IDEOLOGY, COGNITIVE STYLE, AND BELIEF SYSTEMS
ABOUT CRIME AMONG CITY, STATE
AND FEDERAL LEGISLATORS '

Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
JOHN GEORGE SCHUITEMAN

1977

 

   
   

3 1293 10224 7669 I LIBRARY
Michigan State
University

 

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

IDEOLOGY, COGNITIVE STYLE, AND BELIEF SYSTEMS
ABOUT CRIME AMONG CITY, STATE
AND FEDERAL LEGISLATORS

presented by

John George Schuiteman

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Political Science

teatime

0 Major professor

 

 

 

0-7639

 

 

ABSTRACT

IDEOLOGY, COGNITIVE STYLE, AND BELIEF SYSTEMS
ABOUT CRIME AMONG CITY, STATE
AND FEDERAL LEGISLATORS

By

John George Schuiteman

A survey of the literature shows that the meaning of the term
"ideology" has changed with the various historical and research
contexts with which it has been associated. Three general dimen-
sions of ideological thought emerged from this review: the "content
dimension" which considers the substance of political argument (e.g.
liberal-conservative, communist-capitalist, etc.); the "emotional-
commitment dimension" which reflects how strongly men feel about
their beliefs (and is usually defined in terms of the likelihood
or the willingness of men to modify or change their beliefs or
opinions); and the "cognitive-style dimension," which provides a
measure of the quality or structure of ideological thought (i.e.
the extent to which discourse can be described in terms of being
articulate or inarticulate, abstract or concrete, organized or
disorganized, etc.).

This study assessed the ideological thought of a sample of
Michigan office-holders: 50 City Councilmen, Sl State Representatives

and 17 Congressmen. Each respondent was interviewed on a wide

John George Schuiteman

variety of subjects and items and engaged in an open-ended discussion
about the causes and solutions to crime. Three major analyses were
carried out:

(l) Belief Systems about Crime: A model of thought about
crime was developed which contrasts the "person-blame" approach to
crime (crime is the product of the "criminal type") with the "system-
blame" approach (crime is the product of environmental forces on
human behavior). Formal theories of criminal behavior are related
to the model, and data is presented which confirms the person-blame/
system-blame dichotomy as the major structuring dimension in the
crime discussions of legislators. The political and socio-economic
characteristics which differentiate the person-blame and system-blame
office-holders are presented.

(2) Dimensions of Ideological Thought: Putnam's theory of
ideological thought was tested with a cluster analysis of 93 indi-
cators of ideological thought about crime. Contrary to Putnam's
assumption, cognitive-style is ngt_a consistent structuring dimension
of ideological belief. The only dimension of cognitive-style which
emerges is the distinCtion between articulate, organized thinkers
and inarticulate and relatively unorganized thinkers. Evidence is
presented which indicates that Putnam's "ideological style index"
is also a measure of articulation. The "content" and "emotional
comnitment" dimensions are shown to correlate with important political
variables that are ggt_correlated with articulation

(3) Path Model of an Ideological Belief System: A path

analysis was performed on the correlations between 10 variables: the

John George Schuiteman

three dimensions of ideology which emerged from the content analysis
of the crime discussions (articulation, person-blame/system-blame
orientation, and emotionalism); three other dimensions associated
with the concept of ideology (liberalism-conservatism, authoritar-
ianism, and mental rigidity); and four others of interest (office-
level, age, education and intelligence). The result is a path model
which suggests that intelligence is the principle variable by which
men are differentiated in terms of the various dimensions and
attributes associated with ideological thought. The data also
supports the propositions that (l) no one set of "ideological"
traits can provide a consistent definition or approach to the sub-
ject of ideology, (2) mental rigidity and authoritarianism are the
product of a lack of mental ability rather than emotionalism, (3)
the incidence of authoritarianism decreases as one ascends to the
higher levels of legislative office and (4) that the belief that
intellectuals are likely to be extreme, emotional and rigid in their

thinking is unwarranted.

IDEOLOGY, COGNITIVE STYLE, AND BELIEF SYSTEMS
ABOUT CRIME AMONG CITY, STATE
AND FEDERAL LEGISLATORS

By

John George Schuiteman

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Political Science

1977

© Copyright by
JOHN GEORGE SCHUITEMAN

1977

Dedicated to my loving parents

Arnold and Madelyn Schuiteman

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A special note of thanks to John E. Hunter. Professor
Hunter's willingness to share his vast abilities as a theoretician
and data analyst, his patient teaching, and his relentless commit-
ment to the highest standards of social science research added
immeasurably to the quality of this dissertation. I consider
myself extremely fortunate to have had his guidance during this
project and to now consider him my friend.

Important contributions were also made by my dissertation
committee co-chairman Joseph A. Schlesinger and committee members
Charles F. Cnudde and Harold Spaeth. In addition, particular
thanks are due to Iris Richardson for seven years of dependable
clerical assistance on all manner of graduate student business,
to Linn DuBois for the initial typing of Chapter IV and a revised
version of the codebook, to Madelyn Schuiteman for help with
applying Gillie's test for measuring abstraction in writing, and
to Arnold and Madelyn Schuiteman for proofreading the final
manuscript.

A good deal of sincere and meaningful moral support sustained
me through this long, and often frustrating process. In this regard
I particularly want to thank my parents and a host of friends who
provided encouragement, food and drink, and reminders not to take
things too seriously. Thanks therefore to Bob and Ann and Garry

iii

and Marsha, Bill and Maria-elena, Helen and Nelson, Betty and Elmer,

Homer and Florence, and Jack and Ronda.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF FIGURES .

LIST OF APPENDICES .

PREFACE

Chapter

I.

II.

III.

HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY: CONTENT,
PERSONALITY AND COGNITIVE STYLE . . . . .

Ideology and History.

Historical Change of the Substantive
Theory Underlying the Concept

Summary and Overview of the Study

SURVEY OF CITY COUNCILMEN, STATE REPRESENTATIVES,
AND CONGRESSMEN . . . . . .

The Samples .

Sample Composition

The Questionnaire . . .

"Ideological Style" and the Discussion
of Crime . . . . . .

BELIEF SYSTEMS ABOUT CRIME .

Theories of Criminal Behavior . . .
A Note on the "Rational Deterrence" Model
of Criminal Behavior .

Presentation of the Person- Blame/.
System-Blame Model . .

Measurement of the Person- Blame/
System-Blame Continuum .

Person-Blame/System-Blame Differences on
Other Beliefs About Crime .

Characteristics of Person- Blame and
System-Blame Office- Holders .

Discussion . . .

Page
vii
xii

xiii

xiv

21
21
27
27
31
32
3e
41
47
53

61
65

Chapter Page
IV. DIMENSIONS OF IDEOLOGICAL THOUGHT . . . . . . . 74

Putnam's Approach to Ideology : : . . . . . . . 75
Putnam's 151 as a General Measure

of Articulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
New and Better Measurement . . . . . . . . 9l
Second Order Cluster Analysis of the

A Posteriori Clusters . . . . . . . . . . 108
Three Dimensions of Ideology . . . . . . . . . ll3
Replication of Putnam . . . . . . . . . ll5

Comparing the Three Dimensions of.
Ideological Thought . . . . . . . . . . . 117

V. PATH MODEL OF AN IDEOLOGICAL BELIEF SYSTEM . . . . 126

Verification and Validation . . . . . . . 129
The Theoretical Meaning of the Model . . . . . . l32
Missing Paths . . . . . . . . . . . l62

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l65
APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326

vi

Table
l.l

4.3

4.4

LIST OF TABLES

Major Scholars of Ideology and the Characteristics
Which Their Definitions of Ideology Ascribe to
the Belief System of Ideologues . .

Possible Characteristics of Ideological Belief
Systems . . . .

Composition of Sub-samples by Personal and Political
Characteristics . . . . . .

The Person-Blame and System-Blame Approaches to
Crime . . . . . . . . . .

Items of the Person-Blame/System-Blame Index .

Cluster Analysis of the Sixteen Person-Blame/
System-Blame Index Items .

Frequency of Endorsement of the Person-Blame and
System-Blame Groups on Beliefs Related to the
Person-Blame/System-Blame Model . .

Frequency of Endorsement of the Person-Blame and
System-Blame Groups on Beliefs Related to the
Person-Blame/System-Blame Model .

Characteristics and Attitudes of Person-Blame
and System-Blame Type Persons .

Possible Elements in the Definition of Ideology
or Ideological . . . . . . . .

Putnam's "Stylistic Characteristics of Issue-
Discussions" .

Inter-Correlation of the Four Indexes which Form
Putnam's "Ideological Style Index"

Dimensions of Ideological Thought With Respect
to Discussions About the Problem of Crime

vii

Page

26

42
49

5]

54

56

63

76

77

85

94

Table

4.5

.>.>.>>>
01th

.10

.11

.12

.13

A Synopsis of the Content of the Crime
Discussions in the A Posteriori Analysis

APosteriori Crime Discussion Clusters: Means,
Standard Deviations and Coefficient Alphas .

Distribution of Items from the A Priori Clusters
to the Clusters Formed by the A Posteriori
Cluster Analysis . . .

A Posteriori Crime Discussion Cluster Correlations
(Corrected for Attenuation) .

Inter-Correlation of the Crime Discussion Items
which were Predicted to Measure "Reification" .

Clusters Formed by the Cluster Analysis of the
Twenty-one Crime Discussion Clusters .

Correlation Matrix of the Articulation, Person-
Blame/System-Blame and Emotionalism Dimensions

Correlations Between Dimensions of Ideological
Thought and Variables Examined by Putnam

Correlations Between the Dimensions of Ideological
Thought and Various Political, Ideological,
and Socio-Economic Variables . .

Path Model Correlations .

Types of Members of Ideological Social Movements
Hith Respect to Their Emotional and Articulation
Characteristics . .

Environmental Setting of the Interviews

Time of the Interviews in Minutes

Pace of the Interviews

Time of the Discussions<n1Crime in Minutes

Comparison of Samples on Selected Personal and
Political Characteristics

Means and Standard Deviations of the Crime
Discussion Coding Items . . . .

viii

Page

98

101

102

103

106

110

114

116

130

172
188
189
189
189

196

266

Table
C.2
C.3
C.4
C.5
C.6
C.7
C.8
C.9
C.lo
C.ll
C.12
C.13
C.l4
C.lS
C.16
C.l7
C.18
C.19
C.20
C.21
C.22
C.23
C.24
C.25

Cluster Names and Item Numbers

Items of Cluster 501:

I tems
Items
Items
Items
Items
Items
Items
Items
Items
Items
Items
Items
Items
Items
Items
Items
Items
Items
Items
Items

Items

of Cluster 502:
503:
504:

of Cluster
of Cluster
of Cluster
of Cluster
of Cluster
of Cluster
of Cluster
of Cluster
of Cluster
of Cluster
of Cluster
of Cluster
of Cluster
of Cluster
of Cluster
of Cluster
of Cluster
of Cluster
of Cluster

of Cluster

505:
506:
507:
508:
509:
510:
511:
512:
513:
514:
515:
516:
517:
518:
519:
520:
521:
522:

Crime not Criminals
Non-Specific .
Global Orientation .

Environmental

Non-Personal Orientation .

Non-Factual Orientation
Theoretical Approach
Comprehensive
Complex

Structured

Special Breed
Retribution
Rehabilitation
Pro-Enforcement .
New Laws

Historical
Moralistic
Emotionalism .

Fear

Easy Talking .
Self-Assurance

Residual Items

Correlation Matrix of the Items Created for the
Content Analysis of the Crime Discussions

ix

Page
267
268
269

270
271

272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285

’ 286

287
288
289

290

Table
D.l
D.2

0.3

0.4

O
(A)

1""
O O C
N O! 01 «b

E.9
E.10
E.11
E.12
E.13
F.1

6.1

A Posteriori Crime Discussion Cluster Correlations .

Varimax Factors of the Crime Discussion Cluster
Correlation Matrix .

Cluster Correlations, Part-Whole Correlations,
and Second-Order Cluster Correlations from the
Cluster Analysis of the Twenty-One Crime
Discussion Clusters . . . .

Comparison of the Three Dimensions of Ideological
Thought "Constructed" from the Content Analysis
of the Twenty-One Crime Discussion Clusters With

Those Formed by the Second- Order Cluster Analysis

of These Clusters
Items of Cluster 523: Articulation .
Items of Cluster 524: Anti-Authoritarianism .

Items of Cluster 525: Person-Blame/System-Blame
Orientation to Crime . . . . . . .

Items of Cluster 526: Political Distrust .

Items of Cluster 527: Political Flexibility .
Items of Cluster 528: Electoral Intent

Items of Cluster 529: Desire for Advancement
Items of Cluster 530: Perceived Electoral Risk .
Items of Cluster 531: Partisan Frustration

Items of Cluster 532: Conflict Orientation

Items of Cluster 533: Pro-Economic Regulation
Items of Cluster 534: Interest in Politics
Inter-Correlation Matrix of Clusters 523-534 .

Relationships Between the Ideological Style Index
and Other Variables as Reported by Putnam

First Path Model Correlations .

Page
297

298

299

300
302
303

304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314

316
323

Table Page

6.2 Second Path Model Correlations . . . . . . . . . 324
G.3 Third Path Model Correlations . . . . . . . . . 325

xi

LIST OF FIGURES

Model of the Person-Blame Belief System
Model of the System-Blame Belief System

Dimensions of Ideology and Office Level
Path Model . . . .

The Relationship Between Experience, Age
and Intelligence . . . .

The Predicted Scatterplot for Years of Experience
in the Legislature as a Function of the
Intelligence of the Legislator .

First Path Model: System-Blame Explanation
Placed as the Dependent Variable . .

Second Path Model: Articulation and System-Blame
Orientation to Crime Placed as Dependent
Variables .

Third Path Model: Articulation Placed as the Key
Antecedent Variable . . . . . . .

xii

Page
43
44

131

157

159

323

324

325

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix Page
A. INTERVIEW MECHANICS, CODING PROCEDURE, LIST
OF RESPONDENTS AND COMPARISON OF SAMPLES . . . . . 184
B. SURVEY CODEBOOK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
C. ITEM ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME DISCUSSION
CODING ITEMS . . . . . . . . . 265
D. SUBSIDIARY ANALYSES OF THE CRIME DISCUSSION
CLUSTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
E. ITEM ANALYSIS OF OTHER CLUSTERS . . . . . . . . 301
F. PUTNAM'S FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
G. INITIAL PATH MODELS . . . . . . . . . . . . 322

xiii

PREFACE

Though the sequence of thoughts and discussion topics in the
following dissertation proceed in a relatively logical order, comple-
tion of the thesis was accomplished only by traversing a long and
circuitous route. A careful reading of Chapters 1 through 5 might,
therefore, beg such questions as why I switched away from Putnam's
methodology and took up the more concrete yet laborious procedures
of cluster analysis; or why the dissertation, based as it is on a
sample of legislators, does not concern itself more directly with
the influence of "political" variables such as party identification,
office experience, political ambition, etc. To help answer these
questions and possible others, the following synopsis of the origins
and development of the thesis is presented.

The initial inspiration for doing a study on ideology came
in July and August 1973 from discussions with Joseph A. Schlesinger.
Professor Schlesinger's book Ambition and Politics verifies the
existence of the political "opportunity structure;" the perceived
office pathways to higher office which are the product of the
patterned, differential treatment of various offices by those who
have successfully used these offices or intend to use these offices
as the basis for political advancement. Having been impressed by

Putnam's study of "ideological style," my desire was to examine the

xiv

incidence of ideological style among office-holders at the major
levels of the opportunity structure. In particular, I intended to
study the relationship between ideological style, political ambition,
office-experience and age among office-holders at the city, state,
and national levels of American government.

The central hypothesis to be examined was the manner in
which the demands of the various offices worked to filter out or
eliminate persons from public office who possessed certain "ideo-
locical" traits or dispositions (e.g., unwillingness to compromise,
partisan hostility, mental rigidity, power-seeking motivation,
authoritarianism, etc.). A sub-set of hypotheses had also been
reasoned through (in hindsight quite poorly) as to the effect of
political ambition (progressive versus static ambition ala'
Schlesinger or power-motivated versus achievement, affiliative, or
status motivated ambition ala' Rufus Browning‘), office-experience
(i.e., role socialization) and age on the incidence of "ideological
style." The question to be answered first, therefore, was how I
would measure ideological style?

Following Putnam's approach, I assumed (1) that one can
distinguish between men in terms of their ideological orientation
by measuring various elements of their cognitive style (i.e., in

terms of the structure of their beliefs; abstract v. concrete, use

 

1Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand
McNally & Company, 1966), p. 10, and Rufus P} Browning, "The Interac-
tion of Personality and Political System in Decisions to Run for
Office: Some Data and 6 Simulation Technique," Journal of Social
Issues, 25 (September, 1968); 93-108.

XV

of deductive v. use of inductive thinking, tendency to generalize v.
tendency to particularize, etc.), and (2) that one could get at
cognitive style through the content analysis of open-ended issue
discussions. I thus proceeded to interview 118 Michigan legislators,
asking each (along with many other questions) to give me their
opinion about the causes and solutions of crime and the agencies
responsible for dealing with this issue. The interviews - all but
one of which were taped - were completed by July 15, 1974.

Before coding the data, I came to realize - through dis-
cussions with Professor John E. Hunter - that Putnam's definition
and measure of ideology was exceedingly narrow,and that his method
of content analysis was unreliable. Putnam's definition of ideology
disregarded the political content and emotional aspects heretofore
associated with the concept, and his methodology (which may have
preceded explication of his definition) permitted him to separate
or remove these elements from his concern with cognitive style. In
addition, the reliability of his measure of ideology, the Ideological
Style Index (ISI), was suspect because it was based on variables
produced by subjective and/or "global" coder judgments. These
judgments sought to determine the presence of various cognitive
traits among his reSpondents but, were made without appeal to any
clear set of criteria.

It was then that I adopted a much more complex and extensive
methodology (i.e., cluster analysis) and began creating a large
number of relatively specific and concrete items by which I could

analyze the crime discussions and use in the formation of clusters

xvi

(i.e., indexes). It was not until late September, 1974 that this
item formation process was complete and I was ready to begin coding
the interviews. In total 173 items were used to analyze the crime
discussions - this out of a total of 518 variables in the study (most
of which are the “mention/did not mention" variety associated with
the four non-crime, open-ended questions). These items allowed me to
test not only for the presence of cognitive style dimensions such

as those postulated by Putnam, but a host of others as well.

By January 1, 1975 the coding was finished and a cleaned
version of the basic data deck produced. The laborious process of
cluster formation ensued and it was not until July, 1975 that some
initial data analyses and hypotheses could be examined.

The most dramatic result of the initial cluster analyses
was the absolute failure of Putnam's cognitive style dimensions to
materialiZe. When this occurred, I was forced to re-think my entire
approach to the study. The range and complexity of the definitional
and measurement problems of dealing with "ideology" became apparent.
I could no longer hope to simply replicate Putnam's analysis using an
American sample and then add some correlates with regard to political
ambition, office-level, office-experience, etc. I felt that I either
had to abandon Putnam and derive a thesis from the "ideological"
and "political" variables which remained, or do a critique of Putnam
and deal directly with the whole question of the definition and
measurement of ideology within social science. Because of my com-

mitment and desire to examine ideological belief systems among

xvii

legislators, I opted for the latter course (deciding that I could
incorporate the "political" variables in future studies).

In the Fall of 1975, I reviewed the major works on and
definitions of ideology and developed the classification system
presented in Table 1.1 below. Analysis of the historical and social
sCience useage of the concept revealed its tri-dimensional quality
(i.e., that to fully describe the concept one must discuss it in
terms of substantive content, emotional commitment to belief, and
cognitive style (structure) of belief). Both of these analyses were
included in Chapter I which was essentially complete by February,
1976.

I then returned to the question of Putnam, this time
assessing his study from the perspective that his 151 was no more
than a measure of articulation (certainly an element of cognitive
style but conceptually distinct from those Putnam assumed his 151 to
measure). Several types of evidence in support of this hypothesis
were presented among which was a replication of Putnam's results
using an articulation variable (constructed from three of the 21
sub-clusters) as a surrogate 131.

At the same time, I came to focus on the "content" dimension
of the crime discussions and found that these discussions were
primarily structured by a "person-b1ame/system-blame dimension."
This lead to the development of the Person-Blame/System-Blame Index
and the comparison of "person-blame" and "system-blame" legislators.
This analysis is reported in Chapter III and was completed by
October 1976.

xviii

It was during this period that the second-order cluster
analysis became clear. Guided by a new interpretation of several
of the sub-clusters based on the person-blame/system-blame model, I
discovered that the second order analysis paralleled the tri-
dimensional structure suggested by the historical analysis of the
concept "ideology," i.e., content, emotional commitment, and
cognitive style. Clusters representing the three dimensions were
correlated and.the results as well as discussion of the second-order
analysis were inserted into Chapter IV. This work was completed near
the end of November, 1976.

Once I understood the problems with Putnam's analysis of
ideology and the structure of the analysis of the crime discussions,
the stage was set for a complete reanalysis of the nature of ideology.
Ideology is not a monolithic concept, but a set of related variables.
From this perspective, the path analysis presented in Chapter V was
the natural next step. The oral defense of the thesis was presented

on March 7, 1977, a few weeks after the completion of this analysis.

xvix

CHAPTER I

HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT IDEOLOGY: CONTENT. PERSONALITY
AND COGNITIVE STYLE

The word "ideology" has come to mean many things.1 Minar
concluded, for instance, that the term has been used to (1) describe
a set of ideas which serve as a cohesion factor for organizations or
groups, (2) describe ideas which serve psychological or social
adjustment functions for individuals, (3) describe belief systems
which are composed of inter-related elements, (4) describe ideas
which prescribe a utopian situation or ideal, (5) describe a set
of ideas which serves to persuade or to facilitate the "reorientation“
of individuals, or (6) describe the situation where a group, class
or nation shares the same set of beliefs or "character." In this
paper we intend to compare definitions of the term "ideology" and
relate them to the historical and/or research context in which they
originated. Our objective is to explain how the various definitions
arose so that we may begin to unravel the semantic confusion associated
with the concept.

Table 1.1 lists some of the major scholars who have written
about ideology and/or ideologues and denotes the characteristics
which their definitions of the concept ascribe to the belief systems

of ideologues. Table 1.2 defines the characteristics used in Table 1.1.

TABLE l.l.--Major Scholars of Ideology and the Characteristics Which
their Definitions of Ideology Ascribe to the Belief

label-r!

Systems of Ideologues.

 

 

lotto! Sylton Characteristic.

 

m
(1666)

 

Romans wwo mutate tumor
tilklntlicnuawruiui ,

WED!
(1936)

 

 

SHILS
(1958)

BILL
(1960)

mun.
(l960)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LAM!
(I962)

necmsxr
(1966)

 

 

 

 

comm:
( 1966)

 

 

 

uncut
(1969)

 

 

mm
(197!)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

t9
OBIS
E‘NHIT

Wm s cm
meme.

Lasswttt
(1930)

 

ADOIMO IT. AL.
(1950)

MOI!!!
(1931)

IOIZACM
(1960)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Incl-.11 tutors to ”cc-pulalvo power sector.“ and
“political agitaccru”. Adoruo ct. 61. tutor I. "authoritariano'.
lotto: rotate to “true holtovcrn”. and lob-och to ”doc-actctn”.

TABLE l.2.--Possible Characteristics of Ideological Belief Systems.

 

"An ideologue has a belief system which is . . .

Utopian: Oriented to a past or future ideal state.

Extremist:a The ideologue's beliefs place him near one of the polar
extremities of the Left/Right continuum.

Alienated: Estranged and disapproving of the established social
and political institutions.

Authoritarian: Believing in or characterized by an unquestioning
obedience to authority' receptive to totalitarian rule.

 

Affective: Emotionally charged; imbued with passion.

Intolerant: Hostile toward political opponents; prone to "we"
versus "they" thinking.

 

Rigid: Closed, resistant to new information or change; dogmatic;
opposed to compromise.

Articulated: Consciously held; complex; comprehensive; a product
of education.

 

Abstract: Global, constrained - in the sense that the person
possesses a set of overriding principles from which lower
level attitudes and beliefs are determined.

Logical: Deductively organized.

 

aPersons categoring "ideologues" as extremist in terms of the
Left/Right continuum have only a unidimensional view of the political
spectrum. They tend to exclude the different (e.g. populist) or
ideosyncratic forms of ideology.

Table 1.1 shows the term "ideology“ to be associated with
political content (utopian, extremist, alienated, authoritarian),
emotionalism (affective, intolerant, rigid), and with dimensions of
cognitive style that are free of political or emotional content

(articulated, logical, abstract).

Ideology and History

Use of the term has followed certain historical trends.3
In the 1920's and 30's, the concern with ideology paralleled the
public concern with "Bolshevism" and Fascism. Ideology was seen
as a sophisticated form of propaganda; a set of ideas claiming truth
but actually "masking" or rationalizing the underlying motives or
"interests" of a particular group. This notion of the term traces
back to Marx's thesis that ideology is "false consciousness;"
theory claiming truth but reflecting only the interests of the

4 By the 1920's the bourgeoisie had reversed this

ruling class.
proposition by maintaining that it was not they but the socialists
who were being deceptive. They accused the socialists of distorting
reality (i.e. of using ideology) as a means to advance their radical
objectives.

Concern that such "distortions of reality" would incite the
masses and threaten democracy increased as the Bolsheviks and
fascists succeeded in their political schemes. This concern dis-
sipated, however, as surveys of political attitudes showed that
ideological "propaganda" was unlikely to have any discernible impact

5

on public opinion. It was discovered that most people are either

apathetic in the face of ideological appeal, or tend to believe only
the partisan propaganda supportive to their own attitudes or beliefs.6
If anything, apathetics were found to possess a "latent" ideological
perspective largely accepting unconsciously the basic institutions,
values and beliefs of democracy, while political articulates were
found committed to these beliefs in a more sincere, comprehending
manner.

In the post World Har II era, ideology became a question of
serious historical importance. Scholars sought to explain the reasons
why the German people and/or the German "national character" were
susceptible to the Nazis' brand of fascist ideology. It was at this
point that scholars such as Adorno et al. took the lead developed
earlier by Lasswell and related ideology with personality.7 The
concern was not with "ideology" per se, but with the personality traits
of ideologues: the leaders and true believers of (primarily right-
wing) social movements. Words from the lexicon of Psychology such
as "compulsive," "authoritarian" and "dogmatic" replaced the term
"ideological"--yet the beliefs examined by the researchers remained
essentially political in content. Compulsive power-seekers, authori-
tarians or dogmatists were perceived as being particularly susceptible
to the appeal of ideologies whose decision-making process (if not
philosophical content) was totalitarian.8

In more recent years, attention has shifted away from the
question of mass movements to a concern with the politics of the
relatively peaceful Western democracies. Attention has focused on

differences between elite and mass populations. One finding has

been that persons with interest and knowledge about politics tend to
locate toward the end points of the liberal-conservative continuum
and tend to have more articulated belief systems than persons with
little interest and knowledge.9 Campbell, et a1. called these

"10 This use of the term implies that ideologues

persons "ideologues.
are ngt_necessarily intolerant, alienated, utopian, authoritarian or
even extremist in orientation. Rather the assumption is that
ideologues may be identified strictly on the basis of the structure
of their political beliefs, i.e. in terms of the way they think and
not on the basis of what_they think. This idea was originally
suggested by such scholars as Else Frenkel-Brunswik (1949), T. W.
Adorno, et al. (1950) and Milton Rokeach (1960), modified by
Philip E. Converse (1964), and presented in its distilled form by
Robert D. Putnam (1971).]] It is an assumption which presumes that
ideology can be defined in terms of cognitive style.
Historical Change of the Substantive
Theory Underlying,the Concept

Ideology and Self-Interest

Some of the semantic issues concerning the use of the term
ideology have been further confused by the fact that the different
ways of defining the concept are associated with different substantive
theories. The view that ideology is "sophisticated propaganda," for
example, is related to two theories, both of which associate its
meaning with "self-interest." The first theory projects a cynical

view that ideologues consciously use ideology merely as a tool to

 

elicit support for their own political objectives. Mannheim called
this the "particular conception" of ideology and writes that it

. . is implied when the term denotes that we are sceptical of

the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent. They

[our opponent's ideas and representations] are regarded as more

or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation,

the true recognition of which would not be in accord with [our

opponent's] interests. These distortions range all the way

from conscious lies to half-conscious and unwitting disguises;

from calculated attempts to dupe others to self-deception.12

The "self-deception" part of this conception of ideology

constitutes the second substantive theory underlying the association
between ideology and self-interest. This theory maintains that some
people use ideology unwittingly as a means of coping with psychological
maladjustment. These persons use ideological rhetoric to mask certain
motivational impulses within themselves and in the process, may

disguise the true "interest" or design of the group which they claim
to represent.13

Harold Lasswell outlines this theory in his book Psychopathology
and Politics (1930).14 Among others, he lists narcisstic desire for
"emotional responses from the public" (79), displacement of the
desire for homosexual contact (125), unconscious hatred and defiance
of authority (175), and defensive reaction against unperceived self-
doubt (175) as reasons why men willingly distort reality and engage
in revolutionary speech. Self-deception is posited as "perhaps the
rule" . . . among compulsive power-seekers (50) and "political
agitators" are described as men who "relying upon the magic of

rhetoric, . . . conjure away obstacles [e.g. to social change] with

the ritualistic repetition of principles" (79). The theory uses

psycho-analysis to explain how ideology can be a disguise (even for
honest men) that masks alternatives and interests.

In the context of "ideology as self-interest," the word
"ideology" was used as a label for one's opponents' beliefs. Con-
servatives considered ideology the social theory of the collectivist
radicals while liberals or socialists thought of ideology as the
social theory of the bourgeoisie. In either case, ideology was
defined in terms of the content of political belief and not in

terms of the emotional or cognitive aspects of these beliefs.

Ideology and Personality

In the post Horld Uar II period, ideologues were not viewed
as propagandists but as a special breed of persons with personality
deficiencies who were compelled to view the world in an authoritarian
manner. Ideologues were important historical figures who were not
only serious about their beliefs, but psychologically committed to
them to such an extent that they vehemently repressed all opposing
ideas and advocated totalitarian government as the means for their
implementation. Scholars (most notably the authors of The Authori-
tarian Personality) developed a theory which posited that these
"authoritarians" could be identified by their possession of a

15 Furthermore, they argued that

particular cluster of beliefs.
this empirical clustering of beliefs (which are not logically
related) suggested a dynamic psychological relationship. This
dynamic is supposedly set in motion by intense feelings of status

anxiety, and results in (1) an idealized perception of one's self

and parents and (2) acts of aggression and hatred toward minorities
and outsiders. As Roger Brown explains:

. status anxiety produces authoritarian discipline which
produces repression of faults and shortcomings and of
aggression against authority. It is the fate of repressed
faults and shortcomings to be projected to minorities and
outsiders. It is the fate of the repressed aggression to be
displaced from authority and directed against minorities and
outsiders. Finally the projected faults and shortcomings
rationalize the aggression. Prejudice plays an integral role

in the total igeology but the role is psychological rather
than logical.

The research on authoritarianism reinforced the connection between
ideology and personality initially postulated by Lasswell.

Ideologues (authoritarians) were identified by their agreement
or disagreement with the items of the F-scale; a scale composed of
statements of opinion which supposedly measured "implicit authori-
tarian or anti-democratic trends in personality."17 The Berkely
researchers reported evidence that authoritarians manifest certain

‘8 Authoritarians were judged to

characteristics of cognitive style.
be more rigid and also more intolerant of ambiguity than non-
authoritarians and it is here that the association between ideology
and cognitive style (as opposed to ideology and personality) was

first established.

Ideology and Cognitive Style

In recent years, substantive theory related to ideology has
focused primarily on the structure of the public's political beliefs
and opinions. Research has shown that among the great majority of
citizens there is some attachment to democratic values such as freedom

and equality, but that the opinions of most citizens do not reflect

10

the existence of articulate, logically constrained systems of political
beliefs. There is a small percentage of citizens with knowledge and
interest in politics, however, who possess a relatively stable and
organized set of beliefs and attitudes from which they analyze
political issues.19 Because this elite has a relatively rich set

of political ideas, Converse (1964) and others labeled them
"ideologues." This use of the concept continued the shift in the
meaning of the term "ideology" away from the traditional (political)
definitions which related it to group interests and the concern with
"what" men think about politics, toward the most recent definitions
which link the concept with cognitive style and a concern with

"how" men think about politics.

Three scholars who are particularly important to any discussion
about the relationship between ideology and cognitive style are Milton
Rokeach, Philip E. Converse, and Robert D. Putnam.

Rokeach's research is strongly rooted in the research
tradition that links ideology with personality and emotionalism,
specifically ideology and authoritarianism. Convinced that the
F-scale was a measure of "right authoritarianism" rather than
authoritarianism in general, he argued that an ahistorical approach
should be adhered to in the analysis of authoritarianism and that
measures of authoritarianism should be free of ideological (i.e.

20 He believed that the Berkeley researchers

Left-Right) content.
actually came closer to measuring general authoritarianism when
they examined the characteristics of "intolerance of ambiguity“

and "mental rigidity" (elements of cognitive style) than when they

11

21

relied on the use of the F-scale. In his own research, he contended

that "dogmatism"--the extent to which people are closed-minded about
their beliefs--was the key characteristic and the best means of
examining the authoritarian personality.22

By maintaining that authoritarians could best be distinguished
in terms of "how" rather than "what" they thought, Rokeach prescribed
"cognitive style" as the primary criterion by which ideologues
(authoritarians) should be identified. This further separated the
concept of ideology from its origins in the realm of political content,
for it implied that even persons with completely idiosyncratic, non-
traditional political beliefs could be authoritarian and hence
ideologues. Rokeach's approach also separated the concept--at
least conceptually--from its association with personality, by
emphasizing the cognitive as opposed to the emotional aspects of
beliefs systems.23 Therefore as Lasswell's work serves to bridge
the period in which ideology was primarily associated with "self-
interest" with the period in which it was associated with personality,
Rokeach's work serves to link the period in which ideology was
associated with personality with the recent period in which ideology
has been associated primarily with cognitive style.

Converse continued the trend of associating ideology with
cognitive style--with one major difference. In his research, "cogni-
tive style" has no connection to the degree of emotional commitment
which a person attaches to his beliefs. He defines a belief system
as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are

bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence."24

12

The properties of such a belief system are (l) a large fund of
information, (2) a concern for logical consistency, and (3) the

use of overarching principles to derive beliefs. Because he is
concerned with belief systems which "allow some centrality to
political objects," he considers himself to be examining "ideologi-
cal" belief systems.25 Only about 10% of his sample of potential
voters possessed anything like the type of belief system he

describes, and these persons he classifies as "ideologues" and

"near ideologues."26

Converse's "broad" definition of ideology incorporates

elements of cognitive style which permits the stratification of

"27

his sample into "levels of conceptualization. Though his approach

minimizes the importance of political content, the "constraint"
which j§_found among his sample members is largely dependent on
the extent to which they used the "liberal-conservative continuum"

28

as an "ideological dimension of judgment." "Dimensions like the

liberal-conservative continuum" he remarks, "are extremely efficient
frames for the organization of . . . political observations."29
Thus in the end Converse did tend to confound his cognitive style
definition of ideology with extremity on the liberal-conservative
continuum.

In Putnam's study (1971) the connection between ideology
and cognitive style appears in its most distilled form. In dis-
cussing "political style"--which he defines as "the way men hold their

30

beliefs" --he states that it is

. . . not what men think about politics and policy, but ppy_
they do so--this is the essence of political style. And

13

political style provides one way of interpreting the notion of
"ideological politics." An ideological politician is, according
to this interprgtation, a politician who analyzes policy in a
particular way.
This use of the term "ideology" removes all the political and psycho-
logical connotations heretofore associated with it. The concept,
thus stripped of any substantive content, is ready to be reconstructed
purely in terms of cognitive style. Putnam continues saying
. . it is reasonable to argue (assuming we can find the
appropriate empirical clustering of traits) that . . . [the
ideological] . . . politician is one who focuses on general
principles rather than specific details, who reasons
deductively rather than inductively, who stresses the role
of 'ideas' in politics.32
“This," declares Putnam, "is the core of what is usually meant by
ideological politics."33
Putnam's definition and methodological approach to ideology
assumes that ideologies can be identified solely in terms of cognitive
style. Though at times he discusses ideology "in the conventional
left/right sense," he treats this notion of the term as a variable

34 While this comprises a narrow

independent of his own definition.
approach, it stands as the most recent and innovative attempt to

define and/or measure the concept.

Summary and Overview of the Study
Our historical survey suggests that there are at least three
important dimensions of ideological thought. First, there is the
"content dimension;" the dimension which considers the substance
of political argument and thus, the self-interest of individuals

(or groups) within political life. The content dimension identifies

14

the subject of a given discourse and describes the substantive
dimensions along which debate is organized. In political discourse,
for example, debate is often structured in terms of differences
between Left and Right, liberalism and conservatism, socialism
and capitalism, internationalism and isolationism, etc. Secondly,
there is the "emotional commitment dimension;" the dimension which
links ideology with personality. The emotional commitment dimension
reflects how strongly men feel about their beliefs and is usually
defined in terms of the likelihood or the willingness of men to
modify or change their beliefs or opinions. The third dimension is
the "cognitive style dimension" which is oriented toward understanding
"how" men think about politics. This dimension provides a measure
of the quality or structure of ideological thought, i.e. the extent
to which discourse can be described in terms of being articulate or
inarticulate, abstract or concrete, organized or disorganized, etc.

The study below assesses ideological content in the thought
of a sample of Michigan office-holders: 50 City Councilmen, 51 State
Representatives and 17 Congressmen. To facilitate the analysis,
each respondent was questioned about the cause(s), the solution(s)
and the social agencies related to the problem of crime; an issue
to which legislators at each level of government must occasionally
address themselves. From the analysis of these discussions about
crime, three dimensions emerged which correspond to the dimensions
described above.

The dimension which dominated the content aspect of the crime

discussions was essentially a "person blame/system blame" dimension.

15

In brief, this dimension contrasted those persons who viewed crime
as the product of the "criminal type" in society versus persons who
blamed the crime problem more directly on environmental conditions
and/or current trends in public morality or social discipline.

With regard to how "emotionally committed" the respondents
were to their beliefs, the analysis paralleled the research of
Rokeach and others in that no direct attempt was made to assess
respondent closed-mindedness. Emotionalism was narrowly defined to
be the extent to which persons used emotionally charged language in
their discussions. I note that "dogmatism" encompasses two logically
distinct attributes: emotionalism and closed-mindedness, and that
usually it is assumed that "closed-mindedness" exists as a function
of the degree to which a person's belief system is emotionally
charged.

The examination of respondent "cognitive style" suggests
that this aspect of ideological thought (Putnam's Ideological Style
Index notwithstanding) can ppt_be captured by any single index. The
conceptually distinct features of cognitive-style which emerged with
any certainty were highly correlated and when clustered, form a
dimension that distinguishes respondents in terms of whether their
thought with respect to crime is articulate or inarticulate. The
“generalizer-particularizer" and "inductive-deductive thinking"
distinctions which Putnam posits as important criteria of ideological
thinking simply failed to materalize. The study includes a section
on the methodology used to test Putnam's thesis, and evidence is

presented indicating that (l) Putnam himself failed to get any

16

distinction between his “generalizer-particularizer“ and "inductive-
deductive thinking" measures, and (2) that his 151 is no more than a
general measure of articulation. The study also presents data that
establishes the "content" and "emotional commitment" dimensions as
important definitive features of ideological thought in their own
right.

The three dimensions of ideology (cognitive style, content,
and emotional commitment) which emerged from the content analysis of
crime belief systems are then correlated with other variables related
to ideological or political thought (e.g. authoritarianism, liberal/
conservatism, willingness to compromise, education, etc.) and a
path analysis is conducted.35 The result is a path model which
shows that intelligence is the primary antecedent or causal variable
in the respondent's belief systems about crime. This suggests that
intelligence is the principle variable by which men are differentiated
in terms of the various dimensions and attributes associated with
ideological thought. Whereas we might have expected that the content,
emotionalism, and cognitive style dimensions would be the strongest
antecedent or causal variables within belief systems, the model
suggests that their relationship to ideology is actually mediated
through the capacity of persons to acquire and apply knowledge.

The path model data also support the pr0positions that (1)
no one set of ideological traits can provide a consistent definition
of the term "ideological," (2) mental rigidity and authoritarianism
are the product of mental ability rather than emotionalism, (3) the

incidence of authoritarianism decreases as one ascends to the higher

17

levels of legislative office and that (4) the belief that intellectuals
are likely to be extreme, emotional and rigid in their thinking is

unwarranted.

Chapter I--Footnotes

1Classifications of definitions of ideology are available in
Arne Naess, Democracy, Ideology andfiObjectivity (Oslo: University
Press, 1956) and Samuel H. Barnes, "Ideology and the Organization of
Conflict," Journal of Politics, 28 (1966), 513-30. Also, a biblio-
graphy of the literature on ideology prior to 1964 can be found in
David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press

of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 329-34.

2David Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior," Midwest
Journal of Political Science, 5 (1961), 317-331.

 

3The word "ideology" was originally used by philosophers of
the Enlightenment to refer to the new "science of ideas," i.e. they
used the word to describe what we call positivism. See Daniel Bell,
The End of Ideology_(New York: The Free Press, 1960), 394-395.

4Ibid., pp. 395-396, and Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia,
trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, Inc., 1949), p. 40.

5Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, Igg-
People's Choice, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1968), p. 95.

 

6Lester w. Milbraith, Political Participation (Chicago:
Rand McNally & Co., 1965), p. 45 and Lazarsfeld et al., pp. 89-90.

7Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1930: reprint ed., New York: The
Viking Press, 1960), Chapter 10.

8Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1960), pp. 6, 14, 126.

9Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), pp. 188-265.

10Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American
Politics," American Political Science Review, 58 (1964), 361-382,
and Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass
Publics," Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David E. Apter (Glencoe:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 216.

18

19

1lElse Frenkel-Brunswik, "Intolerance of Ambiguity as an
Emotional and Personality Variable," Journal of Personality, 18
(1949), pp. 108-143, T. W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian
Personality (New York: Harper, 1950), Rokeach, pp. 4-11, Converse,
and Robert D. Putnam, The Beliefs 0f Politicians (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1971).

12

13A more recent explanation of this can be found in E. Victor
Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality(Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 172-173.

14The numbers in parentheses are page numbers from this book.
See Lasswell.

 

Mannheim, pp. 55-56.

15Adorno, et a1.

16Roger Brown, Social Psychology (New York: The Free Press,
1965), p. 504.

17Ioid., p. 487.

18Ibid., p. 505, and Frenkel-Brunswik, pp. 108-143.

19Converse, pp. 214-216; McClosky, p. 252; Campbell, et al.,
pp. 216-266; Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter,
American Business and Public Policy (New York: Atherton Press, 1963),
pp. 80-104; James A. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New
York: Random House, 1961); and John C. Pierce, "Ideology. Attitudes
and Voting Behavior of the American Electorate: 1956, 1960, 1964"
(Ph.D. dissertation University of Minnesota, 1969), p. 63.

20Rokeach. pp. 11-16.

2IBrown, p. 541.

22Rokeach. PP. 4-8, 13-14.

23Ioid.. p. 8.

24Converse, p. 207.

2515id.. p. 209.

26Ibid., p. 216.
27Ioid., p. 215.

281bid., p. 214.

20

2915id., p. 219.

30Putnam, p. 4.

3‘Ioid., p. 35.

321bid.

33Ibid. The statement begs the question: "For whom j§.this
the core of what is meant by ideological p01itics?," but the answer
is never given.

34Ioid.. pp. 50-52, 131.

35Path analysis is a procedure for systematically combining
the use of partial and multiple correlation to study the causal
relations among a set of variables.

CHAPTER II

SURVEY OF CITY COUNCILMEN, STATE REPRESENTATIVES,
AND CONGRESSMEN

The methodological premise of this study is that the best
way to discover differences in political beliefs and style among
politicians is to listen carefully to what they say. From January
to June 1974, I talked with 50 City Councilmen, 51 State Representa-
tives, and 17 members of the U. S. House of Representatives in semi-

] The analysis of

structured interviews averaging 64 minutes each.
these interviews provides the basis for this dissertation. Let me
say a bit about three important elements in this research: (1) the

samples, (2) the interviews, and (3) the subsequent analysis.

The Samples

 

Because the initial concern of the study was the comparison
of political style and beliefs among politicians at the different
levels of American government, an attempt was made to interview 50
Michigan city councilmen, 50 Michigan state representatives, and
the 19 members of Michigan's delegation to the U. S. House of
Representatives. In total, one hundred and eighteen interviews were
actually conducted: 50 with city councilmen, 51 with state repre-
sentatives,2 and 17 with congressmen. Because several of the

congressmen were busy with the House Judiciary Committee‘s hearings

21

22

on the possible impeachment of President Nixon, and others were pre-
occupied with pre-Summer recess committee work, only 11 of the 19
Michigan congressmen were interviewed. Consequently, six Midwestern
congressmen were added to the congressional sample strictly on the
basis of their willingness to grant an interview on short notice.

The main criterion used for selecting the city and state
office-holders is related to the study's original emphasis on office-
level comparisons. It was decided to select city councilmen and
state representatives from cities or districts which would most
likely be considered average in terms of their socio-economic, racial
and geographic characteristics. City size was held relatively constant
as a factor in selecting the city councilmen,and urbanity or rural-*
ness of representative district was constrained somewhat in the
selection of the state representatives. Homogeneity of district was
built into the selection procedure to maximize the possibility of
significant mean differences in the comparisons between office-level
samples. By reducing the variability of city size and urbanity or
rural-ness of representative district it was thought that the clarity
of inter-office level comparisons would be enhanced. The presumption,
perhaps in hindsight unwarranted, is that electorates in districts
that are similar in demographic terms will tend to elect relatively
similar types of representatives. Of course, any procedure used to
maximize jptgp-office level differences or comparisons is done at
the expense of reducing the potential differences and comparisons
found within office-level samples. Details of the selection

procedures are as follows.

23

City Councilmen

The city councilmen were selected on the basis of their tenure
on the councils of medium-sized Michigan cities. Initially 20 cities
ranging in population from 30,900 to 56,600 were selected as the
sample base for councilmen. From this group, eleven were selected
on the basis of (1) how close the size of their population was to
the median population of the larger group, and (2) their proximity
in terms of distance and/or driving time from East Lansing. These
eleven cities ranged in population from 35,444 to 45,920 and repre-
sented a sample base of 62 councilmen. From this point, the strategy
was to start with the nearest city and, proceeding down the list,
interview every possible councilman until fifty interviews had been

conducted.

State Representatives

State Representatives (each representing approximately 80,000
people), were selected on the basis of the degree to which their
district was urban or rural. Representatives from districts considered
overly urban or overly rural were eliminated from the selection
process. For example, the representatives from 28 districts each
of which are totally enclaved within the boundaries of large cities
(20 from Detroit, 3 each from Flint and Grand Rapids, and one each
from Saginaw and Warren) were eliminated. Likewise, the representa-
tives from all the districts in the Upper Penninsula (4), the upper
one-third to one-half of the lower penninsula (9), and various other

districts whose size indicated an all but total rural population (7),

24

were removed. In all, 48 representatives of the 110 allotted to the
state House of Representatives were eliminated, leaving a potential
sample of 62 state representatives. As was the case with the city
councilmen, the strategy followed was to start with the (roughly
estimated) median district of the group of 62 and work outward;
interviewing every possible representative until a total of 50 were

interviewed.

Congressmen

Interviewing congressmen is more difficult than interviewing
city councilmen or state representatives. Not only does the inter-
viewer have to travel greater distances to conduct the interviews
(i.e. either to Washington D.C. or the representative's district
office), but the work pressure on congressmen reduces their ability
to grant lengthy interviews. The majority of the 30 to 35 congress-
men I made contact with considered themselves entirely too busy with
committee work, service to constituents, entertaining visitors from
the home district, etc., to allow little more than a brief introduction.
Given these time constraints and my limited resources, only 17 congress-
men were interviewed; 5 at their district offices and 12 in Washington
D.C. between June the 10th and June the 14th, 1974. As noted earlier,
I was only able to obtain interviews with 11 of the 19 Michigan
congressmen. When it became apparent that I would not be able to
complete 15 or so interviews with Michigan congressmen, I attempted
to schedule as many interviews as possible with congressmen from

other Midwestern states. Six representatives, two each from Ohio and

25

Illinois, and one each from Indiana and Pennsylvania allowed me the
privilege of conducting an interview. I, therefore was able to build
my congressional sample to 17 before my time, money and patience

ran out.

Sample Composition

Table 2.1 presents a breakdown of the three subsamples on
selected personal and political variables. A quick perusal shows
that the sample is rich in terms of the variety and range of the
variables measured. These data reflect on the extent to which rela-
tionships found in the Michigan sample can be generalized to the
larger populations of these types of office-holders; or to American
legislative office-holders in general.

In order to determine if my sample selection criteria may
have distorted my sample in terms of socio-economic, or political
characteristics, I compared my sample with larger samples of city
councilmen, state legislators and congressmen on the characteristics
of education, age, occupation, father's occupation, and seniority
in office.3 The comparison samples include (1) the 435 councilmen
from 87 non-partisan cities in the San Francisco area which served
as the basis of Prewitt's study: The Recruitment of Political
Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politics, (2) the 474 state legislators
interviewed by Wahlke, et al. in their classic study The Legislative
Sygtgmb and (3) the 435 incumbent U. S. Representatives of the 88th
(1963-1964) session used for comparison by Fishel in his study Eppty_

and Opposition.4 This cross-checking procedure indicated that there

 

is a good deal of similarity between the comparison samples and the

26

TABLE 2.1.--C0mposition of Sub-Samples by Personal and Political Characteristics.

 

fiw

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

City State U.S.
Councilmen Representatives Representatives Total
(N=50) (N=51) (N=l7) (N8118)

Political Party

Democrats 26 25 6 57

Republicans 9 26 11 46

Independents 15 O O 15
Party Activism

Yes 12 25 13 50

No , 37 26 4 67
Seniority in Office

Less than 5 years 34 26 5 65

5 to 10 years 10 19 7 36

Over 10 years 6 6 3 17
Average Years in Office 4.1 6.1 9.0 5.6
Terms in Office

lst term 20 14 S 39

2nd term 19 12 O 31

3rd or 4th term 6 9 5 20

5th or 6th term 4 10 2 16

Over 6 terms 1 6 5 12
Previous Office Experience

Yes 23 38 13 74

N0 26 13 4 43
592

Less than 45 18 21 4 43

45 to 55 24 16 9 49

More than 55 8 l4 4 26
Average Age 45.6 48.0 49.2 45.4
Education

12 years or less 14 8 O 22

13 to 16 years 22 22 5 49

Over 16 years 14 21 12 47
Average Years of Education 14.8 16.1 17.5 15.7
Parental Social Class

Professional 2 8 5 15

Middle 11 29 9 49

Working 36 14 l 51
£92:

Males 46 50 16 112

Females 4 l l 6
District Partisanshtp_

Solid Democratic 13 4 O 17

Democratic Majority 19 17 4 40

Competitive 2 14 6 22

Republican Majority 13 11 6 30

Solid Republican 2 5 O 7
Political Philosophy?

Liberals 12 12 3 27

Moderates 10 18 6 34

Conservatives 15 15 5 35

Pragmatists 13 6 3 22

 

a20% 0f the total sample expressed some form of objection to the terms "liberal"
and "conservative." All but one of these persons were placed in the “pragmatist”
category.

27

smaller Michigan sub-samples on these variables; at least enough to

demonstrate that the sub-samples are ppt_distorted.

The Questionnaire
Each respondent was asked 46 closed and 7 open-ended ques-

5 The closed-ended questions ranged from the usual queries

tions.
about background, political experience, party activity, etc., to
questions about the respondent's political ambition, chances of
being re-elected and attitude toward political compromise, etc. It
rarely required more than five categories (foils) to adequately
record the answers to these questions. The open-ended questions,
on the other hand, were designed to draw out detailed, in-depth
answers. They examined the respondent's mode of entry into office,
his political motivations and frustrations, his beliefs about the
causes and solutions to the crime problem, and his thoughts about
the "essentials" of democratic government. The coding requirements
for these questions were extensive; the possible answer categories
numbering from 17 (mode of entry) to 41 (political frustrations).
Five closed and five open-ended questions were taken directly from

Putnam's questionnaire. Also replicated were a number of the coding

formats that were designed for these questions.

"Ideological Style" and the Discussion of Crime
One particular set of open-ended questions is of primary
importance to the analysis to be presented. These questions attempt
to reveal the respondent's beliefs about the causes and solutions to

the crime problem, and the institutions and people in society who

28

should be responsible for dealing with the problem. It was necessary
to engage the respondents in issue discussions because of the initial
assumption (an assumption central to Putnam's thesis) that one way

to measure ideological (for Putnam this meant "cognitive") style was

through content analysis of such discussions.

In the planning phase of the study it was decided to engage
each respondent in two issue discussions; one on a subject of his
choice and one chosen by the interviewer. This would replicate
Putnam's design and, supposedly, would reduce bias in the data which
might result if only one issue--with either too much or too little
"ideological" content--was discussed. During the survey pre-test
period, however, it became clear that only one issue could be dis-
cussed if the interviews were to be completed in the intended 45 to
60 minute time period. Time considerations, a desire to enhance the
comparability of the discussions, and the tendency of the first
respondents interviewed to choose "inappropriate" (see below) dis-
cussion topics, also prompted a decision to have the interviewer
suggest the subject for discussion.

The crime issue was selected for two reasons:

1. During the survey pre-test period and the first several
interviews, respondents were allowed to choose the issue
for discussion. This procedure revealed a tendency for
city councilmen to choose relatively "concrete" or
"technical" subjects for discussion; e.g. problems
relating to the financing of new sewer systems or urban
renewal projects, etc. Consequently, the crime issue
was assigned to force discussion of an issue with at

least the potential, but not necessarily the presumption
of "ideological" content.

29

2. The crime issue was one of the few issues familiar and
relevant (in terms of the respondent's legislative
responsibilities) to office-holders at each of the
levels of government.

Respondents were asked three open-ended questions regarding
the crime problem, each followed by appropriate probe questions
intended to flesh out the respondent's ideas and reasoning to the
greatest extent possible. These questions were presented as
follows:

Now, I would like to ask you about an issue which is of

concern not only to (state legislators), but also to both

(city councilmen) and (congressmen). This is the problem

of crime which we have in our society. . . .

Q.___: How do you feel this came to be a problem (i.e. what
do you feel are the origins or sources of crime)?

0. __; What do you think should or can be done about the
crime problem?

0. __: What group or institution do you feel has the power
and/or the responsibility to deal with this problem?

For each question, the interviewer's strategy was to follow
the respondent's reasoning and encourage him to elaborate his ideas.
Care was taken to avoid suggesting approaches, causes, solutions,
etc. to the crime problem which were not implied by the respondent's
answers. The discussions generated by these questions averaged 9.4
minutes in length. Discussions with the city councilmen averaged
9.6 minutes, state representatives averaged 10.1 minutes and congress-
men averaged 6.8 minutes per interview. These discussions serve as
the basis for the examination of the respondents' belief systems about

crime.

Chapter II--Footnotes

1Information on the scheduling, procedural mechanics, environ-
mental setting, length in time, and coding of these interviews, as
well as a list of the respondents, is presented in Appendix A.

2One state representative was added to the state office-
level sample because a representative interviewed earlier had
refused to allow his discussion to be tape recorded. Because the
anticipated coding procedures required relistening to the conversation,
this addition seemed advisable.

3See Table A.5 of Appendix A for the sample comparisons.

4The comparison samples are from: Kenneth Prewitt, ng_
Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Stugy of Citizen-Politics, The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1970, pp. 46, 225-226; John C. Wahlke,
Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, The Legislative
System, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962, pp. 36-37, 489, 491; and
Jeff Fishel, Party andtQpposition, David McKay Company, Inc., 1973,
pp. 21-22.

5

 

 

 

The full set of questions may be found in Appendix B.

30

CHAPTER III

BELIEF SYSTEMS ABOUT CRIME

The stated purpose of this thesis is to examine the ideologi-
cal content and the related cognitive style dimensions within crime
discussions of American office-holders. In order to proceed, a
detailed set of coding items had to be constructed to permit an in
depth content analysis of the relatively unstructured discussions.
The dominant concern during the formulation of these items was to
make sure the items provided an adequate test for the presence of
various dimensions of cognitive style (see Chapter IV). A second
objective, however, was to construct items reflecting ideas that
would have a wide range of currency among office-holders at the
different levels of government. Consequently, the substantive con-
tent of the items was largely reflective of the traditional liberal/
conservative debate on crime; more recently referred to as a debate
between "law and order" advocates and "civil libertarians." The
items created for this analysis comprise 93 "mention/did not mention"
items designed specifically to analyze beliefs about crime, and 98
items which were used to record the various causes, solutions, and
responsible agencies mentioned by the office-holders (see Appendix 8:
items 158-197, 202-232, 237-263, and 266-358).

After the coding of the crime discussions was completed, it

was decided that a content analysis should be derived from an a priori

31

32

formalized model of beliefs about crime. Subsequently, a Person-
Blame/-System-Blame Model of Beliefs about Crime was developed which
outlines two polar types of belief systems. The model contrasts the
"moralist," "retributive," or "person-blame" approach to crime with
the "behavioralist," "environmentalist," or "system-blame" approach
to crime. The person-blame adherents see crime as being caused by

a "special breed" or "criminal type" in society who must be searched
out and punished, and the system-blame adherents hold that crime is
caused by certain environmental conditions which encourage criminal
behavior. This chapter will (1) review the formal theories of criminal
behavior as discussed by legal scholars and criminologists, (2)
present the person-blame/system blame model, (3) present data con-
firming the model's utility for distinguishing belief systems about
crime among political office holders, (4) outline the characteristics
which differentiate the person-blame and system-blame office-holders,
and (5) discuss legislative and other implications which follow from

these characteristics.

Theories of Criminal Behavior
There are two distinct literatures which attempt to structure
debate on the issue of crime; the "legalist" and the "criminologist"
literature. The "legalist" literature is more political in nature
than that found within criminology for it more directly concerns the
impact of the actual criminal procedures which operate in society.
The "criminologist" literature is more abstract or philosophical in

orientation.

33

In formalizing the debate about crime in the context of a
person-b1ame/system-blame model of beliefs about crime, it was
natural to seek guidance from the “legalist" camp. Unlike recent
discussion among criminologists, debate among legal scholars still
reflects the liberal/conservative debate over the question of
retribution. The utility of the concepts "crime," "guilt" and
"punishment" as meaningful to the function(s) of criminal law is
still an issue of contention. Herbert L. Packer describes what he

calls the "retributive" and the "behavioral" positions in the

1

legalist debate, and makes distinctions largely expressive of the

differences between the person-blame and system-blame approaches
to crime. In summated form, Packer states:

The retributive position is an old one . . . [It] holds . . .
that man is a responsible moral agent to whom rewards are due
when he makes right moral choices and to whom punishment is
due when he makes wrong ones. . . . these imperatives flow
from the nature of man and do not require . . . any pragmatic
justification. . . . As individuals we have a . . . proper
desire to seek revenge when wrongs are inflicted on us; as a
society we demand that constituted authority punish those who
unjustifiably inflict injury on others. . . . The purpose of
punishment is to inflict deserved suffering, and the purpose
of criminal law is to provide an acceptable basis within the
social framework for doing so.

[Retributive] judges . . . conceive of their sentencing
function as the expression of society's demand that the
criminal expiate his crime. The police . . . speak of the
criminal sometimes as an animal, sometimes simply as 'the
enemy.‘ He is seen as a 'rat' or a 'vermin' . . . something
to be exterminated. As an enemy he becomes the target in
the 'war on crime.‘

On the other hand, Packer notes that:

. the behavioral [position] . . . is in complete opposition
to the retributive view. . . . [The behavioralists] have or
appear to have on their side the lessons of the new learning
about human behavior. . . . Crime, guilt, and punishment are
meaningless concepts to one who holds this view. He sees the

34

occurrence . . . of crime as simply an occasion for social
intervention, not the reason for it . . . 'crime' is simply
one signal among many that a person needs to be dealt with.

The behavioral position is . . . complex. Its principal

bases can, however, be stated. . . . First, free will is an
illusion, because human conduct is determined by forces that
lie beyond the power of the individual to modify. Second,
moral responsibility, accordingly, is an illusion, because
blame cannot be ascribed for behavior that is ineluctably
conditioned. Third, human conduct, being causally determined,
can and should be scientifically studied and controlled.

Arguments from within the "legalists" camp still appeal to
the retributive/moralist or "person-blame“ perspective as a legiti-
mate basis from which to approach the problem of crime and criminal
law. This stands in contrast to the modern criminologist literature
wherein debate is largely confined to distinctions within the "system-
blame" or "behavioral" perspective. A wide range of typologies of
theories of criminal behavior are offered by the criminologists,4
yet an historical approach offers the best format by which to
summarize their discussion.

The early criminologists--the "social pathologists"5--started
from the moralists' position that there were good and bad types of
people. Yet, as the scientific method became more widely accepted
as the proper (i.e. most objective) approach to the study of deviancy,
much of the moralistic/retributive argument was eliminated, or at
least hidden away. Criminal behavior was largely thought to be the
product of innate physiological or psychological deficiency, or
social maladjustment. Since the existence of a "criminal type"
could not be substantiated, however, criminologists turned more and

more to "deterministic" explanations; explanations which focused on

the effects of environment.-

35

The first environmentalists, sometimes called "value-free
behavioralists" still retained belief in a "criminal type" but
believed these persons were simply the product of various sociologi-
cal conditions.6 Merton's thesis (1938) that "anomic social struc-
ture" pressures certain people to engage in non-conformist behavior,
Sutherland's "differential association" argument (1947) that crime
results when people are socialized apart from anti-criminal norms
of behavior, Cohen's belief (1955) that crime is a sign of status
frustration among lower class juveniles, and Cloward and Ohlin's
theory (1960) that "differential opportunities" within delinquent
subcultures lead to crime are the primier examples of this orienta-

7 These behavioralists are distinguished from the social

tion.
pathologists by their belief that behavior is a function of environ-
ment and not immutable character, and because of their rejection of
the moralist/retributive approach to criminality.

Concern eventually developed over the fact that the focus
of the behavioralists was predominantly on the criminal behavior of
the lower classes; an emphasis which seemed to suggest that the lower
classes alone were capable of deviance. This, it was thought,
constituted unacceptable "class-bias" in that it ignored white-
collar crime, and the role that the powerful in society play in
perpetuating the conditions which lead to crime. In reaction to
this concern, the "phenomenologist" and the "labeling" theories of
crime were developed.

The "phenomenologist" approach relies on viewing criminal

behavior from the perspective of the criminal. The attempt is to

36

"understand" this behavior rather than explain it; to understand
the criminal "in that doing and feeling and the state of mind that
induced him to adopt specific attitudes (and behavior) toward his

"8 This approach supposedly eludes the charge of

environment. . . .
"class bias" (though there is disagreement on thisg) by its view
that men of all classes are equally free to choose or not choose
to act in a deviant manner. It ignores the behavioral research
which indicates that, to the contrary, lower class persons are
restricted by their environment.

From our point of view the phenomenologist approach differs
from the "opportunity structure" explanations of crime in only a
trivial manner. The fact that some environments induce persons to
"choose" criminal behavior rather than non-criminal behavior is
still a distinction yjtpjp_the "system-blame" or environmentalist
perspective. A clearer, but still rather fine distinction, is drawn
by the "labeling" theorists--the approach to crime which has dominated
the criminologist literature since the 1960's.10

The "labelists" start from the position that certain kinds
of environments lead persons to commit "crime" and that anyone in
such conditions could exhibit criminal behavior. Once having been
convicted of a crime, however, a person is labeled "criminal"
(purportedly by the powerful in society who control the agencies
of criminal justice) and is treated as if deviancy is his normal
behavior. This labeling process in effect produces a criminal

social caste wherein persons learn pro-criminal behavior and adopt

a pro-criminal set of ethics. The charge of class bias has been

37

answered by the labelists' concern with the role which "vested
interests" and criminal justice agencies play in the etiology of
crime and by their commitment to examine deviancy among all classes.

Current debate among criminologists, therefore, is not
related to the difference between person-blame and system-blame
explanations of crime, but centers rather on a relatively fine
distinction drawn by two schools within the system-blame orientation.
The debate contrasts the classic view that certain kinds of environ-
ments produce criminals, with the recent--very specifically
situational--view that "criminals" are not produced until deviants
are caught and labeled as such. In comparison to the "legalist"
debate, there is no truck with the idea that a relatively immutable
"criminal type" may exist, or any serious consideration of the idea
that moralism offers a legitimate (i.e. useful in terms of its
"deterrent" potential) approach to the problem of crime.

The person-blame/system-blame distinction which is emphasized
in the model to be tested, is much closer to the "retributive" versus
"environmentalist" (behavioral) distinction found within "legalist"
literature. This is appropriate for it is doubtful that the fine
distinctions illuminating the criminologists' discussion have been
picked up within common parlance, even by men as knowledgeable as
the legislators of our sample. On the other hand, the retributive/
environmentalist distinction is still very much a structuring dimension
of public debate--mainly because the “retributive“ or "person-blame"
perspective is still common. As Packer notes, Nthe retributive

position does not command much assent in intellectual circles but

38

there seems little reason to suppose that it does not continue to
retain a strong hold on the popular mind."11 The data to be presented
supports this hypothesis--at least as it applies to the sample of
office-holders in our study.
A Note on the "Rational Deterrence" Model
of Criminal Behavior

Another approach to crime that has gained currency in recent
years is the "rational deterrence," "cost-benefit," or "economic"
theory of criminal behavior. This theory argues, as James O. Wilson
puts it, that criminals "steal because the benefits of stealing
exceeds the costs of stealing by a wider margin than the benefits

"12 Hence to reduce the

of working exceed the costs of working.
incidence of crime one must either reduce its expected benefits or
increase its expected costs. Stripped of its bookkeeping metaphors,
this theory amounts to the assertion that if a cop is stationed in
front of a liquor store, then the frequency of robberies will
decrease. We believe that this theory is neither new nor profound.
The idea of "rational deterrence" is simply the old idea of
"retribution" dressed in new clothes. It is a restatement of the
humanistically oriented, person-blame position that "deterrence"

and not "pain" should be the goal of punishment. In addition, its
general tenor is reminiscent of the problem of "class bias" in that
it seems predicted on a "we versus they" perspective. Crime is

always pictured as the act of the antisocial person while the criminal

behavior of white collar persons in responsible positions is ignored.‘3

39

The concern in the present study is with individual differences
in beliefs about crime. Thus truisms such as reducing crime by
"reducing expected benefits and increasing expected costs" are
universal beliefs, and hence adherence to them would not yield a
distinction between legislators. Indeed such truisms are so uni-
versal that most legislators would most likely refer to them only
in apologetic terms such as "Obviously you could . . . , but the
more important issues with respect to crime policy are . . . ."

