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THE PERSON-CENTERED FUNCTION
OF HIGHER EDUCATION

by

David Norman Hess

AN ABSTRACT

Submitted to the School for Advanced
Graduate Studies of Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

College of Education

1962

 

ABSTRACT
THE PERSON-CENTERED FUNCTION
OF HIGHER EDUCATION

by David Norman Hess

This study of higherveducation is concerned with that aspect of

education which aims at the development of the student as a person. This

is certainly not the only goal of higher education, but it is a very im-

portant and legitimate one. This view is in no way 'unique to the author,

but has been espoused by philosophers and educators at least since the
time of the Greek civilization.

A person-centered institution of higher education, a college
community, is the extension of a person and is itself an artificial per-
son. Thus a study of the person leads to an understanding of how the
community ought to constitute itself.

Out of the definitions of representative social scientists, philo-
sophers and theologians, a working formulation has been developed. This
formulation or definition consists of~9 parts. The distinction between:

a) Person and thing; a person being the subject of rights and
dutieS, a thing the object of rights.

b) Person and group; a person being prior to the group, which at
its very best is a composite or communion of persons.

C) Person and individual; a person being beyond price, having no
equivalent value and thus possessed of dignity, whereas the individual is

e unit in his class whose value is determined b his func-

tion in 1.115 class.

DAVID NORMAN HESS 2

(1) Person and persona or role; the person being that which one
ultimately is, the persona or role one's response to a particular situa-

t ion or expectation .

In addition 5 necessary conditions or characteristics for the

per son are considered:

a) The person is a moral being, one who must make choices on
the basis of values.

b) The person must be free to some degree. There must be genuine
alternatives or there is no real freedom and no possibility of moral
action .

c) The person is a rational being. The choice between alternatives
must involve thought and reflection. Mere chance or compulsion are not

the basis for moral action.

d) The person's rational capabilities include the possibility for
symbolization and the use of languages. Communication on this level is
distinctly human, but man is able to go beyond communication to the person-
to-person encounter of communion, to give himself.

e) The person is ultimately responsible for both what he does and
what he is.

A community of education based upon principles derived from this
definition is an extension of the ideal person. As such it must so con-
sciously constitute itself that the expectations it brings to the students
are befitting to a person, and will develop in the person a richness which
(1 not be developed without the community. It must be a moral commun-

woul

ity, free yet responSible, intelligent, and not a bundling or grouping,

but a true community.

 

DAVID NORMAN HESS 3

The principles derived from the definition of a person are
applied to the areas of admissions and retention policies, curriculum,

and student evaluation.

 

THE PERSON-CENTERED FUNCTION
OF HIGHER EDUCATION

1

DY

David Norman Hess

A THESIS

Submitted to the School for Advanced
Graduate Studies of Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

College of Education

1962

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is impossible to adequately express my gratitude to those who
have made this study possible. I am hopelessly in debt to my doctoral
advisor, Dr. Carl Gross, who through more than six years has encouraged
and inspired me, and through his criticism and correction has guided me
into most fruitful studies and reflection. I am most grateful to Pro-
fessor John F. A. Taylor of the Department of Philosophy who has led me
into a distinctly human dialogue, and Professor Stanley Idzerda, Director
of the Honors College, whose encouragement and criticism were so desper-
ately needed, and to the other members of my committee, Dr. John A. Fuzak
and Dr. Clyde Campbell. I am grateful that, even in professional prepara-
tion, they introduced me to a genuine person-centered education, a
community of scholars entering into the human dialogue. This study
might well have been profusely illustrated by their relationships with
me and other graduate students. I'm sure I am a richer person for
having worked with these men.

I want to Express my appreciation to Mrs. Seward and Mrs. Cooper
of the Honors College, both of whom spent long and tedious hours typing
this paper.

Finally, how can I express my gratitude to my wife and children
who not only endured the deprivations but encouraged me in the pressures

and anxieties that accompany graduate work.

ii

CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION
II. DEFINITIONS OF PERSON
A. Social Scientists
1. Robert Thorndike .
2. Clyde Kluckhohn
3. Karl Mannheim
4. Talcott Parsons
S. Gordon Allport
B. PhiIOSOphers
1. Aristotle
2. John Locke
3. Immanuel Kant
4. John Dewey
C. Theologians . . . . . . .
1. St. Augustine
2. John Calvin . . . .
3. Augustus Hopkins Strong
4. Martin Buber
5. Paul Tillich

TABLE OF CONTENTS

III. A WORKING DEFINITION

A.

Distinctions . .

DWNH

Characteristics of a Person

U'IDUJNH

Person-Thing
Person-Group .
Person-Individual

Person-Personage or Persona

A Person is a Moral Being

A Person is Free . .

A Person Possesses Reason . . .
A Person Can Communicate and Commune

A Person Stands Alone
Summary

iii

PAGE

12

12

12
13
14
16
18

22

22
24
26
29

31

31
33
34
36
37

41

43

43
48
SO
51

54

55
61
63
65
71
72

CHAPTER

IV.

V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION . . . . . . . . . . .

A. General Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Development of persons shall be viewed as the
end of the educational process.
2. In a society made up of persons, the person is
always prior to the society.
3. The person under all circumstances must be con-
sidered as a person and not as an individual.
4. The life of the community must be so ordered as
to promote the synthesis of that which the per-
sons are inherently with the roles they are
called upon to play.
5. The community must realize that its decisions
are inevitably moral decisions.
6. The community must encourage and provide for
increasing freedom on the part of all persons
within the community. H
7. The object of the curriculum is the development
of a meaningful ordered gestalt which will pro-
vide a guide for conduct.
8. The University is a place for communication and
communion.
9. Each person must stand alone, he must be re-
sponsible for his acts.
B. General Principles Applied to Entrance and . . . .
Retention Policies.
C. General Principles Applied to Curriculum. .
D. General Principles Applied to Student Evaluation.
SUMMARY . .

78

80

83

87

9O

94

97

100

104

112

121

125

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The ever increasing cost of higher education along with rapidly

O
a

expanding enrollments have brought about an intensive interest in the use
of technology in higher education. Thus there are conferences on the use
of teaching aids--1ibrary services, self-instruction devices, computer
applications, visual resources, TV, etc.--and considerable time and money
is being spent on evaluating their effectiveness. The tendency seems to be
toward.bigger classes and less personal pupil—teacher confrontations. At
the same time, there are isolated movements towards more individualized

or personal instruction, such as is seen in‘various honors programs and
some liberal arts programs.

The evaluation of the various techniques and technical aids in
teaching can only be accomplished when the goals have been clearly defined.
It may well be that some techniques are adaptable to certain purposes and
not to others. Thus the necessity of a study of purposes in higher education.

As the literature cited in this chapter shows, it is clearly under-
stood that higher education has various functions. It is a function of
higher education to provide trained and competent professional people-- ~
doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers, etc. The rapid development of pro-
fessional schools has clearly shown the sensitivity of higher education to
this need. Likewise, higher education should take a place of leadership
in the search for knowledge, in scholarly research, and the burgeoning
budgets for research indicate the response to this demahd. It is also a
function of higher education to search out ways in which this knowledge
can be used in the betterment of the living conditions of men, and the Land

1

2
Grant Colleges have shown remarkable leadership in this area. There are
doubtless other functions of higher education, functions that center in
truth or the good of society, or something else.

' It is assumed in this dissertation that there is another function
of higher education, and a very important one, that relates to the devel-
Opment of the person--a person-centered function of higher education. The
writer will deal with this function of higher education only. By consider-
ing only the one function, no diSparagement of the others is implied, and
statements regarding applicability or inapplicability of various techniques
or aids to the fulfillment of this function in no way are meant to imply
that these same techniques would not be suitable for other functions.

The approach in this study will be basically rationalistic. Using
the various disciplines as a basis, a working formulation regarding the
nature of a person will be developed. This formulation, which is by in-
tent quite general in scope, will then be applied to higher education.
Since the formulation is general, the application must also be general.
Particular means,or methods will not be closely examined, but only general
applications of the principles developed will be considered.

That there is a person-centered function of higher education is a
view not at all unique to the writer. Liberal education has long been
viewed as being person-centered. Not only did the early Greek schools,
such as the Socratic school, View the development of the person as being
of utmost importance, but many modern writers, both educators and philoso-
phers, also hold this position. Karl Jaspers, while contending that re-
search is a foremost concern of the University, and that truth Should be

the center, acknowledges that the pursuit of truth demands a serious

3
commitment of the "whole man." He suggests that there are three things
required of a university: "professional training, education of the whole

man, research."* He sums up the purpose of the University as "formation

 

*JaSpers, Karl, The Idea of the University, edited by Karl Deutsch,
translated by H.A.T. Reiche and H.F. Vander Schmidt, (Beacon Press:
Boston, 1959), page 40.

 

of the whole man, for education in the broadest sense of the term."*

 

—7

*Loc. cit., page 3.

 

So that, while Jaspers sees the functions as three-fold, still the end in
View is centered in the person.
The Spanish philosopher, Ortega y Gasset, in his delightful and

stimulating book, Mission of the University, writes,
"...the organization of higher education, the construction of the

university, must be based upon the student, and not upon the pro-

fessor or upon knowledge. The university must be the projection

of the student to the scale of an institution. And his two di-

mensions are, first, what he is--a being of limited learning capa-

city-~and second, what he needs to know in order to live his life?*

 

*Ortega y Gasset, Jose, Mission of the University, (Princeton
University Press: Princeton, 1944), page 70.

 

Obviously, a university built upon these principles would be person-
centered.
Sir Herbert Grierson, looking to the words of John Stuart Mill
as his guide in determining the function of universities, said,
"A University is not a place of professional education. Univer-
sities are not intended to teach the knowledge required to fit men
for some special mode of gaining a livelihood....Its function is

not to make skillful lawyers or physicians or engineers, but
capable and cultivated human beings."*

 

*Grierson, Herbert John C., The University_and A Liberal Education,
(Oliver and Boyd: London, N.D.), page 2.

 

That this is the only function of higher education we may question, but

it can be agreed that it is egg of the functions and a very important one.
Gordon Chalmers recognizes that the aim of teaching the young has

always been associated with a common concern for the society--the city,

or the nation. He cites this in Sparta and The Republic of Plato and in

 

the charters of the early New England colleges. He further notes that
today this is still generally considered the end of education. This sense
of social responsibility within the last two decades, as Chalmers points
out, has led to a twofold conception. First, that school and college
students should be treated in the mass, and second, that the group atti-
tude on specific questions should be the chief concern of teachers. In
criticizing this view, Chalmers contrasts it with liberal education} which
as viewed by him, is clearly person-centered. He writes,

"The liberal aim is, of course, to increase the number of indi-

viduals who are competent to think and act on their own. To

many an educationist this aim means mere skill in thinking. But

it involves as well the ability to establish for one's self a

standard by which to determine what is most worth thinking about'
and doing."*

 

*Chalmers, Gordon, The Republic and the Person: A Discussion of
Necessities in Modern American Education, (Henry Regnery Company:
Chicago, 1952), pages 31-32.

 

Chalmers, in agreeing with Werner Jaeger that education is centered in
the society, and that the improvement of the society comes through indi-
viduals, reasons that ultimately education must be centered in the indi-

vidual. Jaeger writes,

5

"Every nation which has reached a certain stage of development
is instinctively impelled to practice education. Education is
the process by which a community preserves and transmits its
physical and intellectual character...but men can transmit their
social and intellectual nature only by exercising the qualities
through which they created it--reason and conscious will...
education is not a practice which concerns the individual alone:
it is essentially a function of the community. The character of
the community is expressed in the individuals who compose it;
...the community is the source of all behavior. The formative
influence of the community on its members is most constantly
active in its deliberate endeavor to educate each new generation
of individuals so as to make them in its own image."*

 

*Jaeger, Werner, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, translated
by Highet, Gilbert (Oxford University Press: New York, 1945),
Volume I, pp.XIII and XIV.

 

 

It is true that Jaeger views the community as being the educational
agent, and that the purpose is not individual but communal, yet the
method is through the development of the individual, especially his
reason and conscious will.

In another place Chalmers says,

"The learning and thinking requisite to a critical understanding
of the basis of American liberty begin with some grasp of the
individual and his nature. This learning relies upon the con-
stancy of the norm of human conduct, and it has rightly been
said that the whole effort of mind called liberal education may
be described as the approach to that norm. The object of study
is multifarious, rich, varied, disparate, many-faceted. But the
end in view is that surprisingly single, integrated, purposeful,
and steady creature, Man."*

 

*Chalmers, Gordon. Op. cit., p. 55.

 

There is no question but what he refers here to a person-centered
education.

Another college administrator, William H. Lewis, formerly presi-
dent of Lafayette College, points out the person-centered function of

0

education in these words,

6

"Briefly, it is the aim of the college to prepare men to live the
abundant life. And this can be accomplished by implanting the
desire and developing the ability of each individual to be truly
successful in his life work, by stimulating an abiding sense of
his responsibility as a citizen and by showing him how to utilize
his leisure time in the enjoyment of ennobling avocations."*

 

#Lewis, William M., From a College Platform, (Lincoln MacVeagh,
Dial Press, Incorporated: New York, 1932), pages 141-142.

 

He goes on to say that any school that is so large as to view its students
as numbers is too large. The school that cannot know the problems and

1 possibilities of a student is too large. Largeness and greatness are not
the same, for, "Any system of schooling which neglects the individual for

the grodp misses the mark."*

 

*Loc. cit., page 93.

J

Mark Van Doren, for many years a beloved teacher in the East,
also saw liberal education as being centered in the person. However,
since his definition of a person differs from that of Lewis, his education
also differs. He saw the essential element of the person as being the
intellect, and therefore,

"The conscious business of education is with the intellect. The
intellectual virtues, however, are many and difficult, and some
of them are native only to the farthest reaches of self-education.
These are the speculative virtues of understanding, science, and
wisdom, with which the highest education does what it can. The
arts of the intellect, as distinguished from its virtues, can be
taught; and the traditional duty of the college is to teach them.
They are root faculties without which there can be no further
manhood... There is no companion comparable to a mind that can be
used; none more trustworthy or agreeable."*

 

*Van Doren, Mark, Liberal Education,(Beacon Press: Boston, 1959),
page 62. . o

 

 

In another place he writes, "The opportunity of the college is to open up
the realm of reason, not as a mapped place where any tourist may go in
comfort but as the least familiar of human regions, though it is a region

where only men can feel at home."* Education must deal with reason, but

 

*Loc. cit., page 100.

 

not for reason's sake. Reason is of such importance because it is so

human, so eSsential to a developed, rich person. For this very reason,

because liberal education is person-centered, must it deal with reason.
Elton Trueblood writes,

"The college is to be judged by the quality of its human product.
The test of a successful college education is not to be found in
the amount of knowledge which the graduates take away with them,
most of which will be forgotten in any case, but rather by the
appetite to know, by the determination to continue the educational
process, and by the ability to think and act maturely. The
purpose of a college is the production of persons who are both
more civilized and more civilizing."*

 

*Trueblood, Elton, The Idea of a College, (Harper and Brothers:
New York, 1959), page 62.

 

 

He then proceeds to describe a college, both in its curricular and
extra-curricular activities, that will encourage the development of such
persons. The idea of his college is clearly person-centered.

William Neilson and Carl Wittke, in a book dealing with the
function of higher education, state this function as, "to emancipate the
human spirit from prejudice and ignorance, and to teach men and women to
use their freedom in a spirit of respect for the rights of others, and

with a high regard for justice."*

 

*Neilson, William A. and Wittke, Carl F., The Function of Higher
Education, (Northwestern University: Evanston, 1943), page 52.

 

 

These authors also see education as related to the society in that the
end product is citizens, but these citizens are persons and it is the
emancipation of these human spirits which is the means to sane and sound
progress. In order to do this we must concern ourselves with the devel-
opment of proficiencies, attitudes and capacities. We must have both
something to think about and an ability to think, but it is developed
persons that have these abilities.

Donald Cowling and Carter Davidson, two college administrators,
also see the purpose of liberal education as centered in the person.
They point out a distinction between a university and a college and sug-
gest that the distinction is just this, that a college is centered in
the student and a university in the search for knowledge.

"This relationship between teacher and student represents the
fundamental purpose of a true college; all other features of its
program, including administration and finance, should be subser-
vient to this end...;The interest of a college teacher centers

in the student and not in the progress of knowledge as such, impor-

tant as that may be. Upon this distinction rests the difference
between a true college and a true university."*

 

*Cowling, Donald J. and Davidson, Carter, Colleges for Freedom,
(Harper and Brothers: New York, 1947), page 92.

 

In another place they write,

"The purpose of liberal education is not realized in the selection
and arrangement of courses in accordance with any pattern or
method but in the happiness and significance of the lives of those
who are influenced by the programs adopted. The chief danger in
curriculum planning is that it will eventually be made to serve
the purpose of some educational theory or philosophical point of
view or of some vested interest rather than the welfare of the

student himself... Each college, therefore, should seek more
aggressively to build and administer its curriculum to enable
the student to develop a truly integrated personality. More
individualized instruction and guidance, more flexibility in
requirements, less domination by departments during the period
of general education, and more encouragement to seminar and
honors and tutorial work are steps in this direction."*

 

*Loc. Cit., page 74.

 

Here is an acknowledgement that all higher education is not centered in
the person, but that part which is, is of great importance.

Samuel Gould, former president of Antioch College, suggests the
same person-centered function of higher education in these words, "We
must never forget for even a moment that the primary job of education is
to develop people, not technicians, and that this is not yet of particu-

lar moment to the Russians."*

 

*Gould, Samuel B., Knowledge is not Enough, (Antioch Press: Yellow
Springs, Ohio, 1959), page 98.

 

Whereas all of these authors have agreed that there is such a
thing as a person-centered function of higher education, there has been
no agreement as to what the person is. Usually it is evident that some
definition of person has been assumed, but rarely in these writers has
this definition been explicated. The fact that some such definition is
assumed by so many writers, yet not explicated, may be an indication that
there is thought to be a common concept as to what a person is. The
following chapter seems to indicate that such an assumption is not valid.
On the other hand, the lack of clarity as to what constitutes a person

in educational writings may come about because a particular concept of

10
higher education is assumed, and the ideas regarding the nature of a
person are derived from or conformed to this formulation.

Whatever the reason may be, a detailed analysis of a person-
centered higher education must begin with a consideration of what a per-
son is. Only after the deve10pment of some view as to the nature of a
person can a consideration of education Suitable to such a being be
made. Accordingly, the following chapter will deal with various con-
cepts as to the nature of a person. The formulations of selected social
scientists, philOSOphers and theologians will be considered. The writers
selected were chosen on the basis of two criteria:

1) Their eminence in their field of study, and

2) The contribution each makes to the total fbrmulation or

working hypothesis for use in this dissertation.

In such an examination it is soon evident that these writers or
these disciplines present no ready-made commonly accepted definition or
description. This is in part due to the differing nature of the disci-
plines. The social scientists deal primarily upon the basis of scien-
tific methodology, seeking a descriptive-predictive concept. The phil-
osophers center their interest in not that which is amenable to empirical
verification, nor what a person will do, but what should a person be and
do. Theologians, while acknowledging the condition in which man now
finds himself, also look to that which man should be, but see the ful-
fillment of these possibilities through a relationship to others and
to God.

The lack of agreement may be, in part, due to the greatness, the

almost infinite possibilities with which man was created. They may be

ll
of such a magnitude as to exceed the bounds of our present knowledge.
If this be the case, then each of the disciplines may present a true
picture, but not an adequate one.

If all that can be said about a person is that we have no ade-
quate definition, then there is little hope of developing a person-
centered higher education. There must be something that is distinctive
about a person if the term person-centered education is to have any
meaning, if such an education is to be differentiated from any other
form of education or training.

The third part of this consideration will, therefore, consist of
a consideration of that which is distinctive to a person--a working
formulation, for use in developing generalizations applicable to a system
of higher education. These generalizations, and their application to

higher education, will constitute the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER II

DEFINITIONS OF PERSON

A. Social Scientists

Social scientists by virtue of the nature of their work are pri-
marily interested in that which a man does. They concentrate upon a
description and explanation of what man is as seen through what he does.
The psychologists are primarily concerned with this individual as an

individual whereas the sociolo ist's chief concern is with the rou of
, g g P

O
I

which the individual is but a member.

1. Robert Thorndike
Robert Thorndike, a psychologist from Teachers College, presents
a view quite representative of the area of psychology which emphasizes

measurement and evaluation. As might be expected, he does not differen-

tiate between person and individual, for the distinction between them is
not subject to empirical validation. The two areas of concern to him
are what a person can do and what he will do; that is, the measures of
ability and personality. Observational procedure must be based on what
a person does, and thus his actions become the basic material to be

studied. Thorndike says,

"What does it mean to 'know an individual'? Fundamentally, to
know an individual means to be able to describe him accurately
and fully. If we know Mary Jones well, we can describe not only
how she looks--how tall she is and how heavy, the color of her
hair and eyes, the birthmark under her chin. Much more impor-
tantly, we can describe what she can and will do--how she will
dress, what she is likely to talk about, what she will be inter-
ested in, what types of tasks she can do and how well she can

do them, how she will respond to stresses and strains of one
sort and another. To know a person completely means to be able
to describe him completely, to predict how he will behave in
every possible situation. Obviously, we are far, far away from
this objective, and we always will be. It represents the star
to which we hitch our wagon."*

12

l3

 

*Thorndike, Robert L. and Hagen, Elizabeth, Measurement and Evalu-
ation in Psychology and Education, (John Wiley and Sons, Inc.:
New York, 1956), page 8.

 

 

In these terms, to know a person is identical to the knowledge
of rockets or white rats or guinea pigs. It is to be able to describe
all that and only that which may be subsumed under empirical terms and
to be able to predict completely a person's behavior. All of this is
part of what a person--a particular person-~is, but only part, and it

neglects entirely that which a person should be.

