AN EVALUATION OF CERTAIN

PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS TO
EMPLOYEE PILFERAGE AND 'FHE'IR

APPARENT EFFECFI\/ENESS

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IAN EVALUATION OF CERTAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS
TO EMPLOYEE PILFERAGE AND THEIR APPARENT

EFFECTIVENESS IN THE HOSPITAL SETTING

BY

Russell Lynn Colling

AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

Department of Police Administration and Public Safety

November 1965

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ABSTRACT

AN EVALUATION OF CERTAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS
TO EMPLOYEE PILFERAGE AND THEIR APPARENT
EFFECTIVENESS IN THE HOSPITAL SETTING

by Russell Lynn Colling

While industrial concerns rely quite heavily on
physical security controls such as barred windows, access
controls, locks and alarms, these controls can be utilized
in hospitals only to a limited degree. The hospital facili-
ties must remain relatively Open to receive the sick and to
permit visitors to see patients. Thus, hospital protection
programs are forced to rely heavily on psychological de—
terrents to complement their generally inadequate physical
controls.

There is little literature available to guide the
hospital programer in develOping elements of security pro—
tection utilizing the psychological deterrent concept. It
is the purpose of this study to analyze the "psychological
deterrent" concept by studying the responses of a group of
hospital employees to determine the apparent effectiveness
of certain established practices in protecting against

pilferage.

Russell Lynn Colling

The field study was conducted at Chicago Wesley
Memorial Hospital, Chicago, Illinois. Approximately 250
employees were questioned. The employees were told, in
group situations of eight to twelve persons, that the
hospital utilized a security force, a program of polygraph
testing, and a program of fingerprinting to protect its
prOperty° The general aspects of how these elements of the
security program can be used if property is missing was pre—
sented. Each employee was asked to fill out a questionnaire
containing four hypothetical situations in which he had the
opportunity to take certain property. He was then asked,
for each situation, to select which of the three afore-
mentioned elements of security would have the most in-
fluence in keeping him from taking the property. After se-
lecting the most significant deterrent, the respondent was
asked which of the remaining two elements were most
influential. An average of the four situations was computed
to determine the individual ranking of the deterrents.

Data on the questionnaires was analyzed for various
subgroups defined by such categories as age, education,
length of employment, race and salary. Results of the study
reveal that these different employee groups do differ in
their feelings on what deterrents are most significant. For

example, it was found that the least educated group selected

Russell Lynn Colling

fingerprints as the most influential deterrent. As the edu-
cation level increased the importance of fingerprints de-
creased and the importance of the security force increased
markedly. A clear difference of Opinion was found in com—
paring the white group, who felt the security force was most
significant, to the colored group who felt that fingerprint-
ing was the most significant deterrent. This difference was
still apparent when white and colored groups of generally
equal education were compared. Also comparison of different
age groups revealed differences in deterrent selections.

While it is not the purpose of the study to explain
why certain groups selected specific deterrents, the writer
has interspersed some possible interpretations that may ac—
count for group reasoning. The groups selected according to
age, education and race may also have other factors in
common accounting for difference in views on the specific
deterrents. For example, the least educated group may have
selected fingerprints because they are less technically
oriented and may not know what can actually be done with
fingerprints. This lack of knowledge could produce a greater
deterrent value than it would with a greater understanding.
-Also ethnic and social heritage differences may account for
group concensus on specific deterrents. Whatever the

reasons, it is apparent that there are differences and it is

Russell Lynn Colling

these differences that the security programer should take in-

to account in building an efficient security system.

AN EVALUATION OF CERTAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS
TO EMPLOYEE PILFERAGE AND THEIR

APPARENT EFFECTIVENESS

BY

Russell Lynn Colling

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

School of Police Administration and Public Safety

November 1965

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The undertaking Of a project of this nature makes
one indebted to the many individuals who gave both direct
and indirect assistance. Without this assistance the
project could not have been completed.

I would like to take this Opportunity to express
sincere gratitude to Mr. Kenath Hartman, Superintendent of
Chicago Wesley Memorial Hospital and the various Department
Heads in making available the employees and hospital re-
sources which were essential to the study. Also my thanks
to Doctor Jack Arbit, Consulting Psychologist, Northwestern
University and Doctor Leon Weaver, School of Police Ad-
ministration, Michigan State University, my major professor
who has ably guided me from the initiation to the completion

of this project.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Importance of the Study
Limitations Of the Study
Definition of Terms
Organization of the Remainder of the
Thesis
II. .REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
III. GENERAL MOTIVATION CONCEPTS RELATED TO DE-
TERRING THE ACT OF PILFERAGE
IV. THE HOSPITAL SETTING
Semi-Public Building
Power Structure
Hospital WOrk Groups
Education
Summary
V. UTILIZATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS AT
CHICAGO WESLEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
Conditions of Employment

New Employee Orientation

iii

Page

22
29
32
33
36
38

38

4O
41

42

Chapter Page

Signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Telephone Stickers . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Patrolling Officers . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Closed Circuit Television . . . . . . . . 44

VI. THE FIELD STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Employee Grouping . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

The Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Employee Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Compilation of Data . . . . . . . . . . . 50

VII. STUDY ANALYSIS AND CORRELATIONS . . . . . . . 51
VIII. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
.APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

iv

Figure

10.

ll.

12.

LIST OF FIGURES

Attitudes Towards Stealing From Three
Different Types of Organizations

Rationalizations on Stealing From Government

Rationalizations on Stealing From Government

Primary Reasons For Preferring to Steal From
Large Business

A Typical Hospital Organizational System

Respondents' Over—all Ranking of Psycho—
logical Deterrents

Negro and White Respondents' Choice of
Psychological Deterrents

Male and Female Respondents' Choice of
Psychological Deterrents

Age Groups - Choice of Psychological
Deterrents

Education Background - Choice of Psycho—
logical Deterrents

Salary Categories - Choice of Psychological

Deterrents . . . . . . . . . . . .
White and Negro Males With Less Than High

School Choice of Psychological Deterrents

Page

l7

l9

19

20

34

52

53

55

56

57

59

6O

Figure

13.

14.

15.

16.

Negro and White Males - High School Edu—
cation Choice Of Psychological Deterrents

Negro and White Females - High School Edu—
cation Choice of Psychological Deterrents

Choice of Psychological_Deterrents - Negro
and White Males With More Than or Less
Than One Year Service

Selection of Deterrents For Each Situation

By All Respondents

vi

Page

61

63

64

65

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement 9f the Problem

 

Hospitals are much in the public eye at present and
charges concerning such matters as high cost, inefficiency,
improper care, and indifference are being levelled against
them. Hospital administrators across the country are
coming to the realization that sound security programing is
a necessary element of functioning of any general medical-
surgical hospital. This security programing is needed for
many problems, of which one is the tremendous problem of
employee pilferage.

What is the loss picture through pilferage in
hospitals today? According to Norman Jaspan, a management
consultant, hospital costs could be cut by 20 percent if
pilferage was controlled.1 werner Mattersdorff, University
of Pittsburgh, feels that losses to hospitals resulting from
acts of dishonesty are greater than the financial loss due

to a combination of fire damage, settlements for public

l"Pilferage and Larceny in Hospitals," Hospital
Progress, VOl. XLI (November, 1960), p. 28.

liability, and malpractice.2 Literature on this subject
reveals a wide variety of dollar amounts. The truth is that
it is impossible to calculate the loss for any single
hospital, much less on a national scale, but estimates of
knowledgeable administrators indicates that typically it is
a substantial item in the cost of hospital administration.
The majority of today's hospitals are operating
under conditions that are conducive to pilferage and theft
of supplies, equipment, food, drugs, narcotics, and other
expendable goods intended for the patient. The greatest
problem is the failure of trustees and administrators to
recognize and admit the existence of losses. It is easy
for them to rationalize that it is a "moral decay of the
human race and that we are no worse off than other insti-
tutions." Also, administrators are embarrassed to admit
pilferage problems because of implied administrative failure.
However, it is often this refusal to admit the problem that
gives the dishonest employee a basis of rationalizing "that
the administration expects us to take a certain amount."
Often hospital administrators use certain benchmarks,
or indicators, to determine if they are suffering losses.
However, these indicators may not always be measuring what

they purport to measure. One Midwest hospital relied on the

2Werner R. Mattersdorff, "Theft and Dishonesty in
Public Hospitals," Canadian Insurance (February, 1961),

pp. 6, 7.

Purchasing Department to report any sharp increase in buy-
ing of expendable items that might indicate employee pilfer-
age. No reports were received, but a theft ring special-
izing in sheets was discovered and three persons were prose-
cuted for pilfering over 12,000 sheets and pillow cases.
Further investigation revealed that the Purchasing De-
partment had not failed in reporting because this pilferage
was fairly constant and no sharp increase in buying had in
fact occurred.

The vast majority of men and women enter a business
to make a living, not to see how much they can steal. How—
ever, these employees easily slip into the routine of
pilferage if everyone else is doing it and there are no
barriers. Many hospital employees used to receive part of
their pay in food, laundry services, and lodging. Although
the trend has been away from this type of remuneration, such
a tradition is difficult to discontinue and some still con-
sider the taking of hospital items for personal use simply a
fringe benefit.3

The dilemma facing the administrator who is cognizant
of the pilferage problem is: What can he do that is economi-
cal, practical, and unobtrusive to the employee, doctor,
patient, and visitor? The polygraph examiners say, "Use the

polygraph"; the courts say, "Prosecute known offenders";

 

3Ibid., p. 6.

law enforcement officers say, "Use a uniformed guard force."
It appears that a combination Of these and other components
are needed to curb the pilferage problem.

A common underlying factor found in all these ap—
proaches is prevention through creating psychological de-
terrents against the act of pilferage. It is the purpose of
this study to discuss the general concept of psychological
deterrents against pilferage in the hospital setting, and to
then determine which of several selected deterrents are re—
garded as most effective by the hospital employee himself.
It is anticipated that effectiveness of specific deterrents
will vary among different groups of employees, such as fe-
male vs. male, young vs. old, low income vs. high income,

higher education vs. lower education, and Negro vs. white.

Importance_gf the Study

 

 

Literature on controlling pilferage contains many
statements about how authorities feel that certain practices
act as great deterrents. It is generally assumed that claims
such as these are valid, but one has a difficult time find—
ing any supporting data from the people who are supposed to
be deterred. The data collected and analyzed in this study
should provide the administrator or security programer with
some guide lines for establishing and using certain de—
terrents most effective for a specific group. Hospitals are

becoming so large that, while hospital-wide deterrents are

used, it is also necessary to program for specific work
groups. wIt is hOped that this study will set forth guide
lines for making such decisions and, at the same time, pro-

vide a basis for further research in this area.

Limitations 9; the Study

 

 

It is recognized that there is a definite interplay
of physical safeguards and psychological deterrents in all
phases of security programing regardless of the malefactor.
However, the physical safeguards are not considered in this
study from the standpoint of reducing Opportunity, but only
from the standpoint of the manner in which the malefactor is
psychologically deterred. A further limitation of the study
is that consideration is given only to the pilferage of
prOperty by the employee in the hospital setting, but it is
hoped that possible projections to other settings will be ap—
parent. It is also recognized that economics and employer—
employee relations play a significant part in security pro—
graming against employee pilferage, but these ramifications
have also been excluded from this study.

