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This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

On-Going Evaluation of the Planning, Implementation
and the Tenancy (Farm) Size of the Rahad ,
Irrigation Project of Sudan 1

presented by
Elsayed A. A. Zaki

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

 

__Eh.._D_._degree in Agricultural
Economics
Major professor -

January ll, 1980
Date

 

0—7 639

 

 

OVERDUE FINES:
25¢ per day per item

RETURNIKS LIBRARY MATERIALS:

Place in book return to remove
charge from circulation records

 

 

AN ON-GOING EVALUATION OF THE PLANNING,
IMPLEMENTATION, AND TENANCY (FARM) SIZE OF
THE RAHAD IRRIGATION PROJECT OF THE SUDAN

By
Elsayed Ali Ahmed Zaki

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Agricultural Economics

1979

ABSTRACT

AN ON-GOING EVALUATION OF THE PLANNING,
IMPLEMENTATION, AND TENANCY (FARM) SIZE OF
THE RAHAD IRRIGATION PROJECT OF THE SUDAN

By
Elsayed Ali Ahmed Zaki

Agriculture plays a major role in the Sudanese
economy and generates about 40 percent of the GDP. Ir-
rigated agriculture, which is largely owned by the public
sector, contributes one half of the agricultural output.

The Rahad project is a 300,000 feddan irrigation
scheme currently under construction and implementation in
the Sudan. Settlers were established in the Rahad project
in 1977, and by 1978/79, 40 percent of those planned, or
about 5,000 households, had been settled. Tenants were
assumed to have an average household size of five, and all
tenants were allocated a 22 feddan tenancy irrespective
of their household size and composition. Since numerous
problems were encountered in the planning and implementation
of the project, it is appr0priate to conduct an on-going
evaluation of the project to provide guidelines for the
Rahad project management and policy makers who are plan-
ning to bring two million feddans of irrigated land under
cultivation over the next decade. The objectives of the
study are to:

1. Study the planning of the Rahad project in historical

perspective

Elsayed Ali Ahmed Zaki

2. analyze the implementation of the project
3. describe the socio-economic characteristics of the
tenants
A. study the economics of tenancy size and recommend
alternative tenancy sizes consistent with the needs
of settlers and the objectives of the project
5. recommend improvements in the preparation, implemen-
tation and distribution of land in the project
The data were obtained from various sources: the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Deve10pment,
the Ministry of Planning, the Rahad project publications,
the project consultants, Sir M. MacDonalds and Partners.
Tambul Pilot Farm, an interview with the project planners
and managers and a field survey of 125 tenants in April,
1978.
During the planning stage, the major concern was

with the macro aspects of the project. Although six ap-

..praisals were carried out in the period 1965/73, problems

of implementation, tenancy size and the tenants' role in
farming were overlooked or not treated adequately. Mech-
anisms could have been adopted before project approval in
1973 to handle the widely recognized problems of inade-
quate preparation, resource limitations, uncertainty and
lack of coordination (even though coordination was ef-
fective later on in trouble shooting). Overall, more ap-

propriate monitoring techniques could have been used. Such

Elsayed Ali Ahmed Zaki
measures should help the project (chosen from among competing
designs) achieve its potential.

The field survey revealed that tenants have a modest
role in decision making. Tenants control only about 2 percent
of the production costs. A strong case can be made on ef-
ficiency grounds to increase the role of the tenant in decision
making, including the number and timing of water application,
labor allocation and whether mechanical power should be used
for various field Operations.

The analysis of the tenant survey revealed that an
equity problem exists under the present fixed tenancy al-
location policy. The tenant households were heterogeneous:
absolute, labor and consumer equivalents per tenant house—
hold ranged between 1 and 16, 1 and 8.3 and l and 10.? re-
spectively. There was a wide variation in the tenant annual
household expenditures ranging between Ls 600 and Ls 1600.

A method was deve10ped for computing alternative tenancy sizes
on the basis of tenant household sizes, annual expenditures
(the tenancy being almost the exclusive source of income),
coefficients of productivity and net returns per feddan ob-
tained from the field survey. Since the policy of fixed
tenancy size may lead to wide income differentials, variable
tenancy sizes of 11, 22 and 33 feddans for small, medium and
large tenant households are recommended. Under this proposal,
after the original number of households receive land, 15

percent of the land would still be available for additional

Elsayed Ali Ahmed Zaki
households. Since the project is only #0 percent settled,
the pr0posed change in tenancy size should be undertaken

as soon as possible.

Dedicated with gratitude and appreciation to my
parents, my wife Widad M. Eisa, our son Elsiddig and
daughter Bashaer. Also dedicated to my Muslim brothers

who are working for the Islamic cause.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to thank the members of his
guidance committee: Professors Raleigh Barlowe, Dereke
Byerelee, Carl K. Eicher, Carl Leidholm, A. Allan Schmid
and Warren Vincent: and Larry Connor who was my temporary
major professor for the first year. Professor Carl K.
Eicher, Chariman of the guidance committee, has provided
guidance and encouraged me during the entire course of
the graduate program. Professor A“ Allan.Schmid, the re-
search supervisor, has shown deep interest and given
valuable insights, direction and encouragement, particularly
when it was most needed. Thanks are extended to all the
faculty and the graduate students of the Department of
Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, for
the friendly attitude and the opportunity for intellectual
interaction.

Much appreciation is extended to the African
American Institute for financial support throughout my
graduate studies and for funding of this research: the
Rahad Agricultural Corporation for providing all needed
financial support and access to the records and publica-
tions: the Ministry of Flaming (Sudan) for granting me

leave of absence and continuing to pay my salary while

iii

on leave; and for giving access to the Rahad project
documents: the Office of the Cultural Counsellor, Embassy
of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Washington, D.C.
and especially Sayed Osman H. Ahmed for their cooperation:
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) for permission to use their material on the Sudan
and the Rahad project consultants-~Sir M. MacDonald and
Partners, for financing my stay in their office and allow—
ing access to the Rahad project reports and publications.

Numerous individuals have been a driving force in
this research through their contributions, encouragement,
interaction, comments and support. I extend my gratitude
to all of them and particularly my friend and colleague,
Dr. Ahmed A. Osman who facilitated my admission to this
department; Dr. J. Price Gittinger of the IBRD—Economic
Development Institute, Mr. Siceley of the IBRD-International
DeveloPment Association, Sayed Ibrahim Mohammed Ibrahim,
the Executive Director of the Rahad project, Sayed Tagel
Din Ibrahim Omar the Director of Settlement in the Rahad
project, and other staff members of the Rahad Agricultural
Corporation: my friend and colleague Abdel Razig E.
Muhammed for his insightful comments: my friends and col-
leagues Eisa M. Eisa and Ismail M. Hamad who conducted the
field survey: my wife Widad M. Eisa for tabulating and
coding the data: and Paul Wolberg of the Agricultural
Economics Programming Unit for computor work.

I am also indebted to Mrs. Lucy Wells and Cathy
Cooke for typing the draft manuscript, Mrs. Linda Bingen

iv

for editing and assembling the dissertation: and Mrs.
Martha West for typing the final manuscript.

There are those to whom extending thanks, gratitude
and appreciation is not enough. To them I dedicated this
work.

For this work (and for everything), my praise and
thanks be to Almighty Allah "God", the Greater of the
Worlds, Most Gracious and Most Merciful. May He be pleased

with me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x111
List of Terms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . xiv
CHAPTER PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION. 1
A. Agriculture in the Sudanese Economy . . . . . 2
B. Public Investments in Irrigation Projects . a
C. The Need for On-going Evaluation. . . . 7
D. Justification for the Choice of Rahad‘
Project as a Case Study . . . . . . . . . 10
E. The Statement of the Problem. . . . . 11
F. The Objectives of the Study . . . . . . . . 16
G. The Organization of the Study . . . . . . . 17
II. PROJECT DESCRIPTION, SOURCES OF DATA,
METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION . . 18
A. Description of the Rahad Project. 18
1. Project location. . . . . . . . . . l8
2. The Irrigation Network. . . . . . . . . . 20
3. The Tenant Settlement . . . . . . . . . 20
4. The Agricultural Production . . . . . . . 21
B. Sources ofTData . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
C. Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
D. The Method of Analysis. . . . . . . 26
III.PLANNING FOR THE RAHAD PROJECT. 28
A. The Roseires Dam. . . Q . . . . . . . . 28
l. Intensification and Diversification
of Already Existing Schemes . . 29
2. Extensions of the Gezira Scheme (Managil)

and Construction of New Pump Irrigation
Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vi

30

IV.

3. Hydroelectric Power. . . . . . . . .
B. Rahad Project Preparation. . . . . . . .

1. Preparation Stage 1: Identification

As Part of the Roseires Preinvestment

Survey~. . . . .

2. Preparation Stage II: IBRD Appraisal

Missions . . . . . . . . .
3. Preparation Stage III: The Gravity-
Pump Irrigation Controversy. . .

A. Preparation Stage IV: The Rahad Pump

Irrigation Project . . . . . . . . .
C. Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LESSONS FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RAHAD
PROJECT. . . . . . . .

A. Towards A Conceptual Framework For An
Evaluation of the Implementation of
Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. Literature Review. . . . . . . . . .
2. A Conceptual Framework . . . . . . .

B. Evaluation of Project Implementation .

1. Problems of Measuring the Evaluation
of Implementation. . . . . . . .

2. Criteria for Evaluating Implementation

C. The Implementation of the Rahad Project.
1. Project Objectives . . . . . . . .
a. The Need for Coordination in the

Rahad Project. . . . .
b. The Effort to Coordinate the

2. Coordination of Project Implementation

Implementation of the Rahad Project.

3. The Interdependence of the Project

vii

Components . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. The Main Factors Contributing to Delays in
Project Implementation . . . . . . . . . .
E. The Tenant As The Producer . . . . . . .
F. Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31
32

32
36
4O

#6

50

51

51
55

59

7O
73
78

81
84
89

VI.

ROLE AND RELATIONSHIP OF THE TENANT WITH THE
PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHAR:
ACTERISTICS OF THE TENANTS. . . . . . . . . . .

A.

C.

The Role of the Tenant and the Project
Management in DecisioneMaking . . . . . . .

1. The System of Payment For The Use of
Irrigation Water, land and other
Resources . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. Irrigation Control. . . . . .

3. Choice of Crops and Crap Mix.

A. Production and Marketing. . .

5. Non-Farm Occupation . . . . .

6. Provision of Service. . . . .

SocioéEconomic Characteristics of the Tenant.

1. Household Composition . . . .

2. Previous Occupations of Tenants
3. Occupation Outside the Tenancy.
4. Experience in Irrigated Farming

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ANALYSIS OF TENANCY SIZE. . . . . . . .

A.

B.
C.

Evolution of Tenancy Size in the Rahad
Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Change of Crop-Mix and Rotation . .

A Method for Generating Policy Options on
Tenancy Size. 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O

l. Assumption About Sudan Government
Policies Concerning Irrigated Agri—
culture . . . . . . .

2. VariablesAffeCtingTenancy Size . . . .

3. Tenancy Size Computation Formulae . . .

A. Labor Requirements Computation Formulae

5. Potential Supply of Household Labor
Computation Formulae, . . . . . . . . .

The Computation 6f Alternative Tenancy Sizes.

1. Calculation of the Financial Net Returns

Per Feddan of Cr0p._. . . . . . . . .

2. Test-of Variation in Net Returns to
Household Labor Per Feddan of Cotton. .

viii

92

114
115
117

117
119

120

121
122
122
125

127

128

130

a. Labor Equivalents and Classification

of Tenant Households . . . . . . . . 130
b. A Statistical Test of the Variation
in Net Returns of Cotton . . . . . . . . 133

3. Tenant Household Annual EXpenditures:
A Basis_For Tenant Target Incomes. .‘. . . . 137

a. Variations in Tenant Annual House-
hold Expenditures. . . . . . . . . . . . 137
b. Consumer Equivalents and Classification .3
of Tenant Households . . . . . . . . . . 138
c. Tenant Target Incomes. . . . . . . . . . 139

4. Crop Land Ratios For Different Rotations . . 140

5. Results and Analysis of Tenancy Sizes. . . .‘143
E. Comparison of Monthly Labor Requirements For A
22 Feddan Tenancy With The Potential Household it
supply Of Labor. . O O O O O O O O O O I O O O I l 5
1. Monthly Labor Requirements (Demand) For A #
22 Feddan Tenancy. O O O O O O O O O O O O l 5
2. Maximum Potential Household Supply of 4
Labor. . I O O O I O O O O O I I O O O O O O l 9
3. A Comparison of the Peak Demand For Labor
in Cotton Crop Establishment and Groundnuts
ProductionMActivities With The Potential 1 0
Household Supply of Labor. . . . . . . . . . 5
F. Comparison of Net Returns From A 22 Feddan
Tenancy With Annual Household Expenditures By
Consumer Equivalent Household Groups . ... . . 153
G. Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
VII: SUMMARY, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
A. Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 157
B. Policy Implication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
1. Planning of Irrigation Projects. . . . . . . 165
2. Implementation of Irrigation Projects. . .. 167
30 Tenancy (Farm) 8126. e e e e e e e e e e o O 170
C. Suggestions for Future Research. . . . . . . . . 17A

ix

APPENDICES

Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

, BIBLIOGRAPHY.

C.

D.

Detailed Computations of the

Financial Net Returns to Tenant

Household Labor Per Feddan of Cotton.

The Percentage of the Production

Costs Paid Directly by the Tenant .

The Labor and Consumer Equivalents

of Tenant Households. . . .

The Percentage Share of Hired Labor
in Harvesting and Post Harvesting
Activities of Cotton Under the Re-

sponsibility of the Tenant.

Approximations of Annual Household

Expenditures of Tenants .

.178
.186

.189

192

.195

.198

TABLE

1.1

1.2

' 1.3

1.4

2.1

4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

.4.5

LIST OF TABLES

Percentage Contribution of Agriculture in

the Sudan to the Gross Domestic Product at
Factor Costs and Current Prices, Selected .
Years 1955/56 to 1982/83. . . . . . . . . .

Three Years Average of the Percentage of the
Cultivated Area and the Percentage Share of

the Total Production of the Main Crops in the
sudan I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

The Expansion Plan for Irrigation Projects
in the Sudan I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

Differences Among Irrigation Projects in

Gross Tenancy Size, Maximum Number of Tenancies
Allowed Per Tenant, CrOps Grown, Crapping In-
tensity and System of Production in the Sudan .

Sample of Tenants Surveyed, Number and Per-
centage of Tenants to the Block and Village
Population. ‘ I I I I I I . I I I I I . I I .

The Different Characteristics of The Competitive
Rahad Projects Evaluated at the Various Stages
of the Project Preparation. . . . . . . . .

Rahad Project Objectives As Reported By The
Implementation Executives Interviewed . . . .

List of Studies Undertaken After the Approval
and During The Implementation of the Rahad
PrOjeCt I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

Tenants Ranking of Selected Problems in the
Rahad PrOjGCt I I I I I I I4 I I. I I I I I I I

Tenants Ranking of Reasons For Late Settle-
ment in the Rahad Project Area. . . . . . . . .

Tenants Ranking of Settlement Difficulties
in the Rahad Project. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xi

PAGE

14

24

33

67

69

85

87

88

5.1
5.2
5-3
5.4
5.5
6.1

6.2

6.3

6.4
6.5

6.6
6.7
6.8

6.9

6.10
6.11

6.12

Tenant Household Composition by Age-Group, 6
Absolute and Percentage Distribution. . . . . . . 10

Age, Sex and Percentage Distribution of Sample

Of Tenants. 0 e e e o e e e 0.- o o e o o e e o e o 108

Marital Status of Sample of Tenants, Number
and Percentage Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . 108

Sample of Tenant Households, Age, Sex Composition
and Distribution by Relationship. . . . . . . . . 110

Occupation, Number and Percentage Distribution
of Sample of Tenants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Adult—Male Labor Equivalent Weights by Sex
and Age I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 132

Classification of Households According to the
Adult Male Labor Equivalents and the Net Returns
to Household Labor Per Feddan of Cotton . . . . . 134

Net Returns to Tenant Households Per Feddan
Of All crops I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 137

Consumer Equivalent Weights . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Approximations of Annual Household Expenditures
by Consumer Equivalent Tenant Groups. . . . . . . 140

Crop Land Ratios for Various Crap Rotations . . . 142
Computations of Tenancy Sizes in Feddans. . . . . 144
Time Flow of‘Crop-Establishment Activities of

Cotton and Their Labor Requirements per Feddan

in Adult Male Labor Days. . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Time Flow of Production Activities of Groundnuts

and Their Labor Requirements Per Feddan in Adult
Male Labor Days 0 e e o e e e e e __ e o e e e e e o 148

Monthly Calculations of Adult Male Day Equiv-
alents of Cotton and Groundnuts . . . . . . . . . 150

The Maximum Potential Household Supply of Labor
Per Month By Household Labor Equivalent Groups. . 151

A Comparison of A 22 Feddan Tenancy Returns

With the Annual Household Expenditures of Tenant
Household Consumer Equivalent Groups. . . . . . . 154

xii

 

 

 

 

 

' LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES PAGE
2.1 The Map of the Rahad Project. . . . . . . . . 19
4.1 Implementation: A Production Process . . . . 56
4.2 Measurable Differences in the Implementation

Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.3 Input-Output Flow of the Rahad Project. . . . 72
5.1 The Organization of Agricultural Production

in the Rahad Project. . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.1 The Relationship Between Land Ratios of

Crops Grown, The Net Return to Tenant House—

hold Labor, and The Household Size. . . . . . 123
6.2 A Graph Comparing The Tenant Household

Potential Supply of Labor With The Labor
Requirements of Cotton Crop Establishment
and Groundnuts Production Activities. - . - - 152

xiii

Abu VI:
Abu XX:

Acala
442:

ADC:

AID:

ARC:
B.K.:

CEWC:

Dura:

FAD:

Feddan:
Gaffir:
HTS:

IBRD:

IDA:

Ground-
nuts:

LIST OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

The irrigation canal which feed the tenancy.

The terminal minor irrigation canal which supply
Abu IV.

A variety of medium staple cotton grown in the
Rahad project as well as other irrigation schemes.
Agricultural Deve10pment Corporation (1967-1973)
Arab Fund

Agency for International Development-The United
States

Agricultural Research Corporation

Big Kantar of Seed Cotton, approximate weight is
315 pounds

Central Electricity and Water Corporation
Sorghum Vulgare, the staple diet of the Sudan
Economic Development Institute of the IBRD

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations

A feddan is 1.038 areas
The irrigation water superintendent

Hunting Technical Services: A British Engineering

and Consulting Firm

International Bank for Reconstruction and Deve10p-
ment.

International Development Association of the IBRD

Peanuts, the variety usually grown is Ashford

xiv

 

K.F.: Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development

Leguminous‘
fodder: The recommended leguminous fodder for the Rahad

project is philibisara

Ls: Sudanese pound

MMP: Sir Murdoch MacDonald and Partners: A British
Consulting firm

RAC: Rahad Agricultural Corporation

SF: Saudi Fund for Deve10pment

SPC: Supreme Planning Council

Syndicate: Sudan Plantation Syndicate which was responsible
for the management of the Gezira scheme and other
cotton schemes in the Sudan before Independence.

XV

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Agriculture plays a central role in the economy
of the Sudan. The government of the Sudan is constantly
bringing new land under controlled irrigation, and these
public investments in irrigation have transformed the
agricultural sector. The planning, implementation, and
determination of appropriate tenancy size for irrigation
projects raise major issues that pose numerous problems
for planning authorities and policy makers. The Rahad
irrigation project currently under construction presents
an opportunity to investigate these issues: an on-going
evaluation of this project will provide a better under-
standing of the problems.

The determination of tenancy size, on which basis

the land is allocated to the tenants, affects both the

tenants' productivity and the overall project performance.

During project implementation, the accumulation of data
and information on the socio-economic characteristics

of the selected tenants, the identification of technical

coefficients of production, and the accurate estimation of

financial returns will result in a more accurate determi-
nation of tenancy size and equitable land allocation.

1

A. Agricu1ture in the Sudanese Economy

While the Sudan is a country of vast agricultural
resources, it is in the poorest quartile of the world's
nations. Out of 200 million feddans of productive land
suitable for both crop and animal production, less than
10 percent is currently used (13,34). The annual per
capita income has been between $100 and $120, but because
.of inflation has recently increased to more than $250 (44).
Furthermore, most of the economy is poorly structured and
a large segment is in the non-monetized traditional sector.

Although the percentage contribution of agriculture
to the gross domestic product at factor cost is declining
(see Table 1.1), the role of agriculture in the Sudanese
economy is still profound. Not only does agriculture con-
tribute to food production, raw materials, local industry,
foreign exchange earnings, and employment, but a large part
of the value-added contribution of non-agricultural sectors
can also be attributed to processing, transportation, mar-
keting, and various services performed on agricultural
products. According to provisional tabulation of the 1973
Population Census, the agricultural sector employs 72.2
percent of the people (34). Furthermore, about 89 percent
of the population live in rural areas and are thus directly
dependent on the agricultural sector. Agricultural exports
provide 98 percent of foreign exchange earnings (27), and

the government derives directly and indirectly 50 percent

mpczooo< osoocH Hmcowpmz amcflzsmam anneapmz Ho Hmsmficflz .moapmwvmpm mo pCmEpAMQmQ

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nmoam>mn oHEocoom ocm Hawoom no“ swam nmmwwxwm one: .mcficcmam annowpmz mo hhpmwcflso

 

.mmumm,.oo ma magma .msoa .mogooe monocoooom one

 

p

 

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no snowmen:
upmnpm o>fimcmsmnmsoo <

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um>mcmuv :.:mv:m map 90% zwo

«spflsom one pcoesoaoem .spzonog .cofimmfls pomssoaoem mozo\qum

 

 

 

 

 

moonzom m30ahd> Scum omaflmsoo «mmomoom
ooa ooH ooa ooH ooml. ooH ooH ooa Hopes
no no o-nw. [msmo o.ow H.ww, o.mo o.on ouspaoo
-Hcmoacoz .m
.m.: .m.: .m.: «.mw o.oa o.om m.mm m.mw, xoopm
-m>flq An
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noun mono Am
mm mm 0.5: H.mm m.o¢ m.s¢ :.sm o.ao caspaso
-flcmo .H
omo\mooa oaa\osoa noa\nsoa a~s\HRoH mos\mooa moooa mooofl mom\mmoa copoom

 

 

mo\~ooa

os oM\mmoH mmams omaomqmm .mmonm ezmmmoo ozo memoo moeoam a< eoooomm
oHammzoo mmomo mmo os z<oom was zH amoeqoonoa mo oneomHmezoo mooezmommm H.H mamas

u
of its revenue from the agricultural sector (34). Hence,
in the foreseeable future, notwithstanding p0pu1ar wishful
thinking about the possibility of the discovery and ex-
traction of oil, agriculture is likely to remain the basis
for development efforts.

Sudanese agriculture is characterized by a marked
dualism between a modern sector, composed of irrigated
and mechanized rain-fed (dry land) agriculture, and a tra-
ditional agriculture and livestock sector. Government ef-
forts and interests have been directed primarily towards
the modern sector to the relative neglect of the tra-
ditional sector (Osman, 53). The lower risk and uncer-
tainty associated with modern farming reinforces this

attitude.

 

B. Public Investment in Irrigation Projects

Within the modern agricultural sector, the irrigated
agriculture sub-sector receives the maximum attention of
government policy makers. Historically, the government of
the Sudan has financed the supply of irrigation water, land,
capital and management. A number of factors help explain
the government decision to assume this role. First, there
are a variety of interdependencies in the construction of
large irrigation projects. For example, when the govern-
ment invests in large infra-structures like dams, irrigation
canals, accessible roads, etc. which have investment in-

divisibilities, the economies of scale are gained. If

more than one firm invests in these projects, it is probable
that a higher per unit cost will be created. This is i1-
lustrated by the hundreds of small irrigation schemes scat-
tered along the Blue and White Niles which constitute the
present Agrarian Reform Corporation in the Sudan. Second,
irrigation projects with long gestation periods are par-
ticularly vulnerable to changes in factor prices, product
prices, and systems of production, as well as distribution
of ownership of rights and other political considerations.
Furthermore, investment in irrigation projects produces
immobile assets, coupled with limited alternatives in
product-mix--given the soil, climate, and farming experience.
Costs associated with selling or purchasing these factors
of production may be prohibitively high. Once a dam is
built, it is indispensible. For a public investment entity
the cost of a dam can be considered a sunk cost (Gittinger,
23) but for a private firm such possible immobility and
its associated costs scares the firm and limits its in-
vestment in the production of the commodities under con-
sideration--irrigation water being the intermediate good.
The decentralized market fails when the private firms
either produce less than optimal amounts or fail to pro-
duce the good at all (Burkhead and Miner, 10). To provide
this good in the public sector is primarily a political
decision (Schmid, 62).

Another plausible agrument for public provision of

irrigation water is found in cases where the indigenous

6
private sector may not be capable of undertaking the in-
vestment because of a lack of financial and managerial
resources (44). In contrast, the government may be able
to enlarge its opportunity set by international borrowing,
which is not readily available for the private sector.

In the preceding discussion, a case for public pro—
vision of irrigation water has been demonstrated. In fact,
the government of the Sudan has always attempted to de-
velop and eXpand agricultural land by controlled irrigation.
In the past it invested in all the gravity irrigation proj-
ects. Smaller pump irrigated schemes along the Blue and
White Niles had been developed initially by the private
sector, but the government nationalized them during 1968-
70 (Adam, 1). Pump schemes along the Nile, with the ex-
ception of small vegetable and orchard pump schemes and
the Zeidab scheme which was nationalized along with others,
were originally developed by the government. In brief,
all four million feddans under irrigation, except for
small areas commanded by minor schemes have been owned
and managed by the public sector (34). The government owns
about one-quarter of the land under cultivation, which is
mainly the irrigated area (See Table 1.2), and its ir-
rigation projects produce about half the agricultural out-
put of the country. The government is expanding the existing
schemes and developing new irrigation projects. The total
Six4Year Plan appropriation of‘LS 350 millions is designed

to complete the deveIOpment of Rahad I, three sugar

7

plantations, a kenaf plantation, the Jongeli Canal, and
the consolidation and expansion of irrigated areas in
the existing schemes (34, 44). Further eXpansion plans
for the 19803 are shown in Table 1.3.

With the exception of the sugar plantations, the
development of irrigated agriculture followed in the foot-
steps of the Gezira scheme, which first operated in 1925
and is considered a landmark. Additions to Gezira, such
as Managil (1956), and Guneid (1967), new irrigation proj-
ects like New Halfa (1964), Pump Schemes (nationalized in
1968-70), Essuki (1971), and Rahad (1977) were developed
with similar cropping patterns, organizational set-ups

and tenant-management production relations.

C. The Need For On-Goigngvalgation:
Choosingthe Best Project vs. Making
the Project Work
An on-going evaluation aims to identify implementa-
tion constraints and to adapt the project to changing
objectives and circumstances (31). Such an evaluation
can critically examine decisions on major issues that
affect project performance. In this context, an on-going
evalution can improve project implementation and achieve
project objectives.
Some kind of formal or informal evaluation in
economic and/or social terms is usually done prior to proj-
ect acceptance and execution. This is done to assure that

the best project is chosen or that the project meets net

'8

TABLE 1.2 THREE YEARS AVERAGE OF THE PERCENTAGE OF THE
CULTIVATED AREA AND THE PERCENTAGE SHARE OF
TOTAL PRODUCTION OF THE MAIN CROPS IN THE SUDAN

 

 

 

 

 

 

1956767-1959/69 1973/76-1975/76
Type of AxeragetPercentage Average Percentage
Ppgduction - Area Production Area Production
Irrigated 22.4 53.8 18.5 50.3
Non-Irrigated 77.6 46.2 8115 49.7
Modern 47.2 69.2 45.6 71.2
Traditiona1jj 52.8 30.8 54.4 7‘28.2
Public Sector 27.6 54.9 22.3 51.6
Private ._72.4 45.1: 27.7 48.4

 

SOURCEH Ministry of National Planning, "The SixAYear Plan
for Social and Economic Development 1977/78-1982/83,
Sudan, 1977 in Arabic, Table 1.9 p. 35.

