~ ‘.‘ . ‘_‘f‘"9'1’7.-.€ ' A T‘ ~|l {:53 35-: :33: ' e‘.‘ .5!“ is? =3 1;. f. <5 .. 1}: ' I TZT‘C‘ VT :u 2‘ J '- , . V ? Again: ‘Im- “C'ufl’- «m- «n, V . . _, ,,,,, THE NATURE OF MAN AND GUILT. IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNSELING DERIVED FROM AN ANALYSIS OF THE PHILOSOPHIES 0F CORNELIUS VAN TIL AND iERIGH FROMM , A : 75.33;;ggaggsé Thesis for The Degree Inf Rh. TD. . I ‘ MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY ROBERT MANSFIELD NUERMBERGER 1967 LIEU? 4 1?" a LII/AI III/III TIIII/TI/I/ll/I/I MlCLIgan State University This is to certify that the thesis entitled THE NATURE OF MAN AND GUILT: IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNSELING DERIVED FROM ‘ ‘ AN ANALYSIS OF THE PHILOSOPHIES OF CORNELIUS VAN TIL AND ERICH PROMM presented by Robert Mansfield Nuermberger has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. degree in Counseling, Personnel Services and Educational Psychology WW /, v v ”Aflr professor Date September 18, 1963 0-169 IIIAR 15"”: THE NATURE OF MAN AND GUILT: IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNSELING DERIVED FROM AN ANALYSIS OF THE PHILOSOPHIES OF CORNELIUS VAN TIL AND ERICH PROMM by Robert Mansfield Nuermberger A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Counseling,Personnel Services and Educational Psychology 1967 quaS4 3-;uréi '7) Copyright by ROBERT MANS FIE LD NUERMBERGER 1968 ABS TRAC T THE NATURE OF MAN AND GUILT: IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNSELING DERIVED FROM AN ANALYSIS OF THE PHILOSOPHIES OF CORNELIUS VAN TIL AND ERICH FROMM By Robert Mansfield Nuermberger Motivated by the theory Of guilt neurosis prOpounded by O. H. Mowrer, this study probes the nature Of man and guilt by comparing and contrasting the Opposing philosophies of Cornelius Van Til, philosopher, and Erich Fromm, psychoanalyst, who have both written extensively on these subjects . Their positions are analyzed in the belief that the counselor's attitude toward and treatment of guilt would be determined largely by the philOSOphical position assumed on the nature of man. Van Til's system of thought is analyzed in terms of his position on basic presuppositions, theology, reality, knowledge and ethics. Van Til holds that there are only two possible alternatives that are logical to hold and that these are mutually contradictory. Christian man assumes a two-layer theory of being and reality. His primary presupposition is, first, the existence Of the God of the Old and New Testaments, a God who is infinite, eternal and unchangeable in His being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth; his second corollary presupposition is that of the creation of the world, including man. Non-Christian man assumes the ultimacy, autonomy and creativity of the human mind. This presupposition rules Out any sovereign God who controls or maintains the world, and depends upon a universe of chance. Paradoxically, this assumption implies that man must also hold to a deterministic cause-and-effect in order to leave room for rational thought. It further demands, says Van Til, that man must have exhaustive and comprehensive knowledge of reality in order to interpret available phenomena . A detailed study is made of Van Til's theological position, focusing on his doctrines of God, man, Christ, salvation, revelation, the Church and eschatology, and on his concepts of reality, knowledge and ethics. Fromm's theories Of reality and ethics are presented. Fromm deals with man's ultimacy and autonomy on the framework Of an evolu- tionary scheme of reality. Man is capable of penetrating to the essence of phenomena, of discovering truth apart from outside sources, and has the potential for growth. Antithetically, man also has the potential for decay and degeneracy. His orientation around either growth or decay is determined by hereditary tendencies and the process of socialization. Man has transcended from the animal world and finds himself alienated from his origins. Fear drives him to project concepts Of God; he yields up his independent spirit to authoritarianism and commits idolatry. The way to freedom and reunion with the world is to develop his autonomy and his capacities for love. Man must save himself guided by social humanitarianism. The study concludes with a commentary on Van Til and Fromm, pointing out their basic areas of agreement and disagreement and draw- ing certain conclusions in terms of methodology implications for counseling theory, selection of counselors, research implications and personal Observations . Pro Rege "For the King " ACKNOWLEDGE ME NTS In any work of this nature, there are those who make it possible by valuable contributions. Thanks belong to Dr. Buford Stefflre, Professor of Education, and chairman of the committee, who encouraged me to pursue this study which is so different from the usual Ph.D. research in the Counseling field today. His criticisms and suggestions were always given fairly and to the point. It has been a privilege to work under him. Dr. Cornelius Van Til most graciously reviewed the entire manu- script throughout its various developmental stages, carried on an exten- sive correspondence, and provided many of his published and unpublished works. Thanks also go to the committee members who thoroughly reviewed and criticized the study: to Dr. Frank Blackington, Associate Professor of Education, and Dr. Marian Kinget, Associate Professor Of Psychology, whose comments are incorporated into the conclusions, to Dr. Francis M. Donahue, Associate Professor of Religion, who served as theological consultant, and to Dr. John Jordan, Associate Professor of Education. Acknowledgement is made to Mrs. Iudy Lewis of Perry who typed the rough drafts , to Mrs. Phyllis Davis , who typed the final copy and made arrangements for publication in my absense, and to Mrs. Mildred Olcott of Perry who provided office space in her home and numerous cups of coffee. Much credit belongs to my wife, Lois, and to my daughters, Paula, Leslie and D'Arcy, who suffered long and gave moral support during all the years of study. I thank God for all of these. TABLE OF CO NTE NTS CHAPTER PAGE I INTRODUCTION Mowrer's Theory of Guilt Neurosis The Structure of His Theory 1. Subjects 2. Sequence 3. Symptoms Unique Aspects of His Theory Therapy Techniques CDCJ'IU'ICAJCAJNHI'" Analysis of Mowrer 9 Problems in Conceptualizing Guilt 11 1 . Moral Aspects 12 2. Legal Aspects 12 3. Therapeutic Aspects 13 Contemporary Concerns With Guilt 14 The Design of This Study 17 II VAN TIL‘S THEOLOGICAL BASIS 23 INTRODUCTION 23 I. PRESUPPOSITION 24 A. CHRISTIAN PRESUPPOSITIONS 24 1. GOD 24 2. CREATION 25 B. NON -CHRISTIAN PRESUPPOSITICNS 26 II. VAN TIL'S THEOLOGY 28 A. GOD 3O 1 . THE ONTOLOGICAL TRINITY 30 2. GOD'S INCOMMUNICABLE ATTRIBUTES 31 a) The Aselty or Independence of God 31 b) The Immutability of God 31 C) The Infinity of God 32 d) The Unity of God 32 3. GOD'S COMMUNICABLE ATTRIBUTES 33 a) The Intellectual Attributes 34 (1) Spirituality 34 (2) Self-Consciousness 34 b) The Moral Attributes 36 (1) Holiness 36 (2) The Righteousness of God 37 ii (3) The Goodness of God a. Common Grace b. Saving Grace 0) The Attributes of Sovereignty (1) God's Will a. His Secret Will b. His Revealed Will B. THE ETERNAL COUNSELS OF GOD I. THE DOCTRINE OF MAN a) The Image of God in Man (1) Personality (2) Finiteness (3) Autonomous Man (4) Point of Contact b) Man's Relation to Nature 0) The Fall of Man (1) Sin (2) The Covenant Concept d) Regenerate Man e) Man's Freedom 2. THE DOCTRINE OF CHRIST a) His Deity b) His Functions 0) Christ and Revelation 3. THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION a) Dynamic God-Man Relationship b) Unorthodox Views 4. THE DOCTRINE OF REVELATION 5. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH 6. THE DOCTRINE OF ESCHATOLOGY III VAN TIL'S THEORY OF REALITY INTRODUCTION I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF BEING A. ETERNAL UNITY AND PLURALITY B. TEMPORAL UNITY AND PLURALITY 1. SUBORDINATION 2. GENERALIZATION 3. THE BASIS OF SCIENCE C. SIN AND ITS CURSE SUMMARY II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE A. GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF HIMSELF B. GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD C. MAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 38 38 39 39 39 4O 4O 41 41 41 42 42 43 44 45 46 46 48 51 52 52 52 53 55 56 56 57 59 61 61 63 65 65 69 70 70 71 73 74 75 76 77 iii D. MAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNIVERSE 79 E. SIN AND ITS CURSE 81 SUMMARY 82 III. THE PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICS 83 A. THE SUMMUM BONUM OF ETHICS: THE KINGDOM OF GOD 85 1. THE SUMMUM BONUM IDEALLY CONSIDERED: THE INDIVIDUAL 85 2. THE SUMMUM BONUM IDEALLY CONSIDERED: SOCIETY 88 3. THE NON-CHRISTIAN SUMMUM BONUM 90 4. THE BIBLICAL SUMMUM BONUM 92 B. THE CRITERION FOR ETHICS: GOD'S REVEALED WILL 94 C. THE MOTIVATION BEHIND ETHICS: REGENERATION 95 1 . SIN AS ETHICAL 95 2. THE REGENERATED CONSCIOUSNESS 96 3. CONSCIENCE AND GUILT 97 IV FROMM'S THEORY OF REALITY 100 I. THE NATURE OF THE WORLD 100 A. FACTS 100 B. SCIENCE 103 C. EVOLUTION 106 D. FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM 107 E. FAITH 110 II. THE NATURE OF MAN 112 A. THE HUMAN SITUATION 112 1. MAN'S BIOLOGICAL AWARENESS 112 2. EXISTENTIAL AND HISTORICAL DICHOTOMIES 1 1 2 B. PERSONALITY 114 1. CHARACTER 114 a) The Dynamic Concept of Character 115 b) Non-Productive Character Orientations 117 c) The Productive Orientations 118 2. PERSONALITY SYNDROMES 119 a) The Syndrome of Decay 120 (1) Necrophilia 120 (2) Malignant Narcissism 122 (3) Incestuous Symbiosis 124 iv b) The Syndrome of Growth (1) Biophilia (2) The Love of Man (3)1ndependence C. SOCIALIZATION 1. ORIENTATION IN THE PROCESS OF SOCIALIZATION 2. ALIENATION AND SOCIALIZATION a) Alienation and Self-Awareness b) Alienation and Regression (1) Repression (2) Regression in Religion V FROMM'S PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICS I. ABSOLUTE vs. RELATIVE ETHICS A. NORMS B. AUTHORITARIAN VS. HUMANISTIC ETHICS 1. AUTHORITARIANISM 2. HUMANITARIANISM II. LOVE A. LOVE AND CHARACTER B. SELF-LOVE III. CONSCIENCE A. CONSCIENCE AND CHARACTER B. HUMANISTIC CONSCIENCE C. GUILT VI CONCLUSION I. METHODOLOGY A. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS: SUMMARIZATION 1. REALITY 2. MAN 3. ETHICS B. AUTHORITARIANISM AND HUMANISM C. SPECIAL PROBLEMS 1. DETERMINISM AND HUMANISM 2. EMPIRICISM 3. THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE II. IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNSELING THEORY A. VIEW OF THE CLIENT B. GOALS IN THEORY C. TREATMENT OF GUILT FEELINGS D. THE FUNCTION OF CONSCIENCE 126 127 127 128 129 130 131 131 133 134 135 138 138 139 141 142 146 149 150 152 155 155 156 157 161 162 162 162 163 164 166 170 170 173 176 178 178 179 181 184 V III. SELECTION OF COUNSELORS IV. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS V. PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS APPENDIX A BIBLIOGRAPHY 186 186 187 199 202 Chapter I INTRODUCTION This is a study of the nature of man and guilt as these bear upon the process and research in counseling. The method will be an analysis and comparison Of two Opposing viewpoints, that of Cornelius Van Til, the philosopher, and Of Erich Fromm, the psychoanalyst. Van Til's life work has been that of developing a consistent Christian Weltanschauung encompassing the nature Of God and reality, which includes the concepts Of being, fact, time, epistemology and ethics, while Fromm, out Of a Jewish background, has written extensively in the areas of psychology, philOSOphy, religion and ethics from a position which he identifies as Socialist-Humanistic. This comparison Of a theologian and a psycholo— gist is made in the interests of an experiment; certainly, the profitability and validity of such a comparison could be debated. MOWRER'S THEORY OF GUILT NEUROSIS The study originated from an interest in the work Of O. Hobart Mowrer, whose theory Of guilt neurosis has excited fervent reactions within the counseling, education and religious professions.1 He proposes that mental dysfunctioning results from excessive and enduring subjective 1As an example of reactions to Mowrer, refer to the American Psychologist, November, 1960, "Comments" section . -2- distresses occurring whenever there are Objective disruptions in an individual's relationships with "significant others,' such as parents, spouses, children, employers, or in abstract relationships with one's community, society, or God. Although the influence of Sullivan's theory Of interpersonal relationships are clear in Mowrer, the latter's theory suffers from a lack Of philosophical cohesion and scientific testing, and has therefore been criticized as less theory than speculation. However, the Clinical research is beginning to cumulate from a variety Of sources. 2 Further, Mowrer's assaults on cherished traditions, theories and institu- tions, coupled with his use of theological language to define secular concepts, has aroused suspicion and rejection. As London says, This suggests an extension of Newton's Third Law to human behavior, in which one useful index of the seminal quality Of a new theory would be the extent to which it is publicly reviled. If so, then the theory of the origin and treatment of neurosis put forth by O. H. Mowrer may deserve more serious attention than any such theory since Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis, for in the two generations that lie between them, no other mental health theorist has been subjected to such voluble and viturperative criticism. THE STRUCTURE OF HIS THEORY Structurally, his theory is quite simple, concentrating On behav— ioral malfunctions and the educative aspects of therapy. He uses three categories in describing the development of mental breakdown. ZCf. New Evidence Concerning the Nature of PsychOpathology, an unpublished resume‘ of research reports available from Mowrer, 330 Gregory Hall, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois. 3 London, Perry, The Modes and Moral; giPsychotherapy, p. 134. 1. Subjects Mowrer says that severe mental disruption occurs only in persons who have experienced some form Of emotional investment with significant others.4 Violations of these interpersonal relationships creates subjec— tive distress because of the patient's capacity of "conscience."5 London states that the theory applies to learned functional disorders but not to persons whose environment lacks close relationships with significant others.6 However, the statement that subjective distress is caused by a "capacity for conscience" is not an explanation in itself. 2. Sequence He stresses that mental dysfunctioning is actively self-initiated and maintained through a sequence of overt behaviors culminating in those emotions and symptoms associated with psychopathology.7 The necessary sequential conditions are: (a) "Ab-normal" behavior, defined as "deviation from the established ngrgni of the individual's reference group or groups."8 Mowrer hyphenates "ab-normal" to differentiate it from abnormality in the commonly held 4Mowrer, 1964, p. 28. . 5Mowrer, 1961, p. 17f. "Changing Conceptions Of the Unconscious. " 6London, 93.21.}, p. 136. Cf. to Mowrer, "The Behavior Therapies , with Special Reference to Modeling and Imitations . " American burnal 9_f Psychotherapy, Vol. XX, NO. 3, p. 439-461. July, 1966. Hereafter referred to as Mowrer, 1966d. 8Ibid. , p. 448. (b) (c) (d) -4- sense of illness or disease and to indicate that the neur- otic misbehavior is ab-normal, not the emotions arising from that misbehavior. "Given a knowledge Of the individ- uals total life situation, these emotions, however turbulent or painful, are seen as essentially reasonable, normal, and, if responded to in the right way, potentially helpful. "9 Concealment of the deviancy. Anxiety is stimulated by either the recognition of breaches Of sociality produced by the deviant behavior Or by the absence of punishment. Conflict is induced by the fear that others may discover the behavior and respond negatively through punishment or by withholding social esteem."10 The individual maintains his conflict through continued secrecy, while the conflict is further reinforced by the continuing pressures Of the inhibited impulses. The assumption is that the ego is captured by the Id, not by the superego.11 Trapped on the one hand by revulsion over his behavior and his fear of exposure and, on the other hand, by his 91bid., p. 449. loMowrer, 1964, p. 72f. 11 Ibid. , p. 185. -5- desire to express his id impulses, the individual "comes into a state of chronic insecurity. "12 If he becomes over- whelmed by the intensity Of the conflict, he breaks down. 3. Symptoms Mowrer defines these as the "individual's own attempt at self- cure."13 Mowrer holds that most patients and therapists assume "that Il|14 the basic problem is wrong emotions or bad 'nerves, whereas, in fact, the patient's emotions are quite normal. It is his conduct which is "ab-normal . " The above constitutes, for Mowrer and his associates, the essence of the neurosis, which he prefers to call an "identity crisis" or "sociosis. "15 UNIQUE ASPECTS OF HIS THEORY So far the theory is similar to the classical drive-reduction theory of adjustment. But London finds "three critical points at which it differs in content from other theories of breakdown, whether dynamic reinforce- ment theories or associationist theories, and whether oriented towards insight or action. "16 First, Mowrer hypothesizes that once the primary drives are minimally satisfied, the secondary drives achieve more functional 12Mowrer, 1966d, p. 448. 13Ibid., p. 450. 14Loc. 9_i_t_. lsIbid., p. 449, p. 456. 16London, _o_p. 913., p. 137. --6- significance, especially where they are crucial in human relationships. However, in some cases the individual has totally suppressed his primary drives which usually have priority over secondary drives in order to satisfy the secondary even though he knows that death might result from such suppression. Secondly, while other theorists emphasize purely mental phenomena as the major sources of conflict, Mowrer proposes that a person's overt misconduct is usually the real source. The covering of his cheating behavior by further deception produces a deep sense of guilt and erodes 17 If guilt is present in awareness , then it is always his character. founded on some past action. Although Mowrer allows for the traditional Freudian concept that guilt feelings can arise from ideas, thoughts and impulses originating in the Id that are unexpressed in overt behavior, he believes that generally some referent in real guilt can be discovered, that somewhere the person committed acts that transgressed his own social context or religious convictions and which now prey upon his 18 He calls this guilt "real" or "rational" as Opposed to conscience. the "false" or "illusory" guilt that might arise from unexpressed Id impulses. The ethical standards violated may be merely one's personal concepts of human decency. It is noted here that Mowrer often uses pseudo-theological phrases to define these secular concepts. For 17Mowrer, 1964, p. 135. 18Mowrer, 1966d, p. 456; Mowrer, 1966b, p. 1. -7... example, "God" does not necessarily refer to a real person, but is the idealized Objective of the socialization process. 'Sin' is used to mean the overt behavior that violates sociality, that is, transgression. 'Guilt' is used to mean what it means in law: the Objective existence of transgression or sin, as well as the subjective state that describes the recog- nition of such behavior. Therapists should consider guilt feelings as valid and treat the person accordingly. Failure to deal with this seriously, he says, may be the main reason why commonly accepted therapeutic procedures have pro- duced so few positive results, and may have actually been harmful.20 Thirdly, and most significantly, although Mowrer accepts the existence of ego defenses, he not only maintains that therapy research has failed to show that repression is central to neurotic development, but that recent research has firmly established the centrality of suppres— sion.21 Tracing the effects of real guilt in neurosis and psychosis, 22 he concludes that both problems develop as the Id Captures the Ego, forcing suppression of the Superego. Anxiety arises because of the "unheeded railings and anger of conscience."23 A vital fourth difference, not mentioned by London, is Mowrer's thesis that psychOpathOlogy is the product of undersocialization whereas 19London, Qp_. 213., p. 139 zoMowrer, 1966d, p. 449; 1966C, p. 24. ZlMowrer, 1964, p. 184f, 188f, 225i. 22Mowrer, 1966a, p. 13—23. 23Ib1d., p. 31 -8— Freud conceived of psychopathology as the result Of too intensive, over- extended socialization in combination with a powerful Superego.“1 THERAPY TECHNIQUES To facilitate "cure, " Mowrer has devised a sequence of four techniques that reverse the behavioral sequence leading to breakdown. First, clients learn best when they see an example or model of appropriate behavior, as shown by Bandura (1965). Consequently, the therapist opens himself to the Client as he expects the client to do in return, and teaches the client to acknowledge his overt transgressions , reveal his secrets and take responsibility for his guilt.25 Secondly, as soon as possible, the client's referent group is enlarged to include others with whom he shares his true self.26 If feasible, the group might consist Of significant others, perhaps the entire family.27 Thus the client becomes reintegrated with his social community which gives him his identity. Thirdly, the Client is encouraged to make restitution, or payment 28 for his "sins , " on the order of the Roman Catholic doctrine of penance. The client must endeavor to reconcile himself to those against whom he 24Hall, Calvin, A 13143;; 9_f_ Freudian Psychology, p. 31-35. 25Mowrer, 1966d, p. 451; 1966b, p. 38. 26Mowrer, 1956b, p. 14;1964, p. 89. 27Mowrer, 1964, p. 82. 28Ibid.. p. 97. -9... has transgressed, or else to compensate for his transgressions with actions that are constructive for society. Lastly, since the Client formerly hid his transgressions, and publicized his good works and traits, which amounts to a loss of psychic energy and weakening of character, he is now encouraged to hide his good and publicize his transgressions. The latter is done in an appropriate fashion, i.e. , deep crimes or perversions, sins, or weaknesses may be confessed to a small group Of significant others, which might be the therapy group, and lesser sins revealed to the general public. It is unnecessary, however, to reveal one's whole self to the world. Mowrer does not say that he necessarily wishes to strengthen or increase the strictness of the conscience, rather, "All I had said was that perhaps the neurotic's great need was to have his conscience released."29 ANALYSIS OF MOWRER If Mowrer is correct, then his theory has wide implications for psychotherapy and research. It is commonly accepted that the results of traditional forms of psychotherapy roughtly match the rate of "spontane- ous remission.‘ Part of the problem may be inadequately conceived studies and the perpetuation of certain myths prevalent in psychotherapy (Kiesler, 1966). But if the neurotic's problem is at the level of wrong actions rather than wrong emotions, then such efforts as conditioning, 29Mowrer, 1961, p. 27. -10- psychoanalysis, medication, surgery, reassurance, hypnosis, or electro— convulsive shock might be misplaced. Mowrer says that his position is not new, but was anticipated by Runestam (1932), Boisen (1936) and Stekel (1938), and is rapidly gaining adherents in a variety of fields. Parlour, et. al. , (1967) have begun to use these concepts in therapy groups. Understandably, there is much Opposition to this position because it openly attacks the classical psychoanalytic theory of neurotic and psychotic development. This, coupled with Mowrer's "genius for sensing the rawest intellectual nerve of his audience and then addressing himself to it"30 has elicited the wrath of many theologically and psychologically- oriented adversaries! The problem may also arise from Mowrer's failure to establish an integrated philosophical base from which to generate his theory Of personality development, which is similar to the situation in empirical research of generating hypotheses without theory. Chronolog- ically, this has resulted, not because Mowrer began with a philosophical position, but because over the years , he has made a transition in thought largely based upon his personal experiences with neurosis and psychosis , readings in literature, and experiments in psychology. His present theory is emerging a posteriori, and lacks solidity at present. A further problem is that his definitions of sin, conscience, guilt and personality attempt to bridge theology and psychology, without doing justice to either. 30London, QR. 911., p. 135. -11.. This study was conceived in terms of the above considerations, i.e. , the need for developing an integrated concept Of the nature of man out of which would flow an understanding of conscience, sin and guilt. It is confined just to these issues, and is not designed as an experimental study for testing the constructs presented. Religiously -Oriented practitioners who traditionally emphasize "real" or rational guilt as a basic problem of man, see it as producing direct, weakening effects upon his body, mind and spirit. They conceive of "cure" as coming through acknowledgment of sin, atonement by God, and forgiveness experienced. Historically, their confidence in this approach has been weakened by the impact of Freudian psychology, behaviorism and other humanistic approaches. While they look upon the new movement sponsored by Mowrer with interest, they feel cautious about accepting his position wholeheartedly because of his antagonism to orthodox Christianity. On the other hand, many members of the psychological fraternity consider Mowrer's position regressive. PROBLEMS IN CONCEPTUALIZING GUILT The notion of guilt presents us with a complex variety of problems which have tremendous bearing on the process and research in psycho- therapy today. Should we consider guilt as an entirely subjective phenomena resulting perhaps from societal conditioning, subconscious tensions or unrealistic fears, or is there as Mowrer Claims, always an objective referent in previous misbehavior? -12- 1. Moral Aspects There are moral aspects to the problem of guilt. If the individual acts contrary to society's moral standards, he may do so out of the sort 31 said was inherent in every man, of perverseness that Edgar Allen Poe or he may feel that he acts in "freedom" and "responsibility. " Is he then to be judged as "right" or "wrong," or is it a matter Of indifference? These questions are at the heart of the moral revolution in every modern society, and there are Obvious conflicts between those persons striving for personal independence who fear tyranny and depersonalization and those who are concerned with the maintenance of law and order and who fear anarchy and chaos . Character disorders provide additional compli- cations. PsychOpaths seemingly are able to commit a variety of heinous crimes without feeling the least guilty or remorseful, and yet they could eloquently argue that they have acted in responsibility and freedom; or that they merely "lost control" and should really not be held responsible. 2. Legal Aspects Then there is the whole area of legal considerations. Is an individual always guilty of certain transgressions against society, and if declared guilty, can socity always punish or condemn? At what point is the individual considered incompetent? How does society establish culpability? Is it possible to establish culpability in a world of chance 31Poe, "The Imp of the Perverse, " a poem dealing with guilt reactions. Cf. Bibliography. -13... and relativism, or do absolutes provide the only adequate foundation? 3. Therapeutic Aspects In the counseling process, the counselor's attitude as well as the client's may well determine the course of therapy. Suppose that the client experienced powerful guilt feelings. On his part, the counselor may ask whether these feelings emanate from inner tensions alone or from overt actions, and if the latter, whether these actions warrant such intense feelings. Perhaps the counselor is unsympathetic with society's restrictions and prescriptions regarding these specific overt actions, philosophizing that most moral standards are relative, transitory and harshly restrictive. Will the counselor then ignore the overt behavior or try to persuade his client that his fears and guilt feelings are ground- less Or irrational and then schedule a program of therapy designed to change his Client's perceptions? On the other hand, the counselor may be sympathetic with society's standards and concentrate on Changing his Client's behavior to adjust, at least partially, to society's mo'res. We might also ask whether the client will experience any reper- cussions within himself in the absence Of strong guilt feelings, that is, even though he does not f_€_e_e_l guilty about certain overt behavior, is there a sort of inner mechanism which subtly reacts to that behavior, effecting him negatively? If we theorize that neurotic conflict presupposes an outraged superego, then the subject faces two alternatives: either to heed the railings Of the superego and Change his overt behavior, or to -14- suppress the superego and maintain the behavior. In the latter instance, he runs the risk of deadening sensitivity to his feelings and perhaps dulling his awareness of objective phenomena as well. This would imply that, contrary to prevailing notions in the counseling field, the effective life is enhanced by a sensitive conscience, so that the keener the con- science, the greater the awareness Of inner feelings, which would vindi- cate Mowrer's theory. On the other hand, a sensitive conscience could lead to severe conflict, and if the individual strongly desired to maintain behavior which he felt violated the standards of his society, or even of his own lowest standards Of decency, he could choose-to suppress his conscience in order to alleviate the conflict. In this case, he might become cynical, pseudo-sophisticated, or hostile to any religion or ethic which pointed out his responsibilities. Again, the above considerations point out the extreme complexity of the problem of conscience, the attendant symptoms Of conflict, and the need for some base of Operation from which to make judgments and develop testable hypotheses. CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS WITH GUILT Guilt from both the subjective and objective viewpoints is a major concern in literature, philosophy and religion, as well as psychology. Berdyaev confesses in his autobiography, Dream and Reality (1951) , that all his life he has been victimized by guilt feelings that incline toward pessimism and apprehensiveness of lasting happiness. He says, "Every -15- joy in my life has been accompanied by a sense of guilt and wrong. "32 The modern classic on this type of guilt feelings is Kafka's novel, The '1_‘_r_i_gl (1953). The hero is arrested for a crime of which he professes innocence. Nevertheless , he feels guilty, though he never knows why. In all of his frantic efforts to get help, he is unsuccessful in getting to know the nature of his crime. At the end he is condemned and executed, though in the process he breaks down psychologically, committing acts that reveal his capabilities for larger crimes. Quite a different approach was used by Dostoyevsky, especially in his Crime and Punishment (1953). There, the hero, Rodya, has actually committed two murders and is finally broken by his own conscience which causes him to flirt with danger by repeatedly returning to the police authorities to discuss the crimes. Finally, it is his love for his mother - and another woman that brings him out of a delirium to confess and receive clemency, and after eight years in prison he accepts religion in lieu of his driving individualism. Dostoyevsky repeats the theme of the guilty conscience in The Brothers Karamazov (1960), where the son, Ivan, longed for his father's death. The playwright, Sartre (1947, 1956) and the novelist Faulkner (1965) use the concept of guilt widely. In Graham Green's novels (1960), hidden fear pursues the main characters. The feelings Of estrangement and guilt underlie much of the poetry of T. S. Eliot (1962, 1963) . 32Berdyaev, Dream and Reality. 1). 60. -16- Senator Munson, one of the major characters in Allen Drury's Advise and Consent (1961) reflecting on the cold war conflicts endanger- ing the world, attaches universal sharing Of guilt to the liberals who made it easy for the Russians by constantly yielding to them, to the embittered conservatives who closed the door to compassion and under- standing, to the jealous military, the self-righteous scientists, the compliant press, ambitious politicians and a largely complacent citizenry. He thinks , Nobody could stand forth now in America and say, 'I am guilt- less. I had no part in this . I did not help bring America down from her bright pinnacle.‘ For that would be to deny that one had lived through those years , and only babies and little chil- dren could say that. Even the psychologists have not always agreed with Freud (1923, 1953, 1959). Stekel (1950) laid great stress on the part guilt plays in neurosis development, stressing that neurosis is the disease of the bad conscience, and taking issue with Freud's theory that morality is really a reaction formation against the evil in man. Shneidman and Farberow (1957) feel that patients with suicidal tendencies alleviate their guilt conflicts by threatening or attempting acts of self-punishment. In theology, although liberalism had moved away from guilt and atonement in Christianity, it was Karl Barth (1956) , the founder of “neo— orthodoxy, who stressed that guilt was the sure sign of man's deprevity, and thereby created the twentieth century revolution in religious thought 33 Drury, A. , Advise and Consent, Cardinal ed. , p. 33. -17A and a reconsideration of the ancient Biblical doctrines. The late P. T. Forsyth (1905) was no less emphatic that the center of Christianity and man's dilemna lay in the problem of sin and guilt; it was this problem, 34 On the other hand, some argue that he states, that revelation solves. man's guilt is really nothing more than his sense of "nothingness, " while others such as the death-of—God adherents stress that it is rather a sense of man's humanness. Buber (1958) holds that it is the result of estrange— ment of the I-Thou relationship that ought to exist between man and his world. Bultmann (1958) , desiring to preserve the relationship between the l-Thou as essentially between the "I" of man and the "Thou" of God, thinks of guilt as real and in need of forgiveness by God, which he per- formed through Christ: Forgiveness does not mean that the sin is to be compensated for (the man is wholly disobedient); it can only be forgiven. When a man accepts forgiveness, he condemns himself most severely, he really bows his head under the judgement of God. And as his character as sinner signified that he failed in the decision and became another man, a condemned man who had lost his freedom, so forgiveness means that he is to become a new man through God's grace, that he has his freedom once more, that God does not abandon His claim upon him but also does not deprive him of His grace--that God means to bring him out of remoteness into nearness to Himself. THE DESIGN OF THIS STUDY It appears that the debate regarding the genesis , function and resolution of guilt will continue until certain basic issues can be resolved. 