


A STUDY OF THE APPLICATION OF SELECTED VALUE
INFORMATION AND A VALUE JUDGMENT STRATEGY TO
SOCIAL STUDIES CONTENT WITH
MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
DIANE ILEEN LEVANDE
1971



This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

A STUDY OF THE APPLICATION OF SELECTED VALUE
INFORMATION AND A VALUE JUDGMENT STRATEGY TO
SOCIAL STUDIES CONTENT WITH MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS

presented by

Diane Ileen Levande

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ABSTRACT

A STUDY OF THE APPLICATION OF SELECTED VALUE INFORMATION AND A VALUE JUDGMENT STRATEGY TO SOCIAL STUDIES CONTENT WITH MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS

By

Diane Ileen Levande

The purpose of this study was to explore the effects of the application of specific information about values and a strategy for making value judgments to selected social studies content with middle school students.

The hypotheses tested concerned; (1) the effects of treatment, method of instruction, sex of subject, and grade level of the student upon both the acquisition and retention of information about values and maturity of moral judgment, and (2) the effect of instruction and application of the value judgment strategy to selected social studies content on maturity of moral judgment and essay responses to value conflict problems.

The sample consisted of sixty seventh grade students and ninety-eight eighth grade students enrolled in one middle school in East Lansing, Michigan.

The students in each grade were randomly divided into four groups or classes and assigned to one of the following

four treatments; (1) teacher instruction in information about values and the value judgment strategy with application of the information and strategy to selected content from the book Kiowa Years, (2) programmed instruction, employing two booklets specifically designed for this study, to provide information about values and the value judgment strategy with application of the information to selected content from Kiowa Years, (3) teacher instruction in information about values with application of the information to selected content from Kiowa Years, and (4) no explicit instruction in information about values or the value judgment strategy.

Implementation of the experimental treatments and data collection procedures were completed over a ten week period during Fall, 1970. The Knowledge of Values Test (KNOVA) was specifically designed to measure acquisition and retention of information about values. The Moral Judgment Test was adapted from a series of story items devised by Ronald Johnson, in accordance with Piagetian theory, to measure maturity of moral judgment. Additional data was provided by essay responses to value conflict problems administered to the subjects in seventh grade science classes and eighth grade English classes.

Data analysis consisted of a univariate and multivariate analysis of variance of gain scores on the pretest and post test instruments and a content analysis of the essay responses to determine the effect of instruction in the value

judgment strategy and the relationship of the responses to Piagetian stages of moral development.

The results of the analyses yielded the following major conclusions.

1. The presentation of specific information about values and the application of this information to selected social studies content did significantly increase knowledge about values and maturity of moral judgment.
2. The increase in knowledge about values and maturity of moral judgment as a result of the experimental treatments was significant for both boys and girls, seventh and eighth graders, and teacher and programmed instruction groups.
3. Instruction in the value judgment strategy was not significantly reflected in either increased maturity of moral judgment or in the essay responses to value conflict problems.
4. Verbal intelligence was significantly correlated with socio-economic status, however neither verbal intelligence or socio-economic status was significantly related to knowledge about values or maturity of moral judgment.

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Diane Ileen Levande

A THESIS

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1971

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

Almost all known cultures and societies have at least paid lip service to the notion that education should do more than teach social skills, increase knowledge, or improve intellectual ability. Many have tried to build methods of value instruction into their educational systems under such headings as "bringing up children in the fear of the Lord," "the education of a gentleman," "educating the whole man," or "character training." In Western society, Socrates was perhaps the first to question the concept philosophically, by asking whether virtue could be taught and, if so, how.¹ Plato's Republic devotes no small amount of discussion to the transmission of the values of the ideal state to its citizenry, especially the young.²

John Comenius, a pioneer in educational theory, believed the major task in seventeenth century education to

¹John Wilson, Norman Williams, and Barry Sugarman, Introduction to Moral Education (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc. 1967), p. 12.

²The Republic of Plato, Trans. with intro. and notes by Francis M. Cornford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), pp. 88-111.

be moral in nature. His thesis consisted of sixteen fundamental rules which began with; "All the virtues, without exception, should be implanted in the young." The cardinal virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice were to be instilled first, followed by adaptability, industry, unselfishness, and endurance. The primary method used to transmit these values to the young was the living example of parents, teachers, and fellow students who were to present well-ordered lives for the children to imitate.³

In the early development of colonial America the primary responsibility for value indoctrination was assumed by the church. The small communities established by the early pioneers were most often composed of persons having similar religious convictions, standards, and beliefs. The church elders, using God as their authority, arrived at absolute principles and standards in the area of values. The primary purpose of the schools was to maintain and perpetuate the religion and ideals represented by the adult community. The early textbooks designed for use in elementary schools often had religious or moral connotations and successful character building was linked to the disciplined, quiet classroom where good behavior and moral virtue were demanded of the children.

³Michael Belok, et al. Approaches to Values in Education (Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown, 1966), p. 283.

As the nation grew several forces combined to initiate a more secular approach to value education. Stress on religious freedom, governmental control of schools, the methods of science, and the philosophical stance of naturalism were all major influences in the eventual decrease of any particular religious emphasis in the public schools. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, as the newly born social sciences were emphasizing individual choice and the absence of absolute authority regarding matters of value, the idea that teachers could present moral beliefs through the study of subject matter, especially through the careful examination of such subjects as history and literature, became an acceptable approach to value education.

With the advent of the progressive education movement and its emphasis on the educator's responsibility for the development of the whole child, the need for character education was recognized as one of the primary aims of the educational process. Directing his thought toward moral education and character training, John Dewey wrote, "The divorce between the intellectual and the moral must inevitably continue in our schools as long as there is a divorce between learning and doing. The attempt to attach genuine moral consideration to the mere processes of learning, and to the habits which go along with learning, can result only in a moral training which is infected with formality, arbitrariness, and an undue

emphasis upon failure to conform."⁴ Under Dewey's influence much stress was placed on the child's opportunity to experience the results of knowledge. Students were urged to examine questions or topics with open mindedness, sincerity, breadth of outlook, and thoroughness. They were also urged to accept the responsibility for developing the consequences of their own ideas.⁵

Throughout the history of education these various approaches to the problem of value instruction have enjoyed differential periods of support. Simultaneously, each approach, as well as others which might be revealed by a more detailed analysis of educational history, has aroused disagreement and debate. It appears that some of the controversy in value education has arisen from a misunderstanding of the issues and approaches involved in such an endeavor. Much of it, however, stems from the basic philosophical differences regarding the nature and apprehension of values which have served as fuel for the continuing dispute over content and method in the struggle to introduce the young to those ideas, beliefs, and standards cherished by their elders.

⁴John Dewey on Education, ed. by Reginald Archambault (New York: Random House, Inc., 1964), pp. 120-121.

⁵William K. Frankena, Philosophy of Education (New York: Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 73.

Need and Importance of the Study

Societal Concerns

Concern and anxiety about value questions in contemporary American society has grown to national proportions. The daily outpourings of the news media, as well as popular journalistic endeavors and artistic productions, lament the state of a democracy which can allow such outrages as crime, drug abuse, war, racism, poverty, and social inertia to continue and even increase. Articles in both popular magazines and academic journals often conclude that these various social ills have come about because of a basic change in values. The issue most often cited in this hypothesized value shift is the lack of respect for, or total rejection of, the traditional sources of authority.

This charge, if true, of a breakdown in the acceptance of traditional authority presents a serious problem for society in general, but it is considerably worse for those who occupy positions in the traditional and accepted places of authority. The state has governed, in almost all past societies and many present ones, on the basis of a commonly accepted and shared system of values, often backed by a religion or near-religion. There was a traditional acceptance or agreement about certain values which those in authority were trusted to maintain. The mass of people lacked education, opportunity, energy, ability, or economic resources to make any effective

intellectual challenge even if they had desired to do so. If, as many commentators on modern society claim, there has come into being a relatively powerful segment of society who fundamentally disagree with much that has been deemed essential in the traditional value system, then the democracy faces some very special problems. As suggested by Wilson, "you cannot defend a country if people do not think it worth defending, or are pacifists. You cannot implement a policy of hard work for a higher level of living if people no longer believe in the merits of hard work, and do not earnestly desire a higher level of living. You cannot enforce the law if people do not approve of it, or regard law enforcement officers as enemies."⁶

There are some indications that a sizeable number of citizens, especially among the young, are no longer committed to the traditional values. A recent research project designed to diagnose the mood and temper of high school and college youth as compared to members of the business community concluded that, "There are new values held by a great many young people that often conflict with those held by most businessmen. These students do not doubt their ability to make a living, to be successful in the conventional sense if they so choose. Taking these benefits for granted, they discount them and emphasize the importance of the individual, the desirability

⁶Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 15.

of social change, and the search for meaningful personal relationships and work. They question authority on almost every count and hold up virtually every institution of our society for re-examination. For the most part, they find them wanting."⁷

Substantiating the above conclusions a recent editorial reported the following, "We shouldn't be surprised that a recently completed survey of 170,000 freshmen entering college in 1969 showed that a majority tended to reject the achievement values of their parents. Life goals named least often by the freshmen were; contributing to scientific theory, being an expert in finance, and becoming a community leader. Goals most often mentioned included; developing a meaningful philosophy of life, having friends with different backgrounds and interests, and helping others who are in difficulty."⁸

It is perhaps too easy to cast doubt upon these survey studies, based primarily upon responses from young people, by challenging the sample or the methodology of these investigations. Responding to the same theme, John Wilson offers a different kind of evidence that traditional authority is being rejected by pointing to the rise in non-authoritarian

⁷John D. Rockefeller 3rd, "Reconciling Youth and the Establishment," Saturday Review, January 23, 1971, pp. 28-29.

⁸Robert E. Burns, "The Examined Life: One Way of Looking at Everyday Manners and Morals," U.S. Catholic and Jubilee, February 1971, Inside cover.

ways of thinking. He notes the rise in popularity of the ideas expressed in "humanism, existentialism, modern analytic philosophy, psychoanalysis, social science, and perhaps even the increased popularity of the scientific or quasi-scientific approach to life in general. Equally important for educators are the constant references in the literature to the importance of teaching children to be responsible, to think for themselves, and to adapt a critical attitude."⁹ These notions, according to Wilson, testify to the vast but confused desire to substitute something for a vanished or vanishing authority in that area of life which deals with values. The difficulty stems from not being clear about what to substitute.

It has been suggested in the preceding paragraphs that there is at the present time in American society a moving away from authoritarianism regarding matters of value. Those who represent the traditional forms of authority in such institutions as government, religion, and education are experiencing decreasing success in maintaining public commitment to absolute principles and standards in the value area. It would appear that an alternative to these traditional forms of authority is being sought and it is within the context of this phenomenon that the need arises for education to re-examine and clarify the area of value instruction at both the conceptual and applied levels.

⁹Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 13.

Educational Concerns

Much of what appears in the literature concerning value education today centers upon two aspects of contemporary life; the dilemma of personal choice and the seemingly infinite nature of social problems which require the attention of an educated citizenry. Speaking to the problem of personal choice, Smith and Cox predict, "the world will continue to be one of fascinating and dangerous alternatives and the individual growing up in it will either become more skillful in choosing among these alternatives or will by default have his choices made for him."¹⁰ An increasing difficulty in choice making is compounded by the probability that the individual is most often confronted with choices which are not clear-cut cases of good and evil, but entail selections between good and good.¹¹

Regarding the ills of society, it almost appears that problem fomenting conditions are a permanent characteristic of the present environment, for as some problems are dealt with, others become more apparent and persistent. Some seem perennial, reoccurring and reappearing as conditions once believed stable shift and change to undermine old solutions.¹²

¹⁰Frederick R. Smith and C. Benjamin Cox, New Strategies and Curriculum in Social Studies (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), p. 65.

¹¹Byron G. Massialas and C. Benjamin Cox, Inquiry in Social Studies (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 153.

¹²Smith and Cox, New Strategies and Curriculum in Social Studies, pp. 62-63.

In a recent article William Boyer commented upon the necessity of value education in the preparation of citizens who will be confronted with these problems. "Social planning can occur through an elitist top-down system, or it can be based on bottom-up participation, the relative emphasis being reflective of an autocratic or democratic social philosophy. Specialists are needed in either system to provide accurate information about the consequences of alternative plans, but value judgments are necessary to define the kind of future to be planned. This role cannot be performed by specialists. The failure of schools to help students become participants in planning processes virtually predetermines that social planning will be elitist, representing the values of those who have the power to affect social policy."¹³

Urging for research into the nature of values, their development, influence, and transmission comes from many quarters. Cantril acknowledges that "because value judgments play so important a role in scientific thinking, every effort must be made to discover ways and means of making value judgments themselves the subject matter for scientific inquiry."¹⁴

¹³William H. Boyer, "Education for Survival," Phi Delta Kappan, III (January, 1971), p. 259.

¹⁴Hadley Cantril, The Why of Man's Experience (New York: Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 8.

In the social sciences, Rokeach has raised the question of whether the time is not ripe for replacing the study of attitudes, which has occupied a dominant place in research and theory for over half a century, with an even more deserving candidate for the central position--the concept of value.¹⁵ Echoing this concern, David McClelland has stated, "I believe that psychology must deal with substantive moral issues, with content."¹⁶

Preliminary recommendations from the 1970 White House Conference on children contain several specific suggestions related to values. These include; encouraging value communication between parents and children, using a multi-media approach in education to help children develop values, and a plea that more empirical data be amassed on value and value formation.¹⁷

Though value questions are inherent in all aspects of education, many social studies educators agree that their field, with its increased emphasis on social judgment in a democratic society as a paramount act of citizenship, is,

¹⁵Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1969), pp. 157-158.

¹⁶David C. McClelland, "To Know Why Men Do What They Do," Psychology Today, 4, (January, 1971), p. 35.

¹⁷White House Conference on Children, "Preliminary Form Recommendations," Washington, D.C., 1970. (Mimeographed.)

perhaps more than any other subject involved in the language of value education.¹⁸ However, the question of how teachers incorporate the study of values into social studies content has been largely left unanswered. Though some promising models for value inquiry have been reviewed in the literature, little has been done by teachers to bring questions concerned with the ethical domain into the classroom for serious consideration.¹⁹ According to Shaver and Berlak, "It seems obvious, therefore, that in developing a rationale for social studies education, we must consider intellectual strategies appropriate to the making of value judgments."²⁰

It is against this background of broad societal concern about values and increasing demands within the educational sphere for further conceptual and empirical study of value education that this investigation derives its importance. The questions asked in this study are relevant to both the theoretical and applied levels of value education.

Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this investigation is to determine the effects of the presentation of specific value information

¹⁸Smith and Cox, New Strategies and Curriculum in Social Studies, p. 65.

¹⁹Massialas and Cox, Inquiry in Social Studies, p. 177.

²⁰James P. Shaver and Harold Berlak, eds., Democracy, Pluralism, and the Social Studies (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), p. 339.

and the application of a value judgment strategy to selected social studies content by means of two teaching methods with middle school students. Effects will be assessed by techniques designed to measure the development of knowledge and understanding in the study of values, the maturity of moral judgments, and the transfer and use of the value judgment strategy in response to appropriate value conflict problems presented in other subject matter areas.

Assumptions of the Study

This study is based upon the assumption that specific knowledge about the concept of value, the development of values, and value conflicts, as well as, the act of making a value judgment is, in part, a rational process which can be learned in the school environment. The theoretical basis of this investigation rests upon the assumption that Piagetian stage theory, as it relates to moral development, represents a realistic state of growth which will be manifested in the middle school student sample. This study also rests upon the supposition that the value judgment strategy selected for use does facilitate the making of normative judgments and that the measures selected to assess the effects of the application of this strategy to selected social studies content will discriminate changes in knowledge, understanding, and judgment.

Definition of Terms

There is much disagreement among scholars concerning the meaning of terms which are relevant to the study of values and ethics. Thus, the following definitions are specific to this study and have been reached through a review and analysis of both theory and materials used in the context of this investigation.

Value

Social scientists have defined value as a belief, conception, or idea about what is good, desirable, or preferable, which influences or guides man's behavior. In the context of this study the concept of value was presented to the student sample as "our ideas about what is right, good, or best in many areas of life, including things which are good because they are useful or beautiful."

Fact

The following definition of fact was presented to the student sample in the context of this study. "In general we can define a fact as something that has actually happened or that can be proven. Your correct name, the correct address of your house or school are examples of things which you are quite certain are true."

Opinion

Though it is often difficult to distinguish opinion from fact or value, the following explanation of opinion

was given to the student sample in the context of this study. "Opinions are our own views or judgments about many things. Opinions are not based on certainty but on what seems to be true or probable. They frequently concern judgments about matters of taste or our likes and dislikes."

Value Information

In view of the information to be presented about values specific objectives were outlined relevant to knowledge and understanding of value terminology, the differentiation between values, facts, and opinions, the development and transmission of values, and the differentiation of value conflict situations.

Value Judgment

A critical examination of alternative solutions which are selected or rejected on the grounds of their defensibility relative to some predetermined standard or criterion.

Moral Value

The particular area of value theory which deals with ideas about right or good conduct or behavior.

Moral Development

The acquisition by the human being of those ideas or beliefs which guide his actions in the area of right or good conduct or behavior.

Moral Judgment

A critical examination of alternative solutions which are selected or rejected on the grounds of their defensibility relative to some predetermined standard or criterion, specifically in the area of right or good conduct.

Moral Judgement Stages

According to Piagetian theory, levels of moral judgment can be assessed regarding; (1) immanent justice, (2) moral realism, (3) punishment, and (4) responsibility.²¹

Strategy

An intellectual tool constructed for the purpose of enabling one to think about or examine more closely the object or world represented by it.

Value Judgment Strategy

The strategy adapted for use in this study was developed by the Columbia Associates in Philosophy and includes the following steps: (1) Explicit statement of the problem or irresolution, (2) Identification of value or an end in view which is shared by all participants that is related to the problem under consideration, (3) Exploration of the range of alternative solutions to the problem, (4) Establishing the relationship between the proposed course of action and the disputed goal referent by empirically testing "if-

²¹Further explanation of the moral judgment stages can be found on p. 24 of this study.

then" statements or implications, (5) Possible acceptance of a defensible proposal.²²

Social Studies Content

For the purpose of this study, social studies content focused on the information contained in the book Kiowa Years by Alice Marriott.²³ The material in this book attempts to portray the historical struggle between the Kiowa Indians and the white man over land rights as the Indians saw, felt, and understood what happened. The discussion of various value issues raised in Marriott's book was used to present the subjects with one account of an historical event to which they could relate both the information about values and the value judgment strategy.

Programmed Instruction

A teaching technique which presents the material to be learned in step-by-step form. The student learns one step before going on to another; and the material is so presented that he can proceed by himself, checking his responses at each step of the process.

Knowledge of Values Test (KNOVA)

A twenty question multiple-choice instrument developed especially for the collection of pre and post test data on

²²Massialas and Cox, Inquiry in Social Studies, pp. 163-169.

²³Alice Marriott, Kiowa Years (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968).

subject's knowledge about certain aspects of the value concept for the present study.

Moral Judgment Test

Twenty story items developed by Ronald C. Johnson as part of a research effort to test some of Piaget's ideas about children's moral judgment. This instrument was used in the present study to collect pre and post test data on maturity of moral judgment.

General Hypotheses of the Study

A review of the literature on value education, especially in the field of social studies, and of the developmental processes involved in moral judgment according to Piagetian theory has led to the following general hypotheses to be tested in this study. These hypotheses are restated in statistical terms in Chapter III.

1. Knowledge about Values

- a. Instruction in information about values and a value judgment strategy will significantly increase knowledge of values as measured by the KNOVA Test.
- b. Knowledge of values as measured by the KNOVA Test will not vary according to method of instruction.
- c. Knowledge of values as measured by the KNOVA Test will increase significantly more for females than for males.
- d. Knowledge of values as measured by the KNOVA Test will increase significantly more for eighth grade subjects than for seventh grade subjects.

2. Maturity of Moral Judgment

- a. Instruction in information about values and a value judgment strategy will significantly increase maturity of moral judgment as measured by the Moral Judgment Test.
- b. Maturity of moral judgment as measured by the Moral Judgment Test will not vary according to method of instruction.
- c. Maturity of moral judgment as measured by the Moral Judgment Test will increase significantly more for females than for males.
- d. Maturity of moral judgment as measured by the Moral Judgment Test will increase significantly more for eighth grade subjects than for seventh grade subjects.

3. Value Judgment Strategy

- a. Knowledge of the value judgment strategy as presented in social studies classes will be reflected to a significant degree in the analysis of value conflict problems in other subject matter areas as measured by content analysis.

Additional Considerations

Results of several studies which proposed to test certain aspects of Piagetian theory pertaining to moral development have shown a relationship between intelligence, particularly verbal intelligence, and moral judgment. There is also some evidence that a relationship exists between socio-economic status and moral judgment. In view of these findings, some consideration will be given to the variables of intelligence and socio-economic status in the present investigation.

Limitations of the Study

This study is limited by the conceptual view that value development and judgment are based in part upon

cognitive abilities which can be enhanced by learning and the theoretical base which postulates a stage process in moral development.²⁴

The selection of the Columbia Associates model for considering value judgments places another limitation upon this investigation. The present literature indicates that this model has not been previously applied to specific subject matter content in a classroom situation and its selection imposes a certain framework for the consideration of value judgments.

This investigation is also limited by the sensitivity of the measuring instruments available for use, the characteristics of the sample selected, and the abilities of the researcher and the cooperating teachers to devise and implement the research procedures.

Background Theory: Moral Development

McDougall reflected the mood of early twentieth century theorists in his 1908 statement that "the moralization of the individual by society" was the primary focus of social psychology. For some time, morality was the central category for defining social relationships and development, and the social sciences were known as the "moral sciences." From this healthy beginning the concept of morality has slipped in and out of focus as a question for empirical investigation.

²⁴Though this particular conceptual view and theoretical base define certain boundaries for this investigation, they also make the study possible.

In the late twenties and early thirties Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) and Jean Piaget (1932) gave impetus to the study of moral judgment. Renewed interest in this concept did not materialize to any great extent until the late fifties and early sixties when several studies can be located which purport to test aspects of Piaget's theory of moral development.

Piaget's book, The Moral Judgment of the Child, which appeared in 1932 remains one of the most comprehensive child-centered works devoted to this topic. The experiments from which Piaget developed this theory were simple observations of the children's game of marbles. Piaget explains, "Children's games constitute the most admirable social institutions. The game of marbles, for instance, contains an extremely complex system of rules, that is to say, a code of laws, a jurisprudence of its own."²⁵ Piaget maintains that the observations of how a child obtains the rules of the game of marbles is directly related to his moral development. "All morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules."²⁶ During the preliminary experiments, researchers asked children to teach them how to play marbles so that the child was obliged to formulate and express the rules. Analysis of the responses of the subjects, whose ages ranged from six to thirteen years, led

²⁵ Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, trans. by Marjorie Gabain (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 13.

²⁶ Ibid.

to the formulation of a number of recognizable stages in the development of the child's use and understanding of rules.

The Motor Stage. The marbles are handled largely at the dictates of the small child's transient desires, or motor habits. His play is not, however, entirely at random; he develops a number of rigid patterns of behavior, but it is doubtful to what extent it would be correct to call these rules.

The Egocentric Stage. Between the ages of two and five the child begins to imitate rules which he sees in the behavior of other children, but he does not as yet try to co-operate in any real sense.

The Incipient Co-operation Stage. The children are now playing together in a real sense. They are trying to win, and therefore they begin to pay attention to the question of a code of unified rules; but their ideas of rules in general are still vague.

The Codification Stage. Approximately at the age of eleven or twelve this last stage materializes in which rules are now fixed in detail. The code of rules is known to the children's society as a whole.²⁷

These stages apply to the child's use of the rules, his ability to explain them, and the form of his rule-following at various ages. In answer to questions designed to probe into the extent to which a child actually knows what the rules are, and about where and how he acquires his ideas on rules and their operation, the data collected suggested the presence of another set of orderly stages which were similar, but not identical, to the above sequence.

At first the infant has no conception of rules at all, but gradually as they begin to impinge upon his play they are regarded as interesting examples with little binding force or power.

²⁷Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, pp. 260-261.

At the second stage there is a keen awareness of rules. They are regarded as sacred and untouchable; coming from adults and lasting forever. Piaget has termed this level the transcendental stage.

