THE PERSON-CENTERED FUNCTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

by

David Norman Hess

AN ABSTRACT

Submitted to the School for Advanced
Graduate Studies of Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

College of Education

1962

ABSTRACT

THE PERSON-CENTERED FUNCTION
OF HIGHER EDUCATION

by David Norman Hess

This study of higher education is concerned with that aspect of education which aims at the development of the student as a person. This is certainly not the only goal of higher education, but it is a very important and legitimate one. This view is in no way unique to the author, but has been espoused by philosophers and educators at least since the time of the Greek civilization.

A person-centered institution of higher education, a college community, is the extension of a person and is itself an artificial person. Thus a study of the person leads to an understanding of how the community ought to constitute itself.

Out of the definitions of representative social scientists, philosophers and theologians, a working formulation has been developed. This formulation or definition consists of 9 parts. The distinction between:

a) Person and thing; a person being the subject of rights and duties, a thing the object of rights.

b) Person and group; a person being prior to the group, which at its very best is a composite or communion of persons.

c) Person and individual; a person being beyond price, having no equivalent value and thus possessed of dignity, whereas the individual is a replaceable unit in his class, whose value is determined by his function in his class.

d) Person and persona or role; the person being that which one ultimately is, the persona or role one's response to a particular situation or expectation.

In addition 5 necessary conditions or characteristics for the person are considered:

a) The person is a moral being, one who must make choices on the basis of values.

b) The person must be free to some degree. There must be genuine alternatives or there is no real freedom and no possibility of moral action.

c) The person is a rational being. The choice between alternatives must involve thought and reflection. Mere chance or compulsion are not the basis for moral action.

d) The person's rational capabilities include the possibility for symbolization and the use of languages. Communication on this level is distinctly human, but man is able to go beyond communication to the person-to-person encounter of communion, to give himself.

e) The person is ultimately responsible for both what he does and what he is.

A community of education based upon principles derived from this definition is an extension of the ideal person. As such it must so consciously constitute itself that the expectations it brings to the students are befitting to a person, and will develop in the person a richness which would not be developed without the community. It must be a moral community, free yet responsible, intelligent, and not a bundling or grouping, but a true community.

The principles derived from the definition of a person are applied to the areas of admissions and retention policies, curriculum, and student evaluation.

THE PERSON-CENTERED FUNCTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

by

David Norman Hess

A THESIS

Submitted to the School for Advanced
Graduate Studies of Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

College of Education

1962

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is impossible to adequately express my gratitude to those who have made this study possible. I am hopelessly in debt to my doctoral advisor, Dr. Carl Gross, who through more than six years has encouraged and inspired me, and through his criticism and correction has guided me into most fruitful studies and reflection. I am most grateful to Professor John F. A. Taylor of the Department of Philosophy who has led me into a distinctly human dialogue, and Professor Stanley Idzerda, Director of the Honors College, whose encouragement and criticism were so desperately needed, and to the other members of my committee, Dr. John A. Fuzak and Dr. Clyde Campbell. I am grateful that, even in professional preparation, they introduced me to a genuine person-centered education, a community of scholars entering into the human dialogue. This study might well have been profusely illustrated by their relationships with me and other graduate students. I'm sure I am a richer person for having worked with these men.

I want to express my appreciation to Mrs. Seward and Mrs. Cooper of the Honors College, both of whom spent long and tedious hours typing this paper.

Finally, how can I express my gratitude to my wife and children who not only endured the deprivations but encouraged me in the pressures and anxieties that accompany graduate work.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The ever increasing cost of higher education along with rapidly expanding enrollments have brought about an intensive interest in the use of technology in higher education. Thus there are conferences on the use of teaching aids--library services, self-instruction devices, computer applications, visual resources, TV, etc.--and considerable time and money is being spent on evaluating their effectiveness. The tendency seems to be toward bigger classes and less personal pupil-teacher confrontations. At the same time, there are isolated movements towards more individualized or personal instruction, such as is seen in various honors programs and some liberal arts programs.

The evaluation of the various techniques and technical aids in teaching can only be accomplished when the goals have been clearly defined. It may well be that some techniques are adaptable to certain purposes and not to others. Thus the necessity of a study of purposes in higher education.

As the literature cited in this chapter shows, it is clearly understood that higher education has various functions. It is a function of higher education to provide trained and competent professional people--doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers, etc. The rapid development of professional schools has clearly shown the sensitivity of higher education to this need. Likewise, higher education should take a place of leadership in the search for knowledge, in scholarly research, and the burgeoning budgets for research indicate the response to this demand. It is also a function of higher education to search out ways in which this knowledge can be used in the betterment of the living conditions of men, and the Land

Grant Colleges have shown remarkable leadership in this area. There are doubtless other functions of higher education, functions that center in truth or the good of society, or something else.

It is assumed in this dissertation that there is another function of higher education, and a very important one, that relates to the development of the person--a person-centered function of higher education. The writer will deal with this function of higher education only. By considering only the one function, no disparagement of the others is implied, and statements regarding applicability or inapplicability of various techniques or aids to the fulfillment of this function in no way are meant to imply that these same techniques would not be suitable for other functions.

The approach in this study will be basically rationalistic. Using the various disciplines as a basis, a working formulation regarding the nature of a person will be developed. This formulation, which is by intent quite general in scope, will then be applied to higher education. Since the formulation is general, the application must also be general. Particular means or methods will not be closely examined, but only general applications of the principles developed will be considered.

That there is a person-centered function of higher education is a view not at all unique to the writer. Liberal education has long been viewed as being person-centered. Not only did the early Greek schools, such as the Socratic school, view the development of the person as being of utmost importance, but many modern writers, both educators and philosophers, also hold this position. Karl Jaspers, while contending that research is a foremost concern of the University, and that truth should be the center, acknowledges that the pursuit of truth demands a serious

commitment of the "whole man." He suggests that there are three things required of a university: "professional training, education of the whole man, research."* He sums up the purpose of the University as "formation

*Jaspers, Karl, The Idea of the University, edited by Karl Deutsch, translated by H.A.T. Reiche and H.F. Vander Schmidt, (Beacon Press: Boston, 1959), page 40.

of the whole man, for education in the broadest sense of the term."*

*Loc. cit., page 3.

So that, while Jaspers sees the functions as three-fold, still the end in view is centered in the person.

The Spanish philosopher, Ortega y Gasset, in his delightful and stimulating book, Mission of the University, writes,

> "...the organization of higher education, the construction of the university, must be based upon the student, and not upon the professor or upon knowledge. The university must be the projection of the student to the scale of an institution. And his two dimensions are, first, what he is--a being of limited learning capacity--and second, what he needs to know in order to live his life."*

*Ortega y Gasset, Jose, Mission of the University, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1944), page 70.

Obviously, a university built upon these principles would be person-centered.

Sir Herbert Grierson, looking to the words of John Stuart Mill as his guide in determining the function of universities, said,

> "A University is not a place of professional education. Universities are not intended to teach the knowledge required to fit men for some special mode of gaining a livelihood....Its function is not to make skillful lawyers or physicians or engineers, but capable and cultivated human beings."*

*Grierson, Herbert John C., The University and A Liberal Education, (Oliver and Boyd: London, N.D.), page 2.

That this is the only function of higher education we may question, but it can be agreed that it is one of the functions and a very important one.

Gordon Chalmers recognizes that the aim of teaching the young has always been associated with a common concern for the society--the city, or the nation. He cites this in Sparta and The Republic of Plato and in the charters of the early New England colleges. He further notes that today this is still generally considered the end of education. This sense of social responsibility within the last two decades, as Chalmers points out, has led to a twofold conception. First, that school and college students should be treated in the mass, and second, that the group attitude on specific questions should be the chief concern of teachers. In criticizing this view, Chalmers contrasts it with liberal education, which as viewed by him, is clearly person-centered. He writes,

> "The liberal aim is, of course, to increase the number of individuals who are competent to think and act on their own. To many an educationist this aim means mere skill in thinking. But it involves as well the ability to establish for one's self a standard by which to determine what is most worth thinking about and doing."*

*Chalmers, Gordon, The Republic and the Person: A Discussion of Necessities in Modern American Education, (Henry Regnery Company: Chicago, 1952), pages 31-32.

