LIBRARY
Michigan State
University

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

NOMADIC SETTLEMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA:

A SOCIO-HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL CASE STUDY

presented by

Abdallah Hasan Alabbadi

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Sociology

J. Allan Beegle
Major professor

Date 11 May 1981

O-7639

3 1293 10184 3971

OVERDUE FINES:

MSU LIBRARIES

RETURNING MATERIALS:
Place in book drop to remove this checkout from your record. FINES will be charged if book is returned after the date stamped below.

OCT 21 1989

© Copyright by
Abdallah Hasan Alabbadi
1981

NOMADIC SETTLEMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA: A SOCIO-HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL CASE STUDY

By

Abdallah Hasan Alabbadi

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology

1981

To the memory of As-Sayed Mohammad Tahir Aldabbagh 1891-1959, the pioneer in founding modern education in Saudi Arabia. He was the first to found Tahdheer Albe'athat School in Makkah.

To my mother, Fatimah, whose sacrifice and patience made this work possible, and to my wife Albatoul and my children, Manal, Hani and Mohammad. Together we have shared troubled and joyful times.

ABSTRACT

NOMADIC SETTLEMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA:
A SOCIO-HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL CASE STUDY

By

Abdallah Hasan Alabbadi

This study is a socio-historical investigation into the nomadic problem in Saudi Arabia. The central sociological problem addressed in this research is the adoption of social change on the part of a traditional society. Specifically, the study focuses on the adoption of a sedentary life style by the Bedouins of Saudi Arabia. For some time nomadism in Arabia has been confronted with major economic and social structural problems. The Bedouin, linked closely to a harsh environment, is attempting to resolve the problems that have arisen by trying out a more favorable, sedentary environment. Throughout the historical past, the Bedouins of the Arabian peninsula have proved to be a highly adaptable people and have successfully adjusted their way of life to the changes taking place in the desert.

After characterizing the social and economic structure of Bedouin society, including the hema, the dirah and other aspects of Bedouin life, the economic basis of Bedouin society before the discovery of oil is analyzed. We then examine the tribe as a political unit and the importance of tribal structure before the emergence of the modern Saudi state. Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia, are viewed as being either voluntary/spontaneous or planned/directed. Voluntary settlement refers

to the adoption of sedentary life as a result of free choice. Planned settlement refers to governmental plans and policies designed to encourage Bedouin tribes to settle out. Both types of settlements have been explored, explained, and analyzed. The Saudi government, through different planned projects to settle out the Bedouins, did not have much success. We analyze the reasons behind the failure of these projects.

The voluntary Bedouin settlement is the second type analyzed in this study. Most of the successful Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia and in neighboring Middle Eastern countries are of this type. The bulk are concentrated around urban centers and the oil fields. Several factors have contributed to the success of spontaneous settlements, and at the same time resulted in a decline of nomadism. Environmental factors, such as the drought and the consequent reduction of pastures, as well as the termination of the hema system, have encouraged the Bedouins to settle spontaneously. Political factors such as the growing power of the central government and the loss of the political functions of the tribe were responsible for Bedouins to quit nomadism. Economic factors, including the discovery and development of oil have had a major impact on the Bedouin way of life. Social and cultural factors have also led the Bedouins to join the mass migration to cities and the oil centers. The raiding of caravans or of other tribes for example, formerly a major source of income, has been abolished by the government. The change from camel raising to sheep raising occurred for a number of reasons. First, the camel lost its importance as a means of transportation and as a major food source. Second, the Ministry of Agriculture increased its efforts to provide pump-wells in tribal regions. And third, the

introduction of the truck helped to make the camel obsolete. All the factors mentioned have played a major role in convincing the nomadic people to establish spontaneous settlements.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The educational experience of Third World students in American universities is very challenging. Throughout our stay in East Lansing, Michigan, my wife and children as well as myself had to struggle in order to overcome many problems.

This study would not have been possible without the assistance received from many kind people. I wish to express my deep gratitude to my committee chairman, Professor J. Allan Beegle for his generous assistance, positive suggestions and supervision of this study. The support of Professor and Mrs. Beegle has been a source of encouragement and strength to me and my family during our stay at Michigan State University.

I feel very fortunate to have distinguished members of the Sociology Department as members of my Ph.D. committee. My special thanks and sincere gratitude go to Professors John Useem, Wilbur B. Brookover and James B. McKee for their advice, guidance and valuable suggestions and observations.

I take this opportunity to thank the University of Riyadh for granting me a scholarship to complete my advanced studies. I wish to extend my thanks and gratitude to the former President of Riyadh University, Dr. Abdalaziz Al-Fadda as well as to the current president, Dr. Mansour Al-Turki. I would also like to thank the following: Dr. Abdallah Al-Nafi, Dr. Homud Al-Badr, Dr. Saleh Al-'Adhl, and Dr.

Asad Abdo, all of the Riyadh University. A special expression of thanks is given Dr. Mansour Al-Hazmi, the former Dean of Faculty of Arts at Riyadh University and to my friends and colleagues in the Department of Sociology of the same university.

Finally, I extend my gratitude to the members of the Saudi Arabian Educational Mission in Houston, Texas, especially to Mr. Sobhi Al-Harthy, Mr. Melyhan Al-Thebaity and Mrs. Moreen Wharton.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful

[And say: My Lord! Increase me in knowledge—Qur'ān]

PREFACE

My desire to study Bedouin settlement was less a matter of choice than an effort to pursue my deep interest in Bedouin life going back to 1970 when I worked three years for the Central Planning Organization in Riyadh. During this period, I read a great deal of literature about nomadism, and I conducted research about the Bedouins. When the King Faisal Settlement Project at Haradh in Wadi as-Sahba was completed in 1970 (the project was initiated in the early 1960s), I was offered the job of directing the project by the vice president of the Central Planning Organization. I declined the offer on the basis of my belief that the project was insufficiently studied from a sociological point of view. Ironically, I have recently read two articles by one of the editors of the Riyadh daily newspaper raising many questions about the failure of this project.[1]

Why had this project, considered one of the most ambitious, expensive, and technically best-planned pilot projects in Bedouin settlement ever initiated by the government of Saudi Arabia, collapsed? Why was the largest and most sophisticated agricultural Bedouin settlement turned over to three commercial companies to become a mere commercial project producing milk and milk by-products?

Most Saudi students, when planning to do field work about their country, would be eager to study this project. While many Saudi students wish to utilize their academic training in American universities to better understand their own culture and society, they meet many

problems in conducting applied social research. Although the government of Saudi Arabia encourages students to do their research on their own country, problems develop in doing field research, among them the following:

1. Bureaucratic red tape may slow down the researcher. This is less likely if the research is built on an appraisal of, or is complimentary to the status quo, in which case the researcher can expect some help or cooperation. However, if the research is critical or analytical, the researcher might hear a lot of excuses from the bureaucrats.[2]

2. Saudi Arabia is no exception among the Third World countries to the phenomenon of inadequate and inaccurate information and reliable statistics on population. This is especially true of statistics on Bedouins. It is not difficult for a researcher to locate some information, but at the same time, access problems arise from obstacles in the words, "confidential," "secret," and "top secret" data or information.

3. One of the major problems facing the researcher is that Saudi Arabia represents terra incognita for sociological research. The last decade, however, has witnessed a changing direction toward this field of study. The nomads' romantic way of life, the camel, the fascination of the Arabian desert, and the mystery of the Empty Quarter (Al-Rub'a al Khali) to be sure, have captured the interest of western explorers and social historians, who have generally restricted their efforts to observing the Bedouins' daily life rather than conducting sociological studies about them.[3]

4. Still another problem is the absence of a national research center to collect and classify data and information for the purpose of research. The relatively young universities in Saudi Arabia have not tried to finance generously, or to motivate, scholars to conduct scientific research. The work of the National Center for Science and Technology is very limited and most of its emphasis is on natural science research and related subjects. Since it was founded in 1974, the High Council for Literature and Arts has contributed little to social research.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Fozan Al Saleh Al-Dibybi, Al-Riyadh, No. 4648, Sunday, 10/5/80, p. 24; No. 4661, Monday, 10/27/80, p. 16.

[2]I have written to four top officials in Saudi Arabia requesting some information and data about my research without receiving any reply. Ironically enough, all four persons hold Ph.D. degrees from the United States.

In 1979, I went to my country for the purpose of collecting my data. I visited the Central Planning Organization in which I had worked for three years to check a study cited by a Japanese author in her book Bedouin Village: A Study of a Saudi Arabian People in Transition; the study was entitled Bedouin Policy. This study was done by Stanford researchers in connection with the Saudi Development Plan. However, I was not able to see this study.

[3]The words nomads and Bedouins of Saudi Arabia in this study are used interchangeably.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Some western authors in recent years have joined the mass media in western countries in exploiting to an excessive degree the stereotype of the Arabs. They try to express their anti-feeling by using some Bedouin characteristics in order to establish general propositions about the Arabs. In The Arab Mind, Patai points out "honor in the Arab world is a generic concept which embraces many different forms."[1] In his book, he considers Arabic honor as limited to such aspects as having many sons, preferring some kinds of work over other work, being able to defend oneself against one's enemy, and being generous and hospitable. Patai goes on to indicate that the honor concept in Bedouin society is easily extended to the family and the tribe, as well as to the nation as a whole. The author's purpose in citing these examples from Bedouin society is to assert to the western reader that these are the most important values in the Arab world. He uses such examples as a fabricated story manipulated by the Israeli intelligence agency (Mosad) during the 1967 war, to prove his point. As a manifestation of Bedouin characteristics, he asserts, some Arab leaders had to tell lies about the war, this being a necessary thing in the Arab world. We know that in every Arab-Israeli war, some Arab countries made exaggerated statements about the wars; on the other hand, the Israeli

government never released the exact figures about their casualties either. "It is a mistake, however, to exaggerate the behavioral consequences of Arabism by reifying it into a set of character traits subsumed under appellations such as 'the Arab mind.'"[2] Writers, generally, starting with Burckhardt[3] in the eighteenth century to Polk[4] in the twentieth century, have described the Bedouins as one of the most simple, honest and frank people in the world.

Another western writer, in The Arabs,[5] has cited a completely false story about the Bedouin people in Saudi Arabia. On his way from Jeddah on the Red Sea to Riyadh, the author's car broke down in the middle of his trip. A sheikh of a Bedouin tribe living in that area invited him, along with his companion (a translator originally from Armenia), to be his guests and a lamb was slaughtered for their dinner. Then the sheikh, as a part of his hospitality (according to Kiernan's story), sent his most favored wives to choose from, and when the guest turned the offer down, the sheikh sent his daughters. The author, if he is not writing fiction, should not be allowed to tell such lies about those simple and noble Bedouins who took care of him in the desert. No one, even those having very little knowledge about the Bedouins, would believe such untruths. But the average western student who always hears or reads stereotypical statements about the Arabs, like "white-robed camel riders," "religious fanatics," sheikhs with all that oil, money, and women," might accept the story as fact.

It seems to me that certain writers, especially some very well-known orientalists, like to explore the idea of Bedouin characteristics as the explanation for many aspects of Arab culture in the world today. Unfortunately, we find this famous German orientalist, Caskel, who

participated with Oppenheim in writing Die Beduinen, pointing out that the inheritance of anarchy from the Bedouins and the lack of a "Prussian discipline"[6] causes the Arab people to never unite.

Inspired by misunderstanding, some other western writers developed an image of the Arab Bedouins as irrational people. For these writers, the Bedouins are irresponsible in their use of national resources. The "irrationality" of the Bedouins is sometimes exemplified by their tendency to keep many animals and to try to add even more, which might be destructive of the environment. Each Bedouin tries to increase his number of domesticated animals. Peppelenbosch put it this way, "Unfortunately, he does not necessarily associate this number with the conditions of the pastures. This leads often to harmful overgrazing and may ultimately bring about a serious devastation of the natural pastures."[7] This attitude toward Bedouin society is a misunderstanding, on the part of these writers, of the function of Bedouin economy and political life. There are many reasons for Bedouins having large herds. First, a Bedouin's wealth and social prestige among other tribes depends to a great extent on the size of his herds. Second, the Bedouin believes, from experience with the desert, that too much of a good thing will not last long, and he must therefore prepare for the future. Third, a large herd is a means of building up capital assets and of saving herds in case of droughts and epidemic. The basis of the Bedouin pastoral economy from which the Bedouins gain their livelihood emanates from domesticating a large number of animals. The large herd is something indispensable in desert life.

Background of the Problem

The rapid incorporation of virtually every part of the world into the international political and economic "community," signals the intensification of radical changes in the isolated, exotic tribal communities around the world. The process of modernization is broad and includes a variety of transformations of traditional or pre-modern societies into the types of technology and associated social and economic institutions that characterize the "advanced," economically prosperous, and relatively politically stable societies. Except for the Bedouins, every group, whether villagers or settlers, in Saudi Arabia has been or is being helped through organized assistance programs managed by government agencies. The minimal governmental help the Bedouins have received, whether in the past or the present, has been no more than incidental aid given to ameliorate emergencies. One might think that the nature of governmental help for the Bedouins is really a reflection of the Bedouin's life. The past governmental aid to the Bedouins did not help them much--a condition that seems likely to continue.

During the past several years, the government has given aid to the Bedouins in the form of outright gifts (Ar. Sharha), but naturally such aid helped very few nomadic people. It may have ameliorated the recipients' difficulties in specific places and at specific periods of time, but this help was transitory because: (1) the assistance was introduced to solve only the immediate difficulties, and (2) the Bedouin, full of joy upon receiving the little bit of money, thought that the government would not turn him down if he asked for the same amount next year. The kind of feeling that resulted from the direct gift

influenced the Bedouins' thinking and imagination. In some ways, the negative consequences of the direct gifts, economically speaking, have been greater than their positive consequences.[8]

Nomadic life in Saudi Arabia at present is a source of livelihood for at least an estimated one million persons. They are poor if we compare them with other segments of the Saudi Arabian population, but they seem happy. An outsider sees the Bedouin as suffering much hardship and obtaining very little return for his efforts. But even in his worst days, the Bedouin is proud to fight, not only for the necessities of life, but also to preserve a way of life he believes to be the best and most honorable. One might say that he is fighting to preserve his own history as well as that of all Bedouins. This commitment to preserve and defend his way of life is a significant barrier for the Bedouin in considering the abandonment of nomadic traditions for settlement in villages or cities.

The present Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which covers an area about one-fourth the size of the United States, was created by the late King Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud (1932)[9] from a group of territories that had had little unity since the days of early Islam. Prior to the creation of the Saudi kingdom, the Arabian peninsula was occupied mostly by nomadic people who fought protracted wars among themselves for the purpose of enlarging their territorial domains or increasing their wealth. Such tribal wars were possible in the absence of an effective central government. The country's efforts to establish political unity have always fallen short of achieving the goal. Since prehistoric times, geographical conditions have been a cause of separation and disunity among the various tribes who inhabited the land. The Arabian desert,

which has unique geographical conditions, has been a factor in weakening political development at different times.

Each tribe has its own social system which constitutes social rules defining the individual's relations with the family, the tribe as a social unit, moral rules based on the Quran and the Sonnah (the prophet's sayings and acts) and lastly, economic rules within the family, the tribe and other tribes. Nomadic life is facing a great challenge. Efforts are being made to settle a great proportion of the Bedouins in villages where they can practice agriculture. Even though many thousands still move about throughout the country in a planned and deliberate pattern to take advantage of rain-filled wells and pastures for their herds, about twenty percent of the population live a nomadic life. This percentage is decreasing steadily as young Bedouins obtain education and shift to urban life. Moreover, Bedouin families are settling nowadays on the edges of towns and cities and gradually are becoming integrated into urban society where they adopt new norms and increasingly use new methods of transportation and housing.

In treating the social structure of Bedouin life in Saudi Arabia and future Bedouin settlement, we should raise two questions. First: Is it possible for the nomadic Bedouin, who is not tied to the land by a permanent residence or by ownership, as is the villager (Fellah), to conceive of the alien idea of a "home?" A home, as known by the settlers, would provide the Bedouin with a living and give him protection. In contrast, the way of life for most of the Bedouins of Saudi Arabia values constant movement between their territory and the neighboring friendly lands looking for good grazing. It is not easy for

these nomads to conceive of a sedentary home, practicing the cultivation of crops, or engaging in other activities. The second question to be asked is this: Assuming that the government of Saudi Arabia is serious and willing to provide the capital, technology, and other human resources to settle all the Bedouin tribes, are the Bedouins themselves ready to abandon their way of life and to integrate with the rest of the population? Is it possible to envisage, as a result of such a process, the end of nomadic life in Saudi Arabia?[10] Al Bashir, a Saudi scholar and now a top government official, also expresses the idea that a nomadic livelihood is, by the natural turn of events, vanishing. "Eventually nomadic life in Saudi Arabia will vanish; it will vanish despite all tears shed and false statements declared by those who romanticize nomads."[11]

History of Settlement Projects

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the unifying movement gained recognition by conquest in northern Najd, which is now the central province of modern Saudi Arabia. By 1912, Ibn Saud (the founder of modern Saudi Arabia) was acknowledged ruler of Najd. With the twin aims of creating the basis of a centralized political organization and of reviving the ideals of unitarians, he established the Ikhwan, a religious organization modeled on the Unitarian movement.[12] The Ikhwan (mostly Bedouin tribes) were established in settled oasis colonies known as Hijar settlements, where agriculture was to be the basis of economic life, and most important, the reformed religion was to be the basis of social and spiritual life. Ibn Saud, in his efforts to unite the country and to control the scattered Bedouin

nomads, created the first planned Bedouin settlement in Saudi Arabia at al-Artawiyah, about 180 miles north of Riyadh. About 200 Hijar settlements were established, mainly in Najd, and some of them, like the one just mentioned, expanded to a population of over 10,000. While the major professed aim of the Hijar settlements was to enable the settlers to live a truly religious life, some students of Arabian affairs have stated the purposes of the settlements to be as much military and political as religious. However, it has been said that the tribes were settled partly because close supervision of tribal loyalty to Ibn Saud could be made and partly because a large army could be mobilized from the Hijar on short notice. It is noteworthy that Ibn Saud himself supervised the destruction of some of these Hijar settlements, when they revolted against him in the late 1920s, in order to remove the threats to his authority which these communities represented and to preserve the political unity of his country which had just been achieved.

The second government plan to settle the Bedouins began in 1958 when the Wadi Assarhan project was initiated near the Jordanian border. The primary objective of this project was to provide quick relief for the victims of the drought. At the beginning, the government distributed large amounts of food items, clothing, and money among the Bedouins in that area. The Kingdom's budget of 1960 contained a large amount of money to be distributed among the Bedouins who were eligible for such relief. This kind of relief was terminated in 1961, and the government established an agricultural project instead of giving monetary relief. This decision was made in response to the National Economic

Development Program which clearly stated that the aim of this program was to raise the standard of living of the whole population, settlers and Bedouins alike. With the government concentrating on this agricultural project and with the famous drought that hit the country at that time, the Bedouins did not have any other choice. However, this emphasis on sedentary agriculture went counter to some customs and traditions of the Bedouins. In addition, the Bedouins were not prepared to practice agriculture, and the project was doomed to failure.[13]

The most recent settlement plan to which the government has devoted much effort is the King Faisal Settlement Project at Haradh. The basic objectives of the project are to reclaim 4,000 hectares (around 8,000 acres) of desert land and to settle at least 1,000 Bedouin families on a permanent basis. Other objectives include training Saudi Arabian agricultural experts and extension service workers, and establishing a model farm for experimentation and training of Bedouin settlers. The government allocated over 30 million dollars[14] to convert this desert land into a modern, well-watered agricultural oasis.

Definition and Characteristics of Saudi Arabian Bedouins

This section is devoted to our definition of Bedouins and their attributes. Most of the time words mean different things to different people, especially when they do not have a common medium of communication. Badawah, the Arabic word, is a term used to define a group of people that changes its place of residence periodically according to the seasons of the year. Al-Badawah in Arabic means constant moving,

or not to settle down in a permanent place during the whole year. Some of these groups are forced to change their places of residence from time to time or from season to season looking for good grazing and better weather for their animals. This condition exists among people living in the steppes and in the deserts. Some geographers restrict using this term to the groups who move regularly, but tribes or groups that wander aimlessly without having a territory to return to (such as gypsies or groups that earn their living by hunting and gathering), do not come under this term. Even though it is difficult to prove, there are some people that don't have a permanent residence at all.[15]

The Arabic philologists say that the word Albadu is derived from appearance and from it comes the verb Bada. The latter word means to appear or show, because Bedouins' tents are distinct, conspicuous, and prominent in the desert. Also the Badu do not have fancy houses to hide in as the city people do. Coon defines Badu as "pastoral nomads of Arabian blood, speech, and culture who live in the Arabian Peninsula. Unlike primitive hunting and gathering, pastoral nomadism is a sophisticated system of exploiting land incapable of cultivation." [16]
Morroe Berger, in the Encyclopedia Americana, writes: "Bedouin, a desert and steppe dweller of the Middle East and North Africa." The word is a French translation of the Arabic badawiyin, which literally means, from its root, "people who become visible" (as in an open area).

Now in numerical and economic decline, the few million who still remain follow regular routes in their wanderings. "Bedouins are Arab and Muslim, but the Bedouin nomads of North Africa, mainly Berbers by origin, differ from those of the eastern Arab World."[17] By

definition, then, a Bedouin in this study is the nomad who has the following characteristics:

1. Lives in a tent (Ar. Bayt Sha'ar) and moves from place to place looking for grazing for his camels and sheep.

2. Earns most of his living from raising camels or sheep.

3. Believes that kinship or blood relationship is the basis of community in social and political life.

People who go hunting, however, or go for pleasure in the desert once or more every year, and people who live permanently in the cities or villages and go to spend a couple months in the desert (Ar. albar) are excluded from this definition, even though some of them might come from Bedouin origin.

The Problem Focus

Nomads have held the attention of western writers for a very long time, and it is possible to compile a very long bibliography concerning nomadic peoples in several languages. However, the simple truth is that very little is known about human behavior in nomadic societies. Certainly much of what passes for knowledge about Arabia's Bedouins is in fact fiction, or quite misleading. In particular, very little is known about the Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia. The theme of Bedouin settlement is of importance to the Saudi Arabian government, which has never ignored its Bedouin population. The social dilemma facing the government, after spending many million dollars in projects which have failed, is to come up with a general system capable of providing the Bedouins with the necessary help to settle out and to integrate them into the whole society. If the Bedouins wish to abandon

their nomadic way of life, then we will examine the extent to which their social and economic traditions and their cultural heritage must undergo modification. We also wish to understand how these changes would affect the economic position of the settlers. The Bedouin settlement process has not been conceptualized in much of the literature on nomadism. The process of settling the Bedouins in Arabia has been studied much less than has the Bedouin way of life. Little attention has been paid to the impact of settlement on the Bedouins themselves, and on the social and economic changes resulting from Bedouin settlement patterns.

The central sociological problem addressed in this research is the adoption of social changes on the part of a traditional society. Specifically, the focus is the adoption of a sedentary life by the Bedouins of Saudi Arabia. Our interest centers on two types of "settling out" on the part of Bedouins. The first is voluntary, that is, the adoption of sedentary life as a consequence of free choice. The second is involuntary, or governmental attempts to create sedentary communities of Bedouins. In the Arabic language, Isteetan and tawteen suggest the distinction just made. The former word meaning "to settle" reflects the internal power within Bedouin society that induces them to become sedentary. The latter expression "to settle" denotes the existence of an external force leading to settlement.

The sociological problem is one in which two social systems, each with its own social structure and value orientation, come into contact with and achieve or fail to achieve socio-cultural linkage. In the case of voluntary settling-out, the two systems (the dominant society and the Bedouins' society) have been in contact and have

interacted, but the settling out was not a consequence of directed action. In the case of government programs, the Saudi government is a change agent seeking to introduce change into the target system, the nomadic Bedouins. The Saudi government, dominant in the sense of power and authority, is viewed as seeking to "modernize" Bedouin society and otherwise incorporate minority elements into the ascendant social system.

This study seeks to explore several hypotheses concerning the conditions leading to the voluntary abandonment of nomadic life. It also seeks to explore hypotheses concerning the divergent structure and value orientation of the government and the Bedouin's social systems. Hypotheses will be developed concerning the degree of success or failure in relation to planning objectives and variations in the structure of settlement patterns. This study also seeks to attempt a sociological analysis of nomadic settlement, the resultant settlement process and pattern in one country, Saudi Arabia.

Hypotheses

As suggested in the literature review (chapter 3), the hypotheses relate to two sets of prevailing circumstances in Bedouin settlement. The first set is derived from Isteetan or the internal power within Bedouin society that induces them to settle--such change is termed "immanent change" by Rogers and Burdge, 1951. In this instance, the two relevant systems are the Bedouins involved in settling and the dominant Saudi society. It is assumed that the two systems have been in communication and that each possesses a social structure and value orientation that is unique to each system, at least in some respects.

The second set of hypotheses is rooted in tawteen or a settling out due to some external force. Rogers and Burdge call this type "directed change." In this instance, particular tribes or groups of Bedouins are viewed as the target system while the government of Saudi Arabia is the change agent system. Again, each system possesses structure and objectives that are not fully shared by the two systems.

The first set of hypotheses relate to voluntary settling (that is, Isteetan), and derive from an examination of existing literature, from personal experience, or from existing theory related to social change.

1. The rate of voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins has increased as Saudi Arabia itself becomes more modernized.

2. The voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins is characterized by an intermediate stage of semi-nomadism.

3. Necessary pre-conditions for agricultural-based voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins are a reliable water supply, arable plots for agricultural production, and supplementary grazing lands.

4. The voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins (a) occurs primarily within their own tribal territories and (b) primarily at a short distance from their traditional nomadic range.

Hijar settlements (composed of one or a few tribes and usually located apart from established Saudi centers) and Hilal settlements (composed of many tribes and usually located near urban centers) are expected to differ in numerous ways. It is hypothesized that:

5. Hijar, in contrast to Hilal settlements, are characterized by:

    a. less contact and interaction with Saudi Society,

b. more complete development of an independent structure and sustenance organization; and

c. more successful boundary maintenance (maintenance of "old ways" and resistance to elements of the dominant society).

The second group of hypotheses concern outside agency plans to influence settlement (that is tawteen). The following hypotheses are based upon the literature, personal experience, and theory related to change.

1. Saudi Arabian programs to settle nomadic Bedouins have failed to succeed, in part due to failure of inter-system communication and failure by government to secure the legitimization of the program by tribal leaders.

2. Saudi Arabian programs to settle nomadic Bedouins have failed to succeed, in part due to failure by government to teach Bedouins the fundamentals of sedentary agriculture and living.

3. Governmental goals to be achieved through the settlement of Bedouins have changed markedly through time; at no time have these goals been formulated jointly by governmental personnel and Bedouin sheikhs.

Methodology and Data Collection

This study is a qualitative one relying heavily on the existing literature, both in Arabic and English. In addition to published work, data on the nomadic settlement process in the Arabian peninsula was obtained through personal observation in the field.

Data were obtained from various published and unpublished sources in Arabic and in English. Basic material for this study was visits to a number of libraries, including the Central Planning Organization library, Institute of Public Administration library, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor in Saudi Arabia. Additional

sources included the Aramco library in Dhahran, the Saudi Arabian Statistical Yearbooks, and The Arab League and United Nations' reports and documents. Relevant unpublished works such as Ph.D. dissertations about nomadism in general and in Arabia in particular have been consulted. Several field work visits for the purpose of observing Bedouin phenomena were made to Saudi Arabia in the past few years.

This dissertation is organized into nine chapters. The introductory chapter has stated the problem focus, the hypotheses and the nature of the data base. The second chapter provides an introductory survey of modern Saudi Arabia--its geographic, socio-economic, and political setting. Chapter 3 is devoted to a review of selected literature dealing with Bedouins and Bedouinism in Saudi Arabia. This is followed by a description of Bedouins in Saudi Arabia including an appraisal of estimated numbers, and description of their social structural, tribal territory, economic base, and way of life. The next three chapters (5, 6, and 7) are devoted successively to the early Bedouin settlements (Hijar, 1912-1930), to recent Bedouin settlements, 1938-1970, and finally to the King Faisal Model Settlement project at Haradh. Chapter 8 is devoted to a consideration of the guiding hypotheses in light of the long and complex history of Bedouin settlement in Saudi Arabia. Finally, chapter 9 is devoted to a brief summary and conclusion.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), p. 90.

[2] Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics (New Haven and London: Yale University Press), p. 52.

[3] John L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1967).

[4] William Polk. Passing Brave (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973).

[5] Thomas Kiernan, The Arabs (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1975), pp. 107-112.

[6] Warner Caskel, "The Bedouinization of Arabia," in Studies in Islamic Cultural History, G. E. Von Grunebaum, ed., Memoir No. 76. The American Anthropological Assoc. 56, (April 1954), pp. 36-46.

[7] P. G. N. Peppelenbosch, "Nomadism on the Arabian Peninsula," Tijdschrift Voor Econ. En Soc. Geografie 59:6 (November-December 1968), pp. 335-346.

[8] F. Bashir, The Case of Nomadism: To Settle or Not to Settle (Riyadh: Central Planning Organization, 1969), pp. 1-3. This report published in Arabic by the author in Al-Jazeerah Newspaper, No. 2897, 5 July 1980, pp. 1-3 in The Malaf.

[9] His full name is Abdul-Aziz Ibn Abdual Rahman Alfaisal Al Saud the founder of Modern Saudi Arabia. Most writers refer to him as Ibn Saud, and this abbreviation will be used here and throughout this study.

[10] A. S. Helaissi, "The Bedouins and Tribal Life in Saudi Arabia," International Social Science Journal 11:4 (1959), pp. 532-538.

[11] F. Bashir, op. cit., p. 1.

[12] I prefer to use the term Unitarian movement instead of Wahhabi movement, even though the latter term is widely used by Westerners and

some Easterners as well. Shaikh Mohammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab (for whom the movement is named) called for the return to true Islam, which must follow the prophet Mohammad's direction. See George Rentz, Muhammad Ibn Abdal-Wahhab (1703-1792 and the Beginning of the Unitarian Empire in Arabia (Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley: University of California, 1948). To the best of my knowledge this is the best resource written in English about the subject.

[13]Delegation of Saudi Arabia, in Ri'ayat al-Badu Wa-Tahdeeruhum Watawtinuhum ('Sedentarization and Organization of the Bedouins') vol. 1 (Cairo: Dar attib'ah al-Hadithah, 1965), pp. 442-443.

[14]Uhlig Dieter, "King Faisal Settlement Project, Haradh/Saudi Arabia," (Riyadh: Saudi Arabia: Wakuti Consulting Co., n.d.).

[15]Yosef Tony, Dictionary of Geographical Terms (Cairo: Dar Alfikr Alarabi, 1964), p. 73.

[16]Carleton S. Coon, "Badu," in The Encyclopedia of Islam, H.A.R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers ed., (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960 2nd edition) p. 872.

[17]Morroe Berger, "Bedouin" in The Encyclopedia Americana, International Editions, Vol. 3, 1979, p. 435. See also his article "Near Eastern Society 1, The Islamic Countries" in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 11, ed. David L. Sills (New York: The Macmillan Co. and The Free Press, 1968), pp. 90-101.

[18]Everett M. Rogers and Rabel J. Burdge, Social Change in Rural Societies (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972).

CHAPTER II

MODERN SAUDI ARABIA: A BRIEF BACKGROUND

Introduction

Saudi Arabia became known to the west during the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century through western travelers who were fascinated with the Empty Quarter and who stressed the challenge of desert living and the romantic life of the Bedouins. In the second half of the twentieth century, Saudi Arabia is known to the west for the wealth provided by the oil industry, for the leisurely life of its rulers, and for the backwardness of its people. In the last decade, the sudden wealth of the country has begun to slowly show some signs of reshaping the society, especially when the government started to channel some oil revenue into social and economic development. Saudi Arabia is still viewed by western scholars as one of the developing countries in the Middle East, primarily because its traditional society remained isolated from the modern world until the last two decades.[1]

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as it became known officially in 1932, was created as a result of the conquest of the tribes in Najd, Al-Hasa and Asir and the defeat of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Hejaz between 1902 and 1930, by the late King Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdul Rahman Al-Saud (1881-1953). Before the discovery of oil in 1930, Saudi Arabia was not open to western influence, but in the last decade the

country has become one of the richest and largest oil producing countries in the world. In the past few years, the country has undergone extremely rapid social and economic modernization. Due to the increasing demand for oil, Saudi Arabia is becoming more and more a power in international relations.

Geographical Setting

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia covers most of the Arabian Peninsula which is located in southwestern Asia. It is a desert country with an official estimated area of 865,000 square miles (2,200,000 square kilometers) or about one-third the size of the Continental United States. It is bounded on three sides by the sea, on the east by the Gulf of Oman and the Persian (Arabian Gulf), on the west by the Red Sea, and on the south by the Indian Ocean. The people of the country generally call it Jazirat al-Arab or the "Isle of the Arabs," using the word jazirah, which is applied to peninsular as well as to insular areas. The Great Nafud in the north is an expanse of sand covering about 22,000 square miles and consisting of rolling sand dunes that support only sparse vegetation. The Nafud is such an effective desert barrier that it cuts off Saudi Arabia from the rest of Continental Asia, with the result that the land is of an insular character.

Geographically, Saudi Arabia contains nine distinct regions.[2] First, the gulf coastal region stretches from Kuwait to the United Arab Emirates and consists of shallow coast, salt flat (sabkhah) and flat gravel plains. The second region, called the Dahna, is an 800 mile long strip of desert stretching across the west side of Arabia from the Great Nafud to the Empty Quarter. The sands of this region

are reddish in color and several species of grazing plants are found there. The Dahna is a favorite grazing area for the Bedouins in winter and spring. The Dahna is separated from the coast by the third region, a 100 mile wide plain of hard rock, known as the Summa Plateau. The Ghawar oil field, the largest in Saudi Arabia, is in the middle of this arid, barren plateau. The escarpment area engulfing the Najd is the fourth geographic region in Saudi Arabia. The 500 mile long Tuwaiq escarpment is the largest in the region. The fifth region, a vast expanse of gravel and rock plains, extends from the Great Nafud Desert in the north to the borders of Jordan and Iraq. This area cuts across three countries and makes up a part of what is known as the Syrian Desert. The great sand areas constitute the sixth region. These desert areas encompass hundreds of thousands of square miles and include such legendary deserts as the Great Nafud in the north and the Empty Quarter in the south. Explorers such as Bertram Thomas, H. St. John, B. Philby and Wilfred Thesiger acquired lasting fame as a result of their travels through the Empty Quarter. The western mountains and the central plateau immediately to the east of these mountains are the seventh and eighth geographic regions. This area called Tihamah sometimes is divided into Tihamat Al-Hijaz, Tihamat Asir and Tihamat Al-Yaman. To the south of these two regions lie the mountains of southern Arabia, which separate Saudi Arabia from the Republic of North Yemen and the People's Republic of South Yemen, and from the Dhufar region of Sultanate of Oman. These mountains comprise the ninth region. These regions vary in elevation from 3,000 feet in the central plateau to more than 10,000 feet in the highest southern elevations. Dozens of towns and villages are located in the oases found here, and fertile land lies on the

mountain slopes and in the valleys. It is here that the government has the ambition and high hope to develop a modern agricultural system.

There are no rivers in Saudi Arabia, but there are many valleys (Arabic: wadi). These wadis carry the floods (sail) after the rains occurring from some days or weeks of the year. The longest wadi in the country is Wadi Al-Rummah, which has a total length of 600 kilometers and originates near Al-Madinah and runs northeastward through the region of Al-Qasim to the Shatt Al-Arab. This wadi supports a large settled population in the Qasim region like the towns of Alrass, Unayzah, and Buraydah. The important wadi in Najd is Wadi Hanifah which runs in a southeasterly direction. The well known palm groves of Riyadh and actually those of the whole district of Al-Arid are entirely due to subsoil damage.[3] The most important wadis in the Hijaz are Bishah, Ranyah, and Tathlith. It is noteworthy here to point out that the wadis in Saudi Arabia have played a major role in determining land routes and lines of communication throughout the centuries. Their beds have from time immemorial served as natural routes for traders, travelers, explorers, Bedouins, and pilgrims. In a country in which most of its land is desert and arid, it is very important to have water along its traveled routes.

Human Setting

Saudi Arabia is no exception among most of the third world countries in regard to the common phenomenon of inadequate information. For example, there is uncertainty over the population figures and uncertainty as to information relating to the labor force. As of 1980, since a national census had never been taken, demographic information



Figure 1. Physical features of Saudi Arabia.

is scanty and questionable. Population estimates range from 3 to 8 million. The Saudi government has used various estimates ranging from 6 million to 15 million. Authoritative foreign sources, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), accept 5 to 5-1/2 million as a reasonable estimate.

In 1962-63 the Department of General Statistics of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy undertook a comprehensive survey of the population of five cities: Jiddah, Makkah, al Madinah, Taif, and Riyadh. As a result of this survey and later investigations, government statisticians estimated the population at about 3.3 million, but the government has not accepted this figure. In fact, the government officially repudiated the 1962-63 figures, results of the only census taken, as being too modest. Without a precise population census, a researcher faces difficulty in obtaining any general agreement as to the estimated population, and finds it even more difficult to determine the proportion of Bedouins in the total population. Here again, he must rely on the estimates of various sources. I think that one problem causing disagreement among different sources as to the percentage of Bedouins in Saudi Arabia is that those who make the estimates do not define precisely what they mean by Bedouins. I cite two examples. First, the 1970 United Nations Yearbook described the population of Saudi Arabia as 85-90 percent Bedouins which was, of course, an inaccurate estimate. Second, a recently published study (originally a Ph.D. dissertation from Duke University) suggests that "it is probably safe to assume that fewer than 10 percent of the population is Bedouin and that their number decreases at a rate of 2 percent a year."[4]

The population of Saudi Arabia is mostly Arab and completely Muslim. Roughly 25 percent of the population are Bedouins who live in tribal organization, 25 percent are settled cultivators, and the remaining 50 percent are urban dwellers who live in the growing cities. Approximately one-third are employed in agriculture, one-third in public service, and one-fourth in trade, finance, transportation and services. Only four percent are employed in the oil industry.[5] Available statistics indicate that during the last decade about 25 percent of the population live in cities within a population of 20,000 people, 25 percent in towns of 1,000 to 19,999, and the remaining 50 percent live in villages of less than 1,000.[6]

Social and Cultural Setting

Although Saudi Arabian society is undergoing some social changes (especially after the discovery of oil), it still retains an essentially traditional character. The tribe is the main unit of social organization in the country. Kinship ties and recognition of mutual obligations within the kin group are principal norms in Saudi Arabian social organization. The family is the center of the social structure and loyalty to the family overshadows all other obligations. Individual members participate in major family decisions, but the final answer to a question rests in the hands of the father, or the head of the family. Women are increasingly being consulted in the decision-making process. Bedouin women have a more influential role in the affairs of the family than their sisters in the city. The basic family is the extended family with descent traced through the paternal line. An individual's well-being is the responsibility of the whole family,

and the family's well-being is the individual's utmost concern. If the head of a household dies, his family is absorbed into the larger family group. The older children of the deceased usually join the household of the paternal grandfather, or that of the oldest surviving brother. The widow may stay in the husband's family or she may return to her own family, in which case she takes the younger children with her. Final responsibility for the individual members of the family does not necessarily rest with the patriarch. It is not unusual for a more distant relative to take in members of a family.[7]

Administrative Districts

The country was divided into eight major districts during the King Abdul Aziz regime. Each district is ruled by a governor (Amir) and all cities, villages, and Bedouin areas of the district come under his jurisdiction. During King Faisal's regime there was an extensive study done concerning the country's districts with consultation from British expers, but this study has never been published. The districts are as follows:

1. Al-Hejaz was a Hashimate Kingdom until its fall at the hands of King Abdul-Aziz in 1924-25. The Hejaz includes most of the western part of Saudi Arabia, and sometimes it is called the western province, which contains Makkah, Al-Madinah, Taif, and Jeddah. Some of the Arab tribes that live in the Hejaz are: Harb, Juhaynah, Hudhayl, and Utaybah al-Hejaz.

2. Najd is the largest region in the peninsula, which in Arabic is called galb al-jazierah, the heart of the peninsula. It extends from the end of the Empty Quarter in the south to Qirayyat Almelh in the north. This area covers about 600,000 square miles. Najd contains Riyadh, the capital city of the country. Alkharj, Wadi al-Dawaser, and al-Aflaj are areas and cities in this region. Some of the tribes living in Najd are: Subay, Gahtan Najd and Utaybah Najd.

3. Al-Ahsa is the richest region in the country because of its oil and agricultural potential. In the old time it was called Hajr but its name now comes from the oasis of al-Ahsa. The main cities in this region include Dammam, Dhahran, al-Khobar, Qatif Oasis, and Tarout Island. Some of the Bedouin tribes who live in this district are: Al-Ujman, Bani Khalid, Bani Hajir, Al-Murrah, and Al Mansir.

4. Al-Shamal (north). This district lies north of Hejaz and the principal towns include Tabuk, Al-jawf, Sakaka, Badanah, and Turaif. Some of the tribes living in this part of Saudi Arabia are: Anazah, Al-Huwaytat, al-Shararat, and Bani Atiyah.

5. Asir runs along the lower Red Sea coast to the border of Yemen. In the Asir area, Jazan, a town on the Red Sea just north of Yemen, is the capital of the low-lying coastal district of Tihamah. Abha, some 8,000 feet above sea level, is the capital of the highland district of Asir proper.[8] This part has more rain than any other part of the country due to the mountains bounding this district which force the winds coming from the west upward resulting in the release of sufficient rainfall. The average rate of rainfall does not exceed four inches per year in most of the country, but Asir receives more than ten inches of rain per year.