At the third stage it becomes permissible to alter rules provided other players of the game agree as they are seen as being based on mutual consent. Piaget sees this as the final stage which is based on mutual respect and co-operation and the most relevant to the question of genuine moral development.²⁸

Piaget's interest in the transition between stage two (transcendental) and stage three (co-operative) led him to another set of experiments designed to investigate children's ideas about concepts more directly related to moral behavior. These experiments were built around the children's responses to questions about several short stories which Piaget devised portraying children performing morality-relevant acts in specified situations. The following example is one set of stories designed to elicit the child's view regarding intentionality or moral realism.

- A. A little boy who is called John is in his room. He is called to dinner. He goes to the dining room. But behind the door there is a chair, and on the chair there is a tray with fifteen cups on it. John couldn't have known that there was all this behind the door. He goes in, the door knocks against the tray, bang go the fifteen cups and they all get broken!
- B. Once there was a little boy whose name was Henry. One day when his mother was out he tried to get some jam out of the cupboard. He climbed up on a chair and stretched out his arm. But the jam was too high and he couldn't reach it and have any. But while he was trying to get it he knocked over a cup. The cup fell down and broke.²⁹

²⁸ Ibid., p. 262.

²⁹ Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, p. 122.

The children were asked two questions about these stories; (1) Are these children equally guilty? (2) Which of the two is the naughtiest and why? Stories and questions of a similar nature were devised with reference to the child's conception of lying, justice, punishment, and responsibility. The data collected from this series of experiments allowed Piaget to further define the following concepts and to form a kind of dichotomy which reflects immature and mature response in the area of moral judgment.

Immanent Justice. The belief in the existence of automatic punishments which emanate from things themselves. Attributing justice to supernatural causes indicated an immature response; attributing justice to chance indicated a mature response.

Moral Realism. A belief that acts should be judged in terms of consequences, not on the motive behind the act. Immature response indicated by judgment on consequences; mature response indicated by judgment based on intent.

Punishment. A belief in retributive or restitutive punishment and the effectiveness of severe punishment. The immature response indicated retribution with more severe punishment; the mature response indicated restitution with less severe punishment.

Collective and Individual Responsibility. Choice of collective or individual punishment. Immature response indicated collective punishment; mature response indicated individual punishment.³⁰

It was also within the context of this work that Piaget developed his theory of the two moralities of the child. Flavell has a particularly enlightening discussion of this aspect of Piagetian theory.

³⁰ Ronald C. Johnson, "A Study of Children's Moral Judgments," Child Development, 33, (1962), p. 237.

There appears to be two moralities in childhood, at least within the culture from which Piaget's subjects were drawn. The developmentally earlier one is a morality of constraint, formed in the context of the unilateral relations between child as inferior and adult as superior. The child adapts to the prohibitions and sanctions handed down on high by reifying them into simple moral absolutes--simple 'givens' which are unquestioned and sacred, in theory if not in practice. . . . With development, this morality of constraint is at least partially replaced by a morality of cooperation, formed out of the reciprocal relationships among status peers and based on mutual, rather than unilateral respect.³¹

Regarding his theory of the two moralities of the child, Piaget has said that during the morality of constraint the child is willing to accept his rules from adult authority, but during the later morality of cooperation the child is independent of adults. Piaget has even suggested that if children were free from adult imposed standards of right and wrong they would proceed to the more mature morality of cooperation even earlier.³² It appears that this particular aspect of Piagetian theory has raised more controversy than support. Research findings have suggested that this idea of morality, which develops first through adult authority and then through peer group respect, is applicable in some cultures but not in others. Though some educators have interpreted the idea of two moralities to mean less adult control

³¹ John H. Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 295-296.

³² Elizabeth Hall, "A Conversation with Jean Piaget and Barbel Inhelder" Psychology Today Vol. 3, No. 12, May, 1970, pp. 28-29.

and more self-government by children, Piaget has recently stated that such implications of this theory need further empirical study.³³

One of the most fruitful ideas to come from Piaget's research has been the concept of developmental stages in moral growth based upon a particular group of cognitive abilities. These specific abilities have never been explicitly defined by Piaget, but theorists have suggested that these abilities include the ability to form moral concepts, the ability to reason in moral terms, and the ability to make value judgments. Other important factors which have been identified are the ability to make moral or value comparisons, to have insight into the needs of or behavior of others, and the ability to carry out rules in practice.³⁴

Since Piaget's work on moral judgment there have been several studies which draw upon his methods or attempt to subject his findings to more rigorously designed experiments. One of the most well known theorists in America, Lawrence Kohlberg, has been directly involved with testing the stage theory of moral development. He has used larger, more heterogeneous samples and his data have been based on lengthy individual interviews focusing on the child's responses to questions about stories which contain value conflicts. After

³³Ibid.

³⁴Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, pp. 256, 266.

detailed examination of these recorded interviews Kohlberg has concluded that a child's moral development is based upon the following six stages which can be categorized under three major headings; Pre-Moral, Conventional Role Conformity, and Self-Accepted Moral Principles.

I. Pre-Moral

Stage 1. Punishment and obedience orientations. Rules are obeyed to avoid punishment.

Stage 2. Naive instrumental hedonism. The child conforms in order to obtain rewards.

II. Morality of Conventional Role Conformity.

Stage 3. Good-boy morality of maintaining good relations. The child conforms to avoid disapproval.

Stage 4. Authority maintaining morality. The child conforms to avoid censure by authorities and resultant guilt.

III. Morality of Self-Accepted Moral Principles.

Stage 5. Morality of contract. A duty is defined in terms of contract, general avoidance of violation of the rights of others.

Stage 6. The morality of individual principles of conscience. The child conforms to avoid self-condemnation.³⁵

Kohlberg is generally credited with providing statistical evidence (a frequent criticism of Piaget's work which tends to be more clinical and descriptive in nature) for the developmental stage theory in moral growth. Accordingly, a series of stages must be passed through in a certain order, the attainment of one being a prerequisite for passing on to the next. The acceptance of this idea is generally thought to preclude the notion that moral development can be explained

³⁵Ibid., pp. 268-271.

entirely as an internalization of outside values through such processes as socialization, introjection, or conditioning, because the child can internalize the moral values of his parents and culture and make them his own only as he comes to relate these values to a comprehended social order and to his own goals as a social self. The fundamental factor in stage theories of moral development is social participation and role-taking, which involve an emotional component of empathy as well as a cognitive component of being able to define situations in terms of rights and duties.

Similarly, the stage theory seems to indicate that certain views of moral education, in particular, didactic moralizing and punishment, are not as relevant to moral development as the role of the teacher in helping the student take the next step toward maturity of judgment. It is within this latter context that Kohlberg has suggested, "it may be possible to define moral education primarily as a matter of stimulating the development of the child's own moral judgment and its control of action. Because there appears to be considerable regularity of sequence and direction in the development of moral judgment, the stimulation of moral development may be distinguished from the simple imposition of arbitrary cultural or personal standards upon the child. This means, in the first place, the stimulation of the child's use of his current capacities for moral judgment and of his use of these judgments in guiding and criticizing his action.

It means, in the second place, the stimulation of developmental changes of moral judgment to the next level of maturity."³⁶

One major aim of this investigation is the selection, design, and application of specific information, strategy, and methods which may prove significant in giving the student practice in making moral judgments and in stimulating him to the next stage of maturity in moral development.

Overview

Chapter II of this study includes a general review of major conceptual issues in the area of axiology and ethics which have direct bearing on this problem. It also contains a review and discussion of the relevant research. Sample characteristics, instrumentation, and research design are considered in Chapter III. In Chapter IV the statistical and descriptive findings of the study will be presented and discussed. Chapter V will include the conclusions of this study and a discussion of the implications.

³⁶Lawrence Kohlberg, "Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology," in Review of Child Development Research, ed. by Martin L. Hoffman and Lois Wladis Hoffman, I (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), p. 425.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The focus of the first part of this review of literature is on the examination and clarification of some major conceptual issues in axiology and ethics as they relate to the present study. In the second section of the review of literature the empirical findings relating to moral development, value education, and teaching strategies are presented.

Conceptual Issues Relating to Axiology and Ethics

Scholars concerned with value questions have long recognized the need to develop a more precise terminology to enhance and extend the theoretical study of the subject. This acknowledgment may be the only point of agreement, for as efforts increase to generate a scientific language of values there is still little indication of any across discipline concurrence on the meaning of central terms.

In general, social scientists have adopted a conception of value as an observable variable in human behavior and this conception has focused considerable attention on adapting the seemingly objective methods of science to the

study of values. These efforts have led some scholars to warn that, "The methods of science can be applied to any realm of experience in an attempt to find out what facts there are, and scientific theories can be constructed in an attempt to explain these facts, but scientists are the ones who must choose which realm of experience to investigate."¹ Canning continues by explaining that the basis for this choice of what to investigate is a value commitment. Others maintain that not only is the selection of the problem a value question, but also, "Whether any scientist likes to admit it or not, any interpretation he makes must be regarded as a value judgment."² It might also be suggested that the idea of subscribing to the scientific or empirical method reflects a certain kind of value commitment which encompasses its own set of assumptions and limitations. Thus it may be argued that research into questions concerning values is itself saturated with elements of the concept it proposes to investigate.

The following examples represent definitions of value which have been proposed by some well known social scientists. These definitions have frequently been used as the basis for empirical studies investigating particular aspects of this concept.

¹Jeremiah Canning, ed., Values in an Age of Confrontation (Ohio: Charles H. Merrill, 1970), pp. 62-63.

²Cantril, The Why of Man's Experience, pp. 6,8.

Values are things which people want, desire to be or become, feel as obligatory, worship, enjoy. Values are modes of organizing conduct--meaningful, affectively invested pattern principles that guide human action.³

A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action.⁴

A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally and socially preferable to alternative modes of conduct or end-states of existence.⁵

Definitions of this kind which include terms like want, desire, feel, and prefer, as well as postulating a relationship between values and action or choice-making behavior suggest some assumptions about both the nature of man and the nature of values.

The theoretical base of the present study, originating from the pioneer work of Piaget and those who have followed his lead in trying to explain moral development, also encompasses certain ideas about the nature of man and of values. Piaget's model of moral development has a cognitive base which includes certain kinds of abilities, such as the ability to formulate moral concepts, to reason in moral terms, or to make moral judgments. These abilities, taken as a whole,

³ Robin M. Williams, American Society: A Sociological Interpretation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 372.

⁴ Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value Orientations in a Theory of Action: An Exploration in Definition and Clarification," in Toward a General Theory of Action ed. by Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 388-433.

⁵ Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes and Values, p. 160.

might be thought of as problem-solving in the realm of ethics and axiology. John Wilson discusses a parallel notion when he suggests that moral education be conceptualized as giving students some idea about "how to do morality."⁶

The value judgment strategy adapted from the model outlined by the Columbia Associates in Philosophy also assumes that certain cognitive abilities are inherent in the making of normative judgments. Among these abilities might be the recognition that a given problem contains a conflict of values, the ability to form value concepts, and to compare and choose a solution from among various alternatives. Some approaches to value education within the school environment also rely on a cognitive framework for the study of values. They assume that certain kinds of criteria about how to recognize and handle problems relating to values can be learned by attending to specific information and by following given procedures.

It is not the intention of the preceding discussion to be critical of the impingement of values upon scientific endeavors or to suggest that various definitions, theories of moral development, and approaches to value education need not make assumptions about both the nature of man and the nature of value. To the contrary, it is because these assumptions are made that this first section of the review of

⁶Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 26.

literature attempts to define and clarify some of these major suppositions and search for their compatibility with the study of axiology and ethics in the context of this investigation.

Free Will

To believe, or at least to act as though they believe, that things have causes is so common for men that some philosophers have declared it an a priori principle, while others have deemed it to be at least a part of the common sense of mankind. This idea poses no special problem when it is thought of in connection with nature or even in relation to man's physiological functioning, such as his growth or pulse rate. The real controversy arises when this idea of cause is applied to man's thoughts, ideals, and especially to his behavior, which is supposed to be deliberate, purposeful, and perhaps even morally significant.⁷ The nature of the free will question is so complex that it has long been debated in philosophical circles and this debate has produced two major positions known as determinism and indeterminism. Determinism is the view that every event, including human choices and volitions, is caused by other events and happens as an effect or result of these other events. Indeterminism denies this, and states that some events, among them human choices and volitions, happen without cause or explanation. Part of the problem is whether either of these views is true; a question

⁷Richard Taylor, *Metaphysics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 33-35.

which cannot be considered here but must be left for metaphysics to decide. What is important to consider in the context of this investigation is the compatibility of each of these positions and their variations with the idea of value education and moral development based upon a rational view of man.⁸

In trying to clarify and reconcile these positions, Werkmeister has suggested that the basic problem is a distinction between free will in the negative sense and free will in the positive sense. His idea of the negative sense of the term is one which construes free will as complete indeterminacy of action. He argues that this idea is not demonstrable because even our free choices are at least motivated and, therefore, specifically determined. Werkmeister also argues that a view which holds to a thorough going determinism would eliminate freedom of choice. He then elaborates on the idea of free will in a positive sense which conceptualizes man as being other than the rest of nature. It has often been argued, especially by determinists, that since all events in nature are causally determined then man, being a part of nature, must also be causally determined. Werkmeister argues that man is a unique creature; a rational being capable of having insight into causal relations and understanding of the laws of nature. Thus his idea of free will in a positive

⁸William K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 57.

sense is a will which is determined, not by cause and effect relationships, but by insight and understanding and a due consideration of consequences.

Perhaps it is appropriate at this point to examine the notion of cause more closely. This term is ordinarily defined as "an antecedent sufficient condition or set of conditions."⁹ R. S. Peters has noted that there is a "need to distinguish different types of causes which are appealed to in the explanation of behavior. By this is meant not just the distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions... but also between different types of conditions that are appealed to in the explanation of different types of behavior."¹⁰ Peters notes that "most of the things we do, as distinct from things that happen to us, are explained in terms of a model in which an individual is postulated who is conscious of the situation in which he is acting, of means to ends and of rules governing the appropriateness both of means and ends. Within this model concepts such as those of intention, deliberation, foresight, decision, and choice have their appropriate place and can count as causes of actions just as a movement can count as a cause of other movements in a sphere in which a mechanical model may be appropriate, for example, in explaining an eye-blink."¹¹

⁹Taylor, Metaphysics, p. 52.

¹⁰R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education (Oakland, N. J.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1967), p. 188.

¹¹Ibid.

Lillie supports this view by stating that, "the only reasonable form of determinism is that which holds that our actions are directly determined not only by causes outside our bodies, but by causes within the body, in particular by what we have called our character."¹²

If this view of cause as proposed by Peters and Lillie is accepted, then it seems reasonable to suggest that insight and understanding, as noted by Werkmeister in his concept of free will in a positive sense, can also be considered as causes of actions.

Werkmeister suggests that the best evidence for his position on the free will question are the facts of our own first-person experience, for we have all experienced a feeling of freedom which is quite different from a feeling of compulsion: a difference which is reflected in the "I did this" as opposed to the "I could not help it." Werkmeister admits that it could be argued that feelings are no indication of proof, that they are illusory and do not disclose the real state of affairs. Spinoza supported this latter point of view when he suggested that if a stone, having been thrown into the air, were suddenly to become conscious, it would suppose itself to be the source of its own motion, being then conscious of what it was doing but not aware of

¹²William Lillie, An Introduction to Ethics (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1961), p. 45.

the real cause of its behavior.¹³ Similarly, it is possible that man is completely determined but believes that he is free. According to Werkmeister, if the view is held that feelings are not indication of proof or do not express the real situation, then it must be explained how it comes about that we are completely determined but feel that we are free; and to do this may be more difficult than to accept our feelings at face value and bring them into harmony with a positive concept of free will.¹⁴

In summary, Werkmeister's conclusion is that he rejects indeterminism as incompatible with free will and subscribes to a variation of determinism which regards man's actions as determined by insight and understanding. As evidence for the validity of this position he offers first-person experience regarding feelings of freedom versus feelings of compulsion.

Frankena argues that how one answers the question of determinism or indeterminism regarding behavior determines how such acts as praising, blaming and holding responsible are justified morally. If the view is held that behavior is the result of wholly chance swervings such as may be attributed in physics to sub-atomic particles, then it would appear pointless to try to influence people by such methods as holding them responsible, blaming or praising, setting an

¹³Taylor, Metaphysics, p. 53.

¹⁴William Henry Werkmeister, Man and His Values (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), p. 145.

example, or reasoning with them. Unlike Werkmeister, however, Frankena suggests a variation of indeterminism which could be held without being incompatible with free will. One may maintain that there is some indeterminism in the human sphere but that there are statistical regularities in human behavior of a sort that our actions are to some extent predictable and can be influenced by such things as sanctions.¹⁵

Frankena also maintains that a deterministic view could allow for free will by holding that we are normally free to act and choose in accordance with our desires, beliefs, and character. All that the determinist is required to insist upon is that our beliefs, desires, and traits of character have causes.¹⁶ This particular view has come to be known as "soft determinism" and it makes three claims; (1) that all human behavior is caused and determined, (2) that voluntary behavior is nonetheless free to the extent that it is not externally constrained or impeded, and (3) that the causes of voluntary behavior are certain states, events, or conditions within the agent himself; namely, his own acts of will or volitions, choices, decisions, and desires.

Taylor explains that it was thought for a time by many philosophers that the view of "soft determinism" at last brought about a reconciliation between determinism and

¹⁵Frankena, Ethics, pp. 58-60.

¹⁶Ibid.

indeterminism. However, he maintains that it only serves to camouflage the problem and can be refuted by asking whether our own inner choices, decisions, and desires are themselves caused. If determinism is true, then they must also be caused.¹⁷

There is a third alternative to determinism or indeterminism which is usually referred to as the theory of agency and attributed to Immanuel Kant. Specifically, holders of this position argue that a person is a unique agent capable of a kind of "self-determinism" which is not a function of previous causes and yet is not a matter of chance, but of choice, intent, and purpose.¹⁸ This view confirms that man can sometimes be the cause of his own behavior. Taylor suggests that this view fits two things about which most men feel quite certain; (1) that they sometimes deliberate with the view of making a decision, and (2) that whether they deliberate about what to do or not, it is sometimes up to them what they do.¹⁹ It may be noted that Taylor's suggestion that this view supports what man commonly feels about his actions is similar to Werkmeister's first-person experience between freedom and compulsion, and thus subject to the argument that feelings do not reflect the true nature of reality. Though this theory of agency may have certain appeal, it should be

¹⁷Taylor, Metaphysics, pp. 43-44.

¹⁸Frankena, Ethics, p. 60.

¹⁹Taylor, Metaphysics, p. 50.

kept in mind that it involves some rather strange metaphysical notions that are never applied elsewhere in nature. Perhaps the most confusing idea is that a person, who is not merely a collection of things or events, but a substance and a self-moving being can nevertheless be the cause of an event. It will be recalled that being a cause ordinarily means being an antecedent sufficient condition or set of conditions. Taylor suggests that the conception of cause in the agency theory which suggests causation of events by beings or substances that are not events is so different that another word, such as originates, initiates, or performs might better be used in its place.²⁰

Frankena also indicates that the agency theory has not been worked out in any very clear or adequate way. It is his contention that the study of axiology and ethics may proceed with the acceptance of a variation of indeterminism which holds that there is a degree of statistical order in human behavior which can be influenced to some extent by providing examples, educating, or applying sanctions. It is also possible to hold a variation of the deterministic view which allows that men are usually free to act according to their beliefs, desires, and traits. In the final analysis, of course, the determinist would stand firm in the argument that these beliefs, desires, and traits have causes.²¹

²⁰Ibid., pp. 51-52.

²¹Frankena, Ethics, pp. 59-60.

In summary, it can be noted from this brief discussion of free will that there are inherent difficulties in any of the outlined positions, though it is possible to adopt variations of these positions which do allow the study of values, especially moral values, to proceed. A belief in the sheer randomness of all action or in the complete determinism of all action without regard for the possibility of influence through reason or learning would leave little foundation for any concept of morality or value education.

Axiology and Ethics

Having examined some possible views of the free will question which allow for the study of human behavior, especially in the realm of values, and for a rational approach to value instruction, it is the task of this section to consider the study of values (axiology) and morals (ethics) from the historical perspective.

Though there has been some confusion in the past it is generally recognized today that the study of value theory and of ethics are not necessarily one and the same. Axiology is usually explained as being much broader in scope than ethics, including the study of moral values, as well as a wide range of practical and aesthetic evaluations. Ethics might be thought of as one particular aspect of value theory which concerns itself with conduct or behavior in relation to such concepts as good and bad, duty and obligation.²²

²²Werkmeister, Man and His Values, p. 145.

Ethics in the Western World

In the field of ethics two distinct traditions have been developed in the Western World. One tradition, going back to the Greek classics, accepts as key categories the terms good and bad. The other tradition, first formulated in the Mosaic Code, accepts as key categories the terms of duties and obligations. Both traditions are concerned with the question, "What ought I to do."²³

The Greek tradition can be characterized as a search for the ultimate end or good which "ought" to guide all actions. The hedonists concluded that this end was pleasure, Aristotle suggested it was happiness, Plato considered it knowledge, the Stoics deemed it virtue, and the Utilitarians declared it to be the general welfare. This search continued until the arrival on the scene of G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica in 1903. In a revolutionary move Moore declared, "Good is good, and that is the end of the matter."²⁴ He labeled all previous attempts to define good as some particular end as the naturalistic fallacy. According to Moore, these things are good, but they are not goodness itself, i.e., pleasure is good, but pleasure is not goodness. Moore held

²³Ibid., p. 59.

²⁴G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: The University Press, 1903), p. 6.

goodness itself to be incapable of definition though he later came to think of goodness as something which all good things have in common.²⁵

A contemporary representative of this particular view is Hartman who attempts to carry Moore's idea one step further and define good as the property of concepts. He explains that when a person understands that a thing is "good" he doesn't need to know anything about the specific thing in question but he must know something of the concept of which this thing is an instance. In the case of an automobile he does not need to know anything about the particular automobile in question, but he must know something of the concept automobile of which this one particular automobile is an instance. For Hartman, a thing is good when it fulfills the definition of its concept.²⁶

In its modern version, the second tradition in ethics accepts duty and obligation as its key categories. A well known representative of this school is W. D. Ross who regards rightness rather than goodness as ultimate and indefinable and attempts to derive the notion of duty from it. The right act is suitable to the situation in which the agent finds himself. The situation however encompasses both objective

²⁵Robert S. Hartman, "The Science of Value," in New Knowledge in Human Values, ed., Abraham H. Maslow (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 16-17.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 19-20.

and subjective elements. It is rare, if not impossible, for an agent to know fully all the objective elements in a situation and thus he is rarely, if ever, in a position to determine a completely right act. But he does know the subjective elements of a situation and he must accept the subjectively right act as obligatory for him--regarding it as his prima-facie duty.²⁷

Perhaps the most outstanding spokesman for the tradition now under consideration is Immanuel Kant. He attempted to avoid the problem of possible conflict between basic principles by showing that there is only one basic principle from which all others may be derived. For Kant, this principle was what he called the first form of the categorical imperative, "Act only on the maxim which you can at the same time will to be a universal law."²⁸ Kant finds the ultimate justification of the categorical imperative in the fact that man is essentially a rational being who is self-legislative, giving himself universally valid laws through the maxims of his will. The duties he has are thus self-imposed. At this point it is helpful to recall Kant's theory of agency regarding the question of free will. He emphasized that freedom of will is essential to morality and insisted

²⁷Werkmeister, Man and His Values, p. 152.

²⁸Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and intro. by Lewis White Beck (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1959), p. 39.

upon the dignity of man as a rational being and a legislative member of the realm of ends.²⁹

Axiology

The establishment of a general theory of value which was separate from the traditional study of ethics was not accomplished until the latter part of the nineteenth century. While it is true that early philosophers discussed problems of aesthetics, government, and economics which were fraught with value questions, their framework for discussion remained within the realm of ethics. Until the separation of general value theory from ethics, "the good" was most often interpreted as "the morally good."

There appear to be three major developments which laid the foundation for the study of axiology in its present form. The first major step in the separation of axiology from ethics is generally credited to the German philosopher, Lotze. Lotze's doctrine established the dualism of two realms, one of fact and one of value. He conceptualized values as being independent in reality and thus set down a basic tenet of the position known as objectivism. (It might be noted that Lotze was not an innovator in this line of reasoning, but followed in a tradition of long standing that can be traced back to Plato.)³⁰

²⁹Werkmeister, Man and His Values, p. 156.

