A STUDY OF THE APPLICATION 0T- SELECTED VALUE A a
4 INFORMATION AND A VALUE JUDGMENT STRATEGY TD j-"yfjffi?
SOCIAL STUDIES CONTENT WITH ’ ’ ’ ‘ "
MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS

Thesis for the Degree of PIT. D
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY . '
DIANE ILEEN LEVANDIE
1971

 
 
 

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This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

A STUDY OF THE APPLICATION OF SELECTED VALUE
INFORMATION AND A VALUE JUDGMENT STRATEGY TO
SOCIAL STUDIES CONTENT WITH MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS

presented by . ,

Diane Ileen Levande

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph . D . _dggree in Education

 

Date Max 71 1971

0-7639

 

 

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ABSTRACT
A STUDY OF THE APPLICATION OF SELECTED VALUE

INFORMATION AND A VALUE JUDGMENT STRATEGY TO
SOCIAL STUDIES CONTENT WITH MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS

BY

Diane Ileen Levande

The purpose of this study was to explore the effects
of the application of specific information about values and
a strategy for making value judgments to selected social
studies content with middle school students.

The hypotheses tested concerned; (1) the effects of
treatment, method of instruction, sex of subject, and grade
level of the student upon both the acquisition and retention
of information about values and maturity of moral judgment,
and (2) the effect of instruction and application of the
value judgment strategy to selected social studies content
on maturity of moral judgment and essay responses to value
conflict problems.

The sample consisted of sixty seventh grade students
and ninety-eight eighth grade students enrolled in one middle
school in East Lansing, Michigan.

The students in each grade were randomly divided into

four groups or classes and assigned to one of the following

Diane Ileen Levande

four treatments; (1) teacher instruction in information about
values and the value judgment strategy with application of
the information and strategy to selected content from the book

Kiowa Years, (2) programmed instruction, employing two booklets

 

specifically designed for this study, to provide information
.about values and the value judgment strategy with application

of the information to selected content from Kiowa Years,

 

(3) teacher instruction in information about values with appli-

cation of the information to selected content from Kiowa Years,

 

and (4) no explicit instruction in information about values
or the value judgment strategy.

Implementation of the experimental treatments and data
collection procedures were completed over a ten week period
during Fall, 1970. The Knowledge of Values Test (KNOVA) was
Specifically designed to measure acquisition and retention of
information about values. The Moral Judgment Test was adapted
from a series of story items devised by Ronald Johnson, in
accordance with Piagetian theory, to measure maturity of moral
judgment. Additional data was provided by essay responses
to value conflict problems administered to the subjects in
seventh grade science classes and eighth grade English classes.

Data analysis consisted of a univariate and multi-
variate analysis of variance of gain scores on the pretest and
post test instruments and a content analysis of the essay

responses to determine the effect of instruction in the value

Diane Ileen Levande

judgment strategy and the relationship of the responses to

Piagetian stages of moral development.

The results of the analyses yielded the following

major conclusions.

1.

The presentation of specific information about
values and the application of this information to
selected social studies content did significantly
increase knowledge about values and maturity of
moral judgment.

The increase in knowledge about values and
maturity of moral judgment as a result of the
experimental treatments was significant for both
boys and girls, seventh and eighth graders, and
teacher and programmed instruction groups.
Instruction in the value judgment strategy was

not significantly reflected in either increased
maturity of moral judgment or in the essay reSponses
to value conflict problems.

Verbal intelligence was significantly correlated
with socio-economic status, however neither verbal
intelligence or socio-economic status was signifi-
cantly related to knowledge about values or

maturity of moral judgment.

A STUDY OF THE APPLICATION OF SELECTED VALUE
INFORMATION AND A VALUE JUDGMENT STRATEGY TO

SOCIAL STUDIES CONTENT WITH MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS

BY

Diane Ileen Levande

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
College of Education

1971

@Copyright by
DIANE ILEEN LEVANDE

1971

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to Dr. Jean M. LePere for her con-
sistent and insightful direction of this study. Appreciation
is also due Dr. Frank Blackington, Dr. Calhoun Collier, and
Dr. Margaret Jacobson for their helpful suggestions and
support during the course of this investigation.

Grateful recognition is extended to the East Lansing
Public School System, and particularly to the MacDonald
Middle School teachers who willingly cooperated in the
implementation of the experimental program.

I would also like to express my gratitude to the
Office of Research Consultation in the College of Education
for assistance in statistical analysis and data processing.

Sincere appreciation is also extended to my husband
for his patient understanding and encouragement throughout

my educational endeavors.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER

I.

II.

III.

THE PROBLEM . . . . . .

Need and Importance of the Study.
Statement of the Problem . .
Assumptions of the Study . .

y Definition of Terms . . . . .

General Hypotheses of the Study

- Limitations of the Study . . . .
Background Theory: Moral Development

Overview. . . . . . . . .

REVIEW OF LITERATURE . .
Conceptual Issues Relating to Axiology of

Ethics. . . . . . .
Free Will . . . .
Axiology and Ethics .
Values and Reason. .

Summary . . . . .

Research Findings Relating to Moral Develop-

ment and Value Education. . . .

Piagetian Dimensions and Related Research

in Moral Development . . .
Antecedent Conditions .
Value Education . . .
Teaching Strategies . .
Summary . . . . . .

DESIGN AND PROCEDURES . . . . . .

Sample Selection and Characteristics

Experimental Design . . . . . .
Instrumentation . . . . . . .
Content Analysis . . . . . . .
Programmed Instruction . . .
Statistical Hypotheses to be Tested.

Analysis of Data . . . . . .
Summary . . . . . . . . . .

iii

Page

12
13
14
18
19
20
29

3O

3O
34
42
57

62
63

65
73
85
89
93

96

101
106
113
117
124
125
127

CHAPTER Page

IV. ANALYSIS OF DATA. . . . . . . . . . . 128
Individual and Group Dat . . . . . . . 129
Knowledge about Values . . . . . . . . 132
Maturity of Moral Judgment. . . . . . . 136
The Value Judgment Strategy . . . . . . 140
Correlations for Input Variables. . . . . 141
Summary of Hypotheses Testing. . . . . . 143
Discussion of Findings . . . . . . . . 143
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS . . . 161
Conclusions of the Study . . . . . . . 163
Implications of the Study . . . . . . . 166
Implications for Further Research . . . . 168

BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
APPENDIX A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
APPENDIX B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
APPENDIX C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

APPENDIX D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

iv

TABLE
3.1

3.2

3.5

3.6

3.7

LIST OF TABLES

Mean Age of Sample by Grade and Sex . . .

Lorge-Thorndike Verbal Intelligence T-Scores
by Grade and Sex . . . . . . . . .

Socio-Economic Index Scores by Grade and
Sex I O O O O O O O O O O O 0

Numerical Relationship of Test Items to
Behavioral Objectives . . . . . . .

Split-Half Pretest Reliability for KNOVA
Test 0 O I O C O O O O O O O 0

Response Frame Analysis for Values 1
Programmed Booklet . . . . . . . .

Response Frame Analysis of Values 2
Programmed Booklet . . . . . . . .

Cell Means and Standard Deviations of Input
Variables for Individual Analysis by
Treatment, Sex, and Grade . . . . . .

Cell Means and Standard Deviations of Input
Variables for Group Analysis by Treatment
and Grade . . . . . . . . . . .

Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing
Mean Gain Scores of Experimental Treatment
Groups with Mean Gain Scores of Control
Groups on the KNOVA Test . . . . . .

Post Hoc Comparison of Mean Gain Scores on
the KNOVA Test for Teacher Instruction
Groups and Programmed Instruction Groups .

Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing
Mean Gain Scores for Males with Mean Gain
Scores for Females on the KNOVA Test . .

Page

98

100

101

108

109

123

124

130

131

132

133

134

TABLE Page

4.6 Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing
Mean Gain Scores for Seventh Grade Groups
with Mean Gain Scores for Eighth Grade
Groups on the KNOVA Test . . . . . . . 135

4.7 Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing
Mean Gain Scores of Experimental Treatment
Groups with Mean Gain Scores of Control
Groups on the Moral Judgment Test . . . . 137

4.8 Post Hoc Comparison of Mean Gain Scores for
‘ Teacher Instruction Groups and Programmed
Instruction Groups on the Moral Judgment
Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

4.9 Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing
Mean Gain Scores for Males with Mean Gain
Scores for Females on the Moral Judgment
Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

4.10 Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing
Mean Gain Scores for Seventh Grade Groups
with Mean Gain Scores for Eighth Grade
Groups on the Moral Judgment Test . . . . 139

4.11 A t-Test of Mean Differences Between Subjects
Instructed in the Value Judgment Strategy
and Control Subjects for Seventh Grade. . . 140

4.12 A t-Test of Mean Difference Between Subjects
Instructed in the Value Judgment Strategy
and Control Subjects for Eighth Grade . . . 141

4.13 Correlation Matrix for Input Variables of
Socio-Economic Status, Age, Gain Scores
on the KNOVA Test, Gain Scores on the
Moral Judgment Test and Verbal Intelligence
T-Scores. . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

vi

CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM

Almost all known cultures and societies have at least
paid lip service to the notion that education should do more
than teach social skills, increase knowledge, or improve
intellectual ability. Many have tried to build methods of
value instruction into their educational systems under such
headings as "bringing up children in the fear of the Lord,"

"the education of a gentleman,‘ "educating the whole man,"
or "character training." In Western society, Socrates was
perhaps the first to question the concept philosophically,
by asking whether virtue could be taught and, if so, how.1

Plato's Republic devotes no small amount of discussion to

 

the transmission of the values of the ideal state to its
citizenry, especially the young.2
John Comenius, a pioneer in educational theory,

believed the major task in seventeenth century education to

 

1John Wilson, Norman Williams, and Barry Sugarman,
Introduction to Moral Education (Baltimore: Penguin Books,
Inc. 1967), p. 12.

 

2The Republic of Plato, Trans. with intro. and notes
by Francis M. Cornford (New York: Oxford University Press,
1945). pp. 88-111.

 

be moral in nature. His thesis consisted of sixteen funda-
mental rules which began with; "All the virtues, without
exception, should be implanted in the young." The cardinal
virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice were
to be instilled first, followed by adaptability, industry,
unselfishness, and endurance. The primary method used to
transmit these values to the young was the living example of
parents, teachers, and fellow students who were to present
well-Ordered lives for the children to imitate.3
;In the early development of colonial America the primary
responsibility for value indoctrination was assumed by the
church. The small communities established by the early
pioneers were most often composed of persons having similar
religious convictions, standards, and beliefs. The church
elders, using God as their authority, arrived at absolute
principles and standards in the area of values. The primary
purpose of the schools was to maintain and perpetuate the
religion and ideals represented by the adult community. The
early textbooks designed for use in elementary schools often
had religious or moral connotations and successful character

building was linked to the disciplined, quiet classroom where

good behavior and moral virtue were demanded of the children.

 

3Michael Belok, et‘al. Approaches to Values in Education
(Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown, 1966), p. 283.

As the nation grew several forces combined to initiate
a more secular approach to value education. Stress on religious
freedom, governmental control of schools, the methods of
science, and the philosophical stance of naturalism were all
major influences in the eventual decrease of any particular
religious emphasis in the public schools. By the latter half
of the nineteenth century, as the newly born social sciences
were emphasizing individual choice and the absence of absolute
authority regarding matters of value, the idea that teachers
could present moral beliefs through the study of subject
matter, especially through the careful examination of such
subjects as history and literature, became an acceptable
approach to value education.

With the advent of the progressive education movement
and its emphasis on the educator's responsibility for the
development of the whole child, the need for character educa-
tion was recognized as one of the primary aims of the educa-
tional process. Directing his thought toward moral education
and character training, John Dewey wrote, "The divorce between
the intellectual and the moral must inevitably continue in our
schools as long as there is a divorce between learning and
doing. The attempt to attach genuine moral consideration to
the mere processes of learning, and to the habits which go
along with learning, can result only in a moral training which

is infected with formality, arbitrariness, and an undue

emphasis upon failure to conform."4 Under Dewey's influence
much stress was placed on the child's opportunity to experi-
ence the results of knowledge. Students were urged to
examine questions or topics with open mindedness, sincerity,
breadth of outlook, and thoroughness. They were also urged
to accept the responsibility for developing the consequences
of their own ideas.5
Throughout the history of education these various
approaches to the problem of value instruction have enjoyed
differential periods of support. Simultaneously, each
approach, as well as others which might be revealed by a
more detailed analysis of educational history, has aroused
disagreement and debate. It appears that some of the contro-
versy in value education has arisen from a misunderstanding
of the issues and approaches involved in such an endeavor.
Much of it, however, stems from the basic philosophical
differences regarding the nature and apprehension of values
which have served as fuel for the continuing dispute over

content and method in the struggle to introduce the young to

those ideas, beliefs, and standards cherished by their elders.

 

'4John Dewey on Education, ed. by Reginald Archambault
(New York: REndomTHouse, Inc., 1964), pp. 120-121.

5William K. Frankena, PhilOSOphy of Education (New
York: Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 73.

 

 

Need and Importance of the Study

 

Societal Concerns

 

Concern and anxiety about value questions in contem-
porary American society has grown to national proportions.

The daily outpourings of the news media, as well as popular
journalistic endeavors and artistic productions, lament the
state of a democracy which can allow such outrages as crime,
drug abuse, war, racism, poverty, and social inertia to
continue and even increase. Articles in both popular maga-
zines and academic journals often conclude that these various
social ills have come about because of a basic change in
values. The issue most often cited in this hypothesized
value shift is the lack of respect for, or total rejection
of, the traditional sources of authority.

This charge, if true, of a breakdown in the acceptance
of traditional authority presents a serious problem for society
in general, but it is considerably worse for those who occupy
positions in the traditional and accepted places of authority.
The state has governed, in almost all past societies and
many present ones, on the basis of a commonly accepted and
shared system of values, often backed by a religion or near-
religion. There was a traditional acceptance or agreement
about certain values which those in authority were trusted to
maintain. The mass of people lacked education, opportunity,

energy, ability, or economic resources to make any effective

intellectual challenge even if they had desired to do so.

If, as many commentators on modern society claim, there has
come into being a relatively powerful segment of society who
fundamentally disagree with much that has been deemed essential
in the traditional value system, then the democracy faces

some very special problems. As suggested by Wilson, "you
cannot defend a country if people do not think it worth defend-
ing, or are pacifists. You cannot implement a policy of hard
work for a higher level of living if people no longer believe
in the merits of hard work, and do not earnestly desire a
higher level of living. You cannot enforce the law if people
do not approve of it, or regard law enforcement officers as

O 6
enemies."

There are some indications that a sizeable number of
citizens, especially among the young, are no longer committed
to the traditional values. A recent research project designed
to diagnose the mood and temper of high school and college
youth as compared to members of the business community con-
cluded that, "There are new values held by a great many young
people that often conflict with those held by most businessmen.
These students do not doubt their ability to make a living,
to be successful in the conventional sense if they so choose.
Taking these benefits for granted, they discount them and

emphasize the importance of the individual, the desirability

 

6Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 15.

 

O

of social change, and the search for meaningful personal
relationships and work. They question authority on almost
every count and hold up virtually every institution of our
society for re-examination. For the most part, they find them
wanting."7
Substantiating the above conclusions a recent
editorial reported the following, "We shouldn't be surprised
that a recently completed survey of 170,000 freshmen entering
college in 1969 showed that a majority tended to reject the
achievement values of their parents. Life goals named least
often by the freshmen were; contributing to scientific theory,
being an expert in finance, and becoming a community leader.
Goals most often mentioned included; developing a meaningful
philosophy of life, having friends with different backgrounds
and interests, and helping others who are in difficulty."8
It is perhaps too easy to cast doubt upon these
survey studies, based primarily upon responses from young
people, by challenging the sample or the methodology of these
investigations. Responding to the same theme, John Wilson

offers a different kind of evidence that traditonal authority

is being rejected by pointing to the rise in non-authoritarian

 

7John D. Rockefeller 3rd, "Reconciling Youth and the
Establishment," Saturday Review, January 23, 1971, pp. 28-29.

8Robert E. Burns, "The Examined Life: One Way of
Looking at Everyday Manners and Morals," U.S. Catholic and
Jubilee, February 1971, Inside cover.

 

 

ways of thinking. He notes the rise in pOpularity of the
ideas expressed in "humanism, existentialism, modern analytic
philosophy, psychoanalysis, social science, and perhaps even
the increased popularity of the scientific or quasi-scientific
approach to life in general. Equally important for educators
are the constant references in the literature to the impor-
tance of teaching children to be responsible, to think for
themselves, and to adapt a critical attitude."9 These notions,
according to Wilson, testify to the vast but confused desire
to substitute something for a vanished or vanishing authority
in that area of life which deals with values. The difficulty
stems from not being clear about what to substitute.

It has been suggested in the preceding paragraphs that
there is at the present time in American society a moving
away from authoritarianism regarding matters of value. Those
who represent the traditional forms of authority in such
institutions as government, religion, and education are
experiencing decreasing success in maintaining public commit-
ment to absolute principles and standards in the value area.
It would appear that an alternative to these traditional forms
of authority is being sought and it is within the context
of this phenomenon that the need arises for education to
re-examine and clarify the area of value instruction at

both the conceptual and applied levels.

 

9Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 13.

 

Educational Concerns

 

Much of what appears in the literature concerning
value education today centers upon two aspects of contempo-
rary life; the dilemma of personal choice and the seemingly
infinite nature of social problems which require the attention
of an educated citizenry. Speaking to the problem of personal
choice, Smith and Cox predict, "the world will continue to
be one of fascinating and dangerous alternatives and the
individual growing up in it will either become more skillful
in choosing among these alternatives or will by default have

his choices made for him."10

An increasing difficulty in
choice making is compounded by the probability that the
individual is most often confronted with choices which are
not clear-cut cases of good and evil, but entail selections
between good and good.11
Regarding the ills of society, it almost appears that
problem fomenting conditions are a permanent characteristic
of the present environment, for as some problems are dealt
with, others become more apparent and persistent. Some seem
perennial, reoccurring and reappearing as conditions once

believed stable shift and change to undermine old solutions.12

 

0Frederick R. Smith and C. Benjamin Cox, New
Strategies and Curriculum in Social Studies (Chicago: Rand
McNSIly and Company, 1969), p. 65.

11Byron G. Massialas and C. Benjamin Cox, Inquiry in
Social Studies (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, I966T,
p. 153.

 

 

 

12Smith and Cox, New Strategies and Curriculum in
Social Studies, pp. 62-63.

 

 

10

In a recent article William Boyer commented upon the
necessity of value education in the preparation of citizens
who will be confronted with these problems. "Social planning
can occur through an elitist top-down system, or it can be
based on bottom-up participation, the relative emphasis
being reflective of an autocratic or democratic social
philosophy. Specialists are needed in either system to
provide accurate information about the consequences of alter-
native plans, but value judgments are necessary to define
the kind of future to be planned. This role cannot be
performed by specialists. The failure of schools to help
students become participants in planning processes virtually
predetermines that social planning will be elitist, repre-
senting the values of those who have the power to affect
social policy."13
Urging for research into the nature of values, their
development, influence, and transmission comes from many
quarters. Cantril acknowledges that "because value judgments
play so important a role in scientific thinking, every effort
must be made to discover ways and means of making value
judgments themselves the subject matter for scientific

. . "l4
inquiry.

 

13William H. Boyer, "Education for Survival," Phi
Delta Kappan, III (January, 1971), p. 259.

14Hadley Cantril, The Why of Man's Experience (New
York: Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 8.

 

 

11

In the social sciences, Rokeach has raised the
question of whether the time is not ripe for replacing the
study of attitudes, which has occupied a dominant place in
research and theory for over half a century, with an even
more deserving candidate for the central position-~the
concept of value.15 Echoing this concern, David McClelland
has stated, "I believe that psychology must deal with sub-
stantive moral issues, with content."16

Preliminary recommendations from the 1970 White House
Conference on children contain several specific suggestions
related to values. These include; encouraging value commun-
ication between parents and children, using a multi-media
approach in education to help children develop values, and
a plea that more empirical data be amassed on value and
value formation.17

Though value questions are inherent in all aspects of
education, many social studies educators agree that their

field, with its increased emphasis on social judgment in a

democratic society as a paramount act of citizenship, is,

 

15Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1969), pp. 157-158.

16David C. McClelland, "To Know Why Men Do What They
Do," Psychology Today, 4, (January, 1971), p. 35.

17White House Conference on Children, "Preliminary
Form Recommendations," Washington, D.C., 1970. (Mimeographed.)

 

 

12

perhaps more than any other subject involved in the language
of value education.18 However, the question of how teachers
incorporate the study of values into social studies content
has been largely left unanswered. Though some promising
models for value inquiry have been reviewed in the literature,
little has been done by teachers to bring questions concerned
with the ethical domain into the classroom for serious con-

sideration.19

According to Shaver and Berlak, "It seems
obvious, therefore, that in developing a rationale for social
studies education, we must consider intellectual strategies
appropriate to the making of value judgments."20
It is against this background of broad societal con-
cern about values and increasing demands within the educa-
tional sphere for further conceptual and empirical study of
value education that this investigation derives its importance.

The questions asked in this study are relevant to both the

theoretical and applied levels of value education.

Statement of the Problem

 

The purpose of this investigation is to determine

the effects of the presentation of specific value information

 

18Smith and Cox, New Strategies and Curriculum in
Social Studies, p. 65.

19
p. 177.
20James P. Shaver and Harold Berlak, eds., Democracy,

Pluralism, and the Social Studies (Boston: Houghton M1 in,
1968), p. 339.

 

 

Massialas and Cox, Inquiry in Social Studies,

 

l3

and the application of a value judgment strategy to selected
social studies content by means of two teaching methods with
middle school students. Effects will be assessed by techniques
designed to measure the development of knowledge and under-
standing in the study of values, the maturity of moral judg-
ments, and the transfer and use of the value judgment strategy
in response to appropriate value conflict problems presented

in other subject matter areas.

Assumptions of the Study

 

This study is based upon the assumption that specific
knowledge about the concept of value, the development of values,
and value conflicts, as well as, the act of making a value
judgment is, in part, a rational process which can be learned
in the school environment. The theoretical basis of this
investigation rests upon the assumption that Piagetian stage
theory, as it relates to moral development, represents a
realistic state of growth which will be manifested in the
middle school student sample. This study also rests upon
the supposition that the value judgment strategy selected
for use does facilitate the making of normative judgments
and that the measures selected to assess the effects of the
application of this strategy to selected social studies con—
tent will discriminate changes in knowledge, understanding,

and judgment.

14

Definition of Terms

 

There is much disagreement among scholars concerning
the meaning of terms which are relevant to the study of
values and ethics. Thus, the following definitions are
specific to this study and have been reached through a
review and analysis of both theory and materials used in the

context of this investigation.

22.122
Social scientists have defined value as a belief,
conception, or idea about what is good, desirable, or pre—
ferable, which influences or guides man's behavior. In the
context of this study the concept of value was presented to
the student sample as "our ideas about what is right, good,
or best in many areas of life, including things which are

good because they are useful or beautiful."

Fact

 

The following definition of fact was presented to the
student sample in the context of this study. "In general we
can define a fact as something that has actually happened or
that can be proven. Your correct name, the correct address
of your house or school are examples of things which you are
quite certain are true."

Opinion
Though it is often difficult to distinguish opinion

from fact or value, the following explanation of opinion

15

was given to the student sample in the context of this study.
"Opinions are our own views or judgments about many things.
Opinions are not based on certainty but on what seems to be
true or probable. They frequently concern judgments about

matters of taste or our likes and dislikes."

Value Information

 

In view of the information to be presented about
values specific objectives were outlined relevant to know-
ledge and understanding of value terminology, the differ-
entiation between values, facts, and opinions, the develop-
ment and transmission of values, and the differentiation of

value conflict situations.

Value Judgment

 

A critical examination of alternative solutions
which are selected or rejected on the grounds of their
defensibility relative to some predetermined standard or

criterion.

Moral Value

 

The particular area of value theory which deals with

ideas about right or good conduct or behavior.

Moral Develgpment

 

The acquisition by the human being of those ideas or
beliefs which guide his actions in the area of right or good

conduct or behavior.

16

Moral Judgment

 

A critical examination of alternative solutions which
are selected or rejected on the grounds of their defensibility
relative to some predetermined standard or criterion, speci-

fically in the area of right or good conduct.

Moral Judgement Stages

 

According to Piagetian theory, levels of moral judg-
ment can be assessed regarding; (l) immanent justice, (2)

moral realism, (3) punishment, and (4) responsibility.21

Strategy

 

An intellectual tool constructed for the purpose of
enabling one to think about or examine more closely the object

or world represented by it.

Value Judgment Strategy

 

The strategy adapted for use in this study was
developed by the Columbia Associates in Philosophy and includes
the following steps: (1) Explicit statement of the problem
or irresolution, (2) Identification of value or an end in
view which is shared by all participants that is related
to the problem under consideration, (3) Exploration of the
range of alternative solutions to the problem, (4) Establish-
ing the relationship between the proposed course of action

and the disputed goal referent by empirically testing "if-

 

21Further explanation of the moral judgment stages
can be found on p. 24 of this study.

17

then" statements or implications, (5) Possible acceptance of

a defensible proposal.22

Social Studies Content

 

For the purpose of this study, social studies content

focused on the information contained in the book Kiowa Years
23

 

by Alice Marriott. The material in this book attempts to
portray the historical struggle between the Kiowa Indians

and the white man over land rights as the Indians saw, felt,
and understood what happened. The discussion of various
value issues raised in Marriott's book was used to present
the subjects with one account of an historical event to which

they could relate both the information about values and the

value judgment strategy.

Programmed Instruction

 

A teaching technique which presents the material to
be learned in step-by-step form. The student learns one step
before going on to another; and the material is so presented
that he can proceed by himself, checking his responses at

each step of the process.

Knowledge of Values Test (KNOVA)
A twenty question multiple-choice instrument developed

especially for the collection of pre and post test data on

 

2Massialas and Cox, Inquiry in Social Studies,
pp. 163-169.

23Alice Marriott, Kiowa Years (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1968).

 

 

18

subject's knowledge about certain aspects of the value con-

cept for the present study.

Moral Judgment Test

 

Twenty story items developed by Ronald C. Johnson
as part of a research effort to test some of Piaget's ideas
about children's moral judgment. This instrument was used
in the present study to collect pre and post test data on

maturity of moral judgment.
General Hypotheses of the Study

A review of the literature on value education, espe-
cially in the field of social studies, and of the developmental
processes involved in moral judgment according to Piagetian
theory has led to the following general hypotheses to be
tested in this study. These hypotheses are restated in

statistical terms in Chapter III.

1. Knowledge about Values

a. Instruction in information about values and a value
judgment strategy will significantly increase know-
ledge of values as measured by the KNOVA Test.

b. Knowledge of values as measured by the KNOVA Test
will not vary according to method of instruction.

c. Knowledge of values as measured by the KNOVA Test
will increase significantly more for females than
for males.

d. Knowledge of values as measured by the KNOVA Test
will increase significantly more for eighth grade
subjects than for seventh grade subjects.