TABLE 1.3 THE EXPANSION PLAN FOR IRRIGATION PROJECTS IN

 

 

 

THE SUDAN
Project Area_jn Feddans
Rahad II 500,000
Four Sugar Schemes 182,000
Expansion of Pump Schemes 380,000
Setit on Atbara River 600,000
Total 1,662,000

SOURCE: ILO/UNDP Employment Mission, "Growth, Employment,
and Equity: A Comprehensive Strategy for the Sudan,"
(Geneva: International Labor Office, 1976), p.50

9

return thresholds set by the financing organization. PoSt
evalutions of projects are subsequently used to test the
extent to which a project has attained its physical ob-
jectives, benefitted the target groups, or efficiently

used resources. Although useful in planning future proj-
ects, these post evaluations do not improve the prod-
uctivity of the current projects. But the primary purpose
of on-going evaluations is to serve as an early check on
the effectiveness of projects and programs and to provide

a basis for adaptive action to improve performance. Per-
haps planning authorities have put too much of their analy-
tic resources:into choosing the best project and not enough
into making the chosen project achieve its potential.

An on-going evaluation is needed when a project
takes a long period from approval to completion. The Rahad
project, for example, was appraised and finally approved
in 1973. The execution of the project, however, is still
in progress in 1979 andmmy require one or two more years
to complete. During such long implementation periods many
changes may have been introduced because of changing cir-
cumstances. Frequent on-the-spot management decisions,
especially those of a cumulative nature, may lead to sub-
stantial changes in the project design, target group and
objectives. As a project grows in complexity, the need
for such interim evaluation increases.

Occasionally, projects are appraised and their anti~

cipated economic and social impacts are identified at the

10

start. Yet a more detailed plan of execution may develop
from knowledge gained during project implementation. In
such cases, on—going evaluation helps to draw lessons from
past implementation eXperiences, and is especially useful
if similar activities are repeated periodically during im-
plementation. In the Rahad project, for example, tenants
should be selected each season and settled in to a speci-
fied area allocated for crops.

In contrast to project evaluation and post evaluation,
on-going evaluation would involve all the participants.
They would, perhaps, cooperateiJ1the evaluation if its
objectives and usefulness are clear, reasonably acceptable,
and of relevance to them.

The conclusions drawn from an on-going evaluation
could be useful not only for the restructuring of the proj-
ect under execution, but also for improving other irrigation

projects in the Sudan.

D. Justification for the Choice of
Rahad Projects as a Case Study

The central position of irrigated agriculture in
the Sudanese economy and the importance of agriculture in
development lead to the choice of an irrigation project
for an on-going evaluation. As shown in Table 1.3, some
1.7 million feddans are planned to come under irrigation
through the 19805. Since the Rahad project is a public

sector irrigation enterprise presently under development,

11
an on-going evaluation would be valuable not only for later
phases of the present stage of the project, but also for
its future eXpansion. This future expansion constitutes
about one-third of the overall investment program.

The Rahad project is a comprehensive program rather
than a single project, and has several components: ir-
rigation and crop production: farmer settlement; services
in the fields of processing and marketing: transportation:
education; health: etc. The project should provide readily
available data because all parties involved could be reached

with relative ease.

E. The Statement of the Problem

Experience with the development of irrigation proj-
ects, including the Gezira scheme completed in 1925
(Gaitskeil, 20), indicates that there was a large lapse
of time from the perception of the project, to the com-
mencement of work, to completion. Similarly, the Rahad
project was first appraised during 1965-67, approved in
1973 after several other appraisals: but actual construction
started in 1974. Despite this relatively long period and
repeated economic appraisals, the adequacy of the project
planning has been questionable.

A universal problem of development is the frequent
failure in program implementation (8). Failures are due
to time lags, cost overruns, revenue losses, and partici-

pants' dissatisfaction. Project planning should not only

12
be concerned with choosing the best project (based on net
returns to investment), but also with making the chosen
project work to achieve its potential.
Successful project performance depends on achieving
the planned physical output and the desirable impact on
the target group. In irrigation projects, land plots of

l and each allocated to

equal size, each called a tenancy
grow the same crops in the same proportions, are distri-
buted to tenants. With the exception of the Gezira scheme,
each tenant is allotted one tenancy. Tenants are expected
to exercise certain responsibilities at the crop—production
’ level in a manner that will be explained in detail in
Chapter V. In return, they are paid either a percentage
share of the net revenue from crop saleSCN?the net revenue
after the deduction of all production costs. The adoption
of either tenant-management relationships depends primarily
on the way the production costs are handled.

If the tenant is the ultimate producer, then a
crucial question is how much land the tenant should re-

3

oeive, given the cr0p mix? crepping intensity and system

 

1Sugar is produced in public sector plantations,
except in Guneid Scheme where the tenancy system prevails.

2Crop mix refers to the crops grown, area of each
crop within a given rotation and the sequence of cropping.

3Cropping intensity, on the other hand, refers to
the percentage of land annually put to production whether
at the tenancy or the project level.

13
of production. The survey of some selected irrigation
projects in the Sudan, presented in Table 1.4, showed the
differences among these projects in the gross tenancy sizes,
the maximum number of tenancies allowed (i.e. maximum land
area), the cropping intensity, the crop mix and the sys-
tem of production. The wide variations in tenancy size
may lead to disparities in the expected farming returns
to the tenant in the respective irrigation schemes. To
determine the tenancy size in the case of each of these
irrigation schemes, policy-makers must study the issue
in a variety of ways. However, in the Sudan, the income
criterion was not explicitly incorporated in deciding the
tenancy-size of irrigation projects. Instead, after the
size of the tenancy has been decided upon, studies were
conducted to estimate the income from the determined ten-
ancy. There was no case on record where the size of the
tenancy was altered ex post in order to alter the eXpected
returns to the tenant.

Evidence indicated that neither the financial re-
turns to the tenants as the ultimate producers at the basic
unit of production, nor the tenancy size in Rahad project
evaluation were given due consideration. With the ex-
ception of one project appraisal (Osman, 54) known to the
author, financial assessment of tenants' profits and losses
followed the economic evaluation of the project. The
Rahad Project-Roseires Preinvestment Survey Summary reads:

"At this stage of analysis the project is considered as

umapmm co>~omoa on on so» an gonads one

.aafihoaoam

.soamuooc psoscao>om on» on coaoonno macmcoa mza
gonna .asoEomsapho msunagm use ca macho hosao ovsuoca on outdoor acoscs0>om osa .mmaa.mcmczc

a

.ousaawu mcuasmam no mcomaoh you auco ha .eoccaaa song snowmac hadmcoaca mzaaaoho Hazao<m
. .moopscm 9.3.5? scam coinsow .momaom

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

.mmcccm
mzosassmod
omumzo mvsspssonm .
copes a one; ooH«,- .coppno H mm - Ana” enema
oMpmgo masccczohw
nova: a ccwq mbm, .coauoc H on Whoa “gamma
amass can
mazcvszopm
:o omumzo
nova: a and; mazccczoam
:oaaoo so .963?
mcduasmincno. op .coaaoo a ma ammfi acaa: 3m:
:oaaoo
so wring—m must mowmamm GEE oflz
.4 nope ms ..coaammi .a.: mauofl Annma-s~ma~ opus: a azam
.1 soasoo so Accwmzoa
. amzwhazm :xm mpflsocv
nope pa the H ,ma .mmma, Hmmmcmz
unoccom
anon: .926
:owaoo so mpzccsaonm
nwcapasmznoao mm soaaoo N o: mmad «page:
couaozcoam R. czmho pauses mmaccom acosmmflw>on mosozom
no soamzm haumcoucu @3690 can cozoaa< :a mean we annoy onzaazoaum<
msfimmoho modocmsos hazmsma coammfiusa
muossaam Ho 9035:: manna
sssuxaz I

 

 

z<c=m m:& 2H oneo=Dozm to zmemrm 02¢

aammzmaza qummomo .zzcmc mmozo .ezczme gum oesoqs< mmfioz<zme ac mamas:
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7.

...111

..Q

91

‘4'

15

one large farm and no account is taken of the size of

farms and the number of farmers" (25). In subsequent
evalutions, the approach was one of macro concern. The
farm budget analysis was usually performed to rationalize
what the appraised project had already given to the tenants.

Tenancy-size has been altered at various stages in
the lengthy planning process of the Rahad project, yet in
each case the underlying assumption was that tenants would
follow suit. Thus it appears that tenancy size has not
been considered explicitly in policy formalation, design,
and evaluation of the project.

Even if the selection of the tenancy size is made
on the basis of satisfying income needs of some trep-
resentative households", it ignores the heterogeneity of
the would-be tenants. There is no doubt that adequate
household earning is an important factor in?inducing_ tens
ants to maintain and stabilize production at the farm level
and consequently at the project level. The project man-
agement has the managerial advantage of retaining ten-
ancy as the unit of production and at the same time secur-
ing parity in tenant household earnings except for dis-
parities of extraneous nature. Furthermore, the selection
of the tenancy is claimed to be related to the tenant
household's expected labor supply to the cotton crop, as
perceived through the experience of policy-makers (14).
However, despite the heterogeneity in the potential labor

supply of tenant households, the potential labor supply

16
received little attention in the design of the Rahad proj-

ect. In all the irrigated schemes of Table 1.4., this
consideration was ranked low, as evidenced by the wide
variation in tenancy size.

In the course of planning and implementing the Rahad
project, the size of the tenancy was changed a number of
times. As late as six months before the first tenants
settled in, the tenancy-size was re-examined and changed
(as were crop mix and the cropping intensity). These
changes in the tenancy size were made without considering
the tenants' socio—economic characteristics and financial
returns. Thus, the amount of land and, consequently, other
resources that should be allotted to the tenant is a crucial
problem which has an important bearing on project per-

formance.

F. Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the research are as follows:
1. To study the planning of the Rahad project in historical
perspective,
2. To analyse the implementation of the Rahad project,
3. To describe the socio-economic characteristics of
the tenants,
4. To study the economics of tenancy size and recommend
alternative tenancy sizes consistent with the needs
of settlers and the objectives of the project,
5. To recommend improvement in the preparation, implemen—

tation and distribution of land in the project.

17
G. The Organization of the Study

Chapter II explains the method used to collect data
as well as the method of analysis. Chapter III reviews
the history of Rahad project planning and explores the
adequacy of the project preparation. In Chapter IV a brief
review of the literature of implementation, the results of
the inquiry on the Rahad'project implementation, the problems
faced by the project and the tenants: and the likely im-
pact of these problems on the performance are presented.

The socio-economic characteristics of the sample
of tenants surveyed are analyzed in Chapter V. Also ex-
amined are the nature of the agricultural production sys-
tem used in the Rahad project, the relation between the
project management and the tenant, and the role of the
tenant in farming decisions. In Chapter VI, a method is '
developed that incorporates the most important variables
needed to determine tenancy area. The results of the
application of this method using data from the sample of
tenants survey are presented. The returns from a fixed
tenancy size allocated to each tenant irrespective of his
household size and composition are compared with the an-
nual household expenditures of tenants. The labor require-
ments of the fixed tenancy are compared with the tenant
households potential supply of labor.

Chapter VII gives a summary of the findings and
draws policy implications for future planning,implementation

and land allocation in irrigation projects in the Sudan.

CHAPTER II

PROJECT DESCRIPTION, SOURCES OF
DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND DATA COLLECTION

In this chapter a brief description of the Rahad
project is presented. The sources of data used to analyse
the planning, implementation, and tenancy size of the
project are described: and sampling procedures for the
selection of the tenants and the method of data collection
are discussed. Included is a brief outline of the method

of analysis.

A. Description of the Rahad Project

The project consists of two major components: an
irrigation network: and agricultural production including
support services and facilities.

1. Project Location
The project area is located on the east bank of the

Rahad river and extends for 240 kilometers from near Mafaza
in the south to the confluence of the Rahad river and the
Blue Nile in the north, 160 kilometers south of Khartoum
(see attached map). The area is a flat alluvial plain
with a gentle lepe from south-east to north-west of about

.5 meters per kilometer (41).

18

l9

 

. I
\--'\oo"
)
I
I r
I .
I
hav{ _
u-r — ..--

1]"
\
‘\
:L-“x
\ I
E

 

 

 

 

 

     
   
 
   
    

....... ... 110 KV lint
All-wonhr roads:
— ior
- _ - Two In.
- .. -- Single lam
O Gtoup HO
0 Stock HO
Existing sch-mu

f—"T_'T_I_—l
O 2040 6080Km

Q

rROJECT HQ
‘\’ Jamthu

  

 

Source: By courtesy of the Ministry of Irrigation (41)
FIGURE 2.1 Rahad Project Area

 

20

2. TheIrrigatign Network

The irrigation water is conveyed by a supply canal
from Meina, on the Blue Nile, 200 kilometers north of the
Roseires Dam. The capacity of the supply canal is 105
cubic meters per second. The water is pumped into the
supply canal by electrically powered pumps, travels 84
kilometers from the Blue Nile and is siphoned under the
Dinder river to pour into the Rahad river. A barrage and
head regulator, 6 kilometers downstream from the supply
canal outfall on the Rahad River, regulate the water flow
into the subsequent irrigation network. The project's
main canal stems from the Rahad river, skirts the eastern
edge of the area, and branches into major and minor canals
to command 300,000 feddans.
3. The_Tenant Settlement

The population was concentrated along the Rahad
river and especially at the northern segment of the project
area. Traditionally the project land was utilized for
either rainfed (dry-land) agriculture or grazing. There
were few permanent homesteads because of lack of drinking
water, especially in the south-eastern part of the project
area. Those who were settled in the interior of the project
were scattered and had to be resettled for irrigation pur-
poses. The settlement administration provides village
demarcation and services such as drinking water, roads,

health and education. The project authorities had to

21

select the eligible tenants from among numerous applicants
and settle them in the apprOpriate villages.
4. The Agricultural Production

The 300,000 feddans were distributed in units of
22 feddans for eacheligible tenant. The tenancy size was
reduced from 24 feddans to the current 22 feddans in 1977
to meet a field layout condition: that the tenancy size
be a factor of the block of land irrigable from the ter-
minal irrigation channel--estimated at 88 feddan in the
Rahad project. The project management decided the amount
of land per tenancy, the cr0ps to be included in the ro-
tation, the amount of irrigation water for each crop and i
the collection, processing, and marketing of the_products.
The participants in agricultural production, namely the
project management representing irrigation and agricultural
authorities, and the tenants would be rewarded according

to a formula determined by the government.

B. Sources of Data

 

The data were obtained from the following sources:
1. Primary data were obtained by conducting a field
survey of 125 Rahad tenants during April-May, 1978.
Fourteen managers from the Rahad project and agencies
involved in project implementation were also inter-
viewed, as well as fifteen other officials from the

financing agencies and the Sudanese government

22
2. Secondary data were obtained from the Ministry of
National Planning and Rahad Agricultural Corporation
archives. Rahad project appraisal reports and docu-
ments, Tambul Pilot Farm results, the Gezira scheme

statistics were also collected.

C. Data Cgllection

A samply survey of 125 tenants was conducted at
the project site during April-May 1978, and a complete
sampling frame was obtained from the project management.
Stratified random sampling was used to select the tenants.
The stratification was based on the administrative units
of the project, known as "blocks", and this procedure aimed
at reducing the time and cost of data collection. At the
time about 100,000 feddans of the Rahad project were com-
pleted and the sample was drawn from those tenants who
were living in project villages and were farming during
the 1977/78 season. There were five settlement villages
in each of the four blocks; one village was selected at
random from each block, i.e. four out of twenty villages.
The nth tenant was selected from the rth village (Moser and
Kalton, 48). As a precautionary measure against non-response
a reserve list of the kth tenant was selected from each
village. Around 11 percent of the tenants from the rth
villages constituted the total sample size, which is

about 2.5 percent of the total tenants residing in the

23
project. Table 2.1 provides basic data on the sample size
and percentage of tenants in the block or village.

The questionnaire solicited information about vari-
ous aspects of household composition, the household and
hired labor required during the production season, the
costs, yields, total output, annual household expenditure,
problems associated with settlement, and conflicts with
the project'management.

In the one—shot survey, one of the two interviewers
or the author visited each tenant either at his home or
tenancy. Some tenants were revisited after responses to
the questionnaire had been thoroughly reviewed by the
author and the interviewers. Data on agricultural pro—
duction activities, the contribution of household and
labor, and the cost of each production activity paid by
the tenant, were based on tenant recall. Tenant's answers
were checked for consistency by comparing responses and
revisiting them to obtain sound exPlanation for any in-
consistency. Because it was the first year of the project,
the tenants' recall of the information was generally ade-
quate.

The annual household expenditure on food, clothing,
footwear, health, education, and other needs was recorded
for each tenant. Food items consumed on a daily basis
such as grain, tea , cooking oil, milk, onion, okra and
sugar were recorded in physical quantities. Other items

such as meat were given on weekly basis. Tenant's responses

24

manages ho mournsm use econosm wanna «momoom

 

s.HH m.m mma woos mmnm Hesse
m.HH H.m on mmm mass es s
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m.m m.~ mm «mm Hana H H
mPCNEmB mpgwfimm. hmPHzm mHNEmm wwwHHH> x00Hm $5.. Mme—52 .HmQESZ
mmnsan> op sooam o» are sH ens sH se nuances mmnaae> sooam
mpsmsme .Ho mpcmsoe .Ho cocsaosH 928295 mo monouamwm mo covooaom
magnum mo mm oaqsmm .Ho mi message? 909852 H.309 nonssz H.309

 

 

 

 

 

 

ZOHagsmom MU¢AAH> 9.2
£0015 BE. CH. mez<zme .mo mw<ezmommm Qz< mmmssz .QmEmDm mez<zme mo mAmE<m H.N @3429

25
were compared with household size and composition to check
for consistency. The physical quantities of these items
were then priced at the prevailing prices in scattered
shOps in the Rahad project area, and these prices were
compared to those given by the tenants. The annual clothing
and footwear needs of each household member were traced,
and tenants gave the total eXpenditure on these items in
monetary terms. They also gave the typical annual ex-
penditure on other household needs such as health, trans-
portation, social activities in monetary terms.

In addition to the survey data, information was
gathered during frequent visits to the project area before
and after the survey. The author also made field obser-
vations and recorded relevant remarks. Furthermore, the
management interviews, project reports and attendance of
official meetings were used.

The author used two approaches in interviews with
policy-makers, concerned agencies, and the Rahad manage-
ment. About\£5:informal interviews were conducted with
senior executives of some agencies involved in the project
planning and implementation. The interviewees were
Sudanese government officials: the Agency for International
Deve10pment (USAID): the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (IBRD) and its specialized agency,
the International Development Association (IDA); the
Economic Development Institute (EDI): and Sir M. MacDonald

and Partners (MMP), the project consultants. In the second

26

approach a management questionnaire was administered to
fourteen project officials who had broad knowledge of the
project management. Issues discussed included project
objectives, the evolution of the project, criteria for
tenancy allocation, implementation problems, coordination,
etc. Discussion of the criteria for tenancy allocation
focused on the amount of income that the tenant should

receive from the tenancy.

D. The Method of Analysis

To analyse the planning and implementation of the
project, the author drew on the formal management question-
naire, informal interviews, project documents, tenants'
perspectives and field observations. To analyse the socio-
economic characteristics of the tenants and the choice
of the tenancy size, the author used descriptive statistics,
frequencies, percentages, tables, graphs, etc., in de-
picting sample of tenants' characteristics, household
composition, income sources, roles in decision-making and
tenant—management relations. These data were obtained
from the field survey, the management questionnaire and
the project reports. Partial budgeting was used to cal-
culate the net returns to the household labor by deducting
from the gross receipts of agricultural production the
direct costs of production incurred by the tenant, the

costs of production paid by the management on behalf of

27

the tenant, and the cost of irrigation. A method incor-
porating the variables affecting tenancy size was deve10ped
to compute alternative tenancy sizes for consideration by

the policy-makers.

CHAPTER III

PLANNING FOR THE RAHAD PROJECT

Upon completion of the Roseires Dam in 1966, 2086
million cubic meters of irrigation water from the Blue Nile
were at the disposal of the government of the Sudan (l6).
Shortly thereafter a comprehensive investment survey of
irrigation water resource utilization was completed and
the Rahad project was proposed in the list of possible
projects. The Rahad project was irrigated the first time
in August/September 1977. This chapter examines the plan~
ning of the Rahad project over time in order to identify
the key problems, how they were resolved, and the im-

plications for planning future irrigation projects.

A. The Roseires Dam

Water storage behind the Roseires Dam made the
development of the Rahad irrigation project possible. The
Roseires Dam, completed a year ahead of schedule, in 1966,
has a reservoir with a gross storage capacity of 3024
million cubic meters. Annual provisions for sedimentation
are 15 million cubic meters, such that the total dead
storage capacity amounts to 638 million cubic meters over

the envisaged economic life of the dam. An additional 300

28

29

million cubic meters is the estimated annual evaporation
allowance. Adjusting for these losses, the rate at which
the dam approaches the minimum net operating storage
capacity of 2086 million cubic meters depends on the an-
nual rate of sedimentation.

The Roseires Dam stored water resource should have
been utilized for agricultural develOpment in several ways
(29):

l. Intensification and diversification
<3 a reagyexisting schemes

 

Intensification refers to the increase in cropping
intensity, whether by increasing the area of the crops al-
ready grown or by including new crops in the rotation.

The diversification of crOpping had been achieved--especial-
ly in the Gezira scheme by two means. The first was the
growing of temperate crOps like wheat, which requires the
relatively cooler temperatures prevailing during the
November-March period. Such creps could not be grown with-
out the elongation of the irrigation period which was made
possible by the water stored in the Roseires Dam. After

the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement1 between the Sudan and Egypt

 

lThe Sudanese share of the Nile water amounts to
18.5 milliards (thousand millions) cubic meters measured
at Aswan in.Egypt. This constitutes about 25 percent.
The effective amount, when measured at Roseires, rises to
20.5 milliard cubic meters, because of the reduced losses
and Egyptfls share amounts to 55 milliard cubic meters
(Megahed, 18).

30

all restrictions on the withdrawal of irrigation water
from the Nile and its tributaries within the Sudanese
share become unnecessary (16). But, it was only due to
the appreciable increase in the amount of stored water
after the construction of the Roseires Dam that such crops
could be grown. The second was the growing of crops like
irrigated rice which requires large quantities of irrigation
water in a relatively short period of time.
2. Extensions of the Gezira Schemeg(Managil) and con-

Mcfibmew pm iffigatfog schemeg

The utilization of the Roseires Dam for expansion
has been very sluggish. The Rahad project, for example,
which was a candidate for gravity irrigation from the
Roseires Dam, evolved slowly during a decade of appraisals
into a pump irrigation scheme: hopefully it will be com-
pleted within one or two years. When completed, it is
expected to utilize from one-eight to one-quarter of the
Roseires water, depending upon the use and non-use of the
natural flow of the Rahad river.

These intensification, diversification and expansion
efforts were supposed to take place over the final three-
year period of the dam construction (29). In mid-1974,
eight years after the completion of the dam, the financiers
and the owners debated over the percentage utilization of
the dam irrigation water resource. The financiers voiced
their findings in the following remark: "...the consid-

eration of actual monthly flows of the Blue Nile...leads

31

to the conclusion that in the last seven years, only
during one year, 1972/73--which was exceptionally dry
(one of the driest in the last 60 years)--has the dam
proved to be significantly useful for irrigation purposes:
in another year, 1969/70, it was marginally useful (14%
of its capacity), and in the remaining five years it has
not been utilized at all" (29). The Directorate General
of Irrigation, on the other hand, held the position that
"the actual percentage utilization of the Roseires storage
(1972/73) based on the calculation of the Audit Report
and excluding prewatering should be considered as more
than 30% and not 15% (16). Using its own calculation pro-
cedure the Directorate General of Irrigation concluded
that "the percentage of the utilization of Roseires water
during the last four years would vary from 29% to 42% (16).

Pending the fulfillment of the agricultural develop-
ment projects, the financiers argued that in 1980 the per-
centage utilization of the Roseires stored water will be
68% (29). The calculations of the Directorate General of
Irrigation raised the figure to 84% (16).
3. Hydroelectric Power

The building of the hydroelectric power generators

 

started two years after the dam and was completed in 1971.
This delay was additional evidence that the Roseires Dam
was underutilized. But hydroelectric power generation
made available a secure and relatively cheap source of

energy for pump irriation schemes such as the Rahad project.

32
This important factor partially tilted the decision in

favor of pump irrigation rather than the originally pro-

posed gravity irrigation for the Rahad project.

B. Rahad Project Preparation

The Rahad project passed through four stages of
project preparation. The evolution through these four
stages is presented in Table 3.1.

1. Preparation Stage_;: Identification as part
of the Roseiresflpre-invggtment survey

As revealed earlier, the Roseires irrigation project
had two parts: one dealing with the dam construction and
the other with the utilization of the stored water in agri—
cultural development. The government of Sudan in October,

1 the Rahad

1964, entrusted to two British consulting firms
irrigation project study as part of a Roseires pre-invest-
ment survey which identified and prepared irrigation proj-
ects. In March, 1966, the consultants submitted four
volume report coverixg; the engineering, agricultural and
economic aspects of the Rahad project. Although the con-
sultants studied other irrigation projects, they argued
that the Rahad project should receive priority because of
its proximity to the Gezira scheme, the relatively low

rainfall and the uniform topography which was well-suited
for gravity irrigation.(25).

 

lHunting Technical Service (HTS) and Sir M. MacDonald
& Partners (MMP)--hereafter will be referred to as the con-
sultants.

-.0~ A
a:
II...

0...

.£..

 

”3.1

‘i.

33

IABLEIB.1. THE DIFFERENT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMPETITIVE RAHAD PROJECTS EVALUATED AT
THE VARIOUS STAGES OF THE PROJECT PREPARATION ‘

1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

T551 Perceifage Wepased Parcentage
Area of Method of Inten: Crops Assumed of Tenancy Economic
Preparation Project of sity of in the Cotton and Size Rate of
Stage Period Feddans IrriggiionJCroppigg ‘Rotation,Groundnuts ' ‘ Feddans Return
I: b
a _ 430,000 Gravity 83.3 Cotton 5.5 3.x. 12 18.5
“Mm-“1"" 12337 Groundnuts 1.25 tons
Dura
(Sorghum)
Vegetables
II?“
IBRD 1968 410.000 Gravity 83.3 Cotton gggp, 18 8.0
groundnuts 5.0 B.K.
, n.a.
Agricultural 1969 410,000 Gravity +vegetab1es AQQ
Development 7.0 3.x. 12,24 19-23,
Ciggoration 1.5 tons
(. )
III: d
1330 1970 410,000 Gravity 83.3 Cotton IQRD 24 lO—lh
groundnuts 5.5 3.x.
+ n.a.
Jovernment 1971 300,000 Pumps Vegetable Gpvernment
TMCIOS e e e 26.39c
1.5 tons
711':
23313 1973 300.000 Pumps 83.3d Cotton 6.0 24‘1 9-16
Groundnuts 0.9 tons
1'
Vegetable
Tenancies

 

SOURCES: Compiled from various sources:
: Hunting Technical Service and Sir M. MacDonald and Partners ”Roseires Pre-
investment Survey, Report No.2, Rahad Project, Part I-IV, Ministry of Finance
and Economics, 1965.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development "Appraisal of the Rahad
Irrigation Project, Sudan, 1973

Ministry of Agriculture, “A Comparison Between The Gravity and Pump Irrigation
Designs of the Rahad Project: A Memorandum . Sept. 1970f

Ministry of Planning, ”A Memorandum 0n Rahad and Kenana Projects, December 1970"

Osman, A.A. ”Economic Reagpraisal of the Rahad Project, Phase 1, 410,000 Feddans,
Agricultural Development orporation, Khartoum, May, 1969"

8Hunting Technical Service and Sir M.MacDona1ds and Partners.
bBig Kantor (B.K.) of Seed Cotton,

cThe internal rates of return were very high because in the process of evaluation
the disagreeing ministries picked least costs and maximum benefits

dThe tenancy-size was again changed to 22 feddans during implementation and the
intensity of cropping was increased to 100 percent in 1977.

