THE IDEOLOGY OF AMERICAN STRATIFICATION

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
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ABSTRACT

THE IDEOLOGY OF AMERICAN STRATIFICATION

by Joan Rytina

As a necessary background to a study of ideology, the relationship of sociology and epistomology was examined. Pragmatism was described as a power philosophy and the pragmatic model of verification, generally used by sociologists, was said to be subject to the influence of the distribution of power in a society. The sociology of knowledge was said to have epistomological implications for sociology because sociologists are also exposed to the dominant ideology. It was not suggested that there was some other model of verification that would enable sociologists to be more objective as scientists, but rather that sociologists ought to be more aware of social influence, and regard with caution those findings which appear to support a dominant ideology.

The basic assumption of the study was that the dominant ideology, the justification and explanation of the stratification system, best suited those who had the most of what there was to get. This assumption was derived primarily from the work of Marx, Weber, Mosca, and Ossowski. The major empirical question was: Who believes that the dominant

ideology describes the actual distribution of rewards in the society? The main aspects of the dominant ideology were described as the belief that equality of opportunity exists (i.e., that rewards are the result of hard work) and that power is distributed pluralistically. It was predicted that the rich would tend more than the poor to believe that the dominant ideology correctly described the operation of American society.

Family income in the year preceding the study was used as an indicator of a crucial reward of the stratification system. The respondents were categorized as rich, middle-income, and poor. Poverty was defined by annual income adjusted for the number of persons in the family. The respondents were heads of households or their spouses living in the Muskegon, Michigan urban area. The analytic sample (N = 354) was comprised of a systematic sample of this area, and a sample of rich and poor, as operationally defined for the study.

Three major conclusions were drawn. The first was that poor people generally tend to see the distribution of rewards as a result of social structural factors, and the rich as a result of favorable personal attributes: the poor are therefore less likely than the rich to see the dominant ideology as an accurate description of the stratification system. However, middle-income Negroes were often more aware of social structural factors than poor Negroes.

The second conclusion was methodological. All respondents tended to show a much higher agreement with the dominant ideology when the statements were worded in a highly generalized form than when the statements were made quite specific, although in both types of question, the rich supported the dominant ideology more than the poor. This suggests that survey questions given in a highly generalized form may elicit a misleading response, because such questions are often not meaningfully nullifiable. For example, the question, "Can ambitious boys get ahead?" is not meaningful because it fails to specify how much ambition is needed by how many boys to get how far ahead. Agreement with the statement may therefore lack social significance.

It was suggested that it might be fruitful to pay more attention to the opinions of the rich because in this study their responses often differed sharply from those of all other groups, and in spite of their small number, their opinions may actually carry more political weight in the society. In addition, the opinions of sociologists may be important out of proportion to their number because of their increasing participation in policy decisions.

THE IDEOLOGY OF AMERICAN STRATIFICATION

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Max Weber has commented on the rational need for a theodicy of suffering, the need to justify the existence of physical and moral evil.[1] A theodicy of suffering is a reaction to the fact that all men, be they rich and powerful or poor and lowly, must face the death of those they most love. The theodicy of suffering is the explanation and vindication of human misery beyond the capacity of men to change. In death we are all equal.

But we are not equal in life. Some men prosper while others do not, and sometimes the relationship of moral goodness and worldly prosperity appears to be inverse: evil men often thrive like the green bay tree. Although each society has its own particular definitions of valued rewards, over time it appears that most men prefer physical comfort to discomfort and the esteem rather than the contempt of their fellows. Most men in fact behave as though they would prefer to live well rather than meanly, and power and possessions are valued rewards in almost any society. If these rewards

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[1]Max Weber, From Max Weber, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 275-277.

are unequally distributed over time, we may speak of the society as stratified. A stratification system needs to be justified because most men like the rewards, and many men get few indeed.

It would be appropriate to speak of the theodicy of stratification if it could be assumed that God was ultimately responsible for the distribution of rewards. Even though this nation is officially "under God" (which implies that He has some official responsibility for the stratification system along with other details), it is risky to speak of a theodicy of stratification. Currently there is less tendency than formerly to attribute all existing arrangements to God.[1] Although it is not completely satisfactory, the word "ideology" will be used to describe the justification of the stratification system.

The dominant ideology best suits the needs of those who have the most of what there is to get. This arrangement implies that stratification and ideology are inextricably intertwined; in subsequent chapters I shall develop a rationale

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[1]For example, one may think of the verse occasionally cited by sociologists to illustrate Victorian opinion on the matter: "The rich man in his castle,/the poor man at his gate,/ God made them high and lowly/ and ordered man's estate." In the 1940 edition of The Hymnal of the Protestant Episcopal Church of America, this stanza has been omitted from "All Things Bright and Beautiful," an omission implying that, although God made the glowing colors of each little flower that opens and the tiny wings of each little bird that sings, His responsibility for the stratification system is an open question.

for this assertion and explore the possibility that the science of sociology has made contributions to the dominant ideology. Science is supposed to discover facts, not to shore up and support systems of values. Nevertheless, the epistomological foundation of most sociological theory gives scientific support to the dominant ideology.

The empirical hypothesis of this dissertation is that those who have much will differ from those who have little in their explanations of the way the system works. The practical, also theoretical, question is the extent to which poor people believe that mobility out of poverty is possible. This question implies that what men believe has some relationship to their subsequent behavior. In the past few years, the federal government and some private agencies have tried to solve the problem of poverty by providing various opportunities for the poor. But the poor do not always behave as though they believed that these opportunities are real. It is therefore of some practical value to know what poor people do believe about the structure of opportunity. To establish that poor people have different beliefs than other people, it is necessary to compare the poor with other groups. Because a necessary and sufficient attribute of poverty is lack of money, annual family income is used as the major variable to sort out the poor from other people. In this study, respondents will be categorized as poor, middle income, or rich, depending on family income in the year preceding

the interview. The structure of opportunity is described by the dominant ideology, and the major research question is: Who believes it?

Here is a brief sketch of this dominant ideology, the sum and substance of what every schoolboy knows about the way the American system works.

The Dominant Ideology: Everyone Knows That. . . .

Economic success is due to ability and hard work. Lack of success is the result of stupidity or laziness. (In academic circles these deficiencies may be called low IQ and low need-achievement.) American society is classless in the sense that no matter what circumstances a man is born to, his opportunity for success depends ultimately on his personal qualities. American society is not egalitarian, however; that is, rewards differ among men, and this is the way it should be because ability and effort vary. Differential economic rewards are necessary because they motivate individuals to high achievement, and high achievement helps everybody in the long run. One function of public education is to enable a man to operate intelligently in the political arena and to compete effectively in the economic arena. That elementary and secondary education are free and that there are college scholarships available for those who deserve them mean that all persons have equal opportunity to achieve these goals.

Economic organizations, like individuals, owe their success to the hard work and ability of those who manage them. The formula for success is to build a better mousetrap and sell it more cheaply than anyone else. Thus civilization can advance as more and more people can buy better and better mousetraps. The government should intervene as little as possible in the play of free competition. The definition of "as little as possible" is subject to change and remains the object of some dispute, but it is well known that "too much" governmental control is undesirable because it will reduce the chance to make a profit and hence the incentive to develop a better mousetrap.

However, if any one organization becomes so large that it can corner the mousetrap market, then the government may properly try to cut it down to size, because a monopolistic organization may lose the incentive to spend money for mousetrap research and development. On the other hand, small organizations have limited funds for research and development, so it is only fair that the government intervene to preserve free competition. Thus free competition is a good thing, but if it gets too free, then it might not be fair; the government should intervene to see that the system is fair and thereby ensure that it will remain free.

Although this seems rather complicated in theory, in practice few Americans have difficulty understanding it because it is simply taken as a "given." Freedom is the right

to compete without aid or succor from anybody, including the federal government. Fairness is the right to get a share of the rewards. Freedom pertains to individuals and fairness to organized groups. This distinction may seem illogical and explanation is required. American historical experience has proved apparently beyond the shadow of doubt that the only way to preserve individual liberty is through the institution of private property, as John Locke supposed. Private property thus must get a fair share of the rewards, or individuals cannot remain free. Thus fairness outranks freedom, because otherwise freedom cannot be preserved.

Therefore, if economic organizations such as corporations or labor unions suffer from foreign competition, the federal government must intervene in the interest of fairness. Tariffs and immigration restrictions thus promote the general welfare because high profits and wages help everybody.

However, if unorganized individuals suffer from too much competition (sometimes called the law of supply and demand), the government may intervene, but only if the consequences will not be unfair to organizations. Thus it is suitable to have a minimum wage to protect individuals, but it may apply only to those persons who are employed by organizations that can afford to pay it. In practice, the minimum wage doesn't interfere with the operation of the free market because it is required only of organizations who are already paying it.

For example, it is necessary to protect corporations and other business enterprises from foreign competition because private property must be preserved, and besides such protection does not interfere with individual liberty. Government intervention on behalf of unorganized individuals is dangerous because it would detract from their freedom and make them dependent on the government; an individual should not be deprived of the right to compete freely for the rewards.

There is an important distinction between economic organizations whose purpose is to sell commodities and those whose purpose is to sell labor. Control of the former is vested in those who own them in proportion to shareholding. Control of the latter is supposed to be by representative democracy.

In the formal political arena, unlike the economic arena, control is always based on the principle of representative democracy. The Americans did not invent this method of political organization but they have developed it to a high degree of perfection, and it is thought to be worthy of export as the only moral basis for political control. Various factions are able to influence the decision-making process so that no one group can force its exclusive interests on the body politic. This system of power is called pluralistic, and it can be demonstrated that the system really is pluralistic if it can be shown that no one group makes all of the decisions.

On an individual level, the successful operation of the system requires a responsible and informed electorate, and it is the duty of every man to know the issues and get out and vote. Crucially important decisions, affecting the lives of all Americans, are made in the formal political arena, and any man who fails to grasp the importance of individual participation clearly fails to understand what makes the system so great. It is fair that the majority should rule, but minority rights are protected.

Religious institutions in America are free, that is, they are not supported by the state. In fact, a pervasive abhorrence of Erastianism is part of the dominant ideology.[1] Thus, on matters on which there is a high degree of consensus, the churches are always free to support the state, as befits free religious organizations in a free land. Because almost all American wars are defined as just (at least while they are going on), religious organizations have been able to support such activities with a clear conscience. On issues on which the degree of consensus is lower (such as the distribution of material rewards), it is fitting for the church to

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[1]The advantage of a non-Erastian church is that it cannot be told what to do by the state. The disadvantage is that the state can give it no financial support, and because operating any large-scale organization requires funds, the churches are dependent upon those who can supply these funds. To the extent that the persons who can supply the most funds are also the persons who are most dominant in the political or economic arenas, the issue of Erastianism would appear to be comparatively unimportant.

stay out of politics because this is Caesar's realm. Social justice is basically a matter of private conscience, and charity to the poor is a virtue enjoined upon all. The function of the church is to make individuals more moral, not to tamper with the social structure.[1] It is quite sufficient that this nation, under God, is a land of liberty and justice for all, and it is the business of the churches to talk about ideals, not to realize them, for that would breach the basic wall of separation between church and state.

But Who Really Believes It?

This is the ideology of American stratification--the vindication of the unequal distribution of rewards in American society. This is what everybody knows. This is the basic stuff of Congressional oratory, the substance of the endless stream of commencement addresses, the sum of the speeches that give every man a glow of pride in the American dream. Of more importance, this is the sort of material

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[1]Thus has the recurrent demand for social justice, part of the religious tradition inherited by Americans, been reconciled with the support of the powers that be, also part of the same tradition. (See St. Paul, "The powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves a condemnation.") This kind of reconciliation, however, glosses over the efforts of some individuals who have viewed matters differently. Nevertheless, when upon occasion the cry for social justice is loud in the land, the organized churches are not typically in the vanguard.

presented to American children in school textbooks: work hard and you'll get ahead. It doesn't matter whether your father owns the biggest factory in town or whether your father is unemployed, sick, and dirt-poor; it's the same for everybody.

But does everybody in fact believe all of this? Does a poor man really believe he is poor because he didn't work hard enough? Does a rich man really believe he is rich only because he worked so hard? Do people in drastically different positions in the stratification system look at the system in the same way? The empirical question for this research is whether a man's income position has any relationship to his views on social stratification. (These findings will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6.) But the first problem concerns the relationship of sociology to ideology. Sociologists, even as other men, were once schoolboys, read textbooks, and listened to their teachers. Have they been influenced by the dominant ideology? Do they believe it? Does it make any difference in their scientific findings?

The theoretical approach that a sociologist uses influences the framing of his questions and the interpretation of his findings. There are two sharply different approaches to stratification. The one is more or less in accord with the dominant ideology and the other is not. The first approach tends to emphasize individual psychological attributes as important causal factors of social class

position and to define social class in terms of roles of intimate association. Thus position in the system is seen as a consequence of manners and motivation. The second approach tends to emphasize social structural attributes as causal factors of social class position and to define social class in terms of a relationship to the market. Thus position in the stratification system is seen as a consequence of a man's life chances, which are basically dependent on the income position of his parents.

The first approach implies that, if we would eliminate poverty, we must change the poor; the second, that we must change society. Because sociologists are increasingly in a strategic position to influence social policy, we must be aware of the ideological implications of the theoretical approach to stratification.

In the next two chapters let us examine the relationship of sociology to epistomology, ideology, and stratification.

CHAPTER 2

EPISTOMOLOGY AND IDEOLOGY

Every student in sociology is exposed to the idea that issues in methodology are more complicated than he might have supposed. The required reading in the philosophy of science is difficult, chastening, and inhibiting: how, keeping all these caveats in mind, can anyone actually get anything done? The student learns, however, that, in spite of all the difficulties, sociological research does get done and sociologists do publish their findings. Furthermore, he is often told that, if sociologists simply follow the conventional canons of the scientific method, their findings will be just as valid as those of other scientific disciplines.

It seems likely that the pragmatic model of verification is the standard truth model in sociology.[1] This model is generally used quite uncritically. But the pragmatic model, I shall argue here, has an inherent status quo bias. In some disciplines this bias probably makes little

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[1]C. Wright Mills, "Methodological Consequences of the Sociology of Knowledge," American Journal of Sociology, 46 (November, 1940).

difference in the outcome. In others, particularly the social sciences, it may make quite a lot of difference. It is somewhat improbable that anyone can define concepts, pick a research topic, and write up findings in stratification without either implicitly or explicitly criticizing or defending the system that is studied. If this assertion is true, then one would expect to find a rather low degree of consensus on various aspects of stratification. This lack of consensus does exist, and to illustrate it, let us briefly examine what some well-known sociologists have said about the use of the concept of social class in American sociology. Gordon, Lenski, and Lipset and Zetterberg, presumably on the basis of library research, diagree sharply on how American sociologists have used this concept, not only about how it ought to be used. But the concept of social class is not an esoteric notion that sociologists seldom look at; it is one of the most commonly used concepts in sociology. And it would be unwise to assume that the sociologists who have used this concept in their work have been less competent than others. We are thus confronted by a somewhat surprising situation: competent scholars in a scientific discipline simply do not agree on the use and meaning of one of the most widely utilized concepts in that discipline.[1] Yet the pragmatic model requires a consensus

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[1]This point has been clearly shown by John Pease, "The Weberian Mine" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan

of the competent for verification. This is not to imply that scientists should always agree; they should not. However, when competent scholars, looking at the same social scene or, as in the illustration here, the same literature, disagree so completely on such an important concept, something surely has gone wrong.

Sociology and Social Class: The Blind Men and the Elephant

Milton Gordon, reviewing the literature, says that "The term 'social class'--often shortened to 'class'--is used by sociologists to refer to horizontal stratification of a population by means of factors related in some way to the economic life of the society."[1] This conception of the term is derived from the classic tradition of Marx and Weber in which a relationship to the market is the central empirical indicator of class.

State University, 1967), chap. iii. In some ways, the situation is reminiscent of the blind men and the elephant. To illustrate, Kurt Mayer, in Class and Society (New York: Random House, 1955; revised edition, 1964), pp. 7-8, says that "Social classes are not sharply marked off from each other nor are they demarcated by tangible boundaries." But Joseph Kahl, in The American Class Structure (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1957), p. 12, says that "If a large group of families are approximately equal to each other and clearly differentiated from other families, we call them a social class."

[1]Milton Gordon, Social Class in American Sociology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 3.

In another review of the same literature, Lenski points out that the uses of the term have been extremely varied, "but there is a common denominator which runs through most of them. This is the notion that, either implicitly or explicitly, the term refers to some kind of visible, self-evident, self-conscious set of collectivities into which the populations of communities and societies are divided."[1] Although income could be included in this broad "common denominator," so could race, sex, eye color, and a host of other variables. Thus, even though the market has not disappeared altogether, it is no longer the central indicator of class.

In the opinion of Lipset and Zetterberg, American sociologists have used manners, not money, as an indicator of class. Social class "as used by American sociologists, refers to roles of intimate association with others."[2] The context makes clear that Lipset and Zetterberg think not only that this is the way the term has been used, but that it is also the way the term should be used. This is an about-face for Lipset.[3]

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[1]Gerhard Lenski, "Social Stratification," Readings in Contemporary American Sociology, ed. Joseph S. Roucek (Paterson, N. J.: Littlefield, Adams, 1961), pp. 526-527.

[2]Seymour Martin Lipset and Hans Zetterberg, "A Theory of Social Mobility," Sociological Theory, ed. Lewis A. Coser and Bernard Rosenberg (New York: Macmillan, 1957), p. 441.

[3]Kornhauser, in a volume of which Lipset was co-editor, said that W. L. Warner's definition of class, in terms of roles of intimate association, has been criticized and she

Not only has there been disagreement about what ought to be included in a definition of social class, there has also been disagreement on the way the term has actually been used by American sociologists. How can one account for such lack of consensus on a much-used concept within a scientific discipline and what does it mean? To be sure, the history of science is replete with squabbles over concepts and findings, but social stratification seems to suffer from more than would be expected on the basis of chance. Few sociological problems have aroused "so many bitter controversies" as the subject of social stratification.[1]

In my view the main source of difficulty is that ideology in one form or another constantly gets in the way of dispassionate study. Stratification is the study of who gets what and why, and the word "class," for example, has a heavy emotional charge. As Ossowski remarked, "In the conventional sense it would be possible to substitute the term 'stratum' for the term 'class.' But as a signal for conditioned reflexes, the term 'stratal enemy' would hardly

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cites Lipset as one of the critics who objected to a definition of class based on what people say it is. See Ruth Rosner Kornhauser, "The Warner Approach to Social Stratification," Class, Status and Power, ed. Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), p. 243; and, Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, "Social Status and Social Structure: A Re-examination of Data and Interpretations: 1," British Journal of Sociology, 11 (June, 1951), 153-154.

[1]Egon Ernest Bergel, Social Stratification (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), p. 3.

take the place of 'class enemy'."[1] Of course, to prove the assertion that the source of the diversity of opinion on social stratification is an ideological bias on the part of the sociologist would require the nullification of every alternative hypothesis. At most, I can present a rationale. The argument is that, because the pragmatic model used by sociologists has an inherent, status quo bias, the sociology of knowledge is epistomologically relevant to sociology as a science; therefore writing on stratification usually shows an ideological bias. This is to say that the distribution of power in a society strongly influences the dominant ideology; and that the distribution of power (or the status quo) affects the model of verification used by sociologists; and that the distribution of power (through the dominant ideology) influences the scientist himself.

Power and Pragmatism

Mills said that many thinkers believed that the sociology of knowledge had no relevance for epistomology and he cited von Schelting, Speier, Merton, Bain, and MacIver.[2] Mills did not share this view. He thought that anyone who

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[1]Stanislaw Ossowski, Class Structure in the Social Consciousness, trans. Sheila Patterson (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 167.

[2]Mills, American Journal of Sociology, 46, p. 316.

believed that social conditions were irrelevant to the truthfulness of propositions ought to state carefully the conditions on which truthfulness does depend.[1] The current truth-model in sociology is based on pragmatism as developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey, and this model, in turn, was based upon the post-Renaissance model of physical inquiry. This model tends to be taken for granted, a condition reminiscent of Louis Wirth's dictum that the most important thing one can know about a man is wht he takes for granted.[2] As Mills said, this model "seems the most probable we have at present. As a practical fact, if we would socialize our thought among professional thinkers today, we must cast it in such terms."[3]

Now there is nothing wrong with using such a model; we can take it for granted if it has no limitations; or, if it has, we need only be constantly aware of the limitations. There is evidence, however, that this model does have at least two major limitations of which a number of persons using the model seem to be quite unaware.[4] One of these

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[1] Ibid., p. 317.

[2] Louis Wirth, "Preface," in Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. xxii-xxiii.

[3] Mills, American Journal of Sociology, 46, p. 323.

[4] Mannheim, for example, did not seem to be aware of an inherent limitation. Both Mills (Ibid.) and Merton think that Mannheim accepted the pragmatic model. See Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), p. 508.

limitations is that pragmatism derives truth from the outcomes of events, not from the antecedents. Truth thus is seen in terms of how things work out in the future. Because human beings, although they do not control the past, do control the future, truth is clearly put in human hands. Pragmatism is therefore a power philosophy. The second limitation (which pragmatism shares with logical positivism) is that verification depends upon the degree of consensus by the competent, but this notion has never been adequately formalized.[1]

But what does any possible limitation of the pragmatic model of verification have to do with the relevance of the sociology of knowledge to epistomology? The general thesis is that the pragmatic model of verification ultimately is based on social control, that is, how things work out depends on who controls the apparatus of the state. Social influence on the scientist as a person would not be nearly so important if the scientist could be certain that his truth-model was free of the influence of social control. Let us now examine the pragmatic model.

According to Kaplan, the position taken by epistomologists from Locke through Kant was epistemic empiricism--the idea that somewhere in our knowing, experience had to be taken into account. Semantic empiricism, the position

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[1]See A. J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), p. 14.

held by scientists today, has three main variants: logical positivism, operationism, and pragmatism. Kaplan criticizes operationism and logical positivism quite thoroughly; he prefers pragmatism.[1] His major criticism of logical positivism (also made by others) is that it fails to consider "important" questions, as it restricts scientific inquiry to questions that are "answerable" by scientific procedures.

Pragmatism is actually a doctrine older than logical positivism or operationism. It was formulated by Peirce, James, and Dewey, although there are important distinctions among the ideas of these three. Morton White says that Peirce developed a pragmatic theory of meaning, an attack on ontological metaphysics that was later taken up by the logical positivists.[2] James added what White has called a questionable theory of truth: the truth is that which we ought to believe. The reason we ought to believe it is because it is good for us. To the question, "good for whom?" James answered, "for the individual." Peirce noted this ambiguity and reminded James that utility doesn't amount to much if it is confined to a single person. Truth is public.

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[1]Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), pp. 34-46.

[2]Morton White, The Age of Analysis (New York: Mentor Books, 1955), p. 143.

Dewey agreed that truth was public and said that it could be known by its consequences. This view had the advantage (if one was empirically minded) that at least it required that one look around and see what was happening before coming to a decision. But Bertrand Russell, a logical positivist, has found this requirement far from satisfactory as a criterion of truth.[1] The gist of Russell's criticism is that, when one judges events by how they work out, the judgment is put into human hands, for human beings control the future. Therefore, because the way things work out is affected by the mechanisms of social control, Dewey's philosophy is basically a power philosophy. Russell's final remarks about Dewey's pragmatism are extremely critical:

> In all of this I feel a grave danger, the danger of what might be called cosmic impiety. The concept of "truth" as something dependent upon facts largely outside human control has always been one of the ways in which philosophy has hitherto inculcated the necessary element of humility. When this check upon pride is removed, a further step is taken on the road towards a certain kind of madness--the intoxication of power which invaded philosophy with Fichte, and to which modern men, whether philosophers or not, are prone. I am persuaded that this intoxication is the greatest danger of our time, and that any philosophy which, however unintentionally, contributes to it is increasing the danger of vast social disaster.[2]

Now we could argue, in rebuttal to Russell, that power does not affect the purity of scientific procedure because

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[1]Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945). See especially the chapters on Peirce, James and Dewey.

[2]Ibid., p. 826.

the scientist does not judge the goals or choose the goals; he only ascertains which means will work best, given a particular set of goals. But this argument simply will not do. To take any goal as a "given" means that theory, research technique, and interpretation of findings will be circumscribed at every step of the way. If the scientist is free to test only what will work, given a set of goals, then scientific freedom doesn't amount to much. This argument is most obvious in a totalitarian country. Let us suppose that a social scientist in such a country is asked by a policy-making group to test the proposition that scapegoating a minority group will increase internal cohesion. Suppose he finds that it does, even though it may have side effects that he as a moral individual finds rather odious. As a scientist, however, he would have to advise that scapegoating does seem to have the desired effect.

The point is that methodological purity is not very helpful unless the scientist is free to test any and all alternative propositions. The structure of power in the United States is, no doubt, far more benign that that of any totalitarian country, but this does not affect the logic of the argument. It simply makes the influence of power less obvious. The government of the United States for some time has been more or less "liberal," and social scientists are not ordinarily morally affronted by its goals. Consequently, it is quite easy to remain unaware of the influence of power

on scientific findings. Nevertheless, scientific tests are generally determined by what is politically possible.

To illustrate: let us suppose that a social scientist has observed that the children of the poor are under-represented in American colleges. After examining the literature, he discovers that one "cause" of the situation is the failure of the poor to follow the alleged deferred gratification pattern; poor boys want to go out and make money instead of improving their intellects. Rich boys apparently prefer to defer the gratification obtained by earning money at a filling station and to live the ascetic life of American college students. But this particular social scientist has an open mind, and he observes that, in addition to the hypothetical deferred gratification pattern, another difference between rich boys and poor boys might have a bearing on college attendance. The fathers of the rich boys generally pay the necessary fees while the fathers of the poor boys do not. He therefore decides to see what happens to the deferred gratification pattern when financial support is held constant. He draws a sample of 2,000 rich boys and 2,000 poor boys. He divides each of these into a test group and a control group. The four samples, of course, are carefully matched for all other variables known to be relevant, such as academic ability. To the test group of poor boys, he gives $3,000 per year on the condition it be used to go to college. To the control group of poor boys,

he gives nothing. The test group of rich boys is deprived of parental financial support in order that the boys may be free to compete on the basis of their initiative and enterprise. The control group of rich boys is permitted the customary financial support. Thus, controlling for financial support should make the differential distribution of the deferred gratification pattern quite clear.