2. Clyde Kluckhohn

Clyde Kluckhohn, an anthropologist, wrote that the personality
is "the continuity of functional forms and forces manifested through
sequences of organized regnant processes and overt behaviors from birth

to death."*

 

*Kluckhohn, Clyde and Murray, Henry, Personality in Nature, Society,
and Culture, (Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 1956), page 49.

 

 

 

In this definition, organization is the outstanding quality of
personality, and since the seat of this organization is the brain, the
brain takes on major importance.' The personality is like music in that
it may be studied or seen at the present moment in all of its aspects,
and as such it is comparable to harmony. Or, it may be seen in its
duration or sequences, and as such it is comparable to melody.

With other social scientists, Kluckhohn pays great heed to the

functions of personality, and he lists them as:

14

"... to allow for the periodic regeneration of energies by sleep;
to exercise its processes; to express its feelings and valuations;
to reduce successive need-tensions; to design serial programs for
the attainments of distant goals; to reduce conflicts between
needs by following schedules which result in a harmonious way of
life; to rid itself of certain persisting tensions by restricting
the number and lowering the levels of goals to be attained; and,
finally, to reduce conflicts between personal dispositions and
social sanctions, between vagaries of antisocial impulses and the
dictates of the superego by successive compromise formations...."*

 

*Ibid

 

Kluckhohn sees this personality as more than just an object
which is inert or dead but one that within itself has great powers of
organization, and because these powers of organization lie within the
personality itself, he believes that it is almost impossible for a full
comprehension of this personality or these patterns of states to be known
without the aid of subjective reports. But still the personality is
basically seen by what the individual does, a descriptive, predictive
approach is still fundamental for Kluckhohn. Prediction is possible
because of-continuity of functional forces, because of organization.
Here is the introduction of the idea of rationality, for this organiza-
tion is not something outside the personality, it is within, a function

of the personality.

3. Karl Mannheim

Karl Mannheim, an eminent sociologist, as would be expected,
emphasized the impact of society upon the individual rather than the
biological structure of the individual or the organization that takes
place within him. The basis of personality is uniqueness but not‘merely

a biological uniqueness. This uniqueness lies on the level of personality

15

formation. Personality is"

...that kind of organization of the mind,
specific to each individual, by which, through his mutual interaction

with the environment, he develops a pattern of inner organization which

is unique in itself."* This definition in emphasizing organization and

 

*Mannheim,‘Karl, Essays on Sociology and Social Psycholggy, (Oxford
University Press: New York, 1953), page 278.

 

 

the mind has much in common with Kluckhohn. The primary difference comes
in the greater emphasis upon the role of the social system in the "mutual
interaction with the environment." He says man is not born, but

"conditioned."* In the series of four lectures given at Manchester

 

*Op. cit., page 288.

 

College, Oxford, in 1938, Mannheim discusses the question whether a
planned society can produce uniqueness of personality, since personality
is a form of adjustment. Since man is conditioned by the society, a
rigid, conforming society would condition all alike, there would be no
uniqueness. The only society that can produce uniqueness in personality,
he proposes, is that society needing pioneering or differing types, and
democracy is such a society.

Mannheim also distinguishes between the essence of a person and
the social mask. He distinguishes the essence as the "inner spirit of

man" or the "innermost nature" and again the "purely personal self."*

 

*Mannheim, Karl, Systematic Sociology, (Philosophical Library:
New York, 1958), page 54.

 

 

In Speaking in this manner he uses existential terms. In this case, the

16
social mask and the existential person are both integrally involved in
the cultural climate, and the distance between the two is at least, in
a very major part, again the result of the cultural climate.
Mannheim, while still using descriptive-predictive terms, adds
to the conceptions as given by Thorndike and Kluckhohn, the emphasis of
the role that the society plays upon the formation of the personality,

and the distinction between the person and the social mask.

4. Talcott Parsons
Talcott Parsons, a sociologist with a strong background in
economics, also views the personality in its basic relationship to the

society. He defines the personality as
"...the totality of observable unit acts described in their context

of relation to a single actor. But, this is to a greater or less

degree an organic system of action and as such has in its totality

emergent properties not deducible from those of the unit acts

taken atomistically."*

4

*Parsons, Talcott, The Structure of Social Action, (The Free Press:
Glencoe, 1949), page 746.

 

A

These unit acts may be described from various levels. The levels are
not discrete but overlapping, and, in fact, overarching. They may be
deScribed through the three analytical social sciences of organized
action systems, that is, economics, politics, and sociology. These
aspects of the personality are called the "social component of person-

ality."* The application of such a social analysis still leaves a

 

*Op. cit., page 769.

 

residue of data which may be referable to heredity. Psychology is the

17
science concerned with action systems derivable from this hereditary
basis of personality.

Parsons clearly shows that much of what a personality is, is
derived from the society. An integrated personality is that personality
in which the things the person values morally are also the things he
desires, that is, that his values correspond to his hedonistic desires
or the objects of his affection. The moral values are inculcated from

early childhood and are "deeply built into the structure of personality

itself."* These moral patterns or moral sentiments are dependent upon

 

*Parsons, Talcott, Essays in Sociological Theory--Revised Edition,
(The Free Press: Glencoe, 1954), page 57.

 

the support of the majority of the members of a society, whereas the

desires and objects of affection are more personal. The well-integrated
personality is the one in which the desires and the moral values are the
same. 'Thus, the well-integrated personality feels an obligation to live
up to the expectations of the various roles put upon him by the society.
The self-interest then corresponds to institutionally approved patterns,

to institutional status and role.* An integrated personality, then, is

 

*Op. cit., pages72-73.

 

dependent upon an integrated social system which introjects moral values
corresponding to hedonic satisfactions and objects of affection. Not
only does the personality have organizing powers, but the society, too,
must be organized in order to bring together the incubated values and

the personal desires.

18
5. Gordon Allport
Gordon Allport, an eclectic psychologist, defines the personality
as "the dynamic organization within the individual of those psycho-

physical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment."*

 

*Allport, Gordon, Personality, A Psycholggical Interpretation,
(Henry Holt and Company: New York, 1937), page 48.

 

In this definition, Allport agrees with Kluckhohn in his biological
emphasis, and yet seems to leave considerably more room for an expansion
of the role of the society or the environment about him. Infthis he takes
a position much closer to Mannheim and Parsons. Allport speaks of the
personality as being a real thing, not merely a logical entity for the
convenience of hypotheses. The ultimate reality of the psychological
organization is traits; that is, determining tendencies or predisposi-
tions to respond. These traits are not merely nominal, they have an
independent existence and account for the consistency of behavior within-
the individual.

The "prOprium" is that which provides the root of consistency
that marks attitudes, intentions, and evaluations. This proprium in-
cludes self-identity, self-esteem, self-extension, rational thinking,
knowing, self-image, and striving.

While the other social scientists considered have placed great
emphasis upon the past in the formation of personality--the interaction
of the environment and the person--for Allport it is not the past that
provides the key to future action, but the intended future.

The traits and intentions and the prOprium all form a dynamic

organization--that is, an organization within the psychophysical systems.

19
By this he would suggest that personality is neither exclusively mental
nor physical, but includes the organization of both body and mind into
a personal unity which is unique within itself.

Allport differs from many other social scientists in that he
maintains reservations about the sufficiency of the experimental approach.
While the experimental approach is a necessary avenue of study, he main-
tains that the human being may be too complex to be completely understood
through this means alone.

The social scientists, through their objective, empirical ap-
proach, have presented a basis upon which to build a concept of person.
The following points have been stressed: (1) A person is a psycho-
physical being, neither only mind nor only body. (2) A person develops
through the interaction of this biological being with the environment.
(3) The environment and culture with which the person interacts have a
great deal to do with the development of the person, including the
development of goals and moral values, and (4) The person, through his
intelligence, develops a unique pattern organization which gives direc-
tion and meaning to life.

While these generalizations are necessary and good, they do not
appear to be adequate, for they do not provide a complete definition of
the person. This might be expected for, as some of the social scientists
sensed, the objective, empirical method of study itself is limited and
so it would be expected that the generalizations growing out of such a
study would be correspondingly quite limited.

Joseph Tussman in his essay on political philosophy points out

two radically distinct views and perspectives from which political life

20

may be studied. He says,

"First, there is the perspective of the external observer concerned
with the description of political behavior. This is continuous

with the interest and prediction of such behavior since, of course,
an adequate description may reveal patterns which form the basis

of prediction. This perspective, intrinsic to most of what is called
'social science,‘ might, then, be called 'descriptive-predictive.'
Brought to bear upon the political agent or decision-maker its

basic question is 'what will he do?'"*

 

*Tussman, Joseph, Obligation and the Body Politic, (Oxford University
Press: New York, 1960), page 12.

 

Tussman is speaking here of political behavior and political science,

but the distinction he makes is applicable to all of the social sciences
and indeed to the various definitions of man or personality. The social
scientists quoted previously all fall within this "descriptive-predictive"
tradition. In general, their definitions may be summed up by the defi-
nition given in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences; personality is
"the totality of those aspects of behavior which give meaning to an
individual in society and differentiate him from other members in the

community,.each of whom embodies countless cultural patterns in a unique

configuration."*

 

*Engyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (Macmillan Company: New
York, 1937), Volume XII, page 85.

 

Tussman goes on to say,
"...there is the point of view, not of the observer, but of the
person (or persons) within a tribunal confronting his task. And

this task is not predicting but deciding; the question is not what
will I do but what should I do. I shall call this essentially
'normative' or 'practical' perSpective, the 'perspective of action.‘

21
". . It may happen, not infrequently, that the answers to 'what
will he do?‘ and 'what should I do?‘ will be the same. Actors
sometimes do what they should do. But this happy circumstance
should not obscure the basic distinction."*

 

*Ibid.

 

This distinction is quite clearly seen in the conclusions drawn by

Kinsey, et. al. to their research regarding the sexual behavior in the

I" .
human male. They say, '

"The six types of sexual activity, ...may seem to fall into cate-
gories that are as far apart as right and wrong, licit and illicit,
normal and abnormal, acceptable and unacceptable in our social
organization. In actuality, they all prove to originate in the
relatively simple mechanisms which provide for erotic response
when there are sufficient physical or psychic stimuli.

"To each individual, the significance of any particular type of
sexual activity depends very largely upon his previous experience.
Ultimately, certain activities may seem to him to be the only
things that have value, that are right, that are socially accept-
able; and all departures from his own particular pattern may seem
to him to be enormous abnormalities... As scientists, we have
explored, and we have performed our function when we have published
the record of what we have found the human male doing sexually,

as far as we have been able to ascertain that fact."*

 

*Kinsey, Alfred C., Pomeroy, Wardell B., and Martin, Clyde B.,
Sexual Behavior in the Human Male, (W. B. Saunders Company:
Philadelphia, 1948), page 678.

 

 

Upon the basis of this "objective" study of what men do, it is hoped
that recommendations regarding laws and punishments may be established.
Much of what they have found, because it is common, is taken to be
normal, and others have carried this argument on to the place where that
which is the average becomes the normal. This eventually leads to the
conclusion that what man does is what man should do, that there is no

distinction between the "ought" and the "is."

22
Social scientists, using the descriptive-predictive approach,

shy away from thé normative. To differentiate themselves from this

"unscientific,' almost superstitious" acceptance of that which can
neither be seen nor measured, and in a very real sense, does not even
exist--that which man is ideally, or what man should be--they use the
term personality, rather than person. The philosophers and theologians,
however, using terms such as person or self, do direct themselves to a
normative definition. As Robert Browning wrote:

" 'Tis not what man does that exalts him

But what man would do."

B. Philosophers
l. Aristotle

Aristotle, by means of the logical method of division, defines
man. He does not speak of the person nor of the self, but his consider-
ations of the nature of man most closely approximate the subject herein
considered, and out of this definition have come many of the succeeding
definitions of man. Man, like other forms of living things, is a com-
posite being made up of body and soul. The body is the substance, a
composite of matter and form; the material cause. The soul, on the
other hand, is the form of a natural body endowed with the capacity for

life. It is an entity which realizes an idea.* In having both body and

 

*Aristotle, Aristotle's Psychology, Translated by William Alexander
Hammond (Swan Sonnenschein and Company: London, 1902), II, 412A,
pages 42-44.

 

 

soul, as defined by Aristotle, man is no different from other forms of

life. The uniqueness of man is found in the idea or the function of man.

23
This function is certainly not merely the matter of life, for both plants
.
and animals have this, nor is it in mere activity, for again animals
move, nor yet in irrational action, but it lies within the area of ration-
al activity. Aristotle describes the function of man as ”practical life
of the rational part... the function of man is an activity of soul in

O

accordance with the reason, or not independently of reason."* This

 

*Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by J. E. C. Welldon,
(Macmillan and Company: London, 1892), I, 6, pages 15-16.

 

rational activity of man is the unique function of man or the expression
of the nature of man, and out of this conception comes Aristotle's
ethics. This rational activity is equated with moral goodness. Man can
achieve this moral goodness only within a polis or a political associa-

tion. "

... man is by nature an animal intended to live in a polis. He
who is without a polis by reason of his own nature and not of some acci-

dent, is either a poor sort of being, or a being higher than man...."*

 

*Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, translated by Ernest Barker,
(Oxford: London, 1952), I, ii, paragraph 9, page 5.

 

It is through this association that concepts of good and evil, justice
and injustice, are developed. Thus, a man who is not a part of such a
political association or who has no need to share is already self-

sufficient and he must be either a beast or a god.* Since moral perfection

 

‘ *Loc. cit., pages 6,7.

 

is only possible within this association, since we are dependent one
upon the other, and justice is the ordering of such a political associa-

tion, it follows that ethics would be primarily concerned with politics

24
and this is, in fact, just the consideration that Aristotle makes.
Aristotle differentiates between the functions of man as a citizen and
the functions of man as man. Man as a citizen will have various func-
tions and excellence relates to these various functions, but excellence
as a man is only related to the proper function of man, that is, moral
perfection as seen in the activity in accordance with reason. The ideal
state would call forth the functions corresponding to the ideal man or
person.

Since the development of the nature of man is dependent upon an
association, a political association, a sharing, then Aristotle must
deal with the ordering of such an association and he does, indeed, give
a description of such an ideal state. Aristotle, in describing states
as they are (and thus people as they are) distinguishes between that
which is and that which should be, between the actual and the normative.
He does not permit himself to accept that which is as being that which

should be.

2. John Locke

John Locke emphasizes three aspects of personality, all closely
related. The first of these is rationality; that is, a person is a
"thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times

and laces... "* This rationalit is the basis for the second as ect:
P y P

 

*Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (James Kay,
Jr., and Company: Philadelphia, N.D.), page 210. '

 

self-awareness or self-consciousness. This self-consciousness, springing

25
from the rationality, is the self. Contrary to later writers such as
Dewey and Kilpatrick, the self is one continuous self, in that it consists
of an awareness of past activity. Locke does not differentiate between
person and self. The third aspect, which is the unavoidable concomitant
of consciousness, is happiness. The rational self is aware that it is,
that it acts, that it thinks, and it inevitably desires that the self

that it is should be happy.* Locke does not treat the matter of uncon-

 

*Loc. cit., page 217.

 

scious action, dreams and such, nor unreasonable and unreflective action,
and perhaps this is not at all necessary. He is pointing out not the
total constituents of a person, but the necessary elements.

These three constituents, that is, rationality, self-awareness,
leading to happiness, provide the basis for a view of the human being as
expounded in the political treatises of Locke. In these writings, Locke
assumes that man is a moral being, that he has reason, that he is aware
of himself, and that he seeks happiness. He further says that men are

by nature "all free, equal, and independent."* These free men may join

 

*Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government, (Hafner Publishing Com-
'pany: New York, 1947), Second treatise, Chapter 8, paragraph 95,
page 168.

 

 

together by their own consent to form a political society, and it is
only this free consent which can give beginning to any lawful government

in the world.* These free men consent to turn some of their rights over

 

*Op. cit., paragraph 99, page 170.

 

26

to a government determined by them in order to protect their property
with the end of achieving happiness. Such an act is a moral act. Ani-
mals may join into packs or herds. They may unite momentarily and then
break up, but the form is the same within the various species, and the
basis of the union is instinctual, whereas man may consent or not consent
to join and he makes out of this union the form of government that he
desires.

The contract is one of the means by which men are able to shape
their own lives. Locke says, "Men's happiness or misery is most part

J4

of their own making."n This ability is distinctively human and thus is

 

*Locke, John, The Educational Writings of John Locke, edited by
John William Adamson, (University Press: Cambridge, 1922), page 25.

 

 

implicit in the consideration of a person.

3. Immanuel Kant
Immanuel Kant does not expressly state a definition of a person,

but from his considerations of ethics as seen in Principles of the

 

Metaphysic of Ethics, a definition can be deduced. With Aristotle and

 

Locke, Kant begins with the rationality of man. Likewise with Aristotle

he recognizes the necessity of a society, a political community. And

with Locke he agrees that man enters into this community by agreement of

one form or anqther. But he adds to these two conceptions the conception
that values are of differing import. There is a hierarchy in values,

and thus in imperatives. Hypothetical imperatives are imperatives be-

cause they are means to an end while other imperatives may be categorica1---

that is, they are imperatives because they are ends in themselves. The

O

27
latter are of greater import than the former. He also adds a richer
description of what this morality of which the human being is capable
consists in, and in the last place he pronounces as his categorical im-
perative that all men are ends in themselves and never to be treated
merely as means.
Kant wrote,

"Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone

have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws,

that is, according to principles, i.e., have a will. Since the

deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is
nothing but practical reason."*

 

 

If

*Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Practical Reason, translated by Thomas
Abbott, (Longmans, Green and Company: London, 1889), page 29.

 

A perfectly good will would always act by choice and by desire accord-
ing to principle, but man, not always having a perfect will, must act
not in accordance to desire, but often quite apart from desire according

to principle. Such action is duty and is the moral act of mankind.

The first formulation of the categorical imperative is: "Act

 

only 23 the maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should

 

become a universal law."* This is a form of the universal law, but if it

 

 

 

*Op. cit., page 38.

 

is to be such a maxim that I could wish it to become universal law, it
must be drawn from the conception of that which is an end for everyone
because it is an end in itself. Out of this comes the second formulation

of the categorical imperative. "Sp act fig pp treat humanity, whether ip

 

thine own person p£_ip that p£_any other, ip every case as an end withal,

never as means only."* This follows since every man considers his own

28

 

*Op. cit., page 47.

 

existence as an end, and so does every other man on the same rational
principle; therefore, every man should treat every other man as an end.
The third form of this categorical imperative combines the first two.

It is expressed in these words, "Act on maxims which can at the same time

 

 

have for their object themselves as universal laws pf nature.”*

 

 

 

*Op. cit., page 56.

 

Men of good will acting morally or rationally in accordance with
the categorical imperative, each being a legislative being, working to-
gether form a kingdom of ends. This kingdom of ends has as its members
persons who are_at the same time moral legislatbrs and moral agents,
sovereigns and subjects, and its laws are not uniformities of sequence
as natural laws, but imperatives enjoining mutual consideration and
respect. Each person acts in every case as a legislating member in the
universal kingdom of ends; but at the same time, he voluntarily subjects
himself to these same laws that he legislates, and as such a moral being
he has dignity.

" ...neither fear nor inclination, but simply respect for the

law, is the spring which can give actions a moral worth. Our
own will, so far as we suppose it to act only under the condi-
tion that its maxims are potentially universal laws, this ideal
will which is possible to us is the proper object of respect,
and the dignity of humanity consists just in this capacity of
being universally legislative, though with the condition that
it is itself subject to this same legislation."*

 

*Op. cit., page 59. ,

 

29

4. John Dewey

John Dewey, both a philosopher and educator of the pragmatist
school, does not use person as a technical term. He does, however, treat
"the self" and this term seems to be the closest approximation to person
as used herein that can be found in Dewey's writings. He, with the
other philosophers cited, lays great stress on the rationality (or
intelligence) of man and upon the necessity for man to come into rela-
tionship with other men and to enter into some society. He also stresses
the moral nature of man and demonstrates that this moral nature results
in the necessity for a person to make choices.

He, as the social scientists, emphasizes the importance of the
culture and the environment upon the formation of the self or person.
This "self is not something ready-made, but something in continuous

”7’:

formation through choice of action.... He further identifies self and

 

*Dewey, John, Democracy,and Education, (The Macmillan Company:
New York, 1916), page 408.

 

 

interest by saying that the kind and amount of interest actively taken
in a thing reveals the qualitv of self which exists. This self is in
continuous formation through the choice of action--that is,

”It is the business of men to develop such capacities and desires,
such selves as render them capable of finding their own satis-
faction, their invaluable value, in fulfilling the demands which
grow out of their associated life... Such a person has found
himself, and has solved the problem in the only place and in the
only way in which it can be solved: 13 action."*

 

*Dewey, John, Ethics, (Henry Holt and Company: New York, 1926),
page 396. ‘

 

Morality is the "constant discovery, formation, and reformation of the

30

self in the ends which an individual is called upon to sustain and

”7’:

develop in virtue of his membership in a social whole.

 

*Op. cit., pages 396-397.

 

This self is continually reformed and recreated or redirected
out of the old self. It results from the interaction of the individual
or the present self with the environment; thus, what we are comes to us
"from others, by education, tradition and the suggestion of the environ-

I
"7:

ment.

 

*Dewey, John, Human Nature and Conduct, (The Modern Library: New
York, 1950), page 314.

 

 

By conscious choice of action and the quality of the environment,
the self may expand or contract, it may develop or die, it may become
more inclusive or more exclusive. Reason, or intelligence, is essential
since it is the conscious choice of action that forms the self, this
choice being dependent upon reason. The self is not an isolated being,
but comes into being only as it comes into relationship with the environ-
ment and specifically the culture which is the result of other human,
beings. Dewey provides a framework for the choice of values in that he
says the value of choices is dependent upon the probably consequences of
the acts.