³⁰Ibid., p. 59.

A second development in the study of axiology was the establishment of the Baden school in Germany by Windelband. This school was based upon the thinking of Lotze and was responsible for transmitting the objectivist position in value theory to the United States through one of its pupils, Hugo Münsterberg.

A third school of thought was founded in Austria by Franz Brentano. Though Brentano remained committed to the self-evident and absolute nature of value judgments inherent in the Germanic objectivist position, two of his most famous pupils, Alexius Meinong and Christian von Ehrenfels, became champions of the subjectivist position in value theory.³¹

The Objective-Subjective Argument

The objective-subjective debate in axiology has raged for many years and remains one of the most difficult questions in this area of study. Briefly, the argument over the objective or subjective nature of values can be shaped into the following questions; do objects possess value because we desire them, or do we desire them because they possess value? Value is objective if it is independent of a subject or a valuating consciousness; conversely, it is subjective if it owes its existence, its sense, or its validity, to the reactions

³¹Nicholas Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 50.

of the subject who does the valuating, regardless of whether these be physiological or psychological.³²

From the subjective point of view, Meinong postulated that the sensation of pleasure was the ultimate basis of value. Ehrenfels disagreed with Meinong's assertion that the basis of values was pleasure and pointed instead to the realm of appetite or desire. "Things which we desire or covet are valuable, and they are so because we desire and covet them."³³ Ralph Barton Perry elaborated the first and most outstanding subjectivist theory in the field of contemporary American axiology by maintaining that any object, whatever it be, acquires value whenever any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it. Bertrand Russell was also a proponent of the subjectivist position. He asserted that, "when we say that something has value, we do not state a fact independent of our own personal feelings; we are instead giving expression to our own emotions."³⁴

Another school of thought representing logical empiricism goes beyond the customary subjectivist conception of conferring value upon an object by means of our pleasure, desire, or interest, and maintains that a value judgment says nothing at all about the object but merely expresses

³²Werkmeister, Man and His Values, p. 86.

³³Risieri Frondizi, What is Value? (Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1963), pp. 38-39.

³⁴Ibid., p. 37.

an emotional state. Rudolf Carnap is foremost among this particular brand of theorists and he states that value judgments do not affirm anything and, consequently, cannot be true or false. Since such a judgment is not verifiable, it lacks any cognitive significance. A similar position is held by Alfred Ayer who denies the existence of a world of values which is different from a world of facts and holds that value judgments are lacking in meaning because they are mere expressions of an emotional nature.³⁵

As noted earlier, Lotze's doctrine of axiological objectivism was brought to the United States by Hugo Münsterberg who maintained an essentially Kantian position in regard to the objectivity of values, arguing that there exists a real world in which absolute values play a crucial role.

The desire to combat a growing relativism, brought on by the subjective approach to value, and to further the ideas detailed in Kant's ethics led Max Scheler to forcefully assert that it is not our feeling states as such that are or that determine values. Scheler insisted that the cognitively significant intentional feeling of something must, thus, be clearly distinguished from all mere feeling states. "It is the intentionality of the feeling, their being directed

³⁵ Ibid., p. 65.

upon something, which reveals to us all values as genuine objects, as ideal essences, that subsist independent of our experience and that constitute a special value realm."³⁶

Nicolai Hartmann's theory of values is in many respects an elaboration of Scheler's position. According to Hartmann, the value experience involves two aspects; an intuitive value-feeling which directly apprehends and discovers values, and a secondary but rational comprehension and clarifying discernment of what is given in the value-feeling. This latter comprehension is accomplished by reflection and philosophical analysis.³⁷

R. S. Peters has advanced an interesting position related to the objectivity of moral judgments which seems relevant to Hartmann's rational comprehension and clarifying discernment of the value-feeling. He maintains that "words like ought, wrong, good, and bad typically feature a form of discourse which has not only the practical function of determining action but also the function of doing this by the production of reasons."³⁸ He explains that to give reasons, if it is done seriously and with a determination to decide in terms of reasons, is to put the matter up for public discussion; thus making the decision independent of the authority or private whim of any individual and dependent

³⁶Werkmeister, Man and His Values, p. 86.

³⁷Ibid., p. 88.

³⁸Peters, Ethics and Education, p. 40.

upon the force and relevance of the reasons advanced.³⁹ Peters notes that the individual is too often treated as an isolated entity, exercising his own perceptions in a vacuum, while the public character of the decision-making process is ignored.⁴⁰

The limitations of this review do not permit a lengthy analysis of the objective-subjective problem, however it is hoped that the foregoing summary has provided some basis for understanding the historical development of the question and its influence upon contemporary studies of value theory. In order to clarify the assumptions regarding the nature of values upon which this study rests an attempt will be made to outline the major criticisms of each of the above positions.

It can be maintained that subjectivism is right in asserting that value cannot be entirely divorced from valuation, but it errs when it tries to reduce value to valuation. If values were nothing more than a projection of the pleasure, desire or interest of the subject, prone to vary from one man to the next, then one must answer how it happens that there is a good share of agreement with respect to the appreciation of works of art or the evaluation of human behavior. This question may be answered with the assertion that the degree of consensus which does exist in the realm

³⁹Ibid., p. 29.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 43.

of aesthetics and ethics is a matter of sheer cultural conditioning or socialization. Perhaps the more destructive criticism is that if values are created by the subject then the possibility of any aesthetic or ethical education would not make sense, for there could not be any erroneous valuation. This is why many scholars advocate the necessity of adding what might be called the axiological element to the psychological act of valuation. This element is the process of knowing whether what we desire is in fact worthy of being desired.

Russell has stated that the chief reason he has for adapting the doctrine of subjectivism is the complete impossibility of finding any arguments to prove that this or that has intrinsic (objective) value.⁴¹ If Russell had abided by the facts he would have stated that he did not know of any argument which, in his opinion, would prove the existence of intrinsic values. It is within the realm of possibility that intense and constant study in the field of axiology may at some later time prove that something does have intrinsic value. Thus, when Russell refuses to accept the existence of an axiological criterion due to lack of proof he is assuming, without proving it, the superiority of logical value over other values.

The logical empiricists or those philosophers whose orientation toward value theory is similar to that of Carnap and Ayer deny the existence of values in the realm of reality

⁴¹Frondizi, What is Value?, p. 37.

which objectivism postulates and further deny that any value judgment can be either true or false. Subjectivism stops short of this latter denial for it holds that he who states a value judgment asserts the existence of a definite state of mind, and his judgment can be true or false since it may or may not be true that he experiences the state of mind which he asserts.

Since the logical empiricists deny the existence of value in the realm of reality the same objections raised against the position of subjectivism may be applied to this particular school of thought as well. An additional criticism of this position is that there are situations where all are agreed on the basic facts but differ because of strictly axiological reasons, such as in the evaluation of a musical composition.

The primary criticism of objectivism or the belief in the objectivity and independence of values is centered upon how one apprehends these values existing in objective reality if they are to be completely divorced from the realm of subjective experience. There are several theories which liken values to mathematical relationships. This analogy assumes that values behave like mathematical entities, however, it has never been proven that values actually belong to this realm. Even if this assumption is taken as truth there is still the consideration that such subjective elements as education, capacity, and intelligence which influence our

apprehension of mathematical relationships could likewise influence our apprehension of values.

The supposed proofs in favor of objectivity and independence are usually based upon a perhaps more treacherous form of subjectivity; that of emotional intuition. This particular method of apprehension has been held suspect because so often those objective and absolute values revealed by intuition coincide remarkably with the values corresponding to the cultural and historical milieu of the person who possesses this extraordinary talent. For example, when Max Scheler breaks with the concept of a personal, infinite and perfect God, the infallible intuition which had bestowed such absolute knowledge upon him is adjusted to his new theological conception.

When absolute realism tries to escape from emotional intuition, it seems to land in the field of tautology. A typical example of this kind of reasoning is Scheler's statement that the "nutritive is nutritive." Scheler is not interested in the fact that the concept of nutrition is relational and conditional in nature; that what is nutritive for one person may be harmful to another. Instead he sticks to the tautological assertion that "nutritive is nutritive." This is a common practice for those who take refuge in the a priori. From reality they extract concepts which constitute their theories, and then, severing all connections with experience, they transform these concepts, which are of

empirical origin, into immutable a priori essences. Since such essences are what they are by definition, there is not the slightest possibility of questioning them through empirical experience. In this same category is the statement "good is good," an assertion that some would say is as true as it is fruitless.

As can be observed from the foregoing major criticisms of both the objective and subjective stance regarding values, each position has profited by its opposition to the other. Subjectivist doctrine has gained proponents because of the lack of convincing reasoning which is offered as proof of the objective thesis. Likewise, objectivism has won adherents through speculation of the consequences of a moral and social order which would accrue if subjectivism is followed to its logical conclusions.

The position taken in this study is that at this point it seems premature to deny either position completely. It appears that the idea of objective values is a cognitively significant notion and one which provides a certain hopeful outlook in the thinking of many people. It is in some way reassuring to believe that there is an objective reality in which values exist independent of the subjective element.

The question of how to gather evidence relating to the validity of moral concepts and principles falls within the field of meta-ethics. One approach to this problem suggests that questions about "what ought to be," as opposed to questions about "what is," have their own distinctive concepts

and procedures for inquiry. Some philosophers maintain that these concepts must be considered in a "reflective manner" which Hume defined as, "free, impartial, willing to universalize, conceptually clear, and informed about all possibly relevant facts."⁴²

According to Frankena, if one "takes the moral point of view" he is claiming that everyone who does likewise will concur with his principles or judgments and, in that sense, his claims are objectively valid. This is not to suggest that the individual thinker must bow to the judgments of a majority in his society, for he is claiming an ideal consensus which transcends majorities and actual societies. One's society and its code and institutions may be wrong. Here enters the autonomy of the moral agent--he must take the moral point of view and must claim an eventual consensus with others who do so, but he must judge for himself.⁴³

On the other hand, there can be no denial that if values do exist in an objective reality which is independent of the subjective element the only means of attaining, perceiving, or knowing about this reality is through the subjectivity of the individual. Thus, when an individual perceives a value, his perception of this value is conditioned by what he is; and therefore, while what we value is not entirely a projection of our own physiological or psychological states, neither is it completely free from these subjective elements.

⁴² Frankena, Ethics, p. 95.

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 95-96.

The significance of this position for value education would seem to be in the reflection and clarification of values as perceived by the individual through a rational approach similar perhaps to philosophical analysis. This includes exposure to differing conceptions of value between individuals and concentration on a rational resolution of value conflicts.

Values and Reason

The thesis that the values which influence man's choices, decisions, and judgments are arrived at through a rational process is supported by the thinking of many twentieth century scholars. Frankena gives this account in the area of morality.

As Socrates implied and recent philosophers have stressed, morality fosters or even calls for the use of reason and for a kind of autonomy on the part of the individual, asking him, when mature and normal, to make his own decisions, though possibly with someone's advice, and even stimulating him to think out the principles or goals in the light of which he is to make his decisions. Morality is a social institution of life, but one which promotes rational self-guidance or self-determinism in its members.⁴⁴

Frankena continues to explain that morality starts with a set of culturally defined goals which are accompanied by rules for their achievement that are more or less external to the individual and imposed upon him. Usually these rules become internalized or interiorized, that is, the individual takes them as his own and regulates his own conduct by them; he develops a conscience or superego. This process of

⁴⁴Frankena, Ethics, p. 7.

internalization may be quite irrational but it is typical for morality to accompany its inculcation with at least a modicum of reason giving. Thus, we tend to give reasons with our moral instructions as soon as the child has attained an age at which he is capable of something like discretion, and we even lead him to feel that it is appropriate to ask for reasons. We may then move from a rather irrational kind of inner direction to a more rational one in which we achieve an examined life and a kind of autonomy, becoming moral agents on our own; and may even reach a point when we can criticize the rules and values of our society.⁴⁵

Lillie concludes that reason may have some place in determining the ends at which we aim and our actions leading to them. He offers the following evidence; (1) Man has an innate desire to be consistent and to avoid contradiction, to be rational. (2) Conscious judgments are made regarding the attractiveness of one end as compared with another. The making of a judgment is primarily a cognitive process in which reason does play some part. (3) It is impossible to separate the cognitive, affective, and conative aspects of the mind. Thus to suppose that the affective and conative aspects of mind determine an action without reference to the cognitive or rational aspects is a false abstraction. (4) Reasoning may suggest a course of action and to that extent be a determining factor in action. (5) Introspection suggests that we are able to suspend our judgment, so that

⁴⁵Ibid.

when in the course of deliberation an activity is judged to be the most attractive, it is possible to delay action until the reflective part of our mind has attended to other considerations which may influence our judgment.⁴⁶

A major disagreement which might arise over Lillie's evidence is his contention that man has an innate desire to be rational. Present day theorists might be more likely to agree that a desire to be rational is learned. Kurt Baier discusses the question of how it is that we follow reason in this manner. "From early in our lives we have all been taught to think before we act, not to follow impulse or instinct or inclination, but to think first. We have been told that to neglect this will frequently give us cause to regret our action. We are taught that what distinguishes man from beast is that he possesses reason, and we normally understand very well that this is connected with thinking before we leap, rather than following instinct or mere impulse."⁴⁷

According to Wilson, once the child reaches the point where he understands the asking for and giving of reasons it then becomes his characteristically human way

⁴⁶Lillie, An Introduction to Ethics, pp. 40-42.

⁴⁷Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 50.

of dealing with the world. Rational actions are those for which the individual is responsible; they are the attempts which he makes to meet a particular situation in the external world. It is Wilson's belief that to act morally at all the individual must act for a reason.⁴⁸

The giving of reasons in support of a normative judgment may represent a different type of thinking from a meta-ethical inquiry or empirical investigation. Moralists have sometimes spoken as if the moral judgment was logically entailed by the statements given as reasons or criteria. This assumption leads to the error which Hume described as "passing from a proposition of what is to a proposition of what ought to be." Thus the relation between the reasons for a moral judgment and the moral judgment itself is not one of logical entailment.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, the giving of reasons is an important part of ethical thinking. Wilson has suggested that when we ask "why" questions we normally expect some explanation or justification in terms of the agent's intentions, aims,

⁴⁸Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, pp. 49-51.

⁴⁹Lillie, An Introduction to Ethics, p. 327.

purposes or reasons. Thus, if a person were asked why he cheated or why he told a lie and could not sincerely give a reason, one might begin to expect that he had no reason or intention at all, and one would have to stop thinking that he had, in fact, cheated or lied.⁵⁰ It is roughly on these grounds that moral action is tied to the notion of rationality, that is, that if people are to act morally at all they must act for a reason.

It is at this point that empirical findings may become useful in the context of moral education. According to the stages identified by both Piaget and Kohlberg it appears that the cognitive capacity for reasoning in the area of values reaches maturity in late childhood or early adolescence. This evidence, along with the preceding discussion on the rational nature of normative discourse would tend to support an approach to value education based upon the strengthening of cognitive abilities deemed necessary for reasonable judgments in the axiological arena.

⁵⁰ Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, pp. 49-50.

Summary

The aim of this section of the review of literature was to examine some of the major philosophical implications of certain assumptions which are made about the nature of man and the nature of values as they relate to the theoretical basis for this study. Within this framework justification has been given for accepting a view of man which allows at least enough freedom so that his choices and volitions can be considered the products of his desires and beliefs and that they may be influenced by such means as example, learning, and sanctions. A position regarding the objectivity or subjectivity of values has also been outlined which would seem to indicate the necessity for a rational approach to value education. A case has also been made for a view of normative discourse which presupposes the giving of reasons. This particular view is relevant to both cognitive abilities in moral development and value education built upon a rational model which necessitates an understanding of moral development.

The following section contains a review and discussion of empirical research relevant to this investigation.

Research Findings Relating to Moral
Development and Value Education

The studies of Piaget and his research teams in all areas of cognitive development number in the thousands, and a bibliography of published works by Piaget would include several hundred books and articles. Though the work in moral development was completed early in Piaget's career and represents only a small portion of his total contribution in the area of child study, it has provided the basis for several studies which have focused on various theoretical aspects of childhood morality. It has not been an easy task for those attempting to replicate or evaluate the results of Piaget's work on moral development. Flavell notes that perhaps the most important and consistent criticism stems from "Piaget's habitual failure to give a clear and full account of precisely what he did in the experiment. The reader is often left in considerable doubt as to what actual test and inquiry procedures were administered by whom under what testing conditions to how many children of what age, backgrounds, previous testing experiences, and so on."⁵¹ Flavell adds that this communicative inadequacy necessarily haunts any attempts to evaluate Piaget's actual research conduct; for it is hard to criticize what happened when you are not

⁵¹ Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget, pp. 430-431.

sure what happened.⁵² A review of selected studies which deal with aspects of Piaget's theory of moral development confirm this criticism, as there are discrepancies in reporting about the original experiments even on such descriptive data as the age and size of the samples involved.

However, the preliminary nature of Piaget's work deserves special recognition as Williams suggests in the following statement. "In researches of this kind we do not look for precision in the sense of measurement of factors, and the exact age at which they develop. We seek rather a quality of insight into the nature of the processes which are going on, an insight which may enable us to frame hypotheses for further investigations, possibly of a more objective kind. . . . The absence of our familiar apparatus of scientific objectivity does not imply that the author is entirely subjective in his analysis."⁵³ Within the context of subjectivity, it has been suggested that Piaget apparently did his research to convince himself and that, having been convinced, he expected others to take his word for it. Whatever truth this statement may hold, it cannot be denied that, though scholars may not have accepted his theory at first glance, they did see it in terms of generating numerous testable hypotheses. The following section is devoted to a review of Piagetian

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 267.

aspects of moral development and selected research which has attempted to test his various theoretical formulations in a more controlled experimental environment.

Piagetian Dimensions and Related
Research in Moral Development

One major factor in moral development which seems to change with age is the intentionality of judgment. Young children tend to judge an act as bad mainly in terms of its actual physical consequences, whereas older children judge an act as bad in terms of its intent to do harm.

In a study designed to examine developmental trends in the child's concept of justice with increasing age, using 101 boys and girls in grades 2, 5, and 8, Durkin found that the older the subject the more concern he showed for the specific circumstances of the situation being judged. In response to questions about one boy or girl hitting another, six 5th graders and twelve 8th graders questioned the motive for aggression, the deliberativeness, and the severity of aggression. The data showed a significant relationship between the subject's concern for particulars and his chronological age.⁵⁴

Using a sample population of 807 subjects in grades 5, 7, 9, and 11, Johnson also found that in response to Piaget-like questions involving moral realism, which emphasizes

⁵⁴ Dolores Durkin, "Children's Concepts of Justice: A Comparison with the Piaget Data," Child Development, 30(1959), 59-67.

judgment made on the basis of consequences or intentions, that increasing age was related to greater consideration of intentions.⁵⁵

A second factor observed by Piaget was relativism in judgment. He noted that the young child views an act as totally right or totally wrong and believes that everyone views it in the same manner. If he recognizes a conflict in views, the younger child always thinks the adult view is the right one. By approximately age nine the child begins to realize that there may be more than one perspective on moral value in the situation. Both Lerner and Kohlberg, using Piagetian type questions and interview techniques, were able to support this conclusion of the recognition of the relativism of values with increasing age for children in the United States.^{56,57}

Assuming that the degree of authority manifested by parents could influence the development of the child's view of moral perspectives, MacRae used several measures of parental authority but did not find a significant association between these measures of authority and the responses to the moral judgment questions used by Piaget and Lerner. However, he

⁵⁵ Johnson, "A Study of Children's Moral Judgments," 327-354.

⁵⁶ Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order," Vita Humana, 6(1963), 11-33.

⁵⁷ Eugene Lerner, Constraint Areas and the Moral Judgment of Children (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta, 1937).

did find that two of these measures of parental authority showed significant associations with another moral judgment index relating to violation of norms regarding lying and stealing.⁵⁸

A third factor involved in moral growth suggests the independence of sanctions; that is to say, a young child says an act is bad because it will elicit punishment; the older child says an act is bad because it violates a rule, does harm to others, and so forth. Piaget believes this particular factor results from the strong emotional respect which the young child feels for authority and rules which make him feel unable to judge for himself, and forces him to rely on external adult sanctions and commands to define what is right and wrong. In Piaget's view, the young child is oriented to punishment only because punishment is a cue to what is disapproved by adults. Kohlberg found the same factor to be operative in his research on moral development but offers a somewhat different explanation. It is his contention that the young child's definition of wrong in terms of punishment reflects a realistic-hedonistic desire to avoid punishment, rather than a deep reverence for the adult world order.⁵⁹ In either case, only as children reach a level of cognitive

⁵⁸Duncan MacRae, Jr., "A Test of Piaget's Theories of Moral Development," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 49(1954), 14-18.

⁵⁹Kohlberg, "Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order," 11-33.

development at which the meaning of moral concepts can be differentiated from punishment can they attain either a definite hedonism or a degree of disinterested respect for authority.⁶⁰

A fourth factor which has been isolated in moral judgment concerns the use of reciprocity. Piaget and others have observed that four-year-old children do not use reciprocity as a reason for consideration of others, whereas children of seven and older frequently do. Even seven-year-olds show mainly selfish and concrete reciprocity concerns, including anticipation of retaliation and anticipation of a return of favors. By age eleven to thirteen most children can clearly judge in terms of ideal reciprocity; such as putting oneself in the place of someone in a different position, or expressing sentiments of gratitude for past affection and favors. Durkin's findings support this factor. She states, "Between grades 2 and 5 there is evidence of an increasing acceptance of reciprocity; eighth grade subjects, like those in grade two, tend to seek justice in the authority person. This is not to say, of course, that similarity in grade 2 and grade 8 proposals reflect similarity in the two groups' disposition toward such a proposal. For the second graders, telling an authority person was a quick and apparently obvious solution

⁶⁰ Ibid.

to the problem at hand. For the eighth graders, on the contrary, it was a solution that was proposed with neither haste nor enthusiasm."⁶¹

Piaget's data also suggested ideas about the use of punishment as restitution and reform. It has been observed that young children advocate severe painful punishment after stories of misdeeds; while older children increasingly favor milder punishments which lead to restitution for the victim and reform of the culprit. Johnson's research supports this hypothesis on both retribution versus restitution and milder versus severe punishment. He found increasing age to be positively related to advocating punishment which is restitutive to the victim and milder on the culprit.⁶²

The sixth factor observed by Piaget is related to a naturalistic view of misfortune. He noted that six to seven-year-olds have some tendency to view physical accidents and misfortunes occurring after misdeeds as punishments willed by God or by natural objects, while older children do not confuse natural misfortunes with punishments. This particular factor, known as immanent justice, has been supported in the research of Lerner, MacRae, and Johnson. These studies have all shown increasing age to be positively related to more mature moral judgments involving this dimension.

⁶¹Durkin, "Children's Concepts of Justice," 59-67.

⁶²Johnson, "Children's Moral Judgments," 327-354.

The preceding discussion has specifically noted six of the dimensions which Piaget and later researchers have observed in relation to moral development. The other aspects suggested by Piaget's theory do not seem to hold up as general dimensions of moral development. As discussed by Kohlberg, these questionable dimensions are derived from the social-emotional rather than the cognitive components of Piaget's stages. One example is Piaget's concept of a shift from unilateral respect for adults to a mutual respect for peers. In general, the findings do not support the notion that there is a trend from an authoritarian to a democratic ethic, although they do support the notion that the child's earliest morality, which is oriented to obedience, punishment and impersonal forces, progresses to a morality which is more internal in nature. Neither has there been much support for the Piagetian concept of differential peer group participation and its role in moral development.⁶³ Sociometric measures of friendship choice have usually been used to attempt to measure this variable. Although a low correlation has been found between this factor and general moral development, it has not been found to be specifically associated with advance on measures of intentionality and reciprocity as Piaget predicted. Neither has the degree of democracy or permissiveness manifested in the family situation been found to relate to moral development as might be expected from Piaget's theory.

⁶³ Kohlberg, "Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology," pp. 394-400.

Another aspect of the interpretation of the original research which has not been supported relates to the unitary variable of moral judgment. It has been found that the various dimensions isolated by the early theory do not represent definite unitary stages which cut across the separate aspects of moral judgment. For example, it has been noted that a child who gives mature responses in one area of moral judgment may not respond maturely on another aspect of morality. Johnson concluded that, with the exception of communicable responsibility which seemed largely unrelated to the other moral judgment areas, the correlations between aspects of moral judgment (immanent justice, moral realism, and views on punishment) were in the expected direction but considerably lower than one would expect from Piaget's work.⁶⁴

The age trends in moral development discovered in both the original research and in replication studies suggest that certain moral concepts only become meaningful in late childhood and early adolescence, and require the extensive background of cognitive growth and social experience associated with the age factor.

