



This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL CHANGE ON POLICE DEVELOPMENT
IN SAUDI ARABIA: A CASE STUDY OF
RIYADH POLICE DEPARTMENT

presented by

Mohammad Owayedh R. Rajehi

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Doctor degree in Philosophy

Peter Manning

P.K. Manning
Major professor

Date Nov. 7, 1980



OVERDUE FINES:

25¢ per day per item

RETURNING LIBRARY MATERIALS:

Place in book return to remove
charge from circulation records

<p>5860</p> <p>MAY 27 '82</p> <p>041</p> <p>2702 '83</p> <p>14599</p> <p>72124</p> <p>MAY 03 '83</p> <p>MAY 18 '83</p> <p>135</p> <p>020</p> <p>OCT 23 '84</p> <p>307</p> <p>MAY 14 '87</p> <p>JUN 19 '85</p>	<p>APR 24 '85</p> <p>L120</p> <p>JUL 12 '85</p> <p>270396</p> <p>OCT 31 '86</p> <p>MAY 17 '87</p> <p>70 A 124</p> <p>FEB 17 '88</p> <p>100 A 124</p> <p>JUN 03 '88</p> <p>JAN 07 1991</p>	<p>FEB 05 1991</p> <p>033</p> <p>035</p>
---	---	--

THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL CHANGE ON POLICE DEVELOPMENT
IN SAUDI ARABIA: A CASE STUDY OF
RIYADH POLICE DEPARTMENT

By

Mohammad Owayedh R. Rajehi

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology

1981

THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL CHANGE ON POLICE DEVELOPMENT
IN SAUDI ARABIA: A CASE STUDY OF
RIYADH POLICE DEPARTMENT

By

Mohammad Owayedh R. Rajehi

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology

1981

Approved: Professor Peter Manning, Chairman

Professor James McKee, Member

Professor Christopher Vanderpool,
Member

Professor Robert Trojanowicz
(Criminal Justice), Member

Professor John Hudzik (Criminal
Justice), Dean's Representative

P.K. Manning

James McKee

C. Vanderpool

Robert C. Trojanowicz

John Hudzik

ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL CHANGE ON POLICE DEVELOPMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA: A CASE STUDY OF RIYADH POLICE DEPARTMENT

By

Mohammad Owayedh R. Rajehi

The main purpose of this study was to explore, explain, and analyze the effect of specific aspects of social change in Saudi Arabia, a traditional society, on police development. The interest was in the cause, impact, and consequences of change in police role, function, and structure. The writer explored the roots, origins, and structures of Saudi Arabian society as a background for the specific case study. It was deemed proper to outline the concept of social organization and to ask such general questions as: What is social structure? What is social change? What are the sources or factors of change? What are the measures of change? How does a given society react to change (i.e., is change welcomed or resisted)? What are the sources of resistance? What is social control in a society? In other words, where does the locus of power to "apply sanctions" reside in a society? How does the legal system operate? What role is assigned by tradition to the police? What is the function, role, and structure of

the police during a period of change? What degree of control over society does the police department have? Who controls the police? In the first two chapters these general questions were asked in the specific context of Saudi Arabia.

These questions, along with the writer's hypotheses, were the mainstream upon which the theme of the study focused and traced its explanatory and analytical processes. Particular attention was paid to economic growth, population growth, crime rate, foreigners living in Saudi Arabia, and widespread education and the impact of these factors on police development in Saudi Arabia. These factors were the main independent variables of the study. Other important factors such as religious and political commitment and modern communication were touched upon and briefly described rather than statistically analyzed. The hypotheses were:

- I. Economic growth has a direct effect on police development.
- II. Population growth leading to urbanization has a direct effect on police development.
- III. Crime rate has a direct effect on police development.
- IV. Educational growth has a direct effect on police development.
- V. Foreigners living in Saudi Arabia affect police development.

The dependent variable for this research was the main subject matter, police organization in Saudi Arabia.

The research was built upon the writer's own experience of 13 years as a police officer (lieutenant colonel) and 7 years as a government employee--a total of 20 years of government service. The study relied on three types of data: published and unpublished government documents, statistical yearbooks, and other literature on police development in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular; personal interviews with the five highest police officials in the Saudi Arabian police force; and a questionnaire that was administered to 55 police officers in the capital city of Riyadh's police department and to high-ranking officers in the General Directorate of Public Security (10 captains, 26 majors, 6 lieutenant colonels, 6 colonels, 3 major generals, and 4 lieutenant generals). The questionnaire data were analyzed statistically. The background of interviews, existing literature and documents was also utilized. Based on this, the five hypotheses were accepted.

Limitations of the study are noted and discussed, and the degree of generalizability of the findings assessed.

© Copyright

Mohammad Owayedh R. Rajehi

1981

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ In the Name of Allah, the
Compassionate, the Merciful

To my children, Naif, Nada, Nader, Noha, and Nezar,
my mother, Haya, and my wife, Sameera, who
value knowledge and appreciate education

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer would like to extend his thanks and gratitude to the many individuals whose help, assistance and guidance have contributed a great deal in shaping, completing and executing the study in its present format. Any shortcomings of this study regarding contents, judgment or conclusions are the sole responsibility of the writer.

Special thanks goes to Professor Peter Manning, the Chairman of the Guidance Committee, for his valuable expert advice and his academic guidance. He has been very helpful all through the study's many phases. Also, many thanks to the members of the Committee, Professors Christopher Vanderpool, James McKee, and Robert Trojanowicz, for their valuable time, assistance, guidance and continuous encouragement and patience. Special thanks should be attributed to Professor John Hudzik, the Dean of the Social Science College's representative, who gave me many valuable suggestions for changes and good ideas to include in the study. My gratitude also extends to those authors whose books and articles I used for my research, especially Dr. David Bayley, Charles Tilly and Associates, Professor Peter Manning, Neil Smelser, Guy Swanson, the Project Star

authority, and the many others whose names could not possibly be included in this brief paper.

I would also like to thank all those police officers in Saudi Arabia who were very helpful and cooperative during the administration of the questionnaires and personal interviews in Riyadh. I am deeply in debt to all those officers, especially Lt. Colonel Fahed Al-Ghannam, Regional Planning and Budget Director, Colonel Mohammad Iben Raja', Regional Traffic Department Director, Lt. General Mohammad Iben Aish, Riyadh Police Department Director, General Mohammad Iben Hallal, Coast Guard General Director, and Full General Abdullah Al-Shiekh, Public Security General Director, for their help, understanding, and assistance.

In addition to the above officers, special thanks go to Prince Naif Iben Abdullaziz, Minister of the Interior, and his Vice Minister, Prince Ahmed Iben Abdullaziz, for their full encouragement, helpful suggestions, and their unlimited assistance.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF TABLES	x
LIST OF FIGURES	xiii
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Background to the Problem	1
Introduction to Saudi Arabia	3
Historical Background	4
Geography	5
Population	5
Economy	7
Form of Government	10
Social Structure	12
The Legal System	16
The Police System	21
The Problem Focus	37
The Importance of the Problem	39
Definition of Terms	42
Hypotheses	46
Overview of the Study	49
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE	55
General Factors of Social Change	56
Social Change	56
Development	59
Economic Growth	61
Population Growth	62
Growth in the Crime Rate	64
Education	70
Police Development as a Response to the	
Preceding Factors of Social Change	71
Role of the Police	73
Police Organization and Structure	75
Politics and Control of the Police	77
Police Functions and Definition	78
Factors of Social Change in Saudi Arabian	
Society	82
Economic Growth	82
Population Growth	83

	Page
Educational Growth	86
Growth in the Crime Rate.	88✓
Foreigners Living in Saudi Arabia	93✓
Growth of Traditional Institutions as a Result of Development	97✓
Police Development in Saudi Arabia	103
Summary	109
III. METHODOLOGY, PROCEDURE, AND OPERATIONALIZATION	123
Sample	124
Justification for the Selection and Location of the Sample	129
Design of the Instrument	132
Other Sources of Data	132
Operationalization	133
Economic Growth	134✓
Population Growth	134✓
Crime Rate	135✓
Foreigners Living in Saudi Arabia	136✓
Education	137
IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS	139
Statistical Techniques	139
Descriptive Statistics	139
Inferential Statistics	140
Characteristics of Respondents	140
Analysis of the Data	142
Hypothesis I: Economic Growth Has a Direct Effect on Police Development	143
Hypothesis II: Population Growth Has a Direct Effect on Police Development	146
Hypothesis III: Crime Rate Has a Direct Effect on Police Development	148
Hypothesis IV: Education Has a Direct Effect on Police Development, Both Qualitatively and Quantitatively	154
Hypothesis V: Foreigners Living in Saudi Arabia Have an Effect on Police Development	156
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS	177
Summary	178
Conclusions	182✓
Implications of the Study	185
Limitations	185
Generalizations	186

	Page
BIBLIOGRAPHY	191
APPENDIX A: THE QUESTIONNAIRE (English Version) . .	200
APPENDIX B: THE QUESTIONNAIRE (Arabic Version) . .	204

LIST OF TABLES

	Page
1.1 ARAMCO'S SHARE IN SAUDI ARABIA'S OIL PRODUCTION AND REVENUES	8
1.2 SAUDI ARABIA: KEY ECONOMIC INDICATORS	9
2.1 CRIME INDEX FROM 1966-75	91
2.2 MOST SERIOUS CRIMES FROM 1977-78	91
2.3 ALL CRIMES COMMITTED FROM 1977-78 REGARDLESS OF SERIOUSNESS	92
2.4 NUMBER OF PEOPLE BY NATIONALITY (SAUDIS AND NON-SAUDIS) WHO COMMITTED SERIOUS CRIMES FROM 1966-75 AND FROM 1977-78	94
4.1 RANK AND YEARS OF POLICE SERVICE OF RESPONDENTS	141
4.2 DATA FOR HYPOTHESIS I: ECONOMIC GROWTH HAS A DIRECT EFFECT ON POLICE DEVELOPMENT	145
4.2.1. Responses to Economic Growth Question	145
4.2.2. Responses to Economic Growth Question by Rank	145
4.2.3. Responses to Economic Growth Question by Years of Service	145
4.3 DATA FOR HYPOTHESIS II: POPULATION GROWTH HAS A DIRECT EFFECT ON POLICE DEVELOPMENT	149
4.3.1. Responses to Population Growth Question	149
4.3.2. Responses to Population Growth Question by Rank	149
4.3.3. Responses to Population Growth Question by Years of Service	149
4.4 DATA FOR HYPOTHESIS III: CRIME RATE HAS A DIRECT EFFECT ON POLICE DEVELOPMENT	152
4.4.1. Responses to Increased Crime Rate Question	152
4.4.2. Responses to Crime Rate Question by Rank	152
4.4.3. Responses to Crime Rate Question by Years of Service	152

	Page
4.4.4. Periods from 1939 to 1959 Giving Best Indication of Social Problems (Crime Rate) Such as Homocide, Burglary, Theft, Rape, and Traffic Accidents as Measured in Question 5	153
4.4.5. Periods from 1959 to 1979 Giving Best Indication of Social Problems (Crime Rate) Such as Homocide, Burglary, Theft, Rape, and Traffic Accidents as Measured in Question 5	153
4.5 DATA FOR HYPOTHESIS IV: EDUCATION HAS A DIRECT EFFECT ON POLICE DEVELOPMENT	157
4.5.1. Responses to Education Question	157
4.5.2. Responses to Education Question by Rank	157
4.5.3. Responses to Education Question by Years of Service	157
4.6 DATA FOR HYPOTHESIS V: FOREIGNERS HAVE AN EFFECT ON POLICE DEVELOPMENT	160
4.6.1. Responses to Question 7 about the Source of Social Problems (Crime Rates) as Measured in Question 5	160
4.6.2. Rank vs. Source of Social Problems (Crime Rates) as Measured in Question 5 for 1939-1959	160
4.6.3. Years of Service vs. Source of Social Problems (Crime Rates) as Measured in Question 5 for 1939- 1959	160
4.6.4. Responses to Question 9 about the Source of Social Problems (Crime Rate) as Measured in Question 5	161
4.6.5. Rank vs. Source of Social Problems (Crime Rate) as Measured in Question 5 for 1959-1979	161
4.6.6. Years of Service vs. Source of Social Problems (Crime Rate) as Measured in Question 5 for 1959- 1979	161
4.6.7. Responses to Question about the Effect of Increased Numbers of Foreigners on the Crime Rate	164
4.6.8. Rank vs. Effect of Increased Numbers of Foreigners on Crime Rate	164
4.6.9. Years of Service vs. Effect of Increased Numbers of Foreigners on Crime Rate	164

	Page
4.6.10. Responses to Question 11 about Crimes Associated with an Increased Number of Foreigners During the Period 1969-1979 . . .	166
4.6.11. Rank vs. Increase in Crime Frequency Due to Increased Numbers of Foreigners	166
4.6.12. Years of Service vs. Increase in Crime Frequency Due to Increased Numbers of Foreigners	166
4.6.13. Responses to Question 12 about Non-Crime Related Problems Caused by Foreigners During 1969-1979 . . .	168
4.6.14. Rank vs. Non-Crime Related Problems Caused by Foreigners During 1969-1979	168
4.6.15. Years of Service vs. Non-Crime Related Problems Caused by Foreigners During 1969-1979 . . .	168
4.6.16. Responses to Question 13 on Whether or Not Saudi Arabia Should Stop Importing Foreign Laborers	170
4.6.17. Rank vs. Whether or Not Saudi Arabia Should Stop Importing Foreign Laborers	170
4.6.18. Years of Service vs. Whether or Not Saudi Arabia Should Stop Importing Foreign Laborers	170
4.6.19. Responses to Question 14 on the Effects of Stopping the Importation of Foreign Laborers	172
4.6.20. Rank vs. Stopping the Importation of Foreign Laborers Would Decrease Crime Rate	172
4.6.21. Years of Service vs. Stopping the Importation of Foreign Laborers Would Decrease Crime Rate	172

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
1.1 Map of Saudi Arabia	6
1.2 Organizational Structure of the Saudi Police Force in 1937	24
1.3 Organizational Structure of the Saudi Police Force in 1950	26
1.4 Organizational Structure of the Saudi Police Force in 1964	28
1.5 Organizational Structure of the Saudi Police Force in 1966	30
1.6 Organizational Structure of the Saudi Police Force in 1976-1977	31
1.7 Organizational Structure of the Ministry of the Interior in 1980: Main Organizational Sections	33
1.8 Organizational Structure of the General Directorate of Public Security in 1980 . . .	35
2.1 Organizational Structure of the Riyadh Police Department in 1980	108

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background to the Problem

In developing countries, as well as in developed ones, social change not only brings important and innovative ideas; it also brings conflicts and contradictions to the societies involved. Such change not only affects every segment of social organization in any given society, it also affects the daily lives of everyone in that society, irrespective of whether the sources of change come from inside or outside. Since we all live in a world of ideas and fast communication, people are affected by the ideas and discoveries of others. In such situations, social control agencies, especially the police, are at the "cutting edge" of social change. In other words, for the police (being one segment of the social structure), the impact of social change on their role, structure, and function is at its peak. They must carry the burden of coping with the heavy stress of maintaining law and order in the society, with all its differentiated social structures, and at the same time keep their original, traditionally prescribed role. However, the definition of social change and

social order that guides the police in their work may lag behind the conceptual meaning of these terms. Strecher correctly pointed out this problem when he said that "the police see social order as a planned process when it actually involves a number of interrelated factors such as technology, economy, social structure, values, and cultural institutions."¹

Therefore, the main purpose of this study was to explore, explain, and analyze the effect of specific aspects of social change in Saudi Arabia, a traditional society, on police development. The interest was in the causes, impact, and consequences of change in police role, function, and structure. In doing so, the writer was bound, as any social science researcher is, to note the necessity of digging deeply into the roots, origins, and structures of Saudi Arabian society before presenting the specific case study. It was therefore deemed proper to outline the concept of social organization and to ask such general questions as: What is social structure? What is social change? What are the sources or factors of change? What are the measures of change? How does a given society react to change (i.e., is change welcomed or resisted)? What are the sources of resistance? What is social control in a society? In other words, where does the locus of power to "apply sanctions" reside in a society? How does the legal system operate? What role is assigned by tradition to the police? What is the function, role, and

structure of the police during a period of change? What degree of control over society does the police department have? Who controls the police? Furthermore, these general questions were asked in the specific context of Saudi Arabia.

These questions, along with the writer's hypotheses, were the mainstream upon which the theme of the study focused and traced its explanatory and analytical processes. Particular attention was paid to economic growth, population growth, crime rate, foreigners living in Saudi Arabia, and widespread education and the impact of these factors on police development in Saudi Arabia. These factors were the main independent variables of the study. Other important factors such as religious and political commitment and modern communication were touched upon and briefly described rather than statistically analyzed.

Introduction to Saudi Arabia

Due to the fact that this research is concerned with the impact of social change on the development of law enforcement agencies in Saudi Arabia, it is deemed proper to familiarize the reader with Saudi Arabian society. This introduction will briefly touch upon the historical background, geographical location, population, economy, form of government, social structure, legal system, and police system in Saudi society.

Historical Background

Historically, the Saudi Arabian dynasty dates back to 1703 when an alliance was formed between Prince Muhammad Ibn Sau'ud and Sheik Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabi religious movement. During this period many struggles and setbacks threatened the Saudi dynasty, leading to a breakdown in political continuity and control of the region (the central part of what is known as Saudi Arabia today). The first starting point for the present, unified kingdom began only in 1902 when Abdul Aziz al Saud recaptured the city of Riyadh from Ibn Rashid. At this time the country was divided into several regions: one area (the eastern province) was under the control of the Ottoman Empire; another area (the central region) was under tribal rule and experienced disputes among tribal leaders for territorial control; and the remaining area (the western province) was under Hashimait control. Abdul Aziz undertook the difficult task of uniting these regions and their inhabitants under one nation; a task which required about twenty years of continuous effort to accomplish. This dream was finally realized in 1932 when the whole Arabian peninsula was unified under one officially recognized name--the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This consolidation could be considered the first step in the nation-building process.

Geography

Geographically, Saudi Arabia is bounded to the north by Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait; to the east by Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman; to the west by the Red Sea; and to the south by Yeman and Oman (see Figure 1.1). The kingdom occupies an area of just over one million square miles, an area approximately equal to one-third of the area occupied by the United States of America. The density of the Saudi Arabian population is nearly six persons per square mile which is comparable to the 1970 population density of the United States. The climate is permanently hot and dry, and there are no permanent rivers. Rainfall is scarce (about 3.5 inches per year) with occasional rainstorms occurring during the winter months. The mountain areas tend to be temperate, the coastal areas are more humid, and inland areas, such as the capital city of Riyadh, experience very hot summers and moderately cold winters.²

Population

Population statistics for Saudi Arabia are widely variable. The Saudi Arabian government has not been able to release accurate population statistics in part because approximately 10 to 15 percent of its population consists of nomadic peoples. Also, the continuous migration from rural to urban areas does not allow for an accurate census. Thus, estimates vary from six million to nine million people. The latest




Figure 1.1. Map of Saudi Arabia

estimate, which is provided by the U. S. government in its January 1980 National Basic Intelligence Fact Book, indicates that the population of Saudi Arabia is 8,224,000 with an average annual growth rate of three percent.³ In 1974 statistics, the Saudi Arabian government estimated that the country's population was just over seven million.⁴ Fouad Al-Farsy estimates that the population was over eight million in 1978, including the immigrant work force.⁵ However, The Third World Encyclopedia cites a figure of 9,240,000 for the year 1976.⁶

Yet another figure is provided by the U. S. Department of State which in September 1979 estimated the population to be 7.1 million.⁷ From such contradictory figures one can see the dilemma facing the researcher who seeks accurate and reliable information concerning the actual population of Saudi Arabia.

Economy

The main economic source of gross domestic product (GDP) is oil. Table 1.1 shows the country's oil revenues from 1962 to 1976. Key economic indicators for fiscal years 1977-1980 are summarized in Table 1.2. In 1979, the GDP was estimated to be over \$78 billion, with an annual growth rate of 24.9 percent. Per capita income was estimated at \$11,500.⁸ According to Newsweek magazine, the Saudi Arabian government had the fourth highest per capita GNP in the world in 1979.⁹

TABLE 1.1

ARAMCO'S SHARE IN SAUDI ARABIA'S OIL PRODUCTION AND REVENUES

Year	Aramco's Production (m/b)	Total Oil Production (m/b)	Oil Revenue by Aramco (\$ millions)	Total Oil Revenues (\$ millions)
1962	555.1	599.8	381.7	409.7
1963	594.6	651.7	571.3	607.3
1964	628.1	694.1	482.4	524.3
1965	739.1	804.9	618.7	664.1
1966	873.3	949.7	745.8	789.9
1967	948.1	1,023.8	853.2	903.6
1968	1,035.8	1,113.7	872.0	926.4
1969	1,092.3	1,173.9	895.1	949.2
1970	1,295.3	1,386.7	1,148.4	1,214.0
1971	1,641.6	1,740.6	1,806.4	1,884.9
1972	2,098.4	2,202.0	2,643.2	2,744.6
1973	2,677.1	2,772.6	4,195.0	4,340.0
1974	2,996.5	3,095.1	22,375.0	22,573.5
1975	2,491.8	2,582.5	24,838.6	25,676.2
1976	3,053.9	3,139.3	29,937.3	30,747.5

SOURCE: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Annual Report: 1977 (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia), cited in Jobarah Eid Suraisry, "Development of a Dualistic Economy: A Case Study of Saudi Arabia" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1979), p. 63.

TABLE 1.2

SAUDI ARABIA: KEY ECONOMIC INDICATORS¹

Exchange Rate:				
1977 US\$1.00 = SR 3.5251				
1978 US\$1.00 = SR 3.3996				
1979 US\$1.00 = SR 3.36e				
	Fiscal Year 1977/78 ²	Fiscal Year 1978/79 ²	B/A Percent Change	Fiscal Year 1979/80 ^{2,f}
<u>Income and Production</u>				
GDP	64.2	75 ^e	+ 16.8	104
Per Capita GDP (US dollars)	10,351	11,800 ^e	+ 14.0	15,700
GDP (at 1969/70 prices)	12.0	13.3 ^e	+ 10.8	15.3
Non-Oil GDP	25.5	32.8 ^e	+ 28.8	41.1
Non-Oil GDP (at 1969/70 prices)	5.8	6.8 ^e	+ 17.2	7.9
GDP Deflator	4.39	4.83 ^e	+ 10	5.30
<u>Government Budget</u>				
Budgeted Revenue	42.3	38.5	- 8.9	47.6
Budgeted Expenditure	32.2	38.5	+ 19.5	47.6
Actual Revenue	40.9	39.3	- 3.9	60
Of which oil revenue	34.8	34.2	- 1.7	54
Actual Expenditure	32.2	43.6	+ 35.4	57
Surplus or Deficit	+8.7	-4.3	-149	+3
	1977	1978	1978/77 Percent Change	1979
<u>Oil, Money, Prices</u>				
Crude Oil Production (million bbl/day)	9.2	8.3	- 9.8	9.6
Money Supply	13.0	17.1 ^e	+ 31.5	21
Cost of Living Index (1970 = 100)	304.2	299.4	- 1.6	310
<u>Trade and Balance of Payments</u>				
Total Government (SAMA) Foreign Assets	59.1	58.9	- .3	56.9 ³
Official (SAMA) Reserves Minus Gold	+24.6	19.2	- 22	17.2 ⁴
Current Account Balance	12.3	-0.1	-100	+7
Exports (FOB)	40.8	37.8	- 7.4	54
US Share (percentage)	9.5	15.7	+ 65.3	15
Imports	14.7	20.4	38.8	25
US Share (percentage)	18.6	20.9	11.8	21

e = estimated

f = Embassy forecast

¹All values in billions of current U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated²Saudi Fiscal Year 1977/78 = June 17, 1977 to June 5, 1978; 1978/79 = June 6, 1978 to May 26, 1979; 1979/80 = May 27, 1979 to May 15, 1980.³As of April 30, 1979.⁴As of August 31, 1979.⁵Principal imports from the United States: cars and trucks; aircraft and avionics; cereals and preparations; electric power equipment; construction and mining equipment; heating and cooling equipment.SOURCES: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA); Ministry of Finance Central Department of Statistics; International Monetary Fund, Embassy estimates cited in "Saudi Arabia: Development Still Emphasizes Islamic Traditions," Mideast Business Exchange IV (June 1980): 31.

The increased wealth from oil revenues has had a considerable effect on migration, widespread education, and the crime rate (especially for property crimes). Chapters II and IV discuss the effect that this wealth has had on creating social problems for police officials, especially regarding the increased size of the foreign work force that has come to work on the many developmental projects and programs.

In 1977, agriculture accounted for only one percent of the GDP, yet its share of employment was 20.5 percent.¹⁰ This is in sharp contrast to agriculture's role before oil was discovered in 1939. At that time agriculture was the primary economic source both for employment and income.

Form of Government

The government is a monarchy, and Saudi Arabia is ruled at present by one of the founder's sons, King Khaled Bin Abdul Aziz. The King heads the government as prime minister. The Council of Ministers has full executive powers, direct administrative responsibility, and financial control over the government. Each ministry has a full complement of supporting staff and services to insure the smooth fulfillment of the overall national development plan. Saudi Arabia is a founding member of the Congress of the Islamic World, the Arab League, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and a wide range of other international organizations.

The Saudi Arabian governmental structure is centralized yet flexible and elastic. An example of this is the element of decentralization which has been in effect since 1963 when the country was administratively divided into five provinces (western, central, southern, eastern, and, more recently, northern). Each province has an appointed governor (amir) who is charged with local administration, maintenance of peace and order, and interpretation of Islamic laws. These governors are given a direct delegation of authority to deal with all matters regarding their provinces.

Although there are no elections and no political party, Saudi Arabia has its own form of Islamic democracy. In principle all men are regarded as equal, and differences are minimized between the rich and the poor, the governors and the governed. To put this principle into practice, ministers and public officials keep their doors open during certain daily hours. Anyone with any type of business can come without prior appointment and be offered refreshment in accordance with Arab custom.¹¹

This open-door policy is practiced even by the highest ranking official of the country, the King. His Majesty devotes one hour of his working time every day except Thursday (which is devoted completely to this practice) so that people may come in and talk about any problem or issue that they might have. This period is "spent giving audiences open

to all his people, hearing grievances, righting wrongs, dispensing reward and punishment."¹² It was at such an audience (majlis) that King Faisal was assassinated.

Social Structure

The value system in Saudi Arabia differs from that of any Western society. It also differs from the Japanese value system even though Japanese society has experienced the same changes that Saudi Arabia is experiencing now. In Saudi Arabia, the value system is centered around close family ties, whereas in Western societies the value system is centered around material values. In Japan, according to Bellah, the "value system is characterized by the primacy of 'political values.'"¹³ He adds, "there were no clans or sibs, the lineage and nuclear family being the most important structural unit."¹⁴

On the other hand, Saudi Arabian society is characterized by close relationships between families and kinship. Families depend on each other a great deal. These kinship ties are maintained even in urban life. Dr. Ibrahim Al-Awaji, Deputy Minister of the Interior, said in his thesis that "the identity of the individual is identical with that of his group. Individual initiative is only encouraged when it serves and enhances the interests of the group."¹⁵ Allegiance to Islam, loyalty to the family, and loyalty to the community are the bonds which hold the Saudi people very close together.

Strengthening these ties are the common faith, which encompasses 100 percent of the population, the common language, and the non-distinguished class characteristic. People are looked upon as equal and no one man is above others. The only difference that exists between one person and another is what each establishes between himself and his God through his true faith and good belief. Social economic classes are there, of course, but the Islamic doctrine of equality does not differentiate between this in treatment. Those bonds in turn give the individual a sense of importance derived from his social group and a feeling of belonging. Joseph Schacht describes the Saudi Arabs as follows:

The (Saudi) Arabs were, and are, bound by tradition and precedent; they were, and are, dominated by the past. . . . Whatever was customary was right and proper. Whatever their forefathers had done deserved to be imitated.¹⁶

What Mr. Schacht failed to realize was the fact that the Saudi's forefathers had never ridden in an airplane, never gone abroad to study modern technology, and never had a rational development plan to absorb the increasing economic growth of their country. But their late sons did, and still do, and will continue to do so. Regarding this point, Nyrop said:

As long as the Saudi economy continues to expand rapidly, a talented, industrious and loyal secularly educated commoner can be certain of profitable employment and advancement. The best indication of the devotion and loyalty of this emerging modern middle-class was that as of the mid-70s almost all Saudis educated abroad returned home to work; this was in sharp contrast to almost all other developing nations which have experienced extensive brain drains.¹⁷

From this, it is clear that Saudi people are striving for better education, better skills, and better growth for their country in increasing numbers. It is true that Saudis are faithful to their families and their group, but it holds true, too, that they weigh much loyalty to their country which is actually composed of the larger group.