These philosophers, adding to the empirical method the method
of logic, have entered into normative considerations. All have empha-
sized the importance of the rationality of man. They have also given
greater consideration than the social scientists to the culture, that

which is shaped by man. Men must relate to one another, but they decide

31
what type of a relationship this shall be. In choosing, man shapes both
himself and his culture.

Theologians, both Jewish and Christian, add the knowledge gained
from revelation to that coming from both observation and logic. Given
that there is a God who has revealed both Himself and the nature of man,
then the relationship between God and man becomes a necessary part of

the person.

C. Theologians

 

1. St. Augustine
St. Augustine, along with the social scientists and the philo-
sophers, emphasizes the importance of the rationality of man and the very

title of his treatise, The City of God, implies some kind of a community

 

or communion. But St. Augustine describes this community in quite
different terms, for, as would be expected, the community is based on a
proper relationship to God. Man, being made in the image of God, is by
nature moral and has the possibility of doing that which is righteous
or of doing that which is unrighteous--that is, sin. At the same time,
being made in the image of God provides the basis for the worth of each
person.

He emphasizes three things in this discussion of the nature of
man or the human soul: (1) God made man in his own image--he says of
this, "God, then, made man in His own image. For He created for him a
soul endowed with reason and intelligence, so that he might excell all

the creatures of earth, air, and sea, which were not so gifted."*

 

*Saint Augustine, The City of God, translated by Marcus Dods, (The
Modern Library: New York, 1950), page 407.

 

 

32
It is the soul of man that constitutes the image of God. Augustine
seems to derogate the body.
The second point he makes is that God made man from one indivi-
dual and thus all human beings are related. He wrote,

"God, desiring not only that the human race might be able by
their similarity of nature to associate with one another, but also
that they might be bound together in harmony and peace by the
ties of relationship, was pleased to derive all men from one
individual, and created man with such a nature that the members
of the race should not have died, had not the two first (of whom
the one was created out of nothing, and the other out of him)
merited this, by their disobedience; for by them so great a sin
was committed, that by it the human nature was altered for the
worse, and was transmitted also to their posterity, liable to sin
and subject to death."*

 

r

*Op. cit., page 441.

 

Though there are found diverse tribes, languages, and cultures,
yet that which is essential to man is common to all men. The third
point is that the soul, being endowed with reason and intelligence, was
also free to act on its own accord and the sin of Adam and Eve resulted ,
in the fall of man so that all men became sinners. The redemption
through God has resulted in two ways of life and two allegiances; one
the City of God and the other the City of Man. Those in the City of Man
will obey only a part of man--that is the flesh. Those in the City of
God become, in our terms, a whole man in that they obey not just a part
of man.

"When, therefore, man lives according to man, not according to
God, he is like the devil. Because not even an angel might live
according to an angel, but only according to God....When, then, a
man lives according to the truth, he lives not according to him-
self, but according to God; for He was God who said, 'I am the
truth.‘ When, therefore, man lives according to himself--that

is, according to man, not according to God--assuredly he lives
according to a lie."*

33

 

*Op. cit., page 445.

 

Thus, Augustine defines righteousness or goodness and unrighteousness

Righteousness, or moral living, is living not for oneself, but for God

and conversely unrighteousness is selfishness, or living dictated by
the flesh.
2. John Calvin

John Calvin in his compendium of theology entitled The Insti-
tutes of the Christian Religion does not clearly define the nature or
the person of man. In Chapters 14 and 15 he does discuss the persons
the Trinity, that is, the divine persOns, but does not define them in

such a way as to make the definition applicable to man.* In speaking

of

 

*Calvin, John, Institutes of the Christian Religion, translated
by John Allen, (Presbyterian Board of Christian Education:
Philadelphia, N.D.), Volume I, Book I, Chapter 13, page 144.

 

of man he follows Augustine very closely; however, he does enter into
more detail as to what is this image of God and what were the results

the fall of man. The image of God denotes
" ...the integrity which Adam possessed when he was endued with
the right understanding, when he had affections regulated by rea-
son, and all his senses governed in proper order, and when, in
the excellency of his nature, he truly resembled the excellence

of his Creator. And though the principal seat of the Divine Image

was in the mind and heart or in the soul and its faculties, yet
there was no part of man, not even the body, which was not a-
dorned with some rays of its glory. It is certain that the line-
aments of the Divine Glory are conspicuous in every part of the
world; whence it may be concluded that where the image of God is
said to be in man; there is implied a tacit antithesis, which
exalts man above all the creatures, and as it were, separates

him from the vulgar herd."*

of

34

 

*Op. cit., Book I, Chapter 15, page 208.

 

This imageship is constituted of the soul of man, that is, the
mind capable of distinguishing good from evil and just from unjust, and
discovering by the light of reason what ought to be pursued or avoided,
the will on which choice depends, and the faculties of reason, under-
standing, prudence, and judgment. Calvin also says, "In this integrity
man was endued with free will, by which, if he had chosen, he might have

obtained eternal life."*

 

*Op. cit., Book I, Chapter 15, pages 214-215.

 

In the fall of Adam all men have been polluted, for "sin has
possessed all the powers of the soul, since Adam departed from the

fountain of righteousness."* In this corruption man has lost his freedom

 

*02. cit., Book 11, Chapter 1, page 275.

 

of will, but "should, nevertheless, be instructed to aspire to the good
of which he is destitute, and to the liberty of which he is deprived;
O

and should be roused from indolence with more earnestness, than if he

were supposed to be possessed of the greatest strength.”* Through the

 

*Op. cit., Book II, pages 279-280.

 

grace of God as manifested in Jesus Christ, man may regain the condition
from whence he has fallen.
3. Augustus Hopkins Strong

Dr. Strong, a prominent Baptist theologian influential in the

development of Rochester Seminary and the University of Chicago, writing

35
about the turn of the century, followed Augustine and Calvin in holding
I.
that the essential character of the person is that man was made in the

image of God, and being in the image of God was in his original state

necessarily "very good." This image of God consists of a natural like-

ness to God--that is personality, and a moral likeness to God--that is

holiness.

In explaining the natural likeness to God, Dr. Strong defines

the personality as follows:
" ...man was created a personal being, and was by this person-
ality distinguished from the brute. By personality we mean
the twofold power to know self as related to the world and to
God, and to determine self in view of moral ends. By virtue of
this personality, man could at his creation choose which of the
objects of his knowledge--se1f, the world, or God--should be
the norm and center of his development. This natural likeness
to God is inalienable, and as constituting a capacity for re-
demption gives value to the life even of the unregenerate."*

 

*Strong, Augustus Hopkins, Systematic Theology, (The Judson Press:
Philadelphia, 1946), page 515.

 

I
The moral likeness of God consisted of holiness, the moral nature

means "those powers which fit him for right or wrong action. These
powers are intellect, sensibility, and will, together with that peculiar

power of discrimination and impulsion, which we call conscience."*

 

v

*Op. cit., page 497.

 

Man, in his forefather Adam, chose as his norm not God but himself, and
this is the.essence of sin. By voluntary choice, he broke the law of

God and made himself, rather than God, the center of his life.

4. Martin Buber
Martin Buber, the Jewish theologian-philosopher, emphasizes the

wholeness of man. He sees man as distinct and different from the world
about him, and man must see himself in this sense. Yet, in seeing him-
self as distinct and separate from the world about him, man does not
see himself in his entirety. Man cannot be known, he cannot answer the
question 'what is man?I through the study of the individual philosophical
sciences or social sciences.

"Philosophy succeeds in rendering...help in its individual disci-

plines precisely through each of these disciplines not reflecting,

and not being able to reflect, on the wholeness of man....in every

one of these disciplines the possibility of its achieving any-

thing in thought rests precisely on its objectification, on what
may be termed its 'dehumanization'."*

 

*Buber, Martin, Between Man and Man, translated by Ronald Smith,
(Kegan Paul: London, 1947), page 120 ff.

 

 

Man is not human because of his reason though reason'is speci-
fically human; nonreason is also specifically human. "Even man's_hun-
ger is not an animal's hunger._ Human reason is to be understood only
in connection with human non-reason. The problem of philosophical
anthropology is the problem of a specific totality and of,its Specific

structure."*

 

*Op. cit., page 160.

 

To Buber, each person, as he reaches out to others, becomes an
identity in order to relate to others. This relationship with others is
a community of existence rather than the encounter of two isolated

beings. Each person becomes responsible for freeing himself and finding

37
himself so that he may enter into this genuine relationship, this true
dialogue with others and with the universe. The I exists only as it

exists with another being.

"If I face a human being as my Thou, and say the primary word
I-Thou to him, he is not a thing among things, and does not
consist of things. Thus a human being is not Hg or REE:
bounded from every other Hg and She, a specific point in space
and time within the net of the world; nor is he a nature able
to be experienced and described, a loose bundle of named quali-
ties. But with no neighbor, and whole in himself, he is ThOu
and fills the heavens."*

 

 

*Buber, Martin, I and Thou, translated by Ronald Smith, (Charles
Scribner's Sons: New York, 1958), page 8.

h

 

Buber recognizes that man has rationality as do the other social
scientists, philosophers, and theologians, but insists that this is not
the entirety of man. He emphasizes that man is a whole being and that
he becomes a person as he comes into contact--vital contact-~with others.
5. Paul Tillich

Paul Tillich, a contemporary theologian, begins his consideration

of man or the person of man by saying that "man's existential situation

is a state of estrangement from his essential nature.”*

 

*Tillich, Paul, Systematic Theology, Volume II, (The University
of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1957), page 25.

 

 

Existence is the series of unreconciled conflicts which
threaten man. It is the process in which man becomes a thing and not a
person, in which man is dehumanized rather than giving expression to his
essential humanity. Essence is the potentiality of the human person.
The fall of man, as he sees the Biblical account, is a symbolical or

a mytholigical account of man's transition from essence to existence--

38 .

from what he is essentially to present existence and is not a once for
all account, but is the fact of all existence.

Man has a freedom, but it is a finite freedom. Because man
exists in the universe, every act is influenced by this universe.
"But freedom is the possibility of a total and centered act of the per-
sonality, an act in which all the drives and influences which constitute
the destiny of man are brought into the centered unity of a decision...

In this way the universe participates in every act of human freedom."*

!

 

*Op. cit., page 43.

 

This limitation of man's freedom by universal destiny brings
about the transition from essence to existence, and produces both his
moral and tragic character. As a result, man is estranged from the

ground of his being and from himself.*

 

*Op. cit., page 44.

 

Salvation is the healing or reuniting of that which is estranged,

-or the reclaiming of the old and transferring it into the New Being.*

 

*Op. cit., page 166.

 

It is possible through Jesus as the Christ and takes place as the person
participates in the New Being. In regeneration, "The message of conver-
sion is, first, the message of a new reality to which one is asked to
turn; in the light of it, one is to move away from the old reality, the

state of existential estrangement in which one has lived."* Regeneration,

 

*02. cit., page 177.

 

39
then, is the state of having been drawn into the new reality manifest
in Jesus as the Christ.

Justification, the second character of salvation, is the ac-
ceptance that we are accepted by God because of Christ. The third step
of salvation, sanctification, is "the process in which the power of the
New Being transforms personality and community, inside and outside the

church."* Thus, through salvation, the person loses his estrangement

 

*Op. cit., pages 179-180.

 

and enters into his essential nature. He no longer is separated from
the ground of his being, from other beings and from God.
This reunion is love, for "love is the drive towards the unity

of the separated."* The fact that love, which is the moving power of

 

*Tillich, Paul, Love, Power, and Justice, (Oxford University Press:
New York, 1960), page 25.

 

 

life, can operate is an indication of an original unity, for separation
presupposes an original unity. Man becomes man in his essential respect

through personal encounters, through meeting a "thou."*

 

*Op. cit., page 78.

 

This love which brings about the healing of the estranged
character of man is composed of three parts. Eros "strives for a
union with that which is a bearer of values because of the values it

embodies."* Such a love is in the order of a passion-~something that

 

*02. cit., page 30.

 

40
comes upon a person. The second character is that of philia, or prefer-
ential love, such as the preferences of friendship. The third order is
that of 33222: a New Testament concept which "cuts through the separation
of equals and unequals, of sympathy and antipathy, of friendship and
indifference, of desire and disgust. It needs no sympathy in order to

love; it loves what it has to reject in terms of philia.”* Agape love

 

*Op. cit., page 119.

—l

seeks the center of the other person. "One could say that in agape

ultimate reality manifests itself and transforms life and love."*

 

*Op. cit., page 33.

 

This love is the ground and control of power and justice and thus is
the basis for man's essential being in that it provides the means and
the possibility for man to become reunited with the ground of his being;

reunited with others and with God.

CHAPTER III

A WORKING DEFINITION

The authorities cited thus far do not provide a satisfactory
definition of a person. This is, in part, due to the fact that they are
looking at a person at different levels. The social scientists see the
person as a thing to be studied, to be described, its actions to be pre-
dicted. The philosophers are asking what is distinctive in regard to
man, what it is that differentiates him from other species. The theolo-
gians see him in the same manner, adding to this View another level;-
that of his relationship to God. There is no area of common agreement
among these large enough to be designated as a definition. Yet if this
consideration is to have any meaning at all there must be something
explicit that can be said about a person and about the kind of education
which centers in that person.

The formulation given in this chapter is adopted as a working
hypothesis. It is admitted that it is not an inclusive definition, for
certainly there are areas or aspects of the person that are not included.
A person, created in the image of God and the highest of all creation,
may have such an unlimited potentiality that any definition limiting
this potentiality would be out of place.

With these factors in mind, the working hypothesis or conception
of a person for use in the further consideration will consist of two
parts. The person can, first of all, be distinguished from other enti-
ties. These distinctions are: person-thing; person-group; person-
individual; person-persona. In making such distinctions no definition
of a person is given, yet the mere fact of distinguishing it from other

41

42
entities leads to considerable clarification of the issues involved.
Secondly, there are certain characteristics that are necessary and common
to a person. These characteristics are: a person is inherently a moral
being; if a person is a moral being then he must, in some way, be free;
freedom requires intelligent choice, and thus a person must possess some
degree of reason; the person develops through communication and communion;
and, the person stands responsible for what he is and what he does. It
is probable by their very nature that these characteristics cannot be
empirically verified, nor are they universally accepted. This is not to
say, however, that there is no basis for accepting themfl Both the dis-
tinctions and the characteristics have been given prominent place in
some of the writers already considered, but this in itself does not pfove
either their existence nor their necessity. The distinctions seem to be
self-evident. The characteristics, on the other hand, are logically re-
lated to the first and this first, that a person is a moral being, must
be assumed. There is much collaborative evidence that man is a moral
being, but such evidence does not prove the issue and the assertion is

not beyond dispute.*

 

*"The hypothesis that man is not free is essential to the application
of scientific method to the study of human behavior. The free inner
man who is held responsible for the behavior ...is only a prescienti-
fic substitute for the kinds of causes which are discovered in the
course of a scientific analysis. All these alternative causes lie
outside the individual." Skinner, B. F., Science and Human Behavior
(The Macmillan Company: New York, 1953), pp. 447, 448.

 

 

However, the denial of the assumption that the person is a moral
being leaves one with the alternative that education is little, if any,‘

different in kind from the training of white rats. One is left with

Homo sapiens, whose difference from other forms of animal life is that

 

43
merely of degree or quantity, not kind or quality, and whereas the inten-

sity of training may differ, the object and manner would remain the same.

A. Distinctions

 

l. Person-Thing

‘

The first distinction that can and, indeed, should be made is
that distinction of person-thing. This distinction is basic to our
entire civilization.l It is the basis for those writers lamenting the
extreme organization of man and the industrialization of society. Both

David Riesman and his associates in The Lonely Crowd* and William Whyte

 

Q..-

*Reisman, David, The Lonely Crowd, A Study of the ChangingiAmerican
Character, abridged by the authors (Doubleday and Company, Incor-
porated: Garden City, New York, 1953).

 

 

 

in The O;ganization‘Man* decry the de-personalization of man, that man

 

*Whyte, William H., The Organization'Man (Simon and Schuster: New
York, 1956).

 

has become merely a cog in an organization or a machine. Aldous Huxley

in his pessimistic novel Brave New World* carries the tendency to mecha-

 

*Hux1ey, Aldous, Brave New World (Bantam Books: New York, 1958).

 

 

nization and the deliberate manipulation pf people to a fearful extreme.
Kermit Eby, an early organizer within the CIO and now professor at Uni-

versity of Chicago, makes the same protest in his book Protests of an

 

Ex-Organization Man*. That man knows that he is more than a thing is

 

 

'y

*Eby, Kermit, Protests of an Ex-Organization Man (Beacon Press:
Boston, 1961).

 

'44

seen in the rebellion of mistreated workers, the rise of labor unions,

the unknown yet strongly felt fears of those who become a cog in a

machine, and the unrest and rebellion of slave nations:
This distinction between person and thing has a strong legal
basis. A well-known legal textbook makes the distinction in these terms:

"A 'Person' is often defined as being the 'Subject, or Bearer, of
a right'; but this is to narrow the significance of the term.
Rights not only reside in, but also are available against, per-
sons. In other words, there are persons of incidence as well

as of inherence. Persons are the subjects of Duties as well as
of Rights. In persons rights inhere, and against them rights

are available."*

 

*Holland, Thomas Erskine, The Elements of Jurisprudence (The Oxford
Clarendon Press: London, 1890), p. 81..

 

_1
In distinction to this, "A 'Thing' is the Object of a Right; i.e., is
whatever is treated by the law as the object over which one person exer-
cises a right, and with reference to which another person lies under a

duty."* Thus in Greek times a human being could be counted as a person

 

*Loc. cit., p. 86.

 

or as a non-person or thing. Slaves were things, or as Aristotle termed

them, "living tools."

Though they were human beings they were not count-
ed as persons and thus had no rights, but were objects under the exercise
of "masters" who were persons.' Various cultures have defined who persons
are, or the group to be included as persons, in various ways. Modern
American society is now going through the throes of determining this

same issue. Legally, all men have been declared to be persons, to have

rights and duties, rather than just a segment of mankind. This defini-

tion of person may be enlarged to include a group or an organization

45
which may be called an "artificial person"; however, the essential ele-
ment remains--that is, the distinction between a person and a thing.
The law may recognize a group of persons as a legal person and yet the
group must be made up of individual persons and not things. A forest
cannot be included as a legal person although a school or a corporation
can be. Rights and duties speak in ethical or mdfal terms. They refer
to "should" or "ought." Thus, this distinction might well be stated as
”a person is a moral being, a thing is a non-moral being."

J. V. Langmead—Casserley points out this same distinction,
although using a different terminology. Whereas he does not use the
term person, he does speak of "man" in the same terms herein used.

"A humane civilization requires more than merely to know how to
perform humane acts. Its really indispensable foundation is a
doctrine and picture of man which makes men, all of them, really
seem to matter, which gives to the humane a certain quality of
eternal relevance and significance which separates it from the
natural. It is the distinguishing characteristic of a civiliza-
tion-which, at its best, is Christian and ethichl in its philoso-
phical outlook, and at the same time scientific and technical in

its secular practice, that it regards nature as an environment
to be used and man as a being to be served."*

 

*Casserley, J. V. Langmead, Morals and Man in the Social Sciences
(Longmans, Green and Company: London, 1951), p. 15.

 

The moral nature of man is evident in that man may make a humane or in-
humane civilization; that is, he may fall short of the norm or standard
of man. A dog, on the other hand, cannot. In these terms "man" or
"person" is a normative, not a taxonomic, concept.

Robert Redfield, an anthropologist, in showing that all human
communities are basically moral points out this distinction between

person-thing.

46

"Yet another characteristic of pre-civilized living may be asser-
ted. Within those early communities the relationships among people
were primarily those of personal status. In a small and intimate
community all people are known for their individual qualities of
personality. Few or no strangers take part in the daily life.

So men and women are seen as persons, not as parts of mechanical
operations,'as city people see so many of those around them."*

 

*Redfield, Robert, The Primitive World and itspTransformations
(Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1953), p. 9.

 

 

This distinction is also basic to existentialism, as John Wild

showsu

”In spite of many variations in detail, all existentialist think-
ers hold with Kierkegaard that while an individual's thought
certainly belongs to his existence, this existence cannot be
truly grasped as a mere pbject of thought. When I look at myself
in this way, something‘eludes me. When I look at another as a
cognitive object, something also eludes me. And this something
is very vital. It is existence itself, the very heart of the
matter. This must be grasped subjectively in another way by
another mode of awareness. This mode of awareness is practical.
By this I am aware of myself as an existential being, committed
and engaged. To be thus committed is to be human. To regard a, .
human person as an object is to abstract from all commitment.

It is therefore to de-humanize the person, to reduce him to the
level of a thing."*

 

*Wild, John, The Challenge of Existentialism (Indiana University
Press: Bloomington, 1955), p. 34.

 

The

importance of this is not that existentialist thinkers differ in a

very significant way from Locke and John Stuart Mill. The intent is ndt

to point out that existentialists distinguish between person-man, and

John Locke and Mill deny this distinction, for indeed these men do not

deny such a distinction, but rather to show that this eonception is a

basic conception that manifests itself in various ways in various philo-

sophies. It is significant that Mill almost drags the conception into

his

ethical theory, even though it is not necessary and perhaps even

foreign to his logical argument.

47

Paul Tournier, a Swiss psychiatrist, suggests that the failure
to recognize this distinction is the basis of many of our problems in the
mental and emotional realms. When man is made merely a cog in a machine
of production, when men's thoughts are molded by the mass media, when men’
are made to perform excessively specialized operations, when they live

packed in together, they are dehumanized.* The classic formulation of

 

*Tournier, Paul, The Meaningyof Persons (Harper and Brothers: New
York, 1957), p. 40.

