

AN EVALUATION OF CERTAIN
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS TO
EMPLOYEE PILFERAGE AND THEIR
APPARENT EFFECTIVENESS

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AN EVALUATION OF CERTAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS
TO EMPLOYEE PILFERAGE AND THEIR APPARENT
EFFECTIVENESS IN THE HOSPITAL SETTING

By

Russell Lynn Colling

AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS

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ABSTRACT

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While industrial concerns rely quite heavily on physical security controls such as barred windows, access controls, locks and alarms, these controls can be utilized in hospitals only to a limited degree. The hospital facilities must remain relatively open to receive the sick and to permit visitors to see patients. Thus, hospital protection programs are forced to rely heavily on psychological deterrents to complement their generally inadequate physical controls.

There is little literature available to guide the hospital programmer in developing elements of security protection utilizing the psychological deterrent concept. It is the purpose of this study to analyze the "psychological deterrent" concept by studying the responses of a group of hospital employees to determine the apparent effectiveness of certain established practices in protecting against pilferage.

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The field study was conducted at Chicago Wesley Memorial Hospital, Chicago, Illinois. Approximately 250 employees were questioned. The employees were told, in group situations of eight to twelve persons, that the hospital utilized a security force, a program of polygraph testing, and a program of fingerprinting to protect its property. The general aspects of how these elements of the security program can be used if property is missing was presented. Each employee was asked to fill out a questionnaire containing four hypothetical situations in which he had the opportunity to take certain property. He was then asked, for each situation, to select which of the three aforementioned elements of security would have the most influence in keeping him from taking the property. After selecting the most significant deterrent, the respondent was asked which of the remaining two elements were most influential. An average of the four situations was computed to determine the individual ranking of the deterrents.

Data on the questionnaires was analyzed for various subgroups defined by such categories as age, education, length of employment, race and salary. Results of the study reveal that these different employee groups do differ in their feelings on what deterrents are most significant. For example, it was found that the least educated group selected

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fingerprints as the most influential deterrent. As the education level increased the importance of fingerprints decreased and the importance of the security force increased markedly. A clear difference of opinion was found in comparing the white group, who felt the security force was most significant, to the colored group who felt that fingerprinting was the most significant deterrent. This difference was still apparent when white and colored groups of generally equal education were compared. Also comparison of different age groups revealed differences in deterrent selections.

While it is not the purpose of the study to explain why certain groups selected specific deterrents, the writer has interspersed some possible interpretations that may account for group reasoning. The groups selected according to age, education and race may also have other factors in common accounting for difference in views on the specific deterrents. For example, the least educated group may have selected fingerprints because they are less technically oriented and may not know what can actually be done with fingerprints. This lack of knowledge could produce a greater deterrent value than it would with a greater understanding. Also ethnic and social heritage differences may account for group consensus on specific deterrents. Whatever the reasons, it is apparent that there are differences and it is

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these differences that the security programmer should take into account in building an efficient security system.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Hospitals are much in the public eye at present and charges concerning such matters as high cost, inefficiency, improper care, and indifference are being levelled against them. Hospital administrators across the country are coming to the realization that sound security programing is a necessary element of functioning of any general medical-surgical hospital. This security programing is needed for many problems, of which one is the tremendous problem of employee pilferage.

What is the loss picture through pilferage in hospitals today? According to Norman Jaspan, a management consultant, hospital costs could be cut by 20 percent if pilferage was controlled.¹ Werner Mattersdorff, University of Pittsburgh, feels that losses to hospitals resulting from acts of dishonesty are greater than the financial loss due to a combination of fire damage, settlements for public

¹"Pilferage and Larceny in Hospitals," Hospital Progress, Vol. XLI (November, 1960), p. 28.

liability, and malpractice.² Literature on this subject reveals a wide variety of dollar amounts. The truth is that it is impossible to calculate the loss for any single hospital, much less on a national scale, but estimates of knowledgeable administrators indicates that typically it is a substantial item in the cost of hospital administration.

The majority of today's hospitals are operating under conditions that are conducive to pilferage and theft of supplies, equipment, food, drugs, narcotics, and other expendable goods intended for the patient. The greatest problem is the failure of trustees and administrators to recognize and admit the existence of losses. It is easy for them to rationalize that it is a "moral decay of the human race and that we are no worse off than other institutions." Also, administrators are embarrassed to admit pilferage problems because of implied administrative failure. However, it is often this refusal to admit the problem that gives the dishonest employee a basis of rationalizing "that the administration expects us to take a certain amount."

Often hospital administrators use certain benchmarks, or indicators, to determine if they are suffering losses. However, these indicators may not always be measuring what they purport to measure. One Midwest hospital relied on the

²Werner R. Mattersdorff, "Theft and Dishonesty in Public Hospitals," Canadian Insurance (February, 1961), pp. 6, 7.

Purchasing Department to report any sharp increase in buying of expendable items that might indicate employee pilferage. No reports were received, but a theft ring specializing in sheets was discovered and three persons were prosecuted for pilfering over 12,000 sheets and pillow cases. Further investigation revealed that the Purchasing Department had not failed in reporting because this pilferage was fairly constant and no sharp increase in buying had in fact occurred.

The vast majority of men and women enter a business to make a living, not to see how much they can steal. However, these employees easily slip into the routine of pilferage if everyone else is doing it and there are no barriers. Many hospital employees used to receive part of their pay in food, laundry services, and lodging. Although the trend has been away from this type of remuneration, such a tradition is difficult to discontinue and some still consider the taking of hospital items for personal use simply a fringe benefit.³

The dilemma facing the administrator who is cognizant of the pilferage problem is: What can he do that is economical, practical, and unobtrusive to the employee, doctor, patient, and visitor? The polygraph examiners say, "Use the polygraph"; the courts say, "Prosecute known offenders";

³Ibid., p. 6.

law enforcement officers say, "Use a uniformed guard force." It appears that a combination of these and other components are needed to curb the pilferage problem.

A common underlying factor found in all these approaches is prevention through creating psychological deterrents against the act of pilferage. It is the purpose of this study to discuss the general concept of psychological deterrents against pilferage in the hospital setting, and to then determine which of several selected deterrents are regarded as most effective by the hospital employee himself. It is anticipated that effectiveness of specific deterrents will vary among different groups of employees, such as female vs. male, young vs. old, low income vs. high income, higher education vs. lower education, and Negro vs. white.

Importance of the Study

Literature on controlling pilferage contains many statements about how authorities feel that certain practices act as great deterrents. It is generally assumed that claims such as these are valid, but one has a difficult time finding any supporting data from the people who are supposed to be deterred. The data collected and analyzed in this study should provide the administrator or security programmer with some guide lines for establishing and using certain deterrents most effective for a specific group. Hospitals are becoming so large that, while hospital-wide deterrents are

used, it is also necessary to program for specific work groups. It is hoped that this study will set forth guide lines for making such decisions and, at the same time, provide a basis for further research in this area.

Limitations of the Study

It is recognized that there is a definite interplay of physical safeguards and psychological deterrents in all phases of security programing regardless of the malefactor. However, the physical safeguards are not considered in this study from the standpoint of reducing opportunity, but only from the standpoint of the manner in which the malefactor is psychologically deterred. A further limitation of the study is that consideration is given only to the pilferage of property by the employee in the hospital setting, but it is hoped that possible projections to other settings will be apparent. It is also recognized that economics and employer-employee relations play a significant part in security programing against employee pilferage, but these ramifications have also been excluded from this study.

The field data collected for the study was limited to the employees of Chicago Wesley Memorial Hospital primarily because of accessibility of data and the fact that they provided an adequate cross section of personnel. Originally the study format called for a survey of several hospitals and their personnel, but when planning of the

study became more definitive, it was decided that the project as originally conceived would be too large and unwieldy. A chapter on trends in hospital security was also originally included in this project but, as the study progressed, it became apparent that this subject matter would not have a significant bearing on how different groups of people react to psychological deterrents.

Definition of Terms

For the purposes of this study, the following definitions will be utilized:

Employee - All persons performing service in the hospital for which the hospital pays a wage.

Malefactor - Any person committing an illegal act.

Medical Staff - Persons licensed to practice medicine and approved by the governing board to practice and care for patients within a specific institution.

Pilferage - The taking of supplies in small quantities with the intent of the individual(s) to utilize the items himself or for the utilization by friends. The term as used in the context of this study excludes major thefts of supplies and equipment where the intent of the individual(s) is usually for resale. The term

also excludes theft of major items of equipment, such as typewriters, tools, furniture, and like items, even though they may be for the individual's own use.