Kohlberg explains that these age findings may be interpreted in two ways; (1) as the effect of increased learning of the verbal morality characteristics of the adult

⁶⁴Johnson, "Children's Moral Judgments," 327-354.

culture, or (2) as the spontaneous products of the child's efforts to make sense out of his experience in a complex social world with each stage arising sequentially from its predecessors.

Evidence for the latter interpretation, which is usually referred to as the developmental theory, suggests that use of a more advanced stage of thought depends upon earlier attainment of each preceding stage and that each involves a restructuring and displacement of previous stages of thought. Support for the idea of sequence comes from both the regular age order of stages and also from patterning within the individual. Kohlberg found that if a child is predominantly at one stage of thought, the remainder of his thinking will represent neighboring stages. It has also been found that a child can assimilate adult moral reasoning which is one level above his functioning stage to a much greater extent than moral reasoning two levels above his functional stage. There is also some evidence which suggests that children will accept and assimilate moral reasoning one stage higher than their own more readily than they will accept moral reasoning one stage lower than their own. On the other hand, if age development in moral judgment were a matter of verbal learning, the age factor would presumably be largely

a matter of verbal intelligence or verbal mental age.⁶⁵ The following section contains a discussion of the relationship of intelligence and other antecedent conditions to moral judgment.

Antecedent Conditions

Intelligence

Kohlberg investigated Piaget's concept of morality as related to peer reciprocity among boys from fourth, seventh, and tenth grades. He found no significant difference in responses between the higher and lower intelligence levels, although he did find differences in the level of sophistication in the replies. In a later work, Kohlberg reported that moral judgment was moderately correlated with I.Q. ($r=.31$) but quite highly related to age when intelligence was controlled. ($r=.59$).⁶⁶

Boehm, in a study comparing children of average intelligence with academically gifted children in both public and parochial schools, found the only significant relationship between intelligence and moral judgment to be in the area of intentions and outcome of action. Academically gifted children matured earlier in their distinction

⁶⁵ Kohlberg, "Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology," pp. 402-404.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

between intentions and consequences than children of average intelligence.⁶⁷

In her first study of fifth grade children, Durkin felt there was a possible difference in level of responses due to intelligence with children of higher intelligence less inclined to seek help from authority figures than those of lesser intelligence. In a later report, however, Durkin attributed this difference to chance and concluded there was no difference in response between intelligence levels.⁶⁸

MacRae, using subjects from grades 5 to 8, including a small sample of boys of higher I.Q.'s who were compared to those of average intelligence, found that at all ages his children of above average I.Q. responded more maturely to questions concerning intention and result. They also responded more maturely on questions concerning strict punishment. MacRae's explanation of this finding suggests that children of above average intelligence respond more maturely on the cognitive aspects of moral development because they internalize parental rules more strongly and remain dependent upon parents longer than those of average intelligence.⁶⁹ Other findings have not supported his results. For example,

⁶⁷ Leonore Boehm, "The Development of Conscience: A Comparison of American Children of Different Mental and Socio-economic Levels" Child Development, 33, (1962), 575-590.

⁶⁸ Delores Durkin, "Children's Concept of Justice," Journal of Educational Research, 52, (1959), 252-257.

⁶⁹ MacRae, "A Test of Piaget's Theories," 14-18.

Boehm found that gifted children of almost all ages responded with less adult dependency than those of average intelligence.⁷⁰

Johnson investigated several variables in relation to moral judgment responses of fifth, seventh, ninth, and eleventh graders to Piaget-type stories which he devised. He found the variables of I.Q. and parental occupation to be more closely related to moral judgment in the areas of moral realism, retribution versus restitution, and the efficacy of severe punishment, than any of the other variables studied except age. However, he also found that I.Q. and parental occupation were highly correlated. He suggests that the relationship of parental occupation to moral judgment in the specified areas may well be a reflection of I.Q. differences rather than any cultural differences denoted by occupational level.⁷¹ In view of the controversy over what I.Q. tests really measure and the influence of environmental factors, it might also be hypothesized that the relationship of intelligence to moral development is a reflection of parental occupational level or socio-economic status rather than any inherent intellectual differences.

From this brief review of research studies focusing on the relationship of intelligence to moral judgment, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions. In almost every study

⁷⁰ Boehm, "The Development of Conscience," 575-590.

⁷¹ Johnson, "Children's Moral Judgments," 327-354.

socio-economic status, often derived from parental occupational level, was confounded with intelligence. In most cases the I.Q. scores were obtained from school records and the specific instrument used to measure intelligence was not reported.

The majority of results indicate some degree of association between intelligence and moral judgment or aspects of moral judgment, although the correlations obtained in this area tend to range between the mid-twenties and mid-thirties. Williams and others have pointed out that cognitive moral abilities seem to have a clear relationship to other more general intellectual abilities; notably to verbal ability. This relationship can complicate research; for it is quite possible to construct tests of moral thinking which simply measure intelligence, or verbal ability, or some similar factor.⁷² With this idea in mind, Kohlberg has concluded that intellectual development is an important condition for the development of moral thought, but level of moral thought can be clearly distinguished from general intellectual ability. Thus, the level of moral judgment, in Kohlberg's view, appears to be a unitary or consistent personal characteristic distinct from intelligence or specific subcultural background or beliefs.⁷³

⁷²Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 256.

⁷³Kohlberg, "Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology," p. 405.

Socio-economic Status

Investigations of socio-economic status in relation to moral judgment derive from Piaget's theory of adult constraint and authority and the part it plays in moral development. Lerner reported that higher status children gave more mature answers to Piaget-type questions than did lower status children, even after age and intelligence were controlled. He interpreted this finding to support Piaget's hypothesis concerning parental authority. MacRae found that rating of the father's occupation according to the North-Hatt index produced a low but significant correlation with both the intention-consequences aspect and the punishment aspect of moral judgment. He disagrees with Lerner's interpretation, however, because it assumes that lower status parents tend to be more authoritarian in their child rearing practices than higher status parents. MacRae points to a study by Havighurst and Davis which portrayed lower status white parents as more permissive in early training than higher status parents. If this finding holds throughout the United States and if responses to Piaget's questions reflect strictness or permissiveness in discipline, then, according to MacRae, we should expect lower status children to show more rather than less maturity on moral judgment responses. MacRae contends that higher status children mature earlier in cognitive moral development while lower status children

mature earlier in emotional development which results in the latter being more independent of parental authority.⁷⁴

Boehm, using Warner's norms for assigning social class position, found that upper middle-class children develop earlier in regard to the consideration of intentions and outcomes of actions than do working class children. She also found that working class children show earlier peer reciprocity and adult independence than upper middle class children.⁷⁵

Johnson, classifying parental occupations according to the Minnesota Occupational Scale, found higher parental occupation to be positively related to mature moral judgment in the areas of immanent justice, moral realism, and views concerning punishment. He suggests however, that this may be a reflection of differing intellectual abilities since he found occupational level to be highly correlated with I.Q. Johnson also used a test of parental attitudes designed to reflect the degree of "dominance, possessiveness, and ignoringness" in approaches to child rearing. Though he found some correlation between these factors and certain areas of moral judgment, he did not find a significant correlation between the attitude measure and parental occupational level.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ MacRae, "A Test of Piaget's Theories," 14-18.

⁷⁵ Boehm, "The Development of Conscience," 575-590.

⁷⁶ Johnson, "Children's Moral Judgments," 327-354.

In a unique early study designed by Ugurel-Semin, one hundred and sixty-seven children from Istanbul, Turkey, were divided into three groups; rich, middle-class, and poor. The experiment required the child to divide an unequal number of nuts between himself and another child. Analysis of the socio-economic factor found poorer children were as often generous as the rich, more often equalitarian, and less often selfish. Piaget did not deal with moral judgment in the light of a moral act, but he did propose the hypothesis that the child would demonstrate mature moral judgment in action earlier than in speech.⁷⁷ This study relates to a point made by Boehm who suggests that children from working class families are less accustomed to formalized thinking. The less verbally inclined working class child may be just as moral in his actions as the upper middle class child, but might appear less so because of an inadequate way of expressing himself in judging actions.⁷⁸

Kohlberg has summarized the data on socio-economic status by noting that both stages and their sequential order remain the same across social class, though there is some indication that middle class children may move through

⁷⁷Refia Ugurel-Semin, "Moral Behavior and Moral Judgment of children," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 47, (1952) 463-474.

⁷⁸Boehm, "The Development of Conscience," 575-590.

the same sequences somewhat faster and farther than working class children, however the confounding I.Q. variable must once again be taken into account.⁷⁹

Sex Differences

The relationship of sex to moral judgment was mentioned briefly by Piaget in connection with his investigation of the rules of the game of marbles. He could not find a game played by girls in which there were as many rules and as fine and consistent an organization and codification of these rules as in the game of marbles. His research team finally settled on the investigation of hop-scotch. It was found that the same process was at work with the girls as the boys regarding rules; first a mystical respect for the law, which is conceived as untouchable and of transcendent origin, then a cooperation that liberates the individuals from their practical egocentrism and introduces a new and more immanent conception of rules. The sex difference concerning rules which Piaget detected was related to girls being less explicit about agreement upon the rules during the cooperation stage than boys. In view of this finding, Piaget sees girls as being less concerned with legal elaboration than boys and suggests that this difference is due both to the loosely-

⁷⁹Kohlberg, "The Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology," p. 406.

knit character of the game and also to the "mentality of girls."⁸⁰

In one of his studies Kohlberg found adolescent boys were significantly more mature than girls which he attributes to the notion that roles entailing more participation and responsibility should stimulate greater maturity. The assumption is that the masculine role does entail more participation and responsibility, however Kohlberg does not elaborate on this idea.⁸¹

The study by Ugurel-Semin which asked the children to divide an unequal number of nuts between themselves and another child found no sex related differences on the factors investigated which included generosity, equality, and selfishness.⁸²

Though some of the other studies reviewed in the area of moral judgment mention sex as a possible variable there is no report of findings on this factor. It might also be noted that several of the studies used only male subjects.

Though the Piaget and Kohlberg studies suggest the possibility of sex differences in favor of the male in relation to moral judgment, data from another source suggests the opposite view might be hypothesized. Oetzel summarized

⁸⁰ Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, pp. 83-84.

⁸¹ Kohlberg, "The Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology," p. 406.

⁸² Ugurel-Semin, "Moral Behavior," 463-474.

the research on cognitive development related to sex differences and found twenty-three studies in which girls scored higher on language development and verbal fluency as compared to one study where boys were found to score higher in this area.⁸³

Norman Bull, in a comprehensive investigation of moral development, found girls to be more advanced than boys in their moral judgment in every area examined. Besides the greater ability of girls to verbalize, Bull notes the earlier maturation of girls, the possibility of an earlier, parallel development in intelligence, and the more strict judgments of girls.⁸⁴ In view of these considerations there would seem to be some justification for hypothesizing sex differences in relation to moral judgment which favor the female.

Summary: Moral Development

One conclusion which might be drawn from the preceding review of antecedent conditions which influence moral judgment is that the findings to date tend toward incongruity. In each area (intelligence, socio-economic status, and sex) various studies have shown a significant relationship of the

⁸³James J. Gallagher, "Productive Thinking," in Child Development Research, ed. by Martin L. Hoffman and Lois W. Hoffman (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), p. 370.

⁸⁴Norman J. Bull, Moral Judgment from Childhood to Adolescence (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1969), pp. 42-43.

factor to aspects of moral judgment while other investigations have not supported these findings. Added to these inconsistent results is a confusion in the interpretation of what these various findings indicate in relation to Piagetian theory. Part of this discrepancy derives from Piaget's bent toward theoretical overelaboration. Flavell notes, "Our interpretation is that Piaget sometimes becomes unduly fascinated with theory construction as an intellectual exercise. . . the result too often is that the theory-behavior relation gets lost along the way."⁸⁵ Piaget's theory, as has been explained, is based upon the cognitive aspects of moral development. His theorizing in relation to the social-emotional dimensions involved in moral thought remains in a questionable state. The notion of child rearing practices and their relationship to moral development, including authority and permissiveness patterns, continues to be unclear. Because of this conceptual confusion and the methodological difficulties involved in doing research in this area, the findings tend to be sparse.

Aside from the lack of empirical data and the difficulty in interpretation of results, conceptual disagreement about the components of moral development may also be a factor which tends to influence the findings related to antecedent conditions. Wilson, for example, has isolated the following

⁸⁵ Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget, pp. 428-429.

components of morality; (1) the ability to identify with other people to the extent that other people's feelings and interests actually count, (2) awareness or insight into one's own and other people's feelings, (3) the mastery of factual knowledge, (4) rational formulation of a set of rules or moral principles to which the individual commits himself in relation to his own, as well as other people's interest, and (5) the ability to translate these principles into action.⁸⁶

It may be that the low correlations of antecedent variables to moral judgment indicates that the variable under consideration is related to only one aspect of moral judgment. For example, it may be possible that the variable of sex is related to the ability to have insight into one's own and other's feelings, but since this particular component is only one aspect of moral judgment the association is very low or inconsistent. Consideration must also be given to the problem of intervening variables which may not be controlled. For example, if socio-economic status is positively associated with mature moral judgment this association may really be due to the factors of occupation, education, and income which are usually relied upon as criteria for assigning socio-economic status or it may simply be a reflection of I.Q. as has been suggested by Johnson.⁸⁷

⁸⁶Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, pp. 190-195.

⁸⁷Johnson, "Children's Moral Judgments," 327-354.

Though the present study does not purport to be a direct test of Piaget's theory of moral development, there does seem to be some justification for the consideration of these antecedent conditions in relation to the proposed approach to value education in the school environment. It is in the interest of practical application that such questions regarding the effectiveness of the experimental treatments with students who differ in verbal ability, sex, and socio-economic status have been considered.

Value Education

Various approaches to value instruction which have been attempted throughout the history of education were introduced in Chapter I of this study. Attention was also drawn to the relevance of value education for the field of social studies which is by definition concerned with man and society. This section of the review of the literature will focus briefly on some of the problems and research findings from the subject matter area of social studies which have been delineated within the present century and the relationship which these results bear to continued efforts within the field to effectively approach the concept of values.

As early as 1916 the Committee on Social Studies of the National Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education pinpointed "good Citizenship" as an objective of primary importance in the field of social studies. Problems

in the actual implementation of this objective as a vital part of the curriculum have stemmed mainly from its considerable vagueness. However, recent definitions of citizenship and more specific role definitions for citizens have come more particularly to link citizenship training with value analysis.⁸⁸ Allen points out the relationship of value education to social studies in this manner, "A consideration of concepts and values focuses attention on the school's role in the transmission of the social heritage and its concern with the solution of the problems of our time. Furthermore, the greater recognition the social studies gives to the study of the human personality as a manifestation of culture, the more each individual needs to understand the fundamental values which direct the course of human events."⁸⁹ There are many such references in the literature on social studies which offer justification for the inclusion of value study within the social studies curriculum. One can also find many curriculum guides in this area of study which list objectives directly related to value education. However, the few studies which have attempted to survey the results of these objectives have reported disappointing conclusions.

⁸⁸Smith and Cox, New Strategies and Curriculum in Social Studies, pp. 60-62.

⁸⁹John Jarolimek and Huber Walsh, Readings for Social Studies in Elementary Education (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), pp. 13-14.

Easton and Hess found that a child's political orientation is primarily formed between the ages of three and thirteen. They concluded that values and attitudes toward community and government are established before high school and are relatively unassailable by programs in citizenship and government which may be offered at this level, at least within the context of approaches currently being used in value instruction.⁹⁰

Substantiating this conclusion, Horton, in a study of the values of youth, reports that, "the analysis of belief in democratic values in terms of having taken a school course in U. S. Government or Civics showed no constructive effect attributable to such school courses."⁹¹

In the monumental early studies on moral behavior by Hartshorne and May it was found that formal or conventional character education classes or programs in the school or church have little or no effect upon children's moral conduct.⁹²

Massialas emphasizes the lack of attention paid in the classroom to the whole domain of normative propositions and claims. He argues that, "given the present state of our

⁹⁰David Easton and Robert Hess, "The Child's Political World," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. VI (August, 1962), 229-246.

⁹¹H. H. Remmers, ed., Anti-Democratic Attitudes in American Schools (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 58.

⁹²Kohlberg, "The Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology," p. 426.

society and culture with value contradictions and incompatibilities on one hand and extreme uniformities on the other, often resulting in violence and alienation, the need to deal with ethical problems in the social studies becomes mandatory."⁹³ Massialas suggests that one reason why most social studies classes tend to ignore the "ought" or "should" questions stems from the superficial manner in which value issues are treated in textbooks. As evidence for this criticism, Krug analyzed popular civics textbooks to see whether they provided material and the necessary stimulus to involve students in creative and critical assessment of value commitments and crucial issues confronting our democracy. He concluded that authors of the textbooks surveyed presented the narrative in a highly detached manner with no attempt to either reconstruct the mood in which some pressing issues had arisen or to present defensible criteria to deal with human dilemmas. Ballinger reviewed thirteen textbooks plus some revised editions which were being used in methods courses in teacher education programs to see whether controversial and value questions were included and to what extent any theoretical or practical considerations of organizing relevant classroom learning activities were explored. He concluded, with one or two exceptions, that no attention at all

⁹³ Jarolimek and Walsh, Readings for Social Studies, p. 55.

was paid to controversial issues or to any systematic analysis of value judgments.⁹⁴

Summary

The failure of education and particularly of social studies to realize its objectives in relation to value questions, the sparseness of teaching materials and programs which present realistic approaches to classroom activities involving the concept of value, and the confusion in the conceptual justification of value education have all impinged upon the design of the present investigation. Its conception is rooted in the desire to provide a classroom approach to value instruction which involves both teaching techniques and materials that are consistent with a rational view of value education.

Teaching Strategies

The theoretical model selected for facilitating value judgments may be referred to as a strategy or way to think about value questions; similar to the scientific method used as a strategy to consider empirical questions. Hilda Taba has contributed much in the way of teaching strategies, especially to develop concepts and generalizations in social studies. Her strategies are based essentially upon the work

⁹⁴Ibid.

of Piaget and Bruner which suggests that thinking is learned developmentally. "Cognitive skills are seen as products of a dynamic interaction between the individual and the stimulation he receives, rather than as a result of passive absorption of information. The quantity and quality of the concepts and ideas an individual can use seem to depend upon the quantity and quality of stimulation he has had, plus, the amount of effort he has put into active thinking. In other words, the effectiveness with which an individual thinks depends largely on the kind of thinking experiences he has had. Unguided, these experiences may or may not result in productive models of thought. The task of instruction is to provide systematic training in thinking and to help students acquire the cognitive skills that are necessary for thinking autonomously and productively."⁹⁵

Very little research exists concerning the effectiveness of the application of strategies for thinking to specific subject matter content. The few studies which are related to teaching strategies have been done in the area of critical thinking skills. Shaver and Berlak summarize these research findings. "Unless the intellectual competencies that the student should be able to exhibit when confronted with an important issue are specifically identified so that instruction can focus on them, the teaching and learning of

⁹⁵The Taba Curriculum Development Project in Social Studies (Menlo Park: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), p. 13.

competencies will be haphazard, if not accidental."⁹⁶ The following guidelines for the development of critical thinking skills have been derived from the limited research completed to date.

- (1) Determine what concepts are relevant to perform critical thinking operations; for example, formulation and evaluation of hypothesis.
- (2) Teach these strategy concepts explicitly; students do not learn critical thinking as a by-product of content study.
- (3) Situations as similar as possible to those in which students are to use these skills should be set up in the classroom and students should be guided in the application of strategy concepts in this context.⁹⁷

The question of whether the solution of an ethical or value problem requires a different mode of thought or intellectual strategy than does the solution of a factual problem has not been answered. It is usually assumed that successful value judgment models or strategies depend upon the selection and agreement upon (in the case of a group decision) a relevant criterion value, or desirable end result. However, "an adequate model should also take into account the interaction between different strategies in handling public issues. To illustrate: resolving a value conflict may first require that a communication problem be solved by carefully defining

⁹⁶Shaver and Berlak, Democracy, Pluralism, and the Social Studies, p. 337.

⁹⁷Bryon Massialas and Andreas Kazamia, Crucial Issues in the Teaching of Social Studies: A Book of Readings (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 254.

terms or that a factual issue in contention be resolved by gathering sufficient evidence."⁹⁸

There is no single approach analogous to scientific verification in empirical matters which is widely accepted in our society for producing normative generalizations, forming value judgments, or making normative decisions. There are, however, some approaches suggested in the literature which have been adapted from logic, philosophy, and science that can serve as guides for the classroom teacher in this area. One such approach, developed by the Columbia Associates in Philosophy, has been selected for the purpose of this study. This particular strategy is based upon instrumentalism which dictates that a criterion value be selected in order to resolve a value question or make a value judgment. This process attempts to transfer value inquiry into the empirical realm and raises the question of whether meaningful criterion values can be agreed upon or predetermined in isolation from the plans of action that achieve them. The steps of the strategy are as follows:

- (1) Explicit statement of the problem or irresolution.
- (2) Identification of value or an end in view which is shared by all participants that is related to the problem under consideration.
- (3) Exploration of the range of alternative solutions to the problem.

⁹⁸Shaver and Berlak, Democracy, Pluralism, and the Social Studies, p. 340.

- (4) Establishing the relationship between the proposed course of action and the disputed goal referent by empirically testing "if-then" statements or implications.
- (5) Possible acceptance of a defensible proposal.⁹⁹

The adaptation of the preceding strategy for use with middle school students resulted in the following simplification of the process.

- (1) After deciding that a given conflict or problem is about values the first step in trying to solve it is to write out what you think your problem is as clearly as possible.
- (2) The second step is to decide what you hope to achieve or accomplish by solving your problem. This is called your objective or end-goal.
- (3) List all possible ways which you can think of to solve the problem.
- (4) List the advantages and disadvantages of each possible solution.
- (5) Decide upon the solution which you think is best. Keep in mind your objective or end-goal and the advantages and disadvantages of each possible solution.¹⁰⁰

Summary

The dimensions of moral judgment which Piaget proposed in his early research and a discussion of relevant findings from later experimental studies designed to test his theoretical formulations have been presented. It was noted that

⁹⁹Massialas and Cox, Inquiry in Social Studies, pp. 163-169.

¹⁰⁰A helpful discussion of how to solve a moral problem can be found in Mary V. Neff, Ethics for Everyday Living (Chicago: Science Research Association, 1958).

the developmental nature of moral judgment in relation to age appears to be convincingly supported. However, the studies which purport to test those aspects of theory which deal with parental authority and peer group participation, especially those elements involved in the Piagetian conception of the two moralities of childhood, have not produced convincing evidence. The findings in regard to antecedent conditions which may be related to moral development are also inconclusive. There appears to be a low level association between both the variables of I.Q. and socio-economic status based on parental occupations and moral judgment or certain aspects of moral judgment. There has been limited indication that the variable of sex may also be related to aspects of moral judgment, however the findings and interpretations have not been definitive.

Though many educators, especially in the social studies content area, have noted the need for value inquiry in education there is little evidence that much attention has been devoted to this topic in the actual classroom situation. The limited research available on courses which attempt to deal with value issues in both the character training and social studies context show little effect on values attributable to such classes. Kohlberg feels that classes which deal with moral values and character may, because of the long, slow and continually shifting nature of moral development, have a long-range impact on moral conformity or

resistance to temptation. He suggests that it may be possible to define moral education primarily as a matter of stimulating the development of the child's own moral judgment and its control of action.¹⁰¹

The sparse research on the use of teaching strategies has also been reviewed in reference to the proposed model for thinking about and moving toward a solution to questions which involve a conflict in values. Such strategies for thinking, which acquire meaning from the work of Piaget, Bruner, and others in cognitive development, are an attempt to provide systematic training in thinking and to help students achieve those skills necessary for autonomous and productive thought.

The following chapter contains an explanation of the experimental design of the study and a presentation of the sample characteristics. A discussion of instrumentation and material used in the study and the techniques of data analysis are also included.

¹⁰¹Kohlberg, "The Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology," pp. 425-426.

CHAPTER III

DESIGN AND PROCEDURES

The design of the study and information relevant to sample selection and characteristics; experimental treatments and implementation procedures; development and testing of instruments for data collection; statistical hypotheses, and data analysis techniques will be discussed in this chapter.