In an article written in 1974, Harold W. Glidden observes that:

In group solidarity, stemming originally from Arab values, is probably the most salient characteristic of the mechanics of Arab society. It demands a high degree of conformity and therefore imparts a strong authoritarian tone to Arab culture and society.¹⁸

This high conformity is really the key safeguard to stability and security against deviant behavior. People may conform in fear of punishment, but they certainly will conform if the deviant is pointed out in front of his family and group who had been clean and conforming. The consequence of this is not a feeling of guilt for the act itself, but actually the feeling of aching shame. And for more in this regard, Glidden adds:

Whereas societies based at least in part on the so-called protest ethic are often characterized as "guilt-ridden" or "guilt-oriented," the traditional Arab society is often described as "shame-oriented". . . Shame that is "intensely feared" comes not from the commission of an act condemned by the value system, but from the discovery by outsiders of that act. Hence, there is an intense concern with and catering to outward appearance and public opinion that many observers have noted as being characteristic of the Arab society.¹⁹

The stability of the Saudi Arabian political as well as social system is due mostly to the fact that the "socialization" process, that is close family and group ties and school's uniformity, are attained and maintained through homogenous and consistent ways, where elements influencing the individual do not seriously conflict either with each other or with his adult activities and expectations. In spite of urbanization, new mass communication, widespread education (both vocational and academic), the rapid growth of the economy, and the rise of socioeconomic change, Saudi Arabia is still one of the most, if not the only, stable and fast-growing countries. By keeping its homogeneity and Islamic traditions, Saudi Arabia has helped to reduce criminal activities, especially violent ones. As Nyrop comments:

. . . With development of a dual system of harsh repression of crime and swift and impartial justice, reportedly has successfully suppressed the growth of a criminal element. . . . Incidence of crime is not a major problem facing Saudi cities though figures are not publicly known. In 1976, they were reportedly very low.²⁰

Regarding Saudi Arabia's homogeneity, Nyrop writes:

The Saudis are relatively homogeneous ethnically and are primarily from indigenous Arab tribes. Within the tripartite division of Arab culture, Saudi Arabia shows a "high degree" of cultural uniformity. . . the country's cultural homogeneity indicates a similar homogeneity of values. Founded on the triple foundation of Islam, family, and tradition, the Saudi value system has shown relatively little erosion.²¹

The Legal System

The operating legal system in Saudi Arabia is the Islamic (Sharia) law. Under this law all crimes and their punishments are prescribed and specified by the Holy Koran. Once the accused has been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt, he receives the specified penalty corresponding to his crime. In this case, the judge or anybody else, for that matter, cannot reduce or adjust the penalty. Crimes according to Islamic law are divided into three major categories:

1. Crimes which are considered to be restrictive ordinance of God. Included in this category are the following major crimes: (1) adultery, (2) false accusation of adultery for the purpose of defaming or degrading someone's honor, (3) drinking, (4) robbery, and (5) property crimes. Penalties for these crimes are rendered in accordance with the obligation to God as specified. The Holy Koran reads:

It is not for the faithful, man and woman, to decide by themselves a matter that has been decided by Allah and his messenger, and whosoever commits an affront to Allah and his messenger is certainly on the wrong path.
(XXXIII:36)

2. Crimes against the person. Included in this category are (1) deliberately taking a person's life, (2) quasi-deliberate killing, (3) mistaken killing, (4) deliberate assault to injure (bodily harm), and (5) mistaken assault. The right to claim damages for these crimes rests with the individual's legal guardian, father, mother, brother, son, daughter, wife, or close relative in the case of killing.

If no relative is found, the state assumes the responsibility as the legal guardian. In the case of deliberate homicide, it is only up to the relatives mentioned above to waive their right against the accused person either by forgiving him, by demanding blood money, or by demanding his execution. Depending on the relatives' wishes, the accused will be either set free or executed. In the other cases (2, 3, and 4) or if the accused has no money, bond must be paid by the culprit.

3. Chastisements. In the last category are petty offenses or cases of concern to the public interest but which have no specific penalty in Islamic law. Decisions concerning the application and kind of punishment are left to the judge's discretion.

Besides these basic categories, there are other regulatory devices to be initiated by the government from time to time when they are necessary. Traffic regulations, customs, naturalization, and civil service regulations are some examples of such. But, even these regulations are formed to conform to the same basic principles of Islamic law and follow the guidelines set down in the Koran, which call for justice, equality, fairness, and good faith. Therefore, the Saudi Arabian government makes it clear that in each instance when such regulations conflict with or disregard Islamic law, they are not enforceable and should be disregarded by the people.

For example, any employee can leave his office at the time of prayer and join his colleagues in performing the prayer, and if his superior told him to stay and work at that time, he can refuse the order and no one can punish him for that disobedience. God says, "No obedience of human order that contradicts or comes in violation of God's order."

Islamic Law. Islam in the Arabic language means "submission." In religion it means submitting oneself to God. All that one does is directed to God, asking his guidance and requesting his mercy. Islamic law is the basic law of the land in Saudi Arabia from which stems the guiding principles for the society's regulatory behaviors.

There are four basic sources of Islamic law with a controversial fifth source. The "Koran" (Shariah) is the primary source and is defined as the words of God transmitted by His angel Gabriel to His prophet Mohammed. Dr. Al-Moududi emphasizes the importance of this source because it "embodies, word by word, the instructions, the commandments of God and is His unadulterated word."²² The second source is the "Sunah" (the prophet's traditions), which clarifies, explains, and exemplifies the meanings of the Holy Koran. Not only this, but it also includes what the prophet said and did or what someone else said and did in the prophet's presence without his objection. The third source is "Giyas" (analogy), that is when an act has been taken as a rule or precedent that can be applied to future cases or situations. The fourth

source is "Ij'mai" (consensus). This refers to a situation when the judge or the "wally" (governor) decided a case with no precedent during the prophet's lifetime and the prophet was not involved in the action. After the prophet's death, consensus was to be reached by Islamic scholars or religious heads. The fifth source is "Ijtihad" (inference) which is based on the judge's own knowledge and background. This source is used only when the preceding four sources provide no clear-cut guidelines on how to resolve the present case. This fifth source has been the subject of a great deal of religious debate among Islamic scholars (Imams) regarding its validity and application. The controversy has developed because there are four schools of Islamic law: the "Hanbali" School, named after its founder, Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal; the "Maliki" School, named after Imam Ibn Malik; the "Shafis" School, named after Imam Al-Shafi; and, finally, the "Hanifis" School, named after Imam Abu Hanifa. Both Maliki and Hanifis doctrines recognize the utilization of "Ijtihad" though in different forms and under different names--for example, when using this source is in the public interest. On the other hand, the Shafis and the Hanbalis try to restrict the usage of this source. Saudi Arabia relies heavily on its Islamic interpretation of the Hanbalis doctrine.²³

Islam is not only a religious law covering one aspect and ignoring the many prevailing social, political, and

economic situations, but it is a complete way of life which lays down the fundamentals of every social arrangement.

Dr. Al-Moududi writes:

The Sharia'h (Islamic law) has given us the broad framework of administrative law--exactly in the same way as it has given the fundamentals of constitutional law and has left it to the discretion of the Muslims to build up the details in accordance with the demands of the age (time) or country in which they live--subject, of course, to the limits prescribed by the Sharia'h.²⁴

According to Joseph Schacht, Islamic law is systematic--that is to say, it represents a coherent body of doctrines.²⁵

Its several institutions are well put in relation with one another; the greater part of the law of contracts and obligations, for instance, is constructed by analogy with the contract of sale. Furthermore, the whole of the law is permeated by religious and ethical considerations. Islamic law not only defines man's relations, duties, and obligations toward God, but also defines man's relations, duties, and obligations toward his fellow man in five principles. These Islam characterizes as the rights of the individual which should be protected and insured. The first such right, "the self," concerns the right of a man to exist and to be free to enjoy his life. The second right, "the property," insures the right to preserve personal property ownership. Third is "the honor," which holds that an individual has a right to defend himself against false allegations and accusations. The fourth right, "the mind," asserts that a man has as much

right to the use of his mind for judgment, reasoning, and making rational decisions as to life itself. A life without a reasoning mind is not a life at all. "The religion," the fifth right, claims that a man has a right to practice his chosen faith, creed, and belief, providing this choice does not lead to practices violating Islamic law when in an Islamic country. Thus, Islam is inclusive. Interference with a man's prerogative to practice his preferred religion is a crime. The Islamic position is that religious humanism, whether Islamic or Christian, cannot be human without God, God being the beginning and end of all religions. After looking at how the government functions under Islamic law and at how that law affects the society, it is appropriate to look at how the criminal justice system functions under Islamic law.

The Police System


The police mandate in Saudi Arabia is carried out within the framework of the Islamic legal system. Historically, the Saudi Arabian police force was established officially on a small scale, by Royal Decree No. 233 in the early 1930s. At that time, only four cities in the Hejaz region had some form of uniformed police presence left over from the Hashimiat kingdom, whose King Housien had left Hejaz in 1926 after King Abdul Aziz captured it. Those police precincts inherited their system of policing from the Turks who occupied

Hejaz and most of the Arabian peninsula until 1920. King Abdul Aziz, by issuing this decree, ordered that all four cities (Mecca, Taif, Jeddah, and Medina) were to be centralized under one head director located in Mecca. Prior to the establishment of a uniformed police force, policing was done by informal methods. These methods consisted of making the respective governors (amirs) of each city, town, or village, the responsible body for enforcing all civil as well as criminal cases with the assistance and advice of the existing judge (kadi). Each governor (amir) had at his disposal a body of chosen men called "Khoyia", companions, who were used as messengers and bodyguards. Those companions were sent upon the request of a complainant to the said accused to ask him to report to the governor to investigate the matter. Upon the arrival of the said culprit, the governor asked the plaintiffs to present this case in front of the accused. When the governor heard the case as presented by both parties, he had many options open to him. If the accused was proven guilty, the governor ordered both parties to settle the matter peacefully. If this procedure worked out, the matter was finished. If no settlement was reached, the accused was ordered to pay back what he had unlawfully taken or he was jailed until payment was attained. If, on the other hand, the governor was unable to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, then both the complainant and the accused were sent to the judge who then determined, according to legal Islamic law,

the final say in the case. After rendering his judgment, the judge sent the case and both parties to the governor who executed the ruling of the judge without hesitation. The accused could appeal his case to higher courts if he wished. For crime prevention, there was no formal procedure enforced by the governors, only each group could do that among themselves. Since each group knew each other well, crimes against morality, property, or self were prevented under organized ethical and moral standards. Interestingly enough, this old informal system of policing is still practiced very widely in towns and villages which still don't have police departments.

From 1932, the time of unifying the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under a formal system, formally-organized police departments have been spreading rapidly across the country. If one looks at the organizational chart of the Saudi Arabian police force in 1937, 1950, 1969, and 1980, one would realize the major change which took place over this short period of time. Fouad Hamza, who was King Abdul Aziz's advisor and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs until 1940, described the central police force in Mecca in 1937.²⁶ This description is summarized in Figure 1.2, Organizational Structure of the Saudi Police Force in 1937.

From this chart, it seems that the police function was performed on a small scale and to limited degrees.




Constructed and translated from Arabic to English by the writer, based on a description of the central police department by Fouad Hamza in his book, *Al-Bilad Al Arabia Al Saudiah* (Saudi Arabia), 2nd edition (Riyadh: Al Naser Modern Publishers, 1968), pp. 220-223. (Originally published in 1937)

¹The writer found that Fouad Hamza listed 14 police departments in 14 cities but failed to mention the Riyadh Police Department, even though this department was created in 1931 before he wrote his book in 1937.

Figure 1.2. Organizational Structure of the Saudi Police Force in 1937

Activities of police work were directed towards moral enforcement, major crimes, and some traffic enforcement. Planning, training, construction of facilities, and specialized units were all absent. Even the Ministry of the Interior, which now directs the police force, was not created in its present form until 1951. With increasing social problems and increasing police departments, the formal central department had to be enlarged to meet these increasing demands and generate proper responses, and, at that time, specialized units were not established. Personnel were few and their educational backgrounds were very low. Even the traffic control function was not maintained in its proper form. Sometimes one person headed two divisions at the same time and spent most of his time and energy trying to cope with many cases and to make the best of an overloaded situation.

Therefore, in 1950, Royal Decree No. 3594 provided for the establishment of a central General Directorate for all police forces in Saudi Arabia. Specified in this decree were the organizational charts of the national headquarters, the duties and obligations for police, the methods and ways of conducting criminal investigation, and the rights and safeguards of the accused individuals. The 1950 organizational chart for the General Directorate of Public Security is shown in Figure 1.3.




Constructed and translated from Arabic to English by the writer, based on a description in Al-Wajibat Alamah Le Gawat Al Amm Al Dahkili Fi Al-Mamlakah Al Arabia Al Saudiah (General Duties of the Internal Security Forces in Saudi Arabia) by General Kamal Siraj-Adinn (Riyadh: 1969), p. 58.

¹The writer added this division to the chart. General Siraj-Adinn did not mention other police departments in his description.

Figure 1.3. Organizational Structure of the Saudi Police Force in 1950

Even this structure was enlarged compared with the preceding one of 1937. However, the fact remains that it did not provide enough coverage for the increasing needs of modern times. The national police headquarters continued to accommodate all police departments and personnel, except the Coast Guard, until 1962 when the General Investigative Branch, Civil Defense, the Naturalization and Immigration Branch, and later, the Police Colleges, were separated, each becoming a regional force connected directly to the Ministry of the Interior at the same level as the national police headquarters (called the General Directorate of Public Security). This expansion was dictated by the expansion of the country's national income, the prevailing social and political demands of the time, and the necessity of specialization.

A major break for the national police headquarters in regard to specialization came in 1964 when new divisions with specialized tasks were created. Figure 1.4 shows the increase both in the number of departments created and the specialized divisions that were added. As can be seen from this chart, the new organization was far from being perfect. There were a lot of overlapping functions. Some divisions were separated when in fact they could have been combined for practical purposes. For example, the civilian division and the officer's division dealt with personnel matters; the budget projects and accounting office both dealt with financial matters. Therefore, a reorganization was badly needed to correct the




Constructed and translated from Arabic to English by the writer, based on a description in *Al-Wajibat Alamah Le Gawat Al Amn Al Dahkili Fi Al-Mamlakah Al Arabia al Saudiah* (General Duties of the Internal Security Forces in Saudi Arabia) by General Kamal Siraj-Adim (Riyadh: 1969), pp. 59-60.

Figure 1.4. Organizational Structure of the Saudi Police Force in 1964

overlapping. Thus, in 1966 the General Directorate of Public Security was reorganized in a more simple, yet effective way, as can be seen from Figure 1.5. This chart shows some incorporation and consolidation of coherent activities. It is more specialized, yet additional organizational fragmentation was avoided. Chain of command and span of control were easily monitored. Ease of communication was facilitated at vertical as well as horizontal levels. However efficient and simple this chart might be, other changes took place after it was established. The next major move to change the organizational chart took place during 1976 when new departments or divisions were created and already existing departments were expanded to include new divisions or subdivisions. It is interesting to point out that with every coming of a new General Director, a change in the organizational chart should take place. Thus, in 1976-1977 a new chart was authorized and adapted as can be seen from Figure 1.6.


Saudi Arabia's police system at present resembles that of the French system in regard to tasks, national structure, nature of control, internal organization (except in training--the former is military, the latter civilian), and role of behavior and image (except in perceived character, the Saudi police are perceived as trustworthy,²⁷ the French police are mistrusted²⁸). It is highly centralized. Not only are regulations, uniformity, and procedures identical



Constructed and translated from Arabic to English by the writer, based on a description in Al-Majibat Al-Amah Le Gwat Al Amn Al Dahili Fi Al-Mamlakah Al Arabia Al Saudiah (General Duties of the Internal Security Forces In Saudi Arabia) by General Kamal Siraj-Adim (Riyadh: 1969), p. 69.

The writer added this division to the chart. General Siraj-Adim did not mention other police departments in his description.

Figure 1.5. Organizational Structure of the Saudi Police Force in 1966



Constructed and translated from Arabic to English by the writer, based on a description in Al-Ahram Al-Arabiya (Security in Saudi Arabia) by General Yahya Al-Husayni (Cairo: Egypt Publishing Co., 1978), p. 96.


The writer added this division to the chart. General Al-Husayni did not mention other police departments in his description.

Figure 1.6. Organizational Structure of the Saudi Police Force in 1976-1977

throughout the country, but the Ministry of the Interior has the authority to direct, control, and finance the police force. Figure 1.7 outlines the main organizational sections of the Ministry of the Interior.

The system of policing is conceived, considered, and operated as a national government responsibility. Yet, operational control is not exercised by the Ministry of the Interior but is delegated to the general director of each police force at the main headquarters in Riyadh. In turn, each director general delegates some of his authority to the respective police department directors in cities around the country.

There are four distinct police forces, each headed by a full general as director general. First, there is the Public Security General Directorate with responsibility for connecting all police departments. Second, there is the General Directorate of Investigation. Third, there is the General Directorate of the Coast Guard with responsibility for patrolling the border and watching for illegal entry or smuggling. Each of these three forces is headquartered in Riyadh. Finally, there is the General Directorate of the Special Forces Unit, a new police force created for quick deployment in times of emergencies and local crises. There used to be a General Directorate for Civil Defense, but in 1977 it was reduced to a department and came under the



¹As seen in the chart, the General Directorate of Public Security is one of five police forces, but only this Directorate is vested with police functions and responsibility. All police departments, traffic, and civil defense come under this organization. For analytical purposes, the General Directorate of Public Security was the focus of the study, leaving the remaining four forces for general mention only when time, space, and need permitted. One reason for this decision is that the other forces are not directly involved in work: the Internal Forces Security College trains and provides other forces with police graduates; the Coast Guard patrols the border to prevent smuggling or illegal entry; the Directorate of Intelligence gathers intelligence reports, and the Special Unit Force is for emergency deployment. Hence, these four forces don't actually perform police work in regards to crime prevention, crime apprehension, crime investigation, etc. Figure 1.6 outlines the organizational structure of the General Directorate of Public Security.

²For administrative purposes, the country is divided into six major provinces and about 15 smaller provinces. The major provinces are located in the northern, southern, central, eastern, and western regions of the country and in Medina. Each province is headed by an emir (governor) who is directly linked to the Minister of the Interior or the Vice Minister.

Figure 1.7. Organizational Structure of the Ministry of the Interior in 1980:
Main Organizational Sections


SOURCE: Obtained by the writer from the Ministry of the Interior in Summer 1980.

authority of Public Security.* Figure 1.8 outlines the present organizational structure for the General Directorate of Public Security.

One of the distinctive characteristics of the police profession in Saudi Arabia is that it is independent of politics. That does not mean political affiliation to the government's rules and regulations, but it means that police officers or chiefs are not politically selected or elected; they rise to their position through rank and seniority. No junior officer can head a division while there is a senior one in that division. This is to avoid influence or non-seniority bases for promotion and to insulate against political interference. It is a traditionally, professionally, and morally unethical and unaccepted practice to appoint a person other than on a seniority basis. Part 4, Section 1, Article 23 of the uniformed officer's code issued by Royal Decree M/9, dated March 14, 1979, includes a statement that makes seniority the basic condition for promotion to the next rank.

Another interesting point is that the uniformed officer's code treats every officer in the country in the same way, regardless of the force with which they work. For example, all uniformed, commissioned officers (2nd lieutenant and up) of each rank have the same basic monthly salary, basic monthly living expenses, basic yearly clothing allowance,

*The Internal Security Forces College is treated at an equal level of directorship within the Ministry of the Interior hierarchy.



* Riyadh Police Department was the focus of the case study. Riyadh was chosen because it is the capital city and because reliable records about the department are available.

SOURCE: Obtained by personal request by the writer from the Director of the Planning and Budget Department in June 1980.

Figure 1.8. Organizational Structure of the General Directorate of Public Security in 1980

basic yearly housing allowance, basic 45 days vacation a year, and must spend the same amount of time in each rank before promotion. For example, a major, whether in the Coast Guard, Public Security, General Investigation, Special Forces Unit, or the Police College within the Ministry of the Interior, receives the same basic salary, fringe benefits, and promotion period as a major in the military, air force, navy, or national guard. In other words, any officer can transfer from one force to another without losing seniority or pay. There are some extra fringe benefits for special types of jobs. For example, pilots are given extra for flying, special forces unit officers are given special benefits, officers who teach in the college, those with master's degrees in science (engineering, chemistry, etc.) and those holding a Ph.D. in any field receive special pay. This special pay is not counted when they move from the job or as part of their retirement benefits.

No officer may be commissioned or promoted except by royal decree. Officers' files are reviewed by a higher officer's committee which makes a recommendation to the appropriate ministry. The respective minister sends an official letter approving the committee's wishes to the Council of Ministers which is presided over by the King. After these steps have been taken, a royal decree promoting or commissioning the named officer(s) is issued.

Officers may not be fired unless they have been judged morally or ethically at fault. These charges must be proven, and any dismissal must be authorized by the King, who is the commander-in-chief of all of the forces. The dismissal of an officer may occur as the result of one of two formal procedures: the Criminal Court may make a legal decision or the higher officer's committee may recommend disciplinary action. In both cases, the higher officer's committee must make a recommendation to the respective minister who in turn must approve the recommendation and send it to the Council of Ministers. The King presides over this Council and has the final say on the subject.

The Problem Focus

The police are in the midst of the dilemma of the cause, effect, and outcome of social change in their societies. They are charged with the responsibility for keeping the peace, maintaining law and order, and providing safety and security for the public. By the same line of reasoning they must modify their operations to meet and adapt to the everyday life changes being experienced by the society as a whole.

Police work and the police role in modern times have been the focus of continuing controversy. What is the role of the police in modern society? Is it crime prevention and public services or is it crime investigation, arrest, and prosecution?²⁹ Smelser suggests that rapid development will

undoubtedly result in tensions between various social structures. These tensions will arise "between occupation and achievement, between differentiated and undifferentiated structures, between egalitarian and hierarchical principles, and between central and local power."³⁰ With increasingly rapid social and economic development, how can the police meet the challenge of the tensions that are set up between the various social structures in their society? What options and/or methods should the police adopt to cope with conflicting situations and what organizational policies should they follow?

The answers to these important and persistent questions will depend largely on the social structure and the governmental decision-making processes that the writer is studying. Police action is affected by public opinion and national traditions. Public opinion affects police action in regard to assignments and organizational matters. National traditions have an important role because they affect both what individuals can report to the police and what the police can do about the report.

For these reasons, the focus of this research was on examining the impact of social change on the police system in Saudi Arabia. The study analyzed the basic police structure, function, and role with respect to the following questions:

- What factors affect police development?
- What are the prevailing social values in Saudi Arabian society?
- Why has the country organized the police force in the way it has?
- What effect, direct or indirect, do the social change factors outlined in the hypotheses section have on police development in Saudi Arabia?

The Importance of the Problem

The writer was motivated by two areas of concern in undertaking the study. Firstly, there is an overwhelming lack of literature on Third World police forces in general and on Saudi Arabian police in particular. Manning and Van Maanen point to the importance of this problem in an outline for their forthcoming book, Comparative Policing. After discussing recent trends in police studies, they comment:

Within this evolving analytic and research framework, studies concerned with policing in other societies are relatively rare as are historically and culturally informed accounts of the growth and shape of present-day police agencies--although the works of David Bayley, Robert Fogelson, Allen Sivler, and Thomas Repetto are prominent exceptions in this regard. Among police researchers, there is increasing recognition that such a void in the published literature represents a serious impediment to our understanding of police work as it is carried out in this or any other society.³¹

There are no books written in English on the Saudi Arabian police. Many prominent writers have omitted references to the Saudi Arabian police force in their works. For example, Cramer does not mention Saudi Arabia in his 1964 work, The World's Police, and Ingleton's 1979 work, The Police of the

World, includes a note that no information on the Saudi police force was supplied.* Secondly, having been educated and exposed to Western ways of looking at police organization and methods and their reactions to social problems, the writer wished to provide another perspective by studying a traditional Third World society (Saudi Arabia) that is faced with the same modernization process that most Western countries have experienced in order to see how that society's police operated in the prevailing social structure.

There has been continuing interest in the comparative study of police by such writers as Tilly, Bayley, Cain, Manning, Banton, and others. However, this work has either been focused on organizational or social role issues, or it has been limited to the analysis of developed, industrialized nations. There is little research, outside of the work of Bayley on India and Japan, and Manning on the British police, that takes up the development and elaboration of the police mandate under different political and social conditions. The shaping of the Anglo-American mandate under different political conditions (e.g., colonialism, democratic adaptation, and imperialism) is one context for studying the development of policing. This study addresses in part the ways in which the cultural and social traditions of Islam and the political

*Cramer and Ingleton claim to deal with the world's police. Yet neither discusses the Saudi Arabian police force. It seems that for these writers, as for writers such as Mosse (Police Forces in History), Saudi Arabia does not exist.

development of Saudi Arabia have shaped the mandate of the Saudi Arabian police. It thus contributes to the broader academic study of policing comparativity.

Further, the work of Bayley is perhaps the only systematic attempt at comparing the structure, function, and role of police across several similar nations. Bayley studied police development in Western European states (England, France, Germany, and Italy).³² Bayley's work is an important paradigm for this analysis but it suffers from a number of flaws. It is necessary to address comparative developmental issues outside the framework of developed nations. Bayley also negates the claim that economic growth, population growth, and crime rate affect police development. He writes, "there is certainly no threshold of population size which seems to compel development of a police system."³³ Neither can the incidence of criminality or personal insecurity be sufficient to create a police force. To this effect, Bayley comments, "In short, development of police can't be understood in terms of crime."³⁴ Bayley goes one step further to negate the effect of economic transformation on police development. In this regard, he writes, "though containing the thrust of industrialization in a neat chronology is exceedingly difficult, the periods of most vigorous industrial change, when the economic transformation becomes confirmed in practice, don't coincide with the rise of today's police systems."³⁵

Only political transformation, according to Bayley, can have an effect on police systems. With respect to this factor, he writes, "It would be reasonable to expect that the consolidation of government in an expanded geographical area, state building, would be associated with the creation of a police system."³⁶

It is further necessary to isolate development from creation of policing, and to more precisely focus on the impact of social change on the development of the police. In my opinion, Bayley's terminology is ambiguous and this weakens his argument. For one thing, he doesn't define the word "development" or state how it will be applied or used. Secondly, he uses the term "development" to mean "creation." He does not clearly indicate how "development" affects policing.

Hence, it is more pertinent now than ever to close the gap between the lack of literature on the subject and the need to discover, understand, and communicate important information about Saudi Arabian society in general and the police in particular. It is hoped that this study has helped to close that gap and that it will contribute to further research in the area.

Definition of Terms

The very process of defining a variable entails the operation of classifying it relative to phenomena falling

outside the scope of the definition. Smelser writes that definition and classification must be regarded as parts of the same conceptual operation:

Every time an investigator defines a phenomena, he is simultaneously establishing a system of classification containing at least two classes--the class including the variable on the one hand and the class of events and situations that are to be considered or excluded from that class on the other.³⁷

The boundaries of the definition should be made precise and unambiguous, and the kind of social unit to be studied should be specified in the beginning.

For the purposes of this study, the following terms and definitions will be used. Due to the fact that there is no agreement among social scientists concerning the terms with which we are dealing, the writer is obligated, firstly, to use major dictionaries to pinpoint the original meanings of the terms; secondly, to use other writers' definitions of the terms; and, finally, to use his own definition of the terms.

Police, as defined by Webster's Encyclopedia of Dictionaries, is the "civil force which maintains public order."³⁸ The American College Dictionary defines police as "an organized civil force for maintaining order, preventing and detecting crime, and enforcing the laws."³⁹ Research use of this term is defined in the subsequent chapter. The social science literature does not contain an agreed-upon definition that is generally used.

Development is defined by Webster as "a gradual unfolding or growth; expansion, evolution, unraveling of a plot; the result of previous courses."⁴⁰ For this research, development will be used to mean growth, expansion, and evolution. These terms will be used interchangeably during the study.

Modernization, as defined by Webster, is "to bring up-to-date."⁴¹ For this study, modernization will be used to mean bringing the public security police force in Saudi Arabia up-to-date in outlook and ideas.

Bendix defines modernization (sometimes called social and political development) as to "refer to all those social and political changes that accompanied industrialization in many countries of Western civilization."⁴² This definition does not mean that industrialization must be a pre-requisite for modernization nor does it limit our conception of modernization to be judged only by Western standards, or expect all nations to develop in the same way, as is the case with many Western writers. Bendix refers to these writers as falling into the "trap of neo-evolutionists."⁴³

Realizing the limitations facing historians or social scientists who study traditional societies with Western conceptualizations of development, Bendix writes, "Our concept of development must encompass not only the products and by-products of industrialization, but also the various amalgams

of tradition and modernity which make all development partial."⁴⁴ Alexander Gerschenkron goes one step further to say:

What can reasonably be regarded as a prerequisite in some historical cases can be much more naturally seen as a product of industrialization in others. The line between what is a precondition of, and what is a response to, industrial development seems to be a rather flexible one.⁴⁵

Social change, as defined by Webster, has a lot of meanings. For the purposes of this study, it will be used to mean "to alter or make different; to shift; or to quit one state for another."⁴⁶ Social change, as defined by G. and A. Theodorson in the Modern Dictionary of Sociology, means "any modification in the social organization of a society in any of its social institutions or patterns of social roles."⁴⁷ Social change, as the writer defines and uses it in this study, means the art of moving gradually from one state of being to a new stage of evolution or expansion without losing track of the original basic norms, values, or traditions of Saudi Arabian society. It also will be studied in terms of the traditional social structure of Saudi society.

Role in general refers to "a pattern of behavior, structured around specific rights and duties and associated with a particular status position within a group or social situation."⁴⁸ A person's role in any situation is defined by the set of expectations for his behavior held by others and by the person himself. Ralph Linton has referred to role

"as the dynamic aspect of status; a role is the totality of all the cultural patterns associated with a particular status."⁴⁹

Police structure will be defined in terms of the formal organizational chart which shows the chain of command, span of control, and channels of communication--whether vertical or horizontal--of a police force. Hence, a structural definition of police is, by its nature, limited to, determined by, and evaluated with the functional definition. The interactions of police structure and informal processes produce the organizational outcomes and product.