But the social scientist cannot pay the costs of this research himself, so he must find some organization to support the research. He must also find 1,000 rich fathers whose belief in the value of individual initiative is so great that they are willing to allow their own sons to enjoy the benefits of free competition. That the social scientist can carry out this research seems somewhat unlikely. It could have been made to appear even less likely with another example, say, a proposition involving racially integrated housing. To argue that this is only a theoretical limitation on scientific freedom is fatuous, because, in science, practice is everything.

What works out can be tested only if it is politically possible to test it. The pragmatic model of verification allows the testing of only a limited range of propositions: those within the range of what is politically feasible under the status quo. The more benigh the government, the more freedom scientists will have to test alternative propositions, but there are still limitations on the range.

The second limitation on the pragmatic model of verification is that verification itself requires a consensus of the competent on what works. (Logical positivism presents the same problem, as yet unsolved.) Theories, research techniques, and interpretations of findings do not automatically judge themselves--they have to be assessed by human beings. Now if everyone who is competent to decide actually agrees on what works, then there is no existential problem, although the theoretical difficulty remains. Suppose one wants to test the proposition that hydrochloric acid damages human skin. There is already high consensus on the desirability of the goal of saving human skin. The proposition is easy to test and every single dermatologist agrees with the interpretation of the findings. Pragmatism really "works" and is far superior as a method of inquiry than delving into ancient volumes to discover what Aristotle or some other authority said about it.

In sociology the problem is often not this easy. Let us consider two groups of sociologists, all competent, with sharply different interpretations of the findings of studies that have been done in the area of poverty. Let us suppose that one group concludes that poverty is a result of the social structure and that the elimination of poverty requires structural changes, say, in the labor market. Let us suppose that the other group concludes that poverty is basically a consequence of the peculiar culture of the poor, and that the elimination of poverty requires that the poor be changed.

Who is right and on what grounds can we choose? Who decides that a theoretical approach to stratification rooted in its relationship to the market is more fruitful (i.e., works better) than an approach based upon attitudes and manners?

The pragmatic model itself offers no solution to this problem, that is, no "scientific" solution. In my view, there is no scientific solution at all; neither pragmatism nor any other model can solve the problem. But if we can not be saved by science, we must be all the more aware that all problems, scientific and otherwise, are contaminated by the influence of human beings. In sociology, one is sometimes tempted to suppose that the triviality of the proposition and the degree of consensus on it are directly related. Sociologists are quite objective when they make assertions neither they nor anyone else cares much about.

If pragmatism does not offer a "scientific" escape hatch to ensure the purity of scientific findings, then it is all the more important to examine influence upon the scientist. Let us turn to the question of the relationship of the sociology of knowledge to epistomology.

The Sociology of Knowledge and Epistomology

Ideologies concern matters that most people do care about. I define ideology as a comprehensive set of beliefs that serves to justify the distribution of rewards in an actual society or in a society believed to be possible.

The key word in this definition is "justify."[1] the notion that an ideology is a justification is not idiosyncratic; some well-known sociologists have included this idea in their own definitions, as I shall indicate below. However, some students of ideologies have shied away from the notion that an ideology is a justification, because this notion implies that ideologies are motivated, that some kind of social interest in involved. The idea that people tend to act in their own interests (as they define them) may not be so alarming in itself, but what is unsettling is that

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[1]I prefer the word "justify" to the word "legitimize" because "justify" means "to make morally right" and "Legitimize" means "to make legal." These two words are confused in much sociological writing. As illustration, three well-known writers can be cited: Chinoy defines legitimacy as "the social justification of power." See Ely Chinoy, Society (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 247. Lipset says that "legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the best that could possibly be devised." See Seymour Martin Lipset, "Political Sociology," Sociology Today, eds. Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. (New York: Basic Books, 1959), p. 108. Merton says that "if the structure of a rigid system of stratitication, for example, is generally defined as legitimate, if the rights, prequisites and obligations of each stratum are generally held to be morally right. . . ." See Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 267.

Semantically, it would be more appropriate if "legitimate" (and other words derived from the same etymological root) referred to the fact that a particular behavior is supported or proscribed by formal political authority, and "justify" referred to the alleged morality of behavior. This preserves the distinction between morality and the law. If many people deny the morality of a particular law, the law will probably not be on the books forever. Nevertheless, the law and morals do not have a one-to-one relationship. Thus when a sociologist speaks of norms or values as "legitimate," one usually does not know if he means that the norm is embodied in a legal code or if it is morally approved.

sociologists are people too; if they act in their own interests, they cannot be said to be acting in a completely neutral and objective manner. If this is true, then it would follow that the sociology of knowledge has epistomological implications for sociology as a science, a corollary derived from the general proposition that all men are influenced by their location at a particular place and time. Although there is a fairly high consensus that the primary proposition is true, there is by no means agreement on the corollary. I cannot, of course, prove that the corollary is true. But there is more reason to believe it true than to believe it false. I shall first discuss the general proposition.

The idea that the social structure has something to do with human thinking is not new in sociology. Geiger said that it had already been stated in the 18th century by John Millar; eighty years later it was put into a system by Marx and by the end of the 19th century Durkheim and his school had made it the basis of a sociological epistomology.[1] Mannheim's work in this area is usually called "the sociology of knowledge" and was based on his observation that orthodox Marxists claimed that their opponents used ideologies as a verbal screen to conceal their true motives. Mannheim agreed, but he also thought that the Marxist's did so too. The general thesis of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is that

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[1]Theodor Geiger, Ideologie und Wahrheit (Stuttgart: Humboldt-Verlag, 1953), p. 11.

ideologies and ways of thinking are rooted in particular social contexts and cannot be understood except in reference to that context.[1]

In a general way, this idea might be called the major proposition of all sociology: social structure is useful in explaining differential human behavior. (I draw the further implication that any social structure has its own ideology, that is, its own vindication of the particular distribution of rewards in that society. This implies that ideologies are not just sets of ideas that arise at times of social change. Ideologies are simply more evident at such times.[2]) This assumption, that a man's ideas and behavior are influenced by his location in time and space, is hardly startling to a sociologist living in a period of fairly rapid change and having some knowledge of other times and places. But the corollary, that the sociology of knowledge has epistomological implications for sociology, is not so popular. Few persons have addressed themselves to this question and those who have more often come to the opposite conclusion.

In a discussion of ideology, Johnson says that, if the sociology of knowledge affected scientific findings, then sociology would not be a science.[3] The reader is left to draw

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[1]Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia.

[2]For a different view, see Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966), p. 113.

[3]Harry Johnson, "Ideology," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: The Macmillan Co., forthcoming).

his own conclusions. MacRae found the pan-ideological view (i.e., that all persons, including scientists, have ideologies) "alarming" and said that he would not deal with the problem for the same reason that one excludes a whale from the aquarium: it is too big.[1] Stark, on a different tack, found the pan-ideological view unsatisfactory because it was intertwined with pragmatism, and Stark disliked pragmatism because it does not admit that absolute truths are possible where man and society are concerned.[2] Merton thought that Mannheim was led into "unresolved antinomies" when he drew epistomological conclusions from the sociology of knowledge.[3]

Mills was in the opposite camp on this issue;[4] however he never got around to making the critical analysis of pragmatism that his stand on epistomology seemed to require. In a later comment on his dissertation, he pointed out that what was yet needed was a systematic and sociological analysis of the critics of pragmatism.[5] In the dissertation he often

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[1]Donald MacRae, Ideology and Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962), p. 64.

[2]Werner Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 135.

[3]Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 508.

[4]C. Wright Mills, American Journal of Sociology, 46.

[5]C. Wright Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 466.

seemed to verge on a critical analysis of the implications of pragmatism--an analysis that would have been quite appropriate given his own data. Yet he never drew the conclusions that his data seemed to justify.

There are two conditions under which the sociology of knowledge would have no epistomological implications for sociology. The first is that the procedures of verification are not subject to human influence. In my view, this condition does not and never will obtain. The second is that the training of the sociologist will enable him to rise above his own place and time. Mannheim entertained such a hope, not just for sociologists but for all intellectuals. The intellectuals were supposed to be frei-schwebende, above the partisan turmoil of the world in which they lived. Nevertheless, it is unwise to assume that there is some magical quality about the education that sociologists (and other intellectuals) receive to insure that they, unlike other mortals, will examine society with complete objectivity, and it is dangerously misleading to assume that, if a sociologist makes his value assumptions clear, then his work will be "objective." The difficulty is that he can make his own values explicit only if he is aware of them and, at best, a man can be only partially aware of his values. It is not given to any man to know so much, either about the world or about his own motivations, that he can escape the influence of his own place and time.

This does not mean that sociology is an exercise in futility nor that there is a more satisfactory model than pragmatism available. As Kaplan says, to believe a proposition is to make a choice among alternative strategies of action[1]; ultimately, I think, this choice is influenced by power. This is unavoidable. There is no methodologically sanitary road to truth. I argue only that the sociologist ought never forget this.

The most commonly used arguments, then, in support of the view that the sociology of knowledge has no implication for sociology as a science are the assertions that either the sociologist can be objective, or that his scientific procedures ensure objectivity, or both. However, there are other assertions that can be made about ideology and they also imply that ideology does not influence the scientist.

Statements by Sutton and Bendix can be used as illustrations. Both deny that ideologies are necessarily false and misleading. Sutton says that, when he refers to the American Business Creed as "ideology," he is not "using the word in the derogatory sense the term often carries in popular and polemical discussion. For us the term is neutral. . . . Ideology may be true as well as false."[2] Bendix says that

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[1]Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, p. 43.

[2]F. X. Sutton, et al., The American Business Creed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 2-3.

all ideas may be considered in the context of group action; hence he departs "from the identification of 'ideologies' with false and misleading ideas."[1]

Such a departure is undesirable. To say that a system of thought may be true or false implies that one is dealing with a series of logically related, non-metaphysical propositions that can be tested by scientific procedures. A scientist's assertion that an ideology may be true or false has the same logical status as an assertion that a religion or myth may be true or false, because ideologies, like myths, are not aimed at scientific truth but at persuasion. The <u>is</u> in both is entangled with the "<u>ought</u>." It is senseless to assert that a system of thought may be true unless there is some means of demonstrating its truth. The error would be more apparent if a scientist claimed that some religions might be true and, further, that the Christian religion was one of these. The Golden Rule may be good or bad but it is not true or false in scientific terms. To allege a possible truth value is to give it a status of scientific respectability to which it is not entitled. The practical implication of the scientific description of ideologies as true or false is that Everyman may then claim (and doubtless will) that "my ideology is true and yours is false." In short, to assert that an ideology may be true is

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[1]Reinhard Bendix, <u>Work and Authority in Industry</u> (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), p. 443.

to imply that an ideology is not necessarily an opiate, and that it is all right for a scientist to be influenced by an ideology as long as he is careful to choose one that is true.

Another way of avoiding the epistomological implication of the sociology of knowledge is to deny that ideologies are motivated, that there is some sort of interest assumption involved. I shall explain why this is so. Sutton and Stark both reject the "interest" assumption, although for different reasons. Stark appears to follow Mannheim, who thought that the interest assumption involved only a psychological level of analysis.

Mannheim used one word, ideology, with four different modifiers to denote some quite disparate ideas.[1] He identified the particular, total, special, and general conceptions of ideology. The decisive question, in distinguishing between the special and the general conceptions, is whether the thought of all groups or only the thought of one's adversaries is socially determined. The general total ideology is equated with the sociology of knowledge. "At the present state of our understanding, it is hardly possible to avoid this general formulation of the total conception of ideology,

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[1]This usage has not helped to give the word one clear, generally accepted meaning. Originally the word referred to the philosophy of Condillac; Marx gave it the connotation of "false" which it still retains, even in sociological writing. One can note references to "Marxists and other ideologues" but one does not see references to "Republicans and other ideologues." In America, the dominant ideology is generally called "the American Creed," while foreign ideologies are called "Fascist, Marxist, or Socialist ideologies."

according to which the thought of all parties in all epochs is of an ideological character."[1]

The distinction between the particular and total forms of ideology is that the former applies only to isolated ideas while the latter applies to the structure of the entire mind. The particular conception operates primarily with a psychology of interests and makes its analysis purely psychological. The point of reference is always the individual. The total conception of ideology operates "without any reference to motivations, confining itself to an objective description of the structural differences in minds operating in different social settings."[2]

Thus Mannheim relegated the analysis of motivations to the psychological level. But his next few sentences cast some doubt on the separation of motivation from the total conception. He says that the particular conception assumes that a particular interest is the cause of a given lie or deception. But the total conception presupposes only that a given social situation corresponds to a given perspective or point of view.

> In this case, while an analysis of constellations of interests may often be necessary, it is not to establish causal connections but to characterize the total situation. Thus interest psychology tends to be displaced by an analysis of the correspondence between the situation to be known and the forms of knowledge.[3]

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[1]Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 77.

[2]Ibid., pp. 2-4, and 55-59 passim.

[3]Ibid., p. 58.

Mannheim does not make clear why the analysis of interests may be necessary to "characterize" the situation even though such interests have nothing to do with causation. His weakness at this point has been noted by Sutton[1] and by Merton.[2] In spite of Mannheim's denial of such intention, Merton thought that Mannheim occasionally did assume a direct causation of thought by social forces and that he did use the interest assumption in connection with the total conception of ideology. Although Mannheim ascribes "individual" ideology to interests, he never explained the source of "group" ideology.

Stark appears to follow Mannheim's distinction between the particular and total concepts of ideology. Stark says that the thesis of the sociology of knowledge is that the way a man looks at things depends on the type of human relationships in a concrete society, but this "fundamental vision" is not based on "selfish or sectional" interests.[3] The social a priori is not a product of individual minds but rather of the social framework. The value system in the social framework precedes all selfish and sectional preoccupations and all thought and action.[4] The values at the

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[1]Sutton, et al., The American Business Creed, p. 304.

[2]Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 498-500.

[3]Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge, p. 49.

[4]Ibid., p. 66.

root of ideologies are psychologically subliminal while the values at the basis of socially determined ideas are both psychologically and socially subliminal.[1] (Stark does not say how these subliminal values are to be identified.)

Stark's view shows what happens when Mannheim's distinction is carried to a logical conclusion. The sociology of knowledge need not get in the way of scientific findings, but the price is heavy: Social values emanate from a sort of social phlogiston without reference to the needs of individuals. If this were so, then the American belief in "free enterprise" would be just a social happenstance and the fact that this belief serves the needs of one group more than others would be totally irrelevant.

But interest, which was banned from the sociology of knowledge, creeps back in. Because thought is not only determined by but also committed to the society in which we live, "we are emotionally as well as intellectually involved in the social life that has bred and made us; we are--in a way--prejudiced in its favor, prejudiced in favor of the terms of life and thought and value in which our social life is ordered and organized."[2] This statement reminds us of a remark made by Thurman Arnold:

> Men become bound by loyalties and enthusiasms to existing organizations. If they are successful in obtaining

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[1] Ibid., p. 71.

[2] Ibid., pp. 72-73.

> prestige and security from these organizations, they come to regard them as the ultimate in spiritual and moral perfection.[1]

Stark, in what is almost a continuation of Arnold's observations, says:

> We teach and write the kind of history which is appropriate to our organization, congenial to the intellectual climate of our part of the world. We can scarcely help it if this kind of history is at the same time the one most adapted to the preservation of the existing regime.[2]

Stark's argument thus seems to be that, although interests have nothing to do with the sociology of knowledge, for some reason or other, a psychological feeling, an emotional prejudice just naturally happens to cause people to support the status quo.

Sutton is not specifically concerned with the sociology of knowledge but rather with ideology. But, like Stark, he rejects an interest theory of ideology. Again, as with Stark, what has been put out the front door creeps in again at the back.

The interest theory of ideology is said to explain too little: the businessman who dislikes an unbalanced federal budget has not rationally calculated the relationship of such a budget to his own profits and losses. If the term is clearly defined, then the theory becomes "patently inadequate."[3]

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[1]Thurman W. Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), p. 10.

[2]Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge, p. 135.

[3]Sutton, et al., The American Business Creed, p. 303.

On the other hand, if the concept of interest is broadened to include non-rational action, then the interest theory becomes "little more than the bald proposition that ideologies are motivated."[1] The authors give more than one definition of ideology but the definition given in connection with their theory of ideology is:

> . . . a patterned reaction to the patterned strains of a social role. . . . Where a role involves patterns of conflicting demands, the occupants of that role may respond by elaborating a system of ideas and symbols, which in part may serve as a guide to action, but chiefly has broader and more direct functions as a response to strain.[2]

But the "response to strain" turns out to be a psychological need, although the authors do not say whether these needs are rational or non-rational. "For the individual businessman, the function of the ideology is to help him maintain his psychological ability to meet the demands of his occupation."[3] And the choice of ideology apparently has something to do with affective needs: "But the ideologies are selective in particular systematic ways, for they must be built up around the affective needs engendered by the kinds of strains we have analyzed.[4]

In actual fact, instead of postulating economic self-interest, the authors postulate psychic self-interest but

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[1] Ibid., p. 304.

[2] Ibid., p. 307.

[3] Ibid., p. 11.

[4] Ibid., p. 316.

they do not say why this is not open to the objections they presented to the former:

> The business ideology fulfills a major psychological need in legitimizing the high status of the businessman in American society. . . . The need for this justification is made more acute because the businessman is aware of the fact that the race is not completely fair.[1]
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> . . . . . .
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> The business creed's defense of income inequality is not simply the reflection of the economic greed of a fortunate class. It is a defense of high status by an occupation which might lose status if it should lose its income advantages.[2]

Thus the avoidance of role strain involves psychological needs, and ideology, not income, is required for the defense of status. It is, of course, not quite so crass to defend one's status position as it is to defend one's income position. In this conception, manners count and money is only a silent partner.

To "neutralize" ideology by declaring that some ideologies may be true, to assert that the interest assumption is inadequate to explain ideology, and to assume that the interest assumption is effective only on a psychological level are misguided points of view. A number of definitions of ideology can be cited to indicate that some sociologists do conceive of ideology as a body of ideas motivated by group interest; in the following definitions, note the emphasis supplied:

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[1] Ibid., pp. 362-363.

[2] Ibid., p. 364.

> Ideology in its broadest sense constitutes those ideas upon which significant social behavior is based. Ideology includes not only political views but also social values, attitudes, aspirations and motivations underlying group action.[1]

> Ideology may be defined as the organization of ideas for the promotion of social movements or the defense of social institutions.[2]

> The term is neutral and describes any system of beliefs publicly expressed with the manifest purpose of influencing sentiments and actions of others.[3]

> I shall use the phrase "ideologies of management" as the generic designation. All the ideas which are espoused by and for those who exercise authority in economic enterprises and which seek to explain and justify that authority are subsumed under this phrase.[4]

What all of these definitions have in common is the idea that ideology has a purpose: promotion, defense, influence, justification. An ideology is not intended as a neutral, dispassionate description of the world. Ideology is not expected to suit the canons of science in its description of the world. The purpose of ideology is to sell soap, not to analyze the contents of the package.

Furthermore, all of these definitions imply that ideologies involve group interests, not just individual interests. This notion seems sensible enough; to assume that people in

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[1]Sigmund Nosow and William Form, editors, Man, Work, and Society (New York: Basic Books, 1962), p. 404.

[2]Don Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 151.

[3]Sutton, et al., The American Business Creed, p. 2.

[4]Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry, p. 2.

groups suddenly lose the interest in income, honor, and power that they had as individuals would surely be odd. An interest-motivated ideology is not necessarily psychological. In fact, such an ideology is inherently and inescapably sociological, for an ideology is a group justification. It applies to individuals only as they are members of a group. In this sense we might contrast ideology as group justification with rationalization as individual justification. The motivation for both might be similar and the content might overlap somewhat; but ideology is a social myth while rationalization is a private myth and subject to all the variation possible in individual human beings.

This view of ideology is not ahistorical. A man can choose only an ideology that already exists. The choice is limited by place and time. We see history as a necessary but not a sufficient explanation of ideology because history only removes the explanation (why this ideology rather than that) further back in time. As a corollary, however, group interest, is a necessary but not a sufficient explanation of ideology. As Bendix said, "Ideologies of management can be explained only in part as rationalizations of self-interest; they also result from the legacy of institutions and ideas which is 'adopted' by each generation much as a child 'adopts' the grammar of his native language."[1]

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[1]Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry, p. 2.

This is to say that if it is important for the sociologist to know and understand what is already there, it is just as important, if not more so, to ask, cui bono? If social structural (or technological) changes allow new groups to rise to power, the ideology that justifies the power will be developed from ideas already current in the society, but the ideology will still be a justification for the power of a particular group.

The major point of this chapter is that sociology as a science is influenced by social control: The pragmatic model of verification is ultimately based upon social power, and the sociologist as a scientist is influenced by his location in time and space, i.e., by a dominant ideology also based on social control. Does this imply that sociology has no claim to scientific status? It does not. All scientific work is ultimately influenced by social control; it is more obvious in the social sciences because the most elementary concepts used tend to concern matters about which most people have deep feelings. This view does not imply that scientific effort is useless, but rather that considerably more caution is required with reference to sociological findings than is often assumed. Scientific objectivity is an unrealizable goal and methodological purity is a myth. It is better that the scientist learn to tolerate and admit the ambiguity of the situation and to make allowances for it, than to comfort himself with the

pious hope that, as sociology grows bigger and bigger, it will also become better and better.

In this chapter I have asserted that the dominant ideology derives from the distribution of social power, and this assertion was an important part of the logical basis of the argument here. In the next chapter I shall discuss this proposition in detail. Thus it will be necessary to discuss a theoretical approach to stratification, which will be done following an examination of some of the theoretical notions of certain Europeans and Americans relevant to this study. Let us now proceed to Marx and Weber and others who had something to say about stratification.

CHAPTER 3

STRATIFICATION THEORY AND IDEOLOGY

Invoking the need for a fruitful interplay of theory and research is currently part of the liturgy of sociology.[1] One writer has even offered a neat set of rules for the aspiring theoretician.[2] But others (probably a minority) think that the word "theory" is used rather loosely. Homans represents this point of view:

> Most areas of investigation in sociology have called themselves theoretical. Examples are organization theory, role theory and reference group theory. In accordance with this practice, there is no reason why we should not speak of demographic theory instead

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[1]The origin and consequence of this particular usage has been analyzed by James B. McKee in "Some Comments on the Theory-Research Nexus from a Historical Perspective" (an unpublished paper, an edited version of a talk presented in the colloquia program of the Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, November 2, 1962).

[2]See Hans L. Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification in Sociology (Totowa, N. J.: The Bedminster Press, 1965). For the future, however, these rules may not be so very helpful because, as Costner and Leik have pointed out, probabalistic propositions require the assumption of a closed system unless the relationships are extraordinarily strong. (See Herbert Costner and Robert Leik, "Deductions from 'Axiomatic Theory," American Sociological Review, 29 [December, 1964], pp. 819-835.) Thus far, sociological propositions appear to be probabalistic rather than deterministic, strong relationships are hard to come by, and a system cannot be closed by fiat.

> of demography or stratification theory instead of stratification, and we probably soon will, since "theory" is definitely an "O.K." word.[1]

There is probably no theoretical writing in stratification that would meet Homans' stringent requirements for theory construction (based on Braithwaite).[2] Moreover, much American research in stratification is comparatively devoid of theory, even if theory is defined rather loosely. Lipset and Bendix have asserted that much of the mobility research lacks even a rationale.[3] Nevertheless, there are some notions in stratification that can best be described as theoretical simply because there is no other word that would serve as well.[4] In this chapter we shall look at some of those ideas.

The purpose of this chapter is not, however, to offer a comprehensive critique of stratification theory. I want to do three things: to describe, briefly, the theorists upon whose ideas I have based my approach; to illustrate the

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[1]George C. Homans, "Contemporary Theory in Sociology," in Handbook of Modern Sociology, ed. R. E. L. Faris (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 959.

[2]R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953). A difficult but highly rewarding statement.

[3]Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), p. 284.

[4]"Rationale" sounds much less pretentious than "theory" but the person who formulated a rationale would be a "rationalizer" and this won't do at all.

ideological implications of stratification theory; and to make explicit my theoretical approach. Let us begin with Marx.

European Theorists

Marx

Marx's major theoretical idea is that history cannot be understood without paying attention to economic conditions. Marx's work is sometimes interpreted as meaning that only economic conditions determine history, a quite different proposition and easy to refute. Engels later acknowledged that he and Marx had overemphasized the role of the economic factor for polemical reasons,[1] and we therefore have some basis for interpreting their work to mean that only economic factors are important. Nevertheless, Engels also made clear that this interpretation, applied to their entire work, was incorrect.

> . . . According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I has ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase.[2]

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[1]Lewis Feuer, editor, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1959), pp. 395, 399.

[2]Ibid., pp. 397-398.

The ideological and moral implications of the body of Marx's work were quite clear. The capitalistic system of production was doomed to collapse because unrestricted competition would bring on depressions and worse conditions for the working class, which would eventually take over the means of production and the results would be better for most people. Although Marx was not quite clear about what he meant by "class,"[1] he divided society into two (sometimes three) great camps based on the relationship to the means of production: the exploiters and the exploited. Ideologists were thought to be verbal screens to hide the real motives of the exploiters.

Weber

Basically, Max Weber's theoretical ideas on stratification were not very different from those of Marx. Weber did add an important footnote to Marx's work, and some American sociologists have blown up this footnote out of all proportion, as though it represented the main trend in Weber's thinking. The footnote is the idea that stratification has a status dimension that occasionally prevents economic factors from having full effect. Weber remarked that status had no perfect correlation with class position, but he added

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[1] Ralh Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 8-35. See also, Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Karl Marx' Theory of Social Classes," in Class Status and Power, pp. 26-35.

the crucial qualification that, in the long run, it did "and with extraordinary regularity."[1] Weber defined "class" in terms of a relationship to the market and he thought this relationship exceedingly important: "Within the class of those privileged by ownership and education, money increasingly buys--at least on an intergenerational basis--everything."[2] Weber defined social classes by what men could sell in the market -- there were four such classes: (1) those who had much property to sell and (2) those who had little property to sell; there were also (3) those who had labor to sell but had little education and (4) those who had labor to sell and who had considerable education.[3]

Another area where Weber is sometimes said to differ drastically from Marx is in the emphasis on values. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism[4] is sometimes taken to be a refutation of Marx. Tawney[5] and Robertson,[6] among others, thought that Weber had

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[1]Max Weber, From Max Weber, p. 187.

[2]Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, I, ed. Johannes Winckelmann (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1956), p. 179. (Author's emphasis.)

[3]Ibid., pp. 177-180.

[4]Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930).