34
The following discussion examines the major issues

which influenced the selection of the Rahad project. First,
the Opportunity cost1 of the irrigation water resource in
agricultural production must have been perceived at the
time as higher in the Rahad project than in competitive
projects. This is primarily because the Rahad project is
in a lower rainfall zone (400-600 mm of rain) than other
competitive projects south of it (800-1000 mm of rain in
the proposed Roseires project area). The higher rainfall
areas in the south could be utilized economically with
mechanized rainfed (dry-land) agriculture and/or livestock
grazing. It was implicitly argued that the marginal pro-
ductivity of the irrigation water resource in producing
agricultural output increases with the decrease in intensity
and duration of rainfall. Thus the marginal value pro-
ductivity of irrigation water in the Rahad project area

per feddan of cr0p mix was thought to be greater than its

marginal value productivity per feddan of crop mix in the

 

1The opportunity cost of producing one unit of
commodity X is the amount of commodit I that must be
sacrificed in order to use resouce (Z to produce X rather
than'Y (Ferguson and Gould, 19) In the context of this
study, the resource in use is irrigation water (Z) as-
suming that land is not a scarce resource. Commodity X
is produced in the competitive projects. Commodity Y
is produced in the Rahad project. '.

35

competitive projects.l Since the prOposed crOp-mixes, in
which cotton was considered the principal cash crop, were
almost similar for these projects, the Rahad project looked
more attractive than the competitive projects. In any
case, uncertainty associated with the amount and timeliness
of rainfall required the inclusion of considerable idle
capacity in the irrigation network as a safeguard against
dry years. Secondly, the Rahad project area had a higher
population density, which had socio-economic and political
implications. First, it was assumed that anticipated soc-
ial problems would be fewer and financial costs of tenants'
resettlement would be lower in the Rahad project than in
competing projects where settlers might be drawn from
other areas. Second, a more densely p0pulated area would
generally have more political clout, especially in the
prevailing partisan parliamentary system at the time.

The project identified by the consultants was sup-
posed to include 430,000 feddans of land. Gravity ir-

rigation was pr0posed. The irrigation water would be

 

1The marginal value product of an input (Z) is the
change in the total value product attributable to a change
of one unit of the variable input (Z) to the roduction
process, the fixed inputs remained unchanged Bradford and
Johnson, 9, 19). Mathematically: MVP = TVP
Z

Assuming similar crop mixes for Rahad project and
the competitive projects and almost similar irrigation
network capacity, that is equal amount of irrigation per
feddan of crOp mix to accommodate for uncertainty as-
soc1ated w1th rainfall then: MVP 2y > MVP zx

36
conveyed from the Roseires Dam by a l9l-kilometer supply
canal and 338 kilometers of the Rahad river course. The
rotation with 83.3 percent crOpping intensity included
acala or sakel cotton} groundnuts and dura. The tenant
was allotted 12 feddans and an additional l/4 feddan back-
yard vegetable garden. The benefit-cost analysis resulted
in an internal rate of return of 18.5 percent2 (25).

The government of Sudan submitted the Rahad project
prepared by the consultants to the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Deve10pment (IBRD), for financing around
1967.

2. Preparation Stage II: IBRD Appraisal Missions

The IBRD responded by sending a mission to appraise
the project and the mission's report on the economics of
the project was extremely unfavorable. The internal rate
of return was estimated at 8 percent, i.e., below the IBRD
acceptable level of 10 percent. From personal contacts
with the chief of the 1967/68 mission, the author under-

stands that crop yields were assumed to be lower than in

 

lAcala cotton is a medium staple cotton. Sakel
cotton is a long-staple cotton commonly known as Egyptian
cotton.

2Internal rate of return is the discount rate which
just makes the net present worth of the incremental net
benefit stream or cash flow equal to zero (23). Mathe-
matically:

n Bn-Cn = 0
i=I1 l+r

where Bn = benefits each year:
On = costs each year:
n = number of years (economic life of project);
r = interest (discount) rate.

37

1 But yield discripancies by them-

subsequent evalutions.
selves could not eXplain the wide margin of difference be-
tween the consultants' 18.5 percent and the 1967/68 IBRD
missionfs 8 percent internal rates of return.2 Beside
the estimated low economic returns, other reasons which
hampered the financing of the project were cited, in-
cluding the large size of the investment, an implied capital
constraint, the lack of a comprehensive national develop-
ment plan, doubts about the capacity of the government
to provide the required local currency funds, and un-
settled political conditions (28, 29).

During the same period and in close consultation
with the IBRD, the government of Sudan created the Agri-
cultural Development Corporation (ADC)? The main function

of the corporation was to undertake major development

 

1The assumptions of maximum cotton yields varied
from 5 Big Kantars (B.K.) of seed cotton in 1967/68 to
5.5 B.K. in 1970 and 6 B.K. in 1973: on other occasions
a figure of 7 B.K. was used (Osman, 54).

2It was not possible to look for all the underlying
assumptions that may account for the wide margin that sep-
arates the two estimates, because the author could not ob-
tain a cop of the 1967/68 IBRD report. In.fact, the author
used 1967 68 because at times references were made to 1967
(28) and at other times to 1968 (29). Most likely the
mission might have gone to the field in late 1967 and the
report was published in 1968.

3Similarly, at the same time the Mechanized Farming
Corporation was created and entrusted with the deveIOpment
of rainfed (dry-land) agriculture.

38
projects in the irrigated agricultural sector, including
the construction of the Rahad project. The Agricultural
Deve10pment Corporation issued its first economic re-
appraisal of the Rahad project in May, 1969 (Osman, 54).
The results were very favorable, with the internal rate
of return ranging between 19 and 23 percent. The study
made specific recommendations in cropping intensity, ro-
tation and tenancy size, and undoubtedly initiated sub-
sequent efforts with the financiers and encouraged the
IBRD to reconsider its position.

Despite the implicit IBRD decision not to parti-
cipate in financing the Rahad project, it agreed, in 1969
to finance Tambul Pilot Farm with funds left over from
the Roseires Dam project. The purpose of the Tambul
Pilot Farm was to develop intensive farming practices
for the future Rahad project over a three year period.
The International Land Development ConsultantsIILACO) en-
trusted with the assignment completed their final report
in October, 1972 (33).

Following the 1969 coup d' etat, some of the in-
fluential members of the May Revolution voiced strong
opposition to economic activities of some foreign donors
and financial agencies in the Sudan. Paradoxically, bi-
lateral 000peration with some selected countries and their

increased economic participation were advocated and sought.

At the time of the May 1969 Revolution, and IBRD

mission was concluding talks on various issues in Khartoum.

39
The mission, facing a completely different government over-
night, sought the Opinion of the new regime and was given
the impression that the Sudan was interested in economic
cooperation with the IBRD. A second reappraisal mission
was planned for June 23, 1969, but the mission was delayed
until after the Council of’Ministers' resolution in July,
1969. Finally, after the approval of the Council of Min-
isters in January, 1970, the IBRD reappraisal mission ar-
rived in Khartoum in February, 1970. This mission found
that the excavation of the supply canal from behind the
Roseires Dam had already been started--a develOpment which
will be explored subsequently. The findings of the re-
appraisal mission were favorable and the technical aspects
of the project were considered sound. The internal rate
of return was estimated at between 10 and 14 percent.1
There was every indication that the IBRD was willing to
negotiate the financing of the project.

But by the end of 1969 there was much frustration
due to the long delay in the use of the Roseires waters.
Also, sentiments were against the lengthy negotiations
with the IBRD and the alleged terms of financing-~especial-

ly those concerning the use of foreign consultants.

1The 1970 Appraisal report was not available to
the author. The project design was changed shortly after
the departure of the IBRD mission, and hence the interest
in its findings was lost. These details were obtained
from the Ministry of Agriculture Memorandum (38).

40
Something had to be done. Hence, the Minister of Irrigation
at the time pledged to start the excavation of the ir-
rigation network using available local resources. The
Ministry of Irrigation mobilized its heavy equipment and
moved to the site of the supply canal at the end of 1969.
By the time the excavation was stOpped, 2 million cubic
meters of earth were already moved (43).

Though the excavation work in the supply canal was
started and the chances of being financed had greatly im-
proved after the latest IBRD mission, a drastic alteration
in the method of irrigation of the Rahad project prompted
the termination of the excavation work around May, 1970.
The new method of irrigation which was eventually accepted
by all concerned bodies led to what is presently under ex-
ecution--the pump irrigated Rahad project.

3. Preparation§tage III: The Gravity-Pump Irrigation
Controversy: ‘

During the formulation of the 1970/71-1974/75 Five-
Year Plan of Economic and Social Development of the Demo-

cratic Republic of the Sudan}.

the Ministry of Irrigation
was asked to submit an alternative means of irrigation

that would substantially decrease the funds requested for
the construction of the irrigation structures of the Rahad

project (42, 43). The Ministry of Irrigation then proposed

 

1The plan was supervised by a team of eXperts from
the Soviet Union.

'41
an entirely different method of irrigation, which relied
on irrigation by pumps instead of gravity. The length of
the supply canal was reduced from 191 kilometers to 84
kilometers, the prOposed pump site being some 200 kilometers
downstream from the Roseires Dam. The cultivable area of
the project was reduced from 410,000 feddans to 300,000
feddans. The alternative project design was approved and
appropriations were allocated in the FiveAYear Plan without
consulting the agricultural authorities (43).

The Ministry of Agriculture, waging strong opposition
to the alternative proposals, sent a menorandum to the
Ministry of Planning in mid-September, 1970 (38). The
economic evaluation of the competitive projects, based on
assumptions made by the Ministry of Agriculture, favored
the 410,000 feddan gravity irrigation. The memorandum
sparked a tug of war between the agriculture and irrigation
authorities. The Ministry of Planning took the initiative
to make the choice between the two alternatives. In a
series of meetings extending from September to December,
1970, in which top level officials including ministers,
of agriculture, irrigation and planning, participated a
careful scrutiny of assumptions was undertaken.

The differences of Opinion were mainly-technical
and related to irrigation and the flow of net benefit
stream. The flow of net benefit stream in turn depended
on the apportioning of costs among the stages of the Rahad

project. The gravity irrigation supply canal was designed

42

with a capacity of 150 cubic meters per second. All parties
acknowledged the excess capacity of the supply canal, but
disagreed on the precise volume of the excess. The Ministry
of Irrigation held the view that it would not exceed 15
percent, whereas the Ministry of Agriculture contended it
would be 40 percent. Assuming that the excess capacity
could be utilized for irrigating additional land, particu-
larly the expansion of the Rahad project Stage II, the cost
of the supply canal would be divided between the two stages
in accordance with the percentage use of the supply canal.
Furthermore the flow of the net benefit stream depended on
the availability of irrigation water at the tenancy level,
the water requirements of the crops in the rotation, and
the duration of the water application for the crops in-
cluded in the rotation. The Ministry of Planning, acknow-
lodging lack of technial knowledge and experience (43),
relied solely on the Ministry of Irrigation's technical
advice to determine the cost structure of the Rahad com-
petitive methods of irrigation, the capacity of the ir-
rigation structures, the pace of implementation and the
time flow of the cost and benefit streams. The Ministry
of Planning always relied on the Ministry of Agriculture
for technical advice in the field of agriculture, but such
advice was not part of the controversy.

On the basis of these assumptions arrived at during
the numerous high-level meetings, the Ministry of Planning

supported the alternative pump irrigation project. The

43
Ministry of Planning reached this conclusion after dis-
counting the highest return gravity irrigation project,
because the Ministry of Irrigation did not approve the
irrigation technical aspect presumed by the agricultural
authorities (43). The Ministry of Planning Memorandum
paved the way fOr the final approval of the present pump
irrigation project but it also led directly to the resig-
nation of the Minister of Agriculture.1

It was not the economic evaluation per se but

political factors which led to the approval of the present
pump irrigation Rahad project. There was every sign that
that IBRD was ready to help finance the Rahad project,
though the reservations stated earlier did not seem to have
changed. The Soviet expert team advocated the drastic
change in the project irrigation at the time the IBRD was
considering the financing of the project. However, the
shift to pump irrigation reduced the financial burden,
which was much advocated by both the Soviet experts and
the IBRD. Moreover, benefits would be obtained earlier.

The Ministry of Irrigation made a commitment to construct

 

1Paradoxically, the present author was the co-author
of both the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of
Planning memorandums. The author was also responsible for
the computations in both cases, in addition to the co-
ordination of all the meetings and their minutes. The in-
volvement of the author was an invaluable source of infor-
mation and guaranteed an access to the project documents.
The author being aware of the dangers of bias in such cases,
spared no effort to be objective.

4.4

the gravity irrigation project, but without additional
heavy earth-moving equipment it was difficult to execute.
Hence an alternative project which would substantially
reduce the volume of work to within the prevailing execu-
tion capacity of the irrigation authorities was - attractive.
Besides, there were antagonistic feelings against foreign
consultants and investments in general. There was a pr0p-
osition that the smaller, less SOphisticated pump ir-
rigation project could be financed by the local resources
of the country. But even if it was to be financed from
abroad, it was assumed that there would be no need for
foreign consultants.
4. Prepgpation Stage_lV: The Rahad Pump_I;pigation Project

The political situation in the Sudan was very tense
in early 1971. In February, three members of the Revolu-
tionary Council were fired. The climax was reached in
July when those three members staged a coup d' etat. The
leader of the May Revolution was deposed and imprisioned
until a counter-coup set him free three days later. The
brief coup d'etat, believed to be instigated by the
communist bloc, caused a major rift in the relations with
that bloc and the service of the Soviet experts were
terminated. Those experts who remained in compliance with
contracts lost most of their influence. The Minister of
Irrigation was fired On the allegation that he was sym-
pathetic to the aborted coup. Meanwhile, the IBRD pointed

out that the pump design had a number of attractive features,

45
including a lower capital outlay than the gravity scheme.
Also, countries such as the United States and Kuwait showed
willingness to help finance the project.

During 1971, the IBRD made a comparative study of
the two alternative Rahad projects. The study showed that
the difference between the internal rates of return for
the gravity and the pump projects did not exceed 1 percent.
The report concluded:

Benefit cost analysis indicates that the

margin of difference between the gravity

and pump schemes is small enough that the

choice between them can be made on other

criteria (28, Annex 1, p.4).

The other criteria apparently favored the pump project and
the economic appraisal was completed and approved in
February, 1973. The internal rate of return was estimated
at 9 to 16 percent, depending mainly on the future price
of cotton (28).

From mid-February to the end of March, 1973. the
Council of Ministers approved the Rahad project credit
agreements with the Agency for International Development
of the United States (USAID), the International Develop-
ment Association (IDA) of the IBRD, and the Kuwait Fund
for Arab Economic Development (KF). The Rahad pump ir-
rigation project was henceforward put into implementation.
The Ministry of Irrigation undertook the responsibility
to construct the irrigation network. The tenants' settle-
ment, agricultural production, and various related re-

sponsibilities were entrusted to the Rahad Agricultural

46
Corporation (RAC) in place of the Agricultural Development

Corporation.1

Parallel to the changes in the design of the ir-
rigation system, changes were noticed in the agricultural
component. For example, only the acala cotton had been
included in the rotation while sakel cotton was left out.
The area under cotton was increased to half instead of
One-third of the cropped area. The vegetables and orchards
were allocated as a separate enterprise for specialized

tenants, instead of backyard plots.

C. Summary

The irrigation of the Rahad project was made pos-
sible by the construction of the Roseires Dam. However,
the execution of the Rahad project was started a decade
after the completion of the Dam. 'In light of the con-
siderable delay in the usage of the Roseires Dam water
resource--not just in the case of the Rahad project--one
post evaluation argued that the dam was built five years
earlier than it should have been (29). A more logical
conclusion would be that for some reason the dam was not

timely utilized, and this should have been considered in

 

lThe dissolution of the Agricultural Deve10pment
Corporation signified a major shift in policy. Instead
of having a consolidated agricultural authority responsible
for irrigated aggriculture development, each project would
have a separate agency as appropriate.

47
the economic appraisal and planning of the water storage
project.

The products of the dam, whether irrigation water,
electric generation capacity or whatever, are intermediate
and not final outputs. Thus when considering approval of
dam construction, policy-makers should not rely on Say's
Law that supply creates its own demand. In such a large
indivisible and interdependent project, it is crucial to
estimate carefully the'demand for its joint-products. How-
ever, in this case there were only vague ideas about proj-
ects that would be undertaken after the completion of the
dam. Hence anticipated agricultural develoPment was ser—
iously impaired because of poor planning in the beginning.

The case for delayed utilization was demonstrated
by examining various stages of the Rahad project preparation.
In the economic evaluation there were numerous difficulties
and disagreements over the identification and quantification
of the costs and benefits. These disagreements were re-
flected in the wide range of the internal rates of return
at various preparation stages. Finally, the project was
transformed from gravity to pump irrigation, but not with-
out confusion and confrontation. It appears that not only
the method of irrigation mattered but also the amount of
work involved. The pump irrigation project has an ir-
rigation network that could be constructed with relative
ease and with the pay-off in a shorter period than the

gravity irrigation project.

48

The persistent capital constraint, especially when
foreign assistance was sought, contributed to the delay
in approval of either version of the Rahad project. More-
over the capital constraint favored the pump irrigation
project, which needed less investment appropriations.

Politics blended with other factors. Instability
arising from the change in the regimes and differing per-
spective of the leaders contributed to the delay in approval
and execution of the Rahad project. Relations within the
Sudanese government agencies and with the interestd inter—
national agencies also influenced approval and execution
of the project.

The results of the economic appraisals undertaken
at various stages of the project preparations followed
logically from the identification and quantification of
the project costs, benefits, and the nature of their time
flow. .Assumptions regarding these might be manipulated
to suit the dominant interest molded by the prevailing
political, technical and economic factors. There is hardly
a value-free economic appraisal (Chambers, 12).

The concern with the project irrigation design may
have resulted in overlooking some important aspects of
the project. Some are relevant to planning the imple-
mentation of the project, and others to the agricultural
production at the farm level, and the tenant in particular.
The tenants' productivity and well being are important to

the overall performance of the project. Implementation

49
will be discussed in Chapter IV, while important issues
concerning the tenant will be discussed in Chapters V and

VI.

CHAPTER IV

LESSONS FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE RAHAD PROJECT

Projects are only as good as their implementation.
Nevertheless the implementation process receives pro-
portionately less attention from policy-makers than project
choice. Such neglect would undoubtedly lead to: (1) poor
project preparation, (2) erroneous economic evaluation,

(3) delays in project implementation, (4) non-fulfillment
of the stated project objectives, and most important, (5)
failure to learn from past eXperiences. The need to focus
more attention on the on-going evaluation of projects
during implementation is crucial. This kind of evaluation
would provide implementers with valuable information and
enable them to make continuous adjustments as new problems
are encountered and new research findings become available.
The major emphasis in this chapter is to identify the con-
straints encountered during the implementation of the Rahad
project--those which could effect the performance of the
project.

§:fThe implementation of the Rahad project could not
be evaluated in its entirety because of the numerous proj—

ect components, and because it is still not completed.

50

51
The project outputs and impacts are yet to be fully

realized. But, available data and information obtained
from the sample of tenant survey, the management inter-
view, personal contacts and the project reports and
archives are used for an on-going evaluation of the Rahad

project implementation.

A. Towards A Conceptual Framework For An
Evaluation of the Implementation of Projects

 

 

 

1. Literatgpe Review

Research on implementation has been generally con-
fined to a mere listing of implementation problems: most
of the details have remained accessible only to the im-
plementaters and policy makers. A synthesis of these
problems in a broad conceptual framework is yet to come.
As Williams expressed it:

...the lack of concern for implementation

is currently the crucial impediment to im-

proving program operation...Nothing comes

across more strongly than the great naivete

about implementation. We have got to learn

that implementation period for complex social

programs is not a brief interlude between a

bright idea and Opening the door for services.

(Williams, 65, p. 268).

This concern produced a literature which, with few
exceptions, has concentrated on implementation failures.
Moreover, normative considerations and circumstantial
evidence influence the choice of projects for evaluation.
Value judgements of the researcher may also influence the

results of the study. Bardach (6) summarized this as

52

follows: "Opinions differ on whether or not L-P-Sl has
been very effective in this regard...A brief, and neces-
sarily sketchy, personal evaluation of L-P—S is offered
in..."
Exhaustive lists of implementation problems, ranging
from shortages in financial and physical inputs to con-
flicts among participants have been sketched in the lit-
erature. Only recently have some attempts been made to
put together a theoretical framework based on detailed
case studies of policies undertaken in the United States
during the last decade. Hargrove (24) pointed out the
difficulty of defining what implementation precisely means.
Although he considered Williams definition, the "...process
of trying to move from a decision to program or project
operations" (65) as most succinct: he was sceptical about
the interdependence between the decision itself and the
process of obtaining a predetermined product (24). This
concept of interdependence, or the difficulty of separating
policy decisions from their implementation, has led to the
idea that a policy decision could be treated as an hypo-
thesis (56) and implementation would be the process of
trying to put that policy into effect (24). Some public
policy analysts have developed this idea further and

recommended that the analyst provide the decision-maker

 

1Among the few exceptions in the literature is the
Mental Health Reform in California (L-P-S) sponsored by
the state le islator Lanterman. However, even in this case,
the. researc er acknowledges that some people do not
agree with his view (6).

53

with an Vimplementation estimatef that would show the ease
or difficulty of implementing alternatives (24).

Bardach viewed the implementation process as Van
assembly processV, and made an analogy between the im-
plementation process and the operation of a machine. He
argued: "Putting the machine together and making it run
is, at one level, what we mean by the implementation
process" (6). This definition implies that the policy
maker should draw the specifications for the "machine"
as well.

The annual budget of any country reflects a large
number of policies and their variations relative to policy
field, sector, region, nation, level of technology, physical
inputs and outputs, target groups, etc. It seems logical
to conclude that the implementation process would be highly
specific: location specific, policy specific, imple-
mentation agency specific, etc. But as Bardach argues:
"Yet, at an intermediate level of abstraction, one can
see that all such machines do look rather similarV (6).
There are decisions, administrative units to implement,
means of financing, inputs acquisition and use, capital,
labor, services, physical outputs and target groups. With-
in this context it is possible to make some theoretical
abstraction useful for policy formulation and prediction.

A number of writers have explored models of policy
implementation during the last decade. These models de-

pended more or less on the view that policy and implementation

54
fall in a continuum. Smith as quoted in (Quade, 57) pre-
sented a policy implementation model in which policy-making
process and policy are linked to the complex implementation
process by a feedback mechanism. He made what he termed
idealized policy-~i.e., the idealized pattern of inter-
action that those who have defined the policy are attempting
to induce-~the nucleus of the implementation process.
Around this nucleus revolve the various participants with
their patterns of behavior and relationships and the factors
that shape these relationships and the environment.

Williams model considers the implementation process
as part and parcel of policy. According to his model,
policy has six stages which fall in a continuum. Imple—
mentation embodies two stages: policy specification and

‘flhh

field implementation. The model provides a separate stage
s\p“ Vfll-enalpyflm,

for Operation of the policy, though many analysts do not
seem to particularly acknowledge the need for such a pro-
vision.l To qualify his model the author warns that:

The orderliness of the stages (of the model)

and the vigor of the definitions are heuristic
devices used to facilitate exposition. Imple-
mentation is too complicated, and too little

is known about it to eXpect either orderliness

or vigor when analysis and assessment are actually
undertaken. (66, p. 271).

 

1Yet it is interesting to note that the operation
of some particularly vulnerable and controversial projects
are being blocked after their physical completion--e.g.,
nuclear plants. Also in Chapter III, it was shown that
the Roseires Dam remained under utilized for more than
a decade after its physical completion.

55

Recent works by Rein and Rabincvitz (61) and Van
Meter and Van.Horn (68) have examined the association be—
tween policy impacts and the characteristics 6f variables
which are thought to affect those policy impacts. In

general these econometric models would take the form

P'= f (Xi)
where
P = policy impacts - dependent variable
Xi= factors affecting P - Independent variables

1 = 1 ... n

2. A Concgptual Framework

The implementation process could be viewed as a
production process. Policy decisions commit resources
to produce some specific outputs as sketched in Figure
4.1. Within such a conceptual framework stage A is crucial
to the production process because the answersto major
questions determine the objectives of the policy. Those
answers are subject to revisions at varying degrees, de-
pending on the feedback, pressures, compromises, lOOpholes
and problems that might arise in the subsequent stages.

The importance of Stage B, is that in determining
the policy outputs, decision-makers have to commit spec-
ific resources. In many cases resources committed fall
short of the resources actually used. This is not always
due to inefficiencies in production but, apart from un-
certainties, might be due to an overestimation of resource

productivity. Some researchers have called for the

56

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A. B.
Prior 'Policy Decision (to Produce iSpecification of
£2"A__)’ (1) What? , 'Resource Input§
(2; How much?= ob'ectives -l.As part of policy
2 How? J decision being
( ) When? adequately prepared
- by Feasibility
fir'fif Studies: Inputs inn
clude capital ,
physical inputs,
labor, etc.
commands
persuasion
contracts
,id
0
m
:3 .
g C. ‘v
&. Feedback The Producipg Agency (Agencies)
Primarily (1) Interpretation of the
Bureaucratic policy decision
(Primaril (2) Managing the production
Political process

Physical Producation

(3)

(4)
(5)

 

Inter and intra agency
coordination and standard
Operating procedures

The information system
Target groups such as
tenants in irrigation

 

 

Uncertainty & environmental change

projects.
* t

 

 

 

D. 1
Out uts
1. Physical

2. Impacts eSp.on

 

Feedback

 

 

target groups such
as tenants in ir-
rigation projects

 

 

 

Bureaucratic (field staff)
Political (target groups)

FIGURE 4.1 IMPLEMENTATION: A PRODUCTION PROCESS

57

inclusion of implementation estimates for policy alter-
natives at the policy evaluation stage (24).

Actual production commence at Stage‘C, where there
could be substantially different and conflicting inter-
pretations of the objectives. The struggle shifts to
this stage to ensure that the particular participants'
objectives are met. The bureaucracy, for example, may
shape the production process in such a way as to score
gains for its own bureaucratic organization as well as
to serve the original planned Objectives. In the case
of agriculture not all of the production activity is
governmental: some involves the farmers (tenants). They
have their own objectives and depending on those and their
view of costs and benefits, they may affect project output
accordingly. This is why land allocation to tenants can
affect performance.

In Stage D the physical outputs and impacts on
some target goups are finally produced. These outputs are
not necessarily those desired as prescribed by the policy
in A or the bureaucratic organization in C. Feedback is
expected from all participants, target groups, and the
public at large.

The model of Figure 4.1 deals with the implementation
process in the context of production function. The model
permits the study of the relationship of variables within
any one stage and between the various stages. This model

incorporates the basic characteristics of the implementation

58

process as perceived from the literature. These are

summarized as follows:

1.
2.

The interdependence of policy and implementation,

Variables which influence the implementation process

including the following:

a.

b.

the macro social, political and economic policies,
the nature and availability of resources, including
the funds committed and their release,

the implementation agency (or agencies) and its
characteristics, the behavior of the bureaucracy,

the inter and intra-agency coordination, thestandard

operating procedures and the resources available

to any parity for reaching agreement with other
parties when objectives conflict,

the information and feedback,

the participants such as tenants in irrigation
projects, and whether they perceive to gain or

lose from the implementation of the policies:

The iterative nature of the implementation process,

The uncertainty and information cost associated with

implementation,

The joint-product characteristics of the output,

The dynamic nature of implementation,

The problems of developing appropriate criteria for

evaluating implementation.

59

B. Evaluation of Project Implementation

 

l. Problemg;of Measuring the Evaluation of Implementation

There are three situations to be considered in
measuring implementation. The first occurs prior to proj-
ect approval at time<tO (situation A of Figure 4.2) when
the problem or need is first identified. The second con-
cerns the decision taken at to, with the period-<to - tO
used for formulating and compromising the decision to move
to situation B. The third situation takes any length of
time between to and tn+x to achieve the objectives which
change situation A to C, D or E; where D at tn is the
situation predicted on the introduction of the policy or
project.

Failure to clearly identify which difference is
being measured in the course of evaluating implementation '
is common. Politicans, capitalizing on gaining "favorable"
perception from their constituents, frequently emphasize
the hypothetical difference between situation B at t0 and
projected situation D at"tn. They tend to compress the
time needed and ignore the implementation process to impress
their constituents with the great achievements within
their reach (57). The politicans gain by maximizing the
total sum of shOrt-run positive perceptions of change as

viewed by the constituents.1 It is possible, of course,

 

lStatements such as "for local consumption" or "window-
dressing" are commonly used in daily political life when
giving favorable impressions to constitutents. Although
policy inaguration speeches may be sincere, experiences
have shown that they, too, fall far short of their promises.