Chalmers, in agreeing with Werner Jaeger that education is centered in the society, and that the improvement of the society comes through individuals, reasons that ultimately education must be centered in the individual. Jaeger writes,

"Every nation which has reached a certain stage of development is instinctively impelled to practice education. Education is the process by which a community preserves and transmits its physical and intellectual character...but men can transmit their social and intellectual nature only by exercising the qualities through which they created it--reason and conscious will... education is not a practice which concerns the individual alone: it is essentially a function of the community. The character of the community is expressed in the individuals who compose it; ...the community is the source of all behavior. The formative influence of the community on its members is most constantly active in its deliberate endeavor to educate each new generation of individuals so as to make them in its own image."*

---

*Jaeger, Werner, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, translated by Highet, Gilbert (Oxford University Press: New York, 1945), Volume I, pp. XIII and XIV.

It is true that Jaeger views the community as being the educational agent, and that the purpose is not individual but communal, yet the method is through the development of the individual, especially his reason and conscious will.

In another place Chalmers says,

"The learning and thinking requisite to a critical understanding of the basis of American liberty begin with some grasp of the individual and his nature. This learning relies upon the constancy of the norm of human conduct, and it has rightly been said that the whole effort of mind called liberal education may be described as the approach to that norm. The object of study is multifarious, rich, varied, disparate, many-faceted. But the end in view is that surprisingly single, integrated, purposeful, and steady creature, Man."*

---

*Chalmers, Gordon. Op. cit., p. 55.

There is no question but what he refers here to a person-centered education.

Another college administrator, William H. Lewis, formerly president of Lafayette College, points out the person-centered function of education in these words,

> "Briefly, it is the aim of the college to prepare men to live the abundant life. And this can be accomplished by implanting the desire and developing the ability of each individual to be truly successful in his life work, by stimulating an abiding sense of his responsibility as a citizen and by showing him how to utilize his leisure time in the enjoyment of ennobling avocations."*

---

*Lewis, William M., From a College Platform, (Lincoln MacVeagh, Dial Press, Incorporated: New York, 1932), pages 141-142.

He goes on to say that any school that is so large as to view its students as numbers is too large. The school that cannot know the problems and possibilities of a student is too large. Largeness and greatness are not the same, for, "Any system of schooling which neglects the individual for the group misses the mark."*

---

*Loc. cit., page 93.

Mark Van Doren, for many years a beloved teacher in the East, also saw liberal education as being centered in the person. However, since his definition of a person differs from that of Lewis, his education also differs. He saw the essential element of the person as being the intellect, and therefore,

> "The conscious business of education is with the intellect. The intellectual virtues, however, are many and difficult, and some of them are native only to the farthest reaches of self-education. These are the speculative virtues of understanding, science, and wisdom, with which the highest education does what it can. The arts of the intellect, as distinguished from its virtues, can be taught; and the traditional duty of the college is to teach them. They are root faculties without which there can be no further manhood... There is no companion comparable to a mind that can be used; none more trustworthy or agreeable."*

---

*Van Doren, Mark, Liberal Education, (Beacon Press: Boston, 1959), page 62.

In another place he writes, "The opportunity of the college is to open up the realm of reason, not as a mapped place where any tourist may go in comfort but as the least familiar of human regions, though it is a region where only men can feel at home."* Education must deal with reason, but

*Loc. cit., page 100.

not for reason's sake. Reason is of such importance because it is so human, so essential to a developed, rich person. For this very reason, because liberal education is person-centered, must it deal with reason.

Elton Trueblood writes,

> "The college is to be judged by the quality of its human product. The test of a successful college education is not to be found in the amount of knowledge which the graduates take away with them, most of which will be forgotten in any case, but rather by the appetite to know, by the determination to continue the educational process, and by the ability to think and act maturely. The purpose of a college is the production of persons who are both more civilized and more civilizing."*

*Trueblood, Elton, The Idea of a College, (Harper and Brothers: New York, 1959), page 62.

He then proceeds to describe a college, both in its curricular and extra-curricular activities, that will encourage the development of such persons. The idea of his college is clearly person-centered.

William Neilson and Carl Wittke, in a book dealing with the function of higher education, state this function as, "to emancipate the human spirit from prejudice and ignorance, and to teach men and women to use their freedom in a spirit of respect for the rights of others, and with a high regard for justice."*

*Neilson, William A. and Wittke, Carl F., The Function of Higher Education, (Northwestern University: Evanston, 1943), page 52.

These authors also see education as related to the society in that the end product is citizens, but these citizens are persons and it is the emancipation of these human spirits which is the means to sane and sound progress. In order to do this we must concern ourselves with the development of proficiencies, attitudes and capacities. We must have both something to think about and an ability to think, but it is developed persons that have these abilities.

Donald Cowling and Carter Davidson, two college administrators, also see the purpose of liberal education as centered in the person. They point out a distinction between a university and a college and suggest that the distinction is just this, that a college is centered in the student and a university in the search for knowledge.

> "This relationship between teacher and student represents the fundamental purpose of a true college; all other features of its program, including administration and finance, should be subservient to this end....The interest of a college teacher centers in the student and not in the progress of knowledge as such, important as that may be. Upon this distinction rests the difference between a true college and a true university."*

*Cowling, Donald J. and Davidson, Carter, Colleges for Freedom, (Harper and Brothers: New York, 1947), page 92.

In another place they write,

> "The purpose of liberal education is not realized in the selection and arrangement of courses in accordance with any pattern or method but in the happiness and significance of the lives of those who are influenced by the programs adopted. The chief danger in curriculum planning is that it will eventually be made to serve the purpose of some educational theory or philosophical point of view or of some vested interest rather than the welfare of the

> student himself... Each college, therefore, should seek more aggressively to build and administer its curriculum to enable the student to develop a truly integrated personality. More individualized instruction and guidance, more flexibility in requirements, less domination by departments during the period of general education, and more encouragement to seminar and honors and tutorial work are steps in this direction."*

---

*Loc. cit., page 74.

Here is an acknowledgement that all higher education is not centered in the person, but that part which is, is of great importance.

Samuel Gould, former president of Antioch College, suggests the same person-centered function of higher education in these words, "We must never forget for even a moment that the primary job of education is to develop people, not technicians, and that this is not yet of particular moment to the Russians."*

---

*Gould, Samuel B., Knowledge is not Enough, (Antioch Press: Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1959), page 98.

Whereas all of these authors have agreed that there is such a thing as a person-centered function of higher education, there has been no agreement as to what the person is. Usually it is evident that some definition of person has been assumed, but rarely in these writers has this definition been explicated. The fact that some such definition is assumed by so many writers, yet not explicated, may be an indication that there is thought to be a common concept as to what a person is. The following chapter seems to indicate that such an assumption is not valid. On the other hand, the lack of clarity as to what constitutes a person in educational writings may come about because a particular concept of

higher education is assumed, and the ideas regarding the nature of a person are derived from or conformed to this formulation.

Whatever the reason may be, a detailed analysis of a person-centered higher education must begin with a consideration of what a person is. Only after the development of some view as to the nature of a person can a consideration of education suitable to such a being be made. Accordingly, the following chapter will deal with various concepts as to the nature of a person. The formulations of selected social scientists, philosophers and theologians will be considered. The writers selected were chosen on the basis of two criteria:

1) Their eminence in their field of study, and
2) The contribution each makes to the total formulation or working hypothesis for use in this dissertation.

In such an examination it is soon evident that these writers or these disciplines present no ready-made commonly accepted definition or description. This is in part due to the differing nature of the disciplines. The social scientists deal primarily upon the basis of scientific methodology, seeking a descriptive-predictive concept. The philosophers center their interest in not that which is amenable to empirical verification, nor what a person will do, but what should a person be and do. Theologians, while acknowledging the condition in which man now finds himself, also look to that which man should be, but see the fulfillment of these possibilities through a relationship to others and to God.

The lack of agreement may be, in part, due to the greatness, the almost infinite possibilities with which man was created. They may be

of such a magnitude as to exceed the bounds of our present knowledge. If this be the case, then each of the disciplines may present a true picture, but not an adequate one.

If all that can be said about a person is that we have no adequate definition, then there is little hope of developing a person-centered higher education. There must be something that is distinctive about a person if the term person-centered education is to have any meaning, if such an education is to be differentiated from any other form of education or training.

