

IDEOLOGY, COGNITIVE STYLE, AND BELIEF SYSTEMS
ABOUT CRIME AMONG CITY, STATE
AND FEDERAL LEGISLATORS

Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D.
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
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ABSTRACT

IDEOLOGY, COGNITIVE STYLE, AND BELIEF SYSTEMS ABOUT CRIME AMONG CITY, STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATORS

By

John George Schuiteman

A survey of the literature shows that the meaning of the term "ideology" has changed with the various historical and research contexts with which it has been associated. Three general dimensions of ideological thought emerged from this review: the "content dimension" which considers the substance of political argument (e.g. liberal-conservative, communist-capitalist, etc.); the "emotional-commitment dimension" which reflects how strongly men feel about their beliefs (and is usually defined in terms of the likelihood or the willingness of men to modify or change their beliefs or opinions); and the "cognitive-style dimension," which provides a measure of the quality or structure of ideological thought (i.e. the extent to which discourse can be described in terms of being articulate or inarticulate, abstract or concrete, organized or disorganized, etc.).

This study assessed the ideological thought of a sample of Michigan office-holders: 50 City Councilmen, 51 State Representatives and 17 Congressmen. Each respondent was interviewed on a wide

variety of subjects and items and engaged in an open-ended discussion about the causes and solutions to crime. Three major analyses were carried out:

(1) Belief Systems about Crime: A model of thought about crime was developed which contrasts the "person-blame" approach to crime (crime is the product of the "criminal type") with the "system-blame" approach (crime is the product of environmental forces on human behavior). Formal theories of criminal behavior are related to the model, and data is presented which confirms the person-blame/system-blame dichotomy as the major structuring dimension in the crime discussions of legislators. The political and socio-economic characteristics which differentiate the person-blame and system-blame office-holders are presented.

(2) Dimensions of Ideological Thought: Putnam's theory of ideological thought was tested with a cluster analysis of 93 indicators of ideological thought about crime. Contrary to Putnam's assumption, cognitive-style is not a consistent structuring dimension of ideological belief. The only dimension of cognitive-style which emerges is the distinction between articulate, organized thinkers and inarticulate and relatively unorganized thinkers. Evidence is presented which indicates that Putnam's "ideological style index" is also a measure of articulation. The "content" and "emotional commitment" dimensions are shown to correlate with important political variables that are not correlated with articulation

(3) Path Model of an Ideological Belief System: A path analysis was performed on the correlations between 10 variables: the

three dimensions of ideology which emerged from the content analysis of the crime discussions (articulation, person-blame/system-blame orientation, and emotionalism); three other dimensions associated with the concept of ideology (liberalism-conservatism, authoritarianism, and mental rigidity); and four others of interest (office-level, age, education and intelligence). The result is a path model which suggests that intelligence is the principle variable by which men are differentiated in terms of the various dimensions and attributes associated with ideological thought. The data also supports the propositions that (1) no one set of "ideological" traits can provide a consistent definition or approach to the subject of ideology, (2) mental rigidity and authoritarianism are the product of a lack of mental ability rather than emotionalism, (3) the incidence of authoritarianism decreases as one ascends to the higher levels of legislative office and (4) that the belief that intellectuals are likely to be extreme, emotional and rigid in their thinking is unwarranted.

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John George Schuiteman

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Dedicated to my loving parents

Arnold and Madelyn Schuiteman

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PREFACE

Though the sequence of thoughts and discussion topics in the following dissertation proceed in a relatively logical order, completion of the thesis was accomplished only by traversing a long and circuitous route. A careful reading of Chapters 1 through 5 might, therefore, beg such questions as why I switched away from Putnam's methodology and took up the more concrete yet laborious procedures of cluster analysis; or why the dissertation, based as it is on a sample of legislators, does not concern itself more directly with the influence of "political" variables such as party identification, office experience, political ambition, etc. To help answer these questions and possible others, the following synopsis of the origins and development of the thesis is presented.

The initial inspiration for doing a study on ideology came in July and August 1973 from discussions with Joseph A. Schlesinger. Professor Schlesinger's book Ambition and Politics verifies the existence of the political "opportunity structure;" the perceived office pathways to higher office which are the product of the patterned, differential treatment of various offices by those who have successfully used these offices or intend to use these offices as the basis for political advancement. Having been impressed by Putnam's study of "ideological style," my desire was to examine the

incidence of ideological style among office-holders at the major levels of the opportunity structure. In particular, I intended to study the relationship between ideological style, political ambition, office-experience and age among office-holders at the city, state, and national levels of American government.

The central hypothesis to be examined was the manner in which the demands of the various offices worked to filter out or eliminate persons from public office who possessed certain "ideological" traits or dispositions (e.g., unwillingness to compromise, partisan hostility, mental rigidity, power-seeking motivation, authoritarianism, etc.). A sub-set of hypotheses had also been reasoned through (in hindsight quite poorly) as to the effect of political ambition (progressive versus static ambition ala' Schlesinger or power-motivated versus achievement, affiliative, or status motivated ambition ala' Rufus Browning¹), office-experience (i.e., role socialization) and age on the incidence of "ideological style." The question to be answered first, therefore, was how I would measure ideological style?

Following Putnam's approach, I assumed (1) that one can distinguish between men in terms of their ideological orientation by measuring various elements of their cognitive style (i.e., in terms of the structure of their beliefs; abstract v. concrete, use

¹Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966), p. 10, and Rufus P. Browning, "The Interaction of Personality and Political System in Decisions to Run for Office: Some Data and a Simulation Technique," Journal of Social Issues, 25 (September, 1968); 93-108.

of deductive v. use of inductive thinking, tendency to generalize v. tendency to particularize, etc.), and (2) that one could get at cognitive style through the content analysis of open-ended issue discussions. I thus proceeded to interview 118 Michigan legislators, asking each (along with many other questions) to give me their opinion about the causes and solutions of crime and the agencies responsible for dealing with this issue. The interviews - all but one of which were taped - were completed by July 15, 1974.

Before coding the data, I came to realize - through discussions with Professor John E. Hunter - that Putnam's definition and measure of ideology was exceedingly narrow, and that his method of content analysis was unreliable. Putnam's definition of ideology disregarded the political content and emotional aspects heretofore associated with the concept, and his methodology (which may have preceded explication of his definition) permitted him to separate or remove these elements from his concern with cognitive style. In addition, the reliability of his measure of ideology, the Ideological Style Index (ISI), was suspect because it was based on variables produced by subjective and/or "global" coder judgments. These judgments sought to determine the presence of various cognitive traits among his respondents but, were made without appeal to any clear set of criteria.

It was then that I adopted a much more complex and extensive methodology (i.e., cluster analysis) and began creating a large number of relatively specific and concrete items by which I could analyze the crime discussions and use in the formation of clusters

(i.e., indexes). It was not until late September, 1974 that this item formation process was complete and I was ready to begin coding the interviews. In total 173 items were used to analyze the crime discussions - this out of a total of 518 variables in the study (most of which are the "mention/did not mention" variety associated with the four non-crime, open-ended questions). These items allowed me to test not only for the presence of cognitive style dimensions such as those postulated by Putnam, but a host of others as well.

By January 1, 1975 the coding was finished and a cleaned version of the basic data deck produced. The laborious process of cluster formation ensued and it was not until July, 1975 that some initial data analyses and hypotheses could be examined.

The most dramatic result of the initial cluster analyses was the absolute failure of Putnam's cognitive style dimensions to materialize. When this occurred, I was forced to re-think my entire approach to the study. The range and complexity of the definitional and measurement problems of dealing with "ideology" became apparent. I could no longer hope to simply replicate Putnam's analysis using an American sample and then add some correlates with regard to political ambition, office-level, office-experience, etc. I felt that I either had to abandon Putnam and derive a thesis from the "ideological" and "political" variables which remained, or do a critique of Putnam and deal directly with the whole question of the definition and measurement of ideology within social science. Because of my commitment and desire to examine ideological belief systems among

legislators, I opted for the latter course (deciding that I could incorporate the "political" variables in future studies).

In the Fall of 1975, I reviewed the major works on and definitions of ideology and developed the classification system presented in Table 1.1 below. Analysis of the historical and social science useage of the concept revealed its tri-dimensional quality (i.e., that to fully describe the concept one must discuss it in terms of substantive content, emotional commitment to belief, and cognitive style (structure) of belief). Both of these analyses were included in Chapter I which was essentially complete by February, 1976.

I then returned to the question of Putnam, this time assessing his study from the perspective that his ISI was no more than a measure of articulation (certainly an element of cognitive style but conceptually distinct from those Putnam assumed his ISI to measure). Several types of evidence in support of this hypothesis were presented among which was a replication of Putnam's results using an articulation variable (constructed from three of the 21 sub-clusters) as a surrogate ISI.

At the same time, I came to focus on the "content" dimension of the crime discussions and found that these discussions were primarily structured by a "person-blame/system-blame dimension." This lead to the development of the Person-Blame/System-Blame Index and the comparison of "person-blame" and "system-blame" legislators. This analysis is reported in Chapter III and was completed by October 1976.

It was during this period that the second-order cluster analysis became clear. Guided by a new interpretation of several of the sub-clusters based on the person-blame/system-blame model, I discovered that the second order analysis paralleled the tri-dimensional structure suggested by the historical analysis of the concept "ideology," i.e., content, emotional commitment, and cognitive style. Clusters representing the three dimensions were correlated and the results as well as discussion of the second-order analysis were inserted into Chapter IV. This work was completed near the end of November, 1976.

Once I understood the problems with Putnam's analysis of ideology and the structure of the analysis of the crime discussions, the stage was set for a complete reanalysis of the nature of ideology. Ideology is not a monolithic concept, but a set of related variables. From this perspective, the path analysis presented in Chapter V was the natural next step. The oral defense of the thesis was presented on March 7, 1977, a few weeks after the completion of this analysis.

CHAPTER I

HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT IDEOLOGY: CONTENT, PERSONALITY AND COGNITIVE STYLE

The word "ideology" has come to mean many things.¹ Minar² concluded, for instance, that the term has been used to (1) describe a set of ideas which serve as a cohesion factor for organizations or groups, (2) describe ideas which serve psychological or social adjustment functions for individuals, (3) describe belief systems which are composed of inter-related elements, (4) describe ideas which prescribe a utopian situation or ideal, (5) describe a set of ideas which serves to persuade or to facilitate the "reorientation" of individuals, or (6) describe the situation where a group, class or nation shares the same set of beliefs or "character." In this paper we intend to compare definitions of the term "ideology" and relate them to the historical and/or research context in which they originated. Our objective is to explain how the various definitions arose so that we may begin to unravel the semantic confusion associated with the concept.

Table 1.1 lists some of the major scholars who have written about ideology and/or ideologues and denotes the characteristics which their definitions of the concept ascribe to the belief systems of ideologues. Table 1.2 defines the characteristics used in Table 1.1.

TABLE 1.1.--Major Scholars of Ideology and the Characteristics Which their Definitions of Ideology Ascribe to the Belief Systems of Ideologues.

		Belief System Characteristics									
Scholars		UTOPIAN	EXTREMIST	ALIENATED	AUTHORITARIAN	AFFECTIVE	INTOLERANT	RIGID	ABSTRACT	LOGICAL	ARTICULATED
AUTHORS WHO DISCUSSED IDEOLOGY OR IDEOLOGUES	MARX (1848)		X				X				X
	MANNHEIM (1936)								X	X	X
	SHILS (1958)			X		X	X	X	X	X	X
	BELL (1960)	X	X			X	X		X	X	X
	CAMPBELL (1960)		X						X	X	X
	LANE (1962)				X	X			X	X	
	McCLOSKEY (1964)		X						X	X	X
	CONVERSE (1964)		X						X	X	X
	SARTORI (1969)		X		X	X	X	X			
	PUTNAM (1971)								X	X	X
AUTHORS WHO DISCUSSED IDEOLOGY OR IDEOLOGUES UNDER A DIFFERENT RUBRIC*	LASSWELL (1930)				X	X	X	X	X		X
	ADORNO ET. AL. (1950)		X		X	X	X	X			
	HOFFER (1951)	X		X	X	X	X	X			X
	ROKEACH (1960)	X	X	X	X	X	X				X

* Lasswell refers to "compulsive power seekers" and "political agitators", Adorno et. al. refer to "authoritarians", Hoffer refers to "true believers", and Rokeach to "dogmatists".

TABLE 1.2.--Possible Characteristics of Ideological Belief Systems.

"An ideologue has a belief system which is . . ."

Utopian: Oriented to a past or future ideal state.

Extremist:^a The ideologue's beliefs place him near one of the polar extremities of the Left/Right continuum.

Alienated: Estranged and disapproving of the established social and political institutions.

Authoritarian: Believing in or characterized by an unquestioning obedience to authority' receptive to totalitarian rule.

Affective: Emotionally charged; imbued with passion.

Intolerant: Hostile toward political opponents; prone to "we" versus "they" thinking.

Rigid: Closed, resistant to new information or change; dogmatic; opposed to compromise.

Articulated: Consciously held; complex; comprehensive; a product of education.

Abstract: Global, constrained - in the sense that the person possesses a set of overriding principles from which lower level attitudes and beliefs are determined.

Logical: Deductively organized.

^aPersons categoring "ideologues" as extremist in terms of the Left/Right continuum have only a unidimensional view of the political spectrum. They tend to exclude the different (e.g. populist) or ideosyncratic forms of ideology.

Table 1.1 shows the term "ideology" to be associated with political content (utopian, extremist, alienated, authoritarian), emotionalism (affective, intolerant, rigid), and with dimensions of cognitive style that are free of political or emotional content (articulated, logical, abstract).

Ideology and History

Use of the term has followed certain historical trends.³ In the 1920's and 30's, the concern with ideology paralleled the public concern with "Bolshevism" and Fascism. Ideology was seen as a sophisticated form of propaganda; a set of ideas claiming truth but actually "masking" or rationalizing the underlying motives or "interests" of a particular group. This notion of the term traces back to Marx's thesis that ideology is "false consciousness;" theory claiming truth but reflecting only the interests of the ruling class.⁴ By the 1920's the bourgeoisie had reversed this proposition by maintaining that it was not they but the socialists who were being deceptive. They accused the socialists of distorting reality (i.e. of using ideology) as a means to advance their radical objectives.

Concern that such "distortions of reality" would incite the masses and threaten democracy increased as the Bolsheviks and fascists succeeded in their political schemes. This concern dissipated, however, as surveys of political attitudes showed that ideological "propaganda" was unlikely to have any discernible impact on public opinion.⁵ It was discovered that most people are either

apathetic in the face of ideological appeal, or tend to believe only the partisan propaganda supportive to their own attitudes or beliefs.⁶ If anything, apathetics were found to possess a "latent" ideological perspective largely accepting unconsciously the basic institutions, values and beliefs of democracy, while political articulates were found committed to these beliefs in a more sincere, comprehending manner.

In the post World War II era, ideology became a question of serious historical importance. Scholars sought to explain the reasons why the German people and/or the German "national character" were susceptible to the Nazis' brand of fascist ideology. It was at this point that scholars such as Adorno et al. took the lead developed earlier by Lasswell and related ideology with personality.⁷ The concern was not with "ideology" per se, but with the personality traits of ideologues: the leaders and true believers of (primarily right-wing) social movements. Words from the lexicon of Psychology such as "compulsive," "authoritarian" and "dogmatic" replaced the term "ideological"--yet the beliefs examined by the researchers remained essentially political in content. Compulsive power-seekers, authoritarians or dogmatists were perceived as being particularly susceptible to the appeal of ideologies whose decision-making process (if not philosophical content) was totalitarian.⁸

In more recent years, attention has shifted away from the question of mass movements to a concern with the politics of the relatively peaceful Western democracies. Attention has focused on differences between elite and mass populations. One finding has

been that persons with interest and knowledge about politics tend to locate toward the end points of the liberal-conservative continuum and tend to have more articulated belief systems than persons with little interest and knowledge.⁹ Campbell, et al. called these persons "ideologues."¹⁰ This use of the term implies that ideologues are not necessarily intolerant, alienated, utopian, authoritarian or even extremist in orientation. Rather the assumption is that ideologues may be identified strictly on the basis of the structure of their political beliefs, i.e. in terms of the way they think and not on the basis of what they think. This idea was originally suggested by such scholars as Else Frenkel-Brunswik (1949), T. W. Adorno, et al. (1950) and Milton Rokeach (1960), modified by Philip E. Converse (1964), and presented in its distilled form by Robert D. Putnam (1971).¹¹ It is an assumption which presumes that ideology can be defined in terms of cognitive style.

Historical Change of the Substantive Theory Underlying the Concept

Ideology and Self-Interest

Some of the semantic issues concerning the use of the term ideology have been further confused by the fact that the different ways of defining the concept are associated with different substantive theories. The view that ideology is "sophisticated propaganda," for example, is related to two theories, both of which associate its meaning with "self-interest." The first theory projects a cynical view that ideologues consciously use ideology merely as a tool to

elicit support for their own political objectives. Mannheim called this the "particular conception" of ideology and writes that it

. . . is implied when the term denotes that we are sceptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent. They [our opponent's ideas and representations] are regarded as more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation, the true recognition of which would not be in accord with [our opponent's] interests. These distortions range all the way from conscious lies to half-conscious and unwitting disguises; from calculated attempts to dupe others to self-deception.¹²

The "self-deception" part of this conception of ideology constitutes the second substantive theory underlying the association between ideology and self-interest. This theory maintains that some people use ideology unwittingly as a means of coping with psychological maladjustment. These persons use ideological rhetoric to mask certain motivational impulses within themselves and in the process, may disguise the true "interest" or design of the group which they claim to represent.¹³

Harold Lasswell outlines this theory in his book Psychopathology and Politics (1930).¹⁴ Among others, he lists narcissistic desire for "emotional responses from the public" (79), displacement of the desire for homosexual contact (125), unconscious hatred and defiance of authority (175), and defensive reaction against unperceived self-doubt (175) as reasons why men willingly distort reality and engage in revolutionary speech. Self-deception is posited as "perhaps the rule" . . . among compulsive power-seekers (50) and "political agitators" are described as men who "relying upon the magic of rhetoric, . . . conjure away obstacles [e.g. to social change] with the ritualistic repetition of principles" (79). The theory uses

psycho-analysis to explain how ideology can be a disguise (even for honest men) that masks alternatives and interests.

In the context of "ideology as self-interest," the word "ideology" was used as a label for one's opponents' beliefs. Conservatives considered ideology the social theory of the collectivist radicals while liberals or socialists thought of ideology as the social theory of the bourgeoisie. In either case, ideology was defined in terms of the content of political belief and not in terms of the emotional or cognitive aspects of these beliefs.

Ideology and Personality

In the post World War II period, ideologues were not viewed as propagandists but as a special breed of persons with personality deficiencies who were compelled to view the world in an authoritarian manner. Ideologues were important historical figures who were not only serious about their beliefs, but psychologically committed to them to such an extent that they vehemently repressed all opposing ideas and advocated totalitarian government as the means for their implementation. Scholars (most notably the authors of The Authoritarian Personality) developed a theory which posited that these "authoritarians" could be identified by their possession of a particular cluster of beliefs.¹⁵ Furthermore, they argued that this empirical clustering of beliefs (which are not logically related) suggested a dynamic psychological relationship. This dynamic is supposedly set in motion by intense feelings of status anxiety, and results in (1) an idealized perception of one's self

and parents and (2) acts of aggression and hatred toward minorities and outsiders. As Roger Brown explains:

. . . status anxiety produces authoritarian discipline which produces repression of faults and shortcomings and of aggression against authority. It is the fate of repressed faults and shortcomings to be projected to minorities and outsiders. It is the fate of the repressed aggression to be displaced from authority and directed against minorities and outsiders. Finally the projected faults and shortcomings rationalize the aggression. Prejudice plays an integral role in the total ideology but the role is psychological rather than logical.¹⁶

The research on authoritarianism reinforced the connection between ideology and personality initially postulated by Lasswell.

Ideologues (authoritarians) were identified by their agreement or disagreement with the items of the F-scale; a scale composed of statements of opinion which supposedly measured "implicit authoritarian or anti-democratic trends in personality."¹⁷ The Berkely researchers reported evidence that authoritarians manifest certain characteristics of cognitive style.¹⁸ Authoritarians were judged to be more rigid and also more intolerant of ambiguity than non-authoritarians and it is here that the association between ideology and cognitive style (as opposed to ideology and personality) was first established.

Ideology and Cognitive Style

In recent years, substantive theory related to ideology has focused primarily on the structure of the public's political beliefs and opinions. Research has shown that among the great majority of citizens there is some attachment to democratic values such as freedom and equality, but that the opinions of most citizens do not reflect

the existence of articulate, logically constrained systems of political beliefs. There is a small percentage of citizens with knowledge and interest in politics, however, who possess a relatively stable and organized set of beliefs and attitudes from which they analyze political issues.¹⁹ Because this elite has a relatively rich set of political ideas, Converse (1964) and others labeled them "ideologues." This use of the concept continued the shift in the meaning of the term "ideology" away from the traditional (political) definitions which related it to group interests and the concern with "what" men think about politics, toward the most recent definitions which link the concept with cognitive style and a concern with "how" men think about politics.

Three scholars who are particularly important to any discussion about the relationship between ideology and cognitive style are Milton Rokeach, Philip E. Converse, and Robert D. Putnam.

Rokeach's research is strongly rooted in the research tradition that links ideology with personality and emotionalism, specifically ideology and authoritarianism. Convinced that the F-scale was a measure of "right authoritarianism" rather than authoritarianism in general, he argued that an ahistorical approach should be adhered to in the analysis of authoritarianism and that measures of authoritarianism should be free of ideological (i.e. Left-Right) content.²⁰ He believed that the Berkeley researchers actually came closer to measuring general authoritarianism when they examined the characteristics of "intolerance of ambiguity" and "mental rigidity" (elements of cognitive style) than when they

relied on the use of the F-scale.²¹ In his own research, he contended that "dogmatism"--the extent to which people are closed-minded about their beliefs--was the key characteristic and the best means of examining the authoritarian personality.²²

By maintaining that authoritarians could best be distinguished in terms of "how" rather than "what" they thought, Rokeach prescribed "cognitive style" as the primary criterion by which ideologues (authoritarians) should be identified. This further separated the concept of ideology from its origins in the realm of political content, for it implied that even persons with completely idiosyncratic, non-traditional political beliefs could be authoritarian and hence ideologues. Rokeach's approach also separated the concept--at least conceptually--from its association with personality, by emphasizing the cognitive as opposed to the emotional aspects of beliefs systems.²³ Therefore as Lasswell's work serves to bridge the period in which ideology was primarily associated with "self-interest" with the period in which it was associated with personality, Rokeach's work serves to link the period in which ideology was associated with personality with the recent period in which ideology has been associated primarily with cognitive style.

Converse continued the trend of associating ideology with cognitive style--with one major difference. In his research, "cognitive style" has no connection to the degree of emotional commitment which a person attaches to his beliefs. He defines a belief system as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence."²⁴

The properties of such a belief system are (1) a large fund of information, (2) a concern for logical consistency, and (3) the use of overarching principles to derive beliefs. Because he is concerned with belief systems which "allow some centrality to political objects," he considers himself to be examining "ideological" belief systems.²⁵ Only about 10% of his sample of potential voters possessed anything like the type of belief system he describes, and these persons he classifies as "ideologues" and "near ideologues."²⁶

Converse's "broad" definition of ideology incorporates elements of cognitive style which permits the stratification of his sample into "levels of conceptualization."²⁷ Though his approach minimizes the importance of political content, the "constraint" which is found among his sample members is largely dependent on the extent to which they used the "liberal-conservative continuum" as an "ideological dimension of judgment."²⁸ "Dimensions like the liberal-conservative continuum" he remarks, "are extremely efficient frames for the organization of . . . political observations."²⁹ Thus in the end Converse did tend to confound his cognitive style definition of ideology with extremity on the liberal-conservative continuum.

In Putnam's study (1971) the connection between ideology and cognitive style appears in its most distilled form. In discussing "political style"--which he defines as "the way men hold their beliefs"³⁰--he states that it is

. . . not what men think about politics and policy, but how they do so--this is the essence of political style. And

political style provides one way of interpreting the notion of "ideological politics." An ideological politician is, according to this interpretation, a politician who analyzes policy in a particular way.³¹

This use of the term "ideology" removes all the political and psychological connotations heretofore associated with it. The concept, thus stripped of any substantive content, is ready to be reconstructed purely in terms of cognitive style. Putnam continues saying

. . . it is reasonable to argue (assuming we can find the appropriate empirical clustering of traits) that . . . [the ideological] . . . politician is one who focuses on general principles rather than specific details, who reasons deductively rather than inductively, who stresses the role of 'ideas' in politics.³²

"This," declares Putnam, "is the core of what is usually meant by ideological politics."³³

Putnam's definition and methodological approach to ideology assumes that ideologies can be identified solely in terms of cognitive style. Though at times he discusses ideology "in the conventional left/right sense," he treats this notion of the term as a variable independent of his own definition.³⁴ While this comprises a narrow approach, it stands as the most recent and innovative attempt to define and/or measure the concept.

Summary and Overview of the Study

Our historical survey suggests that there are at least three important dimensions of ideological thought. First, there is the "content dimension;" the dimension which considers the substance of political argument and thus, the self-interest of individuals (or groups) within political life. The content dimension identifies

the subject of a given discourse and describes the substantive dimensions along which debate is organized. In political discourse, for example, debate is often structured in terms of differences between Left and Right, liberalism and conservatism, socialism and capitalism, internationalism and isolationism, etc. Secondly, there is the "emotional commitment dimension;" the dimension which links ideology with personality. The emotional commitment dimension reflects how strongly men feel about their beliefs and is usually defined in terms of the likelihood or the willingness of men to modify or change their beliefs or opinions. The third dimension is the "cognitive style dimension" which is oriented toward understanding "how" men think about politics. This dimension provides a measure of the quality or structure of ideological thought, i.e. the extent to which discourse can be described in terms of being articulate or inarticulate, abstract or concrete, organized or disorganized, etc.

The study below assesses ideological content in the thought of a sample of Michigan office-holders: 50 City Councilmen, 51 State Representatives and 17 Congressmen. To facilitate the analysis, each respondent was questioned about the cause(s), the solution(s) and the social agencies related to the problem of crime; an issue to which legislators at each level of government must occasionally address themselves. From the analysis of these discussions about crime, three dimensions emerged which correspond to the dimensions described above.

The dimension which dominated the content aspect of the crime discussions was essentially a "person blame/system blame" dimension.

In brief, this dimension contrasted those persons who viewed crime as the product of the "criminal type" in society versus persons who blamed the crime problem more directly on environmental conditions and/or current trends in public morality or social discipline.

With regard to how "emotionally committed" the respondents were to their beliefs, the analysis paralleled the research of Rokeach and others in that no direct attempt was made to assess respondent closed-mindedness. Emotionalism was narrowly defined to be the extent to which persons used emotionally charged language in their discussions. I note that "dogmatism" encompasses two logically distinct attributes: emotionalism and closed-mindedness, and that usually it is assumed that "closed-mindedness" exists as a function of the degree to which a person's belief system is emotionally charged.

The examination of respondent "cognitive style" suggests that this aspect of ideological thought (Putnam's Ideological Style Index notwithstanding) can not be captured by any single index. The conceptually distinct features of cognitive-style which emerged with any certainty were highly correlated and when clustered, form a dimension that distinguishes respondents in terms of whether their thought with respect to crime is articulate or inarticulate. The "generalizer-particularizer" and "inductive-deductive thinking" distinctions which Putnam posits as important criteria of ideological thinking simply failed to materialize. The study includes a section on the methodology used to test Putnam's thesis, and evidence is presented indicating that (1) Putnam himself failed to get any

distinction between his "generalizer-particularizer" and "inductive-deductive thinking" measures, and (2) that his ISI is no more than a general measure of articulation. The study also presents data that establishes the "content" and "emotional commitment" dimensions as important definitive features of ideological thought in their own right.

The three dimensions of ideology (cognitive style, content, and emotional commitment) which emerged from the content analysis of crime belief systems are then correlated with other variables related to ideological or political thought (e.g. authoritarianism, liberal/conservatism, willingness to compromise, education, etc.) and a path analysis is conducted.³⁵ The result is a path model which shows that intelligence is the primary antecedent or causal variable in the respondent's belief systems about crime. This suggests that intelligence is the principle variable by which men are differentiated in terms of the various dimensions and attributes associated with ideological thought. Whereas we might have expected that the content, emotionalism, and cognitive style dimensions would be the strongest antecedent or causal variables within belief systems, the model suggests that their relationship to ideology is actually mediated through the capacity of persons to acquire and apply knowledge.

The path model data also support the propositions that (1) no one set of ideological traits can provide a consistent definition of the term "ideological," (2) mental rigidity and authoritarianism are the product of mental ability rather than emotionalism, (3) the incidence of authoritarianism decreases as one ascends to the higher

levels of legislative office and that (4) the belief that intellectuals are likely to be extreme, emotional and rigid in their thinking is unwarranted.

Chapter I--Footnotes

¹Classifications of definitions of ideology are available in Arne Naess, Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity (Oslo: University Press, 1956) and Samuel H. Barnes, "Ideology and the Organization of Conflict," Journal of Politics, 28 (1966), 513-30. Also, a bibliography of the literature on ideology prior to 1964 can be found in David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 329-34.

²David Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 5 (1961), 317-331.

³The word "ideology" was originally used by philosophers of the Enlightenment to refer to the new "science of ideas," i.e. they used the word to describe what we call positivism. See Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: The Free Press, 1960), 394-395.

⁴Ibid., pp. 395-396, and Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1949), p. 40.

⁵Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 95.

⁶Lester W. Milbraith, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), p. 45 and Lazarsfeld et al., pp. 89-90.

⁷Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930: reprint ed., New York: The Viking Press, 1960), Chapter 10.

⁸Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960), pp. 6, 14, 126.

⁹Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), pp. 188-265.

¹⁰Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, 58 (1964), 361-382, and Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David E. Apter (Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 216.

¹¹Else Frenkel-Brunswik, "Intolerance of Ambiguity as an Emotional and Personality Variable," Journal of Personality, 18 (1949), pp. 108-143, T. W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950), Rokeach, pp. 4-11, Converse, and Robert D. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

¹²Mannheim, pp. 55-56.

¹³A more recent explanation of this can be found in E. Victor Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 172-173.

¹⁴The numbers in parentheses are page numbers from this book. See Lasswell.

¹⁵Adorno, et al.

¹⁶Roger Brown, Social Psychology (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 504.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 487.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 505, and Frenkel-Brunswik, pp. 108-143.

¹⁹Converse, pp. 214-216; McClosky, p. 252; Campbell, et al., pp. 216-266; Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, American Business and Public Policy (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), pp. 80-104; James A. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1961); and John C. Pierce, "Ideology, Attitudes and Voting Behavior of the American Electorate: 1956, 1960, 1964" (Ph.D. dissertation University of Minnesota, 1969), p. 63.

²⁰Rokeach, pp. 11-16.

²¹Brown, p. 541.

²²Rokeach, pp. 4-8, 13-14.

²³Ibid., p. 8.

²⁴Converse, p. 207.

²⁵Ibid., p. 209.

²⁶Ibid., p. 216.

²⁷Ibid., p. 215.

²⁸Ibid., p. 214.

²⁹Ibid., p. 219.

³⁰Putnam, p. 4.

³¹Ibid., p. 35.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid. The statement begs the question: "For whom is this the core of what is meant by ideological politics?," but the answer is never given.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 50-52, 131.

³⁵Path analysis is a procedure for systematically combining the use of partial and multiple correlation to study the causal relations among a set of variables.

CHAPTER II

SURVEY OF CITY COUNCILMEN, STATE REPRESENTATIVES, AND CONGRESSMEN

The methodological premise of this study is that the best way to discover differences in political beliefs and style among politicians is to listen carefully to what they say. From January to June 1974, I talked with 50 City Councilmen, 51 State Representatives, and 17 members of the U. S. House of Representatives in semi-structured interviews averaging 64 minutes each.¹ The analysis of these interviews provides the basis for this dissertation. Let me say a bit about three important elements in this research: (1) the samples, (2) the interviews, and (3) the subsequent analysis.

The Samples

Because the initial concern of the study was the comparison of political style and beliefs among politicians at the different levels of American government, an attempt was made to interview 50 Michigan city councilmen, 50 Michigan state representatives, and the 19 members of Michigan's delegation to the U. S. House of Representatives. In total, one hundred and eighteen interviews were actually conducted: 50 with city councilmen, 51 with state representatives,² and 17 with congressmen. Because several of the congressmen were busy with the House Judiciary Committee's hearings

on the possible impeachment of President Nixon, and others were pre-occupied with pre-summer recess committee work, only 11 of the 19 Michigan congressmen were interviewed. Consequently, six Midwestern congressmen were added to the congressional sample strictly on the basis of their willingness to grant an interview on short notice.

The main criterion used for selecting the city and state office-holders is related to the study's original emphasis on office-level comparisons. It was decided to select city councilmen and state representatives from cities or districts which would most likely be considered average in terms of their socio-economic, racial and geographic characteristics. City size was held relatively constant as a factor in selecting the city councilmen, and urbanity or rural-ness of representative district was constrained somewhat in the selection of the state representatives. Homogeneity of district was built into the selection procedure to maximize the possibility of significant mean differences in the comparisons between office-level samples. By reducing the variability of city size and urbanity or rural-ness of representative district it was thought that the clarity of inter-office level comparisons would be enhanced. The presumption, perhaps in hindsight unwarranted, is that electorates in districts that are similar in demographic terms will tend to elect relatively similar types of representatives. Of course, any procedure used to maximize inter-office level differences or comparisons is done at the expense of reducing the potential differences and comparisons found within office-level samples. Details of the selection procedures are as follows.

City Councilmen

The city councilmen were selected on the basis of their tenure on the councils of medium-sized Michigan cities. Initially 20 cities ranging in population from 30,900 to 56,600 were selected as the sample base for councilmen. From this group, eleven were selected on the basis of (1) how close the size of their population was to the median population of the larger group, and (2) their proximity in terms of distance and/or driving time from East Lansing. These eleven cities ranged in population from 35,444 to 45,920 and represented a sample base of 62 councilmen. From this point, the strategy was to start with the nearest city and, proceeding down the list, interview every possible councilman until fifty interviews had been conducted.

State Representatives

State Representatives (each representing approximately 80,000 people), were selected on the basis of the degree to which their district was urban or rural. Representatives from districts considered overly urban or overly rural were eliminated from the selection process. For example, the representatives from 28 districts each of which are totally enclaved within the boundaries of large cities (20 from Detroit, 3 each from Flint and Grand Rapids, and one each from Saginaw and Warren) were eliminated. Likewise, the representatives from all the districts in the Upper Peninsula (4), the upper one-third to one-half of the lower peninsula (9), and various other districts whose size indicated an all but total rural population (7),

were removed. In all, 48 representatives of the 110 allotted to the state House of Representatives were eliminated, leaving a potential sample of 62 state representatives. As was the case with the city councilmen, the strategy followed was to start with the (roughly estimated) median district of the group of 62 and work outward; interviewing every possible representative until a total of 50 were interviewed.

Congressmen

Interviewing congressmen is more difficult than interviewing city councilmen or state representatives. Not only does the interviewer have to travel greater distances to conduct the interviews (i.e. either to Washington D.C. or the representative's district office), but the work pressure on congressmen reduces their ability to grant lengthy interviews. The majority of the 30 to 35 congressmen I made contact with considered themselves entirely too busy with committee work, service to constituents, entertaining visitors from the home district, etc., to allow little more than a brief introduction. Given these time constraints and my limited resources, only 17 congressmen were interviewed; 5 at their district offices and 12 in Washington D.C. between June the 10th and June the 14th, 1974. As noted earlier, I was only able to obtain interviews with 11 of the 19 Michigan congressmen. When it became apparent that I would not be able to complete 15 or so interviews with Michigan congressmen, I attempted to schedule as many interviews as possible with congressmen from other Midwestern states. Six representatives, two each from Ohio and

Illinois, and one each from Indiana and Pennsylvania allowed me the privilege of conducting an interview. I, therefore was able to build my congressional sample to 17 before my time, money and patience ran out.

Sample Composition

Table 2.1 presents a breakdown of the three subsamples on selected personal and political variables. A quick perusal shows that the sample is rich in terms of the variety and range of the variables measured. These data reflect on the extent to which relationships found in the Michigan sample can be generalized to the larger populations of these types of office-holders; or to American legislative office-holders in general.

In order to determine if my sample selection criteria may have distorted my sample in terms of socio-economic, or political characteristics, I compared my sample with larger samples of city councilmen, state legislators and congressmen on the characteristics of education, age, occupation, father's occupation, and seniority in office.³ The comparison samples include (1) the 435 councilmen from 87 non-partisan cities in the San Francisco area which served as the basis of Prewitt's study: The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politics, (2) the 474 state legislators interviewed by Wahlke, et al. in their classic study The Legislative System, and (3) the 435 incumbent U. S. Representatives of the 88th (1963-1964) session used for comparison by Fishel in his study Party and Opposition.⁴ This cross-checking procedure indicated that there is a good deal of similarity between the comparison samples and the

TABLE 2.1.--Composition of Sub-Samples by Personal and Political Characteristics.

	City Councilmen (N=50)	State Representatives (N=51)	U.S. Representatives (N=17)	Total (N=118)
<u>Political Party</u>				
Democrats	26	25	6	57
Republicans	9	26	11	46
Independents	15	0	0	15
<u>Party Activism</u>				
Yes	12	25	13	50
No	37	26	4	67
<u>Seniority in Office</u>				
Less than 5 years	34	26	5	65
5 to 10 years	10	19	7	36
Over 10 years	6	6	3	17
Average Years in Office	4.1	6.1	9.0	5.6
<u>Terms in Office</u>				
1st term	20	14	5	39
2nd term	19	12	0	31
3rd or 4th term	6	9	5	20
5th or 6th term	4	10	2	16
Over 6 terms	1	6	5	12
<u>Previous Office Experience</u>				
Yes	23	38	13	74
No	26	13	4	43
<u>Age</u>				
Less than 45	18	21	4	43
45 to 55	24	16	9	49
More than 55	8	14	4	26
Average Age	45.6	48.0	49.2	45.4
<u>Education</u>				
12 years or less	14	8	0	22
13 to 16 years	22	22	5	49
Over 16 years	14	21	12	47
Average Years of Education	14.8	16.1	17.5	15.7
<u>Parental Social Class</u>				
Professional	2	8	5	15
Middle	11	29	9	49
Working	36	14	1	51
<u>Sex</u>				
Males	46	50	16	112
Females	4	1	1	6
<u>District Partisanship</u>				
Solid Democratic	13	4	0	17
Democratic Majority	19	17	4	40
Competitive	2	14	6	22
Republican Majority	13	11	6	30
Solid Republican	2	5	0	7
<u>Political Philosophy^a</u>				
Liberals	12	12	3	27
Moderates	10	18	6	34
Conservatives	15	15	5	35
Pragmatists	13	6	3	22

^a20% of the total sample expressed some form of objection to the terms "liberal" and "conservative." All but one of these persons were placed in the "pragmatist" category.

smaller Michigan sub-samples on these variables; at least enough to demonstrate that the sub-samples are not distorted.

The Questionnaire

Each respondent was asked 46 closed and 7 open-ended questions.⁵ The closed-ended questions ranged from the usual queries about background, political experience, party activity, etc., to questions about the respondent's political ambition, chances of being re-elected and attitude toward political compromise, etc. It rarely required more than five categories (foils) to adequately record the answers to these questions. The open-ended questions, on the other hand, were designed to draw out detailed, in-depth answers. They examined the respondent's mode of entry into office, his political motivations and frustrations, his beliefs about the causes and solutions to the crime problem, and his thoughts about the "essentials" of democratic government. The coding requirements for these questions were extensive; the possible answer categories numbering from 17 (mode of entry) to 41 (political frustrations). Five closed and five open-ended questions were taken directly from Putnam's questionnaire. Also replicated were a number of the coding formats that were designed for these questions.

"Ideological Style" and the Discussion of Crime

One particular set of open-ended questions is of primary importance to the analysis to be presented. These questions attempt to reveal the respondent's beliefs about the causes and solutions to the crime problem, and the institutions and people in society who

should be responsible for dealing with the problem. It was necessary to engage the respondents in issue discussions because of the initial assumption (an assumption central to Putnam's thesis) that one way to measure ideological (for Putnam this meant "cognitive") style was through content analysis of such discussions.

In the planning phase of the study it was decided to engage each respondent in two issue discussions; one on a subject of his choice and one chosen by the interviewer. This would replicate Putnam's design and, supposedly, would reduce bias in the data which might result if only one issue--with either too much or too little "ideological" content--was discussed. During the survey pre-test period, however, it became clear that only one issue could be discussed if the interviews were to be completed in the intended 45 to 60 minute time period. Time considerations, a desire to enhance the comparability of the discussions, and the tendency of the first respondents interviewed to choose "inappropriate" (see below) discussion topics, also prompted a decision to have the interviewer suggest the subject for discussion.

The crime issue was selected for two reasons:

1. During the survey pre-test period and the first several interviews, respondents were allowed to choose the issue for discussion. This procedure revealed a tendency for city councilmen to choose relatively "concrete" or "technical" subjects for discussion; e.g. problems relating to the financing of new sewer systems or urban renewal projects, etc. Consequently, the crime issue was assigned to force discussion of an issue with at least the potential, but not necessarily the presumption of "ideological" content.

2. The crime issue was one of the few issues familiar and relevant (in terms of the respondent's legislative responsibilities) to office-holders at each of the levels of government.

Respondents were asked three open-ended questions regarding the crime problem, each followed by appropriate probe questions intended to flesh out the respondent's ideas and reasoning to the greatest extent possible. These questions were presented as follows:

Now, I would like to ask you about an issue which is of concern not only to (state legislators), but also to both (city councilmen) and (congressmen). This is the problem of crime which we have in our society. . . .

Q. __: How do you feel this came to be a problem (i.e. what do you feel are the origins or sources of crime)?

Q. __: What do you think should or can be done about the crime problem?

Q. __: What group or institution do you feel has the power and/or the responsibility to deal with this problem?

For each question, the interviewer's strategy was to follow the respondent's reasoning and encourage him to elaborate his ideas. Care was taken to avoid suggesting approaches, causes, solutions, etc. to the crime problem which were not implied by the respondent's answers. The discussions generated by these questions averaged 9.4 minutes in length. Discussions with the city councilmen averaged 9.6 minutes, state representatives averaged 10.1 minutes and congressmen averaged 6.8 minutes per interview. These discussions serve as the basis for the examination of the respondents' belief systems about crime.

Chapter II--Footnotes

¹Information on the scheduling, procedural mechanics, environmental setting, length in time, and coding of these interviews, as well as a list of the respondents, is presented in Appendix A.

²One state representative was added to the state office-level sample because a representative interviewed earlier had refused to allow his discussion to be tape recorded. Because the anticipated coding procedures required relistening to the conversation, this addition seemed advisable.

³See Table A.5 of Appendix A for the sample comparisons.

⁴The comparison samples are from: Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politics, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1970, pp. 46, 225-226; John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962, pp. 36-37, 489, 491; and Jeff Fishel, Party and Opposition, David McKay Company, Inc., 1973, pp. 21-22.

⁵The full set of questions may be found in Appendix B.

CHAPTER III

BELIEF SYSTEMS ABOUT CRIME

The stated purpose of this thesis is to examine the ideological content and the related cognitive style dimensions within crime discussions of American office-holders. In order to proceed, a detailed set of coding items had to be constructed to permit an in depth content analysis of the relatively unstructured discussions. The dominant concern during the formulation of these items was to make sure the items provided an adequate test for the presence of various dimensions of cognitive style (see Chapter IV). A second objective, however, was to construct items reflecting ideas that would have a wide range of currency among office-holders at the different levels of government. Consequently, the substantive content of the items was largely reflective of the traditional liberal/conservative debate on crime; more recently referred to as a debate between "law and order" advocates and "civil libertarians." The items created for this analysis comprise 93 "mention/did not mention" items designed specifically to analyze beliefs about crime, and 98 items which were used to record the various causes, solutions, and responsible agencies mentioned by the office-holders (see Appendix B: items 158-197, 202-232, 237-263, and 266-358).

After the coding of the crime discussions was completed, it was decided that a content analysis should be derived from an a priori

formalized model of beliefs about crime. Subsequently, a Person-Blame/-System-Blame Model of Beliefs about Crime was developed which outlines two polar types of belief systems. The model contrasts the "moralist," "retributive," or "person-blame" approach to crime with the "behavioralist," "environmentalist," or "system-blame" approach to crime. The person-blame adherents see crime as being caused by a "special breed" or "criminal type" in society who must be searched out and punished, and the system-blame adherents hold that crime is caused by certain environmental conditions which encourage criminal behavior. This chapter will (1) review the formal theories of criminal behavior as discussed by legal scholars and criminologists, (2) present the person-blame/system blame model, (3) present data confirming the model's utility for distinguishing belief systems about crime among political office holders, (4) outline the characteristics which differentiate the person-blame and system-blame office-holders, and (5) discuss legislative and other implications which follow from these characteristics.

Theories of Criminal Behavior

There are two distinct literatures which attempt to structure debate on the issue of crime; the "legalist" and the "criminologist" literature. The "legalist" literature is more political in nature than that found within criminology for it more directly concerns the impact of the actual criminal procedures which operate in society. The "criminologist" literature is more abstract or philosophical in orientation.

In formalizing the debate about crime in the context of a person-blame/system-blame model of beliefs about crime, it was natural to seek guidance from the "legalist" camp. Unlike recent discussion among criminologists, debate among legal scholars still reflects the liberal/conservative debate over the question of retribution. The utility of the concepts "crime," "guilt" and "punishment" as meaningful to the function(s) of criminal law is still an issue of contention. Herbert L. Packer describes what he calls the "retributive" and the "behavioral" positions in the legalist debate,¹ and makes distinctions largely expressive of the differences between the person-blame and system-blame approaches to crime. In summated form, Packer states:

The retributive position is an old one . . . [It] holds . . . that man is a responsible moral agent to whom rewards are due when he makes right moral choices and to whom punishment is due when he makes wrong ones. . . . these imperatives flow from the nature of man and do not require . . . any pragmatic justification. . . . As individuals we have a . . . proper desire to seek revenge when wrongs are inflicted on us; as a society we demand that constituted authority punish those who unjustifiably inflict injury on others. . . . The purpose of punishment is to inflict deserved suffering, and the purpose of criminal law is to provide an acceptable basis within the social framework for doing so.

[Retributive] judges . . . conceive of their sentencing function as the expression of society's demand that the criminal expiate his crime. The police . . . speak of the criminal sometimes as an animal, sometimes simply as 'the enemy.' He is seen as a 'rat' or a 'vermin' . . . something to be exterminated. As an enemy he becomes the target in the 'war on crime.'²

On the other hand, Packer notes that:

. . . the behavioral [position] . . . is in complete opposition to the retributive view. . . . [The behavioralists] have or appear to have on their side the lessons of the new learning about human behavior. . . . Crime, guilt, and punishment are meaningless concepts to one who holds this view. He sees the

occurrence . . . of crime as simply an occasion for social intervention, not the reason for it . . . 'crime' is simply one signal among many that a person needs to be dealt with.

The behavioral position is . . . complex. Its principal bases can, however, be stated. . . . First, free will is an illusion, because human conduct is determined by forces that lie beyond the power of the individual to modify. Second, moral responsibility, accordingly, is an illusion, because blame cannot be ascribed for behavior that is ineluctably conditioned. Third, human conduct, being causally determined, can and should be scientifically studied and controlled.³

Arguments from within the "legalists" camp still appeal to the retributive/moralist or "person-blame" perspective as a legitimate basis from which to approach the problem of crime and criminal law. This stands in contrast to the modern criminologist literature wherein debate is largely confined to distinctions within the "system-blame" or "behavioral" perspective. A wide range of typologies of theories of criminal behavior are offered by the criminologists,⁴ yet an historical approach offers the best format by which to summarize their discussion.

The early criminologists--the "social pathologists"⁵--started from the moralists' position that there were good and bad types of people. Yet, as the scientific method became more widely accepted as the proper (i.e. most objective) approach to the study of deviancy, much of the moralistic/retributive argument was eliminated, or at least hidden away. Criminal behavior was largely thought to be the product of innate physiological or psychological deficiency, or social maladjustment. Since the existence of a "criminal type" could not be substantiated, however, criminologists turned more and more to "deterministic" explanations; explanations which focused on the effects of environment.

The first environmentalists, sometimes called "value-free behavioralists" still retained belief in a "criminal type" but believed these persons were simply the product of various sociological conditions.⁶ Merton's thesis (1938) that "anomic social structure" pressures certain people to engage in non-conformist behavior, Sutherland's "differential association" argument (1947) that crime results when people are socialized apart from anti-criminal norms of behavior, Cohen's belief (1955) that crime is a sign of status frustration among lower class juveniles, and Cloward and Ohlin's theory (1960) that "differential opportunities" within delinquent subcultures lead to crime are the premier examples of this orientation.⁷ These behavioralists are distinguished from the social pathologists by their belief that behavior is a function of environment and not immutable character, and because of their rejection of the moralist/retributive approach to criminality.

Concern eventually developed over the fact that the focus of the behavioralists was predominantly on the criminal behavior of the lower classes; an emphasis which seemed to suggest that the lower classes alone were capable of deviance. This, it was thought, constituted unacceptable "class-bias" in that it ignored white-collar crime, and the role that the powerful in society play in perpetuating the conditions which lead to crime. In reaction to this concern, the "phenomenologist" and the "labeling" theories of crime were developed.

The "phenomenologist" approach relies on viewing criminal behavior from the perspective of the criminal. The attempt is to

"understand" this behavior rather than explain it; to understand the criminal "in that doing and feeling and the state of mind that induced him to adopt specific attitudes (and behavior) toward his environment. . . ." ⁸ This approach supposedly eludes the charge of "class bias" (though there is disagreement on this ⁹) by its view that men of all classes are equally free to choose or not choose to act in a deviant manner. It ignores the behavioral research which indicates that, to the contrary, lower class persons are restricted by their environment.

From our point of view the phenomenologist approach differs from the "opportunity structure" explanations of crime in only a trivial manner. The fact that some environments induce persons to "choose" criminal behavior rather than non-criminal behavior is still a distinction within the "system-blame" or environmentalist perspective. A clearer, but still rather fine distinction, is drawn by the "labeling" theorists--the approach to crime which has dominated the criminologist literature since the 1960's. ¹⁰

The "labelists" start from the position that certain kinds of environments lead persons to commit "crime" and that anyone in such conditions could exhibit criminal behavior. Once having been convicted of a crime, however, a person is labeled "criminal" (purportedly by the powerful in society who control the agencies of criminal justice) and is treated as if deviancy is his normal behavior. This labeling process in effect produces a criminal social caste wherein persons learn pro-criminal behavior and adopt a pro-criminal set of ethics. The charge of class bias has been

answered by the labelists' concern with the role which "vested interests" and criminal justice agencies play in the etiology of crime and by their commitment to examine deviancy among all classes.

Current debate among criminologists, therefore, is not related to the difference between person-blame and system-blame explanations of crime, but centers rather on a relatively fine distinction drawn by two schools within the system-blame orientation. The debate contrasts the classic view that certain kinds of environments produce criminals, with the recent--very specifically situational--view that "criminals" are not produced until deviants are caught and labeled as such. In comparison to the "legalist" debate, there is no truck with the idea that a relatively immutable "criminal type" may exist, or any serious consideration of the idea that moralism offers a legitimate (i.e. useful in terms of its "deterrent" potential) approach to the problem of crime.

The person-blame/system-blame distinction which is emphasized in the model to be tested, is much closer to the "retributive" versus "environmentalist" (behavioral) distinction found within "legalist" literature. This is appropriate for it is doubtful that the fine distinctions illuminating the criminologists' discussion have been picked up within common parlance, even by men as knowledgeable as the legislators of our sample. On the other hand, the retributive/environmentalist distinction is still very much a structuring dimension of public debate--mainly because the "retributive" or "person-blame" perspective is still common. As Packer notes, "the retributive position does not command much assent in intellectual circles but

there seems little reason to suppose that it does not continue to retain a strong hold on the popular mind."¹¹ The data to be presented supports this hypothesis--at least as it applies to the sample of office-holders in our study.

A Note on the "Rational Deterrence" Model
of Criminal Behavior

Another approach to crime that has gained currency in recent years is the "rational deterrence," "cost-benefit," or "economic" theory of criminal behavior. This theory argues, as James Q. Wilson puts it, that criminals "steal because the benefits of stealing exceeds the costs of stealing by a wider margin than the benefits of working exceed the costs of working."¹² Hence to reduce the incidence of crime one must either reduce its expected benefits or increase its expected costs. Stripped of its bookkeeping metaphors, this theory amounts to the assertion that if a cop is stationed in front of a liquor store, then the frequency of robberies will decrease. We believe that this theory is neither new nor profound. The idea of "rational deterrence" is simply the old idea of "retribution" dressed in new clothes. It is a restatement of the humanistically oriented, person-blame position that "deterrence" and not "pain" should be the goal of punishment. In addition, its general tenor is reminiscent of the problem of "class bias" in that it seems predicted on a "we versus they" perspective. Crime is always pictured as the act of the antisocial person while the criminal behavior of white collar persons in responsible positions is ignored.¹³

The concern in the present study is with individual differences in beliefs about crime. Thus truisms such as reducing crime by "reducing expected benefits and increasing expected costs" are universal beliefs, and hence adherence to them would not yield a distinction between legislators. Indeed such truisms are so universal that most legislators would most likely refer to them only in apologetic terms such as "Obviously you could . . . , but the more important issues with respect to crime policy are"

Aside from rather prosaic notions about the efficacy of security as deterrent to crime, the rationalist theory is largely a matter of the circular generation of new terms for old ideas. That is, it must be clear that the rationalist theory is not to be confused with substantive theories which actually seek to predict and explain the elements of life which motivate criminal activity. Consider the fact that many criminal acts are motivated by the desire to maintain a position of solidarity with a set of criminally oriented peers. How is this explained by the rationalist school? They argue that status is a "benefit" of the criminal act. But what if they are asked to state how status can be shown to be a "benefit" in any economic sense? They are likely to reply that status must be a benefit since the person will commit a criminal act in order to obtain it. This, however, is an entirely circular use of the word "benefit." To see the theoretical emptiness of this usage one should ask "How might we empirically disprove the claim that the criminal went along with his buddies in order to increase his expected benefits?" There is no empirical observation

possible which would demonstrate it to be false. If he went along the benefits were "high enough" and if he does not, they were "not high enough," etc., etc.