 

this distinction is perhaps the practical imperative of Immanuel Kant.

"SQ act g§_£g_treat humanity, whether ig_thine own person 9£_ig
that gf any other, i3 every case as 33 end withal, never gg
means only."*

 

 

*Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Practical Reason, translated by
Thomas Abbott.(Longmans, Gree & Co.: London, 1889), p. 47.

 

Man is never to be merely "used." He is to be considered to be an end

in himself. That is, he is not a thing, he is a person and as a person
has a dignity-demanding respect. He is not to be used indiscriminately
as a hammer or as a screwdriver. A Screwdriver may well be used to

drive screws, or to chisel wood, or as a lever, or the handle of it,
indeed, may be used as firewood. It may be inadvisable to use it for
these latter‘teasons, but this is only because it reduces the efficiency'
of its use for its primary purpose. The choice, however, is made by man.
The screwdriver is not put upon should it be used for firewood. In dis-
tinction to this, man or a person is never to be used only as a means.
This difference, perhaps, may be summarized again in the words of Kant

as he says,

I IL}:

'Respect applies always to persons only--not to things.

48

 

*Loc. cit., p. 169.

 

2. Person-Group

The distinction between a person and a group seems to be so
obvious as hardly to bear mentioning. Yet as already seen, the legal
definition sometimes recognizes a basic similarity between the two. A
corporation that has rights and duties within the legal definition may
be termed a person, though it is only an "artificial person." It is
evident that the community is larger in scope than the individual or the
person and is related to the human individual as a whole to its parts.
Acknowledging this, we still must say that it is only the person that is
a substance, that only the person is autonomous, that is, the person
thinks and wills for himself. Since a society or corporation is not an
organism it has no vital organ of thought, and thus it does not think.

In general, a person may live as a person in a bad society and
even as a good person in a bad society, but no good society can exist
when persons as persons are destroyed or when they are dehumanized, or
when the quality of life of the persons involved is bad. Sub-groups
within the society, while being parasitic themselves, may act one to
another within their own group on quite a high level. Thus the saying

' But the fact that they remain parasitic,

"There is honor among thieves.‘
taking from while contributing nothing to the larger society, indicates
that they deny to mankind in general the respect and dignity due man.
They have failed to perceive that the question "Who is my brother?"
demands a much broader response than they are willing to give. Thus the

quality of life and the sub-group itself must be acknowledged to be of a

very low order.

4- 9

A person is differentiated from a thing, and a person by defini-
tion has precedence over a thing. In distinction to the person, the
society as a non-person must be considered a "thing" not in any material
sense, but merely because it is an entity and yet a non-person. The
state, though an ”artificial person" and in some respects the sovereign
person, still receives its form and meaning from the consent of the indi-
vidual persons constituting it. As such, the person is prior to the
state. Granting this, both society and the state exist for the person,
the person does not exist for them. They are means for the development
of the person, and the person is not a means for their maintenance.

As Martin Buber points out, there is a difference in the way men
ally themselves. There may be a collectivity or a bundling together
which he calls an organized atrophy of personal existence. On the other
hand, the true community is no longer merely individuals side by side,
but in quite a different relationship with one another--a person-to-
person relationship. Community is based on an increase in confirmation
in life lived towards one another. He says that the modern zeal for
collectivity is flight from community's testing the consecration of the
person, a flight from the vital dialogue, demanding the staking of the

self.* This is not to deny the importance of the society nor the neces-

 

*Buber, Martin, Between Man and Man (Kegan Paul: London, 1947),
pp. 31-32.

 

sity of developing good societies. It is affirming the logical and moral
precedence of the person.
The society men make may be on the level of that binding together

of wild wolves, or the more sophisticated grouping of ants within a

50

colony, or bees within a hive. There are all levels of social organi-
zation amongst the ants, but each kind of ant follows its predecessors

in social organization. They are born to organize in a particular in-
stinctual manner° They labor, with diverse functions, but always within
the structure of the society--the ant-hill. Men, however, can labor upon
the structure of society itself, shaping and moulding it as they so
choose. Men m§y_group themselves in the society on the distinctly

human level, of a community based on a person-to-person relationship.

3. Person-Individual-
An individual is the ultimate unit of a multitude or class.
Thus a dog, a particular dog, in this sense is an individual. The dog
being a particular dog, is distinct from all other dogs and things.
Likewise a human individual, a creature with separate bodily existence,

is one of a class of Homo sapiens and being one of a class he excludes

 

from himself all others, both within the same class and within all other

classes.* The individual as a member of a group and separate from every

 

*"In each of us, individuality, being that which excludes from one's
self all that other men are, could be described as the narrowness of
the ego, forever threatened and forever eager Eg_grasp £25 itself."
Maritain, Jacques, The Persbn and the Common Good (Charles Scrib-
ner's Sons: New York, 1947), p. 27.

 

 

other member within the group appears as a replaceable unit and does not
have worth within itself. As a replaceable unit in this class, 52mg
sapiens, the individual is an active member of the class or group and
his value is judged by the part he plays within the whole group. In
modern society the human individual is viewed as a producer and/or a
consumer. The extent to which he is both of these becomes the basis

for our judgment as to his value within his class.*

51

 

j

*Gilby, Thomas, Between Community and Society: A Philosophy and
Theology of the State (Longmans, Green and Company: New York,
1953), p. 106.

 

 

 

In contrast to the individual, the person is viewed not as a
means only but as an end, not as a consumer or producer but as having
dignity; i.e., a proper object of respect, by virtue of his existence as
a human being. A person is judged not by what he does but by the quality
of his existence. A person cannot be viewed as some form of replaceable
ultimate particle in the class but must be seen in some sort of irre-
placeableness. As an individual, anyone else might well serve in his
place, but as a person no one can serve in precisely the same way. An
individual is distinguished from other individuals in that he has bodily
or corporal being. The person is distinguished from other persons in
that each has been endowed as a human being with reason and a moral
nature. As individuals we are all different and unequal. Some are
better producers or consumers than others. Some have better minds than“
others, and in all ways of measuring there are variations so that there
are always those who are better, greater, or more important than others.
However, as persons being ends in themselves and each created in the
image of God, all are equal in that each is of worth beyond all price.

It is evident that the president of the United States, whoever he might
be, is worth more to this society than some underprivileged, underendowed
youngster. But as persons neither is of greater worth, for both are of

immeasurably great worth.

4. Person-Personage or Person-Persona

Persona or personage originally designated the theatrical mask

52

used in early Roman drama to denote change of character. It is used in
modern times by psychologists and sociologists to speak of the roles that
ione is called upon to play. In this sense one may be many personages at
the same time or in succeeding moments. As an instructor I play the role
of an instructor with the authority and prestige that goes with it, but
at noontime as a sports enthusiast and playing with colleagues on the
handball court I play quite a different role. As a father I have yet a
different role than that as husband. Similarly all persons have different
roles or are different personages at the same time or in succeeding times
or moments. Our person is continuous though never static, always chang-
ing and changed very definitely by the personages or personae we play or
put on.

Gordon Allport says of Cicero that he asked, "Why should I walk

around like a persona?"* Cicero was asking why he should put on an ap-

 

*Allport, Gordon, op. cit., p. 39. .

 

pearance of what he really was not. Thus persona or personage can denote
not what a man is, but on the contrary, what he is not. It may denote
the character that is manifested in public. It may be, in a sense, even
as a mask on the stage, a disguise to hide the private personality, the

essence, from the curious world and also from the individual's own con-

sciousness.* At such times the mask, the persona, is our response to

 

*Kluckhohn, Clyde, op. cit., p. 61.

 

other people's expectations. Paul Tournier tells of the conversation he
had with a motorman on'a trolleycar in Switzerland in which they spoke

of a retired minister. The motorman said of the clergyman that he used

53
to smile at them before he retired. In this case, obviously, the role
he played as minister was quite different from that which he really was.
He wore a mask.

Theodore Solotaroff in analyzing the situation of modern graduate
students sees this very process taking place to the detriment of the stu-
dent. The student in graduate school burdened with family and other com-
mitments that force him to "get ahead" in this world follows the line of
least resistance and does that which is expected of him. He enters with
enthusiasm, with vitality, with curiosity, but soon learns to put on a
mask to curb his enthusiasm, to check his curiosity, to do that which is
expected of him.

"The gain in his ability to contribute to the learned journals can
involve the loss of the intellectual energy or confidence to com-
municate beyond them. Five or six years is a long time. The
graduate student who once cynically put on the mask of the con-
ventional scholar, planning in his heart to remove it as soon

as he has his degree, finds often enough that his face... has

grown to fit it. Even--judging by Berelson's Ph.D.'s--to grin
through it."*

 

*Solotaroff, Theodore, "The Graduate Student: A Profile," Commentary
XXXII, 6 (December, 1961), p. 490.

 

 

In this case the roles called forth by the society through higher
education tend to influence the person in a markedly negative manner.

On the other hand, Max Beerbohm in his witty and delightful

 

novelette, The Happy Hypocrite,* follows the life of the wicked Lord

 

*Beerbohm, Max, The Happy Hypocrite (Dodd, Mead and Company: New
York, 1931).

George Hell who falls in love with a charming actress, Jenny Mere. Be-

cause his wickedness shows in his face,‘Miss Mere spurns his offer of

54
marriage. So our hero obtains a mask of sainthood that completely trans-
forms his appearance, and as he appears before his beloved again he wins
the hand of the heroine. The hero, in turn, acts according to the mask
so that he may not be found out. After some time when the mask is ripped
from his face the beholders are startled to find that his face now con-
forms to the mask. The role has transformed the player.

In both of these accounts the difference between person and per—
sona or personage is quite obvious. In both of them the person and the
personage come closer and closer together. In one, the results are quite
laudable. In the other, the person is harmed through change wrought by '
the persona. Tournier says that one of our tasks is to bring into har-
mony the person and the personage or, in the words of Pindar, "become

what you are."

Tournier says,

"We must boldly undertake the formation of a personage for our-
selves, seeking to form it in accordance with our sincerest con-
victions, so that it will express and show forth the person that
we are."* '

 

*Tournier, Paul, op. cit., p. 81.

 

The society must call forth or determine an environment of expectation
calling forth roles that are proper to the person itself. And the person
himself”must take upon himself roles that are good and proper and that

are harmonious with his person.

B. Characteristics of a Person

The consideration of these four distinctions between persons and
other entities has been fruitful, but it has not been adequate. There
is no indication in these distinctions of the basic nature of the person.

The following five characteristics will deal with that which is essential

55
to, or are necessary constituents of, a person. The first, that man is
inherently a moral being, is the basis for the other four; i.e., man is
free; is rational; must commune; and is ultimately responsible for his
acts. The acceptance or denial of the first necessarily includes the
acceptance or denial of the other four. For this reason there will be
a more detailed consideration of this first characteristic than of the
others.
1. A Person is a Moral Being

The basis of the concept of a human person herein develOped is
the assertion that the person is inherently and necessarily a moral
being. A protracted and prolonged definition does not fall within the
purview of this paper. It seems sufficient to say that the moral nature
of man encompasses the matter of deliberate choice--that is, the moral
nature is in some way related to man's necessity to make choices based
upon values springing in some way from purposes. These choices are
determined by some form of good-bad or right-wrong relationships. They
are based upon the relationship of a person to God, himself, or to
other persons.
. It appears quite impossible to conclusively prove that this
assertion is true. There is not sufficient empirical evidence to verify
conclusively the assertion, and perhaps such an assertion is not amenable
to empirical proof. Also logic is not convincing to all, since all will

not accept the assumptions.* However, though the evidence may not

 

*Cf. statement by B. F. Skinner, page 42.

 

convince all, it is still very strong, and the assertion does, indeed,

have good grounds for affirmation. The evidence presented will be

56

drawn from four primary fields: law, the social sciences, philosophy,

I

and religion.

J.

In the legal definition given by Thomas Hollan ,u the words

 

*Holland, Thomas E., op. cit., pages 80-81.

 

"rights" and "duties" refer to values and purposes. According to Kant's
formulation, acting from duty is moral action. Thus, this legal defini-
tion is based upon a moral nature. In fact, in this legal definition

it is moral nature itself that distinguishes persons from things. Even
legal persons made up of groups of persons are distinguished from things
by the fact that they have rights and duties. Holland defines a right

as "the name given to the advantage a man has when he is so circumstanced
that a general feeling of approval, or at least of acquiescence, results
when he does or abstains from doing certain acts, and when other people

act, or forebear to act, in accordance with his wishes...."* As Kant

 

*Loc. cit., p. 70.

 

has shown, a duty is the obligation to act not out of or because of
pleasure or impulse, but because it is right.

The'fact that men whenever they join themselves together form
some kind of regulations, formal or informal, to guide their relation-
ships one with the other, and then provide some form of judgment of
men's actions in accordance with these regulations, is a further indi-
cation of the generality within mankind of the concepts of right and
wrong. It is not necessary for present purposes that all formulations

be the same nor that things judged right be judged right in all areas

57

or in all societies. It is only necessary to show that men do make
deliberate choices based upon values. Animals, too, band together and
there is leadership, but this leadership usually comes through inheri-
tance, as the queen bee, or through power and superior strength, as the
bull elephant. But men, acting as persons, determine the form of the
relationship amongst themselves. Lewis Feuer, a psychiatrist and
psychoanalyst, says,

"The universal ethics, which is the outcome of psychoanalysis,

rests on the scientific belief that there is a common biological

foundation in all the branches of the human race. .Psychoanalysis

confirms the basis for ethical universalism, and therefore can

guide, without inconsistency, the efforts of applied anthropology.

The great contemporary programs of technical aid and medical

assistance to the world's backward areas are founded on such a
common ethical philosophy.”*

 

*Feuer, Lewis, Psychoanalysis and Ethics (Charles C. Thomas:
Springfield, Illinois, 1955), pp. 118.

 

 

In speaking of "ethical universalism, evaluation,‘ and cultural
values" Dr. Feuer gives witness to man's moral nature.

Paul Tournier, another psychiatrist, says, "True personal rela-
tionship, of the sort that makes the person, involves both choice and
risk; it lays one open to a reply, and to the necessity of replying in

turn: it is a dialogue."* Here once again, choice, responsibility,

 

*Tournier, Paul, op. cit., pp. 128-129.

 

risk refer to a basic moral nature.
Robert Redfield, an anthropoligist, also sees the fundamental
moral character of man. In arguing against the position taken by Pro-

fessor Childe that early man was not basically different from lower forms

of life, he says,

58

"Even the little glimpses of religion and sense of obligation

to do right which are accorded the archaeologists show us that
twenty-five thousand years ago the order of society was moral
order. That of wolves or sheep is not. Childe's facts prove
that this was so, and that his comparison of precivilized society
with that of animals is misleading... A people's conceptions as
to the good are only meagerly represented in the material things
that they make. A tribe of western Australia, the Pitjendadjara,
today carry on a religious and moral life of great intensity,

but they make and use material objects so few and so perishable
that were these people exhibited to us only through archaeology,
we would barely know that they had existed and we would know
nothing of their moral life... it is certainly true that naked.
and wandering, with almost none of the material possessions and
power which we associate with the development of humanity, they
are nevertheless as human as are you and I."*

 

*Redfield, Robert, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

 

. In a later portion of the same book, Redfield speaks of Utopias,

I

of freedom, of human rights, of human responsibility, all of which lie
within the general purview of the'moral nature. He says,

"So, following Whitehead's lead, we may suspect that other ideas
of corresponding power and endurance are already at work among
us: the idea of permanent peace, also the idea of universal
human rights. The existence of these ideas does not allow us to
predict that they will one day be realized in fact, for, to some
of us at least, man's freedom includes the possibility and the
power to destroy himself, and the possibility and the power to
continue somehow to muddle along:"*

 

*Loc. cit., p. 83.

 

Philosophers also proclaim the basic moral nature of man as
has been demonstrated through the examination of the few representative
philosophic positions in the previous chapter. Again it is not necessary
to demonstrate that all positions are identical or similar and indeed
this would be impossible to do, but it is of more than passing interest

that the problem of values and choices, the problem of how persons ought

59
to live together has been of primary interest throughout the ages.
It is significant that there are such positions as hedonism, stoicism,
humanism, the ethics of power, religious ethics, and that the consider-
ation and evaluation of these positions is as pertinent and important
today as it was when each of them was first promulgated.
William Ernest Hocking writes,

"Man thus becomes for himself an object of artful reconstruction,
and this is an art peculiar to man. Whatever is done in the world
by way of producing better human individuals, whether for the
benefit of the species or for the ends of individuals themselves,
man is an agent in it: it is done not merely to him but by him.

He has become judge of his own nature and its possibilities.
'Evolution' leaves its work in his hands--so far as he is concerned.

"I do not say that man is the only creature that has a part in its
own making. Every organism may be Said (with due interpretation
of terms) to build itself, to regenerate itself when injured, to
recreate itself and, in striving for its numerous ends, to

develop itself--to grow. It may be, as we were saying, an agent
in evolution. But in all likelihood, it is only the human being
that does these things with conscious intention, that examines

and revises his mental as well as his physical self, and that
proceeds according to a preformed idea of what this self should
be. To be human is to be self-conscious; and to be self-conscious
is to bring one's self into the sphere of art, as an object to

be judged, altered, improved."*

 

*Hocking, William Ernest, Human Nature and Its Remakipg (Yale
University Press: New Haven, 1929), pp. 6-7.

 

 

Robert Ulich writes,

"When a person acts out of a genuine moral impulse, he does not
deliberate about social advantages, nor is he interested in
moral 'theories'--just as little as the artist during the act
of creation is interested in esthetic theory. Moral man does
not obey external authority or the whims of his ego. He is
'bound to do'; yet he is in freedom. His selfness is gone, for
his self has grown together with the creative forces of the
world... If you wish to define it, say that he listens to life
which wishes to preserve itself in its unity and integrity, and
which has an inner urge towards excellence."*

60

 

*Ulich, Robert, The Human Career‘ (Harper and Brothers: New York,
1955), p. 153.

 

 

In another place he says, "But whereas man can delegate and divide
labor, administration, and even research, there is one thing he cannot
delegate without surrender of self, namely his moral and intellectual

integrity."*

 

'*Loc. cit., p. 172.

 

The evident concern of all of the religions in the question of
how men ought to act gives further demonstration of the basic moral
nature of man. Again, religions do not all give the same answers or
formulations, but they do deal with this question, each one formulating
a system of ethics giving guidance to man's life. The Lord, in the
Old Testament, said to the children of Israel, "Be ye holy; for I am

holy."* This same command of the Lord is quoted in the New Testament.

 

*Leviticus 11:44.

 

The Apostle Paul presents the new birth through Jesus Christ as a
change in the orientation or direction of man's life. For he says,

"Do not be conformed to this world but be transformed by the renewal of
your mind, that you may prove what is the will of God, what is good and

acceptable and perfect."*

 

*Romans 12:2 (Revised Standard Version)

 

The Apostle Peter writes,

61

"Having purified your souls by your obedience to the truth for

a sincere love of the brethren, love one another earnestly from
the héart. You have been born anew, not of perishable seed but
of imperishable, through the living and abiding word of God;....
So put away all malice and all guile and insincerity and envy and
all slander.”*

 

*First Peter l:22--2:l (Revised Standard Version)

 

The story of the fall of Adam as given in the first chapter of
Genesis again demonstrates the conception of man as a moral being. Man
in the person of Adam and Eve was given a choice--a choice of being
obedient to God or of following themselves, making a God of themselves.
This was a moral matter. From this beginning the biblical story leads

.
us to the New Testament account, which has just been quoted, that
through Jesus Christ our moral orientation is changed.

The other religions, large and small, also deal with this same
matter. Some hold out the promise of a better state through obedience
to a code or ethical formulation whereas Christianity presents the
possibility of obedience to the Christian Ethic through the Grace of
God as seen in Jesus Christ. The point, however, seems evident that
all are concerned with this matter of the person being basically a
moral being.

2. A Person is Free

Once it is accepted that the person is essentially a moral being,
and this has been given as a basic assumption of this paper, then of
necessity man must be free. Morality assumes the ability to do right or

wrong--that is, the ability to choose courses of action. As the

Florentine humanist, Pico Della Mirandola, wrote in 1486,

62

"We have made thee neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal
nor immortal, so that with freedom of choice and with honor, as
though the maker and molder of thyself, thou mayest fashion thy-
self in whatever shape thou shalt prefer. Thou shalt have the
power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brut-
ish. Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul's judgment, to

be reborn into the higher forms....

"0 supreme generosity of God the Father, 0 highest and most marve-
lous felicity of man! To him it is granted to have whatever he
chooses, to be whatever he wills....Whatever seeds each man culti-
vates will grow to maturity and bear in him their own fruit."*

 

*Cassirer, Ernst; Kristeller, Paul 0.; and Randall, John H., Jr.
(ed.), The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (University of Chicago
Press: Chicago, 1948), p. 225.

 

This freedom is essentially a freedom of choice. It includes a freedom
of action, but the freedom of action depends upon the possibility of
alternative actions and this requires a choice and, thus, essentially

the freedom of the person is a freedom of choice. Man stands in a
peculiar position. Animals may be domesticated, but only man may be
enslaved or enslave himself. Animals may, through lack of adaptation,
become extinct, but man can choose in such a.manner as to annihilate
himself. He can choose that which will cause him to grow or improve or
to deteriorate and, as is starkly apparent today, destroy himself. Thus,
man's existence as a free being is an existence of anxiety, of fearful
choice and consequence. This freedom of the person, a freedom to choose,
implies a freedom to choose the freedoms to be maintained. Man is free
to give up his political freedom for security, to give up his intellec-
tual freedom for position--in short, he must choose the freedoms that

'he wishes to maintain. Thus, man is forced to choose on the basis of
some hierarchy of values. The question is, what, indeed, for the

person are the real values of life?

