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A CASE STUDY OF AN INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT: THE INSTITUTO
NACIONAL DE COMERCIO EXTERIOR Y INTERIOR
IN CIUDAD SANDINO, NICARAGUA

BY

Ronald G. Kirschenheiter_

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in Partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT
A CASE STUDY OF AN INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT: THE INSTITUTO

NACIONAL DE COMERCIO EXTERIOR Y INTERIOR
IN CIUDAD SANDINO, NICARAGUA

BY

Ronald G. Kirschenheiter

This case study attempted to evaluate the impact of
an international development grain drying and storage

project in Ciudad Sandino, Nicaragua. A critical evaluation
was made of several major theoretical schools of thought
including "conventional theory" and "dependency theory."
These macrosociological perspectives were supplemented
with a more microtheoretical approach to the analysis
Of community develoPment projects based on the works of
Andre Gorz and Paulo Freire. This study applied Normative
Sponsorship Theory which explains how different units of
social organization form linkages to achieve common goals.

A wide variety 055 research methods were adopted through-
out the research including the analysis of numerous
documents of official organizations, formal and informal
interviewing and participant observation. A lengthy survey
was also conducted of the campesinos in the Ciudad Sandino
area. This researCh attempted to discover and analyze the

goals norms and values of the various relevant social
I

units affected by the INCEI program, to isolate many of

 

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the rural communities ' problems and needs, and to trace the

complex patterns of interaction within these communities
and between the United States and Nicaragua. Further,
the social, political and economic consequences of the
recent Nicaraguan Revolution received special attention.
The primary findings of this study revealed that,
although the INCEI program originally retained the
potential for responding to the needs and capabilities of
the small farmers in the Ciudad Sandino area, for the most
part, it failed to do 80. Over six years after completion
of the silos, INCEI had yet to have any significant
impact on the lives of the rural population and had failed
to change the farmers's patterns of. grain treatment and
storage. Thus the stabilization of the market prices for
corn and beans in Nicaragua, the primary objective of the

INCEI program, neVer became a reality.

DEDICATION

DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF CARMELITA
SALGADO CERRATO AND THE MARTYRS OF

THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Selecting a guidance committee is one of the most

important tasks facing any graduate student. I feel most

fortunate to be able to thank my committee members, Bill

Ewens, Zolton Ferency, Jim McKee, Chris Sower and Scott

Whiteford for assisting me in this challenging endeavor.
Each of these scholars proved to be knowledgeable, patient
and understanding whenever I turned to them for assistance.
I wish to especially thank my Chairperson, Bill Ewens, for
his encouragement and thoughtfulness throughout this
research. Bill is one of those unique individuals who not
only teaches the ideals of Friere and Marx in the classroom
but also attempts to practice them daily in his relations
with others. I also want to thank Ruth Hamilton for
introducing to me many of the ideas contained in this
dissertation .

Finally and most importantly, I want to thank my
tres princesas, Abbi, Gretchen and Kara. These three
beautiful human beings, not only tolerated six grueling
years of graduate school, law school, field research and
a variety of jobs but also helped me to grow emotionally
and intellectually while achieving 0111’ 90618. Quite Simply,
Without their constant love and support, I never would

have made it .

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page
I. INTRODUCTION - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Conventional Development Theory . . . . . 2
Modernization Theory. . . . . .- . . . . . 4
Weaknesses of Modernization Theorists . . 13
The Psychological/Social Approach to
Development . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Weber as an Intellectual Father Image . . 18
Limitations to the Psycho-Socio Approach

to Development . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Political and Economic Approaches to
Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Drawbacks of the Economic and Political
Frameworks of Development. . . . . . . 33
II. DEPENDENCY THEORY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
The Development of Underdevelopment . . . 50

On the Role of the Masses . . . . . . . 54
Other Refractions from the Prism of

Dependency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
The "Problem" of Surplus. . . . . . . . . 66
The Psychological Consequences of

Dependency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Synthesizing the Dependency Literature. . 70
Summary and Critique of Dependency Theory 72

III. STEPS TOWARDS CREATING EFFECTIVE CHANGE: THE
WORKS OF GORZ, FRIERE, AND NORMATIVE

SPONSORSHIP THEORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Gorz 's Effort at Identifying Non-
Reformist Reforms . . . . . . . . . 83
Paulo Friere' s Pedagogy with the
Periphery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

The Basic Tenets of Normative Sponsorship
Theory. 0 o I I o o o . . . . . . . . . 99

Relevant Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
The Initiation Set. . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Executive Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Smary.................112

Chapter

IV. METHODOLOGY .

General Approaches and Objectives of the

Study -

Problems Inherent in Cross- -Cultural
Surveys.............
The Questionnaire and Selecting the
Random Sample . . . . . .

The Official Interviews . . . . . . .
surveying the Larger Picture. . . . .
V. BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH . . . . . . . .
Geographic, Social, Political, and
Economic Factors. . . . . . . . . .
The "Nicaraguan Route". . . . . . . .
The William Walker Affair . . . . . .
The Rise of Sandino . . . . . . . . .
The Rise of the Somoza Dynasty. . . .
The Somoza Era. . . . . . . . . . . .
The World' 3 "Greediest Dictator". . .
The Tide Shifts . . . . . . . . . .
The Beginning of the End. . . . . . .
The Final Offensive . . . . . . . . .

VI.

The Wave of the Future. . . . . . .

PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF DATA. . . .

The Agricultural Picture in General .
History of the INCEI Program. . . . .
INCEI'S Objectives. . . . . . . . . .

Ciudad Sandino (a. k. a. El Jicaro) . .

Focus of the Research: Cuidad Sandino.

The Interviews with the "Official
Relevant Systems. . . . . . . . . .
Results of the Ciudad Sandino Survey.
Living Conditions . . . . . . . . . .
Patterns of Corn Cultivation. . . . .

Corn Storage Practices. . . . . . . .
Patterns of Beans Cultivation . . . .
Bean Storage Practices. . . . .

The Farmers' Attitudes Towards INCEI.
Summary Analysis of the Data. . . . .

Page

117

118
]21

125
130
134

137

138
141
142
145
151
152
154
165
177
180
185

189

189
193
197
202

203
211
212
218
221
223
226
230
237

Chapter Page

VII~CONCLUSION. ...............242

The FUtUF’e Course of the Revolution . . . 247
The Continuing Dilemma of Foreign Aid . . 251

Final Refractions from the Prism of
Dependency............... 254

Limitations to the Study. . . . . 243

APPENDIXA....-,,,,,,,,,,,,,,260
APPENDIXB-..--................286
APPENDIX c . . . - - 303

APPENDIXD...-.................309

BIBLIOGRAPHY.--.................315

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Any discussion of international development must
accept as its starting point two basic facts, the great
inequality that exists at the national and international
levels and the tendency of this inequality to resist
change. At least two major schools of thought have

evolved in the social sciences in an effort to explain

these injustices and what changes are necessary to elimi-
nate them. The following pages will attempt to survey the
major propositions expounded by these two basic theoret-
ical approaches which, for purposes of discussion, will be
referred to here as conventional developmental theories
and dependency developmental theories.

It should be mentioned that this discussion is not
intended as a detailed analysis of each and every theory
presently popular among students of development or a crit-
ical indepth evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of
each of the various positions. .Rather it is my intention
to present an overview of the subject, to explore what
this writer feels are the major deficiencies and contra-
dictions inherent in many of the different theories, and
to use this discussion as a window from which to view a
Specific Agency for International Development project in

Nicaragua .

CONVENTIONAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY

At the present time, social scientists have yet to
even arrive at a consensus at how many different types or

approaches to developmental theory are presently circulat-

ing in the literature. While perhaps the more critical

Observers on the Subject have identified at least two
major trends, that of a dependency perspective versus a
more conventional or mainstream approach to the problem
(Frank, 1967, 1969; Santos, 1970; Bodenheimer, 1971),
other authors fail to agree on even this basic starting
point.

Two of the more recent books on this subject, for
example, conflict on even this elementary point. Chodak
(1973) tells us that the present state of developmental
literature contains five distinguishable approaches to the
subject. He argues that the various developmental the-
ories can be classified accordingly: (1) evolutionary
theories, (2) theories which emphasize the growing "sys-
temness" of society, (3) theories which focus on indi-
vidual motivational factors leading to deve10pment, (4)
political and economic theories of development, and (5)
modernization theories or those which attempt to "bring
technology, ways of life, social organization, art, modes
of production, and even fashion up to date". (Ibid., p.

253).

ChodAk'S otherwise fine work fails to supply even a
superficial discussion of the major tenets of dependency
theories and his extensive bibliography included at the
back of his book excludes any references to scholars such
as Amin, Beckford, or Frank. Chodak apparently refuses to
present and evaluate the dependency perspective because he
refuses to engage in what he considers a political as
opposed to his more "scientific" approach to the problem.
He fails to realize that his exclusion of this vital area
of the literature is every bit as much of a political
statement as would be critical analysis of the literature.

Long (1977), on the other hand, divides the various
approaches to development into at least four basic ave—.
nues. He focuses on: those which adapt a modernization
approach, those which concentrate on social and cultural
obstacles to development, those which adapt a dependency
perspective, and those which tend to stress individual
motivational factors, or as he puts it, "the analysis of
entrepreneurship".

Although both of these authors have greatly contrib-
uted to my own understanding and organization of the sub-
ject matter, the following discussion will not adopt in
its entirety either of these classification systems.
Rather it is my intention, as stated previously, to
divide this survey of the literature into two major

bodies: dependency theory and conventional development

theory. This latter category will be further subdivided
into three basic subcategories: those which adopt a
social-psychological approach, those which emphasize a
political and economical perspective, and so-called
modernization theories.

It appears obvious that any such classification
scheme is to a great extent an artificial and arbitrary
segmentation of the subject matter. Whether a certain
theorist such as Weber or Marx should be placed into any
particular category is frequently an intellectual exercise
in hair-splitting and often a matter of degree and
personal preferences. This scheme is adopted primarily
for purposes of discussion and only secondarily to ex-
pound uppn the fact that the various theoretical approaches
to the problem do tend to emphasize different social,
political, and economic factors in the interdependent

social process referred to as international development.

MODERN I ZATION THEORY

What are commonly referred to as theories of modern-
ization are labeled such because they tend to stress the
differences between those countries commonly referred to
as "modern", such as the United States, Western Europe,
and the Soviet Union, and those which have to date failed
to achieve a corresponding level of affluence. The pop-

ularity of this area is attested to by the fact that

different volumes of bibliographies have been published on
the subject (Brode, 1970; Spitz, 1969).

Whether a country or society is or is not classified
as "modern“, which in effect often implies "like the
United States", depends to a great extend on the defini-
tional whims of the social scientist doing the defining.
Moore, for example, states that a modern society is one
which has experienced a total transition from traditional
or pre-modern society to the level of technology and
political and social organization presently found in the
Western democracies (Moore, 1963; 89). Lenski and Lenski
reflect this view, and while generally stressing the
desirable effects of modern industrial technology, they
emphasize that the modernization process involves all
aspects of society, not just the technological (Lenski
and Lenski, 1974; 414-459).

Bendix (1967) adapts a somewhat different point of
reference. While not denying that modernization tends to
follow a general pattern in different societies, he also
stresses the uniqueness of the process depending on the
particular country's historical frame of reference. He
argues that all nations cannot be expected to follow in
the historical footsteps of England or the United States,
that shortcuts in the modernization process are certainly
possible, and that government plays a crucial role in

either accelerating or impending the deve10pmental

process towards modernization.

Apter differentiates between terms such as "modern-
ization“, “development", and "industrialization", and
states that modernization is but one type of development.
Modernization, for Apter, necessarily contains three fac-
tors. First, a social system which accepts and advocates
change as part of its value system. Second, a social
structure which differentiates with regards to various
occupations and at the same time, is flexible enough to
allow movement within the various layers of the social
structure. And third, a social system which includes and
perpetuates the type of knowledge, training, and skill
necessary for life in a technologically advanced world
(Apter, 1965; 67). Apter goes on to point out that just
as modernization is but one type of development, so is
industrialization but one kind of modernization. He notes
that whereas a particular country may be able to modernize
with only a minimum level of industrialization, that same
country could not industrialize without modernization.

Thus in general terms, modernization to these theo-
rists refers to a better way of life. A way of life
which is most often found in the advanced, affluent
nations of the world. Modernization becomes in many ways,
a process of imitating the accomplishments of the advanced,
more developed nations by those which are "underdeveloped".

To a very limited extent, my own research might be viewed

 

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as a case study of an attempt at transplanting the advanced
grain drying and storage practices of the United States to
underdeveloped Nicaragua. Unfortunately as the results of
this research will reveal, imitation is not always the pur-
est form of flattery. Within the context of international
development, such so-called "transfers of technology" are
oftentimes a disguised effort at perpetuating a dependency
relationship. Blind imitation of the agricultural practices
of the Center nation, without regard to the unique cultural
and political conditions of the recipient or dependent
country, more often than not, has produced little in terms
of a better life for those on the bottom of the social
structure.

Despite denials to the contrary (see Chodak, 1973;
252), the intellectual roots of modernization theory are
buried in the theoretical soil of the nineteenth century
theories of social evolution (Portes, 1976). Auguste Comte
(1898), Herbert Spencer (1901), and in more recent times,
the writings of Lester Ward (1911), Talcott Parsons (1954),
and Leslie White (1969) all tend to View gradual change in
societies as a reflection of prior adaptations of nature.
Spencer not only viewed human societies as comparable in
many ways to biological organisms, especially in terms of
growth and reproduction, but also that this growth or
development of societies cannot be accelerated or diverted,

but must follow a natural pattern.

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These theorists assumed that social change and devel-
Opment were inevitable and viewed it as pursuing a gradual
unilateral course of progression with each society eventu—
ally passing through the same basic historical stages or
periods of transition. Only minor emphasis was placed on
the actual causes of social change or on what role conflict
should play, if any, in sparking these advances since the
controlling forces were motivated by almost a natural law
(Eisenstadt, 1965).

Although today these evolutionary approaches to devel-
opment are rarely supported in their original or purest
forms, many of the nutrients left behind in this "fertile
soil" of sociological thought remain in the theoretical
constructs of modernizational theorists. Chodak, for
instance, has identified Leslie White as "the most repre-
sentative and elaborate of the evolutionist approaches in
anthropology today"(l973; 32). This is because White, in
his discussion of history as the evolution of culture,
places special emphasis on the fact that culture, in addi-
tion to beliefs, values, norms, and social organizations
and institutions, also includes the material goods made by
humans and the way in which they make them.

White (1969; 366-374) stresses the key role that
energy has placed in this process. He describes the human
race as gradually progressing through a number of stages,

each of which he identified by the type and quantity of

 

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energy available at that period of time. From the period
where humans were the primary source of power, through the
stages of the ancient great civilizations built on animal
and plant power, to the present age of fossil fuels, the
human race's level of material affluence is directly linked
to its ability to harness and produce energy.

White regards the discovery of nuclear energy as "a
tremendously significant technological event" which implic—
itly will herald in a new, more prosperous stage in the
cultural evolution of the human race. White also believes
that the State will play an ever more dominant role in the
control of human affairs. He does not perceive this as a
necessarily negative or positive event as much as an in-
evitable one. After all, this is a result of social evo-
lution, a process which is predestined to occur.

Other central figures in modernization theory reflect
similar views of development. Rostow (1960) in his fre-
quently cited "Non-Communist Manifesto", maintained that
deve10pment can still be regarded basically as a linear
process with developing societies tending to pass through
various stages from traditional, to pre-conditions for
economic take—off, to take-off, through the drive to
maturity, and finally to the age of high mass consumption.
Wilbert Moore's expansion on this theoretical conception
of modernization tends for all practical purposes to equate

the concept with industrialization (Moore, 1963; 89-112).

10

The task 0i the social observers then becomes to identify
the conditions necessary for transition to the next stage
of development, the obstacles present in particular
societies which.hinder this process, and to elaborate on
the consequences which will flow from the failure to cor-
rectly address these problems.

These theorists further point out that the primary
obstacles to development include rapidly increasing popu-
lations, as well as various types of waste including need-
less military expenditures, high levels of luxury consump-
tion among the upper classes of these countries, and wide-
spread corruption at the governmental level. These
obstacles prevent the rapid accumulation of capital neces-
sary to achieve self-sustaining growth (Rosen and Jones,
1977).

Of these, the inability to feed an ever-increasing
population clearly presents a prime obstacle. Robert
McNamara, President of the World Bank Group, has stated
that of the more than 2,000 million people living in the
approximately 100 countries of the developing world, over
800 million presently exist in an absolute state of poverty
that is "a condition of life so limited as to prevent real-
ization of the potential of the genes with which they were
born; a condition of life so degrading as to be an insult
to human dignity" (World Bank, 1975; v). Tydings (1970)

calculates that during the 8-day mission of man's first

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lunar walk approximately 100,000 humans starved to death -
most of whom were children.

Each year food production falls farther and farther
behind.the burgeoning population. Although most Latin
American nations are far from the most deprived of the
developing world, on the average one Latin American child
dies from either hunger or disease every minute of every
day. Out of a total pOpulation of approximately 280 mil-
lion, 50 million are either unemployed or underemployed,
and about 100 million are functionally illiterate (Galeano,
1973; 31-32). During the 1960's, the United Nations' so-
called "Decade of Development", over half of the world's
pOpulation, instead of increasing their protein and calorie
intake and improving their standard of living, actually
suffered lower levels of consumption, endured more unem-
ployment, and earned less real money.

In response to this avalanche of depressing statistics,
many leaders of the developed world conclude that pOpula-
tion control must receive priority over economic develop-
ment. In fact, such control will indirectly lead to devel-
opment when measured by such factors as per capita income.
As President Johnson once stated in a speech to the United
Nations assembly, "Let us act on the fact that less than
$5.00 invested in population control is worth $100 invested
in economic control." (Galeano, 1973; 33). McNamara has

presented the severity of the problem in even more explicit

 

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12

terms; unless these trends are reversed, he argues, it will
be impossible to maintain world peace or to provide for the
security of the United States.

Thus the decade of development turned out to be such
a dismal failure because of, among other factors, political
instability, rapid population growth, unfavorable land
tenure systems, and the abnigation of their responsibilities
by local governments (Zimmerman and Duwors, 1970). Modern—
izational theorists maintain that once these excesses are
controlled, that once the population increase becomes re-
duced and eventually eliminated, along with wasteful mili-
tary expenditures and unproductive consumption patterns,
then the conditions for economic "take-off" will exist.
The mechanization of agriculture will lead to greater pro-
duction which in turn will establish a base for further in-
dustrialization. Foreign aid and private foreign invest-
ment channeled through effective programs of technical
assistance will provide the nutrients necessary to fertil-
ize this growth (Moomaw, 1966). Typically multinational
corporations play a center role in this scheme since they
provide advanced technology and greater efficiency, more
jobs with greater access to the international market, and
in general, demonstrate to the local population how to
imutate the superior western methods of management and

FHOduction (Rosen and Jones, 1977).

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WEAKNESSES OF MODERNIZATION THEORISTS

Numerous authors have provided an extended analysis
of the weaknesses inherent in the modernization approach.
(See, for example, Ocampo and Johnson, 1972; Salisbury,
1970; Chodak, 1973; and Long, 1977.) Therefore only a
brief summation of their key criticisms will be presented
here.

Clearly one of the key flaws contained in much of the
modernization literature is that it basically reflects an
ethnocentric capitalistic world View. Tipps notes that
although the literature of contemporary modernization
theory has been cleaned to the extent that it now projects
a more neutral impression, the underlying biases behind
this approach remain intact. Today, although “it speaks of
'modernity' rather than civilization, 'tradition' rather
than 'barbarism' - it continues to evaluate the progress of
nations, like its nineteenth century forebearers, by their
proximity to the institutions and values of Western, and
particularly Anglo-American societies." (Tipp, 1973; 199-
226). Furthermore, this model does not accurately reflect
the historical, developmental experiences of the West, but
presents an "idealization" of their position (Smith, 1973;
87). It frequently tends to either ignore or to underem-
pmasize the fact many of the industrial and developmental
achievements of the United States, for example, became pos-
SibLe only through exploitation and oppression of her own

People.

13

14

Many critical scholars have clearly documented this
fact. Dowd points out that slavery permitted the exploi-
tation of 15 to 20 million men, women, and children, over
half of whom were killed in the process, for the benefit of
a minority of rich Southern landowners and Northern manu-
facturers (Dowd, 1973; 46). Genovese has provided a bril-
liantly researched documentation of this process and main-
tains that only a very small percentage of capitalists were
the direct beneficiaries of this exploitation (Genovese,
1974). Tabb provides further support for this contention
and notes that while, "Often the terrible burden of slavery
is acknowledged, rarely is the contribution of slave labor
to the capital accumulation process seen as the sizable
factor in American development that it truly was." (Tabb,
1974; 301).

Modernization theorists, while focusing on the internal
obstacles to social change, frequently tend to downplay the
external restraints imposed by a global system of capital-
ism. Development must also be viewed from the macro-level
of political and economic relationships. Special consid-
erationmust be given to determining what effect these
external forces have in terms of a country's individual
development. It does little good, for example, to double
production of basic agricultural commodities through modern
practices of cultivation if these crOps are raised primar-

ily for export and the price on the world market is heavily

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influenced by a few developed countries (Chodak, 1973; 297).
Many mainstream theorists tend to circumvent these problems
by simply accepting the global structure of political and
economic relations as given.

Modernization theorists have also been criticized on
a number of other accounts. Long argues that some leading
theorists exhibit at least 2 major limitations in their
formulations. First they often project the impression that
it is possible to attain "an aggregate assessment of the
degree of structural differentiation of society as a whole".
Yet all societies have social institutions, roles, and
relationships which are BREE differentiated and undifferen-
tiated. Frank (1967), for example, stresses that there is
little difference between the political, economic, and
social elites of less developed countries and those of the
United States in terms of differentiating their roles and
relationships to each other. Furthermore it is also a fal-
lacy to assume that different societies can be rigidly
classified in terms of whether their value and role systems
are based on "universal-achievement" variables or "partic-
ularistic-ascriptive" criteria.

Secondly, even if the argument is accepted that the
less developed nations are much more undifferentiated in
their role patterns and social institutions than the more
(kweloped countries, it does not necessarily follow, as

nlanymodernization theorists imply, that modernization will

16

lead to greater differentiation. Traditional and modern
value systems are not mutually exclusive or in conflict
with each other. As this study will demonstrate, it is
possible to introduce into a small agricultural community
the most modern system of drying and storing basic grains,
at a cost of millions of dollars, and yet have relatively
no impact on the traditional forms of grain drying and
storing. Other studies have also reaffirmed the fact that
the "old" and the "modern" can exist together and both
assist and obstruct development (Salisbury, 1970; Singer,
1968).

These artificial dichotomies created by many moderni-
zation theorists of modern versus traditional, achievement
orientation versus ascription, differentiated social struc-
tures and institutions versus the undifferentiated, have
important implications in terms of research as well as
theory. Not only does it reflect an ethnocentric bias
towards linear development, but it then presents the
research problem as one of hypothesizing the collapse of
traditional cultural practices or of proving how such out—
moded patterns of behavior are preventing development from
taking place. It appears clear that the often unstated
implication behind such research is that unless "help" comes
in from the outside, primarily the Western nations, little
improvement can be expected from the developing countries

operating on their own. It is a short practical step from

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such a theoretical position to advocating developmental
policies which perpetuate a dependency relationship.

This discussion of modernization theorists is by no
means intended as a caricature of their position. Even
superficial experience in the field of international devel-
opment, especially at the local level, will reveal the in-
adequacies of this theoretical perspective when put into
practice. If modernization theory has come under increas-
ing attack in recent years, it is not because the theory
has yet to face practical application, but because it has
been applied in country after country for decades and

failed to produce results.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL/SOCIAL
APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT
A second major approach to development tends to pri-
marily emphasize the psychological and social factors of
individuals and groups which lead to development. These
theorists often attempt to identify and isolate the values
and attitudes possessed by the "modern man" and then to
uncover which social groups or classes exhibit these char—
acteristics to the greatest extent. The work of Max Weber
remains the primary impetus behind this school of thought.
These theories do not view development as an inevit-
able stage of societal evolution, but stress the uniqueness

of the process. They take as their starting point that

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some societies are developed and others are not and that
the presence of certain attitudes and values within a par-
ticular society must exist as a necessary precondition to
sparking the developmental process. Thus, they attempt to
identify and explain what it is that was different histor-
ically about the United States and Western Europe which

allowed them to develop.

WEBER AS AN INTELLECTUAL FATHER IMAGE

Max Weber clearly provided the "intellectual father
image" for many of these modern theorists. His influence
is reflected in the work of numerous scholars such as
McClelland (1961, 1969), Hagen (1962), and Eisenstadt
(1968). It is valuable here to review some of the major
ideas contained in Weber's, The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism. This discussion is by no means in-
tended as an original interpretation of this classic work
nor as a critical review of the weaknesses of his research.
Other writers have adequately addressed this tOpic else-
where (Green, 1959; 1962).

As Chodak observed, Weber's work has had such a pro-
found impact on social scientists in general, and develop-
mental theorists in particular, that entire careers have
teen built on either attacking or defending him. Yet the
real importance of Weber's research today "may not consist

So much in what it actually says about the influence of

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the Protestant Ethic on the spread of the spirit of capi-
talism as in its indispensability to an understanding of
'what has been written on industrialization and development
in Europe". (Chodak, 1973; 152)

Weber's first step in his analysis of the growth of
capitalism was to critically evaluate and discard many of
the common explanations which had been presented previous-
ly. His historical research revealed many of these then
popularly accepted explanations were simply not founded
in fact. Material conditions, for example, had little to
do with capitalism's rise. Florence in the 14th and 15th
centuries was extremely wealthy yet provided somewhat
barren soil for the seeds of capitalism. By contrast, the
back-water, dirt poor thirteen colonies of the New World
presented fertile acreage indeed.

Nor was it accurate to state that the difference in
the presence of capitalism could be found simply in the
value that a particular society placed on making money.
Weber argued that the impulse to acquire ever greater
amounts of money and material comforts is omnipresent.
"The impulse to acquisition, pursuit of gain, of money, of
the greatest amount of money, has in itself nothing to do
Vuth capitalism . . . one may say that it has been common
in all sorts and conditions of men at all times and in all

countries of the earth." (Weber, 1969; 17).

20

Moreover, Weber did not feel it was accurate to say
that Catholics and other sects believe in sacrificing the
present in hopes of achieving their just rewards in ano-
ther world any more than Protestants do. This explanation
fit neither the facts of today nor of the past. Further-
more, although many factors such as rational structures of
law and administration and scientific knowledge and tech-
nology contributed to the rise of capitalism, these factors
in and of themselves were not sufficient to explain its
birth and rapid growth.

What then is the explanation? Weber believed that
the key lay in the fact that Protestants possessed an un-
usual high percentage of managerial ownership and skilled
labor positions, and that Catholics, in similar historical,
political, and economic positions as Protestants, did not tend
to develop at the same level of economic advancement as
the Protestants. Weber explained these social facts in
terms of the differences between Protestants and Catholics
themselves. In other words, in terms of their beliefs.
While Catholics possessed a ”traditional" world view, Pro-
testants were motivated by what he termed the "Protestant
Ethic".

Unlike the traditional approach where business exists
for people, the Protestant Ethic teaches that men and
women should exist for religion through business. Weber

pointed out that the earning of ever greater amounts of

 

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:money, while at the same time avoiding all spontaneous
enjoyment of life, is completely irrational unless one
realizes that the act of making money is itself the result
of virtue and proficiency in one's calling. "Seest thou

a man diligent in his business? He shall stand before
kings." (Psalm VIII).

The traditional approach to making money and business
presented an obstacle to the development of capitalism.
Through many of its most scholarly spokesmen, it taught
that the accumulation of wealth was wrong and that poverty,
to a certain extent, was admirable. Weber believed that
a religious upbringing under the auspices of the Protestant
Ethic presented the greatest opportunity for overcoming
this more traditional view of the world.

Weber felt that the concept of a "calling" was unique
onto Protestants. This concept gave a new, more vibrant
religious and moral significance to worldly labor and
accumulation. The Protestant Ethic stressed the supreme
value of this calling and held that it was reflected in
one's life in this world. "The valuation of the fulfill-
ment of duty in worldly affairs is the highest form which
the moral activity of the individual can assume." (Ibid.,
p. 80). This dictate varies considerable from the tradi-
tional approaches of "give us this day our daily bread"
and "blessed are the meek and humble for they shall in-

herit the earth".

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Perhaps the overriding dogma preached by Calvinism is
predestination. In theory "Calvin rejects in principle
the assumption that one can learn from the conduct of
others whether they are chosen or damned as an unjustifi-
able attempt to force God's secret" (Ibid., p. 115). Yet
the fact remains that if a person is chosen, almost by
definition of the fact, he or she must lead a good life.

A good life meant a prosperous one, "for if God . . .
shows one of his elect a chance of profit, he must do it
with a purpose".

The Protestant Ethic aided capitalism in several
other ways as well. Through Baxter it taught that, "Waste
of time is thus the first and in principle the deadliest
of sins." (Ibid., p. 157) and found division of labor
highly desirable. Even more importantly, it taught men
and women to acquire capital but forbid blatant visible
consumption. Under Puritanism, one "like the servant in
the parable must give an account of every penny entrusted
to him" (Ibid., p. 170). At the same time, "The restraints
which were imposed upon the consumption of wealth naturally
served to increase it by making possible the productive
investment of capital." (Ibid., p. 172). Not only did the
Protestant Ethic justify the owner class, but it also pro-
vided this class with an abundant supply of sober, con-
scientious, and unusually industrious class of laborers

"who clung to their work as a life purpose willed by God"

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(Ibid., p. 177).

It would be wrong to assume that the Protestant Ethic
held that becoming wealthy was an end in itself. It did
not directly promote capitalism as much as capitalism
evolved from its doctrines. Weber maintained that many of
the results of the work of the Protestant Ethic's disciples
was "unforeseen and even unwished for". By Benjamin
Franklin's day, much of the religious ferver behind the
Protestant Ethic had already died out. Yet the ideas re-
mained. It was these ideas, it was argued, which provided
the impetus for conquering traditionalism and making pos—
sible the growth of capitalism and modern development.

Numerous authors have sprouted from Weber's ground—
work and have attempted to expand upon it. Rather than
stress capital formation, they attempted to identify and
praise the "modern man", whose spirit of entrepreneurship
made development possible. Although he states the Weber's
effort has become outdated, Hagen's theory of status with—
drawal strongly reflects Weber's influence.

Hagen argues that modern and traditional societies
produce different personalities. The traditional society
produces an authoritarian personality who refuses to take
risks, to be original, or to rebel against and oppose those
in positions of power over him. Modern society, on the
other hand, tends to produce what Hagen labels an "innova-

tional personality". This individual is confident,

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curious, and a problem solver. Hagen believes that the
transformation from underdeveloped to developing nation
status can be accomplished through a process he calls
"status withdrawal".

Status withdrawal means disrupting one's role in
society by undermining an individual's values and beliefs.
This results in frustration and alienation which gradually
builds up and passes through various stages, including the
retreatist personality to the ritualistic, to the innova-
tional, and eventually the reformist personality, which
allegedly tends to dominate modern society.

Another theorist who emphasizes the psychological
characteristics of individuals present in developing soci-
eties rather than the societies themselves is Alex Inkels
(1969). Following the lead of Parson's, this approach
again focuses on the value-normative or functional inter—
ests of society. It believes that ideas, attitudes, and
values as exposed by modern, so-called "developed individ-
uals" provide the spark plugs for getting a country started
on the road to development.

In his frequently cited study, Inkels interviewed
6,000 men (women were naturally excluded) from 6 develop-
ing nations in order to determine just what it is that
makes men modern. Education was found to be the most sig-
nificant factor in this chain reaction, but occupational

experience in large scale organizations, "eSpecially in

25

factory work", was revealed to be a close second. These
Harvard scholars, financed primarily by the Rockefeller
and Ford Foundations, discovered that modern men not only
think differently, but also act differently. These re-
searchers concluded that, "To a striking degree, the same
syndrome of attitudes, values, and ways of acting - such
as openness to experience, independence from parental auth-
ority, and taking part in civic affairs - defined the
modern men in each of the six countries and in all the
occupational groups."

Perhaps the most famous researcher in the area of
psychological motivation, however, is David C. McClelland.
McClelland's findings support many of Weber's contentions.
He believes that his studies have in fact demonstrated
that religion does play an important role in development.
The more dominant place religion has in a particular so-
ciety, the greater are possibilities of achievement by
individuals in that society. Catholic parents in Germany
as well as the United States exhibit much stricter child-
rearing practices than Protestant parents. They demand
more obedience and punish more frequently when this obed-
ience is not forthcoming. This theoretically tends to
undermine the development of values such as independence
and "achievement motivation". This research if accepted,
obviously has dire implications for countries such as

Nicaragua, as well as the rest of Latin America, where well

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over ninety percent of the population consider themselves
Catholic.

McClelland maintains that economic development his—
torically in all societies has resulted from achievement
motivation. Much of his research consists of identifying
this factor, which he later labeled "n Ach" for need for
achievement, in a variety of cross-cultural and historical
situations. This need, however, does not encompass the
need for personal satisfaction or self-actualization in
Maslowian terms. The need for achievement in this context
means economic achievement, in short, money.

Chodak argues that this need for money reflects not
greed or a love for money for its own sake. Instead, in
tune with Weber's approach, money symbolizes success and
should be accumulated, not spent (Chodak, 1973; 169, 173).
Thus in short, McClelland's advice to the developing world
is to plant and cultivate the seeds of achievement motiva—
tion through the educational process and with care, it
will germinate and blossom into the flower of economic

development .

LIMITATIONS TO THE PSYCHO-SOCIO
APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT
Theories which focus on the psychological factors
related to development and on the recruitment from groups

possessing these characteristics have obviously contributed

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27

to our knowledge of development. At the same time, how-
ever, these theories reveal several key flaws or limita-
tions when examined from a more critical perspective. It
is perhaps worth noting that such weaknesses do not make
these theories "bad" in contrast with other "good" theories
of development. As with most problems in social science,
there is not necessarily a "right" or a "wrong" answer.
The issue should become one of realizing the inherent lim-
itations of this approach, and then taking steps to cor-
rect them. Unfortunately, this is a "sociological fact
of life" which many advocates of this school of thought
have failed to accept.

Although the lists of characteristics which propel
men into "modernity" vary from theorist to theorist, from
religion, to education, to work experience, to childrear—
ing practices and so on, these perspectives clearly em-
phasize individual, psychological variables which influence
development. These internal individual factors constitute
the motivating force behind social change. This approach
tends to completely ignore the vital materialistic and
historical forces at work.

This branch of conventional developmental theory
appears to disregard the international political and eco-
nomic realities which harness and oppress development. It
fails to address the very real possibility that so-called

"modern individuals" who internalize the values, attitudes,

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28

and goals of the developed nations - which here again has
traditionally meant the western capitalist countries -
eventually became roadblocks to development rather than
avenues to it. Even a superficial historical analysis of
many developing societies demonstrates that values such as
individualism, the profit motive, and excessive consumption
patterns do not constitute the most viable vehicles on the
road to development, especially when they come to believe
they are somehow different and superior and in turn organize
themselves into a ruling elite (Feder, 1971).

Nicaragua, for example, has long been under the con-
trol of individuals who most likely would have scored very
high on any scale of modernity. They frequently speak
English, have their children educated in the United States
(as they were), and otherwise share the values of an upper-
class modern American. Yet these admirable characteristics
have done little to lift the country from the grips of
underdevelopment or to cut the ties of dependency which
exist between Nicaragua and the United States.

By focusing on individual psychological variables,
these theorists also tend to underestimate the sociological
reality of poverty and oppression. This author's own exper-
ience of living and working in the highlands and the coast
of Peru for a year and a half have convinced me that even
"modern individuals" who possess an admirable spirit of

independence, curiosity, and creativity are stiffed by their

29

immediate physical and cultural environments. The same
foreign student who is administered a battery of tests while
studying in the relatively luxurious and eliteous environ-
ment of Harvard University would register a very different
score on an index of modernity if forced to scrap out a
living for a family of five from a quarter acre of rocky
soil in the Peruvian Andes while subsisting on a daily diet
of baked potatoes, chica, and coca leaves.

Furthermore, simply because factors such as religious
values facilitated development in a particular historical
timeframe does not mean that these same factors are abso-
lutely necessary preconditions to economic growth. Gersch-
enkron (1962) argues that this theory implies a rigid con-
cept of historical necessity which appears unfounded in the
real world. Clearly the possibility exists that other
psychological variables and social institutions may fulfill
this same role in a different time and place.

A new, still maturing doctrine of Marxist Catholicism
may someday fill the role in Latin America which Calvinism
and the Protestant Ethic played in Europe and the United
States. To say the least, Catholicism has not prevented
such now legendary figures as Camilo Torres in Columbia or
Ernesto Cardenal in Nicaragua, both of whom are Roman
Catholic priests, from achieving a revolutionary conscious-
ness unknown to many disciples of Calvinism (Gott, 1972;

268-307; Cardenal, 1976).

30

The writings of many neo-Weberian theorists then re-
flect the ethnocentric biases mentioned earlier with regard
to modernization theorists . They assume a common objective
of a capitalistic democratic society patterned after the
United States and Europe and populated by the same type of
psychologically motivated individuals which they believe
exist here. They apparently fail to realize, or at the very
least accept, the fact that the road to development may be
paved with a variety of different values and ideologies.

The influence of socialism (Gurley, 1976; Bonachea and
Valders, 1972) and nationalism (Nyerere, 1968) are but two

prime examples of this.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT

In the social sciences, the disciplines of economics
and pdhtical science deserve a special place for their
contributions to theories of economic development. In fact,
it may come as a surprise to a few readers of this disser-
tation that some authorities on the subject believe that
these disciplines are the only areas where theories of
development are the primary focus of scholarly concern.
Chodak (1973; 210), for example, bluntly observes that prac-
tically no historian today believes that development is a
legitimate concept which can be addressed in terms of a

historical process. With regard to sociology, he notes that

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"Sociologists often work on developmental problems, but
after their perplexing disappointments with earlier attempts
to interpret it, they have obtained a sort of idiosyncratic
aversion to it and often give 'development' the widest
possible berth."

Development from this perspective means obtaining a
narrowly defined set of objectives: it means establishing
the nation, protecting one's borders, and industrializing
and finally increasing production. It is concerned with
increasing the overall level of national income through
rational organization and administration of a country's
natural and human resources. Politically it often means
eventually establishing a liberal democracy ideally accom-
panied by great degrees of personal freedom.

Advocates of economic theories of development often
accept social and psychological variables of a particular
society as given. They place heavy reliance on quantifi-
able data and stress that the rate of investment is the
secret to obtaining economic growth. Meier and Baldwin
(1957; 110), for example, explain that the rate of growth
"is equal to the propensity to save times the inverse of
the accelerator. Income must increase, therefore, at a
compound interest rate if full employment is to be main-
tained".

It logically follows under this analysis that, simply

put, countries are poor and underdeveloped because they are

32

poor and underdeveloped. This "Catch 22 of development"
expounds that they are poor because they have no capital to
invest and have no capital to invest because they are too
poor to be able to save (see Chodak, 1973; 227; Nurske,
1957). If they ever hOpe to break out of this vicious cycle
of poverty and underdevelopment, they must somehow accumu-
late capital to invest. It is this line of reasoning which
logically justifies foreign aid in the form of grants and
loans. Other advocates who adopt more of a "self-help"
approach to deve10pment argue that a great increase in
agricultural production can supply this vitally important
initial investment (Reynolds, 1977; Mellor, 1966). Unfor-
tunately, many of these same theorists fail to acknowledge
that this circle of frustration had to begin somewhere.
Other theorists have comprised additional lists of
factors which are necessary for economic growth. Mosher
(1966) identifies the variables which he considers are nec-
essary for development. These include: transportation
facilities, markets, technology, education, credit, and
incentives. Which of these variables are of prime impor-
tance varies from theorist to theorist. Yet in general,
they do tend to agree that the political situation in a
given country is to be accepted as given, and their task is
to operate within that structure Whether it be a liberal
democracy or an Oppressive dictatorship. As Albert 0.

Hirschman, a leading Spokesman of this school observes,

33

"I attempt to answer these questions by avoiding the tempt-
ing device - or slight-of—hand - which consists in discov-

ering some 'prerequisite', be it a resource base, a rate of
capital formation, an elite, an ideology, or a personality

structure, that must allegedly be introduced before change

can possibly assert itself. Rather, I am trying to show

how a society can begin to move forward as it is, in spite

 

of what it is and because of what it is." (Hirschman, 1973;

 

6; emphasis in the original.)

Hirschman's own scheme places heavy emphasis on the
individual entrepreneur. Yet unlike those theories who
stress the psychological characteristics of individuals,
Hirschman focuses on the role government can play in stim-
ulating private investment and increasing production
(Hirschman, 1958). He believes that "strategic unbalanced
government investments", such as establishing industrial
parks, transportation facilities, and public power plants
and utilities, will provide the incentive for private in-
dividuals and firms to set up industries.

Political theories of development also cover a wide
range of alternatives, as Pye (1963) has aptly demonstrat-
ed. Frequently these perspectives stress the problems in-
volved with becoming a modern nation-state and with effi—
cient public administration. Stress is often placed on
transforming agrarian societies, especially in Africa and

Asia, into ideally liberal democracies with a broad yet

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stable level of political participation (Apter, 1965;
Bendix, 1964.

Chodak argues that political developmental theorists
appear less goal-directed than those of the economic de-
velopmental school, although certain parallels between the
two do exist. For example, both anticipate various levels
of individual freedom, government planning, and mass par-
ticipation. The interaction of these factors determines
the possible range of future development.