Or consider an example of the use of the term "cost." If a person refrains from committing a crime because of the fear of moral censure, then the rationalist theorist argues that the crime was not executed because the person perceived too great an expected cost. But in what economic sense is fear of moral censure a "cost?" The usual reply would be that fear of moral censure must be a "cost" since the person will refrain from acts which would lead to censure as a consequence. This is a completely circular use of the word "cost." To see this, ask the following question: "What empirical observation could be produced which would refute the 'theory' that a person who fears moral censure refrains from crime in order to avoid an intolerable cost?"

Perhaps the rationalist theory is popular precisely because of its theoretical emptiness. Two men with diametrically opposed theories of crime can each recast his beliefs in the language of "benefit" and "cost" without contradiction. The terms can be used in an entirely circular way, i.e. they have no meaning as predictive concepts and they cannot be empirically refuted. Rather "benefit" and "cost" serve as ad hoc labels which are applied to motivational facts which have been established on the basis of research generated by substantive theories (be they person blame theories which relate to psychopathology or system blame theories which relate to criminal subculture models).

Presentation of the Person-Blame/
System-Blame Model

As mentioned earlier, the model to be tested contrasts "person-blame" and "system-blame" beliefs about crime. These beliefs are closely analogous to those which might be inferred from the "retributive" and "behavioralist" perspectives described by Packer (pp. 33-34), or which might be deduced from the "left-right" continuum so beautifully laid out by Walter Miller.¹⁴ We regret that we did not discover the latter's paper before we had completed our own empirical and theoretical work. To clarify the person-blame and system-blame positions, and help structure the presentation of the model, the specific beliefs appropriate to each position are listed in Table 3.1. The coding system devised to perform the content analysis of the crime discussions permits a test for the presence of most of these beliefs.

The Person-Blame/System-Blame Model yields two separate causal sequences (shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2). These sequences stem from speculation that there is a psychological sequence to how these belief systems develop. The positioning of the specific beliefs in the figures represents what we believe follows logically, given that a person adheres either to the person-blame belief that "criminals are a special breed which must be controlled" or the system-blame belief that "criminals are simply ordinary persons in special circumstances." Accept for the relatively abstract antecedent variables (moralistic outlook and worldliness), the specific beliefs about the causes and solutions

TABLE 3.1.--The Person-Blame and System-Blame Approaches to Crime.

	<u>Person-Blame Beliefs</u>	<u>System-Blame Beliefs</u>
THE CRIMINAL:	Criminals constitute a special breed or type of person in society	Criminals are ordinary persons in unfortunate circumstances
MORALISTIC OUTLOOK:	There are good people and bad people in society. Changing a person's character is very difficult	People are not bad per se. People are malleable - they behave differently in different circumstances
RETRIBUTION:	Criminals must be punished - both for revenge and deterrent purposes	Punishment just drives criminals further into the criminal subculture (making them more receptive to criminal ethics). Persons should be respected not brutalized
CAUSE OF CRIME:	Breakdown of social discipline and traditional moral values. Leniency of the courts. Bad socialization.	Poverty. Lack of opportunities. Bad socialization. Labeling of the lower classes as potentially deviant
SOLUTION:	Put the criminal away. Remove restraints placed on the police by courts. Improve police apprehension capability	Attack social conditions which alienate persons from law-abiding society. Allow courts discretion with respect to treatment
REHABILITATION:	Requires a transformation of character - either by the old method of repentance and conversion or by psychiatric cure.	Give the criminal a stake in law-abiding society. Give him hope and opportunities to choose law-abiding behavior.




Figure 3.1.--Model of the Person-Blame Belief System.




Figure 3.2.--Model of the System-Blame Belief System.

to crime, the law enforcement agencies, and the matter of rehabilitation all flow from this fundamental distinction.

Certain beliefs within the model can be expected to differentiate the implied "person-blame" and "system-blame" types of persons more than others. Beliefs related to the questions "who are the criminals?," "should there be retribution?," and "what should be the solution to crime?" lie near the heart of the dichotomy and relatively crude measures can be expected to reveal the hypothesized distinctions (see Table 3.1). Beliefs related to "moralistic outlook," the cause of crime, and the process of rehabilitation, however, would appear to require more refined measures to get at these distinctions. The fact of two types of moralists; authoritarian and humanistic is the first case in point.

Both person-blame types and system-blame types may speak in terms of morals or ethics, yet their motivations may be completely different. The person-blame oriented "authoritarian moralist" may see "good people" and "bad people" and demand that law-enforcement agencies clamp down on the "bad people" in order to protect the "good people." The system-blame oriented "humanistic moralist" may see all persons as "good" and demand that law-enforcement agencies be restricted from dealing with anyone in an authoritative ("brutalizing") manner. To categorize a person simply as "moralistic," therefore, is to ignore a distinction important to the person-blame/system-blame dichotomy.

Another area of similarity between the two belief systems is related to the belief that changes within the family, church,

and school have contributed to the growth of crime. Both "person-blame" and "system-blame" persons may adhere to this belief yet entertain different sets of logic about how these changes effect criminal behavior. The person-blame person is apt to see family instability, declining influence of the church, and liberalization of school atmosphere as factors contributing to the development of "criminal types;" persons who have been socialized in such a way that they are bound to lead a life of crime. System-blame persons, on the other hand, might argue that changes in these institutions simply mean that they no longer operate to deter criminal behavior. Where once the moral force of family, church, and school was enough to make persons unwilling to commit crime even if chances of detection were minimal, they no longer have this effect. If any thing, the changes in these institutions have worked to alienate people and deprive them of any compass with which to maintain a law-abiding course of behavior. Both types of persons implied by the model could, therefore, adhere to the belief that crime has resulted from failure within the family, school, and church.

The process of rehabilitation is the third example of similarity between the person-blame and system-blame belief systems. Both types of persons may advocate that criminals be rehabilitated, but disagree on "how" this process should be carried out. Person-blame types would advocate that the "rehabilitation" process actually transforms the criminal's personality, i.e. makes the "bad" person good. Some would adhere to the old moralists' requirement that the criminal repent his sins against society and be spiritually converted.

Others would adhere to the recent update of this view: a psychiatric cure in which the criminal would be lead to see the illness in his past life and to use that self-knowledge to transform his values and behavior to a healthy and constructive pattern.

The system-blame person is more apt to look at rehabilitation as a process of changing the criminal's opportunity structure rather than the criminal as a person. If, through vocational training, drug rehabilitation, counseling, etc., the criminal can be given a stake in law-abiding society, then his penchant for choosing non-law-abiding behavior can be reduced. It is, thus, his perception of opportunities in society which needs transformation, not his character.

The above examples illustrate the fact that although the person-blame and system-blame approaches to crime are distinct, they are not entirely dissimilar. Respondents of both types may share some of the same general beliefs about crime, but possess entirely different reasons for doing so.

Measurement of the Person-Blame/ System-Blame Continuum

The first question to be asked of the data is straightforward: are the various questions or beliefs which differentiate the hypothesized types positively correlated as the model predicts? A check of the 93 cognitive style items suggested that 8 would be useful in identifying the types. Eight summary variables were also constructed for this purpose from the answer codes used to record the causes, solutions, and responsible agencies mentioned by the

respondents. Thus all together 16 items were brought together to act as an index of the person-blame/system-blame continuum. These specific items are shown in Table 3.2.

The 16 items fall roughly into three clusters: (a) three items which assess whether criminals are seen as a special breed or whether they are ordinary people in special circumstances, (b) seven items concerning the role of retribution in the handling of criminals, and (c) six items which assess whether the causes and solutions listed relate to the personality of the criminal or to the situational determinants of the criminal act. The corresponding cluster analysis of these 16 items is presented in Table 3.3.

All open ended questionnaire techniques suffer from a critical defect: a given item may not be mentioned because the respondent does not believe in it or it may simply not come up in the conversation. Thus the items in Table 3.3 can be expected to have relatively low reliabilities whenever the topic is not one which would always arise in open-ended conversation. The diagonal entry for each item is the specific reliability of that item under the assumptions that the cluster is sound and that the item is correctly placed in the cluster. Since these clusters meet the usual criteria for quality of a cluster (homogeneity of content, unidimensionality of the within cluster correlations, and parallelism in the between cluster correlations), the diagonal entries can be safely interpreted as reliabilities. The correlations between items can then be related to those reliabilities (the upper bound for a population correlation is the geometric average of the two

TABLE 3.2.--Items of the Person-Blame/System-Blame Index.^a

<u>Item Number</u>	<u>Item Content</u>
	WHO ARE THE CRIMINALS?
313	Respondent says or implies that criminals are a "special breed" of individuals who are inherently weak in character, immoral, irresponsible or ignorant.
312	Respondent says or implies that criminals are ordinary people in special circumstances (Item is reversed for inclusion in the index).
273	Respondent says or implies that "criminals" are a homogeneous group.
	SOLUTION TO CRIME SHOULD INVOLVE RETRIBUTION
341	Respondent says or implies that the courts (judges) have encouraged crime by not properly enforcing current laws and statutes.
314	In discussing the solution to crime, the respondent mentions or implies that criminals need to be punished.
178	Cause of Crime: Courts (judges) have been too lenient.
213	Solution to Crime: Judges must mete out stronger or harsher punishment.
212	Solution to Crime: Courts must insure certainty of punishment.
478	Index of items 179, 182, 342; all of which reflect a belief that crime has increased because law enforcement officials have been hampered in some way from properly enforcing the law.
214	Solution to Crime: Courts (the Supreme Court) should reverse the decisions which now over-protect the defendant.
	CAUSE AND SOLUTION TO CRIME RELATED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
475	Index of items 158-170, 193, 195; all of which reflect a belief that crime is caused by environmental conditions related to the economy, population distribution, and processes of social change. (Items are reversed for inclusion in the index).

TABLE 3.2.--Continued.

<u>Item Number</u>	<u>Item Content</u>
480	Index of items 202-208, 286; all of which reflect the belief that the solution to crime involves broad social and economic change. (Items are reversed for inclusion in the cluster).
477	Respondent says or implies that social, economic, or other "environmental" conditions are the cause of crime. (Item is reversed for inclusion in the cluster).
280	Respondent says or implies that "society," "the people," "the government," (or some reified equivalent) should handle the problem. (Item is reversed for inclusion in the cluster).
279	Respondent says or implies that individual actions (perhaps due to individual immorality, irresponsibility, ignorance, or fallibility) are the cause(s) of crime. (Item is reversed for inclusion in the cluster).
477	Index of items 175-177; all of which reflect a belief that crime has been caused by a breakdown in social discipline. (Items are reversed for inclusion in the cluster).

^aNote that regardless of how they read, all the items are dichotomous variables and thus, all can reflect either the person-blame or the system-blame orientation.

TABLE 3.3.--Cluster Analysis of the Sixteen Person-Blame/System-Blame Index Items.^a

	312	313	273	314	178	341	213	212	478	214	475	277	480	477	280	279	535	536	537
312	(46)	42	30	19	31	32	25	7	16	7	8	12	19	12	31	28	68	30	39
313	42	(37)	25	20	28	27	25	11	32	15	33	25	32	11	8	26	60	35	47
273	30	25	(20)	29	32	22	23	26	25	21	10	6	15	-2	-3	22	44	40	17
314	19	20	29	(65)	64	60	54	58	31	32	28	21	24	19	9	26	39	81	44
178	31	28	32	64	(58)	67	54	51	29	19	25	26	33	23	21	33	53	76	57
341	32	27	22	60	67	(53)	72	38	23	15	30	22	26	18	21	29	47	73	52
213	25	25	23	54	54	72	(47)	37	20	26	41	21	25	21	21	23	42	69	53
212	7	11	26	58	51	38	37	(39)	30	27	31	24	15	15	-8	30	26	62	38
478	16	32	25	31	29	23	20	30	(22)	55	32	13	20	4	3	19	42	47	32
214	7	15	21	32	19	15	26	27	55	(18)	28	14	16	11	7	8	26	43	30
475	8	33	10	28	25	30	41	31	32	28	(34)	34	55	20	12	11	29	48	58
277	12	25	6	21	26	22	21	24	13	14	34	(33)	27	33	21	15	25	31	58
480	19	32	15	24	33	26	25	15	20	16	55	27	(30)	20	23	-1	38	36	54
477	12	11	-2	19	23	18	21	15	4	11	20	33	20	(23)	26	13	12	24	48
280	31	8	-3	9	21	21	21	-8	3	7	12	21	23	26	(19)	22	21	16	43
279	28	26	22	26	33	29	23	30	19	8	11	15	-1	13	22	(6)	44	37	23
535	68	60	44	39	53	47	42	26	42	26	29	25	38	12	21	44	100	61	59
536	30	35	40	81	76	73	69	62	47	43	48	31	36	24	16	37	61	100	68
537	39	47	17	44	57	52	53	38	32	30	58	58	54	48	43	23	59	68	100

^aCluster 535: Who are the Criminals?

Cluster 536: Solution to Crime in Value Retribution

Cluster 537: Cause/Solution to Crime is Related to Environmental Forces.

reliabilities). In the present set of three clusters, the within cluster correlations do not differ beyond the expectations of sampling error from the predictions of unidimensionality.

The variables labeled 535-537 in Table 3.3 are the true scores for the three clusters (i.e. the hypothetical variables that would have obtained from perfect measurement of each cluster score). The first two clusters are correlated .61 with each other and these two clusters correlate with the third cluster .59 and .68. These correlations are less than the ideal of 1.00 that would apply to perfect unidimensionality, but that difference might well stem from the artifacts created by using open ended questioning. In any case these correlations are certainly more than large enough to warrant collapsing the three clusters into an index. The person-blame/system-blame index so formed has a reliability (coefficient alpha) of .84.

Sometimes correlations mask absolute levels of a given variable. For example in the present case it might be that those who score "high" on the system-blame index are only relatively high, i.e. there might be no full fledged system-blame persons at all. This can be checked by actually splitting the office-holders into groups and looking at the mean response of each group on each item. For this analysis we divided the 118 office holders into three groups of about equal size: a "person-blame group," a "system-blame group," and middle range group which might either be intermediary to the first two or which might be a residual category of other types. Our correlational analysis showed that the middle group is

in fact an intermediary group on all the variables assessed in the present study (i.e. the 16 items considered in Table 3.3 and the 46 other variables considered in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 below), but this does not rule out the possibility that further types will be discovered in the future.

Table 3.4 shows the percentage of endorsement for person-blame and system-blame group on each of the 16 items which make up the person-blame/system-blame index. This table is in part tautological since these items were used to select the persons in the two groups. However, had these items been unrelated to each other (i.e. had they not been tapping some actual dimension), then the mean difference produced by the selection of extreme groups would have been split among the 16 items and would have been quite small. Instead we find that the mean differences on most items are quite large, and that on most items the person-blame respondents endorse the person-blame response while the system-blame respondents endorse the system-blame response. In particular, this means that (a) the system-blame office-holders are not just relatively liberal person-blame adherents and (b) that there is a substantial level of correlation among the items. The conclusion which can be drawn is that the person-blame/system-blame dimension does determine those beliefs which were related in our psychological model.

Person-Blame/System-Blame Differences on
Other Beliefs about Crime

As a further test of the person-blame/system-blame model, the two groups indentified by the index can also be compared on

TABLE 3.4.--Frequency of Endorsement of the Person-Blame and System-Blame Groups on the Person-Blame/System-Blame Index Items.

	Person- Blame Group (N=38)	System- Blame Group (N=43)
CRIMINALS ARE A SPECIAL BREED		
(313) Criminals are individuals inherently weak in character:	79	21
(279) Certain individuals cause crime:	66	26
CAUSE OF CRIME: BREAKDOWN OF TRADITIONAL MORAL VALUES AND SOCIAL DISCIPLINE		
(477) Average score on a three item breakdown of social discipline index (items 175-177); range = 0 to 1.0:	28	03
(477) Percent which mentioned any of the items:	(60)	(09)
RETRIBUTION ORIENTATION		
(314) Criminals need punishment:	92	05
CRIMINALS ONLY UNDERSTAND HARSH TREATMENT		
(178) Cause of crime - leniency of courts (judges):	82	03
(212) Courts must insure certainty of punishment:	53	0
(213) Judges must mete out harsher penalties:	74	02
CAUSE OF CRIME: TOO MANY RESTRAINTS ON POLICE		
(478) Percent which mentioned either of the following items: (179) Cause of Crime: Court decisions which have hamstrung police; (182) Law enforcement agencies have been understaffed and under equipped; (342) Law enforcement authorities have been hampered in enforcing laws:	52	05
CRIME IS CAUSED BY THE FAILURE OF COURTS TO CONVICT		
(341) Courts have encouraged crime by not enforcing laws:	87	07

TABLE 3.4.--Continued.

	Person- Blame Group (N=38)	System- Blame Group (N=43)
COURTS SHOULD BE FORCED TO CONVICT		
(214) Respondent says courts should reverse the decisions which over-protect defendants:	29	0
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR IS A PRODUCT OF SOCIAL CONDITIONING AND ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES		
(312) Criminals are ordinary people in special circumstances (R) ^a :	21	79
(280) "Society," "the people" (or some reified equivalent) is responsible for the crime problem (R):	30	76
(277) Social, economic or "environmental: conditions are the cause of crime (R):	0	50
(475) Average score on a 15 item Crime is caused by Environmental Forces Index (items 158-170, 193, 195); range = 0 to 1.0 (R):	06	16
(475) Percent which mentioned any of the items:	55	100
ULTIMATE SOLUTION: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM; RENEWED EFFORTS BY FAMILY, SCHOOL, AND CHURCH		
(480) Average score on an eight item Social/Economic Reform Index (items 202-208, 286); range 0 to 1.0 (R):	05	18
(480) Percent which mentioned any of the items:	29	72

^a(R) denotes that the item or items have been "reversed" prior to the scoring of the Person-Blame/System-Blame Index.

TABLE 3.5.--Frequency of Endorsement of the Person-Blame and System-Blame Groups on Beliefs Related to the Person-Blame/System-Blame Model.

	Person- Blame Group (N=38)	System- Blame Group (N=43)
<u>Beliefs Relevant to the Person-Blame</u> <u>Belief System about Crime</u>		
CRIMINALS ARE A SPECIAL BREED		
(274) Respondent says/implies that there are <u>not</u> various types of criminals (R) ^a :	63	54
CAUSE OF CRIME: BREAKDOWN OF TRADITIONAL MORAL VALUES AND SOCIAL DISCIPLINE		
(479) Average score on a seven item Failure of School, Family and Church Index (items 185-191); range 0 to 1.0:	12	14
(479) Percent which mentioned any of the items:	(63)	(70)
(476) Average score on a four item Breakdown of Morality Index (items 171-174; range = 0 to 1.0):	07	11
(476) Percent which mentioned any of the items:	(24)	(33)
(349) Respondent cites breakdown of public/ private morality as cause of crime	18	23
(351) Crime is caused by failure of family and school to teach moral behavior:	24	21
REHABILITATION REQUIRES TRANSFORMATION OF CHARACTER		
(289) Recommends "individual change" as a solution to crime:	26	12
CAUSE OF CRIME: TOO MANY RESTRAINTS ON POLICE		
(179) Cause of Crime: Court decisions which have hamstrung police:	42	0
(342) Law enforcement authorities have been hampered in enforcing laws:	37	05
RESTRAINTS ON POLICE SHOULD BE REMOVED		
(218) Recommends increasing police apprehension powers as a solution to crime:	11	0
<u>Beliefs Relevant to the System-Blame</u> <u>Belief System about Crime</u>		

TABLE 3.5.--Continued.

	Person- Blame Group (N=38)	System- Blame Group (N=43)
WORLDLINESS		
(311) Crime is a natural social problem which we will always have:	11	26
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR IS PRODUCT OF SOCIAL CONDITIONING AND ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES		
(220) Respondent says putting the cop back on the beat, improving police techniques, etc., is part of the solution to crime:	11	16
CRIME IS THE PRODUCT OF THE FAILURE OF SCHOOLS, FAMILY AND CHURCHES		
(479) Average score on a seven item Crime is Caused by Failure of Schools, Family and Churches Index (items 185-191); range = 0 to 1.0:	12	14
(479) Percent which mentioned any of the items:	(63)	(70)
(351) Crime is caused by failure of families and schools to teach correct moral behavior:	76	79
REHABILITATION ORIENTATION		
(215) Respondent recommends prison reform ("Persons should be rehabilitated, not taught crime.") as a solution to crime:	13	27
(315) Criminals should be rehabilitated:	24	30
COURTS SHOULD OVERSEE POLICE ACTIVITY		
(179) Courts (or Supreme Court decisions) have not hamstrung the police (R):	58	100
ULTIMATE SOLUTION: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM: RENEWED EFFORTS BY FAMILY, SCHOOL, AND CHURCH		
(286) Recommends general social reform or broad social change as the solution to crime:	11	56
(481) Average score on an eight item School, Family, and Church Should Work Harder Index (items 223-229, 317); range = 0 to 1.0:	09	16
(481) Percent which mentioned any of the items:	47	88

TABLE 3.5.--Continued.

	Person- Blame Group (N=38)	System- Blame Group (N=43)
(317) Respondent says/implies that non-law-enforcement agencies have primary responsibility for handling the crime problem;	34	88
<u>Other General Predispositions Related to the Person-Blame/System-Blame Model</u>		
MORALISM		
(296) Respondent says/implies that his solution to crime derives from a moral belief system:	05	05
(350) Respondent cites the declining influence of the church as a cause of crime:	13	14
(352) Respondent's solution involves some attempt to strengthen public/private morality:	05	16
AUTHORITARIANISM		
(455) A few strong leaders would do more for this country than all the laws and talk:	35 ^b	15
(457) In this complicated world, the only way we can know what is going on is to rely on leaders:	61	47
(458) It will always be necessary to have a few strong, able people actually running everything:	43	33
DOGMATISM		
(456) Few people really know what is in their own best interest in the long run:	32	38
(459) A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion cannot exist for very long:	35	31
(462) Of all the theories of how government should be conducted, only one is true:	31	12

^a(R) denotes an item which has been "reversed" to reflect the intended meaning. The item has been slightly reworded to also reflect this meaning.

^bThe entry for the authoritarianism and dogmatism items is the average score on a 5 point scale from 0 to 100; 0 = Strongly Disagree, 25 = Disagree, 50 = Undecided, 75 = Agree, and 100 = Strongly Agree.

their other beliefs about crime. This comparison is presented in Table 3.5.

For the most part, the groups split on the items in the direction consistent with their approach to crime. This means that the person-blame/system-blame index predicts a wide range of related beliefs. The items which most clearly differentiate the groups concern whether the police have been hampered in their efforts to crack down on criminals (179, 342), whether the solution to crime involves changing the environment of the criminal (286, 16, 317) and whether strong leaders are necessary to insure that things are done right (455, 457, 458, 462). Each of these ideas is clearly related to the person-blame/system-blame distinction. The person-blame advocate is more apt to believe that the police should be free to deal harshly with criminals, because harshness is the only thing the instinctively evil criminal will understand. He will likewise believe that the solution to crime does not involve changing the criminal's environment, because this contradicts his belief that the cause of crime lies within the criminal himself, and not in his environment. Furthermore, though neither of the groups are noticeably authoritarian, the person-blame adherent is much more likely to look to strong leaders to solve social problems than would the system-blame advocate. Believing that intrinsically "bad" persons account for problems such as crime, it is only natural that he would look to "good" leaders rather than change in circumstances or environment for solution to such problems.

On eleven of the items, however, the fact that the two groups do not split merely confirms our speculation that some beliefs are compatible with both types of belief systems (see pages 10, 14-15). These items reflect a moralistic approach to crime (items 476, 349, 351, 296, 350, 352), a belief that certain failings of the family, church, and school have encouraged the growth in crime (items 479, 351, 481), and a belief that criminals should be rehabilitated (items 215, 315). As noted earlier, each of these dispositions are likely to be found among both person-blame and system-blame type persons (though for different reasons), and thus we predicted that the two groups would not differ on these items.

One interesting question with respect to the models is the extent to which either person-blame or system-blame persons suggest or consider morality as a factor related to crime. Person-blame persons are no more apt to discuss crime from a moralistic orientation than system-blame persons, and the extent to which either group subscribes to this orientation is negligible. Perhaps moralism is hidden behind other beliefs, or perhaps office-holders have given up the moralistic approach in favor of pragmatic concerns with changing institutional procedures or enacting new laws and programs. In any case, the crime discussions were not heavily laced with moralistic rhetoric.

On the other beliefs which our coding items allowed us to test, there was at least a reasonable split between the two groups in the predicted direction. This indicates that the person-blame/

system-blame dichotomy is an important structuring dimension of beliefs about crime.

Characteristics of Person-Blame and System-Blame Office-Holders

In order to further distinguish between "person-blame" and "system-blame" persons, correlations were calculated (N=117) which related the Person-Blame/System-Blame Index to a wide range of descriptive and attitudinal variables. These correlations are large to the extent that there is a linear ordering of the means of these variables which correspond to the persons categorized as person-blame, neutral or system-blame in orientation toward crime.

In his studies of political ideologues, Rokeach (1960) found that persons at either extreme of the left-right continuum were more dogmatic than persons in the middle.¹⁵ That is, Rokeach found certain variables to be non-linearly related to political belief. We were worried that a similar phenomenon might occur on the person-blame/system-blame index, i.e. that there might be cognitive style dimensions that would be non-linearly related to the person-blame/system-blame continuum. To check for such relationships a variable was constructed to be a non-linearity indicator. This variable has the property that if it correlates with another variable, then that variable is non-linearly related to the person-blame/system-blame index.

The non-linearity indicator variable was obtained by assigning a score of 0 to both the person-blame and system-blame groups while assigning a score of 1 to the middle-range group. This indicator

is similar to a quadratic trend indicator and a large correlation between this indicator and another variable would indicate a U-shaped regression of that variable onto the person-blame/system-blame dimension (though no such correlations appeared in the data). A smaller but sizeable correlation would indicate that the middle-range group on the person-blame/system-blame dimension was closer to one end of the continuum than to the other in its mean on the other variable in question.

This non-linearity indicator also has the property that it checks to see if the middle range group on the person-blame/system-blame dimension is in fact an intermediate group or if it might contain some very different orientation which contrasts with both of the identified groups. If the middle-range group contained persons of a radically different orientation, then there would be some variable relevant to that orientation on which this group would have a very different mean from that of the person-blame and system-blame groups (which would be similar in mean on this variable).

The Person-Blame/System-Blame Index correlations and the correlations for the non-linearity indicator are presented in Table 3.6. In nearly every instance, the relationship between the person-blame/system-blame dimension and the other variables is linear. The primary exceptions are among the variables measuring respondent articulation (508-510). These correlations show that while there is essentially no difference between the "person-blame" and the "middle-range" group with respect to articulation, these groups differ drastically from the system-blame group. The ability to articulate is sharply higher among system-blame persons.

TABLE 3.6.--Characteristics and Attitudes of Person-Blame and System-Blame Type Persons.

	<u>Non- Linearity Indicator^a</u>	<u>System- Blame Orientation^b</u>
DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS		
(451) Age	.15	-.15
(447) Education	-.05	.28
(449) Occupational Status	-.05	.09
(443) Urban-ness of District	.18	-.05
POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS		
(3) Office Level	-.08	-.05
(471) Office Experience (Index of items 4, 18-20):	.08	-.08
(21) Party Identification (Democrat)	-.05	.29
(472) Party Experience Index of items 28-30)	.00	-.05
(32) Political Philosophy (Liberal)	-.05	.26
(136) Attractiveness to Politics	-.09	.00
(46) Political Ambition	.05	-.22
(465) Delegate Role Orientation	.04	-.23
ATTITUDES ON CRIME		
(513) ^c Pro-Rehabilitation	-.06	.19
(512) Pro-Retribution	-.03	-.90
(514) Pro-Law Enforcement	-.11	-.59
(179) Courts have hamstrung police	-.10	-.57
(218) Police apprehension power should be increased	.04	.15
(347) Responsibility for the crime problem lies with the police, courts and penal authorities	-.19	-.60
(346) Prison reform is part of the solution to crime	-.09	.16
(479) Responsibility for the crime problem lies with family, school and church (index of items 185-191)	.13	.27
(311) Crime is a natural problem which we will always have	.05	.18
(183) Law enforcement officials have failed to crack down on drug abuse	-.09	.02
(482) Respondent's occupational or personal contact or experience with crime problem (index of items 359-363, 368)	-.02	.01

TABLE 3.6.--Continued.

	<u>Non- Linearity Indicator^a</u>	<u>System- Blame Orientation^b</u>
ARTICULATION CHARACTERISTICS		
(508) Crime discussion was comprehensive	-.41	.52
(509) Crime discussion contained numerous elements	-.17	.35
(510) Crime discussion was structured	-.32	.32
(369) Time allotted to the crime discussion	.13	.19
EMOTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS		
(518) Use of emotional words and rhetoric	-.09	-.44
(519) Fear of crime	-.07	-.27
(505) Takes a personal orientation to the crime problem	-.18	-.09
(521) Self-Assurance (boastfulness)	.05	-.14
(520) Expresses thoughts easily	-.14	-.05
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS		
(524) Authoritarianism	.05	-.27
(517) Moralistic Orientation	.02	.07
(516) Historical Orientation	.01	.03

^aThe non-linearity correlation was derived by scoring the middle-range group 1 and the person-blame and system-blame groups 0. It manifests the extent of the quadratic trend if any.

^bThis measure is the Person-Blame/System-Blame Index scored in the system-blame direction.

^cItems which number 500 and above denote clusters formed by cluster analysis (see Chapter 4 pages 27-30).

Some of the correlations in Table 3.6 are important because they confirm our interpretation of the person-blame/system-blame dimension. In contrast with system-blame persons, person-blame adherents are more retribution oriented (512), more apt to see crime strictly as a problem for law enforcement authorities (347, 514, 179), more authoritarian (524), and more emotional in terms of their approach to crime and criminals; i.e. evil persons (518, 519).

The new information provided by the correlations relates primarily to group differences in descriptive and political characteristics. System-blame office-holders are relatively younger (451), more educated (447), more articulate (508-510), more liberal (32), and less politically ambitious (46) than person-blame office-holders.

Discussion

Our experience with this study leads us to recommend that future research be done using pre-set specific questions rather than recoding responses to open-ended questions. With specific, pre-set questions, one would be able to find out exactly what the respondent believes with respect to who the criminals are, what causes them to commit crime, whether retribution is necessary or useful, whether rehabilitation is possible, etc., instead of having to rely on the respondent to bring these points forth in his answers. This would increase the reliability of the data and the ease of the coding process substantially.

It would then be possible to draw finer distinctions about crime belief systems. For example, are there any signs that the

distinctions pertinent to the discussions of the criminologists are filtering into the crime belief systems of politicians? It would be interesting to add items asking their opinions on propositions such as "Most men only truly become criminals when the law forces them to join a criminal society in prison;" "Some environments are so bad that persons have no choice but to become criminals;" "The legal system ignores white collar crime and operates only to restrict lower class criminals;" or "Powerful, vested interests regulate the legal system in such a way as to brand poor people as potentially deviant, and thereby provide a tool by which poor people can be kept under control." Such items should be included in further research on belief systems about crime and it is our hope that the analysis presented will inspire such research.

This analysis has shown that in our sample of office-holders, the dominant content dimension structuring the beliefs about crime is a person-blame/system-blame dimension. Our data show that system-blame office-holders are younger (451), more educated (447), more articulate (508-510), and more liberal (32) than person-blame office-holders. Most of these characteristics may be accounted for by the following theory of the etiology of the system-blame orientation. Most people start out in life from an essentially person-blame or moralistic perspective.¹⁶ The early socialization of most persons is heavily influenced by moralistic tenets laid down by parents, clergy, and school officials. Criminals are looked on as "bad people" who should be punished for their sins--either against God, their fellow man, or "society." As people get older, they are

exposed to other interpretations of criminal behavior. One such view is that the criminal is not so much an evil person as he is an individual without hope, opportunity or stake in law-abiding society. New beliefs about the impact of "environment" challenge old beliefs about the innate deficiencies of criminals, and in time some people adopt a system-blame outlook. Those most open to such influence would be the articulate and educated (who are more likely to adopt opinions on the basis of verbal argument) and the liberals (who already use system-blame logic to explain social inequities in other areas of life).

Articulate and educated youths are also more likely to challenge the views and moral injunctions of their elders (in favor of their own "wisdom"). Consequently, if such persons smoked marijuana, drank under age, stole hubcaps, or committed other youth-related crimes as a teenager; they would be less likely to believe that crime is committed only by evil persons and more likely to believe that crime is generated by situational factors. This also explains the positive relationship between the intellectual variables and the system-blame orientation toward crime.

This scenario suggests that education leads to a more liberal orientation toward social problems and consequently eventuates in a system-blame approach to crime. This suggestion is supported by the correlations of .35 between education and liberalism in our data. The relatively higher amount of education among system-blame persons also explains why the system-blame group proved more articulate in their discussions on crime. The ability to articulate one's

thoughts and to address issues in a comprehensive, organized manner is the hallmark of educated persons. In turn, the reason for the greater amount of education among system-blame types can be related to their relative youthfulness. More young people are staying in high school or going to college than in previous days, and the sample correlation of $-.31$ ($N=118$) between age and education supports this actuality. As a group, younger persons are better educated than older segments of the population and this relationship holds between the younger system-blame and older person-blame types.

The fact that the dominant content dimension is person-blame/system-blame also has implications for educational policy. What we have found is that the knowledge produced by 50 years of research of crime has completely escaped the notice of American public officials. Even those men who sit on the law-making bodies of our country still think in the terms of the debate as it existed 100 years ago. Certainly there is a lesson in this for those who draw up the college curriculum for pre-law and political science majors. But even more important is the implication of this study for the civics programs of the high schools. Lawyers have recently been arguing that there is no meaningful introduction to law anywhere in our educational system. This study clearly supports this contention and suggests that people in political science should urge educators to take a more concrete approach to law making and crime and to introduce fact as well as moral principle into the curriculum.

Our data also shows that educated and articulate legislators are more likely to adopt a system-blame orientation toward crime than

less-educated, inarticulate legislators. Given that legislators are better educated and more articulate than the general population, our data suggests that legislators are much more likely to be system-blame oriented than the general population. Evidence that this is true has long been established by polls which have examined popular opinion with respect to the subject of punishment for crime. Members of the general population are much more likely to believe in harsh treatment such as capital punishment, life imprisonment, etc., and are much more likely to oppose judicial discretion which tends to allow reduced prison sentences or lenient parole requirements.

Why is there such a discrepancy between general opinion about punishment for crime and legislative codes which prescribe punishment for crime? Many of the discrepancies which exist between constituency and legislative opinions are the result of small but powerful vested interest groups who watchdog certain legislative areas and threaten to raise a fuss if the legislators vote against their particular legislative viewpoint. Religious groups which oversee legislative action on alcohol, pornography, or abortion; or business and professional groups which lobby for advantageous tax and licensing laws are examples of this phenomenon. There does not appear to be any such vested interest group which concerns itself with advocating extremely harsh criminal penalties. The discrepancy between legislative and constituency opinion on this matter is simply a reflection of the fact that the legislators are (in terms of political factors) relatively unconstrained. Consequently, the educated and articulate legislators are simply freer to reject constituent opinion in favor

of their own conscience. This conjecture is borne out in our data by the correlation of $-.34$ between articulation and support for the "delegate role" orientation (an indicator of independence of mind), and the correlation of $-.19$ between education and "delegate role" orientation. The correlation between system-blame orientation and "delegate-role" orientation is $-.23$.

Chapter III--Footnotes

¹Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 9-16. For a brief bibliography to what I call the "legalist" literature, see pages 369-375.

²Ibid., pp. 9-10.

³Ibid., pp. 11-12. Packer also identifies the behavioral position with the idea that "the function of the criminal law should be purely and simply to bring into play processes for modifying the personality, and hence the behavior of people who commit antisocial acts, so that they will not commit them in the future." In actual fact, however, many behavioralists are very much oriented toward situational determinants of behavior as much as those related to personality. In any case, this aspect of the behavioral position will be coded under the Person-Blame rather than the System-Blame Model to be presented below.

⁴For example, see Richard Quinney, Criminology: Analysis and Critique of Crime in America (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1975), pp. 4-13; Alex Thio, "Class Bias in the Sociology of Deviance," The American Sociologist, 8 (February, 1973), 1-12; Alex Thio, "The Phenomenological Perspective of Deviance: Another Case of Class Bias," The American Sociologist, 9 (August, 1974), 146-149; Tony G. Poveda, "The Image of the Criminal: A Critique of Crime and Delinquency Theories," Issues in Criminology, 5 (Winter, 1970), 59-83; Tony G. Poveda and Edward Schaffer, "Positivism and Interactionism: Two Traditions of Research in Criminology," Criminal Justice Research, ed. by Emilio Viano (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1975), pp. 25-36; R. Serge Denisoff and Charles H. McCaghy (eds.), Deviance, Conflict, and Criminality (Chicago: Rand-McNally and Co., 1973), and Stephen Schafer, Theories in Criminology (New York: Random House, Inc., 1969).

⁵The labels used to describe the different schools of thought in the history of criminology are the same as those used by Alex Thio (1973). Thio, "Class Bias," pp. 1-12.

⁶Schafer provides an excellent description of the various sociological theories. He says that ". . . many of the sociological theories of crime and delinquency overlap. They draw from one another, from different sectors of the social sciences, and even reach for assistance from other disciplines. Since they use a multifactor theoretical construction, it is extremely difficult, if

not impossible, to catalogue these theories according to orientation. Some may be considered "offensive" in nature. They "attack" the criminal whose "free will" reacts to social injustice and provokes him to attack the society in the form of crime. Or they are offensive against the wrongs of the society and "attack" the society as a whole. Other theories seem to be "defensive;" they view crime and delinquency as products of a disorganized society or social pressures. They emphasize the need for social defense against criminality because criminal conduct is learned or acquired by the criminal in his social context. Some lean in the direction of social psychology, focusing on crime as a product of socialization processes; others refer to cultural differences or to value and norm conflicts; and still others explain crime in terms of the imperfect or divided structure of society." Schafer, pp. 235-236.

⁷Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," American Sociological Review, 3 (1938), 672-682; Edwin H. Sutherland, Principles of Criminology, 6th ed. (Chicago: J. B. Lippencott & Co., 1960); Albert K. Cohen, Delinquent Boys (Illinois: Glencoe Free Press, 1955); and Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs (Illinois: Glencoe Free Press, 1960).

⁸Poveda and Schaffer, *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁹Alex Thio argues that the phenomenologists' view that criminals "choose" deviant behavior belies class-bias in itself. His point is that this view fails to consider that the "social reality" of the powerless in society is largely defined by the powerful, that this social reality does work to restrain the behavioral options of the lower-classes and that, therefore, this belief wrongfully imposes free will upon powerless deviants and holds them much more responsible for their deviance than is actually justified. See Thio, "The Phenomenological Perspective," p. 148.

¹⁰One of the first and most complete descriptions of the "labelist" perspective can be found in Howard S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (London: Free Press, 1963). See also Paul G. Schervish, "The Labeling Perspective: Its Bias and Potential in the Study of Political Deviance," The American Sociologist, 8 (May, 1973), 47-57.

¹¹Packer, p. 10.

¹²James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975).

¹³*Ibid.*, p. xix.

¹⁴Walter B. Miller, "Ideology and Criminal Justice Policy: Some Current Issues," The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 64 (1973), pp. 141-161.

¹⁵Rokeach, pp. 114-116.

¹⁶Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, trans. by Marjorie Gabain (New York: The Free Press, 1965), and J. Adelson, "The Political Imagination of the Young Adolescent," Daedalus, 100 (1971), p. 1026.

CHAPTER IV

DIMENSIONS OF IDEOLOGICAL THOUGHT

The question of whether particular dimensions of thought serve to identify or characterize "ideological" thought is the central point of inquiry in the study presented below. As our history of the concept "ideology" suggests, at least three general dimensions are relevant; (1) the content dimension which identifies the subject of discourse and describes the substantive dimensions along which debate is organized, (2) the emotional commitment dimension which reflects how strongly men feel about their beliefs, and (3) the cognitive style dimension which assesses the quality and/or structure of these beliefs. Other dimensions such as "utopianism," "extremism," "alienation," "authoritarianism," "intolerance," "mental rigidity," and "abstractness" can be categorized in terms of those above; (a) utopianism, extremism, alienation and authoritarianism are facets of content, (b) intolerance and mental rigidity are facets of emotionalism, and (c) abstractness is a facet of cognitive style.

The study below attempts to assess the dimensional aspects of ideological thought with respect to beliefs about the origins and solutions to crime. It concludes that such thought is multi-dimensional and that the higher order dimensions are the general "content," "emotional commitment," and "cognitive style" dimensions.

The study was initially designed to replicate Putnam's study of the cognitive aspects of ideological thought.¹ The objectives were to (1) test his thesis that the essence of ideological thought can be captured by a single dimension, and (2) investigate differences in cognitive style among office-holders at the three levels of American government (i.e., City Councilmen, State Representatives, and Congressmen). Since then, the study has evolved into a broader investigation which not only comprises a test of Putnam and looks at crime belief systems among office-holders, but in addition, examines (1) the inter-relationship between the "content," "emotional commitment," and "cognitive style" dimensions, and (2) the relationship of these dimensions with other variables--political, ideological, and socio-economic. We begin with a brief synopsis of Putnam's study.

Putnam's Approach to Ideology

Putnam's approach to ideology is based on two related premises. First, that one can distinguish between men in terms of their ideological orientation by assessing various elements of their cognitive style, and, second, that one can get at "cognitive style" through the content analysis of issue discussions. To test these assumptions he interviewed 93 Members of the British House of Commons and 83 "deputati" from the Italian Chamber of Deputies.² Each politician was asked to discuss two issues facing his country; one proposed by the respondent himself and one chosen randomly from a list of the following issues: national economic planning, poverty, crime, and urban transportation.³ To facilitate the content analysis

of these discussions, each was transcribed from the interview recording tapes.

Prior to the content analysis, Putnam reviewed the literature on ideology and developed a list of 14 characteristics "each of which" he says, "has appeared with some frequency as one element in a definition of ideology or ideological."⁴ Table 4.1 presents this list.⁵

TABLE 4.1.--Possible Elements in the Definition of Ideology or Ideological.

<p>"A political actor may be said to be ideological when he is . . ." (Choose one or more.)</p>	
1.	Guided by a comprehensive, consistent, deductively organized belief system
2.	Guided by an explicit, consciously held belief system
3.	Guided by a belief system that is closed, rigid, resistant to new information
4.	Guided by a belief system that is affectively or emotionally charged
5.	Guided by a belief system that distorts or oversimplifies reality, that is biased or irrational
6.	Guided by a philosophy of history and/or a social theory that is applied to everyday questions and issues
7.	Concerned with abstract principles, not concrete interests
8.	Future-oriented, utopian
9.	Hostile and intolerant toward political opponents; prone to dichotomous, "black-white" thinking; paranoid
10.	Opposed to compromise, bargaining, incrementalism, and other aspects of pluralist politics
11.	Alienated from established social and political institutions
12.	Extremist
13.	Oriented to conflict and opposed to consensus
14.	Authoritarian; a moral absolutist; prone to value ends, not means

Using these characteristics as a guide, twelve indexes were constructed to measure what he refers to as the "stylistic characteristics of issue-discussions."⁶ Table 4.2 presents a list of these indexes.

TABLE 4.2.--Putnam's "Stylistic Characteristics of Issue-Discussions."

1. Generalizer-particularizer Extreme generalizer Moderate generalizer Mixed Moderate particularizer Extreme particularizer	7. Practicality as criterion Explicit and centrally Vaguely or in passing Not at all
2. Inductive-deductive Extreme deductive Moderate deductive Mixed Moderate inductive Extreme inductive	8. Tradition as criterion Explicit and centrally Vaguely or in passing Not at all
3. Historical context given Explicit and centrally Vaguely or in passing Not at all	9. Cost as criterion Explicit and centrally Vaguely or in passing Not at all
4. Discussion moralized Explicit and centrally Vaguely or in passing Not at all	10. Reference to a named ideology Explicit and centrally Vaguely or in passing Not at all
5. Group benefit as criterion Explicit and centrally Vaguely or in passing Not at all	11. Reference to a future utopia Explicit and centrally Vaguely or in passing Not at all
6. Political acceptability as criterion Explicit and centrally Vaguely or in passing Not at all	12. Reference to a past utopia Explicit and centrally Vaguely or in passing Not at all

Putnam and another coder then analyzed separately (i.e. independently from one another) each of the respondent's issue discussions, using the twelve indexes as criteria by which to judge the extent that these "stylistic characteristics" were evident in the discussions. If a respondent's discussion was scored differently by the two coders, a session would be scheduled to resolve the disagreement.

After the coders reached agreement on the scoring for each issue-discussion, each respondent's scores on the two separate issue-discussions were added together and each respondent was assigned a summary score on each stylistic characteristic.⁷ Then, in accordance with his desire to investigate the extent to which the definitional traits or characteristics of ideology are inter-related,⁸ Putnam intercorrelated the set of summary scores and factor analyzed the resultant matrix of intercorrelations using the varimax rotation procedure.⁹ Three dimensions emerged which he labeled the "ideological style," "traditionalism," and "partisanship" dimensions.¹⁰

Putnam chose the "ideological style" dimension to be the measure of ideology. The stylistic characteristics which "load" most heavily on it are generalizer-particularizer ($r=.80$) and deductive-inductive thinking ($r=.80$) though there are minor loadings for the reference to a named ideology ($r=.47$) and reference to a future utopia ($r=.45$) characteristics. According to Putnam, "this factor reflects a tendency for some politicians consistently to generalize, to use an abstract deductive theory, to use specifically

ideological terms, and to refer to more ideal future states of society."¹¹ Though he admits that the dimension "does not encompass all the characteristics often ascribed to ideological politics, . . . it does," he declares, "include the most central ones."¹²

Putnam uses each respondent's score on the ideological style dimension to form an "ideological style index" (hereafter referred to as the ISI). In order to find the political and social-psychological characteristics of political ideologues he then correlated this index with a large number of variables.

Focus on Cognitive Style

Although Putnam assumes that his ISI captures the essence of what is meant by the term "ideological," it is clear that it only deals with the cognitive aspect of ideological thinking. The basis of this restricted orientation starts as far back as the point at which he converted the "list of possible elements in the definition of ideology" (Table 4.1) into "stylistic characteristics" indexes (Table 4.2). A good deal of the emotional and political content that is a part of the "definitional" elements was eliminated in this process.

To begin with, no measure of "emotional commitment to belief" (element 3) and/or "dogmatism" (element 4) were included among the "stylistic characteristics" indexes. In addition, Putnam also failed to convert elements 9 through 12; "intolerance," "opposition to compromise," "alienation," "extremism," "conflict orientation," and "authoritarianism" into indexes though these variables were

later operationalized either by coder judgment items, specially created indexes, or other items included in the survey. In total, Putnam converted only six of the fourteen "elements" into "stylistic characteristics" indexes,¹³ and four of these six measure "cognitive" aspects of belief systems. They include element 1: "Guided by a comprehensive, consistent, deductively organized belief system," element 2: "Guided by an explicit, consciously held belief system," element 6: "Guided by a philosophy of history and/or social theory that is applied to everyday questions and issues," and element 7: "concerned with abstract principles--not concrete interests."

Putnam used seven indexes to measure the six elements listed above, and created five more, apparently because they seemed to be pertinent cognitive dimensions in his discussions with the British and Italian Parliamentarians.¹⁴ The correlations between these twelve indexes provided the basis for the factor analysis which produced three distinct dimensions. Putnam then chose the dimension on which four of the seven "element-based" indexes loaded (and on which, unlike the other factors, none of the five "non-element based" indexes loaded) as his measure of "ideological style." In doing so, he accepted a very restricted definition of ideology; one which incorporated only four of the original fourteen definitional elements, and in which two of the four were given little weight.

Thus in his actual measure of ideology, Putnam willingly excluded a good deal of the political and psychological content heretofore associated with the concept. Once the ISI was formed, he examined its relationship with variables which have political

and emotional content, e.g. partisan hostility (p. 63), political alienation (p. 51 and pp. 667-668¹⁵), authoritarianism (p. 55), moral absolutism (p. 56), willingness to compromise (p. 54), political extremism (p. 51), and conflict orientation (p. 114n), but, to reiterate, these elements were not incorporated in the correlation matrix which served as the basis of the ISI. Hard measures of the respondent's emotional investment in his belief system or his mental rigidity (dogmatism¹⁶) were not even included in the study.

Though Putnam initially considered that ideological thought was multi-dimensional, he came to assume that the essence of such thought could be captured by assessing only its cognitive aspect. Had he thought the "content" and "emotional" aspects to be important he most likely would have pointed out the lack of substantial correlation between the ISI and "partisan hostility," "unwillingness to compromise," "authoritarianism," "political extremism," etc., as evidence that his ISI was not a measure of ideology. Because he does not, it can be assumed that he considered the "cognitive" traits of ideologues to be their most definitive characteristics.

Putnam's Ideological Style Index

Putnam relies on one single dimension or index as his measure of ideological thought. This "ideological style" index sums across four component indexes: the Generalizer-Particularizer index, the Inductive-Deductive Thinking index, the Reference to a Named Ideology index and the Reference to a Future Utopia index.

For all practical purposes, however, the ISI consists of only two of these indexes, the Generalizer-Particularizer Index and the Inductive-Deductive Thinking index. Were an index formed with just these two, it would correlate $r = .95^{17}$ with Putnam's ISI ($r = .97$ corrected for attenuation). The Generalizer-Particularizer Index and the Inductive-Deductive Thinking Index are therefore the dimensions of cognitive style which Putnam maintains are crucial to the meaning of ideological thought. He assumes that his coders were able to adequately distinguish these dimensions as they scored the respondent issue-discussions, and that each index makes a significant contribution to the measurement of ideological style.¹⁸

In the next few pages we will present an argument based on Putnam's own data which shows that (1) he failed to get distinct measurement between the Generalizer-Particularizer and the Inductive-Deductive Thinking Indexes, and that (2) the ISI is most probably no more than a general measure of articulation; an index which distinguishes knowledgeable, complex thinkers from those whose thought is ignorant and simplistic. Further on in the chapter, we will present data from our own study which suggests that cognitive style is multi-dimensional and that it is unlikely that separable Generalizer-Particularizer and Inductive-Deductive Thinking Indexes exist.

The Problems of Coder "Global" Judgments

Putnam's ISI adds across four of the twelve "stylistic characteristics" indexes. These indexes were scored solely on the

basis of coder "global" judgments,--judgments made without the aid of clearly defined criteria. The content validity of each index is entirely dependent on the accuracy of the coders' judgment as to whether the relevant characteristics are present or absent in the issue-discussions of the respondents.¹⁹ There are several reasons that these coder judgments were inaccurate. The first relates to how the indexes were defined.

The Generalizer-Particularizer and Inductive-Deductive Thinking Indexes

According to Putnam, the Generalizer-Particularizer Index distinguishes between respondents who deal with issues "in terms of sweeping principles" and those who "emphasize specific situations and details."²⁰ Generalizers, he says, see "very important lines . . . [of thought] . . . where others . . . [i.e. non-generalizers] . . . see merely technical questions." Furthermore, generalizers move "easily and quickly from a specific policy problem to general principles of philosophy."²¹

The Inductive-Deductive Thinking Index supposedly taps a different cognitive dimension. Putnam assumes that it measures "the extent to which the respondent appeared to reason synoptically, deducing his analysis from a general abstract political or social or economic theory."²² Coders were to be on guard for stated "chains of reasoning" that include "theoretical premises," and statements which imply that the respondent is approaching the issue in a comprehensive manner.²³

Because Putnam's coders made subjective or "global" judgments in scoring these indexes, we cannot be sure of what they actually measure. What Putnam's examples indicate, however, is that both "generalizers" and "deductive thinkers" are persons who address issues in an abstract and relatively comprehensive manner.²⁴ Both indexes, in other words, seem to measure "abstractness of thought."

The hypothesis that the Inductive-Deductive Thinking Index was not scored on the basis of criteria different from that used to score the Generalizer-Particularizer Index is supported by the fact that it correlates .68 with the Generalizer-Particularizer Index while the reliabilities of these indexes are .57 for the Inductive-Deductive Thinking Index and .64 for the Generalizer-Particularizer Index. That is, if the correlation between the indexes is corrected for error of measurement, then the correlation between the two true scores would be estimated to be $r = 1.13$, i.e. perfect.²⁵ A perfect correlation between the true scores means that there is no differentiation between the two concepts whatever, i.e. the coders were unable to make judgments on these concepts that differed by more than the unreliability of the single judgments.