[5]Richard H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1926).

[6]H. M. Robertson, Aspects of the Rise of Economic Individualism (Cambridge: The University Press, 1935).

overemphasized the influence of religious values on the development of capitalism. At least one of Weber's supporters has claimed, however, that Tawney and Robertson misunderstood Weber, and that Weber had never asserted that religious values "caused" the rise of capitalism. Honigsheim thought that Weber said only that the Protestant ethic legitimized the behavior of the bourgeois who managed his affairs in a capitalistic way. "Weber asserted no more than this. Therefore, for Weber, ascetic Protestantism was not the original cause of capitalism, and the theory is not simply 'Marx turned upside down'."[1]

On the main theoretical issue, the extent to which economic factors shape history, there is little difference between Marx and Weber. As Schumpeter said, "The whole of Max Weber's facts and arguments fit perfectly into Marx's system."[2] Schumpeter was referring to Weber's work on religion. According to Schumpeter, Marx opposed those historians who took "ideologists" at face value, but nevertheless Marx did not think ideas were mere smoke.

> Marx did not hold that religions, metaphysics, schools of art, ethical ideas and political volitions were either reducible to economic motives or of no importance. He only tried to unveil the economic conditions which shape them and which account for their rise and

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[1]Paul Honigsheim, "Max Weber," Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften, 11 (Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer, 1961), p. 558.

[2]Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 11.

> and fall. . . . It was necessary to say this much because Marx has been persistently misunderstood in this respect.[1]

Nevertheless, many American writers on stratification cite Weber and 'follow' him--or at least, they say they do. By twisting Weber's ideas around a bit, we could see social status (and its variants) as a major dimension of stratification and values as explaining the social situation. We must remember, however, that there is ample precedent for denying Marx; even Marx said that he was not a Marxist.

Mosca

Mosca, to whom we turn next because of his ideas on ideology, thought that his own theory refuted Marx's. "We shall not stop to refute that utopia once again. This whole work is a refutation of it."[2] But Michels did not think so; as with Schumpeter and Weber, thus with Michels and Mosca.

> The existence of a political class does not conflict with the essential content of Marxism, considered not as an economic dogma but as a philosophy of history; for in each particular instance the dominance of a political class arises as the resultant of the relationships between the different social forces competing for supremacy, these forces being of course considered dynamically and not quantitatively.[3]

On this point Michels appears to be correct.

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[1] Ibid., p. 11.

[2] Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, trans. Hannah D. Kahn, ed. Arthur Livingston (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1939), p. 447.

[3] Robert Michels, Political Parties, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959), pp. 390-391.

Mosca's major theoretical idea was that every ruling class develops a myth to justify its own rule. Mosca called this myth "the political formula." Such formulas may be based on supernatural beliefs or on concepts which may appear to be rational. They do not correspond to scientific truths, but, even so, they are not "mere quackeries."

> The truth is that they answer a real need in man's social nature; and this need, so universally felt, of governing and knowing that one is governed not on the basis of mere material or intellectual force, but on the basis of a moral principle, has beyond any doubt a real and practical importance.[1]

(I have used the phrase "dominant ideology" where Mosca uses "political formula.") The heart of Mosca's idea is that ruling minorities are never content to rule by force alone. They justify their rule by theories or principles which are in turn based on beliefs or ethical systems which are accepted by those who are ruled. Bertrand Russell has commented on the efficiency of such justification. What he calls "traditional power" obtains when those who are ruled believe in the justice of the system, and this is far more efficient than what he calls "naked power" (i.e., brute force) as a means of maintaining order.[2]

Ossowski

It seems to me that the ideas of the late Polish sociologist, Stanislaw Ossowski, fit in with Mosca's rather well.

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[1]Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 71.

[2]Bertrand Russell, Power (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962).

Ossowski's main point is that the Soviet Union and the United States, thought to be at opposite poles ideologically, utilize the same myth. Ossowski claims that an East European Marxist, looking at American modes of stratification, is bound to regard them as "a sort of mystification aimed at masking the essential class conflict."[1] But he thinks that this should not strike a Marxist as absurd because the American way of combining classlessness with the maintenance of income differences is by no means alien to the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. Stalin had said that classes did exist in the Soviet Union but he maintained that they were not antagonistic. The present official view is said to be that the Soviet Union is a classless society but the superiority of the working class to the peasantry is based on merit, not exploitation.

Ossowski says that the Socialist principle, "to each according to his merits," is in harmony with the tenets of the American Creed, which holds that each man is the master of his fate and that a man's status is fixed by order of merit. The Soviet Union and the United States hold similar notions about the opportunity for vertical social mobility. Ossowski cites Spengler: "The maximization of effort in an achievement-oriented society calls for considerable inequality."[2] Ossowski asserts that Spengler's remark could

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[1]Stanislaw Ossowski, Class Structure in the Social Consciousness, p. 185.

[2]Ibid., p. 109. The citation is J. J. Spengler, "Changes in Income Distrubiton and Social Stratification,"

have been made just as well in the Soviet Union.

Communist doctrine assumes that a necessary condition to the development of a harmonious society is the abolition of private ownership of the means of production. The American Creed regards the system of private enterprise as offering the most favorable condition. "These incompatible assumptions enable similar conceptions of social structure to be applied in countries with such widely varying social systems."[1] Ossowski concludes that the conception of a non-egalitarian, classless society serves certain ideological demands:

> . . . From the viewpoint of the interests of privileged and ruling groups, the utility of presenting one's own society in terms of a non-egalitarian classless society is apparent. In the world of today, both in the bourgeois democracies and the people's democracies, such a presentation affords no bases for group solidarity among the underprivileged. It inclines them to endeavour to improve their fortunes, and to seek upward social mobility by means of personal effort and their own industry, not by collective action.[2]

Ossowski concludes, then, that the myth of a non-egalitarian, classless society suits the ruling groups in both the Soviet Union and the United States.

It will be evident that the approach of this thesis

American Journal of Sociology, 58 (September, 1953), p. 258. (Ossowski incorrectly cites "Spenger," and gives the date of the article as both 1953 and 1958. There is also a reference to "Usimov's" study of stratification in a prairie town.)

[1] Ibid., p. 115.

[2] Ibid., p. 154.

involves a large intellectual debt to Marx, Weber, Mosca, and Ossowski. They are all European and their theories are not in accord with the dominant American ideology. Some Americans have been influenced by Marx and Weber, particularly the sociologists who have studied community power. Other American sociologists, however, have developed theories that are peculiarly American, that is, they are quite in accord with the dominant American ideology and, so far, have apparently been without influence on European sociology. In the last chapter it was asserted that the dominant American ideology would be expected to influence American social scientists. I shall now discuss American development in the light of the dominant ideology. As illustrations I shall use the issues of functional theory, the theoretical emphasis on social status, and the plural distribution of community power.

American Theorists

American society was not supposed to have any classes, and indeed the "fathers" of American sociology (as Charles Page calls them) didn't pay much attention to the matter.[1] Sorokin showed more interest in classes than anyone else prior to the Depression but his work did not stimulate

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[1]Charles Page, "Social Class and American Sociology," in Class, Status and Power, pp. 45-48.

significant research.[1] Actually an important part of his theory was in accord with the dominant ideology; he presented the hypothesis: if brains, then income. About 200 pages of his book were devoted to presenting evidence for this hypothesis,[2] but most of this evidence would be considered quite inadequate now. As a matter of fact, some time before Sorokin presented this hypothesis, Mosca had pointed out that the claim that the upper classes are organically superior to the lower classes was being presented in scientific trappings. Mosca regarded this only as an illustration that "every governing class tends to justify its actual exercise of power by resting it on some universal moral principle."[3] Social Darwinism, of course, was not a uniquely American idea, but it did fit in well with American ideology.

Functional Theory: An American Theodicy

The first full-blown, home-grown American stratification theory was Davis and Moore's theory.[4] Although it

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[1]Milton Gordon, Social Class in American Sociology, p. 62.

[2]Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Mobility (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 133-336.

[3]Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 48.

[4]Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," American Sociological Review, 10 (April, 1945), pp. 242-249.

failed to stimulate any research,[1] it stimulated a great deal of argument.[2] Indeed, so much has already been said that only one point is necessary here: functional theory, in addition to favoring the status quo, is actually a type of religious theory. Its propositions are not testable and it substitutes the sociologist for God. Thus the prestige of the scientist is added to the already existing status quo bias. I shall explicate this point.

Homans has recently presented a useful distinction between what he calls "structural" theory and "functional" theory.[3] (The previous usage was "structural-functional" but it is inadequate because, e.g., the Lynds used it to describe their theoretical approach and it is also used to describe the Moore-Davis theory, and the two approaches are basically quite different.) "Structural" theories simply explain institutions as part of an inter-related structure. "Functional" theories occur only when behavior is explained on the grounds that it is "good" for society. In this sense, a functional theory is teleological in that it explains an

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[1]Gerhard Lenski, "Social Stratification," in Readings in Contemporary American Sociology, p. 522.

[2]For a complete bibliography on "The Great Debate," see John Pease, "The Weberian Mine," (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1967), pp. 18-20.

[3]Homans, Handbook of Modern Sociology, pp. 965-966.

institution by its consequences rather than by its antecedents.[1] In sociology, propositions of the highest level in functional theory are not contingent, or testable, and consequently functional theory is not scientific theory.

Actually all teleological theory favors the maintenance of existing arrangements and it is unnecessary to belabor the point. Merton denied this emphatically but in doing so, he threw away the baby while retaining the bath water. The teleological nature of functional theory can be illustrated by comparing it to a particular form of theological theory. Functional theory assumes that everything that exists has a purpose (or "function," which sounds more scientific). Orthodox Christian theory assumes that God created everything and it all serves His purposes. The functionalist and the Christian are therefore obliged to figure out what the purposes could be. Neither Christians nor functionalists are stupid, and it was quite obvious that some of the things that were going on were unpleasant, incomprehensible, or even sinful. From the standpoint of the Christian, if God were all-wise, all-good, and all-powerful, then how could evil be accounted for? It was a difficult problem and there were several logical possibilities: evil could, by fiat, be declared an illusion. Or, if evil existed, then God could be good but not all-powerful and the Devil could easily account for evil. These solutions were thought to be

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[1]On this point, it therefore parallels the progmatic model.

heretical, however, and the dominant view is that, although God is all-good and all the rest, human beings simply cannot know His purposes. Thus the bad things that happen to the good man--Job, the suffering child of Camus, and Dostoyevsky--are accounted for by the inscrutability of His goal-directed behavior. In short, the explanation of evil is that it somehow serves God's purposes even though man cannot know these purposes.

Likewise, the functionalist observation, that some of the things that went on did not, from a rational point of view, seem to be helpful in maintaining the system, led to a similar explanation. The orthodox functionalist answer is that no matter how things might appear, everything must somehow be functional. Merton made an attempt to salvage functional theory by asserting, quite heretically, that the postulates stated by the leading functionalists were both "debatable and unnecessary."[1] Thus he threw away the baby. But the bath water remains and consists of the co-existence of two ideas: There are functions and dysfunctions (good and evil both exist, as the Christian would say) and only the sociologist can tell the difference. A latent function serves a purpose that is quite unrecognized by the participants in the system but, fortunately, the all-wise sociologist can identify it. Naturally the wisdom of the sociologist is guaranteed because he is a scientist and scientists are objective.

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[1]Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 25.

Thus the functional theory of stratification can be seen as a theodicy: stratification is justified because it serves the "needs" of the entire society, and the sociologist is the supreme being who can define the needs.

Social Class as Politesse

Let us now look at a type of stratification theory quite different from that of Marx and Weber, an approach based upon status, prestige, or roles of intimate association. "Social class" is whatever people say it is. As Mayer has pointed out, if prestige is not recognized, it doesn't exist.[1] Measuring prestige raised a host of conceptual and methodological problems, as noted by Duncan and Artis,[2] and Kornhauser.[3] This discussion, however, will be concerned with the ideological implications of making prestige or status the primary focus of stratification theory.

Actually the student of prestige has two fundamental theoretical choices: following Marx and Weber, he can assume that a relationship to economic institutions has some sort of effect on persons in similar positions; the research question here is, What kind of effect? So long as the investigator remembers that manners are derived from economic

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[1]Mayer, Class and Society, p. 24.

[2]Otis Dudley Duncan and Jay W. Artis, "Some Problems of Stratification Research," Rural Sociology, 16 (March, 1951), pp. 17-29.

[3]Kornhauser, Class, Status and Power, pp. 224-255.

status, he can justifiably assert that he is following Max Weber. He will not assume that teaching the poor "better" manners so that they can associate intimately with "better" people will have any effect on the condition of poverty.

Jones[1] and Centers[2] used this approach and their findings indicated that people were not so aware of class as Marxist theory (and the effect of the Depression) might have led one to suppose. At this point, the investigator can interpret such findings in two ways: he can continue to assume that class is important because it affects life chances and go on to ask why people are not aware of this, or he can assume that, if people are not aware of class differentials, then class isn't really so important after all. It is when his theoretical approach is based primarily on status variables and interrelationships that his invocation of the name of Max Weber has a hollow sound, and the findings are likely to give full scientific support to the dominant ideology.

Let us suppose, for the moment, that there is an imaginary investigator confronted with the problem of studying social class. He lives in a society where Marx is not very popular, a society where godlessness and materialism are thought to be highly associated, a society where nice

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[1]Alfred Winslow Jones, Life, Liberty, and Property (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1941).

[2]Richard Centers, The Psychology of Social Classes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949).

people don't talk about money. As a scientist, of course, he will not be influenced by these considerations. He will examine the facts objectively. He will conclude that Marx was wrong: the proletariat isn't about to revolt; in fact, you can hardly find the proletariat. Everyone is smoking the same kind of cigarettes (although there are some sex-linked differences, so sex must be an important variable), wearing the same kind of clothes (except for teenagers, so age must be an important variable), and buying the same kind of deodorant. Nevertheless, not everybody associates with everybody else and people can really be differentiated according to roles of intimate association. In fact, people are very much aware of status differences. A social class, then, must be "what people say it is," or, as Marshall said, "Social classes are identity groups existing for the sake of the internal contacts which the identity makes possible."[1] Or, social classes exist because people like to have close friends. There certainly isn't anything wrong with having friends, so social classes must be fundamentally good things to have.

But all of this is just an imaginary example. Let us return to the real world and examine an actual theory of social mobility. The authors state at the outset that "Max Weber has indicated how useful it is to conceive of

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[1]T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), p. 110.

stratification along many dimensions,"[1] and Parsons has "suggested that one way of viewing stratification is to conceive of it 'as the ranking of units in a social system in accordance with the standards of the common value system'."[2] Of the "multitude of cross-cutting stratifications" the authors have singled out a few for discussion. They do not state why they picked the ones they did. Thus mobility has four dimensions. The first is occupational rank, which is discussed in terms of prestige level. There is considerable empirical evidence on this. Second, there is consumption ranking. Although the amount of income sets limits on it, a consumption ranking is based upon the way income is spent--the amount spent on "prestigious or cultural pursuits." The third dimension is social class. Here the authors deviate very sharply from Weber[3] (although this fact is not noted), for class refers to roles of intimate association. The fourth dimension is power ranking. (An operational index to power is difficult to construct.) These four are the "dimensions of social stratification which seems [sic] to us theoretically most rewarding and which are accessible by available research techniques."[4]

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[1]Lipset and Zetterberg, "A Theory of Social Mobility," in Sociological Theory, p. 441.

[2]Ibid., p. 437. The citation is Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954), p. 388.

[3]Cf. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 177.

[4]Lipset and Zetterberg, Sociological Theory, p. 443.

Class as a relationship to the market has disappeared. The focus of analysis has shifted to the evaluated prestige of a man's occupation, consumption patterns, and roles of intimate association. Marx has lost his sting and class is swallowed up in politesse.

The Pluralism of Power

Another aspect of stratification theory is the distribution of power. We can look at power theories as the third way of showing possibilities of ideological influences. The distribution of power tends to be only theorized about at the national level. So far, no one has come up with a satisfactory test of the two major theories now extant, that of Mills[1] and that of Riesman.[2] The Mills theory leans heavily on Marx, and the Riesman theory is in accord, more or less, with the dominant ideology. Mills sees national control as vested in three groups: high ranking military officers, a few influential senators and congressmen, and big businessmen. Riesman sees power as shared by a number of groups and holds that once the "machine" is set in motion, it goes by itself, so that the actual distribution of power is not of great importance.

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[1]C. W. Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).

[2]David Riesman (with Nathan Glazer and Reul Denney), The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).

Students of power at the local level have both theorized and engaged in research. Two schools of thought can be identified, and the issue separating them is usually called the elite vs. pluralism issue.[1] The squabble is often presented as a dispute over methodology: should the researcher identify powerful individuals or should he trace the outcome of important community issues? In the background is an ideological conflict: do businessmen run things, as Marx thought; or do all groups share in power, as the dominant ideology suggests? Hunter found that businessmen tended to run things,[2] and, as Form and Miller pointed out, no study of community power has ever shown that economic dominants were not the majority among those to whom power was attributed.[3] On the other hand, Dahl (among many others) found that, when issues were examined, power seemed to be shared by a number of groups in the community.[4]

One aspect of the dispute that is seldom made explicit is that, in addition to an ideological bias, there is also a disciplinary bias. The political scientists have a vested

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[1]For a review of these issues, see William V. D'Antonio and Howard J. Ehrlich, Power and Democracy in America (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961).

[2]Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).

[3]William Form and Delbert Miller, Industry, Labor, and Community (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 507.

[4]Robert Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

interest in issue analysis. Because a political scientist is obliged to assume (unless he doesn't mind thinking of his own discipline as of small importance) that what goes on in the formal political arena is "important." A sociologist, whose discipline obliges him to study all institutions, is not so apt to assume that what goes on in any one is so crucial. It is therefore easier for a sociologist to assume that economic power, exercised outside the formal political arena, may be more important than the power of the ballot. In issue analysis, a primary assumption is that the issues that are studied "make a difference." As long as it is assumed that issues which are put on local ballots are of sufficient importance to measure the distribution of power, the pluralists will undoubtedly have the edge in the argument.

Functional theory, the theoretical focus on status variables, and the issue of pluralism have been used to illustrate ideological implications of American theoretical approaches to stratification. This does not mean that those who follow the European tradition have no ideological bias. All scientific theory is related in one way or another to some ideology. The ideological implications of following Marx or Marxism have been spelled out in great detail both by European and American writers and "everyone knows" that Marxists are ideologues. I shall therefore not record in detail my objections to Marxist ideology but rather say only

that my chief complaint is the notion of the inevitability of certain forms of social structure. Popper has discussed this adequately[1] and I have nothing to add. If I lived in a Marxist country, no doubt I should have preferred to write about the unfortunate effects of Marxist ideology on science, to the extent that it would be possible to do this and stay out of jail. That I have focused on the influences of American ideology on American science is simply the result of the accident of location at a particular place and time. The primary concern is actually with the influence of any ideology on any epistomology.

That a theory tends to provide support for the dominant ideology in the society in which the theorist lives does not mean that it is necessarily an inadequate or unfruitful theory. Nor can we say that a theory which tends to deny the dominant ideology is necessarily "better." The point is simply that it is easier for a scientist to base his approach and define his concepts using what "everybody knows," the "givens" of the society in which he lives, and the possible effect of the dominant myth on the theorizer should therefore be taken into consideration.

It is likely that I too am influenced by the dominant American ideology. I shall not pretend that I can make my hidden assumptions explicit; one is not aware of one's own

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[1]Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).

'givens.' In the theoretical approach presented below, however, the debt to Marx, Weber, Mosca, and Ossowski will be clear enough.

Theoretical Approach of this Study

All societies need order and therefore differential authority. This is a tautological assertion, as society is defined in terms of order. Stratification is based, therefore, upon power. I define stratification as the persistence over time of the unequal distribution of rewards among groups whose recruitment is to some extent based upon the family (thus stratification involves a generational transmission of position). Therefore, in a stratified society the distribution of rewards such as power, honor, and income tends to be based less upon personal characteristics and more upon the accident of birth.

Whether a stratification system serves the "needs" of an entire society is problematical. It depends on how the needs are defined and who defines them. But a stratification system can serve the needs of at least certain groups in the society: the needs of those who have the most of what there is to get. Power gives access to whatever is defined as good to have.

The view that social structure (and thus social integration) is derived from power is probably less popular in American sociology today than the opinion that integration is derived from a consensus on common values. This latter

view holds that if a sufficient number of persons have internalized certain common values, they will behave quite predictably without the immediate (or long range) threat of force. It is quite true that a high consensus on certain kinds of values is a necessary condition of societal existence; consensus is most needed on the values that bear directly on the maintenance of order. For example, the conditions under which one is permitted or obliged to murder must be "internalized" by large numbers of people because sheer physical force is an inefficient means of preventing random murder. But the prevention of random murder again involves the tautology used to define society; one cannot easily imagine a society's persisting when there is much random murder.

Beyond this primitive order value, which directly involves the preservation of human life, there are all sorts of other values, and it is not so easy to argue that these values are absolutely necessary to societal existence <u>per se</u>, although they may be crucial to certain groups within the society. Likewise, consensus on these "secondary" values may vary widely. For example, if John Jones, a deviant type who abhores all American values, decides to enter his neighbor's house and shoot everyone in it, the sanctions against him are likely to be certain and severe. But if he confines his deviant behavior to the economic arena and goes fishing instead of producing his daily quota of widgets, the outcome

is not so predictable. It is quite true that, in the long run, if there were enough deviants like Jones, the machinery of production would stop and doubtless civilization would collapse. However, as Lord Keynes observed, in the long run we are all dead. Primitive order values are crucial because no one wants to be dead in the short run.

This does not imply, however, that the only kind of power that is consequential is formal political power. Economic power must also be considered. In the Soviet Union, it seems likely that political power outranks economic power, that is, that economic decisions are made in the political sector. Marx thought that, under conditions of capitalism, economic power outranked political power, that the most significant decisions were made in the economic arena. Using current terminology, we should say that the informal organization of economic power outranked the formal organization of the state. The implication of the Marxist hypothesis is that the formal organization of the state tends to be epiphenomenal and that all significant power tends to confirm the Marxist hypothesis: "Occasionally the citizens as voters demonstrated their power but this was usually in a decisional context previously set by the influentials."[1]

Polanyi thought that the rise of a market economy (society was embedded in the market rather than the market

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[1]William V. D'Antonio and William H. Form, Influentials in Two Border Cities (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), p. 221.

in society) was responsible for the pre-eminence of economic power.[1] Ure thought that certain technological changes created conditions under which economic power would be pre-eminent; his examples included the (then new) use of coined money in ancient Greece and paper money in the industrial Revolution.[2] He thought that, after the initial impact of such changes (in his view, about five generations), factors other than finance would be of importance in political control, but that it was nevertheless a mistake ever to overlook economic power or to relegate it to an insignificant position.

Nonetheless, there is support for the position that economic power is still of great significance in contemporary America, both at the national and community level. Form and Miller have said that "the economic institutions, especially the large corporations, are the most powerful institutions in American life."[3] Rossi, commenting on Jennings' re-study of Atlanta, concluded that, although Jennings found that Hunter appeared to attribute too much influence to economic dominants, "if you look closely at Jennings' findings, they are not very different from Hunter's, although his

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[1]Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).

[2]P. N. Ure, The Origin of Tyranny (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962).

[3]Form and Miller, Industry, Labor, and Community, p. 521.

conclusions suggest there is more of a difference than I can discern."[1]

The basic assumption here is that the distribution of power in a society is the fundamental factor affecting both the stratification system and the myth that justifies it. It is therefore expected that those who have the most of what there is to get are most likely to agree with the justification, while those who have least would be less inclined to do so. Because one of the things that there is to get is control of mass media and other devices for disseminating opinion, one would expect these media to reflect, more or less, the dominant ideology. It is unrealistic to expect that those who have least would reject the dominant ideology in toto but rather that they would reject it in part or show considerable ambivalence toward it.

In the next chapter we shall proceed to the empirical phase of this study. I shall discuss the specific questions that prompted this research and the research techniques I used in an attempt to answer these questions.

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[1]Peter Rossi, "Review of 'Community Influentials: the Elites of Atlanta'," American Journal of Sociology, 51 (May, 1966), p. 725.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN

The specific intellectual concern of this research is whether a person's position in a stratification system has any relationship to his view of that system, particularly his general views about who gets ahead (and why), and who has the power. The variables used were income, education, occupation, race, sex, and age. The primary stratification variable was income, because the intention was to contrast the ideologies of the rich and the poor. Income is generally associated with education and occupation, and I shall show below the extent to which they were associated in this sample.

Three kinds of groups were therefore needed for comparison in this study: persons of high, middle, and low incomes. I shall discuss below how these groups were operationally defined. The first problem was to select an area from which to draw the sample. I wanted a prosperous northern, urban, industrial area to avoid an area where poverty could be readily explained because of poor soil, poor transportation, and other factors highly associated with widespread poverty. People might "explain" poverty differently in, say, Appalachia than they would in a relatively prosperous urban area.

Likewise, a general economic depression might serve to provide an explanation of poverty in a way that a relatively thriving economy would not.

The urban area of Muskegon, Michigan was chosen as the site. It was sufficiently large to be a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area for the United States Census and it fitted the other requirements of the study. The reason that Muskegon was picked over all other northern SMSA's was that it was nearest and this was important because I intended to do a considerable portion of the interviewing myself and it was advisable to closely supervise other interviewers. Luckily both Muskegon and the rest of the United States were in a comparatively prosperous period at the time of the study. Before describing sampling procedures and the operationalization of variables, let us look at the Muskegon urban area.

The Muskegon Area

No two northern, urban, industrial communities are exactly alike and a brief description of the Muskegon area will allow greater insight into the particular problems of this study. In the middle of the 19th century, Muskegon was primarily a fur-trading outpost on the eastern shore of Lake Michigan. By the end of the century, the lumber industry dominated the economy, but by 1910 the lumbering era was over. At that time, some of the local business

leaders thought it advisable to attempt to attract other industries; the suburb of Muskegon Heights was established to provide space for industrial plants and homes for the workers. One of the advantages of Muskegon was said to be that there were so many workers of Dutch or Scandinavian extraction in the area, and such persons were thought to be highly reliable, hard-working, thrifty, intelligent--and not given to trouble making.