63

This freedom is not a freedom of the mind and the slavery to
the body. The body, though it be material, cannot be thought of as
being a prison of the soul--something foreign to the person. It is not
merely caused, that is, a slave; it is an integral part of the person.

If man is not free, if there are not genuine choices, then there
can be no morality. If man is not a moral being, education becomes, at
most, mere training. It becomes comparable, if not identical, to that
which Pavlov did with his dogs--the conditioning of responses to ex-
ternal stimuli. It must be accepted that man is in some sense free if
we are to declare that man is essentially a moral being, and it must be
accepted that man is a moral being if education is to mean anything
more than mere training. .
3.. A Person Possesses Reason

_ ‘ In some sense freedom is directly related to knowledge. The
choices in true freedom must be genuine choices. There must be real
.alternatives and there must be some criteria of choice. To blindly
accept whether by chance or by external authority is not free action.
The mere fact that there may be unknown paths ahead does not lead to
freedom. Only when alternatives are known can there be true free
choice, and then there must be some knowledge of criteria of selection.
Jesus Christ said, "Know the truth and the truth shall make you free."
r

Though the Lord'Jesus was speaking of himself as a person and as the
source of truth, the statement may be accepted as a general statement
in that truth leads to freedom. The knowledge of alternatives and the
selection of criteria of choice is a matter of reason. Reason has been

defined as "drawing conclusions by reflection."W Wheelright says of

64

 

*Keary, Charles Francis, The Pprsuit of Reason (University Press:
Cambridge, 1910), p. 5.

 

 

man and reflection, .

"Man is the animal who can reflect. Like other animals, no
doubt, he spends much of his time in merely reacting to the
pressures and urgencies of his environment.- But being a man,

he has moments also of conscious.stocktaking, when he becomes
aware not only of his world but of himself confronting his world,
evaluating it, and making choices with regard to it. It is

this ability to know himself and on the basis of self-knowledge
to make evaluations and reflective choices that differentiates
man from his subhuman cousins."* '

L

G

*Wheelwright, Philip, A Critical Introduction to Ethics (The
Odyssey Press, Inc.: New York, 1959), p. 3.

 

Brand Blanshard describes thought as, "That activity of mind

which aims directly at truth."* It is that which has been identified

 

*Blanshard, Brand, The Nature of Thought (The Macmillan Co.: New
York, 1940), Volume I, p. 51.

 

 

as reason or rationality and is made up of perceptions, ideas and
reflection. Ideas, theoretic impulses to give the object a place
within our experience, are develOped out of perceptions. This is cul-
minated in reflection, or "apprehending something in a system which

renders it necessary."* Reflection is a movement toward self-completion

 

*Loc. cit., Vol. II, p. 24.

 

and intelligibility.
Reason or thought might be summarized in reflection which in-

cludes the capabilities of abstraction, generalization, symbolization,

65
and as one enters the area of science and ethics, prediction. Out of
the use of these capabilities the person develops a meaningful ordered’
gestalt of experience, past, present, and future.

Logic, the formulation of rules governing reason, or the scien-
tific study of such rules, while not the all encompassing human endeavor,
is the necessary condition for all that is substantial. It is not ac-
cepted as a permanent thing, but a continuous task and a condition for
all truth.

4. A Person Can Communicate and Commune

To communicate is to give and receive information, signals, or
messages in any way. It may be done through talking, writing, motions,
looks, signals of various kinds. Within this broad definition dogs are
able to communicate with other dogs, and they are, in a rather forcible
manner, able to communicate with cats. Likewise dogs are able to com-
municate with human beings*and human beings with dogs. The important
elements in communication are: there must be a sender or an author;

a sign or signal; and a receiver who observes the sign or signal. The
mere fact of speaking, of writing, or of giving does not guarantee
communication. There must be the counterpart of the speaking, the
writing, the giving, namely, the receiving in some manner whether it be
by understanding, reading, or accepting on the part of the second party.

Language is a highly developed form of communication. As
Professor Leonard says,

"At least one reason why man has so far outrun the lower animals
in his knowledge of the universe rests in his ability to use com-
plicated forms of language. To be sure, the lower animals do
communicate with one another by the use of visual and auditory

signs. But the capacity to use language is enormously greater in
the case of man. He can, and does, learn to use languages of great

66

complexity and subtlety. These-more complex languages can much
more nearly reproduce the intricacies and fine distinctions in
the world he represents by them. To a great extent, he can make
his use of language serve as a substitute for thinking, and so
leave his actual thought free to deal with and to master the
still deeper and more intricate mysteries of the world."*

 

*Leonard, Henry 8., An Introduction to Principles of Right Reason
(Henry Holt and Company: New York, 1957), p. 13.

 

A language is defined as the use of sign-types "such that'the several
tokens of it mean what they mean in virtue of an agreement among the

wills of the several producers of those tokens."* This definition would

 

*Loc. cit., p. 157.

 

exclude the noises made by sub-rational and sub-moral animals since
their meaning is not derived from the agreement among the wills of the
several producers. Only man is able to voluntarily ally himself with
others to make such intricate formulations as our various languages.
The values of such voluntary membership are obviously great. It is
through language that we are able to accumulate knowledge, paving the
way for long range, deliberative attacks on problems. It also enlarges
the possibilities for collaborative efforts, for men to work together.
Language, finally, provides us with a tool which, by its intricacies
and distinctions, makes possible both comprehensive and_detailed thought.
Communication in the form of intricate language is indeed a
truly human endeavor, but it does not plumb the depths of humanity;
communion does. While dogs communicate with other dogs and also with
men, and indeed, this is genuine communication, dogs do not commune

with dogs nor dogs with men for communion is sharing of the person,

67
the impartation of the person and the receiving of the person. Thus,
communion is possible only between persons--man and man or man and God--
and not only is possible, but is necessary for the development of the
person. Communication may be done between individuals, as Martin Buber
states in the I-It relationship.

"The attitude of man is twofold, in accordance with the twofold
nature of the primary words which he speaks. The primary words
are not isolated words, but combined words. The one primary word
is a combination IfThou. The other primary word is a combination
2715; ‘wherein, without a change in the primary word, one of the
words He and She can replace IE. Hence the l_of man is also two-
fold. For the I of the primary word IfThou is a different I

from that of the primary word lfl£° Primary words do not signify
things, but they intimate relations."*

 

*Buber, Martin, I and Thou (Charles Scribner's Sons: New York,
1958), p. 3.

 

 

This relationship between a person and a thing, the I-It relationship,
is an objective, intellectual, informational communication, but the
relationship of communion, the I-Thou relationship, is a communication
of a different order--of the person rather than a bit of news, fact,

etc. It is the person to person or human encounter; it is the being-

together, or togetherness as described by Remy Kwant.* Such an encounter

 

*"Encounter with the other man is the fundamental sphere of our
existence. Meaningful behavior is communicable only within an
encounter, through being-together. We do not learn to live to-
gether because we learn to exist in the world, but within and be-
cause of interhuman encounter we begin to live i» the same world.
The child is taken into the human sphere to the extent that he
learns being-together....We understand the human world because

we understand man, and not vice versa."

Kwant, Remy, Encounter, Duquesne Studies, Philosophical Series,
Number 11, translated by Robert Adolfs (Duquesne University Press:
Pittsburg, 1960), p. 31.

 

68

or communion demands an object of knowledge, but it goes beyond the
object of knowledge of the person into a subject of understanding.
While information is intellectual, communion is spiritual, yet in-
formation is a necessary condition for communion. Information tends
to speak of personages or roles, whereas communion reaches directly
to the person. By information one can understand the situation as it is,
but only through communion can one understand the person. Communion
demands that I open up myself, that I take the risk of not pretending
I am that which I am not--of not hiding what I am. Only in these terms
can there be a personal encounter--can there be communion between per-
sons. Such a communion or encounter has been described as a responsible
dialogue in that one takes upon himself the responsibility of honesty
and Openness, of self-knowledge and knowledge of the other.

As many writers have pointed out, it is part of being human that
the person relate himself. Erich Fromm says,

"...man-cannot live alone and unrelated to others. He has to

associate with others for defense, for work, fof sexual satis-
faction, for play, for the upbringing of the young, for the
transmission of knowledge and material possessions. But beyond
that, it is necessary for him to be related to others, one with
them, part of a group. Complete isolation is unbearable and in-
compatible with sanity."*

 

*Fromm, Erich, Man for Himself (Rinehart and Company: New York,
1947), p. 58.

 

Major William Mayer, an army psychiatrist, has pointed out the
results of the psychological isolation brought about so systematically
upon our own prisoners of war by the Red Chinese during the Korean
conflict. When such isolation was achieved, the possibility of co-

Operative action was eliminated and the individuals, being dehumanized,

69

very often gave up and died.*

 

*Taken from a speech.

 

An individual isolated, either physically or psychologically,
is denied the possibilities of full personal attainment. Such a one is
cut off not only from the access to accumulated knowledge, but more
importantly, from that richness of person that comes through communion
so necessary for personal development. Psychological isolation such
as that of the "other directed" person who receives his norms from
outside himself but enters into no dialogue--that is, he takes from
others, whether they be his own group or a higher group, but in no
ways gives of himself, is seen in the very title of the book describing

such "other directed" individuals--"The Lonely_Crowd."*

 

 

*Riesman, David; Glazer, Nathan; Denney, Reuel, The Lonely Crowd
(Doubleday Anchor Books: New York, 1953).

 

 

How persons relate to one another and to God is a moral
question. Man may relate himself to others on the basis of hate or love,
by competition or cooperation; by oppressing or freeing; but relate
himself he must. John Locke saw man entering into a society primarily
for the protection of property, and it is distinctly human that man
can form a society for such a reason. Aristotle describes three types
of friendships or three ways in which men can relate themselves: the
relationship of utility where a friendship is dependent upon utilitarian
gain on the part of each of the participants; friendship for pleasure,

wherein each of the participants derives pleasure from the other; and

70

friendship on the basis of character, an outgoing friendship that is

the result of the good character of both of the participants. Certainly
the last of these is of a higher order than Locke's or the two previously
mentioned ones of Aristotle.

The description of the highest order of relationship between
persons, the most profound communion between men, is that of éEEES as
described in the New Testament. This order of love goes beyond the
friendship of Aristotle in that Agape loves everybody--it loves what
other love has to reject. It needs no sympathy in order to love. It
is a rational relationship, not a passion into which one falls, but a
matter of the will to open oneself to others in an I-Thou relationship.
It is the relationship that the Apostle Paul speaks of when he says,

"If one member suffers, all suffer together; if one member is honored,

all rejoice together."* The picture here is of a body vitally connected,

 

*First Corinthians 12:26.

 

each part or member dependent upon the others and each contribuding for
the benefit of the others. It is that love which is patient and kind,
not jealous or boastful, not arrogant or rude--love which does not
insist,on its own way, is not irritable or resentful and does not rejoice
at wrong, but rejoices in the right.* Such a relationship is one of

complete openness, perfect communion.

 

*First Corinthians 13:4-6.

 

A man is born an individual and becomes a person, and corres-

pondingly a richer person, as he comes into genuine encounter or dialogue

71
with other persons, as he enters as a person into the society which is

larger than he is, but is made up of persons such as he is, as he com-

munes in I-Thou relationship with other persons.

5.- A Person Stands Alone

All men are born under the sentence of death, a death that in-
exorably approaches from the moment of birth and is at all times starkly
imminent. Such a condition determines that one's life must be judged
by its quality rather than its quantity. The relevant question is,
"what is the quality of life at any given moment?” This is the basis
of judgment.

In this I stand alone. The quality of life may certainly be
enhanced through responsiveness to knowledge and reason; through the
accumulated culture and through communication and communion with other
persons, but essentially and ultimately I stand responsible for my life.
I am forced to act--even in choosing not to act in a given situation
I do indeed act. Each act is uniquely ”my act." It is what I am and
it shapes what I shall become, but it is "my act" and as such I stand
responsible. I may choose to go the way of others, to conform, and as
such I make my decision--I act. Or I may say with Martin Luther,

"Here I stand, I can do no other," and in this, too, I act, but in each

act I value. I say this" is more important than "that," whether

consciously or unconsciously, and as such each decision becomes a
.t . o
moral act, and I, as a moral being, am respon51ble for moral acts.

"The bad man is the man who no matter how good he hag been is
beginning to deteriorate, to grow less good. The good man is a
man who no matter how morally unworthy he REE been is moving to
become better. Such a conception makes one severe in judging
himself and humane in judging others...Not perfection as a final

72

goal, but the ever-enduring process of perfecting, maturing,
refining is the aim in living."*

 

*Dewey, John, Reconstruction in PhiIOSOppy (The Beacon Press:
Boston, 1948), pp. 176-177.

 

 

In summation, a person may be distinguished from:

a thing, a person being the subject of rights and duties, whereas
a thing is the object of rights.

a group, a person being logically prior to the group. Thus the
group exists for the person, not the person for the group.

an individual, for an individual is a replaceable ultimate unit
of a class whose worth is determined by its function within the
class, whereas a person is irreplaceable, with worth and dignity
by virtue of his being a person.

a persona, personage or role, for while all men play many roles at
the same time apd at various times, they still £33 a continuing

though ever changing person.

It has further been said that a person:

is ultimately and inherently a moral being, who is continually
confronted with the necessity of making choices on the basis of
values arising from purposes or goals.

is in some sensehfree, since to deny freedom would at the same time

deny the moral nature of the person and reduce him to the level of

the brute creation. This freedom is basically a freedom of choice.

73

has, to a greater or lesser degree, intellect or rationality. The
person is able to reflect, to form abstractions and generalizations,
to form a meaningful gestalt of experience.

can communicate, or by agreement among men develop symbols that
carry a common meaning; and commune, that is enter into a person-
to-person, I-Thou relationship culminating in a rational, out-

going love.

may choose the quality of life he wants to develOp and is ultimately

responsible for this choice.

CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATION FOR HIGHER EDUCATION

A. General principles

 

A working formulation has now been evolved through the develop-
ment of nine points, four distinctions, and five necessary characteristics.
The application of this working formulation to a system of higher edu-
cation will of necessity be very general in nature. The formulation
itself was by intention drawn in a very broad scale constituted of
elements acceptable by and large. It was meant to include many philoso-
phical systems and many philosophies of education. Such a broad con- '
sideration means that its application to a system of higher education
would also be very broad.

This broad formulation with the resultant general principles
cannot be so broad that it has no meaning, that it does not differentiate
between acceptable and unacceptable, between right and wrong within
this framework, and thus after the general principles have been evolved,
there must needs be a more particular application of these principles.
This application will have to deal with particulars if it is to be of
any value, but again in dealing with particulars it still must deal with
them in'a general way. This, indeed, is a difficulty in any such con-
sideration as this, not to prescribe and proscribe so rigidly that the
application is unacceptable to any but the author and on the other hand,,
not to be so general that it may be accepted by all yet meaningless
to all.

The nine general principles will follow the pattern of the
distinctions and the necessary characteristics of the previous chapter.

Each principle in turn will be directly related to the distinction or

74

75

the characteristic. The discussion following each principle will deal,
largely with those issues not related to curriculum, admissions, and
evaluation, since these will be dealt with more particularly in the

latter part of the chapter.

 

 

1. The development pg persons shall pg viewed pg the end RE the

educational process. All parts and functions of the community--that is,

 

the community of higher education--must be evaluated in the light of
their contribution to this goal. Within the educational system there
should be the encouragement of the assumption of greater rights and

corresponding duties or responsibilities on the part of the persons.

 

Discussion: This principle, applied to the various areas of
the community of higher education, says in essence that these areas are
to be judged by their total contribution to the development of the
persons or students involved. Administration would not exist for its
own sake; it would never be an end in itself, but always considered as
a means and only a means. The function of administration would be to
facilitate the deve10pment of the persons. Those who have most direct
contact with students, in particular the teachers, would be considered
perhaps the most important members of the community as regarding function.
All efforts would be made to facilitate their work. Thus administration
would become a facilitating agency for the promotion of the teacher-
pupil relationship and rather than adding details and additional work
to the load of the teacher, it would in every way possible remove un-
essential or trivial things in order that the time and energy of those
_ working directly with students might be conserved for that work which

more directly relates to their function. The buildings would be constructed

76

and the campus maintained with the student in mind. Since the person
involves more than intellect but emotions and aesthetic appreciation as
well, the buildings and the grounds would, of necessity, be attractive
and artful. Convenience of movement of the student would be taken into
account. Buildings would be arranged so as to facilitate the kind of
contact essential to the teacher-pupil confrontation. Buildings would
be located in such a manner as to provide accessibility to students

so that students would be encouraged to enter into broad areas of know-
ledge rather than to become specialized to the exclusion of liberal
education at an early time in their academic careers.

Regulations governing the life of the students would be formulated
with the development of the student primarily in view. The students
could not be viewed as means for the development of greater housing or
ease of administration. Regulations would be such as to expect of
students an increasing assumption of duties and corresponding rights
as the students mature or develop. Thus, an entering student would
have greater rights and responsibilities the second year than the first,
and even greater responsibilities the fourth year over the first, and
by the end of the fourth year the students, who will now be thrust
upon society and enter into the freedom of other citizens, would be
enjoying that personal freedom within the community in which they are
then existing, that is, within the college community.

Extracurricular activities would also be encouraged in the light
of what they add to the development of persons. Those activities that

do not contribute to the development of students but may contribute in

other areas would not be encouraged by-the college community. They may

77

well be encouraged by other agencies, but they would not be encouraged
by the college community. The question of participation or nonpartici-
pation would be determined by the total effect upon the persons involved.
,In no area and at no time should the students be viewed merely
as means. They must not be used to build departments although a depart-
ment may well become strong as it works with students, but students
are not to be merely means to this end. Nor should they be used merely
for publicity purposes, whether this come through high scholastic
achievement or high achievement in athletics or other areas. They must
not be viewed as cogs in a machine, in a system that becomes ritualized,
whether this be in registration or in the system of excuses and absences
or in the application of regulations regarding conduct. Once they are
seen as numbers, they are dehumanized and are no longer thought of as-
persons.

Students, as persons, are not to be something to be merely
studied or manipulated. One might feel no qualms in experimenting
with white rats, but if persons are of infinite worth then it is impos-
sible to manipulate one or a group for whatever purpose. They must not
be studied merely as objects, but at all times they must be considered
as persons.

Class size would also be governed by the question of what happens
to persons as they go through the experiences the school provides for
them. Size would not be determined by cost per student or merely by
the results of research aimed at the amount of "learning" absorbed
through various methods or techniques. Such considerations as: what

kind of impression is left with the student? Do students continue studies

78

in this area or do they become disinterested through the use of various
techniques? Do they have opportunity to come into personal relationship
with significant persons in this area? would all be taken into consider-
ation. Thus, the question would not be determined upon the basis of
achievement tests alone, but the total effect upon the students as
persons--their reactions, the development or lack of development of
appetites for learning in the area and their satisfactions or dissatis-

factions would all be taken into account.

2. I ‘3 society made pp pf persons, the person lg always prior £9

 

 

 

 

the society. Though the society as a structure is necessary for the

 

deve10pment of the person, the person does not exist for the society,

but the society for the person.

Discussion: Governing rules or codes of conduct must not be

 

made only in order that administration may be eased through the con-
formity of the persons. There must be the actual encouragement of the
various uniquenesses of both staff and students. Rules must be set up
in such a manner that they deal with moral issues--good and bad and
right and wrong--rather than ease and conformity. The enforcement of
the rules must be made in the light of the priority of the persons.
Jesus said of the Sabbath, "Man was not made for the Sabbath, but the
Sabbath for man." In a similar manner, all rules and regulations must
be made for the persons involved and not the persons made for them.
This would mean that there must be considerable flexibility in all rules
and regulations in order to provide for the uniquenesses of the persons
involved and the uniqueness of the situation in each case. Such indi-

vidual or personal consideration is extremely difficult in large

79

organizations when the persons making the decisions regarding others or
that involve others are unable to know the persons their decisions
affect. 'This might well mean that the administrative organization of a
person-centered higher educational system would have to be broken down
into units small enough that those administering the rules and regula-
tions would be able to take into account the persons and situations
involved.

Even as persons live by making moral commitments, so the community
which is made up of persons must order itself in the light of moral
commitments. Groups and the community, that is the community of higher
education as a whole, must be encouraged to make choices upon the basis
of values and the determination of the values to be considered should
have high priority. The community must not just grow, but be consciously
ordered so as to provide the milieu that encourages the development of
the persons comprising the community. Thus, the community must not
only make allowance for, but actively encourage the participation of
persons in the making of decisions. Persons as such do not live to be
governed only but are also governors and thus the students would enter
into the formulation of the regulations governing the behavior and even
goals.

The degree to which the various members should participate and
the kind of participation, advising or actual decision making, of each
member would be directly related to maturity and the assumption of re-
sponsibility. As Kant wrote,

"The practical necessity of acting on this principle, i.e., duty

does not rest at all on feelings, impulses, or inclinations, but
solely on the relation of rational beings to one another, a relation

80

in which the will of a rational being must always be regarded
as legiSlative, since otherwise it could not be conceived as
pp end ip itself."*

 

 

*Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Practical Reason, translated by
Thomas Abbott, (Longmans, Green, & Co.: London, 1889), pp 52-53.

 

 

3. The person under all circumstances must be considered as 3

 

 

person and not as an individual, as merely a number or‘g series of

 

 

numbers or as a replaceable unit of the species Homo sapiens.

 

 

Discussion: The student as a person must never be thought of

 

as a composite of a series of numbers, whether these be a student number
and test scores or numbers of any other sort. When the community becomes
so large that it is required that identification be made only or primarily
through numbers, then the community is too large to be person-centered.
This also might indicate that the administrative units within a person-
centered system of higher education would have to be broken down into
'small enough units that the administration of the rules can be done in
the light of the persons involved, not individuals, nor numbers. Test
scores may well be useful in determining that which may be helpful in
the development of the person, but they are never to be confused with
a total description of the person.