Centralization will be used in this study to mean the ability to maintain power to command, control, and direct the social, economic, and political activities of the state by a central government agency with flexibility and delegation of authority. Decentralization is the opposite of this approach.

Islamic law. Islam, in the Arabic language, means "submission." In religion it means submitting oneself to God. All that one does is directed to God, asking His guidance and requesting His mercy. Islamic law is the basic law of the land in Saudi Arabia from which stems the guiding principles for the society's regulatory behaviors.

Hypotheses

Having discussed, in brief outline, social change and social structure in general and the methods, procedures, and definitions of terminology that were used in the study, some

important issues still need to be identified. These issues concern research questions such as: What are the sources of change? What is it that is changing? And, what are the measures of change?

In this study, the sources of change that are of primary concern and considered as independent variables are economic growth, population growth (urbanization is implicit in population growth), crime rate, foreigners living in Saudi Arabia, and widespread education. Despite Bayley's claim, one would expect to find a direct relationship between these variables and the development of the police in Saudi Arabia. The variables were tested empirically through statistical analysis, government documents, and questionnaires. Other important factors such as religious and political commitment and modern communication have been touched upon and briefly described rather than statistically analyzed.

It was not the intention of the writer to prove or disprove an existing set of hypotheses, but merely to develop guidelines and procedures for studying the research questions. It is the writer's confirmed belief that forming hypotheses in advance influences the direction of a study, hence detracting from its usefulness. If, on the other hand, hypotheses are used as guidelines with no preconceived notions, they can no doubt contribute to the development of a study.

As Claire Selltiz writes:

Whether or not the nature of the anticipated relationships can be stated clearly--i.e., whether or not they can be expressed as hypotheses in the formulation stage

of an inquiry--depends largely on the state of knowledge in the area under investigation. Scientific knowledge can begin with well-formed hypotheses or it can formulate hypotheses as the end product of the research.⁵⁰

Also, it is obvious that hypotheses that are constructed in advance run into some possibility of real-life problems. As Earl Babbie states, "there is a constant danger that constructed theories may overlook relationships not anticipated by formal hypotheses."⁵¹ However, based on the writer's previous police fieldwork, background, and academic achievement, he formulated the following general, broad hypotheses to guide the research project.

- I. Economic growth has a direct effect on police development.
- II. Population growth leading to urbanization has a direct effect on police development.
- III. Crime rate has a direct effect on police development.
- IV. Educational growth has a direct effect on police development.
- V. Foreigners living in Saudi Arabia affect police development.

The dependent variable for this research was the main subject matter, police organization in Saudi Arabia. It is this variable that was studied regarding the question, "What is changing?"

The question, "What are the measures of change?" was approached and evaluated in the following manner: economic

growth was measured using per capita income and the government budget; population growth in Riyadh was measured using government statistics; the crime rate and number of foreigners living in the country were measured using statistics in the government criminal record book; and education was measured using the number of schools and pupils enrolled in those schools.

Questionnaires were distributed to 55 top, high-ranking officers (captain to lieutenant general) in the General Directorate of Public Security, the Traffic Department, and the Riyadh Police Department, which was selected as a case study for the research project. In addition to the questionnaire, the writer personally interviewed a number of top police officials in Saudi Arabia.

Overview of the Study

The following is a brief outline of the methods by which this study was set up.

In Chapter I, the reader is introduced to the problem of the study and its importance, and the background of the country, Saudi Arabia, where the research was conducted. Also, definitions and terminology were discussed. Finally, hypotheses were constructed.

Chapter II is devoted to the review of literature that addresses itself to the subject matter of the study. Social change, development, economic growth, population growth,

crime rate and the wide spread of education were greatly discussed and analyzed. Police development, role, function, structure and political influence on police were also discussed in general. Finally, those factors were discussed and analyzed in the particular context of Saudi Arabia.

Chapter III is designed basically to deal with the methodology, procedures and operationalization as used in the study. Sample selection, justification for selection, design, etc., were discussed. Finally, the five independent variables measurement was introduced.

Chapter IV is devoted to data analysis and reporting of the findings. The statistical techniques, responses, and data findings were given in this chapter. Also, the major hypotheses were measured and evaluated against the study findings.

Chapter V is the final chapter of the study in which the summary, conclusions, implications, limitations and generalizations were advanced and assisted.

Footnotes--Chapter I

¹Victor Strecher, The Environment of Law Enforcement: A Community Relations Guide (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 67.

²Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia (Riyadh: General Directorate Press, 1977), pp. 4-20.

³United States, "Saudi Arabia," in National Basic Intelligence Fact Book (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1980), p. 171.

⁴Fouad Al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia: A Case Study of Development, 2nd ed. (London: Stacey International, 1980), p. 24.

⁵Ibid.

⁶"Saudi Arabia," in Third World Encyclopedia, 1978, p. 1235.

⁷United States, Department of State, Background Notes: Saudi Arabia (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, September 1979), p. 2.

⁸Ibid.

⁹"Rich Man, Poor Man," Newsweek XCIII:22, 28 May 1979, p. 58.

¹⁰Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Annual Report (Riyadh: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 1977), p. 154.

¹¹Robin Dunipace, ed., The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (London: Stacey International, 1977), p. 124. (Printed in Japan.)

¹²Ibid., p. 48.

¹³Robert Bellah, Tokugawa Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 13.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 46.

¹⁵Ibrahim M. Al-Awaji, "Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1971), pp. 134-149.

¹⁶Joseph Schacht, in Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia, 3rd edition, ed. Richard Nyrop (Washington, D.C.: American University, Foreign Area Studies, 1977), p. 5. (Available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.)

¹⁷Richard Nyrop, ed., Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: American University, Foreign Area Studies, 1977), p. 5. (Available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.)

¹⁸Harold Glidden, in Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia, ed. Richard Nyrop.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Nyrop, Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia, p. 344.

²¹Ibid., p. 64.

²²Sayid Abdula Al-Moududi, The Islamic Law and Constitution, 4th ed. (Dacca: Islamic Publications, 1969), p. 70.

²³For more detailed information about these schools, see Joseph Schacht, Islamic Law (London: University Press, and Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1964); Sayid Abdula Al-Moududi, The Islamic Law and Constitution, 4th ed. (Dacca: Islamic Publications, 1969).

²⁴Al-Moududi, Islamic Law and Constitution, pp. 53-54.

²⁵Schacht, Islamic Law, p. 201.

²⁶Fouad Hamza, Al Bilad Al Arabia Al Saudiah (Saudi Arabia), 2nd ed. (Riyadh: Al-Nasar Modern Publishers, 1968; originally published in 1937).

²⁷For more information regarding this point, see the writer's master's thesis, "Saudi Arabian Students' Attitudes toward Police: An Exploratory Case Study with Some Comparisons to American Students' Attitudes toward Police," which showed a favorable attitude of Saudi senior high school students toward police in Saudi Arabia when measured against American students' attitudes toward police in the United States (Michigan State University, 1977).

²⁸David Bayley, "The Police and Political Development in Europe," in Formation of National States in Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975A).

²⁹Peter K. Manning, Police Work (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977).

³⁰Neil Smelser, Essays in Sociological Explanation (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 156.

³¹Peter K. Manning and John Van Maanen, Outline to Comparative Policing, forthcoming, p. 2.

³²David Bayley, "Police Function, Structure, and Control in Western Europe and North America: Comparative and Historical Studies," in Crime and Practice: An Annual Review of Records, eds. Morris Norval and Michael Torry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); David Bayley, "The Police and Political Development in Europe."

³³Bayley, "Police and Political Development in Europe," p. 351.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 352-353.

³⁵Ibid., p. 354.

³⁶Ibid., p. 352.

³⁷Smelser, Essays in Sociological Explanation, p. 201.

³⁸John Allee, ed., Encyclopedia of Dictionaries (Ottenheimer Publishers, Inc., 1978), p. 285.

³⁹The American College Dictionary (New York: Random House, 1963).

⁴⁰Allee, Encyclopedia of Dictionaries, p. 105.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 241.

⁴²R. Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977), p. 12.

⁴³Ibid., p. 11.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Alexander Gerschenkron, quoted in R. Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 393-394.

⁴⁶Allee, Encyclopedia of Dictionaries, p. 66.

⁴⁷G. Theodorson and A. Theodorson, Modern Dictionary of Sociology (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1969), p. 384.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ralph Linton, quoted in G. Theodorson and A. Theodorson, Modern Dictionary of Sociology, p. 352.

⁵⁰Claire Selltiz, Research Methods and Social Relations (New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1964), p. 39.

⁵¹Earl R. Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1975), p. 71.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This study is concerned with selected economic and social developmental factors that affect police growth in Saudi Arabia. Five major factors have been treated as independent variables: economic growth, population growth, educational growth, growth in the crime rate, and foreigners living in Saudi Arabia. Police development from 1932 to the present (1980) has been treated as the dependent variable. Since social change, development, modernization, and political as well as religious aspects, in general, are very important elements in any given society, these factors have been analyzed, evaluated, and treated as intervening variables.

The first section of this chapter provides an overview of the general factors of social change that comprise the intervening variables; the second section examines four of the five major independent variables* to see how different western scholars have treated those factors of social change and have

*The fifth variable, foreigners living in Saudi Arabia, is considered to be a characteristic of Saudi Arabian society. Hence, this variable is discussed in the section on Saudi society.

viewed their relationship to police development in western, European, and Third World societies; the third section analyzes the five independent variables in the context of Saudi Arabian society; and the final section examines the effects of these factors on police development in Saudi Arabia.

General Factors of Social Change

Social Change

In everyday life, people use the word change to denote the same meaning as development, progress, evolution, function, or process.¹ According to Swanson, "all of these terms, including change, refer to a difference that occurs over time."² In spite of this common usage, each one of these terms denotes different meanings. For example, progress denotes that future happenings will be better than whatever has happened before. Evolution refers to a growth and development in human capacity to use and direct its environment effectively. Function, development, and process, on the other hand, "refer to the differences within a structure--a chemical compound, a personality, a living organism, a group, a set of customs--that appear over time and that are initiated by factors already present within that structure."³ Whereas, change refers to "a difference in a structure that occurs over time, initiated by factors outside that given structure."⁴ Therefore, what actually distinguishes change from other processes is the fact that "change lies outside the structure that changes."⁵

Swanson outlines two procedures to assist social science researchers in locating and identifying the sources of change: the exploitation of hints contained in empirical generalizations, and "the determination, on theoretical grounds, that some prospective sources are too unlikely or too remote for our purposes, whereas others have more promise."⁶ He defines the term empirical generalization as a statement that two things have been observed to be associated with one another and in a particular pattern.⁷

To predict any change, we must find the condition sufficient to produce it. There must be a response to change, and there must be a potential for change. Finally, there must be a susceptibility of the entire structure to influence from the outside.

Because this study is concerned with the effect of social change on police, it is important to identify first what structures change and, secondly, what factors cause that change inside and outside a given structure. Social structure is used in the social sciences to refer to two sets of concepts: the directional tendencies of social systems and the resources of social systems. In other words, social structure refers to "organized bundles of human activities oriented to the directional tendencies of a social system. . . . The basic units of social structure are not persons as such but selected aspects of interaction among such persons."⁸

One major difference between simple and complex societies is the degree of differentiation in the social structure.

Although there is no consensus within the field (of social science) concerning how social structure should be defined, as Manning comments, it "can be delineated from other types of groups by its scope and degree of abstractness. . . . The term refers to any basic method of ordering human interaction."⁹ Manning goes one step further and relates to social structure the social institutions which are the "collection of statuses, roles, and norms" that a society possesses "to fulfill the basic functions necessary for the survival and perpetuation of that society."¹⁰

According to Merton, societies have a cultural structure that is separate and distinguishable from a social structure; the former consists of an "organized set of normative values," the latter of "an organized set of social relationships."¹¹ Cultural structure makes it explicit that "goals are more or less integrated and roughly ordered in some hierarchy of values (that) defines, regulates, and controls the acceptable modes of reaching out for these goals."¹²

Social norms depend for their use and continued existence upon the existence of collective relationships, and they serve such relationships as a facility for the conduct of and ordering of its affairs. We, as humans, grow because

of our ability to relate ourselves more effectively to our environment, especially our social environment.

Development

W. A. Lewis refers to economic development as the "growth of output per head of population."¹³ Smelser believes that when we talk about development, we generally speak of several interrelated factors that accompany development such as technical, economic, and ecological factors. Each one of these factors has its own distinctive characteristics in any changing social structure. Therefore, when we speak of change in the realm of technology, we refer to change "from simple and traditionalized techniques toward the application of scientific knowledge"¹⁴ for the period of specialization in cash crops and agricultural wage labor. In industry, the term change refers to the "transition from the use of human and animal power toward industrialization proper"¹⁵ or, as M. Nash noted, "men aggregated at power-driven machines, working for monetary return with the products of the manufacturing process entering into a market-based or a network of exchange relations,"¹⁶ whereas in ecology we use the term change to refer to the "movement from the farm and village toward urban centers."¹⁷ These processes do not necessarily occur at the same time, but neither can we rule out their existence when no full industry reveals itself. For example,

agriculture may be commercialized without any concomitant industrialization and the same reasoning can be applied to crowded cities.

Bendix defines modernization (sometimes called social and political development) as to "refer to all those social and political changes that accompanied industrialization in many countries of western civilization."¹⁸ This definition does not mean that industrialization must be a prerequisite for modernization, nor does it limit our conception of modernization to be judged only by western standards, or expect all nations to develop in the same way, as is the case with many western writers. Bendix refers to these writers as falling into the "trap of neo-evolutionists."¹⁹

Bendix, realizing the limitations facing historians or social scientists who study traditional societies with western conceptualizations of development, writes, "Our concept of development must encompass not only the products and byproducts of industrialization, but also the various amalgams of traditions and modernity which make all development partial."²⁰ Alexander Gerschenkron goes one step further to say, "What can be reasonably regarded as a prerequisite in some historical cases can be much more naturally seen as a product of industrialization in others. The line between what is a precondition of, and what is a response to, industrial development seems to be a rather flexible one."²¹

Economic Growth

The economic growth of any given country depends, in large part, upon its exploiting its natural resources effectively and sufficiently through technological know-how. As Smelser notes, "Economic activity in any society is defined as a relation between those goals (where a society possesses a value system that defines certain goals as desirable for members or groups of the society at various levels) and the degree of scarcity of goods and services."²²

When a society is poor and desperate, it could be argued that communities cannot offer anything of value to thieves and burglars. But, when wealth is acquired by some segments of that society and wealth continues, the opportunity for crime becomes visible.

Patrick Colquhoun, writing in the late 1790s, noted that:

The enlarged state of society, the vast extent of moving property and the unexampled wealth of the metropolis, joined to depraved habits and loose conduct of a great proportion of the lower classes of the people, and above all, the want of an appropriate police applicable to the object of prevention will, after a careful perusal of this work, reconcile the attentive mind to a belief of the actual existence of evils which could not otherwise have been credited.²³

Studies of the relationship between economic conditions and crime have found that "both poverty (of the have-nots) and increasing affluence (of the haves) can result in an increase in crime rate."²⁴ They have also found that, "The

opportunities for crime directed against property increase as countries become more wealthy."²⁵ Industrial and commercial activities more than doubled in France between the years 1826 and 1878, but during the same period of time crime increased two and one-half times. Similarly, in England and Wales, crime has more than tripled over the past 25 years while the standard of living of all classes has been rising.²⁶ State Police in the United States emerged as a response to heavily industrialized areas of the Northeast--i.e., Connecticut (1904); Pennsylvania (1905); New York, Michigan, New Jersey, West Virginia and others (1917).²⁷ In England, according to Tilly, "the number of police increased most rapidly in areas of greatest population density."²⁸ Tobias comments that as shops expand and markets grow, property becomes more movable and the opportunity for petty theft multiplies.²⁹

Population Growth

As a given country's population grows, the number of reported crimes will directly increase. The demand for a wide range of police services to be extended to the new, growing numbers also increases. In this situation, the police must deal with these rising waves either with the same number of officers or increase their number. However, choosing the former alternative will no doubt lead to heavy strains on

the role, function, and structure of police and to anxiety and mistrust by the general public about the police. Hence, increasing manpower is frequently the course of action opened to the police. Fosdick comments that the size of population, at least for city police forces, might affect the amount of auxiliary administration needed.³⁰ Bruce Smith maintains that in the United States auxiliary administrative functions in cities tend to increase with population.³¹ However, Bayley contends that this "simple hypothesis has not been followed up in subsequent research."³²

But, Tilly and his associates argue that in Canada "the growing complexities of urban affairs and increasing demand for efficient city and town administration were among the factors which led to the creating of full-time urban police forces."³³ They claim that "the rise of professional policing occurred throughout the western world as industrialization, urbanization, and the concentration of power in national states proceeded."³⁴

David Bordua believes that "increasing concentration of population in larger cities has allowed the development of larger departments with the possibility of more rigorous selection of personnel, better training, and the development of a more self-consciously professional administrative corps among police commanders."³⁵

Growth in the Crime Rate

Criminal statistics support the notion that police forces are usually developed as a response to an increase in crime or related pressing social problems. Evidence from European, western, and Third World societies tends to strongly support this argument. History provides the much needed evidence in this regard as is illustrated by the following examples.

The creation of the mounted police in Canada demonstrates how police are often desperately needed during a difficult time of social disorder. In 1845, after the workers' dispute at the Welland and St. Lawrence Canal, the Canadian government authorized the governor and council to raise "a body of men not exceeding 100 exclusive officers and to be called 'the mounted police.'"³⁶ In 1849, the government again raised this mounted constabulary force, which consisted of 50 men, "mainly to protect Parliament and other public buildings."³⁷ In 1885, a system of police patrol was begun to reduce smuggling and horse stealing.

In the early 20th century, unpoliced areas in the Canadian frontier were rampant with crime. After the inauguration of federal policing in the northwest, these territories experienced the absence of serious crime in the police districts.³⁸

In the 19th century, special purpose police units were established by the United States government to enforce and protect congressional fiscal operations and the mail. The modern role of protecting the president was not established until 1902 as the result of the assassination of President McKinley.³⁹ Even private policing was created to handle special tasks such as guarding and protecting private and public premises, detective work, surveillance of employees, and strike-breaking.

For example, the Pinkerton National Police Agency began work in 1852 and was employed to protect private property in connection with 70 strikes during the period 1866-1892. Tilly and his associates attribute the decline in property offenses in the United States during the 60-year period from 1860 to 1920 to the "widespread of an efficient organization and the steady growth in size of both public and private police."⁴⁰ When the Chicago police force declined in size relative to population from 1875 to 1885, the number of arrests for property crimes also declined. But, when the size of the police force increased over the next decade, the number of arrests also increased.

In England, the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832 was due to the "steepest rise in the overall crime rate for the period from 1813 to 1826."⁴¹ The years 1836 to 1846 and 1853 had nearly identical crime rates. But, in 1839 the

crime rate was relatively low despite widespread Chartist activity. Tilly comments that this is "apparently due to the Home Office policy of restricting use of the military to assist local magistrates in suppressing disturbances."⁴²

The military was used regularly for controlling crowds and political unrest until the establishment of the Metropolitan Police Force in 1829 in London. This trend continued to prevail outside London until the end of the 19th century and is still used in most developing countries in times of major crisis. In general, as the number of police began to rise rapidly after 1830, and especially after 1858, the crime rate in England showed a decisively downward trend.⁴³

In France, during the period from 1831 to 1881, the number of property crimes declined the most rapidly in those departments where more than 15 percent of the population lived in cities of 10,600 or more and where the size of the police forces of the Ministry of the Interior was expanding rapidly.⁴⁴ In this regard, Tilly finds a "significant relationship between policing and the property crime."⁴⁵ He adds, "Major property crimes have a weak tendency to rise over police expansion."⁴⁶ Thus, in general, the experience of 19th-century France showed that expanding police forces had a significant effect on the decline of property crimes.

In Ceylon in 1806, the authorities resolved to take action against the bands of robbers who caused unrest in the

rural areas. They appointed one or two headmen in each village to combat the robbers.

In 1954, Cyprus experienced unrest because the Turkish majority did not want the island to become united with Greece. In 1955, a gang of terrorists initiated a campaign of murder and violence to prevent the union. At that time, the Greek police could not deal effectively with terrorist activity. Therefore, in 1956 the government called for urgent recruitment and raised the size of the police force to 3,600 in order to effectively meet the challenge of terrorism.⁴⁷

In the 18th century, Ghanaian police forces were small and too ineffective to deal with any social or political upheaval. When riots erupted in Cape Coast in 1865, the existing police force could not meet the challenge. Consequently, the police were replaced by a new force called the "Fani Force." But, when general riots erupted in 1948, this force was caught unprepared and had to be quickly strengthened and enlarged.⁴⁸

In 1776, as a result of the increased crime rate in India, the Bombay government recruited Sepoys to reinforce the militia. But, as this move yielded no improvement, a lieutenant of police was appointed in 1779, and, in 1793, a police commission appointed a superintendent of police. Though there was a slight improvement in the situation, crime continued to flourish, and the public demanded police reform. Thus, in 1809 a committee was set up to study the problem.

This committee proposed that "the policing of Bombay should follow that developed for London."⁴⁹

In Jamaica, the present constabulary force was established as a response to the "Morant Bay Rebellion" in 1867.⁵⁰

In Kenya, the internal unrest stemming from the "Mau-Mau" (a secret society of the Kikuyu tribe) caused the Kenyan police force to be enlarged and better maintained between 1952 and 1956. British troops were also called in to help the police deal with the problem.⁵¹

When an armed communist rebellion arose in Malaya in 1948, the federation police force, which totalled 10,000 men of all ranks, faced a serious problem. The government declared a state of emergency, and the size of the police force expanded to include 31,164 regular police, 44,117 special constables, and 88,000 auxiliary police. As the crisis subsided, the size of the police force was reduced to 20,243 men of all ranks.⁵²

When the government in Sierra Leone was faced with an alarming increase in illicit diamond mining and illicit diamond buying in the diamond areas of the protectorate in 1953, it established permanent police stations and posts throughout the country.

In 1960, when widespread riots broke out in the Bukadi District of the Eastern Province of Uganda, the size of the

police force was immediately increased by a large scale at all levels.⁵³

In Egypt, crimes in some provinces caused the Ministry of the Interior to provide plans, men, and equipment to combat them. For example, in one province where the crime of kidnapping was prevalent, the Ministry assigned armored cars to carry patrols right up to the lairs occupied by criminals in the mountain regions.⁵⁴

As a result of an extensive reorganization of the police structure, Egypt reported a considerable decrease in its crime rate. According to Cramer, the statistics for the period between 1952 and 1959 indicated that burglary decreased by 51 percent, arson decreased by 34 percent, and murder decreased by 7 percent.⁵⁵

When the Gordon Riots erupted in the summer of 1780, London was abandoned to mob violence, and the government resorted to calling in the army. Shelburne, who became the first home secretary, spoke during the second day of the riots. He praised the French police system which, in his opinion, "was wise to the last degree in its structure and only abominable in its use and direction." Thus, he argued that the French system should be adopted in England.⁵⁶

As a result of the riots, a bill calling for the "establishment of a strong police force to act throughout the whole of the metropolitan area" was introduced by Pitt's

government in 1785.⁵⁷ Although the bill was later withdrawn, its very existence illustrates the point that social crises always generate a cry for strong police forces to quell the social upheaval that faces the society.

Historically, the growth of the police system underwent evolutionary change over the years. As Critchley notes, "the system simply adjusted itself, with local variations, to meet the pressures and needs of changing economic and social conditions."⁵⁸

Bordua observes that in the United States "where crime rates soar high and where traffic regulation consumes an important share of police resources, police commanders have been tempted to limit police operations to the central ones of protection of life and property through the suppression of crime and disorder."⁵⁹

Education

A large increase in the money invested in education will pay off in economic and social growth because it will increase the number of skills that a society has to meet its changing institutions. The International Economic Association suggests that the "secret of the United States was not the fact that it was a democracy or a capitalist society, or that it had the greatest physical resources, but rather that it got started very early using education largely, or at least philosophically, for political reasons, and then this

turned out to be a great economic asset."⁶⁰ T. Fox and M. Miller suggest that higher levels of upward mobility are associated with higher levels of education.⁶¹ Thus, the expansion of education opened the door for police organizations, as well as other professions, to choose among many potential candidates and to select the best for the profession. (As levels of education increase, job qualifications and standards for potential candidates for police work increase also. Furthermore, as levels of education rise for police, one would anticipate better job performance and efficiency.) As Smelser notes, "There is good reason to believe, however, that growth in the numbers who attain higher levels of education should result in an increase in the amount of high achievement orientation in the population."⁶² Those highly educated individuals will seek employment in government positions. K. A. Busia has found that students in nations with tiny systems of higher education expect positions in the majority of government jobs.⁶³

Police Development as a Response to the Preceding Factors of Social Change

Police development as a response to the preceding factors of social change can be seen by tracing the history of early police development in response to the need for safety and security. One can find that:

the roots of the primary responsibility for maintaining the king's peace in early English history fell largely upon each locality under a well-understood principle of social obligation. . . . Collective security can be found in voluntary associations or Frithguilds formed in Wessex for mutual protection against theft.⁶⁴

As Professor Sayles puts it:

the primary importance of the villis in governmental life lay in the police duties which came to be imposed upon them. The most serious problem of everyday administration was to discover and punish those evildoers whose deeds struck at the roots of orderly society.⁶⁵

Critchley points out that the collapse from 1689 onwards of the old English police system, which was based on the parish constable, was due to:

sheer inability, in its debilitated and corrupt state, to cope with a social and economic upheaval which, in the course of the 18th century, doubled England's population from six to twelve million, transformed the metropolis from two overgrown cities into a massive conurbation and turned vast rural areas into agglomerations of slums, mines, and factories which lacked the elementary conditions of civilized living.⁶⁶

Life in London at that time was unbearable. As Horace Walpole wrote in 1752, "one is forced to travel, even at noon, as if one were going to battle."⁶⁷

To restore the king's peace to the streets of London, a series of trials and errors were adopted in the form of reforming police methods and criminal law procedures, notably Fieldings. But, it was not until Peel's final reform took place in 1829 that any meaningful, up-to-date, efficient, and effective policing could be recognized as dealing with the rising social problems in England.

When Patrick Colquhoun called attention to the problems in the Port of London in 1797 as the place where thieves, footpads, prostitutes, and pilferers were at work, he advocated creation of a police force in that area. His argument was so appealing and convincing that by June 1798 the Marine Police had been established. This force later became the first regular professional police force in London.⁶⁸ Peel once wrote, when he was faced with the fact of rising crime rates, population growth, and social and economic development:

the time is come, when, from the increase in its population, the enlargement of its resources, and the multiplying development of its resources, and the multiplying of its energies, we may fairly pronounce that the country has outgrown her police institutions and that the cheapest and safest course will be found to be the introduction of a new mode of protection.⁶⁹

Role of the Police

The police role has been the subject of considerable controversy. There is no single agreement as to what that role should be. Are the police social workers or law enforcers? Several studies (Reiss and Black 1967, and Cumming, Cumming, and Edell 1965) showed that less than half of the public calls for police action involved criminality.⁷⁰ One study conducted in Detroit found that 16 percent of the calls received by the Detroit police in 1966 were related to crime. The author of the study, Thomas Bercal, advocated that, in

large urban centers, the police should be viewed as service agencies rather than as law and control agencies.⁷¹

Elmer Johnson believed that there is low morale among police as the result of a role conflict that is caused by this contradiction between the social service function and the maintenance of a law and order function.⁷² This is what J. Q. Wilson meant when he talked about a variety of police behaviors.⁷³

Empirical studies of police behavior show that the average police officer spends more time performing a variety of social services than he spends in the pursuit of criminals. Michael Banton said that "patrol officers spend a larger proportion of their time acting as 'peace officers' than as 'law officers.'" ⁷⁴ Yet, the police are viewed primarily as guardians of the law by the public, and this is also the self-image held by police officers.

Once public acceptance of existing laws based on moral, religious, or traditional grounds declines, the role of the police becomes more difficult. Stanford Kadish has indicated that "an excessive reliance on the criminal law to enforce morals creates acute problems for the administration of (the) criminal justice system."⁷⁵ This means that the police who "hold the same traditional and moral values shared with the other members of the society" face two different kinds of problems.

On the one hand, they may find themselves being required to enforce laws which they themselves regard as obsolete or irrelevant; or on the other hand, they may be unable to view the law enforcement task objectively or rationally because of their own moral assessment of those who break the law.⁷⁶

Because the success of the police depends in large part on their adaptation to their social environment, it is therefore essential for them to understand and make use of the changing social trends in their society. Hence, it is necessary for the police to shape and develop their perspectives, attitudes, and capabilities to keep up with the changing social environment.

Police Organization and Structure

Bureaucracy is one major element of large-scale organization. According to Max Weber, bureaucratic organization emerged in Europe as:

a result of the rational specialization of functions and the requirements for expert knowledge. At first, the experts are called in on a temporary basis to assist in making complex decisions. Later, an official position is created as a permanent element of the government. Finally, the individual position gradually turns into a bureaucracy.⁷⁷

Peter Blau has advanced four characteristics of bureaucracies: specialization, a hierarchy of authority, a system of rules, and impersonality.⁷⁸ In Saudi Arabia, many schools, hospitals, police, and other government agencies possess these features. Therefore, police in general are viewed to be approaching the process of professionalization and specialization, especially in large cities.