The third part of this consideration will, therefore, consist of a consideration of that which is distinctive to a person--a working formulation, for use in developing generalizations applicable to a system of higher education. These generalizations, and their application to higher education, will constitute the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER II

DEFINITIONS OF PERSON

A. Social Scientists

Social scientists by virtue of the nature of their work are primarily interested in that which a man does. They concentrate upon a description and explanation of what man is as seen through what he does. The psychologists are primarily concerned with this individual as an individual, whereas the sociologist's chief concern is with the group of which the individual is but a member.

1. Robert Thorndike

Robert Thorndike, a psychologist from Teachers College, presents a view quite representative of the area of psychology which emphasizes measurement and evaluation. As might be expected, he does not differentiate between person and individual, for the distinction between them is not subject to empirical validation. The two areas of concern to him are what a person can do and what he will do; that is, the measures of ability and personality. Observational procedure must be based on what a person does, and thus his actions become the basic material to be studied. Thorndike says,

> "What does it mean to 'know an individual'? Fundamentally, to know an individual means to be able to describe him accurately and fully. If we know Mary Jones well, we can describe not only how she looks--how tall she is and how heavy, the color of her hair and eyes, the birthmark under her chin. Much more importantly, we can describe what she can and will do--how she will dress, what she is likely to talk about, what she will be interested in, what types of tasks she can do and how well she can do them, how she will respond to stresses and strains of one sort and another. To know a person completely means to be able to describe him completely, to predict how he will behave in every possible situation. Obviously, we are far, far away from this objective, and we always will be. It represents the star to which we hitch our wagon."*

*Thorndike, Robert L. and Hagen, Elizabeth, Measurement and Evaluation in Psychology and Education, (John Wiley and Sons, Inc.: New York, 1956), page 8.

In these terms, to know a person is identical to the knowledge of rockets or white rats or guinea pigs. It is to be able to describe all that and only that which may be subsumed under empirical terms and to be able to predict completely a person's behavior. All of this is part of what a person--a particular person--is, but only part, and it neglects entirely that which a person should be.

2. Clyde Kluckhohn

Clyde Kluckhohn, an anthropologist, wrote that the personality is "the continuity of functional forms and forces manifested through sequences of organized regnant processes and overt behaviors from birth to death."*

*Kluckhohn, Clyde and Murray, Henry, Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture, (Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 1956), page 49.

In this definition, organization is the outstanding quality of personality, and since the seat of this organization is the brain, the brain takes on major importance. The personality is like music in that it may be studied or seen at the present moment in all of its aspects, and as such it is comparable to harmony. Or, it may be seen in its duration or sequences, and as such it is comparable to melody.

With other social scientists, Kluckhohn pays great heed to the functions of personality, and he lists them as:

"... to allow for the periodic regeneration of energies by sleep; to exercise its processes; to express its feelings and valuations; to reduce successive need-tensions; to design serial programs for the attainments of distant goals; to reduce conflicts between needs by following schedules which result in a harmonious way of life; to rid itself of certain persisting tensions by restricting the number and lowering the levels of goals to be attained; and, finally, to reduce conflicts between personal dispositions and social sanctions, between vagaries of antisocial impulses and the dictates of the superego by successive compromise formations...."*

---

*Ibid

Kluckhohn sees this personality as more than just an object which is inert or dead but one that within itself has great powers of organization, and because these powers of organization lie within the personality itself, he believes that it is almost impossible for a full comprehension of this personality or these patterns of states to be known without the aid of subjective reports. But still the personality is basically seen by what the individual does, a descriptive, predictive approach is still fundamental for Kluckhohn. Prediction is possible because of continuity of functional forces, because of organization. Here is the introduction of the idea of rationality, for this organization is not something outside the personality, it is within, a function of the personality.

3. Karl Mannheim

Karl Mannheim, an eminent sociologist, as would be expected, emphasized the impact of society upon the individual rather than the biological structure of the individual or the organization that takes place within him. The basis of personality is uniqueness but not merely a biological uniqueness. This uniqueness lies on the level of personality

formation. Personality is " ...that kind of organization of the mind, specific to each individual, by which, through his mutual interaction with the environment, he develops a pattern of inner organization which is unique in itself."* This definition in emphasizing organization and

*Mannheim, Karl, Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology, (Oxford University Press: New York, 1953), page 278.

the mind has much in common with Kluckhohn. The primary difference comes in the greater emphasis upon the role of the social system in the "mutual interaction with the environment." He says man is not born, but "conditioned."* In the series of four lectures given at Manchester

*Op. cit., page 288.

College, Oxford, in 1938, Mannheim discusses the question whether a planned society can produce uniqueness of personality, since personality is a form of adjustment. Since man is conditioned by the society, a rigid, conforming society would condition all alike, there would be no uniqueness. The only society that can produce uniqueness in personality, he proposes, is that society needing pioneering or differing types, and democracy is such a society.

Mannheim also distinguishes between the essence of a person and the social mask. He distinguishes the essence as the "inner spirit of man" or the "innermost nature" and again the "purely personal self."*

*Mannheim, Karl, Systematic Sociology, (Philosophical Library: New York, 1958), page 54.

In speaking in this manner he uses existential terms. In this case, the

social mask and the existential person are both integrally involved in the cultural climate, and the distance between the two is at least, in a very major part, again the result of the cultural climate.

Mannheim, while still using descriptive-predictive terms, adds to the conceptions as given by Thorndike and Kluckhohn, the emphasis of the role that the society plays upon the formation of the personality, and the distinction between the person and the social mask.

4. Talcott Parsons

Talcott Parsons, a sociologist with a strong background in economics, also views the personality in its basic relationship to the society. He defines the personality as

> "...the totality of observable unit acts described in their context of relation to a single actor. But, this is to a greater or less degree an organic system of action and as such has in its totality emergent properties not deducible from those of the unit acts taken atomistically."*

---

*Parsons, Talcott, The Structure of Social Action, (The Free Press: Glencoe, 1949), page 746.

These unit acts may be described from various levels. The levels are not discrete but overlapping, and, in fact, overarching. They may be described through the three analytical social sciences of organized action systems, that is, economics, politics, and sociology. These aspects of the personality are called the "social component of personality."* The application of such a social analysis still leaves a

---

*Op. cit., page 769.

---

residue of data which may be referable to heredity. Psychology is the

science concerned with action systems derivable from this hereditary basis of personality.

Parsons clearly shows that much of what a personality is, is derived from the society. An integrated personality is that personality in which the things the person values morally are also the things he desires, that is, that his values correspond to his hedonistic desires or the objects of his affection. The moral values are inculcated from early childhood and are "deeply built into the structure of personality itself."* These moral patterns or moral sentiments are dependent upon

*Parsons, Talcott, Essays in Sociological Theory--Revised Edition, (The Free Press: Glencoe, 1954), page 57.

the support of the majority of the members of a society, whereas the desires and objects of affection are more personal. The well-integrated personality is the one in which the desires and the moral values are the same. Thus, the well-integrated personality feels an obligation to live up to the expectations of the various roles put upon him by the society. The self-interest then corresponds to institutionally approved patterns, to institutional status and role.* An integrated personality, then, is

*Op. cit., pages 72-73.

dependent upon an integrated social system which introjects moral values corresponding to hedonic satisfactions and objects of affection. Not only does the personality have organizing powers, but the society, too, must be organized in order to bring together the incubated values and the personal desires.

5. Gordon Allport

Gordon Allport, an eclectic psychologist, defines the personality as "the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment."*

*Allport, Gordon, Personality, A Psychological Interpretation, (Henry Holt and Company: New York, 1937), page 48.

In this definition, Allport agrees with Kluckhohn in his biological emphasis, and yet seems to leave considerably more room for an expansion of the role of the society or the environment about him. In this he takes a position much closer to Mannheim and Parsons. Allport speaks of the personality as being a real thing, not merely a logical entity for the convenience of hypotheses. The ultimate reality of the psychological organization is traits; that is, determining tendencies or predispositions to respond. These traits are not merely nominal, they have an independent existence and account for the consistency of behavior within the individual.

The "proprium" is that which provides the root of consistency that marks attitudes, intentions, and evaluations. This proprium includes self-identity, self-esteem, self-extension, rational thinking, knowing, self-image, and striving.