Gabriel Almond and Powell perceive the political sys-
tem in terms often used in economic analysis. They view
it as a process of transforming political inputs into out-
puts and believe that the performance of the system can be
graded on how effectively this process is handled (Almond
and Powell, 1966; 877). This model is specifically design—
ed to assist political leaders in rationally selecting
between various objectives and responding to the often con-
flicting pressures exerted on them by various interest
groups. With the exception of Pye, Ilchman and Uphoff
(1971) are among the few writers who have attempted a
sophisticated synthesis of the political and economic
frameworks and who then go on to pepper their work with a
seasoning of sociological research. These authors begin
with recognition of the fact that the most influential

studies in this area, including the works of Parsons

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(1951), Almond and Deutsch (1963), primarily adopt a sys-
tems or functional approach to the problem. They then
admit, however, that neither political scientists, econo-
mists, nor social scientists in general can presently con-
tribute anything of value in the conduct of politics or in
making rational choices of scarce resources. Their own

effort, The Political Economy of Change, attempts to cor-

 

rect this deficiency. They argue that, "What is needed are
some ways of assessing the comparative efficiency of policy
alternatives and some means of formulating priorities."
(Ilchman and Uphoff, 1973; 11). In effect their own book
might be regarded as an attempt at practical model for the
do-it-yourself statesman. V

Ilchman and Uphoff begin their analysis with five
basic assumptions. First, that political behavior and de-
cisions among alternatives can be analyzed and explained
in terms of resources, which are loosely described as the
activities and values of individuals. Second, that humans
make decisions and act rationally in pursuit of their ob-
jectives. Third, that an analysis of this process is
facilitated by segmenting the various interest groups into
sectors in order to study the interchange of demands and
resource allocations. They purposely avoid the use of
such terms as “elites" and "masses" because they believe
such distinctions are deceptive, tend to oversimplify, and

ignore the conflicts within such groups. The fourth

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assumption is that "most estimations of value can be made
in marginal terms". And finally, that any difficulties
with measurement which appear insoluable in the abstract
can be made more concrete when evaluated comparatively.
In other words, any particular sector will desire some
amount of X more than some amount of Y.

The various terms these authors use are original and
picturesque. The political arena is divided into two main
factions, the "regime" or the government presently in
power, and the "sectors". A sector is defined as "a group
of persons who reSpond to political issues in a similar
fashion" (Ibid., p. 39). Sectors are portrayed as strati-
fied into five key groupings. The first is the core com-
bination which "is an alliance of those sectors that have
most influence over public policy and the personnel and
goals of the regime" (Ibid., p. 43). In developing coun-
tries especially, the military and upper classes tend to
occupy this strata. Second in importance is the ideolog-
ical bias group. These individuals often receive verbal
support and prestige but few material rewards. The so—
called intellectual class resides here. Next comes the
stability group or "silent majority". They frequently end
up giving more than they receive and are often used by the
core combination and ideological bias group for their own
purposes. Fourth is the extra-stability group which is

typically ideologically oriented against the regime. The

 

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regime often considers them extremists and responds to
their demands by coercion, threats, and oppression. Last
and least are the unmobilized sectors. These individuals
have few if any resources and thus have no effective basis
for making demands on the regime.

Ilchman and Uphoff then devise an elaborate scheme for
describing the interchange which occurs in the political
process. They treat the process of supply and demand in the
political arena as similar in operation to the economic
realm. Political activity involves maximizing one's own
resources while, if possible, minimizing or appeasing the
demands of the opposition. Political resources are some-
thing either a regime or the various sectors use to accom-
plish their goals. Among the resources held by the regime
are economic goods and services, authority, status, infor-
mation, and coercion; those held by the sectors are eco-
nomic goods and services, status, legitimacy, information,
and violence.

Political exchange briefly is the process by which
sectors make demands upon the regime's resources while
trading their own resources to achieve these ends. The
regime likewise makes counterdemands upon the sectors' re-
sources. Who achieves what is determined by who is less
dependent on the resources of the other. ”Political in—
flation" results when demand for the regime's resources

exceeds supply. Hyperinflation is an extreme case of this.

38

"Political deflation" on the other hand occurs when the
regime's resources exceeds the demands of the various sec-
tors. Obviously, a regime prefers political inflation,
especially if controlled, and will continually strive to
achieve this. "Monoply" occurs from the regime's point of
view when it is the only "seller" of specific resources.
"Monopsony" results if she is the only buyer; both of these
conditions are also highly favorable to the regime. If the
sectors, however, should achieve monoply or monopsony, the
regime's position becomes highly precarious. The key tasks
of the regime, and by implication the social scientists
advising it, are to stabilize and control this bank-like
process; to make sure that the regime's resources do not
become overinflated to the extent that there is a run on

the bank.

DRAWBACKS OF THE ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL FRAMEWORKS OF DEVELOPMENT

Many of the problems inherent in the economic and
political theories of development are more extensively
dealt with in the following section dealing with develop-
ment from a dependency perspective. Thus only a cursory
critique of these positions appears here. Here again, it
is not my intent to portray these efforts as totally use-
less in terms of understanding social change, but to high-

light the most blatant biases and oversights implicit in

39

these approaches in an attempt to demonstrate that they
often do little more than compose conceptually sophisticat-
ed descriptions of development which bears little relation-
ship to the real world.

Criticisms of economists and political scientists by
an aSpiring graduate student in sociology may contain many
unstated assumptions or personal biases. It is revealing,
therefore, to note what other economists and political
scientists have to say regarding this subject. Dale Adams
observes that Marshallian economists, because of their pro-
fessional theoretical impotency, have been unable in the
past to support serious efforts at social change, such as
land reform, and will probably continue to defend the pre—
sent system in the future. Socialist thought and the dy-
namics of racial and class antagonisms will determine the
future course of deve10pment, he feels, since his and other
economists' "value hang-ups" have relegated their role to
that of reporting after-the-fact occurrences (Adams, 1973).

E.F. Schumacher, the noted British economist, was the
head planner of the British Coal Board for 20 years.

Schumacher's discussion in Small Is Beautiful demonstrates

 

the foolishness as well as the impossibility of the poor
nations patterning themselves after the rich in terms of
production and fuel consumption (Schumacher, 1973). He

stresses that although economic performance, growth, and

expansion have become almost an obsession with many

40

economists, this abiding interest is irrational, unscien-
tific, and operates to the advantage of a privileged minor-
ity. Schumacher attacks this View on both moral and logic
grounds:

"Economically our wrong living con-

sists primarily in systematically cul-

tivating greed and envy and thus

building up a vast array of totally

unwarranted wants . . . If greed were

not the master of modern man - ably

assisted by envy — how could it be that

the frenzy of economism does not abate

as higher 'standards of living' are

attained, and that it is precisely the

richest societies which pursue their

economic advantage with the greatest

ruthlessness?" (Ibid., p. 37)

He notes that the present trend of economists to force
noneconomic values into their framework through cost anal-
ysis is absurd. It is ridiculous to "measure the immeasur-
able", or to pretend that everything has a price or can be
quantified. Moreover, to measure develOpment in terms of
Gross National Product implies that one who consumes more
is "better off" than one who consumes less, but does not
address the question of what is being consumed.

Schumacher concludes that in order to achieve devel-
opment, other countries must reject imitation of the West
with its mass production, heavy industry, centralized
development planning, and advanced technology. Instead he
advocates a middle-range, "appropriate" level of tech-

nology which responds to the unique needs and resources of

each specific area. This technology would be cheap, allow

 

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equal access to all nations, and maximize the potential
for human creativity. His approach thus tends to empha-
size a more gradual but deep-rooted process which focuses
on education, organization, and discipline - not capital,
foreign aid, or type of infrastructure as the key elements
necessary for development. He recommends that the devel-
oping world not try to "out-capitalize the capitalists",
but instead to "evolve a more democratic and dignified
system of industrial administration, a more human employ-
ment of machinery, and a more intelligent utilization of
the fruits of human ingenuity and effort. If they can do
that, they have the future in their hands."

Another inherent weakness in many of the economic
theories of development is that they only appear to give
lip service to the necessity of bringing about a radical
redistribution of wealth and production resources within
these countries. All too frequently they tend to reinforce
the present system of political, economic, and social in-
equalities rather than attempt to change it. Programs of
agricultural development which stress increases in produc-
tion and the Gross National Product, by their very nature,
primarily assist large farmers and landowners at the
expense of the huge class of farmers at the subsistence
level.

Ilchman and Uphoff are probably correct in arguing

that political and economic development is interdependent

 

 

42

and that it is a useless academic exercise to segmentize
these approaches and discuss them in isolation. At the
same time, however, the problems implicit in Ilchman and
Uphoff's scheme reflect the same biases and weaknesses
found in many of the theories on which their model is
built.

Ilchman and Uphoff's discussion tends to assume that
all factors affecting the developmental process are not
only knowable, but measurable and quantifiable as well.

As noted previously, this is simply not true. They great—
ly underemphasize the importance of historical factors and
random elements, such as the tragic Managuan earthquake of
1972, and the importance these events have upon norms and
values of the people.

It appears somewhat of an intellectual cop-out to note
that "values, norms, historical factors, random occur-
rences, and so forth are important elements affecting
political developments, but we assume that only what is
manifested within some definite time period and impinges
upon political exchange requires measurement and analysis"
(Illchman and Uphoff, 1971; 277). The hatred and frustra-
tion of all classes of Nicaraguan society against the
Somoza regime's handling of the reconstruction effort after
the 1972 earthquake was not manifested through strikes and
uprisings until several years later when widespread general

strikes paralyzed the country for weeks at a time.

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These authors admit that because of "the instrumental
value of resources" (Ibid., p. 50), they cannot be com-
pared in absolute terms. Yet it is precisely this fact
which makes comparison in relative terms equally difficult,
if not impossible. How does one measure the resource of
legitimacy compared to that of censorship or coercion? If
support is given in the form of an IOU, how would one
determine the rate of interest and when and in what form
of final payment will be made? If status equals Y infor-
mation, what does X and Y equal? Even if some type of
rough approximation could be devised, most statesmen and
anti-statesmen have neither the time nor the resources
available to do so.

Moreover, another possible criticism of their approach
is that by attempting to explain and measure everything i
regarding the course of development, in reality they ex-
plain nothing. In other words, they would argue that if a
regime survives for an extended period of time, then it
has successfully managed to balance the exchange of re-
sources, demands, investments, and so on. If the regime
collapses, however, the problem results from its failure
to balance the exchange process, not with the model itself.
It would follow then with regards to Nicaragua that for
over 40 years the Somoza family properly responded by
allocating the regime's resources to the demands exerted

on it by the general population and that this balancing act

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44

broke down in 1979. Such an analysis of the situation in
no way reflects the reality of the oppression and unequal
distribution of resources which characterized Somoza's long
stay in power.

Ilchman and Uphoff also appear incredibly nieve in
their treatment of the relationship between the underdevel—
oped nations and the more developed countries. In diagram-
ing their model, Ilchman and Uphoff position the foreign
sector in the extreme upper left-hand corner (Ibid., p. 43).
Its position and the direction of their arrows implies that
the influence of the foreign sector is relatively unimpor-
tant as compared to that of other sectors. This does not
accurately describe reality, especially among the majority
of developing nations. Foreign sectors frequently demand
more than they give up in the exchange process. The
demands that this sector makes upon the regime often out-
weigh by a large margin those which the regime makes upon
the foreign sector. With regard to most of Latin America,
for example, the foreign sector of the United States should
more properly be portrayed as part of the core combination
group, if not part of the regime itself.

Furthermore, this model clearly reflects a built-in
bias on the part of its authors in favor of the ruling
class. Although they would deny this criticism and instead
allege that this "model of political economy has no conser-

vative bias . . . (that) it is as relevant to a Che Guevara

45

as to an Eduardo Frei", this allegation has little support
in fact. Their model is much more an effort at maintaining
the status quo by advising those in power how to stay there.
It offers little insight for the anti-statesman as to how
the system can be altered.

The key challenge, as Ilchman, Uphoff, and other politi-
ical economists appear to see it, is to avoid extremes.
They view the process of development ”from the top down",
from the perspective of the regime, which in effect for most
of the Third World amounts to oppression. They view human
beings as commodities which must be controlled. They
assume perfect knowledge of the situation and political
equilibrium and that those in power control all means of
violence so that it is not possible for the sectors in the
periphery to make demands on the regime which cannot be met.
Fortunately, as my chapter dealing with the history of
Nicaragua will demonstrate, this does not adequately des-
cribe social and political forces operating in the real

world.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, there appears little doubt that the
various types of conventional theories have in fact con-
tributed to our knowledge of development. Modernization
theories have recently stressed that all countries cannot
be expected to closely follow the historical development of

the United States or Western Europe and have correctly

46

identified many of the obstacles to development. The
psychological and social approaches to development have
isolated for purposes of analysis many of the key individual
and group factors related to development such as religion,
education and occupational experience, as well as document-
ed the central role these elements have played in different
historical periods. Even the political and economic
theories of development, with their heavy emphasis on
" hard", quantifiable data have occasionally facilitated
in the establishment of significant economic growth patterns.
Valuable as these theories may appear in these respects,
however, their effectiveness, especially for the purposes
of my study, remains significantly reduced by their
numerous inherent weaknesses. Modernization theories con-
tinue to stress imitation of the accomplishments of the
"advanced" countries while underemphasizing their exploita-
tion and oppression. They continue to tend to view social
change as inevitably following a gradual unilateral course
of development. Psychological and social theories of
development often still fail to realize that modern values,
attitudes and goals such as those exhibited by the developed
nations can seriously impede as well as facilitate social
change. This perspective, for example, presents an incom-
plete level of conceptualization and does not portray a
realistic picture of the historical determinants and causes

of achievement motivation. The political and economic

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approaches to development refuse to seriously question
whether the types of production and consumption patterns
they so strongly advocate do in fact meet the needs of
lesser developed countries. In short, does it make sense
to try to "out-capitalize the capitalists"? Moreover

what political, economic and social implications do these
types of approaches have for the less fortunate members of
society? As a result of these serious limitations, the
theoretical constructs contained in an alternative field of
thought, that of dependency theory, deserve close examina-

tion.

CHAPTER II

DEPENDENCY THEORY

Dependency theorists disagree with conventional devel-
<nmental theorists concerning both the causes and the cures
fin:underdevelopment. Many conventional theorists, for
example, believe that the causes are primarily internal ob-
stacles such as waste, traditionalism, and over-population,
and the cures are imitation of the West through foreign
financial and technical assistance. Dependency theorists,
on the other hand, often believe that the primary cause of
underdevelOpment is international exploitation and oppres-
sion and that the cure must result from a fundamental change
in the systems of relationships between the developed and
the developing countries.

Neither of these theoretical frameworks can be con-
sidered to accurately describe society unless they can
effectively explain various types of social change. It
Would be incorrect to say that conventional developmental
theorists can never explain change - they can, but the real
QUestion is what type of social change does it explain and
WhY- When some type of change becomes necessary in order
to maintain the present system of international inequali-
ties, such as was the case with Latin America after the
C“ban Revolution, they have successfully supplied a wide
range of developmental schemes. Their theoretical con-
structs encounter serious difficulties, however, when

fOrced to explain other types of social change such as

48

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violence and revolution. Dependency theorists, on the
cmher hand, have made substantial contributions to our
rmderstanding of these social processes.

Furthermore, it remains crucial with any type of re-
search or learning experience to constantly question and
analyze the assumptions implicit in any particular theoret—
ical frame of reference. As noted previously, many conven-
tional theorists tend to assume either implicitly or ex-
plicitly that development follows a continum model of
linear progression. They emphasize an orderly, cumulative,
and stable process of change which often views violent
eruptions as abnormal and unnecessary. Stress is placed
on the importance of consensus, value orientations, inte-
gration, and diffusion as the keys to development. This
clearly reflects a View of the Third World "from the top
down " .

As the following pages will attempt to demonstrate,
dependency theorists tend to observe the social world from
the periphery, from "the bottom up". They argue that the
real social world is composed of social systems which con-
tinue to exist under an asymetrical system of domination
Where superior social actors control subordinates in their
Own class interests. They stress that there cannot be an
equal relationship between unequals. There cannot be
interdependency in the social, political, and economic

eXChanges between and within societies because this assumes

50

a relationship between equals which cannot exist without a
radical restructuring of the present system.

There is not one dependency theory, but a variety of
theoretical constructs which reflect this perspective. It
is impossible in this brief survey of the literature to pre-
sent an analysis of every scholar who has made contributions
in this area or to even touch on all the major figures.
Although dependency theory is often referred to as being at
an infant stage of development, an abundance of material
exists in this area with regard to such topics as over-
population, land reform, agricultural development, and
appropriate technology.

This review of the literature then constitutes but a
tentative excursion into the area. A serious effort has
been made, however, at discussing authors this writer feels
are the most insightful authorities on the subject, espec—
ially with regard to Latin America. An attempt has been
made to summarize their main propositions and arguments and
to briefly critique their positions. Finally, a short dis-
cussion of the most blatant weaknesses of this perspective

will be presented.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Ander Gunther Frank (1967, 1969, 1972) deserved credit
for presenting many of the central themes of "dependistas"

t0 students of this subject in the United States. Frank

51

first utilizes historical case studies of Brazil and Chile
to support his contention that the primary impetus behind
much of Latin America's underdevelopment was the expropri-
ation of the economic surplus by the Center (developed)
powers. He rejects the dualistic interpretation of under-
develOpment so popular among conventional theorists and
correctly points out that the indigenous masses, eVen if
existing at a subsistence level, are fully integrated into
the world capitalist system. He concludes that within this
structural relationship, no process of development is pos—
sible until the links between the metropolis and satellite
nations are ruptured.

In his latter works, Frank reiterates and expands upon
many of these themes. He again argues that capitalism - not
the remnants of feudalism, causes and perpetuates under-
development. He feels that metropolitan-satellite forms of
relationships exist within countries as well as between
them and that the closer historically a country has been to
the metro power, the more underdevelopment it has
experienced.

Frank's analysis derives from at least 4 major hypoth-
eses: that the development of development is strictly lim-
ited by a country's satellite status, that periods of great—
est development have traditionally occurred when the ties
between the metro and satellite nations were weakest, such

as during World Wars I and II and the Depression, that

 

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historically when the metro power recovered from global
setbacks it would terminate and prevent regeneration of any
progress by the satellite country, and that the present
inequitable land tenure systems have commercial, not feudal,
origins.

The primary weaknesses in his argument are that Frank
fails to realize that in many parts of the Third World,
racial contradictions are just as basic as class contradic-
tions. He tends to ignore the social, cultural, and racial
differences which exist independent of class and fails to
acknowledge that historically the greatest changes in Latin
America have frequently derived from the driving force of
racial and ethnic consciousness, not simply from class
antagonisms. Frank also constantly refers to "socialist
development” as the solution to underdevelOpment, yet he
never defines the term nor discusses specifically 22!.it
is to be achieved. His latter work tends to ignore the
historical role of the masses, as well as the potential and
reality of the ripening class consciousness among this seg—
ment of the population. Moreover, he apparently believes
that the national bourgeoisie hold the keys to future
development, but then does not adequately address the prob-
lems of class conflict or why these ruling elites should be
willing to change.

Many other dependency theorists have developed the

ideas discussed by Frank to a fuller extent (see for example

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Furtado, 1964; Cardoza, 1972; Janvry, 1975; Girvan, 1974;
Prebish, 1959). The proposition that much of the surplus
value of the Periphery (underdeveloped nations) has been
siphoned off by Center powers has been extensively docu-
mented. Pierre Jalee (1968, 1969), a French economist,
through analysis of statistical data provided by the United
Nations, estimates that once profits, interest on loans,
and unfair trade practices are taken into consideration,
1.5 times as much aid goes out of the Periphery as comes
in. Dale Johnson provides further statistical data to
support these claims with regard to Central and South
America. While Britain invested 2400 million pounds in
Latin America from 1870 to 1913, she took 4000 million out.
"Between 1950 and 1961, 2962 million dollars of private
U.S. capital flowed into the 7 principle countries of Latin
America, while the return flow was 6875 million dollars. . .
Between the United States and all underdeveloped countries,
the net inflow of private capital E9 the United States,
according to the U.S. Department of Commerce, was 16.6
billion dollars between 1950 and 1965. Latin America's
contribution to this share was 7.5 billion," (Johnson,
1972).

Furthermore, Barnet and Muller (1974) have effectively
demonstrated that international development agencies and
multinational corporations constitute the primary instru-

ments through which the surplus value of the Periphery

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becomes siphoned to the Center powers. They estimate that
between 1960 and 1968, corporations took 79% of their net
profits out of Latin America, with the average rate of pro-
fit during this period ranging over 40%. The host countries
themselves provided 78% of the capital invested in order to
produce these exorbitant profits. Over 50% of the time,

the "transfer of Western technology" consisted of buying up
factories already in Operation, and "modern efficiency"
resulted in using half the labor power for the same volume
of sales as local industry, thus further increasing the
present Depression levels of unemployment. These tendencies
constitute what Frank refers to as the institutionalization

of the development of underdevelopment.

ON THE ROLE OF THE MASSES

Numerous authors have addressed what they perceive as
the role of the masses in development. Regis Debray (1967,
1969), at one stage of his own intellectual development,
forsake the contributions of political parties and mass
educational efforts and believed the guerilla foco should
constitute the equivalent of a revolutionary vanguard to
lead the masses. He regarded securing power through mass
action as a popular myth, kept alive and promoted by
reformist trade unions and political parties. Not only has
no South American county experienced a popular movement

which resulted in revolutionary change, but even if this

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should occur, "the violence with which the people strike
back, 'mass action', is easily dismantled by the enemy's
organized violence," (Debray, 1969; 33).

Many Marxist scholars, theoreticians, and practitioners
have already exposed the numerous deficiencies contained in
Debray's approach, especially with regard to mass partici-
pation in revolutionary activity (Huberman and Sweezy,
1968). Debray himselv later discarded many of his own
positions. In view of the "rags-to-riches success" of the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua, however, it would not be surpris-
ing to see a rebirth of these somewhat romantic ideas.

Until his assasination in 1973, Amilcar Cabral was con-
sidered, like Debray, to be one of the foremost revolution-
ary theoreticians and practitioners in the developing world.
As a leading advocate of Pan Africanism, Cabral caused the
Guinean revolution to attain an importance and influence in
the developing world completely out of proportion to that
country's size and economic strength.

Cabral (1969) adopted Marx's method of historical
analysis and applied it to the unique political, economic,
and socio-cultural conditions of Guines-Bissau. During the
actual revolutionary struggle, he changed from a forced
reliance on the petty bourgeoisie to mass support because
the movement had been given sufficient time to develop its
own future leaders. He constantly stressed the important

role of the masses in any successful revolutionary effort

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and argued that socialism was an ongoing process which no
country could hope to obtain immediately. Whether Guinea's
efforts were labeled Marxist or non-Marxist he felt was a
matter for his critics to debate, not for true freedom
fighters.

Unlike the implications contained in Debray's writings,
Richard Gotts (1972) excellent indepth survey and analysis
of violent resistance movements in Latin America since the
Cuban Revolution conclusive dispels the conventional myth
that the peasantry of the Periphery are a totally passive
group of non-actors who possess little revolutionary poten-
tial and must be led by an elite vanguard. He does not
idealize the possibilities of such struggles, as Debray had
a tendency to do, but Gott does demonstrate that practically
every major Latin American nation has a history of armed
peasant rebellions. In spite of the fact that every revolt
in the last 15 years, with the important exception of the
Nicaraguan effort, has been brutally suppressed, many of
the reforms of the 60's and 70's were a direct response to
these threats.

Gott concludes that the prime objective of the guer-
illas is not to constitute an elite vanguard or create a

revolution, but to create the preconditions for revolution.

 

This vital distinction evolves out of the fact that the
Periphery is not so much ready for revolution as Debray

implied, but that it needs a revolution in order to achieve

57

true development. Moreover, intervention by the Center
powers, the disunity of the Left, and the frequent ignor-
ance of local conditions were the major factors contribut-
ing to the guerillas' failure. (Subsequent chapters in this
dissertation will attempt to demonstrate how each of these
obstacles were successfully overcome in the Nicaraguan revo-
lution.) Gott also maintains that although neither the
peasants nor the urban masses are particularly revolution-
ary, in spite of the unspeakable conditions in which they
live, the most important contribution of the guerillas has
been their continual emphasis on the key role which the
rural masses must play in any effective process of develop-
ment.

Feder (1975) has also attempted to analyze what are
the prospects for the rural masses in the Periphery non-
socialist countries in the immediate future. He sets out
six basic theses. First, that as a result of increasing
populations and expectations and decreasing employment
opportunities, the agricultural economies of these countries
will continue to generate increasing pressures and contra-
dictions which directly threaten to disrupt the present
"disequilibrium balance". Second, that these forces from
the bottom of the social structure will prove less powerful
than the counterforces from the landed and urban elites,
both internal and external, aimed at maintaining the present

system. Third, the Center nations will adopt newer methods

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of control and penetration into the agricultures of the
Periphery. Feder notes, for example, that in Brazil since
1964 alone, over 32 million hectares of land have been pur-
chased either by U.S. citizens or corporations and that
this constitutes almost 4% of the total land in Brazil and
over 10% of all farm land.

Feder's fourth thesis is that due to the restraints of
the capitalist system, these nations will focus on solving
the relatively superficial problems of agricultural produc-
tion rather than address the more crucial socio-political
problems. This will occur primarily through greater em-
phasis on colonization programs, modernization of large
landholdings, and pseudo-agrarian reform projects. Fifth,
that it is practically certain that at lease one or two
countries will attempt a radical change in the present
social structure, such as Cuba in 1959 and Chile in 1969.
Nicaragua in 1979 became one of these trailblazers. The
success of these efforts will be determined not only by the
responses of the Center powers, but also by whether these
reforms also affect other sectors of the economy, such as
the banking and export sectors. Finally, Feder concludes
that in light of the present mass poverty and unemployment,
even the most radical and far reaching reforms will have
little effect on eliminating these problems in the early

years of the programs.

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Other dependency theorists have visualized a much more
limited role for the rural masses in the struggle to achieve
true economic and political freedom. Thus, for example,
Galtung (1971) regards the peasants as somewhat passive non-
actors in his structural scheme. Frank, as previously
noted, originally placed his hOpe for constructive change
primarily with the elite and the middle class of the peri-
phery itself. Dale Johnson, in his essay, "On Oppressed
Classes" (1972), continues this trend to a disturbing de-
gree. His basic proposition is that different concepts
such as "marginal underclasses" or "internal colonies" pro-
vide helpful tools for understanding the dynamics of class
relations and conflict under capitalism. He distinguishes
colonies from social classes on the grounds that "internal
colonies possess a more differentiated social structure. . .
(and) possess a culture distinct to the race that transcends
the boundaries of class structures". He then goes on to
imply that only limited hOpe exists for the peasant masses
because, "Conditions of life among the underclasses are such
that it is probably that underclasses will never form the
vanguard of the revolutions." (Emphasis added). What John-
son fails to realize is that although there are different
methods of domination depending on the specific group, race,
and country involved, the final products of the capitalistic
system remain the same. While race remains an important

contradiction which often transcends class, in terms of the

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overall effects of the oppression and exploitation generated
by the system, the similarities between the Latino campesino
and the Indian peasant greatly outweigh any of these real

or artificial distinctions imposed by sociologists. The
analytical value of such dichotomies must be balanced
against the divisions this creates within the peasant class
itself and the practical barriers this erects against the
creation of effective class movements.

Moreover, in dismissing the revolutionary potential of
this "newly discovered underclass", Johnson appears guilty
of the same condescending bias so frequently found with
many liberal social scientists. He refers to himself as a
"playwright-protagonist (controlling) the political drama
of the modern world" and then goes on to the weary but nec-
essary task of consciousizing the poor, underprivileged
masses. Unfortunately Johnson never st0ps to critically
evaluate his own level of consciousness or to consider that
such analytical concepts as "marginal underclasses" or
"internal colonies" may well serve to confuse rather than
clarify social reality. While his approach may have anal-
ytical value in certain limited cases, eSpecially with
regard to Africa, it also provides the potential for assist-
ing the Center nations in their strategy of dividing and
controlling the Periphery.

In contrast to Frank, Debray, and Johnson, Rodolfo

Stavenhagen (1975) provides one of the most insightful

61

analysis to date regarding the problems of dependency and
the role of the rural masses in reaching solutions to the
problem. Stavenhagen does not exgxmd any simplistic ans-
wers to these questions nor construct another theoretical
model which merely describes segments of the whole. He
does adopt a historical perspective in his analysis and at
least flirts with the possibilities this holds for raising
class consciousness through class conflict.

Stavenhagen quickly dismisses the prevalent myths
of conventional theorists that the Periphery can imitate the
economic development of the Center nations, that indicators
of growth such as yearly increases in GNP accurately reflect
a true process of development, or that underdevelopment can
be clearly understood as anything but a necessary element
in the growth and continuity of global capitalism. Yet he
stresses that the forces which maintain the present system
of inequality and oppression are also internally based and
that any chance of achieving a process of true development
would require a radical shift in the class structures of the
Periphery nations themselves. Most importantly, Staven-
hagen demonstrates that the study of social classes is re-
quired, not simply to describe stratification as most
sociological studies have traditionally done, but in order
to come to grips with the social dynamics which make a

change in social structure possible.

62

Classes must be defined and analyzed in terms of their
relations with each other. Under capitalism, for example,
the most basic relationship is the expropriation of the
surplus value from the working classes, whether industrial
or agricultural, by the capitalist class. Stavenhagen's
brief but apt historical survey illustrates how capitalism
transformed the social structures of many of the Periphery
nations in order to impose this type of relationship on
the indigenous population and, in the process, created the
basis for the present class structures. Whether it was the
Agni of the Ivory Coast, the Indians of Guatemala and
Mexico, or the Incas of Peru, after an initial phase of
barbaric plunder, the EurOpeans were eventually forced to
impose such foreign concepts as private ownership of the
land and commercial cropping and wage labor in order to
insure the flow of surplus. This exploitation, whether it
occurred in direct form, such as with coffee, sugar cane,
or cocoa, or more indirect form, as with the peasants'
production of basic foodstuffs to supply the labors who ex-
tracted raw materials, eventually helped to serve as a
basis for the industrialization of the Center powers and
today directly contributes to their present artificially
high and socially wasteful standard of living.

Perhaps the primary weakness with Stavenhagen's pre-
sentation, as with many scholars in this area, concerns his

failure to fully explore the issue of class consciousness.

63

While he does note that class consciousness is the vital
element necessary to transform a class "in itself" into a
class "for itself", he spends little time exploring specif-
ically how this consciousness may be attained by the pea-
sant masses. His historical analysis clearly traces the
bloody stream of capitalist Oppression and the tragic con-
sequences which followed in its wake. He does observe
that, "It has been estimates in New Spain alone the popu-
lation decreased from around 30 million at the beginning of
the 15th century to 1 million a century and a half later;
and in Peru the population declined by about 50% within 30
years of the conquest." Yet he does not trace the history
of the resistance of the rural masses to this exploitation
which made such overt control necessary and which was fre-
quently much stronger than commonly acknowledged.
Stavenhagen also fails to explore why violent peasant
movements such as the Mexican and Bolivian revolutions
failed to change the structure of class relationships
despite their military successes, nor what lessons this
holds for the future. Although his discussion intention-
ally choses to focus on the internal dynamics of the Peri—
phery nations, any meaningful change in the class structures
of these nations will have international repercussions.
Stavenhagen states that a complete understanding of social
classes in agrarian societies cannot be based on the village

or even the nation state level, but must be viewed in terms

64

of an international capitalistic framework. While this is
implicit throughout his essay, he never fully explores the
ripple effects that successful peasant movements would have
on the Center nations themselves. After the tragic lesson
of Chile, it remains a very real question whether the Center
nations will permit internal shifts in the class structure
even by peaceful democratic processes. It may well evolve
that Nicaragua will be the next testing ground for this

issue in Latin America.

OTHER REFRACTIONS FROM
THE PRISM OF DEPENDENCY
Numerous other authors have viewed the prism of depend-

ency from a variety of angles. Galtung (1971) perceives
global inequalities as the result Of the unequal structural
relationship between the Center nations and the Periphery
nations SEQ between the Center and the Periphery within each
nation. Although, as with many dependency theorists,
Galtung occasionally Operates at an excessively abstract
and general level of analysis, he does manage to supply
valueable insights into the international system Often
overlooked by both conventional and dependency theorists.
He repeatedly emphasizes that although the Third World may
have been nndeveloped, it never was nndnndeveloped - this

Occurred as a direct result of imperialism.

65

Imperialism is not merely an international system of
exploitation as "vulgar dependistas" so frequently assume,
but is intra-national as well. The Center nation becomes
able to pacify its own periphery or lower classes to a
degree that would be otherwise impossible through expropri-
ating the raw materials and surplus value of the vast peri-
phery within the Periphery nations. Lenin (1929, 1939,
1968) originally expounded on this theme and maintained that
this extortion of the surplus from the Peripheries allowed
the capitalist countries to co-Opt and pacify their own
proletariat who in effect now sought a larger slice of the
capitalist's pie instead of a radical redistribution of the
wealth between the rich and the poor.

Through this strategy of divide and conquer, Galtung
argues, the Center nations have developed a centralization
of trade, commodities, and price regulation which provides
an indirect but powerful system of control. Even more
importantly, this system of exploitation and control has
developed to such a degree that overt violence and force
is Often no longer necessary. While acknowledging the 3
most commonly discussed forms of imperialism - economic,
political, and military - Galtung also discusses the equally
effective but Often overlooked types of control found in
cultural and communication imperialism, especially as chan-
neled through the guise of foreign aid and technical assist-

ance as provided by organizations such as the World Bank

66

and the United States Agency for International Development.

THE "PROBLEM" OF SURPLUS

James O'Connor (1973) adopts Baran And Sweezy's con-
cept Of economic surplus (1966) and identifies the absorp-
tion and reinvestment of this surplus as a basic motivation
behind imperialism. His analysis clearly demonstrates that
imperialism must exist for capitalism to survive as we know
it today. Ironically, however, this same system continues
to generate the increasingly serious contradictions Of cap-
italism. Instead of absorbing the surplus, the network of
capitalistic relations between the Center and Periphery
nations actually increases it. O'Connor also stresses the
importance of the intranational forces behind imperialism.
Rather than view the center of the Periphery as a group of
passive actors as Jalee implies, or as a revolutionary
force for change as Frank originally prOposed, O'Connor
accurately portrays them as active, willing partners in
the exploitation of their own periphery.

Petras and LaPorte (1970) also maintain that it is
impossible to achieve a true understanding of development
in Latin America without first addressing the role Of the
United States, the major Center power in the Western Hemis-
phere. They Observe that the Official developmental policy
Of the United States since the time Of Kennedy has been to

emphasize increased production, improved technology and

67

cultivation practices, the protection of existing property
rights, and the colonization of public lands. Not only has
this "modernization from above" approach failed to signifi-
cantly raise agricultural production to the level of re-
ducing food imports, but it has actually increased the in-
equalities and misery of the rural masses. Practically
every country in Latin America, after a brief rise in pro-
duction in the mid-sixties, ended up producing less food
per capita and importing more than when the decade began.
The United States has been successful, however, in
achieving its primary objective of establishing and support-
ing counterrevolutionary alliances among the Periphery's
elites and thus maintaining and expanding its degree of
political and economic penetration. One of the leading
Latin American dependency theorists has concluded that this
trend will continue until the masses of Latin America become
mobilized behind national values and ideals and develop a
system Of economic integration based on regional, not multi-

national, needs and interests (Celso, 1969).

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF DEPENDENCY

Unlike most dependency theorists, George L. Beckford
(1972) recognizes the deep psychological effects created by
the heritage of dependency and the obstacles this erects
against building an effective process of self-determination

and development. He also is one Of the few scholars in this

68

area who has acknowledged and explored the critical role of
racism as a primary motivating force behind the development
Of underdevelopment. Although Beckford focuses on what he
defines as the "plantation economies" in the Periphery,
which encompass the American South, the Brazilian Northeast,
and the Caribbean lowlands, much of his discussion can be
extended to the Periphery as a whole. In a very real sense,
the entire Third World can be viewed as a plantation system
which is farmed for the benefit of the Center powers.

Beckford notes that despite "constitutional" as Opposed
to "political" independence and ambitious modernization pro-
grams, Periphery nations have failed to break out of the
cycle of underdevelopment. One key reason for this failure
are the restraints created by the psychological legacy of
dependency on the minds of the Periphery's peoples. The
history Of the black people in the United States and Africa
clearly demonstrates that legal independence or economic
growth alone do not remove the psychological and social
scars of the plantation system (Fanon, 1967, 1968).

Beckford also attacks many of the traditional schemes
for modernizing the plantation system. He observes, for
example, that one of the most frequently cited types of
development under the plantation system is the taming of
previously wild and uncultivated areas. This approach Often
receives widespread popularity with conventional theorists.

Yet Beckford's own analysis concludes that the prime

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69

characteristic Of plantations' land use is the underutili-
zation of land rather than its development. Plantations
claim large tracts Of potential farm acreage not to culti-
vate it, but to prevent others from doing so. Feder (1971)
utilized the same data source as Beckford, statistics pub-
lished by the Inter-American Committee for Agricultural
Development, to prove that fully 5/6 of all land owned by
large landowners has never been transformed from its origi-
nal state. Clearly such contradictory land use policies
impede rather than facilitate development.

The most basic evil of the plantation system, however,
is its tendency to use race as the basis for dividing
society into class divisions. While other factors such as
education, income, or occupation may slightly temper the
overall effect of one's racial heritage, Beckford maintains
that race itself remains one Of the key determinents of
class and caste in every plantation society in the world.
It is this racism, backed by "the colonized condition of
the minds of the people", which constitutes the most in-
tractable problem Of plantation societies. Eliminating this
psychological heritage of dependency is the precondition of
all preconditions for accomplishing revolutionary change and

development.

SYNTHESIZING THE DEPENDENCY LITERATURE

Although dependency can be discussed from a variety of
perspectives, there are a few strands of agreement which lace
together many of the theorists in this area. Several years
ago, Chilcote (1974) undertook a critical synthesis Of the
dependency literature. His discussion primarily focused
on the contributions made by Latin American theorists such
as Cardosa, Dos Santos, Vasconi, and Frank. Chilcote notes
that each of these theorists, with the exception of Frank,
believes that some type of limited autonomous capitalistic
development is possible within the dependency framework.
Each also maintains, however, that true develOpment which
reaches all segments of society is impossible until the
present structure of relations between the Periphery and
the Center nations is radically altered.

There are at least 3 basic propositions which all
dependistas hold in common. First, that the poverty Of the
rural areas cannot be adequately explained through the tra-
ditional diffusion model which regards the "dualistic"
character of the developing nations as the primary obstacle
to development. Second, that the basic capitalistic rela-
tionship between the rural and urban areas is commerce be-
tween landowners and merchants and that this remains
determined and controlled by the forces of national and
international capitalism. Third, that the center's class
interests are dependent on global imperialism as the pri-

mary source Of their manufactured goods and capital, and

70

71

thus to dissolve this system of dependency is in direct
conflict with their vested interests.

Chilcote also briefly summarizes the main propositions
Of several principle theorists in this area. Frank stresses
that development remains impossible under the present sys-
tem and that the development of underdevelopment will con-
tinue until the ties of dependency are cut. Dos Santos
emphasizes that dependency is not static, but takes on dif-
ferent forms and methods of exploitation relative to various
historical periods. The present dependency he labels
"technological-industrial" dependency and is determined by
the investments, exports, and sales of multinational cor-
porations. Cardosa, on the other hand, feels that it is
naive and oversimplifying the situation to say that nO in-
ternal develOpment or dynamism exists under imperialism.
Yet he does agree that global capitalism severely restricts
the developmental potential Of the Periphery.

Since dependency theory remains at an infant stage,
these and other competing perspectives and interpretations
will continue to be debated for some time. Although it has
become somewhat of a sociological cliche to say more re-
search is needed, the fact remains that the most pressing
task at hand for the present generation of sociologists is
to undertake research and historical studies which will
empirically test and verify or alter the theory. Hopefully

the instant case study of a silo-building project in

72

Nicaragua represents another small step in this direction.

SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE
OP DEPENDENCY THEORY

As with most valuable additions of knowledge in the
social sciences, dependency theory raises as many questions
as it answers. Many authors on the subject have success-
fully identified and documented the primary causes of under-
development. This in itself is a worthwhile insight Often
overlooked by more conventional theorists. Yet after iden-
tifying the causes, many dependency theorists fail to ade-
quately address the problem of what to do about it.

It is completely naive to imply, as Frank did in his
early writings, that development will automatically follow
the severing of relations with the Center powers. Implicit
in O'Connor's analysis is the idea that capitalism and im-
perialism contain the seeds of their own self-destruction.
Resolving the inherent contradiction of surplus absorption
within the framework of capitalism remains, according to
him, the "herculean task" facing the capitalist countries
in the future. Yet at the same time he notes that, "the
surplus absorption capacity Of satellite countries . . . is
for practical purposes unlimited." O'Connor also perceives
a much more militant expansive role for the United States
in the future, but fails to fully discuss the distinct

possibility that the indirect methods of control increas-

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ingly exercised by Center nations may well make such tactics
unnecessary.

While admittedly providing many rich, specific hypo-
theses for future research, a major deficiency of many de-
pendency theorists is their high level of generalization and
abstraction. Their analyses Often tend to be too specula-
tive and unreliable when it comes down to the concrete
problem of drawing up future strategies for aborting the
present structural relationships. Galtung argues that
democracy can be regarded as the structural condition be-
hind those exercising control over the Periphery nations.

In the tradition of Lenin, he reasons that, since a greater
number Of people in the Center nations benefit from the
present structure, they will be less willing to change it
and that, "this will make it even less likely that the
periphery in the Center will really join with the periphery
in the Periphery against the two centers." Unfortunately
while this analysis makes sense in the abstract, Galtung
presents no concrete data or specific information to
support this contention.

It is highly debatable to what extent the tainted
fruits Of the poisonous tree of imperialism actually filter
down to the Center's periphery. It appears even less likely
that much of the Center's population actually realizes the
true source of their relatively high standard of living.

Furthermore, there have been numerous examples of at least

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attempts at forming alliances between the two peripheries.
The opposition to the war in Vietnam and the black libera-
tion movement Of the 60's might be interpreted in this
direction. The mass propaganda increasingly churned out by
the Center reflects its interest in continually camouflaging
the reality of the situation rather than an attempt to
convince their periphery that imperialism also benefits
them.

Other recommendations for change frequently tend to
directly conflict with or inadequately address the reality
of the present situation. Clearly, redistribution of the
surplus is a necessary but not sufficient solution. This
must also be accompanied by changes in both the interna-
tional and intranational systems of relationships. Yet
what remains to be resolved is what will serve as the im-
petus for this change and how it specifically will be car-
ried out. Superior technology and more efficient means of
global communication do, in fact, permit effective patterns
Of indirect control, and multinational corporations control
these resources. Yet specifically how does the Periphery
go about developing effective methods of appropriate tech-
nology or find the resources to develop a global system of
news services and communications? International and intra-
national cOOperation between the two levels Of peripheries
is a clear necessity, but to merely state the Obvious adds

little positive stimulus to the task at hand. If it is true

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that the center of the Peripheries has the most to lose in
any real change in the structure, why should they choose
the side of their own periphery against the Center? How
does one correctly distinguish between programs which lay
the groundwork for effective social change in this area and
those which merely serve to reform and thus perpetuate the
present system?