Aside from rather prosaic notions about the efficacy of
security as deterrent to crime, the rationalist theory is largely
a matter of the circular generation of new terms for old ideas.

That is, it must be clear that the rationalist theory is ppt_to be
confused with substantive theories which actually seek to predict
and explain the elements of life which motivate criminal activity.
Consider the fact that many criminal acts are motivated by the
desire to maintain a position of solidarity with a set of criminally
oriented peers. How is this explained by the rationalist school?
They argue that status is a "benefit" of the criminal act. But
what if they are asked to state how status can be shown to be a
"benefit" in any economic sense? They are likely to reply that
status mp§t_pp a benefit since the person will commit a criminal
act in order to obtain it. This, however, is an entirely circular
use of the word "benefit." To see the theoretical emptiness of
this usage one should ask "How might we empirically disprove the
claim that the criminal went along with his buddies in order to

increase his expected benefits?" There is no empirical observation

40

possible which would demonstrate it to be false. If he went along
the benefits were "high enough" and if he does not, they were "not
high enough," etc., etc.

Or consider an example of the use of the term "cost." If a
person refrains from committing a crime because of the fear of moral
censure, then the rationalist theorist argues that the crime was not
executed because the person perceived too great an expected cost.
But in what economic sense is fear of moral censure a "cost?" The
usual reply would be that fear of moral censure must be a "cost"
since the person will refrain from acts which would lead to censure
as a consequence. This is a completely circular use of the word
"cost." To see this, ask the following question: "What empirical
observation could be produced which would refute the 'theory' that a
person who fears moral censure refrains from crime in order to avoid
an intolerable cost?"

Perhaps the rationalist theory is popular precisely because
of its theoretical emptiness. Two men with diametrically opposed
theories of crime can each recast his beliefs in the language of
"benefit" and "cost" without contradiction. The terms can be used
in an entirely circular way, i.e. they have no meaning as predictive
concepts and they cannot be empirically refuted. Rather "benefit"
and "cost" serve as ad hoc labels which are applied to motivational
facts which have been established on the basis of research generated
by substantive theories (be they person blame theories which relate
to psychopathology or system blame theories which relate to criminal

subculture models).

41

Presentation of the Person-Blame/
System-Blame Model

 

As mentioned earlier, the model to be tested contrasts
"person-blame" and "system-blame" beliefs about crime. These
beliefs are closely analogous to those which might be inferred
from the "retributive" and "behavioralist" perspectives described
by Packer (pp. 33-34), or which might be deduced from the "left-

14 We

right" continuum so beautifully laid out by Walter Miller.
regret that we did not discover the latter's paper before we had
completed our own empirical and theoretical work. To clarify the
person-blame and system-blame positions, and help structure the
presentation of the model, the specific beliefs appropriate to

each position are listed in Table 3.1. The coding system devised

to perform the content analysis of the crime discussions permits a
test for the presence of most of these beliefs.

The Person-Blame/System-Blame Model yields two separate
causal sequences (shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2). These
sequences stem from speculation that there is a psychological
sequence to how these belief systems develop. The positioning
of the specific beliefs in the figures represents what we believe
follows logically, given that a person adheres either to the person-
blame belief that "criminals are a special breed which must be
controlled" or the system-blame belief that "criminals are simply
ordinary persons in special circumstances." Accept for the
relatively abstract antecedent variables (moralistic outlook and

worldliness), the specific beliefs about the causes and solutions

42

TABLE 3.1.--The Person-Blame and System-Blame Approaches to Crime.

THE CRIMINAL:

MORALISTIC
OUTLOOK:

RETRIBUTION:

CAUSE OF CRIME:

SOLUTION:

REHABILITATION:

Person-Blame Beliefs

Criminals constitute a
special breed or type
of person in society

There are good people
and bad people in
society. Changing a
person's character is
very difficult

Criminals must be pun-
ished - both for revenge
and deterrent purposes

Breakdown of social dis-
cipline and traditional
moral values. Leniency
of the courts. Bad soc-
ialization.

Put the criminal away.
Remove restraints placed
on the police by courts.
Improve police apprehen-
sion capability

Requires a transformation

of character - either by

the old method of repent-
ence and conversion or by

psychiatric cure.

System-Blame Beliefs

Criminals are ordinary
persons in unfortunate
circumstances

People are not bad per
se. People are mal-
leable - they behave
differently in dif-
ferent circumstances

Punishment just drives
criminals further into
the criminal sub-
culture (making them
more receptive to
criminal ethics). Per-
sons should be res-
pected not brutalized

Poverty. Lack of oppor-
tunities. Bad sociali-
zation. Labeling of the
lower classes as
potentially deviant

Attack social condi-
tions which alienate
persons from law-
abiding society. Allow
courts discretion with
respect to treatment

Give the criminal a
stake in law-abiding
society. Give him

hope and opportunities
to choose law-abiding
behavior.

 

43

.Empmxm wmwpmm msepmicomcwa we“ we —muoz--.p.m acumen

 

emaumcezo mo
cowuescommcmch mmcwscmm
:owpeuw_waesmm

\\mummwm cu ucmccmumo.

 

    

 

  

uuw>cou
op umucou on

 

            

me mm>cmm mpme_swcu

e_=o;m moazo co oeoeoaoae gape:

        

vm>osmm

 

 

 

 

 

   

cceumcmuca
on Upsocm
8* Fox. :5 .0. 352.:
men so
mucmmgumom pow>cou

op muczou mo
weapvem m »m
.wmzeu we mews

      

cowueucmwco
eoeoaawceo.

 

       

poogom wee .socazo .zpwse
mo mczpweu mmcwpawum_o Fewoom

new mmzpm> Pecos chowuwuech
mo czouxmmcm ”mswcu mo mmsmu

 

empowcpmmm mm
op vmmz cows:

.mmcm Fewumam a

wee mchwewcu

        

 

Emwpmcoz
cowcmpwcosu=<

   

44

.~.m ocsmwc

     

 

cocazu
use .xpwEmm .mpoosom
mo weapwou mgu mo
uoauocm a we mawcu

.Empmxm wowpmm osmpmismpmxm we» mo ~muoz--

 

   
 

         

   

cucscu new .—oo:um
.xpwscm Am mucowwm vwzmcmm

.Ecoeom oesocoum ._mowuw_oe
"oeeeu 6» cowozpom opeswepz

  
     

  

mwucom
—mucwE:ocw>=m use
m=_eoeeeeeou Fawoom
mo uuzuocm m we
cow>ezmm —e=wewco

 
     

   
   
     

   

    

 

    

:owumucwwco
o>_oeo__enacom

 
 

     

use «Peso
mcwcwscmuon cw
:owumcumwo mm:
u~=ogm muczou

Emwfimcoz
owumwcesa

  

  
 
 

 

mwoceumE:uc_u
Pneumam cH

comcom xcecwuco
mew mpecwewcu

   

m_e:wewcu opnowm
mxmz :eu comwca
cu mpaowq mcwucmm

                
 

xpocmE=z mcomcwe Hooch

epaoem m=o_o=ewomee Feeoa
”peace ~_>eu Feaee>wee

uomuoce pmzz mucsou
newecumwm
mmwocoxm

opsonm wowpo.

       

45

to crime, the law enforcement agencies, and the matter of rehabili-
tation all flow from this fundamental distinction.

Certain beliefs within the model can be expected to differ-
entiate the implied "person-blame" and "system-blame" types of
persons more than others. Beliefs related to the questions "who
are the criminals?," "should there be retribution?," and "what
should be the solution to crime?" lie near the heart of the dichotomy
and relatively crude measures can be expected to reveal the hypo-
thesized distinctions (see Table 3.1). Beliefs related to "moral-
istic outlook," the cause of crime, and the process of rehabilitation,
however, would appear to require more refined measures to get at these
distinctions. The fact of two types of moralists; authoritarian and
humanistic is the first case in point.

Both person-blame types and system-blame types may speak in
terms of morals or ethics, yet their motivations may be completely
different. The person-blame oriented "authoritarian moralist" may
see "good people" and "bad people" and demand that law-enforcement
agencies clamp down on the "bad people" in order to protect the
"good people." The system-blame oriented "humanistic moralist" may
see all persons as "good" and demand that law-enforcement agencies
be restricted from dealing with anyone in an authoritative ("brutal-
izing") manner. To categorize a person simply as "moralistic,"
therefore, is to ignore a distinction important to the person-
blame/system-blame dichotomy.

Another area of similarity between the two belief systems

is related to the belief that changes within the family, church,

46

and school have contributed to the growth of crime. Both Hperson-
blame" and "system-blame" persons may adhere to this belief yet
entertain different sets of logic about how these changes effect
criminal behavior. The person-blame person is apt to see family
instability, declining influence of the church, and liberalization

of school atmosphere as factors contributing to the development of
"criminal types;" persons who have been socialized in such a way that
they are bound to lead a life of crime. System-blame persons, on

the other hand, might argue that changes in these institutions simply
mean that they no longer operate to deter criminal behavior. Where
once the moral force of family, church, and school was enough to

make persons unwilling to commit crime even if chances of detection
were minimal, they no longer have this effect. If any thing, the
changes in these institutions have worked to alienate people and
deprive them of any compass with which to maintain a law-abiding
course of behavior. Both types of persons implied by the model
could, therefore, adhere to the belief that crime has resulted

from failure within the family, school, and church.

The process of rehabilitation is the third example of
similarity between the person-blame and system-blame belief systems.
Both types of persons may advocate that criminals be rehabilitated,
but disagree on "how" this process should be carried out. Person—
blame types would advocate that the "rehabilitation" process actually
transforms the criminal's personality, i.e. makes the "bad" person
good. Some would adhere to the old moralists' requirement that the

criminal repent his sins against society and be spiritually converted.

47

Others would adhere to the recent update of this view: a psychiatric
cure in which the criminal would be lead to see the illness in his
past life and to use that self-knowledge to transform his values

and behavior to a healthy and constructive pattern.

The system-blame person is more apt to look at rehabilitation
as a process of changing the criminal's opportunity structure rather
than the criminal as a person. If, through vocational training,
drug rehabilitation, counciling, etc., the criminal can be given a
stake in law-abiding society, then his penchant for choosing non-
law-abiding behavior can be reduced. It is, thus, his perception
of opportunities in society which needs transformation, not his
character.

The above examples illustrate the fact that although the
person-blame and system-blame approaches to crime are distinct, they
are not entirely dissimilar. Respondents of both types may share
some of the same general beliefs about crime, but possess entirely
different reasons for doing so.

Measurement of the Person-Blame/
System-Blame Continuum

The first Question to be asked of the data is straight-
forward: are the various questions or beliefs which differentiate
the hypothesized types positively correlated as the model predicts?
A check of the 93 cognitive style items suggested that 8 would be
useful in identifying the types. Eight summary variables were also
constructed for this purpose from the answer codes used to record

the causes, solutions, and responsible agencies mentioned by the

48

respondents. Thus all together 16 items were brought together to
act as an index of the person-blame/system-blame continuum. These
specific items are shown in Table 3.2.

The 16 items fall roughly into three clusters: (a) three
items which assess whether criminals are seen as a special breed or
whether they are ordinary people in special circumstances, (b) seven
items concerning the role of retribution in the handling of
criminals, and (c) six items which assess whether the causes and
solutions listed relate to the personality of the criminal or to
the situational determinants of the criminal act. The corresponding
cluster analysis of these 16 items is presented in Table 3.3.

All open ended questionnaire techniques suffer from a
critical defect: a given item may not be mentioned because the
respondent does not believe in it or it may simply not come up in
the conversation. Thus the items in Table 3.3 can be expected to
have relatively low reliabilities whenever the topic is not one
which would always arise in open-ended conversation. The diagonal
entry for each item is the specific reliability of that item under
the assumptions that the cluster is sound and that the item is
correctly placed in the cluster. Since these clusters meet the
usual criteria for quality of a cluster (homogeneity of content,
unidimensionality of the within cluster correlations, and parallelism
in the between cluster correlations), the diagonal entries can be
safely interpreted as reliabilities. The correlations between items
can then be related to those reliabilities (the upper bound for a

population correlation is the geometric average of the two

49

TABLE 3.2.--Items of the Person-Blame/System-Blame Index.a

 

Item
Number

313

312

273

341

314

178
213

212

478

214

475

Item Content

 

WHO ARE THE CRIMINALS?

Respondent says or implies that criminals are a "special
breed" of individuals who are inherently weak in character,
immoral, irresponsible or ignorant.

Respondent says or implies that criminals are ordinary
people in special circumstances (Item is reversed for
inclusion in the index).

Respondent says or implies that "criminals" are a
homogeneous group.

SOLUTION TO CRIME SHOULD INVOLVE RETRIBUTION

Respondent says or implies that the courts (judges) have
encouraged crime by not properly enforcing current laws
and statutes.

In discussing the solution to crime, the respondent
mentions or implies that criminals need to be punished.

Cause of Crime: Courts (judges) have been too lenient.

Solution to Crime: Judges must mete out stronger or
harsher punishment.

Solution to Crime: Courts must insure certainty of
punishment.

Index of items 179, 182, 342; all of which reflect a
belief that crime has increased because law enforcement
officials have been hampered in some way from properly
enforcing the law.

Solution to Crime: Courts (the Supreme Court) should
reverse the decisions which now over-protect the
defendent.

CAUSE AND SOLUTION TO CRIME RELATED TO ENVIRONMENTAL
CONDITIONS

Index of items 158-170, 193, 195; all of which reflect
a belief that crime is caused by environmental condi-
tions related to the economy, population distribution,
and processes of social change. (Items are reversed
for inclusion in the index).

50

TABLE 3.2.--C0ntinued.

Item

Number

480

477

280

279

477

Item Content

Index of items 202-208, 286; all of which reflect the
belief that the solution to crime involves broad social
and economic change. (Items are reversed for inclusion
in the cluster).

Respondent says or implies that social, economic, or
other “environmental" conditions are the cause of crime.
(Item is reversed for inclusion in the cluster).

Respondent says or implies that "society,“ "the people,"
"the government," (or some reified equivalent) should
handle the problem. (Item is reversed for inclusion

in the cluster).

Respondent says or implies that individual actions
(perhaps due to individual immorality, irresponsibility,
ignorance, or fallibility) are the cause(s) of crime.
(Item is reversed for inclusion in the cluster).

Index of items 175-177; all of which reflect a belief
that crime has been caused by a breakdown in social
discipline. (Items are reversed for inclusion in the
cluster).

 

aNote that regardless of how they read, all the items are

dichotomous variables and thus, all can reflect either the person-
blame or the system-blame orientation.

51

.mmucoe peacoEcocw>em on umuepma mm mewcu ou cowuapom\mm:eu "smm seams—u
eo_e=neeeom oape> cw oeecu op eoeo=Pom "emm eoemapu
wmpmcwewsu on» who 0:3 "mmm Loumapum

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

00— mm mm mm me we em mm mm om mm mm mm um um we up me an st
mm cop pm mm 0— cm mm PM me me me me me mm ox Fm cc mm on omm
am pm .woob vv —m N— mm mm mm mm we mm me he mm am we on mm mmm
mm um we Am V mm mp p1 mp FF w mp om mm mm mm mm mm mm mm mum
mv op —N NN Ampv ow MN pm NF 5 m m- Fm Pm pm a m1 m pm omm
m¢ cm mp mp om Ammv om mm om pp e mp pm mp mm m— N1 pp N— use
«m mm mm P1 mm ow Aomv um mm mp om mp mm mm mm em m_ mm mp owe
mm pm mm mp Fm mm mm Ammv em wp mp em pm mm mm pm 0 mm NF «mm
mm me am pp Np om mm em nwmv mm mm pm pv om mm mm op mm w muc
on no mm m N FF m_ ep mm Ampv mm mm mm mp mp mm pm mp m epm
.Nm me we mp m e ow mp mm mm ANNV om om mm mm Pm mm mm 0— use
mm mm mm on m1 mp m_ cm Pm mm on Ammv mm mm Pm mm mm pp n NFN
mm me we mm Fm Pm mm Fm Fe mm om um Amvv mm em cm mm mm mm mpm
mm mm Ne mm Fm mp om NN om mp mm mm mm Ammv so on mm um um —¢m
um on mm mm Pm mm mm mm mm mp mm pm um um Awmv em mm mm Pm mm—
¢¢ pm mm mm m mp em FN mm mm Pm mm em co co Amov ow. cu m— ¢Fm
up cw cc mm m1 N1 mp m or Fm mm mm mm mm mm mm Romy mm om mum
he mm on on m r— mm mm mm mp mm PP mw um mm ow mm Anmv we mpm
mm on mm mm pm Np mp up m N mp x mm mm Fm m— on we onv Npm
mam omm mmm mum omm use owe NNN mm: epw mne NFN mpm Fem mnp e—m mum mpm N—m

 

I',r II.

e.memuH xmceH «EmFmYEmum»m\QEepmieomcmm comuxwm on“ Co memxpec< coumspu-1.m.m u4m<p

52

reliabilities). In the present set of three clusters, the within
cluster correlations do not differ beyond the expectations of
sampling error from the predictions of unidimensionality.

The variables labeled 535-537 in Table 3.3 are the true
scores for the three clusters (i.e. the hypothetical variables that
would have obtained from perfect measurement of each cluster score).
The first two clusters are correlated .61 with each other and these
two clusters correlate with the third cluster .59 and .68. These
correlations are less than the ideal of 1.00 that would apply to
perfect unidimensionality, but that difference might well stem from
the artifacts created by using open ended questioning. In any case
these correlations are certainly more than large enough to warrant
collapsing the three clusters into an index. The person-blame/
'system-blame index so formed has a reliability (coefficient alpha)
of .84.

Sometimes correlations mask absolute levels of a given
variable. For example in the present case it might be that those
who score "high" on the system-blame index are only relatively high,
i.e. there might be no full fledged system-blame persons at all.
This can be checked by actually splitting the office-holders into
groups and looking at the mean response of each group on each item.
For this analysis we divided the 118 office holders into three
groups of about equal size: a "person'blame group," a "system-blame
group," and middle range group which might either be intermediary
to the first two or which might be a residual category of other

types. Our correlational analysis showed that the middle group is

53

in fact an intermediary group on all the variables assessed in the
present study (i.e. the 16 items considered in Table 3.3 and the 46
other variables considered in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 below), but this
does not rule out the possibility that further types will be dis-
covered in the future.

Table 3.4 shows the percentage of endorsement for person-
blame and system-blame group on each of the 16 items which make up
the person-blame/system-blame index. This table is in part tautologi-
cal since these items were used to select the persons in the two
groups. However, had these items been unrelated to each other
(i.e. had they not been tapping some actual dimension), then the
mean difference produced by the selection of extreme groups would
have been split among the 16 items and would have been quite small.
Instead we find that the mean differences on most items are quite
large, and that on most items the person-blame respondents endorse
the person-blame response while the system-blame respondents endorse
the system-blame response. In particular, this means that (a) the
system-blame office-holders are not just relatively liberal person-
blame adherents and (b) that there is a substantial level of
correlation among the items. The conclusion which can be drawn
is that the person-b1ame/system-blame dimension does determine those
beliefs which were related in our psychological model.

Person-Blame[System-Blame Differences on
Other Beliefs about Crime
As a further test of the person-blame/system-blame model,

the two groups indentified by the index can also be compared on

54

TABLE 3.4.--Frequency of Endorsement of the Person-Blame and System-
Blame Groups on the Person-Blame/System-
Blame Index Items.

 

Person- System-
Blame Blame

Group Group
(N=38)_ (N=43)

CRIMINALS ARE A SPECIAL BREED
(313) Criminals are individuals inherently
weak in character: 79 21

(279) Certain individuals cause crime: 66 26

CAUSE OF CRIME: BREAKDOWN OF TRADITIONAL
MORAL VALUES AND SOCIAL DISCIPLINE
(477) Average score on a three item
breakdown of social discipline
index (items 175-177); range =

O to 1.0: 28 03
(477) Percent which mentioned any of the
items: (60) (O9)
RETRIBUTION ORIENTATION
(314) Criminals need punishment: 92 05

CRIMINALS ONLY UNDERSTAND HARSH TREATMENT
(178) Cause of crime - leniency of courts

(judges): 82 03
(212) Courts must insure certainty of

punishment: 53 O
(213) Judges must mete out harsher penalties: 74 02

CAUSE OF CRIME: TOO MANY RESTRAINTS ON POLICE
(478) Percent which mentioned either of the

following items: (179) Cause of
Crime: Court decisions which have
hamstrung police; (182) Law enforcement
agencies have been understaffed and
under equipped; (342) Law enforcement
authorities have been hampered in enforc- .
ing laws: 52 05

CRIME IS CAUSED BY THE FAILURE OF COURTS TO CONVICT
(341) Courts have encouraged crime by not
enforcing laws: 87 O7

55

TABLE 3.4.--Continued.

Person- System-
Blame Blame
Group Group

(N=38)_ (N=43)_

COURTS SHOULD BE FORCED TO CONVICT
(214) Respondent says courts should reverse
the decisions which over-protect
defendents: 29 O

CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR IS A PRODUCT OF SOCIAL
CONDITIONING AND ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES
(312) Criminals are ordinary people in
special circumstances (R)a: 21 79

(280) "Society," "the people” (or some
reified equivalent) is responsible

for the crime problem (R): 30 76
(277) Social, economic or "environmental:
conditions are the cause of crime (R): O 50

(475) Average score on a 15 item Crime is
caused by Environmental Forces Index
(items 158-170, 193, 195); range =

O to 1.0 (R): 06 16
(475) Percent which mentioned any of the
items: 55 100

ULTIMATE SOLUTION: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM;
RENEWED EFFORTS BY FAMILY, SCHOOL, AND CHURCH

(480) Average score on an eight item Social/
Economic Reform Index (items 202-208,

286); range 0 to 1.0 (R): 05 18
(480) Percent which mentioned any of the
items: 29 72

 

a(R) denotes that the item or items have been “reversed"
prior to the scoring of the Person-Blame/System-Blame Index.

56

TABLE 3.5.--Frequency of Endorsement of the Person-Blame and System-

Blame Groups on Beliefs Related to the Person-
Blame/System-Blame Model.

 

 

 

Person- System-
Blame Blame
Group Group
(N=38) (N=43)
Beliefs Relevant to the Person-Blame
Belief System about Crime
CRIMINALS ARE A SPECIAL BREED
(274) Respondent says/implies that there are
ppt_various types of criminals (R)a: 63 54
CAUSE OF CRIME: BREAKDOWN OF TRADITIONAL
MORAL VALUES AND SOCIAL DISCIPLINE
(479) Average score on a seven item Failure
of School, Family and Church Index
(items 185-191); range 0 to 1.0: 12 14
(479) Percent which mentioned any of the items: (63) (70)
(476) Average score on a four item Breakdown
of Morality Index (items 171-174; range =
0 to 1.0): 07 11
(476) Percent which mentioned any of the items: (24) (33)
(349) Respondent cites breakdown of public/
private morality as cause of crime 18 23
(351) Crime is caused by failure of family
and school to teach moral behavior: 24 21
REHABILITATION REQUIRES TRANSFORMATION OF CHARACTER
(289) Recommends "individual change" as a
solution to crime: 26 12
CAUSE OF CRIME: TOO MANY RESTRAINTS 0N POLICE
(179) Cause of Crime: Court decisions which
have hamstrung police: 42 O
(342) Law enforcement authorities have been
hampered in enforcing laws: 37 05
RESTRAINTS ON POLICE SHOULD BE REMOVED
(218) Recommends increasing police apprehension
powers as a solution to crime: 11 O

Beliefs Relevant to the System-Blame
Belief System about Crime

57

TABLE 3.5.--Continued.

WORLDLINESS
(311) Crime is a natural social problem which
we will always have:

CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR IS PRODUCT OF SOCIAL CONDITIONING

AND ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES
(220) Respondent says putting the cop back on
the beat, improving police techniques,
etc., is part of the solution to crime:

CRIME IS THE PRODUCT OF THE FAILURE OF SCHOOLS.
FAMILY AND CHURCHES
(479) Average score on a seven item Crime is
Caused by Failure of Schools, Family
and Churches Index (items 185-191);
range = O.to 1.0:

(479) Percent which mentioned any of the items:

(351) Crime is caused by failure of families
and schools to teach correct moral
behavior:

REHABILITATION ORIENTATION
(215) Respondent recommends prison reform
("Persons should be rehabilitated,
not taught crime.") as a solution
to crime:

(315) Criminals should be rehabilitated:

COURTS SHOULD OVERSEE POLICE ACTIVITY
(179) Courts (or Supreme Court decisions)
have not hamstrung the police (R):

ULTIMATE SOLUTION: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM:
RENEWED EFFORTS BY FAMILY, SCHOOL, AND CHURCH
(286) Recommends general social reform or
broad social change as the solution
to crime:

(481) Average score on an eight item School,
Family, and Church Should Work Harder
Index (items 223-229, 317); range =
0 to 1.0:

(481) Percent which mentioned any of the items:

 

Person- System-
Blame Blame
Group Group
(N=38); (N=43)t

ll 26
11 16
12 14
(63) (70)
76 79
13 27
24 3O
58 100
11 56
09 16
47 88

58

TABLE 3.5.--Continued.

Person- System-
Blame Blame
Group Group

(N=38)_ (N=43)

(317) Respondent says/implies that non-law-
enforcement agencies have primary respon-
sibility for handling the crime problem; 34 88

Other General Predispositions Related to the
Person-Blame/System-Blame Model

MORALISM
(296) Respondent says/implies that his solution
to crime derives from a moral belief

system: 05 05
(350) Respondent cites the declining influence

of the church as a cause of crime: 13 14
(352) Respondent's solution involves some attempt

to strengthen public/private morality: O5 16

AUTHORITARIANISM

(455) A few strong leaders would do more for b

this country than all the laws and talk: 35 15
(457) In this complicated world, the only way we

can know what is going on is to rely on leaders: 61 47

(458) It will always be necessary to have a few
strong, able people actually running

everything: 43 33
DOGMATISM

(456) Few people really know what is in their

own best interest in the long run: 32 38
(459) A group which tolerates too much difference

of opinion cannot exist for very long: 35 31
(462) Of all the theories of how government

should be conducted, only one is true: 31 12

 

a(R) denotes an item which has been "reversed" to reflect
the intended meaning. The item has been slightly reworded to also
reflect this meaning.

bThe entry for the authoritarianism and dogmatism items is
the average score on a 5 point scale from O to 100; O = Strongly
Disagree, 25 = Disagree, 50 = Undecided, 75 = Agree, and 100 =
Strongly Agree.

59

their other beliefs about crime. This comparison is presented in
Table 3.5.

For the most part, the groups split on the items in the
direction consistent with their approach to crime. This means
that the person-blame/system-blame index predicts a wide range
of related beliefs. The items which most clearly differentiate
the groups concern whether the police have been hampered in their
efforts to crack down on criminals (179, 342), whether the solution
to crime involves changing the environment of the criminal (286,
16, 317) and whether strong leaders are necessary to insure that
things are done right (455, 457, 458, 462). Each of these ideas
is clearly related to the person-blame/system-blame distinction.
The person-blame advocate is more apt to believe that the police
should be free to deal harshly with criminals, because harshness
is the only thing the instinctively evil criminal will understand.
He will likewise believe that the solution to crime does not
involve changing the criminal's environment, because this contradicts
his belief that the cause of crime lies within the criminal himself,
and not in his environment. Furthermore, though neither of the
groups are noticeably authoritarian, the person-blame adherent is
much more likely to look to strong leaders to solve social problems
than would the system-blame advocate. Believing that intrinsically
"bad" persons account for problems such as crime, it is only natural
that he would look to "good" leaders rather than change in circum-

stances or environment for solution to such problems.

60

On eleven of the items, however, the fact that the two groups
do not split merely confirms our speculation that some beliefs are
compatible with both types of belief systems (see pages 10, 14-15).
These items reflect a moralistic approach to crime (items 476, 349,
351, 296, 350, 352), a belief that certain failings of the family,
church, and school have encouraged the growth in crime (items 479,
351, 481), and a belief that criminals should be rehabilitated
(items 215, 315). As noted earlier, each of these dispositions are
likely to be found among both person-blame and system-blame type
persons (though for different reasons), and thus we predicted that
the two groups would not differ on these items.

One interesting question with respect to the models is the
extent to which either person-blame or system-blame persons suggest
or consider morality as a factor related to crime. Person-blame
persons are no more apt to discuss crime from a moralistic orientation
than system-blame persons, and the extent to which either group
subscribes to this orientation is negligible. Perhaps moralism is
hidden behind other beliefs, or perhaps office-holders have given
up the moralistic approach in favor of pragmatic concerns with
changing institutional procedures or enacting new laws and programs.
In any case, the crime discussions were not heavily laced with
moralistic rhetoric.

0n the other beliefs which our coding items allowed us to
test, there was at least a reasonable split between the two groups

in the predicted direction. This indicates that the person-blame/

61

system-blame dichotomy is an important structuring dimension of
beliefs about crime.
Characteristics of Person-Blame and
System-Blame Office-Holders

In order to further distinguish between "person-blame" and
"system-blame" persons, correlations were calculated (N=ll7) which
related the Person-Blame/System-Blame Index to a wide range of
discriptive and attitudinal variables. These correlations are
large to the extent that there is a linear ordering of the means
of these variables which correspond to the persons categorized as
person-blame, neutral or system-blame in orientation toward crime.

In his studies of political ideologues, Rokeach (1960) found
that persons at either extreme of the left-right continuum were more

15 That is, Rokeach found certain

dogmatic than persons in the middle.
variables to be non-linearly related to political belief. We were
worried that a similar phenomenon might occur on the person-blame/
system-blame index, i.e. that there might be cognitive style
dimensions that would be non-linearly related to the person-blame/
system-blame continuum. To check for such relationships a variable
was constructed to be a non-linearity indicator. This variable has
the property that if it correlates with another variable, then that
variable is non-linearly related to the person-blame/system-blame
index.

The non-linearity indicator variable was obtained by assigning

a score of O to both the person—blame and system-blame groups while

assigning a score of l to the middle-range group. This indicator

62

is similar to a quadratic trend indicator and a large correlation
between this indicator and another variable would indicate a U-
shaped regression of that variable onto the person-blame/system-
blame dimension (though no such correlations appeared in the data).
A smaller but sizeable correlation would indicate that the middle-
range group on the person-blame/system-blame dimension was closer
to one end of the continuum than to the other in its mean on the
other variable in question.

This non-linearity indicator also has the property that it
checks to see if the middle range group on the person-blame/system-
blame dimension is in fact an intermediate group or if it might
contain some very different orientation which contrasts with both of
the identified groups. If the middle-range group contained persons
of a radically different orientation, then there would be some
variable relevant to that orientation on which this group would
have a very different mean from that of the person—blame and system-
blame groups (which would be similar in mean on this variable).

The Person-Blame/System-Blame Index correlations and the
correlations for the non-linearity indicator are presented in
Table 3.6. In nearly every instance, the relationship between the
person-b1ame/system-blame dimension and the other variables is linear.
The primary exceptions are among the variables measuring respondent
articulation (508-510). These correlations show that while there
is essentially no difference between the “person-blame" and the
"middle-range" group with respect to articulation, these groups
differ drastically from the system-blame group. The ability to

articulate is sharply higher among system-blame persons.

63

TABLE 3.6.--Characteristics and Attitudes of Person-Blame and System-
Blame Type Persons.

 

Non- System-
Linearity Blame
Indicatora Orientationb

DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS

(451) Age .15 -.15
(447) Education -.05 .28
(449) Occupational Status -.05 .09
(443) Urban-ness of District .18 -.05
POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS

( 3) Office Level . -.08 -.05
(471) Office Experience (Index of

items 4, 18-20): .08 -.08
( 21) Party Identification (Democrat) -.05 .29
(472) Party Experience Index of

items 28-30) .00 -.O5
( 32) Political Philosophy (Liberal) -.05 .26
(136) Attractiveness to Politics -.09 .OO
( 46) Political Ambition .05 -.22
(465) Delegate Role Orientation .04 -.23

ATTITUDES ON CRIME

(513)c Pro-Rehabilitation -.06 .19
(512) Pro-Retribution -.03 -.90
(514) Pro—Law Enforcement - 11 -.59
(179) Courts have hamstrung police -.10 -.57
(218) Police apprehension power should

be increased .04 .15
(347) Responsibility for the crime problem

lies with the police, courts and

penal authorities -.19 -.60
(346) Prison reform is part of the

solution to crime -.09 .16
(479) Responsibility for the crime problem

lies with family, school and church

(index of items 185-191) .13 .27
(311) Crime is a natural problem which we

will always have .05 .18
(183) Law enforcement officials have

failed to crack down on drug abuse -.09 .02
(482) Respondent's occupational or

personal contact or experience with

crime problem (index of items

359-363, 368) -.02 .01

64

TABLE 3.6.--Continued.

 

Non- System-
Linearity Blame
Indicatora Orientationb

ARTICULATION CHARACTERISTICS

(508) Crime discussion was comprehensive -.41 .52
(509) Crime discussion contained numerous
elements -.17 .35
(510) Crime discussion was structured -.32 .32
(369) Time allotted to the crime discussion .13 .19
EMOTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
(518) Use of emotional words and rhetoric -.O9 -.44
(519) Fear of crime -.07 -.27
(505) Takes a personal orientation to the
crime problem -.18 -.O9
(521) Self-Assurance (boastfulness) .05 -.14
(520) Expresses thoughts easily -.14 -.05
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS
(524) Authoritarianism .05 -.27
(517) Moralistic Orientation .02 .07
(516) Historical Orientation .Ol .03

 

aThe non-linearity correlation was derived by scoring the
middle-range group 1 and the person-blame and system-blame groups 0.
It manifests the extent of the quadratic trend if any.

bThis measure is the Person-Blame/System-Blame Index scored
in the system-blame direction.

CItems which number 500 and above denote clusters formed by
cluster analysis (see Chapter 4 pages 27-30).

65

Some of the correlations in Table 3.6 are important because
they confirm our interpretation of the person-blame/system-blame
dimension. In contrast with system-blame persons, person-blame
adherents are more retribution oriented (512), more apt to see crime
strictly as a problem for law enforcement authorities (347, 514,
179), more authoritarian (524), and more emotional in terms of their
approach to crime and criminals; i.e. evil persons (518, 519).

The new information provided by the correlations relates
primarily to group differences in descriptive and political
characteristics. System-blame office-holders are relatively
younger (451), more educated (447), more articulate (508-510), more
liberal (32), and less politically ambitious (46) than person-blame

office-holders.

Discussion

 

Our experience with this study leads us to recommend that
future research be done using pre-set specific questions rather than
recoding responses to open-ended questions. With specific, pre-set
questions, one would be able to find out exactly what the respondent
believes with respect to who the criminals are, what causes them to
commit crime, whether retribution is necessary or useful, whether
rehabilitation is possible, etc., instead of having to rely on the
respondent to bring these points forth in his answers. This would
increase the reliability of the data and the ease of the coding
process substantially.

It would then be possible to draw finer distinctions about

crime belief systems. For example, are there any signs that the

66

distinctions pertinent to the discussions of the criminologists are
filtering into the crime belief systems of politicians? It would
be interesting to add items asking their opinions on propositions
such as "Most men only truly become criminals when the law forces
them to join a criminal society in prison;" "Some environments are
so bad that persons have no choice but to become criminals;" "The
legal system ignores white collar crime and operates only to
restrict lower class criminals;" or “Powerful, vested interests
regulate the legal system in such a way as to brand poor people as
potentially deviant, and thereby provide a tool by which poor people
can be kept under control." Such items should be included in further
research on belief systems about crime and it is our hope that the
analysis presented will inspire such research.

This analysis has shown that in our sample of office-holders,
the dominant content dimension structuring the beliefs about crime
is a person-blame/system-blame dimension. Our data show that system-
blame office-holders are younger (451), more educated (447), more
articulate (508-510), and more liberal (32) than person-blame office-
holders. Most of these characteristics may be accounted for by the
following theory of the etiology of the system-blame orientation.
Most people start out in life from an essentially person-blame or
moralistic perspective.16 The early socialization of most persons
is heavily influenced by moralistic tenets laid down by parents,
clergy, and school officials. Criminals are looked on as "bad
people" who should be punished for their sins--either against God,

their fellow man, or “society." As people get older, they are

67

exposed to other interpretations of criminal behavior. One such
view is that the criminal is not so much an evil person as he is an
individual without hope, opportunity or stake in law-abiding society.
New beliefs about the impact of "environment" challenge old beliefs
about the innate deficiencies of criminals, and in time some people
adopt a system-blame outlook. Those most open to such influence
would be the articulate and educated (who are more likely to adopt
opinions on the basis of verbal argument) and the liberals (who
already use system-blame logic to explain social inequities in other
areas of life).

Articulate and educated youths are also more likely to
challenge the views and moral injunctions of their elders (in favor
of their own "wisdom"). Consequently, if such persons smoked
marijuana, drank under age, stole hubcaps, or committed other youth-
related crimes as a teenager; they would be less likely to believe
that crime is committed only by evil persons and more likely to
believe that crime is generated by situational factors. This also
explains the positive relationship between the intellectual variables
and the system-blame orientation toward crime.

This scenario suggests that education leads to a more liberal
orientation toward social problems and consequently eventuates in a
system-blame approach to crime. This suggestion is supported by
the correlations of .35 between education and liberalism in our
data. The relatively higher amount of education among system-blame
persons also explains why the system-blame group proved more articulate

in their discussions on crime. The ability to articulate one's

68

thoughts and to address issues in a comprehensive, organized manner
is the hallmark of educated persons. In turn, the reason for the
greater amount of education among system-blame types can be related
to their relative youthfulness. More young people are staying in
high school or going to college than in previous days, and the
sample correlation of -.31 (N=118) between age and education
supports this actuality. As a group, younger persons are better
educated than older segments of the population and this relationship
holds between the younger system-blame and older person-blame types.

The fact that the dominant content dimension is person-
blame/system-blame also has implications for educational policy.
What we have found is that the knowledge produced by 50 years of
research of crime has completely escaped the notice Of American
public officials. Even those men who sit on the law-making bodies
of our country still think in the terms of the debate as it existed
100 years ago. Certainly there is a lesson in this for those who
draw up the college curriculum for pre-law and political science
majors. But even more important is the implication of this study
for the civics programs of the high schools. Lawyers have recently
been arguing that there is no meaningful introduction to law anywhere
in our educational system. This study clearly supports this contention
and suggests that people in political science should urge educators
to take a more concrete approach to law making and crime and to
introduce fact as well as moral principle into the curriculum.

Our data also shows that educated and articulate legislators

are more likely to adopt a system-blame orientation toward crime than

69

less-educated, inarticulate legislators. Given that legislators are
better educated and more articulate than the general population, our
data suggests that legislators are much more likely to be system-
blame oriented than the general population. Evidence that this is
true has long been established by polls which have examined popular
opinion with respect to the subject of punishment for crime. Members
of the general population are much more likely to believe in harsh
treatment such as capital punishment, life imprisonment, etc., and
are much more likely to oppose judicial discretion which tends to
allow reduced prison sentences or lenient parole requirements.

Why is there such a discrepancy between general opinion about
punishment for crime and legislative codes which prescribe punishment
for crime? Many of the discrepancies which exist between constituency
and legislative opinions are the result of small but powerful vested
interest groups who watchdog certain legislative areas and threaten
to raise a fuss if the legislators vote against their particular
legislative viewpoint. Religious groups which oversee legislative
action on alcohol, pornography, or abortion; or business and profes-
sional groups which lobby for advantageous tax and licensing laws
are examples of this phenomenon. There does not appear to be any
such vested interest group which concerns itself with advocating
extremely harsh criminal penalties. The discrepancy between legis-
lative and constituency opinion on this matter is simply a reflection
of the fact that the legislators are (in terms of political fact0rs)
relatively unconstrained. Consequently, the educated and articulate

legislators are simply freer to reject constituent opinion in favor

70

of their own conscience. This conjecture is borne out in our data
by the correlation of -.34 between articulation and support for the
"delegate role" orientation (an indicator of independence of mind),
and the correlation of -.19 between education and "delegate role“
orientation. The correlation between system-blame orientation and

"delegate-role" orientation is -.23.

Chapter III--Footnotes

1Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 9-16. For a brief
bibliography to what I call the "legalist" literature, see pages
369-375.

2Ioid., pp. 9-10.

3Ihid.. pp. 11-12. Packer also identifies the behavioral
position with the idea that "the function of the criminal law should
be purely and simply to bring into play processes for modifying the
personality, and hence the behavior of people who commit antisocial
acts, so that they will not commit them in the future." In actual
fact, however, many behavioralists are very much oriented toward
situational determinants of behavior as much as those related to
personality. In any case, this aspect of the behavioral position
will be coded under the Person-Blame rather than the System-Blame
Model to be presented below.

4For example, see Richard Ouinney, Criminology: AnaLysis
and Critique of Crime in America (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1975),
pp. 4-13; Alex Thio, "Class Bias in the Sociology of Deviance," Ipp_
American Sociologist, 8 (February, l973),l-12;AJex Thio, "The
Phenomenological Perspective of Deviance: Another Case of Class
Bias," Ipe American Sociologist, 9 (August, 1974), 146-149; Tony G.
Poveda, "The Image of the Criminal: A Critique of Crime and
Delinquency Theories," Issues in Criminology, 5 (Winter, 1970), 59-
83; Tony G. Poveda and Edward Schaffer, 'Positivism and Interactionism:
Two Traditions of Research in Criminology," Criminal Justice Research,
ed. by Emilo Viano (Lexington, Mass.: 0. C. Heath and Co., 1975),
pp. 25-36; R. Serge Denisoff and Charles H. McCaghy (eds.), Deviance,
Conflict, and Criminality (Chicago: Rand-McNally and Co., 1973),
and Stephen Schafer, Theories in Criminology (New York: Random
House, Inc., 1969).

5The labels used to describe the different schools of thought
in the history of criminology are the same as those used by Alex Thio
(1973). Thio, "Class Bias," pp. 1-12.

6Schafer provides an excellent description of the various
sociological theories. He says that ". . . many of the sociological
theories of crime and delinquency overlap. They draw from one
another, from different sectors of the social sciences, and even
reach for assistance from other disciplines. Since they use a
multifactor theoretical construction, it is extremely difficult, if

71

72

not impossible, to catalogue these theories according to orientation.
Some may be considered "offensive" in nature. They "attack" the
criminal whose "free will" reacts to social injustice and provokes

him to attack the society in the form of crime. Or they are offensive
against the wrongs of the society and "attack" the society as a whole.
Other theories seem to be "defensive;" they view crime and delinquency
as products of a disorganized society or social pressures. They
emphasize the need for social defense against criminality because
criminal conduct is learned or acquired by the criminal in his social
context. Some lean in the direction of social psychology. focusing

on crime as a product of socialization processes; others refer to
cultural differences or to value and norm conflicts; and still others
explain crime in terms of the imperfect or divided structure of
society." Schafer, pp. 235-236.

7Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," American
. . . Sociological Review, 3 (1938), 672-682; Edwin H. Sutherland,
Principles of Criminology, 6th ed. (Chicago: J. B. Lippencott & Co.,
1960); Albert K. Cohen, Delinquent Boy§ (Illinois: Glencoe Free
Press, 1955); and Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, Delinquenoy
and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs (Illinois: Glencoe
Free Press, 1960)}

 

 

8Poveda and Schaffer, Ibid., p. 27.

9Alex Thio argues that the phenomenologists' view that
criminals "choose" deviant behavior belies class-bias in itself.
His point is that this view fails to consider that the "social
reality" of the powerless in society is largely defined by the
powerful, that this social reality does work to restrain the be-
havioral options of the lower-classes and that, therefore, this
belief wrongfully imposes free will upon powerless deviants and
holds them much more responsible for their deviance than is actually
justified. See Thio, "The Phenomenological Perspective," p. 148.

10One of the first and most complete descriptions of the
"labelist" perspective can be found in Howard S. Becker, Outsiders:
Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (London: Free Press, 1963).
See also Paul G. Schervish, "The Labeling Perspective: Its Bias
and Potential in the Study of Political Deviance," The American
Sociologist, 8 (May, 1973), 47-57.

1‘Packer, p. 10.

12James O. Wilson, Thinking About Crime (New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1975).

13ibid., p. xix.

 

 

14Walter B. Miller, "Ideology and Criminal Justice Policy:
Some Current Issues,‘l The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,
64 (1973). pp. 141-161.

73

15Rokeach, pp. 114-116.

16Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, trans. by
Marjorie Gabain (New York: The Free Press, 1965), and J. Adelson,
“The Political Imagination of the Young Adolescent,“ Daedalus, 100
(1971), p. 1026. "““‘

 

CHAPTER IV

DIMENSIONS OF IDEOLOGICAL THOUGHT

The question of whether particular dimensions of thought serve
to identify or characterize "ideological" thought is the central point
of inquiry in the study presented below. As our history of the
concept "ideology" suggests, at least three general dimensions are
relevant; (1) the content dimension which identifies the subject of
discourse and describes the substantive dimensions along which debate
is organized, (2) the emotional commitment dimension which reflects
how strongly men feel about their beliefs, and (3) the cognitive
style dimension which assesses the quality and/or structure of these
beliefs. Other dimensions such as "utopianism," "extremism,"
"alienation," "authoritarianism," "intolerance," "mental rigidity,"
and "abstractness“ can be categorized in terms of those above; (a)
utopianism, extremism, alienation and authoritarianism are facets
of content, (b) intolerance and mental rigidity are facets of
emotionalism, and (c) abstractness is a facet of cognitive style.

The study below attempts to assess the dimensional aspects
of ideological thought with respect to beliefs about the origins
and solutions to crime. It concludes that such thought is multi-
dimensional and that the higher order dimensions are the general

"content," "emotional commitment," and "cognitive style" dimensions.

74

75

The study was initially designed to replicate Putnam's study
of the cognitive aspects of ideological thought.1 The objectives
were to (1) test his thesis that the essence of ideological thought
can be captured by a single dimension, and (2) investigate differences
in cognitive style among office-holders at the three levels of American
government (i.e., City Councilmen, State Representatives, and Congress-
men). Since then, the study has evolved into a broader investigation
which not only comprises a test of Putnam and looks at crime belief
systems among office-holders, but in addition, examines (l) the
inter-relationship between the "content," "emotional commitment,"
and "cognitive style" dimensions, and (2) the relationship of these
dimensions with other variables--political, ideological, and socio-

economic. We begin with a brief synopsis of Putnam's study.

Putnam's Approach to Ideology

Putnam's approach to ideology is based on two related premises.
First, that one can distinguish between men in terms of their
ideological orientation by assessing various elements of their
cognitive style, and, second, that one can get at "cognitive style"
through the content analysis of issue discussions. To test these
assumptions he interviewed 93 Members of the British House of Commons
and 83 "deputati" from the Italian Chamber of Deputies.2 Each
politician was asked to discuss two issues facing his country; one
proposed by the respondent himself and one chosen randomly from a
list of the following issues: national economic planning, poverty,

crime, and urban transportation.3 To facilitate the content analysis

76

of these discussions, each was transcribed from the interview recording

tapes.

Prior to the content analysis, Putnam reviewed the literature
on ideology and developed a list of 14 characteristics "each of which"

he says, "has appeared with some frequency as one element in a

1."4

definition of ideology or ideologica Table 4.1 presents this

1ist.5

TABLE 4.l.--Possible Elements in the Definition of Ideology or
Ideological.

"A political actor may be said to be ideological when he
is . . ." (Choose one or more.)

Guided by a comprehensive, consistent, deductively organized

belief system

Guided by an explicit, consciously held belief system

Guided by a belief system that is closed, rigid, resistant to

new information

Guided by a belief system that is affectively or emotionally

charged

Guided by a belief system that distorts or oversimplifies

reality, that is biased or irrational

Guided by a philosophy of history and/or a social theory that

is applied to everyday questions and issues

Concerned with abstract principles, not concrete interests

Future-oriented, utopian

Hostile and intolerant toward political opponents; prone to

dichotomous, "black-white" thinking; paranoid

lO. Opposed to compromise, bargaining, incrementalism, and other
aspects of pluralist politics

11. Alienated from established social and political institutions

12. Extremist

l3. Oriented to conflict and opposed to consensus

14. Authoritarian; a moral absolutist; prone to value ends, not

means

—I
I

OWN 0') 01 «b (JON

 

77

Using these characteristics as a guide, twelve indexes were con-
structed to measure what he refers to as the "stylistic character-

istics of issue-discussions."6 Table 4.2 presents a list of these

indexes.

TABLE 4.2.--Putnam's "Stylistic Characteristics of Issue-Discussions.

 

l. Generalizer-particularizer 7. Practicality as criterion
Extreme generalizer Explicit and centrally
Moderate generalizer Vaguely or in passing
Mixed Not at all

Moderate particularizer
Extreme particularizer

2. Inductive-deductive 8. Tradition as criterion
Extreme deductive Explicit and centrally
Moderate deductive Vaguely or in passing
Mixed Not at all

Moderate inductive
Extreme inductive

3. Historical context given 9. Cost as criterion
Explicit and centrally Explicit and centrally
Vaguely or in passing Vaguely or in passing
Not at all Not at all

4. Discussion moralized 10. Reference to a named ideology
Explicit and centrally Explicit and centrally
Vaguely or in passing Vaguely or in passing
Not at all Not at all

5. Group benefit as criterion 11. Reference to a future utopia
Explicit and centrally Explicit and centrally
Vaguely or in passing Vaguely or in passing
Not at all Not at all

6. Political acceptability 12. Reference to a past utopia

as criterion Explicit and centrally

Explicit and centrally Vaguely or in passing
Vaguely or in passing Not at all

Not at all

 

78

Putnam and another coder then analyzed separately (i.e.
independently from one another) each of the respondent's issue dis-
cussions, using the twelve indexes as criteria by which to judge the
extent that these "stylistic characteristics" were evident in the
discussions. If a respondent's discussion was scored differently
by the two coders, a session would be scheduled to resolve the
disagreement.

After the coders reached agreement on the scoring for each
issue-discussion, each respondent's scores on the two separate

issue-discussions were added together and each respondent was

7

assigned a summary score on each stylistic characteristic. Then,

in accordance with his desire to investigate the extent to which
the definitional traits or characteristics of ideology are inter-
related,8 Putnam intercorrelated the set of summary scores and
factor analyzed the resultant matrix of intercorrelations using the
varimax rotation procedure.9 Three dimensions emerged which he

labeled the "ideological style,“ "traditionalism," and "partisanship"

O O ]
dimen51ons. 0

Putnam chose the "ideological style" dimension to be the
measure of ideology. The stylistic characteristics which "load"
most heavily on it are generalizer-particularizer (r=.80) and
deductive-inductive thinking (r=.80) though there are minor loadings
for the reference to a named ideology (r=.47) and reference to a
future utopia (r=.45) characteristics. According to Putnam, "this
factor reflects a tendency for some politicians consistently to

generalize, to use an abstract deductive theory, to use specifically

79

ideological terms, and to refer to more ideal future states of

"11

society. Though he admits that the dimension "does not encompass

all the characteristics often ascribed to ideological politics,
. it does," he declares, "include the most central ones."12
Putnam uses each respondent's score on the ideological style
dimension to form an "ideological style index" (hereafter referred
to as the 151). In order to find the political and social-

psychological characteristics of political ideologues he then

correlated this index with a large number of variables.

Focus on Cognitive Style

Although Putnam assumes that his 151 captures the essence of
what is meant by the term "ideological," it is clear that it only
deals with the cognitive aspect of ideological thinking. The basis
of this restricted orientation starts as far back as the point at
which he converted the "list of possible elements in the definition
of ideology" (Table 4.1) into "stylistic characteristics" indexes
(Table 4.2). A good deal of the emotional and political content
that is a part of the "definitional" elements was eliminated in
this process.

To begin with, no measure of "emotional commitment to belief"
(element 3) and/or "dogmatism" (element 4) were included among the
"stylistic characteristics" indexes. In addition, Putnam also
failed to convert elements 9 through 12; "intolerance," "opposition
to compromise," "alienation," "extremism," "conflict orientation,"

and "authoritarianism" into indexes though these variables were

80

later operationalized either by coder judgment items, specially
created indexes, or other items included in the survey. In total,
Putnam converted only §j§_of the fourteen "elements" into "stylistic

‘3 and four of these six measure "cognitive"

characteristics" indexes,
aspects of belief systems. They include element 1: "Guided by a
comprehensive, consistent, deductively organized belief system,"
element 2: "Guided by an explicit, consciously held belief system,"
element 6: "Guided by a philosophy of history and/or social theory
that is applied to everyday questions and issues," and element 7:
"concerned with abstract principles--not concrete interests."

Putnam used pgygp_indexes to measure the six elements listed
above, and created five more, apparently because they seemed to be
pertinent cognitive dimensions in his discussions with the British

14 The correlations between these

and Italian Parliamentarians.
twelve indexes provided the basis for the factor analysis which
produced three distinct dimensions. Putnam then chose the dimension
on which four of the seven "element-based" indexes loaded (and on
which, unlike the other factors, pppg_of the five "non-element
based" indexes loaded) as his measure of "ideological style." In
doing so, he accepted a very restricted definition of ideology;
one which incorporated only four of the original fourteen definitional
elements, and in which two of the four were given little weight.

Thus in his actual measure of ideology, Putnam willingly
excluded 6 good deal of the political and psychological content

heretofore associated with the concept. Once the 131 was formed,

he examined its relationship with variables which have political

81

and emotional content, e.g. partisan hostility (p. 63), political

15). authoritarianism (p. 55),

alienation (p. 51 and pp. 667-668
moral absolutism (p. 56), willingness to compromise (p. 54),
political extremism (p. 51), and conflict orientation (p. ll4n),
but, to reiterate, these elements were ppt_incorporated in the
correlation matrix which served as the basis of the 151. Hard
measures of the respondent's emotional investment in his belief
system or his mental rigidity (dogmatism‘G) were not even included
in the study.

Though Putnam initially considered that ideological thought
was multi-dimensional, he came to assume that the essence of such
thought could be captured by assessing only its cognitive aspect.
Had he thought the “content" and "emotional" aspects to be important
he most likely would have pointed out the lppt pt substantial
correlation between the 151 and "partisan hostility," "unwillingness
to compromise," "authoritarianism," "political extremism," etc., as
evidence that his 151 was ppt_a measure of ideology. Because he
does not, it can be assumed that he considered the "cognitive"

traits of ideologues to be their most definitive characteristics.

Putnam's Ideological Style Index

Putnam relies on one single dimension or index as his
measure of ideological thought. This "ideological style“ index
sums across four component indexes: the Generalizer-Particularizer
index, the Inductive-Deductive Thinking index, the Reference to a

Named Ideology index and the Reference to a Future Utopia index.

82

For all practical purposes, however, the ISI consists of only two
of these indexes, the Generalizer-Particularizer Index and the
Inductive-Deductive Thinking index. Were an index formed with

‘7 with Putnam's 151

just these two, it would correlate r = .95

(r = .97 corrected for attenuation). The Generalizer-Particularizer

Index and the Inductive-Deductive Thinking Index are therefore the

dimensions of cognitive style which Putnam maintains are crucial

to the meaning of ideological thought. He assumes that his coders

were able to adequately distinguish these dimensions as they scored

the respondent issue-discussions, and that each index makes a

significant contribution to the measurement of ideological style.18
In the next few pages we will present an argument based on

Putnam's own data which shows that (1) he failed to get distinct

measurement between the Generalizer-Particularizer and the Inductive-

Deductive Thinking Indexes, and that (2) the 151 is most probably

no more than a general measure of articulation; an index which

distinguishes knowledgeable, complex thinkers from those whose

thought is ignorant and simplistic. Further on in the chapter,

we will present data from our own study which suggests that

cognitive style is multi-dimensional and that it is unlikely that

separable Generalizer-Particularizer and Inductive-Deductive Thinking

Indexes exist.

The Problems of Coder "Global" Judgments
Putnam's ISI adds across four of the twelve "stylistic

characteristics" indexes. These indexes were scored solely on the

83

basis of coder "global" judgments,--judgments made without the aid
of clearly defined criteria. The content validity of each index
is entirely dependent on the accuracy of the coders' judgment as

to whether the relevant characteristics are present or absent in

19

the issue-discussions of the respondents. There are several

reasons that these coder judgments were inaccurate. The first

relates to how the indexes were defined.

The Generalizer-Particularizer and Inductive-
Deductive Thinking Indexes

According to Putnam, the Generalizer-Particularizer Index
distinguishes between respondents who deal with issues "in terms

of sweeping principles" and those who "emphasize specific situations

20

and details." Generalizers, he says, see "very important lines

- . . [of thought] . . -whereothers . . . [i.e. non-generalizers]
. see merely technical questions." Furthermore, generalizers

move "easily and quickly from a specific policy problem to general

principles of philosophy."21

The Inductive-Deductive Thinking Index supposedly taps a
different cognitive dimension. Putnam assumes that it measures
"the extent to which the respondent appeared to reason synoptically,

deducing his analysis from a general abstract political or social

22

or economic theory." Coders were to be on guard for stated "chains

of reasoning" that include "theoretical premises," and statements

which imply that the respondant is approaching the issue in a

comprehensive manner.23

84

Because Putnam's coders made subjective or l'global" judgments
in scoring these indexes, we cannot be sure of what they actually
measure. What Putnam's examples indicate, however, is that both
"generalizers" and "deductive thinkers" are persons who address
issues in an abstract and relatively comprehensive manner.24 Both
indexes, in other words, seem to measure "abstractness of thought."

The hypothesis that the Inductive-Deductive Thinking Index
was not scored on the basis of criteria different from that used
to score the Generalizer-Particularizer Index is supported by the
fact that it correlates .68 with the Generalizer-Particularizer
Index while the reliabilities of these indeces are .57 for the
Inductive-Deductive Thinking Index and .64 for the Generalizer-
Particularizer Index. That is, if the correlation between the
indexes is corrected for error of measurement, then the correlation
between the two true scores would be estimated to be r = 1.13, i.e.
perfect.25 A perfect correlation between the true scores means
that there is no differentiation between the two concepts whatever,
i.e. the coders were unable to make judgments on these concepts
that differed by more than the unreliability of the single judgments.

Why were the coders unable to differentiate between
"generalizer-particularizer" and "inductive-deductive thinking?"

This correlation most likely resulted because the coders keyed on
the respondent's "use of general principles" when they scored the
Generalizer-Particularizer Index and keyed on their "abstractness
of thought“ when they scored the Inductive-Deductive Thinking Index.

Although we cannot prove that this happened, Putnam's description of

85

the indexes, his reliance on coder global judgments, and the perfect
correlation (assuming correction for attenuation) between the indexes
all support this hypothesis. More on this will be said.
Putnam's 181 as a General Measure
of Articulation
Putnam's 151 was not conceived of as a single variable.
Rather it arose as a factor underlying four variables in a factor
analysis. This section will show that this is a specious distinction
in the present case, i.e. it will show that there is no difference
between the ISI "factor" and the single "generalizer-particularizer"

index.

TABLE 4.3.--Inter-Correlation of the Four Indexes which Form Putnam's
"Ideological Style Index."

 

Gen/ Induct/ Ref/ Ref/

 

Name of Indexa Part. Deduct. Ideo. Utop.
Generalizer-Particularizer -- 1.13b .58 .55
Inductive-Deductive Thinking .68 -- .59 .69
Reference to Named Ideology .38 .36 -- .32
Reference to Future Utopia .36 .42 .21 --

 

aThe reliabilities of the indeces are as follows: General-
izer-Particularizer (.64), Inductive-Deductive Thinking (.57),
Reference to Named Ideology (.66), Reference to a Future Utopia
.66).

bCorrelations above the diagonal are corrected for
attenuation.

86

The correlations required for this analysis were kindly
provided by Putnam and are presented below the diagonal in Table 4.3.

25 the reliability of each

From Putnam's inter-rater correlations,
index can be calculated using the Spearman-Brown formula. These
reliabilities are given in the table notes. The index reliabili-
ties can then be used to correct the correlations in Table 4.3 for
attenuation and the corrected correlations are given above the
diagonal in the table. These correlations represent the correlations
between the variables that would have been obtained had there been no
error in the coder judgments.

The correlation between the Generalizer-Particularizer and
Inductive-Deductive Thinking indexes is perfect (as was noted above)
and thus the factor in Putnam could not obtain greater generality
by summing over both variables than that contained in either one
alone. That is, since the two variables are the same, the sum of
the two variables is identical to one of them in correlational terms.

Is new variance introduced by the fact that the factor
correlates with "reference to a named ideology" and "reference to a
future utopia?" A factor which underlies variables or correlates
with them does not normally relate to all the variance in those
variables. Rather the factor represents only the variance which
is COMMON to those variables. Consider then the two "reference"
indexes. How much variance do they have in common? The correlation
between the two of them, corrected for attenuation, is only .32,
which means that they are ppt_strong indicators of the variable

that underlies the ISI factor. On the other hand, each of the

87

"reference" variables is highly correlated with the generalizer-
particularizer index (or what is the same thing, the inductive-
deductive thinking index). This suggests that that variance which
the “reference" variables have in common is that variance which
they hold in common with the generalizer-particularizer index (i.e.
their inter-correlation being spurious). To test this hypothesis.
we calculated the partial correlation between the two "reference"
indexes with the "generalizer-particularizer" index held constant.
This partial correlation is .001 in contrast to the original
correlation of .32. Thus the variance in the "reference" indexes
tapped by the ISI factor is exactly that variance in each which
they hold in common with the "generalizer-particularizer" index.
That is, the implied correlation between the ISI factor and the
"generalizer-particularizer" index corrected for attenuation is
precisely 1.00.

There is no differentiation whatever between the ISI factor
and the "generalizer-particularizer" index or the "inductive-
deductive thinking" index once error of measurement is taken into
account. The 151 factor measures only one variable and further
evidence will show that that variable is articulation.

Each of the four indexes can be construed as a measure of
respondent articulation. The distinctions which Putnam attempted
to make between "generalizers" and "particularizers," and between
"deductive" and "inductive" thinkers are very much the type of
distinctions which would differentiate between articulate and

inarticulate persons. The ability to use overarching principles

88

in ones' analysis of issues and to think in a deductive, logical
manner are hallmarks of knowledgeable, articulate persons, whereas
the inability to use principles or think logically are hallmarks
of less articulate persons. In addition, it is reasonable to
assume that references to a "named ideology" and to a "future
utopia" are more apt to be found in the discussions of articulate
persons than in those of less articulate persons. Regardless of
whether one adheres to it, to name an ideology is to make use of

a verbal abstraction, and reference to a future I'ideal" state may
simply be indicative of a comprehensive approach to, or discussion
of, a particular issue. All the distinctions implied by the
component indexes of the ISI, therefore, are distinctions which
might differentiate articulate from less-articulate persons. This
supports our belief that the single concept which the indexes
measure is articulation.

The respondents' familarity with the issues could also have
contributed to the emergence of the ISI as a measure of articulation.
Issues on which respondents possessed a good deal of information
could very well have stimulated organized and relatively abstract
thinking by the respondents, while issues which respondents were
not familiar with produced "trial and error," "associative," and
relatively concrete thinking. If the coders keyed on the "abstract-

"27

ness" and "comprehensiveness of the respondent's issue discussions

as evidence of "generalized" and "deductive“ thinking then they

unwittingly laid the basis for a dimension which would reflect

89

differences among respondents with respect to their knowledge about
issues and the development of their cognitive processes.

Leaving aside speculation, there is also concrete evidence
that the ISI measures articulation. Putnam states that "respondents
with very little formal education tend to have a lower score on the
ISI," and that "in Italy 'professional' (might we say more educated?),
career politicians are notably . . . more ideological than their
colleagues."28 If we can assume that education is a strong determinant
of articulation--and according to Putnam we can29--than this correla-
tion supports our thesis.

Further evidence that the ISI measures ”abstractness of
thought" comes in two parts.

Putnam attempted to validate the ISI by correlating it with
several variables among which was a measure of "abstract thinking."
Respondents were asked to describe "the most important differences
between the major political parties," and their discussions were
then rated on a five-point scale according to the abstractness of
their system of classification. A contingency table is presented
which shows a positive relationship between the ISI and the five
"abstractness of framework" categories.30

Because of Putnam's use of coder "global" judgments, it is
hard to know whether "abstractness of thought" was actually measured.
No specific criteria are mentioned as those used by the coders to
determine "abstractness," but it is implied that they assessed "the
extent to which (the respondents) organize(d) their information about

POIItICS ip,terms Qf_systematic, abstract conceptual dimensions."3]

m

 

90

We contend that the coders actually translated this to mean "with
the use of big words and/or “abstractions" and therefore gjg_
measure "abstractness of thought." As proof we offer two pieces
of evidence based on an analysis of samples of discussions--one
which Putnam selected as typical of respondents rated "high" in
"abstractness" and the other as typical of respondents rated "low."
The first piece of evidence simply looks at the difference
between the two samples in terms of the number of "big words" and/
or "abstractions" which they contain. If a "big word" is arbitrarily
defined as one of eight letters or more, the sample Putnam selected
from the most abstract category contains 2.3 big words per line
whereas, the sample selected from the least abstract category only
contains 1.3 big words per line. In the first 95 words of the
"most abstract" sample (which numbers 171 words) there are 18 big
words and only 10 such words in the "least abstract" sample (which
numbers 95 words in total). Furthermore the big words in the "most
abstract" sample are almost entirely "abstractions" whereas the
"least abstract" sample is--in Putnam's words--"near1y devoid of_
abstractions."32 Among the big words in the "most abstract" sample
are "ideologies," "postulates," "pre-suppositions," "theorems,"
"liberalism," "socialism," "communism," "dialectical" and "egometry."
Conversely, the most abstraction-like big words in the "least

abstract" sample are "advantages," "predominantly," "sufficiently,"

33 These samples indicate

"conservative (Party)," and "wealthier."
that Putnam's coders probably keyed on the respondents' use of "big
words" and/or "abstractions" when scoring his measure of abstract

thinking.