The field data collected for the study was limited
to the employees of Chicago Wesley Memorial Hospital pri-
marily because of accessibility Of data and the fact that
they provided an adequate cross section of personnel.
Originally the study format called for a survey of several

hospitals and their personnel, but when planning of the

study became more definitive, it was decided that the pro-
ject as originally conceived would be too large and un-
wieldy. .A chapter on trends in hospital security was also
originally included in this project but, as the study pro-
gressed, it became apparent that this subject matter would
not have a significant bearing on how different groups of

people react to psychological deterrents.

Definition 9f Terms

For the purposes of this study, the following defi-
nitions will be utilized:
Employee - All persons performing service in the
hospital for which the hospital pays a wage.

Malefactor - Any person committing an illegal

 

act.

Medical Staff - Persons licensed to practice
medicine and approved by the governing board to
practice and care for patients within a specific
institution.

Pilferage — The taking of supplies in small
quantities with the intent of the individual(s)
to utilize the items himself or for the utili-
zation by friends. The term as used in the con—
text of this study excludes major thefts of sup-
plies and equipment where the intent of the

indiVidual(s) is usually for resale. The term

also excludes theft of major items of equipment,
such as typewriters, tools, furniture, and like
items, even though they may be for the indi—
vidual's own use.

Psychological Deterrent — An individual's in—
terpretation of a situation in which the po-
tentially punitive or negative aspects of a form
of behavior serve to prevent or preclude the
expression of this behavior.

Organization of the Remainder
of the Thesis

 

A review of the literature on pilferage control is
the subject for Chapter II. This review is intended to show
the reader that much of the literature does allude to the
psychological side of pilferage prevention, but it does not
deal with it directly.

Chapter III is a follow—up of the previous chapter
and could also be termed a review of the literature. This
chapter discusses general concepts of motivation and pilfer—
age in relation to the direction of human behavior in the
establishment of psychological deterrents to pilferage. The
purpose of this chapter is to bring a very intricate and
complicated process somewhere near the experience of the

ordinary person.

In Chapter IV a brief description of the hospital
setting is presented. This data will give the reader in-
sight into the background and problems of administering pro-
grams of any kind in hospitals, especially a program of
rigid security controls often found in industry. However,
it is hOped that even though the study is in this unique
setting, this background will furnish the reader with infor-
mation to determine if the findings of the study can be
readily extrapolated and applied to industrial and com—
mercial settings.

A description of psychological deterrents as applied
by Chicago wesley Memorial Hospital are treated in Chapter V.
The discussion will give the reader some practical appli-
cations of the concepts discussed in Chapter IV. It is also
felt that the application of the deterrents in this hospital
will affect the survey responses.

The field survey is the subject of Chapter VI. In
this chapter the methodology, sources of data, the question-
naire and the organization of the data are described and
discussed.

Chapter VII will present an analysis of the research
results and Chapter VIII will state the conclusions of the

study.

CHAPTER II
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In reviewing the literature on pilferage, one finds
himself engulfed in a voluminous array of information. A
large segment of the writing on this subject is concerned
with arriving at how much is being taken, by what peOple,
for what reasons, and how it is being taken. .Another large
segment concerns itself with what can physically be done to
curb the problem. In this area much can be found on the
concepts of better screening of new employees: "check the
lunch bucket," use of electronic devices, inventory control,
lock and key systems, marking of property, and security
patrols, just to name a few. While these items are es-
sential in understanding the pilferage problem, there is
little data available that can be attributed to having a
direct bearing on the problem of how different groups of
people react to different psychological deterrents to pilfer-
age. It was this apparent lack of psychologically oriented
material in most of the literature that stimulated the
writer to make this study.

This chapter is not intended to summarize an ex—

haustive search of all the literature on pilferage, but

10

rather is a review of some of the more significant writing
on the subject. The review begins with some typical ex-
amples of "standard" treatments that the writer feels have
little or no significant bearing on the specific focus of
this study of psychological deterrents to pilferage. This
review then progresses to the literature that will be more
significant in arriving at a better understanding of the
problem.

John R. Davis4 and B. W. Gocke5 have provided
valuable discussions of practical aspects of theft pre-
vention. By and large, their work can be considered as be-
ing devoted to physical and administrative barriers to
theft; they do not deal directly with the psychological
barriers. It should be pointed out, however, that the
psychological deterrent concept apparently is the basis for
many of the practices that are recommended in their writings.

Melville Dalton has studied rule breaking by em-
ployees of industrial concerns, department stores, and simi—
lar establishments. He reports that employees frequently
apprOpriate services and materials belonging to the organi-
zation for their own use. He entitles this concept as "Un—

official Rewards." These sanctions, in criminal law, would

 

4John R. Davis, Industrial Plant Protection
(Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, Inc., 1957).

5B.W. Gocke, Practical Plant Protection and Policing
(Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, Inc., 1957).

 

11

be regarded as theft, but organizations generally turn their
backs to these "rewards," and rarely are they brought to
public attention. His work points out how relative the term
"theft" can be and depends largely on the VieWpOint the
organization as a whole takes concerning this diversion of
resources.

Edwin Sutherland defines white collar crime as a
crime committed by a person of respectability and high
social status in the course of his occupation. His work
deals with the causes of crime and seeks to prove that the
conventional explanation of crime is invalid. The term con-
ventional in his context means that criminal behavior is
basically explained by poverty and its related pathologies.
While our study here is not concerned with crime causation,
it is significant to note that Sutherland points out that
the upper socio—economic class engages in criminal behavior.
Thus, in this study concerning pilferage, we are concerned
with all persons in the hospital setting, and not just the
lower socio-economic class.7

Norman Jaspan is one of the country's foremost

Imanagement consultants. His book, The Thief $3 The White

Collar, has been widely read and is considered a very

6Melville Dalton, Men Who Manage: Fusions 2f Feeling
aund Theory in Administration (New York: John WiIey and Sons,
1959 , PP. 199-205.

7Edwin Sutherland, White Collar Crime (New York:
The Dryden Press, 1949) .

 

 

 

12

important work in understanding the theft problem in
industry. He points out that the white collar thief yearly
accounts for twice the amount of theft as the professional
criminal. His contention is that we are becoming a nation
of thieves and embezzlers. Jaspan produces many case
histories in an attempt to find out who is the thief in the
white collar, what he looks like, his motives, and how he
operates. His conclusion, relevant to this study, is that
losses can occur anywhere, by anyone, for a wide variety of
reasons.

Donald R. Cressey discusses the criminal violation
of financial trust. The objective in his study is to ac-
count for the differential in behavior indicated by the fact
that some persons in the position of financial trust violate
that trust and others in similar situations do not. The
conclusions he reaches apparently do not have a direct bear—
ing on the pilferage problem explored in this study. How—
ever, he does point out that in his study, each violation
centered around the individual who had the opportunity, had
a."non—sharable" financial problem which could be resolved
13y theft, and could rationalize his behavior.

These three factors were present in all of the
several hundred cases used in Cressey's study. The im-

portant thing from the standpoint of this study is that

 

8Norman Jaspan, The Thief lg The White Collar (New
Yoric: .J. B. Lippincott Company, 1960).

l3

rationalization was apparent in every case, and this
rationalization denotes decision making. In other words,
each violator made a decision before acting.9

The area of employee morale and pilferage has over-
tones Of psychological implications, and is discussed by
several writers. Russell White concludes that low employee
morale leads to and actually encourages the employee to
steal.10 A. L. Des Rosiers states that most employees
rationalize their actions before stealing. If morale is
low, it is not difficult for the employee to say, "They
don't care";'fiflmazwon't miss it"; or "I have this coming to
me." Poor morale has led, in many instances, to mass pilfer—
age where it became the rule to participate in pilferage.
Low morale and pilferage leads to reduced morale and higher
pilferage.ll

Ray Taylor says that there is a little bit of
larceny in all of us. The reasons employee dishonesty is

not more widespread are probably (1) the fear of disclosure,

(2) a strong will to resist temptation, and (3) the lack of

9Donald R. Cressey, Other People's Money (Glencoe:
{Dhe Free Press, 1953).

10Speech by Russell E. White at Top Management
.Business Security Seminar, April 18, 1963.

11A. L. Des Rosiers, "Security Systems in Hospitals"
hanpublished Master's thesis, George Washington University,
‘Washington, D.C., 1964), p. 28.

 

14

favorable opportunities.12 This general approach is sup-
ported by a recent study where 25,000 persons were examined
on the polygraph. .It was found that most of the people were

basically not honest, but refrained from dishonest acts be—

cause they fear consequences if they are caught.13 This con-

clusion is also supported by Clarence Darrow, famed criminal

lawyer, who has said:

Some boilers are safe at 20 pounds pressure to the
square inch but will break at 40. The boiler is
neither honest or dishonest; it stands a certain
pressure and no more. Man cannot be classified as
honest or dishonest. He goes along with the game
of life and can stand a certain pressure for the
sake of his ideals but at a certain point he can

stand no more.14
S. J. Curtis in a recent article states that "low
anticipation of being caught and punished leads the
frustrated, aggressive person to steal. . . . Thus the em-

ployee must have a real fear that he will be caught and

punished."15

Norman Jaspan in one Of his recent articles referred
to psychological deterrents when he stated,

A clear understanding that periodic and unannounced
checks on employee behavior and regular reviews of

 

12Roy C. Taylor, "Preventive Medicine for Employee
Dishonesty," Management Review (NOvember, 1960), p. 23.

13Continental Casualty Company, Crime Loss Pre-
\nantion (Chicago: Continental Casualty Company), p. 23.

l4Ibid0) po 23.

1SS. J. Curtis, "Dishonesty, The Sinister Cancer,"
Zhuiustrial Security (April, 1963), p. 42.

15

all critical aspects of the operation are a normal
part of management control will serve as a deterrent
to dishonest employees.
In the same article he states that fidelity bonds are not
only good protection, but they have a very real psychological
benefit. Experience has shown that employees who are bonded,
and who know they are bonded, are far less likely to steal
than those who are not bonded.l6
In recent years an increasing number of business
firms have adopted the polygraph, commonly known as the "Lie
Detector," as an aid in stamping out employee dishonesty.
Continental Casualty Company advocates the use of the poly-
graph and feels that tests should be applied impartially to
a cross section of the organization. .In time all employees
are tested and the psychological effect is a potent factor
in loss prevention.17
According to Lincoln M. Zonn, "The lie detector is
perhaps the greatest pilferage deterrent force we have come
up with in many decades."18
The significance in using the polygraph to reduce

pilferage by psychological means is supported by S. J.

Curtis. He advances the theory that the best method of

 

l6Norman Jaspan, "The Burglar is a Piker," The

Journal pf Insurance Information (July-August, 1964), p. 33.

17Continental Casualty Company, pp. cit., p. 23.

18Speech by Lincoln M. Zonn at Top Management Business

Security Seminar, April 16, 1963.