6O

Situations

A B C D E

 

 

 

 

 

 

'o o n A n n+x
€>TIME
A: Some "undesirable" situation which makes change
necessary.
(to: Beginning of a period of time during which change

of the situation is being perceived as vital.

B: The situation when the policy to change situation
A has been approved. The only difference between
A and B is that at B, commitment to change is made.

to: The time at which policy is approved.

C,D,E: Situation which may prevail after implementation,
with D being originally projected.

t ---<t , t , t : Represent the period of the imple-
O n n n+x mentation process.

n: Number of units of time to complete the policy.
x: Unknown number of units of time; x g; n.

FIGURE 4.2. A Dia am Explggningpthe Various Measurable
Dif erences in Implementation

61
though very rare, that the implemented policy resembles
the planned policy. But for purposes of research much
care should be exercised to distinguish which difference
is measured, if it is measurable at all.

The comparison of two snap—shots, one at the time
of the policy decision and another upon project completion,
is conceptually deficient. This approach ignores what
may have taken place during the implementation-production-
process, including changes in policy stemming from the
field feedback.

Besides the conventional approach, which measures
the changes in outputs and impacts produced by the imple-
mented policy, the literature suggests an evaluation pro-
cedure by which the alternative policy formulations can
be compared (24). In the first place it is extremely
doubtful that such formulatiOn exists other than in hypo-
thetical terms. Whereas one policy formulation would be
put to field implementation, hypothetical processes of
implementation of the other alternatives should be simulated
for comparison purposes. It is, of course, possible to
compare the theoretical underpinnings of these alternatives.
Yet apart from that, one may be comparing two groups of
different things: apples and citruses. Whereas the apple
is the implemented policy, the citruses refer to all other
alternatives.

For any one policy the rate of implementation, its

success , and failure depend on the period in which the

62
evaluation is undertaken and the participants' valuation
of the outputs and impacts at the time. Determining the
end of implementation poses another difficulty, since
the outputs and impacts may vary with the time at which
they are recorded. Completion of the physical structures--
the irrigation network, the land preparation and the tenant
settlement in the Rahad project, for example--is considered
the beginning of the end of implementation. The precise
time is arbitrarily determined.

To further complicate the situation, the participants
normally have their own perspectives in evaluating the
project implementation:)(If the perspectives of all parti-
cipants are compatible, no theoretical or practical prob-
lems of measurement arise. However, the common situation

is for them to be incompatible in whole or in part. For

“\

this reason the question ofCtenancy sizejis singled out
for emphasis in ChapterKVI. In the Rahad project, for

example, the tenants as a group, the management, and the

 

__government had their own perspectives. Incompatibilities
were evident when the interviewed tenants pointed out that
the shortage of dura (sorghum), their staple diet, was
adversely affecting their well-being. With this per-
spective, they argued strongly for the introduction of

dura in the cr0p rotation, in spite of government assur-

.e...,. _

ances of an ample supply of dura from the adjacent mech-
anized rainfed (dry-land) agricultural region. From the

perspective of the management the inclusion of dura in

63
the rotation creates technical and managerial problems
and furthermore it could be produced at lower costs in
rainfed (dry-land) agriculture.

While none of the participant groups are homogeneous
in composition and/or aspirations, the tenants of irrigation
projects are traditionally considered a single homogeneous
group for the purposes of economic appraisal and project
choice. Aggregation can be detrimental to the success of
field implementation in terms of physical output and posi-
tive change in the welfare of the individual tenant house-
holds constituting the group. The policy expected outputs
and impacts may be reduced if the individual tenants' out-
put and gains are perceived as inadequate.

2. Criteria for Evaluatipg Implementation

In project evaluation a statement certifying the

 

technical, economic and political feasibility of the proj-
ect precedes its approval. In reality projects so described,
frequently encounter technical, economic and political prob-
lems. Whereas in some cases these problems are constraints
which might be overcome, in other cases these are symptoms
of theoretical deficiencies.

A fundamental theoretical deficiency arises when
some objectives are mutually exclusive. This is often
the case when objectives are decided upon after hard
bargaining and compromising among the interest groups
during the policy formulation stage. Any of the interest

groups may have accepted (or been forced to accept) the

64
policy, hoping that the implemented policy version would
be in its favor. Issues that were unwillingly accepted
during policy formulation or later identified as undesir—
able by the interest group will be contested during sub-
sequent stages.

\\\ The most important criterion for evaluating imple- ‘
mentation is measuring the degree to which some selected
policy objectives have been metzj The quantity of physical
outputs such as the area of landdeveloped and the total
and per unit resource output are recorded and compared
with the total and unit resource productivity before the
policy implementation and/or with the policy objectives.
The monetary equivalents of these physical quantities can
be obtained by pricing the resources used and the products.
Financial and economic comparisons of individual incomes,
returns to public investments, foreign exchange earnings,
etc. can be made between the implemented policy and the
originally planned policy objectives, and between the
former and the situation without adOpting that policy.
Assumptions can be made and weighting systems can be used
to compare the qualitative aspects of individuals and
group in the same manner as outlined above.

The use of benefit-costs analysis as a method of
evaluation has a number of perils. First, aggregation
over-simplifies the comparison, especially with the valid-
ation of interpersonal comparisons. Secondly, if benefit-

cost analysis covers a number of future periods (usually

65
years), necessary assumptions are needed about future imple-
mentation performance, and these may be mere speculations.
Therefore policy-makers should attempt to control the imple-
mentation variable and make the project work instead of
spending all their time trying to guess the future outcome.
Thirdly, in benefit-cost analysis, projects are evaluated
according to the life-span of the physical assets, which
may have little relevance to the impacts of the project
on the target groups and their time preference. (A benefit-
cost analysis comparing the performance of the implemented
Rahad project with the approved project may not be meaning-
fuL,because the project was in early stages of implementation
when this study was started in 1978. At the time only
20 percent of the planned area was under agricultural
production. [Ebmments on the rate of implementation and
the relative change in the status of the tenants may prove

useful here.

C. The Implementatign of the Rahad Project

1. Project Objectives
If implementation is viewed as a production activity

then the questions of what, how much, how and when must
be addressed. Whereas the answer to how may be of a
technical nature, the answers to the other questions should
be embodied in the policy objectives. Unfortunately, the
1973 Rahad project appraisal (28), does not state explicitly

the objectives of the project. The implicit objectives

66

could only be obtained from the project description of
how much land would be cultivated, how much production
would be obtained and how much tenants would be settled.
The appraisal study has only given indications of the
planned time framework, implementation and productivity
targets, and project costs.

In order to classify the objectives the author
interviewed numerous implementation executives, identified
a long list of objectives, and reclassified them into a
list of twelve (See Table 4.1). Some of these Objectives
relate only indirectly to project implementation; most
are extremely difficult to put in measurable terms.

During the interviews some of the project imple—
menters reported that when they joined the project, they
were Obsessed by the fact that there was no statement of
project objectives. In September 1973, six months after
the project was approved, the Rahad project management
tried to define the project objectives, and implementers
apparently were not aware of this. In May, 1978, a report
written by a senior implementation executive mentioned only
four broad objectives (58). Some implementers stated they
were aware of only three: the maximum reported was seven.
Generally implementers reported that project objectives
they mentioned could be achieved simultaneOusly. On the
other hand, in response to a consistency question and
discussion, seven of the twelve executives acknowledged

that some of the objectives could be conflicting; examples

67

TABLE 4.1 RAHAD PROJECT OBJECTIVES AS REPORTED BY THE
IMPLEMENTATION EXECUTIVES INTERVIEWED.

 

Number of Executives
Who Reported the
Objectives Objective

 

\\\.l. Socio-economic develOpment of
the project area 11

\O 2. Utilization of land and water
for the expansion of irrigated

agriculture 8
3. Increase in national income 8
4. Contribution to foreign reserves 8
*O 5. Settlement of nomads 8
Increase of tenants'incomes 5
7. Generation of employment
opportunities 4
8. Integration of animals in
irrigated agriculture 4
9. Increase in vegetable production 3
'.,10. Introduction of new technology
and mechanization l
y 11. Development of cooperatives l
\\ 12. Help in developing future projects 1

 

SOURCE: Rahad Project Management Interviews By The Author

68

included the issues of employment versus introduction of
large-scale mechanization, and the introduction of animals
in an agricultural system not designed for them versus

the planned total crop production.

At the project preparation stage, only five of the
executives interviewed were fully involved, three were
partially involved and those remaining did not contribute
to project preparation. Of all the implementers only five
studied the appraisal report carefully, seven studied it
partially to familiarize themselves with their specific
area, and two had not read it.

‘v Thus, with no explicit statement of the project
objectives, limited participation of the management staff
at the project preparation stage, and little access to the
appraisal study, there were bound to be different inter-
pretations of perceived objectives. Such misinterpretations
frequently occur, even in cases where objectives are clearly
defined. But poorly defined objectives can severely hinder
any efforts to evaluate the implementation of a project.
Lack of detailed studies contributed to the ambiguity of
the Rahad project objectives. If the numerous studies-- -\
undertaken after project approval and during implementation-- ‘3
had been made prior to the final decision, a better proj-
ect with well defined Objectives could have been prepared. //
Table 4.2 lists important studies undertaken after the
approval of the Rahad porject. An informed IBRD staff

member mentioned in retrospect that a further detailed

69

TABLE 4.2 LIST OF STUDIES UNDERTAKEN AFTER THE APPROVAL
AND DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RAHAD

 

 

 

 

PROJECT
"Date
The Stpgy Month ear Comment
1. Transportation study of April/1974 A comparison be-
Rahad Project tween tarmac roads
and light railways
2. Location of groundnuts /1975 A comparative lo-
decortication plants in cation study
the Rahad project
3. Fruit and vegetable Feb/1974 Recommended de-
growing in the Rahad creasing the fruit
project. and vegetable area,
to 7,000 feddans
for local industrial
a foreign demand
from a proposed
20,000 feddans
4. Production relations for Aug/1975
horticultural tenancies
5. The human factor in the Dec/1975
Rahad project Area Phase
1: Results of population
& Socioeconomic survey
6. Revised farm budget Aug/1976
7. Report on Rahad project n.a. A report prepared
site planning by Shankland Cox
8. Report on impact of re- Jan/1977 The most important
vised crOpping pattern report which ra-
with livestock integration tionalized change
of tenancy size
from 24 feddans to
22 feddans & studied
livestock inte-
gration.
9. Land and water charge in June/1977
the Rahad project
10. Design note on sewage Feb/1978
disposal at project and _
group headquarters
11. Cotton picking Committee formed
in Feb/1978 to
study the feasi-
bility of mech-
anical picking
SOURCE: Rahad Project Data

70
project preparation was needed prior to project approval:
but it was thought that such a line of action would be
completely unacceptable to the government of the Sudan.
2. Coordination of Project Implementation
It is difficult to find in the literature the un-
qualified use of the term "coordination". The idea is more
commonly perceived as the "problem of coordination". But
it may be more useful to think of coordination as a pre-
requisite for all phases of project implementation. Co-
ordination should be considered at the time the policy
decisions are made.
a. The Need for Coordination in the Rahad Project.
The implementation of the Rahad project presents a
classic example of the need for coordination. A number
of factors make it a crucial task.
(1) The scarcity of resources places the Sudan in the
poorest quartile of the world's nations. A severe
form of resource scarcity is the lack of excess

capacity in the economy.1

 

1To describe lack of excess capacity positively,
Caiden and Wildavsky used the term functional redundancy,
which they defined as "A certain amount of redundancy
(duplication of resources) on which depends the probability
that a given function will be performed" (11).

For the most recent and thorough infrastructural,
labor, and financial resources of the Sudan consult (34).

71
(2) The complexity of the Rahad project, with diverse
physical, labor, and capital resources (as shown
by the chart of Figure 4.3) requires a carefully
managed, coordinated, and monitored program to
finally produce the desired physical output and
impact on target groups.

(3) The large number and diverse composition of the
‘ participants lead. to conflicting interests and
the need to resolve them. There are at least

seven groups of participants:

(a) The political leadership,

(b) The central government agencies participating
at the policy decision level,

(0) A minimum of thirteen government agencies re-
sponsible for project implementation--with
Irrigation, the Rahad Agricultural Corporation,
Central Electricity and the Water Corporation
entrusted with implementation of the key
components,

(d) Five international agencies and a food grant
organization financing the foreign component,
and the Sudan government financing the local
component,

(e) The consulting firms, of which one is respon-
Sible for aiding in and monitoring implemen-
tation, and the others for purchasing and

changing designs as needs arise,

73

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73
(f) National and international construction
companies,
(g) The tenants, who usually join at a later stage,
but whose welfare is affected by the action
and performance of the other groups.

b. The Effort to Coordinate The Implementation of the Rahad
Project.

Efforts to coordinate the project implementation
started in August, 1973. immediately after the agreements
between the Sudan and the financing agencies were ratified
and became effective. The first<OOordination Committee,
formed under the auspices of the Planning Commission, met
for the first time in December, 1973. But, the work of
that committee could not coordinate effectively because
of: large membership; discontinuity of participation by
designated members: a high degree of absenteeism: and lack
of power to command the implementation agencies or to en-
force procedures.

In June, 1974, the Supreme Planning Council (SPC),
a ministerial committee headed by the Minister of Finance
and National Economy, acknowledged the ineffectiveness
of the first Coordination Committee. The SPC ordered the
restructuring of the Coordination Committee and called for
continuity in membership. The membership was limited to
the Ministry of Irrigation; Rahad Agricultural Corporation,
including the Commissioner; Ministry of Construction and
Public Works. The SPC also gave the committee discretion-

ary powers to coordinate the work of different agencies,

74

but did not specify clearly the nature of these powers,

so the same situation prevailed after the restructuring
and the formulation of the second Coordination Committee.
In a meeting between the financiers and the implementation
agencies six months later in December, 1974, one financing
agency representative was quoted as saying:

The project coordination is a concern to

the Bank as it affects every aspect of the

project. He hopes that this question (Of

project coordination) is resolved as minor

details may arise, and if not solved in time,

affect development (sic) (implementation).

He believes that a body responsible to do

this work is to be set up. This body should

have financial powers, as well as decision

making powers to s eed development (sic)

(implementation). 58).

The Director General of Planning maintained the
position that "the Coordination and Follow-Up Committee
solves problems that arise, but is only an advisory com-
mittee" (58).

The second CoordinationCommittee could not gain
discretionary powers, they had them in name only and the
powers were not specified. In April, 1975, apparently
because of the surmounting implementation problems and
the year-long delay in project irrigation, the Council
of Ministers took over the matter and appointed an executive
director at the level of Deputy Minister. The Council also
formed the third Coordinating andFollow-Up Committee headed
by the Executive Director.

The third Coordination Committee and its successive

chairmen did a lot of trouble-shooting but achieved only

75

limited success in project implementation. Irrespective
of how much land was prepared for irrigation or how many
tenants were settled during 1977/78, the actual land cul-
tivated was 60,000 feddans, or only #0 percent of the
projected 150,000 feddans. The land cultivated in 1978/79
was 120,000 feddans--again about 40 percent--instead of
the planned 300,000 feddans“ The project settlement and
cultivation should have been completed in 1978/79.
"Extremely high rates of settlement have been
achieved on previous irrigation schemes, averaging 95,000
feddans per year from 1966 to 1971" (28). The rates of
settlement and irrigation achieved so far in the Rahad
project were much lower than the previous record--which-

ever definition is adopted.1

This implies that even though
the coordination authority had been elevated to an un- ‘
precendented level, the achievements in Rahad project
implementation were moderate. The reasons for this do not
lie in coordination per se; other factors hindered the

efforts of the coordination and implementation authorities.

 

1The rate of settlement may refer to the amount of
irrigated land brought under production and settlement
by the relevant implementation agencies in any one year.
Alternatively it may refer to the total amount of irrigated
land brought under production in a particular irrigation
project, divided by the number of years of implementation.
For example, if Rahad project is completed in 6 years, then
the rate will be 300E000 = 50,000 feddans. A third al-

ternative will be th land brought under production and
settlement after the completion of irrigation infrastructure.
In this case it will be about 60,000 feddans for 1977/78

and 1978/79.

76
Coordination should have focused on the smooth functioning
among implementation agencies and the timely sequencing
of tasks to produce the physical output and impact on
target groups. Instead the coordination committee con-
centrated most of its efforts in securing a "most favored"
position for the project in its competition for the ex—
tremely limited resources.

Members of the Coordination Committee and imple-
mentation staff pointed to the shortage of both local
currency and foreign assistance as the most important
resource constraint. There is some evidence to support
their claim. For example, out of an increase of $lb3
million in foreign assistance to the Rahad project during
1975, approximately $60 million (42%) were available to
cover a $43.5 million cost increase in irrigation works,
building, electrification, etc. Cost increases were due
to changes in design and quantities, the underestimation
of project costs, and an additional $16.5 million needed
for project improvements. Added to these were the in-
crease in contigencies of $49.2 million, and world-wide
price increases of $34 million, primarily after October,
1973 (30). The 1975 cost adjustment were not enough. Sub-
sequently the project costs had to be increased to cope
with international price increases and domestic inflation.

The local and foreign capital constraints were
accompanied by other shortages in labor, energy, machinery,

building materials, cement, farm inputs, consumer goods,

77

etc. Implementation agencies and the successive coordination
committees devoted most of their time and energy coping
with these waves of resource constraints.

The scarcity of resources and the shortage in the
supply of services were not the only reasons for the in-
effectiveness of the coordination efforts. These co-
ordination committees did not develop and adOpt a clear
set of Operational guidelines, i.e., standard Operating
procedures for their conduct. Even if Operational guide-
lines were available, some of the coordination committees
had limited persuasion power to enforce them.

In addition to problems of getting agreement among
agencies, there were information and conceptual problems.
Given the complexity of the project, the large number of
agencies involved in implementation, and the chain of
dependent tasks, modern analytical management techniques .
such as network analysis1 should have been used. Whereas
implementation schedules used in planning the Rahad project
were designed for independent work programs, the techniques
of network analysis such‘as the Program Evaluation and
Review Technique (PERT) and the Critical Path Method (CPM)

are used to relate the time framework of each activity, the

 

1The two most known techniques are the Program Evalu-
ation and Review Technique (PERT) developed by U.S. Navy in
1958 and the Critical Path Method (CPM) of DuPont. For an
excellent review of the technique consult (08,49).

78

critical time relative to other dependent activities, and
the sequence of the activities within the available re-
sources and time. This schedule is used as a tool for
controlling and monitoring the progress of the work.
3. Interdependence of the Project Components

A brief review of the implementation process i1-
lustrates the interlocking nature of the project components.
The excavation of the large supply canals for irrigation
could only be done with heavy excavation equipment, namely
caterpillars. However, as they are not usually stock items,
they were only obtainable on order or as second-hand equip-
ment and to purchase them from either source required a
waiver (of purchase rules) from the financing agencyf-USAID.
Because of this and related obstacles, it was clear from
the beginning, in 1973. that it would be difficult to finish
the excavation of the canals by April of 1976. Letters
exchanged between the Irrigation Authorities, Planning
Commission, IBRD, and USAID during late 1973 and early
1974 expressed that concern (58).

Electric power was needed for pumping the irrigation
water from the Blue Nile; the responsibility was given
to Central Electricity and Water Corporation (CEWC). But
because of difficult technical questions, the financiers
insisted on appointing a consultant firm to assist in in-
stalling the equipment. Ambiguity in the selection pro-
cedure, dissillusion on the part of the implementing

agency, and delays in decision-making decreased the chances

 

79
of timely execution of the electrification program. This
situation prevailed for more than a year after project
approval.

Finally, around November, 1974, the Director General
of Planning who headed the second Coordination Committee
wrote a memorandum to the Commissioner of Planning and the
Minister of Finance and National Economy; he recommended
a de facto one year delay in project implementation. The
recommendation was accepted and it was agreed that 150,000
feddans would be brought into production during each of
the last two years, instead of 100,000 feddans for each
of the last three years. But the financiers thought the
proposed higher rate of implementation was unrealistic,
and their reservation was warranted (58).

The preparation of the agricultural land for cul-
tivation and distribution to tenants was the responsibilty
of the Rahad Agricultural Corporation. The irrigation
authorities were to clear the land and hand it over to
the agricultural authorities for land preparation and
tenancy demarcation. In preparing the land for cultivation
the Rahad management was confronted with numerous dif-
ficulties, including energy shortages, vehicle shortages,
problems of purchasing and transporting farm machinery,
and non-response to building contracts. In settling tenants
in the project area, the management faced two main dif-
ficulties. First, the provision of adequate housing,

drinking water, health, education, transport and marketing

80
services had to be carefully syncronized with the move-
ment of the settlers into the project. Secondly, in moving
the settlers during the March-May period (immediately after
settlers had harvested their rainfed crops), the Rahad
management had to be highly certain that the irrigation
water, land, and other inputs would be readily available
for production. Otherwise the settlers would risk losing
the opportunity to produce by irrigation, after having
given up their previous method of rain-fed production.
Despite this delicate situation, tenants were asked
to settle on the project site, even if their families
couldn't accompany them, in May, 1977. At that time, with
no certainty of the provision of water for irrigation, the
project management decided to take the risk and planted
cotton on dry land. This proved successful. The project
could operate at least partially, and 40 percent of the
target area (of the 1974-75 change in implementation
schedule) was cultivated. This decision to plant pre-
vented a full year delay.
The factors in favor of the decision to plant cotton

on dry land were:
1. The area to be cultivated was in the southeastern part

of the project, which is in a higher isohyte (rainfall),
2. There were enough assurances and indications that the

irrigation water would be available before the end of

the rainy season, which in fact occurred in August-

September, 1977,

81

3. The agriculture and irrigation authorities developed
a working relationship and were able to avoid con-
frontations experienced at the project preparation
stages,

4. Seemingly a desirable degree of competition and chal-
lenge had developed between the two authorities at the
field implementation level,

5. The implementersf strategy, which gave the Rahad proj-
ect a "favored" position, alleviated bottlenecks--esp-

ecially in allocation of resources.

D. The Main Factors Contributing to
Delays in Project Implementation

The factors which have played a major role in delaying

the implementation of the project are identifiable, but

it is difficult to rank these factors because they are inter-

related and the data are incomplete. The factors are as

follows:

1. Project preparation was inadequate.

2. Resource limitations were considered by most of the
implementers as the major cause of delay. The project
was approved and implementation commenced during a
period of high international inflation, as a result,
the estimated cost of the project had to be adjusted
through lengthy negotiations. Foreign aid funds neces-

sary for purchases in the international markets were

often slow in coming. The financing rules and regulations

82
of the lending agencies are based on the reimbursement
principle, i.e. the country pays from its own foreign
reserve resources and presents the necessary documents.
for reimbursement. With extremely limited foreign
reserves, the purchases of capital equipment might be
given lower priority. The lending agencies sometimes
paid directly for market purchases. However, in cases
where a letter of credit had to be opened by the
recipient country the problem prevailed. Even though
the foreign financing was available the problem was
insolvable (46).

Shortages of physical inputs such as building
materials, energy, machinery and equipment, skilled
manpower were mentioned by the implementers as important
factors in the delay. Another was the limited trans-
portation capacity in the country. Considering these
resource limitations, it seems that the Rahad project
could not have been implemented faster. Perhaps it
would have been more appropriate that the implementation
estimates be adjusted accordingly.

Coordination was properly handled only at a later stage
of the implementation process, and coordination efforts
were concentrated primarily in solving the problem of
input shortages. An example of coordination failure
was the electrification component. One function of

the hydroelectric power from the Roseires Dam was to

provide electricity for the irrigation pumps and the

83
ginning factories. The electrification process en-
countered many technical and logistical problems, how-
ever, and only partial electricity was provided for
the ginning factories by the end of April, 1978. About
three to four months of the ginning season were lost
and a large part of the Rahad cotton was transported
to Gezira ginning facilities. Some of the cotton
had to be stored for ginning after the rainy season.
‘4. Uncertainty was an important contributor to the delay.
According to the 1975 revisions of the Rahad project
costs, about a quarter of the eXpected rise in cost
($34 millions) was the result of price increases since
the project appraisal. Furthermore about a third of
the expected rise in cost were due to increases in
contingencies to hedge against future uncertainties
(30). By 1978, since the project management was faced
with price increases and changes in designs and quan-
tities, the government sought to secure increased

funding through parallel financing} or national sources.

lParallel financing is a procedure by which funds are
loaned by one of the donor agencies on a bilateral basis
(Tutside the original financing agreement. These additional
13unds could be complementary or allocated for some specific
Sub-component of the project.

84
E. The Tenant as the Producer

The tenant is the ultimate producer in the irrigation
projects in the Sudan. Hence, to attain the project ob-
jectives an account must be made of the problems which
confronted the tenants.

They were selected for settlement in the Rahad proj—
ect by the following criteria:

1. Sudanese nationality was required,

2. Tenants who owned land or had cultivation or grazing
rights on project land or surroundings were preferred,

3. Preference was given to tenants with larger households.

The tenants interviewed ranked application for
tenancy and the selection procedures as the least difficult
problems. The result presented in Table 4.3, however, re—
flects an obvious bias because the tenants included in the
sample were already chosen. Those who ranked the process
as difficult were those on the waiting list. The settle-
Inent of nomads in the Rahad project was difficult because
they lacked interest and knowledge of settled life, and
(establishing their previous grazing rights was difficult.

Although the survey of tenants was conducted in
the project's first year of partial operation, common
jproblems were already visible. For example, 88 percent of

the tenants sampled experienced difficulty in obtaining

85

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86
hired labor.l Similarly, 90 percent of the tenants sampled
did not like the location of their villages for various
reasons.

Sample tenants were specifically asked to explain
the basic reasons for late settlement of their families
into the project area (near the end of the first production
season). Their answers, presented in Table 4.4, implied
that 87 percent of those who moved in late were not given
ample notification. Fifty-four percent of those who set-
tled late thought that the facilities provided by the
project were not adequate at the time. Another 25 percent
expressed doubts about the provision of irrigation and
drinking water.

These tenants were also asked to list the most
important difficulties they had encountered. Their re-
sponse is presented in Table 4.5. Over the years many of
these problems will be resolved, but by that time both
the physical output and target groups might be adversely
affected.

During the first crOp year, it was too early to
determine if tenant income was adequate, so tenant re-
sponse on this question must be supplemented by a com-

parison of their eXpected income from agricultural production

 

1The survey was conducted during cotton picking.
Both tenants and management were in a tense situation be-
cause of shortages in the supply of labor for cotton

picking.

87

TABLE 4.4 TENANTS RANKING OF REASONS FOR LATE SETTLEMENT

IN THE RAHAD PROJECT AREA

 

l.
2.

 

Percentage
Percentage of the Tenants

Reasons Cited by Of The Who Report
Sample Tenants Number Sample Delay

Late notification 59 47 87

Inadequate facilities

of new village sites 37 3O 54

Doubts about irrigation

and drinking water 17 14 25

Children at school 10 8 15

Involved in other

activities 9 7 13

Busy in managing the

tenancy at the Rahad

project 4 3 6

Proximity of his original

village 3

Other reasons 3 2 4

 

SOURCE: The Survey of Tenants

88

TABLE 4.5 TENANTS RANKING OF SETTLEMENT DIFFICULTIES IN THE

RAHAD PROJECT

 

 

Difficulties Faced Number Percentage
1. Lack of healthy drinking water 74 59
2. Education facilities 60 48
3. Shortage of cash flow 58 46
4 Inconveniencies created by settle-
ment and irrigation authoritiesa 58 46
5. Shortages in supportive servicesb 56 45
6. Shortages in grain--the staple diet 49 39
7. Health facilities 45 36

 

SOURCE: The Survey of Tenants

aThese include: allocation of housing space: claims
that housing loans were not given, crossing bridges

were lacking or remote, etc.

bThese include: lack of flour mills, transport,

building materials, firewood, etc.

89
with their annual household eXpenditures. Project per-
formance, considered in terms of tenant productivity,
overall project output, and impact on tenant well-being,
depends on the income derived from the tenancy. The rule
adopted for tenancy allocation is to give each tenant equal
tenancy, irrespective of his household size. This prin-
ciple might have adverse effects on project performance.
‘Hence, the question of tenancy size must be carefully studied.
Chapter V examines the characteristics of the tenant house-
hold sampled. Chapter VI, using findings of the previous
chapter, focuses on both the apprOpriate procedures for
determining tenancy size and the adequacy of the tenants
return from the tenancy. In Chapter VII, some policy

implications will be drawn.