91

The second bit of evidence simply confirms what was learned
from the analysis just presented--yet it does so in a more scientific
manner. Each discussion sample was analyzed by applying Gillie's
"Simplified Formula for measuring Abstraction in writing."34 On
a scale whose point distribution is described as follows: O-18,
very abstract; 19-30, abstract; 31-42, fairly abstract; 43-54,
standard; 55-66, fairly concrete; 67-78, concrete; 79-90, very
concrete,35 the discussion sample selected from the most abstract
category rated a score of 39 "fairly abstract" and the discussion
sample from the least abstract category rated a score of 56 "fairly
concrete." Though this formula is designed to assess writing
samples of at least 200 words and ppt_for discussion samples with
fewer words (the subject samples of 171 and 95 words having had to
be proportioned upward), these ratings strengthen the argument

that the ISI measures "abstractness" and thereby supports the major

thesis that the ISI is a measure of articulation.

New and Better Measurement

Since it was clear that Putnam's measures failed to adequately
distinguish between the cognitive traits he felt were crucial to the
measurement of ideological style, it was decided to use multiple
measures or indicators in the present study, to see if these dimen-
sions actually exist. An equally compelling reason for using multiple
items, of course, was the desire to avoid the enormous item-reliability
problems associated with the use of coder "global" judgments. Conse-

quently, a set of 93 Bernoulli items was created to measure the

92

relevant dimensions hypothesized by Putnam, and others that we

believed would manifest themselves in discussions about crime.

Although the specific content of the items are related to the

probable referents in these discussions (e.g. the respondent's

view of the criminal, the enforcement agencies, the causes and

solutions to crime, etc.) the items were designed to provide a

number of independent measures of each of the dimensions of

cognitive style.

As an example, where Putnam used a one item five-point

scale to assess his respondent's tendency to think deductively

(see Table 4.2), we created seven separate "mention/did not mention"

items which would measure this tendency more precisely. These items

are:

290

291

292

293

294

The respondent refers to or implies that his ideas about
the causes of crime are deduced from some moral belief
system, or some general social, political or economic
theory.

The respondent refers to or implies that his ideas about
the causes of crime derive from his personal observations
and personal experiences in dealing with and thinking
about the problem.

The respondent refers to or implies that his ideas about
the causes of crime derive from reports, facts and figures
which council/legislature/congress, friends, etc.

The respondent refers to or implies that some type of
belief system or social theory should guide thought

and action with respect to how the crime problem should
be solved.

The respondent refers to or implies that his personal

thoughts and personal experiences in dealing with the

crime problem are the source of his ideas about how to
deal with it.

93

295 The respondent refers to or implies that his ideas about
the solution to crime derive from reports, facts and
figures which have come to his attention through the
media, his work, friends, etc.

296 The respondent refers to or implies that some sort of

moral belief system (Christian ethics/heritage, humanism,
etc.) is the basis of his ideas on how to deal with the

crime problem.

In total, the 93 items allowed a test for the presence of 13
different dimensions. As Table 4.4 indicates, these include (1) the
two major cognitive dimensions of the ISI; the Generalizer-Particularizer
and Inductive-Deductive Thinking dimensions, (2) five other dimensions
from Putnam which seemed applicable in terms of structuring discussions
about crime, and (3) six dimensions not taken from Putnam.36

The complete set of items can be found in a slightly abridged

form in Table C.3 through C.24 of Appendix C, or in their completely

un-abridged form in the questionnaire section of Appendix B.

Methodological Considerations

Because the purpose of creating the 93 Bernoulli items was
to develop concrete indices of the various ideological dimensions,
it was natural that cluster analysis be used as the primary tool in
the analysis of the data. Hunter and Cohen's (1969) PACKAGE system
()f computer routines for the analysis of correlational data was used
to perform this analysis.37 The first step was to do an "oblique
"Haltiple groups" factor analysis (with communalities) on the apriori

CTIJsters; the thirteen groups of items originally created to measure

the various dimensions.38

After this was done, each cluster or index was examined to

identify items which were misplaced in terms of their initial

94

TABLE 4.4.--Dimensions of Ideological Thought with Respect to Discussions About the
Problem of Crime.

J

No. of Measurement
Dimension Issue Discussion Referent Items Created

 

N
4b

Generalizer-Particularizera Focus of the Discussion

Perception of the Crime Victims
Perception of the Criminal
Perception of the Criminal Act
Perception of the Causes of Crime
Perception of who should Handle

the Problem
Perception of the Enforcement Agencies
Perception of the Solution to Crime

Inductive-Deductive Basis of the Respondent's Thought

I o a
Thinking Basis of ideas on the Cause of Crime
Basis of ideas on the Solution to Crime

Complexity-Simplicity Organization and Complexity of Thought

Complexity of Thought
Organization/Logic of Thought
General Organization of the Discussion

Conflict-Consensus Zero-Sum Perspective

Dichotomous Thinking
Moralizer vs. Non-Moralizera
Criminals are a Special Breed
Retribution vs. Rehabilitation

AAA AMA
b M N b (A) u u N U1 g
vvv savvy

Vv

N

Legalistic Orientation Framework of the Discussion

Need for New Legislation
Increase Enforcement

Need for Court and Penal Reform
Role of Non-Enforcement Agencies

Historical Orientationa Framework of the Discussion
Moralistic Orientation ’Framework of the Discussion
Emotional-Objective Saliance of the Issue

Use of Emotional Words and Thetoric
Urgency of the Problem
Respondent Emotional Perspective

Confident-Unconfident Mental Attitude

Openness of Response
Self-Assessed Expertise
Respondent Sense of Efficacy

vvv

AAA dAAA
—‘ N Nap O (3.1—0m \D L” (A) dNbN ‘O bNN-fl ‘0 “01¢

vvv

POlitical Acceptabilitya Standard for Judging Crime Policy
Technical/Administrative Standard for Judging Crime Policy

Feasibilitya
Flliancial Costa Standard for Judging Crime Policy I l
Traditiona Standard for Judging Crime PoliCy l

 

 

aReplicates a dimension used by Putnam. See Putnam, pp. 40-41.

95

assignment to a cluster. If an item was deemed inappropriate for
inclusion in a particular cluster, it was either assigned to a more
suitable cluster, used to form a sub-cluster, or discarded from the
analysis. Throughout this process of cluster (index or scale)
formation, three criteria were applied.

1. The items should be homogeneous in what they measure.

2. Items in a cluster should be reasonably well correlated
with each other (i.e. internally consistent).

3. The items in a cluster should be externally parallel,
i.e. all should exhibit the same pattern of correlations
with other clusters.
When these criteria have been met, one can be reasonably
confident that the items within each cluster or index are measuring
the same concept, and that the Clusters themselves are reasonably

reliable measures of these concepts. The clusters were revised

again and again until they met these criteria.

The A Priori and A Posteriori Cluster Analyses

The a priori cluster analysis had two purposes. First, to
ascertain whether Putnam's Generalizer/Particularizer and Inductive/
Deductive Thinking dimensions were viable structuring dimensions.
Would the items created to measure these dimensions be highly inter-
correlated and would they form distinct clusters which approximated
these component dimensions of the ISI? The second purpose was to
examine the other dimensions taken from Putnam as well as those
which we hypothesized as possible structuring dimensions of the
crime discussions. This analysis assessed whether the sets of items

created to measure the complexity-simplicity, conflict-consensus,

96

legalistic, historical and moralistic orientation, emotional-
objective and confident-unconfident dimensions would actually
coalesce to form clusters.

The a posteriori cluster analysis was the product of some
15 successive reanalyses of the same 93 x 93 correlation matrix.
Each reanalysis improved the clusters in terms of three criteria:
"similarity of item substance," “consistency of correlation among
cluster items," and "external item parallelism."

The a priori analysis produced no empirical support for
Putnam's "generalizer-particularizer" and "inductive-deductive
thinking" dimensions. The items designed to measure these concepts
were either assigned to sub-clusters (some of which appear to be
components of these dimensions) or were placed in clusters completely
different in concept from these dimensions. The "hypothesized"
crime discussion dimensions held up reasonably well though their
items usually dispersed to two or three sub-clusters as well. The

a posteriori analysis structured the data in greatest detail and

 

provided the major evidence in support of our arguments about the
multi-dimensionality of ideological thought.

The a posteriori cluster analysis produced twenty-one Clusters.
Seventy-eight of the ninety-three Bernoulli items were placed in
these clusters, with the remaining fifteen assigned to the residual
cluster (No. 22). Three items were placed in the residual cluster
because they produced no variance, i.e. each being coded "not
mentioned" for all 118 respondents, and 12 were placed in this

cluster because they did not fit well in any of the other twenty-one

97

clusters. Table 4.5 provides the cluster names and the items--in

abbreviated form--which make up the clusters. The items are listed
in the general order of their loading on the cluster. The cluster
means, standard deviations and Coefficient Alphas are presented in

Table 4.6. The Coefficient Alpha is a measure of cluster reliability 1
/ ,,g.

/ ‘ ”I.

based on the average correlation between cluster items.

Table 4.7 shows how the 93 Bernoulli items which were created
to measure the 13 "a priori" dimensions were distributed to the 21
clusters formed by the a posteriori cluster analysis. This table
provides the best visible proof that most of the dimensions which
were expected to "emerge" actually broke into two or more sub-
dimensions (or clusters). Table 4.8 represents the cluster corre-
lations "corrected for attenuation." Tables presenting the means
and standard deviations of the 93 Bernoulli items created to allow
content analysis of the crime discussions, the initial 93 X 9339
correlation matrix, the specific item in each cluster, and the
correlations between the cluster items and the other clusters can

be found in Appendix C. The cluster correlations not corrected

for attenuation, can be found in Appendix D.

 

A quick examination of Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 shows that
both the Generalizer-Particularizer and the Inductive-Deductive
Thinking dimensions failed to materialize as structuring dimensions
in the discussions about crime. Of the 24 items originally designed
to measure the generalizer-particularizer dimension, only 12
clustered at all. These 12 form four sub-clusters and three of

these--which account for seven items--are almost perfectly

98

TABLE 4.5.--A Synopsis of the Content of the Crime Discussion Clusters

501

502

503

504

505

506

507

508

509

510

in the A Posteriori Ana1ysis:a 501-521.b

— ”:1—

Crime not Criminals: Says or implies that factors other than the
criminals themselves are the subject to be dealt with, and cites
the abstraction "crime" as the subject to be dealt with.

 

Non-Specific: Refers to crime only in general terms (no mention
of different types), refers to crime as a homogeneous concept,
and does not recommend specific institutional change as a
solution to the crime problem.

 

Global: Recommends Changes in societal institutions, etc. rather
than change in individuals as the solution to crime, and sees
societal agencies or institutions as responsible for handling

the problem rather than particular individuals.

Environmental: Says or implies that "society" or "the people"
should handle the crime problem, that social, economic and
environmental conditions cause crime, and says or implies that
"society," environment, or social institutions cause crime
rather than "individuals."

 

Non-Personal: The respondents ideas about the causes and
solutions of crime are derived from sources other than his or
her own personal thoughts and/or experiences, he or she does
not seem personally concerned about the problem of crime, any
reference or reflection about "society" is made in a non-
personalized manner.

 

Non-Factual: Says or implies that his or her ideas about the
causes of, and the solutions to crime are derived from sources
other than facts he or she has read or heard about.

 

Theoretical: Says or implies that some sort of social theory

 

should guide crime policy, and that his or her ideas on crime
derive from some sort of social, political, or economic theory.

Comprehensive: Suggests a comprehensive attack (economic,

 

social, political, legal, etc.) or broad social reform as the
solution to crime, also discusses the crime problem in an
organized manner.

Complex: Mentions a relatively high number of causes of crime,
solutions to crime, and social institutions which should deal
with the problem of crime.

Structured: Suggests some type of Chain of reasoning, offers
a listing or sequence of causes, solutions, etc., and/or makes
some type of connection between the cause(s) and solution(s)
to crime in his discussion.

99

TABLE 4.5.--Continued.

511

512

513

515

516

517

£518

q—o-

Special Breed: Says or implies that criminals (1) are a homo-
geneous group, (2) are ppt_just ordinary persons in special
circumstances, (3) are individuals inherently weak in character,
and says or implies that criminals are all the same type of
person.

 

Retribution: Says or implies that the police, the courts and/or

 

the penal authorities are the agencies responsible for dealing
with the crime problem, that courts have encouraged crime by

not enforcing laws, that criminals need punishment, blames the
crime problem on some group, institution or persons, suggests
the restructuring or improvement of the court system as a
solution to crime and refers to abstractions such as "the courts
or "the police“ as agents responsible for handling the problem.

Rehabilitation: Suggests restructuring or improvement of the
penal system as a solution to crime and says or implies that
criminals should be rehabilitated.

 

Pro-Enforcement: Says or implies that law-enforcement authori-

 

ties are hampered in enforcing laws, that the solution to crime
involves improvement of law enforcement capability, and that
crime is a complex issue, does ppt_say or imply that social
institutions (schools, families, Churches, etc.) are responsible
for dealing with the crime problem.

Historical: Uses historical antecedents in his discussion of
the crime problem and refers to some period in history as a
standard by which we should judge today's crime problem.

 

Moralism: Says or implies that crime is caused by the general

breakdown of public and private morality, the declining
influence of the church, and by families and schools which

have failed to teach correct moral behavior, says or implies
that his solution(s) to crime derive from a moral belief system
and suggests an attempt to strengthen public and private
morality as a part of his (or her) solution to the crime
problem.

Emotionalism: Discusses the crime problem in a relatively

 

emotional manner, perceives the crime problem in dichotomous
"we versus they" terms, uses emotionally charged words when
discussing criminals, the causes, the solutions and who is
responsible for dealing with the crime problem.

100

TABLE 4.5.--Continued.

 

‘ 519 Fear: Says or implies that "individuals" are the victims of
crime, says or implies a personal fear that he (or she) will be
a crime victim, that there might not be a solution to the crime
problem, and uses emotionally charged words when discussion
crime and its consequences.

520 Easy Talking: Talked easily about the causes of crime, sug-
gested a solution to the problem without hesitation, offered
his opinion on the causes and solutions to crime readily, did
not qualify his statements about the causes and solutions to
crime, says or implies that there is a solution to crime, and
discusses crime in a relatively organized manner.

 

521 Self-Assured: Feels that his ideas on the causes and solutions
to crime are the "correct" ideas on the subject (beyond just
offering a personal opinion).

 

 

aThese descriptions are no more than a paraphrasing of the
cluster items. Remember that each cluster is an index and that the
items are phrased to describe the substantive content of only one
endpoint of the index. All items were scored either (1) Did Not
Mention or (3) Mentioned.

bThe numbers 501-521 correspond to the cluster numbering
procedure associated with Hunter and Cohen's (1969) PACKAGE system
of computer routines for the analysis of correlational data. The
numbers assigned to the twenty-one Crime Discussing Clusters remain
constant in both the text and the relevant appendices. See John E.
Hunter and Stanley H. Cohen, "Package," Educational and Psychological
Measurement, 29 (1969), 697-700.

101

TABLE 4.6.--A Posteriori Crime Discussion Clusters: Means, Standard

Deviations and Coefficient Alphas.a

 

No. of Possible Range

 

Cluster_ Items of Scores Mean 5.0. Alpha
501 Crime not Criminals 2 l - 6 3.03 1.65 .88
502 Non-Specific 5 1 - 15 10.65 2.97 .60
503 Global 2 l - 6 3.11 1.49 .63
504 Environmental 3 l - 9 5.56 1.99 .48
505 Non-Personal 4 l - 12 10.05 2.24 .58
506 Non-Factual 2 l - 6 2.46 1.03 .57
507 Theoretical 2 1 - 6 5.56 .88 .41
508 Comprehensive 3 1 - 9 7.39 2.24 .80
509 Complex 3 1 - 9 3.68 2.75 .63
510 Structured 3 l - 9 7.07 1.77 .39
511 Special Breed 4 l - 12 8.22 2.64 .61
512 Retribution 8 l - 24 16.38 5.23 .83
513 Rehabilitation 2 1 - 6 5.11 1.54 .83
514 Pro-Enforcement 5 1 - 15 11.51 3.15 .71
515 New Laws 3 l - 9 8.09 1.49 .47
516 Historical 2 1 - 6 5.33 1.11 .33
517 Moralism 5 1 - 15 13.51 2.50 .78
518 Emotionalism 6 l - 18 16.70 2.08 .64
519 Fear 4 1 - 12 11.25 1.54 .64
520 Easy Talking 8 l - 24 12.51 3.59 .83
521 Self Assurance 2 1 - 6 4.94 1.60 .79

aCoefficient Alpha is a measure of cluster reliability based
(on the average correlation between cluster items. A discussion of
Coefficient Alpha is presented in Jum C. Nunnally, Psychometric
'Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1967), pp. 196-198, 210-211.

 

 

m o o o Z on an: ~33.

 

«633.0: “nun
nuano<ruuom “nun
9.56:3. haum “our.

uwum "2n
Haze—.0385 "can

631.3: “:n

13.3qu no:

2:...— aoz "nun
a a . ucuaoouOucM—iohm 3:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

“N

 

S a coauuuafiun-gux "nun
m m N 5323.53— "a:
M N N voonm anaconm "3n
.1 n vouauoaum “can
n nod—Boo "men
n g «innocuous—cu "8n

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

N #333092. “

h
0
fl

 

 

N umauuumnnoz "won

 

HWCOIhUfll—ucz "$0“

 

.—
m “396505.25 "eon
N Huaofiv u on
n
N

 

n

 

owweouom-eoz "non
“158:0 no: 03:0 "Sn

 

 

scenic-um. no:
:00 acuvzcouaa 0300030 coznucoto cofimuaowuo 523:9qu mam—Sacco 3339:; 0333.5 1.3.3333 mEmago

hu«.—«A«-0h taco—52:5 raucowuoam uwumagwnoz gnoaugma: ouumzmwwg iuuzwcou azuaxuunfiou uo>auu3uon nunzmuucuu HHOHEME <

3553::

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Egozh A<DH§OMEH mo monsz‘fln :55: <

 

 

 

.mmmapmc< cmpm3_u wcowcwumom <
gee an coated ucoomseo as» co acoemapu weoeca < use sect ueopH co eoeozeecemeo--.e.e u4m<e

Cluster Correlations (Corrected for Attenuation).

iscu551on

Crime 0

1or1

TABLE 4.8.-A Poster

 

103

     
   
   
 
 
   
   
    
    
 
  
  
 
  

“dd-I“ ““NMWQN
II? 007': MIIAvINNdN7vI‘

NOON-NO. ooooonmm
771‘ 1"” ' ””0".“

."N-flmm-Iflnm - -
NI‘IIfI I IvIdvIINv-I

“WBMMMMNOOIBID
MNI JWH?7I NM I JHv-I

MNMCWMNMQQMN
GIN N I (UN 7"? I 4:17

ONOQMMCIIKU‘HMM
vuffldvl rfll :IdNI
I I

dONCWNMG‘QCd

 

smonstdooot@
r: 9: Yi’i“
I

  

 

d“ 0.0
.t Nv-II NJth
I I
09.409913
ImIO NNNI
I I I I I
manoaososm
v-II ”No-I
I I
”NON.” mnN0‘35m Wk
MdN N a deehldIIhm
II I ddII I I
woman-I: Oct :«mmmtomeo
I INDI CM: Iumtcu—I .dvttl
«dI I II
condom mmn3:¢nahomaa
d mNI V¢N30nd «IS»
I II I I I
News ONthdhnM3d03
NdNnIM :Q.?~?m NdINJ
I
«Iv-II» “G‘GOOMNMUVVO
Ina NHNI IINflIId
I I I I
Nam «asaatumNnaeo
Nd I N dNIdImJNM

 

4501 502 503 506 505 506 507 500 509 510 511 512 513 516 515 516 517 518 519 52. 521

 

Crime DOC Criminals

 
    
    
 
 

NdJNO‘O‘OMQOOmNNfl

NnmndOQNOMG‘Wv-I
HN I94 I 'tv-I I FIFI
I I I I I I I

JGONOBCU‘ONNHO‘CI
v-Iv-I I") I “\ONVIJ’NN I run
I I I I I I I I I

NJIfiMmOv-fidcmaNm
I N d I d «Iv-II?NO.I I
I I

#61", QNNO ”dNI‘I‘IflONQ OOv-I
BOO 69°09 OH «dc-Id v-Iv-Iv-Iv-I dNN
m mmmmuumn

5

Fear

Easy Talking

hensive 5
Self-Assured

Global 5
Environmental 5
Complex
Structured
Special Breed 5
Retribution 5
Rehabilitation 5
New Laws
Historical
Moralism
Emotionalism

Theoretical 5
Pro-Enforcement

Non-Specific 5
Non-Personal
Non-Factual

Compre

 

. 104

non-correlated with each other. The remaining five-item cluster,

 

the "environmental" cluster, seems misplaced--at least in terms of
being a measure of cognitive style. Its highest correlations are
with clusters other than the generalizer-particularizer sub-clusters,
with its highest correlation (r = .69) being with the "retribution"
cluster. An examination of the items of the "environmental" cluster
shows that it would be most logically interpreted as a "content"
dimension (see Appendix C, Table C.6).

A look at the Inductive-Deductive Thinking dimension shows
the same pattern. Only 6 of the 11 items created to measure this
concept clustered. The three clusters which they formed are not
highly correlated and each has its highest correlations with clusters
outside the Inductive-Deductive Thinking or the Generalizer-
Particularizer domains. This refutes the hypothesis that "inductive-
deductive thinking" is a general dimension of cognitive style.
Instead, we find that the use of deduction varies from one idea
domain to another.

Clearly it is possible for a given chain of thought to be
deductive or to be inductive or associational. Thus the abstract
dimension of "deduction-induction" certainly exists. The question
is: is deduction-induction a dimension of individual differences?
The various theorists who posit cognitive styles (including Putnam)
believe that some people tend to use deduction as a characteristic
mode of thought while other people do not. If this characteristic
tendency did exist, then one could move from deduction as a dimension

of particular arguments to deduction as a dimension characterizing

105

people. What the data clearly shows is that this is false. There
is simply no correlation suggesting the consistent tendency of
people to use deduction for arguments which pertain to different
psychological content areas.40 That is, a person who is deductive
in one argument will be inductive in the next, willy-nilly.

The evidence discussed thus far pertains to our attempt to
show that style mattered more than content. We looked at items not
in terms of content (i.e., the referent of crime which was the
subject of a given judged discussion) but rather in terms of the
dimension of cognitive style which the item supposedly measured.
What the data shows, however, is that, for the most part, "content"
won out over "cognitive style." For example, examine the inter-
correlation of the "reification" items as displayed in Table 4.9.
Each of these items was initially designed as a measure of abstract
thinking; a characteristic which Putnam believed descriptive of
"generalizers" as opposed to “particularizers.” The data shows
that although the wording of the items was designed to reflect the
"generalizer" orientation, the items coalesce not with regard to
this common denominator but according to their specific crime
related content. Items 281, 283, and 284 are highly correlated
with each other and the substantive content of each relates to the
respondent's perception of the "police" or the "courts.'I Items 280
and 285 are highly correlated and their substantive content relates
to a belief that "society," "the people,“ or "government“ is

responsible for dealing with crime.41

TAB

106

 

281

283

284

280

285

 

LE 4.9.--Inter-Correlation of Crime Discussion Items which were
Predicted to Measure "Reification."

Item

Numbers (281) (283) (284) (280) (285)
(281) 100 18 38 -36 -15
(283) 18 100 27 -5 9
(284) 38 27 100 -36 5
(280) -36 -5 -36 100 33
(285) -15 9 5 33 100

Respondent refers to or implies that the “police," "courts,“
"legislature," or some similar--yet partially reified--group
or institution should handle the crime problem.

Respondent reifies the word "police" (e.g. respondent says that
"police" have to crack down rather than that the "cop of the
beat" must be more vigilant, etc.).

Respondent reifies the word "court" (e.g. he says that "courts"
are too lenient, rather than that "judges" are afraid to
imprison criminals).

Respondent refers to or implies that "society,“ the "people,“
"the government," (or some reified equivalent) should handle
the problem.

Respondent reifies the word "society" or its equivalent; "the
people," "the community," etc. (e.g. he says "its society's
responsibility rather than "it is all of us" or "each of us
responsibility," etc.).

 

107

Though both of Putnam's broad dimensions of cognitive style
failed to materialize as structuring dimensions, one strong dimension
did emerge. The three clusters formed by the "complexity-simplicity"
items are highly inter-correlated and together they comprise a
measure of "articulation." This more narrowly focused cognitive
style dimension measures the degree to which the respondent's
discussions were comprehensive in scope, complex in terms of the
number of elements of the crime problem mentioned by the respondent(s),
and structured in an organized manner. The correlations of the
"environmental" (504) and "theoretical" (507) clusters (see Table
4.8) suggest these are merely weaker versions of articulation
though logically they are more suitably categorized as "content"
clusters. More will be said about this at a later point.

With regard to the other dimensions measured in both Putnam's
and the present study, only the "historical orientation" items
clustered as expected. Even so, one of these items was dispatched
to the "residual“ cluster, and the coefficient Alpha for the cluster
formed by the remaining two was only a very weak .33. One of the
two "moralizer/non-moralizer“ items (which we incorporated into our
"conflict-consensus" dimension) was also put in the "residual"
cluster; the other being dispersed to the “content" oriented
"retribution" cluster. Finally, the five items which we inserted
to replicate "Political Acceptability," "Practicality,“ "Cost,"
and "Tradition“ (as criteria) stylistic characteristics indexes

(see Table 4.1), did not correlate well either with each other or

108

any of the clusters which was formed in the a posteriori Cluster
analysis. These items were also placed in the "residual" cluster.

The three clusters formed by the "simplicity-complexity"
items are by far the most highly inter-correlated of any set of
clusters in the entire analysis. Except for content differences
(which justify their separate identities) they are easily collapsed
to form a single measure of respondent "articulation." Its
similarity with Putnam's ISI provides the basis of our attempt to
replicate some of the relationships he found between the ISI and
other variables.

The a priori predictions concerning the "conflict-
consensus," "legalistic orientation," and "emotional-objective"
dimensions were not confirmed. Instead of strong correlations
within these blocks, the items dispersed either to clusters made
up, in part, of items from outside the blocks, or into sub-clusters.
Only the "confident-unconfident" items hung together reasonably
well; nine of its ten items forming two sub-clusters.

Second Order Cluster Analysis of the
A Posteriori Clusters

The failure of the a priori cluster analysis is more
understandable when one examines the structure of the a posteriori
clusters. Once the 21 crime discussion clusters were formed it
was natural that a cluster analysis of these cluster variables be
performed. To accomplish this, the matrix of cluster-intercorrelations
was factor analyzed--the factors being determined with communalities

in the matrix. The last varimax rotation produced a set of five

109

factors. A second order cluster analysis was determined by assigning
each variable (i.e. each of the 21 clusters) to a (second order)
cluster according to its highest factor loading. If a cluster's
highest loading on the factor was negative, then its direction of
scoring was reversed. That is each cluster was composed of the set
of variables which had their highest loading on the same varimax
factor. The five clusters which were formed provide a "second-

42

order" structuring of the crime discussion clusters. The make

up of these clusters is presented in Table 4.10.

When the second-order cluster analysis was first performed,
the meaning of its structure was not clear. We proceeded, there-
fore, with the detailed content analysis of crime belief systems
already in progress (see Chapter 3). This analysis lead us to
formulate our thoughts about ideology in terms of three basic
dimensions; cognitive style (specifically articulation), emotional
commitment (use of emotional words and rhetoric) and content (person-
blame vs. system-blame explanations of crime). It was then that we
discovered that with a few initially perplexing exceptions, the

second-order analysis paralleled the structure we had derived

43

independently from the content analysis. The second-order

analysis also paralleled the basic structured suggested by our
historical analysis of the concept of ideology.

Table 4.10 shows that second order cluster 1 contains the
"new laws" and the "rehabilitation" clusters. At first glance this
made the cluster neither a "content" nor "cognitive style" cluster.

However,after the formulation of the person-blame/system-blame

110

TABLE 4.10.--Clusters Formed by the Cluster Analysis of the Twenty-One
Crime Discussion Clusters.

Cluster 1 Cluster 2

(articulation)a

 

510 Structured -512 Retribution
509 Complex

508 Comprehensive
507 Theoretical
515 New Laws

520 Easy Talking

513 Rehabilitation

517 Moralism

Coefficient
Alpha = .74

Coefficient
Alpha = .87

Cluster 4
(unspecified)

506 Non-Factual
-503 Global

 

Coefficient
Alpha = .29

(system-blame)a

504 Environmental
-514 Pro-Enforcement
502 Non-Specific
-511 Special Breed

Cluster 3'
(non-emotion)a
-505 Non-Personal
518 Emotionalism
521 Self-Assured

 

519 Fear
Coefficient
Alpha = .67
Cluster 5
(unspecified)

-5l6 Historical
501 Crime not Criminals

Coefficient
Alpha = .30

aScored to reflect this pole of the dimension.

bA negative sign indicates that the cluster has been

"reversed" for inclusion in the cluster.

Its meaning should there-

fore be interpreted as opposite to its stated content or name.

111

model, it was obvious that these clusters were "universal," that is,
all office-holders advocate some type of legislative action with
respect to crime, and all advocate "rehabilitation“ of one form
or another. The clusters ended up in the "articulation" dimension
because articulate persons--whose discussions include a greater
range and number of elements--were more likely to mention these
beliefs in their discussions.
Similar reasoning explains why the "rehabilitation" cluster
did not correlate with "content" dimension (Cluster 2) formed by
the second-order analysis or with its sister cluster (see Table 4.7)
"retribution." All_office-holders advocate "rehabilitation." Where
they differ is in their opinion as to how this process should be
conducted. [Some demand that "punishment" or "retribution" be a
part of this character transformation while others contend that
"giving the criminal a stake in law-abiding society" is the answer.
This latter group believes that "punishment" will just drive
criminals further into the criminal sub-culture, thereby shutting
them out of law-abiding society. On the other hand they argue
that if criminals can see a payoff in no longer pursuing illegal
activity, the probability of "character change" is increased.
Because our respondents generally advocated rehabilitation
but split over the question of "retribution," the "rehabilitation“
cluster was not correlated with the person-blame/system-blame
cluster 2 (r = .05), or with the "retribution" cluster (r = .08).
Since "rehabilitation" is universal, it correlated with articulation

because articulate speakers mention more topics.

112

The "content? dimension formed by the second-order analysis
also contained clusters which were initially difficult to explain.
We initially interpreted the "non-specific“ and "moralism" clusters
in terms of cognitive style--both supposedly reflecting a type of
deductive and/0r abstract thought. An examination of their items,
however, shows why content won out over style. An analysis of the
content of items in the "non-specific" cluster showed that respondents
who were "specific" were specific in ways which reflected a belief
that "people" and not "conditions" are the cause of crime and that
criminals be dealt with in a relatively harsh fashion. An analysis
of the content of the "moralism" cluster showed that those with
high scores believed crime was caused by a breakdown in public and
private morality, and because families, churches, and schools no
longer taught correct moral behavior. In all other respects the
“content" dimension closely resembles the "person-blame/system-
blame" model which was constructed from our content analysis of
belief systems about crime. It contains items from the "retribution,"
"environmental," and "special-breed“ clusters as does the “person-
blame/system-blame" dimension, and the items of the "pro-
enforcement" cluster are also person-blame in content.

The "emotionalism" dimension formed by the second-order
analysis needs little explanation for each of its four constituent
clusters are clearly emotional in content. One of these clusters,
the "emotionalism" cluster (518) has a part-whole correlation of
.76 with this dimension and was selected as our measure of "emotional

commitment“ or "emotionalism" in further analyses.

113

The two remaining dimensions formed by the second-order
cluster analysis appear to be statistical artifacts. The four
clusters which make them up are all but uncorrelated with the
other dimensions or with each other. The inter-correlations in
these two-variable clusters are so small (r = .17 and .18) that
one suspects they are related only by chance. To see the smallness
of these correlations in its full light, we note that since these
are correlations between clusters formed by a factor analytic process
where communalities were placed in the diagonal of the matrix, these

correlations have already been corrected for attenuation.

Three Dimensions of Ideology

The second-order cluster analyses produced three separate
dimensions which characterize thought with respect to crime;
articulation, person-blame/system-blame orientation, and emotionalism.
To simplify interpretation these dimensions were measured using the
clusters most directly expressive of their content, i.e. Articulation
by a second-order cluster incorporating the Comprehensive, Complex,
and Structured clusters (508-510) produced in the a posteriori
cluster analysis, System-Blame Orientation by scoring the Person-
Blame/System-Blame Cluster formed in Chapter 3 to reflect the
“system-blame" pole of the cluster, and Non-Emotionalism by scoring
the Emotionalism Cluster (518) produced in the a posteriori cluster
analysis to reflect the "non-emotionalism“ pole of the cluster.
Table 4.11 presents the correlations between these dimensions.

The correlations show that Articulation and Emotionalism

are totally unrelated to each other and that the Person-Blame/

114

TABLE 4.11.--Correlation Matrix of the Articulation, Person-Blame/
System-Blame and Emotionalism Dimensions.

 

 

System-Blame Non-
Articulation Orientation Emotionalism
523 Articulation 100 42 15
525 System-Blame
Orientation 42 100 45
518 Non-Emotionalism 15 45 100

 

System-Blame dimension is only moderately related to the other two.
When the Person-Blame/System-Blame variable is held constant the
partial correlation between Articulation and Emotionalism drops to
-.05.44 Inarticulate persons are apparently no more prone to take
an emotional approach to crime than are articulate persons. Similarly,
persons holding person-blame beliefs about crime are only slightly
more emotional in their approach to crime than are persons holding
system-blame beliefs.

The data suggests that each of the dimensions is a distinct
dimension of ideological thought and that none of the dimensions
predominates. Since the term "ideology" has been associated with each
of these dimensions at various times, one could therefore have
several persons talking about ideologues and have absolutely no
correlation between the various definitions or types of ideologues
which they were referring to. Eight varieties of ideologue are
possible and the correlations suggest that six are frequent (the

most likely to occur being the articulate/system-blame-oriented/

115

non-emotional and the inarticulate/person-blame/emotional varieties).
This supports the idea that a number of definitions of ideology may
be empirically valid and that no more dimension or index of cogni-
tive style can adequately capture the meaning of the term “ideologi-

cal."

Replication of Putnam

The only cognitive style dimension to emerge from both the
cluster analyses is the articulation dimension. This dimension
measures the degree to which respondents analyzed the crime problem
in a structured and comprehensive fashion (both in terms of scope
and number of crime related elements mentioned). Since our analysis
of Putnam's work shows that his ISI is probably no more than a global
measure of articulation, our "articulation" dimension can be thought
of as a replication of his index. Consequently, an attempt was made
to replicate some of the comparisons which Putnam made between the
ISI and various other variables--using our "articulation“ dimension
as a surrogate ISI. Appendix 0 presents Putnam's results in the
form given in his book and cites the specific page numbers on which
they are presented. The results of the replication are presented
in Table 4.12.

The table provides more evidence that the ISI is in actuality
a measure of "articulation." The correlations with the "ideological

45 did not replicate

motivation" and "political distrust" variables
Putnam, but the six other comparisons which could be made with

confidence--Left/Right Extremism, Willingness to Compromise,

1'165

TABLE 4.12.--Corre1ations Which Allow the Comparison of Putnam's ISI with the Three Dimensions
of Ideological Thought on Variables Examined in Putnam's Study.a

 

 

Putnam's ISI Cognitive Style Content Emotionalism
Variable (articulation)b (articulation)b (system-blame)b (non-emotionalism)b

474 Ideological Motivation .17ic -.06 -.01 -.09
473 Left/Right Extremism (+)d .15 -.04 -.26*
373 Willingness to Compromise .12c .28* .37* .43*
470 Opposition to Interest c

Group Pol1tics -.l7* -.17 -.18* -.31*
524 Authoritarianism -.09e -.41* -.27* -.29*
526 Political Distrust -.06e .22* .23* .11
451 Age -.20if -.46* -.15 -.07
450 Social Class Background (0)9 .18* -.02 .07
449 Occupation (0)9 .24* .08 .11
447 Education (+) .51* .28* .16
471 Office Experience (0)9 -.18* -.06 .02
472 Party Experience (0)9 .15 -.O6 .05

 

aAll but two of the numbers in the table are Product-Moment Correlations. The two exceptions
are Gamma Correlations (see footnote 5). An asterisk indicates that the correlation is significant
at the .05 level. Also note that the size of the correlations based on the present study is
effected by the fact that they have been corrected for attenuation. Putnam's findings with respect
to the ISI are presented in Appendix F.

bScored to reflect this pole of the dimension. Cognitive Style is measured by Cluster 523,
Content of Cluster 525 and Emotionalism by Cluster 518.

cThis correlation was calculated from percentage figures used by Putnam to describe the
relationship. It may underestimate the actual correlation because the percentages are based on
"high" or "low" scores on the ISI. By splitting the ISI into two categories, its variance is
reduced, and correlations based on this variable will be under-estimated in proportion to this
reduction.

dPutnam does not report a correlation describing the relationship between the ISI and
political extremism. The plus sign indicates the relationship suggested by his Figure 4.1 (p. 51).

ePutnam presents a Gamma Correlation describing this relationship for each national sample.
The correlation reported here is the average of these two correlations (see p. 55).

' fPutnam reports that the correlation between age and the ISI is -.20 (significant at the
.05 level) in Britain, and .02 in Italy (p. 66). This means that in Britain the younger politicians
are more "ideological" (or. as I contend, more articulated) than the older politicians. I contend
that the Italian sample failed to show a similar relationship because it included markedly fewer
young politicians (politicians more apt to be college educated or articulate) and because its
distribution across age categories conformed more toward a "normal" distribution than did the
British sample, i.e. it contained less variance about the mean. The British sample included 19
(N891) politicians 40 years of age or younger (21%), whereas the Italian sample only included 8
(N=81) or 10%. With fewer young politicians in the Italian sample and comparably less variance
in its age distribution, the expected negative correlation between the ISI and age (expected,
that is, given that the ISI is a crude measure of articulation) was suppressed.

gPutnam does ppt_report any correlations for these variables. He merely states in a
footnote (p. 78) that he found, with the minor exception of education, “no consistent or
slilnificant patterns" between the ISI and these variables.

117

Opposition to Interest Group Politics, Authoritarianism, Age and
Education--were all similar with respect to direction of relation-
ship. If one considers sampling error (the width of the confidence
interval for Putnam's sample is .16) and the fact that correlations
based on the present study are "corrected for attenuation," then
none of the numerical comparisons suggest that the ISI and
"articulation" dimensions are measuring different things. Even
Putnam's report of "no relationship" between the ISI and Social
Class Background, Occupation, Office and Party Experience does
not constitute a problem. Some of these "zeros" probably represent
cases where, because of unreliability of measurement, he was unable
to observe the small correlations brought out in my study (my
correlations being corrected for attenuation). The Content and
Emotionalism dimensions were added to the table for contrast.
Comparing the Three Dimensions of
Ideological Thought

Table 4.13 presents correlations between the three dimensions
of ideological thought and various political, ideological, and
socio-economic variables taken from the survey. The primary message
to be derived from the examination of these correlations is that the
"content" and "emotionalism“ dimensions are important dimensions of
ideological thought in their own right. Both of these dimensions
show patterns of correlation with these variables that are different
from the pattern shown by articulation. This makes it clear that
Putnam's ISI (articulation) does ggt_account for all that can be said

about ideology. The Emotionalism dimension correlates with charged

118

TABLE 4.13.--Correlations Between the Dimensions of Ideological Thought. and Various

Political, Ideological, and Socio-Economic Variables.

 

Cognitive Style Content Emotionalism
(articulation) (system-blame) (non-emotionalism)
Political Variables
(3 Office Level .29b -.05 .19.
(471 Office Experience -.18 -.06 .02
(21 Party (Democrat) .15 .30 .15
(472 Party Experience .15 -.06 .05
(22 Ticket Splitter -.09 -.05 -.27
531 Partisan Frustration .08 -.ll -.16
534 Interest in Politics .09 .12 .12
528 Electoral Intent .27 .09 .13
529 Desire for Advancement .31 -.24 .07
530 Perceived Electoral Risk .31 -.20 .00
465 Delegate Role Orientation -.34 -.23 -.19
470 Anti-Interest Group -.17 -.18 -.31
Average Absolute Value
of the Correlations .21 .17 .13
Ideological Variables
524 Authoritarianism -.41 -.27 -.29
463 Dogmatism -.23 -.13 .00
373 Willingness to Compromise .28 .37 .43
532 Conflict Orientation .05 -.13 -.22
464 Zero-Sum Perspective .05 .02 .05
(474 Ideological Motivation -.06 .01 -.09
(32 Liberal Orientation .39 .48 .29
(533 Pro-Economic Regulation .33 .30 .09
(468) Moralistic Orientation -.21 -.Ol .06
Average Absolute Value
of the Correlations .22 .19 .17
Socio-Economic Variables
451 Age -.46 -.15 -.O7
447 Education .51 .28 .16
462 Father's Education .20 .12 .05
449 Occupation .24 .08 .11
450 Father's Occupation .18 -.02 .07
443 Urban-ness of District .02 .05 .00
Average Absolute Value
of the Correlations .27 .12 .08

 

aMeasured the same as in Table 4.11 (see p. 43).

bCorrelations (r) whose value are .18 or greater are significant at the .05 level.

cItems which number 500 and above denote clusters fOrmed by cluster analysis.

119

political variables such as Ticket Splitter (-.27), Partisan
Frustration (-.16), Anti-interest Group Politics (-.31) and
Willingness to Compromise (.43). The "content" or person-blame/
system-blame dimension correlates with other measures that tap
the content of beliefs such as Liberalism (.48), Pro-Economic
Regulation (.30), and Party (.30). Articulation correlates most
highly with those variables which center about education such as
Education (.51), Age (-.46), Father's education (.20).

The point here is that social and political variables can
be roughly classified along the same dimensions as the aspects of
ideology, i.e. as pertaining either to the emotionalism, to the
content, or to the style of political and economic life. This
parallel classification of the two sets of variables tends to locate
the larger correlations, and this prediction of the differential
pattern of correlations of the three aspects of ideology constitutes
a very strong external validation of our conceptual analysis.

Another fact to note are the high correlations between the
articulation dimension and the "socio-economic" variables. In
contrast, the three dimensions are nearly equal in strength with
respect to their overall correlations with the other "political"
and "ideological“ variables. Thus if one selects a cognitive
style dimension (in this case "articulation") as the definitive
criterion of ideological thought, one stands to distinguish as
much between elites (who are more educated and articulate) and
non-elites as one would between ideologues and non-ideologues.

This elite/non-elite distinction would not emerge if one relied

120

on the "content“ dimension and would be particularly unlikely to

emerge if one relied solely on the "emotionalism" dimension.

Chapter IV--Footnotes

(All but one reference to Putnam are based on his book:
Robert D. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1971). The exception refers to his summary
article: Robert D. Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture:
The Case of Ideology," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXV
(September 1971), pp. 651-681.

2
3

Putnam, p. 8.

Ibid., p. 35.

4

Ibid., . 33.

5
6

Ibid., 32.

Ibid., . 40.

UU'U'U

7

Ibid., . 42.

8Ibid., p. 34.

9An explanation of the technique of factor analysis can
be found in Richard L. Gorsuch, Factor Analysis (Philadelphia:
w. B. Saunders Co., 1974): and R. J. Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

loPutnam, p. 43.
1]Ibid., p. 43.
12Ibid., p. 45.

13As we interpret Putnam, the Generalizer-Particularizer
Index measures both element No. 2: presence of an explicit, con-
sciously held belief system, and No. 7: concern with abstract
principles, not concrete interests. The Inductive-Deductive
Thinking Index measures element No. 1: presence of a comprehensive,
consistent, deductively organized belief system and (in part) No. 6:
guided by a philosophy of history and/or social theory that is
applied to everyday questions and issues. The Historical Context
and Tradition as criterion indexes are also (seemingly) measures
of element No. 6. The Discussion Moralized Index supposedly
measures the part of element No. 5 which refers to a belief system
that distorts or oversimplifies reality. The Reference to Named

121

122

ideology Index measures the part of element No. 2 which refers to
an "explicit" belief system. The Reference to Future Utopia Index
measures element No. 8: being future oriented or utopian in
belief. Ibid., pp. 32-41.

'4Ibid.. pp. 35-41.

15All enclosed page references are to Putnam, The Beliefs
of Politicians except the reference to pp. 667-668 which refers
to his summary article in the American Political Science Review.
See Footnote 1.

16Putnam refers to ideologues as "dogmatic" at various
places in his book but never clearly defines his interpretation
of the concept. He equates dogmatism with "authoritarianism"
(p. 56), "fanaticism" (p. 35), "intolerance" (pp. 57 and 74) and
"moral absolutism" (p. 56), but never relates it specifically with
the condition of being "closed-minded." In light of his interest
in political (cognitive) style, this is surprising. His Moral
Absolutism Index (p. 55) is a weak measure of dogmatic thinking
but he never treats it as if it were an important component of
ideological thought. Ibid.

17This correlation is derived from the standard formula
for the correlation of linear combinations. See Jum C Nunnally,
Psychometric Theory(New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1967), pp. 150-
151.

 

18Putnam, p. 45.
191511.. pp. 39-42 and 45n.

2°Ibid.. pp. 34-35.
21

22
23
24

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 37.
Ibid.

Ibid., p. 36.

25A sample correlation "corrected for attenuation" of 1.13
is not considered implausible for the following reason. In a
population, a correlation “corrected for attenuation" is a corre-
lation between the item true scores, i.e. the actual correlation
given perfect reliability of measurement. With sample data, how-
ever, a correlation "corrected for attenuation" is only an
estimate of the actual sample correlation. This estimate is
Based on the reliability . . . of the items being correlated. In
the case footnoted, the reliability coefficients for the Generalizer-
Particularizer Index and the Inductive-Deductive Thinking items were

123

generated by putting the coder judgment Tau Betas (see Footnote 19)
for these items through the Spearman-Brown Prophecy formula. As

an estimate, the sample correlation "corrected for attenuation"
possesses sampling error. The amount of error is calculated by
increasing the sample "standard error" (which is dependent on sample
size) in proportion to the increase in size of the correlation
after "correction for attenuation." In the case we are concerned
with, Putnam's original correlation (r) of .68 was increased 80%

to 1.13. The standard error (.06) is thus increased 80% to .11.
This means that, given an actual sample correlation of 1.00, there
is a 95% chance that the sample estimate of this correlation-~i.e.
the correlation "corrected for attenuation" will fall between .78
and 1.22 (the "confidence interval" for a .05 level of significance
being plus or minus two standard errors).

26Putnam reports the following Tau Beta correlations as his
measures of index reliability: Generalizer-Particularizer (.44),
Inductive-Deductive Thinking (.40), Reference to a Named Ideology
(.50), and Reference to a Future Utopia (.50). Ibid., p. 39 and
Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture," p. 660.

27Ibid., p. 46.

281bid., p. 78n.

291bid.. pp. 73 and 78n.
30

31

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 45.

321bid., p. 46.

33Ibid., pp. 45-46.

34Paul J. Gillie, "A Simplified Formula for Measuring
Abstraction in Writing,“ Journal of Applied Psychology, 41 (1957),
pp. 214-217.

351bid., p. 217.

36The 13 dimensions measured do not presume to be an
exhaustive list of belief system dimensions. Other issues might
suggest other dimensions or dichotomies and other researchers
might have included dimensions different from those selected for
this study. x

37JohnE. Hunter and Stanley H. Cohen, "PACKAGE," Educational
and Psychological Measurement, 29 (1969), 697-700.

38For a detailed explanation of cluster analysis see Gorsuch,
pp. 5-6, 73-84, 186-178, 240-241.

124

39For practical purposes this is only a 90 x 90 matrix since
three of the items produced no variance, i.e. were coded "not
mentioned“ for all 118 respondents.

40Darryle Thomander, John E. Hunter, and Richard L. Marshall,
"A Failure to Find Cognitive Styles in Problem Solving Behavior,“
paper presented at the meetings of the Midwestern Society of Multi-
variate Experimental Psychology, Chicago, Illinois, 12 May, 1973;
L. J. Cronbach, Essentials of Psychological Testing, 3rd ed. (New
York: Harper and Row, 1970): A. J. Davis, ”Cognitive Style: Method-
ological and Developmental Considerations," Child Development, 42
(1971), 1447-1459; V. A. Thomy, Jr., "Some Relationships Between
Anxiety, Cognitive Style, and Problem Solving" (Master's Thesis,
Michigan State University, 1972): Richard E. Nisbett and Linda
Temoshok, "Is There an 'External' Cognitive Style?," Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 33 (1976), 36-47; and Peter
Suedfeld and A. Dennis Rank, "Revolutionary Leaders: Long-Term
Success as a Function of Changes in Conceptual Complexity," Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 34 (1976), 169-178.

4(In terms of the a posteriori cluster analysis, these
items were dispersed in the following manner. Items 281 and 284
were placed in the "retribution" cluster. Item 280 was assigned
to the "environmental" cluster. Item 285 was dispatched to the
"non-personal" cluster and item 283 to the "residual" cluster.

42The cluster correlations, part-whole correlations and
second-order cluster correlations relevant to this analysis can be
found in Table 0.3 of Appendix 0.

43Evidence of this "parallelism" is offered in Table 0.4 of
Appendix D. This table shows the similarity between the three
dimensions of ideological thought which were "constructed" on the
basis of the content analysis, and the three dimensions formed by
the cluster analysis of the crime discussion clusters, with respect
to how they correlate with the individual crime discussion clusters.
They are similar in every respect except that, because the three
dimensions (clusters) formed in the second-order cluster analysis
incorporate more variables (and thus more variance) the magnitude
of the correlations between these dimensions and the crime discussion
clusters are relatively higher than those between the "constructed"
dimensions and these clusters.

44While this suggests that the person-b1ame/system-blame
variable is causally intermediate between articulation and emotion-
alism, later analysis will show that this is not true (see Chapter V).

45Ideological motivation was measured in both studies by an
index formed from items found in the list of possible answers to the
(open ended) question: What do you find most appealing about
politics?“ (See Putnam, pp. 47, 247 & 248.) These items--1isted

125

under the heading "Ideological"--assessed whether the respondent
mentioned "fighting for the interests of a group, class, or party"
(or in my study “theipeople," “the little man," etc.), "fighting
for ideals, a program, a cause," or, in our study, "the chance to
expound a certain philosophy or point of view" (see Appendix B,

p. 197). The problem here is whether fighting for the interests
of a group (e.g. the vested interests, labor, the little man, etc.)
or for "ideals," a cause, etc. necessarily constitutes ideological
motivation." Even ignoring the problem of the meaning of "ideologi-
cal," with politicians of different types of countries and (in my
study) different levels of government responding to the question,
its impossible to know what is really being measured by this "hit
and miss" type of index.

Political Distrust was measured in both studies by an index
composed of the following two items: "Most politicians can be
trusted to do what they think is best for the country," (460) and
"People who go into public office usually think of the good of
the people more than of their own" (461). Both were reversed for
inclusion in the index. The problem here is that neither statement
clearly measures "distrust." The first statement (seemingly a
question more appropriately asked of a Congressman or parliamentarian)
is confused by the phrase "what they think" and its reference to
"most politicans" makes it unnecessarily vague. The second statement
appears to measure "political altruism" as much as trust. I believe
that the correlation of .22 between this index and my “articulation"
dimension indicates that the more sophisticated "articulates"
reject the naive idea that politicians consciously work "for the
country" or to "please the people" rather than for their own inter-
ests.

The other comparisons are based on items on which both
samples would respond with little difference of interpretation.
Putnam measured Left/Right Extremism with a five-point scale
ranging from Far Left to Far Right and I measured it with an index
based on item 3l--the five point Liberal/Conservative scale (473).
On all other comparison variables the questions or indexes used
were the same for both studies.

CHAPTER V

PATH MODEL OF AN IDEOLOGICAL
BELIEF SYSTEM

From his review of the literature on "ideology," Putnam
composed a list of 14 elements or characteristics that have been
linked to the concept of "ideologue."1 Our study contains variables
which measure 10 of those 14 elements2 and thus provided an oppor-
tunity to see just how well these characteristics hang together.

In addition, we added two measures of ideological "content," a
dimension which Putnam failed to include in his analysis. Our
study has a unique advantage over previous studies in that all of
these variables were measured on the same set of persons. Most
earlier studies concentrated on only the one or two characteristics
that a particular author had seen as related to ideological thought.
Because nearly all of the variables related to the concept were
measured, we were able to go beyond looking at single correlations
between the variables and construct a path model of related
correlations.3 Thus we were able to generate a tentative picture
of the direction of causal influence between these characteristics
of ideological thought that is rooted in empirical evidence rather
than intuitive belief.

Two general models were laid out beforehand: one in which

the emotional variables are antecedent to the ideological variables,

126

127

and one in which the intellectual variables take causal precedence.
In view of the near unanimity of prior writing supportive of the
first model (which assumes that emotional commitment generates
articulate and rigid belief systems), the model in which intellectual
variables are causally prior was largely set up to serve as a
stalking horse.

The findings of the path analysis were quite surprising.
None of the models in which the ideological variables are the
product of emotional variables fit the data, i.e. in none of the
models did the reproduced correlations derived from the path
coefficients consistently approximate or match the observed corre-
lations to within sampling error (see Appendix E pages ). This
result directly contradicted our own prior beliefs. Instead, we
found empirical fit for models in which articulation (the strongest
intellectual variable) is causal antecedent to the emotional
variables (i.e. flexibility, authoritarianism, emotionalism toward
crime). Inserting articulation as the key antecedent variable,
however, did not entirely account for the correlations among these
variables. Instead there was a pattern of residual correlations
which suggested that some other antecedent variable existed, one
which would explain articulation, as well as education, flexibility
of thought, liberalism, etc. Since these variables are all related
to the quality of cognitive functioning, the obvious hypothesis
was that the common antecedent variable was respondent intelligence.

Because intellectual ability never explicitly entered the

hypotheses that generated this study, no measure of intelligence

128

was available for the analysis of the data. Thus intelligence was
entered into the path models as an unobserved variable. The model
which fit the data placed intelligence as a causal antecedent of
articulation, but assumed that (with the exception of the Office
Level variable4) articulation had no direct causal effect on any
other variable in the model--ergo, the next few sentences do not
pertain to the correlation between 105 and Office Level. Conse-
quently, the correlation between intelligence and any other
variable was assumed to be directly proportional to the correlation
between that variable and articulation. These correlations are

related by the equation:

rx,ART = rx,IQ ° rIQ,ART

OY‘

rX,ART

rx,IQ ' r
IQ,ART

where IQ is intelligence, ART is articulation, and X is any other
variable. Thus for such a model, there is only one unknown number
which must be estimated, the correlation between articulation and
intelligence (rIQ ART). After a little trial and error, the value
rIQ,ART = .83 seemed to give reasonable fit to the data in the
sense that with that value a great many partial correlations became
approximately 0 and hence a great many potential links in the path

model could be eliminated.

129

The remaining path coefficients were estimated using the
"OLS" method, i.e. the coefficients for the antecedent variables
for any given variable being the beta weights for the multiple (if
necessary) regression of that variable onto its antecedents.

The correlations between the variables in the path model
are presented in Table 5.1a. These correlations have been "corrected
for attenuation" so that the betas or path coefficients encumbent
upon them are not contaminated by error of measurement. The path
coefficients are presented in the path diagram in Figure 5.1. The
reproduced or "predicted" correlations are presented in Table 5.1b
and the residual differences between the observed and the predicted

path model correlations are presented in Table 5.1c.

Verification and Validation

TWo issues are critical to the consideration of any corre-
lation matrix: the issue of sampling error and the issue of
measurement. The issue of measurement is primary. Are the
variables labeled "authoritarianism," "liberalism," etc. really
the same variables as those similarly labeled by previous investi-
gators? In part this is a matter that can be determined by comparing
the content of the items which make up the variable in this study
with the content of the items in other studies. However, in this
study as in most studies there is only a rough similarity in content
and a certain gap exists in judging whether the variables are really
equivalent. This gap is filled by statistical and empirical tests

of equivalence. The most important of these is the concept which

7

Cronbach and Meehl (1955) labeled “construct validity." They noted

‘130

TABLE 5.1.--Path Model Correlations.a

 

IQ LIB FLEX ED ART YOUTH SYS AUTH EMOT LEVEL

 

a. Path Model Observed
Correlations (N = 117)

10: 100
Liberalism: 47 100
Flexibility: 62 20 100
Education: 61 35 24 100
Articulation: 83 39 52 51 100
Youthfulness: 54 17 ll 31 46 100
System-Blame: 50 47 57 28 43 15 100
Anti-Authoritarian: 49 19 23 44 41 26 27 100

Non-Emotional: 18 29 61 16 15 O7 44 29 100
Office Level: 26 00 17 34 29 ~09 -04 29 19 100

b. Path Model Predicted
Correlations

IQ: 100
Liberalism: 47 100
Flexibility: 43 20 100
Education: 61 29 26 100
Articulation: 83 39 36 51 100
Youthfulness: 54 25 23 33 45 100
System-Blame: 38 47 56 23 32 21 100
Anti-Authoritarian: 48 23 21 43 4O 26 19 100

Non-Emotional: 33 19 61 22 28 18 43 27 100
Office-Level: 26 12 11 33 29 -10 10 3O 11 100

c. Residual Differences
Between the Observed
and the Predicted ath
Model Correlations

IQ: --°
Liberalism: O --
Flexibility: 19 0C --
Education: Oc 6 -2 --
Articulation: OC 0 16 O --
Youthfulness: 0c -8 -12 -2 1 --
System-Blame: 12 Oc 1C 5 11 -6 --
Anti-Authoritarian: l -4 2 1 l O 8 --

Non-Emotional: -15 10 O -6 -13 ll 1 2 --
Office-Level: ' 0c -12 6 1 0 1 -14 -l 8 --

aThe correlations are based on the following items: Liberalism (32),
Flexibility (527), Education (447), Articulation (523), Youthfulness (451),
SysteméBlame (525), Anti-Authoritarian (524), Non-Emotional (518), and Office-

Level (3).

bThe standard error of a correlation based on 117 observations is
approximately .09.

cThese differences are forced to be null by the model construction
Process.

131

.quoz spam ~m>m4 muwmwo use amopomuH yo mcopmcmewoii.p.m wcamwm

em.i

eo_oepsoeoe<

 

Fm>m4 mm.

ooeeeo em.

 

:o_pmucmweo
copgmuweo2p3<
-eee<

          

mucmmwFqucH

 

seepeeexo_a
Peoee_Poe

mswgu neoZoh
cowuoucmweo
pmco_uosmi=oz

 

 

mewgo o»
co_pop:mweo
msopmismumAm

 

    
 

coppopcmpc

Peeoe_4

o

 

132

that if two variables are to be measures of the same thing, then
they should have a similar pattern of correlations with other
variables. Thus the validity of the measurement in the present
study can be tested empirically. Do the correlations between
variables in this study match those which have been found in other
studies? In particular, we can have much more confidence in
assigning the label "intelligence" to the unmeasured variable if
its correlations with other variables match those found in other
studies where intelligence was measured.

The issue of sampling error is a simple one: are some of
the correlations in the model a matter of statistical fluke? This
question cannot be answered in cases where there is no prior liter-
ature. But many of the variables in this model have appeared in
other studies and the correlations from those studies can be compared
with those here. Similarity between studies tends to statistically
verify the results of both.

The issues of both verification and validation are thus
served by the same operation; checking the literature for correspond-
ing correlations in other studies. A search of this sort was con-
ducted for all the ideological variables in the path diagram and

the results of this search will be presented in the next section.

The Theoretical Meaningypf the Model
The numbers in a path diagram are numbers which represent
the relations between variables. These relations in turn are only
abstractly related to the actual mental processes which take place

inside the heads of men who are thinking about, emotionally reacting

133

to, or being influenced by events within their environment. It is
the purpose of this section to provide a tentative explanation of
the path diagram by suggesting concrete causal processes which migpp_
cause the variables to be related as they are. The most important
processes are the socialization of political office-holders, their
recruitment into office, and the influence of IQ on the development
of various cognitive dispositions and attitudes.

One hypothesis which weaves through many of the discussions
below is the hypothesis that more intelligent people are more likely
to exhibit independence of thought. We derive this hypothesis from
the following scenario of how this independence of thought is
developed. Picture two young boys, one bright and one dull. Over
the course of growing up, both have ample opportunity to contrast
their thinking with that of others. The bright boy is typically
correct in his reasoning about things and is often shown to be
correct even when disagreeing with his parents and teachers. On
the other hand, the dull boy does not form his own opinions very
often and is typically wrong when he does. He is virtually never
right in those cases in which he disagrees with a parent or teacher.
We believe that the natural concommitant of such experience is that
the bright boy will grow up trusting his own thought and will be
prepared to disregard the "conventional wisdom" of his adult peers,
while the dull boy will grow up with a tendency to believe that
others know best and will develop a tendency to trust any authority

which does not directly bring him pain.

'134

Intelligence and Liberal Orientation

Our explanation of the correlation8 between 10 and Liberal
Orientation is that because bright persons usually possess an
independence of mind which facilitates the examination and incorpo-
ration of liberal ideas. Persons who come to realize that they have
the ability to think through and resolve problems are naturally
disposed against the simple acceptance of solutions that conform
to the conventional wisdom. One piece of evidence in support of
the idea that intelligent persons possess greater independence of
mind is the correlation (r) of -.34 between Articulation and Delegate
Role Orientation (see Chapter 4, Table 4.13). The Delegate Role
Orientation item reads as follows: "A representative ought to work
for what his constituents want even though this may not always agree
with his personal views." The correlation indicates that articulate
(intelligent) office-holders are less likely to yield their own
personal views to those of their constituents than are less
articulate office-holders. This willingness to express opposition
toward a popular tenet of representative government demonstrates a
relatively well developed independence of mind.

Bright independent, thinkers are also more apt to take up a
liberal orientation for philosophical reasons. They are more likely
to understand our country's heritage and accept the American cultural
bias in favor of "equality among men." Consequently, they will more
readily support the cause of the poor and non-powerful against the
rich and powerful than less intelligent men. Hofstadter notes this

tendency in his study of anti-intellectualism in America. He states

135

that "of all the classes which could be called in any sense privi-
ledged, . . . [the intellectual class] . . . has shown the largest
and most consistent concern for the well-being of the classes which

"9

lie below it in the social scale. Of course, some bright persons

will argue that the only way to help the poor is by supporting the
status quo and protecting against chaos. These persons constitute
a relatively small group of articulate conservatives such as
William F. Buckley who hearken back to the reasoning of Edmund Burke.

The association between intelligence and liberalism has also .
been made by Adorno et a1. (1950), Hofstadter (1962), Lipset (1959),
and McClosky (1958). Adorno et a1. reports that "on the average,
'liberals' . . . have been shown to be slightly more inte11igent.”0
and Hofstadter, on the basis of his study of American anti-
intellectualism, states with confidence that “from the Progressive
era onward, the political commitment of the majority of (our) intel-
lectual leadership . . . has been to causes that might be variously
described as liberal . . , progressive, or radical."H Lipset
documEnts this fact and makes this finding the focus of his study
on American intellectuals.12

McClosky also presents data which clearly links IQ with
liberalism. In his study of 1082 Minnesota residents, he found that
"conservatism is not the preferred doctrine of the intellectual
elite or of the more intelligent segments of the population, but
the reverse."13 On the basis of an Education Scale, an Awareness

Scale (which tested a person's knowledge about and "grasp" of the

social process, past and present) and an Intellectuality Scale

136

(which assesses "the degree to which intellectual habits have been
formed and are perceived as attractive"), he concludes that liberal
beliefs are found most frequently among the informed, the most
educated, and so far as he could determine, the most intelligent.14

Our correlation between IQ and Liberalism is therefore in accordance
with other research.

Liberalism and the System-Blame
Orientation to Crime

There is a logical as well as philosophical connection between
liberalism and the system blame orientation to crime. Liberalism is
largely concerned with the inequality between individuals that is
the product of inequality within the economic system of society.
Similarly, the system blame orientation suggests that much of crime
is the product of the criminal's reaction to his unfavorable position
within the social and economic status hierarchy. Thus it seems
likely that a person who is liberal would eventually come to believe
in the system blame model as a matter of thought and argument.

However, this need not be the only process which would produce
a link such as that found in the data. The philosophical link would
also have been present for the person's parents. Those legislators
in the sample who are liberal because their parents were liberal
may also be system blame oriented because their parents were. That
is, many liberal parents would have already made the connection
between these two doctrines and hence would pass the two along to

their children as a package.

137

There is another causal chain which could link liberal legis-
lators to the system blame orientation, one which relates to their
intelligence and independence of thought. Intelligent, independent
thinkers are much less likely to obey moral prescriptions simply
because their elders or some other authority tell them to. Thus,
as teenagers, they would have been more likely to engage in such
illegal activities as smoking pot, stealing hubcaps, etc. If so,
then they would of necessity be more open to the idea that crime
might be a transient or situational act on the part of a person who
is not normally a criminal. That is, their independence of mind is
likely to have lead them to commit crimes themselves at one point
in their lives after which they have proceeded with a crime free
lifestyle.