19

2. Maturity of Moral Judgment

a. Instruction in information about values and a value
judgment strategy will significantly increase
maturity of moral judgment as measured by the Moral
Judgment Test.

b. Maturity of moral judgment as measured by the Moral
Judgment Test will not vary according to method of
instruction.

c. Maturity of moral judgment as measured by the Moral
Judgment Test will increase significantly more for
females than for males.

d. Maturity of moral judgment as measured by the Moral
Judgment Test will increase significantly more for
eighth grade subjects than for seventh grade subjects.

3. Value Judgment Strategy

a. Knowledge of the value judgment strategy as presented
in social studies classes will be reflected to a
significant degree in the analysis of value conflict
problems in other subject matter areas as measured by
content analysis.

Additional Considerations

 

Results of several studies which proposed to test
certain aspects of Piagetian theory pertaining to moral develop-
ment have shown a relationship between intelligence, particu-
larly verbal intelligence, and moral judgment. There is also
some evidence that a relationship exists between socio-economic
status and moral judgment. In view of these findings, some
consideration will be given to the variables of intelligence

and socio-economic status in the present investigation.

Limitations of the Study

 

This study is limited by the conceptual view that

value development and judgment are based in part upon

20

cognitive abilities which can be enhanced by learning and
the theoretical base which postulates a stage process in
moral development.24

The selection of the Columbia Associates model for
considering value judgments places another limitation upon
this investigation. The present literature indicates that
this model has not been previously applied to specific
subject matter content in a classroom situation and its
selection imposes a certain framework for the consideration
of value judgments.

This investigation is also limited by the sensitivity
of the measuring instruments available for use, the charact-
eristics of the sample selected, and the abilities of the

researcher and the cooperating teachers to devise and imple-

ment the research procedures.

Background Theory: Moral Development

 

McDougall reflected the mood of early twentieth century
theorists in his 1908 statement that "the moralization of
the individual by society" was the primary focus of social
psychology. For some time, morality was the central category
for defining social relationships and development, and the
social sciences were known as the "moral sciences." From
this healthy beginning the concept of morality has slipped in

and out of focus as a question for empirical investigation.

 

24Though this particular conceptual view and theoret-
ical base define certain boundaries for this investigation,
they also make the study possible.

7]

‘—

In the late twenties and early thirties Hartshorne and May
(l928e1930) and Jean Piaget (1932) gave impetus to the study
of moral judgment. Renewed interest in this concept did not
materialize to any great extent until the late fifties and
early sixties when several studies can be located which pur-
port to test aspects of Piaget's theory of moral development.

Piaget's book, The Moral Judgment of the Child, which

 

appeared in 1932 remains one of the most comprehensive child-
centered works devoted to this topic. The experiments from
which Piaget developed this theory were simple observations

of the children's game of marbles. Piaget explains, "Chil-
dren's games constitute the most admirable social institutions.
The game of marbles, for instance, contains an extremely
complex system of rules, that is to say, a code of laws, a
jurisprudence of its own."25 Piaget maintains that the
observations of how a child obtains the rules of the game of
marbles is directly related to his moral development. "All
morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of

all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the
individual acquires for these rules."26 During the prelim-
inary experiments, researchers asked children to teach them
how to play marbles so that the child was obliged to formulate
and express the rules. Analysis of the responses of the

subjects, whose ages ranged from six to thirteen years, led

 

25Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, trans.
by Marjorie Gabain (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 13.

26

 

Ibid.

22

to the formulation of a number of recognizable stages in the
development of the child's use and understanding of rules.

The Motor Stage. The marbles are handled largely at
the dictates of the small child's transient desires,
or motor habits. His play is not, however, entirely
at random; he develops a number of rigid patterns of
behavior, but it is doubtful to what extent it would
be correct to call these rules.

The Egocentric Stage. Between the ages of two and five
the child begins to imitate rules which he sees in the

behavior of other children, but he does not as yet try

to co-operate in any real sense.

The Incipient Co-operation Stage. The children are now

playing together in a real sense. They are trying to

win, and therefore they begin to pay attention to the

question of a code of unified rules; but their ideas of

rules in general are still vague.

The Codification Stage. Approximately at the age of

eleven or twelve this last stage materializes in which

rules are now fixed in detail. The code of sules is

known to the children's society as a whole.2

These stages apply to the child's use of the rules,

his ability to explain them, and the form of his rule-following
at various ages. In answer to questions designed to probe
into the extent to which a child actually knows what the
rules are, and about where and how he acquires his ideas on
rules and their operation, the data collected suggested the
presence of another set of orderly stages which were similar,
but not identical, to the above sequence.

At first the infant has no conception of rules at all,

but gradually as they begin to impinge upon his play

they are regarded as interesting examples with little
binding force or power.

 

27Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, pp. 260-

 

261.

23

At the second stage there is a keen awareness of rules.
They are regarded as sacred and untouchable; coming
from adults and lasting forever. Piaget has termed
this level the transcendental stage.

At the third stage it becomes permissible to alter
rules provided other players of the game agree as they
are seen as being based on mutual consent. Piaget
sees this as the final stage which is based on mutual
respect and co-operation and the most relevant to the
question of genuine moral development.28

Piaget's interest in the transition between stage
two (transcendental) and stage three (co-Operative) led him
to another set of experiments designed to investigate
children's ideas about concepts more directly related to
moral behavior. These experiments were built around the
children's responses to questions about several short stories
which Piaget devised portraying children performing morality-
relevant acts in specified situations. The following example
is one set of stories designed to elicit the child's view
regarding intentionality or moral realism.

A. A little boy who is called John is in his room.
He is called to dinner. He goes to the dining
room. But behind the door there is a chair, and
on the chair there is a tray with fifteen cups
on it. John couldn't have known that there was
all this behind the door. He goes in, the door
knocks against the tray, bang go the fifteen cups
and they all get broken!

B. Once there was a little boy whose name was Henry.
One day when his mother was out he tried to get
some jam out of the cupboard. He climbed up on
a chair and stretched out his arm. But the jam
was too high and he couldn't reach it and have
any. But while he was trying to get it he knocked
over a cup. The cup fell down and broke.29

 

28Ibid., p. 262.

29Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, p. 122.

 

24

The children were asked two questions about these stories;

(1) Are these children equally guilty? (2) Which of the

two is the naughtiest and why? Stories and questions of a
similar nature were devised with reference to the child's
conception of lying, justice, punishment, and responsibility.
The data collected from this series of experiments allowed
Piaget to further define the following concepts and to form
a kind of dichotomy which reflects immature and mature

response in the area of moral judgment.

Immanent Justice. The belief in the existence of
automatic punishments which emanate from things
themselves. Attributing justice to supernatural
causes indicated an immature response; attributing
justice to chance indicated a mature response.

Moral Realism. A belief that acts should be judged
in terms of consequences, not on the motive behind
the act. Immature response indicated by judgment
on consequences; mature response indicated by judg-
ment based on intent.

Punishment. A belief in retributive or restitutive
punishment and the effectiveness of severe punish—
ment. The immature reponse indicated retribution
with more severe punishment; the mature response
indicated restitution with less severe punishment.

Collective and Individual Responsibility. Choice
of collective or individual punishment. Immature
response indicated collective punishment; mature
response indicated individual punishment.30
It was also within the context of this work that
Piaget developed his theory of the two moralities of the

child. Flavell has a particularly enlightening discussion

of this aspect of Piagetian theory.

 

30Ronald C. Johnson, "A Study of Children's Moral

Judgments," Child Development, 33, (1962), p. 237.

 

25

There appears to be two moralities in childhood, at
least within the culture from which Piaget's subjects
were drawn. The developmentally earlier one is a
morality of constraint, formed in the context of the
unilateral rEIatIonsIbetween child as inferior and
adult as superior. The child adapts to the prohibitions
and sanctions handed down on high by reifying them
into simple moral absolutes--simp1e 'givens' which are
unquestioned and sacred, in theory if not in practice.
. . . With development, this morality of constraint

is at least partially replaced by a morality of cooper-
ation, formed out of the reciprocal relatIEnShIps

among status peers and based on mutual, rather than
unilateral respect.31

 

 

Regarding his theory of the two moralities of the child,
Piaget has said that during the morality of constraint the
child is willing to accept his rules from adult authority,
but during the later morality of cooperation the child is
independent of adults. Piaget has even suggested that if
children were free from adult imposed standards of right

and wrong they would proceed to the more mature morality of
cooperation even earlier.32 It appears that this particular
aspect of Piagetian theory has raised more controversy than
support. Research findings have suggested that this idea

of morality, which develops first through adult authority
and then through peer group respect, is applicable in some
cultures but not in others. Though some educators have inter-

preted the idea of two moralities to mean less adult control

 

31
John H. Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of

Jean Pia et (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.,
I pp. 295-2960

 

Elizabeth Hall, "A Conversation with Jean Piaget
and Barbel Inhelder" Psychology Today V01. 3, No. 12, May,
1970, pp. 28-29.

 

26

and more self-government by children, Piaget has recently
stated that such implications of this theory need further
empirical study.33

One of the most fruitful ideas to come from Piaget's
research has been the concept of developmental stages in moral
growth based upon a particular group of cognitive abilities.
These specific abilities have never been explicitly defined
by Piaget, but theorists have suggested that these abilities
include the ability to form moral concepts, the ability to
reason in moral terms, and the ability to make value judg-
ments. Other important factors which have been identified
are the ability to make moral or value comparisons, to have
insight into the needs of or behavior of others, and the
ability to carry out rules in practice.34

Since Piaget's work on moral judgment there have been
several studies which draw upon his methods or attempt to
subject his findings to more rigorously designed experiments.
One of the most well known theorists in America, Lawrence
Kohlberg, has been directly involved with testing the stage
theory of moral development. He has used larger, more
heterogeneous samples and his data have been based on lengthy
individual interviews focusing on the child's responses to

questions about stories which contain value conflicts. After

 

33mm.

3«Wilson, IntrodUction to Moral Education, pp. 256,

 

266.

27

detailed examination of these recorded interviews Kohlberg
has concluded that a child's moral development is based upon
the following six stages which can be categorized under three
major headings; Pre-Moral, Conventional Role Conformity, and

Self-Accepted Moral Principles.

I. Pre-Moral
Stage 1. Punishment and obedience orientations. Rules
are obeyed to avoid punishment.
Stage 2. Naive instrumental hedonism. The child conforms
in order to obtain rewards.

II. Morality of Conventional Role Conformity.
Stage 3. Good-boy morality of maintaining good relations.
The child conforms to avoid disapproval.
Stage 4. Authority maintaining morality. The child con-
forms to avoid censure by authorities and
resultant guilt.

III. Morality of Self-Accepted Moral Principles.

Stage 5. Morality of contract. A duty is defined in
terms of contract, general avoidance of viola-
tion of the rights of others.

Stage 6. The morality of individual principles of
conscience. The child conforms to avoid self-
condemnation.35

Kohlberg is generally credited with providing statis-
tical evidence (a frequent criticism of Piaget's work which
tends to be more clinical and descriptive in nature) for the
deveIOpmental stage theory in moral growth. Accordingly, a
series of stages must be passed through in a certain order,
the attainment of one being a prerequisite for passing on to

the next. The acceptance of this idea is generally thought

to preclude the notion that moral development can be explained

 

3SIbid., pp. 268-271.

28

entirely as an internalization of outside values through such
processes as socialization, introjection, or conditioning,
because the child can internalize the moral values of his
parents and culture and make them his own only as he comes

to relate these values to a comprehended social order and to
his own goals as a social self. The fundamental factor in
stage theories of moral development is social participation
and role-taking, which involve an emotional component of
empathy as well as a cognitive component of being able to
define situations in terms of rights and duties.

Similarly, the stage theory seems to indicate that
certain views of moral education, in particular, didactic
moralizing and punishment, are not as relevant to moral
development as the role of the teacher in helping the student
take the next step toward maturity of judgment. It is within
this latter context that Kohlberg has suggested, "it may be
possible to define moral education primarily as a matter of
stimulating the development of the child's own moral judgment
and its control of action. Because there appears to be
considerable regularity of sequence and direction in the
development of moral judgment, the stimulation of moral
development may be distinguished from the simple imposition
of arbitrary cultural or personal standards upon the child.
This means, in the first place, the stimulation of the child's
use of his current capacities for moral judgment and of his

use of these judgments in guiding and criticizing his action.

29

It means, in the second place, the stimulation of developmental
changes of moral judgment to the next level of maturity."36

One major aim of this investigation is the selection,
design, and application of specific information, strategy,
and methods which may prove significant in giving the student

practice in making moral judgments and in stimulating him

to the next stage of maturity in moral development.

Overview

 

Chapter II of this study includes a general review
of major conceptual issues in the area of axiology and ethics
which have direct bearing on this problem. It also contains
a review and discussion of the relevant research. Sample
characteristics, instrumentation, and research design are
considered in Chapter III. In Chapter IV the statistical
and descriptive findings of the study will be presented and
discussed. Chapter V will include the conclusions of this

study and a discussion of the implications.

 

36Lawrence Kohlberg, "Development of Moral Character

and Moral Ideology," in Review of Child Development Research,
ed. by Martin L. Hoffman and Lois Wladis Hoffman, I TNew York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), p. 425.

 

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The focus of the first part of this review of liter-
ature is on the examination and clarification of some major
conceptual issues in axiology and ethics as they relate to
the present study. In the second section of the review of
literature the empirical findings relating to moral develop-
ment, value education, and teaching strategies are presented.

Conceptual Issues Relating
to Axiology and EthIEs

 

 

Scholars concerned with value questions have long
recognized the need to develop a more precise terminology
to enhance and extend the theoretical study of the subject.
This acknowledgment may be the only point of agreement, for
as efforts increase to generate a scientific language of
TIalues there is still little indication of any across dis-
Cipline concurrence on the meaning of central terms.

In general, social scientists have adopted a con-
CEption of value as an observable variable in human behavior
and this conception has focused considerable attention on

adapting the seemingly objective methods of science to the

30

31

study of values. These efforts have led some scholars to
warn that, "The methods of science can be applied to any realm
of experience in an attempt to find out what facts there are,
and scientific theories can be constructed in an attempt to
explain these facts, but scientists are the ones who must
choose which realm of experience to investigate."1 Canning
continues by explaining that the basis for this choice of
what to investigate is a value commitment. Others maintain
that not only is the selection of the problem a value question,
but also, "Whether any scientist likes to admit it or not,
any interpretation he makes must be regarded as a value
judgment."2 It might also be suggested that the idea of sub-
scribing to the scientific or empirical method reflects a
certain kind of value commitment which encompasses its own
set of assumptions and limitations. Thus it may be argued
that research into questions concerning values is itself
saturated with elements of the concept it proposes to investi-
gate.

The following examples represent definitions of value
Which have been proposed by some well known social scientists.
These definitions have frequently been used as the basis for
empirical studies investigating particular aspects of this

Concept..

 

 

_ 1Jeremiah Canning, ed., Values in an Age of Confronta—
£523 (Ohio: Charles H. Merrill, 1970), pp. 62-63.

 

2Cantril,The‘Why_of'Man's Experience, pp. 6,8.

 

32

Values are things which people want, desire to be or
become, feel as obligatory, worship, enjoy. Values
are modes of organizing conducte—meaningful, affectively
invested pattern principles that guide human action.
A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, dis-
tinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group,
of the desirable which influences the selection from
available modes, means, and ends of action.
A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of
conduct or end-state of existence is personally and
socially preferable to altegnative modes of conduct
or end-states of existence.
Definitionsof this kind which include terms like want, desire,
feel, and prefer, as well as postulating a relationship
between values and action or choice-making behavior suggest
some assumptions about both the nature of man and the nature
of values.

The theoretical base of the present study, originating
from the pioneer work of Piaget and those who have followed
his lead in trying to explain moral development, also encom—
passes certain ideas about the nature of man and of values.
Piaget's model of moral development has a cognitive base
which includes certain kinds of abilities, such as the ability

to formulate moral concepts, to reason in moral terms, or to

make moral judgments. These abilities, taken as a whole,

 

 

3Robin M. Williams, American Society; A Sociolo ical
Interpretation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952T, p.37g.
4Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value Orientations in
a Theory of Action: ~An Exploration in Definition and Clarifi-
cation," in‘TOward a General TheOEy‘of'Action ed. by Talcott
Parsons and Edward Shils (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1952), pp. 388-433.

 

5Rokeach, Beliefsy Attitudes and Values, p. 160.

33

might be thought of as problem-solving in the realm of ethics
and axiology. John Wilson discusses a parallel notion when
he suggests that moral education be conceptualized as giving
students some idea about "how to do morality."6

The value judgment strategy adapted from the model
outlined by the Columbia Associates in Philosophy also assumes
that certain cognitive abilities are inherent in the making
of normative judgments. Among these abilities might be the
recognition that a given problem contains a conflict of
values, the ability to form value concepts, and to compare
and choose a solution from among various alternatives. Some
approaches to value education within the school environment
also rely on a cognitive framework for the study of values.
They assume that certain kinds of criteria about how to
recognize and handle problems relating to values can be
learned by attending to specific information and by following
given procedures.

It is not the intention of the preceding discussion
to be critical of the impingement of values upon scientific
endeavors or to suggest that various definitions, theories
of moral development, and approaches to value education need
not make assumptions about both the nature of man and the
nature of value. To the contrary, it is because these

assumptions are made that this first section of the review of

 

6Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 26.

 

34

literature attempts to define and clarify some of these major
suppositions and search for their compatibility with the study

of axiology and ethics in the context of this investigation.

Free Will

 

To believe, or at least to act as though they believe,
that things have causes is so common for men that some philos-
Ophers have declared it an a priori principle, while others
have deemed it to be at least a part of the common sense of
mankind. This idea poses no special problem when it is thought
of in connection with nature or even in relation to man's
physiological functioning, such as his growth or pulse rate.
The real controversy arises when this idea of cause is applied
to man's thoughts, ideals, and especially to his behavior,
which is supposed to be deliberate, purposeful, and perhaps
even morally significant.7 The nature of the free will
question is so complex that it has long been debated in
philosophical circles and this debate has produced two major
positions known as determinism and indeterminism. Determinism
is the view that every event, including human choices and
volitions, is caused by other events and happens as an effect
or result of these other eVents. Indeterminism denies this,
and states that some events, among them human choices and
volitions, happen without cause or explanation. Part of the

problem is whether either of these views is true; a question

 

7Richard Taylor, Metaphysics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 33:35.

 

35

which cannot be considered here but must be left for metaphysics
to decide. What is important to consider in the context of
this investigation is the compatibility of each of these
positions and their variations with the idea of value educa-
tion and moral development based upon a rational View of man.8
In trying to clarify and reconcile these positions,
Werkmeister has suggested that the basic problem is a distinc-
tion between free will in the negative sense and free will in
the positive sense. His idea of the negative sense of the
term is one which construes free will as complete indeter-
minacy of action. He argues that this idea is not demonstra-
ble because even our free choices are at least motivated and,
therefore, specifically determined. Werkmeister also argues
that a view which holds to a thorough going determinism
would eliminate freedom of choice. He then elaborates on
the idea of free will in a positive sense which conceptualizes
man as being other than the rest of nature. It has often
been argued, especially by determinists, that since all
events in nature are causally determined then man, being a
part of nature, must also be causally determined. Werkmeister
argues that man is a unique creature; a rational being capable
of having insight into causal relations and understanding of

the laws of nature. Thus his idea of free will in a positive

 

8William K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 57.

36

sense is a will which is determined, not by cause and effect
relationships, but by insight and understanding and a due
consideration of consequences.

Perhaps it is appropriate at this point to examine
the notion of cause more closely. This term is ordinarily
defined as "an antecedent sufficient condition or set of
conditions."9 R. S. Peters has noted that there is a "need
to distinguish different types of causes which are appealed
to in the explanation of behavior. By this is meant not just
the distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions...
but also between different types of conditions that are
appealed to in the explanation of different types of behavior."10
Peters notes that "most of the things we do, as distinct from
things that happen to us, are explained in terms of a model
in which an individual is postulated who is conscious of the
situation in which he is acting, of means to ends and of rules
governing the appropriateness both of means and ends. Within
this model concepts such as those of intention, deliberation,
foresight, decision, and choice have their appropriate place
and can count as causes of actions just as a movement can
count as a cause of other movements in a sphere in which a
mechanical model may be appropriate, for example, in explain-

ing an eye-blink."ll

 

9Taylor,‘Metaphysi‘cs, p. 52.
10R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education (Oakland, N. J.:
Scott, Foresman and Company, 1967), p. 188.

llIbid.

 

 

 

37

Lillie supports this view by stating that, "the only
reasonable form of determinism is that which holds that our
actions are directly determined not only by causes outside
our bodies, but by causes within the body, in particular by
whatvmahave called our character."12

If this view of cause as prOposed by Peters and Lillie
is accepted, then it seems reasonable to suggest that insight
and understanding, as noted by Werkmeister in his concept of
free will in a positive sense, can also be considered as
causes of actions.

Werkmeister suggests that the best evidence for his
position on the free will question are the facts of our own
first-person experience, for we have all experienced a feel-
ing of freedom which is quite different from a feeling of
compulsion: a difference which is reflected in the "I did
this“ as opposed to the "I could not help it." Werkmeister
admits that it could be argued that feelings are no indica-
tion of proof, that they are illusory and do not disclose
the real state of affairs. Spinoza supported this latter
point of view when he suggested that if a stone, having been
thrown into the air, were suddenly to become conscious, it
would suppose itself to be the source of its own motion,

being then conscious of what it was doing but not aware of

 

12William Lillie, An Introduction to Ethics (New York:

Barnes and Noble, 1961), p. 45.

 

38

the real cause of its behavior.13 Similarly, it is possible
that man is completely determined but believes that he is
free. According to Werkmeister, if the view is held that
feelings are not indication of proof or do not express the
real situation, then it must be explained how it comes about
that we are completely determined but feel that we are free;
and to do this may be more difficult than to accept our
feelings at face value and bring them into harmony with a
positive concept of free will.14
In summary, Werkmeister's conclusion is that he rejects
indeterminism as incompatible with free will and subscribes
to a variation of determinism which regards man's actions
as determined by insight and understanding. As evidence for
the validity of this position he offers first-person experience
regarding feelings of freedom versus feelings of compulsion.
Frankena argues that how one answers the question of
determinism or indeterminism regarding behavior determines
how such acts as praising, blaming and holding responsible
are justified morally. If the view is held that behavior is
the result of wholly chance swervings such as may be attributed
in physics to sub-atomic particles, then it would appear

pointless to try to influence people by such methods as

holding them responsible, blaming or praising, setting an

 

13Taylor, Metaphysics, p. 53.

 

. 14William Henry Werkmeister, Man and His Values
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,’1967), p.7145.

 

39

example, or reasoning with them. Unlike Werkmeister, however,
Frankena suggests a variation of indeterminism which could
be held without being incompatible with free will. One may
maintain that there is some indeterminism in the human Sphere
but that there are statistical regularities in human behavior

of a sort that our actions are to some extent predictable

and can be influenced by such things as sanctions.15

Frankena also maintains that a deterministic view
could allow for free will by holding that we are normally
free to act and choose in accordance with our desires, beliefs,
and character. All that the determinist is required to insist
upon is that our beliefs, desires, and traits of character

16
have causes.

This particular view has come to be known as
"soft determinism" and it makes three claims; (1) that all
human behavior is caused and determined, (2) that voluntary
behavior is nonetheless free to the extent that it is not
externally constrained or impeded, and (3) that the causes of
voluntary behavior are certain states, events, or conditions
within the agent himself; namely, his own acts of will or
volitions, choices, decisions, and desires.

Taylor explains that it was thought for a time by many

philosophers that the view of "soft determinism" at last

brought about a reconciliation between determinism and

 

15Frankena, Ethics, pp. 58-60.

16Ibid.

 

4O

indeterminism. However, he maintains that it only serves to
camouflage the problem and can be refuted by asking whether
our own inner choices, decisions, and desires are themselves
caused. If determinism is true, then they must also be
caused.17
There is a third alternative to determinism or inde-
terminism which is usually referred to as the theory of
agency and attributed to Immanuel Kant. Specifically, holders
of this position argue that a person is a unique agent capable
of a kind of "self-determinism" which is not a function of
previous causes and yet is not a matter of chance, but of

18 This view confirms that man

choice, intent, and purpose.
can sometimes be the cause of his own behavior. Taylor suggests
that this View fits two things about which most men feel

quite certain; (I) that they sometimes deliberate with the

view of making a decision, and (2) that whether they deliber-
ate about what to do or not, it is sometimes up to them what
they do.19 It may be noted that Taylor's suggestion that

this view supports what man commonly feels about his actions

is similar to Werkmeister's first-person experience between
freedom and compulsion, and thus subject to the argument that

feelings do not reflect the true nature of reality. Though

this theory of agency may have certain appeal, it should be

 

17Taylor,'Metaphysics, pp. 43-44.

 

18Frankena,‘Ethics, p. 60.

19Taylor,'Metaphysics, p. 50.

 

41

kept in mind that it involves some rather strange metaphysical
notions that are never applied elsewhere in nature. Perhaps
the most confusing idea is that a person, who is not merely
a collection of things or events, but a substance and a self-
moving being can nevertheless be the cause of an event. It
will be recalled that being a cause ordinarily means being an
antecedent sufficient condition or set of conditions. Taylor
suggests that the conception of cause in the agency theory
which suggests causation of events by beings or substances
that are not events is so different that another word, such
as originates, initiates, or performs might better be used
in its place.20
Frankena also indicates that the agency theory has
not been worked out in any very clear or adequate way. It is
his contention that the study of axiology and ethics may
proceed with the acceptance of a variation of indeterminism
which holds that there is a degree of statistical order in
human behavior which can be influenced to some extent by pro-
viding examples, educating, or applying sanctions. It is also
possible to hold a variation of the deterministic view which
allows that men are usually free to act according to their
beliefs, desires, and traits. In the final analysis, of
course, the determinist would stand firm in the argument that

these beliefs, desires, and traits have causes.21

 

2'O'I'bid., pp. 51-52.

21Frankena, Ethics, pp. 59-60.

42

In summary, it can be noted from this brief discussion
of free will that there are inherent difficulties in any of
the outlined positions, though it is possible to adopt varia-
tions of these positions which do allow the study of values,
especially moral values, to proceed. A belief in the sheer
randomness of all action or in the complete determinism of
all action without regard for the possibility of influence
through reason or learning would leave little foundation for

any concept of morality or value education.

Axiology and Ethics

 

Having examined some possible views of the free will
question which allow for the study of human behavior,
especially in the realm of values, and for a rational approach
to value instruction, it is the task of this section to con-
sider the study of values (axiology) and morals (ethics) from
the historical perspective.

Though there has been some confusion in the past it
is generally recognized today that the study of value theory
and of ethics are not necessarily one and the same. Axiology
is usually explained as being much broader in scope than
ethics, including the study of moral values, as well as a
wide range of practical and aesthetic evaluations. Ethics
might be thought of as one particular aspect of value theory
which concerns itself with conduct or behavior in relation

to such concepts as good and bad, duty and obligation.22

 

22Werkmeister, Man and His Valueg, p. 145.