Psychological Deterrent - An individual's interpretation of a situation in which the potentially punitive or negative aspects of a form of behavior serve to prevent or preclude the expression of this behavior.

Organization of the Remainder of the Thesis

A review of the literature on pilferage control is the subject for Chapter II. This review is intended to show the reader that much of the literature does allude to the psychological side of pilferage prevention, but it does not deal with it directly.

Chapter III is a follow-up of the previous chapter and could also be termed a review of the literature. This chapter discusses general concepts of motivation and pilferage in relation to the direction of human behavior in the establishment of psychological deterrents to pilferage. The purpose of this chapter is to bring a very intricate and complicated process somewhere near the experience of the ordinary person.

In Chapter IV a brief description of the hospital setting is presented. This data will give the reader insight into the background and problems of administering programs of any kind in hospitals, especially a program of rigid security controls often found in industry. However, it is hoped that even though the study is in this unique setting, this background will furnish the reader with information to determine if the findings of the study can be readily extrapolated and applied to industrial and commercial settings.

A description of psychological deterrents as applied by Chicago Wesley Memorial Hospital are treated in Chapter V. The discussion will give the reader some practical applications of the concepts discussed in Chapter IV. It is also felt that the application of the deterrents in this hospital will affect the survey responses.

The field survey is the subject of Chapter VI. In this chapter the methodology, sources of data, the questionnaire and the organization of the data are described and discussed.

Chapter VII will present an analysis of the research results and Chapter VIII will state the conclusions of the study.

CHAPTER II

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In reviewing the literature on pilferage, one finds himself engulfed in a voluminous array of information. A large segment of the writing on this subject is concerned with arriving at how much is being taken, by what people, for what reasons, and how it is being taken. Another large segment concerns itself with what can physically be done to curb the problem. In this area much can be found on the concepts of better screening of new employees: "check the lunch bucket," use of electronic devices, inventory control, lock and key systems, marking of property, and security patrols, just to name a few. While these items are essential in understanding the pilferage problem, there is little data available that can be attributed to having a direct bearing on the problem of how different groups of people react to different psychological deterrents to pilferage. It was this apparent lack of psychologically oriented material in most of the literature that stimulated the writer to make this study.

This chapter is not intended to summarize an exhaustive search of all the literature on pilferage, but

rather is a review of some of the more significant writing on the subject. The review begins with some typical examples of "standard" treatments that the writer feels have little or no significant bearing on the specific focus of this study of psychological deterrents to pilferage. This review then progresses to the literature that will be more significant in arriving at a better understanding of the problem.

John R. Davis⁴ and B. W. Gocke⁵ have provided valuable discussions of practical aspects of theft prevention. By and large, their work can be considered as being devoted to physical and administrative barriers to theft; they do not deal directly with the psychological barriers. It should be pointed out, however, that the psychological deterrent concept apparently is the basis for many of the practices that are recommended in their writings.

Melville Dalton has studied rule breaking by employees of industrial concerns, department stores, and similar establishments. He reports that employees frequently appropriate services and materials belonging to the organization for their own use. He entitles this concept as "Unofficial Rewards." These sanctions, in criminal law, would

⁴John R. Davis, Industrial Plant Protection (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, Inc., 1957).

⁵B. W. Gocke, Practical Plant Protection and Policing (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, Inc., 1957).

be regarded as theft, but organizations generally turn their backs to these "rewards," and rarely are they brought to public attention. His work points out how relative the term "theft" can be and depends largely on the viewpoint the organization as a whole takes concerning this diversion of resources.⁶

Edwin Sutherland defines white collar crime as a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation. His work deals with the causes of crime and seeks to prove that the conventional explanation of crime is invalid. The term conventional in his context means that criminal behavior is basically explained by poverty and its related pathologies. While our study here is not concerned with crime causation, it is significant to note that Sutherland points out that the upper socio-economic class engages in criminal behavior. Thus, in this study concerning pilferage, we are concerned with all persons in the hospital setting, and not just the lower socio-economic class.⁷

Norman Jaspán is one of the country's foremost management consultants. His book, The Thief in The White Collar, has been widely read and is considered a very

⁶Melville Dalton, Men Who Manage: Fusions of Feeling and Theory in Administration (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959), pp. 199-205.

⁷Edwin Sutherland, White Collar Crime (New York: The Dryden Press, 1949).

important work in understanding the theft problem in industry. He points out that the white collar thief yearly accounts for twice the amount of theft as the professional criminal. His contention is that we are becoming a nation of thieves and embezzlers. Jaspan produces many case histories in an attempt to find out who is the thief in the white collar, what he looks like, his motives, and how he operates. His conclusion, relevant to this study, is that losses can occur anywhere, by anyone, for a wide variety of reasons.⁸

Donald R. Cressey discusses the criminal violation of financial trust. The objective in his study is to account for the differential in behavior indicated by the fact that some persons in the position of financial trust violate that trust and others in similar situations do not. The conclusions he reaches apparently do not have a direct bearing on the pilferage problem explored in this study. However, he does point out that in his study, each violation centered around the individual who had the opportunity, had a "non-sharable" financial problem which could be resolved by theft, and could rationalize his behavior.

These three factors were present in all of the several hundred cases used in Cressey's study. The important thing from the standpoint of this study is that

⁸Norman Jaspan, The Thief in The White Collar (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1960).

rationalization was apparent in every case, and this rationalization denotes decision making. In other words, each violator made a decision before acting.⁹

The area of employee morale and pilferage has overtones of psychological implications, and is discussed by several writers. Russell White concludes that low employee morale leads to and actually encourages the employee to steal.¹⁰ A. L. Des Rosiers states that most employees rationalize their actions before stealing. If morale is low, it is not difficult for the employee to say, "They don't care"; "They won't miss it"; or "I have this coming to me." Poor morale has led, in many instances, to mass pilferage where it became the rule to participate in pilferage. Low morale and pilferage leads to reduced morale and higher pilferage.¹¹

Ray Taylor says that there is a little bit of larceny in all of us. The reasons employee dishonesty is not more widespread are probably (1) the fear of disclosure, (2) a strong will to resist temptation, and (3) the lack of

⁹Donald R. Cressey, Other People's Money (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953).

¹⁰Speech by Russell E. White at Top Management Business Security Seminar, April 18, 1963.

¹¹A. L. Des Rosiers, "Security Systems in Hospitals" (unpublished Master's thesis, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., 1964), p. 28.

favorable opportunities.¹² This general approach is supported by a recent study where 25,000 persons were examined on the polygraph. It was found that most of the people were basically not honest, but refrained from dishonest acts because they fear consequences if they are caught.¹³ This conclusion is also supported by Clarence Darrow, famed criminal lawyer, who has said:

Some boilers are safe at 20 pounds pressure to the square inch but will break at 40. The boiler is neither honest or dishonest; it stands a certain pressure and no more. Man cannot be classified as honest or dishonest. He goes along with the game of life and can stand a certain pressure for the sake of his ideals but at a certain point he can stand no more.¹⁴

S. J. Curtis in a recent article states that "low anticipation of being caught and punished leads the frustrated, aggressive person to steal. . . . Thus the employee must have a real fear that he will be caught and punished."¹⁵

Norman Jaspan in one of his recent articles referred to psychological deterrents when he stated,

A clear understanding that periodic and unannounced checks on employee behavior and regular reviews of

¹²Roy C. Taylor, "Preventive Medicine for Employee Dishonesty," Management Review (November, 1960), p. 23.

¹³Continental Casualty Company, Crime Loss Prevention (Chicago: Continental Casualty Company), p. 23.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 23.

¹⁵S. J. Curtis, "Dishonesty, The Sinister Cancer," Industrial Security (April, 1963), p. 42.

all critical aspects of the operation are a normal part of management control will serve as a deterrent to dishonest employees.

In the same article he states that fidelity bonds are not only good protection, but they have a very real psychological benefit. Experience has shown that employees who are bonded, and who know they are bonded, are far less likely to steal than those who are not bonded.¹⁶

In recent years an increasing number of business firms have adopted the polygraph, commonly known as the "Lie Detector," as an aid in stamping out employee dishonesty. Continental Casualty Company advocates the use of the polygraph and feels that tests should be applied impartially to a cross section of the organization. In time all employees are tested and the psychological effect is a potent factor in loss prevention.¹⁷

According to Lincoln M. Zonn, "The lie detector is perhaps the greatest pilferage deterrent force we have come up with in many decades."¹⁸

The significance in using the polygraph to reduce pilferage by psychological means is supported by S. J. Curtis. He advances the theory that the best method of

¹⁶ Norman Jaspan, "The Burglar is a Piker," The Journal of Insurance Information (July-August, 1964), p. 33.