34Forsyth, Faith, Freedom and the Future, p. xii. 35 Bultmann, Iesus and The Word, p. 201. -18- First, there seems to be the unfounded assumption that whenever we dis- cuss man, we are all talking the same language and mean the same things regarding his nature or the nature of man's contextual, phenomenal world. This is quite apparent in the wide—ranging contemporary debate on freedom- determinism where inadequate definition of terms unnecessarily compli- cates and prolongs the argument. Secondly, the terms conscience, sin, transgression, and guilt, depend upon a given concept of the nature of the phenomenal world and of man and of his relationship to that world. It is felt that Mowrer's research points in the right direction, but if Mowrer's theory is essentially correct, it needs some broader philosophical base for integration and power. The natural starting point is the nature of man, which is related to the larger concepts of the nature of being and reality. In order to constrict this study to a reasonable size, it has seemed advisable to assume a position presently held within Christian phIIOSOphy and place it in juxtaposition to an Opposing view, that the contrast and comparison might clarify the differences , benefit from any similarities , and indicate the implications for counseling. The study deals with con- structs which might prove fruitful for development and testing in later research. Two men have been chosen whose concepts of man differ markedly. The theological-philosophical position of Dr. Cornelius Van Til will be reviewed and taken as a base from which to consider the concepts of -19.. Dr. Erich Fromm regarding the nature of reality, man, conscience and guilt. The rationale is that Van Til represents a classical tradition of Reformation Theology, and has a keen interest in the psychology of religion, while Fromm is a neo-Freudian psychoanalyst with an interest in philosophy. Van Til '5 position is precise and clear, having been carefully honed throughout forty years of teaching and writing. Perhaps more than any other Christian apologist, he makes an assault upon all non-Christian or partially Christian theories of man, for which he has been criticized by his own colleagues within Reformation Theology. In response, he argues that by taking a thoroughly Biblical stance, he sharpens the distinctions between Christianity and non-Christianity which provides the only proper ground for dialogue. Van Til classifies his theological position as "Reformed, " a term applied to the Calvinistic school to differentiate that from Lutheran theology, Arminian theology, and the more inclusive "Evangelicalism, all appearing as aspects of Protestant Reformation Theology which developed a reaction to sixteenth century Roman Catholocism, or "Romanism, " as Van Til calls it. While Reformed Theology, Lutheranism, Arminianism and Romanism have fairly well-defined theologies, "Evangelicalism,’ says Van Til, is 36 a loose mixture of all of these, and in some places , he speaks of‘it as "less consistent Calvinism."37 He sees his own task as that of 36 Van Til, Qefensegf the Faith, p. 78-79 3719121.. p. 79. Cf. p. 80. -20- creating the most consistent expression of Christianity possible. In so doing, he gives much credit to his predecessors , including among others, Hodge and Warfield of the " Princeton school" of theology and Kuyper, Bavinck, Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoeven of the " Dutch school" of theology. 38 His other basic sources are Calvin and the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments . Dr. Van Til was born in the Netherlands in 1895. He is a graduate Of Calvin College (A.B.) , of Princeton Theological Seminary (Th.M.) , and Princeton University (Ph.D.). He spent a year in the pastorate and one year as instructor of Apologetics at Princeton Seminary. Since 1929 , he has been Professor of Apologetics at Westminster Theological Seminary near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Van Til is joint-editor of Philosophia Reformata, and frequent contributor to The Westminster Theological |ournal, both of which are devoted to Calvinistic theology and philosophy. He has authored many books, syllabi, articles and pamphlets, many of which are included in the bibliography. His primary interest has been the refutation Of the "neo- orthodox" school led by the German theologian, Karl Barth. Dr. Erich Fromm is the better-known scholar, having gained a t.39 wide reputation as a "neo-Freudian revisionis along with his colleagues, Karen Horney and Harry Stack Sullivan. All three have attempted to show 38Systematic Theology, p. 2. 39Hammond, ManlgEstrangement, p. 24. -21- the relationship of social structures and personal relationships to psycho- analytic concepts, although it has been surmised that these revisions have been more in the nature of opposition to Freud than reform.40 Fromm has been selected because he has drawn out the philosophical implications of psycho-analysis and applied them to many fields of interest, especially politics and religion. Van Til builds his system upon Calvin while Fromm uses Calvin as one of his major antagonists, frequently quoting from Calvin's Institutes o_f the Christian Religion as the epitome of authoritarian religion. Fromm depends heavily upon Aristotle, Spinoza, Dewey, Nietzche, Spencer, Kent and Freud, and finds a close correlation between psycho- “ and Marxian sociology.42 Out of this back- analysis, Zen Buddhism, round, Fromm has been motivated to extend Freudian psychology to the study of the social group, presuming that the psychic attitudes common to most individuals are rooted in the cultural patterns of one's society. Dr. Fromm was born in Frankfurt, Germany, in 1900. He studied at the Universities of Heidelberg and Munich and at the Institute for Social Research of the University of Frankfurt. When Hitler's regime came into Power in 1932, he came to the United States, where he lectured at several 40Loc. cit. 41Fromm, Zen Buddhi§_r_n_ and Psychoanalysis, of. especially pp. 77-141. 42 Fromm, Marx's Concept of an, p. ix. _22_ colleges, including Michigan State University. Currently, he is Professor of Psychoanalysis at the National University of Mexico, Mexico City, and Professor of Psychology at New York University. He is the author of fifteen major works. These two scholars are at variance at almost every point in their thinking on the nature of reality, man, and the causes and solutions of guilt. After their positions have been thoroughly summarized, an attempt will be made to compare them and show the implications for counseling practice and research. CHAPTER II VAN TIL'S THEOLOGICAL BASIS INTRODUCTION Apologetics as the philosophical defense of the Christian faith is concerned with the problem of method. In Van Til, the method Of defense and the faith defended merge into an integrated system built upon his con- cept of basic presuppositions. Defending Christianity from within the theological framework, he uses the language of Scripture and Christian doctrine, borrowing philosophical terms as a bridge to secular thought. This form of reasoning illustrates his contention that all men are forced to argue circuitously once they choose their philosophical points of departure.43 Van Til holds that the place to begin defending the faith is system- atic theology and follows this view in his definitive work, The Defense gf_ the-Egg, where he first discusses his basic doctrines, and then defends this Calvinistic system as the only possible intelligible position for men to accept. But his approach entirely depends upon his concept of argument by presupposition. He is thus consistent with his own premise that the method of apologetics of Protestant Christians "should be in line with their theology . " 44 43Apologetics, p. 62. 44_I_D_efense , p. 4 . -24- I. PRESUPPOSITIONS Characterizing his apologetic is the concept that there are only two alternatives available, that they are radically antithetical to each other and logically impossible to maintain simultaneously. He writes: Every form of intellectual argument rests , in the last analysis, upon one or the other of two basic presuppositions. The non- Christian's process of reasoning rests upon the presupposition that man is the final or ultimate reference point in human predi- cation. The Christian's process of reasoning rests upon the presupposition that God, speaking through Christ by His Spirit in the infallible Word, is the final or ultimate reference point in human predication. In his lectures, Van Til frequently uses a diagram similar to figure 1 (p. 29) . In summary, he says that these basic epistemological and metaphical principles are, by the nature of the case, unproveable, but that they control scientific methods and conclusions .46 He feels that in most cases fruitful discussion between Christians and non-Christians is hampered because men are not consciously aware of their presuppositions . By constantly placing the alternatives in radical opposition, he hopes to create genuine discussion of the primary issues .47 A. CHRISTIAN PRESUPPOSITIONS l. GOD Basic to all the doctrines of Christian theism is that of the self-contained God, or, if we wish, that of the ontological 4511616 ., p. 180. 46 Apologetics, p. 62. 47Defense, p. 298, 299. _25- trinity. It is this notion. . . . hat ultimately controls a truly Christian methodology. 8 t 4 God is the ultimate reality or fact who determines and interprets 49 all other fact; the final reference point required to make "facts" and 50 In Him, the ancient unity-plurality problem is both "laws" intelligible. solved and meaningful.51 2. CREATION The creation of the universe is consequent to the concept Of God's counsel:52 as He willed, so the universe came into existence.53 Since God is self-contained, He does not require the physical universe, nor is it an extension of Himself. Matter is not ultimate, only temporal, and time is seen in both temporal and eternal levels according as the referent is God or His universe.54 However, the universe clearly displays some- thing of the character of God, namely, His eternal power and existence.55 Man is temporal and the quality of his being is on the creature level. His task is to become properly related to God, his Creator, but this relationship is always personal and ethical because God and man are 48Apol_ogetics, p. 62. 49Defense, p. 150. 50 Apologetics, p. 62. 51Defense, p. 10. 52Apologetics, p. 61. 3Case for Calvinism, p. 19. Egghristianity and Barthianism, p. 90f., Defense, p. 10. Theology, p. 76 -26- not correlative, i.e. , of the same essence of being, subject to identical limitations of time and space.56 Although man thinks rationally, as a creature he cannot understand comprehensively nor exhaustively, only 7 analogically,5 and sin further confuses and blinds man both rationally and ethically. He therefore needs to depend upon God for knowledge of God, 58 for personal insight, for understanding of the world around him, and for God's provision of redemption. Reality and fact become what they are 59 not because man possesses because God mediates this knowledge to man, the Kantian categories of causality by which he imposes meaning and order upon raw facts. Thus revelation is essential if man is to gain true under- standing at all. 60 Van Til defines revelation as both that general knowledge of God manifested in nature, His eternal existence and power, and the special revelation appearing in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments . 61 B. NON-CHRISTIAN PRESUPPOSITIONS By "non-Christian," Van Til means all those positions whose 62 authority rests upon man's autonomy, consequently, there is only one 56Defense, p. 29 . 571b1Cl., p. 119f. 58Know1edge, p. 22. 5 9Theology , p . 22 . 60Knowledge, p. 20, 21. 61Theology, p. 65 62 Knowledge, p. 2. -27- basic presupposition for the non-Christian, the ultimacy of the human mind.63 From this premise flows all of his concepts of reality, including any definitions of God, man or fact. Authority resides either in himself, personal experience, other experts, or a God who is equally limited and ultimate with himself.641 His reasoning, like the Christian's, is also circular; "the starting point, the method, and the conclusion are always involved in one another. "65 Van Til asserts that it is of the essence of non-Christian method- ology to claim that it is neutral on all subjects until the evidence is in, and admits that from the non-Christian viewpoint, Van Til's own statement that conclusions are controlled by presuppositions is evidence of the purest form of authoritarianism. In spite of this claim to neutrality on the part of the non- Christian, the Reformed apologist must point out that gygy method, the supposedly neutral one no less than any other, presupposes either the truth or the falsity of Christian theism. The focus on these antithetical presuppositions appears consis- tently through Van Til's works, and he uses them as a tool to measure deviation from Scriptural norms. He sees modern theologies, such as the Death of God movement, Neo-orthodoxy and Liberalism Operating almost 53Defense, p. 63, 180. 641 id., p. 124f. 65339., p. 101. 551b1d., p. 100. -28- entirely on the autonomous-man assumption, Roman Catholicism and Arminianism inconsistently using both assumptions simultaneously, Evangelicalism trying to use Christian assumptions with frequent lapses into autonomy, and Reformed theologies as the most consistently Biblical. Equally important is Van Til's mutually interpretive and interacting concepts of God and fact, which he claims are derived from Scripture and Reformed theology, and from which emerge all his other doctrines. For purposes of clarification, Van Til first specifies his system of doctrine and then defends it by using his concept of fact. 11. VAN TIL'S THEOLOGY By "Christian theology, " Van Til means "Reformed Theology, " i.e. , "a strong Calvinistic Christian theism."67 All other "Christian" theologies have one foot upon the Christian presuppositions of God and His counsel, and one foot upon man's autonomy.68 He holds that Romanism starts with the natural theology of man without God and attaches super- naturalism to it, Arminianism makes God and man interdependent for salva- tion, following the lead of Romanism, while the modern theologies are afflicted with the naturalistic assumptions and therefore fail to present a "Christ who can help sinners in need."69 67Type_s g Apologetic Systems , Ramm, p. 187. 68Defense, p. 3-6. 69Ibid. , p. 5 NSC-ooze 298-2.- Téili] .. m. 35cc- Aoc-onucocv U... H m..- bzpaoa 93.- 3 3:338.- psn- E n. e n 903 a w. m. .. OOH-65533 8 m. m -mcoEoco-n- Ev Exp- .OOO- Eco-562 :5- o. m. A 1 ,. pooo 9; 3 GE 3 o r Eon-09:3 Ono-isn- B- oocE-O 3- AGO-EOEEOGH EOE-p.595- Sun-c.33- EED Am- 33.-630 Am- . 952250 329833-- pcm Exp-536.5- o-OOA Hoar-om 6.3m .m 9683-: twosome-“GOO 65n- .N 3335 x GEE-.2335 x x 63580 x meow- mooEocousm figment-35c:- 3:5 mum-5:: 23>- .- x Ho 3.53:: .4 x x X x x emumwnoéoz mote-3.50 her-H. O5 mZOHHHmOn-n-Dmmmn- OHmna «GOOGOQOO 635.66.610.- 3030-95 1 :2)- oEchD $5.03- GOEOOCO Am- man 5.266.- .oe-pp SEC 0 I ..... .. 11111111111111 «7.1.. 111111111 1.1.... pea. 5:69- .ofimm 6:ch- - HOME-ADO amchmum m.UOO .N \ scam mas-b Gazebo-Om COG-Scounm-om 9.6833 now .- Gmfim-EO -30- Of his own Reformed doctrine, he says: The basic structure of Christian theology is simple. Its every teaching should be taken from the Scriptures of the Old and New testaments as being the words of prophets and apostles spoken on the authority of Jesus Christ, the Son of God and Son of Man, the Saviour of sinners , 7O noting that it is proper to speak of it as a "system of truth" only if we acknowledge that the various doctrines were not deduced from some master concept extraneous to Scripture. A. GOD I . THE ONTOLOGICAL TRINITY Epistemologically, says Van Til, the Christian theist begins with the Scripturally based assumption that there exists a God who is a self- 71 contained ontological trinity --self—existent, self-sufficient, self- determinative, self-Conscious, necessary, sovereign and absolutely free. 72 The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are each an active personality and . . .together constitute the exhaustively personal God. There is an eternal, internal self-conscious interaction between the three persons of the Godhead. They are co-substantial. Each is as much God as are the other two. The Son and Spirit do not derive their being from the Father. The diversity and unity in the Godhead are therefore equally ultimate; they are exhaustively correlative to one another and not correlative to anything else.73 70 71 _I_b_i_d_., p. 7. The unusual term " ontological trinity" is uniquely characteristic of Van Til's writings. He uses it to mean absolute, self-sufficient, the ultimate source of all being. Cf. Apologetics, p. 62. 72Apologetic , p. 5: ByWhat Standard, Rushdooney, p. 12; Types 9f Apologetic Systems, Ramm, p. 186. ”Apologetics, p . 8 . -31- The trinity is viewed both ontologically, referring to the essence of God's being and, economically, referring to the functional relationships of the three persons to the created universe. The Father is centrally active in the creation and sustaining of the universe. The Son is centrally active in the objective work of salvation. The Spirit is centrally active in the sub- jective work of salvation. In all this the triune God is active with respect to the universe. 2. GOD'S INCOMMUNICABLE ATTRIBUTES Van Til discusses the nature of God in terms of the communicable and incommunicable attributes , that is , those characteristics which man can share or which are unique to God. Under the incommunicable attributes, he lists: a) The. A___i._yse t 91: We: Loci God is not correlative to or dependent upon anything extraneous to Himself. Therefore, we cannot speak of the source of His being, for source cannot be applied to God, 75 who is Himself the category of inter- 76 "77 pretation for all things and the "final reference point in human predication. b) The Immutability 9f God Although the Scriptures speak anthropomorphically about God as a condescension to man, God Himself is unchangeable in His existence, 74Loc. ci 0 75.31121” p. 5: Defense. 13. 9. 76Apologetics, p. 7. 77Warfield, p. 25. -32- essence, will and decrees. The concept deals with the internal relation- ships of the trinity as distinguished from the continued changes in the universe, or from the incarnation of the Son as the man Christ Jesus. 78 c) The Infinity 2f G92 "79 or limitless in existence. God is "concrete self-existence, In reference to time this is conceived of as His eternity, meaning that there is continuity, not succession of moments, or beginning or end with God. In reference to space, infinity is seen as omnipresence, meaning that God is neither "included in space nor absent from it; rather, He is above all space yet present in every part of it (1 Kings 8:27, Acts 17:27) . "80 This conception of eternity is of particular importance in Apologetics because it involves the whole question of the meaning of the temporal universe; it involves a definite philosophy of history.81 d) .1112 Units: QI God Van Til means that God is one God and not composed of discrete parts . 82 He argues that this doctrine does not contradict the Biblical presupposition that God is both ontologically and economically triune, though superficially, it would appear that to speak of God as one God negates the statement that there are three persons in the Godhead. He protects himself from this paradox by appealing to his concept of exhaustive 78Theology, p. 211. 79Loc.pijt_. 80Defense, p. 10. 1Loc. Cit. Loc . Cit. -33- interaction among the triune persons: each is equally ultimate and equally 83 exhaustive of divinity, although distinctions among them occur in Scriptural revelation according to their relationships to man. Van Til holds that the incommunicable attributes of God are unique to His self-conscious being. Man Cannot partake of these in any sense. He cannot be self-contained, infinite, eternal or simple. These attributes 84 emphasize God's transcendence and at the same time provide Christians with a distinct philOSOphy of history. All that has happened in the past, all that happens in the present, and all that will happen in the future rests for its presupposition upon the self-sufficient internal activity of the self-predicating and therefore non-delimited being. 85 3. GOD'S COMMUNICABLE ATTRIBUTES God, says Van Til, is unlike man in His incommunicable attributes, but like man in his communicable attributes. 86 He is transcendent but also immanent. But, says Van Til, It is not a sufficient description of Christian theism when we say that as Christians we believe in both the transcend- ence and the immanence of God while pantheistic systems believe only in the transcendence of God. The transcendence we believe in is not the transcendence of deism and the immanence we believe in is not the immanence of pantheism. 83Theology, p. 220. 84Defense, p. 10. 85 Theology, p. 212 . 86 Ibid. , p. 233. -34- In the case of deism transcendence virtually means separa— tion, while in the case of pantheism immanence virtually means identification. And if we add separation to identifica— tion we do not have theism as a result. . .The Christian doctrine of God implies a definite conception of everything in the created universe. a) The Intellectual Attributes (1) Spirituality. When Van Til defines God as a Spirit, he avoids telling of some "vague generic concept of spirituality"88 encompas- sing both God and man. God is the absolute, self-contained, self- individuated Spirit, who "does not need materiality over against Himself in order to individuate Himself. "89 Man, created in the image of God, has a dim replica of this spirituality although he is not a true spirit but a "physico-spiritual being. "90 God alone, as Spirit, is immortal and "invisible, "91 and the Scripture speaks of Him as "light. "92 Spirituality then becomes for Van Til the foundation for God's self-knowledge.93 (2) Self-Consciougnesp. In order to avoid pantheism, Van Til asserts that this self-consciousness is coterminous with God's being, 87 88Theology, p . 233 . 89Loc. cit. 90 Defense, p.11, 12. Les--23. 91Ibid. , p. 234. 92 Defense, p. 10 . 93 Theology, p . 234 . -35- otherwise God's knowledge would have to be Obtained by investigating being that is independent of God. If being and knowledge are not coterminous in God then being stands over against the knowledge of God as a com- plement. There is then no possibility of distinguishing between non-created and created being. There can then be no creation except in the attenuated Platonic sense of forma- tion of a pre-existing material. God's consciousness of self is then interwoven with his consciousness of the world. And because God possesses this exhaustive knowledge of Himself, he also possesses a comprehensive and exhaustive knowledge of all possibility.95 Possibility depends upon the counsel of God, and He is free to create according to His will. Moreover, all facts and laws are what they are because God has freely created and freely known all reality,96 and this knowledge of God preceded the creation of the world. SO Van Til uses the term "analytical" in reference to the necessary, free, and exhaustive self- knowledge of God. In contrast, Man's mirror-image knowledge is dependent, partial, and true, but "analogical."97 Man, therefore, finds difficulty in comprehending such paradoxes as free agency and sovereignty, or actuality and possibility. Man has to wait for events to occur before he can know them, and makes inferences upon which he depends for knowledge of facts and laws . 9411231... p. 235. Loc. git, 96 Loc. cit., Theology, p. 236. 97 Theology, p. 236 . -36- If we keep this biblical notion of the knowledge of God before us, we shall think of human knowledge as analogi- cal of God's knowledge. And only if we do this can we have a truly Christian apologetic. b) The Moral Attributes The moral attributes are God's holiness "whereby He is internally and eternally perfect, "99 God's goodness, and God's righteousness. These form the basis for Van Til's Christian ethics and for his later discus- sion on guilt. (I) Holiness. By the holiness of God we therefore signify God‘s absolute internal moral purity. It is naturally to be expected that when this attribute of God expresses itself in the revelation of God to man, it requires his complete purity. This complete purity in man consists in the complete dedication of man's moral activity to the moral glory of God. Negatively, this will need to express itself as separation from sin. 1 The negative aspects of God's holiness particularly come to expression in the Old Testament period, where, he says, secular persons and things are dedicated to the service and glory of God, not because the secular is considered evil per se, but the secular became evil because of the sin of man.101 In the New Testament, the emphasis is on the positive expression of God's holiness . Van Til says , the Holy Spirit enables men to dedicate 98Loc . cit. 99Defense, p. 11. looTheology, p. 244. 101 LOC. cit. -37_ themselves to God after freeing them from slavery to sin. The negative aspect of God's holiness is still revealed in the punishment of those who rebel against God.102 (2) The B_i_ghteousnessef_G_o_c_I_ signifies the "internal self— consistency of the divine being. "103 God does not respond to a law higher than Himself, for as absolute being He is "absolute law, "104 and expresses this absolute self-contained consistency in the created world "by maintain- ing created consistency among men. "105 God distributes justice to men, punishes injustice and rewards justice. Unfortunately, there is no justice in sinners. "There is, to be sure, a measure of civil righteousness among men, but this proceeds from the 'old man' within them which they have not been able to subjugate fully. "106 If men do any justice, it must be given to them, for if they followed their own "self-consciously adopted princi- "107 they would perform only unrighteous acts. The believer. SBVGd ples by grace, seeks to think God's thoughts after Him in an effort to do His will, and seeks to establish and maintain God's law for all other men "in ways that are themselves in accordance with those laws."108 In this 10211616, p. 245. 103Loc. Cit. 104 Loc. cit. 105LOC. 91;, 106 Loc._qit_. 107 Loc. cit. 108 Loc. cit. -38- fashion the believer seeks to protect the unbeliever from himself. The unbeliever seeks eternal laws as well as eternal truths apart from the person of God, but the fact remains that "true law cannot exist except upon a Christian foundation. "109 (3) The Goodness 9: (5931. Van Til distinguishes between what God is in Himself and what He is in relation to His created works . God is in Himself good and, therefore, God's moral deeds must be centered in Himself, for He cannot look to extraneous principles of truth and good- ness as standards for His own conduct. "It is this notion of the goodness of God that forms the foundation of true Christian ethics. "110 a. Common Grace. The concept of God's conscious goodness to His creatures provides Van Til the basis for his doctrine of 111 toward a world in suffering, and grace. God is merciful and piteous when He is good to undeserving men "it is called grace. "112 But when His goodness, as seen in the rain and the sunshine, talents and opportun- ities, is freely distributed to both believers and unbelievers alike, it is called "common grace. "113 However, God's attitude and purposes differ. To the believers, He extends grace in respect to their forgiven status in order to enable 109Loc. cit. 110 111 H 0.. bi ., p Iid., p w 112 1:92-21}.- 113 Ibid. , p. 240. . 238. . 239. -39- them to mature in Christlikeness. To the unbelievers , He gives grace in order they might fulfill His purposes, and to restrain "their natural tendency ,.114 to do only evil continually, although their misuse of His gifts brings them "greater condemnation."115 This principle of common grace enables 116 men to perform civil righteousness, and is the basis of law and order. b. Saving Grace. The doctrine of common grace underlies the concept of special or saving grace. " Together they form the covenant "117 Through God's framework in which the sovereign God deals with man. special grace He elects unregenerate men to eternal life who, as spiritually dead, are incapable of yielding themselves to God.118 c) The Attributes of Sovereignty These refer to God's ultimate power over the universe and the destiny He has eternally determined for it. (1) God'g Will. "As the self-existent being God wills Himself as His own end";119 He is altogether self-ruled. In order to avoid such ancient arguments as to whether God can make something greater than Himself, or will something contrary to His being, Van Til replies that "God 114Loc. __C_i_t_. 11 SIbid. , p. 241 . 1161bid., p. 245. Particularism and Common Grace, p. 20. For definition of "Covenant," of. to this text, p. 27. 118 119Theology, p. 246 . Common Grace and Witness-Bearing, p. 5. -40- cannot exist otherwise than He exists. His will does not act independently of His nature. His will wills His nature as His nature comes to expression in His will."120 a. Hie Secret Will. God's will with respect to the universe 1'21 God's is considered in terms of "His secret and His revealed will. " will of decree is "secret" because man cannot know that will precisely or in detail. Moreover, it is the "source of all substance and power in the created universe, and is comprehensive; everything is derived from it"122 including creation, revelation, government, the work of Christ, election of sinners and reprobation of men, regeneration, sanctification, and the entire destiny of believers. While God as holy is incapable of sin, His secret decrees allow the creation of finite moral beings who could sin, and l, 123 although, says Van Til, the answers to these 124 for the existence of evi questions remain a mystery to finite man. b. HieRevealed Will. This concept establishes the regulations for human living, says Van T11, and though there seem to be conflicts between God's secret and revealed will, these are only apparent contradictions because of man's limitations.125 Van Til acknowledges the 120Loc. Cit, 121 Ibid., p. 247. 122 Loc. Cit. 123 Ibid., p. 248 124 Loc. cit, 125 Ibid., p. 251 . -41- difficulties in trying to understand how God can be absolutely determinative and man still exercise a measure of freedom, but he says that the Scripture reveals both of these doctrines which are necessary in order to avoid thinking of man as a helpless irresponsible victim of a blind fate.126 B. THE ETERNAL COUNSELS OF GOD While Reformed theologian5127 logically discuss the doctrine of Christ as an adjunct to the doctrine of the TYinity, Van Til apparently uses it to emphasize the need for God and man to be reconciled. Therefore it is possible to categorize it under his concepts of the eternal counsels of God, together with man, revelation, salvation, the church and eschatology. 1. THE DOCTRINE OF MAN Van Til's concept of man is related to his doctrine of creation and to his philosophy of reality or fact. The relation of God to man is the substance of his Apologetics, and he discovers the common ground for dialogue between the antithetical Christian - non-Christian presupposition in the image of God in man. a) 'I_‘_h__e_Image ef_ Coder; Man. To speak of the image of God in man is, for Van Til, to speak of the first man, Adam in paradise before the Fall. He makes no apology for this concept in spite of almost complete rejection of a literal Adam and 126Loc. cit. 1270f. A. H. Strong, Systematic Theology. -42- Eve by the bulk of modern thinkers, depending for his conceptions upon the Scriptural testimony of the Mosaic writings and the theology of Paul, whose doctrine of justification builds upon the analogy between the first Adam and Christ, the "second" Adam.128 (1) Personality. Although finite, man has God's image in both 1 a general and a narrow sense. 29 In the general sense, man has personality. Every act of man is a personal relationship to other men and God, but need not be at the "expense of the personal character of that which surrounds him."130 In dealing with himself or others, man deals with God's creation and therefore with the Creator. Personality is manifested in relationship to God's personality, will and interpretation of reality. (2) Finiteness. In the narrow sense of God's image, man reflects God's moral attributes; he had in Adam true knowledge, true right- eousness and true holiness, which were mutilated through rebellion but restored in personal relationship to Christ. The image of God always appears in both the general and narrow sense so that every act of man is d. "131 Man reveals a moral act, "an act of choice for or against Go righteousness and holiness or unrighteousness and unholiness in every act of knowledge. "The idea of disinterested or neutral knowledge is out of accord with the basic ideas of Christianity."132 128Genesis 2:1-4:l, Luke 3:38, Romans 5. I Corinthians 15- 129Defense, p. 13. 130Rushd001'leY: _B_y What Standard? , p. 142, quote from Van Til, Metaphysics QiApologetice, p. 64. Out of print. 131 Defense, p. 13. 132 Apologetiee, p. 14. -43- Man is also unlike God; he cannot participate in God's incommun— icable attributes of aseity, immutability, infinity, and unity.133 He never outgrows his creaturehood. .1134 Although originally it was "no burden to him, man now chafes under the awareness of his finite being and knowledge. He desires to know God and himself through and through. He struggles with the idea of mystery, asserting "That there is either no mystery for God or man, or there is mystery "135 for both God and man. In contrast, the Christian says that " There is mystery for man but not for God. "136 (3) Autonomous Man. Van Til avers that autonomous man rejects this "doctrine of his creation in the image of God, "137 replacing it with a '138 so that man can "metaphysics of correlativity between God and man' think analytically as God. Van Til rejects this implication of God and man being correlative, since then man would be self—sufficient. In order for man to make any true interpretation of any single fact, he would have to possess comprehensive and exhaustive knowledge of the universe causing him to face the dilemma of either being absolutely ignorant or absolutely omniscient. 139 133Defense, p. 14 . 134Loc. git. 135LOC. cit. 136 Loc. cit, 137Ibid., p. 81. 138 Chgistianityip Modern Theology, p. 19. 1 39Apologetics, p. 54. -44- (4) Pei_n_tef Contact. If then the Christian and non-Christian cannot agree on any common ground upon which to discuss the nature of man and reality, where is the point of contact between them? There must be basis for dialogue, otherwise they could not labor together in any area and the non-Christian would never be convinced of the Christian position. Is there some area upon which all may agree and is there a common method of perceiving this area? It will not do to assume at the outset that these questions must be answered in the affirmative. For the knower himself needs interpretation as well as the thing he knows . The human mind as the knowing subject, makes its contribution to the knowledge it obtains. It will be quite impossible then to find a common area of knowledge between believers and unbelievers unless there is agreement between them as to the nature of man himself. Rejecting the theories that assert a common area of intellectual 141 agreement between believers and unbelievers, or a common religious consciousness acting independently of God, 142 Van Til contends that the only point of contact is the image of God in man. 143 All men are them- selves revelatory of God and surrounded by God's revelation in nature.144 As rational and moral, man is the " ethically responsible reactor to revela- tion";145 his self-consciousness "presupposes God-consciousness."146 140Defense , p. 67 . 14113351., p. 68. , 142Psychologyp;Religion, p. 9, 10. 143Defense, p. 94. 144mg” p. 88, 89. 145 6Ibid., p. 90. LOC. cit. -45- Man is aware of his "inescapable sense of duty"l47 to reinterpret "the counsel of God as expressed in creation to himself individually and collec- tively."148 The image of God is man's "borrowed capital" which enables him to operate as a human being even though he may deny responsibility and relationship to God.”‘9 Man is therefore always "accessible to God."150 He is always in contact with these inescapable truths. "His efforts to hide this fact ..151 from himself are bound to be self-frustrative. The Christian can only be true to Scripture and "effective in reasoning with the natural man" by thus "finding the point of contact in man's sense of deity that lies under- neath his own conception of self-Consciousness as ultimate. "152 b) Man'js Relation Lo_Nature . Next to noting that man was created in God's image it must be observed that man was organically related to the universe about him. Man was to be prophet, priest and king under God in this created world. The vicissitudes of the world would to a large extent depend upon the deeds of man. As a prophet man was to interpret this world after God, as a priest he was to dedicate this world to God, and as a king he was to rule over it for God. In Opposition to this, all non-Christian theories hold that the vicissitudes of man and the universe about him are only accidentally and incidentally related. 