6. Al-Qasim district is located in the northern part of Najd. Before the discovery of oil, this region had a very well-known trade with foreign countries, especially India and Egypt. The Qasim with an abundant water supply and a cooler climate is a potential agriculture area. The district is surrounded by a number of tribes such as Mutayr, Alujman, and Anazah, but a great proportion of the people in the central part of the district are now and always have been sedentary.

7. Jabal Shammar is in the northern part of Najd, and takes the name from one of the most powerful tribes of the north. The principal city in this region is Hayl, the domain of the House of Al-Rashid, which during the second half of the century contended with Al-Saud for control over the interior of the Arabian Peninsula. The Shammar tribe predominates in most of this district.

8. South district is the name given the low-lying central areas of Tihamah coming down from Asir's mountains. The main cities of this district are Jazan, a sea port

on the Red Sea, Abu Arish, and Farasan Island.

Political and Economic Setting

In discussing the country's political setting, we should bear in mind that Saudi Arabia has never been occupied by a colonial power. Saudi Arabia is a conservative monarchy ruled by a king whose power derives from a large royal family, an influential group of religious ulama, and the support of tribal chiefs. The constitutional basis of the government is manifested in Islamic law. This is clear in King Faisal's reply to any question on this matter in the following way:

> A constitution, what for? The Koran is the oldest and most efficient constitution in the world. Elections, a parliament? After the unfortunate experiments which have been attempted in neighboring countries, it is better to forget all about it. Believe me, Islam is a sufficiently flexible and far-sighted religion to ensure the happiness of our people.[9]

Both King Abdul Aziz and King Faisal have ruled the people in the same way. The legitimacy of their rule was based on religion as well as charisma.[10] Despite the economic and social modernization now taking place in the country, the political structure of the government remains the same except that a new group, the technocrats, now join the royal family, the ulama, and the tribal chiefs in making decisions. The allocation of values, economic, political, and/or social, is made by "tiny minorities," or an elite.[11]

The idea of the ruling elite is not new. Mosca, in The Ruling Class, points out:

> In all societies--from societies that are very meagerly developed and have barely attained the dawnings of civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies--two classes of people appear--a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always

> the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, or less arbitrary and violent.[12]

Pareto also talked about the universality of elitism: "Every people is governed by an elite, by a chosen element of the population."[13] The power of the ruling class in the country comes from the positions they hold in the political structure which gives them control over the political, economic, and social activities of the country. Mills pointed out that: "To be celebrated, to be wealthy, to have power, requires access fo major institutions, for the institutional positions men occupy determine in large part their chances to have and to hold these valued experiences."[14] The ruling elites of Saudi Arabia are found in special classes.

> The upper class in Saudi Arabia today still consists almost entirely of the royal family of the House of Saud (al Saud) and its collateral branches. A few leading tribal Shyakhs and top "ulama" [religious learned men] from the Alshaykh family can also be considered upper class, along with a handful of wealthy members of successful merchant families who have attained an upper class lifestyle. But these latter three groups form the lower stratum of the upper class.[15]

Saudi Arabia's climate and vast arid desert have affected her economic condition through the ages. Throughout history, the economy of Saudi Arabia has been dominated by the extreme aridity of the greater part of the peninsula. Some four-fifths of the area receives less than 5 inches of rain a year, an amount insufficient for any form of cultivation. In fact, during the centuries, from the beginning of Islam up to the discovery of oil, there was little significant change in economic and social life of the Arabian peninsula. Pastoral

activities remained the basis of Saudi Arabia's economy, with the income of the bulk of the population rarely exceeding subsistence level. In 1945 the income of the kingdom was less than £ 5 million, mainly from the pilgrim traffic to Makkah and Al-Madinah and even this was unstable and depended on uncontrollable circumstances outside Arabia.[16]

Ibn Saud, with advice from Philby, gave a concession in 1933 to the Standard Oil Company of California to discover oil resources in the eastern region of the country. He gave another concession in 1934 to a Canadian mining company to explore and develop the mineral resources of the Hejaz at Dhalam.[17] Commercial production of oil in Damman began in September 1938, with shipment by barge to Bahrein for refining.[18] But Dr. F. Badr in his dissertation argues that it was not until 1948 that oil revenues constituted a "mighty spending power"[19] that shocked the stationary economy of Saudi Arabia. The economic implications of the rising revenues in oil open the way for more social and economic changes. The Development Plan of 1970-1975 was the first attempt by the government to provide a comprehensive approach to economic development in the country. The general objectives of this plan were to maintain Saudi Arabia's "religious and moral values, and to raise the living standards and welfare of its people, while providing for national security and maintaining economic and social stability."[20] The plan can best be seen as an attempt by the government to rationalize and modernize the economic basis of the country, alongside the attempt in the 1960s to modernize the administration.[21] In the second Five Year Development Plan (1975-1980), the government allocated $142 billion to carry out the plan. The objectives were broader and may be expressed in the following goals:

1. Maintain the religious and moral values of Islam;

2. Maintain a high rate of economic growth by developing economic resources, maximizing earnings from oil over the long term, and conserving depletable resources;

3. Reduce economic dependence on export of crude oil;

4. Develop human resources by education, training, and raising standards of health;

5. Increase the well-being of all groups within the society and foster social stability under circumstances of rapid social change; and

6. Develop the physical infrastructure to support achievement of the above goals.[22]

In the Third Five-Year Development Plan (1980-1985), the Saudi Arabian government has allocated $285 billion to spend during the coming five years, hoping that it might contribute to the modernization of the country. The new plan seems to be designed as a readjustment of the means to achieve the major goals set out in the second plan, based upon the problems and constraints that arose from the first and second plan. The overall thrust in the third plan remains the diversification of national income and the freeing of the country from overdependence on revenue from oil, which still forms the bulk of the national economy. The diversification of national income will come primarily from implementation of petrochemical projects located in the new industrial cities of Jubail in the Eastern Province and Yanbua in the Western Province. But to diversify, in my opinion, does not mean the establishment of new industries solely dependent on oil. Every time that Saudi Arabia increases its production of crude oil to offset a cut made by another oil producing country, (for example, when the war broke out between Iran and Iraq, Saudi Arabia increased its

production to more than 10 million barrels a day). This action seems to contradict the stated national objective of conserving depletable resources. Also, the policy of the country to spend many billions of riyals on establishing industries based on oil contradicts the third national objective in both plans, namely, to reduce economic dependence on oil exports. The new plan places special emphasis on developing Saudi Arabia's manpower in order to replace foreign workers to the maximum extent possible. Halliday estimated the number of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia in 1980 at 1.2 million workers.[23]

FOOTNOTES

[1]Tareq Y. Ismael, Governments and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1970), p. 353.

[2]Arabian American Oil Company, Aramco Handbook: Oil and the Middle East (Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 1968), pp. 208-219.

[3]Shaikh Inayatullah, Geographical Factors in Arabian Life and History (Sh. M. Ashraf: Lahore, 1942), p. 19.

[4]Fouad Al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development (London: Stacey International, 1978), p. 13.

[5]Edmund Asfour, "Saudi Arabia," in The Middle East: A Handbook, Michael Adams, ed. (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 271-281; and The Middle East and North Africa: 1974-1975 (London: Europe Publications, Ltd., 1974), pp. 587-608.

[6]Ramon Knauerhase, "Saudi Arabia's Economy at the Beginning of the 1970's," Middle East Journal, Spring 1974, p. 127.

[7]Ramon Knauerhase, The Saudi Arabian Economy (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 70.

[8]Arabian American Oil Company, op. cit., p. 178.

[9]Gerald de Gaury, Faisal, Biography of a Great King (London: Arthur Barker, 1974), p. 148.

[10]See Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, S. N. Eisenstadt, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977) and Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber, An Intellectual Portrait (New York: Anchor Books, 1962).

[11]Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1976).

[12]Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, translated by Hannah Kahn (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1939), p. 50.

[13]Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1935), p. 246.

[14]C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 9.

[15]William Rugh, "Emergence of a New Middle Class in Saudi Arabia," The Middle East Journal 27, No. 1 (Winter 1973), p. 7. See also, James A. Bill, "Class Analysis and the Dialectics of Modernization in the Middle East," International Journal of Middle East Studies 3, No. 4 (October 1972), pp. 417-434; Manfred W. Wenner, "Saudi Arabia: Survival of Traditional Elites," in Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East, Frank Tachau, ed. (Boston: Shenkman Publishing Co., Inc., 1975), pp. 157-191; and George Lenczowski, Political Elites in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975).

[16]Galal A. Amin, The Modernization of Poverty (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), p. 2.

[17]H. St. John, B. Philby, Arabian Oil Ventures (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1964).

[18]Ramond F. Mikesell and Hollis B. Chenery, Arabian Oil: America's Stake in the Middle East (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1949), p. 61.

[19]Fayez Badr, Development Planning in Saudi Arabia: A Multi-Dimensional Study (Ph.D. dissertation, Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1968), p. 77.

[20]Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, Second Development Plan 1395/1400 A.H. [1975-1980 A.D.] (Jeddah: Dar Okaz, 1975, p. 4.

[21]Helen Lackner, A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (London: Ithaca Press, 1978), p. 140.

[22]United States-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation, Summary of Saudi Arabian Five-Year Development Plan (1975-1980 (Washington, D.C.: The Department of the Treasury, 23 October 1975), pp. 1-2.

[23]Fred Halliday, "Migration and Labor Force in Oil Producing Countries of the Middle East," Journal of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies Vol. 4, No. 13 (Kuwait University, January 1978), p. 59.

CHAPTER III

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The literature relevant to the problems to be investigated in this study is divided into three parts. The first part attempts to give historical background concerning the social structure, social system, manners and customs of the Bedouins, especially those in the Arabian peninsula. In this part, the most important and relevant works by western writers will be reviewed. As mentioned before, the Bedouins' way of life, the desert with camels, and the fantasy of the Empty Quarter have attracted many western writers. The second part attempts a brief survey of literature originating in diverse disciplines describing and characterizing the Bedouins and their social organization. In this part, the focus will be on the major contributions concerning the Bedouins by Arab writers. The third part recognizes a vast literature on the impact of modernization on traditional societies and on the appropriateness of social system theory and the change process.

Western Literature on the Bedouins

What most anthropologists in the 1940s and 1950s called the major characteristic of Bedouins, segmentary lineage systems (for instance, Bacon; Murphy and Kasdan),[1] is clearly brought out in Robertson Smith's book, Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia.[2] In his second book, Smith postulates a distinctive pastoral religion in which groups "transferred to their herds the notions of sanctity and kinship which formerly belonged to species of wild animals." The result, according

to Smith, is "the way was opened for the formation of religious and political communities larger than the old totem kind."[3]

The mystery and the romance of the Arabian peninsula is a western conception that has been widely diffused by English explorers such as Burton, Doughty and Palgrave in the nineteenth century, and by Lawrence, Dickson, Bell, Glubb, Philby and Thesiger in the twentieth century. Other European travellers have contributed to the literature by recording the daily life of the Bedouins. The writers include Niebuhr, Guarmani, Burckhardt, Musil and Oppenheim. Many of the older as well as newer books about Bedouins deal with the racial history of the nomad, with descriptions of the manners and customs. These works treat mainly the nature of nomadism, the Bedouins' social system, the Bedouins' mode of life, political organization, economic activities, and problems. Burton's most important work, published in 1855, is an account of his penetration of Makkah and Al-Madinah, the holy cities of Arabia. His contact with Bedouins on the outskirts of Al-Madinah led him to question the meaning of civilization. The desert Bedouins as a people were not affected, Burton thought, with such "weeds of civilized growth" as "vulgarity, affection, awkwardness and embarrassment."[4] He describes Bedouins' manners as free and simple.

Burckhardt and Doughty describe the Bedouins as desert dwellers who lead an unsettled life and who are characterized by their constant movement and change of dwelling place. In Burckhardt's work published in 1831, we find an enumeration of the Bedouin tribes, their different local organizations, and their military force. He also gives an account of their unique manners, customs and institutions and their arts, dress and many other particulars. In the second part of his

work, Burckhardt compiled a precise history of the Wahhabys from original information, both written and oral. The account traces the Wahhabys from their first appearance in the late nineteenth century as reformers through all their wars with the Turks and other Arabs. Burckhardt reveals his view of the Bedouins in the following passage: "Whatever preference I might give in general to the European character, yet I was soon obliged to acknowledge, on seeing the Bedouins, that, with all their faults, they were one of the noblest nations with which I ever had an opportunity of becoming acquainted."[5]

Doughty's account of Bedouin life in Arabia in 1888 is well worth mentioning at this point. In the countries he visited, the tribes were suspicious of his intentions and motives. He wrote: "El-Beduw mayeta abun, toil not (say they), that is not bodily; but their spirits are made weary with incessant apprehension of their enemies, and their flesh with continual thirst and hunger . . . The nomad's fantasy is high, and that is ever clothed in religion."[6] Doughty suffered a series of health problems and additional "indignities and persecution" at the hands of some Arabians.[7]

The western writer most critical of the Bedouins is the controversial traveller, Palgrave. According to his observations, published in 1883, "vigorous governments have for years pressed on the Bedouins with a rod of iron, and reduced them to their normal condition, that of mere camel-drivers, and nothing more . . . The Bedouin does not fight for his home, for he has none; not for his country, that is anywhere; not for his religion, he owns and cares for none."[8] The implication, of course, is that since these are the causes for which most

Europeans fight, everyone else must find in them reasons for violence. But Palgrave evidently forgot that the Bedouin fights to protect his tribe, his people, his herds, and his guests and companions when they travel with him.

Musil's classic work should be mentioned although it is not relevant to our present discussion. This book, published in 1928, is an exhaustive account of the Rwala tribe, the most powerful of the tribes belonging to the Northern Anazah group.[9]

Among more recent authors, we find H. R. P. Dickson, who was an influential English political agent in Kuwait, assigned to protect British interests in the Middle East. His book, Kuwait and Her Neighbors, (1949) contains much factual data as well as much amusing information about the way of life of the people of Kuwait and the adjacent parts of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. His accounts and descriptions form a valuable contribution to the social history of the region prior to the discovery of oil. Much of his second book, The Arab of the Desert, describes in detail the domestic and material life of the Bedouins. There are beautiful drawings and explanations of tents, camels, saddles, clothing and jewelry as well as translations of Bedouin tales, riddles and songs. As many critics of this book point out, the author fails to deal in any depth with the social and economic changes taking place at that time in the Arabian peninsula as a whole and Kuwait in particular. Further, the writer fails to discuss the impact of the new oil industry on the area, and the rapid penetration of western innovations and new ideas into Arabia. Some trace this in part to the fact that Dickson was a political agent in Kuwait which placed constraints upon

his freedom to write on all matters. Also, experiences may have led him to deplore the disruptions of Bedouins' life caused by the materialism following the impact of western habits.[10]

For Raswan, the lure of the Arab horse was the main reason that he went to live among the inhabitants of the Black Tents. In order to assimilate the habits and customs of the Bedouins, it was important for him to conform to their way of life.[11] Some of the main contributors to the literature on nomadism are geographers and anthropologists. Among them, Daryll Forde has given a detailed and systematic treatment of pastoral groups.[12] Capot-Rey observes nomadism not only as a way of life, but also as a form of social organization based on ties of family and allegiance. Although the nomadic tribes have sometimes been regimented and incorporated into a state like the Sherifian Empire, or have been linked to a religious movement like that of the Senusi in Libya, Capot-Rey concludes that: "Nomadism has always been linked, if not with insecurity (against which mobility and dispersion are not always an adequate protection) at least with the absence or impotence of the central government," and "the history of the Maghreb shows that nomadism only flourishes in a climate of liberty bordering on anarchy."[13]

As we have seen in the previous literature, most studies of nomad society in the Middle East, especially those of the Arabian peninsula, have lacked informative sociological data. The lack of statistical information on the Bedouin of the Arab countries limited Murphy and Kasdan in their study (1959) to a "mechanical model" when they attempted to analyze Bedouin social structure.[14]

As Dyson-Hudson points out, after the 1950s "there appeared a corpus of material capable of transforming the study of nomadic societies," and he called some of those writers the unavoidable inheritors of the Malinowskian revolution. "They were consciously or not following his early programmatic exhortations ("Marriage," Encyclopedia Brittanica, 14th ed.) to record ordinary, day-to-day activities just as much as the exotic, and to search for explanations by way of the evident facts of observable behavior before invoking the weight of the past to account for the actions of the present."[15]

Some French and German thinkers have contributed a great deal to the literature on nomadism. Robert Montagne discusses the material aspect of Bedouin life by presenting a clear picture of the natural environment within which that life has evolved. He shows the important role played by rain in the Bedouins' life, and he portrays the camel as playing the leading role of shaping the culture of the Bedouins in Arabia. In his analysis of the Bedouins' material culture, Montagne begins with the tent as a basic unit, then discusses the family and the various groups beyond the tribe. He sheds light on the dynamics of tribal organization, including the roles played by the sheikh of the tribe, the rise and decline of tribal groups, and the significance of Bedouin nobility.[16]

Baron Von Oppenheim published the first volume of his classic German study, Die Beduinen, in 1939 with the collaboration of Erich Braünlich and Werner Caskel. In 1952, Caskel published the second and third volumes of that work. Rentz writes, "This comprehensive study of the Bedouin tribes of the Near East upholds the best tradition of

German scholarship."[17] The first volume contains detailed information about the origin of the Bedouins and their mobility. Oppenheim portrays the Bedouins as noteworthy for their dignity, intelligence, generosity and hospitality. The second volume describes the Bedouin tribes in Palestine, East Jordan, Sinai, and the Hejaz. The third volume provides information on the Bedouin tribes in the north and in the hinterland. The author provides details about each tribe and its political role in the shaping of events in the Arabian peninsula.[18]

The following observations regarding the approach of the Orientalists to the study of Arab culture, and of the Bedouin culture in particular, should be noted: 1) Even though most of the Orientalists were competent linguistically, they failed to understand the culture of the people; 2) They were highly influential interpreters who left an impact on European and American thought about Arab and Bedouin culture; and 3) the Orientalist approach to the study of Middle Eastern culture was carried on by many twentieth century western writers in their study of this region.

Some of the contributors to the literature of nomadism have discussed Bedouins in the context of larger themes, such as their place in history and in travel. A. Rihani provides a short historical account of early Bedouin settlements. He points out how psychological, geographical and economic conditions combine to create a difficult problem for the Bedouins and their leader, King Ibn Saud. The question facing Ibn Saud is what to do with these hardy, warlike Bedouins, with their fanatic, uncompromising creed, who inhabit an inhospital desert land which denies them any ease and comfort. The answer for Ibn Saud lies in the transformation of the nomads into peasants or townsmen.[19]

Philby does much the same as Rihani in the context of presenting a history of modern Saudi Arabia. Actually, no one has contributed more to the knowledge of the Arabian peninsula than this explorer. In most of his books, he tells the story of the Saudis and the culmination in the reign of the late King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia. He covers the history of the Wahhabi movement in central Arabia, its rise, and its fall. He treats the tribes in the peninsula, their social structure and organization.[20] More recent western authors have devoted considerable attention to Bedouins and the problems of nomadic people and their social structure. I will select some of these recent studies for review.

As is the case of earlier studies, most of those interested in studying nomads are anthropologists, geographers and historians. Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, in his classic study of the Sanusi Islamic reform movement in Libya during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, sheds a great deal of light on the participation of the Bedouins in religious reform movements. This study is very relevant to our subject, because the Sanusi movement resembles the Ikhwan movement in Saudi Arabia. The original success of the Sanusi Brotherhood in Libya was due primarily to the development of an organization of lodges that paralleled the segmentary structure of the Bedouin tribes in Libya. Each lodge was comprised of members of the Sanusi Brotherhood and attached to a particular section or lineage of a tribe. In this case, the lodges created the foundation for a supratribal national organization which did not try to change the basic tribal structure. At the same time the tribe was incorporated into a more universal structure,

that is, the Sanusi Brotherhood.[21]

Montagne, Sweet and Cole each studied one tribe in Arabia as the basic unit. The most relevant information from these authors concerns each tribe's organization which appears to be similar. Montagne, while studying the Shammar, one of the most prominent and powerful Northern Arabian tribes, discovered the pattern of the summer camp, where a sub-section or sometimes a section of the tribe, gathers around a well or wells. The section is the basic social and political unit in Bedouin society, a mini-state, led by a chief. It has territorial unity called Hemá. It has a common single brand or Wasm. The tribes of Shammar comprised of 100,000 to 150,000 people, about 20,000 tents, and includes the settled sections of the tribe.[22]

In her study, Sweet tries to analyze a relatively stable social unit smaller than a tribe among the Arruwalah, Shammar and Mutayr Bedouins. The tribal section, or division (Fakhd), she points out, "governs a number of the techniques and economics of camel pastoralism in North Arabia, and it shows features of corporate structure and process in relation to the control of productive resources."[23] Within the Bedouin tribal territory, the grazing lands (Hema) within which herds are managed, are used by the people of the tribe. The functions of the tribal sections (Fakhd) are economic as well as political. These units organize raiding parties and are often viewed as petty chiefdoms. Finally, Sweet concludes that aside from the joint family there are three units of tribal organization which are functionally significant: the section, with a core of ranked lineages; separate or fixed lineages and sliding lineages. Sweet relates the flexibility in size and internal organization of the section to ecological

conditions. She also gives an estimate of the number of tents and members of each tribe.

Cole studied the Al Murrah, one of the ancient, most aseil (noble) and powerful tribes in the Arabian peninsula. Cole follows the same type of analysis used by Montagne and Sweet in selecting the Fakhd as the basic unit of society. However, he calls the Fakhd "lineage." Lineages vary in size and status. Cole relates this variation to ecological limits. Al Murrah is divided into seven different clans, each of which includes four to six lineages. These lineages form the clan, which Cole calls gabila, and which averages nearly three hundred households. In my opinion, Cole is incorrect in using the term clan instead of tribe, because the term for clan in Arabic is Alfasielah or Alashierah, which is a section or division of the tribe. Seven clans from the Al Murrah tribe total over two thousand households, or about 15,000 people. The Al Murrah territories extend from the southern route, which connects Al Hasa and Riyadh, to the Kharj and Oqair areas. In addition, their territories include the Oases of Jafura and Jabrin up to the Empty Quarter. After the establishment of modern Saudi Arabia, the Bedouins' Hema, or territory, no longer existed and the Al Murrah freely shared with others.[24]

Cole and Ibrahim conducted a survey to assess the needs of Saudi Arabian Bedouins in 1978. The survey was carried out by questionnaire at four summer camps, but the authors fail to give details about the location of these camps. The sample is very small--208, or about 0.01% of the total Bedouin population in Saudi Arabia, and according to the authors, drawn from all parts of the kingdom. Although the

authors claim that they are trying to determine Bedouins' needs in a scientific way, they use the terms, nomads and Bedouins interchangeably, and they project western needs into a totally different culture. I question the validity of using Maslow's system to ascertain the needs of the Bedouins of Saudi Arabia. Throughout the book, the authors make the assumption that Bedouins must change their way of living to fit modern life. Why should not modern life be modified to fit the real needs of the Bedouins? The survey advocates that the Bedouins must be made to settle to fulfill townsmen's needs and to contribute to the solution of the country's labor shortage.[25]

Johnson's Nature of Nomadism was based on documentary materials and was originally presented as a master's thesis in geography at the University of Chicago. One of the stated aims of this study of pastoral nomadism was to review some of the literature on nomadism, restricted to certain ecological aspects of migrations among settled pastoral tribes of southwestern Asia and northern Africa. The second aim of this study was to develop criteria for a classification of pastoral nomadism, based on the type of migratory movement. The two particular pastoral nomads studied are divided into two major groups, horizontal and vertical nomadism, according to the nature of the migration. If the migration of nomads is confined to pasture and water of the plains, steppes or plateaus, the type is horizontal; if the migration leads nomads up and down hills and mountains, the type is vertical. This work can be criticized in that the author seems to want to be geographical in the true sense.[26]

Another geographical study of Bedouin villages in the western part of Saudi Arabia is by a Japanese writer. Actually, the area

which was studied by the author is not really a typical nomadic settlement, since Wadi Fatima is a village rather than a nomadic settlement. It is noteworthy that many tribes in the western part of Saudi Arabia, especially in the Hejaz, have for some time settled down and have abandoned nomadism. I have serious reservations as to the author's claim that during an uninterrupted period of twenty months she learned Arabic and mastered the local language, including its colloquial characteristics, and conducted her field survey. This is very clear, for throughout the book she has misspelled or misused many Arabic words. The first part of the book reports the general ecological, historical, and social setting of the village of Wadi Fatima, situated between Makkah and Jeddah. The second part deals with Bushur, one of the villages in Wadi Fatima, which is the location of a community development center run by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. With the joint efforts of the Ministry of Agriculture, Health, and Education, the center has brought help, information, and social activities into Wadi Fatima. Some of the author's statistics may be inadequate because her stay was very short and her samples were small. This book raises the question of how to validate the work reported. A researcher faces the difficult problem of working with a predominantly illiterate population, attempts to generalize from a very small sample, and is an outsider in every sense. Regarding the question of when a Bedouin settlement can be considered a village, the author's answer lies in her definition of a village in Wadi Fatima as any settlement where residents have built a mosque and a cemetery.[27]

Two anthropological studies of nomads among the Arabs of the East and the Arabs of North Africa should be mentioned here. One study,

edited by Cynthia Nelson, is a collection of essays written by anthropologists, originally presented at the international conference on nomadism in the Middle East and North Africa and sponsored by the American University in Cairo in 1972. The general purpose of the conference was to analyze and describe the nomad, relations with sedentary people, and to develop a model for further testing of various hypotheses. Professor E. Gellner, in his introduction, "Approaches to Nomadism," says: "Many of the papers in this symposium represent an attempt to develop a new conceptualization of nomadism." The editor, in her article, asserts that women wield much more power among nomadic people of the Middle East than has ever been admitted by most male authors. She argues that most male writers agree in their conception of nomadic society in the Middle East as being structured in terms of two separate worlds, "the private sphere of the tent (the woman's world) and the public sphere of the camp (the man's world)."[28]

The other anthropological study is entitled Literature and Violence in North Arabia by M. E. Meeker. The study is a type of structuralist analysis of Bedouin tales and poetry. He argues that it is the combination of commercial urbanism and pastoral nomadism in the ancient Middle East that led the people of the deserts and steppes to invest heavily in resources of aggression, such as ammunition and weapons. He relates the violence in this region to the enticing power of "personal instruments of aggression," and to the camels which are "vulnerable domestic wealth" and must be acquired by each tribe to be used in fighting with other tribes. The book actually concentrates on the two phrases just cited. Meeker tries to use tales and poems of war and camel raiding found in Musil's book, Manners and Customs

of the Rwala Bedouin, and derives generalizations from them. Social processes among Northern Arabians were far more complex, in my judgment, than assertions by the author. "Wars are not the result of the availability of weapons, nor were social relations, interpersonal relations, uncertain in the North Arabian desert around 1900," because in fact the lines and struggles against western penetration and domination were very clear.[29]

The last study to be reviewed in this section, which deals with western literature on nomadism in the Arabian peninsula, is Habib's historical work on the Ikhwan of Najd and their role in the creation of the Saudi Kingdom, 1910-1930. The book is an historical study of the Ikhwan movement which arose in the heart of the Arabian peninsula in 1910, reached its peak in the 1920s, and then declined in the early 1930s. This social reform movement played a major role in the establishment of modern Saudi Arabia under the leadership of King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud. The movement is considered to be the first nomadic settlement in the history of Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud, with the twin aims of creating the basis for a centralized political organization and of reviving the ideals of Wahhabism, established the Ikhwan. They were established in settled oasis colonies known as Hijar settlements where agriculture was to be the basis of economic life. The book concentrates on the role of the Ikhwan in creating the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia rather than "the religious and social implications . . . the economic, social disruptions which may have resulted from the settlement of these Bedouins on the land," as stated by the author in his preface.[30]

As stated before, some of the main contributors to the literature of nomadism are anthropologists, but because their studies relate little to the Bedouins in the Arabian peninsula, they will not be reviewed here.[31]

Arabic Literature on the Bedouins

In the second part of the review of the literature, I will consider some of the Arabic literature devoted to Bedouin life, social and cultural characteristics, and the problems of nomadism and nomad settlement in Saudi Arabia. The ideas of Ibn Khaldun, the fourteenth-century Arabian scholar who is often hailed as one of the world's first sociologists, will be considered first. It was his premise that Bedouins are the basis of, and prior to, sedentary people. All Bedouins and sedentary people, he believed, are different in their social conditions and in their modes of living. Some clans are greater than others, and this is true as well of towns and cities. He considered the Bedouins to be braver, closer to being good, but less intelligent than sedentary people. The Bedouins are proud, dignified, and unwilling to yield to another's supremacy. According to Ibn Khaldun, the Bedouins are difficult to lead, unless the leader is a prophet or holy man. The restraining influence among Bedouin tribes comes from their sheikhs and leaders. The religious leader has the power to rally the Bedouins to forego their personal differences, to diminish their arrogance, and to cease their tribal warfare.

It is noteworthy to point out that Ibn Khaldun tried to develop a model to explain how the Bedouins, during the early centuries of Islam, interacted with the town people, on one hand, and with the

central religious-political government, on the other. According to his model, the Bedouins interacted with the Hadhar (sedentary people) according to a cycle of five stages. During the first stage, the Bedouins unite in religious zeal with some of the sedentary population and establish themselves through conquest as the rulers of a certain area. Usually in this stage, the sedentary people (the Hadhar) take the political, religious and administrative offices, while the Bedouins' main job will be military. The second stage is one in which the ruler gains complete control over the subjects and is characterized by the continuation of a high degree of religious zeal. The third stage is one of leisure in which the fruits of royal authority are enjoyed. The Bedouins in the fourth stage begin to relax, their religious zeal becomes weak, and they begin to lose interest in the whole idea and return to pastoral activities. The last stage is a long one of general decline in the whole enterprise, and for this reason the Bedouins then abandon the state and return to their disorganized life in the desert.[32]

Following in the footsteps of Ibn Khaldun, numerous recent Arab authors have studied the Bedouins' social and economic problems and the problems of their settlement. We mention a few of the most important Arab authors who have contributed continuously to the literature on nomadism. We start with M. Awad. In his view, tribes and tribal groups are widely dispersed throughout the Middle East. Usually they do not constitute the whole population, and in most cases they are not even considered a majority in any political unit, except in Saudi Arabia. Bedouin groups in Saudi Arabia are estimated to be between 15 and 20 percent of the total population. According to Awad, tribal

groups are usually classified into nomadic, semi-nomadic, and sedentary tribes, but the essential characteristic among them is that their members identify themselves as belonging to a specific group, and not to a specific place, village or town. In Egypt, however, the term "Arab" is sometimes restricted to denoting only a tribal group, "whether nomadic, semi-nomadic or sedentary; and as long as they possess a tribal organization they are referred to as 'Arabs' to distinguish them from the settled peasants or 'fellaheen.'"[33] In Arabia, they use the term "qarawi," or "Mozarea," instead of "fellah."

Abou-Zeid studied the social and economic factors forced upon Bedouins to change their relationship to the land. According to this writer, because of an acute decline in the amount of rainfall, a frequent phenomenon in this area, the consequence is famine and death of large numbers of animals. Hence, the Bedouins have no choice but to look for more secure and stable means of living.[34]

Al-Tahir and Aljamil, two Iraqi scholars, provide valuable information, including detailed descriptions of Bedouin tribes in the Arab countries, especially those of Iraq. Al-Tahir also discusses the projects of settlement advocated by the Arab governments to settle the nomads in various regions of the Arab land. He also points out some reasons behind the objection of the tribal leaders to the policy of settlement in Iraq.[35] Al Wardi, an Iraqi sociologist, in his study of the Bedouins, draws upon Ibn Khaldun's study of civilization. According to him, there are two main systems of social norms, those of _badawa_ and _hadara_. _Badawa_'s main norms are kinship, tribal loyalty, individualism and disdain for manual work. On the other hand, _hadara_

maintain none of these values. Because they are incompatible, we might expect conflict between these two social systems which leads to a crisis of social identity and a confusion of values.[36]

The literature reveals that the social aspects of Bedouin life are affected overwhelmingly by economic conditions. The Bedouin recognizes that his animals are the most important source of livelihood and that he must protect them against raiders and thieves. Social life, in general, has been characterized by mutual respect among the tribesmen, on one hand, and between the sheikh and the tribesmen, on the other. Bedouins are marked by their love of freedom and loyalty to the tribe. Al-Fawwal, in particular, notes that the Bedouin is courageous, generous, and loyal to his tribe.[37]

According to Al-Gassab, some writers, such as Burckhardt and Doughty, describe the Bedouins as people living in the desert in an unsettled life which has been characterized by their constant movement with their animals and the changing of their dwelling places from time to time. The French scholar, Capot-Rey, defines nomadism not only as an unsettled way of life, but also as a form of social organization based on ties of family and allegiance. In contrast, Beuermann, a German scholar, defines the Bedouin life in a completely different way. According to him, nomadism is an economic activity more than it is an unsettled system as a way of life. Beuermann assumes that animal husbandry is the fundamental hub around which the Bedouin life rotates. Because the Bedouin does not practice agriculture, there is no settlement to attract his attention as his permanent dwelling. Al-Gassab considers that all previous definitions which give nomadism

economic or social meanings are not complete or accurate. For this reason, he offers his own definition of nomadism which he states as follows: "Al-Badiyah, in my opinion, is a concept which contains both economic and social aspects and together represent the cornerstone of the life of the desert people."[38]

Wahba describes the life of the people, their religion and the history of the Saudi family. He discusses the Ikhwan, originally desert Bedouins, who about 1912 were persuaded by King Ibn Saud to settle in villages. They became religious fanatics and regarded those who did not follow their way of life to be infidels. He also describes their settlements and gives details about the names of the settlements, the tribe living in each one, and the names of their leaders.[39] Hamzah has also devoted many pages to the Ikhwan and their settlements (Hijar) and tried to make a classification of the Bedouin tribes in Saudi Arabia. He lists each tribe, division and clan and describes the tribe's social status and places of residence.[40] Al-Filali, a U.N. expert, visited Saudi Arabia in 1964 and conducted an extensive study dealing with the Bedouins' social and economic problems. During his three-month stay in the country, he offered some solutions and recommendations to the government of Saudi Arabia to deal with the Bedouins' problems.[41]

The tribes of Saudi Arabia today constitute a society, with its subcultures and unique social norms and values. As stated by the Saudi Arabian delegation to the ninth conference of Arab experts in social affairs held in Jerusalem in 1965, Saudi tribes possess the following characteristics:

1. A feeling of belonging on the part of the whole tribe based on a common origin;

2. A feeling of solidarity among its members, with intense unity, common destiny, identical aspirations and goals--the feeling of Asabiyyah;

3. The contribution of all members to the utilization of natural resources and to collective defense of tribal interests;

4. The work of all members to preserve the tribe's traditions and culture;

5. Maintaining the purity of Arab origin;

6. Recognizing the tribe's sheikh or chief as the sole representative of authority in the tribe. Only the sheikh has the right to speak for members and to represent their views.[42]

Of the Arabic literature on Bedouins and problems of settlement, we must include the major contribution by the League of Arab States. This study is the result of the Ninth Conference on Social Affairs and Labor held in Jerusalem in 1965. The Arab League published a two-volume study entitled Sedentarization and Urbanization of the Bedouins. The study contains many articles on nomadism in the Arab countries by well-known Arab scholars in the fields of sociology, anthropology, social history, geography and social psychology. The study also includes a documented report by each government delegation to the conference about Bedouin problems in its own country.[43]

One of the most recent studies on Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia is Alshamekh's study entitled Spatial Patterns of Bedouin Settlement in Al-Qasim Region, Saudi Arabia. He states that the reason for Bedouin sedentarization in the early twentieth century had an important religious component, while more recently that reason has been largely replaced by social and economic factors. Alshamekh, in his

study, developed a taxonomic model of settlement patterns, which included early Hijar, recent Hijar, and Hilal. These types could probably be applied to areas of the Middle East other than Saudi Arabia. The author visited a total of ninety-six Bedouin settlements during two months in 1972. To quote, "At the end of the field work, a total of 6,000 kilometers had been traveled, much of which was over unimproved roads and desert tracks."[44] But this statement might lead us to question some of his statistics and findings because of the short time in relation to the large area covered, especially considering the difficulty of traveling desert roads and tracks.

Finally, to conclude this part of the literature review, we refer to four unpublished studies dealing with nomadism in Saudi Arabia. Said, in "Saudi Arabia: The Transition from a Tribal Society to a Nation-State," tries to describe the historical stages of Saudi Arabia. He begins with the first stage, the Saudi state from 1745 to the fall of Dariyah in 1818. He then covers the second Saudi state from 1824 until the end of the nineteenth century, which witnessed the total defeat and exile of the Saud family. In the third phase of the establishment of Saudi Arabia, he describes the reign of King Abdul Aziz (1900-1953), King Saud (1953-1963) and King Faisal (1963-1975). He devotes one chapter in his study to the Bedouins--a majority turned minority--and reports on their social organization and their relationship with the sedentary people.[45]

Al-Malik, in his study, analyzes the social system of the Bedouins in Saudi Arabia. He also treats the government approach to the development of the Bedouins in relation to the problems of settling

in Saudi Arabia.[46]

El-Farra's geographical study is entitled "The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of an Emerging State: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." He explains the policy advocated by the Saudi leadership to control the Bedouins and to gain their loyalty. He also discusses how Ibn Saud injected a new revolutionary idea into the Bedouin society by detribalizing them in order to make them replace their loyalty to the tribe with loyalty to a political geographic state with fixed boundaries.[47]

In his study "The In-Situ Development of the Bedouin Nomads," Al-Gain tries, even in the title, to suggest a belief in the viability of a traditional way of life. He stands in the middle between two extreme opinions: those who favor abandoning nomadism (or the modernizers), and those who advocate a hands-off policy toward nomadism (the traditionalists). In his study, Al-Gain tries to avoid the temptation of either extreme. Thus, his study implies "the elimination of the inherent backwardness in a traditional system of livelihood without its abandonment." In other words, he suggests the modernization of some aspects of nomadism.[48]

Literature on the Impact of Modernization on Traditional Society

In the third part of our literature review, it is necessary to recognize a voluminous literature concerned with the passing of traditional society and the impact of modernization. This literature emanates from various disciplines, but especially from anthropology, economics, and sociology.[49] It is not our purpose to review the entirety

of this vast literature, but rather only to cite a selection of works. Suffice it to say that the dissertation undertaken is in the tradition of such work, but is a narrowly-defined problem involving a specific change in a particular cultural setting. We now turn to a literature that aids in the conceptualization of the problem of Bedouin settlement. This literature concerns the identification of social systems and their elements, as well as the processes involving change.

Rogers[50] distinguishes two types of social change as follows:

1. Imminent change, or change that originates within the social system, with little or no stimulus from the outside. This type of change corresponds to the Arabic term Isteetan with respect to the origin of the force, including settlement.

2. Contact change, or change that is produced by sources external to the system. Rogers indicates two subtypes:

   a. Selective contact change, or change taking place when outsiders unintentionally communicate new ideas within the system; and

   b. Directed contact change, or change resulting from deliberate, planned programs initiated to bring about change.

   Contact change corresponds to the Arabic term tawteen with respect to outside rather than internal forces, including settlement.

Loomis and Beegle, and Rogers and Burdge,[51] among others, draw a distinction between the change agent system and the target system. A change agent is seen as a professional who attempts to influence the direction of change that is deemed desirable by the change agent system, or that system of which he is a part. The target system, then, is the object (ordinarily a less "modernized" or less "developed" group or society) of the change agent system. The change agent and

target system terms, of course, imply that the change is of a directed contact type.

While the term social system appears in the writings of Comte, Spencer and other early theorists, we draw primarily upon Parsons[52] and others such as Loomis and Beegle,[53] Loomis,[54] and Rogers and Burdge[55] who have applied some of the concepts to social change. A social system is considered a collectivity of individuals oriented toward a common goal. Social systems may be large or small, highly solidified or loosely interrelated. However, all social systems possess a structure and value orientation. The structural elements of social systems, as specified by Loomis and Beegle,[56] include the following: (1) status roles, or that which is expected in a given status or portion; (2) power, or the control over others; (3) social rank, or the standing of individuals based upon consensus as to what is to be rated high and low by the system; (4) sanctions, or the satisfaction-giving or depriving mechanism at the disposal of the system; (5) facilities, or the means used by the system to attain its end; and (6) territoriality, the spatial requirements of the system. The two components of the system's value orientation include: (1) norms, the rules and guiding principles that establish what is acceptable or unacceptable to the system; and (2) ends or objectives, the changes that members of the system hope to accomplish by the operation of the system.

Important processes involved in social change are communication, decision making, boundary maintenance, and social-cultural linkage.[57] Communication refers to the process by which information passes through a social system. In some instances this may be accomplished through

radio, TV, newsprint and other mass media circulation. In others, communication is primarily through face-to-face interaction. Decision making refers to the process by which alternative courses of action are reduced; that is, the process of eliminating numerous possible courses of action and settling upon an agreeable course. Boundary maintenance is the process by which a system retains its integrity and solidarity. Resistance to change from the outside is almost always exhibited by members of traditional societies. Finally, social-cultural linkage is the process by which the elements of the two interacting systems come to be articulated so that they come to function as a single system, at least in some respects. Becker comments upon the process of linkage among the nomads and suggests the intense resistance to change as well. He says, "Pastoral nomads do not change because of movement; nor do they change because of conflict; only when there is conquest, settlement among the conquered, and genuinely social rather than symbolic interaction (systemic linkage) does the nomadic cultural pattern undergo alteration."[58]

Lerner, in his study on the Middle East, indicates that participation in mass media increases wants, thereby creating new ideas and developing political awareness. According to Lerner, a communication system is both an index and agent of change in a total social system. It is interesting enough to note that Lerner summarizes the important characteristics of the Bedouin society and the Bedouin personality like most of the western authors as follows: (1) day-to-day life is concentrated around the tribe, to be loyal to it and move with it, unlike the peasant who is tied by his land; (2) dismay in regard to the city which, in the Bedouins' view, is a soft life, and according

to Lerner includes the view of the communication media; and (3) ignorance of the new modern world. The only news the Bedouin is interested in is that concerning his own or other tribes. Lerner's data were collected in 1950, and constant change has taken place among the Bedouins since that time.[59]

FOOTNOTES

[1]Elizabeth E. Bacon, "Types of Pastoral Nomadism in Central and Southwest Asia," Southwest Journal of Anthropology 10:1 (Spring 1954), pp. 44-68; Elizabeth E. Bacon, "A Preliminary Attempt to Determine the Culture Areas of Asia," Southwest Journal of Anthropology 2:2 (Summer 1946), pp. 117-132; R. Murphy and L. Kasdan, "The Structure of Parallel Cousin Marriage," American Anthropologist 61 (1959), pp. 17-29.