This scenario may be reversed in order to understand con-
servatives. Conservatives are committed to a philosophy which rewards
individual responsibility within the context of economic affairs and
are thus likely to adopt the same stance toward criminal behavior.
That is, a conservative will believe that "a criminal earns his
just reward when he is punished." This logical connection might
be made via the person's own thoughts, or it might have been made
previously by his parents and been passed along to him as a package.
Furthermore, conservatives are more likely to believe in the wisdom
of both their parents and other authorities and hence are more likely
to have avoided any teenage illegal activity. They would also have
been less likely to even interact with young people who engaged in

illegal acts. Thus conservatives are likely to have always been

138

completely cut off from crime and criminals and would hence find it
easier to believe that all crime is "evil" and that all crime is

committed by evil persons.

Intelligence and Political Flexibility

The model suggests that liberals would be no more flexible
than conservatives except for the fact that liberals are higher in
10.15

Bright persons are more politically flexible (i.e. more willing to

It is intelligence, therefore, that produces mental flexibility.

listen to reason and to consider compromise) because their independ-
ence of mind encourages them to consider all of the behavioral
alternatives in any given situation. They are more apt to rely

on "reason" than authority in determining the proper course of
action and are not irrevocably wed to any particular solution or
approach.

The empirical evidence that 10 is correlated with mental
flexibility is varied. Rokeach provides support for the hypothesis
in reporting a correlation of -.31 (uncorrelated for attenuation)
between a "rough measure of intelligence" (the American Council on
Education Test) and the Gough-Sanford Rigidity Scale.16 His
correlation is based on a sample of 61 introductory psychology
students at Michigan State University. McClosky also reports
findings which confirm the relationship, yet his evidence is
indirect. In his study "Conservatism and Personality" (cited

above), intelligence is linked to the doctrine of liberalism and

then liberalism is linked with mental flexibility. The data indicates

139

that only 33% of the presumably more intelligent liberals (N=151)

can be classified as "high“ in mental rigidity, but that 70% of

the less-intelligent, conservatives (N=l44) can be so classified.17
McNemar also provides indirect support of the hypothesis.

He reports positive correlations between measures of intelligence

1118

and measures of "creativity. "Creativity" in his work is

usually defined as the ability to find novel solutions to problems
and is believed by many to be closely linked to the ability to break
set and consider unusual possibilities. Thus creativity seems very
close to our concept of "flexibility." One study examined by McNemar
(based on a sample of 7648 fifteen-year-olds) reported a correlation
between intelligence and creativity of .67 (.80 when corrected for

19

attenuation. On the basis of this and many other studies, he

concluded that "having a high IQ is pp; a guarantee of being crea-
tive, . . . (but) having a low IQ means creativity is impossible."20
Our study suggests that the same would hold with regard to mental

flexibility.

Political Flexibility and the System-Blame
Orientation to Crime

The flexible person's inclination to consider all behavioral
alternatives leads him to accept newer, more advanced explanations
of phenomena. The link between Political Flexibility and the
"system-blame" explanation of crime confirms this thesis. The
typical child is first taught the "person-blame" explanation of

21

crime, i.e. that there are persons who are by nature evil, that

these persons commit crime, and that the duty of the authorities is

140

to capture these persons and lock them up. Only later is the child
exposed to the more advanced ideas about the factors (personality
problems, environment, etc.) which promote deviance. Thus if the
child is to adopt the system blame position, then he must ppppgg_
away from his person blame beliefs. The flexible child (or young
adult) is much more likely to change his beliefs than is the rigid
person, and is hence more likely to adopt the system blame orientation.
The rigid person, on the other hand, is likely to stick by the theory
of crime which he learned first, and regardless of the environmental

stimuli he is exposed to, is more likely to hold to a person blame

orientation.
Political Flexibility and a Non-Emotional
Orientation Toward Crime

A flexible person is likely to generate as many ideas as he
can to explain any given situation. In particular then, he is likely
to generate a number of different ideas as to why some other person
might commit a crime. Since he generates a number of ideas, he is
more likely to come up with a rational explanation of the criminal
act. Personal violence is rarely the motivating source of criminal
behavior, i.e. violence offers little reward for the criminal and
hence a person who views the criminal as rational will confine his
worries to acts against property rather than worry about personal
injury. This narrowing of perceived vulnerability to crime means
that the person who views the criminal as rational will have a much

lower expectation of being a victim, and if he is victimized, he will

141

perceive himself as merely losing belongings rather than life or
limb. Thus he will be much less emotional about crime and
criminals.

The rigid person tends to view the criminal in the terms
in which he first learned about them, i.e. in person blame terms
which assumes the criminal to be "evil." Since there are no
bounds on the "evilness" of criminals comparable to those deter-
mined by the assumption of rationality, the rigid person has no
reason to believe that a criminal might not desire personal injury.
Thus a rigid person who is wedded to the idea of the criminal as
evil will logically worry more about the safety of himself and his
family and will therefore be far more emotional in his attitude
toward crime.

A unique aspect of the path diagram is the fact that it
posits mental flexibility and authoritarianism as determinants of
emotionalism rather than vice versa. This finding is at odds with
Adorno et al., Rokeach, etc., and therefore, constitutes a
particularly interesting and informative discovery; a discovery
which will be analyzed in the discussion section presented after
our explanation of the model.

System-Blame Orientation to Crime and a Non-
Emotional Orientation Toward Crime

The correlation between System-Blame Orientation to Crime
and Non-Emotional Orientation stems largely from the fact that
Political Flexibility is a common causal antecedent to both. If
a person is flexible, then he is apt to be non-emotional because

with his ability to understand why people behave as they do, he will

142

generally see people as rational and generally law-abiding. He will
not feel personally threatened by any "criminal element" and though

he may be alarmed at the increasing incidence of crime, his reaction
will be to ponder new solutions to the problem rather than to panic

or become emotionally upset.

The small direct path coefficient from system blame orienta-
tion to non-emotionalism (.11) might stem from a difference in the
type of crime which the person associates with the term “criminal."
the system blame advocate tends to see crime as stemming from the
criminal's deprived economic background. Thus he thinks of "crime"
as theft. On the other hand, the person blame advocate is more
likely to think of crime as stemming from the "evilness" of criminals

and hence is more likely to think of "crime“ as personal injury.

Determinants of Authoritarian Beliefs

The model suggests that there are two determinants of an
anti-authoritarian disposition; intelligence and education. Edu-
cation has a direct impact on authoritarianism whereas intelligence
contributes to authoritarianism in two ways; first, as a direct
causal factor in its own right and second, indirectly through its

impact on education.

Intelligence and Authoritarianism

As was the case with Liberal Orientation and Political
Flexibility, the contribution made by intelligence is related to
the mental independence usually exercised by intelligent persons.

Brighter persons are more likely to think for themselves and more

143

likely to reject authority (i.e. the opinions and beliefs of authority
figures) as being trustworthy in terms of always providing correct
information or making correct judgments or decisions. The fact that
intellectuals were among the first to question the credibility of
Nixon's explanations about his involvement in the Watergate coverup

is one example of this distrust of authority. The correlation of

-.34 between education and authoritarianism also supports this thesis.

Correspondingly, persons of lesser intelligence are apt to
defer more easily to authority or authority figures. If, from
experience, a person learns that in most situations there are
always smarter persons than himself, he will be inclined to think
that what is needed in the world is adherence to great and gifted
leaders. A person who is used to following is not as threatened
by authority as a person who is accustomed to leading or thinking
things out for himself.

A review of the literature reveals a good deal of other
evidence that 10 is correlated with authoritarianism i.e. that
persons high in ID will tend to be anti-authoritarian. Adorno
et a1. cite eight correlations between 10 and the F scale which
range from -.13 to -.48 (average correlation = -.24).22 Four of
the correlations were based on a sample of 342 Maritime School
Men, and the remaining four on a sample of 104 veterans. Three
different types of intelligence tests were used in the reported
analyses.

Christie also examines the relationship between 10 and

authoritarianism and reports a correlation of -.48 between these

144

23

variables, which is based on his study of 182 Army recruits. He

points out that, on the basis of his and Adorno et al.'s evidence,
there is an "increased (negative) correlation found between intel-
ligence measures and the F scale scores as the range of intelligence

"24 He estimates that the correlation between

measures increases.
IQ and F scores would, for a representative cross-sectional sample,
range between -.50 and -.60. Other studies which report a negative
relationship between IQ and authoritarianism are Hollander (1954)
(who reports a correlation of -.21 based on a sample of 268 Naval
Flight School Cadets who were scored on the F scale and college
level American Council on Education test),25 and Cohn (1957).26
Intelligence, Education, and Anti-
Authoritarian Orientation

The path leading from ID to education and from education to
anti-authoritarianism can be explained quite easily. Bright people
get more education and education instills a distrust for authority.
Education (especially American education) teaches democracy, and
thereby inculcates within the educated a respect for the quality
of man and a belief in individual rights and freedom. Students
elect their leaders and discuss classroom issues which are often
decided by majority vote. An ingrained resentment toward arbitrary
decisions is fostered. In college, where many faculty members openly
encourage students to think for themselves and to distrust authority,
the penchant for anti-authoritarian attitudes is developed to an
even greater extent. This relationship between education and anti-

authoritarianism has been substantiated in literally hundreds of

145

studies.27 The .44 correlation (Table 5.1) and the beta of .22 in
the path diagram are consistent with these findings. Furthermore,
Christie (1954) not only reports correlations substantiating the
present findings for intelligence and education separately, he also
reports partial correlations between IQ and the F-scale with edu-
cation held constant (-.20) and between education and the F-scale
with 10 held constant (-.20) which confirm the structure posited

for all three variables in the present study.28

Anti-Authoritarian Orientation and Non-Emotional
Orientation Toward Crime

The correlation of .29 between "anti-authoritarianism" and
"non-emotionalism" is accounted for in part by the fact that IQ is
antecedent to both of these variables. If IQ were held constant,
then the correlation between Authoritarianism and Emotionalism
would drop from .29 to the level determined solely by the direct
link which is .14. The same effect would occur if the link between
IQ and Emotionalism were eliminated by controlling for the mediating
variables of Flexibility (i.e. Rigidity) and Liberalism (i.e.
Conservatism). Our explanation for this is that most authoritarians
place a high premium on the maintenance of social order and hence
feel hostility toward anyone who threatens this order. For this
reason they would be hostile towards criminals. Evidence of this
tendency in authoritarians is reported in Adorno et a1. (1950),
Christie (1954) and Roberts and Jessor (1958).29

The path diagram shows that emotionalism with respect to

crime is best predicted by assessing a person's mental flexibility

146

rather than his tendency to be authoritarian. This is compatible
to Giovanni Sartori's thesis that emotionalism is more directly
related to mental inflexibility than to authoritarian belief, i.e.

30 The diagram also suggests that, without differences

dogmatism.
in IQ, authoritarians would be no more likely to be politically
inflexible than non-authoritarians. The partial correlation between
"anti-authoritarianism" and "political flexibility" with IQ held

31 The observed correlation between these

constant is .03.
variables simply reflects the fact that differences in IQ

produces common differences in each.

Authoritarianism and Office Level

The correlation of -.29 between Anti-Authoritarianism and
Office Level indicates that the number of authoritarians declines
“as office level increases. This confirms Lasswell's (1954) prediction
that authoritarians would not be found in high office.32 However,
despite the age of this hypothesis and its wide citation, there
are apparently no studies in the previous literature which bear
directly on this hypothesis. There is a related finding in the
study of lobbyists conducted by Milbrath and Klein (1962).33 They
found a correlation of -.08 between the F-scale (a measure of
Authoritarianism) and the holding of political office. There are
at least two possible explanations for such a finding.

Lasswell (1954) derived his hypothesis from a psychoanalytic
model of the authoritarian personality which he borrowed from Adorno

et al. In this model, the authoritarian is rigidly wedded to a

147

clear-cut (usually hierarchically arranged) social structure because
with so much anxiety, any uncertainty threatens to overwhelm his
defenses and unleash his pent up anti-social impulses (i.e. un-
conscious aggression or rage). Since the essence of legislative

life is an uncertain bargaining and lobbying process, Lasswell
predicted that authoritarians would be unable to cope with the
resultant anxiety produced in such an environment. Thus though

some might enter the legislature, they would drop out before they
would attain high office.

A second explanation can be generated without any need to
hypothesize that authoritarians are psychologically deficient. One
need only consider their values and preferences in life style.
Authoritarians believe that human behavior only becomes efficient
and socially oriented if it is conducted within a system of clearly
defined personal responsibility. They are likely to characterize
the constant social interaction of legislative life as "useless
chit-chat" and are likely to be repulsed by the "waste and
inefficiency" of bargaining and lobbying procedures. Thus it would
not be long before they would want to return to or find some other
environment which better fits their value system. In a nutshell,
authoritarians are boot-polishers and not glad-handers; they are
bosses and not mediators; and thus they do not fit in a legislative

context.

The present data cannot distinguish between these two

explanations.

148

Intelligence and Articulation

The reason for the high correlation between 10 and
Articulation is straight forward. Intelligent persons possess the
mental capability to manipulate and organize words and ideas in a
relatively easy fashion. Consequently, as they are exposed to
fbrmal and informal educational experiences, they develop the mental
and verbal skills necessary, to speak in an abstract, organized, and
comprehensive manner to a much greater extent than persons who are
not as intelligent. The fact that most IQ tests contain a verbal
skills component (e.g. the Differential Aptitudes Test (DAT), the
Primary Mental Abilities Test (PMA), the Wechsler Intelligence
Scale for Adults34) also acknowledges the presumably high (yet
less then perfect) correlation between IQ and articulation.

What is interesting about the placement of Articulation in
the path diagram is the fact that education is not posited as a
mediating variable between IQ and Articulation. This means that
when 10 is held constant, the partial correlation between Education
and Articulation is O. This surprising result may be accounted for
by the following theory.

There are three things which are required before a person
can generate an articulate discussion of a given topic. The person
must have either knowledge (true or false) or some theory about the
topic, the person must have the vocabulary to express his ideas,
and the person must be able to organize his thoughts in a systematic
and logical manner. Consider first the acquisition of the knowledge

required to make a statement about the topic. Knowledge can be

149

acquired either through formal education or through such informal
processes as personal experience, leisure reading (newsmagazines,
science fiction, novels, etc.), or television. Which of these
processes predominates would presumably depend on the topic. A

"35 would probably

topic such as "the labelling theory of deviance
only be acquired in a formal and advanced course in sociology or
some related field and knowledge about this theory would thus be
correlated with amount of education. However, the topic of crime
is a popular one. Many elements of police and legal work have been
meticulously and vociferously presented in television police
stories. In addition, other criminal cases such as the Manson
murders often generate considerable technical discussion of

issues related to crime in the nightly news. Thus knowledge of
crime is easily obtained through informal channels and will thus

be relatively uncorrelated with education.

What about vocabulary? Any person familiar with standardized
tests such as the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) can supply
bushels of data to show dramatic evidence of increased vocabulary
produced by the experience of formal post-high school education.

But what is the nature of that vocabulary: To a considerable extent
it consists of the conceptual terms of the various fields of know-
ledge, e.g. biological terms such as "endocrine," political terms
such as "constituency," etc. If a topic requires such words for a
discussion, then articulation on such a topic would be correlated
with differences in amount of formal education. But what of a topic

such as crime? If men were to consider some of the theories put

150

forth in current criminology, then a high level of familiarity with
the terms used in criminology would be required before the correlation
would eventuate. None of the legislators in our sample, however,
expressed awareness of these theories. Most of the discussions of
crime were pitched at a traditional level of knowledge and hence
used vocabulary which is readily available in newsmagazines such
as those which are mostly read by the men in this sample. Thus,
the specialized vocabulary which is the product of a high degree
of education were not required or present in these discussions.

What about the ability of persons to systematically
organize their thoughts? Are there professional experiences which
might promote such activity as forcefully as does formal education?
The occupations which most obviously provide such experience are
those which require a good deal of public speaking, e.g. elected
public officials, professors, etc. Similarly, businessmen who
write memos and reports, lawyers who write briefs, etc., are also
apt to develop organization of thought. Since most men in politics
are from communication-oriented professions, there is no reason to
suppose that they would require the experience afforded by formal
education in order to have acquired such skill as their ability
allows. However, had this sample included people with less than
high school educations, then this argument might not apply.

The upshot of these paragraphs is that by dint of the choice
of the topic of crime, this study set up a situation in which edu-

cation was irrelevant to the extent of a person's degree of articulation

151

in discussion and hence set up a situation in which articulation

would be a relatively pure indicator of 10.

Education and Office Level

Given the nature of the political offices occupied by our
sample members, the positive relationship between education and
office-level is not surprising. The increased financial and
personal mobility requirements which apply to office-holding at
the state and federal levels of government means that usually only
professional and/or financially successful persons can afford to
hold these offices.36 Consequently, people recruited to these
offices will generally have more education than candidates for
city council positions. The correlation of .45 between Respondent
Occupational Status and Office-Level, and the correlation of .46
between Respondent Occupational Status and Education supports this
thesis.

Whereas only 28% of the 50 city councilmen had obtained more
than 16 years of formal education, the comparable figures for the
state legislators (N=51) was 40%, and for congressmen (N=l7) 70%.
Similar and corroborating evidence can be found in Table A.5 of
Appendix A. This table compares our sample to samples from three
separate studies on city councilmen (Prewitt, 1970), state legislators
(Wahlke et al., 1962), and congressional candidates (Fishel, 1973).
These studies show that 48% of the city councilmen (N=365) had 16
years or more of formal education, in comparison to 55% of the

state legislators (N=474) and 75% of the House members of the 88th
Congress (N=435).37

152

The attraction of lawyers to politics because of the perceived
"name recognition" benefits which can enhance a lawyer's law practice
also contributes to the positive Education/Office-Level relationship.
Though our study did not separate the lawyers from the other
"professionals" in the sample, support can be found in the three
studies alluded to above. Prewitt's data indicates that only 10%

of his sample of San Francisco area city councilmen were lawyers.38

39

Businessmen out numbered lawyers by a ratio of 5 to 1. In

comparison, Wahlke et al. (1962) report that in 1957, 52% of all
state legislators in New Jersey, 36% of the Ohio legislators, and
30% of the legislators in both California and Tennessee were

40

lawyers. The average percentage of lawyers in congressional

seats is higher still. Fishel reports that 50% of the House members

4' and Eulau and Sprague (1964)

in the 88th Congress were lawyers,
cite studies which indicate that lawyers have comprised between

50% and 60% of the House and Senate memberships since the late

1920's.42

In addition, the tendency for more highly educated persons
to concentrate in the higher offices can be explained by the fact
that articulation skills play a larger role in compaigns for these
offices. More articulate, and hence usually more educated persons,
are apt to be candidates for these offices simply because there is
a stronger requirement at the higher office levels for candidates
adept at speech-making and adept at using media resources to elicit

voter support.

153

Articulation and Office Level

The relationship between Articulation and Office-Level is
similar to that between Education and Office Level. The fact that
running for higher office normally requires greater candidate
financial security, personal mobility and communication skills
than running for lower offices means that relatively more articulate
persons are liable to be candidates for the state legislative and
congressional offices. The correlation of .29 between Articulation
and Office-Level, the correlation of .45 between Respondent
Occupational Status and Office-Level, and the correlation of .33

between Education and Office-Level all support this reasoning.

Intelligence and Youthfulness

The correlation of .54 between "youthfulness" and "IQ"
indicates that the younger office-holders are more intelligent than
the older office-holders; a correlation which would not hold in the
population at large. Our explanation of this relationship was
devised after three other hypotheses were rejected.

The first hypothesis assumed that younger office-holders
would be brighter because of changing times, i.e. because candidates
for office today have to be brighter than they had to be in the past.
The "changing times" hypothesis presumed that in the old days,
candidates for office were recruited primarily by political parties
("machines"?) and social organizations, and persons got into office
mainly on the strength of their popularity with organization leaders.

Candidacy and re-election required the development and maintenance

154

of a social network of political supporters. In recent times, how-
ever, the declining strength of party organization, the increased
importance of issues as determinants of voting behavior, and the
advent of electronic media as a potent campagne weapon has changed
the nature of political recruitment. No longer are candidates
elected simply on the basis of their popularity among "good ol' boy"
power brokers.

To become a candidate and win political office in recent
times, a person need not please party or other political Chieftains
as much as know how to appeal to the people who vote. Intelligence,
the ability to speak knowledgeably about issues, and the ability to
make proper use of television and radio appearances have become the
key ingredients for electoral victory. Consequently, in contrast
to the old days, a more intelligent set of persons are being
attracted to and recruited for political office. In addition,
because there is comparably less need in recent times for persons
to work their way up in the local party or "power structure" to
become a candidate, younger persons are finding it easier to get
into office.

According to the "changing times" hypothesis, the legislators
who entered public office years ago are--as a group--less bright
than the legislators entering office in recent years. Howevergif
year of entry into political office were held constant, the office-
holders would all be approximately the same in intelligence. Hence,
to test the "changing times" explanation, we looked for support of

the null hypothesis: rIQ,AGE- EXP = 0, where 10 = intelligence,

155

AGE = age of the respondent, and EXP = experience; the number of
years the respondent has served in political office. With office
experience held constant, the partial correlation between IQ and

age is -.53, a clear rejection of the null hypothesis. This
relationship held across office-level also, with the same partial
correlation for city councilmen being -.33, for the state representa-
tives -.42 and for the congressmen -.30.

The failure of the "changing-times" hypothesis means that
one or more of the assumptions which make up the hypothesis is
false. We found no support for the idea that more intelligent men
and women are entering our legislative bodies today than yesterday.
Thus, there is no reason to suspect that a perceived change in
recruitment criteria has produced a brighter type of office candidate.
Persons recruited for office today may have to do more public
speaking and deal more with media personnel than with party
organization bosses, but these differences do not appear to have
produced a change in the general level of intelligence required
of office—holders.

Our second hypothesis explaining why younger office-holders
are likely to be more intelligent than older office-holders was the
"selection-in" hypothesis. This hypothesis assumed that the length
of time it takes for a person to gain political office is a function
of their intelligence. The more intelligent the person, the earlier
in life he will be "selected" into office. In addition, the higher
the level of a person's first office, the brighter a person must be

if he enters young. As a group, young office-holders will be more

156

intelligent than older office-holders. The older legislators may
either be bright persons who entered office young and stayed in
office, or less intelligent persons who got into office relatively
late in life. The latter would likely be persons trusted by party
leaders in relatively safe districts that are being sent to the
legislature or Congress because of their presumed loyalty to the
party.

If the "selection-in" hypothesis were to account for the
data, then people who entered office at an early age would on the
average be brighter than those who entered office relatively late
in life. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the corre-

43 and IQ is - 20. Is it the case that

lation between AGE AT ENTRY
this difference in brightness between young entrants and older
entrants is sufficient to account for the correlation between age
and IQ? To test for this, the partial correlation between age and
10 was calculated with AGE AT ENTRY held constant. This partial
correlation, however, is not 0 but -.52. Thus although brighter
people tend to be elected at a younger age, this fact does not

by itself account for the very large correlation found between IQ
and age.

The third hypothesis considered is the "selection-out"
hypothesis. This hypothesis asserts that bright office holders
will be more likely to leave the legislative body for greener
pastures than less intelligent legislators. Bright, young office-

holders are apt to find that in comparison to other government or

business jobs, a legislative position offers little in terms of

157

pay, job security, or opportunity for advancement. Unless he or

she has a very safe district, is content with only an average income,
and feels confident that in a few years he or she will have decision-
making influence in the legislature, there is liable to develop
within the person a great incentive to leave office. Legislators

are continually in contact with businessmen/lobbyist type persons

who know about available jobs, and often with men who are in

charge (or who personally know who is in charge) of staffing
governmental positions within the state or federal bureaucracy.

In time, therefore, many bright office-holders will opt for the
higher paying and more secure jobs they have heard about through

their legislative contacts.

A

.11—

IL

 

 

db

 

Cohorts Spread By
Year of Entry

<-

l-

1h—————1-—_—dL———

i

 

 

p Year

 

+Date of Study

————

‘— _________ .1
Years of Experience

Figure 5.2.—-The Relationship between Experience, Age and
Intelligence.

158

The statistical impact of this assumption is brought out
in Figure 5.2 which shows the longevity of various cohorts in the
legislature as a function of intelligence. The symbols D and B at
the beginning of each cohort stand for the dull (less intelligent)
and bright (more intelligent) groups respectively. In each cohort,
the bright group has a shorter longevity than does the dull group.
The point of observation of a cross-sectional study such as this
one is represented by the dotted vertical line made at a given point
in time. The longevity lines of some cohorts cross this dotted line
while the longevity lines of other cohorts do not. It is those
groups whose longevity line crosses the dotted line which will
actually have members who are present in the study. By simple
count it is clear that for the older cohorts only the line for the
dull group crosses the vertical line. Thus older members of the
study tend to be duller than do younger members.

A second implication of this hypothesis is also brought
out in Figure 5.2, but it is brought out by considering the dotted
and reversed axis drawn at the bottom of the graph. This axis
shows that years of experience in office, i.e. EXP, is confounded
with the year at entry of a given member. That is, a member with
10 years of experience is a person who entered legislative office
10 years before. By looking above each point on this axis, you
can see which cohorts have this number of years of experience ppg_
have contributed respondents to our study. By count it is thus
shown that fer a higher number of years of experience, only the

duller cohorts will still be around to be members of the study.

159

This generates the bivariate scatterplot of IQ and years of experience
which is shown in Figure 5.3. This figure makes it clear that the
"selection-out" hypothesis not only predicts a very large correlation
between age and 10, but also a very large correlation between experi-
ence and 10. This correlation is borne out in the data: rIQ,EXP =

-.51.

Years of
Experience 4

7]
#0‘4

Figure 5.3.--The Predicted Scatterplot for Years of Experience in
the Legislature as a Function of the Intelligence of
the Legislator (line - Cohort arithmetic mean intel-

ligence).

 

 

5 Intelligence

 

Since age at entry is irrelevant to the “selection-out"
hypothesis (because it concerns only years of office experience),
this hypothesis could only account for all the data if the
correlation between 10 and age of entry were 0. But that corre-
lation is -.20. Thus, the pure "selection-out" hypothesis is also
not sufficient to account for all the data.

What explanation will account for all these findings? We

feel that the simplest explanation is a combination of the second

160

and third hypotheses, i.e. we believe that there is both selection-
in and selection out of the legislature on the basis of IQ. That
is, we believe that brighter people tend to enter the legislature
young and then tend to leave the legislature once they find greener

pastures of employment.

Youthfulness and Office Level
The inverse relationship between Youthfulness and Office

Level44

can be explained by looking at the characteristics of the
different offices which encourage office-holders to leave, stay,
or advance in office. As shown in Table 2.1 the average number
of years in office for City Councilmen is 4.1, for State Repre-
sentatives 6.1 and for Congressmen 9.0. This means that the
higher offices offer more in terms of career potential, i.e. they
allow men to stay longer once elected. For this reason, office-
holders at the higher levels can be expected to be older.

The offices differ substantially in the types of incentives
or rewards offered for continuous service. The city councilmen office
offers no (or only insignificant) monetary reward, and election is
often viewed in terms of "citizen duty" rather than personal gain.45
The office is usually non-partisan and thus candidacy requirements
are minimal.46 Young persons can run for the office, for instance,

47 Also because campaign

without having had to prove party loyalty.
expenditures are lower for city council candidates than candidates
for higher office, younger, less financially secure persons are

not disadvantaged in this regard.

161

The office of State Representative requires a great deal
more in the way of political commitment than the office of City
Councilman. One must usually pull up stakes, change one's occu-
pational status or modus operandi and move to or travel each week
to the State Capitol to fulfill the duties of office. Except for
established professionals or successful (often older) businessmen.
most people cannot afford to do this. The monetary reward for
serving as a state legislator may also prompt a desire to stay
in office for a longer period of time. While not a great deal
by itself (in Michigan a State Representative receives a salary
of $19,000 and an expense account of $3,500 for a total of $22,500
per year) the salary makes a nice second income which most people
would be loathe to give up.

The "seniority system" which operates at the state level and
the fact that most state representatives have "safe" districts also
promotes longevity in office and works to increase the "average age
of state representatives. Redistricting plans tend to keep the
number of competitive districts at a minimum so that most incumbents
wishing to remain in office are fairly assured of being re-elected.
In addition, though the "seniority" rule is not adhered to as rigidly
as in Congress, it nevertheless works to reward longevity in office
by allotting positions of influence to legislators with career
aspirations. Senior legislators with influence on important com-
mittees also find it easier to obtain the media exposure and
campaign funds necessary to insure their re-election. Finally,

local offices such as the city council position often serve as a

162

stepping stone to state legislative office, and hence, state

representatives can be expected to be older than city councilmen.
Congressmen can be expected to be older than State

Representatives for the same reasons which account for the

difference between city councilmen and state representatives.48

The greater expense in terms of campaign expenditure, resettlement

in Washington D.C., and travel to and from one's district mean

that congressmen must usually either be established professionals,

successful businessmen, or have built up a loyal and prosperous

following among the party members and contributors in his district.

All of these statuses usually require time to achieve and presage

a higher average age for persons entering and staying in Congress.

The congressional "seniority system" encourages career motivation

in similar fashion to its influence at the state level. In addition,

many congressmen have advanced to their office after serving many

years in lower offices. Thus congressmen, as a group, can be

expected to be older than state representatives or city councilmen.

MissingpPaths
Perhaps as much can be learned by examining the missing
paths in a path model as can be learned by examining the direct
links of causation. It is the missing paths or relationships which
are the most absolute type of finding. Earlier we discussed the
absence of relationship between authoritarianism and political
flexibility (pp. 21-22) as well as the missing link between edu-

cation and articulation (pp. 25-27). Two other "missing paths“

163

will be discussed; the lack of direct relationship between Youthful-
ness and Education, and between Education and Liberalism.
MissingPath Between Youthfulness

and Education

Given that educational levels have been increasing in the
past few decades--with more and more persons going to college or
obtaining other post-high school training, we expected that age,
in a sense, would determine level of education simply as a matter
of "changing times." Young persons--as a group--wou1d naturally
have more education than older office-holders. The partial
correlation between Youthfulness and Education with IQ held
constant is -.03 however, suggesting that for our sample, age
does not have an independent effect on education.

This partial correlation indicates that for political
office-holders, times have not changed--i.e. the educational level
of young and old alike is quite similar. The average education of
our sample is 15.7 years with only a small degree of variance
across office-level. Apparently within the last 15 to 20 years
(the span in which all but a few of our sample entered political
office) there has been no significant change in the education
level of candidates for public office.

We conclude that education is correlated with age only to
the extent that each is correlated with IQ. If it were not for
the fact that the brighter office-holders (apparently) obtained

more education, and that the brighter office-holders are younger

164

than those less-bright, there would be no correlation between age

and education.

Missipg_Path between Liberalism and Education
One might have expected that education would be a direct
cause of "liberal" orientation toward politics in the path diagram.
At first glance it seems reasonable that persons with more education
would more readily adopt the liberal values of American democracy
and be less tolerant of doctrine which argues against individual
freedom and equality. Our data suggests, however, that except for
the fact that brighter persons are both more liberal and more
educated, there is no evidence that these variables are correlated
(i.e. rED,LIB . IQ = .09).
We believe that education does not contribute directly to
a liberal orientation because for many people and particularly
our legislators, the educational experience does or did not contain

49

any discussion which would promote liberal values. The evidence

suggests that most high school civics courses have concentrated on
politically neutral questions concerning "citizen responsibilities,"
the formal structure of government, etc., without ever dealing

with formative or controversial topics (e.g. those which examine
value implications of governmental policy, note the disparity
between our social reality and our democratic ideals, etc.) which

50 Most college students, past or

would nurture liberal beliefs.
present, have not had such experiences either. Unless students

enroll in courses which examine social reality with the view that

165

governmental policy effects that reality, it is doubtful that their
educational experience will stimulate development of liberal (or

5] Though we do not know the composition

even conservative) beliefs.
of educational experience of our respondents, education per se does
not appear to account for the incidence of liberal and conservative

orientation among these office holders.

Discussion
What are the implications of this study for the concept of
"ideology“ and its usefulness in explaining political behavior? Our
study reflects on the semantic or definitional problems related to
the concept as well as the role which "ideologues" (i.e. the bearers
of ideological beliefs and cognitive traits) play within social

movements .

Definitional Problems with the Term "Ideologue"
The question of what elements or characteristics pertain to
the concept of "ideology" or "ideologue" has been a major concern

52 Our historical analysis of the concept

throughout this study.
(Chapter 1) as well as our examination of beliefs with respect to
crime (Chapters 3 and 4) indicate that at least three general
dimensions are important to any definition; cognitive style
(articulation), emotional commitment, and substantive content
(person-blame/system-blame orientation). We found however, that
these dimensions were only weakly correlated with each other (see

Chapter 4. PP. 43-44). Five other traits which have been associated

with ideology (IQ, education, liberalism, mental rigidity, and

166

authoritarianism) were incorporated in the path model. These traits
or variables are only correlated to a moderate or small degree--
either with each other or with the three variables which were
derived from the discussion of crime (see Table 5.1). Furthermore,
in order that all the correlations in the matrix be positive, the
correlations for authoritarianism, emotionalism, and mental

rigidity had to be reversed. These findings have important

semantic consequences.

Had the correlations among the “ideological" variables
been high, it would not matter which trait was chosen as the
definitive criterion of ideology, for any trait selected would
imply the presence of the others. However, the correlations are
only moderate. Thus if any one trait is chosen as tpg_definitive
ideological characteristic, that trait would imply the presence
of some of the other traits only to a small extent and would not
imply others at all.

The fact that we had to reverse the correlations of authori-
tarianism, emotionalism and mental rigidity is a reversal of the
expectations implicit in the definition of "ideologue" espoused
by such men as Lasswell, Adorno et al., and Rokeach. These men
assumed that the traits of authoritarianism, emotionalism and
mental rigidity would be highly and positively correlated with
articulation. Our data shows these correlations to be -.41, -.15
and -.52 respectively, a clear repudiation of their assumption.

Keying on different traits as the definitive characteristic

of ideological thought can yield “ideologues“ with different and

167

even opposite types of characteristics. For example, if you accept
Converse and Putnam's belief that articulation is the definitive
characteristic of ideological thought, the person you label as an
ideologue will not only be articulate, but will also be mentally
flexible (r = .52), anti-authoritarian (r = .41), and slightly non-
emotional (r = .15). If mental rigidity was considered the key
definitional criterion of the ideologue, the implication would be
that ideologues are relatively inarticulate (.52), somewhat
authoritarian (.23), and emotional (.61). If authoritarianism
were selected, ideologues would be inarticulate (.41), would tend
to be mentally rigid (.23). If emotionalism was assumed to be the
definitive ideological characteristic, the ideologue would be
mentally inflexible (.61), somewhat prone to authoritarianism
(.29), and would show a slight tendency to be inarticulate (.15).
If a person keys on content as the defining variable there
are similar problems. The general content dimension (Liberal/
Conservative Orientation) is only moderately correlated (.47)
with the specific content dimension (Person-Blame/System-Blame
Explanation of Crime). This means that persons who consider
themselves liberal in terms of a general political orientation
are not always liberal across the more specific content areas--
i.e. crime, welfare, environment, etc. Furthermore, the two
content measures are only moderately related to other ideological
characteristics. Left-wing radicals are apt to be more flexible,
more articulate, but less emotional about their political beliefs

than conservatives or right—wing extremists. This is an important

168

finding in its own right in that it runs counter to the vast amount
of literature which equates all varieties of political extremism
with emotionalism, inflexibility, etc. In sum, the "content"
dimensions suffer the same limitation as the other variables which
a person might claim as the definitive ideological trait.

The semantic issue related to the concept of ideology cannot
be solved. Most authors who have written about ideologues have
based their definitions on false conceptions about the substance
or nature of the ideologue's belief system. Our study shows that
the set of traits heretofore defined as "ideological" cannot provide

a consistent definitional criterion for the concept.

Putnam's Approach to Ideology,
The path model also reflects on Putnam's assumption that
a single index (his "ideological style index") can incorporate the
"most central" characteristics which describe the concept "ideologi-
cal."53 Recall, however, that in Chapter IV we present evidence
that Putnam's ISI is no more than a measure of articulation.
Furthermore, the path analysis now shows us that cognitive style
(articulation) is pp; related to other important ideological
traits except as it is mediated through intelligence. In fact,
for articulation to be positively related to the emotionalism
dimension, the emotional variable had to be reversed in sign.
Putnam argues that cognitive style is the basic determinant
of the various aspects of ideological thought. Our data shows,

however, that ideology is not a matter of cognitive style, i.e.

169

of how one views the world, it is a matter of mental ability. It
relates not just to the fact that some people are knowledgeable
and organized in their thinking and others are less knowledgeable
and disorganized, it relates to the fact that people are knowledgeable
and organized to the extent that they grasp ideas and facts within
a particular issue domain, or are non-emotional, non-authoritarian,
liberal, etc. to the extent their mental ability permits ideational
flexibility. Intelligence, not merely cognitive style, is the key
to the presence or absence of those traits and characteristics
deemed "ideological."
Emotionalism: A Product of Rigidity and
Authoritarian Belief

As we noted earlier, our path model is unique in that it
posits mental flexibility and authoritarianism as determinants of
emotionalism rather than vice versa. This puts us at odds with
writers such as Adorno et a1. (1950), Lasswell (1954), Rokeach
(1960), and Sartori (1969) who assume that it is because persons
are emotional (usually described as suffering "status anxiety" or
"emotional ambivalence") that they become rigid and/or authori-

54 These authors believe that emotion (anxiety) auto-

tarian.
matically freezes a person's thought processes and drives them to
grasp authoritarianism as a means of obtaining predictability in
their lives. A person must be non-emotional, therefore, before
he can have flexibility of thought.

We believe that there are two different sources of emotion-

alism concerning crime: the specific beliefs of the authoritarians

170

and their rigidity in thought. The authoritarian believes that
adherence to the commands of superiors is the very foundation of
society and he is incensed when he sees a criminal challenge this
foundation. Criminal activity is seen as a challenge to his
values and hence produces an emotional response.55 On the other
hand, fear of crime and fear of criminals can stem from ignorance
and a tendency to grossly distort the nature of men who do things
counter to that which is done by the typical citizen.56 These
distortions would be most frequent among those of lower 10 who
lack the mental facility to go beyond childhood fairy tales in
seeking explanations for a criminal's behavior. Those of low IQ
cannot understand the rational elements of criminal thought and
hence picture criminals as irrational monsters. A strong emotional
response thus follows from perceptual distortions and inflexible
thought patterns. Since the authoritarian is low in IQ and highly
inflexible, he will thus be subject to unrealistic fears.

Why has there been no previous challenge to the long-
standing claim that emotionalism creates rigidity and authoritarianism?
In part there has been no challenge because this hypothesis is
ubiquitous in the social sciences and hence has never received a
jaundiced critique. But there are also methodological reasons why
this hypothesis would not be discovered to be false. Most prior
investigators have never looked at their data for more than two
variables at a time, and there is nothing in single correlations
such as that between authoritarianism and ethnocentrism to suggest

the direction of causation. Instead, the direction in simple

171

correlations is left to interpretation derived apart from the data,
and these authors simply inserted the most plausible interpretation

at hand. Our analysis focused on the entire pattern of correlations
among the variables, however, and models which posit that emotionalism
causes authoritarianism and mental rigidity simply do not fit the
data. No model in which the cognitive variables were not prior to
emotional variables in the causal diagram fit the data at all. Thus
our path model revealed that rigidity of thought and authoritarian

belief produce emotionalism and not vice versa.

Ideologues and Radical Social Movements

That Lasswell et al. would assume that members of radical
social movements (i.e. ideologues) are both articulate and emotional
is not surprising for such a belief is widespread. The image of
the ideologue has been that of the impassioned revolutionary; a

man of words totally committed to the struggle against political

"57 ll “58

injustice. He is often referred to as a "fanatic, zealot,

"59 all terms which

or, more respectfully, as a "charismatic leader;
suggest a man both articulate and emotionally committed in belief.
Our study shows, however, that the more articulate a person, the
less likely it is that he will be emotional or inflexible in belief.
The question, therefore, is why has the assumption that ideologues
are both articulate and emotional been so widely accepted?

We suspect that it relates to a methodological artifact.

Most field or biographical studies about ideologues have focused

on the leaders of radical social movements. Leaders of these

172

movements are apt to be emotionally committed or at least appear to

60

be emotionally committed to their beliefs for at least three

reasons .

l. leaders usually possess a genuine ideological commitment
to the principles of the movement: a commitment often
born out of frustration and hatred toward the present
or past regime.6

2. as a coalition builder, the leader must use emotional
appeals to (a) weld a unification of purpose amon
contending interests within the movement 2 and (b to

build the legitimacy of the movement among the masses.63

3. the leader's challenge of the status quo will make he

or she fearful of reprisals by members of the current

or past political establishment and this fear will

manifest itself in increased emotional commitment or

rhetoric.

Thus because scholars studying ideology have drawn a biased
sample (by looking primarily at leader-ideologues) they have
consistently reported a high correlation between articulation and
emotionalism among ideologues. This consistutes a narrow view of
the concept "ideologue" and a narrow view of the persons found

within radical social movements.

TABLE 5.2.--Types of Members of Ideological Social Movements with
Respect to their Emotional and Articulation Characteristics.

 

 

 

EMOTIONAL NON-EMOTIONAL
Theoreticians
Leader-

ARTICULATE Ideologues Political

Functionaries
Fellow
True Believers Travelers
INARTICULATE Misfits Financial
Bomb Throwers, etc. Supporters, etc.

 

 

 

 

173

We believe that if one examines a radical social movement
in its entirety, four different types of members will be found.
These four types are shown in Table 5.2. The members of a radical
social movement may vary both in terms of their degree of articu-
lateness and the degree to which they are emotionally committed to
their political or ideological beliefs. These differences are apt
to be related to the role or function that a member is playing
within the movement, or perhaps to the phase in which the movement

64 The point, however, is that members of radical

is proceeding.
social movements are not all highly articulate and emotional persons,

even though they all support an ideological cause.

Ideologues and Anti-Intellectualism
There is a widespread belief that intellectuals are likely
to be extreme, emotional and rigid in their thinking, particularly

65

among conservatives. McClosky writes that conservatives-~out of

a fear and distrust of that which they cannot understand--tend "to
derogate reason and intellectuality" and "are inclined to regard
pure intellectual activity as dangerous to established arrangements.
Intellectuals are likely to be impractical dreamers and potential
radicals, unstable people whose theories may weaken the foundations

n66

of the social order. The intellectual as ideologist is

particularly feared, adds Hofstadter, for the ideologist "is an
object of unqualified suspicion, resentment, and distrust."67
He explains that whereas the intellectual as expert "appears as
a threat to dominate or destrcy the ordinary individual, the

ideologist is widely believed to have already destroyed a cherished

American society."

174

Hofstadter also writes that the intellectual Fimperatively
feels" that ideas are of signal importance in human life. He warns
against the intellectual's commitment to belief. He cautions that
behind this commitment "is the belief that in some measure the
world should be made responsive to his capacity for rationality, his
passion for justice and order: out of this conviction arises much
of his value to mankind and, equally, much of his ability to do

mischief."68

Our data does not support the idea that intellectuals will
be emotional or rigid in thought. Articulation is correlated with
emotionalism -.15 and with inflexibility of thought -.52. To the
contrary, it suggests that articulate persons--those persons who
possess organized belief systems, constrained by overarching
principles--are likely to be somewhat unemotional and very
probably open to compromise and the consideration of different
ideas. Yet these are traits which are normally associated with
thepragmatist.

Is it impossible for an "ideologue" to be "pragmatic?"
This depends on the definitions of these terms. If an "ideologue"
is defined to be any man who has an organized belief system from
which he derives his action, and a "pragmatist“ is defined to be
any man who pgygp_uses a theory to determine his actions, then by
definition a pragmatist cannot be ideological. But an ideologue
does not derive his actions from a theory in order to satisfy
some abstract stylistic principle of consistency, he uses a theory

only because he believes it to be a faithful and hence useful

175

picture of political reality. His primary concern, therefore, is
the same as that of the classic pragmatist: to obtain a workable
solution to political problems. The characteristic most commonly
used to describe or define the pragmatist is his openness to new
ideas and new evidence. Our data indicates, however, that an
ideologue tends to be EQEE flexible than those who are less
articulate. Indeed it indicates that a person who has articulated
a theory may be more able to see its flaws and weaknesses than
someone who is less articulate, but no less convinced. In this
vein, our data suggests that more articulate politicians will be
more pragmatic than those who entertain fewer ideas, who are less
flexible, and who are more emotional.

Much of the anti-intellectualism in current political
thought is the product of the early research on ideology and
ideologues. These researchers appeared to have established a
permanent bond between articulate thought, emotionalism and
mental rigidity. The empirical underpinnings of this pervasive
belief were never established, however, and the evidence to the
contrary was weak and easily ignored. Certainly the horrors
committed by intellectuals such as Stalin, Hitler and Mao are
proof that Plato's notion of the philosopher-king was a gross
over-statement of the intellectual's political beneficience. On
the other hand, our research shows that the image of the intel-
lectual as a wild-eyed radical is even less realistic. Perhaps
this research can mark the beginning of the rehabilitation of the

intellectual in political life.

Chapter V--Footnotes

1Putnam's 14 elements are listed in Table 4.1 of Chapter IV.

2Our study incorporates six distinct ideological dimensions:
articulation, mental flexibility, emotionalism, authoritarianism,
liberalism and system-blame orientation toward crime. Four of these
serve to measure 10 of the 14 characteristics listed by Putnam. The
"articulation" variable measures the characteristics described (and
numbered) by Putnam as (1) having "a comprehensive, consistent,
deductively organized belief system," (2) having "an explicit,
consciously held belief system," (6) possessing "a philosophy of
history and/or a social theor that is applied to every day
questions and issues,“ and (7 being "concerned with abstract
principles, and not concrete interests." The "political flexibility"
variable serves to measure the characteristics which he listed as
(3) having "a belief system that is closed, rigid, resistant to
new information," (5) having "a belief system that distorts or
oversimplifies reality, that is biased or irrational," (10) being
"opposed to compromise, bargaining, incrementalism, and other aspects
of pluralist politics," and (13) being "oriented to conflict and
opposed to consensus." The "emotional orientation toward crime"
variable measures Putnam's characteristic (4) having "a belief
system that is affectively or emotionally charged" and the
"authoritarianism" variable measures his characteristic (14) being
"an authoritarian or moral absolutist."

We feel that two of Putnam's "elements" do not apply to
the concept "ideologue.“ His characteristic (8) "future oriented,
utopian" does not allow for the consideration of ideologues who
are committed to re-instatement of past regimes, and his character-
istic (ll) “alienated from established social and political institu-
tions" implies that political leaders (e.g. Hitler, Stalin, Mao)
cannot be considered as ideologues. Both are unnecessarily
restrictive in scope.

The two elements which we did not measure are Putnam's
characteristics (9) "partisan hostility" and (12) political
"extremism." Two dimensions which are incorporated in our study
of ideology are "liberalism" and "system-blame explanation of
crime." These are both measures of ideological "content;" a
dimension which Putnam does ppt_include in his definition of
ideology.

3For a straight forward explanation of Path Analysis and
its computational requirements, see Michael S. Lewis~Beck,
"Determining the Importance of an Independent Variable: A Path

176

177

Analysis Solution," Social Science Research, 3 (June, 1974), 95-107;
Donald E. Stokes, "Compound Paths: An Expository Note," American
Journal of Political Science, 18 (February, 1974), 191-214; and
Duane F. Alvin and Robert M. Hauser, "The Decomposition of Effects

in Path Analysis," American Sociological Review, 40 (February, 1975),
37-47.

4The correlation between Office Level and 10 was calculated
in accordance with the assumption of the model that articulation
mediates the relationship between IQ and Office Level, i.e. rIQ LEVEL

(rIQ,ARTICULATION) (rARTICULATION, LEVEL)'

5The letters "IQ" are used for intelligence strictly as a
matter of abbreviation and are NOT intended to denote the operational
definition of intelligence used in research on child development,
i.e. mental age divided by cronological age. Moreover, since
intelligence in this study is the adult intellectual ability of
legislators, we make no assumption as to whether or not any of
the variation in intelligence is determined by genetic differences.
The causal antecedents of intelligence are irrelevant to the
present study.

6The "OLS" method refers to the "ordinary least squares“
method of calculating path coefficients which is described by Otis
Dudley Duncan in his article "Path Analysis: Sociological Examples,"
American Journal of Sociology, 72 (1966), 1-16, and by David R.
Heise, "Problems in Path Analysis and Causal Inference," pp. 38-73
in E. F. Borgatta (ed.) Sociological Methodology_(San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1969).

 

7L. Cronbach and P. Meehl. “Construct Validity of Psychologi-
cal Tests," ngchological Bulletin, 52 (1955), 281-302.

8The word "correlation" is appropriate here because with only
one causal antecedent or predictor (x) of a variable (y), the path
coefficient or beta is the same as the simple correlation between
the two variables (rx ). This is so because if you are trying to
predict y from x, the standard score form of the regression line is
y = r y -x, and thus, the correlation (rxy) is the same as the slope
(beta) of the regression line. The one exception to this rule in
our study is the beta for Political Flexibility onto 10. This was
initially estimated as .62 but for reasons of fit was reduced to
.43.

9Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life
(New York: Vintage Books, 1963), p. 29.
IoAdorno et al., p. 281.

nHofstadter, p. 39.

178

12Seymour M. Lipset, "American Intellectuals: Their Politics
and Status," Daedalus (Summer, 1959), pp. 460-486.

13Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," American
Political Science Review, 52 (March, 1958), 34.

14

15This finding is corroborated in an indirect manner by
studies which report a higher level of political tolerance among
"leaders" (as compared with members) of the most conservative ppg_
the most liberal groups in America. See Samuel A. Stauffer,
Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955); and McClosky, "Consensus,"
pp. 361-382. Political tolerance is also linked to education and
intellect in Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1960), pp. 103-104, 109-110.

16

Ibid.

Rokeach, p. 195.

17McClosky, "Conservatism," p. 36.

18Quinn McNemar, "Lost: Our Intelligence? Why?," American
Psychologist, 19 (1964), pp. 871-882.

19

 

Ibid., p. 878.

2OIbia., p. 880.

2‘Piaget, and Adelson, p. 1025.
22Adorno et al., pp. 282-283.

23R. Christie, "Some Determinants of the Accuracy of Social
Judgments Among Army Recruits" (Unpublished paper read before the
Eastern Psychological Association, March, 1952).

24Idem, "Authoritarianism Re-examined," in Studies in the
' Scope, and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality,"TTEds.) R.
Christie and M. Jahoda (New—York: Free Press, 1954), p. 168.

25F. P. Hollander, "Authoritarianism and Leadership Choice
in a Military Setting," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
49 (July, 1954), 365-370.

26T. S. Cohn, "Relation of the F-Scale to Intelligence,"
Journal of Social Psychology, 46 (1957), 207-227.

27A short listing of these studies and reference to works
which summarize their findings may be found in Hevitt Sanford,
"Authoritarian Personality in Contemporary Perspective," Handbook

179

of Political Psychology, ed. Jeanne Knutson, p. 162, and John P.
Kirsht and Ronald C. Dillehay, Dimensions of Authoritarianism: A
Review of Research and Theopy_(Lexington: University of Kentucky
Press, 1967), p. 40

28Christie, “Authoritarianism Re-examined," p. 171.

29Adorno et al., pp. 230-234 and 490, Christie, "Authoritarianism
Re-examined," p. 145, and A. M. Roberts and R. Jessor, “Authoritarianism,
Punitiveness and Perceived Social Status," Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology, 56 (1958), pp. 311-314. .m

30oiouanni Sartori, "Politics, Ideology. and Belief Systems,"
American Political Science Review, 63 (June, 1969), 398-411.

31This correlation is based on a correlation of .43 between
10 and Political Flexibility which is .19 lower than the sample
estimate of .62 (see Table 5.1). When .62 is used, the partial
correlation is -.12. This result suggests two things; that a direct
link between authoritarianism and political flexibility does exist,
or that some variable not included in the study is effecting both
variables.

32Harold D. Lasswell, "The Selective Effect of Personality
on Political Participation," Studies in the Scope and Method of "The
Authoritarian Personality," ed. by R. Christie and M. Jahoda (New
York: Free Press, 1954), pp. 221-225.

 

33Lester W. Milbrath and Walter W. Klein, "Personality
Correlates of Political Participation," Acta Sociologica, 6 (1962),
53-66.

34Mchemar, "Lost," pp. 871-882.

35This theory is discussed on page 8 of Chapter 111.

36Some data based comparisons which provide evidence that the
state legislative and congressional offices exact a greater financial
and personal commitment from their holders than the city councilman
offices may be found in the following places: Monetary Cost: Prewitt,
pp. 197-198; John N. Kingdon, Candidates for Office: Beliefs and
Strategies (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 54 and 104; Fishel,
p. 117; David A. Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1968), p. 88; Personal Commitment: Prewitt,
pp. 19. 84, 88, 100, 111-112, 136, 156-157, 164-165, 171, 177-178.
180, 202; Kingdon, Pp. 38, 52, 54, 134, 138; and Fishel, p. 37.

37Prewitt. pp. 225-226; Wahlke et al., p. 489: and Fishel.
p. 25.

180

38
39

Prewitt, p. 225.
Ibid., p. 157.

 

40Wahlke et al., p. 103.
4‘fishe1, p. 26.
42Heinz Eulau and John D. Sprague, Lawyers in Politics (New
York: Bobbs Merrill Co., Inc., 1964), p. 12. L
?

43AGE AT ENTRY = AGE - EXPERIENCE; the number of years the
respondent has served in public office.

44Empirical evidence of this relationship is presented in
Table A.5 of Appendix A. Data from the present study shows that
average age rises from 45 to 47 to 49 years as one moves from local
to state to congressional sub-samples. For the “comparison" samples
the comparable figures--available for state and congressional levels
only--are 46 and 53 years of age respectively.

45Prewitt. pp. 152, 100-101. 112-114. 157. 164.
46Ibid.. pp. 111-114, 130. 145. 152.

 

47Ibid.. pp. 16. 88, 111-114.

48According to Wahlke et al.'s data, the median age for
congressmen tends to be about ten years older than for their
counterparts in the states. Wahlke et al., p. 491.

49This indictment may not be true for today's high schools.
We suspect that in response to the upheavel of the 1960's, high
school's have inserted the examination of controversial issues into
their curriculum.

50Robert Hess and Judith Torney, The Development of Political
Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine, 1967), pp. 126-127, 248-249.

5lLipset also makes the argument that type of education is
related to political orientation. He notes several studies that show
social scientists to be more liberal than natural science faculty
members, and academics in general to be much more liberal than
persons educated in the professions (e.g. lawyers, physicians,
dentists, etc.). See Lipset, Political Man, pp. 313-323.

52Some authors define ideology in such narrow terms that it
seems possible to consider it as something separate or apart from
the "ideologue." This is the case when an author refers to ideology
as a specific set of beliefs, i.e. in terms of one or a number of
"ideologies," or when ideology is considered'ppt_the actual beliefs

181

of politicians, but as merely the rhetoric which they use to appeal
for public support. Our analysis presumes that there is an identity
between the concepts "ideology" and "ideologue." An ideologue is
simply a person whose belief system is characterized by a particular
set of beliefs or cognitive properties that are defined as ideological.
The question of what beliefs or cognitive properties are properly
labeled as "ideological" is a subject dealt with in this chapter.

53Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians, p. 45.

54Adorno et al., pp. 100, 451, 463, 759; Brown, p. 504,
Sanford. Pp. 144 and 156; Rokeach, pp. 58, 62-63, and Sartori, pp. 403-
504.

55Adorno et al., pp. 97, 409-410, 451. 458, and Roberts and
Jessor, p. 314.

56McClosky notes this tendency in conservatives. McClosky,
"Conservatism and Personality," p. 275.

57Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism, p. 31.

 

58Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Mentor Books,
1951). p. 120.

59Daniel Katz, "Patterns of Leadership," Handbook of Political
Psychology, ed. by Jeanne N. Knutson (Washington: Jossey-Bass, 1973),
pp. 216 and 227, Lester G. Seligman, "Elite Recruitment and Political
Development," Political Development and Social Changp, ed. by Jason L.
Finkle and Richard W. Gable (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1966), 331-332.

60The cynical view of ideology as "rationalization" is discussed
in Chapter 1.

61Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development
of the New States," Political Development and Social Change, ed. by
Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 1966), p. 331, 345: and David C. Schwartz, "A Theory of
Revolutionary Behavior," When Men Revolt and Why, ed. by James C.
Davies (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 120.

62Seligman, p. 331; Schwartz, pp. 122-124; Hoffer, p. 120;
Shils, p. 339: and Katz, p. 221.

63Schwartz discusses the need for leader-ideologues to issue
revolutionary (emotional) appeals and cites studies by LeBon,
Edwards, Arendt, Cantril, Almond and Pye which examine the usefulness
of function of such appeals in social movements. Schwartz, pp. 122-
124, also see Katz, p. 220; and Wolfenstein, p. 172.

182

64The idea that the emotional commitment, or rhetoric (i.e.
the cognitive style) of the leaders of social movements varies as the
movement passes through various phases is discussed by Suedfeld and
Rank, pp. 169-178; Schwartz, pp. 102-132; Hoffer, p. 120; Katz,
pp. 220-224: and Shils, "Intellectuals," pp. 355-362.

65McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," p. 275.

66Ibid.

67Hofstadter, p. 38.

68Ibid., p. 29.

APPENDICES

183

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW MECHANICS. CODING PROCEDURE,
LIST OF RESPONDENTS AND COMPARISON OF SAMPLES

184

 

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW MECHANICS, CODING PROCEDURE
AND COMPARISON OF SAMPLES

Schedulingythe Interviews

Each potential sample member was sent an introductory letter
explaining the study in general terms, stressing its scholarly and
confidential character, and notifying them that they would be con-
tacted by phone in the near future. A copy of this letter is pre-
sented on the next page.

In most cases an interview was set up on the initial call to
the office-holder's home or office. A second or third call back was
required of 16 of the city councilmen. Many of the councilmen were
busy with committee meetings at night and/or could not take time off
during the work day for an interview. This necessitated conducting
interviews at all times of the day or evening. Four councilmen said
they were just too busy to be interviewed and two others failed
repeatedly to keep scheduled appointments.

Because the state Capitol building is located only seven
miles from my residence, making contact with the state legislators
was a comparatively easy task. A few days after the initial letter
was sent, I either phoned the representative's secretary or dropped

by his office on one of my frequent trips to the Capitol. If an

185

 

186

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

 

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE FAST [ANSIN‘G ' MICHIGAN ' 4882-1

May 14, 1974

Representative John Q. Smith
Annex, House of Representatives
Capitol Building

Lansing, Michigan 48901

1." _'-he; "f‘ D.

Dear Representative Smith:

I am presently engaged in a research project which is being conducted to
learn more about the attitudes of political office holders, what they think
of their particular office, and how they go about their work in government.
Unfortunately, while there has been a great deal of study on the attitudes
of city councilmen, there are very few instances of systematically gathered
information which allows for the comparison of attitudes between these
office levels, i.e., for comparing the attitudes of councilmen with those

of state legislators, state legislators' attitudes with those of congressmen,
etc.

The project I am involved in is an attempt to help rectify this past neglect.
As a participant in this process, your observations about your particular
office and politics in general are of great interest to me. Therefore, I
would like to arrange an interview with you at some time in the next few
weeks. I expect that this will take approximately one hour of your time.
While the questions, in my opinion, do not deal with politically or per-
sonally sensitive issues, I will guarantee the anonymity of your responses.

I hope to be in touch with you by telephone in the near future, to arrange

a convenient time for our meeting and to answer any further questions you
might have.

Your agreement to be interviewed is essential for the success of this pro-
ject. First, I am interviewing only a limited number of state legislators,
so each is very important. Second, and most important, as a state legisla-
tor, you are singularly qualified to make the observations in which I am
interested.

I look forward to meeting with you. Thank you for your attention.

Respectfully,

John G. Schuiteman

Phd. Candidate in Political Science
Michigan State University

Phone: 337-2496/355—6590

187

interview could not be scheduled during the next few days, it became

a matter of continually checking with his or her secretary, or pas-

sing notes onto the floor of the House until an interview was set up

and completed. Approximately twenty representatives asked if I might

contact them later in the legislative session, and at least five of

these twenty denied by frequent (yet cordial) requests until the I“
bitter end. Approximately ten of the interviews had to be re-
scheduled at least once and about five others were re-scheduled as
many as two or three times. Persistence and diplomatic behavior are
essential ingredients in any effort to obtain interviews with state
representatives.

Scheduling and obtaining interviews with congressmen proved
to be the most exasperating task of the data collection process.
Four of the eleven Michigan congressmen interviewed requested that
I meet them at their office during one of their trips back to the
home district. One other agreed to meet me in East Lansing on the
day he was scheduled to tape a news commentary show for the campus
television station. These interviews, while one was particularly
rushed and one other conducted in a busy restaurant, went quite
smoothly. The remaining twelve interviews were conducted in
Washington, D.C. in mid-June, 1974.

Congressmen were incredibly busy during the pre-Summer
recess period of 1974. Not only did they have to complete committee
work by June 30th on the fiscal year l974-1975 budget, but the House
proceedings against President Nixon made each of them a target for

media interviewers and pollsters. In this charged atmosphere it was

188

particularly difficult to work myself into the schedule of the 14
Michigan congressmen not as yet interviewed. During the five days
spent in Washington, I obtained six interviews with Michigan congress-
men, five others from representatives of three Mid-Western states

and one other from a representative from Pennsylvannia. Despite a
campaign of letter writing and phone calls to legislative aides,

home district office managers, and the congressmen themselves, it was
only possible to actually set up five firm interviews prior to my
trip to Washington, D.C. Considering the constraints on my time and

theirs, I was fortunate to obtain the congressional interviews which

 

 

 

I did.
Setting the Time of the Interviews
Table A.l.--Environmental Setting of the Interviews.
City State “
Councilmen Representatives Congressmen Total Percent
(N=50) (N=51) (N=l7) (N=118)
Business Office 26 O 0 26 (22%)
Legislator's Office 1 40 14 55 (47:)
House Anteroom 0 9 0 9 ( 81)
Home 20 0 l 2l (l8?)
Other 3 2 l 6 ( 4‘1)

 

One-hundred and two of the interviews (87%) were conducted
in offices or homes which were relatively quiet and free from
interruption. Table A.l presents information on the environmental
setting of the interviews. Nine of the 51 interviews with state
representatives were conducted in the anteroom located off the floor
of the state House of Representatives. These interviews were

occasionally interrupted by roll call votes; the discussion having

 

189

to be sandwiched between the representative's sorties onto the floor.

Since the respondent's themselves suggested that the interview be

conducted in this manner, I have no reason to believe that the candor

or the thoroughness of their answers were adversely affected by these
interruptions. 0f the remaining seven interviews, three were con-
ducted in restaurants, one on the floor of the state House, two in
several different locations, and one in the car of a school adminis-
trator who was traveling about checking on the repair of school

vehicles at various service garages.

Table A.2.--Time of the Interviews in Minutes.

5.3;."— .z'. 'm_- ‘ " -mm: 51;; .:—_'_:_=':'—x_;'Ls_‘t ‘Lm:':’;—:SL.J¢ rum .‘7: . Imas ? Liars: -. .— ;.-

 

 

 

City State
Councilmen Representatives Congressmen Total
(N=50) (N=5l) (N=l7) (N=ll8)
Average Time Per Interview 72.8 62.6 45.4 64.3
Median Interview Time 64.0 62.0 40.0 6l.0
Range of Interview Times 43-l50 35-l43 26-86 26-l50

 

Table A.3.--Pace of the Interviews

L: 7- - -- !-- 1“,,“3 WJI “ms-cg: '_..'.__..'

 

 

arm tar: '.'_—'= m:—:-::;.x-:_-:_.:_.: az—c .4. Li‘—

 

 

 

 

City State
Councilmen Representatives Congressmen Total Fercent (LBQ)*
(N=50) (N=51) (N=l7) (N=l18)
Not Rushed 44 40 8 92 (78 ) (18)
Slightly Rushed 6 4 2 l2 (l0 ) ( 0)
Rushed 0 7 7 l4 (12%) (ll)
(L80) ( 0) (Zl) ( 8) (29)
*Left Brief Questionnaire with the Respondent
Table A.4.--Time of the Discussion on Crime in Minutes
City State
Councilmen Representatives Congressmen Total
(N=50) (N?5I) (N=l7) (N=ll8)
Average Time Per Interview 9.64 10.10 6.76 9.42
Median Interview Time 8.00 9.00 6.00 8.00

Range of Discussion Times 3-25 4-22 3-14 3-25

 

 

190

The average time of the l18 interviews was 64 minutes. As
Table A.2 shows, the city councilmen averaged 73 minutes per inter-
view, the state representatives 63 minutes and the congressmen 45
minutes. In terms of the pace of the interviews, Table A.4 shows
that l4 were classified as "rushed" with seven of these interviews
being with congressmen. Twelve interviews were classified as
"slightly rushed" and the remaining 91 (78% of the total 118) were
classified as "not rushed." In 29 interviews, it was decided to
leave a five-page questionnaire with the respondent which he or she
was to fill out and return. These forms contained l5 closed ended

‘ They helped to minimize

questions and 16 "agree-disagree" items.
interview time in potentially "rushed" situations and assured that an
adequate amount of time would be dedicated to the open-ended ques-

tions.

Interview Mechanics
All but one of the ll8 interviews were tape recorded. This
was done for three reasons: (1) to ease the task of making the
large number of coding decisions required in the content analysis
of the open-ended questions, (2) to permit re-checking of the coding
decisions on the closed-ended questions, and (3) to avoid having to
write out qualifying remarks or elaborate explanations. The pro-

cedure was simply to show up with the tape recorder, assure the

 

1The following items were included in the "five page
questionnaire": 24, 32, 370, 37l, 375, 377, 379, 381, 443, 444,
447-451, 455-470.