147Apologetics, p. 55. LOC . cit . 14 9Defense, p. 94 . 150LOC. 91}. 151Ibid., p. 95. 152Loc. cit. 153Ibid. , p. 14. -46- In order to understand and fulfill his three-fold task, man was, even in Paradise, given revelation in nature and a "supernaturally communi- 1.154 cated positive revelation. Before the Fall, man larned God's purposes with respect to nature and himself through "direct positive revelation. "155 "156 "It was in this atmosphere of revelation that man lives and moves and has his being. Revelation describes his intimate relationship to the universe for which he is responsible, describes his origin and his goal, though none of this is given in detail, and man must continually refer to it. His speculation was always to be subject to revelation. His hypotheses with respect to the relation of any one fact of the universe to any other fact were always to be made within the limits of the presupposition that God rules and directs all things. Thus speculation, that is, intellectual articulation, was consciously subject to the sovereign directing activity of God.1 c) he Fall of Man. (1) Sin. Among Christian theologians, writes Van Til, only 158 159 the Calvinist takes sin seriously. Sin has blinded men to the truth and warped all aspects of their being so that they are totally depraved, i.e. , no area of their being is unblighted. The heart of man's existential guilt is this breakdown of his personal relationship to God, a breakdown brought 154Apolggetics, p. 29. lssSystematig Theology, p. 81. 156The Search ferMeaning. p. 66. 157 158 Apolggeticg , p . 98 . 159 Loc . cit . Loc . Cit . -47- about by man's own willful, rebellious transgression against God. Therefore, the "fall of man needs emphasis as much as his creation."160 If we accept the fact that man was created by God in temporal time, then we must also accept the fact "that soon thereafter man through disobedience sin."161 According to Van Til, the fall. of man is more complicated than believing that Adam merely ate from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. As a creature, man had to live in constant awareness of "the ordinances 162 that God had placed in His creation" which were endemic to man's being. Man's conformity to God's law was in accord with his own nature. The commandment forbidding contact with the knowledge/of good and evil was "only to force an immediate and final test as to whether man would really live in accordance with the law of God as everywhere revealed within and about him."163 In the fall, man sought his identity apart from God. He preferred his own resources. He "sought his ideals of truth, goodness and beauty somewhere beyond God, either directly within himself or in the universe about him. "164 Barth scoffs at the saga of "the speaking serpent" which he says belongs to natural history along with the physical resurrection of Christ, 165 160Defense, p. 14. 151.11.22.92. 1621_b_ig., p. 15. 163L22:1gu5 154312- 211.- 165Chriptianity and Barthianism, p. 14. of. to Intellectual Challereqp , pf the Gospel, p. 35. -48- but Van Til's philos0phy of history encompasses it as part of Satan's plan to destroy the work of God. Satan is a person, not an abstract principle of evil. The warfare is between God and Satan, the embodiments of good and evil. The natural or fallen man has become the bondservant of Satan. When Satan tempted Adam and Eve in paradise he sought to make them believe that man's self-consciousness was ulti- mate rather than derivative and God-dependent. He argued, as it were, that it was of the nature of self-consciousness to make itself the final reference point of all predication. . . that God had no control over all that might come forth in the process of time.166 To the extent that man accepts the monistic assumption of his own ultimacy he "misinterprets all things, flowers no less than God."167 The only thing that saves him from complete Capitulation to his "satanic princi- ple"168 is the "incubus of the sense of deity"169 engraved within his nature. (2) The Covenant Concept. God established a covenant rela- tionship with Adam in which he was always to live in accordance with God's laws and in return God would grant life and peace and would be eternally his God. Through Adam, God assigned mankind its covenant task”O whereby all men would interpret and rule the world aright as prophets, priests and kings . 1 66Defense, p. 92. 167Theolo . p. 27. 168L0C. 9.11- 169Loc. it. Particularism and Common Grace, p. 1 . -49- In this intricate manner the particular and the universal are from the outset of history intertwined with one another. God approaches the mass of mankind through one man as their representative and He approaches each individual human being throughout history through the mass of mankind that has been thus approached through one man. When John Brown is born he may find himself in Africa or in Europe; he may look into the mirror and find himself to be black or white. He may be unable to play ball with other children because of infantile paralysis or he may be a better ball player than his fellows. All the factors of his inheritance and environment are mediated through and are expressive of, the covenant relationship that God from the beginning established with mankind. All the facts of life about him speak of the mandate of God upon mankind, and therefore upon him. And all these facts also speak of the fact that mankind has , through Adam, broken the covenant with God. Thus , self-consciousness for John Brown is identical with covenant-consciousness. John Brown knows he is a covenant breaker to the extent that he knows anything truly at all. 171 The effects of sin upon man are manifold and devastating, requir- ing the restorative powers of the Trinity for salvation and enlightenment. In the fall, man surrounded God as well as himself with "pure contingency or pure irrationalism"172 in believing that God knew no more than he did about reality. At the same time his apostasy "expressed itself from the outset in the idea of the correlativity of pure rationalism and irrationalism. "173 Man's sin has become so pervasive and deceitful that he is unaware of the true nature of his apostasy. 1711bid., p. 2. 1”The Later Heidigger and Theology. 13. 34- 173Loc. Cit. -50- I He assumes that the abnormal state, introduced by his own disobedience, is normal. Since the fall apostate man is at enmity against God. He seeks, with all his God-given powers, to repress the voice of God speaking to him through Christ and His word. When the Christ of the Scriptures is presented to him with the promise of forgiveness of sins on condition of repentance, then this Christ is asked to show his credentials.17 Rebelliousness, argues Van Til, has brought man into intellectual and moral darkness175 so that he cannot receive the "things of the Spirit of God"175 which he sees only as foolishness. He represses God's revelational truths about himself "lest he should have to confess his own guilt, "177 affirming that because "no one has transgressed the law of love "178 of his Creator no one can possibly be condemned. In order to escape the ethical consequences of sin, man either affirms that evil will "eventually "179 or reduces "good and evil to correlatives of fade away into non-being one another."180 His suppression of truth has not only led him to cover up his guilt by denial, but eventually to a hatred of God. "When he speaks of the primacy of the ethical he does this only in the interest of making his own moral consciousness the ultimate source of right and wrong."181 But man faces "self-frustration"182 because "the laws of logic as God had 1741bid., p. 34, 35. 175The Intellectual Challenge of the Gospel. p- 4. 176I Corinthians 2:14 7Biblica1Ecumen§eL p. 6. 178 179 Loc.,__c_i:£. Loc . cit. 180Christianity and Modern Theology, p. 52. 181The Search i__ar Meaning pl Modern Thought, p. 78. lezTheology, p. 92. -51- created them in the universe were not broken by sin, but man's ability to use them rightly was weakened, and still it is true that in his logical interpretation man has , 1p the form of the matter, come very close to the truth . "183 d) Regenerate Man. As Ezekiel stood over the valley of dry bones in his vision and watched the Spirit of God breath into them and raise up a host of living men, 184 says Van Til, so the Christian watches Christ restore men to true knowledge, righteousness and holiness, albeit in principle only. Van Til here refers to the "three types of consciousness. "185 First, the "Adamic consciousness" was perfect and therefore unified, receptive to revelation, and acknowledged creaturehood. Secondly, "fallen or non-regenerate consciousness" claims normality, but " builds upon the non-Theistic asSumption, "186 denies creaturehood, is not 1.187 "receptive of God's revelation, wants to construct its own interpreta- tions , lacks unity because "it has cut itself loose from the only existing "188 source of unity, yet knows God and self "after a fashion, " and 183Loc. Cit. 184d. Defense, p. 80, The’quote from Warfield. cf. Ezekiel 37. 185M” p. 48. 186M“ p. 49. 137ng._§et_. 188Loc. g_i_t. -52- possesses "relative good." Thirdly, the "regenerate consciousness" has been restored to the Adamic consciousness in principle, recognizes its guilt and rebellion, acknowledges dependency and realizes that "it has been saved by grace";189 desires toreceptively reconstruct and possesses unity, "though not comprehensive unity. "190 e) Man's Freedom. To preserve God's ultimacy, Van Til holds that man is relatively free; free within the atmosphere of law; free within the sphere of God's personality. The idea that man is a "rational and moral being"191 is "not inconsistent with the idea that man lives under certain limitations . "192 Man's Character, rationality and environment limit freedom but do not absolutely determine his destiny. Man as a free agent is relatively free to be self-directive and self-determinative. His is not a Platonic kind of freedom that would make God a "finite god. . .an unknown and powerless God."193 2. THE DOCTRINE OF CHRIST a) $2923.1- The concept of the fall Of man lays the base for Van Til's presenta- tion of Jesus Christ. God and man are reconciled, communication is 1Boston Personalism, p. 4. 192Loc. Cit. 193Christianity_i_r_i_ Conflict, Vol. 1, part II, p. 95. -53- reestablished, and life is breathed into the spiritually dead by Christ as an operation of the "economical trinity."194 It was the second person of the ontological trinity, who was, in respect of his essence, fully equal with the Father, who therefore existed from all eternity with the Father, who in the incarnation assumed a human nature. This does not mean that he laid aside his divine nature or that he became a divine-human person. Nor does it mean that the divine and human natures were intermingled . . . .The Creed of Chalcedon has expressed all this by saying that in Christ the divine and the human natures are so related as to be 'two natures , without confusion without change, without division, without separation. '1 As such, while Jesus Christ in His incarnation "shares in the d, "196 at the same time He was incommunicable attributes of the Godhea a truly human creature. "Accordingly even in the incarnation Christ could not commingle the eternal and the temporal. The eternal must always remain independent of and prior to the temporal. "197 b) Hie Functions. In addition, Christ acted as the "true prOphet, priest and king, "198 in relation to all regenerated Christians . As Prophet, He reveals the will of God to man, becoming man's true wisdom and source of knowledge. In Christ the fallen consciousness is restored to the Adamic in principle and 19‘I‘Defense, p. 16 . 195LOO. 911:. 196Loc. cit . 197Apologeticp, p. 18. 198Defense, p. 17f. (also of. ADOIOjetiCS. D- 18f-) -54- "199 although this knowledge is only man is "reinstated to true knowledge, partial. As Priest, He sacrifices Himself to "satisfy divine justice and reconcile us to God, "200 making "continual intercession for us. "201 His death is the foundation for the gift of true knowledge, which at its root "202 involving both knowing and loving God. As "is an ethical question, King, Christ subdues, rules and defends His people and conquers their enemies. "It is only by emphasizing this organic connection of the aspects of the work of Christ that we can avoid all mechanical separation of the intellectual and moral aspects of the question of knowledge. "203 Rejecting Christ is, for Van Til, rejection of God as the Father, and "tantamount to hatred of God as the Father. "204 Conversely, true belief in one necessarily implies belief in the other. "He who is not a Christian is not, properly speaking, a Theist."205 Moreover, if a man does not know Christ as the Son of God, he neither understands Christ for what He truly is, nor does he truly understand himself as a man, nor truly "know reality for what it is ."206 As a result, he cannot "know the nature of the dialogue between God and man, nor the nature of dialogue between man and man . " 207 1991b1d.. p. 17. 200Loc. cit. , quote from the Westminster Shorter Catechism. 201Loc. g_1_t_. 202Loc. cit. 203Ibid.. p. 17. 18. 204Chri§_t and the Iewe. p. 10. 5Loc. cit. 61:99..- 9.1}- Lse- _c_i_t_- -55- c) Christ and Revelation. The questions here are: "What Christ to accept? How can we know Him if He speaks? Where does He speak? Can we separate the so-called historical 'facts' surrounding His life from their 'meaning'? These problems bear on the natures of history, Scripture and fact. Further, if possibility lies outside the being and will of God, then 'the very idea of God becoming man is logically impossible.'"208 Van Til disavows the viewpoints of theologians and philosophers who "assume that Immanuel Kant's view of man's absolute self-dependent freedom is the proper starting point for all human predication"209 because he claims that this viewpoint leads ultimately to complete subjectivity. 210 . . .one who starts with human autonomy unavoidably uses a principle of unification by which he will, in purely _a_ priori fashion, exclude the possibility of the direct identi- fication of God with the Christ of history. In fact one who starts with human autonomy must, in rejecting the self- attesting Christ, reject everything connected with Him. And this rejecting may be accomplished by direct denial or by reinterpretation. When Albert Schweitzer sought for the real Jesus behind the accretions of Gospel history, he despaired, for the supernatural elements were inextricably woven into its fabric of the Christ image. Barth also 208Christianity_i_p Conflict, Vol. I, part I, p. 18. 2091b1d., Vol.1, part III, p. 113. 210Loc. 93L, 21J‘Chpijstianitygp Conflict, Vol. 1, part II, p. 49. -56- seeks the Christ of faith apart from the so-called historical facts . Van Til feels that this effort is doomed to failure, and men face the alternative of either Choosing to join with the hostoric church and bow before the self-attesting and self-explaining Christ of the Scriptures or to construct a Christ-ideal from the materials of a self-existing and self-explanatory man. For the Christ that results from the effort at interpreting Him from historical documents not regarded from the start as the self-attesting Word of Christ, even if that Christ is a skillful combination of the 'historical Jesus' and the 'Christ of faith,‘ is yet no more than a projection of a man that does not need this Christ in any Case. Why teach men to herald, witness to and set forth the meaning of a Christ that cannot be ZflOélnd or, if He can be found, has no help to offer man? 3. THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION There is, says Ramm, "a sharp problem in any man's apologetic, "213 namely, as to how a man becomes a Christian. In view of the fact that Van Til "denies any common ground between Christians and non- Christians " 214 except in the image of God, unbelievers cannot be led from some neutral gound to Christian faith. How then does man come to God and to God-oriented philosophical position? a) Dynamic God-Man Relatienghip. Van Til's solution involves a dynamic, relationship between the Trinity and sinful man. It is not enough that God the Father and the Son should provide a potential salvation for man, but God the Spirit must also 212Ibid., Vol. 1, part I, p. 4. 213Ramm, op. cit., p. 203. 214Loc. cit, -57- apply to man the redemptive work of Christ. "Inasmuch as we are dead in trespasses and sins, it would do us no good to have a wonderful life- saving potion laid next to us in our coffin. It would do us good only if someone actually administered the potion to us. "215 The Spirit, then, takes the initiative in the matter of salvation, otherwise if man were able to reject God's particularistic offer of salvation, the redemptive attempts of Christ would be in vain. 216 Even if we say that in the case of any one individual sinner the question of salvation is in the last analysis dependent upon man rather than upon God, that is if we say that man can of himself accept or reject the Gospel as he pleases , we have made the eternal God dependent upon man. We have then, in effect, denied the incommunicable attributes of God. If we refuse to mix the eternal and the temporal at the point of creation and at the point of the incarnation we must also refuse to mix them at the point of salvation. b) Unorthodox Views . Van Til directs attention to views of the Christian Gospel "as d..218 visualized by the modern min which include combinations of the following points: First, that mankind commonly originates from some form of animal ancestry, in which creation ex nihilo219 is displaced in favor of "some form of saga, as a pictorial presentation, "220 215 216 2171bid. , p. 19. allowing a Defense, p. 18. Loc. g_i_t. 218The Intellectual Challenge p_f_ pile Gospel, p. 35 . 219Ex Nihilo = "out of nothing" 220 The Intellectual Challenge 9_f_ the Gospel, p. 35 . -58- purely impersonal, non-Christian interpretation of man's physical, biological and physiological factors. "This is the general view of Barth, Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr and many others. "221 Secondly, that evil is endemic in man as an integral part of his finitude. On this view, man was never created perfect; each is his own Adam. "As such each man originates sin in the absolute sense. "222 Thirdly, all mankind is actually saved through Christ. But in this View the term saved is not related to God's wrath and man's Objective guilt. Rather, "to be 'saved' in the modern theological circle means being 223 lifted up in the scale of being. " It has no reference to the nature of God, a standard for man's behavior, or a set of revealed propositions . For, on the modern view, God is no more than a hypostatiza— tion of man's own ideals. . .a God of whom nothing can be known, who cannot express His will, who cannot be sinned against, and who therefore cannot forgive sins or do anything to help man in his needs. He has no power over the world. He could not punish man if he would; in any case he would not because He does not exist in any sense that means any- thing to man. Finally, the popular conceptualization of the Gospel is the Christological interpretation225 where the Christ "stands for the ideal perfection of mankind . "226 221Loc. _o_it_. 22231131., p. 36. 223322-519 224112151... p. 37. 225M” p. 38. 226 Ibid. , p. 39. -59- Van Til charges the psychology of religion school with promoting the popular view of the Gospel by "ignoring the objective factor of redemp- "227 tion on the ground that "they were dealing only with the psychology of .1228 religious experience, a purely subjective phenomena. In reply, he says that if the Christian God does not exist, "and if there has been no objective process of redemption"229 by virtue of the suffering of Christ and the soteriological activity Of the Holy Spirit, then "there can be no such thing as regeneration in the sense that Christians conceive of ..230 regeneration, by definition and "implanting of the new spiritual life by the Holy Spirit into the souls of those who are in themselves dead in "231 The assumption of the psychology of religion trespasses and sins. school is that man acts univocally in an "ultimately impersonal environ- ment, "232 i.e. , that "when an is active, pe only i_s_ active"233independ~ ently of God. Similarly, He avers, though all Christian theories of salva- tion are supernaturalistic, they are defective if they fail to emphasize the ethical Character of man's sin and the particularistic concept of salvation. 4. THE DOCTRINE OF REVELATION In the apologetic of Van Til, God's person and eternal counsels are inseparable from His revelation of Himself to man, and He is motivated 227Psychology_<_),_f_Religion, p. 126. 228Loc. cit. 229Loc. cit. 230Loc. cit. 231Loc . cit . 2321bid., p. 133. 23 Loc. cit. -60- by His sovereign good pleasure and love; He does not_r_1eeglto reveal Himself but He has chosen to do so. Van Til consistently stresses three elements in the concept of revelation: First, God has plainly revealed Himself both in nature and in special communications; Secondly, Adam needed and sinful man still needs Objective, authoritative revelation; Thirdly, the Bible is the objective revelation. Van Til adds that the doctrine of the infallibility of the Scripture only claims integrity for the original manuscripts, not necessarily for the resultant versions or translations , nor is it a dictation theory of inspiration. "The personality of each writer of Scripture was 234 allowed full play, " but the prophets and apostles "were guided by the Spirit of God and. . .what they wrote was therefore infallible. "235 Accord- ingly, while Christians cannot solve all the problems raised by the phenomena of revelations, they accept Scripture's integrity "till the foundations of the rival position are investigated. "236 Moreover, the rival position is meaningless "unless men can show that they themselves have a final interpretation Of the facts of the phenomenal world to offer. "237 It is not stubbornnessor ignorance when we Claim that in the original manuscripts of the Bible, the Word of Christ has come into the world. All the 'phenomena of Scripture' as well as all the 'phenomena of science' need this revela- tion of God if they are to present anything but chaos . . .It 234Inteneetuai Challenge ef_ t_h__e_ Gospel. p. 26. 2351199 fl. 2361,22. _o_ii. 237L . Cit. -51- is impossible for you to bring any coherence into your experience, unless you make God's revelation through Christ in Scripture your starting point. Without the light of the sun you search in vain for anything. All the lights of human life, science, philosophy or theology derive their light from Scripture, or they convey no light at all. 5. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH The Westminster Confession's definition of the church is Van Til's definition: The catholic or universal church, which is invisible, consists of the whole number of the elect, that have been, are, or shall be gathered into one, under Christ the head thereof; and is the spous<§39the body, the full— ness of Him that filleth all in all. God plans salvation for his people and builds his true church, that is, the "invisible" church from the "whole number of the elect." "This does not preclude human responsibility. . .It only brings out clearly that God is absolute, here as elsewhere. "240 6. THE DOCTRINE OF ESCHATOLOGY When we come to the Christian conception of the 'last things, ' we see once more how diametrically the Christian position is set over against that of its Opponents. It becomes especially plain here that in the Christian conception of things interpretation precedes facts. Every Christian who trusts his future to God believes that God controls the future. . .that God has interpreted the future; he believes that the future will come to passsz. God has planned it. Prophecy illustrates this point. 382:9 Rege, p. 13. 39Westminster Confession of Faith, cf. "The Church," Vol. XXVII, part I, quoted in Defense, p. 20. 40The Confesgion ef 1967, p. 9. 241Deiense, p. 20, 21. -62- For, if God cannot control the future, then he is not God, and his promises of salvation are invalid. Thus Van Til emphasizes the integral relationship of man and the universe. When Christ prophesied the end 242 of the world he did it in terms of "the regeneration of all things" whereby man's salvation ushered in a "new heaven and a new earth in which righteous- ness shall dwell."243 The church lives "in the glory of that expectation. "244 In broad Outline then, it is seen how Van Til's presuppositional apologetic permeates his theology, and vice versa. It is now possible to view his concept of reality and ethics which underlay the concepts of the nature of man and consciousness. 244Triumph _o_fGrace, p. 120. CHAPTER III VAN TIL'S THEORY OF REALITY INTRODUCTION Raymond Aron once said: In a strict sense, all the sciences spring from a certain manner of interrogating the real, and this manner of interrogation is inspired or justified by a certain concep- tion of the structure of reality.24 One of the most perplexing elements of this structure has been the relation- ship between the one-and-the-many, or the unity that integrates the plural- ity of particulars. In an attempt to deal with the problem, Van Til develops ..246 a Christian "Paideia or theory of reality correlating the various concepts of being, knowledge and ethics; and places it in opposition to the "totality picture of non-Christian thought. "247 Yet, consistent to his own thesis, he only claims analogical knowledge of these areas, not total comprehension. In the debate, he borrows philosophical language but fills it with Christian concepts in order to be able "to contrast the Biblical idea of the Trinity with philosophical theories that are based upon human experience as ultimate. There is no pleading of "scientific neutrality, " for he 245Farber, ed. , PhilOSOphical Thought 1;; France and the United States, p. 302. 246 247 2481b1d., p. 181. Chrifistianitygp Conflict, Vol. 11, part I, preface. Defense, p. 24. -54- argues that such a notion is meaningless; "neutrality" is the assumption of autonomous man that he is able to approach reality with an objectively open mind as he compares his interpretations of facts with those of other men for theoretical validation. As Rushdoony says: Historically, this process has been worked out in Descartes, Berkeley and Hume to the conclusion that man never knows reality except by his ideas of reality. The question then arises, 'is there any valid reason for believing that as I think so reality is?‘ The Kantian answer is determinative of modern philOSOphy: Things-in-themselves can never be known. Our knowledge is confined to phenomena, thingi49 as they appear to us, never reaching the thing in itself. He holds that on this kind of basis there is no such thing as a given world with a given interpreation. It leads to the conclusions that no one can ever reach a valid knowledge of reality in itself and eliminates causality.250 According to Van Til's Paideia, the theory of being centers around the personal creator-creature relationship, the theory of knowledge deals 251 with the "relation between authority and reason, " and ethics focuses upon "the duties of man as he develops himself and the world in accordance with the principles of knowledge and being that undergirds the Paideia as a whole."252 249Rushdoony,2p. cit., p. 10. 250LOC. cit. ZSlChristianityE Conflict. _o_p. _i_t., preface. 252Loc. cit. -65- I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF BEING At the outset, Van Til differentiates between a Christian and non- Christian philosophy of being on the basis of his first presupposition of "God as the absolute, self-conscious Being, who is the source of all finite being and knowledge."253 Therefore, he posits a two-level view of being rather than speaking of "being-in-itself. " A. ETERNAL UNITY AND PLURALITY From Van Til's point of view, the first step in answering the one- and-many questions is "to distinguish between the Eternal one-and-many and the temporal one-and-many. . .because our conception of God as the 254 There is no "non- triune God stands at the center of our thinking. " being" over against God which defines Him, nor is there an abstract principle of being in which both God and man participate. God is the "255 who neces- "absolute personality and therefore absolute individuality sarily exists and who gives meaning to both the eternal and the temporal one-and—many. Idealist philosophy has set forth the notion of the concrete universal "to escape the reductio and absurdum of the abstract particular and the abstract universal. "256 Van Til puts the problem this way: 2 53Theology, p . 8 . 254Defense, p. 25 . 255Loc. it. 256Ibid. , p. 26 . -66- The many must be brought into contact with one another. But how do we know that they can be brought into contact with one another? How do we know that the many do not simply exist as unrelated particulars? The answer given is that in such a case we should know nothing of them; they would be abstracted from the body of knowledge that we have; they would be abstract particulars. On the other hand, how is it possible that we should obtain a unity that does not destroy the particulars? We seem to get our unity by generalizing, by abstracting from the particulars in order to include them into larger unities. If we keep up this process of generalization till we exclude all particulars, granted they can all be excluded, have we then not stripped these particulars of their particularity? Have we then obtained anything but an abstract universal? 257 He maintains that the non-Christian cannot answer these problems adequately, the modern philosopher no more than the ancient Greeks. Aristotle, he says, tried to solve it by employing a form-matter scheme in his theory of reality in conjunction with the law of contradiction. The latter is defined by Clark: The principle is this: the same attribute cannot attach and not attach to the same thing in the same respect. Or, other- wise, contrary attributes cannot belong to the same subject at the same time. This principle. . .is stated not merely as a law of thought, but primarily as a law of being. The onto- logical form is basic, the purely logical is derivative: it becomes a law of thought. 58 Aristotle's form-matter scheme was an eternal dualism, the form standing for "abstract-non-personal thought thinking itself, "259 and matter standing for the concept of pure chance or irrationalism. Another way to 2571mm. p. 25, 26. 258 Clark, Thales_t_c_>_Dew y, p. 98. 259 Christianity _ipConflict, Vol. 11, part I, p. 22. -57- look at it is to see matter as pure non-being and form as pure being or act. Matter is always in the process of becoming form; it has "potential being. "260 Form is pure rationality, pure thought, pure principle, God. A diagram of Aristotle's theory might look like this:261 ALRE’épflhl. faesliaWE: A&§VZO90 0D 7750ng QWIWM. (ouL ’39. (74 0‘50. .f lQKWMaMI _ L ' SENSITIVE SM 71' ' 3/0406)’ [fin-”Tenn”; saw. 1" 'ETR .ATHHEMANES s 5 .. . 7.:- ‘ 84/5/45 442/ \ Pam/u. Manse: Qggl/ -gw; Q/Rb‘ flaunt/sever NOTE: This is _a_lpgical, not Q chronological evolution. In this scheme, each lower level of being has potential for achieving a higher level of being; all is in process of becoming. At the bottom is pure individuation, the "many" of Greek philosophy. At the top is pure 2501mm, p. 9. 261Diagram taken from class notes. -68- unity. Aristotle hoped to create an all-inclusive theory of reality and knowledge and thus solve the problem of the one-and-the-many. It is, comments Van Til, "an attempt to combine an abstract principle of unity with an equally abstract principle of diversity."262 Aristotle is assuming that "all reality is amenable to the exhaustive logical manipulation by 263 man, " but to do this "he has to appeal to intuition or faith; not only so, he must appeal to faith in pure contingency as somehow furnishing the ..264 basis for the validity of logical demonstration. Aristotle's position is the same as that of Kant, "namely an island of regularity floating on a boiling cauldron of chance. "265 Van Til reasons that Hegel, Tillich, Maritain and the existential- ists also build upon Aristotle's form-matter scheme when they say that man is in the act of "becoming," that there are, as Maritain says, "degrees of "266 or that man is growing closer to participation in being and goodness, the being of God. If so, contends Van Til, then "why should God be said to be_h_;g_pe_r_ than man if God is himself enveloped by pure contingency except so far as he i_s_ pure contingency? "267 On such theory, all men are "in principle sons of God already through the idea of the analogy of being";268 there is no individuation left. 262mm,, p. 10. 2631.90. 2111.. 264Loc. cit. 265 266Orthodox Protestantism, p. 18. Quote from Maritain. _Slo _______Thomas and the ProBlem _o_f Evil, p. 5. 227mg” p. 25. 2 8Ibid., p. 26. Loc . cit . -59- Such a position, he says, which underlies the whole of modern philoSOphy, theology and science, cannot solve the one-and-the-many. Only the Christian doctrine of the Trinity gives an answer and demonstrates the true concrete universal. "In God's being there are no particulars not related to the universal and there is nothing universal that is not fully expressed in the particulars. "269 Nothing is hidden in God's being, in whom "possibility is identical with reality and potentiality is identical with actuality. "270 B. TEMPORAL UNITY AND PLURALITY Van Til asserts that since there is no such thing as an Aristotelian- potentially-active-non—being, nor an abstract Platonic principle of being over against God, it is natural to hold that there is a realm of temporal one-and-many created by God. The doctrine of creation then becomes , for Van Til, the core of his doctrine of fact. He says that the temporal one-and-many are equal in terms of their derivation and dependency upon the "God who sustains them both. "271 Their relations to each other are ordained so that "the particulars or facts of the universe do and must act in accord with universals or laws. There is order in the created universe. "272 The ultimate universal is God from whom all other facts and universals derive their meaning. If, on the other 269Defense, p. 26. 270Apologetics, p. 6. 271Defense, p. 27. 272LOC. Cit. -70- hand, it would be true that the universe were composed of self-contained facts, or if man's mind alone could interpret facts, then it would logically follow that God would be extraneous. l. SUBORDINATION Van Til makes three points relating to the above. First, although all temporal facts or laws are basically equal, "there is a relation of sub- ordination between them as ordained by God. "273 The teleological laws are higher than the mechanical laws, and the will and intellect of man supersede the physical aspects of the universe. So man is spoken of as having dominion over God's creation in order to subdue it as prophet, priest and king. In turn, he is to learn subordination to the will of God. Man and the physical universe are thus intimately related; the destiny of the latter depends upon that of the former. 