[2]W. Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia (Boston: Beacon Press, 1903).

[3]W. Robertson Smith, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (KTAV Publishing House, Inc., 1969; first published in 1927), p. 355.

[4]Sir Richard F. Burton, Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah, Vol. 2 (New York: Dover Publications, 1964; first published in 1855), p. 85.

[5]John L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. 1 (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1967; first published in 1831), p. 358; John L. Burckhardt, Travels in Arabia (London: Frank Cass & Company, Ltd., 1968).

[6]Charles M. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta, Vol. 1 (London: Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1936; first published in 1888), pp. 270-280. There is a recent 2-volume edition in 1979 by Dover Publications of New York. D. G. Hogarth, The Life of Charles M. Doughty (London: Oxford Press, 1928); D. G. Hogarth, The Penetration of Arabia (London: Lawrence & Bullen, 1904). In this book, Hogarth admits that Doughty had "a certain prejudice against all things Semitic," but claims it was manifested "with a sympathy that has never been excelled" (p. 275).

[7]Robin Fedden, English Travellers in the Near East (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1958), p. 30.

[8]William Palgrave, Personal Narrative of a Year's Journey Through Central and Eastern Arabia (London: Macmillan & Company, 1967; first published in 1883). Palgrave was a Jesuit of Jewish extraction who in 1862 supposedly crossed the Arabian peninsula. See Peter Brent, Far Arabia: Explorers of the Myth (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977). About the controversy, see Robin Bidwell, Travellers in Arabia (London: The Hamlyn Publishing Group, Ltd., 1976), p. 83.

[9]A. Musil, The Manners and Customs of the Rwala Bedouins (New York: AMS, 1978; first published in 1928).

[10]H. R. P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert: A Glimpse into Badawin Life in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (London: Allen & Unwin, 1951; first published in 1949); H. R. P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours (London: Allen & Unwin, 1956).

[11]Carl Raswan, Black Tents of Arabia (New York: Creative Age Press, 1947).

[12]C. Daryll Forde, Habitat, Economy and Society: A Geographical Introduction to Ethnology (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1961; first published in 1934).

[13]R. Capot-Rey, "The Present State of Nomadism in the Sahara," Paris Symposium on the Problems of the Arid Zone (Paris: UNESCO, Arid Zone Research, 18, 1962), pp. 301-302.

[14]Murphy and Kasdan, op. cit.

[15]Neville Dyson-Hudson and William Irons, eds., Perspectives on Nomadism (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), pp. 6-7.

[16]R. Montagne, La Civilisation du Desert (Paris: Hachette, 1947). See Afif I. Tannous, summary and review of the book, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 2, no. 3 (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1948), pp. 353-354.

[17]George Rentz, "Notes on Oppenheim's Die Beduinen," Oriens 10 (1957), pp. 77-89.

[18]Max Freiherr Von Oppenheim, Die Beduinen (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1939); Mostafa Maher, "Summary and Review of Kitab Al Badw," Al 'Faisal 3:29 (Thu Algeadah 1399; October 1979), pp. 83-90. (In Arabic).

[19]Ameen Rihani, Maker of Modern Arabia--Ibn Saud of Arabia: His People and His Land (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928).

[20]H. St. J. B. Philby, Saudi Arabia (New York: Arno Press, 1972; first published in 1955); H. St. J. B. Philby, Arabia (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1930).

[21]Sir Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940).

[22]R. Montagne, La Civilisation du Desert, op. cit., pp. 51-59.

[23]L. E. Sweet, "Camel Pastoralism in North Arabia and the Minimal Camping Unit," in Man, Culture and Animals: The Role of Animals in Human Ecological Adjustments, A. Leeds and A. P. Vayda, eds., (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1965), pp. 129-152.

[24]D. Cole, Nomads of the Nomads: The Al Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter (Chicago: Aldine, 1975). See Richard L. Tapper "The Organization of Nomadic Communities in Pastoral Society of the Middle East," in Pastoral Production and Society, ed. L'Equipe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 43-65.

[25]D. Cole and S. E. Ibrahim, Saudi Arabian Bedouins: An Assessment of Their Needs (Cairo: American University of Cairo, Papers in Social Science, Monograph Five, 1978). See A. H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper and Row, 1954).

[26]D. L. Johnson, The Nature of Nomadism (Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago, Dept. of Geography, Research Paper no. 118, 1969).

[27]M. Katakura, Bedouin Village: A Study of a Saudi Arabian People in Transition (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977).

[28]Cynthia Nelson, ed., The Desert and the Sown: Nomads in the Wider Society (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, Research Series No. 21, 1973), p. 46.

[29]Michael E. Meeker, Literature and Violence in North Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Professor Louise E. Sweet, review of The Middle East Journal, Winter 1980, pp. 89-90.

[30]John S. Habib, Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the Saudi Kingdom, 1910-1930 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978). The book is the author's Ph.D. dissertation from the University of Michigan in 1970, with a changed title.

[31]Morton H. Fried, The Notion of Tribe (Menlo Park, Calif.: Cummings Publishing Co., 1975); Marshal D. Sahlins, Tribesmen (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1968); L. G. Sweet, ed., Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, 2 vols. (New York: The Natural History Press, 1970); and B. Spooner, "The Cultural Ecology

of Pastoral Nomads," in Current Topics in Anthropology, Vol. 8 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1973).

[32]Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, 3 vols., trans. from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958).

[33]Mohammed Awad, "Nomadism in the Arab Lands of the Middle East," Arid Zone Research 18 (1962), pp. 325-339.

[34]Ahmed M. Abou-Zeid, "The Changing World of the Nomads," Mediterranean Rural Communities and Social Change, ed, J. G, Peristiany (Athens: Acts of the Mediterranean Sociological Conference, July 1963).

[35]Makki Al-Jamil, Nomadism and Nomads in the Arab Countries (Cairo: Al-Nasr Press, 1962); Abd Al-Jalil Al-Tahir, Bedouins and Tribes in the Arab Countries (Cairo: Al-Itimad Press, 1954).

[36]Ali Al Wardi, Social Aspects of the Modern History of Iraq, Vol. 1 (Baghdad: Al-Irshad Press, 1969).

[37]Salah M. Al Fawwal, Al-Badawah Al-Arabiah Wa-Tanmiyah [The Arab Bedouins and Development] (Cairo: Maktabat Al-Qahirah Al-Hadithah, 1967).

[38]Nafi Nasir Al-Qassab, "Geographic Aspects About the Sedentarization of Bedouin Tribes," The Journal of Iraqi Geographical Society 5 (June 1969), pp. 275-324.

[39]Hafiz Wahba, Arabian Days (London: Arthur Barker, Ltd., 1964).

[40]Fuad Hamzah, Heart of the Arabian Peninsula (Riyadh: Maktabat Al-Nasr Al-Hadithah, 1968).

[41]Mustafa Al Filali, Project for Sedentarization and Urbanization of Bedouin Groups in Saudi Arabia (Riyadh: Central Planning Organization, 1964).

[42]League of Arab States, Ri'ayat al Badu Wa-Tahdirihum Wa-Tawtinihum (Cairo: Dar At-Tiba'ah Al-Hadithah, 1965), vol. 1, pp. 407-408.

[43]League of Arab States, Ri'ayat Al-Badu Wa-Tahdirihum Wa-Tawtinihum [Development and Sedentarization of the Bedouins], 2 vols. (Cairo: Dar At-Tiba'ah Al-Hadithah, 1965).

[44]Ahmed A. Shamekh, Spatial Patterns of Bedouin Settlement in Al-Qasim Region, Saudi Arabia (Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Kentucky, Department of Geography, 1975).

[45]Abdul Rahman H. Said, Saudi Arabia: The Transition from a Tribal Society to a Nation-State (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, Columbia, 1978).

[46]Salih A. Malik, A Study of the Social System of the Bedouins: Its Relation to the Problems of Settling in Saudi Arabia (M.A. thesis, Wayne State University, Detroit, 1968).

[47]Taha O. El-Farra, The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of an Emerging State: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1973).

[48]Abdulbar A. Al-Gain, The In-Situ Development of the Bedouin Nomads: A Bayesian Decision Analysis (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Arizona, 1974).

[49]See the following general works and case studies: W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960); Theodore W. Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Clifford Geertz, Peddlars and Princes: Social Development and Economic Change in Two Indonesian Towns (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); T. S. Epstein, Economic Development and Social Change in South India (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1962); Manning Nash, Machine Age Maya: The Industrialization of a Guatemalan Community (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958); Aubrey L. Rechardo, Economic Development and Tribal Change (Cambridge: Heffer, 1954); and Clifton R. Wharton, Jr. Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Development (Chicago: Aldine, 1969). See especially Chapter 13, "Case Studies of Planned Change," pp. 387-455.

[50]Everett M. Rogers, "Motivations, Values and Attitudes of Subsistence Farmers: Toward a Subculture of Peasantry" in Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Development by Clifton R. Wharton, Jr. (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), pp. 111-135.

[51]C. P. Loomis and J. A. Beegle, Rural Social Systems (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950); Everett M. Rogers and Rabel J. Burdge, Social Change in Rural Societies (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972).

[52]Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951).

[53]Loomis and Beegle, Rural Social Systems, op. cit.

[54]Charles P. Loomis, Social Systems (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1960); Charles P. Loomis and Zona K. Loomis, Modern Social Theories (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961).

[55]Rogers and Burdge, Social Change in Rural Societies, op. cit.

[56]C. P. Loomis and J. A. Beegle, Rural Sociology: The Strategy of Change (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1957).

[57]Ibid., pp. 17-19.

[58]Howard Becker, "Pastoral Nomadism and Social Change," Sociology and Social Research 15:5 (1931), p. 427.

[59]D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: The Free Press, 1967.

CHAPTER IV

BEDOUIN SOCIETY IN ARABIA

Who Are the Bedouins?

The primary task of this chapter is to examine Bedouin society in Saudi Arabia. We shall attempt to clarify the terms Bedouin and Bedouinism, to examine the question of Bedouin numbers and to name the major tribes of Saudi Arabia and their areas of residence. The social structure of Bedouin society and the characteristics of Bedouins, villagers and city dwellers are discussed. The economic structure of the Bedouins, including the dirah range of the tribes, raiding, and the important role played by the camel in the Bedouin life of the Arabian peninsula will be analyzed in detail.

There is some confusion, especially among western writers and scholars, about the term Bedouin and related terms such as nomads, pastoral nomadism, Arab and Arab el-dar. In fact, the designation of the people of the desert most familiar to western writers is Bedouin, Badwin, or Badu. We find different approaches among western scholars in their attempts to understand the historical evolution of pastoral nomadism. It is not appropriate here to detail the different hypotheses, but it may be useful to cite a few examples. Bobek, Johnson, and Lattimore[1] agree that pastoral nomadism evolved from sedentary agriculture dependent upon rainfall in dry areas. Thurnwald[2] offers a contrasting view, namely, that nomadism developed from specialized

hunting groups who, in pursuit of a particularly abundant animal, gradually developed a system to control the movement of the animals. If we view pastoral nomadism as a sustenance-seeking response to ecological conditions in which adaptation was achieved through the utilization of resources in the environment, then the origin of the history of nomadism must also relate to environmental conditions. In this matter, Johnson provides a good explanation when describing nomadism as a "specialized offshoot of agriculture that developed along the dry margins of rainfall cultivation."[3] Caskel[4] offers another suggestion when he contends that the socioeconomic institutions of pastoral nomadism, in the case of the Bedouinization of Arabia, developed as a result of the collapse of the Arab trading kingdoms around AD 100. At that time the urban population of the Arabian Peninsula became nomadic, then gradually spread north and south throughout Arabia. While such factors as the collapse of the Arab trading kingdoms may have contributed to a reinforcement of pre-existing nomadic society, they are inadequate by themselves in explaining pastoral nomadism.[5]

Some Arab scholars have their own hypotheses concerning the origin of Arab Bedouinism. For example, Ibn Khaldun, the Arab historian and sociologist of the fourteenth century, viewed the Bedouins as prior to sedentary people. Bedouins restrict themselves to the bare necessities of life while sedentary people like to enjoy more luxuries. Therefore, the existence of Bedouins, according to Ibn Khaldun, was prior to, and the basis of, the existence of towns and cities.[6] Recent Arab writers view Bedouinism as a way of life for those who must constantly move to find pasture. The length of stay

in any area depends on three factors:

1. Abundance of pasture and grass for the animals;
2. Adequacy of technical means to be utilized;
3. The social and natural security existing in these areas.[7]

Al-Abd views Bedouinism as an advanced stage of human development, if compared with the hunting stage characterized by man's consumption of animals. In contrast, the stage of pastoralism came when productive activity began to embrace the breeding and care for animals. Mankind, then, began to use some tools in daily life, and to develop traditions and social norms to organize human behavior. This stage paved the way to the next one, namely, agriculture.[8] The Bedouin, in my own view, is one who (1) lives in a regular tent or biyt sha'ar; (2) moves from place to place with his camels and/or sheep; and (3) earns most of his income from raising camels and/or sheep. But those who go to hunt or to enjoy the wilderness (Ar. Albar) on occasion and for short periods because they like to experience their old life, cannot be considered Bedouins even though they originally had Bedouin backgrounds.[9]

The Question of Bedouin Numbers

From time immemorial, the inhabitants of Arabia have been known to be divided into two groups: nomadic people and settled people. Nomadism in most parts of the Arabian Peninsula was the dominant way of life before the discovery of oil. "If we trace the geographical distribution of the nomads and settlers of Arabia, we find that their distribution is in close conformity with the climatic and hydrographic

conditions of the regions which they inhabit."[10] Where there is a fairly adequate amount of rain (as in the Asir and Yaman), or where stream water is available (as in some parts of Al-Hasa and Oman), people tend to engage in sedentary cultivation.

In 1965, it was estimated in a government report that nomads accounted for 50 percent of the country's population. In the same report, the government estimated the total population of Saudi Arabia to be between seven and eight million people.[11] Al-Abd, a United Nation's expert from Egypt, presented a paper at the Ninth Conference for Social Affairs and Labor held in Jerusalem in 1965, in which he estimated that 30 percent of the 1965 population of Saudi Arabia was nomadic.[12] In the only census ever taken by the Saudi Arabian government during 1962-63, the population numbered 3,297,657, of which 2,611,459 (79.2 percent) were listed as sedentary, and 686,198 (20.8 percent) were classified as nomadic.[13] As mentioned before, the census of 1963 was not published or accepted by the government. Governmental officials regarded the total population of about 3.3 million to be too low. Some argue that there is now both political and economic motivation for Saudi Arabia to exaggerate the size of the population.[14] In any case, the count of Bedouins was carried out during the summer on the assumption that all Bedouin groups move around looking for pasture during the fall and winter from October to March, and come back to desert wells and oases to escape the desert heat of the summer season. However, we know that many tribes in Saudi Arabia do not have permanent wells or streams of water to which they return during the summer. This fact leads us to assume that some of the Bedouins were excluded from the census.[15]

As a result of Al-shamekh's field work in 1972, he believes that the nomadic and semi-nomadic people in Saudi Arabia do not exceed 25 percent of the total population. Under this assumption, there would have been around 1,375,000 Bedouins in 1972.[16] Students of modern Saudi Arabia have evidence indicating that the number of Bedouin people has been declining rapidly. These observations suggest that the decline in the percentage of Bedouins from 62 percent in 1963 to about 25 percent in 1972 is real. As a Saudi official (now Deputy Minister of Industry and Electricity) wrote recently:

> Estimates made by Saudi officials early in 1977 suggest that there are probably no true Bedouins left, that is, there are no longer nomads who live a completely nomadic life. It is probably safe to assume that fewer than 10 percent of the population is Bedouin and that their numbers decrease at a rate of 2 percent a year.[17]

In spite of many of the shortcomings in the 1963 census, table 1 does show where the Bedouins in the country were concentrated. The Northern Province, by a wide margin, has the highest ratio of Bedouins, followed by the Middle Province (Najd). The lowest ratio of Bedouins are found in the west and southwest coastal regions. The ratio ranges from 78.2 percent in the Khasirah-Afif area in the Central Province to about 2.1 percent in Jizan in the Southern Province. Relying on this table, al-Gosaibi contends that this census has refuted all previous estimates which assume that the majority of the population are still Bedouins.

Professor Razqanah presents another set of data similar to table 1. Table 2 indicates the following concerning the size of Bedouin populations in Arabia:

Table 1.--Data concerning the number and proportion of settled and Nomadic population in the census of 1962-63

Province	Total Population	Settled	Percentage	Nomads	Percentage
Northern Province	406,383	128,672	31.8	277,714	68.2
Qurayat	20,933	5,799	27.7	15,134	72.3
Joaf	43,989	17,918	40.7	26,071	59.3
Hail	187,804	62,289	33.2	125,515	66.3
Northern boundaries	77,801	17,551	22.6	60,250	77.4
Northern	75,859	25,115	33.1	50,744	66.9
Eastern Province	306,605	267,603	87.3	39,002	12.7
Qatif	67,703	67,703	100.0	0	0
Al-Hasa	158,023	126,763	80.3	31,260	19.7
Ras-Tanurah	80,879	73,137	90.5	7,742	9.5
Middle Province	797,946	621,219	78.0	176,727	22.0
Riyadh	539,692	442,896	82.1	96,794	17.9
Qasim	222,761	170,578	76.6	52,183	23.4
Khasirah-Afif	35,493	7,743	21.8	27,750	78.2
Western Province	986,118	892,733	90.0	93,385	10.0
Mecca	627,447	593,924	94.7	33,523	5.3
Medina	159,695	120,577	75.5	39,118	24.5
Biljershi-Ranyah	198,976	178,232	89.5	30,744	10.5
Southern Province	746,355	667,399	90.6	79,056	9.4
Asir	324,709	271,407	83.6	53,802	16.0
Jizan	365,063	357,337	97.9	7,726	2.1
Najran	56,583	38,555	68.1	18,028	31.9
Total population	3,297,657	2,611,459	79.2	686,198	20.8

Source: K. Al-Gosaibi, "The Program for Bedouins" (Riyadh: Central Planning Organization, 1963), p. 2.

Table 2.--Data concerning the number and percentage of Bedouins and settlers in Saudi Arabia

Province	Bedouins	Bedouin Percentage	Settled	Settled Percentage
Al-Hijaz	700,000	64.00	400,000	36.00
Asir	450,000	37.50	750,000	62.50
Najd	1,300,000	62.00	800,000	38.00
Al-Ahsa	299,000	67.00	100,000	33.00
The other provinces	350,000	70.00	150,000	30.00
Total	3,000,000		2,200,000	

Source: I. Razqanan, "Causes of Nomadism and Its Size," in League of Arab States, Ri'ayat, op. cit., p. 341.

1. Najd is the stronghold of Bedouins having by far the largest number, many of them living around oases (e.g., Wadi al-Dawasir, Al-Aflaj, Al Kharj, Alard, and al-Washm).

2. Asir, in the south, is an exception, in that the number of settled persons exceeds the number of Bedouins.

3. Social changes took place in Al-Ahsa as a result of the discovery of oil, which helped to establish new cities like Al-Khobar, Al-Dhahran, Al-Dammam, and Ras-Tanurah.

The delegation of the Saudi Arabian government to the Jerusalem Conference, mentioned before, presented a different table indicating the percentage of Bedouins in the population as shown in table 3. This table shows, as did tables 1 and 2, that Najd and the Northern Province have the highest ratio of Bedouins while the Southern Province has the lowest ratio of Bedouins to the total population. It should

Table 3.--Percentage of Bedouins in different regions of Saudi Arabia

Province	Sections	Rank	Percentage
Najd	Al-Khasirah	1	86.5
	Northern boundaries	2	77.4
	Afif	3	76.7
	Al-Qurayat	4	72.3
	Northern province	5	66.9
	Hail	6	66.8
	Al-Joaf	7	49.3
	Najran	8	31.9
	Ranyah	9	25.9
	Qasim	11	23.4
	Bishah	12	22.2
	Riyadh	13	17.6
Western Province	Medina	10	24.5
	Asir	14	16.4
	Mecca	16	5.3
	Jizan	17	2.1
Eastern Province	All sections	14	16.4

Source: League of Arab States, Delegation of Saudi Arabia in Ri'ayat, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 405.

be taken into consideration in reference to Bedouin distributions that Bedouins tend to consider certain areas to be their own territory, but that it is very difficult to draw a definite line around their residences. Generally it may be said that the tribes move constantly in their own area looking for those sections having rainfall and pasture during the fall and winter. They then return to summer camps in areas close to the streams and oases. For this reason we find that the valleys (Arabic: wedyan) attract the Bedouins, as shown in table 4. Table 4 is used as an example, but it does not include all the major tribes in the country. It is very hard nowadays to tabulate the names of the tribes according to their number, wealth, power, and social position.

Social Structure of the Bedouins

The Arabs in Saudi Arabia live in three main types of communities, each with some distinctiveness as to social and economic organisation. There are the city dwellers (Ar., hadhar), the villagers (fellaheen), and the nomads (Bedouins). The first group, those residing in cities and towns, live in fixed houses of mud and stone. The city and town dwellers are engaged in activities other than cultivation or pastoralism. The second group, those who live in villages, small settlements, and farms, earn their living by cultivating the land around them. Some of them practice animal husbandry--that is raising goats and cattle--in order to support themselves with animal products. The Bedouins, a small and declining people, still live in tents in the desert and practice nomadism as a way of life. They struggle in order to make a living in a harsh environment by raising herds of camels,

Table 4.--The names of some tribes and their territories in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Name of Tribe	Area of Residence near Valleys
Harb	Wadi Al-Rummah and Wadi Al Hamdh
	Wadi Alsafra-Wadi Jareer
Anazah	Wadi Ar'ar-Wadi Aba Al gour
Qahtan	Wadi Tathleith
Utaibah	Wadi Al-Risha
Hwaitat	Wadi Fajja-Wadi Alghal
Al-Shararat	Wadi Sirhan
Shahran	Wadi Bisha
Ujman	Wadi Al Miyah
Al-Dawasir	Wadi Al-Dawasir
Quraish	Al-Mughmas
Al-Bugoum	Wadi Truabah
Subia	Wadi Ranyah-Wadi Rimah
Al-Murrah	Haradh and Jibreen
Zahran	From Rghwat Beir to Ruba Guraish
Bani Malik	In valley from slope from the north of Buthra Mountain

Source: Leage of Arab States Delegation of Saudi Arabia in Ri'yat, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 406. (See figure 2)



Figure 2. Location of major tribes in Saudi Arabia.

sheep and goats, wandering from place to place in search of green grazing areas, according to well established patterns. "Nomadism [here] does not mean aimless or whimsical wandering through desert and steppe. It is, rather, a highly rational adaptation of human life to a severe environment."[19]

A comparison of the characteristics of Bedouins and settled people in Saudi Arabia may be summarized as follows:

1. Bedouins are migratory, while settlers are sedentary and cultivate their fields or engage in activities other than agriculture.

2. The Bedouins live in portable tents, while the settlers have fixed houses of mud and stone.

3. Domestic animals are essential to the Bedouin economy, while this is not true for settlers.

4. The mobility of Bedouins makes it difficult to bring them under political control, while city dwellers are more subject to control. More than five hundred years ago, Ibn Khaldun described nomads as the least capable, among all people, of being governed.[20]

5. Small autonomous Bedouin groups tend to be a source of trouble to the central government and an obstacle to political development. On the other hand, the settled population is viewed as favoring a centralized government.

Why Middle Eastern governments view the Bedouins as an obstacle to development is outside the scope of this dissertation. It should be the task of the sociology of knowledge to study this important phenomenon.

Many Arab genealogists contend that all Arabs are descended from Abraham: those of the north through Ishmael, and those of the south through Yoktan (Ar., qahtan). Another view of genealogists suggests that the "true Arabs" (al Arab, al-Arbah) are the extinct tribes of Ad and Thamud, together with the tribes descended from Qahtan, and

that the Ishmaelite tribes represent the "Arabicised Arabs (al-Arab al-Musta'ribah)." The name true Arabs, however, is also used for the Bedouin's, who speak the purest Arabic.[21]

Bedouins in Saudi Arabia are divided into two groups: (1) Noble or Sharif tribes (asil) and (2) inferior or non-Sharif tribes. Of these, the first claim descent from the patriarchs Qahtan and Ishmael. Some of the tribes best known as examples of the asil group are: Quraish, Anazah, Harb, Shammar, Mutayr, Al-Ujman, Bani Khalid, Bani Hajir, Adh-Dhafir, Al-Murrah, Qahtan, Utaybah, Ad-Dawasir, Subay, Al-Manasir, Al-Huwaytat and Al-Qawasim. It is interesting to note here that the Royal families of Al Saud (of Saudi Arabia), Al Sabah (of Kuwait), and Al Khalifah (of Bahrain), all claim descent from the Anazah tribe. Some of the non-asil tribes include: Al-Awazim who reside between Kuwait and on the Persian Gulf; Hutaym, a large and powerful group of tribes in north and west Arabia; and As-Sulabah, the most despised of desert tribes, who are said to be descendants of the Christian Crusaders. They are found throughout the northern half of the Arabian Desert, roughly from a line drawn east and west through Madina and Riyadh in the south, to another line drawn from Aleppo to Mosul.[22] There are two reasons for their origin or connection with the Crusades and Saracen Wars. First, the symbol of this tribe is the cross and second, the name of the tribe is derived from the words saleeb, which means "cross" in Arabic. This tribe is also the least integrated into the society, partly due to the fact that there is no intermarriage between this tribe and other tribes, and no pure Bedouin can marry a Sulubbah girl, because he might be put to death by his

tribe. Another reason for this tribe's lack of integration is that the tribe does not concentrate in one region but is spread throughout the northern part of Arabia.

The individual Bedouin owes his allegiance to his tribe. Unlike the farmers and city residents, the Bedouins characteristically are either independent of the central government or bound to it by weak ties. That Bedouins should be organized in tribes is only natural in the law of the desert, because being completely independent, they have to provide political structure for their own society. "Political structure is needed since the nomad by definition migrates."[23]

Movement of the Bedouins depends on the seasonal availability of fresh water and good grazing. The family in the Bedouin society is an extended family. Many members of each family live together in a single household, work together, and share the responsibility for the whole family. The young Bedouin, when he gets married, does not move outside the family, as in the case of the city people. The family and the tribe play a major role in the socialization of the Bedouin child. The typical Bedouin family lives in relative isolation in the desert. The child here learns a set of rules, customs, and expectations. The Bedouin is frank and simple. He is outspoken in his antagonism and sincere in his love and devotion.

Bedouins are famous for their love of freedom, especially freedom of speech, and for their loyalty to the tribe and to friends. Generosity and hospitality are typical Bedouin characteristics related to the strong pride of the individual nomad. The Bedouins of Arabia are hospitable, which does not confine itself to entertainment

only but includes the physical protection of their guests as well. The Bedouin takes pride in offering complete protection to anyone seeking refuge in his house. A host would protect his guest, even if the latter had killed the host's father or son. "In desert society it (hospitality) is connected with personal safety. The man who dwells in the desert cannot ignore others in it."[24] Certain trades and occupations are anathema to the Saudi Bedouins. To be a carpenter, jeweler, tailor, blacksmith, or butcher would be beneath the Bedouin's dignity. Some of the nomadic people of the Arabian Peninsula, notably those who raise camels, despise agricultural work. Those who raise sheep and goats, however, like to engage in agricultural work. The reasons for these attitudes toward cultivation should be the subject of sociological studies.

Bedouin Raiding

Among the Bedouins, camel raiding generally has been regarded as a man's sport, which may help to explain the great happiness when a baby boy is born to a Bedouin family. A male heir is at the root of the Bedouin tribal structure, for the number of sons is related to a family's power. Some western writers have looked upon raiding as feuding or as warfare that costs much in terms of human life. But those writers often fail to recognize its significance for the Bedouins. Burckhardt says of raids:

> It may almost be said that the Arab Bedouins are obliged to rob and pillage. Most families of the Anezes are unable to defray the annual expenses from the profits on their cattle, and few Arabs would sell cattle to purchase provisions; he knows from experience that to continue long in a state of peace, diminishes the wealth of individuals; war and plunder, therefore become necessary.[25]

Doughty noted an economic aspect of the Bedouin raids when he said, "Their ghrazzus [raids] and counter-ghrazzus are the destruction of the Arab. Reaving and bereaved they may never thrive; in the end of every tide it is but an ill exchange of cattle."[26] Palgrave observes the following with respect to Bedouin raids: "Their feuds are continual, but at little cost of life, the main object of a raid is booty, not slaughter; and the Bedouin, though a terrible braggart, has at heart little inclination for killing or being killed."[27] Even though raiding was a major activity of Bedouin life before the formation of political states in the region, it was governed by a set of rules. It was not permissible for a Bedouin to raid or pillage other tribal members. While plunder was permitted against other hostile tribes, it was held a gross violation of tribal law if committed within the tribe. Few students of Bedouin life suggest that the main reason for the Bedouin pattern of raiding was the gain of additional wealth in terms of camels and sheep, or even arms. Rather, many Bedouins consider raiding a part of achieving self-respect, reputation, and prestige. Bedouins view raiding as a means of equalizing the wealth of animals among them. Poorer tribes have the opportunity to conduct more frequent raids than rich ones. In general, raiders are generous and share the wealth they gain from the raid with needy individuals in their tribe to alleviate hunger and despair.[28]

King Ibn Saud, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, abolished the raiding system in the 1920s. He recognized the dangerous influence of raiding on the loyalties of his friendly tribes.[29] Some Bedouin tribes objected to this action because raiding was the only source of

gain at that time. They had neither crops nor palm trees nor were they engaged in commerce or trade. The banning of raids was a major blow that damaged the Bedouin economic system. Only with the prohibition of raiding, were poor Bedouins for the first time reduced to hunger and despair.[30]

Tribal Territory

Each tribe in the Arabian Peninsula had its own territory (dirah) in which all members of the tribe moved freely to conduct their daily life. The Bedouin dirah is not a strictly bounded and exclusively occupied territory, but rather a customary one "wherein only the permanent wells and oases communities are specially claimed by the clan [tribe] sections."[31] Only with agreement among the tribes could others freely pasture in the tribe's dirah. Any intrusion from a hostile tribe would often cause skirmishes and sometimes tribal wars. Usually the tribal territory encompassed one or more valleys.[32]

As we have said before, most of the tribes in Arabia live near a valley, but the size of tribal territory differs according to the power of each tribe. By power is meant a combination of wealth (in terms of the number of livestock owned) and bravery. The territory of some noble tribes like Utaybah, Anazah, Shammar, Harb, and Al-Murrah, comprises thousands of square kilometers. Some less important tribes have a much smaller size territory.

It is important to note that a tribe does not remain all the time in complete isolation in its own territory. When rain and grazing is plentiful, the tribe stays close to home. But when rain becomes scarce, then the tribe must move in search of good grazing and

sometimes finds itself in the territory of its neighbors. The tribe must be very careful not to wander into territory of hostile tribes. It is customary in Arabia that some tribes form alliances with friendly tribes. As in the case of banning tribal raids, the Saudi Arabian government took a major step to encourage settling out among the Bedouins by abolishing the hima system in 1953.[33] The hima system which had prevailed in Arabia, gave tribes customary and traditional property rights to range land, including the right to keep other tribes out of it.

The Economic Base of Bedouin Society

The economic base of Bedouins in Arabia comes from raising herds of domesticated animals. In the harsh environment of the desert it is understandable that Bedouin tribes try to increase their wealth. Several factors support this phenomenon. First, the Bedouin's wealth and prestige among the tribes is judged by the size of his herds. Second, a factor which in my opinion is more important than the first, is that Bedouins depend almost exclusively on their herds to sustain life in the desert. Third, the Bedouins know from thousands of years of experience that the future under desert conditions is gloomy, in that there is persistent danger of drought and famine. These two natural enemies force the Bedouins to attempt, when possible, to increase the size of their herds.

After the severe 10-year drought of 1957 to 1967, which was especially severe in the northern part of Saudi Arabia, everything concerning Bedouins changed drastically. During the drought, pasture land deteriorated, most of the domesticated animals perished, and

many Bedouins became poverty-stricken. While Saudi Arabia was an exporter of livestock (camels and sheep) before 1964, the country started to import approximately 110 million Saudi riyals worth of meat.[34] The consequences of that long drought were emphasized in the government delegation report to the Bedouins' Conference in 1965. The losses of animals cited in that Report were as follows:

1. In Qurayat Al-Milh, camels decreased from 22,000 to 2,000 for one herd.

2. In Domat Al-Jandal, camels decreased from 33,000 to about 2,000 in one herd.

3. In the Eastern Province, camels decreased from 100,000 to 1,600; cows from 60,000 to 8,000, and sheep from 270,000 to around 28,000.[35]

The long years of drought had a major impact on the Bedouins' economic and social life. Some of the Bedouins left the desert and migrated to the cities looking for jobs, and some turned to cultivation with only moderate success. The consequences will be pursued in more detail in chapters 5 and 6.

The Camel

Until the 1960s, the camel was the main animal bred in the Arabian Peninsula. It appears that camels had been domesticated by the Bedouins from early times, and, in fact, the camel has been associated with the Arabs in general and the Bedouins in particular. This is due to the fact that the camel alone possesses unique qualities adapted to the geographical conditions of Arabia. The Arabian Peninsula's climate is known for its extreme dryness and heat, and most of its land area is poor in water and grazing. The camel is remarkable in that it can overcome these disadvantages. For food, the camel

picks up what it can, living on the roughest grass and on thorny tamarisk (athil),[36] and this as the Bedouin's say, "is to the camel what flesh-meat is to a man."[37]

The camel is well-known for its ability to forego water for a long time. Even in the summer season, during the unbearable heat of the desert, the camel can withstand thirst for five or six days, and in the winter it can survive for weeks without water. The Bedouins think that the camel has a water storage reservoir which he ruminates when the need arises. This belief is reinforced by the fact that the camel consumes huge quantities of water when he drinks. Some writers report that a camel that has not had water for some days will drink as much as 27 gallons in ten minutes.[38] Although the camel can remain without water for a long time, there is no evidence that the camel has a special water-storage organ.[39]

The camel serves the Bedouins as a general agent of transportation, a function of great importance to them as a migratory people. The camel is capable of carrying 150 to 300 kilograms per animal.[40] The Bedouins also hire out the camel for money to settlers and city people to be used in long journeys through the desert or to make the haj (pilgrimage). The camel's extraordinary patience, power of endurance, and physical strength make it highly suited for the hard life of the desert. The importance of the camel is well expressed in the following quotation from Doughty, "If God had not created the camel, Najd [the Arabs say] would have been without an inhabitant."[41]

Other Animals

Sheep and goats are also raised by some Bedouin tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. The care of goats is less taxing than that of either camels or sheep. This is supported by the fact that Bedouins usually assign children to tend the goats, while camels and sheep require effort from all members of the tribe.[42] Sheep need water more frequently than goats, and sheep are highly selective in their grazing areas. Traditionally, the noble tribes of Arabia (asayl) are not herders of sheep or goats because of their inability to travel for long distances or to endure the desert without water. Nevertheless, some non-noble tribes do raise sheep and goats. Glubb Basha, who lived among Jordan's Bedouins for a long time, points out that the nature of camels and sheep necessitated the division of the Bedouins into two groups: Ra ai al-ibel [camel herder], and ash-shawiy ah [sheep herder]." He elaborates as follows:

> Camels and sheep, however, did not do well together. The camel migrated far and fast, crossing long stretches of waterless deserts which would have proved fatal to flocks of sheep. Camels, throughout most of the year, grazed on the desert shrubs, but sheep preferred grass.[43]

Although other animals, especially horses are also kept and raised in abundance, they form a small part of the Bedouin economy. Horses were used primarily for raiding (ghazu) and tribal war, and therefore have lost their importance after Ibn Saud abolished raiding among the tribes of the country.

In summary, this chapter attempts to depict the social structure and economy of the Saudi Arabian Bedouins today, and to highlight recent changes that have had an impact on Bedouin life. This

chapter clarifies residential patterns in Saudi Arabia and explicitly defines the meaning of Bedouinism. In the absence of definitive census counts, several estimates of the number and distribution of Bedouins are presented and evaluated. The social structure of Bedouin society, including raiding and territorial use patterns, is presented. The economy of Bedouin society and the crucial role played by the camel are explained in some detail.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Hans Bobek, "The Main Stages in Socio-Economic Evolution from a Geographical Point of View," in Readings in Cultural Geography, Philip L. Wagner and Marvin J. Mikesell, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Douglas L. Johnson, "The Nature of Nomadison," Research Paper No. 118, (The University of Chicago, Department of Geography, 1969); and Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, 2nd ed. (New York: Capital Publishing Co., and American Geographical Society, 1951).

[2]Richard Thurnwald, L'économie primitive (Paris: Payot, 1937), quoted in Johnson, ibid., p. 2.

[3]Johnson, op. cit., p. 2.

[4]Werner Caskel, "The Bedouinization of Arabia," in Studies in Islamic Cultural History, G. E. Von Grunebaum, ed., Memoir No. 76 (American Anthropological Assn., 56, April 1954), pp. 36-46.

[5]Johnson, op. cit., p. 3.

[6]Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, Vol. 1, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), pp. 252-253.

[7]Muhi Al-Din Sabir and L. K. Maleikah, Bedouins and Bedouinism (Egypt: Markaz Tanmiyat Al Moj Tama, Sirs Allyyan, 1966), p. 8.

[8]Salah Al-Abd in League of Arab States, Ri'ayat Al-Baduwa-Tahd'irihum Wa-Tawtinihum (Cairo: Dar At-Tiba'ah Al-Hadithah, 1965) p. 375.

[9]Abdallah H. Alabbadi, Ra'yhawl Al-Badufi al Mamlakah-al-Arabiyyah al-Saudiyya [Opinion about Bedouins in Saudi Arabia] (Riyadh: Central Planning Organization, 1970), p. 2.

[10]Shaikh Inayatullah, Geographical Factors in Arabian Life and History (Sh. M. Ashraf: Lahore, 1942). p. 39.

[11]League of Arab States Delegation of Saudi Arabia, in Ri'ayat, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 404.

[12]Al-Abd, in Ri'ayat, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 378.

[13]Quoted in Ahmed A. Shamgkh, Spatial Patterns of Bedouin Settlement in Al-Qasim Region, Saudia Arabia (Lexington, Ky.: The University of Kentucky, Dept. of Geography, 1975), p. 35.

[14]Yusif A. Sayigh, The Economies of the Arab World Development Since 1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 182.

[15]Alabbadi, op. cit., p. 5.

[16]Shamekh, op. cit., p. 37.

[17]Fouad Al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development (London: Stacey International, 1978), p. 13.

[18]Delegation of Saudi Arabia, in Ri'ayat, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 406.

[19]Morroe Berger, The Arab World Today (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1962), p. 60.

[20]Ibn Khaldoun, op. cit., p. 305.

[21]The Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd. ed., Vol. 1, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960), pp. 372-373.

[22]H. R. P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert (London: Allen & Unwin, 1951), pp. 112, 515.

[23]Carlton S. Coon, "The Nomads," in Social Forces in the Middle East, Sydney N. Fisher, ed. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955), p. 24.

[24]Berger, op. cit., p. 67.

[25]John L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and the Wahabys (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1967), pp. 71-72.

[26]Charles M. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta (London: Jonathan Cope, Ltd., 1936), p. 391. I believe the r in ghrazzus should be omitted because the Arabic word for raid is ghazu.

[27]William Palgrave, Personal Narrative of a Year's Journey Through Central and Eastern Arabia (London: Macmillan & Company, 1967), p. 23.

[28]Sir John B. Glubb, War in the Desert (New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1961), p. 25.

[29]Taha O. El-Farra, The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of an Emerging State: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Geography, University of Pittsburgh, 1973), p. 41.

[30]Glubb, op. cit., p. 25.

[31]Louise E. Sweet, ed., "Camel Raiding of North Arabian Bedouin: A Mechanism of Ecological Adaptation," in Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, Vol. 1 (New York: The Natural History Press, 1970), p. 271.

[32]El Farra, op cit., p. 44.

[33]United National Economic and Social Office in Beirut, Nomadic Population in Selected Countries in the Middle East (New York, 1980), p. 114.

[34]Al-Abbadi, op. cit., p. 11.

[35]Delegation of Saudi Arabia, op. cit., p. 411.

[36]Shaikh Inayatullah, op. cit., p. 58.

[37]Doughty, op. cit., p. 651.

[38]K. Schmidt-Nielson "The Physiology of the Camel," Scientific American 201 (1959), pp. 140-150. See also his article with others "Body Temperature of the Camel and Its Relation to Water Economy," American Journal of Physiology 188 (1957), pp. 103-112.

[39]Schmidt-Nielson, "The Physiology of the Camel," ibid., p. 141.

[40]Louise E. Sweet, "Camel Pastoralism in North Arabia and the Minimal Camping Unit," in Man, Culture, and Animals: The Role of Animals in Human Ecological Adjustments, A. Leeds and A. P. Vayda, ed. Washington, D.C.: American Anthropological Publication No. 78, 1960) p. 133.