With the establishment of uniformed, armed, and well-organized police in modern times as a response to prevailing social problems, police specialization became the rule rather than the exception. With the exception of the United States, all countries in Western Europe and North America have enacted statutes specifying principles for the way in which police coverage is to be organized.

According to Bayley, the United States has no general principles for organizing police coverage. Forty years ago, Bruce Smith noted that the United States does not really have a police system. What exists is merely a "hodgepodge of autonomous forces created by various levels of government according to parochial considerations." In other words, Bayley notes, "American police coverage is made up of patches on patches rather than tailored to fit."⁷⁹

In the United States, work assignments are not made in relation to specific skills or specialized training, as they would be in an industrial corporation, a university, a hospital, or a government agency. As Egon Bittner observes:

The projection of a career in police work means virtually always spending one's working life in a single department. Thus, the police officers are, in a sense, captives of departments and must restrict their career planning and social life to opportunities that are available locally.⁸⁰

However, what little specialization there would be is merely a case of "exceptions to the more general rule that being a policeman is basically an undifferentiated employment status."⁸¹

As a result of this dramatic situation with regard to police organization, police officers have little opportunity for lateral movement across different organizations. According to Bittner, police departments in the United States, by contrast with other institutions, are "organizationally primitive."⁸² To this he adds that police departments are "the only large-scale institution in our society that has not benefited from advances in management science."⁸³

The President's Commission noted in 1967 that the evolution of scientific discovery which occurred in shaping and controlling the physical environment, in the health field, and in national security has "largely bypassed the problem of crime and crime control." The greatest need, the Commission found, was the need to "know."⁸⁴

Politics and Control of the Police

In France, Italy, and Spain, direct orders are issued from a national police headquarters to local police chiefs. French supervision is national and bureaucratic. Any local control is exercised only by delegation from the central government. This national bureaucratic procedure is common practice in Italy, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands. In Germany, police command is organized by the states that form the federation.

In Britain, with the exception of the London metropolitan police who are responsible directly to the central

government, control of the police is in the hands of the "police authority"* for each force. In Canada, policing is carried out at three levels: national, provincial, and municipal. The control is decentralized except for the Canadian mounted police which comes under the direct control of the Minister of Justice and is exercised by appointed police commissioners, some of whom are elected officials.

In the United States, the constitutional preference has been reflected in a tendency to keep the police under the control of local levels. This tendency, according to David Bordua, "has been accompanied in the United States by special problems of securing efficiency and honesty in police operations." Bordua adds, "Until recently, it has been difficult for police commanders in the United States to secure sufficient independence from local politics to develop systems of recruitment, promotion, and assignment based on merit rather than political performance."^{8 5}

Police Functions and Definition

As has been mentioned before, there is disagreement in the literature on how to define the police. Within the

*The "police authority" is an appointed body: two-thirds of the members are the elected officials of local government councils; one-third are magistrates.

literature, one also finds disagreement among many authors as to the role and functions of the police.*

Added to policing functions are political and economic functions. Manning (1977), Quinney (1977), Skolnick (1966), Chapman (1970), and others maintain that police can be used for oppression or to further the economic interests of special groups by protecting or ignoring the practice of gambling, prostitution, nightclubs, etc.⁸⁸ Political police, secret police, or corrupt police have not been dealt with in this study.

From the preceding, the writer maintains that, definitionally, the police function in any given society is determined by the legal order that created the police force and the social surroundings. The police role should and must be looked at as one would look at that of any other citizen of society. The police role is not or should not be different from any other citizen's role; only the function of the police is different.

The socialization process for police will not be different from that of other citizens unless we give them another role. Then, they will be cast away and isolated. Role playing behavior, as the writer understands it, is a

*Manning, for example, has seven definitions of the police. He uses functional, structural, attitudinal, cultural-historical, output or praxis, legalistic, and phenomenological definitions. He believes that functional definitions "are perhaps the most commonly used in American sociology."⁸⁶ Bayley defines the police as "an organization authorized by a collectivity to regulate social relations within itself by utilizing, if need be, physical force."⁸⁷

behavior playing activity by individuals or groups in any given society. Hence, because the police are members of the whole society, their role must be looked at and interpreted in the context of the whole society.

Each society has its own definition of the role and function of the police. For example, linguistically, the Arabic word for police (shorta) means a condition of doing something in a specific way or a mark or symbol which could be easily identified. This name was given to the police because they used to wear something to identify them easily which developed later to a uniform and number.⁸⁹

Legally, Royal Decree No. 30, dated 4-14-1384 (1964), defined the internal security forces (Public Security, Civil Defense, General Investigation, the Coast Guard, the Special Forces Unit, and the Internal Security Forces College) as:

the armed forces responsible for keeping the peace, order, and public security in land and sea,* especially preventing crime before its occurrence and apprehending criminals and investigating crimes that have occurred; protecting lives, property, and morality in accordance with the rules, regulations, and royal decrees issued by the Council of Ministers and/or the Ministry of the Interior.⁹⁰

From the royal decree above, one can see that the police have (definitionally) three main functions in Saudi Arabian society: they perform an administrative function when they enforce the law equally for everyone, maintain peace

*The word sea is included because the Coast Guard is considered to be one of the internal security forces.

and order, raise their level of efficiency, etc.; they perform a legal function when they apprehend criminals and bring them to prosecution and justice; and they perform a social function when they seek to provide an understanding of the causation of crime and social ills and try to prevent crime by trying to alleviate and reduce the causes of social ills.⁹¹

Generally speaking, the disagreements concerning the role and substance of the police deal with appearance and not with the substance of the matter. In the literature, the authors mostly deal with the question, "What is the police?" They don't deal with the question, "Why have the police been created?" Once we know the logic, the philosophy, and the reason behind creating the police force, then the definition of the function, role, and structure of the police will become clear.

In my opinion, the definition of the police should be looked at from the standpoint of the legal order or royal decree that created the police force. Therefore, the police have two definitions to consider--the linguistic definition and the legal definition.

Having discussed the major independent variables of the study in a general context (except the fifth variable, foreigners living in Saudi Arabia) and examined their impact on police development, the writer will next examine the variables in the specific context of Saudi Arabian society.

Factors of Social Change in
Saudi Arabian Society

Economic Growth

Before the discovery of oil and its production and exportation in 1938, the Saudi Arabian economy was based mainly on subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry. Because of the scarcity of rain and the primitive methods used in agriculture, the national income was low and per capita income fell beyond the poverty line. Peter Hobday writes, "For much of the early years, he (the King) had to live on monthly stipends from the British."⁹² Since 1938, Saudi Arabian economic growth has increased at a rapid rate. However, Philby notes that "it was not until 1946 that the first substantial dividends were to find their way into the Saudi treasury."⁹³

Oil production has jumped from 0.5 million barrels a day in 1938 to 9.5 million barrels a day in 1980. The government budget has increased from 758 million riyals in 1951-52 to 111.4 billion riyals in 1977-78*. The gross domestic product increased from 4,000 million riyals in 1372 (1952) to 200 billion riyals in 1396-97 (1976-77).⁹⁴ Gross national product was 75 million dollars in 1979, reaching 104 billion in 1980 with per capita income at \$15,700.⁹⁵

*In 1980, U. S. \$1.00 equaled 3.334 Saudi riyals.

Population Growth

As indicated in Chapter I, there is no reliable documentation concerning the overall population growth of Saudi Arabia. Various figures have been cited, including those of the Saudi government which in 1974 estimated that the population was over seven million. The Statistical Book of the Ministry of the Interior: 1966-75 does give statistics for the overall Saudi population from 1966-75. Though this research does not specifically deal with the overall population of Saudi Arabia, these figures have been used as general guidelines of population growth. In 1966, the population of Saudi Arabia was 5,662,000. By 1975, the population was 7,201,000, a figure which reflects a steady increase in population each year (5,815,000 in 1967; 5,973,000 in 1968; 6,135,000 in 1969; 6,301,000 in 1970; 6,472,000 in 1971; 6,647,000 in 1972; 6,828,000 in 1973; and 7,012,000 in 1974).⁹⁶ These figures give the reader a general indication of the trend in population growth.

Riyadh, the capital city of Saudi Arabia and the location of the case study, was the main focus of the study, and thus more information about population growth was developed for Riyadh than for Saudi Arabia in general.

Riyadh is located in the heart and center of the nation. All ministries, regional departments and most large business firms are located there. More than one-half of the

civil servants work in Riyadh, and major decisions on issues, policies, and matters of importance concerning the citizenry or foreign relations are made and declared in Riyadh.

His Majesty, King Khalid, and His Royal Highness, Crown Prince Fahed, reside in Riyadh, as do all other ministers and most high-ranking officials. The foreign embassies that are now in Jeddah have been asked to move to Riyadh--a process that is close to completion.

The growth of Riyadh (both in physical and in human terms) is an interesting phenomenon. Within a relatively short period of time, the city has been transformed from a walled, small town to a metropolitan city. In the words of St. John Philby, who came to Saudi Arabia in 1917 and worked very closely with King Abdul Aziz as an advisor:

There is indeed no resemblance whatever between the great city of today (1959) and the tight, little, walled town which served for close to 40 years as the headquarters of the great Ibn Saud during his campaigns for conquest and unification of a nation.⁹⁷

Philby's description of Riyadh in the 1920s indicates that the walled town measured some 700 yards from north to south and about 650 yards from east to west. The population was about "30,000 souls at most."⁹⁸ When Philby wrote his article about ancient and modern Riyadh in 1959, he estimated that the population had grown to 300,000 and that Riyadh was a city "covering an area of about 100 square kilometers and spreading out in all directions from the old 100-acre 'heart of Arabia.'⁹⁹

In 1968, Doxiadis, an American consulting firm under the direction of Dr. Doxiadis, gave the same figure of 300,000 for the Riyadh population.¹⁰⁰ This firm made a master plan for Riyadh and called it "Riyadh in 2,000." Five years later, many newspaper reporters used the name as a joke because Riyadh's expansion in 1976 exceeded the plan's estimates for the year 2,000.

The firm encountered similar difficulties in its estimation of land prices. For example, in its final recommendations in July 1968, the firm estimated that vacant land prices in the central business district ranged from 3,000 to 2,000 riyals (as of March 1968). In the residential areas of the old city (center) that were outside of the central business districts, the prices ranged from 500-100 riyals.¹⁰¹ The firm also estimated that "The cost of land in the industrial areas, as well as on Khurais Road (outside the residential area), the respective prices vary between 70-25 and 10 riyals (all estimates are per square meter)."¹⁰²

Unfortunately, only five years later the prices quoted above did not represent even one-tenth of the real land prices in the areas described by the firm. The farthest area they said would sell for 25-10 riyals did not exceed the 10-kilometer radius. In 1980, no land within a 25-kilometer radius of Riyadh could be bought for less than 100 riyals per square meter.

SCET-International/SEDES, a French consultant firm, was hired by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to continue working with the remainder of the original master plan for "Riyadh in 2,000." In a February 1977 technical report, the firm estimated that the population of Riyadh was 829,000 in 1977 and that it would be 1,030,000 in 1980.¹⁰³ This study has used the SCET-International/SEDES figures concerning the 1980 population of Riyadh.

Educational Growth

In Saudi Arabia, education at all levels is free for any citizens or aliens living in the country. Not only are books, teaching materials, facilities and transportation (especially for girls) free, but students who go to college, the university, a teacher's training institute, technical school, special education or religious school are given a year-round monthly salary including summer vacations. Moreover, in 1977 free lunch-time meals were introduced for all elementary school-age children. In 1980, the government began paying each student 200 riyals a month instead of giving them the free meal.

Education in Saudi Arabia is rapidly expanding. For example, in 1953, there were 506 elementary schools with 44,000 students and 1,472 teachers. In 1978, there were 2,987 schools with 466,000 students and 25,188 teachers. In 1953, there were 100 secondary schools enrolling 793 students.

In 1978, there were more than 600 secondary schools enrolling 123,548 students. In 1953, there were about 50 high schools enrolling 522 students. In 1978, there were 200 high schools enrolling 44,037 students.

By the 1979-80 school year, the system had again expanded. There were 3,638 elementary schools enrolling 517,069 students with 28,135 teachers and 4,186 administrators; 906 secondary schools enrolling 143,725 students with 10,171 teachers and 2,320 administrators; and 259 high schools enrolling 54,841 students with 3,003 teachers and 775 administrators.

In 1953, the General Educational Directorate (created in 1925 and now called the Ministry of Education) budget was 12 million riyals (about 3 million dollars at that time). In 1977-78, the budget was almost more than 8 billion riyals (more than 2.6 billion dollars).

By 1978, the total school system in Saudi Arabia at all levels of education, including 2,113 night schools and 123 kindergartens, included 8,695 schools with a total student body of 1,219,818, including foreign students. The total Saudi national student population was 1,054,932. Of this total, 361,448 were Saudi girls. The total number of teachers in these schools was 78,364 of which 50 percent were foreign teachers. The number of Saudi teachers, when compared with that of foreign teachers, is small, especially in the upper

levels of schooling. The total number of Saudi teachers in the Saudi Arabian school system was 39,290. Of this total, 7,732 were female Saudi teachers.¹⁰⁴

The 8,695 schools came under the direction of different authorities. For example, the Ministry of Education for boys' training from the first grade to the twelfth grade and junior colleges and Presidency for Girls' Education (including a separate higher education system for girls) have between them the largest number of schools with the largest number of enrollments. The Ministry of Education for boys' training and junior colleges had a total of 5,532 schools in 1978 out of the total 8,695 schools with an enrollment of 698,422 students of which 620,002 were Saudis. The Presidency for Girls' Education had 2,163 schools in 1978 with an enrollment of 390,838 of which 341,495 students were Saudis. The remaining schools and enrollees come under the jurisdiction of other educational authorities.

Growth in the Crime Rate

The crime index rate published by government agencies is considered by many scholars (Bordua and Reiss 1967; Reiss 1970; Black 1972; Manning 1977; and Quinney 1970)¹⁰⁵ to be unreliable and undependable as a basis for developing a true picture of what actually happens in the real world. The reasons for this unreliability are numerous. For one thing, the definition of what constitutes a crime or an offense

differs from one society to another. Secondly, when agreement is reached on major crimes, only those are included in the criminal index. (For example, the FBI usually lists only seven major crimes in its index.) Thirdly, crimes included in the index are only those crimes that are known to the police. Fourthly, some police departments may, on occasion, either over-report crimes (in order to increase their budget) or under-report crimes (in order to show the department's professionalism and efficiency). Finally, the pressure on police to process a large number of cases and to show a crime rate may lead to more arrests or false accusations, not to mention the violation of due process.¹⁰⁶ Thus, in fact, the nature of the true crime rate is like that of "a chimera."

The following figures on the Saudi Arabian crime index are probably subject to the same limitations discussed above. The first statistics on crime were published in 1966. Before this period, no official statistics were available, either from the police departments or the national police headquarters (General Directorate of Public Security in Riyadh). Therefore, the period covered in this study was from 1966-78.* Crimes listed in the index for 1966-70 are:

(1) homicide, (2) property crimes (there are no breakdowns in this category), (3) moral crimes, (4) cheating and embezzlement, (5) drugs (this category implicitly includes alcohol),

*Figures for 1976 have been omitted because they have not been published by the Statistics Department.

and (6) smuggling (there are no breakdowns in this category). Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 show the total number of crimes committed during the period 1966-1978. Table 2.1 shows the crime index from 1966 to 1975 as broken down by official statistics, Table 2.2 shows the most serious crimes committed in 1977-78, and Table 2.3 shows all crimes committed in 1977-78 regardless of their seriousness.

From these tables one can see the general trend toward an increase in the crime rate. For example, 372 more crimes were committed in 1978 than in 1977, an increase of almost 17 percent in one year. If one looks at the entire ten-year period, the total number of crimes decreased from 1,850 to 1,304. However, this decrease was not because less crimes were committed during this period (as claimed by the Statistics Department) but was due to the failure to include drug and alcohol crimes in figures for the years after 1971. If the figures for these crimes in 1978, which totaled 1,733 cases, are added to the total number of crimes committed in 1978, then the total becomes overwhelmingly high. On the other hand, when the crime index for 1977-78 is examined, it becomes apparent that there was a 25 percent increase in the total number of crimes in 1978 (from 182 crimes in 1977 to 223 crimes in 1978). This increase, in the writer's opinion, represents the general trend in the crime rate.

TABLE 2.1

CRIME INDEX FROM 1966-75

Crime ¹	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Homocide	169	154	74	40	49	41	54	39	45	70
Property crimes	879	905	905	791	854	791	980	973	948	873
Moral crimes	380	405	300	321	392	345	346	323	339	328
Drugs & alcohol	128	49	34	60	56	2	2	2	2	2
Cheating & embezzlement	117	48	30	16	47	21	31	26	14	19
Smuggling & other crimes	177	64	34	1	3	36	13	15	24	14
Total	1850	1625	1377	1229	1401	1234	1424	1376	1370	1304

¹Categories used in official statistics.

²Drug crimes committed after 1970 were not included in this listing but were listed separately.

SOURCE: Saudi Arabia, Ministry of the Interior, Statistical Yearbook: 1966-75 (Riyadh), p. 9. (Arabic)

TABLE 2.2

MOST SERIOUS CRIMES FROM 1977-78¹

Crime	1977	1978
Homocide	41	51
Suicide	16	9
Pulling a weapon	5	19
Assault with intent to kill	45	103
Forced robbery	3	1
Kidnapping	31	17
Rape	32	22
Total	173	222

¹This chart was constructed separately because different categories were used in the 1977-78 index.

SOURCE: Saudi Arabia, Ministry of the Interior, Statistical Yearbook: 1977-78 (Riyadh), pp. 26-27. (Arabic)

TABLE 2.3

ALL CRIMES COMMITTED FROM 1977-78 REGARDLESS OF SERIOUSNESS¹

Crime	1977	1978	Crime	1977	1978
Pulling a weapon	5	19	Adultery	50	78
Smuggling alcohol	3	8	Homocide	41	51
Selling alcohol	12	24	Arson	11	13
Making alcohol	45	34	Purse snatching	134	90
Consuming alcohol	1690	1996	Forced robbery	3	1
Breaking and entering	7	14	Weapon smuggling	7	3
Bribery	7	12	Suicide	16	9
Imposters	3	7	Kidnapping	31	17
Intent to kill	54	103	Rape	32	22
Sexual harassment	43	70	Conjury	2	1
Embezzlement	26	22	Total	2222	2594

¹This listing represents a compilation of information from several tables. Crimes are listed without regard to any particular order of seriousness.

SOURCE: Saudi Arabia, Ministry of the Interior, Statistical Yearbook: 1977-78 (Riyadh), pp. 26-27. (Arabic)

Foreigners Living in Saudi Arabia

After examining the nationality of those who committed crimes during the period from 1966-75, the writer found that foreigners constituted a large proportion of those responsible for committing crimes. For example, in 1966, the total number of people who committed the crimes categorized in the previous section was 2,560. Of this total, 833 individuals were Saudis.* Table 2.4 shows the total number of people by nationality who committed serious crimes from 1966-75 and 1977-78.

If we take the two-year period from 1977 to 1978, we find that 7,986 people committed crimes in 1977 and 8,539 people committed crimes in 1978. Of these, 2,513 were foreigners in 1977 and 2,713 were foreigners in 1978. There was a 7 percent increase in criminality from 1977 to 1978 for foreigners as compared with a 6 percent increase for Saudis for the same period. (The number of Saudis totaled 5,473 and 5,826, respectively.)

If we examine the total number of persons who committed crimes in 1978, we find that a total of 5,826 Saudis out of a population of 8,612,970 inhabitants¹⁰⁷ had committed

*The writer found a discrepancy in the total number of crimes committed in 1966 as reported in two government statistical indexes. One index was issued by the Public Security Crime Statistics Division (national police). This index, which reported crimes from 1966-70, listed the total number of crimes committed in 1966 as 2,560. Another index was published by the Ministry of the Interior Central Statistics Department. This index, which reported crimes from 1966-75, listed the total number of crimes committed in 1966 as 2,721. Interestingly, both used the same categories.

TABLE 2.4

NUMBER OF PEOPLE BY NATIONALITY (SAUDIS AND NON-SAUDIS) WHO COMMITTED SERIOUS
CRIMES FROM 1966-75 AND FROM 1977-78¹

Nationality	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1977	1978
Saudis	1830	1728	1177	1067	1232	973	1089	1088	1155	1175	5473	5826
Non-Saudis	791	701	556	527	550	542	637	661	732	632	2513	2713
Total	2621	2429	1733	1594	1782	1515	1726	1749	1887	1807	7986	8539
<u>Percentages</u>												
Saudis	67%	70%	68%	67%	69%	64%	61%	62%	61%	65%	68.5%	68%
Non-Saudis	33%	30%	32%	33%	31%	36%	39%	38%	39%	35%	31.5%	32%

¹Figures for 1976 are not available.

NOTE: The crime index does not identify foreigners by nationality or profession, but in the writer's own experience the non-Saudis who commit crimes are mostly unskilled or semi-skilled workers who came to Saudi Arabia from other Arab and Islamic countries.

SOURCES: Saudi Arabia, Ministry of the Interior, Statistical Yearbook: 1966-75 (Riyadh), pp. 72-81; Statistical Yearbook: 1977-78 (Riyadh), pp. 46-52. (Arabic)

criminal activity as compared with a total of 2,713 foreigners who had committed crimes out of a total foreign population of 859,694 living in Saudi Arabia during that same period.

The Statistical Book for the Ministry of the Interior used two indexes for foreigners in 1978: one index showed that 606,403 foreigners were granted legal stay status; the other index showed that 253,291 foreigners had their status renewed.*¹⁰⁸ Because the writer could not interpret whether or not the last category was a subdivision of the first and to avoid any confusion or over-representation of foreigners committing crimes in Saudi Arabia, the writer combined the two figures into one total. Even this combination, according to his knowledge, is still low. The appropriate figure should be over 1,000,000 foreigners. However, even allowing that the total number of foreigners in Saudi Arabia in 1978 was over 1,000,000, the percentage of foreigners who commit crimes (0.27 percent) is still quite high as compared with that for Saudis (0.067 percent).

*The renewal of legal stay status is granted to those foreigners who have been living in Saudi Arabia on an official permit and have requested that the permit, which is granted for a certain period of time, be renewed. Another type of legal stay status is called "visa issuance" and occurs when an embassy abroad grants a visa to foreigners whose services are either requested by public or private institutions or who have themselves asked for a job in the country. This clarification should be approached with extreme caution, however, as not every foreigner living in the country requests a renewal of his stay every year, and all of those who are issued visas do not necessarily come to Saudi Arabia.

It is also interesting to look at the total number of people who are in Saudi Arabian prisons for committing one or more of the categorized crimes and/or traffic accidents. Of a total of 9,244 prisoners in Saudi Arabia in 1978, 5,127 (55.5 percent) were Saudis and 4,117 (44.5 percent) were foreigners. Comparing these figures with the total population of each group (1,000,000 for foreigners and 8,612,970 for Saudis) yields percentages of 0.41 for foreigners and 0.059 for Saudis.¹⁰⁹ The reader may interpret these figures as being intentionally inflated for foreigners by police officers as a matter of differentiated practice. For example, more foreigners rather than natives are likely to be arrested, hence statistically used. However legitimate this claim may appear, the fact remains that foreign work force criminal activities are under-reported in order to continue importing more foreign work forces to carry out the desired plans for developmental projects in the country.

From the preceding discussion we have seen how important the variables of economic growth, population growth, growth in crime rate, and educational growth are in determining the rate and magnitude of development in many societies. We have also seen how these four variables plus the fifth variable, foreigners living in Saudi Arabia, have shaped the present police and social structure in Saudi Arabian society. It is amazing to see how Saudi Arabia has leapt many strides

ahead on the path of immense development in all of its institutions in such a short period of time. Fifteen years ago, no citizen (or foreigner) with any forecasting abilities could have even come close to foreseeing the present state of economic and social growth.

Growth of Traditional Institutions
as a Result of Development

In 1964, Robert Sinai believed that development cannot be attained without breaking with centuries-old traditions.

In this regard, he wrote:

India can, in fact, never advance towards its proclaimed goals unless, and until, it has the courage, the strength of character, to free itself from its bondage to this tradition. . . .¹¹⁰

In the Arab countries of the Middle East, the struggle between tradition and innovation is writ large in male violence, the explosive tensions, the erratic policies, the vicious inconstancy of the religion. . . .¹¹¹

Everywhere, even in autocratic, benighted Saudi Arabia, there is the same agonizing and unresolved debate among the newly forming middle classes, among army officers, white-collar workers and intellectuals between permanence and change.¹¹²

At the time that Sinai wrote the above, this may have been a point well taken, but what Mr. Sinai failed to realize was the fact that development, to be effective, must be locally incorporated, modified, and adjusted to meet the particular social and economic settings of a given society. In other words, we can't expect all societies to develop in the same way or using the same approach. Thus, Saudi Arabia's

approach to development "modernization" is not an imported, carbon-copy imposed or in conflict with its basic traditions.

The efforts the government takes to maintain such a rapid economic and social growth, without eroding many of its valued and established traditions, means that the government of Saudi Arabia, as a social change agent, has been trying to selectively modernize its institutions and, at the same time, maintain the society's norms and values in conformity with Islamic law and tradition.

As might be expected in the early phases of modernization, many traditional commitments must be overcome or modified to allow for the desired organizational change to take place. Such a process, however, must be approached with care, sensitivity, and diplomacy. Saudi Arabia's government is trying to accomplish change through a well-balanced social system, integrating traditionalists peacefully into the new system and maintaining basic Islamic traditions as the sole source of law in the land and the national heritage.

Ralph Braibanti, in analyzing King Faisal's role in developing Saudi Arabia, writes:

Great leadership in a developing nation doesn't reject the traditions of the system. It introduces change into the complex issue of religion, history, tradition, and culture with caution and humility so as to minimize perforations in the membrane of continuity which is the psychic--even sacred--possession of all men. . . . Yet to preserve and to fortify this precious (Islamic) religious heritage which will be (is) 1,400 years old in 1980. There must be a quality of Olympian statesmanship which is faithful to the Koran and yet wise and

prudent in using modernized, secular political power to safeguard the religious heritage. Here, the Koranic concept of viceregency (Khalifah) is crucial: "No man may rule over others unless he is superior in faith and piety." This superiority in faith and piety Faisal possessed to a remarkable degree.¹¹³

Dr. Fouad Al-Farsy writes:

Analysis would have shown the strong ties of continuity between the two cultures, shared assumptions of national ideology and the profound spiritual consensus for the teaching of the Koran. This is the first point to establish, that beyond many significant differences carved upon Saudi Arabia from the pre-industrial development process to the process of modernization is the total sense of continuity maintained by the tightly woven fabric of Islamic spirituality.¹¹⁴

Helen Lackner comments:

Saudi Arabia became a dominant power in the Arab world after 1967, but it was only after the massive oil price rises in 1973 and 1974 that the country reached a position of importance on the world scene thanks to its financial clout. . . .¹¹⁵

We thus have the strange phenomenon of a state which is an anachronism in political terms in the twentieth century, while at the same time it is a financial world power and has introduced massive technological modernization in the country. . . . Yet the regime subscribes to the fundamental Islamic ideas by which every man is equal.¹¹⁶

Planned change does not mean, as Smelser has said, that "traditional norms, values and religion will decline in every respect at the time of modernization."¹¹⁷ On the contrary, traditions (especially those with a strong national heritage and religious commitment) can be an important factor in fostering social and economic growth.

Max Weber showed this when he wrote about the role of Protestantism in the rise of modern capitalism:

(This doctrine) made mandatory the expression of devotion to God in all aspects of man's daily life, and made an obedience to the Biblical commandment to bring forth the fruits of the earth through economic pursuits of equal spiritual value to the life of spiritual contemplation. (Leading, in the final analysis,) to a more systematic pursuit of economic activities (in the right direction. Such activities implanted the great idea of the) glory of God and spiritual development of man in the mind of the Protestants.¹¹⁸

That is why Islamic religion makes it a duty and an obligation for its followers to direct their mental as well as physical energies to both religious worship and the acquisition of knowledge. Contrary to the Hindu religion, which calls for directing energy toward worship, R. Sinai comments, "Its energy has been spent in worship rather than in thought . . . instead of stimulating the activities of individuals, it has condemned it to the most degrading spiritual serfdom."¹¹⁹

Tilak, a militant nationalist who was called the "father of Indian unrest," firmly believed that only by a revival of Hinduism could the country be saved and win back its dignity and independence. Gandhi not only rejected the political domination of the British but also rejected any form of western presence. To this end, he said, "One effort is required and that is to drive western civilization out. All else will follow."¹²⁰ He believed that the west's industrial and democratic civilization was merely materialistic and destructive of harmony and community. One would question

Gandhi's stand of complete rejectionism of western civilization, but even after witnessing, as Gandhi did, the ugly face of colonialism and its effort to impose its own outside foreign culture on the nationals, one can rationalize the stand that Gandhi took.

Past experience in modernization has shown the setbacks caused by forced or sudden social changes on developing societies, especially Asians. For example, Japanese modernization processes not only produced discontent among the Japanese elite but also produced a "schizophrenic" Japanese society.¹²¹

In Turkey, Kemal Ataturk tried to abolish the whole Ottoman society's heritage and culture by introducing new western concepts of modernization, a process that led, in the final analysis, to a revolution against Ataturk and a retreat to Turkey's old traditions.