191

respondent that his remarks would be kept confidential, and begin
the discussion by recording "This is interview number ____ (the
respondent's assigned number)." Only one of the respondents flatly
refused to have the interview taped. Two others were rather sus-
picious and recorded the interview on their own tape recorders. I
suppose they did this as a way of countering the threat of being
misquoted; apparently not believing my initial promise that their
remarks would 39} be associated with their names. These two per-
sons appeared to loosen up once the non-controversial nature of my
questions became apparent. In contrast, one very suspicious first
term congressman allowed me to tape our interview, but was notably
irritated when I asked about his political ambitions and the degree
to which he contributed to his own campaign. These questions were
the most "sensitive" of all the questions yet only a few respon-

dents seemed to hedge their remarks on them.

Coding the Data

 

The coding procedure simply involved listening to the taped
interviews, selecting the appropriate answer categories from the
questionnaire codebook, and recording the answer codes onto what
appear to be IBM test answer sheets. These sheets are designed
such that they can be transformed into IBM cards; each filled in
scoring space corresponding to one punch hole in an IBM card. In
sum 518 variables were scored. This amounted to almost nine IBM
cards worth of information on each respondent. Three-hundred and

thirty-one of these variables were simple yes or no items designed

192

to record whether the respondent mentioned or failed to mention
certain ideas in his answers. The number of possible answer cate-
gories for the open-ended questions in themselves accounted for

228 of the variables. 0n twenty-two variables a "Judgment Confi-
dence Index" was scored. These indexes provided a measure of how
easy or confident the coder felt in scoring the respondent(s) on
these variables. None of the variables incorporated in this thesis

were problematic in terms of a persistent lack of confidence on the

 

part of the coder scoring the relevant answer codes.

For all but four or five of the respondents, the tape
recorder was no threat to the frankness of their discussion. Of
course, this is a bit hard to judge, but as men whose opinions are
often voiced in public, it seemed that taping the conversations
had little effect on their candor or willingness to talk. There
were tape recording problems on seven interviews; either battery or
tape cartridge failure, or tape gaps caused by mental error on
behalf of the interviewer. These contributed to later coding

deficiencies.

List of Respondents

CITY COUNCILMEN

 

 

City of Allen Park City of Battle Creek
Burger, Francis E. Jr. Corey, Richard
Cunningham, James R. Finney, Henry L.
Demeter, Leslie Oglesby, Floyd

Duda, Harold Sherrod, Donald
Pretty, R. Don Valentine, Clark M.

Rourke, John J. Unrue, Betsy

City of East Detroit

Bodnar, Frank
Lane, Harriet
Rubino, Nick
Sanfenico, Anthony

City of Highland Park

Daboul, Fred
Garian, Kalen
Miller, Jesse P.
White, Damon L.

City of Jackson

Bisbee, Leland 5. Jr.
Lyke, Eugene R.

Leverett, Harrison F. Jr.

Ratchford, Thomas J.
Shellberg, Gerald w.

City of Oak Park

Colburn, Merton
Cronk, Bernard
Rothstein, Charlotte

 

City of Nyandotte

Clack, Clifford
Radakovic, Jo Ann
Zulewski, Frank

STATE REPRESENTATIVES

Anderson, Thomas J.

(R - 28th District)
Baker, Raymond L.

(R - 64th District)
Bonior, David E.

(D - 75th District)
Brown, Thomas H.

(D - 37th District)
Bullard, Perry

(0 - 53rd District)
Buth, Martin D.

(R - 90th District)

193

City of Garden City

 

Mazzoni, Orin J.
Murphy, Timothy J.
Pappas, Samuel T.
Plakas, James A.

City of Inkster

 

Colleran, James J.
Hamlin, Clyde A.
Lecesne, Terree
Stapleton, Rolland Lee

City of Madison Heights

 

Breckenridge, George
Cagle, Charles E.
Gast, Fordon G.
Suarez, George w.

City of Trgy

King, Loren

Lynch, Carlos w.
Nichaelson, Norman
Molinar, Arthur
Pallotta, Anthony
Shaver, Sherwood E.
Taucher, Peter A.

Buth, Richard D.

(R - 92nd District)
Cramton, Louis K.

(R - lOan District)
Damman, James J.

(R - 63rd District)
Defebaugh, James E.

(R - 65th District)
DiNello, Gilbert J.

(D - 73rd District)
Edwards, George H.

(D - 9th District)

Forbes, Joseph

(D - 9th District)
Gast, Harry Jr.

(R - 43rd District)
Geake, Robert R.

(R - 35th District)
Geerlings, Edgar A.

(R - 97th District)
Goemaere, Warren N.

(D - 72nd District)
Griffin, Michael J.

(D - 50th District)
Hasper, Gerrit C.

(D - 96th District)
Hayward, William

(R - 68th District)
Hoffman, Quincy

(R - 77th District)
Holmes, Kirby

(R - 26th District)
Jondahl, H. Lynn

(0 - 59th District)
Jowett, William L.

(R - 76th District)
Kehres, Raymond C.

(D - 39th District)
Keith, William R.

(D - 334d District)
Kildee, Dale E.

(D - Blst District)
Kok, Peter

(R - 9lst District)
Larsen, Melvin L.

(R - Glst District)
Mahalak, Edward E.

(D - 38th District)
Marker, John F.

(D - 36th District)

CONGRESSMEN (Michigan)

Brown, Garry
(R - 3rd District)

Broomfield, William S.

(R - 19th District)
Cederberg, Elford A.

(R - 10th District)
Esch, Marvin L.

(R - 2nd District)
Ford, William D.

(D - 15th District)
Griffiths, Martha W.

(D - l7th District)

194

Mastin, Philip 0.

(D - 69th District)
McCollough, Lucille H.

(D - Blst District)
Mittan, Ray C.

(R - 44th District)
Mowat, John S. Jr.

(R - 40th District)
Nelson, Earl E.

(D - 57th District)
O'Brien, Warren

(R - 25th District)
O'Neill, James E. Jr.

(D - 85th District)
Owens, Gary M.

(D - 22nd District)
Sheridan, Alfred A.

(D - 29th District)
Seitsema, Jelt

(D - 94th District)
Smart, Clifford H.

(R - 24th District)
Smith, James F.

(R - 83rd District)
Smit, Raymond J.

(R - 52nd District)
Spencer, Roy L.

(R - 78th District)
Stackable, Frederick L.

(R - 58th District)
Wellborn, John A.

(R - 47th District)
Wolpe, Howard

(D - 46th District)
Young, Richard A.

(D - 32nd District)
Ziegler, Hal W.

(R - 23rd District)

Huber, Robert J.
(R - 18th District)
O'Hara, James G.

(D - 12th District)
Riegle, Donald W. Jr.
(D - 7th District

Ruppe, Philip E.
(R - llth District)
Van Der Veen, Richard
(D - 5th District)

CONGRESSMEN (Other States)

Hamilton, Lee

(D - 9th District Indiana)
Derwinski, Edward J.

(R - 4th District Illinois)
Hanrahan, Robert Paul

(R - 3rd District Illinois)

195

Guyer, Tennyson

(R - 4th District Ohio)
Regula, Ralph S.

(R - 16th District Ohio)
Williams, Lawrence G.

(R - 7th District Penn.)

Comparison of Samples

 

(See Table A.5, page 196)

1536

Table A.5.--Comparison of Samples. on Selected Personal and Political Characteristics.

 

 

 

 

City Councilmen State Representatives Congressmen
Schuiteman Prewitt Schuiteman Wahlke Schuiteman Fishel
(N=50) (N'365) (N=51) (N-474) (N=l7) (N-435)
Education
Less than 12 years 4% 9% 0% 19%
12 years : 11!
Some College 28% 19f 22% 26% 17% 12%
16 years 12% 16%
12 years or more 72% 85% 100% 81%
16 years or more 44% 48% 63% 55% 83% 75%
Over 16 years 70% 59%
Median Education 15 yrs. 16 yrs.
Age (N=365)b
21 to no years 16% 8%c 27% 32% 18% 10%
41 to 50 years 54% 38% 29% 31% 41% 32%
51 to 60 years 24% 27% 29% 22% 29% 31%
Over 60 years 6% % 14% 15% 12% 25%
Average age 45.6 (NA) 48.0 (NA) 49.2 (NA
Median age 47 (NA) 47 46.6 49 53
Occupation d
Professional 30% 26% 84% 47% 100% 62%
Managerial % 43% 16% 35% 05 20%
Clerical 16% 11% 2% 5% 0% 17%
(All White Collar) (84%) (80%)
Skilled labor 14% % % 2% 0% 1%
Independent farmer (6%)e 10%
Service worker 0% %
(All Working Class) (14%) (10%) (0%) (1%)
Other % 10%
Father's Occupation
Professional % 17% 16% 18% 30% (NA)
Managerial 16% 27% 40% 29: 47% (NA)
Clerical 6% 9% 18% 5% 6? (NA)
(All White Collar) (28%) (53%) (74%) (52%) (83%) (NA)
Skilled labor 54% 24% 28% 163 6% (NA)
Independent farmer (6%)8 16: (1221;)e 25%
Unskilled labor 12% 4% 0% 5%
(All Working Class) (72%) (44%) (28%) (46%) (0%) (NA)
Other % % 0% 2% 11% (NA)
Seniority (N=376)b
O to 1 year 30% 29$ 30% 15%
(At least 2 years) 46% 29;
2 to 4 years 22% 26% 0% 15%
(3 to 5 years) 34% 39;
5 to 6 years 61 14% 0% 13%
(6 to 8 years) 8% 15%
7 to 8 years 12% 11% 30% 6%
(9 or more years) 12% 16%
Over 9 years f 32% 20% 41% 51%
Average yrs.irioffice 4.1 4.2 6.1 4.0

 

aThe comparison of samples are from: Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political
Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politics, The Bobbs-Merrill Company. Inc., 1970. see pps.
46, 225-226; John C. Wahlke,’Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan. and Leroy C. Ferguson, The

Le islative S stem. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962, see pps. 36-37, 489, 491; and JETf
Fishel, Party and Opposition, David McKay Company, Inc., 1973. see pps. 21-22.

 

bIncludes only House and 995 Senate members from the f0ur legislatures interviewed.

cPrewitt's figures only add to 80%.

d84% is a deceptive figure as it includes respondents who said their occupation was
"legislator." Had the respondent's pre-office holding occupation been obtained, the
percentages would more nearly replicate those of Wahlke's sample.

ePercentage of possible farmers (inadvertently placed in the managerial category).

fEstimated from Prewitt's graph (p. 226) by multiplying the percentage in the sample
in the year category by the category mean.

APPENDIX B

SURVEY CODEBOOK

197

APPENDIX B

SURVEY CODEBOOK

The following is The codebook used To converT The respondenT's
answers To The inTerview quesTions inTo usable daTa. The codebook
conTains The inTerview quesTions, The coding iTems used To analyze
quesTion answers, and several indexes formed on The basis of specific
quesTions. lT also conTains sixTeen "agree/disagree" iTems on
which The respondenTs were asked To respond, and several iTems on
inTerview mechanics. The coding procedure was To enTer on code-
sheeTs numbers corresponding To my judgmenT on each separaTe coding
iTem. The shorT answer quesTions were coded Twice; once during The
inTerview and laTer when lisTening To The Taped inTerview. NoTes
were Taken on The open-ended quesTions buT These were coded primarily
on The basis of a careful lisTening To The relevanT answers and/or
discussions which They evoked.

A sligthy abridged version of The codebook is presenTed. Missing
are quesTions abouT The "power sTrucTure" (eliminaTed early in The
inTerview schedule for being Too vague), TwenTy-Two "JudgmenT Confidence
Indexes" used To noTe Those inTerviews and quesTions on which coding

was problemaTic (see Appendix A), and a number of miscellaneous

quesTions which proved To be Too complex, absTracT or confusing To a

(198)

3

wnragl
1L. .

(I99)

subsTanTial number of The respondenTs. Also missing are Those codes

used in The original version which noTed answers noT covered by coding

caTegories (coded as "oTher"), siTuaTions where a quesTion did noT

apply To cerTain respondenTs (coded as "NA" NoT Applicable), or when
no answer To a quesTion was obTained (coded as "NO" NoT ObTained).

To faciliTaTe The correlaTionai analysis These occurances were
each assigned a code of "9" or "99" and eiiminaTed from The daTa

analysis.

Codebook Symbols:

NA = NoT AscerTained

NO NoT ObTained

(MAC) Make a Card

(#) = A number in parenTheses indicaTes The frequency ThaT
The code was chosen. For MenTion/NOT MenTion and

and Yes/No iTems The number is The frequency of
"menTion" or "yes" codes scored.

IDEOLOGY, COGNITIVE STYLE Deck I

AND BELIEF SYSTEMS

 

 

Var. Column
No. Number Code
I OI DECK NUMBER (I)
2 02-04 RESPONDENT INTERVIEW NUMBER
001-051 CiTy Councilman or CiTy Commissioner
052-101 STaTe RepresenTaTive
102-118 U.S. RepresenTaTive
3 05 RESPONDENT OFFICE LEVEL
I. CiTy Councilman or CiTy Commissioner
2. STaTe RepresenTaTive
3. U.S. RepresenTaTive
4-5 06-08 YEARS AND MONTHS IN PRESENT OFFICE
Q. I. How many years and monThs have you served
in your presenT office?
4 06-07 0|. One compleTe year served.
02. Two compleTe years served.
03. ETC.
5 08 1. One addiTionaI monTh served.
2. Two addiTionaI monThs served.
3. ETC.
6 09-10 TERMS IN PRESENT OFFICE
Q. 2. How many Terms have you served in your presenT
office? NOTE: Include The Term They are now
serving in The counTo
01. Is serving his firsT Term.
02. Is serving his second Term.
03. ETC.
7-9 Il-16 MODE OF ENTRY INTO CURRENT OFFICE

Q. 3. Can you Tell me how you firsT became inTeresTed
in running for The office of (CiTy Councilman/STaTe
RepresenTaTive/U.S. RepresenTaTive)? (Use The Mode
of EnTry Code SheeT and code up To Three menTions
in order of imporTance To The respondenT)

(200)

(201)

 

Var. Column

N9;_. Number Code Deck I
7 II-12 _____ MosT prominenT menTion

8 I3-I4 _____ Second mosT prominenT menTion

9 I5-I6 Third mosT prominenT menTion

MODE QE_ENTRY CODE SHEET

 

.OPPORTUNITY AROSE

01. New disTricT creaTed by redisTriCTing had no
incumbenT - disTricT was safe or aT IeasT my
parTy had a majoriTy.

02. New disTricT creaTed by redisTricTing had no
incumbenT - had a 50-50 Chance of winning.

03. New disTricT creaTed by redisTriCTing - incumbenT
vulnerable.

O4. IncumbenT reTiring - as a member of The incumbenT's
parTy, iT was a good chance aT a safe seaT.

05. IncumbenT elecTed To higher office - good chance
aT a safe seaT.

06. IncumbenT reTiring - good Chance ThaT The
opposiTion parTy (my parTy) could win The seaT.

O7. IncumbenT elecTed To higher office - good Chance
ThaT The opposiTion parTy (my parTy) could win
The seaT.

08. OTher

DISSATISFACTION

II. RespondenT ThoughT he could do a beTTer job Than
The incumbenT was or had been doing.

12. IncumbenT IeT down his consTiTuenTs on key issue(s).
I7. OTher

AMBITION

2|. RespondenT wanTed The job and wenT afTer iT.

22. RespondenT wanTed The job and was encouraged by
friends. (CiTizens).

23. RespondenT wanTed The job and was encouraged by
businessmen or business associaTes;

24. RespondenT wanTed The job and was encouraged by
boTh CiTizens and businessmen.

27. OTher.

Var.
No.

 

Column
Number
I7-18
I9
(I)
(4)
(18)
(4)
(32)
(55)
(4)
20
(83)
(15)
;(5)
(4)
(I)
(I)
(O)
(O)
(9)

 

(202)

Code Deck 1
DRAFTED
3|. RespondenT was approached by friends (CiTizens)
who convinced him To run.
32. RespondenT was approached by businessmen or
business associaTes who convinced him To run.
33. RespondenT was approached by friends and business-
men who convinced him To run.
37. OTher.
99. OTher, NA, NO.

MODE OR ENTRY INTO FIRST POLITICAL OFFICE

(Coded using Mode of EnTry Codes)

INTEREST IN POLITICS

Q. 4.

PERSON

Q. 5.

Have you always had an inTeresT in poliTics?

No; NoT unTiI I decided To run for office (noT
acTive in civic affairs).
No; NoT unTil I decided To run for office (acTive

in Civic affairs).
No; NoT unTil a parTicular evenT or siTuaTion

prompTed my inTeresT.
Yes; Civic affairs mainly (no inTeresT in local

poliTics per se).
Yes; Very inTeresTed (aTTended CiTy council meeTings,

some parTy acTiviTy).

Yes; Very inTeresTed (noT only local poliTics).
OTher; NA; NO.

RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RESPONDENT'S CANDIDACY

Who was primarily responsible for you becoming a

candidaTe for your currenT office?

\OCD'NIOUl-bUJN—
C

RespondenT's own idea.

SuggesTed by friends.

SuggesTed by CiTizens.

SuggesTed by parTy leaders.

SuggesTed by businessmen.

SuggesTed by business associaTes.
SuggesTed by someone oTher Than The above.
CombinaTions noT including foil 1.

OTher; NA; NO.

var. Column

 

(203)

52.:— W Code Deck I
I3 21 ELECTION OR APPOINTMENT TO OFFICE
Q. 6. Did you iniTiaIIy enTer This office by being

elecTed in a general elecTion, elecTed in a special
eiecTion, or appoinTed?

\OLNN—

EleCTed In a general elecTion.
EIecTed in a special elecTion.
AppoinTed.

OTher; NA; N0.

I4-l7 22-28 PREVIOUS OFFICE AND GOVERNMENTAL EXPERIENCE

I4 22 Q. 7.

Have you ever held any oTher elecTive or appoinTed

office in governmenT oTher Than your currenT office
(includes Local Board of EducaTion buT noT Civic minded
organizaTions).

<43) ' I.

(74) 2.
(I) 9.

Yes.
OTher; NA; NO.

(If Yes) WhaT posiTions have you held?

NOTE: Code up To Three menTions. If The respondenT has
held more Than Three offices, seIeCT The Three in
which he served The longesT Time.

15 23—24 FIRST ELECTED OR APPOINTED OFFICE HELD

0i. Commission or board appoinTed by The CiTy council
or commission.

02. Commission or board appoinTed by The mayor.

O3. CiTy councilman/commissioner.

04. Mayor.

05. AppoinTed CiTy Office.

06. Township Supervisor.

07. AppoinTed Township Office.

08. CounTy Board of Supervisors.

09. OTher counTy office.

10. AppoinTed counTy office.

11. STaTe board or commission appoinTed by The Governor.

12. STaTe RepresenTaTive.

I3. STaTe SenaTor.

l4. OTher sTaTe office.

20. OTher elecTed CiTy office.

21. Local Board of EducaTion.

22. Local HumaniTarian ProjeCT (UniTed Fund, MenTal
HealTh Board, eTc.).

23. OTher civic mended organizaTion.

(204)

Var. Column
No. Number Code Deck I

 

 

24. Local home owners associaTion.
99. OTher; NA; NO.

l6 25-26 SECOND ELECTED OR APPOINTED OFFICE

(Use The code for columns 23-24)

17 27-28 THIRD ELECTED OR APPOINTED OFFICE
(Use The code for columns 23—24)
I8-20 29-34 YEARS SERVED IN PREVIOUS ELECTED OR APPOINTED OFFICES
(If Yes on O. 7.) How long did you serve in These posiTions?

I8 29-30 NUMBER OF YEARS IN FIRST ELECTED OR APPOINTED OFFICE

Oi. One year served.
02. Two years served.

03. ETC.
99. OTher; NA; NO.

I9 3I-32 NUMBER OF YEARS IN SECOND ELECTED OR APPOINTED OFFICE

(Use The code for columns 29-30)

20 33-34 NUMBER OF YEARS IN THIRD ELECTED OR APPOINTED OFFICE
(Use The code for columns 29-30)

2| 35 POLITICAL AFFILIATION

Q. 8. As far as poliTicaI affiliaTion goes, how do you
Think of yourself - as a Republican, a DemocraT, or whaT?

I. Republican
3. IndependenT (VoTes for The man).
(57) 5. DemocraT

9. OTher; NA; NO

22 36 TICKET SPLITTING

O. 9. In voTing in elecTions, have you ever spIiT your
TickeT? If yes, how regular or common, over The pasT
five or Ten years, have you found if desirable To spliT
your TickeT?

(25) I. No; sTraighT TickeT voTer.

(I7) 3. Yes; buT very rarely.

(2|) 4. Yes; someTimes.

(55) 5. Yes; very regular occurance.
9

. OTher; NA; NO.

Var.
No.

23

24-27

24

25

 

#LNN—
e

(205)

Column
NUmber Code Deck 1
37 PATTERN OF TICKET SPLITTING
0.10. (If Yes on Q. 9.) Now in spliTTing your TickeT,
have you noTiced any paTTern, i.e. have you voTed for
one parTy, say, for The offices aT The naTional level -
congress or The PresidenT, and voTed for anoTher parTy's
candidaTes for The sTaTe or counTy offices - or whaT?
(26) l. lnapplicable (sTraighT TickeT voTer).
(2|) 2. PaTTern: spliTs aT The local or counTy level.
(10) 3. PaTTern: spliTs aT The local and sTaTe level.
(8) 4. PaTTern: spliTs aT The naTionaI level.
(6) 5. PaTTern: spliTs according To The candidaTes'
ideological posiTion.
(42) 6. No PaTTern noTed.
(5) 9. OTher; NA; NO.
38-41 PARTY OFFICES HELD
33 0.11. Have you ever held a posiTion in your parTy oTher
Than by virTue of your elecTed office?
NOTE: If The number of years respondenT has spenT
as a precincT delegaTe equals his years of parTy
acTiviTy, assume ThaT respondenT has noT been
involved wiTh his parTy oTher Than by virTue of
his elecTed posiTion.
(67) 1. N0.
(50) 5. Yes.
(I) 9. OTher; NA; NO.

(If Yes on 0. ll.) WhaT posiTion(s) have you held in your
parTy? Code up To Three menTions. If The respondenT
has held more Than Three posiTions, code The Three
mosT prominenT in Terms of years held; oTherwise code
Chronologically.

39 FIRST PARTY OFFICE

PrecinCT DelegaTe.

DelegaTe To The sTaTe convenTion.
DelegaTe To The naTionaI convenTion.
Member of The Township/CounTy/Congressional DisTriCT

Ruling CommiTTee or Board.

Chairman of The Township/CounTy/Congressional DisTriCT

Ruling CommiTTee or Board.
Member of The STaTe ParTy CommiTTee.

Member of a local parTy Club.
OTher; NA; NO.

Var.
No.

26

27

28-30

28

29

30

3|

32

Column

Number

40

4|

42é47

42-43

44-45

46-47

48

(I3)
(16)
(38)
(I3)
(I61
(22)

(0)
49

(29)

(206)

Code Deck 1

 

SECOND PARTY OFFICE
(Use The code for column 39)
THIRD PARTY OFFICE

(Use The code for column 39)

YEARS SERVED IN PARTY OFFICE

(If Yes on 0. ll.) How long have you held your parTy
office(s)?

YEARS SERVED IN FIRST PARTY OFFICE

00. lnapplicable
01. One year
02. Two years

03. ETC.
99. OTher; NA; NO

YEARS SERVED IN SECOND PARTY OFFICE

(Use The Code for columns 42-43)

YEARS SERVED IN THIRD PARTY OFFICE

(Use The code for columns 42-43)

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

0.12. How abouT your poliTical phIIOSOphy? Generally speak-
ing, do you consider yourself To be more of a liberal, a
moderaTe, or a conservaTive on poliTical issues?

. ConservaTive

. ModeraTe ConservaTive
ModeraTe

ModeraTe Liberal
Liberal

PragmaTisT; IT depends on The issue (RespondenT
says he is liberal on some issues, conservaTive on

oThers yeT he doesn'T Classify as a moderaTe).
9. OTher; NA; NO.

OlU'l-bLNN—
. .

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY INDEX
Index based on The Code for Column 48.

l. ConservaTive (1's and 2's)

Var.
No.

 

33

34

35

36

Column
Number
(38)
(29)
(22)
50
(83)
(8)
(8)
(4)
(I)
(14)
5|
(ll)
(39)
(68)
52
(0)
(I)
(9)
(21)
(18)
(69)
53
(0)
(I)
(26)

Code

2.
3.
9.

(207)

Deck I

ModeraTe (3's)
Liberal (4's and 5's)
OTher; NA; NO (6's and 9's)

ACCEPTANCE OF THE LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE LABELS INDEX

Index based on The respondenT's answer To 0. 12.

AccepTed The labels wiThouT commenT.
AccepTed The labels for The mosT parT, yeT sTaTed
ThaT They were no longer very meaningful.

AccepTed The labels for The mosT parT yeT sTaTed
ThaT They were ambiguous.

RejecTed The labels enTirely; They no longer have
meaning.

ReJeCTed The labels enTirely; They are ambiguous.
OTher; NA; N0.

COGNIZANCE OF OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE

0.|3.

(COUNCILMEN ONLY) Do you know of any CiTy councilmen/

commissioners who have gone on To oTher elecTed offices
or posiTions in governmenT?

I.
5.
9.

No.
Yes.
OTher; NA; NO.

DOES SERVING ON THE COUNCIL/COMMISSION HELP

0.|4.

(COUNCILMEN/COMMISSIONERS ONLY) Do you feel ThaT

being on The council/commission qualifies you or helps
your Chances of being elecTed or nominaTed for oTher
offices?

0

OUT-bUN—
e

No; noT aT all.
No; noT much.
Perhaps; IT can; IT really depends on The person.

Yes; iT helps.
Yes; very much.

OTher; NA; NO.

OFFICES WHICH SERVICE ON THE COUNCIL/COMMISSION MIGHT HELP

ATTAIN

(If Yes or Perhaps on 0. 14.). WhaT offices do you have in
mind?

I.
2.
3.

Mayor.
CounTy Supervisor/Commissioner.
STaTe RepresenTaTive (no middle office necessary).

Var.
No.

 

37

38

39

40

Column
Number
;(3)
(7)
(IO)
(71)
54
(I3)
(27)
(27)
(51)
55
(2)
(2)
(3)
(32)
(O)
(0)
(0)
(79)
56
(5)
(0)
(O)
(113)
57

Code

 

\001U1-b

(208)

Deck I

EiTher Mayor or CounTy Supervisor.
EiTher Mayor or STaTe RepresenTaTive.
EiTher CounTy Supervisor or STaTe RepresenTaTive.

OTher; NA; NO.

OFFICES WHICH ARE STEPPING STONES UP THE POLITICAL LADDER

0.|5.

(LEGISLATOR/CONGRESSMAN ONLY) In your opinion,

are There any offices which are naTuraI sTepping sTones
up (The poliTical ladder) from your posiTion as

(legislaTor/congressman)?

 

3.

5.
9.

No; No clear paThway up; Offices become available
primarily Through chance occurances or opporTuniTy.
Perhaps - buT advancemenT in elecTive office is
primarily The resulT of chance opporTuniTy and
ambiTion.

Yes; Unequivical.

OTher; NA; NO.

STEPPING STONE OFFICES

(LEGISLATORS ONLY — If Yes or Perhaps on 0.15.) WhaT are
These offices?

\O\|O\U1<blLfl N—
o

STaTe SenaTor.
STaTe SenaTor - yeT The office of sTaTe senaTor is

noT (or is only a small) sTep up.
U.S. RepresenTaTive — inTermediaTe office necessary.

U.S. RepresenTaTive - inTermediaTe office noT necessary.
LT. Governor.

Governor.

STaTe SenaTor or U.S. RepresenTaTive.

OTher; NA; NO.

(CONGRESSMEN ONLY - If Yes or Perhaps on 0.15.) WhaT are
These offices?

\OAUN—

U.S. SenaTor.
Governor.

LT. Governor.
OTher STaTewide Office.
OTher; NA; NO.

COGNIZANCE OF OFFICE PATHWAY INDEX

NOTE:

This index is based on The respondenT's answer To
eiTher 0.14 (counciImen/commissioners) or 0.15
(congressmen).

Var.
No.

 

4|

42

Column
Number
(11)
(36)
(33)
(34)
(4)
58
.(2)
(4)
(2)
(3)
(9)
(I3)
(72)
(I3)
59
(67)

(6)

(9)

Code

3.

(209)

Deck I

RespondenT percieves no office paThway up from his
office.

RespondenT admiTs ThaT There is some evidence of an
office paThway, buT mainTains ThaT advancemenT in
elecTive office is primarily The resulT of chance
occurrances; personaliTy; ambiTion.

RespondenT perceives an office paThway - buT he
doesn'T consider himself To be in such a paThway.

RespondenT perceives an office paThway leading up from
his currenT office (No indicafion ThaT he does noT
consider himself in This paThway).

OTher; NA; NO.

RESPONDENT‘S FUTURE IN POLITICS

NOTE:

0.16.

lnformaTion ThaT may be helpful for coding This
seCTion on poliTicaI ambiTion may also be found in
The discussion abouT The respondenT's hypoTheTicaI
TransiTion from office which is The subjecT of
quesTions 23 and 24.

Generally speaking, how do you view your fuTure in

poliTics? For example, do you expeCT To conTinue To run
for The office of (CiTy councilman/commissioner, sTaTe
legisIaTor, congressman)?

6.
7.
9

No - have become fed up wiTh The Job (dissaTisfaCTion

noTed).

No - have served long enough.

No - reTiring because of age, healTh reasons, or cosT
in Terms of IosT work.

No - buT respondenT inTends To remain acTive in

poliTics (eiTher running for lower level office or
involving himself in communiTy affairs).

No - will run for higher office nexT eIeCTlon (MAC
of respondenT's number and The office he will seek)
Probably; MosT Likely.

Yes; DefinaTer.

OTher; NA; NO.

NUMBER OF TERMS RESPONDENT WISHES TO REMAIN

(If Yes on 0.16) Do you feel ThaT There is only a IimiTed
number of Terms you wish To remain (on The council/in The
legislaTure/in The congress)?

I O
2.

No - RespondenT has no seT number of Terms he wishes To

remain.
Yes - RespondenT has a definaTe number of Terms in

mind, and Then he plans To reTire from poliTics.

Yes - RespondenT has a definiTe number of Terms in mind
buT he will leave because he believes no represenTaTivo
should serve indefinaTely.

Var.
No.

 

43

44

45

Column
Number
(5)
.(9)
(22)
60
61
(28)
(25)
(31)
(20)
(13)
(l)
62
(IO)
(8)
(7)
,(7)
(15)
(2)
(69)

Code

4.

9.

(210)

Deck 1

Yes - RespondenT has a definaTe number of Terms

in mind, buT will remain in poliTics (eiTher
running for lower office or reinvolving himself in
communiTy affairs).

Yes - RespondenT has a definaTe number of Terms

he wishes To remain in his presenT office, Then
he plans or aT leasT enTerTains The idea ThaT he

may advance in poliTics.
OTher; NA; NO.

NUMBER OF TERMS RESPONDENT WISHES TO REMAIN

(If Yes on 0. 16., and Yes - RespondenT has a definaTe
number of Terms he wishes To remain in his presenT
office) How many Terms?

\DChU'l-bUlN—O

lnapplicable.

One more Term.

Two more Terms.

Three more Terms.

One or Two more Terms.
Two or Three more Terms.
Three or four more Terms.
OTher; NA; NO.

AMBITION FOR OTHER OFFICES

0.17.

Are There any oTher poliTical or governmenTal

posiTions - local, sTaTe, or federal - which you
personally would like To seek?

UN—

4.
5.
9

No; definaTely noT
No; NoT aT This Time

Possibly; IT Depends; Non-commiTal buT posiTive
abouT poliTics.

Yes; Probably; If The opporTuniTy came up.

Yes

OTher; NA; NO.

POSSIBLE FUTURE OFFICES

(If Yes or Possibly on 0.17) WhaT are (or is) There posiTion(s)?

\OOUl-bLNN—
0

Mayor.

CounTy Board of Supervisors.
STaTe RepresenTaTive.

STaTe SenaTor.

Congressman.

U.S. SenaTor.

OTher; NA; NO.

Var. Column
No. Number

46 63-64

(9)

(I)

(I4)

(4)

(12)

(5)

(18)

(2)

(l9)

(l3)

(7)
(8)

(6)
47 65

(IO)
(53)
(49)

(6)

Code

(211)

Deck 1

POLITICAL AMBITION INDEX

0|.

02.

03.

04.

05.

06.

07.

08.

O9.

99.

RespondenT is leaving office afTer The presenT

Term and anTicipaTes no more or very IiTTle more
poliTical involvemenT.

RespondenT is leaving office afTer The presenT Term buT
inTends To remain acTive in poliTical affairs (eiTher

seeking whaT he considers a lower level office or involv-
ing himself in local poliTical affairs).

RespondenT plans To remain in presenT office for
a IimiTed number of Terms Then plans To subsTanTially

reduce his poliTical InvolvemenT.
RespondenT plans To remain in presenT office for only

one or Two more Terms buT inTends To remain acTive in
poliTical affairs (This includes The possibiliTy

of RespondenT seeking a lower level office or
becoming involved or re—involved in local

poliTical affairs.
RespondenT plans or is willihg To serve in his

presenT office as long as he feels he's doing
an effecTive or good Job and enjoys iT.
RespondenT is planning To remain in office as
long as consTiTuTenTs reTurn him To office (no
dedicaTlon To presenT office discerned).

RespondenT is planning To remain in office as long
as consTiTuenTs reTurn him To office (some dedicaTion

To presenT job discernible; some indicaTion he would
like To remain in office).

RespondenT Is dedicaTed To presenT office and hopes
To rise in influence wiThin iTs range or purview
(e.g. wiThin house, run for mayor, eTc.).

RespondenT leaves open The possibiliTy ThaT he may
seek higher office in The fuTure (no menTion of

dedicaTion To presenT office in Terms of making
if a career).

RespondenT plans To work hard in his presenT office
yeT leaves open The possibiliTy ThaT he may seek

higher poliTical office in The fuTure.
RespondenT plans To run for higher office in The

fuTure.
RespondenT is going To seek higher poliTical office

in The nexT elecTion.
OTher; NA; NO.

COLLAPSED POLITICAL AMBITION INDEX

I.
3.
5.
9

DiscreTe AmbiTion (01's and 02's)
STaTiC AmbiTion (03 To 07)
Progressive AmbiTion (08 To 12)
OTher; NA; NO

Var.
No.

 

48-61

48
49

50

51
52

53
54

55

56
57
58

59

60

Column
Number
66-80
06-21

(Dk 2)

66 (l)
67 (0)
68 (3)
69 (2)
70 (I4)
71 (I)
72 (3)
73 (51)
74 (43)
75 (2)
76 (25)
77 (31)
78 (2)

Code

 

0.18.

(212)

Deck 1

In reflecTing on your own experience (on The

council/in The IegislaTure/in The congress), and in
poliTics in general, whaT is if you find mosT
appealing abouT poliTics? (WhaT aTTracTs you To iT?).

NOTE:

I.
5.

FIRST, code each appealing aspecT noTed by The

proceeding down The lisT of possible appealing aspecTs
on The following PoliTical MoTivaTion Code SheeT.

For each aspecT lisTed, code wheTher if was menTioned
by RespondenT. The code for each iTem on The code-
sheeT is as follows.

NoT menTioned by The respondenT.
MenTioned by The respondenT.

POLITICAL MOTIVATION CODE SHEET

GENERAL OR UNDEFINED

II.
12.

Life commiTmenT; like everyThing abouT poliTics.
OTher (MAC)*

AFFILITATIVE BENEFITS

21.

23.
25.

26.
27.

ConviviaIiTy wiTh colleagues (on council, in The

House, in The Congress) - general sTaTemenT.

The social aTmosphere of The council/legislaTure/congress.
Talking and being wiTh my friends on The council/in

The legislaTure/in The congress.

ConTaCT wiTh greaT/influenTial men.

OTher (MAC).

POWER/INFLUENCE/"CENTER OF THINGS"

30.34. Being in The "cenTer of Things", "where The

acTion is", eTC. (See following NoTe)

31.35. Power or influence on decisions or poliTical affairs.
32.36. Freedom of acTion.
33.37. Having The power or influence To cuT Through

bureaucraTiC red Tape when you wanT To help someone.

38. Chance To express opinions or share in public

discussion.

39. OTher. (MAC).

* - MAC means make a card.

Var.
No.

61
62

Column

Number

79 (I8)
80 (43)

Code

NOTE:

-(213)

Deck 1

The caTegory "Power/lnfluence/‘CenTer of Things'"
perTains To remarks by respondenTs which indicaTe
saTisfacTion wiTh or a desire To wield power and
influence for iTs own sake raTher Than as a means
To accomplish cerTain goals. IT was esTablished To

disTlnguish.commenTs indicaTive of an auThoriTarian's
saTisfacTion wiTh holding power from The achievemenT—

orienTed person's saTisfacTion wiTh holding power
because of iTs insTrumenTal uTiIiTy. Coders should
be sensiTive To This disTincTion - especially in
judging sTaTemenTs such as "I like poliTics because
iT puTs me where The acTion is". Such a sTaTemenT

ma indicaTe an "achievemenT" orienTaTion raTher Than
a 'power" orienTaTion. The Codes 30-33 are The "power

moTivaTion" codes and The codes 34-37 are The "achieve-
menT moTivaTion" codes. These apply only To The second

parT of The coding procedure for 0.18 (see below).
Coders should lisTen To The respondenT's enTire

response as To whaT appeals To him abouT poliTics
before deciding The caTegory in which This Type
of remark should be placed.

STATUS/PRESTIGE/RESPECT

4|.

43.

ConTaCT wiTh people, consTiTuenTs.
Honor; PresTige; RespeCT accorded To The posiTion.

Var.

63
64

65

66
67

68

69

70
71

72
73

74

75

76
77

78

Column
Number

01

02-04

05

06-21

06 (4)
07 (5)
08 (21)
09 (32)
IO (30)
II (9)
12 (23)
I3 (26)
I4 (2)
15 (7)
16 (ll)
17 (O)
18 (25)
19 (5)
20 (5)

21 (I)

(214)

Code Deck 2
DECK NUMBER (2)
RESPONDENT INTERVIEW NUMBER

001-051 CiTy Councilman or CiTy Commissioner

052-101 STaTe RepresenTaTive
102-118 U.S. RepresenTaTive

RESPONDENT OFFICE LEVEL

1. CiTy Councilman or CiTy Commissioner
2. STaTe RepresenTaTive
3. U.S. RepresenTaTive

POLITICAL MOTIVATION CODE SHEET CONTINUED

45. EnTree; Access To imporTanT people
47. OTher."" ’ (MAC)

ACHIEVEMENT

51. Solving concreTe social, Technical, or IegislaTive
problems.

53. Service To consTiTuenTs, "casework", "ombudsman".

55. Helping To deyeIOp and pass IegislaTion.

57. OTher' " " (MAC)

MORAL/PHILOSOPHICAL

6|. "CiTizen duTy"; conTribuTion To solving social-
poliTical problems (no issue conTenT).

63. Chance To help people (humaniTarian sense).

67. OTher. (MAC).

IDEOLOGICAL

7i. Chance To represenT or fighT for The "IiTTle man",
The people, eTC.

73. Chance To expound a cerTain philosophy or poinT of
view.

77. OTher. (MAC)

MISCELLANEOUS

81. lnTelleCTual saTisfacTions; educaTional experiences.

83. DiversiTy of experiences.
87. OTher.’ (MAC)

91. NoThing; No aTTracTions (This code is noT inconsisTenT

wiTh oTher codes in These columns; iT is a prioriTy
code, however, i.e. if iT appears, iT musT appear in

columns 23—24 also).

Var.
No.

79

80

8|

82

83
84

85

86
87

88
89

 

(215)

Deck 2

SECOND parT of 0.18. Code up To Three menTions in order
of prominence or imporTance To The respondenT. If
prominence cannoT be ascerTained by voice inflecTion,
eTc., lisT The main menTions in order of Their

menTion. Also, some informafion perTinenT To This coding
judgemenT may be found in The respondenT's answers To

0. 27 and 0. 28. LisTen To These answers before
making final judgemenT abouT RespondenT's moTivaTions.

(Use The PoliTicaI MoTivaTion Code SheeT)

 

 

(Use The PoliTical MoTivaTion Code SheeT)

(Use The PoliTical MoTivaTion Code SheeT)

WhaT do you find unappealing abouT poliTics?

FIRST, code each unappealing aspecT noTed by The
respondenT by proceeding down The IisT of possible
unappealing aspecTs of poliTics on The PoliTical

FrusTraTions Code SheeT. For each aspecT lisTed,
code wheTher iT was menTioned by RespondenT. The

code for each iTem on The code sheeT is as follows.

 

Time consTrainTs in general; heCTicness.
No Time for family; friends; privacy gone; relaxaTion,

General working condiTions: lack of faciliTies; lack

Column
Number Code
22-23 RESPONDENT'S MOST PROMINENT POLITICAL MOTIVATION
24—25 RESPONDENT‘S SECOND MOST PROMINENT MOTIVATION
26-27 RESPONDENT'S THIRD MOST PROMINENT MOTIVATION
28-77 POLITICAL FRUSTRATIONS

0.19.

NOTE:

1. NOT menTioned by The RespondenT
5. MenTioned by The RespondenT
POLITICAL FRUSTRATIONS CODE SHEET

WORKING CONDITIONS AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS
28 (16) ll.
29 (34) 12.

hobbies, eTc.
30 (3) l4.
of assisTance; irregular schedule.

31 (12) 15. Financial problems; noT enough pay.
32 (6) 16. WasTed Time.
33 (4) l7. Boredom; rouTine; drugery of The job.
34 (II) 18. OTher (MAC).

Var.
No.

 

90

91
92

93
94

95
96

97
98

99
100

101

102
103

104
105
106

107
108

109

110

III
112

113

114

115

Column

Number

35 (ll)
36 (7)
37 (2)
38 (2)
39 (5)
4O (0)
4| (2)
42 (ll)
43 (2)
44 (0)
45 (3)
46 (7)
47 (6)
48 (5)
49 (3)
50 (6)
51 (I3)
52 (12)
53 (6)
54 (2)
55 (IO)
56 (O)
57 (3)
58 (3)
59 (4)
60 (9)

Code

(.216)

Deck 2

IMPOTENCE WITH RESPECT TO OTHER POLITICAL ACTORS

21.

22.
23.

24.
25.

26.
27.

One man cannoT bring abouT any significanT Change.

Lack of influence of minoriTy parTy on policy-making.
Lack of influence wiTh senior parTy members.

Lack of influence wiTh leaders in The legislaTure/congress.
RespondenT senses impoTence in comparison To or in

conTesT wiTh The power of cerTain voTing blocs or

inTeresT groups.

ParTy dominaTion of legislaTure/congress.

OTher' (MAC).

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, LEADERSHIP AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

3|.
32.

35.
37.

40.

41.
42.

43.
44.
45.

46.
47.

48.

49.

OrganizaTion, meThods, and slowness of The council/
legislaTure/Congress To acT.

Slowness-and oTher inadequacies of poliTical

insTiTuTions in general.

Lack of educaTed, Technically prepared poliTical leaders.
OTher. (MAC).

Public apaThy and ignorance; consTiTuenTs who over
esTimaTe your power.

Servicing consTiTuenTs' demands; "casework".
EleCTions and campaigning; having To good hand
for supporT.

Having To ask for campaign money.

PuinCiTy, public aTTenTion, inaccurage press.
Undue pressure or criTiCism from parTicular
inTeresT groups or consTiTuenTs on policy.
Lack of respeCT for poliTiCians.

NecessiTy of making loTs of conTaCTs; "The social
side of iT".

Gap beTween poliTical leaders and The people;
popular apaThy.

OTher (MAC).

LIMITATIONS ON SOLVING PROBLEMS OR REACHING GOALS

51.
52.

53.

54.

55.

Too much Talk - noT enough acTion; prioriTy of

absTraCT discussion over concreTe problem solving.
"ParTisanship"; prioriTy or necessiTy of parTisan

maneuvering or parTisan bickering over concreTe problem-
solving. '
Uselessness of acTiviTy; problems never solved;

decisions never made; noThing concreTe ever accomplished;

no sense of accomplishmenT.

No Time or opporTuniTy for sTudying concreTe problems
or IegislaTion.

FrusTraTion of geTTing oThers' agreemenT To policy
proposals; poliTical reaIiTies Taking precedenT over
ideals.

Var.
No.

 

116

117

118

119
120

121

122

123
124

125

126

127
128
129

I30
I31
I32

I33

 

Column
Number Code
61 (I) 56.

62 (4) 57.

63 (6) 58.

(217)

Deck 2

LegislaTive leaders Too narrow minded, lack of
vision or perspeCTive.

CommiTTee sysTem, legislaTive procedures prevenT
expediTious problem solving.

OTher. ' (MAC).

AMBITION, ANTAGONISM, AND DISTRUST

64 (2) 61.
65 (4) 62.

66 (2) 63.

67 (I) 68.

Personal anTagonisms, RespondenT CiTes difficulTies

among colleagues in Terms of personaliTy coaniCT.
RespondenT CiTes persons or groups whose ambiTion or lusT

for power is disTasTeful.

RespondenT indicaTes ThaT iTs difficuIT To mainTain
ones inTegriTy in The conTexT of poliTical
bargaining.

OTher (MAC).

POLITICAL MORALITY

68 (I) 71.
69 (I) 72.

7O (7) 73.

7| (3) 74.

72 (2) 75.
73 (0) 76.
74 (4) 77.

RespondenT CiTes low level of moraliTy or inTegriTy

among his colleagues.
RespondenT dislikes poliTics because iT encourages demogogy -

disTorTing issues To gain The favor of The eleCToraTe.
RespondenT CiTes The propensiTy of some colleague who

use Their office To beTTer Their personal sTaTus or

wealTh.

RespondenT CiTes lack of poliTicaI eThics; unfair

TaCTics and personal aTTacks on The parT of his

colleagues.

Special inTeresTs Taking prioriTy over The general inTeresT.
Cynicism; hypocrisy; bad faiTh.

OTher (MAC).

MISCELLANEOUS

75 (4) 81.
76 (0) 80.
77 (O) 99.

OTher poliTiCians boring or uninTeresTing, or ignoranT.
OTher (MAC).
No dissaTisfacTions.

78-79 SECOND, code up To Three menTions in order of prominence or
06-08 imporTance To The respondenT. If prominence cannoT be
(Dk 3) ascerTained by voice inflecTion, eTc., lisT according To The

order of menTion. InformaTion perTinenT To This judgemenT
may also be found in RespondenT's answers To quesTions 27

and 28 on "TransiTion".

78-79 RESPONDENT'S MOST PROMINENT POLITICAL FRUSTRATION

(Use The PoliTical FrusTraTions Code SheeT)

(ConTinued on Column 06 of Deck 3)

 

IDEOLOGY, COGNITIVE

AND BELIEF SYSTEMS

Varu Column

No . Number
01
02-04
05

134 06—07

135 08-09

I36 10

(2)

(5)

(I8)
(43)

(49)
(I)

STYLE,

Code Deck 3

 

DECK NUMBER (3)

RESPONDENT INTERVIEW NUMBER

001-051 CiTy Councilman or CiTy Commissioner

052-101 STaTe RepresenTaTive
102-118 U.S. RepresenTaTive

RESPONDENT OFFICE LEVEL

1. CiTy Councilman or CiTy Commissioner
2. STaTe RepresenTaTive
3. U.S. RepresenTaTive

RESPONDENT'S SECOND MOST PROMINENT POLITICAL FRUSTRATION

(Use The PoliTicaI FrusTraTions Code SheeT)

RESPONDENT'S THIRD MOST PROMINENT POLITICAL FRUSTRATION
(Use The PoliTical FrusTraTions Code SheeT)

OVERALL ATTRACTIVENESS TO POLITICS INDEX

This index is based on The coder's JudgmenT abouT The
respondenT's aTTracTion To poliTics.

l. The respondenT dislikes iT very much. No imporTanT
saTisfacTions.

2. On balance, he dislikes 1T. Some aTTracTions, buT
dissaTisfacTions are more imporTanT.

3. Pro-Con. SaTisfaCTions and veryiimporTanT dissaTisfacTions.

4. On balance he likes iT. Some dissaTisfacTions, buT
saTisfacTions more imporTanT.

5. The respondenT likes if very much. No imporTanT

dissaTisfacTions.
9. OTher; NA; NO.

(218)

i‘IHI' 1. ._.~

(219)

Varu Column

 

No. Number Code Deck 3
I37 ll-|2 CARE WHEN SPEAKING OUT 0R VOTING

0.20. How careful would you say you have To be (are) when
speaking ouT or voTing on public issues in Terms of how
iT effecTs your Chances for winning re-elecTion?

.(9) 01. NOT very careful (no reason given).

(3) 02. NoT very careful - RespondenT says ThaT The eleCToraTe
is so unknowledgeable or uninTeresTed ThaT he cannoT
geT hurT no maTTer which way he voTes or speaks ouT.

(3) 03. NoT very careful - RespondenT says he voTes The way
he Thinks is righT and The Chips fall where They
may.

(16) 04. NoT very careful - RespondenT says he does noT pay

aTTenTion To special inTeresTs or pressure groups,
buT voTes his conscious.

(IO) 05. NoT very careful - voTers TrusT my judgmenT; As long
as I can jusTify my posiTion on The issues, "as long

as you're honesT wiTh The people", eTc.
(30) 06. Reasonable careful - RespondenT says as long as he

explains his posiTion To his consTiTuenTs, he is
quiTe free To voTe as he Chooses.

(ll) 07. Reasonable careful - RespondenT says on mosT issues
he does noT have To be careful, buT on some he
has To be reasonable careful.

(25) 08. Reasonably careful - RespondenT says iT is wise To
be careful on all issues; Should be generally careful.

(3) 09. Reasonably careful - RespondenT says on mosT issues
he does noT have To be concerned, buT on some he
musT be very careful.

(2) 10. Very careful - minimal qualificaTions.

(0) 99. OTher; NA; NO.

I38 I3 RESPONSIVENESS INDEX

This index is based on The code for 0.20.

(47) I. NoT very careful (01 Through 05).
(69) 2. Reasonably careful (06 Through 09).
(2) 3. Very Careful (10's)

(0) 9. OTher; NA; NO (99's)

I39 14 INTENSITY OF CAMPAIGN EFFORT

0.21. How would you describe The inTensiTy of your efforTs
To be elecTed (or re-elecTed) during The lasT campaign -
i.e., would you say ThaT you exerTed considerably efforT,
moderaTe efforT, or a raTher small amounT of efforT?

(3) I. A raTher small amounT of efforT — respondenT did noT
seem To care if he won.

(220)

Var. Column
No. Number Code Deck 3

 

(21) 2. A raTher small amounT of efforT - no real compeTiTion;
safe disTricT.
(7) 3. A raTher small amounT of efforT - RespondenT says

he had only minimal compeTiTion in The primary and/or
The general elecTion.

(l6) 4. ModeraTe efforT - RespondenT says he did noT have
To puT forTh a considerable efforT buT he did work

hard.
(6) 5. ModeraTe efforT - RespondenT says he had moderaTely

sTrong compeTiTion in eiTher The primary or general

elecTion.
(l9) 6. Considerable efforT - RespondenT says he campaigns

hard every elecTion.
(I7) 7. Considerable efforT - RespondenT had sTrong

compeTiTion in The general elecTion.
(29) 8. Considerable efforT - RespondenT had sTrong primary

compeTiTion or was running his firsT campaign.
(0) 9. OTher; NA; NO.

140 15 PREVIOUS ELECTION EFFORT INDEX

This index is based on The code for 0.2l.

(3i) . A raTher small amounT of efforT (1'5, 2'5 and 3'5).
(22) . ModeraTe efforT (4's and 5's).

1

3
(65) 5. Considerable efforT (6'5, 7'5, 8's).
(0) 9. OTher; NA; NO (9's).

|4I I6 ELECTORAL EXPECTATIONS

0.22. (COUNCILMAN/COMMISSIONERS ONLY) Is There ever much
compeTiTion for The office of CiTy (councilman/commissioner)
here in (CiTy) ?

(2) I. No; Only rarely is There ever much compeTiTion.

(l6) 3. SomeTimes; IT varies.

(33) 5. Yes; There is always compeTiTion; There is usually
compeTiTion.

(67) 9. OTher; NA; NO.

I42 I7 NECESSITY OF A PRIMARY ELECTION

0.23. (COUNCILMEN) Do you expecT ThaT in The nexT campaign,
a primary elecTion will be necessary To deTermine who

will be The CiTy council (commission) candidaTes in The
general eICTion? (LEGISLATORS/CONGRESSMEN) Do you

expecT To have serious primary compeTiTion in The nexT
campaign?

(2|) I. No. - RespondenT says he expecTs no compeTiTion.

Var.

No»

143

I44

I45

Column

Number

20

(22)

(I3)
(33)

(ll)
(18)

(44)

(48)
(9)
(5)

(0)
(0)
(12)

(92)

(I4)
(0)
(12)

.(6)

(24)
(2)

(71)

(15)

Code

2.

(221)

Deck 3
No. - AT leasT no serious compeTiTion.
Possibly; lTs hard To say aT This Time.
Yes. - RespondenT Thinks There will be aT leasT
a moderaTe ThreaT To his posiTion.
Yes. - RespondenT says he is sure he will have

To work hard in The primary race.
OTher; NA; NO.

CHANCES IN THE PRIMARY

0.24.

If There is a primary elecTion, how would you,,aTu

This Time, assess your Chances of being selecTed as a
candidaTe for anoTher Term?

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
9.

100% confidenT of winning; sure Thing; no problem
whaTsoever.

Very likely; 70-90% confidenT of winning.

Likely — some Chance of defeaT however; 60% confidenT.
50-50 Chance of winning; Too Close To predicT;

Always runs a Close race.
SomewhaT unlikely; 40% confidenT of winning.

Very unlikely; 0-30% Chance of winning.
OTher; NA; N0.

PRIMARY ELECTION ANTICIPATION INDEX

This index is based on The code for 0.24.

3.
5.
9

Very likely/CerTain (1'5 2'5 and RespondenT's who
face no primary compeTiTion).

50-50; SomewhaT unconfidenT (3's and 4's).

NoT very likely (5's and 6's).

OTher; NA; NO.

PROBLEMS IN PRIMARY VS. PROBLEMS IN GENERAL ELECTION

0.25.

Do you expecT more problems in winning The primary

Than The general elecTion, or more problems in The
general elecTion Than in The primary?

hulk)—
e

\0
o

More problems in The primary elecTion.

More problems in The general elecTion.
RespondenT anTicipaTes problems in boTh elecTions.

RespondenT does noT anTicipaTe problems in eiTher

elecTion.
OTher; NO; NO.

Var.
No.

 

I46

I47

I48

I49

Column

Number

2I

22

23

24

(222)

Code Deck 3

 

CHANCES IN THE GENERAL ELECTION

0.26. How do you assess your chances of winning The
nexT (general) elecTion?

(24) l. 100% confidenT of winning; Sure Thing; AnTicipaTes
no problem whaTsoever.

(56) 2. Very likely To win; 70-90% confidenT of winning.

(17) 3. Likely - some chance of defeaT expressed however;
60% confidenT.

(9) 4. 50—50 chance of winning; Too close To predicT;

Always runs as if iTs a close race.
(0) 5. SomewhaT unlikely ThaT he will win; 40% confidenT

of winning.

(0) 6. Very unlikely ThaT he will win; O-30% confidenT
of winning.

(12) 9. OTher; NA; N0.

GENERAL ELECTION ANTICIPATION INDEX
This index is based on The code for 0.26.

(80) 1. Very likely. (1's and 2'5).
(26) 3. 50-50; SomewhaT unconfidenT (3's and 4's).
(0) 5. NoT very likely (5's and 6's).

9. OTher; NA; NO.

ELECTORAL CONFIDENCE INDEX

This index is based on The codes for 0.24 and 0.26.

(75) l. RespondenT expecTs no problem winning eiTher The

primary or general elecTions (RespondenT scored
l's or 2's or boTh on 0.24 and 0.26).

(14) 2. RespondenT is confidenT (RespondenT scored a I or
2 on one of The quesTions and a 3 on The oTher).

(17) 3. RespondenT sees re-elecTion chances as problemaTic
(RespondenT scores a 1 Through 3 and 4 combinaTlon

on The quesTions or 3's on boTh).
(0) 4. RespondenT is unconfidenT-(RespondenT scored 2
Through 4 on one quesTion and a 4 on The oTher).
(O) 5. RespondenT is very unconfidenT (RespondenT scored
a 4 Through 6 on one quesTion and a 5 or 6 on The

oTher).
(12) 9. OTher; NA; NO.

COLLAPSED ELECTORAL CONFIDENCE INDEX

This index is based on The code for The ElecToral Confidence
Index.

(89) 1. RespondenT is confidenT (1's and 2's).

Var.

No.

150

I51

152

(223)

Column
Number Code Deck 3
(I7) 3. Pro-Con; 50-50 chance of winning (3's).
(0) 5. RespondenT is doubeul (4's and 5's).
9. OTher; NA; N0.
25 GENERAL CAMPAIGN EFFORT INDEX

NOTE: This index is based primarily on The respondenT's
answer To 0.21 (p.18). The coder should use The
informaTion from This answer and any perTinenT infor- “fl
maTion revealed by quesTions number 22 Through 26
To make a judgmenT abouT The efforT which The
respondenT normally makes (or probably will make)
in his campaign efforTs. r.

(18) l. RespondenT puTs forTh a raTher small amounT of

efforT.

(46) 2. RespondenT puTs forTh a moderaTe efforT.

(44) 3. RespondenT puTs forTh a considerable efforT.

(10) 9. OTher; NA; NO.

26 PERSONAL LOSS IF NOT RE-ELECTED
0.27. How much of a personal loss would you feel if, for

some reason, you are noT re—elecTed in The nexT elecTion
(if you lefT poliTics)?

NOTE: Coder should use The informaTion on The respondenT's
poliTical moTivaTion and in The Overall ATTracTive-
ness Index (p.16) for assisTance in making This
judgmenT.

(40) l. RespondenT anTicipaTes no personal sense of loss.

(45) 2. RespondenT anTicipaTes a moderaTe personal sense of

loss.
(26) 3. RespondenT anTicipaTes a greaT personal sense of loss.
(7) 9. OTher; NA; N0.
27 TRANSITION
0.28 If you lefT poliTics, do you Think There would be

much of a problem re-adjusTing To a life which does noT
include your parTicipaTion (on The council/in The
legislaTure/in The congress)?

(97) l. RespondenT anTicipaTes no problem in re-adjusfing -

in facT he may menTion some desire or advanTages To
leaving.

(224)

Var. Column
No. Number Code Deck 3

(ll) 2. RespondenT anTicipaTes some difficulTy in re-adjusTing
buT noThing problemaTic - minor financial, oc-

cupaTional or sTaTus problems menTioned.
(7) 3. RespondenT anTicipaTes a hard TransiTion - some

expression of anTicipaTed difficulTy or aT leasT
possible financial or occupaTionaI problems sTaTed.
(3) 9. OTher; NA; NO.

153 28 ADVANTAGES TO LEAVING POLITICS

0.29. Do you foresee any advanTage(s) To leaving poliTics?
(Does leaving poliTics appeal To you aT all?).

(56) 1o RespondenT noTes no real advanTage To leaving
poliTics aT all (Maybe some offhand advanTage
noTed - buT noT in a serious vain).

(34) 3. RespondenT noTes some advanTage To leaving
poliTics - aT leasT in leaving his presenT
poliTical acTiviTies.

(26) 5. RespondenT noTes real advanTages or a real
desire To leave his poliTical acTiviTies.
(2) 9. 0Ther;.NA; N0.

154 29 SOURCE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCES

0.30. In your campaigns, have you found ThaT There was
enough "ouTside money" available To finance iT adequaTely,
or have you found iT necessary To make a subsTanTial con-
TribuTion To This efforT from your personal resources?

(29) l. OuTside money used exclusively (no problem).

(32) 2. OuTside money by far The main source (RespondenT will
puT money in only for inconsequenTial expenses or
in unusual circumsTances - no hardship indicaTed).

(24) 3. Mixed (ouTside money The main source buT RespondenT
has puT in or usually puTs in 15-50% - no hardship
indicaTed).

(8) 4. Mixed (ouTside money is The main source buT RespondenT
usually conTribuTes a meaningful share of The campaign
finances; "meaningful" being a subjecTive judgmenT
based on 0.30 and 0.31).

(20) 5. RespondenT puTs in a good parT or all of whaT Is
required ouT of his own pockeT (no hardship indicaTed).

(3) 6. RespondenT puTs in a good parT of whaT is required
from his own pockeT (some hardship indicaTed).

(2) 9. OTher; NA; NO.

155 30 COST OF THE LAST CAMPAIGN

0.31. WhaT do you esTimaTe as The ToTaI cosT of your lasT
campaign?

Var.
No.

 

156

157

158-201

Column

Number

Code

NOTE:

00001.

00010.
00100.

31

(26)
(46)

(II)
(6)

(6)
(23)

32 i

(92)

(24)

33-80

(225)
Deck 3

Record The dollar amounT using all five columns
for campaigns cosTing over 9,999 dollars, four
columns (cols. 37-40) for campaigns cosTing over

999 dollars, Three columns (cols. 38-40) for
campaigns cosTing over 99 dollars, eTc.

One dollar spenT (unopposed IasT campaign).

Ten dollars spenT.
ETc.

FINANCIAL SITUATION NEXT CAMPAIGN

0.32.

How abouT in The nexT campaign, if you run, do you

foresee The same financial siTuaTion (in Terms of having
To puT money in ouT of your own pockeT)?

2.

9.

Yes - RespondenT will noT conTribuTe any of his own

money.

Yes - RespondenT will conTribuTe only an Incon-
sequenTial sum.

No - RespondenT will spend less of his own money.
Yes - RespondenT will conTribuTe a meaningful

share ("meaningful being a subjecTive coder
judgmenT).

No - RespondenT anTicipaTes having To spend more
of his own money.

OTher; NA; N0.

FINANCIAL COMMITMENT INDEX

This index is based on The coder's judgmenT of respondenT
answers To quesTions 30 and 32.

2.

RespondenT is noT concerned abouT campaign finances
(eiTher because iTs easy To geT enough money, he
feels he can work wiTh whaTever is raised, or because
campaign expenses are so inconsequenTial).

RespondenT is concerned abouT campaign finances buT
does noT seem worried abouT having To puT his own

money in if This is necessary.
RespondenT is financially commiTTed To his own

re-elecTion (some possible hardship or incon-
venience suggesTed).
OTher; NA; NO.

THE ORIGINS OF CRIME

0.33o

Now, I would like To ask you abouT an issue which

is of concern noT only To (sTaTe legislaTors), buT also
To boTh (CiTy councilmen) and (congressmen). This is

Var.
No.

158-197

158
I59
I60

I61
I62

I63
I64
I65
I66

167
168
I69
I70

I71
I72

I73
I74

I75
I76

I77

Column

Number

33-72

33
34
35

36
37

38
39
40
41

42
43
44
45

46
47

48
49

50
51

52

(2)
(23)
(28)

(28)
(29)

(7)
(6)
(II)
(3)

(2)
(I)
(3)
(4)

(22)
(9)

(5)
(6)

(20)
(25)

(6)

(226)

Code Deck 3

The problem of crime which we have in our socieTy.
How do you feel This came To be a problem (WhaT are The
origins or sources of crime)?

FIRST, code each cause of crime volunTeered or noTed by The

respondenT by proceeding down The lisT of possible causes
on The Causes of Crime Code SheeT. For each cause lisTed,

code wheTher iT was menTioned by RespondenT. The code
for each iTem on The Causes of Crime Code SheeT is as

follows.

1. NOT menTioned
5. MenTioned

CAUSES OF CRIME CODE SHEET

 

ECONOMIC/SOCIAL CONDITIONS

01. lnflaTion.
02° Affluence; maTerialism; poor envious of The rich.
O3. UnemploymenT.

O4. PoverTy.
O7. OTher (MAC)

 

POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

11. Increased populaTion.

12. DensiTy of The populaTion.
I3. MobiliTy of The populaTion.
I7. OTher (MAC).

SOCIAL CHANGE

21. Process of urbanizaTion.

22. Process of indusTriaIizaTion.
23. Process of modernizaTion.

27. OTher (MAC).

MORAL CLIMATE

31. Breakdown of moraliTy in socieTy.
32. Declining influence of religion.

33. CorrupTion in.high places.
37. OTher (MAC).

SOCIAL DISCIPLINE
41. General lack of respecT for laws and auThoriTy.

42. Permissive aTmosphere; Spockism; Public ApaThy.
47° OTher (MAC).

 

Var.

No.

178
I79

180
181

182
I83

I84

185
I86

187

I88

I89

190

00
N—

193

I94
I95
I96
I97

Column

Number

53
54

55
56

57
58

59

60
61

62

63

64

65

66
67

68

69
70
71
72

(227)

Code _ Deck 3

 

INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE

GOVERNMENTAL

(37) 51. CourTs (Judges) have been Too lenienT.
(20) 52. CourTs (or Supreme CourT decisions) have hamsTrung

law enforcemenT officials.
(9) 53. LegislaTors have noT properly addressed The problem..

(24) 57. OTher (MAC). -n
LAW ENFORCEMENT

(I) 55. Law enforcemenT agencies have been under sTaffed and

underequipped.
(2) 56. Law enforcemenT forces have failed To crack down or

deal wiTh The drug problem.
(13) 57. OTher (MAC).

EDUCATIONAL

(12) 61. Schools (Teachers) have failed To insTill a respecT
for discipline and auThoriTy.
(6) 62. Teachers and college professors have undermined
respecT for auThoriTy (TaughT permissiveness).
(18) 67. OTher (MAC).

FAMILY

(50) 71. Family uniTy has been weakened as an insTrumenT of
social discipline or as a conTrol on member behavior.

(11) 72. MoThers are working and socializing more To The
neglecT of child supervision.
(I3) 77. OTher _(MAC).