New industries were attracted and the Muskegon area grew industrially; but by the 1950's some problems became apparent. Muskegon's growth rate was behind that of other cities of comparable size. Most business leaders felt that the basic reason for the low growth rate was that the industrial composition was not sufficiently diversified, that Muskegon was too dependent on Detroit and the market for automotive goods and supplies. This dependence resulted in unemployment rates above the national average whenever automotive demand dropped; another consequence was what the editor of the Muskegon newspaper called a surplus of low-skilled workers: too many blue-collar jobs and too few white-collar jobs to make Muskegon attractive to energetic young people. There is no doubt that the Muskegon Area Development Council (a direct descendant of the Chamber of Commerce) is concerned about this situation and would like to see a larger proportion of white-collar employment in the area.

A second problem is the political fragmentation of the area. As the head of the local division of a national paper products company remarked in a presidential address to the Chamber of Commerce, the maintenance of separate units greatly increased the cost of local government and made it difficult to establish rational growth policies. Although the 1960 United States Census showed that the Muskegon (County) SMSA included 149,943 persons in 1959, only 46,485 were in the City of Muskegon. Other incorporated units within the SMSA were Muskegon Heights, 19,552; North Muskegon, 3,885; and Roosevelt Park, 2,578. Periodic attempts to unify at least Muskegon and Muskegon Heights have met with no success.

Sampling Procedures

Three kinds of samples were drawn for the study; all three together were defined as the analytic sample. The first sample was supposed to be representative of the Muskegon area in order to anchor the study in the context of a particular place and time. Although a statistical chain of inference cannot be extended beyond the Muskegon area, the rational chain can be extended to the extent that the demographic characteristics of the representative sample resemble the characteristics described by Census data, for it is then possible to estimate how similar Muskegon is to other urban communities in the United States. Supplementary

samples of rich and poor were necessary because a representative sample typically includes too few people in extreme positions. For the major portion of the data analysis, these three samples were combined into the analytic sample.

For purposes of comparison with Census data, it would have been best to choose a sample by random procedures from the tracted portions of the SMSA. Limitations on research time and money made such a procedure unfeasible. The compromise involved drawing a systematic sample of every 160th residence address in Polk's City Directory for 1965. (The 1966 edition had not yet been published.) Unfortunately, the area covered by the directory does not coincide exactly with the tracted portions of the SMSA. The outlying (and less heavily populated) portions of three townships were not included. Thus there were 34,494 housing units in the tracted areas in 1959, but only 29,760 units listed in the directory.

The sampling unit was therefore the household address listed in the directory, and the respondent was the household head or spouse. Although it would have simplified the analysis to control for race and sex by interviewing only white males, we decided to include women and Negroes in the study. The rationale was that if race and sex did not affect the attitudes investigated, the efficiency of the design would not suffer; if they did, it would be better to cope with an inconvenient fact than to ignore it. Only the household head

or spouse were interviewed in order that it could be assumed that all respondents had had some experience with the problems of making a living and maintaining a household.

Because the sample was selected systematically rather than randomly, it was decided in advance that, if for any of several stated reasons a respondent could not be obtained at the selected address, the interviewer should proceed to the first address on the right. It seemed important that an interview be obtained in a particular neighborhood even though this would mean that a probability value could not be assigned to addresses not included in the original sample. In fact, 23% of the respondents in the systematic sample (N = 186) were located at addresses not in the original sample. There were 24 refusals, 11 not-at-homes (after three callbacks at different hours), and nine addresses where the house was torn down, vacant, or missing (i.e., the address was incorrectly listed in the directory).

In order to supplement the systematic sample with persons who were rich or poor, it was necessary to define wealth and poverty for purposes of the study. Simple measures based on annual family income are used. These measures certainly do not represent a definition of "social class" in Weber's sense[1] but they were thought to be sufficient to sort out those whose attitudes about the stratification system might reasonably be expected to differ.

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[1]For a discussion of the implications of Weber's definition, see John Pease, "The Weberian Mine" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, 1967).

Before presenting an operational definition of poverty, let us look at two objections which are often raised with reference to any definition. The first has ideological overtones. It is an artifact of any statistical distribution that there be a bottom. Is it reasonable to call the bottom nth "poverty"? If it be true that the poor in Calcutta, in central Brazil, and Elizabethan England were more destitute than the American "poor," are the American poor really "poor"? Is poverty a social problem?

There are two answers to this objection. The first is that the condition of the poor in Calcutta is irrelevant, because the American poor do not compare themselves to the poor of India but rather to the affluent in America. With reference to social change and political action, what matters is how the poor feel about their share of good things in the society they live in. Anyone who values social stability is well-advised to consider how those at the bottom feel about the "fairness" of the situation. The second answer is based on data (discussed below) on the income it takes to provide an adequate diet and housing for a particular number of persons. Nutritional science is sufficiently advanced that an "adequate" diet can be objectively defined. It can be and has been demonstrated that there are families living at an income level too low to obtain adequate food and shelter.

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The second objection likely to be raised against a particular definition of poverty is that any definition is arbitrary and based on inadequate data. H. P. Miller thinks that knowledge in this area is in a "deplorable" state.[1] Miller points out that past estimates failed to take into account factors such as size of family, age of family head, rural or urban residence, and the like. However the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has prepared a revised estimate based on the use of an economy budget developed by the Department of Agriculture. Using a formula taking into consideration the cost of food in a particular year, Orshansky defined poverty for families by size, sex of the head of the household, and rural or urban residence, for 1963.[2]

The definition used in this study is based on size of family and urban residence. (All respondents were urban.) A respondent was defined as poor if:

Annual family income in the year preceding the study was:	and the number of persons in the family was:
$2,000 or less	any number
$2,000 - 2,499	2 or more
$2,500 - 2,999	3 or more
$3,000 - 3,499	4 or more
$3,500 - 3,999	5 or more
$4,000 - 4,999	7 or more
$5,000 - 5,999	9 or more
$6,000 - 6,999	11 or more

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[1]Herman P. Miller, "Changes in the Number and Composition of the Poor," in Poverty in America, ed. Margaret S. Gordon (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), p. 81.

[2]Mollie Orshansky, "Counting the Poor: Another Look at the Poverty Profile," Social Security Bulletin, XXVIII (January, 1965), pp. 3-29, cited in Miller, Poverty in America, p. 83.

A respondent was defined as being in the middle income range if annual family income in the year preceding the study was $7,000-24,999, regardless of the number of persons in the family.

A respondent was defined as rich if annual family income in the year preceding the study was $25,000 or more.

In order to save the interviewer's time, a method to locate rich and poor before attempting the interview was devised.[1] (The income questions were at the end of the schedule.) Consultation with local real estate men indicated that ownership of a house whose assessed market value was $50,000 or more almost always involved a family income of $25,000 or more. A list of all houses assessed at $50,000 or more was compiled from records in the various city and township halls. Because all houses in the area had been reassessed in 1965, the personnel at the tax offices were convinced that the assessment represented fair market value. (All assessments had to be adjusted to obtain the market value.) This procedure produced only 69 addresses. As one real estate man plaintively remarked, "People in Muskegon just don't go in for spending a lot of money on their homes the way they do in Chicago." This method, of course, would locate only rich people who lived in expensive houses. A net was therefore devised to catch some of the rich who lived more modestly.

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[1]Census data (1959) indicates that 230 families in the tracted area have incomes over $25,000, and 4,718 families have incomes below $3,000.

An officer of a local financial institution was asked to name the richest men in town. He gave 24 names. In addition, three persons were asked to name the most powerful men in town.[1] There were 49 names on the three lists: of the ten men who were on all lists, seven were also on the list of the richest men. After eliminating duplications on all lists (high housing, money, power) there were 96 addresses. It was decided to interview only males on the power list but either men or women on the money and housing lists even though the decision involved no hypothesis to be tested in the study. From the total list of 96 addresses, 49 interviews were obtained. There was no attempt to sample systematically from the list. A few persons on the list were old and ill and did not want to be interviewed; a larger number, not surprisingly, were in Florida. (This interviewing was done in January.) Of the 49 interviews, four were on the power list only, seven were on the power and money list, four were on the money list only, two were on the power and housing list, and 32 were on the housing list only.

An inspection of Census data indicated that Negroes would be over-represented among the poor. In addition,

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[1]These persons were promised anonymity. To be explicit about their institutional connections would be tantamount to naming them. But all three occupied positions whose incumbents can generally provide this sort of information.

because Muskegon has a Negro ghetto,[1] the Negro poor tend to be concentrated in a fairly restricted area. The director of the Urban League and the director of the Community Action Against Poverty Program reported that the poorest Negro neighborhood was the area called "Jackson Hill" north of the central city area. A Negro woman who lived in Jackson Hill was hired to interview the poorest people she could find there, white or Negro. Whether her respondents represent the poorest of the poor, we do not know; in any event, most of her respondents were poor as operationally defined here. A few other interviews were secured with Negro poor in other parts of the ghetto by other interviewers.

The white poor were located after consultation with the director and assistant directors of Community Action Against Poverty (CAAP) who made available a list of names obtained under CAAP's direction in May, 1966. The list was comprised of names of persons who in the middle of May had been on the rolls of one of the social agencies in Muskegon.[2] There were 4,179 names on the list; 1,038 were identified as men, 2,050 as women. On every tenth page of this list, the

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[1]Almost all Muskegon Negroes live in two (of four) tracts in the Heights, in downtown Muskegon, and in an area north of the central city and separated from it by a deep ravine: Jackson Hill. The personnel of the Urban League were able to indicate which city blocks contained Negroes and which did not.

[2]The Urban League, Goodwill Industries, Muskegon County Board of Social Welfare, Michigan Employment Security Commission, Neighborhood Youth Centers, Vocational Rehabilitation, and the Skill Center.

addresses of all persons who could be identified as white heads of households were chosen.[1] Two hundred addresses were obtained, and the list compiled was used as a guide. Whenever the investigator (who did almost all the interviewing of the white poor) saw a particularly delapidated house, there was an attempt to gain access whether the address was on the list or not. About 60% of the white poor were on the CAAP list, and about 40% of them lived near addresses on this list.

A Note on Locating Rich and Poor

It would be gratifying to report that these methods of locating rich and poor worked perfectly, and that all the respondents interviewed turned out to be what was expected. This did not happen. I shall comment on the type of mistake and what (if anything) might be done about this problem in the future.

Many investigators, if they wish to locate rich or poor (the latter being far more likely), use census tracts. This method is certainly easier than the method used here, as one can simply take every nth house in a particular tract and then simply, by fiat, declare the respondent to be rich or poor. I have reservations about this method. It is possible, of course, that some census tracts are so loaded with either

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[1]This meant that there were no addresses of persons whose contact had been with MESC because under state law, MESC could not identify clients by race.

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rich or poor that one cannot go far wrong. In Muskegon this method was entirely too risky. It is true that two tracts in Muskegon Heights had the lowest median family income of all tracts, and North Muskegon the highest, but the variations within tracts were too great. This does not imply that the Muskegon area is badly tracted, that is, that the tracts are not as homogeneous as they should be. Muskegon probably was difficult to tract. Many respondents (as well as the investigator) had the impression that Muskegon neighborhoods, by housing value, were lacking in homogeneity. A frequent comment was, "It's hard to find a really nice neighborhood here, it's so mixed." (This comment referred to the price of the house, not the color of the occupant.)

There was greater accuracy in locating rich than poor. In part, this was an artifact of definition, since residence in a house with a market value of $50,000 was one indicator of being rich. Because market value could be checked objectively in advance, there was no way of going wrong, if the method were used correctly. Locating the rich through informants also provided little chance of going wrong. But things did go wrong and two cases were lost. We interviewed 49 rich, but when the data emerged from the computer, there were only 47. The mistake was unnecessary. (Luckily, the research design allowed me to bury these mistakes in the middle-income group of the analytic sample, so the interviews were not a total waste.) What happened was this: I had

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planned to train interviewers and get them started on the systematic sample first. While the interviewers were out working, the rich and the poor would be located. But it didn't work out this way. Obtaining interviewers who were actually willing to go out and work proved to be very hard.[1] It was therefore necessary to do much more interviewing personally. After a conversation with a real estate man, a preliminary step in locating the rich, I inspected a neighborhood where I had been told the houses were all worth more than $50,000. I picked out the best looking house in this neighborhood, copied down the addresses, and gave them to a reliable interviewer who, I thought, was particularly well suited to interviewing the rich. I did not check the housing assessments first. I wanted to get this particular interviewer started at once, as he was leaving for Florida in a few weeks. Two days later I discovered the error. The real estate man had been too optimistic; not all the houses were assessed at $50,000. In most instances, this didn't matter as the respondent turned up on the "richest" list, or admitted to an income of more than $25,000.

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[1]There were times when I felt that these troubles were typical, rather than rare, and one wonders whether national survey organizations are aware of what goes on in the field. I finally made contact with women who represented national organizations in Grand Rapids and Muskegon and they were voluble about the difficulties of hiring interviewers who actually go out and work. "They want the money," one representative reported, "but they have P. T. A. on Monday, ironing on Tuesday, bowling on Wednesday, and they finally have ten minutes to go out on Thursday; they have to shop on Fridays."

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But two respondents lived in houses assessed only at about $40,000, and their incomes were slightly below $25,000. With regret, we added them to the middle-income group.

There were more errors in locating the poor. These errors were probably unavoidable because the definition of poverty was not by housing value but by number of dependents living on a particular income. The appearance of the house, upon occasion, was used as an indicator of poverty to locate a respondent with a high probability of being poor, but I did not feel then (and still do not) that residence in a house worth less than, say, $5,000 is a sufficient definition of poverty. I shall illustrate typical errors.

While interviewing in a poor neighborhood, I was attracted by one unusually delapidated-looking house. (It turned out to have a market value of about $3,000.) The respondent was a white man over 90 years old. His own income was $30 per month; he lived with his daughter who was a baby-sitter earning $70 per month. But they were not poor (by the definition used here) because a second daughter living in a distant state contributed $130 per month to his support. This daughter was almost old enough to retire and the respondent was much more worried about his daughter (quite reasonably) than the possibility of a depression or other economic calamity.

Another respondent lived at an address that had appeared on the CAAP list. He had lived there about two months.

He was less than 30 years old, white, father of six children, and he had an unskilled job which paid about $5,500 per year. He had had the job about 15 months. For 10 months before that, he had been unemployed and on relief. Nevertheless, at the time of the interview, he was not poor, by the definition used.

We cannot assume that the poor and rich in these samples are representative of poor and rich in Muskegon. They might be, but there is no way of being certain. All we know about them is that by the definition here, they are rich or poor, and they do live in the Muskegon area. That is sufficient for our purposes.

Comparison of Systematic Sample with Census Data

The great bulk of the analysis will concern the analytic sample, that is, a comparison of the attitudes of persons of high, middle, and low incomes. However, upon occasion the answers of the systematic and analytic samples will be compared and this raises the question of the degree to which the systematic sample is representative of the Muskegon urban area. In the following comparison of the characteristics of the systematic sample with demographic characteristics of the Muskegon area population in 1959, the tracted portions will be called "Muskegon," and the systematic sample will be called "the sample." Remember that the census data were obtained in 1959, the sample data in December 1966-January

1967, and that the geographical areas do not coincide exactly; consequently, we have no way of knowing the degree to which Muskegon and the sample should be alike to indicate that the sample actually is representative of "Muskegon."

In 1959 the population of Muskegon was 111,937. The vast bulk of the non-white population, about 10% of the total population, was Negro; only 273 persons were in the category "other races." In the sample, 90% of the respondents were white, 10% Negro. In Muskegon, 48% of the population aged 14 or over was male, 52% female. In the sample. 50% of the respondents were male, 50% female.

To compare occupational composition, some of the census categories had to be collapsed because the "higher" categories were coded differently. "Group one" was the same as the census category, "operatives, etc." and "group two" was the same as the census category "foremen, skilled." But "group three" was called "lower white-collar," defined as occupations that ordinarily do not require any college training, such as clerical, some sales, some managers, some technical. "Group four" higher white collar, was defined as occupations that ordinarily require a college (or other professional) education. Therefore, in order to make these categories comparable with census categories, it was necessary to collapse the census categories "professional, technical, managers, proprietors, clerical and sales" in addition to the

Table 1. Comparison of Occupational Composition in Muskegon Area and Systematic Sample

	Males in Labor Force			
	Census		Sample	
Occupational Categories	%	N	%	N
Professional, manager, clerical, sales	32	8,613	37	50
Foremen, skilled	25	6,464	23	32
Operatives, etc.	43	11,341	40	54

categories "lower white collar" and "higher white collar." In the computation of occupational composition, the census category "occupation not reported" was excluded. The sample data are based only on employed male household heads.

The median years of education in Muskegon for the population 25 years and over was 10.5 years in 1959; the sample median was 10.75. In 1959 median family income in Muskegon was $6,109; in the nation it was $5,660. The median income in the nation was $6,882 in 1966; the sample median family income was $7,000.

It seems reasonable to conclude that the systematic sample is fairly representative of the Muskegon urban area. A question of more importance in this study is the extent to which the demographic variables in the analytic sample are associated with each other. We shall consider this next.

Association of Variables in the Analytic Sample

It is a truism in sociology that everything is ultimately related to everything else. Any investigator therefore has to decide which variables have the most effect on the attitudes in which he is interested. There is no neat set of rules to follow to insure that the investigator chooses the most effective variables. The decision must be based on a rational analysis of the problem and must take into account the relevant body of knowledge that already exists.

Income, education, occupation, age, sex, and race have often been considered relevant to a variety of sociological problems. I therefore ran all the questions by these six variables, although I did not expect age and sex to have much effect on the opinions investigated in this study. The rationale here was that previous studies have indicated that the factors known to have an effect on income position have, by and large, already had their effect by the time a person is 30 years old, and consequently there is little reason to suppose that advancing age will have any important effect on a person's position in the stratification system.[1] It is quite true that income does tend to increase with age but the differences between age groups are far less than the differences between, say, occupational groups. Likewise, sex is associated with income; however, family income is of greater interest here than individual income and the limitations of sexual status, for example, do not prevent the wife of a rich man from enjoying the benefits of the family income.

Hence, my definition of stratification minimizes the importance of age and sex as variables because I see the reward system as associated with family position. As expected, age and sex did not in fact make much difference in the respondents' attitudes. With income held constant,

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[1]This may not be true for the relatively small occupational groups like physicians and organizational elite, but it is reasonable to suppose that by age 30 such persons are aware of a considerable income potential.

variations by sex and age were generally less than five per cent and only rarely as high as ten per cent.

Occupation, education, and income tend to be highly associated and have often been used singly, or in combination, as indicators of social class. Which one of these (if any) "causes" the other(s) is a difficult problem. From the standpoint of an investigator focusing on stratification, the Weberian view seems most adequate: if income in one generation, then life chances for the next. That is, parental income provides the probability that the individual will be educated to enter a particular occupation and receive a particular income himself. If the nature of the study requires only that one look at an individual at one point of time, then it might be more rational to suggest that his education "caused" his occupation which, in turn, "caused" his income. But stratification involves more than one point in time, and it is in this sense that income is viewed as a primary "causal" factor.

Nevertheless it is important to ascertain the extent to which income, education, and occupation are associated in this study. Table 2 shows the relationship of education and income. About three-fifths of the respondents with 0-7 years of education are poor; two-fifths have middle incomes, and none are rich. About two-fifths of the respondents with 8-11 grades of education are poor; three-fifths of them are of middle income, and less than five per cent are rich.

Table 2. Total Sample Income Composition by Education Level (In Per Cent)

Years of Education		Poor	Middle	Rich	Total %	Total N
0-7 years		59	41	0	100	(49)
8-11		39	59	3	100	(147)
12-15		18	68	14	100	(114)
16-more		0	39	61	100	(44)
Total, analytical sample	%	30	57	13	100	
	N	(107)	(200)	(47)		(354)

About one-fifth of the respondents with 12-15 years of education are poor; about three-fifths are in the middle range, and about one-seventh are rich. Respondents with college degrees are poor; about two-fifths of them are of middle income, and three-fifths of them are rich.

When examining relationship between occupation and income, remember that, although income refers to the present family income of the respondent, occupation refers to (1) present male occupation if a male is present and employed; (2) most recent male occupation if a male is present and unemployed; (3) most recent male occupation if a male is dead or permenently absent from the household; (4) female occupation if a female never married. Table 3 shows that a little less than half of the "low-skilled" group are poor, while the remainder are of middle income. None are rich. Less than twenty per cent of the "high-skilled" group are poor, and more than four-fifths are of middle income. None are rich. One-third of the "lower white collar" group are poor, about two-thirds are of middle income and less than five per cent are rich. One per cent of the "higher white collar" group are poor, about two-fifths are of middle income, and about three-fifths are rich. The relationship of education to occupation (see Table 4) is in part an artifact of definition: "higher white collar" was defined using an occupation usually requiring a college education, and, not surprisingly, almost everyone with a college degree is "higher white collar."

Table 3. Total Sample Occupational Composition[a] By Income Level (In Per Cent)

Occupational Level		Poor	Middle	Rich	Total %	Total N
Low skilled		45	55	0	100	(183)
High skilled		17	83	0	100	(47)
Lower white collar		33	63	4	100	(46)
Higher white collar		1	41	58	100	(78)
Total, analytic sample	%	30	57	13	100	
	N	(107)	(200)	(47)	100	(354)

[a]See page 95 for referent of "occupation."

Table 4. Total Sample Educational Composition by Occupational Level (In Per Cent)

Years of Education		Unskilled	Skilled	Lower white collar	Higher white collar	Total %	Total N
0-7		88	8	4	0	100	(49)
8-11		67	14	14	4	99	(147)
12-15		35	19	20	25	99	(114)
16-more		2	0	0	98	100	(44)
Total, analytic sample	%	52	13	13	22	100	
	N	(183)	(47)	(46)	(78)		(354)

Almost nine-tenths of the persons with 0-7 years of education are in unskilled occupations. About two-thirds of those with 8-11 years of education are unskilled, and about one-seventh are in skilled occupations, and one-seventh in "lower white collar" occupations. Of persons with 12-15 years of education, one-third are in unskilled occupations, about one-fifth in skilled, one-fifth in "lower white collar, and one-fourth in "higher white collar."

The tables above have been presented for the purpose of showing the degree of overlap between the various categories of occupation, education, and income. In the discussion of the findings generally the marginals will be shown only by income, of these three. The results by education will be shown under two circumstances: where, because of the nature of the question, other persons might reasonably be interested in the possible association of education with the attitude, and where the findings indicated that the differences among groups were greater according to education than income. There are data to show the simultaneous effect of income, race, and education but after inspecting these data I decided neither to discuss it in the text nor to present it in tables. Once the various groups had been differentiated by income and race, adding education only rarely produced any important differences, that is, differences greater than five or ten per cent. When education did seem to produce important differences (say, 75% vs. 25%), the numbers in the cells were

so small (three or four, e.g.) that it would not have been possible to justify any conclusions.

However, in every subsequent table the marginals for race as well as income will be shown. This decision was made after the interviewing was completed but before the data had been processed. Because the attitudinal questions focus upon aspects of the stratification system, and because the position of Negroes in the system varies systematically from that of whites, it appeared that showing the marginals by race would be necessary in order to interpret the findings.

Not surprisingly, Negroes in the sample had less education than whites. Table 5 shows that there were no college graduates among the Negroes. Two-tenths of the white males and one-tenth of the white females had graduated from college. Mean educational level for white males was more than ten grades, and it was slightly higher for white females. Mean educational level of Negro males was about seven grades, and nine grades for Negro females.

Summary

The purpose of the study design is to show how attitudes toward various aspects of the stratification system vary by income and race. A systematic sample was drawn to anchor the study in the context of a particular place and time, and this sample provided the bulk of the middle income respondents.

Table 5. Total Sample Race and Sex By Educational Level

Race and Sex	Years of Education 0-7	8-11	12-15	16 or more	Total %	N
White male	16	36	27	21	100	(122)
White female	7	37	44	12	100	(147)
Negro male	34	59	7	0	100	(41)
Negro female	11	57	32	0	100	(44)
Total, analytic sample %	14	41	32	12	99	
N	49	(147)	(114)	(44)		(354)

A sample of rich and of poor respondents was also drawn. These three samples were combined to produce the analytic sample which is the main basis of the analysis. The total number in the analytic sample was 354; of these, 107 were poor, 200 were of middle income, and 47 were rich. By sex and race, 122 were white males, 147 were white females, 41 were Negro males and 44 were Negro females.

Let us turn now to a discussion of the questions that were used and the answers that the respondents gave.

CHAPTER 5

THE REWARDS

The theoretical approach of this study involves the assumption that the dominant ideology justifying a particular stratification system will be most attractive to those who are gaining the highest rewards from that system. Following Marx and Weber, I assumed that the most important rewards in this society are derived from a market relationship. As a crude indicator of that relationship, annual family income in the year preceding the study was used. The major hypothesis here is that income will affect belief in the dominant ideology, that is, the higher the income, the more the respondent will tend to believe the ideology.

The purpose of an ideology is to enable those who are rewarded to feel comfortable about the system that rewarded them, as well as to justify the system to those who receive few rewards. People like to feel that they deserve their rewards. Few men would dispute the ethical proposition that goodness <u>ought</u> to be rewarded; an ideology merely combines the <u>ought</u> with the <u>is</u>, and explains how it happens that a particular kind of goodness which should be rewarded actually is rewarded. If this theoretical approach has any merit, one would expect to find that rich people tend to believe

that wealth and poverty are the result of good or bad personal attributes--if a man is rich, it's because he worked hard, because he was smart, because he was thrifty; if a man is poor, he must have been lazy, stupid, or a spendthrift. On the other hand, one would expect poor people to tend to feel that personal attributes really don't have so much to do with the way things turn out; rather, it's the system. Rich children become the rich and poor children become the poor.

Background Data

Before discussing the respondents' perceptions of the stratification system, let us examine some important background questions. The first series concerns the respondents' feelings about the Muskegon urban area as a place to live and work. The second concerns the respondents' class self-identification. We shall then turn to the primary questions of this chapter: What kind of rewards do people want, what kind of opportunities are there to get these rewards, and why do people get the rewards that they do?

The three categories whose opinions will be examined are the rich, the middle-income group, and the poor. These categories were obtained by combining the systematic sample with the samples of rich and poor, according to the definitions given in chapter 4. In brief, a respondent is classified as poor if his family income in the year preceding the

study was $3,500 for four persons. If family income was between $7,000 and $25,000, the respondent was defined as "middle income" regardless of the number of persons in the family. With an income above $25,000, the respondent was defined as "rich."