Beckford Observes that there exists a "multiplier
effect" inherent in the plantation system. In short, he
believes that greater investment, production, and income
should continue to generate more of the same and help create
real economic growth in the develOping countries in the
future. Yet such economic abstractions bear disturbing
similarity to myths such as Rostow's "stages of development"
and also appear to contadict reality. This model assumes
that the surplus remains within the Periphery nation, not
expropriated as is the case under the present system of
global capitalism. Historically both the relative and ab-
solute incomes Of the Center nations have multiplied.

Barnet and Muller documented that the average income Of a
North American is 7 times that Of a Latin American and grows
10 times as fast. There is little wonder that, according
to United Nations' statistics, in 1900 the per capita in-
come Of the poorer nations was half that of the rich, but

by 1970 had decreased to 1/20 of that of the rich.

76

As most dependency theorists repeatedly stress, the
dependency relationship has existed for a long time and
there are clear reasons for it. From a Marxian perspective,
international expansion and exploitation are not simply
evil, but are vitally necessary for the survival of a glo-
bal system Of capitalism. On the other hand, if one adopts
the position of such authors as Frank and Johnson, that any
Periphery country would be better off cutting all ties with
the Center power, one then by implication assumes that a
radical redistribution of the internal wealth will occur,
which in turn implies that the ruling elites will either
be changed or destroyed.

One crucial issue, as always, is can a country develop
in isolation? What are Nicaragua's chances today of plow-
ing a furrow towards development without becoming another
Cuba? How unique and exceptional is the China experience?
While develOpment without outside influence appears at least
theoretically possible, is it worth the sacrifice in terms
Of time and human suffering? These factors must be bal-
anced against the reality that no foreign aid or technical
assistance has arrived yet without some type of strings
attached.

Cartels, regionalism, and isolation all present pos-
sible solutions. Yet more importantly, less emphasis needs
to be placed on studying the leaders and programs Of devel-

Oping nations and more stress placed on the people and their

77

resistance to dependency. One must avoid seeing "the
masses" as irrational, passive actors as Frank, Johnson,
Galtung, and others tend to portray them. Historical
analysis Often reveals that the people, not their leaders,
have been the primary force for change. People are not
usually irrational, but often do what appears "irrational"
based on another's perspective. Any solution must ulti-
mately be reduced to a question of power. Power is not a
sufficient condition for achieving development, but it is a
necessary one.

Whether or not most sociologists admit or are aware
of the fact, much of social science in general, and conven-
tional theory in particular, has constituted an academic
mask for the class interests Of the Center nations. Depen—
dency theorists, however, have also viewed the world through
ideologically tinted glasses. Stavenhagen's discussion of
class and race and Beckford's repeated references to Cuban
model are clear examples of this. It is not necessary to
ignore or underemphasize race in order to undertake a reli-
able analysis Of class conflict. Social and cultural dif—
ferences do exist independent of class; but race contradic-
tions are Often as basic as class contradictions. It is
grossly naive to attempt to eliminate one type of Oppression
by ignoring the other. From a historical perspective, race
or ethnic consciousness has frequently constituted the

spearhead in these societies for initiating the farthest

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reaching social changes.

Thus, many of the perplexing questions generated by
dependency theorists remain to be resolved. What do ab-
stract terms such as "social develOpment" and "revolution-
ary change" mean in the real world? How does this differ
from concepts such as "modernization" and "growth without
develOpment"? What values and assumptions are implicit in
all such generalizations? What is meant by the psycholog-
ical heritage of dependency and how can vague concepts such
as class consciousness become an effective tool at elimi-
nating it?

Beckford was probably correct when he labeled the
psychological heritage of dependency as the greatest ob-
stacle towards achieving a process of true human develop-
ment. Yet it must not be forgotten that the center of the
Periphery has been the most infectedwith this psychological
disorder, perhaps incurably so. As a result Of "education",
the upper classes of many countries have incorporated the
values and norms Of the dominant powers to such an extent
that they are now "more British than the British". They
Often assume that the Center's way of life is vastly
superior and begin to regard their own styles and traditions
as backward and useless. The numerous expensive North
American styled shOpping malls built by the Somoza regime
after the 1972 earthquake, while hundreds of thousands of

Nicaraguans remained homeless, is but one blatant example

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79

of this derangement.
At the same time, however, the dualistic description
and interpretation of societies in the Periphery must

clearly be rejected. The masses of Africa, Latin America,

and Asia are by no means excluded from the global system of
capitalism, but remain a vitally important part of it.

Their subsistent level of existence and labor makes possible
a significant percentage of the artificially high standard
of living found in the Center nations. It is this oppres-

sion and inherent contradiction which continues tO plant

the seeds Of future revolutionary change. Furthermore, as

Beckford has again so eruditely observed, because Of their

lack Of social mobility, "the least colonized minds are to

be found among the lowest ranks Of the social order.
Theznein lies the greatest potential for a revolutionary
break with the existing system."

lfirom.a practical Or strategical point of view then,
dependency theory does not lay down a set blueprint of
future: tactical maneuvers. On the one hand, it appears
somewhat elitist for social scientists to even consider it
their txask alone to proclaim such a strategy. On the other
hand, tKD deliberately ignore the dilemma of addressing what
Step3 are necessary for transforming the present structural

relationship remains a clear vote in support of the status

quo.

 

 

 

 

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80

Obviously no one solution exists with regard to chang-
ing the status quo; there are no easy answers or predeter—
mined "practical" solutions. Effort must continually be
made at differentiating between simple economic growth and
true social development. The effects of capitalism and
dependency on the individual must continually be explored.
Obviously, humans somehow manage to adapt to even the most
wretched conditions of exploitation and oppression - but
what are the long-run consequences of such adaptions? At
the very least, what must be done is to study historically
the roots Of the exploitation in each unique set of social
and economic conditions and then hopefully, through this
greater understanding, to stimulate the inter-dynamics of
this class conflict. Although everyone is not a guerilla,
each of us must help to "grease the cotton" in our own
occupations and personal lives so that a spark will ignite
these conflicts and contradictions once they converge.

In the final analysis then, the system of relations
which presently exists between the Center and the Periphery
did not result simply from foreign policy positions freely
adOPted by the Center nations. Marx and others have demon—
Strated that expansion, accumulation, and exploitation are
necessary for the very survival of capitalism. The budding
SYStem of state capitalism must continue to extract the

Perlphery's raw materials and consolidate its political

con . . . .
tr01 there. This 18 necessary, in part, in order to

 

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81

pacify their own populations through creation and perpetu-

ation Of their artificially high and grossly wasteful stand-

ard of living. In one sense then, the most difficult task

of modern students of dependency is to convince the Center's
people Of the reality Of this situation and to assist them
in determining where their true human interests lie. From
this perspective it is we who possess the greatest colo-

nized, alienated minds and who represent the greatest

Obs tacles to development .

CHAPTER III
STEPS TOWARD CREATING EFFECTIVE CHANGE:
THE WORKS OF GORZ, FRIERE, AND
NORMATIVE SPONSORSHIP THEORY
The works of Andre Gorz (1967) and Paulo Friere (1968,

1978) provide solutions to the dilemmas left unanswered by

many dependency theorists. Gorz argues that modern capi—

talism, while creating a system of domination under which
most individuals have no control over many facets of their
lives, has also produced conditions, which under certain
circumstances, can eventually lead to the transformation of
the present structure of social and economic relationships.
Friere provides even greater insight into these issues by

spenzifically and concretely addressing the crucial concept
of 'Hconsciousness". He attempts to define in practical
terms what is meant by this abstraction and how the process
of developing it can be undertaken. Furthermore, as the
follrnving pages will attempt to demonstrate, it is this
writer's opinion that Normative Sponsorship Theory, the
theoretical model used as the backbone to this research,
provides at least one possible analytical tool for evaluat-
ing Whether a developmental program does in fact supply the

seeds 0f change or merely constitutes another of the fre-

quently meaningless efforts at providing more of the same.

82

GORZ'S EFFORT AT IDENTIFYING
NON-REFORMIST REFORMS
Andre Gorz, a French economist and philosopher, has

primarily directed his writings to the problems of the

Western European working class. Yet his discussion of how

change can occur in modern industrial societies also sup-

plies valueable contributions to the analysis of many Of

the dilemmas faced by the Periphery. Like Cardosa, Gorz

maintains that it is incorrect to maintain that no dyna-
mism or development is possible within the framework of

capitalism and that terrorism or violent revolution are the

only practical alternatives. Gorz does not make specific

predictions regarding the future of the capitalist system,
but rather identifies tendencies which are open to change
in response tO shifting material and social relationships.
TO a certain extent, the oppressive restraints bemoaned by
many dependistas are only as unchangeable or "institution-
alized" as the nations of the Periphery continue tO make
them.

Gorz maintains that achieving a democratic socialist
5°CietY in which individuals exercise control over their
lives and labor remains a long-term process which must be
attaCked on various levels. He explores the tactics and
strategy considerations necessary to begin the transition
to d"31"0C31‘zatic socialism by the modern working classes and
argues tZhat the motivations behind these tactics are the

qualltatiVe needs created by the advanced capitalism which

83

84

have blunted the more quantitative needs of the past.
While there are clear and important differences between
the tactical considerations of the unionized workers in
industrialized nations and peasant movements in Latin

America, to a certain extent the underlying blueprint re-

mains the same. TO have a successful socialist movement,

individuals must often strive for "intermediate Objectives"
.as part of the process for approximating the new alterna-
‘tive model of society. As the chapter discussing the
liistory of Nicaragua will attempt to demonstrate, this was
Exarhaps the central tactical consideration facing the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

Gorz's discussion Of reformist movements appears
especially useful in this regard. He begins by distin-
guishing between "non-reformist" and "reformist" reforms.
A reformist reform is one which "subordinates its Objec-
tives to the criteria of rationality and practicality of a
given: system and policy". It will oppose any change which
threatens the existence Of the present system. A main
finding of this research is that the AID designed silo
project in Nicaragua was in reality a reformist reform.

A non-reformist reform, on the other hand, is basic-

ally an anti-capitalistic reform. It is not restricted to

the perimeters of the capitalistic system, but attempts to
mlfill and respond to the full range Of human needs and

Potentials. It asks, for example, not only what crops and

85

products are being cultivated and produced, but nnn_the
individuals involved with the labor process will produce
them.

Demands for nonreformist reforms retain the potential
for unifying the working class through the education and
mobilization which the struggle for such reforms will
entail. These are not simply more demands for a higher
Inourly wage or more fringe benefits, but radical efforts
tn: increase class consciousness and permit worker control
(Jf the labor process and the social reasons for which it
eicists. This strategy repeatedly emphasizes that achieving

class consciousness and worker control is a process involv-

ing many short-range goals and numerous future defeats, but

the overall perspective remains unaltered. In the end an

ixuiividual's labor, whether farmer or factory worker, would
no longer be a mere commodity to be bought and sold on the
market place according to capitalist manipulation Of supply
and demand. Instead, one's labor will become a vital part
Of‘huunan development; it will belong to the individual
workers, and its social use will be determined and con-
trolled by them alone.

Ckbrz's essay remains valuable because Of the import-
ance i1: places on delineating what specific tactics should
be adopted in an effort tO raise both individual and class
consciousness. He does not provide ready-made answers on

how to achieve an alternative model of society, but designs

86

a viable framework within which these issues can be de-
bated. Serious questions remain regarding how to distin-
guish reformist from nonreformist reforms in a variety of
concrete situations. What are the specific conditions
necessary for implementation of non-reformist as Opposed
to reformist reforms? Who will define what is "socially
necessary"; what specific criteria will govern the dis-
tribution Of goods and services? Not only who decides
what is grown or produced must be a major decision, but
what will be the organizational process through which
these decisions can be reached? Unfortunately once again
these are questions which many dependency theorists fail

to even explore.

PAULO FRIERE'S PEDAGOGY WITH THE PERIPHERY

Paulo Friere's practical and theoretical insight con-
tansamany of the strengths found in Gorz's work and few
of its weaknesses. This is especially true Of his later
works. Friere's writings are clear testimony to his maxim
that human education and development is an ongoing process
of change. Thus he views humans and their physical world
as existing in a dialectical relationship in which they
are both constantly changing and being changed.

The germs of Friere's approach to development were
contained in his doctoral dissertation written in 1959 at

the University of Recife in Brazil. His method was

87

extensively used in the early '60's in northeastern Brazil
as part of an effective literacy program. It met with
such success that Friere was briefly imprisoned and then
requested in 1964 to leave the country by the military
junta. He then traveled to and worked in Chile where his
method was adapted to the agrarian reform program until
the overthrow Of Allende. Friere was later invited by the
leftist military junta in Peru to assist in developing and
expanding a literacy program in that country as part Of
the Peruvian revolution's effort to "build a new man". He
also worked extensively in Guinea-Bissau in an attempt to
assist the Cabral government develOp a widespread grass
roots literacy campaign.

Each of these countries adapted and modified his
approach to fit its own unique set of circumstances.
Friere Observed that this flexibility remains vital if the
process of conscientization is to occur. "What our past
and present experiences teach us is that they cannot ever
be simply transplanted. They can and must be explained,
discussed, and critically understood by those whose prac-
tice is in another context. In that new context they will
be valid only to the degree that they are 'reinvented'."
(Friere, 1978; 74)

One Of Friere's central themes is the dialetic between
action and reflection, between context and consciousness.

His own experiences and writings clearly reflect this

88

process. Friere's earliest work in English, Pedagogy of

 

the Oppressed, stressed his belief that every human being

 

no matter how poor, uneducated, or oppressed, retains the
potential for critically viewing and understanding his or
her reality. Yet at the same time, Friere himself in this
early work failed to critically examine and discuss the
underlying structure of class relations in Brazilian
society. This lack Of depth in his analysis, as well as
his tendency to imply that urbanization and industriali—
zation interact to produce a richer environment for the
conscientization process, has been cited by some of his
critics as a major weakness. (Borndt, 1978; Martin, 1975)

In his most recent English work, however, Pedagogy in

 

Process, Friere rectifies these earlier deficiencies. He
repeatedly emphasizes that discovering and theorizing
about reality is not the same as transforming it. He
argues that the development Of class consciousness must
accompany individual consciousness, and without this union,
true humanization remains impossible. Like Gorz, Arono-
witz (1973), and others, he maintains that the working
class must transform itself from a class in itself into a
class for itself. He believes that this vital transition
cannot occur simply through the conscientization of humans
acting alone or through individual self-fulfillment, but
must be grounded in a change in the political and economic

system and by transforming the present mode of production.

ESE

89

Friere has also removed from his later writings any
taint of the modernization school Of development. He now
regards development on the local and rural community
levels as more important and feels that this is where the
most effective militants are to be found. He noted that,

"We have Observed that the intellectual
level, the teachers in a training semi-
nar may accept totally our analysis of
the literacy education Of adults as a
creative act . . . In actual practice,
however, many of these teachers are
conditioned by their class position

and by the myths of their superiority

in relation to the peasants and workers."

(1978; 80)
Friere goes on to Observe that,

"Some Of the best experiments I have
seen were those in Chile where we had
as educators young Chilean peasants
who, when they were trained, revealed
indisputable efficiency. They worked
in rural areas, participating in pro-
duction, which was not for them some-
thing vague. They were a group of
people who were not dreaming of how
they could be urbanized. Their dreams
were fully identified with those of
their community."

(Ibid., p. 82)
Friere is most strongly identified with the process
Of conscientization. I was first introduced to this con-
cept in Nicaragua as a Peace Corps volunteer in 1972. At
that time several radical priests had patterned community

development programs after Friere's method in northeast

90

Brazil and had agreed to extend their efforts to the Peace
Corps volunteers interested in giving it a try. The
rationale behind the program with the volunteers was that
we could scarcely help to develop the political, social,
and economic consciousness of the Nicaraguan campesinos
when our own critical consciousness was so grossly
underdeveloped.

The majority of Peace Corps volunteers were white
middle-class, recent college graduates, who firmly be-
lieved that they were there to help and enlighten the
Nicaraguans and show them the "proper" way to live. Most
Of the volunteers, as well as many of the other interna-
tional development specialists I met, failed to under—
stand then as they still do now that:

"Authentic help means that all who are
involved help each other mutually,
growing together in the common effort
to understand the reality which they
seek to transform. Only through such
praxis — in which those who helped

and those who are being helped help
each other simultaneously - can the
act of helping become free from the
distortion in which the helper dominates
the helped. For this reason there can
be no real help between dominating and
dominated classes, nor between 'imper-
ial' and so-called 'dependent' socie-
ties. These relationships can never
be understood except in light Of class
analysis."

(Ibid)

91

It is significant that each of the priests who seriously
attempted to implement Friere's work in Nicaragua were
either ejected from the country by force by the Guardia
or were not permitted to return once they had left on
their own.

Friere states that literacy, education, health pro-
jects, and, for that matter, grain storage projects to be
effective cannot be applied mechanically. It is not sim-
ply a process of rotely memorizing the mechanics of read-
ing and writing nor Of building sophisticated grain drying
and storage facilities. These actions are political acts
which involve political decisions which must be based on
consideration Of the material conditions in society, the
means of production, and a new concept of distribution
based on people's needs rather than the profit motive.
Friere repeatedly argues that the revolutionary activists
or militants of the middle class must cOmmit "class
suicide" and be reborn as revolutionary workers if
Periphery nations are to achieve national liberation.

Friere also maintains that there is a radical differ-
ence between the violence Of the Center powers and the

violence of the Periphery. The violence Of the Oppressor

is necessary to maintain the exploitation and domination

92

implicit in a dependency relationship. The violence Of

the oppressed, however, is a means for eliminating violence
through the revoluntionary transformation of the oppressive
reality.

Friere is obviously well aware Of the harsh realities
and difficult decisions facing many dependent nations. He
realizes, fOr example, that capital accumulation is an in-
dispensable part Of any national developmental program.

Yet he agrees with Cabral that a country which strives to
achieve a democratic socialism must reject consumerism and
be much more than simply a capitalist society without cap-
italists. In such a society, production must be determined
by the well being of the entire society, not the narrower
class interests of private or state capitalists. This way
the surplus capital which is not paid to the individual
workers is not unjustly expropriated from them, but becomes
their contribution or quota to the collective good.

Frequently develOpment must first germinate at a local
level. Preparing for a restructuring and transforming of
society consists of a critical understanding of the trans-
formation which individuals actually experience. Friere
emphasizes that revolutionary thought is cultivated through
real, concrete experiences. Once peOple have actively
participated in concrete solutions to everyday problems,

whether it be building a school or a community grain silo,

93

problems that they can understand and relate to, they are
much more likely to move on to regional and national
issues. As Cabral observed, people normally will not
fight for vague ideals or abstractions, but for concrete
improvements in their daily lives.

The reality of this observation was driven home to me
during my first year in Nicaragua. Murra, a small moun-
tainous village about 3 hours horseback from Cuidad Sandino
is the last town before the frontier with Honduras. Be-
tween Murra and the border sprawls a large rainforest
which is practically inaccessible 6 months of the year.
This jungle has been homesteaded the last 20 years primar-
ily by young, energetic farmers who were forced to relocate
because they owned no land or had their farms repossessed
by the national bank. Living under these conditions was
extremely difficult, to say the least. There were no
schools, doctors, or stores closer than Murra, which was
12 hours away by mule; jeeps and even horses could not
enter most farms because of the 3 feet deep mud trails.

This jungle area and its adventurous, dedicated in-
habitants should have provided fertile soil for revolution-
ary activity. Yet prior to the recent war, at least 2
attempts were made to organize these individuals, once by
Cuban and Nicaraguan guerillas and once by Nicaraguan
Marxist university students. Both attempts met with

dismal failure - not a single farmer from the area joined

94

their ranks. The guerillas were slaughtered by elite
American-trained counter-insurgency units of the Nicara-
guan Guardia and were forced to flee into Honduras. The
university students were so badly beaten that when the
Guardia paraded the survivors in chains through the streets
of Cuidad Sandino, several of my friends said they saw
swarms of maggots feeding off their raw backs.

When I visited these farmers in an attempt to assist
them in their efforts to build a road through the area, I
Often asked different individuals why they personally had
refused to take part in the movement or to assist the guer-
illas. Over and over the farmers gave the same basic
response: they saw no point in fighting and likely dying
for a worthless cause. They knew nothing of socialists
other than "they did not believe in God" and saw little
point in getting killed and ending up being damned to hell.
These early forerunners of the present Sandanistas made no
impact on the farmers in terms of their daily lives. The
experience of these revolutionaries was not unlike that of
Che Guevara in Bolivia who frequently mentioned in his
diary the gap between the ideals of the guerillas and the
reality of the campesinos. (James, 1968; 61)

Paulo Friere, perhaps as a result of his own exten-
sive experiences in living and working at social change at
a grass roots level, is well aware of the obstacles activ-

ists must face. He stresses that a false dichotomy has

95

developed in terms Of action versus reflection as it re-
lates to consciousness. Critical consciousness cannot
result from pure action on either an individual or collec-
tive level, nor can it evolve from simple reflection.
There must be a dynamic, ongoing interaction between action
and reflection which paves the way to a critical under-
standing Of the oppressive elements in reality. As Friere
repeatedly emphasized, "action without critical reflection
and even without gratuitous contemplation is disastrous
activism." Yet at the same time, "theory or introspection
in the absence of collective social action is escapist
idealism and wishful thinking. Genuine theory can only be
derived from some praxis rooted in historical struggles."
Unlike most theorists, Friere repeatedly addresses
the concept Of consciousness both actively and reflectively.
He describes conscientization as "the deepening Of the
attitude of awareness characteristic of all emergence."
It is a never-ending process of learning to perceive the
social, political, and economic contradictions found in
society and the taking of action against this reality.
Borndt and others have correctly Observed that many North
Americans have misunderstood this term. They frequently
view it as synonomous with individual "consciousness-
raising", self-fulfillment, or self-actualization. These
terms implicitly fail to incorporate Friere's emphasis on

the necessity of collective action against Oppressive

96

elements in reality. Such individuals often fail to
realize that within the present structure Of capitalism,
the raising of one's consciousness or individual self-
actualization is impossible without collective action. It
is completely self serving and naive to believe that in-
dividuals can become liberated and self-fulfilled by
"doing one's own thing" without also changeing the under—
lying structure Of domination and control.

For purposes of analysis, Friere originally described
3 basic levels or degrees of consciousness. "Magical con-
sciousness" which tends to explain reality in terms of
superior forces which dominate the situation and must be
obeyed. "Naive consciousness", which assumes it under-
stands and controls reality while in fact the individual
Often over-simplifies the problems and tends to create
artificial solutions to it. Many Officials connected with
sociology departments and international developmental
agencies tend to exhibit this type of consciousness.
Finally, "critical consciousness" is that which perceives
things as they exist in reality. Barndt observes that this
stage or level of consciousness is characterized by "a
deeper interpretation of problems as systematic, causal
principles instead of magical explanations, willingness
to test one's findings and review them, avoidance of pre-
conceived notions, refusal to transfer responsibility, re—

jection of passive positions, sound argumentation,

97

dialogue, and a receptivity to the new."

Debra Barndt studied Friere's method of conscienti-
zation within the context of Peru. Through the use of a
photonovella and indepth interviews, she explored the
world View of 4 Peruvian women who had migrated to the
coast from the Sierra and used their perspectives on edu-
cation and their social experiences to explore the process
Of conscientization. Barndt's discussion of Friere is
especially valuable for its emphasis of the various dimen—
sions of conscientization which other analyses tend to
either ignore or underemphasize. She identifies, solely
for the purposes of analysis, 4 dimensions to the conscien-
tization process: ideology, transformation, social iden-
tification, and behavioral change.

Ideology refers to reflection or theoretical under-
standing of the social, political, and economic structure
Of society. Transformation results from action upon these
structures in an effort to create social change. Social
identification evolves from reflection on one's psycholog-
ical and sociological experiences during the conscientiza-
tion process. Furthermore, behavioral change will result
from concrete action taken on the psycho-social issues.
Ideally, all 4 dimensions must interact throughout the
process, and it is this dynamic interaction which gives

conscientization its critical quality.

98

An overemphasis on one or more of these elements pre-
vents the process of conscientization from flowing effec-
tively. For example, the grain storage project which
served as the focus of research in the instant case can be
dissected in these terms. Transformation was attempted
through the actions of building relatively sophisticated
storage silos and grain drying units throughout the country
in an effort to change the agricultural storage practices
and increase the food supply and production. Unfortunately
as later chapters Of this thesis will demonstrate, many
farmers were either effectively eliminated from this entire
process or were treated as mere objects to be manipulated.
There was no critical reflection on their part on the
structure of the situation. There was no social identifi-
cation generated through psycho-social experiences because
there were none. As a result, as my data will clearly
demonstrate, no behavioral change occurred on any of the
farms in the Cuidad Sandino area.

Paulo Friere's real value then is not in providing a
method which can be simply tranSplanted to any social sit-
uation at all times. But rather for his emphasis on
develOping a critical approach to the problem of develop-
ment which is reflected in his method and which stresses
the unique contradictions inherent in any particular con-
text. It is out of this critical process that conscious-

ness expands.

99

Friere constantly stresses that it is not possible to
separate action from reflection, or theory from practice.
One cannot segmentize the act of knowing existing know—
ledge from the act of creating new knowledge any more than
one can separate teaching from learning or educating from
being educated. My own experience in Nicaragua both as an
agricultural extension agent and as a social researcher
repeatedly affirmed the validity of these statements.
Clearly the mere act of teaching farmers how to apply urea
to their corn or phosphorous to their beans is meaningless
without critical reflection on the political and economic
context in which this activity occurs. Furthermore, there
is no doubt that in over 2-1/2 years in Nicaragua, both my
family and I learned much more from our Nicaraguan friends
and the farmers of Cuidad Sandino and Murra than we ever
taught. Despite the obstacles created by our own class
biases, it was this praxis - "in which those who helped
and those who are being helped, helped each other simul-
taneously", that most greatly assisted us in the process

Of critically understanding reality.

THE BASIC TENETS OF
NORMATIVE SPONSORSHIP THEORY
Normative sponsorship provides a theoretical framework
from which to analyze community action prOgrams. Instead

of simply providing another macro—sociological perspective

100

on how the ideal develOpmental program should proceed, it
presents a microtheoretical window from which to view
social reality. In somewhat simplistic terms, "normative
sponsorship" means that innovations or technological
changes related to any developmental scheme stand a better
chance of being sponsored, supported, and adapted by the
social systems and organizations involved with or affected
by the program if they are contained within the norms and
values Of those groups. (Sower, Holland, Tiedke, and
Freeman, 1957)

This model has been recognized as a useful took for
explaining the Obsolescence and inefficiency of modern
organizations and other social systems (see for example
Holland, Tiedke, and Miller, 1966). Yet perhaps its even
more-valuable application is in providing a practical
analytical framework from which to View developmental pro-
grams. Friere states that no effective social change can
take place if the individuals affected by that social pro-
cess are treated as mere objects. In tune with this theme,
normative sponsorship theory predicts that any community
action program which is controlled primarily by individuals
or groups who have a vested interest in maintaining the
status quO is doomed to fail. To a great extent, it is
this basic proposition which this research tested with

regard to the INCEI project.

101

This model appears superior to several other
approaches to community development for a variety of rea-
sons (Klein, 1968). As with Friere's analysis, it focuses
on the interaction between those in a position of power
and the public in general. With regard to the silo pro-
ject, research based on normative sponsorship would ex-
plore the relationship between the individuals or groups
which controlled the program and the campesinos in the
surrounding area. It would ask whether there existed a
relationship of domination and control or whether there
was a dynamic interchange or give-and-take between the
relevant social systems.

This approach also places a considerable amount Of
emphasis on understanding the goals, values, and norms of
the local area in which the developmental program occurs.
These considerations are just as important, if not more
so, than the tactics and Objectives of the group in power.
Conflict and resistance, whether passive or active, is the
normal, logical outcome of developmental schemes which
either ignore or violate the values and beliefs of the in-
dividuals affected by the program. Thus if the INCEI pro-
ject in Cuidad Sandino failed to take into account, either
deliberately or unintentionally, the values and norms of
the campesinos in the surrounding area, these farmers
would be expected to Oppose attainment of the program's

Objectives.

102

Finally, normative sponsorship theory appears partic-
ularly useful because its flexibility allows for its appli-
cation in a variety of different social contexts. This is
because in brief, the theory explains that one basic
method in which social scientists can determine whether an
action process tends to treat humans as passive objects
rather than thinking subjects in a particular social situ-
ation is simply to ask them. This, in perhaps somewhat
simplistic terms, is what my research attempted to accom-
plish in Nicaragua.

This theory has been successfully utilized in a num-
ber Of different studies and research projects in the
United States. Sower, Miller, and others initially demon-
strated that normative sponsorship provides an effective
analytical tool for enabling public health workers to
achieve a greater understanding of complex patterns of
interaction within communities and can assist them in iso-
lating the most prominent Obstacles to development in these
specific locations. Logan (1972) has adapted the tenets
of this model to the analysis Of problems in Detroit's
inner city to help explain why certain areas are more prone
to erupt into violence, such as during the infamous riots
of 1967. Trajanowitz (1974), Christian (1973), and my own
research (Kirschenheiter, 1975), have demonstrated that the
theory is especially applicable to research in the field

Of criminal justice. The research involved in the instant.

103

case will present the first attempt at applying this theo-
retical framework in comparative developmental research;
it will be a test of the "universality of generalization"
Of the theory.

It is important to state at the outset a few of the
more basic assumptions behind this theory. Normative spon-
sorship assumes that the developmental process under anal-
ysis is a voluntary problem-oriented one which is con-
trolled at least partially at the local level. Authority
and power are assumed to be dispersed among several com-
peting social groups. While the model assumes that con-
sensus and cooperation among the various social systems
involved - the "relevant systems" - can facilitate devel-
Opment, it by no means regards conflict as abnormal or nec-
essarily undesirable. Power, as always, remains a crucial
element. Power is not a sufficient factor in community
action programs, but it is a necessary one.

Conflict can result, for example, if there is an ex-
clusion of the least powerful or visible relevant systems
from the program or from their neutralization. As noted
previously, a major proposition of this theory states that
if a relevant system vital to the success Of the program
becomes neutralized, through either ignoring or violating
their basic norms or values, then the program will tend to
fail. Furthermore, apparent or "Official" success of the

program, such as the erection of physical structures or

104

the paper construction of community organizations, must be
distinguished from actual success which involves the active
support and participation of the relevant systems or key
groups in the community.

For general analytical purposes, the normative spon-
sorship model portrays the action process as occurring con-
tinuously. It tends to follow a natural history from
convergence of interest to an initiation stage, through
various crises or problem phases, on to either successful
or unsuccessful resolution of these Obstacles, and finally
to either attainment or rejection of the desired goals.

At the same time, however, these stages do not necessarily
follow any set pattern, nor is it always possible to clear-
ly isolate them. Each phase does tend to possess certain
identifiable characteristics.

The first identifiable element of this model is con-
vergence of interest. There must be present in the com-
munity some individuals interested enough in a problem to
make a concerted effort at resolving it. The motivations
Of the group may be self-centered or altruistic, and it is
not necessary that they have equal interests in eliminating
the problem.

Thus interest in achieving the Objectives of a partic-
ular program can originate from a number of individuals or
groups. Frequently the interests Of a group are obvious,

but continue to be unstated because of the oppressed

105

conditions of the individuals within that group or because
they see no realistic manner in which their needs can be
met. Friere noted, for example, that many peasants in
Chile saw no point in learning to read or write as part of
the agrarian reform program because it had no relation to
their previous experience. It was only once extensive
cooperatives were set up and the farmers actually realized
the advantages of literacy in their daily lives that the
intensity Of interest increased.

Similarly, when the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development adopted and agreed to finance a
Nicaraguan proposal for building drying units and silos
across the country as part of an effort to improve storage
practices and regulate grain prices, the agency was in one
sense implicitly stating a desire to improve the lives of
the rural population. Obviously this somewhat abstract
Objective would have been Of interest to the farmers in
the Cuidad Sandino area. Like the peasants of Chile,
however, one would predict that, based on their prior life
experiences, these farmers would be less than enthusiastic
regarding the likelihood Of the program meeting success.
Whether these farmers cynicism and pessimism was in fact
justified will be discussed later.

It must be stressed that convergence of interest does
nnn_mean that effective community action programs can be

dictated from above.- One simply cannot go to Oppressed,

106

dominated individuals and give them food, technology, or
"knowledge" as the answer to their problems. Such solu-
tions, no matter how benign, constitute at best stop-gap
emergency measures. Over and over again, developmental
programs have failed because they refused to accept this
basic sociological fact. The technicians and specialists
behind such projects frequently design and implement them
according to their own view of reality, ignoring the fact
that people affected by the program possess a different
world view and thus will perceive the situation differ-
ently. This is what is meant by develOpment "from the top
down". TO be effective, however, such programs must start
"from the bottom up". As Mao Tse Tung observed:

"All work done for the masses must
start from their needs and not from
the desire Of any individual, however
well-intended. It Often happens Ob-
jectively the masses need a certain
change, but subjectively they are not
yet conscious of the need, not yet
willing or determined to make the
change. In such cases, we should wait
patiently. We should not make the
change until, throughout our work,
most of the masses have become con-
scious of the need and are willing to
carry it out. Otherwise we shall iso-
late ourselves from the masses. . .
There are two principles here: one is
the actual needs of the masses rather
than what we fancy they need, and the
other is the wishes of the masses who
must make up their own minds instead
of our making up their minds for them."

(Cited in Friere, 1978; 83)

107

THE INITIATION SET

Following convergence of interest, the initiation
set occurs which usually involves the formation of a group
which will attempt to agree upon a common set of goals.
These objectives can be broad or quite Specific, and fre-
quently a polling of the membership by the researcher is
required in order to accurately determine to which each
member actually supports these efforts. There also should
exist general agreement within the group regarding the
practical means for attaining these objectives. If the
developmental process eventually reaches this point,
legitimation and sponsorship becomes possible.

Under normative sponsorship then, the initiating set
presents the problem and possible alternatives or solutions
to the various relevant systems for their consideration
and, in turn, must reconsider their initial suggestions in
response to these groups. To an extent, many of the
features identified by Friere as characteristic Of
"problem-posing education" can ideally be Observed Oper-
ating within the framework of the sponsorship model. In
an effective community action program, individuals learn

to critically View the world. In other words, they learn

108

to perceive how they exist, not as part of a passive
reality, but as an active participant in transforming that
reality. They are not treated as Objects of assistance,

but as critical thinkers and activists.

RELEVANT SYSTEMS

Relevant systems are individuals or groups who,
although not necessarily a part of the initiating set,
remain important to achievement of the desired goals.

Since the initiating set must accumulate widespread support
from the local communities, it must allow all groups who
are either interested in the problem or will be affected
-by it to become an active part in the decision making pro-
cess. This "problem stage" Of the process frequently be-
comes characterized by conflict, OOOptation, efforts at
achieving consensus, and the neutralization of Opposing
groups. Here again, participation, Observation, and inter-
views with the Official and unofficial leaders and members
of the relevant systems constitute basic research tools to
determine how strongly these groups support the proposed
tactics and objectives and whether some workable level of
consensus can be achieved. It bears reemphasizing that if
these objectives violate or ignore the norms and values Of
the relevant social systems involved, the theory then pre-

dicts that the program will not achieve actual as Opposed

109

tO apparent or "official" success. A key concern of this
research was to determine what degree of legitimation and
sponsorship actually took place with regard to the INCEI
project. Specifically, this case study attempted to ex-
plore how much input and support the silo program received
from campesinos in and around Cuidad Sandino. A variety

of methods, including a survey of every fourth farmer in
the valles surrounding Cuidad Sandino, intensive interviews
with representatives from Official agencies, analysis of
published and unpublished documents, and participant ob-

servation were used to answer this question.

EXECUTIVE SET

While convergence of interest often broadly states the
general Objectives of a program, and legitimation and spon-
sorship addressed specifically how these goals will be
achieved, the executive set determines whether they are in
fact adopted and implemented. For example, Officially the
INCEI project was adopted and successfully implemented
with the completion Of the last silo in 1972. This model
recognizes, however, that official implementation in no
way assures resolution of the underlying problems addressed
by a particular development strategy. Unfortunately, spon-
sorship theory fails to address certain key questions, such
as the nature Of the goals which the action process

attempts to achieve and the type Of strategies for

110

attaining them. It is this implied "neutrality" or arti-
ficial Objectivity which makes the sponsorship model un-
acceptable without the important contributions of Gorz and
Friere.

Gorz and Friere Obviously recognize that adoption of
their concepts and methods in no way guarantees successful
resolution of any particular community problem. Both
authors, however, do begin with the same fundamental
assumption that the present system of social relations is
basically unjust and oppressive and must be transformed in
favor of a social structure which allows for more equality
and a greater potential for human development and freedom.
Gorz argues that action programs which maintain the present
system, so-called reformist reforms, must be rejected from
the start, whereas strategies which are not artificially
confined to the perimeters of the present system, nonre-
formist reforms, must be actively pursued. In other words,
Gorz does not lay out a specific blueprint for achieving
a society based on an alternative form of social relations,
but does construct a valuable framework in which these
issues can be discussed.

Friere clearly goes beyond the contributions of both
Gorz and normative sponsorship theory and explores the
dilemmas Of not only which Objectives should be sought

after, but also the strategies and tactics for achieving

111

them. Thus his approach would reject as inadequate pro-
grams designed solely to increase the general literacy rate
or to merely provide modern, secure locations for drying
and storing corn and beans. In short, for him n9! the
final goal is achieved is as important as the goal itself.
Friere's method stresses that the program must allow for a
dynamic interaction of action and reflection by all indi—
viduals in order that the process of conscientization may
begin. Specifically with regard to the INCEI program in
Nicaragua, the actual design and construction of the silos
is nowhere near as important as whether the campesinos
played an active or passive role in the program's concep-
tion, implementation, and administration.

As with normative sponsorship theory, Friere's method
is not simply another idealized paradigm of how community
action programs should proceed. In many ways his model
parallels the basic tenets of the sponsorship model.
Countries which have adopted this approach in the real
world, from Brazil to Chile to Peru to Guinea Bisseau,
attest to its value as a realistic strategy for creating
the conditions under which effective social change can
occur. I have personally witnessed its successful imple-
mentation in both Nicaragua and Peru. On the other hand,
the denial of these basic principles greatly diminishes
the possibilities of achieving meaningful change. Students

can be made to rotely memorize the alphabet, just as

112

foreign aid agencies can spend millions of dollars to
finance and construct extensive grain storage facilities.
Yet this does not change the underlying contradictions of
an Oppressive reality. If the individuals most oppressed
by this reality do not come to understand and seriously
attempt to change it, the present system of inequality will
continue to resist the numerous superficial attempts at

eliminating it.

SUMMARY

It may prove useful at this point to briefly summarize
how the major concepts of normative sponsorship theory were
adapted to the instant case. The entire INCEI project from
its conception to the present was regarded as the action
process. Clearly the United States Agency for International
Development, in planning the project, and the Import-Export
Bank, by providing the major source of funding, played cen-
tral roles in this process. Logically then, AID must bear
major responsibility for either the program's success or
failure. The major focus of my research was not concerned
with exploring how and why this program was conceived as
much as it was with determining whether the project did in
effect bring about effective social change, especially in
the Cuidad Sandino area.

Representatives from AID, INCEI, Banco National, the
Nicaraguan Department Of Agriculture, and grain buyers in

Cuidad Sandino were recognized as occupying official

113

positions of authority since it was they who controlled the
funds and actually implemented the program. These individ-
uals constituted the membership of the initiating set and
the relevant systems. Furthermore, the "charter" of the
program was defined as the Objectives of the project as
set forth in the official documents and as stated by Offi-
cial representatives of the relevant systems during the
interviews.

Another key relevant system for purposes of this re-
search were the campesinos of the Cuidad Sandino area.
This is because, nominally at least, the silo project was
designed and intended to effect and improve the lives of
these individuals. Logically, of course, the entire rural
population of Nicaragua could have been defined as a rele-
vant system. Practical limitations of time and money,
however, (as well as the fact that a war was about to break
out), made the inclusion of these groups impossible. An
effort was also made to identify and interview represen-
tatives from any group which either had input into the silo
project or were affected by it. In order to ensure that
no relevant system was unintentionally overlooked, each
respondent was asked during the Official interviews to
identify individuals or groups whom he or she felt were
most likely to be affected by the program. NO groups other

than those mentioned surfaced as a result of this process.

114

The questionnaire used in the survey and the official
interviews, as well as my own knowledge based on 2-1/2
years as an agricultural extension agent in the Cuidad
Sandino area, constituted the key instruments for identi-
fying the norms and values of these groups, as well as the
degree of consensus arrived at by the relevant systems.
Moreover, it was possible to determine the extent to which
the silos were being used simply through periodic visits
to the graineries and by analyzing the records kept by
INCEI'S field representative in Cuidad Sandino. It is sig-
nificant that in my 2 years in Cuidad Sandino, 5 Of the 6
silos were never utilized, except to store fertilizer, and
that 5 years later this trend remained basically unchanged.

Specific questions during the survey were directed at
exploring what degree Of consensus existed. If a relevant
system diSplayed ignorance of the goals of INCEI or refused
to actively participate in the program, it was concluded
that these goals did not reflect the norms, goals, or
values of that relevant system. Thus for example, with
regard to the number of farmers who have changed their
storage practices in the last 5 years, the data speaks for
itself: Of the 122 farmers interviewed, only one has
changed his practice of storing grain - and that one
switched from storing his corn in a troja to using barrels!

Thus in conclusion, through this case study an effort

was made to determine:

115

A. What were the Objectives, official and actual, of
the INCEI silo program in the Cuidad Sandino area?

B. Whether the campesinos from the area had an input
into the planning, design, construction, control,
and administration of the silo project in Cuidad
Sandino.

C. The extent to which the Objectives of the project
were actually achieved 5 years after INCEI had
been in Operation.

D. Whether the behavior of the Cuidad Sandino campe-
sinos had changed as a result of the INCEI; more
specifically, whether this project had affected
their practices of buying, selling, and storing
corn and beans.