16

controlling the internal pilferer is the installation of a
routine periodic lie detection screening examination. The
person who is not psychologically a criminal, who just takes
items because they are handy, is not going to take things if
he knows that he will be questioned periodically.19
An interesting study concerning attitudes of the
public on stealing was conducted at the University of
Indiana. The findings of this study are quite significant
in understanding the individual's rationalization that takes
place in pilferage from organizations. In one phase of the
study respondents were asked about their approval of steal-
ing in relation to three types of organizations. Figure 1
summarizes their replies and reveals that respondents
generally disapprove of stealing regardless of the size of
organization. Despite the general disapproval, important
differences were found in the degree of disapproval. There
is greater disapproval of stealing from the small business
than from the large business. In further differentiation,
the lower the socio—economic status, the greater is the ap-
proval of stealing, regardless of the organizational size.
This same consistency was found in analyzing the educational
level. Respondents with less than thirteen years of edu-
cation were more approving of stealing than those with more

education.

—¥

198. J. Curtis, Modern Retail Security (Springfield:

Charles C. Thomas, Inc., 1960), p. 515.

17

 

 

ATTITUDE ORGANIZATION
Large Small
Government Business Business

 

Strongly Approve to

 

 

 

Approve 0% 1% 0%
Approve to Indifferent 6% 3% 2%
Indifferent to Disapprove 63% 61% 48%
Disapprove to Strongly

Disapprove 31% 34% 50%

Total 100% 100% 100%
FIGURE 1

ATTITUDES TOWARDS STEALING FROM THREE

DIFFERENT TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS

In further analyzing the responses, it was also
found that females were more inclined to approve of stealing
than males. Although the females were more approving of
stealing than males, they felt more strongly about not steal—
ing from the small organization than did the males.

Since most of the respondents were disapproving of
theft, the remaining phases of the study were conducted on a
forced—choice basis. In other words, each respondent was
asked to choose the type of organization from which he would
rather steal if in need and he had to steal. Large
Inutinesses were selected by about 60%; government by about

33%;' and small business by about 7%. Two basic lines of

18

reasoning were used to explain their preference. These in-

volved consideration of the principle of least evil and/or
the possibility of being caught and punished for the theft.
Least evil in this context refers to the fact that the re—
spondent feels it is wrong to steal, but, at the same time,

he can rationalize that it is less wrong under certain

c i rcumstances .

The persons choosing to steal from the small business

had rather a direct reason. Selection was made mainly on

the principle of least risk. Even if caught, these re—

spondents felt that the small business man would be more
lenient than managers of large business or government.

Persons preferring to steal from the government had

many varied reasons as shown in Figure 2. While the principle

of least risk was involved, the primary reason was that it

was the least evil. Figure 3 reveals respondents reasons

for not stealing from the government.

The respondents selecting large business also based

their selection on the principle of lesser evil. They felt

that stealing from big business was not as bad as stealing
from the government (oneself) or from small business because
large organizations are impersonal, powerful and ruthless.
Some preferences were based on the principle that large

business provided more opportunity for theft with less

Chance of discovery or punishment.20

\

20ErwinO. Smigel, "Public Attitudes Toward Stealing

28 Related to The Size of The Victim Organization," American
Wical Review (June, 1956), pp. 320-327.

 

Reasons For Stealing _gg£_gent

Can afford it best 32.1
Taking back own money 15.1
Government should take care of needy 13.2
Against Democratic Administration 13.2
Bureaucratic inefficiencies 9.4
Everybody does it 9.4
Distributes the loss 7.6

Total 100.0

FIGURE 2

RATIONALIZATIONS ON STEALING FROM GOVERNMENT

 

Reasons For Not Stealing I§§£.Qeg§
It's stealing from yourself 29.5
Good chance of being caught——

Stiff penalty 23.1
Needs its money 19.2
Losses affect citizens in the

community 16.7
Patriotism 9.0
Lack of opportunity 2.5

Total 100.0
FIGURE 3

RATIONALIZATIONS ON STEALING FROM GOVERNMENT

19

20

 

Reasons For Stealing Per Cent

Can afford it--has tremendous capital 67.7
Allows for it by raising prices-—is insured 12.8
They cheat you--ruth1ess 7.8
Less chance of being caught 3.9
Provides the greatest opportunity 2.9
No reasons offered 4.9

Total 100.0

FIGURE 4

PRIMARY REASONS FOR PREFERRING TO STEAL

FROM LARGE BUSINESS

The significance of Smigel's work for our study of
(psycfliological deterrents is that it asserts that people do
make: decisions in relation to pilferage. While there were
many? different reasons for not stealing, the risk of being
caugTrt and punished did serve as a stimulus for their de—
cisicnu in many of the situations.

This chapter has provided us with the fact that most
Writftrs in the field of pilferage allude to the psychological
detextrent, but few have actually gone directly to the people
for tflueir views. Smigel did go to the peOple and it is his
finfitings, specifically the apprehension aspect, that we will
look: at in further detail. The following chapter explores

80"“? <3f the general concepts of motivation and decision

21

making. In understanding the concept of deterrence, the
reader must have a basic understanding of individual stimulus

which produces behavior patterns.

CHAPTER III

GENERAL MOTIVATION CONCEPTS RELATED TO

DETERRING THE ACT OF PILFERAGE

Hospital administrators are beginning to follow the
trend of increased interest in discovering what makes people
within the institutional setting willing or unwilling to
work, and how human resources can be motivated and utilized
for greater effectiveness. Whenever people act in any way,
good or bad, it is because they are motivated to act. In
our frame of reference in this study, we are considering
aspects of motivating people to be honest.

Behavior is Observed as a contemporary event——a
dynamic relation between the organism and environment.
There are many limited hypotheses and points of view con-
cerning behavior motivation. Since there is no general
integrating principle, a multifactor approach to motivation
seems to be clearly indicated. Most people approve of the
term Or concept of "motivation," but there is little agree-
ment concerning its nature. A general all-inclusive theory

of motivation simply does not exist.21 It is agreed:

\

W' 21Paul Young, Motivation and Emotion (New York: John
lley & Sons, Inc., 1961), p. 596.

23

however, that behavior is motivated by an interrelation of:

(a) Needs

(b) Sensory acuity, nerves and muscles

(c) Conditions like fatigue, illness, anxiety

(d) Past experiences
2X11 of these factors influence the meaning and significance
c>f the situation to the individual. Motives are never
(iirectly observable in the sense that emotions, learning,
rnemory or even intelligence are observable; rather motives
Eire inferred or hypothesized from behavior.22 In this study
Vve are concerned primarily with one small area of motivation
mfliich is directing behavior from the standpoint of the fear of
busing caught and the subsequent possibility of being
pulnished.

This does not imply that fear is the only reason
Ipenople do not steal. Other motives such as one's conscience,
allility, and goals also play an important part in determin—
ing this behavior.

Organisms continually experience needs or wants which
irnpel them to action. When the individual is driven either
tRD attain some goal or to avoid some undesirable consequence,
““3 Zhave evidence of motivation. Differences in motivation

oftenaccount for the fact that various persons may react

quitedifferently when confronted by the same set of
\

22.S._Stansfield Sargent and RObert C. Williamson,

ۤSlsaial PsycholOgy (2d. ed.; New York: The Ronald Press,
958), p. 166.

24

circumstances, and a given person may behave differently when
confronted by a particular set of circumstances on different
occasions. It has been said that everything the individual
experiences and everything that he does leaves him a little
different from what he was before.23

Man is predominately a social being and is forced to
live in his social environment. Motives that involve other
people, directly or indirectly, are called social motives.
They are distinguishable from physiological drives because
usually the form they take is determined by the particular
culture through rules, regulations and taboos. Man's be—
havior has to fit into the pattern of activity that society
dictates or risk rejection by society. The majority of
people resist some of their own tendencies toward anti-
social behavior, not because of moral qualms, but because of
fear of real consequences. Inhibitions of anti-social
tendencies are acquired in the course of our individual de—
velopment and thus depend more or less on the moral code and
convention of a given cultural age.

.A common characteristic to be found in many of the
goals for which human beings strive is the tendency to
acquire objects. All behavior that has the goal of acquiring
more objects can be attributed to an underlying need for

acquisition. In a culture built on economic foundations,

‘

3Laurence Siegel, Industrial Psychology (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962), p. 279.

25

it is natural that behavior motivated by this

It

such as ours,

Iieed would play a very important role in every day life.
.is recognized that this need cannot always be satisfied with-
c>ut conflicting with those of others and culture thus places

irestrictions on this need to direct it into socially ac-

<:eptab1e behavior. This need falls in the "growth moti-

xration" concept advanced by Maslow that the more one gets

‘tlie more one wants and thus the wanting of self-acutalization

:i. S endless .24

The choice to react in an acceptable way is an ex-

fpxwession of the adjustment which our subjective instinct

dixzive makes to the objective demands of reality. This need

:EtDJ: acquisition may be repressed and held in a latent state.

2353 the environment changes, and with the possibilities of

gylrzatification, the memories of past experiences most simi-

J—Ell? and pertinent to the external condition are sifted out.

frfleay’are pushed into consciousness when Opportunity is

Eli—\fennazs

It is clear that only an infinitesimal part of an

-1r1Cij:vidua1's knowledge can be in consciousness at any given

“KDDneant. The belief that man is a rational animal who makes

Ili-SB gplans with foresight is appealing, and true to some

\

 

24Young,.gp. cit., p. 590.

25Walter C. Langer, Psyghologv and Human Living (New
YZDITIE: Appleton-Century—Crofts, Inc., 1943), p. 79.

26

degree, but it is an incomplete statement of man's nature.

.Actions are determined more by unconscious than conscious

motivation. The unconscious is a storehouse of all the

knowledge a person has accumulated in various ways through

the process of living experience. This vast storehouse con—

tains a fantastic number of past experiences in finding

«gratification for needs, together with the consequence of

'these past efforts and feelings they aroused. There is

constant interplay between the conscious and unconscious

Inind. Social scientists believe that human behavior is the

:result of human decisions. But these decisions to act in
(one way and not in another are arrived at in an essentially

ruon-rational manner.26 Psychologists' analytical experi-

erice shows us that the conscious self—restraint of instincts

pilays but a very modest role as compared with the emotional

fEactors of love and punishment. The threat of punishment

has sobering effect on the individual's instinctual impulses

,Ztt; has long been recognized that fear motivates human be-

lmaxrior. Parents have used fear to direct the conduct of

tJIELir children. The state, the church, and other organi—

zations have also, from time to time, used fear to produce

a desired form of behavior.
\

 

26Ibid., p. 111.

27Temple Burling,

fiE§lfi§a and Take 13 Hospitals (New York:
5(5), p. 85.

Edith Lentz and Robert Wilson, The
G. P. Putnam's Sons,

27

The unconscious mind, where we have our memory and
our intuitive judgement, is the part influenced by sug—
gestion and imagination. A suggestion that seems to
strengthen ideas already present is usually productive of
action. For example, the person considering pilferage knows
it is wrong and the deterrents, or "invisible barriers," to
theft that have been built up in the unconscious reinforce
this conscious realization. Thus the motivation impulse be-
low the level of the conscious mind has produced a "con-
ditioned response."

Whyte, in The Organization Man, sums up the situ-
ation when he says, "Man today has changed." Where a few
years ago he was "inner—directed," today he has become an
"outer—directed" person. By this he means we are getting
our motivation "orders" today from outside ourselves. Man's
behavior patterns are set by those he looks to outside of
himself for leadership. It is because man today is most
susceptible to outside influences that he can be consciously
Or unconsciously influenced as never before. We can shape
111s attitudes and beliefs without his being aware of it.
lie is willing and waiting for us to motivate him because he
vvants to know what is expected of him.28

S. J. Curtis refers to this control as "motivational

ENsycholOgy." Utilizing security educational programs, with

28Curtis,.9_p. Cit., 5. 85.