[41]Doughty, op. cit., p. 292. See also Donald R. Hill, "The Role of the Camel and the Horse in the Early Arab Conquest," in Technology and Society in the Middle East, V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1975); and Richard W. Bulliet, The Camel and the Wheel (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975).

[42]Abdulbar A. Al-Gain, The In-Situ Development of the Bedouin Nomads: A Bayesian Decision Analysis (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona, 1974), p. 31.

[43]Glubb, op. cit., p. 33.

CHAPTER V

EARLY BEDOUIN SETTLEMENTS (HIJAR) 1912-1930

It is the purpose of this chapter to investigate the socio-historical background of the early Bedouin settlements in Arabia. Because Najd is considered the traditional home of the early Ikhwan colonies (1912-1930), it will be treated first. This is followed by a brief discussion of the Wahhabi movement, which inspired the nomadic people in Saudi Arabia to abandon their nomadic way of life and agree to settle out in communities called hijar. The Ikhwan movement and the experience in settling new agricultural communities is the focus of this chapter. The Ikhwan movement is one of the most discussed but least understood social movements of the Arabian Peninsula. The Wahhabi movement in central Arabia attempted expansion by combining religious teaching and jihad with an emphasis on Bedouin participation in the social and economic mainstream of settlements and an integration into the cities' whole society.

Najd

Geographically, Najd is the highland heart of Arabia. Sometimes Arab historians call it the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, or as it is called in Arabic, galb Jazirat Al Arab. Najd is bounded by the Great Nafud to the north which separates the Jowf region from Najd, by the Empty Quarter to the south, by Al Ahsa and the oil fields to the east and by the Hejaz to the west. Even though Najd is separated from

all surrounding regions, these barriers are not difficult to pass through. The land had always attracted nomads, pilgrims, and merchants and Bedouin warriors traverse this area. Indeed, much of this desert land, during the winter and spring of the year, provides the Bedouin tribes fresh herbage for their herds and flocks to graze and grow fat.

Traditionally, Najd is divided into three subdistricts. The first is the southern district which contains the capital Riyadh which is the center of Al Saud political power, both in the past and in the present. Most of the settlements and villages are located in the oases in the valley which cut through the Tuwayq Mountain. Riyadh is located in Al-Arid, where Wadi Hanifah is the principal valley. This wadi runs southward and then eastward to the city of Al-Kharj, the site of unusual spring-fed pools of water and a government farm.[1] Nevertheless, the water of Al-Kharj has decreased substantially during the last decade and the government farm has been terminated. South of Riyadh are the oases of Al-Hawtah and Al-Hariq, the district of Al-Aflaj, and the long valley of Wadi Al-Dawasir which derived its name from a large tribe living in the region, with some of its members settled in eastern Arabia. The second, or northern district is known as Jabal Shammer and is named for one of the most powerful tribes in the north. The principal city of this district is Hayil, the center of the political power of the house of Al-Rashid, which was in constant struggle with the house of Al-Saud for supremacy over the interior of the Arabian Peninsula before the former lost the struggle to Al Saud. The third subdistrict is the central district, known by the name of Qasim. This district, with an abundant water supply and with a milder, cooler

weather than Riyadh, is predominantly an agricultural area. Even though surrounded by a number of major tribes (e.g., Mutayr, Al-Ujman, and Anazah), a large proportion of the population in Qasim is, and always has been, sedentary. Very famous, talented traders who range from the Persian Gulf to India and Egypt reside in the large cities of Unayzah and Buraydah in the Qasim. If the Arabian Peninsula is the traditional home of Middle Eastern nomadism, then Najd is the heart of the peninsula to the nomads. Within this vast desert, marked with villages, small settlements, and palm oases, the great and noble Bedouin tribes of the Najd reside, namely, Utaybah, Shammar, Harb, Mutayr, Qahtan, and Dawasir "whose members of their endless migrations through the desert wove, as it were, the desert and the town into a common fabric."[2]

It is common among societies and nations that people look upon others stereotypically due to rivalry, misunderstanding and other factors. In Najd, for example, the town people in general are famous for their courage and endurance. The people of Qasim, because they travel a great deal, engage in trade, and have contact with the settlers of the big cities of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, seem to be more friendly than the people of Al'Arid. The people of Qasim think of themselves as the elite of the Najd, because they are the best informed, best mannered, and best in handling industrial and commercial business. On the other hand, the people of Al'Arid consider themselves superior to all others in the Najd in courage, in endurance, in strict adherence to religion and in preserving Arab customs and traditions. Ahl (people) of Al-Arid have formed the core of the Arabian Peninsula

and have been well-known for their loyalty to the Wahhabi tradition and to the Al-Saud family. This loyalty has been their secret strength in the past and might be so in a future renaissance.[3]

The nomadic tribes of Najd live in isolation and austerity. The determining element in a Bedouin's life is rain. When rain comes, the Bedouin is happy, joyful, and optimistic, assured of his livelihood during the coming days. He looks forward to good grazing for his herd and flocks, which, in turn, means prosperity for his family and his tribe.[4] But when the rains are delayed, he falls into despair, uncertain about the future. He asks God through his prayers for an end to the long drought. Several rainless years reduce the Bedouins to misery. As Harrison points out, "life in the villages and towns of Najd was ascetic, with few pleasures, that last only a short time."[5]

Ibn Abdal Wahhab and Wahhabism[6]

This important movement is very relevant to the establishment of the first Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia. The Bedouin tribes that left everything behind them and founded the colonies called Hijar, were very much under the influence of the Wahhabi movement. Ameen Rihani, in his book Modern Najd and Its Dependencies, gives this unique observation:

> In Wadi Hanifah, appeared Musaylemah (the liar) who waged war against the Prophet Mohammed and Islam, but was defeated. . . . And in Wadi Hanifah, appeared Mohammed Ibn Abdal-Wahhab who fought against innovations and superstitions and was winner.[7]

The above quotation from Rihani gives us a clear-cut picture of the importance of Najd, as the birthplace of the movement which was a turning point in Islamic history. Ibn Abdal Wahhab had brought the people of

Najd back to the true spirit of Islam. Before that time, they had been stupefied by various superstitions which were not in the Prophet's Islam, but nonetheless spread over the Arabian Peninsula. Deviant religious beliefs led both city people and Bedouin tribes to drift away from the Islam of the Prophet Mohammad.

> They worshipped tombs, and rocks, and trees making vows to them, supplicating them for favours: they raised walis [saints] above Allah in their prayers; they no longer could or would read the Koran; they ceased to pay the zakat-money; and they cared not about true pilgrimage to Mecca.[8]

Mohammad Ibn Abdal Wahhab, the founder of this movement, was born in the year 1703 A.D. (1115 H) in the town of Al-Uyainah, located in the upper reaches of Wadi Hanifah of southern Najd. His father and grandfather before him, were qadi or judges, that is, the chief religious figures, following the path of the Hanbalite School.[9] Shaikh Ibn Abdal Wahhab, like most of the people of Najd at that time, was a townsman of Bedouin origin, for he traced his lineage back to the ancient tribe of Tamim.[10] He obtained his first education from his father, then traveled to Al Ahsa, Al Hejaz, and Basra in Iraq to increase his knowledge. He became an authority on the Hadith (the prophet's sayings and actings), Arabic literature and theology. When he returned to Najd, he was determined to devote his time and his life to the revival of the Islamic religion and to stand firm in his opposition to all kinds of superstitions and innovations which had swept the region.

Ibn Abdal Wahhab's call for the return to true Islam was influenced by the works of Sheikh Al-Islam Ibn Taymiyah. The latter was born in 1263 and died in 1328 A.D. (the Muslim years 661 and 728 H).

The aims of Ibn Taymiyah were for the return to the Qur'an and Al Sunnah (the prophet's sayings), as well as the return to the early Moslems in their interpretation of the Qur'an and the Hadith. He took a firm stand against innovations and superstitutions, especially those that connect God with place or a person. His teachings prohibited any kind of prayers to anyone but God. He permitted no worship of trees or tombs of good Muslims. He also did not want too much personal importance given to the personality of the prophet. Instead, he asked for concentration and sincere devotion to follow his teaching and example. Also, he encouraged Ijtihad, that is, the original and individual explanation of the Quaran and Sunnah by the Muslim religious thinkers.

Ibn Abdal Wahhab did not preach a new religion. He wanted a return to the source of Islam. He was a follower of Ibn Hanbal, one of the four Muslim Imams, who lived around the middle of the ninth century (A.D.) and whose teachings, to a large extent, were elaborated by Ibn Taymiyah and his student Ibn Al-Qayyim.

The term Wahhabism (or Wahhabiyah) which is widely used by westerners, obviously has been taken from the name of the founder of this movement. However, the term Wahhabiyah is literally unknown in Najd. The Wahhabiyah is a term invented by Turkish propaganda and diplomacy when most of the Arab countries were under Turkish rule. Their aim was to create antagonism toward the people of Najd by representing them, to the Islamic world, as the innovators of a new kind of religion not in conformity with the religion taught by the four recognized schools of Islam.

The idea of establishing the first Saudi state began in Dariyah, about 10 miles from Riyadh, in 1741-1745. Amir Mohammad Ibn Saud of Dariyah, the first ruler of the present ruling family, had political ambitions to expand his territory beyond the limits of his mini city-state. But due to lack of resources, his ambition fell short, even though he was waiting for an opportunity to grab power. This chance came when Ibn Abdal Wahhab arrived in Dariyah and the alliance of religion and politics was effected. The Amir entrusted the supervision of everything related to religious affairs to Ibn Abdal Wahhab, who remained in the city trying to rally people around his reform movement. It was a golden opportunity for both the Amir and the sheikh. The latter possessed the ability to mobilize the people of the area through religious zeal and by creating a force so powerful that the people were willing to sacrifice their lives, families, and tribe for the cause of Islam. The two leaders agreed to carry out their decision to create a Saudi state and to make true Islam the official religion of the new state. The following quotation from Philby sheds light on this alliance:

> So the alliance of prince and priest was duly cemented that day of the year 1745; but Muhammad Ibn Saud sought assurances from the shaikh on two points. "I fear," he said, "that, if I help you and we win the world, you and I, you may leave me to seek your fortune elsewhere, and secondly I am entitled by the laws of my land to certain revenues on the earnings of my subjects from agriculture and trade and the rest. You will not ask me to forego this right." The shaikh replied: "As for the first matter, give me your hand on it. And as regards to the second, perchance Almighty God will conquer you conquests [sic], and recompensate you with spoils of war far more ample than your present revenues."[11]

Origins of the Ikhwan Settlements

Historically, there were numerous attempts on the part of political leaders and local amirs in the Arabian Peninsula to control the Bedouin nomads. The first attempt, just mentioned, was the alliance between Ibn Saud Amir Al Dariyah and Sheikh Ibn Abdal Wahhab in 1745. Since that time Saudi leaders tried to make the Bedouins staunch followers of Wahhabism. After King Abdul Aziz conquered most of Najd and Riyadh fell under his control in 1902, he restored the Saudi dynasty to power in central Arabia. But he was not satisfied because Najd was a poor region, so he planned strategies to control Al Ahsa and Al-Hejaz. To do that successfully, he had to build a mobile, solid, and reliable military force. Most of the army which supported him in recapturing Najd was composed of townsmen from Al Arid. Most of these people were engaged in trade and commerce and could not leave their shops and businesses for a long time in order to join the forces of Ibn Saud to march toward Al Ahsa and Al-Hejaz. Or as Habib explained,

> The villages of Najd were the most loyal citizens and most reliable soldiers, but they could not leave their field and shops for extended military service in campaigns far from their homes; on the other hand, the Bedouin in their nomadic state were too opportunistic and fickle in their loyalties to provide the dependability which an Arabian leader required for distant, long range conquests.[12]

Ibn Saud, with a political vision for the future realized that it was not enough for him to control the tribes and make them Wahhabis. In order for him to found the new cohesive national state he dreamed of, he had to come up with new methods, as pointed out by Rihani:

> Three things had to be done to bring the Bedu within the pale of authority, to keep them there and make them behave: three things, two of which had been

> tried by his great predecessors and were only temporarily successful. So he could add a third, he would (1) conquer the Badu; (2) make good Wahhabis of them; and (3) chain them to the soil.[13]

In order for Ibn Saud to reach his goal of expanding his realm of political influence, he had to convince the Bedouins to change their loyalty from their own tribe to a new state with fixed political boundaries. Rihani refers to Ibn Saud's secret in controlling the Bedouins as due to his comprehension of the Bedouin mentality. Rihani cites the following quotation by the King Abdal Aziz:

> "We raise them [the Bedouins] not above us," he said, "nor do we place ourselves above them. We give them when we can; we satisfy them with an excuse when we cannot. And when they go beyond their bounds we make them taste of the sweetness of our discipline."[14]

It must be recalled that in the past, the Bedouins carried out raids plundered and robbed others. These kinds of activities were an essential part of the Bedouins' way of life. The Bedouin justification was simple:

> All worldly goods belong to God. Today they are mine, tomorrow they may be yours. This morning we were poor; by night-time we had become rich. The next morning we may wake up rich but by night we may have become poor again.[15]

Rihani, the Lebanese-American who visited the country at that time wrote: "The Bedouin were traditionally known for their fickleness and their political unreliability, characteristics of their inherent individualism."[16]

Ibn Saud realized the tragic effect of the Egyptian expedition, sent at the order of the Ottoman Khalif, against the Wahhabis in the early nineteenth century to suppress the movement, which at that time was gaining momentum in Najd. The nomadic tribes of Najd and some of

Al-Hejaz as well, later withdrew their loyalty from Al Saud family and joined the forces of Ibrahim Pasha, the leader of the Egyptian expedition in his campaign against Al-Dariyah, the political center of Al-Saud. In fact, it was the brave villagers of Najd who stood firmly behind Al-Saud and played the major role in preventing the forces of the Egyptian from advancing.[17] This incident was always in the mind of Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud.

After Ibn Saud gradually conquered Najd and Alahsa after the Turks left the area he became the unchallenged ruler of central and eastern Arabia. From 1902 through 1915, the area pacified by King Ibn Saud was characterized by a number of emerging problems, which have been described as social dislocations. The nature of those social problems added a new burden to the magnitude of the task faced by Wahhabism, as well as by Ibn Saud in generating and implementing solutions to the problems.

As stated before, there were many cases of defection from Ibn Saud to his enemies. Furthermore, the Bedouin tribes were generally unreliable. Also, tribal levies provided insufficient economic base to run the government. This financial problem not only involved the Bedouins but also was a problem in the more settled villages. For a long time, these villages were loyal to local ruling families and to some tribal sheikhs. Another social problem faced by Ibn Saud was the conflict of interests among tribes, especially in relation to grazing territory (dirah). There had always been the possibility of small or major wars because of this problem. If the central government was strong, tribes would have to observe the customary law of territories. That is, no tribe would dare to wander into the land that belonged to

a different tribe without permission. But if the central government is weak or totally absent, then "merry hell is let loose, and every tribe is at its neighbor's throat."[18] The Bedouins may consider this state of "merry hell" a good system for their desert life, but Ibn Saud found the idea to be damaging to his attempt to create a nation state. In order to better appreciate the problems faced by Ibn Saud, it is appropriate to briefly recall essential features of Bedouin life. Three factors are essential in determining his life style. First, the Bedouin is obliged to constantly look for fresh grazing; second, adequate wells are sparse; and third, extremes of heat and cold characterize the Arabian desert.[19] Further, raiding is an important aspect of the Bedouin system. As Professor Sweet observed: "A continuously operating system of camel exchange clearly solves the fundamental ecological problems of survival of the camel herds in the desert."[20] The camel, of course, was very important in transporting goods as well as a resource of food, wool, leather, and other products.[21] To summarize,

> The camel . . . is the only important marketable thing that the Bedouins have. Sold to itinerant traders, or in oasis markets, it pays for the weapons, clothing, and auxiliary food supplies that are carried into the desert.[22]

Ibn Saud was very much preoccupied with the changing loyalties of the tribes. The Bedouins changed their loyalties according to advantages they acquired from the prince or the governor. "They feel practically no loyalty to rulers, and unashamedly transfer their allegiance from one to another to further their own advantage."[23] This state of affairs among the Bedouins can hardly be considered fickleness, for it is much like changing jobs among the city dwellers.

Raiding among Bedouins, for example, was always considered a sport or gamble and Bedouins were reluctant to give it up at the order of rulers. In the raids,

> Some became rich, some were ruined; there was a net loss on the whole. But everybody lived in hope, and everybody always believed that the next time he would come home driving untold flocks and wealth.[24]

The majority of the population under Ibn Saud's control during his first regime was either disloyal or at some time could potentially defect to opponents. Ibn Saud was aware of the danger of the political and social problems arising from tribal disloyalty. For him to maintain power, everything depended upon the ability to deal with the life style of the Bedouins.[25]

To solve the problem of questionable loyalty of Bedouin tribes, Ibn Saud used his imagination and vision to create a new structure that would cut across tribal allegiance and create commitment to a political leader and state. Wahhabism, the uniting force of his ancestors, provided him with the basis for that structure. The movement was still alive in the minds and hearts of many people in Najd. Many years ago Ibn Khaldun had asserted that the Bedouins are difficult to lead except when they follow a prophet or holy man. In addition to its religious characteristics, Wahhabism could also be interpreted to include elements of political and social organization. Hence, Ibn Saud developed the Ikhwan movement.[26] The term ikhwan is the plural of the word akh, which means literally, brother or dear sincere friend. The Prophet Akha made brothers between his supporters Al-Aws and Al Khazraj, in Madinah, so that old feuds were forgotten. The Holy Qur'an refers to this incident in the verse:

> Fortify yourselves by following the teaching of God, holding all together, and falling not away from one another. Remember the blessing of God on you in bringing your hearts together, so that you who were enemies are through His grace become brothers, and you who stood upon the brink of Hell have been saved from destruction.[27]

The term Ikhwan, as it was originally used by the Bedouins of Najd, signifies the brotherhood which they found through their common colonies, sharing the Islamic brotherhood relations, and putting them above family and tribal ties, as well as forgetting past feuds. To quote the Quaran:

> Cling all of you to the rope of God and do not separate and remember God's blessings, for you were enemies and he joined your hearts together and you became, by the grace of God, brothers.[28]

In later years, the word Ikhwan came to refer to the nomadic Bedouins of Arabia who accepted the fundamentals of the Hanbali Islamic school as taught by Ibn Abdal Wahhab and who abandoned their nomadic way of life and settled in villages and small communities. Their settlements were known as Hijar or "departures" because the inhabitants departed from their old life to adopt a sedentary life. The inmigration (hijrah) of Bedouins from nomadic life to settled communities symbolized the early life of Prophet Mohammad when he migrated from Makkah to Al-Madinah to mark the dawn of the Islamic era. Hijar is the plural of hijrah which in Arabic means, leaving the ranks of unbelievers and joining the Brotherhood of Islam.

In order to implement his policy of putting an end to tribal wars and to lay down the foundations of a new political nation-state, Ibn Saud planned two major steps. The first step was to make the Bedouins firm believers in the unitarian movement which was expected

to bring harmony and brotherhood among rival tribes. This step also was expected to create for the Ibn Saud a strong military force which would be the vanguard of his power in continuing the strategy of unifying most of the Arabian Peninsula (northern region, Al Ahsa, Al Hejaz and Asir). The second step was to convince the Bedouins that a good Muslim must leave his nomadic life and settle down.

In order to accomplish settlement, Ibn Saud created small agricultural communities into which the Bedouins could settle. The idea of combining religious teaching with jihad (Holy War) was "present in the activity of Ibn Adal Wahhab himself"[29] and was common throughout the course of the history of Islamic reform movements. Nevertheless, the unitarian movement of Arabia, in addition to its religious zeal and jihad, had new economic and social elements, that is, the involvement of nomadic tribes in the mainstream of the settlers. During the early part of this century, tribal functionalism and tribal structure were the core of social life in the Arabian Peninsula. Despite a scattering of different attempts and plans that were suggested, none had the vision to solve the bitter feuds among the tribes themselves or between them and the city people. In discussing this problem, Tannous cites the "need for a continuous enlightened program of tribal development."[30] He suggests the following six points essential to tackling the Bedouin problem:

1. To carry out social research in tribal structure and a comprehensive understanding of the Bedouin's way of life. This should be done before any attempt is made to plan any kind of settlement projects.

2. A project for Bedouin settlements should lead to the ultimate objective of raising the standard of

living of the Bedouin community and of enlarging the amount of its social, economic, and political contributions to the national state.

3. Gradual steps should be taken in considering the ways utilized to achieve the best results in Bedouin settlement, rather than a sudden radical change from nomadism to agriculture.

4. Bedouin settlement should be carried out only in response to voluntary desire on the part of the tribes concerned.

5. Any sound project for Bedouin settlement should not concentrate on agricultural activities exclusively, but should include other aspects of community life as well.

6. Follow-up work to study the problems arising from the settlements, and to evaluate the extension program are important and should be made a permanent policy of the newly-developed community.[31]

In 1912, Ibn Saud sent missionaries to the Bedouin tribes of the desert to teach them the principles of Islam, the word of God, and the sayings of prophet Mohammad. Many religious students devoted their time to this endeavor, sometimes guided by older religious teachers. The efforts of those religious teachers, because of their extreme zeal and dedication, had much success in persuading the Bedouins to abandon the nomadic way of life in favor of settled communities. After the religious campaign spread the word of salvation among the nomads, they believed that they would have to leave their nomadism in order to achieve salvation.

Bedouins were encouraged by the authorities to build up the new communities in which they would change from nomads to settlers. Each tribe as it became convinced of the idea of settling, was given an area in which to establish a settlement. Although the location of each settlement had to be taken into consideration, four elements had

to be considered in selecting a favorable settlement site. These elements were: the availability of adequate water for irrigation, the arability of the soil, location within the dirah of the tribe, and strategic location. This latter point means that the settlement should be chosen in the vicinity of wadis or oases.

The first settlement (hijra) established was Al-Artawiyah in early January, 1912. It had an ideal location at the east corner of Sudayr Province, on the caravan route between Qasim and Kuwait. The site also had long been known for an abundant, pure water supply as well as good pasture land. The location of this settlement fell within the dirah of one of the most powerful and brave tribes of central Arabia, the Mutayr tribe. Members of this tribe had caused Ibn Saud troubles because of their fluctuating loyalty, and he wanted them to abandon their wild, nomadic life. The Bedouins of Mutayr sold their herds and horses in the Kuwait market and decided to settle down to devote themselves to the practice of agriculture as well as to learn and memorize the Holy Qur'an and the sayings of the prophet and religious teachers (mutawaein). They would not permit any member of the tribe to work outside agriculture and to learn anything except principles of Wahhabism. All foreign persons were forbidden from entering the hijra. The Mutayr tribe was joined by a subgroup of the Harb tribe, the Al-'Uraymat.[32] This group lived in their dirah in Al-Hejaz, mostly around Al-Madinah and they engaged in agriculture, trade, and other skilled manual work. Because these people possessed the skills required to set up such a settlement, they understood most of the actual construction of the community. Then, later on in the same year,

the Utaybah tribe settled out on a hijra called Al-Ghotghot, located about fifty miles southwest of Riyadh.

After these two successful hijar, there were many others established. The idea, in fact, had wide appeal to the nomadic people, especially those living in Najd. The total number of these hijar has never been firmly agreed upon. The number of hijar, reported by conflicting sources, range in estimate from 70 to 500. Goldrup puts the number at 125.[33] The most comprehensive listing is given by Rihani, who not only lists 72 settlements but gives the name of the tribes and the number of people who would respond to the call to jihad.[34] Um-Al-Qura, the official paper of the government, gives this listing: Anazah, 7 hijar; Shammar, 16; Harb, 22; Mutayr, 13; Utaybah, 15; Subay, 3; as-Suhul, 3; Qahtan, 8; ad-Dawasir, 4; Bani-Khalid, 2; Al-'Ujman, 14; Al-'Awazim, 2; Bani Hajir, 4; Al-murrah, 4; Hutaym, 3; and ad-Dafir, 1. The total in this source is 121.[35] Oppenheim provided another listing for the hijar: Anazah, 4 hijar; Shammar, 9; Harb, 27; Mutayr, 16; 'Utaybah, 19; Subay', 3; as-Suhul, 3; Qahtan, 8; ad-Dawasir, 3; Bani Khalid, 2; Al-Ujman, 14; Al-Awazim, 2; Bani Hajir, 4; and Al-Murrah, 4, the total being 118.[36] Philby, one of the major sources on modern Saudi Arabia gives the total of the hijar at 74.[37]

A majority of the Bedouin tribes of Najd took part in the hijar settlements. In any case, some small Bedouin hijar settlements were quickly abandoned due to the improper site of settlement or the lack of sufficient water. Most of the settlements were very small and insignificant. This is undoubtedly a reason for the differences in the count of hijar by the different resources mentioned. The four major

hijar settlements in regard to the size of the community, the military significance, and the power struggle which developed later in the uprising against the Ibn Saud were: al-Artawiyah of Mutayr tribe, al-Ghotghot of 'Utaybah tribe; Dukhna of Harb and al-Ajfar of Shummar (see figure 3).

Social Life in the Hijar

During the early days of the hijar, most of the Bedouins agreed voluntarily to sell their camels and horses, as well as other materials essential to maintaining their traditional life. Once they began living in the newly established communities, they devoted their time to religious learning and listening to citations from the Qur'an and the Hadith. They avoided practicing agriculture as well as any kind of trade or business. They devoted themselves completely to religious salvation and they awaited their other-worldly rewards when they would become brothers. The reason they did not work was in part due to their lack of basic skills for trade and commerce, but also to their lack of preparation for sedentary farming. But the most important reason for the failure of early settlers to engage in manual work was their sincere conviction that the pursuit of material wealth was inconsistent with their total dedication to religious things.

Ibn Saud then sent his religious teachers to motivate the Bedouins to work, quoting the Qur'an and the Hadith as proof that the Muslim who works is far more pleasing to God than the Muslim who does not. The Bedouins were also told that most of the prophets had their own work in addition to their dedication to Islamic principles. For example, Abu Bakr, the first Khalef, owned many horses and cattle and



Figure 3. Location of the major early Hijar in Saudi Arabia, 1912-1930.

was a trader. In fact, Islam urges the Muslim to work. For example, there is a statement attributed to Omar, the Second Khalef of Islam, that Muslims must work because the sky does not rain gold or silver. The religious teachers persuaded the Bedouins to keep their lawful wealth and urged the importance of doing some sort of work if they wished to conform to the tradition of true early Islam. A rich believer, they were told, was better than a poor believer. Why should the true believers, the unitarians, not pursue the path of the Muslim tradition? The religious teachers told them to go to work, for it is not enough to go to the mosque for prayer. They were also told to engage in trade, which meant that they had to have stock and provisions. Therefore, they had to turn to livestock breeding and to cultivating the land. In this way they might expect to become rich without going on raids against others.

After this campaign of explanations by the religious teachers of Ibn Saud, everything changed in the hijar communities. The settlers took part in activities typical of the daily life in any organized community. Some of the Ikhwan were farmers, merchants, shepherds, and religious teachers. Each group contributed its share in the development and the welfare of the new settlements. The daily life in the settlements was very interesting. Each religious volunteer was responsible for the construction of his family's dwelling. Most of the construction consisted of one room for guests, another for meals, a third for sleeping, and a fourth for storage.

During peacetime, the work involved cultivating the land and growing wheat and barley necessary for family consumption during the

whole year. When not at their work in agriculture and trades, the Ikhwan spent time in the Mosque.[38] Instead of raiding, the tribe was occupied in the plowing and planting of fields around and outside its village community. The people of each hijra community were divided into three classes: farmers--the majority of the Bedouin settlers; the religious teachers; and the merchants.[39]

Tribal social distinctions in each settlement were maintained within these three groups of "equals," (because all are considered brothers in Islam, which does not allow differences in treatment). One subgroup of the farmer class functioned as the ghuzah (warriors), who would respond first to the call for jihad but also did light work in agriculture. Another group within the farmer class did much of the actual agricultural work of the tribe. The merchants or "tinkering" class encompassed families of smiths. They were not warriors. Sometimes they did not even belong to the tribe but came from low status tribes who joined the "noble ones" for protection and stayed with them.[40] These groups could be found among all Bedouin tribes and they performed very important services, such as shoeing horses, making swords and spears, and repairing weapons and utensils.[41] During a war this group would remain in the hijar to perform these functions. Some members of the class of religious teachers came from the same tribe, but most of them were under the direct influence and control of the ulama, in which case they became outsiders. Their chief loyalty was to the ulama of Riyadh, who were responsible for teaching them the fundamentals of Islam.

The Military Aspect of the Settlements

During the ten years from 1912 to 1922, many hijar were founded, with populations ranging from two-to ten thousand each. Some of these new communities became successful rival trading centers. For example, Al-Artawiyah, located in Al-Qasim region east of Buraidah, was the first hijrah to be founded and it became the largest and most flourishing settlement and an important grain center. Likewise, Dukhnah, located west of Al-Qusim and Al-Ghotghot in Al-Arid southwest of Riyadh, became an important grain center.

The Bedouins who settled in these new towns were Mutayr, Harb, and Utaybah, among the most warlike and noble tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. In fact, the gazu (raid) instinct was still strong even among the settlers,[42] and for that reason the military aspect was one of the major features of the Ikhwan colonies. These colonies, besides their religious and agricultural functions, had the function of responding to the call of jihad when they were asked to do so. It could be that this function of the new colonies made the Bedouins think that their old life was not completely sacrificed for the sake of sedentary agricultural settlement.

The three previous hijar along with the Al-Ajfar of Shammar tribe formed the core of the military organization of the Ikhwan movement. Almadani points out that the military organization of the Ikhwan was divided into the following five groups:

1. The Northeast Center at the Iraqi border, which was under the leadership of the Ibn Jabril and Ibn Thenayyan, with headquarters in Lina. The job of this center was to inculcate the tribes living around the area with the Ikhwan creed.

2. The Northwest Center, which was under Ibn Aqil and whose role was to be concentrated around the Syrian Desert.

3. The Northern Hejaz Center, called the Madinah Center, which was under the leadership of Ibn Naheit. It was located partly in Dukhna and partly in Tayma.

4. The Southern Hejaz Center, which was under Ibn Luway after the fall of the Hejaz to the forces of Ibn Saud, and with headquarters in Khurmah.

5. The reserve forces under the leadership of Faysal Al-Dawish of Mutyr tribe, which had its center in Al-Artawiyah.[43]

Each Bedouin hijra was divided into three groups, namely, those who were in a state of readiness to respond to the first call of jihad; those who were herdsmen, who resemble the reserve in the modern regular army, and finally, those who would have to stay in the settlement to conduct the normal daily agricultural and business activities. This, of course, does not apply to the first hijra, Al-Artawiyah, which stands by itself as a reserve unit.

Reasons for Success and Failure

Two major features characterized the social life of the people of the Arabian Peninsula during the first two decades of the twentieth century. During that epoch of history, the majority of the population in Arabia lived in nomadic tribes. Each tribe was engaged in raiding another tribe and the loyalty of the Bedouin belonged to his tribe. He had little choice but to conform to the tribe's laws and customs. Loyalties changed every time the Sheikh of the tribe thought the interest and the benefit of his tribe necessitated that change. Thus, the Bedouins had no particular ties or obligations to the ruler or governor. They had to obey their leader, who was the spokesperson for

the whole tribe--the father they looked up to fulfill their needs and interests.

The second feature of life was the conflict of interests inherent in the different lifestyles of townsmen and Bedouins, the two major groups that dominated the Arabian Peninsula at that time. There were some major differences between the Bedouins and the hadhar (city dwellers) in their relation to the land.[44] There were also differences between them in the position of women, in the level of religious education, and in the way they interpreted the Islamic religion, especially during the peak of the unitarian movement. The Bedouins were more zealous than the city people, who were more tolerant and less strict in their interpretation of religion.

These kinds of differences caused mutual animosity and mistrust. In fact, both groups have long disliked each other, the city people making fun and jokes about the Bedouins and the latter describing the city dwellers in demeaning terms.[45] There was no intermarriage between the two groups.

The Bedouins who responded to the call of Ibn Saud's religious teachers and sold their animals and tents in order to purchase some farming equipment viewed the nomadic life as a transition from the state of jahiliya, the state of ignorance, to the light of Islam. The Islamic religion was the main incentive behind the Bedouin's dramatic change. Before that, it was really very rare to find a Bedouin who knew the Fatihah, the first Surah in the Qur'an by heart. Musil refers to this remarkable change in the social life of the Bedouins of Najd during the spread of the Wahhabi movement.[46] The Bedouin settlements

were usually voluntary. But there were some problems that faced the Ikhwan colonies. There was much importance given to religion and jihad, but little to agriculture. Religion, I feel, was the core reason for the Bedouin forsaking his herds and settling out. Teaching the Bedouins true Islam made them true believers and resulted in their viewing any nonconformist an infidel who must be converted, even by force of war.

This state of fanaticism led the leaders of the Ikhwan movement to revolt against Ibn Saud, considered by many to be the founder of the movement. They revolted against him because he drove the Turks (who are Muslims) out of the Arabian Peninsula, and then came to good terms with the British, (who are considered infidels). This agreement deprived the Ikhwan of raiding the people of Kuwait and Iraq and of bringing them into the realm of Islam. Al-Dawish, the mastermind of the revolt against Ibn Saud, had told him that the campaign against Ibn Rashid of Hayl was inspired by the British for their advantage. The leader of the Ikhwan spoke out in criticism of Ibn Saud's attitude and his clear desire to meet the wishes of the infidels. Al-Dawish had a deep hatred for British policy in the Arabian Peninsula, and he accused them of having "castrated" Ibn Saud.[47]

It is not an objective of this study to go into details concerning the collapse of the first successful Bedouin settlement.[48] But the Imam[49] Ibn Saud, as a spiritual as well as a political leader, was able during the hijar establishment to reduce geographical and social factionalism, to weaken tribalism, and to promote the subordination of tribal unity and loyalty to that of the interest of his mini-state.

As a result of religious fanaticism and of the little attention paid to teaching fundamentals of agriculture to the Bedouins, the settlers were not prepared to conduct commercial activities or even light industry even though they had accepted the explanations by the religious teachers that these activities are not contrary to Islam, and that a rich Muslim was far better than a poor one. As a result of such factors, some communities failed, some of them very quickly, and finally the whole movement collapsed. The defeat of the Ikhwan forces took place in March 1929, at the hand of Ibn Saud's forces in the famous battle of Sabila.

The Wahhabi Movement and Other Similar Religious Movements in Libya and in the Sudan

The Sanusi Islamic movement in Libya during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries motivated the Bedouins of Libya to participate in religious reform. The success of the Sanusi movement was largely due to the fact that an organization of lodges that paralleled the segmentary structure of the tribes in Libya was developed. Each lodge, consisting of members of the Sanusi brotherhood, was attached to a special section of lineage of a tribe. The Sanusi movement, like its sisters, the Wahhabi movement in Arabia and the Mahdi movement in the Sudan, tried to motivate the tribes of Libya through religion to become integrated with the whole society. In the Sanusi brotherhood movement, the foundation for a supratribal national organization which did not try to change the basic tribal structure, was created. At the same time, the movement tried to integrate the tribes of Libya into a more universal structure, that of the Sanusiyyah brotherhood

movement.[50]

It is important here to also mention the Mahdi movement in the Sudan. Bedouin society started to play a major role in the political structure of the Sudan from the beginning of the Mahdi movement founded by Mohammad Ahmad Al-Mahdi in the latter half of the nineteenth century. This movement was characterized by political and religious motives. The Mahdi guided the rebellion against British rule in the Sudan and rallied the support of many nomadic Sudani tribes. They captured Al-Khartoum in 1885 and established its political center in Umdurman, to which many Bedouins migrated. Thus, the Mahdi political and religious movement, with its many nomadic leaders, subjugated the people in the villages and in the cities. As a result, the population of the Sudan became more integrated and internal migration occurred on a large scale. Since World War I, the Mahdi movement in the Sudan, through its use of religious motivation, stimulated many Sudani tribes to settle out in a way similar to the Wahhabi movement in Arabia. Sabir put it this way: "Migration and settlement of the nomads was encouraged as a religious duty which should be fulfilled in the Sudan."[51]

Why did these three religious movements encourage the Bedouins as a religious duty, to abandon nomadism and settle out in agricultural communities? To attempt an answer is beyond the scope of our study and the question should be the subject of future sociological study.

Summary

In this chapter we enumerated a number of major events which occurred during the early history of modern Saudi Arabia. These events

were: the revival of the Wahhabi movement, the early hijar for the Ikhwan to settle out and practice agriculture, the rapid expansion of the Ikhwan agricultural colonies, and the differences between some of the leaders of the Ikhwan movement and King Ibn Saud. The revolt of the Ikhwan took place in 1929, when they were defeated by Ibn Saud forces and finally liquidated as a religious and military force by King Ibn Saud. First, we examined the Najd region and its historical and geographical background as the traditional home of nomadic tribes. Second, we gave a brief historical background about Ibn Abdul Wahhab and the religious movement of Wahhabism, upon which basis Ibn Saud, with his twin aims of creating the basis of a centralized political government and of reviving the concept of Wahhabism, established the Ikhwan. Third, we gave an account of the establishment of Ikhwan settlements, which were designed by Ibn Saud to put an end to tribal raids and tribal loyalty as a stronger force than loyalty to the central government. These Ikhwan settlements were known as hijar where agriculture was supposed to be the basis of economic life and the reformed movement was to be the basis of social and spiritual life. Fourth, we attempted to point out the socio-religious and political factors which were responsible for the expansion of the hijar, and the increasing trends among the Bedouins of Arabia to abandon their nomadism by selling their animals and settling in the hijar. Fifth, we attempted to describe and analyze the social life of the Bedouins in the new hijar and investigated the military aspects of the Ikhwan movement and the extent to which Ibn Saud used mighty military forces of the Ikhwan to control most parts of modern Saudi Arabia. Sixth, we tried to shed

some light on the strategies which had contributed to the rising success of the Ikhwan movement, and the rapid decline and final liquidation by King Ibn Saud himself. Finally, we touched briefly upon a comparison of the Wahhabi movement in Arabia, the Sanusi movement in Libya, and the Mahdi movement in the Sudan.

The early hijar settlements of the Ikhwan fall under the Arabic term, isteetan, meaning the internal power within Bedouin society that induces them to settle. Such change is termed "immanent change" by Rogers and Burdge. In this instance, the two relevant systems are the Bedouins involved in settling and the dominant Saudi society. The two systems have been in communication and each possesses a social structure and value orientation and that is unique to each system at least in some respects. Religion is considered the prime factor motivating the Bedouin tribes to sell their herds and leave their nomadic way of life. Members of the hijar cultivated the land and devoted much time in learning the principles of true Islam. The success of the early Bedouin hijar settlements and the expansion to around 200 hijar was due, in fact, to the voluntary nature of these settlements. Other social factors contributing to the success of these communities include the fact that the settlements were composed of only one or a few clans, and a completely dependent structure and sustenance organization.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Arabian American Oil Company, Aramco Handbook, (Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 1968), p. 178.

[2]John S. Habib, Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the Saudi Kingdom, 1910-1930 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978), p. 8.

[3]Uthman Ibn Bishr, Anwan Al-Majd Fitarikh Najd [Chapters of Glory in the History of Najd] (Riyadh, 1953), pp. 14-15.

[4]Hafiz Wahba, Arabian Days (London: Arthur Barker Ltd., 1964), pp. 12-13.

[5]Paul W. Harrison, "Al Riyadh, the Capital of Najd," Moslem World 1 (1918), p. 413.

[6]As I indicated in the introduction of this study, I prefer the term unitarian movement, but because Wahhabism is used in western literature, I use it here to avoid confusion.

[7]Ameen Rihani, Najd Wa-mulhagatih [Modern Najd and Its Dependencies] (Beirut: Dar Al-Rihani Publishing Co., 1964), p. 35.

[8]Ameen Rihani, Maker of Modern Arabia Ibn Saud of Arabia: His People and His Land (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928), p. 189.

[9]There are four main religious schools of Islamic law: the Hanafite, the Shafiite, Malikite, and Hanbalite. The last one founded by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal is the most restricted and conservative.

[10]George S. Rentz, Muhammad Ibn Abdal-Wahhab (Ph.D. dissertation Berkeley: University of California, 1948), p. 16.

[11]H. St. J. Philby, Saudi Arabia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), pp. 39-40.

[12]John S. Habib, op. cit., p. 6.

[13]Rihani, Maker of Modern Arabia, op. cit., p. 191.

[14]Ibid., p. 198.

[15]Wahba, op. cit., p. 128.

[16]Rihani, Najd Wamulhagatih, op. cit., p. 161.

[17]Philby, op. cit., p. 140.

[18]H. R. P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert (London: Allen & Unwin, 1951), pp. 48-49.

[19]J. C. Glubb, "The Bedouin of Northern Arabia," (misprinted as Iraq), Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 22 (January 1935), pp. 13-14.

[20]Louise E. Sweet, "Camel Raiding of North Arabian Bedouin," in Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, Vol. 1 (New York: The National History Press, 1970), p. 270.

[21]Ibid., p. 272.

[22]Daryll C. Forde, "The Habitat and Economy of the North Arabian Badawin," Geography 17 (1933), p. 208.

[23]Glubb, op. cit., p. 20.

[24]Ibid., p. 22.

[25]Paul L. Goldrup, Saudi Arabia: 1902-1932: The Development of a Wahhabi Society (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1971), p. 184.

[26]There is a controversy among many Arabs about the development of the movement. Was Ibn Saud the inventor of it or just one who used it for political and military purposes? See John Habib's book, op. cit.

[27]The Holy Qur'an, Surat, Al-Umran, line 102.

[28]Ibid., Al-Umran, line 103.

[29]Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 200.