Galtung once observed that, "A theory should not only
be evaluated according to its potential as a resevoir of
hypothesis implications to be tested against present
reality (data), but as much - or perhaps more - as a rese-
voir of policy implications to be tested against potential
reality (goals, values)." Five years ago I first undertook
research concerning the Management Task Force of the Mich-
igan Commission on Criminal Justice Goals and Standards
which I regarded as an empirical application Of normative
sponsorship theory rather than as a rigid test (Kirschen-
heiter (1975). I noted then that, "The continuing accumu-

lation of such studies will indicate the differences and

 

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116

similarities of various action processes. Analysis of
specific cases will make possible the postulating of fur-
ther tentative generalizations and eventually lead to addi-
tional research and further modifications of this model."
Hopefully the additions of the insights derived from the
works Of Gorz and Friere can be viewed as a positive step

in this continuing process.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

GENERAL APPROACHES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This research constituted an indepth analysis of the
impact Of INCEI'S silo project on the rural Nicaraguan
community of Cuidad Sandino. Following the advice of
Warwick and Osherson (1973; VIII) that, "many Of the dif—
ficulties encountered in comparative research could be
greatly reduced by creative combinations of methods",
numerous research techniques were utilized, including:
the analysis of historical official and unofficial docu-
ments, participant observation, an extensive survey of
farmers in the target area, and lengthy interviews with
official representatives of the relevant systems.

As mentioned previously, the major thrust of the pro-
ject in broad terms was: to isolate the relevant systems
involved with the project and, through the use of formal
and informal interviewing, to attempt to identify the norms
and values of these groups; to explore the differences and
contradictions within these social units; and to try and
present a few possible practical alternatives to what, in
the final analysis, turned out to be another attempt to
artificially impose Western technology from above. This
study hypothesized that rural develOpmental projects which
reflect the norms and values of the groups to be affected

by the project stand a much greater chance of attaining

117

118

success than a developmental process which ignores or ex-
cludes major segments of the campesino population. The
questionnaire constituted a key instrument in this study
for gauging both the values and Opinions of the relevant
systems and for attempting to estimate levels of consensus

and conflict.

CIUDAD SANDINO (A.K.A. EL JICARO)

Perhaps a short comment is apprOpriate here with re-
gard to my own biases. At the onset, I make no false
claims to neutrality or objectivity. I agree with Beck-
ford (1972; VII) that, "How human beings can engage in any-
thing Objective is really beyond my comprehension," espec-
ially in the study of human activity. Moreover, as Myrdal
suggests, true Objectivity in social research is achieved
by stating the values on which the study is based.

This study focused on the INCEI unit situated in
Cuidad Sandino, a small farming community located in north-
eastern Nicaragua. I chose this site because of my exper-
ience and interest in the area. Cuidad Sandino was also
selected because its patterns of cultivation and levels Of
technology are representative of much of rural Nicaragua,
as well as the rest of Latin America. I seriously doubt
whether I could have successfully carried out this study
in such a relatively short period of time in any other

town in Nicaragua. I especially owe a great debt of

119

gratitude to the 4 individuals who so unselfishly agreed
to assist me in interviewing the farmers in this area. I
am certain that their service was much more a result of
our "amista" than por dinero.

My biases against the INCEI program evolve out of my
work for over 2 years in the area as an agricultural ex-
tension agent, planting demonstration plots with the
farmers, and as a credit analyst with the local branch of
Banco Nacional. This "participant observation" convinced
me that, as Of 1974, INCEI had no measurable impact on the
storage practices of the farmers in the area. I returned
4 years later in order to determine whether this situation
had changed, to hopefully get a more complete view of this
development from the bottom up.

Like most campesinos in Nicaragua, Cuidad Sandino
farmers plant primarily corn and beans and use relatively
primitive levels Of cultivation and storage. Approximately
70% of the planting is done through the use of a heavy
wooden, homemade plow pulled by oxen and 30% through the
use Of an especque, an iron tipped wooden planting stick.
Few farmers use either fertilizer or insecticide, and vir-
tually all of them store their corn and beans in their
homes. Storage practices range from piling the corn in
rows inside the house, Often with the youngest children
using this as a bad, to sacks and barrels. Probably the

most common method, however, is the troja, a raised hut

built out of sticks in which the corn is usually stored
without removing the husks. The most important part of
this research consisted of a random sample of the farmers
in the Cuidad Sandino area. The questionnaire was intended
tO identify their values and norms covering a wide range
Of topics from living conditions, to farming practices, to
attitudes towards the rural bank, and to analyze the system
of interaction between these campesinos and the local INCEI
unit.

As the major hypothesis of this study implies, ignor-
ance on the part of Officials from AID and INCEI of many
Of the small farmers' norms and values might well account
for the program's apparent failure. Many campesinos, for
example, do not understand the reasons and effects of
mechanically drying grain before storage. They do know,
however, that it reduces the weight, and therefore the
price of their product by 8% to 12%. They harbor an in-
herent distrust of government agencies and prefer market-
ing their product with local merchants. Occasionally a
significant percentage of campesinos must sell their har-
vest "de futuro" and therefore retain no control over the
ultimate destination of the harvest. Many individuals also
refuse to permit their grains to be mixed and stored with
that Of other farmers in a single location since this means
the corn or beans they get back 9 months later is not their

own and must therefore be "inferior".

PROBLEMS INHERENT IN
CROSS-CULTURAL SURVEYS

Certain key Obstacles arise in any comparative anal-
ysis involving sample surveys or participant Observation.
These include conceptual equivalence, equivalence of
measurement, linguistic equivalence, and sampling (Warwick,
1973; 11). It was impossible, despite intensive prepara-
tion, for the study in the United States to adequately
anticipate all the problems which arose during the field
research. Certain safeguards, however, did increase the
likelihood of success.

It was decided to use back translation and random
probing in order to ensure linguistic and measurement
equivalence. Back translation involved translating the
original questionnaire from English to Spanish by a native
speaker Of Spanish, then back to English by a native
speaker Of English, then back to Spanish and so on until
all discrepancies in the translation were either straight-
ened out or removed (Warwick, 1973; 30). Random probes
were also used during the interviews themselves as a second
step in guaranteeing the validity and reliability of the
responses (Schuman, 1973; 138). (Obviously this is but an
indication of validity since it can never be measured
directly.)

Each interviewer randomly selected a specific number
Of questions for each respondent and "probed" into them in

order to compare the intended purposes Of the question and

121

122

the selected response with its meaning as perceived and
explained by the reSpondent. Nondirective inquiries by the
interviewer, such as, "What do you mean by that; can you
expand on your answer?" were also used in an effort to
achieve this same result. Moreover, several inquiries
throughout the questionnaire constituted the same basic
questions as a means of providing another method to eval-
uate the consistency of responses. Yet without a doubt,
the most reliable safeguard for ensuring the reliability
of the responses given throughout the study was the know—
ledge and experience of the interviewers themselves.

Many authors have stressed the obstacles raised by
having native interviewers Of social classes different from
that of their respondents. Obviously, interviewer effects
can be lessened to some extent by having a group of well-
trained individuals who closely follow the set of standard-
ized instructions. As Warwick noted (1973; 196), develop-
ing and maintaining rapport with the respondents also re-
mains crucial to achieving reliable, free-flowing inter-
views. In order tO achieve this Objective and in order to
reduce the effects Of class and cultural background, 4 of
the 5 interviewers were themselves small farmers from the
area. Each of these individuals were literate, intelligent
men with whom this researcher hadeorked in the paSt in
planting demonstration plots, school gardens, and a variety

of community development programs. The fact that the other

123

farmers had once elected 2 of these men as Officers of a
now defunct marketing cooperative implied that they pos-
sessed a level of respect and knowledge of the community
which facilitated the reliability of the response rate.)
Many observers argue that such methods constitute the only
way of ensuring comprehensive, unbiased information
(Mitchell, 1973; 221)..

An intensive training period buttressed by administra-
tion of a pretest were also a vital part of the design.
The writings of Frey (1973; 241) and Fink (1973; 21-34)
provided several practical guidelines which were followed
in the selection and training Of these interviewers. These
included completely familiarizing them with the Objectives
and instruments of the study, extensive role playing prior
to the field in order to increase confidence and expose
hidden pitfalls, and daily supervision on my part. The
pretest served a variety of key functions, including an
evaluation of the adequacy of the questions as well as the
interviewers, a rough estimate Of the rate of nonresponse
and the reasons behind them, as well as a general sketch
of the inevitable unanticipated obstacles such as selecting
a prOper random sample and finding respondents at their
home when the interviewers arrived.

Furthermore, I believe that case studies such as this
one cannot be justified merely on the grounds that it ful-

fills the requirement for an academic degree. Swantz

124

(1974), Vio (1975), and Hall (1977) among other, have
argued that the research team should contribute to the
productive work of the area. This goal was hopefully at
least partially accomplished in the instant case since 4
Of the 5 members Of the research team were farmers who
lived and worked in the local area.

Several advantages resulted from the use of community
members rather than outsiders to conduct the interviews.
Not only were these individuals and their families known,
reSpected, and thus more likely to be trusted by the re-
spondents (a factor of key importance in view Of the fear
many farmers had of Somoza's spies), but since the inter-
viewers personally knew most of the farmers they inter-
viewed, they were Often able to detect if their responses
were less than completely honest. In a small rural com-
munity, for example, it is common knowledge how much land
each family or individual owns, especially with regard to
the larger landowners. During the course of the survey,
only 2 of the 121 respondents gave blatantly false esti-
mates of their landholdings, and both of these readily
cOrrected themselves when the interviewers probed into the
response and pointed out the discrepancy.

Hall also correctly argues that it is important the
community gains not just from the results of the research,
but from the process itself. He points out that this means

that as a result of the study, respondents should be able

125

to articulate their problems and ideally begin to initiate
processes to find solutions. The questionnaire was partly
constructed with this objective in mind. The fact that
most of the campesinos welcomed the opportunity to express
their Opinions was reflected in the surprisingly high re-
sponse rate - only 2 farmers out of 123 approached during
the survey refused to be interviewed. In fact, several
farmers voiced the hope that through their responses, the
corruption of the Somoza regime would receive wider pub-

licity in the United States.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND
SELECTING THE RANDOM SAMPLE

The questionnaire was intentionally designed to be
relatively short, specific, and primarily consist of close-
ended questions. As the first Peruvian national survey
revealed, many uneducated rural inhabitants have difficulty
comprehending in such a short time the idea behind ordering
one's responses on a scale (Warwick, 1973; 15). Since many
Of the interviewees were illiterate, the multiple choice
questions had a limited number of alternatives and were
written as brief and simple as possible. The questionnaire
intentionally began with several short, neutral queries,
such as, "What do you plant premeria?; do you plant with a
plow, an espeque, or both?", and then gradually move into

the potentially more sensitive questions concerning the

126

rural bank and INCEI. Each interviewer repeatedly and
strongly emphasized that this study was not officially con-
nected with the Nicaraguan government in any way and would
be kept in strict confidence.

Furthermore, as Eric Wolf (1969) has correctly ob-
served, it is a serious mistake to simply refer to peasants
or campesinos as one undifferentiated mass. It was possi-
ble that differences between tenants and landowners,
laborers, coffee growers, and cattlemen, and between corn
and bean farmers could have been as great as between urban
and rural dwellers. For example, do large planters regard
INCEI as more of a success than small farmers? DO they use
the silos more frequently? What effect does the quantity
of one's harvest have upon the assistance and selling price
he receives? The data generated by these and similar ques-
tions provided valuable insight into which relevant systems
exercised the greatest degrees Of influence and helped to
differentiate the actual, unofficial goals of INCEI from
the Officially proclaimed objectives.

Rural Nicaragua presents a unique problem for this
type of cross-cultural research since the only experience
most farmers have had with interviews was through the
national census. Unfortunately, since no income tax exists
in the country, this census provided the basis for taxation
depending on the individual's farm size, harvest, and num-

ber of livestock. As a result, many campesinos regard

127

such interviews as a potential threat and lie notoriously
on them.

Originally I had hoped to obtain access to census data
and to use this information as a base from which to select
a random sample. Unfortunately this proved impossible.

The head supervisor of the national census Office in
Managua explained during an interview that the results of
the last national census had been only partially published
because it contained so many errors; mistakes which he
promised "would not be made again". He noted that the
government had spent over 6 million cordovas for three
different national censuses, and none of them had produced
very reliable data. The respondents repeatedly refused to
reveal their true incomes and the amount of land they owned,
and most women refused to reveal their actual age. This
same official stated that no accurate census on the coun-
try's agricultural system had even been conducted, but that
his Office was then in the process of carrying out another
more promising census of the rural population based on 380
interviews drawn from a national sample. This same census
would also involve the use Of detailed aerial photos taken
by United States reconnaissance planes in an effort to

verify the accuracy of the questions dealing with

128

landholdings.*

Since no reliable census data existed, an alternative
means of securing a reliable sample had to be devised. The
campo (rural area) surrounding Ciudad Sandino is divided
into "valles" roughly similar to townships or districts in
the United States. I had hoped to visit each juez local
(local judge) and determine the number of farms in each
valle and then interview every fourth or fifth residence.
Thus in effect obtaining a two-stage cluster, systemic sample.

UnfOrtunately, this method also proved unreliable
since apparently the judges themselves did not know the
exact number Of homes under their jurisdiction. The juez
local from Muijuca, for example, one of the most advanced
valles in terms of electricity and access to all—weather
roads, stated that he believed there were approximately
180 houses in his district. An actual count revealed
there to be 74. Finally, after discussing the situation
with the various interviewers, it was agreed that each of
them would survey the valles he knew best and draw a map
containing the exact number of houses. Afterwards they
used these maps as guides in interviewing approximately

every fourth farm in the surrounding area.

 

*I was shown samples of these photos, and they are
incredibly detailed. It was explained to me that the cam-
eras on the U.S. planes were powerful enough to show the
manufacturer's title on a golf ball from a distance of
hundreds Of thousands of feet. Whatthis official did not
state was that such pictures have also frequently been used
by certain dictators in Latin America to detect and elim-
inate guerilla activity.

129

The survey also required the interviewers to spend
considerable time revisiting farms. Due to time and finan-
cial restraints, the interviews were conducted during the
planting season and accordingly many farmers when first
visited were working in their fields, Often a considerable
distance from their houses. The situation became more com-
plicated since the farmers typically head for their fields
at 6:00 a.m. and return at dusk, and visiting them after
dark would have violated a cultural norm. Moreover, be-
cause of increasing amounts of guerilla activity, the
Guardia was suspicious of anyone traveling in the campo at
night for whatever reason.

These factors also proved somewhat detrimental to the
interviewers' morale. Since they were originally paid per
interview, it was obviously uneconomical to spend their
time repeatedly trying to interview the same individual.
Eventually I agreed to pay the 2 most reliable interviewers
a minimum of C$50 per day, 3 times the current rate of a
field hand, regardless of how many interviews were obtain-
ed. If their per interview rate was greater thanC$50 per
day, they were paid the larger sum. As a result, we Often
had to fit the visits around both the interviewer's and
the respondent's work schedules. It ended up taking over
5 weeks to conduct the pretest and 121 interviews.

Finally, various unobtrusive measures were used to

test the accuracy of the responses from the campesinos.

130

Permission was obtained from the INCEI field representative
in Cuidad Sandino to examine their records. This valuable
data, although far from complete, did reveal which silos
were used by which individuals at what time Of year. The
quantity Of grain actually stored constituted an objective
measure of the effect this program had on Cuidad Sandino.
Moreover, visits and interviews with private grain buyers
provided an insightful, if somewhat uncomprehensive, view

of the spin-off effects of the project.

THE OFFICIAL INTERVIEWS

The campesinos surrounding Cuidad Sandino provided
but one source of data. Other informative sources included
numerous articles and documents published by INCEI, the
loan prOposal itself, as well as other documents provided
by AID Managua and AID Washington, information provided by
the Cuidad Sandino office of Banco Nacional, and general
background information published in La Prensa. Further-
more, Over 20 "Official" interviews were conducted with
representatives from the other relevant systems. Depending
on the circumstances, these formal interviews were both
prearranged and spontaneous. Included in these interviews
were representatives from the AID mission in Managua, pre-
sent and former employees of INCEI, and Officials from

Banco Nacional and the Department of Agriculture.

131

Originally I had hoped to obtain an interview with
President Somoza. Although improbable, the fact that I had
2 such sessions with Somoza in the past, one of which took
place in Cuidad Sandino, presented the hope that such an
interview was not impossible. By the time of the actual
field research, however, the political situation in the
country had deteriorated to such an extent that attempts
at this interview were abandoned.

Each official respondent was informed of the purpose
Of the study and the reasons for the interview. Each was
promised strict confidentiality with regard to their re-
sponses. It was explained that the interview was intended
to identify their values, norms, and official positions
of the organizations rather than any one person. Although
a list of questions was drawn up in advance, the actual
interview was kept as open-ended as possible. Every effort
was made to maximize the spontaneity of the responses and
to probe the replies and opinions of the interviewees
rather than to strictly adhere to the predetermined format.
These interviews lasted between 1—1/2 to 5 hours in dura-
tion.

As mentioned previously, every effort was made during
the course of the research to "get close to the data".
Among other things, this involved making 4 separate trips
from Cuidad Sandino to Managua, spending a total of 3 days

I

at the American Embassy interviewing and pondering over

132

documents which I was allowed to read and take detailed,
copious noted from but not allowed to xerox, and visiting
the Banco Nacional and INCEI representatives in Cuidad
Sandino on a semi-regular basis for months.

Because Of the extremely precarious political situa-
tion at the time of the field research, unanticipated dif-
ficulties continued to crop up. Although I never feared
for my family's safety while in Cuidad Sandino, travel to
and from the capital was a different matter. The Guardia
at this time was in a state of readiness against attacks
by the Sandinistas, and searches of anyone traveling back
and forth were commonplace. Many of the Guardia were
young, inexperienced, poorly trained teenagers. (Both I
and the average Nicaraguan feared encounters with the
Guardia much more than with the guerillas.) The infamous,
irrational murder of the North American reporter, Bill
Stewart, for example, while on his knees at a roadblock was
not an isolated incident. Fortunately, however, these con-
ditions only interfered with the successful completion of
one interview - an INCEI official in Managua who repeatedly
cancelled appointments. For the most part, the re5pondents
were extremely helpful and more than willing to both pro-
vide and expand upon their answers. My knowledge Of the
inner workings and Official goals and values of these rele-

vant systems benefitted considerably from their cooperation.

133

The interviews with these official respondents,
all of which I conducted, presented very different prob-
lems than those with the campesinos. Equal emphasis was
paid to what their organizations actually did as to what
their representatives said; moreover, the prearranged
questions were used as guidelines and not strictly follow-
ed. These associations by definition exist to serve the
public interest, but they also must satisfy the needs of
their own direct membership. Frequently these public and
private interests are far reaching and conflict with each
other.

Etziani (1969), Perrow (1969), and others present a
strong argument for separating the goals Of all such organ-
izations into categories such as "official" and "operative".
Official goals constitute what the group actually strives
to accomplish as reflected by their operating policies.
Operative goals may support, conflict, or be irrelevant to
official goals. They are established by the dominant mem-
bers of the group and are strongly influenced by their
class backgrounds and interests, professional competence,
and career lines. Moreover, the primary sources of finan—
cial funding can Often be traced to the dominant relevant
system (in this case AID), which Operates levers to achieve
its own basic Objectives. Thus, identifying the Operative
goals of each of the relevant systems constituted a major

objective of this study. A broad spectrum of resources was

134

tapped in addition to the survey data in an effort to
answer these and related questions. It is my conclusion
that based on the data discussed in the following chapters,
the INCEI silo project had no positive effect on the small

farmer and was never designed to do so.

SURVEYING THE LARGER PICTURE

Richard Adams emphasized in his study of Guatemala
(1970), that no community can be completely understood
without also addressing the larger national and interna-
tional pictures. The periphery of Cuidad Sandino then must
be analyzed in relation to its center in Managua, and the
Periphery nation of Nicaragua cannot be understood without
examining its relationship with its Center power, the
United States. This research then also involved a survey
and analysis Of the political-economic relationships
between and among these systems.

Both Wolf's and Adams' research expounds on at least
3 common themes. First, that the collection of social
groups or systems in a single nation can never portray a
total description of the functioning of that country.
"Rather, it was the interrelations that Operated between
the various sectors and groups that could provide the
major guide for study." (Adams, 1970; 35). Second, that
"brokers" provide a key role in connecting these systems.

And third, that power will be one of the dominant

135

characteristics in all such interactions. The higher
degrees of unity, organization, and resources within each
relevant system in turn generates more power. Various
groups in any action process will frequently compete for
and conflict over power; this explains why some relevant
systems triumphed, others were neutralized, and others were
excluded. In short, true development "therefore implies
destruction as well as expansion; not only the destruction
of converting natural resources into waste, but also the
destruction of one portion of a society by another."
(Adams, 1970; 42).

Finally, a discussion of the methodology involved in
this case study would not be complete without addressing
the issue of funding. Many of the practical limitations
in any cross-cultural study were greatly intensified in
this case study because of funding difficulties. Although
for 2 years I had hoped to finance this research through a
research assistantship provided by the Comparative Commit-
tee in Sociology at Michigan State University, and had re-
ceived written and verbal promises to this effect, in the
end no support Of any type was provided. I was informed
by one of the committee members that my research would not
be funded, in part, because it appeared to approach the

problems of community development from a dependency

136

perspective and "there is no future in dependency theory."*
On the other hand, the people of Cuidad Sandino were
as generous and helpful as the Comparative Committee at
Michigan State was obstinate. It appears extremely doubt-
ful whether this study would have been completed without
the constant care and multifaceted assistance of our
friends and neighbors in this small village. My wife,
daughters, and I were provided with a modern, completely
furnished house rent free for the entire time period nec-
essary for completion of the field research. In addition
to this and the never ending current of eggs, mangoes,
tortillas, and other essentials which were funneled across
our doorstep, numerous farmers willingly provided valuable
insight into the local problems Of the community. Doubt-
lessly a portion of this unexpected OOOperation from peo-
ple we had not seen in 4 years was a dividend of our Peace
Corps experience. Yet to a much greater extent, this re-
sponse simply reflects the warmth and kindness which would
be Offered by'thesebeautiful townspeople to any outsider
who was fortunate enough to take the time to get to know

them.

 

*It never was explained if this meant that this
theoretical approach held "no future" for North American
sociologists accustomed to studying the issues related to
dependency from the tOp down or for the members of the
periphery intent on severing the bonds of dependency.

CHAPTER V

BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH

NO community or developmental project can be studied
completely without also addressing the large national and
international picture and without placing them in a his-
torical perspective. The periphery of Cuidad Sandino then
must be analyzed in relation to its center in Managua; and
the Periphery nation of Nicaragua cannot be understood
without examining and understanding its historical rela-
tionship with its Center power, the United States.

Adams (1970) indepth analysis of Guatemala emphasized
3 major themes which were also given special consideration
in my own research. First, that the collection of social
groups or systems in a single country could never portray
a total description of the functioning of that country.
"Rather, it was the interrelations that Operated between
the various sectors and groups that could provide the major
guide for study." (Adams, 1970; 35). Second, that "brok-
ers" provide a key role in connecting these systems. And
third, that power will be one of the dominant character-
istics in all such interactions. The degrees of unity,
organization, and resources within each relevant system is
not static, but increases and decreases and in turn gener-
ates more or less power. Various groups in any action
process will frequently compete for and conflict over the
same degrees of power; this explains why some relevant

systems triumphed, others were neutralized, and still

137

138

others excluded completely.

This chapter then will present an indepth historical
analysis of the political and economic relationships of
many key Nicaraguan social groups and systems. Recent
events in Nicaragua clearly indicate that the process of
development does in fact involve destruction as well as
construction. It remains to be seen whether the incredible
destruction and loss Of lives in Nicaragua over the last 2
years will in fact prepare the country for a sincere devel-
opmental effort or simply lead to turmoil and eventually

"Somosoism" without Somoza.

GEOGRAPHIC, SOCIAL, POLITICAL,
AND ECONOMIC FACTORS

A variety of factors have been conducive to the polit-
ical conditions which sprouted in Nicaragua. Heterogenity
characterizes the country geographically, socially, polit-
ically, and economically. Known as "the land of lakes and
volcanoes", the majority of Nicaraguans are sprinkled along
a narrow strip of land 100 miles in length which borders on
Lake Managua and Lake Nicaragua. Many large cities such
as San Juan del Norte, Bluefields, and Puerto Cabazas have
only recently become accessible by land.

The country is divided into a collage Of different
geographic zones such as: the Caribbean lowlands, swamps
and jungle which occupy over half of the country; a range

of rocky mountains and plateaus Often pierced with acres

139

of pine trees similar to Northern Michigan; the lake re-
gions and surrounding areas which are famous for possessing
the only freshwater sharks in the world; the Pacific strip;
and the plain areas punctured by a variety of active and
dormant volcanoes (Carlson, 1946; 386-390). The capital

Of the country, Managua, lies only 198 feet above sea level
and frequently experiences temperatures that run into a
muggy 900 to 1000 F.

Although the largest country in Central America,
Nicaragua is actually a relatively small country about the
size of Michigan. Its population of 2.3 million is com—
prised, in order Of relative percentages, of Mestizos,
Europeans, Blacks, and Indians. It has a population growth
rate Of 3% annually, with over half Of the population
living in the rural areas.

Almost half of the agricultural production is export—
ed, and agriculture accounts for 70% to 80% of all exports
and include, in order of importance, cotton, coffee, meat,
and sugar (Ryan, 1970; 207-250). Three of these 4 products
require seasonal employment, especially during the harvest
season, and the unemployment statistics reflect this.
Officially, the Minister of Economy stated in 1973 that 36%
of the economically active population was unemployed, yet
at least another third of the pOpulation must be regarded
as underemployed (Jonas, 1976; 3). Other recent estimates

have held the urban unemployment rate to be near 70%.

140

It remains impossible to obtain accurate social sta-
tistics on the country, not only because little information
is available in reliable documented form, but because of
the Somozan government's well known tendency to manufac-
ture and mold data to fit its own purposes.* The inequal-
ities of income and land distribution found in the country,
however, doubtlessly parallel, if not exceed, those of any
other country in Latin America. The bottom 50% of the
population has a median income of $90 a year, while the tOp
5% of the population enjoys a median income of over $1800
a year. Almost half of the farms consist of 7 hectares or
less and constitute 2% of all farm land, while the top 2%
of the farms consisting of 350 or more hectares take up 48%
of the farm land available. There is less than a 50% lit-
eracy rate, and the infant mortality rate stands at over
13%. Over 47% of the homes in the cities and 81% in the

countryside have no sanitary facilities, and well over 80%

 

*I received first-hand knowledge of this practice
during one of the interviews I conducted as part of my
field research in Managua. After Speaking with a high-
ranking official from Banco Central, I was Offered a posi-
tion at over $20,000 a year as a "resident sociologist".
My job would entail publishing a study documenting that
Nicaraguans enjoyed the highest standard of living Of the
5 Central American republics. When I asked to see the data
which was to be used to support this study, the official
Simply responded that it would be produced from various
governmental sources. When I asked why She didn't retain
a Nicaraguan sociologist for the task, this official ex-
plained that they were all too "leftist" and critical Of
the government. Thus in Short, it was made clear that my
acceptance Of the position hinged on my agreeing to reach
conclusions favorable to the Somoza regime before ever
even being allowed to see the data.

141

in both areas do not have safe drinking water.

Nicaragua's mineral wealth, especially its gold, as
well as its geographic position, have played key roles in
its "development of underdevelopment". The Spanish founded
Granada in 1524 as a key link to dominate the large Indian
population and force them to work in the mines throughout
the Americas. As late as 1955, Nicaragua remained the
second largest producer of gold in Latin America. After
a while, rivalries and conflicts developed between the
"peninsulares" from Spain and the younger American-born
Spanish, the "oriollos" (Levene, 1940; 99). Eventually
this led to independence from Spain in 1821, and the coun-

try passed under the British Sphere of influence.

THE "NICARAGUAN ROUTE"

By 1850, the discovery Of gold in California caused
the United States to become interested in Nicaragua pri-
marily as a close overland bridge between the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans. Political conditions inside the country
remained ripe for outside exploitation because of the on-
going internal dispute between the 2 key factions Of the
ruling class, the Conservatives and the Liberals (Davies,
1972; 608-611). The Conservatives, whose center Of power
was in Granada, reflected the interests of the Older wealth,
the merchant class, and the cattle raisers. The Liberals

advocated the interests Of the newer wealth, especially the

142

coffee growers and artisans from Leon. The armed conflicts
between these 2 factions inside Nicaragua were part Of a
larger struggle between these same 2 interest groups
throughout Central America.

Cornelius Vanderbilt, the infamous American robber
baron, believed at this time that conditions appeared ripe
in Nicaragua and the United States to accomplish the age-
Old dream Of a water passage to India. Like Louis Napolean
Bonaparte and many other foreigners before him, Vanderbilt
believed that the San Juan River, which flowed from the
Atlantic into Lake Nicaragua, Offered an ideal location for
fast, relatively cheap transportation between the 2 oceans.
He believed that the establishment of such a route would
not only win him international acclaim, but once he con-
nected this natural waterway with a man-made canal, "the
lucrative California and India trade would fall into his
lap." (Folkman, 1972; 16). In time the railroad baron did
establish and Operate such a transit company for several
years until war forced the Nicaraguan location to shut
down. This route was later discarded in favor of the

Panama site.

THE WILLIAM WALKER AFFAIR

During this period, another infamous American left his
mark on the pages of Nicaraguan history. William Walker

was an American doctor, lawyer, and self—proclaimed

143

general who had previously attempted to conquer the Mexican
Territory of Lower California and Sonora and declare it an
independent republic. Although he failed in Mexico and
barely escaped with his life, Walker met with much greater
success in Nicaragua.

In May of 1855, he was invited by the Liberal faction
in Nicaragua to intervene on their side against the
Conservatives. Williams and 56 of his followers, armed
with a new model rifle, accepted the invitation. In a
short period of time, after commandeering a steamer on Lake
Nicaragua owned by Vanderbilt, they captured Granada.
Walker then took over Vanderbilt's entire company and
transferred it to friends who had financially backed his
venture.

Originally Walker apparently hoped to have Nicaragua
become a state of the United States. With this in mind,
in 1854 he established a new government with himself as
President and suspended Nicaragua's laws against slavery.
He also declared English to be the Official language and
forced the Spanish-speaking Nicaraguan Congress to vote for
the new Constitution which was written entirely in English.
The United States formally recognized this new government
in 1856.

Walker's exploits forced the "trans Nicaraguan Route"
to close down and caused Vanderbilt to lose hundreds of

thousands of dollars. This, in turn, led Vanderbilt to

144

support the Central American countries in their efforts to
dispose Walker. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Costa Rica correctly feared that Walker's eventual goal was
to create a strong federation of these 5 republics based
on military rule with himself as dictator (Folkman, 1972;
85). Their combined efforts forced him from power in 1857
when he surrendered to the United States Navy in order to
avoid capture. He later launched 2 other unsuccessful
attempts to retake Nicaragua, was finally captured by the
British, and turned over to Honduras officials and was
executed on September 12, 1860.

Several scholars believe that Walker, rather than
financial or geographic considerations, prevented Nicaragua
from becoming the vital link between east and west present-
ly enjoyed by Panama. "If Walker had not come to Nicaragua,
there is little doubt that the route would have continued
and probably even surpassed the popularity of Panama. Of
all that Walker is remember for, the most important result
of his filibustering activities was the closing of inter-
oceanic communication across the isthmus of Nicaragua."
(Ibid., p. 92).

At the same time, however, many Nicaraguans saw the
closing of this interoceanic bridge as a blessing in dis—
guise. Just as with many modern "dependistas", they re-
garded the much acclaimed technological advances brought

by the U.S. to be little more than a tool of American

145

imperialism. As Mirabeau B. Lamar, the United States min-
ister to Nicaragua bemoaned in 1858, "There is in all this
country a deep-seated terror, that, when the Americans are
admitted into it, the natives will be thrust aside - their
nationality lost -- their religion destroyed - and the

common classes be converted into hewers of wood and drawers

of water." (Ibid., p. 99).

THE RISE OF SANDINO

The Conservatives managed to control the government
for 30 years following the fall of Walker. In 1893, the
Liberals took power under Jose Santos Zelaya, who ruled
until 1909. Zelaya instituted numerous "modernization"
policies which led to a basic consolidation of political
and economic power. He also helped to establish coffee as
a key export product and to assist the new rising "coffee
bourgeoisie" in their efforts to expand their plantations
at the expense Of the campesinos.

But the dream of building a canal across Nicaragua was
yet to play another key role in this country's history.
Although the U.S. had Obtained from Panama exclusive rights
to build a canal there in 1903, her interests demanded that
She retain a monoply over the right to any transoceanic
canal in Central America. Zelaya made the "mistake" of
thinking that Nicaraguans had the right to determine what

was best for Nicaragua independent of the United States.

146

In 1909 he began negotiating with the Japanese over
the possibility of their constructing a canal in Nicaragua.
This proved to be the final impetus behind a Conservative
insurrection backed by the U.S. against Zelaya (Jonas,
1976; 2). The Conservatives and the Liberals once again
plunged Nicaragua into civil war for the next 3 years.

In 1912, under the pretense of preventing more blood-
shed between the 2 factions, the United States committed
troops tO Nicaragua for the first time. Over 2700 Marines
landed at the invitation of Conservative President Diaz to
suppress a revolt by the Liberals. From 1912 to 1925, a
smaller number of Marines remained in the country under the
facade of maintaining law and order. When the Marines were
finally withdrawn in 1925, fighting again broke out. The
Marines immediately reinvaded and this time remained until
1933.

Augusto Caesar Sandino, a bright, idealistic mine
worker at the time, refused to accept the presence of U.S.
Marines on his country's soil. He also refused to accept
the periodic political compromises imposed by the United
States. AS a result, from 1927 to 1933, he successfully
fought the Marines to a standstill in a guerilla war that
has since come to be labeled our "first Vietnam".

Sandino and his followers were considered bandits by
the United States and heroes and freedom-fighters by many

Nicaraguans. He was the only Nicaraguan leader who had the

147

nerve to resist American imperialism in spite of the over-
whelming odds against him. Sandino's resistance originated
and spread from the same area from which most of the inter-
views for this study were obtained — the rural area sur-
rounding Cuidad Sandino. In fact, the recent changing of
the name of E1 Jicaro to Cuidad Sandino reflects the towns-
peOple's pride in this fact. Moreover, many of the Older
farmers can remember fighting either for or against Sandino
and the tremendous hardships Of that period. Don Abraham,
the 88-year-old farmer who provided us with a house rent
free during my field research, enjoyed telling and retell-
ing stories of the Sandino era, including how he frequent-
ly cut up cow hides into soft ball shaped objects and
filled them with gun powder and nails in order to have
effective homemade hand grenades to throw at the Gringos.
Don Abraham worked with Sandino at the San Albino gold

mine and joined his movement not because he hated the
United States, but because "Sandino was a friend of mine
who was in trouble and needed help."

The war against Sandino did have many striking simi-
larities to the war in Vietnam. For example, the U.S.
feared the influence that leftist foreign governments -
in this case Mexico - might have had on Nicaragua as a re-
sult of their efforts to support the conservative cause
there. The typical U.S. response to the successes of the

guerillas was to commit more troops and send more modern

148

equipment (Macauley, 1971; 48-134). This was also consti-
tuted the first time U.S. aircraft supported ground trOOps
through extensive and coordinated strafing and bombing.

In fact, many of the towns surrounding Cuidad Sandino, such
as Murra, Quilali, and San Fernando, were either destroyed
by the U.S. Air Force or had their main streets taken over,
bulldozed, and expanded to serve as makeshift runways.

Just as in Vietnam, however, these bombings produced more
civilian victims than guerilla casualties and tended to
strengthen the resistance movement.

The Marines also faced the dilemma of Often having to
destroy property and homes in order to "save" them and of
fighting a war in which most of the weapons used by their
opponents were supplied by the U.S. Moreover, public
Opinion in the United States, which never supported the
commitment of troops in Nicaragua in the first place,
turned strongly anti-interventionistic once coffins filled
with young Marines began to be flown home. It eventually
became clear that the war against Sandino could not be won
either militarily or politically.

The Marines and their host government also largely
failed in their prOpaganda efforts to mold Nicaraguan pub-
lic opinion against Sandino. "Like any guerilla force, the
peoples' army was dependent on material support (food,
supplies, information) from the local residents and shared

its resources with them." (Jonas, 1976; 6). At the same

149

time, however, based on my discussions with several indi-
viduals who actually lived and worked in the area during
the insurrection, it appears that the support among many
Nicaraguans was lacking with regard to both Sandino and the
Americans.

One respondent after another voiced the same con-
flicts: if they remained working on their farms, guerillas
or, more frequently, bandits who called themselves Sandin-
istas would steal their crops and animals, rape their wives
and daughters, and burn their huts. On the other hand, if
they sought refuge in the towns, the occupying Marines,
most of whom could not even Speak Spanish or communicate
effectively with the people, regarded them as Spies and
either imprisoned, tortured, or Shot them. Rape, murder,
and pillage became such common occurrences during the war
that thousands of Nicaraguans from the northern areas fled
their homes and sought refuge in Honduras.

The United States finally accepted the reality Of this
"no win, possible loss" situation and decided to withdraw
her troops in 1933 - but not before it orchestrated a
"Nicaraguanization" Of the conflict. The U.S. left in
place of the Marines the Guardia Nacional, a military-
police force trained and equipped by the Americans and
headed by an English-speaking Nicaraguan named Anastasio

Somoza Garcia.

150

During the truce that followed the Marines' withdrawal,
Sandino agreed to travel to Managua and meet with President
Sacasa to discuss the disarmament. On February 21, 1934,
after an official dinner in which photographs show Sacasa
and Sandino hugging each other and promising no further
retaliations, Sandino and several of his followers were
taken prisoner. They were executed the next morning by
machine guns fired by National Guardsmen acting under
direct orders from Somoza. The next day the Guard attacked
and massacred hundreds of Sandino's followers in the north.
Their actions effectively destroyed his movement - for the
moment anyway - at the same time that it created the
Sandino legend.

Sandino, despite intensive U.S. propaganda to the con-
trary, was not a communist, but an anti-imperialist nation-
alist who exposed many socialistic ideas (Selser, 1974).
His efforts constituted the first military defeat for the
United States in Latin America. Although betrayed and mur-
dered in the end, he soon became one Of the most popular
heroes, not just in Nicaragua, but in all Latin America.
Fidel Castro and the Che Guevara studies his tactics, imi-
tated his successes, and learned from his errors. Over 45
years later, when Somoza's son, "Tachito", fled to Florida
from Managua, the Sandinistas stated that "the last Marine"
had finally been defeated and proclaimed their victory as

the final triumph of Sandino. Thus Sandino's famous

151

prediction that, "Same day the Yankees will have to be
completely defeated, and if by chance I am not able to see
this finale, the ants in the ground will come and tell me

about it in my grave," became a reality.

THE RISE OF THE SOMOZA DYNASTY

The first Somoza remained in charge of the Guardia
Nacional until his own assasination in 1956. In 1936 he
overthrew Sacasa outright and had himself "Officially
elected" President. He later changed the Constitution to
allow himself to remain as President until 1946. After
WOrld War II, outside pressures forced Somoza to step down
and his handpicked successor, Leonardo Arguello, took over
the Official reins of power.

Arguello, however, failed to distinguish between the
appearance of power and actual power. After assuming the
Presidency, he refused to play by Somoza's rules of the
game and attempted to replace Tacho as head of the Guardia
Nacional. In less than a month, Somoza responded by over-
throwing Arguello as President and replaced him with his
uncle. In 1951 Somoza again had himself elected President.
After his assasination in 1956 by a deranged poet, the
mantle of power passed to his sons, Luis and Anastasio Jr.
(Tachito).

Luis reigned as President from 1957 to 1963 when out-

side pressure, this time from President Kennedy and the

152

Alliance for Progress, again forced the Somozas to step
aside in favor of Rene Schick, another hand-picked succes-
sor. Real power, of course, remained in the hands of
Anastasio Jr., who headed the Guardia Nacional from 1957
until his departure in 1979. Anastasio took his own turn
at the Presidency in 1967 and again changed the Nicaraguan

Constitution to permit his "reelection" in 1974.

THE SOMOZA ERA

Despite the ups and downs typical of any long-
standing dictatorship, Somoza remained firmly entrenched
in power until his control started to dwindle following
the devastating earthquake in December 1972. In many ways,
his response to this tragedy, rather than the event itself,
set the forces in motion which eventually helped to lead
to his overthrow despite efforts to the contrary by the
United States.

Anastasio Somoza was an expert politician even by U.S.
standards. Somoza attended LaSalle Military Academy in
Oakland, Louisiana, for his high school education from
1936 to 1942 and then moved to West Point. He graduated
from West Point in 1946 and returned to Nicaragua and was
immediately promoted to major and appointed inspectOr-
general of the Guardia Nacional.

While in Nicaragua as Peace Corps Volunteers, my wife

and I had the opportunity to meet with "El Hombre" on 2

153

different occasions, in 1971 and again in 1973. On the
first occasion, I naively asked Somoza if he cared to spec-
ulate as to his political career. His response, in perfect
English tinged with a Southern accent, was a model example
of political double-talk. He responded that no "specula—
tion" was necessary. He stated that he had never wanted
the Presidency in the first place, but had been "forced"

to run by his party. Furthermore, when his term was over
in 1974, his only desire was to abandon politics once and
for all and return to his career as a professional military
officer, following and enforcing the laws of Nicaragua.

It is highly doubtful that the Somoza family could
ever have ascended to power, let alone remain there for
over 45 years, without the constant military and financial
support of the United States. As Franklin Deleanor
Roosevelt once observed of Tachito's father, "sure Somoza's
a son-of-a-bitch, but he's our son-of-a-bitch".

Somoza constantly did his best to live up to his repu-
tation. For example, he allowed the C.I.A.-backed and
trained Guatemalans to use Nicaragua as a base for their
successful invasion in 1956 and overthrow of the constitu-
tionally elected President Jacobo Arbenz (Matthews, 1971;
262—264). The blotched Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba was
also launched from the islands off the coast of Nicaragua,
and Somoza offered to send his own tr00ps to fight with the

United States in Korea in 1950 and again in South Vietnam

154

in 1967. Occasionally Somoza's and the Nicaraguan govern-

ment's efforts to please the United States bordered on the

absurd, such as the time the Nicaraguan treasury issued 20

cordova bills with U.S. Ambassador Sheldon Turner's face

on the front. Yet the U.S. rewarded the Somoza family well
for his loyalty.

During the Somoza era, U.S. assistance, of which the
INCEI project was but a small part, flowed in a never-
ending current. Since the 1940's, over $500 in interna-
tional loans and grants have streamed to the Somozan
government from AID, the World Bank, and the Inter-
American Development Bank. In 1975 and 1976, Nicaragua,
one of the smallest countries in Latin America, has re-
ceived more direct U.S. economic aid than any other country
in the region. Since 1973, the U.S. has provided over 76.7
million dollars for earthquake relief and reconstruction

alone (Jonas, 1976; 22).