F. Summary -

Most of the implementation studies concentrated on
the problems. The approach followed here has considered
implementation problems as symptoms of more fundamental
shortcomings in the design and specification of projects.
Implementation is a production process where decisions
involve questions of what, how much, how and when to
produce: setting objectives: and committing specific
resources to meet these objectives. The products of the
process are of two types: physical outputs and impact on
target groups. There are conceptual problems in measuring

the outputs of the implementation process. If the evaluation

90.
of implementation is to become an empirical question,
there should be a precise definition of what is being
measured and what level and quality of outputs should be
compared. Evaluations should focus on the chances of
attaining the predicted outcome of implementing a policy
or project.

The objectives of the Rahad project were not explic-
itly stated. The agencies responsible for implementation
of different project components had specified different
setscxfproject objectives, some of which were competitive.

In the beginning, the project lacked coordination,
but as implementation progressed, more effective coordi-
nation was achieved, even though efforts were oriented
towards trouble-shooting. Modern techniques of coordinating
and monitoring implementation were not applied, despite
the need to c0pe with the complexity of the project and
the interdependence of its components. Coordination, in-
adequate project preparation, resource limitations, and
uncertainty were considered the most important factors
in the delay of project implementation.

While settling in, the tenants faced shortages of
drinking water, staple diet, and vital social services
such as health and education. As a result, the productivity
of the tenants and the overall project performance were
affected. Furthermore, tenant households were considered
a homogenous group, and accordingly, each tenant was al-
located a uniform tenancy. If the tenant household is

proved to be heterogeneous in size and composition, then

91
the allocation of uniform tenancy could also affect tenant
productivity and overall project performance. Chapters

V and VI examine this problem.

CHAPTER V

ROLE AND RELATIONSHIP OF THE TENANT
WITH THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND SOCIO-
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TENANTS

In irrigated agricultural projects in the Sudan, the
project management sets forth rules and guidelines for the
tenant that encompass all aspects of production and mar-
keting--from seed variety selection to the market price
of the produce. But the tenant, as a decision unit and
in his individual or group capacities, affects output both
at the tenancy and project levels. Thus there is a need
to focus on the tenant's decision-making role and his
relationship with the project management.

The administrative rules, and especially the guide-
lines for tenancy eligibility, imply a total dependence
of the tenant on the income generated from his tenancy.

To achieve higher productivity it follows that the income
needs of the tenant should be reasonaly met. These needs

are partially determined by the size and composition of

the tenant's household. (In addition, the tenant's house-
hold supplies labor at the tenancy level. Hence, it be-
comes necessary to examine the socio-economic characteristics

of the tenant and his household.’)

92

93

A. The Role of the Tenant and the Project

Management in Decision4making_

Decisions are made by a complex body of policy-
makers including the government, the financing agencies,
the Rahad project management, and the tenants. Their
decisions affect all aspects of production: the financial
and physical resources allocated for production, crops,
processing, marketing, etc. The organization chart of Figure
5.1 depicts the various participants in the decision-making
process.

The role of the tenant, restricted to supplying
labor at the tenancy level, has been determined by a number
of factors: (1) the hierarchy of agricultural production
within the project, (2) the tenancy agreement, and (3) the
impact of the role played by the different participants
in adjacent irrigation projects. For example, most of the
field staff responsible for project implementation and
supervision of crop production is either seconded by the
Gezira Board or trained in the Gezira scheme.

At the production level: mechanical units prepare
the land, tenants provide labor, field officers supervise
work and handle supplies, and irrigation officers manage
the water. Tenants do not participate in contract ne-
gotiations for reaching tenancy agreements nor are they
supposed to dispute them. But in fact, a would-be tenant
is not legally a tenancy holder until he signs this written

agreement, which is usually based on the tenant agreements

94

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95
and traditions of the Gezira scheme. Tenants are eXpected
to cultivate the land according to the crop rotation and
cultural practices as laid out by the project management
(Barnett, 8).

The role of the project management and the tenant
vis-a-vis the different policies and activities of the
project are discussed in the following:-

1. The §y§tem of ngment for the Use of Irrigation Water,
Land and Other Resources

Two systems of payment are used in Sudanese irrigation
schemes to pay for irrigation water, land preparation,
cultivation, management, processing and marketing: (1)
crop-sharing for cotton--while other crops are considered
the prOperty of the tenantl--as in the Gezira scheme: and
(2) land and water charges, where all costs from land
preparation to marketing, are deducted from the tenant's.
gross revenue from all crops--ad0pted for the Rahad project.
Crop-sharing is advocated because risk and uncertainty are
shared among the partners: the land and water charge is
favored as more efficient in resource use. The decision

to adOpt either system is the responsibility of the

 

1During the 1977/78 season, the government intro-
duced a new sharing arrangement which aimed to extend the
sharing to other cash crOps but dura, as a subsistence
crop, remains a tenant property. The Gezira Tenant
Union waged a strong opposition to these measures.

96
government policy-makers and the project management: tenants
have never shared in making this decision, even though it
directly affects their productivity and returns.
2. Irrigation Control

Depending on the amount of water available in the
irrigation canals and the amount and frequency of rainfall,
the project management determines the frequency (and hence
number) of irrigations that each crop should receive ac-
cording to the economic priority it enjoys and within the
optimum level specified by researchers. The optimum depends
on numerous factors, but in the Rahad project, it was ob-
served that the field staff advocated different numbers of
applications. Some believed that it was more appropriate
to continually apply water to the cotton crOp while others
believed that water stress towards the end of the growing
season induces polling and water would be wasted at this
stage.

Number and frequency of irrigations to cotton and
groundnuts depend on the level of technology used in crop
harvesting. In the event of mechanical harvesting, water
should be withheld to induce uniform maturation and to
enable machinery to get into the field. The tenant does
not control the amount of the irrigation water or the
amount of rainfall nor does he decide the Optimum number
of irrigations, the economic importance of the crOp, or
the level of technology in harvesting. The role of the

tenant is extremely weak in the Rahad project. Maas and

97
Anderson recently commented:

The technological characteristics of
irrigation agriculture - especially the

flow, stochasticity and singularity of

water supplies — create special problems

of control to which there are two polar
responses, with a relatively small number

of alternatives between them: a single
leader or leadership group, which may be

from outside the irrigated area, can Oper-
ate the control structures and procedures:

or all the irrigators of a water course who
live within a defined service area can create
and support a users organization with author-
ity to operate the structures and procedures
of water control.

Wittfogel and like-mined scholars believe

that the typical response is the first-

control from outside and from on tOp, which

can lead to despotic power in an agronomical

bureaucracy that tends towards totalitarian

control over water users. (35, p. 366).

The tenant role is to inform the agricultural field
officer either directly or through the water canal super-
intendent (Ghaffir) that irrigation water is needed. If
there is enough water in the canal and in accordance to
a scheduled program, the agricultural field officer com-
mands the Ghaffir to release water to the whole set of
tenancies. If water is not in the canal, the agricultural
field officers turn in their constituents' needs at the
block level and so on, until finally the total requirements
of the project are available to the irrigation authorities.
The irrigation authorities then dispatch the required
amount of water from the irrigation network head to the
specified canals in the system.

The tenants most important decision concerns applying

water to his tenancy. Since each tenancy cannot be policed--

98
except at extremely high costs--tenants are known to
over-irrigate. It is not uncommon for the spillover of
irrigation water to cause roads to become impassable.
Although water lost in such a manner is not charged at
cost to the tenant, the agricultural field officer, if
aware of the situation, could record it, and the tenant
may be fined.
3. Choice of Crops and Crop Mix

The tenant exercises no role in the choice of crops
to be grown in the project. Neither does he have a say,
except marginally, on the selection of area for each crop.
These are usually determined-~and changed whenever it
appears appropriate to the project management--and specified
outside the contractual agreement. In flact, in the tenant
contractual agreement, the crops are left out intentionally.
For Gezira "The Standard Conditions of Tenancy 1936" states:
The tenants shall cultivate the land in proper manner and
according‘to the scheme of crop rotation laid down by and
to the satisfaction of the (Sudan Plantation) Syndicate--

(a British company responsible for managing the Gezira
scheme then)...(Gaitskell, 20).

The Rahad Project 1973 appraisal states that: "The
tenants shall hand over to the (Rahad) Corporation their
prescribed croos in clean condition at the collection
centers..." (28, Annex 12 p. 35).

The project management does not like to be legally

bound by specifying the crOps. Furthermore, the tenants

99
whether as individuals or as a group, cannot alter the
cropping pattern. Tenants are part of a complex system
and do not seem to be the most important.

Historically crop rotations have been changed over
time in irrigated agirculture in the Sudan. Decisions on
crop rotations are made by the government and dictated by
national objectives. But, in at least one case the na-
tional and the tenant interests. matched: the introduction
of dura (sorghumL.the staple diet, in the Gezira scheme
rotation. In the early days of the scheme, the project
management noticed that tenants would leave cotton, the
partnership cash crOp, and devote more of their time to
the dura grown outside the rotation area. Hence, dura
was included in the rotation in order to provide food
security to the tenant and save him the trekking time to
distant dura parcels (Tothill, 64). But to safeguard
against the tenant's bias toward husbanding his subsistence

crop, the Standard Conditions of Tenancy (1936) read:

The said scheme of crop rotation shall
allow the growth by rain cultivation
and subject to the prior requirements

. of the cotton crOp by irrigation water
on a portion of the said land of a crOp
of dura sufficient for and restricted to
the tenant's own requirements. Provided
that the tenant shall not sell any part of
the said crop and shall in no way neglect
the cultivation of the cotton crop for the
sake of the dura crOp (20).

In the course of planning the Rahad project, the

central government has retained the right to determine the

100

crop rotation and mix. The policy—makers have always
focused on a rotation of two crops: medium staple cotton
and groundnuts. But since livestock was a major enterprise
of many farmers before they joined the Rahad project, the
project management decided to allow the tenant to determine.
whether to keep livestock and include leguminous fodder in
his rotation, or to concentrate on producing groundnuts
and cotton.
4. Production and Marketing

In production and marketing decision, the power lies
with the project management. Annex 12, Article 5 of the
1973 Rahad project apprisal is a good example:

The (Rahad) Corporation may also undertake

the following operations on behalf of the

tenant whenever it is considered by the

Corporation to be advantageous or conven-

ient to do so. The cost of such operations

together with interest at a rate to be fixed

by the Corporation taking into consideration

the current bank rate shall be a charge on

the tenants. Such Operations shall include

the following:

(a) Land preparation (including ploughing,

smoothing, and ridging). mechanical
planting and harvesting,

(b) Supply of improved seeds and cost of
seed treatment,

(0) Supply of fertilizers,

(d) Supply of chemicals and-crop spraying to
- control pests and diseases,

(e) Ginning of the cotton crops,
(f) Hulling of groundnuts
(g) Transport of the crOp,

(3) Crop insurance,

101

(i) Crop storage,

(j) Marketing,

(k) Construction of Abu VI canals,

(1) Supply of Abu VI pipes,

(m) Any Operations done by the Corporation on

behalf of any tenant due to the negligence
or failure of the tenant to fulfill his
obligations (28, Annex 12, p.3).

The analysis of cotton production costs in the sample
of 125 tenants revealed that the tenant commanded on the
average only 2 percent of the costs per fedden (See Appendix
B)- A large part of these costs were advanced as loans
by the project management to the tenants. Even though cost
allocation does not reflect day-to-day decision making in
the field, the tenants' share in cost allocation must be
viewed as an important means of control and an indicator
of decision-making.

Unlike the adjacent Gezira scheme where cotton is
the only joint-venture crop,in the Rahad project both
cotton and groundnut are produced and marketed under the
joint auspices of the project management and the tens
ant. Article 35 of Annex 12, of the 1973 Rahad project
appraisals addresses marketing procedures:

The tenants shall hand over to the (Rahad)

Corporation their prescribed crops in clean

condition at the collection centers estab-

lished by the Corporation. The Corporation

shall market such crOps on behalf of the

tenants to give the tenants the benefit of

economies of marketing on a large scale. The

tenants shall market on their own their vege-
tables, fruits and livestock. The Corporation

shall extend to them advisory services in the
marketing of these products (28, Annex 12, p.3).

102

The rationale for project management control over
production and marketing of cotton and groundnuts is stated
as economies of scale. But tHis is not the whole story.
In August, 1975, a committee set up to determine the re-
lations between the project management and the fruit and
vegetable tenants reported that: It is extremely dif-
ficult to secure the repayment of the land and water charge
and costs of services and inputs provided in cash by the
(Rahad) Corporation to the fruit and vegetable tenants (59).

Earlier suggestions for repayment, which arose in
one of the meetings Of the Rahad Agricultural Corporation
Board of Directors, called for either of two solutions:
that the (Rahad) Corporation receives a mandate from the
Board to collect the dry Haricot beans and market that
crOp for its advances and debts on fruit and vegetable
tenants: or alternatively that the tenant should sign an
injunction to pay these debts at the end of the season,
and that he may be legally evicted in case of his failure
to do so. (58). The Committee did not go so far as giving
the marketing responsibility to the Corporation: instead,
it recommended formation of cooperatives to handle the
marketing of fruits and vegetables. It also recommended
that a tenant be evicted if he did not repay the loans
advanced for these crops. The Committee's final recom-
mendations state that: (l) the tenant should not dispose
of onions, Haricot beans and fruits privately, since these

crops are suitable for cooperative marketing and the

103

returns which accure from them should be enough to repay
the Corporation advances; (2) the tenant should repay his
debts on a strict timetable to be agreed upon with the
Corporation; and (3) if the tenant failed to meet his
obligations as stated in the agreement, the Corporation
would be free to undertake the necessary steps to safe-
guard its interests. In the occasion of tenant evication,
the Corporation would determine the best use of the fruit
and vegetable tenancy, in accordance with the rules and
regulations (59).

The repayment of loans, advances, and production
costs has always been the primary concern of the project
management.

5. Non-Farm Occupations

 

Traditionally, in irrigation projects in the Sudan,
tenants have been strongly encouraged not to pursue off-
farm jobs. For example, field officers monitor tenants,
frequently make note of the absence of tenants in their
tenancies, and examine the condition of the tenancy for
weed control, drainage, and the flow of water. “In the
Rahad project the approach is the same--except where oc-
cupations, such as trading, are perceived to be of vital
importance to the tenants. Thus, the tenancy remains the
most important, if not the only, source of income for the
tenant.

6. Provision of Services
Services such as health, drinking water, education,

electricity, paved roads, etc. affect production at all

104
levels. An adequate supply and fair distribution of these
goods are not only important for the social welfare of the
tenants but also essential for the utilization of resources.
In the Sudan most of these services are provided free of
charge by the public sector. Three of them, education,
health care, and drinking water, are of special interest
in this investigation. Whereas in the assumed perfectly
competitive model they would be considered private goods,
in Sudanese irrigated agriculture they are at best Vimpuref
public goods. First, the market fails to provide these
services at market prices which the majority of consumers
could afford. Secondly, there are high costs of exclusion
associated with the use of these goods (62). Although the
demand for these services is expanding, the supply is failing
to keep pace because the cost of producing these goods is
very high.

Tenants may be aware of the stalemate which the
government faces as a producer of these goods, but they
generally do not appreciate the preferential distribution
of these services. That is, these services may be provided
for some of them and not others. During the field work
for this study many tenants reported that they were ap—
prehensive about the inadequate production and unfair dis-
tribution of these goods. For example, about 60 percent
of the tenants surveyed ranked the shortage of drinking
water as their most serious problem, followed by problems

in health and education.

105

B. Sggio-Economic Characteristig§_of the Tenants
1. Household Composition

Household composition is important in many respects
for the proper operation of the production system. In the
context of this study, the household is of interest both
as a source of labor and as a consumption unit. The basic
assumption is that the tenant and his household will supply
the needed labor, at least to cultivate a certain acreage
of cotton, the principal cash crop, in the rotation (39).
On the other hand, the project management makes sure that
the tenant devotes full time to the tenancy. Since there
are few, if any, alternative income opportunities, the
tenant and his household must rely on the tenancy for their
sustenance.

The dependency rate is obtained by calculating the
ratio of persons below 15 years of age plus persons above
64 years of age to the active population between 15 and
64 years of age. The dependency rate in the tenant house-
hold sampled was l.2 However, field observations indicated
that children in the 10-14 years age bracket were active
participants in agricultural production: when these children
were included the dependency rate dropped to 0.7. The
results of this sample tenant survey (See Table 5.1) were
within the range of dependency rates found in a survey
of the total population conducted in the area during 1974-75
for the would-be tenants in Rahad project (Galal Eldin,21).

106

TABLE 5.1 TENANT HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION BY AGE-GROUP,

ABSOLUTE AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION

 

 

Age Group Total Number Cumulative

(Years) in the Sample Percentage. Percentage
179 297 35 35
10-14 123 15 51
15-19 88 ll 61
20-64 286 34 96

65 & above 35 4 100
TOTAL 829 100

 

SOURCE: The Survey of Tenants

107

A micro level examination is needed of household
characteristics and composition, and of the individual
tenants in the sample. In subsequent analysis, it was
contended that household composition is an important vari-
able in tenancy size determination and hence in all policies
that follow, such as tenancy allocations, production de-
cisions, settlement, and services provision.

Table 5.2 indicates that tenancies were distributed
predominantly to males, who were usually the heads of house-
holds. The 4 percent females represent widows who lost
their husbands and either did not have sons in their im-
mediate families or had sons who were not adults at the
time of tenancy distributions. That tenancy holders were
selected predominantly from among males and females with.
families is reinforced by the results shown in Table 5.3.
Even the 2.4 percent unmarried males and the 4 percent
widows were selected because they were heads of families.

Table 5.2 further reveals that 72 percent of the
tenants were betweengO and\501years of age, which suggests
a large variability in househOld size and composition. This,
in turn, implies a large variation in the household labor
potential and in per capita (or per consumer equivalent)
income derived from tenancy farming. Considering the under-
lying assumption that the tenant is eXpected to supply the
needed labor for the tenancy, the adequate supply of household
labor is most critical in times of peak demand for labor--

especially for weeding in the Rahad project farming system.

108

TABLE 5.2 AGE, SEX AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE
OF TENANTS ~ _-

 

§sx_2i§££ibution
Age Group Absolute Numbers Percentages
Male Female Total Male. Female Total

15-19 1 0 'l 0.8 0 0.8
20-29 29 0 29 23.2 0 23.2
30-39 32 0 32 25.6 0 25.6
40-49 29 3 32 23.2 2.4 25.6
50-64 18 1 19 14.4 0.8 15.2
65 & above 11 l 12 8.8 0.8 9.6

Total 120 5 125 96.0 4.0 100.0

 

SOURCE: The Survey of Tenants

TABLE 5.3 MARITAL STATUS OF SAMPLE 0F TENANTS. NUMBER AND
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION

 

Number of Percentage
Status Tenants Distribution
Un-married (males) 3. 2.4
Married (males) 117 93.6
Widows (females) _5 4.0
TOTAL 125 100.0

 

SOURCE: The Survey of Tenants

109

The tenant selection procedure favors tenants with larger
households. But it allows unweighted Vequalfl access to
the land and Other resources by distributing a uniform
tenancy size to each tenant irrespective of the size and
composition of his household. This could eventually lead
to unequal income Opportunities. Furthermore, if there
are no internal correction devices responsive to the size
and changing needs of the family living on tenancy incomes,
then skewed distribution could prevail in the future, if-
not already.

It is also clear from a joint interpretation of
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 that the age groups of 30-39 and 40-49
were the most eligibe cultivators and accounted for half
the holdings. Table 5.4 depicts the relationship of all
sample tenant household members to each other, and their
age and sex. In the survey there were 415 males and 414
females. The ratio between girls and boys in the 1-9 year
age category was equal, but changed to about 40 percent
girls and 60 percent boys in the 10-14 year age group. The
prospect of marriage for girls, as early as 13-14 years,
offers a possible explanation for this ratio change
(Mohammed, 47). Some of these ratios are already recorded
in Table 5.4 Early marriage may also explain why there
were only 2 female dependents in the 15-19 age group. The
average age of tenant wives was 11 years younger than that
of married male tenants.

Researchers have observed that in the irrigation

projects in the Sudan, the system of production promotes

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111

nuclear rather than extended families (8). In this case,
however, the shift to the nuclear family proceeds gradually
because the analysis of the tenant survey conducted in the
first year of Rahad project settlement revealed that there
were still 13 percent male and female dependents. Around
40 percent of these dependents were not at the productive
age: 22 percent were above/65lyears of age and 18 percent
were less than 10 years old (see Table 5.4). The age at
which family members are considered active producers in
the labor force is estimated in this study to be between
10 and 64years.
I The variations in the size and composition of the
tenant households should be a pivotal factor in determining
the tenancy size. Yet tenants have a limited Opportunity
to change their tenancy size which is mandated by the
project authorities.
2. Previous Occupations of Tenants

The would-be tenants were slected from among area
inhabitants who showed that they had established land rights
by the use of the project land over the years. It is im-
portant to identify the occupations these tenants had prior
to the construction of the project for several reasons.
First, farming experience, in general, whether as a farmer
Or a livestock rearer whether nomadic or settled, has an
important bearing on productivity both at the farm and
project level. Secondly, experience with irrigated farming

and cotton production also affects the performance of the

112
tenant. Thirdly, the tenants previous income can be used
as a guide to project future income of the tenants.

From Table 5.5 it is clear that the primary oc-
cupation prior to the construction of the project was rain
cultivation. Statistical surveys in the area had shown
that dura (sorghum), the staple grain in the Sudan, was
grown on 97 percent of the area under rain cultivation
(dry-land farming) (15).

Though raising animals was a subsidiary occupation
for about 40 percent of the sample of tenants, it was the
major previous occupation for only 3 percent of the sample
of tenants. This low percentage did not reflect the im-
portance of animals in the project area, however, because
the full-time animal rearers were nomads, who were the least
aware of and the least interested in settled life. As a
result they were most likely to be under-represented in the
total number of settlers: although after the project began
they applied by the thousands.

3. Occupations Outsiue the Tenancy

The management of the irrigation projects in the
Sudan aims at keeping the tenant fuLly occupied with his
tenancy. The tenant finds little time to take care of
other activities, even those that seem complementary by
nature. Most of the tenants were originally rain cul-
tivators in the same area now occupied by the project
(See Table 5.5). With rain cultivation still existing on
land adjacent to the project, tenants who might find tenancy

work to be less than their management and labor capacity,

113

TABLE 5.5 OCCUPATION, NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
OF SAMPLE OF TENANTS

 

 

Percent to

 

Number of
Occupation Number Households
Rain Cultivation 121 96.8
Coal and Firewood
Production : 51 40.8
Livestock rearing 48 38.4
Dura Harvesting 30 24.0
Daily Paid Labor 23 18.4
Cotton Picking 22 17.6
Trading 17 13.6

SOURCE: The Survey of Tenants .

114
or who might place high value on securing their staple
diet grain, might try to keep their rain cultivation plot.
When interveiwed, however, only 3 percent of the sample
tenants were determined to pursue some rain cultivation
on areas adjacent to the project.

About one-third Of the sample of tenants were still
Operating their previous businesses. Some of these oc-
cupations, like trading (8 percent), hut construction, bed-
making, and coal and firewood production (only 2 percent),
were vital for the functioning of the project.

Animal rearing is of special interest. There is
no doubt that animal products, namely milk and meat, are
important for the nutrition of the population. However,
at the beginning the project management promoted total
dependence on the cash crops-~cotton and groundnuts--and
no plans were made to integrate animals into the rotation.
Sensing the importance of animals (for example, about
one-third of the sample tenant households kept animals
for domestic milk and meat consumption), the project man-
agement made plans to integrate livestock into the rotation.
4. Experieuce in_I§rigated Farmiug

It is extremely difficult to determine the amount
of previous irrigated farming eXperience of tenants, but
it appears that most of the tenants' experience was limited.
All but 3 percent of the tenants had practiced rain culti-
vation--primarily the production of dura. For off-season

employment, about 41 percent of the tenants interviewed had

115
engaged in cooking coal and firewood production, 24 percent
in grain harvesting in commercial schemes, and 18 percent
in daily paid labor. Cotton picking, the only activity
from which the would-be tenants might have benefited in
irrigated farming, was the least favored, with 18 percent
of the sample of tenants involved.

This limited exposure to irrigated farming and to
the crops grown in the project is further reflected in ten-
ant's :response to problems they were eXperiencing. Sixty-
four percent of the sample of tenants considered that their
ineXperience with crOps grown in the project posed dif-
ficult problems. Moreover, 77 Percent of the sample of

tenants encountered problems in irrigation.

C. Summagy

This examination of tenant and management responsi-
bilities in the Rahad project has shown that the management
is in control of the farming decision on irrigation, choice
of crOps, rotation, production activities, processing,
marketing, and payment arrangements for the use of the
resources. The tenant role is restricted to supplying
labor, particularly that of his household. The sample
survey of 125 tenants in 1978 revealed that the tenant was
responsible for only about 2 percent of the total cotton
production costs in the 1977/78 season. Hence, the role
of the tenant in the Rahad project was extremely weak.

The analysis of the socio-economic characteristics

of 125 tenants included in the sample survey revealed that

116
tenant's household size and composition were heterogenous:
the size of the tenant household varied between 1 and 16.
This has important implications for the current tenancy
allocation policy of the Rahad project where each tenant
had been allotted one tenancy irrespective of household
size and composition.

The results of the sample of tenant survey showed
that the tenant and his household had limited off-farm
employment opportunities. The work on the tenancy was,
given priority by the projeCt management such that the
tenant was left with virtually no time to allocate for
off-farm occupations which would bring in additional income.
Therefore, the tenants' returns from the tenancies should
be sufficient at least to meet the annual expenditures by
each tenant household, which vary with each household
Size and cOmposition. This could be achieved by replacing
currentfixed tenancy size with a variable tenancy size.
In Chapter VI, the variable tenancy Size will be otained
by using the tenants' returns from farming, the annual
household expenditures, and the size of the tenant house-

hold.

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF TENANCY SIZE

In the previous chapter the analysis of the tenant
sample identified unifonn tenancy size as an important
problem which should be addressed by the policy-makers.
Tenancy sizes vary from lC>in.Essuki to 40 feddans in the
. Gezira main schemes. For the Rahad project tenancy size

isiigged atggfeddans, distributed to each tenant ir-
respective of the SIze and composition of his household.
This chapter will focus on tenancy size. First, a method
for generating alternative tenancy sizes will be presented

for policy makers consideration. Second, the consequences

of fixed tenancy size will be examined.

A. Evolution of the Tenanuy
Size in the Rahad Pro‘ect

 

In 1967, the Roseires Preinvestment Survey (25)
chose 12 feddans as the Optimum tenancy size for each
Rahad project tenant. The study states:

The final evaluation revealed that a self-
contained family holding (in which its labor
demand can be supplied primarily by the

family labor) of 12 feddans was the optimum
size, having due regard to the cropping pat-
pern envisaged, labor inputs, mechanization,
the availability of casual labor and the level

117

118

of income which the tenant would antici-
pate. (25, Part 1, p.2).

In 1969, the Agricultural Deve10pment Corporation prpposed
two tenancy sizes: 12 and 24 feddans which could tap all
available household labor from small and large families.

Holdings of 12 feddans are alloted to

small families supplying labour equivalent

of 200 man-days per year. Holdings of 24

feddans are alloted to large families sup-

plying labor equivalent of 300 man-days

per year. (54, p.8).
The distinction among households on the basis of size and
household labor supply was an extremely important develop-
ment, because it pointed up the heterogeneity in the size
of tenants' household and the need for variable tenancy
sizes. The study further asserted that larger tenancies
would provide incentives for full time farming.

; The level of income to be realized by a
\ tenant is more or less a function of both

yield and the size of holding,as the main

factor. Hence the larger the size of

holding, the higher the level of income,

and hence the incentive for people to be

settled as permanent farmers. The smaller

the size of holding the more would be the

incentive for people to look for part—time

employment to subsidize their income (54, pp 8-9)

In 1970, an IBRD mission for the appraisal of Rahad.
project suggested a tenancy size of 18 feddans, and the
1973 study for the Rahad project (28) suggested a 24 feddan
tenancy size for each tenant. In both cases, the 1969
suggestion of variable tenancies was not considered. The
government of the Sudan approved the 1973 study and the

project implementation began in October, 1973.