While the other social scientists considered have placed great emphasis upon the past in the formation of personality--the interaction of the environment and the person--for Allport it is not the past that provides the key to future action, but the intended future.

The traits and intentions and the proprium all form a dynamic organization--that is, an organization within the psychophysical systems.

By this he would suggest that personality is neither exclusively mental nor physical, but includes the organization of both body and mind into a personal unity which is unique within itself.

Allport differs from many other social scientists in that he maintains reservations about the sufficiency of the experimental approach. While the experimental approach is a necessary avenue of study, he maintains that the human being may be too complex to be completely understood through this means alone.

The social scientists, through their objective, empirical approach, have presented a basis upon which to build a concept of person. The following points have been stressed: (1) A person is a psychophysical being, neither only mind nor only body. (2) A person develops through the interaction of this biological being with the environment. (3) The environment and culture with which the person interacts have a great deal to do with the development of the person, including the development of goals and moral values, and (4) The person, through his intelligence, develops a unique pattern organization which gives direction and meaning to life.

While these generalizations are necessary and good, they do not appear to be adequate, for they do not provide a complete definition of the person. This might be expected for, as some of the social scientists sensed, the objective, empirical method of study itself is limited and so it would be expected that the generalizations growing out of such a study would be correspondingly quite limited.

Joseph Tussman in his essay on political philosophy points out two radically distinct views and perspectives from which political life

may be studied. He says,

> "First, there is the perspective of the external observer concerned with the description of political behavior. This is continuous with the interest and prediction of such behavior since, of course, an adequate description may reveal patterns which form the basis of prediction. This perspective, intrinsic to most of what is called 'social science,' might, then, be called 'descriptive-predictive.' Brought to bear upon the political agent or decision-maker its basic question is 'what will he do?'"*

---

*Tussman, Joseph, Obligation and the Body Politic, (Oxford University Press: New York, 1960), page 12.

Tussman is speaking here of political behavior and political science, but the distinction he makes is applicable to all of the social sciences and indeed to the various definitions of man or personality. The social scientists quoted previously all fall within this "descriptive-predictive" tradition. In general, their definitions may be summed up by the definition given in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences; personality is "the totality of those aspects of behavior which give meaning to an individual in society and differentiate him from other members in the community, each of whom embodies countless cultural patterns in a unique configuration."*

---

*Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (Macmillan Company: New York, 1937), Volume XII, page 85.

Tussman goes on to say,

> "...there is the point of view, not of the observer, but of the person (or persons) within a tribunal confronting his task. And this task is not predicting but deciding; the question is not what will I do but what should I do. I shall call this essentially 'normative' or 'practical' perspective, the 'perspective of action.'

> "... It may happen, not infrequently, that the answers to 'what will he do?' and 'what should I do?' will be the same. Actors sometimes do what they should do. But this happy circumstance should not obscure the basic distinction."*

---

*Ibid.

This distinction is quite clearly seen in the conclusions drawn by Kinsey, et. al. to their research regarding the sexual behavior in the human male. They say,

> "The six types of sexual activity, ...may seem to fall into categories that are as far apart as right and wrong, licit and illicit, normal and abnormal, acceptable and unacceptable in our social organization. In actuality, they all prove to originate in the relatively simple mechanisms which provide for erotic response when there are sufficient physical or psychic stimuli.
>
> "To each individual, the significance of any particular type of sexual activity depends very largely upon his previous experience. Ultimately, certain activities may seem to him to be the only things that have value, that are right, that are socially acceptable; and all departures from his own particular pattern may seem to him to be enormous abnormalities... As scientists, we have explored, and we have performed our function when we have published the record of what we have found the human male doing sexually, as far as we have been able to ascertain that fact."*

---

*Kinsey, Alfred C., Pomeroy, Wardell B., and Martin, Clyde E., Sexual Behavior in the Human Male, (W. B. Saunders Company: Philadelphia, 1948), page 678.

Upon the basis of this "objective" study of what men do, it is hoped that recommendations regarding laws and punishments may be established. Much of what they have found, because it is common, is taken to be normal, and others have carried this argument on to the place where that which is the average becomes the normal. This eventually leads to the conclusion that what man does is what man should do, that there is no distinction between the "ought" and the "is."

Social scientists, using the descriptive-predictive approach, shy away from the normative. To differentiate themselves from this "unscientific," almost "superstitious" acceptance of that which can neither be seen nor measured, and in a very real sense, does not even exist--that which man is ideally, or what man should be--they use the term personality, rather than person. The philosophers and theologians, however, using terms such as person or self, do direct themselves to a normative definition. As Robert Browning wrote:

> " 'Tis not what man does that exalts him
> But what man would do."

B. Philosophers

1. Aristotle

Aristotle, by means of the logical method of division, defines man. He does not speak of the person nor of the self, but his considerations of the nature of man most closely approximate the subject herein considered, and out of this definition have come many of the succeeding definitions of man. Man, like other forms of living things, is a composite being made up of body and soul. The body is the substance, a composite of matter and form; the material cause. The soul, on the other hand, is the form of a natural body endowed with the capacity for life. It is an entity which realizes an idea.* In having both body and

---

*Aristotle, Aristotle's Psychology, Translated by William Alexander Hammond (Swan Sonnenschein and Company: London, 1902), II, 412A, pages 42-44.

---

soul, as defined by Aristotle, man is no different from other forms of life. The uniqueness of man is found in the idea or the function of man.

This function is certainly not merely the matter of life, for both plants and animals have this, nor is it in mere activity, for again animals move, nor yet in irrational action, but it lies within the area of rational activity. Aristotle describes the function of man as "practical life of the rational part... the function of man is an activity of soul in accordance with the reason, or not independently of reason."* This

*Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by J. E. C. Welldon, (Macmillan and Company: London, 1892), I, 6, pages 15-16.

rational activity of man is the unique function of man or the expression of the nature of man, and out of this conception comes Aristotle's ethics. This rational activity is equated with moral goodness. Man can achieve this moral goodness only within a polis or a political association. "... man is by nature an animal intended to live in a polis. He who is without a polis by reason of his own nature and not of some accident, is either a poor sort of being, or a being higher than man...."*

*Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, translated by Ernest Barker, (Oxford: London, 1952), I, ii, paragraph 9, page 5.

It is through this association that concepts of good and evil, justice and injustice, are developed. Thus, a man who is not a part of such a political association or who has no need to share is already self-sufficient and he must be either a beast or a god.* Since moral perfection

*Loc. cit., pages 6,7.

is only possible within this association, since we are dependent one upon the other, and justice is the ordering of such a political association, it follows that ethics would be primarily concerned with politics

and this is, in fact, just the consideration that Aristotle makes. Aristotle differentiates between the functions of man as a citizen and the functions of man as man. Man as a citizen will have various functions and excellence relates to these various functions, but excellence as a man is only related to the proper function of man, that is, moral perfection as seen in the activity in accordance with reason. The ideal state would call forth the functions corresponding to the ideal man or person.

Since the development of the nature of man is dependent upon an association, a political association, a sharing, then Aristotle must deal with the ordering of such an association and he does, indeed, give a description of such an ideal state. Aristotle, in describing states as they are (and thus people as they are) distinguishes between that which is and that which should be, between the actual and the normative. He does not permit himself to accept that which is as being that which should be.

2. John Locke

John Locke emphasizes three aspects of personality, all closely related. The first of these is rationality; that is, a person is a "thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places... "* This rationality is the basis for the second aspect:

---

*Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (James Kay, Jr., and Company: Philadelphia, N.D.), page 210.

---

self-awareness or self-consciousness. This self-consciousness, springing

from the rationality, is the self. Contrary to later writers such as Dewey and Kilpatrick, the self is one continuous self, in that it consists of an awareness of past activity. Locke does not differentiate between person and self. The third aspect, which is the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness, is happiness. The rational self is aware that it is, that it acts, that it thinks, and it inevitably desires that the self that it is should be happy.* Locke does not treat the matter of uncon-

*Loc. cit., page 217.

scious action, dreams and such, nor unreasonable and unreflective action, and perhaps this is not at all necessary. He is pointing out not the total constituents of a person, but the necessary elements.