¹⁷ Continental Casualty Company, op. cit., p. 23.

¹⁸ Speech by Lincoln M. Zonn at Top Management Business Security Seminar, April 16, 1963.

controlling the internal pilferer is the installation of a routine periodic lie detection screening examination. The person who is not psychologically a criminal, who just takes items because they are handy, is not going to take things if he knows that he will be questioned periodically.¹⁹

An interesting study concerning attitudes of the public on stealing was conducted at the University of Indiana. The findings of this study are quite significant in understanding the individual's rationalization that takes place in pilferage from organizations. In one phase of the study respondents were asked about their approval of stealing in relation to three types of organizations. Figure 1 summarizes their replies and reveals that respondents generally disapprove of stealing regardless of the size of organization. Despite the general disapproval, important differences were found in the degree of disapproval. There is greater disapproval of stealing from the small business than from the large business. In further differentiation, the lower the socio-economic status, the greater is the approval of stealing, regardless of the organizational size. This same consistency was found in analyzing the educational level. Respondents with less than thirteen years of education were more approving of stealing than those with more education.

¹⁹S. J. Curtis, Modern Retail Security (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, Inc., 1960), p. 515.

<u>ATTITUDE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>		
	<u>Government</u>	<u>Large Business</u>	<u>Small Business</u>
Strongly Approve to Approve	0%	1%	0%
Approve to Indifferent	6%	3%	2%
Indifferent to Disapprove	63%	61%	48%
Disapprove to Strongly Disapprove	31%	34%	50%
Total	100%	100%	100%

FIGURE 1

ATTITUDES TOWARDS STEALING FROM THREE DIFFERENT TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS

In further analyzing the responses, it was also found that females were more inclined to approve of stealing than males. Although the females were more approving of stealing than males, they felt more strongly about not stealing from the small organization than did the males.

Since most of the respondents were disapproving of theft, the remaining phases of the study were conducted on a forced-choice basis. In other words, each respondent was asked to choose the type of organization from which he would rather steal if in need and he had to steal. Large businesses were selected by about 60%; government by about 33%; and small business by about 7%. Two basic lines of

reasoning were used to explain their preference. These involved consideration of the principle of least evil and/or the possibility of being caught and punished for the theft. Least evil in this context refers to the fact that the respondent feels it is wrong to steal, but, at the same time, he can rationalize that it is less wrong under certain circumstances.

The persons choosing to steal from the small business had rather a direct reason. Selection was made mainly on the principle of least risk. Even if caught, these respondents felt that the small business man would be more lenient than managers of large business or government.

Persons preferring to steal from the government had many varied reasons as shown in Figure 2. While the principle of least risk was involved, the primary reason was that it was the least evil. Figure 3 reveals respondents reasons for not stealing from the government.

The respondents selecting large business also based their selection on the principle of lesser evil. They felt that stealing from big business was not as bad as stealing from the government (oneself) or from small business because large organizations are impersonal, powerful and ruthless. Some preferences were based on the principle that large business provided more opportunity for theft with less chance of discovery or punishment.²⁰

²⁰ Erwin O. Smigel, "Public Attitudes Toward Stealing As Related to The Size of The Victim Organization," American Sociological Review (June, 1956), pp. 320-327.

<u>Reasons For Stealing</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
Can afford it best	32.1
Taking back own money	15.1
Government should take care of needy	13.2
Against Democratic Administration	13.2
Bureaucratic inefficiencies	9.4
Everybody does it	9.4
Distributes the loss	7.6
Total	100.0

FIGURE 2

RATIONALIZATIONS ON STEALING FROM GOVERNMENT

<u>Reasons For Not Stealing</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
It's stealing from yourself	29.5
Good chance of being caught-- Stiff penalty	23.1
Needs its money	19.2
Losses affect citizens in the community	16.7
Patriotism	9.0
Lack of opportunity	2.5
Total	100.0

FIGURE 3

RATIONALIZATIONS ON STEALING FROM GOVERNMENT

<u>Reasons For Stealing</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
Can afford it--has tremendous capital	67.7
Allows for it by raising prices--is insured	12.8
They cheat you--ruthless	7.8
Less chance of being caught	3.9
Provides the greatest opportunity	2.9
No reasons offered	4.9
Total	100.0

FIGURE 4

PRIMARY REASONS FOR PREFERRING TO STEAL
FROM LARGE BUSINESS

The significance of Smigel's work for our study of psychological deterrents is that it asserts that people do make decisions in relation to pilferage. While there were many different reasons for not stealing, the risk of being caught and punished did serve as a stimulus for their decision in many of the situations.

This chapter has provided us with the fact that most writers in the field of pilferage allude to the psychological deterrent, but few have actually gone directly to the people for their views. Smigel did go to the people and it is his findings, specifically the apprehension aspect, that we will look at in further detail. The following chapter explores some of the general concepts of motivation and decision

making. In understanding the concept of deterrence, the reader must have a basic understanding of individual stimulus which produces behavior patterns.

CHAPTER III

GENERAL MOTIVATION CONCEPTS RELATED TO DETECTING THE ACT OF PILFERAGE

Hospital administrators are beginning to follow the trend of increased interest in discovering what makes people within the institutional setting willing or unwilling to work, and how human resources can be motivated and utilized for greater effectiveness. Whenever people act in any way, good or bad, it is because they are motivated to act. In our frame of reference in this study, we are considering aspects of motivating people to be honest.

Behavior is observed as a contemporary event--a dynamic relation between the organism and environment. There are many limited hypotheses and points of view concerning behavior motivation. Since there is no general integrating principle, a multifactor approach to motivation seems to be clearly indicated. Most people approve of the term or concept of "motivation," but there is little agreement concerning its nature. A general all-inclusive theory of motivation simply does not exist.²¹ It is agreed,

²¹Paul Young, Motivation and Emotion (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1961), p. 596.

however, that behavior is motivated by an interrelation of:

- (a) Needs
- (b) Sensory acuity, nerves and muscles
- (c) Conditions like fatigue, illness, anxiety
- (d) Past experiences

All of these factors influence the meaning and significance of the situation to the individual. Motives are never directly observable in the sense that emotions, learning, memory or even intelligence are observable; rather motives are inferred or hypothesized from behavior.²² In this study we are concerned primarily with one small area of motivation which is directing behavior from the standpoint of the fear of being caught and the subsequent possibility of being punished.

This does not imply that fear is the only reason people do not steal. Other motives such as one's conscience, ability, and goals also play an important part in determining this behavior.

Organisms continually experience needs or wants which impel them to action. When the individual is driven either to attain some goal or to avoid some undesirable consequence, we have evidence of motivation. Differences in motivation often account for the fact that various persons may react quite differently when confronted by the same set of

²²S. Stansfield Sargent and Robert C. Williamson, Social Psychology (2d. ed.; New York: The Ronald Press, 1958), p. 166.

circumstances, and a given person may behave differently when confronted by a particular set of circumstances on different occasions. It has been said that everything the individual experiences and everything that he does leaves him a little different from what he was before.²³

Man is predominately a social being and is forced to live in his social environment. Motives that involve other people, directly or indirectly, are called social motives. They are distinguishable from physiological drives because usually the form they take is determined by the particular culture through rules, regulations and taboos. Man's behavior has to fit into the pattern of activity that society dictates or risk rejection by society. The majority of people resist some of their own tendencies toward anti-social behavior, not because of moral qualms, but because of fear of real consequences. Inhibitions of anti-social tendencies are acquired in the course of our individual development and thus depend more or less on the moral code and convention of a given cultural age.

A common characteristic to be found in many of the goals for which human beings strive is the tendency to acquire objects. All behavior that has the goal of acquiring more objects can be attributed to an underlying need for acquisition. In a culture built on economic foundations,

²³Laurence Siegel, Industrial Psychology (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962), p. 279.

such as ours, it is natural that behavior motivated by this need would play a very important role in every day life. It is recognized that this need cannot always be satisfied without conflicting with those of others and culture thus places restrictions on this need to direct it into socially acceptable behavior. This need falls in the "growth motivation" concept advanced by Maslow that the more one gets the more one wants and thus the wanting of self-actualization is endless.²⁴

The choice to react in an acceptable way is an expression of the adjustment which our subjective instinct drive makes to the objective demands of reality. This need for acquisition may be repressed and held in a latent state. As the environment changes, and with the possibilities of gratification, the memories of past experiences most similar and pertinent to the external condition are sifted out. They are pushed into consciousness when opportunity is given.²⁵

It is clear that only an infinitesimal part of an individual's knowledge can be in consciousness at any given moment. The belief that man is a rational animal who makes his plans with foresight is appealing, and true to some

²⁴Young, op. cit., p. 590.