Kant distinguishes between person and individual or person and

thing in the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. He

 

wrote, "In the kingdom of ends everything has either Value or Dignity.
Whatever has a value can be replaced by something else which is egpivalent;
whatever, on the other hand, is above all value, and therefore admits of

no equivalent, has a dignity."*

81

 

*Ibid.

 

This dignity or intrinsic worth, must be the basis upon which
men deal with men, or persons with persons.

A person as a person is not replaceable. He is unique and he
fills a unique place. Thus, it is of considerable import as to whether
a student remains in school or drops out, whether while in school he
functions well or not. It is on the basis of the principle that persons
have infinite worth, that admissions policies must be determined (a
consideration of admissions policies will be discussed later in this
chapter). Whatever the policies may be, once a student has been accepted
a great responsibility to see that the student succeeds, matures and
develops, then devolves upon the community. It is not a light matter
whether 20 per cent fail or not. It is not a light matter whether 2
per cent drop out because of sheer boredom. As persons these two per
cent are of great value, and whether the institution presents a challenge
or not is of utmost importance.

The worth of the individual, in distinction to the person, may
be determined by his function in the total group, that is, in the college
community, and therefore there will, indeed, be differences in function.
Some will play football; some will be student leaders; some will be
neither, and thus come about differences in function. But as far as
intrinsic worth is concerned, there can be no difference and one member
can have no advantages because of his extrinsic function that another
member has not. Those things that are necessary for the prOper function

of his place in the community are of necessity not only to be allowed but

 

82

to be encouraged, but these relate only to function and not to the basic
worth of the person. This would mean that students would not be shown
greater leniency as regards admissions and withdrawals, as regards
classroom accomplishments, or in other areas because they perform some
function useful to the community. But great allowance for difference
and for flexibility in the administration of the rules must be made on
the basis of the persons as persons and such flexibility would be due
every person without respect of worth to the community. Thus, in this
light the fact that the football player in the fall term spends hours in
practices and his energy is expended in violent exercise would be taken
into account in determining the level of work he should achieve and the
type of work he should enter into, but not because of his value to the
university as a football player but because he is a person. The same
consideration should be taken for one who spends his energies of necessity
in working long hours or in other things that are pr0per and good.

The person must never be thought of as merely a replaceable
unit or as an item to be placed in a particular slot. If music is worth
while and it is good for the person to participate in it, then there
must be means for such participation whether this be of professional
quality or not. There may be groups for the benefit of the community
as a whole, such as a high quality orchestra or choral group, but these
are not to be confused with that which is aimed at the betterment of
the persons through participation. Artistotle says that we should play
for the purpose of enjoyment, but to do this professionally makes us
slaves to others and thus tends towards dehumanization. This would

pertain equally to athletics, dramatics, and music. The organization,

83

then, whether it be a musical group or a team or any other organization,
is a means to the continuation of personal relationships, a means to

the deve10pment of appreciations of an ever increasing level and is not
to be viewed as an end in itself.

All activities within the community of higher education are not
to be encouraged. It is obviously impossible for an institution of
higher education to do all things, and indeed it would be contrary to
the purpose of the institution to encourage all things. The decision
as to what activities are to be encouraged should be made in the light
of what they contribute to the quality of life at that time and for
future times. The community must make a choice as to that which con-
tributes most to the quality of life. It may well be that football does
present a general rallying cry or emotional center for the entire com-
munity and thus becomes the unifying element. While it may do this, if
it does not contribute in a very real way to the quality of life of the
persons involved and the quality of life of the community as a whole,
then it is not adequate for this task. The community must make a choice
of something that does contribute more to the quality of life and this
might well mean that quantity and enthusiasm and other aspects would
necessarily be diminished. It seems incongruous to say that the unifying
element of a community of persons is something that is by nature a
spectator activity and is not an activity that calls primarily upon

I

the intellect in the making of moral choices.

4. The life p£_the community--in this case, the community of higher

 

 

 

the persons are inherently with the roles they are called upon.£2 play.

84

Since it is inevitable and proper that persons play various roles, there
must be the encouragement for both faculty and students to genuine-

ness so that the roles played harmonize with the basic values and atti-
tudes of the persons playing them and likewise the roles encouraged

are of such a nature as to produce the enrichment rather than the de-
gradation of the persons.

Discussion: The culture--that is, the community as self-

 

consciously constituted--shou1d be of such an order as to encourage
proper roles by the students or persons. Martin Trow has defined four

types of expectations or sub-cultures in higher education today: the

"collegiate culture,’ which centers in football, sororities and fraterni-

ties, dates, cars, drinking and campus fun; the "vocational culture,"
which centers in a curriculum that leads to a diploma and a better job;

' which identifies with the intellectual concerns

the "academic culture,‘
of the serious faculty members; and the "nonconformist culture," which
centers in an aggressive nonconformism, a critical detachment from the

college and faculty and a generalized hostility to the college adminis-

tration.* All of these expectations are not of equal value, and it is

 

*Trow, Martin, "The Campus Viewed as a Culture," Research on
College Students'(The Western Interstate Commission for Higher
Education: Boulder, Colorado, 1960), pp. 105-110.

 

 

 

a matter,of no little concern that the community determine which of these
expectations are proper and good, and then so arrange all that it does
and is that these become the expectations of the group and bring about
the call for good and desirable roles on the part of the individual per-‘

'sons. The collegiate expectation, the "rah-rah boy,” the well-rounded

85

social conformist is not a role to be promoted. Likewise a student who
sees the diploma as the ultimate goal because of doors it opens, that
is the vocational expectation, is not looking to the quality of life
involved and as such would not be an expectation promoted by the com-
munity. Nonconformity for nonconformity's sake produces a conformity,
a conformity not to the codes or mores of the society in general, but
to an out-group within the larger society. Such nonconformity when it
has no greater basis than this, is also not to be encouraged, although
nonconformity upon reflective, purposeful basis is highly desirable.
The fourth role, that of the academic, if thought of in broad enough
terms, can indeed be considered a desirable role and the college should
so order its activities as to encourage this role on the part of students.
The role of a scholar as the one who searches after truth in order to
open up new areas of freedom and responsibility, conforms to the defi-
nition of person as given in the previous chapter. In order to accomplish
this, the unifying element of the community must consist in something
that deals with the intellect as related to freedom and responsibility.
This might be a series of lectures and accompanying discussions built
about some themes worthy of the attention of all mankind, or it might
be courses developed for the same purpose or, as one school now employs,
common readings for the whole student body. But whatever this unifying
element might be, it must appeal to the intellect and deal with that
which is of moral concern to the students and faculty involved.

"Since the role of the advisor is of very great importance, the
college must, in whatever ways possible, through advancement policies,

through pay increases, and other means encourage the members of the

86

faculty to play this role in a genuine way. Likewise, since good
teaching is important the expectation for this must be evident in the
community as a whole. But the community must not encourage things that
are quite outside the values or the abilities of the persons involved so
that they take on an artificial activity, an artificial role. Thus,

one who is not and will not become a good teacher and does not want to
teach should not be encouraged to teach, to take on this role which,
though very important, is unpleasant or is seen by the person as unim-
portant. For one who is not equipped to enter into genuine research or
the advancement of knowledge in a significant way, this should not be

an expectation. That is to say that there must be diverse expectations
within a community so that the persons involved may find satisfying
roles. But these diverse expectations of the community must all be of
such a nature as to enrich the persons involved. Certainly one cannot
teach well without being involved in a deeply intellectual process and
likewise one cannot enter into genuine research and the advancement of
knowledge in a significant way as a person without relating this in some
way to others. But the ways in which these are done should be broad
enough to fit within the basic value and character systems of the per-
sons involved.

Extracurricular activities would be limited to only those
activities calling forth roles that enrich the life of the person. These
would be approved or promoted by the community as a whole. There are
other agencies outside of a community of higher education that can work

with other roles.

87

The community encourages certain expectations or roles through
the activities sponsored and the services rendered or subsidized. It
is entirely proper that the college sponsor and subsidize the arts that
so enrich the life. It is also right that the physical health of the
student be protected through various health services, and that mental
health be maintained through counseling and psychiatric help. But,
would it not be pr0per to sponsor and if necessary subsidize a book
store so that students might leisurely browse and select books to buy at
a reduced rate. Or, perhaps the encouragement of a student c00perative
book store would be more suitable, for not only would the books be
procured at a reduced price, but the students would be accepting gen-
uine responsibility. The library provides a vast storehouse of know-
ledge, but it does not become the students', so that while the library
is essential it is not sufficient. Students must be encouraged to
build their own libraries, and the college should do whatever necessary
to encourage this.

The issue is simply this: that unless the community as a whole
acts rationally and morally, unless it plays roles compatible with and
reinforcing to its character or nature, it cannot expect the students,
as persons involved, to act rationally and morally, to take on roles
consistent with that which is distinctly human. Unless the community
as a whole determines its goals and consciously constitutes itself in
the light of these goals, it cannot expect the students to do so.

5. The communipy, the higher educational unit, must realize that

 

its decisions are inevitably moral decisions involvipg right and wrong,

good pp bad, and i£_must pg constitute itself that 1; encourages the same

 

 

88

realization and the same action, ppon the part 2E all the persons

 

 

constituting‘ip.

 

Discussion: This principle is central-~all others relate to

 

it. If man is inherently and inevitably a moral being, then when men
join together their collective decisions are also inherently and in-
'evitab1y moral decisions. The community, as the individual, must not
jusn.grow, but the growth must be guided. The curriculum (to be dis-
cussed later in the chapter) must be developed with a view as to what is
good and bad or right and wrong. Not all things are suitable for re-
flection and study in higher education and some things are more suitable
than others. Likewise, extracurricular activities must be chosen on
this basis. Many activities are good, but all activities cannot or
should not be entered into by a college community. The activities must
be selected upon the basis of values, the contributions to the quality
of life of the persons involved. 'Participation sports which seem to
contribute directly to the person would be of more importance than
spectator sports. This is not to say that spectator sports have no
value, but it is to say that participation sports have more value than
spectator sports and thus must have priority. Likewise, participation
groups in music and drama and other areas would be of more importance
than spectator activities in these same areas. Those things in which
the person does play the part of a spectator must also be carefully

chosen on the basis of what they contribute to the enrichment of life

I
a

and the discrimination of standards. That which encourages reflection,
understanding, and promotes a broadening of appreciations and attitudes

would take priority over that which is only passing entertainment. Music

 

89
and drama which call forth reflection and point out moral choices would
be chosen on this basis. It is of utmost importance that choices be
evident, that the community make choices upon values and in this manner
the individuals be encouraged to do the same.

Methods of teaching must be selected on the basis of how they
contribute to the enrichment of the person, whether they develop under-
standings, attitudes and appreciations, whether they require reflection
and the deve10pment of ideas, whether they touch basic value systems.
The way students and faculty are looked upon is not only an administrative
matter, it is a moral question. It is a moral choice, whether students
are thought of as numbers or replaceable units or whether they are
thought of as ends or goals in themselves. Likewise, it is a moral
matter whether faculty are considered as employees subject to the control
or manipulation of administration, and as such are to be "administered,"
or whether they, too, are considered persons, goals in themselves, of
inestimable worth. It is a moral matter when either faculty or students
are manipulated in order to accomplish the purposes of any other indi-
vidual or group. It is a moral matter whether the coaches are chosen
because of their ability to produce winners or because of that which
they contribute to those with whom they come in contact. These issues
must be made clear. The community must be conSciously aware that these
are not neutral matters and that the choices involved inevitably become
moral choices.

Since the community is constituted for the purpose of the devel-
Opment of the persons, and much of this work is done through emulation

and the encouragement produced by the culture, the college must be true

90

to itself. No part or phase of its operation may be divorced from moral
commitments. Thus it becomes a matter of some importance whether the
budget appears to be made for the faculty and students or whether the
-Students and faculty seem subject to the budget, that is, whether an
initial budget consideration or determination is ultimate or whether

the wisdom of the people involved shall govern. Likewise, it is of
great import whether administration is seen as a means for the encourage-
ment of the ultimately final work, the person-to-person contact between
students, and between students and faculty, or whether it is seen as
that which drains off the energies in such a manner as to debilitate
this activity.

6. The communipy pf higher education must encourage_and pppvide

 

 

for increasing freedom.pp the part pf all persons within the community.

 

 

This freedom must not pg limited pp those issues which are trivial, where

no danger or risk is involved or where the consequences are of little

 

 

import. There must pg genuine and importapp alternatives. However,

since freedom inevitably demands responsibility, the degree of freedom

 

must 22.32 accord with the degree p£ responsibility taken 22,

 

 

h

Discussion: The community must be consistent in its behavior,

 

that is, it cannot expect the deve10pment of freedom among students
while prohibiting or limiting freedom on the part of faculty. Thus,

the issue of faculty freedom becomes one of real significance. The
faculty should be encouraged to take a greater voice and indeed ulti-
mately to have control in those areas relating to the educational pro-
cess, such as admissions, curriculum, athletics, etc. In order to avail

themselves of these freedoms, the faculty must assume the responsibilities

91
essential to such functions. This would include both a willingness to
become informed about and genuinely concerned about the entire community
and its various parts. The faculty would also be encouraged to enjoy and
employ their freedom both as citizens and as scholars, freedom to speak
out as other citizens in matters of government and politics and freedom
to study and report in those areas of interest and concern to the indi-
vidual members of the faculty.

This freedom would not only relate to the students and faculty
in groups or organizations, but to the individual persons involved.
Faculty members would be given greater freedom within their own class-
rooms. In such a circumstance, the selection of both faculty and stu-
dents would be of signal importance for both would have to be genuinely
desirous of learning, of studying areas of real human import. There are
real possibilities for failure in such an arrangement or perhaps lack of
arrangement, but this is essential to real freedom. Freedom of such an
order that mistakes, and important mistakes, cannot be made is not
freedom. Images, what people will think, and such should not be relevant
factors or, if relevant, certainly not supreme.

Student government, if it is to exist at all, must have important
areas of freedom and authority. This is doubtless risky, for students
lack experience, maturity, and sometimes even insight, but if it is
trivial freedom only, if it is not risky, it may do more harm than good,
for it may acf as a pacifier and leave the persons unprepared for real
issues. Trivial issues, in creating the illusion of freedom, may well

be destructive.

92

It seems peculiar that we accord to many very recent high
school graduates a rather extreme degree of freedom. They marry, es-
tablish their own residences, become employed or even set up their own
businesses, etc., immediately after high school graduation. Yet, the
group that one would assume to be more mature and capable, the group
that goes on in higher education, we control and limit to a very great
extent. This is doubtless in part due to the peculiar situation under
which they live, in large groups of the same age and sex and often more
heavily subsidized by the state than other citizens. But these reasons
hardly seem adequate. Furthermore, there is little more freedom for a
senior than a SOphomore or a freshman, yet such a student has had two
or three more years of maturation and education. There ought to be
progressively greater freedom, greater freedom as a freshman in college
than as a senior in high school and certainly greater freedom as a
senior in college than as a freshman, and this progressive development
ought not to include any great disjunctive steps, i.e., the steps be-
tween high school and college and between undergraduate and graduate or
professional’training, or between undergraduate and post-graduate em-
ployment. However, if we are to assume that this is to be a person-
centered education, we nevertheless cannot assume that all persons of
the same age are equally mature and can take on equal responsibility.
Thus, all freshmen or, indeed, all seniors should not have the same
freedoms. The kinds and degrees of freedom would be dependent upon the
responsibility undertaken by the one to whom the freedom is given. It
would seem feasible, however, to make some generalizations about fresh-

men who have had somewhat the same experiences and senior students who

93

likewise have had some common experiences, and these generalizations
could be stated in terms of some rules and regulations. However, these
would only be guides and must always be thought of a such, flexible
enough to be applicable in individual cases. Unless it is assumed that
education has no part in the maturation of the students, that students
do not become more responsible as they progress (in such a case, there
is no such thing as person-centered education) then each student must be
encouraged to take on greater freedom and responsibility in each suc-
ceeding year. '

Since learning will not be guided by a mentor or teacher after
graduation, systematic learning, if there is to be any, will have to be
self-motivated and self-conducted. Students ought to be prepared for
this by the senior year. Thus, guidance would be greater at the freshman
year and accordingly classes would be smaller and contact with faculty
greater than in succeeding years. Such contacts and guidance might even
decrease and class size increase in the ensuing years of study until by
the time the senior year is completed, most of the studying could be
done with a minimum of direct supervision or control. It may well be
that it is difficult,to learn freedom and responsibility in large groups
where one tends to feel he can play no part and have no influence, where
the regulations must be of such rigidity as to be able to control large
groups. If so, this would mean that the units--academic, housing, and
any other areas in which the students should have freedom and responsi-
bility-~would have to be broken down into small enough groupings that
the students may indeed have a genuine voice, genuine control and genuine

freedom. This might mean that houseing regulations would not be

94

campuswide, but might be determined within a particular house or unit.
This would be confusing, but one of the major criteria is not the issue
of confusion, but the development of the person.

Such conceptions as stated herein are indeed precarious. The
chance for failure is very great, for they demand great responsibility
on the part of all who administer the governing principles. This would
include both faculty and students, for all must act both as legislators
and subjects to the law. But for this no excuse is offered, for person-
centered education by definition demands a self-government and is indeed
precarious even as life itself is precarious.

7. The object pf the curriculum both.ip its extracurricular and

 

 

 

curricular appectsl lg the development pf_a_meaningful ordered gestalt

 

 

 

‘pg experience, past, present, and future, which will provide a guide

 

 

 

for conduct. Perception, abstraction, generalization, symbolization,

 

prediction are all tools leading to this end. This gestalt might be
termed wisdom; the perceptions and ideas leading to it, knowledge.
Knowledge as such cannot be the goal of the curriculum, whereas wisdom
may well be. Wisdom in these terms is impossible without knowledge,
and the greater the knowledge, the greater the possibilities of wisdom,
but there may be great knowledge with little wisdom or reason.

Discussion: No study should end as only a survey or an encyclo-

 

pedia of facts. All study must culminate in the integration of know-
ledge within a particular field, and finally within the field of know-
ledge and experience as a whole. Since particular knowledge must be
integrated into the total field of human knowledge and man is basically

moral, such an integration cannot be divorced from value.

95

The study that did not require that which is uniquely human,
i.e., reason resulting in wisdom, would not be worth doing. Thus,
analysis, synthesis, and integration would all be required. ,The methods
of teaching would be those requiring response from reason on the part of
the leaners. Lectures might well be used to provide background material,
acquaint others with significant persons, and to provide living illus-
trations of the application of reason to fundamental issues, but under
normal conditions, teaching would demand a response from the learner in
the form of a thoughtful paper or in espousing and defense of ideas in
the seminar.

The course of study as outlined by student and advisor would
necessitate some unifying factor. It would include the means for gather-
ing data or perceptions, but it would also have to include the integra-
tion of thig matter within the field of study and within the whole field
of human experience. Such an endeavor requires reflection and thus a
course pould not be built up of minute segments of knowledge demanding a
scurrying from class to class and from source to source, but would re-
quire a time for thoughtful reflection or the making of judgments, for
abstraction and generalization. The senior year might especially be
set aside for this very endeavor. It would provide a time when the
students would be encouraged to slow their pace in some respects, to
study in depth those things of genuine concern, to reflect and to bring
together their experience into a philosophy of life that gives meaning
to life and guidance for conduct. '

Some means must be found for the encouragement of both faculty

and students to spend time in meditation and reflection. This means that

96

administration must so constitute itself and the school as a whole in
such a manner that such endeavor is encouraged. Meetings and committees
would be held to a minimum. Writings would be encouraged not for their
own sake, but for that which they contribute to knowledge and specifi-
cally to mankind. Howard Mumford tells of the seminar he held with a
group of educators, most of them doctors of philosophy, people who had
already achieved eminence in their profession: When he asked them how
many spent as much as half an hour a day in complete solitude or re-
flection with no outside interruption, most reported that they had never
even considered the need for such-a period and if they came upon such
an "empty" time, they felt compelled to "do something" with it. No
self-directed thought, no reverie, no subjective art, no prayer, and
only one participant, by general agreement the most brilliant mind in
the group, confessed to do anything but the most cursory and passive
activity, as he bashfully admitted that he prayed. Mumford says of
these educators, "As a result, these well-intentioned men and women were
always reacting and responding to something outside themselves: adjust-

ing and conforming, without any ability to take the initiative and to

make a genuine departure of their own."* Person-centered higher educa-

 

*Mumford, Lewis, The Conduct of Life (Harcourt, Brace and Company:
New York, 1951), pp 255-256.

 

 

tion must in some way or ways encourage the ultimate in human reason,
reflection resulting in a meaningful whole of man's experience.

It seems apparent that the total program of the school must be
developed rationally. This would mean not only that things were chosen

on the basis of values, as is inevitably the case, but that there must

97'

be some rational approach to the determination of values and their ap-
plication to the total picture of higher education. Thus, at any time
one ought to be able to raise questions regarding activities, as to their
rightness, their goodness, their priority, their place in the educational
picture. Finally, both teachers and students must be protected from the
encroachments of power groups without the community and from within in
order that they may probe and share and hypothesize, in order that they
may in uninhibited expression, in thinking out loud, reach tentative

and spontaneous ideas. This is dangerous, for not always are the ideas
controllable or predictable, nor indeed should they be, but such is a
part of learning, and freedom for this must be encouraged and guaranteed.

8. The university lg 3 place for communication. This may be in the

 

form of writing, and as such the library is perhaps central to the whole
university, but there must also be the live communication--student to
student and faculty to student and student to faculty. All communication
is not of equal merit, and one of the functions of the community of
higher education would be to sort out those things that are relevant,
pertinent, important, and to provide whatever means possible for the

communication of these matters. But communication is not enough.