These three constituents, that is, rationality, self-awareness, leading to happiness, provide the basis for a view of the human being as expounded in the political treatises of Locke. In these writings, Locke assumes that man is a moral being, that he has reason, that he is aware of himself, and that he seeks happiness. He further says that men are by nature "all free, equal, and independent."* These free men may join

*Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government, (Hafner Publishing Company: New York, 1947), Second treatise, Chapter 8, paragraph 95, page 168.

together by their own consent to form a political society, and it is only this free consent which can give beginning to any lawful government in the world.* These free men consent to turn some of their rights over

*Op. cit., paragraph 99, page 170.

to a government determined by them in order to protect their property with the end of achieving happiness. Such an act is a moral act. Animals may join into packs or herds. They may unite momentarily and then break up, but the form is the same within the various species, and the basis of the union is instinctual, whereas man may consent or not consent to join and he makes out of this union the form of government that he desires.

The contract is one of the means by which men are able to shape their own lives. Locke says, "Men's happiness or misery is most part of their own making."* This ability is distinctively human and thus is

---

*Locke, John, The Educational Writings of John Locke, edited by John William Adamson, (University Press: Cambridge, 1922), page 25.

---

implicit in the consideration of a person.

3. Immanuel Kant

Immanuel Kant does not expressly state a definition of a person, but from his considerations of ethics as seen in Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics, a definition can be deduced. With Aristotle and Locke, Kant begins with the rationality of man. Likewise with Aristotle he recognizes the necessity of a society, a political community. And with Locke he agrees that man enters into this community by agreement of one form or another. But he adds to these two conceptions the conception that values are of differing import. There is a hierarchy in values, and thus in imperatives. Hypothetical imperatives are imperatives because they are means to an end while other imperatives may be categorical---that is, they are imperatives because they are ends in themselves. The

latter are of greater import than the former. He also adds a richer description of what this morality of which the human being is capable consists in, and in the last place he pronounces as his categorical imperative that all men are ends in themselves and never to be treated merely as means.

Kant wrote,

> "Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is, according to principles, i.e., have a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason."*

*Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Practical Reason, translated by Thomas Abbott, (Longmans, Green and Company: London, 1889), page 29.

A perfectly good will would always act by choice and by desire according to principle, but man, not always having a perfect will, must act not in accordance to desire, but often quite apart from desire according to principle. Such action is duty and is the moral act of mankind.

The first formulation of the categorical imperative is: "Act only on the maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law."* This is a form of the universal law, but if it

*Op. cit., page 38.

is to be such a maxim that I could wish it to become universal law, it must be drawn from the conception of that which is an end for everyone because it is an end in itself. Out of this comes the second formulation of the categorical imperative. "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only."* This follows since every man considers his own

*Op. cit., page 47.

existence as an end, and so does every other man on the same rational principle; therefore, every man should treat every other man as an end. The third form of this categorical imperative combines the first two. It is expressed in these words, "Act on maxims which can at the same time have for their object themselves as universal laws of nature."*

*Op. cit., page 56.

Men of good will acting morally or rationally in accordance with the categorical imperative, each being a legislative being, working together form a kingdom of ends. This kingdom of ends has as its members persons who are at the same time moral legislators and moral agents, sovereigns and subjects, and its laws are not uniformities of sequence as natural laws, but imperatives enjoining mutual consideration and respect. Each person acts in every case as a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends; but at the same time, he voluntarily subjects himself to these same laws that he legislates, and as such a moral being he has dignity.

> " ...neither fear nor inclination, but simply respect for the law, is the spring which can give actions a moral worth. Our own will, so far as we suppose it to act only under the condition that its maxims are potentially universal laws, this ideal will which is possible to us is the proper object of respect, and the dignity of humanity consists just in this capacity of being universally legislative, though with the condition that it is itself subject to this same legislation."*

*Op. cit., page 59.

4. John Dewey

John Dewey, both a philosopher and educator of the pragmatist school, does not use person as a technical term. He does, however, treat "the self" and this term seems to be the closest approximation to person as used herein that can be found in Dewey's writings. He, with the other philosophers cited, lays great stress on the rationality (or intelligence) of man and upon the necessity for man to come into relationship with other men and to enter into some society. He also stresses the moral nature of man and demonstrates that this moral nature results in the necessity for a person to make choices.

He, as the social scientists, emphasizes the importance of the culture and the environment upon the formation of the self or person. This "self is not something ready-made, but something in continuous formation through choice of action...."* He further identifies self and

---

*Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, (The Macmillan Company: New York, 1916), page 408.

---

interest by saying that the kind and amount of interest actively taken in a thing reveals the quality of self which exists. This self is in continuous formation through the choice of action--that is,

> "It is the business of men to develop such capacities and desires, such selves as render them capable of finding their own satisfaction, their invaluable value, in fulfilling the demands which grow out of their associated life... Such a person has found himself, and has solved the problem in the only place and in the only way in which it can be solved: in action."*

---

*Dewey, John, Ethics, (Henry Holt and Company: New York, 1926), page 396.

Morality is the "constant discovery, formation, and reformation of the

self in the ends which an individual is called upon to sustain and develop in virtue of his membership in a social whole."*

---

*Op. cit., pages 396-397.

This self is continually reformed and recreated or redirected out of the old self. It results from the interaction of the individual or the present self with the environment; thus, what we are comes to us "from others, by education, tradition and the suggestion of the environment."*

---

*Dewey, John, Human Nature and Conduct, (The Modern Library: New York, 1950), page 314.

By conscious choice of action and the quality of the environment, the self may expand or contract, it may develop or die, it may become more inclusive or more exclusive. Reason, or intelligence, is essential since it is the conscious choice of action that forms the self, this choice being dependent upon reason. The self is not an isolated being, but comes into being only as it comes into relationship with the environment and specifically the culture which is the result of other human beings. Dewey provides a framework for the choice of values in that he says the value of choices is dependent upon the probably consequences of the acts.

These philosophers, adding to the empirical method the method of logic, have entered into normative considerations. All have emphasized the importance of the rationality of man. They have also given greater consideration than the social scientists to the culture, that which is shaped by man. Men must relate to one another, but they decide

what type of a relationship this shall be. In choosing, man shapes both himself and his culture.

Theologians, both Jewish and Christian, add the knowledge gained from revelation to that coming from both observation and logic. Given that there is a God who has revealed both Himself and the nature of man, then the relationship between God and man becomes a necessary part of the person.

C. Theologians

1. St. Augustine

St. Augustine, along with the social scientists and the philosophers, emphasizes the importance of the rationality of man and the very title of his treatise, The City of God, implies some kind of a community or communion. But St. Augustine describes this community in quite different terms, for, as would be expected, the community is based on a proper relationship to God. Man, being made in the image of God, is by nature moral and has the possibility of doing that which is righteous or of doing that which is unrighteous--that is, sin. At the same time, being made in the image of God provides the basis for the worth of each person.

He emphasizes three things in this discussion of the nature of man or the human soul: (1) God made man in his own image--he says of this, "God, then, made man in His own image. For He created for him a soul endowed with reason and intelligence, so that he might excell all the creatures of earth, air, and sea, which were not so gifted."*

---

*Saint Augustine, The City of God, translated by Marcus Dods, (The Modern Library: New York, 1950), page 407.

It is the soul of man that constitutes the image of God. Augustine seems to derogate the body.

The second point he makes is that God made man from one individual and thus all human beings are related. He wrote,

> "God, desiring not only that the human race might be able by their similarity of nature to associate with one another, but also that they might be bound together in harmony and peace by the ties of relationship, was pleased to derive all men from one individual, and created man with such a nature that the members of the race should not have died, had not the two first (of whom the one was created out of nothing, and the other out of him) merited this, by their disobedience; for by them so great a sin was committed, that by it the human nature was altered for the worse, and was transmitted also to their posterity, liable to sin and subject to death."*

---

*Op. cit., page 441.

Though there are found diverse tribes, languages, and cultures, yet that which is essential to man is common to all men. The third point is that the soul, being endowed with reason and intelligence, was also free to act on its own accord and the sin of Adam and Eve resulted in the fall of man so that all men became sinners. The redemption through God has resulted in two ways of life and two allegiances; one the City of God and the other the City of Man. Those in the City of Man will obey only a part of man--that is the flesh. Those in the City of God become, in our terms, a whole man in that they obey not just a part of man.