28

emotional appeal, we can prevent pilferage losses through
constructive motivation of our outer-directed employee. In
order to find the materials necessary for motivational psy-
chology, there must be a feed-back from an audience. We
cannot rely on our personal judgments to find the necessary
appeals, as each of us is a human being surrounded by his
individuality. Within this cell of our own subjective view-
point, none of us can see the world as another person sees
it. Deciding what motivates us will not solve the problem
of motivating others.29 It is thus the purpose of this
study to ask employees about their feelings in regard to
certain pilferage deterrents.

The preceeding chapter has reviewed the general
aspects of decision making and motivation. The following

chapter is presented to give the reader a closer look at the

work environment of the people involved in this study.

29Ibid., p. 641.

CHAPTER IV

THE HOSPITAL SETTING

What is a hospital? The answer most often heard is
that a hospital is a place to care for the sick and injured.
While this answer is correct, it is an overgeneralization.
There are three types of institutions that comprise the
hospital pattern in this country today—-voluntary, govern-
mental and proprietary. Of these, voluntary nonprofit
hospitals, the subject of this study, fill the major needs
of our population. The hospital must be viewed within the
framework of a patient-care system with supporting elements,
such as operating expenses, income, purchases, policies,
interactions of the public, the patient, the employee, and
the doctor. It is difficult to realize, as we pass one of
our modern medical centers, that hospitals originally were
little more than houses of refuge.

In its evolution the hospital has climbed a long and
tortuous road. It has struggled along its hazardous path
from England, Germany, Spain, Italy to America. The organi-
zation and staffing have drastically changed in hospitals
during this evolution. While drug therapy and medical ad—

vances developed in the 17th and 18th centuries, the

30

hospital itself remained basically a very simple institution.
Personnel were required to feed patients and to tend to
basic wants, but there was comparatively little need for any
specialization. In the following century the numerous ad—
vances of medical science and education resulted in a rapid
transformation of the hospitals from mere custodial insti-
tutions to the scientific institutions they are today.

The primary function of the hospital, the one which
has been constant throughout the whole of its evolution, is
to care for the sick and injured. While other important
functions have develOped, they are all subordinate because
they contribute indirectly to the care of the sick. These
secondary functions are:

(a) Education of physicians, nurses and other personnel

(b) Public health——prevention of disease and promotion
of health

(c) Advancement of research in scientific medicine.3O

Hospital development in the 20th century has been
characterized by mushroom-like growth. During no previous
period was there such a proportionate increase. The popu—
lation in the United States has more than doubled since
1873, but the number of hospitals has increased more than 44

times. ,Each year one of every eight persons in the United

 

3OMalcom T. MacEachern, Hospital Organization é
Management (Chicago: Physicians Record Company, 1957),
p. 29.

31

States enters a hospital for treatment.31 Hospital business
is big business. It represents, in fact, the fifth largest
industry in the country today. It is big business "plus,"
but this "plus" is what differentiates it from commercial
enterprise. Conducted on a nonprofit basis with human lives
as its product, its principals are professional people
rendering services free or at a small proportion of the total
cost. A voluntary hospital constitutes a public utility,
but a public utility operated without financial gain.

Further justification for placing hospitals in the
big business category lies in the volume of their purchases.
When it is considered that these institutions buy everything
from safety pins to freight elevators, from tongue de—
pressors to air conditioners, it is not surprising to find
their total annual purchases are in excess of
$4,000,000,000.32 Besides food, furniture, equipment, and the
like, hospitals carry an inventory of more than 3,000 miscel—
laneous items. Usage of paper napkins, for example, totals
more than 3,500,000,000 yearly and the usage of drinking
glasses totals more than 25,000,000.33

Although the hospital is big business, it has general-

ly lagged behind business and industry in the development

 

31Raymond P. Sloan, This Hospital Business 9; Ours
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1952), p. 21.

32Burling,'9_p. cit., p. v.

33Ibid., pp. 21-22.

32

of management policies and techniques pertaining to the non-
medical functions of the hospital of which one is the se—
curity function. There have been cries of, "why can't this
or that be done as in industry? " These people forget that
the hospital is more like a small city rather than an in—
dustrial plant. Management decisions require consideration
of many more and different ramifications than is the case in
a typical industrial plant, and thus, by the very nature of
its complexity, must often move more slowly and cautiously.
It thus is the purpose of this chapter to give the reader
an understanding of administrative realities and pitfalls
encountered in the execution of management controls of all

kinds, including the reduction of pilferage.

Semi-public building. A hospital's doors must re—
main open 24 hours a day. Service, or as in the industrial
plant, "production," cannot be shut down at 5:00 P.M. and
resumed again at 7:00 A.M. The building must remain a
relatively Open building to admit the sick and injured, per-
mit the patient his visitors, and to carry on the normal
business of the gift shops, the cashiers, the pharmacy, the
doctors' offices, and the like. There is no practical way
to determine who belongs or who doesn't belong with people
entering through numerous entrances.

The hospital visitor and patient present unique
features not found in any other social setting. The patient

is Paying the bill and his wants must be considered within

33

the organizational framework of the institution. This is
Inot simple when one considers the person is not completely
liimself or he probably would not be in the hospital. He is
I10t expected to make the same effort as a well person to
rnaintain pleasant social relations. The same applies to the
\Iisitor in certain respects in that, when a member of the
:family or a close friend is ill, the visitor's actions and
:reactions to management practices may not always be com-
Ioletely rational. Thus tolerance and allowances for human
loehavior must be major considerations in the hospital ad-

rninistrative program.

Power structure. A very important difference be—
tnveen the hospital and industry is the power structure found
iJi the hospital. In general, hospital organizational
synatems are organized along similar lines as portrayed in
tints simple diagram as shown in Figure 5. Within each
organizational system certain statuses possess an insti-
tutjxanalized right to control the actions of other statuses
in tflne system. This right may be of a formal character in
that: it has been legitimized in systemic organization, or it
may hue informal in that an individual has developed some de-
gree <>f influence in the decision-making operations of the
SYStenn. Although the administrator holds the institutional-
ized liight to control the actions of others in the system,
he is .not a "free agent" in the decision making process

Since, in the final analysis, he is subordinate to the board

 

Bd. Trustees

 

 

 

 

LMedical Staff

 

 

‘

 

 

 

 

Administrator

 

34

 

Dept.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dept. Dept. Dept. Dept. Dept.

 

 

Dept.

 

 

FIGURE 5

A TYPICAL HOSPITAL ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM

 

 

35

of trustees. Thus, the final rights of power are vested in

the hands of an authoritative board not involved in day—to-

rather than in the status-role which exercises

day direction,
34

this power in day-to—day interactions within the hospital.

'The hospital administrator, in addition to assuming responsi—

loility for management of a substantial business, must serve

as an educator and interpreter to these trustees who, al-

'though governing the institution, are not too familiar with

:its Operation. In this respect his obligations are wholly

ciifferent from those of the business executive whose con-

tzrolling group is presumably acquainted with the organi—

zation it is governing.

Although the medical staff are not employees of the

11c>spital, and are not normally included in the formal organi—

2:zation.chart, they possess legitimate authority in their

cxaritacts with system members. Thus, although the physician

115 in many respects outside the daily interaction of the
S§zsrtem, his status—role gives him considerable power to con—

trol the actions of other status-roles in patient-care and

treatment functions. This group is a very close and in-

fllleantial group as illustrated by this excerpt from a recent

StJJC33h

(Phe staff of the hospital was a stable and highly
(Drganized community. Within this community over the

 

34John N. Edwards, Richard A. Kurtz and Donald E.

Saathoff, Hospital §ocial Systems and Differential Per—
Sfiiptixans (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, Inc., 1962),

E3- 31.

 

36

years, an informal system of sanctions and rational-
izations had evolved. They enabled the staff to
exert control over the administration and to keep
discipline effective to stalemate a vigorous program
of reformlintroduced by the administration. The
system was also so pervasive that even the sizable
group within the staff who wished to participate in
hospital reform were confused or neutralized.

‘Here again the administrator must serve as an educator and

interpreter in achieving a sound administrative program

beneficial to all.

Hospital work groupg. Hospitals are peOple. All
kinds of people with all kinds of attitudes and dispositions
xnake up the hospital family. The members of the family fall
into a great variety of occupational and professional groups,
all concerned, in one way or another, with providing good
.patient care. So great, in fact, is the variety of work to
1x3 done in the hospital that few other institutions have so
cxmnplex an organization as the hospital requires for the
apuplication of its varied talents. The fusion of these di-
velrse talents into the timely exactness of action, with
Tunnan.1ives at stake, requires administrative concepts found
Onlgy in the hospital setting.

The percentage of employees for any given position
or xnork group varies among hospitals depending on size and
type, In this frame of reference, type refers to emphasis

on-'teaching, research, rehabilitation, free clinic care or

\

35Esther Brown, Ph.D., Newer Dimensions pf Patient
EELEEE (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1962), p. 51.

37

Inedical specialty. For the purposes of this paper, a general

Inedical—surgical hospital representing a general balance of

the basic hospital functions has approximately this per-

centage of specialized groups:

8%

15%

10%

20%

15%

20%

7%

5%

Auxiliary Nursing Personnel (including orderlies,
nurse aides, and station clerks)

Registered Nurses

Food Service

Laundry, Housekeeping, Maintenance

Professional Technicians (XFRay, Pathology, ECG,
Physical Therapy)

General Services (Elevator operators, security,
admitting, storeroom, delivery, medical records,
telephone operators)

Business Office (Accounting, cashiers, insurance
clerks)

Administration (Administrator, Assistant Adminis-
trators, Department Heads and Assistant Department

Heads).36

Ir1 aanalyzing these groupings, it is apparent that close to

fifty percent of the personnel can be classed as profession—

531- This in itself creates an administrative control handi—

‘3313 :in that a professional, highly specialized hospital

\

36

Statement by Marlin Barklage at a Chicago Hospital

Personnel Managers Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, November,

1964.

38

group is inherently more autonomous than the nonprofessional
group. This is also true in industry with research and
specialized engineering groups, but these groups generally
represent a smaller percentage of the total employees than

in a hospital .

Education. The educational level of persons filling
hospital positions range from practically no academic edu—
cation to a Master's Degree. The "low education" category
is composed of a high proportion of food service personnel,
laundry, housekeeping, nurses aides, elevator operators and
delivery personnel. The "middle education" category, high
school graduates, is composed of high prOportion of business
office, maintenance, station clerks, and medical records

personnel. The "higher education" category, above high
school, consists of nurses, professional technicians and ad-
ministrators. While each hospital department has individuals
in each educational category, the department generally has a
large prOportion of its members in only one of these edu—

ca t ional categorie 3.

Summary. As in any other organization, the hospital
has material, facilities and people. In this respect, there
is little difference between the hospital and the industrial
concern. The differences become apparent upon examination
of the management concepts and end products involved.

HO Spitals are living and growing social structures designed

39

to provide the best patient care possible. The individuals
in the organizations are not any undifferentiated human mass.
On the contrary, they are separated into well-defined groups
in accordance with the formal organization. We will look
at these groups in greater detail in order to measure the

values they place on different components of the security

p rog ram .