 

43

Ethics in the Western World

 

In the field of ethics two distinct traditions have
been developed in the Western World. One tradition, going
back to the Greek classics, accepts as key categories the
terms good and bad. The other tradition, first formulated
in the Mosaic Code, accepts as key categories the terms of
duties and obligations. Both traditions are concerned with
the question, "What ought I to do."23

The Greek tradition can be characterized as a search
for the ultimate end or good which "ought" to guide all
actions. The hedonists concluded that this end was pleasure,
Aristotle suggested it was happiness, Plato considered it
knowledge, the Stoics deemed it virtue, and the Utilitarians

declared it to be the general welfare. This search continued

until the arrival on the scene of G. E. Moore's Principia

 

Ethica in 1903. In a revolutionary move Moore declared,

"24 He

"Good is good, and that is the end of the matter.
labeled all previous attempts to define good as some particular
end as the naturalistic fallacy. According to Moore, these

things are good, but they are not goodness itself, i.e.,

pleasure is good, but pleasure is not goodness. Moore held

 

23Ibid., p. 59.

24G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: The

University Press, 1903), p. 6.

 

44

goodness itself to be incapable of definition though he later
came to think of goodness as something which all good things
have in common.25
A contemporary representative of this particular view
is Hartman who attempts to carry Moore's idea one step further
and define good as the property of concepts. He explains that
when a person understands that a thing is "good" he doesn't
need to know anything about the specific thing in question
but he must know something of the concept of which this thing
is an instance. In the case of an automobile he does not
need to know anything about the particular automobile in
question, but he must know something of the concept automobile
of which this one particular automobile is an instance. For
Hartman, a thing is good when it fulfills the definition of
its concept.26
In its modern version, the second tradition in ethics
accepts duty and obligation as its key categories. A well
known representative of this school is W. D. Ross who regards
rightness rather than goodness as ultimate and indefinable
and attempts to derive the notion of duty from it. The right

act is suitable to the situation in which the agent finds

himself. The situation however encompasses both objective

 

25Robert S. Hartman, "The Science of Value," in New
ghowledge in Human Values, ed., Abraham H. Maslow (New YorE:
Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 16-17.

26

 

Ibid., pp. 19-20.

45

and subjective elements. It is rare, if not impossible, for
an agent to know fully all the objective elements in a situa-
tion and thus he is rarely, if ever, in a position to determine
a completely right act. But he does know the subjective
elements of a situation and he must accept the subjectively
right act as obligatory forhinr-regarding it as his prima-
facie duty.27
Perhaps the most outstanding spokesman for the tradi—
tion now under consideration is Immanuel Kant. He attempted
to avoid the problem of possible conflict between basic
principles by showing that there is only one basic principle
from which all others may be derived. For Kant, this prin-
ciple was what he called the first form of the categorical
imperative, "Act only on the maxim which you can at the

28 Kant finds the

same time will to be a universal law."
ultimate justification of the categorical imperative in the
fact that man is essentially a rational being who is self-
legislative, giving himself universally valid laws through
the maxims of his will. The duties he has are thus self-
imposed. At this point it is helpful to recall Kant's theory

of agency regarding the question of free will. He emphasized

that freedom of will is essential to morality and insisted

 

27Werkmeister, Man and His Values, p. 152.

 

28Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of
Morals, trans. and intro. by Lewis White BeCk (New York: The
BoEBs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1959), p. 39.

 

46

upon the dignity of man as a rational being and a legislative

member of the realm of ends.29

Axiology

 

The establishment of a general theory of value which
was separate from the traditional study of ethics was not
accomplished until the latter part of the nineteenth century.
While it is true that early philosophers discussed problems
of aesthetics, government, and economics which were fraught
with value questions, their framework for discussion remained
within the realm of ethics. Until the separation of general
value theory from ethics, "the good" was most often inter-
preted as "the morally good."

There appear to be three major developments which
laid the foundation for the study of axiology in its present
form. The first major step in the separation of axiology
from ethics is generally credited to the German philosopher,
Lotze. Lotze's doctrine established the dualism of two
realms, one of fact and one of value. He conceptualized
values as being independent in reality and thus set down
a basic tenet of the position known as objectivism. (It
might be noted that Lotze was not an innovator in this line
of reasoning, but followed in a tradition of long standing

that can be traced back to Plato.)30

*

29Werkmeister, Man and His Values, p. 156.

 

3OIbid., p. 59.

47

A second development in the study of axiology was
the establishment of the Baden school in Germany by Windelband.
This school was based upon the thinking of Lotze and was
responsible for transmitting the objectivist position in
value theory to the United States through one of its pupils,
Hugo Mfinsterberg.

A third school of thought was founded in Austria by
Franz Brentano. Though Brentano remained committed to the
self-evident and absolute nature of value judgments inherent
in the Germanic objectivist position, two of his most famous
pupils, Alexius Meinong and Christian von Ehrenfels, became

champions of the subjectivist position in value theory.31

The Objective-Subjective Argument

 

The objective-subjective debate in axiology has raged
for many years and remains one of the most difficult questions
in this area of study. Briefly, the argument over the objec-
tive or subjective nature of values can be shaped into the
following questions; do objects possess value because we
desire them, or do we desire them because they possess value?
Value is objective if it is independent of a subject or a
valuating consciousness; conversely, it is subjective if it

owes its existence, its sense, or its validity, to the reactions

 

31Nicholas Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-HaII, Inc., 19697, p. 50.

48

of the subject who does the valuating, regardless of whether
these be physiological or psychological.32
From the subjective point of view, Meinong postulated
that the sensation of pleasure was the ultimate basis of
value. Ehrenfels disagreed with Meinong's assertion that
the basis of values was pleasure and pointed instead to the
realm of appetite or desire. "Things which we desire or
covet are valuable, and they are so because we desire and

33 Ralph Barton Perry elaborated the first and

covet them."
most outstanding subjectivist theory in the field of con-
temporary American axiology by maintaining that any object,
whatever it be, acquires value whenever any interest, what-
ever it be, is taken in it. Bertrand Russell was also a
proponent of the subjectivist position. He asserted that,
"when we say that something has value, we do not state a
fact independent of our own personal feelings; we are
instead giving expression to our own emotions."34
Another school of thought representing logical
empiricism goes beyond the customary subjectivist conception
of conferring value upon an object by means of our pleasure,

desire, or interest, and maintains that a value judgment

says nothing at all about the object but merely expresses

 

32Werkmeister, Man and His Values, p. 86.

 

3Risieri Frondizi, What is Value? (Illinois: Open
Court Publishing Company, 1963), pp. 38-39.

34

 

Ibid., p. 37.

49

an emotional state. Rudolf Carnap is foremost among this
particular brand of theorists and he states that value judg-
ments do not affirm anything and, consequently, cannot be

true or false. Since such a judgment is not verifiable, it
lacks any cognitive significance. A similar position is held
by Alfred Ayer who denies the existence of a world of values
which is different from a world of facts and holds that value
judgments are lacking in meaning because they are mere expres-

. . 3
Sions of an emotional nature. 5

As noted earlier, Lotze's doctrine of axiological
objectivism was brought to the United States by Hugo
Mfinsterberg who maintained an essentially Kantian position
in regard to the objectivity of values, arguing that there
exists a real world in which absolute values play a crucial
role.

The desire to combat a growing relativism, brought
on by the subjective approach to value, and to further the
ideas detailed in Kant's ethics led Max Scheler to forcefully
assert that it is not our feeling states as such that are
or that determine values. Scheler insisted that the cogni-
tively significant intentional feeling of something must,
thus, be clearly distinguished from all mere feeling states.

"It is the intentionality of the feeling, their being directed

 

351bid., p. 65.

50

upon something, which reveals to us all values as genuine
objects, as ideal essences, that subsist independent of
our experience and that constitute a special value realm."36
Nicolai Hartmann's theory of values is in many
respects an elaboration of Scheler's position. According
to Hartmann, the value experience involves two aspects; an
intuitive value-feeling which directly apprehends and dis-
covers values, and a secondary but rational comprehension
and clarifying discernment of what is given in the value-
feeling. This latter comprehension is accomplished by
reflection and philosophical analysis.37
R. S. Peters has advanced an interesting position
related to the objectivity of moral judgments which seems
relevant to Hartmann's rational comprehension and clarifying
discernment of the value-feeling. He maintains that "words
like ought, wrong, good, and bad typically feature a form
of discourse which has not only the practical function of
determining action but also the function of doing this by the

38 He explains that to give reasons,

production of reasons."
if it is done seriously and with a determination to decide
in terms of reasons, is to put the matter up for public

discussion; thus making the decision independent of the

authority or private whim of any individual and dependent

 

36Werkmeister, Man and His Values, p. 86.

 

37Ibid., p. 88.

38Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 40.

 

51

upon the force and relevance of the reasons advanced.39

Peters notes that the individual is too often treated as
an isolated entity, exercising his own perceptions in a
vacuum, while the public character of the decision-making
process is ignored.40
The limitations of this review do not permit a lengthy
analysis of the objective-subjective problem, however it is
hoped that the foregoing summary has provided some basis
for understanding the historical develOpment of the question
and its influence upon contemporary studies of value theory.
In order to clarify the assumptions regarding the nature of
values upon which this study rests an attempt will be made
to outline the major criticisms of each of the above positions.
It can be maintained that subjectivism is right in
asserting that value cannot be entirely divorced from valua-
tion, but it errs when it tries to reduce value to valuation.
If values were nothing more than a projection of the plea-
sure, desire or interest of the subject, prone to vary from
one man to the next, then one must answer how it happens that
there is a good share of agreement with respect to the
appreciation of works of art or the evaluation of human
behavior. This question may be answered with the assertion

that the degree of consensus which does exist in the realm

 

39Ibid., p. 29.

4OIbid., p. 43.

52

of aesthetics and ethics is a matter of sheer cultural
conditioning or socialization. Perhaps the more destructive
criticism is that if values are created by the subject then
the possibility of any aesthetic or ethical education would
not make sense, for there could not be any erroneous valua-
tion. This is why many scholars advocate the necessity of
adding what might be called the axiological element to the
psychological act of valuation. This element is the process
of knowing whether what we desire is in fact worthy of being
desired.

Russell has stated that the chief reason he has for
adapting the doctrine of subjectivism is the complete
impossibility of finding any arguments to prove that this or
that has intrinsic (objective) value.41 If Russell had
abided by the facts he would have stated that he did not
know of any argument which, in his opinion, would prove the
existence of intrinsic values. It is within the realm of
possibility that intense and constant study in the field of
axiology may at some later time prove that something does
have intrinsic value. Thus, when Russell refuses to accept
the existence of an axiological criterion due to lack of
proof he is assuming, without proving it, the superiority of
logical value over other values.

The logical empiricists or those philOSOphers whose
orientation toward value theory is similar to that of Carnap

and Ayer deny the existence of values in the realm of reality

 

41Frondizi, What is Value?, p. 37.

 

which objectivism postulates and further deny that any value
judgment can be either true or false. Subjectivism stops
short of this latter denial for it holds that he who states a
value judgment asserts the existence of a definite state of
mind, and his judgment can be true or false since it may or
may not be true that he experiences the state of mind which
he asserts.

Since the logical empiricists deny the existence of
value in the realm of reality the same objections raiSed
against the position of subjectivism may be applied to this
particular school of thought as well. An additional criticism
of this position is that there are situations where all are
agreed on the basic facts but differ because of strictly axio-
logical reasons, such as in the evaluation of a musical com-
position.

The primary criticism of objectivism or the belief,
in the objectivity and independence of values is centered
upon how one apprehends these values existing in objective
reality if they are to be completely divorced from the realm
of subjective experience. There are several theories which
liken values to mathematical relationships. This analoqy
assumes that values behave like mathematical entities, how-
ever, it has never been proven that values actually belong
to this realm. Even if this assumption is taken as truth
there is still the consideration that such subjective elements

as education, capacity, and intelligence which influence our

54

apprehension of mathematical relationships could likewise
influence our apprehension of values.

The supposed proofs in favor of objectivity and
independence are usually based upon a perhaps more treacherous
form of subjectivity; that of emotional intuition. This
particular method of apprehension has been held suspect
because so often those objective and absolute values revealed
by intuition coincide remarkably with the values corresponding
to the cultural and historical milieu of the person who
possesses this extraordinary talent. For example, when Max
Scheler breaks with the concept of a personal, infinite and
perfect God, the infallible intuition which had bestowed such
absolute knowledge upon him is adjusted to his new theological
conception.

When absolute realism tries to escape from emotional
intuition, it seems to land in the field of tautology. A
typical example of this kind of reasoning is Scheler's state-
ment that the "nutritive is nutritive." Scheler is not
interested in the fact that the concept of nutrition is
relational and conditional in nature; that what is nutritive
for one person may be harmful to another. Instead he sticks
to the tautological assertion that "nutritive is nutritive."
This is a common practice for those who take refuge in the
a priori. From reality they extract concepts which constitute
their theories, and then, severing all connections with

experience, they transform these concepts, which are of

55

empirical origin, into immutable a priori essences. Since
such essences are what they are by definition, there is

not the slightest possibility of questioning them through
empirical experience. In this same category is the state-
ment "good is good," an assertion that some would say is as
true as it is fruitless.

As can be observed from the foregoing major criticisms
of both the objective and subjective stance regarding values,
each position has profited by its opposition to the other.
Subjectivist doctrine has gained proponents because of the
lack of convincing reasoning which is offered as proof of the
objective thesis. Likewise, objectivism has won adherents
through speculation of the consequences of a moral and social
order which would accrue if subjectivism is followed to its
logical conclusions.

The position taken in this study is that at this point
it seems premature to deny either position completely. It
appears that the idea of objective values is a cognitively
significant notion and one which provides a certain hopeful
outlook in the thinking of many people. It is in some way
reassuring to believe that there is an objective reality in
which values exist independent of the subjective element.

The question of how to gather evidence relating to the
validity of moral concepts and principles falls within the
field of meta-ethics. One approach to this problem suggests
that questions about "what ought to be," as opposed to

questions about "what is," have their own distinctive concepts

56

and procedures for inquiry. Some philosophers maintain that
these concepts must be considered in a "reflective manner"
which Hume defined as, "free, impartial, willing to universalize,
conceptually clear, and informed about all possibly relevant
facts.42
According to Frankena, if one "takes the moral point
of view" he is claiming that everyone who does likewise will
concur with his principles or judgments and, in that sense,
his claims are objectively valid. This is not to suggest that
the individual thinker must bow to the judgments of a majority
in his society, for he is claiming an ideal consensus which
transcends majorities and actual societies. One's society
and its code and institutions may be wrong. Here enters the
autonomy of the moral agent--he must take the moral point of
view and must claim an eventual consensus with others who do
so, but he must judge for himself.43
On the other hand, there can be no denial that if values
do exist in an objective reality which is independent of the
subjective element the only means of attaining, perceiving,
or knowing about this reality is through the subjectivity of
the individual. Thus, when an individual perceives a value,
his perception of this value is conditioned by what he is;
and therefore, while what we value is not entirely a projec-

tion of our own physiological or psychological states,

neither is it completely free from these subjective elements.

 

42Frankena, Ethics, p. 95.

43Ibid., pp. 95-96.

57

The significance of this position for value education
would seem to be in the reflection and clarification of values
as perceived by the individual through a rational approach
similar perhaps to philosophical analysis. This includes
exposure to differing conceptions of value between individuals

and concentration on a rational resolution of value conflicts.
Values and Reason

The thesis that the values which influence man's
choices, decisions, and judgments are arrived at through a
rational process is supported by the thinking of many twen-
tieth century scholars. Frankena gives this account in the

area of morality.

As Socrates implied and recent philosophers have
stressed, morality fosters or even calls for the
use of reason and for a kind of autonomy on the
part of the individual, asking him, when mature

and normal, to make his own decisions, though
possibly with someone's advice, and even stimulat-
ing him to think out the principles or goals in the
light of which he is to make his decisions. Morality
is a social institution of life, but one which pro-
motes rational silf-guidance or self-determinism

in its members.4

Frankena continues to explain that morality starts with a
set of culturally defined goals which are accompanied by
rules for their achievement that are more or less external
to the individual and imposed upon him. Usually these rules
become internalized or interiorized, that is, the individual
takes them as his own and regulates his own conduct by them;

he develops a conscience or superego. This process of

 

44Frankena, Ethics, p. 7.

 

58

internalization may be quite irrational but it is typical

for morality to accompany its inculcation with at least a
modicum of reason giving. Thus, we tend to give reasons

with our moral instructions as soon as the child has attained
an age at which he is capable of something like discretion,
and we even lead him to feel that it is appropriate to ask
for reasons. We may then move from a rather irrational

kind of inner direction to a more rational one in which we
achieve an examined life and a kind of autonomy, becoming
moral agents on our own; and may even reach a point when we

I O O I 4
can critiCize the rules and values of our soc1ety.

Lillie concludes that reason may have some place in
determining the ends at which we aim and our actions leading
to them. He offers the following evidence; (1) Man has an
innate desire to be consistent and to avoid contradiction,
to be rational. (2) Conscious judgments are made regarding
the attractiveness of one end as compared with another. The
making of a judgment is primarily a cognitive process in
which reason does play some part. (3) It is impossible to
separate the cognitive, affective, and conative aspects of
the mind. Thus to suppose that the affectiVe and conative
aspects of mind determine an action without reference to
the cognitive or rational aspects is a false abstraction.

(4) Reasoning may suggest a course of action and to that
extent be a determining factor in action. (5) Introspection

suggests that we are able to suspend our judgment, so that

4Sibid.

 

 

when in the course of deliberation an activity is judged to
be the most attractive, it is possible to delay action until
the reflective part of our mind has attended to other
considerations which may influence our judgment.46
A major disagreement which might arise over Lillie's
evidence is his contention that man has an innate desire to
be rational. Present day theorists might be more likely
to agree that a desire to be rational is learned. Kurt
Baier discusses the question of how it is that we follow
reason in this manner. "From early in our lives we have all
been taught to think before we act, not to follow impulse
or instinct or inclination, but to think first. We have
been told that to neglect this will frequently give us
cause to regret our action. We are taught that what
distinguishes man from beast is that he possesses reason,
‘and we normally understand very well that this is connected
with thinking before we leap, rather than following instinct
or mere impulse."47
According to Wilson, once the child reaches the

point where he understands the asking for and giving of

reasons it then becomes his characteristically human way

46Lillie, An Introduction to Ethics, pp. 40-42.

 

47Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (New York:
Random House, 1965), p. 50.

 

60

of dealing with the world. Rational actions are those for
which the individual is responsible; they are the attempts
which he makes to meet a particular situation in the external
world. It is Wilson's belief that to act morally at all
the individual must act for a reason.48
The giving of reasons in support of a normative
judgment may represent a different type of thinking from a
meta-ethical inquiry or empirical investigation. Moralists
have sometimes spoken as if the moral judgment was logically
entailed by the statements given as reasons or criteria.
This assumption leads to the error which Hume described
as "passing from a proposition of what is to a propostion
of what ought to be." Thus the relation between the reasons
for a moral judgment and the moral judgment itself is not
one of logical entailment.49
Nevertheless, the giving of reasons is an important
part of ethical thinking. Wilson has suggested that when

we ask "why" questions we normally expect some explanation

or justification in terms of the agent's intentions, aims,

 

48Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, pp. 49-

 

51.

49Li11ie, An Introduction to Ethics, p. 327.

61

purposes or reasons. Thus, if a person were asked why he
cheated or why he told a lie and could not sincerely give
a reason, one might begin to expect that he had no reason
or intention at all, and one would have to stop thinking

that he had, in fact, cheated or lied.SO

It is roughly
on these grounds that moral action is tied to the notion
of rationality, that is, that if people are to act
morally at all they must act for a reason.

It is at this point that empirical findings may
become useful in the context of moral education. According
to the stages identified by both Piaget and Kohlberg
it appears that the cognitive capacity for reasoning in
the area of values reaches maturity in late childhood
or early adolescence. This evidence, along with the
preceding discussion on the rational nature of normative
discourse would tend to support an approach to value
education based upon the strengthening of cognitive
abilities deemed necessary for reasonable judgments in

the axiological arena.

 

50Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, pp. 49-

 

50.

62
Summary

The aim of this section of the review of literature
was to examine some of the major philosophical implications
of certain assumptions which are made about the nature of man
and the nature of values as they relate to the theoretical
basis for this study. Within this framework justification
has been given for accepting a view of man which allows at
least enough freedom so that his choices and volitions can
be considered the products of his desires and beliefs and
that they may be influenced by such means as example,
learning, and sanctions. A position regarding the objectivity
or subjectivity of values has also been outlined which would
seem to indicate the necessity for a rational approach to
value education. A case has also been made for a view of
normative discourse which presupposes the giving of reasons.
This particular view is relevant to both cognitive abilities
in moral development and value education built upon a
rational model which necessitates an understanding of moral
development.

The following section contains a review and
discussion of empirical research relevant to this investiga-

tion.

63

Research Findings Relating to Moral
DeveIopmenEIand’VaIue Education

 

 

The studies of Piaget and his research teams in all
areas of cognitive development number in the thousands, and a
bibliography of published works by Piaget would include
several hundred books and articles. Though the work in
moral development was completed early in Piaget's career
and represents only a small portion of his total contribution
in the area of child study, it has provided the basis for
several studies which have focused on various theoretical
aspects of childhood morality. It has not been an easy task
for those attempting to replicate or evaluate the results of
Piaget's work on moral development. Flavell notes that per-
haps the most important and consistent criticism stems from
"Piaget's habitual failure to give a clear and full account
of precisely what he did in the experiment. The reader is
often left in considerable doubt as to what actual test and
inquiry procedures were administered by whom under what
testing conditions to how many children of what age, back-

51 Flavell

grounds, previous testing experiences, and so on."
adds that this communicative inadequacy necessarily haunts
any attempts to evaluate Piaget's actual research conduct;

for it is hard to criticize what happened when you are not

 

51Flavell,'The Developmental Psychology of Jean
Piaget, pp. 430-431.

 

64

sure what happened.52 A.review of selected studies which deal
with aspects of Piaget's theory of moral development confirm
this criticism, as there are discrepancies in reporting about
the original experiments even on such descriptive data as the
age and size of the samples involved.

However, the preliminary nature of Piaget's work
deserves special recognition as Williams suggests in the
following statement. "In researches of this kind we do not
look for precision in the sense of measurement of factors, and
the exact age at which they develop. We seek rather a quality
of insight into the nature of the processes which are going
on, an insight which may enable us to frame hypotheses for
further investigations, possibly of a more objective kind.

. . . The absence of our familiar apparatus of scientific
objectivity does not imply that the author is entirely sub-
jective in his analysis."53 Within the context of subjectivity,
it has been suggested that Piaget apparently did his research
to convince himself and that, having been convinced, he
expected others to take his word for it. Whatever truth this
statement may hold, it cannot be denied that, though scholars
may not have accepted his theory at first glance, they did

see it in terms of generating numerous testable hypotheses.

The following section is devoted to a review of Piagetian

 

52Ibid.
53

 

Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 267.

 

65

aspects of moral development and selected research which has
attempted to test his various theoretical formulations in a
more controlled experimental environment.

Piagetian Dimensions and Related
Research in Moral DeveIOpmenE’

 

 

One major factor in moral development which seems to
change with age is the intentionality of judgment. Young
children tend to judge an act as bad mainly in terms of its
actual physical consequences, whereas older children judge
an act as bad in terms of its intent to do harm.

In a study designed to examine developmental trends
in the child's concept of justice with increasing age, using
101 boys and girls in grades 2, 5, and 8, Durkin found that
the older the subject the more concern he showed for the
specific circumstances of the situation being judged. In
response to questions about one boy or girl hitting another,
six 5th graders and twelve 8th graders questioned the motive
for aggression, the deliberativeness, and the severity of
aggression. The data showed a significant relationship
between the subject's concern for particulars and his chro-
nological age.54

Using a sample population of 807 subjects in grades

5, 7, 9, and 11, Johnson also found that in reponse to Piaget-

like questions involving moral realism, which emphasizes

 

54Dolores Durkin, "Children's Concepts of Justice: A
Comparison with the Piaget Data," Child Development, 30(1959),
59-67 0

 

66

judgment made on the basis of consequences or intentions,
that increasing age was related to greater consideration of
intentions.55

A second factor observed by Piaget was relativism in
judgment. He noted that the young child views an act as
totally right or totally wrong and believes that everyone
views it in the same manner. If he recognizes a conflict in
views, the younger child always thinks the adult view is the
right one. By approximately age nine the child begins to
realize that there may be more than one perspective on moral
value in the situation. Both Lerner and Kohlberg, using
Piagetian type questions and interview techniques, were able
to support this conclusion of the recognition of the rela-
tivism of values with increasing age for children in the
United States.56’57

Assuming that the degree of authority manifested by
parents could influence the development of the child's view
of moral perspectives, MacRae used several measures of parental
authority but did not find a significant association between
these measures of authority and the reSponses to the moral

judgment questions used by Piaget and Lerner. However, he

 

55
JOhnSOfl: "A StUdY Of Children's Moral Judgments,"
327-354.

6
Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's
Orientations Toward a Moral Order," Vita Humana, 6(1963),ll-33.

 

7Eugene Lerner, Constraint Areas and the Moral Judg-
ment of Children (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta, 1937).

 

 

67

did find that two of these measures of parental authority
showed significant associations with another moral judgment
index relating to violation of norms regarding lying and
stealing.5

A third factor involved in moral growth suggests the
independence of sanctions; that is to say, a young child says
an act is bad because it will elicit punishment; the older
child says an act is bad because it violates a rule, does
harm to others, and so forth. Piaget believes this particular
factor results from the strong emotional respect which the
young child feels for authority and rules which make him feel
unable to judge for himself, and forces him to rely on external
adult sanctions and commands to define what is right and
wrong. In Piaget's view, the young child is oriented to
punishment only because punishment is a cue to what is disap-
proved by adults. Kohlberg found the same factor to be
operative in his research on moral development but offers a
somewhat different explanation. It is his contention that the
young child's definition of wrong in terms of punishment
reflects a realistic-hedonistic desire to avoid punishment,
rather than a deep reverence for the adult world order.59 In

either case, only as children reach a level of cognitive

 

58Duncan MacRae, Jr., "A Test of Piaget's Theories
of Moral Development," Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, 49(1954), l4-I8.

59Kohlberg, "Children's Orientations Toward a Moral
Order," 11-33.