THE WORLD'S "GREEDIEST DICTATOR"

Much of this foreign assistance has been consistently
used by the Somoza family for their own personal benefit.
In 1933, the Somoza's wealth consisted of a single small
coffee plantation. By the time of Anastacio senior's
assassination in 1956, the family's estimated worth was
over 60 million. By 1975, the syndicated columnists Jack

Anderson and Les Whitten, after months of research,

155

concluded that Somoza ranked as one of the world's richest
and "greediest dictators".

A partial listing of the property and industry owned
outright or directly controlled by the Somoza family in-
cluded: 50% of the private property in Nicaragua, includ-
ing 30% of the most fertile farmland. As a result, he was
a leading exporter of cotton, cattle, and coffee, while
hundreds of thousands of his peOple suffered from malnu-
trition. He owned the cement factory which made the high-
ways and the Mercedes-Benz franchise which sold the cars
that drove on them. Most wealthy Nicaraguans drove
Mercedes-Benz vehicles, as did the Guardia, a few bus
drivers, and even some garbage collectors; the majority of
vehicles bought by the government were Mercedes. It was
impossible to drink a beer, smoke a cigarette, buy shoes,
wash clothes at a laundromat, or even strike a Nicaraguan
match without funneling money into the Somoza family
coffers.

His family owned the national airline, one of the 2
major newspapers, television and radio stations, and the
largest shipping fleet in the country. His farms, factor-
ies, and companies produced instant coffee, lumber, sugar,
boots, clothes, salt, and oil. In fact, Somoza literally
bled his peOple to death through one of his company's known
as Plasmaferesis. This firm, run by Cuban exiles hostile

to Castro, paid poverty-stricken Nicaraguans $5 for a half

156

liter of blood and then sold it in Miami and other European

cities for $30 and up. La Prensa (October 21, 1975), the

 

major Opposition newspaper, documented that hepatitis broke
out among the workers there on several occasions and that
numerous deaths had been reported. This list only includes
some of Somoza's holdings in Nicaragua.

He is also one of the largest landowners in neighbor-
ing Costa Rica, with estimates of his estate there running
between $10 and $12 million. In the United States, Somoza
owns a 1 million dollar mansion in Miami, 2 luxurious con-
dominiums in Coconut Grove through his estranged wife, and
a plush apartment complex in the name of his mistress,
Dinorah Simpson. He also owns at lease 6 companies in
Miami (that imported over $30 million in beef in 1978
alone), various coal and gold mines throughout Latin
America, and controlling interest in Vision, a popular con-
servative news magazine which is the Latin American

equivalent to U.S. News and World Report.

 

In addition to his private wealth, while in power
Somoza collected no fewer than 4 different salaries from
the Nicaraguan government itself. His monthly salary con-
sisted of: sc9,900 as President of the Republic;$C7,986 as
Chief Director of the National Guard;:x3,993 as "General
de Division"; and $C7,000 as "Senador Vitalicio", for a
total salary of $C28,879 per month. This salary, although

small in comparison with his private income, was the

157

highest of any president in Latin America (La Prensa, June

 

5, 1978).

Both officially and unofficially, the U.S. response
to this tremendous accumulation of wealth by Somoza is that
he deserved it since he maintained order and stability in
an otherwise volatile area of the world. The State
Department's 1970 analysis of the situation in Nicaragua
concluded that:

"The current political system has given
political stability since its inception
in the 1930's. During this period,
administrations formed by the National
Liberal Party (Partido Liberal
Nationalista - PLN) headed by the
Somoza family, have provided on the
whole an orderly domestic scene and a
number of economic and social accom-
plishments. The relationship between
the government and the peOple in
Nicaragua has traditionally tended to
be a paternal one. The people see the
state as a source of prOtection, wel-
fare, and socioeconomic satisfaction;
the government expects loyalty in
return.

The imperatives of dealing with a lim-
ited resource base and a challenging
climate, and a revulsion from the dis-
orders of 200 years of civil conflict,
have probably led the electorate to
prize stability and peace more than
political theory, to value the practi-
cal necessities of building the
economy over ideological concerns."

(Ryan et al, 1970; 201)

158

William Buckley, a leading defender of U.S. interests
abroad, has strongly endorsed this analysis. Buckley
maintained that attacking or criticizing Somoza promotes
communism in Central America. He argued that Somoza, as
a model capitalist, richly deserved the aforementioned
catalogue of financial rewards since he took the risk of
investing millions of dollars in an underdeveloped
country.

Nor is Buckley and the State Department alone in their
praise for somoza. In June of 1976, the Subcommittee on
International Organizations of the House of Representatives
conducted hearings on the possibility of human rights vio-
lations in Nicaragua and explored what implications this
had for U.S. policy there. The distinguished Congressman
Jack Murphy from New York provided the members of the
subcommittee with his analysis of the situation. Murphy,
as Chair of Panama Committee and a member of the House
committee assigned the task of finding an interocean level
canal through Central America, is considered one of the
leading experts on the area in Congress. He has traveled
extensively throughout the region over the last 14 years
and attended grammar and high school with Somoza in the

United States.

159

In his testimony before the subcommittee, Murphy
attempted to distinguish between various "facts" and
"myths" with regard to Nicaragua. He asserted that Somoza
was not a military dictator, but a civilian leader, "re-
Spected and admired by most other leaders in Latin America
to the exclusion of Fidel Castro and his faltering and
sometimes murderous handmaidens in Nicaragua, the Sandin-
ista National Liberation Front," (Hearings, 1976; 3). He
argued that conditions regarding political expression and
the functioning of all democratic processes in Nicaragua
were "excellent" until 1974 when the Sandinistas conducted
"a murderously successful criminal act" which forced Somoza
to impose martial law.

Murphy supported the State Department's claim that
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro has "run amuck" and "run wild" with

La Prensa, but that since 1948, Somoza's tolerance of

 

Chamorro has constituted "a living testament to the freedom
of political expression" in Nicaragua. He maintained that
although there might exist "isolated incidents of such vio-
lations (of human rights) as can be found in even the most
advanced societies", that neither U.S. investigators nor
the State Department have found "a shred of evidence" to
support the charge that Somoza's government has instituted
a pattern of such abuse (Ibid., p. 4).

The distinguished Congressman went on to observe that:

according to the U.S. Government's own evaluation, the

160

Sandinistas "remain relatively ineffective and without
wide, solid popular base", that the FSLN "cannot do on a
large scale what they achieved on a small" (i.e. success—
fully confront Somoza's military machine); that Somoza took
"great pride" in the fact that there were no political
prisoners in Nicaragua, and that the State Department con-
firmed "that an impressive and virtually ironclad case can
be made to substantiate this." Furthermore, there have
been "no executions, no torture, and no disappearances" of
Nicaraguan citizens.

Finally, Murphy argued that Castro, not Somoza, must
be regarded as the culprit in Nicaragua. He alleged that
Castro gave paramilitary training and "ideological" support
to the guerillas, as well as promises of financial and
military aid should they prove successful in their efforts
to overthrow Somoza. Murphy concluded that:

"The Castro regime has taken dead aim at

Nicaragua since 1962 and is bent on turning it

from a strong U.S. ally into a pro-Communist

satellite in the Caribbean. I am joined in this

assessment by our U.S. intelligence people who

state, and I quote from our people on the scene,

that our 'Country Nicaraguan team in unanimous

in believing that possibility is genuine.’

Finally I urge this subcommittee to look at the

facts as they exist, and not at a fabrication by

those who would destroy an ally.

We have a strong friend in Nicaragua in a part

of the world we need them. Uncritical acceptance

of unjust accusations and their dissemination

would constitute not only a denigration of the

U.S. Congress, but an injustice of great magni-
tude and inestimable harm to a country, a people,

161

and a government that are a strong friend to the

United States." (Ibid., p. 5-6).

Despite the "impressive and virtually ironclad case"
constructed by our experienced and insightful State
Department officials on the scene that no systematic, offi-
cially sanctioned violations of human rights existed in
Nicaragua, other witnesses and sources of information pre-
sented a convincing case to the contrary. Father Fernando
Cardenal, the noted author, poet, and professor of philo-
sophy at the National University of Nicaragua, testified
after Congressman Murphy.

Father Cardenal could also be considered something of
an expert on the Somoza regime. Although he did not attend
grade school or high school with Tacho, he did have years
of personal experience living and working with the poor of
the country. He founded the famous lay monastery on
Solentiname, an archipelago of 38 islands on Lake Nicaragua.
Solentiname achieved worldwide fame for the primitive
paintings and beautiful poetry produced by the peasants
there and was the subject of several movies, including one
by the BBC. The islanders also manufactured a variety of
handicrafts made from wood, leather, copper, bronze, and
silver, while maintaining a successful agricultural coop-
erative based on Christian principles. On November 13,
1978, Cardenal went into exile and later turned up as a
leader in the FSLN. Shortly afterwards, the Guardia in-

vaded the islands and, after failing to capture Cardenal,

162

destroyed the settlement and forced the majority of occu-
pants to flee for their lives.

Father Cardenal informed the subcommittee that instead
of contributing to Nicaragua's peace and domestic stability,
the aid given by the United States to the Somoza regime
"has stimulated a constant state of agitation" and direct-
ly caused armed resistance by all sectors of the social
structure. Cardenal provided a detailed list of Nicara-
guans murdered by the National Guard and the names of hun-
dreds of peasants who had simply "disappeared" from many
departments in the country, including Neuvo Segovia (the
department where Cuidad Sandino is located), Matagalpa,
Zelaya, and Esteli. He documented that Somoza had con-
structed numerous concentration camps throughout the coun-
try as an effective tactic at terrorizing and attempting
to subdue the rural population. Incarcerated in these
camps were not just suspected guerillas, but hundreds of
women, children, and elderly people whose only "crime" was
their refusal to sell or cede their small plots of land to
Guardia officials.

Cardenal also described in detail the systematic tor-
ture conducted at these camps:

"The most refined type of torture is practiced

against prisoners in both the rural concentration

camps and the urban prisons.

When a prisoner is captured, his head is immedi-

ately covered by a sort of 'sack' made of strong,

black material, and tied at the neck with a cord.
This 'sack' hardly allows the person to breathe.

163

In this fashion, the questioning starts. The
prisoner is insulted, threatened, beaten, espec-
ially in the stomach, chest, and head. Simula-
tions of hangings and executions are frequently
practiced.

The testicles of prisoners are stuck with needles.
The prisoner is left in a refrigerated room for
several days still hooded and with no nourishment
but salted water.

Electric shocks are also applied, especially in
the genital area. Other forms of torture prac-
ticed include hanging the prisoner from the thumbs,
clubbing him or her on the head, and submerging
them in pits of filthy water until the prisoner
loses consciousness.

WOmen are raped and they are stripped naked for
interrogation.

Many prisoners, when brought before the military
court, show signs of beatings and great physical
exhaustion. In giving their testimony, several
prisoners, disregarding the pressure and threats

they have received, have testified that they were

tortured." (Ibid., p. 12)

The poet-priest noted that since the imposition of
martial law in 1974, Nicaragua has been governed by mili-
tary authorities. They follow "poor translations" of rules
and regulations laid down by the U.S. Marine Corps during
their second occupation from 1926 to 1933. Unions were
also prosecuted and freedom of the press was nonexistent.
Cardenal further documented that, "What has created the
most harm to Nicaragua is, without a doubt, the constant
military aid given out by the U.S. Government to the regime
of the Somoza family." This has allowed Somoza to trans-

form the Guardia Nacional into his own personal army. Over

5,000 members of the Guard have received training under the

164

auspices of the U.S. military stationed in the Canal Zone
in Panama. On a per capita basis, not other country in
Latin America has received more training of this type.
Finally, Cardenal stated that several U.S. ambassadors
have intentionally deceived the American Congress and peo-
ple regarding the situation in Nicaragua. He stressed
that, "There does not exist a single loan or grant of funds
from the U.S. Government sources or its agencies that the
family does not take advantage of for its personal benefit."
Amnesty International confirmed many of the accusa-
tions made by Padre Fernando. In a 75-page report released
in 1977, the highly respected human rights organization
concluded that it was "highly probable" that the majority
of prisoners in Nicaragua were tortured while in captivity.
The Guardia adopted many of the more infamous methods of
controlling the rural population utilized by South Vietnam
and the United States during the Vietnam War. The report
observed that the populations of entire villages had been
exterminated or taken away as prisoners by the Guard and
that widespread killing of campesinos and their frequent
"disappearance" after arrest constituted the most serious
violations of human rights in Nicaragua. Yet despite these
facts and Carter's widely publicized portrayal of the
United States as the guardian of human rights, the House
of Representatives voted 225 to 180 the same year that this

report was released to extend over 3 million dollars in

165

military aid alone to Somoza.

THE TIDE SHIFTS

How did an inexperienced, rag-tag band of unknown,
militarily naive individuals known as the "Sandinistas"
accomplish in 16 years the overthrow of the most firmly
entrenched dictatorship in Latin America? The Sandinistas'
amazing victory is a product of a kaleidoscope of political,
economic, social, geographic, and international factors
which will be discussed in the remaining pages of this
chapter.

In the early stages of their development, the Sandin-
istas committed one error after another. They failed to
run after hit-and-run attacks, robbed rural banks which
had no significant amounts of money in their vaults, and
fought with the U.S. trained and well-equipped Guardia
Nacional with antiquated rifles and hunting knives. Many
of the first members of the movement came from wealthy
upper class Nicaraguan families and had little knowledge
of living, let alone surviving, in the campo and jungle
areas. For example, one group of volunteers active in the
Cuidad Sandino area in the late 1960's were almost totally
wiped out by the Guardia before they completed a single
operation. ~The few remaining survivors of the group were
dragged through the streets of town like animals with ropes

around their necks. Several first—hand observers

166

remembered that these young guerillas, mostly college stu-
dents from the urban areas, were in such poor shape physi-
cally that the areas of their backs where their backpack

straps rubbed were raw and completely covered with maggots.

Yet amazingly the Sandinistas survived long enough to
learn from their mistakes. Although originally formed as
a small Marxist-Leninist guerilla movement, their efforts
expanded to include a hodge-podge of capitalists, workers,
farmers, and religious leaders. Few Nicaraguans today do
not either consider themselves "Sandinistas" or, at the
very least, praise the accomplishments of the movement.

As mentioned previously, many of Somoza's problems
increased during the aftermath of the 1972 earthquake. The
terrible destruction and human suffering of this disaster
was awesome. I had left for Christmas vacation in the
States 3 days prior to the quake and returned 10 days later.
In these short 2 weeks, the bustling capital of Managua
became transformed into a wasteland.

Practically every major building, as well as most of
the homes, were either destroyed or severely damaged.

There were no significant amounts of food, water, or med-
ical supplies available. Every Nicaraguan who survived the
quake had his or her personal nightmare to relate. A close
friend of mine, for example, a medical doctor, told of
Operating on and treating the victims in makeshift field

hospitals during workshifts that lasted over 30 hours at a

167

time. His nurse was forced to unravel the threads on the
victim's clothing in order to obtain temporary stitches
with which to close their wounds.

The relief aid from the United States and the rest of
the world quickly began pouring in at an astounding rate -
a total of $250 million overall. Almost immediately,
rumors and evidence of the theft of this aid by Somoza and
other high officials began to surface. For example, USAID
made an emergency grant of 3 million dollars to Nicaragua
which was personally delivered to Somoza by the American
Ambassador, Sheldon Turner. These funds were earmarked for
the relocation of Nicaraguan families rendered homeless by
the quake. Three days before receiving the grant, Somoza
had purchased land used for the cultivation of cotton out-
side Managua for approximately $30,000. This land was
later sold to the government through the Nicaraguan Housing
Institute for the same $3 million donated by AID. Despite
his profit of over $2,970,000, Somoza never built any homes
for the earthquake victims on this land (Hearings, 27-28).
AID's own investigation exposed the Managua Public Register
verified the above transaction.

Yet the abuses continued. The theft reached such pro-
portions that the Spanish ambassador returned assistance
sent from Spain to the International Red Cross back to
Madrid rather than turn it over to Somoza's son, who was

in charge of relief efforts at the airport. Clothes and

168

food, including canned meats, cheeses, and cookies suddenly
turned up at several of the elite private schools through-
out the country attended by the children of Guardia offi-
cials and Liberal Party politicians. Many of these enter-
prising students began selling the items on their own
internal black market in imitation of their parents.

The immediate profits obtained by Somoza were small,
however, in comparison with those generated by the recon-
struction effort. Since this disaster constituted the
third time in less than 100 years that Managua had been
leveled by a quake, it was decided to rebuild on the out-
skirts of the city, away from the main fault lines. By
coincidence, these lands were either owned by the Somoza
family or were immediately purchased by them and a small
clique of privileged insiders.

Foreign assistance financed the majority of water and
sewer pipes, electrical lines, and roads (paved, of course,
with bricks manufactured by Somoza's brick factory) to
these areas. Somoza also constructed several large shOp-
ping malls which the travel brochures proudly proclaimed
”were more like those in the United States than the shop-
ping malls found in any other Central American country."
Visits to these malls during my field research revealed
that 40% to 50% of the merchandise in many of them was
imported from the United States. The supermarkets adver-

tised U.S. canned fruits and refried beans bearing labels

169

which had not even been translated from the original
English to Spanish. The prices of most products appeared
more than 3 or 4 times that found in the United States.
For example, beans sold for almost 50 cents a pound at a
time when most Nicaraguans earned $1 to $2 per day.

The new design of the city made getting around on foot
almost impossible. Taxis were tremendously expensive.
Practically all the buses, the major source of transporta-
tion, were rickety, retired U.S. school buses, many Of
which still had the name of the American school or county
lettered on the side. As a result, many Nicaraguans began
moving back into the earthquake zone. They either inhabit-
ed the few buildings which remained standing, most of which
were structurally dangerous and near collapse, or built
makeshift homes of tin, cardboard, and other discarded
material.

The business community remained powerless and increas—
ingly bitter over Somoza's new near total control of the
economy. Although bribes and fraud had long constituted
an accepted cost of doing business in Nicaragua, the ex-
tent of corruption in the years following the quake reached
unprecedented heights. "In short, the general was changing
the rules and the independent sector was being denied a

piece of the action." (New York Times, 1978; 42).

 

Nevertheless Somoza, after another "free election"

assumed the Presidency for a new 6-year term on December

170

l, 1974. Within a month, however, the tide of events
shifted dramatically.

On December 24, 1974, members of the FSLN burst into
a Christmas party of a high-ranking government official and
narrowly missed capturing the American ambassador. They
held numerous Liberal Party politicians hostage until
Somoza met their demands, including release of several key
FSLN leaders, a ransom, publication of their objectives,
and a plane to Cuba. (Ironically, one of the demands which
Somoza was forced to meet was a 100% raise in the salaries
of all noncommissioned members of the Guardia Nacional
below the rank of sergeant.)

In response to this successful guerilla attack,
Somoza declared martial law in an effort to wipe out the
Sandinistas and their bases of pOpular support. By 1977,
Somoza again bragged that the FSLN had been effectively
crushed. The U.S. Embassy, as usual, echoed his optimism
when it observed in early 1977 that "Nicaragua should con-
tinue to enjoy political stability for some time to come.
. . During 1976, the government inflicted heavy blows on
the local guerilla organization and now faces no serious
threat from that quarter." (Bendana, 1978; 23).

Novedades (circulation 10,000), the paper owned and

 

operated by the Somoza family, ran daily articles which
condemned the guerillas as "terrorists", "los seguidores

of comunismo internacional", and Marxists whose key

171

objective was to dispurse "panic and death" among the pop-

ulation (Novedades, July 12, 1978; 40). La Prensa (circu-

 

 

1ation 30,000), the Opposition press, on the other hand,
continued to document the poverty and oppression in the
country and to make martyrs Of the many Nicaraguans slain

daily by the Guardia (see for example, La Prensa, July 8,

 

10, 15, 1978). La Prensa's own office was attacked and
machine gunned by "unknown assailants" in an apparent
attempt to silence its strong criticism of the Somoza
regime.

La Prensa, however, continued its offensive and made

 

it clear that the United States was directly responsible
for what had taken place in Nicaragua. (Ibid., June 6,
1978; 2). Although ordinarily a conservative newspaper in

many respects, La Prensa helped to maintain the revolu-

 

tionary fervor of the country by running frequent articles
on revolutionary martyrs such as Che Guevarra and Sandino
and by keeping the activities of "El Frente" in the
peoples' minds, even while many leaders of the movement
were incarcerated (Ibid., May 25, 1978; 4; October 27,
1977; 4).

Pedro Joaquin Chamorro was much more than just the

owner and editor of La Prensa. He was internationally

 

recognized for his reporting, had run for President against
Somoza, and more than any single individual, symbolized the

democratic Opposition to Somoza. Although the head of the

172

Conservative Party, he had also extended this movement to
include the Independent Liberal and Social Christian
Parties, as well as many dissidents from Somoza's Liberal
Party. All of these groups united under an umbrella group
known as the Union Democratica de Liberacion (UDEL).

On January 10, 1978, Chamorro was killed by "unknown
assailants" while on his way to work. His death caused
the passions and pent-up frustrations of hundreds of thou-
sands of Nicaraguans to boil over. A hostile, revenge-
seeking mob carried his body through the streets of Managua
burning cars, stores, and factories, many of which
belonged to Somoza.

Whether Somoza in fact ordered the assassination of
Chamorro will probably never be known. Most Nicaraguans
remain convinced that he either ordered the publisher's
death or else knows who did. As for Somoza, he denies any
part in the incident. He informed the press that "killing
him would have been a stupid thing for me to do because I
could have predicted what would happen. It was the worse
crisis of my career."

Although it is unknown to this day who actually assas-
sinated Chamorro, 5 employees of Plasmaferesis (the com-
pany selling the blood of poor Nicaraguans to the U.S.),
did confess to Guardia officials. They allegedly committed
the murder in revenge for Chamorro's numerous strong

attacks on their company. What is certain is that the

173

editor's death constituted the spark which led to a series
of general strikes calling for Somoza's resignation, which
shut down 70% to 90% of all commerce in the country for
weeks at a time.

The unexpected effectiveness Of these strikes again
exposed Somoza as vulnerable and convinced many Nicaraguans
that he could, in fact, be forced from office. General
Somoza, however, did not see it this way. He observed in
an interview that, "We have dominated the strike and will
dominate any future attempts," and that, in fact, the
strike had assisted the public since they did not have to
bother spending their money on "superfluous things".
(Washington Post, February 23, 1978; 27)

These general strikes, the first of which lasted 17
days at a cost of over $50 million to the business commun-
ity, also assisted the guerilla movement by demonstrating
that Somoza would not be removed from power by peaceful,
democratic means. The bourgeoisie Obviously resented being
effectively cut out of the financial picture after the 1972
earthquake. Furthermore, the lack of significant invest-
ment by U.S. multinationals bothered many businessmen.
Although there was an estimated $125 million in total for-
eign investment in Nicaragua, at least 75% Of which was
from U.S. multinationals, and U.S. banks had an estimated
$350 million loan exposure, very little private outside

capital flowed into the country after the earthquake. It

174

appeared obvious to even the more adventurous investors
that the political climate in Nicaragua, in addition to
Tacho's customary 10% to 20% off-the-tOp, meant the country
was less than desirable as an investment Opportunity.

The public in general also responded to Chamorro's
death by boycotting the municipal elections held in
February 1978. Less than 1/3 of the eligible voters both-
ered to turn out to cast a ballot; at best 136,000 voters
out of 700,000 eligible cast their ballots for the Liberal
Party, and even this official figure is considered inflated.
At least 52 of the 132 Conservative Party candidates volun-
tarily withdrew from the various local races, leaving the
Liberal candidates to run unopposed.

Hundreds of middle-class women and children conducted
their own noisy protests against Somoza in Managua,
Diriamba, and other cities night after night by turning out
in the streets to beat pots, pans, and buckets. The
Guardia responded to these protests with tear gas, beatings
and arrests.

Another significant event which fertilized this
groundswell of opposition was the return of "Las Doce"

(The Twelve). Las Doce was a group of middle-class busi-
nessmen, priests, and intellectuals who came from all parts
of the country. They consisted of: Father Miguel D'Escota,
a Maryknoll priest; Father Fernando Cardenal Martinez, a

Jesuit and brother of the poet-priest Father Ernesto

175

Cardenal; Carlos Gutierrez, a dentist; Carlos Tunnerman
Bernheim, rector of the National University; Joaquin Cuadra
Chamorro, a lawyer; Arturo Cruz, an economist; Casimira
Satelo Rodriguez, an architect; Ricardo Cortonel Kautz, an
agronomist; Sergio Ramirez Mercado, a writer; Ernesto
Castillo Martinez, a lawyer and founder of a legal aid
clinic in Managua; and Emilio Baltodano Pallias, an indus-
trialist. These 12 prominent Nicaraguans were convicted
in 1977 of inciting rebellion because they signed an anti-
Somoza document. They were all forced to flee into exile
in Costa Rica.

From exile they formed a broad coalition against
Somoza, the Broad Opposition Front, which consisted of at
least 15 different organizations, including political par-
ties and labor unions. On July 5, 1978, they decided to
call Somoza's bluff to arrest them on sight and returned
to Managua. Although the government cut Off public trans-
portation to the airport located 12 miles outside Managua,
over 150,000 cheering supporters, the largest demonstration

in Nicaraguan history, turned out to welcome them (National

 

Catholic Reporter, August 18, 1978; 13-16).

 

Somoza, apparently fearing an all-out rebellion,
backed down at the last second and did not arrest them.
Los Dos then began a 7-week tour of every major city to
solidify the opposition. In city after city, they were met

by enthusiastic crowds repeatedly demanding the ouster of

176

Somoza. The middle class, conservative backgrounds of
these individuals and many of their supporters helped ex-
pose the myth that the primary opponents to Somoza were a
small group of radical, Marxist guerillas trained and
indoctrinated in Cuba.

Meanwhile, the Sandinistas were experiencing their own
internal problems as well. By the mid-1970's, the FSLN had
split into 3 groups as a result of disagreement concerning
the best tactics for overthrowing Somoza. One faction
argued that a lengthy guerilla war, or a "Guerra Popular
Prolongada", offered the only alternative. Another group
abandoned seeking immediate military Objectives and advo-
cated focusing on the urban areas and the formation of a
revolutionary party of workers. The third group, the
"Terceristas", at first tried to reconcile these 3 groups'
differences and then developed their own strategy (NACLA,
1978; 43-45).

The Terceristas maintained that the time was now right
for a successful insurrection, as long as support came from
all sectors of the country opposed to Somoza. They advo-
cated a broad-based coalition, spearheaded militarily by
the Sandinistas, but backed economically by the bourgeoisie
and the working class (Bendana, 1978; 22). It was not un-
til March 20, 1979, that the FSLN reunified under a single
national leadership which basically adopted this strategy

of the Terceristas (Bendana, 1979; 41).

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

On August 22, 1978, the Terceristas proved their point
by striking again militarily. This time, in an even more
daring and spectacular raid than the December 24th incident,
commandos from the FSLN dressed in Guardia Nacional uni—
forms smartly marched into the Palacia Nacional, the Nic-
araguan Congress, and took almost the entire Senate and
House of Representatives prisoner. Over 1,500 persons were
taken hostage, including many of Somoza's cohorts and rela-
tives; he had no alternative but to agree to the Sandin-
istas' demands. The guerillas obtained the release of 59
political prisoners, $500,000 in cash, safe passage out of
the country, and made a national hero out of "Commander
Zero", the leader of the Operation.

The Palace take-over significantly weakened Somoza's
support among right-wing Guardia officials who felt humil-
iated by the Sandinistas' success. More importantly, how-
ever, it achieved several key objectives for the FSLN, in-
cluding the freeing of many important leaders, widespread
national and international dissemination of their plan to
launch "the final offensive", and how they expected the
population to COOperate.

On September 9, 1978, the Sandinistas launched suc-
cessful coordinated attacks on Masaya, Leon, Chinandego,
and Esteli. Within hours the local Guardia forces were
either captured or bottled up in their own garrisons. The

guerillas were soon joined by thousands of supporters from

177

178

the general population, especially high school students of
both sexes.

But the guerillas proved no match for the heavily
armed Guardia reinforced by Cuban exiles and American mer—
cenaries and military personnel from Brazil and Argentina

(La Prensa, July 5, 1978; July 12, 1978; l). The Guardia

 

simply surrounded each city one at a time and indiscrimi-
nately bombed the rebels into submission. The attack was
quashed in a matter of weeks at an incredible loss of
civilian lives and property. Although July 1978 again saw
numerous lengthy general strikes appear in practically
every Nicaraguan city, Somoza felt more in control than

ever (La Prensa, July 20, 1978; 16).

 

Somoza now was blaming not only Castro, but the human
rights policies of the Carter administration as one of the
primary impetuses behind his troubles. Somoza stated in
one interview (given during the September insurrection)
that, "I have stated time and time again that the human
rights policy of this administration has given the opposi-
tion in many countries the idea that they can overthrow
their government by force. And the Nicaraguans, very sorry
for me to say, were elated by this policy, and they took
on to make public demonstrations in the streets, provoked
the authorities, and finally delivered an armed attack
against my government - things that have been very diffi-

cult for me because we've been at this for months, with a

179

great deal of tolerance and a great deal of patience."
(MacNeil and Lehrer, 1978; 5).

In order to polish his image with the American press,
Somoza hired the New York public relations firm Of Lawrence,
Patterson, and Farrell, Inc. Somoza paid public relations
executive Norman Wolfson $84,000 a year plus expenses and
fees of over $1,000 a day to "present Nicaragua as it is,
not as a biased people see it."

Somoza might have his doubts whether Wolfson earned
his pay. By February of 1979, even the Carter administra-
tion was severing its most visible ties with Somoza. The
Carter administration cut off all further military aid,
withdrew its 4-man military advisory team, withdrew the 21
remaining Peace Corps volunteers, and reduced by half the
number of AID and embassy personnel in Managua. As a re-
sult of U.S. pressure, the World Bank refused to consider
$66 million in economic aid requested by Somoza. The U.S.
also refused to consider any new AID economic aid programs
until Somoza agreed to mediate the crisis.

The United States, however, refused to sever all ties
with the Somoza regime. The U.S. Ambassador, Mauricio
Solaum, was not recalled, and the embassy remained open.
More importantly, $30 million in economic aid previously
promised the Nicaraguan government was not cut off, alleg-
edly because it was to alleviate "the needs of the poor".

In fact, much of this money was diverted to buy arms from

180

Israel and Argentina.

Semana Santa (Holy Week) of 1979 presented an omen of
things to come. While Somoza vacationed with his children
in Florida, approximately a hundred guerillas retook the
northern city of Esteli. Only a few weeks earlier, rebels
had wiped out the Guardia post stationed in Cuidad Sandino.
The Guardia again managed to retake Esteli with the help
of Sherman tanks and rocket-firing airplanes, but only
after the town itself was totally destroyed (Time, April

23, 1979; 38).

THE FINAL OFFENSIVE

On June 1, 1979, the Sandinista guerilla movement
opened its long-awaited "final Offensive" with coordinated
attacks on most major cities and the entry of 300 men from
Costa Rica. At the time Of this final push, the Sandin—
istas had grown from 1500 to an estimated 5000 men versus
a National Guard that expanded in less than a year from
7500 to 15,000 men.

Since many of the Guard's recruits were poorly train-
ed and motivated youngsters, Somoza attempted to augment
his troops with as many as 2500 mercenaries, including
United States veterans from Vietnam and South Koreans. The
military governments of El Salvador and Guatemala also sent
trOOps and arms to assist Tacho. The General estimated

that this time it would take "2 or more weeks" to defeat

181

the guerillas (New York Times, June 2, 1979; 1-2).

 

Two weeks later, Somoza's forces had fared so poorly
that he reassessed the situation and stated that because
"the will of the peOple had weakened", the war could go
either way. By now the Andean Group countries of Ecuador,
Peru, Bolivia, Columbia, and Venezuela recognized the San-
dinistas as a "legitimate army" and began funneling arms
to them via Panama and Costa Rica. Somoza's threat to in-
vade Costa Rica, thereby escalating the conflict into a
regional war, was met by Venezuela and Panama. Both these
countries sent bombers and crews to CoSta Rica and promised
to retaliate against Nicaragua if Costa Rica, a country
which has no army or air force of its own, was invaded.

The strategy of the Sandinistas was to pin down the
Guard in various sections of the country, to control high-
ways, and allow the cities to be seized by popular insur-
rection similar to that of the previous summer. These
tactics, which met with success in 7 short weeks, obviously
would have failed without the widespread support of the
general population.

Somoza's response was to allow the guerillas to tem-
porarily take control Of the major cities and towns
throughout the country, "using up their ammunition first",
and then launch a counterattack city by city. The Guardia
intended to again encircle each city individually and then

indiscriminately bomb with artillery and aircraft the

182

individuals trapped inside their circle of death.

Ironically, the results of this same tactic which had
proven so successful only the year before ultimately led
to Somoza's defeat. So many innocent men, women, and
children had been slaughtered in the previous uprising that
thousands of bitter Nicaraguans who had not yet taken part
joined the revolution. Thousands of unemployed, urban, and
rural teenagers of both sexes took to the streets and built
barricades of overturned cars, buses, sandbags, and cement-
blocks produced by Somoza's own factory. The Sandinistas
slogan of "every house a fortress" became a reality in
town after town.

By June, the United States was trying frantically to
get Somoza to resign in hOpes of establishing an "interim
government of national reconciliation" which would include
members Of the Liberal Party and once again be backed by
a peace-keeping force composed, in part, by U.S. Marines.
Since the Sandinistas refused to even discuss this pro—
posal, Somoza had no choice but to also refuse.

The United States later tried to starve-off defeat
through a proposal for a peace-keeping force under the spon-
sorship of the Organization of American States (OAS). The
U.S. intended this force to be composed of military trOOps
from several Latin American countries - again including
U.S. Marines. Not one of the 26 Latin American countries

backed the proposal, although several of them did severely

183

criticize the suggestion.

The United States also attempted to divert some of the
criticism away from Somoza and towards Cuba. State
Department officials asserted that Cubans were heavily in-
volved in the training and supplying of the Nicaraguan
rebels and that dozens, "perhaps scores", of Cubans were
taking part in the fighting. These allegations, however,
received little support at home or abroad.

In fact, the viciousness and cruelty of the Guardia
became blatantly clear to millions of Americans in June of
1979 as they watched Bill Stewart, an ABC-TV correspondent,
shot and killed in cold blood on the nightly news report.
The film showed that Stewart had obediently stopped for a
routine roadblock, was ordered to lie face down, kicked in
the ribs, and then shot in the back of his head for no
reason whatsoever. The soldiers then brought his body back
to his crew, who had filmed the entire incident and allowed
them to drive Off (New York Times, June 23, 1979; 1).

By July 9, 1979, Somoza was telling the Nicaraguan
Congress that he intended to draft 50,000 more men for the
National Guard. He was disgusted with the performance of
most of his recruits, many of whom were illiterate men from
the eastern coast where the Sandinista influence was least
strongly felt. He repeatedly bemoaned the fact that the
Carter administration was not being realistic in seeking

a "moderate solution", since the only real choice was

184

between himself and a Cuban-styled government led by the
Sandinistas.

Once Somoza finally accepted the reality of his in-
evitable resignation, he further complicated the situation
by attempting to impose preconditions on his departure.

He insisted that the Liberal Party be allowed to continue
as a force in Nicaraguan politics, that the Guardia
Nacional be preserved intact, and that none of his subor-
dinates, either civilian or military, be imprisoned or ex-
ecuted. It appears that these demands were motivated as
much by his own self-interests as those Of his followers
since, as one observer noted, "Somoza is watching out for
himself. If he doesn't get those guarantees for his Guard,
he might not get out alive." The Sandinistas promised to
be merciful in victory, but refused to negotiate terms with
Somoza.

Somoza finally resigned anyway on July 17, 1979, and
flew to his luxurious retreat on Miami Beach's Sunset
Island. Before departing, Somoza and other high Guardia
and Liberal Party officials removed all but $3.5 million
of the country's foreign reserves (which were valued at
$150 million as of 1977). Somoza's son, backed by National
Guardsmen with tanks, had raided every major bank in
Managua and removed any remaining foreign currencies.

After his departure, Somoza's successor, Francisco

Urcuzo, shocked both the United States and Nicaragua by

185

announcing he intended to remain as the constitutionally
elected President until his term expired in 1981. (He had
been elected at a midnight session of the Nicaraguan legis-
lature just before many of the members hastily fled the
country.) Urcuzo only agreed to step down after the United
States informed Somoza that he would be deported back to
Nicaragua unless his successor left immediately. Somoza
now resides in Paraguay under the protection of the dic-
tator Alfredo Stroessner, the same individual who has

given sanctuary to infamous Nazis for the last 35 years.

THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE

On July 19, 1979, the Sandinista army Victoriously
marched into Managua and were swamped by a cheering crowd.
Of over 50,000 people in the newly renamed Plaza of the
Revolution. Once in power, the Sandinistas were true to
their word that there would be no mass trials or executions
Of former Guardia and government officials. Roberto
Arguello Hurtado, the newly appointed Chief Justice Of the
Nicaraguan Supreme Court, whose brother was jailed and
killed by the National Guard, explained that, "The Sandin-
ista National Liberation Front is hard in war but generous
in victory."

The Sandinistas set up 3-man courts consisting of one
Sandinista, one civilian, and one lawyer and began con-

ducting trials of Guardsmen. Their punishment rarely

186

resulted in jail terms of over 10 days. Higher Guardia
officials were turned over to the Red Cross; there was only
one documented officially sanctioned execution of a Guardia
official.

This response stood in stark contrast to that of the
Somozan government in the waning days of the war. The
Guardia had captured and sumarrily executed hundreds of
Nicaraguan youth for the "crime" of being between the ages
of 12 and 25. When the Sandinistas entered Managua, they
found the shores of Lake Managua littered with the corpses
of these youths with their hands bound behind their backs
and sacks tied around their necks.

Samoza's departure came at the end of the final 7-week
Offensive of the guerillas which saw practically the entire
population rise up against him in a "national mutiny".

The Sandinistas had taken control of every major town ex-
cept Managua, where it had infiltrated 2,000 guerillas,
and controlled all major highways. The war produced an
estimated 20,000 dead and 650,000 refugees out of a popu-
lation of 2.2 million - many of whom fled across the bor-
ders into neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica.

Well in advance of Somoza's departure, the FSLN had
set up a 5-member junta to replace him. Only one of these
5 individuals, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, is an avowed Marxist.
Ortega was born to a middle-class Managuan family and was

one of the original participants Of the Sandinista movement.

187

He took part in various guerilla activities, was eventually
captured, and served a lengthy jail term.

The other 4 members of the junta presently ruling
Nicaragua are: Alfanso Robelo Calejas, a politically con-
servative chemical engineer who comes from a wealthy fam-
ily. He was president of the Nicaraguan Chamber of
Commerce and other powerful business organizations and an
ardent opponent of Somoza.

Violeta Barrios de Chamorro is the widow of Pedro
Joaquin Chamorro, the hero of the Conservative Party who
became a hero of the revolution when he was assassinated
on January 10, 1978. Like her husband, Violeta de Chamorra
is wealthy, conservative, and has a long history of
opposing Somoza.

Moises Hassan Morales, although a leftist and a guer-
illa leader in the Sandinista movement, disavows the
Marxist label and regards himself as a moderate. Hassan
was born in Managua of humble origins, but became a civil
engineer and professor of mathematics at the University of
Managua.

Sergio Ramirez Mercado, the remaining member of the
junta, is also a "non-Marxist leftist". He was born to a
poor family in southern Nicaragua, became a lawyer, and
taught law at the University of Nicaragua until 1974. In
1977, he helped to found "Los Doce", the group of 12 in—

fluential Nicaraguan businessmen, intellectuals, priests,

188

and professionals who played a crucial role in undermining
the Somoza government.

The new government faces problems as great, if not
greater, than the Somoza regime itself. Somoza left physi—
cal damage of over half a billion dollars, in addition to
a foreign debt of over 1.3 billion (Burbach and Flynn,
1979; 40-44). In addition to the immediate problem of
feeding the population, since the war prevented most
farmers from planting, the new government must address the
awesome problems of rebuilding a devastated economy and
generating social justice while combatting "Somocismo
without Somoza". Moreover, there is the clear and ever
present danger of a counter—revolution, especially in View
Of the fact that there are approximately 3,000 armed ex-
Guardsmen in Honduras under the direction Of Somoza's son,
many Of whom have vowed to return.

Immediately after the junta took power, a new Spirit
of hOpe and rebuilding infected the land. The junta has
cancelled the country's $5.1 million debt to Israel and
Argentina for military arms purchased by Somoza in the
last days Of his dictatorship. They have promised free
elections, a non-aligned foreign policy, a redistribution
of Somoza's holdings, and a "mixed economy" based on re-
spect for private property and social justice. Only time
will tell if the deaths, suffering, ideals, and love of the
revolution will make a just and equitable Nicaragua a

reality.

 

 

CHAPTER VI

PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF DATA
THE AGRICULTURAL PICTURE IN GENERAL

Without a doubt, agriculture is the key to the
Nicaraguan economy. It contributes 40% of the gross
national product, employs approximately 60% of the labor
force, and produces over 75% of the country's exports.
From 1960 to 1968, Nicaragua had one of the highest annual
growth rates in Latin America. The 8% annual increase in
agricultural production, most of which took place in the
production of export crOps, especially cotton, constituted
the primary impetus behind this upsurge.

Although reliable data on agricultural production is
practically nonexistent, the figures which do exist indi—
cate that the production of the basic food crops during
the 1950's and 1960's barely kept pace with the 3.4% annual
population increase. Nicaragua, while exporting millions
of dollars worth of cotton, coffee, and beef annually to
the United States and Europe, has yet to gain self-
sufficiency in the basic grains. Although the country
manages to export a minimal amount of beans and sorghum to
neighboring countries, she doubled her imports of corn and
rice from 1963 to 1968. This trend has continued unabated
through the 1970's and will doubtlessly worsen in the years

immediately following the revolution.

189

190

Export crops account for over 50% of all agricultural
production, livestock accounts for 31.8%, and the basic
food crops for 18.8% of the total. Yet 75% of the farms
in Nicaragua plant corn, and this crops occupies 36% of the
total planted land. The second ranked crop, coffee, occu-
pies less than half as much land area. Beans rank a dis-
tant third, are grown on 37% of the farms, and occupy 9%
of the total planted area (Warnken, 1975; 24-26).