The findings for Negro and white respondents will be shown separately because there is sufficient reason to believe that the experiences of Negroes in the labor market and in the opportunity structure differ from those of whites. The total number of cases in the analytic sample is 354; of these, 70 are poor whites, 37 are poor Negroes, 152 are middle-income whites, 48 are middle-income Negroes, and 47 are rich whites. There were no rich Negroes. The small numbers in each group make it imperative that all of the findings of this study be regarded with great caution.

Attitudes toward Muskegon as a Place to Live and Work

An important background question is the extent to which people like the place they live and work.[1] The respondents were asked whether they liked the Muskegon area as a place to rear a family, as a place to work, whether a young man should seek factory work or professional work there, and whether they thought the schools were satisfactory. Table 6 shows the results. The totals for the systematic sample are also

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[1]About three-fourths of all whites have lived in the Muskegon area more than 20 years; about half of the poor Negroes and one-third of the middle income Negroes have done so.

shown because they seem appropriate here. In general, three-fourths or more of all groups like Muskegon as a place to rear a family,[1] and as a place to work, and they believe it a good place for a young man to look for factory work. However, somewhat fewer of the middle-income whites and Negroes think a professional man should settle in Muskegon. The degree of satisfaction with the public school system is lower; two-thirds of the total sample say it is good, but poor and middle-income whites say it is better than Negroes do. The rich who did not like the schools offered spontaneous comments. One rich man said, "The school system should be overhauled and the money spent more economically." Another said, "The public schools are generally a lost cause. They are concerning themselves with everything but education. They train or entertain." A rich woman said, "I don't like all this modern stuff."

What is significant because of the focus of this study is the high degree of satisfaction with Muskegon as a place to work. About nine-tenths of every group like Muskegon in this respect. The respondents do not seem to suffer from a fundamental discontent with the place they live, and their subsequent responses must be viewed in this light.

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[1]Of the rich who did not like Muskegon, a middle-aged white man remarked, "This is a delapidated, crumby town. This is a community of haves and have-nots. There's a small group of men with accumulated wealth and a lot of blue collar." A middle-age woman reported, "My husband says Muskegon was laid out by two wandering cows. It's poorly planned--no nice upper-middle class homes here."

Table 6. Evaluation of Muskegon Area (Per Cent Who Find Area Good)[a]

Income and Race		Rearing a family	Working	Opportunity for Young Man to Find: Factory Work	Professional Work	Schools
Poor	Negro	67	94	95	89	62
	White	76	88	89	83	74
Middle	Negro	67	85	85	67	40
	White	79	92	75	65	67
Rich		81	91	83	74	55
Total, systematic sample	%	77	91	80	79	67
	N	(186)	(182)	(179)	(162)	(186)
Total analytic sample	%	76	90	82	73	63
	N	(348)	(342)	(353)	(353)	(354)

[a]When the N is less than 354 in the analytic sample and less than 186 in the systematic sample, the "don't know," "no answer," or "other" response has been omitted in computing percentages. In order to economize in the presentation of the data, in this table, as in certain subsequent ones, only the per cent of respondents who agree with a certain statement will be shown; thus no rows or columns will total 100%.

Class Self-Identification

The second background question concerned class identification. The question was forced-choice, and the wording was adapted from Centers' question.[1] The respondent was asked to identify himself as middle, lower, working, or upper class. If the respondent asked how classes were defined, he was told that classes were whatever he thought they were. As Table 7 shows, 54% of the systematic sample identified themselves as working class and 43% as middle class.[2] In the analytic sample, 49% identified themselves as working class and 40% as middle class. The choice "upper-middle class" (a free response) occurred only in the analytic sample, and with one exception, this response was given only by the rich.

A few rich said that they were working class and a few poor Negroes said that they were upper class. The rationale for this response was, in the words of one woman, "Class is a matter of how you carry yourself." There was almost no identification with the lower class. One woman, currently

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[1]Centers, The Psychology of Social Classes, p. 233. For a discussion of the consequences of using a forced-choice or free choice question to ascertain the respondent's class identification, see Llewellyn Gross, "The Use of Class Concepts in Sociological Research," American Journal of Sociology, LIV (March, 1949), pp. 409-421.

[2]Cf. Centers, The Psychology of Social Classes, p. 77. In July, 1945, a national cross section of white males showed that 51% identify with the working class and 43% with the middle class. In February, 1946, a similar cross section showed 52% working class and 36% middle class.

Table 7. Class Identification, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)[a]

Income and Race		Lower	Working	Middle	Upper-middle (free response)	Upper	There are no classes (free response)	Total %	Total N
Poor	Negro	3	57	32	0	8	0	100	(37)
	White	7	52	37	0	1	1	98	(67)
Middle	Negro	0	79	19	0	2	0	100	(48)
	White	1	51	46	1	1	0	100	(150)
Rich		0	2	55	14	19	9	99	(47)
Total, systematic sample	%	2	54	43	0	1	0	100	
	N	(2)	(100)	(80)	0	(1)	0		(183)
Total, analytic sample	%	2	49	40	2	5	1	99	
	N	(7)	(172)	(141)	(8)	(16)	(5)		(349)

[a]Where percentages do not total one-hundred, it is the result of rounding errors.

receiving ADC, said, "Well, I'm really working class but I'm not working now, so I guess I'll have to say lower class." One poor white respondent and a few rich respondents denied the existence of classes.

The Differential Appeal of Money, Prestige, and Power

It is commonly believed that Max Weber said that the dimensions of stratification are class, status, and power.[1] They may also be conceived of as the rewards of the stratification system. In this section I shall discuss the differential desire for these rewards. Originally I had expected that the poor would want money; the middle-income group, status; and the rich, power. The rationale was that money appears to be the basic need, for it is rare to find a man of high status and great power living in poverty, and likewise, poor people rarely appear to have high status or power. The respondents were asked this question:

> Now I'm going to read you three things that a lot of people are concerned about. Could you say which of

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[1]Actually Weber didn't quite put it this way. He spoke of classes, estates, and parties and it is not unreasonable to say that he really meant that these were the dimensions of stratification. Yet Weber was quite nominalistic and apt to be very careful about what he called things. His translators have interpreted him for us. His essay on "Stände und Klassen" (estates and classes) is entitled "Social Stratification and Class Structure" by Parsons, for example. See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1947), p. 424.

these concerns you the most, that is, which of these do you think about or worry about the most?

1. Earning a living, so that there will be enough money to pay for the groceries, the rent, and the doctor bills.

2. Gaining a good reputation so that other people can respect you and your family for the way you live.

3. Influencing other people so that you are able to make important decisions at work or in the community.

Table 8 shows that the only large differences among groups are between the rich and all others, so that only in this instance was the expectation substantially confirmed, although differences are largely in the predicted direction. Six-tenths of all groups except the rich were most interested in money; less than two-tenths of the rich were most interested in money. About one-fourth of the rich and the poor whites were interested in prestige, with all other groups showing less interest. About four-tenths of the rich and about one-tenth or less of all other groups expressed most interest in power.

To amplify the results of the question on the desire for class, status, or power, a further question was presented which couched the choices in less abstract terms:

> If you could have any one of these three things, which would you take: to be a U. S. senator, to write a book or do some important scientific research, to become president of a big corporation like General Motors, or to have your yearly income tripled?[1]

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[1]Two types of power were included in the question because we thought that some women might find it hard to imagine serving in the economic arena and dealing with profit and loss statements, and that some males might strongly prefer economic to formal political power. Both responses were coded together under "power."

Table 8. Priority of Concern for Income, Prestige, Influence (Generalized Referents), by Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Class	Status	Power	None of These	All Equally	Total %	Total N
Poor	Negro	72	16	8	3	0	99	(37)
	White	64	24	7	0	4	99	(70)
Middle	Negro	68	15	6	2	8	99	(48)
	White	66	16	13	1	5	101	(151)
Rich		17	24	39	13	7	100	(46)
Total, analytic sample	%	60	18	14	3	5	100	
	N	(212)	(65)	(48)	(17)	(10)		(352)

This question changed the picture in some ways. (See Table 9.) Interest in income among all Negroes increased, but dropped among middle-income whites and the rich. A few comments given by poor women illustrate the financial perception of those who are struggling very hard to make ends meet. One Negro woman living alone and earning about $60 per month baby-sitting said that if her income were tripled, "I might buy a new coat." A Negro widow, about 40 years old, with five children said, "If my income were tripled, I wouldn't be on top but I'd be in better shape. I could pay my doctor bills." (The respondent had sickle cell anemia, among other health problems.) A middle-aged white woman said, "I'd like to have my income tripled, but I don't have any." A middle-aged Negro woman with six children said, "If my income were tripled, I might live average."

The decreased interest in income among whites, compared with interest generated by the earlier question, did not appear to increase the interest in status or power, but rather the numbers of those who professed an interest in none of these choices.[1] The rationale for this choice was

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[1]Probably a different approach to interviewing problems in survey research could have reduced this response. A sufficiently determined interviewer can often badger a forced choice out of the respondent, but the interviewers were specifically instructed not to press very hard. I prefer to put up with the analytic inconvenience caused by a free-wheeling interview from an unwilling respondent, i.e., a response that fits neatly into one of the preconceived notions of what a respondent ought to say.

Table 9. Priority of Concern for Income, Prestige, Influence (Concrete Referents), By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Income tripled	Write book, etc.	Become senator, etc.	None or other	Total %	Total N
Poor	Negro	86	3	11	0	100	(37)
	White	64	8	16	13	101	(64)
Middle	Negro	80	4	13	2	99	(47)
	White	50	18	13	19	100	(150)
Rich		7	40	29	24	100	(45)
Total, analytic sample	%	55	15	15	14	99	
	N	(189)	(53)	(53)	(48)		(343)

often, in the words of one rich man, "I have everything I want; I only want for my children to lead happy, useful lives." One middle-income white man said, "I just hope my health stays good."

What stands out most clearly from these two questions is the extreme interest of Negroes in economic rewards. A further question on economic concerns threw this interest into even sharper relief. The respondent was asked to look at a picture of a ladder with ten steps and to imagine that on the tenth step was a man who was constantly thinking about ways he would make money, while on the first step was a man who, although he worked very hard at his job, was relatively uninterested in thinking about ways he could increase his income. Table 10 shows that all groups show few differences with reference to a disinterest in making money; about one-seventh made this choice. However three-fourths of the poor Negroes and one-half of the middle-income Negroes placed themselves on the tenth step (greatest interest). About two-fifths of the poor whites and one-fifth of middle-income whites and rich were on the tenth step. The bulk of the middle-income whites and rich were somewhere around the middle rung (average interest).

Typical of the poor Negroes who placed themselves at the top of the ladder was a young woman with six children who said, "I like to think of ways to make money, but I don't end up on top because every time I get an extra dollar,

Table 10. Concern With Making Money, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Step 1 (low)	Steps 2-3	Steps 4-5-6	Steps 7-8-9	Step 10 (high)	Total %	Total N
Poor	Negro	13	0	3	10	74	100	(31)
	White	14	11	28	9	38	(101)	(64)
Middle	Negro	18	7	14	9	52	100	(44)
	White	12	9	39	20	20	100	(147)
Rich		17	7	33	24	20	101	(46)
Total, analytic sample	%	14	7	29	16	33	99	
	N	(46)	(26)	(97)	(54)	(109)		(332)

something happens and I have to spend more." Typical of the white poor who did not place themselves on the top rung was a middle-aged woman with six children, living on ADC, who simply said, "That's impossible. I couldn't be on the top. I don't have the education or money to do anything with."

On the other hand, one rich white man said that he would be on one of the lower rungs. "Money isn't important to me." A rich woman gave the same kind of response: "Money in itself is useless."

A further series of questions attempted to tap the concern with income and economic security. The respondents were first asked if they were satisfied with their present incomes and were then asked to specify the degree of satisfaction: highly satisfied, moderately satisfied, etc. Table 11 shows that three-fourths of the rich and about one-third of the middle-income whites are satisfied with their present income. One-fifth of poor whites, one-seventh of the middle income Negroes, and one-twentieth of the poor Negroes are also satisfied. About one-seventh of all Negroes and poor whites were "very dissatisfied" with their incomes; less than one-tenth of the middle-income whites and only one rich respondent felt this way.

The respondents were then asked if they felt that they had had more, the same, or fewer economic opportunities than other people. More than two-fifths of all Negroes, about one-fifth of the poor whites, and considerably fewer average

and rich whites felt that they had had fewer economic opportunities than other people. (See Table 11.)

Last, the respondents were asked if they felt "lucky" compared to other people with reference to income position. Whatever makes people feel lucky, present income seems to have little to do with it. The differences are in the predicted direction but they are very small, and range from about two-thirds of the poor Negroes to about three-fourths of the rich. (See Table 11.) The comments of three elderly white females illustrate the rationale for feeling lucky even though poor. One woman said, "I'm thankful I have as much as I have. Jesus said to be content with all things." Another said, "I've been lucky because some are in worse shape than I am." A woman living, with her husband, on social security said, "We are luckier than people were years ago because then they didn't have social security." "I'm lucky. I didn't have an education but I've always been able to get a job," was the reply of one middle-aged, poor Negro man.

What these questions were designed to show is that poor people want money and rich people want other things. Although it might seem rather obvious that the poor would like money, it does not appear to be obvious to everyone. In any event, certain programs to "help" the poor seem to be planned to "improve" their education, motivation, family structure, personalities, and on and on and on. As one rich woman

Table 11. Income-Related Concerns, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Satisfied with income	Very dissatisfied with income	Fewer economic opportunities	Lucky in income
Poor	Negro	5	14	41	65
	White	20	19	22	70
Middle	Negro	13	17	46	69
	White	30	8	7	74
Rich		74	2	2	77
Total, analytical sample	%	29	11	18	72
	N	(353)	(352)	(349)	(351)

remarked, "What we really should do is to visit the poor in their homes. Giving them money would only mean that they'd spend it on drink or something like that. They need someone to encourage them." Nevertheless the poor are interested in economic rewards. The next question we shall consider is how the poor (and the other groups) perceive the opportunity structure, the chance to get these rewards.

The Perception of Opportunity

According to the dominant ideology, America is a land of opportunity, and if you work hard, you'll get ahead. Everyone is used to hearing it. Everyone is used to believing it, more or less. The obverse sounds positively un-American: America is a land of little opportunity and no matter how hard you work, you'll never get ahead. The problem here, therefore, was to devise some way of wording questions that would test belief in a popular cliché without making the respondent who didn't believe it feel like a member of the Communist Party.

Frank Westie used a technique that seemed to get around the difficulty.[1] He presented a series of generalized statements that were in fact a series of clichés referring to America as a land of freedom and the like. Then he prepared a number of corollaries that were specifically linked to race.

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[1]Frank Westie, "The American Dilemma: An Empirical Test," American Sociological Review, 30 (August, 1965), pp. 527-538.

The logic of the technique was that people would tend to agree with the cliché because it was what "everybody" knows is true, but that some persons, at least, would balk at the race-linked corollary; for example, "I believe in equality but I don't want to live next door to a Negro." Westie thus assumed that some respondents will be logically inconsistent. When the technique was used in this study, few respondents appeared to notice any inconsistency in their responses. One woman laughed and said, "I guess I'm being inconsistent." The interviewer said, "Wellll . . . ," and the woman continued, "but I guess I'll just have to say that anyway. It's the way I feel."

The substantive areas covered were generalized opportunity, the chance to get a college education, legal equality, and political equality. The respondent was first presented with the generalized cliché and, later in the interview, with the class-linked specification. The hypothesis here is that a higher proportion of respondents would agree with the generalized statement than with the specification, and that the higher the income, the greater the proportion of respondents who would agree with either type of statement.

Like most of the other attitudinal questions in this study, all of these statements were worded in "either-or" form because some investigators have suggested that lower class people tend to agree with any positive statement regardless of

substantive content.[1]

The first general statement concerned opportunity.[2]

> Some people say there's not much opportunity in America today--that the average man doesn't have much chance to really get ahead. Others say there's plenty of opportunity and anyone who works hard can go as far as he wants. How do you feel?

In the pre-testing, the class-linked specification of this statement was:

> Do you think that a boy whose father is poor and a boy whose father is rich have the same chance to get ahead, or do you think the rich boy has a much better chance to get ahead?

A number of blue-collar respondents agreed that the boys had the same chance to get ahead, but several commented that "naturally," the boy whose father was rich would go a lot further. Opportunity appeared to be equal, but for some it was more equal than for others. The final wording therefore took into account the question of who could go furthest with an equal amount of work.

> Do you think that a boy whose father is poor and a boy whose father is rich have the same opportunity to make the same amount of money if they work equally hard or do you think that the boy whose father is rich has a much better chance of earning a lot more money?

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[1]See Campbell, et al., The American Voter, pp. 510-515. Other comments on this problem are in R. Christie and M. Jahoda, editors, Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality" (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954).

[2]This wording was developed by Campbell, et al., The American Voter. I used it because it was approximately what I wanted and I feel that, whenever possible, it is desirable to use questions for which there is other data available, to facilitate comparison.

The results can be seen in Table 12. The great majority of white respondents see America as a land of opportunity, the rich most of all. Contrary to expectation, poor whites see somewhat more opportunity than middle-income whites, nine-tenths as compared to eight-tenths. But Negroes see considerably less; just over half of both groups agreed that there was plenty of opportunity. The response to the class-linked specification shows that all five groups drop sharply in proportion of those agreeing as compared to the general statement, and that the intra-group differences occur as predicted, except that middle-income Negroes show less agreement than poor whites.

To the first question on generalized opportunity, one rich white man replied, "There are all kinds of opportunity and a bunch of lazy people. If the government quit giving stuff away, it might help." A middle-income Negro man said, "Truth is, if you come from Germany, Cuba, or Russia, you got a chance 'way above the colored race. People <u>born</u> here don't have that much chance. Sometimes I feel the South is a better place to live. Up here they don't hit yuh, they discriminate yuh."

To the class-linked question, one rich man responded that the question was poorly stated: "For this reason: they have equal opportunity but when you interject money as a measuring stick of success, then the rich boy has the opportunity from the money standpoint." A poor white woman thought

Table 12. Beliefs on Chances to Get Ahead, Go to College, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Plenty of opportunity (general)	Rich and poor have equal opportunity (class-linked)	Equal opportunity for college (general)	Poor as likely to be in college (class-linked)
Poor	Negro	56	11	22	11
	White	90	37	57	38
Middle	Negro	58	21	41	28
	White	80	49	75	37
Rich		93	57	96	43
Total, analytic sample	%	78	42	64	34
	N	(342)	(351)	(348)	(344)

that the rich boy had the better chance. "High ability alone doesn't make any difference. People with money have a tendency to pull strings. If the fathers would stay out, maybe they'd be equal." Thus one respondent implies that the race is on equal terms because money is not the goal, and the other implies that the race would be equal if money didn't determine the starting point. A poor white man (he and his wife were nearly blind) said, "Economic opportunity? As far as work, they don't give no opportunities. But I appreciate the pension. I'd rather be working, but it's wonderful what they do for the poor. It could be worse." (He and his wife received pensions totalling $93 per month.)

The second set of questions concerned the chance to go to college. The general statement was:

> Do you feel that all young people of high ability have fairly equal opportunity to go to college or do you feel that a large percentage of young people do not have much opportunity to go to college?

The class-linked statement was:

> Do you think that most young people in college come from families who can give them financial help or do you think that young people whose parents are poor are just as likely to be in college as anyone else?

Table 12 shows that about one-fifth of the poor Negroes, two-fifths of the middle-income Negroes, over one-half of the poor whites, three-fourths of the middle-income whites, and almost all of the rich think that equal opportunity for a college education is a fact. When the question was restated in a class-linked form, all groups show a drop of about

50% in the number of persons agreeing that the poor are just as likely to be in college. This set of questions appears to confirm the hypothesis.

The third set of questions covered legal equality:

> A number of people believe that in America everyone gets equal and fair treatment from the law while others believe that the police and courts are basically unfair in the administration of justice. What do you think?

The class-linked corollary was:

> Do you think that, if he breaks the law, a rich man is just as likely to end up in jail as a poor man, or do you think it's a lot easier for a rich man to stay out of jail?

The results of the first question (Table 13) showed some differences by income but they were not all in the predicted direction and were not nearly so marked as the differences by race. Only one-fourth of middle-income Negroes, almost half of the poor Negroes, three-fifths of the middle-income whites and three-fourths of the rich and poor whites, thought that the law treated people equally. The specific statement showed the predicted drop in total group agreement. Almost four-fifths of the entire group thought that the rich got better treatment. However, intra-group differences were almost non-existent. Most of the respondents who felt that the rich fared better added a regretful comment such as, "I'm sorry to say this, but that's the way it is." But one rich woman said firmly, "Of course the rich man gets better treatment; that's the way it should be. He deserves it because he can pay for it." A rich man said, "Nothing wrong with a rich

Table 13. Beliefs About Legal and Political Equality, By Income and Race (Per Cent Who Perceive Equality)

Income and Race		Law is fair	Jail is likely for rich	Voting is vital	Poor influence government as much as rich
Poor	Negro	46	8	76	3
	White	75	23	88	30
Middle	Negro	27	20	89	15
	White	59	20	89	30
Rich		75	22	94	55
Total, analytical sample	%	58	20	88	29
	N	(340)	(343)	(303)	(345)

man's staying out of jail. He spends his money protecting himself. These days, wealth buys you the country club, clothes, cars, and attorneys." A poor Negro man said, "Money influences the law. If you don't have any money, they put you in jail and forget you." A poor Negro woman remarked, "They don't do what they should until someone has been killed. If you call them with problems in the neighborhood, they will tell you, 'It's nothing they can do.' When someone is killed or hurt badly, here they are."

One white, middle-income husband and wife had a difference of opinion. It was the wife who was being interviewed:

> Wife: Can the rich man stay out of jail easier? Oh <u>yes</u>. Now, I'd better not say that either. They're more careful--they don't drink and drive like an ordinary person.
>
> Husband: They're as bad as the rest.
>
> Wife: I haven't heard of one being arrested for drunk driving. They're more careful. They know the law.
>
> Husband: They don't have to go to public places. They can go to private places and drink.

The last set of questions concerned political equality as expressed in the franchise. In democratic theory, at least, one man's vote is the equal of another's. The general statement was:

> Some people think that voting is a vital part of the governmental process in this country while others think that it really doesn't make much difference who gets elected because the same people go on running things anyway. What do you think?

The specific form of the statement was:

> Some people say that, regardless of who gets elected, people who are rich get their way most of the time, while others say that people who are poor have just as much influence in government as people who are rich. What do you think?

On the general statement, the range of response was not very great. Agreement was from a low of three-fourths of the poor Negroes to more than nine-tenths of the rich; almost nine-tenths of the other three groups agreed that voting is vital. (See Table 13.) Side comments to the question indicated that most respondents were hearing an article of faith. It was almost as though they had been hearing a question such as, "Some people say that motherhood is a vital part of human organization while others say that it doesn't make much difference because children generally grow up anyway."

The class-linked specification produced a different response. (See Table 13.) The group total dropped sharply and the intra-group response was as predicted with the exception of a similar response on the part of middle-income and poor whites. Almost no poor Negroes and only a few middle-income Negroes thought that the poor had as much influence as the rich, while about one-third of the middle-income and poor whites thought so, as did more than half of the rich. One middle-income white man said, "Money talks. It doesn't have to be that way, but that's the way it is." Another remarked, "The rich get their way? I'm not against the rich, but it's a fact that it takes money to do things." A middle-income

Negro man said, "Politics is all money--of course, they'll let the public know it's different."

These four sets of questions were designed to show that people will tend to agree with popular clichés but will show less agreement with specific corollaries of the clichés. Three other questions used in this study may also benefit from this kind of analysis. The first question is a generalized statement contrasting the opportunity for occupational mobility in Europe with that in the United States. The second and third concern the specific opportunities for crossing what is usually called a major stratum boundary.

The generalized statement was derived from a comment by Lipset and Rogoff.[1] In a discussion of occupational mobility in Europe and the United States, Lipset and Rogoff pointed out that European mobility is just as high as American mobility, and they commented upon what they called the myth of low European mobility.

> High mobility is a relative term; we call the American rate "high" in comparison with what is assumed to be the "low" rate obtaining in the rigid, closed societies of Europe. But is this assumption, traditional and universal though it be, justified, or is it another one of those myths waiting to be destroyed by sociological analysis?[2]

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[1]Seymour M. Lipset and Natalie Rogoff, "Occupational Mobility in Europe and the United States," Man, Work, and Society, ed. Sigmund Nosow and William H. Form (New York: Basic Books, 1962), pp. 362-370.

[2]Ibid., p. 363.

I questioned whether it is universally assumed that European mobility is low. The reason for doubt is based on historical changes in the past 150 years. At one time almost all of Europe was ruled by kings and princes, and experience with George III convinced Americans that such aristocratic rulers were wicked or foolish--to say nothing of being fearful snobs. We wanted none of that sort of thing in the land of the free. But the few kings left in Europe no longer confuse their royal persons with the state, and it is difficult to believe that Americans feel threatened by royalty. The contrast is no longer between the aristocrats and the common people, but between the communists and non-communists. Of course, if the old societies of Western Europe are still rigid and closed, then it would appear that Karl Marx must have had a point after all. And since Karl Marx must have been wrong, then the non-communist countries must not really be so bad: they must have the same sort of freedom that we do.

With this sort of thinking in mind, it was decided to put the Lipset-Rogoff assumption to the test. I therefore re-phrased one of their sentences, "Ambitious sons are able to rise in all Western societies."[1] Because the phrase "Western societies" might be ambiguous to some respondents, concrete referents were substituted. The paraphrase was this:

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[1] Ibid., p. 370.

> Do you believe that ambitious sons of lower class fathers are able to rise into the middle class in most European countries like Germany, France, and England, or do you think that ambitious boys can rise only in the United States?

Note that this question assumes that ambitious boys can rise. Indeed, as a scientific proposition this would be hard to nullify, for ambition is an open-ended quality and, given enough of it, probably almost anyone can rise. Some investigators apparently forget to inquire how much more ambition a poor boy needs than a rich boy.

If the assumption that mobility is low in Europe is universal, we would expect to find that almost the entire sample believed it. The theoretical approach might lead us to expect that, if there should be group differences, the rich would be more likely to believe it. And in fact, they do. (See Table 13.) About one-third of the rich think that ambitious boys can rise more easily in the United States, while about one-fifth of the middle-income whites, one-seventh of the poor Negroes, and less than one-tenth of the middle-income Negroes and poor whites think so. (These percentages represent the combination of the groups of those who thought that ambitious boys could rise only in the United States, and those who thought that ambitious boys could rise more easily in the United States (a free response). In the Muskegon urban area, the myth does not appear to be widespread at all: only 16% of the entire sample believed it. However, the importance of this question is that the great majority of the sample believes that ambitious boys can rise.