India's leaders have always pressed the point that "only by going back to the values and practices of India's 'golden past' and only by returning to Gandhi's pristine teachings can the country be saved and rejuvenated."¹²²

Motoori Norinaga of Japan (1730-1801) rejected any Chinese influence over Japan and for that matter rejected all metaphysics as foreign importation and "insisted in a literal belief in the ancient myths as contained especially in the *Kosiki*."¹²³

An increase of motivational commitment to the institutional pattern would strengthen the ability of the integrative or institutional system to control and channel social action. In other words, it would lead to an increase in social discipline. Bellah notes that this occurred in the case of Japan's social structure. "The institutional structure was held together largely through ties of loyalty between the superior and inferior."¹²⁴ Thus, strengthening the intensity of loyalty leads to the strong and close relationships between the political and social institutions.

Japan has tried, in its own way, to Japanize almost everything, including religion. Where Confucianism and Shinto had borrowed from Buddhist "metaphysics and psychology, Buddhism and Shinto had borrowed much of Confucian ethics; Confucianism and Buddhism had been rather thoroughly Japanized."¹²⁵

Saudi Arabian modernization, like that of Japan (except in regard to the Islamic religion where no change in any of its teaching or principles are allowed), is Saudianized. Dr. Al-Gosaibi comments:

Unlike most development efforts in the world, the Saudi experiment escapes the doctrinaire clutches of both capitalism and socialism. In common with capitalist systems, private enterprise is encouraged, and the market forces are the final determinants of economic policy. In common with socialist systems, the state assumes a very aggressive role in promoting welfare; there are loans, grants, and subsidies in Saudi Arabia which never crossed the imagination of the social democrat. . . . However, the Saudi economic system is not a theoretical hodgepodge of capitalism and socialism but the result of the evaluation and interplay of beliefs and forces peculiarly Saudi.¹²⁶

Comparing Saudi development with that of other societies, Dr. Al-Gosaibi notes that "in stark contrast" to these societies, "Saudi development is a child born in a cradle of Saudi mores, customs and traditions."¹²⁷

Police Development in Saudi Arabia

The impact of the preceding social factors and growth of traditional institutions on police development in Saudi Arabia cannot escape the mind or thoughts of a student of social change. The Saudi Arabian police force is growing steadily and at the same pace as other institutions in the society, particularly if we recognize the fact that before 1920 a regular police force was nonexistent (see Chapter I). When the Hejaz region was captured by King Abdul Aziz in January, 1926, there was some type of formal police presence in four cities: Taif, Mecca, Jeddah, and Medina. These cities inherited their system of policing from the Ottoman Empire that controlled the region for a long period of time and were represented by King Hussein. The police in the four cities continued to perform the same function and role until early 1930 when the King issued Royal Decree No. 233 which provided for the creation of a central police department to be located in Mecca. This decree gave the newly formed central police responsibility for the police precincts in the four cities.¹²⁸

From that time on, police departments were established in most of Saudi Arabia's cities and towns. According to Fouad Hamza, in 1932 there were only 14 police departments in the country, and the total police force in the entire kingdom had only 929 men. Of these, 33 were commissioned officers (from 2nd lieutenant and up); the remaining 896 were regular policemen. In 1980, there were over 86 police departments, stations, or precincts all over the country. The Ministry of Finance authorized a budget for the General Directorate of Public Security that allowed for a total police force of 73,121 men, not including civilian employees.

Of this total, 2,375 positions were authorized for commissioned police officers. These positions had to be filled by those who have graduated from the Police College in Riyadh or from other accredited colleges or universities inside or outside the country and who have entered their police careers as commissioned officers. The individual police officer's position is vacated for the following reasons:

1. Death
2. Resignation
3. Retirement
4. Forced retirement
5. Physical disability
6. Dismissal for committing an illegal act, whether criminal or ethical

7. Failing to pass the promotion exams for the ranks from 2nd lieutenant to major three times for one rank trial
8. Promotion to the next rank

These are the primary causes of vacancy of a police position. However, the creation of new positions allowed in each new budget is the most important factor in police officers' position openings.

The remaining 70,746 positions were authorized for regular policemen. These policemen had to have completed the fifth grade or higher, be 18 years of age or older (up to age 40), and have received clearance regarding their high personal integrity and emotional stability.

Because all of the jobs allocated for both ranks in 1980 will not have been completely filled, the writer has adjusted the figures, based on his own experience, to allow for some percentage decrease in the number of police officers and policemen. Therefore, if we allow that 15 percent of the officer's positions and 20 percent of the policemen's positions will have been vacant in 1980, the total police force for that budget year will have included slightly more than 2,000 commissioned officers and approximately 53,000 policemen. These figures are consistent with a pattern of previous increases in police personnel from 1959 to 1980.

To illustrate this point, in 1959 the total number of police officers was 421 and the total number of policemen


was 10,599.¹²⁹ In 1969, the figures were 888 and 21,057, respectively, reflecting an increase of over 100 percent. Therefore, in accordance with the previous percentage adjustment, the 1980 figures of 2,000 officers and 53,000 policemen are very close to reality. The number of police per capita in Saudi Arabia is a hard estimate to come by because first, the total population is not statistically well established (see page 5). Secondly, of all the various internal security forces, the General Directorate of the Coast Guard, the General Directorate of Investigation, the General Directorate of the Special Forces Unit, the Police College, Immigration and Naturalization, and the General Directorate of Public Security, only the last one performs real police functions. If we take the General Directorate of Public Security's total police force for 1980 to be 53,000 policemen and 2,000 police officers, totaling 55,000, and take the total population of Saudi Arabia as given by the U. S. Government in January, 1980, as 8,224,000, then the percentage of police per capita can be calculated at 0.0067 percent.

The budget for the General Directorate of Public Security for 1959 was 55,112,600 riyals; for 1969 it was 167,431,530 riyals; and for 1979/80 it was 3,771,881,428 riyals.*

*For the 1979/80 budget, U. S. \$1.00 = 3.334 riyals, although the exchange rate previously fluctuated between 3.5 and 4 riyals/dollar.

If we look at the Riyadh Police Department, which is the main focus of the study, we can see that this department is also growing rapidly. Figure 2.1 outlines the 1980 organizational structure for the Riyadh Police Department. In 1950, there were 1,255 policemen and 37 police officers, not including civilians; in 1960 there were 2,971 policemen and 47 officers; in 1970 there were 2,971 policemen and 123 officers; and in 1980 there were 6,419 policemen and 137 officers. The relatively stable number of officers in 1970 and 1980 is due primarily to the increased delegation of authority to sergeants, staff sergeants, and major sergeants, the majority of whom have been educated in the United States, Europe, and/or Asian countries. These sergeants have assumed authority in areas that used to be for officers only (e.g., training, patrol and supervision, and important administrative jobs). Therefore, there is less need for commissioned officers.

This change is reflected in the increased number of sergeants, staff sergeants, and major sergeants in the Riyadh police force. For example, in 1950 there were only seven sergeants and no major sergeants in the police force (the position of staff sergeant was not created until much later); in 1960 there were 18 sergeants and 18 major sergeants; in 1970 there were 50 sergeants and 27 major sergeants; and in 1980 there were 645 sergeants, 148 staff sergeants, and 54 major sergeants.



Constructed by the writer from job and rank descriptions of various departments and sections obtained from the Riyadh Police Department at personal request. The writer made many requests for descriptions of earlier organizational structures of the police department but no one was able to find any such descriptions.

Figure 2.1. Organizational Structure of the Riyadh Police Department in 1980

Figures for the Riyadh Police Department budget are only available for the period from 1975/76 to 1980. A recent source indicated to the writer that the budget was 113,872,841 riyals in 1975/76; 108,557,422 riyals in 1976/77; 211,623,141 riyals in 1977/78; 243,289,554 riyals in 1978/79; and 227,428,970 riyals in 1979/80. There are two main reasons for the decrease in the Riyadh Police Department budget from 1978/79 to 1979/80. The first is the transfer of the Riyadh Traffic Division's budget for personnel, equipment, and facilities to the Regional Traffic Department which was created as a separate budget division in 1976/77. Secondly, most of the needed projects and equipment for the Riyadh police were completed in the previous fiscal budget period (1978/79). The general pattern, these years aside, is an increase of over 100 percent from 1975/76 to 1979/80 (without taking into account inflation).

Summary

Today, developing countries have been engaged in massive development programs, each pursuing its own development according to its national goal. Without setting a goal, development can be of no value other than the paper it contains. Saudi Arabia as a developing nation has been striving in the right direction of developing in accordance with its basic values and national heritage. It has launched two

huge five-year plans--one for 1975-80 for a huge sum of \$142 billion. The second five-year plan for 1980-85 (already started in June 1980) had a more striking huge sum of over \$330 billion, which Ed Bradley of CBS claimed to be the highest figure ever put by mankind on earth for developmental projects. The aim of this plan is to readjust ways and means learned from the preceding one to accomplish the major national goals. Those goals are varied and numerous, most important among them are to diversify sources of national income by not relying heavily on oil revenues, and to create a more national skilled work force which is badly needed for carrying out the plan.

The diversification of national income sources will stem primarily from implementation of the already constructed petrochemical projects at the newly established two industrial cities of Jubail and Yenbu. In a country living with these huge, ambitious plans of development over a short period of time, one would wonder how its traditional social institutions could handle all these fast-growing developmental projects with the same rate of speed.

For a foreign observer it might seem impossible, but for those who live and witness the experience of developing it is no magic at all. Each institution has to share its duties and responsibilities with hope, patience, and good faith in what it is doing. Take, for example, the educational

institutions. In 1953 there were 506 elementary schools with 44,000 students. In 1978 there were 2,987 schools with 466,000 students. In 1953 there were 100 secondary schools enrolling 793 students, whereas in 1978 there were 600 secondary schools enrolling 123,548 students. At the high school level in 1953 there were only 50 high schools with 522 students, while in 1978 there were 200 high schools with more than 34,037 students. These figures belong to boys only; there were no formal schools for girls in the whole country until after 1960. Now there are more than 2,163 schools for girls with an overall enrollment of 390,838 girls, of whom 341,495 are Saudis. Before 1950 there was no single university in the country. Now there are six major universities, two junior colleges, one police college, one military college, one air force college, and three girls' colleges in three cities. Another example is the police force in Saudi Arabia. Before 1920, Saudi police were non-existent. Only in 1926, upon the capture of the Hejaz region (the eastern province in Saudi Arabia now), did that change, as that region had four police precincts in four cities. In 1932, the total uniformed police force in Saudi Arabia was 929 men of which 33 were commissioned police officers and the remaining 896 were regular men, with 15 police districts all over the country. Now, as of 1980, there are 4,000 police officers and over 80,000 regular policemen in the whole internal

security force with over 80 police departments, stations or precincts. The Public Security force alone has 2,000 police officers and over 50,000 policemen.

In the health realm, according to Fouad Hamza, in 1937 the total number of hospitals operating in Saudi Arabia was nine in all and three clinics with about 20 doctors.¹³⁰ In 1971, there were 1,138 physicians and 5,078 paramedical personnel providing health services for both public and private sectors.¹³¹

Medical care in Saudi Arabia, including hospitalization costs, is provided free for each citizen or foreigner. In addition, any citizen is eligible to receive free medical treatment abroad if a medical report indicates that his case requires this treatment. Treatment is available regardless of cost and place of treatment. Individuals also have the right to have a companion be with them during their treatment abroad. Companions are provided with free tickets, expense money for living abroad, and free transportation.

In the realm of social work, the Ministry of Work and Social Welfare, through its respective branches located in each city, town, and village, is the responsible social agent for providing a basic monthly salary for each poor family with no bread provider, each widow, each social worker who works in the field, and each orphaned school student (or reform school, as it is called now). In 1975, 110,000 people

received a social welfare salary each month. In that year, the total number of citizens who received social welfare salary assistance or urgent relief was 199,400.

In the industrial realm, it should be noted that Saudi Arabia has a long way to go to be, definitionally, called an industrial nation by western criteria. But, looking at the rate of growth in light industrial development, one can, with full confidence, say that Saudi Arabia has both the potential means and will and is moving in the right direction. For example, 20 years ago one would not have been able to find a private factory operating with Saudi capital or run by Saudi hands. In 1975, the Ministry of Industry had issued, after recognizing each request's economic utility, 509 permits for private sector light financing. In 1977, this figure was almost doubled--800 permits were issued, capitalized at \$2 billion. The government itself, last year, opened two industrial cities for petro-chemical industries. To encourage the expansion of industrial development, the government provides the private sector with free land on which to install the desired project and free studies and consultations about the economic utility of the project. Besides this, the government provides 50 percent of the costs of the project on a long-term loan without any interest. This assistance is also applied to each citizen who desires to build his private home, but with a longer period for paybacks.

These brief examples provide an illustration of how Saudi Arabian institutions are growing very fast with a steady and rapid rate. If, as Horowitz said, "the methodological orientation was the bridge which enabled the Americans to cross over from an agricultural to an industrial base,"¹³² then Islamic tradition as a Saudi value is the bridge Saudi Arabia is taking to cross to development. As Bendix nicely puts it, "a fully modern society lacking tradition is an abstraction without any meaning."¹³³

Footnotes--Chapter II

¹Guy E. Swanson, Social Change (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman, and Co., 1971), p. 2.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Peter K. Manning, "Social Groups and Social Functions," in Sociology: A Basic Concept, ed. Edward Sagarin (New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Co., Winter 1978), pp. 190-191.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 191.

¹¹Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structures (New York: Free Press, 1957), pp. 125-132.

¹²Ibid.

¹³W. A. Lewis, quoted in Neil Smelser, Essays in Sociological Explanation (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 126.

¹⁴Neil Smelser, Essays in Sociological Explanation (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 126.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶M. Nash, quoted in Neil Smelser, Essays in Sociological Explanation, p. 126.

¹⁷Smelser, Essays in Sociological Explanation, p. 126.

¹⁸R. Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 12.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 11.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Alexander Gerschenkron, quoted in R. Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, pp. 393-394.

²²Smelser, Essays in Sociological Explanation, p. 68.

²³Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, p. 12.

²⁴American Justice Institute/Project Star, The Impact of Social Trends on Crime and Criminal Justice (Sacramento, California: Anderson Davis Publishers, 1976), p. 193.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Charles Tilly et al., "How Policing Affected the Visibility of Crime in Nineteenth-Century Europe and America," to be published in The Criminal Justice System, ed. Theodore Ferdinand, p. 33.

²⁸Ibid., p. 74.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Raymond Fosdick, quoted in David Bayley, "Police Function, Structure, and Control in Western Europe and North America: Comparative and Historical Studies," in Crime and Practice: An Annual Review of Records, eds. Morris Norval and Michael Torry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 115-116.

³¹Bruce Smith, quoted in David Bayley, "Police Function, Structure, and Control in Western Europe and North America: Comparative and Historical Studies," p. 116.

³²David Bayley, "Police Function, Structure, and Control in Western Europe and North America: Comparative and Historical Studies," p. 116.

³³Tilly, "How Policing Affected the Visibility of Crime in Nineteenth-Century Europe and America," p. 23.

³⁴Ibid., p. 7.

³⁵Ibid., p. 177.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 18.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 29.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 54.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., p. 64.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 79.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 95.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 98.

⁴⁷ James Cramer, The World Police (London: Cassell, 1964).

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 132.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 137.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 154.

⁵² Ibid., p. 157.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 284.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 285.

⁵⁶ T. A. Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales, 2nd ed. (Montclair, New Jersey: Patterson Smith, 1971), p. 36.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ David Bordua, "The Police," in International Encyclopedia of Social Science, ed. D. Sills (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 174.

⁶⁰Clark Kerr, quoted in Neil Smelser, Essays in Sociological Explanation, p. 172.

⁶¹T. Fox and M. Miller, quoted in Neil Smelser, Essays in Sociological Explanation, p. 176.

⁶²Smelser, Essays in Sociological Explanation, p. 175.

⁶³K. A. Busia, mentioned in Neil Smelser, Essays in Sociological Explanation, p. 175.

⁶⁴Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales, p. 2.

⁶⁵Sayles, quoted in T. A. Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales, p. 2.

⁶⁶Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales.

⁶⁷Walpole, quoted in T. A. Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales, p. 21.

⁶⁸For further information, see T. A. Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales.

⁶⁹Peel, quoted in T. A. Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales, p. 48.

⁷⁰See Donald Black and Albert Reiss, "Career Orientations, Job Satisfaction, and the Assessment of Law Enforcement Problems by Police Officers," in Studies of Crime and Law Enforcement in Major Metropolitan Areas, vol. 75 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1966); Elaine Cumming, Ian Cumming, and Laura Edell, "Policeman as Philosopher, Guide, and Friend," Social Problems 12:3 (Winter 1965):276-286.

⁷¹Thomas Bercal, "Calls for Police Assistance: Consumer Demands for Governmental Service," in Police in Urban Society, ed. Harlan Han (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1970).

⁷²Elmer Johnson, "Police: An Analysis of Role Conflict," Police 14:3 (January-February 1970):47-52.

⁷³J. Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).

⁷⁴Michael Banton, The Policeman in the Community (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 43.

⁷⁵Stanley Kadish, quoted in American Justice Institute/Project Star, The Impact of Social Trends on Crime and Criminal Justice, p. 87.

⁷⁶American Justice Institute/Project Star, The Impact of Social Trends on Crime and Criminal Justice, p. 90.

⁷⁷Max Weber, quoted in H. Gerth and W. Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976; originally published in 1946), pp. 204-208.

⁷⁸Bayley, "Police Function, Structure, and Control in Western Europe and North America: Comparative and Historical Studies," p. 124.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Egon Bittner, The Function of the Police in Modern Society (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 72-73.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Ibid., p. 54.

⁸⁴United States, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 273.

⁸⁵Bordua, "The Police," p. 177.

⁸⁶Peter K. Manning, Memo No. 2 to the Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, January 30, 1980.

⁸⁷David Bayley, "The Police and Political Development in Europe," in Formation of National States in Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979A), p. 328.

⁸⁸See Peter K. Manning, Police Work (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977); Richard Quinney, The Social Reality of Crime (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1970); Jerome Skolnick, Justice Without Trial (New York: Wiley, 1966); B. Chapman, Police State (London: Macmillan, 1970).

⁸⁹Kamal Siraj-Addin, Al-Wajibat Alamah Le Gwat Al Amn Al Dahkili Fi Al'Mamlakah Al Arabia Al Saudiah (General Duties of the Internal Security Forces in Saudi Arabia) (Riyadh, 1969).

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Peter Hobday, Saudi Arabia Today (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 28.

⁹³Bayley, "The Police and Political Development in Europe," p. 328.

⁹⁴John Philby, "Riyadh: Ancient and Modern," Middle-East Journal 13:3 (Spring 1959):131.

⁹⁵Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Annual Report: 1977 (Riyadh: 1977), pp. i-ii; Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Annual Report: 1978 (Riyadh: 1978), p. 171.

⁹⁶"Saudi Arabia: Huge Developments Based on Islamic Traditions," cover story, Mideast Business Exchange IV:48 (June 1980).

⁹⁷Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of the Interior, Statistical Book: 1966-75; Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of the Interior, Statistical Book: 1977-78 (Riyadh).

⁹⁸John Philby, "Riyadh: Ancient and Modern," p. 131.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Doxiadis, "Riyadh Existing Conditions," Doxiadis official report submitted to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, July 1968 (DOZ-SA-A2), p. 86--Table 13.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³SCET-International/SEDES, Technical Report #2 (Riyadh: February 1977), p. 13.

¹⁰⁴Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Education, Educational Statistics, 11th issue, 1977-78, pp. 43 and 46.

¹⁰⁵See D. Bordua and A. J. Reiss, "Sociology in Law Enforcement," in The Uses of Sociology, ed. Paul Lazarsfeld et al. (New York: Basic Books, 1967); Albert Reiss, Crime in Urban Society (New York: Dunnellan Publishers, 1970); D. J. Black, "The Production of Crime Rates," American Sociological Review 35 (August 1970):733-748; Peter K. Manning, Police Work; Richard Quinney, The Social Reality of Crime.

¹⁰⁶Ronald Akers and Richard Hawkins, eds., "A Disposition of Cases," in Law and Control in Society (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975), p. 186.

¹⁰⁷This figure was given in the Ministry of the Interior's Statistical Yearbook: 1977-78.

¹⁰⁸Figures for 1966-75 were obtained from publications by the Central Statistics Department of the Ministry of the Interior and the Public Security Crime Statistics Division of the Ministry of the Interior. Figures for the 1977-78 period were obtained from the Ministry of the Interior's Statistical Book: 1977-78, pp. 260-266.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰Robert Sinai, The Challenge of Modernization: The West's Impact on the Non-Western World (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1964), p. 80.

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 92.

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³Ralph Braibanti, "Saudi Arabia in the Context of Political Development Theory," in King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia, ed. Willard Beling (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 40.

¹¹⁴Fouad Al-Farsy, "King Faisal and the First Five-Year Development Plan," in King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia, ed. Willard Beling, p. 60.

¹¹⁵Helen Lackner, A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (London: Ithaca Press, 1978), p. 124.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 216.

¹¹⁷Smelser, Essays in Sociological Explanation, p. 136.

¹¹⁸Max Weber, quoted in Guy E. Swanson, Social Change, p. 179.

¹¹⁹Sinai, The Challenge of Modernization: The West's Impact on the Non-Western World, pp. 42-43.

¹²⁰Gandhi, quoted in Robert Sinai, The Challenge of Modernization: The West's Impact on the Non-Western World, p. 61.

¹²¹Sinai, The Challenge of Modernization: The West's Impact on the Non-Western World, p. 68.

¹²²Ibid., p. 77.

¹²³Robert Bellah, Tokugawa Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 101.

¹²⁴Ibid., p. 55.

¹²⁵Ibid., p. 59.

¹²⁶Ghazi A. Al-Gosaibi, "Saudi Development--A Unique Experiment," Mideast Business Exchange IV:48 (June 1980):37.

¹²⁷Ibid.

¹²⁸Siraj-Addin, Al-Wajibat Alamah Le Gwat Al Amn Al Dahkili Fi Al'Mamlakah Al Arabia Al Saudiah (General Duties of the Internal Security Forces in Saudi Arabia), p. 46.

¹²⁹These figures were obtained in June 1980 when the writer contacted the Director of Central Planning and Budgeting at the national police headquarters in Riyadh.

¹³⁰Fouad Hamza, Al Bilad Al Arabia Al Saudiah (Saudi Arabia), 2nd ed. (Riyadh: Al-Naser Modern Publishers, 1968; originally published in 1937), pp. 208-211.

¹³¹Fouad Al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia: A Case Study of Development, 2nd ed. (London: Stacey International, 1980), pp. 208-211.

¹³²Irvin Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 90.

¹³³Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, p. 11.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY, PROCEDURE, AND OPERATIONALIZATION

In this chapter, the methodology and procedures used in the study will be approached with the original scope of the study in mind--i.e., the impact of social and economic factors on police development in Saudi Arabia. The case study of the Riyadh Police Department provides an illustration of both the impact of these factors and the qualitative and quantitative sources of growth of the police. As Bayley notes,

. . . to determine meaningful data for the emergence of modern police systems, in regard to the growth of capacity of a police force, one needs to look at (1) the number of police personnel in the force, qualitatively and quantitatively, which is an indicator of (2) the amount of resources the government is willing to expend on policing.¹

In order to determine the impact of social and economic factors on police development in Saudi Arabia, the study as a whole was exploratory, analytical, explanatory, and documentary in nature. The research was built upon the writer's own experience of 13 years as a police officer (lieutenant colonel) and 7 years as a government employee--a total of 20

¹David Bayley, "The Police and Political Development in Europe," in Formation of National States in Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 350.

years of government service. The study relied on three types of data: published and unpublished government documents, statistical yearbooks, and other literature on police development in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular; personal interviews with high police officials in the Saudi Arabian police force; and a questionnaire that was administered to police officers in the capital city of Riyadh's police department and to high-ranking officers in the General Directorate of Public Security.

Sample

At the beginning of 1980 there were about 3,800 police officers working in the various internal security forces in Saudi Arabia. Of this total, 3,000 held the rank of 2nd lieutenant, 1st lieutenant, or captain;* 723 officers held the rank of major, lieutenant colonel, or colonel; and 77 officers held the rank of brigadier general, major general, or general, with one officer as a full general. (In this study, it should be understood that the term "police officers" refers to commissioned, uniformed officers with the rank of 2nd lieutenant to full general. The term "policemen" refers to those whose rank is major sergeant or lower, down to private.)

*The questionnaire was not administered to 2nd or 1st lieutenants or to captains, except in 10 cases where captains were either temporarily assigned to a post because the director was absent or were permanently assigned supervisory duties, as in the case of police precincts.

Of the 800 officers who held the rank of major or higher, about 40 to 50 percent worked in the public security force alone. The remaining 50 to 60 percent worked with the other security forces and did not perform police duties in a real sense. This means that police officers who worked in the General Directorate of the Coast Guard, the Internal Security Forces College, the General Directorate of Investigation, the Special Forces Unit, and the Naturalization and Immigration offices were not included in the questionnaire distribution. These officers were omitted because their work is of a different nature from that performed by those who work in the General Directorate of Public Security and particularly differs from that performed by those who work in police departments all over the country. Therefore, the Riyadh Police Department was chosen to represent the other departments, and the questionnaire was distributed only to those who worked in it or in the General Directorate of Public Security (both in Riyadh).

In 1980, there were a total of 137 police officers in the Riyadh Police Department. Of this total, there were 17 majors, 6 lieutenant colonels, 6 colonels, 1 brigadier general, and 1 lieutenant general (the director)--a total of 31 high-ranking officers. When the research was conducted, 3 majors, 2 lieutenant colonels, and 2 colonels were not available to receive the questionnaire. In order to increase the

size of the sample and to assure good representation within the sample, 10 captains were also given the questionnaire. These captains were selected because they had 10 or more years of police service, daily work assignments that involved them in crime-related investigative activities at the central or precinct level, and authority to act in the place of higher-ranking officers who were away or on leave during the distribution of the questionnaire. Thus, a total of 34 officers in the Riyadh Police Department were given the questionnaire.

Because the questionnaire was administered by the researcher at each officer's place of work, the responses were encouraging and good controls were provided. To avoid any misunderstanding, the researcher explained each question thoroughly to each of the officers. As a control measure, the officers were not allowed to communicate with one another while answering the questionnaire. Prior to actually administering the questionnaire, the researcher conducted a pilot study using 5 officers (majors) who worked in the offices of the Ministry of the Interior. This pilot study gave the writer an opportunity to test the validity of the questionnaire, identify questions that needed further explanation or clarification, and determine the amount of time needed to complete the questionnaire. This pilot study gave the writer a good indication of what to anticipate during the actual administration of the questionnaire.

However, even though the researcher personally explained each questionnaire, 2 respondents were disqualified at the completion of the study: one respondent had marked more than one answer, and the other had forgotten to mention his rank. As a result, the total number of respondents from the Riyadh Police Department was 32. Although this number was highly representative of the Riyadh Police Department, it only represented about 7.7 percent of the total number of high-ranking officers who worked either at the General Directorate headquarters in Riyadh or in other police departments all over the country. Because of the validity questions raised by this small percentage, it was decided to increase the sample size by including officers from the headquarters of the General Directorate of Public Security, from the regional traffic department, and from the Riyadh traffic division--all of which are located in Riyadh.

Sixteen high-ranking officers from the General Directorate headquarters were selected based on the following characteristics: (1) they all (except for 3) held the rank of major or higher; (2) they all served as directors or assistant directors of important regional (central) departments; (3) they all (except for 3) had worked at one time or another in various police precincts around the country; and (4) all of their jobs involved planning, supervision, training, and reviews of criminal investigation efforts.

The 16 officers from the General Directorate headquarters included 1 lieutenant colonel (the director of the Central Planning, Organizing, and Budget Department); 1 colonel (the director of the General Training Department) and 1 major (his assistant); 3 major generals (one was the director of the Criminal Investigation Division) and 2 majors in Central Investigation; 2 lieutenant generals (one was the director of the Central Control Board) and 1 major in the Central Control Board; 1 captain (the assistant chief of the Criminal Statistics Division); 1 major and 2 captains who worked in the technical department of the Criminal Evidence Department); and 1 major who was the chief officer in the regional division of the Criminal Control Department.

Eight high-ranking officers from the Regional Traffic Department and the Riyadh Traffic Division were also included in the sample. Officers at the regional level included 1 colonel (the director of the Regional Traffic Department); 1 lieutenant colonel (the director's assistant); and 1 major (the director of the Traffic Statistics Section). All of the remaining five officers from the Riyadh Traffic Division were majors.

The same control and explanation procedures were followed in administering the 24 questionnaires to these officers. Of these questionnaires, 23 were used in the study;

1 questionnaire was not included because one of the captains in the technical department did not indicate his length of service.

In summary, a total of 55 questionnaires were analyzed for the study. These represented a significant portion of high-ranking officers in the Riyadh Police Department, the headquarters of the General Directorate of Public Security, the Regional Traffic Department, and the Riyadh Traffic Division.

The researcher also conducted personal interviews with Prince Naif Ibn Abdullaziz (the Minister of the Interior); the Director General of Public Security Forces (a full general); the Director General of the Coast Guard (who was the director of the Riyadh Police Department for more than 15 years before leaving that position in 1978 to direct the Special Forces Unit and then in 1980 the Coast Guard); the Deputy Assistant General Director of Public Security for Operations; and the present director of the Riyadh Police Department. These interviews yielded valuable information and added a large measure of reliability, validity, and comprehensiveness to this research.