Sample Selection and Characteristics

The population from which this study sample was selected included all seventh and eighth grade students living within the MacDonald Middle School district in East Lansing, Michigan. The "Statement of Philosophy" of the East Lansing Public Schools describes the cultural setting of the school-community as, "one which is growing in number, is relatively mobile, and relatively homogeneous racially. The socio-economic range in the community is broad, but extremes are few. The economic base for school support is relatively favorable, and our citizens generally support the value of public school education. The schools and the

total community are influenced by the proximity of Michigan State University. The school reflects the comparatively high educational level of the community, as well as its strong aspiration for educational achievement."¹ The socio-economic, religious, and racial nature of the community have been summarized in the following manner. "East Lansing is a middle class community, predominantly Protestant, with less than one per cent Negro students in the schools."²

MacDonald Middle School is organized into subject matter teaching teams with students divided between two seventh grade teams and two eighth grade teams. The selected sample included all students in one seventh grade team and all students in one eighth grade team. The seventh grade team was composed of 66 students and 2 teachers, while the eighth grade team was composed of 106 students and 4 teachers. In each team the member who taught social studies was the primary cooperating teacher for this study. The seventh grade science teacher and the eighth grade English teacher also cooperated in gathering student essay responses for the content analysis portion of the investigation.

¹East Lansing Public Schools, East Lansing, Michigan, "Statement of Philosophy," East Lansing, 1967, p. 1. (Mimeographed).

²John W. Vaughn, "Implications of Physical and Intellectual Growth Characteristics, Interests, and Cultural Forces for the Improvement of the Middle School Program" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1969), p. 87.

During the course of the study the experimental mortality rate totaled six subjects in the seventh grade team and eight subjects in the eighth grade team, which resulted in a final sample of 60 seventh graders and 98 eighth graders, (88 girls and 70 boys), totaling 158 subjects. This attrition rate was attributed to: moving from the school district while the research was in progress, extended illnesses, and incomplete verbal intelligence information.

Age

The mean age was 12 years, 5.5 months for seventh graders and 13 years, 4.5 months for eighth graders. Table 3.1 contains the mean ages of the total sample arranged by grade and sex.

TABLE 3.1.--Mean Age of Sample by Grade and Sex.

Grade	Sex	N	Age	
			Year	Months
7	M	28	12	7.0
7	F	34	12	4.5
8	M	42	13	5.5
8	F	54	13	3.5

Verbal Intelligence

It has been suggested in both the theoretical discussion and the empirical findings that a significant relationship exists between intelligence, particularly verbal intelligence, and moral judgment. For this reason it appeared desirable to obtain some measure of verbal intelligence which could be used as a covariable in an attempt to control the differences in this factor between treatment groups. In the East Lansing Public School system the Lorge-Thorndike Intelligence Test is administered to all seventh grade students, therefore it was possible to obtain the T-scores (a standard score with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10) on the verbal battery of the Lorge-Thorndike for each subject from the student records.

The Lorge-Thorndike Intelligence Test has been described as one of the sounder instruments available, from the view of psychological insights shown in selecting and developing the materials, and from the standpoint of statistical analysis of the standardization data.³ This instrument has been standardized on 136,000 subjects in 44 communities in 22 states. It has an established reliability of the verbal scales for grades seven through nine of .86. The mean T-score was 52.49 for seventh grade subjects and

³Oscar K. Buros, ed., The Fifth Mental Measurements Yearbook (Highland Park, New Jersey: The Gryphon Press, 1959), p. 350.

55.49 for eighth grade subjects in this sample. Table 3.2 contains the mean T-score arranged by grade and sex.

TABLE 3.2.--Lorge-Thorndike Verbal Intelligence T-Scores By Grade and Sex.

Grade	Sex	N	T-Score
7	M	28	51.42
7	F	34	53.38
8	M	42	51.31
8	F	54	58.75

Socio-Economic Status

Socio-economic status (SES) data, based upon the North-Hatt Prestige Scale and Socio-economic Index was also obtained for the sample.⁴ For this study the occupation of the subject's father was used as the basis for socio-economic status assignment. The mean SES was 76.08 for the seventh grade sample and 75.96 for the eighth grade sample. Table 3.3 presents the mean SES of the total sample arranged by grade and sex.

The Socio-Economic Index based upon the North-Hatt Prestige Scale has a numerical range from approximately 20 to 95, with the higher prestige occupations receiving the higher numerical index. Though there is some overlapping of the eleven

⁴Albert J. Reiss, Occupations and Social Status (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961).

TABLE 3.3.--Socio-Economic Index Scores by Grade and Sex.

Grade	Sex	N	Mean SES
7	M	28	74.60
7	F	34	77.24
8	M	42	75.43
8	F	54	76.37

categories, the majority of occupations in this study were classified under the general heading of Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers which is representative of the highest prestige status. A random selection of occupations from this category is as follows: college professors and instructors, engineers, lawyers and judges, architects, social and welfare workers, and medical and dental technicians.

Experimental Design

The design of this study is of a quasi-experimental nature discussed by Campbell and Stanley as the nonequivalent control group design. This particular design applies to groups which are most likely to constitute naturally assembled collectives such as classrooms, as similar as availability permits but yet not so similar that one can dispense with the pretest.⁵

⁵Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963), p. 47.

In the context of the nonequivalent control group design, the following four treatments were outlined for implementation with the selected sample.

Treatment One (T_1) employed the method of explicit teacher instruction in presenting general information about the value concept relating to the definition of terms, the distinction between value, fact, and opinion, the development and study of values, and the recognition of value conflict. The teacher also explicitly taught the value judgment strategy to these treatment groups through classroom lectures and discussion, and assisted the groups in the application of the information about values and the value judgment strategy to selected content from the book Kiowa Years.

Treatment Two (T_2) employed the method of programmed instruction to present general information about the concept of values as described in T_1 , as well as the value judgment strategy. Two booklets were designed according to the principles of programmed learning; Values 1 presented information about the concept of value, and Values 2 presented the value judgment strategy. The teacher's role relevant to T_2 was to explain the purpose and directions of the programmed booklets to the subjects and to function as a

discussion leader in the application of the information about values and the value judgment strategy to selected content from the book Kiowa Years.

Treatment Three (T_3) was a partial control group which employed the method of explicit teacher instruction to present information about the concept of value as described in T_1 . The value judgment strategy was not presented to T_3 groups and the application of information about values to selected content from the book Kiowa Years did not include those situations used for the application of the value judgment strategy presented to T_1 and T_2 groups.

Treatment Four (T_4) was the control group which also used the book Kiowa Years, but without any attempt on the part of the teacher to explicitly teach either information about values or the value judgment strategy. The control group used Kiowa Years primarily as a tool to learn about such topics as Indian tribes and secret societies.

Implementation of Experimental Procedures

Preliminary meetings were arranged with the two cooperating social studies teachers during the spring and summer of 1970 for initial explanation and discussion of the

research project. At this time the teachers were also given copies of two Michigan State University Cooperative Extension Service Bulletins for background information about values.⁶

Three meetings were held during the first two weeks of September, 1970, to complete a definite time schedule for pre-post testing and to plan for the implementation of experimental procedures. Regular weekly sessions followed during the ten-week period while the research was in progress for discussion of specific problems and questions relating to the study.

The schedule of data collection and implementation of experimental procedures is presented in the following outline.

September 21

KNOVA pretest data was collected by the social studies teachers during regular fifty-minute class periods for the total sample.

September 22

Moral judgment pretest data was collected by the social studies teachers during regular fifty-minute class periods for the total sample.

⁶Margaret M. Jacobson, "Values 1" (Michigan State University Cooperative Extension Service: Extension Bulletin E-647, Home and Family Series, (April, 1969); "Helping Children Learn Values," Michigan State University Cooperative Extension Service. (Mimeographed).

September 28-30

The social studies teachers for each grade level randomly assigned the total number of students per team to four approximately equal groups. The treatments (T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4) were then randomly assigned to the four seventh grade groups and the four eighth grade groups.

October 5-9

All groups received an introduction to and reading assignments in Kiowa Years during social studies classes.

October 12-16

Information about values was presented to T_1 and T_3 groups by the social studies teachers. The Values₁ programmed booklet was completed by T_2 groups. Approximate time: 2 fifty-minute class periods.

October 19-23

The value judgment strategy was presented to T_1 groups by the social studies teachers and T_2 groups through programmed booklet Values 2. Approximate time: 2 fifty-minute class periods.

October 26-December 4

Knowledge about values was applied to selected information in Kiowa Years by T_1, T_2 , and T_3 groups. The value judgment strategy was applied to selected value conflict situations in Kiowa Years by T_1 and T_2 groups. Approximate time: 1 fifty-minute class period per week.

December 3

The 7th grade science teacher and the 8th grade English teacher collected essay responses to a value conflict problem presented in their respective classes. Approximate time: 1 fifty-minute class period.

December 10-11

Post test data was collected by social studies teachers using the KNOVA Test and Form B of the Moral Judgment Test. Approximate time: 2 fifty-minute class periods.

Instrumentation

The pretest and post test data for the study were obtained through the use of two instruments, the Knowledge of Values Test and the Moral Judgment Test. The content analysis data which were collected in an attempt to examine whether the subjects would transfer the value judgment strategy to subject matter content other than social studies utilized value conflict problems requiring an essay type response. The programmed booklets used in the T_2 groups were specifically developed to present both the information about values and the value judgment strategy to these subjects.

Knowledge of Values Test

The Knowledge of Values Test (KNOVA) was developed for use as a measuring tool after careful review of evaluation devices, especially in the social studies content area, failed to produce an existing instrument which could be employed as a pre-post measure to indicate the subject's knowledge about certain aspects of the value concept.

After a review of available materials and programs concerned with value education and a careful examination of the value judgment strategy, it was decided that the following information about values would facilitate learning and application of the value judgment strategy. (1) Information about the value concept in terms of definition, classification,

and distinction from fact and opinion. (2) Information about the nature of a value decision, especially related to value conflict. (3) Information about how values are developed and how values may be studied. From this outline, the following behavioral objectives were developed:⁷

- (1) Given a statement which illustrates a fact, opinion, or value, the student will be able to identify the category which it represents.
- (2) Given a story problem which illustrates a value decision and a list of values, the student will be able to identify the primary value underlying the decision.
- (3) Presented with a story problem which illustrates a value conflict, the student will be able to select the combination of values in conflict from a list of alternatives.
- (4) Provided with a partial description of the definition and purpose of values the student will be able to identify the statement which best completes the description from a list of alternatives.
- (5) Given partial descriptions of the nature of value transmission, change, and study, the student will be able to select the responses which best complete the statements from a list of alternatives.

Preliminary efforts in the development of the KNOVA instrument consisted of collecting and developing questions which would appropriately test the outlined objectives. These questions were formulated into approximately twenty multiple-choice items and submitted to three readers for

⁷Robert F. Mager, Preparing Instructional Objectives (Palo Alto: Feron Publishers, Inc., 1962).

editing related to grammar, language appropriate to sample age, objectivity, and content validity. After appropriate revision of these items, the KNOVA instrument was administered to a selected sample of eighty-four eighth graders in social studies classes during the spring of 1970. Analysis of the test scores indicated a split-half reliability of .69. The test results were then subjected to an item analysis to obtain information on the difficulty and the discrimination index of each item. With the aid of these results and further consideration of content and form the KNOVA test was refined and used as one measure for gathering pretest and post test data in the present investigation. (See Appendix A.) The final version of the KNOVA Test remained a twenty question multiple-choice instrument which included items directed toward the testing of each behavioral objective as indicated in Table 3.4.

TABLE 3.4.--Numerical Relationship of Test Items to Behavioral Objectives.

Objective	Number of Questions
(1) Fact, opinion, and value	6
(2) Value decisions	3
(3) Value conflicts	4
(4) Definition and purpose	3
(5) Value transmission, change, and study	4

The KNOVA was administered by the cooperating teachers in their social studies classes as a pretest early in the fall of the school year 1970. The teachers read and explained the directions which asked the students to carefully read each question and select the answer which they thought best by circling the appropriate letter on the answer sheet. Scoring was a simple procedure of tabulating correct and incorrect responses on the answer sheet. The pretest data from the present study, which included test scores from 63 seventh graders and 101 eighth graders, was analyzed to determine test reliability. The results are shown in Table 3.5.

TABLE 3.5.--Split-Half Pretest Reliability for KNOVA Test.

Grade	N	Reliability
7	63	.79
8	101	.71

Moral Judgment Test

This instrument is composed of twenty story problems which illustrate five types of moral judgment as outlined by Piaget: immanent justice, moral realism, retribution and expiation versus restitution and reciprocity, the efficacy of severe punishment, and group or individual responsibility.

These stories were developed by Ronald C. Johnson as part of a research investigation designed to test certain Piagetian ideas about moral judgment. Johnson did not use Piaget's original stories because he was interested in a somewhat older sample than the six-to-twelve year olds whom Piaget studied, and because a much larger sample was involved which necessitated an instrument which could be administered as a paper and pencil test rather than the lengthy interview method characteristic of earlier studies. An initial analysis of the stories by several persons who were familiar with Piaget's original work narrowed the items to the twenty most likely to be intrinsically interesting to the subjects, most similar in meaning to those of Piaget, and of an approximately equal level of difficulty. The stories were then presented to ninety-three college student judges who categorized them into the appropriate five areas of moral judgment which they were designed to represent. Their percentage of agreement on categorization was eighty-two per cent, indicating a rather high degree of content validity.

Each of the five areas of moral judgment outlined by Piaget is depicted in four separate stories. These stories are scored on the basis of either an immature or mature response in the following manner.

- (1) Immanent Justice--mature response indicates a chance factor involved; immature response attributes some sort of supernatural cause to the event.
- (2) Moral Realism--mature response judges acts in terms of intent; immature response judges acts according to consequences.
- (3) Punishment in terms of expiation or retribution versus punishment in terms of restitution--mature response chooses restitution; immature response chooses expiatory punishment.
- (4) Efficacy of severe punishment--mature response indicates less severe punishment would be more effective; immature response indicates more severe punishment would be most effective.
- (5) Group or individual Responsibility--mature response rejected group punishment; immature response accepted group punishment.

The twenty question moral judgment instrument was administered by Johnson to 807 subjects consisting of both boys and girls in grades 5, 7, 9, and 11, in a midwestern public school system in May, 1957. The reliability of the entire moral judgment scale was approximately .60 at each age level. Correlations between moral judgment responses revealed far more positive and significant correlations than might be expected by chance, and responses within moral judgment areas were nearly always positively and significantly correlated.⁸

⁸Ronald C. Johnson, "A Study of Children's Moral Judgment," 327-354. Permission to use the Moral Judgment Stories was granted by the Society for Research in Child Development, June 1, 1970.

For the purpose of the present investigation, the twenty story items were pretested on approximately eighty 8th grade students in the spring of 1970. The results from this pretest indicated that from twenty-five to thirty per cent of the responses could be categorized as follows: (1) leaving the answer space blank, (2) responding with "I don't know," or (3) constructing answers which indicated a clear misunderstanding of the question. In view of these response problems the following adaptations were implemented for use in this study.

- (1) Each story was followed with a choice of at least two possible alternatives; one indicating a mature response and one indicating an immature response according to the Piagetian conception. These alternative responses were derived primarily from the free responses written in answer to each question in the pretest study. Though Johnson used a multiple-choice alternative on those questions relating to punishment, he did not incorporate this design into questions relevant to other dimensions of moral judgment. In the revised form of the test used for the present study those questions to which a multiple-choice response was added also allowed space for a free response constructed by the subject.
- (2) The twenty item instrument was divided into Form A, consisting of ten stories which were administered as the pretest, and Form B consisting of ten stories which were used to collect post test data. This was accomplished by randomly assigning two of the four items which pertained to each area of moral judgment to the pretest and two items to the post test. (See Appendix B.)

In the administration of both the pretest and the post test, the cooperating teachers read each story aloud while the subjects read it silently; a procedure which was also followed by Johnson. Scoring the tests was accomplished by assigning a zero (0) to each immature response and a one (1) to each mature response. The responses for each test were then totaled to represent a moral judgment score. In the few instances (1%) where subjects chose to construct their own responses in answer to an item, the response was also judged according to the Piagetian criteria of immature and mature moral judgments. Two independent judges categorized these free responses with a .95 percentage of agreement. Reliability was established for the control groups in the present study by the parallel test method which indicated a reliability of .64 for the eighth grade control group and .62 for the seventh grade control group.

Content Analysis

Content analysis has been defined by Berelson as, "a research tool for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication."⁹ Content analysis was historically employed to study the content of newspapers and to analyze style features of literature,

⁹Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952), p. 18.

however with refinement and clarification this technique has become useful for investigating characteristics, causes, and consequences of communication which emanates from a multi-media environment.¹⁰

Content analysis was used in this study to determine whether the subject's essay responses to value conflict problems reflected knowledge of the value judgment strategy.

Value Conflict Problems

The original proposal for the present study indicated that the cooperation of the teachers responsible for English instruction in both the seventh and eighth grade teams would be sought to test the hypothesis that the analysis of value conflict problems presented in a subject matter area other than social studies would reflect knowledge of the value judgment strategy. In the actual investigation, the seventh grade team was composed of only two teachers, with the social studies teacher also responsible for English instruction. Because of the possibility of the subjects associating the strategy with a particular teacher as well as with a specific subject, the teacher responsible for seventh grade science cooperated in collecting data for this analysis. The eighth grade content analysis data was collected by the English teacher.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 21-25.

The criteria which guided the development of the two story problems for use in this aspect of the study included; (1) the portrayal of a problem which presented an obvious conflict of values, making the application of the value judgment strategy an appropriate response, (2) a problem related to instruction which was currently taking place in seventh grade science and eighth grade English in an attempt to dispel any suspicion by the subjects of a transfer of learning measurement, and (3) a problem which would present a meaningful value conflict within the comprehension range of the subjects, and to which a short essay response would be appropriate. The following story problems were devised in consultation with the cooperating teachers, and administered to the total sample as an appropriate exercise during one class period. The teachers read the problem and directions outloud while the students read them silently. The subjects were urged to do their best but were assured that the problem did not constitute a test, but rather that it would be used as a diagnostic tool to plan for future classroom activities.

The seventh grade science problem. A medical student was working on an important experiment in the laboratory which had to do with a new drug. Though it had only been tested one time on the lab animals, it had been successful. The hospital Board of Directors asked if it had been completely tested so that it could now be used on humans and the medical student assured them that it was ready. You have been working with the student in the experiment and know that the drug has only been tested once.

He is your best friend and you know that if the drug works on humans it could be a big break for both of you, yet you feel guilty about lying to the hospital Directors.

In the space below write how you would decide about what to do.

The eighth grade English problem. In "The Parsley Garden" by William Saroyan, Al Condraj stole a hammer to make something out of the nails and apple box which he had collected. He was caught in the act of stealing and left feeling humiliated by the two men at the store. Suppose the story was changed so that Al was not caught but walked freely from the store with the hammer in his pocket. Suppose also that Al's best friend, Pete Wawchek, happened to be looking in the store window when Al was taking the hammer. Pete thought that what Al did was wrong. He had never known Al to steal anything before even though Al and his mother had very little money. Pretend that you are Pete and have just seen your best friend steal the hammer.

In the space below write how you would decide about what to do.

Procedures for Content Analysis

The steps of the value judgment strategy were defined and illustrated with appropriate examples drawn from the essay responses of both the seventh and eighth grade samples. These category definitions and specific directions for scoring the responses were presented to two raters, one male and one female, to determine rater reliability. (See Appendix C.) Twenty per cent of the responses were randomly selected from both samples. These responses were evaluated by the investigator and then by each of the two raters. A rater

reliability of .89 was established for the seventh grade responses and .87 for the eighth grade responses.¹¹

Programmed Instruction

Early in the twentieth century Sidney L. Pressey, who is sometimes referred to as the grandfather of the teaching machine, invented a small machine that would score a multiple-choice examination automatically at the time the answer button was pushed. Although he designed this piece of equipment as a testing device, he soon realized the implications for teaching if he adjusted it so that the correct answer button had to be pushed before a subsequent question would appear. The concept of the teaching machine has grown over the past fifty years so that today the educator is faced with many types and styles, from simple paper and pencil materials to complex electronic models. However, all of these various devices have at least three characteristics in common: (1) they present information and require frequent responses by the student, (2) they provide immediate feedback, informing the student about the correctness of his response, and (3) they allow the student to work individually.¹²

¹¹Robert L. Ebel, "Estimation of the Reliability of Ratings," Psychometrika, XVI(1951), 407-424.

¹²David Cram, Explaining "Teaching Machines" and Programming (San Francisco: Fearon Publishers, Inc., 1961), p. 8.

The decision to develop and use programmed booklets as part of this study was predicated upon the stability of the information to be presented, its potential for use across subject matter content and grade levels, the absence of any existing programs to meet the objectives encompassed by this approach to value education, and the feasibility of testing the results obtained in the context of this investigation.

Planning the Program

Instruction usually encompasses the notion of two interrelated but separable functions; planning and implementation. One purpose of programmed instruction is to reduce the time and effort spent in the implementation phase of instruction by the teacher through the use of teaching machines or similar devices. Many other resources, such as textbooks and films, are often used, at least in part, for the same purpose. The emphasis in designing programmed materials is placed upon the planning phase and includes a thorough knowledge of the content area and its relationship to the objectives of instruction. Espich and Williams have described this phase in terms of observation and curriculum. Observation is particularly important when a program is being designed to teach a physical skill. The curriculum aspect

of the planning includes determining what is to be taught, at what level, and how the results will be measured.¹³

The planning stage for the specific programmed materials used in this study was based upon a review of the literature on value education including existing educational programs and materials relevant to this area. The first booklet to be developed, Values 1, was formulated in accordance with those content areas and behavioral objectives outlined in the section pertaining to the development of the KNOVA instrument.¹⁴ The second programmed booklet, Values 2, was predicated upon an analysis of the steps contained in the value judgment strategy.

Designing the Program

The technique for presenting the program content followed a linear design with the constructed response frame sequence which is perhaps the most common type of programming in use today. A linear program is one in which all students read every frame in identical sequence as opposed to a branching program which offers the reader alternative paths from which to choose, with the path he takes depending upon the response he makes in each frame. The word constructed implies that no choices are presented to the student, in other words, he does not select one response from many, but

¹³James Espich and Bill Williams, Developing Programmed Instructional Materials (Palo Alto: Fearon Publishers, Inc., 1967), pp. 17-28.

¹⁴See pp. 106-107.

must construct his own response to each frame. The constructed response linear program is advocated by B. F. Skinner for two reasons: (1) recall is more efficient in the learning process than recognition, and (2) the act of responding tends to cause learning, therefore, a student should not be exposed to incorrect alternatives as in multiple-choice programming.¹⁵

In the particular material designed for this study the student was asked to write a word or series of words in a blank provided for this purpose at or near the end of each frame. Most frames were designed in such a way that they could stand alone, that is, the student could deduce the correct answer from the information given in each frame. After writing in his answer the student was asked to lift the portion of the folded back jacket of the booklet which covered the correct responses on the right side of each page. Other words with similar meaning to the correct response which were also acceptable answers were listed in parenthesis below the first response. The following examples illustrate two typical frames. (See Appendix D for further description of the programmed booklets).

¹⁵Cram, Explaining "Teaching Machines" and Programming, p. 34.

FRAME	CORRECT RESPONSE
We have values about many different areas of life. For example, we have values about what is good and right behavior or conduct. These are called moral values. Moral values are concerned with right ways of _____.	behaving (behavior) (conduct) (acting)

FRAME	CORRECT RESPONSE
Suppose you feel that honesty and friendship are both very important values. Then your best friend asks you how you like his new baseball glove. Actually you do not like it at all. Do you tell him you don't like it and risk losing a friend or do you tell him it's really great and risk being less than honest? If you were in this situation we could say you have a _____ conflict.	value

Testing the Program

Several persons, including one of the cooperating teachers for this study, worked through the programs and edited them for grammar, language appropriate to the sample, clarity, and aptness of examples. Mechanical details, such as the length of response blanks and readability, were also considered. The programs were then checked for continuity from one frame to the next and for the size of steps.

Revisions were made accordingly and the programs were tested in a one to one situation with a sampling of subjects of comparable age to the selected sample. Consideration of the response errors of these subjects was the basis for the final revision of the booklets before use in this investigation. The use of the programmed booklets in this study represents the first attempt at actual field testing.