2. GENERALIZATION Secondly, God's laws are but His generalized operations with the particulars. At any time, God may "take one fact and set it into a new "274 relation to created law. All particular facts are subject to His will. This is Van Til's rationale'for miracles which "are at the heart of the Christian position."Z75 Nowhere does the Christian position allow that "the being of God and the being of man are united with one another ,- "276 273Loc. Cit. 274Loc. cit. 275 Loc, Cit. 276The Case for Calvinism, p. 20. -71- which is the presupposition supporting the popular rejection of miracle. Miracle forms part of the "larger circle of redemptive works"277 generating the incarnation, death and resurrection of Christ. Nor may the fact of miracle be fit into a pragmatic scheme of "abstract impersonal logic, logic which virtually asserts that the facts Cannot possibly display the plan of God. "278 It only fits into the notion of the self-contained ontolog- ical Trinity. Again the physical and historical elements in miracles cannot be removed in order to allow them to be merely interpreted "theologically "279 for then they must either be denied as historical and redemptively fact, or else accepted as historical fact without religious significance. Rather, miracle is "a mode of revelation"280 whereby God fulfills his redeeming work and "destroys the power of sin"281 in man. 3. THE BASIS OF SCIENCE Thirdly, Van Til asserts that God-created and interpreted fact lays the only proper foundation for science. "God makes the facts to be what they are, "282 and the facts are all related to a larger whole sustained by God's counsel. A blade of grass is not a "brute fact" dissociated from 277Evidences, p. 56. 78 Theology, p. 18. 2791b1d., p. 68. 2801b1d., p. 130. 281Loc. cit. 2 2 8 Defense, p. 147. -72- Chance has no place in God's universe. The all other "brute facts." facts of mathematics, the facts of history, of life, only are "subordinately and derivatively important"283 and cannot be disentangled from coherent principles of interpretation. Without the undergirding of the Christian (Calvinistic) philosophy of reality, man sinks into a "sea of contingency" and irrationalism. On autonomous principles he can know nothing truly. This involves Van Til in the scientific ideal set before science. This goal is "complete comprehension."284 Evaluated from Van Til's point of view, such a goal "wipes out the basic distinction between the Creator and the creature"285 and therefore makes two errors: first, it fails to realize that God has already reached the scientific ideal, and, secondly, it puts man in the impossible situation of trying to gain exhaustive comprehension of all things. This ideal mani- fests itself in all branches of science in the current determinancy- indeterminancy debate.286 Van Til contends that, in practice, scientists assume the equal relevancy of both. On the one hand, determinancy under- lies the concepts of prediction, statistical averages and physical laws, and on the other hand, such problems as exceptional cases,287 discreteness ‘ 283Ibid., p. 148. 284 Evidences, p. 57, cf. also ChrieganityipConflict, Vol.1, part II, p. 43f. 285Loc. cit. 286 Ibid. p p. 95-980 287Loc. cit. -73- 290 288 and man's apparent freedom argue probability , 289 of sensations, for indeterminancy. Again, Van Til finds that the doctrines of creation and providence as elements of God's revelation point toward the solution of this apparent paradox. All existence, and meaning, the laws of mathematics and physics, even time itself are not eternal principles , but God-created modes of finite existence291 revelatory of the nature of God who determines all things. C. SIN AND ITS CURSE The Clearness of this revelation is obscured by the all-pervasive effects of the sin of man, the opposition of Satan to God, and the subse- quent curse of God upon the world. These aspects, he writes, must be 292 accounted for in any concept of temporal being. God has entered temporal time in the person of His Son to reconstruct the whole and set it right. 293 SUMMARY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF BEING In Van Til's metaphysics there is a two-layer theory of reality: eternal ultimate being and temporal analogical being. The relationship 288_I_b_i_c_i. , p 21. 28911319., p. 22. 290Christianity ijonflict, Vol. I, 2, p. 45 and 108. 291Theology, p. 66. 292Defense, p. 28. 293 Loc . cit . -74- between the two is not conceived of primarily in terms of principle, but 294 God's being is not subject to becoming and Change. nor as personal. is it a function of time.295 All of these properly belong to temporal reality. In the Ontological Trinity are ultimately resolved the paradoxes of unity and diversity, determinancy and indeterminancy, time and eternity. Sin and its resultant condemnation have obscured and complicated man's grasp of these ideas, but God's remedial work in Christ provides the ground for and adequate epistemology. II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE Van Til makes it plain that "our theory of knowledge is what it is because our theory of being is what it is. "296 As his concept of being was taken from the Bible, so he feels compelled to look there for his epistemology. 29 7 The business of philosophy is to ask "How do we know? "298 and the Christian answer is that true knowledge must correspond to God's 299 knowledge. If man argues that true knowledge is to be found by appeal to some neutral area of uninterpreted fact, or to some level of knowledge 2941mm, p. 29. 295Loc. EIL- 296Ibid., p. 32. 297Loc. cit. 2981mm, p. 33. 299Loc. _o_it_. -75- or being apart from God, then in effect, he denies the ultimacy of God's 300 301 being and authority, which denial was the core of Adam's sin. Once again Van Til introduces the doctrine of sin. Sin has ruined 302 so that he cannot understand or 303 man's perceptual and emotional fields yield to God's interpretation without the regeneration of the Holy Spirit. Sin manifests itself in the field of knowledge whenever man asserts himself as ultimate, refuses God's authority, and fails to correctly interpret the natural phenomena of God‘s general revelation of Himself.304 A. GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF HIMSELF .1305 Van Til posits a "two-layer theory of knowledge, that of the self-determinative God306 who knows Himself exhaustively and analytically , 307 308 as the object of knowledge, and that of man who knows analogically. God does not have to look beyond Himself309 nor even within Himself for self—knowledge.310 As God, He knows analytically or in self- dependence, i.e. , He does not Obtain knowledge by comparing or contrasting 300Ibid., p. 34. 301 Loc. cit. 302 Ibid. , p. 35. 303 Loc. cit. 304 305Loc. cit. 306 Loc. cit. 307Ibid. , p. 37. 308mg” p. 39. 309 Ibid., p. 37. 310Loc. cit. Loc. _o_f_t. -75- 311 Himself with being or non-being; He knows "by one simple eternal act "312 of vision. Therefore, it can be said that in God "the real is the rational and the rational is the real."313 Van Til observes that this point is vital because modern theories of knowledge depend essentially upon the Platonic and Aristotelian logic that God neither knows Himself nor man nor the universe, and is Himself 314 unknowable; whereas upon Christian terms, human knowledge of both God and man is possible because of the internal coherence of the Trinity.315 Though God is eternally incomprehensible, 316 He has revealed Himself to man, and it is therefore unnecessary to rest upon any such doctrine as the primacy of the intellect in order to establish a basis for human knowledge. 317 B. GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD In dealing with the nature of God's knowledge of things beyond 318 God had a plan for the 319 Himself, Van Til turns to the creation doctrine. universe from all eternity, though the universe pe_r__s_e_ is not eternal. But this creates a problem. If God's self-consciousness is coterminous 31 1149.2- 21.11.- 312Loc. cit. 314 Christianity in Conflict, 1, part 2, p. 31. 315Theology, p. 22. 316Ibid., p. 159. 317Ibid., p. 161. 318Defense, p. 37. 319 Loc . Cit . -77- with His being, "would it not seem to follow that God's knowledge of the universe is to be identified with the being of the universe?"320 i.e. , if God eternally knew of the universe, must not the universe eternally exist? After all, if man's self-awareness presupposes £1.53. existence, does not God's awareness of the world also presuppose existence of it? In reply, Van Til says that the very analogical quality of human logic is also its weakness; man always thinks in terms of his own limitations. This is "the most basic contrast conceivable between a Christian and non-Christian theory of . "321 knowledge, the former interpreting "reality in terms of the eternally "322 and the latter seeing it as independ- self—conscious divine personality ent of God. God knew the universe and His plan for it prior to its actual existence. C. MAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD Man's knowledge is "analogical of divine knowledge. "323 The question Van Til asks is, can man have true or objective knowledge of God, can "we get back to God by the road that He has used to create us? "324 He replies that, apart from the ethical complications of sin, it follows that if God is a self-conscious Being wo "exists necessarily as a self-complete ..325 system of coherence and men are created as self—conscious image- 320_I_b_i_g_,, p. 38. 321Loc. cit. 322Loc. cit. 3231bid., p. 39. 32 41bid. , p. 40. 325Loc.£p;. -78- ..326 bearers, then men "must have true knowledge of Him. This knowledge 327 need not be comprehensive to be true. Furthermore, the relation between God and man is rational, and Christianity is "an absolute rationalism, "328 while "all other systems of epistemology believe in ultimate irrationalism. "329 He affirms that non-Christian epistemology does allow for certain types of authority that are in keeping with its principle of autonomy. First, there is an authority that is based upon "the existence of the endless 330 multiplicity of factual material. " Time and pure factuality are seen as ultimate and contingent upon chance and irrationalism. This authority rests upon Kant's thesis that the moral and religious aspects of man as well as his intellect are able to come into contact with ultimate experience, 331 and thus gives room for both faith and reason. Yet, in Kant's noumenal realm of faith, man can never be really sure of his knowledge of God.332 This is, responds Van Til, essentially a Greek idea in which God is an impersonal, unknowable, abstract principle.333 Such an idea of "pure factuality or chance is the best guarantee that no true authority. . .will ever confront man . " 334 326LOC. cit. 3271bid., p. 41. 328Loc. cit. 329Loc. Cit. 330Ibid. , p. 124. 3311bid., p. 125. 332 Christianityyie Conflict, I, 2, p. 46. 33Ibid., p. 82. 334Defense, p. 126. -79- The second kind of authority acceptable to natural man "springs from the fact that even that which the intellect does assert about the objects of knowledge is, of necessity, involved in contradiction,"3351.e. , that all logical assertion about phenomena must be "self—contradictory in charac- ter"336 because Chance is irrational. On this basis, says Van Til, reality is always reduced to mere perceptualization, 337 a way of seeing things. There can, again, be no true and objective authority, only a relative kind. If "reality" can be spoken of, it must only be in the terms of inward thought and self-experience. 338 Finally, there is the authority of the expert. D. MAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNIVERSE By the term "universe," Van Til means "the whole of the created world including man himself and his environment."339 Man's ultimate environment is God, and therefore is personal.340 His immediate environ- ment contains other finite persons and things intimately related to each 341 other under God's control. Theworld of objects was created for man 335Loc. cit. , Van Til here refers to F. H. Bradley, Appearance 53—99. Reality which details this position. 336LOC. cit. 337Ibid., p. 127. 338Christianity_i_r_1_ Conflict, I, l, p. 12. 339Defense, p. 42. 340 341L92- .c_1_t. Loc . cit . -80- 342 On this basis alone. Van Til hOIdS' 343 the subject to interpret under God. can man think of objective knowledge. If man's knowledge is both partial and true, then the problem of "antinomies" or paradoxes is more clearly understood.344 It would seem that if God controls, knows, and interprets all things, then man cannot 345 add anything to this system. The historical would be meaningless, scientific endeavor fruitless. One cannot add water to a full bucket. 346 But if God is completely coherent and man is not, then man has to learn to live with apparent ambiguity and with the faith that all phenomena is ultimately coherent. 347 Van Til depends upon Dooyewerd for the argument that science is totally dependent upon the Christian presupposition for its principle of coherence. Partial truths are insufficient in themselves; they are only truths in the context of theoretical truths which presuppose the totality 348 of truth. For example, "the proposition 2 x 2 = 4 is not 'true in itself,‘ but only in the context of the laws of number and the logical laws of 3421mm, p. 43. 343Loc. cit, 344Ib1d., p. 44. 345Ihid., p. 45. 346Loc._c_:_i_i;. 347 Theology, p. 43. 348Ch1’_ietianity igConflict, II, 3, p. 52. -81- thought. "349 The function of science is to find the revelational truths of God in the whole of created reality.350 Controlled by the Christian pre- supposition, the scientist rules out certain hypotheses that deny the systematic relationship of the universe to God.351 The natural man suppres- ses this at every point in his knowledge of things, 352 being restrained only by the gift of God's common-grace.353 By the same common-grace principle, Christian and non-Christian can cooperate in scientific and humanitarian enterprises.354 Simultaneously, the Christian must challenge the entire freedom-nature scheme of autonomous man in the interest of showing that on its terms the methods of science, theology and philosophy "lead from nowhere into nothing . " 355 E. SIN AND ITS CURSE As in his theory of being, so Van Til feels compelled to introduce the problem of sin and condemnation into his theory of knowledge, for "the question of knowledge is an ethical question at its root. "256 True knowledge 349Loc._c:_i’§_. 350Defense, p. 97. 3511hid., p. 99, of. Theology. p. 15. 352 Theology, p. 15 . 353Defense, p. 174, 175. 354Loc. cit. 355Case for Calvinism, p. 109. 356Defense, p. 17. -82- is not only intellectual assent to propositions, but "knowing and loving God. "357 To know the world truly is to know God truly, and this is the 358 work of Christ. He adds, "From what has been said, it has already become apparent that it is through Christ that the unity of science is to be attained . " 359 Seen in this light, the Christian can no longer imagine the sinful mind to be "normal. "360 Christ transforms the fallen consciousness into 361 regenerate consciousness that now desires once more to be "receptively reconstructive"362 concerning "the revelational material in which he lives, moves and has his being."363 Apart from Christ, man's mind is character- 364 ized by s elf—frustration . SUMMARY OF THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE Van Til affirms that it is beyond human capacities to integrate the antinomies of determinism and indeterminism into a meaningful combin- 365 ation. On the intellectual basis of autonomy either man has to claim 357LOC. _C_i_t_. 358Loc. c_:_1_t. 3591b1d., p. 154. 350mm,, p. 48. 36111113. , p. 49. 352Loc.£p;. 363Inteiieetuai Challenge, p. 14 . 364Theology, p. 92 . 365Inteiieetuai Challenge, p. 40. -83... that both are absurd, claim to have comprehensive knowledge, or claim to know nothing. On the Christian two-layer theory of knowledge man has the only coherent foundation for science. On this basis man does not need exhaustive knowledge to have objective and true knowledge. Sin has obscured man's knowledge, but common-grace enables Christian and non-Christian to cooperate. The foundation of knowledge is essentially Christological . III. THE PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICS Sooner or later, says Van Til, all ethical writers must deal with 366 Van Til relies on the man's summum bonum, criterion and motivation. simplicity of the Reformed Confessions that the highest good of man is the glory of God.367 In the temporal realm, God is glorified when His kingdom becomes man's summum bonum, His revealed will man's criterion, and His life-giving Spirit motivates man to obey and love Him.368 Relating his philosophies of being and knowledge to ethics, Van Til claims that, surrounded by revelation and possessing God's image, "man's very constitution as a rational and moral being is itself revelational to man, 369 and, that God's revealed moral attribute of goodness "forms 366Defense , p. 51 . 367cf. Westminster Confession, question 1. 368Defense, p. 51 . 369Apologetics , p. 55 . -84- "370 the foundation of true Christian ethics. In contrast, the ideal in every non-Christian ethic is said to be "no more than an abstract principle "371 subject to the ultimacy of change372 because nothing "373 of goodness prevents "man from making himself his ownegmmum bonum. Nor can any "non-Christian system of thought find a solution for the question of '374 as long as its God is finite, powerless and human responsibility' unknowable.375 Van Til wonders if there can be any meaning in ethical words like obedience, disobedience, love and hate apart from "the back- ground of the self-determinate triune God of Scripture. "376 I The basic differences between Christian and non-Christian ethics in Van Til's view are, first, "the acceptance, or denial, of the ultimately self-determinative will of God";377 secondly, the non-Christian assumption of the "ultimacy of chance that either makes the determinate good an achieve- ment, or it sets the good out of relation to its environment, and therewith destroys its value, "378 and thirdly, the non-Christian idea that man's 370 Theology . p . 238 . 373Loc. cit. 37411616., p. 251. 375ghristianityei Conflict, I, 2, p. 94, 95. 376Theology of Lamee Daane, p. 119. 377 378 Defense, p. 62. Ibid.. p. 61. -85_ "379 moral activity is "creatively constructive vs. the Christian idea of it being "receptively reconstructive. "380 A. THE SUMMUM BONUM OF ETHICS: THE KINGDOM OF GOD Whenever Van Til discusses the Christian summum bonum, he does it in terms of original man in the state of righteousness. Only this is "the "381 by which all other theories of the summum normal state of affairs ppm must be judged. 1. THE SUMMUM BONUM IDEALLY CONSIDERED: THE INDIVIDUAL According to Van Til, God desired man to set before himself the ideal of the glory of God, 382 that man would seek His glory directly in religious activity and indirectly in ethical activity.383 These distinctions are seen merely as a matter of emphasis in the temporal sphere because "strictly speaking, God's glory cannot be increased. "384 As emphases , however, religion tends to deal with the will of man in the act of adoration to God, while ethics is more concerned with the “driving and directing forces" of personality in the act of Obedience385 to God as these are expressed in dealings with fellow men. Both religion and ethics deal with 386 the whole personality in terms of the intimate relationship of the 379ibid., p. 53. 380 381Ethics , p. 53. 332mm,, p. 38. 383 Loc. cit. Loc. __c__i_t_, 384Loc. Cit. 3851bid., p. 40. 38 Ibid., p. 39. —86- 387 388 individual with society through historical process as "revelatory of God and as genuinely significant for the development of God's purpose with the universe . " 389 The most vital aspect in realizing the kingdom of God as the Ideal "390 is that man sees himself as "God's vicegerentip history. Man is 391 as the head of all creation. All "392 SO given a central place in the universe things in the universe are in "covenant relation with one another that even the flowers of the field glorify God "indirectly and consciously through man."393 As King over God's domain, man ought, above all, to seek self-realization as the most direct way of glorifying God. 394 Man realizes himself in three ways. First, he learns to develop his own will 395 To serve God spontaneously, "man's will ..396 to its highest capacities. needs to become increasingly spontaneous in its reactivity. He becomes increasingly sensitive to his "subordination" to God and his 387LOC. cit, 388Loc. cit. 389Ibid. , p. 40. 390 3.13.1.4- : p. 41. "Vicegerent: acting in the place of another, " Wins ton Dictionary. 391L9c. cit. 392Loo. cit, 393Loc. Cit, 39411911., p. 41, 42. 395Loc. _c_i_t_. 396Loc. cit. _87- "coordination" to his fellow men and "therefore increasingly spontaneous in his desire to maintain these relationships . "397 His will develops as he exercises obedience to God. "A neutral will cannot develop because it cannot function. " 398 Secondly, "man's will needs to become increasingly fixed i it 400 self-determination"399 as he reflects the self-determination of God. "An unstable man would be useless in the Kingdom of God";401 so he needs solidity of moral character. This self-determination refers to "man's subconscious processes as well as to man's self-conscious processes. "402 Thirdly, "man's will must increase ip_ momentum. " His area of activity grows larger in proportion to his responsibility, spontaneity and determination. In respect to this self-realization, says Van Til, all believers should Oppose the commonly held notions of determinism and indeterminism 404 which "place man in an impersonal environment" that excludes God. 397Ib1d., p. 43. 398 399Ihid., p. 42. 400Loc. cit. 401LOC. c H t 4021161d., p. 46. 4031bid., p. 42. 4O4Ibid., p. 44. T l 11 Till TI TI" I 5" T -88- "This is of the utmost significance for the proper conception of his free- "405 dom. For man to be free, there must be nothing in his environment or 1.406 in himself that would prevent him from doing God's wil Van Til qualifies this in reference to the types of psychology that find determinism 407 in the drives and instincts of the "sublimal self" motivating man. He says that man was created to be a replica of God, though he could not, as a temporal being, be entirely self-conscious. "Man can never become pure act as God is pure act. "408 for man is subject to change. Neverthe- less, as originally created his "will controlled his subconscious life, while after the fall man's sub-conscious life controlled his will."409 Man "410 now has become the "slave of his instincts which are turned against God. Thus man has lost his freedom to become self—realized apart from grace in Christ and the empowering activity of the Spirit.411 2. THE SUMMUM BONUM IDEALLY CONSIDERED: SOCIETY The immediate task of society is "the self-realization of every finite personality , " 4 1 2 405 406Loc. _c 407 bi . p. 45. 408LOO. 911. 409 41()Loc. cit. but presently this is hampered by the necessity to g... t 1: Loc. C H- H 0.. Loc . cit . 411 412Ethics , p. 47 . Christianipylp Conflict, I, 1, p. 6. -89- repair the damages of sin.413 If the mind and will of man had not been effected by sin the successive generations could have accomplished unlimited achievements, and self-realization of each individual in developing spontane— ity and power of the will would "bring about righteousness in society. "414 Competition would only serve to enhance other men not destroy them.415 In contrast, Van Til says, any ethic that depends upon the "principle of individuation is ultimately non-rational. "416 On such a principle one man's personality can only be developed "by way of contrast to other men's individual personalities. "417 Law will be seen only in formal, abstract .1418 terms "correlative to non-rational individuality, making it imperative for each man to make his own applications. Self-realization would then be 419 at the expense of society as a whole, whereas in the New Testament sense, every member of society has a function within the whole organism.420 Christian ethics, implies Van Til, favors prosperous use of the world because it does not view matter as evil per ee, as does Thomas 413Loc. cit. 4141mm, p. 48. 415 of. to Van Til's discussion of Kant's theory that the ethical self must be sufficient to itself in order to be truly free. In Modern Ethical Theories , Chapter III, "Speculation and Revelation," p. 22f. 416Loc. cit. 417Loc gi_t_. of. p. 62, 63. 418Loc. cit. 419Ibid. , p. 49 . 420LOC. Cit. -90- 421 Aquinas, or Arminianism to a lesser degree; neither does it posit pros- perity,422 happiness, 423 utility,424uor good will425 as ends in themselves nor as non-rational principles, nor as means to an end, only as the by- products of seeking the Kingdom of God. There must be no ulterior motives in seeking God's glory.426 3. THE NON-CHRISTIAN SUMMUM BONUM Van Til charges that all non-Christian ethics take for granted 427 the normality of present existence which assumes that there will "never be a perfect world."428 Correlative with this is the assumption of inherent 429 evil in matter, although this may sometimes be referred to as "irration- ality."430 This, he says, effects a psychological dualism; either the 431 as in rational and the sensual are seen in continuous internal strife, Greek thinking, or as in modern times, "ethics tends to become an art of skillfully manipulating the drives and instincts of man in order to accomplish 4211bid., p. 49, 50. 422Loc. _c_:_i_t. I id., p. 51. Ibid.. p. 52. 4251bid., p. 53. Ibid., p. 55, of. Defense, p. 62. 429Ibid., p. 56, 57, Cf. also PsychoanalysispiReligion, p. 127. 43°Chrpgianity p; Conflict, I, 2, p. 73. 4311bid., p. 60. -91- the greatest amount of good and prevent the greatest amount of evil"432 on the belief that man lacks a "definitely and intellectually conceived goal."433 On the other hand, Christian ethics sees man as originally created as a whole personality in perfect harmony with himself, hence tries to avoid the intellectualistic-voluntaristic dualism.434 Society is also seen as an integrated whole. Although nations seem to have unique characteristics because God gave them different gifts, 435 He intended those gifts to be used for all peoples. There is more than just a "concidental resemblance between the various ethical ideals of "436 437 various peoples. It is imperative to think of the family of man, 438 This principle of an organismic not just "an aggregate of individuals . " society provides the proper basis for parental authority, whereas the princi- ple of individuation runs either to the perverted extremes of parental autocracy or of the autocracy of the child, or also replaces the autocracy of the king with a "false democracy which seeks the ultimate source of authority in the multitude of men, without recognition of God."439 The 432 Loc. 21L. 433Loc. cit, 434Loc. cit. 435Ibid. , P. 61 . 436Loc. _c_i_t_. 437Loc. _c_i_’t_. 4”Ibid., p. 62. 439 Loc . cit . -92- middle-of—the-roader ideal man of Aristotle is no solution either, for it subverts "the idea of the possibility of a perfect man. "440 4. THE BIBLICAL SUMMUM BONUM Van Til postulates four differences between Old and New Testament ethics in relation to the Biblical _scummum bonum.441 First, all Scripture speaks of an absolute ethical ideal. Secondly, the Kingdom of God is a gift. Thirdly, a part of the task of realizing that kingdom is absorbed in eradicating the works of evil. Fourthly, the ideal will never be realized in the present world. Christian ethics must concentrate on the "original existence of a «442 perfect man, a concept only found in the Old and New Testaments.443 In the light of the absolute requirements of perfection in the moral law/144 445 the promises to Israel of a permanent country, and the progressive nature of revelation,446 it is easier to understand the reasons for the threats and penalties incurred by disobedience.447 In both Testaments "the reward d..;448 for obedience is that of eternal life in the presence of Go with no 440mm,, p. 63. 4411mm, p. 68. 442Loc. cit, 443 Loc. cit. 444Loc. cit. 4451b1d., p. 69. 446Loc. git. 447Loc, _<_:_i_t. 448Loc. cit. -93- concept of an in-between state for immortal souls; it is an either-or. Apart from God the woe is eternal and complet .449 In Scripture, says Van Til, "the sin of man is definitely set forth as the cause of all physical evil. "450 Consequently, every act has moral significance.451 The Old Testament ordinances on hygiene and the burial of the dead taught that evil was introduced by man and has no place in God's world; disease is abnormal and man responsible.452 The joy of the Kingdom-ideal is that God effects a perfect redemp- tion through Christ, delivering men from sin and re-establishing the princi- ple of harmony in the inward man and between men.453 The task of Biblical ethics is "the destruction of evil within man and round about man, moral and physical. "454 This is the negative but unavoidable task of every believer;455 for sin insults the holiness of God and prevents man's self-realization.456 At the same time, this negative aspect of Christian ethics has brought unfavorable criticism, especially when the Old Testament required destruction of God's enemies.457Van Til 449Loc. cit. 45°1b1d., p. 70. 4511b1d., p. 71, 452Loc. cit. 453mm,, p. 72—74. 454mm” p. 75. 455Loc. cit. 456Loc. cit. 457Ibid., p. 77. -94- argues that the Old Testament goal had to be reached in externalistic fashion while in New Testament times it is done in "more spiritual or internalistic ways . "458 Lastly, the Biblical summum bonum is other-worldly; it is "an ethics of hope. "459 The Christian looks for the complete renovation of the ..460 universe "in God's own good time. In that h0pe, he looks for perfect righteousness in his resurrection in Christ.461 B. THE CRITERION FOR ETHICS: GOD'S REVEALED WILL Van Til claims that the notion of a moral or "common consciousness" is insufficient as the standard for Christian ethics for it has too many contra- dictions.462 The only way, he says, that we can prOperly imagine the propriety of a moral consciousness is if it "has never functioned apart from God, "463 a position rejected by non-Christian ethics .464 Van Til does not deny that a general moral consciousness exists , but that man's perception of right and wrong has been subverted by sin, and that in cases where there is conflict between intuition or conscience, and revealed principles, the latter must always prevail.465 458Loc. 913. cf. also p. lO4f. 459 _I_b_i__c_l., p. 80. 460fl.£lt_. 46113331.. p. 104. 4529191., p. 113. 45313131., p. 115. 464Loc. cit., of. discussion of Windelband, Modern Ethical Theories, I, p. 1-6. 4651bid., p. 119. -95— The only logical standard of ethics for the Christian is "in the revealed will of God, "466 and centers in the doctrines of God, creation, the fall of man and of redemption in Christ.467 Its foundation also rests in the convenantal relationship between God and man.468 C. THE MOTIVATION BEHIND ETHICS: REGENERATION l. SIN AS ETHICAL Van Til Opposes any ethics that views man's sin as an aspect 469 of his finiteness or as metaphysical tension470 because these both "471 and therefore a "low view of the atonement. "472 imply a "low view of sin By such methods, he writes. it is possible to obliterate the concepts of the substitution of Christ for man, the transference of sin to Him and the need for miraculous grace.473 The Christian needs to affirm the ethical basis of sin and the total depravity of man in order to proclaim the neces- 474 sity of God's grace and the regeneration of the Spirit. 466 bid. , p. 116. 457Defense, 1). 66. 4680Mistianity_i_rl Conflict, I, 3. P. 138. 469Defense. p. 53; m, p. 36; Intellectual Challenge, p. 35. 470g§§§fgg Calvinism, D. 91f. 4710m1gianity gr Conflict, I, 2, p. 59. 4721-29-91}.- 473_1_1_3_1_g_,,,1,1, p. 7. 474Ib1dol 1! 31 p0 123' Cf. Defense, p. 54. -96.. 2. THE REGENERATED CONSCIOUSNESS Although the consciousness is reinstated, it is merely so in principle.475 Nevertheless it now serves as a "reference point."476 However it must constantly test itself and sharpen its sensitivity to the inward work of God by regular contact with the revealed will of God in the 477 since it often errs. It is the work of the Holy Spirit to Scriptures, enable man to submit his consciousness to an objective standard outside of itself.478 However, moral consciousness implies responsibility, and if regenerate man must learn to obey the revealed will of God as his rule of faith and practice, how can he develOp his self-determination? Van Til's answer to this is the Reformed doctrine of the "Adiaphora. "479 The Scripture lays out the basic principles of ethics but often omits the details or the application. The believer must integrate various principles and apply them as he keeps before himself the controlling ideal of God's glory. Thus there is a wide area for disagreement and debate among Christians and a range of activities that are morally indifferent in themselves, their moral signi- ficance entirely depending upon the attitude and purpose of the Christian using them. 475Defense , p. 55 . 476L251. cit, 477 Loc. _c_i_t. 478Ethics, p. 128. 479 Material taken from lecture notes. "Adiaphora" means things indifferent in themselves . -97- 3. CONSCIENCE AND GUILT The concepts of conscience and guilt, here summarized, have been previously discussed under various topics. It is obvious that, for Van Til, the idea of man's responsibility for his own sin implies belief in an absolute God who is a moral Being and who holds man responsible for his actions. Accountability, he asserts, can only rest on this basis ,480 "481 The conscience is for, "only an analogical act is a responsible act. an aspect of the image of God which, in turn, cannot be entirely sup- pressed.482 As a created being, man possesses character; he is not an "intellectual and moral blank. "483 This sense of ethical power and responsi- bility to God is always present in his subconscious, if not clearly held in conscious awareness.484 Van Til feels that the more one tries to suppress this creator-creature awareness, the more clearly that relationship stands out. Desiring to escape this relationship, man seeks freedom, authenti- city, and identity in terms of his autonomous assumptions.485 Now it is precisely this sort of 'freedom' that is designated as slavery to sin in Scripture. For this sort of 'freedom' is based upon the repression of God as man's creator and law- giver. According to the Scriptures , man has become a sinner 4803211221. p. 32. 481M“ p. 34. 482Intellectual Challenge, p. 1-7. 483m. p. 34. 484PsychoanalysijsgfReligion, p. 132. 435Later Heidigger and Theology. p. 36. _98_ by his disobedience to God's requirements. Man's guilt is the result of this disobedience.486 Man lives with a gnawing sense of guilt manifested either when he is aware of his rejection of God, or when estranged from his fellow men, or when experiencing internal conflict. Even if barely glimmering in the recesses of his mind, it drives him to find meaning in life. Everywhere he finds substitutes for the eternal I-Thou relationship, but remains unsatisfied.487 By attempting to cut himself loose from God through univocal reasoning, man brings upon himself God's wrath. His sin further warps and corrupts his entire personality. Ideally, the intellect, will and emo— tions are equal,488 although the intellect has primacy in the economical operations , 489 however sin not only creates conflict between the will, emotions and intellect, but also brings reason at variance with itself.490 In time, these elements adapt to this abnormal ethical estrangement so that man now believes that the disruptive conditions within himself and his environment are normal and permanent; on such terms, guilt and conversion seem meaningless . Nevertheless, says Van Til, it is not necessary for man to live burdened with guilt. Forgiveness and reconciliation with God is provided 486Loc. cit. 487Defense, p. 173, 174. 4 88Van Til is not concerned whether one accepts a three-fold concep- tion of man or a two-fold conception in which the emotions are included under the will , as long as the ethical considerations are made prominent. Theology, p. 36 . 489Theoiogy, p. 32. 90110101., p. 33. -99... in Christ's atonement.491 Through Christ's righteousness, man can be "accounted ethically perfect. "492 Once ethically reunited to the Trinity regenerated man begins the "existential" process of self-understanding the "covenantal response of the whole man to the total and many-sided 493 Under the control revelation of God to man in Christ and His Word. " of the Holy Spirit, man grows in freedom, power and spontaneity in his responses to the will' of God. Warfield494 directs attention to the perfect man, Iesus , who maintained a perfect symmetry between all elements of His personality, although He manifested the strongest emotions of both love and wrath, not because He held to the primacy of the intellect, but because as the sinless One, He showed that powerful emotions are naturally in accord with the will of God. 491Later Heidigger and TheologyJ p. 36. 