In terms of production per manzana, Nicaragua ranks
behind the other 5 Central American countries in corn and
third in bean production. In comparison with the United
States, which produces approximately 78.6% (in hundred
weight per manzana) of corn and 21.6% of beans, Nicaragua
produces 14.0% of corn and 12.6% of beans (Ibid., p. 14).

With regard to cotton, however, Nicaragua outproduces the

 

U.S. 10.6 to 7.6. As a result, cotton is the mainstay of
the export sector of the economy. This one crop alone
accounts for almost half of all exports. Despite the ob-
vious dangers of dependency on a single crop, the cultiva-
tion of cotton has always received the benefits of modern
technology. In 1966, for example, 85% of all mechanical
power, 96% of pesticides, and 53% of the fertilizer were
devoted exclusively to cotton.

Thus one of the most blatant and consistent contra-
dictions facing Nicaragua in recent years has been this

ability to export huge quantities of cotton, coffee, and

191

beef while remaining unable to feed her own population.
The United States has instituted a variety of rural devel-
opment projects over the years in an effort to assist the
rural population with this dilemma. At the same time,
these programs have helped to support the Somoza regime,
thereby protecting U.S. interests in the area.

Between 1951 and 1967, for example, Nicaragua received
13 different loans from the World Bank totaling $43,100,000
(Ryan, 1970; 307). These developmental programs encom-
passed everything from electric power and irrigation pro-
jects to construction of highways and port facilities to
the purchase of agricultural machinery. From 1961 to 1967,
Nicaragua also received 15 loans from the Inter-American
Development Bank totaling $50,625,000. These loans were
used for agriculture and cattle raising (approximately 50%
of the total), housing (30%), industry (15%), highways
(5%), and education (less than 1%). AID by the end of 1967
had provided Nicaragua with at least 19 different loans
under the Alliance for Progress program totaling over
$49,000,000 (Ibid., p. 308). This figure does not include
outright grants by AID to the Somoza regime.

Some of AID's most conserted efforts to assist the
campesinos included highway construction and financial
assistance to Banco Nacional and I.A.N. (the Agrarian
Reform Ministry). With regard to road construction and

maintenance, the Nicaraguan government has invested $12

192

million in domestic and foreign expenditures between 1961
and 1967 and double this amount between 1967 and 1973. The
country increased its total miles of roads from 601 in 1953
to 4,216 in 1967. Banco Nacional received funding which
allowed them to provide short-term financing for small and
medium-sized farmers and to supply them with insecticide,
fertilizer, and technical assistance. The purpose of these
loans was to increase the production Of corn, beans, rice,
sorghum, and sesame and to permit the purchase of livestock,
primarily pigs and cattle. This rural credit agency, in
addition to its main office in downtown Managua, maintained
50 branch offices and a permanent staff of 217 employees,
95 special technicians, and 47 American Peace Corps
volunteers.

Agrarian reform in Nicaragua operated under the
auspices of I.A.N., in part with the assistance of a $2
million loan from AID. An AID loan assistance study recog-
nized that "King Cotton" had forced many small farmers to
move into the jungle areas controlled by I.A.N. because,
"Land which was formerly devoted to the production of corn
and other food crops raised primarily by small farmers had
been taken over for the production of cotton on an indus-
trial basis, forcing these farmers to become seasonal
laborers in the cotton field." (United States Department
of State Agency for International Development, 1965; 20).

These small farmers had an abundance of land to which to

193

migrate, since almost two-thirds of the land in Nicaragua
is uncolonized jungle.

Originally I.A.N. inherited a small group of colonies
throughout this area and faced the challenge of improving
them with roads, schools, health centers, and modern agri-
cultural practices. This institution, however, eventually
faced the unenviable task of organizing the thousands of
spontaneous settlers and issuing them land titles. In
1967, for example, over 3,000 titles were issued, and by

1970, this annual rate had doubled.

HISTORY OF THE INCEI PROGRAM

Like many other countries in Latin America, Nicaragua
experiences a 6-month rainy season followed by a 6-month
dry season. Wild price fluctuations traditionally follow
the agricultural cycle even in normal times. At the end
of each harvest, the availability of large quantities of
grain drives the price down to as low as $C 10 per arroba
(25 U.S. pounds) for corn and $C 25 per arroba for beans.
Six to nine months after the harvest, however, the shortage
of these same grains will often cause the price to rise by
50% to 200%.

Many campesinos, because of poverty and inadequate
storage facilities, will sell their product at the low“
harvest price and will be forced to purchase either domestic

or imported grain 9 months later at a greatly inflated

194

price in order to feed their families. Large landowners
and investors who possess the necessary capital are able
to maintain an extremely high standard of living by buying
grain when the price is deflated, storing it, and then
reselling the product once the price rose.

Moreover, perhaps as much as 50% of the nation's har-
vest is lost each year because of poor transportation and
storage facilities. The farmers traditionally store their
corn either in their homes or in a troja stacked in rows
without removing the husks or shell it and pour the grain
into large wooden boxes called "buques". Both of these
methods provide inadequate protection against the ravages
of mice, rats, insects, and mildew.

In order to eliminate this waste, in 1968 the
Nicaraguan government established INCEI, Instituto Nacional
de Comercio Exterior y Interior. This institution faced
the task of eliminating the necessity for importing basic
foodstuffs and of controlling the wild price fluctuations
associated with the planting and harvesting seasons.

Under a program develOped by specialists from the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
and eventually financed by a loan from the Import-Export
Bank, the method by which INCEI hoped to accomplish this
task appeared relatively simple. The Bank, under the
Alliance for Progress, agreed to advance Nicaragua a loan

for $4,512,100 on March 12, 1968. This money was to be

195

used for the construction of 5 huge regional grain storage
centers and for the purchase in the United States of
approximately 100 local storage units which were to be
located throughout the country's corn and bean producing
regions. AID agreed to supply technical advisors to in-
struct the Nicaraguan Operators as to the care and opera-
tion of the facilities.

Each unit consisted of 6 large silos and a drying
machine manufactured in the United States which allowed
farmers to dry and store their grains for a nominal fee.
INCEI intended to buy these grains at a set minimum price
at the harvest and to resell them at a slightly higher
price once the demand of the market increased. Whether the
campesino chose to store his harvest in the silos or sell
it to INCEI remained his own choice.

INCEI was to be a semi-autonomous institution which
Operated directly under the authority of the executive
branch of government. President Somoza, as might be ex-
pected, appointed the 3—member board Of directors. By law,
at least 1 Of these individuals had to come from the
opposition, Conservative Party.

Originally the centers were also to provide the farm-
ers with tractors, plows, discs, and trained equipment
operators. Grain drying and cleaning equipment were avail—
able at each local unit since the AID agricultural special-

ists had concluded that, "grains now cannot be properly

196

conserved by the farmers as there is no drying equipment
available in the rural areas." INCEI was also supposed to
greatly improve the marketing processes for small and
medium farmers and provide them with technical assistance.
According to the AID analysis, "the foreign specialist
(i.e., AID employees) is a key individual in the project,"
because it was to be his task to train the Nicaraguans in
the use and upkeep of this array of modern agricultural
equipment.

The selection of the centers allegedly received care-
ful attention after a detailed investigation based on
"close visual observation and discussion of some depth with
the various community and agricultural leaders and a sam-
pling of representative farmers to gain first-hand infor-
mation regarding their service needs and probable response
to the services and type of center organization contem-
plated." (Ibid., p. 24). The main criteria for location
Of the centers was: the availability of services antici-
pated under the prevailing conditions, the present and
potential grain production levels, the availability of
rural credit, "ecological conditions", a sufficiently large
population base, community interest, and "overall need in
terms of economic and social characteristics".

USAID deserves much Of the credit for the original
design and implementation of the project, although the

actual purchase and construction of the first stage of the

197

project was financed by a loan from the Import-Export Bank.
According to Official government documents, representatives
from Banco Nacional approached the USAID Director in
Nicaragua and discussed the possibilities for developing
such a program for serving the needs of small farmers.
Since "the expensive farm machinery, drying equipment,
storage sheds, and marketing facilities that are essential
to profitable grain production are not feasibly within the
reach of individual small or medium producers," (Ibid.,

p. ii) AID agreed to supply these modern "essentials" on

both the regional and local levels.

INCEI ' S OBJECTIVES

Although at first AID projected the construction of
only 47 centers, 10 the first year, 15 the second, and 22
the third year, this projection was later increased to 100
local units. AID estimated direct benefits to 7,000
families by the second year of operation and over 17,000
families by the fifth year.

The official goals of the INCEI program according to
the AID loan proposal were:
(1) A 22% increase in total national grain production by

the fifth year of Operation with a total value in

198

excess of $5 million based on current prices.*

(2) To increase agricultural production and the small
farmer's family income and nutritional levels.

(3) To make Nicaragua self-sufficient in the basic food
grains.

(4) And to "develop democratic institutions at the grass
roots level through self-help and community improve-
ment." (Ibid., p. IV-V).

Although these were the official goals of the program,

AID documents expanded on other objectives they believed

would be reached once INCEI had been in operation for a

period of years. Their intensive review estimated that:

"Analysis of the economic impact of this
project is difficult because the benefits
are not wholly within the project itself,
but also from other programs that can be
reached through use of the centers. Never-
theless, the BNN-AID working group has
sought to estimate the minimum direct im-
pact this program can have on grain produc-
tion, not through incentives for farmers

to go into or expand grain production, but
by merely increasing productivity on land
now planted in grains through use of center
tractors and farm supply goods.

First, a hypothetical 'center user' popula-
tion was defined and a level of current and

 

*These production objectives seemed modest in compar-
ison with claims made by AID for other programs assisting
farmers. For example, AID's loan prOposal for the INCEI
project noted that a recent rural credit program financed
by the International Development Bank had assisted over
20,000 farmers in 5 short years and stated that, "A recent
evaluation of the program indicates that participating
farmers have increased their income by an average of 160%
and doubled their capital assets." (Ibid., p. 3).

199

future production was established assuming
no-use of center facilities. This was done
by calculating an estimated number of center
users (2-300 per center in first years,
gradually increasing later); estimating
that the average user will have 8.4 acres
planted in grain (he will probably have
more); assuming he is currently producing
about 10 CWT per manzana (manzana is 1.7
acres) and is selling that grain at $2.70
per CWT . . . the center services should
account for an added production of 23 per
cent in the first year and reach 50 per cent
by the third year and almost double by the
tenth year. This increase, it should again
be stressed, is only that attributable to
center-provided services applied to acreage
already in cultivation. The effect of the
center's storage, drying, and marketing
services on farmers' incentives to produce
grains should be even greater and result in
production increases far in excess of those
projected above." (Ibid., p. 32-33).

The loan proposal then went on to observe that,
"Gross income from production of grains can
be assumed to grow by the amount that pro-
duction is increased, so it can be antici-
pated that the previously mentioned minimum
production increases would also apply to
income increases as well. That is gross
income could grow by 50% the third year and
almost double the tenth year. In reality
the increases should be much greater for
several reasons. . ." (Ibid., p. 36).

The reasons offered to further explain predicted in-
creases much greater than 50% or 100% included the fact9
that farmers could sell their grain to INCEI at a guaranteed
price. Spoilage and grain losses would be greatly reduced
through INCEI'S "prOper" drying and cleaning of the corn
and beans. Finally, the farmers would ideally be able to
increase their production through another AID assistance

program to the Banco Nacional which focused on rural credit

200

and technical assistance.

This later AID project became possible once the
Import-Export Bank retracted their earlier rejection and
agreed to finance the INCEI project.* As a result, in
fiscal year 1978, AID provided loan assistance to Nicaragua
through 3 projects: a $9.4 million loan for Basic Food
Crops (a significant percentage of which was to supplement
the INCEI project); $2.2 million for Health Centers and
Rural Health Units; and $10.2 million for Rural Electric
Cooperatives. This total package of $21.8 million consti-
tuted a significant increase over the level of fiscal
assistance provided in previous years by AID. For example,
Nicaragua received $14.2 million in fiscal year 1965, $14.3
million in fiscal year 1966, and $9.2 million in fiscal
year 1967 (Department of State Agency for International
DevelOpment, 1968).

The terms of these loans, on the surface, were ex-
tremely favorable to Nicaragua. Each loan's repayment

period stretched out over 40 years after the first

 

*Although AID designed the INCEI program and, accord-
ing to unclassified documents, originally intended to
finance it, this shift by the Import-Export Bank prevented
this. Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended
by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 S .251(b), AID is
effectively prohibited from authorizing developmental loans
if financing is available from other free world sources
(usually either the WOrld Bank, the International Develop-
ment Bank, or the Import-Export Bank) or private sources
within the U.S.

201

disbursement, with a 10-year grace period. The interest
rate during this grace period was 2% per year and 2-1/2%
thereafter.

On the other hand, as usual, this foreign aid package
appeared to benefit the United States. $20.83 million of
this $21.8 million had to be used "to finance U.S. goods
and services which are in addition to normal Nicaraguan
procurement and only $975,000 (was) used in local cost
financing." The loan proposal further blatantly observed
that, "This project as envisioned will have no adverse
effect on the U.S. economy or balance-of-payments situa-
tion and may provide some amount of direct economic benefit
to the U.S. The loan will be utilized to finance the pur-
chase of U.S. manufactured equipment and provide U.S.
technical assistance. Increased production through the use
of the center will generate new income and serve to expand
the effective demand for U.S. capital and consumer goods."
(Ibid., p. 39). AID went on to note that while Nicaraguan
exports to the U.S. from 1960 to 1966 only increased from
$26.9 million to $35.9 million, imports from the U.S. to
Nicaragua during the same period increased from $37.7

million to $75.7 million.

'202

FOCUS OF THE RESEARCH: CIUDAD SANDINO

This study focused on the INCEI unit located in Ciudad
Sandino, Nicaragua. This location was selected because of
my own familiarity with many of the farmers in the area,

(I doubt whether I could have conducted these interviews

in such a relatively short timeframe under such tense con-
ditions in any other rural area in Nicaragua), and because
the agricultural traditions and levels of technology reflect
a patter representative of much Of rural Nicaragua and

Latin America in general.

At the time of this research, Cuidad Sandino had a
population of approximately 1,500 peOple and consisted of
257 houses and 143 stores. (The front room of every third
house typically offered a small potporri of items for sale,
including sugar, corn, soft drinks, and cigarettes - avail-
able individually or by the pack.) The grade school con-
sisted of 6 grades with 300 students and 8 teachers; there
was no high school. The town had branch offices of the
Ministry of Agriculture and Banco Nacional available to
assist the farmers from the surrounding rural areas. The
town had running water but no electricity except for a
small generator. This generator was located in a shed be—
hind the church and primarily provided power for periodic
fund-raising events. Although the town had no doctor, it
did have a health center staffed by a registered nurse.

Ciudad Sandino had no industry other than a small hat

factory, and depended on the agricultural community for its

203

economic support. Politically the town, at least on the
surface, reflected an admiration for and imitation of the
Somoza style of government. Almost every major political
figure in local government was a member of Somoza's Liberal
Party and a member of the same family, including the mayor,
the Congresswoman, the town's secretary and subtreasurer,
the school's director, and several teachers (LaPrensa,

5/20/78).

THE INTERVIEWS WITH THE
"OFFICIAL RELEVANT SYSTEMS"

As mentioned previously, the major thrust of my
research constituted a concerted effort to identify the
relevant systems involved with the INCEI project and,
through the process of formal and informal interviewing,
to discover the norms and values of these groups and to in-
vestigate the levels of consensus and conflicts between
and among these social groups. This study hypothesized
that a rural development project which understands and re-
flects the norms and values of the social systems effected
by the program stand a greater chance of success and attain—
ing its goals than one which ignores or excludes major seg-
ments of the population which it intends to assist.

During the field research, interviews were conducted
with 21 individuals representing a variety of official
relevant systems. Although the interviews were based on

a prearranged set of questions (see Appendices C and D),

204

this format was not strictly adhered to; instead the inter—
views were kept informal and spontaneous in order to obtain
as much information as possible. The respondents included
several large grain buyers, employees of Banco Nacional,
INCEI and the Ministry of Agriculture in Ciudad Sandino,
AID personnel in Managua, and Nicaraguan census officials.
These interviews, in addition to the AID documents cited
previously, helped to identify the official and unofficial
goals of the project and to estimate the extent to which
these goals were actually attained.

According to INCEI officials, the 100 local INCEI
units have a capacity of 24,000 quintales each. Each site
has 6 silos with a capacity for storing approximately 4,000
quintales. There are also 3 regional centers located in
Managua, Chinandega, and Matagalpa with an additional
storage potential of over 3 million quintales. In addition
to the cleaning, drying, and storage of grains, each center
sells hybrid seeds, insecticides, fertilizer, and basic
farm implements such as shovels, hoes, and machettes.

One of INCEI'S main functions is to establish a mini-
mum price for the basic grains. For example, in 1976-1977,
the prices established by INCEI per quintale were C$ 45 for
white corn, C$ 40 for yellow or mixed corn, CS 105 for
black or red beans, C$ 35 for red or yellow sorghum, CS 40

for white sorghum, and C$ 40 for rice.

205

Although in theory INCEI establishes a minimum price
level for the campesinos' produce, in the words of INCEI'S
director,

"This does not mean that they have an obli-
gation to sell their harvest to INCEI. They
have the freedom to sell their produce to
whoever pays the highest price. Under the
policies of the Liberal Party our policy is
clear: the land must be the property of the
farmer, and under our system of private
enterprise so is the harvest. . ."

(Bojorge, 1977)

Bojorge emphasized that another key task of INCEI was
to "guarantee a normal supply of food for the population",
in case of crop failure. For example, although 1975-1976
was a poor agricultural year due to drought, INCEI had
stored by January a total of 1,332,700 quintales of grain.
In that same year, INCEI had purchased a total of 1,785,800
quintales of grain comprised of 766,000 quintales of corn,
147,800 quintales of beans, 209,100 quintales of rice, and
662,900 quintales of sorghum.

The INCEI representative in charge of the unit at
Ciudad Sandino was interviewed numerous times throughout
the course of this study. His responses and records pro-
vided independent verification of the survey findings dis-
cussed later in this chapter. Surprisingly no records
existed with regard to the amount of grain, if any, stored
at the unit in 1974 and 1975; in 1976 his records revealed

that no significant amounts of grain had been stored at

this unit. In 1977, a mere 165 quintales of corn and no

206

beans whatsoever were purchased by the INCEI unit in Cuidad
Sandino and less than 1,000 quintales of corn were stored
there by 8 local farmers. Although no official records for
1978 were available at the time of my field research, the
pattern of usage appeared to be consistent with that of
previous years.

Perhaps one of the key reasons for the INCEI program's
apparent failure can be attributed to the institution's
policy of drying and cleaning the farmers' grains. The
Cuidad Sandino representative explained that, on the aver-
age, a farmer bringing 100 pounds of corn or beans to INCEI
could only be paid for 86.4 pounds since the drying pro-
cess, elimination of foreign material (rocks, dirt, sticks,
etc.) and the subtraction of bad or cracked grains consti-
tuted an average of 13.6% of the total grain weight. He
insisted that even this policy was lenient since INCEI only
subtracted 3% of the grain's weight for foreign material
and 6% for poor grains, when in fact the corn purchased in
Cuidad Sandino over the last 2 years contained an average
of 12% to 22% foreign matter and defective grains.

Unfortunately, few farmers understand such technical
estimates or calculations or the necessity for these mechan-
ical drying and cleaning processes. They feel that if they
sell or store their corn or beans at INCEI, they will be
unfairly denied a significant percentage of their harvest

and thus prefer selling their product to local buyers who

207

simply buy their grain in its present state.

Several other individuals interviewed, including pre-
sent and former employees of INCEI, stated that INCEI's
internal policies were riddled with mismanagement and cor-
ruption. It was not uncommon, for example, for large quan-
tities of grain to simply "disappear" from the silos and
then reappear on the open market (LaPrensa, 7/23/78).
Moreover, frequently the local silo units lacked the neces-
sary capital to purchase the grains when the farmers did
want to sell them. In numerous cases, however, INCEI
supervisors were accused of utiliZing INCEI trucks and
storage facilities for their own personal buying of grains.
Several high Guardia officials also allegedly obtained
large loans from Banco Nacional in order to purchase large
quantities of corn to store at the silos and sell at a
later date. -

The interviews with various AID officials in Managua
provided a very different view of INCEI from that held by
the campesinos. These officials stated that the price
stabilization program had been in the planning stages for,
4 years prior to implementation. They added that they
received extensive assistance during this period from Banco
Nacional. AID had fully intended to finance the program
with a 40-year loan to the Bank as well as to lend tech—
nical assistance, and only scrapped the idea when the

Export-Import Bank finally agreed to be responsible for

208

the financing.

They stated that the original idea for the project
came from Banco Nacional officials who hoped to imitate
the successful grain storage programs of their neighbors
to the north and the south, Honduras and Costa Rica. The
Nicaraguan government decided where to locate the units
and, although factors such as transportation facilities and
develOpment of the local areas were key considerations,
political motives remained the most important. One official
observed that after the 100 silo units were tentatively
located, Somoza relocated many of them to areas where he
felt he needed more political support.

These officials admitted, however, that in several
sites the silos were in fact rotting from lack of use and
that the study erred in not discovering that there was not
sufficient demand for the INCEI units in these areas. They
reasoned that this was a "very technical project and some
mistakes were bound to occur." One of those interviewed
maintained that the vast majority of small farmers were not
using the silos simply because they did not produce enough
of a surplus crop.

The AID personnel in Managua repeatedly stressed that
the small farmers were included in every stage of the
planning of the program, primarily through personal inter—
views and public opinion surveys (although unfortunately

they were not able to produce the results of these surveys).

209

In their words, they were certain that, "a lot of time was
spent talking with all of them." They also felt that INCEI
had been tremendously successful and had achieved many of
its original objectives, especially with regard to market-
ing and price stabilization. Moreover, the program had
introduced hybrid seed such as Hondurean 46, fertilizer,
and insecticide to many farmers for the first time. They
did admit, however, that "much remained to be done" in
terms of eliminating traditional agricultural practices.
These officials appeared uncertain as to how the actual
decision was reached to build the specific silo design
finally adopted, but here again noted that "various studies
were conducted considering all aspects of the problem."
They explained that the idea of constructing small silos
on individual farms was considered but rejected because,
"the campesinos weren't ready for this yet." York, an
American-based firm manufactured the silos and began actual
cOnstruction, but a firm controlled by Somoza ended up
finishing the task. Only 1 of the 5 AID officials inter-
viewed believed that INCEI had had no impact on the rural
areas, although he felt the organization had managed to
establish a floor on the price fluctuations of the basic
grains. This individual recognized that INCEI was not a
profit making entity, but stated that the institution was
spending too much time trying to make up for the hundreds

of thousands of dollars lost in the first 3 or 4 years of

210

operation as a result of mismanagement, corruption, and
outright theft. He insisted that the construction of such
large units was foolish and that credit should have been
extended to the campesinos for the construction of small
individual units. He pointed out that 5 years ago he had
approached the Ministry of Agriculture with a plan to build
a small unit with local materials for approximately $50.00.
Technicians studied the design and actually drew up plans
for implementation, but then finally rejected the entire
scheme as too impractical.

The majority of AID respondents maintained that not
only were small farmers repeatedly contacted in the early
stages of the program, but that ongoing dialogue had been
established with them in order to properly set the basic
grain prices which must be readjusted each year. They
stated that an intelligent decision could not be made with
regard to pricing and export-import policies without
accurate information regarding production figures, credit
availability, amount of rainfall, and "a million other
factors."

They recognized that most farmers still stored their
corn and beans in the same manner as they did 5 years ago,
but they also insisted that almost all farmers in Nicaragua
understood what INCEI'S functions were. In fact, one re-
spondent stated that, "Whenever there's a silo, the farmers

always know about INCEI and the work it is doing." They

211

also believed that price stabilization appeared both pos-
sible and probable within the near future, eSpecially with
sufficient funding and proper management.

Furthermore, a general consensus existed among AID
officials that INCEI, except for the large rice farmers,
primarily benefitted the small and poor farmers. The prime
obstacle preventing the campesinos' further development,
as they saw it, was the farmers' own resistance to change.
One respondent pointed out that, "It took over 20 years
for the Ministry of Agriculture to get them to just dust
their corn (with insecticide), and this saved them 20% of
their crOp."

They concluded that little chance existed at the pre-
sent time for convincing the farmers to provide their own
funds for the construction of communal silos in cooperation
with their neighbors because, "the campesinos just don't
have any community spirit." They also admitted, however,
that INCEI and other institutions of the Nicaraguan govern-
ment under Somoza had done very little to change these

tendencies.

RESULTS OF THE CIUDAD SANDINO SURVEY

The survey conducted during my field research gener-
ated an abundance of information with regard to the norms,
values, living conditions, and agricultural practices of

the small farmers in and around the Ciudad Sandino area

212

(see Appendices A and B). As the following discussion will
demonstrate, much of this data supports the major propo-
sition of Normative Sponsorship Theory that community action
or developmental programs which ignore, violate, or fail

to effectively neutralize relevant systems essential to

the action process will more often than not fail to attain
their proclaimed objectives. It is worth reemphasizing at
this point that an important distinction exists between
official attainment of a program's goals, as defined by the
relatively more power social groups and the social reality
of the situation. In other words, the success of INCEI
cannot be measured by the physical construction of over

600 silos, but must be evaluated by the degree to which the
farmers actually participate in the INCEI program. Accord-
ing to this criteria, the major conclusion of this research
was that by 1978, over 6 years after completion of the last
silo, INCEI had yet to have a lasting or measureable im-

pact on the rural population in the Cuidad Sandino area.

LIVING CONDITIONS

The respondents of this survey were comprised of
individuals who had moved to Cuidad Sandino from many parts
of Nicaragua, including Leon (30%), Esteli (29%), Trinidad
(14%), and Puerto Cabaza (2%). Although more than half of

the farmers (54%) were born in the Cuidad Sandino area,

213

75% of those interviewed stated that, if possible, "they
would like to go" to a different area.* Other background

questions revealed that: 59% of the farmers had 4 or more

children, 76% of them owned their own radios (a sign of

relative affluence), and well over half stated that they

could not read (60%) nor write (63%) .
Farmers were interviewed from the 15 surrounding

viajes (districts) with 20% of the survey coming from

Muyuca, the largest viaje, and 16% from San Albino, the
The

home of Sandino and the famous San Albino gold mine.

typical farmer lived in either an adobe (58%) or wood (22%)
The

house and had either one (57%) or two (31%) rooms.

floor was usually earthen (89%), and 74% of the homes had

no electricity, 91% had no running water, and 53% lacked

a latrine.
The vast majority of the homes obtained their drinking

water from a stream (61%) or a "water hole" (25%). Both

of these practices are extremely unhealthy since few
Nicaraguans in the campo boil their water before drinking

it, and often the rivers and streams are infested with a

*This question, "If you could, would you like to go
to a different area?" (Question #85) was one of the few
poorly worded questions to make it through the pretest
without detection. It was originally intended as an indi-
cation of the farmers' satisfaction with their current
living conditions. It is impossible to determine, however,
whether the farmers interpreted it to ask whether they
actually wished to move to another area or simply wanted
to visit other places, to get to know them.

 

 

 

   

214

variety of parasites. Only 10% of the survey stated that
they obtained their water from a well, and less than 1%
actually had running water.

The farmers were also surprisingly open in responding
to the wide range of questions concerning the number of
animals they owned and the amount of land they planted.*
Of the farmers interviewed, 51% owned their own land, 43%
rented their farmland from others, and 6% obtained land
free from their families, but did not own it. The typical
amount of land cultivated by a single farmer was rather
small; only 8% of the farmers planted more than seven manzanas
of corn primeria, and 62% planted three manzanas or less.
Many of the farmers planted at least some beans primeria;
23% planted less than a manzana, and another 23% planted
approximately one manzana.

As a result of the heavier rainfall, beans produce
less in the primeria planting season than in the postrera,
and farmers who do plant at this time usually only plant
in order to obtain seed. None of the farmers planted corn

in the postrera; 3% of the farmers did not plant beans in

 

*As mentioned in Chapter IV, these questions were par-
ticularly sensitive because at the time of the survey,
Nicaragua had no income tax and the government used ques-
tions similar to these in determining the farmers' taxes.
As a result, the farmers frequently attempt to disguise or
underestimate their assets. The honest and high response
rate is clearly a credit to the interviewing skills of my
four research assistants.

 

 

215

the postrera, and another 4% planted less than a manzana.
This significant minority of farmers planting little or no
beans primarily resulted from an onslaught of diseases in
the area which attack beans postrera. "E1 lippe", a worm-
like creature with an amazing appetite, is especially dam-
aging since it is capable of devouring several acres of
beans in a single night. Moreover, 24% of the farmers
plant 1 manzana of beans postrera and 43% plant 2 manzanas.
This appears to represent the maximum area of beans which
can be cultivated by a single individual without the neces-
sity of employing mozos (outside laborers).

Other significant indicators of living standards in-
volve the number of livestock owned by the farmers, espec-
ially vacas paridas (cows with l or more calves) and bueys
(oxen). Vacas paridas are the primary source of creme,
milk, and cheese for the farmers and their families. As
a general rule, if a farmer does not own these animals,
their diet will not contain this essential food group since
there are few stores and practically no refrigeration
available in the campo. Bueys not only serve as draft
animals for hauling firewood and grain, but, more impor-
tantly, allow a farmer to plow his land rather than plant
by espeque (an iron-tipped digging stick which has remained
basically unchanged since the days of the Mayans). Since
both corn and beans grow much better after the land has

been plowed, a farmer's harvest and income remains tied to

216

his ability to either purchase or rent bueys. Of those
interviewed, 58% did not own vacas paridas; of the 26% who
did own such animals, 26% owned 1 cow, 26% owned 2 cows,
and 20% owned 3 cows. 53% of the farmers did not own oxen,
and of the 47% who did own oxen, 88% owned 2 animals or
less.

With regard to the remaining types of animals found
in the rural area surrounding Cuidad Sandino, 42% of the
farmers owned no pigs, and 42% owned 2 pigs or less.
Chickens, a daily source of eggs, meat, and protein, were
more common, with 11% of the farmers owning no chickens,
17% owning l to 5 chickens, 21% owning 6 to 10, 17% owning
11 to 15, and 34% of the farmers possessing 16 or more
chickens. Horses in Nicaragua remain somewhat of a luxury,
since they serve few functions outside of transportation.
Plowing with horses, a common practice in the frontier
days of the United States, is a practically unknown pattern
of cultivation in Nicaragua. This may explain why 59% of
the farmers owned no horses, and another 25% owned only 1.
The domestication of goats and sheep is not practiced in
northern Nicaragua.

Four questions on the survey (numbers 99 to 102) were
designed as an indication of the farmers' belief in super-
stitions or the supernatural. Most of the farmers (86%)
believed the moon is important in planting. The vast

majority of farmers in Nicaragua believe that corn, beans,

217

and any other crop must be planted under a full moon or
they simply will not grow.

On the other hand, the belief in "monogente", monkey-
1ike creatures who possess the unique ability to transform
themselves into humans and back again into monkeys, appears
almost nonexistent. 95% of the farmers responded that they
did not believe in monogente, 98% said that they did not
know anyone who had corn, beans, or chickens stolen by
monkey people, and 96% did not even know anyone who claimed
to have seen such a creature. Generally most of the farm-
ers found it amusing that I even asked such questions.

Perhaps one of the most interesting questions in terms
of responses was question number 98 which asked, "More or
less, how many quintales of beans and corn do you need to
harvest each year for a comfortable life?" Although almost
all the farmers eventually responded to this question,
this inquiry appeared the most difficult for many of them
to understand and answer. The interviewers often had to
repeatedly explain what was meant by this question before
obtaining a response. Answers such as "quien sabe" (who
knows), "Que Dios quiere," (whatever God wants), and "no
matter how much one harvests, it is never enough" were
fairly common.

The ideal harvest for corn ranged from less than 100
arrobas (8%) to 100 arrobas (17%) to 150 arrobas (8%) to

200 arrobas (33%) to 250 arrobas (3%) to 300 arrobas (10%)

218

to over 300 arrobas (22%). The range with regard to beans
covered a spectrum from less than 50 arrobas (23%) to 50
arrobas (29%) to 100 arrobas (28%) to over 100 arrobas
(23%). These relatively low ideal levels of income, espec-
ially compared to U.S. standards, possibly reflect the
harsh reality of life in the campo, as well as the fact
that many farmers do not think in such hypothetical terms
nor anticipate a considerable improvement in their standard
of living in the foreseeable future. It would be interest-
ing to explore whether these aspiration levels have risen

in the aftermath of the successful revolution.

PATTERNS OF CORN CULTIVATION

This research found that the agricultural patterns of
cultivation in the Cuidad Sandino area, while generally
"primitive" in comparison with the United States and
Western Europe, encompass a wide range of technological
practices. All of the farmers surveyed planted corn pri-
meria, with many (30%) planting both corn and beans. The
majority (69%) plant with a plow, 17% use only an espeque,
and 14% utilize both methods. 59% of the farmers weed
their corn only once, while 40% clean it twice; no one
weeds more than 3 times. Most of the farmers (70%) have
diseases which attack their corn, yet 59% do not use any
type of pesticide to combat them. Of the insecticides

utilized, malathion and DDT are the most frequently used.

219

74% of the farmers plant 4 manzanas or less of corn, about
the maximum amount of land which can be cultivated by an
individual farmer with a minimum amount of hired help.

Although 77% of the farmers responded that they knew
what fertilizer was, only 24% have used fertilizer in the
past, and less than a third presently apply it. Of those
respondents utilizing fertilizer, the vast majority (88%)
apply it to corn. The responses most frequently given for
not applying fertilizer included: "too expensive" (60%),
the farmer did not know how to apply it (12%), the appli-
cation was not worth the additional effort (4%), and
"other" explanations such as, "The soil does not need it,"
(1%), "The ground is too hilly," (2%), and "Because I plant
at the will of God." (1%).

The range of arrobas of corn harvested per manzana
(l arroba equals 25 U.S. pounds) ranged from less than 20
arrobas per manzana to over 500 arrobas, with an average
harvest of 99 arrobas. The majority of farmers (68%) pro-
duced between 40 and 100 arrobas per manzana. Slightly
more than half of the farmers used field hands at some part
of the cultivation process, usually during either the
planting or weeding period. When paid, these workers
usually earned between $1.00 and $2.00 per day. Frequently,
however, small farmers assisted either their neighbors or
family members in return for assistance on their own plots

at a later date.

220

Surprisingly none of the farmers responded that they
sold their harvest "de future" (prior to the harvest). A
small minority (3%) sell their entire crop at harvest time.
The vast majority, however, either sell part at the har-
vest and store the rest (73%) or keep all their corn for
personal consumption (23%).

Despite the repeated claims of numerous representa-
tives from the other relevant systems such as AID and INCEI,

every farmer interviewed agreed that the price of corn

 

still continued to fluctuate between the planting season
and the harvest. Moreover, their estimates of these price
changes appeared to be substantial. Many farmers stated
that an increase of 50% from C$ 10 to CS 15 per arroba was
typical, and other estimates ranged from price increases
of 33% to over 300%. These key responses indicate that,
at least in the Cuidad Sandino area, one of the key
official objectives of the silo project had not been
accomplished over 6 years after construction of the silos.
Furthermore, although the results of my research are
not necessarily representative of other parts of Nicaragua
in all respects, it does appear likely that these reSponses
regarding price fluctuations do indicate that the national
program of price stabilization has also failed to a con-
siderable extent. Although Cuidad Sandino is located a
considerable distance from the capital of Managua, it is

by no means isolated from the national and international

221

markets. Price changes throughout the country affect
Cuidad Sandino and vice versa. In short, the results of
this survey, although not conclusive, are in fact a re-

flection of the success of INCEI nationwide.

CORN STORAGE PRACTICES

Of the farmers who sell all or part of their corn
harvest, 80% sell it at their farms. This practice appears
to reflect an attempt to eliminate costly transportation
charges, since 65% of the farmers stated that they must
rent their means of transporting grains. As the interviews
with other relevant systems indicated, representatives from
INCEI rarely if ever venture into the campo to visit the
farmers or purchase grains at their homes. Thus in effect,
at least in the Cuidad Sandino area, INCEI has effectively
eliminated itself from 80% of the direct market in grains.
It is exactly this type of ignorance or misunderstanding
of local cultural practices which Normative Sponsorship
Theory predicts will tend to prevent successful completion
of a community action or developmental process.

Another of the most significant questions concerned
whether the farmers had changed their methods of storing

grain in the last 5 years. Almost all the respondents

 

(98%) stated that they continued to store their corn in
the same manner as they did 5 years earlier. The re-

maining 2% either could not explain how they had changed

222

or shifted from the use of trojas to barrels. 66% of the
farmers interviewed continue to store their grain in
trojas, 22% keep it in rows inside their houses without
removing the husks, and the rest use either barrels (6%),
storage boxes (2%), or sacks (2%). The INCEI program has
obviously had no impact whatsoever on the storage practices
of the farmers included in this survey.

Furthermore, 71% of the sample stated that they
treated their corn with insecticide before storage. The
majority (64%) use DDT, an insecticide prohibited in the
United States because of its deadly residual effects. Yet
the same multinational corporations prohibited from manu-
facturing and selling this insecticide in the U.S. reap
millions of dollars in profits from selling it to Third
World countries. Ironically, the vast majority of the
nearly 1 billion pounds of insecticide applied annually in
the Third World is used on crops such as coffee, cotton,
and bananas that are then exported back to the United
States (Dowie, 1979; 43). Other treatments applied prior
to storage included phostoxin (2%), gorgohicida (10%),
salt (12%), ashes (1%), and "the hand of God," (1%).

The problems most commonly faced by the farmers during
storage were rats and "e1 gorgoho" (an insect which bores
into the kernel, deposits her egg inside, and covers the
opening with a gelatin-like fluid; the larvae are legless

and feed on the inside of the grain, change to pupae, and

223

eventually emerge as adult weevils over a four week
period). Losses as a result of inadequate treatment and
storgage facilities ranged from "nada" (13%) to half of
all the grain stored (30%).

It is nothing short of tragic in a country with such
high rates of malnutrition that over 77% of the farmers
estimated that they lose on the average of 20% to 50% of
their harvest after storing it. If INCEI had reduced these
levels to any significant degree on a national scale, this
action alone would have enabled Nicaragua to attain self-
sufficiency in the basic grains and converted the country
from a net importer to exporter of these crops.

On the other hand, 74% of the farmers did believe it
was possible to store their corn at home until the price
reached the highest possible level without losing any.
Unfortunately, as many farmers (28%) believed that this
would only occur Vsi Dios quiere" (if God wants it), as
put their faith in gorgohicida, the most common, safe, and

effective insecticide available in Nicaragua.

PATTERNS OF BEAN CULTIVATION

Bean cultivation practices in the area surrounding
Ciudad Sandino tend to mirror those of corn in many re-
spects. Since beans require less rain than corn (too much
rain cuases the beans to germinate on the vine), they

are usually planted in the postrera. None of the farmers

224

planted corn in the postrera, while 98% of them planted
beans during this period.

The beans are either planted by eSpeque at the base
of the corn (33%) (in order to conserve on space and allow
the vines to grow around the corn stalks), by plow (32%),
or else by espeque in rows (28%). Of the farmers inter-
viewed, 84% treat their beans before planting them and use
a variety of colorful, if somewhat ineffective, methods,
including gorgohicida, keroscene, ashes, baking soda, and
cow manure. Most of the farmers weed their beans once or
twice, and 89% of them plant 4 manzanas or less.

Although 66% of the farmers stated that they knew what
insecticide was, only 28% use it on a regular basis during
their bean cultivation. This often seriously limits the
bean harvest since 95% of the farmers admitted that var-
ious diseases or insects frequently attacked their beans.
The most commonly mentioned "plagas" included the lippe,
maya, and picuda. La maya are small, light green triangular
‘shaped insects with piercing, sucking mouthparts which
often Spread viruses among the beans, severely lowering
yields. La picuda, which also has a variety of other local
names, is a leaf aphid about the size of a pinhead. They
' also suck sap from the plant's leaves and then secrete a
honey dew that allows a black mold to form which stunts

and deforms the beans' normal growth (Leonard, 1969).

225

Often the onslaught of these insects and worms reach
such proportions that a farmer who does not take specific
steps to combat them loses almost his entire harvest in a
matter of weeks if not days. Controlling these pests in
the viajes surrounding Cuidad Sandino is especially diffi-
cult since most farmers do not spray or dust their crop.
As a result, those few individuals who do take action must
usually face the disappointing prOSpect of eliminating the
problem from their own fields, only to see the insects re-
turn in a matter of days because their neighbors failed to
take similar action.

Few farmers in the area plant anything other than corn
or beans. Of the 27% of the respondents who stated they
did plant other crOps, only 2 farmers planted more than 2
manzanas of any other type of cultivation. The most pOp-
ular alternative cultivations in order of frequency were
coffee, sorghum, rice, and chili peppers.

The farmers estimated that they harvested anywhere
from 15 to 100 arrobas of beans per manzana. Most of them
(63%) harvested between 40 and 60 arrobas per manzana,
with an average yield of 49.85 for the entire sample.

Significantly, a full 97% of the farmers interviewed
provided responses which support the contention that INCEI
had failed to stabilize bean marketing conditions. The
price of beans continued to fluctuate between the harvest

and planting seasons. The price did not appear to change,

226

however, to the same extent as with corn. Estimates of

the price fluctuations ranged from a harvest/planting ratio
of 25 to 50 cordovas (3%) to 30 to 50 (37%) to 35 to 50
(42%) to an increase of 48 to 75 cordovas (less than 1%).
Thus these key responses again clearly indicate INCEI had
not achieved one of its foremost objectives years after

construction of the last silo.

BEAN STORAGE PRACTICES

The results of the survey questions which explored
the farmers' bean storage practices also paralleled in many
respects the responses dealing with corn. None of the
farmers stated that they sold their harvest "future". Only
2% of the farmers sold their entire crop at the harvest,

6% kept all the beans solely for their family's consump-
tion, and 92% responded that they sold part of their
harvest and stored the remaining portion.

The actual percentage of the bean harvest stored also
varied greatly. 28% of the sample estimated that they sold
half of their crop and stored the other half. Other esti-
mates by the farmers concerning the ratio of sold to stored
beans varied from 60/40 (10%) to 67/33 (6%) to 70/30 (16%)
to 75/25 (20%) to 80/20 (20%). To a certain extent, these
ratios reflect the tendency of the Nicaraguan campesino to
View his bean crop in the same way a middle-class American

regards his savings account. In effect, for the farmer,

227

these beans are "money in the bank" which accumulates
interest (i.e., increases in value because of price fluc-
tuations) and can be "withdrawn" or sold whenever
circumstances require it.