RELIGIOUS

(ll) 81. The church has declined as a moral force in socieTy.
(O) 87. OTher (MAC).

MISCELLANEOUS

(25) 91. HisToricaI cycle: presenT phase of a hisTorical
cycle (auThoriTarian-permissiveness cycle, war-
peace cycle, depression-prosperify cycle).

(57) 93. AvailabiliTy of drugs.

(23) 95. AIienaTion from socieTy (frusTraTion).

(7) 97. RespondenT says he does noT know whaT causes crime.

(25) 99. OTher; NA; NO.

Var.
No.

 

198-201

198

I99

200

201

Column

Number

73-74

75-76

77-78

79-80

(228)

Code Deck 3

 

 

SECOND, code up To four menTions in order of Their
imporTance To The respondenT.

RESPONDENT'S MOST PROMINENT SOURCE OF THE CRIME PROBLEM
(Use The Causes of Crime Code SheeT)

RESPONDENT'S SECOND MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF CRIME
(Use The Causes of Crime Code SheeT).

RESPONDENT'S THIRD MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF CRIME
(Use The Causes of Crime Code SheeT).

RESPONDENT'S FOURTH MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF CRIME

(Use The Causes of Crime Code SheeT).

IDEOLOGY, COGNITIVE STYLE,

AND BELIEF SYSTEMS

Var.
No.

 

202-236

202-232

202
203

Column
Number Code Deck 4

 

OI DECK NUMBER (4)

02-04 RESPONDENT INTERVIEW NUMBER

001-051 CiTy Councilman or CiTy Commissioner

052-101 STaTe RepresenTaTive
102-118 U.S. RepresenTaTive

05 RESPONDENT OFFICE LEVEL

1. CHY Councilman or CiTy Commissioner
2. STaTe RepresenTaTive
3. U.S. RepresenTaTive

06-44 SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF CRIME

0.33B. WhaT do you Think should or can be done abouT The
crime problem?

06-36 FIRST, code each soluTion of crime volunTeered or noTed by

The respondenT by proceeding down The lisT of possible
soluTions on The SquTion To Crime Code SheeT. For

each soluTion lisTed, code wheTher iT was menTioned by
RespondenT. The code for each iTem on The SquTions To
Crime Code SheeT is as follows.

!0 NoT menTioned
2. MenTioned

SOLUTIONS T0 CRIME CODE SHEET

 

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

ECONOMIC
06 (I) 01. RedisTribuTe income via Tax reform, eTc.

07 (8) 02. InsTiTuTe governmenT work programs To end poverTy,
unemploymenT, eTc.

(229)

 

Var.

No.

204

205
206

207

208

209

210
211

212
213

214
215

216

217
218
219

220

221
222

223

224
225

226

(230)

Column

Number Code Deck 4

08 (2) O3. Revamp welfare sysTem; insTiTuTe guaranTeed annual
income plan.

09 (7) 04. General economic reform - no specific plan offered.

10 (I4) 07. OTher (MAC)

SOCIAL-HISTORICAL CHANGE

11 (I4) 21. SquTion will occur as we reTurn To The non—permissive
or more auThoriTarian phase of The social/hisTorical L
cycle.

12 (23) 27. OTher; General social reform (MAC)

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

GOVERNMENTAL-LEGISLATIVE

 

13 (II) 31. LegislaTure should revise criminal code; decriminalize
vicTimIess crimes.
I4 (6) 32. LegislaTe gun conTrol.

I5 (19) 37. OTher (MAC).

GOVERNMENTAL-COURTS/PENAL

(29) 4|. CourTs musT insure cerTainTy of punishmenT.
17 (31) 42. Judges musT meTe ouT sTronger or harsher punishmenT.

18 (14) 43. CourTs (or "Supreme CourT") should reverse The courT
decisions which now overproTecT The defendenT.

I9 (23) 44. Reform The penal insTiTuTions; persons should be
rehabiliTaTed noT TaughT The arT of crime.

20 (43) 47. OTher (MAC).

GOVERNMENTAL—LAW ENFORCEMENT

21 (I) 51. Enforce gun conTrol.
22 (8) 52. Increase police apprehension powers.
23 (6) 53. Increase police manpower and equipmenT.

24 (I6) 54. Improve police Techniques; puT The cop back on The

beaT, eTc.
25 (I7) 55. Crack down hard on drug pushers and big dealers.

26 (21) 57. OTher (MAC).

EDUCATIONAL

27 (9) 61. Schools (Teachers) should discipline sTudenTs and

Teach respecT for auThoriTy.
28 (9) 62. Schools should insTiII moral responsibiIiTy in sTudenTs.
29 (IO) 63. Schools should sTress relevanT subjecTs which enable

graduaTes To obTain work and rise above condiTions

which encourage or faciliTaTe criminal behavior.
30 (23) 67. OTher (MAC).

Var.
bk).

 

2227

2228

1229

23Cl

231

232

233-236

233

234

235

236

237-265

237-263

(231)

 

 

 

Column
Number Code Deck 4
FAMILY
31 (15) 71. Family should work harder To insTiII individual
responsibiliTy moral Training; family Training.
32 (2) 77. OTher (MAC).
RELIGIOUS
33 (2) 81. Churches should Teach moral improvemenT; individual
responsibiliTy.
34 (0) 87. OTher (MAC).
MISCELLANEOUS
35 (18) 95. RespondenT says he does noT know any soluTion(s)

To The crime problem.
36 (I6) 99. OTher; NA; NO.

37—44 SECOND, code up To four menTions in order of imporTance or
prominence To The respondenT.

37-38 RESPONDENT'S MOST PROMINENT RECOMMENDED SOLUTION TO THE
CRIME PROBLEM

(Use The SoluTions To Crime Code SheeT)

39-40 RESPONDENT'S SECOND MOST PROMINENT RECOMMENDED SOLUTION
TO THE CRIME PROBLEM

(Use The SoluTions To Crime Code SheeT)

41-42 RESPONDENT'S THIRD MOST PROMINENT RECOMMENDED SOLUTION
TO THE CRIME PROBLEM

(Use The SoluTions To Crime Code SheeT)

43-44 RESPONDENT'S FOURTH MOST PROMINENT RECOMMENDED SOLUTION
TO THE CRIME PROBLEM

(Use The SoluTions To Crime Code SheeT)

45-75 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRIME PROBLEM

0.330. WhaT group or insTiTuTion do you feel has The power
and/or responsibiliTy To deal wiTh This problem?

45-71 FIRST, code each agency or insTiTuTion which The respondenT
ciTes as being responsible for dealing wiTh The crime

problem by proceeding down The lisT of insTiTuTions on
The ResponsibiliTy for Crime Code SheeT. For each
insTiuTion or agency lisTed, code wheTher iT was

Var.
No.

237
238

239
240
241
242

243

244
245

246
247
248

249
250

251
252
253
254

255
256

257

Column

Number

45
46

47
48
49
50

51

52
53

54
55
56

57
58

59
60
61
62

63
64

65

(232)

Code Deck 4

 

menTioned b RespondenT. The code for each iTem on
The ResponsnbiliTy for Crime Code SheeT is as follows.

1. NOT MenTioned
5. MenTioned

RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIME CODE SHEET

 

GOVERNMENT-LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

(8) II. The ciTy council/commission.
(6) 12. Local governmenT in general.

(23) 13. The IegislaTure.
(2) 14. STaTe governmenT in general.

(15) 15. The Congress.
(38) I7. OTher (MAC); I8. = LegislaTive branch aT all levels.

GOVERNMENT-EXECUTIVE BRANCH

(2) 21. The Governor.

(II) 22. The adminisTraTion in WashingTon.
(2) 23. OTher (MAC); 24 = ExecuTive branch aT all levels.

GOVERNMENT-COURTS/PENAL INSTITUTIONS

(61) 31. The courTs.
(15)‘ 32. The penal auThoriTies.
(II) 37. OTher (MAC); The Supreme CourT (MAC).

 

GOVERNMENT-LAW ENFORCEMENT

(23) 41. The law enforcemenT agencies (police).
(I) 47. OTher (MAC).

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

(28) 51. The family.
(30) 52. The schools.
(5) 53. The churches.
(2) 57. OTher (MAC).

MEDIA

(0) 61. The press.
(0) 62. Television and radio newscasTers.

(2) 67. OTher (MAC)°

Var.

No.

258
259
260

261
262

263

264

265

Column

Number

66
67
68

69
70

71

72-73

74-75

(233)

 

Code Deck 4
SOCIETY
(4) 71. The elecToraTe.
(20) 72° The people; socieTy in general.
(22) 77. OTher (MAC); All social/governmenTal insTiTuTions
musT play a parT.
.(0) 97. OTher general responses (MAC).
(1) 98. No one is responsible or has The power To deal wiTh
The problem.
(0) 99. OTher; NA; N0.
SECOND, code up To Two menTions in order of imporTance To
The respondenT.
SOCIAL AGENCY WHICH THE RESPONDENT HOLDS MOST RESPONSIBLE
FOR DEALING WITH CRIME
(Use The ResponsibiliTy for Crime Code SheeT)
SOCIAL AGENCY WHICH THE RESPONDENT HOLDS SECONDARILY

RESPONSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH CRIME

(Use The ResponsibiliTy for Crime Code SheeT)

ITEMS CREATED FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS OF

THE CRIME DISCUSSION

GENERALIZER-PARTICULARIZER DIMENSION - "FOCUS OF THE
DISCUSSION"

Main CriTerion: The exTenT To which RespondenT Takes a general

NOTE:

(CODE:

or global approach To The crime problem,
concerning himself wiTh The general philosophical
or socieTal aspecTs involved, or wheTher
RespondenT Takes a parTicularisTic approach,
concerning himself more wiTh specific deTaiIs

or The objecTive consequences of The problem.

To measure The dimension, each respondenT will be
coded according ToThe way he preceives cerTain
referenTs which are common (eiTher eprIcITIy or
ImpIIcITIy) in any discussion of The crime
problem.

N0 = I Yes = 3)

 

Var.
bk).

 

26KB

267'

268

269

270

(234)

Column
Number Code Deck 4
*R's PERCEPTION OF THE VICTIM(S) OF CRIME
(A) "SocieTy" vs. "Individuals".
76 (0) .R says or Implies ThaT "socieTy" (or some reified equivalenT)
is The vicTim.
77 (18) R says or implies ThaT individuals are The vicTims (l.e.
persons noT objecTs).
(B) HomogeneiTy of The ConcepT "VicTims".
78 (2) R says or implies ThaT The "vicTims" of crime are a
homogeneous group.
79 (2) R says or implies ThaT There are differenT Types of
vicTims (vicTims of burglers, drug pushers, rapisTs, eTc.).
R'S PERCEPTION OF THE CRIMINAL (only one of iTems 270-272
can be coded "YES").
(A) Is The Problem "Crime" or "Criminals" (i.e. Are Crimes
CommiTTed by People)?
80 (84) Overall R refers To "crime" as The subjecT or facTor which

musT be dealT wiTh (concerned more wiTh "The problem" Than
The individuals involved).

(ConTinued on Column 06 of Deck 5)

* R = The RespondenT

IDEOLOGY, COGNITIVE STYLE,

 

AND BELIEF SYSTEMS Deck 5
Var. Column
N_°_°_ m COde
01 DECK NUMBER (5)
02-04 RESPONDENT INTERVIEW NUMBER
001-051 CiTy Councilman or CiTy Commissioner

052-101 STaTe RepresenTaTive
102-118 U.S. RepresenTaTive

05 RESPONDENT OFFICE LEVEL

1. CiTy Councilman or CiTy Commissioner
2. STaTe RepresenTaTive
3. U.S. RepresenTaTive

ITEMS CREATED FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME
DISCUSSION (ConTinued)

(CODE: No = I; Yes = 3)

271 O6 (7) R refers To "degeneraTes", "punks", "kids", "criminal

elemenT", (or oTher evaluaTive Term wiTh no logical
conTenT) as The subjecT or facTor which musT be dealT

wiTh.

272 O7 (27) R refers To individuals (eiTher criminals or oTher
persons) as The subjecT or facTor which musT be
dealT wiTh.

(B) HomogeneiTy of The ConcepT "Criminal".

273 08 (36) R refers To or implies (perhaps reifying The concepT
"criminals") ThaT "criminals" are a homogeneous group
(e.g. "Criminals have goT To be punishedI").

274 09 (46) R refers To or menTions various Types of criminals
(drug pushers, murderers, rapisTs, muggers, eTc.),
or To criminals as individuals.

R'S PERCEPTION OF THE CRIMINAL ACT

(A) HomogeneiTy of The ConcepT "Crime".

(235)

 

Var.
Pk).

 

2755

2765

277

278

279

280

281

282

283

(236)

Column
Number Code Deck 5
10 (41) R refers To crime as a homogeneous concepT (NoT

specifying Types may be a clue).
(50) R refers To various Types of crime.

R'S PERCEPTION OF THE CAUSE(S) OF CRIME

(A) ExTernal Forces vs. Individual lmmoraIiTy.

(89) R menTions or Implies ThaT social, economic, or

oTher "environmenTal" condiTions are The cause of
crime (unemploymenT, populaTion densiTy, poverTy, alienaTion

from socieTy, The "Times", permissive aTmosphere, eTc.).
(61) R menTions or implies ThaT problems wiTh law enforce-

menT insTiTuTions, or governmenTal insTiTuTions in
general are The cause of crime (e.g. lack of police,

Training and manpower, lenienT judges, eTc.).
(55) R menTions or implies ThaT individual acTions (i.e.

individual immoraliTy, irresponsibiliTy, ignorance,
or infallibiliTy) are The cause(s) of crime (e.g.

"Kids Think They have a righT To sTeal because They

don'T have money.", "Some people are jusT born

criminals.", eTc.). NOTE: ParenTs are individuals.

Does R say ThaT Individuals cause crime raTher Than environ-
menT? Is There some indicaTion R holds The individual
responsible?

R'S PERCEPTION OF THE AGENT OF THE SOLUTION(S) TO CRIME

(A) R'S PERCEPTION 0F WHO'S RESPONSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH
THE PROBLEM

(50) R menTions or implies ThaT "socieTy", The "people",

"The governmenT" (or some reified equivalenT) should
handle The problem.

(63) R menTions or implies ThaT The "police", "courTs",
"IegislaTure", .or some similar-buT parTiaIIy reified -
group or insTiTuTion should handle The crime problem.

(44) R menTions To or Implies ThaT cerTain individuals should
handle The problem (judges, policemen, Teachers, parenTs,
moral leaders, waTchful clleens, eTc.).

 

(B) R'S PERCEPTION OF THE ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (DOES HE
REIFY THESE AGENTS

(8) R reifies The word "police" (e.g. R says ThaT "police"
have To crack down raTher Than ThaT The "cop on The
beaT" musT be more vigilenT, eTc.).

 

Var.

No.

284

285

286

287

288

289

290

291

(C) R'S SOLUTION TO CRIME - HOW SPECIFIC IS THE TYPE OF

(237)

Code Deck 5

R reifies The word "courT" (e.g. R says ThaT "courTs"
are Too lenienT, raTher Than ThaT "Judges" are afraid

To imprison criminals).

R reifies The word "socieTy" or iTs equivalenT "The
people", "communiTy", eTc. (e.g. R says "IT's socieTy's
responsibiliTy" raTher Than "iT is all of us" or "each
and everyone of us responsibiliTy", eTc.).

SOLUTION

R recommends general social reform or some Type of
broad social change as The soluTion To crime (e.g.
redisTribuTion of income and/or power). ‘
R recommends a projecT, course of acTion, eTc., buT

names no agenT for carrying iT ouT.

R recommends specific insTiTuTional procedural

change or governmenTaI program as The soluTion To The

crime problem (e.g. The courT sysTem musT be

made more efficienT, eTc.).

R recommends individual change, i.e. The acTion of

cerTain individual (Judges, parenTs, eTc.) as The

soluTion To crime (e.g. "Children musT learn To respecT

auThoriTy.", "People need To be shown ThaT crime doesn'T

pay", "ParenTs have To....", eTc.).

 

 

DEDUCTIVE-INDUCTIVE DIMENSION - "BASIS OF THOUGHT"

Main CriTerioni The exTenT To which R deduces his Thoughts

Column

Number

19 (36)
20 (24)
21 (31)
22 (63)
23 (88)
24 (21)
25 (13)
26, (27)

abouT crime from some general absTracT
poliTicaI, economic, or social Theory,
raTher Than inducing Them from his "own"
experiences, siTuaTion or observaTions.

(CODE: N0 = 1; YES = 3)

R'S PERCEPTION OF THE CAUSES OF CRIME

R says or implies ThaT his ideas abouT The causes of

crime are deduced from some moral belief sysTem (e.g.
ChrisTian MoraIiTy), or some general, absTracT (named

or impliciT) poliTical, economic or social Theory (e.g.
"I9Th CenTury Liberalism", Theory ThaT "hisTory runs in

cycles", "Spockism", eTc.).
R says or implies ThaT his ideas abouT The causes or

crime derive from his personal observaTions and personal
experiences in dealing wiTh and Thinking abouT The

problem (9. . "From my experience....", "I personally
believe.... , eTc. NOTE: A "personal" basis of

ThoughT requires ThaT R menTions some experience of his
as The basis of his Thinking - or admiTs ThaT he has ThoughT
The subjecT over.

Var.
No.

 

292

293

294

295

296

297

(238)

 

Column
Number Code Deck 5
27 (21) R says or implies ThaT his ideas abouT The causes
of crime derive from reporTs, facTs and figures which
have come To his aTTenTion Through The media, The
council/IegislaTure/congress, friends, eTc. (e.g.
"According To a newspaper arTicle....", "The police
chief", eTc.).
(B) R'S PERCEPTION OF THE SOLUTION(S) T0 CRIME
28 (7) R says or implies ThaT he has some Type of belief I

sysTem or social Theory which should guide ThoughT
and acTion wiTh respecT To solving The crime problem.
(NOTE: A soluTion which, according To R, geTs aT
The "roofs" of crime, implies some Theory abouT whaT
Those rooTs are, a soluTion which TreaTs sympToms
implies no Theory.)

29 (19) R says or implies clearly ThaT his personal ThoughTs

and personal experiences in dealing wiTh The problem
are The source of his ideas abouT how To deal wiTh

iT (e.g. "From whaT I've seen....", "I believe...",
"From my eXperience....", "The way I see iT...", eTc.).
3O (6) R refers To or implies ThaT his ideas abouT The soluTion
To crime derive from reporTs, facTs and figures which
have come To his aTTenTion Through The media, his work,

friends, eTc. (e.g. From whaT l undersTand...", "From
whaT I hear...", 'According To whaT I've read...", eTc.).

31 (5) R refers To or implies ThaT some sorT of moral belief
sysTem (ChrisTian eThics/heriTage, humanism, eTc.) is

The basis of his ideas on how To deal wiTh The crime
problem (e.g. "1 Think our moral code requires ThaT we...").

 

COMPLEXITY-SIMPLICITY DIMENSION - "COMPLEXITY AND
ORGANIZATION OF

Main CriTerion: The exTenT To which R perceives The crime
problem as a complex social issue involving a number
and varieTy of facTors and Their inTer-relaTionship, as
opposed To an oversimplified percepTion, or one in which
There is no discernible paTTern or organizaTion.

(CODE: N0 = 1; YES = 3)

(A) VARIETY OF CAUSAL FACTORS, SOLUTIONS AND RESPONSIBLE
AGENCIES

32-33 R menTioned Types of causal facTors.

(Record R's counT in Terms of The caTegories on
The Causes of Crime Code SheeT)

Var.

No.

 

298

299

300

301

302

303

304

305

306

307
308

Column

Number

34-35

36-37

38

39

4o

41

42

43

44

45
46

(39)

(16)

(57)

(28)

(18)

(5)

(35)

(28)
(51)

€239)

Code Deck 5

 

 

R recommended Types of soluTions.

(Record R's counT according To The caTegories
on The SoluTions To Crime Code SheeT)

R suggesTed ThaT There were Types of responsible
agencies.

(Record R's counT in Terms of The caTegories on The
ResponsibiliTy for Crime Code SheeT)

 

(B) ORGANIZATION OF THOUGHT - LOGIC

R offers some Type of chain of reasoning in his analysis
("UnemploymenT leads To poverTy and poverTy leads To
crime.", eTc.); linkage musT be clearly implied.

R offers some Type of sequence in his analysis (lisTing

or numbering causes, soluTions, eTc.).

R offers some Type of direcT connecTion (eiTher explicile
or implicile) beTween The causes and The soluTion(s)

To The crime problem.

R's soluTion recommends changes in environmenTal (economic
or social) condiTions in addiTion To changes in social

and governmenTal insTiTuTions, advocaTes a comprehensive
aTTack on crime incorporaTing general reform and specific

insTiTuTional changes.
R offers some Type of circular reasoning in his analysis

(e.g. "The reason crime is a problem is because we have
Too many people who feel They can geT away wiTh illegal

or criminal acTs.").
(C) GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THOUGHT

R's discussion sTrayed from The quesTion(s) aT leasT
more Than once.

R's discussion was parTicularly well organized and

well ThoughT ouT (argumenTs hang TogeTher as if he had
ThoughT abouT The problem before).

R's discussion was unorganized, disjoinTed or meandering.
R implies or expliciTy sTaTes ThaT The crime problem

is a complex issue. '

CONFLICTUAL-CONSENSUS DIMENSION - "ZERO-SUM PERSPECTIVE" .

Main CriTerion: The exTenT To which R perceives The crime

problem in Terms which are conflicTual raTher Than con-
sensual, inToIeranT raTher Than ToleranT.

(CODE: N0 = 1; YES = 3)

(240)

Var. Column

 

140. Number Code Deck 5
(A) "CRIMINALS" VS. "SOCIETY"
L309 47 .(9) R perceives The crime problem in dichoTomous Terms
' ("we" vs. "They", "black" vs. "whiTe", "poor" vs. "rich",
eTc.) implying ThaT They is hosTiliTy beTween criminals
(as a group) and socieTy.
(B) MORALIZER VS. NON-MORALIZER

.310 48 (38) R blames The crime problems (expliciTIy or Implicifly)
on some parTicular group or insTiTuTion (e.g. "Crime
comes mainly from blacks.", "The judges Themselves have
helped To increase crime.", eTc.); NOTE: "Blame"
musT be disTinguishable from responsibiliTy.

311 49 (27) R refers To or implies ThaT crime is a naTural social
problem which we will always have (e.g. "There will
always be people who will rob and sTeal.", eTc.).

NOTE: lneviTabiIiTy musT be aT leasT implied.
(C) R'S PERCEPTION OF THE CRIMINAL
312 50 (58) R refers To or implies ThaT criminals are ordinary

people in special circumsTances (e.g. "If a man can'T
feed his family, he's liable To begin robbing people.",

"Under Those condiTions, any man would Turn To crime.",
"Anyone hooked on drugs has goT To Turn To crime.", eTc.).

NOTE: There should be some hinT ThaT criminals are
vicTims;,or ThaT iT is Their environmenT which makes Them

Turn To crime.

313 51 (55) R refers To or implies ThaT criminals are individauls
_ who are inherenle weak in characTer, immoral, irresponsible,

or ignoranT (ice. R implies iT is Their own faulT for
being criminals), (e.g. "Some people jusT don'T care
whaT's righT or wrong.", "Some men are criminals by
naTure.", eTc.).

(D) RETRIBUTION VS. REHABILITATION

314 52 (53) In discussing The soluTion To crime, R menTions or
implies ThaT criminals need To be punished.

315 53 (29) In discussing The soluTion To crime, R menTions or implies
ThaT criminals should be rehabiliTaTed and noT merely
punished.

(E) RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEALING WITH CRIME

316 A 54 (72) R refers To or implies ThaT The police, The courTs, or

The penal auThoriTies (no menTion of rehabiliTaTion) are
The agencies responsible for dealing wiTh This problem.

NOTE: Should be implied ThaT punishmenT is necessary.

(See Rls menTions on The ResponsibiliTy for
Crime Code SheeT)

 

Var.
lflo.

 

317

318

319

320

321

322

323

(241)

 

Column
Number Code Deck 5
55 (77) R refers To or implies ThaT non-law enforcemenT
"consensus building" agencies (schools, families,
churches, The legislaTure, eTc.) are The agencies
responsible for dealing wiTh The problem of crime.
(See R35 menTions on The ResponsibiliTy
for Crime Code SheeT)
EMOTIONAL-OBJECTIVE DIMENSION — "AFFECT AND/OR SALIENCE
OF THE SUBJECT"
Main CriTerion: The exTenT To which R's discussion
of The crime problem is emoTionally
or affecTively charged.
(CODE: N0 = 1; YES = 3)
(A) EMOTIONAL WORDS AND RHETORIC
56 (8) R uses emoTionally charged words and/or rheToric in

discussing The subjecT of crime or iTs consequences
(e.g. "Crime is desTroying our culTure and TradiTions.",
"My wife is scared To deaTh To shop downTown.", eTc.).

57 ((11) R uses emoTionalIy charged words and/or rheToric in
discussing The causes of crime (e.g. "Crime has resulTed
from insane, assinine courT decisions.", "Flaming
liberal college professors cause aloT of The problem.",
"ITs The obscene living condiTions in The gheTTo which
causes crime.", eTc.).

58 (3) R uses emoTionally charged words and/or rheToric in
discussing criminals (e.g. "These degeneraTes and
bums Think They can geT away wiTh murder.", eTc.).

59 (II) R uses emoTionaIly charged words and/or rheToric in

discussing The soluTion(s) To The crime problem (e.g.
"Drug pushers should’be’Taken ouT and shoT.", "Why puT

a kid in prison where he'll be raped and TorTured.", eTc.).
6O (3) R uses emoTionally charged words and/or rheToric in

discussing who's responsible for dealing wiTthhe
problem of crime (e.g. “Those jerks in WashingTon are

The ones who can besT solve The problem.", eTc.).

 

(B) URGENCY OF THE PROBLEM

61 (14) R views The crime problem as an urgenT maTTer which
needs immediaTe aTTenTion (some hinT of urgency apparenT).

Var.

140.

L324

L325

.326

327

328
329

330

331

332

333
334

(242)

Column

Number Code Deck 5
(C) R'S APPROACH

62 (79) R discussed The problem in an objecTive manner, sTanding

back and looking aT The problem as jusT anoTher social
problem. NOTE: One can view The problem as urgenT
yeT look aT iT in objecTive Terms.

63 (4) R expresses or implies a personal fear ThaT he will be
The vicTim of a crime (e.g. "In facT, I have a burgler
sysTem To proTecT my house.", eTc.).

64 (44) R feels emoTional or is personally concerned abouT
The problem of crime.*

* This iTem is parTicularly relevanT for disTinquish-

ing R's who use emoTionally charged descripTive
Terms buT who lack emoTional commiTmenT To The

issue.

CONFIDENT—UNCONFIDENT DIMENSION - "MENTAL ATTITUDE"

Main CriTerion: The exTenT To which R discusses or analyzes
The crime problem in an open vs. relucTanT
manner and/or in an opTimisTic vs. pessimisTic
manner (or a combinaTion Thereof).

(CODE: N0 = 1; YES =3)

(A) OPENESS OF RESPONSE

65 (99) R offered his opinions abouT The causes of crime
readily; no probing required.

66 (14) R was relucTanT To Talk abouT The causes of crime;
probing required.

67 (96) R offered his opinions abouT The soluTion To The crime
problem readily; no probing required.

68 (22) R was relucTanT To recommend a soluTion To The crime
problem; probing required (e.g. "I don'T know whaT The

soluTion is.", eTc.).
(B) SELF—ASSESSED EXPERTISE
69 (34) R appeared To feel ThaT his ideas were The "correcT"

ideas (beyond jusT offering his personal viewpoinT)
abouT whaT caused crime.

70 (28) R qualified his sTaTemenTs abouT The causes of crime
(e.g. "I don'T really know, buT...", "Well, in my
opinion...", eTc.). Plays down his experTise.

71 (28) R appeared To feel ThaT his soluTion(s) were The "correcT"

soluTions To The crime problem.

72 (28) R qualified his sTaTemenTs abouT The soluTion(s) To The
crime problem (e.g. "I'm noT sure buT...", "We mighT
Try....", eTc.). Plays down his own experTise.

 

Var.

bk).

L335

L336

337

338

339

Column

73

74

75

76

77

Number

(60)

(14)

(30)

(27)

(9)

(243)

Code Deck 5

PROBLEM SOLVABILITY - R's EFFICACIOUSNESS

R said or implied ThaT There was a soluTion To The
crime problem (personal confidence ThaT crime could
be deaIT wiTh).

R said or implied ThaT There mighT noT be a soluTion To
The crime problem ("We'll always have crime", "aT

leasT aT The presenT Time", eTc.).

FRAMEWORK OF THE DISCUSSION - "HISTORICAL"

Main CriTerion: The exTenT To which R uses hisTory

or some period in hisTory as a sTandard
by which we should assess The crime
problem; or wheTher R believes The crime

problem To be a manifesTaTion ThaT we
are in a parTicular phase of an hisTorical

cycle.

(CODE: N0 = 1; YES = 3)

R refers To hisTory, or some period in hisTory, as

a sTandard by which we should assess The crime problem
(e.g. "During The depression...", "In The old days...",
eTc.).

R refers To or implies ThaT The crime problem exisTs
because we are in some Type of hisTorical or social
cycle (e.g. war/peace cycle, auThoriTarian/permissive-
ness cycle, "In warTime men are more prone To criminal

behavior.", eTc.).
R uses "hisToricaI anTecedenTs" (references To occurances

or evenTs in The pasT) in his discussion of The crime
problem (e.g. "If we hadn'T had The migraTion of blacks

To The NorThern ciTies, we couldn'T have had This
crime problem.", eTc.). NOTE: The VieTnam war may

be such an anTecedenT.

FRAMEWORK OF THE DISCUSSION - "LEGAL-TECHNICAL"

Main CriTerion: The exTenT To which R discusses The crime

problem as a maTTer of inadequaTe law-making,
inadequaTe or imprOper law enforcemenT,

or The improper adjudicaTion or applicaTion
of The law.

(CODE: NO =1; YES = 3)

 

Var.
bk).

 

3MHO

344

3422

(244)

Column
Number Code Deck 5
78 (23) R ciTes inadequacies in The criminal code as a facTor

bearing on The crime problem (e.g. "VicTimless crimes
should be decriminalized.", eTc.).

79 (50) R refers To or implies ThaT The courTs (judges) have
encouraged crime by noT properly enforcing currenT
laws and sTaTuTes (by noT meTing ouT sTiff enough
penalTies, eTc. ).

80 (27) R refers To or implies ThaT law enforcemenT auThoriTies

are hampered in some way from properly enforcing The
law (e. Q. "We need To puT The cop back on The sTreeT.'

"CourT decisions have Tied The policeman' 5 hands."
"The police need more ciTizen co-operaTion.", eTc.).

(ConTinued on Column 06 of Deck 6)

IDEOLOGY, COGNITIVE STYLE,

AND BELIEF SYSTEMS

Var.

Now

343

344
345

346
347

348

 

Column
Number Code Deck 6
0| DECK NUMBER (6)

02-04 RESPONDENT INTERVIEW NUMBER

001-051 CiTy Councilman or CiTy Commissioner

052-101 STaTe RepresenTaTive
102-118 U.S. RepresenTaTive

05 RESPONDENT OFFICE LEVEL

1. CiTy Councilman or CiTy Commissioner
2. STaTe RepresenTaTive
3.- U.S. RepresenTaTive

ITEMS CREATED FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME
DISCUSSION (ConTinued)

(CODE: N0 = 1; YES = 3)

O6 (16) R refers To or implies ThaT new laws are needed To
properly deal wiTh This problem (e.g. "Gun conTrol
should be legislaTed.", "I'd make a law which would

require prison senTences for....", "We need To
de-criminalize vicTimIess crimes", eTc.).

07 (28) R's soluTion To The crime problem involves The improve-
menT of law enforcemenT capabiIiTy.

O8 (54) R's soluTion involves The resTrucTuring or The improve-
menT of The courT sysTem; iTs procedures or personnel.

O9 (23) R's soluTion involves The resTrucTuring or The improve-

menT of The penal sysTem.
10 (80) R refers To or implies ThaT The police, The courTs,
The legislaTure or The penal auThoriTies are The agencies

responsible for dealing wiTh The crime problem.
11 (74) R refers To non-law enforcemenT agencies (e.g. schools,

families, churches, eTc.) as The agencies responsible
for dealing wiTh The problem.

(245)

 

Var.
bk).

 

349)
I350

351

352

353

354

355

Column

12
13

Number

(28)
(I6)

(25)

(I3)

(0)

(4)

(7)

(246)

Code Deck 6

 

FRAMEWORK OF THE DISCUSSION - "MORALISTIC"

Main CriTerion: The exTenT To which R perceives The

crime problem as a maTTer of declining
public and privaTe moraliTy and general
disregard of social-eThical values.
NOTE: MoraliTy is disTinguished from
"social discipline" here.

(CODE: N0 = 1; YES = 3)

R ciTes The general breakdown of public or privaTe

moraliTy as a cause of crime.
R ciTes The declining influence of The church as a

cause of crime.
R noTes or implies ThaT crime has been caused by

families and schools which have failed To Teach
individuals correcT moral behavior.

R's soluTion To The crime problem involves some aTTempT
or means To sTrengThen public and privaTe moraliTy
(e.g. "Allow religion back in schools.", eTc.).

R menTions or implies ThaT minisTers, priesTs and oTher
moral leaders have a responsibiliTy for dealing wiTh
The crime problem.

STANDARDS FOR JUDGING POLICY - "POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY"

Main CriTerion: The exTenT To which R is concerned wiTh

The poliTical feasibiliTy of solving The
crime problem, boTh in Terms of The bi-

parTisan supporT necessary, and any poTenTiaI
soluTion's general accepTance among The

ciTizenry.

(CODE: N0 = 1; YES = 3)

R says or implies ThaT parTisan or poliTical inTeresT-
group accepTabiIiTy is a facTor which bears on The

chances for implemenTaTion for any soluTion To crime
(e.g. "The conservaTives would never agree To decriminalize

drug Taking.", "The democraTs would lose supporT in
The gheTTos if They came down in favor of coverT police
operaTions.", eTc.).

R refers To or implies ThaT public accepTabiIiTy is a
facTor which bears on The chances for implemenTaTion

for any soluTion To crime (e.g. "The people mighT accepT
The legalizaTion of poT in a few years.", eTc.).

(247)

Var. Column

 

 

No. Number Code Deck 6
STANDARDS FOR JUDGING POLICY - "TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY/
ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY"
Main CriTerion: The exTenT To which R is concerned wiTh
The Technical feasibiliTy or adminisTraTive
efficiency of poTenTial soluTions To The
crime problem.
(CODE: N0 = 1; YES = 3)
356 19 (I) R refers To or implies ThaT cerTain soluTions are eiTher
- objecTionabIe or perferred because of Their difficulTy
or ease of implemenTaTion (e.g. "The bookwork would
be impossible.", "...buT The prisons couldn'T handle
iT.", eTc.).
STANDARDS FOR JUDGING POLICY - "FINANCIAL COST"
Main CriTerion: The exTenT To which R is concerned wiTh
The financial cosT of poTenTial soluTions
To The crime problem.
(CODE: N0 = 1; YES = 3)
357 20 (13) R refers To or implies ThaT financial cosT Is an imporTanT
facTor in deciding whaT To do abouT crime (e.g. "We
could provide more police and more police equipmenT, buT
The cosT would be prohibiTive.", eTc.).
STANDARDS FOR JUDGING POLICY - "TRADITION"
Main CriTerion: The exTenT To which R is concerned wiTh
TradiTional norms and cusToms as a
sTandard by which To assess poTenTial
soluTions To The crime problem.
(CODE: N0 = 1; YES = 3)
358 21 (0) R refers or implies ThaT cerTain TradiTions are imporTanT

in assessing poTenTiaI soluTions To crime (e.g. "If we

are To preserve The ProTesTanT work eThic, Than increasing
welfare as a means of prevenTing crime is unaccepTabIe.",

eTc.).

R'S CLOSENESS TO THE ISSUE (i.e., from R's discussion of The
crime problem, whaT can be said abouT his closeness To
The subjecT or problem of crime)

(CODE: N0 = 1; YES = 3)

Var.
bk).

 

.359

L360

36”
362
363

364
365

366

367
368

369

370

(248)

Column
Number Code Deck 6

 

22 (I3) R's (non-office-holding) occupaTion broughT (brings) him
in regular conTacT wiTh police or oTher law enforcemenT
officials.

23 (18) R's (non-office—holding) occupaTion has broughT (brings)
him in conTacT wiTh courT officials (judges) and penal

auThoriTies.
24 (12) R's office-holding responsibiliTies has broughT him

 

inTo regular personal conTacT wiTh law enforcemenT officials.

25 (3|) R's commiTTee work deals wiTh law enforcemenT in some F
way. I

26 (II) R has inTroduced legislaTion in The area of law enforce— I
men .

27 (I) R has been The vicTim of a crime.

28 (2) R's family member(s), or friend(s) has been vicTimized i
by crime.

29 (l) R or one of his family members or friends has been con-
vicTed of a crime.

30 (2) R admiTTed To commiTing a crime aT some Time in his life.

31 ([8) R appears To have had (or has) a good deal of direcT

conTacT wiTh law enforcemenT officials or wiTh The
problem of crime iTseIf.

32-33 TIME OF ISSUE DISCUSSION

01. One minuTe.

02. Two minuTes.
O3. ETc.

REPRESENTATION

34 0.35 Would you say ThaT on issues on which The (council/
legislaTure/congress) has an inpuT, ThaT you Tend more

To (1) represenT Those persons who voTed for you, or ThaT
(2) you represenT all The voTers in your (communiTy/disTricT)?

(10) I. My own personal views.

(3) 2. Those who voTed for me.
(3) 3. R percieves some inTeresT group or segmenf which he

represenTs in parTicular.
(I) 4. All The voTers in my (communiTy/disTricT) - because

my disTricT is made up of like-minded people.
A l The voTers in my (communiTy/disTricT) - because

R sees everyone as poTenTial fuTure voTers, or
because he cannoT idenTify Those who voTed for him.

(82) 6. All The voTers (oTher or no reason offered).
(11) 9. OTher; NA; N0.

(8) 5.

Var.
No.

 

371

.372

373

Column
Number
35
(5)
(I9)
(33)
(43)
(I3)
(5)
36
(33)
(60)
(12)
(I3)
37
(52)
(29)
(8)
(20)

(8)

(I)

(249)

Code Deck 6

 

GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE ECONOMY

0.36. We are currenle faced wiTh The so-called "energy-

crisis". Would you, aT This Time, Tend To favor or
Oppose The idea of governmenT regulaTion of The oil

indusTries?

l. R sTrongly opposes regulaTion of The oil indusTry.

2. R Opposes regulaTion.

3. R is currenle opposed To regulaTion buT circumsTances
could change his mind.

4. R favors regulaTion - wiTh specified limiTs beneaTh
The regulaTory OpTions lisTed in foil one.

5. R sTrongly favors regulaTion - menTions The pos-
sibiliTy of governmenT ownership or making This
indusTry a public uTiIiTy.

9. OTher; NA; N0.

GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE ECONOMY INDEX

This index is based on The coder's judgmenT of R's

answer To 0.36.

1. R believes governmenT should sTep in only when
business disregards The inTeresTs of The average

ciTizen.
3. R opposes governmenT inTerference in The economy.

5. R favors governmenT conTrol of The economy.
9. OTher; NA; NO.

ATTITUDE TOWARD POLITICAL COMPROMISE

0.37. LeTs Think hypoTheTicaIly for a momenT. Imagine ThaT

you are a member of an organizaTion whose members are
spliT 50-50 on some issue. You hold The Tie-breaker
voTe and sTrongly believe ThaT one side is righT and

ThaT The oTher side is misTaken. If you casT your voTe
wiTh The side you sTrongly agree wiTh, however, you chance

dividing The members inTo Two opposing camps — a siTuaTion
hereTofore uncommon To The organizaTion. WhaT do you

Think you would do? would you be inclined To sTick wiTh
The side ThaT you believe is righT or Try To find a

compromise accepTable To all Concerned?

DefiniTer would look for compromise.

I

2. Leans Toward compromise.

3. Pro-Con; 1T depends.

4. Leans To sTicking To The side wiTh which he sTrongly
agrees.

5. DefiniTely would sTick wiTh The side he Thinks is

righT.
9. OTher; NA; NO.

Var. Column
No. Number
374 38
(32)
(56)
(19)
(4)
(7)
375 39
(2)
(46)
(23)
(36)
(4)
(7)
376 40
(3)
(15)
(36)
(4|)
(0)
(4)

(5)

(0)

(l4)

 

(250)

Code Deck 6

 

SECOND CODE FOR 0.37.

This index is based on The coder's judgmenT of R's answer
To p.37.

1. R views compromise in posiTive Terms (no indicaTion
ThaT on some issues compromise is noT possible).
2. R views compromise in posiTive Terms (some indicaTion

ThaT on some issues one cannoT compromise).
3. R views compromise in negaTive Terms (some indicaTion

ThaT he feels iT is necessary or expedienT in cerTain
siTuaTions however).
4. R views compromise in negaTive Terms (no indicaTion
ThaT he would agree To iT under any circumsTances).
9. OTher; NA; N0.

GROUP CONFLICT

0.38. Generally speaking, do you Think ThaT There is always

conflicT among groups in socieTy, or raTher ThaT These
groups have a greaT deal in common?

Consensus beTween groups by far more Typical.

Consensus basically more Typical, Though conflicTs occur.
Pro-Con. BoTh common: neiTher are clearly more Typical.

ConflicT basically more Typical, buT There are shared
inTeresTs.

. ConflicT is by far more Typical.
. OTher; NA; NO.

#LNN—
0.

0m

SECOND CODE FOR 0.38.

This index is based on The coder's judgmenT of R's answer
To 0. 38.

I. R percieves no conflicT beTween groups in socieTy
(no qualificaTions).

2. R percieves some conflicT beTween groups.

3. R percieves some conflicT beTween groups - buT believes
ThaT This is naTural or beneficial To socieTy.

4. R percieves conflicT beTween groups — buT believes
This is naTural orxbeneficial To socieTy.

5. R percieves conflicT beTween groups (no qualificaTions).
6. R percieves conflicT beTween groups and believes This To

be a regreTTable or a bad Thing.

7. R percieves a greaT deal of conflicT beTween groups
and believes This To be naTural or beneficial To
socieTy.

8. R percieves a greaT deal of conflicT beTween groups
and sees This as regreTTable or a bad Thing.

9. OTher; NA: NO.

 

Var. Column
No. 539235
377 41
L(8)
(35)
(26)
(4|)
(2)
(6)
378 42
(8)
(14)
(30)
(46)
(2)
(7)
(4)
(0)
(7)
379 43
(26)

Code

 

(251)

Deck 6

SOCIAL CLASS CONFLICT

0.39.

How abouT social classes, do you Think ThaT There

will always be conflicT among social classes or can They
geT along TogeTher wiThouT conflicT?

9.

SECOND

0.40.
legislaTure/congress), have you been able To:
sTick wiTh your iniTial opinion, or have you
(2) some adjusTmenT in your iniTial posiTion

Class harmony exisTs; There is no conflicT beTween
classes.

Class harmoney is Typical, buT There are conflicTs
beTween classes.

There is boTh class conflicT and class harmony;
neiTher one is more Typical Than The oTher.

Class conflicT is Typical, buT There are some
common inTeresTs among classes.

Class conflicT exisTs; There is no common inTeresT
beTween classes.
OTher; NA; NO.

CODE FOR 0.39

R percieves no conflicT beTween social classes
(no qualificaTions).

R percieves some conflicT beTween social classes.

R percieves some conflicT beTween social classes -
buT believes ThaT This is naTural or beneficial To
socieTy.

R percieves conflicT beTween social classes - buT
believes This To be naTural or beneficial To socieTy.

R percieves conflicT beTween social classes (no
qualificaTions).

R percieves conflicT beTween social classes and
believes This To be a regreTTable or bad Thing.

R percieves a greaT deal of conflicT beTween social
classes and believes This To be naTural or beneficical
To socieTy.

R percieves a greaT deal of conflicT beTween social
classes and sees This as a regreTTable or bad Thing.
OTher; NA; NO.

RESPONDENT FLEXIBILITY

ln voTing on imporTanT issues before The (council/
(1) generally

found ThaT;
is ofTen

necessary before The final voTe?

Can sTay wiTh my iniTial opinion virTuaIly all of
The Time.

 

383-435 47-80

'(252)

Code Deck 6

 

(32) 2. Can sTay wiTh my iniTial opinion The majoriTy of
The Time.

(34) 3. SomeTimes I sTay wiTh my iniTial posiTion;
someTimes adjusTmenT is necessary. (50-50).

(14) 4. OfTen iT is necessary To adjusT my iniTial opinion.

(I) 5. I find ThaT adjusTmenT of my iniTial view is almosT

always necessary.
(11) 9. OTher; NA; NO.

RESPONDENT FLEXIBILITY INDEX

This index is based on The coder's judgmenT of R's answer
To 0.40.

(7) l. R appears relucTanT To change his iniTial opinions.
(29) 3. R appears somewhaT relucTanT To adjusT his views.

(80) 5. R appears flexible in Terms of adjusTing his issue
opinions (aT leasT wiThin reason).
(2) 9. OTher; NA; NO.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS

0.42. Do you Think There should be more ciTizen parTicipaTion
in poliTics and governmenT?

(93) I. Yes - unqualified.
(ll) 3- Yes - qualified.
(7) 5.. No.

(7) 9. OTher; NA; NO.

RECOMMENDED FORMS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

(If Yes on 0.42) WhaT form do you Think increased parTicipaTion
should Take? (CODE R's mosT imporTanT alTernaTive).

(20) I. More voTing.

(22) 2. GreaTer inTeresT and aTTenTion To poliTics and issues.

(17) 3. More parTicipaTion in poliTical parTy organizaTions.

(I7) 4. More parTicipaTion in local governmenT affairs, boards
and commissions.

(20) 5. More communicaTion To poliTical leaders and elecTed

represenTaTives.
(0) 6. More acTive involvemenT - no preferred acTiviTy sTaTed.

(22) 9. OTher; NA; NO.
ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF DEMOCRACY

0.43. WhaT do you believe are The essenTial ingredienTs
necessary for a governmenT To be considered democraTic?

(253)

 

 

Var. Column
No. Number Code Deck 6
383-432 47-80 FIRST, code each essenTiaI ingredienT of democracy noTed

by The respondenT by proceeding down The lisT of possible

essenTial ingredienTs on The EssenTials of Democracy
Code SheeT. For each essenTial ingredienT lisTed,

code wheTher iT was menTioned by R. The code for
each iTem on The EssenTials of Democracy Code SheeT
is as follows:

1. NOT menTioned
5. MenTioned.

ESSENTIALS OF DEMOCRACY CODE SHEET

GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE

383 47 (18) II. GovernmenT by The people In general; rule of The

people; conTrol by The people (use more specific
caTegories 12-17 when possible).

384 48 (22) 12. Popular inTeresT in and awareness of poliTics.

385 49 (32) I3. AccounTabiliTy of governmenTs (or represenTaTives)
To The people; governmenT by consenT.

386 ' 50 (34) I4. AcTive dialogue beTween The governmenT and people.

387 51 (32) 15. POpuIar parTicipaTion; popular involvemenT in decision-
making; direcT democracy.

388 52 ((3) l6. DecenTralized governmenT.

389 53 (I6) 17. Open policy making; no secreTs; publiciTy and public
debaTe.

390 54 (2) l8. OTher (MAC).

EQUALITY AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

391 55 (2) 2|. EqualiTy in general.

392 56 (IO) 22. PoIiTical equaliTy; one-man, one voTe.

393 57 (5) 23. EqualiTy of opporTuniTy; each man can develop him-
self as far as possible.

394 58 (3) 24. JusT sTandard of living; social and economic securiTy
for all.

395 59 (l) 25. Less social disTance beTween classes; fewer rich and
poor; less social prévilege.

396 60 (4) 26. EqualiTy of respecT; digniTy of all.

397 61 (O) 27. Social ownership/conTrol over The economy.

398 62 (4) 28. OTher ' ' (MAC).

LIBERTY

399 63 (6) 3|. LiberTy and freedom in general.

400 64 (22) 32. PoliTical or civic liberTies in general.

401 65 (27) 33. Freedom of expression (speech, press, eTc.).

402 66 (6) 34. MinoriTy righTs.

403 67 (7) 35. LimiTed governmenT, no arbiTrary governmenT.

404 68 (I3) 36. Laissez-faire, socially and economically; freedom

(254)

 

Var. Column
No. Number Code Deck 6
from governmenT inTerference in socio-economic
affairs.
405 69 (I) 37. Religious IiberTy.
406 70 (0) 38. OTher‘ ‘ ' (MAC).
GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES
407 71 (40) 41. Free elecTions; The righT To voTe.
408 72 (8) 42. MajoriTy rule.
409 73 (24) 43. RepresenTaTive governmenT.
410 74 (I) 44. LegislaTive conTrol over The execuTive.
41 l 75 (3) 45. Free press.
412 76 (3) 47. Rule of law; legal righTs; fair legal sysTem.
413 77 (4) 48. OTher (MAC).
POLITICAL COMPETITION AND CHOICE
414 78 (1) 51. The possibi l iTy of changing governmenT.
415 79 (5) 52. Two parTy governmenT; elecToral choice.
416 80 (O) 53. STrong criTical opposiTion.

(CONTINUED ON COLUMN 06 0F DECK 7)

(255)

IDEOLOGY, COGNITIVE STYLE,

AND BELIEF SYSTEMS

Var.
Ncn

 

417

418
419

420

421
422 '

423

424
425
426
427

428
429

Column

Number

01

02-04

05

06

07
08

09

10
II

-13

I4
15
16

17
18

Code Deck 7

 

DECK NUMBER (7)
RESPONDENT INTERVIEW NUMBER

001-051 CiTy Councilman or CiTy Commissioner

052-101 STaTe RepresenTaTive
102-118 U.S. RepresenTaTive

RESPONDENT OFFICE LEVEL

1. CiTy Councilman or CiTy Commissioner
3. STaTe RepresenTaTive
5. U.S. RepresenTaTive

ESSENTIALS OF DEMOCRACY CODE SHEET (CONTINUED)

(3) 54. PossibiliTy of removing official disapproved of by

elecToraTe.
(O) 55. EIiTe compeTiTion.

(I) 57. OTher (MAC)
SOCIAL CONDITIONS

(1) 61. Pluralism: a varieTy of privaTe associaTions and

insTiTuTions.
(3) 62. ConsulTaTion beTween government and inTeresT groups.

(0) 64. ParTies as cenTers of parTicipaTion and/or channels

for eXpressing popular will.
(0) 67. OTher (MAC).

CHARACTERESTICS OF CITIZENS; MORALITY

(12) 71. MaTure, educaTed, inTelligenT CiTizens.
(2) 72. Individual self-conTrol; liberTy noT license.
(9) 73. AssumpTion of reasponsibiliTy and duTies.

(IO) 74. AcTion in The inTeresT of collecTiviTy, noT of
individuals.

(0) 75. Reciprocal respecT and Tolerance.
(O) 77. OTher __(MAC).

Var.
bk).

 

(£30
443l

4432

.433

4:54

435

436

437

Column

Number

19 (0)
20 (0)

21 (22)

22-23

24-25

26-27

28

(15)
(17)
(23)

(33)
(23)

(7)

29

(18)

(74)

(10)

Code

 

(256)

Deck 7

MISCELLANEOUS

81.
87.

99.

STrong, disciplined governmenT.
OTher responses noT included under The above

general headings."' (MAC).
OTher; NA; NO.

SECOND, code up To Three menTions in order of There
prominence or imporTance To R.

FIRST ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT

(Use The EssenTials of Democracy Code SheeT)

SECOND ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT

(Use The EssenTials of Democracy Code SheeT)

THIRD ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT

(Use The EssenTials of Democracy Code SheeT)

FOCUS OF DEMOCRACY

R's general focus in his concepTion of democracy. Use
code as a conTinuum.

Wholly insTrumenTaI. An exclusive emphasis on
democraTic meThods and insTiTuTions.

Generally insTrumenTal; general emphasis on meThods

and insTiTuTions, buT some menTion of values and ideals.
Mixed; insTrumenTaI and normaTive elemenTs equally
imporTanT.

Generally normaTive. General emphasis on values and
ideals, buT some menTion of meThods and insTiTuTions.

Wholly normaTive. An exclusive emphasis on democraTic

ideals and values.
OTher; NA; NO.

R'S ABILITY TO HANDLE THE CONCEPT "DEMOCRACY"

This code is based on The coder's judgmenT of R's answer

To 0. 43.

2.

3.

R handled The concepT adequaTely and seemed To have
preconceived noTions abouT iTs meaning.

R handled The concepT adequaTely buT had noxpre-
conceived noTions as To whaT consTiTuTed democraTic
governmenT.

R handled The concepT adequaTely.

Var.

 

I438

439-442 31-34

439

440

441

Column
Number

30

31

32

33

Code

(0)

(12)
(4)

(31)
(39)

(43)

(84)
(20)

(5)

4.

5.
9.

(257)

Deck 7

R confused The Term "democraTic" wiTh The parTisan
adjecTive "DemocraTic".

R had difficulTy discussing The concepT - iT seemed
To absTracT for him To handle wiTh ease.

OTher; NA; NO.

TIME ALLOTTED TO THE DISCUSSION OF DEMOCRACY

NOTE:

01.

02.
03.

This code records The ToTaI minuTes spenT discussing
The essenTiaI ingredienTs democracy.

One minuTe.

Two minuTes.
ETC.

MODELS OF DEMOCRACY

CLASSICAL MODEL

Coder judgmenT: How prominenT in R’s discussion is The
classical model of democracy, wiTh emphasis on direcT

popular parTicipaTion and conTrol?

Does noT appear.

This model appears in his discussion, buT is noT
cenTral.

This is cenTral To his discussion.

OTher; NA; NO.

SCHUMPETERIAN MODEL

Coder judgmenT: How prominenT in R's discussion is The
SchumpeTerian medel of democracy,wiTh emphasis on compeTiTion
beTween several Teams of leaders?

Does noT appear.
This model appears in his discussion, buT is noT
cenTraI.

This is cenTral To his discussion.
OTher; NA; NO.

LIBERAL MODEL

Coder judgmenT: How prominenT in Rfs discussion is The
Liberal model of democracy, wiTh emphasis on legislaTive
governmenT, poliTical liberTies and The rule of law?

Var.
No.

 

442

443

444

Column
Number
(36)
(35)
(43)
34
85)
(I4)
(10)
35
(7)
(4)
(5|)
(6)
(5)
(I9)
(25)
(l)
36
(7)
(30)
(22)
(40)

(I7)
(2)

Code

 

(258)

Deck 7

Does noT appear.

This model appears in his discussion, buT is noT
cenTral.

This is cenTraI To his discussion.

OTher; NA; NO.

SOCIAL MODEL

Coder judgmenT: How prominenT in R's discussion is The Social
model of democracy, wiTh emphasis on social or economic

equaliTy and securiTy?

l.
3.

5
9.

Does noT appear.
This model appears in his discussion, buT is noT

cenTral.
This is cenTral To his discussion.
OTher; NA; NO.

URBAN/RURAL CHARACTER OF DISTRICT (URBAN-NESS OF DISTRICT)

0.46.

How would you describe your disTricT/ciTy in Terms

of how rural, urban, or suburban iT is?

\O\IO\U'l-I>LNI\)—
O

Mainly rural.
MixTure of rural and suburban.

Mainly suburban.
MixTure of urban and rural

MixTure of rural, suburban, and urban.
MixTure of suburban and urban.

Mainly urban.
OTher; NA; NO

PARTISAN DIVISION ON DISTRICT/CITY (DEMOCRAT STRENGTH)

0.47

(COUNCILMEN) Now I recognize ThaT you hold an non-

parTisan office, buT how would you describe your (ciTy/
ward) in Terms of The division beTween DemocraTs

and Republicans? (LEGISLATORS/CONGRESSMEN) How would
you describe your disTricT in Terms of The division

beTween DemocraTs and Republicans?

OUTAKNN—
o

Solidly Republican.
Republicans are in The majoriTy.

CompeTiTive.
DemocraTs are in The majoriTy.

Solidly DemocraTic.
OTher; NA; NO.

Var.
bk).

44 5-451

445

44f)

447

448

449

(259)

 

Column
Number Code Deck 7
37-48 PERSONAL INFORMATION
37 RESPONDENT'S SEX
(112) 1. Male
(6) 3. Female.
38 RESPONDENT'S RACE
(Ill) 1. Caucasion.
(7) 3. Negro
39-40 RESPONDENT'S EDUCATION
0.48. WhaT is The lasT grade of school or year of college
you compleTed?
01. One year of school.
02. Two years of school.
03. ETc.
41-42 FATHER'S/HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD'S EDUCATION
0.49. WhaT was your faTher's (or head of your household's)
level of educaTion?
01. One year of school.
02. Two years of school.
03. ETc.
43-44 RESPONDENT'S OCCUPATION

0.50.

(Use The OccupaTion Code SheeT)

OCCUPATION CODE SHEET

 

PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL

OI. AccounTanTs and audiTors.

02. Clergymen.

03. Public school Teachers; adminisTraTors
05. DenTisTs.

06. Physicians and surgeons.

O7. Engineers.

08. Lawyers and judges.

09. Social and welfare workers.

10. Trained nurse, sTudenT nurse.

WhaT do you consider as your occupaTion?

(260)

Var. Column
No. ‘ Number Code Deck 7

ll. PoliTician; law-maker

12. Highschool Teacher

13. College Teacher

17. OTher professional and Technical

SELF-EMPLOYED BUSINESSMEN - MANAGERS AND OFFICIALS

21. Self-employed businessman, owner or parT-owner
(include farm owners).

22. Self-employed businessman, owner or parT-owner
'small' business. (include farm owners).

23. Self-employed business, NA whaT size.
28. Managers, officials and proprieTors.

29. OTher.

 

CLERICAL

30. Technicians; insurance agenTs
33. Sales (indusTrial/or higher sTaTus).

34. Sales (inside/lower sTaTus).
35. Office-workers.

36. STenographers/SecreTaries
37. OTher.

SKILLED WORKERS

41. Self-employed arTisans and crafTsmen.

42. Foremen.

48. OTher crafTsmen and kindred workers.

49. OTher (Includes policemen and firemen of SargeanT
rank or below).

SEMI-SKILLED -- OPERATIVES AND KINDRED WORKERS

5|. OperaTives and kindred workers.

SERVICE WORKERS

6|. ProTecTive service - planT guards, eTc.
62. OTher proTecTive service workers.
68. OTher service workers.

UNSKILLED WORKERS

71. Farm laborers.
78. JanaTorial
79. OTher unskilled laborers.

88. STudenT

(261)

 

 

 

Var. Column _
No. Number Code Deck 7
450 45-46 FATHER'S/HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD'S OCCUPATION
0.51. WhaT was your faTher's (or The head of your household's)
occupaTion?
(Use The OccupaTion CodesheeT)
451 47-48 AGE OF RESPONDENT
0.52. WhaT is your age?
21. R TwenTy-one years old.
22. R TwenTy-Two years old.
23. ETC.
452 49-51 TIME OF THE INTERVIEW
001. One minuTe.
010. Ten minuTes.
IOO. ETc.
000. NA
CODE:
453 52 ENVIRONMENT AND SETTING OF INTERVIEW
(75) I. 0uieT office - no inTerupTions.

(8) 2. 0uieT office - inTerupTions.

(9) 3. Off The floor of The House of RepresenTaTives -
inTerupTions.

(6) 4. His home - inTerupTions.

(I4) 5. 0uieT home.

(6) 9. OTher; NA; NO.

454 53 HOW RUSHED WAS THE INTERVIEW

(73) I. lnTerview was noT rushed.
(18) 2. lnTerview was noT parTicularly rushed buT a wriTTen

quesTionnare wiTh some of The quesTions was lefT
wiTh The respondenT To save Time.

(12) 3. lnTerview was slighTIy rushed.
(2) 4. lnTerview was rushed.
5

(12) . lnTerview was very rushed.
LISTED ITEMS RESPONDENT WAS ASKED TO AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH

NOTE: Each of The following iTems were scored by The
respondenTs Themselves using The following codes:

Var.
No.

 

455

456

457

458

459

460

461

462

463

464

Column

Number

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

(262)

 

Code Deck 7
I. Disagree
2. Tend To disagree
3. Undecided
4. Tend To agree
5. Agree
9. OTher; NA; NO.

AUTHORITARIANISM INDEX

A few sTrong leaders would do more for This counTry Than
all The laws and Talk.

Few people really know whaT is in Their own besT inTeresT
in The long run.

In This complicaTed world, The only way we can know whaT
is going on is To rely on leaders or experTs who can be
TrusTed.

IT will always be necessary To have a few sTrong, able people
acTually running everyThing.

A group which ToleraTes Too much difference of opinion
among iTs own members cannoT exisT for very long.

POLITICAL DISTRUST INDEX

MosT poliTicians can be TrusTed To do whaT They Think
is besT for The counTry.

People who go inTo public office usually Think of The good
of The peOpIe more Than of Their own.

MORAL ABSOLUTISM INDEX

Of all The differenT Theories abouT The way governmenT
should be conducTed, There is only one which is True.

Unless There is freedom for many poInTs of view To be
presenTed, There is liTTle chance ThaT The TruTh can
ever be known.

SOCIAL CONFLICT INDICATOR - ZERO SUM PERSPECTIVE

When an individual or group gains, iT usually means ThaT
anoTher individual or group loses.

 

Var.

No.

465

466

467

468

469

470

471

472

473

474

475

476

Column

Number

64

65

66

67

68

69

(263)

Code Deck 7

 

REPRESENTATION ATTITUDES

A represenTaTive oughT To work for whaT his consTiTuenTs
wanT even Though This may noT always agree wiTh his
personal views.

TRUSTEE ROLE

I seldom have To sound ouT my consTiTuenTs because I
Think so much like Them ThaT I know how To reacT To
almosT any proposal.

MISCELLANEOUS STATEMENTS

The besT advice on a proposed policy usually comes from
The inTeresTs direchy affecTed.

A represenTaTive oughT To decide how To voTe on mosT
issues by asking himself if The proposed law or
ordinance is morally righT.

So many groups and individuals wanT so many differenT

Things ThaT iT is ofTen difficulT To know whaT sTand To
Take.

Pressure and special inTeresT groups like labor unions,

business associaTions, professional organizaTions, eTc.
hamper The proper workings of governmenT.

Indexes Cons+pggfed from Survey ITems

70

71

72

73

74

75

OFFICE-EXPERIENCE INDEX
(addiTive index 0? iTems 4, 18-20)

PARTY-EXPERIENCE INDEX
(addiTive index of ITems 28-30)

LEFT-RIGHT EXTREMISM INDEX
(Index creaTed by giving foil I and 5 of iTem 31 a score of
l and foils 2, 3 and 4 a score of O)

IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATION INDEX
(addiTive index oT'iTems 72-74)

CRIME IS THE PRODUCT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS INDEX
(addiTive index of ITems 158-170, 193 and 195)

CRIME IS THE PRODUCT OF THE BREAKDOWN OF MORALITY INDEX
(addiTive Thdex of iTems 171-I74)

 

(264)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Var. Column

No. Number Code Deck 7

477 76 CRIME IS THE PRODUCT OF A BREAKDOWN IN SOCIAL DISCIPLINE
INDEX
(addiTive index of ITems 175-177)

478 77 CRIME RESULTS BECAUSE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS ARE
HAMPERED FROM PROPERLY ENFORCING THE LAW INDEX
(addiTive index of iTems I79, 182 and 342)

479 78 CRIME IS THE PRODUCT OF THE FAILURE OF SCHOOL, FAMILY
AND CHURCH INDEX
(addiTive Index of iTems 185-191)

480 79 SOLUTION TO CRIME WILL INVOLVE BROAD SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CHANGE INDEX
(addiTive index of iTems 202-208 and 286)

481 80 TO SOLVE CRIME THE SCHOOL, FAMILY AND CHURCH MUST WORK
HARDER’INDEX
(addiTive index of iTems 223-229 and 317)

482 6 RESPONDENT'S OCCUPATIONAL OR PERSONAL CONTACT OR EXPERIENCE

(DK 8) WITH THE CRIME PROBLEM INDEX

 

 

(EddiTIve index of iTems 359-363 and 368)

 

APPENDIX C

ITEM ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME
DISCUSSION CODING ITEMS

265

266

Tab1e C.1.--Means and Standard Deviations of the Crime Discussion
Coding Items.*

 

 

Item Item
Number Mean S.D. Number Mean S.D.
267 2.69 .72 312 2.01 1.00
268 2.97 .26 313 2.06 1.00
269 2.97 .26 314 2.09 1.00
270 1.56 .90 315 2.50 .86
271 2.88 .47 316 1.77 .97
272 2.54 .84 317 1.68 .95
273 2.39 .92 318 2.86 .51
274 2.21 .98 319 2.80 .61
275 2.30 .95 320 2.95 .32
276 2.15 .99 321 2.81 .58
277 1.48 .85 322 2.95 .31
278 1.93 1.01 323 2.76 .65
279 2.06 1.00 324 1.65 .94
280 2.15 .99 325 2.93 .36
281 1.92 1.00 326 2.25 .97
282 2.25 .97 327 1.17 .56
283 2.86 .51 328 2.76 .65
284 2.39 .92 329 1.29 .71
285 2.59 .81 330 2.62 .78
286 2.47 .51 331 2.42 .91
287 1.92 1.00 332 2.52 .85
288 1.50 .86 333 2.52 .85
289 2.64 .77 334 2.52 .85
290 2.78 .63 335 1.96 1.00
291 2.54 .84 336 2.76 .65
292 2.64 .77 337 1.65 .94
293 2.88 .47 338 2.54 .84
294 2.68 .74 339 2.84 .53
295 2.90 .44 340 2.61 .80
296 2.92 .41 341 2.15 .99
**297 3.93 1.47 342 2.54 .84
**298 2.45 1.11 343 2.73 .69
**299 1.94 1.06 344 2.52 .85
300 2.33 .94 345 2.08 1.00
301 2.73 .69 346 2.61 .80
302 ’2.01 1.00 347 1.63 .93
303 2.52 .85 348 1.74 .96
304 2.69 .72 349 2.52 .85
305 2.92 .41 350 2.73 .69
306 2.40 .92 351 2.57 .82
307 2.52 .85 352 2.78 .63
308 2.13 .92 354 2.93 .36
309 2.85 .53 355 2.88 .47
310 2.35 .94 356 2.98 .18
311 2.54 .84 357 2.78 .63

 

*In actuality, this table contains only 90 items since three
items (266, 353 and 358) were coded "not mentioned" for all 118
respondents.