²⁵Walter C. Langer, Psychology and Human Living (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1943), p. 79.

degree, but it is an incomplete statement of man's nature. Actions are determined more by unconscious than conscious motivation. The unconscious is a storehouse of all the knowledge a person has accumulated in various ways through the process of living experience. This vast storehouse contains a fantastic number of past experiences in finding gratification for needs, together with the consequence of these past efforts and feelings they aroused. There is constant interplay between the conscious and unconscious mind. Social scientists believe that human behavior is the result of human decisions. But these decisions to act in one way and not in another are arrived at in an essentially non-rational manner.²⁶ Psychologists' analytical experience shows us that the conscious self-restraint of instincts plays but a very modest role as compared with the emotional factors of love and punishment. The threat of punishment has sobering effect on the individual's instinctual impulses. It has long been recognized that fear motivates human behavior. Parents have used fear to direct the conduct of their children. The state, the church, and other organizations have also, from time to time, used fear to produce a desired form of behavior.²⁷

²⁶ Ibid., p. 111.

²⁷ Temple Burling, Edith Lentz and Robert Wilson, The Give and Take in Hospitals (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), p. 85.

The unconscious mind, where we have our memory and our intuitive judgement, is the part influenced by suggestion and imagination. A suggestion that seems to strengthen ideas already present is usually productive of action. For example, the person considering pilferage knows it is wrong and the deterrents, or "invisible barriers," to theft that have been built up in the unconscious reinforce this conscious realization. Thus the motivation impulse below the level of the conscious mind has produced a "conditioned response."

Whyte, in The Organization Man, sums up the situation when he says, "Man today has changed." Where a few years ago he was "inner-directed," today he has become an "outer-directed" person. By this he means we are getting our motivation "orders" today from outside ourselves. Man's behavior patterns are set by those he looks to outside of himself for leadership. It is because man today is most susceptible to outside influences that he can be consciously or unconsciously influenced as never before. We can shape his attitudes and beliefs without his being aware of it. He is willing and waiting for us to motivate him because he wants to know what is expected of him.²⁸

S. J. Curtis refers to this control as "motivational psychology." Utilizing security educational programs, with

²⁸Curtis, op. cit., p. 85.

emotional appeal, we can prevent pilferage losses through constructive motivation of our outer-directed employee. In order to find the materials necessary for motivational psychology, there must be a feed-back from an audience. We cannot rely on our personal judgments to find the necessary appeals, as each of us is a human being surrounded by his individuality. Within this cell of our own subjective viewpoint, none of us can see the world as another person sees it. Deciding what motivates us will not solve the problem of motivating others.²⁹ It is thus the purpose of this study to ask employees about their feelings in regard to certain pilferage deterrents.

The preceeding chapter has reviewed the general aspects of decision making and motivation. The following chapter is presented to give the reader a closer look at the work environment of the people involved in this study.

²⁹Ibid., p. 641.

CHAPTER IV

THE HOSPITAL SETTING

What is a hospital? The answer most often heard is that a hospital is a place to care for the sick and injured. While this answer is correct, it is an overgeneralization. There are three types of institutions that comprise the hospital pattern in this country today--voluntary, governmental and proprietary. Of these, voluntary nonprofit hospitals, the subject of this study, fill the major needs of our population. The hospital must be viewed within the framework of a patient-care system with supporting elements, such as operating expenses, income, purchases, policies, interactions of the public, the patient, the employee, and the doctor. It is difficult to realize, as we pass one of our modern medical centers, that hospitals originally were little more than houses of refuge.

In its evolution the hospital has climbed a long and tortuous road. It has struggled along its hazardous path from England, Germany, Spain, Italy to America. The organization and staffing have drastically changed in hospitals during this evolution. While drug therapy and medical advances developed in the 17th and 18th centuries, the

hospital itself remained basically a very simple institution. Personnel were required to feed patients and to tend to basic wants, but there was comparatively little need for any specialization. In the following century the numerous advances of medical science and education resulted in a rapid transformation of the hospitals from mere custodial institutions to the scientific institutions they are today.

The primary function of the hospital, the one which has been constant throughout the whole of its evolution, is to care for the sick and injured. While other important functions have developed, they are all subordinate because they contribute indirectly to the care of the sick. These secondary functions are:

- (a) Education of physicians, nurses and other personnel
- (b) Public health--prevention of disease and promotion of health
- (c) Advancement of research in scientific medicine.³⁰

Hospital development in the 20th century has been characterized by mushroom-like growth. During no previous period was there such a proportionate increase. The population in the United States has more than doubled since 1873, but the number of hospitals has increased more than 44 times. Each year one of every eight persons in the United

³⁰Malcom T. MacEachern, Hospital Organization & Management (Chicago: Physicians Record Company, 1957), p. 29.

States enters a hospital for treatment.³¹ Hospital business is big business. It represents, in fact, the fifth largest industry in the country today. It is big business "plus," but this "plus" is what differentiates it from commercial enterprise. Conducted on a nonprofit basis with human lives as its product, its principals are professional people rendering services free or at a small proportion of the total cost. A voluntary hospital constitutes a public utility, but a public utility operated without financial gain.

Further justification for placing hospitals in the big business category lies in the volume of their purchases. When it is considered that these institutions buy everything from safety pins to freight elevators, from tongue depressors to air conditioners, it is not surprising to find their total annual purchases are in excess of \$4,000,000,000.³² Besides food, furniture, equipment, and the like, hospitals carry an inventory of more than 3,000 miscellaneous items. Usage of paper napkins, for example, totals more than 3,500,000,000 yearly and the usage of drinking glasses totals more than 25,000,000.³³

Although the hospital is big business, it has generally lagged behind business and industry in the development

³¹Raymond P. Sloan, This Hospital Business of Ours (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1952), p. 21.

³²Burling, op. cit., p. v.

³³Ibid., pp. 21-22.

of management policies and techniques pertaining to the non-medical functions of the hospital of which one is the security function. There have been cries of, "why can't this or that be done as in industry?" These people forget that the hospital is more like a small city rather than an industrial plant. Management decisions require consideration of many more and different ramifications than is the case in a typical industrial plant, and thus, by the very nature of its complexity, must often move more slowly and cautiously. It thus is the purpose of this chapter to give the reader an understanding of administrative realities and pitfalls encountered in the execution of management controls of all kinds, including the reduction of pilferage.

Semi-public building. A hospital's doors must remain open 24 hours a day. Service, or as in the industrial plant, "production," cannot be shut down at 5:00 P.M. and resumed again at 7:00 A.M. The building must remain a relatively open building to admit the sick and injured, permit the patient his visitors, and to carry on the normal business of the gift shops, the cashiers, the pharmacy, the doctors' offices, and the like. There is no practical way to determine who belongs or who doesn't belong with people entering through numerous entrances.

The hospital visitor and patient present unique features not found in any other social setting. The patient is paying the bill and his wants must be considered within

the organizational framework of the institution. This is not simple when one considers the person is not completely himself or he probably would not be in the hospital. He is not expected to make the same effort as a well person to maintain pleasant social relations. The same applies to the visitor in certain respects in that, when a member of the family or a close friend is ill, the visitor's actions and reactions to management practices may not always be completely rational. Thus tolerance and allowances for human behavior must be major considerations in the hospital administrative program.

Power structure. A very important difference between the hospital and industry is the power structure found in the hospital. In general, hospital organizational systems are organized along similar lines as portrayed in this simple diagram as shown in Figure 5. Within each organizational system certain statuses possess an institutionalized right to control the actions of other statuses in the system. This right may be of a formal character in that it has been legitimized in systemic organization, or it may be informal in that an individual has developed some degree of influence in the decision-making operations of the system. Although the administrator holds the institutionalized right to control the actions of others in the system, he is not a "free agent" in the decision making process since, in the final analysis, he is subordinate to the board




FIGURE 5

A TYPICAL HOSPITAL ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM

of trustees. Thus, the final rights of power are vested in the hands of an authoritative board not involved in day-to-day direction, rather than in the status-role which exercises this power in day-to-day interactions within the hospital.³⁴ The hospital administrator, in addition to assuming responsibility for management of a substantial business, must serve as an educator and interpreter to these trustees who, although governing the institution, are not too familiar with its operation. In this respect his obligations are wholly different from those of the business executive whose controlling group is presumably acquainted with the organization it is governing.