Unfortunately, other cultural practices tend to ser-
iously undermine their investment. ,Most of the farmers
(70%) store their beans either in sacks or wooden boxes
known as "buques". Less than 1 out of every 3 farmers use
barrels for bean storage. These differences in storage
practices are significant since the type of barrels used
most frequently - metal containers with airtight lids -
constitute an inexpensive but effective mini-silo which
permits little or no loss to insects and rats. Sacks and
buques, on the other hand, offer no protection against
these elements.

The loss of beans as a result of poor storage prac-
tices is further aggravated by the fact that 44% of the
farmers do not treat their beans prior to storage.* Of
those who do treat their beans, only 77% use an effective
insecticide such as phostoxin or gorgohicida. The other
23% use a variety of original concoctions including ashes
(3%), ground chile (2%), DDT (2%), bisfuro (8%), and

"alconfor" (6%), an inexpensive children's cold medicine.

 

*This fact means little to the farmers utilizing
barrels, however, since the lack of air in the barrel tends
to eliminate many insects without the necessity of
insecticide.

228

With regard to beans, again one of the most signifi-
cant findings of this study revealed that INCEI has had no
impact whatsoever on changing these storage and treatment

practices. Not a single farmer in the entire sample stated

 

that he had changed his bean storage practices in the last
5 years. According to Normative Sponsorship Theory, this
failure reflects an ignorance, misunderstanding, or indif-
ference on the part of INCEI officials regarding the
cultural norms and values of the campesinos.

Yet the survey also indicated that the farmers clearly
realized both the importance of drying their beans prior
to storage and the possibility of reducing post-harvest
losses. 89% of those interviewed stated that they dried
their beans prior to storing them, and 97% of these farmers
dried their beans in the sun for 2 or more days. The
majority of the farmers (78%) also stated that, under the
proper conditions, it would be possible for someone to
store beans in their house without losing any until the
price reached the highest level possible.

On the other hand, 75% of those surveyed stated that
there were insects or diseases which attacked their beans
which did not attack their corn. The most frequently iden-
tified culprit was "e1 gorgoho de frijole" (a type of
weevil); 89% of the farmers had problems with this insect.
Although 36% of the farmers stated that they usually did

not lose any significant amount of beans during storage

229

(usually those fortunate enough to have sufficient numbers
of barrels at their disposal), the remaining 64% of those
surveyed experienced serious losses. These losses ranged
from less than 10% of the beans stored to up to 50% of the
entire crop kept at home.

As repeatedly stressed throughout this dissertation,
Normative Sponsorship Theory proposes that developmental
programs imposed from "the tOp down" will tend to fail if
they violate or take into account the norms and values of
the social groups affected by the program. The total
failure of the INCEI project to change the storage and
treatment practices of the campesinos supports this propo-
sition. Ironically, it appears likely that if INCEI had
adopted the basic tenets of normative sponsorship, it could
have in fact achieved its primary objectives of price sta-
bilization and improved storage practices. These goals
became unrealistic, however, without allowing the campe-
sinos an effective voice in the planning and implementation
of the program.

The responses indicated that many, if not most, of
the farmers realized the advantages of storing their beans
in barrels. Usually, however, they simply could not afford
to purchase and transport barrels to their farms. Yet for
a percentage of the cost it took to build and maintain the
6 silos located in Cuidad Sandino, silos which only a small

minority of the farmers have ever bothered using, INCEI

230

could have purchased enough barrels for all the interested
farmers in the area. The farmers could have then repaid
INCEI with the money earned as a result of the reduction
in grain losses and spoilage. Whether or not the farmers
themselves would have proposed or agreed to such an alter-
native strategy will never be known; as the second part of

the survey demonstrated, no one ever asked them.

THE FARMERS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS INCEI

The second part of the survey attempted to discover
the opinions of the campesinos in the Cuidad Sandino area
with regard to governmental institutions such as INCEI and
Banco Nacional. An effort was also made to explore whether
their values, norms, and Opinions could theoretically have
facilitated an effective community action program. As the
following discussion indicates, it appears likely that the
obstacles facing INCEI were not as great as AID officials
and other representatives from various relevant systems
assumed.

Implicit in the basic tenets of Normative Sponsorship
Theory and in the works of Gorz and Friere is the reoccur-
ring theme that any developmental project to be successful
must appeal to the immediate needs and concerns of the
target pOpulation. Even more importantly, the individuals
affected by the program must be conscious of their needs

and be willing to take action to meet them. The validity

231

of these propositions is reflected in the farmers' responses
with regard to Banco Nacional and INCEI. Many of them had
willingly worked with the Bank in the past and hOped to do
so again in the future. The representatives from INCEI,
however well-intended, attempted to dictate to the campe-
sinos what problems they had and how these problems should
be resolved. As a result, INCEI in many ways became effec-
tively isolated from the rural community.

The primary function of the Banco Nacional branch
office located in Cuidad Sandino is the disbursal and col-
lection of loans to local farmers. Interviews with bank
employees and a lengthy detailed investigation of the

bank's records revealed the information contained in Table

 

 

 

I.
TABLE I

Type of Crop, Amount Loaned in 1976 Amount Loaned in 1978

(in cordovas)l (in cordovas)
Coffee 219,850 for 245 mzs. 244,500 for 137 mzs.
Corn 413,488 for 1,211 mzs. 561,570 for 579 mzs.
Beans 195,240 for 535 mzs. 274,800 for 305 mzs.
Sorghum 19,700 for 5 mzs. 1,200 for 2 mzs.
Sugar Cane 5,700 for 11 mzs. (no data available)

The increase between 1976 and 1978 in the amount of
cordovas lent per manzana reflects a change in bank policy
and a greater emphasis on the application of fertilizer.
The farmers were often not allowed to borrow money unless

they first agreed to buy and apply fertilizer. These loans

232

were for "corto plaza" (18 months) at 16% interest.
Table II contains the information with regard to loans

for "largo plaza" (six years) at 18% interest

 

TABLE II
Type of Animal Amount Loaned 1976 Amount Loaned in 1978
(in cordovas) (in cordovas)

Novio 67,500 for 89 animals 0
Terrereros 89,000 for 178 animals 0
Vacas

Paridas 87,200 for 59 animals 7,500 for 3 animals
Vacquios 112,500 for 115 animals 0
Toros 54,200 for 18 animals 3,000 for 1 animal
Bueys 184,780 for 124 animals 5,000 for 3 animals
Cerdos 1,650 for 11 animals 0

As of June 29, 1978, the farmers of the Ciudad Sandino
area were overdue half a million cordovas to Banco Nacional.
$C 317,697 of this was due in short-term loans and
$C 160,129 in long-term loans. While these totals included
approximately 30% of the Bank's clients, according to the
Bank's records, only 7% of the farmers failed to pay off
their loans in the long run. The majority of those overdue
on their loans were paying "poco a poco" (little by little).
The results of the survey revealed that 46% of the
farmers had borrowed money from Banco Nacional. The farm-
ers borrowed for the following purposes: agriculture (66%),

oxen (14%), cow with a calf (5%), cattle (4%), agriculture

233

and oxen (7%), oxen and cattle (2%). The loans for agri-
culture were divided accordingly: corn with fertilizer
(51%), corn without fertilizer (24%), beans with fertilizer
(2%), beans without fertilizer (2%), corn and beans with
fertilizer (20%).

Although 51% of the farmers believed the Bank helped
the rich farmers more than the small farmers, 30% felt they
both benefitted equally, and 9% believed the small farmers
gained the most. Even more significant perhaps was the
fact that 83% of the farmers interviewed stated they would
~work with the Bank in the future if given an opportunity.
The farmers preferred to borrow for the following purposes:
agriculture (64%), cattle (21%), cattle and agriculture
(5%), agriculture and oxen (2%), cows with calves (3%),
milk cows (1%), coffee (1%), and business loans (2%).

These statistics clearly indicate that the Cuidad
Sandino campesinos can and will work with government agen-
cies if they View it in their self—interest to do so. This
is true even though the majority of these farmers believe
the Bank is biased in favor of the rich. This data not
only exposes the myth that small farmers in Nicaragua are
unwilling to change or work with government agencies, but
also, for the purposes of this study, makes the following
responses regarding INCEI all the more significant.

DeSpite the fact that INCEI had been in operation in

Cuidad Sandino for more than 6 years by the time of this

234

study (in fact many of the farmers had to pass the large
silo complex every time they came to town), 79% of the
farmers admitted that they did not know what INCEI'S job
was. Even more significantly, 95% of the farmers had never
been visited by an INCEI representative, and 89% had not
sold corn nor beans to INCEI.

With regard to the few farmers who had sold their corn
or beans to INCEI, no one had worked with this institution
3 times, and 58% of these farmers had dealt with them only
once. The explanations most often given for not working
with INCEI were that: "The price INCEI pays is too low,"
(14%), it was too difficult to transport the grains there
(12%), "The harvest was too small," (28%), the farmer sold
his entire crop at home (24%), and INCEI does not
accurately weigh the grains (6%).

Other responses by the farmers tended to indicate less
of a bias against INCEI than a lack of knowledge concerning
the objectives of the organization. In terms of Sponsorship
Theory, these replies constituted a logical response by the
campesinos to INCEI's either intentional or inadvertent
decision to attempt to neutralize the Cuidad Sandino
campesinos as a relevant system. Fewer farmers believed
that INCEI favored the rich farmers than felt that Banco
Nacional favored the wealthy. 39% of those interviewed
believed the rich gained the most from INCEI, 9% believed

the poor gained more, 24% felt both the rich and poor

235

benefitted equally, and 28% responded that they just did
not know which group INCEI helped the most. Another 70%
of the farmers did not know anyone who had either sold or
stored grains at INCEI. With regard to drying the grains,
66% of the farmers did not know if INCEI was drying the
grains too much, and 71% did not even know why INCEI was
drying the grains in the first place.*

Despite this seemingly widespread unfamiliarity with
the work and objectives of INCEI, many farmers did agree
with these objectives in the abstract, or at least were
not opposed to them. For example,‘46% of the farmers be-
lieved it was possible to control the price of corn and
beans year round, while another 41% stated that they did
not know whether or not this was a realistic objective.

In a related question, a majority of the farmers (54%)
stated that it would be good if the price of grain stopped
fluctuating, while another 33% were undecided whether they
desired price stabilization.

Although relatively backward in their patterns of
cultivation, the survey also demonstrated that most farmers’
were not distrusting of the parties to whom they sold their
grains, nor were they biased against selling their grains

in the local area. 84% of the farmers responded that they

 

*It may be worth noting here that many farmers did
not perceive INCEI'S process of mechanically drying and
cleaning the corn and beans as the equivalent of their
own "sunning" of their harvest.

236

had never been cheated while selling their corn and beans,
and 59% stated that they preferred selling their crops to
buyers from the Cuidad Sandino area. Another 17% responded
that it did not matter to them to whom they sold their
harvest, and 13% said they merely wanted to get the best
price possible.

Finally, two other key questions appeared to indicate
that the majority of farmers were in fact ready to con-
sider changing their present storage practices, if it was
in their interest to do so. 54% of the farmers were will—
ing to spend their own money to construct individual silos
on their farms if it was likely that their post—harvest
losses would be eliminated. Moreover, if this type of in-
dividualistic program proved too expensive, even more of
the farmers (68%) stated that they would donate their own
money to help build a communal storage area with their
neighbors if it provided sufficient protection from the
ravages of insects, mice, rats, and other pests. Thus not
only were most of the farmers willing to invest their own
hard-earned cordovas into a properly organized silo pro-
gram, but they were also willing to cooperate with others
if it became necessary. Unfortunately the INCEI program

failed on both accounts.

SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

This case study can be regarded as an attempt at
applying the analytical tools provided by Normative Spon-
sorship Theory to a rural development project in Nicaragua.
The insights provided by Paulo Friere and Andre Gorz were
also important aids in the analysis of the INCEI program
in Cuidad Sandino. In terms of this analysis, there
appears to be little doubt that although the INCEI program
had the potential for responding to the needs and capabil-
ities of the small farmers, it totally failed to do so.
While INCEI at one time might have mobilized the campesinos
in a serious effort at increasing their class consciousness
and control over their own work processes and products, in
the final analysis, the program amounted to little more
than a reformist reform. The remaining pages of this
chapter will briefly attempt to summarize why, in my
opinion, the INCEI program went astray.

Friere, Marx, and others have repeatedly emphasized
that human education and develOpment are a never ending
process of changing and being changed. In the process of
modifying the physical and social worlds through their work
efforts, human beings themselves become transformed. This
ongoing dialetical relationship between action and reflec-
tion, between context and consciousness can supply the
basis for transforming a class in itself into a class for
itself. In other words, true development cannot be im-

posed from above, no matter how altruistic the intentions

237

238

of the international and national agencies or the individ-
uals responsible for promoting the program. In order to
effectively change the storage practices of farmers in
Cuidad Sandino, for example the dictates and solutions
cannot come from "experts" in Washington or Managua, but
must come from the farmers themselves. Although community
action programs generated at the local level will inevit—
ably produce numerous false starts and failures, these
experiences will in turn provide the groundwork for the
successes of the future.

Normative Sponsorship Theory asserts that the people
and relevant systems involved in and affected by the pro-
cess of change must themselves recognize, participate in,
and control the solutions to their own problems. It is
not for outside experts, no matter how well trained tech-
nically they might be, to decide whether the farmers are
or are not ready to adOpt a particular technological inno-
vation or other improvement. The people themselves must
make this decision.

As stressed in Chapter EVof this dissertation, the
dynamic process of conscientization involves various dimen-
sions, including: ideology, transformation, social iden-
tification, and behavioral change. It simply is not pos-
sible to fragment or divide this process without destroy—
ing it. Lasting behavioral change does not result from

the million dollar construction of modern drying and

239

storage units, but through critical reflection by the
farmers concerning the social, political, and economic
structure of their environment. They must critically re-
flect on their own psychological and sociological exper-
iences at transforming these structures, and as a result
Of this analysis, determine what actions should be taken
to further improve the situation. One general conclusion
of this study then is that AID, INCEI, and the other rele-
vant systems committed a serious fundamental error as a
result of their efforts to separate action from reflection,
to divide theory from practice.

The theoretical model which served as the basis for
this research places heavy emphasis on the dynamic inter-
change or "give and take" between and among social systems
involved in the developmental process. It repeatedly
focuses on the goals, values, and norms of these various
social units and the importance of not violating these
characteristics while attempting to implement change. The
variety of research methods utilized throughout this study,
including the analysis of the documents of official organ-
izations, formal and informal interviewing, and partici-
pant observation consistently supported the key findings
of the survey conducted among the campesinos. INCEI's
program, at least in the Cuidad Sandino area, did not in-
volve a dynamic interchange of ideas between the various

relevant systems; there was no give-and-take between the

240

farmers and INCEI or AID officials. This is clearly sup-
ported by the fact that the overwhelming majority of farm-
ers had never even been visited by INCEI officials, did not
understand why INCEI was drying the grain, nor even what
the work of this institution was, and as a result, the
farmers rarely sold or stored their grains there.

Furthermore, the planning stages and operational pol-
icies of INCEI repeatedly either misunderstood or ignored
many of the most basic values, norms, and cultural prac—
tices of the farmers. It makes little sense, for example,
to devise a storage, marketing, and price control system
at a single centralized location while most farmers either
store their harvest at home or sell their produce on the
farm. This decision alone effectively eliminates INCEI
from 80% of the market in corn and beans in the Cuidad
Sandino area and relegated the organization to the position
of buying and selling to middlemen.

Normative Sponsorship would predict that under these
social conditions, the logical outcome of this action pro-
cess would be conflict and resistance from the campesinos
and rejection of INCEI'S goals. This appears to have been
the result of the silo project in the Cuidad Sandino area
as reflected in the numerous responses by the farmers.

The survey demonstrated that none of the farmers have
changed their practices of treating and storing their corn

and beans as a result of INCEI, and the price fluctuations

241

of these products, although possibly reduced somewhat, con-
tinue to range from 33% to 200%. Thus in brief, INCEI did
not treat the farmers as critical thinkers and activists,
but as objects of assistance - and, in the words of the

or

campesinos of the area, they simply responded, No gracias,

Senor."

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

At this point, a few concluding comments seem appro-
priate concerning dependency theory, the future of
Nicaragua, and the limitations of my research. Hopefully
this case study constitutes more than just another effort
at demonstrating how a well—financed developmental program
went astray. In addition to explaining why such "develop-
ment from the top down" simply cannot work, an attempt was
made to analyze the norms and values of the relevant organ-
izations related to and affected by the INCEI program, to
isolate many of the rural communities' problems and needs
in the Cuidad Sandino area, and to achieve a greater under—
standing of the complex patterns of interactions within
this community. Ideally this study should provide insight-
ful information of social processes which also may be util-
ized in future research projects.

Studies such as this one which explain why a specific
action process failed to achieve its objectives do not
merely restate the obvious as attested to by many of the
AID programs currently under consideration in other areas.
Fortunately the present government in Nicaragua, for the
time being at least, does not appear to be repeating these
same mistakes. Although the immediate future of the revo-
lution remains open to debate, one prediction appears cer-
tain. While there will doubtlessly in the future be many

failures and frustrations, there presently exists little

242

243

likelihood of the new junta repeating the numerous errors
Of the INCEI program.

The junta, although willing to accept and in desperate
need of foreign aid, insists that it arrive "with no
strings attached". As a result, the $75 million aid pack-
age requested by the new government remains stalled in
Congress. Tomas Borge, the only avowed Marxist member of
the FSLN Directorate has emphatically stated, "We prefer
to die of hunger rather than accept aid with strings
attached." It appears that at least for the moment, some

of the strands of dependency have finally begun to unravel.

LIMITATIONS TO THE STUDY

This research attempted to evaluate the impact of the
INCEI grain drying and storage project in Ciudad Sandino,
Nicaragua. Perhaps one of the most obvious limitations of
the research is that the specific findings of this study can-
not necessarily be extended beyond the Ciudad Sandino area.
Time and financial limitations, plus the imminent outbreak of
the war, made an extension of the survey to a random sample
of the entire rural population in Nicaragua impossible. These
same limitations prevented me from addressing other crucial
issues such as what effect a successful INCEI program would
have had on the middlemen in the domestic grain market and
what ripple effects, if any, it would have had on the inter-
national market, especially with regards to the world market
price of corn, beans, cotton and coffee.

These same restraints also limited to a degree my access

to other relevant documentary evidence. Fortunately

244

AID officials in Washington agreed to xerox and mail such
valuable information as the original AID loan request for
the project, and the official authorization for three subse-
quent related projects. This data proved useful in helping
to identify the official goals of the project. Additional
material, however, presently stored in cardboard boxes at
the AID warehouse in New Orleans was left unexamined.*

This study did not begin until six years after the com-
pletion of the final silo. Although this time lag did
provide the advantage of allowing the project sufficient
time in which to accomplish its objectives, it also made
interviews with several members of various relevant systems
somewhat difficult. Only two of the AID officials inter-
viewed in Managua were present during the planning stages
of the INCEI program, and several other participants had
long since been assisgned to other parts of the world.

Moreover, I would have preferred to obtain a month-by—
month accounting of the price fluctuations of corn, beans,
rice, sesame, and sorghum for an extended period of
time for both Ciudad Sandino and Nicaragua as a whole.

Many officials continue to insist that INCEI has in fact

successfully reduced the most radical price changes with

 

*Although I remain indebted to the AID officials in
Washington for this assistance, I perhaps should note that
originally they informed me on numerous occasions that no
material whatsoever relating to the INCEI project was
available, either in Washington or elsewhere. It was only
after I finally made several desperate phone calls to
Senator Riegle and Congressman Carr explaining my plight
that the documents were xeroxed and mailed to me.

245

regard to these crops. Independent verification of these
statements was not possible during the relatively short
period of time in which the field research was conducted.

Finally, I also would have liked to explore to a much
greater extent what alternatives to the INCEI program
existed in terms of appropriate technology, since any
country that seriously attempts to attain any significant
degree of political, economic, and psychological indepen-
dence must primarily rely on its own human and physical
resources. As noted in Chapter‘vx storage barrels and
smaller community silos do provide 2 possible alternatives.
Both of these objects, however, would have to be imported
in large quantities to allow sufficient distribution to
the rural population. A more viable option from Friere's
and a Normative Sponsorship perspective would be to allow
the farmers themselves to confront the problems of effec-
tively drying and storing their grains and to arrive at a
solution through the utilization of local materials and
talent.

Hall's discussion of a community development silo
project in Tanzania, for example, provides an analysis of
the successful application of these principles. The
Tanzanian farmers, after an unusually large harvest, faced
a serious problem of grain spoilage and waste. Tradition-
ally, government officials handled this type of problem
by conducting basic experiments at the agricultural

research station and transferring this technology to the

246

farmers. This type of approach to the problem had met
with relatively minor success in the past.

In June of 1976, the Community Development Trust
Fund adopted an alternative "Friereian approach" to the
situation. They began by assuming that the problem of
grain storage was not new and that the local farmers al-
ready possessed a grain storage science and minimum level
of technology. Committees were than formed in each village
comprised of local builders, farmers, artists, and outside
technical experts and were assigned the task of resolving
the grain storage problem. The outside experts were
chosen for political as well as technical awareness.

Hall notes that some of the first discoveries made by
the committees were that not everyone had a storage prob-
1em and that various silo designs were required depending
on the size and needs of the different farmers. The local
farmers also decided to reject the silo design advocated
by the outside technical experts (the so-called "Nigeria"
model in this case) in favor of a modified design of what
they already had. Hall concludes by noting that:

"At the end of the 6-week period of analysis,
4 or 5 substantially improved silos or
methods were constructed. Visits were made
to other villages nearby to discuss the
findings of the research, and the villagers
presented a seminar to the Faculty of
Agriculture staff at the University of
Morogoro. These farmers were aware that
they were experts in low cost grain storage.
They had created knowledge without the

benefit of university degrees." (Hall, 1977;
15).

247

Perhaps one of the most promising directions for
future research generated by this study would be to observe
how the new INCEI administration deals with the problems
so successfully resolved by the Tanzanian farmers. Whether
the deploreable widespread grain spoilage in Nicaragua can
be prevented and the price of the basic grains stabilized
remains to be seen. Any new or modified attack on these
problems must begin by incorporating the norms and values
of the Nicaraguan campesinos, thereby utilizing their

existing knowledge and expertise.

THE FUTURE COURSE
OF THE REVOLUTION
There is little doubt that Nicaragua presently faces
an awesome challenge in attempting to rebuild its war—torn
society. Recent reports by the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America estimate that the physical
damage of the war alone, including housing, health centers,
and transportation facilities amounts to more than $86
million. The agricultural and industrial sectors suffered
losses of over $480 million. In addition to this, the new
Government has inherited a public debt of over $1.5 billion
from Somoza.
Internally the war brought the economy to a virtual
standstill. Coffee rust has ravished the coffee crop while

thousands of farmers did not plant corn, beans, rice, or

248

cotton. By nationalizing the holdings of the Somoza
family, the Government has become the controlling factor
in the economy overnight. Somoza, however, extracted pay-
ment for his vast financial empire prior to his departure
by mortgaging many of his holdings for 2 or 3 times their
worth during his last years in power. Because of these
obstacles, many international observers predict that the
country will need 2 to 3 times the United Nations' esti-
mates in order to rebuild (Morales, 1979; 172).

Agrarian reform must remain a major concern of the
new administration since agriculture has played such a
central role in the economy and will continue to do so in
the future. ExprOpriation of Somoza's land has given the
recently formed agrarian reform ministry direct control
over 51% of the arable land. This ministry also has the
authority to expropriate large fincas which are not formed
efficiently by their present owners. However, Jaime
Wheelock, the Marxist Agrarian Reform Minister, has stated
that, "For now we are going to limit ourselves to the
Somoza lands because we don't need anymore."

Under the program of the Provisional Government of
National Reconstruction, the large agro-industrial com-
plexes (usually those producing cotton, coffee, and beef)
will remain intact, but the workers will take an active
part in the administration of these estates. Smaller farms

of 200 to 300 manzanas will be converted into cooperatives,

249

while the smallest plots of land owned by the campesinos
will remain untouched. The state also intends to distri-
bute land and technical assistance to the landless
campesinos.

These land reform policies must be regarded as a
serious attempt at redistributing power, wealth, and social
status from Nicaragua's center to its periphery. This
fact has caused the United States and the remaining landed
elites much apprehension. One of the most severe tests of
the new Government, in my opinion, will occur if and when
it attempts to expropriate the property of the remaining
privileged groups. In the past, opponents to land reform
have tended to ignore the social justice and political
factors inherent in the land reform process and to empha-
size purely quantitative considerations such as technology
levels and production rates. A comprehensive land reform
program may well result in a quantitative reduction of ex-
port crops such as coffee or cotton, but would inevitably
produce a higher qualitative outcome in terms of feeding
the hundreds of thousands of individuals who actually
cultivate the land.

Moreover, an effective land reform program retains
the potential for combining the best features of both the
large and the small estates. Nicaragua's coffee and cotton
fincas have traditionally been characterized by the employ-

ment of few permanent workers, an over-abundance of land,

250

and relative to the smaller farms, extremely high levels
of technology. The minifundias possess many underemployed
workers, little land, and low levels of technology. Feder
(1971) has demonstrated that radical land reform policies
would allow the larger holdings to become as labor inten-
sive as the smaller plots and also enable them to produce
at the same rate per acre. In many cases, advanced tech-
nology and mechanization would neither be necessary nor
desireable since there is an overabundance of labor avail-
able. This might well be considered a blessing in disguise
since mechanization often involves immense outlays of
capital which Nicaragua simply does not have.

Dependistas repeatedly emphasize that each Periphery
nation must write its own script as determined by its unique
climate, agricultural, cultural, and social characteristics.
Although there exist no guarantees for most Nicaraguans
with regard to immediate quanitative leaps in their stand-
ard of living, land reform can help to establish a solid
base for further development. For example, a combination
of increased production and diversification will lead to
a cheaper, more abundant food supply, an indispensable
condition for industrialization and social stability.
Agrarian reform also retains the potential for creating a
vast redistribution of present wealth and future income.
This in turn will create a greater domestic market and

further impetus to industrialization. If this base is

251

supplemented with strict restraints on foreign corpora~
tions, which the Provisional Government has promised to
do, the potential expansion of national industries becomes
greatly enhanced. Finally, as the Cuban experience has
demonstrated, land reform relieves the pressure on the
urban populations and allows for the development of both
the rural and urban sectors.

Thus a radical, rapid, comprehensive land reform pro-
gram is a basic precondition to achieving economic, social,
and political development in Nicaragua. While it is not
a sufficient condition for such develOpment, it is a neces-
sary one. The possibilities for development are greatly
enhanced when redistributed in the working hands of the
many, rather than retained in the viselike grips of a few.
Moreover, as this case study has clearly demonstrated, the
application of modern technology and foreign aid to the
present system usually produces greater growth without

development, further inequality, and more oppression.

THE CONTINUING DILEMMA
OF FOREIGN AID
Petras (1979; 20) has stressed that, "Bourgeois
writers and spokespeOple (who) emphasize the destruction,
the economic losses, the costs, and the need to seek cap—
italist support for reconstruction, development, and so

on, minimize the tremendous creative efforts that have

252

emerged internally from the struggle and given birth to
popular mass organizations, which, in addition to carrying
out the bulk of the fighting, also organized neighborhoods,
production, and distribution." Yet at the same time, as
Jaime Whellock has observed, "socialism cannot be built
overnight." The destruction left by the war was so great
that the Sandinistas must move slowly in their efforts to
transform Nicaraguan society. The critical state of
affairs has forced the junta to appeal to all foreign
governments for assistance. Surprisingly this plea has
met with relative success. The United States has provided
$30 million in emergency assistance, West Germany has auth-
orized a loan for $23 million at 2% interest over 30 years,
and Spain has loaned the country $25 million (Burbach,
1980; 36-37).

While international aid is obviously not a solution
to Nicaragua's problems over the long haul, this immediate
stop-gap financing did help alleviate some of the most
pressing problems after Somoza's departure. To date, the
Inter-American Development Bank has provided the most fund-
ing. In September of 1979, this Bank advanced a $100
million dollar loan to the new government to be used to
plan and begin implementation of future developmental
projects.

Besides the $30 million in emergency humanitarian

relief, the United States has continued to broadcast

253

conflicting signals to the Nicaraguan people. While re-
fusing to process the $75 million request to AID, on
September 11, 1979, by a 7 to 3 vote, the House Subcommit-
tee on Foreign Affairs did approve $9 million in direct
U.S. assistance to Nicaragua, which even included $23,000
for military spending. Although this amount appears ridic-
ulously low in view of the flood of aid funneled towards
Somoza and the actual needs of the country, it does pro-
vide a symbolic gesture of hope for the future.

On the other hand, many of Somoza's old friends in
the U.S. Congress remain firmly entrenched against the new
regime. Many supporters of Tacho have taken a hard line
approach to the situation and have branded the Sandinistas
as Cuban Marxists who are attempting to install a Soviet-
block regime in Central America. In view of the volatile
conditions in neighboring El Salvador and Guatemala, many
observers believe that the committment of U.S. troops in
the area remains a distinct possibility, especially if a
Conservative candidate assumes the presidency in 1980. It
also appears certain that the U.S. Agency for International
Development will most likely offer little technical or
financial assistance to the new regime until well after

the 1980 elections.

FINAL REFRACTIONS FROM THE
PRISM OF DEPENDENCY

Moral considerations aside, the United States and
other developed countries should provide assistance to the
underdeveloped nations because it is in their interest to do
so. Apparently many members of both political parties fail
to understand that after a certain point the United States
does not buy more security in Latin America or elsewhere
by buying more military equipment or by propping up puppet
dictatorships. Excessive military spending, not just in
Latin America, but in the world as a whole does not reduce
the chances for violent revolutionary change, but greatly
increases them. The obvious reason for this is that the
vast outlays for military hardware and personnel diverts
these resources from vitally needed projects aimed at
eliminating poverty.

Even such previously strong proponents of military
spending as ex-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara now
agree with this analysis. In a speech at the University
of Chicago delivered while the people of Nicaragua were
still fighting Somoza's U.S. financed military machine in
the streets, McNamara observed that "Global defense expen-
ditures have grown so large that it is difficult to grasp
their full dimensions. The overall total is now in excess
of $400 billion a year." He also noted that the $30
billion spent each year just on research and development

for military purposes exceeds the total amount of money

254

 

 

 

 

255

spent on the problems of food, health, energy, and
education combined.

In reality, however, there appears little chance that
the awesome problems of reconstruction and development will
be overcome through foreign aid alone. The new government
in Managua as well as the rest of the Periphery, must con-
front the harsh reality of dependency. While it is not
possible, let alone desireable for Nicaragua to severe all
economic ties with Center powers, to achieve true develop-
ment she must seriously examine the conditions and assump-
tions on which this assistance has been based.

As Chapter V of this dissertation attempted to docu-
ment, the lessons of history are clear. There has never
been an equal relationship between Nicaragua and the United
States. Equality between nations in the modern world re-
mains a legal myth that has no foundation in economic re-
ality. Nicaragua and the United States are not equal.
Simply increasing agricultural production will not
eliminate these economic facts of life.

The case of cotton provides a classic example of this.
In the last decade and a half, Nicaragua has greatly in-
creased its production to the extent that it now produces
more cotton per acre than the United States. Yet since
most of this cotton is exported to the United States, it
is this country which has the most influence in setting

the price for this product. Nicaragua, because it is so

256

desperate for foreign exchange, must export as much cotton
as it can produce and accept whatever price the Center
powers will pay. Only on the relatively rare occasions
when there is a severe drought or some other natural disas-
ter will competition force the price higher - but only
temporarily.

Should Nicaragua somehow manage to expand its indus-
trial capacity to the extent that it can some day produce
cloth instead of raw cotton fibers, the foreign exchange
structure will still continue to support the Center powers.
Tariff barriers, quota regulations, and a variety of other
legal devices prevent the exportation of manufactured goods
to the same Center countries that willingly import the raw
materials and then sell the finished manufactured product
to the underdevelOped countries. As Castro once observed,
much of Latin America exports lumber, leather, and sugar
only to turn around and import furniture, shoes, and candy.
The World Bank estimates that the underdeveloped nations

could sell an additional $33 billion worth of goods to the

 

developed world if existing trade barriers were eliminated
(Nyerere, 1979).

Thus there cannot be an equal relationship or system
of exchange between unequals. The underdeveloped countries
remain underdeveloped because they are forced to function
in a world system structured in favor of the Center powers.

This same phenomena also explains much of the poverty

257

within the Center powers themselves. The numerous statis-
tics supporting these contentions are only too well known
and necessitate only a brief mentioning here.

Although the poor nations constitute 70% of the
world's population, they have less than 17% of the Global
Gross National Product. While much of the Periphery has
a per capita national income of less than $300, that of the
United States is over $7,000. What's worse, this inequal-
ity, instead of decreasing, continues to increase each
year. From 1965 to 1975, the poorest 25 countries in the
world increased their per capita income, after controlling
for inflation, at an annual rate of $2. During the same
period, the per capita income of the United States and
Western Europe increased by over $130 (Ibid., p. 2).

The Periphery is repeatedly told by the Center powers
that it must control their pOpulation in order to severe
the bonds of poverty. Yet the fact remains that much of
the developed world has a population density many times
that of most countries in Africa and Latin America.
Belgium has 38 times as many inhabitants per square mile
as Brazil; Britain has almost 50 times as many as Paraguay
or Argentina; and Japan has 32 times as many as Peru.
Switzerland with 404 inhabitants per square mile is seldom
regarded as overpopulated, whereas Brazil with 31.4 is
considered just that. As Galeano has pointed out, Haiti

and El Salvador, "the human antheaps of Latin America",

 

 

 

258

have less inhabitants than Italy. Over half of the land
in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela,
and Nicaragua has no inhabitants at all. More importantly,
one study after another has demonstrated that development
reduces the birth rate not the other way around.

Obviously Nicaragua is not alone in facing these di-
lemmas of development. Julius K. Nyerere, President of
Tanzania and one of the leading spokesmen for the Periphery,
in a speech at the Howard University has clearly explained
why ture development cannot occur within the present inter-
national economic system. His anlysis is worth quoting
here:

"International aid is certainly not the
answer, especially as it is offered by most
countries as if it were charity for which
we should be 'deserving poor' in the best
traditions of feudalism, and also very
grateful!

All the poor countries - including my own -
welcome capital and technical aid when it

is given without political strings . . .

But in any case, the whole idea of aid is
wrong because it is both ineffective in
dealing with the problem of poverty, and
humiliating to the receiver. Within Nations
we no longer think it proper to deal with
the problem of poverty through the personal
charity of the rich. Yet voluntary charity
by the rich nations is what is being advoca-
ted as the method for dealing with the
poverty of nations!

Like the workers of the Industrialized
countries, what we poor nations need is
the right to work, and a fair return for
our labor. We want equity not charity.

We want to depend upon our own efforts . .

 

 

259

(But) economics is only a part of life.
Political freedom, social equality and re-
spect, freedom of worship, freedom to live
in peace and harmony with your fellows -
all these things are very important to man.
People have been willing to kill for them.
But economics is about the means of life;
it is basic. In poor countries, if there
is a clash between personal freedom and
economic development, it is generally not
possible to give priority to the former.
For people are dying unnecessarily because
they do not have clean water, enought good
food, or basic medical care - which is what
economic development means to us. The most
basic human right of all is the right to
life itself, and a life which is not made
miserable by hunger, ignorance, or prevent-
able disease." (Ibid.)

The success of the Sandinista movement will allow the
Nicaraguan people the opportunity to obtain these rights

which have been unjustly denied them for so long.

APPENDIX A

What do you plant primera, corn, beans, or both?

A.
B.
C.

DO

Corn - 30%
Beans - 0
Both - 70%

you plant with a plow, an espeque, or both?

Plow - 69%
Espeque - 17%
Both - 14%

How many times do you weed your corn?

COCOS,

DO

One - 59%
Two - 40%
Three - 2%
None - 0

you have any dangerous diseases which frequently

attack your corn?

QHCEQ'TJEIUOIDD’

Yes - 70%

No - 27%

No answer - 2%
yes) ask: What do you use to combat the disease?
Nothing - 59%
Malathion - 7%
Dipterex - 1%
"Insecticide" - 8%
DDT - 5%
Licteran - 1%
Yellow cal - 1%
Neguban - 1%
Forgot - 1%
Other — 16%

(responded with name of the disease or insect
instead of what was used to combat it)

260

10.

11.

261

More or less, how many manzanas of corn do you plant

each year?

A. 1 to 2 manzanas - 41%
B. 3 to 4 manzanas - 33%
C. 5 to 6 manzanas - 18%
D. 7 to 8 manzanas - 2%
E. 9 to 10 manzanas - 3%
F. 11 to 12 manzanas - 0

G. More than 12 manzanas - 0

Do you know what fertilizer is?

A. Yes - 77%
B. No - 22%
C. No answer - 0

Have you used fertilizer in past years?

A. Yes - 24%
B. No - 75%
C. NO answer - 1%

Do you use fertilizer now?

A. Yes - 33%
B. No - 67%

(If yes) ask: On what do you apply the fertilizer?

A. Corn - 88%
B. Beans - 12%

(If he says no) ask: Why are you not

using it?

A. Costs too much - 60%
B. Does not know how to apply it - 12%
C. Not worth the trouble to apply it — 4%
D. Fertilizer doesn't work - 0

E. Others - 24%

(Including: Ground too hilly - 2%; Good results

without it - 1%; Plants at God's will - 1%; Soil
doesn't need it - 1%; Bank would not give the loan
money to buy it - 2%; No reason - 6%)

12.

13.

14.

How many arrobas of corn can you harvest from one

manzana?

20
40
50
60
70
75
80
100
120
125
140
150
160
200
250
300
350
500

arrobas
arrobas
arrobas
arrobas
arrobas
arrobas
arrobas

arrobas
arrobas
arrobas
arrobas
arrobas
arrobas
arrobas
arrobas
arrobas
arrobas
arrobas

NO answer

per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per

262

manzana
manzana
manzana
manzana
manzana
manzana
manzana

manzana
manzana
manzana
manzana
manzana
manzana
manzana
manzana
manzana
manzana
manzana

(Average yield per manzana

Generally do you use mozos (field laborers) in the

cultivation of your corn?

A.
B.

(If the answer is yes) ask:

Yes - 4

No - 5

9%
1%

less

less
less
less

less

less
less

= 99 arrobas.)

employed for how many days?‘

No. of Mozos

 

when)NFJPHHFJHFHPHHFJHFHP‘

than 1%
2%

8%

6%

4%

4%

14%

30%
than 1%
than 1%
than 1%
12%
than 1%
9%

2%

2%

than 1%
than 1%
2%

No. of Days Employed

 

10
4
8

14

18

20

15

30

50

45

12

32

30

20

60

26

How many mozos are

No. of Responses

 

HNHfiHHHHNHwNHwHw

263

No. of Mozos No. of Days Employed No. of Responses

 

 

 

16
12
25
8
40
20
18
50
67
80
60
8
96
39
26
12
20
30
85
40
18
4
12
18
50
80
10 30
11 6

m~qoum¢spasnuscsacuuawcnoawcucameos:Nbdkaw
FdhfldP4PP‘F‘HFHPJHPHFJHP‘F‘HP‘F‘HF‘RJHPHquFJH

Generally what do you do with your corn harvest?

A. Sell it futuro - 0
B. Sell it all at harvest - 3%
C. Keep it all for own use - 23%
D. Sell part at the harvest and store part - 73%
E. Other - 3%

(Including "Kept it all to sell to the poor at
reduced cost.")

Tell me in your opinion, is there much difference
between the price of corn at harvest time and at the
time of planting?

A. Yes - 100%
B. No - 0

264

17. (If yes) ask: What is the price at the harvest and

at the planting?

Price at Harvest per Price at Planting

 

 

Arroba of Corn

 

per Arroba of Corn

 

c$

No answer - 2 respondents

C$ 15

18

13
14
15
16
12
14
12
13
14
15
16
17
20
to
15
35
30
40
60
18

75

Frequency

 

of Responses

 

less than
less than

5%

19%
less than
less than
less than
less than

15%

4%

32%

4%
less than
less than
less than
less than
less than
less than
less than
less than
less than

1%
1%

1%
2%
2%
3%

2%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

265

How do you send your corn and beans to market to sell
them?

A. Cart with bueys - less than 1%
B. Mules - 7%
C. Truck - less than 1%
D. Horses - 6%
E. Sell at farm - 80%
F. Other - 5%

Generally do you have to rent or do you own your
method of sending your basic grains to market?

A. Have to rent - 65%
B. Have own method - 35%

(If he rents) ask: What does he use and how much
does it cost?

Response Number of Responses Cost per Arroba

 

 

 

Cart with oxen 2 C$l; C$2

Oxen w/o cart 0 No answer

Cart w/o bueys 1 Free (borrowed)

Mules 7 C$1; C$l; C$2;
C51; C31; ’
C$13 per dia;
C$20 per dia;

Horses 0 no answer

Truck 1 C$l.25

Other 0 no answer

How do you store your corn in the house to sell later?

A. On the husk - 22%
B. In grain storage boxes - 2%
C. In barrels - 6%
D. In sacks — 2%
E. In trojas - 66%
F. Other - 2%

A e you storing your corn in the same way now as you
dld 5 years ago?

A

B

. Yes - 98%
. No - 2%

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

266

(If he has changed) ask: How have you changed?

1 respondent has changed from using a troja in the
past to presently using barrels; 2 respondents said
they could not answer how they had changed.

Do you treat your corn with something before you store
it?

A. Yes - 71%
B. No - 29%

(If he says yes) ask: What are you using to treat
your corn?

A. DDT - 64%
B. Phostoxin - 2%
C. Gorgohicida - 10%
D. Insecticide - 5%
E. Salt - 12%
F. Ashes - 1%
G. Sulfur - 1%
H. "The hand of God" - 1%
I. Other - 1%
J. Forgot - 2%

What problems do you have with the corn which is
stored in your house?

A. El gorgoho - 71%
B. Rats - 20%
C. No problems - less than 10%

If you store 10 arrobas of corn in your house, how
many arrobas will you lose before you sell the corn?

A. Nothing - 13%
B. Less than 1 arroba - 4%
C. l arroba - 7%
D. 2 arrobas - 17%
E. 3 arrobas - 18%
F. 4 arrobas - 12%
G. 5 arrobas - 30%
H. Other - 0

Do you think it could be possible for someone to store
corn at home until the price reaches its highest level
without losing any of the corn?