[30]Afif I. Tannous, "The Arab Tribal Community in 'Nationalist State,'" The Middle East Journal 1 (January 1947), pp. 12-17.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Sulayman ad-Dakhil, "Al-Artawiya AWL Baldat jadidah fi Diyar Najd," Lughat Al-Arab (Baghdad, Jumaday 11, 1331/May 13, 1913), pp. 481-482.

[33]Goldrup, op. cit., p. 229.

[34]Al-Rihani, Tarikh Najd, op. cit., pp. 404-406; and Maker of Modern Arabia, op. cit., pp. 198-199.

[35]Um Al-Qura (Makkah), 6 Rajab 1347/18 December 1928), pp. 4-5.

[36]Quoted in Goldrup, op. cit., p. 230.

[37]Philby, op. cit., p. 262.

[38]Muhammad Mugharibi Futayih Al-Madani, Firgat Al-Ikhwan Al-Islamiyah bi Najd [The Islamic Brotherhood of Najd] no publisher given, 1923, pp. 40-41.

[39]Al-Rihani, Maker of Modern Arabia, op. cit., p. 194.

[40]The term class as used in the discipline of sociology might not be proper here; in this case I prefer unit, group, or division.

[41]Goldrup, op. cit., p. 233. See also Forde, op. cit., pp. 215-216; and Alois Musil, Northern Nagd (New York: American Geographical Society, 1923), pp. 281-282.

[42]Rihani, Maker of Modern Arabia, op. cit., p. 193.

[43]Al Madani, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

[44]F. S. Vidal, "Date Culture in the Oasis of Al-Ahsa," The Middle East Journal 11 (Autumn 1954), p. 424.

[45]Hafiz Wahbah, Ja Zirat al-Arab fi al-Qarn al-Ishrin [The Arab Peninsula in the Twentieth Century] (Cairo: Maktabat Al-Nahdah Al-Masriyah, 1961), p. 10.

[46]Alois Musil, Arabia Deserta (New York: American Geographical Society, 1927), p. 427.

[47]Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Arabian Destiny (London: Elek Books, 1957), p. 141.

[48]For this part of the movement, see references 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 25, and 47 in this chapter.

[49]The Imam, Ibn Saud first took this title, which means the leader of a religious community, then he adopted the title of Sultan, which means in Arabic something close to governor and finally, a couple of years after the fall of the Hejaz, he took the purely secular title of Malek, king.

[50]Sir Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940).

[51]Muhyi Al-Din Sabir, in League of Arab States. Riayat Al-Badu (Cairo: Dar At-Tiba'ah Al-Hadithah, 1965), pp. 262-265.

CHAPTER VI

RECENT BEDOUIN SETTLEMENTS 1938-1970

Introduction

In this chapter, our attention turns to some types of Bedouin settlements supported by the government (Ar. tawteen). We will examine the Al-Kharj project, wadi al-Sarhan project, Tabouk project, and organization of the pasture project. We will investigate the socio-historical reasons behind the establishment of these projects and their failure. We will then focus on spontaneous and voluntary Bedouin settlements (Ar. isteetan). This type of settlement took place as a result of the decline of the Bedouin's role in defense, the collapse of the Ikhwan colonies, the failure of the settlement projects supported by the government, and the economic and social changes introduced by the discovery of oil. The impact of oil on Bedouin life will be investigated. A concluding summary ends this chapter.

After the collapse of the Ikhwan colonies on March 31, 1929, most of the leaders of the Ikhwan rebellion called their brothers to jihad opposing the infidels. Ibn Saud was blamed for the following:

1. Sending his son Saud to Egypt to deal with the Mahmal[1] incident, because Egypt was occupied by the English.

2. Sending his son Faisal to London in 1926 to deal favorably with British polytheists.

3. Introducing the telegraph, telephone, and automobile into the land of Islam, all of which were

Christian innovations.

4. Levying taxes on the Muslims in Najd.

5. Permitting the tribes of Jordan and Iraq (who are not Ikhwan) to graze their herds in the lands of the Muslims.

6. Prohibiting trade with Kuwait. If this was meant as punishment because the people of Kuwait were infidels, then the Ikhwan should be allowed to carry out raids in Kuwait, but if they were true Muslims, then Ibn Saud should not prevent commerce between the two countries.

7. Tolerating the dissenters of al-Ahsa and al-Qatif. The feeling was that he should force them to adhere to Wahhabi Islam or else to kill them.[2]

Ibn Saud acted on the recommendation of the ulama, which supported the Ikhwan in most of their grievances (except in the case of number 3 above). The ulama did not decide to introduce these innovations, since there was no precedent either in the Qur'an, in the Sharia (the sayings of the prophet), or among the learned ulama of Islam about them. But still the Ikhwan were not satisfied with any action taken by Ibn Saud.

War broke out between the two camps and Ibn Saud emerged victorious. Ibn Saud sent his son Saud to hijrat al-Ghotghot (one of the major settlements that had revolted against him) to collect the weapons and to destroy the hijra itself. Today, a visitor to the site of one of the most flourishing Bedouin desert settlements will find it in complete ruins.[3] The rebellion of the Ikhwan and the destruction of the first Bedouin settlements in the Arabian Peninsula proved to Ibn Saud that tribal loyalties were still very much alive. Men who had fought for him before, now fought against him and died at the order of their tribal shaikhs.

The basic socio-religious foundation establishing the Ikhwan hijar was very quickly forgotten. However, Ibn Saud continued to support the remaining hijar, particularly those belonging to some tribes that did not take any part in the rebellion, with annual grants (sharha) of rice, flour, and other food items. This financial aid, handled through the Bureau of Bedouin Affairs at the Ministry of Finance, had negative results on its recipients from a psychological, moral, and economic point of view. Subsidies free of obligation led to laziness and a complete dependence on the government among those who received them. It also contributed to the person's loss of dignity, self respect, and self-confidence, and killed any desire in the able bodied to conduct a decent and respectable life through hard work.

Stable political government with its complex international ties and obligation toward the world community had overcome Bedouin chaos and tribal individuality. While the Ikhwan became Mujahideen[4] and later on joined the National Guard, the Ikhwan movement belonged to the past. With the collapse of that movement, the Bedouins were finally and completely brought under the control of Al Saud. We might ask, was the grand mosque incident last year a type of revival of the Ikhwan movement? No one knows the answer to this question, at least at the time of the writing of this study. No information is available from neutral sources to analyze the latest revolt. The Ikhwan revolt supported Ibn Saud's old dream that the only way to maintain his own political power would be a gradual abolition of tribalism, which, in turn, would depend upon a reduction of nomadism.

Ibn Saud encountered many problems after successfully defeating his rivals and making himself king of Saudi Arabia, which at that time

included two-thirds of the Arabian Peninsula. His objective was to achieve a large settled population that devoted its time primarily to protection and caring for plots of land and which was dependent upon the political and economic system of the state. Such a project was faced with several difficult problems. One was that Ibn Saud's revenue at that time was less than one-half million dollars and the needs of his people were larger than the budget. For example, he had to pay the sheiks of the Bedouin tribes monthly or annual rewards to retain their loyalty. Ibn Saud devoted a great deal of effort to the problem of creating an orderly and stable society in tribal Najd, for the Bedouins themselves were unwilling to change their nomadic way of life. "But the hardest task, to all appearances, was to lure people into the adoption of a way of life which they at that time held in contempt."[5]

The discovery of oil, of course, became a very important resource to finance the governmental projects and programs. The impact of oil was to bring significant social changes in the country. After the discovery of oil, education expanded, modern roads were built, communication means were established, and modern methods of cultivation were introduced, including enlarged spending on agriculture.

Al-Kharj Project

A peaceful policy involving land use brought about by King Ibn Saud was an undeniable prerequisite for successful long-term development projects. The government's efforts to expand and modernize the agricultural sector include the settlement of the Bedouin tribes, and the development of water supplies, especially controlling the sail flood and utilizing it for more efficient irrigation systems. The government also

has made grants of arable land to those who would cultivate it, giving them agricultural credit and helping them to utilize modern agricultural techniques.

In 1938 Shaikh Abdullah al-Suleyman, the Saudi Minister of Finance, submitted to Ibn Saud a plan for an irrigation project--a more elaborate agricultural scheme than anything attempted before. The Finance Minister had spent an entire summer in al-Kharj studying the possibilities and recognized the potentiality of developing it into a large farm project.[6] Al-Kharj district is about 275 miles west of the oil coast and is located 56 miles south of Riyadh, the political capital of the country. This became the site of the "great three-thousand acre agricultural project which is one of the happy symbols of the ceaseless campaign of Ibn Saud and his government to bring Saudi Arabia closer to self-sufficiency in the matter of food supply."[7]

In al-Kharj there were large ains (water pits) and good farming soil created by the silt in the wadi. The main wells "are about 300 feet in diameter and approximately 420 feet deep. The average water level in both is about 30 feet below the surface of the desert."[8] Old camel caravan trails led part way down into these ains, and the area showed remains of ruins of long-vanished Bedouin settlements. But during the centuries of inter-tribal raids and the disintegration of Arab society priot to "Pax Ibn Saud," the settlements were abandoned.[9]

The king's approval of the al-Kharj plan was reflected in his request to Aramco[10] for assistance in developing the project. The shortage of food during World War II forced the king to find some new method to increase the productivity of the agricultural sector. After

the war, Aramco took over the whole project, and brought trained advisors from the United States, mostly from New Mexico, Arizona, Texas, and elsewhere in the American southwest, where similar conditions of soil and climate exist.[11] It should be pointed out here that the al-Kharj is entirely a Saudi government project, conceived by the government and financed by it. Aramco's role was to assist the project in supplying trained personnel and required equipment for the development of the project, the cost being reimbursed by the government. But this project, as well as other similar plans in which the government sought water in order to settle out the Bedouins, had little success. Due to the lack of sufficient water and the poor quality of the soil, among other causes, most of the projects have been unsuccessful.

Another Recent Settlement

From past experience with Bedouin settlements, and remembering the lessons learned from failure, the government of Saudi Arabia tried to avoid the shortcomings encountered with the old settlements when forming new settlements. The Saudi government came to the conclusion that if new settlements were to succeed, the process of establishing them should take into consideration the following steps:

1. Extensive scientific research studies should be made of the soil, the availability of water, and the suitability of the land so that the area selected would be acceptable to the Bedouin settlers.

2. Sociological studies and social surveys should be made concerning tribalism to determine those tribes that are more inclined to settle, to engage in cultivation, and to more readily accept some modification of their way of life.

3. Pastures in the country should be organized and animal husbandry should be given high priority along with agriculture. These considerations are very important in improving the social and economic conditions of the Bedouins in the new settlements. It is difficult to have all the Bedouins settle in agricultural colonies, due to the reluctance of most Bedouins to leave their pastures.

The production of oil on a large, commercial scale is responsible for the prosperity of city dwellers. This observation is evident from the yearly budget of the government and from the Statistical Yearbook which is issued by the Ministry of Finance and National Economy. While two-thirds or more of the annual budget is distributed for projects in the cities, little money is left to be spent for Bedouin projects. The nomads, it would seem, should have equal access to the prosperity of the country made possible by the wealth from oil. The Bedouins should have a chance to achieve their goals, either by developing pastures if they wish to be a pastoral people, or by settling in agricultural areas, if they desire a sedentary life.

A basic principle of Islam which is reflected in the government is the equality of all people. While the intention of the government to settle the Bedouins may be real, problems still rest on the shoulder of the technocrats. During the famous drought which hit the northern part of the country, it was observed that camels decreased from 33,000 to about 2,000 for one herd. In the eastern part, the decrease of camels was from 100,000 to 1,500. This decline in the Bedouin herds caused serious problems in the economy of the Bedouins and made them look for a more secure, stable way of life. Another factor that affected Bedouin life was the introduction of automobiles in the country as the major means of transportation. As a result, the demand for

camels declined. In addition, the government's responsibility to provide security and protection increased. These important functions previously had been carried out by the tribes. The takeover of these functions by the government weakened the tribe as a strong political and economic unit.

Wadi Al-Sarhan Project

Wadi al-Sarhan is composed of a group of valleys that are located in the northwestern part of Saudi Arabia in the vicinity of the Saudi-Jordanian border. The tribes living around this area, such as Anazah and Shararat, were formerly among the richest tribes of the Arabian Peninsula. After the drought hit the northern part of the country in 1958, those tribes lost 90 percent of their herds and flocks. The economic condition of the nomads in the wadi worsened as a result of several successive years of drought. In 1959 the government chose this area to initiate a temporary agricultural project, aimed at giving the Bedouins some assistance to substitute for their loss of wealth in livestock due to the severe drought.

The Objectives of the Project

The first aim of the project was to provide immediate help to the Bedouins who were badly affected by the drought. Another aim was to improve the social and economic conditions of those who desired to settle down. The plan of the project was to make the nomads become farmers and to engage in cultivation. In order to encourage the Bedouins to become farmers, the Saudi government project provided the settlers with the following agricultural machinery:

1. Settlers were provided with mobile water pumps to be used by all individuals collectively. The collective use of this machinery was intended to stimulate cooperation.

2. Settlers were given tractors free of charge in order to help prepare and reclaim the land for agriculture.

3. The Bedouins were provided with small manual machines to be used in the fields.

4. The settlers were given barley, cereal, and vegetable and other seeds free of charge.

5. Finally, the government also provided fuel to settlers free of charge for all machines used on the project.[12]

After three years, the whole project encountered difficulties and failed. It failed despite the fact that the government allocated around two million dollars to be distributed, through a special government committee, to the Bedouins in form of cash, clothes, and food. The difficulties may be summarized as follows:

1. Scientific agricultural and sociological studies were not carried out prior to the Bedouin settlement. As a consequence of the haste in executing the project, it was left to the Bedouins themselves to select the land they were to cultivate. This resulted in the choice of land not suitable for agriculture, both because of the high percentage of salt in the soil and because the land was exposed to blowing sand. Hence, from a technical point of view the land was not suitable for agriculture.

2. Human and socio-psychological aspects of settlement of Bedouins were not considered by the planners of the project. It was not easy for the Bedouins to adjust to the new social environment. The sudden change from depending on constant movement to find pastures to the practice of sedentary agriculture was among the major factors contributing to the failure of the project.

3. The project concentrated on sedentary agriculture and did not attempt to develop and improve pasture lands. Bedouinism is a way of life and possesses

certain social and economic characteristics that are uniquely attached to the behavior of Bedouins. In this case, the Bedouins were forced to accept the government offer to cultivate the land, not because they wanted to be farmers, but because there was no other alternative. Hence, most of the Bedouins left the fields and went back to the desert, especially when it rained. This demonstrates the Bedouins' intense love for the desert and the pasture lands.[13]

4. No trained or skilled personnel knowledgeable of of Bedouins' traditions and customs were responsible for the projects' direction. In such settlements, a gradual change with an active part played by settlers is necessary to avoid some of the problems encountered.

5. The Bedouins were not prepared to use the agricultural equipment, and no technicians were involved in the project to train the Bedouins to use the equipment. Al-Farra, in his dissertation, pointed out, after visiting some of the settled Bedouins in the region in 1972, that "in spite of the difficulties which these Bedouins are facing, they were determined to take farming as an occupation."[14]

Tabouk Project

This project came into existence after the government realized that the wadi al-Sarhan agricultural project was a failure. However, there is no evidence that the new project was an extension of the old one nor that it was completely new. This project was also located in the northern part of Saudi Arabia which includes wadi al-Sarhan. The tribes living in the project area are: Al-Huwaytat, Bani Atiyah, Anazah, Ash-Sharrat and Ruwalah. The objective of the project was to settle the Bedouins of the north who were hard hit by several consecutive years of drought. The project was designed to reclaim agricultural land estimated to be around ten thousand hectares and to settle out 2,407 families. The government provided the settlers, as in the

Wadi Al-Sarhan project, with agricultural equipment free of charge. The following table illustrates the number of settlers benefiting from the project.

Table 5.--The number of people who will settle in Tabouk project

Area	No. of Families	Water Pumps	No. of Hectares	No. of Wells	No. of Settlements
Tabouk	243	43	127.5	1,207	
Skaka	930	50	304.3	840	
Quraiyat	1,234	32	510.5	258	
Total	2,407	130	942.3	2,305	734

Source: M. Filaly, Project of Settling Nomads in Saudi Arabia, 1964, p. 71.

The problems that were encountered in the Tabuk project were identical with those faced in the previous projects involving Bedouin settlements. Lack of sufficient water, soil unsuited to cultivation, and failure to prepare the Bedouins to handle the agricultural machines and equipment were again typical problems. Adding to all these factors we must note that the land selected for settlement was divided into small units, 0.3 to 0.5 hectares in size. Table 5 indicates that the size of the allotted land was very small, which in itself could not be expected to encourage Bedouins to settle out (see figure 4).

Organization of the Pastures Project

The Bedouin settlement projects tried in different areas of the country were all based on agriculture. However, if agriculture alone



Figure 4. Location of recent Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia, 1939-1970.

were used as a means to settle the Bedouins, the result would be the death knell of the natural pastures that cover a large fraction of the deserts. For that reason, the organization of pastures is a very important feature to be incorporated in any policy attempting to improve and develop the potential of the nomads of Saudi Arabia.

Most studies of nomadic people in Arabia, whether by United Nations special experts or by Western, Arabian, and native scholars alike, indicate that it is not an easy task to mobilize the Bedouins in agricultural settlements. The United Nations experts concerned with pasture organization and working with the Ministry of Agriculture and Water, have pointed out that it is conceivable that with organized pasture development, Saudi Arabia can restore favorable pasture conditions. Income from animal sources is very important to the national economy of Saudi Arabia, since it is the second most important resource after oil.[15] The immense decrease of livestock after the long period of drought could provide the country with a very good opportunity to improve the pastures, because the limited number of animals would give time for the grass, shrubs, and other plants to increase. Some plants mature rapidly and it is possible for pastures to revive very quickly. In his report on developing pastures in Saudi Arabia, Dr. Draz advised the government to take action to prevent any further deterioration of pastures, as a result of unorganized grazing, cutting bushes and plants for fuel, soil erosion, and high salinity.[16] Other methods to improve the conditions of pastures may be suggested, as: (1) Distributing water wisely, especially that around valleys and oases during the rainy season; (2) organizing and protecting pastures from excessive

use, and working to limit the size and movements of the herds; (3) storing of surplus food for the herds to be used in the event of successive years of drought; and (4) stabilizing of the sand dunes through the planting of grazing shrubs.[17]

Another recent study of the economics of pastures in Saudi Arabia indicated that 5 percent of the total pasture area (140 million hectares) is still in excellent condition, 10 percent is in good condition, about 25 percent is in moderate condition, and the remaining 60 percent is deteriorated.[18] The deteriorated condition is due to excessive grazing, especially around the water sources, excessive cutting of bushes and shrubs for use as fuel, and the migration of labor force from pasture areas to the oil and urban centers.

The increase of population in the cities and the urban centers was rapid, especially after oil became the mainstay of the economy. During the last twenty years, these urban centers absorbed a large number of Bedouins who came looking for jobs, often in the National Guard, the Army, and the Internal Security Forces.

The pastures of Saudi Arabia still have significance to the national economy, because they provide nutrition for about 2.85 million sheep, 0.4 million cattle, 6 million camels, and 270,000 cows. The estimation of the animals wealth of the country is around 8.55 million livestock units, of which 6.35 million units depend on natural pastures.[19] In Saudi Arabia, mutton is the preferred meat in the urban centers. Camel meat is highly preferred by the Bedouins, but some of the elite families, including the royal family prefer to eat camel meat. There are now private corporations that raise young camels for

consumption. Beef is preferred only by foreigners, especially those of Western origin.

Reasons for Failure

The success of any agricultural project to settle the Bedouins in Saudi Arabia depends on several factors: (1) abundancy of water; (2) availability of rich soil free from salinity; (3) preparation and training of Bedouins in use of agricultural machinery; (4) a well-planned campaign to educate the nomads on the importance of agriculture to their livelihood, (5) organizing and improving the conditions of pastures alongside the agricultural settlement; (6) the involvement of Bedouins by bureaucrats in decisions concerning agricultural settlements; and (7) accessibility of agricultural settlements to market centers.

In applying these major factors to the previous agricultural projects to settle the nomads, we find that none of these factors were taken into consideration in planning and executing the settlement projects. The government acted in a hasty way with regard to all projects. There was a lack of careful studies and social surveys of the social and economic conditions of the nomads who had been affected by the drought. The drought, of course, was among the major factors contributing to the failure of wadi al-Sarhan and Tabouk projects.

Recent Hijar

As we have seen in the previous agricultural projects, the Bedouins turned to agriculture because of drought and because no alternative was available to them. The emphasis on projects based on

agriculture contradicts traditions and customs of the Bedouins. As the report of the Saudi delegation stated: "The desire of some tribes to adopt agriculture and leave nomadism, at least temporarily, is the result of the successive years of drought and rain shortage."[20] The failure of the agricultural settlements set out by the Saudi government in various types of projects does not mean in any way that all Bedouins of Arabia dislike agriculture or sedentary life. In fact, many Bedouins acted upon their desire to settle and to practice agriculture long before the government initated any program for settling out the Bedouins. Some Bedouins took the initiative by digging wells at their own expense in order to cultivate the land, even though their methods of cultivation were not particularly modern.

A. Shamekh, in his study, Spatial Patterns of Bedouin Settlement in Al-Qasim Region of Saudi Arabia, states that the movement to found new hijar in Qasim started in 1942, but the movement grew very slowly. Only five of 44 recent hijar were founded between 1930 and 1952. It was the decade of the 1950s that showed a marked increase in Bedouin movement toward sedentarization. From 1952 to 1959, 28 new hijar were founded. The drought of 1952-53 in the region was a motivating factor behind the establishment of 14 new recent hijar. By the end of 1953, eight new hijar were established. During the 1960s, the number of new hijar declined to only 11. Shamekh indicates that the reason for the decline of new hijar settlements in the 1960s was not in any way reflective of a decline in Bedouin sedentarization. He indicated that the reasons were twofold: First, the evidence from his field study suggests that most tribes of al-Qasim region had already established themselves in their new hijar; second, some Bedouins were unable to

have their choice of land, and some failed to acquire permission from the authority to use an untested site.[21]

The early hijar of the Ikhwan were inspired and motivated by religious as well as political factors. In contrast, the motivation behind the recent nomadic hijar settlements was purely economic, especially after the famous drought that lasted for about seven consecutive years. The nomadic people recognized their way of life as vulnerable, full of danger and risk, and they accepted the concept of settlement. Shamekh, in his study, reports that of the 41 recent hijar in Qasim he visited, 20 were founded by settlers coming directly from nomadism. The remaining 21 settlements were established by Bedouin tribes that migrated from the early hijar.[22]

Shamekh found the most important reasons for the Bedouins to settle in the newly created hijar communities was the amenities provided by sedentary agricultural life, especially education, social services, and health facilities. He found that such amenities were the major factors for settlement in 56 percent of the recent hijar as compared to 5 percent in the early Wahhabi hijar colonies. Religion was the dominant factor in the early Ikhwan hijar communities (83.8 percent), but only 39 percent in the case of Bedouins in the recent hijar. The decline in the importance of religion as a major factor in the recent hijar is very interesting, especially when we know that about one-half of these new communities were established by immigrants from the early Ikhwan hijar colonies who abandoned their nomadic life for religious reasons. The increasingly difficult desert life, and the loss of considerable wealth in the form of animals were more

important factors in the recent hijar than in the early ones (22 percent and 9.8 percent, respectively). The difficult life of desert nomadism was a minor factor in the early Ikhwan hijar (2.7 percent), while the loss of animal wealth was not even considered a factor.[23]

Spontaneous Settlement Around Urban and Oil Centers

This type of settlement, as well as the recent hijar just discussed, and to some extent the early Wahhabi hijar discussed in chapter 5, are all derived from isteetan or the internal power within Bedouin society that moves them to settle. In fact, most of the successful Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia are of this spontaneous type. Some Arabian experts on nomadic settlements call these settlements voluntary, in the sense that no governmental, regional, or international organization was involved in planning and carrying out the concept of settlement, or in forcing the Bedouins to accept settlement. Others describe them as an adaptive form of settlement, which means that individuals or groups select their own place to settle out, without any outside influence. In fact, the decision to settle is mainly in response to their needs, which are largely economic. Needless to say, the bulk of Bedouin settlements which have been successful in neighboring Arab countries fall under the spontaneous variety of settlement.

Spontaneous Bedouin settlements sometimes begin on an individualistic basis, but then turn into a group formed from internal migration from nomadism to the cities and the urban centers. This happened in the case of the Bedouins of the western desert in Egypt who migrated to the cities to work mainly as street cleaners or servents in households. In the Sudan, we find the Bedouins of Baggara working as guards

for the industrial complexes and government agencies. Another example of spontaneous settlement is evident in the Bedouins who migrated to the oil centers in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. They came to work for the oil companies and later sent for their kin to join them. These Bedouins became agents of change, whether they chose to continue to work for the oil companies or to go back to nomadism after several years. In either case, they have been affected by new methods and concepts about modern living.

Al-Shamekh in his study on the Al-Qasim Region in Saudi Arabia has counted 18 spontaneous Bedouin settlements located around seven cities and towns in the Qasim core area. Al-Shamekh called this type of settlement hilal. "The hilal seem to be a recent phenomenon in Qasim. The average life of the hilal is only thirteen years."[25] Actually hilal are not restricted to the al-Qasim region, because they are to be found in every part of Saudi Arabia, especially in the western and southern provinces. The semi-nomadic Bedouin may be seen in settlements consisting of such temporary dwellings as palm huts. Generally speaking, the number of sheep and goats owned is small as compared with those belonging to some of the noble, purely nomadic tribes. Settlers plant and harvest some fruits and vegetables. Some Bedouins work as agricultural laborers for the settled farmers, and some of them find jobs in factories, construction, transportation, and civil services in cities, such as Jeddah and Makkah. Some of these spontaneous Bedouin communities may finally establish themselves in one place permanently.

The Bedouins who have settled spontaneously usually live in clay or cement houses formina a Qaryah (village or hamlet), with a mosque.

They keep only a few sheep and goats to support the household and not for the market. The settled Bedouins derive their income from selling their vegetables and fruit at the city market. They have accepted agriculture as a "way of living." Their enlarged agricultural activity utilizes water from artesian wells and springs as well as from rainfall. "Some of the settled Bedouins also work as agricultural laborers, find employment in the cities, and engage in the artisan manufacture of such products as fans and mattresses woven from palm leaves."[26] Katakura here refers to the semi-nomadic people of Wadi Fatima, located between Jeddah and Makkah in the western province. Such voluntary Bedouin settlements are scattered in the Hejaz region as well as in Tihama and Asir in the south.

Spontaneous Bedouin settlement has been a continuous process influenced by many major factors. One important factor in spontaneous settlement includes the tribe's loss of role as guardian and protector of caravan roads and trade routes, and the protection of other ignoble tribes or weaker villagers who paid regular tribute to the more powerful and noble tribes. Although the long, serious, and continuous droughts of 1955-64 intensified the Bedouin movement toward spontaneous settlements, fewer and fewer attempted to settle at permanent water locations. The deterioration of pastures, with the resulting loss of herds, was recorded in a report by one of the International Labor Office experts on nomadic life. This report claimed the loss of more than 70 percent of the camel herds in the northern part of Arabia, with an even higher percentage in the eastern region.[27]

It must be borne in mind that the momentum of the spontaneous settlements in recent years has been increasing, with Bedouins migrating to Riyadh, Jeddah and the other urban centers, and to the oil towns of the eastern province in Saudi Arabia. These spontaneous Bedouin settlements reflect, to a large extent, the large-scale economic changes that are taking place all over Saudi Arabia. Increasing numbers of Bedouin tribes are abandoning their pastoralism and joining the labor force and are working for wages. They either sell their herds or leave them in the care of some relatives. The movement to the cities started in the 1950s and has increased in recent years.

Many Bedouins have settled around the oil centers in shanty towns built of scrap metal (Ar. sanadig). Cole reports that "at least three such shanty towns belong to or are predominantly inhabited by members of the Al-murrah. Although some of them have developed some agriculture, all of them have settled because of their activities in industrial occupations."[28]

> One of these shanty towns is located just off the Riyadh-Dhahran highway about five miles west of Abquaiq. It is composed of over thirty housing units, each one of which typically has an enclosed, subdivided yard and two or three rooms with separate, nonconnecting entrances. . . . All of the structures, including the wall encircling the yard, are made of tin and scrap lumber, much of which has been scavenged from oil company buildings no longer in use which have been torn down.[29]

Such shanty towns are to be found not only around the Aramco oil centers but also extended into the neutral zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, where the oil concessions belong to Amin Oil, Getty (both are American companies) and the Arabian Japanese Oil Company.

In 1962, while working with the Ministry of Labor and Social Arrairs, I was asked to go with another colleague to the neutral zone and collect data about the social and economic conditions of the workers for the oil companies in that troubled area. There were riots among Saudi laborers protesting their miserable conditions, including housing, wages, and medical facilities. The writer has seen many shanty towns occupied by Bedouins from different tribes who had originally lived a nomadic life. These shanty towns were identical to those described by Cole in the previous quotation.

The Impact of Oil on Bedouin Life

In 1938, oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia, but it was not until 1948 that oil revenues contributed to the massive spending power of Saudi Arabia. By 1950, oil production amounted to more than 25 million tons per year. Saudi Arabia became the second largest oil producer in the Middle East, just under that of Iran with her 30 million ton output. As a result of this production level, the Saudi oil revenues rose to about $90 million in 1950. The impact of oil revenues was equally significant on both social and political levels. The sudden wealth had a revolutionizing effect on the internal condition of the country. This wealth helped Ibn Saud to carry out his plans for the development and modernization of the country. Ibn Saud intended to spend some of the oil wealth on technological development in the areas of agriculture and water supply, transportation, schools, and hospitals, but agricultural development had first priority in his plans. He believed that modernizing the agricultural sector would be more beneficial to the welfare of his people than spending money on

education. This intention is reflected in one major agricultural experiment known as the Al Kharj Project started in 1942 by an American agricultural mission headed by Twitchell.[30]

By 1970, oil production had reached 1,386 million barrels, and oil revenues had risen to $1,150 million. Because of the quadrupling of oil prices in December 1973 and the subsequent increases, Saudi Arabia's revenue from oil reached the $25 billion level in 1976, while its reserves in foreign currency, earmarked for investments, attained the figure of $45 billion. In 1980, Saudi Arabia produced close to 10 million barrels a day and sold it at a lower price than most of the OPEC members. This policy of increasing production of crude oil, in fact, runs counter to two basic goals in the three five-year development plans. These two goals were stated clearly by the Saudi government as: (1) maximizing earnings from oil over the long-term and conserving depletable resources (of which oil is certainly one) and (2) reducing economic dependence on the export of crude oil.

Some writers consider that Saudi Arabia has indeed secured for herself "a better position with the world economy,"[31] but that does not reflect markedly on her domestic economy or on the lives of most of the people of the country. One observes that lack of trained manpower remains one of the main obstacles to rapid development in Saudi Arabia yet the government has "introduced more restrictions on female employment" and unemployment is high among nomads. This policy is seen as an attempt on the part of the government to develop the country "without straining the existing political and social fabric."[32]

Another contradiction in the development plans is evident in the first two priorities of the Second Five-Year Plan. These are "to

maintain the religious and moral values of Islam" and "to insure the defense and internal security of the kingdom." A Saudi businessman observed that if these two goals are attained, then they defeat all others. "How can a nation determine to preserve Islam and its own internal security and at the same time throw open its doors to foreign technology, manpower, and other influences?"[33]

Through its capital accumulation from international sales of oil, Saudi Arabia and most of the oil exporting countries have become integrated into the capitalist structure of the world market, whether they like it or not. As the Saudi Oil Minister Ahmad Z-Yamani has commented: "The oil exporting countries are themselves part and parcel of the western economic system."[34] I think this statement by the oil minister explains the policy of increasing oil production, even if that practice contradicts the stated goals of the development plans. Another social and economic implication of oil revenues on the country comes from the new technology and innovation of Aramco, the American oil company. As the former U. S. Ambassador H. Eilts pointed out,

> Aramco has launched Saudi Arabia on the process of social change. It exposed a heretofore languid Saudi society to a massive and powerful dosage of modern technology. It brought a wave of bustling Americans and other foreigners with strange ways and emphasizing productivity."[35]

The first impact of the oil industry on the Bedouin was especially marked in Al-ahsa region, where the major oil fields are located. It is significant to note that in the early years of oil development, thousands of Bedouins constituted a sizable portion of the Aramco labor force and rapidly developed an ability to handle modern machinery.[36] The company attracted the Bedouins due to the high wages

offered. At first Saudi workers benefited from the educational and health facilities provided by Aramco, but they were not allowed by order of the religious leaders, to mix socially with the Americans. This cultural separation did not last long as the Saudi workers grew in number and some began to occupy higher positions in the company and hence became more and more exposed to American culture.[37]

After completion of the major oil industry construction, the company needed more and more skilled workers. Today Aramco employs about 10,000 Bedouins. After having worked for the oil company and after having experienced regular wage labor and the advantages of a settled life, many Bedouins became reluctant to return to pastoralism. From a long time perspective, however, George points out that "while the social and economic forces triggered by the development of the oil industry have been the major factors encouraging Bedouin settlement, the movement towards a more sedentary life preceded the oil boom, and can be traced to the earliest days of the Saudi state."[38]

Other spontaneous settlements were formed when the Aramco Company, for technical reasons, dug water wells near most of the important oil fields. As a result, many Bedouin tribes have moved to the new locations. This has led to population concentrations around the new water wells, and to an increasing demand for water by the movement of new Bedouin tribes. The settlement of the Bedouin tribes with their camels around the oil installations had endangered the activity of the oil company as well as the tribes themselves. For that reason, Aramco decided to collect information about the different tribes which had settled in the company's industrial centers. The company established a

research department to study the immigration of the Bedouin tribes and their original dirah. The company also sent social researchers to study the tribal structure and social organization and the geographical location of these tribes living in the Eastern Province where the oil-rich fields are located. For instance, the company studied Al Murrah, Bani Khalid, Bani Hajr, and Al Ujman.

The provision of service for the oil industry by Bedouins also has contributed to their settlement, especially in northern Arabia and throughout the trans-Arabian pipeline.

> For example, in the course of constructing the trans-Arabian pipeline (tapline), a road was constructed alongside the pipe, and water wells were drilled at the intermittent oil pumping stations. Nomads settled permanently around the new wells and the towns of Ar'ar, al-Qaysumah and Annuayriyah have developed from these Bedouin encampments, where only the desert existed before 1950.[39]

As a result of Saudi Arabia's economic growth and the changes brought to the country through its oil wealth, the Bedouins responded to the attraction of the new economic centers. As a consequence, a wave of evacuation and spontaneous massive migration from nomadic territories and rural areas to these new economic centers occurred. Cities like Al-Dhahran, Al-Dammam, Hofuf, Abqiq, and Ras Tannurah, became new destinations for the Bedouins. This process resulted in the deterioration of the pastoral economy. While up to 1944 Saudi Arabia was exporting livestock worth over $2 million per year, after 1952 the country became heavily dependent on imports. Frozen mutton and beef is imported from New Zealand, Australia, and Argentina, and herds of camels and sheep are shipped from Sudan and Turkey.

Two other types of Bedouin settlements can also be viewed as resulting from the economic and social changes brought by the oil wealth and the introduction of modern technology. The first type is the National Guard, founded as a counter to the armed forces after some military officers in the Middle East, during the 1950s and 1960s, revolted against the established regime. The idea of the National Guard goes back to the time of Ibn Saud when he tried, after the collapse of the Ikhwan movement, to rally the tribes and to obtain their allegiance. The practice of subsidizing tribal leaders to ensure their loyalty and cooperation has persisted. The members of the National Guard are chosen from the noble Bedouin tribes who are always loyal to the house of Al Saud. The National Guard offers opportunities for the young Bedouins to learn new skills and participate in shaping the new society in a way very acceptable to them. Since the Guard does not demand full-time commitment, this allows the Bedouins freedom to go back periodically to their livestock entrusted to relatives. The Guard also is desirable to the Bedouins, since most of them lack the level of education and required skills to work in the civil administration of the government. Since the foundation of modern Saudi Arabia, the tribes have been incorporated within the military structure of the state.

Changes occurring to the tribes in the National Guard are that,

> instead of a direct relationship between a tribe and a village or a tribe and a market-town, all of the tribes have been incorporated into the National Guard which is commanded by and serves the interests of the centralized state of Saudi Arabia and thus the total nation. Payments are channeled to the Bedouin mainly through the National Guard by the central government.[40]

The National Guard is a military organization based on Bedouin tribal structure. However, the National Guard is not the only establishment that attracted the nomads. Large numbers of Bedouins also joined the armed forces, the Internal Security Forces, and the Coast Guard. Why does the Bedouin prefer the military service? The answer is that he believes that the positions of guard, military service, or security officer represent a continuation of the old position as hami alhima, or protector of the tribe and its territory. Also, he likes to have arms because armament was a necessity in the old days when the Bedouins encountered danger and risk. Still another typical Bedouin occupation is in the field of transportation. According to Cole, the area outside pastoraliam in which the Bedouins have achieved the most remarkable success is transportation. He points out that "most taxis in Saudi Arabia are owned and operated by Bedouins or recently sedentarized Bedouin."[41]

Many Bedouins also own and operate trucks. Many work as chauffeurs for important governmental officials in the Ministries and in other government agencies. Some work as private chauffeurs for members of the royal family, and others work as drivers for business firms and foreign companies. Here again, we find the Bedouin's choice of certain jobs related to his view of traditional work. He prefers to work as a driver because he believes that the automobile is a kind of replacement for his camel and because he likes the freedom of movement that the car achieves for him. Distance was always the Bedouin's first enemy in the desert, and through the automobile he can overcome that challenge.

Summary

In this chapter we discussed the socio-religious factors which were responsible for the decline of the early Bedouin settlements. We pointed out the Ikhwan's (the early settlers) main objections to Ibn Saud's policy which resulted in conflict, then a war between the two sides. The result of the war was in Ibn Saud's favor and marked the end of the Ikhwan rebellion. This brought an end to the Ikhwan settlements which had been either destroyed in the war or deserted. It was an historical round in the long struggle between the Bedouins and the settled people in Arabia.

Then, the old type of voluntary settlement based on the religious zeal to fight, to restore the true ideals of Islam, gave way to a new type of settlement with different objectives. As we have seen, the government tried unsuccessfully to settle the Bedouins in new settlement projects emphasizing agriculture. It was pointed out that the old spontaneous Bedouin settlement had emerged again, but with a new dimension. Unlike the early settlements which were motivated by religion, these recent voluntary settlements emerged primarily for economic reasons and because of the attractiveness of sedentary life. Finally we emphasized the major role played by the discovery of oil in causing a drastic change within the Bedouin society. Many Bedouins, stimulated by the introduction of automobiles, radios, and other modern inventions, began to look for work in the oil fields and urban centers.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The mahmal is the frame borne by the camel which carries the Kiswah, a woven cloth donated by the people of Egypt annually as the covering for the Ka'bah at Makkah. The Ikhwan objected to the use of bugles by the Egyptian army which accompanied the mahmal, because it violated the spirit of Islam by the use of musical instruments during the Haj.

[2]Saud Ibn Hadhlul, Tarikh Muluk al Saud [History of the Kings of Al Saud] (Riyadh: Matabi Al-Riyadh 1390/1960), p. 136.

[3]Ibid., pp. 193-194.

[4]Mujahideen, persons who fought with Ibn Saud in founding his kingdom, and for that reason receive a monthly allowance from the government.

[5]Hedley V. Cooke, Challenge and Response in the Middle East (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 88.

[6]Ibid.

[7]George Kheirallah, Arabia Reborn (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1952), p. 211.

[8]Richard H. Sanger, The Arabian Peninsula (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 59.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Aramco: The Standard Oil Company of California obtained the concession to explore for oil in Saudi Arabia in 1933 (A. H. 1352). In 1944 the American company came to operate under the name of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). In 1947, the company sold shares to other American companies at huge profits. Since then, the company consists of the following: Standard Oil Company of California, 30 percent; Texas, 30 percent; Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 30 percent; and Socony, 10 percent. The government of Saudi Arabia has obtained 50 percent of the company and is in the process of completing the whole ownership of the company.

[11]George Kheirallah, op. cit., p. 221.

[12]League of Arab States, Report of Delegation of Saudi Arabia, in Ri'yat, vol. 1, pp. 442-443.

[13]Ibid., pp. 443-444.

[14]Taha El-Farra, The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of an Emerging State: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1973), p. 184.

[15]Report of Delegation of Saudi Arabia, op. cit., pp. 426-427.

[16]D. A. Draz, Report About the Development of Pastures in Arabia, (Riyadh, 1965).

[17]"Report of Delegation of Saudi Arabia," op. cit., pp. 428-432.

[18]Hasan H. Hajrah, The Potentiality of Agricultural Development in Saudi Arabia (Riyadh: Ministry of Agriculture and Water, no date), p. 94.

[19]Ministry of Planning, The Second Development Plan 1395-1400/ 1975-1980 (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia), p. 202.

[20]"Report of Delegation of Saudi Arabia," op. cit., p. 444.

[21]Ahmed A. Shamekh, Spatial Patterns of Bedouin Settlement in Al-Qasim Region, Saudi Arabia (Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Kentucky, Department of Geography, 1975). See also his article "Bedouin Settlements," in Ekistic, 43 (258) (May 1977), pp. 249-259.

[22]Ibid., p. 171.

[23]Ibid., p. 184.

[24]Al-Shamekh prefers the term hilal to refer to spontaneous Bedouin settlements. The term is derived from the Arabic verb halla which means to reside in one place or to become sedentary, in contrast to the verb irtahala which means to depart or move. "The two terms [halla and irtahala] are often used by the Bedouins in the context of sedentary and nomadic life respectively." See ibid., pp. 219-220.