Justification for the Selection and Location of the Sample

The Riyadh Police Department was selected because Riyadh is the capital city of Saudi Arabia and is located in

the heart and center of the nation. All ministries and most large business firms are located in Riyadh. More than one-half of the government work force is assigned to Riyadh. The central decision-making processes for the whole nation for major issues and matters of importance to all citizens are originated and declared from Riyadh. His Majesty, King Khalid, and His Royal Highness, Crown Prince Fahed, both reside in Riyadh, as do other ministers and most high-ranking officials. The foreign embassies have been informed that the government would like them to move from Jeddah to Riyadh. Most government employees must work in Riyadh for at least some time because of the job opportunities and because the civil service headquarters are located there.

The General Directorate of Public Security is headquartered in Riyadh. The Riyadh Police Department is one of the largest, if not the largest, of 3 major police departments in the country. As of 1980, there were 7,064 policemen in the Riyadh Police Department: 3,883 were regular patrolmen and 3,181 were noncommissioned officers (corporal to major sergeant). There were 137 commissioned police officers, 125 civilian employees, and 75 persons who were employed on a contract basis.*

Due to its location in the capital and its closeness to high officials in the country, Riyadh has had to set a

*These statistics were obtained from a personal letter to the researcher.

high standard of efficiency and professionalism. Therefore, it has maintained reliable and accurate records since 1950. (Records from the national police headquarters date only to 1959.)

With regard to the sample, the risk of biased selection was lessened, if not eliminated, by using the major departments which deal directly with police-related activities (e.g., the budget and planning, training, investigation, and crime statistics departments) and interviewing the directors of each department rather than selecting the names of individual officers. The advantage to focusing on positions rather than individuals was that someone with departmental authority was always available, whereas the random selection of individuals would have required that the researcher deal only with possibilities--were the officers still in the police force and were they available? The sample was also kept relatively small because of difficulties encountered in administering the questionnaire and conducting the interviews. Police officials in Saudi Arabia are extremely accessible to the general public (in the case of Riyadh police officers) and to the general public and other administrators (in the case of officers at the national police headquarters).^{*} Because anyone can drop in at any time without prior appointment,

^{*}It is a common practice for government officials to leave their doors open so that people may come in at any time.

obtaining a response from even one police officer sometimes took several hours.

This same time-consuming process occurred in the case of interviews with the five top police officers in the country. Only Prince Naif, the Minister of the Interior, instructed his office not to allow anyone to come in until the interview was completed, which took one hour. In the case of one general, so many people came into his office during the day that it was necessary to interview him at his home in the evening.

Design of the Instrument

The questionnaire consisted of 13 multiple-choice questions and 2 questions about the respondent's rank and number of years of service. The multiple-choice questions were designed to yield information about the five independent variables in the study. The interviews were open-ended and "conversations with a purpose." They discussed the primary topics of interest and allowed respondents to recall events, examples, and past developments in their own experience relevant to the research hypotheses.

Other Sources of Data

Since the purpose of the study was to determine the impact of certain social and economic growth factors on police development in Saudi Arabia, the writer sought to gather as much information as possible in order to properly address

this important problem. In addition to the questionnaire and the interviews, the researcher analyzed published and unpublished materials on Saudi Arabia in general and on police development in particular.

However, the writer faced many problems in gathering these materials. With the exception of a few unpublished student papers, there are no materials written in English on the development of the police in Saudi Arabia and only a few materials are available in Arabic.

Working with government documentation also presented certain problems. Complete records did not exist in many cases. Statistics were only available for certain areas and did not cover all historical periods with respect to manpower, budgets, or organizational structures. Even when such records had been compiled, they were often misplaced or lost during a move from one office to another. Finally, the accuracy of some of the statistics is questionable. As is the case with data from other governments, the information cited in government records may not be completely reliable.

Operationalization

The five independent variables (economic growth, population growth, crime rate, foreigners living in Saudi Arabia, and widespread education) were tested empirically by analyzing statistics found in government documents and the results of the questionnaires and interviews. Other important

factors such as religious and political commitment and modern communication were touched upon and briefly described rather than analyzed.

Economic Growth

This variable was measured using budget and manpower estimates for the General Directorate of Public Security (national police headquarters) for the period from 1959 to 1980 and budget and manpower estimates for the Riyadh Police Department for 1950 to 1980. Background information about Saudi Arabia's gross domestic product (GDP) and per capita income in the early 1920s, after 1938 when oil was discovered, and during the present time were also studied.

These figures were then analyzed in regard to general information gathered from the literature, personal interviews, and the questionnaires. Question 4 of the questionnaire was designed to yield the respondents' beliefs about economic growth and its effects on police development. It asked whether or not respondents agreed that an increase in a country's national income and budget requires an increase in the number of policemen and the quality of training facilities and materials.

Population Growth

The earliest available data about the population of Saudi Arabia are those published in a Ministry of the Interior

statistical publication for the period 1966 to 1975. These figures were used as the basis for the study. Statistics for the population of Riyadh during the early 1920s were taken from figures cited by St. John Philby. Estimates for later periods were taken from materials published by the government, consultants to the government, and various western writers. It should be remembered, however, that there is no accurate figure concerning the population of Riyadh.

These figures were then analyzed in regard to general information gathered from the literature, personal interviews, and the questionnaires. Question 3 of the questionnaire was designed to yield the respondents' beliefs about the effect of population growth on police development. It asked whether or not respondents agreed that population growth requires an increased number of policemen.

Crime Rate

The measurements for the crime rate were based on the Government of Saudi Arabia crime index yearbook. These figures are based on "crime" as defined and specified by the Holy Koran. (See Chapter I for a discussion of crime and punishment in Islam.) Because the index only covers the period from 1968-1978, only figures for this time period were used. These figures were then analyzed in regard to general information gathered from the literature, personal interviews,

and the questionnaires. Questions 5, 6, and 8 of the questionnaire were designed to yield the respondents' beliefs about the crime rate and its effect on police development. Question 5 asked respondents whether or not they agreed that an increasing crime rate (e.g., homicide, burglary, theft, rape, and traffic accidents) required an increased number of policemen; Question 6 asked which periods (1939-1949, 1949-1959, or both periods) gave the best indication of the social problems mentioned in Question 5 or whether there were no serious social problems during these periods; and Question 8 asked for similar information concerning the periods 1959-1969 and 1969-1979.

Foreigners Living in Saudi Arabia

Figures concerning the total number of foreigners living in the country and the number of crimes or incidents committed by foreigners during the period 1966-1978 were taken from the Government of Saudi Arabia crime index, the same source used for the crime rate.

These figures were then analyzed in regard to general information gathered from the literature, personal interviews, and the questionnaires. Questions 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 of the questionnaire were designed to yield the respondents' beliefs concerning foreigners and their effect on police development. Questions 7 and 9 asked respondents to indicate

whether natives, foreigners, or both groups were the source of the social problems mentioned in Questions 5, 6, and 8; Question 10 asked respondents whether or not the increased number of foreigners coming into Saudi Arabia has a direct effect on the increase of crimes in general; Question 11 asked which crimes (burglary, homicide, arson, picking pockets and snatching purses, rape and drugs) increased most frequently because of foreigners; Question 12 asked which non-criminally-related problems (traffic accidents, laborers who have escaped from their employers, laborers' disputes) were caused by foreigners and preoccupied the police during the period 1969-1979; Question 13 asked whether or not it is a good idea for Saudi Arabia to stop importing foreign laborers; and Question 14 asked whether stopping the importation of foreign laborers would affect the crime rate.

Education

The number of schools (elementary, secondary, and high schools) and the number of students and teachers for the male population in each school level were used as the basis for studying educational expansion from 1953 to 1980. Statistics for other educational organizations such as the General Presidency for Girls' Schools, which supervises all female education, the Ministry of Higher Education which supervises all colleges and universities and scholarships for abroad,

and technical, vocational, special, and adult education organizations were analyzed when this information was available.

These figures were then analyzed in regard to general information gathered from the literature, personal interviews, and the questionnaires. Question 15 of the questionnaire was designed to yield the respondents' beliefs concerning education and its effects on police development. It asked respondents whether or not widespread education can have a direct effect on police performance (administratively, technically, and quantitatively--i.e., by increasing the number of policemen).

CHAPTER IV

DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Sections in this chapter discuss the statistical techniques used to analyze the results of the questionnaire, the characteristics of the respondents, and the findings from the questionnaire with respect to each of the five research hypotheses concerning officers' perceptions of the impact of economic growth, population growth, growth in the crime rate, educational growth, and foreigners living in Saudi Arabia on police development in Saudi Arabia.

Statistical Techniques

In this study, the writer used both descriptive and inferential statistics to report the findings of the study.

Descriptive Statistics

The following descriptive statistics were used:

1. Absolute and relative frequencies of responses to survey questions.
2. Mean, mode, median, range, variance, and standard error for variables related to increasing the number of police in Saudi Arabia.

3. Contingency tables displaying the observed frequencies within each cell for rank and years of service in relationship to economic growth, population growth, crime rate, foreigners living in Saudi Arabia, and educational growth.

Inferential Statistics

The following inferential statistic was used in the study:

The chi-square test of independence was used to test for significant deviation from independence in contingency tables where no directional alternative hypothesis seemed appropriate. The null hypothesis for such a test is that of independence of the two variables and/or classification considered. This hypothesis is rejected for $p \leq .05$ and otherwise accepted. The test for an $r \times c$ table involves calculation of a normalized sum of squared deviations of observed from expected frequencies and comparison of the resulting statistic to the chi-square distribution with $(r-1) \times (c-1)$ degrees of freedom.

Characteristics of Respondents

Respondents to the questionnaire were asked to indicate their rank and number of years of service in police work. As is indicated in Table 4.1, 47.2 percent of the subjects who responded to the questionnaire were majors, 21.8 percent were colonels and lieutenant colonels, 18.2 were captains,

TABLE 4.1

RANK AND YEARS OF POLICE SERVICE OF RESPONDENTS

Rank	Number of Years of Service	Number of Officers	Relative Frequency
Captain	10	2	3.6
	11	4	7.3
	12	3	5.5
	13	1	1.8
Total		10	18.2
Major	10	2	3.6
	11	2	3.6
	12	3	5.5
	13	7	12.7
	14	9	16.4
	15	2	3.6
	22	1	1.8
Total		26	47.2
Lieutenant Colonel	18	2	3.6
	20	4	7.3
Total		6	10.9
Colonel	22	3	5.5
	23	2	3.6
	24	1	1.8
Total		6	10.9
Major General	23	1	1.8
	26	1	1.8
	28	1	1.8
Total		3	5.4
Lieutenant General	28	1	1.8
	31	2	3.6
	32	1	1.8
Total		4	7.2

and 12.6 percent were either major generals or lieutenant generals.

Regarding years of police service, none of the 55 respondents had less than 10 years of police service, and only 7.3 percent had only 10 years of service. The vast majority of respondents (30 officers or 54.5 percent) had 11 to 15 years of police service. The mean for years of service is 16.873 and the range is 22 (from 10 to 32 years of service).

Analysis of the Data

In Chapter II, the writer has shown, using existing literature, the impact of selected economic and social factors on the growth of police forces in many western, European, and Third World societies. These factors included economic growth, population growth, growth in the crime rate, and widespread education. The second section of Chapter II examined these variables plus a fifth variable, foreigners living in Saudi Arabia, in the context of Saudi Arabian society. In this section, the writer will take each independent variable (corresponding to each initial hypothesis) and analyze it in regard to the findings from the literature review, the responses to the questionnaire, and information gained from the personal interviews conducted by the writer.

Hypothesis I: Economic Growth Has a
Direct Effect on Police Development

Generally, when communities are poor and desperate, thieves and burglars have no change of operating because nothing of value can be found. But, with the availability of wealth and property, crime waves tend to take place in a society. Therefore, the police are mostly needed. In the 1790s, Patrick Colquhoun wrote:

The enlarged state and society, the vast extent of moving property and unexplained wealth of the metropolis, joined to the depraved habits and loose conduct of a great proportion of the lower classes of the people, and above all, the want of an appropriate police applicable to the object of prevention will, after a careful perusal of this work, reconcile the attentive mind to a belief in the actual existence of evils which could not otherwise have been credited.¹

According to a publication of Project Star in 1976, "opportunities for crime directed against property increase as countries become more wealthy."² The same source maintains that between 1826 and 1978 in France, where industrial and commercial activities more than doubled, crime increased two and one-half times. Similarly, "in England and Wales crime has more than tripled over the past 25 years while the standard of living of all classes has been rising."³ In the United States, the early state police emerged as a response to the "heavily industrialized areas of the Northeast."⁴ recent article in U. S. News and World Report maintains that "budget problems are forcing sharp cutbacks in law enforcement manpower in some of the nation's largest cities."⁵

The findings of the present research, obtained from the responses of 55 top, high-ranking Saudi officers (whose rank ranged from captain to lieutenant general), tend to strongly support the contention that there is a relationship between economic growth and increased police manpower. As is shown in Table 4.2, 83.6 percent of the respondents marked "yes, definitely" and 16.4 percent marked "yes" when asked whether "increasing national income and budget requires increasing the number of policemen."

It is interesting to note that all of the 55 respondents agreed with the statement regardless of rank.* Similar results were obtained when the respondents were analyzed with respect to number of years of service.** It was found that all of the respondents supported the writer's first hypothesis regardless of their number of years of service.

*For the sake of analysis, respondents were divided into two groups according to whether their rank was "high" or "low." Colonels, lieutenant generals, and major generals were included in the group whose rank was "high," while captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels were included in the group whose rank was "low." These categories were used in analyzing all hypotheses.

**Respondents were also divided into groups according to their number of years of service. Two major groups were analyzed: those who had 10 to 17 years of service and those who had 18 to 32 years of service. These categories were used in analyzing all hypotheses.

TABLE 4.2

DATA FOR HYPOTHESIS I: ECONOMIC GROWTH HAS A DIRECT
EFFECT ON POLICE DEVELOPMENT

TABLE 4.2.1.--Responses to Economic Growth Question

Question 4: Increasing national income and budget requires increasing the number of policemen.		Relative Frequency	Number of Subjects
1.	Yes, definitely	83.6	46
2.	Yes	16.4	9
3.	No	0.0	0
4.	No, definitely not	0.0	0
5.	Do not know	0.0	0

TABLE 4.2.2.--Responses to Economic Growth Question by Rank

Rank	Agreed	Disagreed	Total
Low (captains, majors, lt. colonels)	42	0	42
High (colonels, lt. generals, maj. generals)	13	0	13
Total	55	0	55

Statistics: Calculation of statistics is impossible.

CONCLUSION: There was complete agreement, regardless of rank, that increasing national income and budget requires increasing the number of policemen.

TABLE 4.2.3.--Responses to Economic Growth Question by Years of Service

Years of Service	Agreed	Disagreed	Total
10 through 17 years	35	0	35
18 through 32 years	20	0	20
Total	55	0	55

Statistics: Calculation of statistics is impossible.

CONCLUSION: There was complete agreement, regardless of years of service, that increasing national income and budget requires increasing the number of policemen.

Hypothesis II: Population Growth Has a
Direct Effect on Police Development*

In any society, as the population of a country grows, the demand for more services increases. At the top of the list of demands is the demand for police protection of persons and property. In such situations, police may meet these demands with one of two options: they may accommodate the demands with their existing force or they may increase the size of the force. Choosing the first option will, no doubt, result in placing a heavy strain on police function and personnel as well as anxiety and mistrust of the police by the general public, especially when the number of available police cannot meet the challenge of criminal activities in the country. In this situation people get annoyed, frustrated, and afraid. Virginia Davidson, president of a Detroit neighborhood citizens association, has said:

There is a growing feeling of apathy toward contacting the police. There have been more incidents of breaking and entering and more gang problems. The entire situation has become worse. Why should we report crimes when we know we aren't going to get any action?⁶

If they are to deal effectively with an increasing population rate, the police must resort to the second option-- i.e., increasing the size of the police force. Various studies have shown considerable support of this trend. Fosdick thought that the size of population, at least for city police, might affect the amount of auxiliary administration needed.⁷

*Urbanization is implicit in population growth.

Bruce Smith also maintained that in the United States auxiliary administrative functions in cities tended to increase with population.⁸ Bayley, on the other hand, thinks that police development cannot be accounted for by population growth. Tilly and others maintain, in studying Canada, that "the growing complexities of urban affairs and increasing demand for efficient city and town administration were among the factors which led to the creating of full-time urban police forces."⁹ They conclude that the "rise of professional policing occurred throughout the western world as industrialization, urbanization, and the concentration of power in the national states proceeded."¹⁰

Regarding England, Tilly writes, "the number of police increased most rapidly in areas of greatest population density."¹¹ David Bordua supports this notion. He notes that "increasing concentration of population in larger cities has allowed the development of larger departments . . ."¹² In Saudi Arabia, when the population was small and scattered in small cities, towns, and villages, the number of policemen was quite small. In 1937, as reported by Fouad Hamza, the total number of police officers (2nd lieutenant and higher) was 33.¹³ In 1980, there were 3,800 police officers in the same ranks. This total was expected to increase to 4,000 as new cadets graduated from the police college in Riyadh at the end of the year.

The responses to the questionnaire supported the writer's hypothesis concerning population growth and police development and the general trend in the literature discussed above. As is shown in Table 4.3, 78.2 percent of the respondents marked "yes, definitely" and 20 percent marked "yes" when asked if an increase in population growth requires an increased number of policemen.

To determine if rank or length of service affect respondents' views about population growth and police development, the writer applied the chi-square test of independence for low and high-ranking officers and for those with 10 to 17 and 18 to 32 years of service. The same results were obtained: 41 of 42 officers of low rank and 13 of 13 officers of high rank agreed with the statement with $\chi^2 = 0.315$ and $p = 0.574$ for both. Regarding length of service, 35 of 35 officers with 10 to 17 years of service and 19 of 20 officers with 18 to 32 years of service agreed with the statement with $\chi^2 = 1.78$ and $p = 0.182$ for both. The result shows full agreement with the second hypothesis, irrespective of rank or length of service.

Hypothesis III: Crime Rate Has a
Direct Effect on Police
Development

Historically documented research has shown that police development occurs as a response to prevailing social problems in general and to crime-related problems in particular.

TABLE 4.3

DATA FOR HYPOTHESIS II: POPULATION GROWTH
HAS A DIRECT EFFECT ON POLICE DEVELOPMENT

TABLE 4.3.1.--Responses to Population Growth Question

Question 3: Increases in population growth require an increased number of policemen.	Relative Frequency	Number of Subjects
1. Yes, definitely	78.2	43
2. Yes	20.0	11
3. No	1.8	1
4. No. definitely not	0.0	0
5. Do not know	0.0	0

TABLE 4.3.2.--Responses to Population Growth Question by Rank

Rank	Agreed	Disagreed	Total
Low (captains, majors, lt. colonels)	41	1	42
High (colonels, lt. generals, maj. generals)	13	0	13
Total	54	1	55
Statistics: $\chi^2 = 0.315$ $p = 0.574$ $df = 1$			

CONCLUSION: Agreement that increases in population growth require an increased number of policemen is independent of rank.

TABLE 4.3.3.--Responses to Population Growth Question by Years of Service

Years of Service	Agreed	Disagreed	Total
10 through 17 years	35	0	35
18 through 32 years	19	1	20
Total	54	1	55
Statistics: $\chi^2 = 1.78$ $p = 0.182$ $df = 1$			

CONCLUSION: Agreement that increases in population growth require an increased number of policemen is independent of years of service.

Reports on crime in western, European, and Third World countries support this contention. In the 19th century, special purpose police units were established by the federal government of the United States to enforce and protect congressional fiscal operations and the mail. "The modern role of protecting the president," according to Tilly and his associates, "was not established until 1902 as the result of the assassination of President McKinley."¹⁴ In Canada in the early 20th century, unpoliced areas in the Canadian frontiers were plagued by crime, while "with the inauguration of Federal policing in the northwest territories, by contrast, we hear about the remarkable absence of serious crime in the police districts."¹⁵ In France, according to Tilly and his associates, there is "a significant relationship between policing and property crime. . . . Major property crimes have a weak tendency to rise over the police expansion."¹⁶ In India, Jamaica, Ceylon, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Egypt, as crimes and social upheaval became major sources of problems, the size of the police force had to be expanded and enhanced.

In its issue for October 27, 1980, the U. S. News and World Reports noted that trimming the police force in Philadelphia resulted in a 6 percent increase in crime. Because of this, "residents are appealing to the mayor to avoid further cuts."¹⁷ According to the Figgie Report on the effect of crime on the American psyche, more than half of 1,047 persons

interviewed across the United States supported higher taxes if the money would go for wider police protection.¹⁸ On the other hand, a study conducted by Philadelphia's Citizen's Crime Commission showed that "having fewer police did not necessarily result in a jump in the crime rate."¹⁹ This view is also supported by the previous stand of Bayley. Yet both stands come into conflict with the reality of everyday life--that there is a demand for more police when the crime rate rises. The findings of the writer strongly support the findings of the other research reported above and reject both Bayley's stand and the Philadelphia commission's conclusion.

As is shown in Table 4.4, 58.2 percent of the respondents marked "yes, definitely" and 35.5 percent marked "yes" when asked whether increasing crime rates required an increased number of policemen. Of those who disagreed with the statement, 12.7 percent marked "no" and only 3.6 percent marked "no, definitely not."

An analysis of the respondents by rank indicated that 36 of the 42 persons in the low rank category agreed with the statement and 10 of 13 persons in the high rank category agreed, with $\chi^2 = 0.561$ and $p = 0.454$ for both ranks. When the respondents were analyzed according to their length of service, 31 of 35 officers with 10 to 17 years of service and 15 of 20 officers with 18 to 32 years of service agreed, with $\chi^2 = 1.713$ and $p = 0.191$ for both.

TABLE 4.4

DATA FOR HYPOTHESIS III: CRIME RATE HAS A DIRECT
EFFECT ON POLICE DEVELOPMENT

TABLE 4.4.1.--Responses to Increased Crime Rate Question

Question 5: Increasing crime rates (e.g., homicides, burglary, theft, rape, and traffic accidents) require increasing numbers of policemen.		
	Relative Frequency	Number of Subjects
1. Yes, definitely	58.2	32
2. Yes	35.5	14
3. No	12.7	7
4. No, definitely not	3.6	2
5. Do not know	0.0	0

TABLE 4.4.2.--Responses to Crime Rate Question by Rank

Rank	Agreed	Disagreed	Total
Low (captains, majors, lt. colonels)	36	6	42
High (colonels, lt. generals, maj. generals)	10	3	13
Total	46	9	55
Statistics: $\chi^2 = 0.561$ $p = 0.454$ $df = 1$			

CONCLUSION: Agreement that increasing crime rates require increasing numbers of policemen is independent of rank.

TABLE 4.4.3.--Responses to Crime Rate Question
by Years of Service

Years of Service	Agreed	Disagreed	Total
10 through 17 years	31	4	35
18 through 32 years	15	5	20
Total	46	9	55
Statistics: $\chi^2 = 1.713$ $p = 0.191$ $df = 1$			

CONCLUSION: Agreement that increasing crime rates require increasing numbers of policemen is independent of years of service.

TABLE 4.4.4.--Periods from 1939 to 1959 Giving Best Indication of Social Problems (Crime Rate) Such as Homocide, Burglary, Theft, Rape, and Traffic Accidents as Measured in Question 5

Period	Relative Frequency	Number of Subjects
1. 1939 to 1949	3.6	2
2. 1949 to 1959	5.5	3
3. Both periods	10.9	6
4. There were no serious problems	50.9	28
5. Do not know	29.1	16

TABLE 4.4.5.--Periods from 1959 to 1979 Giving Best Indication of Social Problems (Crime Rate) Such as Homocide, Burglary, Theft, Rape, and Traffic Accidents as Measured in Question 5

Period	Relative Frequency	Number of Subjects
1. 1959 to 1969	1.8	1
2. 1969 to 1979	61.8	34
3. Both periods	10.9	6
4. There were no serious problems	20.0	11
5. Do not know	5.5	3

It is interesting to note that the people who responded were high-ranking police officers who have spent a considerable amount of time in the police force working in crime-related activities. They know from practical, first-hand experience what is best needed to combat an increase in crime. Another interesting point arose during the personal interviews, namely, that good training and better police development where it is most needed can contribute to curbing the crime rate, a stand that is well taken.

Hypothesis IV: Education Has a Direct
Effect on Police Development, Both
Qualitatively and Quantitatively

As education expands in a given society, the chance for understanding the police role in providing services to the community becomes noticeable. Hence, more people enter the police force. Also, as the level of education increases, job qualifications and better standards for potential candidates for police work increase as well. Consequently, as levels of education and training of police rise, one would expect better job performance and efficiency. In general, as Smelser notes, "there is good reason to believe, however, that growth in the numbers who attain higher levels of education should result in an increase in the amount of high achievement orientation in population."²⁰

For analytical purposes, let us take the case of Saudi Arabia. When the School of Police (now the Police College) was established in 1936, the educational level required for admission was 4th, 5th, or 6th grade. Anyone meeting this requirement plus the medical, mental health, and age requirements could be admitted. Yet even with these minimal requirements, the enrollment was very low. Up to 1961, only 196 police officers graduated from the school. As the level of education for the population increased, the educational level required for admission was raised to the 6th grade. From approximately 1962 to 1967, anyone with a 6th-grade education or higher could be admitted. The length of time spent at the school before graduating during these periods varied from as low as 6 months to as high as 2 years. From 1968 until the present (1980), the educational level required for admission was raised to the 12th grade, and the time for graduation has been maintained at 2-1/2 years. At this time, the college receives more high school applicants than it needs, and the time for processing admission requests takes up to 2 months.

The Police College is not the only source of training for police in Saudi Arabia. After 1960, a number of institutes and training centers for police were established. For example, in Saudi Arabia there are now police officers' institutes, language training institutes, regular patrolmen's institutes

for promotion and skills training, traffic training centers, car and shop training institutes, and a physical training institute. All of these have been maintained as the result of widespread education in general in Saudi Arabia which has affected, no doubt, both the quality and quantity of the police.

As is shown in Table 4.5, the findings of the study tend to support the writer's initial hypothesis concerning the effect of widespread education on police development. When asked whether education has a direct effect on the quality and quantity of the police, 85.5 percent marked "yes, definitely" and 14.5 percent marked "yes." All of the 55 officers agreed with the above statement regardless of rank or number of years of service. Hence, the writer's fourth hypothesis is confirmed by a 100 percent positive response to the statement and by the personal interviews.

Hypothesis V: Foreigners Living in Saudi Arabia Have an Effect on Police Development

Foreigners living in Saudi Arabia is a unique case; therefore, it is analyzed only in the particular context of Saudi Arabia. As reported in Chapter II, the number of foreigners who commit crimes is higher than that of Saudis when measured against their total population. If we take the total number of prisoners in Saudi Arabian jails in 1978, we

TABLE 4.5

DATA FOR HYPOTHESIS IV: EDUCATION HAS A DIRECT
EFFECT ON POLICE DEVELOPMENT

TABLE 4.5.1.--Responses to Education Question

Question 15: Education has a direct effect on police development.	Relative Frequency	Number of Subjects
1. Yes, definitely	85.5	47
2. Yes	14.5	8
3. No	0.0	0
4. No, definitely not	0.0	0
5. Do not know	0.0	0

TABLE 4.5.2.--Responses to Education Question by Rank

Rank	Agreed	Disagreed	Total
Low (captains, majors, lt. colonels)	42	0	42
High (colonels, lt. generals, maj. generals)	13	0	13
Total	55	0	55

Statistics: Calculation of statistics is impossible.

CONCLUSION: There was complete agreement, regardless of rank, that education has a direct effect on police development.

TABLE 4.5.3.--Responses to Education Question by Years of Service

Years of Service	Agreed	Disagreed	Total
10 through 17 years	35	0	35
18 through 32 years	20	0	20
Total	55	0	55

Statistics: Calculation of statistics is impossible.

CONCLUSION: There was complete agreement, regardless of years of service, that education has a direct effect on police development.

find that of 9,244 prisoners, 4,117 (45 percent) were foreigners and 5,127 (55 percent) were Saudis. Measuring both numbers against the total general population (1,000,000 foreigners and 8,612,970 Saudis), we can see that a higher percentage of foreigners (0.41 percent) have been jailed than have Saudis (0.060 percent).

The foreign work force in Saudi Arabia has, no doubt, affected the increase of crime and social problems, especially since foreigners have come to Saudi Arabia in large numbers during the past 10 years. When police officers were asked which periods (1939-1949, 1949-1959 or both [p. 153]) give the best indication of crime waves or social problems, 50.9 percent of the respondents indicated that there was no "serious problem" during these periods, 29.1 percent indicated that they did not know, 10.9 percent marked both periods, 3.6 percent marked 1939-1949, and 5.5 percent marked 1949-1959.

When asked about the source of these problems (natives, foreigners, or both), 70.9 percent responded that there were no serious problems, 7.3 percent indicated that foreigners were the source of the problems, and 14.5 percent indicated that both Saudis and foreigners were the sources of the problems, but foreigners committed more crimes. Only 1.8 percent said that natives were the source of the problems, and 1.8 percent said both foreigners and natives were the source of the problems, but that natives committed more crimes. Only

3.6 percent indicated that both foreigners and natives were equally responsible as sources of the problems. (See Table 4.6.1.)