A. Yes - 74%
B. No - 25%
C. Don't know - 1%

267

29. (If he says yes) ask: How is it possible?

A. With gorgohicide - 29%
B. With luck - 3%
C. "If God wants it" - 28%
D. "It all depends" - 1%
E. With barrels - 12%
F. "Knowing the prOper way of storing" - 3%
G. "Making a home silo" - 1%
H. With DDT - 1%
I. With malethion - 1%
J. Treating the corn first - 7%
K. "I never lose because the pigs eat the
damaged corn" - 2%
L. A,B, and C - 1%
M. A and C - 7%
N. B and C - 2%
0. "With God's help and barrels" - 1%

30. Do you plant coffee?

A. Yes - 23%
B. No - 77%

31. (If he says yes) ask: What amount of coffee do you
plant?

Number of Responses Number of”Coffee Trees

 

 

20
25
50
100
200
300
400
500
1000
1500
2000
3000
4000
20,000
No answer

PJHrdh)fihdthh4HLukHHF4H

32. What do you plant postrera?

A. Corn - 0
B. Beans - 98%
C. Both - 0
D. Nothing - 2%

("Because the diseases have gotten too bad.")

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

268

How do you plant your beans?

A. Plow - 32%
B. Espeque - 28%
C. Espeque below corn - 33%
D. Both - 6%
E. A and C - 1%

Do you treat your beans with something before you
plant them?

A. Yes - 16%
B. No - 84%

(If he says yes) ask: What do you treat your beans
with before you plant them?

Type of Treatment Number of Responses

 

 

Gorgohicide l
Keroscene

Ashes

Carbonate

Bisulfuro

Cow Manure

HP‘F‘NFH\J

How many times do you clean your beans?

A. None - less than 1%
B. One - 85%
C. Two - 13%
D. Three - less than 1%

Do you know what insecticide is?
A. Yes - 66%
B. No - 34%
C. No answer - less than 1%

Do you use insecticide every year?

A. Yes - 28%
B. NO - 72%

Are there insects or diseases that attack your beans?

A. Yes - 95%
B. No - 5%

40.

41.

42.

43.

269

(If he says yes) ask: What are these diseases?

A. Maya - 31%
B. Lippe - 34%
C. Langosta - 1%
D. Gusano ciego - less than 1%
E. Burra - less than 1%
F. Picudo - 25%
G. Chamusca - less than 1%
H. Hielo negro - less than 1%
I. Pulgon - 3%

Do you plant anything besides corn and beans?

A. Yes - 27%
B. No - 73%

(If he says yes) ask: What else do you plant, and
how many manzanas do you plant of it?

Type of Crop Number of Responses Number of Manzanas

 

 

 

Rice 7 1/2; 1/2; 1/4;
1/2; 1/2; 1/4; 1
Coffee 20 2; 2; 1; 1/2; 2;

1/47 1/4; 1-1/4;
1/2; 1/4; 4; 3/4;
1; 5; 1/2; 1/2;
1; 1; 1/2; 2; 3;
1/2; 1; 1; 1/2;
1; l; l; 2

Sorgo 9 3; 1/2; 1; 1;
1/2; 1; 1; l; 2
Chilla 1 1

How many manzanas of beans do you plant each year?

A. l to 2 - 70%
B. 3 to 4 - 19%
C. 5 to 6 - 8%
D. 7 to 8 - less than 1%
E. 9 to 10 - less than 1%
F. 11 to 12 - less than 1%
G. 12 to 13 - 0
H. Other - -

270

44. How many arrobas of beans do you harvest per manzana?

Arrobas Per Manzana Freguency of Response

 

 

15 less than 1%
20 6%

25 3%

30 11%

35 2%

40 14%

45 less than 1%
50 29%

60 19%

70 3%

75 2%

8O 4%
100 5%

45. What do you do with you bean harvest?

 

 

 

A. Sell it futuro - 0

B. Sell it all at the harvest — 2%

C. Keep it all - 6%

D. Sell part and keep part - 92%

Ratio of Part Sold

to Part Kept Frequency of Response

25/75 less than 1%
30/70 less than 1%
40/60 less than 2%
55/45 less than 1%
50/50 28%
60/40 10%
67/33 6%
70/30 16%
75/25 7%
80/20 20%
85/15 less than 1%
90/10 6%

46. Is there a difference in the price of beans at
harvest time and at planting time?

A. Yes - 97%
B. No - 3%

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

(If he says yes) ask:

Ratio of Price at Harvest Time

271

How has the price changed?

Frequency of Response

 

to Price at Planting Time

25/50
25/45
28/40
28/50
30/50
35/40
35/45
35/50
40/50
45/50
48/50
48/75

3%
less than
less than

3%

37%
less than
less than

14%

28%

7%
less than
less than

Don't know

How do you store
A. In sacks - 6
B. In barrels - 3
C. In bunkers -
D. Other -
Are

you

A. Yes - 100%

B. No -

(If he has changed) ask:

7%
0%
3%
0

No one has changed!

How have you changed?

2%
1%

1%
1%

1%
1%

the beans you plan to sell later?

you storing your beans in the same manner that
stored them 5 years ago?

Before storing your beans, do you treat them with
something?

A.
B. No

Yes - 56%
- 44%

272

52. (If he says yes) ask: What do you treat the beans

with?

A. DDT - 2%
B. Phostoxin - 3%
C. Gorgohicide - 74%
D. Insecticide - 2%
E. Ashes - 3%
F. Bisfuro - 8%
G. Alcanfor - 6%

(children's cold medicine)

H. Chile (ground) - 2%

53. Do you dry your beans in the sun before storing them?

A. Yes - 89%

B. No - 11%
54. (If he says yes) ask: How many days do you dry them

in the sun for?
A. One - 3%
B. Two - 25%
C. Three - 56%
D. Four - 6%
E. Five - 5%
F. Six - 3%
G. Seven - 0
H. Eight - 3%

55. During storage, are there insects or diseases which
attack your beans which do not attack your corn?

A. Yes - 75%
B. No - 24%
C. Don't know - 1%

56. (If he says yes) ask: What are these diseases or

insects?

A. Gorgohol de frijole - 89%
B. Polilla - 8%
C. Palomillo - 2%

D. Forgot the name - 1%

57.

58.

273

If you store 10 arrobas of beans in your house, how
many arrobas will you lose before you sell the beans?

EEO'TJFJUOWS’

DO

None

Less than 1
l

2
3
4
5
Other

you think it

- 36%
- 13%
- 18%
- 14%
- 5%
- 3%
- 10%

would be possible for someone to

store beans in their house until the price is the
highest possible but not lose any?

A.
B.

Yes - 78%
No - 22%

59.

60.

61.

62.

63.

PART II

Have you ever borrowed money from Banco Nacional?

A.
B.

Yes - 46%
No - 54%

(If he says yes) ask: For what did you use the
loan? (Some farmers took out different types of

loans.)

A. Agriculture - 66%

B. Oxen - 14%

C. Vacas paridas - 5%

D. Cattle - 4%

E. A and B - 7%

F. B and D - less than 2%
G. A, B, C and D - 4%

H. Fattening pigs - less than 2%
I. Mules - less than 2%

(If the loan was for agriculture) ask: What did you
plant with the loan and did you plant with or without

fertilizer?

A. Corn with fertilizer - 51%
B. Corn without fertilizer - 24%
C. Beans with fertilizer - 2%
D. Beans without fertilizer - 2%
E. Corn and beans with fertilizer - 20%

Who do you think the bank is helping more: the rich
farmers, the poor farmers, both of them?

A.
B.
C.
D.

If

The rich farmers - 53%

The poor farmers - 9%
Both equally - 30%
Don't know - 8%

the bank would give you a loan, would you work

with the bank in the future?

A.
B.
C.

Yes - 83%
No - 16%
Don't know - 1%

274

64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

69.

(If he says yes) ask:
out a loan for?

HEO'TJEUUOUIV

Cattle

Agriculture
Milk cows

275

What would you like to take

Agriculture and oxen
A and B

Vacas parida

Coffee

Business loan
Don't know

Do you know what INCEI'S

A.
B.

(If he says yes) ask:

A.
B.

C.

Have you ever sold corn or beans to INCEI?

A.
B.

(If he says yes) ask:

Yes - 21%

NO

To buy grains and sell them in other parts
To provide the farmers with a safe
location to store their corn and beans

To stop the price of corn and beans from
fluctuating

"To dry corn"

"To buy grains"

"To give technical assistance to the
farmers so that they can get a better

- 79%

harvest"

"An agricultural institution for the

farmers"

anyone from INCEI ever visited you?

Yes -
No

Yes - 11%

No - 89%

5%
- 95%

What is the work of INCEI?

job is?

21%
64%
1%
2%
5%
3%
1%
2%
2%

8%
58%
12%

4%
12%

3%

3%

How many times have you sold

corn or beans to INCEI?

000135

waI-J

58%
42%
0
0

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

276

(If he says no) ask: Why have you never sold corn
or beans to INCEI?

A. The price that INCEI pays is too

low - 14%
B. The grains weigh too little after
INCEI drys them - 2%
C. It is very difficult to transport
the grains there - 12%
D. INCEI cheats in weighing the
grains - 6%
E. Don't know - 6%
F. "No chance" - 3%
G. "Harvest is too small" - 28%
H. Sells all at home - 24%
I. "Sells to others" - less than 1%
J. INCEI doesn't always buy - 2%
K. Doesn't trust INCEI - 2%
L. Only trusts one buyer in town - less than 1%

Do you think it would be possible to maintain the
price of corn and beans all year?

A. Yes - 46%
B. No - 13%
C. Don't know - 41%

Do you think it would be good if the price of corn
and beans always stayed the same?

A. Yes - 54%
B. No - 13%
C. Don't know - 33%

Who do you think INCEI is helping more, the rich
farmers, the poor farmers, or both equally?

A. The rich farmers - 39%

B. The poor farmers - 9%
C. Both equally - 24%
D. Don't know - 28%

Do you know anyone who either sold or stored their
corn or beans in the silos at INCEI?

A. Yes — 30%
B. No - 70%

75.

76.

77.

78.

79.

277

To whom do you sell your corn and

Herman Rayo

Porfilio Flores

Orlando Cerrato

Outside buyers

Others

"highest bidder"

"first person who comes"
"whoever will buy"

"to the poor who need it most

HEO'TJDIUOUIID'

- 6%
- 2%
- 15%
- 38%
- 4%
- 8%
- 9%
- 18%
less than 1%

Has anyone ever cheated you when you were selling

your corn and beans?

A. Yes - 16%
B. No - 84%

(If he says yes) ask: What happened?

"The poor who need it most"
Don't know

A. The scale was rigged - 11%

B. The buyer did not pay a fair price — 32%

C. Other —

D. Lied about the correct weight - 47%

E. B and D - 11%

To whom do you prefer selling your corn and beans to,
buyers from Cuidad Sandino or from other parts?
A. Sandino - 59%
B. Ocotal - less than 1%
C. Esteli — 0
D. Managua - 0
E. Other areas - 9%
F. Does not matter - 17%
G. Highest bidder - 13%
H

I

Would you spend your own money to

less than 1%
less than 1%

build a spot where

you could store your grains on your own farm and at
the same time be certain that you would not lose any

corn or beans?

A. Yes - 54%
B. No - 11%
C. Don't know - 35%

80.

81.

82.

278

If a silo on your own land was too expensive, would
you give money to build a site where you could store
grain with your neighbors and at the same time be
certain that you would not lose any corn or beans?

A. Yes - 68%
B. No - 13%
C. Don't know - 19%

Do you think that INCEI is drying the corn and beans
too much?

A. Yes - 20%
B. No - 9%
C. Don't know - 71%

Do you know why INCEI is drying the corn and beans?
A. Yes - 28%

B. No - 6%
C. Don't know — 66%

83.

84.

85.

PART III

How many years have you lived in this location?

Less than
6 to 10
11 to 15
16 to 20
21 to 25
26 to 30
31 to 35
36 to 40
41 to 45
More than
No answer

NC-IHDIQ'TJEUUOWID

Were you born
part?

A. Here
B. Came from

Locations

 

Somota

Leon

Esteli
Ocotal
Condega
Quilali
Pueblo Nuevo
Trinidad
Jalapa

Santa Maria
Osocona

San Juan

El Sausa
Puerto Cabaza
No answer

If you could,

5

6%
17%
- 12%

- 13%

- 8%

- 10%

- 10%

- 6%

- 3%

45 - 16%
- 2%

here or have you come from another

- 54%
another location - 46%

- 3%
- 30%
- 29%
- 2%
- 3%
- 2%
- 2%
- 14%
- 3%
- 2%
- 2%
- 2%
- 2%
- 2%
- 2%

would you like to go to another

location?

A. Yes - 75%
B. No - 15%
C. No answer - 7%
D. Does't know - 3%

279

86.

87.

88.

89.

How old are you?

HL'L‘DWHUOWZU

15
21
26
31
36
41
46
MO

-20
-25
-30
-35
-40
-45
-50
re than 51

NO answer

How many kids do

OZEVNQH’JOWL’UUOUJS’

5?

you

0011135

\DCDQONU'IIBWNHO

you the owner of the land that

- 14%
- 3%
- 6%
- 18%
- 13%
- 8%
- 12%
- 10%
- 7%
- 9%
- 0

- 0

- 0

- 2%
- 1%

renting it?

Own

Re

nt

Both

Family provides land rent free

- 3%
- 16%
- 9%
- 14%
- 20%
- 11%
- 3%
- 23%
- 2%

you have?

280

you plant or are

51%
43%
0

6%

How many manzanas do you plant each year?

A.

Number of manzanas of corn primeria

0
1
2
3
4
5
6

manzanas
manzanas
manzanas
manzanas
manzanas
manzanas
man zana S

Over 7 manzanas -

O
16%
25%
21%
11%
14%

5%

8%

281

B. Number of manzanas of beans primeria

0 manzanas - 44%
Less than 1 manzana - 23%
l manzana - 23%
2 manzanas - 5%
3 manzanas - 3%
Over 3 manzanas - 3%

C. Number of manzanas of corn postrera
0 manzanas - 100%

D. Number of manzanas of beans postrera

0 manzanas - 3%
Less than 1 manzana - 4%
1 manzana - 24%
2 manzanas - 43%
3 manzanas - 13%
4 manzanas - 8%
Over 4 manzanas - 5%

Do you own vacas paridas?

A. Yes - 42%
B. No - 58%

(If he says yes) ask: How many vacas paridas do you own?

Owns l vaca parida - 26%
Owns 2 vacas paridas - 26%
Owns 3 vacas paridas - 20%
Owns 4 vacas paridas - 16%
Owns 5 vacas paridas - 4%
Owns 6 vacas paridas - 2%
Owns more than 6 vacas paridas - 6%

Do you own oxen?

A. Yes - 47%
B. No - 53%.

(If he says yes) ask: How many oxen do you own?

Owns 1 ox - 9%
Owns 2 oxen - 79%
Owns 3 oxen - 4%
Owns 4 oxen - 9%

282

94. Do you own other animals, pigs, chickens, or horses?

A. Number of pigs owned

None - 42%
Owns l pig - 25%
Owns 2 pigs - 17%
Owns 3 pigs - 6%
Owns 4 pigs - 3%
Owns 5 pigs - 3%
Owns more than 5 pigs — 5%

B. Number of chickens owned

None - 11%
Owns 1 to 5 chickens — 17%
Owns 6 to 10 chickens - 21%
Owns 11 to 15 chickens - 17%
Owns 16 to 20 chickens - 21%
Owns over 20 chickens - 13%
C. Number of horses owned
None - 59%
Owns 1 horse - 25%
Owns 2 horses - 11%
Owns 3 horses - 1%
Owns more than 3 horses - 3%

95. Do you own a radio?

A. Yes - 76%
B. No - 24%

96. Do you know how to read?

A. Yes - 40%
B. No - 60%

97. Do you know how to write?

A. Yes - 37%
B. No - 63%

283

98. More or less how many quintales of beans and corn do
you need to harvest each year for a comfortable life?

A. Corn
Less than 100 arrobas - 8%
100 arrobas - 17%
150 arrobas - 8%
200 arrobas - 33%
250 arrobas - 3%
300 arrobas - 10%
350 arrobas - 17%
400 arrobas - 5%
500 arrobas - 8%
Over 500 arrobas — 8%

B. Beans

Less than 50 arrobas - 23%

50 arrobas - 29%
100 arrobas - 28%
150 arrobas - 3%
200 arrobas - 10%
300 arrobas - 5%
500 arrobas - 5%

99. Do you think the moon is important in planting?

A. Yes - 86%
No - 14%

w

100. Do you believe there are monkey people?

A. Yes - 5%
B. No - 95%

101. Do you know anyone who has had corn, beans, or
chickens stolen by monkey people?

A. Yes - 2%
B. No - 98%

102. Do you know anyone who has seen monkey people?’

A. Yes - 4%
B. No - 96%

284

103. Write the name of the farmer:

104. What valle is he from?

San Diego - 10%
El Collo - 5%
San Albino - 16%
Quebrada Grande - 3%
Muyuca - 20%
Casa Viejas - 6%
Pie de Cuestra - 1%
Arenal - 2%
Sabana Larga - 7%
Sabana Grande - 6%
El Terrero - 5%
Carrisal - 4%
La Podria - 2%
La Fragua - 2%
Buenos Aires - 10%

105. Type of house

Adobe - 58%
Straw - 5%
Stick - 8%
Brick - 2%
Wood - 22%
No answer - 2%

106. Number of rooms

1 room - 57%
2 rooms - 31%
3 rooms - 9%
4 rooms - 2%

107. Where do you get your water from?

Stream - 61%
Well - 10%
Running water - 1%
Water hole - 25%
River - 2%

108. Is there electricity?

Yes - 26%
No - 74%

285

109. Is there a latrine?

Yes - 47%
No - 53%

110. What type of floor do you have?

Earth - 89%
Wood - 1%
Brick - 1%
Cement - 8%

1%

Tile

APPENDIX B

286

287

l I O O 0’ I I
dQue Siembra usted de primera, maiz, frijoles o los
dos?

A. maiz
B. frijoles
C. los dos

 

 

 

dSiembra usted con arado, con espeque 0 con los dos?

A. de arado
B. de espeque
C. los dos

 

 

 

' I . . /
cCuantas veces limpia usted su maiz?

 

 

 

A. ninguna
B. una
C. dos
D. tres

 

éTiene usted algunas plagas peligrosas que ataca su
maiz con mucha frecuencia?

A. si
B. no

 

 

(Si dice que si) preguhtele: gQué usa usted para
combatir las plagas?

ESCRIBA lo que el dice

 

I
I I I O O
Mas o menosjdcuantas manzanas Slembra usted de maiz
IV
cada ano?

 

 

 

 

 

 

A. 1 a1 2 E. 9 a1 10

B. 3 a1 4 F. 11 al 12
C. 5 al 6 G. Mas que 13
D. 7 al 8

 

éSabe usted lo que es abono?

A. si
B. no

 

 

. N
dHa usado usted abono en los anos pasados?

A. si
B. no

 

 

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

288

éUsa usted abono ahora?

A. si
B. no

 

 

(Si dice que si) preguhtele: ,iEn que aplica e1
abono?

A. maiz
B. frijoles

 

 

/ , /
(Si dice que ho) preguntele: CPorque no esta
usandolo?

A. cuesta demasiado

B. no sabe como aplicarlo

C. no vale la pena aplicarlo

D. e1 abono/no sirve

E. otra razon (escriba que dice)

 

 

 

 

 

. / ./
’Cuantas arrobas de maiz puede usted cosechar de una
manzana?

(ESCRIBA e1 numero)

 

éGeneralmente ocupa usted mozos para el cultivo de su
maiz?

A. si
B. no

 

 

. . . I . ’ I
(81 dice que Sl) preguntele: l¢Cuantos mozos esta
ocupanao y por cuantos dias?

A. numero de mozos
B. numero de dias

 

 

. /
cGeneralmente que hace usted con su cosecha de maiz?

A. se vende futuro

. se vende todo a1 cosecha

. dejarla todo para sus gastos

. vende una parte a la cosech y guarde una parte

 

 

 

 

I?! DOW

. otra (Escriba lo que el dice)

 

I t 0 O
Digame en su Opinion <:Hay mucha d1ferenc1a entra e1
precio de maiz del tiempo de cosechar y del tiempo
de sembrar?

A. si
B. no

 

 

289

17. (Si dice que si) preguntele: ¢Cuales son los precios
a la cosecha y a la siembra?

A. e1 precio a la cosecha por arroba de maiz C$

 

B. el precio a la siembra por arroba de maiz C$

 

. I . .
18. AEn que manera manda usted su mafz y frijoles a1
mercado para venderlos?

A. en carreta con bueyes
B. en machos

C. en caballos

D. en camioneta

E. vende en la finca

F. otra

 

 

 

 

 

 

l9. Generalmenta 'tiene usted que aquilar o tiene su
propio metodo a mandar sus granos basicos a1 mercado?

A. tiene que aquilar
B. tiene su proprio metodo

 

 

20. Si aquila preguhtele: éQué usa y cuanto vale?

A. carreta con bueyes
precio por arroba CS?
B. bueyes sin carreta
precio por dia C$
C. carreta sin bueyes
precio por dia C$
D. machos
precio por arroba C37
E. caballos
precio por arroba C$
F. camioneta
precio por arroba C$
G. otra
precio

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I g, o
21. dComo guarda usted e1 maiz que tiene en su casa para
vender mas tarde?

. en la mazorca

. en los bunques
en los barriles
. en sacos

. en una troja
. otra (Diga lo que el dice)

 

 

 

 

 

WEIUOCDII’

 

290

‘ x f .
22. dEsta guardando usted su maiz en la misma manera como
lo hizo hace cinco afios?

 

 

A. si
B. no
23. (Si lo habia cambiado) preguhtele: ‘éComo lo habia

cambiado usted?

A. ESCRIBA lo que el dice

 

 

 

24. CEsta curando su maiz con algo antes de que lo guarde?
A. si
B. no

25. (Si dice que’si) preguhtele: ‘iQué esta usando para

curar e1 maiz?

A. D D T
B. Phostoxin
C. Otra cosa

 

 

 

I
26. éQue problema tiene usted con el maiz cuando esta
guardandolo en su casa?

A. el gorgoho
B. ratones
C. otra (diga lo que dice)

 

 

 

I
27. Si tuviera usted diez arrobas de maiz guardado en su
I I o
casa <Lcuantas arrobas pudiera perder antes de que
se vende?

nada

menos que una arroba
una arroba

dos arrobas

tres arrobas

cuatro arrobas

cinco arrobas

otra

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EQWMUOWP

 

28. éPiensa usted que seria posible para alguien a guardar
e1 maiz en su casa hasta el precio es lo mas alto
| O I
p051ble Sln perder nada del maiz?

A. si
B. no

 

 

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

291

(Si dice que si) preguntele: éComo serfa posible
este?

A. con gorgohicide

B. con suerte

C. si Dios quiere

D. otra (escriba lo que dice)

 

 

 

 

éSiembra usted e1 cafe?

A. si
B. no

 

 

(Si dice que si) preguntele: LQue cantidad de café
siembra usted?

A. ESCRIBA la cantidad

 

LQué siembra usted de postrera?

 

 

I
A. maiz
B. frijoles
C. nada

 

dcomo esta sembrando usted los frijoles?

A. de arado

. con espeque

. con espeque abajo e1 maiz
. los dos

 

 

 

DOW

 

3Esta curando usted los frijoles con algo antes de
sembrarlos?

A. si
B. no

 

 

(Si dice que si) preguntele: 8Con que cura usted los
frijoles antes de sembrarlos?

A. ESCRIBA lo que dice

 

dCuantas veces limpia usted los frijoles?

A. ninguna
B. una
C. dos
D. tres

 

 

 

 

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

292

éSabe usted lo que es insecticida?

A. si
B. no

 

 

I
dEsta usando usted insecticida todos los afibs?

A. si
B. no

 

 

éTiene usted algunas plagas o enfermidades que ataca
sus frijoles?

A. si
B. no

 

 

(Si dice que si) preguhtele: éCuales son las plagas?

A. ESCRIBA lo que dice

 

éEsta sembrando usted algo mas de maiz y frijoles?

A. si
B. no

 

 

. . . / - /' / I
(31 dice que Sl) preguntele: (:Que mas esta sembrando
y el numero de manzanas?

 

 

 

 

 

 

A. arroz numero de manzanas
B. café numero de manzanas
C. sorgo numero de manzanas
D. otra numero de manzanas

 

 

' I . . I

Cuantas manzanas de fri oles esta sembrando usted
‘~ 3

cada ano?

 

 

 

 

 

 

A. 1 a1 2 E. 9 a1 10
B. 3 a1 4 F. 11 a1 12
C. 5 a1 6 G. 13 al 14
D. 7 a1 8 H. otra

 

 

q I I I /
CCuantas arrobas de frijoles esta cosechando usted de
una manzana?

A. ESCRIBA 1a cantidad

 

3Qué hace usted con su cosecha de frijoles?

A. se vende futuro
B. se vende todo a la cosecha
C. se vende una arte y guarda una parte
(si #0, preguntele e1 porciento) vender
guardar

 

 

 

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

293

/ .
Digame (Lhay una diferencia entre el precio de los
frijoles a la cosecha y al tiempo de sembrar?

A. si
B. no

 

 

(Si dice que si) preguntele: <§C6mo ha cambiado e1
precio?

A. precio a la cosecha por arroba es CS

 

B. precio a1 siembra por arroba es C$

 

. I I l

CComo guarda en la casa los frijoles que va a vender
I

mas tarde?

A. en sacos

 

 

 

B. en barriles
C. en bunques
D. otra

 

' / . . .
éEsta guardando usted los frijoles en la misma manera
como lo hizo hace cinco anos?

A. si
B. no

 

 

(Si lo habia cambiado) preguhtele: éComo cambio?

A. ESCRIBA lo que dice

 

AAntes de que usted guarda los frijoles esta curando
los frijoles?

A. si
B. no

 

 

(Si dice que si) preguhtele: aCon que esta curando
los frijoles?

 

 

 

A. D D T

B. Phostoxin

C. Gorgohicide

D. otra (escribe que)

 

éAsolea usted sus frijoles antes de guardarlos?

A. si
B. no

 

 

294

 

 

 

 

54. (Si dice que si) preguhtele: éPara cuantos dias esta
asoleandolos?
A. un dia C. tres dias
B. dos dias D. otra

55. Cuando esta guardando sus granos Citiene ud.algunas

insectos o plagas que ataca solamente los frijoles y
que no ataca el maiz?

 

 

A. si
B. no
56. (Si dice que si) preguntele: éCuales son?

A. ESCRIBA lo que dice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

57. ISi usted guarde diez arrobas de frijoles en su casa,
Couéntas arrobas puede perder antes de que usted
vendelas?

A. nada

B. menos que una arroba
C. una arroba

D. dos arrobas

E. tres arrobas

F. cuatro arrobas

G. cinco arrobas

H. otra

 

58. éPiensa usted que seria posible para alguien guardar
frijoles en su casa hasta que el precio es lo mas
alto posible sin perder nada?

A. si
B. no

 

 

59.

60.

61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

295

II
éAlguna vez ha prestado usted dinero del Banco
Nacional?

A. si
B. no

 

 

(Si dice que si) preguntele: éPara que usaba e1
prestamo?

A. agricultura

B. bueyes

C. vacas paridas

D. ganado

E. otra (escriba que)

 

 

 

 

 

(Si fuera para la agricultura) preguntele: 2 Que
sembrd usted con el prestamo y lo sembro sin 0 con
abono?

A. tipo de siembra
B. con abono
C. sin abono

 

 

 

éA quién piensa usted e1 banco esta ayudando mas, a
los agricultores ricos o a los agricultores pobres,
o a los dos igualmente?

A. a los ricos
B. a los pobres
C. a los dos igualmente

 

 

 

Si e1 banco 1e diera habilitacion,citrabajarfa usted
con el banco en el futuro?

A. si
B. no

 

 

I
(Si dice que si) preguntele: éPara que le gustaria
sacar e1 prestamo?

A. ESCRIBA lo que dice

 

éSabe usted lo que es el trabajo de INCEI?

A. si
B. no

 

 

296

 

 

 

66. (Si dice que si) preguntele: lQué es el trabajo de

INCEI?

A. para comprar granos y venderlos en otra parte

B. para dar a los agricultores un sit1o seguro para
guardar el ma1z y frijoles

C. para parar e1 precio de maiz y frijoles de subir
y bajar

D. otra (escriba lo que dice)

 

67. éAlguna vez ha venido a visitarle en su casa un
representante de INCEI?

 

 

 

A. si
B. no
68. 3Ha vendido usted alguna vez maiz o frijoles al
INCEI?
A. $1
B. no

 

69. (Si dice que si) preguntele: gCuantas veces ha
vendido su maiz o frijoles a INCEI?

 

 

 

 

A. una C. tres
B. dos D. otra (escriba lo que dice
70. (Si dice que no) preguntele: (iPorque nunca ha

vendido su ma1z o frijoles a INCEI?

A.

B.

el precio lo que paga INCEI es muy bajo

 

los granos pesan demasiado pocos despres ellos
se secan

 

es muy dificil a llevar los granos alla

 

no le sale la pesa
no sabe
otra razon

 

 

 

297

71. dPiensa usted que seria posible mantener e1 precio
de ma1z y frijoles todo el ano?

A. si
B. no
C. no sabe

 

 

 

' O 0/ I I I/
72. ¢P1ensa usted que ser1a bueno 51 e1 prec1o de maiz
y frijoles siempre quedaba lo mismo?

A. 51
B. no
C. no sabe

 

 

 

73. aA quién piensa usted que INCEI esta ayudando mas, a
los agricultores ricos, o a los agricultores pobres,
o a los dos igualmente?

A. los ricos
B. los pobres
C. los dos

 

 

 

74. AConoce usted alguna persona quien vendio o quién
guardaba su maiz o frijoles en los silos de INCEI?

 

 

A. 51
B. no
75. A quién vende usted su maiz y frijoles?

A. Herman Rayo

B. Porfilio Flores

C. Orlando Cerrato

D. compradores de afuera
E. otra (escriba a quien)

 

 

 

 

 

76. ¢Alguien 1e engafiaba a usted alguna vez cuando
estaba vendiendo su maiz y frijoles?

A. si
B. no

 

 

77. (Si dice que si) preguntele: éQué 1e paso?

. la balanza era equivocada

no le pagaba un precio justo
otra razon (diga lo que dice)
. 1e cachaba 1a pesa

 

 

 

COUCH},

 

 

 

 

 

 

78.

79.

80.

81.

82.

298

/ I
¢A quien prefiere vender su maiz y frijoles a los

comerciantes del Jicaro o otra parte?

. de Jicaro

. de Ocotol

. de Esteli

. de Managua

. otra parte

. no es muy importante

 

 

 

 

 

wmoowiv

 

. I
cGastar1a usted su propio d1nero para constru1r un

sitio donde pudiera guardar sus granos en su propio
finca y al mismo tiempo queda seguro usted que no
perderia nada de su ma1z y frijoles?

A. 51
B. no
C. no sabe

 

 

 

Digamos que un silo en su propio terrano es
demasiado caro, ¢dar1a usted dinero para construir
un sitio donde puede guardar granos juntos con su
vecinos y al mismo tiempo queda seguro que no va a
perder nada de su ma1z o frijoles?

A. si
B. no
C. no sabe

 

 

 

CPiensa usted que INCEI esta secando e1 maiz y
Cfrijoles demasiado?

A. si
B. no
C. no sabe

 

 

 

éSabe usted porque INCEI esta secando e1 maiz y
frijoles?

A. 51
B. no
C. no sabe

 

 

 

83.

84.

85.

86.

87.

88.

89.

90.

91.

299

III

/ ,v . . .
dCuantos anos t1ene usted de V1v1r en este lugar?

A. Escriba e1 numero del afibs

 

ANacio usted aqu1 0 ha venido de otra parte?
1‘ .’
A. nacio aqu1
B. vino de otra parte
( donde?)

 

 

 

Si usted podria, ale gustaria ir a otra parte?

A. 31
B. no

 

 

l / H a
¢Cuantos anos t1ene usted?

 

 

 

 

 

 

A. 15 a 20 E. 36 a 40
B. 21 a 25 F. 41 a 45
c. 26 a 30 - G. 46 a so
D. 31 a 35 H. mas que 51

 

gCuantos nifios tiene uSted?

Numero Numero de varones
Los edades . Numero de embras

 

 

'Esté usted e1 duefio de la tierra que esta sembrando
o esta aquilandola?

A. duefio
B. aquilando
C. los dos

 

 

 

' I I .
¢Cuantas manzanas esta sembrando usted cada afio?

I
A. Numero de manzanas de ma1z pr1mera
B. Numero de frijoles primera

 

 

C. Numero de manzanas de maiz postrera

 

D. Numero de manzanas de frijoles postrera
éTiene usted vacas paridas?

A. si
B. no

 

 

(Si dice que si) preguntele: ,3Cuéntas vacas paridas
tiene usted?

A. ESCRIBA e1 numero

 

300

 

92. Tiene usted bueyes?
A. 51
B. no

 

93. (Si dice que si) preguntele: <:‘Cuantas bueyes tiene
usted?

A. ESCRIBA el numero

 

94. éTiene usted otras animales como chanchos, gallinas
o caballos?

A. numero de cerdos
B. numero de gallinas
C. numero de caballos

 

 

 

95. éTiene usted un radio?

A. si
B. no

 

 

96. éSabe usted como leer?

A. 31
B. no

 

 

97. éSabe usted como escribir?

 

 

A. 31
B. no
98. Mas o menos acuantos quintales de maiz y frijoles

. N
t1ene ue cosechar usted cada ano para tener una
Vida m s o menos regular?

A. numero de quintales de maiz
B. numero de quintales de frijoles

 

 

99. éPiensa usted que la luna es importante cuando uno
esta sembrando?

A. si
B. no

 

 

100. éCree usted que hay mono gente?

A. si
B. no

 

 

301

101. dConoce usted a alguien que tenia maiz, frijoles,
o gallinas robado por mono gente?

A. 51
B. no

 

 

102. éConoce usted a alguna persona que ha visto mono
gente?

A. si
B. no

 

 

302

103. Escriba el nombre de agricultor

 

104. Valle

 

105. Numero de cuartos en la casa

 

106. Tipo de casa: Adobe Paja

 

 

Ladrillo

 

107. éDe donde consiga usted su agua?

Quebrada Pozo Agua Potable
108. aHay electricidad? Si No
109. éHay una latrina? Si No

 

 

110. {Que tipo de piso tiene usted?

APPENDIX C

As mentioned in my letter of introduction, I am a
graduate student in Sociology from Michigan State
University in the United States. As part of the require-
ments for my degree, I am conducting research on INCEI and
grain storage practices here in Nicaragua. If it is not
too much trouble, I would like to ask you a few questions.
I will not identify any of the individuals I interview as
part of my research by name, so please feel free to give
any opinions you may have regarding the subjects I am about
to discuss with you and to expand upon your answers at any

time.

1. To begin with, do you know how long the INCEI project
was in the planning stages before the Nicaraguan
government actually began construction of the silos?

2. How did INCEI decide what type of silo to use? Were
various different models or structures considered?

3. What were the advantages of building large centralized
silos as opposed to small silos on individual farms?

303

 

10.

30.4

What do you believe were the major goals or objectives
of INCEI?

Do you know who the original idea behind the project
came from?

Who decided where to locate the silos?

What factors were important in deciding where to
locate the silos?

Do you know the names of the companies which actually
build the silos?

Do you know how these companies were selected? For
example, were competitive bids submitted or what?

To your knowledge, were the campesinos ever asked
whether or not they wanted or would use the silos?

wwk A

 

 

 

11.

12.

l3.

14.

15.

16.

17.

305

Do you think INCEI has done a lot to help the small
farmers in the area of grain storage and price
control?

Do you believe there is much that still remains to be
done in this area? (If so, what specifically?)

Do you have any specific ideas what may help INCEI
become more effective?

If you could start the program over again from
scratch, is there anything you would like to see done
differently?

What do you think are the major problems with INCEI?

What do you think are the major strong points or
accomplishments of INCEI?

What major groups, organizations, or institutions
were affected by this project?

 

 

 

 

 

 

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

306

Do representatives from INCEI ever visit the small
farmers on their farms?

Do you think INCEI is a threat to large grain buyers?
(If so, why?)

If a small farmer stores 10 arrobas of corn or beans
in his house for 6 months, how many pounds do you
think he would lose to insects, rats, or whatever?

Do you believe there is much of a difference between
the price of corn at planting time and at the harvest?
(If so, how much?)

Do you believe there is much of a difference between
the price of beans at planting time and at the harvest?
(If so, how much?)

Do you think most campesinos are storing their corn
and beans in the same manner as they did 5 years ago?

Do you think most small farmers presently know what
INCEI'S job is?

 

 

 

 

   

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

303

Do you have any idea what percentage of farmers have
either sold or stored corn or beans with INCEI?

Why do you think some farmers are still not working
with INCEI?

Do you think it is possible to keep the price of corn
and beans at the same level all year round?

Do you think it would be a good idea if the price of
corn and beans was kept at the same level all year?

Who do you think INCEI is helping more: the rich
farmers, the poor farmers, or both equally?

Do you think the average farmer would spend his own
money to build a small silo on his farm if he knew
for certain that he would not lose any corn or beans?

If it was too expensive to build an individual silo
on this farm, do you think the average farmer would
spend his own money to build a community silo where
he could store with his neighbors if he knew for
certain that he would not lose any corn or beans?

32.

33.

308

Do you think INCEI is drying the farmers' corn and
beans too much?

Do you believe that it is a very serious problem that
INCEI employees steal from the farmers while weighing
their corn and beans?

APPENDIX D

Como estaba mencionado en mi carta de introduccion,
yo soy un estudiante graduado de la universidad de Michigan
State en los Estados Unidos. Los requisitos para mi
doctorado exigen que conduzca un estudio del INCEI y los
metodos de guardar los granos aquf en Nicaragua. Si no es
muy dificil, me gustaria hacer algunas preguntas a cerca
del INCEI. Los individuos a quienes yo entrevistare no
seran identificados por nombre en mi investigacion y yo le
agradeceria mucho si usted pudiera darme alguna informacion
u Opiniones que tiene a cerca del sujeto y que usted se

0 I I O
Slenta comodo para expand1r sus respuestas en cualqu1er

momento.

l. Primero, {sabe usted cuanto tiempo ha estado e1 pro-
yecto del INCEI en las etapas del planeo antes de que
el gobierno de Nicaragua empezara la construccion de
los silos?

I
2. éComo decidio e1 INCEI e1 tipo de silo que querian
utilizar? éConsideron varios modelos o estructuras
diferentes?

. I . . .
3. CCuales eran las ventajas de constru1r s1los grandes y
bien centralizados en comparacion a los silos mas

pequenos situados en fincas individuales?

309

 

310

4. gCuales cree usted que son 1as metas o objetivos mas
1mportantes del INCEI

5. ASabe usted de donde se origino 1a idea para el
projecto?
6. dQuién decidio los lugares en donde poner los silos?

o I I
7. CCuales fueron los factores mas 1mportantes para
decidir en donde se iban a situar los silos?

8. gSabe usted los nombres de 1as companias que
construyeron los silos?

o O l O I

9. CComo estaban selecc1onados 1as com an1as que h1c1eron
1a construccidn? Por ejemplo, habian propuestas
competitivas sometidas?

I . . .’
10. Segun su conoc1m1ento, se leéhab1an preguntados a los
campesinos que si ellos querian poder usar los s1los?

11.

12.

13.

311

‘Piensa usted que el INCEI ha hecho mucho para ayudar

a los pequenos campesinados en el area de guardar los
granos y el control del precio?

gCree usted que hay mucho que hacer en esta area?
(Y si hay, especificamente cuél es?)

I
éTiene usted algunas ideas especificas que le ayudara'
a1 INCEI ser més efectivas?

. I
14. ¢Si pudiere empezar/el programa nuevamente, habria

15.

16.

17.

algo que le gustaria hacer o cambiar a diferente
manera?

dCuales piensa que son los problemas mayores del
INCEI?

£Cuales piensa que son los puntos y los hechos mas
importantes del INCEI?

a I a Q o o O
Cuales son los grupos y organ1zac1ones o 1nst1tuc1ones
que estaban afectados por este proyecto?

18.

312

éHan visitado alguna vez los representantes del INCEI

a los campesinos en sus fincas?

19. éPiensa usted que el INCEI es una amenaza para los

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

ompradores grandes? (Y 31 hay porque?)

I
Si un campesino pequéfio guarda diez arrobas de maiz
o frijoles en su casa para/seis meses,<fcuantas libras
piensa usted que el perder1a por causa de los insectos
or ratas etc. . .?

iCree usted ue hay una gran diferencia entre e1

precio de ma1z a1 tiempo de la siembra y cosecha?
(Y 81 hay, cuantos?)

‘Cree usted que hay una gran diferencia entre e1
precio de los frijoles a1 tiempo de la siembra y la
cosecha?

' 0’ . I
3P1ensa usted que la mayor1a de los campe31nos estan

I I I I
guardando su maiz y frljoles de la m1sma manera que
lo hicieron hace cinco anos?

o I 1’ . N
¢P1ensa que la mayor1a de los campes1nos pequenos

saben ahora el trabajo del INCEI?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

313

gTiene alguna idea que porcentaje de agricultores ha
vendido 0 ha guardado su ma1z o frijoles con el INCEI?

éPorqge piensa usted que hay algunos campesinos que
todav1a no estan trabajando con el INCEI?

r
¢Piensa que seria posible mantener e1 precio de maiz
y frijoles al mismo nivel todo el ano?

/
¢P1ensa que ser1a una buena idea que si e1 precio de
maiz y frijoles estan a1 mismo nivel todo el ano?

3A quien piensa usted que el INCEI esta ayudando mas
a los agricultores ricos o a los agricultores pobres
o a los dos igualmente?

. I
éPiensa usted que el tipico agricultor gasgaria su
propio dinero para construir un silo pequeno en su
terreno, si el tuviera a seguridad de que no iba
a perder nada de su maiz o frijoles?

Si fuera demasiado caro para construir un silo indi-
vidual en su terreno,¢piensa usted que el tipico
agricultor gastaria su propio dinero para construir
un silo de la comunidad donde el pudiera guardar con
sus vecinos si tuviera la seguridad de que el no iba
a perder nada de su maiz o frijoles?

 

32.

33.

314

éPiensa usted que el INCEI esta secando demasiado el
maiz y los frijoles?

éCree usted que sea un problema serio que los
empleados gel INCEI estan robando a los campesinos
cuando estan pesando su maiz y frijoles?

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