Although the medical staff are not employees of the hospital, and are not normally included in the formal organization chart, they possess legitimate authority in their contacts with system members. Thus, although the physician is in many respects outside the daily interaction of the system, his status-role gives him considerable power to control the actions of other status-roles in patient-care and treatment functions. This group is a very close and influential group as illustrated by this excerpt from a recent study.

The staff of the hospital was a stable and highly organized community. Within this community over the

³⁴John N. Edwards, Richard A. Kurtz and Donald E. Saathoff, Hospital Social Systems and Differential Perceptions (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, Inc., 1962), p. 31.

years, an informal system of sanctions and rationalizations had evolved. They enabled the staff to exert control over the administration and to keep discipline effective to stalemate a vigorous program of reform introduced by the administration. The system was also so pervasive that even the sizable group within the staff who wished to participate in hospital reform were confused or neutralized.³⁵

Here again the administrator must serve as an educator and interpreter in achieving a sound administrative program beneficial to all.

Hospital work groups. Hospitals are people. All kinds of people with all kinds of attitudes and dispositions make up the hospital family. The members of the family fall into a great variety of occupational and professional groups, all concerned, in one way or another, with providing good patient care. So great, in fact, is the variety of work to be done in the hospital that few other institutions have so complex an organization as the hospital requires for the application of its varied talents. The fusion of these diverse talents into the timely exactness of action, with human lives at stake, requires administrative concepts found only in the hospital setting.

The percentage of employees for any given position or work group varies among hospitals depending on size and type. In this frame of reference, type refers to emphasis on teaching, research, rehabilitation, free clinic care or

³⁵ Esther Brown, Ph.D., Newer Dimensions of Patient Care (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1962), p. 51.

medical specialty. For the purposes of this paper, a general medical-surgical hospital representing a general balance of the basic hospital functions has approximately this percentage of specialized groups:

- 8% Auxiliary Nursing Personnel (including orderlies, nurse aides, and station clerks)
- 15% Registered Nurses
- 10% Food Service
- 20% Laundry, Housekeeping, Maintenance
- 15% Professional Technicians (X-Ray, Pathology, ECG, Physical Therapy)
- 20% General Services (Elevator operators, security, admitting, storeroom, delivery, medical records, telephone operators)
- 7% Business Office (Accounting, cashiers, insurance clerks)
- 5% Administration (Administrator, Assistant Administrators, Department Heads and Assistant Department Heads).³⁶

In analyzing these groupings, it is apparent that close to fifty percent of the personnel can be classed as professional. This in itself creates an administrative control handicap in that a professional, highly specialized hospital

³⁶ Statement by Marlin Barklage at a Chicago Hospital Personnel Managers Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, November, 1964.

group is inherently more autonomous than the nonprofessional group. This is also true in industry with research and specialized engineering groups, but these groups generally represent a smaller percentage of the total employees than in a hospital.

Education. The educational level of persons filling hospital positions range from practically no academic education to a Master's Degree. The "low education" category is composed of a high proportion of food service personnel, laundry, housekeeping, nurses aides, elevator operators and delivery personnel. The "middle education" category, high school graduates, is composed of high proportion of business office, maintenance, station clerks, and medical records personnel. The "higher education" category, above high school, consists of nurses, professional technicians and administrators. While each hospital department has individuals in each educational category, the department generally has a large proportion of its members in only one of these educational categories.

Summary. As in any other organization, the hospital has material, facilities and people. In this respect, there is little difference between the hospital and the industrial concern. The differences become apparent upon examination of the management concepts and end products involved. Hospitals are living and growing social structures designed

to provide the best patient care possible. The individuals in the organizations are not any undifferentiated human mass. On the contrary, they are separated into well-defined groups in accordance with the formal organization. We will look at these groups in greater detail in order to measure the values they place on different components of the security program.

CHAPTER V

UTILIZATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

AT CHICAGO WESLEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

A formalized security program was instituted at Chicago Wesley Memorial Hospital in August of 1964. The primary emphasis of the new program was, and is, on prevention rather than on enforcement. The program can be broken down into two major steps: (a) eliminate or reduce the opportunity for current or potential negative behavior, and (b) build psychological walls or deterrents against negative behavior. The latter has received primary attention to date; however, plans and procedures are being formulated to reduce opportunity by improving physical safeguards, such as controlling ingress and egress of persons, lock and key control, physical arrangements, package and equipment passes, and security identification badges.

For the purpose of this study, we will, for the most part, ignore the physical factors of protection and illustrate in more detail the psychological picture as it pertains to the employee. It must, however, be understood that a complete separation of physical and psychological elements is not possible. All elements of a security program

complement and support each other; also, many of the elements of the security program fall in both the "physical" and "psychological" categories. For example, the mere presence of a uniformed security force is "physical," but at the same time a very important aspect is to register in the minds of malefactors that the hospital is protected.

Conditions of employment. When a person first inquires about employment in the hospital, he is required to complete an application for employment form and attached thereto is a form called "Conditions of Employment." (Appendix A.) This is the beginning of his awareness of security and some of the elements of the protection program that he will be required to conform with. Among these is the condition that the employee will submit to a polygraph examination at the discretion of the hospital administration. Also there is a condition of being fingerprinted and photographed by the Security Department. Experience in the first six months has shown that approximately ten percent of all applicants completing the form fail to follow-up on their desire for employment by leaving then or failing to appear for the department interview. This ten percent compares to approximately a two percent figure prior to utilization of this attachment.

If the aspirant is accepted by the department involved, he is then sent to the Security Department where a

uniformed security officer fingerprints and photographs the employee. The employee then signs his name on the fingerprint form beneath large letters, "FOR POLICE RECORD CHECK." At this point approximately three percent of the aspirants apparently change their minds about employment as they either fail to report for the next step of the employment procedure or report back to the Personnel Department stating they have changed their minds. There is no criteria to compare this percentage with and only inferences can be made as to why some of the persons changed their minds.

New employee orientation. Twice a month a new-employee orientation is held. All new employees starting within the two-week time period are required to attend this orientation. Attendance is mandatory and the employee's first paycheck is given out at this time. The orientation consists of many facets of which one pertains to security concepts. Here a uniformed security officer explains what security means in the hospital and relates to the employee his responsibility and the benefits of this program. The hospital's prosecution policy, which is one of vigorous prosecution, and the use of polygraph examinations are stressed and discussed in a rather straightforward manner.

So far the employee has had a fairly strong dose of the protection image. However, it does not stop here, and the following items are also elements of planting the

protection idea into the conscious and sub-conscious mind of employees.

Signs. All employee locker rooms have a large red sign posted which reads, "\$100 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of persons responsible for theft or malicious destruction of property. Call Security--X555." The hospital has not paid any money as yet, but just about every employee can tell you what the sign says. The individual employee may know something and not bring it to anyone's attention, but if he is involved, or about to become involved in a situation, he does not know what his neighbor might do. This uncertainty factor creates a certain amount of inhibition toward anti-social behavior.

Investigations. Previous to the security program, any loss of property was reported to an Administrative Assistant on a cumbersome Unusual Incident Report form. There was practically no follow-up and the malefactor responsible for the loss in all probability did not know the loss was detected, much less reported. The procedure now is for the person discovering the loss to notify the Security Department who immediately send a uniformed officer to make an investigation. In the course of investigations, the officer contacts all known persons who had access or knowledge of the situation. Even if the case is not brought to an immediate successful conclusion, the malefactor, in

many cases, is contacted or at least visually sees a form of action resulting from the loss.

Telephone stickers. All general-usage telephones in the hospital have been labeled with a red sticker which reads, "Security X555." This sticker has a twofold purpose: (a) readily visible telephone number to call in an emergency, (b) every time a person uses the phone, he reads the word "Security" and again he is consciously or sub-consciously reminded of the protection concept.

Patrolling officers. Employees are reminded again of security when they see the security officer routinely checking in their work areas. No part of the complex is too remote or unimportant to receive the unannounced inspection by a member of the security staff.