One rough measure of a program's worth is sometimes referred to as the 90/90 standard. An initial test of this standard is that ninety per cent of the subjects will be able to answer ninety per cent of the program frames correctly. Both of the programmed booklets, Values 1 and Values 2, directed the subjects to draw a line through each incorrect response and to write the correct response beneath it. Thus, the booklets could be analyzed for incorrect response data.

The Values 1 program was composed of twenty-one frames, excluding three frames devoted to understanding the directions for working the program. Analysis of the results of Values 1 response errors for both seventh and eighth grade T₂ groups are presented in Table 3.6.

In the seventh grade T₂ group, which totaled 14 subjects, eleven subjects or seventy-seven per cent of the sample answered ninety per cent or more of the frames correctly, while ninety-one per cent of the sample was able to answer eighty-six per cent of the frames correctly. This 91/86 standard approaches the criterion of 90/90. In the eighth

TABLE 3.6.--Response Frame Analysis for Values 1 Programmed Booklet.

Correct Response Frames		Seventh Grade		Eighth Grade	
N	%	N	%	N	%
21	100	5	36	5	19
20	96	4	29	11	42
19	90	2	14	6	23
18	86	2	14	1	4
17 or less	80	1	7	3	12

grade T_2 group, which totaled twenty-six subjects, twenty-two subjects or eighty-four per cent of the sample answered ninety per cent or more of the frames correctly, while eighty-eight per cent of the subjects were able to answer eighty-six per cent of the frames correctly for a standard of 88/86.

The Values 2 program was composed of twenty-two frames, excluding three direction frames and a concluding problem in the application of the value judgment strategy. Results of this analysis are shown in Table 3.7. In the seventh grade T_2 group, which totaled thirteen students, eight subjects or sixty-one per cent of the sample answered ninety-one per cent of the frames correctly, while eighty-four per cent of the sample were able to answer eighty-six per cent of the frames correctly for an 84/86 standard. In the eighth grade T_2 group, which totaled twenty-five students, eighteen subjects or seventy-five per cent of the sample answered ninety-one

TABLE 3.7.--Response Frame Analysis for Values 2 Programmed Booklet.

Correct Response Frames		Seventh Grade		Eighth Grade	
N	%	N	%	N	%
22	100	0	0	5	20
21	96	6	46	7	28
20	91	2	15	6	24
19	86	3	23	1	4
18	82	1	8	3	12
17 or less	77	1	8	3	12

per cent or more of the frames correctly, while eighty-eight per cent of the sample was able to answer eighty-two per cent of the frames correctly for an 88/82 standard.

The response frame analysis of the Values 1 and Values 2 booklets indicated that both programs approached the 90/90 criterion. The results of the implementation of the experimental treatments presented in Chapter IV of this study provide another means for examining the effectiveness of the programmed booklets.

Statistical Hypotheses to be Tested

The following hypotheses have been stated in the null form. The instrument used for data collection and the form in which the data were analyzed have been specified for each hypothesis.

1. Knowledge of Values

- a. Knowledge about values as measured by gain scores on the KNOVA Test does not vary according to treatment.
- b. Knowledge about values as measured by gain scores on the KNOVA Test does not vary according to method of instruction.
- c. Knowledge about values as measured by gain scores on the KNOVA Test does not vary according to sex of subject.
- d. Knowledge about values as measured by gain scores on the KNOVA Test does not vary according to grade level.

2. Maturity of Moral Judgment

- a. Maturity of moral judgment as measured by gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test does not vary according to treatment.
- b. Maturity of moral judgment as measured by gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test does not vary according to method of instruction.
- c. Maturity of moral judgment as measured by gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test does not vary according to sex of subject.
- d. Maturity of moral judgment as measured by gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test does not vary according to grade level.

3. Value Judgment Strategy

- a. Essay responses to value conflict problems presented in subject matter areas other than social studies do not vary according to knowledge of the value judgment strategy as measured by content analysis.

Analysis of Data

The general program used for the analysis of gain scores was a multivariate analysis of covariance. Multivariate analysis is generally considered to include those

statistical procedures concerned with analyzing multiple measurements which have been made on a number of individuals. The important distinction is that the multiple variates are considered in combination, as systems. Analysis of covariance has the effect of adjusting the means for uncontrolled variables and makes the necessary modification in sampling error. This corrected sampling error is then used to test for the significance among adjusted means. The assumptions to be met in multivariate analysis require that the observations be independently drawn from normal treatment populations each having the same variance, and with error components independent across all pairs of observations. The assumptions associated with normal distribution and independence were met in terms of the study design which included random assignment of subjects to groups and random assignment of treatments to groups. Independence was established by considering each group as an experimental unit. Tests for homogeneous variances are extremely sensitive to any departure from normality in the population, and modern opinion holds that analysis of this nature can and should be carried on without a preliminary test of variances.¹⁶

The specific computer program employed in this investigation was developed and named for Jeremy D. Finn.¹⁷

¹⁶William L. Hays, Statistics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963), p. 381.

¹⁷Jeremy D. Finn, Multivariate: Fortran Program for Univariate and Multivariate Analysis of Variance and Covariance (Buffalo: Department of Educational Psychology, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1967).

The advantage of this type of program is that it allows for the analysis of more than one dependent variable at the same time, as well as incorporating a covariable. In this study the dependent variables used were the gain scores derived from the pre-post KNOVA scores and the pre-post Moral Judgment Test scores. The covariable was the subject's T-score on the Lorge-Thorndike Verbal Intelligence Test and the factors included in the analysis were treatments, grade, and sex.

The portion of the data analyzed by content analysis was subjected to a test of significance of the means of the raw scores obtained on essay responses to the value conflict problem administered in science and English classes.

Summary

This chapter contained a description of the sample characteristics and design of the study. Attention was also given to the development and testing of the instruments used for data collection, as well as the planning, designing, and testing of the programmed booklets. The statistical hypotheses have been stated in the null form and the methods which were employed to test these hypotheses have been discussed. Chapter IV will include the results and discussion of this analysis.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF DATA

The initial analysis of data on knowledge about values and maturity of moral judgment employed the individual as the experimental unit, while the subsequent analysis of the data utilized the group as the experimental unit. The means and standard deviations for selected variables are presented for both the individual and group analyses.

The presentation of findings is consistent with the order and form of the hypotheses stated in Chapter III relevant to: (1) knowledge about values, (2) maturity of moral judgment, and (3) application of the value judgment strategy. The analyses for interaction effects of treatment, sex, and grade, and the correlation matrix for the variables of socio-economic status, age, KNOVA gain scores, Moral Judgment gain scores, and verbal intelligence T-scores are also presented.

A discussion of the results follows the presentation of findings, including an examination of the essay responses to value conflict problems in relation to both the application of the value judgment strategy and the cognitive stages of moral development.

Individual and Group Data

In the preliminary analysis of the data, 158 individuals were designated as the experimental unit. The input variables included; socio-economic status, age, gain scores on the KNOVA Test, gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test, and verbal intelligence T-scores. The factors in the design were; (1) treatment (four levels), (2) sex (two levels), and (3) grade (two levels). The number of cells in the analysis of variance matrix was 16. The cell means and standard deviations of the input variables for the individual analysis are presented in Table 4.1.

In the subsequent analysis of the data, 16 groups were designated as the experimental unit. The two input variables were gain scores on the KNOVA Test and gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test. The factors in the design were; (1) treatment (four levels), and (2) grade (two levels). The number of cells in the analysis of variance matrix was eight. The cell means and standard deviations of the input variables for group analysis are presented in Table 4.2.

A chi square test of the hypothesis of no association between the dependent variables of gain scores on the KNOVA Test and on the Moral Judgment Test and the covariable of verbal intelligence T-scores yielded a chi square value of 4.973 with a probability less than 0.0832. On this basis,

TABLE 4.1.--Cell Means and Standard Deviations of Input Variables for Individual Analysis by Treatment, Sex, and Grade.

Treatment	FACTORS		INPUT VARIABLES			
	Sex	Grade	SES	Age	KNOVA	Moral IQVerb
1	M	7	73.666	12.630	-0.500	0.166 47.833
1	M	8	77.000	13.350	1.250	1.125 53.187
1	F	7	77.666	12.240	1.333	0.777 50.222
1	F	8	77.800	13.270	1.300	0.900 55.600
2	M	7	77.600	12.782	0.400	-0.800 48.800
2	M	8	65.285	13.582	3.142	0.571 49.714
2	F	7	75.166	12.603	2.333	-0.083 50.166
2	F	8	78.600	13.252	3.266	0.466 57.400
3	M	7	73.375	12.427	1.125	1.000 49.750
3	M	8	76.375	13.760	0.750	0.625 49.500
3	F	7	76.000	12.190	1.400	1.400 61.200
3	F	8	73.600	13.275	1.066	1.333 60.133
4	M	7	74.625	12.510	0.125	0.375 57.750
4	M	8	78.909	13.374	-0.454	1.090 50.909
4	F	7	80.000	12.425	0.888	-0.888 56.111
4	F	8	75.928	13.392	-0.071	0.714 61.000
Variance of Input Variables			101.657	0.226	4.815	2.982 93.629
Standard Deviation of Input Variables			10.082	0.475	2.194	1.727 9.676

Legend:

SES--Socio-economic Status
 KNOVA--Gain scores on the KNOVA Test
 Moral--Gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test
 IQVerb--Lorge-Thorndike Verbal Intelligence T-Scores

TABLE 4.2.--Cell Means and Standard Deviations of Input Variables for Group Analysis by Treatment and Grade.

FACTORS		INPUT VARIABLES	
Treatment	Grade	KNOVA	Moral
1	7	0.416	0.472
1	8	1.175	1.012
2	7	1.366	-0.441
2	8	3.205	0.519
3	7	1.262	1.200
3	8	0.908	0.979
4	7	0.507	-0.257
4	8	-0.263	0.902
Variance of Input Variables		0.501	0.209
Standard Deviation of Input Variables		0.708	0.457

Legend:

KNOVA -- Gain scores on the KNOVA Test

Moral -- Gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test

the null hypothesis was not rejected, and the covariable was deleted from the analysis of the group data.

The demographic variables of socio-economic status and age, and the factor of sex were also omitted from the group analysis. All the findings related to knowledge about values and maturity of moral judgment are based upon analysis

of group data, with the exception of the findings related to the sex variable which are based upon the analysis of individual data.

Knowledge About Values

Null Hypothesis 1-a: Knowledge about values as measured by gain scores on the KNOVA Test does not vary according to treatment.

A univariate analysis of variance comparing the mean gain score on the KNOVA Test for the experimental treatment groups with the mean gain score on the KNOVA Test for the control groups across grade and sex yielded an F-Ratio of 6.4531 with a probability less than 0.0158. The multivariate test of equality of mean vectors was 4.8844 with 6 and 14 degrees of freedom and a probability less than .0069.

On the basis of the findings presented in Table 4.3 the null hypothesis was rejected.

TABLE 4.3.--Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing Mean Gain Scores of Experimental Treatment Groups with Mean Gain Scores of Control Groups on the KNOVA Test.

Source	df	Mean Squares	Univariate F*	P Less Than
Between Treatment Groups	3	3.235	6.453	.015
Within Treatment Groups	8	.501		

* F .05 (3,8) = 4.07

Null Hypothesis 1-b: Knowledge about values as measured by gain scores on the KNOVA Test does not vary according to method of instruction.

Following the rejection of null hypothesis 1-a, a post hoc comparison utilizing the Scheffé Test for differences between means was computed on the group data. The confidence interval based upon the mean gain scores on the KNOVA Test for treatment one (teacher instruction) groups and treatment two (programmed instruction) groups was as follows:

$$-3.730 < \underline{\psi} < \hat{\underline{\psi}} + .850$$

The confidence interval included zero which indicated failure to achieve significance at the .05 level and the null hypothesis was not rejected. The mean gain scores and the error variance utilized in the computation of the comparison of method effects are presented in Table 4.4.

TABLE 4.4.--Post Hoc Comparison of Mean Gain Scores on the KNOVA Test for Teacher Instruction Groups and Programmed Instruction Groups.

Method	Mean Gain Score	Error Variance
Teacher Instruction	.845	.501
Programmed Instruction	2.285	

$$F_{.05(3,12)} = 3.49$$

Null Hypothesis 1-c: Knowledge about values as measured by gain scores on the KNOVA Test does not vary according to sex of subject.

A univariate analysis of variance comparing the mean gain scores on the KNOVA Test for males with the mean gain scores on the KNOVA Test for females across treatment and grade yielded an F-Ratio of .996 with a probability less than .319. The F-Ratio for the multivariate test of equality of mean vectors was 0.6256 with 2 and 147 degrees of freedom and a probability less than .5364.

On the basis of the findings presented in Table 4.5 the null hypothesis was not rejected.

TABLE 4.5.--Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing Mean Gain Scores for Males with Mean Gain Scores for Females on the KNOVA Test.

Source	df	Mean Squares	Univariate F*	P Less Than
Between Treatment Groups	1	4.751	.996	.319
Within Treatment Groups	148	4.815		

* $F_{.05(1,148)} = 2.60$

Null Hypothesis 1-d: Knowledge about values as measured by gain scores on the KNOVA Test does not vary according to grade level.

A univariate analysis of variance comparing the mean gain scores on the KNOVA Test for seventh grade groups with the mean gain scores on the KNOVA Test for eighth grade groups across treatment and sex yielded an F-Ratio of 1.233 with a probability less than .299. The F-Ratio for the multivariate test of equality of mean vectors was 3.1344 with 2 and 7 degrees of freedom and probability less than 0.1067.

On the basis of the findings presented in Table 4.6 null hypothesis 1-d was not rejected.

TABLE 4.6.--Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing Mean Gain Scores for Seventh Grade Groups with Mean Gain Scores for Eighth Grade Groups on the KNOVA Test.

Source	df	Mean Squares	Univariate F*	P Less Than
Between Treatment Groups	1	0.6186	1.233	.299
Within Treatment Groups	8	0.501		

* $F_{.05(1,8)} = 5.32$

A test of the hypothesis of no interaction effects between treatments one and two and sex, and treatments one and two and grade resulted in a univariate F-Ratio of 0.6906 with 3 and 148 degrees of freedom and a probability less than 0.5592. The null hypothesis of no interaction was not rejected for the analysis of individual data on the KNOVA Test.

A test of the hypothesis of no interaction effects between treatment groups one, two, and three and grade yielded a univariate F-Ratio of 2.8036 with 3 and 8 degrees of freedom and a probability less than 0.1084. The null hypothesis of no interaction was not rejected for group data on the KNOVA Test.

Maturity of Moral Judgment

Null Hypothesis 2-a: Maturity of moral judgment as measured by gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test does not vary according to treatment.

A univariate analysis of variance comparing the mean gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test of the experimental treatment groups with the mean gain scores of the control groups across sex and grade resulted in an F-Ratio of 4.082 with a probability less than .049. The F-Ratio for the multivariate test of equality of mean vectors was 5.8733 with 6 and 294 degrees of freedom and a probability less than .0001. Null hypothesis 2-a was rejected on the basis of the findings presented in Table 4.7.

Null Hypothesis 2-b: Maturity of moral judgment as measured by gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test does not vary according to method of instruction.

Following the rejection of null hypothesis 2-a, a post hoc comparison utilizing the Scheffé Test for differences between means was computed on the group data. The confidence interval based upon the mean gain scores on the Moral Judgment

TABLE 4.7.--Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing Mean Gain Scores of Experimental Treatment Groups with Mean Gain Scores of Control Groups on the Moral Judgment Test.

Source	df	Mean Squares	Univariate F*	P Less Than
Between Groups	3	.854	4.082	.049
Within Groups	8	.209		

$$*F_{.05(3,8)}=4.07$$

Test for treatment one (teacher instruction) groups and treatment two (programmed instruction) groups was as follows:

$$-.800 \leq \hat{\psi} \leq 2.206$$

The confidence interval included zero which indicated failure to achieve significance at the .05 level and the null hypothesis was not rejected. The mean gain scores and the error variance utilized in the computation of the post hoc comparison is presented in Table 4.8.

TABLE 4.8.--Post Hoc Comparison of Mean Gain Scores for Teacher Instruction Groups and Programmed Instruction Groups on the Moral Judgment Test.

Method	Mean Gain	Error Variance
Teacher Instruction	.742	.209
Programmed Instruction	.039	

$$F_{.05(3,12)}=3.49$$

Null Hypothesis 2-c: Maturity of moral judgment as measured by gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test does not vary according to sex of subject.

A univariate analysis of variance comparing the mean gain scores for female subjects with the mean gain scores for male subjects on the Moral Judgment Test across treatment and grade yielded an F-Ratio of .270 with a probability less than .603. The F-Ratio for the multivariate test of equality of mean vectors was 0.6256 with 2 and 147 degrees of freedom and a probability less than .5364. On the basis of the findings presented in Table 4.9 the null hypothesis was not rejected.

TABLE 4.9.--Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing Mean Gain Scores for Males with Mean Gain Scores for Females on the Moral Judgment Test.

Source	df	Mean Squares	Univariate F*	P Less Than
Between Groups	1	.797	.270	.603
Within Groups	148	2.982		

* $F_{.05(1,148)} = 2.70$

Null Hypothesis 2-d: Maturity of Moral Judgment as measured by gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test will not vary according to grade level.

A univariate analysis of variance comparing mean gain scores for seventh grade groups on the Moral Judgment Test with mean gain scores for eighth grade groups on the Moral Judgment

Test across treatment and sex yielded an F-Ratio of 7.103 with a probability less than .028. The F-Ratio for the multivariate test of equality of mean vectors was 3.134 with 2 and 7 degrees of freedom and a probability less than 0.1067. On the basis of the findings presented in Table 4.10 the null hypothesis was rejected.

TABLE 4.10.--Univariate Analysis of Variance Comparing Mean Gain Scores for Seventh Grade Groups with Mean Gain Scores for Eighth Grade Groups on the Moral Judgment Test.

Source	df	Mean Squares	Univariate F*	P Less Than
Between Groups	1	1.487	7.103	.028
Within Groups	8	0.209		

* $F_{.05(1,8)} = 5.32$

A test of the hypothesis of no interaction between sex, grade, and treatments one and two yielded a univariate F-Ratio of .1362 with 3 and 148 degrees of freedom and a probability less than .938. The null hypothesis was not rejected for individual data on the Moral Judgment Test.

A test of the hypothesis of no interaction between grade and treatments one, two, and three yielded a univariate F-Ratio of 1.7835 with 3 and 8 degrees of freedom and a probability less than .2280. The null hypothesis was not rejected for group data on the Moral Judgment Test.

The Value Judgment Strategy

Null Hypothesis 3-a: Essay responses to value conflict problems presented in subject matter areas other than social studies do not vary according to knowledge of the value judgment strategy as measured by content analysis.

A test for differences between the means of the individual raw scores obtained by content analysis of the essay responses for the treatment groups instructed in the strategy (T_1, T_2) and the control groups (T_3, T_4) for seventh grade subjects yielded a t-value of 0.176. This failed to achieve significance at the .05 level and null hypothesis 3-a was not rejected for the seventh grade sample. The computational data for the t-test is presented in Table 4.11.

TABLE 4.11.--A t-Test of Mean Differences Between Subjects Instructed in the Value Judgment Strategy and Control Subjects for Seventh Grade.

Source	Mean Score	Standard Deviation	N	t-Value*
Instruction	1.59	1.35	32	.176
No Instruction	1.35	1.25	28	

* $t_{.05} = 1.96$

A similar test of difference between means was performed on the individual raw scores of the essay responses of eighth grade subjects with a resultant t-value of 1.111. This failed to achieve significance at the .05 level and null hypothesis 3-a was not rejected for the eighth grade

subjects. The computational data for the t-test is presented in Table 4.12.

TABLE 4.12.--A t-Test of Mean Difference Between Subjects Instructed in the Value Judgment Strategy and Control Subjects for Eighth Grade.

Source	Mean Score	Standard Deviation	N	t-Value*
Instruction	2.30	1.29	50	1.111
No Instruction	2.10	.72	47	

* $t_{.05}=1.96$

Correlations for Input Variables

As part of the univariate and multivariate analysis of variance the correlation matrix for the five input variables (socio-economic status, age, gain scores on the KNOVA Test, gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test, and Verbal Intelligence T-scores) was obtained. A test of significance of each correlation yielded the following results; a negative correlation of $-.218$ between age and socio-economic status was significant at the $.01$ level, a negative correlation of $-.313$ between age and verbal intelligence T-scores was significant at the $.01$ level, and a positive correlation of $.414$ between verbal intelligence T-scores and socio-economic status was significant at the $.01$ level. The negative correlations seem to indicate that older children in both grades

come from lower socio-economic status families, as determined by father's occupation, and tend to score lower on measures of verbal intelligence. This may be a reflection of the degree of emphasis placed upon verbal learning by different socio-economic status groups. The significant positive correlation which indicates that children from higher socio-economic groups score higher on verbal intelligence measures would seem to support this explanation, however caution is urged in the interpretation of these correlations due to the restricted range of the sample.

None of the other correlations in the matrix approached significance at either the .01 or .05 level. The complete correlation matrix for the five input variables is presented in Table 4.13.

TABLE 4.13.--Correlation Matrix for Input Variables of Socio-Economic Status, Age, Gain Scores on the KNOVA Test, Gain Scores on the Moral Judgment Test and Verbal Intelligence T-Scores.

		VARIABLES				
		Ses ¹	Age ²	Knova ³	Moral ⁴	IQverb ⁵
1	ses	1.000				
2	age	-0.218*	1.000			
3	Knova	0.072	-0.111	1.000		
4	Moral	0.032	-0.080	0.010	1.000	
5	IQverb	0.414*	-0.313*	0.127	0.131	1.000

* Indicates significance at the .01 level

Summary of Hypotheses Testing

The findings resulting from the analysis of data for study have led to the following statements regarding the rejection of the null hypotheses.

Knowledge about Values

1-a.	No effect due to treatments	Rejected
1-b.	No effect due to method of instruction	Not Rejected
1-c.	No effect due to sex of subject	Not Rejected
1-d.	No effect due to grade level	Not Rejected

Maturity of Moral Judgment

2-a.	No effect due to treatments	Rejected
2-b.	No effect due to method of instruction	Not Rejected
2-c.	No effect due to sex of subject	Not Rejected
2-d.	No effect due to grade level	Rejected

Value Judgment Strategy

3-a.	No effect due to instruction in the value judgment strategy for both seventh and eighth grade subjects	Not Rejected
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Discussion of Findings

Knowledge about Values

The findings related to treatment effects in the area of knowledge about values indicate rather strongly that

the experimental treatments achieved the purpose for which they were designed. The significant increase in gain scores from pretest to post test for the treatment groups that received the information about values suggest that the subjects were able to acquire and retain selected information about the value concept.

The findings indicate that the acquisition and retention of the information about the value concept was not sex or grade dependent within the context of this study. That is to say, the selected information about values was acquired and retained as well by males as by females, and as well by seventh graders as by eighth graders.

The results also suggest that the effect of the experimental treatments was not dependent upon the method of instruction. This is reflected in the finding of no significant difference in gain scores on the KNOVA Test between the groups receiving the instruction from the teachers and the groups receiving the instruction from the programmed booklet, Values 1.

Maturity of Moral Judgment

The findings related to maturity of moral judgment indicate that the experimental treatments did significantly influence the scores from pretest to post test on the Moral Judgment Test.

Although the level of statistical significance was less for maturity of moral judgment (.95) than for knowledge about values (.985), the results do seem to indicate that the systematic presentation and application of information about values to selected social studies content tends to increase maturity of moral judgment.

The tendency toward increased maturity of moral judgment was not dependent upon the method of instruction as indicated by the post hoc comparison of teacher instruction groups with programmed instruction groups.

One important question is whether instruction in the value judgment strategy, which was included in treatments one and two but not in treatment three, was a significant factor in the increased maturity of moral judgment. Post hoc comparisons performed on the group data indicate that mean gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test were significantly higher for treatment three groups than for control groups. However, no significant differences were found between treatment one groups and treatment three groups or treatment two groups and treatment three groups on mean gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test. These comparisons would seem to indicate that the treatment effect on maturity of moral judgment was due only to the information about values segment of the treatments and not a result of instruction in the value judgment strategy.