A_person-centered education must g3 beyond communication to communion.

 

The community must develop pp environment that will encourage person-

 

 

to-person encounters.

Discussion: Since communication is of such vital importance in

 

the development of mankind and individual persons, the usual forms of
mass communication must be employed. Thus, radio, TV, audio-visual

aids, and newspapers would all be important. The point of difference

98
between these means of mass communication as employed by the university
and as employed outside the university would be primarily in the matter
of selection of material to be communicated, as this material relates to
the highest forms of human activity. A system of higher education may be
as well evaluated by what it does not communicate as by what it does.
Since the accumulation of knowledge is of such great importance in the
continued technological and ideological development of mankind, the li-
-brary would be of central concern. The use of the library would be en-
couraged by faculty and the development of the library would take a high
priority in budget considerations. The use of language would also take
a very important place within the curriculum. The students in all areas
would be encouraged to develop their skill in communication, both spoken
and written, and yet communication is not to be considered as an end in
itself, but as a vehicle for the transmission of information, data,
ideas, conceptions, in general, human thought. Thus neither writing for
writing's sake nor talking for talking's sake would be encouraged. Com-
munication would be a part of every class, and not relegated to only one
area of study.

But above and beyond the area of communication is the area of
communion, that which is so distinctively human and to be encouraged at
all costs. The school must be so arranged as to bring about the possi-
bility of person-to-person encounter. There must be provisions within
classes for this kind of an encounter, and this would probably mean that
the students would have to be at some time in classes of quite limited
size. There must also be opportunity outside of class for informal
person-to-person encounter. This might be encouraged through a more

leisurely dining hour and the participation of faculty in student dining,

99

or it might be done through coffee hours, or more informally, by provid-
ing a gathering place for faculty and students where there might be a
sense of freedom and assurance so that the persons encountering each
other may open themselves without fear of reprisal or loss of status.
Administrators must be absolutely "above-board" in planning and not only
communicate with others of the faculty, but expose themselves and their
ideas to the faculty for judgment and evaluation. The faculty must then
be encouraged to be honest in their appraisals. Students also should be
invdlved in this process. Their participation would not only be per-
mitted, but be felt essential. The.atmosphere should be one of such
freedom that faculty would be free to expose themselves and their work
to other faculty members. Faculty members would not feel it necessary
to build up islands of knowledge where they are supreme because nobody
else has knowledge in that particular area. They would not feel it neces-
sary to have such islands in order to maintain rank and status within the
disciplines, but on the contrary, such isolation would be discouraged.
One would feel it essential to encounter others with his ideas and work.
Likewise, students would be encouraged with complete openness
and honesty to submit themselves and their ideas to an encounter with
their peers and with the faculty. They must be able to question, with-
out fear, statements and ideas of faculty, and faculty must be able to
question and sharpen the views of students. This would mean that teach-
ing could not consist merely of the pouring out of facts and the regur-
gitation of the same facts in the form of tests, but that both faculty
and students would have to make conclusions and commitments and submit

these to the scrutiny of the other members of the community.

 

100

Since a person-to-person encounter and I-Thou relationship demands
commitment on the part of the persons involved, such commitments would be
encouraged by the school and the school would itself make commitments.

It would say, "these" are things we are seeking after or we count "these"
to be good, and likewise faculty members would be encouraged to make such
commitments. They would be encouraged to participate in government. The
architects and urban planners would dare to criticize public housing in
those areas in which it failed. The Journalism Department would speak
out against the evils of advertising and the inadequacies of newspapers.
The Physics Department would have something to say about the matter of
competition or cooperation in international science and the uses to

which its knowledge is put. Finally, students would be encouraged to
make commitments and though their views at times would be embarrassing
and the stands possibly contrary to those of their elders and specifi-
cally the administration, still sucH commitments would be encouraged.

For only as these commitments would deal with matters that might embarrass
and might be contrary to the views of others within the community in im-'
portant areas would'the commitments of the students be important.

Such an environment is possible when the various persons view
the others, not as individuals or objects to be used for their own ag-
grandizement or benefit, but as persons worthy of respect and dignity,
who not only have the rights of personal development, free communication,
and commitment, but who have also the obligation for these because only
in this manner may each of the persons be beneficial to the others within
the community.

9. Each person must stand alone, he must pe responsible for his

 

 

acts. The community should provide an environment which encourages

 

101

knowledge, wisdom, the mutually beneficial life of communication and
communion, that is, the development of the person. But then each person
must be ultimately responsible for what he does and what he is. Students
and faculty must be encouraged to act according to knowledge, on the
basis of values developed through reason, and then each be responsible
forthis acts.

Discussion:

 

Faculty and students can be encouraged to act and be responsible
for their acts only as the community acts and is responsible for its

acts. As Paul Goodman points out,
"...there are 1900 American colleges and universities; several
hundreds of these have collected in one place many learned,
free, and creative adults, and all of them are centers of
lively and promising youth; yet one could not name a dozen that
strongly stand for anything, whether idiosyncratic, peculiarly
wise, dangerous, adventurous, or even exceptionally licentious
or stupid. This is astounding, that there should be so many
communities and so much conformity to the national norms;....*

 

*Goodman, Paul, "The Community of Scholars," Commentary, Volume
33, 3 (March, 1962), p. 208.

 

The community must be willing to stand for that which it holds. Once

it has made a commitment, and in this case it would be the commitment

to a person-centered education, then it must not be forced into patterns
of conformity to other schools of higher education. Granted that univer-
sities are tending to leave the person-centered education for the sake

of greater specialization and'graduate education; granted that such a
procedure is almost requisite for high status in the world of higher
education; granted that person-centered education would be difficult

and expensive; that faculty willing to enter into such an endeavor are

hard to obtain and perhaps harder still to hold, still once the commit-

 

102

ment is made, the school must act accordingly. How can we encourage
responsible action on the part of persons when the schools themselves
refuse to act responsibly? Likewise, if it is determined that football
is not a proper unifying center for the school, in that it does not meet
the prerequisites for such an element, then in spite of the fact that
legislators and alumni will vigorously oppose such action, the school
must in its integrity develop a center that more aptly meets the require-
ments for a person-centered community. If a school is not able to exist
Without making intellectual compromises, and moral compromises, then
perhaps it should not exist at all. If grading is found to be inimical
to the goals of a person-centered higher education, then it must be
abolished. Goodman, in the same article, tells about the lunch he had
with six senior professors from ahbig midwestern university, including
some chairmen of departments. All of them verbally opposed grading as
being injurious to teaching and learning and yet none of them was Willr
ing to speak out for the abolition of grading, upon the basis of various
rationalizations. Such action can only encourage the individuals within
a community to like action. Certainly it is easier to offer factual
information and only factual information, not to encourage the student
in the forming of concepts and the integrating of knowledge into the
larger body of knowledge and values. Certainly, such information can

be more readily graded through machine tests and short answer examina-
tions. But if such testing and such teaching is found to be inimical to
the development of persons as persons, then the school must take a stand
opposing such procedures. To compromise on the basis of expediency or
ease is to encourage the same type of behavior on the part of both

students and faculty.

103

The encouragement to act responsibly upon the basis of a rational
value system cannot take place when there is the fear of vindictive retri-
bution, when the climate promotes the idea that failure inevitably brings
punishment and that nonconformity leads to dismissal. Responsible acti-
vity certainly will lead to failure and sometimes major failure, and it
may well encourage nonconforming action, but such is the price of person-
centered education. Laws must be upheld and rules followed, but when
either laws or rules are of such an order or number as to inhibit free-
dom then the call to responsible action becomes quite meaningless. U1-
timately, both the society and the person must choose and in choosing,
they not only show what they are but what they will become, and for this
they are responsible. Just as the person is responsible for his indivi-
dual acts, in spite of the environment in which he was brought up and
the difficult situations he has faced, even so, the community of higher
education must be responsible for its actions. The question for higher
education is not how much will society give in the way of financial as-
siStance. This is a question for the society. The question is, how
;will it use that which they do give. _The university community cannot
say that this or that was added or done because of pressure from outside,
for in acceding to this pressure it chooses, and is responsible for this
choice. The outside pressures are not responsible. Likewise, the facul-
ty member must be responsible for what he does in his classroom. He
may find the situation such that he must protest, or so intolerable that
he must move on, but whatever the choice, he must act responsibly. Stu-
dents, too, must be expected to become more and more responsible. They
must be left with real alternatives and then be held responsible for

their choices and their actions. They must choose between formal and

104

informal classwork, between community and non-community activities.
These must be real alternatives. But when faced with such alternatives,

the student must stand responsible for his choice.

B. General principles applied to entrance and retention policies.

The application of the general principles as developed in this
dissertation thus far has been overlapping and sometimes repetitive.

This is in part due to the nature of the principles themselves, for they,
too, are sometimes overlapping and often closely inter-related. The
application has been in those parts of the total program of higher edp-
cation often thought of as peripheral--housing, athletics, student
government, etc. These, in truth, are neither peripheral nor trivial,
for an integrity and consistency within the college as a whole is deman-
ded, and thus nothing may be considered trivial.

The following consideration will deal with three issues gene-
rally recognized to be pivotal in an educational system--admission and
(retention of students, curriculum, and student evaluation. The principles;
as developed, will be'applied to these areas, not one at a time as in the
previous section, but in quite general terms. O

In general, present policies for entrance and retention in high-
er education seem to emphasize or conform to the nonperson-centered
functions of higher education or training rather than the person-centered
function. This is not surprising, since person-centered practices are
' difficult and open to much error and are perhaps more time consuming and

expensive. Secondly, much of higher education is rightfully_nonperson-

 

centered, that is, it is centered in the needs of society or in truth.

Professional education of all kinds is of this order. For the protection

 

105

and good of the society, certain standards of performance and knowledge
must be maintained. We are not primarily interested in how rich the
lives of doctors as persons are, or what the quality of their life at a
given moment is, but we are tremendously interested in whether they have
certain skills, proficiencies, and knowledge. With teachers, too, there
is certain knowledge they must have regarding the nature of_children, the
nature of learning, and the subject matter taught. Likewise, for archi-
tects and engineers, there is a minimum standard, both as to skills and
to knowledge that must be maintained for the sake and the protection of
society. For the sake of the society, we must encourage individuals

who will becdme productive members. We must see that they become pro-
ficient scientists and engineers to meet the needs of the rapidly ex-
panding technical world about us. As Ortega y Gasset points out, the
number who are capable of becoming true scientists is very limited. But,
it would appear that there are ways of predicting the probabilities of
the achievement of such knowledge and skills. There are tests that are'
fairly accurate predictors of eventual achievement in such areas as
these. It is true that these tests are only fairly good predictors,
that without a doubt many students are eliminated who eventually could
achieve the minimum requirements, and that many students are encouraged
to undertake professional studies whd fail to make good professional
people. But, if society is to train people for its own good and is to
do this to a large extent at the society's cost, it has the right and
even the duty to screen out those that apparently have no possibility

of achieving the minimum required for society's protection. Thus,

students entering into such professional areas must prove a certain

 

106
academic ability on the basis of past achievements and score above
minimum levels on tests used as predictors of success. We may be able
to argue about the general merits of the particular tests and their
reliability and validity, but the right of the society to protect itself
by such means is beyond dispute.

The same principles and practices are not appropriate for person-
centered education, however. Who can determine what the minimum stand-
ard of academic success is in order to be a person or a good person?

Is there, indeed, a minimum acceptable for a person? Are there certain
skills and knowledge that must be achieved within a specified time,
notably four years, for a person to be a good, an adequate person? It
.
would appear that here our predictors of success are not sufficient.
There is no necessary correlation between test scores, high school
achievement and that which is so necessary in a person-centered educa—
tion, that is, ”human concern." Because a person has done well in high
school and performs well on tests we have no grounds for assuming that
the student is interested in his own development as a person, or that
he is interested in the great problems of truly human concern. The
basis for acceptance or entrance in a person-centered school of higher
education might be these: 1) a determination that this is the best
program of study for the student. This would be judged from both what
the student desires and what he appears to be able to do. It has been
assumed that person-centered education is only one of the functions of
higher education, and it is only right that there be others. The
question then devolves to the determination of what type of higher edu-
cation is right for what person. It is rather foolish to encourage

a student in endeavors which are both unappealing and appear to be

 

 

107

unfruitful to him or are beyond his ability. The program offered at
any institution must be within the reasonable expectations of the students
encouraged to participate in such programs. However, since tests are
fallible and give only generalized guidance, the desires of the students
would ultimately override the results of "objective" tests. The question
for both the student and the school to answer is, is this the best pro-
gram for the student in question? Does it offer that which he can grasp
and gain therefrom? Even a person-centered educational institution may

,
not be ideal for every person. Because of human frailities and limita-
tions it may be necessary to have many different schools so as to en-
compass all the levels of development and the unique aspects of various
persons. ‘

Students who give no indication of ability to comprehend or
benefit from programs offered in person-centered higher education might
be encouraged to enter other endeavors, and at a later time they might
find the benefits of a person-centered program most helpful. A person-
centered program of higher education would be both broad and flexible
enough to be adaptable to the needs of students from various backgrounds
and at various ages.- It is not necessary that students must be seven-
teen or eighteen to benefit from higher education. Those with lesser
capacities might well benefit from such education at a later time in
their lives after they have gained further maturation through other
types of experiences.

It is doubtless legitimate for government and industry to pro-
vide special inducements for students to enter those professional areas

of peculiar need to the society at the time, but no such inducements

 

108

'should be offered to persons who are interested in more general educa-
tion such as is outlined within this consideration. Person-centered
education requires that the final criterion be not that which is good
for the society as a structure, but that which is good for the person
in his intra-personal relationships within the society, i.e., the
society as a true community. Good persons will make a better society.

2) The second element to be considered as a determining factor
in entrance requirements for students is the desire on the part of the
student to participate in experiences aimed primarily at deve10ping
the person. It may well ba that tests and grades are not the best ways
to determine this desire. The most important factor might be the con-
clusions drawn by faculty persons interviewing students desirous of
entering--interviews aimed at gaining evidence of books read recently,
questions the student would like to pursue, and other evidences of
general curiosity and human concern. Upon the basis of such an inter-
view, the faculty member then would make a judgment as to whether this
student is genuinely interested in learning and is prepared to enter
into study. The faculty member might then become advisor or tutor for
the student.

The administrative officers dealing with admissions might look
for evidences of the use of freedom and the acceptance of responsibility,
and such evidence might have little relationship or even a negative
relationship to grades. It is possible that grades in high school may
be achieved through the loss of freedom, through a lack of personal '
involvement, or the suppression of intellectual curiosity. In educa-

tion today, it is possible that the conformer, the regurgitator of

fact, the apathetic may achieve on our evaluation instruments at a

 

 

109

higher level than the nonconforming, original, creative thinker. So,
the schools might look for evidences of radicalism in some respect, the
"offbeat," the nonconformist in some area or another. These in them-
selves give no guarantee that such a student would gain from the educa-
tion offered, but evaluated in their context, they might give some indi-
cation as to the intellectual curiosity, the desire to develop and learn
and to confront fiEw ideas and other people. Evidences of responsibility
and the proper use of freedom would be more readily ascertainable and,
indeed, be more genuine after the student is out of high school some
time. The application of these ideas might demand a radical change in
our view of higher education. We have traditionally viewed person-
centered higher education as preceding professional education. Perhaps
this need not be the case, but a rigorous, well-developed, person-centered
higher education might be more profitable when studied either simul-
taneously or after professional training, after a student has matured
and is prepared to examine the questions of freedom and responsibility
and has shown evidence of the assumption of the same.

Retention policies today are also based primarily upon the 27‘
professional concept. Usually there are certain minimum requirements
that must be met within a specified time, and the total task must be
completed in four years or less. To complete it, one must accumulate a
certain number of credits. This may well be material that was learned
beforehand and, thus, very little actual learning need take place. It
is assumed that all learning is equally good and that any credit is of
equal value. That which is required is a minimum number of hours of

credit. A student is evaluated only on the basis of that which takes

110

place within the classroom, usually over a given body of knowledge and
in some areas certain skills.

Person-centered higher education should proceed on quite a
different basis. The question is not whether a student at a given moment
has attained certain minimum requirements, but whether the student is
profiting sufficiently from the experiences offered to him. Such a
judgment must be made by a person having close contact with the student,
knowing him well as a person. It might be that the student started
with a very poor background and, thus, within two years might not reach
the minimum requirements usually expected of students. But, if in those
two years he has given evidence of growth, maturity, of the acceptance
of greater freedoms and resppnsibilities, if he now sees greater ques-
tions, if his human concern has increased, if his intellectual curiosity
has grown, then what reason is there for rejecting him? On the other
hand, a student who may be meeting all of the minimum requirements that
have been set up, but still shows no human concern, no interest in great
questions, no development of new appreciations and interests, may be
actually impoverishing himself. What reason is there for encouraging
and maintaining such a student? Such a student is in desperate need of
such education, but even though a particular school cannot accomplish
that which is necessary, and such a case is entirely possible, another
school or other experiences might.

Evaluation on such broad terms as these probably cannot be done
through classwork examinations alone. For one thing, much of the value

of a person-centered education would necessarily take place outside a

classroom. The lectures, concerts, coffee hours, seminars, symposia,

lll

informal discussions of all types would be an integral part of an edu-
cation. The amount and type of reading and the development of a stu-
dent's own library would also be a part of this education. In such a
program, the development of the student as a person can only be judged
through a personal contact with others, with someone who knows the
student in such terms that he can tell whether he is deve10ping or not.
A person-centered system of higher education might have not only
to tolerate, but even encourage the student who for some time may find
the work in the classroom quite boring, or not meeting his intellectual
needs, and so, Spends his time in the library learning exceedingly
valuable things and providing for himself the background for further
seminar and class work. It might have not only to tolerate but encourage
the student who suddenly becomes involved in social justice and enters
into some activist phase of life. That, indeed, becomes a part of his
maturation and deve10pment. For such students the school should under-
stand that this is a part of their deVelOpment rather than a time of
declension and loss in their education. A student who comes from a
geographical area or class group that has kept him from many of the
riches of human experience and enters into them at the university for
the first time, who begins enjoying music and art, who finds excitement
in sitting down with exciting people and discussing with them things of
import, may be profiting tremendously from his university experience.
At the same time, as courses are now set up, he may be doing somewhat
less than acceptable work. On the other hand, a student may come and
impoverish himself while here, yet do very acceptable work within the

classroom. The point is simply this, that grades over specified materials

 

112

may not be sufficient indicators for either retention or expulsion of
students, that the only way such an evaluation can be made is through
the personal contact and evaluation of an advisor, faculty member,

or counselor.

C. Generalyprinciples applied to curriculum

The curriculum may be thought of as either the formal classes
constituted of students, the teacher, and a formal body of knowledge
to be considered, or it may be thought of as those experiences coming
under the guidance and determination of the school which are intended
for the purpose of learning. In the latter case, the formal classes
would be included, but they would not Constitute the entirety of the
curriculum. The college, being an institution for education or learning,
a community of scholars, would so constitute all of its activities that
they would result in education and learning, and that in these terms,
the first definition would be inadequate. The previous discussion or
consideration of the general principles governing a person-centered
higher education has, to a degree, considered the non-classroom areas
of higher education. A few additional remarks would be appropriate.
Whatever form these activities might take, whether it be in the field
of athletics, or the art forms, or clubs and societies, or any other
activity under the guidance of the school, they ought to bring people
into direct contact with others, either through listening, watching or
reading, through actual person-to-person encounter. These activities
ought, in some way, to lead to participation and eventual personal
commitment. This participation need not be physical, for it is impos-

sible for all to play the violin because Isaac Stern visits the campus,

 

113

or all to give lectures because Ralph Bunche lectures. But the activi-
ties should be of such an order as to lead one into intellectual activity
and eventual personal commitment, they are not to be mepe entertainment.
They must all be chosen in terms of their contribution to the quality

of life of the persons participating and watchine.

A more formal and detailed consideration of the classroom as-
pects is appropriate. The curriculum, in these terms, is composed of
students, teachers, and the content of knowledge--a thing studied. The
matter of the selection of students has already been considered. Though
it is of vital importance and cannot be separated from the determination
of the curriculum, it will not be considered again. The teacher must

be considered as a more experienced learner and the student a less

experienced learner. Both teachers and students should consciously be
learning and maturing. Both must manifest curiosity and concern in
things human, in their relationships to the world, to others, and to
God. Viewing both faculty and Students as basically learners would mean
that they, together, form a community. Activities within this community
would be for the community, not just a class within the community.
Religious groups would not be student religious groups, but they would
be constituted of members from the total community, that is both fac-
ulty members and students. Other organizations would also be expressions
of this community of learners, and would not be limited to students
only. This community would be composed of students, teachers, staff,
and families or others with a common interest in learning.

If the teachers are not learners, if they are not excited and

stimulated through their learning, they can be of little stimulation to

 

 

114

the students. The teacher must, first of all, be one worthy of emula-
tion, and especially emulation in the active process of learning. There
seems to be little doubt now but that most factual knowledge, if not all,
can be gained as easily and cheaply through the various aides growing

out of our technical skills, through teaching machines, television,
radio, programmed learning, and such, as through classroom experience
with teachers. It may well be that classrooms and teachers are a

thing of the past--an outmoded instrument--if the goal of education is
only the learning of factual material or the development of concepts.

The one area left to the teacher, then, is the area of human art--the

art of being human. Data, information, generalizations, and laws can all
be learned through other means than through the use of the time of
teachers. But, human activity within these areas cannot be learned
through machines, but is learned through emulation and participation.
Thus, a student truly learns--learns that which is significant--as he
works with a more experienced learner in the gathering of data, in
making generalizations, in discriminating values, in demonstrating the
beautiful, in formulating hypotheses, and in other things that are
distinctly human. For.this, a teacher is essential.