 

 

68

development at which the meaning of moral concepts can be
differentiated from punishment can they attain either a
definite hedonism or a degree of disinterested respect for
authority.60
A fourth factor which has been isolated in moral
judgment concerns the use of reciprocity. Piaget and others
have observed that four-year-old children do not use recipro-
city as a reason for consideration of others, whereas children
of seven and older frequently do. Even seven-year-olds show
mainly selfish and concrete reciprocity concerns, including
anticipation of retaliation and anticipation of a return of
favors. By age eleven to thirteen most children can clearly
judge in terms of ideal reciprocity; such as putting oneself
in the place of someone in a different position, or express-
ing sentiments of gratitude for past affection and favors.
Durkin's findings support this factor. She states, "Between
grades 2 and 5 there is evidence of an increasing acceptance
of reciprocity; eighth grade subjects, like those in grade
two, tend to seek justice in the authority person. This is
not to say, of course, that similarity in grade 2 and grade
8 proposals reflect similarity in the two groups' disposition
toward such a proposal. For the second graders, telling an

authority person was a quick and apparently obvious solution

 

60 Ibid.

69

to the problem at hand. For the eighth graders, on the
contrary, it was a solution that was proposed with neither
haste nor enthusiasm."61

Piaget's data also suggested ideas about the use of
punishment as restitution and reform. It has been observed
that young children advocate severe painful punishment after
stories of misdeeds; while older children increasingly favor
milder punishments which lead to restitution for the victim
and reform of the culprit. Johnson's research supports this
hypothesis on both retribution versus restitution and milder
versus severe punishment. He found increasing age to be
positively related to advocating punishment which is restitu-
tive to the victim and milder on the culprit.62

The sixth factor observed by Piaget is related to a
naturalistic view of misfortune. He noted that six to seven-
year-olds have some tendency to view physical accidents and
misfortunes occurring after misdeeds as punishments willed
by God or by natural objects, while older children do not
confuse natural misfortunes with punishments. This particular
factor, known as immanent justice, has been supported in the
research of Lerner, MacRae, and Johnson. These studies have

all shown increasing age to be positively related to more

mature moral judgments involving this dimension.
61Durkin, "Children's Concepts of Justice," 59-67.

62“Johnson, "Children's Moral Judgments," 327-354.

70

The preceding discussion has specifically noted six
of the dimensions which Piaget and later researchers have
observed in relation to moral development. The other aspects
suggested by Piaget's theory do not seem to hold up as general
dimensions of moral development. As discussed by Kohlberg,
these questionable dimensions are derived from the social-
emotional rather than the cognitive components of Piaget's
stages. One example is Piaget's concept of a shift from
unilateral respect for adults to a mutual respect for peers.
In general, the findings do not support the notion that there
is a trend from an authoritatian to a democratic ethic,
although they do support the notion that the child's earliest
morality, which is oriented to obedience, punishment and
impersonal forces, progresses to a morality which is more
internal in nature. Neither has there been much support for
the Piagetian concept of differential peer group participation
and its role in moral development.63 Sociometric measures of
friendship choice have usually been used to attempt to measure
this variable. Although a low correlation has been found
between this factor and general moral development, it has not
been found to be specifically associated with advance on
measures of intentionality and reciprocity as Piaget predicted.
Neither has the degree of democracy or permissiveness mani-

fested in the family situation been found to relate to moral

development as might be expected from Piaget's theory.

 

63Kohlberg, "Development of Moral Character and Moral
Ideology," pp. 394-400.

71

Another aspect of the interpretation of the original
research which has not been supported relates to the unitary
variable of moral judgment. It has been found that the
various dimensions isolated by the early theory do not represent
definite unitary stages which cut across the separate aspects
of moral judgment. For example, it has been noted that a
child who gives mature responses in one area of moral judg-
ment may not respond maturely on another aspect of morality.
Johnson concluded that, with the exception of communicable
responsibility which seemed largely unrelated to the other
moral judgment areas, the correlations between aspects of
moral judgment (immanent justice, moral realism, and views
on punishment) were in the expected direction but consider-
ably lower than one would expect from Piaget's work.

The age trends in moral development discovered in
both the original research and in replication studies suggest
that certain moral concepts only become meaningful in late
childhood and early adolescence, and require the extensive
background of cognitive growth and social experience assoc-
iated with the age factor.

Kohlberg explains that these age findings may be
interpreted in two ways; (1) as the effect of increased

learning of the verbal morality characteristics of the adult

64Johnson, "Children's Moral Judgments," 327-354.

72

culture, or (2) as the spontaneous products of the child's
efforts to make sense out of his experience in a complex
social world with each stage arising sequentially from its
predecessors.

Evidence for the latter interpretation, which is
usually referred to as the developmental theory, suggests
that use of a more advanced stage of thought depends upon
earlier attainment of each preceding stage and that each
involves a restructuring and displacement of previous stages
of thought. Support for the idea of sequence comes from both
the regular age order of stages and also from patterning
within the individual. Kohlberg found that if a child is
predominantly at one stage of thought, the remainder of
his thinking will represent neighboring stages. It has also
been found that a child can assimilate adult moral reasoning
which is one level above his functioning stage to a much
greater extent than moral reasoning two levels above his
functional stage. There is also some evidence which suggests
that children will accept and assimilate moral reasoning one
stage higher than their own more readily than they will accept
moral reasoning one stage lower than their own. On the other
hand, if age development in moral judgment were a matter of

verbal learning, the age factor would presumably be largely

65
a matter of verbal intelligence or verbal mental age. The
following section contains a discussion of the relationship
of intelligence and other antecedent conditions to moral

judgment.

Antecedent Conditions

 

Intelligence

 

Kohlberg investigated Piaget's concept of morality
as related to peer reciprocity among boys from fourth,
seventh, and tenth grades. He found no significant differ-
ence in responses between the higher and lower intelligence
levels, although he did find differences in the level of
sophistication in the replies. In a later work, Kohlberg
reported that moral judgment was moderately correlated with
I.Q. (r=.3l) but quite highly related to age when intelli-
gence was controlled. (r=.59).66

Boehm, in a study comparing children of average
intelligence with academically gifted children in both public
and parochial schools, found the only significant relation-
ship between intelligence and moral judgment to be in the

area of intentions and outcome of action. Academically

gifted children matured earlier in their distinction

 

65Kohlberg, "Development of Moral Character and Moral
Ideology," pp. 402-404.

74

between intentions and consequences than children of average

intelligence.67

In her first study of fifth grade children, Durkin
felt there was a possible difference in level of responses
due to intelligence with children of higher intelligence less
inclined to seek help from authority figures than those of
lesser intelligence. In a later report, however, Durkin
attributed this difference to chance and concluded there
was no difference in response between intelligence levels.68

MacRae, using subjects from grades 5 to 8, including
a small sample of boys of higher I.Q.‘s who were compared
to those of average intelligence, found that at all ages
his children of above average I.Q. responded more maturely
to questions concerning intention and result. They also
responded more maturely on questions concerning strict pun-
ishment. MacRae's explanation of this finding suggests that
children of above average intelligence respond more maturely
on the cognitive aspects of moral development because they
internalize parental rules more strongly and remain depen-

dent upon parents longer than those of average intelligence.69

Other findings have not supported his results. For example,

 

Leonore Boehm, "The DevelOpment of Conscience: A
Comparison of American Children of Different Mental and Socio—
economic Levels" Child DevelOpment, 33, (1962), 575-590.

68Delores Durkin, "Children's Concept of Justice,"
Journal of Educational Research, 52, (1959), 252-257.

69

 

 

MacRae, "A Test of Piaget's Theories," 14-18.

75

Boehm found that gifted children of almost all ages responded
with less adult dependency than those of average intelligence.

Johnson investigated several variables in relation to
moral judgment responses of fifth, seventh, ninth, and
eleventh graders to Piaget-type stories which he devised. He
found the variables of I.Q. and parental occupation to be more
closely related to moral judgment in the areas of moral
realism, retribution versus restitution, and the efficacy of
severe punishment, than any of the other variables studied
except age. However, he also found that I.Q. and parental
occupation were highly correlated. He suggests that the
relationship of parental occupation to moral judgment in the
specified areas may well be a reflection of I.Q. differences
rather than any cultural differences denoted by occupational
level.71 In view of the controversy over what I.Q. tests
really measure and the influence of environmental factors,
it might also be hypothesized that the relationship of
intelligence to moral development is a reflection of parental
occupational level or socio-economic status rather than any
inherent intellectual differences.

From this brief review of research studies focusing
on the relationship of intelligence to moral judgment, it is

difficult to draw firm conclusions. In almost every study

 

70

71Johnson, "Children's Moral Judgments," 327-354.

Boehm, "The DevelOpment of Conscience," 575-590.

76

socio-economic status, often derived from parental occupa-
tional level, was confounded with intelligence. In most
cases the I.Q. scores were obtained from school records and
the specific instrument used to measure intelligence was not
reported.

The majority of results indicate some degree of
association between intelligence and moral judgment or aspects
of moral judgment, although the correlations obtained in this
area tend to range between the mid-twenties and mid-thirties.
Williams and others have pointed out that cognitive moral
abilities seem to have a clear relationship to other more
general intellectual abilities; notably to verbal ability.
This relationship can complicate research; for it is quite
possible to construct tests of moral thinking which simply
measure intelligence, or verbal ability, or some similar
factor.72 With this idea in mind, Kohlberg has concluded that
intellectual development is an important condition for the
develOpment of moral thought, but level of moral thought can
be clearly distinguished from general intellectual ability.
Thus, the level of moral judgment, in Kohlberg's view,
appears to be a unitary or consistent personal characteristic
distinct from intelligence or specific subcultural back-

ground or beliefs.73

 

2 . . .
7 Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 256.

73'Kohlberg, "Development of Moral Character and

Moral Ideology," p. 405.

77

Socio-economic Status

 

Investigations of socio-economic status in relation
to moral judgment derive from Piaget's theory of adult
constraint and authority and the part it plays in moral
develOpment. Lerner reported that higher status children
gave more mature answers to Piaget-type questions than did
lower status children, even after age and intelligence were
controlled. He interpreted this finding to support Piaget's
hypothesis concerning parental authority. MacRae found that
rating of the father's occupation according to the North-
Hatt index produced a low but significant correlation with
both the intention-consequences aspect and the punishment
aspect of moral judgment. He disagrees with Lerner's inter-
pretation, however, because it assumes that lower status
parents tend to be more authoritarian in their child rearing
practices than higher status parents. MacRae points to a
study by Havighurst and Davis which portrayed lower status
white parents as more permissive in early training than higher
status parents. If this finding holds throughout the United
States and if responses to Piaget's questions reflect strict-
ness or permissiveness in discipline, then, according to
MacRae, we should expect lower status children to show more
rather than less maturity on moral judgment responses. MacRae
contends that higher status children mature earlier in

cognitive moral development while lower status children

78

mature earlier in emotional development which results in the
latter being more independent of parental authority.7

Boehm, using Warner's norms for assigning social
class position, found that upper middle-class children develop
earlier in regard to the consideration of intentions and
outcomes of actions than do working class children. She
also found that working class children show earlier peer
reciprocity and adult independence than upper middle class
children.75

Johnson, classifying parental occupations according
to the Minnesota Occupational Scale, found higher parental
occupation to be positively related to mature moral judgment
in the areas of immanent justice, moral realism, and views
concerning punishment. He suggests however, that this may
be a reflection of differing intellectual abilities since
he found occupational level to be highly correlated with
I.Q. Johnson also used a test of parental attitudes designed
to reflect the degree of "dominance, possessiveness, and
ignoringness" in approaches to child rearing. Though he
found some correlation between these factors and certain
areas of moral judgment, he did not find a significant
correlation between the attitude measure and parental occupa-

tional level.76

 

74MacRae, "A Test of Piaget's Theories," 14-18.

75Boehm, "The Development of Conscience," 575-590.

76Johnson, "Children's Moral Judgments," 327-354.

79

In a unique early study designed by Ugurel-Semin,
one hundred and sixty-seven children from Istanbul, Turkey,
were divided into three groups; rich, middle-class, and
poor. The experiment required the child to divide an unequal
number of nuts between himself and another child. Analysis
of the socio-economic factor found poorer children were as
often generous as the rich, more often equalitarian, and
less often selfish. Piaget did not deal with moral judgment
in the light of a moral act, but he did propose the hypothesis
that the child would demonstrate mature moral judgment in
action earlier than in speech.77 This study relates to a
point made by Boehm who suggests that children from working
class families are less accustomed to formalized thinking.
The less verbally inclined working class child may be just
as moral in his actions as the upper middle class child,
but might appear less so because of an inadequate way of
expressing himself in judging actions.

Kohlberg has summarized the data on socio-economic
status by noting that both stages and their sequential
order remain the same across social class, though there is

some indication that middle class children may move through

 

77Refia Ugurel-Semin, "Moral Behavior and Moral
Judgment of hildren," Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, 47, (1952) 463-474}

78

 

Boehm, "The Development of Conscience," 575-590,

80

the same sequences somewhat faster and farther than working
class children, however the confounding I.Q. variable must

once again be taken into account.

Sex Differences

 

The relationship of sex to moral judgment was men-
tioned briefly by Piaget in connection with his investigation
of the rules of the game of marbles. He could not find a
game played by girls in which there were as many rules and
as fine and consistent an organization and codification of
these rules as in the game of marbles. His research team
finally settled on the investigation of hop-scotch. It was
found that the same process was at work with the girls as the
boys regarding rules; first a mystical respect for the law,
which is conceived as untouchable and of transcedental origin,
then a cooperation that liberates the individuals from their
practical egocentrism and introduces a new and more immanent
conception of rules. The sex difference concerning rules
which Piaget detected was related to girls being less explicit
about agreement upon the rules during the COOperation stage
than boys. In view of this finding, Piaget sees girls as
being less concerned with legal elaboration than boys and

suggests that this difference is due both to the loosely-

 

79Kohlberg, "The DevelOpment of Moral Character and

Moral Ideology," p. 406.

81

knit character of the game and also to the "mentality of
girls."80

In one of his studies Kohlberg found adolescent boys
were significantly more mature than girls which he attributes
to the notion that roles entailing more participation and
responsibility should stimulate greater maturity. The
assumption is that the masculine role does entail more parti-
cipation and responsibility, however Kohlberg does not
elaborate on this idea.81

The study by Ugurel-Semin which asked the children
to divide an unequal number of nuts between themselves and
another child found no sex related differences on the factors
investigated which included generosity, equality, and sel-
fishness.82

Though some of the other studies reviewed in the
area of moral judgment mention sex as a possible variable
there is no report of findings on this factor. It might
also be noted that several of the studies used only male
subjects.

Though the Piaget and Kohlberg studies suggest the
possibility of sex differences in favor of the male in

relation to moral judgment, data from another source suggests

the opposite view might be hypothesized. Oetzel summarized

 

80Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, pp. 83-84.

 

81Kohlberg, "The DevelOpment of Moral Character and

Moral Ideology," p. 406.

ngurel-Semin, "Moral Behavior," 463-474.

82

the research on cognitive development related to sex differ-
ences and found twenty-three studies in which girls scored
higher on language development and verbal fluency as com-
pared to one study where boys were found to score higher in
this area.83

Norman Bull, in a comprehensive investigation of
moral development, found girls to be more advanced than
boys in their moral judgment in every area examined. Besides
the greater ability of girls to verbalize, Bull notes the
earlier matruation of girls, the possibility of an earlier,
parallel develOpment in intelligence, and the more strict
judgments of girls.84 In view of these considerations there
would seem to be some justification for hypothesizing sex

differences in relation to moral judgment which favor the

female.

Summary: Moral Development

One conclusion which might be drawn from the pre-
ceding review of antecedent conditions which influence moral
judgment is that the findings to date tend toward incongruity.
In each area (intelligence, socio-economic status, and sex)

various studies have shown a significant relationship of the

 

83James J. Gallagher, "Productive Thinking," in Child
Development Research, ed. by Martin L. Hoffman and Lois W.
HOffman (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), p. 370.

 

84Norman J. Bull, Moral Judgment from Childhood to
Adolescence (Beverly Hills, California: Sage PubIIcations,
1969), PP. 42-43.

 

83

factor to aspects of moral judgment while other investigations
have not supported these findings. Added to these incon-
sistent results is a confusion in the interpretation of what
these various findings indicate in relation to Piagetian
theory. Part of this discrepancy derives from Piaget's bent
toward theoretical overelaboration. Flavell notes, "Our
interpretation is that Piaget sometimes becomes unduly fas-
cinated with theory construction as an intellectual exercise. .
the result too often is that the theory-behavior relation gets
lost along the way."85 Piaget's theory, as has been explained,
is based upon the cognitive aspects of moral development.
His theorizing in relation to the social-emotional dimensions
involved in moral thought remains in a questionable state.
The notion of child rearing practices and their relationship
to moral deve10pment, including authority and permissiveness
patterns, continues to be unclear. Because of this conceptual
confusion and the methodological difficulties involved in
doing research in this area, the findings tend to be sparse.
Aside from the lack of empirical data and the difficulty
in interpretation of results, conceptual disagreement about
the components of moral development may also be a factor
which tends to influence the findings related to antecedent

conditions. Wilson, for example, has isolated the following

 

8SFlavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget,

pp. 428-429.

84

components of morality; (l) the ability to identify with
other people to the extent that other people's feelings

and interests actually count, (2) awareness or insight into
one's own and other people's feelings, (3) the mastery of
factual knowledge, (4) rational formulation of a set of
rules or moral principles to which the individual commits
himself in relation to his own, as well as other people's
interest, and (5) the ability to translate these principles
into action.

It may be that the low correlations of antecedent
variables to moral judgment indicates that the variable
under consideration is related to only one aspect of moral
judgment. For example, it may be possible that the variable
of sex is related to the ability to have insight into one's
own and other's feelings, but since this particular com-
ponent is only one aspect of moral judgment the association
is very low or inconsistent. Consideration must also be
given to the problem of intervening variables which may not
be controlled. For example, if socio-economic status is
positively associated with mature moral judgment this
association may really be due to the factors of occupation,
education, and income which are usually relied upon as criteria
for assigning socio-economic status or it may simply be a

reflection of I.Q. as has been suggested by Johnson.87

 

86Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, pp. 190-195.

87

 

Johnson, "Children's Moral Judgments," 327-354.

85

Though the present study does not purport to be a
direct test of Piaget's theory of moral development, there
does seem to be some justification for the consideration of
these antecedent conditions in relation to the proposed
approach to value education in the school environment. It
is in the interest of practical application that such ques-
tions regarding the effectiveness of the experimental treat-
ments with students who differ in verbal ability, sex, and

socio-economic status have been considered.

Value Education

 

Various approaches to value instruction which have
been attempted throughout the history of education were
introduced in Chapter I of this study. Attention was also
drawn to the relevance of value education for the field of
social studies which is by definition concerned with man and
society. This section of the review of the literature will
focus briefly on some of the problems and research findings
from the subject matter area of social studies which have
been delineated within the present century and the relation-
ship which these results bear to continued efforts within
the field to effectively approach the concept of values.

As early as 1916 the Committee on Social Studies of
the National Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary
Education pinpointed "good Citizenship" as an objective of

primary importance in the field of social studies. Problems

86

in the actual implementation of this objective as a vital
part of the curriculum have stemmed mainly from its consider-
able vagueness. However, recent definitions of citizenship
and more specific role definitions for citizens have come

more particularly to link citizenship training with value
analysis.88 Allen points out the relationship of value
education to social studies in this manner, "A consideration
of concepts and values focuses attention on the school's

role in the transmission of the social heritage and its
concern with the solution of the problems of our time.
Furthermore, the greater recognition the social studies gives
to the study of the human personality as a manifestation of
culture, the more each individual needs to understand the
fundamental values which direct the course of human events."89
There are many such references in the literature on social
studies which offer justification for the inclusion of value
study within the social studies curriculum. One can also
find many curriculum guides in this area of study which list
objectives directly related to value education. However,
the few studies which have attempted to survey the results

of these objectives have reported disappointing conclusions.

 

88Smith and Cox, New Strategies and Curriculum in

Social Studies, pp. 60-62.

89John Jarolimek and Huber Walsh, Readihgs for Social
Studies in Elementary Education (New York: THe Macmillan
Company, 1965), pp. 13-14.

 

 

 

87

Easton and Hess found that a child's political
orientation is primarily formed between the ages of three
and thirteen. They concluded that values and attitudes
toward community and government are established before high
school and are relatively unassailable by programs in
citizenship and government which may be offered at this
level, at least within the context of approaches currently
being used in value instruction.90

Substantiating this conclusion, Horton, in a study of
the values of youth, reports that, "the analysis of belief
in democratic values in terms of having taken a school course
in U. S. Government or Civics showed no constructive effect
attributable to such school courses."91

In the monumental early studies on moral behavior by
Hartshorne and May it was found that formal or conventional
character education classes or programs in the school or
church have little or no effect upon children's moral con-
duct.92

Massialas emphasizes the lack of attention paid in

the classroom to the whole domain of normative propositions

and claims. He argues that, "given the present state of our

 

90David Easton and Robert Hess, "The Child's Political
World," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. VI (August,
1962), 229-246.

91H. H. Remmers, ed., Anti-Democratic Attitudes in
American Schools (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1963f, p. 58.
, 92Kohlberg, "The Development of Moral Character and
Moral Ideology," p. 426.

 

 

 

88

society and culture with value contradictions and incompat-
ibilities on one hand and extreme uniformities on the other,
often resulting in violence and alienation, the need to deal
with ethical problems in the social studies becomes man-
datory."93 Massialas suggests that one reason why most social
studies classes tend to ignore the "ought" or "should" ques-
tions stems from the superficial manner in which value issues
are treated in textbooks. As evidence for this criticism,
Krug analyzed popular civics textbooks to see whether they
provided material and the necessary stimulus to involve
students in creative and critical assessment of value commit-
ments and crucial issues confronting our democracy. He
concluded that authors of the textbooks surveyed presented
the narrative in a highly detached manner with no attempt

to either reconstruct the mood in which some pressing issues
had arisen or to present defensible criteria to deal with
human dilemmas. Ballinger reviewed thirteen textbooks plus
some revised editions which were being used in methods courses
in teacher education programs to see whether controversial
and value questions were included and to what extent any
theoretical or practical considerations of organizing rele-
vant classroom learning activities were explored. He con-

cluded, with one or two exceptions, that no attention at all

 

3 . . . .
Jarolimek and Walsh, Readings for Soc1al Studies,

 

p. 55.

89

was paid to controversial issues or to any systematic analysis

of value judgments.

Summary

The failure of education and particularly of social
studies to realize its objectives in relation to value ques—
tions, the sparseness of teaching materials and programs
which present realistic approaches to classroom activities
involving the concept of value, and the confusion in the
conceptual justification of value education have all impinged
upon the design of the present investigation. Its conception
is rooted in the desire to provide a classroom approach to
value instruction which involves both teaching techniques
and materials that are consistent with a rational view of

value education.

Teaching Strategies

 

The theoretical model selected for facilitating value
judgments may be referred to as a strategy or way to think
about value questions; similar to the scientific method used
as a strategy to consider empirical questions. Hilda Taba
has contributed much in the way of teaching strategies,
especially to develop concepts and generalizations in social

studies. Her strategies are based essentially upon the work

 

94Ihid .

90

of Piaget and Bruner which suggests that thinking is learned
developmentally. "Cognitive skills are seen as products of
a dynamic interaction between the individual and the stimula-
tion he receives, rather than as a result of passive absorp-
tion of information. The quantity and quality of the con-
cepts and ideas an individual can use seem to depend upon
the quantity and quality of stimulation he has had, plus,
the amount of effort he has put into active thinking. In
other words, the effectiveness with which an individual
thinks depends largely on the kind of thinking experiences
he has had. Unguided, these experiences may or may not
result in productive models of thought. The task of instruc-
tion is to provide systematic training in thinking and to
help students acquire the cognitive skills that are necessary
for thinking autonomously and productively."9

Very little research exists concerning the effective-
ness of the application of strategies for thinking to Specific
subject matter content. The few studies which are related to
teaching strategies have been done in the area of critical
thinking skills. Shaver and Berlak summarize these research
findings. "Unless the intellectual competencies that the
student should be able to exhibit when confronted with an
important issue are specifically identified so that instruc-

tion can focus on them, the teaching and learning of

 

95The Taba Curriculum Development Prgject in Social
Studies (MenIo Park: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
I969), p. 13.

 

91

96 The

competencies will be haphazard, if not accidental."
following guidelines for the development of critical think-
ing skills have been derived from the limited research com-
pleted to date.

(1) Determine what concepts are relevant to perform
critical thinking operations; for example, form-
ulation and evaluation of hypothesis.

(2) Teach these strategy concepts explicitly;
students do not learn critical thinking as a
by-product of content study.

(3) Situations as similar as possible to those in
which students are to use these skills should
be set up in the classroom and students should
be guided in the application of strategy con-
cepts in this context.

The question of whether the solution of an ethical or
value problem requires a different mode of thought or intel-
lectual strategy than does the solution of a factual problem
has not been answered. It is usually assumed that success-
ful value judgment models or strategies depend upon the
selection and agreement upon (in the case of a group decision)
a relevant criterion value, or desirable end result. However,
"an adequate model should also take into account the inter-
action between different strategies in handling public issues.

To illustrate: resolving a value conflict may first require

that a communication problem be solved by carefully defining

96Shaver and Berlak,'Democracy)‘Pluralism, and the
Social Studies, p. 337.

97Bryon Massialas and Andreas Kazamia, Crucial Issues
in the Teaching of Social Studies: A Book of Readings
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 254.

 

 

 

 

92

terms or that a factual issue in contention be resolved by
gathering sufficient evidence."98

There is no single approach analogous to scientific
verification in empirical matters which is widely accepted
in our society for producing normative generalizations,
forming value judgments, or making normative decisions.
There are, however, some approaches suggested in the liter-
ature which have been adapted from logic, philoSOphy, and
science that can serve as guides for the classroom teacher
in this area. One such approach, developed by the Columbia
Associates in Philosophy, has been selected for the purpose
of this study. This particular strategy is based upon
instrumentalism.which dictates that a criterion value be
selected in order to resolve a value question or make a
value judgment. This process attempts to transfer value
inquiry into the empirical realm and raises the question
of whether meaningful criterion values can be agreed upon
or predetermined in isolation from the plans of action that
achieve them. The steps of the strategy are as follows:

(1) Explicit statement of the problem or irresolu-
tion.

(2) Identification of value or an end in view which
is shared by all participants that is related
to the problem under consideration.

(3) Exploration of the range of alternative solutions
to the problem.

 

98Shaver and Berlak, Democracy, Pluralism, and the
Social Studies, p. 340.

 

 

93

(4) Establishing the relationship between the
proposed course of action and the disputed
goal referent by empirically testing "if-then"
statements or implications.

(5) Possible acceptance of a defensible proposal.99
The adaptation of the preceding strategy for use with
middle school students resulted in the following simplifi-
cation of the process.

(1) After deciding that a given conflict or problem
is about values the first step in trying to
solve it is to write out what you think your
problem is as clearly as possible.

(2) The second step is to decide what you hope to
achieve or accomplish by solving your problem.
This is called your objective or end-goal.

(3) List all possible ways which you can think of
to solve the problem.

(4) List the advantages and disadvantages of each
possible solution.

(5) Decide upon the solution which you think is best.
Keep in mind your objective or end-goal and the

advantages and disadvantages of each possible
solution.10

Summary

The dimensions of moral judgment which Piaget proposed
in his early research and a discussion of relevant findings
from later experimental studies designed to test his theo-

retical formulations have been presented. It was noted that

 

99Massialas and Cox, Inquiry in Social Studies, pp. 163-

 

169.