> "When, therefore, man lives according to man, not according to God, he is like the devil. Because not even an angel might live according to an angel, but only according to God....When, then, a man lives according to the truth, he lives not according to himself, but according to God; for He was God who said, 'I am the truth.' When, therefore, man lives according to himself--that is, according to man, not according to God--assuredly he lives according to a lie."*

*Op. cit., page 445.

Thus, Augustine defines righteousness or goodness and unrighteousness. Righteousness, or moral living, is living not for oneself, but for God and conversely unrighteousness is selfishness, or living dictated by the flesh.

2. John Calvin

John Calvin in his compendium of theology entitled The Institutes of the Christian Religion does not clearly define the nature or the person of man. In Chapters 14 and 15 he does discuss the persons of the Trinity, that is, the divine persons, but does not define them in such a way as to make the definition applicable to man.* In speaking

*Calvin, John, Institutes of the Christian Religion, translated by John Allen, (Presbyterian Board of Christian Education: Philadelphia, N.D.), Volume I, Book I, Chapter 13, page 144.

of man he follows Augustine very closely; however, he does enter into more detail as to what is this image of God and what were the results of the fall of man. The image of God denotes

> " ...the integrity which Adam possessed when he was endued with the right understanding, when he had affections regulated by reason, and all his senses governed in proper order, and when, in the excellency of his nature, he truly resembled the excellence of his Creator. And though the principal seat of the Divine Image was in the mind and heart or in the soul and its faculties, yet there was no part of man, not even the body, which was not adorned with some rays of its glory. It is certain that the lineaments of the Divine Glory are conspicuous in every part of the world; whence it may be concluded that where the image of God is said to be in man, there is implied a tacit antithesis, which exalts man above all the creatures, and as it were, separates him from the vulgar herd."*

*Op. cit., Book I, Chapter 15, page 208.

This imageship is constituted of the soul of man, that is, the mind capable of distinguishing good from evil and just from unjust, and discovering by the light of reason what ought to be pursued or avoided, the will on which choice depends, and the faculties of reason, understanding, prudence, and judgment. Calvin also says, "In this integrity man was endued with free will, by which, if he had chosen, he might have obtained eternal life."*

*Op. cit., Book I, Chapter 15, pages 214-215.

In the fall of Adam all men have been polluted, for "sin has possessed all the powers of the soul, since Adam departed from the fountain of righteousness."* In this corruption man has lost his freedom

*Op. cit., Book II, Chapter 1, page 275.

of will, but "should, nevertheless, be instructed to aspire to the good of which he is destitute, and to the liberty of which he is deprived; and should be roused from indolence with more earnestness, than if he were supposed to be possessed of the greatest strength."* Through the

*Op. cit., Book II, pages 279-280.

grace of God as manifested in Jesus Christ, man may regain the condition from whence he has fallen.

3. Augustus Hopkins Strong

Dr. Strong, a prominent Baptist theologian influential in the development of Rochester Seminary and the University of Chicago, writing

about the turn of the century, followed Augustine and Calvin in holding that the essential character of the person is that man was made in the image of God, and being in the image of God was in his original state necessarily "very good." This image of God consists of a natural likeness to God--that is personality, and a moral likeness to God--that is holiness.

In explaining the natural likeness to God, Dr. Strong defines the personality as follows:

> " ...man was created a personal being, and was by this personality distinguished from the brute. By personality we mean the twofold power to know self as related to the world and to God, and to determine self in view of moral ends. By virtue of this personality, man could at his creation choose which of the objects of his knowledge--self, the world, or God--should be the norm and center of his development. This natural likeness to God is inalienable, and as constituting a capacity for redemption gives value to the life even of the unregenerate."*

---

*Strong, Augustus Hopkins, Systematic Theology, (The Judson Press: Philadelphia, 1946), page 515.

The moral likeness of God consisted of holiness, the moral nature means "those powers which fit him for right or wrong action. These powers are intellect, sensibility, and will, together with that peculiar power of discrimination and impulsion, which we call conscience."*

---

*Op. cit., page 497.

Man, in his forefather Adam, chose as his norm not God but himself, and this is the essence of sin. By voluntary choice, he broke the law of God and made himself, rather than God, the center of his life.

4. Martin Buber

Martin Buber, the Jewish theologian-philosopher, emphasizes the wholeness of man. He sees man as distinct and different from the world about him, and man must see himself in this sense. Yet, in seeing himself as distinct and separate from the world about him, man does not see himself in his entirety. Man cannot be known, he cannot answer the question 'what is man?' through the study of the individual philosophical sciences or social sciences.

> "Philosophy succeeds in rendering...help in its individual disciplines precisely through each of these disciplines not reflecting, and not being able to reflect, on the wholeness of man....in every one of these disciplines the possibility of its achieving anything in thought rests precisely on its objectification, on what may be termed its 'dehumanization'."*

---

*Buber, Martin, Between Man and Man, translated by Ronald Smith, (Kegan Paul: London, 1947), page 120 ff.

Man is not human because of his reason though reason is specifically human; nonreason is also specifically human. "Even man's hunger is not an animal's hunger. Human reason is to be understood only in connection with human non-reason. The problem of philosophical anthropology is the problem of a specific totality and of its specific structure."*

---

*Op. cit., page 160.

To Buber, each person, as he reaches out to others, becomes an identity in order to relate to others. This relationship with others is a community of existence rather than the encounter of two isolated beings. Each person becomes responsible for freeing himself and finding

himself so that he may enter into this genuine relationship, this true dialogue with others and with the universe. The I exists only as it exists with another being.

> "If I face a human being as my Thou, and say the primary word I-Thou to him, he is not a thing among things, and does not consist of things. Thus a human being is not He or She, bounded from every other He and She, a specific point in space and time within the net of the world; nor is he a nature able to be experienced and described, a loose bundle of named qualities. But with no neighbor, and whole in himself, he is Thou and fills the heavens."*

---

*Buber, Martin, I and Thou, translated by Ronald Smith, (Charles Scribner's Sons: New York, 1958), page 8.

Buber recognizes that man has rationality as do the other social scientists, philosophers, and theologians, but insists that this is not the entirety of man. He emphasizes that man is a whole being and that he becomes a person as he comes into contact--vital contact--with others.

5. Paul Tillich

Paul Tillich, a contemporary theologian, begins his consideration of man or the person of man by saying that "man's existential situation is a state of estrangement from his essential nature."*

---

*Tillich, Paul, Systematic Theology, Volume II, (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1957), page 25.

Existence is the series of unreconciled conflicts which threaten man. It is the process in which man becomes a thing and not a person, in which man is dehumanized rather than giving expression to his essential humanity. Essence is the potentiality of the human person. The fall of man, as he sees the Biblical account, is a symbolical or a mytholigical account of man's transition from essence to existence--

from what he is essentially to present existence and is not a once for all account, but is the fact of all existence.

Man has a freedom, but it is a finite freedom. Because man exists in the universe, every act is influenced by this universe. "But freedom is the possibility of a total and centered act of the personality, an act in which all the drives and influences which constitute the destiny of man are brought into the centered unity of a decision... In this way the universe participates in every act of human freedom."*

*Op. cit., page 43.

This limitation of man's freedom by universal destiny brings about the transition from essence to existence, and produces both his moral and tragic character. As a result, man is estranged from the ground of his being and from himself.*

*Op. cit., page 44.

Salvation is the healing or reuniting of that which is estranged, or the reclaiming of the old and transferring it into the New Being.*

*Op. cit., page 166.

It is possible through Jesus as the Christ and takes place as the person participates in the New Being. In regeneration, "The message of conversion is, first, the message of a new reality to which one is asked to turn; in the light of it, one is to move away from the old reality, the state of existential estrangement in which one has lived."* Regeneration,

*Op. cit., page 177.

then, is the state of having been drawn into the new reality manifest in Jesus as the Christ.

Justification, the second character of salvation, is the acceptance that we are accepted by God because of Christ. The third step of salvation, sanctification, is "the process in which the power of the New Being transforms personality and community, inside and outside the church."* Thus, through salvation, the person loses his estrangement

*Op. cit., pages 179-180.

and enters into his essential nature. He no longer is separated from the ground of his being, from other beings and from God.

This reunion is love, for "love is the drive towards the unity of the separated."* The fact that love, which is the moving power of

*Tillich, Paul, Love, Power, and Justice, (Oxford University Press: New York, 1960), page 25.

life, can operate is an indication of an original unity, for separation presupposes an original unity. Man becomes man in his essential respect through personal encounters, through meeting a "thou."*

*Op. cit., page 78.