Though evidence related to the effect of sex upon the maturity of moral judgment has been inconclusive in earlier studies, the findings of the present investigation indicate that there were no significant differences in maturity of moral judgment between males and females. It may be noted that the verbal intelligence scores, which were higher for girls than for boys in this study, were not significantly correlated with gain scores on the KNOVA Test or gain scores on the Moral Judgment Test. This would tend to negate any initial advantage in favor of females due to a higher level of verbal intelligence.

The findings also indicate that there was a tendency for maturity of moral judgment to increase significantly more for eighth graders than for seventh graders. This may be interpreted as reflecting the relationship between age and the stages of moral development: a relationship which has been consistently supported in previous studies of moral judgment. The mean age for the samples indicated a difference between the seventh and eighth graders of approximately one year. Though this is a relatively short period of time, the year between ages twelve and thirteen may be a crucial one for the development of moral judgment.

In the context of the present study it would appear that the thirteen year old subject may have the ability to apply the information about values to hypothetical moral judgment problems to a greater degree than the twelve year old subject.

Socio-Economic Status and Verbal Intelligence

The results of this study indicated the same significant correlation between verbal intelligence T-scores and socio-economic status as has been evident in other studies of moral judgment. In the present study, however, verbal intelligence and socio-economic status were not significantly related to either KNOVA gain scores or Moral Judgment gain scores. This finding seems to suggest support for the notion that moral judgment involves more than either verbal intelligence or the environmental factor of socio-economic status based upon occupational data.

These results should be interpreted with caution, however, due to the homogeneity of the selected sample which reduced variability. An expanded range in terms of verbal intelligence and socio-economic status may account for the significant correlations between these variables and maturity of moral judgment found in previous studies.

Essay Responses to Value Problems

The value problems presented to both the seventh and eighth grade samples were designed to depict conflict between two positive values. In each problem these two values were friendship and honesty. In his studies of moral judgment, Norman Bull found that younger children exhibited a far greater facility in judging conflicts involving a vice

and a virtue than in conflicts between virtue and virtue. This facility was still pronounced at eleven years of age but by thirteen years of age the evidence suggested a marked increase in ability to judge conflicts between two positive values or virtues.

The following value problem was presented to the seventh grade sample in science classes in this study.

A medical student was working on an important experiment in the laboratory which had to do with a new drug. This drug could be the long awaited cure for a fatal disease. Though it had only been tested one time on the lab animals it had been successful. The hospital Board of Directors asked if it had been completely tested so that it could now be used on humans and the medical student assured them that it was ready. You have been working with the student in the experiment and know that the drug has only been tested once. He is your best friend and you know that if the drug works on humans that it could be a big break for both of you, yet you feel guilty about lying to the hospital Directors.

In the space below write how you would decide about what to do.

Approximately thirty per cent of the seventh grade subjects in the T_1 , T_2 , and T_3 experimental groups identified the conflict between friendship and honesty as illustrated by the following excerpts.

I would try to think what my friend would do if I told, and how important that friend was to me.

I would take into consideration that my best friend would get fired if the Board of Directors found out that he only tested it once, but I would tell the Board.

I would tell the doctors that it was only tested once. I know it would make my friend mad.

I like him a lot and I don't want to tell on him
but I have to tell because it might not work.

The following value problem was presented to the eighth
grade subjects in English classes.

In "The Parsley Garden" by William Saroyan, Al Condraj stole a hammer to make something out of the nails and apple box which he had collected. He was caught in the act of stealing and left feeling humiliated by the two men at the store. Suppose the story was changed so that Al was not caught but walked freely from the store with the hammer in his pocket. Suppose also that Al's best friend, Pete Wawchek, happened to be looking in the store window when Al was taking the hammer. Pete thought that what Al did was wrong. He had never known Al to steal anything before even though Al and his mother had very little money. Pretend that you are Pete and have just seen your best friend steal the hammer.

In the space below write how you would decide about what to do.

Slightly more of the eighth graders in the T_1 , T_2 , and T_3 experimental groups (approximately forty per cent) than the seventh graders identified the conflict between friendship and honesty as illustrated by the following responses.

I would think about the welfare of the store and the wrong involved in stealing the hammer. I would also think about our friendship and how telling might affect it.

I think I should tell because I know he's wrong but he is my best friend and I know he is poor.

If I don't do something I am as guilty as he is.

Application of the Value Judgment Strategy

The above discussion illustrates the extent to which the subjects demonstrated the use of the first step of the strategy which involved stating the problem or conflict. The second

step of the strategy was to choose a criterion value (end-goal or objective) which would guide the selection of a final solution or action. There was some question as to whether or not subjects of this age would understand and apply this particular step of the strategy.

Approximately fifty-five per cent of the seventh grade subjects in the experimental treatment groups explicitly identified the preservation of life and/or health as the criterion value. The following responses are representative of this value on human life and health.

It may kill humans. It may have an after effect.

It's better to lose a friend than to have a patient die.

What is more important, patients that are sick and may die, or myself getting rich and famous?

If it were used to cure fatal diseases, it would probably be strong and might kill or harm a person.

Approximately fifty-four per cent of the eighth grade subjects in the experimental treatment groups cited the future well-being of a friend as the criterion value for resolving the value conflict.

I would consider what would happen to Al if he were caught and how he would probably do it again.

I wouldn't want him to steal more things in the future, but I would feel awkward telling a best friend what to do.

I think I would try to make him never steal again by talking to him.

If I thought he was going to go on stealing things I would try to convince him not to steal.

These responses appear to indicate a tendency in both the seventh and eighth grade subjects toward the ability to choose a criterion value as a guide for the selection of a final solution.

Although there was a tendency for students in the experimental treatment groups in both grades to apply the first two steps of the value judgment strategy, approximately eighty per cent of the seventh graders and seventy per cent of the eighth graders proceeded to outline their final solution after noting the value conflict and/or mentioning a criterion value. However, approximately thirty per cent of the eighth grade students who had been instructed in the value judgment strategy did consider more than one possible solution. In a few cases the advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives were also considered. However, this trend was not found to be significant as reflected in the t-test of differences in means.

Only about twenty per cent of the seventh grade students who had been instructed in the value judgment strategy mentioned more than one alternative or speculated about the pros and cons of an alternative. This may have been due to the specific value conflict problem which was assigned to the seventh grade sample. The majority of seventh graders viewed their problem as a life or death matter. The value placed upon life may have been so strong that it distorted the subject's ability to consider any alternatives except the most direct one to the preservation of life.

Moral Development Stages.--Piaget characterized moral development as being composed of two major stages; heteronomy and autonomy. Heteronomous morality is the first stage of moral development for the child and focuses upon external rules and authority. The autonomous stage, which follows heteronomy, appears when mutual respect is strong enough to make the individual feel from within the desire to treat others as he himself would like to be treated. Piaget also briefly discussed an intermediate phase of development between heteronomy and autonomy in which, "the child no longer obeys the commands given by the adult but obeys the rule itself, generalized and applied in an original way."¹

Though his explanation of the factors which allow a child to progress from one phase of morality to the next differs from the Piagetian conception, Bull describes similar stages in the developmental process. Heteronomy or external morality is dominated by rules imposed by others, as well as references to such authority figures as parents, teachers, religion, and police agencies. Bull's intermediate stage is labelled socionomy or external-internal morality. The child is not longer controlled by the external sanctions of reward and punishment in the physical sense, but rather by the voice

¹Piaget, Moral Judgment of the Child, pp. 194-196.

of public opinion; of social praise and blame. The final stage of autonomy or internal morality is characterized by the individual's own inner ideals of conduct. He is no longer dependent for his moral controls upon fear of authority or fear of public opinion. According to Bull, this autonomy may vary greatly in its quality, from punitive guilt feelings which castigate self and others to inner attitudes which are rational rather than irrational, and altruistic rather than basically self-concerned.²

The responses of both the seventh and eighth grade samples have been analyzed for evidence of these three stages.

Heteronomy.--There were only two direct references to specific authority figures from the 60 seventh grade responses which composed the sample.

The story is not correct because the U. S. government would not have the drug on the market without quite a few tests on it.

The FDA would test the drug more.

It is interesting to note that six of the seventh grade subjects indicated the direct application of the scientific method to the testing of the drug. This may be regarded as a reflection of what had been taught in science classes, but it may also be regarded as an appeal to a different kind of authority.

²Bull, Moral Judgment from Childhood to Adolescence, pp. 30-35.

There were also several references to possible considerations regarding external punishment among the seventh grade responses.

If it did not work, what would happen to us?

We would get in a lot of trouble.

If you use the drug and it isn't safe you could get into a lot of trouble.

Though about seventy per cent of eighth grade subjects were willing to consider Al's specific situation and the reasons for his stealing the hammer, there were a few instances where the application of a specific rule seemed to determine the final action. One boy justified his solution with the following statement.

You should not take things without paying for them because the person who you stole the item from probably had to work hard to get it.

A girl expressed the following rule as justification for her decision.

Nobody has a reason for taking or stealing things no matter what the cost.

On the other hand, a few subjects resorted to the rule that, "it is none of my business" to justify taking no action.

Several of the eighth grade responses indicated a concern with external punishment.

He might keep on stealing and get caught one of these times. If he got caught he would have a police record.

I would not want him to get punished for what he did, if he took it back.

He might get into trouble and get put in jail and have to put up bond.

Other eighth grade responses suggested reliance upon an authority figure.

If it were something big and expensive I would tell his parents.

I should tell his parents so they will try to do something about it.

I decided to go to Al's mother and tell her about what happened and ask her if she would talk to Al about it.

I would talk it over with a teacher.

Approximately six per cent of the subjects decided to rely upon a different kind of authority which was Al's ability to solve his own problems.

Even though he was my friend I would stay out of the way and let Al worry about it.

I would discuss it with Al and let him decide.

I'd leave it entirely up to him.

I would talk with him first and let him decide.

Socionomy.--An interesting seventh grade response which might be seen as a bridge between the stages of heteronomy and socionomy was the following.

The hospital Directors might get sued if any of the people die from the drug.

There is a concern with others (the Directors) rather than with self and getting sued may represent a form of social blame. It is also possible that the notion of getting sued represents the suggestion of external punishment. The

following responses seem to express the stage of socionomy somewhat more explicitly.

If it didn't work, they would blame it on the student and me for not telling the Board of Directors.

If it didn't work on humans you might be considered a failure, and that would be more degrading than if he wasn't a friend with you.

Approximately eighty per cent of eighth grade subjects responded that they would not tell on Al to anyone. In some cases this was to avoid punishment such as Al going to jail, and in other cases it was so Al could avoid social blame from his peers. One girl expressed it this way.

It would really make me feel funny if my friends and my sister and brothers found out because I always tell them how nice he is and that he would never steal in his life.

Two boys wrote about how their own opinions about their friend would change.

It would change my thoughts completely about him. I wouldn't trust him.

I wouldn't like what he had done and I might down-grade my friend a little. I might not hang around with him anymore.

Autonomy.--A clear representation of the stage of autonomy as characterized by guilt feelings was expressed by the seventh grade subject who wrote:

I would feel very guilty for not telling the Directors.

Piaget's consideration of the reciprocity factor inherent in the autonomous stage was indicated in the following seventh grade responses.

If I had the fatal disease would I like to have a drug used on me that had only been tested once?

If I were sick I would want the medicine to be safe.

Three other seventh grade responses seemed to indicate that the subjects had reached his own inner ideals of conduct.

I don't think there is any real decision when it comes to human life.

I would certainly not do anything that would endanger someone's life.

You can make new friends but you can't make a person live again.

Over twenty per cent of the eighth grade sample seemed to have reached a conclusion based upon their own inner ideals of conduct concerning stealing as reflected in the following responses.

I don't want to tell on him, but leaving well enough alone is out of the question according to my values.

But how would I feel about myself, I mean he might just keep on stealing.

First off I would ask him why he did it and tell him he is wrong.

Al's my best friend but I think what he did was wrong.

Over ten per cent of the subjects seemed to have concluded from their own inner ideals of conduct that friendship was the most important value.

If he were a real good friend and I knew him well then I would go by that.

I wouldn't do anything because he is my best friend.

I probably would not tell on him because he is a friend of mine.

What he was doing wasn't right but because he is my friend I wouldn't tell on him.

The guilt aspects of the autonomous stage were reflected in a few responses with reference to Al.

He would probably have it on his conscience.

I'd let his conscience take over from there.

What about how his conscience is going to feel?

Finally I would come to the conclusion that I should make Al feel guilty enough to take it back.

Many of the eighth grade subjects, approximately seventy per cent, considered much more than the possible consequences of Al's actions. In several instances they questioned his motives and intentions.

I would think that maybe he is stealing because he doesn't want to bother his mother by asking for money.

Do I know this person? Is he doing something which he himself thinks is wrong or doesn't he care?

I would wonder why he did it. Maybe because he wants to make something for his mother.

I would think about why he did it and if he had a good reason.

In view of this descriptive analysis of the essay responses it would seem that more eighth grade students than seventh grade students had reached the autonomous

stage of moral development. However, this conclusion may only be representative of the different value conflict problems presented to the two groups. Certainly the eighth grade subjects did not consider their value conflict problem as a life or death matter. In comparison with the seventh grade problem, the eighth grade situation may have been easier for the subjects to identify with and respond to on the basis of their own inner ideals of conduct.

One final observation about the essay responses concerns the complexity of the thinking reflected in some of the answers. One seventh grade subject wrote:

If the person that would take the drug had no chance to live, then I would be quiet, but if the person was not going to die right away and had a long life ahead--friend or no friend--I'd tell the Directors.

While one eighth grade girl was drawn into the following discussion on the psychology of Al's behavior.

First I would think about the kind of person I knew Al was Would any of his actions be leading up to his stealing? After I thought about his personality I would wonder about his conditions at home. Was he violent? Withdrawn? Was he just regular? To decide this I would have to know how he felt toward his mother and how she felt about him.

Summary

The findings of this study indicated that knowledge about values and maturity of moral judgment were significantly increased as a result of the experimental treatments. The analysis of data also indicated that the increase in

knowledge about values and maturity of moral judgment was not affected by the method of instruction employed, the sex of the subject, or the grade level of the student.

Content analysis of the essay responses did not reflect significant differences in the application of the strategy to value conflict problems as a result of instruction, although the findings did suggest that students in the experimental groups were able to identify value conflicts and select criterion values. Though students in T_3 groups were not instructed in the strategy they tended to be able to apply the first two steps of the strategy almost as well as the students who had received explicit instruction. One explanation of this performance may be in the overlapping nature of the information about values which was presented to T_3 groups and the first two steps of the strategy. The limited number of subjects who applied the total value judgment strategy to the value conflict problems were almost all from the T_1 and T_2 groups.

The essay responses also tended to demonstrate the complexity of moral judgment and the variability of subjects in relation to Piaget's stages of moral development.

The summary, conclusions, and implications of this study are discussed in Chapter V.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

The purpose of this investigation was to determine the effects of the application of specific information about values and a value judgment strategy to selected social studies content by means of two teaching methods with middle school students.

The selected sample was composed of 60 seventh grade students and 98 eighth grade students in two teaching teams at MacDonald Middle School in East Lansing, Michigan. The primary cooperating teachers for both grades were the members of the teaching teams responsible for social studies instruction.

The total seventh grade team was randomly divided into four groups or classes and each group was assigned to one of four treatments. A similar procedure was followed for the eighth grade team, resulting in a total of eight groups, with each treatment represented by one seventh grade group and one eighth grade group.

The four treatments were as follows; (1) teacher instruction in information about values and the value judgment strategy and application of the information and

strategy to selected content from the book Kiowa Years, (2) programed instruction, utilizing two booklets specifically designed for this study, to provide information about values and the value judgment strategy with application of the information and strategy to selected content from Kiowa Years, (3) teacher instruction in information about values and application of this information to selected content from Kiowa Years, and (4) no explicit instruction about values or the value judgment strategy.

The hypotheses tested concerned; (1) the effects of treatment, method of instruction, sex of subject, and grade level of student upon the acquisition and retention of knowledge about values, (2) the effects of treatment, method of instruction, sex of subject, and grade level of student on maturity of moral judgment, and (3) the effect of instruction in the value judgment strategy on essay responses to value conflict problems. The relationship of socio-economic status and verbal intelligence to the acquisition and retention of knowledge about values and maturity of moral judgment was also examined.

Two instruments were employed to collect both pretest and post test information. The Knowledge of Values Test (KNOVA) was specifically designed for the study to reflect the acquisition and retention of selected information presented about the value concept. The Moral Judgment Test was

adapted from a series of twenty story items devised by Ronald Johnson in accordance with the Piagetian theory of moral judgment. These story items were employed in the present study to determine the effect of the treatments on moral judgment.

An additional source of data was provided by essay responses to value conflict problems administered to the subjects in seventh grade science classes and eighth grade English classes.

The implementation of the specified treatments and the collection of data took place over a ten week period during Fall, 1970. The data from the pretest and post test using the KNOVA and the Moral Judgment instruments was subjected to a univariate and multivariate analysis of variance employing mean gain scores. A t-test of mean differences was performed on both the seventh and eighth grade essay response scores. A descriptive analysis which related the content of the essay responses to the application of the value judgment strategy and to Piaget's stages of moral development was also completed.

Conclusions of the Study

The first four conclusions are related to the effect of the presentation and application of information about values to selected social studies content.

1. The presentation of specific information about values and the application of this information to selected social studies content did significantly increase knowledge about values and maturity of moral judgment.
2. Significant increase in knowledge about values and maturity of moral judgment was achieved by both the teacher instruction and the programmed instruction method.
3. Significant increase in knowledge about values and maturity of moral judgment was achieved by both boys and girls.
4. Significant increase in knowledge about values and maturity of moral judgment was achieved by both seventh and eighth graders. Grade level did affect maturity of moral judgment, however, to the extent that maturity of moral judgment increased significantly more for eighth graders than for seventh graders.

The following three conclusions are relevant to the effects of instruction and application of the value judgment strategy to selected social studies content.

5. Instruction in the value judgment strategy and application of the strategy to selected social studies content did not have a significant effect on maturity of moral judgment.

6. Knowledge of the value judgment strategy was not significantly reflected in the essay responses to value conflict problems by either seventh or eighth grade subjects.
7. The descriptive analysis of the essay responses indicated that approximately thirty per cent of the seventh graders and forty per cent of the eighth graders in the experimental treatment groups recognized the values which were in conflict in the problems. Over fifty per cent of the subjects from both grades in the experimental treatment groups explicitly chose a criterion value which represented the basis for the selection of the final solution.

The two final conclusions indicate the relationship of socio-economic status and verbal intelligence to knowledge about values and moral judgment and the reflection of Piaget's stages of moral development in the essay responses.

8. Verbal intelligence was significantly correlated with socio-economic status, however neither socio-economic status nor verbal intelligence was significantly related to knowledge about values or maturity of moral judgment.
9. Content analysis of responses of both seventh and eighth graders suggested the variability which can be found in relation to Piaget's stages of moral development in subjects of similar ages. This tends to reinforce the notion that the proposed stages of moral development are

theoretical constructs which represent a general framework of moral development, subject to individual differences in terms of age and circumstances.

Implications of the Study

Wilson has noted that the area of moral education urgently demands some kind of action, even though the field is largely uncharted and much of the work must proceed by trial and error. He encourages educators to "try out various practical possibilities in as intelligent and well-informed way as possible, with proper regard to the dangers inherent in new methods; but certainly without undue hesitation."¹

In keeping with Wilson's suggestion, this study was designed as an exploratory investigation which utilized a rational approach to value education. The results of this study indicate that the experimental treatments, specifically designed and implemented in the context of this research, were successful in increasing student's knowledge about values. Perhaps the more important finding, however, was the tendency toward increased maturity of moral judgment, defined in Piagetian terms, as a result of the experimental approach to value education.

These findings seem to imply that programs in value education based upon specific objectives which include;

¹Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 399.

(1) the distinction between facts, opinions, and values;
(2) the identification of values which underlie decisions;
(3) the identification of values which come into conflict in selected situations, and (4) explanation of the nature, transmission, and study of values, do positively influence the student's knowledge about values and maturity of moral judgment.

These results offer empirical support for the contention that the understanding of concepts, the mastery of facts relevant to the morality of the child's society, and activities designed to objectify moral or psychological problems are important content aspects of moral education.²

Possibilities regarding the use of programmed materials in value instruction are also suggested by the findings of this study. This is not to say that the teacher is unnecessary when such materials are employed. The role of the teacher in guiding and directing the student in the use of the programmed materials and in the application of the information contained in such materials remains important.

Implication for the use of the particular program in value education employed in this study in the school environment suggests that it is equally effective with boys and girls, and with seventh and eighth grade students, though

²Ibid., p. 411.

eighth grade students tend to demonstrate a greater increase in maturity of moral judgment as a result of the program.

The classroom use of value conflict problems which required essay responses from students supported the notion that moral development is a complex process. The responses elicited by the value conflict problems may provide an important tool in the assessment of a child's growth in the area of moral judgment.

Implications for Further Research

One of the most important questions to which future research can be directed concerns the relationship between increased knowledge about values and maturity of moral judgment to moral behavior and action.

The early studies of Hartshorne and May concluded that little evidence existed to support the notion that a child would express the same values in a real situation as he has expressed in writing or in personal interviews where he is asked to judge a hypothetical case. The Hartshorne and May studies leave the impression that what a student says he will do in a given situation is "more moral" than what he will actually do.³

Piaget takes the opposite view. He agrees that the verbal judgment of a hypothetical situation may differ from

³Bull, Moral Judgment from Childhood to Adolescence, pp. 18-19.

actual behavior in a similar situation. However, according to Piaget, the verbal judgment will lag behind the actual behavior. That is to say, the child's moral judgments in the actual situation will be more mature than his verbal responses will indicate when he is questioned about a hypothetical story problem.⁴

Thus, the effect of increased maturity of moral judgment, as measured by Piaget-type stories, upon actual behavior would seem to be a relevant question for future research.

The approach to value instruction employed in the present study produced some positive results relating to increased value knowledge and maturity of moral judgment. The question of whether these results can be replicated with more heterogeneous samples in terms of age, intelligence, and socio-economic status remains to be investigated.

Additional questions for further research concern the effectiveness of the value instruction approach as tested in the present study when applied to subject matter other than social studies and utilizing situations for the application of the information about values other than the historical struggle portrayed in Kiowa Years.

The relationship between length of time spent on the implementation of the program and the effectiveness of

⁴Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, pp. 112-120.

instruction also provides an interesting question for future research. In the present study the implementation of the experimental treatments and the data collection procedures took place over a ten week period of time, with approximately one to two hours per week devoted to instruction or testing specific to value education. The effect of variation in the period of time devoted to value education and the intensity of value instruction within a given time period remains to be studied.

It is hoped that the modest success of the present exploratory study will encourage others to investigate educational programs designed to enhance the process of moral development.

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APPENDIX A

KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES TEST

KNOVA

DIRECTIONS: We are interested in knowing what students your age think about the following questions. This is not a test for which you will receive a grade or be given a time limit to finish. Please read the instructions for each part and consider each question carefully, then circle the answer which you think is best.

Before beginning the questions, please fill out the top part of the answer sheet.

Part I. It is sometimes hard to decide whether a word or a statement is fact, opinion, or value. However, in everyday life we often act as if we know the difference. Circle the one lettered response on the answer sheet which you think best describes each of the following statements.

1. Freedom of speech
 - A. Fact
 - B. Opinion
 - C. Value
2. Oxygen is necessary for human life
 - A. Fact
 - B. Opinion
 - C. Value
3. Ice Cream is good
 - A. Fact
 - B. Opinion
 - C. Value
4. Dogs are animals
 - A. Fact
 - B. Opinion
 - C. Value

5. Movies are fun

- A. Fact
- B. Opinion
- C. Value

6. Concern for physical and mental health

- A. Fact
- B. Opinion
- C. Value

Part II. The following situations represent certain value decisions and value conflicts. Circle one answer from the lettered responses which you think best completes each situation.