100A helpful discussion of how to solve a moral problem
can be found in Mary V. Neff, Ethics for Everyday Living
(Chicago: Science Research Association, 1958)Tg'

 

94

the developmental nature of moral judgment in relation to
age appears to be convincingly supported. However, the
studies which purport to test those aspects of theory which
deal with parental authority and peer group participation,
especially those elements involved in the Piagetian con-
ception of the two moralities of childhood, have not pro-
duced convincing evidence. The findings in regard to
antecedent conditions which may be related to moral develop-
ment are also inconclusive. There appears to be a low
level association between both the variables of I.Q. and
socio-economic status based on parental occupations and
moral judgment or certain aspects of moral judgment. There
has been limited indication that the variable of sex may
also be related to aspects of moral judgment, however the
findings and interpretations have not been definitive.
Though many educators, especially in the social studies
content area, have noted the need for value inquiry in
education there is little evidence that much attention has
been devoted to this topic in the actual classroom situation.
The limited research available on courses which attempt to
deal with value issues in both the character training and
social studies context show little effect on values attri-
butable to such classes. Kohlberg feels that classes which
deal with moral values and character may, because of the
long, slow and continually shifting nature of moral develop-

ment, have a long-range impact on moral conformity or

95

resistance to temptation. He suggests that it may be possible
to define moral education primarily as a matter of stimulat-
ing the development of the child's own moral judgment and
its control of action.101

The sparse research on the use of teaching strategies
has also been reviewed in reference to the proposed model
for thinking about and moving toward a solution to questions
which involve a conflict in values. Such strategies for
thinking, which acquire meaning from the work of Piaget,
Bruner, and others in cognitive development, are an attempt
to provide systematic training in thinking and to help students
achieve those skills necessary for autonomous and productive
thought.

The following chapter contains an explanation of the
experimental design of the study and a presentation of the
sample characteristics. A discussion of instrumentation and

material used in the study and the techniques of data analysis

are also included.

101Kohlberg, "The Development of Moral Character and

Moral Ideology," pp. 425-426.

CHAPTER III

DESIGN AND PROCEDURES

The design of the study and information relevant to
sample selection and characteristics; experimental treat-
ments and implementation procedures; development and testing
of instruments for data collection; statistical hypotheses,
and data analysis techniques will be discussed in this

chapter.

Sample Selection and Characteristics

 

The population from which this study sample was
selected included all seventh and eighth grade students liv-
ing within theMacDonald Middle School district in East
Lansing, Michigan. The "Statement of Philosophy" of the
East Lansing Public Schools describes the cultural setting
of the school-community as, "one which is growing in number,
is relatively mobile, and relatively homogeneous racially.
The socio-economic range in the community is broad, but
extremes are few. The economic base for school support is
relatively favorable, and our citizens generally support

the value of public school education. The schools and the

96

97

total community are influenced by the proximity of Michigan
State University. The school reflects the comparatively
high educational level of the community, as well as its

1 The

strong aspiration for educational achievement."
socio-economic, religious, and racial nature of the community
have been summarized in the following manner. "East Lansing
is a middle class community, predominantly Protestant, with
less than one per cent Negro students in the schools."2
MacDonald Middle School is organized into subject
matter teaching teams with students divided between two
seventh grade teams and two eighth grade teams. The selected
sample included all students in one seventh grade team and
all students in one eighth grade team. The seventh grade
team was composed of 66 students and 2 teachers, while the
eighth grade team was composed of 106 students and 4 teachers.
In each team the member who taught social studies was the
primary cooperating teacher for this study. The seventh
grade science teacher and the eighth grade English teacher

also cooperated in gathering student essay responses for the

content analysis portion of the investigation.

 

1East Lansing Public Schools, East Lansing, Michigan,
"Statement of Philosophy," East Lansing, 1967, p. 1.
(Mimeographed).

2John W. Vaughn, "Implications of Physical and Intel-
lectual Growth Characteristics, Interests, and Cultural
Forces for the Improvement of the Middle School Program"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University,
1969), p. 87.

98

During the course of the study the experimental mortal-
ity rate totaled six subjects in the seventh grade team and
eight subjects in the eighth grade team, which resulted in
a final sample of 60 seventh graders and 98 eighth graders,
(88 girls and 70 boys), totaling 158 subjects. This
attrition rate was attributed to: moving from the school
district while the research was in progress, extended ill-

nesses, and incomplete verbal intelligence information.

E

The mean age was 12 years, 5.5 months for seventh'
graders and 13 years, 4.5 months for eighth graders. Table
3.1 contains the mean ages of the total sample arranged by

grade and sex.

TABLE 3.l.--Mean Age of Sample by Grade and Sex.

 

 

Age
Grade Sex N Year Months
7 M 28 12 7.0
7 F 34 12 4.5
8 M 42 13 5.5
8 F 54 13 3.5

 

99

Verbal Intelligence

 

It has been suggested in both the theoretical dis-
cussion and the empirical findings that a significant relation-
ship exists between intelligence, particularly verbal intel-
ligence, and moral judgment. For this reason it appeared
desirable to obtain some measure of verbal intelligence
which could be used as a covariable in an attempt to control
the differences in this factor between treatment groups. In
the East Lansing Public School system the Lorge-Thorndike
Intelligence Test is administered to all seventh grade
students, therefore it was possible to obtain the T-scores
(a standard score with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation
of 10) on the verbal battery of the Lorge-Thorndike for each
subject from the student records.

The Lorge-Thorndike Intelligence Test has been
described as one of the sounder instruments available, from
the view of psychological insights shown in selecting and
developing the materials, and from the standpoint of
statistical analysis of the standardization data.3 This
instrument has been standardized on 136,000 subjects in 44
communities in 22 states. It has an established reliability
of the verbal scales for grades seven through nine of .86.

The mean T-score was 52.49 for seventh grade subjects and

 

3Oscar K. Buros, ed., The Fifth Mental Measurements
Yearbook (Highland Park, New Jersey: The Grypfion Press,
1959), p. 350.

 

100

55.49 for eighth grade subjects in this sample. Table 3.2

contains the mean T-score arranged by grade and sex.

TABLE 3.2.--Lorge-Thorndike Verbal Intelligence T-Scores By
Grade and Sex.

 

Grade Sex N T-Score
7 M 28 51.42
7 F 34 53.38
8 M 42 51.31
8 F 54 58.75

 

Socio-Economic Status

 

Socio-economic status (SES) data, based upon the
North-Hatt Prestige Scale and Socio-economic Index was also
obtained for the sample.4 For this study the occupation of
the subject's father was used as the basis for socio-economic
status assignment. The mean SES was 76.08 for the seventh
grade sample and 75.96 for the eighth grade sample. Table
3.3 presents the mean SES of the total sample arranged by
grade and sex.

The Socio-Economic Index based upon the North-Hatt
Prestige Scale has a numerical range from approximately 20 to
95, with the higher prestige occupations receiving the higher

numerical index. Though there is some overlapping of the eleven

 

4Albert J. Reiss, Occupations and Social Status

(New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 196IY.

 

101

TABLE 3.3.--Socio-Economic Index Scores by Grade and Sex.

 

 

Grade Sex N Mean SES
7 M 28 74.60
7 F 34 77.24
8 M 42 75.43
8 F 54 76.37

 

categories, the majority of occupations in this study were
classified under the general heading of Professional, Tech-
nical, and Kindred Workers which is representative of the
highest prestige status. A random selection of occupations
from this category is as follows: college professors and
instructors, engineers, lawyers and judges, architects,

social and welfare workers, and medical and dental technicians.

Experimental Desigg

 

The design of this study is of a quasi-experimental
nature discussed by Campbell and Stanley as the nonequivalent
control group design. This particular design applies to
groups which are most likely to constitute naturally assembled
collectives such as classrooms, as similar as availability
permits but yet not so similar that one can dispense with

the pretest.5

 

5Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental

and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand
McNalIy and Company, 1963i: p. 47.

 

102

In the context of the nonequivalent control group
design, the following four treatments were outlined for

implementation with the selected sample.

 

Treatment One (Tl) employed the method of explicit
teacher instruction in presenting general informa-
tion about the value concept relating to the defini-
tion of terms, the distinction between value, fact,
and opinion, the development and study of values,
and the recognition of value conflict. The teacher
also explicitly taught the value judgment strategy
to these treatment groups through classroom lectures
and discussion, and assisted the groups in the
application of the information about values and the
value judgment strategy to selected content from the

book Kiowa Years.

 

Treatment Two (T2) employed the method of programmed

 

instruction to present general information about the
concept of values as described in T1’ as well as the
value judgment strategy. Two booklets were designed
according to the principles of programmed learning;
Values 1 presented information about the concept of
value, and Values 2 presented the value judgment
strategy. The teacher's role relevant to T2 was to
explain the purpose and directions of the programmed

booklets to the subjects and to function as a

103

discussion leader in the application of the informa-
tion about values and the value judgment strategy

to selected content from the book Kiowa Years.

 

Treatment Three (T3) was a partial control group

 

which employed the method of explicit teacher
instruction to present information about the concept
of value as described in T1' The value judgment
strategy was not presented to T3 groups and the
application of information about values to selected

content from the book Kiowa Years did not include

 

those Situations used for the application of the
value judgment strategy presented to T1 and T2

groups.

Treatment Four (T4) was the control group which also

 

used the book Kiowa Years, but without any attempt

 

on the part of the teacher to explicitly teach either
information about values or the value judgment

strategy. The control group used Kiowa Years pri-

 

marily as a tool to learn about such topics as Indian

tribes and secret societies.

Implementation of Experimental Procedures

 

Preliminary meetings were arranged with the two
cooperating social studies teachers during the spring and

summer of 1970 for initial explanation and discuSsion of the

104

research project. At this time the teachers were also given
copies of two Michigan State University Cooperative Exten-
sion Service Bulletins for background information about
values.6

Three meetings were held during the first two weeks
of September, 1970, to complete a definite time schedule
for pre-post testing and to plan for the implementation of
experimental procedures. Regular weekly sessions followed
during the ten-week period while the research was in progress
for discussion of specific problems and questions relating
to the study.

The schedule of data collection and implementation
of experimental procedures is presented in the following

outline.

September 21

KNOVA pretest data was collected by the social studies teachers
during regular fifty-minute class periods for the total
sample.

September 22
Moral judgment pretest data was collected by the social

studies teachers during regular fifty-minute class periods
for the total sample.

 

6Margaret M. Jacobson, "Values 1" (Michigan State
University Cooperative Extension Service: Extension Bulletin
E-647, Home and Family Series,(April, 1969); "Helping Children
Learn Values," Michigan State University Cooperative Exten-
sion Service. (Mimeographed).

105

September 28-30

The social studies teachers for each grade level randomly
assigned the total number of students per team to four
approximately equal groups. The treatments (T ,T ,T ,T4)
were then randomly assigned to the four seventH gfadg
groups and the four eighth grade groups.

October 5-9

All groups received an introduction to and reading assign-
ments in Kiowa Years during social studies classes.

 

October 12-16

Information about values was presented to T and T groups
by the social studies teachers. The Values 1 programmed
booklet was completed by T2 groups. ApprOXimate time: 2
fifty-minute class periods.

October 19-23

The value judgment strategy was presented to T groups by
the social studies teachers and T groups thrngh programmed
booklet Values 2. Approximate time: 2 fifty-minute class
periods.___—__—'

October 26-December 4

Knowledge about values was applied to selected information
in Kiowa Years by T ,T2 , and T groups. The value judgment
strategy was applied to selectgd value conflict situations
in Kiowa Years by T and T groups. Approximate time: 1
fifty-minute class eriod er week.

 

 

December 3

The 7th grade science teacher and the 8th grade English
teacher collected essay responses to a value conflict
problem presented in their respective classes. Approximate
time: 1 fifty-minute class period.

December 10-11
Post test data was collected by social studies teachers

using the KNOVA Test and Form B of the Moral Judgment Test.
Approximate time: 2 fifty-minute class periods.

106

Instrumentation

 

The pretest and post test data for the study were
obtained through the use of two instruments, the Knowledge
of Values Test and the Moral Judgment Test. The content anal-
ysis data which were collected in an attempt to examine whether
the subjects would transfer the value judgment strategy to
subject matter content other than social studies utilized
value conflict problems requiring an essay type response.
The programmed booklets used in the T2 groups were specifi-
cally developed to present both the information about values

and the value judgment strategy to these subjects.

Knowledge of Values Test

The Knowledge of Values Test (KNOVA) was developed
for use as a measuring tool after careful review of evaluation
devices, especially in the social studies content area,
failed to produce an existing instrument which could be
employed as a pre-post measure to indicate the subject's
knowledge about certain aspects of the value concept.

After a review of available materials and programs
concerned with value education and a careful examination of
the value judgment strategy, it was decided that the follow-
ing information about values would facilitate learning and
application of the value judgment strategy. (1) Information

about the value concept in terms of definition, classification,

107

and distinction from fact and opinion. (2) Information
about the nature of a value decision, especially related

to value conflict. (3) Information about how values are
developed and how values may be studied. From this outline,
the following behavioral objectives were developed:7

(1) Given a statement which illustrates a fact,
opinion, or value, the student will be able
to identify the category which it represents.

(2) Given a story problem which illustrates a
value decision and a list of values, the stu-
dent will be able to identify the primary
value underlying the decision.

(3) Presented with a story problem which illus-
trates a value conflict, the student will be
able to select the combination of values in
conflict from a list of alternatives.

(4) Provided with a partial description of the
definition and purpose of values the student
will be able to identify the statement which
best completes the description from a list of
alternatives.

(5) Given partial descriptions of the nature of
value transmission, change, and study, the
student will be able to select the responses
which best complete the statements from a
list of alternatives.

Preliminary efforts in the development of the KNOVA

instrument consisted of collecting and developing questions
which would appropriately test the outlined objectives.

These questions were formulated into approximately twenty

multiple-choice items and submitted to three readers for

 

7Robert F. Mager, Preparing Instructional Objectives
(Palo Alto: Feron Publishers, Inc., 1962).

108

editing related to grammar, language appropriate to sample
age, objectivity, and content validity. After appropriate
revision of these items, the KNOVA instrument was adminis-
tered toaiselected sample of eighty-four eighth graders in
social studies classes during the Spring of 1970. Analysis
of the test scores indicated a split-half reliability of
.69. The test results were then subjected to an item
analysis to obtain information on the difficulty and the
discrimination index of each item. With the aid of these
results and further consideration of content and form the
KNOVA test was refined and used as one measure for gather-
ing pretest and post test data in the present investigation.
(See Appendix A.) The final version of the KNOVA Test
remained a twenty question multiple-choice instrument which
included items directed toward the testing of each behav-

ioral objective as indicated in Table 3.4.

TABLE 3.4.--Numerical Relationship of Test Items to Behavioral
Objectives.

 

 

Objective Number of Questions
(1) Fact, opinion, and value 6
(2) Value decisions 3
(3) Value conflicts 4
(4) Definition and purpose 3

(5) Value transmission, change, and study 4

 

109

The KNOVA was administered by the cooperating teachers
in their social studies classes as a pretest early in the
fall of the school year 1970. The teachers read and explained
the directions which asked the students to carefully read
each question and select the answer which they thought best
by circling the appropriate letter on the answer sheet.
Scoring was a simple procedure of tabulating correct and
incorrect responses on the answer sheet. The pretest data
from the present study, which included test scores from 63
seventh graders and 101 eighth graders, was analyzed to
determine test reliability. The results are shown in Table

3.5.

TABLE 3.5.--Split-Half Pretest Reliability for KNOVA Test.

 

 

Grade N Reliability
7 63 .79
8 101 .71

 

Moral Judgment Tegt

This instrument is composed of twenty story pro-
blems which illustrate five types of moral judgment as out-
lined by Piaget: immanent justice, moral realism, retribution
and expiation versus restitution and reciprocity, the efficacy

of severe punishment, and group or individual responsibility.

110

These stories were developed by Ronald C. Johnson as part of
a research investigation designed to test certain Piagetian
ideas about moral judgment. Johnson did not use Piaget's
original stories because he was interested in a somewhat
older sample than the six-to-twelve year olds whom Piaget
studied, and because a much larger sample was involved which
necessitated an instrument which could be administered as
a paper and pencil test rather than the lengthy interview
method characteristic of earlier studies. An initial analysis
of the stories by several persons who were familiar with
Piaget's original work narrowed the items to the twenty most
likely to be intrinsically interesting to the subjects, most
similar in meaning to those of Piaget, and of an approxi-
mately equal level of difficulty. The stories were then
presented to ninety-three college student judges who cate-
gorized them into the appropriate five areas of moral judg-
ment which they were designed to represent. Their percentage
of agreement on categorization was eighty-two per cent,
indicating a rather high degree of content validity.

Each of the five areas of moral judgment outlined by
Piaget is depicted in four separate stories. These stories
are scored on the basis of either an immature or mature

response in the following manner.

111

(l) Immanent Justice--mature response indicates
a chance factor involved; immature response
attributes some sort of supernatural cause
to the event.

(2) Moral Realism--mature response judges acts in
terms of intent; immature response judges acts
according to consequences.

(3) Punishment in terms of expiation or retri-
bution versus punishment in terms of restitution--
mature response chooses restitution; immature
response chooses expiatory punishment.

(4) Efficacy of severe punishment--mature response
indicates less severe punishment would be more
effective; immature response indicates more
severe punishment would be most effective.

(5) Group or individual Responsibility-~mature
response rejected group punishment; immature
response accepted group punishment.

The twenty question moral judgment instrument was
administered by Johnson to 807 subjects consisting of both
boys and girls in grades 5, 7, 9, and 11, in a midwestern
public school system in May, 1957. The reliability of the
entire moral judgment scale was approximately .60 at each
age level. Correlations between moral judgment responses
revealed far more positive and significant correlations
than might be expected by chance, and responses within moral
judgment areas were nearly always positively and significantly

correlated.8

 

8Ronald C. Johnson, "A Study of Children's Moral
Judgment," 327-354. Permission to use the Moral Judg-
ment Stories was granted by the Society for Research in
Child Development, June 1, 1970.

112

For the purpose of the present investigation, the
twenty story items were pretested on approximately eighty
8th grade students in the spring of 1970. The results from
this pretest indicated that from twenty-five to thirty per
cent of the responses could be categorized as follows: (1)
leaving the answer space blank, (2) responding with "I don't
know," or (3) constructing answers which indicated a clear
misunderstanding of the question. In view of these response
problems the following adaptations were implemented for use

in this study.

(1) Each story was followed with a choice of at
least two possible alternatives; one indicat-
ing a mature response and one indicating an
immature response according to the Piagetian
conception. These alternative responses were
derived primarily from the free responses
written in answer to each question in the pre-
test study. Though Johnson used a multiple-
choice alternative on those questions relating
to punishment, he did not incorporate this
design into questions relevant to other dimen-
sions of moral judgment. In the revised form
of the test used for the present study those
questions to which a multiple-choice response
was added also allowed space for a free response
constructed by the subject.

(2) The twenty item instrument was divided into
Form A, consisting of ten stories which were
administered as the pretest, and Form B con-
sisting of ten stories which were used to
collect post test data. This was accomplished
by randomly assigning two of the four items
which pertained to each area of moral judgment
to the pretest and two items to the post test.
(See Appendix B.)

113

In the administration of both the pretest and the post test,
the cooperating teachers read each story outloud while the
subjects read it silently; a procedure which was also followed
by Johnson. Scoring the tests was accomplished by assigning
a zero (0) to each immature response and a one (1) to each
mature response. The responses for each test were then
totaled to represent a moral judgment score. In the few
instances (1%) where subjects chose to contruct their own
responses in answer to an item, the response was also judged
according to the Piagetian criteria of immature and mature
moral judgments. Two independent judges categorized these
free responses with a .95 percentage of agreement. Reli-
ability was established for the control groups in the present
study by the parallel test method which indicated a reli-
ability of .64 for the eighth grade control group and .62

for the seventh grade control group.
Content Analysis

Content analysis has been defined by Berelson as,
"a research tool for the objective, systematic, and quantita-
tive description of the manifest content of communication."9
Content analysis was historically employed to study the con-

tent of newspapers and to analyze style features of literature,

9Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication
Research (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952), p. 18.

 

 

114

however with refinement and clarification this technique
has become useful for investigating characteristics, causes,
and consequences of communication which emanates from a
multi-media environment.lo
Content analysis was used in this study to deter-

mine whether the subject's essay responses to value conflict

problems reflected knowledge of the value judgment strategy.

Value Conflict Problems

 

The original proposal for the present study
indicated that the cooperation of the teachers responsible
for English instruction in both the seventh and eighth grade
teams would be sought to test the hypothesis that the analysis
of value conflict problems presented in a subject matter
area other than social studies would reflect knowledge of
the value judgment strategy. In the actual investigation,
the seventh grade team was composed of only two teachers,
with the social studies teacher also responsible for English
instruction. Because of the possibility of the subjects
associating the strategy with a particular teacher as well
as with a specific subject, the teacher responsible for
seventh grade science cooperated in collecting data for this
analysis. The eighth grade content analysis data was

collected by the English teacher.

 

loIbido’ pp. 21-250

115

The criteria which guided the development of the
two story problems for use in this aspect of the study
included; (1) the portrayal of a problem which presented
an obvious conflict of values, making the application of
the value judgment strategy an appropriate response, (2)
a problem related to instruction which was currently taking
place in seventh grade science and eighth grade English
in an attempt to dispel any suspicion by the subjects of
a transfer of learning measurement, and (3) a problem which
would present a meaningful value conflict within the com-
prehension range of the subjects, and to which a Short essay
response would be appropriate. The following story problems
were devised in consultation with the c00perating teachers,
and administered to the total sample as an appropriate
exercise during one class period. The teachers read the
problem and directions outloud while the students read them
silently. The subjects were urged to do their best but
were assured that the problem did not constitute a test, but
rather that it would be used as a diagnostic tool to plan
for future classroom activities.
The seventh grade science problem. A medical student
was working on an important experiment in the labor-
atory which had to do with a new drug. Though it
had only been tested one time on the lab animals,
it had been successful. The hospital Board of
Directors asked if it had been completely tested
so that it could now be used on humans and the
medical student assured them that it was ready. You

have been working with the student in the experiment
and know that the drug has only been tested once.

 

116

He is your best friend and you know that if the
drug works on humans it could be a big break for
both of you, yet you feel guilty about lying to the
hospital Directors.

In the space below write how you would decide about
what to do.

The eighth grade English problem. In "The Parsley
Garden"vBy William Saroyan, Al Condraj stole a hammer
to make something out of the nails and apple box
which he had collected. He was caught in the act of
stealing and left feeling humiliated by the two men
at the store. Suppose the story was changed so that
Al was not caught but walked freely from the store
with the hammer in his pocket. Suppose also that
Al's best friend, Pete Wawchek, happened to he look-
ing in the store window when Al was taking the hammer.
Pete thought that what A1 did was wrong. He had
never known Al to steal anything before even though
Al and his mother had very little money. Pretend
that you are Pete and have just seen your best friend
steal the hammer.

In the space below write how you would decide about
what to do.

 

Procedures for Content Analysis

The steps of the value judgment strategy were defined
and illustrated with appropriate examples drawn from the
essay responses of both the seventh and eighth grade samples.
These category definitions and specific directions for scor-
ing the responses were presented to two raters, one male and
one female, to determine rater reliability. (See Appendix C.)
Twenty per cent of the responses were randomly selected from
both samples. These responses were evaluated by the inves-

tigator and then by each of the two raters. A rater

117

reliability of .89 was established for the seventh grade

responses and .87 for the eighth grade responses.ll
Programmed Instruction

Early in the twentieth century Sidney L. Pressey,
who is sometimes referred to as the grandfather of the
teaching machine, invented a small machine that would score
a multiple-choice examination automatically at the time the
answer button was pushed. Although he designed this piece
of equipment as a testing device, he soon realized the
implications for teaching if he adjusted it so that the
correct answer button had to be pushed before a subsequent
question would appear. The concept of the teaching machine
has grown over the past fifty years so that today the
educator is faced with many types and styles, from simple
paper and pencil materials to complex electronic models.
However, all of these various devices have at least three
characteristics in common: (1) they present information
and require frequent responses by the student, (2) they
provide immediate feedback, informing the student about the
correctness of his response, and (3) they allow the student

to work individually.12

 

11Robert L. Ebel, "Estimation of the Reliability of
Ratings," Psychometrika, XVI(1951), 407—424.

12David Cram, Explaining "Teaching Machines" and
rogramming (San Francisco: Fearon Publishers, Inc., 1961),

 

 

P
P

118

The decision to develop and use programmed booklets
as part of this study was predicated upon the stability of
the information to be presented, its potential for use
across subject matter content and grade levels, the absence
of any existing programs to meet the objectives encompassed
by this approach to value education, and the feasibility of
testing the results obtained in the context of this inves-

tigation.

Planning the Program

Instruction usually encompasses the notion of two
interrelated but separable functions; planning and imple-
mentation. One purpose of programmed instruction is to
reduce the time and effort spent in the implementation phase
of instruction by the teacher through the use of teaching
machines or similar devices. Many other resources, such as
textbooks and films, are often used, at least in part, for
the same purpose. The emphasis in designing programmed
materials is placed upon the planning phase and includes a
thorough knowledge of the content area and its relationship
to the objectives of instruction. Espich and Williams have
described this phase in terms of observation and curriculum.
Observation is particularly important when a program is being

designed to teach a physical skill. The curriculum aspect

119

of the planning includes determining what is to be taught,
at what level, and how the results will be measured.13
The planning stage for the specific programmed
materials used in this study was based upon a review of the
literature on value education including existing educational

programs and materials relevant to this area. The first

booklet to be developed, Values 1, was formulated in accor-

 

dance with those content areas and behavioral objectives
outlined in the section pertaining to the development of the

KNOVA instrument.14 The second programmed booklet, Values 2,

 

was predicated upon an analysis of the steps contained in

the value judgment strategy.

Designing the Program

The technique for presenting the program content
followed a linear design with the constructed response frame
sequence which is perhaps the most common type of programming
in use today. A linear program is one in which all students
read every frame in identical sequence as Opposed to a
branching program which offers the reader alternative paths
from which to choose, with the path he takes depending upon
'the response he makes in each frame. The word constructed
implies that no choices are presented to the student, in

other words, he does not select one response from many, but

 

'13James Espich and Bill Williams, Develo ing Program-
pgd Instructional Materials (Palo Alto: Fearon fiblishers,
Inc., 1967), pp. 17-28.

14

 

See pp. 106-107.

120

must construct his own response to each frame. The con-
structed response linear program is advocated by B. F. Skinner
for two reasons: (1) recall is more efficient in the learn-
ing process than recognition, and (2) the act of responding
tends to cause learning, therefore, a student should not be
exposed to incorrect alternatives as in multiple-choice
programming.15
In the particular material designed for this study
the student was asked to write a word or series of words in
a blank provided for this purpose at or near the end of each
frame. Most frames were designed in such a way that they
could stand alone, that is, the student could deduce the
correct answer from the information given in each frame.
After writing in his answer the student was asked to lift
the portion of the folded back jacket of the booklet which
covered the correct responses on the right side of each page.
Other words with similar meaning to the correct response
which were also acceptable answers were listed in parenthesis
below the first response. The following examples illustrate

two typical frames. (See Appendix D for further deScription

of the programmed booklets).