[25]Ibid.

[26]M. Katakura, Bedouin Village (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977), p. 31.

[27]Mustapha Filali, Settlement and Urbanization of Nomadic Tribes in Saudi Arabia (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1964), p. 23.

[28]Donald P. Cole, Nomads of the Nomads (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1975), p. 153.

[29]Ibid.

[30]George Lenczowski, Oil and State in the Middle East (New York: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 271.

[31]Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans (London: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 25.

[32]Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of . . . Saudi Arabia, Annual Supplement, 1978, pp. 3-4.

[33]Quoted in Helen Lackner, A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, (London: Ithaca Press, 1978), p. 151.

[34]Quoted in Joe Stark, Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), p. 283. See also Enid Hill, Modernization of Labor in the Arab Gulf (Cairo: The American University, 1969), pp. 32-50.

[35]Herman Eilts, "Social Revolution in Saudi Arabia," in Parameters: The Journal of the Army War College, Part 1, (1970), p. 11.

[36]Fatina A. Shaker, Modernization of the Developing Nations: The Case of Saudi Arabia, (Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue University, Lafayette, 1972), p. 131. For the Bedouins working for Aramco, see Grant C. Butler, Kings and Camels: An American in Saudi Arabia (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1960), pp. 87-100; Carlton S. Coon, "Operation Bultiste: Promoting Industrial Development in Saudi Arabia," in Hands Across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation, Howard M. Teaf, Jr., and Peter G. Frank, eds. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955), pp. 307-361; and Roy Lebkicher, "The Training of Saudi Arab Employees, Arabian American Oil Company," reprinted from The Yearbook of Education (London: Evans, 1954). Aramco has mostly expatriates in skilled occupations, with Americans and Europeans holding the key positions, and other nationalities from urban background lower down the company hierarchy in the less skilled jobs. Aramco has been slow to replace those expatriates with local Saudi labor despite its long history of activity in Saudi Arabia. See Randey Willson, The Economies of the Middle East (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers Inc., 1979), p. 43.

[37]See Grant C. Butler, ibid., pp. 125-126.

[38]George Allan, "Bedouin Settlement in Saudi Arabia," Middle East International (London), No. 51, (September 1955), p. 27.

[39]Ibid., p. 28.

[40]Cole, op. cit., p. 108.

[41]Ibid., pp. 143-144. See also Fred Halliday, "Immigration and Labor Force in the Oil Producing Countries of the Middle East," Journal of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 4,No. 13 (Kuwait University, January 1978), p. 52.

CHAPTER VII

THE KING FAISAL MODEL SETTLEMENT PROJECT AT HARADH

This chapter is devoted to the last experiment by the government of Saudi Arabia to settle the Bedouins. The project was carried out with assistance from western organizations such as Aramco, the Ford Foundation, and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). These organizations contributed modern technology and sophisticated planning. The Saudi Arabian government, like other Middle Eastern governments, had tried several different projects designed by western experts, United Nations experts, or in some cases by native bureaucrats, to settle the Bedouins in agricultural communities. All of these agricultural projects have either failed, or in a few instances, have met partial success. The partial success achieved does not justify the huge amount of money, energy, and time invested in these projects.

The reasons for failure of the agricultural projects in Arabia are related to the ecology of the Arabian Peninsula. To settle the nomads in agriculturally-based communities is not an easy task, because agriculture is limited, due to a shortage of water, inadequate rainfall, infertile soil, and the absence of modern sophisticated technology. Where irrigation and rainfall are inadequate for crops, "soils are destined to remain useful for range forage production."[1] This kind of land constitutes 98 to 99 percent of the whole kingdom, and there is no more than 1 or 2 percent that can be cultivated.

The Bedouins of Arabia, and perhaps other nomadic pastoralists in other Arab countries of the Middle East, are the least likely segment of the population to possess the patience or skills required for agriculture. Throughout history, the Bedouins of the Arabian Peninsula, especially those living in the hinterland and the north, have traditionally despised agricultural work and they know virtually nothing about sedentary agriculture. The incentives for the Bedouins to abandon nomadism, apart from the religious zeal inspired by the Wahhabi movement in the early hijar, were not sufficiently strong to lead them to develop new, unproven agricultural communities. This is true despite the fact that these projects have been financed and supported generously by a wealthy Saudi Arabian government. The Haradh project is the continuation of government policy to provide a permanent agricultural settlement for some of the most needy Bedouin tribes.

The Haradh Area Project

This project is considered to be one of the most significant, ambitious, technically well planned, and undoubtedly the most sophisticated agricultural settlement project in the history of Saudi Arabia. The project location is near Ain (well) Haradh in wadi al Sahba. The wadi is about seventy kilometers long and four kilometers wide. It stretches from the Dahna Sand and the Empty Quarter and extends to include Jabrin Oasis in the southeastern part of the country. Haradh, the site of the project known as the King Faisal settlement project, is located 10 kilometers from Haradh railway station, 240 kilometers east southeast from the capital city Riyadh, about 170 kilometers east from the oasis of Alkharj, and 180 kilometers south from Hafouf City in the

Eastern Province.

The project is planned to reclaim and develop an area of some 4,000 hectares (around 8,000 acres) of former grazing lands. This area was to be prepared for agricultural purposes and would provide an experimental farm and agricultural training center at a cost of approximately $30 million.[2] The area of the project lies within the tribal territory of Al-murrah, one of the most truly nomadic tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. This tribe is loyal to the government of Saudi Arabia. The area of the project is well located in terms of communication, because Haradh is linked to Riyadh, the capital city, and to the oil centers in the Eastern Province by rail. The project is located on desert land. Like most parts of the country, it does not have favorable weather conditions. The nearest water is the Arabian Gulf, about 350 kilometers to the east. The main features of Haradh weather as cited by the FMC[3] are as follows:

> Summer temperature range: 65° to 120° F (18°C to 49°C);
> Winter temperature range: 32° to 95° F (0°C to 35°C);
> Summer relative humidity range: 5% to 55%
> Winter relative humidity range: 10% to 100%
> Annual rainfall: 2-1/2 inches (63 mm);
> Peak wind velocity: 55 mph (89 km/hr); and
> Maximum average for 15 minutes: 40 mph (64 km/hr).

Dust and sand storms occur 35 to 40 days per year. Also, deviations from the above recorded measures do occur and a temperature maximum of 55°C and minimum of -7°C have been recorded. In spite of these climatic conditions, the new location for Bedouin settlement avoided many technical shortcomings that characterized the old settlements. Water has been found at two levels (900 feet and 3,500 feet), and it is very abundant and usable for an irrigation system. The land is

suitable for agriculture, because it is located in wadi Alsahba which is known for its fertile soil. Dahna provides very good pasture ranges.

Some ten kilometers northeast of the location is an Aramco GOSP (Gas-Oil Separation Plant). This plant will supply all the natural gas required for development of electrical power and other uses.[4] The site falls between three cities, Riyadh, al-Kharj, and Hafouf, which is important for the Bedouin settlers to profitably market their products beyond the region.

The Objectives of the Haradh Project

The King Faisal Model Settlement Project includes the following objectives:

1. The settlement of a portion of the Bedouin tribes in the country, and the use of human resources by providing job opportunities to raise social and economic welfare.

2. The utilization and development of natural and human potentialities in the area.

3. The achievement of self-sufficiency in the sector of agriculture by utilizing the natural resources in view of the knowledge that oil will not last forever.

4. Making the country able to sustain population growth in view of Saudi Arabia's extremely high birth rate.

5. The use of the agricultural training center in the project to train Saudi technical personnel to help with agricultural activities. Also the use of facilities to conduct agricultural research and to apply the results.

6. Bringing the Bedouins into the mainstream of the working force of the country by bridging the social and economic gap between the nomadic and the settled population. This objective also seeks to integrate the Bedouins within the society, while at the same time preserving their self-identity and subculture. It is hoped that this goal will make the Bedouins realize their role in a new, young country.[5] (see figure 5)



Source: Waluti, Final Completion Report, Faisal Settlement Project Haradh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Agriculture and Water, March, 1972.

Figure 5. General map of the King Faisal Settlement Project at Haradh.

The Concept of the Project

The Haradh project was started during the early 1960s at a time when most Arabian Bedouins had suffered heavy losses in their animal herds due to a drought of at least seven consecutive years. Losses were especially great among the previously wealthy northern tribes of Anazah, Al Huwaytat, and Ashshararat. At the same time, the country witnessed an acceleration in the growth of urban centers as a consequence of government spending to expand education, communication, health, and other social services. The benefits of the money derived from oil started to make its mark on the whole country. Due to the impact of oil and the long drought, an increasing number of young Bedouins began to abandon nomadism and to look for work mainly as unskilled workers in the cities. Typically, they joined the National Guard, the Army, and the Internal Security forces. Some of them left to seek jobs in the oil centers of the country and a few went to the various states of the Arabian Gulf, especially Kuwait, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi. The government of Saudi Arabia, after having spent generously on the major cities, became concerned about another part of its population, the nomadic people, many of whom had helped King Ibn Saud to found the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The government felt that it was now urgent to do something for its nomadic people and so sought to improve their social and economic conditions. The fate of many nomadic people after the drought led the government to seek a better solution, in order to establish a more secure subsistence than pastoralism afforded. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the government tried various agricultural settlement projects in different parts of the kingdom. Even though those projects had been almost complete failures, the government had not given up the

idea of settling the Bedouins in agricultural communities.

During its exploration studies for oil, Aramco called the attention of the government to the availability of abundant water in the wadi al Sahba area. Aramco discovered a huge amount of water in two deep wells called the umm er Radhuma and wasia aquifers. After the discovery of the water, the area became a potential area for development and for irrigated cultivation. At the same time, while the standard of living of those living in the cities and urban centers was rising due to oil, the standard of living of nomadic people was declining for reasons mentioned earlier. Hence, the development of projects to fit the Bedouin mode of life was very important on the government's priority list. It was the government's aim to have oil wealth benefit all groups in the country, settlers, villagers, and nomads alike. The government of Saudi Arabia considered the settling of the Bedouins a very significant objective in the overall economic development policy.

The Haradh project was initiated by the government in response to and in accord with recommendations presented by the Ford Foundation.[6] This report given to the Saudi government summarized the Haradh project development program objectives as a series of changes from:

1. kinship to citizenship;
2. isolated camp life to community life;
3. nomadic pastoralism to modern farming;
4. individualism to cooperative participation;
5. traditional technology to modern technology; and
6. tribal participation as a kinsman to national participation as a citizen.[7]

The report suggested that Bedouin development can be achieved through the social processes of socialization, sedentarization, and modernization. The report pointed out that these three processes are the important social means through which the Bedouin can become full participant members in the national society. But the report stopped short of specifying effective methods of achieving the processes mentioned. The report stated that Bedouinism in Arabia had developed and had survived as the most efficient way to earn a livelihood under the harsh environmental conditions of the Arabian desert. On the other hand, the persistence of nomadism developed in Bedouin society a set of social norms and values that govern social conduct, role in the tribe, relationship to fellow members, and expectations the tribe demands from each other. These social values, customs, and traditions determine the Bedouin's behavior.

Some of these social values contributed much to the Bedouin's security and safety in the past, but today, these patterns may be drawbacks to his development. Two examples are given in the Ford Foundation report to illustrate the problems of development among Bedouins in Saudi Arabia. First, the Bedouin's hospitality is limitless, and second, he is a "man who lives for the day and with no concern for tomorrow and who enjoys peace of mind."[8] These two examples of the values of Bedouinism were seen by the rural development specialists of the Ford Foundation as drawbacks to development. Due to these attributes of social ethos, Bedouins would be prevented from accumulating wealth and saving for the future. Saving and investment are two elements considered necessary for economic development in the highly advanced

technological countries, but they are not part of the Bedouin system of values.

The authors of the Ford Foundation report are criticized by Cole, a western scholar, for their lack of understanding of Bedouin society. Cole spent eighteen months with Al Murrah in the desert regions of eastern and southeastern Saudi Arabia, lived with the tribe, and eventually became an honorary member. In Nomads of the Nomads, Cole states:

> While the author of this report [Ford Foundation] may have been a victim of his own cultural biases in favor of conscious citizenship (which may be said to be sorely lacking in the western world) and the primary family as the basic productive unit in a competitive, capitalistic economy, there is no reason to believe that any of the Saudi personnel involved in the program were consciously interested in creating alienated individualists out of the Bedouins.[9]

The aim of the personnel of the Ministry of Agriculture was altruistic--to change the insecure Bedouin pastoralism to a better way of life. The Ford Foundation report revealed to the Saudi government that very little data were available on the subject of Bedouinism and Debedouinism. Despite the lack of important knowledge about the Bedouins of Arabia, nevertheless the report did not hesitate to recommend the expenditure of large sums to drastically change the economic and family structure of a major segment of Arabian society.

This change in the Bedouin's life, deeply rooted in Bedouin ethos, was made without even consulting those to be subjected to dramatic change. "The models envisioned for this new 'debedouinized' society were taken directly [though perhaps unconsciously] from western [American] society."[10]

After the discovery of oil and the introduction of western technology, the country began to experience a major structural upheaval in

the economic activities of the population as well as in the social values of the society. At the same time, we find a significant number of the younger, educated generation consciously trying to preserve some cultural traits of a tribal, kin-oriented society.

The westernized model for settling the Bedouins was criticized sharply by F. Bashir, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Planning, who originally was a Bedouin himself. He made the statement that everything is imported in Saudi Arabia, and ironically, this even includes the ideas that the settlement of African tribes in Africa or American Indians in the United States are applicable to Bedouin settlement in Saudi Arabia.[11] This happened even though we know that there are sharp differences between Saudi Bedouin traditions, on the one hand, and African and American Indians, on the other.

Stages of Haradh Project

King Faisal's project for the settlement of Al-Murrah tribe in Haradh may be considered the first of its kind in Saudi Arabia and perhaps in neighboring countries as well. The significance of the project stems from the following two premises:

1. This project will be the first complete and integrated project aimed at transforming an important number of people from existing nomadic pastoralism to settled, agricultural life.

2. The project is a pilot project that could be copied on a limited scale in the settlement of larger tribes in the areas that fall under the influence of such tribes.

The success or failure of this pilot project would have far-reaching effects on the future of settlement projects. The outcome of this experiment would undoubtedly affect the government's attitude toward its

policy concerning Bedouin settlements. If the project failed, it would mean that the country would continue to observe the exodus of Bedouins migrating in large numbers to the cities and urban centers. The consequences of such an exodus would be the draining of manpower resources from large areas, and adding new strains on the already congested cities and urban centers.

Envisioned by the project is the development of a planned agricultural community to introduce a "green revolution" into the heart of the desert, capable of supporting a local community of several thousand persons. The project consists of three important stages: (1) the establishment of an experimental farm covering an area of one hundred acres; (2) the establishment of an agricultural training center to train Saudi Arabians in technical matters concerning mechanized farming in the desert; and (3) the reclamation of 10,000 acres to absorb 1,000 Bedouin tribal families in the area.[12] During this stage, the government plans to construct six model villages built along the wadi on barren ground, well above the high water line, in case of floods which occur about every one-hundred years. One village is planned for each subtribe and one for the heterogeneous population.[13] The purpose in the latter is to attract those Bedouins who are not yet ready for sedentary life in irrigated agriculture.

Factors in Success or Failure

As mentioned before, the four ecological conditions necessary to successful Bedouin settlement (abundant water, good soil, a range for grazing, and favorable location in terms of communication and markets) are all present at Haradh project. For these reasons the government

was ready to undertake this highly ambitious and sophisticated settlement project.

Availability of water. The source of available water in the Haradh area is ground water. The Wakuti Consulting Company estimated that 12,000 acres would require at least 84,000 acre/feet of water per year. This volume is equivalent to 42,871,000 gallons every day (or 1,000,000 42-gallon barrels per day). For that reason the drilling of 50 deep water wells is necessary to meet this demand.[14] The available water to be utilized in this agricultural project comes from two major aquifers which are present in the subsurface at a reasonable drilling depth. As the outcrop area is crossed from west to east, progressively younger sediments are encountered. This report indicates that:

> water table conditions are found on outcrop, and artesian conditions exist to the east. These artesian conditions range from non-flowing to flowing, as the topographic gradient is greater than the hydraulic gradient.[15]

The two aquifers utilized for the purpose of the project are umm er Radhuma and Wasia. The quality of both aquifers--as a result of the studies done by Aramco in the area--is considered very suitable for agriculture.[16]

The irrigation area. The center of the Haradh area is the 40 km. long irrigation area in the wadi al Sahba. Wadi al Sahba starts just east of the Dahna dune belt. A total of 50 deep water wells equipped with electric submersible pumps, each with a capacity of 300 cbm/hour, pump the fresh water into two main canals and about 25 pumps are installed on each side of the wadi. Lateral irrigation ditches run from both sides to the middle of the wadi. The irrigation canals are prefabricated concrete elements of parabolic forms, resting on saddles

above the ground.[17] Three systems of irrigation are used in Haradh project, namely, open concrete canal systems, low-pressure pipe system, and sprinkler system. Wadi al-Sahba is known for its fertile soil and alfalfa is cultivated for cattle and sheep. Planting alfalfa in the area for a long time is one of the methods of enriching the soil. With alfalfa an essential, other crops grown will be barley and oats for fodder, and some rice. All kinds of vegetables are grown here, including tomatoes, melons, cucumbers, and carrots. For nomadic grazing, the location is excellent because the Dahna dune belt provides an excellent range and requires only a small yearly rainfall to produce good pasture. All the nearby important cities are connected to Haradh through railroads, highways, and airplanes which makes the site excellent in terms of communication. In addition to the natural resources just mentioned, another favorable factor in the Haradh project relates to human resources, namely the Al-Murrah tribe. Because of the importance of the human factor in the project, we will spend some time discussing the historical and social background of the Al-Murrah.

The Al-Murrah Tribe

Historical Background. The tribe traces its ancestry to Qahtan, the progenitor of the southern Arabs. It is one of the largest and most powerful tribes of the southern Arabian Peninsula. This tribe is a very hardy, noble nomadic people who are primarily dwellers in the sands. They are camel raisers and are well-known for their abilities as trackers and hunters.[18] Thomas, Harrison, Philby, Dickson, and Thesiger[19] are among those who have written about this powerful but little known tribe. All of these writers make some mention of

Al-Murrah's mysterious habitat, its folklore, its fairy tales, and the amazing tracking abilities of its members. The Al-Murrah are a "wild" and proud people and have the reputation of being especially loyal supporters of the government of Saudi Arabia. This support has lasted ever since King Ibn Saud's family, in exile from Riyadh, sought and received asylum with the Al-Murrah tribe. There is no recorded incident of defection on the part of the tribe, nor have they ever joined a tribe hostile to the regime of King Ibn Saud.

Current Status. As is the case of modern Saudi Arabia, there is no accurate population census for the Bedouins or for this tribe. However, the tribe is estimated to consist of about 10,000 persons, although some estimates go as high as 36,000. Cole estimated their number to be about 15,000 people. Al-Murrah is one of the most noble (asil) and distinguished tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. They are very well-known for their devotion to true Bedouin traditions, and for their love of nomadism and the wild life of the Arabian desert.

Most members of Al-Murrah originally raised camels, but due to declining importance of camels in transportation and the abolishing of tribal raids Al-Murrah, like other tribes, has changed to sheep-raising. The change from camels to sheep and goats is directly attributable to the development of underground water resources by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water through the drilling of deep wells operated by mechanical pumps. The Bedouins increasingly use trucks to move their herds from one pasture to another. In the past, the camel was the only animal that could go for days and even weeks in search of grazing land. Sheep and goats do not have the ability to forego water for a long time

and, for that reason, must be kept close to springs and streams of water. The development of ground water resources and the introduction of trucks and pick-ups have contributed to the change from camel raising to sheep and goat herding.

Despite extremely difficult conditions faced in nomadic life, some Al-Murrah members broke with strong nomadic tradition and joined the masses of migrants to the cities and oil centers looking for work. Some Al-Murrah Bedouins work for the oil company (Aramco) at Abqaiq or Ras Tannurah, or for other industrial and agricultural projects in Dammam and Hafouf, or engage in the services of the government branches in the Eastern Province. The Al-Murrah Bedouins who engage in work outside their territory (dirah), return to their people during vacations to strengthen their ties with fellow members of their lineage and tribe.

The Al-Murrah Territory

The traditional territory of Al-Murrah is bordered in the west by the Sands of the Dahna, and runs south across the central part of the Empty Quarter (the Ruba'al Khali). Tribe members roam in the desert where they find water and good grazing from the southern edge of the Ruba'al Khali to al-Dhafrah. Some members of Al-Murrah tribe also live on the Qatar Peninsula. In the past, the Al-Murrah seldom ranged farther north than the trade route from Al-Uqair to Hafouf. But, since the establishment of the land peace policy by the late King Ibn Saud, the Al-Murrah have roamed as far as the Kuwait borders.[20] The early home of the Al-Murrah tribe was in southwestern Arabia. Although the tribe has migrated (like some other southern tribes) in a northeastern direction, this tribe still has ties with kin groups in Najran area and

its vicinity. Cole, referring to dirat Al-Murrah which is located within the national boundaries of the modern Saudi Arabia, covers around 250,000 square miles and this by far is the largest and less inhabited territory of any tribe in the Arabian Peninsula. The traditional northern boundary of diraht Al-Murrah is around Al-Ahsa in the eastern region, but during the winter and spring seasons, they move for pasture as far as Kuwait and southern Iraq. "Their own traditional wells, to which they claim exclusive rights, are located from immediately south of al-Hasa all the way into the central sands of the Rub' al-Khali, with another set of wells in the Najran area."[21]

As we have mentioned in chapter 4, each Bedouin tribe has its own dirah, the only territory on which the members of the tribe can move and graze freely. Nevertheless, each tribal territory (dirah) is not strictly bounded, but rather is a customary territory. This means that each tribal shaikh and all members of the tribe know the approximate limits of their dirah. Each tribe's territory is recognized by the other tribes and any encroachment will be met by force. The most noble (Asil) tribes of Arabia have a large dirah, and less noble tribes, smaller territories. Some weaker tribes seek protection from the more powerful tribes and in this case they use the pastures of the latter tribe. In some cases, due to the failure of the pasture to provide the herds with fodder, the tribe might seek permission to pasture in another tribe's dirah. In most cases such permission is granted.

At the present time, the tribal boundaries are losing their significance. On one hand, this is due to the growth of a strong central government, which has an interest in creating a modern society built on peace and order for the welfare of all inhabitants. A strong central

government makes the old inter-tribal disputes over water and grazing rights practically impossible. On the other hand, it is due to the fact that the Bedouins increasingly realize that nomadic life has lost its former attraction. This has been brought about by the growing feeling that tribal allegiance has been undermined by the weakened political and economic functions of the tribe and the newly-growing feeling of national consciousness and solidarity.

The dirah of Al-Murrah reaches across the gravel plains, contains water wells, clean sands, fresh air, and the best plants for their herds. Haradh and Jabrin oases, which are about sixty km. south of the Haradh settlement project, are considered by many members of the tribe to be the main areas of concentration. During the summer many members of Al-Murrah go back to the Jabrin oasis to plant trees. (see figure 6)

Social Organization

> Few major Arabian tribes have been as greatly maligned and misunderstood as Al-Murrah. They have been characterized as savage, treacherous, predatory, and virtually pagan; they have been accused of speaking a dialect unintelligible to other Arabs; and it has even been suggested that they are aboriginal survivors of pre-Arab inhabitants of the country. . . . "But perhaps their evil reputation," states one defamatory description of them in a moment of honest reflection, "is due in some degree to the small knowledge of them possessed by the outside world."[22]

Kinship is the primary organizing principle of each tribe in Arabia. The normal family unit is the extended family, and several extended families form lineages. Lineages are related through common descent from a certain male ancestor. The lineages consist of extended families whose actual relationship is known and their common interests are very important. In this case, the lineage (Ar. Fakhd or Ashirah) is the



Figure 6. The Dirah of the Al-Murrah Tribe.

unit within which most economic and social problems are to be dealt with. This unit gains its importance from the fact that some families form a solid and coherent unit as far as their movement and access to water rights is concerned.

The classification of the Bedouin community into its units and the names and the sizes of these units are different from one tribe to another and from one region to another in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. According to Baer,[23] the following are the main units into which the Bedouin community is generally divided:

1. The extended patriarchal family, which is considered the basic unit of the Bedouin community. The name given to this unit is usually ahl, a'ilah, and ahl al-bait, with all these different terms being referred to in English as "family."

2. A group of families having a common male ancestor five to seven generations ago is called by different tribes a hamulah, a ashirah, or a fakhd (which in Arabic means "thigh"). The latter term is used by Al-Murrah. The English term for this unit is "lineage." Among some Bedouin tribes this group is the unit of ownership of wells and land. This unit (Fakhd) camps during the summer as a group around its own wells.

3. The tribe is known in some of the Arab countries such as Iraq, as the ashirah, but this unit is referred to as the qabilah in Cyrenaica, Egypt, and Sudan. While members of one tribe consider themselves to be related cousins (Ar. awlad ala'm), the tribal unit is primarily political. Hence, the tribe will include refugees, emigrants from other weaker tribes, and persons under its protection. The whole tribe is held together as a unit by common martial aims. It serves as the protector of an area of settlements which pay it Khuwa.[24] Each tribe is headed by a shaikh or amir. His political power and social position is generally hereditary, within specific families, but it is not necessarily the position of the tribal head that passes from father to son. The shaikh is expected to settle conflicts and disputes which might arise within the tribe. He also carries out his responsibilities in making decisions in the affairs of movement, war,

and settling feuds with other tribes. In most important matters facing the tribe, such as declaring war on another tribe, the shaikh is advised by a group of wise and experienced elders from the tribe, that is, the council of the tribe (majlis). The shaikh also represents his group in external contacts and collects government taxes (zakat) from the tribe's members.

4. A coalition or federation of several tribes sometimes is formed under pressure of intertribal war. Examples of such protective federations, are: (a) Harb-Mutayr; (b) Dhafir-Shammar and Alawazim; and (c) Al-Ujman-Al-Murrah. These federations of tribes have blood relationships in Bedouin tradition and law. Of the Al-Murah tribe, Cole says:

> The most basic unit of their society is the patrilocal household composed of an old man and an old woman, their sons and their sons' wives, and their children. Households average about seven people. Above the level of the household is the lineage which includes all the people descended from a male ancestor who lived about five generations ago; a lineage averages about fifty households. From four to six lineages unite, according to the patterns of patrilocal descent, to form clans. The Al-Murrah tribe, which includes all the descendants of Murrah, is composed of seven clans.[25]

Lineages of Al-Murrah are essentially equal in size, wealth, power, and social status. This equality Cole relates to ecological limits, the abundancy of water in the wells, and surrounding pastures to support herds and tents in certain numbers. Although size and locations of households may vary, they must share in the collective responsibilities with all members of the lineage. In the past, the lineage was a military unit, with a leader chosen from the lineage. Now tribal war belongs to the past and the lineage now has no war leader and no council of elders. But the lineage has kept its own camel brand (wasm), war cry, and other symbols even though Al Murrah, like most tribes of Saudi Arabia, has been incorporated into the National Guard. Apart from its division into households and lineages, Al Murrah is divided into seven

different clans. Four to six lineages form a clan for which Al Murrah uses the term gabilah. This term is usually referred to as tribe in English.

The clans are residual units and have no major role in the economic organization of Al-Murrah, but the clans are very important as political units. The political activities of the clan include, among others, to defend one's resources, to gain concessions from the government, to seek vengeance, and to solve legal disputes. All such activities involve the support of the clan as a whole, and the amir takes his part in making decisions in all the previous activities. In any political matter, each Al-Murrah individual or lineage knows that he can count on the support of all lineages of the clan.[26] Figure 7 shows the tribal social structure of Al Murrah tribe.

As mentioned before, the Al Murrah are very famous for their ability as trackers of humans as well as of game. It is said that Al Murrah skill is so great that in following the tracks of a human female, a tracker is able to say whether the person was married or single, and whether or not the woman is pregnant. Their ability to track is shown by the fact that a Marri tracker is assigned to a police department in Najd and in the Eastern Province. The individual footprint alone can provide the skilled tracker with much valuable information about that individual. He knows from the footprints whether the person was a man or a woman, old or young, a relative, or from another tribe. The Murrah can follow the faint tracks of men and animals over terrain that appears impressionless. In Saudi courts, the tracker's testimony is considered comparable to that of a fingerprint expert in the western



Figure 7. Lineages and Clans of the Al-Murrah Tribe.
(Source: Aramco Company, Al-Murrah (Report, n.d.), p. 15.

world.[27]

The Al-Murrah also are known for their remarkable sense of direction. They roam the Arabian desert by identifying the stars and by knowing the location of the best areas for grazing. They know all geographical routes and features of their territory. They also know a great deal about the desert's natural resources and vegetation, and they can locate easily the best plants for camels and sheep. They are a very faithful and religious people, for they cannot live in harsh environments without spiritual beliefs to reinforce their confidence and maintain high morale.[28]

Economic Conditions

The Bedouins of the Arabian Peninsula used to refer to themselves as ahl al-ibair, the people of the camel. This was true at least in the past, because of their almost complete dependence upon the camel for transportation, food, and other necessities of life (see chapter 4). This reference applies to Al-Murrah tribe more convincingly than it does to many of the other tribes of Arabia. Without camels, Al-Murrah could not live in the sands or even survive the harsh environment of the Empty Quarter, for camel milk was their principal (and often sole) food for months.

In comparing the Al-Murrah wealth to some tribes of the northern parts of the Arabian peninsula such as Anazah, they seem to be a poor and wretched lot. The tents of the most important persons of the tribe are small and light, and their personal belongings are pitifully scant, despite the fact that Al-Murrah is among the richest in number of camels. But the declining importance of camels in recent years has

forced the Al-Murrah to seek other ways to increase their incomes. Due to the harsh environment in most of the Al-Murrah territory, production possibilities are very limited. The two major sources of income derive from herding and some agricultural activities, especially around Jabrin oasis. According to Cole:

> Herding is the main production and consumption unit in their economy, and what little exchange they engage in occurs between members of the household and the wider extra-tribal society through the medium of urban-based markets.[29]

> From day to day, the Al-Murrah rely only on camels for livelihood. Camels give the tribes mobility; they supply hair for ropes and wool for clothing; above all, each female with an offspring gives as much as a gallon of milk daily for eleven months out of the year.[30]

The diet of the Al-Murrah consists mainly of meat, milk, milk by-products, and dates. Most of the other major food items are now purchased with cash from markets at Hafouf, the bazaar center (suq) of the Bedouin tribes of the area in Al-Hasa region. The food items they purchase include rice, flour, coffee, tea, sugar, and spices. They also purchase incense, perfume and clothes. The money they use for purchasing food and other items comes from military pensions (Al Mujahideen, people whose fathers or grandfathers fought with Ibn Saud to establish his kingdom) and allowances for participation in the National Guard. In recent years, there is increasing money coming from wages especially from work for the oil companies, or for government agencies in the Eastern Province as guards, taxi drivers, and chauffeurs for governmental and business officials.

During Cole's visit to Haradh project between 1968-70, he found about twenty Al-Murrah males working as coolies along with Germans,

Palestinians, and Jordanians. The workers who were always spoken of as "future, potential settlers," received monthly salaries that ranged from $66 to $110, while their Bedouin foremen received approximately $222. The Palestinian and Jordanian supervisors made several times this amount, while the European elite made many times that amount.[31]

The second economic resource of Al-Murrah comes from agriculture at Jabrin Oasis. This oasis is considered by the tribe as the main summer center, because all members of the tribe come to camp around the oasis. The only work they do is to collect dates. However, they neglect the palm trees most of the year, which reflects to some degree the Al-Murrah's attitudes toward agriculture.

Al-Murrah Attitudes Toward Settlement

The transformation of Saudi Arabia from a highly tribal society to a modern nation-state started after the decline of the Ikhwan hijar movement inspired by the Wahhabi teaching of true Islamic principles during the 1930s (see chapter 5). Although the discovery of oil has been a major factor in Ibn Saud's successful policy of detribalizing most of the Arabian Peninsula, the economic and social changes affecting the tribal social structure during the last decades of this century were responsible for inducing many Bedouins to take a second look at nomadism as the only way of life. The reasons for Bedouins to change or to adapt themselves to a new life are numerous. It is quite enough here to mention several reasons for this change: severe, continuous droughts, declining importance of the camel as a means of transportation and as a food resource, loss of the political and military power of the tribe as guardian and protector of caravan and pilgrimage routes,

and growing opportunities for wages in oil companies, the army, and National Guard.

The Al-Murrah tribe is no exception in their desire for change. Like other Arabian tribes, they look for change, hoping that their desert life will become a better one. According to Cole, "most of them recognize that benefits can accrue from some aspects of settlement, and they desire to have some kind of participation in this general process."[32]

In 1964, the Ministry of Agriculture conducted a survey about the Bedouins' desire for settlement in the Haradh area. The survey showed that 90 percent desired to settle and 99 percent wanted to live in concrete houses instead of traditional tents. During Cole's visit to the project area in 1970, most of the project's physical and technological features had been almost finished, the settlement site had become a lush green and ready for cultivation. At that point, there were only two minimal lineages of Al-Murrah taking an active part in the program designated for them. In addition, there were a few other Bedouins associated with the Haradh project as salaried farm wage workers.[33]

When survival is not in jeopardy, Al-Murrah accepts settlers as long as social criteria are maintained. Al Jaber leaders (a lineage of the tribe) have voiced their objection to the idea of developing the oasis of Jabrin in any way similar to that at the King Faisal settlement Project at Haradh, located sixty km. to the north. Their objection arose from their feeling that unwanted foreigners as well as non-tribal Hadhar people from the country would be brought into their territory. If that took place, it would mean an end to the oasis as one

of the few remaining centers for tribal gatherings. Some Al-Murrah would accept settlement as long as one or more clans settle-out together in one area. This indicates that the Al-Murrah views the lineage as the basis of their social structure. Politics also plays a role in the Al-Murrah attitudes toward settlement at Haradh.

> Some of the traditional leading men of the tribe fear full-time settlement as a means of facilitating political subservience of the tribe to the nation-state. Nomads, they reason, are not so easily coerced for political purposes if they migrate and are not tied to any specific piece of land.[34]

In another study, Dequin points out that Al-Murrah tribe, which claimed the first right to settle in the Haradh area because it lies within their dirah, is not ready to settle down to a sedentary life based on irrigation agriculture.[35] The author also found that Bedouins in Saudi Arabia prefer some kind of sedentary life instead of their unsteady and insecure roaming and wandering in the desert. All the Bedouins interviewed by the author expressed their strong desire to engage in cultivation of the land, not as individual small families, but as larger tribal units, such as clans. This result is similar to that found by Cole in his study of Al-Murrah. Al-Fiar, a native, did his Ph.D. dissertation on the Haradh project. His sample of the population in the project area was small, 100 persons divided into three groups: (1) Al-Murrah (local nomads); (2) non-local nomads; and (3) villagers. The Al-Murrah comprised a relatively small percentage of his total sample. Even though the Al-Murrah Bedouin sample is very small, he found that nomads in general and local nomads in particular, expressed very strong dedication and seriousness toward settling down to engage in farming. He suggested that the Al-Murrah tribe would be the logical

choice to settle in the project area, not because the project site was located in their territory, but because they were most familiar with the environment and its surroundings. However, his conclusion is not identical with that of Cole and Dequin concerning the desire of Al-Murrah to prefer settlement in groups such as lineages or clans.[36]

Final Thought on the Project

One wonders why a well intentioned well designed project in terms of technical aspects, scientific facilities and organization, did not successfully fit Bedouin settlement requirements. Why did this highly sophisticated and costly Haradh settlement project fail to develop successfully for Al-Murrah (or other nomadic tribes in the vicinity of the project) at least as of 1980. The Ministry of Agriculture and Water as of December 10, 1980 formally declared that the Council of Ministers agreed to transfer the Haradh Settlement project to a company called the National Company for Agricultural Development. The government will own 20 percent of shares and the remaining shares will be owned by private corporations and individuals. Because the Bedouins are poor, compared to other segments of the society (even though their standard of living has risen recently), they still will not be able to hold shares in the new company.[37]

Cole attributes the failure of the project to a crucial factor from the time of its inception in 1960, "a dearth of communication between the nomads and the project planners and developers."[38] A lack of communication has always existed between the nomadic populations and the bureaucrats who appear to be a rising force in the policy-making decisions in the country. This lack of communication has widened as

more bureaucrats have been committed to further industrialization, westernization, and rapid progress. Cole also states that "at no time were any of the Al-Murrah ever seriously approached to find out their feelings on the subject of sedentarization and how they would like to restructure their economy and society if they were given the opportunity."[39]

The Bedouins, of course, possess their own ideas as to the problem of nomadism and settlement, and it appears no effort was made to develop a dialogue with the Bedouins on subjects crucial to their way of life. The failure to communicate may be due to the fact that bureaucrats find it easiest to plan from their ivory tower, and to the fact that cultural barriers between the modernized bureaucrats and simple, traditional tribal peoples are not easy to bridge. The basis of operation for Al-Murrah, was best explained by one of its representatives at the Riyadh court and quoted by Dequin:

> We must make use of the desert by herding our flocks and herds, but at the same time continue nomadic life, as distances are too large. You see the water trucks carrying water from far away. There are no possibilities for wells everywhere, but grass grows after rain everywhere. . . . We have to look for ways to overcome the hazards of droughts. Therefore, we need irrigated land to grow fodder for our camels and donkeys so that we have feed for them, when the desert does not give any feed.[40]

An Al Jaber clan leader at Jabrin Oasis voiced rejection to the idea of abandoning their tried, nomadic way of life when Cole visited in the summer of 1969. One of the leaders reasoned that throughout history, the Arabian Peninsula has been a sparse land but that nomads and sedentary peoples alike managed to live and adjust to the harsh environment of the desert. A dependence upon their herds and dates had

been enough for them to survive. But now the situation has completely changed. The Bedouin leader said,

> The oil wells can be blown up in thirty minutes and, with no money, all those people in Dhahran and Riyadh would die from lack of food, why they would not even have enough gasoline to leave and go back to their homelands.[41]

Summary

In this chapter, we have focused on the King Faisal Model Settlement Project at Haradh. The importance of the project lies in the involvement of some well known western organizations such as Aramco, FAO, and the Ford Foundation in designing and planning the physical, technical aspects of the project. In keeping with the government's continuous aim to find a better solution to the nomadic problem, the site of the project was selected in accordance with past governmental experience in settlement of the Bedouins. The government tried to finance the project generously after careful study and planning.

The settlement is located within the Al-Murrah tribal territory. According to the plan, 1,000 Bedouin families were to be settled in the project area. Approximately 90 percent of the families were to come from Al-Murrah, with the remaining 10 percent to come from Qahtan, Al-Ujman and Al-Dawasir tribes. Since the Al-Murrah were most important numerically, the social and economic structure of that tribe was discussed. This tribe is considered one of the most noble, truly nomadic tribes of the Arabian Peninsula. The members of the tribe are very well known for their devotion to Bedouin traditions and for their love of nomadism. It is not a wealthy tribe, when compared with some of the northern tribes such as Anazah, but it is loyal to the Al Saud ruling

family. For Al-Murrah, the basic unit is the lineage. Each lineage is essentially equal in size, wealth, power, and social status.

This equality is related to ecological limits. Herding is the most important economic activity of this tribe. Additional income for members of the tribe comes from light agriculture and work in the oil centers. Some receive salaries from the National Guard, the Army, and other similar governmental agencies. The tribe originally was known for camel raising but recently has changed to sheep and goats. This change is related to the decline of the importance of the camels and is affected by the development of underground water resources.

In the final part of the chapter we dealt with the problem of Bedouin attitudes toward settlement. While most Bedouins appear to be in favor of settlement, they have views that differ from those of government planners. An attempt was also made to analyze the important human factors behind the failure of the project to become a model experiment for Bedouin settlement. We noted the transfer of the project to the National Company for Agricultural Settlement.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Harold F. Heady "Ecological Consequences of Bedouin Settlement in Saudi Arabia," in The Careless Technology: Ecology and International Development, M. Taghi Farvar and J. P. Milton, ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: The Natural History Press, 1972), p. 686.

[2]Dieter Uhlig, King Faisal Settlement Project, Haradh/Saudi Arabia, (Riyadh: Wakuti Consulting Company, n.d.), p. 15. The cost of the project has risen sharply to a figure of about $300 million, because it has taken more than ten years to complete the project, and the costs of everything have risen rapidly after 1970.

[3]FMC Corporation, Land Reclamation and Development Haradh Project, Saudi Arabia, Vol. 1 (March 1965), p. 10. FMC (Food Machinery Corporation of California) was awarded a contract by the Ministry of Agriculture in the spring of 1964 to study economic feasibility of Haradh project and evaluate its potential resources.

[4]R. Smither, The Haradh Project (Beirut: The Ford Foundation, Ms., 1966), p. 9.

[5]League of Arab States, "Report of Delegation of Saudi Arabia" in Ri'ayat Al-Badu Wa-Tahdir'uhum Watawtinihum (Cairo: Dar At-Tiba'ah Al-Hadithah, 1965), Vol 1, pp. 437-438.

[6]Ford Foundation came to Saudi Arabia in the 1960s to modernize the administrative system of the country.

[7]Smither, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

[8]Ibid., p. 19.

[9]D. P. Cole, Nomads of the Nomads: The Al Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter (Chicago: Aldine, 1975), p. 148.

[10]Ibid., p. 149.

[11]F. Bashir, The Case of Nomadism: To Settle or Not to Settle, (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Central Planning Organization, 1969), p. 6.

[12]Report of Delegation of Saudi Arabia, in Ri'ayat, op. cit., p. 438.

[13]See H. F. E. Dequin, The Challenge of Saudi Arabia (Hufuf: Saudi Arabia, 1976), p. 45.