119

In January 1977, for field layout convenience, the
project management decided to reduce the tenancy size from
24 to 22 feddans so that the 88 feddan area to be irrigated
from the terminal channel could be more easily subdivided.
To compensate for this reduction in tenancy size, cropping
intensity was increased from 83 percent to 100 percent.

Evaluation revealed that the Rahad project policy-
makers repeatedly changed the size of tenancy, yet/gave

no consideration to the heterogeneity of the tenants'

[5"

. _.~ .-.——

households. Their decision was much simplified by ag-
gregating the would-be tenants into a "representative"

tenant household.

B. Chauge of Crop-mix andRotation

The choice of crOp-mix and rotation must take the
following factors into account:

1. The productivity of land and other resources,

2. The recommended sequence of the rotation which deter-
mines the amount of land that can be allotted to the
respective crops:

3. The choice of any one crOp or rotation which ultimately
influences the cost of production, the gross revenues,
and the net economic and financial returns.

These factors--yield, area, and net returns per unit
of output--are the determinants of benefit streams which

are then discounted to obtain the net present worth.

120
Alternatively, the present worth of the cost and revenue
streams are discounted to finally calculate a cost-benefit
ratio or to find the internal rate that would equate the
_va1ue of the two streams. The returns to the tenant are
usually calculated for frepresentativef tenants.

The choice of crop mix and rotation was made on
the basis of recommendations of the Agricultural Research
Corporation (ARC). Since it was believed, until recently,
that there was an abundant supply of irrigation water for
expansion of irrigated agriculture, crOp water requirements
had but a limited impact on the choice of crops at the
planning stage. But once the irrigation network and con-
trol system were designed, the insufficient supply of ir-
rigation water imposed a constraint on the crap mix and
the rotation.

In analyzing the tenancy size to determine possible
alternative tenancy sizes for the consideration of the
policy-makers, the choice of the crop-mix and rotation
must be taken as given, with the clear understanding that
the returns to each individual tenant are affected by the

policy-maker choice on what, how much and how to produce.

 

C. A Methou_For Generatiug Policy
Options on Tenancy Size

The policy maker needs guidance in determining
tenancy size acceptable to the tenants, the project manage-

ment and the society at large. Rather than allowing each

121
tenant a different tenancy size, the policy maker should
be provided with reasonable number of options from which
to choose. Obviously, some degree of aggregation is in-
evitable and should be based on a classification scheme
that accounts for the tenant's household characteristics
which vary widely in the Rahad project.

1. Assumptions About Sudan Government Policies
Concernlng Irrigated Agriculture

The question of tenancy size must be analysed in
the context of the policy environment guiding irrigated
projectsiJlthe Sudan. The following assumptions are made
about the government policies in irrigation projects:

1. The government will continue to prefer tenancies of
equal size.

2. The project management will decide the crops to be
grown, the area under each crOp, and the rotation,

3. The project management will perform a variety of pro-
duction activities on behalf of the tenant and deduct the
costs from crOp proceeds,

4. The project management will provide irrigation water
and decide the frequency of application. In return for
irrigation water and agricultural management, the tenant
will pay a fixed cash rent known as the land and water
charge.

5. Tenants and their families will be responsible for all
production activities that need direct labor input,

6. Tenants and their families will be urged to derive

their living premarily from farming.

122

2. Variables AffectipgTenanpyé§ize

7 Considering the previous discussion and the policy
constraints, the following variables are the most relevant
in determining tenancy size:
1. Tenant household size and composition, the household
being a source of labor and a consumption unit,
2. The income from the tenancy, obtained by computing the
net returns to household labor and reflected in the explicit
income choice,
3. The crop mix and rotation and their impact on both
labor requirements and net returns to labor.

The relationship between the three variables is

S
depicted in Fibure 6.1.

3. Tenancy-Size Computatipn Formulag

In the analysis'which follows, a method is deve10ped
to determine the amount of land (area of tenancy), given
the tenant household size, the tenancy returns, and the
crop mix and rotations. This relationship is computed

using the following formulae:

1

(1) A.. =

Y..
13 k

R..C.
ii"J J

i=1

123

Tenant Household Size

A

Net Returns to Tenant
Household Labor

/

 

Land Ratios of
Crops in the Rotation

FIGURE 6.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAND RATIOS OF CROPS
GROWN, THE NET RETURN TO TENANT HOUSEHOLD LABOR,
AND THE HOUSEHOLD SIZE

124

 

where: Aii = Area of Tenancy
Y.. = Exogenously given target income based on
13 annual household expenditure- which varies
with the consumer equivalent of the tenant's
household

R . = group mean(s) of net returns to household
labor per unit area of jth crop

C = Land ratio under the jth crOp, the relative
weight for a given rotation

i 1...m associated with consumer equivalent
household size.

1 group mean of (l.O-3.0) consumer equivalent
household size.

2 group mean of (3.1-4.4) consumer equivalent
household size etc.

j l..k associated with income level as generated
by net returns to household labor per feddan
of the jth crop, Rij

The net returns to household labor per feddan of
jth crop, an, R3. are computed using the formula:
(2)R.=G. 2
n3 n3 - (l + 2) (Tnj t Fj + Unj+ Lj)
where: j = l...k associated with the crops included in
the rotation Cj

n = l...125 number of cases in the sample of

tenants surveyed
an = Oni'Pwi
n3
Onj = total output per feddan for nth tenant growing

jth crOp -

125

weighted price calculated for joint products,
e.g., cotton (lint, seed and scarto). It

is the Same price offered for all tenants'
output.

5

nj = Area of the jth crop of the nth tenant.

r = The current rate of interest estimated at
10 percent, since the production season is
6 months, it is divided by 2.

Tn. = cost of production activities paid by the

J tenant either from his own resources or
through advances from the project management.
These could be per crOp area or output. The
total costs incurred are divided by area
under the jth crOp for the tenant, Anj'

F. = costs of production activities per unit area
3 of the jth crop paid by the product manage-
ment on behalf of the tenant. It is the same
cost per feddan.

U . = costs of production per.unit of out ut post-
“3 harvest operations) of Jth crop Pro uce by nth
tenant, paid by the project management on
behalf of the tenant. It is transformed to
per feddan cost by multiplying unit cost by

0 ,

nl‘l O
A .
DJ
L. = land and water charge per unit area of the
J jth crop. It is the same cost per unit
area of the jth crop, irrespective of actual
use of irrigation water.
4. Labor Requirements Compulation Formulae
Two categories of production-activities in which
the tenant has some responsibility and provides labor are

identified:{:OrOp establishment, and harvest and post-
,1 7

l
V

harvest activities,
To obtain the total labor requirements for the crop
establishment activities, the following relationships were

used:

126

(l) Lnk = FLnj + HLn
Where: Lnk = total labor inputs per cotton production
actlv1ty
n = 1.....125 number of cases
= crOp establishment activities (See
Table 6.8)
FLnj = family labor in hours of work
J'= 1. 2.3
l = adult male labor
2 = adult female labor
3 = child labor
FLn = daily work hours x days per activities
HLn = hired labor in hours of work

To resolve the problem of common denominator, all
labor inputs will be converted into adult male labor.
If f and c are the transformation coefficients for female
and child labor respectively then:

(2) FLnj = FLnl + FLn2 . f + FLnB' C

Assuming that the work done by hired labor is of
the same type and quality as household labor, then hired

labor can be eXpressed in terms of household labor as

follows:
(3) HL = (__Pnk.____). FLnJ.
, 100 - Pnk ’
where: P = percentage of work done by hired labor per

nk kth activity in nth case

127

Hence; equation (1) becomes (2) + (3) or

(4)Lnk=PLnl+FLn2.f+FLn3.C+(FLnl+FLn2.

P

 

f + FLn3 . C)( 100?; )
- nk
or
.._. P
(5)Lnk (FLnl+FLn2.f+FLn3.C)(l+ m; )
100 - Pnk
The reduced form is:
(6) L =FL. (1+ P
nk nj _
100 Pnk

The second category of production activities includes

harvest and post-harvest activities where sample tenants

have depended to a large extent on hired labor. For ex-

ample, more than 75 percent of cotton picking, 90 percent
of packing and weighing, almost all cotton transportation

to collection centers, and .60 percent of stalk cleaning

are done by hired labor. Hence, in the analysis of peak

clemand for labor for the various tenancy sizes: it will

be assumed that most of the harvest and post-harvest

activities are done by hired labor. (See Appendix D)

5 - Po‘t‘ep’t‘ia; Supply of’ Household Labor Couputation Formulae
The mean labor requirement for the crOp establish-

ment activities in tenancies under various crOp rotations

will be compared with the maximum potential household

128
:Labor available on a month by month basis using the
following formula:

(7) SF = (FLl + FL2 . r + FL . C ) . d

3
adult male labor

where : FL

1
FL2 = adult female labor
FL3 = child labor
f = transformation coefficients from adult
female labor to adult male labor equivalent
C = transformation coefficient from child labor
to adult male labor equivalent
d = annual days of work

D. The Computation of Alternative Tenancy Size§
1.. Calculation of the Financial Net
Returns Per Feddan of‘ rpp
The net returns per household per feddan of cotton
aura computed using partial capital budgeting and applying
the formula:
_ _ '.£ .
The results are depicted in Appendix 1%: There
are five types of tenant production costs:
1. Tenants pay the interest on Operating capital
for a utilization period of six months. The
annual simple rate which is currently charged

by the commercial banks is 10 percent.

129
The tenant incurs expenditures from past savings,
‘borrowings, or credit advances from the project
management (Tnj) to pay for production activities
under his supervision,
The project management undertakes, on the tenant's
behalf, per feddan eXpenditure (Fj)’ for large
Operations where economies of scale are ex-
perienced (or assumed), such as agricultural
aviation for pest and disease control or land
preparation. Over and above the realization of
scale economies, the project management may be
Opting for certain standards such as variety
selection and treatment of seeds for planting,
and planting to attain a certain pOpulation per
hole or per unit area. The total cost of these
Operations are "socialized" by dividing them
equally per feddan of crOp irrespective of the
specific costs incurred in a Specific area or
tenancy. This procedure is acceptable because
the random allocation of resources with variable
qualities gives rise to cost variations. Cost
variations are evened out through this procedure
but there is no evidence that output variations
are evened out as well.
There are per unit of output eXpenditures on
post-harvest Operations, including marketing

(Unj) where, in addition to realizing scale

130
economies, the project management collects the
sales proceeds to deduct the land and water
charge, production and management costs incurred
and loans, Again the total costs are divided
to obtain a per unit output cost which will
then be charged uniformly.

5. The land and water charge (L3) is a flat rate
per feddan of crOp, by the project management
on a Usocialized cost? basis. That is, the
charge per total crop area of each tenant is
deducted irrespective of the amount of water
applied by the tenant. Whether water is
available or not, the number of applications
is subject to the discretion and approval of
the agricultural field officer (inspector) and
not the tenant. The intensity of each application
is essentially left to the tenant because of
the high costs of extension and policing. On
the other hand, a tenant may be limited by the
availability of water in the canal, his tenancy
location relative to the water flow, and the
adequacy of his tenancy leveling to receive
irrigation and drainage.

2- T TV 'at' '
Labor Per Feddan of Cgtton

51- Labor Equivalents and Classifiction of Tenant Households

To test the variation of the net returns to house-

hOld labor, the household labor equivalents of the sample

131

of tenants need to be calculated. In order to compute

them the common denominator for expressing the different

male, female and child labor units must be determined.

The weighting of the household labor.presented in Table

6.1 is based on the following assumptions:

1.

Physical labor productivity is initially positively
correlated with age and then negatively correlated
with age (Norman, 52).

The weights are assigned to age groups because it is
not practical to assign them for each age.

Children participate in agricultural production in
irrigation projects in the Sudan as early as 10 years
old. Children from ages 10 to 14 play an important
role in water application, resowing and weeding.

From ages 15 to 64, both men and women are fully
productive..

The productivity of females ages 15 to 64 is equal to
that of same age group of males in some agricultural
activities such as weeding, sowing and picking, but
lower than that of males in other activities such as
the tilling of soil and construction of ridges. Field
observation indicates that the weeding activity, in
which females equal males in productivity, is of the
greatest importance, and hence, women are given higher

weights than those given to them by Norman (52).

132

TABLE 6.1 ADULT-MALE LABOR EQUIVALENT
Weights by Sex and Age

 

 

Sex
Age Group Male Female W_
0-9 0.0 0.0
10-14 0.5 0-5
15-65 1.0 0.9
65 0.0 0.0

SOURCE: Based on the Survey of Tenants and Field
Observations

133
The male labor equivalents of the sample of tenants
are obtained by applying these weights to the following
relationship.

FL . = FL + FL

n3 n1 n2 3
adult males with a weight of unity

. 0.9 + FLn . 0.5

N H
II II

adult females with a weight of 0.9

Kl)
II

children with a weight of 0.5
The labor equivalents of the tenant households are given
in Appendix C. .

In order to test for the variation in net returns
per feddan of cotton, the tenant household are divided
according to their labor equivalence into three equal
groups of small, medium and large households. Then the
means of the net returns to household labor per'feddan
of cotton fiij are obtained for each of the three groups
(See Table 6.2).

b. A Statistical Test of the Variations in Net Returns
Per Feddan of Cotton.

To determine whether the net returns to household
labor per feddan of cotton for the group means are signi-
ficantly different from each other and from that of the
entire sample, a multiple test, or F-test of variance, is
conducted.

The N_u_]_._l_ hypothesis is:

U = U = U

l‘ l 2 3

The alternativa hypothesis is:

H:U=U=U
01 23

134
TABLE 6.2 CLASSIFICATION OF HOUSEHOLDS ACCORDING TO ADULT-

MALE LABOR EQUIVALENTS AND THE NET RETURNS T0
HOUSEHOLD LABOR PER FEDDAN 0F COTTON

 

 

Household Groups Group Mean .
By Adult-Male Percentage Net Return to
Labor a ofvSample Household Labor/
GrOup_p Equivalents Households Feddan of Cotton Ls
Small 1 - 2.3b 32 75.474
medium 20“ - 308 . I 3502 710660
Large 3.9 - 8.30 32.8 72.308
Mean 3.4 100 74.693

SOURCE: The Survey of Tenants

aThe Classifiction is made around the mean household,
with approximately one-third of the sample tenant house-
holds in each group.

bThe mode of the observations (1.9) falls within this
group. It comprises about 83% of this group and 26% of
all observations. .

0The effective class interval of this group is 3.9 - 6.9
since only two observations (8.2 and 8.3) have higher
values.

135
where:

U = group mean #1 net returns to household labor
per feddan of cotton.

U2 = group mean #2 net returns to household labor
.per feddan of cotton.
U3 = group mean.#3 net returns to household labor

per feddan of cotton.
To test the null hypothesis an analysis of variance
was performed. The results of the analysis of variance

were as follows:

 

 

 

 

- F
Source D.F. Sum of Squarap Mean Squarea Ratioftrobability
Between 2 404.5 202.3 0.07 0.93
Groups
Within 122 347703.9 2850.0
Groups
Total 124 348108.4

Thus, with 0.93 probability, there are no variations be-
tween the means of the three groups of net returns to
household labor per feddan of cotton. Alternatively there
is a probability of 0.93 that type one error will be com-
mitted by rejecting the null hypothesis (Ho: Ul = U2 = U3)
while it is in fact true. Consequently the entire sample
tenant mean of net returns to household labor per feddan
of cotton can be substituted for any one of the group means.
Furthermore, the variations amongst the three
group means and between the three of them on one side and
the sample mean on the other side are very small. In

absolute terms, the maximum difference is about 1S4 be-

tween the first two group means, while the maximum

136

difference between any group mean and the sample mean is

around 133.

Some of the reasons for such uniformity in net

returns to household labor per feddan of cotton are:

1.

The project management undertakes, on behalf of the
tenant, all the production activities and post-harvest
Operations which may exhibit economies of scale.

The project management further reduces variation in
net returns per feddan by collecting equal charges

per feddan or unit of output in return for conducting
these activities on the tenant's behalf. The land

and water charge is also levied on the same principle.
The tenant's share--whether in terms of direct house-
hold labor or hired labor--in performing production
activities is very meager, as revealed in earlier
discussions.

The prices of inputs and outputs are the same, since
the purchasing of inputs and the marketing of outputs
are carried out by the project management.

In the Rahad projeCt, the production of all crops is
based on similar farming practices and production
relations. Groundnuts, like cotton, is a cash crOp,
and the project management assumes the lion's share
in production and marketing. Although the author
could not obtain data on groundnuts production in
Rahad project, it could be hypothesized that the net

returns per feddan of crop are neutral to scale,

137
whether of household or tenancy. The net returns to

the tenant household per feddan of all crOps are
presented in Table 6.3

TABLE 6.3 NET RETURNS TO TENANT HOUSEHOLD PER FEDDAN 0F

 

 

ALL CROPS
CROPS MEAN NET RETURNS
(R.) ls
J
Cotton 3 74.693
Groundnutsb 31.705
Leguminous Fodderb 22.520
Fallow 0.0

 

SOURCE: aThe Survey of Tenants

bAhmed, M.A., The Revised Farm Budget: Rahad

Corporation (Ministry of Agriculture, Food and
Natural Resources, May 1975).

3, Trenantfipuaehpld Annual Expenditures:
appasiSRFor-Tenant;Target Incouap.
a. Variations in Tenant Household Annual Expenditures
In Chapter II it was pointed out that a survey of
125 tenants provided information for estimating tenant
household annual exPenditures for 1977/78. The results
of the survey, presented in Appendix 13 , showed large
variation among the tenant household annual expenditures.
These variations arise partially from difference in the

Size, age, and sex composition of the tenant households.

138

b. Consumer Equivalents and Classification
of Tenant Households

To find a common denominator for expressing the
consumer units of tenant households, a weighting procedure
= suggested by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
of the United Nations (18) was used (See Table 6.4). Its

TABLE 6.4 CONSUMER EQUIVALENT WEIGHTS

 

 

Age/Sex Group Male Female
0-4 .2 .2
5-9 05 '5

10-11; 075 '7
15+ 1.0 .9

 

SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the

United Nations, Calorie Requirements: Report
of the Second Committee on Calorie Re uirements,

Nutritional Studies, No. 15, Rome: F.A.0. 1957).

use was justified inspite of the problems of standardization
and comparison of the consumption scale pointed out by
Woodbury (67) and Prais and Houthakker (55). According

to the FAO weighting procedures, the consumption require-
ments of individuals are positively correlated with age.
While they do not vary with sex for children in the (0-4)
and (5-9) age groups, they vary with sex in higher age

groups and the consumption requirements of males become

139
larger than that of females. The consumer equivalent
weights were used to compute the tenant household<xnr-
sumer equivalents (See Appendix C) .

As a result of these large variation in annual
household eXpenditures, the sample of tenants was divided
into five consumer equivalent groups: two groups smaller
than the mean (average) tenant household: two groups larger
than the mean: and one group representing the mean. These
consumer equivalent groups are shown in Column 1 of Table
6.5
c. Tenant Target Incomes

The average annual household expenditures of each
of the five groups were obtained from the field survey
and are shown in Column 3 of Table 6.5. Columns 4 and 5

of Table 6.5 illustrate to the policy-maker the projected
level of eXpenditures by consumer equivalent groups when
the 1977/78 level of annual household eXpenditures is in-
creased by 10 and 20 percent. These percentages were
chosen because the interviewed managers' response, when
asked abbut the level of income that should be adopted
as a target for the tenants, ranged from Ls600 to le600,
and hence was not useful in determing the target income
for the tenants. The procedure adopted in this study
is in agreement with the Rahad project managing director
at the time who prOposed in his response a target income

of cost-of-living-plus.

140

TABLE 6.5 APPROXIMATIONS OF ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES
BY CONSUMER EQUIVALENT TENANT GROUPS

 

 

_l_ _ 2 3, '4 5
Sample of
Tenants House- Annual Annual Annual
hold Consumer Household Household Household
Group Equivalent Expenditure EXpenditure EXpenditure
# Groupsa Ls +10% LS +20% LS
l 1 - 3.0 ‘ 637 701 765
(2-3)
2 3.1 - 4.4 823 - 905 988
(3.8)
3 4.5 - 6.0 994 1093 1192
(5.0)
4 6.1 - 8.0 1014 1115 1217
(7-0)
5 8.1 -lO.7 1611 1772 2053
(9.3)
Mean 4.7 913 1005 1096

 

SOURCE: The Survey of Tenants

aThe figures in the brackets represent the group
means of the consumer equivalents.

141

In determining target incomes of tenants, the author
decided to use the 1978 survey results of approximate annual
household eXpenditures for the previous twelve month period.
The tenants reported annual household expenditures ranging
from Ls637 to Ls16ll. Although the 1978 annual household
expenditure survey was very crude, it does illustrate the
wide range of annual household expenditures and the need
for flexible tenancy sizes in order that the declared
policy objective-u-providing a decent living to the tenant
household--be achieved. The 10 and 20 percent increases
above the tenant household annual expenditures were chosen
to illustrate alternative income target choices which the
policy-makers might select.

4. Qppp Land Ratiqaufor Different Rotatippp

The ratio of land under each crop in a given rotation
affects the net returns of the tenancy. The average re-
turns per feddan of crOp weighted by the ratio of land
under each crop included in the rotation will reveal the
total income from the tenancy.

Rotation 1 has equal land under cotton and ground-
nuts. Rotation 2 has half-tenancy under cotton, one-third
under groundnuts and one-sixth.under leguminous fodder.
Rotation 3 has half the tenancy under cotton, one-third
under groundnuts and one-sixth fallow, and was the basis
on which the project was evaluated and financed. The crop
land ratios are given in Table 6.6. Depending on the

resources available to him, his management abilities, the

142
TABLE 6.6 CROP LAND RATIOS FOR VARIOUS CROP ROTATIONS

 

 

Rotations a a b
Rotation 1 Rotation 2 Rotation 3
Crops ' __ ' " '
Cotton 0.5 0.5 O;5
Groundnuts 0-5 0-333 0-333
Leguminous Fodder 0.0 0.167 0.0
Fallow 0.0 0.0 0.167
Total 1.0 1.0 1.0

‘-

SOURCE: 2M. MacDonald and Partners: Report on Impact
pipRevised Cr p igg_§attern with Livestock
Ippegration, Rahad IrrIgaron Project, Mifiistry
of Irrigation and Hydro-Electric Energy, January

1977

 

bInternational Bank for Reconstruction and De-

velopment. Appraisal of the Rahad Irrigation
Project, Sudan, 1973

143 -

amount of animals he possesses and their marketability,
the tenant can choose either Rotation l or 2. At present
it seems that tenants strongly prefer Rotation 1. This
is positively reinforced by the project management for a
variety of reasons, the most important and obvious being
the problems associated with keeping animals inside the
project and the low to negative returns anticipated from
the fodder enterprise (45).
5. Results and Analypls of Tenancy Siaap

Using the information in Tables 6.3, 6.5 and 6.6,

and applying the tenancy-size formula:

Yij

A.
13 k R..C.
31:1 .1 J

the tenancy sizes obtained are presented in Table 6.7.

The following observations emerged from the results
of the preceding computations.

l. The differences in the consumer equivalents of the
sample of tenant households are the main cause of the
differences in the required tenancy Sizes. In Table
6.7, the largest consumer equivalent household group
required a tenancy size from 140 to 180 percent larger
than the one required for the smallest consumer equiv-
alent household group.

2. On the other hand, using alternative income targets
in the computations, the highest target income re-
quires a 20 percent larger tenancy size than the lowest
income choice as compared with the 140 to 180 percent

of the consumer equivalent of tenant households.

 

144

 

amass: OHozs unease: on» Ow OOHOEHxOHOOO Ohm mouHmszocm209d

n .n Hun
U m w"
0. HH

 

n <
HH»

OHOEuOm OsHm accuses and m.o .m.o .n.o OOHQOE mch: eoaaaeoo .momaom

 

n HN OH Hm OH mH Hm OH OH 5.: :00:

a... R an 3 an Hm mm mm 0n H.0H- H. 0

mm mm HN am mm HN mm Hm OH 0.0 u H.0

n: ON HN ON Hm . OH mm Hm OH 0.0 : m.:

HN OH OH OH 0H OH OH OH OH 3.: : H.m

0H OH OH OH :H . NH :H mH NH o.n : O.H
meww ndH+ OusuHecoa ndN+ uoH+ OuspHecom, .wo~+ maH+ OhspHeccm, masons
OOEHHO OAOHHO uxu OAOHHO OAOHHO tam OespHe OOOHHO sum u2OHm>Hsom
ucozxm Iceman OHOzousom usoaxm ncoaxm OHonomsoz usoaxm usoaxu eHonomsoz nossmcoo
OHoaounO= OHOsomsoz Hascs< OHOgomsoz eHosomsoz Haass< OHonmzoz OHonomsoz Hoscs< OHO=OOOO=
Hmuuq< HO:::< Haasz< Hmscc< . stcc< Hmscc< HCMGOE
mo OH smm

 

n 20Ha<eom memo

N oneceom homo

H onB<9om memo

mmz<anmm 2H mmuHm wuz<zm9 mo on9<9=mzoo O.o HHm<e

145

The changes in crop rotation have the least effect

on tenancy size: for example, the tenancy of the

least intensive crOp rotation ranges 10 percent larger
in area than the tenancy of the most intensive crop
rotation.

On the basis of the average consumer equivalent tenant
household, the tenancy size is between 17 and 23 fed-
dans, depending on the expenditure level and the crOp
rotation. The Rahad project current tenancy of 22

feddans falls within this range.

E. Com arison of Monthl Labor Re uire-
ments For A 2ngaddan Tenanpypfiitfi
The Potential HoupaholdSupply of Labor

Monthly Labor Requirements (Demandl_Fo§_A 22 Feddan
Tenancy.

The subsequent analysis of labor requirements is

made on the basis of peak demand. To satisfy the con-

ditions of peak demand for labor, the calculations were

made using crOp Rotation l which is half cotton, half

groundnut, and the most intensive option at present in

the Rahad project. The average of the actual cultural

activities recorded by the sample of tenants was used.

For the cotton crOp, the labor requirements of each

production activity were obtained by applying the following

formula to the crop establishment activities:

P
_ ___ nk
Lnk ‘ FLnj (1" loo-Prlk )

146

Table 6.8 gives the average labor requirements per
feddan of production activity actually carried out in the
field in adult male labor equivalents, the contributions
of households and hired labor and the time of the year
in which the production activity was performed. The time
flow of the production activities was constructed by using
the sequence of the standard practices and not the in-
dividual tenants' actual timing because major field oper-
ations such as land preparation and sowing are undertaken
by the project management. However, for the timing of
these production activities, the Tambul Pilot Farm--Final
Report (33) was consulted and followed with due consideration
for the large-scale field production conditions.

For groundnuts, adult male labor requirements per
production activity were taken from the results of Tambul
Pilot Farm (33). Similarly, the timing of the production
activities was based on the same source. This was chosen
because in adjacent schemes like Gezira, groundnut pro-
duction was not mechanized and the produce was solely the
prOperty of the tenant until the 1977/78 season--factors
which had a tremendous impact on the quantity of labor
demanded and supplied. The labor requirements of ground-
nuts per feddan of production activity in hours of labor,
their equivalents in adult male equivalent days, and the
suggested timing of the activity are presented in Table
6.9.

From the suggested timing of the crop establishment

activities of cotton and production activities of

147

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148

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149
groundnuts, a half-year schedule of demand for labor was
drawn up and presented in Table 6.10.
2. Maximum Potential Household Supply of Labor
On the supply side, the maximum potential household
supply of labor was obtained using the formula:

=(FL1+FL .f+FL3.c).d

2

The averages of the adult male labor equivalent household
groups given in Table 6.2 were calculated. The maximum
potential household supply of labor was obtained by assuming
that on the average, field work days during the period of
peak demand for labor number 25 days per month. The results
are shown in Table 6.11
3. A Comparison of the Peak Demand for Labor in Cotton
Cropeestablishment and rGroundnuts Production Activities
With the Potential Household Supply of: Labor.