 

15Cram, Explaining "Teaching Machines" and Program-

ming, p. 34.

121

FRAME CORRECT RESPONSE
We have values about many different areas behaving
of life. For example, we have values about (behavior)
what is good and right behavior or conduct. (conduct)
These are called moral values. Moral values (acting)

are concerned with right ways of .

 

FRAME CORRECT RESPONSE
Suppose you feel that honesty and friend-
ship are both very important values. Then
your best friend asks you how you like his
new baseball glove. Actually you do not value
like it at all. Do you tell him you don't
like it and risk losing a friend or do
you tell him it's really great and risk
being less than honest? If you were in
this situation we could say you have a

conflict.

 

Testing the Program

Several persons, including one of the cooperating
teachers for this study, worked through the programs and
edited them for grammar, language appropriate to the sample,
clarity, and aptness of examples. Mechanical details, such
as the length of response blanks and readability, were also
considered. The programs were then checked for continuity

from one frame to the next and for the Size of steps.

122

Revisions were made accordingly and the programs were tested
in a one to one situation with a sampling of subjects of
comparable age to the selected sample. Consideration of

the response errors of these subjects was the basis for the
final revision of the booklets before use in this investiga-
tion. The use of the programmed booklets in this study
represents the first attempt at actual field testing.

One rough measure of a program's worth is sometimes
referred to as the 90/90 standard. An initial test of this
standard is that ninety per cent of the subjects will be
able to answer ninety per cent of the program frames correctly.
Both of the programmed booklets, Values 1 and Values 2,
directed the subjects to draw a line through each incorrect
response and to write the correct response beneath it. Thus,
the booklets could be analyzed for incorrect response data.

The Values 1 program was composed of twenty-one

 

frames, excluding three frames devoted to understanding the
directions for working the program. Analysis of the results

of Values 1 response errors for both seventh and eighth grade

 

T2 groups are presented in Table 3.6.

Inthe seventh grade T2 group, which totaled 14 sub-
jects, eleven subjects or seventy—seven per cent of the
sample answered ninety per cent or more of the frames correctly,
while ninety-one per cent of the sample was able to answer
eighty-six per cent of the frames correctly. This 91/86

standard approaches the criterion of 90/90. In the eighth

123

TABLE 3.6.--Response Frame Analysis for Values 1 Programmed

 

 

Booklet.

Correct Response Frames Seventh Grade Eighth Grade
N % N % N %
21 100 5 36 5 19
20 96 4 29 11 42
19 90 2 l4 6 23
18 86 2 14 l 4
17 or less ' 80 1 7 3 12

 

grade T2 group, which totaled twenty-six subjects, twenty-two
subjects or eighty-four per cent of the sample answered ninety
per cent or more of the frames correctly, while eighty-eight
per cent of the subjects were able to answer eighty-six per
cent of the frames correctly for a standard of 88/86.

The Values 2 program was composed of twenty—two frames,
excluding three direction frames and a concluding problem in
the application of the value judgment strategy. Results of
this analysis are shown in Table 3.7. In the seventh grade
T2 group, which totaled thirteen students, eight subjects or
Sixty-one per cent of the sample answered ninety-one per cent
of the frames correctly, while eighty-four per cent of the
sample were able to answer eighty-six per cent of the frames
correctly for an 84/86 standard. In the eighth grade T2
group, which totaled twenty-five students, eighteen subjects

or seventy-five per cent of the sample answered ninety-one

124

TABLE 3.7.-—Response Frame Analysis for Values 2 Programmed

 

 

 

Booklet.

Correct Response Frames Seventh Grade Eighth Grade
N % N % N %
22 100 0 0 5 20
21 96 6 46 7 28
20 91 2 15 6 24
19 86 3 23 1 4
18 82 1 8 3 12
17 or less 77 l 8 3 12

 

per cent or more of the frames correctly, while eighty-eight
per cent of the sample was able to answer eighty-two per
cent of the frames correctly for an 88/82 standard.

The response frame analysis of the Values 1 and

 

Values 2 booklets indicated that both programs approached

 

the 90/90 criterion. The results of the implementation of
the experimental treatments presented in Chapter IV of this
study provide another means for examining the effectiveness

of the programmed booklets.

Statistical Hypotheses to be Tested

The following hypotheses have been stated in the null
form. The instrument used for data collection and the form
in which the data were analyzed have been specified for each

hypothesis.

125

1. Knowledge of Values

a. Knowledge about values as measured by gain scores
on the KNOVA Test does not vary according to treat-
ment.

b. Knowledge about values as measured by gain scores
on the KNOVA Test does not vary according to method
of instruction.

c. Knowledge about values as measured by gain scores
on the KNOVA Test does not vary according to sex
of subject.

d. Knowledge about values as measured by gain scores
on the KNOVA Test does not vary according to grade
level.

2. Maturity of Moral Judgment

a. Maturity of moral judgment as measured by gain
scores on the Moral Judgment Test does not vary
according to treatment.

b. Maturity of moral judgment as measured by gain}
scores on the Moral Judgment Test does not vary
according to method of instruction.

c. Maturity of moral judgment as measured by gain
scores on the Moral Judgment Test does not vary
according to sex of subject.

d. Maturity of moral judgment as measured by gain
scores on the Moral Judgment Test does not vary
according to grade level.

3. Value Judgment Strategy
a. Essay responses to value conflict problems presented
in subject matter areas other than social studies

do not vary according to knowledge of the value
judgment strategy as measured by content analysis.

Analysis of Data

 

The general program used for the analysis of gain
scores was a multivariate analysis of covariance. Multi-

variate analysis is generally considered to include those

126

statistical procedures concerned with analyzing multiple
measurements which have been made on a number of individuals.
The important distinction is that the multiple variates are
considered in combination, as systems. Analysis of covariance
has the effect of adjusting the means for uncontrolled
variables and makes the necessary modification in sampling
error. This corrected sampling error is then used to test
for the Significance among.adjusted means. The assumptions
to be met in multivariate analysis require that the observa-
tions be independently drawn from normal treatment populations
each having the same variance, and with error components
independent across all pairs of observations. The assump-
tions associated with normal distribution and independence
were met in terms of the study design which included random
assignment of subjects to groups and random assignment of
treatments to groups. Independence was established by con-
sidering each group as an experimental unit. Tests for
homogeneous variances are extremely sensitive to any departure
from normality in the population, and modern Opinion holds
that analysis of this nature can and should be carried on
without a preliminary test of variances.16
The specific computer program employed in this

investigation was developed and named for Jeremy D. Finn.17

 

16William L. Hays, Statistics (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963), p. 381.

 

7Jeremy D. Finn, Multivariance: Fortran Program for
Univariate and Multivariatd'Analysis of Variance and Covariance
TBfiIIalo: Department of Edficational Psychology, State University
of New York at Buffalo, 1967).

127

The advantage of this type of program is that it allows for
the analysis of more than one dependent variable at the same
time, as well as incorporating a covariable. In this study
the dependent variables used were the gain scores derived
from the pre-post KNOVA scores and the pre-post Moral Judg-
ment Test scores. The covariable was the subject's T-score
on the Lorge-Thorndike Verbal Intelligence Test and the
factors included in the analysis were treatments, grade, and
sex.

The portion of the data analyzed by content analysis
was subjected to a test of significance of the means of the
raw scores obtained on essay responses to the value conflict

problem administered in science and English classes.

Summary

This chapter contained a description of the sample
characteristics and design of the study. Attention was also
given to the development and testing of the instruments
used for data collection, as well as the planning, designing,
and testing of the programmed booklets. The statistical
hypotheses have been stated in the null form and the methods
which were employed to test these hypotheses have been dis-
cussed. Chapter IV will include the results and discussion

of this analysis.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF DATA

The initial analysis of data on knowledge about
values and maturity of moral judgment employed the individ-
ual as the experimental unit, while the subsequent analysis
of the data utilized the group as the experimental unit.
The means and standard deviations for selected variables
are presented for both the individual and group analyses.

The presentation of findings is consistent with the
order and form of the hypotheses stated in Chapter III
relevant to: (1) knowledge about values, (2) maturity of
moral judgment, and (3) application of the value judgment
strategy. The analyses for interaction effects of treat-
ment, sex, and grade, and the correlation matrix for the
variables of socio-economic status, age, KNOVA gain scores,
Moral Judgment gain scores, and verbal intelligence T-scores
are also presented.

A discussion of the results follows the presentation
of findings, including an examination of the essay responses
to value conflict problems in relation to both the applica-
tion of the value judgment strategy and the cognitive stages

of moral development.

128

129

Individual and Group Data

 

In the preliminary analysis of the data, 158 individ-
uals were designated as the experimental unit. The input
variables included; Socio-economic status, age, gain scores
on the KNOVA Test, gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test,
and verbal intelligence T-scores. The factors in the design
were; (1) treatment (four levels), (2) sex (two levels),
and (3) grade (two levels). The number of cells in the
analysis of variance matrix was 16. The cell means and
standard deviations of the input variables for the individual
analysis are presented in Table 4.1.

In the subsequent analysis of the data, 16 groups
were designated as the experimental unit. The two input
variables were gain scores on the KNOVA Test and gain scores
on the Moral Judgment Test. The factors in the design were;
(1) treatment (four levels), and (2) grade (two levels). The
number of cells in the analysis of variance matrix was eight.
The cell means and standard deviations of the input variables
for group analysis are presented in Table 4.2.

A chi square test of the hypothesis of no association
between the dependent variables of gain scores on the KNOVA
Test and on the Moral Judgment Test and the covariable of
verbal intelligence T-scores yielded a chi square value of

4.973 with a probability less than 0.0832. On this basis,

130

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TABLE 4.2.--Ce11 Means and Standard Deviations of Input
Variables for Group Analysis by Treatment and Grade.

 

 

 

 

 

FACTORS INPUT VARIABLES
Treatment Grade KNOVA ,Moral
l 7 0.416 0.472
1 8 1.175 1.012
2 7 1.366 -0.441
2 8 3.205 0.519
3 7 1.262 1.200
3 8 0.908 0.979
4 7 0.507 -0.257
4 8 -0.263 0.902
Variance of Input Variables 0.501 0.209
Standard Deviation of Input
Variables 0.708 0.457
Legend:
KNOVA -- Gain scores on the KNOVA Test
Moral -- Gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test

the null hypothesis was not rejected, and the covariable was
deleted from the analysis of the group data.

The demographic variables of socio-economic status
and age, and the factor of sex were also omitted from the
(group analysis. All the findings related to knowledge about

values and maturity of moral judgment are based upon analysis

132

of group data, with the exception of the findings related to
the sex variable which are based upon the analysis of

individual data.

Knowledge About Values

 

Null Hypothesis l-a: Knowledge about values as
measured by gain scores on the KNOVA Test does not vary
according to treatment.

A univariate analysis of variance comparing the mean
gain score on the KNOVA Test for the experimental treatment
groups with the mean gain score on the KNOVA Test for the
control groups across grade and sex yielded an F-Ratio of
6.4531 with a probability less than 0.0158. The multivariate
test of equality of mean vectors was 4.8844 with 6 and 14
degrees of freedom and a probability less than .0069.

On the basis of the findings presented in Table 4.3

the null hypothesis was rejected.

TABLE 4.3.--Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing Mean
Gain Scores of Experimental Treatment Groups with Mean Gain
Scores of Control Groups on the KNOVA Test.

 

 

Mean Univariate P
Source df Squares F* Less
Than
Between Treatment
Groups 3 3.235 6.453 .015
Within Treatment
.Groups. .,.8. .501 ..

 

*

F .05(3,8) = 4.07

133

Null Hypothesis l-b: Knowledge about values as
measured by gain scores on the KNOVA Test does not vary
according to method of instruction.

Following the rejection of null hypothesis l-a, a
post hoc comparison utilizing the Scheffé Test for differences
between means was computed on the group data. The confidence
interval based upon the mean gain scores on the KNOVA Test

for treatment one (teacher instruction) groups and treatment

two (programmed instruction) groups was as follows:
-3.730:Y:u+.850

The confidence interval included zero which indicated failure
to achieve significance at the .05 level and the null hypo-
thesis was not rejected. The mean gain scores and the error
variance utilized in the computation of the comparison of

method effects are presented in Table 4.4.

TABLE 4.4.--Post Hoc Comparison of Mean Gain Scores on the
KNOVA Test for Teacher Instruction Groups and Programmed
Instruction Groups.

 

 

Mean
Method Gain Error
Score Variance
Teacher Instruction .845 .501
Programmed Instruction . 2.285

 

F.05(3,12)=3.49

134

Null Hypothesis l-c: Knowledge about values as
measured by gain scores on the KNOVA Test does not vary
according to sex of subject.

A univariate analysis of variance comparing the mean
gain scores on the KNOVA Test for males with the mean gain
scores on the KNOVA Test for females across treatment and
grade yielded an F-Ratio of .996 with a probability less than
.319. The F-Ratio for the multivariate test of equality of
mean vectors was 0.6256 with 2 and 147 degrees of freedom
and a probability less than .5364.

On the basis of the findings presented in Table 4.5

the null hypothesis was not rejected.

TABLE 4.5.--Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing Mean
Gain Scores for Males with Mean Gain Scores for Females on
the KNOVA Test.

 

 

Mean Univariate P
Source df Squares F* Less
Than
Between Treatment
Groups 1 4.751 .996 .319
Within Treatment
Groups 148 ' 4.815

 

*
F.05(1,148)=2.60

Null Hypothesis 1-d: Knowledge about values as mea-
sured by gain scores on the KNOVA Test does not vary according
to grade level.

135

A univariate analysis of variance comparing the mean
gain scores on the KNOVA Test for seventh grade groups with
the mean gain scores on the KNOVA Test for eighth grade groups
across treatment and sex yielded an F-Ratio of 1.233 with a
probability less than .299. The F-Ratio for the multivariate
test of equality of mean vectors was 3.1344 with 2 and 7 degrees
of freedom and probability less less than 0.1067.

On the basis of the findings presented in Table 4.6

null hypothesis 1-d was not rejected.

TABLE 4.6.--Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing Mean
Gain Scores for Seventh Grade Groups with Mean Gain Scores for
Eighth Grade Groups on the KNOVA Test.

 

Mean Univariate P
Source df Squares F* Less
Than
Between Treatment
Groups 1 0.6186 1.233 .299
Within Treatment
Groups 8 0.501

 

*

F.05(1,8)=5.32

A test of the hypothesis of no interaction effects
between treatments one and two and sex, and treatments one and
two and grade resulted in a univariate F-Ratio of 0.6906 with
3 and 148 degrees of freedom and a probability less than
0.5592. The null hypothesis of no interaction was not rejected

for the analysis of individual data on the KNOVA Test.

136

A test of the hypothesis of no interaction effects
between treatment groups one, two, and three and grade yielded
a univariate F-Ratio of 2.8036 with 3 and 8 degrees of freedom
and a probability less than 0.1084. The null hypothesis of
no interaction was not rejected for group data on the KNOVA

Test.

Maturity of Moral Judgment

 

Null Hypothesis 2-a: Maturity of moral judgment as
measured by gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test does not
vary according to treatment.

A univariate analysis of variance comparing the mean
gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test of the experimental
treatment groups with the mean gain scores of the control
groups across sex and grade resulted in an F-Ratio of 4.082
with a probability less than .049. The F-Ratio for the multi-
variate test of equality of mean vectors was 5.8733 with 6
and 294 degrees of freedom and a probability less than .0001.
Null hypothesis 2-a was rejected on the basis of the findings
presented in Table 4.7.

Null Hypothesis 2-b: Maturity of moral judgment as
measured by gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test does not
vary according to method of instruction.

Following the rejection of null hypothesis 2-a, a
post hoc comparison utilizing the Scheffé Test for differences

between means was computed on the group data. The confidence

interval based upon the mean gain scores on the Moral Judgment

137

TABLE 4.7.--Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing Mean
Gain Scores of Experimental Treatment Groups with Mean Gain
Scores of Control Groups on the Moral Judgment Test.

 

 

Mean Univariate P
Source df Squares F* Less
Than
Between Groups 3 .854 4.082 .049
Within Groups 8 .209

 

*

F.05(3,8)=4.07

Test for treatment one (teacher instruction) groups and treat-

ment two (programmed instruction) groups was as follows:
-.800:T:w+2.206

The confidence interval included zero which indicated
failure to achieve significance at the .05 level and the null
hypothesis was not rejected. The mean gain scores and the
error variance utilized in the computation of the post hoc

comparison is presented in Table 4.8.

TABLE 4.8.--Post Hoc Comparison of Mean Gain Scores for Teacher
Instruction Groups and Programmed Instruction Groups on the
Moral Judgment Test.

 

 

Method Mean Error
Gain variance
Teacher Instruction .742 .209
.Programmed InStruction. . ...-039..

 

F.05(3,12)=3.49

138

Null Hypothesis 2-c: Maturity of moral judgment as
measured by gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test does not
vary according to sex of subject.

A univariate analysis of variance comparing the mean
gain scores for female subjects with the mean gain scores for
male subjects on the Moral Judgment Test across treatment and
grade yielded an F-Ratio of .270 with a probability less than
.603. The F-Ratio for the multivariate test of equality of
mean vectors was 0.6256 with 2 and 147 degrees of freedom
and a probability less than .5364. On the basis of the find-

ings presented in Table 4.9 the null hypothesis was not

rejected.

TABLE 4.9.--Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing Mean
Gain Scores for Males with Mean Gain Scores for Females on
the Moral Judgment Test.

 

 

Mean Univariate P
Source df Squares F* Less
Than
Between Groups 1 .797 .270 .603
Within Groups 148 2.982

 

*
F.05(1,l48)=2.70

Null Hypothesis 2-d: Maturity of Moral Judgment as
measured by gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test will not
vary according to grade level.

A univariate analysis of variance comparing mean gain
scores for seventh grade groups on the Moral Judgment Test with

mean gain scores for eighth grade groups on the Moral Judgment

139

Test across treatment and sex yielded an F-Ratio of 7.103
with a probability less than .028. The F-Ratio for the
multivariate test of equality of mean vectors was 3.134 with
2 and 7 degrees of freedom and a probability less than 0.1067.
On the basis of the findings presented in Table 4.10 the null

hypothesis was rejected.

TABLE 4.lO.--Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing Mean
Gain Scores for Seventh Grade Groups with Mean Gain Scores
for Eighth Grade Groups on the Moral Judgment Test.

 

Mean Univariate P

 

Source df Squares F* Less

Than

Between Groups 1 1.487 7.103 .028
Within Groups 8 0.209

 

*
F.05(l,8)=5.32

A test of the hypothesis of no interaction between
sex, grade, and treatments one and two yielded a univariate
F-Ratio of .1362 with 3 and 148 degrees of freedom and a
probability less than .938. The null hypothesis was not
rejected for individual data on the Moral Judgment Test.

A test of the hypothesis of no interaction between
grade and treatments one, two, and three yielded a univariate
F-Ratio of 1.7835 with 3 and 8 degrees of freedom and a
probability less than .2280. The null hypothesis was not

rejected for group data on the Moral Judgment Test.

140

The Value Judgment Strategy

 

Null Hypothesis 3-a: Essay responses to value con-
flict problems presented in subject matter areas other than
social studies do not vary according to knowledge of the
value judgment strategy as measured by content analysis.

A test for differences between the means of the
individual raw scores obtained by content analysis of the
essay responses for the treatment groups instructed in the
strategy (Tl’TZ) and the control groups (T3,T4) for seventh
grade subjects yielded a t-value of 0.176. This failed to
achieve significance at the .05 level and null hypothesis

3-a was not rejected for the seventh grade sample. The

computational data for the t—test is presented in Table 4.11.

TABLE 4.1l.--A t-Test of Mean Differences Between Subjects
Instructed in the Value Judgment Strategy and Control Sub-
jects for Seventh Grade.

 

 

Mean Standard
Source Score Deviation N t-Value*
Instruction 1.59 1.35 32 .176
No Instruction 1.35 1.25 28

 

*
t .05=1.96

A similar test of difference between means was per-
formed on the individual raw scores of the essay responses
of eighth grade subjects with a resultant t-value of 1.111.
This failed to achieve significance at the .05 level and

null hypothesis 3-a was not rejected for the eighth grade

141

subjects. The computational data for the t-test is presented

in Table 4.12.

TABLE 4.12.--A t-Test of Mean Difference Between Subjects
Instructed in the Value Judgment Strategy and Control Sub-
jects for Eighth Grade.

 

 

Mean Standard
Source Score Deviation N t-Value*
Instruction 2.30 1.29 50 1.111
No Instruction 2.10 .72 47

 

*

t.05=l.96

Correlations for Input Variables

 

As part of the univariate and multivariate analysis
of variance the correlation matrix for the five input variables
(socio-economic status, age, gain scores on the KNOVA Test,
gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test, and Verbal Intelli-
gence T-scores) was obtained. A test of significance of
each correlation yielded the following results; a negative
correlation of -.218 between age and socio-economic status
was significant at the .01 level, a negative correlation of
-.313 between age and verbal intelligence T-scores was
significant at the .01 level, and a positive correlation of
.414 between verbal intelligence T-scores and socio-economic
status was Significant at the .01 level. The negative correla-

tions seem to indicate that older children in both grades

142

come from lower socio-economic status families, as determined
by father's occupation, and tend to score lower on measures
of verbal intelligence. This may be a reflection of the
degree of emphasis placed upon verbal learning by different
socio-economic status groups. DThe significant positive
correlation which indicates that children from higher socio-
economic groups score higher on verbal intelligence measures 1
would seem to support this explanation, however caution is
urged in the interpretation of these correlations due to the
restricted range of the sample.

None of the other correlations in the matrix approached
significance at either the .01 or .05 level. The complete
correlation matrix for the five input variables is presented

in Table 4.13.

TABLE 4.13.--Correlation Matrix for Input Variables of Socio-

Economic Status, Age, Gain Scores on the KNOVA Test, Gain

Scores on the Moral Judgment Test and Verbal Intelligence
T-Scores.

 

 

VARIABLES
Sesl Age2 Knova3 Moral4 IQverb5
l ses 1.000
2 age -0.218* 1.000
3 Knova 0.072 -0.111 1.000
4 Moral 0.032 -0.080 0.010 1.000
s IQverb 0.414* -0.313* 0.127 0.131 1.000

 

*
Indicates Significance at the .01 level

143

Summary of Hypotheses Testing

 

The findings resulting from the analysis of data for
study have led to the following statements regarding the

rejection of the null hypotheses.

Knowledge about Values

 

l-a. No effect due to treatments Rejected
l-b. No effect due to method of

instruction Not Rejected
l-c. No effect due to sex of subject Not Rejected
l-d. No effect due to grade level Not Rejected

Maturipy of Moral Judgment

2-a. No effect due to treatments Rejected

2-b. No effect due to method of

instruction Not Rejected
2-c. No effect due to sex of subject Not Rejected
2-d. No effect due to grade level Rejected

Value Judgment Strategy

 

3-a. ‘No effect due to instruction in the
value judgment strategy for both
seventh and eighth grade subjects Not Rejected

Discussion of Findings

 

Knowledge about Values

 

The findings related to treatment effects in the

area of knowledge about values indicate rather strongly that

144

the experimental treatments achieved the purpose for which
they were designed. The significant increase in gain scores
from pretest to post test for the treatment groups that
received the information about values suggest that the sub-
jects were able to acquire and retain selected information
about the value concept.

The findings indicate that the acquisition and
retention of the information about the value concept was
not sex or grade dependent within the context of this study.
That is to say, the selected information about values was
acquired and retained as well by males as by females, and
as well by seventh graders as by eighth graders.

The results also suggest that the effect of the
experimental treatments was not dependent upon the method
of instruction. This is reflected in the finding of no
significant difference in gain scores on the KNOVA Test
between the groups receiving the instruction from the
teachers and the groups receiving the instruction from the

programmed booklet, Values 1.

Maturity of Moral Judgment

 

The findings related to maturity of moral judgment
indicate that the experimental treatments did significantly
influence the scores from pretest to post test on the Moral

Judgment Test.

145

Although the level of statistical significance was
less for maturity of moral judgment (.95) than for knowledge
about values (.985), the results do seem to indicate that
the systematic presentation and application of information
about values to selected social studies content tends to
increase maturity of moral judgment.

The tendency toward increased maturity of moral
judgment was not dependent upon the method of instruction
as indicated by the post hoc comparison of teacher instruction
groups with programmed instruction groups.

One important question is whether instruction in
the value judgment strategy, which was included in treat-
ments one and two but not in treatment three, was a signifi-
cant factor in the increased maturity of moral judgment.

Post hoc comparisons performed on the group data indicate

that mean gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test were
Significantly higher for treatment three groups than for
control groups. However, no significant differences were
found between treatment one groups and treatment three groups
or treatment two groups and treatment three groups on mean
gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test. These comparisons
would seem to indicate that the treatment effect on maturity
of moral judgment was due only to the information about values
segment of the treatments and not a result of instruction in

the value judgment strategy.

146

Though evidence related to the effect of sex upon
the maturity of moral judgment has been inconclusive in
earlier studies, the findings of the present investigation
indicate that there were no significant differences in
maturity of moral judgment between males and females. It
may be noted that the verbal intelligence scores, which were
higher for girls than for boys in this study, were not
significantly correlated with gain scores on the KNOVA Test
or gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test. This would tend
to negate any initial advantage in favor of females due to
a higher level of verbal intelligence.

The findings also indicate that there was a tendency
for maturity of moral judgment to increase significantly
more for eighth graders than for seventh graders. This may
be interpreted as reflecting the relationship between age
and the stages of moral development: a relationship which
has been consistently supported in previous studies of
moral judgment. The mean age for the samples indicated a
difference between the seventh and eighth graders of approxi-
mately one year. Though this is a relatively short period
of time, the year between ages twelve and thirteen may be a
crucial one for the development of moral judgment.

In the context of the present study it would appear
that the thirteen year old subject may have the ability to
apply the information about values to hypothetical moral
judgment problems to a greater degree than the twelve year

old subject.

147

Socio-Economic Status and
VerBal Intelligence

 

 

The results of this study indicated the same signifi-
cant correlation between verbal intelligence T-scores and
socio-economic status as has been evident in other studies
of moral judgment. In the present study, however, verbal
intelligence and socio-economic status were not significantly
related to either KNOVA gain scores or Moral Judgment gain
scores. This finding seems to suggest support for the notion
that moral judgment involves more than either verbal intell-
igence or the environmental factor of socio-economic status
based upon occupational data.

These results should be interpreted with caution,
however, due to the homogeneity of the selected sample which
reduced variability. An expanded range in terms of verbal
intelligence and socio-economic status may account for the
significant correlations between these variables and maturity

of moral judgment found in previous studies.

Essay Repponses to Value Problems

The value problems presented to both the seventh
and eighth grade samples were designed to depict conflict
between two positive values. In each problem these two
values were friendship and honesty. In his studies of moral
judgment, Norman Bull found that younger children exhibited

a far greater facility in judging conflicts involving a vice

148

and a virtue than in conflicts between virtue and virtue.
This facility was still pronounced at eleven years of age
but by thirteen years of age the evidence suggested a marked
increase in ability to judge conflicts between two positive
values or virtues.