It seemed advisable to re-phrase the question in a more specific, occupationally-linked form. The respondents were asked to think of two large groups: factory workers and small businessmen, and big business executives and professional men. The questions were worded in terms of these groups because, if occupational mobility is meaningful, it should involve crossing major stratum boundaries and should not involve a move just five points up the NORC scale. The first question pertained to upward occupational mobility:

> Who do you think are more likely to become business executives and professional men: the sons of big business executives and professional men or the sons of factory workers and small businessmen?

Then the question was reversed to discover the perception of downward occupational mobility:

> Who do you think are more likely to become factory workers and small businessmen: the sons of factory workers and small businessmen, or the sons of big businessmen and professionals?

Most respondents (see Table 14) saw the occupational system as somewhat stratified. No poor Negroes thought a factory worker's son just as likely to become a professional as the son of a professional, and only about one-tenth of the rich thought so. The results were similar concerning downward mobility. Very few respondents thought the son of a professional as likely to become a factory worker as the son of a factory worker,[1] but the intra-group differences

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[1]One rich woman who did said, "I'm assuming professional men have such substantial incomes that it tends to breed incompetence in their children and the initial drive is lacking. You look around North Muskegon and learn something."

Table 14. The Son Also Rises, By Income and Race (Per Cent Who Agree)

Income and Race		Opportunity better in America	Blue-collar son as likely to become executive	Executive son as likely to become blue-collar
Poor	Negro	16	0	19
	White	9	11	6
Middle	Negro	7	4	4
	White	19	8	3
Rich		30	9	0
Total, analytical sample	%	16	7	5
	N	(351)	(344)	(347)

were the opposite of what was predicted. No rich person but almost one-fifth of the poor Negroes thought an executive's son just as likely to become a factory worker as a factory worker's son. Perhaps the rich (as well as almost everyone else) know better: it is unthinkable that an upper class boy become a factory worker. As Norbert Long remarked, "The whole point of a stratification system is to prevent downward mobility among the sons of those who have."[1] One middle-income white woman echoed this idea: "I can't see any doctor or lawyer letting his son go into a factory if he could help it." A rich woman said, "Quite often they inherit their executive position--I'm really being a traitor to Horatio Alger."

Thus far I have discussed the distribution of rewards in the temporal order. Nevertheless, in the view of many persons, there is an eternal order of greater significance. It would be interesting to know what the respondents thought wealth had to do with the requirements for high status in the eternal stratification system, for it has been written that, in the system to come, the last shall be first and the first shall be last. To encourage comment, the interviewer read the story (basically the version in Matthew) about the rich young man, the kingdom of heaven, the camel, and the eye

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[1]In an address delivered at a session of the Ohio Valley Sociological Society meeting in Notre Dame, Indiana, on April 27, 1967.

of the needle. Jesus was reported to have said to his disciples that it was easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven. Anyone who believes that Jesus really meant what He said would have to conclude that the prospects of the rich man in the next world would be quite unsatisfactory. The respondents were asked what the story meant to them.

The religious preference of most respondents was (at least nominally) Christian.[1] (See Table 15.) The analytic sample did not differ greatly from the systematic sample. Of the total sample, 10% were fundamentalist Protestant,[2] 23% were Baptist, 17% were Roman Catholic, 40% were modernist Protestant,[3] and 10% had no preference. Almost half the respondents said that they went to church every week and about three-fourths professed a belief in some form of "afterlife." (See Table 16.) This belief was inversely related to income, but the group differences were small.

Most of the respondents appeared to be familiar with the story, but it made many a little uncomfortable and only

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[1]The one Jew in the sample was added to the "modernist Protestant" group and the one Greek Orthodox person was added to "Roman Catholic."

[2]This includes Seventh Day Adventist, Assemblies of God, Berean, Brethren, Church of God, Holiness, Nazarene, Pilgrim, Salvation Army, Pentecost, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Wesleyan Methodist.

[3]This includes Christian Reformed, Christian Science, Episcopal, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, Reformed Church of America.

Table 15. Church Preference, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Table 15. Church Preference, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Fundamentalist Protestant	Baptist	Roman Catholic	Modernist Protestant	None	Total %	Total N
Poor	Negro	5	78	0	8	8	99	(37)
	White	13	11	29	40	7	100	(70)
Middle	Negro	15	58	2	10	15	100	(48)
	White	10	11	21	45	14	101	(152)
Rich		2	0	17	80	0	99	(46)
Total, systematic sample	%	9	15	21	45	10	100	
	N	(16)	(28)	(39)	(84)	(19)		(186)
Total, analytical sample	%	10	23	17	40	10	100	
	N	(34)	(81)	(61)	(141)	(36)		(353)

Table 16. Church Attendance, Belief in Afterlife, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race			Attend services each week	Believe in some form of afterlife
Poor	Negro		32	84
	White		48	84
Middle	Negro		40	73
	White		52	74
Rich			48	72
Total, systematic sample		%	54	76
		N	(178)	(186)
Total, analytical sample		%	47	77
		N	(342)	(352)

a few were able to interpret it without encouragement. A typical comment was, "Well, of course I've heard it many times--but I never did know what to make of it." One of the few respondents with a ready answer was a rich woman who said, "It means just what it says and that's why I don't agree with it. It's all part of the Social Gospel movement and that's what's wrong with the churches today."

The answers were coded into six categories:

1. It is easier for the poor to enter heaven. They have fewer temptations.

2. Anyone, rich or poor, can get in. Money has nothing to do with it. It is necessary only to live a good life, behave decently, believe in Jesus Christ, etc.

3. The rich should share what they have.

4. A rich man will have to give away all his money or he won't get in.

5. Spiritual values are more important than material values. If a man puts spiritual values ahead of all others, he will get in.

6. Don't know.

Several findings stand out clearly. More than half of the Negro groups thought that the story meant that a rich man couldn't get into heaven unless he gave all his money away. (See Table 17.) One-tenth or less of the poor and middle-income whites felt this way, but not one rich respondent agreed. Two-fifths of the rich (their largest single response) thought the story meant that the rich should share what they have. About one-tenth of the respondents were unable to interpret the story, except for poor Negroes--all of them were able to comment.

Table 17. The Chance for Eternal Rewards, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Easier for poor	Anyone can get in	Rich should share their money	Rich should give all money away	Spiritual values more important	Don't know	Total %	N
Poor	Negro	14	5	17	56	8	0	100	(36)
	White	10	24	24	10	19	12	99	(67)
Middle	Negro	0	2	27	58	4	9	100	(45)
	White	20	11	30	7	22	9	99	(148)
Rich		20	13	41	0	17	9	100	(46)
Total, analytical sample	%	15	12	28	18	17	9	100	
	N	(15)	(42)	(97)	(63)	(59)	(30)		(342)

We then asked a further question:

> Do you think that most rich people give away most of their wealth or do you think that they tend to keep most of it for themselves?

Many of the respondents laughed at this question. "Of course they keep it; that's why they're rich," was a frequent comment. Almost all middle income Negroes thought that the rich kept their money, and three-fourths of the poor whites thought so; the middle-income whites and poor Negroes were in between. (See Table 18.) It is interesting that both middle-income groups were somewhat more likely than the poor to think that the rich kept their money.

The rich were different. Less than half of them thought that rich people tended to keep most of their money, more than one-third thought that rich people gave away a lot, but not most (a free response), and almost one-fifth thought that rich people gave most of it away.

Because the "camel" question was open-ended, the respondent was "forced" to answer in his own words. Some of these comments may provide insight into what the question meant to the respondents.

The Rich:

White man: It's true that people who already have economic power are subject to avarice and greed--inattention to the needs of subordinates and inferiors. I feel very strongly that it's people who are fighting their way up who are healthy.

Table 18. Do the Rich Part with Temporal Rewards, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Give most of it away	Give a lot but not most (free response)	Keep most of it	Total %	Total N
Poor	Negro	3	15	82	100	(34)
	White	4	22	74	100	(68)
Middle	Negro	0	4	96	100	(48)
	White	4	10	86	100	(144)
Rich		17	37	46	100	(46)
Total, analytical sample	%	5	16	79	100	
	N	(18)	(53)	(269)		(340)

White man: Well, it means that the natural avariciousness of people is such that it is hard to divest yourself but the parable really means that your life should be spent in giving--not necessarily of what you own but of yourself.

White man: Well, it doesn't mean if he is rich and had the right attitudes he couldn't get in. Only if all his interests were in material rather than spiritual things would he fail to get in.

White woman: If you share and help others--after all, if you've worked hard, you're entitled to it. But to enjoy life, you have to share and that's the way to gain happiness.

White woman: Jesus was encouraging charity. Jesus was a realist and knew He was dealing with the poor and therefore He was shouting it for the poor.

Middle-Income Whites:

White man: It doesn't mean you have to give all to the poor because a lot of poor would just set back and take it. You should help your church. You're obliged to share but not make a pauper of yourself.

White woman: I heard it in Sunday School but I forget what it means.

White woman: I don't think a rich man should give all his riches to the poor. The poor should help themselves, unless they're sick or disabled. And any man who has riches is blessed with it.

White man: That fellow didn't understand Jesus. He didn't mean to sell all. Why should he? He isn't stupid. You don't need to strip a man. How are you going to give to the poor if you don't have the people who can give till it hurts?

Middle-income Negroes:

Negro man: You can't take that seriously. The rich man has his heaven here on earth.

Negro woman: A rich man won't hardly enter heaven. The poor will be on top and the rich on the bottom. The Bible says the top rail will be on the bottom and the bottom on top.

Poor Whites:

White woman: A rich man doesn't have anything to pray for because he has everything he wants. He would have to give up his riches to have eternal life.

White woman: It will be only a few rich people in heaven, because only a few people give away their money. I knew one rich woman that was always helping the poor.

White man: It means what it says. There are no rich people in heaven.

White woman: We cannot trust in riches to get to heaven. Not that a rich man can't get in if he's willing to repent--go God's way. He doesn't have to give up his money but he has to be willing to if God asks him to. The rich are generous.

White woman: Well, I don't understand it too good. I've read it so many times and I still haven't come to the real conclusion. But I know that, if we don't make a big howl about what we give, we get more blessings.

Poor Negroes:

Negro woman: It is impossible for a rich man to enter heaven because if he gives away his riches, he isn't a rich man.

Negro man: None but the pure in heart shall see God.

Negro man: That don't mean nothing. When you dead, you done.

Negro man: The rich person should share. I don't think they will have to give away everything, just some of it.

Negro woman: A rich man doesn't have anything to suffer for, so he will have to give up his treasures on earth in order to have treasures in heaven. You must suffer and have crosses on earth to have a crown in heaven.

As Table 18 showed, the rich were the only category in which there was an appreciable positive response to the question, "Do the rich give their money away?" The answers of two rich women illustrate a rationale for this response. One woman said, "Most people of means I know are very generous. They have a lot for themselves but they do a lot of good too, and by buying a lot, you're putting money in other peoples' pockets." Another woman commented, "The extremely wealthy give a lot away. You're better off to give it away, because the wealthier you are, the more you should give away because you can't keep it on account of taxes." One middle-income white man thought the rich gave a lot away. "But they don't hurt themselves, let's say that, but they do give a good share away. They do it for tax purposes most of the time."

Nevertheless, except for the Negroes, the vast majority of respondents (as the preceding question showed) do not see wealth as an insuperable bar to the kingdom of heaven. If you can't take it with you, at least it won't get in your way when you get there.

In these past few pages, the focus was on the respondents' perception of the opportunity to gain rewards. Let us now turn to the question of the factors behind the differential distribution: Why do people get what they do?

Why Are Rich People Rich And Poor People Poor?

The respondents were asked a series of questions touching upon causal factors of wealth or poverty. According to the dominant ideology, wealth is the result of hard work, ability, motivation, and other favorable personal attributes. Poverty is the result of laziness, stupidity, and other unfavorable personal attributes. The major hypothesis for this series of questions is: the higher the income, the greater the tendency to assign personal factors as causal for wealth or poverty; and the lower the income, the greater the tendency to assign social structural factors as causal.

The first two questions in this series were open-ended: why are rich people rich and why are poor people poor?[1] The responses were coded as personal attribute or social structural. There were mixed responses, of course; however, in Table 19 where the per cent of respondents who see personal factors as causal is shown, only those responses that were solely in terms of personal factors are included.

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[1]I am indebted to John Pease for the development and final presentation of these questions.

Table 19. Personal Attributes as a Cause of Income, By Income and Race[a] (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Wealth	Poverty	Poor don't work as hard	Poor don't want to get ahead
Poor	Negro	17	17	3	0
	White	34	30	13	19
Middle	Negro	30	20	4	6
	White	34	41	30	29
Rich		72	62	39	46
Total, analytical sample	%	37	36	21	23
	N	(350)	(341)	(343)	(347)

[a] In the "wealth" column, the percentages represent those who saw favorable traits as a "cause" of wealth; in the "poverty" columns, unfavorable traits as a "cause" of poverty. The residual categories for the "wealth" column would include respondents who indicated both personal and structural responses as causal, and those who saw only structural factors as causal.

Almost three-fourths of the rich see favorable personal factors as the cause of wealth. The proportion holding this view drops sharply with other groups: about one-third of the middle-income whites, middle-income Negroes, and poor whites explain wealth this way, and about one-seventh of the poor Negroes do so.

Intra-group differences are somewhat greater with reference to the cause of poverty. Among the respondents who think unfavorable personal attributes cause poverty are three-fifths of the rich, two-fifths of the middle-income whites, one-third of the poor whites, one-fifth of the middle-income Negroes, and less than one-fifth of the poor Negroes.

Some of the responses will illustrate the opinions of various groups.

The Rich:

White man: Inheritance is the exception today. If you have to generalize, it's the self-discipline to accumulate capital and later to use that capital effectively and intelligently to make income and wealth. The poor? I don't think the average person on the lower economic scale wants to assume the responsibilities and obligations necessary to become rich. He doesn't want to be bothered.

White man: People are rich because of inheritance and the availability of capital. You can't save a fortune.

White man: The poor were born into it and they stay that way. Being lazy is a lot easier than working.

White man: The rich had the motivation to acquire money. And they were damn lucky.

White woman: The rich were smarter and more energetic. The poor? Circumstances beyond their control, and indifference.

White woman: All the people I know who are rich are up at the job and working. I'm not thinking of those who inherited. The poor? It's so trite to say fate and luck but it plays a part. Discouragement of their spirit. Lack of education covers a lot of it. Really, there's no reason why kids can't be educated today. It may be the apathy of the parents, but I don't know if I'd do any better under those circumstances.

White woman: They had a dream or goal and they worked hard toward it. Along the way, they were frugal and sorted out the important from the non-important. The poor were the opposite.

White man: The poor are lazy and shiftless as a class, although there are exceptions.

White woman: The rich worked hard and were smart enough to hang onto it. The poor are ignorant and poor managers.

White woman: Some poor were born into it, and some don't seem to have the ability. If they're born into it, often their ability is low too.

White woman: In Muskegon, the rich acquired it by their own efforts. In other areas, they inherited. The poor lack the ability to rise above their class situation. There's no lack of opportunity, but lack of ability.

White woman: You shouldn't have to apologize for the rich and poor. It's the facts of life.

White woman: The rich have the intellect to pursue the avenues which lead them to better financial reward.

White man: Being poor is a matter of their own choice. Some people would rather live in Harlem than Fifth Avenue.

Middle-income Whites:

White woman: They've been rich all their days. They had a better chance. Got it from their families. The poor haven't had the chance or opportunities for good jobs.

White man: You want me to tell you the truth? They take it out of poor people. I seen this happen. The poor? That's a pretty big question. A lot of poor people won't do nuthin' for theirself, and if they could get relief or welfare, they wouldn't go out and look for a job.

White woman: Their folks left it to them. When we were in school, those kids whose parents had money have it today.

White woman: Rich men are greedy and poor men will give you the shirt off their backs if they can, which the rich man won't. They have better pull than we have. The poor haven't got a chance to get up in the world. People runs 'em down. People say you're no good.

White woman: Well, a lot of them inherited it. I don't know any self-made rich person. It takes money to make money.

White woman: Everyone I know that's rich in Muskegon has inherited money, and is second generation or more. In some cases they do alright, but in others, they just don't cut the mustard.

White man: The average poor person thinks small.

Middle-income Negroes:

Negro man: Some rich fall into it, others have imagination. Neither of these are true here in Muskegon. Here, they worked for it.

Negro woman: The poor weren't lucky. They couldn't get enough money to invest so they could make money.

Negro man: The rich? They stole. And some of the poor throw away their money.

Poor Whites:

White man: The rich? Got to be a certain amount of crook in 'em or they wouldn't be rich. A man in business is shrewd. The poor live from day to day, have enough to eat, a place to sleep, and don't give a damn--that's the case with me. You can't take it with you.

White woman: The poor weren't hardly able to make any amount of money and what they made, they could hardly live on.

White woman: They were poor from the beginning of the world. Their parents passed it on to them. That's why most people are rich.

White woman: The rich have a different way of doing things. Some people live extravagant, you know, while others get along on little and save their money. I'll tell you why I'm poor--I give too much to charity. I don't tell. But most poor are extravagant and drink, and that's something I don't do.

White man: Ordinary working man'll never get rich nowadays. The poor? For myself, wife and I, we've been working and working and we're no further ahead.

White woman: We're poor because we can't make much money and have to be satisfied.

White woman: Rich families are surrounded by rich; poor people come from poor people.

White woman: Lot of 'em, their folks dies and leaves 'em the money and that's how they got rich. A lot of poor tries to git goin' but have a lot of sickness.

White man: I'll explain it this way: because they have poor people earning money for them and poor people works for them. The poor? Their jobs didn't pay enough.

Poor Negroes:

Negro man: The poor? They didn't have jobs that paid anything.

Negro man: The poor didn't have a chance.

Negro woman: They worked the Negroes hard and then they took everything they made. The poor were born poor. Their parents before them were poor. They were slaves from the beginning and haven't had a chance to get on their feet.

Negro woman: The rich took it from people that didn't have enough education to realize what was being done. Their parents were made rich by doing this and this fell to the childrens.

Negro man: The rich man work day and night trying to figure out ways to keep from spending his money.

Negro man: The rich stole, beat, and took. The poor didn't start stealing in time, and what they stole, it didn't value nothing, and they were caught with that.

Negro woman: The rich? Their parents took it from the Indians years ago. The poor weren't wise enough to invest their money and let it make money for them.

Negro woman: Most people were rich from generations back. It was handed down through their foreparents. The poor were poor from the beginning. Their foreparents were poor.

Negro man: Most rich people were rich from the beginning. The slaves and the Indians made them rich, and it has been handed down from generation through generation. The poor lost everything they had and they haven't gained it back.

Negro man: The rich stepped on other people's toes to acquire what they got, or they were born with it. The poor? It was handed down through the family like the rich. They lacked opportunity. They were born that way.

The next question concerned how hard the poor work:

> Naturally, everyone can think of exceptions, but on the whole, would you say that poor people work just as hard as rich people, or do you think that poor people generally don't work as hard as rich people?[1]

About two-fifths of the rich, one-third of the middle-income whites, one-tenth of the poor whites, and one-twentieth of the poor and middle-income Negroes thought that the poor didn't work as hard as the rich. (See Table 19.) Some of the poor thought the poor worked harder. One white woman said, "I work for the rich and they don't work at all." A Negro man said, "Rich people don't work hard. They don't have or need to work hard because they have what the poor person is looking for." A Negro woman (with seven children) said, "The poor work harder. Most rich people doesn't have to work. They have someone to work for them."

The next question concerned the basic attitudes of poor people toward getting ahead:

> Do you think that poor people want to get ahead just as much as everyone else or do you think that basically poor people don't care too much about getting ahead? Please try not to think of individual exceptions you may know of, but rather in terms of the group in general.

A little less than half of the rich thought that the poor didn't care too much about getting ahead; holding the

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[1]A number of respondents wanted to know the definition of "rich." Very few raised questions about the definition of "poor." The respondents were told that "rich" meant whatever it meant to the respondent in the context of the Muskegon area, i.e., it did not refer only to Rockefellers and others whose wealth is common knowledge in the entire nation.

same view were about one-fourth of the middle-income whites, one-fifth of the poor whites, and one-twentieth of middle-income Negroes, but no poor Negroes. (See Table 19.) One rich woman said, "The poor don't really want to get ahead. So many poor are happy just where they are. Another said, "On the whole, the poor are happier than the rich. There's just so much you can do with money." A rich man said, "They don't have as much desire in general. They have as much desire to get the next ten cents or twenty cents, but they don't want to become a foreman or superintendent."

On the other hand, a poor Negro woman said, "The poor get ahead? Some want to. And some have tried and failed. And have given up. I have." A white woman said, "I'm poor and I want to get ahead." A Negro woman said, "The poor get ahead? I can speak for myself. I do. Everyone wants to get ahead."

The next two questions attempted to prove the question of why people went on relief, both during the Great Depression and in the last few years. During the pre-testing it was observed that many respondents wanted to give two answers, one to cover the depression years and the other to cover a more recent period of time.

> Since the 1930's, a lot of people have been on welfare at one time or another. Back in the years of the Great Depression in the 1930's, what do you suppose was the main reason that most people were on relief? Quite a lot of people have been on relief in the last six years, too. What do you suppose is the main reason that people have gone on relief in the last six years?

Aomost no one assigned unfavorable personal factors as the cause of going on relief during the Great Depression. The rich were most likely to do so, but the differences are very small. (See Table 20.)

Relief in the last few years turned out to be a different matter. Almost four-fifths of the rich, three-fifths of the middle-income whites, less than one-half of the middle-income Negroes and poor whites, and about one-fourth of the poor Negroes see going on relief as a consequence of unfavorable personal attributes.

One rich man said, "They're on relief because they can't do the work there is to do." Another said, "People on relief just don't want to work. I'm biased. I run a plant where we try to hire men and they just won't stay." Another said, "It's an easy method to receive their allotments. It's just too easy. Like ADC, and that kind of stuff. To me it's just criminal." An elderly middle-income white man said, "They just don't want to work. I've seen them go down this street shovelling snow, and you just don't see them working that way now." A middle-income white woman said, "There's been work if they wanted to find it. They're too easy going. They live better than we do, a lot better. I don't personally know anyone, but from what I hear. . . ."

In contrast, a middle-income white woman said, "When we were on, I didn't like it and we did all we could to get off. Although I always thought there were some lazy ones too."

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Table 20. Personal Attributes as a Cause of Being on Relief, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race			On relief in depression	On relief last six years	How do the rich explain being on relief?	How do reliefers explain being on relief?
Poor	Negro		0	28	51	8
	White		6	46	64	30
Middle	Negro		4	45	70	18
	White		3	59	68	34
Rich			7	78	76	19
Total, analytical sample		%	4	54	67	27
		N	(353)	(347)	(352)	(352)

A poor Negro woman said, "It could be different things. I've been on for eight years. My husband was killed. I had to take care of my kids and I was always sick." Another said, "They didn't have enough education to get some job and the women didn't have any baby-sitters and they couldn't pay any so they went on relief." A Negro woman said, "I've been on for six years or more and it's because I can't make enough on a job to take care of my six kids."

The respondents were then asked to take the role of the other, for a moment, which caused difficulties for some. They were asked what they supposed rich people think is the main reason why people go on relief or welfare, and what they supposed the people who are on relief think is the main reason they are on it. Some respondents would reply, "How would I know? I've never been rich," or "I've never been on relief." Nevertheless, most of them managed to answer the question. As expected, the rich sampled are more convinced than other groups that rich people say people are on relief because of unfavorable personal attributes; about three-fourths of them thought so. The proportion who thought that rich people thought reliefers were lazy dropped somewhat with other groups, but not sharply, to a low of about half of the poor Negroes. A very frequent response to this question was: "They'd say they're lazy," or the one word, "Lazy." Synonyms for this word occurred rarely in the experience of the investigator.

Some of the respondents said that the rich never thought about the poor, as one middle-income white man said bluntly. A poor white woman said, "They throw all of 'em in the same basket and think they don't try." A middle-income Negro man said, "They think the poor haven't got no initiative but this isn't true. They just haven't got no opportunity like the rich person's got." An elderly poor white woman said, "They don't think about how hard it is for some people--people that are poor--because I never hear of any of them helping, giving money for them." Another poor white woman said, "They can imagine a lot of things. They say that they don't want to work, but the real reason is that they're out of a job." A young white woman, who had caught her arm in a washing machine wringer, tried to get welfare aid for medical attention, and failed, said "If the rich could see the reasons, they'd understand, but I think they think we're lazy."

The respondents generally thought that reliefers wouldn't see their condition in the same way. A high of one-third of the middle-income whites and a low of less than one-tenth of the poor Negroes feel that reliefers blame their plight on personal factors. The remarks on the protocols indicate that there are two quite different reasons for the response, and we unfortunately failed to probe further. Some respondents (usually higher income) would comment, "Of course they don't blame themselves--they always put the blame on someone else," indicating that the reliefers were misguided if they placed the blame on structural factors. Other respondents (usually

of lower income) would say, "Of course they know why they're on relief--there aren't any jobs." Both of these responses are "structural," but they have different meanings to the respondents.

In the preceding section on the opportunity to gain rewards, there was a question on the chance to go to college. Here we included a question on the reasons why young people go (or do not go) to college, because education is often thought to be an open door to opportunity.

A famous theorist thought that motivation was more important than family income in explaining why boys go to college. The first question was based on his statement:[1]

> Do you agree or disagree with this statement: If a poor boy lives in a city where there is a regular university, it isn't mainly lack of money that keeps him from going to the university, even if his parents cannot afford to help him, but rather the fact that he doesn't want to go badly enough.

To verify this response, at a later period in the interview, we presented an open-ended question:

> A lot of poor boys don't go to college. What do you think is the main reason they don't go?

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[1]For the original statement, see Talcott Parsons, "A Revised Analytic Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," Class, Status, and Power, p. 127. Parsons remarks that the economic difficulties of going to college are not the principal barriers even for those from relatively low-income families, then says: "If this is correct, then an unexpectedly heavy emphasis falls on the factor of motivation to mobility, on the part of the boy himself, and of his parents on his behalf, as distinguished from objective opportunity for mobility." (Emphasis in original.)

The range of response on the first question ran from about nine-tenths of the rich to three-fifths of the middle-income Negroes who thought that motivation was the main factor in keeping a poor boy out of college. Differences among white groups were slight although in the predicted direction. (See Table 21.)