CHAPTER V

UTILIZATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

AT CHICAGO WESLEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

A formalized security program was instituted at

Chicago Wesley Memorial Hospital in August of 1964. The
primary emphasis of the new program was, and is, on pre-
ve ntion rather than on enforcement. The program can be
broken down into two major steps: (a) eliminate or reduce
the opportunity for current or potential negative behavior,
and (b) build psychological walls or deterrents against
negative behavior. The latter has received primary at-
tention to date,- however, plans and procedures are being
for'mulated to reduce opportunity by improving physical safe—
guards, such as controlling ingress and egress of persons,
lock and key control, physical arrangements, package and
equipment passes, and security identification badges.

For the purpose of this study, we will, for the most
part, ignore the physical factors of protection and illus-
trate in more detail the psychological picture as it per—
tains to the employee. It must, however, be understood that
a COmplete separation of physical and psychological elements

is not possible. All elements of a security program

41
complement and support each other; also, many of the ele—
ments of the security program fall in both the "physical"

and "psychological" categories. For example, the mere

presence of a uniformed security force is "physical," but
at the same time a very important aspect is to register in

the minds of malefactors that the hospital is protected.

Conditions pf employment. When a person first in—

quires about employment in the hospital, he is required to

complete an application for employment form and attached
thereto is a form called "Conditions of Employment." (Ap-

pendix A.) This is the beginning of his awareness of se-

curity and some of the elements of the protection program

that he will be required to conform with. Among these is

the condition that the employee will submit to a polygraph
examination at the discretion of the hospital administration.

Also there is a condition of being fingerprinted and photo-

graphed by the Security Department. Experience in the first

Six months has shown that approximately ten percent of all
applicants completing the form fail to follow-up on their

desire for employment by leaving then or failing to appear

for the department interview. This ten percent compares to

approximately a two percent figure prior to utilization of

thi S ' attachment .
If the aspirant is accepted by the department in-

volved, he is then sent to the Security Department where a

42

uniformed security officer fingerprints and photOgraphs the

The employee then signs his name on the finger-

employee.
"FOR POLICE RECORD CHECK."

print form beneath large letters,

At this point approximately three percent of the aspirants

apparently change their minds about employment as they

either fail to report for the next step of the employment

procedure or report back to the Personnel Department stating

they have changed their minds. There is no criteria to com—

pare this percentage with and only inferences can be made as
to Why some of 'the‘ persons changed 1 their minds .

New employee orientation. Twice a month a new—

employee orientation is held. -All new employees starting

within the two—week time period are required to attend this

orientation. Attendance is mandatory and the employee's
The orientation

first paycheck is given out at this time.
consists of many facets of which one pertains to security

concepts. Here a uniformed security officer explains what

security means in the hospital and relates to the employee

his responsibility and the benefits of this program. The

hospital's prosecution policy, which is one of vigorous
Prosecution, and the use of polygraph examinations are
Stressed and discussed in a rather straightforward manner.

So far the employee has had a fairly strong dose of

the protection image. However, it does not stop here, and

the following items are also elements of planting the

43

protection idea into the conscious and sub—conscious mind of

employees.

Signs. All employee locker rooms have a large red
sign posted which reads, "$100 reward for information lead—
ing to the arrest and conviction of persons responsible for
theft or malicious destruction of property. Call Security——
X555." The hospital has not paid any money as yet, but just
about every employee can tell you what the sign says. The
individual employee may know something and not bring it to
anyone's attention, but if he is involved, or about to be-
come involved in a situation, he does not know what his
neighbor might do. This uncertainty factor creates a certain

amount of inhibition toward anti-social behavior.

Investigations. Previous to the security program,
any loss of prOperty was reported to an Administrative As—
sistant on a cumbersome Unusual Incident Report form. There
was practically no follow—up and the malefactor responsible
for the loss in all probability did not know the loss was
<ie‘tected, much less reported. The procedure now is for the
person discovering the loss to notify the Security De-
partment who immediately send a uniformed officer to make
Elrl investigation. In the course of investigations, the
c>2Eficer contacts all known persons who had access or
knowledge of the situation. Even if the case is not brought

to an immediate successful conclusion, the malefactor, in

44

Inany cases, is contacted or at least visually sees a form

<>f action resulting from the loss.

Telephone stickers. All general-usage telephones in
'the hospital have been labeled with a red sticker which
:reads, "Security X555." This sticker has a twofold purpose:
(a) readily visible telephone number to call in an emergency,
(b) every time a person uses the phone, he reads the word

"Security" and again he is consciously or sub—consciously

:reminded of the protection concept.

Patrolling officers. Employees are reminded again of
asecurity when they see the security officer routinely check-
irng in their work areas. No part of the complex is too re—

nncme or unimportant to receive the unannounced inspection

loy'a member of the security staff.

Closed—circuit television. A system of monitoring
.a. tunnel area by closed—circuit television is also a part
(>1? this security program. While this system would be pri-
Inaarily classed as physical protection, its psychological
implications cannot be overlooked. Although a complement of
"<3Lnnmy" cameras is not part of the system, the employee's
iflnéugination, in not understanding the system, can be quite
"i\7id, Often, employees passing by the security control
Gearl'ter, who can see the monitor but not the picture, will

arik;3 "What area of the hospital is being watched today?"

45

As stated previously, the protection theme and re—
sulting psychological deterrence is not any one of the above
factors, but each factor fits into place to build and sus-
-tain this concept. At this point the hospital administration
:is convinced, in analyzing past and present usage statistics,
tflnat the program is effective and further benefits in the re—

duction of pilferage should be apparent as physical safe—

guards are implemented.37

From the total program, the three most known and
observable deterrents of fingerprints, polygraph (lie de—
tector) and security force were selected to be used in
polling the employees in this study. Only three deterrents
were selected since it was felt that more than three would

complicate the study resulting in less direct inferences and

conclusions .

\
37Kenath Hartman, "Security Program Progress Report."

Areport given to the Board of Trustees, Chicago Wesley
emerial Hospital, Chicago, Illinois, March, 1965), pp. 1—3.

CHAPTER VI
THE FIELD STUDY

Whenever a hospital undertakes the regulation of
pailfering by establishing psychological deterrents, the
c1uestion inevitably comes up, “What will do the most good?"
£3ince the hospital is made up of persons with varied back—
ggrounds, ages, and socio-economic status, the idea is some-
t:imes advanced that different deterrents have different
\ralues for certain groups. This study is an attempt to ask
t:he individual employee which of three major deterrents uti-
Jnized at Chicago wesley Memorial Hospital have the most im—

Exact or influence in "keeping him honest."

Employee grouping. The selection of individual
background groupings was on the basis of the need for cate—
SJCXries to use in classifying responses. By selecting age,
race, sex, and economic status, the results could be broken
CkDan to work groups and deterrents according to the pre—
do‘minance of the characteristic backgrounds within the
()Ikaanization. The groupings originally took into consider—
atlion professional vs. non—professional, but this grouping
was very difficult to define and it was felt that by salary
rehge and education the reader could make this analogy ac-

(ectrding to his own definition of "professional."

47

The ggestionnaire. The grouping for sex, age, and

education are self—explanatory on the questionnaire. (See

.Appendix B.) However, the data within the "Do Not Write"

space needs further explanation. For the deterrents to the

.left, the total number of points were entered by the investi—

ggator according to the respondent's average for all four

:situations. The "S" and "R" to the right represent salary

zand race. Race was recorded as Negro or white. Salary was

Iaroken into under $4,000 annually, $4,000 to $6,000 annually

aand.over $6,000 annually, based on the starting wage for the

£>articular job position occupied by the individual.

The questionnaire, as originally developed, required

tihe respondent to record his name. This permitted verifi-

czation of the respondent's information regarding the group-
j.ng data of age and education and did not require asking

i.nformation relative to salary and race which might be ob-

:iectionable to the respondent. .This salary and race data

Chould have easily been obtained from the application blank

Cin.fi1e with the respondent's personnel records. However,

Etfter a reappraisal of the questionnaire, with the name, it

Was decided that the name might affect the respondent's de—

sire to be polled. Also, the name might affect the insti—

tllrtion's employee relations and possibly affect the responses

t1<> the situations. Thus, the name was taken off the question-

rléiire and the respondent's job or position was substituted.

E33? utilizing a salary schedule, the economic grouping data

48

could still be obtained. -As for race information, this was

merely recorded as the respondent finished the questionnaire

and it was turned over to the investigator. The grouping

for the length of employment was included to determine if

there was any over-all significant differences of responses

between "long—term" and "short-term" employees. As stated

previously, the employee with less than a year was exposed

to more security indoctrination than the employee with a

year or more of service. The employee with over a year of

service was cognizant of the conditions of employment,
fiingerprinting and photographing and new employee orien—

tation, but was not directly exposed to them.

The questionnaire contains four situations each with

tflnree deterrents. Each deterrent was to be ranked ac-

cording to which had the strongest influence on the re—

spondent, the next strongest and then the one with the least

aumount of influence. For each situation the deterrents were

Eirouped in a different way so that the response would necessi—
flare reading the deterrent in a different sequence pattern.
F<I>ur situations were given so that an over—all average, or
Ilcirm, could be computed for each individual deterrent.

The first three situations involve common pilferage

items of approximately the same monetary value, but the

fc>'ur'th situation involves a camera, the loss of which could

I1<>tbe considered as pilferage. While no monetary value of

tlfle camera was given, it would obviously be much higher than

49

any of the other items. The purpose for including this item
was to ascertain in a situation—by—situation comparison if
there was a significant difference in responses.

The respondent's first choice was assigned the
numerical value of three, the next choice a numerical value
of two, and the last choice a numerical value of one. Each
deterrent then received the total numerical value of the
four situations. This value indicates the respondent's

over-all ranking of each of the three deterrents.

Employee sample. Employees were queried in groups

of approximately eight to twelve persons by the writer.

The sample was random rather than selecting the employees

to be polled. The employees were told to disregard need,
opportunity, their sense of right and wrong, and to concen-
trate on the fact that they are considering the taking of
the items and to consider only the deterrents listed. An
explanation of each of the three deterrents was presented

to the groups so that they understood the concept within the
context of this study. The explanation and the general ap—
proach is covered in Appendix C.

This approach varied somewhat with the type of group
since the terminolOgy had to coincide with the group's under—
standing. Groups with extremely low educational background
required the repetition of many points and in some cases

individual help was required.

50

A total of 340 persons were queried; however, some

persons were unable to understand the concepts and did not

attempt to complete a questionnaire. A total of 286 question-

naires were returned; however 35 were discarded due to incom—

pleteness. Thus 251 questionnaires were utilized in this

study. The incomplete category also included those responses

Where two deterrents received the same numerical value and
we re thus classed as equal by the respondent.

Compilation p_f_ data. After each questionnaire was

analyzed for completeness, the individual's over-all choice

Of deterrents was computed. This information and the group-

ing 'data was then coded and entered on electronic data pro—

Ce ssing cards according to a prepared job layout procedure.

( See Appendix D.) Appendix E shows the data cards utilized

fo r the study .