492Ethics, p. 35. 493 Later Heidigger, 29. 9_i_i_;_. p. 41. 494Warfield, Biblical and Theological Studies, P- 55 . CHAPTER IV FROMM'S THEORY OF REALITY Fromm's evolutionary approach gives the structure to his concepts of human nature and society. Man is seen as moving from his primal unity with nature to a transcendence which ultimately enables him to establish a productive reunion with nature. In order to draw these conclusions , Fromm makes certain assumptions regarding the nature of reality that he never questions, but accepts on faith. I. THE NATURE OF THE WORLD A. FACTS In his book Socialist Humanism, Fromm introduces the contributors as those who are concerned about "the reality of human existence, and "495 who desire to know the essence of hence are critical of ideology things, what life is really all about. These men are realists/ he says, who passionately seek truth. Sharing a "belief in the possibility of man's perfect- ibility, "495 the humanist commitment to reason has always constituted a "threat to mankind"497 for mankind has historically been swayed more by emotion and tradition than by reason. 495Socialist Humanism, p. 11. 496 Ibid., p. 7. 4971b1d., p. 8. ~101- Fromm sees reason "as a means for discovering the truth and penetrating the surface to the essence of phenomena. "498 It is autonomous, incapable of being interfered with by even "the supernatural voices from heaven. "499 In this fashion, Fromm accepts the Kantian view that man is 500 capable of being objective to phenomenal facts, of making valid state- 501 "502 ments about facts, and of seeing "the totality of a phenomenon in terms of its nature.503 The only alternative to human autonomy and reason is moral confusion.504 On these premises, Fromm suggests that man is able to discern and make value judgments about reality in order to arrive at "valid ethical norms"505 that can guide us toward productive living. These ethical norms are based on the knowledge of man's nature, not on revelation or man—made 506 and true knowledge "always and necessarily laws and conventions, refers to a judgment and not to a description of a phenomenon which we perceive with our senses and which we denote with a word symbol. "507 498Psychoanalysis and Religion, p. 5. 499112.191... p. 47. 500Man for Himself, p. 110. 5011933., p. 26. 50231151., p. 110. 503119194. 111. 504mg” p. 15. 5051b1d., p. 16. 506Loc. __ch 507 Psychoanalysis and Religion, p. 15. -102- Fromm holds that this is the only possible position to maintain, that while it is possible to have "ideas" about things, these ideas may be delusional or they may correspond to facts, but they are not necessarily "true" in themselves; in the final analysis, all "ideas" must be subjected to the "criterion of truth, " to which even the great religions of the world attest. 508 "But even if man's frame of orientation is entirely illusory it satisfies his need for some picture which is meaningful to him. "509 Fromm further differentiates between reason and intelligence: Reason is man's instrument for arriving at the truth, intelli- gence is man's instrument for manipulating the world more successfully; the former is essentiall human, the latter belongs to the animal part of man.510y Man needs some frame of reference to give meaning to his life and to keep sane,511 but his objectivity can be distorted by malignant narcissism.512 Nevertheless, man's powers of love and reason enable him to comprehend the world, mentally and emotionally, and in utilizing these powers over matter, he is able to produce things in creative process.513 Fromm views each society as essentially normal in relationship to itself, and that "pathology can be defined only in terms of the individual's "514 lack of adjustment to the ways of life in his society. Considering the 508mm, p. 15. 509§ane Society. p. 64. 5101b1d., p. 55. 511Loc. cit. 512 513Man for Himself, p. 103. 514Sane Society. p. 21. Heart of Man, p. 85.. -103— environmental, hereditary and constitutional forces interacting in an indiv- idual and in his society, each man has a number of "real possibilities"515 for personal choice in his process of develOpment. In terms of ethics, this "516 and has little implies that "the concept of absolute is meaningless place in a scientific outlook. B. SCIENCE According to Fromm, all sciences are based on discovery/ "on what dominates nature. "517 The proof of what makes a science is the attitude of the researcher, the critical approach to problem-solving and the correctness of the scientific method being applied.518 All scientists are prone to falsification, therefore the scientific attitude is basically a matter of 519 "In the last analysis, the whole of the scientific orienta- conscience. tion is really a matter of sanity; namely, knowing the difference between fact and thought, between reality and subjective experience."520 On these terms, he justifies psychoanalysis as a science.521 The main task of the psychoanalyst is to examine his own subjective motivation, biases and 522 distortions of data. The combination of self-analysis and patient 515Heart ngan, p. 140. 516Man f_c_>_r Himself, p. 26. 517 518 519 Evans, _D_i_alogue with Erich Fromm, p. 80. Ibid. I p. 8]- 0 Ibid., p. 82. 5201bid., p. 81. 1Loc. §_i_t. 522 Loc. _c_i_t. ~104- analysis qualifies psychoanalysis as a rigorously empirical science;523 it lays the basis for hypothesis testing and continual growth in the search for truth.524 We might perhaps agree that the history of science is a history of errors, for it is the nature of the scientific pro- cess that one error be replaced by a new error. Neverthe- less, in this process of replacing one error with another (or one truth with another) scientific thought proceeds . There is no such thing as a final statement about ultimate truth. The difference really is whether an error is produc- tive or sterile. The history of science is the history not only of fertile error but also of fertile truth." The study of psychology, says Fromm, "must be based on an anthropologico-philosophical concept of human existence"526 that takes into account social and economic forces. Consequently, "the scientific study of character begins on the day when Freud published his short paper on the anal character. "527 While Fromm occasionally refers to other branches of psychology and their respective contributions to the knowledge of man, he is thoroughly committed to psychoanalysis as the most rigorous 528 of the branches as well as the one that has contributed the most signi- ficant material.529 Acknowledging that in the past, it made mistakes in "divorcing psychology from problems of philosophy and ethics,"530 Fromm 523Ibid., p. 76. 524Ibid., p. 79, 83, 84. 525mm,, p. 83. 526Man Lg; Himself, p. 54. 527Evans, 93. g_i_t., p. 2. 5281bid., p. 74. 529Man f_o_r Himself, p. 40. 5301b1d., p. 16. -105- finds that psychoanalysis today seeks to understand "man in his totality, which includes his need to find an answer to the question of the meaning of his existence and to discover norms according to which he ought to live. "531 Psychoanalysis is concerned with experience; "the investigation of its influence on emotional development is its primary purpose."532 One of its presuppositions is that a person's constitution more or less determines the emotional development of the individual, "but psychoanalysis itself is concerned exclusively with the investigation of the influence of the individual's life-situation on his emotional development. "533 In practice this means that the analyst must have "extensive information concerning the individual's life pattern"534 based on general observations and case history. Psychoanalysis aims at removing illusions that block 535 decision-making, overcoming alienation within both the analyst and patient, 536 enabling the unconscious to become conscious, 537 freeing 538 man to live according to rational rather than irrational forces , and helping the patient to adjust psychically to reality.“39 5311bid., p. 17. 532 533 Dogma nghrist, p. 7. Loc. g:_1_t. 534Loc. git. 535Ibid., p. 198. 536mg“ p. 200. 537Hammond, wingtrangement, p. 51. 538Psychoanalysis and Religion, p. 6, 1\_/I__a_r_1 f9; Himself, p. 44. 539Dogma2fChrist, p. 9. ~106- C. EVOLUTION Fromm's conceptualization of the development of man and society along evolutionary lines is another crucial theme in all of his writing, leading him to continual revision of Freud's classical theories in order to incorporate current data on personality.540 He views man's birth as essentially a negative event.541 Man is the most helpless of animals at birth and learns to develop his potentials gradually. Environmental conditions can either encourage independence and growth in man or bring conflicting demands, discourage growth and act contrary to man's nature. In order to maintain sanity, man must either react to "bring about conditions which are more in accordance with his "542 or else face deterioration and death. Man's ability to adapt, needs coupled with "certain indestructible qualities of his nature"543 which propel him forward, make him unique in the animal world. He is a freak of nature because "he is the only case of a living organism having aware- ness of itself."544 This ability to transcend nature, Fromm calls the "545 "psychic evolution, and it leaves man frightened because his animal ancestry binds him to the very nature he transcended. 540Hammond, p_p_. 911., p. 25. Sane Society, p. 34, 238, 240. 541Sane Society, p. 27. 542Loc. _c_:_i_1:. 543Man for Himself, p. 32. 544Evans, 92. gi_t., p. 18. 545Zen Bgddhisig and Psychoanalysis, p. 86. Hereafter Cited Zen Buddhism. ~107- There is only one solution to his problem: to face the truth. . . to recognize that there is no power transcending him which can solve his problem for him. . .recognize that there is no meaning to life except the meaning man gives his life by the unfolding of his powers , by living productively. . . "546 547 As man has evolved, his societal forms, ethical norms and religious concepts548 have changed to meet his current needs. Therefore 549 man cannot be thought of in terms of "good" or "evil, " only in terms of his creativeness or destructiveness in relation to himself and his society.550 Society evolves because man is "by origin a herd animal";551 it is destroyed because of man's alienation and narcissism. 552 D. FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM Fromm uses his concepts of man's animal origins and transcendent self-awareness to develOp his discussions on freedom. By this procedure, he hOpes to circumvent the dilemma of, on the one hand, holding the view that there is at; essence in man, which is the view held by those who claim that man is only the product of his culture or, on the other hand, holding the Freudian view that man has a basic nature, which seems to 545Man f_gg Himself, p. 53. 5471:1131“ p. 28, 29. 548Dogma of Christ, p. 8. 549Heart ngan, p. 123. 550Sane Society, p. 312. 1 55 Psychoanalysis and Relig_ion, p. 58. 552Sane Society, p. 312. -108- deny evolution by assuming that man's nature has remained basically the 553 same since his emergence. "There is, " he says, "one condition which every answer must fulfill: it must help man to overcome the sense of separ- ateness and to gain a sense of union, of oneness, of belonging."554 Fromm rejects several solutions to the separateness-unity problem. He first rejects what he terms the "regressive answer, "555 the seeking to return to one's origins or one's ancestors so widely found in primitive reli- gions and severe psychopathology. Equally invalid is the "progressive solution, that of finding a new harmony. . .by the full development of all h_u_m_§_11 forces, of the humanity within oneself."556 This latter view depends upon revelations and man becoming god-like. Both of these views force belief in man's goodness 0: evilness and ultimately lead either to bitter disillusionment or false optimism.557 The question is raised whether man is free to choose the good for himself, or whether he is controlled by forces within and outside of him- self. "A realistic view sees both possibilities as real potentialities, and studies the conditions for the development of either of them."558 Fromm 553Heartngan, p. 115. 554 H bid., p. 117. 5551bid., p. 118. 5 5 6Loc . cit 557 H 0.. i ., p. 123. 5581.99511- -109- asserts that the answer is found in a compromise between both positions, or in "alternativism, " and hinges upon the problem of "real possibility, "559 mentioned above. Man is a "constellation of forces" structured in an identifiable manner and influenced by "environmental conditions (class, society, family) and by hereditary and constitutional conditions."560 His fictitious possibilities are symbolized by his wishes that can never be realized, and his real possibilities are those capable of fulfillment. A person with a particular constitutional make-up has no real possibility of transforming himself into an entirely different kind of person; he may be able to control certain tendencies, but he will never be indifferent to his own constitutional factors. For example, the person with "a constitution- 561 ally given or early acquired sadistic component" has the real possibilities of becoming a sadist, or overcoming it through formation of "a particularly strong mental 'antibody' which makes him incapable"562 of cruelty, but he will always be sensitive to sadistic tendencies on his or another's part. He concludes that the unconscious forces or inclinations operating in personality reach high or low intensities which either determine a man's actions or provide him with reasonable choices. These choices are also influenced by the environmental forces. Freedom consists in the awareness of alternatives and consequences. "There is never indeterminism; there 5591bid., p. 140. 560 I." O i H O 0 561Loc. 562Loc. 1 0 fl 0 pa. ¢-+ l —110- is sometimes determinism, and sometimes alternativism based on the uniquely inhuman phenomenon: awareness."563 Although the laws of cause and effect determine man, both Marx and Freud proposed tha t by "awareness and right action he (man) can create and enlarge the realm of freedom."564 Freedom, per se is an abstract concept; the only reality is "the act of freeing ourselves in the process of making choices. "565 In the light of the above, Fromm reaches certain conclusions regarding the problem of evil. First, evil is an "attempt to regress to the pre-human state, and to eliminate that which is specifically human: reason, love, freedom."566 But, tragic as is regression, it can never satisfy man who still yearns for survival. Secondly, evil manifests itself in degrees corresponding to the degrees of regression. Lesser evil appears as lack of love, lack of reason or of courage. The greater evils appear as malig- nant narcissism and the love of death. Thirdly, man is capable of moving backward or forward depending on "the balance of inclinations" within him. Fourthly, man is only responsible when he is relatively free to make his own choices. Lastly, "man's heart can harden; it can become inhuman, yet never non-human";567 man always retains his uniqueness. E. FAITH Any discussion of Fromm's concept of the world would be incomplete without mentioning his ideas of faith. Usually when he speaks of faith, 563Ibid., p. 143. 5541b1d., p. 126. 555mm,, p. 136. 5661b1d., p. 148. 557Ibld., p. 150. ~111- he clearly eliminates any theological connotations , especially those of Calvinism, which he considers anathema.568 He argues for a humanistic faith in man resting upon man's courage to be himself.569 This faith preserves us from becoming sterile570 and consists of a basic attitude, "a character trait which pervades all his (man's) experiences , which enables man to face reality without illusions . "571 True faith avoids irrational doubting of the validity of all experience, a doubting that says that there can be no certainty anywhere. Faith does encompass rational doubting of the assumptions of authority, so important h.572 It has critical elements that lead to in the emancipation of yout hypothesis formation and testing.573 It is "rooted in one's own experience, in the confidence in one's power of thought, observation and judgment, "574 and sees the potentialities in every individual. 575 576 To live by faith is to live productively and creatively. Without rational faith, man cannot find real meaning or the will to progress. Fromm's world view repeats itself throughout all of his discussions on the nature of man and ethics. It colors his methodology and his conclu- sions; therefore it is well to keep it in focus in the following discussions. 568Man f_o_r Himself. 9. 212. 559mm,, p. 251. 570 bid., p. 201. 571Loc. cit. 57211210., p. 203. 57315191.. p. 207. 574Ibid., p. 208. 57519191.. p. 209. 5761bid., p. 210. H -112- II. THE NATURE OF MAN For the pmposes of this study, Fromm's position on man is viewed in terms of his concepts of the human Situation, personality and socializa- tion, and partly overlaps what has already been said. A. THE HUMAN SITUATION The basis of Fromm's psychology of man is what he calls the "human situation Any person represents all human beings as a "specific "577 example of man's peculiarities and uniqueness. Thus, while Fromm eschews any idea of a basic nature for man, he cannot help speaking about man's self-awareness that distinguishes him from all other animals.578 1. MAN'S BIOLOGICAL WEAKNESS Man, Fromm prOposes, is negatively differentiated from other animals by his relative inability to instinctively adapt himself to his sur- 579 roundings. He says that "the less complete and fixed the instinctual equipment of animals, the more develOped is the brain and therefore the ability to learn. " 5 80 2. EXISTENTLAL AND HISTORICAL DICHOTOMIES Man's unity and harmony with nature has been disrupted by his emerging transcendence, his "self-awareness, reason and imagination. "581 577Ib1d., p. 47. 5788ane Society, p. 29. 579Ibid.. p. 30. Man for Himself, p. 48. 580Man f_o_rllimself, p. 48. 5811111914, 10. 48. ~113- Man's "break with nature, " symbolically referred to as the fall of man, 582 now drives him "to seek new unities and harmonies with nature, his fellow man and himself. "583 Actually, it is only by breaking with nature that man can find his true humanity. Here Fromm again introduces his concepts of regression and progression, previously mentioned. Rooted in man's existential situation are three dichotomies. The most fundamental is the dichotomy between life and death.584 Death is man's ever present enemy, irrevocable and tragic. Awareness of it "pro- "585 foundly influences man's life and he has tried to negate it through such ideologies as the Christian doctrines of immortality and resurrection, 586 but he cannot alter its final defeat of him. The mortality of man faces him with the second dichotomy: every human being is "the bearer of all human potentialities, but the short span of his life does not permit their full "587 Again , man realization under even the most favorable circumstances. does not really solve this problem, but chooses vainly to establish ideolo- gies; that life is fulfilled after death, or that man is subordinate to the state or the community. Thirdly, man is an alienated individual who some- how must find his identity and solidarity in relationship to society; this is the eternal problem of the one-and-the-many coupled with that of isolation vs . fellowship. 582 _Sgne Society, p. 30. 583Hammond, op. cit., p. 45. 584M313 f9; Himself, p. 50. 585L522.- 9.313.: 5861b1d., p. 51. 587Loc. cit. -1l4— Faced by these dilemmas, man may choose either to deny his uniqueness and his powers , or else use them in creative productivity and the acceptance of responsibility. Only the latter course will lead him to find meaning for himself.588 B. PERSONALITY Fromm defines personality as "the totality of inherited and acquired psychic qualities which are characteristics of one individual and which make the individual unique."589 "Temperament, gifts, and constitutionally given "590 psychic qualities are inherited, while the acquired qualities are one's character. The latter reveal one's success in the art of living and form the basis for the problem of ethics. 1 . CHARACTER Fromm prefers to deal with character rather than with temperament. Temperament is constitutional and unchangeable, the "mode of reaction"591 of man, and its confusion with character has complicated the history of 592 593 ethics, especially the questims of responsibility and moral judgment. 594 588mm. , p. 53. ., p. 59. 593Heart of Man, p. 128. 594Man f_gr Himself, p. 232. ~115- a) The Dynamic Concept g_f_Character Fromm contends that Freud developed the first, and "the most consistent and penetrating theory of character as a system of strivings which underlie, but are not identical with, behavior, "595 i.e. , the theory of unconscious motivation. Behavior can be understood and predicted only by understanding the highly charged unconscious forces motivating man. 596 Closely allied with this is Freud's "theory of the conative nature "597 of character traits which states that a person's specific character structure largely determines his perceptions and emotions and his ability to control his inner dynamic forces.598 The character structure is an organizational pattern or syndrome of character traits that result from what Fromm calls an "orientation of character. "599 However, he modifies Freud's idea that "the sexual drive was the source of energy of the charac— ter"600 in order to include the larger dimensions of man's interpersonal relationships to society, nature and self. The main difference. . .is that the fundamental basis of charac- ter is not seen in various types of libido organization but in specific kinds of a person's relatedness to the world. In the process of living, man relates himself to the world (1) by acquiring and assimilating things, and (2) by relating him- self to people (and himself). The former I shall call the process of assimilation; the latter, that of socialization.601 5951bid., p. 63. 596 597Man for Himself, p. 64. Heart _o_f_Man, p. 65. 598L952, cit. 599Ibid., p. 66. 6001bid., p. 65. 601Loc. _c_i_t. -ll6- With these orientations forming the core of personality structure, Fromm defines character as "the (relatively permanent) form in which human energy is canalized in the process of assimilation and socialization. "602 And simultaneously, he rejects the typically behavioristic explanation "that man reacts in a semiautomatic fashion by developing habits of action and thought which can be understood in terms of conditioned reflexes . "603 Fromm is also aware of the problems of defining the conscious and the unconscious. He points out that the term unconscious has been variously used to refer to the lack of subjective awareness of inner experi- 11504 605 ences, a specific "part of personality, as "the seat of irrationality" as Freud conceived of it, or as "the seat of the deepest sources of wisdom"606 as Jung thought. Fromm argues that both the conscious and the unconscious depend on the mores of society and "on the patterns of feelings and thoughts it produces";607 both are socially conditioned in large part. Man is conscious only of those thoughts and feelings that are capable of penetrat- ing the barriers of socially conditioned language, logic and taboos.608 602 M0! p0 670 603Loc. cit. 604'Zen Buddhism, p. 95f. 605 oc. __i_t. 606Loc __1}. 607 I 1d,, p. 106. Ibid. , p.104. -ll7- "Experiences which can not be filtered through remain outside of awareness; 609 that is , they remain unconscious . " But the unconscious "always repre- sents the whole man, with all his potentialities for darkness and light. "610 b) Non-Productive Character Orientations According to Fromm, "the character of any given person is usually a blend"611 of several types of orientation, both productive and non- productive, but a person may be dominated by one of them. "612 the person believes that all In the "Receptive Orientation good comes from outside of himself. He is almost exclusively concerned with being loved and cared for, rather than with loving and giving; therefore, he is utterly dependent on others for support, the typical "yes-man." The "Exploitative Orientation"613 also operates on the premise that all good comes from without, the difference being that this type uses force and cunning to manipulate others in giving the "good. " These persons tend to fall in love with some other person's spouse, plagiarize the works of others, lack originality, underrate their own talents, and overrate the talents of others. 609Loc. cit. MOLE“ p. 106. 611Man f_o_r Himself, p. 69. 512mg” p. 70. 613Ibid., p. 71. -118- 614 gains security from keeping and The "Hoarding Orientation" saving; giving constitutes threat. "Death and destruction have more reality than life and growth. "615 They are seen as rigid, sterile, backward looking, orderly and compulsive. 616 fits well into modern societies The "Marketing Orientation" geared to the advertising approach to life. The self is submerged to fit the laws of supply and demand, gradually becoming a commodity, an object with exchange value. Success depends on how well one can sell oneself, manage the appearance, or fit in to the group. This orientation leaves the personality vague and undefined, and the person fails to develop in freedom and individuality. c) The Productive Orientation This refers to a basic attitude, or mode of relatedness in "mental, emotional and sensory responses to others , to oneself and to things. "617 It mobilizes all the life-giving forces in "man's inherent primary potential- "618 ities to fight against destructive and evil impulses. It can construc- tively use any of the forms of social relatedness--loya1ty, authority, 14 6 Ibid., p. 73. 6151b1d., p. 74. 616I 1 0.. ., p. 75-85. 617Ibid., p. 91. 618Ib1d., p. 230. -119- fairness , assertiveness-~which in the non-productive person would become submission, domination, withdrawal, destructiveness.619 The productive person experiences himself fully, participates in life, uses his powers of reason love and imagination,620 and lives realistically. Productivity is not to be confused, however, with creativ- ity621 or with activity622 pe_r s2. 2. PERSONALITY SYNDROMES When Fromm wrote his second book, Man for Himself (1 94 7) , he was apparently just beginning to formulate concepts that later became identified as the "personality syndromes" in I_h_e_ Heart _g_f_ Man (1964) . In the intervening years , a significant shift took place which Hammond saw as incongruity in Fromm's ideas of mature love. It would seem that in discussiong 'progressive' love Fromm alternates between two partially contradictory conceptions. On the one hand. . .progressive (as well as regressive) love springs from man's deep need to be reunited with the world and his fellow man. This understanding suggests that love presupposes alienation, that union presupposes separation. On the other hand, Fromm describes love as a form of pro- ductivity. Love is self-giving, the highest expression of human potency. 619mm,, p. 119. 620 Ibid., p. 95. 6211b1d., p. 92. 622 oc. cit. 623Hammond, pp. 913., p. 53. —120- Probably when Fromm concentrated on the problem of ethical norms (_M_a_n_fg_r Himself) and rationality (The Sane Society) , he was mainly con- cerned with the idea of interrelatedness in terms of productivity and econ- omics, the result of his Marxist interest. In pursuing the problem of good and evil he focussed on man's capacity to love ('_l‘_l_1_e_A_i_:t 9_f_ Iggying, 1956), and later dealt with man's capacity to destroy, his narcissism and his incestuous fixation. In _'I_‘h_e__H_e§_r_t9_f_ MEAL these paradoxical tendencies are called BiOphilia, the love of life and Necrophilia, the love of death. Oriented to one or the other, man develops either the syndrome of growth or the syndrome of death. He speaks of them in The Sane Society (1955) as orientation in the process of socialization. a) The Syndrome 51 _D_gggay. The syndrome of decay is composed of three sub-orientations or phenomena, which in Fromm's Opinion, form "the basis for the most vicious and dangerous form of human orientation. "624 Because this syndrome epitomizes stagnation and destruction, it fulfills Fromm's criterion by which he measures whether man is good or evil, 625 that man is evil only 626 and reverts to archaic impulses. 627 if he lacks growth and development (1) Necrophilia - The Love _o_f_ Death. The necrophile is attracted by "all that is not alive, all that is dead; corpses, decay, feces, dirt";628 624 Heart9_f_Man, p. 23. 625Man f_o_r Himself, p. 212. 6261bid., p. 220; cf. p. v-9. 627Heart 9_f_Man, p. 121. 6281bid., p. 39. -121- they love to discuss sickness, burials and death. Here they find a perverted source Of strength. The theme of decay reappears in their passions, dreams, attachments and behavior, even their appearance.629 Usually, it is blended with the sexual instinct, which produces sadism, masochism, 630 necrophagia and coprophagia, and Fromm also related it to Freud's anal character distinguished by extreme orderliness, parsimony and obstinacy. 631 632 633 The necrophile dwells in the past, nurses old grudges , glories in destruction of life.634 He is magnetized by force and by those who symbolize the power to kill.”5 Thus, he loves mechanical devices, 636 the bureaucratic order and is only attracted by an object or a person if he can possess them.637 Fromm's prime examples of the pure necrophilic type are Hitler and C. G. Iung. Hitler's "deepest satisfaction lay in witnessing total 629 Ibid. , p. 42. 6301 1d. , p. 46. Necrophagia: eating of corpses; coprophagia: eating of excrement . 631 Ibid. , p. 53. 6321bid., p. 39. 633Ibid., p. 40. 634Loc. cit. 635L419. cit. 6361bid., p. 42. 637Ibid., p. 41. -122- and absolute destruction: that of the German people, of those around him, and of himself. "638 "639 Iung, whose dreams were "filled with corpses, blood, killings and who was fascinated by corpses , 640 balanced his tendencies with a desire to heal and create, using his necrophilic interests as the subject matter for "his brilliant speculations . "641 (2) Malignant Narcissism. This concept provides Fromm with an understanding of "psychosis ('narcissistic neurosis'), love, castration. fear, jealousy, sadism" in relation to the individual, and "nationalism, national hatred and the psychological motivations for destructiveness and ar..642 w in relation to society. He accomplishes this by expanding Freud's concept of narcissm that Fromm claims was restricted to the states of infancy and psychosis . 643 According to this Freudian theory, man develops from "absolute narcissism to a capacity for objective reasoning and object love, 644 and narcissism is never absent in even the most mature adult. While Freud 645 used his notion of sexual libido as a basis for the narcissistic impulse, Fromm uses a concept of non-sexual psychic energy. The person is bound, 538ibid.. p. 39 Ibid., p. 43. 640 __OC- _i_t. 641—b1gnp. 44. 5421 id., p. 62. 6431.532. cit. 644Ibid., p. 63. 645 Ibid. , p. 64. —123- unified, integrated by psychic energy that enables him to relate to himself 646 and the outside world. The infant is seen as having not yet related to the outside world and therefore being unable to differentiate between the "I" and the not "I." To the insane person the world outside has "ceased to be real, "647 while the paranoid and the neurotic fear the world. Psycho— sis is the "state of absolute narcissism";648 the patient himself alone is real, a God to himself. Bordering on psychotic isolation are persons who have reached an extraordinary degree of God-like power: "the Egyptian pharoahs , the Roman "649 who have all attained Caesars, the Borgias, Hitler, Stalin, Trujillo, the authority of absolute judgment and demand the impossible. Less severe narcissism is found in. preoccupation with one's body, appearance and "650 the talents, and the demand for attention. In "moral hypochondriasis person is absorbed with overwhelming guilt feelings, inadequacy, unreality and self-accusation. The Narcissist acts and looks smug and self- satisfied, but may hide behind a disguise of modesty and humility. Essen- tially he is an idol worshipper: asked who he is , he replies that "he is 5501mm. p. 69. -124- his brain, his face, his wealth, his penis, his conscience, and so on."65‘l Fromm argues that narcissism is necessary for survival, but that it is also a "threat to survival"652 when it distorts rational judgment. 653 Individual narcissism is effected by group narcissism, becoming preju- diced654 and biased against the extraneous world. Criticism of the group is met with hostility, possibly resulting in rationalistic justification for "defensive warfare" and "righteous indignation. " "The highly narcissistic group is eager to have a leader with whom it can identify itself, "655 and submits to him in an "act of symbiosis. "656 (3) Incestuous Symbiosis. The fixation on the mother figure is the core of incestuous symbiosis . Fromm agrees with Freud that this attachment persists into adulthood, weakening independence and goal- striving, and leading to "various neurotic conflicts and symptoms . "657 ' But it is the "pre—Oedipal attachment of boys and girls to their mother658 that is for Fromm, far more vital than any genital desires , and "one of the central phenomena in the evolutionary process and one of the main causes of neurosis or psychosis."659 651Ibid., p. 71. 652 Ibid. , p. 73. 6531bid., p. 85. 6 4 5 Loc. git. 655Ibid. , p. 87. 656 Loc. git. 657Ib1d., p. 95. 6581bid., p. 97. 659Loc. cit. -125- This 'incestuous' striving, in the pregenital sense, is one of the most fundamental passions in men or women, comprising the human being's desire for protection, the satisfaction of his narcissism; his craving to be freed from the risks of res- ponsibility, of freedom, of awareness; his longing for uncon- ditional love, which is offered without any expectation of his loving response.660 Adults as well as infants are dependent, helpless and crave certainty; they know the risks and dangers of life, therefore seek protec- tion and power for control of life's forces. It is this seeking that provides 661 and indicates why there is 662 the base for all religions in Fromm's View; a paradoxical fear and love of God in so many of them. By the "symbiotic" attachment, Fromm means that the "person is part and parcel of the 'host' person to whom he is attached";663 he cannot live apart from the host person, whether that host is living or dead or merely a symbol. The deepest level of this mother fixation is "incestuous "664 symbiosis, a condition of complete identity between the person and the host. The person "may sometimes feel superior, sometimes inferior, sometimes equal to the host person--but always they are inseparable. "665 660 I:9§- sit. 661 Ibid., p. 99. cf. alsolo_u Shall BegsGods, p. 7. 664Loo. sic- 665Loc. 9_i_t. -126- The level of regression determines the extent of the symbiotic pathology. In many cases there is only a minor dependence on, or fear of, women. Pathology increases from hostility toward any critics of the host person, distortion of reason, failure to experience "another being as fully human, "666 loss of independence and integrity, and finally, self- imprisonment. When all these three phenomena join together in greater or lesser degree, they form the syndrome of decay, resulting in various forms of 667 668 violence and destructiveness; and in masochistic-sadistic character- istics .669 Fromm says that the fact that most peOple do not fear total destruction, such as nuclear war, is because they do not love life, are indifferent to life, or are attracted to death. 670 The most fundamental contradiction in man is the affinity to life opposed by the affinity to death . 671 b) The Syndrome gf Growth Just as the syndrome of death is the "evil" in man, so Fromm sees the "good" existing in the syndrome of growth. 6661bid., p. 107 667Ibid. , p. 24-36. Fromm lists eight types of violence. 668Escape From Freedom, p. 203. Fromm speaks of rational and irrational destructiveness . 669 bid. , p. 163f. Fromm thinks of masochism as vicarious parti- cipation in a power enterprise. p. 177. 670Heart-ngan, p. 56. 