The following value problem was presented to the

seventh grade sample in science classes in this study.

A medical student was working on an important experi-
ment in the laboratory which had to do with a new drug. This
drug could be the long awaited cure for a fatal disease.
Though it had only been tested one time on the lab animals it
had been successful. The hospital Board of Directors asked
if it had been completely tested so that it could now be
used on humans and the medical student assured them that it
was ready. You have been working with the student in the
experiment and know that the drug has only been tested once.
He is your best friend and you know that if the drug works on
humans that it could be a big break for both of you, yet you
feel guilty about lying to the hospital Directors.

In the space below write how you would.decide about
what to do.

 

Approximately thirty per cent of the seventh grade

subjects in the T T2, and T3 experimental groups identified

ll
the conflict between friendship and honesty as illustrated

by the following excerpts.

I would try to think what my friend would do if
I told, and how important that friend was to me.

I would take into consideration that my best friend
would get fired if the Board of Directors found out
that he only tested it once, but I would tell the
Board.

I would tell the doctors that it was only tested
once. I know it would make my friend mad.

149

I like him a lot and I don't want to tell on him
but I have to tell because it might not work.

The following value problem was presented to the eighth
grade subjects in English classes.

In "The Parsley Garden" by William Saroyan, Al Condraj
stole a hammer to make something out of the nails and apple
box which he had collected. He was caught in the act of
stealing and left feeling humiliated by the two men at the
store. Suppose the story was changed so that Al was not
caught but walked freely from the store with the hammer in
his pocket. Suppose also that Al's best friend, Pete Wawchek,
happened to be looking in the store window when Al was taking
the hammer. Pete thought that what Al did was wrong. He had
never known Al to steal anything before even though Al and his
mother had very little money. Pretend that you are Pete and
have just seen your best friend steal the hammer.

In the space below write how you would decide about
what to do.

Slightly more of the eighth graders in the T1’ T2,
and T3 experimental groups (approximately forty per cent)
than the seventh graders identified the conflict between

friendship and honesty as illustrated by the following

responses.

I would think about the welfare of the store and
the wrong involved in stealing the hammer. I
would also think about our friendship and how
telling might affect it.

I think I should tell because I know he's wrong
but he is my best friend and I know he is poor.

If I don't do something I am as guilty as he is.

Application of the Value Judgment Strategy
The above discussion illustrates the extent to which
the subjects demonstrated the use of the first step of the strategy

which involved stating the problem or conflict. The second

150

step of the strategy was to choose a criterion value (end-
goal or objective) which would guide the selection of a
final solution or action. There was some question as to
whether or not subjects of this age would understand and
apply this particular step of the strategy.

Approximately fifty-five per cent of the seventh
grade subjects in the experimental treatment groups explicitly
identified the preservation of life and/or health as the
criterion value. The following responses are representative
of this value on human life and health.

It may kill humans. It may have an after effect.

It's better to lose a friend than to have a patient
die.

What is more important, patients that are sick and
may die, or myself getting rich and famous?

If it were used to cure fatal diseases, it would
probably be strong and might kill or harm a person.

Approximately fifty-four per cent of the eighth grade
subjects in the experimental treatment groups cited the

future well-being of a friend as the criterion value for

resolving the value conflict.

I would consider what would happen to A1 if he
were caught and how he would probably do it again.

I wouldn't want him to steal more things in the
future, but I would feel awkward telling a best
friend what to do.

I think I would try to make him never steal again
by talking to him.

If I thought he was going to go on stealing things
I would try to convince him not to steal.

151

These responses appear to indicate a tendency in both
the seventh and eighth grade subjects toward the ability to
choose a criterion value as a guide for the selection of a
final solution.

Although there was a tendency for students in the
experimental treatment groups in both grades to apply the first
two steps of the value judgment strategy, approximately eighty
per cent of the seventh graders and seventy per cent of the
eighth graders proceeded to outline their final solution after
' noting the value conflict and/or mentioning a criterion value.
However, approximately thirty per cent of the eighth grade
students who had been instructed in the value judgment strategy
did consider more than one possible solution. In a few cases
the advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives were also
considered. However, this trend was not found to be signifi-
cant as reflected in the t-test of differences in means.

Only about twenty per cent of the seventh grade stu-
dents who had been instructed in the value judgment strategy
mentioned more than one alternative or speculated about the
pros and cons of an alternative. This may have been due to
the specific value conflict problem which was assigned to
the seventh grade sample. The majority of seventh graders
viewed their problem as a life or death matter. The value
placed upon life may have been so strong that it distorted
the subject's ability to consider any alternatives except

the most direct one to the preservation of life.

152

Moral Development Stages.--Piaget characterized moral

 

development as being composed of two major stages; heteronomy
and autonomy. Heteronomous morality is the first stage of
moral development for the child and focuses upon external
rules and authority. The autonomous stage, which follows
heteronomy, appears when mutual respect is strong enough to
make the individual feel from within the desire to treat
others as he himself would like to be treated. Piaget also
briefly discussed an intermediate phase of development
between heteronomy and autonomy in which, "the child no longer
obeys the commands given by the adult but obeys the rule
itself, generalized and applied in an original way."1

Though his explanation of the factors which allow
a child to progress from one phase of morality to the next
differs from the Piagetian conception, Bull describes similar
stages in the developmental process. Heteronomy or external
morality is dominated by rules imposed by others, as well as
references to such authority figures as parents, teachers,
religion, and police agencies. Bull's intermediate stage is
labelled socionomy or external-internal morality. The child
is not longer controlled by the external sanctions of reward

and punishment in the physical sense, but rather by the voice

 

lPiaget,'Moral Judgment of the Child, pp. 194-196.

 

153

of public opinion; of social praise and blame. The final
stage of autonomy or internal morality is characterized by
the individual%.own inner ideals of conduct. He is no longer
dependent for his moral controls upon fear of authority or
fear of public opinion. According to Bull, this autonomy
may vary greatly in its quality, from punitive guilt feelings
which castigate self and others to inner attitudes which are
rational rather than irrational, and altruistic rather than
basically self-concerned.2

The responses of both the seventh and eighth grade
samples have been analyzed for evidence of these three stages.

Heteronomy.--There were only two direct references

 

to specific authority figures from the 60 seventh grade
responses which composed the sample.

The story is not correct because the U. S. government

would not have the drug on the market without quite

a few tests on it.

The FDA would test the drug more.
It is interesting to note that six of the seventh grade sub-
jects indicated the direct application of the scientific method
to the testing of the drug. This may be regarded as a
reflection of what had been taught in science classes, but

it may also be regarded as an appeal to a different kind of

authority.

 

2Bull, Moral Judgment from Childhood to Adolescence,
pp. 30-35.

 

154

There were also several references to possible con-
siderations regarding external punishment among the seventh
grade responses.

If it did not work, what would happen to us?
We would get in a lot of trouble.

If you use the drug and it isn't safe you could get
into a lot of trouble.

Though about seventy per cent of eighth grade subjects
were willing to consider Al's specific Situation and the
reasons for his stealing the hammer, there were a few instances
where the application of a specific rule seemed to determine
the final action. One boy justified his solution with the
following statement.
You should not take things without paying for them
because the person who you stole the item from prob-
aly had to work hard to get it.

A girl expressed the following rule as justification for her

decision.

Nobody has a reason for taking or stealing things
no matter what the cost.

On the other hand, a few subjects resorted to the rule that,
"it is none of my business" to justify taking no action.

Several of the eighth grade responses indicated a
concern with external punishment.

He might keep on stealing and get caught one of these
times. If he got caught he would have a police record.

I would not want him to get punished for what he did,
if he took it back.

155
He might get into trouble and get put in jail and
have to put up bond.
Other eighth grade responses suggested reliance
upon an authority figure.

If it were something big and expensive I would tell
his parents.

I should tell his parents so they will try to do some-
thing about it.

I decided to go to Al's mother and tell her about
what happened and ask her if she would talk to A1
about it.
I would talk it over with a teacher.
Approximately six per cent of the subjects decided to rely
upon a different kind of authority which was Al's ability

to solve his own problems.

Even though he was my friend I would stay out of
the way and let Al worry about it.

I would discuss it with Al and let him decide.
I'd leave it entirely up to him.
I would talk with him first and let him decide.

Socionomy.--An interesting seventh grade response

 

which might be seen as a bridge between the stages of heter-
onomy and socionomy was the following.

The hospital Directors might get sued if any of
the peOple die from the drug.

There is a concern with others (the Directors) rather than
with self and getting sued may represent a form of social
blame. It is also possible that the notion of getting sued

represents the suggestion of external punishment. The

156

following responses seem to express the stage of socionomy

somewhat more explicitly.

If it didn't work, they would blame it on the
student and me for not telling the Board of Directors.

If it didn't work on humans you might be considered

a failure, and that would be more degrading than if

he wasn't a friend with you.

Approximately eighty per cent of eighth grade subjects

responded that they would not tell on Al to anyone. In
some cases this was to avoid punishment such as Al going to
jail, and in other cases it was so Al could avoid social
blame from his peers. One girl expressed it this way.

It would really make me feel funny if my friends

and my sister and brothers found out because I

always tell them how nice he is and that he would
never steal in his life.

Two boys wrote about how their own opinions about their

friend would change.

It would change my thoughts completely about him.
I wouldn't trust him.

I wouldn't like what he had done and I might down-
grade my friend a little. I might not hang around
with him anymore.

Autonomy.--A clear representation of the stage of

 

autonomy as characterized by guilt feelings was expressed
by the seventh grade subject who wrote:

I would feel very guilty for not telling the
Directors.

Piaget's consideration of the reciprocity factor
inherent in the autonomous stage was indicated in the

following seventh grade responses.

157

If I had the fatal disease would I like to have a
drug used on me that had only been tested once?

If I were sick I would want the medicine to be safe.
Three other seventh grade responses seemed to
indicate that the subjects had reached his own inner ideals

of conduct.

I don't think there is any real decision when it
comes to human life.

I would certainly not do anything that would endanger
someone's life.

You can make new friends but you can't make a per-
son live again.

Over twenty per cent of the eighth grade sample
seemed to have reached a conclusion based upon their own

inner ideals of conduct concerning stealing as reflected

in the following responses.

I don't want to tell on him, but leaving well
enough alone is out of the question according
to my values.

But how would I feel about myself, I mean he
might just keep on stealing.

First off I would ask him why he did it and
tell him he is wrong.

Al's my best friend but I think what he did was
wrong.

Over ten per cent of the subjects seemed to have
concluded from their own inner ideals of conduct that

friendship was the most important value.

158

If he were a real good friend and I knew him well
then I would go by that.

I wouldn't do anything because he is my best friend.

I probably would not tell on him because he is a
friend of mine.

What he was doing wasn't right but becauSe he is
my friend I wouldn't tell on him.

The quilt aspects of the autonomous stage were
reflected in a few responses with reference to A1.
He would probably have it on his conscience.
I'd let his conscience take over from there.
What about how his conscience is going to feel?

Finally I would come to the conclusion that I should
make Al feel guilty enough to take it back.

Many of the eighth grade subjects, approximately
seventy per cent, considered much more than the possible
consequences of Al's actions. In several instances they
questioned his motives and intentions.

I would think that maybe he is stealing because he
doesn't want to bother his mother by asking for

money.

Do I know this person? Is he doing something which
he himself thinks is wrong or doesn't he care?

I would wonder why he did it. Maybe because he wants
to make something for his mother.

I would think about why he did it and if he had a
good reason.

In view of this descriptive analysis of the essay
responses it would seem that more eighth grade students

than seventh grade students had reached the autonomous

159

stage of moral development. However, this conclusion may
only be representative of the different value conflict
problems presented to the two groups. Certainly the eighth
grade subjects did not consider their value conflict prob-
lem as a life or death matter. In comparison with the
seventh grade problem, the eighth grade situation may have
been easier for the subjects to identify with and respond
to on the basis of their own inner ideals of conduct.

One final observation about the essay responses
concerns the complexity of the thinking reflected in some
of the answers. One seventh grade subject wrote:

If the person that would take the drug had no chance

to live, then I would be quiet, but if the person

was not going to die right away and had a long life

ahead--friend or no friend--I'd tell the Directors.
While one eighth grade girl was drawn into the following
discussion on the psychology of Al's behavior.

First I would think about the kind of person I

knew Al was . . . . Would any of his actions be

leading up to his stealing? After I thought about

his personality I would wonder about his condi-

tions at home. Was he violent? Withdrawn? Was

he just regular? To decide this I would have to

know how he felt toward his mother and how she
felt about him.

Summary

The findings of this study indicated that knowledge

about values and maturity of moral judgment were significantly

increased as a result of the experimental treatments. The

analysis of data also indicated that the increase in

 

 

160

knowledge about values and maturity of moral judgment was
not affected by the method of instruction employed, the
sex of the subject, or the grade level of the student.

' Content analysis of the essay responses did not reflect
significant differences in the application of the strategy
to value conflict problems as a result of instruction,
although the findings did suggest that students in the
experimental groups were able to identify value conflicts
and select criterion values. Though students in T3 groups
were not instructed in the strategy they tended to be able to
apply the first two steps of the strategy almost as well as
the students who had received explicit instruction. One
explanation of this performance may be in the overlapping
nature of the information about values which was presented
to T3 groups and the first two steps of the strategy. The
limited number of subjects who applied the total value judg-
ment strategy to the value conflict problems were almost all
from the T1 and T2 groups.

The essay responses also tended to demonstrate the
complexity of moral judgment and the variability of subjects
in relation to Piaget's stages of moral development.

The summary, conclusions, and implications of this

study are discussed in Chapter V.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

The purpose of this investigation was to determine the
‘effects of the application of specific information about values
and a value judgment strategy to selected social studies
content by means of two teaching methods with middle school
students.

The selected sample was composed of 60 seventh grade
students and 98 eighth grade students in two teaching teams
at MacDonald Middle School in East Lansing, Michigan. The
primary cooperating teachers for both grades were the members
of the teaching teams responsible for social studies instruc-
tion.

The total seventh grade team was randomly divided
into four groups or classes and each group was assigned to one
of four treatments. A similar procedure was followed for the
eighth grade team, resulting in a total of eight groups, with
each treatment represented by one seventh grade group and
one eighth grade group.

The four treatments were as follows; (1) teacher
instruction in information about values and the value

judgment strategy and application of the information and

161

162

strategy to selected content from the book Kiowa Years, (2)

 

programed instruction, utilizing two booklets specifically
designed for this study, to provide information about values
and the value judgment strategy with application of the

information and strategy to selected content from Kiowa Years,

 

(3) teacher instruction in information about values and
application of this information to selected content from

Kiowa Years, and (4) no explicit instruction about values

 

or the value judgment strategy.

The hypotheses tested concerned; (1) the effects of
treatment, method of instruction, sex of subject, and grade
level of student upon the acquisition and retention of know-
ledge about values, (2) the effects of treatment, method of
instruction, sex of subject, and grade level of student on
maturity of moral judgment, and (3) the effect of instruction
in the value judgment strategy on essay responses to value
conflict problems. The relationship of socio-economic status
and verbal intelligence to the acquisition and retention of
knowledge about values and maturity of moral judgment was
also examined.

Two instruments were employed to collect both pretest
and post test information. The Knowledge of Values Test
(KNOVA) was specifically designed for the study to reflect
the acquisition and retention of selected information pre-

sented about the value concept. The Moral Judgment Test was

151‘

163

adapted from a series of twenty story items devised by Ronald
Johnson in accordance with the Piagetian theory of moral
judgment. These story items were employed in the present
study to determine the effect of the treatments on moral
judgment.

An additional source of data was provided by essay
responses to value conflict problems administered to the
subjects in seventh grade science classes and eighth grade
English classes.

The implementation of the specified treatments and
the collection of data took place over a ten week period
during Fall, 1970. The data from the pretest and post test
using the KNOVA and the Moral Judgment instruments was sub-
jected to a univariate and multivariate analysis of variance
employing mean gain scores. A t-test of mean differences
was performed on both the seventh and eighth grade essay
response scores. A descriptive analysis which related the
content of the essay responses to the application of the
value judgment strategy and to Piaget's stages of moral

development was also completed.

Conclusions of the Study

:The first four conclusions are related to the effect
of the presentation and application of information about

values to selected social studies content.

164

The presentation of specific information about values and
the application of this information to selected social
studies content did significantly increase knowledge about
values and maturity of moral judgment.

Significant increase in knowledge about values and matur;
of moral judgment was achieved by both the teacher instruv~
tion and the programmed instruction method.

Significant increase in knowledge about values and maturity
of moral judgment was achieved by both boys and girls.
Significant increase in knowledge about values and maturity
of moral judgment was achieved by both seventh and eighth
graders. Grade level did affect maturity of moral judg-
ment, however, to the extent that maturity of moral
judgment increased significantly more for eighth graders

than for seventh graders.

The following three conclusions are relevant to the

effects of instruction and application of the value judgment

strategy to selected social studies content.

5.

Instruction in the value judgment strategy and application
of the strategy to selected social studies content did
not have a significant effect on maturity of moral

judgment.

h IlIJ

. .‘

 

 

165

Knowledge of the value judgment strategy was not signifi-
cantly reflected in the essay responses to value conflict
problems by either seventh or eighth grade subjects.

The descriptive analysis of the essay responses indicated
that approximately thirty per cent of the seventh graders
and forty per cent of the eighth graders in the experi-
mental treatment groups recognized the values which were

in conflict in the problems. Over fifty per cent of the
subjects from both grades in the experimental treatment
groups explicitly chose a criterion value which represented

the basis for the selection of the final solution.

The two final conclusions indicate the relationship

of socio-economic status and verbal intelligence to knowledge

about values and moral judgment and the reflection of Piaget's

stages of moral development in the essay responses.

8.

Verbal intelligence was significantly correlated with
socio-economic status, however neither socio-economic
status nor verbal intelligence was significantly related
to knowledge about values or maturity of moral judgment.
Content analysis of responses of both seventh and

eighth graders suggested the variability which can be
found in relation to Piaget's stages of moral development
in subjects of similar ages. This tends to reinforce the

notion that the proposed stages of moral development are

166

theoretical constructs which represent a general frame-
work of moral development, subject to individual differ-

ences in terms of age and circumstances.

Implications of the Study

 

Wilson has noted that the area of moral education
urgently demands some kind of action, even though the field
is largely uncharted and much of the work must proceed by
trial and error. He encourages educators to "try out various
practical possibilities in as intelligent and well-informed
way as possible, with proper regard to the dangers inherent
in new methods; but certainly without undue hesitation."l

In keeping with Wilson's suggestion, this study was
designed as an exploratory investigation which utilized a
rational approach to value education. The results of this
study indicate that the experimental treatments, specifically
designed and implemented in the context of this research,
were successful in increasing student's knowledge about values.
Perhaps the more important finding, however, was the tendency
toward increased maturity of moral judgment, defined in
Piagetian terms, as a result of the experimental approach
to value education.

These findings seem to imply that programs in value

education based upon specific objectives which include;

 

lWilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 399.

 

167

(l) the distinction between facts, opinions, and values;

(2) the identification of values which underlie decisions;

(3) the identification of values which come into conflict in
selected situations, and (4) explanation of the nature, trans-
mission, and study of values, do positively influence the
student's knowledge about values and maturity of moral
judgment.

These results offer empirical support for the con-
tention that the understanding of concepts, the mastery of
facts relevant to the morality of the child's society, and
activities designed to objectify moral or psychological
problems are important content aspects of moral education.

Possibilities regarding the use of programmed materials
in value instruction are also suggested by the findings of
this study. This is not to say that the teacher is unnecessary
when such materials are employed. The role of the teacher
in guiding and directing the student in the use of the
programmed materials and in the application of the information
contained in such materials remains important.

Implication for the use of the particular program
in value education employed in this study in the school

environment suggests that it is equally effective with boys

and girls, and with seventh and eighth grade students, though

 

2Ibid., p. 411.

168

eighth grade students tend to demonstrate a greater increase
in maturity of moral judgment as a result of the program.
The classroom use of value conflict problems which
required essay responses from students supported the notion
that moral development is a complex process. The responses
elicited by the value conflict problems may provide an
important tool in the assessment of a child's growth in the

area of moral judgment.
Implications for Further Research

One of the most important questions to which future
research can be directed concerns the relationship between
increased knowledge about values and maturity of moral
judgment to moral behavior and action.

The early studies of Hartshorne and May concluded
that little evidence existed to support the notion that a
child would express the same values in a real situation as
he has expressed in writing or in personal interviews
where he is asked to judge a hypothetical case. The Hartshorne
and May studies leave the impression that what a student says
he will do in a given situation is "more moral" than what he
will actually do.3

Piaget takes the opposite View. He agrees that the

verbal judgment of a hypothetical situation may differ from

A

3Bull, Moral Judgment from Childhood to Adolescence,
pp. 18-19.

169

actual behavior in a similar situation. However, according
to Piaget, the verbal judgment will lag behind the actual
behavior. That is to say, the child's moral judgments in
the actual situation will be more mature than his verbal
responses will indicate when he is questioned about a
hypothetical story problem.4

Thus, the effect of increased maturity of moral
judgment, as measured by Piaget-type stories, upon actual
behavior would seem to be a relevant question for future
research.

The approach to value instruction employed in the
present study produced some positive results relating to
increased value knowledge and maturity of moral judgment.

The question of whether these results can be replicated with
more heterogeneous samples in terms of age, intelligence,
and socio-economic status remains to be investigated.

Additional questions for further research concern
the effectiveness of the value instruction approach as tested
in the present study when applied to subject matter other
than social studies and utilizing situations for the applica-
tion of the information about values other than the historical

struggle portrayed in Kiowa Years.

 

The relationship between length of time spent on the

implementation of the program and the effectiveness of

4Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, pp. 112-120.

 

170

instruction also provides an interesting question for future
research. In the present study the implementation of the
experimental treatments and the data collection procedures
took place over a ten week period of time, with approximately
one to two hours per week devoted to instruction or testing
specific to value education. The effect of variation in the
period of time devoted to value education and the intensity
of value instruction within a given time period remains to
bevstudied.

It is hoped that the modest success of the present
exploratory study will encourage others to investigate
educational programs designed to enhance the process of

moral development.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

171

q m '

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Belok, Michael; Bontrager, O. R.; Oswalt, Howard; Morris,
Mary; and Erickson, E. A. Approaches to Values in
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Berelson, Bernard. Content Analysis in Communication Research.
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Bull, Norman J. Moral Judgment from Childhood to Adolescence.
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Buros, Oscar K., ed. The Fifth Mental Measurements Yearbook.
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Campbell, Donald T. and Stanley, Julian C. Experimental and
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Canning, Jeremiah, ed. Values in an Age of Confrontation.
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Cantril, Hadley. The Why of Man's Experience. New York:
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Cram, David. Explaining "Teaching Machines" and Programming.
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Espich, James and Williams, Bill. Developing Programmed
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Finn, JeremyD Multivariance: Fortran Program for Univariate
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172

173

Flavell, John H. The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget.
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Frondizi, Risieri. What is Value? Illinois: Open Court
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Gallagher, James. "Productive Thinking." in Child Development
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Hartman, Robert S. "The Science of Value." in New Knowledge
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John Dewey on Education. Archambault, Reginald, ed. New
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Kluckhohn, Clyde. "Values and Value Orientations in a Theory
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Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Development of Moral Character and Moral
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Lerner, Eugene. Constraint Areas and the Moral Judgment of
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Lillie, William. An Introduction to Ethics. New York: Barnes
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174

Mager, Robert F. Preparing Instrugtional Objectives. Palo
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Marriott, Alice. Kiowa Years. New York: The Macmillan Co.,
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Massialas, Bryon G. and Cox, C. Benjamin. Inquiry in Social
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. and Kazamia, Andreas. Crucial Issues in the Teaching
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Moore, G. E. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: The University
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Neff, Mary V. Ethics for Everydanyiving. Chicago: Science
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Peters, R. S. Ethics and Education. Oakland, N.J.: Scott,
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Piaget, Jean. The Moral Judgment of the Child. Translated
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Reiss, Albert J. Occupations and Sgcial Status. New York:
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Remmers, H. H. Anti-Democratic Attitudes in American Schools.
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Rescher, Nicholas. Introduction to Value Theory. Englewood
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Rokeach, Milton. Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values. San
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Shaver, James P. and Berlak, Harold, eds. Democracy, Pluralism,
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1968.

 

Smith, Frederick R., and Cox, C. Benjamin. New Strategies
and Curriculum in Social Studies. Chicago: Rand
McNalIy and Company,1969.

 

175

Taylor, Richard. Metaphysics. Englewood, Cliffs, N.J.:
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The Republic of Plato. Translated with Introduction and
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The Taba Curriculum Development Project in Social Studies.
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1969.

Werkmeister, William Henry. Man and His Values. Lincoln:
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Williams, Robin M. American Society: A Sociological Inter-
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Wilson, John; Williams, Norman; and Sugarman, Barry. Intro-
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Articles

 

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Durkin, Dolores. "Children's Concepts of Justice: A Compari-
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. "Children's Concepts of Justice." Journal of
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Easton, David and Hess, Robert. "The Child's Political World."
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Ebel, Robert L. "Estimation of the Reliability of Ratings."
Psychometrika, XVI(1951), 407—424.

 

176

Hall, Elizabeth. "A Conversation with Jean Piaget and Barbel
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Jacobson, Margaret M. "Values 1". Michigan State University
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Johnson, Ronald C. "A Study of Children's Moral Judgments."
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Kohlberg, Lawrence. "The Development of Children's Orienta-
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MacRae, Duncan. "A Test of Piaget's Theories of Moral
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177

Additional References

 

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Bettelheim, Bruno. Overcoming Prejudice. Chicago: Science
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Blackington, Frank H., and Patterson, Robert S. School,
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Young." in Aspects of Value. Edited by Frederick
Gruber. PhiladeIphia: University of Pennsylvania
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Engbretson, William E. "Values of Children." Childhood
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Foster, Constance J. Developing Responsibility in Children.
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with The United States National Commission for
UNESCO. 1963.

 

Higgins, Elizabeth B. "An Exploratory Investigation of the
Valuing Process of a Group of Fourth-Grade Pupils."
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Montagu, Ashley. Helping Children Deve10p Moral Values.
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178

Ojemann, Ralph and Pritchett, Karen. "Piaget and the Role
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Peters, R. 8., ed. The Concept of Education. New York:
The Humanities Press, 1967:

 

Rokeach, Milton. "The Measurement of Values and Value
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Simon, Sidney B. and Harmin, Merrill. "Subject Matter with
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Smith, Philip G., ed. Theories of Value andiProblems of
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Taylor, Paul W. The Moral Judgment. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963.

 

APPENDIX A

KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES TEST

179

KNOVA

DIRECTIONS: We are interested in knowing what students your

age think about the following questions. This
is not a test for which you will receive a grade
or be given a time limit to finish. Please read
the instructions for each part and consider each
question carefully, then circle the answer which
you think is best.

 

Before beginning the questions, please fill out
the tOp part of the answer sheet.

Part I. It is sometimes hard to decide whether a word or a

statement is fact, Opinion, or value. However, in
everyday life we often act as if we know the differ-
ence. Circle the one lettered response on the
answer sheet which you think best describes each of
the following statements.