This love which brings about the healing of the estranged character of man is composed of three parts. Eros "strives for a union with that which is a bearer of values because of the values it embodies."* Such a love is in the order of a passion--something that

*Op. cit., page 30.

comes upon a person. The second character is that of philia, or preferential love, such as the preferences of friendship. The third order is that of agape, a New Testament concept which "cuts through the separation of equals and unequals, of sympathy and antipathy, of friendship and indifference, of desire and disgust. It needs no sympathy in order to love; it loves what it has to reject in terms of philia."* Agape love

*Op. cit., page 119.

seeks the center of the other person. "One could say that in agape ultimate reality manifests itself and transforms life and love."*

*Op. cit., page 33.

This love is the ground and control of power and justice and thus is the basis for man's essential being in that it provides the means and the possibility for man to become reunited with the ground of his being; reunited with others and with God.

CHAPTER III

A WORKING DEFINITION

The authorities cited thus far do not provide a satisfactory definition of a person. This is, in part, due to the fact that they are looking at a person at different levels. The social scientists see the person as a thing to be studied, to be described, its actions to be predicted. The philosophers are asking what is distinctive in regard to man, what it is that differentiates him from other species. The theologians see him in the same manner, adding to this view another level--that of his relationship to God. There is no area of common agreement among these large enough to be designated as a definition. Yet if this consideration is to have any meaning at all there must be something explicit that can be said about a person and about the kind of education which centers in that person.

The formulation given in this chapter is adopted as a working hypothesis. It is admitted that it is not an inclusive definition, for certainly there are areas or aspects of the person that are not included. A person, created in the image of God and the highest of all creation, may have such an unlimited potentiality that any definition limiting this potentiality would be out of place.

With these factors in mind, the working hypothesis or conception of a person for use in the further consideration will consist of two parts. The person can, first of all, be distinguished from other entities. These distinctions are: person-thing; person-group; person-individual; person-persona. In making such distinctions no definition of a person is given, yet the mere fact of distinguishing it from other

entities leads to considerable clarification of the issues involved. Secondly, there are certain characteristics that are necessary and common to a person. These characteristics are: a person is inherently a moral being; if a person is a moral being then he must, in some way, be free; freedom requires intelligent choice, and thus a person must possess some degree of reason; the person develops through communication and communion; and, the person stands responsible for what he is and what he does. It is probable by their very nature that these characteristics cannot be empirically verified, nor are they universally accepted. This is not to say, however, that there is no basis for accepting them. Both the distinctions and the characteristics have been given prominent place in some of the writers already considered, but this in itself does not prove either their existence nor their necessity. The distinctions seem to be self-evident. The characteristics, on the other hand, are logically related to the first and this first, that a person is a moral being, must be assumed. There is much collaborative evidence that man is a moral being, but such evidence does not prove the issue and the assertion is not beyond dispute.*

---

*"The hypothesis that man is not free is essential to the application of scientific method to the study of human behavior. The free inner man who is held responsible for the behavior ...is only a prescientific substitute for the kinds of causes which are discovered in the course of a scientific analysis. All these alternative causes lie outside the individual." Skinner, B. F., Science and Human Behavior (The Macmillan Company: New York, 1953), pp. 447, 448.

However, the denial of the assumption that the person is a moral being leaves one with the alternative that education is little, if any, different in kind from the training of white rats. One is left with Homo sapiens, whose difference from other forms of animal life is that

merely of degree or quantity, not kind or quality, and whereas the intensity of training may differ, the object and manner would remain the same.

A. Distinctions

1. Person-Thing

The first distinction that can and, indeed, should be made is that distinction of person-thing. This distinction is basic to our entire civilization. It is the basis for those writers lamenting the extreme organization of man and the industrialization of society. Both David Riesman and his associates in The Lonely Crowd* and William Whyte

*Reisman, David, The Lonely Crowd, A Study of the Changing American Character, abridged by the authors (Doubleday and Company, Incorporated: Garden City, New York, 1953).

in The Organization Man* decry the de-personalization of man, that man

*Whyte, William H., The Organization Man (Simon and Schuster: New York, 1956).

has become merely a cog in an organization or a machine. Aldous Huxley in his pessimistic novel Brave New World* carries the tendency to mecha-

*Huxley, Aldous, Brave New World (Bantam Books: New York, 1958).

nization and the deliberate manipulation of people to a fearful extreme. Kermit Eby, an early organizer within the CIO and now professor at University of Chicago, makes the same protest in his book Protests of an Ex-Organization Man*. That man knows that he is more than a thing is

*Eby, Kermit, Protests of an Ex-Organization Man (Beacon Press: Boston, 1961).

seen in the rebellion of mistreated workers, the rise of labor unions, the unknown yet strongly felt fears of those who become a cog in a machine, and the unrest and rebellion of slave nations.

This distinction between person and thing has a strong legal basis. A well-known legal textbook makes the distinction in these terms:

> "A 'Person' is often defined as being the 'Subject, or Bearer, of a right'; but this is to narrow the significance of the term. Rights not only reside in, but also are available against, persons. In other words, there are persons of incidence as well as of inherence. Persons are the subjects of Duties as well as of Rights. In persons rights inhere, and against them rights are available."*

---

*Holland, Thomas Erskine, The Elements of Jurisprudence (The Oxford Clarendon Press: London, 1890), p. 81.

In distinction to this, "A 'Thing' is the Object of a Right; i.e., is whatever is treated by the law as the object over which one person exercises a right, and with reference to which another person lies under a duty."* Thus in Greek times a human being could be counted as a person

---

*Loc. cit., p. 86.

---

or as a non-person or thing. Slaves were things, or as Aristotle termed them, "living tools." Though they were human beings they were not counted as persons and thus had no rights, but were objects under the exercise of "masters" who were persons. Various cultures have defined who persons are, or the group to be included as persons, in various ways. Modern American society is now going through the throes of determining this same issue. Legally, all men have been declared to be persons, to have rights and duties, rather than just a segment of mankind. This definition of person may be enlarged to include a group or an organization

which may be called an "artificial person"; however, the essential element remains--that is, the distinction between a person and a thing. The law may recognize a group of persons as a legal person and yet the group must be made up of individual persons and not things. A forest cannot be included as a legal person although a school or a corporation can be. Rights and duties speak in ethical or moral terms. They refer to "should" or "ought." Thus, this distinction might well be stated as "a person is a moral being, a thing is a non-moral being."

J. V. Langmead-Casserley points out this same distinction, although using a different terminology. Whereas he does not use the term person, he does speak of "man" in the same terms herein used.

> "A humane civilization requires more than merely to know how to perform humane acts. Its really indispensable foundation is a doctrine and picture of man which makes men, all of them, really seem to matter, which gives to the humane a certain quality of eternal relevance and significance which separates it from the natural. It is the distinguishing characteristic of a civilization which, at its best, is Christian and ethical in its philosophical outlook, and at the same time scientific and technical in its secular practice, that it regards nature as an environment to be used and man as a being to be served."*

---

*Casserley, J. V. Langmead, Morals and Man in the Social Sciences (Longmans, Green and Company: London, 1951), p. 15.

The moral nature of man is evident in that man may make a humane or inhumane civilization; that is, he may fall short of the norm or standard of man. A dog, on the other hand, cannot. In these terms "man" or "person" is a normative, not a taxonomic, concept.

Robert Redfield, an anthropologist, in showing that all human communities are basically moral points out this distinction between person-thing.

"Yet another characteristic of pre-civilized living may be asserted. Within those early communities the relationships among people were primarily those of personal status. In a small and intimate community all people are known for their individual qualities of personality. Few or no strangers take part in the daily life. So men and women are seen as persons, not as parts of mechanical operations, as city people see so many of those around them."*

---

*Redfield, Robert, The Primitive World and its Transformations (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1953), p. 9.

This distinction is also basic to existentialism, as John Wild shows.