.After the initial key punch operation, the cards

Were then processed through the verifier so any card punch—

ing errors could be rectified. The electro-mechanical

SO:l:'1:er was utilized for rapid correlation of groupings and

re Sponses. The data was then reduced to percentages for

pre sentation in Chapter VII.
This study reveals only a few of the correlations

that are possible from the data compiled. Appendix F has

1been added to allow other researchers to carry analysis of

t1Itese data further. This appendix reveals the data col-

leeted in a tabular form.

CHAPTER VII
STUDY ANALYSIS AND CORRELATIONS

The data compiled in this study, and the resulting
correlations, can be readily portrayed by simple bar graphs.
This form of presentation was selected to reveal the study
findings with as little narration as possible.

The mean of all the respondents in their selection
Of the most influential deterrent is shown in Figure 6.
This figure reveals that the presence of a uniformed se-
curity force was held to be of most value in deterring em—
ployee pilferage by 56% of the respondents. The lie--
de tector and fingerprint deterrents were ranked as the first
Choice by 26% and 18% of the respondents respectively.

As shown in Figure 7, comparing Negro respondents
to white respondents, there is wide divergence placed on the
Value of the security force and that of fingerprinting.
Fingerprinting was selected as being the most influential
by 44% of the Negro respondents, while this deterrent re-
Qe ived only 7% of the white respondent's selection. In
Q0It‘ltrast, the white group selected the security force as
be ing the most influential by a 66% majority. Only 31% of

the Negro group selected the security force. The value

70%

6 0%
5 0%
40%
3 0%
2 0%

10%

0%

 

 

 

 

 

R\\\\\\\\\\
\N
n

\\

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

E: £3" 8
H 0E a
girl ZH U

U Hm Lil
UM III-:04 EIJE-I
l’x-‘lO Hm
(DEL. HQ

FIGURE 6

RESPONDENTS OVER-ALL RANKING OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

52

53

 

WHITE

 

 

///////

 

 

 

/flV.

 

 

 

7/////////////////////

 

 

NEGRO

 

 

 

 

///////

 

 

 

//./////////////

 

 

 

/—

 

80%
7 0%-

60%-
50%-
40%- .
30/
20°/
lO°/'l

. mm

mOBUmEmQ
mHA

MBZHmm
IMMGZHQ

momom
MBHMDONW

MOBUMBNQ
WHA

mBZHmm
IMHQZHM

mumom
NBHmDUHm

FIGURE 7
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

NEGRO AND WHITE RESPONDENTS CHOICE OF

54

pplaced on the lie detector was nearly the same for each
group.

.A comparison of all female respondents to all male
respondents is shown in Figure 8. This comparison reveals
that the female employee feels that the security force is of
significantly greater value than fingerprints with the lie
detector falling in between. -The male rates each of the
three deterrents more equally with the lie detector being
the least significant to this group.

Figure 9 compares all respondents under thirty years
of age to all respondents over the age of thirty years. The
security force was about of equal value for each group ac—
counting for over 50% of each group's choice. The older
(employee felt that the fingerprints were much more important
'than the lie detector, while the younger group reversed
'these two deterrents, feeling that the fingerprints were of
the least value.

A multiple group comparison of less than high school

enducation, high school education and college education is

Shown in Figure 10. This comparison shows quite radical

(ii.fferences of consensus concerning the different deterrents.

UDIIis analysis shows quite clearly that the least educated
lrainked fingerprints very high, while the highest educated
group ranked fingerprints extremely low. Conversely, as

education increased, so did the importance of the security

55

 

FEMALE

 

 

7//////.fl.

 

 

 

//A

 

 

 

 

V/////////////

 

MALE

 

 

 

//////

 

 

,//////./ L.

 

 

 

//////////

 

 

 

 

£3CE%

'7Cfi%~

6(T5‘
SCPoj
4C864
3CB6-
ZCPOq
lCBé-
096

MOBUMBHQ
WHA

mBZHmm
ImmOZHm

mumom
MEHMDUmm

mOBUMBmQ
MHA

mBZHmm
ImmDZHm

mumom
WBHmDUmm

FIGURE 8

MALE AND FEMALE RESPONDENTS CHOICE OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

56

 

O

OVER AGE

 

 

////

 

 

 

 

V////V

 

 

 

/////////////////A

 

 

UNDER AGE 30

 

 

 

 

///////////

 

 

//A

 

 

 

 

///////////////

 

 

 

80%
'7CBés

60%
50%-
40%-
3 A,
2 A-
10%

T
0%

mOEUmEmQ
MHA

wBZHmm
IMWOZHh

momom
MBHmDUMm

MOBUWBMQ
MHQ

mBZHmm
IMMUZHm

mvmom
MBHmDUQm

FIGURE 9

AGE GROUPS-~CHOICE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

57

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

m ////////
a
7////////////// .
m ////////A
////A

 

 

i ///

 

 

 

 

V////%//////////////

 

 

 

%

 

 

 

mOBUNBmQ
MHQ

mBZHmm
ImmeHh

momom
MBHmbumm

MOBUHBMQ
HHA

mBZHmm
IMWOZHQ

MUMOh
NBHmbumm

moaomewn
m3

mBZHmm
IMHOZHW

mumom
MBHMDOMW

FIGURE 10

EDUCATION BACKGROUND CHOICE OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

58

force, rising from 20% to 55%‘to 67% for less than high
school, high school, and college, respectively.

Figure 11 represents the three salary categories
of the respondents. These categories parallel closely the
three educational categories and it should be noted that the
responses also parallel fairly closely. However, the salary
group comparison does reveal the largest divergence in the
over $6,000 annual salary category, going from 83% ranking
the security force as the first choice compared to only 5%
selecting the fingerprint deterrent. The less than $4,000
annual salary rated all the deterrents rather closely with
fingerprints, security force, and lie detector being se—
lected in that order.

A comparison of the Negro male with less than high
SChool education to the white male with less than high
SChool education is shown in Figure 12. The Negro re—
SPendents selected fingerprinting as the most influential
deterrent by a 67% majority, while only 17% of the white re-
SPendents selected this deterrent. The security force was
Selected by 53% of the white group, compared to 20% of the
Negro group. Also the lie detector was of more significance
to the white group by a 30% to 13% comparison. This compari—
son parallels the comparison of all Negro and all white
peli‘Sons shown in Figure 7.

Figure 13 compares the Negro male and white male with

a high school education. The white group selected the

59

 

 

 

////////.

 

 

/////.////////

 

 

 

 

r .//////////

 

 

 

§4,000 - $6,000 LESS THAN $4,000

 

 

 

 

 

/

x////////./

/ mBZHmm

 

 

///////////////////A

 

 

 

OVER $6y000

 

7///////

V/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

7 ////////////////////////

 

 

 

590%

w

807
70°/
60°/ 1
50%-
4074
30°/

.
m/w.
«A

10%..

OBUMBWQ
WHA

mBZHmm
[MHDZHm

HOmOh
MEHMDUmm

MQBUMBHQ

MHA

IMWUZHh

momom
NBHMDUWM

MOBUWBMQ
mHA

mBZHMm
IMMOZHQ

mumom
NBHMDUMM

FIGURE 11

SALARY CATEGORIES CHOICE OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

60

 

 

 

 

 

V/////////%

 

 

 

7////2

 

 

 

V////////////////

 

 

 

 

NEGRO MALE - LESS THAN HS. WHITE MALE - LESS THAN HS.

 

 

 

 

 

 

//////////W/.///////////

 

 

.////

 

 

/////.

 

 

£3CE%

'7CBé-

£5096"

5CE%'

‘4CBé'

300° "

20%
1 0% -
0%.

mOBUMBmQ
mHA

MBZHmm
IMMUZHm

momom
NBHMDomm

mOBUmBMQ
MHA

WBZHmm
IMMDZHm

mumom
MBHMDUmw

FIGURE 12

WHITE AND NEGRO MALES WITH LESS THAN

SCHOOL CHOICE OF

HIGH

PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

61

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

/////¢//.

mm 7

///////////////////z

7////////

mm 7////.////
mm

/

wmmmmmmma

MOBUHBHQ
MHA

WBZHMQ
ImMDZHm

mumom
MBHmDUmm

mOBUHBmQ
qu

mBZHmm
ImMOZHm

momom
weHmDUmm

FIGURE 13

NEGRO AND WHITE MALES - HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION

CHOICE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

55

 

FEMALE

 

 

////////A

 

 

 

///A

 

 

 

V////////A///////

 

4 i

 

 

MALE

 

 

///////

 

 

7//////////

 

 

 

7//////////

 

 

 

 

80%

70%.

60%'

50%‘

40%.

307
.20‘%'1
L107

0‘7

MOBUMBMQ
HHA

wBZHmm
ImmUZHm

mumch
NBHMDumm

MOBUmBmQ
MHA

WBZHMQ
IMQUZHE

momom
MBHMDUmm

FIGURE 8

MALE AND FEMALE RESPONDENTS CHOICE OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

56

 

O

OVER AGE

 

 

 

/

 

 

 

V//////

 

 

 

////////////////2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

630%

 

7/////////
a
a //z
m ///////////////.
Ari/1.1.1..
3:11.:

MOBOMBWQ
WHQ

mBZHmm
ImmUZHm

mvmom
MBHmDUmm

MOBUMBmQ
mHA

mBZHmm
IMMOZHm

mUmOm
MBHMDUMm

FIGURE 9

AGE GROUPS-~CHOICE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

57

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

m
/////////////////A
m //////A

 

 

 

 

 

a 7/

 

 

 

 

V//////////////////

 

 

 

 

7////

 

 

 

 

mOBUHBMQ
HHA

mBZHMQ
ImmUZHm

momom
MEHmDUMM

MOBUmBmQ
mHA

mBZHMQ
IMQOZHW

momom
MBHmDUmm

moaomawo
m3

mBZHMQ
ImMOZHh

mumom
MBHMDUWm

FIGURE 10

EDUCATION BACKGROUND CHOICE OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

58

force, rising from 20% to 55% to 67% for less than high
school, high school, and college, respectively.

Figure 11 represents the three salary categories
of the respondents. These categories parallel closely the
three educational categories and it should be noted that the
:responses also parallel fairly closely. However, the salary
ggroup comparison does reveal the largest divergence in the

over $6,000 annual salary category, going from 83% ranking

the security force as the first choice compared to only 5%

selecting the fingerprint deterrent. The less than $4,000

annual salary rated all the deterrents rather closely with

fingerprints, security force, and lie detector being se-

lected in that order.

,A comparison of the Negro male with less than high
scihool education to the white male with less than high
£3Cfl1001 education is shown in Figure 12. The Negro re—
:apxondents selected fingerprinting as the most influential
deterrent by a 67% majority, while only 17% of the white re—
spOndents selected this deterrent. The security force was
sealxacted by 53% of the white group, compared to 20% of the
Negro group. Also the lie detector was of more significance
tC> 1:he white group by a 30% to 13% comparison. This compari-
SC"Tlparallels the comparison of all Negro and all white
persOns shown in Figure 7.

Figure 13 compares the Negro male and white male with

a high school education. The white group selected the

59

 

 

 

V/fl/////,

 

 

////.//.///////

 

 

 

 

 

7.//////////.

 

 

 

- $6,000 LESS THAN $4,000

w

 

 

 

V.