Why were the coders unable to differentiate between "generalizer-particularizer" and "inductive-deductive thinking?" This correlation most likely resulted because the coders keyed on the respondent's "use of general principles" when they scored the Generalizer-Particularizer Index and keyed on their "abstractness of thought" when they scored the Inductive-Deductive Thinking Index. Although we cannot prove that this happened, Putnam's description of

the indexes, his reliance on coder global judgments, and the perfect correlation (assuming correction for attenuation) between the indexes all support this hypothesis. More on this will be said.

Putnam's ISI as a General Measure
of Articulation

Putnam's ISI was not conceived of as a single variable. Rather it arose as a factor underlying four variables in a factor analysis. This section will show that this is a specious distinction in the present case, i.e. it will show that there is no difference between the ISI "factor" and the single "generalizer-particularizer" index.

TABLE 4.3.--Inter-Correlation of the Four Indexes which Form Putnam's "Ideological Style Index."

Name of Index ^a	Gen/ Part.	Induct/ Deduct.	Ref/ Ideo.	Ref/ Utop.
Generalizer-Particularizer	--	1.13 ^b	.58	.55
Inductive-Deductive Thinking	.68	--	.59	.69
Reference to Named Ideology	.38	.36	--	.32
Reference to Future Utopia	.36	.42	.21	--

^aThe reliabilities of the indexes are as follows: Generalizer-Particularizer (.64), Inductive-Deductive Thinking (.57), Reference to Named Ideology (.66), Reference to a Future Utopia (.66).

^bCorrelations above the diagonal are corrected for attenuation.

The correlations required for this analysis were kindly provided by Putnam and are presented below the diagonal in Table 4.3. From Putnam's inter-rater correlations,²⁶ the reliability of each index can be calculated using the Spearman-Brown formula. These reliabilities are given in the table notes. The index reliabilities can then be used to correct the correlations in Table 4.3 for attenuation and the corrected correlations are given above the diagonal in the table. These correlations represent the correlations between the variables that would have been obtained had there been no error in the coder judgments.

The correlation between the Generalizer-Particularizer and Inductive-Deductive Thinking indexes is perfect (as was noted above) and thus the factor in Putnam could not obtain greater generality by summing over both variables than that contained in either one alone. That is, since the two variables are the same, the sum of the two variables is identical to one of them in correlational terms.

Is new variance introduced by the fact that the factor correlates with "reference to a named ideology" and "reference to a future utopia?" A factor which underlies variables or correlates with them does not normally relate to all the variance in those variables. Rather the factor represents only the variance which is COMMON to those variables. Consider then the two "reference" indexes. How much variance do they have in common? The correlation between the two of them, corrected for attenuation, is only .32, which means that they are not strong indicators of the variable that underlies the ISI factor. On the other hand, each of the

"reference" variables is highly correlated with the generalizer-particularizer index (or what is the same thing, the inductive-deductive thinking index). This suggests that that variance which the "reference" variables have in common is that variance which they hold in common with the generalizer-particularizer index (i.e. their inter-correlation being spurious). To test this hypothesis, we calculated the partial correlation between the two "reference" indexes with the "generalizer-particularizer" index held constant. This partial correlation is .001 in contrast to the original correlation of .32. Thus the variance in the "reference" indexes tapped by the ISI factor is exactly that variance in each which they hold in common with the "generalizer-particularizer" index. That is, the implied correlation between the ISI factor and the "generalizer-particularizer" index corrected for attenuation is precisely 1.00.

There is no differentiation whatever between the ISI factor and the "generalizer-particularizer" index or the "inductive-deductive thinking" index once error of measurement is taken into account. The ISI factor measures only one variable and further evidence will show that that variable is articulation.

Each of the four indexes can be construed as a measure of respondent articulation. The distinctions which Putnam attempted to make between "generalizers" and "particularizers," and between "deductive" and "inductive" thinkers are very much the type of distinctions which would differentiate between articulate and inarticulate persons. The ability to use overarching principles

in ones' analysis of issues and to think in a deductive, logical manner are hallmarks of knowledgeable, articulate persons, whereas the inability to use principles or think logically are hallmarks of less articulate persons. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that references to a "named ideology" and to a "future utopia" are more apt to be found in the discussions of articulate persons than in those of less articulate persons. Regardless of whether one adheres to it, to name an ideology is to make use of a verbal abstraction, and reference to a future "ideal" state may simply be indicative of a comprehensive approach to, or discussion of, a particular issue. All the distinctions implied by the component indexes of the ISI, therefore, are distinctions which might differentiate articulate from less-articulate persons. This supports our belief that the single concept which the indexes measure is articulation.

The respondents' familiarity with the issues could also have contributed to the emergence of the ISI as a measure of articulation. Issues on which respondents possessed a good deal of information could very well have stimulated organized and relatively abstract thinking by the respondents, while issues which respondents were not familiar with produced "trial and error," "associative," and relatively concrete thinking. If the coders keyed on the "abstractness" and "comprehensiveness"²⁷ of the respondent's issue discussions as evidence of "generalized" and "deductive" thinking then they unwittingly laid the basis for a dimension which would reflect

differences among respondents with respect to their knowledge about issues and the development of their cognitive processes.

Leaving aside speculation, there is also concrete evidence that the ISI measures articulation. Putnam states that "respondents with very little formal education tend to have a lower score on the ISI," and that "in Italy 'professional' (might we say more educated?), career politicians are notably . . . more ideological than their colleagues."²⁸ If we can assume that education is a strong determinant of articulation--and according to Putnam we can²⁹--than this correlation supports our thesis.

Further evidence that the ISI measures "abstractness of thought" comes in two parts.

Putnam attempted to validate the ISI by correlating it with several variables among which was a measure of "abstract thinking." Respondents were asked to describe "the most important differences between the major political parties," and their discussions were then rated on a five-point scale according to the abstractness of their system of classification. A contingency table is presented which shows a positive relationship between the ISI and the five "abstractness of framework" categories.³⁰

Because of Putnam's use of coder "global" judgments, it is hard to know whether "abstractness of thought" was actually measured. No specific criteria are mentioned as those used by the coders to determine "abstractness," but it is implied that they assessed "the extent to which (the respondents) organize(d) their information about politics in terms of systematic, abstract conceptual dimensions."³¹

We contend that the coders actually translated this to mean "with the use of big words and/or "abstractions" and therefore did measure "abstractness of thought." As proof we offer two pieces of evidence based on an analysis of samples of discussions--one which Putnam selected as typical of respondents rated "high" in "abstractness" and the other as typical of respondents rated "low."

The first piece of evidence simply looks at the difference between the two samples in terms of the number of "big words" and/or "abstractions" which they contain. If a "big word" is arbitrarily defined as one of eight letters or more, the sample Putnam selected from the most abstract category contains 2.3 big words per line whereas, the sample selected from the least abstract category only contains 1.3 big words per line. In the first 95 words of the "most abstract" sample (which numbers 171 words) there are 18 big words and only 10 such words in the "least abstract" sample (which numbers 95 words in total). Furthermore the big words in the "most abstract" sample are almost entirely "abstractions" whereas the "least abstract" sample is--in Putnam's words--"nearly devoid of abstractions."³² Among the big words in the "most abstract" sample are "ideologies," "postulates," "pre-suppositions," "theorems," "liberalism," "socialism," "communism," "dialectical" and "egometry." Conversely, the most abstraction-like big words in the "least abstract" sample are "advantages," "predominantly," "sufficiently," "conservative (Party)," and "wealthier."³³ These samples indicate that Putnam's coders probably keyed on the respondents' use of "big words" and/or "abstractions" when scoring his measure of abstract thinking.

The second bit of evidence simply confirms what was learned from the analysis just presented--yet it does so in a more scientific manner. Each discussion sample was analyzed by applying Gillie's "Simplified Formula for measuring Abstraction in Writing."³⁴ On a scale whose point distribution is described as follows: 0-18, very abstract; 19-30, abstract; 31-42, fairly abstract; 43-54, standard; 55-66, fairly concrete; 67-78, concrete; 79-90, very concrete,³⁵ the discussion sample selected from the most abstract category rated a score of 39 "fairly abstract" and the discussion sample from the least abstract category rated a score of 56 "fairly concrete." Though this formula is designed to assess writing samples of at least 200 words and not for discussion samples with fewer words (the subject samples of 171 and 95 words having had to be proportioned upward), these ratings strengthen the argument that the ISI measures "abstractness" and thereby supports the major thesis that the ISI is a measure of articulation.

New and Better Measurement

Since it was clear that Putnam's measures failed to adequately distinguish between the cognitive traits he felt were crucial to the measurement of ideological style, it was decided to use multiple measures or indicators in the present study, to see if these dimensions actually exist. An equally compelling reason for using multiple items, of course, was the desire to avoid the enormous item-reliability problems associated with the use of coder "global" judgments. Consequently, a set of 93 Bernoulli items was created to measure the

relevant dimensions hypothesized by Putnam, and others that we believed would manifest themselves in discussions about crime. Although the specific content of the items are related to the probable referents in these discussions (e.g. the respondent's view of the criminal, the enforcement agencies, the causes and solutions to crime, etc.) the items were designed to provide a number of independent measures of each of the dimensions of cognitive style.

As an example, where Putnam used a one item five-point scale to assess his respondent's tendency to think deductively (see Table 4.2), we created seven separate "mention/did not mention" items which would measure this tendency more precisely. These items are:

- 290 The respondent refers to or implies that his ideas about the causes of crime are deduced from some moral belief system, or some general social, political or economic theory.
- 291 The respondent refers to or implies that his ideas about the causes of crime derive from his personal observations and personal experiences in dealing with and thinking about the problem.
- 292 The respondent refers to or implies that his ideas about the causes of crime derive from reports, facts and figures which council/legislature/congress, friends, etc.
- 293 The respondent refers to or implies that some type of belief system or social theory should guide thought and action with respect to how the crime problem should be solved.
- 294 The respondent refers to or implies that his personal thoughts and personal experiences in dealing with the crime problem are the source of his ideas about how to deal with it.

295 The respondent refers to or implies that his ideas about the solution to crime derive from reports, facts and figures which have come to his attention through the media, his work, friends, etc.

296 The respondent refers to or implies that some sort of moral belief system (Christian ethics/heritage, humanism, etc.) is the basis of his ideas on how to deal with the crime problem.

In total, the 93 items allowed a test for the presence of 13 different dimensions. As Table 4.4 indicates, these include (1) the two major cognitive dimensions of the ISI; the Generalizer-Particularizer and Inductive-Deductive Thinking dimensions, (2) five other dimensions from Putnam which seemed applicable in terms of structuring discussions about crime, and (3) six dimensions not taken from Putnam.³⁶

The complete set of items can be found in a slightly abridged form in Table C.3 through C.24 of Appendix C, or in their completely un-abridged form in the questionnaire section of Appendix B.

Methodological Considerations

Because the purpose of creating the 93 Bernoulli items was to develop concrete indices of the various ideological dimensions, it was natural that cluster analysis be used as the primary tool in the analysis of the data. Hunter and Cohen's (1969) PACKAGE system of computer routines for the analysis of correlational data was used to perform this analysis.³⁷ The first step was to do an "oblique multiple groups" factor analysis (with communalities) on the apriori clusters; the thirteen groups of items originally created to measure the various dimensions.³⁸

After this was done, each cluster or index was examined to identify items which were misplaced in terms of their initial

TABLE 4.4.--Dimensions of Ideological Thought with Respect to Discussions About the Problem of Crime.

Dimension	Issue Discussion Referent	No. of Measurement Items Created
Generalizer-Particularizer ^a	Focus of the Discussion	24
	Perception of the Crime Victims	(4)
	Perception of the Criminal	(5)
	Perception of the Criminal Act	(2)
	Perception of the Causes of Crime	(3)
	Perception of who should Handle the Problem	(3)
	Perception of the Enforcement Agencies	(3)
	Perception of the Solution to Crime	(4)
Inductive-Deductive Thinking ^a	Basis of the Respondent's Thought	7
	Basis of ideas on the Cause of Crime	(3)
	Basis of ideas on the Solution to Crime	(4)
Complexity-Simplicity	Organization and Complexity of Thought	12
	Complexity of Thought	(4)
	Organization/Logic of Thought	(5)
	General Organization of the Discussion	(3)
Conflict-Consensus	Zero-Sum Perspective	9
	Dichotomous Thinking	(1)
	Moralizer vs. Non-Moralizer ^a	(2)
	Criminals are a Special Breed	(2)
	Retribution vs. Rehabilitation	(4)
Legalistic Orientation	Framework of the Discussion	9
	Need for New Legislation	(2)
	Increase Enforcement	(4)
	Need for Court and Penal Reform	(2)
	Role of Non-Enforcement Agencies	(1)
Historical Orientation ^a	Framework of the Discussion	3
Moralistic Orientation	Framework of the Discussion	5
Emotional-Objective	Saliance of the Issue	9
	Use of Emotional Words and Thetoric	(5)
	Urgency of the Problem	(1)
	Respondent Emotional Perspective	(3)
Confident-Unconfident	Mental Attitude	10
	Openness of Response	(4)
	Self-Assessed Expertise	(4)
	Respondent Sense of Efficacy	(2)
Political Acceptability ^a	Standard for Judging Crime Policy	2
Technical/Administrative Feasibility ^a	Standard for Judging Crime Policy	1
Financial Cost ^a	Standard for Judging Crime Policy	1
Tradition ^a	Standard for Judging Crime Policy	1

^aReplicates a dimension used by Putnam. See Putnam, pp. 40-41.

assignment to a cluster. If an item was deemed inappropriate for inclusion in a particular cluster, it was either assigned to a more suitable cluster, used to form a sub-cluster, or discarded from the analysis. Throughout this process of cluster (index or scale) formation, three criteria were applied.

1. The items should be homogeneous in what they measure.
2. Items in a cluster should be reasonably well correlated with each other (i.e. internally consistent).
3. The items in a cluster should be externally parallel, i.e. all should exhibit the same pattern of correlations with other clusters.

When these criteria have been met, one can be reasonably confident that the items within each cluster or index are measuring the same concept, and that the clusters themselves are reasonably reliable measures of these concepts. The clusters were revised again and again until they met these criteria.

The A Priori and A Posteriori Cluster Analyses

The a priori cluster analysis had two purposes. First, to ascertain whether Putnam's Generalizer/Particularizer and Inductive/Deductive Thinking dimensions were viable structuring dimensions. Would the items created to measure these dimensions be highly inter-correlated and would they form distinct clusters which approximated these component dimensions of the ISI? The second purpose was to examine the other dimensions taken from Putnam as well as those which we hypothesized as possible structuring dimensions of the crime discussions. This analysis assessed whether the sets of items created to measure the complexity-simplicity, conflict-consensus,

legalistic, historical and moralistic orientation, emotional-objective and confident-unconfident dimensions would actually coalesce to form clusters.

The *a posteriori* cluster analysis was the product of some 15 successive reanalyses of the same 93 x 93 correlation matrix. Each reanalysis improved the clusters in terms of three criteria: "similarity of item substance," "consistency of correlation among cluster items," and "external item parallelism."

The *a priori* analysis produced no empirical support for Putnam's "generalizer-particularizer" and "inductive-deductive thinking" dimensions. The items designed to measure these concepts were either assigned to sub-clusters (some of which appear to be components of these dimensions) or were placed in clusters completely different in concept from these dimensions. The "hypothesized" crime discussion dimensions held up reasonably well though their items usually dispersed to two or three sub-clusters as well. The *a posteriori* analysis structured the data in greatest detail and provided the major evidence in support of our arguments about the multi-dimensionality of ideological thought.

The *a posteriori* cluster analysis produced twenty-one clusters. Seventy-eight of the ninety-three Bernoulli items were placed in these clusters, with the remaining fifteen assigned to the residual cluster (No. 22). Three items were placed in the residual cluster because they produced no variance, i.e. each being coded "not mentioned" for all 118 respondents, and 12 were placed in this cluster because they did not fit well in any of the other twenty-one

clusters. Table 4.5 provides the cluster names and the items--in abbreviated form--which make up the clusters. The items are listed in the general order of their loading on the cluster. The cluster means, standard deviations and Coefficient Alphas are presented in Table 4.6. The Coefficient Alpha is a measure of cluster reliability based on the average correlation between cluster items.

Table 4.7 shows how the 93 Bernoulli items which were created to measure the 13 "a priori" dimensions were distributed to the 21 clusters formed by the a posteriori cluster analysis. This table provides the best visible proof that most of the dimensions which were expected to "emerge" actually broke into two or more sub-dimensions (or clusters). Table 4.8 represents the cluster correlations "corrected for attenuation." Tables presenting the means and standard deviations of the 93 Bernoulli items created to allow content analysis of the crime discussions, the initial 93×93^{39} correlation matrix, the specific item in each cluster, and the correlations between the cluster items and the other clusters can be found in Appendix C. The cluster correlations not corrected for attenuation, can be found in Appendix D.

A quick examination of Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 shows that both the Generalizer-Particularizer and the Inductive-Deductive Thinking dimensions failed to materialize as structuring dimensions in the discussions about crime. Of the 24 items originally designed to measure the generalizer-particularizer dimension, only 12 clustered at all. These 12 form four sub-clusters and three of these--which account for seven items--are almost perfectly

TABLE 4.5.--A Synopsis of the Content of the Crime Discussion Clusters
in the A Posteriori Analysis:^a 501-521.^b

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- | | |
|-----|---|
| 501 | <u>Crime not Criminals</u> : Says or implies that factors other than the criminals themselves are the subject to be dealt with, and cites the abstraction "crime" as the subject to be dealt with. |
| 502 | <u>Non-Specific</u> : Refers to crime only in general terms (no mention of different types), refers to crime as a homogeneous concept, and does not recommend specific institutional change as a solution to the crime problem. |
| 503 | <u>Global</u> : Recommends changes in societal institutions, etc. rather than change in individuals as the solution to crime, and sees societal agencies or institutions as responsible for handling the problem rather than particular individuals. |
| 504 | <u>Environmental</u> : Says or implies that "society" or "the people" should handle the crime problem, that social, economic and environmental conditions cause crime, and says or implies that "society," environment, or social institutions cause crime rather than "individuals." |
| 505 | <u>Non-Personal</u> : The respondents ideas about the causes and solutions of crime are derived from sources other than his or her own personal thoughts and/or experiences, he or she does not seem personally concerned about the problem of crime, any reference or reflection about "society" is made in a non-personalized manner. |
| 506 | <u>Non-Factual</u> : Says or implies that his or her ideas about the causes of, and the solutions to crime are derived from sources other than facts he or she has read or heard about. |
| 507 | <u>Theoretical</u> : Says or implies that some sort of social theory should guide crime policy, and that his or her ideas on crime derive from some sort of social, political, or economic theory. |
| 508 | <u>Comprehensive</u> : Suggests a comprehensive attack (economic, social, political, legal, etc.) or broad social reform as the solution to crime, also discusses the crime problem in an organized manner. |
| 509 | <u>Complex</u> : Mentions a relatively high number of causes of crime, solutions to crime, and social institutions which should deal with the problem of crime. |
| 510 | <u>Structured</u> : Suggests some type of chain of reasoning, offers a listing or sequence of causes, solutions, etc., and/or makes some type of connection between the cause(s) and solution(s) to crime in his discussion. |

TABLE 4.5.--Continued.

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- 511 Special Breed: Says or implies that criminals (1) are a homogeneous group, (2) are not just ordinary persons in special circumstances, (3) are individuals inherently weak in character, and says or implies that criminals are all the same type of person.
- 512 Retribution: Says or implies that the police, the courts and/or the penal authorities are the agencies responsible for dealing with the crime problem, that courts have encouraged crime by not enforcing laws, that criminals need punishment, blames the crime problem on some group, institution or persons, suggests the restructuring or improvement of the court system as a solution to crime and refers to abstractions such as "the courts" or "the police" as agents responsible for handling the problem.
- 513 Rehabilitation: Suggests restructuring or improvement of the penal system as a solution to crime and says or implies that criminals should be rehabilitated.
- 515 Pro-Enforcement: Says or implies that law-enforcement authorities are hampered in enforcing laws, that the solution to crime involves improvement of law enforcement capability, and that crime is a complex issue, does not say or imply that social institutions (schools, families, churches, etc.) are responsible for dealing with the crime problem.
- 516 Historical: Uses historical antecedents in his discussion of the crime problem and refers to some period in history as a standard by which we should judge today's crime problem.
- 517 Moralism: Says or implies that crime is caused by the general breakdown of public and private morality, the declining influence of the church, and by families and schools which have failed to teach correct moral behavior, says or implies that his solution(s) to crime derive from a moral belief system and suggests an attempt to strengthen public and private morality as a part of his (or her) solution to the crime problem.
- 518 Emotionalism: Discusses the crime problem in a relatively emotional manner, perceives the crime problem in dichotomous "we versus they" terms, uses emotionally charged words when discussing criminals, the causes, the solutions and who is responsible for dealing with the crime problem.

TABLE 4.5.--Continued.

-
- 519 Fear: Says or implies that "individuals" are the victims of crime, says or implies a personal fear that he (or she) will be a crime victim, that there might not be a solution to the crime problem, and uses emotionally charged words when discussing crime and its consequences.
- 520 Easy Talking: Talked easily about the causes of crime, suggested a solution to the problem without hesitation, offered his opinion on the causes and solutions to crime readily, did not qualify his statements about the causes and solutions to crime, says or implies that there is a solution to crime, and discusses crime in a relatively organized manner.
- 521 Self-Assured: Feels that his ideas on the causes and solutions to crime are the "correct" ideas on the subject (beyond just offering a personal opinion).
-

^aThese descriptions are no more than a paraphrasing of the cluster items. Remember that each cluster is an index and that the items are phrased to describe the substantive content of only one endpoint of the index. All items were scored either (1) Did Not Mention or (3) Mentioned.

^bThe numbers 501-521 correspond to the cluster numbering procedure associated with Hunter and Cohen's (1969) PACKAGE system of computer routines for the analysis of correlational data. The numbers assigned to the twenty-one Crime Discussing Clusters remain constant in both the text and the relevant appendices. See John E. Hunter and Stanley H. Cohen, "Package," Educational and Psychological Measurement, 29 (1969), 697-700.

TABLE 4.6.--A Posteriori Crime Discussion Clusters: Means, Standard Deviations and Coefficient Alphas.^a

Cluster	No. of Items	Possible Range of Scores	Mean	S.D.	Alpha
501 Crime not Criminals	2	1 - 6	3.03	1.65	.88
502 Non-Specific	5	1 - 15	10.65	2.97	.60
503 Global	2	1 - 6	3.11	1.49	.63
504 Environmental	3	1 - 9	5.56	1.99	.48
505 Non-Personal	4	1 - 12	10.05	2.24	.58
506 Non-Factual	2	1 - 6	2.46	1.03	.57
507 Theoretical	2	1 - 6	5.56	.88	.41
508 Comprehensive	3	1 - 9	7.39	2.24	.80
509 Complex	3	1 - 9	3.68	2.75	.63
510 Structured	3	1 - 9	7.07	1.77	.39
511 Special Breed	4	1 - 12	8.22	2.64	.61
512 Retribution	8	1 - 24	16.38	5.23	.83
513 Rehabilitation	2	1 - 6	5.11	1.54	.83
514 Pro-Enforcement	5	1 - 15	11.51	3.15	.71
515 New Laws	3	1 - 9	8.09	1.49	.47
516 Historical	2	1 - 6	5.33	1.11	.33
517 Moralism	5	1 - 15	13.51	2.50	.78
518 Emotionalism	6	1 - 18	16.70	2.08	.64
519 Fear	4	1 - 12	11.25	1.54	.64
520 Easy Talking	8	1 - 24	12.51	3.59	.83
521 Self Assurance	2	1 - 6	4.94	1.60	.79

^aCoefficient Alpha is a measure of cluster reliability based on the average correlation between cluster items. A discussion of Coefficient Alpha is presented in Jum C. Nunnally, Psychometric Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1967), pp. 196-198, 210-211.

TABLE 4.7.--Distribution of Items from the A Priori Clusters to the Clusters Formed by the A Posteriori Cluster Analysis.

A POSTERIORI CLUSTERS	A PRIORI DIMENSIONS OF IDEOLOGICAL THOUGHT									
	Generalizer-Particularizer	Deductive-Inductive	Complexity-Simplicity	Conflict-Consensus	Legalistic Orientation	Historical Orientation	Moralistic Orientation	Emotional-Objective	Confident-Unconfident	Partisanship-Feasibility Cost Tradition
501: Crime Not Criminals	2									
502: Non-Specific	3									
503: Global	2									
504: Environmental	5									
505: Non-Personal	1	2						1		
506: Non-Factual	2									
507: Theoretical	2									
508: Comprehensive	1		2							
509: Complex			3							
510: Structured			3							
511: Special Breed	2			2						
512: Retribution	2			3	3					
513: Rehabilitation				1	1					
514: Pro-Enforcement		1		1	3					
515: New Laws					2			1		
516: Historical						2				
517: Moralism		1					4			
518: Emotionalism				1				5		
519: Fear	1							2	1	
520: Easy Talking		1							7	
521: Self-Assured									2	
522: Residual	5	2		1		1	1			5
Total (93)	24	11	8	9	9	3	5	9	10	5

TABLE 4.8.--A Posteriori Crime Discussion Cluster Correlations (Corrected for Attenuation).

Crime	not Criminals	501	502	503	504	505	506	507	508	509	510	511	512	513	514	515	516	517	518	519	520	521
Non-Specific	100	100	3	16	46	22	-31	22	-1	22	-10	3	-9	1	-17	1	-10	15	-35	20	-12	-5
Global	16	100	10	0	30	15	-31	14	-1	-6	-32	-10	-50	-40	-25	-36	-42	27	-21	-10	-34	-51
Environmental	46	30	46	100	46	120	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11
Non-Personal	100	10	100	46	100	120	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11
Non-Factual	22	10	3	-17	-12	-20	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11
Theoretical	22	10	3	-17	-12	-20	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11
Comprehensive	5	10	10	-2	51	-20	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11
Complex	5	10	10	-2	51	-20	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11
Structured	5	10	10	-2	51	-20	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11
Special Breed	5	10	10	-2	51	-20	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11
Retribution	5	10	10	-2	51	-20	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11
Rehabilitation	5	10	10	-2	51	-20	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11
Pro-Enforcement	5	10	10	-2	51	-20	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11
New Laws	5	10	10	-2	51	-20	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11
Historical	5	10	10	-2	51	-20	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11
Moralism	5	10	10	-2	51	-20	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11
Emotionalism	5	10	10	-2	51	-20	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11
Fear	5	10	10	-2	51	-20	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11
Easy Talking	5	10	10	-2	51	-20	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11
Self-Assured	5	10	10	-2	51	-20	-12	37	-1	-3	-27	-39	-60	-20	-33	-43	-10	20	-45	-10	-10	11

non-correlated with each other. The remaining five-item cluster, the "environmental" cluster, seems misplaced--at least in terms of being a measure of cognitive style. Its highest correlations are with clusters other than the generalizer-particularizer sub-clusters, with its highest correlation ($r = .69$) being with the "retribution" cluster. An examination of the items of the "environmental" cluster shows that it would be most logically interpreted as a "content" dimension (see Appendix C, Table C.6).

A look at the Inductive-Deductive Thinking dimension shows the same pattern. Only 6 of the 11 items created to measure this concept clustered. The three clusters which they formed are not highly correlated and each has its highest correlations with clusters outside the Inductive-Deductive Thinking or the Generalizer-Particularizer domains. This refutes the hypothesis that "inductive-deductive thinking" is a general dimension of cognitive style. Instead, we find that the use of deduction varies from one idea domain to another.

Clearly it is possible for a given chain of thought to be deductive or to be inductive or associational. Thus the abstract dimension of "deduction-induction" certainly exists. The question is: is deduction-induction a dimension of individual differences? The various theorists who posit cognitive styles (including Putnam) believe that some people tend to use deduction as a characteristic mode of thought while other people do not. If this characteristic tendency did exist, then one could move from deduction as a dimension of particular arguments to deduction as a dimension characterizing

people. What the data clearly shows is that this is false. There is simply no correlation suggesting the consistent tendency of people to use deduction for arguments which pertain to different psychological content areas.⁴⁰ That is, a person who is deductive in one argument will be inductive in the next, willy-nilly.

The evidence discussed thus far pertains to our attempt to show that style mattered more than content. We looked at items not in terms of content (i.e., the referent of crime which was the subject of a given judged discussion) but rather in terms of the dimension of cognitive style which the item supposedly measured. What the data shows, however, is that, for the most part, "content" won out over "cognitive style." For example, examine the inter-correlation of the "reification" items as displayed in Table 4.9. Each of these items was initially designed as a measure of abstract thinking; a characteristic which Putnam believed descriptive of "generalizers" as opposed to "particularizers." The data shows that although the wording of the items was designed to reflect the "generalizer" orientation, the items coalesce not with regard to this common denominator but according to their specific crime related content. Items 281, 283, and 284 are highly correlated with each other and the substantive content of each relates to the respondent's perception of the "police" or the "courts." Items 280 and 285 are highly correlated and their substantive content relates to a belief that "society," "the people," or "government" is responsible for dealing with crime.⁴¹

TABLE 4.9.--Inter-Correlation of Crime Discussion Items which were Predicted to Measure "Reification."

Item Numbers	(281)	(283)	(284)	(280)	(285)
(281)	100	18	38	-36	-15
(283)	18	100	27	-5	9
(284)	38	27	100	-36	5
(280)	-36	-5	-36	100	33
(285)	-15	9	5	33	100

- 281 Respondent refers to or implies that the "police," "courts," "legislature," or some similar--yet partially reified--group or institution should handle the crime problem.
- 283 Respondent reifies the word "police" (e.g. respondent says that "police" have to crack down rather than that the "cop of the beat" must be more vigilant, etc.).
- 284 Respondent reifies the word "court" (e.g. he says that "courts" are too lenient, rather than that "judges" are afraid to imprison criminals).
- 280 Respondent refers to or implies that "society," the "people," "the government," (or some reified equivalent) should handle the problem.
- 285 Respondent reifies the word "society" or its equivalent; "the people," "the community," etc. (e.g. he says "its society's responsibility rather than "it is all of us" or "each of us responsibility," etc.).
-

Though both of Putnam's broad dimensions of cognitive style failed to materialize as structuring dimensions, one strong dimension did emerge. The three clusters formed by the "complexity-simplicity" items are highly inter-correlated and together they comprise a measure of "articulation." This more narrowly focused cognitive style dimension measures the degree to which the respondent's discussions were comprehensive in scope, complex in terms of the number of elements of the crime problem mentioned by the respondent(s), and structured in an organized manner. The correlations of the "environmental" (504) and "theoretical" (507) clusters (see Table 4.8) suggest these are merely weaker versions of articulation though logically they are more suitably categorized as "content" clusters. More will be said about this at a later point.

With regard to the other dimensions measured in both Putnam's and the present study, only the "historical orientation" items clustered as expected. Even so, one of these items was dispatched to the "residual" cluster, and the coefficient Alpha for the cluster formed by the remaining two was only a very weak .33. One of the two "moralizer/non-moralizer" items (which we incorporated into our "conflict-consensus" dimension) was also put in the "residual" cluster; the other being dispersed to the "content" oriented "retribution" cluster. Finally, the five items which we inserted to replicate "Political Acceptability," "Practicality," "Cost," and "Tradition" (as criteria) stylistic characteristics indexes (see Table 4.1), did not correlate well either with each other or

any of the clusters which was formed in the a posteriori cluster analysis. These items were also placed in the "residual" cluster.

The three clusters formed by the "simplicity-complexity" items are by far the most highly inter-correlated of any set of clusters in the entire analysis. Except for content differences (which justify their separate identities) they are easily collapsed to form a single measure of respondent "articulation." Its similarity with Putnam's ISI provides the basis of our attempt to replicate some of the relationships he found between the ISI and other variables.

The a priori predictions concerning the "conflict-consensus," "legalistic orientation," and "emotional-objective" dimensions were not confirmed. Instead of strong correlations within these blocks, the items dispersed either to clusters made up, in part, of items from outside the blocks, or into sub-clusters. Only the "confident-unconfident" items hung together reasonably well; nine of its ten items forming two sub-clusters.

Second Order Cluster Analysis of the A Posteriori Clusters

The failure of the a priori cluster analysis is more understandable when one examines the structure of the a posteriori clusters. Once the 21 crime discussion clusters were formed it was natural that a cluster analysis of these cluster variables be performed. To accomplish this, the matrix of cluster-intercorrelations was factor analyzed--the factors being determined with communalities in the matrix. The last varimax rotation produced a set of five

factors. A second order cluster analysis was determined by assigning each variable (i.e. each of the 21 clusters) to a (second order) cluster according to its highest factor loading. If a cluster's highest loading on the factor was negative, then its direction of scoring was reversed. That is each cluster was composed of the set of variables which had their highest loading on the same varimax factor. The five clusters which were formed provide a "second-order" structuring of the crime discussion clusters.⁴² The make up of these clusters is presented in Table 4.10.

When the second-order cluster analysis was first performed, the meaning of its structure was not clear. We proceeded, therefore, with the detailed content analysis of crime belief systems already in progress (see Chapter 3). This analysis lead us to formulate our thoughts about ideology in terms of three basic dimensions; cognitive style (specifically articulation), emotional commitment (use of emotional words and rhetoric) and content (person-blame vs. system-blame explanations of crime). It was then that we discovered that with a few initially perplexing exceptions, the second-order analysis paralleled the structure we had derived independently from the content analysis.⁴³ The second-order analysis also paralleled the basic structured suggested by our historical analysis of the concept of ideology.

Table 4.10 shows that second order cluster 1 contains the "new laws" and the "rehabilitation" clusters. At first glance this made the cluster neither a "content" nor "cognitive style" cluster. However, after the formulation of the person-blame/system-blame

TABLE 4.10.--Clusters Formed by the Cluster Analysis of the Twenty-One Crime Discussion Clusters.

<u>Cluster 1</u> (articulation) ^a	<u>Cluster 2</u> (system-blame) ^a	<u>Cluster 3</u> (non-emotion) ^a
510 Structured	-512 Retribution	-505 Non-Personal
509 Complex	504 Environmental	518 Emotionalism
508 Comprehensive	-514 Pro-Enforcement	521 Self-Assured
507 Theoretical	502 Non-Specific	519 Fear
515 New Laws	-511 Special Breed	
520 Easy Talking	517 Moralism	
513 Rehabilitation		
Coefficient Alpha = .87	Coefficient Alpha = .74	Coefficient Alpha = .67
<u>Cluster 4</u> (unspecified)	<u>Cluster 5</u> (unspecified)	
506 Non-Factual	-516 Historical	
-503 Global	501 Crime not Criminals	
Coefficient Alpha = .29	Coefficient Alpha = .30	

^aScored to reflect this pole of the dimension.

^bA negative sign indicates that the cluster has been "reversed" for inclusion in the cluster. Its meaning should therefore be interpreted as opposite to its stated content or name.

model, it was obvious that these clusters were "universal," that is, all office-holders advocate some type of legislative action with respect to crime, and all advocate "rehabilitation" of one form or another. The clusters ended up in the "articulation" dimension because articulate persons--whose discussions include a greater range and number of elements--were more likely to mention these beliefs in their discussions.

Similar reasoning explains why the "rehabilitation" cluster did not correlate with "content" dimension (Cluster 2) formed by the second-order analysis or with its sister cluster (see Table 4.7) "retribution." All office-holders advocate "rehabilitation." Where they differ is in their opinion as to how this process should be conducted. Some demand that "punishment" or "retribution" be a part of this character transformation while others contend that "giving the criminal a stake in law-abiding society" is the answer. This latter group believes that "punishment" will just drive criminals further into the criminal sub-culture, thereby shutting them out of law-abiding society. On the other hand they argue that if criminals can see a payoff in no longer pursuing illegal activity, the probability of "character change" is increased.

Because our respondents generally advocated rehabilitation but split over the question of "retribution," the "rehabilitation" cluster was not correlated with the person-blame/system-blame cluster 2 ($r = .05$), or with the "retribution" cluster ($r = .08$). Since "rehabilitation" is universal, it correlated with articulation because articulate speakers mention more topics.

The "content" dimension formed by the second-order analysis also contained clusters which were initially difficult to explain. We initially interpreted the "non-specific" and "moralism" clusters in terms of cognitive style--both supposedly reflecting a type of deductive and/or abstract thought. An examination of their items, however, shows why content won out over style. An analysis of the content of items in the "non-specific" cluster showed that respondents who were "specific" were specific in ways which reflected a belief that "people" and not "conditions" are the cause of crime and that criminals be dealt with in a relatively harsh fashion. An analysis of the content of the "moralism" cluster showed that those with high scores believed crime was caused by a breakdown in public and private morality, and because families, churches, and schools no longer taught correct moral behavior. In all other respects the "content" dimension closely resembles the "person-blame/system-blame" model which was constructed from our content analysis of belief systems about crime. It contains items from the "retribution," "environmental," and "special-breed" clusters as does the "person-blame/system-blame" dimension, and the items of the "pro-enforcement" cluster are also person-blame in content.

The "emotionalism" dimension formed by the second-order analysis needs little explanation for each of its four constituent clusters are clearly emotional in content. One of these clusters, the "emotionalism" cluster (518) has a part-whole correlation of .76 with this dimension and was selected as our measure of "emotional commitment" or "emotionalism" in further analyses.

The two remaining dimensions formed by the second-order cluster analysis appear to be statistical artifacts. The four clusters which make them up are all but uncorrelated with the other dimensions or with each other. The inter-correlations in these two-variable clusters are so small ($r = .17$ and $.18$) that one suspects they are related only by chance. To see the smallness of these correlations in its full light, we note that since these are correlations between clusters formed by a factor analytic process where communalities were placed in the diagonal of the matrix, these correlations have already been corrected for attenuation.

Three Dimensions of Ideology

The second-order cluster analyses produced three separate dimensions which characterize thought with respect to crime; articulation, person-blame/system-blame orientation, and emotionalism. To simplify interpretation these dimensions were measured using the clusters most directly expressive of their content, i.e. Articulation by a second-order cluster incorporating the Comprehensive, Complex, and Structured clusters (508-510) produced in the a posteriori cluster analysis, System-Blame Orientation by scoring the Person-Blame/System-Blame Cluster formed in Chapter 3 to reflect the "system-blame" pole of the cluster, and Non-Emotionalism by scoring the Emotionalism Cluster (518) produced in the a posteriori cluster analysis to reflect the "non-emotionalism" pole of the cluster. Table 4.11 presents the correlations between these dimensions.

The correlations show that Articulation and Emotionalism are totally unrelated to each other and that the Person-Blame/

TABLE 4.11.--Correlation Matrix of the Articulation, Person-Blame/ System-Blame and Emotionalism Dimensions.

	Articulation	System-Blame Orientation	Non- Emotionalism
523 Articulation	100	42	15
525 System-Blame Orientation	42	100	45
518 Non-Emotionalism	15	45	100

System-Blame dimension is only moderately related to the other two. When the Person-Blame/System-Blame variable is held constant the partial correlation between Articulation and Emotionalism drops to $-.05$.⁴⁴ Inarticulate persons are apparently no more prone to take an emotional approach to crime than are articulate persons. Similarly, persons holding person-blame beliefs about crime are only slightly more emotional in their approach to crime than are persons holding system-blame beliefs.

The data suggests that each of the dimensions is a distinct dimension of ideological thought and that none of the dimensions predominates. Since the term "ideology" has been associated with each of these dimensions at various times, one could therefore have several persons talking about ideologues and have absolutely no correlation between the various definitions or types of ideologues which they were referring to. Eight varieties of ideologue are possible and the correlations suggest that six are frequent (the most likely to occur being the articulate/system-blame-oriented/

non-emotional and the inarticulate/person-blame/emotional varieties). This supports the idea that a number of definitions of ideology may be empirically valid and that no more dimension or index of cognitive style can adequately capture the meaning of the term "ideological."

Replication of Putnam

The only cognitive style dimension to emerge from both the cluster analyses is the articulation dimension. This dimension measures the degree to which respondents analyzed the crime problem in a structured and comprehensive fashion (both in terms of scope and number of crime related elements mentioned). Since our analysis of Putnam's work shows that his ISI is probably no more than a global measure of articulation, our "articulation" dimension can be thought of as a replication of his index. Consequently, an attempt was made to replicate some of the comparisons which Putnam made between the ISI and various other variables--using our "articulation" dimension as a surrogate ISI. Appendix D presents Putnam's results in the form given in his book and cites the specific page numbers on which they are presented. The results of the replication are presented in Table 4.12.

The table provides more evidence that the ISI is in actuality a measure of "articulation." The correlations with the "ideological motivation" and "political distrust" variables⁴⁵ did not replicate Putnam, but the six other comparisons which could be made with confidence--Left/Right Extremism, Willingness to Compromise,

TABLE 4.12.--Correlations Which Allow the Comparison of Putnam's ISI with the Three Dimensions of Ideological Thought on Variables Examined in Putnam's Study.^a

Variable	Putnam's ISI (articulation) ^b	Cognitive Style (articulation) ^b	Content (system-blame) ^b	Emotionalism (non-emotionalism) ^b
474 Ideological Motivation	.17* ^c	-.06	-.01	-.09
473 Left/Right Extremism	(+) ^d	.15	-.04	-.26*
373 Willingness to Compromise	.12 ^c	.28*	.37*	.43*
470 Opposition to Interest Group Politics	-.17* ^c	-.17	-.18*	-.31*
524 Authoritarianism	-.09 ^e	-.41*	-.27*	-.29*
526 Political Distrust	-.06 ^e	.22*	.23*	.11
451 Age	-.20* ^f	-.46*	-.15	-.07
450 Social Class Background	(0) ^g	.18*	-.02	.07
449 Occupation	(0) ^g	.24*	.08	.11
447 Education	(+)	.51*	.28*	.16
471 Office Experience	(0) ^g	-.18*	-.06	.02
472 Party Experience	(0) ^g	.15	-.06	.05

^aAll but two of the numbers in the table are Product-Moment Correlations. The two exceptions are Gamma Correlations (see footnote 5). An asterisk indicates that the correlation is significant at the .05 level. Also note that the size of the correlations based on the present study is effected by the fact that they have been corrected for attenuation. Putnam's findings with respect to the ISI are presented in Appendix F.

^bScored to reflect this pole of the dimension. Cognitive Style is measured by Cluster 523, Content of Cluster 525 and Emotionalism by Cluster 518.

^cThis correlation was calculated from percentage figures used by Putnam to describe the relationship. It may underestimate the actual correlation because the percentages are based on "high" or "low" scores on the ISI. By splitting the ISI into two categories, its variance is reduced, and correlations based on this variable will be under-estimated in proportion to this reduction.

^dPutnam does not report a correlation describing the relationship between the ISI and political extremism. The plus sign indicates the relationship suggested by his Figure 4.1 (p. 51).

^ePutnam presents a Gamma Correlation describing this relationship for each national sample. The correlation reported here is the average of these two correlations (see p. 55).

^fPutnam reports that the correlation between age and the ISI is -.20 (significant at the .05 level) in Britain, and .02 in Italy (p. 66). This means that in Britain the younger politicians are more "ideological" (or, as I contend, more articulated) than the older politicians. I contend that the Italian sample failed to show a similar relationship because it included markedly fewer young politicians (politicians more apt to be college educated or articulate) and because its distribution across age categories conformed more toward a "normal" distribution than did the British sample, i.e. it contained less variance about the mean. The British sample included 19 (N=91) politicians 40 years of age or younger (21%), whereas the Italian sample only included 8 (N=81) or 10%. With fewer young politicians in the Italian sample and comparably less variance in its age distribution, the expected negative correlation between the ISI and age (expected, that is, given that the ISI is a crude measure of articulation) was suppressed.

^gPutnam does not report any correlations for these variables. He merely states in a footnote (p. 78) that he found, with the minor exception of education, "no consistent or significant patterns" between the ISI and these variables.

Opposition to Interest Group Politics, Authoritarianism, Age and Education--were all similar with respect to direction of relationship. If one considers sampling error (the width of the confidence interval for Putnam's sample is .16) and the fact that correlations based on the present study are "corrected for attenuation," then none of the numerical comparisons suggest that the ISI and "articulation" dimensions are measuring different things. Even Putnam's report of "no relationship" between the ISI and Social Class Background, Occupation, Office and Party Experience does not constitute a problem. Some of these "zeros" probably represent cases where, because of unreliability of measurement, he was unable to observe the small correlations brought out in my study (my correlations being corrected for attenuation). The Content and Emotionalism dimensions were added to the table for contrast.

Comparing the Three Dimensions of Ideological Thought

Table 4.13 presents correlations between the three dimensions of ideological thought and various political, ideological, and socio-economic variables taken from the survey. The primary message to be derived from the examination of these correlations is that the "content" and "emotionalism" dimensions are important dimensions of ideological thought in their own right. Both of these dimensions show patterns of correlation with these variables that are different from the pattern shown by articulation. This makes it clear that Putnam's ISI (articulation) does not account for all that can be said about ideology. The Emotionalism dimension correlates with charged

TABLE 4.13.--Correlations Between the Dimensions of Ideological Thought^a and Various Political, Ideological, and Socio-Economic Variables.

	Cognitive Style (articulation)	Content (system-blame)	Emotionalism (non-emotionalism)
Political Variables			
(3) Office Level	.29 ^b	-.05	.19
(471) Office Experience	-.18	-.06	.02
(21) Party (Democrat)	.15	.30	.15
(472) Party Experience	.15	-.06	.05
(22) Ticket Splitter	-.09	-.05	-.27
(531) ^c Partisan Frustration	.08	-.11	-.16
(534) Interest in Politics	.09	.12	.12
(528) Electoral Intent	.27	.09	.13
(529) Desire for Advancement	.31	-.24	.07
(530) Perceived Electoral Risk	.31	-.20	.00
(465) Delegate Role Orientation	-.34	-.23	-.19
(470) Anti-Interest Group	-.17	-.18	-.31
Average Absolute Value of the Correlations	.21	.17	.13
Ideological Variables			
(524) Authoritarianism	-.41	-.27	-.29
(463) Dogmatism	-.23	-.13	.00
(373) Willingness to Compromise	.28	.37	.43
(532) Conflict Orientation	.05	-.13	-.22
(464) Zero-Sum Perspective	.05	.02	.05
(474) Ideological Motivation	-.06	.01	-.09
(32) Liberal Orientation	.39	.48	.29
(533) Pro-Economic Regulation	.33	.30	.09
(468) Moralistic Orientation	-.21	-.01	.06
Average Absolute Value of the Correlations	.22	.19	.17
Socio-Economic Variables			
(451) Age	-.46	-.15	-.07
(447) Education	.51	.28	.16
(462) Father's Education	.20	.12	.05
(449) Occupation	.24	.08	.11
(450) Father's Occupation	.18	-.02	.07
(443) Urban-ness of District	.02	-.05	.00
Average Absolute Value of the Correlations	.27	.12	.08

^aMeasured the same as in Table 4.11 (see p. 43).

^bCorrelations (r) whose value are .18 or greater are significant at the .05 level.

^cItems which number 500 and above denote clusters formed by cluster analysis.

political variables such as Ticket Splitter (-.27), Partisan Frustration (-.16), Anti-interest Group Politics (-.31) and Willingness to Compromise (.43). The "content" or person-blame/system-blame dimension correlates with other measures that tap the content of beliefs such as Liberalism (.48), Pro-Economic Regulation (.30), and Party (.30). Articulation correlates most highly with those variables which center about education such as Education (.51), Age (-.46), Father's education (.20).

The point here is that social and political variables can be roughly classified along the same dimensions as the aspects of ideology, i.e. as pertaining either to the emotionalism, to the content, or to the style of political and economic life. This parallel classification of the two sets of variables tends to locate the larger correlations, and this prediction of the differential pattern of correlations of the three aspects of ideology constitutes a very strong external validation of our conceptual analysis.

Another fact to note are the high correlations between the articulation dimension and the "socio-economic" variables. In contrast, the three dimensions are nearly equal in strength with respect to their overall correlations with the other "political" and "ideological" variables. Thus if one selects a cognitive style dimension (in this case "articulation") as the definitive criterion of ideological thought, one stands to distinguish as much between elites (who are more educated and articulate) and non-elites as one would between ideologues and non-ideologues. This elite/non-elite distinction would not emerge if one relied

on the "content" dimension and would be particularly unlikely to emerge if one relied solely on the "emotionalism" dimension.

Chapter IV--Footnotes

¹All but one reference to Putnam are based on his book: Robert D. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). The exception refers to his summary article: Robert D. Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXV (September 1971), pp. 651-681.

²Putnam, p. 8.

³Ibid., p. 35.

⁴Ibid., p. 33.

⁵Ibid., p. 32.

⁶Ibid., p. 40.

⁷Ibid., p. 42.

⁸Ibid., p. 34.

⁹An explanation of the technique of factor analysis can be found in Richard L. Gorsuch, Factor Analysis (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1974); and R. J. Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

¹⁰Putnam, p. 43.

¹¹Ibid., p. 43.

¹²Ibid., p. 45.

¹³As we interpret Putnam, the Generalizer-Particularizer Index measures both element No. 2: presence of an explicit, consciously held belief system, and No. 7: concern with abstract principles, not concrete interests. The Inductive-Deductive Thinking Index measures element No. 1: presence of a comprehensive, consistent, deductively organized belief system and (in part) No. 6: guided by a philosophy of history and/or social theory that is applied to everyday questions and issues. The Historical Context and Tradition as criterion indexes are also (seemingly) measures of element No. 6. The Discussion Moralized Index supposedly measures the part of element No. 5 which refers to a belief system that distorts or oversimplifies reality. The Reference to Named

ideology Index measures the part of element No. 2 which refers to an "explicit" belief system. The Reference to Future Utopia Index measures element No. 8: being future oriented or utopian in belief. Ibid., pp. 32-41.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 35-41.

¹⁵All enclosed page references are to Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians except the reference to pp. 667-668 which refers to his summary article in the American Political Science Review. See Footnote 1.

¹⁶Putnam refers to ideologues as "dogmatic" at various places in his book but never clearly defines his interpretation of the concept. He equates dogmatism with "authoritarianism" (p. 56), "fanaticism" (p. 35), "intolerance" (pp. 57 and 74) and "moral absolutism" (p. 56), but never relates it specifically with the condition of being "closed-minded." In light of his interest in political (cognitive) style, this is surprising. His Moral Absolutism Index (p. 55) is a weak measure of dogmatic thinking but he never treats it as if it were an important component of ideological thought. Ibid.

¹⁷This correlation is derived from the standard formula for the correlation of linear combinations. See Jum C Nunnally, Psychometric Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1967), pp. 150-151.

¹⁸Putnam, p. 45.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 39-42 and 45n.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 34-35.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., p. 37.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., p. 36.

²⁵A sample correlation "corrected for attenuation" of 1.13 is not considered implausible for the following reason. In a population, a correlation "corrected for attenuation" is a correlation between the item true scores, i.e. the actual correlation given perfect reliability of measurement. With sample data, however, a correlation "corrected for attenuation" is only an estimate of the actual sample correlation. This estimate is based on the reliability . . . of the items being correlated. In the case footnoted, the reliability coefficients for the Generalizer-Particularizer Index and the Inductive-Deductive Thinking items were

generated by putting the coder judgment Tau Betas (see Footnote 19) for these items through the Spearman-Brown Prophecy formula. As an estimate, the sample correlation "corrected for attenuation" possesses sampling error. The amount of error is calculated by increasing the sample "standard error" (which is dependent on sample size) in proportion to the increase in size of the correlation after "correction for attenuation." In the case we are concerned with, Putnam's original correlation (r) of .68 was increased 80% to 1.13. The standard error (.06) is thus increased 80% to .11. This means that, given an actual sample correlation of 1.00, there is a 95% chance that the sample estimate of this correlation--i.e. the correlation "corrected for attenuation" will fall between .78 and 1.22 (the "confidence interval" for a .05 level of significance being plus or minus two standard errors).

²⁶Putnam reports the following Tau Beta correlations as his measures of index reliability: Generalizer-Particularizer (.44), Inductive-Deductive Thinking (.40), Reference to a Named Ideology (.50), and Reference to a Future Utopia (.50). Ibid., p. 39 and Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture," p. 660.

²⁷Ibid., p. 46.

²⁸Ibid., p. 78n.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 73 and 78n.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid., p. 45.

³²Ibid., p. 46.

³³Ibid., pp. 45-46.

³⁴Paul J. Gillie, "A Simplified Formula for Measuring Abstraction in Writing," Journal of Applied Psychology, 41 (1957), pp. 214-217.

³⁵Ibid., p. 217.

³⁶The 13 dimensions measured do not presume to be an exhaustive list of belief system dimensions. Other issues might suggest other dimensions or dichotomies and other researchers might have included dimensions different from those selected for this study.

³⁷John E. Hunter and Stanley H. Cohen, "PACKAGE," Educational and Psychological Measurement, 29 (1969), 697-700.

³⁸For a detailed explanation of cluster analysis see Gorsuch, pp. 5-6, 73-84, 186-178, 240-241.

³⁹For practical purposes this is only a 90 x 90 matrix since three of the items produced no variance, i.e. were coded "not mentioned" for all 118 respondents.

⁴⁰Darryle Thomander, John E. Hunter, and Richard L. Marshall, "A Failure to Find Cognitive Styles in Problem Solving Behavior," paper presented at the meetings of the Midwestern Society of Multivariate Experimental Psychology, Chicago, Illinois, 12 May, 1973; L. J. Cronbach, Essentials of Psychological Testing, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); A. J. Davis, "Cognitive Style: Methodological and Developmental Considerations," Child Development, 42 (1971), 1447-1459; V. A. Thomy, Jr., "Some Relationships Between Anxiety, Cognitive Style, and Problem Solving" (Master's Thesis, Michigan State University, 1972); Richard E. Nisbett and Linda Temoshok, "Is There an 'External' Cognitive Style?," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33 (1976), 36-47; and Peter Suedfeld and A. Dennis Rank, "Revolutionary Leaders: Long-Term Success as a Function of Changes in Conceptual Complexity," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34 (1976), 169-178.