6711bid., p. 50. ~127- (l) Biophilia--The Love 911.1%. Fundamental to all living substance is "the tendency to preserve life and to fight against death, "672 and this drive toward life integrates, unites and enhances development and growth in the entire organism.673 This provides the basis for attractions between males and females culminating in sexual union and creative productivity . The most basic conditions for the development of biophilia are, first, for the child to "be with people who love life, love of life is just as h";674 secondly, for the child to grow up in an 675 contagious as love of deat atmosphere of economic and psychological abundance; thirdly, the abolition of injustice;676 fourthly, the freedom to venture and be creative. 677 Such conditions enable the person to develop his true identity as an authen- tic individual, fully experiencing himself as the "center and subject of human power. "678 (2) The Love _o_f_ Man. Man's narcissism can be overcome by "the scientific and humanist orientations . "679 The humanist creed is 5721mm, p. 45. 73 19.19.. p. 46- 674Ibid., p. 51. 6751bid., p. 52. 676Loc. cit, 677Loc. cit. , cf. Sane Socie’gz. p. 61. 678 Evans. Loc. c_:_i,t_., p. 28. 6791bid., p. 92. -128— essentially religious—spiritual, 680 viewing each man as representative of all mankind with worth and value; "the 'human condition' is one and the same for all men, in spite of unavoidable differences in intelligence, talents, heights, and color."681 Humanism transcends nationalism, preferring to extend group "682 narcissism to include "the entire human family where no man would 1683 be alien to another, since all are equa and all carry within themselves the elements of sinner and saint, child and adult, sane and insane, the past and the future.684 (3) Independence. Man becomes increasingly independent as he becomes increasingly aware of himself, basing his behavior "on the awareness of alternatives and their consequences. "685 He is able to cut the umbilical cords binding him to any gods, to mother and to tribe, 686 thus freeing him to bear his own convictions , to think rationally, to experience himself.687 0 68 I id., p. 90. 681 Ibid., p. 93. Ibid., p. 143. Ibid. , p. 107. -129- C. SOCIALIZATION When Fromm deals with the problem of human consciousness , he depends more upon Marx than upon Freud. Although both Marx and Freud taught that ideology and rationalism created a "false" consciousness 688 in men and that behavior is basically controlled by unconscious motivations, Marx attributed to society the direction of consciousness and the blocking 689 of awareness of facts and experiences, while Freud attributed these to "man's libidinal strivings."690 This way of looking at character development is the foundation for Fromm's "social character, " which refers to the nucleus of the character structure which is shared by most members of the same culture in contradistinction to the individual character in which peoBle belonging to the same culture differ from each other.6 1 Society, therefore, plays a large role in shaping the individual, particularly through the agency of the family. It is this concern for social pathology that sets Fromm's work apart from Freud's , leading him toward the possi- bilities of social health in a "sane society."692 688 Zen Buddhism, p. 98. 689 , Marx 5 Concept _o_f Man, p. 21. 690Loc. cit. 691Sane Society. p. 76. 5921mm, p. 13-20. -l30- Earlier, we noted that Fromm emphasized man's distinctiveness as his evolutionary transcendence, his self-awareness that in turn led to isolation, or alienation from nature, and eventually brought him toward reunion with nature.693 By coupling this idea with Marx's view of the social origin of consciousness , Fromm radically departed from Freud's conceptualization of socialization as being primarily a process of controll- ing and redirecting the internal desires.694 Freud saw physiological moti- vations as the root of self-awareness, but Fromm holds that self—awareness develops in addition to physiological forces. 695 l. ORIENTATIONS IN THE PROCESS OF SOCIALIZATIONS In 1955, Fromm spoke of assimilation and socialization as the 696 distinguished by three forms: "two kinds of relatedness to the world " symbiotic relatedness, withdrawal-destructiveness and love. By 1964 these developed into his "personality syndromes" mentioned above. The point here is that Fromm sees these syndromes as largely influenced and controlled by socialization, although man has freedom to cooperate with his affinity to life and thus transform or modify his personality.697 6930f., p. v-6, v-12. 694Freud, Civilization and its Discon.t.e.n__.t p- 94-103- 695Evans, _92. _g__1;_- . p. 10- 696Manf __r,Himself p. 113 697 Heart of Man, p. 57. -l 31- 2. ALIENATION AND SOCIALIZATION Hammond points out that Fromm uses the concept of alienation from nature and from self to explain the process of socialization, but that he does not always use it consistently. 698 In his earlier writing, Fromm used alienation as a positive term to describe man's necessary progression toward maturity, but in his later works, he differentiates between aliena- tion as such and man's regressive answer to the fact of alienation. In this, he differs from Marx, who, he says, thought of alienation only as corrupt- 699 ing and perverting all human values , and restricted it to the unskilled working class, whereas today all classes are alienated to the extent that they have lost the sense of self and the sense of their creative powers . 700 And he suggests that dynamic psychology ought to empirically study those specific behaviors , "all those religions, philosophical and political phenom- na"701 associated with alienation. e a) Alienation and Self-Awareness Fromm sees two sides to alienation. Negatively, man "must first separate himself from nature and his fellow man, and in a real sense from 698Hammond. 22. Cit.. Po 65-77. 121-130' 699Beyond the Chain; gfIllusion, p. 52. 700Evans, gp_. git“ p. 89 701mm,, p. 90. -132- himself"702 before he can become "fully born."703 Positively, alienation leads to a higher consciousness of self and the better use of one's powers . 704 The process of achieving self-awareness has three aspects: "intellection, " overcoming narcissism and the distortion of consciousness by society. As the person matures, he splits the subject from the object, the "me" from the "not-me." "This separation gradually takes place, and the final achievement is expressed by the fact that the child can say 'I.'"705 This development of objectivity is called intellectual reflection, or "intellection. "706 The second aspect of mature self-awareness is the overcoming of narcissism. The child soon learns to distinguish reality as it is from what he wants it to be. It is essentially an affective development. But if the person does not accept reality and continues to live in his wishes, he will neurotically attempt "to force reality to correspond to his wishes (that is, to do the impossible)."707 This is narcissistic omnipotence. 702 Hammond, 92. c_:i_t., p. 65. 703Zen Buddhism_, p. 94. 704Beyond the Chains sf Illusion, p. 61 . 05 ‘ Zen Buddhism, p. 128. 706mm,, p. 97. 707Ibid.. p. 90. ~133- Thirdly, society influences the development of consciousness and unconsciousness by means of its "social filters." At this point, Hammond clarifies Fromm's analysis of self—awareness by differentiating between abstract consciousness (the form) and the content of consciousness, which society regulates . Man. . .has the formal or abstract capacity for consciousness. However, the actual content of consciousness (that is , how self and the world are understood) is deeply affected by the type of society into which the individual is born. A regressive society. . .may force the individual to repress some aspects of his own self-awareness. As we have seen, it is the limitation of the content of consciousness that must be eliminated in full maturity. Since this limitation is due in large measure to the repressive effect of the society on the individual, and since this in turn stems from regression in society, we can see that alienation and regression cannot be completely separated, though they must be distinguished.708 The aspects of intellection and overcoming of narcissism lead to temporary alienation; as one sees himself separate from other persons he feels his separation and aloneness more keenly. The societal factor may not, in itself, lead to alienation, but could increase or decrease this feeling depending on whether the "social character" of the culture was progressive or regressive. b) Alienation and Regression Not only does Fromm use alienation to mean a progressive move- ment upward, but he also uses it in reference to man's regressive answer to the fact of alienation, which tends to confuse the issue. It would probably be better if he had restricted its use to the progressive form. 708 Hammond, pp. cit., p. 68. -l34- Man, declares Fromm, tries to escape from his alienation. Authori- tarian religion, repression, neurosis and psychosis are a few of the common forms of escape. Any attempt to fall back on destructive impulses , find symbolic security in the womb or in death, or in archaic forms of pre-human existence are regressive impulses, totally incompatible "with the inherent goals of the evolution of man's nature. "709 (l) Repression. Repression is a form of regression. Repression is the process of limiting consciousness or of preventing any impulse from entering the realm of consciousness , or removing the experience of the impulse from the conscious.710 All forms of neuroses are the result of deep repressions of "unconscious strivings which tend to harm and block h’n711 a person's growt and, he writes, it is the task of psychoanalysis to "de-repress, " i.e., "to make the unconscious conscious . "712 On the whole, he feels that regression in any form is evil and archaic. Regression in the form of neurosis is a "symptom of moral failure . . .the specific expression of moral conflicts. "713 The pre-Oedipal attachment is "one of the main causes of neurosis and psychosis. "714 Neurosis is the failure to live productively.715 709 710 Zen Buddhism, p. 105. Man f_o_r Himself, p. 228. 7111bid., p. 183. 71229n Buddhism, p. 95, 105. 713Man _f_g_r Himself, p. 5. 714 Heart_o_f_Man, p. 97. 715Man f_o_r Himself, p. 222. -135- (2) RegressionigReligion. Fromm sees all religions and ethical systems, except those of humanism, as regressions to archaic forms, dehumanizing their adherents. Religion is "the formalized and "716 elaborate answer to man's existence that creates "a feeling of reasonableness and of security by the very communion with others . "717 He correlates religious ideas with neurotic ideas. When the regressive wishes of man clash with consciousness and society's demands, the result is often a regression to primitive forms of religion. 718 In a "719 sense, a neurosis is a "private form of religion. In neurotic regres- sion, one passion comes to dominate the person and becomes set apart from the rest of his personality. It becomes his ruler, his idol. He grows weaker as "it" grows stronger until "he has become alienated from himself precisely because 'he' has become the slave of part of himself."720 It is in this sense that he often uses the term alienation. I use 'alienation' as it was used by Hegel (1960) and later by Marx (1932): instead of experiencing his own human powers-~for example, love or wisdom, thought or reason, acting justly-ma person transfers these powers to some idol, to force or forces outside himself. In order, then, to get in touch with his own human power, he must submit completely to this idol. 716 Zen Buddhism, p. 91. 717Loc. cit. 718Psychoanalysis and Religicm. Po 27- 719Zen Buddhism. p. 91. 720Beyond the Chains gr: Illusion, Po 50- 721Evans, 92. cit., p. 88. -l36- Fromm attacks any religion that demands submission to a force or God, and although he admits that the concept of monotheistic authority "guarantees man's independence from human authority. "722 He states that "every act of submissive worship, is an act of alienation and idolatry";723 the power undergirding the Christian church is nothing but " group narcis- "724 sism, and religious devotion is an attempt to remove "reason and self-awareness , "725 the "regressive, archaic solution to the problem of human existence . " 726 The problem of religion is vital to Fromm's position on man and ethics, occupying a major portion of all his works . He assumes that man's concepts of God are always projections or fantasies of man's inner needs 727 and that the history of religion parallels man's evolution. and impulses , . . .religion has a threefold function: for all mankind, consola- tion for the privations exacted by life; for the great majority of men, encouragement to accept emotionally their class situation; and for the dominant minority, relief from guilt feelings caused by the suffering of those whom they Oppress.728 722 ——_—*— 723Sane Society, p. 113. 724 Heart of Man, p. 85. 7251b1d., p. 118. 726 oc. cit. t" 727Dogma o_fChrist, p. 46. 7281mm, p. 20. -137- Fromm's concern for religious ideas stems from their psychic 729 influences on man, and the fact that all men have religious needs 730 even though some deny it. His which find expression somehow, definition of religion is: "any system of thought and action shared by a group which gives the individual a frame of orientation and an object of devotion. "731 Fromm is particularly hostile to Calvinism as his example of the most authoritarian form of religion. He sees its main virtue as obedience 732 and "its cardinal sin is disobedience. " It epitomizes worship of dependence, self—degradation and self-limitation, and is therefore "masochistic and self-destructive. " 733 There is no such thing as a God who is a real being in Fromm's system, only a symbol "of man's own powers ."734 But ecclesiastical authorities established a concept of God as a father figure in order to increase the guilt feelings of the masses and thus through the rituals of repentence and pardon, to maintain control.”5 The ethical implications will be considered in more detail in the next chapter. 729Heart f Man, p. 118. 12.0.9.._ma o_fC_______hrist, 9° 9° 730Psychoanalysis and Religion, p. 25. 731mm,, p. 21. 7321bid., p. 35. 733Ibid. , p. 53. 734Ibid., p. 49. 735 Dogma ~c_>_f_ Christ, p. 66. CHAPTER V FROMM'S PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICS Fromm's concept of ethics emanates from his concern for the grow- ing skepticism and moral confusion in today's world where man finds him- self cut off from the traditional "guidance of either revelation or reason. "736 The result is the acceptance of a relativistic position which prOposes that value judgments and ethical norms are exclu- sively matters of taste or arbitrary preference and that no objectively valid statement can be made in this realm. But since man cannot live without values and norms, this rela— tivism makes him an easy prey for irrational value systems. He reverts to a position which the Greek Enlightenment, Christianity, the Renaissance, and the eighteenth-century Enlightenment had already overcome. The demands of the State, the enthusiasm for magic qualities of powerful leaders, powerful machines, and material succesas/ become the sources for his norms and value judgments. Because this study is concerned primarily with the problem of conscience and guilt, it has not seemed necessary to detail Fromm's position on every area he discusses in ethics; consequently, only brief summarizations will be made on some problems which are arbitrarily assigned to the section following. I. ABSOLUTE VS. RELATIVE ETHICS True to his presuppositions on the nature of man, Fromm estab- lishes his ethics on man's autonomy, and rejects any authoritarian ethics 736 Man _f_c_>_r Himself, p. 15. 737Loc. it. -l39- founded on . . .the premise that the criterion of validity is the unques- - tionable superior and omniscient power of the authority. It is the very essence of this claim to superiority that the authority cannot err and that its commands and prohibitions are eternally true. Fromm disposes of this claim on the basis of appeal to "all other fields of scientific thought, where it is generally recognized that there is no abso- lute truth but nevertheless there are objectively valid laws and principles. "739 Every new insight enables man to make a closer approximation of the truth;740 every culture makes its contributions. A. NORMS Furthermore, he argues , ethical norms are not only subject to constant revision, but there are situations "which are inherently insoluble and do not permit any choice ‘which can be considered the 'right' one."741 These situations arise in connection with existential dichotomies and with conditions inherent in the social order. Fromm also distinguishes between "universal" and "socially immanent" ethics.742 "Universal ethics" refer to those norms of conduct 738I 1 Q. ., p. 239 739Loc. g_i_t. Ibid., p. 240. 7421513, p. 241-245. ~140- that appear in most world cultures , and the "socially immanent norms" are those specific codes of conduct enabling a particular culture to maintain itself efficiently; i.e. , people do "what they have to do under the exist- ing circumstances . " 743 In this connection, it is interesting to note that Fromm uses the term "norm" in a distinctive manner. As commonly used, norm refers to "an authoritative standard; a principle of right action binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide, control, or regulate proper and "744 acceptable behavior, or perhaps in the sense of the usual kind of behavior observed. But Fromm uses the word norm as an equivalent of "principle, " which has the meaning of "a comprehensive and fundamental law, doctrine or assumption; a rule or code of conduct; a primary source; " 745 an underlying faculty or endowment. . . He also believes that both norms and principles can remain valid for an indefinite period in a variety of cultures, and that they have the force of an "ought, " as in the following: A few words must be said about my approach to the Bible in this book. I do not look at it as the 'word of God,‘ not only because historical examination shows that it is a book written by men--different kinds of men, living in different times--but also because I am not a theist. Yet, to me, it is an extraordinary book, expressing many norms and princi- ples that have maintained their validity throughout thousands 743Ibid., p. 242. 744Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary. 9- 575- 745Ibid, p. 676 . -l41- of years . It is a book which has proclaimed a vision for men that is still valid and awaiting realization. 746 Moreover, Fromm seems to hold to a Platonic concept of eternal principles that govern both God and man. In discussing the evolutionary development of the concept of God in the Old Testament, Fromm writes: With Abraham's challenge (for God to comply with the princi- ples of justice) a new element has entered the Biblical and later Jewish tradition. Precisely because God is bound by the norms of justice and love, man is no longer his slave. Man can challenge God--as God can challenge man-~because above both are principles and norms. B. AUTHORITARIAN VS. HUMANISTIC ETHICS One of Fromm's major themes is his distinction between authori- tarianism and humanistic ethics. Fromm asserts that man's religious needs stem from man's dichotomous relationship to nature, i.e. , his identity with and transcendence of nature, resulting in an inherent fear of his alienation, 748 insecurity, and a vast feeling of powerlessness. This condition gener- ates within him a‘ desire to restore his equilibrium, to establish ideals, to seek satisfaction and meaning.749 This is seen by Fromm as the moral "750 problem of man today: "man's attitude toward force and power which 747Ibid., p. 28. 748_P_§ychoanalysis and Religion, p. 22. 749Ibid., p. 24, 25. 750Man f_g_r Himself, p. 246. ~142- is rooted in his existence. Threatened by his fears, man becomes paralyzed emotionally and mentally, grasping at any promises made by those in posses- sion of power who offer peace and security. "Man's submission to this combination of threat and promise is his real 'fall.‘ By submitting to power = domination he loses his power = potency. "751 Man becomes indifferent to himself,752 losing his sense of uniqueness, and in his loss of courage, he turns to idolatry. l. AUTHORITARIANISM The error of authoritarian religion as Fromm sees it is that it originally fought against idolatry in the name of God, and then proceded to turn its God into another idol. The approach to the understanding of what an idol is begins with the understanding of what God is not. God as the supreme value and goal is not man, the state, an institution, nature, power, possession, sexual powers, or any artifact made by man. The affirmations 'I love God,’ 'I follow God,‘ 'I want to become like God'--mean first of all 'I do not love, follow, or imitate idols.‘ An idol represents the object of man's central passion, the desire to return to the soil-mother, the craving for posses- sion, power, fame, and so forth. The passion represented by the idol is , at the same time, the supreme value within man's system of values.753 As we noted previously, Fromm sees idol worship as the impover- ishment of man that occurs when he transfers his "passions and qualities 751Ibid. , p. 247. 7521b1d., p. 249. 753 ~143- to the idol, "754 which then becomes the "alienated form of man's experi- ence of himself. "755 Through the media of the idol, man worships himself. Thus , "God" can become an idol. Man can transfer his qualities to the supreme being, impoverish himself by submission, guilt feelings and devotion. What does Fromm ask of man? Simply, "__r_1_g_t_ to blaspheme God "756 and not to worship idols. "If mankind has achieved solidarity and peace, not even the common worship of one God is necessary. "757 To briefly sum up Fr0mm's concept of the development of authori- tarian religion and ethics: The Old Testament prophets and leaders intended to restrain their people from idol worship and indignity. They developed the concept of a single authoritarian God who must be obeyed; God became "the constituticn a1 monarch"758 who later "becomes bound by the princi- ples he has announced."759 Eventually, he becomes the nameless God, "EHEYEH,"760 who bears no possible representation, but is only experi- enced.761 Man becomes liberated to determine his own history, free to 754Loc. _c_i_t. 75511191., p. 44. Ibid., p. 51. Ibid., p. 52. 758M, p. 225. 75913331., p. 226. 33.1.9.2. p. 30. 7611b1d., p. 30-42. ~144- accept or reject the prophetic message. The concept of God became merely a "unifying principle"762 for the Iewish nation, a religious attitude that easily developed into a humanistic affinity toward their fellow men and nature. Later, the Christian Church slowly evolved a system of theology that reverted to idolatry in the figure of Iesus, who originally satisfied the need for the suffering masses to identify with one who had proclaimed deliverance from life's misery and who had himself suffered under the hands of authorities whom the masses despised.763 Soon the suffering servant was transformed into the Son of God; the Christian could now identify with the God-man, and thereby relieve his hostilities against a sovereign God of judgment and oppressive power. Since the believing enthusiasts were imbued with hatred and death wishes-~consciously against their rulers , unconsciously against God the Father--they identified with the crucified; they themselves suffered death on the cross and atoned in this way for their death wishes against the father, Through his death, Iesus expiated the guilt of all, and the first Christians needed such an atonement. 764 Identification with Iesus meant that in the after-life, the believer would also rule alongside God and become content. Next, the "Church" promulgated the idea that Jesus had eternally existed with the Father-God, but only after the composition of the Christian 7621mm. p. 226. 763Dogma 9_f_Christ, p. 29-41. 764Ib1d., p. 48. -145- community shifted from the oppressed masses to the middle and upper classes in the age of Constantine.765 The theology of Paul, an intellec- tual, predominated over the simplicity of the Gospels. The eschatalogical expectation thatthe Kingdom of God was imminent began to dissipate and Christians looked backward to the cross,766 and to inward, rather than political salvation . Finally, a decisive change took place in Christian doctrine: Christ was conceived of now as God becoming man and this , contends Fromm, destroyed the revolutionary spirit of the early Christian community that had directed its aggressive impulses against the established authori- ties. When the Christian masses began to think of Christ as God coming down to mankind, they could no longer relieve their hostility against the Father, but now had to turn their aggressiveness against themselves, thus simplifying their subjugation to the clergy. Church authorities then assumed complete control; by rigidifying their doctrines, they bound the masses in subservient obedience. 767 While the Protestant Reformation began the movement away from "768 "the passively infantile attitude of the Middle Ages and toward a reviv- ification of the Father-God, Lutheranism and especially Calvinism, 76531191., p. 50. 76631151., p. 58. 767i19i91~ p. 64-71. 768Ibid., p. 91. -l46- "emphasized the wickedness of man and taught self-humiliation and self— abasement as the basis of all virtue."769 Says Fromm: An illustration is the feeling of guilt and anxiety which Calvin's doctrines aroused in men. It may be said that the person who is overwhelmed by a feeling of his own powerlessness and unworthiness , by the unceasing doubt of whether he is saved or condemned to eternal punish- ment, who is hardly capable of any genuine joy and has made himself into the cog of a machine which he has to serve, that person, indeed, has a severe defect.770 Authoritarian ethics forces the person to "internalize" the rules and prohibitions of higher authorities, and to obey them "as if he were obeying himself.”71 He believes this voice to be his own conscience. Disobedience to the conscience is evil; compliance is virtuous . 2. HUMANITARIANISM Quite different from the authoritarian (heteronomous) conscience is the 'humanistic' (autonomous) conscience. It is not the internalized voice of an authority whom we are eager to please and afraid of displeasing; it is the voice of our total personality expressing the demands of life and growth. 'Good' for the humanistic conscience is the voice of our self which summons us back to our- selves , Lg become what we potentially are. Fromm avers that man is free to choose the kinds of ideals that he will follow, but that he "is not free to choose between having or not having ideals."773 For humanistic ethics, the summum bonum is the 769Escape from Freedom, p. 117. 770M_§_n_f9_r Himself, p. 223. 771You Shall _l_3_e__A_sGods, p. 55. 772Loc. git. 7”Psychoanalysis and Religion. 13- 24- —l47- productive character: 774 "the ability of man to make productive use of his powers is his potency; the inability is his impotence."775 To live productively, one must be able to love, which is possible only when one knows and respects the loved one. This depends on the "776 use of reason, which attempts to grasp "the total picture of self and others , reaching to the depth or "the essence of things and processes."777 Fromm rejects any attempt to establish the "dicta" of the authority as the criteria for good or evil, but aware of the complicating factors, he says: Humanistic ethics has to cope with the difficulty. . .that in making man the sole judge of values it would seem that pleasure or pain becomes the final arbiter of good and evil. If this were the only alternative, then, indeed, the human- istic principle could not be the basis for ethical norms. . . How can our life be guided by a motive by which the animal as well as man, the good and the bad person, the normal and the sick are motivated alike? Even if we qualify the pleasure principle by restricting it to those pleasures which do not injure the legitimate interests of others, it is hardly adequate as a guiding principle for our actions. The empirical approach, he holds, is the answer to the fallacious alternative of choosing between submission to either authority or to pleas- ure. It leads him to conclude that: 774115311 _f__r Himself, p. 93. 7751.919“ p. 107. 776mg“ p. 110. 777M“ p. 108. 7781451., p. 176. ~148- Happiness and joy although, in a sense, subjective experi- ences, are the outcome of interactions with, and depend upon, objective conditions. . . (which) can be summarized compre- hensively as productiveness. Psychoanalysis gives us the empirical method of discovering the foundations for the proper norms of behavior and pleasure, confirming the view "that the subjective experience of satisfaction is in itself deceptive "780 and not a valid criterion of value. "Every neurosis. . .confirms the fact that pleasure can be in contradiction to man's real interests. "781 Happiness is actually a function of our entire personality, an "expression 782 of the state of the entire organism. " For a few, pleasure is "the feeling accompanying the relief from painful tension, "783 but the tension can be psychic tension as well as physiological (as Freud hypothesized) springing from insatiable irrational desires that represent "a dissatisfaction within oneself. "784 The conditions influencing irrational or rational pleasure and satisfaction include economic and psychological scarcity or abundance, 785 independence. self-accomplishment and awareness.786 Ibid. , p. 176-177. 7801bid., p. 182. 78111d., p. 183. 782 I id., p.185. Ibid., p. 186. Ibid., p. 188. Ibid., p. 189. 786Ib1d.. p. 192-194. ~149- Fromm also depends on rational faith in the development of human- istic ethics, which has already been discussed. In his earlier works, Fromm realized that man achieves happiness through practical activities, primarily his work, but also through other interests. Man is free under the conditions of economic, intellectual and moral freedom , 787 a freedom that can only be attained when he is able to ' reconcile his conflicts in the interpersonal relationships in society. The only alternative to alienation, automatization and insanity is " humanistic communitarianism";788 this involves sharing property, work and experience. II. LOVE Fromm warns that the growing interest in psychology can easily blind us to those aspects that are "dangerous and destructive to the spirit- ual development of man. "789 The patient can be considered as an object, a thing for manipulation and dissection. Yet, the psychologist is driven to "penetrate into the secret of man's soul, into the nucleus which is 'he.'"790 Moreover, psychology functions negatively, telling us what man is not, how man is bound by his illusions and fears; but "it cannot tell us what man, what each one of us, is."791 787'Sane Society, p. 277. 788Ibid. , p. 313. 789Dogma of Christ, p. 191. 79°1bid., p. 194. 791 Ibid. , p. 195. ~ -150- However, there is "another path to knowing man's secret; this "792 path is not that of thought, but that of lpys, and psychological know- ledge may provide the "condition for full knowledge in the act of love"; 793 it ought never become a substitute for love or for union with others . Love is not primarily a relationship to a specific person; it is an attitude, an orientation of charsc_t_e_r which deter- mines the relatedness of a person to the world as a whole, not toward one 'object' of love. If a person loves only one other person and is indifferent to the rest of his fellow men, his love is not love but a symbiotic attachment, or an enlarged egotism. Love is an act of the will, a "decision to commit my life completely "795 to that of one other person. It is vital to productiveness; the ability to achieve unity with others, while remaining independent. A. LOVE AND CHARACTER Man's desire to reunite with nature and his fellows motivates him k 796 797 to alleviate his anxieties through productive wor , orgiastic union 798 and conformity. These are only partial answers; "the full answer lies 792Loc. _QLL. 793Loc. 93}. 794The Ar___t t9_f_Loving, p. 38, 39. 7951bi d. , p. 47. 79611d., p. 14. 797I—bflor p. 9.11. 7981 id., p. 12-14. III! I)": II. 1 . --151- in the achievement of interpersonal union, of fusion with another person, "799 Essentially, it comes through the act of giving. in love. It is hardly necessary to stress the fact that the ability to love as an act of giving depends on the character develop- ment of the person. It presupposes the attainment of a pre- dominantly productive orientation; in this orientation the person has overcome dependency, narcissistic omnipotence, the wish to exploit others , or to hoard, and has acquired faith in his own human powers , courage to rely on his powers in the attainment of his goals. To the degree that these qualities are lacking, he is afraid of giving himself-- hence of loving. The perversion of love is manifested in passive and active states of symbiotic union with others , the seeking of oneness with another by destroying the integrity of oneself. The passive form of symbiotic union is masochism, the submitting of oneself to another by merging with the more powerful entity. The masochist rids himself through humiliation and abasement. Pain may be present, but pain in itself is not his aim; his goal is the destruction of himself as a unique person.801 Fromm uses Calvinism as his example of theological masochism. It is a theology, . . .according to which man is essentially evil and powerless. Man can achieve absolutely nothing that is good on the basis of his own strength or merit. . .Man should have not only the conviction of his absolute nothin ness but he should do everything to humiliate himself. 8 7991mm, p. 15. 800 H bid., p. 21, 22. 801 H id., p. 16. 802 an for Himself, p. 124, 125. -152- The active form of symbiotic union is sadism, or domination. Here, too, the sadist wants to become part of the host person, but accomplishes this escape from alienation by enhancing and inflating himself at the expense of the other.803 In seeking power, the sadist often uses pain, but pain is, again, not the ultimate concern. In the more benign forms of sadism, the sadist permits the host some measures of satisfaction, except the most vital one: independence. Masochism and sadism manifest different symptoms, but they have in common the element of "fusion without integrity";804 consequently, some persons react sadistically-masochistically toward different objects. Hitler reacted primarily in a sadistic fashion toward people, but masochistically toward fate, history the 'higher power' of nature. His end--suicide among general distruction-—is as characteristic as was his dream of success--total domination . 8 Sadistic-masochistic tendencies have been interpreted by some people as their love for the objects of their desires; the proof is in the limits granted to the host persons. B. SELF-LOVE Fromm criticizes Calvin, Kant, Nietzsche and Freud for their inadequate conceptualizations of self-love. He says that Freud's self-love 803A__r_t 9_f_Loving, p. 16. 8°4Ihid., p. 17. 805Loc. git. —153- is "the same as narcissism, the turning of the libido toward oneself";806 Libido could only be turned toward others or self; in extreme cases the person "is insane." On such terms , Love and self-love are thus mutually exclusive in the sense that the more there is of one, the less there is of the other. If self-love is bad, it follows that unselfishness is virtuous . 807 In contrast, Fromm stresses the conjunctive relation in love, that love for self "is inseparably connected with the love for any other being."808 The Biblical injunction, "love thy neighbor as thyself" expresses this idea. Here, once more, is Fromm's idea that, " not he who hss much is rich, but he who gi_v«_e_s_much";809 it is the psychological as well as the material hoarder who is impoverished. Therefore, in order to give, one must be able to possess, and one must know and appreciate one's own possessions. The failure of modern culture, he asserts, is that people are not concerned enough with their own real interests , "not in the fact that they are too selfish, but that they do not love themselves . "810 True self-love has four indispensable elements that are missing in the selfish, narcissistic person: concern for others , acceptance of 806 Ibid., p. 48. 