 

//////////

 

 

//////////////////A

 

 

 

 

//////////

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

... /
m7///////////////////////2

OBUMBMQ
HHA

mBZHmm
meUZHm

momom
NBHmDUmm

MOBUMBHQ
MHQ

mBZHmm
IMMOZHW

momom
MBHMDUHQ

MOBUHBMQ
HHQ

mBZHMm
ImWGZHm

mUmOh
MBHMDUMm

FIGURE 11

SALARY CATEGORIES CHOICE OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

59

 

 

 

////////.

 

 

///////////

 

 

 

 

V.////////2

 

 

 

§42000 - §6y000 LESS THAN $4,000

 

 

//////////./

 

 

Q

 

 

 

7////////////////

 

 

 

 

OVER $6y000

 

 

/////////

V

 

 

 

 

 

 

7//////////////////////////

 

 

i 4

 

 

90%

mama/6.
321

80°/ J
70%
60%“
50%
40°/

OBUMBMQ
MHA

mBZHmm
LMMUZHW

mvmom
MEHMDomm

MQBUMBNQ
WHA

mBZHmm
ImMUZHm

MUMOm
MBHMDUWm

MOBUMBHQ
MHA

mEZHMm
IMMUZHE

momom
NBHMDUmm

FIGURE 11

SALARY CATEGORIES CHOICE OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

60

 

 

 

 

 

7/////////./.

 

 

 

7////2

 

 

7//////////////

 

 

 

 

 

NEGRO MALE - LESS THAN HS. WHITE MALE - LESS THAN HS.

 

 

 

 

 

 

7/////////////////// /

 

I

 

/////

 

 

V/A.

 

 

80%

70%-

60%‘

50°/
40%-
30%
20%
10%-

0%

mOBUWBMQ
mHQ

mBZHmm
IMMGZHm

momom
NBHMDUmm

MOBUMBMQ
MHA

mBZHmm
IMMOZHm

momom
NBHMDUWw

FIGURE 12

WHITE AND NEGRO MALES WITH LESS THAN

HIGH SCHOOL CHOICE OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

61

 

HIGH SCHOOL

WHITE MALE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

V/Z

 

 

 

V//////////////////A

 

 

 

 

NEGRO MALE
HIGH SCHOOL

 

 

 

 

7//////A

 

 

//////.////

 

 

 

7//////// .

 

An

 

80%

70% ‘

60%

50% ‘

40% ‘

30%
20% ‘
10%
0%

MOBUMBNQ
HHA

mBZHmm
IMMUZHm

momom
MBHMDUflw

MOBUMBMQ
mHA

mBZHmm
IMMOZHE

momom
VBHMDUmm

FIGURE 13

NEGRO AND WHITE MALES - HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION

CHOICE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

62

security force, lie detector, and fingerprints by 62%, 30%,

and 8% respectively. These percentages are contrasted by
the Negro group who selected the security force, lie de—

28%, and 36%, respectively.

tector, and fingerprints by 36%,

This close ranking by the Negro group is a contrast to the

divergence shown by the white group.

The same close ranking by the Negro group in Figure

13 is also apparent in Figure 14 which represents Negro and

white females with a high school education. The Negro group

selected the lie detector as their first choice by a 40%

majority, while the security force and fingerprints received

32% and 28% respectively. The white group was much more di—

vergent in their selections. The ranking and percentage of

the white group were almost identical to the white group

shown in Figure 13.
Figure 15 compares the Negro and white male re—

:spondents with one year of service and those with less than

<>ne year of service. It is interesting to note that none of

tile Negro males with more than one year service selected the

lrie detector, while the white group with more than one year

Service selected the lie detector by 25%. Again the white

EJITDup, as a whole, selected the security force, while the

Negro group, as a whole, selected fingerprints as the most

influential deterrent .

63

 

WHITE FEMALE
HIGH SCHOOL

 

///////A

 

 

 

A

 

 

 

 

//////////////////////

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EL 7/////////%
mm V/////////.//

MOBUMBMQ
MHA

mBZHmm
ImHGZHm

momOh
MBHMDUMm

MOEUHEHQ
.MHQ

wBZHmm
IMMUZHW

momom
MBHMDUmm

FIGURE 14

NEGRO AND WHITE FEMALES - HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION

CHOICE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

 

 

‘HQIOHIHG

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

E

6 \\\
§S>3 \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
\\\\\\\\\\\\\ \
g \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
3% s\\\\\\‘\\
gag ;\\\\\\\ \
g \\\\\\\\\\\\\V
\\\\\\\

‘SLNIHd
rHEONIJ

} 33303
XIIHDDES

HOLOHLHG
. ‘HIT

HSINIHd
rHEDNIJ

33303
KIIHHDHS

HOLOHLHG
HIT

SINIHd
-H39NIJ

HOHOJ
ALIHDDHS

HOLDHLEG
HIT

.SLNIHd
:HHONIJ

33303
AIIHHOHS

FIGURE 15

64

NEGRO AND WHITE MALES WITH MORE THAN OR LESS THAN ONE YEAR SERVICE

CHOICE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

65

Figure 16 shows each situation and how many re—
spondents selected each deterrent as their first choice.
It should be noted that for each situation the security
force was favored by approximately two to one as compared to

the next choice.

SECURITY FINGER- LIE
FORCE PRINTS DETECTOR
SITUATION ONE 125 63 63
SITUATION TWO 140 34 77
SITUATION THREE 134 46 71
SITUATION FOUR 128 58 65
FIGURE 16

SELECTION OF DETERRENTS FOR EACH SITUATION

BY ALL RESPONDENTS

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

The data presented in Chapter VII may be viewed in
various ways depending on one's interpretation of the data.
This chapter is intended to reveal the writer's conclusions
and interpretations of the study findings. It is not the
intent of the study to explain why each group responded as
they did; however, the writer has interjected some inferences
on this point in this chapter to provide "food for thought."

In discussing the various conclusions, it is im—
portant to point out that the variables of race, age, sex,
length of employment, and education were utilized to allow
for a manageable grouping of employees in this study. It is
reCOgnized that more direct variables, such as intelligence,
moral concepts, family cohesiveness, conscience and the like,
may provide better criteria, but these items are quite
difficult, if not impossible, to determine. In this study
it was assumed that groups defined by such variables share
various life experiences, and personal history events to
some extent.

The principal conclusions one can draw from the

survey data are as follows:

67

1. Employee Groups - Different employee groups do place
different values on different psychological deterrents to
pilferage.

2. .ggpp - Typically the Negro group is more psycho—
logically deterred from the act of pilferage by utilization
of fingerprints than is the white group. Conversely, the
white group is more deterred by the security force than is
the Negro group.

3. §§x - As a general rule, the female is more psycho—
logically deterred from the act of pilferage by a security
force than is the male. The male shows no great preference
for any one of the deterrents and feels they are almost
equal in value. It is hypothesized that the female prefer-
ence for the security force stems from the cultural concept
of the male as a protection image.

4. ‘Agp - Other things being equal, persons over 30 years
of age place more significance on fingerprints as a de-
terrent than do those under 30 years of age. Conversely,
those under 30 years feel that the lie detector is a greater
deterrent than persons over 30 years. The security force
is the most significant deterrent of the three deterrents
for each age group.

5. Education - As the individual's educational level

 

increases, so does the significance of the security force

as a pilferage deterrent. Also, as the individual's

68

educational level increases, the significance of finger—
prints as a deterrent decreases.

6. Salary Level - As the salary level increases, the
importance of the security force as a pilferage deterrent
also increases and the importance of fingerprints decreases.
This conclusion parallels that of the education group and
probably arises out of the fact that the higher salary
groups are also the more highly educated groups.

7. Length 2; Employment — There is only a slight vari-

 

ance in the choice of deterrents of one group of employees
with less than a year service and the other group with more
than one year of service. It would thus appear that direct
contact with the three deterrents had little effect on
choice. There is the possibility that some of the group
with more than a year's service who did not have as much
direct contact with the deterrents may have a more vivid
imagination of the deterrents than if they had come into
direct contact with them.

8. Item Value - The monetary value of the items ap-

 

parently had no significance to the respondents, because the
deterrents in situation four (with the camera) were rated
substantially the same as for the other situations involving
items with a low monetary value.

Essentially, the same conclusions of the study could
have been drawn had any one of the four situations, or a

combination of the four situations, been utilized. In other

69

words, had any one of the situations been utilized by itself,
the study conclusions would have remained the same. It
should be noted, however, that in situations one (water
pitcher) and four (camera), fingerprints were rated slightly
higher than in situations two or three. This rating may
have resulted from the respondent's realization that finger—
prints could be on the stainless steel pitcher and camera
but not on the towels or butter. (This was brought to the
writer's attention by two of the respondents after completion
of the questionnaire.) This should, however, have no bear-
ing on their choice, as fingerprint techniques would require
prints being on surrounding items and not on the pilfered
item itself, which would be gone.

The conclusions should be evaluated from the stand-
point of how one variable interrelates or correlates with
another. For example, consider education and age. Persons
in the lower-education category and persons in the higher-
age category both felt that fingerprints were the most sig-
nificant deterrent. There could be a direct correlation
here since the higher-age category tends to be the least edu-
cated due, in part, to our rising level of education as a
whole. Another example of the data correlating can be found
in comparing Negro and white groups with the same educational
background. Regardless of the educational level, the white

group selected the security force deterrent as being more

70

significant than the fingerprinting, while the Negro group
consistently selected the fingerprint deterrent.

The conclusion reached in reference to race is sure
to raise many questions and the writer would like to set
forth an opinion in this respect. One can only speculate on
reasons for the difference between the white and the Negro
groups. The importance of fingerprints to the Negro group
may in part stem from the possibility that this group had
been subjected to fingerprinting more often than the white
group. This increased exposure could have resulted in their
selection of the fingerprint deterrent. Another possibility
may be the Negro's cultural background and the fact that the
Negro group was less educated as a whole than the white group.
Being less educated the Negro may have attached more im—
portance to the fingerprints because he was less knowledge-
able in what could actually be done with the fingerprints.

By not understanding it is possible that more significance
could have been placed on the deterrent than is actually
‘warranted from the technical standpoint.

The "understanding" concept as discussed in the pre-
ceding paragraph could also account for the white group se—
lecting the security force as the most important deterrent.
IEt is highly possible that the white group as a whole has
liad less direct contact with police than has the Negro group.
C Police and security represent essentially the same general

CRDncept.) The white group, perhaps mistakenly, may tend to

71

feel that the police are more successful than they actually
are in reality. This is achieved by reading about how the
police solved a crime, how good their training is, new
technical equipment and the like, without having the direct
contact. On the other hand, the Negro may be more familiar
with the practical police application and this understanding
may cause him to see the police as being less a deterrent
than did the white group. In direct contact, an individual
may see a friend "picked up" by the police and one hour
later the individual is released. The more direct contact,
and thus familiarity with procedures, could lessen the
psychological deterrent impact.

Finally, it is the conclusion of this writer that
much more research needs to be done in the area of psycho—
logical deterrents against pilferage. The writer looks upon
this study as a pilot project which may suggest the need for
further studies. For example, feedback from industrial and
government employees would be very valuable in comparing and
analyzing pilferage deterrents. Another worthwhile study
inould be the same sort of field study as presented here, but
conducted in a hospital which has no organized security

System. Such a study might yield valuable comparison with

this study.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS

Abrahamsen, David, M.D. Who Are the Guilty? London: Lowe
and Brydone, Ltd., 1954.