When respondents were asked to indicate which periods (1959-1969, 1969-1979, or both [p. 153]) give the best indication of crime and social problems mentioned in Question 5, only 1.8 percent, or 1 respondent, indicated 1959-1969, whereas 61.8 percent, or 34 respondents, indicated 1969-1979, 10.9 percent, or 6 respondents, indicated both periods, 20.0 percent, or 11 respondents, indicated that there were no "serious problems," and 5.5 percent, or 3 respondents, answered that they did not know. When respondents were asked about the main source of the problems (natives, foreigners, or both), 47.3 percent said both foreigners and natives were responsible, but foreigners committed more crimes, 23.6 percent said foreigners were the main source, and 23.6 percent said that there were no "serious problems." None of the respondents said that natives were the main source of the problems, although 3.6 percent said that both foreigners and natives were the main source but natives committed more crimes, and 1.8 percent, or 1 respondent, said that the percentage of crimes committed by both groups was equal. (See Table 4.6.4 and p. 153.)

When the responses for the period 1939-1959 were analyzed according to the respondent's rank and number of years of police service, 9 of 42 officers in the low-rank category

TABLE 4.6

DATA FOR HYPOTHESIS V: FOREIGNERS HAVE AN
EFFECT ON POLICE DEVELOPMENT

TABLE 4.6.1.--Responses to Question 7 about the Source of Social
Problems (Crime Rates) as Measured in Question 5

Question 7: Source of social problems (crime rates) as measured in Question 5.	Relative Frequency	Number of Subjects
1. No serious crimes	70.9	39
2. Natives were main source	1.8	1
3. Foreigners were main source	7.3	4
4. Both foreigners and natives were source, but natives committed more crimes	1.8	1
5. Both foreigners and natives were source, but foreigners committed more crimes	14.5	8
6. Percentages of foreigners and natives who committed crimes are equal	3.6	2

TABLE 4.6.2.--Rank vs. Source of Social Problems (Crime Rates)
as Measured in Question 5 for 1939-1959

Rank	Source			Total
	Foreigners	Natives	Neither	
Low (captains, majors, lt. colonels)	9	1	32	42
High (colonels, lt. generals, maj. generals)	3	1	9	13
Total	12	2	41	55
Statistics: $\chi^2 = 0.847$ $p = 0.655$ $df = 2$				

CONCLUSION: These categories of sources of social problems (crime rate) in 1939-1959 are independent of rank.

TABLE 4.6.3.--Years of Service vs. Source of Social Problems
(Crime Rates) as Measured in Question 5 for 1939-1959

Years of Service	Source			Total
	Foreigners	Natives	Neither	
10 through 17 years	7	1	27	35
18 through 32 years	5	1	14	20
Total	12	2	41	55
Statistics: $\chi^2 = 0.394$ $p = 0.821$ $df = 2$				

CONCLUSION: These categories of social problems (crime rate) for 1939-1959 are independent of years of service.

TABLE 4.6.4.--Responses to Question 9 about the Source of Social Problems (Crime Rate) as Measured in Question 5

Question 9: Source of social problems (crime rates) as measured in Question 5.	Relative Frequency	Number of Subjects
1. No serious problems	23.6	13
2. Natives were main source	0.0	0
3. Foreigners were main source	23.6	13
4. Both foreigners and natives were sources, but natives committed more crimes	3.6	2
5. Both foreigners and natives were sources, but foreigners committed more crimes	47.3	26
6. Percentages of foreigners and natives who committed crimes are equal	1.8	1

TABLE 4.6.5.--Rank vs. Source of Social Problems (Crime Rate) as Measured in Question 5 for 1959-1979

Rank	Source			Total
	Foreigners	Natives	Neither	
Low (captains, majors, lt. colonels)	28	1	12	41
High (colonels, lt. generals, maj. generals)	11	1	1	13
Total	39	2	13	54
Statistics: $\chi^2 = 3.01$ $p = 0.222$ $df = 2$				

CONCLUSION: These categories of sources of social problems in 1959 to 1979 are independent of rank.

TABLE 4.6.6.--Years of Service vs. Source of Social Problems (Crime Rate) as Measured in Question 5 for 1959-1979

Years of Service	Source			Total
	Foreigners	Natives	Neither	
10 through 17 years	22	1	12	35
18 through 32 years	17	1	1	19
Total	39	2	13	54
Statistics: $\chi^2 = 5.709$ $p = 0.058$ $df = 2$				

CONCLUSION: These categories of sources of social problems in 1959 to 1979 are independent of years of service.

said that foreigners were the main source of the problem, 1 said that natives were the main source, and 32 answered that neither group was the main source of the problem. Of the officers in the high-rank category, 3 of the total 13 officers said that foreigners were the source of the problem, 1 said that natives were the source, and 9 said that neither group was the source of the problem. Regarding length of service, 7 of 35 officers with 10 to 17 years of service said that foreigners were the main source of the problem, 1 said that natives were the source, and 27 said that neither group was the source of the problem. Of the 20 officers with 18 to 32 years of service, 5 said that foreigners were the source of the problem, 1 said that natives were the source, and 14 said neither. (See Tables 4.6.2-3.)

For the period 1959-1979, 28 of 41 officers in the low-rank category said that foreigners were the source of the problem, 1 said that natives were the source, and 12 said that neither group was the source. Of the 13 officers in the high-rank category, 11 said that foreigners were the source of the problem, 1 said that natives were the source, and 1 said that neither group was the source of the problem. Regarding length of service, 22 of 35 officers in the 10 to 17 years service category said that foreigners were the source of the problem, 1 said that natives were the source, and 12 said that neither group was the main source of the problem.

Of the 19 officers in the 18 to 32 years of service category, 17 said that foreigners were the source of the problems, 1 said that natives were the source, and 1 said that neither group was the source of the problem. (See Tables 4.6.5-6.)

From the above breakdown, we can see that the higher the rank and the longer the length of service of officers, the more convinced they are that, in recent years, foreigners have been the major source of social problems. This is due in fact to their past experience in police work when they used to witness low crime rates and few social problems. To further test this notion, the writer asked respondents whether the increased number of foreigners in the work force has had a direct effect on the increased crime rate. In response to this question, 61.8 percent said "yes, definitely," 16.4 percent said "yes," and 21.8 percent said "no." No one said "no, definitely not" or that they did not know. (See Table 4.6.7.)

When the responses were analyzed by rank of the respondents, 31 of 42 officers in the low-rank category agreed with the statement while 11 disagreed, and 12 of 13 officers in the high-rank category agreed with the statement while 1 disagreed. Regarding length of service, 26 of 35 officers with 10 to 17 years of service agreed with the statement while 9 disagreed, and 17 of 20 officers with 18 to 32 years of service agreed with the statement while 3 disagreed. (See Tables 4.6.8-9.)

TABLE 4.6.7.--Responses to Question about the Effect of Increased Numbers of Foreigners on the Crime Rate

Question 16: Increased numbers of foreigners have a direct effect on the increased crime rate.	Relative Frequency	Number of Subjects
1. Yes, definitely	61.8	34
2. Yes	16.4	9
3. No	21.8	12
4. No, definitely not	0.0	0
5. Do not know	0.0	0

TABLE 4.6.8.--Rank vs. Effect of Increased Numbers of Foreigners on Crime Rate

Rank	Agreed	Disagreed	Total
Low (captains, majors, lt. colonels)	31	11	42
High (colonels, lt. generals, maj. generals)	12	1	13
Total	43	12	55
Statistics: $\chi^2 = 1.991$ $p = 0.158$ $df = 1$			

CONCLUSION: Agreement that increased numbers of foreigners increases crime rate is independent of rank.

TABLE 4.6.9.--Years of Service vs. Effect of Increased Numbers of Foreigners on Crime Rate

Years of Service	Agreed	Disagreed	Total
10 through 17 years	26	9	35
18 through 32 years	17	3	20
Total	43	12	55
Statistics: $\chi^2 = 0.857$ $p = 0.355$ $df = 1$			

CONCLUSION: Agreement that increased numbers of foreigners increases crime rate is independent of years of service.

In order to find out about the last 10 years in particular, officers were asked to indicate which crimes occurred the most frequently during the period 1969-1979 because of the increased number of foreigners. Table 4.6.10 indicates their perceptions of whether crimes such as homicide, burglary, arson, pickpocketing, and rape clearly increased, increased but not to a great extent, or whether there were no such crimes: 40.0 percent of the respondents said that all of these crimes occurred but not to a great extent, 25.5 percent said burglary and armed robbery, 14.5 percent said arson, 3.6 percent said rape, and 3.6 percent said that all crimes clearly increased.

When the responses were analyzed by rank and number of years of service of respondents, 26 of 42 officers in the low-rank category associated crime frequency with an increase in the number of foreigners, while 16 did not make such an association. Of the 13 officers in the high-rank category, 7 officers agreed that crime frequency was associated with an increased number of foreigners, while 6 officers disagreed. Regarding length of service, of the 35 officers in the 10 to 17 years category, 23 officers agreed with the statement and 12 disagreed. Of the 20 officers with 18 to 32 years of service, 10 officers agreed that crime frequency is associated with an increased number of foreigners, while 10 disagreed. (See Tables 4.6.11-12.)

TABLE 4.6.10.--Responses to Question 11 about Crimes Associated with an Increased Number of Foreigners during the Period 1969-1979

Question 11: Which crime occurred most frequently from 1969 to 1979 because of increased numbers of foreigners?	Relative Frequency	Number of Subjects
1. Homocide	0.0	0
2. Burglary and armed robbery	25.5	14
3. Arson	14.5	8
4. Picking pockets and snatching purses	12.7	7
5. Rape and drugs	3.6	2
6. All crimes clearly increased	3.6	2
7. All crimes occurred but not to a great extent	40.0	22
8. There were no such crimes	0.0	0

TABLE 4.6.11.--Rank vs. Increase in Crime Frequency Due to Increased Numbers of Foreigners

Rank	Foreigners and Crime Frequency		Total
	Agreed	Disagreed	
Low (captains, majors, lt. colonels)	26	16	42
High (colonels, lt. generals, maj. generals)	7	6	13
Total	33	22	55
Statistics: $\chi^2 = 0.269$ $p = 0.604$ $df = 1$			

CONCLUSION: Agreement that increased numbers of foreigners increases crime frequency is independent of rank.

TABLE 4.6.12.--Years of Service vs. Increase in Crime Frequency Due to Increased Numbers of Foreigners

Years of Service	Foreigners and Crime Frequency		Total
	Agreed	Disagreed	
10 through 17 years	23	12	35
18 through 32 years	10	10	20
Total	33	22	55
Statistics: $\chi^2 = 1.039$ $p = 0.253$ $df = 1$			

CONCLUSION: Agreement that increased numbers of foreigners increases crime frequency is independent of years of service.

When officers were asked which of the non-crime related problems such as traffic, escaped laborers, and laborers' disputes among themselves and their employers are caused by foreigners, 56.4 percent said that all of these problems are caused by foreigners, 21.8 percent said laborers who escape from their employers, 16.4 percent said traffic accidents, and 5.5 percent said laborers' disputes among themselves and with their employers are caused by foreigners. No one said that there are no such problems. (See Table 4.6.13.)

When the questions were analyzed with respect to the respondent's rank and length of service, the results yielded the same confirming attitude. All of the 42 officers in the low-rank category and all of the 13 officers in the high-rank category agreed that these problems of a non-criminal nature are caused by foreigners. The same results were obtained for the categories dealing with years of service. All of the 35 officers with 10 to 17 years of service and all of the 20 officers with 18 to 32 years of service agreed that these problems of a non-criminal nature are caused by foreigners. (See Tables 4.6.14-15.)

To further test this overwhelming agreement, the officers were asked to respond to the statement that it is a good idea to stop importing foreign laborers to Saudi Arabia. As is shown in Table 4.6.16, only 7.3 percent answered "yes,

TABLE 4.6.13.--Responses to Question 12 about Non-Crime Related Problems Caused by Foreigners during 1969-1979

Question 12: Non-crime related problems caused by foreigners during 1969-1979.	Relative Frequency	Number of Subjects
1. Traffic accidents	16.4	9
2. Laborers who escaped from their employers	21.8	12
3. Laborers' disputes among themselves or between themselves and their employers	5.5	3
4. All of these problems	56.4	31
5. There were no such problems	0.0	0

TABLE 4.6.14.--Rank vs. Non-Crime Related Problems Caused by Foreigners during 1969-1979

Rank	Non-Crime Related Problems		Total
	Agreed	Disagreed	
Low (captains, majors, lt. colonels)	42	0	42
High (colonels, lt. generals, maj. generals)	13	0	13
	—	—	—
Total	55	0	55

Statistics: Calculation of statistics is impossible.

CONCLUSION: There was complete agreement, regardless of rank, that non-crime related problems caused by foreigners preoccupied police during 1969 to 1979.

TABLE 4.6.15.--Years of Service vs. Non-Crime Related Problems Caused by Foreigners during 1969-1979

Years of Service	Non-Crime Related Problems		Total
	Agreed	Disagreed	
10 through 17 years	35	0	35
18 through 32 years	20	0	20
	—	—	—
Total	55	0	55

Statistics: Calculation of statistics is impossible.

CONCLUSION: There was complete agreement, regardless of years of service, that non-crime related problems caused by foreigners preoccupied police during 1969 to 1979.

definitely," while 70.9 percent said "yes, except when essential," 20.0 percent said "no," and 1.8 percent said that they did not know. None of the respondents said "no, definitely not."

When the sample was analyzed by rank and number of years of police service, 31 of the 41 officers in the low-rank category agreed that the importation of foreign laborers should be stopped, while 10 disagreed. Of the officers in the high-rank category, 12 officers agreed with the statement, while 1 officer disagreed. Regarding length of service, 27 of 35 officers with 10 to 17 years of service agreed that the importation of foreign laborers should be stopped, while 8 disagreed. Of the 19 officers with 18 to 32 years of service, 16 agreed with the statement, while 3 disagreed. (See Tables 4.6.17-18.)

In order to find out what effect stopping the importation of laborers would have on crime, the officers were asked to respond to the following statement: "Stopping the importation of foreign laborers would lead to: a decrease in the crime rate and social problems, an increase in the crime rate, no change, or do not know."

It is interesting to note that 89.1 percent said that stopping the importation of foreign laborers would lead to a decrease in the crime rate and in social problems, 9.1 percent said that it would have no effect, and 1.8 percent said that

TABLE 4.6.16.--Responses to Question 13 on Whether or Not Saudi Arabia Should Stop Importing Foreign Laborers

Question 13: Stop importing foreign laborers?	Relative Frequency	Number of Subjects
1. Yes, definitely	7.3	4
2. Yes, except when essential	70.9	39
3. No	20.0	11
4. No, definitely not	0.0	0
5. Do not know	1.8	1

TABLE 4.6.17.--Rank vs. Whether or Not Saudi Arabia Should Stop Importing Foreign Laborers

Rank	Agreed	Disagreed	Total
Low (captains, majors, lt. colonels)	31	10	41
High (colonels, lt. generals, maj. generals)	12	1	13
Total	43	11	54
Statistics: $\chi^2 = 1.697$ $p = 0.193$ $df = 1$			

CONCLUSION: Agreement that it is a good idea to stop importing foreign laborers is independent of rank.

TABLE 4.6.18.--Years of Service vs. Whether or Not Saudi Arabia Should Stop Importing Foreign Laborers

Years of Service	Agreed	Disagreed	Total
10 through 17 years	27	8	35
18 through 32 years	16	3	19
Total	43	11	54
Statistics: $\chi^2 = 0.379$ $p = 0.538$ $df = 1$			

CONCLUSION: Agreement that it is a good idea to stop importing foreign laborers is independent of years of service.

they did not know. None of the respondents said that it would increase the crime rate or social problems. (See Table 4.6.19.)

When these responses were analyzed according to the officer's rank and number of years of service, 37 of the 41 officers in the low-rank category agreed that it would decrease the crime rate, while 4 disagreed. Of those in the high-rank category, 12 officers agreed that it would decrease the crime rate, while 1 disagreed. Regarding length of service, 33 of the 35 officers with 10 to 17 years of service agreed that it would decrease the crime rate, while 2 disagreed. Of those with 18 to 32 years of service, 16 officers agreed with the statement and 3 disagreed. (See Tables 4.6.20-21.)

It is amazing to see how much effect the foreign work force has had in regard to both causing social problems and in creating a negative police attitude toward them. When the writer interviewed Prince Naif Ibn Abdullaziz, Minister of the Interior, these feelings were discussed. The Prince responded that he knew these things, but "this is the price we have to pay for the huge developmental program the country is undertaking." Further, he explained that "most Saudis who enter into government contracts ask for foreign laborers in order to execute on time the contracted projects. We can't tell them not to enter as local contractors because they don't have local laborers. It is within their rights and privilege to do so." He added that once a contract is signed by both

TABLE 4.6.19.--Responses to Question 14 on the Effects of Stopping the Importation of Foreign Laborers

Question 14: Stopping the importation of foreign laborers would lead to:	Relative Frequency	Number of Subjects
1. Decrease in crime rate and social problems	89.1	49
2. Increase in crime rate and social problems	0.0	0
3. No change in crime rate and social problems	9.1	5
4. Do not know	1.8	1

TABLE 4.6.20.--Rank vs. Stopping the Importation of Foreign Laborers Would Decrease Crime Rate

Rank	Decrease Crime Rate by Stopping Importation		Total
	Agreed	Disagreed	
Low (captains, majors, lt. colonels)	37	4	41
High (colonels, lt. generals, maj. generals)	12	1	13
Total	49	5	54
Statistics: $\chi^2 = 0.050$ $p = 0.823$ $df = 1$			

CONCLUSION: Agreement that stopping the importation of foreign laborers would lead to a decrease in crime rate is independent of rank.

TABLE 4.6.21.--Years of Service vs. Stopping the Importation of Foreign Laborers Would Decrease Crime Rate

Years of Service	Decrease Crime Rate by Stopping Importation		Total
	Agreed	Disagreed	
10 through 17 years	33	2	35
18 through 32 years	16	3	19
Total	49	5	54
Statistics: $\chi^2 = 1.488$ $p = 0.223$ $df = 1$			

CONCLUSION: Agreement that stopping importation of foreign laborers would lead to a decrease in crime rate is independent of years of service.

the government and the private sector to perform any given program, construction or otherwise, all the contractors need to do is to show the Ministry of the Interior the contract and their application for the workers they need. He also pointed out that "there are a lot of Saudis who ask for foreign drivers or house workers because of their growing social and family obligations. "If they can afford to pay for these services," said the Prince, "we can't object, or reject their requests." Prince Naif was confident that through increasing public awareness of these problems, educating more Saudis for semi-skilled and skilled jobs, and by attracting more town and village dwellers to work in the cities, the foreign labor force can be contained if not considerably decreased.

When the General Director of Public Security (national police headquarters in Riyadh) was interviewed, he had more serious and alarming concerns over the many crimes and social problems caused by the foreign work force. He was against the high influx of foreign laborers. He commented that large numbers in the foreign work force may contribute to contradictory moral values of the society and probably lead to many more internal social problems. He went further to tell the writer that major property crimes could be planned from abroad and that criminals might obtain a temporary visa to perform these crimes inside the country, and after the crime has been

completed, if not caught, the criminal leaves the country within a matter of days. These feelings were shared by the other three generals interviewed by the writer, one of whom was the director of the Riyadh Police Department.

The presence of foreigners is, in reality, a social dilemma facing not only the police in Saudi Arabia, but also ordinary citizens who are affected by the problems caused by the foreign work force. The findings of the study clearly show how much concern the matter is to police officers in particular. These findings, as well as the other ones reported earlier, have strongly provided support in confirming the researcher's five original hypotheses. In conclusion, the hypotheses maintain that economic growth, population growth, crime rate, widespread education, and foreigners living in Saudi Arabia all, individually and collectively, have a direct effect on police development in Saudi Arabia.

Footnotes--Chapter IV

¹Patrick Colquhoun, quoted in Charles Tilly et al., "How Policing Affected the Visibility of Crime in Nineteenth-Century Europe and America," to be published in The Criminal Justice System, ed. Theodore Ferdinand.

²American Justice Institute/Project Star, The Impact of Social Trends on Crime and Criminal Justice (Sacramento, California: Anderson Davis Publishers, 1976), p. 193.

³Ibid.

⁴Charles Tilly et al., "How Policing Affected the Visibility of Crime in Nineteenth-Century Europe and America," to be published in The Criminal Justice System, ed. Theodore Ferdinand, p. 33.

⁵"Fear Stalks the Streets," U. S. News and World Report, 27 October 1980, p. 58.

⁶Ibid., p. 59.

⁷Raymond Fosdick, quoted in David Bayley, "Police Function, Structure, and Control in Western Europe and North America: Comparative and Historical Studies," in Crime and Practice: An Annual Review of Records, eds. Morris Norval and Michael Torry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 115-116.

⁸Bruce Smith, cited in David Bayley, "Police Function, Structure, and Control in Western Europe and North America: Comparative and Historical Studies," p. 116.

⁹Tilly, "How Policing Affected the Visibility of Crime in Nineteenth-Century Europe and America," p. 231.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 7.

¹¹Ibid., p. 74.

¹²David Bordua, "The Police," in International Encyclopedia of Social Science, ed. D. Sills (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 177.

¹³Fouad Hamza, Al Bilad Al Arabia Al Saudiah (Saudi Arabia), 2nd ed. (Riyadh: Al-Naser Modern Publishers, 1968), pp. 208-211.

¹⁴Tilly, "How Policing Affected the Visibility of Crime in Nineteenth-Century Europe and America," p. 14.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 95.

¹⁷"Fear Stalks the Streets," p. 59.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 60.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 59.

²⁰Neil Smelser, Essays in Sociological Explanation (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 175.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to give a summary of the problem and of the study's findings, to present the conclusions arrived at by the writer, and to discuss the implications of the study. Today, with rapid economic and social growth, police are in the midst of a social dilemma. In other words, the police are at the cutting edge of social change and at the same time they are viewed by many societies, especially in fast-developing ones, as the brokers of that change. The police are charged with maintaining and enforcing law and order within the society uniformly, including those laws and regulations which might come into complete contradiction with their basic beliefs as citizens of the society. At such situations, the policeman is caught between performing his department job, satisfying public demands, and playing his role as a social being and a policeman. This sociological and psychological bind not only presents role ambiguities for both the police and the public, but also makes it difficult for scholars in police work to come up with a workable and acceptable definition of police and their work. As Skolnick realized:

The dilemma of a democratic society requiring the police to maintain order and at the same time to be accountable to the rule of the law is thus further complicated. Not only is the rule of the law often incompatible with the maintenance of order but the principles by which police are governed by the rule of law in democratic society may be antagonistic to the ideology of worker initiative associated with a nontotalitarian philosophy of work. In the same society, the ideal of legality rejects discretionary innovation by the police, while the ideal worker's freedom and autonomy encourages such initiative.¹

Summary

Although police work is as old as the society in which police operate, the definitions of police or their jobs are not exclusively agreed upon. As Bayley comments, "to study what police do, one must decide who the police are."² This good point will be taken if we all agree, even theoretically, upon what police are in order to arrive at what they do. The question to be raised here is who has the ability, the knowledge, and the authority to define the police and their work and to impose this definition on other people or other societies. In my opinion, no one can define the police because this is a job that must be left to each particular society or locality to decide upon.

Historically, localities created their police to deal with certain prevailing social problems that characteristically belonged to those localities. From that point on, the police continued to perform their defined jobs incorporating any rising new problems into the old ones. Yet, the practice is

locally initiated, not externally imposed. When the Allied Forces occupied Japan and Germany at the end of World War II, they introduced police systems foreign to the occupied regions. These systems were patterned along the lines of Anglo-American constitutional structures. Japan's police system was changed in 1947 to complete decentralization, hence treating the Japanese police force as if it operated in any of the occupying authorities' cities and disregarding the Japanese social structure and the country's values in the process. Later, being unable to adapt itself to an imposed foreign police system, Japan returned back in 1954 to its previous formal system of policing.³ This case illustrates the point advanced above. Namely, that police and their functions must be defined in regard to what each society desires them to be because society is supposed to be the source for identifying what is acceptable and tolerated behavior and what is not. In simple and homogenous societies, one would agree that the police and their work could be easily established and clearly identified because each individual shares the same value beliefs. But, in more complex and heterogeneous societies, one might argue that the situation is different. If people in these societies cannot agree on their value systems, how can they agree upon what the police or their work are? Although this argument may hold true in many cases, it is also true that some complex societies can

agree on their police role. According to Peter Manning, people in England look at the police job as "preventive in nature" and essentially the police confine their actual activity to this role.⁴ Commenting on Canadian and U. S. police, Kirkpatrick notes, "it is important to Canadian police to maintain a public identity distinct from that of law enforcement agencies in the United States."⁵

From the preceding, it should be emphasized that the definition of the police and their role must be viewed in terms of the society in which they operate. The fact remains that in most developed societies, especially in the United States, many scholars on police work take the burden of defining the police and their role on their shoulders.⁶ Yet, each one of them has his own conceptions and beliefs. Let us take two or three of these definitions for illustrative purposes and see how different these definitions are. For example, Bayley defines police as "a group authorized in the name of territorial communities to utilize force within the community to handle whatever needs doing."⁷ Bayley not only maintains that physical force is used, when needed, but also singles out the police for using this force. In this regard, he writes, "By and large, only the police have an explicit mandate to use physical force in order to resolve disputes or to enforce community directives."⁸ What has skipped Bayley's mind here is that most other law enforcement agencies, as well

as private guards, use force in performing whatever needs doing. Coast guard, customs, and I. R. S. agents, to name a few, utilize force when needed. Not only this, but in some countries police do not even carry guns (e.g., in England). Hence, the risk of the police using force is minimized.

Manning, realizing the shortcomings of Bayley's definition, tries to go one step beyond Bayley when he defines the police as "those agencies that stand ready to employ force upon the citizenry on the basis of situationally determined exigencies."⁹ Cain, avoiding the issue of dialectical definition, comes up with the indisputable argument that "police, then, must be defined in terms of their key practices."¹⁰ Despite all these role ambiguities and a lack of clear-cut definitions of the police and their work, the police continue to perform their jobs, and their development has taken place in accordance with their society's social institutions. (See Chapter II.) As we have seen earlier, from existing literature and the findings of this study, economic growth, population growth, growth in the crime rate, and educational growth have a direct impact on the evolution and expansion of the police. These findings address themselves to the original theme of the problem studied which was designed to find out if these factors have a direct impact on police development.

Conclusions

Based on the findings of the study both in regard to the existing literature and the information gathered from the questionnaire and interviews (see Chapters II and IV), a number of conclusions were reached. The findings of the study, as obtained from the responses of a sample population of 55 top-ranking police officers (from the rank of captain to the rank of lieutenant general) in Saudi Arabia, are outlined below.

1. Regarding the first hypothesis which maintains that economic growth has a direct effect on police development: the findings are that 83.6 percent of the officers said "yes, definitely" and 16.4 percent said "yes," comprising full agreement. Thus, the first hypothesis was accepted.

2. Regarding the second hypothesis which maintains that population growth has a direct effect on police development: the findings are that 78.2 percent of the officers said "yes, definitely," while 20.0 percent said "yes." The result is supportive; thus, the second hypothesis is confirmed.

3. Regarding the third hypothesis which reads that crime growth has a direct effect on police development: the findings are that 58.2 percent of the officers said "yes, definitely," 25.5 percent said "yes," 12.7 percent said "no," and 3.6 percent said "no, definitely." This supports the hypothesis; therefore, the hypothesis is accepted.

4. Regarding the fourth hypothesis which maintains that educational growth has a direct effect on police development: the findings are that 85.5 percent said "yes, definitely" and 14.5 percent said "yes." This in fact supports this hypothesis; therefore, the fourth hypothesis is confirmed.

5. Regarding the writer's fifth hypothesis which maintains that increased numbers of foreigners living in Saudi Arabia have an effect on police development (actually this hypothesis addresses itself to foreigners as a source of crimes and social problem growth in Saudi Arabia, which in turn affects police development): the findings are that 61.8 percent of the officers said "yes, definitely" and 16.4 percent said "yes," while 21.8 percent said "no" when asked if foreigners could be the source of crimes and social problems, especially from 1959 to 1979. When the responses were broken down by rank and years of service, 28 of 41 officers in the low-rank category (captain to lieutenant colonel) agreed that foreigners are the source of social problems, 1 said natives were the source, and 12 said neither. For high-ranking officers (colonels, major generals and lieutenant generals), 11 of 13 officers agreed, 1 disagreed, and 1 said neither. Regarding length of service, of those with 10 to 17 years of service, 22 out of 35 agreed, 1 said no, and 12 said neither. Of those with 18 to 32 years of service, 17 out of 19 agreed.

When asked about foreigners as the source of non-crime related activities for the period 1969-1979, 42 of 42 officers in the low-rank category agreed and 13 of 13 officers in the high-rank category agreed. Regarding length of service, 35 of 35 officers with 10 to 17 years of service agreed and 20 of 20 officers with 18 to 32 years of service agreed.

When asked if it was a good idea to stop importing foreigners for the work force, 7.3 percent said "yes, definitely," 70.9 percent said "no, except when essential," 4 percent said "no," and 1.8 percent said don't know.

When asked if stopping the importation of foreigners will lead to a decrease or an increase in crime or will have no effect, 89.1 percent agreed that it would lead to a decrease, and 9.1 percent said that it would have no effect on the crime rate.