A graphical comparison of June-November monthly
labor requirements for cotton and groundnuts with the po-
tential household supply of labor for a 22 feddan tenancy
under these crops is depicted in Figure 6.2. It is clear
that two-thirds of the tenant households would have to
resort to hired labor at the period of peak field activities,
even if all household members are part of the labor force.
The demand for hired labor peaked during August-September
because of the labor intensity of the weeding operation.
The only group of tenant households which could supply
the needed labor during the peak period and still exhibit
some surplus, if all household members worked would be

large labor equivalent tenant household group. Thus, with

150

TABLE 6.10 MONTHLY CALCULATIONS OF ADULT MALE DAY EQUIVALENTS
PER FEDDAN OF COTTON AND GROUNDNUTS

 

Groundnuts *TotaI_

 

Cotton Adult Adult Male Adult Male
Male Equiv- Equivalent Equivalent
Month alent Days Days Days
January xa 0.2 --
February x 0.# --
March x 0.7 --
April n.a.b 0.8 --
May n.a. 0.9 --
June 0.6 2.5 3 1
July 1.9 2.5 u.u
August 8.0 2.2 10.2
September 5.6 1.5 7.1
October 1.2 1.1 3.3
November 0.5 2.1 2.6
December x 1.6 ~-

 

SOURCE: Computations based on Tables 6.8 and 6.9

ax stands for the second category of production
activities which was not included in this analysis
of peak demand for labor. Cotton picking is the
most important of these activities and usually
begins in December.

bn.a. means data were not available.

151

TABLE 6.11 THE MAXIMUM POTENTIAL HOUSEHOLD SUPPLY OF LABOR
PER MONTH BY HOUSEHOLD LABOR EQUIVALENT GROUPS

 

Adult Male Labor

Monthly Maximum
Potentia1,Household

 

 

Equivalent Household Weighted Labor Sfipply
Groups Average (Adult a e Days)
(1 - 2.3) Small 1.8u A6

(2.# - 3.8) Medium 3.0 75

(3.9 - 8.3) Large 5.13 128

SOURCE: The Survey of Tenants

152

Potential labor supply

125 - of large households

100 4

Labor Requipements AdultflMale Equiva

Tents
U1

Potential labor supply

 

of medium households

 

 

 

 

O - / \ Potential labor supply
i \ of small households
/ \
/ \
. K \\ Total
-5-—" u—_ .I‘”~ ‘ Groundnuts
/ '\ \ -/
// "\ .Xf
\
....../ \_..Cotton
0 ' V t U j I
J J A S O N D

Months (June-December Period)

FIGURE 6.2 A Graph Comparing The Tenant Household Potential

Supply of Labor With The Labor Requirements of
Cotton CrOp Establishment and Groundnuts Pro-
duction Activities.

153
a fixed tenancy distribution policy, the marked differences
in seasonal labor requirements require that the smaller
tenant households purchase labor while the larger tenant

households seek employment outside the tenancy.

F. meparison of Net ReturnspFrpppA_22 Peggap
Tenancy With Annual Household Expenditure
by Cppgum§r_Eqfiivaignt Household Groups
It was shown earlier that there were no significant
variations in the net returns to tenants per feddan of
cotton with the labor equivalent household groups. Similar
assumptions were made for other crops for the same reasons.
To simplify the comparison, the net returns to the tenant
household labor per feddan of cotton and groundnuts (See
Table 6.3) for crop rotation 1, were adopted. The annual
household expenditures were shown to vary with the con-
sumer equivalent household groups, while the tenancy re-
turns did not vary by household size.
The results of the computation, presented in Table
6.12, showed that four out of five tenant household groups
are meeting their approximate annual household expenditures-
and that the large tenant household group will fall short
of income needs under the 22 feddan tenancy. The fixed

tenancy size favors smaller tenant households at the ex-

pense of large tenant households.

154

TABLE 6.12 A COMPARISON OF A 22 FEDDAN TENANCY RETURNS
WITH THE ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES OF
TENANT HOUSEHOLDS CONSUMER EQUIVALENT GROUPS

 

 

Sample of Tenant Returns From Annual .
Household Cog- a 22 Feddans Household b Surplus +
sumer Groups Tenanc Expenditures Deficit -
ls ls ls

l.O - 3.0 1170 637 +533

3.1 - #.4 1170 823 +357

4.5 - 6.0 1170 994 +176

6.1 - 8.0 1170 101# +156

8.1 ~10.7 1170 1611 ~4A1

 

SOURCE: The Survey of Tenants

3‘Table 6.3

bTable 6.5

The review of the evolution of Rahad tenancy size
revealed that during project planning five different ten-
ancy sizes were purposed. Even though a number of factOrs
were considered in making these proposals, the hetero-
geneity of the tenant household, the expected variation
in households income needs, and the changes in crop mix
and rotation were somewhat overlooked. A method for
computing appropriate tenancy sizes must incorporate the
tenant household size and composition, the tenancy net
returns, the annual household expenditures (as a basis for
tenant target income), and the land ratio of craps in-
cluded in the different rotations.

The net returns per feddan of cotton were found to
have no variation with the labor equivalent household groups,
primarily because of the production system adopted in the
Rahad project. Hence it was assumed that net returns per
feddan of other crOps, mainly groundnuts, also do not vary
with the tenant household groups. Therefore the average
net returns of cotton, obtained from the survey of tenants,
and of groundnuts and leguminous fodder, obtained from the
project reports, were utilized in the computation of ten-
ancy sizes. In contrast, the survey of tenants revealed
that there were variations in the annual household expend-
itures of the consumer equivalent household groups. These
annual household expenditures were used to determine target

incomes for tenants.

156

The computation of tenancy size showed that ten-
ancies for the different consumer equivalent household
groups ranged from 12 to 43 feddans, depending on the
household group, the tenant target income, and the crop
rotation. The variation in the tenant income needs of the
various household groups accounted for most of the variations
in the tenancy size.

The labor requirements for establishing cotton and
producing groundnuts in crop rotation l of a 22 feddan
tenancy were compared with the maximum potential household
supply of labor. The results of the comparison revealed
that a fixed tenancy of 22 feddans will require that smaller
tenant households purchase labor and that larger tenant
households seek employment outside the tenancy. The com-
parison of the net returns of the fixed tenancy of 22
feddans revealed that while most of the tenants are meeting
their approximate annual household expenditures, larger
tenant households are not. Thus the fixed tenancy size
is in favor of smaller tenant households and disadvantageous
for larger tenant households. Therefore, variable tenancy
sizes were advocated to replace the current fixed tenancy
size. In Chapter VII, specific suggestions will be made

for variable tenancy sizes.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY. POLICY IMPLICATIONS. AND
SUGGUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

A. Summary

The Rahad project is an irrigation scheme currently
under construction in the Sudan along the east bank of the
Rahad river. It extends for 240 kilometers along the Rahad
river to its confluence with the Blue Nile about 160 kilo—
meters south of Khartoum. The project is financed by an
international loan from IBRD-IDA, USAID, KF, SFD and AF,
and by funding from the government of the Sudan. It is
irrigated by pumps installed at the Blue Nile to draw from
waters stored behind the Roseires Dam, the project is de-
signed to promote agricultural production and the develop—
ment of the area at large.

The total area of the project is 300,000 feddans,
which is divided into tenancies of 22 feddans each. These
tenancies are allocated to tenants who are selected for

[Settlement primarily from among pe0ple in the project site
and the surrounding area Each tenant was allocated a
single tenancy irrespective of the size and compotision
of his household.i;AIl tenants are required to grow the

same crops in pre-determined prOportions and rotation.

157

158
Medium staple Acala 4A2 cotton was planted in half the
tenancy area, while the other half was devoted to ground-
nuts and leguminous fodder.

The objectives of this study are: to analyze from
an historical perspective the planning and implementation
of the Rahad project: to study selected tenants to deter-
mine their socio-economic characteristics, their net re-
turns from agricultural production, and their annual house-
hold expenditure: and to determine whether the size of
tenancy should be changed from the fixed 22 feddans to a
variable size. In order to pursue these objectives, the
project documents and reports were thoroughly reviewed,
and a management questionnaire was administered to under-
stand the project implementation process. In addition, a
field survey of 125 tenants was conducted in 1978 to deter-
mine socio-economic characteristics of the tenants, and to
calculate both their net returns from agricultural pro-
duction and their annual household eXpenditures.

The review of Rahad project planning revealed that
during a decade of planning prior to the launching of the
project in 1973, the main concern was with macro aspects.
The project design and the choice of irrigation system—-
gravity or pump--were controversial. Selecting the type
of irrigation system and the overall project design which
met the minimum benefit-cost ratios required by the financing
agencies were major concerns. Valuable time and effort

were spent in securing project financing from donor agencies.

159

Besides the technical and financial factors, the political
instability of the late 1960's and early 1970's contri-
buted to the delay in project approval.

Although the project was appraised several times
before construction began in 1973, important issues were
either overlooked or not adequately treated--for example,
the amount of land allocated for the tenant and his house-
hold, and the tenant's role in farming decisions. In this
case it is a factor affecting equity and realization of
production goals.

To study the implementation process, a management
questionnaire was administered to fourteen project officials
who had broad knowledge of the project implementation and
management. In addition, the author interviewed another
fifteen officials from the IBRD, project-consultants, and
the Sudan government who participated in the planning and
monitoring of the project at the implementation stage.
Numerous documents and reports were examined.

The review of the literature on implementation re-
vealed that there has been a general lack of concern for
the implementation of develOpment projects. The primary
concern of planners has usually been to choose the best
project on the basis of an economic analysis procedure
'which gives little attention to implementation. As a
‘production process, implementation should respond to
questions of what, how much, how and when to produce: these

should be included in the statement of project objectives.

160
Unfortunately, in the Rahad project the objectives were

not stated clearly.

Four main factors contributed to implementation
delay in the Rahad project: inadequate project preparation:
resource limitations: lack of coordination in the initial
stages of implementation; and uncertainty. In chosing the
best project, mechanisms to handle these widely recognized
problems should be adopted before the project is approved.
The Rahad project was a relatively large undertaking and
other projects in the Sudan competed with it for the limited
financial, physical, and human resources, for instance,
local funds, transportation, energy and building materials.
In complex irrigation-settlement projects like the Rahad
project, the need for coordination was evident from the
beginning: lack of it prevented the timely execution of
the project. As implementation progressed, coordination
became effective in trouble-shooting and in reducing the
shortages of construction materials. Overall, more ap-
propriate techniques could have been adopted to monitor
the implementation of the project and adjust to new infor-
mation as it became available.

The final outputs of the implementation process
are the physical products and the impacts on the tenants, the
target group. In this case the problems of implementation
directly affected the level and flow of agricultural pro-
duction. The field survey of 125 tenants revealed that

the tenants were eXperiencing a number of implementation

161
problems. Not only did they face shortages in health and
education services, drinking water, and the staple diet,
but many of them were also dissatisfied with the location
and accessibility of the villages.

Tenants have a modest role in decision-making in ‘\J
irrigated farming in the Sudan, and particularly in the
Rahad project, where the land allotted for the tenant, the
crops and their intensity, the planting dates, the cultural
operations, the number of irrigations, the degree of mecha-
nization, the marketing, and the production relations are
all decreed by the project management. The tenant partici-
pates mainly by supplying household labor.(:Within.this
framework of decision-making, the tenant as a decision-
.maker has a limited effect on the returns from his tenancy.
Since the project management either invests directly in
agricultural production or provides the necessary capital
for the tenants, the tenant is in many ways a "paid laborer".
Deducting the cost of hired labor (also largely financed
through loans advanced by the project management), the
:remainder of the returns from the tenancy will be the net
.returns to the tenant household labor.

The policy in the Rahad project (and to a large ex-
tent in some other irrigated agricultural projects in the
Sudan) is to distribute a single tenancy for each tenant
irrespective of his household size and composition. The
field.survey of 125 Rahad project tenants conducted by the
.author during April-May, 1978, revealed that the tenant

162

households were heterogenous. Their absolute, labor, and
consumer equivalents ranged betweel l and 16, l and 8.3
and l and 10.7 respectively. These variations were indeed
large enough to question the wisdom of assuming a "rep-
resentative" five member household and allocating a single
tenancy for all tenants accordingly. Since the tenants
depend on their living on the income derived from the
tenancy, and since the managements of irrigated schemes
in the Sudan, including the Rahad project, generally do
not permit tenants to take off-farm jobs during the cr0p
production season (which extends almost the entire year),
the income which accrues to the tenant from the tenancy
should, under these circumstances, at least satisfy the
tenant's household needs. Therefore, if tenants are to
meet their needs, maintain their productivity, and.con-
tinue in the project, an explicit target income based on
size and composition of the tenant household should be the
starting point from which to determine the appropriate
tenancy size for each tenant household. Beyond physical
survival, the question of need is a matter for public
choice. Nevertheless, some reference point from actual
experience would be useful. The current annual household
expenditures obtained from the field survey were used as
that reference point.

The sample of tenant households was divided into
five consumer equivalent household groups after assigning

'weights based on sex and age composition to find the common

163

denominator. Then three target income choices were made
for each household group on the basis of the tenant annual
household eXpenditure. Subsequently, the net returns to
the tenant household labor per feddan of crop in the rotation
were computed from the field survey and the project data.
The costs of production for cotton were recorded from actual
expenses incurred by the tenants and the project management,
and the gross returns from cotton were computed from the
.agricultural output data of the field survey and the es-
timated prices of lint and cotton seed of 1978/79. The
net returns from cotton were found to have no significant
variation with the size of household labor equivalent groups.
The net returns for the other crops in the rotation, ground-
nuts and leguminous fodders, were taken from the most recent
project reports. The weighted net returns per feddan in-
cluded in the three rotations varied according to the ratio
of land devoted to each of the three crops or left fallow.

Tenancy sizes were computed using the net returns
to tenant household's labor, and the land ratio of crops
included in the rotation to meet alternative target incomes
(based on the current annual household eXpenditure) for
five groups of tenant households. The analysis of the
matrices of tenancy areas revealed wide variations in the
required tenancy size for each tenant household group.
Tenancy sizes ranged between fleddfiansqand 43 feddans.
Therefore, the current policy of fixed tenancy sizes for_

all tenants may lead to inequity in the tenancy returns.

164

To further investigate the distributional impacts of the
current policy, the 22 feddan tenancy returns were compared
with the current annual household expenditures obtained from
the field survey. The results showed that the fixed ten-
ancy size policy is in favor of smaller tenant household
groups. The larger tenant household groups could be forced
to find sources of income outside the Rahad project--a
problem the project management would like to avoid in their
desire that tenants work full time in their tenancies.

Policy-makers usually claim that the potential tenant's
household labor will be sufficient to meet the tenancy labor
requirements. The labor requirements of the 22 feddan ten-
ancy currently used in the Rahad project were computed on
the needs of crop rotation l, which is most intensive. The
potential labor supply of the sample of tenant households
was calculated. During the period of peak demand for labor
in cotton cr0p establishment activities and groundnut pro-
duction activities for cr0p rotation l, the small and medium
tenant household groups could not supply adequate labor
and as a result would have had to hire labor. In contrast,
the largest tenant household group had surplus labor and
hence needed more land or off-farm employment Opportunities.
iLarge labor equivalent tenant households also exhibit large
consumer equivalence.(:Thus a fixed tenancy size for each
tenant is unjustifiable, whether in terms of the tenant's
household needs or labor potential supply. This in turn

affects the chances of attaining the project objectives of

165
maximum physical output and the desired impact on the
tenants as the target group, which are Optimum tenant

productivity, and equity in income distribution.

B. Policy Implications

l. Plannipg of Irrigation Projects

 

Although the Rahad project was given a high priority
in the national investment plan, it had no clearly stated
set of objectives. There is an obvious need to clarify
project objectives, whether in terms of the physical outputs
or the impacts on the target groups, the tenants. Clearly
planning and implementation cannot be taken seriously if
there is lack of agreement on what the project is supposed
to achieve.

In planning irrigation projects, planners must realize
that irrigation water, agricultural land, and other re-
sources are intermediate inputs: and that irrigation water
storage, provision of irrigation water, preparation of
agricultural land, settlement and resettlement of tenants,
and transport, storage and processing of agricultural prod-
cuts are complementary investments. Each one of these
components has to be identified within the context of joint
intermediate inputs.

In the government effort to secure financing of the
Rahad project from donor agencies during the project pre-
paration more concern was given to the macro aspects than

to the completeness and soundness of the individual project

166

components. Most of the micro problems did not receive
attention or detailed study until after financing was secured
and the project implementation was started in 1973. If
micro studies had been conducted prior to project approval
and during the policy formulation phase, less delays would
have occurred. Tambul Pilot Farm was an exception. The
pilot farm was financed by savings from the IBRD loan to
the Roseires Dam and it generated technical data for the
field irrigation and agricultural practices of the Rahad
project. Because technical data were required in other
areas for the timely execution of the project, and con-
sidering the substantial delays in the project implemen-
tation, more detailed micro and macro studies should have
been included in the project preparation stage. The fi-
nancing source, whether local or foreign, should have ex-
tended financial support to undertake pilot studies which
would generate physical coefficients and identify likely
human, physical, and institutional bottlenecks that could
greatly affect overall project implementation. This step
could have been more important than the complex analysis
for ranking the competing project designs which only pro-
vided weak input-output data.

The complexity of irrigation projects such as Rahad
points to the need for special analysis of institutions
of planning and implementation. Valuable time and effort
‘were spent in trying to resolve conflicting technical and
economic aspects of the two competing project versions--

gravity and pump irrigation. The economic evaluations of

”167
the competing irrigation systems were the product of dif-
fering assumptions about technical coefficients., These
could not be independently verified by the Ministry of
Planning because it lacked technical expertise. It is the
author's judgment, based on experience, that to effectively
undertake this role in the economic evaluation of projects,
the staff of the Ministry of Planning should command at
least modest technical knowledge of the issues disputed.
Hence, it is recommended that the Ministry of Planning
strengthen its technical staff to effectively fulfill its
prescribed role.
2. Implementation of Irrigation Projects

This study has examined the decisions taken by the
policy-makers that would lead to the timely completion of
the project and achievement of its objective. The issues
discussed include the implementation estimates, the com-
mitment of resources to the project, the impact of the
implementation problems on timely execution of the project
and on the tenants, and the coordination among the various
agencies involved in implementing the project.

These agencies provide implementation estimates which
are accurate only if certain conditions are met. For ex-,
ample, the canal excavation program could not be carried
out expeditiously without procuring heavy earth moving equip-
ment on time,increasing the financial resources to meet the
price escalation, and training the technicians to operate

this machinery. But analysts often provide implementation

168

estimates only for the purposes of economic appraisals
and project choice. If, in the process, project conditions
have not been projected accurately, the project will fall '
short of its estimated performance. The implementation
agency has hedged against being held responsible for failures
in meeting these estimates: but if the decision-maker has
not taken the necessary steps to accurately access and avoid
the probable future impediments, then the subsequent policy
decision will be based on non-realistic implementation esti-
mates. The irrigation and the electrification programs of
the Rahad project are cases in point. Hence, it is recom-
mended that policy decisions be based on realistic estimates.
The completion of the project on schedule depends
on the commitment of adequate physical, financial, and man-
power resources. For example, many times during the imple-
mentation of the Rahad project, the cost of equipment vital
for timely project execution exceeded the budget pro-
visions, which came largely from foreign donors. One line
of action could have been to ask for a second bid, but
because of price escalation in this case, costs ended up
higher than they were in the first bid. Another line of
action could have been to decrease the amount of equipment,
which, if approved by the policy-makers, would lead to
a slower implementation rate, though that might not be
acknowledged. A third line of action could have been to
ask for additional provisions, which would require even
more time for approval because of the complex financing

plan of the Rahad project. Thus, to avoid these difficulties

169

it is recommended that policy-makers not only assure ade-
quate allocation of funds from the beginning, but also adopt
flexible arrangements to handle future uncertainties in
financing, procurement of equipment, etc.

Coordination is a prerequisite for the implementation
of all activities. While the need for coordination varies
from one activity to another, it increases with the scarcity
of resources, the complexity of the project, and the diver-
sity of the participants. The Rahad project faced just
this situation. Coordination of the project was lacking
from the start, and although efforts to coordinate improved
after the implementation process was well underway, they
were focused on trouble-shooting. No modern techniques
of coordination and monitoring were applied. Hence, it
is recommended that a detailed coordination plan be drawn
up and approved from the beginning. The coordination body
should adOpt apprOpriate techniques to monitor project im-
plementation so that new information can be utilized as
it becomes available.

Problems which tenants encountered during settlement
in the project area affected the individual tenant pro-
ductivity and ultimately the total agricultural output of
the project. These problems included lack of health and
education facilities, lack of hygienic water for domestic
use, and inadequate nutrition especially the staple diets
and daily rations, etc. It is therefore recommended that

policy-makers and implementers not overlook the importance

170

of these services and that special efforts be made to
secure adequate provisions.
3. Tenancy (Farm) Size

In irrigated schemes in the Sudan, land is divided
traditionally into tenancy units of equal area, where
tenants grow the same crop mix and follow the same rotation.
The project management determines the area of the tenancy,
the number of tenancies each household can possess, the
crops and cropping intensity, the irrigation method and
frequency, the cultural practices, and the marketing of the
most important crops. With the exception of the Gezira
scheme the government policy for irrigation schemes has
been based on the distribution of one tenancy for each
tenant. But, the policy of uniform tenancies does not
recognize the heterogeneity in size and composition of
households. The present policy, for example, assumes that
the size of the average household is five and uses this
figure when determining the size of the tenancy. The re-
sults of the sample of tenants survey in the Rahad project
revealed that tenant household size varies from 1 to 16.
Adjusting for age and sex differences, the labor equivalence
and the consumer equivalence of the size of the tenant
households vary from 1.0 to 8.3 and from 1.0 to 10.7 re-
spectively. Consequently, the present policy in the Rahad
project of allocating one uniform 22 feddan tenancy per
tenant household, irrespective of its size and composition,

cannot be justified because it is inequitable and inefficient.

171

Thus it is recommended that variable land areas should be
allotted according to each tenant's household size.

The results of this study emphasized the need for
the policy-maker to select an explicit income for tenants
and to gear the decision on tenancy size accordingly. Since
the tenant and his household are expected to live primarily
on the income earned from the tenancy, the size of the ten-
ancy is critical for both the tenant and the project per-
formance.

To facilitate field management of irrigated agri-
cultural projects in the Sudan, the government policy calls
for the allocation of land in tenancy units. Tenancy size
is constrained by the area of land irrigable from the ter-
minal irrigation channel. In the Rahad project this area
is 88 feddans. Consequently, to facilitate field layout,
management, and tenancy consolidation, the 88 feddans were.
necessarily a multiple of the tenancy size.

The results of the computation showed that for the
smallest tenant household group the tenancy size ranges
between 12 and 15 feddans depending on the level of income
and the crop rotation (l or 2) chosen. The nearest whole
number to satisfy the field layout constraint would be a
tenancy size of 11 feddans, which is recommended for the
smallest tenant household group. The land area for the
second group of tenant households ranges between 15 and 19
feddans: for the third and fourth groups it ranges between

19 and 24 feddans, depending on the choice of the target

172
income and the cr0p rotation (l or 2). It is recommended
that these three groups (which include the average tenant
household), be allotted two tenancy units for a total area
of 22 feddans (which is the current tenancy area distributed
to all tenant households in the Rahad project). For the
largest tenant household group the land area ranges be-
tween 30 and #0 feddans depending on the choice of the tar-
get income and the crop rotation (l or 2). At least three
(and sometimes up to four) tenancy units for a total area
of 33 feddans may be allotted to tenants in this group. This
recommendation for tenancy distribution (or one that is based
on similar principles) realizes the heterogenity of the
tenant households and hence is more equitable than the pres-
ent policy.

Since tenancies have been distributed to 40 percent
of the tenants in the Rahad project there will be some dif—
ficulty in re—allocating tenancies on the basis of these
proposals. However, there is a precedent in the Gezira
scheme where in 1931-33, the size of the tenancy was in-
creased from 30 to 40 feddans. It is recommended that im-
mediate steps be taken in the Rahad project to allocate
variable tenancies of 11, 22 and 33 feddans for tenants
with small, medium and large households respectively. If
this system is adOpted, about one-fourth of the present
tenants will have to give up land, while about one-tenth
will receive more land. After the original number of tenants
are established, the land available for distribution will

increase by about 15 percent.

173

Within the present tenancy allocation policy, there
are means by which more land can be allocated to larger
tenant households. It was mentioned earlier that the unit
dfirrigable land from an irrigation channel is around 88
feddans. Due to the tOpography of land, this area varies
widely, and further division into tenancies also produces
significant variations. For example, in the sample survey,
about 15 percent of the Rahad project tenancies were less
than 22 feddans in the range of 18 to 20 feddans: 3 per-
cent were more than 22 feddans--ranging from 24 to 28 fed-
dans. Rahad project data revealed that the size of ten-
ancies varies from 14 to 34 feddans.

In addition to field crop production, the Rahad
project has other production components. It is proposed
that 7,000 feddans be divided into 5-feddan plots for
vegetable and fruit production. (Again the 5-feddan plot
was arbitrarily determinedl) These are to be given to
tenants who have experience in and prefer vegetable pro-
duction over cr0p production. There is yet a third com-
ponent, where tenants with a certain minimum number of
cattle or sheep will be allotted land, capital, equipment
and technical advice for the production of milk and milk
products to supply the growing centers in the project area.
Tenants with large households could be given priority in
the allocation of land for fruit and vegetable production
as well as for livestock.

At present the tenants' participation in decision-

making in the Rahad project is limited to the supply of

174
household labor. The tenant has no voice in how much land
to put into production, which crops to grow, the type and
level of inputs to apply and where to market the produce,
etc. Individual tenants should be encouraged to make
tenancy-level decisions on the use of the following re-
source: (1) the number and duration of irrigation water
application (the total irrigation charges would vary with
the number of applications), (2) the use of labor or
mechanical power for planting their crops, and (3) the
hiring of agricultural machinery from the project manage-
ment or from other cooperative or private sources. At the
policy level tenant representatives should be allowed to
share in the overall decision making for the project. This
should increase the chances of meeting project goals in
physical output as well as improve tenant productivity and

well being.

0. Suggestions for Future Research

To improve the planning, implementation and future
eXpansion of the Rahad project and other irrigated agri-
cultural projects in the Sudan there is a need for research
in the following areas:

1. The optimum use of resources at the farm level. Analy—
ses are needed of the socio-economic characteristics
of the tenant households, including the size and com-
position, supply of household labor, attitudes toward

farm work, level of education, managerial abilities,

175

the opportunity cost, etc. Analyses are also needed
of other resources, particularly land, irrigation water,
the demand for and the supply of hired labor, agri-
cultural machinery, chemical fertilizers and insecti-
cides, etc.

Comparative economic studies of hand and machine cul-
tivation under various field conditions. In the Rahad
project, agricultural machinery has been widely used
in field Operations which were traditionally the re—
sponsibility of the tenant. At the farm level, the
extensive use of agricultural machinery leads to the
displacement of labor and a decrease in returns to the
tenant. At the project level, large apprOpriations
are needed for the procurement Of the agricultural
machinery, equipment and spart parts, and for the
management, Operation and maintenance of the fleet.

The role of tenants in decision-making. In this study,
it has been Observed that the Rahad project tenants
have a modest role in decision-making as compared to
other irrigated agricultural projects in the Sudan.
There is a need to determine the impact Of alternative
decision-making arrangements, where tenants may exercise
a greater control over variable farm inputs such as
the application of irrigation water, fertilizer and
insecticides, the use of hand labor or machines, etc.
The organization of the field Operations. The manage-
ment of the Rahad project determines the field Oper-

ations, the optimum time for each operation, and whether

176
the Operation should be done mechanically or by hand
labor. The project management supplies the agricultural
machinery on the assumption that economies of scale will
be realized from large scale field Operations. However,
diseconomies of scale may arise as the fleet of agri- -
cultural machinery grows larger because of management
problems and the decrease in flexibility. Research is
needed to determine the most economical size of the
agricultural machinery fleet. Another aspect of this
issue which requires research is whether the project
management should remain the sole supplier of the agri-
cultural machinery services in the project, or whether
alternative supply sources (private or cooperative)
should compete with the project management. This issue
is closely related to that of increasing the tenants'
role in decision-making.