Freedom of speech

A. Fact
B. Opinion
C. Value

Oxygen is necessary for human life

A. Fact _
B. Opinion
C. Value

Ice Cream is good

A. Fact
B. Opinion
C. Value

Dogs are animals

A. Fact
B. Opinion
C. Value

180

181

Movies are fun

A. Fact
B. Opinion
C. Value

Concern for physical and mental health

A. Fact
B. Opinion
C. Value

Part II. The following situations represent certain value

decisions and value conflicts. Circle one answer
from the lettered responses which you think best
completes each situation.

Jane had not studied her math assignment before class
and her teacher gave a surprise quiz. She copied from
Mark's paper and received a high grade, but she was
upset about it and told her teacher that she had cheated.
In making the decision to tell her teacher, Jan recog-
nized her value of

A. Being competent

B. Being self-reliant
C. Being ambitious

D. Being responsible
E. Being honest

John was left in charge of his young brother for a short
time each morning until the regular baby-sitter arrived.
One morning the sitter was later than usual and John
knew if he stayed with his brother any longer he would
be late for school. He also knew the sitter would be
there within a few minutes and he considered leaving his
brother alone for that short time. But he decided to
stay at home until the sitter arrived and in making this
decision John probably recognized his value of

. True friendship
An exciting life
Being responsible
Freedom

Courage

MUOWF

182

9. Pam and Mary were both planning to go to their class
party. Mary had a new dress to wear and showed it to
Pam. Pam did not care for the dress, but when Mary
asked her if she liked it Pam replied, "Yes, it will
look great on you." In making this reply Pam probably
expressed her value for

A. Ambition

B. Friendship

C. Honesty

D. Accomplishment
E. Courage

10. On the way home from school Tom saw a bad fight between
two of his friends. He thought about trying to stop it
but did not interfere. Later he felt guilty. Tom pro-
bably had a value conflict between

A. A sense of accomplishment and a sense of excitment
B. Friendship and pleasure

C. Freedom of individuals and protection of human life
D. Responsible behavior and broadminded behavior

E. Self-controlled behavior and obedient behavior

11. Issues like fair housing and school desegregation often
cause people to have a value conflict between

A. Family security and responsible behavior
B. Individual freedom and equal opportunity
C. A peaceful world and an exciting life

D. Friendship and independence

E. Broadminded behavior and obedient behavior

12. National decisions to enter wars often cause peoPle to
have a value conflict between

A. Obedience and pleasure

B. Security and excitement

C. Courage and self-control

D. Responsibility and creativity
E. Peacefulness and security

Part III. The following questions are concerned with general
information about values. Circle the one response
which you think best answers each question.

13. A value may best be described as

A. Something we want; like a new bike
B. An idea about what is good

. A wish for happiness

A statement of fact

An opinion about nature

MUG

 

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

183

Values

A. Guide the behavior of most people
B. Are held by only good people

C. Are the same for all peOple

D. All of the above

E. None of the above

A person's first step toward solving a value conflict
would probably be

A. Listening to his parents

B. Listening to his friends

C. Knowing that he has a value conflict
D. Talking about the issues

E. Drawing conclusions

The value which is the most important to you

. Can change with age and experience

. Is also the most important value for each of your
classmates

. Will remain the same forever

. Is outlined for you in the Constitution if you are
a United States citizen

E. Is probably not the most important value for anyone

else

It is quite likely that as young children our values were
influenced mostly by

A. Our teachers

B. Our friends

. Stories we were told
. Television programs
. Our parents

[3100

An important group of values are those known as moral-
ethical values. These are ideas about

A. What is good and right behavior
B. What is beautiful

What is useful

What is economically profitable
What is in style or fashion

MUD

19.

20.

184

We can study the values of other people by

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Watching what they do

Listening to what they say

Reading about other peOple's ideas
All of the above

None of the above

We can learn to know our own values better by

A.
B.

C
D
E

Thinking about how we live

Thinking about what choices we make when decisions are
necessary

Thinking about how we judge other people

All of the above

None of the above

APPENDIX B

MORAL JUDGMENT TEST

FORMS A AND B

185

FORM A

DIRECTIONS: This is not the usual kind of test because there

are no right or wrong answers. This is an
important way for teachers to find out what
students your age really think. Read each
question carefully along with your teacher and
circle the letter of the answer following each
question which you think is best. For some
questions there will be a space for you to write
in your own answer if you do not agree with
those listed.

Please fill in the following information about yourself.

 

 

 

NAME
AGE: YEARS MONTHS
CHECK ONE: GIRL BOY

 

 

SOCIAL STUDIES CLASS

1.

 

Four boys went downtown one day and were looking around
in the store windows. One boy said, "Let's go into this
store and see if we can take something." Two of the
others thought this was a good idea but the other one
didn't want to. The three that wanted to told the one
that didn't want to that they'd tell all the other guys
that he was chicken. So he went with them. They all
took a few things but then the store detective caught up
with them. He caught the one that had suggested it and
he caught the two that had gone along with the idea. But
he didn't notice the one who hadn't wanted to take any-
thing, even though he was right beside the others and

was acting the same as they were, so that this one didn't
get caught at all.

Why did this one boy get away when the other three were
caught?

A. Because he really didn't want to take anything in
the first place.
B. It was just luck. Maybe the detective didn't see him.
C. Other (Write your own answer if you do not agree with
A or B).

186

2.

187

A girl named Nancy liked one of the boys in her class a
lot, but she didn't want anyone to know it. She told

her best girl friend about it and the girl friend promised
not to tell. But then she got angry at Nancy one day and
told a lot of people, so that Nancy got teased a lot,

but this boy hadn't gone with her before, so she had no-
thing to lose on that score.

Here is a story something like the first one.

 

This girl was named Sharon. She was going steady with
one boy, but her parents had visitors from out of town,
who had a son her age. Her parents asked her to show
this boy a little of the town. She didn't like doing
this because she thought it wasn't fair to her steady
boyfriend, but she went out with this boy to be polite.
She told her best friend about this and her girl friend
promised not to tell--just like in the first story. But
just by accident Sharon's girl friend mentioned it in
front of Sharon's steady boyfriend and some other kids.
He got angry at Sharon because she'd gone out with some-
one else when they were supposed to be going steady, so
he quit going with her. Sharon got teased and lost her
boy friend too, because of what her girl friend had said
without thinking.

Was Nancy's girl friend or was Sharon's girl friend the
worst?

A. Nancy's girl friend was the worst because she told
on purpose.

B. Sharon's girl friend was the worst because Sharon
lost her steady boy friend.

C. Both girl friends were equally bad.

Some boys and girls were playing football in the street.
A pass was thrown and the boy who ran to catch it ran

up onto a yard and trampled some recently planted shrubs
and flowers. What should be done to the boy: 1. make
him pay for the damage done or replace the shrubs and
flowers, 2. give him a licking so he won't do it again,
3. not allow him to play football.

What punishment would be fairest?
A. Make him pay for damages.

B. Give him a licking.
C. Not allow him to play football.

188

What punishment would be hardest?

A. Make him pay for damages.
B. Give him a licking.
C. Not allow him to play football.

The stores downtown are always worried about shoplifting.
In the past few years the stores have been good to school
students by giving them part-time work, especially at
Christmas, to provide those who don't have much money
with some buying power. The police have been working

on the shoplifting problem too; arresting many more
people. Shoplifting has decreased recently.

What do you think is responsible for most of the decrease,
the stores helping the young people or the increased
police action?

A. The stores giving part-time work because the students
have something to do plus earning their own money.

B. The increased police arrests because the students are
afraid of being caught.

C. Other (Write in your own answer).

A group of young people were coming back to school after
playing softball. Some of them had picked up rocks on
the diamond and were throwing them around. Finally, one
boy threw a rock which broke a window in the school.

The principal was nearby and heard the crash. He took
them all into a room and asked them who broke the window.
The boy who had broken the window wouldn't say he had
done it and the other boys would not tell on him.

Should the principal punish all the boys or none of them?
A. All of them because they shouldn't have been throw-

ing rocks in the first place.
B. None of them because only one boy is guilty.

189

6. A boy, about 16 years old, had a driver's license. His
father said that he could use the car whenever he asked,
as long as his parents weren't going to use it. The boy
used it pretty often but one night his father told him
not to, because he and the boy's mother wanted to use it
as soon as the father got off work that evening. His
mother was out so the boy figured that he'd use it any—
way and get it back before either parent got home. He
and his buddy took a ride around town but just as he
was headed home, he got a flat. Because of the time it
took fixing the flat, the boy didn't get the car home
on time to beat his Dad, so that his Dad found out, and
wouldn't let him use the car for a month.

If he'd have been driving the car with his father's
consent would he have still got the flat?

A. Yes, because the flat tire doesn't have anything to
do with his father's consent.

B. No, the world works in strange ways.

C. Other (Write in your own answer).

7. There was a young fellow named George who was working in
a filling station. He was putting gas in a car and the
driver asked him to check the oil. Then the driver went
inside. George got done putting in gas and was just
about to check the oil when another car came in that
wanted service in a hurry. He went to wait on this car
and then had to help with another car. He forgot all
about checking the oil in the car he had started out
with. The driver paid him but didn't ask about the oil
because he figured George would have added some if it
was needed. It happened that the oil was very low when
George forgot to check it and soon there wasn't any oil
left, so that the motor was damaged.

Here is another story like the first one.

This young man's name was Dale and he worked as a station
attendant too. He was putting gas in a car when the
driver asked him to check the oil. The driver went inside
and then Dale got to talking to some of his friends who'd
come in to see him. He figured that probably the car
didn't need any oil anyway. When the driver came out he
asked Dale how the oil was and Dale said that it was all
right, even though he knew he hadn't checked it. The

oil was low on this car too, but the owner had it checked
again before it ran completely out of oil, so that not too
much happened to hurt the car.

 

190

Which station attendant was worse?

A. George was the worst (the first attendant) because
car motor was damaged.

B. Dale (the second attendant) was worst because he
didn't check the oil on purpose.

C. Both attendants were equally bad.

This group of boys went into a candy store every day
after school. When they started out everything was all
right, but soon they began to take candy and things. One
day the owner caught them. They admitted that they'd
been taking things for quite awhile. The owner didn't
know whether to call the juvenile squad of the police

or to give the boys a spanking or to have the boys do
things like sweeping and mopping the store till they'd
worked to pay for what they had taken.

What punishment would be the fairest?

A. Call the police
B. Give the boys a spanking
C. Make them work to pay for what they had taken

What punishment would be the hardest?

A. Call the police
B. Give the boys a spanking
C. Make them work to pay for what they had taken.

Two guys about 10 years old, who lived in the same apart-
ment house, got hold of some firecrackers last Fourth

of July. Firecrackers are illegal and besides that they
both had fathers who worked nights. The firecrackers
woke their fathersup and each father took his own boy
into the house. The first father gave his boy a couple
of pretty hard swats for waking him up. The second
father took his son in and just told him how he'd been
up all night and needed to sleep, and that waking him up
would be just the same sort of thing as if someone kept
the boy awake at night after he wanted to go to sleep.
So both boys went outside again and played more quietly.
But there were still firecrackers left and the next day
one of the boys set them off, waking up the two fathers
again.

Which boy do you think it was this time?

A. The boy who got the swats because his father did not
explain why it was wrong to set off the firecrackers.

B. The boy who got the talking to because it wasn't hard
enough punishment for him to remember.

C. Other (Write in your own answer).

 

10.

191

A science class was on a trip in the spring and they
stopped to look over an apple orchard that was in bloom.
While the teacher wasn't around, one person in the
group cut off many branches to get apple blossoms. He
did this when none of the others were looking, so that
none of the group knew who did it. The farmer saw the
cut branches in the cars and was very angry. He com-
plained to the teacher but no one knew who did it so
no one could tell. The farmer and the teacher decided
to charge everyone in the group equally to pay the
damages, since they couldn't find out who had done it.

Was this right?

A. Yes, because everyone in the group should have
stopped the person who did it. The damage had
to be paid for.

B. No, because only one person was involved and the
whole group shouldn't be made to pay.

"4 .AJ‘ films-us.
C

192

FORM B

DIRECTIONS: This is not the usual kind of test because there

are no right or wrong answers. This is an impor-
tant way for teachers to find out what students
your age really think. Read each question care-
fully along with your teacher and circle the
letter of the answer following each question which
you think is best. For some questions there will
be a space for you to write in your own answer

if you do not agree with those listed.

Please fill in the following information about yourself.

 

 

 

NAME
AGE: YEARS MONTHS
CHECK ONE: GIRL BOY

 

 

SOCIAL STUDIES CLASS

1.

 

Two fellows were out one night and wanted to go riding

in a car. They didn't have one, but they saw a car

that was parked in front of a house with the keys in it,
so they took that car. They drove it around for awhile
but then they spotted a police car so they stopped the
car and got out and started to run through back yards

and alleys to ditch the police. They ran for awhile but
then one of them got winded and the police caught up with
him. The other one ran for awhile more and then he
crossed a ravine by an old bridge. The bridge was rotten
and a plank broke on him so that one leg went through

and got broken.

If this boy had not stolen the car and had been running
across the old rotten bridge would he have still broken
through and hurt himself?

A. Yes, because the bridge was rotten and would have
broken no matter who ran across it.

B. No, because he would not need to be punished in this
way.

C. Other (Write in your own answer if you do not agree
with A or B).

193

There was a boy named Bill whose parents were going on
vacation. He had a paper route and had to get someone
to take it for him for a week so that he could go with
them. He got his friend, a boy named Jimmy, to take the
route and Jimmy did a good job for a couple of days.
Then Jim's grandfather got sick and his parents had to
leave town to be with him and the boy had to go with his
parents. He didn't want to go and leave Bill's route,
but he had to. He had to leave with his folks in such

a hurry that he didn't have time to get anyone else to
take the route: he just notified the paper manager.
Well, when Bill got back from his vacation he had lost
his paper route because Jimmy, the boy he'd gotten as

a substitute had to leave it, so they'd hired another boy.

Here is another story about like the first one:

 

There was a boy named Johnny who had a paper route too.
His parents were going on vacation and he had to find
someone to take the route for him so he could go too.

He got one of his friends, a boy named Paul, to take

the route for a week. Paul got paid $5.00 in advance
for the week so he didn't pay much attention to how he
did the job. He forgot some places some of the days and
didn't deliver to all of them. Some other customers

got angry because he didn't roll the papers tight and
parts of the paper blew away or sometimes got wet. When
Johnny got back he found that he had lost one customer
out of every five.

Which one of the friends that took the paper route was
worse, the first or the second one?

A. Jimmy (the first one) because Bill lost his paper
route.

B. Paul (the second one) because he was just plain
careless.

C. Both boys were equally bad.

This girl was sitting around the house on a day off from
school. Her Dad asked her to go to the grocery store to
get some things because he and the mother didn't have a
chance to go themselves. The girl said that she'd go in
a few minUtes and then she said she'd go after while,
anyway, she never got around to going. No one else had
been able to go, so they had a pretty poor dinner that
night. The father was angry at her. He figured out a
few different punishments for the girl. The first one
he thought of was of not letting her go out at all that
week. The second one he thought of was to whip her. The
third punishment that he thought of was this: The girl
had a bike and often asked her Dad, who was a good
mechanic, to do some work on it. So the father

194

decided that the next time the girl asked him, he'd do
just like the girl, and never get around to helping her.

Which punishment was the fairest?

A.
B.
C.

Not letting her go out.
The whipping.
Not fixing her bike.

Which punishment was the worst?

A.
B.
C.

Not letting her go out.
The whipping.
Not fixing her bike.

A girl wanted to use her mother's new coat but her mother
didn't want her to and told her not to use it because
she was afraid the girl would maybe lose it in some way.

The
but
the

girl used it anyway figuring she wouldn't get caught,
the mother caught her. When she caught her using
coat she was so angry she made the girl stay in at

night for a week.

There was another girl who wanted to use her mother's

new
and
and
did
her
One

she
did

coat too, even though her mother didn't want her to
told her not to use it. The girl did use it anyway
the mother caught her at it but what this mother

was talk to the girl, explaining why she didn't want
to use it so that the girl would understand.

of these girls used her mother's coat the next time
thought the mother was not around and the other one
not.

Which one do you think used the coat again?

A.

B.

The girl who had to stay in because she didn't under—
stand why it was wrong to use the coat and she wanted
revenge.

The girl who was talked to because the punishment
wasn't hard enough to do any good.

195

There was a school dance and one small group was smoking
in the school building, which was against the rules.

The grownups found out that this had happened, but they
couldn't find out who had done it, because no one would
tell. Since they couldn't find out who the individuals
were, the principal decided to discontinue the dances
for the whole school for the rest of the semester.

Was this right?

A. Yes, because smoking is against the rules and no one
would tell who was guilty.

B. No, because everyone should not be punished for the
acts of a few.

C. Other (Write in your own answer).

A girl named Mary didn't like another girl because this
girl was going with a boy Mary liked. Mary called up
this girl's mother and told her a lot of lies about the
boy, so that the mother wouldn't let her daughter go out
with him. Because of this Mary got to go out with him.
The first time that they went out, another car hit the
one they were in, and Mary got a broken nose.

If Mary had not told any lies, but had gotten to go
out with this boy she liked anyway, would she still have
gotten the broken nose?

A. Yes, accidents like this can happen anytime.
B. No, she was being punished for lying.

This story is about a guy who came from a tough neighbor-
hood. He did pretty well, generally, but he sometimes
took things. He had a friend who was a very good basket-
ball player but whose folks didn't have much money so
that his buddy couldn't afford to get gym shoes. One

day when this boy was downtown he went into a store and
took some gym shoes that they had there and gave them to
his friend. Then a couple of weeks later he was hanging
around the drug store and managed to take a big box of
candy that only cost about one fourth as much as the gym
shoes. He didn't tell anyone about it, just ate all the
candy by himself. He wasn't caught either time and no
one ever found out where his friend got the gym shoes.

196

Which time was the stealing worse?

A. The first time because gym shoes cost more than
candy.

B. The second time because he was thinking only of
himself.

C. Both times were equally bad.

A boy was out with a group of friends one evening. They
got to wrestling and one boy began wrestling each of the
others, even when they didn't want to. He got to
wrestling a boy who was wearing glasses and the glasses
fell off and broke. There were all sorts of things that
the grownups could do to him; they could give him a
spanking or they could have him work to pay for replac-
ing the glasses or they could break something of his.

What would be the worst punishment?

A. A spanking.
B. Pay for the glasses.
C. Break something of his.

What would be the fairest punishment?

A. A spanking.
B. Pay for the glasses.
C. Break something of his.

Two boys got caught stealing a car. Their homes, their
school records, etc., were exactly alike, and neither
had led the other into taking the car, but for some
reason one was sent to Redwing Training School and the
other was put on probation and was allowed to stay at
home. The one who stayed at home had a good probation
officer who worked with him a lot. The one who was
sent to Redwing was given lots of discipline till he was
released after about a year and came home. They were
both in their neighborhood again. About six months
later one of them stole another car.

Which one do you think it was?
A. The one who went to Redwing because he didn't under-

stand why stealing was wrong and he wanted revenge.
B. The one who stayed home because he had it too easy.

10.

197

Some girls borrowed a car one night from the older
brother of one of them. They went for a ride in the
country and, since they all had drivers licenses,
they took turns driving. They all drove carefully
but one was driving a little fast and skidded on the
ice. The car went into the ditch and got a banged up
grille and right fender. ‘

Was the one driving responsible for the accident or
should they all be held responsible?

A. The one driving was responsible since she was
careless.

B. All the girls were responsible because they could
have stOpped their friend from driving too fast.

C. Other (write in your own answer).

APPENDIX C

DIRECTIONS AND CODING SHEET

FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

198

DIRECTIONS FOR RATERS

The purpose of the analysis of the essay responses
which you will score is to determine whether the student
responses reflect the employment of a specific strategy for
resolving the value problem. This strategy is defined and
illustrated by the following categories.

CATEGORY 1: Sentence indicates a clear statement of the
problem, especially the recognition that a value conflict
exists.

 

EXAMPLES:

Seventh Grade: "I would think to myself that it might
harm people if it didn't work. I don't
care if it would be a break through for
me, I would not want people to die."

Eighth Grade: "What he was doing (stealing) wasn't

right but because he was my friend I
wouldn't tell on him."

CATEGORY 2: Sentence indicates what is to be achieved by
solving the problem; the recognized end-goal, objective,
or criterion value.

 

EXAMPLES:

Seventh Grade: "If I said nothing I could be responsible
for someone's death."

Eighth Grade: "I would not want my best friend to get

into trouble or steal again."

CATEGORY 3: Sentence indicates a consideration of more than
one possible solution or alternative.

 

EXAMPLES:
Seventh Grade: "I would state my problem. Should I tell
them or not?"

Eighth Grade: "Should I forget about it? Or should I
tell the store? Or should I tell A1
that he is doing something wrong and
leave it at that?"

199

200

CATEGORY 4: Sentence indicates a consideration of the dis-
advantages and/or advantages of proposed solution or solu-
tions. A consideration of the consequences of the alter-
natives.

EXAMPLES:

Seventh Grade: "It might be terrible to tell the
Directors the truth because of the
harsh response."

Eighth Grade: "If I did tell, I wouldn't be his best

friend anymore."

CATEGORY 5: Sentence indicates the selection of a final
solution after a consideration of alternatives and/or con-
sequences.

EXAMPLES:

Seventh Grade: "Therefore I would not give this drug to
the hospital Directors even though this
could be a break of a lifetime for us."

Eighth Grade: "Then I'd talk with him about it, see

why he did it, and tell him I would
tell the manager the next time I
caught him."

Specific Directions for Coding Responses

1. On the coding sheet place your rater number and the grade
level of the subject whose response you are scoring in
the blanks provided at the top of the sheet.

2. Place the identification number of each response scored
in the first blank provided at the left of the coding
sheet.

3. Read each sentence of the response and determine, accord-
ing to the above category definitions, whether it satis-
fies the criteria of any one category. If it does, place
a one (1) in the space provided under the category
heading.

a. If the sentence cannot be classified under any of
the categories, no score is recorded. Proceed to
the next sentence.

 

201

b. If a sentence, particularly a compound sentence, can
be classified under more than one category, place a
(1) under each category.

c. Once any category has a score (1) placed under it,
do not record another score even though other sen-
tences may be classified under the same category.

When an entire response has been scored, total the number
of categories which have a recorded score of (l) in the
blank provided at the right of the coding sheet. The
total score per essay response may range from 0 to 5.

202

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Hmuoe

HO COHUUGHTW

m anommumo

mmomucm>ommeo mm>flumoumuam Ho
pom mommucm>pm maceuoaom maowmmom
mo sofiumumoemcoo mo oceumuwoemcou

v whommumu m whommumu

moam> coeumueno
wan um>fluomhno
no Hmomloom

N whommumu

uoaamcoo moam>
no Emaooum umnfioz
mo ucmsmumum coHuMOemeucmpH

H anommumu

 

 

Hm>mq momuo

 

HQQEdz Hmumm

8mmmm UZHQOU

APPENDIX D

SELECTED FRAMES FROM VALUES 1

AND VALUES 2

203

VALUES 1

General Directions

To the Student

 

This booklet is called a program. It is to "work" not just
to read. It is not a test. In fact, it is just the opposite.
A test finds out how much you know about something you have
already learned, but a program teaches you something new.

You "work" a program in three stages. First, you read the
short paragraph or statement on each page which is called a
"frame". Then, you write the answers which you think best
complete the sentences in the blanks provided. Third, you
lift the folded edge of the back cover to check and see if
the answer you have written is the same as the answer found
there. It is important that you write or print your answer
in the blanks provided instead of just thinking about it in
your head and peeking under the folded edge to see if you are
correct. Writing the answer in the blank will help you
remember it. After completing a page be sure the folded edge
of the back cover is properly placed to cover the answers on
the following page. (Proceed to the next page).

As you work your way through the program you will notice

that some of the frames will ask about something which you
have just read. Others may ask you to review things you

read earlier and you may need to turn back to an earlier

page to find the answer if you do not remember it. Always
check your answer before proceeding to the next page. If you
choose the wrong answer, read the frame again carefully to
see that you have not misunderstood the question. Then check
to see if your answer is similar to the answer given. If you
have trouble deciding how close your answer is to the one given
see your teacher for help. Do not erase your first answer if
it is wrong. Write the correct answer beneath it. For some
blanks you may notice that several answers are given beneath
the first one. This means that any of the answers given are
acceptable. For example:

Decrease
(become smaller)
(less)

(Turn the page and test yoursefifi4on what you have just read)

205

Test Question

 

 

Your answer is correct if it is the same as it
the answer(s) given or similar to (the one
in meaning. 'given)

Introduction to Values 1

The peoples of the world have developed ways of living which
have helped them adjust to and solve some of the problems
which their environment presents. For example, men have
found ways to deal with such problems as heat, cold, storms,
and distance. We have also learned some means of caring for
plants and animals. Man has invented such things as language
so that he can communicate with others. Man also has some
ideas about what is right, desirable and proper. These ideas
are usually called values.

(Proceed with program)

Selected Frames from Values 1

 

 

 

(Frame 1)

Values are ideas about what is right, good, or best.

They are an important part of our culture. Values good,
are ideas about what is right, best
or .

(Frame 2)

We have values about many different areas of

 

life. For example, we have values about what behaving
is good or right behavior or conduct. These (behavior)
are called moral values. Moral values are (conduct)
concerned with right ways of . (acting)
(Frame 15)

Many people share Jim's value of honesty

and feel it is very important. However,
since most of us also hold other values
which we feel are important it is possible
to have a disagreement between two or more conflict
of our values. This is called a value
conflict. It is possible for your values
about a certain situation or decision to
disagree with the values of another perSon
or group of peOple. This can also be called
a value .

 

206

VALUES 2

The Values 2 program directions were similar to those given
for the Values 1 program.

Introduction to Values 2

In the Values 1 program you learned that it is possible in
certain Situations for two or more values to disagree. We
called this disagreement a value conflict. This value con-
flict may be within yourself, between you and another person
or several persons, or between small or large groups of
peOple. Scientists, philosophers, and others have worked
out a method for solving problems. With the help of this
step-by-step method, it is possible to understand and even
to solve some confusing problems. You can apply this method
to value conflicts when trying to find a possible answer or
solution which will work. This Values 2 program will help
you learn to use the problem-solving method in situations
where values disagree or conflict.

(proceed with program)
Selected Frames from Values 2
(Frame 3)

Suppose you feel that honesty and good grades

in school are both important values. You go

to class and have a quiz for which you have not

studied. Your teacher is called from the room conflict
and you know you can look quickly at your class

notes from yesterday and copy the correct answers.

In debating about what to do you can be said to

 

have a value .

(Frame 5)

In the situation discussed earlier where you

are debating about whether or not to look up good grades
the quiz answers when your teacher leaves the (doing well
room there is a value conflict between honesty in school)

and .

207

(Frame 15)

In reviewing the method for solving a value problem
conflict the first step is to write out the (conflict)
(disagreement)

 

as clearly as possible.

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