⁴¹In terms of the a posteriori cluster analysis, these items were dispersed in the following manner. Items 281 and 284 were placed in the "retribution" cluster. Item 280 was assigned to the "environmental" cluster. Item 285 was dispatched to the "non-personal" cluster and item 283 to the "residual" cluster.

⁴²The cluster correlations, part-whole correlations and second-order cluster correlations relevant to this analysis can be found in Table D.3 of Appendix D.

⁴³Evidence of this "parallelism" is offered in Table D.4 of Appendix D. This table shows the similarity between the three dimensions of ideological thought which were "constructed" on the basis of the content analysis, and the three dimensions formed by the cluster analysis of the crime discussion clusters, with respect to how they correlate with the individual crime discussion clusters. They are similar in every respect except that, because the three dimensions (clusters) formed in the second-order cluster analysis incorporate more variables (and thus more variance) the magnitude of the correlations between these dimensions and the crime discussion clusters are relatively higher than those between the "constructed" dimensions and these clusters.

⁴⁴While this suggests that the person-blame/system-blame variable is causally intermediate between articulation and emotionalism, later analysis will show that this is not true (see Chapter V).

⁴⁵Ideological motivation was measured in both studies by an index formed from items found in the list of possible answers to the (open ended) question: What do you find most appealing about politics?" (See Putnam, pp. 47, 247 & 248.) These items--listed

under the heading "Ideological"--assessed whether the respondent mentioned "fighting for the interests of a group, class, or party" (or in my study "the people," "the little man," etc.), "fighting for ideals, a program, a cause," or, in our study, "the chance to expound a certain philosophy or point of view" (see Appendix B, p. 197). The problem here is whether fighting for the interests of a group (e.g. the vested interests, labor, the little man, etc.) or for "ideals," a cause, etc. necessarily constitutes ideological motivation." Even ignoring the problem of the meaning of "ideological," with politicians of different types of countries and (in my study) different levels of government responding to the question, it's impossible to know what is really being measured by this "hit and miss" type of index.

Political Distrust was measured in both studies by an index composed of the following two items: "Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country," (460) and "People who go into public office usually think of the good of the people more than of their own" (461). Both were reversed for inclusion in the index. The problem here is that neither statement clearly measures "distrust." The first statement (seemingly a question more appropriately asked of a Congressman or parliamentarian) is confused by the phrase "what they think" and its reference to "most politicians" makes it unnecessarily vague. The second statement appears to measure "political altruism" as much as trust. I believe that the correlation of .22 between this index and my "articulation" dimension indicates that the more sophisticated "articulates" reject the naive idea that politicians consciously work "for the country" or to "please the people" rather than for their own interests.

The other comparisons are based on items on which both samples would respond with little difference of interpretation. Putnam measured Left/Right Extremism with a five-point scale ranging from Far Left to Far Right and I measured it with an index based on item 31--the five point Liberal/Conservative scale (473). On all other comparison variables the questions or indexes used were the same for both studies.

CHAPTER V

PATH MODEL OF AN IDEOLOGICAL
BELIEF SYSTEM

From his review of the literature on "ideology," Putnam composed a list of 14 elements or characteristics that have been linked to the concept of "ideologue."¹ Our study contains variables which measure 10 of those 14 elements² and thus provided an opportunity to see just how well these characteristics hang together. In addition, we added two measures of ideological "content," a dimension which Putnam failed to include in his analysis. Our study has a unique advantage over previous studies in that all of these variables were measured on the same set of persons. Most earlier studies concentrated on only the one or two characteristics that a particular author had seen as related to ideological thought. Because nearly all of the variables related to the concept were measured, we were able to go beyond looking at single correlations between the variables and construct a path model of related correlations.³ Thus we were able to generate a tentative picture of the direction of causal influence between these characteristics of ideological thought that is rooted in empirical evidence rather than intuitive belief.

Two general models were laid out beforehand: one in which the emotional variables are antecedent to the ideological variables,

and one in which the intellectual variables take causal precedence. In view of the near unanimity of prior writing supportive of the first model (which assumes that emotional commitment generates articulate and rigid belief systems), the model in which intellectual variables are causally prior was largely set up to serve as a stalking horse.

The findings of the path analysis were quite surprising. None of the models in which the ideological variables are the product of emotional variables fit the data, i.e. in none of the models did the reproduced correlations derived from the path coefficients consistently approximate or match the observed correlations to within sampling error (see Appendix E pages). This result directly contradicted our own prior beliefs. Instead, we found empirical fit for models in which articulation (the strongest intellectual variable) is causal antecedent to the emotional variables (i.e. flexibility, authoritarianism, emotionalism toward crime). Inserting articulation as the key antecedent variable, however, did not entirely account for the correlations among these variables. Instead there was a pattern of residual correlations which suggested that some other antecedent variable existed, one which would explain articulation, as well as education, flexibility of thought, liberalism, etc. Since these variables are all related to the quality of cognitive functioning, the obvious hypothesis was that the common antecedent variable was respondent intelligence.

Because intellectual ability never explicitly entered the hypotheses that generated this study, no measure of intelligence

was available for the analysis of the data. Thus intelligence was entered into the path models as an unobserved variable. The model which fit the data placed intelligence as a causal antecedent of articulation, but assumed that (with the exception of the Office Level variable⁴) articulation had no direct causal effect on any other variable in the model--ergo, the next few sentences do not pertain to the correlation between IQ⁵ and Office Level. Consequently, the correlation between intelligence and any other variable was assumed to be directly proportional to the correlation between that variable and articulation. These correlations are related by the equation:

$$r_{X,ART} = r_{X,IQ} \cdot r_{IQ,ART}$$

or

$$r_{X,IQ} = \frac{r_{X,ART}}{r_{IQ,ART}}$$

where IQ is intelligence, ART is articulation, and X is any other variable. Thus for such a model, there is only one unknown number which must be estimated, the correlation between articulation and intelligence ($r_{IQ,ART}$). After a little trial and error, the value $r_{IQ,ART} = .83$ seemed to give reasonable fit to the data in the sense that with that value a great many partial correlations became approximately 0 and hence a great many potential links in the path model could be eliminated.

The remaining path coefficients were estimated using the "OLS" method, i.e. the coefficients for the antecedent variables for any given variable being the beta weights for the multiple (if necessary) regression of that variable onto its antecedents.⁶

The correlations between the variables in the path model are presented in Table 5.1a. These correlations have been "corrected for attenuation" so that the betas or path coefficients encumbent upon them are not contaminated by error of measurement. The path coefficients are presented in the path diagram in Figure 5.1. The reproduced or "predicted" correlations are presented in Table 5.1b and the residual differences between the observed and the predicted path model correlations are presented in Table 5.1c.

Verification and Validation

Two issues are critical to the consideration of any correlation matrix: the issue of sampling error and the issue of measurement. The issue of measurement is primary. Are the variables labeled "authoritarianism," "liberalism," etc. really the same variables as those similarly labeled by previous investigators? In part this is a matter that can be determined by comparing the content of the items which make up the variable in this study with the content of the items in other studies. However, in this study as in most studies there is only a rough similarity in content and a certain gap exists in judging whether the variables are really equivalent. This gap is filled by statistical and empirical tests of equivalence. The most important of these is the concept which Cronbach and Meehl (1955) labeled "construct validity."⁷ They noted

TABLE 5.1.--Path Model Correlations.^a

	IQ	LIB	FLEX	ED	ART	YOUTH	SYS	AUTH	EMOT	LEVEL
a. Path Model Observed Correlations (N = 117)										
IQ:	100									
Liberalism:	47	100								
Flexibility:	62	20	100							
Education:	61	35	24	100						
Articulation:	83	39	52	51	100					
Youthfulness:	54	17	11	31	46	100				
System-Blame:	50	47	57	28	43	15	100			
Anti-Authoritarian:	49	19	23	44	41	26	27	100		
Non-Emotional:	18	29	61	16	15	07	44	29	100	
Office Level:	26	00	17	34	29	-09	-04	29	19	100
b. Path Model Predicted Correlations										
IQ:	100									
Liberalism:	47	100								
Flexibility:	43	20	100							
Education:	61	29	26	100						
Articulation:	83	39	36	51	100					
Youthfulness:	54	25	23	33	45	100				
System-Blame:	38	47	56	23	32	21	100			
Anti-Authoritarian:	48	23	21	43	40	26	19	100		
Non-Emotional:	33	19	61	22	28	18	43	27	100	
Office-Level:	26	12	11	33	29	-10	10	30	11	100
c. Residual Differences Between the Observed and the Predicted Path Model Correlations^b										
IQ:	-- ^c									
Liberalism:	0	--								
Flexibility:	19	0 ^c	--							
Education:	0 ^c	6	-2	--						
Articulation:	0 ^c	0	16	0	--					
Youthfulness:	0 ^c	-8	-12	-2	1	--				
System-Blame:	12	0 ^c	1 ^c	5	11	-6	--			
Anti-Authoritarian:	1	-4	2	1	1	0	8	--		
Non-Emotional:	-15	10	0	-6	-13	11	1	2	--	
Office-Level:	0 ^c	-12	6	1	0	1	-14	-1	8	--

^aThe correlations are based on the following items: Liberalism (32), Flexibility (527), Education (447), Articulation (523), Youthfulness (451), System-Blame (525), Anti-Authoritarian (524), Non-Emotional (518), and Office-Level (3).

^bThe standard error of a correlation based on 117 observations is approximately .09.

^cThese differences are forced to be null by the model construction process.




Figure 5.1.--Dimensions of Ideology and Office Level Path Model.

that if two variables are to be measures of the same thing, then they should have a similar pattern of correlations with other variables. Thus the validity of the measurement in the present study can be tested empirically. Do the correlations between variables in this study match those which have been found in other studies? In particular, we can have much more confidence in assigning the label "intelligence" to the unmeasured variable if its correlations with other variables match those found in other studies where intelligence was measured.

The issue of sampling error is a simple one: are some of the correlations in the model a matter of statistical fluke? This question cannot be answered in cases where there is no prior literature. But many of the variables in this model have appeared in other studies and the correlations from those studies can be compared with those here. Similarity between studies tends to statistically verify the results of both.

The issues of both verification and validation are thus served by the same operation; checking the literature for corresponding correlations in other studies. A search of this sort was conducted for all the ideological variables in the path diagram and the results of this search will be presented in the next section.

The Theoretical Meaning of the Model

The numbers in a path diagram are numbers which represent the relations between variables. These relations in turn are only abstractly related to the actual mental processes which take place inside the heads of men who are thinking about, emotionally reacting

to, or being influenced by events within their environment. It is the purpose of this section to provide a tentative explanation of the path diagram by suggesting concrete causal processes which might cause the variables to be related as they are. The most important processes are the socialization of political office-holders, their recruitment into office, and the influence of IQ on the development of various cognitive dispositions and attitudes.

One hypothesis which weaves through many of the discussions below is the hypothesis that more intelligent people are more likely to exhibit independence of thought. We derive this hypothesis from the following scenario of how this independence of thought is developed. Picture two young boys, one bright and one dull. Over the course of growing up, both have ample opportunity to contrast their thinking with that of others. The bright boy is typically correct in his reasoning about things and is often shown to be correct even when disagreeing with his parents and teachers. On the other hand, the dull boy does not form his own opinions very often and is typically wrong when he does. He is virtually never right in those cases in which he disagrees with a parent or teacher. We believe that the natural concomitant of such experience is that the bright boy will grow up trusting his own thought and will be prepared to disregard the "conventional wisdom" of his adult peers, while the dull boy will grow up with a tendency to believe that others know best and will develop a tendency to trust any authority which does not directly bring him pain.

Intelligence and Liberal Orientation

Our explanation of the correlation⁸ between IQ and Liberal Orientation is that because bright persons usually possess an independence of mind which facilitates the examination and incorporation of liberal ideas. Persons who come to realize that they have the ability to think through and resolve problems are naturally disposed against the simple acceptance of solutions that conform to the conventional wisdom. One piece of evidence in support of the idea that intelligent persons possess greater independence of mind is the correlation (r) of $-.34$ between Articulation and Delegate Role Orientation (see Chapter 4, Table 4.13). The Delegate Role Orientation item reads as follows: "A representative ought to work for what his constituents want even though this may not always agree with his personal views." The correlation indicates that articulate (intelligent) office-holders are less likely to yield their own personal views to those of their constituents than are less articulate office-holders. This willingness to express opposition toward a popular tenet of representative government demonstrates a relatively well developed independence of mind.

Bright independent, thinkers are also more apt to take up a liberal orientation for philosophical reasons. They are more likely to understand our country's heritage and accept the American cultural bias in favor of "equality among men." Consequently, they will more readily support the cause of the poor and non-powerful against the rich and powerful than less intelligent men. Hofstadter notes this tendency in his study of anti-intellectualism in America. He states

that "of all the classes which could be called in any sense privileged, . . . [the intellectual class] . . . has shown the largest and most consistent concern for the well-being of the classes which lie below it in the social scale."⁹ Of course, some bright persons will argue that the only way to help the poor is by supporting the status quo and protecting against chaos. These persons constitute a relatively small group of articulate conservatives such as William F. Buckley who hearken back to the reasoning of Edmund Burke.

The association between intelligence and liberalism has also been made by Adorno et al. (1950), Hofstadter (1962), Lipset (1959), and McClosky (1958). Adorno et al. reports that "on the average, 'liberals' . . . have been shown to be slightly more intelligent,"¹⁰ and Hofstadter, on the basis of his study of American anti-intellectualism, states with confidence that "from the Progressive era onward, the political commitment of the majority of (our) intellectual leadership . . . has been to causes that might be variously described as liberal . . . , progressive, or radical."¹¹ Lipset documents this fact and makes this finding the focus of his study on American intellectuals.¹²

McClosky also presents data which clearly links IQ with liberalism. In his study of 1082 Minnesota residents, he found that "conservatism is not the preferred doctrine of the intellectual elite or of the more intelligent segments of the population, but the reverse."¹³ On the basis of an Education Scale, an Awareness Scale (which tested a person's knowledge about and "grasp" of the social process, past and present) and an Intellectuality Scale

(which assesses "the degree to which intellectual habits have been formed and are perceived as attractive"), he concludes that liberal beliefs are found most frequently among the informed, the most educated, and so far as he could determine, the most intelligent.¹⁴ Our correlation between IQ and Liberalism is therefore in accordance with other research.

Liberalism and the System-Blame Orientation to Crime

There is a logical as well as philosophical connection between liberalism and the system blame orientation to crime. Liberalism is largely concerned with the inequality between individuals that is the product of inequality within the economic system of society. Similarly, the system blame orientation suggests that much of crime is the product of the criminal's reaction to his unfavorable position within the social and economic status hierarchy. Thus it seems likely that a person who is liberal would eventually come to believe in the system blame model as a matter of thought and argument.

However, this need not be the only process which would produce a link such as that found in the data. The philosophical link would also have been present for the person's parents. Those legislators in the sample who are liberal because their parents were liberal may also be system blame oriented because their parents were. That is, many liberal parents would have already made the connection between these two doctrines and hence would pass the two along to their children as a package.

There is another causal chain which could link liberal legislators to the system blame orientation, one which relates to their intelligence and independence of thought. Intelligent, independent thinkers are much less likely to obey moral prescriptions simply because their elders or some other authority tell them to. Thus, as teenagers, they would have been more likely to engage in such illegal activities as smoking pot, stealing hubcaps, etc. If so, then they would of necessity be more open to the idea that crime might be a transient or situational act on the part of a person who is not normally a criminal. That is, their independence of mind is likely to have lead them to commit crimes themselves at one point in their lives after which they have proceeded with a crime free lifestyle.

This scenario may be reversed in order to understand conservatives. Conservatives are committed to a philosophy which rewards individual responsibility within the context of economic affairs and are thus likely to adopt the same stance toward criminal behavior. That is, a conservative will believe that "a criminal earns his just reward when he is punished." This logical connection might be made via the person's own thoughts, or it might have been made previously by his parents and been passed along to him as a package. Furthermore, conservatives are more likely to believe in the wisdom of both their parents and other authorities and hence are more likely to have avoided any teenage illegal activity. They would also have been less likely to even interact with young people who engaged in illegal acts. Thus conservatives are likely to have always been

completely cut off from crime and criminals and would hence find it easier to believe that all crime is "evil" and that all crime is committed by evil persons.

Intelligence and Political Flexibility

The model suggests that liberals would be no more flexible than conservatives except for the fact that liberals are higher in IQ.¹⁵ It is intelligence, therefore, that produces mental flexibility. Bright persons are more politically flexible (i.e. more willing to listen to reason and to consider compromise) because their independence of mind encourages them to consider all of the behavioral alternatives in any given situation. They are more apt to rely on "reason" than authority in determining the proper course of action and are not irrevocably wed to any particular solution or approach.

The empirical evidence that IQ is correlated with mental flexibility is varied. Rokeach provides support for the hypothesis in reporting a correlation of $-.31$ (uncorrelated for attenuation) between a "rough measure of intelligence" (the American Council on Education Test) and the Gough-Sanford Rigidity Scale.¹⁶ His correlation is based on a sample of 61 introductory psychology students at Michigan State University. McClosky also reports findings which confirm the relationship, yet his evidence is indirect. In his study "Conservatism and Personality" (cited above), intelligence is linked to the doctrine of liberalism and then liberalism is linked with mental flexibility. The data indicates

that only 33% of the presumably more intelligent liberals (N=151) can be classified as "high" in mental rigidity, but that 70% of the less-intelligent, conservatives (N=144) can be so classified.¹⁷

McNemar also provides indirect support of the hypothesis. He reports positive correlations between measures of intelligence and measures of "creativity."¹⁸ "Creativity" in his work is usually defined as the ability to find novel solutions to problems and is believed by many to be closely linked to the ability to break set and consider unusual possibilities. Thus creativity seems very close to our concept of "flexibility." One study examined by McNemar (based on a sample of 7648 fifteen-year-olds) reported a correlation between intelligence and creativity of .67 (.80 when corrected for attenuation).¹⁹ On the basis of this and many other studies, he concluded that "having a high IQ is not a guarantee of being creative, . . . (but) having a low IQ means creativity is impossible."²⁰ Our study suggests that the same would hold with regard to mental flexibility.

Political Flexibility and the System-Blame Orientation to Crime

The flexible person's inclination to consider all behavioral alternatives leads him to accept newer, more advanced explanations of phenomena. The link between Political Flexibility and the "system-blame" explanation of crime confirms this thesis. The typical child is first taught the "person-blame" explanation of crime,²¹ i.e. that there are persons who are by nature evil, that these persons commit crime, and that the duty of the authorities is

to capture these persons and lock them up. Only later is the child exposed to the more advanced ideas about the factors (personality problems, environment, etc.) which promote deviance. Thus if the child is to adopt the system blame position, then he must change away from his person blame beliefs. The flexible child (or young adult) is much more likely to change his beliefs than is the rigid person, and is hence more likely to adopt the system blame orientation. The rigid person, on the other hand, is likely to stick by the theory of crime which he learned first, and regardless of the environmental stimuli he is exposed to, is more likely to hold to a person blame orientation.

Political Flexibility and a Non-Emotional Orientation Toward Crime

A flexible person is likely to generate as many ideas as he can to explain any given situation. In particular then, he is likely to generate a number of different ideas as to why some other person might commit a crime. Since he generates a number of ideas, he is more likely to come up with a rational explanation of the criminal act. Personal violence is rarely the motivating source of criminal behavior, i.e. violence offers little reward for the criminal and hence a person who views the criminal as rational will confine his worries to acts against property rather than worry about personal injury. This narrowing of perceived vulnerability to crime means that the person who views the criminal as rational will have a much lower expectation of being a victim, and if he is victimized, he will

perceive himself as merely losing belongings rather than life or limb. Thus he will be much less emotional about crime and criminals.

The rigid person tends to view the criminal in the terms in which he first learned about them, i.e. in person blame terms which assumes the criminal to be "evil." Since there are no bounds on the "evilness" of criminals comparable to those determined by the assumption of rationality, the rigid person has no reason to believe that a criminal might not desire personal injury. Thus a rigid person who is wedded to the idea of the criminal as evil will logically worry more about the safety of himself and his family and will therefore be far more emotional in his attitude toward crime.

A unique aspect of the path diagram is the fact that it posits mental flexibility and authoritarianism as determinants of emotionalism rather than vice versa. This finding is at odds with Adorno et al., Rokeach, etc., and therefore, constitutes a particularly interesting and informative discovery; a discovery which will be analyzed in the discussion section presented after our explanation of the model.

System-Blame Orientation to Crime and a Non-Emotional Orientation Toward Crime

The correlation between System-Blame Orientation to Crime and Non-Emotional Orientation stems largely from the fact that Political Flexibility is a common causal antecedent to both. If a person is flexible, then he is apt to be non-emotional because with his ability to understand why people behave as they do, he will

generally see people as rational and generally law-abiding. He will not feel personally threatened by any "criminal element" and though he may be alarmed at the increasing incidence of crime, his reaction will be to ponder new solutions to the problem rather than to panic or become emotionally upset.

The small direct path coefficient from system blame orientation to non-emotionalism (.11) might stem from a difference in the type of crime which the person associates with the term "criminal." the system blame advocate tends to see crime as stemming from the criminal's deprived economic background. Thus he thinks of "crime" as theft. On the other hand, the person blame advocate is more likely to think of crime as stemming from the "evilness" of criminals and hence is more likely to think of "crime" as personal injury.

Determinants of Authoritarian Beliefs

The model suggests that there are two determinants of an anti-authoritarian disposition; intelligence and education. Education has a direct impact on authoritarianism whereas intelligence contributes to authoritarianism in two ways; first, as a direct causal factor in its own right and second, indirectly through its impact on education.

Intelligence and Authoritarianism

As was the case with Liberal Orientation and Political Flexibility, the contribution made by intelligence is related to the mental independence usually exercised by intelligent persons. Brighter persons are more likely to think for themselves and more

likely to reject authority (i.e. the opinions and beliefs of authority figures) as being trustworthy in terms of always providing correct information or making correct judgments or decisions. The fact that intellectuals were among the first to question the credibility of Nixon's explanations about his involvement in the Watergate coverup is one example of this distrust of authority. The correlation of $-.34$ between education and authoritarianism also supports this thesis.

Correspondingly, persons of lesser intelligence are apt to defer more easily to authority or authority figures. If, from experience, a person learns that in most situations there are always smarter persons than himself, he will be inclined to think that what is needed in the world is adherence to great and gifted leaders. A person who is used to following is not as threatened by authority as a person who is accustomed to leading or thinking things out for himself.

A review of the literature reveals a good deal of other evidence that IQ is correlated with authoritarianism i.e. that persons high in IQ will tend to be anti-authoritarian. Adorno et al. cite eight correlations between IQ and the F scale which range from $-.13$ to $-.48$ (average correlation = $-.24$).²² Four of the correlations were based on a sample of 342 Maritime School Men, and the remaining four on a sample of 104 veterans. Three different types of intelligence tests were used in the reported analyses.

Christie also examines the relationship between IQ and authoritarianism and reports a correlation of $-.48$ between these

variables, which is based on his study of 182 Army recruits.²³ He points out that, on the basis of his and Adorno et al.'s evidence, there is an "increased (negative) correlation found between intelligence measures and the F scale scores as the range of intelligence measures increases."²⁴ He estimates that the correlation between IQ and F scores would, for a representative cross-sectional sample, range between $-.50$ and $-.60$. Other studies which report a negative relationship between IQ and authoritarianism are Hollander (1954) (who reports a correlation of $-.21$ based on a sample of 268 Naval Flight School Cadets who were scored on the F scale and college level American Council on Education test),²⁵ and Cohn (1957).²⁶

Intelligence, Education, and Anti-Authoritarian Orientation

The path leading from IQ to education and from education to anti-authoritarianism can be explained quite easily. Bright people get more education and education instills a distrust for authority. Education (especially American education) teaches democracy, and thereby inculcates within the educated a respect for the quality of man and a belief in individual rights and freedom. Students elect their leaders and discuss classroom issues which are often decided by majority vote. An ingrained resentment toward arbitrary decisions is fostered. In college, where many faculty members openly encourage students to think for themselves and to distrust authority, the penchant for anti-authoritarian attitudes is developed to an even greater extent. This relationship between education and anti-authoritarianism has been substantiated in literally hundreds of

studies.²⁷ The .44 correlation (Table 5.1) and the beta of .22 in the path diagram are consistent with these findings. Furthermore, Christie (1954) not only reports correlations substantiating the present findings for intelligence and education separately, he also reports partial correlations between IQ and the F-scale with education held constant (-.20) and between education and the F-scale with IQ held constant (-.20) which confirm the structure posited for all three variables in the present study.²⁸

Anti-Authoritarian Orientation and Non-Emotional Orientation Toward Crime

The correlation of .29 between "anti-authoritarianism" and "non-emotionalism" is accounted for in part by the fact that IQ is antecedent to both of these variables. If IQ were held constant, then the correlation between Authoritarianism and Emotionalism would drop from .29 to the level determined solely by the direct link which is .14. The same effect would occur if the link between IQ and Emotionalism were eliminated by controlling for the mediating variables of Flexibility (i.e. Rigidity) and Liberalism (i.e. Conservatism). Our explanation for this is that most authoritarians place a high premium on the maintenance of social order and hence feel hostility toward anyone who threatens this order. For this reason they would be hostile towards criminals. Evidence of this tendency in authoritarians is reported in Adorno et al. (1950), Christie (1954) and Roberts and Jessor (1958).²⁹

The path diagram shows that emotionalism with respect to crime is best predicted by assessing a person's mental flexibility

rather than his tendency to be authoritarian. This is compatible to Giovanni Sartori's thesis that emotionalism is more directly related to mental inflexibility than to authoritarian belief, i.e. dogmatism.³⁰ The diagram also suggests that, without differences in IQ, authoritarians would be no more likely to be politically inflexible than non-authoritarians. The partial correlation between "anti-authoritarianism" and "political flexibility" with IQ held constant is .03.³¹ The observed correlation between these variables simply reflects the fact that differences in IQ produces common differences in each.

Authoritarianism and Office Level

The correlation of $-.29$ between Anti-Authoritarianism and Office Level indicates that the number of authoritarians declines as office level increases. This confirms Lasswell's (1954) prediction that authoritarians would not be found in high office.³² However, despite the age of this hypothesis and its wide citation, there are apparently no studies in the previous literature which bear directly on this hypothesis. There is a related finding in the study of lobbyists conducted by Milbrath and Klein (1962).³³ They found a correlation of $-.08$ between the F-scale (a measure of Authoritarianism) and the holding of political office. There are at least two possible explanations for such a finding.

Lasswell (1954) derived his hypothesis from a psychoanalytic model of the authoritarian personality which he borrowed from Adorno et al. In this model, the authoritarian is rigidly wedded to a

clear-cut (usually hierarchically arranged) social structure because with so much anxiety, any uncertainty threatens to overwhelm his defenses and unleash his pent up anti-social impulses (i.e. unconscious aggression or rage). Since the essence of legislative life is an uncertain bargaining and lobbying process, Lasswell predicted that authoritarians would be unable to cope with the resultant anxiety produced in such an environment. Thus though some might enter the legislature, they would drop out before they would attain high office.

A second explanation can be generated without any need to hypothesize that authoritarians are psychologically deficient. One need only consider their values and preferences in life style. Authoritarians believe that human behavior only becomes efficient and socially oriented if it is conducted within a system of clearly defined personal responsibility. They are likely to characterize the constant social interaction of legislative life as "useless chit-chat" and are likely to be repulsed by the "waste and inefficiency" of bargaining and lobbying procedures. Thus it would not be long before they would want to return to or find some other environment which better fits their value system. In a nutshell, authoritarians are boot-polishers and not glad-handers; they are bosses and not mediators; and thus they do not fit in a legislative context.

The present data cannot distinguish between these two explanations.

Intelligence and Articulation

The reason for the high correlation between IQ and Articulation is straight forward. Intelligent persons possess the mental capability to manipulate and organize words and ideas in a relatively easy fashion. Consequently, as they are exposed to formal and informal educational experiences, they develop the mental and verbal skills necessary, to speak in an abstract, organized, and comprehensive manner to a much greater extent than persons who are not as intelligent. The fact that most IQ tests contain a verbal skills component (e.g. the Differential Aptitudes Test (DAT), the Primary Mental Abilities Test (PMA), the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Adults³⁴) also acknowledges the presumably high (yet less than perfect) correlation between IQ and articulation.

What is interesting about the placement of Articulation in the path diagram is the fact that education is not posited as a mediating variable between IQ and Articulation. This means that when IQ is held constant, the partial correlation between Education and Articulation is 0. This surprising result may be accounted for by the following theory.

There are three things which are required before a person can generate an articulate discussion of a given topic. The person must have either knowledge (true or false) or some theory about the topic, the person must have the vocabulary to express his ideas, and the person must be able to organize his thoughts in a systematic and logical manner. Consider first the acquisition of the knowledge required to make a statement about the topic. Knowledge can be

acquired either through formal education or through such informal processes as personal experience, leisure reading (newsmagazines, science fiction, novels, etc.), or television. Which of these processes predominates would presumably depend on the topic. A topic such as "the labelling theory of deviance"³⁵ would probably only be acquired in a formal and advanced course in sociology or some related field and knowledge about this theory would thus be correlated with amount of education. However, the topic of crime is a popular one. Many elements of police and legal work have been meticulously and vociferously presented in television police stories. In addition, other criminal cases such as the Manson murders often generate considerable technical discussion of issues related to crime in the nightly news. Thus knowledge of crime is easily obtained through informal channels and will thus be relatively uncorrelated with education.

What about vocabulary? Any person familiar with standardized tests such as the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) can supply bushels of data to show dramatic evidence of increased vocabulary produced by the experience of formal post-high school education. But what is the nature of that vocabulary: To a considerable extent it consists of the conceptual terms of the various fields of knowledge, e.g. biological terms such as "endocrine," political terms such as "constituency," etc. If a topic requires such words for a discussion, then articulation on such a topic would be correlated with differences in amount of formal education. But what of a topic such as crime? If men were to consider some of the theories put

forth in current criminology, then a high level of familiarity with the terms used in criminology would be required before the correlation would eventuate. None of the legislators in our sample, however, expressed awareness of these theories. Most of the discussions of crime were pitched at a traditional level of knowledge and hence used vocabulary which is readily available in newsmagazines such as those which are mostly read by the men in this sample. Thus, the specialized vocabulary which is the product of a high degree of education were not required or present in these discussions.

What about the ability of persons to systematically organize their thoughts? Are there professional experiences which might promote such activity as forcefully as does formal education? The occupations which most obviously provide such experience are those which require a good deal of public speaking, e.g. elected public officials, professors, etc. Similarly, businessmen who write memos and reports, lawyers who write briefs, etc., are also apt to develop organization of thought. Since most men in politics are from communication-oriented professions, there is no reason to suppose that they would require the experience afforded by formal education in order to have acquired such skill as their ability allows. However, had this sample included people with less than high school educations, then this argument might not apply.

The upshot of these paragraphs is that by dint of the choice of the topic of crime, this study set up a situation in which education was irrelevant to the extent of a person's degree of articulation

in discussion and hence set up a situation in which articulation would be a relatively pure indicator of IQ.

Education and Office Level

Given the nature of the political offices occupied by our sample members, the positive relationship between education and office-level is not surprising. The increased financial and personal mobility requirements which apply to office-holding at the state and federal levels of government means that usually only professional and/or financially successful persons can afford to hold these offices.³⁶ Consequently, people recruited to these offices will generally have more education than candidates for city council positions. The correlation of .45 between Respondent Occupational Status and Office-Level, and the correlation of .46 between Respondent Occupational Status and Education supports this thesis.

Whereas only 28% of the 50 city councilmen had obtained more than 16 years of formal education, the comparable figures for the state legislators (N=51) was 40%, and for congressmen (N=17) 70%. Similar and corroborating evidence can be found in Table A.5 of Appendix A. This table compares our sample to samples from three separate studies on city councilmen (Prewitt, 1970), state legislators (Wahlke et al., 1962), and congressional candidates (Fishe1, 1973). These studies show that 48% of the city councilmen (N=365) had 16 years or more of formal education, in comparison to 55% of the state legislators (N=474) and 75% of the House members of the 88th Congress (N=435).³⁷

The attraction of lawyers to politics because of the perceived "name recognition" benefits which can enhance a lawyer's law practice also contributes to the positive Education/Office-Level relationship. Though our study did not separate the lawyers from the other "professionals" in the sample, support can be found in the three studies alluded to above. Prewitt's data indicates that only 10% of his sample of San Francisco area city councilmen were lawyers.³⁸ Businessmen outnumbered lawyers by a ratio of 5 to 1.³⁹ In comparison, Wahlke et al. (1962) report that in 1957, 52% of all state legislators in New Jersey, 36% of the Ohio legislators, and 30% of the legislators in both California and Tennessee were lawyers.⁴⁰ The average percentage of lawyers in congressional seats is higher still. Fishel reports that 50% of the House members in the 88th Congress were lawyers,⁴¹ and Eulau and Sprague (1964) cite studies which indicate that lawyers have comprised between 50% and 60% of the House and Senate memberships since the late 1920's.⁴²

In addition, the tendency for more highly educated persons to concentrate in the higher offices can be explained by the fact that articulation skills play a larger role in campaigns for these offices. More articulate, and hence usually more educated persons, are apt to be candidates for these offices simply because there is a stronger requirement at the higher office levels for candidates adept at speech-making and adept at using media resources to elicit voter support.

Articulation and Office Level

The relationship between Articulation and Office-Level is similar to that between Education and Office Level. The fact that running for higher office normally requires greater candidate financial security, personal mobility and communication skills than running for lower offices means that relatively more articulate persons are liable to be candidates for the state legislative and congressional offices. The correlation of .29 between Articulation and Office-Level, the correlation of .45 between Respondent Occupational Status and Office-Level, and the correlation of .33 between Education and Office-Level all support this reasoning.

Intelligence and Youthfulness

The correlation of .54 between "youthfulness" and "IQ" indicates that the younger office-holders are more intelligent than the older office-holders; a correlation which would not hold in the population at large. Our explanation of this relationship was devised after three other hypotheses were rejected.

The first hypothesis assumed that younger office-holders would be brighter because of changing times, i.e. because candidates for office today have to be brighter than they had to be in the past. The "changing times" hypothesis presumed that in the old days, candidates for office were recruited primarily by political parties ("machines"?) and social organizations, and persons got into office mainly on the strength of their popularity with organization leaders. Candidacy and re-election required the development and maintenance

of a social network of political supporters. In recent times, however, the declining strength of party organization, the increased importance of issues as determinants of voting behavior, and the advent of electronic media as a potent campaign weapon has changed the nature of political recruitment. No longer are candidates elected simply on the basis of their popularity among "good ol' boy" power brokers.

To become a candidate and win political office in recent times, a person need not please party or other political chieftains as much as know how to appeal to the people who vote. Intelligence, the ability to speak knowledgeably about issues, and the ability to make proper use of television and radio appearances have become the key ingredients for electoral victory. Consequently, in contrast to the old days, a more intelligent set of persons are being attracted to and recruited for political office. In addition, because there is comparably less need in recent times for persons to work their way up in the local party or "power structure" to become a candidate, younger persons are finding it easier to get into office.

According to the "changing times" hypothesis, the legislators who entered public office years ago are--as a group--less bright than the legislators entering office in recent years. However, if year of entry into political office were held constant, the office-holders would all be approximately the same in intelligence. Hence, to test the "changing times" explanation, we looked for support of the null hypothesis: $r_{IQ,AGE \cdot EXP} = 0$, where IQ = intelligence,

AGE = age of the respondent, and EXP = experience; the number of years the respondent has served in political office. With office experience held constant, the partial correlation between IQ and age is $-.53$, a clear rejection of the null hypothesis. This relationship held across office-level also, with the same partial correlation for city councilmen being $-.33$, for the state representatives $-.42$ and for the congressmen $-.30$.

The failure of the "changing-times" hypothesis means that one or more of the assumptions which make up the hypothesis is false. We found no support for the idea that more intelligent men and women are entering our legislative bodies today than yesterday. Thus, there is no reason to suspect that a perceived change in recruitment criteria has produced a brighter type of office candidate. Persons recruited for office today may have to do more public speaking and deal more with media personnel than with party organization bosses, but these differences do not appear to have produced a change in the general level of intelligence required of office-holders.

Our second hypothesis explaining why younger office-holders are likely to be more intelligent than older office-holders was the "selection-in" hypothesis. This hypothesis assumed that the length of time it takes for a person to gain political office is a function of their intelligence. The more intelligent the person, the earlier in life he will be "selected" into office. In addition, the higher the level of a person's first office, the brighter a person must be if he enters young. As a group, young office-holders will be more

intelligent than older office-holders. The older legislators may either be bright persons who entered office young and stayed in office, or less intelligent persons who got into office relatively late in life. The latter would likely be persons trusted by party leaders in relatively safe districts that are being sent to the legislature or Congress because of their presumed loyalty to the party.

If the "selection-in" hypothesis were to account for the data, then people who entered office at an early age would on the average be brighter than those who entered office relatively late in life. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the correlation between AGE AT ENTRY⁴³ and IQ is $-.20$. Is it the case that this difference in brightness between young entrants and older entrants is sufficient to account for the correlation between age and IQ? To test for this, the partial correlation between age and IQ was calculated with AGE AT ENTRY held constant. This partial correlation, however, is not 0 but $-.52$. Thus although brighter people tend to be elected at a younger age, this fact does not by itself account for the very large correlation found between IQ and age.

The third hypothesis considered is the "selection-out" hypothesis. This hypothesis asserts that bright office holders will be more likely to leave the legislative body for greener pastures than less intelligent legislators. Bright, young office-holders are apt to find that in comparison to other government or business jobs, a legislative position offers little in terms of

pay, job security, or opportunity for advancement. Unless he or she has a very safe district, is content with only an average income, and feels confident that in a few years he or she will have decision-making influence in the legislature, there is liable to develop within the person a great incentive to leave office. Legislators are continually in contact with businessmen/lobbyist type persons who know about available jobs, and often with men who are in charge (or who personally know who is in charge) of staffing governmental positions within the state or federal bureaucracy. In time, therefore, many bright office-holders will opt for the higher paying and more secure jobs they have heard about through their legislative contacts.




Figure 5.2.--The Relationship between Experience, Age and Intelligence.

The statistical impact of this assumption is brought out in Figure 5.2 which shows the longevity of various cohorts in the legislature as a function of intelligence. The symbols D and B at the beginning of each cohort stand for the dull (less intelligent) and bright (more intelligent) groups respectively. In each cohort, the bright group has a shorter longevity than does the dull group. The point of observation of a cross-sectional study such as this one is represented by the dotted vertical line made at a given point in time. The longevity lines of some cohorts cross this dotted line while the longevity lines of other cohorts do not. It is those groups whose longevity line crosses the dotted line which will actually have members who are present in the study. By simple count it is clear that for the older cohorts only the line for the dull group crosses the vertical line. Thus older members of the study tend to be duller than do younger members.

A second implication of this hypothesis is also brought out in Figure 5.2, but it is brought out by considering the dotted and reversed axis drawn at the bottom of the graph. This axis shows that years of experience in office, i.e. EXP, is confounded with the year at entry of a given member. That is, a member with 10 years of experience is a person who entered legislative office 10 years before. By looking above each point on this axis, you can see which cohorts have this number of years of experience and have contributed respondents to our study. By count it is thus shown that for a higher number of years of experience, only the duller cohorts will still be around to be members of the study.

This generates the bivariate scatterplot of IQ and years of experience which is shown in Figure 5.3. This figure makes it clear that the "selection-out" hypothesis not only predicts a very large correlation between age and IQ, but also a very large correlation between experience and IQ. This correlation is borne out in the data: $r_{IQ,EXP} = -.51$.




Figure 5.3.--The Predicted Scatterplot for Years of Experience in the Legislature as a Function of the Intelligence of the Legislator (line - Cohort arithmetic mean intelligence).

Since age at entry is irrelevant to the "selection-out" hypothesis (because it concerns only years of office experience), this hypothesis could only account for all the data if the correlation between IQ and age of entry were 0. But that correlation is $-.20$. Thus, the pure "selection-out" hypothesis is also not sufficient to account for all the data.

What explanation will account for all these findings? We feel that the simplest explanation is a combination of the second

and third hypotheses, i.e. we believe that there is both selection-in and selection out of the legislature on the basis of IQ. That is, we believe that brighter people tend to enter the legislature young and then tend to leave the legislature once they find greener pastures of employment.

Youthfulness and Office Level

The inverse relationship between Youthfulness and Office Level⁴⁴ can be explained by looking at the characteristics of the different offices which encourage office-holders to leave, stay, or advance in office. As shown in Table 2.1 the average number of years in office for City Councilmen is 4.1, for State Representatives 6.1 and for Congressmen 9.0. This means that the higher offices offer more in terms of career potential, i.e. they allow men to stay longer once elected. For this reason, office-holders at the higher levels can be expected to be older.

The offices differ substantially in the types of incentives or rewards offered for continuous service. The city councilmen office offers no (or only insignificant) monetary reward, and election is often viewed in terms of "citizen duty" rather than personal gain.⁴⁵ The office is usually non-partisan and thus candidacy requirements are minimal.⁴⁶ Young persons can run for the office, for instance, without having had to prove party loyalty.⁴⁷ Also because campaign expenditures are lower for city council candidates than candidates for higher office, younger, less financially secure persons are not disadvantaged in this regard.

The office of State Representative requires a great deal more in the way of political commitment than the office of City Councilman. One must usually pull up stakes, change one's occupational status or modus operandi and move to or travel each week to the State Capitol to fulfill the duties of office. Except for established professionals or successful (often older) businessmen, most people cannot afford to do this. The monetary reward for serving as a state legislator may also prompt a desire to stay in office for a longer period of time. While not a great deal by itself (in Michigan a State Representative receives a salary of \$19,000 and an expense account of \$3,500 for a total of \$22,500 per year) the salary makes a nice second income which most people would be loathe to give up.

The "seniority system" which operates at the state level and the fact that most state representatives have "safe" districts also promotes longevity in office and works to increase the "average age of state representatives. Redistricting plans tend to keep the number of competitive districts at a minimum so that most incumbents wishing to remain in office are fairly assured of being re-elected. In addition, though the "seniority" rule is not adhered to as rigidly as in Congress, it nevertheless works to reward longevity in office by allotting positions of influence to legislators with career aspirations. Senior legislators with influence on important committees also find it easier to obtain the media exposure and campaign funds necessary to insure their re-election. Finally, local offices such as the city council position often serve as a

stepping stone to state legislative office, and hence, state representatives can be expected to be older than city councilmen.

Congressmen can be expected to be older than State Representatives for the same reasons which account for the difference between city councilmen and state representatives.⁴⁸ The greater expense in terms of campaign expenditure, resettlement in Washington D.C., and travel to and from one's district mean that congressmen must usually either be established professionals, successful businessmen, or have built up a loyal and prosperous following among the party members and contributors in his district. All of these statuses usually require time to achieve and presage a higher average age for persons entering and staying in Congress. The congressional "seniority system" encourages career motivation in similar fashion to its influence at the state level. In addition, many congressmen have advanced to their office after serving many years in lower offices. Thus congressmen, as a group, can be expected to be older than state representatives or city councilmen.

Missing Paths

Perhaps as much can be learned by examining the missing paths in a path model as can be learned by examining the direct links of causation. It is the missing paths or relationships which are the most absolute type of finding. Earlier we discussed the absence of relationship between authoritarianism and political flexibility (pp. 21-22) as well as the missing link between education and articulation (pp. 25-27). Two other "missing paths"

will be discussed; the lack of direct relationship between Youthfulness and Education, and between Education and Liberalism.

Missing Path Between Youthfulness and Education

Given that educational levels have been increasing in the past few decades--with more and more persons going to college or obtaining other post-high school training, we expected that age, in a sense, would determine level of education simply as a matter of "changing times." Young persons--as a group--would naturally have more education than older office-holders. The partial correlation between Youthfulness and Education with IQ held constant is $-.03$ however, suggesting that for our sample, age does not have an independent effect on education.

This partial correlation indicates that for political office-holders, times have not changed--i.e. the educational level of young and old alike is quite similar. The average education of our sample is 15.7 years with only a small degree of variance across office-level. Apparently within the last 15 to 20 years (the span in which all but a few of our sample entered political office) there has been no significant change in the education level of candidates for public office.

We conclude that education is correlated with age only to the extent that each is correlated with IQ. If it were not for the fact that the brighter office-holders (apparently) obtained more education, and that the brighter office-holders are younger

than those less-bright, there would be no correlation between age and education.

Missing Path between Liberalism and Education

One might have expected that education would be a direct cause of "liberal" orientation toward politics in the path diagram. At first glance it seems reasonable that persons with more education would more readily adopt the liberal values of American democracy and be less tolerant of doctrine which argues against individual freedom and equality. Our data suggests, however, that except for the fact that brighter persons are both more liberal and more educated, there is no evidence that these variables are correlated (i.e. $r_{ED,LIB \cdot IQ} = .09$).

We believe that education does not contribute directly to a liberal orientation because for many people and particularly our legislators, the educational experience does or did not contain any discussion which would promote liberal values.⁴⁹ The evidence suggests that most high school civics courses have concentrated on politically neutral questions concerning "citizen responsibilities," the formal structure of government, etc., without ever dealing with formative or controversial topics (e.g. those which examine value implications of governmental policy, note the disparity between our social reality and our democratic ideals, etc.) which would nurture liberal beliefs.⁵⁰ Most college students, past or present, have not had such experiences either. Unless students enroll in courses which examine social reality with the view that

governmental policy effects that reality, it is doubtful that their educational experience will stimulate development of liberal (or even conservative) beliefs.⁵¹ Though we do not know the composition of educational experience of our respondents, education per se does not appear to account for the incidence of liberal and conservative orientation among these office holders.

Discussion

What are the implications of this study for the concept of "ideology" and its usefulness in explaining political behavior? Our study reflects on the semantic or definitional problems related to the concept as well as the role which "ideologues" (i.e. the bearers of ideological beliefs and cognitive traits) play within social movements.

Definitional Problems with the Term "Ideologue"

The question of what elements or characteristics pertain to the concept of "ideology" or "ideologue" has been a major concern throughout this study.⁵² Our historical analysis of the concept (Chapter 1) as well as our examination of beliefs with respect to crime (Chapters 3 and 4) indicate that at least three general dimensions are important to any definition; cognitive style (articulation), emotional commitment, and substantive content (person-blame/system-blame orientation). We found however, that these dimensions were only weakly correlated with each other (see Chapter 4, pp. 43-44). Five other traits which have been associated with ideology (IQ, education, liberalism, mental rigidity, and

authoritarianism) were incorporated in the path model. These traits or variables are only correlated to a moderate or small degree--either with each other or with the three variables which were derived from the discussion of crime (see Table 5.1). Furthermore, in order that all the correlations in the matrix be positive, the correlations for authoritarianism, emotionalism, and mental rigidity had to be reversed. These findings have important semantic consequences.

Had the correlations among the "ideological" variables been high, it would not matter which trait was chosen as the definitive criterion of ideology, for any trait selected would imply the presence of the others. However, the correlations are only moderate. Thus if any one trait is chosen as the definitive ideological characteristic, that trait would imply the presence of some of the other traits only to a small extent and would not imply others at all.

The fact that we had to reverse the correlations of authoritarianism, emotionalism and mental rigidity is a reversal of the expectations implicit in the definition of "ideologue" espoused by such men as Lasswell, Adorno et al., and Rokeach. These men assumed that the traits of authoritarianism, emotionalism and mental rigidity would be highly and positively correlated with articulation. Our data shows these correlations to be $-.41$, $-.15$ and $-.52$ respectively, a clear repudiation of their assumption.

Keying on different traits as the definitive characteristic of ideological thought can yield "ideologues" with different and

even opposite types of characteristics. For example, if you accept Converse and Putnam's belief that articulation is the definitive characteristic of ideological thought, the person you label as an ideologue will not only be articulate, but will also be mentally flexible ($r = .52$), anti-authoritarian ($r = .41$), and slightly non-emotional ($r = .15$). If mental rigidity was considered the key definitional criterion of the ideologue, the implication would be that ideologues are relatively inarticulate (.52), somewhat authoritarian (.23), and emotional (.61). If authoritarianism were selected, ideologues would be inarticulate (.41), would tend to be mentally rigid (.23). If emotionalism was assumed to be the definitive ideological characteristic, the ideologue would be mentally inflexible (.61), somewhat prone to authoritarianism (.29), and would show a slight tendency to be inarticulate (.15).

If a person keys on content as the defining variable there are similar problems. The general content dimension (Liberal/Conservative Orientation) is only moderately correlated (.47) with the specific content dimension (Person-Blame/System-Blame Explanation of Crime). This means that persons who consider themselves liberal in terms of a general political orientation are not always liberal across the more specific content areas-- i.e. crime, welfare, environment, etc. Furthermore, the two content measures are only moderately related to other ideological characteristics. Left-wing radicals are apt to be more flexible, more articulate, but less emotional about their political beliefs than conservatives or right-wing extremists. This is an important

finding in its own right in that it runs counter to the vast amount of literature which equates all varieties of political extremism with emotionalism, inflexibility, etc. In sum, the "content" dimensions suffer the same limitation as the other variables which a person might claim as the definitive ideological trait.

The semantic issue related to the concept of ideology cannot be solved. Most authors who have written about ideologues have based their definitions on false conceptions about the substance or nature of the ideologue's belief system. Our study shows that the set of traits heretofore defined as "ideological" cannot provide a consistent definitional criterion for the concept.

Putnam's Approach to Ideology

The path model also reflects on Putnam's assumption that a single index (his "ideological style index") can incorporate the "most central" characteristics which describe the concept "ideological."⁵³ Recall, however, that in Chapter IV we present evidence that Putnam's ISI is no more than a measure of articulation. Furthermore, the path analysis now shows us that cognitive style (articulation) is not related to other important ideological traits except as it is mediated through intelligence. In fact, for articulation to be positively related to the emotionalism dimension, the emotional variable had to be reversed in sign.

Putnam argues that cognitive style is the basic determinant of the various aspects of ideological thought. Our data shows, however, that ideology is not a matter of cognitive style, i.e.

of how one views the world, it is a matter of mental ability. It relates not just to the fact that some people are knowledgeable and organized in their thinking and others are less knowledgeable and disorganized, it relates to the fact that people are knowledgeable and organized to the extent that they grasp ideas and facts within a particular issue domain, or are non-emotional, non-authoritarian, liberal, etc. to the extent their mental ability permits ideational flexibility. Intelligence, not merely cognitive style, is the key to the presence or absence of those traits and characteristics deemed "ideological."

Emotionalism: A Product of Rigidity and Authoritarian Belief

As we noted earlier, our path model is unique in that it posits mental flexibility and authoritarianism as determinants of emotionalism rather than vice versa. This puts us at odds with writers such as Adorno et al. (1950), Lasswell (1954), Rokeach (1960), and Sartori (1969) who assume that it is because persons are emotional (usually described as suffering "status anxiety" or "emotional ambivalence") that they become rigid and/or authoritarian.⁵⁴ These authors believe that emotion (anxiety) automatically freezes a person's thought processes and drives them to grasp authoritarianism as a means of obtaining predictability in their lives. A person must be non-emotional, therefore, before he can have flexibility of thought.

We believe that there are two different sources of emotionalism concerning crime: the specific beliefs of the authoritarians

and their rigidity in thought. The authoritarian believes that adherence to the commands of superiors is the very foundation of society and he is incensed when he sees a criminal challenge this foundation. Criminal activity is seen as a challenge to his values and hence produces an emotional response.⁵⁵ On the other hand, fear of crime and fear of criminals can stem from ignorance and a tendency to grossly distort the nature of men who do things counter to that which is done by the typical citizen.⁵⁶ These distortions would be most frequent among those of lower IQ who lack the mental facility to go beyond childhood fairy tales in seeking explanations for a criminal's behavior. Those of low IQ cannot understand the rational elements of criminal thought and hence picture criminals as irrational monsters. A strong emotional response thus follows from perceptual distortions and inflexible thought patterns. Since the authoritarian is low in IQ and highly inflexible, he will thus be subject to unrealistic fears.

Why has there been no previous challenge to the long-standing claim that emotionalism creates rigidity and authoritarianism? In part there has been no challenge because this hypothesis is ubiquitous in the social sciences and hence has never received a jaundiced critique. But there are also methodological reasons why this hypothesis would not be discovered to be false. Most prior investigators have never looked at their data for more than two variables at a time, and there is nothing in single correlations such as that between authoritarianism and ethnocentrism to suggest the direction of causation. Instead, the direction in simple

correlations is left to interpretation derived apart from the data, and these authors simply inserted the most plausible interpretation at hand. Our analysis focused on the entire pattern of correlations among the variables, however, and models which posit that emotionalism causes authoritarianism and mental rigidity simply do not fit the data. No model in which the cognitive variables were not prior to emotional variables in the causal diagram fit the data at all. Thus our path model revealed that rigidity of thought and authoritarian belief produce emotionalism and not vice versa.

Ideologues and Radical Social Movements

That Lasswell et al. would assume that members of radical social movements (i.e. ideologues) are both articulate and emotional is not surprising for such a belief is widespread. The image of the ideologue has been that of the impassioned revolutionary; a man of words totally committed to the struggle against political injustice. He is often referred to as a "fanatic,"⁵⁷ "zealot,"⁵⁸ or, more respectfully, as a "charismatic leader,"⁵⁹ all terms which suggest a man both articulate and emotionally committed in belief. Our study shows, however, that the more articulate a person, the less likely it is that he will be emotional or inflexible in belief. The question, therefore, is why has the assumption that ideologues are both articulate and emotional been so widely accepted?