807Ibid., p. 49. 808Loc. it. 309mm, p. 20. 810 Man _f_9_r Himself, p. 143. -154- 811 responsibility, respect, and knowledge of self and others. To put love into practice, one must have concentration, patience, and supreme concern.812 Concentration means the abilities to observe, listen, and "live fully in the present, "813 i.e. , development of sensitivity. In order to love, one needs courage and faith in his fellow men. In the light of this, what does Fromm mean when he says that the mature person might learn to love God? The truly religious person, if he follows the essence of the monotheistic idea, does not pray for anything, does not expect anything from God; he does not love God as a child loves his father or his mother; he has acquired the humility of sensing his limitations, to the degree of knowing that he knows nothing about God. God becomes to him a symbol . . .He has faith in the principles which 'God' represents; he thinks truth, lives love and justice, and considers all of his life only valuable inasmuch as it gives him the chance to arrive at an ever fuller unfolding of his human powers-- as the only reality that matters, as the only object of 'ulti- mate concern'; and, eventually, he does not speak about God--nor even mention his name. To love God, if he were going to use this word, would mean then, to long for the attainment of the full capacity to love, for the realization of that which 'God' stands for in oneself. 8111 id., p. 134-145; of. also A_rt o_fLoving, p. 48-53. 812 _ ;Ar_t_;Loving, p. 91 112. 813mm,, p. 96. 814Ib1doo p. 59-600 -155- III. CONSCIENCE A. CONSCIENCE AND CHARACTER According to Fromm, man has a limited ability to control or influence internal and external forces through some modification of those conditions that bring about realization of the good. However, it must be kept in mind that, . . .while we have reason and conscience, which enable us to be active participants in our life, reason and conscience themselves are inseparably linked up with our character. If destructive forces and irrational passions have gained dominance in our character, both our reason and our con- science are affected and cannot exercise their function properly. 815 This point was previously elaborated in discussing Fromm's concept of the "social character" and here merely serves to underscore his ideas of the humanistic conscience, sin, and guilt. Just as the problem of moral judgment relates to those of determinism and indeterminism, so the individual conscience can be viewed in these same terms . All aspects of man, his conscience no less than his will, are expressions of his character.816 The productive person acts according to his reason and is able to exercise his will toward his own enhancement, but the nonproduc- tive person is slave to irrationality and lacks willpower. Therefore we need to understand "the strength of a person's innate vitality that made 815Man for Himself, p. 234. 816-1192. c1 «'9' -156- it possible for him to resist environmental forces acting upon him in his "817 childhood and later on in order to make judgments upon him. But only the authoritarian conscience really feels qualified to pass judgments on the conscience of its fellow men, for it assumes a prior supreme authority, 8’18 which would, of course, be absurd as long as the "concept 'God' was conditioned by the presence of a socio-political structure. "819 B. HUMANISTIC CONSCIENCE The humanistic conscience, ideally, "is the reaction of our total "820 personality to its proper functioning or dysfunctioning. It represents the real self; "it contains also the essence of our moral experiences in life. "821 Fromm asks , why does not man develop his natural tendencies for a humanistic conscience? The fact is, he replies , the human situation is morally precarious.822 There are extremely difficult problems for the humanistic conscience to overcome. One is the fact that its voice is 823 feeble in most people because they have lost themselves . Another 81713151., p. 235. 81812153., p. 236. 819193 Shall l_3_s&Gods, p. 18. 8201mm f_o_r Himself, p. 162. 82119191., p. 163. 822149.. p. 164. 823Loc. it. -157- fact is that most peOple refuse to listen, or have become insensitive to it, for this requires discipline plus the rare art of learning to "be alone with oneself."824 Then, too, our conscience speaks indirectly; we only realize its symptoms: guilt, anxiety, the fear of death, the fear of disapproval.825 Fromm concludes that man has too long been under the domination of the authoritarian conscience. It has left him with irrational guilt feelings; it has suppressed that true conscience that would lead him on toward life.826 C. GUILT It is by now quite obvious that the themes of conscience and guilt pervade Fromm's writings, that the antagonists are authoritarian conscience and guilt vs. humanistic conscience and guilt. Why speak of "humanistic" guilt? Fromm prOposes that, Often guilt feelings are consciously experienced in terms of the authoritarian conscience while, dynamically, they are rooted in the humanistic conscience. A person may feel consciously guilty for not pleasing authorities, while unconsciously he feels guilty for not living up to his own expectations of himself. He gives the example of a man who repressed his own desires to be a musician in order to satisfy his father, who wanted him to enter the business field. Unsuccessful, and feeling frustrated and depressed, he Ibid., p. 165. Ibid., p. 165-167. Ibid., p. 171. Ibid. , p. 169. -158- went to a psychoanalyst. At first, he superficially felt that his guilt feelings were caused by his father's disappointment in him; however, later he came to see that, the core of his guilt feeling is not the failure to satisfy his father, but, on the contrary, his obedience to him and his failure to satisfy himself. These guilt feelings, says Fromm, are common to patients; they feel overwhelmed for not loving their parents as they should, performing unsatisfactory work, hurting another's feelings: They react with a sense of inferiority, of depravity, and often with a conscious or unconscious desire for punish- ment. It is usually not difficult to discover that this all- pervasive guilt reaction stems from an authoritarian orientation . Fromm refers to The Trial by Kafka as "a beautiful illustration of the complex interrelation of authoritarian and humanistic conscience. "830 The hero, K, is arrested and kept ignorant of his crime. After vainly trying to find means of escape, he is finally executed. K's inner experiences symbolize, . . .the sense of guilt of a man who feels accused by unknown authorities and feels guilty for not pleasing them; yet these authorities are so beyond his reach that he cannot even learn of what they accuse him, or how he can defend him- self. Looked at from this angle, the novel would repre- sent the theological viewpoint most akin to Calvin's 828Ibid. , p. 170. 8291519hoanalysis and Rejgion, Po 90- 830Man _f_gr Himself, p. 171. -159- theology. Man is condemned or saved without understand- ing the reasons. All he can do is to tremble and to throw himself upon God's mercy.831 In contrast, he argues, the humanistic conscience rejects any transcendent power. Man is responsible tosave himself; "Only if he understands the voice of his conscience, can he return to himself. "832 Here Fromm returns to his concept of responsibility. The usual denotation given to responsibility, he says , is that the person is "punishable or accusable."833 Fromm much prefers to think of responsibility apart from any connection between punishment or guilt. "In this sense responsibility only means 'I am aware thatI did it."'834 As soon as the deed is experi- enced as "sin" or "guilt" it is alienated from the subject. Now, it is no longer the person who did the deed, but "the sinner, " "the bad one, " the "other person" who needs punishment; thus the subject avoids loath- ing himself and life.835 The bIOphilic conscience is motivated by its attraction to life and joy; the moral effort consists in strengthening the life-loving side in oneself. For this reason the biophile does not dwell in remorse and guilt which are, after all, only aspects of self-loathing and sadnessé He turns quickly to life and attempts to do good.83 ~160- Man ought, therefore, asserts Fromm, not to be oppressed by a sense of sin, which is after all human, "almost unavoidable."837 Fromm interprets the Old Testament words for "sin" as meaning "to miss (the road), ""to err, " and as rebellious "transgression. "838 The man who repents is the man who returns to the right road, "to God, to himself. "839 "Because we all share in the same humanity, there is nothing inhuman in sinning, hence nothing to be ashamed of, or to be despised for. "840 We are just as capable of returning to the good as we are to the evil. 837 —* —* 838mm,, p. 168. 8391mm, p. 169. 8401hid., p. 176. CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS This study probed into the larger problem of the nature of man as it related to the narrower problem of guilt. Van T11 and Fromm were chosen because of their diametrically opposite positions; placing them in juxta- position has revealed how deep and irreconcilable are the Christian and non-Christian conceptions of man and guilt as viewed by these men. Certainly other men could have been chosen whose positions on the issues would have varied from those of Van Til and Fromm, but in retrospect the selection seems most fortunate; they represent extreme views on the nature of reality, and enable us to see more clearly, perhaps, what kind of impact their philosophies would have upon the client in therapy, and what might be some of the implications for practice and research in counseling. Depending upon their background, critical readers will see other points of comparison and arrive at implications and conclusions varying from those presented here. In the interests of brevity, the following areas have been selected for summary discussion: Methodology, Implications for Counseling Theory, Selection of Counselors , Research Implications and Personal Observations . -l62- I. METHODOLOGY A. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS: SUMMARIZATION l. REALITY The most obvious differences between Van T11 and Fromm are their fundamental presuppositions . Van Til holds that there are only two alternatives concerning reality that man could logically maintain, and Van Til chooses to assume the ultimacy of God. Corollary to this assump— tion is a two-layer theory of being and knowledge, and the analogical relationship of nature and man, to God. The uniqueness of Van Til lies in his consistent application of this principle to every area under discus- sion even though it leads him to antinomies , or seeming paradoxes such as that of God's sovereignty and man's free agency. The question could be raised: "Does Van Til really solve anything by positing paradox as a function of human limits? " Van Til would probably reply that he is simply stating a truism; paradox is inherent in man's perception of reality by virtue of man's lack of exhaustive and comprehensive knowledge of that reality. This does not mean that man should avoid grappling with the antinomies, but that he should become aware that God alone knows the ultimate solutions. Man must live with ambiguity and by faith. Van Til argues that the antinomies are naturally expected by one who believes that the world has mystery for man, but not for God, and that it is faith in God's sovereign power and ultimate goodness that gives men the motiva- tion to face life rationally; that unless one firmly holds to these principles, -163- rational thinking collapses; that there would be no basis for science or philosophy, and finally, no meaning to life. Fromm also sees the challenge of alternatives, but he chooses to accept man's autonomy, and is generally consistent in applying this principle. Man's reason cannot be interfered with, even by supposedly supernatural powers , it can make valid statements about the phenomenal world, it is capable of piercing to the essence of phenomena; reason can make value judgments about reality. This primacy of the intellect is the basis for all true science. He feels that the only alternative to the autonomy of man is meaninglessness, confusion, fear and subjugation to blind irrationalism and authoritarianism. 2. MAN Van Til understands man to be a creature of God, utterly depend- ent upon Him for life and knowledge, both temporally and eternally. Man's dignity lies in his possession of the Divine Image, which reflects certain attributes of God's own nature, i.e. , His righteousness, holiness, good- ness, spirituality and self-consciousness. Created by God as unique from all other creatures, man is responsible to live in active obedience, the only condition that gives him true freedom to develop his full potentials. Fromm views man as not having a basic nature, but as being the peak of the evolutionary continuum and thus intimately related to the animal world. Man has also transcended the animal world, but the ensuing self-awareness creates existential dichotomies, or tensions, -164— between life and death, between potentiality and lack of fulfillment, and between independence and a need for social communion. Man finds meaning for life only in himself, though at the same time, he is condi- tioned by society. In spite of his denial of man's basic nature, Fromm speaks of man's uniqueness, transcendence, and alienation, which really seems to imply a "nature" that is identifiable. 3. ETHICS Both Van Til and Fromm agree that society falls short of its ideal state, that good and evil are resident in man, that perfectibility is possible and that alienation is the root of man's troubles, but they thoroughly disagree on the meaning of and the solution for each of these problems. For Fromm, the ideal state for man and society is productivity in terms of life, love, and freedom. "Good" and "evil" are relative terms, universally present and equally ultimate in all persons, i.e. , it is equally possible for man to grow as it is for him to decay. However, man can perfect himself if he will only learn to cooperate with the biophilic tend- encies motivating him toward growth and if he fights against the death- pursuing necrophilic tendencies , which are evil. Alienation is man's human condition, and Fromm talks of this in terms akin to metaphysics: man's self-awareness has separated him from nature; frightened, man flees to illusions about reality, creating idols to which he projects aspects of his own personality, thus impoverishing himself by the loss of his "soul. " Maintenance of this alienated condition brings ethical conflicts -165- within man, and between man and his peers. But, since man is responsi- ble to himself, his sin is essentially against himself, and he can seek forgiveness from himself and "save" himself by using his own productive powers; he can destroy his idols and become independent. The "cure" for man's neurotic symbioses leads to "adjustment" to society and self. Adjustment is relative to different societies , but because all societies are slowly growing towards each other according to the universal norms and principles established by the criterion of truth, Fromm holds that it is possible to speak of the "ideal state" for all men. However, he fails to deal with the origin, the locus, or the functioning of his "criterion of truth." Van Til accepts only the Adamic State as the criterion for "normal- ity"; man's summum bonum is God's glory, which finds expression on earth in the kingdom of God. The fall of man was ethical, not metaphysical, and produced an estrangement between God and man. Cut off from direct relationship with his Creator, man is lost, adrift on the sea of contingency and irrationalism and suffering under the wrath of God. Although the image of God is damaged by man's rebellion, it can never be completely eradi- cated; this image serves as the voice of conscience, that seed of religion continually motivating man to return to true fellowship. The diVine image reinforced by common grace enables even the worst of sinners to perform some measure of civil good and empowers many to develop a large measure of their creative potential; nevertheless, man's blindness and hardness of -166- heart prevent him from fulfilling his destiny. God's saving grace, manifested in Christ and transmitted through the Holy Spirit, regenerates man, establishes him in the proper Creator-creature covenantal relation- ship, and thus enables man to become, in principle, an integrated per- sonality. Sin is still present in the believer, which hampers his full growth and prevents his perfectibility until the after—life when he partici- pates fully in the resurrection of Christ. Meanwhile, society stands in desperate need of the restraining force and constructive efforts of regener- ate men who are free to COOperate on every level with unbelievers for the common good, and all society "borrows" the principles of Christianity for its own use. All things are "good" that glorify God, all the detracts from His glory are "evil. " Adjustment means renewal to relationship with God, and implies that believers will become unadjusted to their culture in terms of ultimate goals, methods of operation, standards, and mores, but only this reconciliation to God is able to free man from slavery to self (idolatry) and set him on the road toward inner growth, peace and happiness. B. AUTHORITARIANISM AND HUMANISM Fromm's antagonism against authoritarianism in all its forms pro- vides a major theme for his works. Ironically, he speaks from the author- itarian position of psychoanalysis to establish his case. Authoritarianism, says Fromm, reflects sadism and masochism in its efforts to control, estab- lish symbiotic union, and destroy freedom. It deludes man into believing -l67- that the higher authority has a right to demand worship and that irreverence 841 Van Til declares that Fromm's and disobedience constitute sin. In reply, analysis of Christianity is a caricature, a straw man existing only in Fromm's imagination. While Christianity accepts an omnipotent Creator, says Van Til, "it does not believe in a God of pure power"842 1 n any arbitrary sense. It does believe that man was created to return God's love; obedience is love's expression. "Accordingly to the Christian, sin is a setting aside of God as man's loving Father, not an effort to escape from a tyrant, as Fromm suggests."843 Van Til asserts that Calvin also fought against authoritarian religion in "its most obj ection- able form, " and that Calvin's concern for man's humility before God was the result of Calvin's appreciation that man in his sinful condition experi- enced misery and powerlessness, not that Calvin sought to imprison man in such a condition. Fromm holds that man's independence rests upon the principle of autonomy, while Van Til replies that on Fromm's basis , man would be in a vacuum: "It is only on the presupposition of the truth of the Christian position that human personality stands in an intelligible relationship to its environment. " 844 841d. Appendix A. 842Van Til, Search fgg Meaning. p. 38. 843Loc. c_i_t. 8441bid., p. 39. -168- In view of the purpose of this study, a few comments are in order regarding Fromm's hostility against Calvin. In pursuing Calvin, Fromm usually quotes those passages supporting his own thesis that Calvinism is masochistic, perhaps sadistic, but he fails to point out that there are semantic and presuppositional differences behind this running argument. In fact, Fromm may only be reacting to a popular misconception of Calvin rather than to Calvin himself. Referring to Calvin's teaching on self-love, Fromm comments, This emphasis on the nothingness and wickedness of the individual implies that there is nothing he should like and respect about himself. The doctrine is rooted in self- contempt and self-hatred. Calvin makes this point very clear: he speaks of self-love as 'a pest.’ If the indiv- idual finds something 'on the strength of which he finds pleasure in himself,‘ he betrays this sinful self-love. This fondness for himself will make him sit in judgement over others and despise them. Therefore to be fond of oneself or to like anything in oneself is one of the reatest Sins. It is supposed to exclude love for others8 and to be identical with selfishness. Calvin did, indeed, see man as sinful and worthless in himself with respect Q salvation by virtue of the fact that, through sin the will of man "is in a state of captivity, so that it can do nothing towards "848 righteousness" until it has been liberated by "Divine grace. The 845Calvin, Institutes _g_f_ the Christian Religion, trans. John Allen, Eerdmans Publishing Co. , 1949. (Note that Fromm's 1928 edition which he cites has different page references.) Vol. I, Bk. III, Chp. II, p. 756. 846Fromm makes a reference to Calvin that does not exist. Perhaps typographical error: Man f9_r_Himself, p. 125, footnote 5. 847Man fgr Himself, p. 125. 84806137111, 522. git-y Chp. III par. 8' p’ 288' -l69- other half of the coin is that Calvin saw the dignity of man resident in the image of God, which, although mutilated by sin, was restored in Christ; conformed to Him, "we are so restored that we bear the Divine image in true piety, righteousness, purity, and understanding."849 For Fromm, this is the height of folly, a base submissiveness to God as an idol, but he forgets that both he and Calvin are consistent with their basic presuppositions. Fromm's god is man; self-love is therefore right and good. Calvin's God would be offended by this self-adulation and by the detraction from His glory. There is also a semantic difference interwoven in the presupposi- tional one. When Calvin uses the term "self-love, " it is apparently synonymous with what Fromm calls "selfishness . " Fromm accuses Calvin of misunderstanding self-love, but he does this, first, by standing on his own assumptions of man's autonomy in order to attack Calvin's concept of self-love which rests on other assumptions. Secondly, after defining self-love in terms of productivity, care, responsibility, and respect, as "the affirmation of one's own life,’ happiness, growth, freedom, "850 and as the capacity for love, he then argues that Calvin did not have this concept of self-love. And, indeed, Calvin did not have that concept. By self-love, Calvin meant pride, haughtiness, ostentation, avarice, libidinousness, luxury, effeminancy, and "a depraved passion for glory."851 849 M'I Chap. XVI par. 4; p. 209. 850 Man {9; Himself, p. 135. 8510a1v1n, _p. gi_t., Vol. 1, Book III, Chp. VII, par. 11. p. 753- -l70- "For we are all so blinded and fascinated by self-love, that every one imagines he has a just right to exalt himself, and to undervalue all others who stand in competition with him."852 Far from attaining a level of superiority over, or desire to judge, men, in view of the Christian's relationship to God, Calvin said: We should remember, that we must not reflect on the wicked- ness of men, but to contemplate the Divine image in them; which, concealing and obliterating their faults, by its beauty and dignity allures us' to embrace them in the arms of our love.853 C. SPECIAL PROBLEMS l. DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM Oriented as he is to a philosophical-theological structure, Van Til does not spell out in psychological terms the relationship of determinism and freedom to the development of the Self. Psychology looks for causes in order to explain behavior. Perhaps there are those who might commit themselves to a strict concept of determinism, but most psychologists seem to accept some measure of freedom in man's 854 i.e. , that in some aspects of living. man experiences development, liberation from necessity or coercion or constraint in choice or action. Indeed, psychotherapy has for its task the motivation of some inner fac- tors whose influence will enable us to respond differently under the same 8521mm. par. IV, p. 755. 853Ibid., par. V1. p. 759. 854 cf. to Hook, ed. , Determinism and Freedom is the Age gf Modern Science. -17l- conditions. For example, McKenzie accepts self-determination as a "causal agency, "855 adding that, if the Self fails to act in the interest of the whole personality, there must be some adequate explantion. Van Til would say that the believer as well as the unbeliever acts contrary to his best interests because of the effects of sin on his emotional and intellectual being. The difference between believers and unbelievers is that the former are restoredig principle to a condition of integration and thus have the possibility to grow indefinitely because their powers of life are given by God's grace. Believers have attained a new measure of freedom because they have been freed from slavery to sin by the atone- ment of Jesus Christ. They may now cooperate with God toward the full development of their potentials , whereas the unbeliever is still bound by the principle of sin and therefore determined in rebelliousness toward God. On the other hand, says Van Til, the principle of common grace enables unbelievers to develop their potentials to a partial degree, at least until death stops the process of growth, and even in this life, sin tends toward disintegration of the entire organism. Granted that the above is true, at what points does man possess real freedom to enhance his own development? How can he change circumstances if God controls all things? For example, how would Van Til conceive of the relationships between character and behavior on the one hand, and definite motives , habits, emotions and interests on the BSSMCKenzie, Guilt: _Iis Meanissgnd Significance! P- 115' -l72- other? If the Self is not free, how can God expect man to be responsible? But if the Self is free, then how does God exercise control? Van Til implies that such questions are mysteries. The researcher might choose to assume either freedom or determinism as man's condition and proceed with investigation. Van Til would reply that the researcher needs a sovereign God; the alternative is research in a vacuum. Seemingly, Fromm's appeal to "alternativism" as a compromise between freedom and determinism supplies a better answer in psychologi- cal terms. Man is a constellation of forces that are structured in a defin- able manner (one's character) and influenced by environmental conditions. There are circumstances within and outside the self over which man cannot exercise control regardless of his wishes, but there are also real choices and possibilities. Fromm says that man has the capabilities of cooperating with his biophilic or necrophilic tendencies, and agrees with Marx and Freud that man can enlarge the realm of freedom. As neat as it may appear, Fromm's appeal does not supply the answer. Under closer scrutiny, Fromm's position is seen to be essentially an assumption about the nature of man and reality. He simply affirms that man_:_l_s capable of progressing or regressing. This is the beginning and ending of his argument. But we are not told why man chooses to move one way or the other. On Fromm's own ground, is it possible that some men might have extremely powerful necrophilic tendencies which would predispose them toward personality orientations around the syndrome of -l73- decay? If so, then these persons would be pre-determined regarding their choices , they would have no "real" freedom. Conversely, the same argument would hold regarding persons born with, or conditioned to develop, powerful biophilic tendencies. Fromm does say that a parti- cular society can possess a particular "social character.‘ To the degree that each member of that society is conditioned toward the orientation he loses a measure of freedom. In that case, it is highly unlikely that the individual will ever break out of the mold of his society. Fromm might respond that the individual's biophilic tendencies would clash with society's demands, and the person would free himself. In that case, it is evident that the person's biophilic tendencies were so powerful that he was predetermined to break his chains. Where then is freedom? He could do no other than what he did! And, on the other hand, if the person was afraid to contradict his culture, then his fear determined his choices, and he, too, lacked real freedom. Therefore, it is evident that the problem of freedom and determin- ism remains a mystery for both Van Til, who admits it, and for Fromm, who claims he has the solution. 2. EMPIRICISM While Van Til does not claim to be an empiricist, Fromm repeat- edly affirms his commitment to psychoanalysis as a rigid, empirical science because it relies upon cautious observations and integration of psychic data. Therefore, he contends, psychoanalysis is able to -l74- determine valid norms and principles for human behavior. His generaliza- tions reflect Freud's view that psychoanalysis was a revolutionary move- ment promising to transform the world.856 It can be shown that Fromm has committed himself to an untenable position. Empiricism depends solely on observation or experience, often without regard to system or theory, and is open to verification, disproof and revision. Now, it is true that Fromm has followed the dictates of ' his observations to some degree in revising his original Freudian and Marxian theories in order to fit subsequent evidence, but it is also clear that Fromm does operate within a theory. In fact, analysis of his sixteen major works produced from 1941 to 1966 indicates that he has not only maintained essentially the same theoretical position in this period, but also that he has used essentially the same language, case histories and illustrations with only minor revision. He further jeopardizes his empiricism when he states that there are eternal norms standing above both God and man, thus revealing his presupposition of a Platonic principle of eternal truth, a principle incap- able of empirical observation. Moreover, it is apparent that both the data obtained in psycho- analysis and the methods used to obtain the data are completely bound to subjectivism. First, there is the fact of the diversity of psychoanalytic schools. Secondly, the psychoanalyst is not dealing with events in 856Fromm, Sigmund Freud's Mission, last chapter. -l75- their historical situation, that is, as they have been experienced, are now perceived, and are being transmitted by the patient. Therefore, the analyst can never be sure that the events occurred precisely as the patient describes them. For example, the patient's quotation of another person's remark is distorted by his attitudes toward the other person, the environ- mental setting, the tone and pitch of voice used, and perhaps by relevant variables antecedent to the event of the quotation. The analyst can only make his judgments on the event or the quotation as given to him by the patient, and does not make any verification beyond the therapeutic setting itself. Also, the analyst is himself influenced by his own feelings toward the patient, his immediate emotional condition, the environment, and his psychological theories and training. Added to this is the fact that psychologists do not agree on certain universal norms or principles governing human behavior, that there is no accepted body of concepts regarding man's nature, and that psychologists are themselves motivated by a wide variety of desires and goals . At least one psychology professor describes his field as "an amalgam of humbug, platitude, piercing intuition, naivete, soaring flight of imagina- tion, dull dogma, incisive reasoning, and sheer drivel"857 and suggests that a healthy dosage of salt to be taken during its study. it., p. 61. Quote from Cohen, Humanistic 857McKenzie, 92. Psychology, p. 11. ~176- Even Fromm, himself, underscores this notion when he says that the average man is half asleep even when awake! I mean that his contact with reality is a very partial one; most of what he believes to be reality (outside or inside of himself) is a set of fictions which his mind constructs. He is aware of reality only to the degree to which his social functioning makes it necessary. Finally, Fromm fails to realize the contradiction in affirming, on the one hand, that science is a history of errors in which we make small approximations of the truth, and on the other hand, saying that humanism in general and psychoanalysis in particular have "laid the foundations for value systems based on man's autonomy and reason."859 This is compound- ed by his claim that psychoanalysis (and by implication, he himself) is capable of penetrating to the essence of man's "nature" in terms of man's total personality. In order to accomplish this, Fromm has to assume comprehensive, exhaustive knowledge, not only of man as an individual phenomenon, but of society as a group phenomenon and of reality as a whole. Van Til stresses the impossibility of possessing such knowledge. 3. THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE In every system, the problem of epistemology is foremost. How does man really know anything truly? Does he have to know the whole before he can understand the part? In view of the complexity of data and 858Fromm, Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis. Po 108- 859Man f_or Himself, p. 16. (Perhaps Fromm should have said that science is a history of diminishing errors.). -l77- the problem of integrating the data into a meaningful system, one is forced to a position of humility. Van Til declares that man only knows partially, but that he can know truly, provided he has been given a foundation for that knowledge in revelation. Revelation from God enables man to understand truths about God and the world; the only other choice is to possess comprehens- ive knowledge. Is revelation in the Bible, then, trustworthy? There are those who argue with Fromm that the Bible is filled with errors and is only the product of man's mind. Van Til says that unless the revelation in Scripture is trustworthy, we have no source of knowledge that is authori- tative. But Van Til is not a literalist, in the extreme sense of that word. He simply accepts the Scriptures as authentic and authoritative and endeavors to discern what they mean if taken at their face value. To argue that Van T11 is a literalist is to set up a straw man, for hardly any- one holds a completely literal point of view in reference to the Bible. The issue as Van Til sees it, is what should be taken literally and what should be taken symbolically in terms of the Scripture as supernaturally conceived literature. Can Van Til be sure that God exists and that it is possible to know Him? Can Fromm be equally sure that God does not exist and 'on that assurance dismiss all contentions to the contrary? One could wish for absolute knowledge about knowledge itself. There is only that principle to which Van Til and Fromm subscribe, each in his own way, namely, the —178- principle of faith. One must be satisfied with sufficient and necessary implications based upon logical analysis of both positions. One must assume each position for the sake of argument to see where the ultimacy of God or man lead to, and then live by the faith one concludes is most reasonable. However, Van Til would say that without God as one's presupposition, there is no possibility for predication. II. IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNSELING THEORY A. VIEW OF THE CLIENT It would seem logical that both Fromm and Van Til would view the person coming to therapy, not as a "client" as in the Rogerian view where the counselor‘and counselee are peers in an existential situation, but as a "patient" who comes to the expert for assistance. Both men deal with the patient from a favored position of authority; Van Til from the authority of the revelation in Scripture, and Fromm from the authority of psychoanalysis. Each believes that he clearly knows the goals for the patient and fairly well understands the patient's general situation. However, the specific therepeutic techniques used might be the same. On the other hand, it is possible that the Van Tilian counselor who perceives himself as a "sinner saved by grace" would feel on a par with the counselee, and thus speak of him as a "client. " -179- B. GOALS IN THERAPY The counselor operating on Van Til's theories would relate to the patient on a foundation of loving concern, hOping eventually to bring the patient to acknowledgment of his guilt and into relationship with God. The counselor would rest in the authoritative, subjective work of the Holy Spirit as the Agent of regeneration, believing that He alone knows the extent of temptation, the inherent weaknesses, the delicacies of healing, and man in his totality. It could be argued that this position is essentially "soul-saving" rather than a liberating of growth forces and therefore cannot serve as a basis for therapy as an interpersonal professional endeavor. Van Til would probably reply that there is no such thing as a liberation of growth forces on any permanent basis apart from a true-Creator-creature relationship, and that the concept, "libera- tion of growth forces, " is a value judgment based upon a particular philosophy of man. The Frommian would also relate lovingly to the patient in the hOpe of making the unconscious conscious, replacing the irrational (the id) by reason (the ego) and changing the habits of thinking. He would seek adjustment, defined as the person's "ability to act like the majority of people in his culture. "850 86"Jf‘romm, Psychoanaiygi and 11911110“: 9' 73° [I i II. I III! III .I I... l ~180- The Van Tilian might experience conflict between his genuine desire to help every patient regardless of the patient's own religious convictions, and his own conviction that the patient cannot really be helped unless the patient becomes reconciled to God. Therefore, it would be difficult for the counselor, if not impossible, to set aside his own personal convictions. However, he would probably justify his approach on the ground that it is the only position to assume, and that any other approach could not lead to healing. He might contend truly permanent therapy would have to include conversion as a requisite for positive , long-range growth . The Frommian also faces inherent problems in his therapeutic goals. It is to be noted that REPRESSIONis a moderate form of REGRESSION in psychoanalysis . Fromm uses the term "de-repress" to indicate the psychoanalyst's task of making the unconscious conscious.861 But, Fromm points out that certain human impulses are incurably destructive, that the "syndrome of decay" represents the evil in man. If so, then should not the analyst help the patient to repress those evil tendencies for the sake of the patient himself as well as for the security of society? Does it not seem reasonable that the analyst would seek to enhance the patient's development of life by repressing those tendencies toward death? Then repression cannot be altogether "unhealthy" , yet this would defeat Fromm's goal. 861Zen Buddhism, p. 95, 105. —181- Fromm comes close to accepting the usefulness of some forms of @pression when he speaks of benign as well as malignant forms of mother- fixation, 862 but on the whole, he feels that any form of regression is archaic, a symptom of moral failure.863 C. TREATMENT OF GUILT FEELINGS If a patient entered therapy with a Frommian or a Van Tilian counselor, he would probably be considered in terms of the counselor's theoretical attitude toward man. Fromm classifies the person who is overwhelmed with his guilt 864 one who is constantly preoccupied with as a moral hypochondriac, his transgressions , although outwardly he may appear conscientious, moral, and concerned with others. Actually, says Fromm, he is quite narcissistic. The Frommian might even be suspicious of the person's true motives on the assumption that behind all guilt feelings is this "narcissistic preoccupation with oneself. "865 Through interpretation of case history, free association and dream material, the Frommian would select out those variables that he considered relevant. If the patient focused attention on his guilt and frustrations , the analyst would probably deal with this material as actions taken by the patient against himself. 862Heart_o_f_Man, p. 101. 863Man f_qr Himself, p. 5. 864Heart giMan, p. 69. 865Loc. git. ~182- In order to help the patient toward productive living, the analyst would endeavor to remove the authoritarian conscience by substituting the humanistic conscience. Using a progressive society as a model, the patient would be encouraged to follow his own desires, establish his own goals, free himself from the shackles of standards and mores that thwarted his self-enhancement. Attention would be concentrated on early parent-child relationships and other significant relationships during the formative years of growth.- The feeling of guilt would be viewed as rooted in the patient's alienation. The solution would also lie in alienation, but this time by alienating oneself from the unwholesome action committed. In this sense responsibility only means 'I am aware that I did it.‘ In fact, as soon as my deed is experienced as 'Sin' or 'guilt' it becomes alienated. It is not iwho did this, but 'the sinner,‘ 'the bad one ' that 'other person' who now needs to be punished. . . 866 From the description given of this procedure, it would seem that Fromm helps the person rid himself of the feelings of guilt without actu- ally doing anything about the deed itself assuming that it is possible to do something. But, does the "alienation" of the deed really mean that the person no longer feels responsible for the deed? Is it psychologically possible to rid oneself completely of the impression of responsibility? If it were possible, what would be the social and legal implications of this action? Finally, how would we define "responsibility"? 8661 id., p. 128. 5183- How would a Van Tilian handle this problem? Van Til says that man has confused the metaphysical and ethical aspects of reality; man somehow rationalizes that his finiteness, or his human condition is the source of "sin." Instead "sin" is his ethical estrangement from God, and this influences his relationships with other men and his own psycho— logical conditions. Unwilling to accept the blame for his own sin, man lays the blame on the circumstances around him and within him. It would follow from this, that the Van Tilian would encourage the patient to accept his guilt as" real, that is, guilt would have some basis in objective fact. This position would be along the lines proposed by Mowrer, as we have seen before, although Mowrer sees guilt on non- theological lines. Mowrer wants to help the patient face the consequences of the deed in order to solve the problem of the social repercussions. What would be the effects of facing the deed and admitting res- ponsibility? It would separate the deed from the person! Fromm is say- ing to the patient, "Don't worry about it; look at the deed from another point of view. You don't have to loath yourself; after all, we are all in the same 'human situation' ! " He wants the patient to experience the effect of alienation without going through any struggle, and expects that behavior will change as a result of changed attitudes. It would seem that what Van T11 (and Mowrer) are saying is, "The only way to solve the problem is for you to acknowledge responsibility for the deed and then do something about it. Repentance and reconciliation, perhaps even -l84- penance, will relieve your feelings of guilt. Consequently, your behavior will change: attitudes follow actions." The Frommian would be optimistic about the success of therapy because he has faith in the patient's motivation for life; the Van Tilian would be pessimistic about the patient's abilities to help himself, but optimistic because he has faith in the power of the Holy Spirit to bring men to God and because he would feel that, though he only is a human counselor, he would be God's instrument for healing. They would differ on whether or not the guilt feelings could be accounted for by some objec- tive event. D. THE FUNCTION OF CONSCIENCE It appears that the Freudian view of conscience is essentially negative, although Fromm differentiates between the constructive human- istic conscience and the destructive authoritarian type. The problem is: how is one's "inner voice" qualitatively different from an "externalized conscience, " i.e. , a conscience formed by introjecting societal standards? Fromm would reply that the inner voice, or source of the humanistic conscience, moves one toward growth, while the externalized or authoritarian conscience pushes one toward decay. But since man is, on all terms, societally conditioned, his conscience is part of this con- ditioning. And therefore, would it not be difficult for the person to know whether a particular desire or "good" will truly enhance him or cause ultimate decay? Perhaps the person will become confused and imagine -185- that the healthy demands of society are actually unhealthy. He might then reject those demands and seek to loose himself from mores which experience has proven to be useful for individual growth. He might turn toward decay simply out of a desire to become independent and "free. " Fromm only approximates a reply to these concerns. He assumes that somewhere there are norms and principles which science will discover. On the positive side, Fromm does appreciate the fact that con- science can serve in two ways. A rigid, unyielding conscience that has internalized the standards of others may create undue anxiety within the patient. It is suggested that ggih Fromm and Van Til would agree that this kind of conscience needs adjustment. Conversely, conscience can serve as an organizational system integrating the self—structure of the patient and freeing him for productivity. Obviously both Fromm and Van Til would seek to establish this kind of conscience. McKenzie gives a definition of conscience along the lines of the latter type, which definition might serve as a guide to further study: Conscience is that sentiment which co-ordinates and regu- lates our moral ideas, emotions and behavior according to moral values, moral ideals, and moral principles we have consciously or unconsciously assimilated. It has an exec- utive function as well as a judicial. It is a dynamic struc- ture of the Self. If we define Will as the ability of the Self to canalize its energy toward its self-chosen ends, then so far as these ends are consistent with the content of con- science the Will is reinforced by the conscience. This is the definition of the mature conscience. Its viola- tion leads to realistic guilt-feelings. It is authoritative in -l86- the sense that it acts on behalf of the Self as a whole; it is this which gives it authority over every partial impulse. It is related to the fundamental need for moral unity in our lives . 857 III. SELECTION OF COUNSELORS Any professional or lay persons in a position of referring persons to conselors would certainly want to know whether the counselor operated in an acceptable value system, i.e. , whether they could trust their patients to the counselor. It seems obvious that a Van Tilian would avoid referring patients to a Frommian out of concern that the Frommian would change the values of the patients , and that a Frommian would think it folly to refer his patients to a Van Tilian counselor. IV. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS The ultimate answers to the problem of guilt are unavailable. However, the theories of Fromm and Van Til could serve as the foundation for further research if studies could be designed to test certain elements of these two viewpoints. At present, research in psychoanalysis is confined to analysis of theoretical essays. If psychoanalysts would allow use of more rigor- ous testing of their claims and theory in their own clinical settings, it would open up much more fruitful avenues for research. Kiesler (1966) has stated that at present research in psychoanalysis has been very ambiguous . 867McKenzie, _gp. gi_t., p. 54. -187- If, however, therapists of each persuasion could be matched on certain variables and then given certain matched groups of patients to insure uniformity of both therapist and patient groups, it would be possi- ble to pursue the question of whether the patient's behavior would change more effectively if concentration were placed upon his attitude or upon his transgressions . V. PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS I think that it is appropriate to make a few remarks concerning my own commitments now that this study has concluded, for research is, after all, a mode of self-expression and should have some practical application. The problems here discussed are vital to the entire field of counseling because they deal with ultimate values and because there are so many tensions between Christian theology and psychoanalytically- oriented psychology. Like Erich Fromm, many psychologists experience strong feelings against traditional religion, and especially against Christianity, and also like Fromm, while they disclaim Christianity, they cannot leave it alone. Fromm exemplifies this paradox. He says in '_I‘_l_1_s A__r_t 9_f_ Loving (p. 59, 60), and in his most recent book, 19g Shsii fislis Gods, that the mature person does not need to speak God's name, yet Fromm himself constantly speaks of God, of revealed religion, of idolatry, and of John Calvin. He seems obsessed with God. But the God with whom he is obsessed is not the Christian God of the Scriptures, —188- but a God of wrath and anger and infantile desires . Logically enough, Fromm's concept of God seems to have come from Freud, who saw God 868 and who prophesied the demise of reli- as a magnified father image gion.869 Years before Fromm challenged the notion that man's chief business was to glorify God, Cattell said that the physical sciences ..870 finally destroyed "illusory religious notions. Later, Flugel pro- claimed the doctrine of man's autonomy and the uselessness of super- naturalism . 871 It is precisely here that Van Til's position is so relevant. He emphasizes that the real battle for men's minds does not lie in the physi- cal sciences, or even in the behavioral sciences , which are far more esoteric, but in the philosophical presuppositions upon which men base their sciences. Once man begins on the wrong foundation, his whole house of cards will eventually tumble around him in chaos. The problem has been set in perspective by Clark who intimated that there are no facts , only theories about facts, and that science does not explain the why of things, only the how.872 5471“ 868Ernest Jones, The Life and Work pi Sigmund Freud. V01- 111' P~ 354- 869Freud, The Future piss Illusion, p. 68. 870 Quoted in White, God and the Unconscious , p. 3. 871F1ugel, Man, Morais and Socieiy, p. 280—281. 872Clark, The Philosophy g_f_ Science and Belief in God, p. 42. ~189- The question has been raised: Does Christianity (or any philosophy for that matter) effect empirical science? Aren't we talking about two different things? Put another way, when the chemist sets up a laboratory experiment, does his philosophy of life in any way determine his methods? Isn't the scientist neutral in relationship to the facts of his data, and isn't he led by conclusions derived from the data? Perhaps this problem could be answered by asking whether it is possible to compartmentalize the scientist's subjectivity and objectivity. In this view, when he deals with philosophical, religious and ethical values and concepts, he would be said to act subjectively, and he would be objective when he arranges his laboratory experiment and arrives at his conclusions about physical laws. In reply, Clark points out that: At best, scientific law is a construction rather than a dis- covery, and the construction depends on factors never seen under a microsc0pe, never weighed in a balance, never handled or manipulated. He writes that, regardless of its complexity, the process of experimenta- tion is essentially the "measurement of a line. "874 In order to measure any event, whether the temperature or pressure of a liquid, or the factors within light and sound, the scientist must calibrate it on a scale, and make inferences from his readings. However, repeated measurements bring varied results to which he assigns a range of error, such as 8731bid., p. 61 . 874lbid., p. 62. -190- 20.35 i .004. He then adds his readings and divides in order to obtain an arithmetic mean. He could, however, choose the median or mode of his readings. The choice of mean, median or mode is entirely arbitrary; it is not dictated by the data, but is contributed by the scientist himself. He may then also plot his readings on a graph, pass a line or curve through the various points, and derive a formula that expresses the relationship between the data. But, since there are an infinite number of lines and curves that could connect the points on the graph, the choice of one is entirely arbitrary again, the product of his own subjective decision process. Even through a series of points apparently on a straight line it is equally easy to pass a straight line or sine curve. . . . The empirical data do not necessitate any given curve. In other words, so far as observation is concerned, the scient- ist could have chosen a law other than the one he actually selected. Indeed, his range of selection was infinite; and out of this infinity, he chose, he did not discover, the equation he accepts. From this specific data and his newly derived law, the scientist now begins to establish relationships with other data and laws , increas- ingly broadening his base of inferences. We ask, then, at what point does he cease to be objective and introduce his philosophy of science, and we reply, at the point of simple measurement. In like manner, it is inferred here that any man's philosophy of science is intimately related to his philos0phy of life, and that it is impossible to separate them at any place. 875Ibid. , p. 64. -191- If this is so, then there is really no such thing as pure empiricism, or a purely scientific method. There is only good or bad philOSOphy. As Clark suggests also, science is useless outside its own restricted sphere because "science cannot determine its own value. "876 There might be some truth to the statement that, The psychologist is an authority in his own subject, yet when he leaves his own field and commences to prOpound a philosophy of life, he ceases to be an expert. His opin- ion outside his own specialty must carry no more weight than that of any other non-specialist. The Christian believes that the Bible contains profound principles to which human psychology (like all other branches of knowledge) must defer for their basic view of life and the world. The Bible certainly contains the most penetrating analysis of man's personality which we know. The Christian will ordinarily be grateful for the contributions to knowledge and for the new methods of treatment which modern psychol- ogy has brought. Where, however, psychological theory is in conflict with the plain teaching of the Bible, he will naturally hold to the latter. 877 The problem is that no psychologist is an expert on human behavior, but rather a student in a vastly complicated field , and he must incorporate knowledge from a larger array of sciences in order to arrive at meaningful inferences in his own specialty. Furthermore, I believe that the scientist ought to go to the original source and consider what the Bible itself says about reality, God, and man's destiny, and avoid building his arguments either on the distorted religious views held by neurotic patients in therapy or on some second- hand data. 876Ibid., p. 95. 877Intervarsity Fellowship, A Christian Approach Q Psychological Medicine, p. 19. -l92- As I see it, Fromm misinterprets the Christian view, and particu- larly the Calvinistic viewpoint because he insists on running the Biblical data through his Freudian sieve. His method in Ygg §h__all B_e_ As soggy which is a radical interpretation of the Old Testament, is to transform Bible language into psychoanalytic thought patterns regardless of the original writer's intent. Fromm's method is extremely clever, but if Van Til's assumptions are correct, then Fromm has gravely transgressed against God and if Fromm's own assumptions about God are correct, then his study seems irrelevant, or at least imprOperly focussed. Nevertheless, Fromm has done what Van Til expects of the superior non-Christian: he has produced works that offer insight into the human mind. His writings are very useful as springboards for think- ing, and suggest a theoretical approach to therapy. His synthesis of the syndromes of grthh and death, his productive and non-productive charac- ter orientations and his attempts to relate ethics to various fields stimulate creative thought. It has been suggested that psychology (or psychiatry) and religion ought to work together for the common good, and that in a large sense, established facts of science and true religion can never really be at odds with each other.878 Once we rid ourselves of the distortions of both, we can arrive at the common truth. Yet, Jansma has said that there exists 8781bid, p. 18. ~193- "879 that recognizes the subjectivity, the a "Christian psychotherapy value-centered orientations of the counselor, and the illusions of neutral- ity, and that unless Biblical Christianity is wedded with an adequate psychology of man, "psychiatry cannot be a healing science. "880 Assuming that it is possible to wed these two disciplines, how can we look at conscience and guilt? Fromm's position is that man creates the idea of a wrathful God in order to solve the problems of his fears, hostilities and guilt. Similarly, a moral code was developed for society, and the authorities in society were invested with authority from the supreme Law-Giver. Carried over into the family the father was given moral authority, and the child identified his father with God. Thus , for Fromm, God is an illusion, morality relative, and religion a regressive adaptation. There is undoubtedly some truth to what he says, but the Christian holds that such distortions are the result of man's failure to relate to God, and the natural result of man's sin and degenerate state. Those infantile adaptations or forms of idolatry are what is left from man's original high estate. Therefore, Fromm's theorizing about morality, sin. conscience and guilt lose their significance for the Christian. These same distortions might also be the product of Fromm's own projections . 879Jansma, "Christian Psychotherapy, " Chr_istianity Today, Vol. IV, 19, June 20, 1960, p. 9, 10. ‘ 880Quoted in Christianity Today, Vol. V, 9, Jan 30, 1961. p. 12. -194- Sin implies personal and social responsibility. Personally, I feel that this may be why Christianity is attacked more widely than any other religion; among all the major religions, it leaves no room for man to escape full responsibility for his misery. Man has no one else to blame, not even God. If there is no room for responsibility, then there is also none for free choice, independent action, or creativity. Indeed, if man is largely conditioned by society, then Fromm's view is of no more significance than any layman's view on life and its meaning. Apparently, Fromm avoids facing the patient with the need to bear full responsibility for misbehavior, as was pointed out in the dis- cussion on alienating oneself from one's deeds. The results of such an issue are clearly stated by Frankel: The year is 1930. The place, Berlin. You are a practicing psychoanalyst confronting an interesting new patient in your office. His name, Adolf Hitler. He is a professional poli— tician regarded as one of the country's rising young men. Now he has come to you because he is troubled by persist- ent anxieties. He speaks confidently about his plans for Germany, yet he admits to fear of failure and therefore punishment by 'lesser' beings. Lately, however, when he considers some of the harsh deeds demanded by his grandi- ose plans, he has been bothered by feelings of guilt. Nevertheless, he is convinced that the ends he has in mind fully justify the means. He is bothered only because his increasing anxieties and guilt feelings may impede him in the execution of his designs . Hitler asks you to put an end to these disturbing feelings. Can you help him? 881 881Marvin Frankel, "Morality in Psychotherapy, " Psychology Today, Vol. I, 4, Aug. 1967, p. 25. ~195— Hitler's purpose was to relieve himself of his feelings of guilt, not to have his values or plans change-d. Would it be right for the therapist to argue that "there is no virtue in confronting one's fear"? 882 I believe that the therapist must help the client to become sensitive to the voice of conscience, but in a healthy manner. By this, I mean that the conscience can serve a constructive purpose. Obviously, a person can feel excess- ively guilty about overt actions or thoughts. He can unnecessarily blame himself for things for which he is not responsible, or only partially res— ponsible. On the other hand, if he is committing or planning actions detrimental to otl‘e rs, then clearly, something is amiss if he does not feel concerned about the consequences. His conscience needs to be heeded. In the Scriptures , the key reference to the concept of conscience is Romans 2:15, where Paul writes that men "Show that what the law requires is written on their hearts , while their conscience also bears witness and their conflicting thoughts accuse or perhaps excuse them. . . " The conscience acts as a moral sense of right and wrong, warning us of the danger to our welfare and permitting us to pursue constructive goals . Obviously, the conscience can be warped, acting as a taskmaster and tyrant. But God acts to calm that conscience according to Scripture, as it is written in I John 3:20 , ". . . (if) our hearts (conscience) condemn us , God is greater than our hearts, and He knows everything. " So the 882ihid., p. 26. -196- conscience can be trained to serve man as well as it can be allowed to destroy him. In the psychoanlaytic theory, "the superego performs the functions of self-criticism and control; much of this function is unconscious, and guilt is its normal concomitant. "883 However, there has been a confu- sion between guilt and guilt feelings . In the Biblical view, all men are sinners and ethically guilty. Associated with objective guilt is some degree of feelings of guilt. Lack of such a sense of guilt is regarded as abnormal, just as it would be abnormal and harmful if a person felt no pain when burned. It is regarded as useful to help men acknowledge this guilt and become reconciled to God. Guilt feelings , or a guilt complex are different problems. They can be considered psychopathic, if they are out of proportion to their origin. Fear of punishment by the father-figure, self-abasement, a lack of worth, and suicidal tendencies emanate from a hyperactive, distorted conscience. It is possible for a Christian to have a neurosis resulting from such a conscience. It is also possible for a person to be lead into deeper religious experiences and to develop a sensitized conscience through psychoanaly— sis. As Tournier says, psychoanalysis as he practices it, does not eliminate guilt, but shifts it.884 883 884 Tournier, Guilt and Grace, p. 129. Inter-Varsity Fellowship, gp. _g_i_t. , p. 29. -197- . . .above all, and without the analysed person perhaps realizing it, guilt is the driving force towards healing, the decisive power which determines the result of the struggle. It is easy to unburden oneself up to a point to someone who is neutral and kindly disposed. Sooner or later, however, the analysis of dreams or the free-association of ideas brings into consciousness memories of feelings the acknow- ledgement of which seems almost impossible. At that point, any loophole of escape or deception can decisively jeopardize the cure; while on the other hand, the courage to retain absolute frankness even to the bitter end, will open the door to a great deliverance. The inward struggle is terrible. What is it that determines the issue? Two forms of guilt are at stake, engaged in mortal combat: one which creates a sense of terrible shame at giving expression to the memory or the feeling, and the other urges the patient to keep silent, to create a diversion or to take cowardly flight from this difficult task. When the latter form of guilt appears even less tolerable than the former, then the turning point of the cure is passed. Thus the sense of guilt awakened by Biblical doctrines is not seen as contrary to the love of God any more than the pain experienced in surgery is contrary to continued health. The ultimate aim is not to "suppress the arrogant sinner, but to arouse his sense of guilt, and so to humble him, thereby opening for him the way to grace. "886 Man is full of paradoxes. Set apart from the animal world by his powers of reason and imagination, capable of producing works of beauty and reaching heights of ecstacy, he as easily turns upon himself destruc- tively. He traps himself, destroys what he has created, slaughters his 885Loc. git. 8861hid., p. 142. ~198- fellow man. Why does he seem bent upon crushing all that is fine and beautiful, delicate and intelligent? The imagination is fired when it conceives of what mankind could have become through gradual refinement of what Fromm has so aptly called the syndrome of growth. Yet, through bitter wars and centuries of violence, man seems destined to wander in circles , ever re-learning and re-losing the experiences of the past. Education has not granted man moral integrity, even though it has been influenced over the centuries by a variety of religious concepts , and in many cases, the sharpened intelligence has only made him more able to circumvent the laws designed to protect all of society. He is torn by a powerful drive upward and a matching drive downward, the good and the evil. Reflection upon man's historic dilemma caused at least one man to wonder, "what is man, that Thou art mindful of him, and the son of man, that Thou dost care for him? "887 887Psalm 8:4. APPENDD( A A Quotation From C. Van Til, The Search for Meaning in Modern Thought Class Syllabi Mimeographed October, 1961 Erich Fromm Erich Fromm deals with the subject "humanistic Religion. " What he says here on the subject is taken from his work on Psychoanalysis and Religion. There are, says Fromm, basically only two kinds of religion, the authoritarian and the humanistic. Fromm himself holds to the latter. This seems to make it impossible for him even to give an objectively correct statement of "authoritarian" religion. (1) On the authoritarian view, says Fromm, "man is controlled by a higher power outside of himself." Because of this control this higher being is said to be "entitled" to "obedience, reverence and worship." Thus , he adds "the reason for worship, obedience, and reverence lies not in the moral qualities of the deity, not in love or justice, but in the fact that it has control, that is, has power over man. Furthermore it shows that the higher power has a right to force man to worship him and that lack of reverence and obedience constitutes sin. " But, Christianity believes nothing of the sort. Christianity does indeed believe that God is all- powerful, but it does not believe in a God of pure power. It believes that God is infinite, eternal and unchangeable. . . .It believes that God created man holy and righteous and asked him for the return of his love. Man's obedience to God was to be but the expression of his love. How can a child be said really to love his parents if he does not obey them? Obedience is but the expression of love. Accordingly to the Christian, sin is a setting aside of God as man's loving Father, not an effort to escape from a tyrant, as Fromm suggests. It is not surprising that, from his point of view, Calvin gives expression to authoritarian religion in its most objectionable form. Calvin speaks of the believer's humility due to his sense of misery and powerless- ness. Regarding this Fromm remarks: "In authoritarian religion GOd is a -200- symbol of power and force, He is supreme because He has supreme power, and man in juxtaposition is utterly powerless. " Then, as over against this authoritarian view, in which "religious or secular 'elites' control the lives of their fellow men" is humanistic religion. This humanistic religion is "centered around man and his strength." "Man's aim in humanistic religion is to achieve the greatest strength, not the greatest powerlessness; virture is self-realization, not obedience. Faith is certainty of conviction based on one's experience of thought and feeling, not assent to propositions on credit of the proposer. The prevailing mood is that of joy, which the prevailing mood in authori— tarian religion is that of sorrow and of guilt. " Now "Jesus' precept that 'the Kingdom of God is within you' is the simple and clear expression of nonauthoritarian thinking." It was the Church, not Jesus , that introduced the authoritarian idea of religion. But the "humanistic , democratic element was never subdued in Christian or in Jewish history, and this element found its most potent expressions in the mystic thinking within both religions. " Having thus set forth the contrasting characteristics of the two mutually exclusive religions , Fromm goes on to an "analysis of their dynamics." It is here, he says, that the psycho-analyst can make his special contribution. For he can probe even into the "unconscious process- es" that control men's attitudes. The "mechanism of projection" with which the believer in authori- tarian religion works, enriches God at man's expense. "The more perfect God becomes , the more imperfect becomes man. He projects the best he has onto God and thus impoverishes himself." "The more he praises God, the emptier he becomes. The emptier he becomes the more sinful he feels. The more sinful he feels, the more he praises his God--and the less able is he to regain himself. " Fromm speaks of two "fallacies of reasoning" in connection with the authoritarian view of religion. Authoritarians do not realize that though man is dependent on forces beyond his control it is masochistic and self— destructive to worship such forces . Authoritarians do not realize that though man has a longing to relate himself to something beyond himself this is not proof that there is a God that actually exists. "Obviously that follows as little as our strongest desire to love someone proves that there is a person with whom we are in love. All it proves is our need and perhaps our capacity. -201- In reply to Fromm it should be noted that if with him we reject the idea of man's dependence on God through Christ then we place man in a vacuum. It is only on the presupposition of the truth of the Christian position that human personality stands in an intelligible relation to his environment. Then as to the logical fallacies that Fromm finds in the authori— tarian view it should be remarked that there would be no contact between human logic and his environment at all except upon the presupposition that man and his world are placed in relation to one another by God. It is only because Fromm assumes human autonomy that he finds the falla- cies he mentions. He assumes that man is self-dependent and not the creature of God. But, if man were self-dependent, then it would be illogical to prove that God exists as his creator. Christianity finds no intelligibility in the idea of man except in terms of his creation and direction by God in Christ. The believer does not start with the idea of man as autonomous in order, then, to prove the existence of God. This is indeed the Roman Catholic way of reasoning, but it is not the Protestant one. The Protestant view is that no human reasoning has meaning except on the presupposition of the truth of Christianity. BIBLIOGRAPHY Bandura, A. , Behavior Modification Through Modeling Procedures, Research iiiBehavior Modifications, L . Krasner and L. P. Ullmann, eds. , New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965. Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics; Vol. i, Doctrine g_f_ the Word of God. (trans. by G. T. Thomson) Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1956, edition. Belgum, David, §u_i1_t: Where Psychology and Religion Meet, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965. Berdyaev, Nicolai, Dream and Reality; gig essay i_ri autobiography (trans. by K. 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