Closed-circuit television. A system of monitoring a tunnel area by closed-circuit television is also a part of this security program. While this system would be primarily classed as physical protection, its psychological implications cannot be overlooked. Although a complement of "dummy" cameras is not part of the system, the employee's imagination, in not understanding the system, can be quite vivid. Often, employees passing by the security control center, who can see the monitor but not the picture, will ask, "What area of the hospital is being watched today?"

As stated previously, the protection theme and resulting psychological deterrence is not any one of the above factors, but each factor fits into place to build and sustain this concept. At this point the hospital administration is convinced, in analyzing past and present usage statistics, that the program is effective and further benefits in the reduction of pilferage should be apparent as physical safeguards are implemented.³⁷

From the total program, the three most known and observable deterrents of fingerprints, polygraph (lie detector) and security force were selected to be used in polling the employees in this study. Only three deterrents were selected since it was felt that more than three would complicate the study resulting in less direct inferences and conclusions.

³⁷Kenath Hartman, "Security Program Progress Report." (report given to the Board of Trustees, Chicago Wesley Memorial Hospital, Chicago, Illinois, March, 1965), pp. 1-3.

CHAPTER VI

THE FIELD STUDY

Whenever a hospital undertakes the regulation of pilfering by establishing psychological deterrents, the question inevitably comes up, "What will do the most good?" Since the hospital is made up of persons with varied backgrounds, ages, and socio-economic status, the idea is sometimes advanced that different deterrents have different values for certain groups. This study is an attempt to ask the individual employee which of three major deterrents utilized at Chicago Wesley Memorial Hospital have the most impact or influence in "keeping him honest."

Employee grouping. The selection of individual background groupings was on the basis of the need for categories to use in classifying responses. By selecting age, race, sex, and economic status, the results could be broken down to work groups and deterrents according to the predominance of the characteristic backgrounds within the organization. The groupings originally took into consideration professional vs. non-professional, but this grouping was very difficult to define and it was felt that by salary range and education the reader could make this analogy according to his own definition of "professional."

The questionnaire. The grouping for sex, age, and education are self-explanatory on the questionnaire. (See Appendix B.) However, the data within the "Do Not Write" space needs further explanation. For the deterrents to the left, the total number of points were entered by the investigator according to the respondent's average for all four situations. The "S" and "R" to the right represent salary and race. Race was recorded as Negro or white. Salary was broken into under \$4,000 annually, \$4,000 to \$6,000 annually and over \$6,000 annually, based on the starting wage for the particular job position occupied by the individual.

The questionnaire, as originally developed, required the respondent to record his name. This permitted verification of the respondent's information regarding the grouping data of age and education and did not require asking information relative to salary and race which might be objectionable to the respondent. This salary and race data could have easily been obtained from the application blank on file with the respondent's personnel records. However, after a reappraisal of the questionnaire, with the name, it was decided that the name might affect the respondent's desire to be polled. Also, the name might affect the institution's employee relations and possibly affect the responses to the situations. Thus, the name was taken off the questionnaire and the respondent's job or position was substituted. By utilizing a salary schedule, the economic grouping data

could still be obtained. As for race information, this was merely recorded as the respondent finished the questionnaire and it was turned over to the investigator. The grouping for the length of employment was included to determine if there was any over-all significant differences of responses between "long-term" and "short-term" employees. As stated previously, the employee with less than a year was exposed to more security indoctrination than the employee with a year or more of service. The employee with over a year of service was cognizant of the conditions of employment, fingerprinting and photographing and new employee orientation, but was not directly exposed to them.

The questionnaire contains four situations each with three deterrents. Each deterrent was to be ranked according to which had the strongest influence on the respondent, the next strongest and then the one with the least amount of influence. For each situation the deterrents were grouped in a different way so that the response would necessitate reading the deterrent in a different sequence pattern. Four situations were given so that an over-all average, or norm, could be computed for each individual deterrent.

The first three situations involve common pilferage items of approximately the same monetary value, but the fourth situation involves a camera, the loss of which could not be considered as pilferage. While no monetary value of the camera was given, it would obviously be much higher than

any of the other items. The purpose for including this item was to ascertain in a situation-by-situation comparison if there was a significant difference in responses.

The respondent's first choice was assigned the numerical value of three, the next choice a numerical value of two, and the last choice a numerical value of one. Each deterrent then received the total numerical value of the four situations. This value indicates the respondent's over-all ranking of each of the three deterrents.

Employee sample. Employees were queried in groups of approximately eight to twelve persons by the writer. The sample was random rather than selecting the employees to be polled. The employees were told to disregard need, opportunity, their sense of right and wrong, and to concentrate on the fact that they are considering the taking of the items and to consider only the deterrents listed. An explanation of each of the three deterrents was presented to the groups so that they understood the concept within the context of this study. The explanation and the general approach is covered in Appendix C.

This approach varied somewhat with the type of group since the terminology had to coincide with the group's understanding. Groups with extremely low educational background required the repetition of many points and in some cases individual help was required.

A total of 340 persons were queried; however, some persons were unable to understand the concepts and did not attempt to complete a questionnaire. A total of 286 questionnaires were returned; however 35 were discarded due to incompleteness. Thus 251 questionnaires were utilized in this study. The incomplete category also included those responses where two deterrents received the same numerical value and were thus classed as equal by the respondent.

Compilation of data. After each questionnaire was analyzed for completeness, the individual's over-all choice of deterrents was computed. This information and the grouping data was then coded and entered on electronic data processing cards according to a prepared job layout procedure. (See Appendix D.) Appendix E shows the data cards utilized for the study.

After the initial key punch operation, the cards were then processed through the verifier so any card punching errors could be rectified. The electro-mechanical sorter was utilized for rapid correlation of groupings and responses. The data was then reduced to percentages for presentation in Chapter VII.

This study reveals only a few of the correlations that are possible from the data compiled. Appendix F has been added to allow other researchers to carry analysis of these data further. This appendix reveals the data collected in a tabular form.

CHAPTER VII

STUDY ANALYSIS AND CORRELATIONS

The data compiled in this study, and the resulting correlations, can be readily portrayed by simple bar graphs. This form of presentation was selected to reveal the study findings with as little narration as possible.

The mean of all the respondents in their selection of the most influential deterrent is shown in Figure 6. This figure reveals that the presence of a uniformed security force was held to be of most value in deterring employee pilferage by 56% of the respondents. The lie detector and fingerprint deterrents were ranked as the first choice by 26% and 18% of the respondents respectively.

As shown in Figure 7, comparing Negro respondents to white respondents, there is wide divergence placed on the value of the security force and that of fingerprinting. Fingerprinting was selected as being the most influential by 44% of the Negro respondents, while this deterrent received only 7% of the white respondent's selection. In contrast, the white group selected the security force as being the most influential by a 66% majority. Only 31% of the Negro group selected the security force. The value




FIGURE 6

RESPONDENTS OVER-ALL RANKING OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS




FIGURE 7

NEGRO AND WHITE RESPONDENTS CHOICE OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

placed on the lie detector was nearly the same for each group.

A comparison of all female respondents to all male respondents is shown in Figure 8. This comparison reveals that the female employee feels that the security force is of significantly greater value than fingerprints with the lie detector falling in between. The male rates each of the three deterrents more equally with the lie detector being the least significant to this group.

Figure 9 compares all respondents under thirty years of age to all respondents over the age of thirty years. The security force was about of equal value for each group accounting for over 50% of each group's choice. The older employee felt that the fingerprints were much more important than the lie detector, while the younger group reversed these two deterrents, feeling that the fingerprints were of the least value.

A multiple group comparison of less than high school education, high school education and college education is shown in Figure 10. This comparison shows quite radical differences of consensus concerning the different deterrents. This analysis shows quite clearly that the least educated ranked fingerprints very high, while the highest educated group ranked fingerprints extremely low. Conversely, as education increased, so did the importance of the security




FIGURE 8

MALE AND FEMALE RESPONDENTS CHOICE OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS




FIGURE 9

AGE GROUPS--CHOICE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS




FIGURE 10

EDUCATION BACKGROUND CHOICE OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

force, rising from 20% to 55% to 67% for less than high school, high school, and college, respectively.

Figure 11 represents the three salary categories of the respondents. These categories parallel closely the three educational categories and it should be noted that the responses also parallel fairly closely. However, the salary group comparison does reveal the largest divergence in the over \$6,000 annual salary category, going from 83% ranking the security force as the first choice compared to only 5% selecting the fingerprint deterrent. The less than \$4,000 annual salary rated all the deterrents rather closely with fingerprints, security force, and lie detector being selected in that order.