We suspect that it relates to a methodological artifact. Most field or biographical studies about ideologues have focused on the leaders of radical social movements. Leaders of these

movements are apt to be emotionally committed or at least appear to be emotionally committed⁶⁰ to their beliefs for at least three reasons.

1. leaders usually possess a genuine ideological commitment to the principles of the movement; a commitment often born out of frustration and hatred toward the present or past regime.⁶¹
2. as a coalition builder, the leader must use emotional appeals to (a) weld a unification of purpose among contending interests within the movement⁶² and (b) to build the legitimacy of the movement among the masses.⁶³
3. the leader's challenge of the status quo will make he or she fearful of reprisals by members of the current or past political establishment and this fear will manifest itself in increased emotional commitment or rhetoric.

Thus because scholars studying ideology have drawn a biased sample (by looking primarily at leader-ideologues) they have consistently reported a high correlation between articulation and emotionalism among ideologues. This constitutes a narrow view of the concept "ideologue" and a narrow view of the persons found within radical social movements.

TABLE 5.2.--Types of Members of Ideological Social Movements with Respect to their Emotional and Articulation Characteristics.

	EMOTIONAL	NON-EMOTIONAL
ARTICULATE	Leader-Ideologues	Theoreticians Political Functionaries
INARTICULATE	True Believers Misfits Bomb Throwers, etc.	Fellow Travelers Financial Supporters, etc.

We believe that if one examines a radical social movement in its entirety, four different types of members will be found. These four types are shown in Table 5.2. The members of a radical social movement may vary both in terms of their degree of articulateness and the degree to which they are emotionally committed to their political or ideological beliefs. These differences are apt to be related to the role or function that a member is playing within the movement, or perhaps to the phase in which the movement is proceeding.⁶⁴ The point, however, is that members of radical social movements are not all highly articulate and emotional persons, even though they all support an ideological cause.

Ideologues and Anti-Intellectualism

There is a widespread belief that intellectuals are likely to be extreme, emotional and rigid in their thinking, particularly among conservatives. McClosky⁶⁵ writes that conservatives--out of a fear and distrust of that which they cannot understand--tend "to derogate reason and intellectuality" and "are inclined to regard pure intellectual activity as dangerous to established arrangements. Intellectuals are likely to be impractical dreamers and potential radicals, unstable people whose theories may weaken the foundations of the social order."⁶⁶ The intellectual as ideologist is particularly feared, adds Hofstadter, for the ideologist "is an object of unqualified suspicion, resentment, and distrust."⁶⁷ He explains that whereas the intellectual as expert "appears as a threat to dominate or destroy the ordinary individual, the ideologist is widely believed to have already destroyed a cherished American society."

Hofstadter also writes that the intellectual "imperatively feels" that ideas are of signal importance in human life. He warns against the intellectual's commitment to belief. He cautions that behind this commitment "is the belief that in some measure the world should be made responsive to his capacity for rationality, his passion for justice and order: out of this conviction arises much of his value to mankind and, equally, much of his ability to do mischief."⁶⁸

Our data does not support the idea that intellectuals will be emotional or rigid in thought. Articulation is correlated with emotionalism $-.15$ and with inflexibility of thought $-.52$. To the contrary, it suggests that articulate persons--those persons who possess organized belief systems, constrained by overarching principles--are likely to be somewhat unemotional and very probably open to compromise and the consideration of different ideas. Yet these are traits which are normally associated with the pragmatist.

Is it impossible for an "ideologue" to be "pragmatic?" This depends on the definitions of these terms. If an "ideologue" is defined to be any man who has an organized belief system from which he derives his action, and a "pragmatist" is defined to be any man who never uses a theory to determine his actions, then by definition a pragmatist cannot be ideological. But an ideologue does not derive his actions from a theory in order to satisfy some abstract stylistic principle of consistency, he uses a theory only because he believes it to be a faithful and hence useful

picture of political reality. His primary concern, therefore, is the same as that of the classic pragmatist: to obtain a workable solution to political problems. The characteristic most commonly used to describe or define the pragmatist is his openness to new ideas and new evidence. Our data indicates, however, that an ideologue tends to be more flexible than those who are less articulate. Indeed it indicates that a person who has articulated a theory may be more able to see its flaws and weaknesses than someone who is less articulate, but no less convinced. In this vein, our data suggests that more articulate politicians will be more pragmatic than those who entertain fewer ideas, who are less flexible, and who are more emotional.

Much of the anti-intellectualism in current political thought is the product of the early research on ideology and ideologues. These researchers appeared to have established a permanent bond between articulate thought, emotionalism and mental rigidity. The empirical underpinnings of this pervasive belief were never established, however, and the evidence to the contrary was weak and easily ignored. Certainly the horrors committed by intellectuals such as Stalin, Hitler and Mao are proof that Plato's notion of the philosopher-king was a gross over-statement of the intellectual's political beneficence. On the other hand, our research shows that the image of the intellectual as a wild-eyed radical is even less realistic. Perhaps this research can mark the beginning of the rehabilitation of the intellectual in political life.

Chapter V--Footnotes

¹Putnam's 14 elements are listed in Table 4.1 of Chapter IV.

²Our study incorporates six distinct ideological dimensions: articulation, mental flexibility, emotionalism, authoritarianism, liberalism and system-blame orientation toward crime. Four of these serve to measure 10 of the 14 characteristics listed by Putnam. The "articulation" variable measures the characteristics described (and numbered) by Putnam as (1) having "a comprehensive, consistent, deductively organized belief system," (2) having "an explicit, consciously held belief system," (6) possessing "a philosophy of history and/or a social theory that is applied to every day questions and issues," and (7) being "concerned with abstract principles, and not concrete interests." The "political flexibility" variable serves to measure the characteristics which he listed as (3) having "a belief system that is closed, rigid, resistant to new information," (5) having "a belief system that distorts or oversimplifies reality, that is biased or irrational," (10) being "opposed to compromise, bargaining, incrementalism, and other aspects of pluralist politics," and (13) being "oriented to conflict and opposed to consensus." The "emotional orientation toward crime" variable measures Putnam's characteristic (4) having "a belief system that is affectively or emotionally charged" and the "authoritarianism" variable measures his characteristic (14) being "an authoritarian or moral absolutist."

We feel that two of Putnam's "elements" do not apply to the concept "ideologue." His characteristic (8) "future oriented, utopian" does not allow for the consideration of ideologues who are committed to re-instatement of past regimes, and his characteristic (11) "alienated from established social and political institutions" implies that political leaders (e.g. Hitler, Stalin, Mao) cannot be considered as ideologues. Both are unnecessarily restrictive in scope.

The two elements which we did not measure are Putnam's characteristics (9) "partisan hostility" and (12) political "extremism." Two dimensions which are incorporated in our study of ideology are "liberalism" and "system-blame explanation of crime." These are both measures of ideological "content;" a dimension which Putnam does not include in his definition of ideology.

³For a straight forward explanation of Path Analysis and its computational requirements, see Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "Determining the Importance of an Independent Variable: A Path

Analysis Solution," Social Science Research, 3 (June, 1974), 95-107; Donald E. Stokes, "Compound Paths: An Expository Note," American Journal of Political Science, 18 (February, 1974), 191-214; and Duane F. Alvin and Robert M. Hauser, "The Decomposition of Effects in Path Analysis," American Sociological Review, 40 (February, 1975), 37-47.

⁴The correlation between Office Level and IQ was calculated in accordance with the assumption of the model that articulation mediates the relationship between IQ and Office Level, i.e. $r_{IQ,LEVEL} = (r_{IQ,ARTICULATION}) (r_{ARTICULATION, LEVEL})$.

⁵The letters "IQ" are used for intelligence strictly as a matter of abbreviation and are NOT intended to denote the operational definition of intelligence used in research on child development, i.e. mental age divided by chronological age. Moreover, since intelligence in this study is the adult intellectual ability of legislators, we make no assumption as to whether or not any of the variation in intelligence is determined by genetic differences. The causal antecedents of intelligence are irrelevant to the present study.

⁶The "OLS" method refers to the "ordinary least squares" method of calculating path coefficients which is described by Otis Dudley Duncan in his article "Path Analysis: Sociological Examples," American Journal of Sociology, 72 (1966), 1-16, and by David R. Heise, "Problems in Path Analysis and Causal Inference," pp. 38-73 in E. F. Borgatta (ed.) Sociological Methodology (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969).

⁷L. Cronbach and P. Meehl, "Construct Validity of Psychological Tests," Psychological Bulletin, 52 (1955), 281-302.

⁸The word "correlation" is appropriate here because with only one causal antecedent or predictor (x) of a variable (y), the path coefficient or beta is the same as the simple correlation between the two variables (r_{xy}). This is so because if you are trying to predict y from x, the standard score form of the regression line is $y = r_{xy} \cdot x$, and thus, the correlation (r_{xy}) is the same as the slope (beta) of the regression line. The one exception to this rule in our study is the beta for Political Flexibility onto IQ. This was initially estimated as .62 but for reasons of fit was reduced to .43.

⁹Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), p. 29.

¹⁰Adorno et al., p. 281.

¹¹Hofstadter, p. 39.

¹²Seymour M. Lipset, "American Intellectuals: Their Politics and Status," Daedalus (Summer, 1959), pp. 460-486.

¹³Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," American Political Science Review, 52 (March, 1958), 34.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵This finding is corroborated in an indirect manner by studies which report a higher level of political tolerance among "leaders" (as compared with members) of the most conservative and the most liberal groups in America. See Samuel A. Stauffer, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955); and McClosky, "Consensus," pp. 361-382. Political tolerance is also linked to education and intellect in Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1960), pp. 103-104, 109-110.

¹⁶Rokeach, p. 195.

¹⁷McClosky, "Conservatism," p. 36.

¹⁸Quinn McNemar, "Lost: Our Intelligence? Why?," American Psychologist, 19 (1964), pp. 871-882.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 878.

²⁰Ibid., p. 880.

²¹Piaget, and Adelson, p. 1025.

²²Adorno et al., pp. 282-283.

²³R. Christie, "Some Determinants of the Accuracy of Social Judgments Among Army Recruits" (Unpublished paper read before the Eastern Psychological Association, March, 1952).

²⁴Idem, "Authoritarianism Re-examined," in Studies in the Scope, and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality," (eds.) R. Christie and M. Jahoda (New York: Free Press, 1954), p. 168.

²⁵F. P. Hollander, "Authoritarianism and Leadership Choice in a Military Setting," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 49 (July, 1954), 365-370.

²⁶T. S. Cohn, "Relation of the F-Scale to Intelligence," Journal of Social Psychology, 46 (1957), 207-227.

²⁷A short listing of these studies and reference to works which summarize their findings may be found in Nevitt Sanford, "Authoritarian Personality in Contemporary Perspective," Handbook

of Political Psychology, ed. Jeanne Knutson, p. 162, and John P. Kirsht and Ronald C. Dillehay, Dimensions of Authoritarianism: A Review of Research and Theory (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), p. 40

²⁸Christie, "Authoritarianism Re-examined," p. 171.

²⁹Adorno et al., pp. 230-234 and 490, Christie, "Authoritarianism Re-examined," p. 145, and A. H. Roberts and R. Jessor, "Authoritarianism, Punitiveness and Perceived Social Status," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 56 (1958), pp. 311-314.

³⁰Giouanni Sartori, "Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems," American Political Science Review, 63 (June, 1969), 398-411.

³¹This correlation is based on a correlation of .43 between IQ and Political Flexibility which is .19 lower than the sample estimate of .62 (see Table 5.1). When .62 is used, the partial correlation is -.12. This result suggests two things; that a direct link between authoritarianism and political flexibility does exist, or that some variable not included in the study is effecting both variables.

³²Harold D. Lasswell, "The Selective Effect of Personality on Political Participation," Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality", ed. by R. Christie and M. Jahoda (New York: Free Press, 1954), pp. 221-225.

³³Lester W. Milbrath and Walter W. Klein, "Personality Correlates of Political Participation," Acta Sociologica, 6 (1962), 53-66.

³⁴McNemar, "Lost," pp. 871-882.

³⁵This theory is discussed on page 8 of Chapter III.

³⁶Some data based comparisons which provide evidence that the state legislative and congressional offices exact a greater financial and personal commitment from their holders than the city councilman offices may be found in the following places: Monetary Cost: Prewitt, pp. 197-198; John W. Kingdon, Candidates for Office: Beliefs and Strategies (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 54 and 104; Fishel, p. 117; David A. Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), p. 88; Personal Commitment: Prewitt, pp. 19, 84, 88, 100, 111-112, 136, 156-157, 164-165, 171, 177-178, 180, 202; Kingdon, pp. 38, 52, 54, 134, 138; and Fishel, p. 37.

³⁷Prewitt, pp. 225-226; Wahlke et al., p. 489; and Fishel, p. 25.

³⁸Prewitt, p. 225.

³⁹Ibid., p. 157.

⁴⁰Wahlke et al., p. 103.

⁴¹Fishe1, p. 26.

⁴²Heinz Eulau and John D. Sprague, Lawyers in Politics (New York: Bobbs Merrill Co., Inc., 1964), p. 12.

⁴³AGE AT ENTRY = AGE - EXPERIENCE; the number of years the respondent has served in public office.

⁴⁴Empirical evidence of this relationship is presented in Table A.5 of Appendix A. Data from the present study shows that average age rises from 45 to 47 to 49 years as one moves from local to state to congressional sub-samples. For the "comparison" samples the comparable figures--available for state and congressional levels only--are 46 and 53 years of age respectively.

⁴⁵Prewitt, pp. 152, 100-101, 112-114, 157, 164.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 111-114, 130, 145, 152.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 16, 88, 111-114.

⁴⁸According to Wahlke et al.'s data, the median age for congressmen tends to be about ten years older than for their counterparts in the states. Wahlke et al., p. 491.

⁴⁹This indictment may not be true for today's high schools. We suspect that in response to the upheaval of the 1960's, high school's have inserted the examination of controversial issues into their curriculum.

⁵⁰Robert Hess and Judith Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine, 1967), pp. 126-127, 248-249.

⁵¹Lipset also makes the argument that type of education is related to political orientation. He notes several studies that show social scientists to be more liberal than natural science faculty members, and academics in general to be much more liberal than persons educated in the professions (e.g. lawyers, physicians, dentists, etc.). See Lipset, Political Man, pp. 313-323.

⁵²Some authors define ideology in such narrow terms that it seems possible to consider it as something separate or apart from the "ideologue." This is the case when an author refers to ideology as a specific set of beliefs, i.e. in terms of one or a number of "ideologies," or when ideology is considered not the actual beliefs

of politicians, but as merely the rhetoric which they use to appeal for public support. Our analysis presumes that there is an identity between the concepts "ideology" and "ideologue." An ideologue is simply a person whose belief system is characterized by a particular set of beliefs or cognitive properties that are defined as ideological. The question of what beliefs or cognitive properties are properly labeled as "ideological" is a subject dealt with in this chapter.

⁵³Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians, p. 45.

⁵⁴Adorno et al., pp. 100, 451, 463, 759; Brown, p. 504, Sanford, pp. 144 and 156; Rokeach, pp. 58, 62-63, and Sartori, pp. 403-504.

⁵⁵Adorno et al., pp. 97, 409-410, 451, 458, and Roberts and Jessor, p. 314.

⁵⁶McClosky notes this tendency in conservatives. McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," p. 275.

⁵⁷Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism, p. 31.

⁵⁸Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Mentor Books, 1951), p. 120.

⁵⁹Daniel Katz, "Patterns of Leadership," Handbook of Political Psychology, ed. by Jeanne N. Knutson (Washington: Jossey-Bass, 1973), pp. 216 and 227, Lester G. Seligman, "Elite Recruitment and Political Development," Political Development and Social Change, ed. by Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), 331-332.

⁶⁰The cynical view of ideology as "rationalization" is discussed in Chapter I.

⁶¹Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," Political Development and Social Change, ed. by Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 331, 345; and David C. Schwartz, "A Theory of Revolutionary Behavior," When Men Revolt and Why, ed. by James C. Davies (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 120.

⁶²Seligman, p. 331; Schwartz, pp. 122-124; Hoffer, p. 120; Shils, p. 339; and Katz, p. 221.

⁶³Schwartz discusses the need for leader-ideologues to issue revolutionary (emotional) appeals and cites studies by LeBon, Edwards, Arendt, Cantril, Almond and Pye which examine the usefulness of function of such appeals in social movements. Schwartz, pp. 122-124, also see Katz, p. 220; and Wolfenstein, p. 172.

⁶⁴The idea that the emotional commitment, or rhetoric (i.e. the cognitive style) of the leaders of social movements varies as the movement passes through various phases is discussed by Suedfeld and Rank, pp. 169-178; Schwartz, pp. 102-132; Hoffer, p. 120; Katz, pp. 220-224; and Shils, "Intellectuals," pp. 355-362.

⁶⁵McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," p. 275.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Hofstadter, p. 38.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 29.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW MECHANICS, CODING PROCEDURE,
LIST OF RESPONDENTS AND COMPARISON OF SAMPLES

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW MECHANICS, CODING PROCEDURE AND COMPARISON OF SAMPLES

Scheduling the Interviews

Each potential sample member was sent an introductory letter explaining the study in general terms, stressing its scholarly and confidential character, and notifying them that they would be contacted by phone in the near future. A copy of this letter is presented on the next page.

In most cases an interview was set up on the initial call to the office-holder's home or office. A second or third call back was required of 16 of the city councilmen. Many of the councilmen were busy with committee meetings at night and/or could not take time off during the work day for an interview. This necessitated conducting interviews at all times of the day or evening. Four councilmen said they were just too busy to be interviewed and two others failed repeatedly to keep scheduled appointments.

Because the state Capitol building is located only seven miles from my residence, making contact with the state legislators was a comparatively easy task. A few days after the initial letter was sent, I either phoned the representative's secretary or dropped by his office on one of my frequent trips to the Capitol. If an

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EAST LANSING • MICHIGAN • 48824

May 14, 1974

Representative John Q. Smith
Annex, House of Representatives
Capitol Building
Lansing, Michigan 48901

Dear Representative Smith:

I am presently engaged in a research project which is being conducted to learn more about the attitudes of political office holders, what they think of their particular office, and how they go about their work in government. Unfortunately, while there has been a great deal of study on the attitudes of city councilmen, there are very few instances of systematically gathered information which allows for the comparison of attitudes between these office levels, i.e., for comparing the attitudes of councilmen with those of state legislators, state legislators' attitudes with those of congressmen, etc.

The project I am involved in is an attempt to help rectify this past neglect. As a participant in this process, your observations about your particular office and politics in general are of great interest to me. Therefore, I would like to arrange an interview with you at some time in the next few weeks. I expect that this will take approximately one hour of your time. While the questions, in my opinion, do not deal with politically or personally sensitive issues, I will guarantee the anonymity of your responses. I hope to be in touch with you by telephone in the near future, to arrange a convenient time for our meeting and to answer any further questions you might have.

Your agreement to be interviewed is essential for the success of this project. First, I am interviewing only a limited number of state legislators, so each is very important. Second, and most important, as a state legislator, you are singularly qualified to make the observations in which I am interested.

I look forward to meeting with you. Thank you for your attention.

Respectfully,

John G. Schuiteman
Phd. Candidate in Political Science
Michigan State University
Phone: 337-2496/355-6590

interview could not be scheduled during the next few days, it became a matter of continually checking with his or her secretary, or passing notes onto the floor of the House until an interview was set up and completed. Approximately twenty representatives asked if I might contact them later in the legislative session, and at least five of these twenty denied by frequent (yet cordial) requests until the bitter end. Approximately ten of the interviews had to be re-scheduled at least once and about five others were re-scheduled as many as two or three times. Persistence and diplomatic behavior are essential ingredients in any effort to obtain interviews with state representatives.

Scheduling and obtaining interviews with congressmen proved to be the most exasperating task of the data collection process. Four of the eleven Michigan congressmen interviewed requested that I meet them at their office during one of their trips back to the home district. One other agreed to meet me in East Lansing on the day he was scheduled to tape a news commentary show for the campus television station. These interviews, while one was particularly rushed and one other conducted in a busy restaurant, went quite smoothly. The remaining twelve interviews were conducted in Washington, D.C. in mid-June, 1974.

Congressmen were incredibly busy during the pre-Summer recess period of 1974. Not only did they have to complete committee work by June 30th on the fiscal year 1974-1975 budget, but the House proceedings against President Nixon made each of them a target for media interviewers and pollsters. In this charged atmosphere it was

particularly difficult to work myself into the schedule of the 14 Michigan congressmen not as yet interviewed. During the five days spent in Washington, I obtained six interviews with Michigan congressmen, five others from representatives of three Mid-Western states and one other from a representative from Pennsylvania. Despite a campaign of letter writing and phone calls to legislative aides, home district office managers, and the congressmen themselves, it was only possible to actually set up five firm interviews prior to my trip to Washington, D.C. Considering the constraints on my time and theirs, I was fortunate to obtain the congressional interviews which I did.

Setting the Time of the Interviews

Table A.1.--Environmental Setting of the Interviews.

	City Councilmen (N=50)	State Representatives (N=51)	Congressmen (N=17)	Total (N=118)	Percent
Business Office	26	0	0	26	(22%)
Legislator's Office	1	40	14	55	(47%)
House Anteroom	0	9	0	9	(8%)
Home	20	0	1	21	(18%)
Other	3	2	1	6	(4%)

One-hundred and two of the interviews (87%) were conducted in offices or homes which were relatively quiet and free from interruption. Table A.1 presents information on the environmental setting of the interviews. Nine of the 51 interviews with state representatives were conducted in the anteroom located off the floor of the state House of Representatives. These interviews were occasionally interrupted by roll call votes; the discussion having

to be sandwiched between the representative's sorties onto the floor. Since the respondent's themselves suggested that the interview be conducted in this manner, I have no reason to believe that the candor or the thoroughness of their answers were adversely affected by these interruptions. Of the remaining seven interviews, three were conducted in restaurants, one on the floor of the state House, two in several different locations, and one in the car of a school administrator who was traveling about checking on the repair of school vehicles at various service garages.

Table A.2.--Time of the Interviews in Minutes.

	City Councilmen (N=50)	State Representatives (N=51)	Congressmen (N=17)	Total (N=118)
Average Time Per Interview	72.8	62.6	45.4	64.3
Median Interview Time	64.0	62.0	40.0	61.0
Range of Interview Times	43-150	35-143	26-86	26-150

Table A.3.--Pace of the Interviews

	City Councilmen (N=50)	State Representatives (N=51)	Congressmen (N=17)	Total (N=118)	Percent	(LBQ)*
Not Rushed	44	40	8	92	(78%)	(18)
Slightly Rushed	6	4	2	12	(10%)	(0)
Rushed	0	7	7	14	(12%)	(11)
(LBQ)	(0)	(21)	(8)			(29)

*Left Brief Questionnaire with the Respondent

Table A.4.--Time of the Discussion on Crime in Minutes

	City Councilmen (N=50)	State Representatives (N=51)	Congressmen (N=17)	Total (N=118)
Average Time Per Interview	9.64	10.10	6.76	9.42
Median Interview Time	8.00	9.00	6.00	8.00
Range of Discussion Times	3-25	4-22	3-14	3-25

The average time of the 118 interviews was 64 minutes. As Table A.2 shows, the city councilmen averaged 73 minutes per interview, the state representatives 63 minutes and the congressmen 45 minutes. In terms of the pace of the interviews, Table A.4 shows that 14 were classified as "rushed" with seven of these interviews being with congressmen. Twelve interviews were classified as "slightly rushed" and the remaining 91 (78% of the total 118) were classified as "not rushed." In 29 interviews, it was decided to leave a five-page questionnaire with the respondent which he or she was to fill out and return. These forms contained 15 closed ended questions and 16 "agree-disagree" items.¹ They helped to minimize interview time in potentially "rushed" situations and assured that an adequate amount of time would be dedicated to the open-ended questions.

Interview Mechanics

All but one of the 118 interviews were tape recorded. This was done for three reasons: (1) to ease the task of making the large number of coding decisions required in the content analysis of the open-ended questions, (2) to permit re-checking of the coding decisions on the closed-ended questions, and (3) to avoid having to write out qualifying remarks or elaborate explanations. The procedure was simply to show up with the tape recorder, assure the

¹The following items were included in the "five page questionnaire": 24, 32, 370, 371, 375, 377, 379, 381, 443, 444, 447-451, 455-470.

respondent that his remarks would be kept confidential, and begin the discussion by recording "This is interview number ____ (the respondent's assigned number)." Only one of the respondents flatly refused to have the interview taped. Two others were rather suspicious and recorded the interview on their own tape recorders. I suppose they did this as a way of countering the threat of being misquoted; apparently not believing my initial promise that their remarks would not be associated with their names. These two persons appeared to loosen up once the non-controversial nature of my questions became apparent. In contrast, one very suspicious first term congressman allowed me to tape our interview, but was notably irritated when I asked about his political ambitions and the degree to which he contributed to his own campaign. These questions were the most "sensitive" of all the questions yet only a few respondents seemed to hedge their remarks on them.

Coding the Data

The coding procedure simply involved listening to the taped interviews, selecting the appropriate answer categories from the questionnaire codebook, and recording the answer codes onto what appear to be IBM test answer sheets. These sheets are designed such that they can be transformed into IBM cards; each filled in scoring space corresponding to one punch hole in an IBM card. In sum 518 variables were scored. This amounted to almost nine IBM cards worth of information on each respondent. Three-hundred and thirty-one of these variables were simple yes or no items designed

to record whether the respondent mentioned or failed to mention certain ideas in his answers. The number of possible answer categories for the open-ended questions in themselves accounted for 228 of the variables. On twenty-two variables a "Judgment Confidence Index" was scored. These indexes provided a measure of how easy or confident the coder felt in scoring the respondent(s) on these variables. None of the variables incorporated in this thesis were problematic in terms of a persistent lack of confidence on the part of the coder scoring the relevant answer codes.

For all but four or five of the respondents, the tape recorder was no threat to the frankness of their discussion. Of course, this is a bit hard to judge, but as men whose opinions are often voiced in public, it seemed that taping the conversations had little effect on their candor or willingness to talk. There were tape recording problems on seven interviews; either battery or tape cartridge failure, or tape gaps caused by mental error on behalf of the interviewer. These contributed to later coding deficiencies.

List of Respondents

CITY COUNCILMEN

City of Allen Park

Burger, Francis E. Jr.
Cunningham, James R.
Demeter, Leslie
Duda, Harold
Pretty, R. Don
Rourke, John J.

City of Battle Creek

Corey, Richard
Finney, Henry L.
Oglesby, Floyd
Sherrod, Donald
Valentine, Clark M.
Unrue, Betsy

City of East Detroit

Bodnar, Frank
 Lane, Harriet
 Rubino, Nick
 Sanfenico, Anthony

City of Highland Park

Daboul, Fred
 Garian, Kalen
 Miller, Jesse P.
 White, Damon L.

City of Jackson

Bisbee, Leland S. Jr.
 Lyke, Eugene R.
 Leverett, Harrison F. Jr.
 Ratchford, Thomas J.
 Shellberg, Gerald W.

City of Oak Park

Colburn, Merton
 Cronk, Bernard
 Rothstein, Charlotte

City of Wyandotte

Clack, Clifford
 Radakovic, Jo Ann
 Zulewski, Frank

City of Garden City

Mazzoni, Orin J.
 Murphy, Timothy J.
 Pappas, Samuel T.
 Plakas, James A.

City of Inkster

Colleran, James J.
 Hamlin, Clyde A.
 Lecesne, Terree
 Stapleton, Rolland Lee

City of Madison Heights

Breckenridge, George
 Cagle, Charles E.
 Gast, Fordon G.
 Suarez, George W.

City of Troy

King, Loren
 Lynch, Carlos W.
 Michaelson, Norman
 Molinar, Arthur
 Pallotta, Anthony
 Shaver, Sherwood E.
 Taucher, Peter A.

STATE REPRESENTATIVES

Anderson, Thomas J.
 (R - 28th District)
 Baker, Raymond L.
 (R - 64th District)
 Bonior, David E.
 (D - 75th District)
 Brown, Thomas H.
 (D - 37th District)
 Bullard, Perry
 (D - 53rd District)
 Buth, Martin D.
 (R - 90th District)

Buth, Richard D.
 (R - 92nd District)
 Cramton, Louis K.
 (R - 102nd District)
 Damman, James J.
 (R - 63rd District)
 Defebaugh, James E.
 (R - 65th District)
 DiNello, Gilbert J.
 (D - 73rd District)
 Edwards, George H.
 (D - 9th District)

Forbes, Joseph
 (D - 9th District)
 Gast, Harry Jr.
 (R - 43rd District)
 Geake, Robert R.
 (R - 35th District)
 Geerlings, Edgar A.
 (R - 97th District)
 Goemaere, Warren N.
 (D - 72nd District)
 Griffin, Michael J.
 (D - 50th District)
 Hasper, Gerrit C.
 (D - 96th District)
 Hayward, William
 (R - 68th District)
 Hoffman, Quincy
 (R - 77th District)
 Holmes, Kirby
 (R - 26th District)
 Jondahl, H. Lynn
 (D - 59th District)
 Jowett, William L.
 (R - 76th District)
 Kehres, Raymond C.
 (D - 39th District)
 Keith, William R.
 (D - 334d District)
 Kildee, Dale E.
 (D - 81st District)
 Kok, Peter
 (R - 91st District)
 Larsen, Melvin L.
 (R - 61st District)
 Mahalak, Edward E.
 (D - 38th District)
 Marker, John F.
 (D - 36th District)

Mastin, Philip O.
 (D - 69th District)
 McCollough, Lucille H.
 (D - 31st District)
 Mittan, Ray C.
 (R - 44th District)
 Mowat, John S. Jr.
 (R - 40th District)
 Nelson, Earl E.
 (D - 57th District)
 O'Brien, Warren
 (R - 25th District)
 O'Neill, James E. Jr.
 (D - 85th District)
 Owens, Gary M.
 (D - 22nd District)
 Sheridan, Alfred A.
 (D - 29th District)
 Seitsema, Jelt
 (D - 94th District)
 Smart, Clifford H.
 (R - 24th District)
 Smith, James F.
 (R - 83rd District)
 Smit, Raymond J.
 (R - 52nd District)
 Spencer, Roy L.
 (R - 78th District)
 Stackable, Frederick L.
 (R - 58th District)
 Wellborn, John A.
 (R - 47th District)
 Wolpe, Howard
 (D - 46th District)
 Young, Richard A.
 (D - 32nd District)
 Ziegler, Hal W.
 (R - 23rd District)

CONGRESSMEN (Michigan)

Brown, Garry
 (R - 3rd District)
 Broomfield, William S.
 (R - 19th District)
 Cederberg, Elford A.
 (R - 10th District)
 Esch, Marvin L.
 (R - 2nd District)
 Ford, William D.
 (D - 15th District)
 Griffiths, Martha W.
 (D - 17th District)

Huber, Robert J.
 (R - 18th District)
 O'Hara, James G.
 (D - 12th District)
 Rieggle, Donald W. Jr.
 (D - 7th District)
 Ruppe, Philip E.
 (R - 11th District)
 Van Der Veen, Richard
 (D - 5th District)

CONGRESSMEN (Other States)

Hamilton, Lee
(D - 9th District Indiana)
Derwinski, Edward J.
(R - 4th District Illinois)
Hanrahan, Robert Paul
(R - 3rd District Illinois)

Guyer, Tennyson
(R - 4th District Ohio)
Regula, Ralph S.
(R - 16th District Ohio)
Williams, Lawrence G.
(R - 7th District Penn.)

Comparison of Samples

(See Table A.5, page 196)

Table A.5.--Comparison of Samples^a on Selected Personal and Political Characteristics.

	City Councilmen		State Representatives		Congressmen	
	Schuiteman (N=50)	Prewitt (N=365)	Schuiteman (N=51)	Wahlke (N=474)	Schuiteman (N=17)	Fishel (N=435)
Education						
Less than 12 years	4%	9%	0%	19%	0%	11%
12 years						
Some College	28%	19%	22%	26%	17%	12%
16 years					12%	16%
12 years or more	72%	85%	100%	81%		
16 years or more	44%	48%	63%	55%	83%	75%
Over 16 years					70%	59%
Median Education	15 yrs.	16 yrs.				
Age						
				(N=365) ^b		
21 to 40 years	16%	8% ^c	27%	32%	18%	10%
41 to 50 years	54%	38%	29%	31%	41%	32%
51 to 60 years	24%	27%	29%	22%	29%	31%
Over 60 years	6%	7%	14%	15%	12%	25%
Average age	45.6	(NA)	48.0	(NA)	49.2	(NA)
Median age	47	(NA)	47	46.6	49	53
Occupation						
Professional	30%	26%	84% ^d	47%	100%	62%
Managerial	38%	43%	16%	35%	0%	20%
Clerical	16%	11%	2%	5%	0%	17%
(All White Collar)	(84%)	(80%)				
Skilled labor	14%	9%	0%	2%	0%	1%
Independent farmer			(6%) ^e	10%		
Service worker	0%	1%				
(All Working Class)	(14%)	(10%)	(0%)	(1%)		
Other	0%	10%				
Father's Occupation						
Professional	6%	17%	16%	18%	30%	(NA)
Managerial	16%	27%	40%	29%	47%	(NA)
Clerical	6%	9%	18%	5%	6%	(NA)
(All White Collar)	(28%)	(53%)	(74%)	(52%)	(83%)	(NA)
Skilled labor	54%	24%	28%	16%	6%	(NA)
Independent farmer	(6%) ^e	16%	(12%) ^e	25%		
Unskilled labor	12%	4%	0%	5%		
(All Working Class)	(72%)	(44%)	(28%)	(46%)	(0%)	(NA)
Other	0%	3%	0%	2%	11%	(NA)
Seniority						
				(N=376) ^b		
0 to 1 year			30%	29%	30%	15%
(At least 2 years)	46%	29%				
2 to 4 years			22%	26%	0%	15%
(3 to 5 years)	34%	39%				
5 to 6 years			6%	14%	0%	13%
(6 to 8 years)	8%	15%				
7 to 8 years			12%	11%	30%	6%
(9 or more years)	12%	16%				
Over 9 years			32%	20%	41%	51%
Average yrs. in office	4.1	4.2 ^f	6.1	4.0		

^aThe comparison of samples are from: Kenneth Prewitt, *The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politics*, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1970, see pps. 46, 225-226; John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, *The Legislative System*, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962, see pps. 36-37, 489, 491; and Jeff Fishel, *Party and Opposition*, David McKay Company, Inc., 1973, see pps. 21-22.

^bIncludes only House and not Senate members from the four legislatures interviewed.

^cPrewitt's figures only add to 80%.

^d84% is a deceptive figure as it includes respondents who said their occupation was "legislator." Had the respondent's pre-office holding occupation been obtained, the percentages would more nearly replicate those of Wahlke's sample.

^ePercentage of possible farmers (inadvertently placed in the managerial category).

^fEstimated from Prewitt's graph (p. 226) by multiplying the percentage in the sample in the year category by the category mean.

APPENDIX B

SURVEY CODEBOOK

APPENDIX B

SURVEY CODEBOOK

The following is the codebook used to convert the respondent's answers to the interview questions into usable data. The codebook contains the interview questions, the coding items used to analyze question answers, and several indexes formed on the basis of specific questions. It also contains sixteen "agree/disagree" items on which the respondents were asked to respond, and several items on interview mechanics. The coding procedure was to enter on code-sheets numbers corresponding to my judgment on each separate coding item. The short answer questions were coded twice; once during the interview and later when listening to the taped interview. Notes were taken on the open-ended questions but these were coded primarily on the basis of a careful listening to the relevant answers and/or discussions which they evoked.

A slightly abridged version of the codebook is presented. Missing are questions about the "power structure" (eliminated early in the interview schedule for being too vague), twenty-two "Judgment Confidence Indexes" used to note those interviews and questions on which coding was problematic (see Appendix A), and a number of miscellaneous questions which proved to be too complex, abstract or confusing to a

substantial number of the respondents. Also missing are those codes used in the original version which noted answers not covered by coding categories (coded as "other"), situations where a question did not apply to certain respondents (coded as "NA" Not Applicable), or when no answer to a question was obtained (coded as "NO" Not Obtained). To facilitate the correlational analysis these occurrences were each assigned a code of "9" or "99" and eliminated from the data analysis.

Codebook Symbols:

NA = Not Ascertained

NO = Not Obtained

(MAC) = Make a Card

(#) = A number in parentheses indicates the frequency that the code was chosen. For Mention/Not Mention and Yes/No items the number is the frequency of "mention" or "yes" codes scored.

AND BELIEF SYSTEMS

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>
1	01	DECK NUMBER (1)
2	02-04	RESPONDENT INTERVIEW NUMBER 001-051 City Councilman or City Commissioner 052-101 State Representative 102-118 U.S. Representative
3	05	RESPONDENT OFFICE LEVEL (50) 1. City Councilman or City Commissioner (51) 2. State Representative (17) 3. U.S. Representative
4-5	06-08	YEARS AND MONTHS IN PRESENT OFFICE Q. 1. How many years and months have you served in your present office?
4	06-07	01. One complete year served. 02. Two complete years served. 03. Etc.
5	08	1. One additional month served. 2. Two additional months served. 3. Etc.
6	09-10	TERMS IN PRESENT OFFICE Q. 2. How many terms have you served in your present office? NOTE: Include the term they are now serving in the count. 01. Is serving his first term. 02. Is serving his second term. 03. Etc.
7-9	11-16	MODE OF ENTRY INTO CURRENT OFFICE Q. 3. Can you tell me how you first became interested in running for the office of (City Councilman/State Representative/U.S. Representative)? (Use the Mode of Entry Code Sheet and code up to three mentions in order of importance to the respondent)

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	Deck 1
7	11-12	_____	Most prominent mention
8	13-14	_____	Second most prominent mention
9	15-16	_____	Third most prominent mention

MODE OF ENTRY CODE SHEET

OPPORTUNITY AROSE

01. New district created by redistricting had no incumbent - district was safe or at least my party had a majority.
02. New district created by redistricting had no incumbent - had a 50-50 chance of winning.
03. New district created by redistricting - incumbent vulnerable.
04. Incumbent retiring - as a member of the incumbent's party, it was a good chance at a safe seat.
05. Incumbent elected to higher office - good chance at a safe seat.
06. Incumbent retiring - good chance that the opposition party (my party) could win the seat.
07. Incumbent elected to higher office - good chance that the opposition party (my party) could win the seat.
08. Other

DISSATISFACTION

11. Respondent thought he could do a better job than the incumbent was or had been doing.
12. Incumbent let down his constituents on key issue(s).
17. Other

AMBITION

21. Respondent wanted the job and went after it.
22. Respondent wanted the job and was encouraged by friends. (citizens).
23. Respondent wanted the job and was encouraged by businessmen or business associates.
24. Respondent wanted the job and was encouraged by both citizens and businessmen.
27. Other.

<u>Var.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Column</u> <u>Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	Deck I
---------------------------	--------------------------------	-------------	--------

DRAFTED

- 31. Respondent was approached by friends (citizens) who convinced him to run.
- 32. Respondent was approached by businessmen or business associates who convinced him to run.
- 33. Respondent was approached by friends and businessmen who convinced him to run.
- 37. Other.
- 99. Other, NA, NO.

10	17-18	MODE OR ENTRY INTO FIRST POLITICAL OFFICE
----	-------	---

(Coded using Mode of Entry Codes)

11	19	INTEREST IN POLITICS
----	----	----------------------

Q. 4. Have you always had an interest in politics?

- (1) 1. No; Not until I decided to run for office (not active in civic affairs).
- (4) 2. No; Not until I decided to run for office (active in civic affairs).
- (18) 3. No; Not until a particular event or situation prompted my interest.
- (4) 4. Yes; Civic affairs mainly (no interest in local politics per se).
- (32) 5. Yes; Very interested (attended city council meetings, some party activity).
- (55) 6. Yes; Very interested (not only local politics).
- (4) 9. Other; NA; NO.

12	20	PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RESPONDENT'S CANDIDACY
----	----	---

Q. 5. Who was primarily responsible for you becoming a candidate for your current office?

- (83) 1. Respondent's own idea.
- (15) 2. Suggested by friends.
- (5) 3. Suggested by citizens.
- (4) 4. Suggested by party leaders.
- (1) 5. Suggested by businessmen.
- (1) 6. Suggested by business associates.
- (0) 7. Suggested by someone other than the above.
- (0) 8. Combinations not including foil 1.
- (9) 9. Other; NA; NO.

<u>Var.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Column</u> <u>Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	Deck 1
13	21	ELECTION OR APPOINTMENT TO OFFICE	
		Q. 6. Did you initially enter this office by being elected in a general election, elected in a special election, or appointed?	
		1. Elected in a general election.	
		2. Elected in a special election.	
		3. Appointed.	
		9. Other; NA; NO.	
14-17	22-28	PREVIOUS OFFICE AND GOVERNMENTAL EXPERIENCE	
14	22	Q. 7. Have you ever held any other elective or appointed office in government other than your current office (includes Local Board of Education but not civic minded organizations).	
	(43)	1. No.	
	(74)	2. Yes.	
	(1)	9. Other; NA; NO.	
		(If Yes) What positions have you held?	
		NOTE: Code up to three mentions. If the respondent has held more than three offices, select the three in which he served the longest time.	
15	23-24	FIRST ELECTED OR APPOINTED OFFICE HELD	
		01. Commission or board appointed by the city council or commission.	
		02. Commission or board appointed by the mayor.	
		03. City councilman/commissioner.	
		04. Mayor.	
		05. Appointed City Office.	
		06. Township Supervisor.	
		07. Appointed Township Office.	
		08. County Board of Supervisors.	
		09. Other county office.	
		10. Appointed county office.	
		11. State board or commission appointed by the Governor.	
		12. State Representative.	
		13. State Senator.	
		14. Other state office.	
		20. Other elected city office.	
		21. Local Board of Education.	
		22. Local Humanitarian Project (United Fund, Mental Health Board, etc.).	
		23. Other civic minded organization.	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	Deck I
		24. Local home owners association. 99. Other; NA; NO.	
16	25-26	SECOND ELECTED OR APPOINTED OFFICE (Use the code for columns 23-24)	
17	27-28	THIRD ELECTED OR APPOINTED OFFICE (Use the code for columns 23-24)	
18-20	29-34	YEARS SERVED IN PREVIOUS ELECTED OR APPOINTED OFFICES (If Yes on Q. 7.) How long did you serve in these positions?	
18	29-30	NUMBER OF YEARS IN FIRST ELECTED OR APPOINTED OFFICE 01. One year served. 02. Two years served. 03. Etc. 99. Other; NA; NO.	
19	31-32	NUMBER OF YEARS IN SECOND ELECTED OR APPOINTED OFFICE (Use the code for columns 29-30)	
20	33-34	NUMBER OF YEARS IN THIRD ELECTED OR APPOINTED OFFICE (Use the code for columns 29-30)	
21	35	POLITICAL AFFILIATION Q. 8. As far as political affiliation goes, how do you think of yourself - as a Republican, a Democrat, or what? (46) 1. Republican (15) 3. Independent (Votes for the man). (57) 5. Democrat (0) 9. Other; NA; NO	
22	36	TICKET SPLITTING Q. 9. In voting in elections, have you ever split your ticket? If yes, how regular or common, over the past five or ten years, have you found it desirable to split your ticket? (25) 1. No; straight ticket voter. (17) 3. Yes; but very rarely. (21) 4. Yes; sometimes. (55) 5. Yes; very regular occurrence. 9. Other; NA; NO.	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	Deck 1
23	37	PATTERN OF TICKET SPLITTING	
		Q.10. (If Yes on Q. 9.) Now in splitting your ticket, have you noticed <u>any</u> pattern, i.e. have you voted for one party, say, for the offices at the national level - congress or the President, and voted for another party's candidates for the state or county offices - or what?	
		(26) 1. Inapplicable (straight ticket voter).	
		(21) 2. Pattern: splits at the local or county level.	
		(10) 3. Pattern: splits at the local and state level.	
		(8) 4. Pattern: splits at the national level.	
		(6) 5. Pattern: splits according to the candidates' ideological position.	
		(42) 6. No Pattern noted.	
		(5) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
24-27	38-41	PARTY OFFICES HELD	
24	38	Q.11. Have you ever held a position in your party other than by virtue of your elected office?	
		NOTE: If the number of years respondent has spent as a precinct delegate equals his years of party activity, assume that respondent has not been involved with his party other than by virtue of his elected position.	
		(67) 1. No.	
		(50) 5. Yes.	
		(1) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
		(If Yes on Q. 11.) What position(s) have you held in your party? Code up to three mentions. If the respondent has held more than three positions, code the three most prominent in terms of years held; otherwise code chronologically.	
25	39	FIRST PARTY OFFICE	
		1. Precinct Delegate.	
		2. Delegate to the state convention.	
		3. Delegate to the national convention.	
		4. Member of the Township/County/Congressional District Ruling Committee or Board.	
		5. Chairman of the Township/County/Congressional District Ruling Committee or Board.	
		6. Member of the State Party Committee.	
		7. Member of a local party club.	
		9. Other; NA; NO.	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	Deck 1
26	40	SECOND PARTY OFFICE	
		(Use the code for column 39)	
27	41	THIRD PARTY OFFICE	
		(Use the code for column 39)	
28-30	42-47	YEARS SERVED IN PARTY OFFICE	
		(If Yes on Q. 11.) How long have you held your party office(s)?	
28	42-43	YEARS SERVED IN FIRST PARTY OFFICE	
		00. Inapplicable	
		01. One year	
		02. Two years	
		03. Etc.	
		99. Other; NA; NO	
29	44-45	YEARS SERVED IN SECOND PARTY OFFICE	
		(Use the code for columns 42-43)	
30	46-47	YEARS SERVED IN THIRD PARTY OFFICE	
		(Use the code for columns 42-43)	
31	48	POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY	
		Q.12. How about your political philosophy? Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be more of a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative on political issues?	
	(13)	1. Conservative	
	(16)	2. Moderate Conservative	
	(38)	3. Moderate	
	(13)	4. Moderate Liberal	
	(16)	5. Liberal	
	(22)	6. Pragmatist; It depends on the issue (Respondent says he is liberal on some issues, conservative on others yet he doesn't classify as a moderate).	
	(0)	9. Other; NA; NO.	
32	49	POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY INDEX	
		Index based on the Code for Column 48.	
	(29)	1. Conservative (1's and 2's)	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	Deck 1
		(38) 2. Moderate (3's)	
		(29) 3. Liberal (4's and 5's)	
		(22) 9. Other; NA; NO (6's and 9's)	
33	50	ACCEPTANCE OF THE LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE LABELS INDEX	
		Index based on the respondent's answer to Q. 12.	
		(83) 1. Accepted the labels without comment.	
		(8) 2. Accepted the labels for the most part, yet stated that they were no longer very meaningful.	
		(8) 3. Accepted the labels for the most part yet stated that they were ambiguous.	
		(4) 4. Rejected the labels entirely; they no longer have meaning.	
		(1) 5. Rejected the labels entirely; they are ambiguous.	
		(14) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
34	51	COGNIZANCE OF OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE	
		Q.13. (COUNCILMEN ONLY) Do you know of any city councilmen/ commissioners who have gone on to other elected offices or positions in government?	
		(11) 1. No.	
		(39) 5. Yes.	
		(68) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
35	52	DOES SERVING ON THE COUNCIL/COMMISSION HELP	
		Q.14. (COUNCILMEN/COMMISSIONERS ONLY) Do you feel that being on the council/commission qualifies you or helps your chances of being elected or nominated for other offices?	
		(0) 1. No; not at all.	
		(1) 2. No; not much.	
		(9) 3. Perhaps; It can; It really depends on the person.	
		(21) 4. Yes; it helps.	
		(18) 5. Yes; very much.	
		(69) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
36	53	OFFICES WHICH SERVICE ON THE COUNCIL/COMMISSION MIGHT HELP ATTAIN	
		(If Yes or Perhaps on Q. 14.). What offices do you have in mind?	
		(0) 1. Mayor.	
		(1) 2. County Supervisor/Commissioner.	
		(26) 3. State Representative (no middle office necessary).	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	Deck I
		(3) 4. Either Mayor or County Supervisor.	
		(7) 5. Either Mayor or State Representative.	
		(10) 6. Either County Supervisor or State Representative.	
		(71) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
37	54	OFFICES WHICH ARE STEPPING STONES UP THE POLITICAL LADDER	
		Q.15. (LEGISLATOR/CONGRESSMAN ONLY) In your opinion, are there any offices which are natural stepping stones up (the political ladder) from your position as _____ (legislator/congressman)?	
		(13) 1. No; No clear pathway up; Offices become available primarily through chance occurrences or opportunity.	
		(27) 3. Perhaps - but advancement in elective office is primarily the result of chance opportunity and ambition.	
		(27) 5. Yes; Unequivical.	
		(51) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
38	55	STEPPING STONE OFFICES	
		(LEGISLATORS ONLY - If Yes or Perhaps on Q.15.) What are these offices?	
		(2) 1. State Senator.	
		(2) 2. State Senator - yet the office of state senator is not (or is only a small) step up.	
		(3) 3. U.S. Representative - intermediate office necessary.	
		(32) 4. U.S. Representative - intermediate office not necessary.	
		(0) 5. Lt. Governor.	
		(0) 6. Governor.	
		(0) 7. State Senator or U.S. Representative.	
		(79) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
39	56	(CONGRESSMEN ONLY - If Yes or Perhaps on Q.15.) What are these offices?	
		(5) 1. U.S. Senator.	
		(0) 2. Governor.	
		(0) 3. Lt. Governor.	
		(113) 4. Other Statewide Office.	
		9. Other; NA; NO.	
40	57	COGNIZANCE OF OFFICE PATHWAY INDEX	
		NOTE: This index is based on the respondent's answer to either Q.14 (councilmen/commissioners) or Q.15 (congressmen).	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	Deck 1
		(11)	1. Respondent perceives no office pathway up from his office.
		(36)	3. Respondent admits that there is some evidence of an office pathway, but maintains that advancement in elective office is primarily the result of chance occurrences; personality; ambition.
		(33)	5. Respondent perceives an office pathway - but he doesn't consider himself to be in such a pathway.
		(34)	7. Respondent perceives an office pathway leading up from his current office (No indication that he does not consider himself in this pathway).
		(4)	9. Other; NA; NO.
41	58	RESPONDENT'S FUTURE IN POLITICS	
		NOTE: Information that may be helpful for coding this section on political ambition may also be found in the discussion about the respondent's hypothetical transition from office which is the subject of questions 23 and 24.	
		Q.16. Generally speaking, how do you view your future in politics? For example, do you expect to continue to run for the office of (city councilman/commissioner, state legislator, congressman)?	
		(2)	1. No - have become fed up with the job (dissatisfaction noted).
		(4)	2. No - have served long enough.
		(2)	3. No - retiring because of age, health reasons, or cost in terms of lost work.
		(3)	4. No - but respondent intends to remain active in politics (either running for lower level office or involving himself in community affairs).
		(9)	5. No - will run for higher office next election (MAC of respondent's number and the office he will seek)
		(13)	6. Probably; Most Likely.
		(72)	7. Yes; Definitely.
		(13)	9. Other; NA; NO.
42	59	NUMBER OF TERMS RESPONDENT WISHES TO REMAIN	
		(If Yes on Q.16) Do you feel that there is only a limited number of terms you wish to remain (on the council/in the legislature/in the congress)?	
		(67)	1. No - Respondent has no set number of terms he wishes to remain.
		(6)	2. Yes - Respondent has a definite number of terms in mind, and then he plans to retire from politics.
		(9)	3. Yes - Respondent has a definite number of terms in mind but he will leave because he believes no representative should serve indefinitely.

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 1</u>
	(5)	4.	Yes - Respondent has a definite number of terms in mind, but will remain in politics (either running for lower office or reinvolving himself in community affairs).
	(9)	5.	Yes - Respondent has a definite number of terms he wishes to remain in his present office, then he plans or at least entertains the idea that he may advance in politics.
	(22)	9.	Other; NA; NO.
43	60	NUMBER OF TERMS RESPONDENT WISHES TO REMAIN	
		(If Yes on Q. 16., and Yes - Respondent has a definite number of terms he wishes to remain in his present office) How many terms?	
		0.	Inapplicable.
		1.	One more term.
		2.	Two more terms.
		3.	Three more terms.
		4.	One or two more terms.
		5.	Two or three more terms.
		6.	Three or four more terms.
		9.	Other; NA; NO.
44	61	AMBITION FOR OTHER OFFICES	
		Q.17. Are there any other political or governmental positions - local, state, or federal - which you personally would like to seek?	
	(28)	1.	No; definitely not
	(25)	2.	No; Not at this time
	(31)	3.	Possibly; It Depends; Non-committal but positive about politics.
	(20)	4.	Yes; Probably; If the opportunity came up.
	(13)	5.	Yes
	(1)	9.	Other; NA; NO.
45	62	POSSIBLE FUTURE OFFICES	
		(If Yes or Possibly on Q.17) What are (or is) there position(s)?	
	(10)	1.	Mayor.
	(8)	2.	County Board of Supervisors.
	(7)	3.	State Representative.
	(7)	4.	State Senator.
	(15)	5.	Congressman.
	(2)	6.	U.S. Senator.
	(69)	9.	Other; NA; NO.