[14]Aramco, Groundwater Resources, Proposed Wadi Sahba Agricultural Project, (Report, n.d.), p. 2.

[15]Ibid.

[16]For more details, see Wakuti Consulting Company, Summary of the Final Report (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Agriculture and Water, November 1971), pp. 4-12. Also see H. Dequin, op. cit., p. 44; and M. H. Al-Fiar, The Faisal Settlement Project at Haradh, Saudi Arabia Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, Department of Geography, 1977), pp. 108-116.

[17]Dequin, op. cit., p. 44.

[18]Aramco, Al-Murrah (Report, n.d.), p. 1.

[19]Bertram Thomas, Arabia Felix (New York: Scribner's, 1932); Paul W. Harrison; The Arab at Home (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1924); John Philby, The Empty Quarter (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1933); H. R. P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956); and Wilfred Thesiger, Arabian Sands (London: Longmans, 1959).

[20]Aramco, Al-Murrah, op. cit., p. 1.

[21]Cole, op. cit., pp. 28-30.

[22]Aramco, Al-Murrah, op. cit., p. 2..

[23]Gabriel Baer, Population and Society in the Arab East, trans. Hanna Szöke (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 122-125.

[24]Alkhuwa, is a kind of insurance tribute taken by powerful tribes from inferior ones and from trade caravans. When an inferior tribe happened to travel within the dirah of a superior tribe, the former paid the khuwa in cash or kind. See El-Farra, The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of an Emerging State: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1973), p. 62.

[25]Cole, op. cit., p. 24.

[26]Ibid., pp. 85-93.

[27]Aramco Al-Murrah, op. cit., p. 6.

[28]Al-Fiar, op. cit., pp. 185-200.

[29]Cole, op. cit., p. 69.

[30]Donald P. Cole, "Al Murrah, Bedouin of Arabia's Empty Sands," Nomads of the World, (National Geographic Society, 1971), pp. 52-71.

[31]Cole, Nomads of the Nomads, op. cit., pp. 149-150.

[32]Ibid., p. 155.

[33]Ibid., p. 148.

[34]Ibid., p. 157.

[35]Dequin, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

[36]Al-Fiar, op. cit., pp. 156-158, 206.

[37]See Al Madina Newspaper, No. 5080, 3 Safar 1401/10 December 1980, p. 2. See also Al Jazeerah Daily Newspaper, No. 3025, 18 Muharram 1401/26 November 1980, p. 2, and No. 3042, 1 Safar 1401/13 December 1980, p. 5.

[38]Cole, Nomads of the Nomads, op. cit., p. 149.

[39]Ibid.

[40]H. Dequin, op. cit., p. 46.

[41]Cole, Nomads of the Nomads, op. cit., p. 155.

CHAPTER VIII

EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESES

The purpose of this chapter is to recall the guiding hypotheses specified in the introductory chapter and to evaluate the evidence supporting or failing to support them. The previous three chapters have documented Bedouin settlements representing the isteetan and tawteen types. In addition chapter 4 details Bedouin society, including a long history of settlement in villages and towns.

It will be recalled that our sociological framework envisaged two social systems, each with its own set of norms, values and objectives. The two systems are viewed as being in communication, thus ensuring some level of socio-cultural linkeage. Bedouin tribes in Saudi Arabia represent one system, the other being the government or settled population of that nation. Bedouin contact with the settled population and indeed the central government had led some Bedouins for many years to leave their nomadic way of life. Further, the central government, in its desire to alleviate social and economic problems facing the Bedouins devised a number of plans to settle them. These contrasting situations lead to two types of circumstances culminating in settlement.

As suggested in the introductory chapter, the guiding hypotheses relate to the two sets of prevailing circumstances in Bedouin settlement in Saudi Arabia. The first set is derived from Isteetan, or the internal power within Bedouin society, that induces the Bedouin people

to settle. Such change is termed "immanent change" by Rogers and Burge.[1] In this instance, the two relevant systems are those Bedouins who are involved in settling and the dominant settled Saudi society. It is assumed that the two systems have been in communication and that each possesses a social structure and value orientation that is unique to each system, at least in some respects.

The first set of hypotheses relate to voluntary settling (that is, Isteetan),and derive from an examination of existing literature, from personal experience, or from existing theory related to social change. These hypotheses, as stated in chapter 1, are:

1. The rate of voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins has increased as Saudi Arabia itself becomes more modernized.

2. The voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins is characterized by an intermediate stage of semi-nomadism.

3. Necessary pre-conditions for agricultural-based voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins are a reliable water supply, arable plots for agricultural production, and supplementary grazing lands, and the accessibility of the designated areas to marketing centers.

4. The voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins (a) occurs primarily within their own tribal territories and (b) primarily at a short distance from their traditional nomadic range.

Early hijar settlements (composed of one or a few tribes and usually located apart form established Saudi Centers) and recent voluntary hilal settlements (composed of different tribes and usually located near urban centers) are expected to differ in numerous ways. It is hypothesized that:

5. Early hijar, in contrast to recent voluntary settlements, hilal, are characterized by (a) less

> contact and interaction with Saudi society, (b) more complete development of an independent structure and sustenance organization; and (c) more successful boundary maintenance (maintenance of "old ways" and resistance to elements of the dominant society).

Before considering the hypotheses related to Isteetan, it is necessary to review the many kinds of settlements in this category. The early hijar settlements inspired by the religious movement of Wahhabism, the recent hijar settlements especially around the Qasim and Najd regions, and the spontaneous and voluntary Bedouin settlements around the oil fields, the urban centers and those located around valleys and streams all fall under the Arabic term, Isteetan. In all these cases, there was no intervention by the local regional, or national government nor by any international organization in the process of settlement. While we did not suggest it as a hypothesis, the evidence supports the proposition that spontaneous, voluntary Bedouin settlements have been more successful than planned and directed settlements among Saudi Bedouins. In support of this proposition, we found that the early Ikhwan colonies (1912-1930) were established in permanent new communities, with populations ranging from 2,000 to 10,000 persons. The Bedouin tribes, motivated by religion in the form of the Wahhabi movement for the first time, freely abandoned nomadism, sold their herds and decided to settle out. The new hijar were located around water wells, in order to cultivate the land. They were relatively successful even though Ibn Saud attempted to break the backbone of Bedouin individualism and to replace the tribal loyalty with nation-state loyalty. The hijar are considered spontaneous since there is no clear cut evidence that Ibn Saud planned the Ikhwan hijar first. By

1930, there were approximately 200 hijar with an overall estimated population of a quarter of a million, representing most of the major tribes of Arabia. With strong social, political, and military purposes behind their establishment, many of them have been very successful while some others have failed. Apart from achieving political stability and economic improvement, Ibn Saud was to establish a new way of life for the Bedouins "more propitious to the enforcement of regular religious observance and the preservation of authentic traditions."[2] The Bedouin tribes, inspired by the teaching of the Wahhabi missionaries, sold their herds and tents to purchase farming material and seeds. This transition was described as leaving behind the jahiliyah, the state of ignorance, for Islam.[3]

The recent hijar and the voluntary settlement of Bedouins throughout much of Saudi Arabia (discussed in chapter 4) appears to be the major trend among nomadic tribes during the last two decades. The acceleration of this type of settlement seems to be due to a combination of environmental, political, economic and social reasons. All of these factors put pressure on the Bedouins to change their traditional way of life for a new, more secure and stable one. Some of these Bedouin tribal groups are totally settled out, and these settlements are scattered in the Hejaz region, as well as in Tihama and Asir in the south. Still some Bedouin groups live in tents and hut houses forming amall Qaryah, (village or hamlet) that surround the urban centers. Other groups of Bedouins have adopted agriculture and cultivation in oases as a "way of living." Many of the settled Bedouin groups, however, have kept some form of tribal organization but these structures appear to be

weakening. We now turn to a consideration of the evidence supporting (or failing to support) the hypotheses concerning spontaneous settlement of Bedouins. The evidence derives from the analysis contained in previous chapters, from an examination of existing literature in both Arabic and English, and from personal and work experience in Saudi Arabia.

1. As hypothesized, the evidence is overwhelmingly that the rate of voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins has increased as Saudi Arabia itself has become more modernized. The oil wealth, the introduction of modern technology, and the collapse of the Bedouins' tribal structure have been important factors in the increasing rate of settlement. This hypothesis is also supported by the rapid decline of nomadism. Until the 1950s the majority of the population of Saudi Arabia (at least 55 or 60 percent) were Bedouin tribesmen. Today, the Bedouins constitute no more than 15 percent of the total population. The net decrease in the nomadic population is estimated to be 2 percent per year.[4]

2. That voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins is characterized by an intermediate stage of semi-nomadism, as specified in the second hypothesis, is supported. Historically, many Bedouins first settle in villages where they acquire their first experiences in the settled society. This is especially true, for example, of Bedouin settlements in Wadi Fatimah and most villages in the Hejaz and Asir regions as well as many villages in Najd and Qasim regions. Lipsky's assertion is relevant when he said: "Except for the absence of a tribe in many villages, the village kinship system is of the same type as that of the nomads."[5]

3. The third hypothesis states that necessary preconditions for agricultural-based settling out on the part of Saudi nomadic population are a reliable water supply, arable plots for agricultural production, supplementary grazing lands, and the accessibility of the designated areas to marketing centers. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that when these four conditions are present the possibility of success, or the degree of success, for Bedouin settlement is high. This is clear in the four major early hijar settlements, namely, Al-Artawiyah, Alghot Ghot, Dukhnah,

and Al-Ajfar. It was also found to be true of successful recent hijar settlements in Al-Qasim region, known for its abundant water supply, rich soil, and cooler climate. Furthermore, the success of spontaneous Bedouin settlements around valleys and water wells in the Hejaz, Tihama and Asir regions is related to the existence of the four conditions mentioned in the hypothesis.

4. Hypothesis 4 predicts that the spontaneous settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouin tribes occurs: (a) primarily within their own tribal territories and (b) primarily at a short distance from their traditional economic range. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that the first Bedouin settlement or hijrah in 1912 was started at Al-Artawiyah, the valley very well known among the nomads for its many wells, potable water, and for its good grazing lands with numerous trees.[6]

The valley is located within the dirah of Mutayr tribe, the first Bedouin tribe to settle out in this area. The site of the second early settlement, Al-Ghot Ghot lies within the territory of Utaybah tribe and was occupied by many members of this tribe. Al-Shameh[7] in his recent study about Al-Qasim region finds that Bedouin groups desire to settle out within their own tribal dirah to avoid social and economic conflicts and they desire to move a short distance only from the site of their settlement. Cole[8] also finds the same desire among Al-Murrah tribe who prefer to settle out in Haradh or to practice some light agriculture in Jabrin oasis. Both sites fall within the range of their tribal territory.

5. The last hypothesis in this group postulates several differences between early hijar settlements and recent voluntary settlements (hilal). The former were usually located at some distance from urban centers while the latter were usually located near urban centers and oil fields. The early hijar consisted of a single tribe while the recent voluntary settlements often comprised many tribes.[9] Thus, it was hypothesized that early hijar in contrast to recent hilal settlements, (a) exhibit less contact and interaction

> with Saudi society; (b) possess more complete development of independent structure and sustenance organization and (c) exhibit more successful boundary maintenance.

The evidence is clear that the early hijar had less contact than the hilal settlements with Saudi society. Interaction for members of hijar settlements were fewer not only because of their remote locations but also because strangers were forbidden from entering the new hijar communities. Members of the more recent voluntary settlements, on the other hand, were in frequent contact with the nearby urban centers and oil fields.

The evidence is strong that sustenance organization and structural independence were more complete in the early hijar than in the recent voluntary settlements. The early hijar settlers were forced to become self-sustaining since they refused to purchase any product that they could not themselves produce. The ultimate aim of the early hijar settlements was religious--to liberate the Arabian peninsula from heretic Muslims. The recent voluntary settlements, on the other hand, were highly dependent upon the facilities of the nearby urban centers. These settlements were formed without the religious ideology of the early hijar settlements. Instead, they were formed for environmental, political, and economic reasons as well as for the advantages of sedentary life. Finally, unlike the recent voluntary settlements, the early hijar had a military function which gave them a certain level of autonomy. The Ikhwan communities, in addition to their religious and agricultural functions, had the duty of responding to the call of Jihad.

In keeping with the hypothesis, the early hijar settlements were far more successful than recent voluntary settlements in their

boundary-maintaining operations. Since the early hijar settlements were remote from cities and since they shared a common religious zeal, interactions with outsiders were relatively rare and unwelcome. In contrast, the recent voluntary settlers were compelled to interact with urban residents at work as a matter of survival.

The second group of hypotheses concern outside agency plans to influence settlement, that is, tawteen. Planned or directed tribal settlements refer to official government policy of Saudi Arabia to encourage the Bedouins to settle out. The following propositions are based upon the literature, personal experience, and theory related to change:

1. Saudi Arabian programs to settle nomadic Bedouins have failed to succeed, in part due to failure of inter-system communication and failure by government to secure the legitimization of the program by tribal leaders. The analysis found in previous chapters clearly supports this hypothesis. The failure of the Haradh project to become a successful Bedouin settlement relates to lack of communication between the bureaucrats and the nomadic peoples. Cole[10] reports the failure on the part of the project's planners to approach the Bedouins to find out their feelings and attitudes toward settlement. Al-Fiar[11] who studies the Haradh projects, advocates the participation of tribal leaders and sheikhs in some of the decision-making process for settlement.

2. The hypothesis that Saudi Arabian programs to settle nomadic Bedouins in agricultural areas have failed to succeed, in part due to failure by government to teach the Bedouins the fundamentals of sedentary agriculture and living, finds extensive support. The failure of settlements, such as Wadi Assarhan and Tabouk discussed in chapter 6, relates to the fact that the Bedouins who were to settle were not prepared to participate effectively in these projects and most of them knew little about farming.

3. The third hypothesis in this group states that governmental goals to be achieved through the settlement of Bedouins have changed markedly through time; at no

> time have these goals been formulated jointly by governmental personnel and Bedouin sheikhs. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that Saudi planned programs to settle nomadic Bedouins have failed to succeed, in part due to failure of the government to incorporate the tribe's leaders in the decision-making process for settlement. Bates has observed the effect of nomadic leaders to take part in the process of settlement to succeed in the case of Nogaylar in Turkey. He points out, "it is apparent that lineage leaders, not marginal herders, were instrumental in organizing the joint settlement."[12] Another Saudi scholar advocates the participation of the Bedouins in the process of settlement Malik says: "the Bedouin must partake in the execution of the project (of settlement). Working in the project will familiarize him with it and he will accept it as his own."[13] It is important for the success of any Bedouin settlement to approach the Bedouins themselves or their leaders to find out their feelings on the process of settlement. The Al-Murrah tribe who are considered to settle out at Haradh project have never been approached by the modernized administrators to develop a serious dialogue with them.[14]

Two findings based upon our study, but not stated among the hypotheses, are important. First, many Saudi Bedouins who have settled out on a voluntary basis in urban centers follow their traditional way of life. In many instances settled Bedouins select occupations reminiscent of their "old ways," such as drivers, soldiers, policemen and security guards. All of these occupational roles relate to the man's position in the old tribal structure. Second, despite the decline in the number of nomadic Bedouins, elements of Bedouins' ethos still persists in the society of Saudi Arabia. For example, the early tribal structural pattern, such as kinship and lineage, still remain as important factors in shaping the social relations in Saudi Arabian society. Also, communal Bedouin values, such as mutual obligation, hospitality, and interdependence are still basic elements in the Saudi

social structure. Why do the Bedouins of Saudi Arabia prefer certain jobs over others? Why is the Bedouin ethos so persistent in Saudi society, despite the declining number of people who can still be classified as nomads? The answer to these important questions lie in sociological studies on the aftermath of acculturation.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Everett M. Rogers and Rabel J. Burdge, Social Change in Rural Societies (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972).

[2]J. Berque, "Introduction, Nomads and Nomadism in the Arid Zone," International Social Science Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1959), pp. 493-494.

[3]Hafiz Wahbah, Jazirat al'Arab Fi al-Qarn al-Ishrin (Cairo: Al-Nahdhah Al-Misriyyah, 1961), p. 126.

[4]Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, The Second Development Plan for 1395-1400 AH - 1975-1980 A.D. (Riyadh: 1976), pp. 420-422.

[5]George A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia - Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven: Harf Press, 1959), p. 82.

[6]Sulayman Al-Dakhil, "Al-Artawiyah awl Baldat jadidah Fidiyar Najd," Lughat Al-Arab (Baghdad), Jumada 11 1331/May 1913, p. 483.

[7]Ahmed A. Shamekh, Spatial Pattern of Bedouin Settlement in Al-Qasim Region, Saudi Arabia (Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Kentucky, 1975).

[8]Donald P. Cole, Nomads of the Nomads: The Al-Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter (Chicago: Aldine, 1975).

[9]The four major early hijar consisted of one tribe. The settlers of Al-Artawiyah come mainly from Mutayr tribe, the Bedouin groups of the second hijrah, Al-Ghot Ghot are mainly from Utaybah tribe, the nomadic members of Dukhnah belong to Harb tribe, and finally the settlers of Al-Ajfar settlement are from Shammar tribe.

[10]Cole, op. cit., p. 156.

[11]M. H. Al-Fiar, The Faisal Settlement Project at Haradh, Saudi Arabia: A Study in Nomad Attitudes Toward Sedentarization (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1977), p. 221.

[12]Daniel G. Bates, Nomads and Farmers: A Study of the Yoruk of Southeastern Turkey (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, Museum of

Anthropology, Anthropological Papers No. 52, 1973), p. 197.

[13]Salih A. Malik, A Study of the Social System of the Bedouins: Its Relation to the Problems of Settling in Saudi Arabia (M.A. thesis, Wayne State University, Detroit, 1968), p. 93.

[14]Cole, op. cit., p. 149.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Summary and Conclusions

This study is a socio-historical investigation into the nomadic problem in Saudi Arabia. The central sociological problem addressed in this research is the adoption of social changes on the part of a traditional society. Specifically, the study focuses on the adoption of a sedentary life style by the Bedouins of Saudi Arabia. Nomadism in Arabia for some time has been confronted with major economic and social structural problems. The Bedouin, linked closely to a harsh environment, is attempting to resolve the problems that have arisen by trying out a more favorable, sedentary environment.

Throughout the historical past, the Bedouins of the Arabian peninsula have proved to be a highly adaptable people and have successfully adjusted their way of life to the changes taking place in the desert. Until 1950, most of the inhabitants of Saudi Arabia were Bedouins. Since that time, nomadism has been declining and sedentary living, especially the voluntary and spontaneous type has been increasing, which has resulted in drastic changes in the economic and social organization of Bedouin society and in the relationship between man and his environment.

After characterizing the social and economic structure of the Bedouin society, including the hema, the dirah and other aspects of

Bedouin life, the economic basis of Bedouin society before the discovery of oil was analyzed. We then examined the tribe as political unit and the importance of tribal structure before the emergence of the modern Saudi state.

Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia can be seen as being either voluntary/spontaneous or planned/directed. Voluntary or spontaneous settlement refers to adopting sedentary life as a result of their own free will. Planned or directed Bedouin settlement refers to governmental policies designed to encourage Bedouin tribes to settle out.

In the first nomadic settlement in modern Saudi Arabia, the Ikhwan were established in settled oasis colonies known as hijar settlements. In these settlements, agriculture was to be the basis of economic life, and of even greater importance, the reformed religion was to be the basis of social and spiritual life. The first hijrah was established in 1912 at Al-Artawiyah, about 180 miles north of Riyadh. About 200 hijar settlements were founded, especially in Najd, and some, including the one just mentioned, expanded to a population of over 10,000. The hijar settlements began on a voluntary basis when some Bedouin tribes sold their herds in Kuwait markets and decided to migrate to hijrah. (This act resembled the prophet Mohammad when he migrated from Makkah to Al-Madinah, a major landmark of the Islamic era).

The Bedouin tribes abandoned their nomadic life, devoted themselves to agriculture, and to learning the teachings of the unitarian movement (Wahhabbism). While some hijar settlements were compulsory, most of them were voluntary. The major professed aim of the settlements was to enable the settlers to live a truly religious life.

However, some observers have stated that the settlements had military and political as well as religious purposes. Others have argued that the tribes were settled so that tribal loyalty to Ibn Saud could be clearly watched and to ensure that a large army could be mobilized on short notice.

Our research revealed that a major factor often overlooked in the decline of the Ikhwan was the widespread failure to successfully develop agriculture in the new communities. The nomadic pastoralists who settled had no knowledge of agriculture and little enthusiasm to learn about it. Moreover, the water resources were often insufficient to support any large scale development. In the end, ecological factors forced many of the settled Bedouins to return to nomadism. This pioneer phase in Bedouin settlement lasted from 1912 to 1936.

The second period of government planned projects to settle the Bedouins started with the Al-Kharj project in 1940. In 1958 the government initiated the Wadi Assarhan project near the Jordanian border. The Tabouk project in the northern part started in 1960. These two projects represented an attempt by the government to deal with the severe seven-year drought that hit the country, mainly in the northern region. All of these planned government projects to settle the Bedouins failed to properly develop agriculture and to organize and improve the pastures. These failures were also major factors in the demise of the settlements. The evidence shows that the success of any agricultural project to settle the Bedouins appears to depend on five things, namely, the abundance of water, the richness of the soil, the organization and improvement of the pastures, the willingness and preparation of settlers

to practice agriculture, and the availability of marketing centers. The government policy makers and administrators, due to hasty organization of the projects, failed to pay attention to the five factors mentioned. Moreover, the Bedouins were not prepared psychologically and technically to participate effectively in the settlement projects.

The last and most recent settlement plan to which the government has devoted much effort, time, and money is the King Faisal Settlement Project at Haradh. The objectives of the project are to reclaim 40,000 dunums of desert land, to settle 1,000 Bedouin families on a permanent basis, and to establish a model farm for experimentation and training of Bedouin settlers. The project was finally abandoned by the government as a settlement project for the Bedouins. In December of 1980, the Ministry of Agriculture and Water transferred the Haradh project to the National Company for Agricultural Development, to manage on a profit-sharing basis, with 20 percent of the shares to be owned by the government.

The voluntary or spontaneous Bedouin settlement is the second type analyzed in this study. Most of the successful Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia and in neighboring Middle Eastern countries are of this type. The bulk are concentrated around urban centers and the oil fields. Several factors have contributed to the success of spontaneous settlements, and at the same time resulted in a decline of nomadism. Environmental factors, such as the drought in the 1950s and in the 1960s and the consequent reduction of pastures, as well as the termination of the hema system, have encouraged the Bedouins to settle spontaneously. Political factors, such as the growing power of the central government

and the loss of the political functions of the tribe were responsible for Bedouins settling out. Economic factors, including the discovery and development of oil have had a major impact on the Bedouin way of life. At first, the oil producing centers attracted Bedouins to settle around the oil field areas, and increasingly, Bedouins joined the oil industry as laborers. The process by which Bedouins came to work for the oil companies was not a consequence of guidance or pressure from the government. Rather, the process clearly exemplifies the voluntary adaptation of the nomadic people to new environmental opportunities. This is an area of needed sociological research.

Social and cultural factors have also led the Bedouins to join the mass migration to cities and to the oil centers. The raiding of caravans or other tribes, for example, formerly a major source of income, has been abolished by the government. The change from camel raising to sheep raising occurred for a number of reasons. First, the camel lost its importance as a means of transportation and as a major food source. Second, the Ministry of Agriculture increased its efforts to provide pump-wells in tribal regions. And third, the introduction of the truck helped to make the camel obsolete. All the factors mentioned have played a major role in convincing the nomadic people to establish spontaneous settlements.

The early hijar settlements (chapter 5), the recent Bedouin settlements around the Qasim and Najd regions, and the spontaneous settlements around the oil fields and urban centers, as well as those located around valleys and springs (chapter 6), all fall under isteetan, meaning the internal power within Bedouin society that induces them to settle.

The first set of hypotheses relate to voluntary settling (that is, isteetan), and derive from the examination of existing literature both in Arabic and in English, from personal and work experience and from existing theory related to social change. The findings from this study lend support for the following propositions:

1. The rate of voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins has increased as Saudi Arabia becomes more modernized.

2. The spontaneous settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins is characterized by an intermediate stage of semi-nomadism. Many Bedouins settle first in villages where they acquire experience in settled society.

3. The voluntary settling out on the part of Saudi Bedouins occurs (a) primarily within their own tribal territories and (b) primarily at a short distance from their traditional economic range.

4. Early hijar settlements, composed of one or a few clans of a tribe and usually located apart from Saudi urban centers, were found to differ in numerous ways from the recent Bedouin settlements established after the discovery of oil.

The latter are composed mainly of lineages from certain tribes. It was found that early settlements, in contrast to recent settlements were characterized by:

1. Less contact and interaction with Saudi society;

2. More complete development of an independent structure and sustenance organization;

3. More successful boundary maintenace, that is maintenance of "old ways" and resistance to elements of the dominant society. The settlers in voluntary settlements on the other hand were more affected by the "new ways" in the urban centers. A major difference, of course, is that the early hijar settlements showed a common religious ideology while the recent settlements did not.

The Haradh project and the government projects discussed in chapter 6, all fall under tawteen, external influence to foster Bedouin settlement. Our evidence supports these propositions:

1. Saudi programs to settle Bedouins have failed to succeed, in part, due to failure of intersystem communication, especially between the nomadic peoples and the bureaucrats, and failure by the government to secure the legitimization of the program by tribal leaders.

2. Saudi programs to settle nomads have failed to succeed in part due to failure by government to teach willing Bedouins the fundamentals of sedentary agriculture.

Two further findings from our study merit mention. First, those Bedouins who have settled in urban centers tend to select occupations that duplicate features of their traditional way of life, such as drivers, soldiers, policemen, and security guards. Second, the early tribal structural patterns, including kinship and lineage, still remain the essence of social relations. Certain communal Bedouin values, such as mutual obligation and interdependence, still persist. These observations about the Bedouin's selection of jobs after settling out require future studies of the culture and personality of nomadic people.

Discussion

The nomadic way of life is a very ancient form of adaptation to an arid and semi-arid environment. This form of adaptation of man to land started early in history, after the neolithic period and the domestication of plants and animals.[1] There is no doubt that nomadism still provides a livelihood for substantial numbers in the Arab world in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular. Nomadism is clearly

related to the ecological environment in which it exists. The availability of water and the condition of pastures are major factors determining the size of herds, the direction of migration and the type of animals raised.

The Bedouin social system is also a form of adaptation affected by the environment of the tribe's territory. The kin group systems' norms and customs govern behavior and determine what is right or wrong. They also define the obligation of each member to his tribe. Each kinship group may include a number of cohesive lineages. It consists of several extended families whose relationship and obligation toward each other are normally recognized by members of the lineages. Mutual obligation and interdependence are related to the following facts, namely, "1) members of a lineage rely for their protection on their lineage kin group and/or the tribe at large, and 2) members of the lineage share common economic interests and, therefore, they are obliged to participate and enhance the interest of their group."[2]

The high risk in desert living has always reminded the Bedouins of the danger of drought, famine, communicable disease and the threat of attack by other tribes. This in itself reinforced the interdependence among tribes and strengthened relationships. Individualism does not exist in a tribal society because each member needs and depends on others. Capot-Rey, the French scholar understood this aspect of Bedouin life when he stated that "nomadism is not only a way of life, it is also a form of social organization based on ties of family and allegiance.[3]

"For centuries the Bedouins of Arabia have been a source of wonder to their sedentary neighbors and they still share something of the

awesome prestige of the desert."[4] Amiran had the same idea about nomadism as a form of adaptation when he said: "Nomadism is the optimum adaptation of non-industrial populations to the occupance of fully arid areas outside of oases."[5]

Social and economic factors have forced the Bedouins to adapt to a new way of life because of the acute decline in the amount of rainfall and the scarcity of water in general in the Middle East area in recent years. The consequence, of course, is famine, deterioration of the pastures, and death of large numbers of animals. Such forces have left the Bedouins with no choice but to look for a more secure and stable means of livelihood. Most governments of the Middle Eastern countries view nomadism as an obstacle to the concept of a nation-state as well as to national economic development. Abou-Zeid, a leading anthropologist in the Arab world, notes the hostile attitude toward nomadism on the part of some governments and regional and international organizations. The hostility, he believes, is due to the following: First, nomadism in the modern nation-state system is something wasteful; second, the continuous roaming of the herdsmen makes it difficult for the central authority to exercise control; and third, settlement of Bedouins makes it easier for the central government to collect taxes (or only zakat in the case of Saudi Arabia), to conduct general censuses, and to draft men for military duties. Further, the settlement of Bedouins will help the central authority to introduce a complete system of social services such as education, health, and sanitarian programs, and other services ordinarily not available to most nomadic people. Finally, the settlement of the Bedouins is regarded the most effective

way of integrating them with semi-Bedouins and urbanites into a single national state.[6]

Why have the governments of the Middle Eastern countries looked upon settlement as the only solution to nomadism? Some students do not view settlement as the only way to solve the Bedouin's problems. Capot-Rey says: "The establishment of a settled dwelling-place, is not the end of the evolution which is bringing the nomads into modern society; these new villagers lack the qualities that make a peasant class love for the earth, farming experience, permanent presence on the plantations, a wealth of effort only equalled by the shortage of financial resources."[7] Despite this view, in the Middle East, there have been Bedouins who have accepted a completely sedentary life, with agriculture as their main occupation. However, even though they have abandoned their nomadic life, they retain their tribal organization. This condition calls for sociological study.

Most central governments of the Middle East tend to look at Bedouin tribes as a form of mini-state within a state which endangers the political and economic stability of the country. Hence, the concern about nomads on the part of most governments is based on their desire to achieve an integrated, politically united state. In addition, Bedouins pose a serious problem to the administrators in finding a comprehensive plan for the provision of education, health and other social services. For these bureaucrats the only solution to the nomadic troubles seems to rest in the form of enforced settlement. Cunnison points out the "anxiety" of many administrators that nomadism is a holdover from an irrational past, and therefore lacking "modern" rational administration.[8]

In regard to forced settlement, Swidler points out "the attempt to settle forcibly large nomadic populations has been a repetitive historical occurrence in the Middle East, and such efforts have been met with considerable resistance."[9] Some Middle Eastern states, especially Turkey and Israel, have been criticized for their policy in handling the affairs of their nomadic population. They are criticized, "particularly for pursuing policies of forced sedentarization which show little consideration for the psychological upheaval consequent on overrapid settlement."[10]

During the 1930's the late Shah of Iran tried to settle by force the nomadic tribes of Iran in order to destroy their tribal organization. The result of this policy was disastrous to the nomads as well as to the country. Barth, who did extensive studies on the nomadic people of Iran, has criticized the policy of enforced settlement. He states that "the policy of enforced settlement in Iran is not wise. Most of the Basseri of Iran were forcibly settled for some years, suffering a considerable loss of flocks and people."[11]

The soviets also attempted to force the nomadic Kazakh in Central Asia to settle out. They believed that nomadism did not help to spread socialist ideas, and the nomads were forced to settle in limited areas. But this policy resulted in the death of thousands of animals, and social disruption and poverty among the tribesmen.[12]

Saudi Arabia does not really pursue a policy of forcing the Bedouins to settle out, as does the policy pursued by the governments of Russia, Turkey or Iran (during the era of the Shah). But in the Saudi Arabian settlement projects, the policy planners and administrators never tried to approach the Bedouins to know their feelings with

respect to settlement. The notion of viewing the Bedouins as an obstacle to the economic development of the country is prevalent. As Al Helaissi points out: "So far tribel life in Saudi Arabia has had a delaying effect on the economic development of the country because of the virtual failure of the Bedouins to make any real contribution to it."[13] As stated before, up until 1950 when the revenue from oil became the major contribution to the country's economy, the pastoral economy was the dominant economic factor in the history of Saudi Arabia. Today, nomadism in the Arabian peninsula is different from nomadism of the 1940s, 1950s and even 1960s, and it has been declining rapidly following the discovery of oil.

The nomadic Bedouin portion of the Saudi Arabian population has never been ignored by the government. It was given special recognition as a part of the Second Development plan, 1975-1980. This plan included a realistic appraisal of the conditions among Bedouins. It correctly noted the lack of access of Bedouins to social, educational and civil services and the increasing migration of Bedouins to urban areas and oil producing centers. The net annual decrease of the nomadic population amounted to 2 percent per year. The third Development Plan for 1980-1985 attempts to correct some deficiencies of the previous plan. The current plan emphasizes the development of human resources through education and training.[14] Such development could help to reduce the 2 million Yemenites and a similar number of workers from other countries now in Saudi Arabia.[15] Despite the millions of riyals spent on different types of settlement plans by the government, most of the plans, including King Faisal at Haradh, have been less than successful.

It would seem essential, based upon past experience, that new programs that consider the real needs and changing role of Bedouins in modern Saudi Arabia, are required to bring the nomadic people fully into the mainstream of society.

Do the many different Bedouin settlement experiments attempted by the government and the different circumstances of spontaneous settlement explored in this dissertation enable us to reach a sound conclusion as to the nomadic problem? Is that "sound solution" one that the Bedouins themselves would approve? How can the old and most respected values and customs of Bedouin culture be seen in terms of success or failure in the adaptation to a modern way of life? A proper response to these questions lies in the conduct of more research. It would seem advisable to establish a Bedouin Research Institute, with the cooperation of the Departments of Sociology, Anthropology, Geography and other related departments in the universities of Saudi Arabia, with the assistance of outside scholars. In both Egypt and Israel, a Desert Research Institute has contributed much to the policy relating to some successful settlements of Bedouin tribes in those countries. However, some of these settlements were forced upon the nomadic people and for this reason, have been criticized.

It is the writer's opinion that the government should encourage universities, through a program of special funds, to carry out research on the Bedouins and their economic and social structure. Ideally, the research studies would be formulated by native social scientists in cooperation with scholars from other countries specializing in the study of nomadism. This research should focus on many aspects of the

Bedouin problem, particularly on Bedouin social structure, factors in willingness to settle, their perception of settlement needs, and their views of social change. In the writer's opinion, any further spending on Bedouin settlement projects would be a waste of time and money without the benefit of the results from sociological and anthropological studies.

As previously mentioned, most governments in the Middle East think that settled populations are more civilized and cooperative than nomadic people. M. Awad believes that the duty of any strong government "must be to carry out a policy of settling, either completely or partially, the nomad groups. Whether prompted by humanitarian, political, economic, strategic or administrative motives, such a course must be adopted and the desired results achieved, as quickly as possible."[16] Of course, the strong voice of Arab and non-Arab alike behind settling the nomads is to promote national integration. However, one must ask just how such an effort, which in fact represents a great challenge to desert ecology, can succeed via nomadic settlement. One must also ask "whether such a result can be achieved without undue harshness" . . . and "whether such a success would not destroy psychological and cultural values, whose role, as a positive aspect of Islamic civilization and as a desirable contribution to world culture, should not be underestimated."[17]

Settlement alone does not produce a magic solution for the Bedouins. It may only be considered one of the alternatives for the nomads, and only if they desire it. Professor Elphinston points out that: "to think that the future of the Bedouin can be satisfactorily

solved by land settlement alone is, however, an over simplification of the problem. In the first place it is not at all desirable that all the Bedouin should cease to be nomadic."[18]

The settlement of the Bedouins is not an easy task. Transforming the Bedouins to settled communities is a complicated process involving time, money, experience and education. As Mahhouk points out with reference to Syria's experience: "settlement on a fixed plot of land will not in itself turn the Bedouin into a farmer or an artisan, for sedentarization is a process of gradual social development and not one of social will or action."[19] Because the Bedouin adaptation in the Arabian peninsula evolved over thousands of years, attempts at settlement should take gradual steps involving transitional changes rather than radical and forced changes. The Saudi Arabian government should not attempt to force the nomadic people to abandon their traditional customs and values in a sudden transition to sedentary life. But for nomadic people who cannot make the transition, we should provide them with appropriate technology designed to improve their way of living without endangering or demoralizing their social values and norms.

One of the major factors which contributed to the failure of all planned government projects to settle the Bedouins in Saudi Arabia, was the lack of communication between the planners and bureaucrats of these projects and the Bedouins who were the primary beneficiaries. Participation of the Bedouins themselves, through voluntary cooperation, is necessary to any successful settlement project, with technical aspects being left to the experts of the central government. As Bates observes in regard to Turkish nomads: "Most herders among the Yoruk today belong to a small number of patronymic or lineage groups, and

closely related families continue to move and rent pastures together."[20] Cole had the same observation about the Saudi nomads: "A lineage settlement, however, located at a convenient place on one's territory, inhabited either full-time or part-time by some of the lineage members and visited at least occasionally by nomads from one's own lineage is not only acceptable but ideal."[21] The absence of the nomadic people or their leaders from the planning process of settlement was evident in the failure of all Bedouin settlement schemes in Saudi Arabia.

The writer believes that if the Bedouins of Saudi Arabia desire to settle down and to practice agriculture, they should be encouraged to do so. The desire of some Bedouin tribes to settle and to practice farming during the last two decades has been supported by recent literature (Cole, 1975 and Shamekh, 1975). The shaikh of Al-Murrah tribe, for example, presented his peoples' desire to settle for the following reasons:

1. The Bedouins wish to send their children to school and the government would provide schooling in the settlements;

2. No longer is nomadism considered by the nomads themselves as a secure occupation in supplying basic needs;

3. Many Bedouins now realize the importance of health facilities which could be provided by the central government in settlements; and

4. Settlement gives the Bedouins a psychological feeling of self-respect since they can feel they are making a contribution to the whole society. This also will not depict them as depending on governmental charity.[22]

The Bedouins should be trained and prepared to use modern agricultural machinery and techniques. We should keep in mind that any

successful scheme to settle the Bedouins must incorporate livestock because of its importance to the economy. The government of Saudi Arabia recently recognized the importance of livestock as a major component of the national economy. Most of the animal wealth of the country is owned and managed by the nomadic people. In recent years, the government through the Ministry of Agriculture and Water, has initiated a cash subsidy program to encourage and develop the pasture sector of the national economy.[23]

Since nomadism in Arabia is a very firmly established mode of life, it may be that some Bedouin tribes will not abandon nomadism completely. For instance, members of the Al-Murrah tribe do not agree with either the westerners or the government bureaucrats, that Bedouin pastoralism is doomed in an increasingly industrialized world. "Rather, they are seeking ways--with little outside help as encouragement--to modernize their pastoralism and to become more actively involved in modern society."[24] Lancaster points out that "changes toward making nomadism easier, more productive and profitable is a line which has been almost totally ignored. Perhaps it should be tried? The Bedu are as adaptable, intelligent and willing as anyone to try out innovations."[25] In the final analysis, perhaps improving pastures and the nomadic condition in general, will enable the Bedouins to play a major creative role in the development of their environment.

To conclude this thesis, the question of modern education and its impact on the attitudes of the Bedouins of Saudi Arabia regarding settling out should be examined. Sociological studies should be carried out to know and understand the impact of education on the Bedouins decision to abandon nomadism.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Nomadic Pastoralism as a Method of Land Use," in Arid Zone Research, the Problems of the Arid Zone, proceedings of the Paris Symposium, (Paris: Unesco, 1962), p. 357.

[2] Ibrahim Al-Awaji, Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1971), pp. 57-58.

[3] R. Capot-Rey, "The Present State of Nomadism in the Sahara" in L. Dudley Stamp, ed., A History of Land Use in Arid Regions (Unesco: Arid Zone Research XVII, 1961), pp. 301-302.

[4] J. Berque, "Introduction, the Nomads and Nomadism in the Arid Zone," International Social Science Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1959), p. 484.

[5] David Amiran, "Arid Zone Development: A Reappraisal under Modern Technological Conditions" in Economic Geography, Vol. 41, No. 3 (July, 1965), p. 190.

[6] Ahmed M. Abou-Zeid, "The Changing World of the Nomads," in J. G. Peristiany, ed., Mediterranean Rural Communities and Social Change, (Athens: Acts of the Mediterranean Sociological Conference, July, 1963), p. 280.

[7] R. Capot-Rey, op. cit., p. 307.

[8] I. Cunnison, "Nomadism in the 1960's," Inaugural Lecture, University of Hull, England, 1967. See also Dawn Chatty, "The Pastoral Family and the Truck," in Philip C. Salzman, ed., When Nomads Settle (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), pp. 80-94.

[9] Nina Swidler, "Sedentarization and Modes of Economic Integration in the Middle East" in Salzman. Ibid., p. 21.

[10] Allan George, "Egypt's Remaining Nomads," Middle East International, No. 37 (July, 1974), p. 28.

[11] Fredrik Barth, Nomads of South Persia: The Basseri of the Khamseh Confederacy (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1961), p. 3.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Nomadic Pastoralism as a Method of Land Use," in Arid Zone Research, the Problems of the Arid Zone, proceedings of the Paris Symposium, (Paris: Unesco, 1962), p. 357.

[2] Ibrahim Al-Awaji, Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1971), pp. 57-58.

[3] R. Capot-Rey, "The Present State of Nomadism in the Sahara" in L. Dudley Stamp, ed., A History of Land Use in Arid Regions (Unesco: Arid Zone Research XVII, 1961), pp. 301-302.

[4] J. Berque, "Introduction, the Nomads and Nomadism in the Arid Zone," International Social Science Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1959), p. 484.

[5] David Amiran, "Arid Zone Development: A Reappraisal under Modern Technological Conditions" in Economic Geography, Vol. 41, No. 3 (July, 1965), p. 190.

[6] Ahmed M. Abou-Zeid, "The Changing World of the Nomads," in J. G. Peristiany, ed., Mediterranean Rural Communities and Social Change, (Athens: Acts of the Mediterranean Sociological Conference, July, 1963), p. 280.

[7] R. Capot-Rey, op. cit., p. 307.

[8] I. Cunnison, "Nomadism in the 1960's," Inaugural Lecture, University of Hull, England, 1967. See also Dawn Chatty, "The Pastoral Family and the Truck," in Philip C. Salzman, ed., When Nomads Settle (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), pp. 80-94.