The tenant-management relationship. In theory the

.system of paying cash for the use of resources in farming

is more efficient than sharing the crOp or crop revenue.
But the hypothesized efficiency of the cash system is
based on the assumptions of the competitive economic
model. The land and water charge system currently
applied in the Rahad project does not Operate under
these assumptions. For example, most of the resources
are supplied and their use is controlled by the project
management. Tenants have no access to the inputs and

products markets. Hence there is a need for a comparative

177

study between the crop-sharing system which is practiced
in the Gezira Scheme and the land and water charge sys-
tem practiced in the Rahad project.

Institutional research to compare the performance of

the different agencies and the coordinating committees
involved in the planning and implementation Of the
Rahad project.

The importance of the resource constraints and the im-
pact of competition among the projects within the agri-
cultural sector and other sectors for these limited

resources .

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

DETAILED COMPUTATIONS OF THE FINANCIAL
NET RETURNS TO TENANT HOUSEHOLD
LABOR PER FEDDAN OF COTTON

178

TABLE A.1 COMPUTATION OF WEIGHTED PRICE OF ACALA 442

 

 

 

COTTON
Ginning A Big Kantar Estimated Weighted
Output of Seed Cotton Price/Unit Price
Term Yields LS L3
40% Lint 1.26 Kantars 19.0 23.94
58% Seed .083 M.Ton 50.0 4.15
1.2% Scarto 3.78 lbs. .05 0.19
0.8% Imputirites 2.52 lbs. 0.0 0.00
100.0 28.23

 

SOURCE: Author's Inquiry During 1977/78

179

TABLE A.2 COST OF PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES AND SUPPLIES UNDER-

TAKEN BY THE PROJECT-MANAGEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE
TENANT-ON PER FEDDAN BASIS

 

Production Activity Cost per Feddan
, s

 

 

A. Land Preparationa

 

-Disc Harrowing and Land Levelling 3.542

-Ridging 1.090

-Fertilizer Application 1.150

-Planting 1.000

-Interrow Cultivation and green

ridging b 1-350

-Mechanical Pulling of Cotton stalks 1.000
Sub Total 9.132-

B. Supplies

-Seedc d 1.900

-Fertilizers _ e 11.093

-Insecticides and Aerial Spraying- 19.312

-Miscellaneous Supplies to the

tenant 1.00
Sub Total 33.305

TOTAL 42.437

 

SOURCE:

Compiled from Various Sources

aHassan, M., Costs of Mechanical Field Operations,
Rahad A icultural Corporation, draft computations,
(April, 1978).

bEstimated by the author from discussions with

the project authorities and the tenants

 

chrahim, A.M. and Berkoff, J. "An Economic Eval-
uation of the Rahad Irrigation Project" Sudan
ggmmitteeplnternational Commission on Irrigation
and Drainage‘(ICIDI, (May, 1978)

dAGRAR-UND, New Halfa Rehabilitation Project,

Phase 1. Project Preparation Unit, Ministry of
National Planning, (1978) (ActualICOsts for 1977/78
season).

180
TABLE A.2 (Cont)

eRahad Agricultural Corporation, The Rahad Project
Documents (1978) (Actdal.Contract Costs of In—
secticides and Aerial Application).

181

TABLE A.3 SUMMARY OF THE TOTAL COSTS OF PRODUCTION UNDER-
TAKEN BY THE_PROJECT MANAGEMENT ON BEHALF OF

 

THE TENANT
Per Feddan Costsa L 3 42.137
Per Kantar Costsb LS 4.536
Land and Water Chargec L s 31:.200

 

SOURCE: Compiled from various sources

aSee Table A. 2

bBased on the Figures of the Farm Budget, Ahmed

M.A. "The Revised Farm Budget - 1975" Rahad
.Corporation, Ministry of A iculture Food and
Natural Resources,Revised %Aug, 1976)

cAhmed, M.A. "Estimation of the Land and Water
Charge in the Rahad Project" Rahad Agricultural
Corporation (June 1977)

 

182

TABLE A.4 COMPUTATION OF THE FINANCIAL NET RETURNS T0 TENANT
HOUSEHOLD LABOR PER FEDDAN 0F COTTONa

 

 

TOtal
Gross Tenant Cost of Net
Returns Tenant Direct Production Return
Per Direct Cost Per Per Per
Case Feddan Costs Feddan Feddan Feddan
NO. Is Ls Ls L8 L8
1 183.817 20.537 1.867 108.029 70.386
2 205.587 23.652 2.365 112.024 87.962
3. 127.593 18.137 1.649 98.780 23.874
4 171.982 23.322 2.332 106.593 60.058
5 202.198 21.962 2.196 111,311 85.322
6 216.421 20.077 1.825 113.224 97.535
7 201.531 22.332 2.030 111.038 84.941
8 130.417 14.732 1.339 98.924 26.547
9 139.403 26.482 2.407 101.436 32.895
10 180.993 20.152 1.832 107.541 68.075
11 180.993 30.667 2.788 108.497 67.071
12 189.721 26.212 2.383 109.494 74.753
13 195.626 36.457 3.314 111.373 78.684
14 201.531 25.777 2.343 111.351 84.612
15 142.227 23.832 2.167 101.648 35.496
16 112.703 18.032 1.639 96.379 11.505
17 142.227 15.917 1.447 100.929 36.252
18 118.608 19.357 1.760 97.448 16.298
19 - 237.216 16.172 1.470 116.210 115.196
20 273.928 13.995 1.399 122.036 145.791
21 172.007 14.282 1.298 105.564 61.165
22 290.615 20.667 1.879 125.195 159.160
23 320.139 42.532 3.867 131.925 181.617
24 240.040 40.762 2.912 118.105 116.030
25 77.769 18.097 1.392 90.521 -17.278
26 142.227 16.127 1.466 100.948 36.231
27 172.007 24.002 2.182 106.447 60.238
28 243.121 37.411 3.401 119.089 118.077
29 136.322 20.687 1.881 100.414 30.887
30 148.388 11.127 1.012 101.483 41.831
31 124.513 19.992 1.817 98.454 21.136
32 145.308 14.935 1.358 101.335 38.906
33 213.597 24.232 2.203 113.149 94.791
34 159.838 11.792 1.179 103.490 51.174
35 133.498 22.680 2.062 100.142 28.349
36 239.099 34.322 2.860 117.902 115.302
37 269,820 34.137 3.103 123.080 140.587
38 124.513 9.852 .986 97.532 22.104
39 188.951 14.537 1.322 108.309 75.227
40 128.620 6.512 .592 97.888 25.838
41 225.407 7.007 .637 113.480 106.253

 

183
TABLE A.4 (Cont)

 

Total
Gross Tenant Cost of Net
Returns Tenant Direct Production Return
Per Direct Cost Per Per Per
Case Feddan Costs Feddan Feddan Feddan
No. Ls Ls Ls Ls Ls

 

50 119.334 129.629
89 118.208 120.440
94 117.333 114.016
. 89 106.294 66.860

42 254.930 19.247 1
43 244.558 22.889 2.
44 237.216 28.532 2
45 178.477 9.892
1

46 136.964 10.512 .051 99.688 32.292
47 88.109 11.497 1.150 91.939 -8.427
48 204.612 17.312 1.574 111.076 87.982
49 186.897 17.357 1.578 108.235 73.251
50 139.403 12.452 1.132 100.160 34.235
51 273.415 24.757 2.251 122.804 144.470
52 237.216 21.747 1.977 116.716 114.664
53 225.407 23.862 2.169 115.012 104.644
54 163.022 16.522 1.502 104.324 53.482
55 124.513 16.222 1.475 98.111 21.496
56 176.218 16.762 1.676 106.618 64.269
57 177.912 23.072 2.097 107.311 65.235
58 193.059 9.882 .898 108.545 79.087
59 280.423 20.167 2.017 123.696 150.542
60 302.168 30.732 3.073 128.245 167.510
61 320.053 45.697 3.808 131.853 181.608
62 174.831 15.502 1.409 106.128 63.397
63 186.897 23.142 2.104 108.761 72.699
64 123.315 14.743 1.638 98.082 20.328
65 91.908 6.812 .619 92.019 -4.711
66 166.103 5.687 .517 103.834 57.077
67 198.707 17.872 1.625 110.179 83.019
68 154.293 ' 26.735 2.430 103.851 '45.250
69 215.651 351742 3.249 114.525 952400
70 207.692 24.807 2.255 112.252 89.827
71 141.765 20.460 2.046 101.454 35.238
72 82.923 13.652 1.241 91.197 -12.834
73 100.894 15.367 1.397 94.240 1.942
74 145.308 23.817 2.165 102.142 38.059
75 179.324 16.937 1.694 107.134 66.833
76 106.799 12.907 1.173 94.965 7.086
77 103.718 14.587 1.326 94.623 4.364
78 130.417 9.457 .860 98.445 27.050
79 139.403 14.047 1.277 100.305 34.082
80 166.103 18.457 1.678 104.995 55.858
81 142.227 26.762 2.433 101.915 35.216
82 198.707 20.107 1.828 110.382 82.806
83 71 113 20.472 1.861 89.921 -23.303

84 71:627 12.087 1.099 89.241 -22.076

184

 

 

 

TABLE A.4 (Cont)
Total
Gross Tenant Cost Of Net
Returns Tenant Direct Production Return
Per Direct Cost per Per Per
Case Feddan Costs Feddan Feddan Feddan
No. L8 L8 L8 Ls Ls
85 121.689 18.737 1.703 97.8860 18.908
86 100.894 19.932 1.812 '94.655 1.506
87 124.513 14.267 1-297 97.934 21.682
88 128.620 22.492 2.045 99.341 24.312
89 84.720 15.142 1.514 -91.759 -11.627
90 103.718 13.922 1.266 94.562 4.428
91 103.718 18.497 1.682 94.978 ‘3.991
92 133.498 13.602 1.237 99.316 29.216
93 189.978 33.392 3.036 110.188 74.281
94 128.364 19.137 1.740 98.995 24.419
95 241.067 7.262 .660 116.018 119.248
96 228.462 30.297 3.030 116.363 106.281
97 195.113 9.907 .901 108.877 80.792
98 311.581 27.701 3.078 129.762 175.331
99 229.601 40.037 3.640 128.400 164.781
100 163.022 19.667 1.788 104.610 53.181
101 323.220 35.607 3.237 131.791 184.840 .
102 207.436 31.562 2.869 112.825 88.969
103 216.421 26.317 2.392 113.792 96.940
104 195.626 25.553 2.323 110.382 79.725
105 272.901 24.852 2.259 122.731 144.034
106 177.912 25.810 2.346 107.560 64.974
107 269.820 26.402 2.400 122.377 141.325
108 195.626 31.802 2.891 110.950 79.128
109 92.486 34.602 2.882 94.376 66.609
110 201.531 32.592 2.963 111.970 83.962
111 272.901 35.752 3.250 123.721 142.994
112 234.135 31.072 2.825 117.069 111.213.
113 349.919 48.912 4.447 137.289 205.766
114 264.429 48.822 4.428 123.549 134.703
115 332.205 36.277 3.298 133.295 192.246
116 205.382 28.557 2.596 112.222 87.549
117 156.450 22.762 2.276 104.043 47.205
118 241.324 18.832 1.712 117.111 118.357
119 154.036 18.832 1.712 103.091 45.791
120 231.311 33.128 3.012 116.803 108.669
121 183.303 30.102 2.737 108.816 69.046
122 225.407 24.503 2.228 115.070 104.583
123. 266.996 22.912 2.083 121.606 139.310
124 222.326 26.637 2.422 114.769 101.818
125 340.934 47.837 4.349 135.748 198.399
SOURCE: The Survey of Tenants and Rahad Project Data

 

185
TABLE A.4 (Cont)

aNet Returns to tenant household labor are calculated
using the formula

R . = G . - +3, T . + . + . + .
n3 na (1 2) ( nJ Fa Una La)

Where: G . (Column 2) is obtained from the survey
of tenangg and weighted price Ls28.23 is obtained
from Table A.1

r = 10 percent
Tnj = (Column 3) is obtained from the Survey of Tenants
E3 = L842.437 per feddan of cotton
nj = L8 4.536 per unit of output (Kantar)of cotton
Lj = L834.200 per feddan of cotton (See Table A,3)

To obtain column 6 - the net returns per feddan,
Column 5 - the total costs of production is multi-
plied by 1.05 (a 10% rate of interest for an invest-
ment period of six months); and then subtracted from
Column 2 - the gross returns per feddan.

APPENDIX B

THE PERCENTAGE OF THE PRODUCTION
COSTS PAID DIRECTLY BY THE TENANT

186

TABLE B.l THE PERCENTAGE OF THE DIRECT COSTS INCURRED BY
THE SAMPLE OF TENANTS TO TOTAL COSTS OF PRODUCTION

 

Percentage of Tenant

Direct Cost of Total

Cost of Production
Case No. Per Feddan

\OQVQU‘PWNF’

N\O\nO\O\NOU\-POI~‘\OU mommOmmmmeHUCDi-‘VHHONO‘sVUuCDChQNQOV

h)
N
NHHOOHHNNNHHHHHHNNHHNNHHHHHHHmmmNNHNHHHHNHNH.

187
TABLE B.l (Cont)

 

Percentage of Tenant

Direct Cost of Total

Cost of Production
Case No. Per Feddan

 

Q5
46

HWQVNHfl-FQUO PNOfl-‘Ul-P'OO (DUUWJI'QVVDMMO PO\OOO\U\ PWVCDI-‘UI-PU OO

ox
m
NHHHHNHNHHOHHHNHHNNNNHOOHHHNNHHNHHHHHHHHHHHH

188
-TABLE B.1 (Cont)

 

Percentage of Tenant
Direct Cost of Total
Cost of Production

 

Case No. Per Feddan
89 1.6
90 1.3
91 1.8
92 1.2
93 2.8
94 1.8
95 0.6
96 2.6
97 0.8
98 2.4
99 2.8
100 1.7
101 2.5
102 2.5
103 2.1
104 2.1
105 1.8
106 2.2
107 2.0
108 2.6
109 3.1
110 2.6
111 2.6
112 2.4
113 3.2
114 3.6
115 2.5
116 2.3
117 2.2
118 1.5
119 1.7
120 2.6
121 2.5
122 1.9
123 1.7
124 2.1
125 3.2

 

SOURCE: The Survey of Tenants

APPENDIX C

THE LABOR AND CONSUMER EQUIVALENTS
OF TENANT HOUSEHOLDS

189
TABLE C.l ABSOLUTE, LABOR AND CONSUMER EQUIVALENTS OF

TENANT HOUSEHOLDS

Consumer
Equivalent

Labor
Equivalent

Household

Absolute
Size

 

Case No.

 

0000000000005000555055000000050
184n63712916691325u 364178819264
132

a. 98 2 798 9914 9979999998.“. 99999995“. 9392 39998 9.4 9914“

113442411111/011322.46551121112215152113n132122

57976nm35234923875R88R364532433%3n344995m8377

111111111122222222223333333333h~uh~h~ I4

l 0
TABLE 0.1 (Cont) 9

 

 

Absolute .
Household Labor Consumer

Case No. Size Equiva1ent Eguiva1§nt

8 4.4 6.00
47 3 1.9 2.10
48 8 3.9 6.10
49 9 5-1 6.95
50 7 2.9 4.60
51 9 3-3 5-45
52 10 3.9 5.80
55 7 3.8 5.00
56 8 308 5050
59 5 4.8 4.80
61 5 3.8 4.00
62 10 6.2 8.40
63 4 2.8 3.00
64 6 2.8 4.20
65 10 6.6 7.80
66 8 4.4 6.10
67 5 364 [+015
68 6 3.3 4.50
69 16 5.7 9.80
70 3 1.91 2.10
71 .5 1.9 2.80
72 4 2.4 3.55
73 .7 4.3 4.90
71+ 16 2.8 3070
7S 6 3.4 4.00
76 4 2.4 3.15
77 7 4.8 5.70
78 8 4.8 5.70
79 5 1.9 2.80
82 7 3.3 4.70
83 14 5.7 9.30
34 13 8.3 10.65
86 7 2.9 4.20
87 13 5.2 8.30
as 9 3.3 5.70
89 6 1.9 3.30
90 6 507 5070
91 2 1.9 1.90
92 5 1.9 3.10
93 16 6.6 9.85

191
TABLE C.l (Cont)

 

 

Kbsolute ,
Household Labor Consumer
Case No. Size Equivalent Equivalent
94 5 2.4 3.30
95 9 5.3 7.40
96 5 333 4.20
97 9 4.8 6.45
98 7 4.2 5.15
99 13 5.6 8.95
100 5 1.9 2.80
101 7 4.3 5.20
102 10 6.7 7.85
103 2 1.9 1.90
104 2 2.0 2.00
105 8 4.3 5.95
106 6 2.9 4.20
107 6 2.8 4.00
108 3 1.4 2.15
109 14 6.7 9.60
110 6 2.9 4.10
111 8 4.3 5.75
112 5 2.4 3.60
113 5 1.9 3.10
114 4 1.9 3.00
115 l 1.0 1.00
116 5 1.5 4.25
117 7 2.9 4.55
118 13 3.4 7.60
119 11 8.2 9.05
120 8 2.8 4.70
121 6 2.4 3.85
122 9 4.9 6.90
123 7 3.4 4.80
124 7 3.9 5.35
125 3 1.9 2.10

SOURCE: The Survey of Tenants

APPENDIX D

THE PERCENTAGE SHARE OF HIRED LABOR
IN HARVESTING AND POST-HARVEST ACTIVITIES
OF COTTON UNDER THE RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE TENANT

192

TABLE D.l THE PERCENTAGE SHARE OF HIRED LABOR, HARVESTING
AND POST-HARVEST ACTIVITIES OF COTTON

 

PERCENTAGE SHARE OF HIRED LABOR PER ACTIVITY

 

 

Transportation
To

Case . Cotton Cotton Collection Cotton
No. Picking Packing Centers Weighing

1 87 188 108 1‘”

2 9° 56 100 '

5 54 102 100 100

6 95 9 100 0

8 80 100 100 -
10 92 100 100 100
11 100 100 100 100
12 94 100 100 100
13 100 100 100 0
1a 66 188 100 100
l7 96 88 100 100
18 75 100 100 100
19 59 100 100 40
20 61 100 100 0
21 88 100 100 100
22 73 100 100 25
23 89 100 100 100
24 97 100 100 100
25 74 100 100 100
26 100 0 198 100
27 100 57 100
28 96 100 100 100
29 93 100 100 53
30 73 100 100 0
31 98 100 100 100
32 84 100 100 100
33 93 100 100 100
34 55 100 100 50
35 67 100 100 100
36 97 100 100 100
37 78 100 100 100
38 0 100 100 100
39 76 100 100 0

4O 45 O 100 100

193
TABLE D.l (Cont)

° PERCENTAGE SHARE OF HIRED LABOR PER ACTIVIT:

 

 

Transportation
To

Case Cotton Cotton Collection Cotton
No. Picking Packing Center§__ Weighing
41 13 100 100 100
42 40 877 100 100
43 75 87 100 o
44 88 100 100 100
45 6o 85 100 o
46 48 A71 100 100
47 74 59 76 0
48 44 100 100 100
49 59 100 100 100
50 68 o 100 o
51 84 100 100 100
52 78 95 100 o
53 57 100 100 100
54 55 53 100 100
55 38 48 100 100
56 41 100 100 ' 100
57 80 67 100 100
58 32 73 100 100
59 69 100 100 78
60 83 100 100 100
61 100 100 100 o
62 58 92 100 100
63 81 87 100 o
64 88 100 100 100
65 68 68 100 o
55 9 100 100 o
67 94 100 100 10
68 60 100 100 o
69 91 100 100 o
70 96 86 100 0
71 86 53 100 o
72 71 71 100 o
73 91 100 100 o
74 63 100 100 o
75 82 82 100 o
76 47 100 100 o
77 86 100 100 o
78 68 100 100 -
79 89 100 100 o
80 73 100 100 o
81 100 100 100 94
82 40 100 100 0

TABLE D.l (Cont)

 

PERCENTAGE SHARE OF HIRED LABOR PER ACTIVITY

 

Transportation
to
Case Cotton Cotton Collection Cotton
No. Picking Packing Centers Weighing_
83 75 40 100 0
84 40 100 100 O
85 100' 100 100 O
86 71 100' 100 O
87 38 100 100 0
88 52 100 100 25
89 88 100 100 100
90 77 62 100 35
91 91 71 100 50
92 7o 71 100 100
93 92 88 100 0
94 79 100 100 67
95 5 76 100 0
96 81 100 100 0
97 48 100 100 0
98 100 48 100 100
99 90 100 100 0
100 99 95 100 100
101 94 100 100 0
102 61 100 100 O
103 95 100 100 0
104 100 73 100 0
105 96 100 100 0
106 90 98 100 O
107 56 67 100 0
108 85 92 100 100
109 100 100 100 0
110 - 78 100 100 O
111 100 63 100 100
112 91 100 100 O
113 93 100 100 100
114 92 100 100 O
115 85 78 100 O
116 89 100 100 O
117 83 100 100 0
118 62 100 100 50
119 100 100 100 0
120 85 100 100 0
121 89 96 100 0
122 91 100 100 O
123 - 67 100 100 O
124 100 67 100 o
125 100 100 100 100

 

SOURCE: The Survey of Tenants

APPENDIX E

APPROXIMATIONS OF ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD
EXPENDITURES OF TENANTS

195
TABLE E.l APPROXIMATION OF ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES OF

 

 

TENANTS
Cost of Total
Maintain- Cost Cost of Cost of Annual
ing Farm 'Of Clothing & Other Household
Case Animals Food Footwear Items Expenditures
l 00 566.11 63.50 117.35 746.96
2 45.63 790.95 128.50 68.50 1033.58
3 91.25 774.89 295.00 194.00 1355.14
4 91.25 661.13 160.40 107.25 1020.03
5 00 554.07 109.50 110.50 774.07
6 00 616.30 92.70 106.00 815.00
7 00 595.98 93.50 95.00 784.48
8 00 485.82 28.50 59.25 573.57
9 45.63 525.96 101.00 112.00 784.59
10 45.63 546.04 23.00 50.00 664.67
11 182.50 419.57 71.25 69.50 742.82
12 00 465.74 89.75 90.80 646.29
13 182.50 931.48 233.60 292.35 1639.93
14 00 550.06 46.20 81.00 677.26
15 54.75 750.81 159.90 115.00 1080.46
16 146.00 750.81 188.00 168.00 1252.81
17 73.00 706.64 158.00 107.30 1044.94
18 45.63 790.96 98.40 60.00 994.99
19 91.25 690.58 171.00 120.70 1073.53
20 45.63 457.71 32.15 70.25 605.74
21 45.63 801.00 101.85 101.00 1049.48
22 68.44 790.96 162.00 207.50 1228.90
23 45.63 485.82 136.00 50.00 717.45
24 45.63 803.00 155.00 77.00 1080.63
25 73.00 650.43 97.00 84.00 904.43
26 00 423.59 48.10 55.50 527.19
27 45.63 429.61 36.30 70.50 .582.04
28 00 345.29 42.50 118.00 505.79
29 00 345.29 44.00 86.00 475.29
30 00 501.87 102.00 80.50 684.37
31 00 347.30 53.50 65.00 465.80
32 00 489.83 42.50 70.30 602.63
33 00 385.44 58.00 85.50 528.94
34 45.63 586.19 110.00 100.00 841.82
35 00 411.54 70.00 79.00 560.54
36 00 353.32 112.00 106.00 571.32
37 00 529.98 93.00 114.00 736.98
38 45.63 630.36 201.00 340.00 1216.99
39 91.25 646.42 176.50 171.00 1085.17
40 00 345.29 '29.00 37.00 411.29

196

 

 

TABLE E.1 (Cont)

Cost of Total

Maintain- Cost Cost of Cost of Annual

ing Farm Of Clothing & Other Household
Case Animals Food Footwear Items Expenditures
No LS LS Ls Ls Ls
41 182.50 809.03 171.00 132.00 1294.53
42 00 489.83 83.50 85.00 658.33
43 00 540.02 77.40 172.30 789.72
44 36.50 534.00 116.50 132.00 819.00
45 00 485.82 77.50 55.00 618.32
46 195.63 648.82 66.85 83.00 994.30
47 00 429.61 72.00 72.00 573.61
48 182.50 730.73 116.00 70.00 1099.23
49 00 632.37 169.00 132.00 933.37
50 00 525.97 125.00 105.80 756.77
51 00 588.60 228.00 108.25 “924.85
52 00 578.16 170.50 233.80 982.46
53 00 485.82 97.00 91.00 673.82
54 00 548.45 102.00 124.30 774.75
55 54.75 630.36 354.00 279.00 1318.11
56 00 770.88 84.50 84.00 939.38
57 00 546.04 66.00 103.00 715.04
58 116.80 521.95 104.00 49.00 791.75
59 45.63 525.97 127.00 161.50 860.10
60 00 568.13 130.00 298.50 996.63
61 00 475.78 104.00 125.60 705.38
62 00 529.98 , 201.00 150.30 881.28
63 00 365.37 96.50 140.30 602.17
64 68.44 576.16 104.50 122.00 871.10
65 60.83 789.35 89.00 124.00 1063.18
66 91.25 606.27 194.00 157.00 1048.52
67 91.25 525.97 140.00 152.00 909.22
68 91.25 546.04 130.00 162.00 _929.29
69 91.25 1027.84 350.00 253.50 1722.59
70 45.63 385.44 75.00 127.00 633.07
71 36.50 365.37 64.00 57.00 522.87
72 91.25 505.89 95.00 86.50 778.64
73 45.63 445.67 107.00 102.00 700.30
74 91.25 529.98 249.00 156.00 1026.23
75 91.25 620.32 212.00 230.00 1153.57
76 45.63 574.15 118.00 110.00 847.78
77 00 694.60 97.00 79.00 870.60
78 00 570.13 145vOO 105.00 820.13
79 00 546.04 109.00 108.00 763.04
80 182.50 489.83 144.00 120.00 936.33
81 45.63 385.44 73.00 94.00 598.07
82 54.75 790.96 217.00 295.00 1357.71

TABLE E.1 (Cont)

197

 

 

 

Cost of Total
Maintain- Cost Cost of Cost of Annual
ing Farm Of Clothing & Other Household

Case Animals Food Footwear Items Expenditures
No. Ls Ls Ls Ls Ls

83 91.25 911.41 305.00 105.70 1413.36

84 241.25 1180.41 211.00 203.00 1835.66

85 135.05 634.37 104.00 163.00 1036.42

86 91.25 654.45 134.00 145.30 1025.00

87 58.40 730.73 305.00 152.50 1246.63

88 228.13 734.75 317.00 266.00 1545.88

89 45.63 650.43 132.00 194.00 1022.06

90 91.25 610.28 195.00 202.00 1098.53

91 226.30 397.49 97.00 136.10 856.89

92 00 485.82 145.50 112.00 743.32

93 273.75 1538.64 418.50 372.00 2602.89

94 45.63 485.82 142.40 123.00 796.85

95 273.75 768.88 119.50 88.00 1250.13

96 00 670. 50 109.50 113.45 893.45

97 60.83 707. 85 125.50 110.00 1004.18

98 43.80 ‘-- -- --

99 00 995- 72 266.00 270.00 1531.72
100 00 568.13 81.00 106.00 755.13
101 136.88 538.01 171.50 175.70 1022.09
102 45.63 698.61 94.00 190.00 1028.24
103 45.63 348.16 81.00 72. 00 545.79
104 54.75 388.26 76300 127. 00 646.01
105 00 491.04 209.00 170. 50 870.54
106 91.25 418.90 99.00 138.00 747.15
107 60.85 536.01 104.00 133.30 834.16
108 00 343.69 73.00 96. 50 513.19
109 91.25 1031.85 395.00 263.00 1781.10
110 91.25 430.81 135.50118.5O 776.06
111 00 -- -- --

112 00 385.44 128.50 93.00 606.94
113 36.50 365.37 99.00 121.74 622.61
114 30.42 405.52 62.00 116.00 613.94
115 54.75 445.67 68.00 101.40 669.82
116 00 301.13 00 136.00 437.13
117 00 566.12 248.00 210.00 1024.12
118 00 730.73 241.00 145.00 1116.73
119 54.75 943.13 375.00 490.00 1862.88
120 00 831.11 127.00 128.00 1086.11
121 45.63 470.96 102.00 86. 00 704.59
122 73.00 746.78 238.00 195.60 1253.38
123 36.50 479.80 107.00 150.00 773.30
124 47.45 586.19 171.00 125.00 929.64
125 00 -- -- -- --
SOURCE The Survey of Tenants

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