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	Deck 1
46	63-64	POLITICAL AMBITION INDEX	
	(9)	01. Respondent is leaving office after the present term and anticipates no more or very little more political involvement.	
	(1)	02. Respondent is leaving office after the present term but intends to remain active in political affairs (either seeking what he considers a lower level office or involving himself in local political affairs).	
	(14)	03. Respondent plans to remain in present office for a limited number of terms then plans to substantially reduce his political involvement.	
	(4)	04. Respondent plans to remain in present office for only one or two more terms but intends to remain active in political affairs (this includes the possibility of Respondent seeking a lower level office or becoming involved or re-involved in local political affairs).	
	(12)	05. Respondent plans or is willing to serve in his present office as long as he feels he's doing an effective or good job and enjoys it.	
	(5)	06. Respondent is planning to remain in office as long as constituents return him to office (no dedication to present office discerned).	
	(18)	07. Respondent is planning to remain in office as long as constituents return him to office (some dedication to present job discernible; some indication he would like to remain in office).	
	(2)	08. Respondent is dedicated to present office and hopes to rise in influence within its range or purview (e.g. within house, run for mayor, etc.).	
	(19)	09. Respondent leaves open the possibility that he may seek higher office in the future (no mention of dedication to present office in terms of making it a career).	
	(13)	10. Respondent plans to work hard in his present office yet leaves open the possibility that he may seek higher political office in the future.	
	(7)	11. Respondent plans to run for higher office in the future.	
	(8)	12. Respondent is going to seek higher political office in the next election.	
	(6)	99. Other; NA; NO.	
47	65	COLLAPSED POLITICAL AMBITION INDEX	
	(10)	1. Discrete Ambition (01's and 02's)	
	(53)	3. Static Ambition (03 to 07)	
	(49)	5. Progressive Ambition (08 to 12)	
	(6)	9. Other; NA; NO	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck I</u>
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48-61	66-80 06-21 (Dk 2)	Q.18. In reflecting on your own experience (on the council/in the legislature/in the congress), and in politics in general, what is it you find most appealing about politics? (What attracts you to it?).	
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NOTE: FIRST, code each appealing aspect noted by the proceeding down the list of possible appealing aspects on the following Political Motivation Code Sheet. For each aspect listed, code whether it was mentioned by Respondent. The code for each item on the code-sheet is as follows.

1. Not mentioned by the respondent.
5. Mentioned by the respondent.

POLITICAL MOTIVATION CODE SHEET

GENERAL OR UNDEFINED

48	66	(1)	11. Life commitment; like everything about politics.
49	67	(0)	12. Other _____ (MAC)*

AFFILITATIVE BENEFITS

50	68	(3)	21. Conviviality with colleagues (on council, in the House, in the Congress) - general statement.
51	69	(2)	23. The social atmosphere of the council/legislature/congress.
52	70	(14)	25. Talking and being with my friends on the council/in the legislature/in the congress.
53	71	(1)	26. Contact with great/influential men.
54	72	(3)	27. Other _____ (MAC).

POWER/INFLUENCE/"CENTER OF THINGS"

55	73	(51)	30.34. Being in the "center of things", "where the action is", etc. (See following Note)
56	74	(43)	31.35. Power or influence on decisions or political affairs.
57	75	(2)	32.36. Freedom of action.
58	76	(25)	33.37. Having the power or influence to cut through bureaucratic red tape when you want to help someone.
59	77	(31)	38. Chance to express opinions or share in public discussion.
60	78	(2)	39. Other. _____ (MAC).

* - MAC means make a card.

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	Deck 1
NOTE: The category "Power/Influence/'Center of Things'" pertains to remarks by respondents which indicate satisfaction with or a desire to wield power and influence for its own sake rather than as a means to accomplish certain goals. It was established to distinguish comments indicative of an authoritarian's satisfaction with holding power from the achievement-oriented person's satisfaction with holding power because of its instrumental utility. Coders should be sensitive to this distinction - especially in judging statements such as "I like politics because it puts me where the action is". Such a statement may indicate an "achievement" orientation rather than a "power" orientation. The Codes 30-33 are the "power motivation" codes and the codes 34-37 are the "achievement motivation" codes. These apply only to the second part of the coding procedure for Q.18 (see below). Coders should listen to the respondent's entire response as to what appeals to him about politics before deciding the category in which this type of remark should be placed.			

STATUS/PRESTIGE/RESPECT

61	79	(18)	41. Contact with people, constituents.
62	80	(43)	43. Honor; Prestige; Respect accorded to the position.

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	Deck 2
01		DECK NUMBER (2)	
02-04		RESPONDENT INTERVIEW NUMBER	
		001-051 City Councilman or City Commissioner	
		052-101 State Representative	
		102-118 U.S. Representative	
05		RESPONDENT OFFICE LEVEL	
		1. City Councilman or City Commissioner	
		2. State Representative	
		3. U.S. Representative	
06-21		<u>POLITICAL MOTIVATION CODE SHEET CONTINUED</u>	
63	06	(4) 45. Entree; Access to important people	
64	07	(5) 47. Other. _____ (MAC)	
		ACHIEVEMENT	
65	08	(21) 51. Solving concrete social, technical, or legislative problems.	
66	09	(32) 53. Service to constituents, "casework", "ombudsman".	
67	10	(30) 55. Helping to develop and pass legislation.	
68	11	(9) 57. Other. _____ (MAC)	
		MORAL/PHILOSOPHICAL	
69	12	(23) 61. "Citizen duty"; contribution to solving social-political problems (no issue content).	
70	13	(26) 63. Chance to help people (humanitarian sense).	
71	14	(2) 67. Other. _____ (MAC).	
		IDEOLOGICAL	
72	15	(7) 71. Chance to represent or fight for the "little man", the people, etc.	
73	16	(11) 73. Chance to expound a certain philosophy or point of view.	
74	17	(0) 77. Other. _____ (MAC)	
		MISCELLANEOUS	
75	18	(25) 81. Intellectual satisfactions; educational experiences.	
76	19	(5) 83. Diversity of experiences.	
77	20	(5) 87. Other. _____ (MAC)	
78	21	(1) 91. Nothing; No attractions (This code is not inconsistent with other codes in these columns; it is a priority code, however, i.e. if it appears, it must appear in columns 23-24 also).	

<u>Var.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Column</u> <u>Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 2</u>
			SECOND part of Q.18. Code up to three mentions in order of prominence or importance to the respondent. If prominence cannot be ascertained by voice inflection, etc., list the main mentions in order of their mention. Also, some information pertinent to this coding judgement may be found in the respondent's answers to Q. 27 and Q. 28. Listen to these answers before making final judgement about Respondent's motivations.

79	22-23	RESPONDENT'S MOST PROMINENT POLITICAL MOTIVATION
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(Use the Political Motivation Code Sheet)

80	24-25	RESPONDENT'S SECOND MOST PROMINENT MOTIVATION
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(Use the Political Motivation Code Sheet)

81	26-27	RESPONDENT'S THIRD MOST PROMINENT MOTIVATION
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(Use the Political Motivation Code Sheet)

82	28-77	POLITICAL FRUSTRATIONS
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Q.19. What do you find unappealing about politics?

NOTE: FIRST, code each unappealing aspect noted by the respondent by proceeding down the list of possible unappealing aspects of politics on the Political Frustrations Code Sheet. For each aspect listed, code whether it was mentioned by Respondent. The code for each item on the code sheet is as follows.

- 1. Not mentioned by the Respondent
- 5. Mentioned by the Respondent

POLITICAL FRUSTRATIONS CODE SHEET

WORKING CONDITIONS AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS

83	28	(16)	11.	Time constraints in general; hecticness.
84	29	(34)	12.	No time for family; friends; privacy gone; relaxation, hobbies, etc.
85	30	(3)	14.	General working conditions: lack of facilities; lack of assistance; irregular schedule.
86	31	(12)	15.	Financial problems; not enough pay.
87	32	(6)	16.	Wasted time.
88	33	(4)	17.	Boredom; routine; drudgery of the job.
89	34	(11)	18.	Other _____ (MAC).

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 2</u>
IMPOTENCE WITH RESPECT TO OTHER POLITICAL ACTORS			
90	35	(11)	21. One man cannot bring about any significant change.
91	36	(7)	22. Lack of influence of minority party on policy-making.
92	37	(2)	23. Lack of influence with senior party members.
93	38	(2)	24. Lack of influence with leaders in the legislature/congress.
94	39	(5)	25. Respondent senses impotence in comparison to or in contest with the power of certain voting blocs or interest groups.
95	40	(0)	26. Party domination of legislature/congress.
96	41	(2)	27. Other _____ (MAC).
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, LEADERSHIP AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS			
97	42	(11)	31. Organization, methods, and slowness of the council/ legislature/Congress to act.
98	43	(2)	32. Slowness and other inadequacies of political institutions in general.
99	44	(0)	35. Lack of educated, technically prepared political leaders.
100	45	(3)	37. Other _____ (MAC).
101	46	(7)	40. Public apathy and ignorance; constituents who over estimate your power.
102	47	(6)	41. Servicing constituents' demands; "casework".
103	48	(5)	42. Elections and campaigning; having to good hand for support.
104	49	(3)	43. Having to ask for campaign money.
105	50	(6)	44. Publicity, public attention, inaccuracy press.
106	51	(13)	45. Undue pressure or criticism from particular interest groups or constituents on policy.
107	52	(12)	46. Lack of respect for politicians.
108	53	(6)	47. Necessity of making lots of contacts; "the social side of it".
109	54	(2)	48. Gap between political leaders and the people; popular apathy.
110	55	(10)	49. Other _____ (MAC).
LIMITATIONS ON SOLVING PROBLEMS OR REACHING GOALS			
111	56	(0)	51. Too much talk - not enough action; priority of abstract discussion over concrete problem solving.
112	57	(3)	52. "Partisanship"; priority or necessity of partisan maneuvering or partisan bickering over concrete problem-solving.
113	58	(3)	53. Uselessness of activity; problems never solved; decisions never made; nothing concrete ever accomplished; no sense of accomplishment.
114	59	(4)	54. No time or opportunity for studying concrete problems or legislation.
115	60	(9)	55. Frustration of getting others' agreement to policy proposals; political realities taking precedent over ideals.

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 2</u>
116	61	(1) 56.	Legislative leaders too narrow minded, lack of vision or perspective.
117	62	(4) 57.	Committee system, legislative procedures prevent expeditious problem solving.
118	63	(6) 58.	Other. _____ (MAC).
<u>AMBITION, ANTAGONISM, AND DISTRUST</u>			
119	64	(2) 61.	Personal antagonisms, Respondent cites difficulties among colleagues in terms of personality conflict.
120	65	(4) 62.	Respondent cites persons or groups whose ambition or lust for power is distasteful.
121	66	(2) 63.	Respondent indicates that its difficult to maintain ones integrity in the context of political bargaining.
122	67	(1) 68.	Other _____ (MAC).
<u>POLITICAL MORALITY</u>			
123	68	(1) 71.	Respondent cites low level of morality or integrity among his colleagues.
124	69	(1) 72.	Respondent dislikes politics because it encourages demogogy - distorting issues to gain the favor of the electorate.
125	70	(7) 73.	Respondent cites the propensity of some colleague who use their office to better their personal status or wealth.
126	71	(3) 74.	Respondent cites lack of political ethics; unfair tactics and personal attacks on the part of his colleagues.
127	72	(2) 75.	Special interests taking priority over the general interest.
128	73	(0) 76.	Cynicism; hypocrisy; bad faith.
129	74	(4) 77.	Other _____ (MAC).
<u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>			
130	75	(4) 81.	Other politicians boring or uninteresting, or ignorant.
131	76	(0) 80.	Other _____ (MAC).
132	77	(0) 99.	No dissatisfactions.
78-79 06-08 (Dk 3)	SECOND, code up to three mentions in order of prominence or importance to the respondent. If prominence cannot be ascertained by voice inflection, etc., list according to the order of mention. Information pertinent to this judgement may also be found in Respondent's answers to questions 27 and 28 on "transition".		
133	78-79	RESPONDENT'S MOST PROMINENT POLITICAL FRUSTRATION (Use the Political Frustrations Code Sheet)	

IDEOLOGY, COGNITIVE STYLE,
AND BELIEF SYSTEMS

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	Deck 3
	01	DECK NUMBER (3)	
	02-04	RESPONDENT INTERVIEW NUMBER	
		001-051 City Councilman or City Commissioner	
		052-101 State Representative	
		102-118 U.S. Representative	
	05	RESPONDENT OFFICE LEVEL	
		1. City Councilman or City Commissioner	
		2. State Representative	
		3. U.S. Representative	
134	06-07	RESPONDENT'S SECOND MOST PROMINENT POLITICAL FRUSTRATION	
		(Use the Political Frustrations Code Sheet)	
135	08-09	RESPONDENT'S THIRD MOST PROMINENT POLITICAL FRUSTRATION	
		(Use the Political Frustrations Code Sheet)	
136	10	OVERALL ATTRACTIVENESS TO POLITICS INDEX	
		This index is based on the coder's judgment about the respondent's attraction to politics.	
	(2)	1. The respondent dislikes it very much. No important satisfactions.	
	(5)	2. On balance, he dislikes it. Some attractions, but dissatisfactions are more important.	
	(18)	3. Pro-Con. Satisfactions and very important dissatisfactions.	
	(43)	4. On balance he likes it. Some dissatisfactions, but satisfactions more important.	
	(49)	5. The respondent likes it very much. No important dissatisfactions.	
	(1)	9. Other; NA; NO.	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 3</u>
137	11-12	CARE WHEN SPEAKING OUT OR VOTING	
		Q.20. How careful would you say you have to be (are) when speaking out or voting on public issues in terms of how it effects your chances for winning re-election?	
		(9) 01. Not very careful (no reason given).	
		(3) 02. Not very careful - Respondent says that the electorate is so unknowledgeable or uninterested that he cannot get hurt no matter which way he votes or speaks out.	
		(3) 03. Not very careful - Respondent says he votes the way he thinks is right and the chips fall where they may.	
		(16) 04. Not very careful - Respondent says he does not pay attention to special interests or pressure groups, but votes his conscious.	
		(10) 05. Not very careful - voters trust my judgment; As long as I can justify my position on the issues, "as long as you're honest with the people", etc.	
		(30) 06. Reasonable careful - Respondent says as long as he explains his position to his constituents, he is quite free to vote as he chooses.	
		(11) 07. Reasonable careful - Respondent says on most issues he does not have to be careful, but on some he has to be reasonable careful.	
		(25) 08. Reasonably careful - Respondent says it is wise to be careful on all issues; Should be generally careful.	
		(3) 09. Reasonably careful - Respondent says on most issues he does not have to be concerned, but on some he must be very careful.	
		(2) 10. Very careful - minimal qualifications.	
		(0) 99. Other; NA; NO.	
138	13	RESPONSIVENESS INDEX	
		This index is based on the code for Q.20.	
		(47) 1. Not very careful (01 through 05).	
		(69) 2. Reasonably careful (06 through 09).	
		(2) 3. Very Careful (10's)	
		(0) 9. Other; NA; NO (99's)	
139	14	INTENSITY OF CAMPAIGN EFFORT	
		Q.21. How would you describe the intensity of your efforts to be elected (or re-elected) during the last campaign - i.e., would you say that you exerted considerably effort, moderate effort, or a rather small amount of effort?	
		(3) 1. A rather small amount of effort - respondent did not seem to care if he won.	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 3</u>
		(21) 2.	A rather small amount of effort - no real competition; safe district.
		(7) 3.	A rather small amount of effort - Respondent says he had only minimal competition in the primary and/or the general election.
		(16) 4.	Moderate effort - Respondent says he did not have to put forth a considerable effort but he did work hard.
		(6) 5.	Moderate effort - Respondent says he had moderately strong competition in either the primary or general election.
		(19) 6.	Considerable effort - Respondent says he campaigns hard every election.
		(17) 7.	Considerable effort - Respondent had strong competition in the general election.
		(29) 8.	Considerable effort - Respondent had strong primary competition or was running his first campaign.
		(0) 9.	Other; NA; NO.
140	15	PREVIOUS ELECTION EFFORT INDEX	
		This index is based on the code for Q.21.	
		(31) 1.	A rather small amount of effort (1's, 2's and 3's).
		(22) 3.	Moderate effort (4's and 5's).
		(65) 5.	Considerable effort (6's, 7's, 8's).
		(0) 9.	Other; NA; NO (9's).
141	16	ELECTORAL EXPECTATIONS	
		Q.22. (COUNCILMAN/COMMISSIONERS ONLY) Is there ever much competition for the office of city (councilman/commissioner) here in <u>(city)</u> ?	
		(2) 1.	No; Only rarely is there ever much competition.
		(16) 3.	Sometimes; It varies.
		(33) 5.	Yes; there is always competition; there is usually competition.
		(67) 9.	Other; NA; NO.
142	17	NECESSITY OF A PRIMARY ELECTION	
		Q.23. (COUNCILMEN) Do you expect that in the next campaign, a primary election will be necessary to determine who will be the city council (commission) candidates in the general elction? (LEGISLATORS/CONGRESSMEN) Do you expect to have serious primary competition in the next campaign?	
		(21) 1.	No. - Respondent says he expects no competition.

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 3</u>
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- (22) 2. No. - At least no serious competition.
- (13) 3. Possibly; Its hard to say at this time.
- (33) 4. Yes. - Respondent thinks there will be at least a moderate threat to his position.
- (11) 5. Yes. - Respondent says he is sure he will have to work hard in the primary race.
- (18) 9. Other; NA; NO.

143 18 CHANCES IN THE PRIMARY

Q.24. If there is a primary election, how would you, at this time, assess your chances of being selected as a candidate for another term?

- (44) 1. 100% confident of winning; sure thing; no problem whatsoever.
- (48) 2. Very likely; 70-90% confident of winning.
- (9) 3. Likely - some chance of defeat however; 60% confident.
- (5) 4. 50-50 chance of winning; Too close to predict; Always runs a close race.
- (0) 5. Somewhat unlikely; 40% confident of winning.
- (0) 6. Very unlikely; 0-30% chance of winning.
- (12) 9. Other; NA; NO.

144 19 PRIMARY ELECTION ANTICIPATION INDEX

This index is based on the code for Q.24.

- (92) 1. Very likely/Certain (1's 2's and Respondent's who face no primary competition).
- (14) 3. 50-50; Somewhat unconfident (3's and 4's).
- (0) 5. Not very likely (5's and 6's).
- (12) 9. Other; NA; NO.

145 20 PROBLEMS IN PRIMARY VS. PROBLEMS IN GENERAL ELECTION

Q.25. Do you expect more problems in winning the primary than the general election, or more problems in the general election than in the primary?

- (6) 1. More problems in the primary election.
- (24) 2. More problems in the general election.
- (2) 3. Respondent anticipates problems in both elections.
- (71) 4. Respondent does not anticipate problems in either election.
- (15) 9. Other; NO; NO.

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 3</u>
146	21	CHANCES IN THE GENERAL ELECTION	
		Q.26. How do you assess your chances of winning the next (general) election?	
		(24) 1. 100% confident of winning; Sure thing; Anticipates no problem whatsoever.	
		(56) 2. Very likely to win; 70-90% confident of winning.	
		(17) 3. Likely - some chance of defeat expressed however; 60% confident.	
		(9) 4. 50-50 chance of winning; Too close to predict; Always runs as if its a close race.	
		(0) 5. Somewhat unlikely that he will win; 40% confident of winning.	
		(0) 6. Very unlikely that he will win; 0-30% confident of winning.	
		(12) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
147	22	GENERAL ELECTION ANTICIPATION INDEX	
		This index is based on the code for Q.26.	
		(80) 1. Very likely. (1's and 2's).	
		(26) 3. 50-50; Somewhat unconfident (3's and 4's).	
		(0) 5. Not very likely (5's and 6's).	
		9. Other; NA; NO.	
148	23	ELECTORAL CONFIDENCE INDEX	
		This index is based on the codes for Q.24 and Q.26.	
		(75) 1. Respondent expects no problem winning either the primary or general elections (Respondent scored 1's or 2's or both on Q.24 and Q.26).	
		(14) 2. Respondent is confident (Respondent scored a 1 or 2 on one of the questions and a 3 on the other).	
		(17) 3. Respondent sees re-election chances as problematic (Respondent scores a 1 through 3 and 4 combination on the questions or 3's on both).	
		(0) 4. Respondent is unconfident. (Respondent scored 2 through 4 on one question and a 4 on the other).	
		(0) 5. Respondent is very unconfident (Respondent scored a 4 through 6 on one question and a 5 or 6 on the other).	
		(12) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
149	24	COLLAPSED ELECTORAL CONFIDENCE INDEX	
		This index is based on the code for the Electoral Confidence Index.	
		(89) 1. Respondent is confident (1's and 2's).	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 3</u>
		(17) 3. Pro-Con; 50-50 chance of winning (3's).	
		(0) 5. Respondent is doubtful (4's and 5's).	
		9. Other; NA; NO.	
150	25	GENERAL CAMPAIGN EFFORT INDEX	
		NOTE: This index is based primarily on the respondent's answer to Q.21 (p.18). The coder should use the information from this answer and any pertinent information revealed by questions number 22 through 26 to make a judgment about the effort which the respondent normally makes (or probably will make) in his campaign efforts.	
		(18) 1. Respondent puts forth a rather small amount of effort.	
		(46) 2. Respondent puts forth a moderate effort.	
		(44) 3. Respondent puts forth a considerable effort.	
		(10) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
151	26	PERSONAL LOSS IF NOT RE-ELECTED	
		Q.27. How much of a personal loss would you feel if, for some reason, you are not re-elected in the next election (if you left politics)?	
		NOTE: Coder should use the information on the respondent's political motivation and in the Overall Attractiveness Index (p.16) for assistance in making this judgment.	
		(40) 1. Respondent anticipates no personal sense of loss.	
		(45) 2. Respondent anticipates a moderate personal sense of loss.	
		(26) 3. Respondent anticipates a great personal sense of loss.	
		(7) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
152	27	TRANSITION	
		Q.28 If you left politics, do you think there would be much of a problem re-adjusting to a life which does not include your participation (on the council/in the legislature/in the congress)?	
		(97) 1. Respondent anticipates no problem in re-adjusting - in fact he may mention some desire or advantages to leaving.	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 3</u>
		(11) 2.	Respondent anticipates some difficulty in re-adjusting but nothing problematic - minor financial, occupational or status problems mentioned.
		(7) 3.	Respondent anticipates a hard transition - some expression of anticipated difficulty or at least possible financial or occupational problems stated.
		(3) 9.	Other; NA; NO.
153	28	ADVANTAGES TO LEAVING POLITICS	
		Q.29. Do you foresee any advantage(s) to leaving politics? (Does leaving politics appeal to you at all?).	
		(56) 1.	Respondent notes no real advantage to leaving politics at all (Maybe some offhand advantage noted - but not in a serious vain).
		(34) 3.	Respondent notes some advantage to leaving politics - at least in leaving his present political activities.
		(26) 5.	Respondent notes real advantages or a real desire to leave his political activities.
		(2) 9.	Other; NA; NO.
154	29	SOURCE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCES	
		Q.30. In your campaigns, have you found that there was enough "outside money" available to finance it adequately, or have you found it necessary to make a substantial contribution to this effort from your personal resources?	
		(29) 1.	Outside money used exclusively (no problem).
		(32) 2.	Outside money by far the main source (Respondent will put money in only for inconsequential expenses or in unusual circumstances - no hardship indicated).
		(24) 3.	Mixed (outside money the main source but Respondent has put in or usually puts in 15-50% - no hardship indicated).
		(8) 4.	Mixed (outside money is the main source but Respondent usually contributes a meaningful share of the campaign finances; "meaningful" being a subjective judgment based on Q.30 and Q.31).
		(20) 5.	Respondent puts in a good part or all of what is required out of his own pocket (no hardship indicated).
		(3) 6.	Respondent puts in a good part of what is required from his own pocket (some hardship indicated).
		(2) 9.	Other; NA; NO.
155	30	COST OF THE LAST CAMPAIGN	
		Q.31. What do you estimate as the total cost of your last campaign?	

<u>Var.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Column</u> <u>Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 3</u>
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NOTE: Record the dollar amount using all five columns for campaigns costing over 9,999 dollars, four columns (cols. 37-40) for campaigns costing over 999 dollars, three columns (cols. 38-40) for campaigns costing over 99 dollars, etc.

00001. One dollar spent (unopposed last campaign).
00010. Ten dollars spent.
00100. Etc.

FINANCIAL SITUATION NEXT CAMPAIGN

156	31	Q.32. How about in the next campaign, if you run, do you foresee the same financial situation (in terms of having to put money in out of your own pocket)?
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- (26) 1. Yes - Respondent will not contribute any of his own money.
- (46) 2. Yes - Respondent will contribute only an inconsequential sum.
- (11) 3. No - Respondent will spend less of his own money.
- (6) 4. Yes - Respondent will contribute a meaningful share ("meaningful being a subjective coder judgment).
- (6) 5. No - Respondent anticipates having to spend more of his own money.
- (23) 9. Other; NA; NO.

157	32	: FINANCIAL COMMITMENT INDEX
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This index is based on the coder's judgment of respondent answers to questions 30 and 32.

- (92) 1. Respondent is not concerned about campaign finances (either because its easy to get enough money, he feels he can work with whatever is raised, or because campaign expenses are so inconsequential).
- (24) 2. Respondent is concerned about campaign finances but does not seem worried about having to put his own money in if this is necessary.
- (2) 3. Respondent is financially committed to his own re-election (some possible hardship or inconvenience suggested).
- 9. Other; NA; NO.

158-201	33-80	THE ORIGINS OF CRIME
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Q.33. Now, I would like to ask you about an issue which is of concern not only to (state legislators), but also to both (city councilmen) and (congressmen). This is

<u>Var.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Column</u> <u>Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 3</u>
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the problem of crime which we have in our society.
How do you feel this came to be a problem (What are the
origins or sources of crime)?

158-197 33-72 FIRST, code each cause of crime volunteered or noted by the
respondent by proceeding down the list of possible causes
on the Causes of Crime Code Sheet. For each cause listed,
code whether it was mentioned by Respondent. The code
for each item on the Causes of Crime Code Sheet is as
follows.

- 1. Not mentioned
- 5. Mentioned

CAUSES OF CRIME CODE SHEET

ECONOMIC/SOCIAL CONDITIONS

158	33	(2)	01. Inflation.
159	34	(23)	02. Affluence; materialism; poor envious of the rich.
160	35	(28)	03. Unemployment.
161	36	(28)	04. Poverty.
162	37	(29)	07. Other _____ (MAC)

POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

163	38	(7)	11. Increased population.
164	39	(6)	12. Density of the population.
165	40	(11)	13. Mobility of the population.
166	41	(3)	17. Other _____ (MAC).

SOCIAL CHANGE

167	42	(2)	21. Process of urbanization.
168	43	(1)	22. Process of industrialization.
169	44	(3)	23. Process of modernization.
170	45	(4)	27. Other _____ (MAC).

MORAL CLIMATE

171	46	(22)	31. Breakdown of morality in society.
172	47	(9)	32. Declining influence of religion.
173	48	(5)	33. Corruption in high places.
174	49	(6)	37. Other _____ (MAC).

SOCIAL DISCIPLINE

175	50	(20)	41. General lack of respect for laws and authority.
176	51	(25)	42. Permissive atmosphere; Spockism; Public Apathy.
177	52	(6)	47. Other _____ (MAC).

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 3</u>
INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE			
GOVERNMENTAL			
178	53	(37) 51.	Courts (judges) have been too lenient.
179	54	(20) 52.	Courts (or Supreme Court decisions) have hamstrung law enforcement officials.
180	55	(9) 53.	Legislators have not properly addressed the problem..
181	56	(24) 57.	Other _____ (MAC).
LAW ENFORCEMENT			
182	57	(1) 55.	Law enforcement agencies have been under staffed and underequipped.
183	58	(2) 56.	Law enforcement forces have failed to crack down or deal with the drug problem.
184	59	(13) 57.	Other _____ (MAC).
EDUCATIONAL			
185	60	(12) 61.	Schools (teachers) have failed to instill a respect for discipline and authority.
186	61	(6) 62.	Teachers and college professors have undermined respect for authority (taught permissiveness).
187	62	(18) 67.	Other _____ (MAC).
FAMILY			
188	63	(50) 71.	Family unity has been weakened as an instrument of social discipline or as a control on member behavior.
189	64	(11) 72.	Mothers are working and socializing more to the neglect of child supervision.
190	65	(13) 77.	Other _____ (MAC).
RELIGIOUS			
191	66	(11) 81.	The church has declined as a moral force in society.
192	67	(0) 87.	Other _____ (MAC).
MISCELLANEOUS			
193	68	(25) 91.	Historical cycle: present phase of a historical cycle (authoritarian-permissiveness cycle, war-peace cycle, depression-prosperity cycle).
194	69	(57) 93.	Availability of drugs.
195	70	(23) 95.	Alienation from society (frustration).
196	71	(7) 97.	Respondent says he does not know what causes crime.
197	72	(25) 99.	Other; NA; NO.

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 3</u>
198-201		SECOND, code up to four mentions in order of their importance to the respondent.	
198	73-74	RESPONDENT'S MOST PROMINENT SOURCE OF THE CRIME PROBLEM (Use the Causes of Crime Code Sheet)	
199	75-76	RESPONDENT'S SECOND MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF CRIME (Use the Causes of Crime Code Sheet).	
200	77-78	RESPONDENT'S THIRD MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF CRIME (Use the Causes of Crime Code Sheet).	
201	79-80	RESPONDENT'S FOURTH MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF CRIME (Use the Causes of Crime Code Sheet).	

IDEOLOGY, COGNITIVE STYLE,
AND BELIEF SYSTEMS

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 4</u>
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	01	DECK NUMBER (4)	
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	02-04	RESPONDENT INTERVIEW NUMBER	
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		001-051	City Councilman or City Commissioner
		052-101	State Representative
		102-118	U.S. Representative

	05	RESPONDENT OFFICE LEVEL	
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- | | | | |
|--|--|----|--------------------------------------|
| | | 1. | City Councilman or City Commissioner |
| | | 2. | State Representative |
| | | 3. | U.S. Representative |

202-236	06-44	SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF CRIME	
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Q.33B. What do you think should or can be done about the crime problem?

202-232	06-36	FIRST, code each solution of crime volunteered or noted by the respondent by proceeding down the list of possible solutions on the Solution to Crime Code Sheet. For each solution listed, code whether it was mentioned by Respondent. The code for each item on the Solutions to Crime Code Sheet is as follows.	
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- | | | | |
|--|--|----|---------------|
| | | 1. | Not mentioned |
| | | 2. | Mentioned |

SOLUTIONS TO CRIME CODE SHEET

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

ECONOMIC

202	06	(1)	01.	Redistribute income via tax reform, etc.
203	07	(8)	02.	Institute government work programs to end poverty, unemployment, etc.

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 4</u>
204	08	(2) 03.	Revamp welfare system; institute guaranteed annual income plan.
205	09	(7) 04.	General economic reform - no specific plan offered.
206	10	(14) 07.	Other_____ (MAC)
SOCIAL-HISTORICAL CHANGE			
207	11	(14) 21.	Solution will occur as we return to the non-permissive or more authoritarian phase of the social/historical cycle.
208	12	(23) 27.	Other; General social reform (MAC)
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE			
GOVERNMENTAL-LEGISLATIVE			
209	13	(11) 31.	Legislature should revise criminal code; decriminalize victimless crimes.
210	14	(6) 32.	Legislate gun control.
211	15	(19) 37.	Other_____ (MAC).
GOVERNMENTAL-COURTS/PENAL			
212	16	(29) 41.	Courts must insure certainty of punishment.
213	17	(31) 42.	Judges must mete out stronger or harsher punishment.
214	18	(14) 43.	Courts (or "Supreme Court") should reverse the court decisions which now overprotect the defendant.
215	19	(23) 44.	Reform the penal institutions; persons should be rehabilitated not taught the art of crime.
216	20	(43) 47.	Other_____ (MAC).
GOVERNMENTAL-LAW ENFORCEMENT			
217	21	(1) 51.	Enforce gun control.
218	22	(8) 52.	Increase police apprehension powers.
219	23	(6) 53.	Increase police manpower and equipment.
220	24	(16) 54.	Improve police techniques; put the cop back on the beat, etc.
221	25	(17) 55.	Crack down hard on drug pushers and big dealers.
222	26	(21) 57.	Other_____ (MAC).
EDUCATIONAL			
223	27	(9) 61.	Schools (teachers) should discipline students and teach respect for authority.
224	28	(9) 62.	Schools should instill moral responsibility in students.
225	29	(10) 63.	Schools should stress relevant subjects which enable graduates to obtain work and rise above conditions which encourage or facilitate criminal behavior.
226	30	(23) 67.	Other_____ (MAC).

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 4</u>
FAMILY			
227	31	(15) 71.	Family should work harder to instill individual responsibility moral training; family training.
228	32	(2) 77.	Other _____ (MAC).
RELIGIOUS			
229	33	(2) 81.	Churches should teach moral improvement; individual responsibility.
230	34	(0) 87.	Other _____ (MAC).
MISCELLANEOUS			
231	35	(18) 95.	Respondent says he does not know any solution(s) to the crime problem.
232	36	(16) 99.	Other; NA; NO.
233-236	37-44	SECOND, code up to four mentions in order of importance or prominence to the respondent.	
233	37-38	RESPONDENT'S MOST PROMINENT RECOMMENDED SOLUTION TO THE CRIME PROBLEM	
		(Use the Solutions to Crime Code Sheet)	
234	39-40	RESPONDENT'S SECOND MOST PROMINENT RECOMMENDED SOLUTION TO THE CRIME PROBLEM	
		(Use the Solutions to Crime Code Sheet)	
235	41-42	RESPONDENT'S THIRD MOST PROMINENT RECOMMENDED SOLUTION TO THE CRIME PROBLEM	
		(Use the Solutions to Crime Code Sheet)	
236	43-44	RESPONDENT'S FOURTH MOST PROMINENT RECOMMENDED SOLUTION TO THE CRIME PROBLEM	
		(Use the Solutions to Crime Code Sheet)	
237-265	45-75	RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRIME PROBLEM	
		Q.33C. What group or institution do you feel has the power and/or responsibility to deal with this problem?	
237-263	45-71	FIRST, code each agency or institution which the respondent cites as being responsible for dealing with the crime problem by proceeding down the list of institutions on the Responsibility for Crime Code Sheet. For each institution or agency listed, code whether it was	

<u>Var.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Column</u> <u>Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 4</u>
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mentioned by Respondent. The code for each item on the Responsibility for Crime Code Sheet is as follows.

- 1. Not Mentioned
- 5. Mentioned

RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIME CODE SHEET

GOVERNMENT-LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

237	45	(8)	11. The city council/commission.
238	46	(6)	12. Local government in general.
239	47	(23)	13. The legislature.
240	48	(2)	14. State government in general.
241	49	(15)	15. The Congress.
242	50	(38)	17. Other _____ (MAC); 18. = Legislative branch at all levels.

GOVERNMENT-EXECUTIVE BRANCH

243	51	(2)	21. The Governor.
244	52	(11)	22. The administration in Washington.
245	53	(2)	23. Other _____ (MAC); 24 = Executive branch at all levels.

GOVERNMENT-COURTS/PENAL INSTITUTIONS

246	54	(61)	31. The courts.
247	55	(15)	32. The penal authorities.
248	56	(11)	37. Other _____ (MAC); The Supreme Court (MAC).

GOVERNMENT-LAW ENFORCEMENT

249	57	(23)	41. The law enforcement agencies (police).
250	58	(1)	47. Other _____ (MAC).

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

251	59	(28)	51. The family.
252	60	(30)	52. The schools.
253	61	(5)	53. The churches.
254	62	(2)	57. Other _____ (MAC).

MEDIA

255	63	(0)	61. The press.
256	64	(0)	62. Television and radio newscasters.
257	65	(2)	67. Other _____ (MAC).

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 4</u>
SOCIETY			
258	66	(4) 71.	The electorate.
259	67	(20) 72.	The people; society in general.
260	68	(22) 77.	Other _____ (MAC); All social/governmental institutions must play a part.
261	69	(0) 97.	Other general responses _____ (MAC).
262	70	(1) 98.	No one is responsible or has the power to deal with the problem.
263	71	(0) 99.	Other; NA; NO.

264 72-73 SECOND, code up to two mentions in order of importance to the respondent.

SOCIAL AGENCY WHICH THE RESPONDENT HOLDS MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH CRIME

(Use the Responsibility for Crime Code Sheet)

265 74-75 SOCIAL AGENCY WHICH THE RESPONDENT HOLDS SECONDARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH CRIME

(Use the Responsibility for Crime Code Sheet)

ITEMS CREATED FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME DISCUSSION

GENERALIZER-PARTICULARIZER DIMENSION - "FOCUS OF THE DISCUSSION"

Main Criterion: The extent to which Respondent takes a general or global approach to the crime problem, concerning himself with the general philosophical or societal aspects involved, or whether Respondent takes a particularistic approach, concerning himself more with specific details or the objective consequences of the problem.

NOTE: To measure the dimension, each respondent will be coded according to the way he perceives certain referents which are common (either explicitly or implicitly) in any discussion of the crime problem.

(CODE: No = 1 Yes = 3)

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 4</u>
*R's PERCEPTION OF THE VICTIM(S) OF CRIME			
(A) "Society" vs. "Individuals".			
266	76	(0)	R says or implies that "society" (or some reified equivalent) is the victim.
267	77	(18)	R says or implies that individuals are the victims (i.e. persons not objects).
(B) Homogeneity of the Concept "Victims".			
268	78	(2)	R says or implies that the "victims" of crime are a homogeneous group.
269	79	(2)	R says or implies that there are different types of victims (victims of burglars, drug pushers, rapists, etc.).
R'S PERCEPTION OF THE CRIMINAL (only one of items 270-272 can be coded "YES").			
(A) Is the Problem "Crime" or "Criminals" (i.e. Are Crimes Committed by People)?			
270	80	(84)	Overall R refers to "crime" as the subject or factor which must be dealt with (concerned more with "the problem" than the individuals involved).

(Continued on Column 06 of Deck 5)

IDEOLOGY, COGNITIVE STYLE,

AND BELIEF SYSTEMS

Deck 5

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>
	01	DECK NUMBER (5)
	02-04	RESPONDENT INTERVIEW NUMBER
		001-051 City Councilman or City Commissioner
		052-101 State Representative
		102-118 U.S. Representative
	05	RESPONDENT OFFICE LEVEL
		1. City Councilman or City Commissioner
		2. State Representative
		3. U.S. Representative
		ITEMS CREATED FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME DISCUSSION (Continued)
		(CODE; No = 1; Yes = 3)
271	06	(7) R refers to "degenerates", "punks", "kids", "criminal element", (or other evaluative term with no logical content) as the subject or factor which must be dealt with.
272	07	(27) R refers to individuals (either criminals or other persons) as the subject or factor which must be dealt with.
		(B) Homogeneity of the Concept "Criminal".
273	08	(36) R refers to or implies (perhaps reifying the concept "criminals") that "criminals" are a homogeneous group (e.g. "Criminals have got to be punished!").
274	09	(46) R refers to or mentions various types of criminals (drug pushers, murderers, rapists, muggers, etc.), or to criminals as individuals.
		R'S PERCEPTION OF THE CRIMINAL ACT
		(A) Homogeneity of the Concept "Crime".

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 5</u>
275	10	(41)	R refers to crime as a homogeneous concept (Not specifying types may be a clue).
276	11	(50)	R refers to various types of crime.
R'S PERCEPTION OF THE CAUSE(S) OF CRIME			
(A) External Forces vs. Individual Immorality.			
277	12	(89)	R mentions or implies that social, economic, or other "environmental" conditions are the cause of crime (unemployment, population density, poverty, alienation from society, the "times", permissive atmosphere, etc.).
278	12	(61)	R mentions or implies that problems with law enforcement institutions, or governmental institutions in general are the cause of crime (e.g. lack of police, training and manpower, lenient judges, etc.).
279	14	(55)	R mentions or implies that individual actions (i.e. individual immorality, irresponsibility, ignorance, or infallibility) are the cause(s) of crime (e.g. "Kids think they have a right to steal because they don't have money.", "Some people are just born criminals.", etc.). NOTE: Parents are individuals. Does R say that individuals cause crime rather than environment? Is there some indication R holds the individual responsible?
R'S PERCEPTION OF THE AGENT OF THE SOLUTION(S) TO CRIME			
(A) R'S PERCEPTION OF WHO'S RESPONSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM			
280	15	(50)	R mentions or implies that "society", the "people", "the government" (or some reified equivalent) should handle the problem.
281	16	(63)	R mentions or implies that the "police", "courts", "legislature", or some similar-but partially reified - group or institution should handle the crime problem.
282	17	(44)	R mentions to or implies that certain <u>individuals</u> should handle the problem (judges, policemen, teachers, parents, moral leaders, watchful citizens, etc.).
(B) R'S PERCEPTION OF THE ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (DOES HE REIFY THESE AGENTS			
283	18	(8)	R reifies the word "police" (e.g. R says that "police" have to crack down rather than that the "cop on the beat" must be more vigilant, etc.).

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 5</u>
284	19	(36)	R reifies the word "court" (e.g. R says that "courts" are too lenient, rather than that "judges" are afraid to imprison criminals).
285	20	(24)	R reifies the word "society" or its equivalent "the people", "community", etc. (e.g. R says "It's society's responsibility" rather than "it is all of us" or "each and everyone of us responsibility", etc.).

(C) R'S SOLUTION TO CRIME - HOW SPECIFIC IS THE TYPE OF SOLUTION

286	21	(31)	R recommends general social reform or some type of broad social change as the solution to crime (e.g. redistribution of income and/or power).
287	22	(63)	R recommends a project, course of action, etc., but names no agent for carrying it out.
288	23	(88)	R recommends <u>specific institutional</u> procedural change or governmental program as the solution to the crime problem (e.g. the court system must be made more efficient, etc.).
289	24	(21)	R recommends individual change, i.e. the action of certain individual (judges, parents, etc.) as the solution to crime (e.g. "Children must learn to respect authority.", "People need to be shown that crime doesn't pay", "Parents have to....", etc.).

DEDUCTIVE-INDUCTIVE DIMENSION - "BASIS OF THOUGHT"

Main Criterion: The extent to which R deduces his thoughts about crime from some general abstract political, economic, or social theory, rather than inducing them from his "own" experiences, situation or observations.

(CODE: NO = 1; YES = 3)

(A) R'S PERCEPTION OF THE CAUSES OF CRIME

290	25	(13)	R says or implies that his ideas about the causes of crime are deduced from some moral belief system (e.g. Christian Morality), or some general, abstract (named or implicit) political, economic or social theory (e.g. "19th Century Liberalism", theory that "history runs in cycles", "Spockism", etc.).
291	26	(27)	R says or implies that his ideas about the causes of crime derive from his personal observations and personal experiences in dealing with and thinking about the problem (e.g. "From my experience....", "I personally believe....", etc. NOTE: A "personal" basis of thought requires that R mentions some experience of his as the basis of his thinking - or admits that he has thought the subject over.

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 5</u>
292	27	(21)	R says or implies that his ideas about the causes of crime derive from reports, facts and figures which have come to his attention through the media, the council/legislature/congress, friends, etc. (e.g. "According to a newspaper article....", "the police chief", etc.).
(B) R'S PERCEPTION OF THE SOLUTION(S) TO CRIME			
293	28	(7)	R says or implies that he has some type of belief system or social theory which should guide thought and action with respect to solving the crime problem. (NOTE: A solution which, according to R, gets at the "roots" of crime, implies some theory about what those roots are, a solution which treats symptoms implies no theory.)
294	29	(19)	R says or Implies clearly that his personal thoughts and personal experiences in dealing with the problem are the source of his ideas about how to deal with it (e.g. "From what I've seen....", "I believe...", "From my experience....", "The way I see it...", etc.).
295	30	(6)	R refers to or implies that his ideas about the solution to crime derive from reports, facts and figures which have come to his attention through the media, his work, friends, etc. (e.g. From what I understand...", "From what I hear...", "According to what I've read...", etc.).
296	31	(5)	R refers to or implies that some sort of moral belief system (Christian ethics/heritage, humanism, etc.) is the basis of his ideas on how to deal with the crime problem (e.g. "I think our moral code requires that we...").

COMPLEXITY-SIMPLICITY DIMENSION - "COMPLEXITY AND ORGANIZATION OF

Main Criterion: The extent to which R perceives the crime problem as a complex social issue involving a number and variety of factors and their inter-relationship, as opposed to an oversimplified perception, or one in which there is no discernible pattern or organization.

(CODE: NO = 1; YES = 3)

(A) VARIETY OF CAUSAL FACTORS, SOLUTIONS AND RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES

297 32-33 R mentioned _____ types of causal factors.

(Record R's count in terms of the categories on the Causes of Crime Code Sheet)

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 5</u>
298	34-35	R recommended _____ types of solutions. (Record R's count according to the categories on the Solutions to Crime Code Sheet)	
299	36-37	R suggested that there were _____ types of responsible agencies. (Record R's count in terms of the categories on the Responsibility for Crime Code Sheet)	
(B) ORGANIZATION OF THOUGHT - LOGIC			
300	38	(39) R offers some type of chain of reasoning in his analysis ("Unemployment leads to poverty and poverty leads to crime.", etc.); linkage must be clearly implied.	
301	39	(16) R offers some type of sequence in his analysis (listing or numbering causes, solutions, etc.).	
302	40	(57) R offers some type of direct connection (either explicitly or implicitly) between the causes and the solution(s) to the crime problem.	
303	41	(28) R's solution recommends changes in environmental (economic or social) conditions in addition to changes in social and governmental institutions, advocates a comprehensive attack on crime incorporating general reform and specific institutional changes.	
304	42	(18) R offers some type of circular reasoning in his analysis (e.g. "The reason crime is a problem is because we have too many people who feel they can get away with illegal or criminal acts.").	
(C) GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THOUGHT			
305	43	(5) R's discussion strayed from the question(s) at least more than once.	
306	44	(35) R's discussion was particularly well organized and well thought out (arguments hang together as if he had thought about the problem before).	
307	45	(28) R's discussion was unorganized, disjointed or meandering.	
308	46	(51) R implies or explicitly states that the crime problem is a complex issue.	

CONFLICTUAL-CONSENSUS DIMENSION - "ZERO-SUM PERSPECTIVE"

Main Criterion: The extent to which R perceives the crime
problem in terms which are conflictual rather than con-
sensual, intolerant rather than tolerant.

(CODE: NO = 1; YES = 3)

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 5</u>
(A) "CRIMINALS" VS. "SOCIETY"			
309	47	(9)	R perceives the crime problem in dichotomous terms ("we" vs. "they", "black" vs. "white", "poor" vs. "rich", etc.) implying that there is hostility between criminals (as a group) and society.
(B) MORALIZER VS. NON-MORALIZER			
310	48	(38)	R blames the crime problems (explicitly or implicitly) on some particular group or institution (e.g. "Crime comes mainly from blacks.", "The judges themselves have helped to increase crime.", etc.); NOTE: "Blame" must be distinguishable from responsibility.
311	49	(27)	R refers to or implies that crime is a natural social problem which we will always have (e.g. "There will always be people who will rob and steal.", etc.). NOTE: Inevitability must be at least implied.
(C) R'S PERCEPTION OF THE CRIMINAL			
312	50	(58)	R refers to or implies that criminals are ordinary people in special circumstances (e.g. "If a man can't feed his family, he's liable to begin robbing people.", "Under those conditions, any man would turn to crime.", "Anyone hooked on drugs has got to turn to crime.", etc.). NOTE: There should be some hint that criminals are victims; or that it is their environment which makes them turn to crime.
313	51	(55)	R refers to or implies that criminals are individuals who are inherently weak in character, immoral, irresponsible, or ignorant (i.e. R implies it is their own fault for being criminals), (e.g. "Some people just don't care what's right or wrong.", "Some men are criminals by nature.", etc.).
(D) RETRIBUTION VS. REHABILITATION			
314	52	(53)	In discussing the solution to crime, R mentions or implies that criminals need to be punished.
315	53	(29)	In discussing the solution to crime, R mentions or implies that criminals should be rehabilitated and not merely punished.
(E) RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEALING WITH CRIME			
316	54	(72)	R refers to or implies that the police, the courts, or the penal authorities (no mention of rehabilitation) are the agencies responsible for dealing with this problem. NOTE: Should be implied that punishment is necessary.

(See R's mentions on the Responsibility for
Crime Code Sheet)

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 5</u>
317	55	(77)	R refers to or implies that non-law enforcement "consensus building" agencies (schools, families, churches, the legislature, etc.) are the agencies responsible for dealing with the problem of crime.

(See R's mentions on the Responsibility
for Crime Code Sheet)

EMOTIONAL-OBJECTIVE DIMENSION - "AFFECT AND/OR SALIENCE
OF THE SUBJECT"

Main Criterion: The extent to which R's discussion
of the crime problem is emotionally
or affectively charged.

(CODE: NO = 1; YES = 3)

(A) EMOTIONAL WORDS AND RHETORIC

318	56	(8)	R uses emotionally charged words and/or rhetoric in discussing the subject of crime or its <u>consequences</u> (e.g. "Crime is destroying our culture and traditions.", "My wife is scared to death to shop downtown.", etc.).
319	57	(11)	R uses emotionally charged words and/or rhetoric in discussing the <u>causes</u> of crime (e.g. "Crime has resulted from insane, assinine court decisions.", "Flaming liberal college professors cause alot of the problem.", "Its the obscene living conditions in the ghetto which causes crime.", etc.).
320	58	(3)	R uses emotionally charged words and/or rhetoric in discussing criminals (e.g. "These degenerates and bums think they can get away with murder.", etc.).
321	59	(11)	R uses emotionally charged words and/or rhetoric in discussing the <u>solution(s)</u> to the crime problem (e.g. "Drug pushers <u>should be taken out and shot.</u> ", "Why put a kid in prison where he'll be raped and tortured.", etc.).
322	60	(3)	R uses emotionally charged words and/or rhetoric in discussing <u>who's responsible</u> for dealing with the problem of <u>crime</u> (e.g. "Those jerks in Washington are the ones who can best solve the problem.", etc.).

(B) URGENCY OF THE PROBLEM

323	61	(14)	R views the crime problem as an urgent matter which needs immediate attention (some hint of urgency apparent).
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<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 5</u>
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(C) R'S APPROACH

324	62	(79)	R discussed the problem in an objective manner, standing back and looking at the problem as just another social problem. NOTE: One can view the problem as urgent yet look at it in objective terms.
325	63	(4)	R expresses or implies a personal fear that he will be the victim of a crime (e.g. "In fact, I have a burgler system to protect my house.", etc.).
326	64	(44)	R feels emotional or is personally concerned about the problem of crime.*

* This item is particularly relevant for distinguishing R's who use emotionally charged descriptive terms but who lack emotional commitment to the issue.

CONFIDENT-UNCONFIDENT DIMENSION - "MENTAL ATTITUDE"

Main Criterion: The extent to which R discusses or analyzes the crime problem in an open vs. reluctant manner and/or in an optimistic vs. pessimistic manner (or a combination thereof).

(CODE: NO = 1; YES =3)

(A) OPENESS OF RESPONSE

327	65	(99)	R offered his opinions about the causes of crime readily; no probing required.
328	66	(14)	R was reluctant to talk about the causes of crime; probing required.
329	67	(96)	R offered his opinions about the <u>solution</u> to the crime problem readily; no probing required.
330	68	(22)	R was reluctant to recommend a solution to the crime problem; probing required (e.g. "I don't know what the solution is.", etc.).

(B) SELF-ASSESSED EXPERTISE

331	69	(34)	R appeared to feel that his ideas were the "correct" ideas (beyond just offering his personal viewpoint) about what caused crime.
332	70	(28)	R qualified his statements about the causes of crime (e.g. "I don't really know, but...", "Well, in my opinion...", etc.). Plays down his expertise.
333	71	(28)	R appeared to feel that his solution(s) were the "correct" solutions to the crime problem.
334	72	(28)	R qualified his statements about the solution(s) to the crime problem (e.g. "I'm not sure but...", "We might try....", etc.). Plays down his own expertise.

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 5</u>
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(C) PROBLEM SOLVABILITY - R's EFFICACIOUSNESS

- | | | | |
|-----|----|------|--|
| 335 | 73 | (60) | R said or implied that there was a solution to the crime problem (personal confidence that crime could be dealt with). |
| 336 | 74 | (14) | R said or implied that there might not be a solution to the crime problem ("We'll always have crime", "at least at the present time", etc.). |

FRAMEWORK OF THE DISCUSSION - "HISTORICAL"

Main Criterion: The extent to which R uses history or some period in history as a standard by which we should assess the crime problem; or whether R believes the crime problem to be a manifestation that we are in a particular phase of an historical cycle.

(CODE: NO = 1; YES = 3)

- | | | | |
|-----|----|------|---|
| 337 | 75 | (30) | R refers to history, or some period in history, as a standard by which we should assess the crime problem (e.g. "During the depression...", "In the old days...", etc.). |
| 338 | 76 | (27) | R refers to or implies that the crime problem exists because we are in some type of historical or social cycle (e.g. war/peace cycle, authoritarian/permissiveness cycle, "In wartime men are more prone to criminal behavior.", etc.). |
| 339 | 77 | (9) | R uses "historical antecedents" (references to occurrences or events in the past) in his discussion of the crime problem (e.g. "If we hadn't had the migration of blacks to the Northern cities, we couldn't have had this crime problem.", etc.). NOTE: The Vietnam war may be such an antecedent. |

FRAMEWORK OF THE DISCUSSION - "LEGAL-TECHNICAL"

Main Criterion: The extent to which R discusses the crime problem as a matter of inadequate law-making, inadequate or improper law enforcement, or the improper adjudication or application of the law.