On the open-ended question, all groups except the rich and the middle income Negroes showed a greatly decreased tendency to attribute a boy's absence from college to motivation. Four-fifths of the rich still thought it was motivation, but less than half of the middle-income whites, about half of the middle-income and poor Negroes, and about two-fifths of the poor whites held this view.[1] A number of the respondents behaved, therefore, as if the first question were a generalized cliché and the second a class-linked specification. One rich woman said that poor boys "haven't the brain power or the ambition, so they wash out." Another said, "From my experience, anyone who wants to can win a scholarship and go." A rich man said that poor boys "generally feel the need to start earning. They don't take the long view. Some feel they have no opportunity for financial help, but the opportunities are there, if they go after them." A middle-income white woman said, "He'd go if he had more money, but

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[1]Controlling for education seems to make little difference. Of white college graduates, 81% of the rich (N = 26) and 53% of the middle-income group (N = 17) thought lack of motivation the primary factor. Of white respondents who had completed 12-15 years of education, 81% of the rich (N = 16), and 45% of the middle-income group (N = 64) thought lack of motivation a primary factor.

Table 21. Poor Boys and College (Per Cent Who See Motivation as Cause For Failure to Attend)

Income and Race			Forced choice	Open-end
Poor	Negro		68	41
	White		75	41
Middle	Negro		59	52
	White		83	46
Rich			87	80
Total, analytical sample		%	77	51
		N	(350)	(350)

if a kid really wants to go, he'll find a way." A young poor white woman said, "I've heard there's a trust fund to help those who want to go so they can go if they want to." (She and her husband both had completed nine years of education.) But an older poor white woman said, "My granddaughter is having trouble getting a loan to go to college."

Conclusion

The major expectation concerning response to the preceding questions was that income would be associated with beliefs about the reward system. In general, the data tends to support this expectation, although the support is far from perfect. Differences among groups were most clear when the questions concerned the structure of opportunity, the chance to obtain a college education, and the factors causing poverty and wealth. Rich people tend to attribute success and failure to personal factors; poor people tend to attribute success to the social structure. The great majority of the poor think that they have worked just as hard as everybody else. Nevertheless, their rewards have been low. It seems reasonable to suppose that a poor person, confronted with "objective" opportunity, may simply not see it as a chance to demonstrate his personal merit. If none of the other "structural" opportunities have benefitted him, why should a new one?

It is notable that Negroes of middle-income often have opinions more like those of poor Negroes than middle-income

whites. In fact, the middle-income Negroes often see things more in structural terms than poor Negroes. It seeme likely that a more complex hypothesis is necessary if it is to include Negroes.

CHAPTER 6

IDEOLOGIES OF POWER

We have examined various aspects of the reward system: who wants what, who has the chance to get what, and why people get what they do. The theoretical approach used indicated that the distribution of rewards follows the distribution of power. In this chapter, the focus of attention will be on control: who has the power? Or, more accurately, who do the respondents think is running things?

The major hypothesis of this chapter is that those who have the most will tend to believe that the way the political system is run is the way it is supposed to be run, according to the dominant ideology. Much has been written on American political ideology and this research touches only certain aspects. The following description is not intended to be exhaustive. I shall mention only certain areas with reference to which I hope to get some response from the sample.

The Dominant Ideology: Control of the Political System

The theoretical approach to the American Constitution was based on the ideas of John Locke.[1] Individual liberty was

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[1]For a comprehensive discussion on this point, see F. S. C. Northrup, The Meeting of East and West (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946).

stressed, to the extent that it did not interfere with the common welfare. The best government was thought to be the least government. A system of checks and balances was instituted at the federal level to make sure that no one branch of government could have too much control, and a number of powers were reserved to the states. The primary idea was to see that no one person or group could ever have too much power, for too much power was thought to be the greatest threat to individual liberty.

The primary purpose of government is the promotion of the general welfare. Formally, the federal government is a representative democracy and the majority rules. However, there is some protection of the rights of minorities. Nevertheless, although minorities do have rights, no minority group or faction is supposed to be dominant over time.

Individual interests are represented by groups, formal and informal. Two major parties carry the burden of formal representation. Economic concerns are of great salience to most individuals, and in a general way, the two major parties are thought to represent such interests: the Republican party is, more or less, thought to be the party representing business interests, and the Democratic party represents the interests of the working man. Informal groups (such as lobbies) represent a great variety of interests, but lobbies representing economic interests have always been powerful. The dominant ideology is a bit vague about what lobbies are

actually supposed to be able to accomplish; theoretically, it is quite permissible for any group to further its interests as best it can, but it takes either wide popular support or considerable quantities of money or both for an informal group to be effective. Consequently, there is generally some nervousness about the relationship of lobbies to the promotion of the general welfare.

The government is supposed to avoid intervening in the economic arena as much as possible, but over time there are certain areas where the government is not only permitted but obliged to intervene, such as the prevention of economic monopoly, widespread unemployment, and the like.

The primary responsibility of the citizen is to vote regularly to ensure that the ruling group actually represents a majority, and to ensure that rascals be turned out of office regularly. Only well-informed, responsible, interested citizens can ensure that the system will work properly, and that no one group will control the system.

That aspect of the dominant ideology considered to be most important for this study is the idea that power is distributed pluralistically, i.e., that no one group is running things, and every substantial group of citizens receives some consideration in the promotion of the general welfare. To provide a background to the perception of power, let us consider the political affiliations of the respondents.

Political Party Affiliation

In this sample, poor people tend to be Democrats and rich people Republicans. (See Table 22.) There were no poor Negro Republicans and no rich Democrats. About one-fifth of the poor and middle-income whites and middle-income Negroes had no party preference, that is, they said they were neither Democrats, Republicans, nor Independents; about one-tenth of the Negro poor had no preference, and all of the rich had a preference. Among poor whites, Democrats outnumbered Republicans two to one, but among middle-income whites, the proportion was about the same. On party preference the analytic and systematic samples were almost alike.

The Images of Power[1]

The first research question concerned the over-all image of power the respondents had, that is, the general view of the way things were being run. Two different questions were used to elicit these images so that the suggestion implicit in each question would be less likely to affect the response. It is difficult in survey research to frame any question that does not in some way suggest a possible response. I therefore wanted to use one question that would suggest that the distribution of power was in accordance with the dominant ideology and another which would suggest that it was not.

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[1]For the idea of testing differential images of power and for help in developing the questions used we are indebted to William H. Form.

Table 22. Political Party Preference, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Republican	Democrat	Independent	No Preference or No Answer	Total %	Total N
Poor	Negro	0	89	0	11	100	(36)
	White	26	49	6	20	101	(70)
Middle	Negro	4	77	0	19	100	(47)
	White	35	39	7	18	99	(152)
Rich		96	0	4	0	100	(47)
Total, systematic sample	%	32	46	7	16	101	
	N	(59)	(85)	(12)	(30)		(186)
Total, analytic sample	%	34	46	5	16	101	
	N	(118)	(162)	(17)	(55)		(352)

At one point in the interview, the respondents were given three statements purportedly describing the way things were really run in this country and were asked to choose the "best" description. This tends to suggest that one of these descriptions might actually constitute a fairly realistic description of the political system. At another point in the interview, the respondents were given a list of 12 groups and asked which group had the most influence over the way things were run in this country. Here, the implicit suggestion is that one group might actually be dominant. The respondents were also asked which of these groups were the least powerful and which ought to have most power.

The three statements describing the distribution of power in this country represented an attempt to summarize the views of three theorists: Karl Marx, C. Wright Mills, and David Riesman.[1] Marx's theory is especially interesting because it is in such direct conflict with the dominant ideology. Under capitalism, Marx thought, big businessmen would run everything; they would dominate all forms of political control. If this were true, then representative democracy would be a fraud and an individual vote of no importance.

Mills' theory is also in conflict with the dominant ideology in that it is an elitist theory. Yet one of the groups Mills sees as most powerful consists of a group of men

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[1]Originally Professor Form and I also developed summaries of the views of Peter Drucker and James Burnham as well, but it was observed in the pre-testing that no respondents seemed interested in them, so they were dropped.

who are subject to some popular control, so that the theory is partially in accord with the dominant ideology. It was expected that the Mills' theory would provide a refuge for those who found the dominant ideology an inaccurate description but thought the Marxist theory too anti-business.

The order in which the three statements were read was changed at each interview and the respondent was not advised of the sources. He was told only that he would hear three statements about which groups run the country; he was told that "none of these may be exactly true," but he was asked, Which do you think best describes the way things are run in Washington and which is the poorest description?"

> Big businessmen really run the government in this country. The heads of the large corporations dominate both the Republican and Democratic Parties. This means that things in Washington go pretty much the way big businessmen want them to.
>
> A small group of men at the top really runs the government in this country. These are the heads of the biggest business corporations, the highest officers in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and a few important senators, congressmen and federal officials in Washington. These men dominate both the Republican and Democratic Parties.
>
> No one group really runs the government in this country. Instead, important decisions about national policy are made by a lot of different groups such as labor, business, religious, and educational groups, and so. These groups influence both political parties but no single group can dictate to the others, and each group is strong enough to protect its own interests.

The results (see Table 23) show that, when respondents are given a description much like the dominant ideology, they tend to choose it. About six-tenths accepted it but almost four-tenths accepted other alternatives. This means,

Table 23. Images of Power: Marx, Mills, Riesman, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Marx	Mills	Riesman	Total %	Total N
Poor	Negro	33	6	61	100	(36)
	White	23	22	55	100	(64)
Middle	Negro	40	16	44	100	(45)
	White	17	20	63	100	(143)
Rich		12	23	65	100	(43)
Total, systematic sample	%	18	19	63	100	
	N	(32)	(33)	(109)		(175)
Total, analytic sample	%	22	19	59	100	
	N	(74)	(62)	(195)		(331)

of course, that a substantial minority of all groups but a majority of middle-income Negroes chose an elitist description (either Marx or Mills). Although the intra-group differences, on the Riesman choice, run in the predicted direction, they are quite small. About two-thirds of the rich and middle-income whites, three-fifths of the poor Negroes, over half of the poor whites, and less than half of the poor Negroes made the choice most in accord with the dominant ideology.

The differences in choice between Marx and Mills is also of interest. Marx' description is least like the dominant ideology and Mills' is somewhat less so. Negroes were considerably more likely to choose Marx's theoretical position rather than that of Mills. About one-third of the poor Negroes chose Marx, and about one-twentieth chose Mills. About two-fifths of middle-income Negroes chose Marx and about one-seventh, Mills. With white respondents, the tendency to choose Mills rather than Marx increased with income, as predicted. The proportion of poor whites choosing Marx and Mills was about the same, one-fifth each. The same proportion of middle-income whites chose Mills, and slightly less chose Marx. About one-fourth of rich whites chose Mills, but only half as many chose Marx.

The differences in choice between Marx, Mills, and Riesman stand out more sharply when the question is run by education. Table 24 shows that about two-fifths of the

Table 24. Images of Power: Marx, Mills, Riesman, By Years of Education (In Per Cent)

Years of Education		Marx	Mills	Riesman	Total %	Total N
0-7 years		40	26	33	99	(42)
8-11 years		28	16	57	101	(141)
12-15 years		14	19	67	100	(108)
16 years or more		8	20	73	101	(40)
Total, analytical sample	%	22	19	59	100	
	N	(74)	(62)	(195)		(331)

respondents with 0-7 years of education chose Marx, with the proportion dropping steadily to a low of less than one-tenth of college graduates. Education appears to have no effect on the choice of Mills, however. There, intra-group differences are small, ranging from one-fourth of those with 0-7 years of education to about one-seventh of those with 8-11 years of education. With Riesman, however, education again appears to make a difference. About one-third of those with 0-7 years of education, more than half of those with 8-11 years, two-thirds of those with 12-15 years, and about three-fourths of the college graduates chose the Riesman description. I shall comment on this below.

The outcome of the second power question was quite different. The question was put in this way:

> I'd like to ask you which groups you think have the most influence on the way things are run in Washington. On the page I gave you, you'll see some important groups listed. I'll read the list while you look at it.
>
> | | | |
> |---|---|---|
> | Protestants | Farmers | Small business |
> | Negroes | Catholics | Rich people |
> | Labor unions | Big business | Poor people |
> | Jews | University professors | Military leaders |
>
> Now, which of these groups has the most influence and power in Washington?

The intent was to include all the main groups that might be considered dominant and to give the respondent as wide a choice as possible. No respondent in the 119 interviews I completed questioned the assumption that some group or groups were dominant.

The groups most often chosen as powerful were "unions," "big business and rich," and the "military." (See Table 25.) A little less than half the sample saw "big business and rich" as most powerful, about one-third chose labor unions, and about one-tenth, military; about one-tenth chose some other group. "Big business" and "rich" had been presented separately to the respondents, although it is reasonable to suppose that all big businessmen are rich, in order to allow the respondents to distinguish the relative power of the two categories. It was expected that, if they chose one of these two groups, higher income persons would tend to choose big business and lower income persons would tend to choose rich. The choice of "rich" is less in accord with the dominant ideology than the choice of "big business" because "rich" in itself does not imply that a man is accomplishing anything to deserve either fortune or power, while "big business" implies some ability and work which "justify" power. As Table 26 shows, the major intra-group differences on this choice were between whites and Negroes. Both middle-income and poor Negroes chose "rich" more often than "big business," while the three white income groups chose "big business" more often than "rich." Nevertheless, among the three white income groups, the tendency to choose "big business" more often than "rich" increased with income, as predicted.

Table 25. Group Perceived as Most Powerful, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Unions	Big Business and Rich	Military	All Others	Don't Know	Total %	Total N
Poor	Negro	32	41	11	14	3	101	(37)
	White	14	46	10	17	12	99	(69)
Middle	Negro	17	54	13	8	8	100	(48)
	White	33	52	8	5	3	101	(150)
Rich		54	28	4	13	0	99	(46)
Total, systematic sample	%	26	52	6	10	6	100	
	N	(48)	(97)	(13)	(17)	(12)		(183)
Total, analytical sample	%	30	47	9	10	5	101	
	N	(104)	(161)	(31)	(34)	(17)		(350)

Table 26. Choice of Big Business or Rich as Most Powerful, By Income and Race[a] (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Big Business	Rich
Poor	Negro	19	22
	White	38	9
Middle	Negro	21	33
	White	45	7
Rich		24	4
Total		35	12

[a]See Table 25.

About three-fourths of the entire sample chose either "labor unions" or "big business and rich." A little less than half chose "big business and rich" and a little less than one-third chose "labor unions." Only the rich had a higher proportion choosing "labor unions" than "big business." More than one-half chose "labor unions" and more than one-fourth chose "big business." (See Table 25.)

It is interesting to contrast the proportion of respondents who chose Marx's theory in the last question with the proportion who chose "big business and rich" as most powerful in this question. The two questions are not quite comparable, of course. Marx's theory presents big businessmen as running everything, while the choice of "big business and rich" as "most powerful" does not necessarily mean that they run everything. A little more than one-fifth of the sample chose Marx in the last question, but a little less than one-half chose "big business and rich" as most powerful. Table 27 indicates that the "Marx" response provides somewhat better support for our hypothesis than the "most powerful" response. With the exception of the middle-income Negroes, two-fifths of whom chose the Marx theory, the choice follows the level of income. The choice of "big business and rich," however, is highest in the white and Negro middle-income groups; it was predicted it would be highest in the low-income groups. The sampled rich, however, did behave as predicted--only a little more than one-fourth of them chose "big business and rich."

Table 27. Two Images of Power: Marxian and Economic Elite, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Marxian Image of Power[a]	Big Business and Rich as Most Powerful[b]
Poor	Negro	33	41
	White	23	46
Middle	Negro	40	54
	White	17	52
Rich		12	28
Total		22	47

[a]See Table 23.

[b]See Table 25.

The analysis of these questions has thus far been based on the analytic sample. Let us turn briefly to the systematic sample and examine their responses. Remember that we do not know exactly how representative the systematic sample is of the Muskegon urban area, nor do we know exactly how representative this area is of northern urban communities. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that more than half of the respondents in the systematic sample chose "big business and rich" as most powerful. About one-fourth chose "labor unions." No other group was chosen by more than about five per cent of the sample.

Now it may be that the dominant ideology (as well as a number of social scientists) offers a "correct" description of the distribution of power, both at the local and national levels. But the respondents in the systematic sample (who tend to be middle-income) do not seem to see it that way. The pluralist assumption involves the notion that a number of groups share power and that no one is overwhelmingly predominant. These respondents appear to have a somewhat different image of power.

Let us now return to a discussion of the analytic sample and examine the relationship of education to the responses. As Table 28 indicates, the percentage of those choosing "unions" as most powerful rose steadily with increasing education, from a low of about one-seventh of the respondents with 0-7 years to a high of more than half of college graduates.

The tendency to choose "big business and rich" as most powerful also increased with education--up to a point. More than one-third of those with 0-7 years, a little less than half of those with 8-11 years, and more than half of those with 12-15 years chose "big business and rich." But college graduates dropped back to the percentage of the least education, a little more than one-third. Table 28 indicates that more than half of the middle-income group thought "big business and rich" most dominant, but only a little more than one-fourth of the sampled rich. In Chapter III we showed the relationship of income and education in the analytic sample; three-fifths of the college graduates are in the group of sample rich; two-fifths are in the middle-income group. Of those with 12-15 years of education in the analytic sample, about one-seventh are in the group of sample rich, and about two-thirds are in the middle-income group.

Table 27 shows the contrast between the respondents who chose Marx's theory on the first question and those who chose "big business and rich" as most dominant on the second. In Table 29 we can see that, when the response is run by education, the situation is similar. The least educated have the greatest tendency to choose Marx's theory, but the per cent selecting "big business and rich" on the second question increases with education.

"Big business and rich" and "labor unions" were clearly selected most often as the most powerful groups in Washington.

Table 28. Group Perceived as Most Powerful, By Years of Education (In Per Cent)

Years of Education		Unions	Big business and rich	Military	All others	Don't know	Total %	Total N
0-7 years		14	38	14	20	14	100	(49)
8-11 years		27	46	10	11	6	100	(145)
12-15 years		31	52	6	6	2	100	(113)
16 years or more		53	37	5	5	0	100	(43)
Total, analytical sample	%	30	47	9	10	5	101	
	N	(104)	(164)	(31)	(34)	(17)		(350)

Table 29. Two Images of Power: Marxian and Economic Elite, By Years of Education (In Per Cent)

Years of Education	Marx[a]	Big Business and Rich[b]
0-7 years	40	38
8-11 years	28	46
12-15 years	14	55
16 years or more	8	37
Total	22	47

[a]See Table 24.
[b]See Table 28.

When the respondents were asked which groups were least powerful, the choice was not quite so clear-cut. (See Table 30.) The "poor" led all other groups; one-third of the total sample thought them least powerful. "Small business"[1] was second, chosen by about one-seventh. "Farmers" and "Negroes" each were chosen by about one-tenth. The sampled rich are least likely to see the "poor" as lowest in power. In fact, they are the only income group in the sample who nominated another group as lowest: "Small business." About half of the Negro poor see the "poor" as lowest and about one-third of poor whites, middle-income whites, and Negroes and about one-fifth of the rich do so.

The results of this question by education (see Table 31) show fewer intra-group differences than by income, with one exception: the tendency to choose "small business" appears to increase with education.

Thus far, images of power have been discussed in terms of what is rather than what ought to be. I shall briefly summarize the findings thus far before proceeding further. The image of power based on Riesman's ideas was the most popular with the entire sample; with the exception of middle-income Negroes, more than half of all groups made this choice. When the respondents were asked which group was

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[1]In this study, small business was defined to the respondent as a corner grocery store or filling station. The respondent was specifically instructed not to think of the definition of the U. S. Census of Manufactures (a business employing fewer than 500 persons).

Table 30. Group Perceived as Least Powerful, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Poor	Small Business	Farmers	Negroes	Jews	University Professors	All Others	Don't Know	Total %	Total N
Poor	Negro	46	11	11	19	8	0	3	3	101	(37)
	White	37	11	13	6	11	1	3	17	99	(70)
Middle	Negro	35	6	19	23	4	0	2	10	99	(48)
	White	35	17	12	9	4	6	7	10	100	(151)
Rich		20	26	7	9	4	11	24	0	101	(46)
Total, systematic sample	%	36	14	15	7	4	5	6	13	100	
	N	(67)	(26)	(27)	(13)	(8)	(9)	(11)	(25)		(186)
Total analytic sample	%	35	15	12	11	6	4	7	9	99	
	N	(122)	(53)	(42)	(39)	(22)	(15)	(25)	(33)	(352)	

Table 31. Group Perceived as Least Powerful By Years of Education (In Per Cent)

Years of Education	Poor	Small Business	Farmers	Negroes	Jews	University Professors	All Others	Don't Know	Total %	Total N
0-7 years	35	10	4	16	8	0	5	22	100	(49)
8-11 years	40	12	15	11	7	3	3	9	100	(147)
12-15 years	30	19	14	12	4	5	8	8	100	(113)
16 years or more	27	40	7	5	9	9	3	0	100	(43)
Total, %	35	15	12	11	6	4	7	9	99	
analytic sample N	(122)	(53)	(43)	(39)	(22)	(15)	(25)	(33)		(352)

most powerful and which least powerful, the biggest contrast in response was between the rich and all other groups. The sampled rich thought "labor unions" most powerful; all other groups thought "big business and rich" most powerful. The sample rich thought "small business" least powerful; all other groups thought the "poor" least powerful. Other intra-group differences are not as great as expected, although many of them are in the predicted direction.

When the two types of questions used to elicit an image of power are contrasted, we find that the first type (Marx, Mills, Riesman) elicited a pluralistic response from the majority of the respondents. The second type (which group is most powerful) elicited a somewhat less pluralistic response. The contrast is greater in the systematic sample. In the analytic sample, about two-fifths of the respondents chose Marx or Mills (i.e., gave an anti-pluralist response) in the first question, while a little less than half thought "big business and rich" most powerful. In the systematic sample, less than two-fifths of the respondents chose Marx or Mills, and more than half chose "big business and rich." The situation resembles somewhat the finding in the preceding chapter, where the percentage of agreement with a generalized cliché was much higher than with a class-linked corollary. It seems reasonable to conclude that when people hear a general statement that sounds like the dominant ideology, they will tend to agree with it, but when the question is focused more sharply, some of this belief will be eroded.

The last question in the series on the power of groups concerned not what is, but what ought to be, that is, which group ought to have most power. This shifts the focus of analysis. The next question I shall consider is the differential desire for representative democracy. Who among the respondents would like to see the system run the way the dominant ideology says it should be run?

Income, Education, and the Desire for Democracy

The first question in this series concerning the desire for democracy was: What group ought to have the most power and influence in Washington. The list of 12 groups used in the preceding question was used again. It was thus implicitly suggested to the respondent that one of these groups really should be most powerful. In the pre-testing, it was observed that a number of respondents stated spontaneously that no one group should be dominant--that all groups should be equal. This response was coded but the interviewers were instructed not to suggest it to the respondent, because, if an ideologically "appropriate" response were suggested to the respondents, they might tend to take it.

Table 32 shows the results by income, Table 33 by education. That all groups should share in power was the largest single response to the question. More than two-fifths of the entire sample gave this response, Negroes more than whites, the white poor more than the rich, and the less

Table 32. Which Group Ought To Be Most Powerful, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		All should be equal	Big business	Labor unions	All others	Don't know	Total %	Total N
Poor	Negro	64	0	14	8	14	100	(36)
	White	43	6	6	28	17	100	(65)
Middle	Negro	47	4	9	25	15	100	(47)
	White	40	9	13	29	9	100	(149)
Rich		39	30	0	27	4	100	(46)
Total, systematic sample	%	41	8	12	29	10	100	
	N	(76)	(15)	(22)	(55)	(18)		(186)
Total, analytic sample	%	44	10	9	26	11	100	
	N	(150)	(34)	(32)	(88)	(39)		(343)

Table 33. Who Ought to Have Power, By Years of Education (In Per Cent)

Years of Education		All should be equal	Big business	Labor unions	All others	Don't know	Total %	Total N
0-7 years		52	2	4	23	19	100	(48)
8-11 years		48	4	13	22	13	100	(141)
12-15 years		38	19	10	25	8	100	(112)
16 years or more		38	14	0	41	7	100	(42)
Total, analytic sample	%	44	10	9	26	11	100	
	N	(150)	(34)	(32)	(88)	(39)		(343)

educated more often than the more educated. The groups who most doubt that the dominant ideology describes the way things really are run are the groups most ready to affirm (spontaneously) that things really ought to be run that way. The groups who have the most income, the most education, and the most convenient skin color--in short, those who have the most of what there is to get--are the least likely to assert freely that all groups should share power.

To emphasize this point, let us contrast the "all equal" response to the "Riesman" response by income and by education. (See Table 34.) Those who are highest in income and education are most likely to think the Riesman description best when they hear it--that all groups should share in power. But they are the least likely, left to their own devices, to think that this is the way it ought to be. By income, about two-thirds of the rich thought the Riesman description best, but two-fifths thought all groups should share power. Almost three-fourths of the college graduates thought the Riesman description best, but a little less than two-fifths thought all groups should share power. It certainly cannot be argued that college graduates are less well-equipped to think of a free response than those with less than eight grades of education.[1]

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[1]This reminds us of V. O. Key's remark concerning physicians: "The indoctrination of a high-status, high-income, literate class of persons and their political management, oddly enough, seems to be far more feasible than is the mobilization of lesser peoples who are supposedly

Table 34. Desire for Political Pluralism Contrasted to Belief that It Exists, By Income and Race, and Education (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Riesman best	All should be equal	Years of Education	Riesman best	All should be equal
Poor	Negro	61	64	0-7	33	52
	White	55	43			
Middle	Negro	44	47	8-11	57	48
	White	63	40	12-15	67	38
Rich		65	39	16 or more	73	38

easy to manipulate." See V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, fifth edition (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), p. 125.

The differential desire for democracy was probed in two further questions. The dominant ideology holds that representative democracy in the formal political arena is a good thing; in the economic arena, on the other hand, it is a bad thing. Obviously there are many historical reasons for this development but nevertheless it might be difficult to explain to a disinterested observer why it is that what is good for the United States is very bad for General Motors. A very generalized question applying the concept not only to formal political organizations but to all kinds of organizations, was therefore asked about representative democracy.

> Some people feel that the only moral way to run <u>any</u> kind of organization, be it political, religious, economic, educational, or social, is by representative democracy, that is, by letting those who are affected by the decisions choose the top officials; other people feel that the top officials should be chosen only by those few men who know best what is going on. How do you feel about this?