**Items 297-299 simply record the number of causes, solutions,
and responsibIe agencies with regard to crime and. therefore, the
range of scores on these items was unbounded. The range of scores
for a11 other items is 1-3.

 

 

267

Table C.2.--Cluster Names and Item Numbers.

 

 

Cluster
Number Cluster Name Cluster Item Numbers

501 Crime Not Criminals Cluster: (272,270)

502 Non-Specific Cluster: (276,275,288,287,278)

503 Global Orientation CLuster: (289,282)

504 Environmental Cluster (280,277,279)

505 Non-Personal Orientation Cluster: (294.291.326.285)

506 Non-Factual Orientation Cluster: (292.295)

507 Theoretical Approach Cluster: (293,290)

508 Comprehensive Cluster: (303,286,306)

509 Complex Cluster: (298,299,297)

510 Structured Cluster: (300,301,302)

511 Special Breed Cluster: (273.312.313.274)

512 Retribution Cluster: (314,347.316.341.345,
284,28l.310)

513 Rehabilitation Cluster: £346,315)

514 Pro-Enforcement Cluster: 317.348.344.308,342)

515 New Laws Cluster: (340,343,323)

516 Historical Cluster: (339.337)

517 Moralistic Cluster: (349,350,352,351,296)

518 Emotionalism Cluster: (324,309,322,3l9,321,
320

519 Fear Cluster: (325.336.318.267)

520 Easy Talking Cluster: (330.329,328,327.334,
335,307,332)

521 Self-Assurance Cluster: (331,333)

522 Residual Item Cluster: (268,269,271,283.304,
305,3ll,338.354,355,

356.357)

 

268

TABLE C-3.--Items of Cluster 501: Crime not Criminals (items
indicating a concern with "crime" but not "criminals")*.

 

-272 Respondent says that the individuals who commit crimes are
the subject to be dealt with.

270 Respondent cites the abstraction "crime" as the subject
which must be dealt with.

 

 

272 270
272 80 78
270 78 80
501 89 89 Crime not Criminals
502 6 -O Non-Specific
503 14 15 Global Orientation
504 36 45 Environmental
505 23 16 Non-Personal
506 -5 3 Non-Factual
507 17 23 Theoretical
508 -3 10 Comprehensive
509 -3 11 Complex
510 -3 9 Structured
511 21 6 Special Breed
512 -6 -10 Retribution
513 -3 5 Rehabilitation
514 -10 ~20 Pro-Enforcement
515 -6 8 New Laws
516 -15 -17 Historical
517 8 18 Moralism
518 -29 -33 Emotionalism
519 15 20 Fear
520 -15 -5 Easy Talking
521 -5 -4 Self-Assured

 

*The items have been scored to reflect the meaning of the cluster
title. Table entries for Table C-3 through C-24 are correlations.

269

TABLE C-4.--Items of Cluster 502: Non-Specific (items related to

-276
275
-288

287

-278

an imprecise or relatively non-specific orientation
to crime).

Respondent refers to various types of crime.
Respondent refers to crime as if it were a homogeneous concept.

Respondent recommends some specific institutional change as a
solution to the crime problem.

Respondent recommends a course of action yet does not name an
agent for carrying it out.

Respondent says or implies that specific institutional prob-
lems cause crime.

 

276 275 288 287 278

 

276

47 56 30 21 13

5 5 -O -8 7 Crime not Criminals
69 48 53 39 32 Non-Specific
-5 20 -ll 17 -2 Global Orientation
9 5 10 20 30 Environmental
l 14 4 -5 22 Non-Personal
29 22 19 2 1 Non-Factual
-1 8 9 8 10 Theoretical
-3 -16 -12 11 -3 Comprehensive
6 -8 -14 15 -14 Complex
-22 -28 -31 7 -2 Structured
-4 -2 12 -11 -8 Special Breed
-20 -3 -32 -21 -45 Retribution
-19 -26 -30 -12 -29 Rehabilitation
-13 -2 -l -27 -18 Pro-Enforcement
-28 -16 -12 -5 -26 New Laws
18 21 26 18 17 Historical
8 -8 32 20 14 Moralism
-16 -4 3 -8 -27 Emotionalism
-4 -7 4 4 -16 Fear
-17 -11 -24 -5 -25 Easy Talking
-4O -22 -23 -20 -18 Self-Assured

 

270

TABLE C-5.--Items of Cluster 503: Global Orientation (items
related to a global orientation to crime).

 

-289 Respondent recommends individual change as the solution to
crime.

-282 Respondent says or implies that certain individuals should
handle the crime problem.

 

 

289 282
289 50 46
282 46 50
501 15 8 Crime not Criminals
502 -O 11 Non-Specific
503 69 69 Global Orientation
504 28 35 Environmental
505 7 -2 Non-Personal
506 -12 -12 Non-Factual
507 -13 -17 Theoretical
508 9 -5 Comprehensive
509 O -4 Complex
510 -2 -12 Structured
511 -3 7 Special Breed
512 -2 O Retribution
513 7 1 Rehabilitation
514 3 9 Pro-Enforcement
515 -24 -34 New Laws
516 -10 -14 Historical
517 5 -l Moralism
518 -11 -2 Emotionalism
519 -14 1 Fear
520 -3 -11 Easy Talking

521 -6 8 Self-Assured

 

271

TABLE C-6.--Items of Cluster 504: Environmental (items related to
the idea that environmental conditions cause crime).

 

280 Respondent says or implies that "society" or "the people"
should handle the crime problem.

277 Respondent says or implies that social. economic, or environ-
mental conditions cause crime.

-279 Respondent says or implies that individuals cause crime.

 

 

 

280 277 279
280 24 20 26
277 20 20 23
279 26 23 29
501 21 22 24 Crime not Criminals
502 23 29 -8 Non-Specific
503 36 -2 33 Global Orientation
504 48 44 54 Environmental
505 -13 22 -7 Non-Personal
506 7 -6 -17 Non-Factual
507 14 20 20 Theoretical
508 22 29 23 Comprehensive
509 16 37 -3 Complex
510 24 18 -2 Structured
511 -15 -29 -13 Special Breed
512 -43 -41 -17 Retribution
513 17 1 11 Rehabilitation
514 -6 -30 -13 Pro-Enforcement
515 2 7 -4 New Laws
516 -16 15 -26 Historical
517 18 6 5 Moralism
518 -9 -39 -19 Emotionalism
519 2 —6 1 Fear
520 5 4 2 Easy Talking'

521 l3 -l4 l7 Self-Assured

 

272

TABLE C~7.~~Items of Cluster 505: Non-Personal (items related to
a non-personal orientation to crime).

 

~294 Respondent says or implies that his ideas about the solution(s)
to crime derive from his personal thought.

~291 Respondent says or implies that his ideas on the cause(s) of
crime derive from his own personal experiences.

~326 Respondent seems personally concerned about the problem of
crime.

~285 Respondent reifies the word society or refers to it in a
personalized manner.

 

 

294 291 326 285

 

294 32 42 18 24

291 42 32 24 17

326 18 24 22 30

285 24 17 3O 21

501 22 21 8 ~6 Crime not Criminals
502 13 8 15 ~6 Non-Specific
503 6 5 4 ~8 Global Orientation
504 13 14 5 ~29 Environmental
505 57 57 47 45 Non-Personal
506 12 17 2 10 Non-Factual

507 9 17 ~33 ~5 Theoretical

508 ~4 ~1 ~36 ~16 Comprehensive
509 2 10 ~24 11 Complex

510 8 21 ~46 20 Structured

511 18 29 5 ~4 Special Breed
512 ~5 5 ~3 3 Retribution

513 11 ~3 ~21 ~7 Rehabilitation
514 ~37 ~7 ~2 ~4 Pro-Enforcement
515 17 21 ~41 ~13 New Laws

516 ~21 ~23 4 8 Historical

517 2 16 2 ~24 Moralism

518 ~24 ~37 ~34 ~13 Emotionalism
519 ~21 ~19 ~17 ~25 Fear

520 ~7 ~3 ~23 ~7 Easy Talking

52l ~3 ~22 ~33 ~15 Self-Assured

273

TABLE C~8.~-Items of Cluster 506: Non-Factual (items related to a
non-factual orientation to crime).

 

~292 Respondent says or implies that his ideas about the cause(s)
of crime derive from facts he has heard.

~295 Respondent says or implies that his ideas about the solution(s)
to crime derive from facts he has heard.

 

 

 

292 295
292 43 40
295 40 43
501 9 ~11 Crime not Criminals
502 19 21 Non-Specific
503 ~13 ~9 Global Orientation
504 1 ~16 Environmental
505 26 1 Non-Personal
506 64 64 Non-Factual
507 27 13 TheoreticaI
508 4 ~16 Comprehensive
509 13 ~8 Complex
510 1 ~35 Structured
511 23 1 Special Breed
512 ~16 ~10 Retribution
513 ~12 4 Rehabilitation
514 6 ~2 Pro-Enforcement
515 ~1 ~3 New Laws
516 1 ~3 Historical
517 17 15 Moralism
518 5 8 Emotionalism
519 ~5 ~1 Fear
520 4 ~7 Easy Talking

521 ~6 ~15 Self-Assured

 

274

TABLE C~9.~~Items of Cluster 507: Theoretical (items related to
a theoretical approach to the crime problem).

 

293 Respondent says or implies that some sort of social theory
should guide public policy on crime.

290 Respondent says or implies that his ideas on the causes of
crime are deduced from some social. political or economic

 

 

 

theory.

293 290
293 30 25
290 25 30
501 7 16 Crime not Criminals
502 18 ~3 Non-Specific
503 ~24 1 Global Orientation
504 21 18 Environmental
505 ~3 ~3 Non-Personal
506 14 19 Non-Factual
507 53 53 Theoretical
508 16 31 Comprehensive
509 37 5 Complex
510 37 29 Structured
511 ~14 7 Special Breed
512 ~13 ~12 Retribution
513 15 12 Rehabilitation
514 ~20 ~2 Pro-Enforcement
515 39 21 New Laws
516 23 ~20 Historical
517 ~4 29 Moralism
518 13 2 Emotionalism
519 ~14 13 Fear
520 ll 17 Easy Talking

521 12 34 Self-Assured

 

275

TABLE C-lO.~-Items of Cluster 508: Comprehensive (items related to
a comprehensive discussion).

 

303 Respondent suggests a comprehensive attack on crime (economic.
social, political, legal, etc.) as his (or her) solution to
the problem.

286 Respondent recommends general social reform or broad social
change as the solution to the crime problem.

306 Respondent's discussion was particularly well organized.

 

 

303 286 306
303 79 66 60
286 66 53 45
306 60 45 44
501 l 10 ~0 Crime not Criminals
502 ~9 9 ~22 Non-Specific
503 ~l l4 ~7 Global Orientation
504 38 53 24 Environmental
505 ~23 ~16 ~24 Non-Personal
506 ~ll ~7 ~3 Non-Factual
507 28 43 30 Theoretical
508 90 72 65 Comprehensive
509 67 59 68 Complex
510 66 65 73 Structured
511 ~48 ~32 ~29 Special Breed
512 ~22 ~29 ~4 Retribution
513 36 23 41 Rehabilitation
514 ~33 ~33 ~24 Pro-Enforcement
515 30 25 21 New Laws
516 ~15 ~12 4 Historical
517 ~8 5 19 Moralism
518 ~21 ~6 ~8 Emotionalism
519 ~2 ~2 ~4 Fear
520 33 19 40 Easy Talking

521 20 26 22 Self-Assured

 

 

276

TABLE C-ll.~~Items of Cluster 509: Complex (items related to a
rather complex discussion of the crime problem).

 

298 Code the number of various crime solutions mentioned by the
respondent.

299 Code the number of societal agencies which the respondent says
should deal with the problem of crime.

297 Code the number of various causes of crime mentioned by the

 

 

respondent.

298 299 297
298 59 44 40
299 44 31 25
297 40 25 26
501 ~12 11 10 Crime not Criminals
502 ~1 ~22 13 Non-Specific
503 ~7 3 ~2 Global Orientation
504 16 21 26 Environmental
505 ~19 IO 8 Non-Personal
506 04 ~17 28 Non-Factual
507 30 19 23 Theoretical
508 64 61 31 Comprehensive
509 78 55 49 Complex
510 76 71 37 Structured
511 ~26 ~4 ~18 Special Breed
512 O4 1 ~4 Retribution
513 37 37 19 Rehabilitation
514 ~29 ~25 ~3O Pro-Enforcement
515 3O 16 8 New Laws
516 5 ~3 25 Historical
517 ~ll ~2 20 Moralism
518 -1 ~21 ~12 Emotionalism
519 1 ~22 ~7 Fear
520 27 41 5 Easy Talking

521 4 6 ~26 Self-Assured

 

 

277

TABLE C~12.~~Items of Cluster 510: Structured (items related to a
structured discussion).

 

300 Respondent offers some type of chain of reasoning in his dis-
cussion of the crime problem.

301 Respondent offers some type of sequence of events or listing
(e.g.. of causes. solutions, etc.) in his analysis of crime.

302 Respondent offers some type of connection between the cause(s)
and the solution(s) to crime in his (or her) discussion.

 

 

300 301 302
300 32 25 17
301 25 18 10
302 17 IO 9
501 ~14 17 1 Crime not Criminals
502 -8 ~18 ~14 Non-Specific
503 ~3 3 ~13 Global Orientation
504 14 13 8 Environmental
505 -6 ~10 l7 Non-Personal
506 1 ~11 ~24 Non-Factual
507 52 2 25 Theoretical
508 61 27 26 Comprehensive
509 57 32 4O Complex
510 58 42 28 Structured
511 ~20 5 ~4 Special Breed
512 -8 ~4 ~4 Retribution
513 35 14 5 Rehabilitation
514 ~15 ~22 ~26 Pro-Enforcement
515 39 24 32 New Laws
516 16 -9 ~17 Historical
517 1 ~13 ~6 Moralism
518 8 -0 ~14 Emotionalism
519 ~15 9 1 Fear
520 39 26 30 Easy Talking

521 28 30 15 Self-Assured

 

278

TABLE C~13.~~Items of Cluster 511: Special Breed (items related to
the belief that criminals are a special breed of
person).

 

273 Respondent says or implies that criminals constitute a
homogeneous group.

~312 Respondent says or implies that criminals are ordinary
persons in special circumstances.

313 Respondent says or implies that criminals are inherently
weak in character.

~274 Respondent says or implies that there are various types of
criminals.

 

 

273 312 313 274

 

273 49 25 3O 46

312 25 33 42 22

313 30 42 20 2

274 46 22 2 17

501 -l 14 5 15 Crime not Criminals
502 ~l ~23 ~4 15 Non-Specific
503 6 7 ~l ~6 Global Orientation
504 ~6 ~35 ~43 0 Environmental
505 5 3 6 37 Non-Personal
506 12 2 15 11 Non-Factual

507 10 ~27 1 1 Theoretical

508 ~13 ~45 ~23 ~21 Comprehensive
509 ~6 ~33 ~5 ~13 Complex

510 15 ~24 ~12 ~11 Structured

511 70 57 44 41 Special Breed
512 35 32 30 13 Retribution

513 ~13 ~20 ~8 ~26 Rehabilitation
514 27 41 14 12 Pro-Enforcement
515 28 -15 10 5 New Laws

516 ~l ~15 ~O ~15 Historical

517 ~9 9 23 ~2 Moralism

518 28 13 18 ~5 Emotionalism
519 23 2 -2 ~2 Fear

520 16 ~10 ~3 ~15 Easy Talking

521 31 9 -3 -4 Self-Assured

 

279

TABLE C.l4.~~Items of Cluster 512: Retribution (items related to

314

347

a retribution orientation toward criminals).

In discussing the solution(s) to crime. the respondent says or
implies that criminals need punishment.

Respondent says or implies that the police. the courts. or the
penal authorities are the agencies responsible for dealing with
the crime problem.

 

316 Respondent says or implies that law enforcement agencies should
handle the crime problem.
341 Respondent says or implies that courts have encouraged crime by
not enforcing laws.
345 Respondent's solution involves the restructuring or improvement
of the court system.
284 Respondent reifies the work "court."
281 Respondent refers to abstractions such as "the courts" or "the
police" as the agencies that should handle the crime problem.
310 Respondent blames the crime problem on some group. institution.
or person(s).
314 347 316 341 ‘45 2’14 281 310
314 69 55 61 64 5'3 43 29 (.0
3h? 55 58 71 51 59 33 37 12
316 61 71 S7 47 41 41 29 25
351 64 51 #7 51 52 36 25 29
345 50 59 41 52 44 35 31 5
2'14 L3 33 b1 36 35 29 36 9
281 29 37 29 25 31 36 19 9
318 BO 12 25 29 5 9 9 8
501 -15 2 -2 1 6 -18 7 -27
502 ~31 ~59 ~32 ~42 ~34 ~23 ~33 2 $1.11“; 2217. CE'm'm's
232 -23 -13 26% -32 -5}, “:3 -332 :33 Glob bao l(1)1rienyation
505 ~15 15 “x ~2 6 16 24 ~24 RSV-'- .1353? i
506 -16 -22 -15 -1O -22 3 -26 12 on- Factua
507 ~18 ~11 -25 ~S 17 -20 -23 -29 Theoretical
SOB ~23 ~15 ~28 ~16 1 ~9 ~1 ~23 Eompfex ehensnve
509 -1 11 -7 -3 19 -6 -4 -30 omple
510 o -5 -32 -5 17 -22 -3 -21, Structured
511 «6 40 42 3e 22 27 11 23 Special Breed
512 83 76 75 72 st. 53 43 28 Retr'butlon
513 1 29 -1; 1p. 32 I] 1.3 -23 Rehabilitation
51a 38 e1 56 28 19 27 13 29 Pro-Enforcement
515 14 2 h 1 9 9 1 14 Newt Laws
516 25 -2 18 -9 11 16 O -6 Him (wcal
517 -13 -13 -8 -13 -11. -12 -15 -1 0"?151“
518 40 17 23 28 3 19 -1 «2 Emothmlimn
519 11 lo 16 21 1'5 -.6 -5 21 ear
520 14 1 -8 1? 22 -3 4. -2 Eafy alkin
521 24 22 ‘3 11 29 10 1 5 ’ ssure

 

 

TABLE

280

C~15.~~Items of Cluster 513:
to a rehabilitation orientation towards criminals.

Rehabilitation (items related

 

 

 

346 Respondent's solution involves restructuring or improvement
of the penal system.
315 In discussing the solution(s) to crime, the respondent says
or implies that criminals should be rehabilitated.
346 315
346 73 71
315 71 73
501 5 ~3 Crime not Criminals
502 ~37 ~45 Non-Specific
503 7 4 Global Orientation
504 22 11 Environmental
505 ~14 ~3 Non-Personal
506 ~7 ~4 Non-Factual
507 23 21 Theoretical
508 35 39 Comprehensive
509 42 45 Complex
510 27 45 Structured
511 ~24 ~30 Special Breed
512 6 8 Retribution
513 85 85 Rehabilitation
514 ~23 ~19 Pro-Enforcement
515 19 22 New Laws
516 ~22 ~17 Historical
517 2 ~4 Moralism
518 ~8 ~8 Emotionalism
519 2 ~9 Fear
520 14 27 Easy Talking
521 23 13 Self-Assured

 

 

281

TABLE C-16.--Items of Cluster 514: Pro-Enforcement (items related
to a pro-enforcement orientation to crime).

 

~317 Respondent says or implies that social institutions (schools,
families, churches. etc.) are responsible for dealing with
the crime problem.

~348 Respondent says or implies that non-law enforcement agencies
are the institutions which should deal with the problem of
crime.

344 Respondent's solution to the crime problem involves improve-
ment of law enforcement capability.

~308 Respondent says or implies that crime is a complex issue.

342 Respondent says or implies that law enforcement authorities
are hampered in enforcing laws.

 

 

317 348 344 308 342

 

317 62 76 27 27 38

348 76 54 20 38 26

344 27 20 25 37 36

308 27 38 37 20 7

342 38 26 36 7 19

501 -l ~9 ~9 ~25 ~6 Crime not Criminals
502 ~19 ~16 ~24 3 ~17 Non-Specific
503 3 ll 12 -l ~O Global Orientation
504 ~19 ~9 ~21 ~30 ~19 Environmental
505 ~14 ~14 ~4 ~20 ~18 Non-Personal
506 -5 ~6 4 ll 6 Non-Factual

507 ~2 ~12 ~26 ~1 ~19 Theoretical

508 ~34 ~33 ~7 ~29 ~12 Comprehensive
509 ~42 ~53 4 ~24 ~19 Complex

510 ~26 ~26 ~22 ~32 ~36 Structured

511 51 41 14 7 15 Special Breed
512 50 39 ll 15 27 Retribution

513 ~20 ~8 ~13 ~8 ~23 Rehabilitation
514 79 73 50 45 43 Pro-Enforcement
515 6 ~2 ~2 4 ~6 New Laws

516 4 ~3 ~5 4 ~8 Historical

517 ~13 ~14 ~13 ~11 ~16 Moralism

518 28 36 17 24 24 Emotionalism
519 20 17 ~l 4 19 Fear

520 17 20 ~O 13 2 Easy Talking

521 22 25 6 5 -4 Self-Assured

 

 

282

TABLE C~17.~~Items of Cluster 515: New Laws (items related to the
belief that new laws are needed to deal with the crime
problem).

 

340 Respondent cites inadequacies in the criminal code as a factor
bearing on the crime problem.

343 Respondent says or implies that new laws are needed to properly
deal with the crime problem.

323 Respondent views the crime problem as an urgent matter needing
immediate attention.

 

 

 

340 343 323
340 36 3O 22
343 30 25 16
323 22 16 13
501 ~4 ~12 18 Crime not Criminals
502 ~15 ~22 ~16 Non-Specific
503 ~21 ~26 ~13 Global Orientation
504 ~l ~5 12 Environmental
505 ~5 ~8 l Non-Personal
506 ~2 ~7 5 Non-Factual
507 47 20 16 Theoretical
508 35 ~2 15 Comprehensive
509 27 2 13 Complex
510 42 24 41 Structured
511 6 4 10 Special Breed
512 8 12 ~4 Retribution
513 14 7 l4 Rehabilitation
514 ~2 4 ~1 Pro-Enforcement
515 61 49 35 New Laws
516 ~16 ~7 ~21 Historical
517 l ~5 ~12 Moralism
518 l 9 ll Emotionalism
519 ~7 ~2 29 Fear
520 23 11 8 Easy Talking

521 12 12 17 Self-Assured

 

 

283

TABLE C~18.~~Items of Cluster 516: Historical (items related to
an historical approach to the subject of crime).

 

339 Respondent uses historical antecedents in his discussion of
the crime problem.

337 Respondent refers to some period in history as a standard by
which we should judge today's crime problem.

 

 

339 337
339 25 20
337 20 25
501 2 ~19 Crime not Criminals
502 23 16 Non-Specific
503 ~16 -1 Global Orientation
504 ~6 ~12 Environmental
505 ~5 ~9 Non-Personal
506 ~15 13 Non-Factual
507 9 ~6 Theoretical
508 ~7 -2 Comprehensive
509 8 6 Complex
510 6 ~13 Structured
511 ~l9 5 Special Breed
512 ~2 12 Retribution
513 ~9 ~12 Rehabilitation
514 ~14 11 Pro-Enforcement
515 ~20 ~lO New Laws
516 47 47 Historical
517 7 ~6 Moralism
518 ~5 20 Emotionalism
519 7 ~5 Fear
520 ~20 ~2 Easy Talking

521 ~12 ~5 Self-Assured

 

284

TABLE C~l9.~~Items of Cluster 517: Moralism (items related to a
moralistic perspective about the crime problem).

 

349 Respondent cites the general breakdown of public and private
morality as a cause of crime.

350 Respondent cites the declining influence of the church as a
cause of crime.

352 Respondent's solution involves some attempt to strengthen
public and private morality.

351 Respondent says or implies that crime is caused by families
and schools which have failed to teach correct moral behavior.

296 Respondent says or implies that his solution(s) to crime is(are)
derived froma moral belief system.

 

349 350 352 351 296

 

349 45 48 44 44 38

350 48 42 33 34 53

352 44 33 4O 41 46

351 44 34 41 37 41

296 38 53 46 41 48

501 8 13 2 IO 14 Crime not Criminals
502 23 20 33 l 12 Non-Specific
503 ~4 21 ~4 ~11 6 Global Orientation
504 26 15 15 ~6 14 Environmental
505 9 ~7 ~11 13 ~10 Non-Personal
506 22 17 14 24 3 Non-Factual

507 14 7 23 4 26 Theoretical

508 5 7 7 ~O 4 Comprehensive
509 10 ll ~2 l ~6 Complex

510 ~18 4 ~14 ~4 ~14 Structured

511 ~O l4 3 1 14 Special Breed
512 ~17 ~7 ~31 ~4 ~O Retribution

513 5 ~7 ~11 12 ~1 Rehabilitation
514 ~16 ~24 ~20 ~13 ~3 Pro-Enforcement
515 ~15 ~6 -1 ~14 -3 New Laws

516 19 7 ~9 ~20 7 Historical

517 67 65 63 6O 7O Moralism

518 ~16 ~3 ~10 ~14 -l Emotionalism
519 4 18 ~8 ~5 15 Fear

520 ~14 ~10 ~9 ~5 ~lO Easlealking

521 ~22 ~12 ~18 ~6 2 Self-Assured

 

285

TABLE C~20.~~Items of Cluster 518: Emotionalism (items related
to an emotional orientation to the crime problem).

 

~324 Respondent discussed the crime problem objectively ~ as just
another problem.

309 Respondent perceives the crime problem in dichotomous "we
versus they" terms.

322 Respondent uses emotionally charged words when discussing who
is responsible for dealing with the crime problem.

319 Respondent uses emotionally charged words when discussing
the causes of crime.

321 Respondent uses emotionally charged words when discussing
the solution(s) to the crime problem.

320 Respondent uses emotionally charged words when discussing
criminals.

 

324 309 322 319 321 320

 

324 37 28 23 43 34 12

309 28 34 36 33 24 16

322 23 36 23 12 13 32

319 43 33 12 24 18 12

321 34 24 13 18 ' 17 13

320 12 16 32 12 13 11

501 ~8 ~14 ~31 ~21 ~9 ~17 Crime not Criminals
502 ~11 2 ~11 ~2 ~lO ~30 Non-Specific
503 ~13 ~11 ~12 ~2 5 7 Global Orientation
504 ~31 ~17 ~25 ~19 ~21 ~19 Environmental
505 ~43 ~38 ~26 ~19 ~15 ~13 Non-Personal
506 5 16 9 13 ~11 ~2 Non-Factual

507 24 3 ~9 51 ~19 ~9 Theoretical

508 ~19 2 ~8 ~5 ~8 ~8 Comprehensive
509 ~16 ~3 ~5 5 ~13 ~22 Complex

510 ~8 ~3 ~O l0 ~7 ~6 Structured

511 33 9 ~9 17 21 2 Special Breed
512 35 9 2 11 27 IO Retribution

513 ~7 ~5 ~3 ~1 ~16 5 Rehabilitation
514 29 3O l5 17 31 7 Pro-Enforcement
515 21 13 ~14 36 1 ~14 New Laws

516 2 12 24 18 -9 ~2 Historical

517 ~14 8 ~6 -8 ~18 ~1 Moralism

518 61 58 48 49 41 33 Emotionalism
519 40 6 5 ~10 6 5 Fear

520 ~O l3 3 18 O 9 Easy Talking

521 38 23 3 45 17 25 Self-Assured

 

_.-....L

 

 

286

TABLE C~21.~~Items)of Cluster 519: Fear (items related to a fear of
crime .

 

325 Respondent says or implies that he (or she) has a personal fear
of becoming a crime victim.

336 Respondent says or implies that there might not be a solution
to the crime problem.

318 Respondent uses emotionally charged words when discussing
crime and its consequences.

267 Respondent says or implies that individuals are the victim of

 

 

crime.

325 336 318 267
325 55 37 32 44
336 37 3O 42 13
318 32 42 29 17
267 44 13 17 17
501 12 4 18 10 Crime not Criminals
502 ~3 9 5 ~28 Non-Specific
503 ~15 ~5 8 ~10 Global Orientation
504 8 ~1 ~10 ~3 Environmental
505 ~18 ~29 ~16 ~27 Non-Personal
506 l ~l 15 ~26 Non-Factual
507 3 ~13 25 ~17 Theoretical
508 -l 7 ~8 ~6 Comprehensive
509 ~5 ~6 ~14 ~8 Complex
510 2 ~25 ~17 32 Structured
511 ~2 ~6 23 7 Special Breed
512 -6 2 22 18 Retribution
513 2 ~4 ~2 ~3 Rehabilitation
514 4 ~1 22 19 Pro-Enforcement
515 4 4 4 19 New Laws
516 ~17 29 5 ~13 Historical
517 ~8 ll 26 ~12 Moralism
518 ~2 21 11 ll Emotionalism
519 75 55 54 41 Fear
520 2 ~24 ~9 6 Easy Talking

521 ~l ~16 8 18 Self-Assured

 

287

TABLE C.22.~~Items of Cluster 520: Easy Talking (items related to

how talkative the respondent was).

 

~330 Respondent was reluctant to recommend a solution to the crime
problem (probing required).
329 Respondent offered his opinion about the solution to the crime
problem readily.
~328 Respondent was reluctant to talk about the causes of crime
(probing required).
327 Respondent offered his opinion on the causes of crime readily.
~334 Respondent qualified his statements about the solutions to the
crime problem.
335 Respondent says or implies that there was a solution to the
crime problem.
-307 Respondent's discussion was unorganized and meandering.
~332 Respondent qualified his statements about the causes of crime.
330 329 323 327 3314 335 307 332
330 72 1 63 48 6 M1 40 35
a: is 63 3:. g: a: 5:
329 «a 6g 55 45 33 32 26 26
334 60 45 35 33 41 39 3O 34
335 141 38 33 32 38 27 22 22
307 £0 22 35 26 30 22 17 11
332 35 22 23 26 34 22 11 14
50 ~12 -2 -4 ~16 -1¢. -5 9 9 rim no riminals
502 -25 -19 -29 -11 -12 -3O -3O -11 Non-specific .
533 -7 -2 -3 -13 -8 5 -21 -2 Global OrIenfatIon
54 9 -6 -7 -7 O 12 12 23 EnVIronmenta ‘
505 -13 -21 «~11 -16 ~11 ~19 11 -18 Non-Personal
506 -1 -13 -9 2 16 -15 -111 $9 Non-Factua
507 12 16 11 18 26 5 16 6 Theoretlca
53° 3: :3 2: :2 i: 19 3: 88132275”:
313 69 52 m. 31 57 43 53 19 Strustured
1 -3 -1. -1 -9 a -7 -6 -2 Special Breed
512 5 3 16 -3 16 5 6 -7 Retr'Pu'E'O".
513 15 19 15 1a 19 24. 15 13 Rehabllltatlon
514 13 13 22 1o 11 17 6 ~3 Pro-Enforcement
51s 29 27 17 15 14. 23 13 5 New Laws
516 -13 -12 -36 '11 7 ‘13 -12 -219 HIstorIcal
51? -1h -19 -17 -8 -9 -25 15 5 Moralism
518 16 1O 8 1O 23 5-18 11 Emotionalism
513 ~5 -1, 3-13 7 ~33 ~11 ~1 Fear
52 E5 75 7 67 6‘4 32 ‘01 33 Easy Talking
521 29 30 244 18 36 33 1‘4 27 Self-Assured

 

 

 

. 1.4

288

TABLE C-23.--Items of Cluster 521: Self-Assured (items related to
the respondent's sense of self-assurance).

 

331 Respondent appeared to feel that his ideas on the cause of
crime were the "correct" ideas (i.e., beyond his personal
point of view).

333 Respondent appeared to feel that his solution(s) to the crime
problem were the "correct” solutions (i.e., beyond his per-
sonal point of view).

 

 

 

331 333
331 68 66
333 66 68
501 -6 -2 Crime not Criminals
502 -34 -49 Non-Specific
503 8 -6 Global Orientation
504 16 1 Environmental
505 -30 -29 Non-Personal
506 -12 -15 Non-Factual
507 37 34 Theoretical
508 28 21 Comprehensive
509 -4 -9 Complex
510 42 52 Structured
511 13 12 Special Breed
512 17 19 Retribution
513 19 16 Rehabilitation
514 12 19 Pro-Enforcement
515 17 29 New Laws
516 ~15 -15 Historical
517 -14 -15 Moralism
518 44 . 42 Emotionalism
519 6 0 Fear
520 34 37 Easy Talking

521 82 82 Self-Assured

 

 

 

 

2E“?

TABLE C.24.--Cluster 522: Residual Items of the Residual Cluster. Note: These items did not fit in
any of the clusters. Items denoted by an asterisk (*) were put in the Residual Cluster
because they produced no variance; i.e., all respondents were scored the same on the item.

 

*266 Respondent says or implies that “society" is the victim of crime.
268 Respondent says or implies that crime victims are a homogeneous group.
269 Respondent says or implies that there are different types of crime victims.

271 Respondent says that "degenerates," "punks,“ "the criminal element,“ etc., are the subject to be
dealt with.

283 Respondent reifies the word "police."

304 Respondent offers some type of circular reasoning in his discussion of crime.

305 Respondent's discussion strayed from the question(s) more than once.

3ll Respondent says or implies that crime is a natural social problem we will always have.

338 Respondent says or implies that the crime problem exists because we are in some historical or
social cycle. _, .....

*353 Resoondent says or implies that priests, ministers, rabbis, etc., have a responsibility to deal
with the crime problem.

354 Respondent says or implies that partisan or political interest group acceptability is a factor in
the implementation of any new crime policy.

355 Respondent says or implies that public acceptability is a factor in the implementation of any
new crime policy.

356 ReSpondent says or implies that technical or administrative feasibility is a factor which impinges
on any attempt to solve the crime problem.

357 Respondent says or implies that financial cost is a factor which must be considered when consider-
ing the solution to the crime problem.

*358 Respondent says or implies that certain traditions must be considered when assessing any solution(s)
to the crime problem.

 

266 269 271 283 3GB 305 311 336 356 355 356 357
52: "W a =2 1:. 9 -; -7 -g 9 “~29
273 -3 1o -7 -1 -5 3 5 - - -2 -1b
$8.. $5 2 :1 159.135 '3 's -22 13 9 12 “E
305 -3 -5 -6 3 100 -12 -19 19 1 - 7
g: :g -2 g : -.z :15 "2 61:12-3 15-1;
353 :3 3 £6 :3 :§ :2 i; 3% 1g3 13% 3 :3
339 -16 -§ -1 -12 a 5 13 -1§ - 3 103 103
28: a 5; a ‘1; -23 as 3 -2 31.12225111232:
234. 13% 14 -1§ ~29 -2 -%1 3 1h 31 4 g {43:1 grrirspggtl
336 i 23 -14. I 1612 -9 -3 -5; 12 ~16 Ia 132353322]
535 -12 25512 -1? -33 -13 '1 13.2}; 2i I ‘5 Comprehenswe
509 -1%-3a -7 2-23 -17 1o -6 -1a -9 2 gg'pggggred
510 -2 -36 -13 -za -1a -7 3 1a 17 -7 -1 -19 .
511 a 12 1o 19 39 -1a «4 -13 -7 6 -a 12 Specra'fireed
51g 7 2 11 21 2 -13 "é 1B -13 7 a 1* Reuubusum
5 1-19 -6 -12 -29 -1 - 26 -1 1, -6 gehgbllltation
as 113-3% *2 a -1; =9 '5 3 13 =2 '3 MW
5317 -12-38 a; 25 -19 15 :12 ~13 -56 -33 5', -12 Hnéiatul’iéfia'
£13 .1 -3 -1; 1; e a; :23; '3 a; -. 1; 22W
552 -16 :16 -16 '12 -2 -a -13 1g 13 12 :3 -n £31612;th

 

 

TABLE C-25.-Correlation Matrix of the Items Created for the Content Analysis of the Crime Discussions* (upper left section).

 

267 26. 269 270 271 272 273 276 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 263 28k 205 286 287 288 289 29. 291 292 293 296 295 29‘

290

OflnanO-NdNozkfldfln“CNN-”Ndmm .JNnflflNN‘CONNCON
II Idl? ddndIII : 7| I??dm NI?

NMNo-HHMNONN"NNUKNNNNGOOOC-ORDOOOQMJOM-MNNOO

N NIddIIdddIH NI Id Nd J O INIded «dd NI

I II I I I I d I III II
dfl-Hn-fiCOOO8.30.0NONCCNNDNNNHNOCNMONOO

“NONOO
Nada N N «an N ca 9 IIId «I «NINNNN
II I d II III

«an-o dfiNksmOKO=NO{:0d0mmNCflom‘OQCCOdthMONNM
dI “ . d: mdfl “dd“ I I?I
I I

NON-NOhkdOmMOONMHMMMNNCKNCN“ N7ONNOONOOQJNO
7 ddI dddd I .VNIN dIddadfllINII II 7 dII

.00-n.mNNN::NszdnszONnONmNONSmNOJONNOQNNN.‘
?I NINNM I I ddad : Nd Id «IN? NrN?I

GmOQGMNmHthNOddWNOOONNOMNmOQMONNNNOGOOJONOM.
II?NIHNIII dI :IN I ngN NNIN?
I

NoomNuNad¢annononNNnacgNdco:doNvadNmdaddNN-N
u IHId NHI IN Named .3 ' . IN I «a ?'7?7
I I I

000d:d:lNOOOMOQCOMmdfl-JNOdNOMNMdNNddJONOJNMNO
:I «Ioddn Nrd? vi Nzrl «N «d “7'7?““'7?““
I I I

nddflN.NdeN‘m$ $"NONNGOCIOdOZNMDNNmNQNd=MCNdN=
II I d IdedINvdlrfdzNfl Id Id ”INN
I I

OONNNmakmeNNONNOMNISHManaflflfifiONGd0 :nmna¢ud
IINNI I NI MN N031Nd IstN NI

omNonnNNNudN:0aomN¢NNmNONno oONNONnocmOONONONon

dNIINII NNI adNI IIdd NIN Id INNNNININN

II II all I III II

Nu09:No¢daNNmncNooNnoNNNnnoon:aNaooden¢:coa
N

ddN ded.” No Ndd NIIII II I ddd IdIdd I
I I IIIII d III I III
NMJNNONOONKONNN dJCOMONflnddMNOOdOdNNNMNNOCdMM
IN IId Idvdlfddad I d IdI d INVNIIINI dI
I

3M=OmCOMOMNflNdQOQN¢NMQOdeDON?°O??MSO:O:ONJ?O
I

dII Nuaau I d :IINN I
«I II
QNNMGONOMNOOONQOHOdNNOndONaaNnnmeNdan3:NOQON
II dd «N? faddMNId?M?dd?d? fIdI I 7? NI? I
II N I I

MdNHNmNNNdOMOQddNMOONQOQNJNG:NO:OO:O:.NQ QNNB
IHINId 7 NHNanVf? NN” ”d {I ..
I

NNNHNNnonmnNaooNNm:N&M"Nd00¢¢=noa3n:Nnmn«:¢«m
I 6N NI «IAN I '4ch I I odd—It‘d I
I I a II I I I III

JNddmzNOGM9GLMOOOKNN:OMmJMM3N@dmOJMMOmHMJHQOO
«NI ddNa dd ?? dN “I Id?I ..d?....?d
II «I I I

QJNHMKMQOOO‘MBBNNMdONOOthzgnflnozszNNOmdml0d
ININIfld figNNNNIvN N” d ”dd N vddeMN
I I I I dI III

ONmnNOdMOO32MddeDdmeJQNONOOdflNSOOOf.“ONO”no
dId HMO HI “.7“. NHII d M.
I dd I I I I

NOINN.OflccflgnNMSOleéflandNONNONM3OGNMNNNNNCN
NdHIdd um Idddl Na d Iraal? NM? Id
II N II I

{NOD-00°C“'OQNOMOQKNNJCMNNONMDnMWJ‘n990¢0n.1d
Id“ Nfl'fl H | IIdvlnd NI ledI NNdNI ? N
d I II

nmwotcgwo«mNnNzozeNON:NNm:«oq'Qf99=¢anmncnoN4
d J .. NII I add NNI I «I
3

@NNOMSOOCONBNmOOONNWONdNSOMQZNNOQNONNNOONOQN’
IN dd HdeH .7. TIHM N. H? 7HI IdvI NVNI

NMNN-m‘CNNnmNNO&8OHNNJNOnNOdomdmflM-MONMNHONCM
70 ?D de I 7. IddI 7IIIII 7.? IdIIIII? I?
d I

doO'NOOGNMMdHnMONQONMNGOOCGOON’me:MQde’OQdN
d IS?NI I N N“ NIdI flde dIddIHId d? NNTNI

”NGOMNOOBON«NNNBQONNNOOOONNNNGOONOONOfln-NNJON
7 3. ' “dd'.?. ? '? .I “ IIIIIII I.

MINnnhfidflNONNddnnnOCdOOOQOnNMHONNOBHNHBOON.
do I dvINvddIIN. NII II I? II vIIvIdIIIdI I

OHHNNODJdOQJNHQONNJOMONQONNBNONNOGNDNOONNOMO:
“d7“? «INVI? II I 7..77.777??.. ? NNI II I
«

NOODHNHOmONOO.dNHlmO~OO-flNnOmONCOONNMOSCKQOCH
OOONNNNNNNNNKQGOO.QQOOOQOOOOOOOOOOCDS=W “dd
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN MNNNNM nnnnnnn

 

*Items 226, 353, and 358 were omitted from the matrix because there was no variance in terms of the way the respondents scored these items.

 

 

4 yfihjflmhwl. ta

TABLE C-25.-Continued (upper middle section).

 

297 290 299 III 30t 302 303 30k 395 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 315 315 316 317 310 319 320 321 322 323 JZI 325 326

«NNN-NGNOdo-Noun
77w NdquuduII 7N
ONNNm-OOOthdemfi”NHdCOONMthdeDMODOBJNONmkd
:I «Id II «II dIIrIII 7 a I I? a I

I

unoccnnsu-Iowmunonbousn
N I In I?77?I Idd?I' 7

vIII‘MOCrCIG. “WWW H00.”
NdVdIvIN 7C: :II'II'I'II IN II .4

'4 VI

.NM‘.“MO%HN*“NN“OO MO!

I NIH IIII ddvIIIvIv-I v-II I M I vI

I I I I I I I I I

NOOMHMNQON‘OOKONOCMU‘" .

OI “NI“ If? 7" GIVII v.4? I
I

.NNflfim0MOHO*dfi::?GOONOCOD
I «It: .'I"I“I": I IIIII I
I

aannmumd«soufnnNofmnuommo@¢ounsd
I Nd?NId?II I

I
MEMJNNNOIBNOJBNO OOMchflOOIflvfiKN
GIN I?C.III . IvI ”Iv-II NI .?.?...

.Oflfldfidm-‘NNfidCCOcCN "IMHO, OJMOM
IW.NINO N???U.Idv.Iv.I.v.-I . . 7vddm.
I

oom:mmmwuow:m«o~ommoom
1"??? C'II 0“. OIIIC'I Nmnd HdIMdII?I
I I

2;”;

.deMOU‘HOmOWMOMQvQM“v-IONJMMNOCIMQMddIflQO
CI IIII :IM I?MWNN d‘.~.~fl.r.fl. III I? IIINNJI
I I

NNMNMNONv-INIANOKIDNO“dnoafiznmmnnmmMQ-‘vfi
I I I I0 ddI7? ICININI Iv-Idc-II . IIIN III vIv-II
I I

GDWQMMNNOSSONIOBQHIBMK”IBNQNQMOU‘QVIOnN’OC‘Od
Hdm7v?ll . .I.“ I NI “NNI? Ich-U.’ 0'0ch
I I I I

CNNNMOMOMQNflfi-ONMNO QOmNNnWI-NNNIBNQNNOINC
7| I Iv'I Nv-IIv.'IIIII I“ v: IIIvII':I v-I v-I “7":
I

on0d.~k:¢m00«Nmonathnno d~:@?OONQONGdGMNOHOQ
u-I Inc-«0.4 .4 ”dc-Id Iv-I «IN Ndv-IIv-Idv-I v-IINv-II Iv-IvIINvINNOI
III IIII II III II III I II '4

Ifil‘ONQNCIOIJODNQNONJMMNONMWJNIDOODUMBO-VI“
I dIv-I vIIIv'IId dI dd v-Iv-IdeIIN v-I c-Io-II—IIv-Io-I I—ISNI
I I I I I I I I I I I I

IDNN-DQDMK’an-Qflm ’0 wdmdomummmwm CNII‘QOOM
Id 4:] I: .Iv'I III v-IINv'.Iv-IIIVI Nv-I NIvIv-ININv-Iv-INISVINv-I
I I I I I I I I I

NONQmIDQNNdQvI-fNOUIQMJMBHMNONIIOONHOOWONN
I Iv-Iv-I I INvIv'IIv'IIv-II‘II IdII:?v:(\IN I .‘I‘fl deMdINMDII?1-I

NO 9.:«3nodommoouon3mno #390051“.ka Ont-IOFMBONNC‘II‘ I
II? IIINNI'IIv-I 7':VI IJI.N ..dNMQNNONI°nN N
I VI I

mowoudomonoInmuom:mua~mno:mcmom~
II 7.7.?“ 77. 7 IINVdId 77d? dII? II? ZINddI?

CH OddNMNQNMQMVINNOJH 8 “NOdOD‘MCdOQO ”'00. .vaIA
VI v-I I vIINN Id? I vI I «v: v-I v.4 ddddv-INlevIo-I: N I dds-I
I I I I I I I I I

M «'QONW QNAOQIDN dOONOMOanNQWN v'IQIlVBO Nan” OGN
II? IINN?INIVI¢II I'v‘fiDv-I? v-II VI 7. flNm33flN67‘IOdNIv‘Iv-I

onnmnNOBOOOMOOddMOWJOdNOONOMHNJMNNOBm¢OdNOM MN
fir? II I?.?N «INI dIdINvanddoN?INnI?I

«In 0.0.0 «03.9mm SNIAHOOUINNWOdnvMOOIn-Imoocdnnflomtu
n.fd?‘d. .. 77IN ?I I dTIddMNSdHHINHNII

.0 00MB '31, JOOO’ONOOOM MOOONOMMM DWI-IGMOOIB “a
I?II'.‘ V‘IIHIC'IVIII? .9" I N N I NMSNHlN ‘d'I‘dI

ONNddOCBHNQIOQdQM MHNNKNN nod-Hulasdnsomomndkn
77?« I've? dIIIdeIfd dIddNINOOQHNJd?MNdrNd

Nam“”mommmuN:N-Im“m1mmsmmooooam
CII I'dIIIvIvI‘II-II I‘d‘II IINIIO‘I'SOJMM‘IIJC‘I I

«no:mma«nmam::ononNo«zmom "CODHQNOUIW
II” I? dMII I: NVI :ONNUIOIN'IIN N CII

N. HMNMIIIONOOQM “ONQNWMMOKWOMOIAONOOC-l
QOONNNNNNNNNNQ “0.000000QOOOQOOOOOOOOOOCCOO odd
WWWNWN WNNNNNWNNN mmmnmnmnm

 

 

 

TABLE C-25.-Continued (upper right section).

 

327 32. 329 330 331 332 333 335 335 336 337 330 339 3b0 3&1 362 363 355 365 3&6 3b? 3&8 3&9 35. 351 352 355 355 356 357

.00.! CHRONOdNn GOO NOONOdONOmOOOMKOFO N
IdI ? IddddII II I I II I IdI II dd

I
dd‘Nfi‘thW'OO. “ONOMQNHN
I d Id I I I I IIII Id“

- is -2:
i
t; 1:
-i
2
a?
-s

WOO-NdHONOdNNddON'NOWNCOHd.@NNHNONdmON”~.O
d I d I C IIId Idd d

‘5 ‘15 13 -11 .5

dIIIIII ?II dI I
I .

b

I

n

I

N

I

m

I

I

NNJoJNd. Hanna. addcovOOOOoONgNONTHN?d.w¢o¢uO

I «I «

cac-oowoounndnoOBHONNOOONONGNONNJOmmconMNdc

« ddd I IdddId IN Nddddd?l mNI « dIII
I I

NNM d?NdOONNOMO30ddgnNMcNmflnnnfimedNOMNNdOmdug

dIIdddINNI dd IN IIIH dI
I I II I I I

NJaddM’dOMmOMOJNBQ’OddMdeOmOdOOnfioo-Nflamflfink
d dddIMdIdddI dd ..I IIde N77lrd7dd? MdN?
I

OOONONzaOOmOONh-QMON-ON mnoogmnozomn:::aoNde
I NN?INM dndd?NdId.I . dII . . Id?
II I

MCCNHNCNfllnooabnm-NOw ”GOO-MONONNdONDOdCMOdeN
Id? I ??7.M . . dr? dIrdd dnnNd N?” IINI

n«dmnoc::NNOGQNMNm-OomomNonnanNOMNNModndovtmN
d I ..NI Ian NI VNNTI «Nddl VIddI? I
I

n
d
I

O100.803.0mflhflcflkm’dNOdHNdOOMNMOmOdNHONNMF3MN
NIINI II? II ddd77Id7 ddeII IVVI II MdII

«mmnoo«:no«0Non dMNMd JhdJN 0Ndfi:0:d¢0d:fikm°
dI I fuvIIIaII dIdIldde Id I IdI I a?

OQKOMJMNNNNJmBOdOdOBHMdfiO’JOONOSOMOONdNfiNfiNOfi
d I I I .?d.? N VNIIII 7? ?.?.?rd?.7. Ndd
I I I

dNNQONOON”OJOOfileNddNON008d7dflOWOOéNdleHKOO
~ ' mm“ " i‘W' . ~'

nNdJMOmONQMMGNNMMDNOQOM0m-MNOOMONNa
I «I IN I“ «In «N «N NflIde dI
I

‘ dN.Om@= NHdUMNMJHN.NNOM..N”NNNMONGMd°.OO
ad I IddddIdeIddI dI III
II I I II I I I

NhhdmndNNm NQNBOdOONmCOQ‘J'MlOQONMQDONOOONded
d Id d IddddddII 7NI IIdIId Idd .d .II
I I I

GQNCQQNdeWNOHdeQ odonNNDONNOMMNQJQOOmnnODJQdO
IIINdddIdd I?IIIdN I d Iddl I IdIII d
I I

nmmflad‘HdBJHMONOdNOQNM”MdDONOOOGOMKOOdOdOOOQd
dd I II ININd dIIddId dI rdId IIId dd
I

'13

I I I II IIII
HNKQdOOODN70d'OOONNO" non~w0¢mouanm~ons~womaoN
IIddNI II I dIdIdd IINNHNddI NMddd

II I I
«acadnn::n«onoaNdeom ”GMNMdO’NdeOQNdOQONEdON
N I dIN N?.?d Id d?dNN?N?IWI.I N N”d Nd

:NchnN-nNNQONONNNOOQMan=:n:Noce:d9NnN-NQOQN
I Idd II dddIIIrld I dId “I ded Ndddd

1

OQdOOWNCdNMdmdeNNQONmddDJOMdOdOONCQdOWSOMSO.
INIdIN77??7dN dI der Mdl 7N . Nd NI

OdOOOOOflddOOdddONGOOdMQDDQMOddNOOJOmNOddeOflm
dIIddddvr dIdIVNIIdIN d II? dNMdflN IflOdddI

”HMO-NanOCQmOdNOdOJOO.NdN-MOWQOQOOdHOMNNNNQO
IdINddddId #7 Id Id 7 dIdIVT NNNdNNIINNddI

ammonoNcNocnamNNoNoo-BnanONoamNmonnddcmlncdnu
«I 7. 77? 7.. I Idov d IIIII dNNdNN INnddI

IONmNNNnN0903NdsdouNdodNoumNONo:NN¢N¢o=ocomm
NI7I? 7| 7?. ?I « vIdddI dNNd dI II

-§

hQOIdNHOQOFOOBdNMOBONQOIdNHJWONOQOdNMCUONOO-d
00058 KENNKNNNQOOOOCOOndoaam OOO...::
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN NNNW M”

 

TABLE C-25.-Continued (lower left section).

 

267 260 269 27! 271 272 273 27k 275 276 277 278 279 230 281 282 283 20b 285 286 287 200 289 29. 291 292 293 296 295 296

NWMNMMOONMNCOCDN-WMNNMJ”
ddII N IIIIII‘IIIfl II‘IdIId I? II MIfl‘OIMI
.M.‘OO?"O'% JMOBOONMJMDNOMONONON.
I '0'. ddd d I I I I Id dId d d I
I I I I I I I
NMONnanNOIflM ? NO,” «own-annuaoiooovo

onn
I « «« I«N«I««IIII I
I II II I II I

II‘U‘OCNdNU‘ Cam-.mszNn-MKC
NI IdddIIO IIdNId Id INMIVdd.v-Idld dI I
I I I

nmmoNoumchcumw-NM'OJN«
ddI? d II dII dI I IdIdI‘IdIv-‘II I Id

I
N«Io«««a~m scanNaNnmvNNm NOONN WONNJIIIM no.«nuso
«II« I«I«7«N?~7 7 ?.?..77 Id I II
I

@deONdemWHMOIfiwfi “WMWNNOQNNJ'IC
Idddv.‘ MdId ddd MdeIII dd Id? dI dd NIdI
I I I I
”ddo- JCONONHU‘OOOHWWNNNfNO OdédOOdHIIU‘OInONDN
I? dI I IId? I dI I ddIINdI d “II INI
I

MMON :¢.0?nnNa:«mmwnmmNmn MCQOHOUMINOID'IM’
NNV.‘ I I I I 7d??? I NdeNd I NI ‘I I NNI}! Nd ”dd I d
I I I I

”WNONOMNNNdMQOm-"Nmflzn mmmmNQN d“.
W77” 7" 7 . 7 . “.77: 77"“ ~' 7
I I

90:00Nom.«..o«««o:coooc¢can”:«aN«00Non0¢o««oo
?NN«NNI ? ?NI Ndddde ««I INN?I?I«?N I«. I

NMWMWNQNNOOQOOW CNN NO OCONOOdeNNMnO
II ”III I?IM IIIdldIIN I Id 7d??? NI? I

”On-d :JthvfiHHOdeflNsflmhmo Odoflmedman
d Id?I I . dI IN I FIN-dd") ”ddI ddNII

NIflOOdO‘OM ONN“:JC.NN*N\dIflMIB 30fiNMSNd~dzthN
dddN d dddddIdI dNIIIIdeI Id

o«ocN CNNdK wnmmthedNNiflnf?ddO ««momm~ou~«mnm
I v'IId.II C‘III.d I II.'Id . dII I?I

«momam QON?Ndmnde“Nd:dM WON. d» OOMdOBIII
d N NN I dI . I I MdNIdNIIv‘I

dandOIOHONdIflM.’ mo««~a:NonoN:a-oo
..' IIv.-IIdI I IHNd Id .Idd..
“I

N
I
.dmOONN’vIFNduIIDOMUMONQMMOnmdMMO'U’MMdQOOd
InN dII-I dIdIIdIdIdddId ddIII I d I
I I I I I I I I I

«in:

O
N
I
NOMCOONNC‘OOQ o«::c.::««m anO” {NdfiN

mm NddINdd Md Ndldd
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
N
d
I

MWQOQQWGMNW WOMOHWIBIMIB: ”NO.
ddddIdIddI dd dIddMIMdI dd ddIII
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

dd

I
N”O\D?.OdNNNdIfl-’MNII\W OMdthDO NNH. 1.0“. .0”. *II‘
C.lII . d. ddl Id TIdleI :07IIIIII7I-I

NNIDNMNdN@OGQNONN ”“DOO3MUIN3H ~38-'30.“ dddOMd
N Nd dd I I d? . ddfi I 1.! 10 . dI I I I I

mguno:oa«N««n00NNNoNNnaooN«NOan«o¢uN:«0N NNOQO
Nnn?«NNN « Nn ««N . « N?«n? «rIII

mN«0NmmmNna:m-NNoNomnnoo«:n«0NQ:NONNmN.¢.anm.
« «II «ddIn«Iv-I««Iv-IHI I«I dd I «I I d «I
I II I I II I I I
=~oonnNmoNooomcmn-oo«««umomsuunconno«ooom MONO
«I I«NI«I«II INI ««7«7«7«I« I? NdI dIdIIIIIT
0Nm«NNNn:NONONNNooooQCONo-33NcooomNNzn:oONao.
« v.4 II«~.v.-Iv.-II:I«Id v." (:III-I II II

CW?033JNJMON:‘UIMOUINMUININ* MM “NMENM?

IIINIIId IIN I IIdId
I I I I
¢««o.cn0NonmNNonn«oNoN«moN¢NNoma«.o:NONnNn«o
I« NII«I« Ifova I«I II IN « IdIIIIIr
owemm:o~o««:«:mwomonmn “NMMONMMOCIO.
I«I«« ««f a. I IN« dIdIINdd «I «r I««?II
33««35««33~”’3 annnnnngnnn::c:cg 3::
II
nnnnnnnnnnn3~n ggnnnnnnnnnnnnnm mangaasn

 

 

TABLE C-25.-Continued (Iower middle section).

 

297 29. 299 3.. 3.1 302 3.3 30b 3.5 306 3C7 30. 309 310 311 312 313 315 315 316 317 31. 319 32. 321 322 323 32b 325 326

294

ddb...fi..fi..~fi.szmNOHOO“fin”,Od-ONJ-OOOCNOCL
I.“ INNIdNNIIddd WHN I d. NII d
. I. ... d0......... 0 . .

..0-O‘NononNh-mobCONCOC-hd-monNNd
II I nIIIINdzI Nnvull «I? I IVIII
0

COG-ddNMNJ”:.k:-.d~.=OnOd-flhal- O
HdN?N”MJdHN«=d. Id ? Ndd ”INN
dN”G”dd‘OOO.JN.ND.dflNOCad-‘dNWQONN
d I dd. I=dNN dd d d?dd~..d..
I I

ocanuoNNncznngmdsoN:conzosmonoo:n
II IdndzINId d I «II N IN
I I ~I
vac-annon-nooomunna~no:~maooac:30coo-o
dN?dN dde MI I « ?.IdN « Ida?

MOSNNCQNOMNON7=ROKOMOSOSSNOM0.000Nod-OOWOH‘NO
Idzdflldw . I dd. II

mmoohNoNuNenfac-IN 409040.: ooNvIOInNam cmom Nam 0mm
Madddd3 Nddddéd .« «Id IId
I

H
Nmmc:noN3n3«NNN1.NMNddNoNodmnmafiaNJNNNoddmNnd
ddIHNS I IdMMII vdI NO I IN I N dNHNd I II

m~n~oonsooouu0¢out~s00 “OdnsmOOnhstOdndoons
MNO?J:N« N de dldd IdI. NNMKd??I I
I I

oewNon:oNON?uao:nnsozhnuhennosmouu:«mmo~s::so
”do?:¢« NI . 'I V II 4 In N:7NNIII?IH

COM-NNOCMW MODDMOdONdOCOOONNOOONOONdnnfl ”zNfid
?I 3d?l 7 d rdNNdd d dIINIddN .thI f. I
I I

OdflMdflOMOthOQNQQnOddKOMNKMOHOdOd.Nm’mdddCdflm
N”- fi’dddN N0. dd NIdd .d Odd “.mNT..?IId
d

NOdOQNMMONONMOdNNCQJ"O‘CONNOR,“Nd@‘JfiMNJOQNON
JSMIded d. d... I I I. .. .HINflddflHIdId

ONQDOMNmmOOdgadNONONOCNOHJOCmDOM-”mWO’MONflzan
=¢~rnn I.“ . .I I ?.?.???NN N dNN
.

d8¢M~QmNOCOflQdfMd.mONN~O=Od.C0068«MMNOJOMCmNN

dIIIIdd IddIIIdddIHdHIdd

I II . I ..I . .

OdBOMMQNBQMMML?mn.=0.00°Oddifl’mTDdNNCddMMOHH

«fl! «NNd «Nd dd NdN 0. . dd
.

oamNanmno'oo“nswuN:No«0No-NQNNN~0endedNoom
dNIdd ndNn Nld Hddd Nd NII N ddIIdII dINI
I I

mauvosonngooONf:=z=nnfi0~¢0=¢:nsm=OJsgmmcssonf
NIdefl dd

QMdQMdOKlOOJdOOOWNOOHWONCMNdMONZHOOOOO“.:O$B‘

.IHHflIIIIIIN .NMNJ «HMN77 d I
I
NWNOJMHCHOdWNNOBQNdOOCOOdO@“JOMGNdMCOdNHNNNOM
MI.MHNId I ”In ”NNNMddNNN. .N.0 Id” dddd d

nnNNoo«HNNnon:«omnquoNnonoo-«NoNnan-N190
7III7IdNNIII I .IdddIdIII vdI flddd.

OM0000NONNNMOMH‘QOOOBOJNdHONndWMF:d‘thdfiOOOO
N d dI Id II . Id .I..?d. 0 d. d. I
I.

dunnOQNOOdOOQCNNande”3. @HNNdHOOOCMBmd
f??”??...?.fl? NHNNNNNddM d.”?? I N??.III? I

..dOddNMSNMOKad‘dd&..~00.0.fl.JCDN””mom “NNOHQM
.I. NIIIIId0dI NNM fldd??fl N vdv0 r ..Ifl. I

mntNmo«moooododeoooaoNohoonooodnNmoNon
I dd.?. INI 7ddddddfl~d||dl I? VNNIrN I: «I?
I I I I

QnNOmmmJdBdMMDNNOOJNI'mdfiOSKOOHOO dflfimd “NON.
NIIMVIIN??dfl.7?NNNnNdNHN. I N.vd.dNI.I ’III I.
o.»«on:«o~ommoo:oooaoanOmeznowmnus NMHONNO
I 0M.Nd..ddfldIdNNNN Nnd d... Nnun I.

II II I I I
UNQOOMDNOCCOONOOROCJONSOOONMOONd‘O.NOJENQNQMJB
??.n07. ? Ndde d .N.?d d” ?...0. I.

QMOOINMMONHO‘NNNNWNdOdanNON.“ONHNMMOOONNNNNO
N N‘NI V7. 7.. N NIVI 7“ II. d NNN II?

?

esoo.«uau

NMOGONOOONNncnONOOONNno 0M. «an " ‘

C
dddddd Nnnnnnnnnnn o: :
unannn83333333333 agnngn

ii

unmannnnnn

 

'l

TABLE C-25.-Continued (lower right section).