(CODE: NO = 1; YES = 3)

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 5</u>
340	78	(23)	R cites inadequacies in the criminal code as a factor bearing on the crime problem (e.g. "Victimless crimes should be decriminalized.", etc.).
341	79	(50)	R refers to or implies that the courts (judges) have encouraged crime by not properly enforcing current laws and statutes (by not meting out stiff enough penalties, etc.).
342	80	(27)	R refers to or implies that law enforcement authorities are hampered in some way from properly enforcing the law (e.g. "We need to put the cop back on the street.", "Court decisions have tied the policeman's hands.", "The police need more citizen co-operation.", etc.).

(Continued on Column 06 of Deck 6)

IDEOLOGY, COGNITIVE STYLE,
AND BELIEF SYSTEMS

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 6</u>
	01	DECK NUMBER (6)	
	02-04	RESPONDENT INTERVIEW NUMBER	
		001-051 City Councilman or City Commissioner	
		052-101 State Representative	
		102-118 U.S. Representative	
	05	RESPONDENT OFFICE LEVEL	
		1. City Councilman or City Commissioner	
		2. State Representative	
		3. U.S. Representative	
		ITEMS CREATED FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME DISCUSSION (Continued)	
		(CODE: NO = 1; YES = 3)	
343	06	(16) R refers to or implies that new laws are needed to properly deal with this problem (e.g. "Gun control should be legislated.", "I'd make a law which would require prison sentences for....", "We need to de-criminalize victimless crimes", etc.).	
344	07	(28) R's solution to the crime problem involves the improvement of law enforcement capability.	
345	08	(54) R's solution involves the restructuring or the improvement of the court system; its procedures or personnel.	
346	09	(23) R's solution involves the restructuring or the improvement of the penal system.	
347	10	(80) R refers to or implies that the police, the courts, the legislature or the penal authorities are the agencies responsible for dealing with the crime problem.	
348	11	(74) R refers to non-law enforcement agencies (e.g. schools, families, churches, etc.) as the agencies responsible for dealing with the problem.	

<u>Var.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Column</u> <u>Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 6</u>
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FRAMEWORK OF THE DISCUSSION - "MORALISTIC"

Main Criterion: The extent to which R perceives the crime problem as a matter of declining public and private morality and general disregard of social-ethical values.
NOTE: Morality is distinguished from "social discipline" here.

(CODE: NO = 1; YES = 3)

- | | | | |
|-----|----|------|--|
| 349 | 12 | (28) | R cites the general breakdown of public or private morality as a cause of crime. |
| 350 | 13 | (16) | R cites the declining influence of the church as a cause of crime. |
| 351 | 14 | (25) | R notes or implies that crime has been caused by families and schools which have failed to teach individuals correct moral behavior. |
| 352 | 15 | (13) | R's solution to the crime problem involves some attempt or means to strengthen public and private morality (e.g. "Allow religion back in schools.", etc.). |
| 353 | 16 | (0) | R mentions or implies that ministers, priests and other moral leaders have a responsibility for dealing with the crime problem. |

STANDARDS FOR JUDGING POLICY - "POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY"

Main Criterion: The extent to which R is concerned with the political feasibility of solving the crime problem, both in terms of the bi-partisan support necessary, and any potential solution's general acceptance among the citizenry.

(CODE: NO = 1; YES = 3)

- | | | | |
|-----|----|-----|--|
| 354 | 17 | (4) | R says or implies that partisan or political interest-group acceptability is a factor which bears on the chances for implementation for any solution to crime (e.g. "The conservatives would never agree to decriminalize drug taking.", "The democrats would lose support in the ghettos if they came down in favor of covert police operations.", etc.). |
| 355 | 18 | (7) | R refers to or implies that public acceptability is a factor which bears on the chances for implementation for any solution to crime (e.g. "The people might accept the legalization of pot in a few years.", etc.). |

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 6</u>
		STANDARDS FOR JUDGING POLICY - "TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY/ ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY"	
		Main Criterion: The extent to which R is concerned with the technical feasibility or administrative efficiency of potential solutions to the crime problem.	
		(CODE: NO = 1; YES = 3)	
356	19	(1) R refers to or implies that certain solutions are either objectionable or preferred because of their difficulty or ease of implementation (e.g. "The bookwork would be impossible.", "...but the prisons couldn't handle it.", etc.).	
		STANDARDS FOR JUDGING POLICY - "FINANCIAL COST"	
		Main Criterion: The extent to which R is concerned with the financial cost of potential solutions to the crime problem.	
		(CODE: NO = 1; YES = 3)	
357	20	(13) R refers to or implies that financial cost is an important factor in deciding what to do about crime (e.g. "We could provide more police and more police equipment, but the cost would be prohibitive.", etc.).	
		STANDARDS FOR JUDGING POLICY - "TRADITION"	
		Main Criterion: The extent to which R is concerned with traditional norms and customs as a standard by which to assess potential solutions to the crime problem.	
		(CODE: NO = 1; YES = 3)	
358	21	(0) R refers or implies that certain traditions are important in assessing potential solutions to crime (e.g. "If we are to preserve the Protestant work ethic, than increasing welfare as a means of preventing crime is unacceptable.", etc.).	
		R'S CLOSENESS TO THE ISSUE (i.e., from R's discussion of the crime problem, what can be said about his closeness to the subject or problem of crime)	
		(CODE: NO = 1; YES = 3)	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 6</u>
359	22	(13)	R's (non-office-holding) occupation brought (brings) him in regular contact with police or other law enforcement officials.
360	23	(18)	R's (non-office-holding) occupation has brought (brings) him in contact with court officials (judges) and penal authorities.
361	24	(12)	R's office-holding responsibilities has brought him into regular personal contact with law enforcement officials.
362	25	(31)	R's committee work deals with law enforcement in some way.
363	26	(11)	R has introduced legislation in the area of law enforcement.
364	27	(1)	R has been the victim of a crime.
365	28	(2)	R's family member(s), or friend(s) has been victimized by crime.
366	29	(1)	R or one of his family members or friends has been convicted of a crime.
367	30	(2)	R admitted to committing a crime at some time in his life.
368	31	(18)	R appears to have had (or has) a good deal of direct contact with law enforcement officials or with the problem of crime itself.

369 32-33 TIME OF ISSUE DISCUSSION

- 01. One minute.
- 02. Two minutes.
- 03. Etc.

REPRESENTATION

- 370 34 Q.35 Would you say that on issues on which the (council/ legislature/congress) has an input, that you tend more to (1) represent those persons who voted for you, or that (2) you represent all the voters in your (community/district)?
- (10) 1. My own personal views.
 - (3) 2. Those who voted for me.
 - (3) 3. R perceives some interest group or segment which he represents in particular.
 - (1) 4. All the voters in my (community/district) - because my district is made up of like-minded people.
 - (8) 5. All the voters in my (community/district) - because R sees everyone as potential future voters, or because he cannot identify those who voted for him.
 - (82) 6. All the voters (other or no reason offered).
 - (11) 9. Other; NA; NO.

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 6</u>
		GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE ECONOMY	
371	35	<p>Q.36. We are currently faced with the so-called "energy-crisis". Would you, at this time, tend to favor or oppose the idea of government regulation of the oil industries?</p> <p>(5) 1. R strongly opposes regulation of the oil industry. (19) 2. R opposes regulation. (33) 3. R is currently opposed to regulation but circumstances could change his mind. (43) 4. R favors regulation - with specified limits beneath the regulatory options listed in foil one. (13) 5. R strongly favors regulation - mentions the possibility of government ownership or making this industry a public utility. (5) 9. Other; NA; NO.</p>	
372	36	<p>GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE ECONOMY INDEX</p> <p>This index is based on the coder's judgment of R's answer to Q.36.</p> <p>(33) 1. R believes government should step in only when business disregards the interests of the average citizen. (60) 3. R opposes government interference in the economy. (12) 5. R favors government control of the economy. (13) 9. Other; NA; NO.</p>	
373	37	<p>ATTITUDE TOWARD POLITICAL COMPROMISE</p> <p>Q.37. Lets think hypothetically for a moment. Imagine that you are a member of an organization whose members are split 50-50 on some issue. You hold the tie-breaker vote and strongly believe that one side is right and that the other side is mistaken. If you cast your vote with the side you strongly agree with, however, you chance dividing the members into two opposing camps - a situation heretofore uncommon to the organization. What do you think you would do? Would you be inclined to stick with the side that you believe is right or try to find a compromise acceptable to all concerned?</p> <p>(52) 1. Definitely would look for compromise. (29) 2. Leans toward compromise. (8) 3. Pro-Con; It depends. (20) 4. Leans to sticking to the side with which he strongly agrees. (8) 5. Definitely would stick with the side he thinks is right. (1) 9. Other; NA; NO.</p>	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 6</u>
374	38	SECOND CODE FOR Q.37.	
		This index is based on the coder's judgment of R's answer to Q.37.	
		(32) 1. R views compromise in positive terms (no indication that on some issues compromise is not possible).	
		(56) 2. R views compromise in positive terms (some indication that on some issues one cannot compromise).	
		(19) 3. R views compromise in negative terms (some indication that he feels it is necessary or expedient in certain situations however).	
		(4) 4. R views compromise in negative terms (no indication that he would agree to it under any circumstances).	
		(7) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
375	39	GROUP CONFLICT	
		Q.38. Generally speaking, do you think that there is always conflict among groups in society, or rather that these groups have a great deal in common?	
		(2) 1. Consensus between groups by far more typical.	
		(46) 2. Consensus basically more typical, though conflicts occur.	
		(23) 3. Pro-Con. Both common: neither are clearly more typical.	
		(36) 4. Conflict basically more typical, but there are shared interests.	
		(4) 5. Conflict is by far more typical.	
		(7) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
376	40	SECOND CODE FOR Q.38.	
		This index is based on the coder's judgment of R's answer to Q. 38.	
		(3) 1. R percieves no conflict between groups in society (no qualifications).	
		(15) 2. R percieves some conflict between groups.	
		(36) 3. R percieves some conflict between groups - but believes that this is natural or beneficial to society.	
		(41) 4. R percieves conflict between groups - but believes this is natural or beneficial to society.	
		(0) 5. R percieves conflict between groups (no qualifications).	
		(4) 6. R percieves conflict between groups and believes this to be a regrettable or a bad thing.	
		(5) 7. R percieves a great deal of conflict between groups and believes this to be natural or beneficial to society.	
		(0) 8. R percieves a great deal of conflict between groups and sees this as regrettable or a bad thing.	
		(14) 9. Other; NA: NO.	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 6</u>
377	41	SOCIAL CLASS CONFLICT	
		Q.39. How about social classes, do you think that there will always be conflict among social classes or can they get along together without conflict?	
		(8) 1. Class harmony exists; there is no conflict between classes.	
		(35) 2. Class harmony is typical, but there are conflicts between classes.	
		(26) 3. There is both class conflict and class harmony; neither one is more typical than the other.	
		(41) 4. Class conflict is typical, but there are some common interests among classes.	
		(2) 5. Class conflict exists; there is no common interest between classes.	
		(6) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
378	42	SECOND CODE FOR Q.39	
		(8) 1. R percieves no conflict between social classes (no qualifications).	
		(14) 2. R percieves some conflict between social classes.	
		(30) 3. R percieves some conflict between social classes - but believes that this is natural or beneficial to society.	
		(46) 4. R percieves conflict between social classes - but believes this to be natural or beneficial to society.	
		(2) 5. R percieves conflict between social classes (no qualifications).	
		(7) 6. R percieves conflict between social classes and believes this to be a regrettable or bad thing.	
		(4) 7. R percieves a great deal of conflict between social classes and believes this to be natural or beneficial to society.	
		(0) 8. R percieves a great deal of conflict between social classes and sees this as a regrettable or bad thing.	
		(7) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
379	43	RESPONDENT FLEXIBILITY	
		Q.40. In voting on important issues before the (council/ legislature/congress), have you been able to: (1) generally stick with your initial opinion, or have you found that; (2) some adjustment in your initial position is often necessary before the final vote?	
		(26) 1. Can stay with my initial opinion virtually all of the time.	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 6</u>
		(32) 2. Can stay with my initial opinion the majority of the time.	
		(34) 3. Sometimes I stay with my initial position; sometimes adjustment is necessary. (50-50).	
		(14) 4. Often it is necessary to adjust my initial opinion.	
		(1) 5. I find that adjustment of my initial view is almost always necessary.	
		(11) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
380	44	RESPONDENT FLEXIBILITY INDEX	
		This index is based on the <u>coder's judgment</u> of R's answer to Q.40.	
		(7) 1. R appears reluctant to change his initial opinions.	
		(29) 3. R appears somewhat reluctant to adjust his views.	
		(80) 5. R appears flexible in terms of adjusting his issue opinions (at least within reason).	
		(2) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
381	45	CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS	
		Q.42. Do you think there should be more citizen participation in politics and government?	
		(93) 1. Yes - unqualified.	
		(11) 3. Yes - qualified.	
		(7) 5.. No.	
		(7) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
382	46	RECOMMENDED FORMS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION	
		(If Yes on Q.42) What form do you think increased participation should take? (CODE R's most important alternative).	
		(20) 1. More voting.	
		(22) 2. Greater interest and attention to politics and issues.	
		(17) 3. More participation in political party organizations.	
		(17) 4. More participation in local government affairs, boards and commissions.	
		(20) 5. More communication to political leaders and elected representatives.	
		(0) 6. More active involvement - no preferred activity stated.	
		(22) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
383-435	47-80	ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF DEMOCRACY	
	06-21		
	(DK 7)	Q.43. What do you believe are the essential ingredients necessary for a government to be considered democratic?	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 6</u>
383-432	47-80	<p>FIRST, code each essential ingredient of democracy noted by the respondent by proceeding down the list of possible essential ingredients on the Essentials of Democracy Code Sheet. For each essential ingredient listed, code whether it was mentioned by R. The code for each item on the Essentials of Democracy Code Sheet is as follows:</p>	

- 1. Not mentioned
- 5. Mentioned.

ESSENTIALS OF DEMOCRACY CODE SHEET

GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE

383	47	(18)	11. Government by the people in general; rule of the people; control by the people (use more specific categories 12-17 when possible).
384	48	(22)	12. Popular interest in and awareness of politics.
385	49	(32)	13. Accountability of governments (or representatives) to the people; government by consent.
386	50	(34)	14. Active dialogue between the government and people.
387	51	(32)	15. Popular participation; popular involvement in decision-making; direct democracy.
388	52	(3)	16. Decentralized government.
389	53	(16)	17. Open policy making; no secrets; publicity and public debate.
390	54	(2)	18. Other _____ (MAC).

EQUALITY AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

391	55	(2)	21. Equality in general.
392	56	(10)	22. Political equality; one-man, one vote.
393	57	(5)	23. Equality of opportunity; each man can develop himself as far as possible.
394	58	(3)	24. Just standard of living; social and economic security for all.
395	59	(1)	25. Less social distance between classes; fewer rich and poor; less social privilege.
396	60	(4)	26. Equality of respect; dignity of all.
397	61	(0)	27. Social ownership/control over the economy.
398	62	(4)	28. Other _____ (MAC).

LIBERTY

399	63	(6)	31. Liberty and freedom in general.
400	64	(22)	32. Political or civic liberties in general.
401	65	(27)	33. Freedom of expression (speech, press, etc.).
402	66	(6)	34. Minority rights.
403	67	(7)	35. Limited government, no arbitrary government.
404	68	(13)	36. Laissez-faire, socially and economically; freedom

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>		<u>Deck 6</u>
			from government interference in socio-economic affairs.	
405	69	(1) 37.	Religious liberty.	
406	70	(0) 38.	Other _____ (MAC).	

GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES

407	71	(40) 41.	Free elections; the right to vote.
408	72	(8) 42.	Majority rule.
409	73	(24) 43.	Representative government.
410	74	(1) 44.	Legislative control over the executive.
411	75	(3) 45.	Free press.
412	76	(3) 47.	Rule of law; legal rights; fair legal system.
413	77	(4) 48.	Other _____ (MAC).

POLITICAL COMPETITION AND CHOICE

414	78	(1) 51.	The possibility of changing government.
415	79	(5) 52.	Two party government; electoral choice.
416	80	(0) 53.	Strong critical opposition.

(CONTINUED ON COLUMN 06 OF DECK 7)

IDEOLOGY, COGNITIVE STYLE,

AND BELIEF SYSTEMS

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 7</u>
	01	DECK NUMBER (7)	
	02-04	RESPONDENT INTERVIEW NUMBER	
		001-051 City Councilman or City Commissioner	
		052-101 State Representative	
		102-118 U.S. Representative	
	05	RESPONDENT OFFICE LEVEL	
		1. City Councilman or City Commissioner	
		3. State Representative	
		5. U.S. Representative	

ESSENTIALS OF DEMOCRACY CODE SHEET (CONTINUED)

417	06	(3) 54. Possibility of removing official disapproved of by electorate.
418	07	(0) 55. Elite competition.
419	08	(1) 57. Other _____ (MAC)

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

420	09	(1) 61. Pluralism: a variety of private associations and institutions.
421	10	(3) 62. Consultation between government and interest groups.
422	11	(0) 64. Parties as centers of participation and/or channels for expressing popular will.
423	12	(0) 67. Other _____ (MAC).

CHARACTERISTICS OF CITIZENS; MORALITY

424	13	(12) 71. Mature, educated, intelligent citizens.
425	14	(2) 72. Individual self-control; liberty not license.
426	15	(9) 73. Assumption of responsibility and duties.
427	16	(10) 74. Action in the interest of collectivity, not of individuals.
428	17	(0) 75. Reciprocal respect and tolerance.
429	18	(0) 77. Other _____ (MAC).

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 7</u>
MISCELLANEOUS			
430	19	(0) 81. Strong, disciplined government.	
431	20	(0) 87. Other responses not included under the above general headings. _____ (MAC).	
432	21	(22) 99. Other; NA; NO.	
SECOND, code up to three mentions in order of there prominence or importance to R.			
433	22-23	FIRST ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT	
(Use the Essentials of Democracy Code Sheet)			
434	24-25	SECOND ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT	
(Use the Essentials of Democracy Code Sheet)			
435	26-27	THIRD ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT	
(Use the Essentials of Democracy Code Sheet)			
436	28	FOCUS OF DEMOCRACY	
R's general focus in his conception of democracy. Use code as a continuum.			
(15) 1. Wholly instrumental. An exclusive emphasis on democratic methods and institutions.			
(17) 2. Generally instrumental; general emphasis on methods and institutions, but some mention of values and ideals.			
(23) 3. Mixed; instrumental and normative elements equally important.			
(33) 4. Generally normative. General emphasis on values and ideals, but some mention of methods and institutions.			
(23) 5. Wholly normative. An exclusive emphasis on democratic ideals and values.			
(7) 9. Other; NA; NO.			
437	29	R'S ABILITY TO HANDLE THE CONCEPT "DEMOCRACY"	
This code is based on the coder's judgment of R's answer to Q. 43.			
(18) 1. R handled the concept adequately and seemed to have preconceived notions about its meaning.			
(74) 2. R handled the concept adequately but had no pre- conceived notions as to what constituted democratic government.			
(10) 3. R handled the concept adequately.			

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 7</u>
		(0) 4. R confused the term "democratic" with the partisan adjective "Democratic".	
		(12) 5. R had difficulty discussing the concept - it seemed to abstract for him to handle with ease.	
		(4) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
438	30	TIME ALLOTTED TO THE DISCUSSION OF DEMOCRACY	
		NOTE: This code records the total minutes spent discussing the essential ingredients democracy.	
		01. One minute.	
		02. Two minutes.	
		03. Etc.	
439-442	31-34	MODELS OF DEMOCRACY	
439	31	CLASSICAL MODEL	
		Coder judgment: How prominent in R's discussion is the classical model of democracy, with emphasis on direct popular participation and control?	
		(31) 1. Does not appear.	
		(39) 3. This model appears in his discussion, but is not central.	
		(43) 5. This is central to his discussion.	
		9. Other; NA; NO.	
440	32	SCHUMPETERIAN MODEL	
		Coder judgment: How prominent in R's discussion is the Schumpeterian model of democracy, with emphasis on competition between several teams of leaders?	
		(84) 1. Does not appear.	
		(20) 3. This model appears in his discussion, but is not central.	
		(5) 5. This is central to his discussion.	
		9. Other; NA; NO.	
441	33	LIBERAL MODEL	
		Coder judgment: How prominent in R's discussion is the Liberal model of democracy, with emphasis on legislative government, political liberties and the rule of law?	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 7</u>
		(36) 1. Does not appear.	
		(35) 3. This model appears in his discussion, but is not central.	
		(43) 5. This is central to his discussion.	
		9. Other; NA; NO.	
442	34	SOCIAL MODEL	
		Coder judgment: How prominent in R's discussion is the Social model of democracy, with emphasis on social or economic equality and security?	
		(85) 1. Does not appear.	
		(14) 3. This model appears in his discussion, but is not central.	
		(10) 5. This is central to his discussion.	
		9. Other; NA; NO.	
443	35	URBAN/RURAL CHARACTER OF DISTRICT (URBAN-NESS OF DISTRICT)	
		Q.46. How would you describe your district/city in terms of how rural, urban, or suburban it is?	
		(7) 1. Mainly rural.	
		(4) 2. Mixture of rural and suburban.	
		(51) 3. Mainly suburban.	
		(6) 4. Mixture of urban and rural	
		(5) 5. Mixture of rural, suburban, and urban.	
		(19) 6. Mixture of suburban and urban.	
		(25) 7. Mainly urban.	
		(1) 9. Other; NA; NO	
444	36	PARTISAN DIVISION ON DISTRICT/CITY (DEMOCRAT STRENGTH)	
		Q.47 (COUNCILMEN) Now I recognize that you hold an non-partisan office, but how would you describe your (city/ward) in terms of the division between Democrats and Republicans? (LEGISLATORS/CONGRESSMEN) How would you describe your district in terms of the division between Democrats and Republicans?	
		(7) 1. Solidly Republican.	
		(30) 2. Republicans are in the majority.	
		(22) 3. Competitive.	
		(40) 4. Democrats are in the majority.	
		(17) 5. Solidly Democratic.	
		(2) 9. Other; NA; NO.	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 7</u>
445-451	37-48	PERSONAL INFORMATION	
445	37	RESPONDENT'S SEX	
	(112)	1. Male	
	(6)	3. Female.	
446	38	RESPONDENT'S RACE	
	(111)	1. Caucasian.	
	(7)	3. Negro	
447	39-40	RESPONDENT'S EDUCATION	
		Q.48. What is the last grade of school or year of college you completed?	
		01. One year of school.	
		02. Two years of school.	
		03. Etc.	
448	41-42	FATHER'S/HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD'S EDUCATION	
		Q.49. What was your father's (or head of your household's) level of education?	
		01. One year of school.	
		02. Two years of school.	
		03. Etc.	
449	43-44	RESPONDENT'S OCCUPATION	
		Q.50. What do you consider as your occupation?	
		(Use the Occupation Code Sheet)	

OCCUPATION CODE SHEET

PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL

01. Accountants and auditors.
02. Clergymen.
03. Public school teachers; administrators
05. Dentists.
06. Physicians and surgeons.
07. Engineers.
08. Lawyers and judges.
09. Social and welfare workers.
10. Trained nurse, student nurse.

<u>Var.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Column</u> <u>Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 7</u>
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- 11. Politician; law-maker
- 12. Highschool teacher
- 13. College teacher
- 17. Other professional and technical

SELF-EMPLOYED BUSINESSMEN - MANAGERS AND OFFICIALS

- 21. Self-employed businessman, owner or part-owner (include farm owners).
- 22. Self-employed businessman, owner or part-owner 'small' business. (include farm owners).
- 23. Self-employed business, NA what size.
- 28. Managers, officials and proprietors.
- 29. Other.

CLERICAL

- 30. Technicians; insurance agents
- 33. Sales (industrial/or higher status).
- 34. Sales (inside/lower status).
- 35. Office-workers.
- 36. Stenographers/Secretaries
- 37. Other.

SKILLED WORKERS

- 41. Self-employed artisans and craftsmen.
- 42. Foremen.
- 48. Other craftsmen and kindred workers.
- 49. Other (includes policemen and firemen of Sargeant rank or below).

SEMI-SKILLED -- OPERATIVES AND KINDRED WORKERS

- 51. Operatives and kindred workers.

SERVICE WORKERS

- 61. Protective service - plant guards, etc.
- 62. Other protective service workers.
- 68. Other service workers.

UNSKILLED WORKERS

- 71. Farm laborers.
- 78. Janatorial
- 79. Other unskilled laborers.
- 88. Student

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 7</u>
450	45-46	FATHER'S/HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD'S OCCUPATION	
		Q.51. What was your father's (or the head of your household's) occupation?	
		(Use the Occupation Codesheet)	
451	47-48	AGE OF RESPONDENT	
		Q.52. What is your age?	
		21. R twenty-one years old.	
		22. R twenty-two years old.	
		23. Etc.	
452	49-51	TIME OF THE INTERVIEW	
		001. One minute.	
		010. Ten minutes.	
		100. Etc.	
		000. NA	
		CODE: _____	
453	52	ENVIRONMENT AND SETTING OF INTERVIEW	
		(75) 1. Quiet office - no interruptions.	
		(8) 2. Quiet office - interruptions.	
		(9) 3. Off the floor of the House of Representatives - interruptions.	
		(6) 4. His home - interruptions.	
		(14) 5. Quiet home.	
		(6) 9. Other; NA; NO.	
454	53	HOW RUSHED WAS THE INTERVIEW	
		(73) 1. Interview was not rushed.	
		(18) 2. Interview was not particularly rushed but a written questionnaire with some of the questions was left with the respondent to save time.	
		(12) 3. Interview was slightly rushed.	
		(2) 4. Interview was rushed.	
		(12) 5. Interview was very rushed.	

LISTED ITEMS RESPONDENT WAS ASKED TO AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH

NOTE: Each of the following items were scored by the respondents themselves using the following codes:

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 7</u>
		1. Disagree 2. Tend to disagree 3. Undecided 4. Tend to agree 5. Agree 9. Other; NA; NO.	
		AUTHORITARIANISM INDEX	
455	54	A few strong leaders would do more for this country than all the laws and talk.	
456	55	Few people really know what is in their own best interest in the long run.	
457	56	In this complicated world, the only way we can know what is going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.	
458	57	It will always be necessary to have a few strong, able people actually running everything.	
459	58	A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion among its own members cannot exist for very long.	
		POLITICAL DISTRUST INDEX	
460	59	Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country.	
461	60	People who go into public office usually think of the good of the people more than of their own.	
		MORAL ABSOLUTISM INDEX	
462	61	Of all the different theories about the way government should be conducted, there is only one which is true.	
463	62	Unless there is freedom for many points of view to be presented, there is little chance that the truth can ever be known.	
		SOCIAL CONFLICT INDICATOR - ZERO SUM PERSPECTIVE	
464	63	When an individual or group gains, it usually means that another individual or group loses.	

<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 7</u>
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REPRESENTATION ATTITUDES

465	64	A representative ought to work for what his constituents want even though this may not always agree with his personal views.	
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TRUSTEE ROLE

466	65	I seldom have to sound out my constituents because I think so much like them that I know how to react to almost any proposal.	
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MISCELLANEOUS STATEMENTS

467	66	The best advice on a proposed policy usually comes from the interests directly affected.	
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468	67	A representative ought to decide how to vote on most issues by asking himself if the proposed law or ordinance is morally right.	
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469	68	So many groups and individuals want so many different things that it is often difficult to know what stand to take.	
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470	69	Pressure and special interest groups like labor unions, business associations, professional organizations, etc. hamper the proper workings of government.	
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Indexes Constructed from Survey Items

471	70	<u>OFFICE-EXPERIENCE INDEX</u> (additive index of items 4, 18-20)	
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472	71	<u>PARTY-EXPERIENCE INDEX</u> (additive index of items 28-30)	
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473	72	<u>LEFT-RIGHT EXTREMISM INDEX</u> (index created by giving foil 1 and 5 of item 31 a score of 1 and foils 2, 3 and 4 a score of 0)	
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474	73	<u>IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATION INDEX</u> (additive index of items 72-74)	
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475	74	<u>CRIME IS THE PRODUCT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS INDEX</u> (additive index of items 158-170, 193 and 195)	
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476	75	<u>CRIME IS THE PRODUCT OF THE BREAKDOWN OF MORALITY INDEX</u> (additive index of items 171-174)	
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<u>Var. No.</u>	<u>Column Number</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Deck 7</u>
477	76	<u>CRIME IS THE PRODUCT OF A BREAKDOWN IN SOCIAL DISCIPLINE INDEX</u> (additive Index of Items 175-177)	
478	77	<u>CRIME RESULTS BECAUSE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS ARE HAMPERED FROM PROPERLY ENFORCING THE LAW INDEX</u> (additive Index of Items 179, 182 and 342)	
479	78	<u>CRIME IS THE PRODUCT OF THE FAILURE OF SCHOOL, FAMILY AND CHURCH INDEX</u> (additive Index of Items 185-191)	
480	79	<u>SOLUTION TO CRIME WILL INVOLVE BROAD SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE INDEX</u> (additive Index of Items 202-208 and 286)	
481	80	<u>TO SOLVE CRIME THE SCHOOL, FAMILY AND CHURCH MUST WORK HARDER INDEX</u> (additive Index of Items 223-229 and 317)	
482	6 (DK 8)	<u>RESPONDENT'S OCCUPATIONAL OR PERSONAL CONTACT OR EXPERIENCE WITH THE CRIME PROBLEM INDEX</u> (additive Index of Items 359-363 and 368)	

APPENDIX C

ITEM ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME

DISCUSSION CODING ITEMS

Table C.1.--Means and Standard Deviations of the Crime Discussion Coding Items.*

Item Number	Mean	S.D.	Item Number	Mean	S.D.
267	2.69	.72	312	2.01	1.00
268	2.97	.26	313	2.06	1.00
269	2.97	.26	314	2.09	1.00
270	1.56	.90	315	2.50	.86
271	2.88	.47	316	1.77	.97
272	2.54	.84	317	1.68	.95
273	2.39	.92	318	2.86	.51
274	2.21	.98	319	2.80	.61
275	2.30	.95	320	2.95	.32
276	2.15	.99	321	2.81	.58
277	1.48	.85	322	2.95	.31
278	1.93	1.01	323	2.76	.65
279	2.06	1.00	324	1.65	.94
280	2.15	.99	325	2.93	.36
281	1.92	1.00	326	2.25	.97
282	2.25	.97	327	1.17	.56
283	2.86	.51	328	2.76	.65
284	2.39	.92	329	1.29	.71
285	2.59	.81	330	2.62	.78
286	2.47	.51	331	2.42	.91
287	1.92	1.00	332	2.52	.85
288	1.50	.86	333	2.52	.85
289	2.64	.77	334	2.52	.85
290	2.78	.63	335	1.96	1.00
291	2.54	.84	336	2.76	.65
292	2.64	.77	337	1.65	.94
293	2.88	.47	338	2.54	.84
294	2.68	.74	339	2.84	.53
295	2.90	.44	340	2.61	.80
296	2.92	.41	341	2.15	.99
**297	3.93	1.47	342	2.54	.84
**298	2.45	1.11	343	2.73	.69
**299	1.94	1.06	344	2.52	.85
300	2.33	.94	345	2.08	1.00
301	2.73	.69	346	2.61	.80
302	2.01	1.00	347	1.63	.93
303	2.52	.85	348	1.74	.96
304	2.69	.72	349	2.52	.85
305	2.92	.41	350	2.73	.69
306	2.40	.92	351	2.57	.82
307	2.52	.85	352	2.78	.63
308	2.13	.92	354	2.93	.36
309	2.85	.53	355	2.88	.47
310	2.35	.94	356	2.98	.18
311	2.54	.84	357	2.78	.63

*In actuality, this table contains only 90 items since three items (266, 353 and 358) were coded "not mentioned" for all 118 respondents.

**Items 297-299 simply record the number of causes, solutions, and responsible agencies with regard to crime and, therefore, the range of scores on these items was unbounded. The range of scores for all other items is 1-3.



Table C.2.--Cluster Names and Item Numbers.

Cluster Number	Cluster Name	Cluster Item Numbers
501	Crime Not Criminals Cluster:	(272,270)
502	Non-Specific Cluster:	(276,275,288,287,278)
503	Global Orientation Cluster:	(289,282)
504	Environmental Cluster	(280,277,279)
505	Non-Personal Orientation Cluster:	(294,291,326,285)
506	Non-Factual Orientation Cluster:	(292,295)
507	Theoretical Approach Cluster:	(293,290)
508	Comprehensive Cluster:	(303,286,306)
509	Complex Cluster:	(298,299,297)
510	Structured Cluster:	(300,301,302)
511	Special Breed Cluster:	(273,312,313,274)
512	Retribution Cluster:	(314,347,316,341,345, 284,281,310)
513	Rehabilitation Cluster:	(346,315)
514	Pro-Enforcement Cluster:	(317,348,344,308,342)
515	New Laws Cluster:	(340,343,323)
516	Historical Cluster:	(339,337)
517	Moralistic Cluster:	(349,350,352,351,296)
518	Emotionalism Cluster:	(324,309,322,319,321, 320)
519	Fear Cluster:	(325,336,318,267)
520	Easy Talking Cluster:	(330,329,328,327,334, 335,307,332)
521	Self-Assurance Cluster:	(331,333)
522	Residual Item Cluster:	(268,269,271,283,304, 305,311,338,354,355, 356,357)

TABLE C-3.--Items of Cluster 501: Crime not Criminals (items indicating a concern with "crime" but not "criminals")*.

-272 Respondent says that the individuals who commit crimes are the subject to be dealt with.

270 Respondent cites the abstraction "crime" as the subject which must be dealt with.

	272	270	
272	80	78	
270	78	80	
501	89	89	Crime not Criminals
502	6	-0	Non-Specific
503	14	15	Global Orientation
504	36	45	Environmental
505	23	16	Non-Personal
506	-5	3	Non-Factual
507	17	23	Theoretical
508	-3	10	Comprehensive
509	-3	11	Complex
510	-3	9	Structured
511	21	6	Special Breed
512	-6	-10	Retribution
513	-3	5	Rehabilitation
514	-10	-20	Pro-Enforcement
515	-6	8	New Laws
516	-15	-17	Historical
517	8	18	Moralism
518	-29	-33	Emotionalism
519	15	20	Fear
520	-15	-5	Easy Talking
521	-5	-4	Self-Assured

*The items have been scored to reflect the meaning of the cluster title. Table entries for Table C-3 through C-24 are correlations.

TABLE C-4.--Items of Cluster 502: Non-Specific (items related to an imprecise or relatively non-specific orientation to crime).

-
- 276 Respondent refers to various types of crime.
- 275 Respondent refers to crime as if it were a homogeneous concept.
- 288 Respondent recommends some specific institutional change as a solution to the crime problem.
- 287 Respondent recommends a course of action yet does not name an agent for carrying it out.
- 278 Respondent says or implies that specific institutional problems cause crime.
-

	276	275	288	287	278	
276	47	56	30	21	13	
275	56	23	12	14	10	
288	30	12	29	29	29	
287	21	14	29	15	14	
278	13	10	29	14	10	
<hr/>						
501	5	5	-0	-8	7	Crime not Criminals
502	69	48	53	39	32	Non-Specific
503	-5	20	-11	17	-2	Global Orientation
504	9	5	10	20	30	Environmental
505	1	14	4	-5	22	Non-Personal
506	29	22	19	2	1	Non-Factual
507	-1	8	9	8	10	Theoretical
508	-3	-16	-12	11	-3	Comprehensive
509	6	-8	-14	15	-14	Complex
510	-22	-28	-31	7	-2	Structured
511	-4	-2	12	-11	-8	Special Breed
512	-20	-3	-32	-21	-45	Retribution
513	-19	-26	-30	-12	-29	Rehabilitation
514	-13	-2	-1	-27	-18	Pro-Enforcement
515	-28	-16	-12	-5	-26	New Laws
516	18	21	26	18	17	Historical
517	8	-8	32	20	14	Moralism
518	-16	-4	3	-8	-27	Emotionalism
519	-4	-7	4	4	-16	Fear
520	-17	-11	-24	-5	-25	Easy Talking
521	-40	-22	-23	-20	-18	Self-Assured

TABLE C-5.--Items of Cluster 503: Global Orientation (items related to a global orientation to crime).

-289	Respondent recommends individual change as the solution to crime.		
-282	Respondent says or implies that certain individuals should handle the crime problem.		
	289	282	
289	50	46	
282	46	50	
501	15	8	Crime not Criminals
502	-0	11	Non-Specific
503	69	69	Global Orientation
504	28	35	Environmental
505	7	-2	Non-Personal
506	-12	-12	Non-Factual
507	-13	-17	Theoretical
508	9	-5	Comprehensive
509	0	-4	Complex
510	-2	-12	Structured
511	-3	7	Special Breed
512	-2	0	Retribution
513	7	1	Rehabilitation
514	3	9	Pro-Enforcement
515	-24	-34	New Laws
516	-10	-14	Historical
517	5	-1	Moralism
518	-11	-2	Emotionalism
519	-14	1	Fear
520	-3	-11	Easy Talking
521	-6	8	Self-Assured

TABLE C-6.--Items of Cluster 504: Environmental (items related to the idea that environmental conditions cause crime).

280 Respondent says or implies that "society" or "the people" should handle the crime problem.				
277 Respondent says or implies that social, economic, or environmental conditions cause crime.				
-279 Respondent says or implies that individuals cause crime.				
	280	277	279	
280	24	20	26	
277	20	20	23	
279	26	23	29	
501	21	22	24	Crime not Criminals
502	23	29	-8	Non-Specific
503	36	-2	33	Global Orientation
504	48	44	54	Environmental
505	-13	22	-7	Non-Personal
506	7	-6	-17	Non-Factual
507	14	20	20	Theoretical
508	22	29	23	Comprehensive
509	16	37	-3	Complex
510	24	18	-2	Structured
511	-15	-29	-13	Special Breed
512	-43	-41	-17	Retribution
513	17	1	11	Rehabilitation
514	-6	-30	-13	Pro-Enforcement
515	2	7	-4	New Laws
516	-16	15	-26	Historical
517	18	6	5	Moralism
518	-9	-39	-19	Emotionalism
519	2	-6	1	Fear
520	5	4	2	Easy Talking
521	13	-14	17	Self-Assured

TABLE C-7.--Items of Cluster 505: Non-Personal (items related to a non-personal orientation to crime).

-
- 294 Respondent says or implies that his ideas about the solution(s) to crime derive from his personal thought.
- 291 Respondent says or implies that his ideas on the cause(s) of crime derive from his own personal experiences.
- 326 Respondent seems personally concerned about the problem of crime.
- 285 Respondent reifies the word society or refers to it in a personalized manner.
-

	294	291	326	285	
294	32	42	18	24	
291	42	32	24	17	
326	18	24	22	30	
285	24	17	30	21	
501	22	21	8	-6	Crime not Criminals
502	13	8	15	-6	Non-Specific
503	6	5	4	-8	Global Orientation
504	13	14	5	-29	Environmental
505	57	57	47	45	Non-Personal
506	12	17	2	10	Non-Factual
507	9	17	-33	-5	Theoretical
508	-4	-1	-36	-16	Comprehensive
509	2	10	-24	11	Complex
510	8	21	-46	20	Structured
511	18	29	5	-4	Special Breed
512	-5	5	-3	3	Retribution
513	11	-3	-21	-7	Rehabilitation
514	-37	-7	-2	-4	Pro-Enforcement
515	17	21	-41	-13	New Laws
516	-21	-23	4	8	Historical
517	2	16	2	-24	Moralism
518	-24	-37	-34	-13	Emotionalism
519	-21	-19	-17	-25	Fear
520	-7	-3	-23	-7	Easy Talking
521	-3	-22	-33	-15	Self-Assured

TABLE C-8.--Items of Cluster 506: Non-Factual (items related to a non-factual orientation to crime).

-292	Respondent says or implies that his ideas about the cause(s) of crime derive from facts he has heard.		
-295	Respondent says or implies that his ideas about the solution(s) to crime derive from facts he has heard.		
	292	295	
292	43	40	
295	40	43	
501	9	-11	Crime not Criminals
502	19	21	Non-Specific
503	-13	-9	Global Orientation
504	1	-16	Environmental
505	26	1	Non-Personal
506	64	64	Non-Factual
507	27	13	Theoretical
508	4	-16	Comprehensive
509	13	-8	Complex
510	1	-35	Structured
511	23	1	Special Breed
512	-16	-10	Retribution
513	-12	4	Rehabilitation
514	6	-2	Pro-Enforcement
515	-1	-3	New Laws
516	1	-3	Historical
517	17	15	Moralism
518	5	8	Emotionalism
519	-5	-1	Fear
520	4	-7	Easy Talking
521	-6	-15	Self-Assured

TABLE C-9.--Items of Cluster 507: Theoretical (items related to a theoretical approach to the crime problem).

293	Respondent says or implies that some sort of social theory should guide public policy on crime.		
290	Respondent says or implies that his ideas on the causes of crime are deduced from some social, political or economic theory.		
	293	290	
293	30	25	
290	25	30	
501	7	16	Crime not Criminals
502	18	-3	Non-Specific
503	-24	1	Global Orientation
504	21	18	Environmental
505	-3	-3	Non-Personal
506	14	19	Non-Factual
507	53	53	Theoretical
508	16	31	Comprehensive
509	37	5	Complex
510	37	29	Structured
511	-14	7	Special Breed
512	-13	-12	Retribution
513	15	12	Rehabilitation
514	-20	-2	Pro-Enforcement
515	39	21	New Laws
516	23	-20	Historical
517	-4	29	Moralism
518	13	2	Emotionalism
519	-14	13	Fear
520	11	17	Easy Talking
521	12	34	Self-Assured

TABLE C-10.--Items of Cluster 508: Comprehensive (items related to a comprehensive discussion).

- 303 Respondent suggests a comprehensive attack on crime (economic, social, political, legal, etc.) as his (or her) solution to the problem.
- 286 Respondent recommends general social reform or broad social change as the solution to the crime problem.
- 306 Respondent's discussion was particularly well organized.

	303	286	306	
303	79	66	60	
286	66	53	45	
306	60	45	44	
501	1	10	-0	Crime not Criminals
502	-9	9	-22	Non-Specific
503	-1	14	-7	Global Orientation
504	38	53	24	Environmental
505	-23	-16	-24	Non-Personal
506	-11	-7	-3	Non-Factual
507	28	43	30	Theoretical
508	90	72	65	Comprehensive
509	67	59	68	Complex
510	66	65	73	Structured
511	-48	-32	-29	Special Breed
512	-22	-29	-4	Retribution
513	36	23	41	Rehabilitation
514	-33	-33	-24	Pro-Enforcement
515	30	25	21	New Laws
516	-15	-12	4	Historical
517	-8	5	19	Moralism
518	-21	-6	-8	Emotionalism
519	-2	-2	-4	Fear
520	33	19	40	Easy Talking
521	20	26	22	Self-Assured

TABLE C-11.--Items of Cluster 509: Complex (items related to a rather complex discussion of the crime problem).

- 298 Code the number of various crime solutions mentioned by the respondent.
- 299 Code the number of societal agencies which the respondent says should deal with the problem of crime.
- 297 Code the number of various causes of crime mentioned by the respondent.

	298	299	297	
298	59	44	40	
299	44	31	25	
297	40	25	26	
501	-12	11	10	Crime not Criminals
502	-1	-22	13	Non-Specific
503	-7	3	-2	Global Orientation
504	16	21	26	Environmental
505	-19	10	8	Non-Personal
506	04	-17	28	Non-Factual
507	30	19	23	Theoretical
508	64	61	31	Comprehensive
509	78	55	49	Complex
510	76	71	37	Structured
511	-26	-4	-18	Special Breed
512	04	1	-4	Retribution
513	37	37	19	Rehabilitation
514	-29	-25	-30	Pro-Enforcement
515	30	16	8	New Laws
516	5	-3	25	Historical
517	-11	-2	20	Moralism
518	-1	-21	-12	Emotionalism
519	1	-22	-7	Fear
520	27	41	5	Easy Talking
521	4	6	-26	Self-Assured

TABLE C-12.--Items of Cluster 510: Structured (items related to a structured discussion).

300	Respondent offers some type of chain of reasoning in his discussion of the crime problem.			
301	Respondent offers some type of sequence of events or listing (e.g., of causes, solutions, etc.) in his analysis of crime.			
302	Respondent offers some type of connection between the cause(s) and the solution(s) to crime in his (or her) discussion.			
	300	301	302	
300	32	25	17	
301	25	18	10	
302	17	10	9	
501	-14	17	1	Crime not Criminals
502	-8	-18	-14	Non-Specific
503	-3	3	-13	Global Orientation
504	14	13	8	Environmental
505	-6	-10	17	Non-Personal
506	1	-11	-24	Non-Factual
507	52	2	25	Theoretical
508	61	27	26	Comprehensive
509	57	32	40	Complex
510	58	42	28	Structured
511	-20	5	-4	Special Breed
512	-8	-4	-4	Retribution
513	35	14	5	Rehabilitation
514	-15	-22	-26	Pro-Enforcement
515	39	24	32	New Laws
516	16	-9	-17	Historical
517	1	-13	-6	Moralism
518	8	-0	-14	Emotionalism
519	-15	9	1	Fear
520	39	26	30	Easy Talking
521	28	30	15	Self-Assured

TABLE C-13.--Items of Cluster 511: Special Breed (items related to the belief that criminals are a special breed of person).

273	Respondent says or implies that criminals constitute a homogeneous group.			
-312	Respondent says or implies that criminals are ordinary persons in special circumstances.			
313	Respondent says or implies that criminals are inherently weak in character.			
-274	Respondent says or implies that there are various types of criminals.			

	273	312	313	274	
273	49	25	30	46	
312	25	33	42	22	
313	30	42	20	2	
274	46	22	2	17	
501	-1	14	5	15	Crime not Criminals
502	-1	-23	-4	15	Non-Specific
503	6	7	-1	-6	Global Orientation
504	-6	-35	-43	0	Environmental
505	5	3	6	37	Non-Personal
506	12	2	15	11	Non-Factual
507	10	-27	1	1	Theoretical
508	-13	-45	-23	-21	Comprehensive
509	-6	-33	-5	-13	Complex
510	15	-24	-12	-11	Structured
511	70	57	44	41	Special Breed
512	35	32	30	13	Retribution
513	-13	-20	-8	-26	Rehabilitation
514	27	41	14	12	Pro-Enforcement
515	28	-15	10	5	New Laws
516	-1	-15	-0	-15	Historical
517	-9	9	23	-2	Moralism
518	28	13	18	-5	Emotionalism
519	23	2	-2	-2	Fear
520	16	-10	-3	-15	Easy Talking
521	31	9	-3	-4	Self-Assured

TABLE C.14.--Items of Cluster 512: Retribution (items related to a retribution orientation toward criminals).

-
- 314 In discussing the solution(s) to crime, the respondent says or implies that criminals need punishment.
- 347 Respondent says or implies that the police, the courts, or the penal authorities are the agencies responsible for dealing with the crime problem.
- 316 Respondent says or implies that law enforcement agencies should handle the crime problem.
- 341 Respondent says or implies that courts have encouraged crime by not enforcing laws.
- 345 Respondent's solution involves the restructuring or improvement of the court system.
- 284 Respondent reifies the work "court."
- 281 Respondent refers to abstractions such as "the courts" or "the police" as the agencies that should handle the crime problem.
- 310 Respondent blames the crime problem on some group, institution, or person(s).
-

	314	347	316	341	345	284	281	310	
314	69	55	61	64	50	43	29	40	
347	55	58	71	51	59	33	37	12	
316	61	71	57	47	41	41	29	25	
341	64	51	47	51	52	36	25	29	
345	50	59	41	52	40	35	31	5	
284	43	33	41	36	35	28	36	9	
281	29	37	29	25	31	36	19	9	
310	40	12	25	29	5	9	9	8	
501	-15	2	-2	1	6	-18	7	-27	Crime not Criminals
502	-31	-59	-32	-42	-30	-23	-33	2	Non-Specific
503	-8	8	-12	-7	-1	3	30	-19	Global Orientation
504	-53	-42	-53	-36	-27	-56	-36	-39	Environmental
505	-15	15	3	-2	6	-6	24	-24	Non-Personal
506	-16	-22	-15	-10	-22	3	-26	12	Non-Factual
507	-18	-11	-25	-5	17	-20	-23	-29	Theoretical
508	-23	-15	-28	-16	1	-9	-1	-29	Comprehensive
509	-1	11	-7	-3	19	-6	-4	-30	Complex
510	0	-5	-22	-5	17	-22	-2	-24	Structured
511	46	40	42	36	22	27	13	23	Special Breed
512	83	76	75	72	64	53	43	28	Retribution
513	1	20	-15	16	32	0	10	-23	Rehabilitation
514	38	41	56	28	10	27	13	29	Pro-Enforcement
515	14	2	4	1	8	9	1	14	New Laws
516	25	-2	18	-9	11	16	0	-6	Historical
517	-13	-13	-8	-13	-14	-12	-18	-1	Moralism
518	40	17	21	20	3	19	-1	42	Emotionalism
519	11	4	16	21	15	-6	-5	21	Fear
520	14	1	-8	15	22	-3	4	-2	Easy Talking
521	24	22	5	11	29	10	1	5	Self-Assured

TABLE C-15.--Items of Cluster 513: Rehabilitation (items related to a rehabilitation orientation towards criminals.

346	Respondent's solution involves restructuring or improvement of the penal system.		
315	In discussing the solution(s) to crime, the respondent says or implies that criminals should be rehabilitated.		
	346	315	
346	73	71	
315	71	73	
501	5	-3	Crime not Criminals
502	-37	-45	Non-Specific
503	7	4	Global Orientation
504	22	11	Environmental
505	-14	-3	Non-Personal
506	-7	-4	Non-Factual
507	23	21	Theoretical
508	35	39	Comprehensive
509	42	45	Complex
510	27	45	Structured
511	-24	-30	Special Breed
512	6	8	Retribution
513	85	85	Rehabilitation
514	-23	-19	Pro-Enforcement
515	19	22	New Laws
516	-22	-17	Historical
517	2	-4	Moralism
518	-8	-8	Emotionalism
519	2	-9	Fear
520	14	27	Easy Talking
521	23	13	Self-Assured

TABLE C-16.--Items of Cluster 514: Pro-Enforcement (items related to a pro-enforcement orientation to crime).

-
- 317 Respondent says or implies that social institutions (schools, families, churches, etc.) are responsible for dealing with the crime problem.
- 348 Respondent says or implies that non-law enforcement agencies are the institutions which should deal with the problem of crime.
- 344 Respondent's solution to the crime problem involves improvement of law enforcement capability.
- 308 Respondent says or implies that crime is a complex issue.
- 342 Respondent says or implies that law enforcement authorities are hampered in enforcing laws.
-

	317	348	344	308	342	
317	62	76	27	27	38	
348	76	54	20	38	26	
344	27	20	25	37	36	
308	27	38	37	20	7	
342	38	26	36	7	19	
501	-1	-9	-9	-25	-6	Crime not Criminals
502	-19	-16	-24	3	-17	Non-Specific
503	3	11	12	-1	-0	Global Orientation
504	-19	-9	-21	-30	-19	Environmental
505	-14	-14	-4	-20	-18	Non-Personal
506	-5	-6	4	11	6	Non-Factual
507	-2	-12	-26	-1	-19	Theoretical
508	-34	-33	-7	-29	-12	Comprehensive
509	-42	-53	4	-24	-19	Complex
510	-26	-26	-22	-32	-36	Structured
511	51	41	14	7	15	Special Breed
512	50	39	11	15	27	Retribution
513	-20	-8	-13	-8	-23	Rehabilitation
514	79	73	50	45	43	Pro-Enforcement
515	6	-2	-2	4	-6	New Laws
516	4	-3	-5	4	-8	Historical
517	-13	-14	-13	-11	-16	Moralism
518	28	36	17	24	24	Emotionalism
519	20	17	-1	4	19	Fear
520	17	20	-0	13	2	Easy Talking
521	22	25	6	5	-4	Self-Assured

TABLE C-17.--Items of Cluster 515: New Laws (items related to the belief that new laws are needed to deal with the crime problem).

-
- 340 Respondent cites inadequacies in the criminal code as a factor bearing on the crime problem.
- 343 Respondent says or implies that new laws are needed to properly deal with the crime problem.
- 323 Respondent views the crime problem as an urgent matter needing immediate attention.
-

	340	343	323	
340	36	30	22	
343	30	25	16	
323	22	16	13	
501	-4	-12	18	Crime not Criminals
502	-15	-22	-16	Non-Specific
503	-21	-26	-13	Global Orientation
504	-1	-5	12	Environmental
505	-5	-8	1	Non-Personal
506	-2	-7	5	Non-Factual
507	47	20	16	Theoretical
508	35	-2	15	Comprehensive
509	27	2	13	Complex
510	42	24	41	Structured
511	6	4	10	Special Breed
512	8	12	-4	Retribution
513	14	7	14	Rehabilitation
514	-2	4	-1	Pro-Enforcement
515	61	49	35	New Laws
516	-16	-7	-21	Historical
517	1	-5	-12	Moralism
518	1	9	11	Emotionalism
519	-7	-2	29	Fear
520	23	11	8	Easy Talking
521	12	12	17	Self-Assured

TABLE C-18.--Items of Cluster 516: Historical (items related to an historical approach to the subject of crime).