From these data it is clear that, in the perceptions of senior police officers, increasing the foreign work force in Saudi Arabia has contributed to an increase in crime and social problems. Hence, indicatively, this has had a direct impact on police development since Hypothesis III, concerning the crime rate, has been supported. Taking the findings of the study as reported and analyzed, the writer's original five hypotheses, which state that economic growth, population growth, crime growth, educational growth, and increased numbers of foreigners in the work force in Saudi Arabia have a direct

impact on police development, are in the affirmative and therefore being accepted.

Implications of the Study

Limitations

1. The study was conducted in one city (Riyadh, capital of Saudi Arabia) of the many cities in the country, which might have had some bearing or effect on the outcome of the results had they been included in the study.
2. Administering the questionnaire to top-ranking officers (captains and above) and ignoring other ranks might have affected the outcomes had cross-sections of all ranks been selected.
3. Those officers interviewed at director's level capacity might refrain from giving a true and real picture of crime-related problems in order to show their departmental efficiency.
4. Lack of obtaining old documents regarding police manpower, budget, or crime indexes in Saudi Arabia contributed to shortening the period of study research. For example, the Riyadh Police Department, the case study, was created in 1931, but reliable documentation records existed only from 1950. Also, the General Directorate of Public Security Headquarters in Riyadh (the national police) was created on a small scale in 1930, but records were only available from 1959.

5. With all the limitations of crime statistics, especially governmental ones, this study should by no means be excluded from criticisms directed toward these statistics. The problem of developing nations in forming a systematic approach to statistics may contribute to either over- or under-reporting of crimes. However, the perceptions of senior officers in the study are conclusive. They believe that these statistics are valid. Not only this, but they believe that in 1980 trends are continuing upward since the time the data was last reported in 1978. However, the reader should be aware of the fact that the beliefs, attitudes, and behavior of many police may not reflect the reality of the situation.

The above factors could, no doubt, limit the findings of the study to some extent. It is the hope of the writer that further research studies could be conducted and remedies for these limitations could be advanced.

Generalizations

The gain of generality is often
won at the expense of analytic
utility. (Bendix)

The writer, in spite of the study's limitations, would take the position to generalize the findings of his study to be the trend of police development in Saudi Arabia on the following grounds:

1. The top-ranking police officers responding to the questionnaire were all directors of departments, chiefs of

police sections, or in supervisory positions in the General Directorate of Public Security, Traffic Department or the Riyadh Police Department.

2. The other four higher-ranking officers (three generals and 1 full general) are the final authorities to whom all police officers in the country are accountable.

3. The final say in all police matters, approving police assignments, promotions, budgets, and establishing new departments, rests with the Minister of the Interior, Prince Naif Ibn Abdulaziz, who was also interviewed. Hence, all police matters regarding allocating manpower for other police departments, allocation of cars and equipment, facilities, etc., are done by these high-ranking officers.

4. Riyadh is the capital of Saudi Arabia. It is the location of the national police headquarters which supervises all other police departments in the country.

5. Riyadh is now the largest city in the country, both in population and in the largest police personnel in the whole country. It also has the largest congregation of foreign work force, which makes the wave of social problems more acute, and if the present trends continue the way they are now, more serious problems are anticipated by the writer.

6. Riyadh is at the center of the country and is the place where top government officials, including the King, reside.

Based on these qualifying factors, it is deemed safe to generalize that police development in Saudi Arabia follows the trend that was found by the writer manifesting itself in the Riyadh Police Department. Yet, the reader should be advised that the generalizations must be viewed and valued in the context of Saudi Arabian society and its police force. That is due to the fact that policing must be culturally defined in terms of the society it operates in. Therefore, future research should address itself to cross-cultural and historical comparative analysis, either in similar societies sharing the same values and traditional social settings or in different societies showing similar trends in police development processes.

Footnotes--Chapter V

¹James Skolnick, quoted in Anthony Guenther, ed., Criminal Behavior and Social Systems (Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally & Co., 1971), p. 341.

²David Bayley, "Police Function, Structure, and Control in Western Europe and North America: Comparative and Historical Studies," in Crime and Practice: An Annual Review of Records, eds. Morris Norval and Michael Torry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 116.

³David Bordua, "The Police," in International Encyclopedia of Social Science, ed. D. Sills (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 177.

⁴Peter K. Manning, Police Work (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977).

⁵A. M. Kirkpatrick and W. T. McGreth, Crime and You (Ontario: Macmillan of Canada, Maclean-Hunter Press, 1976), p. 36.

⁶See, for example, Peter K. Manning, Police Work; Egon Bittner, The Function of the Police in Modern Society (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970); H. Goldstein, Policing a Free Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1977); John Webster, The Realities of Police Work (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall and Hunt, 1973); B. Chapman, Police State (London: Macmillan, 1970); J. J. Tobias, "Police and Public in the United Kingdom," Journal of Contemporary History 7 (January/April 1972); David Bayley, "The Police and Political Development in Europe" and "Police Function, Structure, and Control in Western Europe and North America: Comparative and Historical Studies"; T. A. Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales, 2nd ed. (Montclair, New Jersey: Patterson Smith, 1971); David Bordua, "The Police"; and J. Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968). Each of these writers, like many others, has advanced one or more definitions of the police and their function.

⁷Bayley, "Police Function, Structure, and Control in Western Europe and North America: Comparative and Historical Studies," p. 113.

⁸Bayley, "The Police and Political Development in Europe," p. 328.

⁹Manning, Police Work, p. 40.

¹⁰Maureen Cain, Society and the Policeman's Role (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Akers, Ronald, and Hawkins, Richard, eds. "A Disposition of Case." In Law and Control in Society. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975.
- Al-Awaji, Ibrahim M. "Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1971.
- Al-Farsy, Fouad. "King Faisal and the First Five-Year Development Plan." In King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia. Edited by Willard Beling. London: Croom Helm, 1980.
- _____. Saudi Arabia: A Case Study of Development. 2nd ed. London: Stacey International, 1980.
- Al-Gosaibi, Ghazi A. "Saudi Development--A Unique Experiment." Mideast Business Exchange IV:48 (June 1980):37-38.
- Allee, John Gage, ed. Webster's Encyclopedia of Dictionaries. Ottenheimer Publishers, Inc., 1978.
- Al-Moualami, Yahya (General). Al-Amn Fi Al'Mamlakah Al Arabia Al Saudiah (Security in Saudi Arabia). Cairo: Egypt Publishing Co., 1978.
- Al-Moududi, Sayid Abdula. The Islamic Law and Constitution. 4th ed. Dacca: Islamic Publications, 1969.
- The American College Dictionary. New York: Random House, 1963.
- American Justice Institute/Project Star. The Impact of Social Trends in Crime and Criminal Justice. Sacramento, California: Anderson Davis Publishers, 1976.
- Anderson, J. N. Islamic Law in the Modern World. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1959.
- Babbie, Earl R. The Practice of Social Research. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1975.

- Banton, Michael. The Policeman in the Community. New York: Basic Books, 1964.
- Bayley, David. Comparative Analysis of Police Practices. U. N. Resource Material Series, No. 10. Tokyo, Japan: United Nations, 1975A.
- _____. "Police Function, Structure, and Control in Western Europe and North America: Comparative and Historical Studies." In Crime and Practice, An Annual Review of Records. Edited by Morris Norval and Michael Torry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.
- _____. "The Police and Political Change in Comparative Perspective." Law and Society Review (6 August 1971): 91-112.
- _____. "The Police and Political Development in Europe." In Formation of National States in Europe. Edited by Charles Tilly. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975A.
- Becker, Harold. Police Systems in Europe: A Survey of Selected Police Organizations. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1973.
- Beling, Willard, ed. King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia. London: Croom Helm, 1980.
- Bellah, Robert. Tokugawa Religion. Boston: Beacon Press, 1970.
- Bendix, R. Nation-Building and Citizenship. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1977.
- Bercal, Thomas. "Calls for Police Assistance: Consumer Demands for Governmental Service." In Police in Urban Society. Edited by Harlan Han. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1970.
- Berkley, George. The Democratic Policeman. Boston: Beacon Press, 1959.
- Bittner, Egon. The Functions of the Police in Modern Society. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970.

- Black, D. J. "The Production of Crime Rates." American Sociological Review 35 (August 1970):733-748.
- Black, Donald, and Reiss, Albert. "Career Orientations, Job Satisfaction, and the Assessment of Law Enforcement Problems by Police Officers." Studies of Crime and Law Enforcement in Major Metropolitan Areas. Vol. 75. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1966.
- Blau, Peter. Bureaucracy in Modern Society. New York: Random House, 1956.
- Bordua, D., and Reiss, A. J. "Sociology in Law Enforcement." In The Uses of Sociology. Edited by Paul Lazarsfeld et al. New York: Basic Books, 1967.
- Bordua, David. "The Police." In International Encyclopedia of Social Science. Edited by D. Sills. New York: Free Press, 1968.
- Braibanti, Ralph. "Saudi Arabia in the Context of Political Development Theory." In King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia. Edited by Willard Beling. London: Croom Helm, 1980.
- Cain, Maureen. Society and the Policeman's Role. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973.
- . "Trends in the Sociology of Police Work." International Journal of the Sociology of Law 7 (1979):143-167.
- Chapman, B. Police State. London: Macmillan, 1970.
- Chapman, Richard A. "Administrative Reforms in Saudi Arabia." Journal of Administration Overseas XIII, No. 2, (April 1974).
- Cramer, James. The World Police. London: Cassell, 1964.
- Critchley, T. A. A History of Police in England and Wales. 2nd ed. Montclair, New Jersey: Patterson Smith, 1971.
- Cumming, Elaine; Cumming, Ian; and Edell, Laura. "Policeman as Philosopher, Guide, and Friend." Social Problems 12:3 (Winter 1965):276-286.

- Dorey, Marcia, and Swidler, George. World Police Systems. Boston, Massachusetts: Northeastern University Press, 1975.
- Doxiadis. "Riyadh Existing Conditions." Doxiadis Official Report to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, July 1968, DOX-SAU-A2.
- Dunipace, Robin, ed. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. London: Stacey International, 1977. (Printed in Japan)
- "Family Way in Saudi Arabia." The Economist, May 17, 1975.
- "Fear Stalks the Streets." U. S. News and World Report, 27 October 1980.
- Fosdick, Raymond. American Police Systems. Montclair, New Jersey: Patterson Smith, 1969. (Originally published in 1920)
- Gerth, H., and Mills, W., eds. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. (Originally published in 1946)
- Goldstein, H. Policing a Free Society. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977.
- Guenther, Anthony, ed. Criminal Behavior and Social Systems. Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally & Co., 1971.
- Halm, H., ed. Police in Urban Society. Beverly Hills, California: Charles Merrill, 1972.
- Hamza, Fouad. Al Bilad Al Arabia Al Saudiah (Saudi Arabia). 2nd ed. Riyadh: Al-Nasar Modern Publishers, 1968. (Originally published in 1937)
- Hobday, Peter. Saudi Arabia Today. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978.
- Horowitz, Irvin. Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966.
- Ingleton, Roy. The Police of the World. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1979.

Johnson, Elmer. "Police: An Analysis of Role Conflict."
In Police 14:3 (January-February 1970):47-52.

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Uniformed Officer's Code for All
Commissioned Personnel. Riyadh: Issued by Royal
Decree M/9, dated 3/24/1397 (March 14, 1977).

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Education. Educational
Documentation. A semi-annual journal (15 April 1978).

_____. Educational Statistics. 11th issue. Riyadh,
1977-78.

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Information. Al-Taleem
Al-Aly (Higher Education). Falcon Press, 1980.
(Printed in Italy)

_____. Saudi Arabia. Riyadh: The General Directorate
Press, 1977.

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of the Interior. Al-Amn
Fi Dhellal Al-Faisal (Public Security under King
Faisal's Direction). Riyadh: Directorate of Public
Security, Public Relations Division, 1973.

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of the Interior, Central
Statistics Department. Statistical Book: 1966-75.
Riyadh.

_____. Statistical Book: 1977-78.

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of the Interior, Public
Security Crime Statistics Division. Criminal
statistics for 1966-70.

Kirkpatrick, A. M., and McGreth, W. T. Crime and You.
Ontario: Macmillan of Canada, Maclean-Hunter Press,
1976.

Knauerhase, Norman. "Economic Development in Saudi Arabia:
A Review." Current History 68:423 (January 1977).

Lackner, Helen. A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy
of Saudi Arabia. London: Ithaca Press, 1978.

Lenczowski, George. "Tradition and Reform in Saudi Arabia." Current History (February 1967).

Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1958.

Lipsky, George. Saudi Arabia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture. New Haven, Connecticut: Hartford Press, 1959.

Long, David. "Saudi Arabia--The Environment: Historical Background and Problems and Prospects." Washington papers, Vol. 4, No. 39, 1976.

Manning, Peter K. Memo #2 to the staff of the Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan. January 30, 1980.

_____. Police Work. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977.

_____. "Social Groups and Social Functions." In Sociology: A Basic Concept. Edited by Edward Sagarin. New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Co., Winter 1978.

Manning, Peter K., and Van Maanen, John. Outline for Comparative Policing. Forthcoming.

Martin, P. "Saudi Arabia: The State of Islam." The Economist, 10 December 1977.

Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York and Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1957.

Moore, Barrington, Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 2nd printing. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1968.

Moore, Wilbert. Social Change. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974.

Mosse, George, ed. Police Forces in History. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1975.

Nyrop, Richard K., ed. Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia. 3rd ed. Washington, D. C.: American University, Foreign Area Studies. Available from the U. S. Government Printing Office, 1977.

- Philby, John (St.). "Riyadh: Ancient and Modern." In The Middle-East Journal 13:3 (Spring 1959):131.
- Preiss, Jack, and Ehrlich, Howard. An Examination of Role Theory: The Case of the State Police. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1966.
- Quinney, Richard. The Social Reality of Crime. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1970.
- Radelet, L. The Police and the Community. 2nd ed. Beverly Hills, California: Glencoe Press, 1977.
- Rajehi, Mohammad O. "Saudi Arabian Students' Attitudes Toward Police: An Exploratory Case Study with Some Comparisons to American Students' Attitudes Toward Police." Master's thesis, Michigan State University, 1977.
- Reiss, Albert. Crime in Urban Society. New York: Dunnellan Publishers, 1970.
- Reiss, Albert, Jr., and Bordua, David. "Environment and Organization: A Perspective on the Police." In The Police: Six Sociological Essays. Edited by David Bordua. New York: Wiley, 1967.
- "Rich Men, Poor Men." Newsweek XCIII:22, 28 May 1979.
- Robison, Cyril. "The Major and the Police: The Political Role of the Police in Society." 1974. Police Forces in History. Edited by George Mosse. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1975.
- Roy, M. N. The Historical Role of Islam. Calcutta, India: B. M. Bose and Brojo, 1968.
- "Saudi Arabia." In Third World Encyclopedia. 1978.
- "Saudi Arabia: Huge Developments Based on Islamic Traditions." Cover story. Mideast Business Exchange IV:48 (June 1980).
- Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). Annual Report. Riyadh, 1977.
- Sayigh, Yusif. The Economies of the Arab World. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978.

- SCET-International/SEDES. Technical Report #2, February 1977. Riyadh.
- Schacht, Joseph. Islamic Law. London: University Press; and Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1964.
- Selltiz, Claire. Research Methods and Social Relations. New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964.
- Shanely, Mark, and Kravitz, M. International Policing: A Selected Bibliography. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1976.
- Sinai, Robert. The Challenge of Modernization: The West's Impact on the Non-Western World. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1964.
- Siraj-Addin, Kamal (General). Al-Wajibat Alamah Le Gowat Al Amn Al Dahkili Fi Al'Mamlakah Al Arabia Al Saudiah (General Duties of the Internal Security Forces in Saudi Arabia). Riyadh, 1969.
- Skolnick, Jerome. Justice without Trial. New York: Wiley, 1966.
- Smelser, Neil. Essays in Sociological Explanation. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968.
- Smelser, Neil T. The Sociology of Economic Life. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963.
- Smith, Bruce. Police Systems in the United States. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1960. (Originally published in 1940)
- Smith, W. S. "Islam Confronted by Western Secularism." In Islam in the Modern World. Edited by Bartha S. Frank. Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1951.
- Strecher, Victor. The Environment of Law Enforcement: A Community Relations Guide. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971.
- Swanson, Guy E. Social Change. Glenview, Illinois and London: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1971.

- Theodorson, George, and Theodorson, A. Modern Dictionary of Sociology. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1969.
- Tilly, Charles, ed. The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975.
- Tilly, Charles, et al. "How Policing Affected the Visibility of Crime in Nineteenth-Century Europe and America." To be published in The Criminal Justice System. Edited by Theodore Ferdinand.
- Tobias, J. J. "Police and Public in the United Kingdom." Journal of Contemporary History 7 (January/April 1972).
- Trojanowicz, Robert C. Juvenile Delinquency. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978.
- United States, Department of State. Background Notes: Saudi Arabia. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, September 1979.
- _____. "Saudi Arabia." In National Basic Intelligence Fact Book. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, January 1980.
- United States, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967.
- Webster, John. The Realities of Police Work. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall and Hunt, 1973.
- Westley, William. Violence and the Police: A Sociological Study of Law, Custom, and Morality. Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1970.
- Wilson, J. Q. Varieties of Police Behavior. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE QUESTIONNAIRE (English Version)

APPENDIX A
THE QUESTIONNAIRE (English Version)

Questionnaire for Police Officers (Commissioned)
in the Riyadh Police Department

Dear Fellow Officers:

The purpose of this questionnaire is to obtain your opinions regarding (a) the development of the police department in Riyadh, specifically, and in Saudi Arabia in general, and (b) the impact of social, economic, and other related social factors on this development. The questionnaire responses will be used for my Ph.D. research regarding the effect of these factors.

Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated. Please put an X in front of the answer that you consider to be the most appropriate for each question. You do not need to give your name or job assignment.

Thank you all,

Lt. Col. Mohammad O. Rajehi

1. Rank: _____
2. Number of years of police service: _____
3. Do you agree that population growth (for example, in Riyadh City) requires an increased number of policemen?

<input type="checkbox"/> a. yes, definitely	<input type="checkbox"/> d. no, definitely not
<input type="checkbox"/> b. yes	<input type="checkbox"/> e. do not know
<input type="checkbox"/> c. no	
4. Do you agree with the notion that greatly increasing a country's national income and budget, as in Saudi Arabia, requires increasing the number of policemen and providing the best training facilities and materials for them?

<input type="checkbox"/> a. yes, definitely	<input type="checkbox"/> d. no, definitely not
<input type="checkbox"/> b. yes	<input type="checkbox"/> e. do not know
<input type="checkbox"/> c. no	
5. Do you believe that increasing crime rates (e.g. homicide, burglary, theft, rape, and traffic accidents) require increased numbers of policemen to meet these social problems?

- ☐ a. yes, definitely ☐ d. no, definitely not
☐ b. yes ☐ e. do not know
☐ c. no
6. According to your own practical experience in police work, which of the following periods give the best indication of the social problems mentioned in Question 5?
- ☐ a. the period from 1939-1949
☐ b. the period from 1949-1959
☐ c. both periods
☐ d. there were no serious social problems during these periods
☐ e. do not know
7. Regarding Question 6, what was the source of these social problems?
- ☐ a. there were no serious problems as indicated above
☐ b. natives were the main source of the problems
☐ c. foreigners were the main source of the problems
☐ d. both foreigners and natives were sources of the problems, but natives committed more crimes
☐ e. both foreigners and natives were sources of the problems, but foreigners committed more crimes
☐ f. the percentages of foreigners and natives who committed crimes during that period are equal
8. According to your practical experience and personal information, which of the following periods give the best indication of the social problems mentioned above?
- ☐ a. the period from 1959 to 1969
☐ b. the period from 1969 to 1979
☐ c. both periods
☐ d. there were no serious social problems during these periods
☐ e. do not know
9. Regarding Question 8, what was the source of these social problems?
- ☐ a. there were no serious problems as indicated above
☐ b. natives were the main source of the problems
☐ c. foreigners were the main source of the problems

- ☐ d. both foreigners and natives were sources of the problems, but natives committed more crimes
☐ e. both foreigners and natives were sources of the problems but foreigners committed more crimes
☐ f. the percentages of foreigners and natives who committed crimes during that period are equal
10. According to your practical experience, do you think that the increased number of foreigners coming into Saudi Arabia has a direct effect on the increase of crimes in general?
- ☐ a. yes, definitely ☐ d. no, definitely not
☐ b. yes ☐ e. do not know
☐ c. no
11. In the past ten years (1969-1979), what crime has occurred most frequently because of the increased number of foreigners?
- ☐ a. homicide ☐ e. rape and drugs
☐ b. burglary and armed robbery ☐ f. all of these crimes clearly increased
☐ c. arson ☐ g. all of these crimes happened but not to a great extent
☐ d. picking pockets and snatching purses ☐ h. there are no such crimes
12. What problems that were not criminally-related were caused by foreigners and preoccupied the police during the same period?
- ☐ a. traffic accidents ☐ d. all of these problems
☐ b. laborers who have escaped from their employers ☐ e. there were no such problems
☐ c. laborers' disputes among themselves or between themselves and their employers
13. Do you think that it is a good idea for Saudi Arabia to stop importing foreign laborers?
- ☐ a. yes, definitely ☐ d. no, definitely
☐ b. yes, except when essential ☐ e. do not know
☐ c. no

14. Do you think that stopping the importation of foreign laborers would lead to:
- ☐ a. a decrease in the crime rate and in social problems
 - ☐ b. an increase in the crime rate and in social problems
 - ☐ c. no change in the crime rate or social problems
 - ☐ d. do not know
15. Do you think that widespread education can have a direct effect on police performance (administratively, technically, and quantitatively—i.e. increasing the number of policemen)?
- ☐ a. yes, definitely
 - ☐ b. yes
 - ☐ c. no
 - ☐ d. no, definitely not
 - ☐ e. do not know

Thank you for your contribution to this study.

APPENDIX B

THE QUESTIONNAIRE (Arabic Version)

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

APPENDIX B

THE QUESTIONNAIRE (ARABIC VERSION)

استبيان للزملاء ضباط الشرطة بمنطقة الرياض

اخواني الزملاء :

الهدف من هذا الاستبيان هو الحصول على آرائكم بخصوص تقدم الشرطة بمنطقة الرياض بصفه خاصه وتقدم الامن العام بالمملكه بصفه عامه وتأثير التقدم الاجتماعى والاقتصادى وما شابه ذلك على هذا التقدم .

الاجابات على هذا الاستبيان ستستعمل فى رساله الدكتوراه التى أقوم بها حاليا لدراسة هذه العوامل الاجتماعيه والاقتصاديه الموضحة فى الاسئلة المرفقه لا داعى لذكر الاسم أو الوظيفة شاكرا لكم تعاونكم بوضع علامة (x) امام الجواب الذى تعتقد انه الجواب الانسب بالنسبه لراى كل منكم ... شاكرا لكم تعاونكم جميعا .

اخوكم

المقدم / محمد عويض الراجحي البقمى

- ١- المرتبه :
- ٢- مدة الخدمه :
- ٣- هل توافق على أن زيادة عدد سكان المدن - كمدينة الرياض مثلا يتطلب زيادة عدد رجال الشرطة :
- أ- نعم بكل تأكيد .
- ب- نعم .
- ج- لا .
- د- لاوافق .
- هـ- لا أدري .

- ٤- هل توافق على أن زيادة واردات الدوله الماديه (الميرانيه)

مثل كما هو حاصل فى المملكة وخططها التنمويه الطموحه - يـؤدى
بالتالى الى زياده عدد افراد الشرطه وتأمين أحسن وسائل التدريب
والتاهيل لهم .

- أ- نعم بكل تأكيد .
- ب- نعم .
- ج- لا .
- د- لا بكل تأكيد
- هـ- لا أدري .

٥- هل تعتقد أن زياده الجرائم - كالقتل والسطو والسرقه وهتـك
العرض - وكثره حوادث المرور يـؤدى الى ضرورة رفع عدد رجال الشرطه
لمقابله هذه المشاكل الاجتماعيه .

- أ- نعم بكل تأكيد .
- ب- نعم .
- ج- لا
- د- لا بكل تأكيد .
- هـ- لا أدري .

٦- حسب خبرتك العمليه بمجال الشرطه - ما هى السنوات من الجدول الاتى
التي تعتقد انها كانت تعتبر أكثر الفترات تجسيدا للمشاكل
الاجتماعيه المذكوره فى السؤال رقم (٥) اعلاه :

- أ- السنوات من ١٣٥٩ هـ - الى ١٣٦٩ هـ .
- ب- السنوات من ١٣٦٩ هـ - الى ١٣٧٩ هـ .
- ج- كل هذه السنوات من ١٣٥٩ هـ الى ١٣٧٩ هـ .
- د- لا أعتقد انه كان يوجد مشاكل صعبه فى تلك الفترات .
- هـ- لا أدري .

٧- استطرادا للسؤال رقم (٦) ما هو مصدر تلك المشاكل (الجرائم)
فى نظرك .

- أ- لم يكن هناك مشاكل صعبه كما ذكرت فى اجابتي السابقه .
- ب- كان المصدر الرئيسى لتلك المشاكل هم المواطنيين " اهل البلد " .
- ج- كان المصدر الرئيسى لتلك المشاكل هم الوافدون " الاجانب "
- د- كان المصدر الرئيسى لتلك المشاكل مريج من المواطنيين والاجانب
ولكن المواطنيين هم الغالبية لارتكاب تلك الجرائم .
- هـ- كان المصدر لتلك المشاكل هم مزيج من المواطنيين والوافدين
ولكن الوافدين هم الغالبية لارتكاب تلك الجرائم .

و- فى نظرى أن النسبه متساويه بين الموظفين والوافدين لارتكاب تلك الجرائم .

٨- حسب خبرتك العمليه ومعلوماتك الخاصه ما هى الفترات الاتيه - التى تعتبرها أكثر الفترات تجسيدا لتلك المشاكل الاجتماعيه (الجرائم) المذكوره سابقا :-

- أ - السنوات من ١٣٧٩هـ الى ١٣٨٩هـ .
- ب - السنوات من ١٣٨٩هـ الى ١٣٩٩هـ .
- ج - كل هذه السنوات .
- د - لا اعتقد أن هناك مثل تلك المشاكل فى هذه الفترات .
- هـ - لا أدرى .

٩- استكمالا للسؤال رقم (٨) ما هو فى نظرك - المصدر الرئيسى لتلك المشاكل الاجتماعيه :-

- أ - لا يوجد مشاكل صعبه حسبما ذكرت فى اجابتي السابقه .
- ب - كان المصدر الرئيسى لتلك المشاكل هم المواطنين " اهل البلد " .
- ج - كان المصدر لتلك المشاكل هم الوافدين " الاجانب " .
- د - كان المصدر الرئيسى لتلك المشاكل هم مزيج من المواطنين والوافدين ولكن الوافدين أكثر نسبه .
- هـ - كان المصدر الرئيسى لتلك المشاكل هم مزيج من المواطنين والوافدين ولكن المواطنين أكثر نسبه .
- و - فى نظرى ان النسبه متساويه فى ارتكاب تلك الجرائم .

١٠- حسب خبرتك العمليه هل زياده عدد الوافدين " الاجانب " للمملكه له تأثير مباشر على ارتفاع نسبه الجرائم بصفه عامه :-

- أ - نعم بكل تأكيد .
- ب - نعم .
- ج - لا .
- د - لا بكل تأكيد .
- هـ - لا أرى .

١١ - ماهى أكثر الجرائم حدوثا - فى نظرك - بسبب زياده عدد الاجانب خصوصا

فى السنوات العشرين الاخيره من ١٣٨٩هـ - الى ١٣٩٩هـ .

- أ- القتل .
- ب- السطو والسرقة .
- ج- اشعال الحرائق لاختفاء السرقات .
- د- جرثم النشل المستتر .
- هـ- هتك العرض والمخدرات .
- و- كل هذه الجرائم ارتفعت بشكل ظاهر .

- ز - كل هذه الجرائم واقعه ولكنها غير مرتفعه .
ج - لا يوجد جرائم من هذا النوع .

١٢ - ماهى أكثر مشاكل الوافدين الى المملكة فى نفس الفتره السابقه
والتي لا تشمل على طابع اجرامى ولكنها تشغل الشرطه .

- أ - حوادث المرور
ب - مشاكل هروب العمال .
ج - مشاكل مخاصمات العمال مع بعضهم أو مع كافليهم .
د - كل هذه المشاكل
هـ - لا يوجد مشاكل من هذا النوع .
١٣ - هل تعتقد انه من الافضل قفل باب الاستخدام للاجانب من الان فصاعدا
والاكتفاء بما لدينا منهم حاليا .

- أ - نعم بكل تأكيد
ب - نعم - الا عند الضروره
ج - لا

د - لا بكل تأكيد

هـ - لا أدري .

١٤ - هل تعتقد أن قفل باب الاستخدام سيؤدى الى :-

- أ - انخفاض نسبة الجرائم والمشاكل الاجتماعيه .
ب - زيادة نسبة الجرائم والمشاكل الاجتماعيه .
ج - لن يؤثر على نسبة انخفاض وارتفاع الجرائم .
د - لا أدري .

١٥ - هل تعتقد أن اتساع وازدياد التعليم له تاثير مباشلا على تقدم

اعمال الشرطه اداريا وفنيا وعدديا :

أ - نعم بكل تأكيد .

ب - نعم

ج - لا

د - لا بكل تأكيد

هـ - لا أدري .

某某有限公司

٢١٩٨١ / ٢١٩٨٠

1980/1981

MICHIGAN STATE UNIV. LIBRARIES



31293101892580