[9] Nina Swidler, "Sedentarization and Modes of Economic Integration in the Middle East" in Salzman. Ibid., p. 21.

[10] Allan George, "Egypt's Remaining Nomads," Middle East International, No. 37 (July, 1974), p. 28.

[11] Fredrik Barth, Nomads of South Persia: The Basseri of the Khamseh Confederacy (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1961), p. 3.

[12]"Stabilization of the Nomads," Central Asian Review, Vol. 7 (1959), pp. 226-227.

[13]A. Helaissi, "Bedouins and Tribal Life in Saudi Arabia," International Social Science Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1959), p. 533.

[14]Ministry of Planning, The Second Development Plan for 1395-1400 AH, 1975-1980 A.D. (Riyadh: Saudi Arabia, 1976), pp. 420-422, and The Strategy for the Third Development Plan for 1980-1985, (Riyadh: Saudi Arabia, 1978).

[15]Al-Yamamah Magazine, Vol. 14, no. 620 (Friday 24 Thu Al Qe'adah 1400/3 October 1980), p. 12 (published in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia). I think the estimated number of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia given by the magazine is exaggerated.

[16]Mohamed Awad, "Settlement of Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Tribal Groups in the Middle East," International Labor Review, Vol. 79 (January-June 1959), p. 35.

[17]J. Berque, op. cit., p. 497.

[18]W. Elphinston, "The Future of the Bedouin of Northern Arabia," International Affairs, 21-3 (July, 1945), p. 373.

[19]Adnan Mahhouk, "Recent Agricultural Development and Bedouin Settlement in Syria," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring, 1965), p. 176.

[20]Daniel G. Bates, "Yoruk Settlement in Southeast Turkey" in Salzman, op. cit., p. 126.

[21]Donald P. Cole, Nomads of the Nomads: The Al-Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter (Chicago: Aldine, 1975), p. 156.

[22]T. El-Farra, The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of an Emerging State: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1973), pp. 193-194.

[23]Donald Cole, "Pastoral Nomads in Rapidly Changing Economy: The Case of Saudi Arabia," in Tim Niblock, ed., Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf, (London: Croom Helm and Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, Exeter, 1980), p. 113.

[24]Cole, Nomads of the Nomads, op. cit., p. 24.

[25]W. Lancaster, "Saudi Arabian Bedouin: A Review," Commission on Nomadic Peoples, Newsletter, No. 5 (January 1980), p. 26. (published in Montreal, Canada).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abou-Zeid, Ahmad M.
1963 "The Changing World of the Nomads" in Mediterranean Rural Communities and Social Change, edited by J. G. Persistiany. Athens: Acts of the Mediterranean Sociological Conference.

Alabbadi, Abdallah H.
1970 Ra'y Hawl Al-Badu Fi al-Mamlakah al-Arabiyyah al-Saudiyyah (Opinion about Bedouins in Saudi Arabia). Riyadh: Saudi Arabia, Central Planning Organization.

Alawaji, Ibrahim
1971 Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia.

Al Farsy, Fouad
1978 Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development. London: Stacy International.

Al Fawwal, Salah M.
1967 Al-Badawah Al-Arabiyah Wa-Tanmiyah (The Arab Bedouinism and Development). Cairo: Maktabat Al-Qahirah Al-Hadithah.

Al Fiar, Mohammad H.
1977 The Faisal Settlement Project at Haradh, Saudi Arabia: A Study in Nomad Attitudes Toward Sedentarization. Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University.

Al Gain, Abdulbar A.
1974 The In-situ Development of the Bedouin Nomads: A Bayesian Decision Analysis. Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Arizona.

Al Qassab, Nafi N.
1969 "Geographical Aspects About the Sedentarization of Bedouin Tribes." The Journal of Iraqi Geographical Society, 5 (June), 275-324.

Amiran, David
1965 "Arid Zone Development: A Reappraisal Under Modern Technological Conditions." Economic Geography, 41:3 (July), 189-210.

Arabian American Oil Company.
1968 Aramco Handbook: Oil and the Middle East, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

Aramco Arabian Research Unit.
1965 Bedouin Settlement in Saudi Arabia. Its Effect on Company Operations. Published by Aramco, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

Aramco Special Study Group.
1963 Social Change in Saudi Arabia: Problems and Prospects, edited by Thomas O'Dea. Published by Aramco, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

Ashford, Douglas E.
1964 "Contradictions of Nationalism and Nation-Building in the Muslim World." The Middle East Journal, 18:4 (Autumn), 421-430.

Ashkenazi, Touvia.
1948 "The Anazah Tribes." Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 4:2 (Summer), 222-236.

_____.
1965 "Social and Historical Problems of the Anazeh Tribes." Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 8:1 (August), 93-100.

Aswad, Barbara C.
1962 "Social and Ecological Aspects in the Origin of the Islamic State." Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts and Letters, 48:2, 419-442.

Awad, Mohamed.
1954 "The Assimilation of Nomads in Egypt." Geographical Review, 44, 240-252.

_____.
1959 "Settlement of Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Tribal Groups in the Middle East." International Labor Review, 79 (January-June), 25-56.

_____.
1962 "Nomadism in the Arab Lands of the Middle East," in Unesco, The Problems of the Arid Zone, proceedings of the Paris Symposium. Arid Zone Research, 18, Paris: Unesco, 325-339.

Bacon, Elizabeth D.
1946 "A Preliminary Attempt to Determine the Culture Areas of Asia." Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 2:2 (Summer), 117-132.

_____.
1954 "Types of Pastoral Nomadism in Central and Southwest Asia." Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 10:1 (Spring), 44-68.

Baer, Gabriel
1964 Population and Society in the Arab East, translated by Hanna Szöke. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

Barth, Fredrik.
1961 Nomads of South Persia: The Basseri of the Khamseh Confederacy. Boston: Little Brown & Company.

Bashir, Faisal S.
1969 The Case of Nomadism: To Settle or Not to Settle. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Central Planning Organization.

Beaumont, Peter
1977 "Water and Development in Saudi Arabia." Geographical Journal, 143, 42-60.

Beling, Willard A., ed.
1980 King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia. London and Boulder, Colorado: Croom Helm and Westview Press.

Berger, Morroe.
1962 The Arab World Today. New York: Doubleday & Co. Inc.

Berque, Jacques.
1978 Cultural Expression in Arab Society Today. Austin and London: University of Texas Press.

Bill, James A.
1972 "Class Analysis and the Dialectics of Modernization in the Middle East." International Journal of Middle East Studies, 3, No. 4, (October), 417-434.

Bujra, Abdalla S.
1971 The Politics of Stratification: A Study of Political Change in a South Arabian Town. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bullard, Sir Reader.
1961 The Camels Must Go: An Autobiography. London: Faber and Faber.

Bulliet, Richard W.
1975 The Camel and the Wheel. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Burckhardt, John L.
1967 Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, 2 vols. New York: Johnson Reprinting Corporation.

Capot-Rey, Robert
1962 "The Present State of Nomadism in the Sahara," in Unesco. The Problems of the Arid Zone. Proceedings of the Paris Symposium, Arid Zone Research No. 18, Paris: Unesco, 301-309.

Caskel, Werner
1954 "The Bedouinization of Arabia," Studies in Islamic Cultural History, edited by G. E. Von Grunebaum, American Anthropological Association, Memoir No. 76: 36-46,

Chatty, Dawn
1974 From Camel to Truck: A Study of the Pastoral Economy of the Fadl and Al-Hassanna in the Beqaa Valley of Lebanon. Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles.

_____.
1981 "From Camel to Truck: A Pastoral Adaptation. Folk, 18:113-128.

_____.
1978 The Current Situation of the Bedouin in Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia and Their Prospect for the Future. London: Conference on Nomadic Peoples in a Changing World, Commission on Nomadic Peoples.

Clements, Frank A.
1979 Saudi Arabia: A Bibliography. Oxford, England and Santa Barbara, California: Clio Press.

Cole, Donald P.
1975 Nomads of the Nomads: The Al-Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter. Chicago: Aldine.

Cole, Donald P. and S. E. Ibrahim.
1978 Saudi Arabian Bedouins: An Assessment of Their Needs. Cairo: American University of Cairo, Papers in Social Science, Monograph 5.

"Comparative Studies of Nomadism and Pastoralism." Anthropological Quarterly, special issue edited by the Department of Anthropology, The Catholic University of America, vol. 44, July 1971, no. 3, pp. 104-210.

Coon, Carlton S.
1955 "The Nomads." In Social Forces in the Middle East edited by Sydney N. Fisher. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

_____.
1955 "Operation Bultiste: Promoting Industrial Development in Saudi Arabia." In Hands Across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation, edited by Howard M. Teaf, Jr. and Peter G. Frank. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

_____.
1960 "Badw," in Encyclopaedia of Islam, edited by H. A. R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 872-892.

_____.
1965 Caravan: The Story of the Middle East, Rev. ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Cottrell, Alvin J., General Editor.
1981 The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Cressey, George B.
1960 Crossroads: Land and Life in Southwest Asia. Chicago: J. P. Lippincott Co.

Cunnison, I. G.
1967 Nomads in the 1960's. Inaugural Lecture University of Hull, England.

_____.
1966 Baggara Arabs: Power and the Lineage in a Sudanese Nomad Tribe. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Darling, F. F. and Farvar, M. A.
1972 "Ecological Consequences of Sedentarization of Nomads." In The Carles Technology, eds. M. T. Farvar and J. P. Milton. Garden City, N. Y.: Natural History Press, 671-682.

DeGaury, Gerald.
1944 "An Arabian Bibliography." Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 31:315-320.

_____.
1946 Arabian Phoenix. London: George G. Harrap.

_____.
1966 Faisal: King of Saudi Arabia. London: Arthur Barker Limited.

DeQuin, Horst.
1976 The Challenge of Saudi Arabia. Singapore: Eurasian Press.

Dickson, Harold R. P.
1968 Kuwait and Her Neighbours. London: George Allen and Unwin.

_____.
1972 The Arab of the Desert: A Glimpse into Bedouin Life in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Dodd, Peter C.
1973 "Family Honor and the Forces of Change in Arab Society." The Middle East International, 4:1 (January), 39-54.

Doughty, Charles M.
1979 Travels in Arabia Deserta. 2 vols. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.

Dowson, V. H. W.
1949-1950 "The Date and the Arab." Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 36, Part 1 (January), 34-41.

Edens, David G.
1974 "The Anatomy of the Saudi Revolution." International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 5:50-64.

Eilts, Herman F.
1971 "Social Revolution in Saudi Arabia." Parameters: The Journal of the Army War College, 1:1 (Spring), Part 1: 4-18.

_____.
1971 "Social Revolution in Saudi Arabia." Parameters: The Journal of the Army War College, 1:2 (Fall), Part 2: 22-33.

El-Farra, Taha Osman M.
1973 "The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of an Emerging State: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.

Elphinston, W. G.
1945 "The Future of the Bedouin of Northern Arabia." International Affairs, 21:370-375.

English, Paul W.
1967 "Urbanites, Peasants and Nomads: The Middle Eastern Ecological Trilogy." Journal of Geography, 66, (February), 54-59.

Evans-Pritchard, Sir Edward E.
1973 The Sanusi of Cyrenaica. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Fernea, Robert A.
1963 "Conflict in Irrigation." Comparative Studies in Society and History, 6:76-83.

_____.
1970 Shaykh and Effendi: Changing Patterns of Authority Among the Elshabana of Southern Iraq. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Field, Henry.
1931 "Among the Bedouins of North Arabia." The Open Court, XLV (October), 577-595.

_____.
1932 "The Ancient and Modern Inhabitants of Arabia." The Open Court, 46:847-872.

Field, Henry and J. E. Glub.
1943 The Yezidis, Sulubba, and other Tribes of Iraq and Adjacent Regions. General Series in Anthropology, Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Publishing Company.

Filali, Mustafa.
1964 Project for Sedentarization and Urbanization of Bedouin Groups in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh: Central Planning Organization.

Fisher, William B.
1971 The Middle East: A Physical, Social and Regional Geography. London: Methuen.

Forde, C. Daryll.
1933 "The Habitat and Economy of North Arabian Badawin." Geography, 99, Part 1 (March), 205-219.

_____.
1961 Habitat, Economy and Society: A Geographical Introduction to Ethnology. London: Methuen.

Fried, Morton H.
1975 The Notion of Tribe. Menlo Park, California: Cummings Publishing Co.

George, A.
1975 "Bedouin Settlement in Saudi Arabia." Middle East International, 51 (September), 27-30.

Gischler, C.
1979 Water Resources in the Arab Middle East and North Africa. Cambridge: Menas Press.

Glubb, John Bagot.
1935 "The Bedouins of Northern Arabia [misprinted as Iraq]. Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 22, Part 1: 13-31.

_____.
1961 War in the Desert. New York: W. W. Norton and Company Inc.

Goldrup, Lawrence P.
1971 Saudi Arabia: 1902-1932: The Development of a Wahhabi Society. Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles.

Goldthrope, J. E.
1975 The Sociology of the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goldziher, Ignaz.
1977 Muslim Studies. Edited by S. M. Stern, translated from the German by C. R. Barber and S. M. Stern. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2 vols.

Habib, John S.
1978 Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and their Role in the Creation of the Sa'udi Kingdom, 1910-1930. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Halliday, Fred.
1978 "Migration and Labor Force in Oil Producing Countries of the Middle East." Journal of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, Kuwait University, 4:13 (January), 39-70.

_____.
1974 Arabia Without Sultans. London: Penguin Books.

Hamzah, Fuad.
1968 Qalb Jazirat Al-Arab. (Heart of the Arab Peninsula). Riyadh: Maktabat Al-Nasr Al-Hadithah.

_____.
1968 Al-Bilad Al-Arabiyah Al-Sa'udiyah, (Saudi Arabia). Second Edition. Riyadh: Maktabat Al-Nasr Al-Hadithah.

_____.
1968 Fi Bilad Asir (In Asir Country), second edition. Riyadh: Maktabat Al-Nasr Al-Hadithah.

Harrison, Paul W.
1924 The Arab at Home. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.

Heady, Harold F.
1972 "Ecological Consequences of Bedouin Settlement in Saudi Arabia." In The Careless Technology: Ecology and International Development, eds. M. Taghi Farvar and John P. Milton. Garden City: The Natural History Press.

Helaisi, Abdal Rahman S.
1959 "Bedouins and Tribal Life in Saudi Arabia." Internal Social Science Journal, 11, 4:532-538.

Helms, Christine Moss.
1981 The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Political Identity. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Hill, Donald R.
1975 "The Role of the Camel and the Horse in the Early Arab Conquests." In War, Technology and Society in the Middle East, edited by V. J. Parry & M. E. Yapp. London: Oxford University Press.

Hitti, Said and George T. Abed.
1974 "The Economy and Finances of Saudi Arabia." International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 21:2 (July), 247-306.

Hobday, Peter
1978 Saudi Arabia Today: Introduction to the Richest Oil Power. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Hodges, Carl N.
1975 "Desert Food Factories." Ekistics, 40:239 (October), 246-251.

Hogarth, David George.
1904 The Penetration of Arabia. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company.

_____.
1922 Arabia. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

_____.
1925 "Wahabism and British Interests." Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs, (March), 70-81.

_____
1978 Hejaz Before World War I. Cambridge: Oleander/Falcon Press.

Holden, David.
1966 Farewell to Arabia. London: Faber and Faber.

Holt, Major A. L.
1923 "The Future of the North Arabian Desert." The Geographical Journal, 62:4 (October), 259-271.

Hopwood, Derek (ed.)
1972 The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Howarth, David.
1964 The Desert King: Ibn Saud and His Arabia. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Hudson, Michael C.
1977 Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Hudson, Michael C. (ed.)
1979 The Arab Future: Critical Issues. Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University.

Huntington, Ellsworth.
1911-12 "The Arabian Desert and Human Character." The Journal of Geography, 10:169-175.

Ibn, Khaldun, A.
1958 The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Translated by Franz Rosenthal. 3 Vols. New York: Pantheon Books.

Ibrahim, Saad Eddin and Nicholas S. Hopkins (eds.)
1977 Arab Society in Transition: A Reader. Cairo: American University.

Inayatullah, Shaikh.
1942 Georgraphical Factors in Arabian Life and History. Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf.

Irons, William and Neville Dyson-Hudson (eds.)
1977 Perspectives on Nomadism. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Jarvis, C. S.
1936 "The Desert Bedouin and His Future." Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 23, part 4 (October), 585-593.

Johnson, Douglas L.
1969 The Nature of Nomadism: A Comparative Study of Pastoral Migrations in Southwest Asia and North Africa. Chicago: University of Chicago, Department of Geography Research Paper no. 118.

_____.
1975 "The Cultural Ecology of Pastoral Nomadism." Geographical Review, 65, no. 1 (January), 118-120.

Katakura, Motoko.
1977 Bedouin Village: A Study of a Saudi Arabian People in Transition. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

Kay, Shirley.
1978 The Bedouin. New York: Crane, Russak and Company.

Kelly, J. B.
1966 "The Future in Arabia." International Affairs, 52 (October), 619-640.

Khan, Saleem M. A.
1971 "Saudi Arabia: Wahabism and Oil." Islam and the Modern Age, 11, no. 2 (May), 87-101.

Kheirallah, George.
1952 Arabia Reborn. Albuquerque, New Mexico: The University of New Mexico Press.

Kimball, Solon T.
1956 "American Culture in Saudi Arabia." The New York Academy of Sciences, Series 11, 18, no. 5 (March) 469-484.

Knauerhase, Ramon.
1974 "Saudi Arabia's Economy at the Beginning of the 1970's." Middle East Journal, (Spring), 126-140.

_____.
1975 The Saudi Arabian Economy. New York: Praeger.

Lackner, Helen.
1978 A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia. London: Ithaca Press.

Lancaster, W. O.
1977 "Bedouin in the Oil Economy." Middle East International, No. 74 (August), 26-27.

_____.
1978 "The Bedouin and Progress." Middle East International, no. 79 (January), 26-27.

Lasky, Herbert.
1978 "Saudi Arabia: A Short History of an Immoderate State." Middle East Review, 11, no. 1 (Fall), 13-17.

Lattimore, Owen.
1962 Nomads and Commissars: Mongolia Revisited. New York: Oxford University Press.

League of Arab States
1965 The Ninth Conference of Social Affairs and Labor: Jerusalem, 1965. Ri'yat Al-Badu Wa Tahdiruhum Wa Tawtinuhum, (Development and Sedentarization of the Bedouins), 2 vols. Cairo: Dar At-Tib'ah Al-Hadithah.

Lebkicher, Roy.
1954 The Training of Saudi Arab Employees: Arabian American Oil Company. The Year Book of Education, New York: World Book Com., 514-535.

Lenczowski, George.
1960 Oil and State in the Middle East. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

_____.
1975 Political Elites in the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

_____.
1976 Middle East Oil in a Revolutionary Age. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

_____.
1980 The Middle East in World Affairs, 4th edition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

L'Equipe, ed.
1979 Pastoral Production and Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lerner, Daniel.
1963 The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, Third Edition. New York: The Free Press.

Levy, Reuben.
1957 The Social Structure of Islam, Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lewis, C. C.
1933 "Ibn Saud and the Future of Arabia." International Affairs, 12, no. 4 (July-August), 518-534.

Linabury, George O.
1970 British-Saudi Arab Relations, 1902-1927: A Revisionist Interpretation. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Columbia University.

_____.
1978 "The Creation of Saudi Arabia and the Erosion of Wahhabi Conservatism." Middle East Review, 11, no. 1 (Fall), 5-12.

Lipsky, George A.
1959 Saudi Arabia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture. New Haven: HRAF Press.

Long, David.
1976 Saudi Arabia. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington D. C. Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publication.

Loomis, C. P. and J. A. Beegle.
1950 Rural Social Systems. New York: Prentice Hall.

_____.
1957 Rural Sociology: The Strategy of Change. New York: Prentice-Hall.

Loomis, Charles P.
1960 Social Systems. New York: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc.

Loomis, Charles P. and Zona K. Loomis.
1961 Modern Social Theories. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.

Lorimer, J. G.
1970 Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia, 6 vols. Farnborough, England: Gregg International.

Mackie, J. B.
1924 "Hasa: An Arabian Oasis." Geographical Journal, 63: 189-207.

Malik, Saleh A.
1969 A Study of the Social System of Bedouins: Its Relation to the Problems of Settling in Saudi Arabia. Master's Thesis, Wayne State University.

_____.
1973 Rural Migration and Urban Growth in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan.

Malone, Joseph J.
1966 "Saudi Arabia." The Muslim World, 56, no. 4, (October), 290-295.

Marx, Emanuel.
1974 "The Organization of Nomadic Groups in the Middle East." In Society and Political Structure in the Arab World, edited by Menahem Wilson. New York: Humanities Press.

_____.
1977 "The Tribe as a Unit of Subsistence: Nomadic Pastoralism in the Middle East." American Anthropoligist, 79.

Matthews, Charles D.
1954 "Research in Saudi Arabia." The Moslem World, 43, no. 2 (April), 110-125.

_____.
1960 "Bedouin in Contemporary Arabia." Rivista deglistudi orientali, Rome 35 Fasc, 1-2:31-61.

McDonald, Norman W.
1977 "Arabia Moderate." Contemporary Review, 231 no. 1339, (August), 87-91.

McGregor, R.
1972 "Saudi Arabia: Population and the Making of a Modern State." In Populations of the Middle East and North Africa: A Geographical Approach, ed. J. I. Clarke and W. B. Fisher. New York: Africana Publishing Corp., 220-241.

Meeker, Michael E.
1979 Literature and Violence in North Arabia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Melamid, Alexander.
1965 "Political Boundaries and Nomadic Grazing." Geographical Review, 55, no. 2 (April), 287-290.

Mikesell, Ramond E. and H. B. Chenery.
1949 Arabian Oil: America's Stakes in the Middle East. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

Miles, S. B.
1966 The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf, 2 vols., 2 editions. London: Frank Cass and Co.

Monroe, Elizabeth.
1975 "Arabia from Incense to Oil." Asian Affairs, 62, new series no. 6, part 11 (October), 253-263.

Muksam, H. V.
1951 "Fertility and Reproduction of the Bedouin." Population Studies, 4 (March), 354-363.

Musil, Alois
1928 "Religion and Politics in Arabia." Foreign Affairs, 6, no. 4 (July), 675-681.

_____.
1960 "The Complicated Lives of Desert Nomads." A Reader in General Anthropology, edited by Carleton S. Coon. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 380-407.

_____.
1978 Arabia Deserta. Reprinted. New York: AMS.

_____.
1978 The Manners and Customs of the Rwala Bedouins. Reprinted. New York: AMS.

_____.
1978 Northern Negd. Reprinted. New York: AMS.

_____.
1978 Northern Hejaz. Reprinted. New York: AMS.

_____.
1978 A Map of Northern Arabia. Reprinted. New York: AMS.

Nasir, Sari J.
1976 The Arabs and the English. London: Longman Group.

Nash, Manning.
1966 Primitive and Peasant Economic System. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company.

Nelson, Cynthia (ed.)
1973 The Desert and the Sown: Nomads in the Wider Society. Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies.

Niblock, Tim (ed.)
1980 Social and Economic Development on the Arab Gulf. Center for Arab Gulf Studies, Exeter, London: Croom Helm.

Nieuwenhuijze, C. A. O. Van
1962 "The Near Eastern Village: A Profile." The Middle East Journal, 16, no. 2 (Summer), 295-308.

_____.
1964 "The Tribal Sector in Middle East Society: A Profile." Correspondance d'orient Etudes, 5-6:39-62.

_____.
1965 Social Stratification and the Middle East: An Interpretation. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

_____.
1971 Sociology of the Middle East. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

_____. (ed.)
1977 Commoners, Climbers and Notables: A Sampler of Studies on Social Ranking in the Middle East. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Nolte, Richard
1958 "A Tale of Three Cities,"1. Dhahran: American Universities Field Staff, (January-June), 1-19.

_____.
1958 "A Tale of Three Cities," 2. Riyadh: American Universities Field Staff, (January-June), 1-14.

_____.
1958 "A Tale of Three Cities," 3. Jedda and the King: American Universities Field Staff, (January-June), 1-26.

_____.
1963 "From Nomad Society to New Nation: Saudi Arabia." In Expectant Peoples, edited by K. H. Silvert. New York: Random House, 77-94.

"Nomads and Nomadism in the Arid Zone." International Social Science Journal, 11, no. 4: 481-585, 1959.

O'Leary, DeLacy.
1973 Arabia Before Muhammad. London: Kegan Paul and New York: AMS.

Oppenheim, Max Von, A. S. Freiherr
1939-1952 Die Beduinen, 3 vols. Leipzig and Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

Palgrave, William Gifford.
1969 Narrative of a Year's Journey Through Central and Eastern Arabia, 2 vols. Farnborough: Gregg International.

Parsons, Talcott.
1951 The Social System, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press.

Pastner, Stephen.
1971 "Camels, Sheep and Nomad Social Organization: A Comment on Rubel's Model." Man: Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, New Series 6, no. 2 (June) 285-288.

Patai, Raphael
1951 "Nomadism: Middle Eastern and Central Asian." Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 7:401-414.

_____.
1952 "The Middle East as a Cultural Area." The Middle East Journal, 6, no. 1 (Winter), 1-21.

_____.
1955 "The Dynamics of Westernization in the Middle East." The Middle East Journal, 9, no. 1 (Winter, 1-16.

_____.
1971 Society, Culture and Change in the Middle East. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Pelly, Lewis.
1977 Report on a Journey to Riyadh in Central Arabia. Cambridge: Oleander Press.

Peppelenbosch, P. G. N.
1968 "Nomadism on the Arabian Peninsula: A General Appraisal." Tijdschrift Econ. Soc. Geogr., 49, no. 6 (November and December), 335-346.

Peterson, J. L.
1977 "Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia." Middle East Journal, 31, no. 3 (Summer), 297-312.

Philby, H. St. J.
1923 "Jauf and North Arabian Desert." The Geographical Journal, 62, no. 4 (October), 242-259.

_____.
1959 "Riyadh: Ancient and Modern." The Middle East Journal, 13, no. 2 (Spring), 129-141.

_____.
1923 The Heart of Arabia, 2 vols. New York: G. P. Putnam Sons.

_____.
1930 Arabia. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

_____.
1933 The Empty Quarter. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

_____.
1948 Arabian Days. London: Robert Hale.

_____.
1952 Arabian Highlands. Ithaca: Cornell University.

_____.
1953 Arabian Jubilee. New York: The John Day Company.

_____.
1972 Saudi Arabia. New York: Arno Press.

_____.
1977 Arabia of the Wahhabis. London: Frank Cass.

Phoenix
1930 "A Brief Outline of the Wahabi Movement." Journal of the Central Asian Society, 17, part 2 (October), 401-416.

Polk, William R. and William J. Mates.
1973 Passing Brave. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Rahman, Fazlur
1979 Islam, 2nd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rajab, Omar A. S.
1977 "The Ecology of Nomadism in Saudi Arabia." Journal of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, 3, no. 2 (July), 85-120.

Raswan, Carl R.
1930 "Tribal Areas and Migration Lines of the North Arabian Bedouins." Geographical Review, 20:494-502.

_____.
1949 Black Tents of Arabia: My Life Among the Bedouins. New York: Creative Age Press.

Raunkiar, Barclay.
1969 Through Wahhabiland on Camel Back. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

Rentz, George.
1948 Muhammad Ibn Abdal-Wahhab (1703-1792) and the Beginning of Unitarian Empire in Arabia. Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley: University of California, Dept. of History.

_____.
1950 "Literature on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." Middle East Journal, 4, no. 2 (April), 244-49.

_____.
1951 "Notes on Dickson's the Arab of the Desert." The Muslem World, 41, no. 1 (January), 49-64.

_____.
1957 "Notes on Oppenheim's 'Die Beduinen.'" Oriens, 10: 77-89.

_____.
1965 "Saudi Arabia: The Islamic Island." Journal of International Affairs, 19, no. 1, 77-86.

_____.
1969 "The Wahhabis." In Religion in the Middle East, ed. by A. J. Arberry, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 270-284.

Rihani, Ameen.
1928 Maker of Modern Arabia: Ibn Saud of Arabia, His People and His Land. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.

_____.
1964 Tarikh Najd Wa Mulhaqtihi (Najd and Its Dependencies). Beirut: DAR ar-Rihani Publishing Company.

Ritter, Wigand
1975 "Central Saudi Arabia." Wiener Geographische Schriften, 43/44/45, Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsgeographie 1: 205-228.

/
_____.
1977 "A Note on the Sedentarization of Nomads in Eastern Saudi Arabia." Studien zur allgemeinen und regionalen Geographie. Frankfurter Wirtschafts und Sozialgeographische Schriften, 407-434.

Rogers, Everett M.
1969 "Motivations, Values and Attitudes of Subsistence Farmers Toward a Subculture of Peasantry." In Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Development, ed. by Clifton R. Wharton, Jr. Chicago: Aldine, 111-135.

Rogers, Everett M. and Rabel J. Burdge.
1972 Social Change in Rural Socities. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Rosenfeld, Henry.
1965 "The Social Composition of the Military in the Process of State Formation in the Arabian Desert," part 1. Anthropological Institute, 95:75-86.

_____.
1965 "The Military Force Used to Achieve and Maintain Power and the Meaning of its Social Composition, Slaves, Mercenaries and Townsmen," part 2, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 95:174-194.

Rowton, M.
1973 "Urban Autonomy in a Nomadic Environment." Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 32 no. 1 & 2 (January-April), 201-215.

_____.
1974 "Enclosed Nomadism." Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 17, part 1, 1-30.

Rubel, Paula G.
1969 "Herd Composition and Social Structure: On Building Models of Nomadic Pastoral Societies." Man: Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 4 no. 2 (June) 268-273.

Rugh, William
1973 "Emergence of a New Middle Class in Saudi Arabia." The Middle East Journal, 27, no. 1 (Winter), 7-20.

_____.
1979 "Saudi Arabia: A Tale of Two Houses." The Wilson Quarterly, 3, no. 1 (Winter), 59-72.

Sabir, Muhi Al-Din and L. K. Maleikah.
1966 Bedouins and Bedouinism. Egypt, Sirs Allyyan: Markaz Tanmiyat Al Mojtama'.

Sadleir, George Foster.
1977 Diary of a Journey Across Arabia (1819). Cambridge: Oleander Press.

Sahlins, Marshal O.
1968 Tribesmen. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc.

_____.
1972 Stone Age Economics. Chicago: Aldine.

Said, Edward W.
1978 Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books.

Said, Abdul Rahman H.
Saudi Arabia: The Transition from a Tribal Society to a Nation-State. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, Columbia, n.d.

Salzman, Philip Carl (ed.)
1980 When Nomads Settle. New York: Praeger.

Salzman, Philip Carl.
1978 "Ideology and Change in Middle Eastern Tribal Societies." Man: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, New Series 13, no. 4 (December), 618-637.

_____.
1974 "Tribal Chiefs as Middle Men: The Politics of Encapsulation in the Middle East." Anthropological Quarterly, 47, no. 2 (April), 203-210.

Sanger, Richard H.
1947 "Ibn Saud's Program for Arabia." Middle East Journal, 1, no. 2 (April), 180-190.

_____.
1954 The Arabian Peninsula. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Sayigh, Yusif A.
1971 "Problems and Prospects of Development in the Arabian Peninsula." International Journal of Middle East Studies, 2, no. 1 (January), 40-58.

_____.
1978 The Economies of the Arab World Development Since 1945. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Schmidt-Nielson, Knut.
1957 "Body Temperature of the Camel and Its Relation to Water Economy." American Journal of Physiology, 188, no. 1 (January), 103-112.

_____.
1959 "The Physiology of the Camel." Scientific American, 201 no. 6, (December), 140-151.

Schultz, Theodore W.
1964 Transforming Traditional Agriculture. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Seale, Morris S.
1974 The Desert Bible: Nomadic Tribal Culture and Old Testament Interpretation. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Shaker, Fatina A.
1972 Modernization of the Developing Nations: The Case of Saudi Arabia, Ph.D. dissertation, Lafayette: Purdue University.

Shamekh, Ahmed A.
1975 Spatial Paterns of Bedouin Settlement in Al-Qasim Region, Saudi Arabia. Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Kentucky.

_____.
1977 "Bedouin Settlements." Ekistics, 43, no. 258 (May), 249-259.

Shils, Edward.
1971 "Tradition." Comparative Studies in Society and History, 13, no. 2 (April, 122-159.

Silverfarb, Daniel N.
1972 British Relations with Ibn Saud of Najd 1914-1919. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Dept. of History.

Sjoberg, Gideon
1952 "Folk and Feudal Societies." The American Journal of Sociology, 58, no. 3 (November), 231-239.

Smalley, W. F.
1932 "The Wahhabis and Ibn Saud." The Moslem World, 22, no. 3 (July), 227-247.

Smith, C. G.
1970 "Water Resources and Irrigation Development in the Middle East." Geography, 55, no. 249, part 4 (November), 407-425.

Smith, W. Robertson.
1903 Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia. Boston: Beacon Press.

_____.
1969 Lectures on the Religion of Semites. Ktav Publishing House, Inc.

Smith, Wilfred Cantwell.
1957 Islam in Modern History. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Spooner, Brian
1971 "Towards a Generative Model of Nomadism." Anthropological Quarterly, 44 (July), 198-210.

_____.
1973 The Cultural Ecology of Pastoral Nomads. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley (Module 45).

Stauffer, Thomas B.
1955 "The Industrial Worker." In Social Forces in the Middle East, ed. by S. N. Fisher. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 83-95.

Stevens, J. H.
1970 "Changing Agricultural Practice in an Arabian Oasis." The Geographical Journal, 136, part 3 (September), 401-418.

_____.
1972 "Oasis Agricultural in the Central and Eastern Arabian Peninsula." Geography, 57, no. 257, part 4 (November), 321-326.

Storrs, Sir Ronald
1937 Orientations. London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson.

Sweet, Louise E.
1965 "Camel Raiding of North Arabian Bedouin: A Mechanism of Ecological Adaptation," American Anthropologist, 67:1132-50.

_____.
1965 "Camel Pastoralism in North Arabia and the Minimal Camping Unit." In Man, Culture and Animals: The Role of Animals in Human Ecological Adjustment, ed. Anthony Leeds. Washington, D. C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science,: 129-152.

Sweet, Louise E. ed.
1970 Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, 2 vols. Garden City: The Natural History Press.

_____.
1971 "The Arabian Peninsula." In The Central Middle East. New Haven: Hraf Press, 199-265.

Tannous, Afif I.
1947 "The Arab Tribal Community in a Nationalist State." Middle East Journal, 1, no. 1 (January), 5-17.

_____.
1951 "Land Reform: Key to the Development and Stability of the Arab World." Middle East Journal, 5, no. 1 (Winter), 1-20.

Thesiger, Wilfred P.
1950 "The Badu of Southern Arabia." Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 37, part 1 (January), 53-61.

_____.
1959 Arabian Sands. London: Longmans.

_____.
1964 The Marsh Arabs. New York: E. P. Dutton.

Thomas, Bertram.
1931 Alarm and Excursions in Arabia. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company.

Toynbee, Arnold.
1925 "The Resurrection of the Wahhabi Power in the Arabian Peninsula and the Fall of the House of Hashim." Survey of International Affairs, vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 271-346.

Trial, George T., and R. Bayly Winder.
1950 "Modern Education in Saudi Arabia." History of Educational Journal, 1 (Spring), 121-134.

Troeller, Gary.
1976 The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud. London: Frank Cass.

United Nations.
1970 "Nomadic Population in Selected Countries in the Middle East and Related Issues of Sedentarization and Settlement." In Studies on Selected Development Problems in Various Countries in the Middle East. New York: United Nations, 105-17.

Unesco.
1961 A History of Land Use in Arid Regions. Arid Zone Research, no. 17, Paris: Unesco.

_____.
1962 The Problems of the Arid Zone. Proceedings of the Paris Symposium, Arid Zone Research no. 18. Paris: Unesco.

Vicker, Ray.
1974 The Kingdom of Oil. New York: Scribner's.

Vidal, Frederico S.
1954 "Date Culture in the Oasis of al-Hasa." The Middle East Journal, 8, no. 4 (Autumn), 417-428.

_____.
1955 The Oasis of al-Hasa. Dhahran, Saudi Arabia: Arabian American Oil Company.

_____.
1976 "Mutayr: A Tribe of Saudi Arabia Pastoral Nomads." In The Study of Anthropology, edited by David G. Hunter, Maryann B. Foley, Philip Whitten. New York: Harper and Row.

_____.
1955 "The Utilization of Surface Water by Northern Arabian Bedouins." In Social and Technological Management in Dry Lands: Past and Present, Indigenous and Imposed, edited by Nancie L. Gonzalez. Boulder, Colorado: West View Press.

Wahbah, Hafiz.
1929 "Wahhabism in Arabia: Past and Present." Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 16, part 4 (October), 458-467.

_____.
1960 Khamsuna 'Aman Fi Jazirat Al-Arab (Fifty Years in the Arabian Peninsula). Cairo: Matba'at Al-Babi Al-Halabi.

_____.
1961 Jazirat al-Arab Fi al-Qarn al-Ishrin (The Arab Peninsula in the Twentieth Century). Cairo: Maktabat Al-Nahdah Al-Masriyah.

_____.
1964 Arabian Days. London: Arthur Barker Ltd.

Walpole, Norman C. (ed.)
1971 Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia. Washington, D. C.: The American University.

Weber, Max
1977 On Charisma and Institution Building, edited by S. N. Eisenstadt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

_____.
1978 Economy and Society. Edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich, 2 vols. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wehr, Hans
1976 Arabic English Dictionary. Ithaca, N.Y.: Spoken Languages Services Inc.

Weir, Shelagh
1976 The Bedouin: Aspects of the Material Culture of the Bedouin. London: World of Islam Publishing Co.

Wenner, Manfred W.
1975 "Saudi Arabia: Survival of Traditional Elites." In Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East, ed. by Frank Tachau. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman.

Wilkinson, J. C.
1977 Water and Tribal Settlement in South East Arabia: A Study of the Aflaj of Oman. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

_____.
1978 "Islamic Water Law with Special Reference to Oasis Settlement." Journal of Arid Environment, 1:86-87.

Winder, Bayly R.
1948 'Al-awamil allati Sa'adat 'ala tautid al mulk al-Su'udi, (Factors Contributed to the Strength of Al-Saud's Rule), Al-Abbath:1:3-14.

_____.
1965 Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century. London: Macmillan.

Wolf, Eric R.
1951 "The Social Organization of Mecca and the Origins of Islam." Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 7, no. 4 (Winter), 329-356.

Zirikli, Khair al-Din
1970 Shibh Al-Jazirah Fi 'Ahd al-malik Abd al-Aziz. (The Arabian Peninsula During Abd al-Aziz Reign), 3 vols. Beirut: Matabia Dar al-Qlam.

_____.
1978 Mara'aytu Wa Smi-atu (What I Saw and Heard). Taif, Saudi Arabia: Makatabat Dar Al-Ma'arf.

VITA

Abdallah Hasan Alabbadi was born in Alm'aabdh district, Makkah Saudi Arabia. He attended elementary schools in Makkah and Taif. He completed his secondary education at Alm'adh Al Saudi in Makkah. In 1960 he graduated from Cairo University, Egypt with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology.

In the summer of 1960, he worked for the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. First, he conducted sociological studies with his colleague Abdallah Al'alawla about the Saudi labor conditions in the Arabian American Oil Company in the Eastern Region, and at the Arabian Japanese Oil Company and Getty Oil Company in the Saudi-Kuwaiti neutral zone. Second, he established and directed the labor office in Al-Madinah and Tabouk. In 1962 he was appointed Director of the Youth Welfare Department in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. He represented his country in several conferences held in the Middle East and Western Europe and dealt with youth problems and sports activities. In 1964 he presided over the Saudi Arabian delegation to the first GANEFO held in Djakarta, Indonesia. In the summer of 1964, he came to the United States for graduate study and in 1967, he received his M.A. in Political Science and Sociology from Central Michigan University. In the summer of 1967, he returned home to work for the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. First he worked as an advisor to the Social Affairs Agency and then as Assistant to the General Director of the Youth Department in the same Ministry.

In 1968 he attended the Olympics in Mexico City as a member of the Saudi National Olympic Committee. From 1970-1972 he worked for the Central Planning Organization in Riyadh and participated with the Stanford Research Group in the formation of the first Five-Year Plan, 1970-1975. In 1972, he attended the Olympics in Munich, West Germany representing the Saudi Athletics Federation.

When the University of Riyadh in 1973 decided to open the Sociology Department in the Faculty of Arts, he joined the new department as a lecturer. He taught for two years, Introductory Sociology and History of Social Thought in the College of Education and the Sociology Department of Riyadh University. He has frequently contributed to Saudi newspapers and magazines writing about social issues. He has travelled to most countries in the Middle East, Western Europe, Asia, North and South America.

He is married to Albatoul T. Aldabbagh and she is enrolled in the Ph.D. program in Sociology at Michigan State University. There are three children: Manal, Hani and Mohammad.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الاهداء

الى ذكرى المرحوم السيد/ محمد طاهر الدباغ من أوائل رواد التربية والتعليم في المملكة العربية السعودية .

الى والدتي فاطمة ، والى زوجتي البتول ، والى ابنائي منال وهاني ومحمد ، رمزا للمحبة والوفاء .

عبد الله حسن العبادي (أبو هاني)

مارس / ١٩٨١م

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

توطين واستيطان البدو في المملكة العربية السعودية

" دراسة اجتماعية تحليلية "

موضوع رسالة دكتوراه في علم الاجتماع من جامعة ولاية متشيجن - الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية .

١٤٠١هـ ١٩٨١م

عبد الله حسن العبادي (أبو هاني)

MICHIGAN STATE UNIV. LIBRARIES
31293101843971