A comparison of the Negro male with less than high school education to the white male with less than high school education is shown in Figure 12. The Negro respondents selected fingerprinting as the most influential deterrent by a 67% majority, while only 17% of the white respondents selected this deterrent. The security force was selected by 53% of the white group, compared to 20% of the Negro group. Also the lie detector was of more significance to the white group by a 30% to 13% comparison. This comparison parallels the comparison of all Negro and all white persons shown in Figure 7.

Figure 13 compares the Negro male and white male with a high school education. The white group selected the




FIGURE 11

SALARY CATEGORIES CHOICE OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS




FIGURE 12

WHITE AND NEGRO MALES WITH LESS THAN
HIGH SCHOOL CHOICE OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS




FIGURE 13

NEGRO AND WHITE MALES - HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION

CHOICE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS




FIGURE 8

MALE AND FEMALE RESPONDENTS CHOICE OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS




FIGURE 9

AGE GROUPS--CHOICE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS




FIGURE 10

EDUCATION BACKGROUND CHOICE OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

force, rising from 20% to 55% to 67% for less than high school, high school, and college, respectively.

Figure 11 represents the three salary categories of the respondents. These categories parallel closely the three educational categories and it should be noted that the responses also parallel fairly closely. However, the salary group comparison does reveal the largest divergence in the over \$6,000 annual salary category, going from 83% ranking the security force as the first choice compared to only 5% selecting the fingerprint deterrent. The less than \$4,000 annual salary rated all the deterrents rather closely with fingerprints, security force, and lie detector being selected in that order.

A comparison of the Negro male with less than high school education to the white male with less than high school education is shown in Figure 12. The Negro respondents selected fingerprinting as the most influential deterrent by a 67% majority, while only 17% of the white respondents selected this deterrent. The security force was selected by 53% of the white group, compared to 20% of the Negro group. Also the lie detector was of more significance to the white group by a 30% to 13% comparison. This comparison parallels the comparison of all Negro and all white persons shown in Figure 7.

Figure 13 compares the Negro male and white male with a high school education. The white group selected the




FIGURE 11

SALARY CATEGORIES CHOICE OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS




FIGURE 11

SALARY CATEGORIES CHOICE OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS




FIGURE 12

WHITE AND NEGRO MALES WITH LESS THAN
HIGH SCHOOL CHOICE OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS




FIGURE 13

NEGRO AND WHITE MALES - HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION

CHOICE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

security force, lie detector, and fingerprints by 62%, 30%, and 8% respectively. These percentages are contrasted by the Negro group who selected the security force, lie detector, and fingerprints by 36%, 28%, and 36%, respectively. This close ranking by the Negro group is a contrast to the divergence shown by the white group.

The same close ranking by the Negro group in Figure 13 is also apparent in Figure 14 which represents Negro and white females with a high school education. The Negro group selected the lie detector as their first choice by a 40% majority, while the security force and fingerprints received 32% and 28% respectively. The white group was much more divergent in their selections. The ranking and percentage of the white group were almost identical to the white group shown in Figure 13.

Figure 15 compares the Negro and white male respondents with one year of service and those with less than one year of service. It is interesting to note that none of the Negro males with more than one year service selected the lie detector, while the white group with more than one year service selected the lie detector by 25%. Again the white group, as a whole, selected the security force, while the Negro group, as a whole, selected fingerprints as the most influential deterrent.




FIGURE 14

NEGRO AND WHITE FEMALES - HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION
CHOICE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS




FIGURE 15

NEGRO AND WHITE MALES WITH MORE THAN OR LESS THAN ONE YEAR SERVICE
CHOICE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

Figure 16 shows each situation and how many respondents selected each deterrent as their first choice. It should be noted that for each situation the security force was favored by approximately two to one as compared to the next choice.

	SECURITY FORCE	FINGER- PRINTS	LIE DETECTOR
SITUATION ONE	125	63	63
SITUATION TWO	140	34	77
SITUATION THREE	134	46	71
SITUATION FOUR	128	58	65

FIGURE 16

SELECTION OF DETERRENTS FOR EACH SITUATION
BY ALL RESPONDENTS

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

The data presented in Chapter VII may be viewed in various ways depending on one's interpretation of the data. This chapter is intended to reveal the writer's conclusions and interpretations of the study findings. It is not the intent of the study to explain why each group responded as they did; however, the writer has interjected some inferences on this point in this chapter to provide "food for thought."

In discussing the various conclusions, it is important to point out that the variables of race, age, sex, length of employment, and education were utilized to allow for a manageable grouping of employees in this study. It is recognized that more direct variables, such as intelligence, moral concepts, family cohesiveness, conscience and the like, may provide better criteria, but these items are quite difficult, if not impossible, to determine. In this study it was assumed that groups defined by such variables share various life experiences, and personal history events to some extent.

The principal conclusions one can draw from the survey data are as follows:

1. Employee Groups - Different employee groups do place different values on different psychological deterrents to pilferage.

2. Race - Typically the Negro group is more psychologically deterred from the act of pilferage by utilization of fingerprints than is the white group. Conversely, the white group is more deterred by the security force than is the Negro group.

3. Sex - As a general rule, the female is more psychologically deterred from the act of pilferage by a security force than is the male. The male shows no great preference for any one of the deterrents and feels they are almost equal in value. It is hypothesized that the female preference for the security force stems from the cultural concept of the male as a protection image.

4. Age - Other things being equal, persons over 30 years of age place more significance on fingerprints as a deterrent than do those under 30 years of age. Conversely, those under 30 years feel that the lie detector is a greater deterrent than persons over 30 years. The security force is the most significant deterrent of the three deterrents for each age group.

5. Education - As the individual's educational level increases, so does the significance of the security force as a pilferage deterrent. Also, as the individual's

educational level increases, the significance of fingerprints as a deterrent decreases.

6. Salary Level - As the salary level increases, the importance of the security force as a pilferage deterrent also increases and the importance of fingerprints decreases. This conclusion parallels that of the education group and probably arises out of the fact that the higher salary groups are also the more highly educated groups.

7. Length of Employment - There is only a slight variance in the choice of deterrents of one group of employees with less than a year service and the other group with more than one year of service. It would thus appear that direct contact with the three deterrents had little effect on choice. There is the possibility that some of the group with more than a year's service who did not have as much direct contact with the deterrents may have a more vivid imagination of the deterrents than if they had come into direct contact with them.

8. Item Value - The monetary value of the items apparently had no significance to the respondents, because the deterrents in situation four (with the camera) were rated substantially the same as for the other situations involving items with a low monetary value.

Essentially, the same conclusions of the study could have been drawn had any one of the four situations, or a combination of the four situations, been utilized. In other

words, had any one of the situations been utilized by itself, the study conclusions would have remained the same. It should be noted, however, that in situations one (water pitcher) and four (camera), fingerprints were rated slightly higher than in situations two or three. This rating may have resulted from the respondent's realization that fingerprints could be on the stainless steel pitcher and camera but not on the towels or butter. (This was brought to the writer's attention by two of the respondents after completion of the questionnaire.) This should, however, have no bearing on their choice, as fingerprint techniques would require prints being on surrounding items and not on the pilfered item itself, which would be gone.

The conclusions should be evaluated from the standpoint of how one variable interrelates or correlates with another. For example, consider education and age. Persons in the lower-education category and persons in the higher-age category both felt that fingerprints were the most significant deterrent. There could be a direct correlation here since the higher-age category tends to be the least educated due, in part, to our rising level of education as a whole. Another example of the data correlating can be found in comparing Negro and white groups with the same educational background. Regardless of the educational level, the white group selected the security force deterrent as being more

significant than the fingerprinting, while the Negro group consistently selected the fingerprint deterrent.

The conclusion reached in reference to race is sure to raise many questions and the writer would like to set forth an opinion in this respect. One can only speculate on reasons for the difference between the white and the Negro groups. The importance of fingerprints to the Negro group may in part stem from the possibility that this group had been subjected to fingerprinting more often than the white group. This increased exposure could have resulted in their selection of the fingerprint deterrent. Another possibility may be the Negro's cultural background and the fact that the Negro group was less educated as a whole than the white group. Being less educated the Negro may have attached more importance to the fingerprints because he was less knowledgeable in what could actually be done with the fingerprints. By not understanding it is possible that more significance could have been placed on the deterrent than is actually warranted from the technical standpoint.