Alexander, Franz and Staub, Hugo. xThe Criminal, The Judge
and the Public. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956.

Bernhardt, Karl S., M.A., Ph.D. Practical Psychology.
2d ed. New York: McGraw—Hill Book Co., Inc., 1953.

Brown, Esther, Ph.D. Newer Qimensions pp Patient Care.
Part II. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1962.

Burling, Temple, Lentz, Edith and Wilson, Robert. The Give
and Take 1p Hospitals. New York: G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1956.

Cressey, Donald R. Other People's Money. Glencoe: The
Free Press, 1953.

Curtis, S. J. Modern Retail Security. Springfield: Charles
C. Thomas, 1960.

Dalton, Melville. Men Who Manage: Fusions 9; Feeling and
Theory_;p Administrgpion. New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1959.

Davis, John R. Industrial Plant Protection. Springfield:
Charles C. Thomas, 1957.

Diesing, Paul. Reason in Society. Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1962.

Freidson, Eliot. The Hospital ip Modern Society. Glencoe:
The Free Press, 1963.

(Socke, B. W. Practical Plant PrOtection and Policing.
Springfield: C. C. Thomas Co., 1957.

Iiaire, Mason. Modern OrganizatiOnTheory. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959.

73

Hilgard, Ernst R. Introduction pg PsycholOgy. New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1957.

 

Jaspan, Norman. The Thief 13 the White Collar. New York
and Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1960.

 

Johnson, Palmer 0., Ph.D. Statistical Methods pp Research.
New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950.

 

Katz, Elihu and Lazarsfeld, Paul. Personal Influence.
Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955.

Kurtz, Richard A., Edwards, John N. and Saathoff, Donald E.
Hospital Social Systems and Differential Perceptions.
Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, Inc., 1962.

Langer, walter C. Psychology and Human Living. New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1943.

Lawrence, Paul R. The Changing pf Organizational Behavior
Patterns. Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1958.

 

Loomis, Charles P. Social Systems: Essays pp Their Per-
sistence and Change. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand,
Inc., 1960.

 

MacEachern, Malcom T. Hospital Organization g Management.
Chicago: Physicians' Record Company, 1957.

Maslow, A. H. New Knowledge ip Human Values. New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1959.

 

 

Maslow, A. H. Motivation and Personality. New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1954.

 

Sargent, S. Stansfeld and Williamson, Robert C. Social
Psychology. 2d ed. New York: The Ronald Press,
1958.

Siegel, Laurence. ~Industrial Psychology. Homewood:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962.

Sloan, Raymond P. This Hospital Business pg Ours. New York:
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1952.

.Sutherland, Edwin H. White COllar Crime. New York: The
Dryden Press, 1949.

 

Stoung, Paul T. Motivation and Emotion. New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1961.

74

PERIODICALS

Burnstein, Harvey. "Not So Petty Larceny," Harvard Business
Review, Vol. XXXVII, No. 3 (May-June, 1959), 72-78.

 

"Business Uses the Lie Detector," Business week (June, 1960),
98.

 

Collings, Anthony. "Foiling the Light Fingered," Management
Review, No. 52 (August, 1963), 58-61.

 

Curtis, S. J. "Dishonesty, the Sinister Cancer," Industrial
Security, Vol. VII, No. 2 (April, 1963), 19.

 

Elbow, Paul X. "All Kinds of People Steal From Hospitals,"
The Modern Hospital, Vol. XXCV (July, 1955), 62-64.

Elbow, Paul x. "How to Frustrate Prospective Pilfers,"
The Modern Hospital, Vol. XXCV (August, 1955), 64—66.

Festinger, L. "Cognitive Dissonance," Scientific American,
(October, 1962), 93-98.

 

Hull, C. L. "Behavior Postulates and Corollaries," Psycho-
logical Review, No. 57 (1951), 173-180.

"Internal Control, Who's Cheating and How?" New England
Hospital Assembly (March, 1963).

Jaspan, Norman. "The Burglar is a Piker," The Journal 9:
Insurance Information (JulyeAugust, 1964), 33.

 

 

Malone, Lee. "Psychological and Educational Approaches To
Create Favorable Employee Attitudes,“ Industrial
Security, Vol. VII, No. 4 (October, 1963), 7.

Mattersdorff, Werner R. "Theft and Dishonesty in Public
Hospitals," Canadian Insurance (February, 1961), 6,
7.

McLean, James C. "Is Your Hospital Being Robbed?" The
Modern Hospital (July, 1964), 79-82.

"Pilferage and Larceny in Hospitals," Hospital Progress,
Vol. XLI (November, 1960), 28.

Ross, Irwin. "Thievery in the Plant," Fortune (October,
1961), 140-143.

75

Smigel, Erwin 0. "Public Attitudes Toward Stealing As Re—
lated To The Victim Organization," American Socio-
logical Review (June, 1956), 320-327.

 

Taylor, Roy C. "Preventive Medicine for Employee Dis-
honesty," Management Review, Vol. XLIX (November,
1960), 20—28.

 

PAMPHLETS

Continental Casualty Company. Crime Loss Prevention.
Chicago: Continental Casualty Company.

SPEECHES

Barklage, Marlin. Talk Before Chicago Hospital Personnel
Managers' Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, NOvember, 1964.

White, Russell E. "Relationship of Employee Morale to
Theft," Presented at Top Management Business Se-
curity Seminar, April 18, 1963.

Zonn, Lincoln M. "The Effect of Employee Dishonesty on
Profit," Presented at TOp Management Business Se—
curity Seminar, April 18, 1963.

UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

Des Roseirs, Allan. "Security Systems in Hospitals." Un—
published Master's thesis, George Washington Uni—
versity, Washington, D.C., 1964.

Hartman, Kenath. "Security Program Progress Report."
Chicago wesley Memorial Hospital, 1965.
(Mimeographed.)

Riddle, Hasty W. "A Study of Informal Organization and Its
Relation to the Hospital." Unpublished Master's
thesis, Baylor University, waco, Texas, 1956.

- APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

CHICAGO WESLEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
250 East Superior Street
Chicago, Illinois 60611

Have you ever been convicted by any Courts for crimes other
than those involving moving vehicles? YES NO

If your answer is "YES," state specifically the crime in-
volved and any sentence imposed. Also, if "YES," are you
currently on parole or probation?

 

 

CONDITIONS pg EMPLOYMENT

An identification badge is issued to all Hospital em—
ployees to be worn while on duty in the Hospital. This
badge is the property of the Hospital and will be re—
turned upon termination.

Employee lockers are the property of the Hospital and sub-
ject to inspection at any time. No Hospital property
will be stored in an employee's locker except property
issued to the employee for which he is responsible.

All employees will be fingerprinted and photographed by
the Security Department. Background investigations will
be conducted to determine the applicant's suitability
for employment.

When reporting to work, or leaving after a work shift,
all employees will utilize the 239 East Chicago Avenue
entrance or the West door of the Front Lobby entrance
during the hours it is Open.

All materials, equipment or packages leaving the Hospital
building are subject to inspection by any member of the
Security Department or a member of Hospital
Administration.

78

6 - Loitering, use of intoxicants, use of drugs, profane
language, gambling, loud and boisterous conduct will not
be tolerated on Hospital premises.

7 - As a further Condition of Employment, I hereby agree to
submit voluntarily to be examined by a Polygraph (lie
detector) detection of deception technique at any time
while employed by the Hospital.

I have read and understand the seven Conditions of Employment
as listed above. I further understand that I am obligated by
any other Policies or Procedures that the Hospital deems

necessary in the best interests and operation of the Hospital.

Signature:

 

Witness:

 

Date:

 

APPENDIX B

 

 

 

Position Sex: M F
Age: Under 30 years Over 30 years
Education: Less than High School High School

.College Degree

Length of Employment: Less than 1 year More than 1 year

 

 

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BOX

Security Force S.
Fingerprints R.
Lie Detector

 

 

 

 

 

(1) Situation: You are in a patient room by yourself and see
a small stainless steel water pitcher belong-
ing to the hospital. You are tempted to take
it for yourself to be used at home. Of the
following, which would have the most influence
on your not taking the pitcher? Next? Least?

Fingerprints Lie Detector Security Force
(Investigation)

(2) Situation: You are folding towels belonging to the
hospital and suddenly remember you are short
of towels at home. Which of the following
would have the most influence on your not
taking several towels home? Next? Least?

Lie Detector Security Force Fingerprints
(Investigation)

(3) Situation: You are in a kitchen area by yourself and you
see two packages of butter on a counter. You
are tempted to take them home for your own use.
Which of the following would have the most in—

fluence on your not taking the butter? Next?
Least?

Fingerprints Security Force Lie Detector
(Investigation)

(4) Situation:

Security Force
(Investigation)

80

You are in an office by yourself and see a
camera. Since you have been wanting a new
camera, you are tempted to take it home with
you. Which of the following would most in-
fluence your not taking it? Next? Least?

Fingerprints Lie Detector

APPENDIX C

I'm meeting with you today to ask your help in pro-
viding some information for a study. This study has nothing
to do with the hospital management and is for my own use.
The information asked for will be transferred to data pro-
cessing cards and the individual information is used only to
find an average.

This study deals with people taking things that belong
to the hospital. I'm sure that this is not a problem with
this group but each of us realizes that the fear of getting
caught has a tremendous bearing on whether or not we do some—
thing that we know is wrong.

Many of you have fingerprints on file in our Security
office. Many times the "guilty party" has been apprehended
by using these prints to match those at the scene of a loss
or to check a person's background for information.

You all signed a condition of employment stating you
would take a lie detector examination at the request of the
hospital. As a matter of practice, five per cent of all em—
ployees are examined annually. One never knows when he may
be one of the five per cent or asked'to take anoexamination
as the result of a specific problem.

Another thing you have all observed is our uniformed
Security Force. They are constantly checking employee work
and rest areas, watching for anything that might be wrong.
Upon being notified of a prOperty loss, the Security Force
begins an investigation into all aspects of the situation.
These three items are only a part of our security program,
but parts that each employee must consider.

As I pass out this questionnaire, please fill in the
t0p part only and do not go any further. If any of you do
not want to complete this questionnaire, you may return it
blank.

I will read the first situation aloud as you read it
to yourself. Listed below are the three items we just dis—
cussed. Disregarding your sense of "right and wrong," which
one of the items would have the most influence on whether or
not you, or your fellow employee, would take this property?

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APPENDIX F

This appendix reveals the number of persons select—

ing an item for each column number.

for use in conjunction with Appendix D.

 

This data is intended

 

 

 

COLUMN ITEM ONE, ITEM TWO ITEM THREE
One 60 191 NA
Two 174 77 NA
Three 30 136 85
Four 101 150 NA
Five 104 87 60
Six 173 78 NA
Seven 138 70 43
Eight 46 86 119
Nine 67 97 87
Ten 63 78 110
Eleven 63 102 86
Twelve 125 71 55
Thirteen 77 100 74
Fourteen 140 79 32
Fifteen 34 72 145
Sixteen 46 68 137
Seventeen 134 85 32
Eighteen 72 98 81
Nineteen 128 64 59
Twenty 58 102 91
Twenty—one 65 85 101

    

    

    

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