339	Respondent uses historical antecedents in his discussion of the crime problem.		
337	Respondent refers to some period in history as a standard by which we should judge today's crime problem.		
	339	337	
339	25	20	
337	20	25	
501	2	-19	Crime not Criminals
502	23	16	Non-Specific
503	-16	-1	Global Orientation
504	-6	-12	Environmental
505	-5	-9	Non-Personal
506	-15	13	Non-Factual
507	9	-6	Theoretical
508	-7	-2	Comprehensive
509	8	6	Complex
510	6	-13	Structured
511	-19	5	Special Breed
512	-2	12	Retribution
513	-9	-12	Rehabilitation
514	-14	11	Pro-Enforcement
515	-20	-10	New Laws
516	47	47	Historical
517	7	-6	Moralism
518	-5	20	Emotionalism
519	7	-5	Fear
520	-20	-2	Easy Talking
521	-12	-5	Self-Assured

TABLE C-19.--Items of Cluster 517: Moralism (items related to a moralistic perspective about the crime problem).

349	Respondent cites the general breakdown of public and private morality as a cause of crime.				
350	Respondent cites the declining influence of the church as a cause of crime.				
352	Respondent's solution involves some attempt to strengthen public and private morality.				
351	Respondent says or implies that crime is caused by families and schools which have failed to teach correct moral behavior.				
296	Respondent says or implies that his solution(s) to crime is (are) derived from a moral belief system.				

	349	350	352	351	296	
349	45	48	44	44	38	
350	48	42	33	34	53	
352	44	33	40	41	46	
351	44	34	41	37	41	
296	38	53	46	41	48	
501	8	13	2	10	14	Crime not Criminals
502	23	20	33	1	12	Non-Specific
503	-4	21	-4	-11	6	Global Orientation
504	26	15	15	-6	14	Environmental
505	9	-7	-11	13	-10	Non-Personal
506	22	17	14	24	3	Non-Factual
507	14	7	23	4	26	Theoretical
508	5	7	7	-0	4	Comprehensive
509	10	11	-2	1	-6	Complex
510	-18	4	-14	-4	-14	Structured
511	-0	14	3	1	14	Special Breed
512	-17	-7	-31	-4	-0	Retribution
513	5	-7	-11	12	-1	Rehabilitation
514	-16	-24	-20	-13	-3	Pro-Enforcement
515	-15	-6	-1	-14	-3	New Laws
516	19	7	-9	-20	7	Historical
517	67	65	63	60	70	Moralism
518	-16	-3	-10	-14	-1	Emotionalism
519	4	18	-8	-5	15	Fear
520	-14	-10	-9	-5	-10	Easy Talking
521	-22	-12	-18	-6	2	Self-Assured

TABLE C-20.--Items of Cluster 518: Emotionalism (items related to an emotional orientation to the crime problem).

-324	Respondent discussed the crime problem objectively - as just another problem.
309	Respondent perceives the crime problem in dichotomous "we versus they" terms.
322	Respondent uses emotionally charged words when discussing who is responsible for dealing with the crime problem.
319	Respondent uses emotionally charged words when discussing the causes of crime.
321	Respondent uses emotionally charged words when discussing the solution(s) to the crime problem.
320	Respondent uses emotionally charged words when discussing criminals.

	324	309	322	319	321	320	
324	37	28	23	43	34	12	
309	28	34	36	33	24	16	
322	23	36	23	12	13	32	
319	43	33	12	24	18	12	
321	34	24	13	18	17	13	
320	12	16	32	12	13	11	
501	-8	-14	-31	-21	-9	-17	Crime not Criminals
502	-11	2	-11	-2	-10	-30	Non-Specific
503	-13	-11	-12	-2	5	7	Global Orientation
504	-31	-17	-25	-19	-21	-19	Environmental
505	-43	-38	-26	-19	-15	-13	Non-Personal
506	5	16	9	13	-11	-2	Non-Factual
507	24	3	-9	51	-19	-9	Theoretical
508	-19	2	-8	-5	-8	-8	Comprehensive
509	-16	-3	-5	5	-13	-22	Complex
510	-8	-3	-0	10	-7	-6	Structured
511	33	9	-9	17	21	2	Special Breed
512	35	9	2	11	27	10	Retribution
513	-7	-5	-3	-1	-16	5	Rehabilitation
514	29	30	15	17	31	7	Pro-Enforcement
515	21	13	-14	36	1	-14	New Laws
516	2	12	24	18	-9	-2	Historical
517	-14	8	-6	-8	-18	-1	Moralism
518	61	58	48	49	41	33	Emotionalism
519	40	6	5	-10	6	5	Fear
520	-0	13	3	18	0	9	Easy Talking
521	38	23	3	45	17	25	Self-Assured

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TABLE C-21.--Items of Cluster 519: Fear (items related to a fear of crime).

325	Respondent says or implies that he (or she) has a personal fear of becoming a crime victim.				
336	Respondent says or implies that there might not be a solution to the crime problem.				
318	Respondent uses emotionally charged words when discussing crime and its consequences.				
267	Respondent says or implies that individuals are the victim of crime.				
	325	336	318	267	
325	55	37	32	44	
336	37	30	42	13	
318	32	42	29	17	
267	44	13	17	17	
501	12	4	18	10	Crime not Criminals
502	-3	9	5	-28	Non-Specific
503	-15	-5	8	-10	Global Orientation
504	8	-1	-10	-3	Environmental
505	-18	-29	-16	-27	Non-Personal
506	1	-1	15	-26	Non-Factual
507	3	-13	25	-17	Theoretical
508	-1	7	-8	-6	Comprehensive
509	-5	-6	-14	-8	Complex
510	2	-25	-17	32	Structured
511	-2	-6	23	7	Special Breed
512	-6	2	22	18	Retribution
513	2	-4	-2	-3	Rehabilitation
514	4	-1	22	19	Pro-Enforcement
515	4	4	4	19	New Laws
516	-17	29	5	-13	Historical
517	-8	11	26	-12	Moralism
518	-2	21	11	11	Emotionalism
519	75	55	54	41	Fear
520	2	-24	-9	6	Easy Talking
521	-1	-16	8	18	Self-Assured

TABLE C.22.--Items of Cluster 520: Easy Talking (items related to how talkative the respondent was).

-330	Respondent was reluctant to recommend a solution to the crime problem (probing required).
329	Respondent offered his opinion about the solution to the crime problem readily.
-328	Respondent was reluctant to talk about the causes of crime (probing required).
327	Respondent offered his opinion on the causes of crime readily.
-334	Respondent qualified his statements about the solutions to the crime problem.
335	Respondent says or implies that there was a solution to the crime problem.
-307	Respondent's discussion was unorganized and meandering.
-332	Respondent qualified his statements about the causes of crime.

	330	329	328	327	334	335	307	332	
330	72	61	63	48	60	41	40	35	
329	61	56	60	65	45	38	22	22	
328	63	60	52	55	35	33	35	23	
327	48	65	55	45	33	32	26	26	
334	60	45	35	33	41	39	30	34	
335	41	38	33	32	38	27	22	22	
307	40	22	35	26	30	22	17	11	
332	35	22	23	26	34	22	11	14	
501	-12	-21	-4	-16	-14	-9	9	9	Crime not Criminals
502	-25	-19	-29	-11	-12	-30	-30	-11	Non-Specific
503	-7	-2	-3	-13	-8	5	-21	-2	Global Orientation
504	9	-6	-7	-7	0	12	12	23	Environmental
505	-13	-21	-11	-16	-11	-19	11	-18	Non-Personal
506	-1	-13	-9	2	16	-15	-10	19	Non-Factual
507	12	16	11	18	25	5	16	26	Theoretical
508	30	28	27	21	19	36	19	21	Comprehensive
509	28	32	28	22	24	19	23	23	Complex
510	69	52	44	31	57	43	52	19	Structured
511	-3	-4	-1	-9	0	-7	-6	-2	Special Breed
512	5	3	16	-3	16	5	8	-7	Retribution
513	15	19	15	10	10	24	15	13	Rehabilitation
514	13	13	22	10	11	17	6	-3	Pro-Enforcement
515	29	27	17	15	14	23	13	5	New Laws
516	-13	-12	-36	-11	7	-13	-12	-24	Historical
517	-14	-19	-17	-8	-9	-25	15	5	Moralism
518	16	18	8	10	23	5	-18	11	Emotionalism
519	-5	-4	2	-13	7	-33	-11	-1	Fear
520	85	75	72	67	64	52	41	38	Easy Talking
521	29	30	24	18	36	38	14	27	Self-Assured

TABLE C-23.--Items of Cluster 521: Self-Assured (items related to the respondent's sense of self-assurance).

331	Respondent appeared to feel that his ideas on the cause of crime were the "correct" ideas (i.e., beyond his personal point of view).		
333	Respondent appeared to feel that his solution(s) to the crime problem were the "correct" solutions (i.e., beyond his personal point of view).		
	331	333	
331	68	66	
333	66	68	
501	-6	-2	Crime not Criminals
502	-34	-49	Non-Specific
503	8	-6	Global Orientation
504	16	1	Environmental
505	-30	-29	Non-Personal
506	-12	-15	Non-Factual
507	37	34	Theoretical
508	28	21	Comprehensive
509	-4	-9	Complex
510	42	52	Structured
511	13	12	Special Breed
512	17	19	Retribution
513	19	16	Rehabilitation
514	12	19	Pro-Enforcement
515	17	29	New Laws
516	-15	-15	Historical
517	-14	-15	Moralism
518	44	42	Emotionalism
519	6	0	Fear
520	34	37	Easy Talking
521	82	82	Self-Assured



TABLE C.24.--Cluster 522: Residual Items of the Residual Cluster. Note: These items did not fit in any of the clusters. Items denoted by an asterisk (*) were put in the Residual Cluster because they produced no variance; i.e., all respondents were scored the same on the item.

- *266 Respondent says or implies that "society" is the victim of crime.
 268 Respondent says or implies that crime victims are a homogeneous group.
 269 Respondent says or implies that there are different types of crime victims.
 271 Respondent says that "degenerates," "punks," "the criminal element," etc., are the subject to be dealt with.
 283 Respondent reifies the word "police."
 304 Respondent offers some type of circular reasoning in his discussion of crime.
 305 Respondent's discussion strayed from the question(s) more than once.
 311 Respondent says or implies that crime is a natural social problem we will always have.
 338 Respondent says or implies that the crime problem exists because we are in some historical or social cycle.
 *353 Respondent says or implies that priests, ministers, rabbis, etc., have a responsibility to deal with the crime problem.
 354 Respondent says or implies that partisan or political interest group acceptability is a factor in the implementation of any new crime policy.
 355 Respondent says or implies that public acceptability is a factor in the implementation of any new crime policy.
 356 Respondent says or implies that technical or administrative feasibility is a factor which impinges on any attempt to solve the crime problem.
 357 Respondent says or implies that financial cost is a factor which must be considered when considering the solution to the crime problem.
 *358 Respondent says or implies that certain traditions must be considered when assessing any solution(s) to the crime problem.

	268	269	271	283	304	305	311	338	354	355	356	357	
268	100	2	-3	13	13	-3	-7	7	-2	-3	-1	-16	
269	-2	100	3	4	6	-3	-7	-7	-2	-3	-1	-16	
271	-3	3	100	-7	-1	-5	-3	-5	-5	-6	-2	-16	
283	13	4	-7	100	-2	-6	-7	-9	14	7	-3	-12	
304	13	6	-1	-2	100	3	5	-16	-8	9	-4	8	
305	-3	-3	-5	-6	3	100	-12	-19	19	12	-2	7	
311	-7	-7	-3	-7	-1	-5	100	-1	-10	-12	17	-13	
338	7	7	-5	-9	-16	-19	-1	100	-12	-12	-5	-13	
354	-2	-2	14	7	-8	19	-10	-12	100	-5	-2	-8	
355	-3	-6	7	-4	9	12	-12	-5	-5	100	-2	-3	
356	-1	-1	-2	-3	-4	-2	-5	-2	-2	-5	100	10	
357	-16	-16	-16	-12	8	-7	-13	-13	-8	-3	10	10	
358	9	-9	-15	-4	13	-19	-3	14	12	-2	6	5	Crime not Criminals
359	-13	-14	-5	-15	17	-19	-19	-29	-15	-2	-2	15	Non-Specific
360	-2	-12	-2	-1	-16	13	-14	-4	10	-7	-23	-5	Global Orientation
361	-15	-15	-15	-24	-6	-11	4	8	14	-1	4	6	Environmental
362	-31	15	15	-8	-1	-26	7	-8	-1	-30	-10	-7	Non-Personal
363	-7	29	-14	15	14	-6	-9	-6	-25	-1	-14	-8	Non-Factual
364	-8	-12	-14	-5	-3	18	-5	3	-11	22	-5	12	Theoretical
365	-11	-29	-6	-11	-28	-13	7	12	-19	5	-7	9	Comprehensive
366	-11	-38	-7	-2	-23	-17	10	-6	-18	-2	-9	-2	Complex
367	-22	-36	-13	-28	-18	-7	3	18	17	-7	-1	-19	Structured
368	9	12	10	19	39	-18	-4	-13	-7	6	-8	12	Special Breed
369	7	12	11	21	2	-13	-11	14	-14	7	-8	11	Retribution
370	1	-1	11	-22	-24	-8	-6	-17	18	19	-8	14	Rehabilitation
371	18	-7	21	13	28	-8	-24	-16	-12	19	-8	-1	Pro-Enforcement
372	1	-3	12	4	10	-18	-1	25	3	13	-8	5	New Laws
373	-1	-3	12	21	10	-17	-18	-8	-17	-3	28	-1	Historical
374	-2	8	-11	5	18	15	-12	-13	-8	33	-6	12	Moralism
375	4	9	8	23	6	16	-5	-24	-9	18	-6	11	Emotionalism
376	22	-1	-14	15	4	-4	-9	13	1	-8	8	1	Fear
377	-11	-11	-10	-14	-1	-3	2	2	18	7	-8	4	Easy Talking
378	521	0	-18	16	-6	2	0	-12	18	6	12	-7	Self-Assured

TABLE C-25.--Correlation Matrix of the Items Created for the Content Analysis of the Crime Discussions* (upper left section).

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*Items 226, 353, and 358 were omitted from the matrix because there was no variance in terms of the way the respondents scored these items.

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TABLE C-25.--Continued (lower middle section).

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APPENDIX D

SUBSIDIARY ANALYSES OF THE
CRIME DISCUSSION CLUSTERS

TABLE D.1.--Crime Discussion Cluster Correlations (not corrected for attenuation).

	501	502	503	504	505	506	507	508	509	510	511	512	513	514	515	516	517	518	519	520	521
Crime not Criminals	100	2	12	30	15	2	15	4	4	0	11	-36	-35	-17	0	-13	12	-22	17	-15	-35
Non-Specific	12	100	100	27	16	-11	-19	-1	-2	-17	-21	-41	-37	-17	-24	17	16	-12	-5	-25	-25
Global	30	2	100	100	2	-14	-17	31	10	12	14	-31	13	-15	1	-9	0	-26	-5	-6	-6
Environmental	15	16	2	27	100	100	100	-21	-10	-20	14	-15	10	-19	-26	-7	12	-23	-26	-10	-10
Non-Personal	15	16	-11	17	14	100	100	100	100	-20	14	-15	10	-19	-26	-7	12	-23	-26	-10	-10
Non-Factual	15	16	-11	17	14	100	100	100	100	-20	14	-15	10	-19	-26	-7	12	-23	-26	-10	-10
Theoretical	15	16	-11	17	14	100	100	100	100	-20	14	-15	10	-19	-26	-7	12	-23	-26	-10	-10
Comprehensive	15	16	-11	17	14	100	100	100	100	-20	14	-15	10	-19	-26	-7	12	-23	-26	-10	-10
Complex	15	16	-11	17	14	100	100	100	100	-20	14	-15	10	-19	-26	-7	12	-23	-26	-10	-10
Structured	15	16	-11	17	14	100	100	100	100	-20	14	-15	10	-19	-26	-7	12	-23	-26	-10	-10
Special Breed	15	16	-11	17	14	100	100	100	100	-20	14	-15	10	-19	-26	-7	12	-23	-26	-10	-10
Rehabilitation	15	16	-11	17	14	100	100	100	100	-20	14	-15	10	-19	-26	-7	12	-23	-26	-10	-10
Pro-Enforcement	15	16	-11	17	14	100	100	100	100	-20	14	-15	10	-19	-26	-7	12	-23	-26	-10	-10
New Law	15	16	-11	17	14	100	100	100	100	-20	14	-15	10	-19	-26	-7	12	-23	-26	-10	-10
Historical	15	16	-11	17	14	100	100	100	100	-20	14	-15	10	-19	-26	-7	12	-23	-26	-10	-10
Moralism	15	16	-11	17	14	100	100	100	100	-20	14	-15	10	-19	-26	-7	12	-23	-26	-10	-10
Emotionalism	15	16	-11	17	14	100	100	100	100	-20	14	-15	10	-19	-26	-7	12	-23	-26	-10	-10
Easy Talking	15	16	-11	17	14	100	100	100	100	-20	14	-15	10	-19	-26	-7	12	-23	-26	-10	-10
Fear	15	16	-11	17	14	100	100	100	100	-20	14	-15	10	-19	-26	-7	12	-23	-26	-10	-10
Self-Assured	15	16	-11	17	14	100	100	100	100	-20	14	-15	10	-19	-26	-7	12	-23	-26	-10	-10

1

TABLE D.2.--Varimax Factors of the Crime Discussion Cluster Correlation Matrix (see Table 4.10).*

	1	2	3	4	5
510	107*	2	-4	9	6
509	96*	18	-36	3	-21
508	84*	37	3	-17	-6
520	62*	-20	21	-4	5
515	60*	-20	17	42	22
513	55*	-4	-6	-24	10
507	52*	35	23	52	14
512	3	-80*	10	0	-2
504	26	-75*	-2	-23	41
502	-36	61*	-19	27	-21
514	-32	-47*	46	-1	6
511	-27	-46*	10	40	33
517	-10	35*	-3	23	7
505	-14	-8	-63*	22	31
518	-1	-32	66*	16	-26
521	43	-20	61*	-4	21
519	-7	0	38*	5	5
506	-14	15	-4	40*	-3
503	-14	17	0	-47*	31
516	-13	12	-1	11	-59*
501	-1	26	-11	7	56*

PROPORTION OF VARIANCE

1	2	3	4	5
.22	.13	.09	.04	.07

Factor 1: Articulation

Factor 2: System-Blame Orientation Toward Crime

Factor 3: Non-Emotional Orientation

Factor 4: (unspecified)

Factor 5: (unspecified)

*The clusters (variables) have been reordered and grouped according to their largest factor loading.

TABLE D.3.--Cluster Correlations, Part-Whole Correlations and Second-Order Cluster Correlations from the Cluster Analysis of the Twenty-one Crime Discussion Clusters.*

	510	509	508	520	515	513	507	512	504	502	514	511	517	505	518	521	519	506	503	516	501	502	503	504	505
510	1.00																								
509	.134	1.00																							
508	.101	.475	1.00																						
520	.171	.409	.291	1.00																					
515	.101	.409	.291	.344	1.00																				
513	.134	.475	.291	.344	.291	1.00																			
507	.134	.475	.291	.344	.291	.207	1.00																		
512	.134	.475	.291	.344	.291	.207	.207	1.00																	
504	.274	.351	.409	.207	.309	.309	.207	.207	1.00																
502	.326	.409	.409	.207	.309	.309	.207	.207	.207	1.00															
514	.460	.460	.460	.207	.309	.309	.207	.207	.207	.207	1.00														
511	.157	.409	.409	.207	.309	.309	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	1.00													
517	.157	.409	.409	.207	.309	.309	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	1.00												
505	.157	.409	.409	.207	.309	.309	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	1.00											
518	.157	.409	.409	.207	.309	.309	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	1.00										
521	.157	.409	.409	.207	.309	.309	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	1.00									
519	.157	.409	.409	.207	.309	.309	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	1.00								
506	.157	.409	.409	.207	.309	.309	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	1.00							
503	.157	.409	.409	.207	.309	.309	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	1.00						
516	.157	.409	.409	.207	.309	.309	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	1.00					
501	.157	.409	.409	.207	.309	.309	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	1.00				
502	.157	.409	.409	.207	.309	.309	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	1.00			
503	.157	.409	.409	.207	.309	.309	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	1.00		
504	.157	.409	.409	.207	.309	.309	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	1.00	
505	.157	.409	.409	.207	.309	.309	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	.207	1.00

*Communality in the diagonal.

TABLE D.4.--Comparison of the Three Dimensions of Ideological Thought "Constructed" from the Content Analysis of the Twenty-one Crime Discussion Clusters with Those Formed by the Second-Order Cluster Analysis of these Clusters.

Cluster	Cognitive Style (articulation) ^a		Content (system-blame) ^a		Emotionalism (non-emotion) ^a	
	Content Analysis	Cluster Analysis	Content Analysis	Cluster Analysis	Content Analysis	Cluster Analysis
501 Crime not Criminals	.04	.05 ^b	.16	.22 ^b	.35	.18 ^b
502 Non-Specific	-.14	-.31	.42	.47	.21	.40
503 Global	-.02 ^c	-.16	.21	.13	.09	.09
504 Environmental	--	.36	--	.70	--	.16
505 Non-Personal	-.12	-.14	.09	.04	.53	.82
506 Non-Factual	-.09	-.02	-.05	.12	-.10	.13
507 Theoretical	.49	.58	.30	.37	-.14	-.26
508 Comprehensive	--	.81	--	.46	--	-.16
509 Complex	--	.84	--	.32	--	.17
510 Structured	--	1.16	--	.17	--	-.20
511 Special Breed	--	-.24	--	-.44	--	-.11
512 Retribution	-.16	-.08	-.90	-.95	-.29	-.29
513 Rehabilitation	.47	.47	.17	.05	.09	-.08
514 Pro-Enforcement	-.46	-.33	-.59	-.62	-.44	-.45
515 New Laws	.43	.56	-.05	-.20	-.15	-.27
516 Historical	-.01	-.15	.02	.09	-.16	.06
517 Moralism	.01	-.02	.07	.25	.14	.09
518 Emotionalism	--	-.01	--	-.53	--	-.76
519 Fear	-.08	-.05	-.27	-.14	-.18	-.30
520 Easy Talking	.50	.53	-.04	-.18	-.15	-.28
521 Self Assured	.24	.43	-.13	-.33	-.52	-.50

^aScored to reflect this pole of the dimension.

^bCorrelations between the dimensions formed by the second-order cluster analysis and the individual crime discussion clusters are somewhat larger than those between the "constructed" clusters and these clusters because the second-order clusters incorporate a greater amount of variance. The second-order cluster analysis spanned the entire domain established by the 21 crime discussion clusters and thus, the second-order clusters contain more variance than those constructed from specific clusters and items during the content analysis.

^cThe hyphens indicate that items of this cluster were used to form the articulation, "person blame-system blame," and "emotionalism" clusters in the content analysis of crime belief systems. Unlike the procedure used to form these "dimensions of ideological thought" in the second order cluster analysis, these items could not be used to form both the crime discussion clusters (wherein they were initially placed) and the three predominant dimensions which became evident during the content analysis.

APPENDIX E

ITEM ANALYSIS OF OTHER CLUSTERS

TABLE E.1.--Items of Cluster 523: Articulation* (coefficient
alpha = .81).

303	Respondent's approach to crime is comprehensive and involves environmental, social and specific institutional factors.
286	Respondent recommends general social reform or broad social change as the solution to crime.
306	Respondent's discussion was particularly well organized and well thought out.
298	Actual numerical count of the respondent's recommended solutions.
299	Actual numerical count of the social agencies the respondent said were responsible for dealing with the crime problem.
297	Actual numerical count of the causal factors of crime mentioned by the respondent.
300	Respondent offers some type of chain of reasoning in his analysis.
301	Respondent makes a point to list or number the causes, solutions, etc. in his discussion.
302	Respondent offers some type of explicit or implicit connection between the causes and solutions to crime that he mentions.

	303	286	306	298	299	297	300	301	302	
303	56	66	60	55	47	20	41	19	25	
286	66	45	45	44	42	23	48	21	14	
306	60	45	52	48	50	27	49	23	21	
298	55	44	48	54	44	40	45	17	35	
299	47	42	50	44	43	25	37	31	23	
297	20	23	27	40	25	14	23	10	14	
300	41	48	49	45	37	23	39	25	17	
301	19	21	23	17	31	10	25	10	10	
302	25	14	21	35	23	14	17	10	11	
523	75	67	72	74	66	38	62	32	33	Articulation
524	21	27	30	17	38	21	19	21	18	Anti-Authoritarianism
525	45	52	21	25	23	17	25	7	9	System-Blame Orientation
526	-13	-33	-20	-12	3	-15	-24	-7	5	Political Distrust
527	35	28	33	24	39	27	35	19	31	Political Flexibility
528	28	26	24	19	23	10	21	1	-12	Electoral Intent
529	27	18	37	8	40	1	5	5	19	Desire for Advancement
530	35	32	28	46	33	5	53	22	16	Perceived Electoral Risk
531	7	-2	-3	0	17	5	16	4	-2	Partisan Frustration
532	-5	3	0	-2	3	17	-3	2	9	Conflict Orientation
533	-35	-26	-28	-26	-17	9	-20	-6	-24	Pro-Economic Regulation
534	19	8	28	7	17	1	-5	-8	-20	Interest in Politics

*Unless otherwise noted, the items have been scored to reflect the meaning of the cluster title. Table entries for Table E.1-E.12 are correlations.

TABLE E.2.--Items of Cluster 524: Anti-Authoritarianism* (coefficient alpha = .68).

-
- 459 A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion among its own members cannot exist for very long.
- 457 In this complicated world, the only way we can know what is going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.
- 458 It will always be necessary to have a few strong, able people actually running everything.
- 456 Few people really know what is in their own best interest in the long run.
- 455 A few strong leaders would do more for this country than all the laws and talk.
- 462 Of all the different theories about the way government should be conducted, there is only one which is true.
-

	459	457	458	456	455	462	
459	42	31	27	36	11	52	
457	31	32	30	22	24	34	
458	27	30	30	26	28	26	
456	36	22	26	17	7	19	
455	11	24	23	7	9	15	
462	52	34	26	19	15	35	
523	22	30	21	9	21	23	Articulation
524	65	56	54	41	30	59	Anti-Authoritarianism
525	9	12	11	-7	32	27	System-Blame Orientation
526	-15	-26	0	-22	-14	-31	Political Distrust
527	23	8	11	-9	14	23	Political Flexibility
528	2	8	5	17	3	7	Electoral Intent
529	18	1	5	7	-12	16	Desire for Advancement
530	13	37	13	17	-2	14	Perceived Electoral Risk
531	8	-1	9	1	4	4	Partisan Frustration
532	-5	-8	-28	4	-16	-3	Conflict Orientation
533	5	-14	-13	4	-5	-1	Pro-Economic Regulation
534	9	24	3	1	-8	9	Interest in Politics

TABLE E.3.--Items of Cluster 525: Person-Blame/System-Blame Orientation toward Crime* (coefficient alpha = .84).

-314	In discussing the solution to crime, the respondent mentions or implies that criminals need to be punished.
-178	Cause of crime: Courts (judges) have been too lenient.
-341	Respondent says or implies that courts (judges) have encouraged crime by not properly enforcing current laws and statutes.
-213	Solution to Crime: Judges must mete out stronger or harsher punishment.
-212	Solution to Crime: Courts must insure certainty of punishment.
312	Respondent says or implies that criminals are ordinary people in special circumstances.
-478	Crime Results because Law Enforcement Officials are Hampered from Properly Enforcing the Law Index.
-313	Respondent says or implies that criminals are a "special breed."
477	Crime is the Product of a Breakdown in Social Discipline Index.
-214	Solution to Crime: Courts (the Supreme Court) should reverse the decisions which now over-protect the defendant.
-273	Respondent says or implies that "criminals" are a homogeneous group.
475	Crime is a Product of Environmental Conditions Index.
277	Respondent says or implies that social, economic, or other "environmental" conditions are the cause of crime.
480	Solution to Crime will Involve Broad Social and Economic Change Index.
280	Respondent says or implies that "society," "the people," "the government," (or a similar reified equivalent) should handle the crime problem.
-279	Respondent says or implies that individual irresponsibility, immorality or ignorance is the cause of crime.

	314	178	341	213	212	312	479	313	477	214	273	475	277	480	280	279	
314	56	67	64	54	51	28	29	31	33	19	32	25	33	26	23	21	
178	67	48	60	72	38	27	23	32	29	15	22	30	26	22	18	21	
341	64	60	46	54	58	20	31	19	26	32	29	28	24	20	19	29	
213	54	72	54	45	37	25	20	25	23	26	23	41	24	20	21	2	
212	51	38	58	37	29	11	30	7	30	27	26	31	19	21	18	-8	
312	28	27	20	25	11	23	32	42	26	15	25	33	42	28	11	-8	
479	29	23	31	20	30	32	22	16	19	55	25	32	28	13	14	3	
313	31	32	19	25	7	42	16	18	28	7	30	5	19	12	12	31	
477	33	29	26	23	30	26	19	28	16	8	22	11	-1	15	13	22	
214	19	15	32	26	27	15	55	7	8	16	21	28	16	15	11	-7	
273	32	22	29	23	26	25	25	30	22	21	14	10	15	5	-5	-3	
475	25	30	28	41	31	33	32	4	11	24	10	29	25	34	20	12	
277	33	26	24	25	15	32	20	19	-1	16	15	55	22	27	20	23	
480	26	22	20	21	24	25	13	12	15	15	6	34	29	18	33	25	
280	23	19	19	21	15	11	4	12	13	11	-2	20	29	35	18	24	
279	21	21	9	21	-8	8	3	31	22	7	-3	12	23	20	26	8	
523	11	11	9	11	22	37	24	15	11	21	4	40	38	69	21	8	Articulation
524	22	22	2	22	14	4	24	6	10	2	0	20	16	21	7	11	Anti-Authoritarianism
525	75	69	64	67	53	48	47	43	41	2	37	2	17	24	33	28	System-Blame Orientation
526	-3	-13	-14	-17	-22	-28	0	-13	0	-28	37	-13	-17	-16	-5	-20	Political Distrust
527	34	27	23	31	15	30	35	28	12	38	14	41	37	19	42	21	Political Flexibility
528	-4	-1	14	-9	1	12	10	-1	-7	6	6	3	-8	17	2	18	Electoral Intent
529	-15	-32	-9	-26	-22	2	-4	-8	-17	-8	-8	-21	3	-24	-10		Desire for Advancement
530	-5	5	-8	-3	-3	0	-21	0	-23	-18	-16	15	-2	27	-9	-21	Perceived Electoral Risk
531	-11	4	-19	-12	-20	-9	9	-11	-4	-6	-17	4	1	-3	-7	16	Partisan Frustration
532	-7	-9	2	-6	-9	-11	-12	-14	-7	-11	-7	-5	-13	-5	-5	-2	Conflict Orientation
533	-22	-21	-24	-20	3	-25	6	-32	-25	-4	-4	-3	-16	-16	-7	-20	Pro-Economic Regulation
534	32	1	22	0	15	13	11	-14	-4	-5	5	12	-6	17	1	1	Interest in Politics

*Cluster scored to reflect the "system-blame" orientation.

TABLE E.4.--Items of Cluster 526: Political Distrust (coefficient
alpha = .64).

-
- 460 Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best
for the country.
- 461 People who go into public office usually think of the good of
the people more than of their own.
-

	460	461	
460	50	47	
461	47	50	
523	-3	-29	Articulation
524	-22	-27	Anti-Authoritarianism
525	-10	-21	System-Blame Orientation
526	70	70	Political Distrust
527	25	3	Political Flexibility
528	-13	-7	Electoral Intent
529	37	10	Desire for Advancement
530	-3	-16	Perceived Electoral Risk
531	3	3	Partisan Frustration
532	6	-2	Conflict Orientation
533	24	23	Pro-Economic Regulation
534	11	20	Interest in Politics

TABLE E.5.--Items of Cluster 527: Political Flexibility (coefficient
alpha = .69).

-
- 374 Coder judgment of respondent's willingness to compromise on
an issue rather than risk dividing an organization into
opposing factions.
- 380 Coder judgment of respondent's flexibility in terms of adjusting
or modifying his issue opinions.
-

	374	380	
374	56	53	
380	53	56	
523	37	40	Articulation
524	8	26	Anti-Authoritarianism
525	38	46	System-Blame Orientation
526	11	19	Political Distrust
527	74	74	Political Flexibility
528	4	-2	Electoral Intent
529	0	3	Desire for Advancement
530	11	18	Perceived Electoral Risk
531	-1	10	Partisan Frustration
532	-18	-13	Conflict Orientation
533	0	1	Pro-Economic Regulation
534	11	-4	Interest in Politics

TABLE E.6.--Items of Cluster 528: Electoral Intent*(coefficient
alpha = .87).

46 Index assessing the respondent's plans for leaving, staying or advancing in political office.			
44 Respondent's intentions with respect to running for higher office.			
	46	44	
46	78	77	
44	77	78	
523	27	21	Articulation
524	6	18	Anti-Authoritarianism
525	10	5	System-Blame Orientation
526	-13	-12	Political Distrust
527	9	-6	Political Flexibility
528	88	88	Electoral Intent
529	42	44	Desire for Advancement
530	9	9	Perceived Electoral Risk
531	25	22	Partisan Frustration
532	2	15	Conflict Orientation
533	-1	-9	Pro-Economic Regulation
534	50	31	Interest in Politics

*Cluster measures the respondent's plan or desire to leave politics, to remain in his or her present position, or advance in political office.

TABLE E.7.--Items of Cluster 529: Desire for Advancement (coefficient alpha = .39).

-
- 152 If you left politics, do you think there would be much of a problem re-adjusting to a life which does not include your participation in politics (measure of commitment or investment in politics)?
- 151 How much of a personal loss would you feel if, for some reason, you are not re-elected in the next election (measure of respondent's sense of loss if he left politics)?
- 150 Coder assessment of the respondent's effort in his election campaign(s).
-

	152	151	150	
152	25	28	10	
151	28	32	14	
150	10	14	6	
523	22	4	14	Articulation
524	11	0	4	Anti-Authoritarianism
525	-7	-10	-14	System-Blame Orientation
526	14	12	18	Political Distrust
527	6	-2	-2	Political Flexibility
528	8	26	30	Electoral Intent
529	49	57	23	Desire for Advancement
530	-4	16	50	Perceived Electoral Risk
531	0	-2	5	Partisan Frustration
532	0	23	-6	Conflict Orientation
533	-6	22	11	Pro-Economic Regulation
534	31	48	37	Interest in Politics

TABLE E.8.--Items of Cluster 530: Perceived Electoral Risk (coefficient alpha = .33).

146	Respondent's assessment of his chances in the next general election.		
444	Degree of party competitiveness in the respondent's electoral district.		
	146	444	
146	25	19	
444	19	25	
523	22	26	Articulation
524	2	28	Anti-Authoritarianism
525	-10	2	System-Blame Orientation
526	-21	8	Political Distrust
527	4	15	Political Flexibility
528	3	6	Electoral Intent
529	15	30	Desire for Advancement
530	47	47	Perceived Electoral Risk
531	-2	6	Partisan Frustration
532	-14	3	Conflict Orientation
533	-8	19	Pro-Economic Regulation
534	-20	14	Interest in Politics

1

TABLE E.9.--Items of Cluster 531: Partisan Frustration (coefficient alpha = .77).

112	Respondent feels frustrated because of "partisanship" or the necessity of partisan maneuvering or partisan bickering over concrete problem solving.		
116	Respondent feels frustrated because of legislative leaders who are too narrow minded or who lack vision or perspective in legislative affairs.		
	112	116	
112	60	57	
116	57	60	
523	13	-1	Articulation
524	7	4	Anti-Authoritarianism
525	-5	-10	System-Blame Orientation
526	5	3	Political Distrust
527	6	3	Political Flexibility
528	21	19	Electoral Intent
529	7	-4	Desire for Advancement
530	7	-1	Perceived Electoral Risk
531	77	77	Partisan Frustration
532	5	0	Conflict Orientation
533	13	22	Pro-Economic Regulation
534	-1	-3	Interest in Politics

TABLE E.10.--Items of Cluster 532: Conflict Orientation (coefficient alpha = .77).

- 378 Respondent's assessment of the degree of conflict which exists between social classes.
- 375 Respondent's assessment of the degree of conflict which exists between various economic, racial and religious groups in society.

	378	375	
378	65	63	
375	63	65	
523	12	-5	Articulation
524	-11	-17	Anti-Authoritarianism
525	-13	-10	System-Blame Orientation
526	1	4	Political Distrust
527	-3	-31	Political Flexibility
528	8	8	Electoral Intent
529	10	11	Desire for Advancement
530	-6	-12	Perceived Electoral Risk
531	10	-5	Partisan Frustration
532	80	80	Conflict Orientation
533	-17	-17	Pro-Economic Regulation
534	-4	2	Interest in Politics

TABLE E.11.--Items of Cluster 533: Pro-Economic Regulation (coefficient alpha = .76).

371 Degree to which the respondent favors government regulation of the oil companies (given the 1973 oil crisis).

372 Coder judgment of the respondent's attitude toward government regulation of the economy.

	371	372	
371	64	62	
372	62	64	
523	-24	-28	Articulation
524	-10	-3	Anti-Authoritarianism
525	-23	-23	System-Blame Orientation
526	35	19	Political Distrust
527	6	-5	Political Flexibility
528	-3	-6	Electoral Intent
529	32	1	Desire for Advancement
530	19	-1	Perceived Electoral Risk
531	25	11	Partisan Frustration
532	-16	-18	Conflict Orientation
533	79	79	Pro-Economic Regulation
534	1	-14	Interest in Politics

TABLE E.12.--Items of Cluster 534: Interest in Politics (coefficient alpha = .53).

136	Coder judgment of the respondent's overall attraction to politics.			
153	Degree to which the respondent sees advantages to leaving politics.			
11	Index measuring the length of time that the respondent has had an interest in politics.			
	136	153	11	
136	58	44	25	
153	44	30	13	
11	25	13	10	
523	10	-6	10	Articulation
524	1	2	20	Anti-Authoritarianism
525	10	-2	13	System-Blame Orientation
526	21	5	10	Political Distrust
527	11	-4	0	Political Flexibility
528	40	23	11	Electoral Intent
529	60	57	28	Desire for Advancement
530	-9	-11	11	Perceived Electoral Risk
531	1	4	-8	Partisan Frustration
532	1	-7	3	Conflict Orientation
533	-6	-12	4	Pro-Economic Regulation
534	79	54	30	Interest in Politics

TABLE E.13.--Inter-Correlation Matrix of Clusters 523-534 (corrected for attenuation).

	523	524	525	526	527	528	529	530	531	532	533	534
Articulation	100	41	43	22	52	27	31	52	9	5	-3	9
Anti-Authoritarianism	41	100	27	-25	23	14	12	31	7	-18	-3	14
System-Blame Orientation	43	27	100	-23	52	19	-24	39	-9	-14	-29	13
Political Distrust	-25	-23	100	100	20	-14	34	-20	5	3	7	22
Political Flexibility	27	14	20	-14	100	100	49	10	6	-21	5	46
Electoral Intent	31	12	34	34	20	100	100	49	26	19	15	99
Desire for Advancement	52	39	52	52	20	49	100	100	2	13	21	99
Perceived Electoral Risk	33	17	29	-14	30	100	49	100	4	1	11	62
Partisan Frustration	33	17	29	-14	30	100	49	100	4	1	11	62
Conflict Orientation	52	39	52	52	20	49	100	100	2	13	21	99
Pro-Economic Regulation	33	17	29	-14	30	100	49	100	4	1	11	62
Interest in Politics	34	14	13	22	45	46	69	11	22	-21	-9	100

APPENDIX F
PUTNAM'S FINDINGS

Table F.1.--Relationships between the Ideological Style Index and Other Variables as Reported by Putnam^a

Variable	Mode of Comparison	Relevant Sub-sample	Nature of the Dependent Variable	Putnam's Finding	Putnam's Assessment
(1) Abstractness of Thought	Table (p. 46)	Britain Italy	Cell Entry: Mean score on ISI for respondents in five categories measuring HIGH to LOW "Abstractness of Framework for Explaining Party Differences." Respondent's "abstractness" measured by coder judgement (p. 45).	Positive Relationship "the more abstract the framework, ... the higher the average score on the ISI for both sets of politicians."	"...provides independent confirmation that those who rate high on the ISI tend to think theoretically. "Stylistic ideologies" are also "conceptual ideologies" (p. 47).
(2) Ideological Motivation	Percentages (p. 47)	15% of the British respondents who are classified as "ideologically motivated" (N=14). 35% of the Italian respondents that have been classified as "ideologically motivated" (N=29).	Text: "Of the ideologically motivated Englishmen, 43% were rated HIGH on the ISI compared to only 24% for the rest of the British sample." "Of the ideologically motivated Italians, 79% were rated HIGH on the ISI while only 61% of the remaining sample were so rated" (p. 47). Respondent "ideological motivation" based on coder judgement of the open-ended question: "What is most appealing to you about being in politics and government?"	Positive Relationship	These percentages .. "help to confirm that the ISI does indeed measure what its name suggests. "Motivational ideologies" tend to be "stylistic" ideologies" (p. 47).
(3) Political Idealism ^c	Table (p. 48)	Britain Italy	Cell Entry: Mean score on ISI for respondents in four categories measuring from "agree strongly" to "disagree strongly" in reaction to the statement "Politics is the art of the possible" and political leaders should not worry about grand plans and distant ideals" (p. 47).	Positive Relationship	"The item separates the "idealists" from the "realists" and the table "shows that the idealists rate significantly higher on the ISI than do realists" (p. 47).

^aAll page numbers refer to Robert D. Putnam, *The Beliefs of Politicians* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).

^bIn all cases, "High" and "Low" scorers on the ISI refer to respondents above and below the mean score for both national samples combined.

^cThis variable was not measured in the study of Michigan office-holders and thus, its relationship with our version of Putnam's ISI (the "articulation" cluster) was not examined.


Variable	Mode of Comparison	Relevant Sub-sample	Nature of the Dependent Variable	Putnam's Finding	Putnam's Assessment
(4) Political Culture ^c	Figure (p. 48)	Britain (N=93) Italy (N=83)	Figure: Presents the scattergram distribution of each national sample along the ISI. Y axis=Percentages of each national sample. X axis=ISI scorers of each national sample.	Italian respondents score higher on ISI than British respondents.	None
(5) Left/Right Continuum (political extremism)	Figure (p. 51)	Britain Italy	Figure: Y axis=ISI scorers of each national sample. X axis=distribution of each national sample along the five points of the left-right scale; from "Far Left" to "Far Right." Placement based on coder judgement of the respondent's view of the "proper role of the state in society" (p. 49).	Positive Relationship In both countries, the average ISI score rises regularly as one moves outward from the center.	"Ideologues are indeed concentrated at the political extremes." Possible explanation: "Perhaps those at the extremes of the spectrum are forced more often ... to defend their position, using fairly abstract and theoretical propositions" (p. 50).
(6) Willingness to Compromise	Table (p. 54)	Britain Italy	Cell Entry: Percentage of "High" and "Low" ISI scorers in each national sample that were classified as "opposed to political compromise" on four "largely independent" measures. Respondent "unwillingness to compromise" based on coder judgement on three of the four items (see pp. 52-53).	No Relationship "There is no difference between high scorers and low scorers on the ISI in terms of these four measures" (p. 53).	"...[I]n neither country is there any support for the proposition linking an ideological style of politics to opposition to give and take" (p. 54).
(7) Opposition to Interest Group Politics	Percentages (p. 54)	High and Low scorers on the ISI for each national sample	Variable measured by respondent agreement or disagreement with the statement: "Pressure groups and special interests, like trade unions, commercial associations, and professional organizations, etc., hamper the proper workings of government." 5% of the British High ISI scorers agreed and 11% of the Low ISI scorers agreed. Comparable figures for Italians; 20% and 33% (p. 54).	No Relationship (Negative relationship for both national samples) ^d	"Ideological politicians are not, pace Shils, hostile to the usages and practices of pluralism" (p. 54).

^dBracketed remarks indicate my appraisal of Putnam's data. In several places where he found "no relationship," his figures are more accurately described as indicating in "inverse" or "negative" relationship with the ISI.

Variable	Mode of Comparison	Relevant Sub-sample	Nature of the Dependent Variable	Putnam's Findings	Putnam's Assessment
(8) Belief that "the end justifies the mean"	Percentages (p. 55)	High and Low Scorers on the ISI for each national sample	Variable measured by a three item index; i.e. respondent's agreeing or disagreeing with three statements (see pp. 54-55). Of the British respondents whose ISI score was "relatively high", 29% were also relatively high on the index. 4% of the Low ISI scorers were high on the index. For Italian respondents, the comparable figures were 44% for the High ISI scorers, and 52% for the Low ISI scorers. See (p. 56).	No Relationship	"...[I]deologues in both countries were <u>slightly less likely to endorse the principle that methods do not matter</u> " (p. 56).
(9) Moral Absolutism ^c	Table (p. 55)	Britain (N=86) Italy (N=55)	Cell Entry: Two statistics are presented for the next four variables. A Spearman-Brown reliability coefficient for each index formed, and the Gamma (rank order) Correlation of the index with the ISI. Each index was formed from item-statements on which respondents placed themselves according to a four point scale from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" (p. 55). Moral Absolutism was measured by a two item index. Spearman-Brown .50 Gamma Correlation -.07 Spearman-Brown .39 Gamma Correlation .02	No Relationship No Relationship	"...[R]espondents who scored High on the ISI never differ systematically from Low scorers on Moral Absolutism, Authoritarianism, Political Distrust, or Social Distrust (as measured). The series of negative coefficients implies a series of negative verdicts on the hypotheses... Some people are more dogmatic than others, but ideologues as a group are not" (p.56).
(10) Authoritarianism	Table (p. 55)	Britain (N=86) Italy (N=56)	Authoritarianism is measured by a five item index. Spearman-Brown .62 Gamma Correlation -.04 Spearman-Brown .68 Gamma Correlation -.17	No Relationship No Relationship No Relationship (Negative relationship) ^d	(Same as above)

Variable	Mode of Comparison	Relevant Sub-sample	Nature of the Dependent Variable	Putnam's Finding	Putnam's Assessment
(continued from last page)					
(11) Political Distrust	Table (p. 55)	Britain (N=85) Italy (N=53)	Political Distrust was measured by a two-item index Spearman-Brown .39 Gamma Correlation -.16 Spearman-Brown .67 Gamma Correlation -.20	No Relationship (Negative relationship) No Relationship (Negative relationship)	(see previous page)
(12) Social Distrust ^c	Table (p. 55)	Britain (N=81) Italy (N=55)	Social Distrust was measured by a two-item index Spearman-Brown .30 Gamma Correlation -.06 Spearman-Brown .44 Gamma Correlation -.20	No Relationship No Relationship (Negative relationship)	(see previous page)
(13) Partisan Hostility ^c	Table (p. 63)	Party members of each national sample British: Labor Party (N=54) Conservatives (N=37)	Cell Entry: Gamma Correlation between the Index of Partisan Hostility (IPH) and the ISI for each set of party members. The IPH is a four-item index. Respondent's score on each item was based on a coder judgement (see pp. 57-58). Gamma Correlation .18 Gamma Correlation -.13	No Relationship No Relationship	"...Shils generalization is quite inaccurate.. In neither country - in fact, in none of the individual parties - is there a significant positive correlation between the IPH and the ISI" (p. 62).
(continued on next page)					

Variable	Mode of Comparison	Relevant Sub-sample	Nature of the Dependent Variable	Putnam's Finding	Putnam's Assessment
Partisan Hostility (continued)	Table (p. 63)	Italian: Communists (N=20) Socialists (N=18) Christian Democrats (N=33) Rightist (N=10)	Gamma Correlation -.08 Gamma Correlation .05 Gamma Correlation .02 Gamma Correlation -.33	No Relationship No Relationship No Relationship No Relationship (Negative relationship) Inverse Relationship	(see previous page) "Some extremists are ideological and some extremists are hostile, but they are rarely the same extremists" (p. 63).
(partisan hostility) ^c	Correlations (p. 63)	Extremists on the Left/Right Continuum	Gamma Correlation between the IPH and ISI. "Among British politicians who fall at either the extreme left or the extreme right, the Gamma Correlation = -.22. Among extremists in Italy, the Gamma Correlation = -.37."		
(14) Age	Figure (p. 66)	Britain Italy	Figure: Presents the distribution of ISI scores of each national sample along a four category age scale (61 and over, 51-60, 41-50, 40 and under). Y axis = the ISI and the X axis = the Age Index.	No Relationship	As one moves from older to younger politicians in either country, there is no decline in the extent of ideological political style (i.e. no evidence for "the end of ideology"). See pp. 66-67.
(age)	Correlations (p. 66)	Britain (N=93) Italy (N=83)	Product-moment Correlation (r) between Age and the ISI Product-moment Correlation -.20 Product-moment Correlation .02	Inverse Relationship No Relationship	"In Britain there is, on balance, a slight increase in the ISI ... In Western politics ... there is no evidence of a decline in ideology; no decline, that is in the tendency to "conduct politics from the standpoint of a coherent, comprehensive set of beliefs" (pp. 66-67).



Variable	Mode of Comparison	Relevant Sub-sample	Nature of the Dependent Variable	Putnam's Findings	Putnam's Assessment
(15) Social Class Background	Footnote (p. 78)		Not Presented	No Relationship	None
(16) Geographical Origins ^c	Footnote (p. 78)		Not Presented	No Relationship	None
(17) Type and Amount of Education	Footnote (p. 78)	Italian "professional" career politicians	Text: "Respondents with very little formal education tend to have a lower score on the ISI..." (see footnote p. 78) Text: "In Italy 'professional' career politicians are notably less hostile and more ideological than their colleagues" (see footnote, p. 78).	Significant Positive Relationship	"No doubt some minimal educational exposure is necessary for one to become familiar with the abstract coinage of the realm of ideology" (p. 78).
(18) Occupation	Footnote (p. 78)		Not Presented	No Relationship	None
(19) Career Pattern ^c	Footnote (p. 78)		Not Presented	No Relationship	None
(20) Political Experience	Footnote (p. 78)		Not Presented	No Relationship	None
(21) Party Experience	Footnote (p. 78)		Not Presented	No Relationship	None
(22) Trade Union ^c Experience	Footnote (p. 78)		Not Presented	No Relationship	None

APPENDIX G

INITIAL PATH MODELS




Figure G.1.--First Path Model: System-Blame Explanation Placed as the Dependent Variable.

TABLE G.1.--First Path Model Correlations.

	ED	LIB	ART	SYS
a. Path Model Observed Correlations				
Education:	100			
Liberalism:	15	100		
Articulation:	51	39	100	
System-Blame:	28	48	42	100
b. Path Model Reproduced Correlations				
Education:	100			
Liberalism:	15*	100		
Articulation:	51*	39*	100	
System-Blame:	19	48*	42*	100
c. Residual Differences Between the Observed and the Reproduced Correlations				
Education:	--			
Liberalism:	0*	--		
Articulation:	0*	0*	--	
System-Blame:	-9	0*	0*	--

*Indicates a situation in which use of the observed correlations to calculate betas has resulted (as a product of the computational formula) in perfect prediction or reproduction of the relevant correlation. In these instances the model is "constrained" in the sense that it is impossible that the predicted or reproduced correlation be anything but equal to the observed correlation. No adequate "test" of the model is possible where nearly all of the possible predicted correlations are "constrained" in this manner.




Figure G.2.--Second Path Model: Articulation and System-Blame Explanation of Crime Placed as Dependent Variables

TABLE G.2.--Second Path Model Correlations.

	AUTH	YOUTH	ED	LIB	ART	SYS
a. Path Model Observed Correlations						
Anti-Authoritarian:	100					
Youthfulness:	.26	100				
Education:	.44	.31	100			
Liberalism:	.19	.17	.15	100		
Articulation:	.41	.46	.51	.39	100	
System-Blame:	.27	.15	.28	.48	.42	100
b. Path Model Reproduced Correlations						
Anti-Authoritarian:	100					
Youthfulness:	.26*	100				
Education:	.44	.31	100			
Liberalism:	.19	.17	.15	100		
Articulation:	.41	.46	.51	.39	100	
System-Blame:	.27	.15	.28	.48*	.42*	100
c. Residual Differences Between the Observed and the Reproduced Path Model Correlations						
Anti-Authoritarian:	--					
Youthfulness:	.00*	--				
Education:	-.05	-.11	--			
Liberalism:	-.03	-.05	-.05	--		
Articulation:	-.16	-.27	-.03	-.05	--	
System-Blame:	-.13	-.07	-.10	.00*	.00*	--

* See Footnote on p.




Figure G.3.--Third Path Model: Articulation Placed as the Key Antecedent Variable.

TABLE G.3.--Third Path Model Correlations.

	ART	YOUTH	AUTH	ED	SYS	LIB
<u>a. Path Model Observed Correlations</u>						
Articulation:	100					
Youthfulness:	46	100				
Anti-Authoritarian:	41	26	100			
Education:	51	31	44	100		
System-Blame:	42	15	27	28	100	
Liberalism:	39	17	19	15	48	100
<u>b. Path Model Reproduced Correlations</u>						
Articulation:	100					
Youthfulness:	46*	100				
Anti-Authoritarian:	41*	18	100			
Education:	51*	23	44*	100		
System-Blame:	42*	19	17	21	100	
Liberalism:	39*	18	16	20	48*	100
<u>c. Residual Differences Between the Observed and the Reproduced Correlations</u>						
Articulation:	--					
Youthfulness:	0*	--				
Anti-Authoritarian:	0*	-08	--			
Education:	0*	-08	0*	--		
System-Blame:	0*	04	-10	-07	--	
Liberalism:	0*	01	-03	05	0*	--

* See Footnote on p.

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