The "understanding" concept as discussed in the preceding paragraph could also account for the white group selecting the security force as the most important deterrent. It is highly possible that the white group as a whole has had less direct contact with police than has the Negro group. (Police and security represent essentially the same general concept.) The white group, perhaps mistakenly, may tend to

feel that the police are more successful than they actually are in reality. This is achieved by reading about how the police solved a crime, how good their training is, new technical equipment and the like, without having the direct contact. On the other hand, the Negro may be more familiar with the practical police application and this understanding may cause him to see the police as being less a deterrent than did the white group. In direct contact, an individual may see a friend "picked up" by the police and one hour later the individual is released. The more direct contact, and thus familiarity with procedures, could lessen the psychological deterrent impact.

Finally, it is the conclusion of this writer that much more research needs to be done in the area of psychological deterrents against pilferage. The writer looks upon this study as a pilot project which may suggest the need for further studies. For example, feedback from industrial and government employees would be very valuable in comparing and analyzing pilferage deterrents. Another worthwhile study would be the same sort of field study as presented here, but conducted in a hospital which has no organized security system. Such a study might yield valuable comparison with this study.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

CHICAGO WESLEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
250 East Superior Street
Chicago, Illinois 60611

Have you ever been convicted by any Courts for crimes other than those involving moving vehicles? YES NO

If your answer is "YES," state specifically the crime involved and any sentence imposed. Also, if "YES," are you currently on parole or probation?

CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT

- 1 - An identification badge is issued to all Hospital employees to be worn while on duty in the Hospital. This badge is the property of the Hospital and will be returned upon termination.
- 2 - Employee lockers are the property of the Hospital and subject to inspection at any time. No Hospital property will be stored in an employee's locker except property issued to the employee for which he is responsible.
- 3 - All employees will be fingerprinted and photographed by the Security Department. Background investigations will be conducted to determine the applicant's suitability for employment.
- 4 - When reporting to work, or leaving after a work shift, all employees will utilize the 239 East Chicago Avenue entrance or the West door of the Front Lobby entrance during the hours it is open.
- 5 - All materials, equipment or packages leaving the Hospital building are subject to inspection by any member of the Security Department or a member of Hospital Administration.

- 6 - Loitering, use of intoxicants, use of drugs, profane language, gambling, loud and boisterous conduct will not be tolerated on Hospital premises.
- 7 - As a further Condition of Employment, I hereby agree to submit voluntarily to be examined by a Polygraph (lie detector) detection of deception technique at any time while employed by the Hospital.

I have read and understand the seven Conditions of Employment as listed above. I further understand that I am obligated by any other Policies or Procedures that the Hospital deems necessary in the best interests and operation of the Hospital.

Signature: _____

Witness: _____

Date: _____

APPENDIX B

Position_____ Sex: M_____ F_____

Age: Under 30 years_____ Over 30 years _____

Education: Less than High School_____ High School_____

College Degree_____

Length of Employment: Less than 1 year____ More than 1 year ____

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BOX

Security Force_____

S._____

Fingerprints_____

R._____

Lie Detector_____

-
-
- (1) Situation: You are in a patient room by yourself and see a small stainless steel water pitcher belonging to the hospital. You are tempted to take it for yourself to be used at home. Of the following, which would have the most influence on your not taking the pitcher? Next? Least?

Fingerprints_____ Lie Detector_____ Security Force_____ (Investigation)

- (2) Situation: You are folding towels belonging to the hospital and suddenly remember you are short of towels at home. Which of the following would have the most influence on your not taking several towels home? Next? Least?

Lie Detector_____ Security Force_____ Fingerprints_____ (Investigation)

- (3) Situation: You are in a kitchen area by yourself and you see two packages of butter on a counter. You are tempted to take them home for your own use. Which of the following would have the most influence on your not taking the butter? Next? Least?

Fingerprints_____ Security Force_____ Lie Detector_____ (Investigation)

- (4) Situation: You are in an office by yourself and see a camera. Since you have been wanting a new camera, you are tempted to take it home with you. Which of the following would most influence your not taking it? Next? Least?

Security Force_____ Fingerprints_____ Lie Detector_____
(Investigation)

APPENDIX C

I'm meeting with you today to ask your help in providing some information for a study. This study has nothing to do with the hospital management and is for my own use. The information asked for will be transferred to data processing cards and the individual information is used only to find an average.

This study deals with people taking things that belong to the hospital. I'm sure that this is not a problem with this group but each of us realizes that the fear of getting caught has a tremendous bearing on whether or not we do something that we know is wrong.

Many of you have fingerprints on file in our Security office. Many times the "guilty party" has been apprehended by using these prints to match those at the scene of a loss or to check a person's background for information.

You all signed a condition of employment stating you would take a lie detector examination at the request of the hospital. As a matter of practice, five per cent of all employees are examined annually. One never knows when he may be one of the five per cent or asked to take an examination as the result of a specific problem.

Another thing you have all observed is our uniformed Security Force. They are constantly checking employee work and rest areas, watching for anything that might be wrong. Upon being notified of a property loss, the Security Force begins an investigation into all aspects of the situation. These three items are only a part of our security program, but parts that each employee must consider.

As I pass out this questionnaire, please fill in the top part only and do not go any further. If any of you do not want to complete this questionnaire, you may return it blank.

I will read the first situation aloud as you read it to yourself. Listed below are the three items we just discussed. Disregarding your sense of "right and wrong," which one of the items would have the most influence on whether or not you, or your fellow employee, would take this property?

APPENDIX D

Study Layout Procedure

<u>Column No.</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Vertical Number Code</u>
1	Sex	(1) Male (2) Female
2	Age	(1) Under 30 years (2) Over 30 years
3	Education	(1) Less than High School (2) High School (3) College Degree
4	Employment	(1) Less than 1 year (2) More than 1 year
5	Salary	(1) Less than \$4,000 per year (2) \$4,000 to \$6,000 per year (3) Over \$6,000 per year
6	Race	(1) White (2) Negro
7 Mean of Four Situations	Security Force	(1) 1st Choice (2) 2nd Choice (3) 3rd Choice
	Fingerprints	(1) 1st Choice (2) 2nd Choice (3) 3rd Choice
	Lie Detector	(1) 1st Choice (2) 2nd Choice (3) 3rd Choice
	Fingerprints	(1) 1st Choice (2) 2nd Choice (3) 3rd Choice
10 Situation One	Lie Detector	(1) 1st Choice (2) 2nd Choice (3) 3rd Choice
	Security Force	(1) 1st Choice (2) 2nd Choice (3) 3rd Choice

Situation Two	13	Lie Detector	(1)	1st Choice	(2)	2nd Choice	(3)	3rd Choice
	14	Security Force	(1)	1st Choice	(2)	2nd Choice	(3)	3rd Choice
	15	Fingerprints	(1)	1st Choice	(2)	2nd Choice	(3)	3rd Choice
Situation Three	16	Fingerprints	(1)	1st Choice	(2)	2nd Choice	(3)	3rd Choice
	17	Security Force	(1)	1st Choice	(2)	2nd Choice	(3)	3rd Choice
	18	Lie Detector	(1)	1st Choice	(2)	2nd Choice	(3)	3rd Choice
Situation Four	19	Security Force	(1)	1st Choice	(2)	2nd Choice	(3)	3rd Choice
	20	Fingerprints	(1)	1st Choice	(2)	2nd Choice	(3)	3rd Choice
	21	Lie Detector	(1)	1st Choice	(2)	2nd Choice	(3)	3rd Choice

OB PROCEDURE CARD LAYOUT

JOB NUMBER

DATE _____

DB DESCRIPTION

CARDS RECEIVED FROM

FREQUENCY OF REPORT

DISPOSITION OF CARDS

CARD VOLUME[illegible]

APPENDIX F

This appendix reveals the number of persons selecting an item for each column number. This data is intended for use in conjunction with Appendix D.

<u>COLUMN</u>	<u>ITEM ONE</u>	<u>ITEM TWO</u>	<u>ITEM THREE</u>
One	60	191	NA
Two	174	77	NA
Three	30	136	85
Four	101	150	NA
Five	104	87	60
Six	173	78	NA
Seven	138	70	43
Eight	46	86	119
Nine	67	97	87
Ten	63	78	110
Eleven	63	102	86
Twelve	125	71	55
Thirteen	77	100	74
Fourteen	140	79	32
Fifteen	34	72	145
Sixteen	46	68	137
Seventeen	134	85	32
Eighteen	72	98	81
Nineteen	128	64	59
Twenty	58	102	91
Twenty-one	65	85	101

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