To confirm the prediction, the rich would have to choose top officials in a higher proportion than the poor, for <u>any</u> organization logically includes corporations; and the employees, according to the dominant ideology, have no business running them.

But the findings (see Table 35) do not consistently confirm the prediction. The highest degree of preference for representative democracy in all organizations is shown by about two-thirds of middle-income whites, followed, in this order, by poor whites, middle-income Negroes, and the rich, and finally, by poor Negroes (a little more than one-third).

Table 35. The Desire for Democracy, and for Federal Support to Disadvantaged Groups, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Run all organizations by representative democracy	Run business enterprise by representative democracy	Government stay out of open occupancy	Government done too much for poor	Government shouldn't pay poor to go to school
Poor	Negro	38	92	8	8	30
	White	54	36	62	23	34
Middle	Negro	48	73	8	15	17
	White	63	16	73	32	64
Rich		48	0	96	72	78
Total, analytic sample	%	54	34	57	31	52
	N	(342)	(347)	(344)	(351)	(350)

Although the rich are less inclined than middle-income and poor whites to like representative democracy in all organications, the Negro groups are low--among the whites, only the rich are as low as middle-income Negroes.

At a later point in the interview, a more pointed question about economic democracy was asked:

> Some people think that a large corporation should be run democratically, that is, that the employees or workers should have a chance to select the top managers or bosses; other people think that the managers should be chosen only by those few people who know the most about running the company. What do you think?

The response to this question (see Table 35) confirms the general expectation quite well, except that middle-income Negroes are much more likely to prefer economic democracy than poor whites. The differences between whites and Negroes are great: more than nine-tenths of the poor Negroes and about three-fourths of the middle-income Negroes like the idea of the workers' having some responsibility for running a corporation; but about one-third of the poor whites, one-sixth of the middle-income whites, and no rich whites like the idea.

One aspect of the desire for democracy concerns attitudes toward promoting the welfare of all groups. According to the dominant ideology, if any man works hard enough, he will get ahead. Nevertheless, some facets of American life indicate to many people that this idea doesn't quite apply to all groups. One such group consists of Negroes. The discrepancy between "The American Creed" and American practice is well-known to many. Another group that some people see as living in a more

or less permanently disadvantaged state is the poor. Doubtless no one would disagree with the assertion that Negroes and the poor should be encouraged to get ahead. But there would be much conflict over what form the encouragement should take. Some persons feel that only federal action will have any effect and others feel that the problem can best be solved by private groups. The dominant ideology about the suitability of federal intervention has changed over time, and it is still in a process of change. The questions in this area therefore cannot be said to have any definite fixed relationship to the dominant ideology. Consequently the predictions will be somewhat different.

Three questions about the desirability of government intervention to promote the general welfare clearly reflect personal values. The respondents were asked whether the government should intervene to promote open occupancy for Negro housing and the welfare of the poor. (The specific wording is given below.) My own view is that only federal action is sufficient to have any effect on such problems, and that a rejection of such action is tantamount to doing nothing at all. Therefore such a rejection will be interpreted as evidence of a lack of desire for democracy.

The predictions for these particular questions are exactly the reverse of the previous predictions. This is the rationale: those who have the most of what there is to get tend to like things the way they are. They tend to believe that the ideology that justifies the <u>status quo</u> is an accurate

description of the way things really are. The ideology currently dominant in America says that every man has a fair chance to get ahead. But suppose the ideology is not in accord with the facts. In this instance, any changes made to bring the two into accord would not benefit the rich; indeed, it might even cost them some money. In short, one might expect that those who have most will reject the idea that the dominant ideology isn't in accord with the facts and, further, will reject any attempts by others who think differently to bring ideology and fact into better accord.

Therefore it was predicted that favorable attitudes toward federal intervention to promote the welfare of Negroes and the poor would be inversely related to income.

The first question concerned open occupancy:

> There is a lot of talk bout discrimination these days; that is, people having trouble buying houses in neighborhoods they would like because of their race. Do you think that the government should see to it that Negroes can buy any house they can afford or do you think the government should stay out of this problem?

The results may be seen in Table 35. Among white respondents, almost all of the rich, three-fourths of the middle-income, and a little less than two-thirds of the poor thought that the government should stay out of this problem. Less than one-tenth of the Negroes thought the government should stay out. The prediction was confirmed.

One rich man commented, "I haven't any other alternative than time as a solvent to heal this wound." A rich woman said, "I'm going to quote a colored woman I had working for

me. 'You can't legislate (that wasn't the word she used) love.' If they aren't wanted, it won't help. I hope we can be educated to know that the color of your skin makes no difference. I don't think desegregationists pushing and marching does any good either. When they prove themselves, it will work out over the years." On the other hand, a poor white woman said vehemently, "They should buy if they have the wherewithal. The Bible don't say if God was black, red, green, or yellow. I don't think we're superior. I'm not like the Germans." Another white poor woman said, "They should be all treated alike, and let it go at that, why yes they should. They have a heart same as we do. I don't see why they should do the way they do with some of them."

The second and third questions covering federal intervention concerned the poor:

> Some people think that the government should do more to help poor people get better education and training and better jobs. On the whole, would you say that the government has done too much or that it hasn't done enough here?
>
> Do you think the government in Washington should pay unemployed poor people over 30 years old regular full-time wages to go to school and get general education and to learn specific jobs, or do you think that the tax payers shouldn't have to foot the bill for this kind of job preparation.[1]

On the second question (see Table 35), almost three-fourths of the rich, one-third of the middle-income whites,

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[1]Three per cent of the sample gave an unanticipated response: the taxpayer should not have to pay, but the government should. These respondents were mostly white and Negro poor.

and one-fourth of the poor whites thought the government had done too much for the poor. A lower per cent of the middle-income Negroes and poor Negroes felt this way. The prediction was confirmed.

On the third question (see Table 35), more than three-fourths of the rich, about two-thirds of the middle-income whites, and about one-third of the poor whites thought that the government should not pay poor people while they receive general education and job training. About one-seventh of the middle-income Negroes, but almost one-third of the poor Negroes were of this opinion. The prediction was partially confirmed.

One rich man said, to the second question, "One way or another we're going to foot the bill. Probably if they have the opportunity to learn, it's a well-spent dollar." But a rich woman said, "They can do it by themselves, if they have any ambition." Another rich woman said, "The government train the poor? I have to say it but it seems good for people to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps." And yet another remarked, "This last program, Upstart [sic], they went overboard with wages on that. So much waste."

Reported Political Behavior

We have examined the respondents' images of power and their attitudes toward democracy, let us turn now to an area that is covered quite clearly by the dominant ideology:

political behavior, as reported by the respondents. Sociologists would have little quarrel with the proposition that people tend to participate in a system when they think they are rewarded by it. As we have seen, the respondents in this survey tended to see big business and the rich as having most control over the national government and the poor as having least control. One might therefore predict that the sampled rich would tend to have higher rates of participation than the sampled poor. The general hypothesis of this study was that the rich would tend to believe the dominant ideology more than the poor. Here I shall predict that the rich, more than the poor, tend to act as though they believe it.

According to the dominant ideology, it is the right and duty of every citizen to inform himself of the issues and to vote regularly. Two questions developed by Campbell and coworkers were used to discover the extent of participation other than voting.[1] The first was:

> I have a list of some of the things that people do to help a party or candidate win an election. I wonder if you could tell me whether you did any of these things in the past presidential election when Johnson ran against Goldwater.
>
> Did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates?
>
> Did you give any money, go to any political meetings or rallies or do any work for one of the parties in the last presidential election?

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[1]Campbell, et al., The American Voter.

Almost three-fourths of the rich, one-third of the middle-income whites, and about one-sixth of the poor whites reported having talked to someone. (See Table 36.) This result appears to confirm the hypothesis. However, poor Negroes apparently did more talking than middle-income Negroes, although the difference is not large. A little less than one-third of the poor Negroes said that they talked to someone, and slightly more than one-fourth of the middle-income Negroes did to.

With reference to giving money and other activities, 87% of the rich, 15% of the middle-income whites, 6% of the middle-income Negroes, and almost no poor whites or poor Negroes reported such behavior. (See Table 36.) The prediction appears to be confirmed.

The differences in reported voting behavior are not so great. Respondents who "always voted" included 87% of the rich, 64% of the middle-income whites, 45% of the middle-income Negroes, 39% of the poor whites, and 35% of the poor Negroes.[1]

Summary

The majority of the respondents chose the Riesman image of power as the best description of the way things really were. Nevertheless, when asked which group had the most

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[1]A perfect record was more difficult for some Negroes because of previous residence in southern states where their voting was not considered appropriate.

Table 36. Political Behavior, By Income and Race (In Per Cent)

Income and Race		Talked politics	Gave money, etc.	Always voted
Poor	Negro	30	0	35
	White	17	1	39
Middle	Negro	27	6	45
	White	32	15	64
Rich		72	87	87
Total, analytical sample	%	33	19	56
	N	(351)	(352)	(342)

power, "big business and rich" were clearly chosen over all other groups. When asked who ought to have power, the respondents' desire to see power shared by all groups was inversely related to income and education: those who had the most had the least desire to see power shared by all groups. On the other hand, those who had the most of what there is to get try to preserve what they have by more active participation in the political process and more financial support to political activities.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This study began with an inquiry into the relationship of sociology and epistomology. Pragmatism was described as a power philosophy and the pragmatic model of verification was therefore said to be subject to the influence of the distribution of power in a particular society. Moreover, the sociology of knowledge was said to have epistomological implications for sociology because the sociologist, like everyone else in the society, is exposed to whatever ideology happens to be dominant.

I have not suggested that there is some other model of verification that would insure scientific objectivity, because I do not think that there is. I have argued, rather, that it would be wise for sociologists to be alert to social influence and to be a bit suspicious if theories and findings appear to support a dominant ideology. European theorists whose works were reviewed briefly appear to be social structural, that is, stratification is seen as the consequence of the distribution of power in society rather than as the result of individual attributes. The functional theory of stratification, theories of social class and social mobility that focus on manners and motivation, and theories of the

plural distribution of power are basically in accord with the dominant American ideology, and an individual's position in the system tends to be viewed as a result of his personal attributes.

The basic theoretical assumption of this study is that the dominant ideology, the justification and explanation of the stratification system, best suits those who have the most of what there was to get. This assumption was derived primarily from European theorists: Marx, Weber, Mosca, and Ossowski. Briefly, I assumed that the distribution of power determines the distribution of rewards, and that the dominant ideology is the justification for the distribution of power. If this assumption were true, one would expect that those who were getting the greatest rewards would be the most likely to believe that the stratification system was really working the way it was supposed to, according to the dominant ideology. One would expect that those who were getting the least rewards would be the least likely to believe that the dominant ideology described the way the system really worked. The major empirical question of this study was: who believes that the dominant ideology describes the actual distribution of rewards in American society?

In order to test this assumption, an independent definition of the dominant ideology was necessary. The description was based upon what one hears in popular patriotic oratory, what one reads in school textbooks, what sociologists have

said about "The American Creed" and "The American Dream," what every schoolboy is supposed to know. What he knows is that America is a land of equal opportunity and success is due to ability and hard work. If a man is rich, he must have been smart and worked hard. Thus the dominant ideology may be viewed as a secular version of the Protestant ethic, where worldly success constituted proof that the believer was one of the elect. In the political realm, the main tenet of the dominant ideology is that power is distributed pluralistically and that the system of representative democracy insures that each individual will have a share of influence on decisions that affect his welfare.

Family income in the year preceding the study was used as an indicator of a crucial reward of the stratification system. The respondents were categorized as rich, middle-income, or poor. Poverty was defined by annual family income, adjusted for the number of persons in the family. In addition, the respondents were categorized by race because of the high relationship of race to reward allocation. The respondents were heads of households or their spouses living in the Muskegon, Michigan urban area, defined as the area included in Polk's City Directory.

Conclusions

Three major conclusions can be drawn from this study. The first is that poor people, in general, tend to see the distribution of rewards as a result of social structural

conditions, and the rich in terms of favorable personal attributes, which is to say that the poor are less likely than the rich to see the dominant ideology as an accurate description of the stratification system. Nevertheless, controlling for race proved to be wise because Negroes tended to perceive social structural factors as causal more often than whites. Middle-income Negroes were often more aware of social structural factors than poor Negroes.

The second conclusion is that middle-income Negroes, poor Negroes, and poor whites tend to have a stronger desire than middle-income and rich whites for the realization of a pluralistic distribution of power, while middle-income and rich whites are more likely to think a pluralistic distribution is already realized. Those getting the greatest rewards are most likely to think that the dominant ideology describes the way the system <u>is</u> run, but those getting the least rewards are most likely to think that the dominant ideology describes the way it <u>ought</u> to be run. The rich think the system is fair and the poor think it ought to be fair.

The third conclusion is methodological. All respondents tended to show a much higher agreement with the dominant ideology when the statements were worded in a highly genalized form than when the statements were made quite specific, although in both types of question the rich support the dominant ideology more than the poor. Because the

specific statements were logical derivatives of the generalized statements, one is tempted to surmise that if a question is worded appropriately, one can get almost everyone to agree to almost anything. This finding has methodological implications to which we shall now turn.

Implications of the Study

Methodological Implications

If a respondent can be purposefully induced to be inconsistent, what is the implication for survey research? Let us suppose, for the moment, that a social scientist wants to discover whether people tend to be satisfied with the society in which they live. He wants to know what people think of the opportunity for social mobility so he asks the respondents whether they agree with the statement that "ambitious boys can generally get ahead." He concludes that people perceive the opportunity for mobility as satisfactory; persons who are responsible for public policy can utilize this finding to support the view that no drastic social changes are desired by the public.

Our research indicates that such a conclusion is not justifiable. The assertion about ambitious boys is empirical, unlike, for example, the assertion that "God's in His heaven and all's right with the world." Ambitious boys exist and getting ahead is something they can do. Technically the assertion is a nullifiable proposition. But in the form

given, it is not meaningfully nullifiable, because it doesn't make any difference whether the proposition is true. Under the rubric of "getting ahead" one can include the rise of the ambitious bootblack to the position of janitor, and the garage mechanic to the position of plumber. A major fault of this question is that it fails to specify how many people have to rise how far, so that it is impossible to know whether the rise is socially consequential.[1] Another difficulty is with the word "ambition." Like motivation, ambition is a Tinker Bell factor[2] and no one has yet figured out how much ambition it takes to rise X distance from a starting point of N position. Ambition is the elusive quality that someone must have had if he actually got ahead; it offers splendid opportunity for ex post facto analysis and it enables one to conclude that what poor boys need most is a massive injection of motivation so that they can run the race just like everybody else.

In this study, questions which were put in more specific form elicited a different response from those in a generalized form. This does not imply, of course, that most survey

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[1]Center's question on opportunities for children was quite general: "Would you say that your children had just as good a chance, poorer, or a better chance to rise in the world as anybody else's?" See Centers, The Psychology of Social Classes, p. 148. Of the urban "middle class," 95% thought their children had just as good a chance, and 84% of the urban "working class."

[2]According to Jay W. Artis, oral communication, May, 1966.

research questions framed by American sociologists have been vague generalities; we are saying only that vague questions tend to elicit responses lacking in social significance.

Theoretical Implications

A belief in the dominant ideology implies a belief that the system is really running the way it is supposed to: ought equals is. This statement can be put in a form more familiar in sociological literature. One could say that a belief in the dominant ideology means a belief that the values are institutionalized. To recast our findings in this language, we could say that those who have the greatest rewards are most likely to think that American values are institutionalized, but least likely to support measures to 'further' institutionalize them. This is understandable. If one thinks that equality of opportunity already exists, what need could there be for more of what there already is enough of?

In sociological literature, some writers speak of an entity called "American Values," as though everyone holds these values. Other writers feel that the degree of consensus on values may be problematical, although the degree of consensus is rarely stated or even implied. This research suggests that the consensus on values, what ought to be, may be very high indeed, so high that it may be somewhat irrelevant to speak of the consensus as problematical.

Where the consensus is problematical is not on the values but on whether the values are institutionalized. The values represent the ought of the dominant ideology. A good, durable myth generally has something in it for everybody, especially for those who are not getting many actual rewards. Equality of opportunity and the brotherhood of man have a quite universal appeal. So does motherhood. Who can oppose such sterling values?[1] As a matter of fact, equality of opportunity is such a satisfactory value that it is held in both the Soviet Union and the United States. Whether these values have been incorporated into the web of social structure in such a way that they can be realized is quite another question.

Let us examine one instance of the confusion of values and the institutionalization of values. Smelser says that "values are cultural standards that indicate the general goals deemed desirable for organized social life. . . ."[2] An important value in American society is said to be equality of opportunity. Smelser says that Reissman (in a later chapter

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[1]Unfortunately, we did not put this to a test, except in our imagination. Doubtless we should have asked our respondents, "Do you believe in equality of opportunity, or do you believe that opportunity should be unequal? Do you believe in the brotherhood of man, or do you believe that men ought to treat each other as strangers or enemies? Do you believe that motherhood is a noble estate, or do you believe that motherhood is a social and biological mistake?

[2]Neil J. Smelser, ed., Sociology (New York: Wiley, 1967), p. 8.

of the same book) contrasted caste in India and the United States and said that the situations differ because "the value of equality of opportunity is institutionalized in America."[1] This assertion completely ignores the extent to which this value may be realized in American society, and implies that Reissman thinks that the social web is designed and operates in such a way that equality of opportunity exists.

Reissman did not say this, however. What he did say was that American values do not support caste divisions, and that "this may sound relatively picayune in the light of social realities. . . ."[2] It is doubtless great comfort to poor Negroes in American society to know that American values do not support a caste system because if they did, Negroes might have the menial jobs in the society, at low wages, with bad housing conditions, low social status, and all the other disadvantages of caste.

In our view, it is an error to attribute great significance to the fact that equality of opportunity is an important value in American society, because it is an important value in any industrial society. This value rose to prominence at the time of the industrial revolution and it has been around ever since. There is nothing peculiarly American about it. "Work hard and you'll get ahead" is a useful carrot to induce anyone to engage in productive effort, however dull

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Leonard Reissman, Sociology, p. 241.

and unrewarding the job might actually be.

What is socially significant is the extent to which this value is realized in any industrial society. Reifying the value is fruitless as an explanation of social development. To speak of the "tension" between the values of "liberty" and "equality of opportunity" is pure realism in the Platonic tradition. A dose of nominalism would be more helpful. To invoke a value is one thing; to examine the actual behavior of men is quite another.

Practical Implications

The Poor

The poor tended to believe that they worked as hard as everybody else, and that poverty was transmitted generationally. It is unreasonable to expect that a man who has worked hard but has yet remained poor to define a new opportunity as "real." If hard work has been insufficient in the past, what reason is there to suppose that it will be sufficient in the future? As a poor Negro commented, "A poor person can't get ahead on work only." People tend to predict outcomes based upon past experience.

There have been programs to help the poor, although it has been argued that these are not nearly sufficient to meet the need.[1] It would be foolish to argue that skill levels

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[1]See Daniel P. Moynihan, "The American Crisis," The Detroit Free Press (August, 6, 1967), p. 9.

are of no importance or that it is useless to attempt to develop the labor market potentialities of the poor. Nevertheless, this approach can be effective only if there are enough jobs available, at wages above the poverty level. The labor market is like the game of musical chairs--when the music stops, someone has to do without.

At the time of this study, the number of cases on welfare was lower in Muskegon County than it had been for some time. Simultaneously, the Community Action Against Poverty program was initiating measures to upgrade the skill levels of the poor. I asked an official involved what would happen if unemployment in Muskegon went up to nine per cent. "Well," he said, "I guess that would be that. We'd be right back where we started from."

Lack of jobs is one problem and the level of wages is another. American society tolerates poverty level wages for jobs that are to be filled by grown men and women. As an illustration, one of the respondents in this study was a Negro woman with eight children, deserted by her husband. She was caring for children in a white neighborhood. (The house where she worked had an assessed market value of $34,000.) She was paid $25 per week. We asked whether she had been to the Michigan Employment Security Commission to see if she could get a better job. She replied that she got her present job through the MESC. When I mentioned this to an official of the CAAP program, he replied that she was

lucky: plenty of women were in domestic service for ten to fifteen dollars per week.

It may be argued that domestic service and baby-sitting require low skills and that a poverty level wage is all the job is worth.[1] Unlike the pickle pickers, the baby-sitters are not likely to be automated out of existence. The situation can best be described as exploitation and it is tolerated. The poor use baby-sitters and they complain about the cost just as their wealthier counterparts do.[2] Considering the high values that Americans are believed to accord to the rearing of children, it seems somewhat odd that those who care for children should be among the lowest paid workers in the society. The minimum wage doesn't apply here; as one respondent remarked, "That minimum wage don't do us no good--not for the kind of jobs we have to take."

Middle-Income Negroes

In this study, middle-income Negroes tended to respond more like poor Negroes than like middle-income whites.

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[1]Although motherhood is extolled as a role of the greatest social significance, the primary requirement for a mother-substitute is a strong back and a good disposition, and the market value of the role is below the poverty level.

[2]I once asked several women (who were rich by the definition of this study) why, if it was so hard to get help, they didn't try placing an advertisement offering double and prevailing wage rate. "That wouldn't be fair to everyone else," was one reply. "Why, I couldn't afford to pay that to a baby-sitter," said another who had just returned from a week's vacation in Las Vegas.

In fact, the responses of the middle-income Negroes were often more social structural than those of any other category in the study. This finding cannot be interpreted with a high degree of certainty, but my own view is that as patient abiders, the middle-income Negroes are not feeling very meek any more.[1] They seem inclined to attribute their troubles to the social structure rather than to themselves. There is some evidence that the economic condition of the American Negro has recently improved in terms of some important measures of well-being.[2] Expectations appear to be rising and the discrepancy between what Negroes are coming to expect and what they get is still great. Such a discrepancy often leads to a mood of irritation.

The Rich

It is appropriate to ask why, under a representative form of government, it should make much difference what the rich believe, because their numbers are so small. By the definition used in this study, only about one per cent of the families in the United States are rich. To the extent that elections are honest, the rich certainly cannot out-vote any other group, even though they are more likely to vote.

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[1]The next line in Psalm IX is "Up, Lord, and let not man have the upper hand."

[2]Alfred L. Malabre, Jr., "The Outlook," The Wall Street Journal (August 7, 1967), p. 1. Among other sources, this article cites a "soon-to-be-released" study by the Commerce Department.

The rich can give more money to parties and candidates. This does not imply that every politician is nothing but a puppet on strings controlled by rich constituents. Nevertheless, it seems likely that a campaign contribution of, say, $10,000 would ensure that the name, face, and opinions of the donor would remain fixed in the memory of the recipient. It seems reasonable to suppose that the rich have influence considerably beyond their actual numbers, but how much more, we do not know.

In this study it was observed that the rich are much less likely than poorer people to believe that the federal government should intervene on behalf of disadvantaged groups. If the eradication of poverty will not come about as a result of the natural operation of the market, if it should require some kind of federal intervention, then the opinion of the rich could constitute a real barrier to appropriate action.

The Sociologists

Like the rich, sociologists are few in number. It is not possible to know exactly how great their influence is, but perhaps it is increasing. They have a tremendous advantage in their favor: they can cast themselves in the role of the disinterested observer. They are free of the crass interests of the market. They are the social engineers--or so some of them say--and an engineer is the man who really understand what makes the engine work.

Nevertheless, the engineer is only another human being.

The approach to stratification based upon manners and motivation is essentially in accord with the dominant ideology. This does not necessarily mean that the approach is inadequate and that it cannot serve to explain some things that need explaining. It should be made clear, however, that this kind of approach is essentially conservative. From the standpoing of pure science, the label should make no difference. Yet in human interaction, labels carry weight and it is more honest if ideological influence inherent in any approach be known for what it is. No man can make all of his hidden assumptions explicit but every social scientist has a moral obligation to question his own assumptions and motivations about good and evil in his own society.

Mea Culpa: Suggestions for Future Research

There are a number of ways in which this research could have been improved, but three are particularly important. The first is that all respondents should have been asked whether they contributed money to a party or candidate. Because Campbell and co-workers found that few persons are involved in organized political activities,[1] these activities were lumped into one question: "did you give any money, . . . go to any political meetings, . . . or do any work? . . ." Participation in organized political activity was

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[1]Campbell, et al., The American Voter, p. 91.

differentiated from participation in unorganized activity ("did you talk to anyone? . . .") Actually, the Campbell scale of political participation differentiates only high (voted and engaged in other activity), medium (voted), and low (did not vote).[1]

When the data were analyzed, it became apparent that the shortcut was an error. The rich participated in organized activity far more than other groups, and it would have been advisable to know whether most of this activity consisted of giving contributions. From the comments heard during the interviews, it seems probable that giving money was the main activity, but one cannot know.

The second error is logically related to the first. The sample of rich was too small. It seems likely that what the rich think and do is far more important politically than what others think and do. Any research based upon a random or systematic sample cannot include very many rich. If, using the present definition of income, one obtained a random sample (N = 5,000) of U. S. families, it would have included only 50 rich respondents. The major theoretical assumption of the voting studies is that the voter actually decides. Nevertheless, the voter can only decide upon items that appear on the ballot and no one has, as yet, studied just what difference the franchise makes.[2] Until someone does,

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[1]Campbell, et al., The Voter Decides, p. 31.

[2]Scott Greer and Peter Orleans, Handbook of Modern Sociology, p. 822.

one might think that a study of the rich and the very rich might be a rewarding enterprise.

The third error was that none of the questions on the distribution of political power were put into open-ended form, and none of the questions on the causes of wealth and poverty were forced-choice. It was observed in pre-testing that when the "causes of wealth, poverty" question was presented in forced-choice form, the respondents tended to emphasize personal attributes. We shifted to the open-ended question during the pre-testing and the proportion of respondents giving a structural response increased markedly. In the final interview, a forced-choice question should have been retained for comparison. This would have presented some difficulties in working but we feel the problem could have been solved.

It seems likely that had the questions on the distribution of power been given in an open-ended form, the responses in accord with the dominant ideology would have decreased. In any event, open-ended questions reduce the probability that the investigator, in his superior wisdom--and his arrogance--has squeezed out a response that can be pigeon-holed neatly into one of his own finely-wrought intellectual categories.

This study focused upon the perception of equality of opportunity. Although this paper bristles with obvious value judgments, in the event that my own position has not been made sufficiently clear, let me add that the value of equality of opportunity a fine thing--and that the realization of equality of opportunity would be an even finer thing.

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