7. Jane had not studied her math assignment before class and her teacher gave a surprise quiz. She copied from Mark's paper and received a high grade, but she was upset about it and told her teacher that she had cheated. In making the decision to tell her teacher, Jan recognized her value of

- A. Being competent
- B. Being self-reliant
- C. Being ambitious
- D. Being responsible
- E. Being honest

8. John was left in charge of his young brother for a short time each morning until the regular baby-sitter arrived. One morning the sitter was later than usual and John knew if he stayed with his brother any longer he would be late for school. He also knew the sitter would be there within a few minutes and he considered leaving his brother alone for that short time. But he decided to stay at home until the sitter arrived and in making this decision John probably recognized his value of

- A. True friendship
- B. An exciting life
- C. Being responsible
- D. Freedom
- E. Courage

9. Pam and Mary were both planning to go to their class party. Mary had a new dress to wear and showed it to Pam. Pam did not care for the dress, but when Mary asked her if she liked it Pam replied, "Yes, it will look great on you." In making this reply Pam probably expressed her value for
- A. Ambition
 - B. Friendship
 - C. Honesty
 - D. Accomplishment
 - E. Courage
10. On the way home from school Tom saw a bad fight between two of his friends. He thought about trying to stop it but did not interfere. Later he felt guilty. Tom probably had a value conflict between
- A. A sense of accomplishment and a sense of excitement
 - B. Friendship and pleasure
 - C. Freedom of individuals and protection of human life
 - D. Responsible behavior and broadminded behavior
 - E. Self-controlled behavior and obedient behavior
11. Issues like fair housing and school desegregation often cause people to have a value conflict between
- A. Family security and responsible behavior
 - B. Individual freedom and equal opportunity
 - C. A peaceful world and an exciting life
 - D. Friendship and independence
 - E. Broadminded behavior and obedient behavior
12. National decisions to enter wars often cause people to have a value conflict between
- A. Obedience and pleasure
 - B. Security and excitement
 - C. Courage and self-control
 - D. Responsibility and creativity
 - E. Peacefulness and security

Part III. The following questions are concerned with general information about values. Circle the one response which you think best answers each question.

13. A value may best be described as
- A. Something we want; like a new bike
 - B. An idea about what is good
 - C. A wish for happiness
 - D. A statement of fact
 - E. An opinion about nature

14. Values

- A. Guide the behavior of most people
- B. Are held by only good people
- C. Are the same for all people
- D. All of the above
- E. None of the above

15. A person's first step toward solving a value conflict would probably be

- A. Listening to his parents
- B. Listening to his friends
- C. Knowing that he has a value conflict
- D. Talking about the issues
- E. Drawing conclusions

16. The value which is the most important to you

- A. Can change with age and experience
- B. Is also the most important value for each of your classmates
- C. Will remain the same forever
- D. Is outlined for you in the Constitution if you are a United States citizen
- E. Is probably not the most important value for anyone else

17. It is quite likely that as young children our values were influenced mostly by

- A. Our teachers
- B. Our friends
- C. Stories we were told
- D. Television programs
- E. Our parents

18. An important group of values are those known as moral-ethical values. These are ideas about

- A. What is good and right behavior
- B. What is beautiful
- C. What is useful
- D. What is economically profitable
- E. What is in style or fashion

19. We can study the values of other people by
- A. Watching what they do
 - B. Listening to what they say
 - C. Reading about other people's ideas
 - D. All of the above
 - E. None of the above
20. We can learn to know our own values better by
- A. Thinking about how we live
 - B. Thinking about what choices we make when decisions are necessary
 - C. Thinking about how we judge other people
 - D. All of the above
 - E. None of the above

APPENDIX B

MORAL JUDGMENT TEST

FORMS A AND B

FORM A

DIRECTIONS: This is not the usual kind of test because there are no right or wrong answers. This is an important way for teachers to find out what students your age really think. Read each question carefully along with your teacher and circle the letter of the answer following each question which you think is best. For some questions there will be a space for you to write in your own answer if you do not agree with those listed.

Please fill in the following information about yourself.

NAME _____
AGE: YEARS _____ MONTHS _____
CHECK ONE: GIRL _____ BOY _____
SOCIAL STUDIES CLASS _____

1. Four boys went downtown one day and were looking around in the store windows. One boy said, "Let's go into this store and see if we can take something." Two of the others thought this was a good idea but the other one didn't want to. The three that wanted to told the one that didn't want to that they'd tell all the other guys that he was chicken. So he went with them. They all took a few things but then the store detective caught up with them. He caught the one that had suggested it and he caught the two that had gone along with the idea. But he didn't notice the one who hadn't wanted to take anything, even though he was right beside the others and was acting the same as they were, so that this one didn't get caught at all.

Why did this one boy get away when the other three were caught?

- A. Because he really didn't want to take anything in the first place.
B. It was just luck. Maybe the detective didn't see him.
C. Other (Write your own answer if you do not agree with A or B).

2. A girl named Nancy liked one of the boys in her class a lot, but she didn't want anyone to know it. She told her best girl friend about it and the girl friend promised not to tell. But then she got angry at Nancy one day and told a lot of people, so that Nancy got teased a lot, but this boy hadn't gone with her before, so she had nothing to lose on that score.

Here is a story something like the first one.

This girl was named Sharon. She was going steady with one boy, but her parents had visitors from out of town, who had a son her age. Her parents asked her to show this boy a little of the town. She didn't like doing this because she thought it wasn't fair to her steady boyfriend, but she went out with this boy to be polite. She told her best friend about this and her girl friend promised not to tell--just like in the first story. But just by accident Sharon's girl friend mentioned it in front of Sharon's steady boyfriend and some other kids. He got angry at Sharon because she'd gone out with someone else when they were supposed to be going steady, so he quit going with her. Sharon got teased and lost her boy friend too, because of what her girl friend had said without thinking.

Was Nancy's girl friend or was Sharon's girl friend the worst?

- A. Nancy's girl friend was the worst because she told on purpose.
 - B. Sharon's girl friend was the worst because Sharon lost her steady boy friend.
 - C. Both girl friends were equally bad.
3. Some boys and girls were playing football in the street. A pass was thrown and the boy who ran to catch it ran up onto a yard and trampled some recently planted shrubs and flowers. What should be done to the boy: 1. make him pay for the damage done or replace the shrubs and flowers, 2. give him a licking so he won't do it again, 3. not allow him to play football.

What punishment would be fairest?

- A. Make him pay for damages.
- B. Give him a licking.
- C. Not allow him to play football.

What punishment would be hardest?

- A. Make him pay for damages.
- B. Give him a licking.
- C. Not allow him to play football.

4. The stores downtown are always worried about shoplifting. In the past few years the stores have been good to school students by giving them part-time work, especially at Christmas, to provide those who don't have much money with some buying power. The police have been working on the shoplifting problem too; arresting many more people. Shoplifting has decreased recently.

What do you think is responsible for most of the decrease, the stores helping the young people or the increased police action?

- A. The stores giving part-time work because the students have something to do plus earning their own money.
- B. The increased police arrests because the students are afraid of being caught.
- C. Other (Write in your own answer).

5. A group of young people were coming back to school after playing softball. Some of them had picked up rocks on the diamond and were throwing them around. Finally, one boy threw a rock which broke a window in the school. The principal was nearby and heard the crash. He took them all into a room and asked them who broke the window. The boy who had broken the window wouldn't say he had done it and the other boys would not tell on him.

Should the principal punish all the boys or none of them?

- A. All of them because they shouldn't have been throwing rocks in the first place.
- B. None of them because only one boy is guilty.

6. A boy, about 16 years old, had a driver's license. His father said that he could use the car whenever he asked, as long as his parents weren't going to use it. The boy used it pretty often but one night his father told him not to, because he and the boy's mother wanted to use it as soon as the father got off work that evening. His mother was out so the boy figured that he'd use it anyway and get it back before either parent got home. He and his buddy took a ride around town but just as he was headed home, he got a flat. Because of the time it took fixing the flat, the boy didn't get the car home on time to beat his Dad, so that his Dad found out, and wouldn't let him use the car for a month.

If he'd have been driving the car with his father's consent would he have still got the flat?

- A. Yes, because the flat tire doesn't have anything to do with his father's consent.
- B. No, the world works in strange ways.
- C. Other (Write in your own answer).

7. There was a young fellow named George who was working in a filling station. He was putting gas in a car and the driver asked him to check the oil. Then the driver went inside. George got done putting in gas and was just about to check the oil when another car came in that wanted service in a hurry. He went to wait on this car and then had to help with another car. He forgot all about checking the oil in the car he had started out with. The driver paid him but didn't ask about the oil because he figured George would have added some if it was needed. It happened that the oil was very low when George forgot to check it and soon there wasn't any oil left, so that the motor was damaged.

Here is another story like the first one.

This young man's name was Dale and he worked as a station attendant too. He was putting gas in a car when the driver asked him to check the oil. The driver went inside and then Dale got to talking to some of his friends who'd come in to see him. He figured that probably the car didn't need any oil anyway. When the driver came out he asked Dale how the oil was and Dale said that it was all right, even though he knew he hadn't checked it. The oil was low on this car too, but the owner had it checked again before it ran completely out of oil, so that not too much happened to hurt the car.

Which station attendant was worse?

- A. George was the worst (the first attendant) because car motor was damaged.
- B. Dale (the second attendant) was worst because he didn't check the oil on purpose.
- C. Both attendants were equally bad.

8. This group of boys went into a candy store every day after school. When they started out everything was all right, but soon they began to take candy and things. One day the owner caught them. They admitted that they'd been taking things for quite awhile. The owner didn't know whether to call the juvenile squad of the police or to give the boys a spanking or to have the boys do things like sweeping and mopping the store till they'd worked to pay for what they had taken.

What punishment would be the fairest?

- A. Call the police
- B. Give the boys a spanking
- C. Make them work to pay for what they had taken

What punishment would be the hardest?

- A. Call the police
- B. Give the boys a spanking
- C. Make them work to pay for what they had taken.

9. Two guys about 10 years old, who lived in the same apartment house, got hold of some firecrackers last Fourth of July. Firecrackers are illegal and besides that they both had fathers who worked nights. The firecrackers woke their fathers up and each father took his own boy into the house. The first father gave his boy a couple of pretty hard swats for waking him up. The second father took his son in and just told him how he'd been up all night and needed to sleep, and that waking him up would be just the same sort of thing as if someone kept the boy awake at night after he wanted to go to sleep. So both boys went outside again and played more quietly. But there were still firecrackers left and the next day one of the boys set them off, waking up the two fathers again.

Which boy do you think it was this time?

- A. The boy who got the swats because his father did not explain why it was wrong to set off the firecrackers.
- B. The boy who got the talking to because it wasn't hard enough punishment for him to remember.
- C. Other (Write in your own answer).

10. A science class was on a trip in the spring and they stopped to look over an apple orchard that was in bloom. While the teacher wasn't around, one person in the group cut off many branches to get apple blossoms. He did this when none of the others were looking, so that none of the group knew who did it. The farmer saw the cut branches in the cars and was very angry. He complained to the teacher but no one knew who did it so no one could tell. The farmer and the teacher decided to charge everyone in the group equally to pay the damages, since they couldn't find out who had done it.

Was this right?

- A. Yes, because everyone in the group should have stopped the person who did it. The damage had to be paid for.
- B. No, because only one person was involved and the whole group shouldn't be made to pay.

FORM B

DIRECTIONS: This is not the usual kind of test because there are no right or wrong answers. This is an important way for teachers to find out what students your age really think. Read each question carefully along with your teacher and circle the letter of the answer following each question which you think is best. For some questions there will be a space for you to write in your own answer if you do not agree with those listed.

Please fill in the following information about yourself.

NAME _____
AGE: YEARS _____ MONTHS _____
CHECK ONE: GIRL _____ BOY _____
SOCIAL STUDIES CLASS _____

1. Two fellows were out one night and wanted to go riding in a car. They didn't have one, but they saw a car that was parked in front of a house with the keys in it, so they took that car. They drove it around for awhile but then they spotted a police car so they stopped the car and got out and started to run through back yards and alleys to ditch the police. They ran for awhile but then one of them got winded and the police caught up with him. The other one ran for awhile more and then he crossed a ravine by an old bridge. The bridge was rotten and a plank broke on him so that one leg went through and got broken.

If this boy had not stolen the car and had been running across the old rotten bridge would he have still broken through and hurt himself?

- A. Yes, because the bridge was rotten and would have broken no matter who ran across it.
B. No, because he would not need to be punished in this way.
C. Other (Write in your own answer if you do not agree with A or B).

2. There was a boy named Bill whose parents were going on vacation. He had a paper route and had to get someone to take it for him for a week so that he could go with them. He got his friend, a boy named Jimmy, to take the route and Jimmy did a good job for a couple of days. Then Jim's grandfather got sick and his parents had to leave town to be with him and the boy had to go with his parents. He didn't want to go and leave Bill's route, but he had to. He had to leave with his folks in such a hurry that he didn't have time to get anyone else to take the route: he just notified the paper manager. Well, when Bill got back from his vacation he had lost his paper route because Jimmy, the boy he'd gotten as a substitute had to leave it, so they'd hired another boy.

Here is another story about like the first one:

There was a boy named Johnny who had a paper route too. His parents were going on vacation and he had to find someone to take the route for him so he could go too. He got one of his friends, a boy named Paul, to take the route for a week. Paul got paid \$5.00 in advance for the week so he didn't pay much attention to how he did the job. He forgot some places some of the days and didn't deliver to all of them. Some other customers got angry because he didn't roll the papers tight and parts of the paper blew away or sometimes got wet. When Johnny got back he found that he had lost one customer out of every five.

Which one of the friends that took the paper route was worse, the first or the second one?

- A. Jimmy (the first one) because Bill lost his paper route.
 - B. Paul (the second one) because he was just plain careless.
 - C. Both boys were equally bad.
3. This girl was sitting around the house on a day off from school. Her Dad asked her to go to the grocery store to get some things because he and the mother didn't have a chance to go themselves. The girl said that she'd go in a few minutes and then she said she'd go after while, anyway, she never got around to going. No one else had been able to go, so they had a pretty poor dinner that night. The father was angry at her. He figured out a few different punishments for the girl. The first one he thought of was of not letting her go out at all that week. The second one he thought of was to whip her. The third punishment that he thought of was this: The girl had a bike and often asked her Dad, who was a good mechanic, to do some work on it. So the father

decided that the next time the girl asked him, he'd do just like the girl, and never get around to helping her.

Which punishment was the fairest?

- A. Not letting her go out.
- B. The whipping.
- C. Not fixing her bike.

Which punishment was the worst?

- A. Not letting her go out.
- B. The whipping.
- C. Not fixing her bike.

4. A girl wanted to use her mother's new coat but her mother didn't want her to and told her not to use it because she was afraid the girl would maybe lose it in some way. The girl used it anyway figuring she wouldn't get caught, but the mother caught her. When she caught her using the coat she was so angry she made the girl stay in at night for a week.

There was another girl who wanted to use her mother's new coat too, even though her mother didn't want her to and told her not to use it. The girl did use it anyway and the mother caught her at it but what this mother did was talk to the girl, explaining why she didn't want her to use it so that the girl would understand.

One of these girls used her mother's coat the next time she thought the mother was not around and the other one did not.

Which one do you think used the coat again?

- A. The girl who had to stay in because she didn't understand why it was wrong to use the coat and she wanted revenge.
- B. The girl who was talked to because the punishment wasn't hard enough to do any good.

5. There was a school dance and one small group was smoking in the school building, which was against the rules. The grownups found out that this had happened, but they couldn't find out who had done it, because no one would tell. Since they couldn't find out who the individuals were, the principal decided to discontinue the dances for the whole school for the rest of the semester.

Was this right?

- A. Yes, because smoking is against the rules and no one would tell who was guilty.
- B. No, because everyone should not be punished for the acts of a few.
- C. Other (Write in your own answer).

6. A girl named Mary didn't like another girl because this girl was going with a boy Mary liked. Mary called up this girl's mother and told her a lot of lies about the boy, so that the mother wouldn't let her daughter go out with him. Because of this Mary got to go out with him. The first time that they went out, another car hit the one they were in, and Mary got a broken nose.

If Mary had not told any lies, but had gotten to go out with this boy she liked anyway, would she still have gotten the broken nose?

- A. Yes, accidents like this can happen anytime.
- B. No, she was being punished for lying.

7. This story is about a guy who came from a tough neighborhood. He did pretty well, generally, but he sometimes took things. He had a friend who was a very good basketball player but whose folks didn't have much money so that his buddy couldn't afford to get gym shoes. One day when this boy was downtown he went into a store and took some gym shoes that they had there and gave them to his friend. Then a couple of weeks later he was hanging around the drug store and managed to take a big box of candy that only cost about one fourth as much as the gym shoes. He didn't tell anyone about it, just ate all the candy by himself. He wasn't caught either time and no one ever found out where his friend got the gym shoes.

Which time was the stealing worse?

- A. The first time because gym shoes cost more than candy.
- B. The second time because he was thinking only of himself.
- C. Both times were equally bad.

8. A boy was out with a group of friends one evening. They got to wrestling and one boy began wrestling each of the others, even when they didn't want to. He got to wrestling a boy who was wearing glasses and the glasses fell off and broke. There were all sorts of things that the grownups could do to him; they could give him a spanking or they could have him work to pay for replacing the glasses or they could break something of his.

What would be the worst punishment?

- A. A spanking.
- B. Pay for the glasses.
- C. Break something of his.

What would be the fairest punishment?

- A. A spanking.
- B. Pay for the glasses.
- C. Break something of his.

9. Two boys got caught stealing a car. Their homes, their school records, etc., were exactly alike, and neither had led the other into taking the car, but for some reason one was sent to Redwing Training School and the other was put on probation and was allowed to stay at home. The one who stayed at home had a good probation officer who worked with him a lot. The one who was sent to Redwing was given lots of discipline till he was released after about a year and came home. They were both in their neighborhood again. About six months later one of them stole another car.

Which one do you think it was?

- A. The one who went to Redwing because he didn't understand why stealing was wrong and he wanted revenge.
- B. The one who stayed home because he had it too easy.

10. Some girls borrowed a car one night from the older brother of one of them. They went for a ride in the country and, since they all had drivers licenses, they took turns driving. They all drove carefully but one was driving a little fast and skidded on the ice. The car went into the ditch and got a banged up grille and right fender.

Was the one driving responsible for the accident or should they all be held responsible?

- A. The one driving was responsible since she was careless.
- B. All the girls were responsible because they could have stopped their friend from driving too fast.
- C. Other (write in your own answer).

APPENDIX C

DIRECTIONS AND CODING SHEET

FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

DIRECTIONS FOR RATERS

The purpose of the analysis of the essay responses which you will score is to determine whether the student responses reflect the employment of a specific strategy for resolving the value problem. This strategy is defined and illustrated by the following categories.

CATEGORY 1: Sentence indicates a clear statement of the problem, especially the recognition that a value conflict exists.

EXAMPLES:

Seventh Grade: "I would think to myself that it might harm people if it didn't work. I don't care if it would be a break through for me, I would not want people to die."

Eighth Grade: "What he was doing (stealing) wasn't right but because he was my friend I wouldn't tell on him."

CATEGORY 2: Sentence indicates what is to be achieved by solving the problem; the recognized end-goal, objective, or criterion value.

EXAMPLES:

Seventh Grade: "If I said nothing I could be responsible for someone's death."

Eighth Grade: "I would not want my best friend to get into trouble or steal again."

CATEGORY 3: Sentence indicates a consideration of more than one possible solution or alternative.

EXAMPLES:

Seventh Grade: "I would state my problem. Should I tell them or not?"

Eighth Grade: "Should I forget about it? Or should I tell the store? Or should I tell Al that he is doing something wrong and leave it at that?"

CATEGORY 4: Sentence indicates a consideration of the disadvantages and/or advantages of proposed solution or solutions. A consideration of the consequences of the alternatives.

EXAMPLES:

Seventh Grade: "It might be terrible to tell the Directors the truth because of the harsh response."

Eighth Grade: "If I did tell, I wouldn't be his best friend anymore."

CATEGORY 5: Sentence indicates the selection of a final solution after a consideration of alternatives and/or consequences.

EXAMPLES:

Seventh Grade: "Therefore I would not give this drug to the hospital Directors even though this could be a break of a lifetime for us."

Eighth Grade: "Then I'd talk with him about it, see why he did it, and tell him I would tell the manager the next time I caught him."

Specific Directions for Coding Responses

1. On the coding sheet place your rater number and the grade level of the subject whose response you are scoring in the blanks provided at the top of the sheet.
2. Place the identification number of each response scored in the first blank provided at the left of the coding sheet.
3. Read each sentence of the response and determine, according to the above category definitions, whether it satisfies the criteria of any one category. If it does, place a one (1) in the space provided under the category heading.
 - a. If the sentence cannot be classified under any of the categories, no score is recorded. Proceed to the next sentence.

- b. If a sentence, particularly a compound sentence, can be classified under more than one category, place a (1) under each category.
 - c. Once any category has a score (1) placed under it, do not record another score even though other sentences may be classified under the same category.
4. When an entire response has been scored, total the number of categories which have a recorded score of (1) in the blank provided at the right of the coding sheet. The total score per essay response may range from 0 to 5.

APPENDIX D

SELECTED FRAMES FROM VALUES 1

AND VALUES 2

VALUES 1

General Directions

To the Student

This booklet is called a program. It is to "work" not just to read. It is not a test. In fact, it is just the opposite. A test finds out how much you know about something you have already learned, but a program teaches you something new. You "work" a program in three stages. First, you read the short paragraph or statement on each page which is called a "frame". Then, you write the answers which you think best complete the sentences in the blanks provided. Third, you lift the folded edge of the back cover to check and see if the answer you have written is the same as the answer found there. It is important that you write or print your answer in the blanks provided instead of just thinking about it in your head and peeking under the folded edge to see if you are correct. Writing the answer in the blank will help you remember it. After completing a page be sure the folded edge of the back cover is properly placed to cover the answers on the following page. (Proceed to the next page).

As you work your way through the program you will notice that some of the frames will ask about something which you have just read. Others may ask you to review things you read earlier and you may need to turn back to an earlier page to find the answer if you do not remember it. Always check your answer before proceeding to the next page. If you choose the wrong answer, read the frame again carefully to see that you have not misunderstood the question. Then check to see if your answer is similar to the answer given. If you have trouble deciding how close your answer is to the one given see your teacher for help. Do not erase your first answer if it is wrong. Write the correct answer beneath it. For some blanks you may notice that several answers are given beneath the first one. This means that any of the answers given are acceptable. For example:

Decrease
(become smaller)
(less)

(Turn the page and test yourself on what you have just read)

Test Question

Your answer is correct if it is the same as the answer(s) given or similar to _____ in meaning.

it
(the one
given)

Introduction to Values 1

The peoples of the world have developed ways of living which have helped them adjust to and solve some of the problems which their environment presents. For example, men have found ways to deal with such problems as heat, cold, storms, and distance. We have also learned some means of caring for plants and animals. Man has invented such things as language so that he can communicate with others. Man also has some ideas about what is right, desirable and proper. These ideas are usually called values.

(Proceed with program)

Selected Frames from Values 1

(Frame 1)

Values are ideas about what is right, good, or best. They are an important part of our culture. Values are ideas about what is right, _____ or _____.

good,
best

(Frame 2)

We have values about many different areas of life. For example, we have values about what is good or right behavior or conduct. These are called moral values. Moral values are concerned with right ways of _____.

behaving
(behavior)
(conduct)
(acting)

(Frame 15)

Many people share Jim's value of honesty and feel it is very important. However, since most of us also hold other values which we feel are important it is possible to have a disagreement between two or more of our values. This is called a value conflict. It is possible for your values about a certain situation or decision to disagree with the values of another person or group of people. This can also be called a value _____.

conflict

VALUES 2

The Values 2 program directions were similar to those given for the Values 1 program.

Introduction to Values 2

In the Values 1 program you learned that it is possible in certain situations for two or more values to disagree. We called this disagreement a value conflict. This value conflict may be within yourself, between you and another person or several persons, or between small or large groups of people. Scientists, philosophers, and others have worked out a method for solving problems. With the help of this step-by-step method, it is possible to understand and even to solve some confusing problems. You can apply this method to value conflicts when trying to find a possible answer or solution which will work. This Values 2 program will help you learn to use the problem-solving method in situations where values disagree or conflict.

(proceed with program)

Selected Frames from Values 2

(Frame 3)

Suppose you feel that honesty and good grades in school are both important values. You go to class and have a quiz for which you have not studied. Your teacher is called from the room and you know you can look quickly at your class notes from yesterday and copy the correct answers. In debating about what to do you can be said to have a value _____.

conflict

(Frame 5)

In the situation discussed earlier where you are debating about whether or not to look up the quiz answers when your teacher leaves the room there is a value conflict between honesty and _____.

good grades
(doing well
in school)

(Frame 15)

In reviewing the method for solving a value
conflict the first step is to write out the

as clearly as possible.

problem
(conflict)
(disagreement)

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