 

327 32. 329 33. 331 332 333 335 335 336 337 33. 339 3400 361 JBZ 3b! 3b. 365 3h6 367 35. 3&9 35. 351 352 356 355 356 357

295

MkmeMdN‘ddeh:dJMJdNNO.m.M.O:.MdzlfidNOMN
d IId d? d . . I d? d ?? I dII 3

'O-MNFMMNMNMON NNOMZOOMMm-MMMNMdBMRDmOW 3mm NNOM
IIdI IIIIIIIII MN . I I . mI MIdIIId. IIIIIIIS

deNMBbmlllNdmOOOOMQOdeOmNNOOMdMNMNMOdNMMCNM
dd. d I NI. dIIIddI NdNNIsII
II

..odoomonononomOKOON-«uasm onuodkflkmd OchomNo
I I'I III II I I IddIIdd dd. Ia? dIOIII
II

NfidObOdMOdOWMKddNOdNdMOMOQOCSWQOMNdfl.‘Md.K$MN
dNIdI IIdIIdII :ddv ?I. I NdIdeNVJMJSINId
I I I “I I I

OOWONdddMKMMQ-MdMONOmmmMCNONMMOMWNdMOJ l-d.NWB
d. Ird? ?.?7?“ ?I7IdIIdId III... dIdénaJrNI
I I I

“fiddOMOmO'ONdKMMQNOOMddF@d'kd“
dI?IrNI IIIIIIdIdII dIddIN IId
I I I I I

Omm°mdNNQGJ°OCQJOdJ
dd IdddId II dIddI

Onaando-addsmtdnoaostochmmeow.mauoomtcmnhu
NdnlnkN ddNIN deddINdNIdIdINN4NddNDd7d7d II
I d. I

OlMMdNdeOdMDNDOmNCWNNWBMON.OSJCd06.00mMONNOM
MNMdNMd ddIINI dd. mN NWNBNIIIN.
I “I I

mQNdJN!MOOQmNMOOQOKBMchNzNfiOOSBMNBOdOdddOWWQ
rIIN.. I IIdI . Nd N N. .naN7 IddIdI
I I

”OCNdNNJNCMNOdNQnOOONCQMNMOMCNOMNONDMNNNNNNOH
dmN’NNd 7Id I dd NdNNd. d an .3MMd7I NdIdd

1

OddOONdkJSJN’dOONOJdONdONJNOOJON.NMHOM‘OMded
NI INN I 7. I IIIdId. NIIIM arTNNrrIrd I
I d

$8300Md2000‘.N.N~OMNKMdMNM.d°@OGNMmadszOOd'N
IddINd dd Id. ddM .0 .II I d..
I d

Omdeoo~co:c:NdNoooon~somooo:oo:o05:0nw000nmo
N dNMM N Idd I I II II dQIM uNN dIdd I

I d I I II

BOOONQmm.JMWOMOQNOdOJQNKOMMMd.QO3NOdNQQMmOOd’
NdOdlMN dIIN I N N. Gd .0 mNIIIN? dd
d

mmMOOmmGOOONNOONN:QOMMMNNONOOd3o ooaaoNndmaoom:
? Id IIIN Id ddd dddN Id In ”Id IIIIdI I
I 3

NoownhmdmOmddmnéomdd:wdhOONOOmodo' canons-msN-
d. I I dIIId I ddeddI ddNIOIIIdI IIdd IIM
IIIII. I d I I

QNmNMMdNOak3°6fi0d6¢MMO~3OOQ~NMO¢NONNWNGJONNWM
?N N IINIdddddIII OIdNIdNHN IdN ITd d
I I I I d I II I I

Okhh:doondoodddcmnNnommmoeaoonomomcoN:chdmme
I dIdd ? ddIIII a NII . d IdIvdId
NI I d I I I

dONONlNJdedONDOdMOONdOM3000NOWNNNNM03003809m
7... IJIdddddeNdddI NIM. d I I d. IIN
II... I Id

OOROMOQJMNmOM-tNMGdJNQQQMmGBNNQM.MWMONKMmOMOC
II d. N Iannn3N~nn3n dN «um NNvdT Idd
I I I I I

NdOOMdfifiwJOOOOOMMGCNJdOOQWNdMNNdd.OdedMOdMWO
d d Id d dMMJONMnSMI ddIIIN ddIIIdI

COLONOdQSOOOQQMNdMNOMOdOdeOMQNMdOM 'NdMMfidmN
Idd d M“ WNNOdgMMNIdId IddVdNN??IdddI7
I

onuoao«monthawondeoMINNon:n:s~oNnNsommdaomN
III vIId II vNNNnnaan I vdI IIddvII d

NOddQNNOMNNdNNNMOOdDdONlflMMdOO'Nd0amOQOOKNOOd
Nd deNd dMIMddNNOMONNIId? I INNddrIIdl II
I

OMGNNNMOCdoddOmondadmhadONododon0ONQOOONSOMI:
I. d. dd ?:OO:NMNO:?I ddd d. Id

NOMOMQNONmkoocbnaadfiNanmncfiOomflo8QNOdNOOQCMm
7 ded d ?oo =ONNN3M7d Nd Id d Idvar N7

IMOdeONOMdmnbN$OOMQMdedmeNhOkNMmnMOOMNNOMO
«N 7 dmfloOdNNMMddlddN d «~7.77

NNOOOO‘.“dMNNOdCMmOMONMNOJOOKONNQOOQHdedOUCd
7. dddId dszOdeMMN I? d. 7dI? ?I
I

:zzm0NQOCdNMQ“0~OOCdNMOMON” .“'::‘h::.nga
MMMMMMMMMMMgagMMMMMMMMMMgM mg MQMMMMMMM

 

APPENDIX D

SUBSIDIARY ANALYSES OF THE
CRIME DISCUSSION CLUSTERS

296

TABLE D.1.-Crime Discussion Cluster Correlations (not corrected for attenuation).

501 502 503 505 505 506 507 506 509 510 511 512 513 516 515 516 517 510 519 520 521

 

297

{III NCO-.30'ICON “\me v4 Cdfi
I ".5 ??NN I ”0"“de I 74' PI:

mmouaouanomumoamosdau
7?..?.dn~"ddd~.7 ?SM

csmwgow~o~o¢csoa¢og=¢
HIIIVIIIIIH d3.

NNOlmodn~ndoo~ncna¢sd
NdINM ddflINNIMH Had a
II II II I“

NQQNHO‘JIDOfiooca‘OdOMJIDU‘
v-Iq-I u-I VIC-I I . . “I ICH v-Iv-I

MCKONMNmOmJGMNNodOdm@
7“... II II 7 rgl II

accuswmwonssoeawonces
(:1?) IINNq-IM v-I QdIH NH
HI

3'. momnaanmeeas OONU‘N 4mm
Vivi v-Iv-I HMMNP’)Mv-I¢3 v-IMv-Idfl

II II IIII Id I

dmlnomeQtheGOMeOJOB
n flIIdMMN? grad IIfiH
I H I

OIDv-IMGII‘ QOMNBON ONOOC 3N0
IMI: «HNIIMc dNHdH
I I III “ I

u:~d::nssoasmes:o«mmo
«I NHWIMHIOMNM IH
I II d I

9¢N~aoc~aoosmonmknwod
HId IwmmoIINNnIIIoan
I d I

:dNOdDOOGOKMOMQGONGMO
..Q’I' “momv-IIMN.)H v.4INI
d I

:OfidflncOON360HNmOMNd3
I MNImommnmnnNI HIMN
I d II I I

moes¢ma¢aensm=o~¢ddde
« dd'fiONdNIHdflNIHdIdN
I I I

choeoon004msmwnwmooc
v-Iv'IIv-IOHI Iv-Iv-II I H II?
I d I

moweeach939cmssdm000
fl DfiINI H IfiII MNHN
I I IIII
CONDDQNdQNdMMOdONJNdQ
mama IHMfiHNJH“ IHNII
d I I I

N‘DGNNdOdNbNdJ 038°®|hCN

« eN «« II I NI III
d II I
Naoom000d4¢omsooo~kmm
e a « IIdIMMdeddINM
d I IIII I II

oNNemNm::eHcd:on~~:mg
e and d «I 7 vdwdrI
“ I

HNMCWONCOQdNn¢mIDNO 0904
GO OOOOOOOOHFIVI'I dflddfl FINN
Inmmmmmmmmmmmm Immnmmmmm

—--mmmmm>ommoocztummmco
aka“: :U.—p—LQI—o- Q mu...— 0- L
C"OCOH'—WQDLUU EJ""_U~-¥=
“We‘nwsszmssszsee "as
(3 L0”
'58 lehfiuyo-fl-I—OUOO I—<
LU) OO-IOQ) um osz-- I
uI bICOI— u—u-u— .. u >~u—
C I-COLQ- (DUO-QC g In—
HO >OZI-E Udall-Ll NC)
02 C2 0 Q .13! u: III-ND
C UJ U W 00
KL.
Q.) Q.
E
L
U

 

 

t. L‘;114:4“.‘——-L-

298

TABLE D.2.--Varimax Factors of the Crime Discussion Cluster Correla-
tion Matrix (see Table 4.10).*

 

 

1 2 3 u S
51" 107‘ 2 -h 9 6
209 86‘ 18 -36 3 -21
08 au‘ 37 3 -17 -E
520 62‘ -20 21 -k E
515 60* ~28 17 #2 22
513 5“ -A -6 -2& 18
507 52‘ 35 23 52 1b
512 -3 -80* 10 G -2
50h 25 73* -2 -23 A1
502 -36 61‘ ~19 27 ~21
51b -32 -h7‘ #6 -1 6
S11 -27 -h6* 10 «0 33
S17 ~10 3“ -3 23 7
505 -1b -8 -63' 22 31
S18 -1 -32 66‘ 16 -26
521 #3 -20 61‘ ~c 21
519 -7 0 38‘ E S
586 -1h 15 -u h9‘ -3
503 -1A 17 a -h7‘ 31
516 -13 12 -1 11 -59‘
.501 -1 26 -11 7 Sb‘
PROPORTION OF vnfiIANC?
1 2 3 a 5
.22 .13 .09 .G’ .07

 

Factor 1: Articulation

Factor 2: System-Blame Orientation Toward Crime
Factor 3: Non-Emotional Orientation

Factor 4: (unspecified)

Factor 5: (unspecified)

*The clusters (variables) have been reordered and grouped according
to their largest factor loading.

TABLE D.3.-Cluster Correlations, Part-Whole Correlations and Second-Order Cluster Correlations from
the Cluster Analysis of the Twenty-one Crime Discussion Clusters.*

299

NHOMOUNNNNOMm“ “d
fiddflnNNNhfdef?dN ?3O
I I

ChafinQ-dJOMOWON-DOODO
v-I “NC-IN N 33"“
I I aI NIN I I I II

chock-oooomd dmNuaonw
~7«~N N?d1f?Ithn?
I

NNOOCWNWONN m ”MJNMO
dӢ?? HOFJOjN me7dd7I

meanwhooodnoNldnmNmm
«cvmmem MMMNIdIJIldd
d I

 

 
   
  
 
     
  

'2'

z?
1“ -26 -hi 1“.

-1

3 -3: 1!! 13;

 

 

510 509 508 520 515 513 507 512 50“ 502 51k 511 517 505 518 521 519 506 503 516 501 501 502 503 50‘ 5.5

 

nmg~uuwoonsmm~mmadcom
N 3 fidd~7INI7 N
I I I

NmBMdHMv-IQ «mm momwd’o
vauandqu?I?7qg 7N

   
  
   
 

QMMBNONdGOOMMM@
d IHQINIQI I

OJONmflflcNHJGmOOO
N IIIIMNHMIfiNNd7I
I I I

:MMNJJdONOCQ D
IdIfidIIdII?d d IflI
I I I I

pwp¢rdJNHHOm
WIMJNNJ?dT77.

mmommocwmugm
IfidddIdMJNQN
II IIIII

«anaoamammac
I NN « IT?N

masmua DKMO :Qcmndm
a adINHNNma a? NIIfi
I II I I

msmoamhmomgo mmconmm
«w: an mm :«fi Nfldd dd
I I IIII II

woecamdwmmosm::oa:cnh
JJJWINNRMNVJNN47?I In
I II

NWOdedCdQNM
MNN mummInIf
III

MdNNOc
JMMMNI?NI71HJ

 

 

 

Ncocooa
nodnm:
I IIII

NQdK‘
mmm

 
 
 
    
   
   
    
    
 
   
   
 

N

 

NNwaddm
nwwwnu
III

N3HNMOJ€HHNMN
MdN N “JInNIN

MJJOdC

ocmwdomdcwmmd
INJNMIHINIIIN
I

40«:~cmccmwaq
“I «« adean

ksommomJNNemN
I ”N deJfiIHNd

II I I I
doetkcoomomea
mac: NanIId

I I -
cookedwomtnmm
Obc¢Nm4 MI4N ”Id 7
d

8N0mmdm83055”

    

Z
1
5 23

“NOON
MJJN¢
I I I

a0:N
News
II

cmoww
WNNN
I

08$ON
MMNGN

KmQJO
4 «N
I
mopno
mNNJM
I
homo”
muw «
I

HQflJO
C¢drd

gussw
one ?
I

OFOON

‘Hded

 

OOOQWNFNQNJdFmOW@OMOd
HOONddOdOOddHOdeBQfl
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm

«uncm
69°
mam

 

*Communality in the diagonal.

 

300

TABLE D.4.--Comparison of the Three Dimensions of Ideological Thought "Constructed" from
the Content Analysis of the Twenty-one Crime Discussion Clusters with Those
Formed by the Second-Order Cluster Analysis of these Clusters.

Cognitive Style Content Emotionalism

 

 

 

 

 

(articulation)a (system-blame)a (non-emotion)a
Content Cluster Content Cluster Content Cluster

Cluster Analysis Analysis Analysis Analysis Analysis Analysis
501 Crime not Criminals .04 .05b .l6 .22b .35 .le
502 Non-Specific -.l4 -.3l .42 .47 .21 .40
503 Global -.02 -.l6 .21 .13 .09 .09
504 Environmental __c .36 -- .70 -- .16
505 Non-Personal -.l2 -.l4 .09 .04 .53 .82
506 Non-Factual -.09 -.02 -.05 .l2 -.l0 .l3
507 Theoretical .49 .58 .30 .37 -.l4 -.26
508 Comprehensive -- .8l -- .46 -- -.l6
509 Complex -- .84 -- .32 -- .l7
5l0 Structured -- l.l6 -- .l7 -- -.20
Sll Special Breed -- -.24 -- -.44 -- -.ll
512 Retribution -.16 -.08 -.90 -.95 -.29 -.29
5l3 Rehabilitation .47 .47 .l7 .05 .09 -.08
514 Pro-Enforcement -.46 -.33 -.59 -.62 -.44 -.45
515 New Laws .43 .56 -.05 -.20 -.lS -.27
5l6 Historical -.Dl -.lS .02 .09 -.l6 .06
5l7 Moralism .Ol -.02 .07 .25 .14 .09
5l8 Emotionalism -— -.0l -- -.53 -- -.76
519 Fear -.08 -.05 -.27 -.l4 -.18 -.30
520 Easy Talking .50 .53 -.04 -.l8 -.l5 -.28
52l Self Assured .24 .43 -.l3 -.33 -.52 -.50

 

aScored to reflect this pole of the dimension.

bCorrelations between the dimensions formed by the second-order cluster
analysis and the individual crime discussion clusters are somewhat larger than those
between the "constructed" clusters and these clusters because the second-order clusters
incorporate a greater amount of variance. The second-order cluster analysis spanned
the entire domain established by the 2l crime discussion clusters and thus. the
second-order clusters contain more variance than those constructed from specific
clusters and items during the content analysis.

cThe hyphens indicate that items of this cluster were used to form the
articulation," "person blame-system blame," and "emotionalism" clusters in the content
analysis of crime belief systems. Unlike the procedure used to form these "dimensions
of ideological thought" in the second order cluster analysis. these items could not
be used to form both the crime discussion clusters (wherein they were initially placed)
and the three predominant dimensions which became evident during the content analysis.

APPENDIX E

ITEM ANALYSIS OF OTHER CLUSTERS

30l

 

302

TABLE E.l.--Items of Cluster 523: Articulation* (coefficient

alpha = .81).

 

303 Respondent's approach to crime is comprehensive and involves

286

306

298

299

297

300

301

302

environmental, social and specific institutional factors.

Respondent recommends general social reform or broad social
change as the solution to crime.

Respondent's discussion was particularly well organized and
well thought out.

Actual numerical count of the respondent's recommended solu-
tions.

Actual numerical count of the social agencies the respondent
said were responsible for dealing with the crime problem.

Actual numerical count of the causal factors of crime mentioned
by the respondent.

Respondent offers some type of chain of reasoning in his
analysis.

Respondent makes a point to list or number the causes, solu-
tions, etc. in his discussion.

Respondent offers some type of explicit or implicit connection
between the causes and solutions to crime that he mentions.

 

WUIUIU‘IUIU’IUIUI WWW OI“ NNNNU NU
uuuwuNNNNNNN 960000000
PNNF‘O0DV‘3UIPU WOVOOOOQ

303 286 306 298 299 297 300 301 302

56 66 6g 55 (.7 20 II1 19 25

66 lIS ‘0 MI hZ 23 ‘65 21 1“

60 55 '52 IIB '50 27 E9 23 2%

SS bk an Sb 4“ “0 #5 17 3

#7 #92 50 «II 03 25 37 31 23

20 23 27 #0 25 1¢I 23 10 1k

“1 b0 #9 «5 37 23 39 25 17

18 21 23 17 31 10 25 10 10

25 1k 21 35 23 1h 17 10 11

75 67 72 7b 66 30 62 32 33 Arti icxlati on

21 27 30 17 3B 21 19 21 10 Anti- uthoritarianism
#5 ‘52 2% 25 23 17 25 7 2 System-Blame Orientation
-13 -33 -2 -12 3 ~15 ~21I -7 ' Pglitical Pistrufi

35 28 33 2h 39 27 35 19 31 ca eXIb ity
28 26 24 19 23 10 2’] 1 -12 Electoral Intent

27 10 37 8 Mi 1 9 5 19 Desire for Advancement
35 32 20 ‘06 33 5 53 22 15 Perceived Electoral Risk

7 ‘2 ‘3 0 17 5 16 ‘I '2 rigisano Frustration
-6 3 0 -2 3 17 -3 2 9 Con ict Orientation
03‘3 -26 -28 -26 -17 9 -20 -6 -2¢I Pro- Economic Regulation
19 0 28 7 17 1 '5 -8 '20 Interest in Politics

 

*Unless otherwise noted, the items have been scored to reflect the
meaning of the cluster title. Table entries for Table E.l-E.l2 are
correlations.

 

303

TABLE E.2.--Items of Cluster 524: Anti-Authoritarianism* (coeffi-

cient alpha = .68).

 

 

—459 A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion among
its own members cannot exist for very long.
-457 In this complicated world, the only way we can know what is
going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.
-458 It will always be necessary to have a few strong, able people
actually running everything. !
_-456 Few people really know what is in their own best interest in ”a
the long run.
-455 A few strong leaders would do more for this country than all _e.
the laws and talk. :3
-462 Of all the different theories about the way government should
be conducted, there is only one which is true.
459 as? has «56 «:5 4‘2
“59 1+2 31 27 36 11 52
1.57 31 32 30 22 21+ 3L.
(ISO 27 30 30 26 28 ‘26
#56 36 22 26 17 7 19
#55 11 2h 23 7 9 16
062 52 3h 26 19 1‘5 35
523 22 3o 21 a 21 23 Articulation
524 65 SE 51‘ A1 39 ‘39 Anti-Authoritarianism
332 1; 1‘2 1% 2: L: g: System-Blame Orientation
‘ ' - ’ ’ n. ‘ ° Political Distrust
3g? 23 ‘3 11 '3 1“ 23 Political Flexibility
523 1g 2 2 1., -13 1; Electoral Intent
530 1.5 37 1;; 17 _2 1‘; Desire for Advancement
531 B ;1’ *9 1 a , Perceived Electoral Risk
532 _5 -8 _2, ~16 _; Partisan Frustration
m s -1. ~11 ff :.. -i Besiéégio°iéeaéaigison
. , . - m
53“ 9 2" 3 1- ‘3 9 Interest in Pol?tics

 

304

TABLE E.3.--Items of Cluster 525: Person-Blame/System-Blame Orientation toward Crime* (coefficient
alpha = .84 .

-3l4 In discussing the solution to crime. the respondent mentions or implies that criminals need to
be punished.
-l78 Cause of crime: Courts (judges) have been too lenient.

-341 Respondent says or implies that courts (Judges) have encouraged crime by not properly
enforcing current laws and statutes.

-2l3 Solution to Crime: Judges must mete out stronger or harsher punishment.
-2l2 Solution to Crime: Courts must insure certainty of punishment.
3l2 Respondent says or implies that criminals are ordinary people in special circumstances.

-478 Crime Results because Law Enforcement Officials are Hampered from Properly Enforcing the Law
Index.

-3l3 Respondent says or implies that criminals are a “special breed."
477 Crime is the Product of a Breakdown in Social Discipline Index.

~2l4 Solution to Crime: Courts (the Supreme Court) should reverse the decisions which now over-
protect the defendent.

-273 Respondent says or implies that "criminals" are a homogeneous group.
475 Crime is a Product of Environmental Conditions Index.

277 Respondentsaysor implies that social, economic, or other "environmental" conditions are the
cause of crime.

480 Solution to Crime will Involve Broad Social and Economic Change Index.

280 Respondent says or implies that “society.“ "the people," "the government,“ (or a similar reified
equivalent) should handle the crime problem.

-279 Respondent says or implies that individual irresponsibility, immorality or ignorance is the
cause of crime.

31“ 176 351 213 212 312 679 313 677 215 273 £75 277 6!] 290 279

31k 56 67 6b Sb 51 28 29 31 33 19 32 25 33 26 23 21
$76 27 h 60 72 38 27 23 32 22 A; 23 30 26 22 1g 2%
‘I1 II (- “6 5h 50 20 31 1°. 2 2 28 2“ 20 g
213 5b 7 5k #5 37 25 20 25 23 26 23 b1 25 21 1 21
212 51 36 56 37 29 11 30 7 30 27 26 31 15 29 15 -8
312 2‘ 27 20 25 11 23 32 62 26 15 25 33 32 25 11 a
370 29 23 31 20 39 32 22 16 19 55 25 32 20 13 2 3
13 31 32 19 25 AZ 16 10 20 7 30 I 19 12 1 31
677 33 29 26 23 3g 26 1; 28 16 0 22 11 -% 1g 13 2;
21A 19 15 32 26 2 15 5 7 0 16 21 20 1 1 11
£73 32 22 29 23 26 25 25 30 22 21 19 10 15 6 -3 -3
7, 25 30 29 A1 31 33 32 I 11 29 10 29 55 3b 2 12
277 33 26 2b 25 15 32 2g 1g -% 16 15 55 2; 27 20 53
«an 26 22 20 21 2h 25 1 1 1 15 6 3b 2 16 33 0
290 23 16 19 21 15 11 II 12 13 11 '2 20 20 33 10 26
279 21 21 9 21 -R B 3 31 22 7 -3 12 23 20 26 a
523 11 11 9 11 22 37 26 15 11 21 lo «0 30 69 21 I Artic lation
52; 92 as i :2 1" I: i; .6 i° 2 J a: is :1 3' u 2'“:- "awnings...
. .. ys em- ame n
336 -§ -13 -i. -J - -23 o -1? i -38 5-13 -17 -13 -E -33 Political Distrust
527 36 27 23 31 15 30 35 28 12 36 1h 01 37 19 52 21 Political Flexibility
528 b -1 1h -9 1 12 10 -1 -7 6 6 3 -0 17 2 18 E.ector Inéent
529 -15 ~32 -9 -26 -22 2 do -6 ~17 -II -6 5 ~21 3 -2II «$0 DeSire or A vancement
530 -5 5 -I -3 -3 9 -21 0 -23 -16 -1k 15 2 27 -9 - 1 Perceived Electoral Risk
531 -11 B -19 -12 -20 -9 9 ~11 -k 6 -17 II 1 -3 -7 16 ParHsan Frustration
32 -7 -9 2 -6 '9 -11 -12 -18 -7 -11 -7 -5 -13 5 -5 2 C00 'Ctof'flflatflm
33 -22 -21 -2# -20 3 -25 6 -32 -25 -; -h -3 -12 -1; -7 -20 Pancommnc ReIQation
.35 32 1 22 0 15 13 11 -19 “I - 5 12 - 1 1 1 Interest In Pol tics

 

 

*Cluster scored to reflect the "system-blame“ orientation.

305

TABLE E.4.--Items of Cluster 526: Political Distrust (coefficient
alpha = .64).

 

-46O Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best
for the country.

-46l People who go into public office usually think of the good of
the people more than of their own.

 

 

 

460 46l
460 50 47
461 47 50
523 -3 -29 Articulation
524 -22 -27 Anti-Authoritarianism
525 -10 -2l System-Blame Orientation
526 70 70 Political Distrust
527 25 3 Political Flexibility
528 -13 -7 Electoral Intent
529 37 IO Desire for Advancement
530 -3 -16 Perceived Electoral Risk
531 3 3 Partisan Frustration
532 6 -2 Conflict Orientation
533 24 23 Pro-Economic Regulation

534 ll 20 Interest in Politics

 

306

TABLE E.5.--Items of Cluster 527: Political Flexibility (coefficient
alpha = .69).

 

374 Coder judgment of respondent's willingness to compromise on
an issue rather than risk dividing an organization into
opposing factions.

380 Coder judgment of respondent's flexibility in terms of adjusting
or modifying his issue opinions.

 

 

374 380
374 56 53
380 53 56
523 37 4O Articulation
524 8 26 Anti-Authoritarianism
525 38 46 System-Blame Orientation
526 ll 19 Political Distrust
527 74 74 Political Flexibility
528 4 -2 Electoral Intent
529 O 3 Desire for Advancement
530 ll 18 Perceived Electoral Risk
53l -l 10 Partisan Frustration
532 —18 -l3 Conflict Orientation
533 0 l Pro-Economic Regulation

534 ll -4 Interest in Politics

 

 

307

TABLE E.6.--Items of Cluster 528: Electoral Intent*(coefficient
alpha = .87).

 

46 Index assessing the respondent's plans for leaving, staying or
advancing in political office.

44 Respondent's intentions with respect to running for higher

 

 

office.

46 44
46 78 77
44 77 78
523 27 21 Articulation
524 6 18 Anti-Authoritarianism
525 10 5 System-Blame Orientation
526 -13 -12 Political Distrust
527 9 -6 Political Flexibility
528 88 88 Electoral Intent
529 42 44 Desire for Advancement
530 9 9 Perceived Electoral Risk
531 25 22 Partisan Frustration
532 2 15 Conflict Orientation
533 -1 —9 Pro-Economic Regulation
534 50 31 Interest in Politics

 

*Cluster measures the respondent's plan or desire to leave politics, to
remain in his or her present position, or advance in political
office.

308

TABLE E.7.-—Items of Cluster 529: Desire for Advancement (coefficient

alpha = .39).

 

152 If you left politics, do you think there would be much of a

problem re-adjusting to a life which does not include your
participation in politics (measure of commitment or investment
in politics)?

 

 

151 How much of a personal loss would you feel if, for some reason,
you are not re-elected in the next election (measure of
respondent's sense of loss if he left politics)?

150 Coder assessment of the respondent's effort in his election
campaign(s).

152 151 150

152 25 28 10

151 28 32 14

150 10 14 6

523 22 4 l4 Articulation

524 11 O 4 Anti-Authoritarianism

525 -7 -10 -14 System-Blame Orientation

526 14 12 18 Political Distrust

527 6 -2 -2 Political Flexibility

528 8 26 30 Electoral Intent

529 49 57 23 Desire for Advancement

530 -4 16 50 Perceived Electoral Risk

531 O -2 5 Partisan Frustration

532 O 23 -6 Conflict Orientation

533 -6 22 ll Pro-Economic Regulation

534 31 48 37 Interest in Politics

 

 

E...- r;

309

TABLE E.8.--Items of Cluster 530: Perceived Electoral Risk (coeffi-

cient alpha = .33).

 

146 Respondent's assessment of his chances in the next general

election.

444 Degree of party competitiveness in the respondent's electoral

 

 

 

Articulation a

district.

146 444
146 25 19
444 19 25
523 22 26
524 2 28 Anti-Authoritarianism
525 -lO 2 System-Blame Orientation
526 -21 8 Political Distrust
527 4 15 Political Flexibility
528 3 6 Electoral Intent
529 15 30 Desire for Advancement
530 47 47 Perceived Electoral Risk
531 -2 6 Partisan Frustration
532 -14 3 Conflict Orientation
533 —8 l9 Pro-Economic Regulation

534 -20 14

Interest in Politics

 

310

TABLE E.9.--Items of Cluster 53l: Partisan Frustration (coefficient
alpha = .77).

 

112 Respondent feels frustrated because of "partisanship" or the
necessity of partisan maneuvering or partisan bickering over
concrete problem solving.

116 Respondent feels frustrated because of legislative leaders who
are too narrow minded or who lack vision or perspective in
legislative affairs.

 

 

 

112 116
112 60 57
116 57 60
523 13 -l Articulation
524 7 4 Anti-Authoritarianism
525 -5 -10 System-Blame Orientation
526 5 3 Political Distrust
527 6 3 Political Flexibility
528 21 19 Electoral Intent
529 7 -4 Desire for Advancement
530 7 -l Perceived Electoral Risk
531 77 77 Partisan Frustration
532 5 0 Conflict Orientation
533 13 22 Pro-Economic Regulation

534 —l -3 Interest in Politics

 

i~.’i§.flim t I
4.1

311

TABLE E.lO.--Items of Cluster 532: Conflict Orientation (coeffi-
cient alpha = .77).

 

378 Respondent's assessment of the degree of conflict which exists
between social classes.

375 Respondent's assessment of the degree of conflict which exists
between various economic, racial and religious groups in society.

 

 

 

378 375
378 65 63
375 63 65
523 12 -5 Articulation
524 -ll -17 Anti-Authoritarianism
525 -13 ~10 System-Blame Orientation
526 l 4 Political Distrust
527 -3 —31 Political Flexibility
528 8 8 Electoral Intent
529 10 ll Desire for Advancement
530 -6 -12 Perceived Electoral Risk
531 10 -5 Partisan Frustration
532 80 8O Conflict Orientation
533 -17 ~17 Pro-Economic Regulation

534 -4 2 Interest in Politics

 

 

312

TABLE E.ll.--Items of Cluster 533: Pro-Economic Regulation (coeffi-
cient alpha = .76).

 

371 Degree to which the respondent favors government regulation of
the oil companies (given the 1973 oil crisis).

372 Coder judgment of the respondent's attitude toward government
regulation of the economy.

 

 

371 372
371 64 62
372 62 64
523 -24 -28 Articulation
524 -10 -3 Anti-Authoritarianism
525 —23 ~23 System-Blame Orientation
526 35 19 Political Distrust
527 6 -5 Political Flexibility
528 -3 -6 Electoral Intent
529 32 1 Desire for Advancement
530 19 -l Perceived Electoral Risk
531 25 ll Partisan Frustration
532 ~16 -18 Conflict Orientation
533 79 79 Pro-Economic Regulation

534 1 -14 Interest in Politics

 

 

313

TABLE E.12.--Items of Cluster 534: Interest in Politics (coefficient
alpha = .53).

 

l36 Coder judgment of the respondent's overall attraction to

 

 

 

politics.
153 Degree to which the respondent sees advantages to leaving
politics.
ll Index measuring the length of time that the respondent has had
an interest in politics. I
‘51
l36 153 ll
136 58 44 25 W
153 44 30 l3 i
ll 25 l3 10 iv
523 10 -6 l0 Articulation
524 l 2 20 Anti-Authoritarianism
525 10 -2 l3 System-Blame Orientation
526 2l 5 l0 Political Distrust
527 ll -4 0 Political Flexibility
528 40 23 ll Electoral Intent '
529 60 57 28 Desire for Advancement
530 -9 -ll ll Perceived Electoral Risk
53l l 4 -8 Partisan Frustration
532 l -7 3 Conflict Orientation
533 -6 -12 4 Pro-Economic Regulation

534 79 54 30 Interest in Politics

 

 

TABLE E.l3.-Inter-Correlation Matrix of Clusters 523-534 (corrected for attenuation).

 

26 927 528 529 533 531 532 533 53“

’ 25 5

5

523 SZu

314

O‘JMNLfimd‘wNNO‘
«Iv-IN JFI I I I

MEO‘Jva-Ivdnlq-IC‘O‘
m I NM I NHNNUI
I I I "‘

mmamwcwdmom
Hv-I Nv-Iv-Ivd CDNI

III I'HI

«sommmmacn NM
| N c: NI
'4

hIfiO‘JDC’Q‘CIQ «wou-
mm I «IN—4.1L) «a.
I '4 I

FIN 8.30.1006“me HO‘
")V‘INM JC’J HNCS
I I-I

cg 30%;: we: o‘cnco \O'I‘
(\JH H €3.1v-IC‘Jv-I I J
. H

NMF- CON (VCHK‘HCJID
mmusmw m N
d I

(\Iqu‘cwc 1 JJU‘V’JI‘J
NN3NDNHMv-I MN
I I Iv-I I I

M's QMBO‘J C‘C‘J 0"“
4'3)on N . .7403...
v“ I I I I

HOBW‘MJNv-IBI an:
dammed—mu! v1 Iv-I
*4 I I

"Du-INQIVI‘F v-II‘ :ruuvo'
LJJJ'NU\N""€\ IV)
“I I I

no.3mtmcar‘o cow-IN M:
NNNNNNNM MM F'M
mmmmmuammwmmm

cEcu >~uuxcc c m

..t Ema:
EU
0

Pro-Economic Re
In

~Autho
3]
Bo.
Poll 1
E
d E
isan

Ant
tem-
Interest

ar
Con

Sys

 

 

‘

APPENDIX F
PUTNAM'S FINDINGS

315

316

.Anc .av

=ounuaaou ov sang HmH uzu
so uonwwc uddddududmdflm.
ou-u auuuauuvw «nu uugu
oioso: ouaau 0:» van :mumu
Iago»: can scum :aumwauovw:
on» nounuomuo Bouu ope:

magchHuuaox o>auanom

.vuaaamxu uoc an: Auoumaau :couuaaauuuua: ocuv HmH ¢.a¢:u=m uo cauuuo> use nu“: nasacowunaou
mug .nssu van muovaosnooauuo ammunuuz uo avaua any cu vouaunua uoc mu: canaaua> nacho

.voaaaaou cognac» Hanouua: :uon uou «noun some «nu scans van 0:05:

mucovconnuu ou uuuou HmH usu co auououu :304: new :zwwm: .ouocu Haw an

.Anc .av :mamov“ ucwumgv

vac mcuaa vcaum uaonu hypo: uoc vdaosm who

nomad Huuuuwfioa vac :odnammoa «no mo gun:

on» m« nouufidom: ucmsuuaum 0:» ea samuomcu

cu :zawGOuun mouwmmuv: cu :hawcouum nouns:

Baum wcwpsmuua «manomauau usow cu mucu
uvconuou how amH co ououm com: "huucm daoo

aHaoH

cwaufiun

a

.Anuaa .uaoum auaauo>w== can»
":u>am 3mzv mauauwuuaom mo muowaon any .awauam .o uuonox ou Mouou auunaua ouam AH<I

Ame .av manna

oaauauova fiuuauwgom any

 

.A~¢ .av =.o=uo~ocufl
:uuuouahuo: on On vcou
=oo=uo~oovw Ancowuo>w
Inez: .uuuomwaa use: an“
nun) QuSQQuS vomv6« uuov
Hun usu unnu sauu:0u cu

:wuaoscuo>ow van mowuwflon cw wagon

usonu no» 0» unwaooanu unoa mu umzz: "co“

-uuonv vmvcouamao onu no ucoaawvsn uuuou co
woman :=o«ua>wuos Huouwodoovi: ucovcoamoz

.An¢ .mv =v0uwu on who: «mason

wcqcfluauu any no Nac haco uawza HmH on» :o

39H: voua» who: Non .m:w«HQUH voum>wuoa

aaflauuuofioouw and co: :.a~aaaw :mfiuuam

may no you» ecu new N¢~ haco cu voumasoo

.AoNuzv

:vuuu>wuoe aaau
uuwmodoovw: an vow
uwwawwfiu coon o>w5
uwsu mucuvcoamou
caqauuu osu mo Nnn

.Aadnzv :uauu>uuoe
addaufimofioauu:
am vowuamouau one

 

HmH way so aloua coach who: Nnc .cosnmfia on: mucousoanou A~¢ .av scauu>uuox
adon:.. conqunoouoa vouch awnmco«uoaox o>wuwaom Imam vmua>uuoa Addwuwwo~oovw «nu mo: "uxma Amwufiun ago we find muwuucouumm unnamedouva any
:.acu«
.Auq .av .ausmod -uouudoa mo moon soon
noova annuauucoo: coda ouo new an gnu so mucum .Am¢ .av

=IGQNOHOOQd Uwuuwdhum: .%~
unquuuouoosu sauna cu ucou
Han any so sad: can» on:
ouonu unnu coda-EuaucoU
uuovconovna uuua>0ua...:

ownuo>w any uonww:
on“ ... .xuoamfiuuu
unu uomuuunm ouoa usu:

nann:o«uw~ox o>uufiaom

ucuaomvan yucca an vousumua :muUCUuuuumnm:
m.ucmvconmom :.noucouuuu«o zuuam we“
Icamaaxm uou xuosofiuuh mo mmocuumuumn<: 30:
cu 30H: weauaamwa nowuommumu m>uu cw n.ucu
uvcoamou new HmH co «woum cow: “huucm dame

hawuH

Cw Cu a h”

Ace .av oHnaa

unwaoaa
mo nuocuouuuoa< Adv

 

u:ufiaouau¢ ..anaush

undead“ ..auausm

 

 

canawum> unovcoaoo onu no ouauaz

 

oamswmipam
u=w>oao¢

comwuoaaoo
no «we:

 

 

J

ounauuu>

 

Qamcunm an vuuuoaum on moannuum> cacao can xuvau oflhum amouwodoovH onu cuosuon anunuco«uu~ozll.fl.m manna

1‘11

317

.Aen .av ..aawdacadn we
avowuuuun can ovum»: 0;» cu
odwuno: .nawzm MMMN .uoc who
«caucuuwfiom unnamedoovu:

 

III! III-I'll. III. .|

.Aem .av :uxuu can o>uw
on ao«uuaomno ou nuauudoo
mo mahu- mucunodoovm cu
wa«x¢«~ noduuooaoun man
you uncanaa has ouonu nu
auuaaou nonuuoc can”...:

 

.HmH onu saw: magnaouumdou :u>gumwoc: no :wmum>=«: cw wcwumuavcw mm vmnanumov hauumusuum uuoa ouw ouuamau a“:

:.a«;m:ouuaaou on: v:50u u: muons amuoan Huuo>oo an

vamoanamm

Hmcowum: zuon haw
awsmcofiuofiou o>uuwmozv
maLuCOauuaum oz

.Anm .nv :uouaauoa
uaow among no asuuu
ca awn use no one
uuouo 3o~ use muonoua
and: cooauun muco
auuuufiv oc mu whosaz

nunncowundux oz

I II. I. ‘iIIII-llll

.Asm .av “am can RON mmcmsaauo tow macawuu
odnaumasou .vomuwm muouoom HmH 304 any
we RAH can voouwm uuououm Hmu an“: :mfiUflum
usu no Hm :.ucwecuo>ow mo unawxuos coaoun
can “mason ..uuo .mcouuonwcmwyo Hmcowmmom
noun vcm .mcowuwquwmo fiawouoeeou .mcoucs
ovouu oxaa .muoououcfi Amwuonm vcm mmaoum
ouanmoum: "ucoEoumum onu sum: nauseouwmmwv
no ucosooumo ucovcoamm» zn cousmoue capmMum>

 

7 l . I'IIIII 4 .l (:41

.AmnINn .ma uumv macaw uaow egg «0 moan“
so ucoaomvaa uovou =o woman :omHEOHQEOo
ou aaozwcuaddacs: ucuvcoamom .nouammoe
:ucovaomoucq savanna: uSOu co :umweouanu
auuwuaaoa cu veaoaao: mm commMomoau whoa
uunu ounaou Aqueoua: sumo cw muououm HmH
:zoa: vac :swam: mo ammucuuuom "huucu Hauu

Y (In . .I ltlnxllt II

«Anson

Hmcowum: Luau you
HmH ago so auououm
sag can so“:

.uuoc m.aucu=m uo Hmmfimnaaw as ouaoavcu asunauu vouuxuqun

Aqn .av
nowwucouuum #

v

uuuuuuom
nacho uauuuucm

ou :ouuuuoano any

 

AfiauH

caugfiun

3n .3 ~38.

owaaouaaoo
cu .aoauauggus on

 

.Acn .av

:nGOuuuooaoum “wouuuuoosu
van uunuunnv Aguanu woman
queuuuaoa ufiuzu vcuuov cu
... couuo.ouoa vuuuou can
aauuuuau on» No ouauuuxo
05¢ a. ouosu unqnuom:
”newuuuuaaxo ounaaoom
:..uflouuxu awouuugon

ogu us vousuuaousoo
vuuvcu oua uoamodouvmz

.uoucou as“ Bonn
vumauao mo>o6 ado
an hanogawou nuoau
whoou Hmu omuuo>o
ogu .auupucaoU :uop as

masocouumaox u>fiugmom

.A¢¢ .av :zumwuom cg oumum msu
mo uaou nonoun: osu mo 30a> m.ucovcoamou
«nu mo uaaauwvan havou co woman usuaoumam

=.u=woa you: ou :uuua use: scum madman snoop
uuuuH unu no aucaon o>wu ozu macaw uHaEMm do
IcOuuwc zoom mo aowuanwuumwvumwxo x .odasmm
Hacofiuu: sumo no mumuoum HmHumwxm w nouamwm

hamuH

awmuwum

Aam .ov
ouawwm

AEowaouuxu unequuaonv

anscfiucoo
unw«m\uuug anv

 

ocoz

.muco
Ivaoamou smauuun conu
man so uo:w«: ouoou
nucmvconnou cauauua

.oanaua aucofiuu: sumo mo muouoou HmHumwxa x

.oanawu annouuoc sumo uo mowaucouuomumwxm w
.HmH ozu macaw manamo amcowuoc Luna «0

cowuanwuunuu Baumuouumum onu aucomoum “uuowwm

Ammuzv 5HQUH

29% 52:5

Ame .nv
enough

uounuaso donuuwaom Aqv

 

uuuaooono< u.aucu=m

waavcam n.5ocunm

 

manuwuu> ucovcmqoo ozu no unauoz

 

maneonnnam
ucm>o~o¢

 

:Omfiummsoo
mo over

 

 

«annouu>

 

318

v

Ao>onu an mawmv

.Aon.av :uo: uun aaouw a an
uuauouoovw uaa .ouozuo sang
ouuuawov ouoa nun adaooa
«so» ...uonosuoaan onu co
cucuvuo> u>aquuc no nozuo-
a ooazasw aucoguzuuo

uou o>fiuowwc wo mouuuu

05H .Avouaowoa any uuouu
noun unauom uo .unauuuua
gonauuzom .auunwwuauz
cuozua< .Enuuaaoun< amuo:
so auouoou 30A noun azaa
uuuuuaouazo youuqv uo>uc
HmH can so an“: vououa

0:3 oucuvconnuazu...=

 

 

 

 

Aous-no«u-Hou o>wummmzv
nosncowuazum oz

ausmcowumzoz oz

 

 

aanCOuumaoz oz

azcmco«uoduz oz

xovcu sown

 

nz.u cozumzouuoo mEEmo
we. csounucuscmoam
«0.- cozumzuuuou oEEmo
No. caounncmEumoam

.xovcw
Emu“ o>fiu a an vouaamoe aw Emacoflumuwuosu=<

 

 

 

 

 

No. couumdouuou meaoo
an. caoumncuEuuonm
se.- cozumzouuoo «5260
On. c3o~nncqauuoam

.xovcw
Sou“ can a an vouanuoa no: Emwusaomn< umuoz

.Ann .nv :uouMmagv hawcouun:
cu :oouuu zzmcouua: scum uduoa ucuoa know o
On w=«Vuouou mo>~omso£u nouoza nucovcoamou
50%;: co nucoaououm-Eouw scum coauou no:
.HmH onu nag: xovcu ago we cozuu
uaouuoo Auovuo xcmuv «Same any can .vofiuou
xovaz sumo you ucowuwwuoou zuwawnowaou
nsounuaqahaonm c .aoanouuo> uaou uxoc may
nan voucououo mum nozumzunum 039 "auucm Have

Aonuzv homo“

Aomuzv cwmuwan

Anni: 33H

Acmnzv coauoun

Ann .av ozone

 

Ann .av «Home

.filll.

amicaouquzuonu=< Aozv

 

uauwuaaona< Honor Aav

 

.Aon .nv :uouuqa uoc ov
ovosuoa u-su oznuuauua on“
ouuovao cu Azoxaa anoH
muunuuan onus uuuuucoou

 

.Aom .mv mum .uuuuoua HmH and egg
yaw Rmn van «muououn HmH swam osu now Ned
who: mopawuu capouoaaou 0;» .nucovaoamou

camaauu uom .xovaz osu no swan uuoa muououm

HmH so; on“ we so .xoocw and co so“; ad
nu>zuu~uu coda one: Now .:nwuz >~o>wuu~ou:
no: uuouu HmH anon: mucuvcoamou smuuuum
any no .Annuen .nn moav mucosououn conga
nu“: unwoouwwmwv uo wcfioouwm n.9covaoamo»

oaaaun
dqaomuu: sumo wow

Uzflfla 0&0

 

HmH as“ no auuuoum Ann .mv nouuaunna van
nuoa :« aoamouoov—HH...: awcoco«ua~oz oz .0.“ uxovcw Sou“ oousu u an vousmmoa manowun> Jog now an“: nowmucouuom azu: not» modded any
«guano-paw cenwuwasoo
unmannuuu< n.51cuaa amuavcum n.6ocusm canazum> ucoocoooa ecu mo ouaumz ocm>ozo¢ uo moo: o~nc«uq>

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

319

.ANO .ov ..HmH ozo
vcm zmH ecu coosuop cowuo
-Hoquu o>wuzmoa ucmowuzc
ing» a oposu ow u mowupma
Amavu>wucfi ago we oco: cm

.uuau a“ I zuucaou yonuzoc

ca ..oumusuomcfi ouzza ow
noduouaflmuocum madam...:

oozoooooozoa oz

nz.u cozumHouuoo mEEmU

ma. cozumawuuoo wEEmo

.AmnINn .ma oomv acosowvan

Hovoo a no woman no: Emu“ sumo co ououm

m.u:ov=oamuz .xwvcw Eouwuuaow a a“ zmH

ash .mumnewe zuuoa mo uom coco you HmH

ozu can Azmuv zuwzfiuwoz somzuuom mo xuocm
any cooauun cowumzouuoo «same "auucm zaoo

Aumuzvmm>zum>uomcoo

Aomuzvaoaom Boom;
"smooooo

onEam
Hmcoaumc sumo
mo muoasoa zuuum

Ame .ov oflooa

Aomwm uxo: so nosauucOUV

ozugzfiuoom naouuu-m Andy

 

Amman m=o«>wum mamv

Aomma msoH>0pa ommv

Aquzmcofiumzmu o>Humwoz
v awcmcowumzoz o

Awnmco«umfium oz

Aa«;m:oHuoHou m>wuowezv
n afizmcozuodoz oz

 

Aauzwcoaumzmu o>aumwozv
o augm:0woozom oz

o~.a cofiumzouuoo mEEoo
o3. caoumlcmsnooam
oo.u cofluoaouuou wasmu
on. czoumucoEuwwam

xoucfi
Eouwnozu a an vaSmmoE mm: uwauumwa Hmwuom

o~.u cofiumaouuoo «Esau
no. csoumncwEumoam
0A.- cozumaouuoo «Esau
on. c3oumucmEumwam

xoncw
Ewuw-oau m an nousmome mm: umauumwa Hmowozzo@

Annnzv zzooH

AHmuzv cooooon

Ammuzv szmoH

Ammnzv oooooom

IIIIJ.

Ann .mv maan

Ann .ov ozooa

A I

o oooooooa zoooom Auzv

 

ooouoooa zooooozom Azzv

Aomqn none
608 cusp—3:03

 

ucaEmmomm< m.EMCu:m

wcvawm n.6mcuam

 

 

oanwaum> ucmvcoaoa on» «o wusuoz

 

oszmaunam
ucm>oaom

 

acuwumaaoo
mo coo:

vanquuo>

 

 

320

o ANOIOO onflv :IHOH

Idea no uoa o>uocozuunsoo
.uauuogoo a mo ucuoavomum
on» abuw nouuzuoa uuov
ocou: ou hucovoou ozu ca nu
uqnu .oawzuuv o: “amazoovu
cu oozauov a mo moouvw>o
a: nu uuusu... nowuuzon
ouooooz :H ... Hm“ ozo so
ooqouoaa uzwuzu u .ouoozmn
so on“ ouonu adouzun :H:

 

 

 

 

.nouoo .na mom .A:zwo~oov«
we can onu: uou ouoovw>o
oo.u.uv Oahu. acoauuzon
aooawo~oovz no ucuuxo

ago :a ocazuuv on ma
ouonu .zuuoooo nozuao cu
unnuuauwaon homusoa cu
novao aouu ao>oa moo u<

 

adsocozuoaoz oz

nwsoao«uoaoz omuu>qH

oozooooo-zoz oz

«0. ceaumaouuoo acoEOEuuoavoum

ON.-

cowumgouuoo unoEOEqusvoum

HmH ozo ooo

om< cooauon Auv cozuoaouuou acoEosuuuavoum

 

 

 

 

 

ago I ozxo z
.uo>o van gov oaooa

.zooooo ooo oo .on-zo .oo-zn

own anomouuo know

a macaw canaou Hoseauw: zoom «0 ououoou

HMH mo cauusnuuunav oSu nuauaohm

uuuawah

Ana-2v zzoon

Ana-2V ozoouon

zHuuH

camuwua

zoo .ov
mooauoaouuoo

 

zoo.ov ououou

zen-V

out zany

 

.Ano .nv :ouoaaouuxo usa-
onu hauuuu ouu zozu uan
.oaauao: on: auoaaouuxo

0300 van unowwouoovw

 

 

 

 

.nn.n I coauoaouuoo assoc any ozzouu ca

nuawaouuxo woos<
osu ouswau «aouuxu onu

 

 

oNNoI I gflflfldflhhou EGO

no uuoa oEouuxo «no

 

 

Enscflucoo

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

nusuzo um Hana oz: mcmzozuwaom :mwuuum wooE<= uswzzxuw Ann .nv
on: ou-«aouuxu oaom: nusuco«uoauu ouuu>an .amu vow zmH unu cooauoa cozum~ouuoo maamo ago so numzsouux occuuoauuuou cahuuauuoo: auuuuuuav
I ll] J.
wflnznoco«u-wu o>uuuwmzv
oozoooooozoz oz nn.- oozoozoooou assoc zozjzvomoozmoz
a«£mcozuu~oz oz No. nodumzwuuoo «same Amalzvououuoaon
cozoozuzu
azzmcozuqauz oz no. :ozuuzouuou Queue szuzvmuozauzuom
Aowoa maoz>oza oomv mangOAanoz oz $0.- cozuoaouuoo mEEmo AoNuzvmumaoaasou
Avuaczucoov
"amazouu
Amo .av manna zuwuuu-oz an-auuqm
azaEmm-nam :Omwuwaaoo
unoanoonu< n.6qcuom wcaoaam «.6u6uam odnmwuo> ucooooaoa ago no ouauoz uco>o~o¢ mo moo: mun-«uo>

 

 

— ruck.

 

32l

 

Am“ .ov

oocouuoaxm

 

 

 

oaoz masocouuozoz oz vuocomoum uoz ouocuoom u down: ovens Aqu
no“ .ov
oooz aunoco«uc~oz oz voucomoum uoz ouocuoom oucouuoaxm zuuom AaNV
Ans .av . oonouuomxu
oooz auzoao«uqaoz oz vousoooum uoz ouoouoou uuuuuzflom Aowv
Am“ .ov
unoz nun-nauuoaoz oz voucoaoum uoz ouocuoom nocuouuum noouoo Aoav
zoh .ov .
ocoz nus-aouuqaoz oz vouoououm uoz ouonuoom oozuonsooo “may
Ann .a ~ouoouoou ooav
:ooawooadou uuonu song doozwozoovu once acouuauaaom
Aus.aV shuoaooea uo aaqou vow ozuuao: «nod zanouoc ouo acououuzaoa umouou :Hq:o«
can we ouuauoo uuuuuonu uouuoo :aocoaooououn: zzoum :H: "uxoh :muououn: coudauu
Qua nu“: uoaauflou uaouon
cu coo now hung-coon masocouuuzum Ann .a ouoouoou ooov :...HmH oau
cu nus-onuo floccuuouavu o>uuuoom no ouoou uoaoa a o>an ou voou nowuooovo “as .nv ocuuouavw
"cicada olo- unsov oz: uoaoauuamam auauou ouuuau zuu> sou: auoovcoauom: nexus ouoauooh mo unsoa< vac «aha Asav
Aw“ .mv u nouwuuo
oooz ausnooauoaoz oz vouconoum uoz ouocuoom doownauuwooc Aoav
“as .ov ooooomxoon
oaoz awnucouuaaom oz concomoum uoz ouocuoom mango undoom Andy
«Haawmcasm cauwuunaoo
anal-...04 -.I-cu=h ouuavcum ..Iuouam oznmzuu> unovcomoa any uo ounumz noo>udoz mo woo: canowuo>

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX G

INITIAL PATH MODELS

322

323

  
  
 

  

Liberal

 

   

Orientation

Figure G.l.--First Path Model:

TABLE G.l.--First Path Model Correlations.

 
  

"System-Blame
Explanation
of Crime

   

  

System-Blame Explanation Placed as
the Dependent Variable.

 

 

 

 

 

 

ED LIB ART SYS

a. Path Model Observed Correlations

Education: lOO

Liberalism: l5 lOO

Articulation: El 39 lOO

System-Blame: 28 48 42 100
b. Path Model Reproduced Correlations

Education: 100

Liberalism: 15* lOO

Articulation: 51* 39* 100

System-Blame: l9 48* 42* lOO
c. Residual Differences Between the Observed

and‘the Reproduced Correlations

Education: --

Liberalism: 0* --

Articulation: 0* 0* --

System-Blame: -9 0* 0* --

 

*Indicates a situation in which use of the observed correla-
tions to calculate betas has resulted (as a product of the computa-
tional formula) in perfect prediction or reproduction of the relevant

correlation.

In these instances the model is "constrained" in the

sense that it is impossible that the predicted or reproduced correla-

tion be anything but equal to the observed correlation.

No adequate

"test" of the model is possible where nearly all of the possible
predicted correlations are "constrained" in this manner.

324

 
     
 

.39

 

Authoritarian

 

   

. System-Blame
Explanation
of Crime

 

 
     

Figure G.2.--Second Path Model: Articulation and System-Blame
Explanation of Crime Placed as Dependent Variables

 

TABLE G.2.--Second Path Mode] Correlations.
AUTH YOUTH ED LIB ART SYS

 

 

a. Path Model Observed Correlations

 

Anti-Authoritarian: lOO

Youthfulness: 26 100

Education: 44 31 100

Liberalism: l9 17 15 100

Articulation: 41 46 51 39 100

System-Blame: 27 15 28 48 42 100
b. Path Model Reproduced Correlations

Anti-Authoritarian: 100

Youthfulness: 26* 100

Education: 44 31 100

Liberalism: l9 17 15 100

Articulation: 4l 46 51 39 100

System-Blame: 27 15 28 48* 42* 100

c. Residual Differences Between the
Observed andithe Reproduced Path
Model Correlations

Anti-Authoritarian: --
Youthfulness: 00*

Education: -05 -ll --

Liberalism: -03 -05 —05 --
Articulation: -16 -27 -03 -05 --
System-Blame: -13 -07 -10 00* 00* --

 

*
See Footnote on p.

.45

.51

‘rticulation Education

 

 
   
 
  
 
 

.27

 
 
 

Liberal
Orientation

Figure G.3.--Third Path Model:
Antecedent Variable.

TABLE G.3.--Third Path Model Correlations.

 
  
   
   
 

Anti-
Authoritarian
Orientation

System-Blame
Explanation

 
 

 
   
      

Articulation Placed as the Key

-..—..- .— .

ART YOUTH AUTH ED SYS LIB

 

a. Path Model Observed Correlations

 

 

 

 

Articulation: 100
Youthfulness: 46 100
Anti-Authoritarian: 41 26
Education: 51 31
System-Blame: 42 15
Liberalism: 39 17
b. Path Model Reproduced Correlations
Articulation: 100
Youthfulness: 46* 100
Anti-Authoritarian: 41* 18
Education: 51* 23
System-Blame: 42* 19
Liberalism: 39* 18
c. Residual Differences Between the
Observed and the Reproduced
Correlations
Articulation: --
Youthfulness: 0* --
Anti-Authoritarian: 0* -08
Education: 0* -08
System-Blame: 0* 04
Liberalism: 0* 01

100

44 100
27 28
19 15
100

44* 100
I7 21
16 20
-6* --
-10 -O7
-O3 05

100
48 100

100
48* 100

0* --

 

*
See Footnote on p.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

326

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adelson, J. "The Political Imagination of the Young Adolescent."
Daedalus 100 (Fall, 1971): 1013-1050.

Adorno, T. N., Frenkel-Brunswik, Else, Levinson, D. J. and
Sanford, R. N. The Authoritarian Persona1ity. New York:

Harper, 1950.

Alvin, Duane F. and Hauser, Robert M. "The Decomposition of
Effects in Path Analysis." American Sociological Review 40

(February, 1975): 37-47.

Apter, David, ed. Ideology and Discontent. New York: The Free
Press of Glencoe, 19641

Barnes, Samuel H. "Ideology and the Organization of Conflict."
Journal of Politics 28 (1966): 513-530.

Bauer, Raymond, de Sola Pool, Ithiel and Dexter, Louis A. American
Business and Public Policy. New York: Atherton Press,

19631

Becker, Howard S. Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance.
London: Free Press, 1963}

Bell, Daniel. The End of Ideology. Revised ed. New York: The
Free Press, 1962.

Brown, Roger. Social Psychology, New York: The Free Press, 1965.

 

Browning, Rufus P. "The Interaction of Personality and Political
Systems in Decisions to Run for Office: Some Data and a
Simulation Technique." Journal of Social Issues 25
(September, 1968): 93-108.

Campbell, Angus: Converse, Philip E.; Miller, Warren E.; and Stokes,
Donald E. The American Voter. New York: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 1960.

Christie, R. "Some Determinants of the Accuracy of Social Judgments

among Army Recruits." Unpublished paper read before the
Eastern Psychological Association, March, 1952.

327

328

Christie, R. "Authoritarianism Re-Examined." In Studies in the
chpe and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality,“
Edited by R. Christie and M. Jahoda. New York: Free
Press, 1954.

Cloward, Richard A. and Ohlin, Lloyd E. Delinquency and Opportunity:
A Theory of Delinquent Gangg, Illinois: Glencoe Free
Press, 1960.

Cohen, A1bert K. Delinquent Boys. Illinois: Glencoe Free Press,
1955.

Cohn, T. S. "Relation of the F-Scale to Intelligence.” Journal of
Social Psychology_46 (1957): 207-217.

Converse, Philip E. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics."
In Ideo1ogy and Discontent. PP. 206—261. Edited by David
E. Apter. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe,

1964.

Cronbach, L. J. Essentials of Psychological Testing, 3rd ed.
New York: ‘Harper and’Row, 1970.

Cronbach L. and Meehl, P. "Construct Validity of Psychological
Tests." Psychological Bul1etin 42 (July, 1955): 281-302.

Davis, A. J. "Cognitive Style: Methodological and Developmenta1
Considerations.“ Child Development 42 (1971): 1447-1459.

Denisoff, Serge R., McCaghty, Charles H. (eds.). Deviance, Conflict,
and Crimina1ity. Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 19732

Duncan, Otis Dudley. "Path Ana1ysis: Socio1ogical Examples."
American Journal of Sociology 72 (1966): 1-16.

Eulau, Heinz and Sprague, John 0. Lawyers in Politics. New York:
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1964.

Fishe1, Jeff. Party and Opposition. New York: David McKay
Company, Inc., 1973.

Frenkel, Brunswik. "Intolerance of Ambiguity as an Emotional and
Perceptual Personality Variable." Journal of Personality
18 (1949): 108-143.

Gillie, Pau1 J. "A Simplified Formula for Measuring Abstraction in
Writing." Journal of Applied Psychology_41 (1957): 214-217.

Gorsuch, Richard L. Factor Analysis. Philadelphia: w. B.
Saunders Company, 1974.

329

Heise, David R. "Problems in Path Analysis and Causal Inference."
In Sociological Methodology, pp. 38-73. Edited by E. F.
Borgatta. *San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969.

Hess, Robert and Torney, Judith. The Development of Political Atti-
tudes in Children. Chicago: Aldine, 1967.

 

Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer. New York: Mentor Books; The New
American Eibrary, 1951.

 

Hofstadter, Richard. Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. New
York: Vintage Bodks, 1962.

Hollander, E. P. "Authoritarianism and Leadership Choice in a
Military Setting." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psycho-
logy 49 (July, 1954): 365-370.

Hunter, John E. and Cohen, Stan1ey H. "PACKAGE." Educational and
Psychological Measurement 29 (1969): 697-700.

Katz, Daniel. "Patterns of Leadership.” In Handbook of Political
Psychology, pp. 203-233. Edited by Jeanne N. Knutson,
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973.

 

Kingdon, John W. Candidates for Office: Beliefs and Strategies.
New York: Random House, 1966.

Kirsht, John P. and Dillehay, Ronald C. Dimensions of Authoritar-
ianism: A Review of Research and Theory. Lexington:
University of’KentuCkyTPress, 1967.

Lane, Robert E. Political Ideology, New York: The Free Press,
1962.

 

Lasswell, Harold. Esychgpathology and Politics. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1930: reprint edi, New York: The Viking
Press, 1960.

. "The Selective Effect of Personality on Political
Participation." In R. Christie and M. Jahoda (eds.) Studies
in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality."
New York: Free Press, 1954.

 

Lazarsfeld, Pau1; Berelson, Bernard; and Gaudet, Hazel. 1333
People's Choice. 3rd ed. New York: Columbia University
Pressi—1968.

 

Leuthold, David A. Electioneerin in a Democracy. New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 19 8.

330

Lewis-Beck, Michael S. "Determining the Importance of an Independent
Variable: A Path Analysis Solution." Socia1 Science
Research 3 (June, 1974): 95-107.

Lipset, Seymour M. "American Intellectuals: Their Politics and
Status." Daedalus (Summer, 1959): 460-486.

. Political Man. Garden City: Doubleday and
Company, Inc., 1960.

 

 

Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia. Translated by Louis Wirth
and Edward Shils. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.,
1936.

Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. The Communist Manifesto. Trans-
lated by Samuel Moore. Edited by Joseph Katy. ‘New York:
Washington Square Press, 1964.

McC1osky, Herbert. "Conservatism and Personality." American
Political Science Review 52 (1958): 27-45.

. "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics."
American Political Science Review 58 (1964): 361-82.

 

McNemar, Quinn. "Lost: Our Intelligence? Why?" American Psycho-
logist 19 (1964): 871-882.

Merton, Robert K. "Social Structure and Anomie." American Socio-
logical Review 3 (1938): 672-682.

 

Milbrath, Lester W. Political Participation. Chicago: Rand McNally
and Co., 1965.

Miller, Walter B. "Ideology and Criminal Justice Policy: Some
Current Issues." The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
64 (1973): 141-161.

Minar, David. "Ideology and Politica1 Behavior." Midwest Journal
of Political Science 5 (1961): 317-31.

 

Naess, Arne. Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity. 0510: University
Press, 1956.

Nisbett, Richard E. and Temoshok, Linda. "Is There an 'External'
Cognitive Style?" Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 33 (1976)? 36-47.

 

Nunnally, Jum C. Psychometric Theory. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
1967.

A.

 

331
Packer, Herbert L. The Limits of the Criminal Sanction. Stanford:
Stanford University Press;T1968.

Piaget, Jean. The Moral Judgment of the Child. Translated by
Marjorie Gabain. New York: TheTFree Press, 1965.

 

Pierce, John C. "Ideology. Attitudes, and Voting Behavior of the
American Electorate: 1956, 1960, 1964." Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Minnesota, 1969.

Poveda, Tony G. "The Image of the Criminal: A Critique of Crime
and Delinquency Theories." Issues in Criminology 5 (Winter,
1970): 59-83.

Poveda, Tony G. and Schaffer, Edward. "Positivism and Interactionism:
Two Traditions of Research in Criminology." In Criminal
Justice Research, pp. 25-36. Edited by Emilio Viano.
Lexington, Massachusetts: 0. C. Heath and Company, 1975.

 

Prewitt, Kenneth. The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of
Citizen-Politicians. New York: The Babbs-Merri11 Company,
Inc., 1970.

 

Putnam, Robert D. "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of
Ideology." American Political Science Review LXV. (September,
1971): 651-681.

. The Beliefs of Politicians. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1973.

 

Quinney, Richard. Criminology: Analysis and Critique of Crime in
America. Boston: Little Brown 8 Co., 1975.

Roberts, A. H. and Jessor, R. "Authoritarianism, Punitiveness and
Perceived Socia1 Status." Journal of Abnormal and Socia1
Psychology_56 (1958): 311-314.

 

Rokeach, Milton. The Open and Closed Mind. New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1960.

Rosenau, James A. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, New York:
Random House, 1961.

Rummel, R. J. Applied Factor Analysis. Evanston, Illinois:
Northwestern University Press, 1970.

 

Sanford, Nevitt. "Authoritarian Personality in Contemporary
Perspective." In Handbook of Political Psychology, pp.
139-170. Edited by Jeanne N. Knutson. iSan Francisco:
Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973.

 

 

332

Sartori, Giovanni. "Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems."
American Political Science Review 63 (June, 1969): 398-411.

Schafer, Stephen. Theories in Criminology. New York: Random House,
Inc. 1969.

Schervish, Paul G. "The Labeling Perspective: Its Bias and
Potential in the Study of Political Deviance." The American
Sociologist 8 (May, 1973): 47-57.

 

Schlesinger, Joseph A. Ambition and Politics. Chicago: Rand
McNally & Company, 1966.

Schwartz, David C. "A Theory of Revolutionary Behavior." In When
Men Revolt and Why, pp. 134-148. Edited by James C. Davies.
New York: The Free Press, 1971.

 

Seligman, Lester G. "Elite Recruitment and Political Development."
In Political Development and Social Change, pp. 329-338.
Edited by Jason L. Finkie and Richard W. Gable. New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966.

Shils, Edward. "Ideology and Civility: 0n the Politics of the
Intellectual.‘I Sewanee Review 66 (1958): 450-480.

"The Intellectuals in the Political Development of
the New States." In Political Development and Social
Change, pp. 338-365. Edited by Jason L. Finkle and Richard
W. Gable. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966.

 

Stokes, Donald E. "Compound Paths: An Expository Note." American
Journal of Political Science 18 (February, 1974): 191-214.

Stouffer, S. A. Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties. New
York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955,

Suedfeld, Peter and Rank, A. Dennis. ”Revolutionary Leaders: Long
Term Success as a Function of Changes in Conceptual Com-
plexity." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 34
(1976): 169-178.

Sutherland, Edwin H. Principles of Criminology_6th Edition. Chicago:
J. B. Lippincott Co., 1960.

Thio, Alex. "Class Bias in the Sociology of Deviance." The American
Sociolggist 8 (February, 1973): 1-12.

 

"The Phenomenological Perspective of Deviance: Another
Case of Class Bias." The American Sociologist 9 (August,
1974): 146-149.

 

333

Thomander, Darr1; Hunter, John E.; and Marshall, Richard L. :5
Failure to Find Cognitive Styles in Problem Solving Behavior.
Paper presented at the meetings of the Midwestern Society
of Multivariate Experimental Psychology. Chicago: May 12,
1973.

Thomy, V. A. Jr. “Some Re1ationships Between Anxiety, Cognitive
Style, and Problem Solving." Master's Thesis, Michigan
State University, 1972.

Wahlke, John C.; Eulau, Heinz; Buchanan, William; and Ferguson,
LeRoy C. The Legislative System. New York: John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., 1962.

Wilson, James 0. Thinking About Crime. New York: Basic Books, Inc.,
1975.

Wolfenstein, E. Victor. The Revolutionary Personality, Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967.

iIIJIIINI Ijllfi‘

   

IllIll/((11311111111111III/11111111111111/11/11