Even the library fails to distinguish between that which is
significant and that which is trivial. It is a storage house for know-
ledge, including every shade and every degree of importance, and yet,
the distinction between triviality and significance is one of great
importance. It is the teacher who must lead into subjects of importance
and encourage the student to make distinctions between that which is of

relative unimportance and that which is of distinctly human importance.

For such activity, nothing can substitute for a teacher.

 

 

115

This teacher must be, first of all, a person--not a computer
that accumulates and then spews forth information, but one that has a
love for general truths, and unites with this love a sense of what every
student is there for, common understandings. He need not be a first-
hand investigator, although if one can draw students into investigation,
or create in them a desire to inquire through one's own inquiry, then
certainly teaching has been enhanced. But, whether a firsthand investi-
gator or not, a teacher must be one who synthesizes, relates, correlates,

,
interprets, interrelates within and between the various realms of know-
ledge--he must be a scholar. He must be one who draws out a fresh,
creative synthesis of knowledge. His primary commitment must be to
teaching. This will not prohibit research, in fact, it will encourage
research. But, it may well determine or limit such research. Such a
person must find his satisfaction in the work he does, for if there is
no such satisfaction, then he no longer becomes a proper person for
emulation on the part of the students. The university, on its part,
must reward, in whatever ways it has at its disposal, such a teacher.
While a dedicated teacher may indeed teach without due reward, or at
least exterior reward, for the sake of the university and the commit-
ments it makes it must reward such people and reward them well.

Courses composed mainly of factual material, material to be
memorized and held ready at one's disposal, i.e., survey courses, could
be taught in various ways. Language courses and certain speech courses
might well be taught through language teaching aids, such as tape re-

corders or disks. Material that must be demonstrated can very often

be more graphically demonstrated through television. Other material

 

 

116

that traditionally has been given through lecture might be better

printed or mimeographed and given out to the students. In none of

these three would there be need for classes, that is, definite times

and places when the students and a faculty member must get together.

The television could be in the student's room, the printed material ob-
tained through a bookstore, and tests taken and sent in to a central
testing agency. The languages could be taped and graded,at an instructor's
leisure. While such learning is essential, it should be recognized

that it is not person-centered education, but is that which is prepara-
tory for such education.

Such an arrangement would leave both the students' and faculty
members' time free to meet either individually or in groups in such a
manner as to encourage an E72222 relationship. It would leave the
faculty free to encourage, to criticize, to lead on the students--in
general to confront the students with both the joys and pains of learning.
This would have to be done in fairly small groups. It might well be
that much of this could be done with only a minimum guidance on the
part of the faculty. It could be assumed that as students become more
experienced learners, more mature in their learning process, they-might
become more independent and spend more and more of their time on pro-
jects of special and perhaps individual interest to them. Other formal
learning situations might be developed with students only and without
the presence and direct guidance of any faculty member.

The faculty in such a school would have to form some kind of.

a genuine unity: It has been said of Johns Hopkins in its early stages

that the faculty did form such a unity, that it was indeed a universe.

yin—m“ a]. .. ‘ -om‘mi-._ I.

 

ll7

Scholars like Professor Gildersleeve, or Dr. Osler, or President Gilman
sat in with other members of the faculty on the various lectures. Thus,
the best minds were continually stimulating one another instead of
working always in departmental isolation. Certainly this would stimulate
intellectual vitality, it would raise the sights of both faculty and

students. It would be immoral to encourage such a procedure if the

lectures dealt with trivial matters, for to waste the time of students
or teachers would be a matter of utmost concern. '

The curriculum would present not only the chief works of the
human arts, but also the noblest of the humans. Arts, in this sense,
would include more than the performing arts, but would include that work
of man which is distinctively human. Thus, such a curriculum would pre-
sent all of the areas of human endeavor--science, history, art, litera-
ture, religion, wherever human beings have worked with rationality,
insight and skill. Someone has suggested that amazing lists could be
made of the little things with which the graduate's head is stored and
the important things from which it is free. A person-centered education
would consciously and actively discourage such an "education." There
should be provision, perhaps at the very center of the study, for con-
tact with those persons who have so greatly influenced human life, whose
ideas have had an impact upon the stream of human thought. This can
hardly be done through secondary texts, but would have to be done
through contact with the original writings themselves.

The curriculum should also deal with the various modes of

thought and knowledge. Science, as one of the ways of thinking and

investigating, must become a part of the equipment of a student, not

 

118

because all students will be scientists, but because this is a manner

of human thinking. For this reason it should be considered as a liberal
rather than a technical subject. It should be an inquiry into the
subject for the light it casts on the nature of the physical world,

and not for the sake of something else such as engineering or medicine.
The purpose of science must be humane and virtuous. In a person-
centered education, science cannot be thought of as "domestic science"
but instead should result in an intelligent appreciation of a method of
learning and a body of knowledge which are of great value for human
purposes. Revelation, as another way or source of human knowledge, must
also be considered. Religion cannot be divorced from the consideration
of the human condition, a consideration of how we have arrived at the
place we are, or the direction we should take. Certainly revelation

as a means of knowledge should have its place in the curriculum. Like-
wise, literature as a mode of thought and knowledge would be considered.
Literature would not be studied with the exclusive devotion to the
history of literature, but the principle emphasis being centered on
literature as art and as an interpretation of life. As Gordon Chalmers
says, "Poetry is a way to think, and it is available to every man. Its

chief practical usefulness to us lies in improving our ability to see

the world as in itself it really is."* He goes on to say that poetry

 

*Chalmers, Gordon, The Republic and the Person (Henry Regnery
Company: Chicago, 1952), p. 71

 

 

cannot be known merely by describing poems. They must be spoken, written,

- 10‘; -..-..' Q

“‘o-AP

 

119

and ruminated upon, and, to teach many peOple poetry requires not only
a great deal of knowledge, but a vivid imagination. Anthony Standen,
in demonstrating that literature is an important way of knowing and
expressing human thought, points out that great novelists are great
because they are good psychologists, and that if we want to understand
human beings we ought to read good literature. He points.out that

the great psychological insights cannot be expressed as so many propo-
sitions. If Shakespeare could have described what it feels like to be
a murderer or to be mad, he would have done so in clear terms, but such

feelings cannot be expressed in propositions, so he wrote Macbeth and

other studies in madness.* The visual arts are another form of human

 

*Standen, Anthony, Science is a Sacred Cow, (E. P. Dutton & Co.,
Inc.: New York, 1950), p. 131.

 

 

thought and expression, and a direct acquaintance with them would be one
of the goals of a person-centered education. Such an acquaintanceship
would not be gained only through formal classes in art theory and art
appreciation or history, but would include the prominent display in all
parts of the campus of worthy objects of art. The study of art in its
various forms involves not only the intellect, but also the heart, and
thus is especially humane.

The curriculum would deal with both general education and
liberal education. General education, as its name implies, is education
common to our genus or kind. It is that education needed to enable an
individual to become an intelligent and c00perative member of the society
and does not emphasize the distinctive features of his own personality.

General education sometimes tends to be superficial since it deals with

 

 

120

broad areas and broad generalities in a very limited time. Such need
not be the case, but often is. A prerequisite for both general and
liberal education would be that the courses be not limited to any speci-
fied number of hours because of the ease of arrangement in scheduling.
But, rather, it should be determined what time is necessary to teach

an area and then set the course up accordingly. Courses might take two
hours of time, and others might demand a much larger block of time,

such as eight or ten hours. The content should determine the number

of hours required and the credits given rather than that ease in
Scheduling of courses be the determining factor.

Liberal education aims at the distinctive features of each
person's personality. True liberal education is much more difficult
than general education, both to teach and to attain. It places greater
emphasis upon higher mental powers. As Cowling and Davidson say,

"The facts and values of general education can be assimilated

by the mind of the student chiefly through observation, asso-
ciation, or memory; they can be tested objectively. But liberal
education demands logical reasoning and creative imagination;
these cannot be absorbed by mere contact, but must grow within

the mind; imagination is too unstandardized to be tested on a
Hollorith machine."*

 

*Cowling, Donald J., and Davidson, Carter, Colleges for Freedom
(Harper and Brothers: New York, 1947), pp. 47-48.

 

 

The task of liberal education is to lead the student to see what the
teacher himself sees and then go on through problems, questions, tasks,
challenges, through discussions, through puzzlements. The teacher must
mercilessly criticize, the student must define and defend himself and

try conclusions. Vagueness and inaccuracy dare not be allowed. Thorough-

ness and clearness must be emphasized. Such is the work of liberal education.
’ .

 

 

121
In the world today the only ones we need fear are those who
have received technical training. Technology gives tools, and powerful
tools, which may be used for good or for bad, for that which edifies
or that which destroys. The question of how or for what purposes to
use our knowledge and skills becomes a matter of vital concern. Thus,

person-centered education may not deal only with the technologies, but

.-. ~ . wry

must deal primarily with values, the discrimination of good from bad,

of joy from pleasure, of right from wrong. The goal of a person-

;ru- . ..

centered education is thus closely linked to human values. Such an
education should lead to a full and rich life. This would include
careful and prolonged discipline in learning to discriminate between the
good and the inferior in every line of experience. The result is joy,

the final test and reward of achievement.

D. General principles applied to student evaluation

 

‘Evaluation, as everything else in a person-centered higher
education, must have as its goal the development of the student. Thus,
evaluation cannot be primarily for teachers or for discipline, but must
somehow be centered in the student. Testing may point out to the
teachers areas where greater emphasis need be given. This may be
valuable for the teacher and, thus, for the whole class as well as the
individual student. For the student, it should point out areas of
weakness and strength so as to encourage him in what has been learned
and to motivate him to greater efforts, not as a club, but as a device
for seeing himself as he is. The test may also cause him to system-
atically consider the study he has already undertaken. But, it is

hard to see how tests at the end of a given study, a study which will

 

122
not be continued, help the student, or the faculty. That particular
part of the education is over, so what advantage is gained by knowing
the relative standing of each student? The education tends to be dis-
continuous, and thus, the evaluation of one course has little to do

with the next course. This form of evaluation may be legitimate in

other forms of education, but does not seem to be legitimate in

4'. ‘ pw'v

person-centered education.

Evaluation often determines both the curriculum and the method-
ology. We tend to evaluate that which we think can be evaluated, and
since testing has such an important place in the total program of higher
education today, we want to do it where it can be done easily and fairly.
Lacking both time and skill to test in depth, the tendency is to short
answer, objective tests. This may be done because such a procedure
seems to deal more fairly with the students, and it may well be that
short answer objective tests do measure very well indeed. There are two
objections to this. One is that most teachers do not have the skill to
compose objective tests that are fair and which do measure accurately.
Such test making is much more complex and difficult than usually sup-
posed. The second objection is that no matter what level of learning is
aimed at in an objective test the impression left with the student, and

a
very often the teacher, is that the matters dealt with are somewhat
disconnected, discrete, factual material. The question is not whether
this is the case or not, though far too often it is the case, but what.
is the impression left with the student? Teachers, being honest, teach

for that which they evaluate, and if they believe they are evaluating

for factual data, then they teach at this same level of learning. To do

 

123

otherwise would be immoral. Students soon learn what is expected, they
study for that which is evaluated. The result is that in general a
low level of learning is the expectation of both the faculty and the
students. ‘

Would it not be better to acknowledge that we do a poor job of
evaluation at any level of learning, that objective tests usually deal
with factual material, that they cannot measure the imagination, creati-
vity, or other distinctly human aspects, and that if they could measure
this, our skill at test making is poor enough that the average teacher
could not construct such tests. Once acknowledging this, we are then
left free to do a poor job at a significant level. If the goal of
person-centered education is a person who commits himself to his work
and thinks clearly and concisely and imaginatively or creatively, then
we must test for this learning, acknowledging that our testing will not
be adequate for making a rank ordering of students, but may be adequate
to point out strengths and weaknesses to both the students and the
teachers. It would seem better to do a poor job at a significant level
of learning than a good job at an insignificant level. It is better to
raise the expectations of the students and not be able to differentiate
exactly between them or to place them in some kind of a rank order, than
it is to lower their expectations and at the same time more exactly
measure something of far less significance. This is to say that, as
everything else in our person-centered system of higher education,
evaluation must be personal. It must be so on two counts. Its purpose

resides in the student, not in records, reports, curves, or anything

else. Secondly, it must be personal in that it is a personal evaluation,

 

 

124

one person so raising significant questions to another that in answer-
ing, both the student and instructor have a clearer.idea of who they
are and where they are in their development.

Such principles put into Operation might well mean the abandon-
ment of letter grades, of discrimination between persons on the basis of
achievement. Such evaluation, that is letter grade evaluation over a
Specific content, can only have meaning when a certain subject content
is considered within a limited time, when all students are expected
to move along in their intellectual deve10pment at the same rate. A

person-centered education denies this conception.

 

 

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY

It is the task of the community, that is.the college, to so
constitute itself as to evoke from both students and faculty those roles
which will enrich the person. Using another figure, the college must
call upon the persons to put on the masks (personae) and play parts
that befit persons. A person-centered higher education must have a
genuine function, namely do that which could not be done otherwise,
or do that which might be done by other agencies, but do it better.

That is, person-centered education must somehow bring about the develop-
ment or growth of persons in a way or to a degree that would not obtain
without such a community. This task is accomplished as the community
consciously constitutes itself as the extension of an ideal or mature
person. To the extent that the community does this, that which it does
and the expectations it calls forth are all befitting a person, and that
which would be unbecoming to the person would be unbecoming to the
community or artificial person. Thus by an examination of what is
ffitting for a person we can learn a great deal about how the community
should constitute itself.-

The community must first of all be moral, it must make its
choices upon the basis of values, the values deriving from purposes or
goals. Thus it must always act in ways that will enrich the person,
since this is the goal of such education. The development of the person
necessitates the assumption of more and greater freedoms and responsibili-
ties. The community, too, must act as free yet responsible. It must
not be hamstrung by tradition, or conformed to other institutions, yet

125

 

 

126
it must not be different merely for the sake of being different, or for
the sake of fame and fortune.

Certainly the community cannot be free and responsible if the
persons constituting it are not free and responsible. Thus the commun-
ity must encourage both faculty and students in freedom, while at the
same time requiring of them greater responsibility. Since freedom and
responsibility are dependent upon reason, the community must act accord-
ing to reason, and this, of course, is dependent upon the use of reason
by the persons constituting it. The community must act upon the basis
of reflective thought, and demand a like action on the part of its
members. It must, on the basis of reflection, determine what it should
do and be, and act accordingly.

What should such a community be? It should, first of all, be
a genuine community of persons, not merely a bundling or grouping of
individuals. It must be constituted of persons with a unity of purpose--
the development of free, responsible; rational and wise people. Thus the
selection of both faculty and students is of utmost importance. It must
furthermore be a community in the sense of an open communion, consti-
tuted of persons willing to commune, to give of themselves. They must
be willing to enter into the human encounter, the exposing of oneself
and one's ideas to others. This, of course, necessitates a spirit of
freedom and a sense of security. The threat of failure or shame is
hardly conducive to a real person—to-person encounter. It must be a
community willing to commit itself, to make an unqualified commitment

to persons as persons.

 

127

Such an education may be both inconvenient and expensive. But
we do not ask of the person only that which is convenient, we ask for
that which is right and good. Likewise the community cannot seek only
that which is convenient, but must also seek that which is right and
good.

The cost can only be considered in relationship to something
else. To say that education which develops the person as a person is
too costly is to say that either there are other things of more value
than the deve10pment of persons, or there are more efficient ways of
doing it. If there are other ways more efficient, then there is no
place for person-centered education. But if such an education is too
costly for other reasons, it can only be assumed that there are other
things of more value than the person. To admit that there is something
of equivalent or greater value than the person is to deny the dignity
and worth of the person, and ultimately destroy the concept of a person.

Upon this basis, the financing of person-centered education
would have a high priority for both the community and the persons. All
forms of formal education are expensive, that is they are expensive in
terms of some other things. But we hardly complain about the price to
the society for luxuries or temporary and transitory pleasures. In
comparison with these, education is not expensive. One can hardly
compare the worth of a person with ease in travel or exterior beauty and
not accept the fact that education deserves priority. Thus person-
centered education cannot be termed expensive.

It may be unfair to consider person-centered education as ex-

pensive even in terms of other forms of education. It is true that

128
administrative units might have to be reduced in size and thus increased
in number so that persons could be treated as persons. But this might
be compensated for by dispersing administrative duties, by giving faculty
members and advisors more responsibility and by expecting more responsi-
bility on the part of the students. Small classes would also be required
so that faculty and students might enter into genuine human dialogue.
But this could be compensated for by not requiring teachers to deal with
those areas wherein the students can learn without supervision. In
such a system teachers would be needed only in the truly human arts
and not those human activities which can be duplicated by machines.

The complaint that a person-centered education is risky or pre-
carious must, indeed, be considered. It has already been conceded that
such is the case. The possibility of failure is very great. The very
number of persons acting both as legislators and subjects involves risk.
There are so many that certainly some will fail, and it is entirely
possible that the whole venture may fail. But this is only the risk of
human life. It certainly is no greater than faces all mankind today.

Is it not better to fail in that which affirms the dignity of the person
and is in general uplifting and worthy, than to either succeed or fail
in that which ultimately dehumanizes and denies the dignity of the person?

A person-centered education corresponds with a democratic system.
Democracy demands of persons that they act as persons, i.e., they act
morally, responsibly, on the basis of reason. It accords to them great
freedom, yet freedom proportional to the degree of reSponsibility one
can and will assume and it demands an attitude of "I am my brother's

keeper,‘ that is a true community. This is only what has been said of

 

129
a person-centered education. Since both a democratic society and a
person-centered educational community are extensions of the person,
it is not to be wondered at that they so readily harmonize.

It is entirely possible that all education need not be built
upon the principles deveIOped within this dissertation. Traditionally
the military services have not dealt with people on these terms since
the function of the military is not the deve10pment of the person but.
is the protection of the society. Perhaps professional or vocational
education can parallel the military and not deal with persons as per-
sons. If this be the case, then it would be difficult to maintain both
types of education under the same administration or in the same location.

There still remains a very major question. Can any educational
institution afford to treat persons in any way other than as persons?

When persons are not treated as persons are they not dehumanized
and lowered to the level of other members of the animal kingdom? Is
not such action necessarily destructive to the ones so treating others,
that is, to the school? Finally, how can a society, the larger commun-
ity,be strengthened and at the same time the person debased? Thus it
might be well to question whether any educational or training institu-
tion can legitimately act on principles other than those deveIOped out
of the meaning of person. The function of the society or community is
the development of persons and thus every agency of it and within it

must also contribute to this general goal.

 

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' '-" ‘f‘

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Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle. Translated by Ernest Barker.
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Augustine, St., The City of God. Translated by Marcus Dods.
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Mannheim, Karl, Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology. Oxford
University Press: New York, 1953.

Mannheim, Karl, Systematic Sociology. Philosophical Library:
New York, 1958.

 

Maritain, Jacques, The Person and the Common Good. Charles Scribner's
Sons: New York, 1947.

 

Mumford, Lewis, The_Conduct of Life. Harcourt, Brace and Co.:
New York, 1951.1

 

Neilson, William A. and Wittke, Carl F., The Function of Higher
Education. Northwestern University: Evanston, 1943.

 

Ortega y Gasset, Jose, Mission of the University. Princeton University
Press: Princeton, N.J., 1944.

 

Parsons, Talcott, Essays in Sociological Theory-~Revised Edition.
The Free Press: Glencoe, 1954.

 

133

Parsons, Talcott, The Structure of Social Action. The Free Press:
Glencoe, 1949.

 

Redfield, Robert, The Primitive World and its Transformations.
Cornell University Press: Ithaca, N.Y., 1953.

Riesman,.David; Glazer, Nathan; and Reuel, Denny, The Lonely Crowd,
A Study of the Changing American Character. Abridged.
Doubleday and Co., Inc: Garden City, N.Y., 1953.

 

Skinner, B. F., Science and Human Behavior. The Macmillan Co.:
New York, 1953.

Standen, Anthony, Science is a Sacred Cow. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc.:
New York, 1950.

 

Strong, Augustus Hopkins, Systematic Theolpgy. The Judson Press:
Philadelphia, 1946.

Thorndike, Robert L. and Hagen, Elizabeth, Measurement and Evaluation
in Psychology and Education. John Wiley and Sons, Inc.: New
York, 1956.

 

Tillich, Paul, Love, Power; and Justice. Oxford University Press:
New York, 1960.~

Tillich, Paul, Systematic Theology, Vol. II. The University of
Chicago Press: Chicago, 1957.

 

Tournier, Paul, The Meaning of Persons. Harper and Brothers: New
York, 1957.

' Trow, Martain, "The Campus Viewed as a Culture," Research on College
Students. The Western Interstate Commission for Higher
Education: Boulder, Colorado, 1960.

 

Trueblood, Elton, The Idea of a College. Harper and Brothers:
New York, 1959.

 

Tussman, Joseph, Obligation and the Body Politic. Oxford University
Press: New York, 1960.

 

Ulich, Robert, The Human Career. Harper and Bros.: New York, 1955.
VanDoren, Mark, Liberal Education. Beacon Press: Boston, 1959.

Wheelwright, Philip, A Critical Introduction to Ethics. The Odyssey
Press, Inc.: New York, 1959.

 

 

134

Whyte, William H., The Organization Man. Simon and Schuster:
New York, 1956.

Wild, John, The Challepge of Existentialism. Indiana University
Press: Bloomington, 1955.

PERIODICALS

Goodman, Paul, "The Community of Scholars," Commentary XXXIII, 3
(March, 1962).

 

Solotaroff, Theodore, "The Graduate Student: A Profile,"
Commentagy XXXII, 6 (December, 1961).

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