"In spite of many variations in detail, all existentialist thinkers hold with Kierkegaard that while an individual's thought certainly belongs to his existence, this existence cannot be truly grasped as a mere object of thought. When I look at myself in this way, something eludes me. When I look at another as a cognitive object, something also eludes me. And this something is very vital. It is existence itself, the very heart of the matter. This must be grasped subjectively in another way by another mode of awareness. This mode of awareness is practical. By this I am aware of myself as an existential being, committed and engaged. To be thus committed is to be human. To regard a human person as an object is to abstract from all commitment. It is therefore to de-humanize the person, to reduce him to the level of a thing."*

---

*Wild, John, The Challenge of Existentialism (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1955), p. 34.

The importance of this is not that existentialist thinkers differ in a very significant way from Locke and John Stuart Mill. The intent is not to point out that existentialists distinguish between person-man, and John Locke and Mill deny this distinction, for indeed these men do not deny such a distinction, but rather to show that this conception is a basic conception that manifests itself in various ways in various philosophies. It is significant that Mill almost drags the conception into his ethical theory, even though it is not necessary and perhaps even foreign to his logical argument.

Paul Tournier, a Swiss psychiatrist, suggests that the failure to recognize this distinction is the basis of many of our problems in the mental and emotional realms. When man is made merely a cog in a machine of production, when men's thoughts are molded by the mass media, when men are made to perform excessively specialized operations, when they live packed in together, they are dehumanized.* The classic formulation of

*Tournier, Paul, The Meaning of Persons (Harper and Brothers: New York, 1957), p. 40.

this distinction is perhaps the practical imperative of Immanuel Kant.

> "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only."*

*Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Practical Reason, translated by Thomas Abbott (Longmans, Gree & Co.: London, 1889), p. 47.

Man is never to be merely "used." He is to be considered to be an end in himself. That is, he is not a thing, he is a person and as a person has a dignity demanding respect. He is not to be used indiscriminately as a hammer or as a screwdriver. A screwdriver may well be used to drive screws, or to chisel wood, or as a lever, or the handle of it, indeed, may be used as firewood. It may be inadvisable to use it for these latter reasons, but this is only because it reduces the efficiency of its use for its primary purpose. The choice, however, is made by man. The screwdriver is not put upon should it be used for firewood. In distinction to this, man or a person is never to be used only as a means. This difference, perhaps, may be summarized again in the words of Kant as he says,

> "Respect applies always to persons only--not to things."*

*Loc. cit., p. 169.

2. Person-Group

The distinction between a person and a group seems to be so obvious as hardly to bear mentioning. Yet as already seen, the legal definition sometimes recognizes a basic similarity between the two. A corporation that has rights and duties within the legal definition may be termed a person, though it is only an "artificial person." It is evident that the community is larger in scope than the individual or the person and is related to the human individual as a whole to its parts. Acknowledging this, we still must say that it is only the person that is a substance, that only the person is autonomous, that is, the person thinks and wills for himself. Since a society or corporation is not an organism it has no vital organ of thought, and thus it does not think.

In general, a person may live as a person in a bad society and even as a good person in a bad society, but no good society can exist when persons as persons are destroyed or when they are dehumanized, or when the quality of life of the persons involved is bad. Sub-groups within the society, while being parasitic themselves, may act one to another within their own group on quite a high level. Thus the saying "There is honor among thieves." But the fact that they remain parasitic, taking from while contributing nothing to the larger society, indicates that they deny to mankind in general the respect and dignity due man. They have failed to perceive that the question "Who is my brother?" demands a much broader response than they are willing to give. Thus the quality of life and the sub-group itself must be acknowledged to be of a very low order.

A person is differentiated from a thing, and a person by definition has precedence over a thing. In distinction to the person, the society as a non-person must be considered a "thing" not in any material sense, but merely because it is an entity and yet a non-person. The state, though an "artificial person" and in some respects the sovereign person, still receives its form and meaning from the consent of the individual persons constituting it. As such, the person is prior to the state. Granting this, both society and the state exist for the person, the person does not exist for them. They are means for the development of the person, and the person is not a means for their maintenance.

As Martin Buber points out, there is a difference in the way men ally themselves. There may be a collectivity or a bundling together which he calls an organized atrophy of personal existence. On the other hand, the true community is no longer merely individuals side by side, but in quite a different relationship with one another--a person-to-person relationship. Community is based on an increase in confirmation in life lived towards one another. He says that the modern zeal for collectivity is flight from community's testing the consecration of the person, a flight from the vital dialogue, demanding the staking of the self.* This is not to deny the importance of the society nor the neces-

---

*Buber, Martin, Between Man and Man (Kegan Paul: London, 1947), pp. 31-32.

---

sity of developing good societies. It is affirming the logical and moral precedence of the person.

The society men make may be on the level of that binding together of wild wolves, or the more sophisticated grouping of ants within a

colony, or bees within a hive. There are all levels of social organization amongst the ants, but each kind of ant follows its predecessors in social organization. They are born to organize in a particular instinctual manner. They labor, with diverse functions, but always within the structure of the society--the ant-hill. Men, however, can labor upon the structure of society itself, shaping and moulding it as they so choose. Men may group themselves in the society on the distinctly human level, of a community based on a person-to-person relationship.

3. Person-Individual

An individual is the ultimate unit of a multitude or class. Thus a dog, a particular dog, in this sense is an individual. The dog being a particular dog, is distinct from all other dogs and things. Likewise a human individual, a creature with separate bodily existence, is one of a class of Homo sapiens and being one of a class he excludes from himself all others, both within the same class and within all other classes.* The individual as a member of a group and separate from every

*"In each of us, individuality, being that which excludes from one's self all that other men are, could be described as the narrowness of the ego, forever threatened and forever eager to grasp for itself." Maritain, Jacques, The Person and the Common Good (Charles Scribner's Sons: New York, 1947), p. 27.

other member within the group appears as a replaceable unit and does not have worth within itself. As a replaceable unit in this class, Homo sapiens, the individual is an active member of the class or group and his value is judged by the part he plays within the whole group. In modern society the human individual is viewed as a producer and/or a consumer. The extent to which he is both of these becomes the basis for our judgment as to his value within his class.*

*Gilby, Thomas, Between Community and Society: A Philosophy and Theology of the State (Longmans, Green and Company: New York, 1953), p. 106.

In contrast to the individual, the person is viewed not as a means only but as an end, not as a consumer or producer but as having dignity; i.e., a proper object of respect, by virtue of his existence as a human being. A person is judged not by what he does but by the quality of his existence. A person cannot be viewed as some form of replaceable ultimate particle in the class but must be seen in some sort of irreplaceableness. As an individual, anyone else might well serve in his place, but as a person no one can serve in precisely the same way. An individual is distinguished from other individuals in that he has bodily or corporal being. The person is distinguished from other persons in that each has been endowed as a human being with reason and a moral nature. As individuals we are all different and unequal. Some are better producers or consumers than others. Some have better minds than others, and in all ways of measuring there are variations so that there are always those who are better, greater, or more important than others. However, as persons being ends in themselves and each created in the image of God, all are equal in that each is of worth beyond all price. It is evident that the president of the United States, whoever he might be, is worth more to this society than some underprivileged, underendowed youngster. But as persons neither is of greater worth, for both are of immeasurably great worth.

4. Person-Personage or Person-Persona

Persona or personage originally designated the theatrical mask

used in early Roman drama to denote change of character. It is used in modern times by psychologists and sociologists to speak of the roles that one is called upon to play. In this sense one may be many personages at the same time or in succeeding moments. As an instructor I play the role of an instructor with the authority and prestige that goes with it, but at noontime as a sports enthusiast and playing with colleagues on the handball court I play quite a different role. As a father I have yet a different role than that as husband. Similarly all persons have different roles or are different personages at the same time or in succeeding times or moments. Our person is continuous though never static, always changing and changed very definitely by the personages or personae we play or put on.

Gordon Allport says of Cicero that he asked, "Why should I walk around like a persona?"* Cicero was asking why he should put on an ap-

*Allport, Gordon, op. cit., p. 39.

pearance of what he really was not. Thus persona or personage can denote not what a man is, but on the contrary, what he is not. It may denote the character that is manifested in public. It may be, in a sense, even as a mask on the stage, a disguise to hide the private personality, the essence, from the curious world and also from the individual's own consciousness.* At such times the mask, the persona, is our response to

*Kluckhohn, Clyde, op. cit., p. 61.

other people's expectations. Paul Tournier tells of the conversation he had with a motorman on a trolleycar in Switzerland in which they spoke of a retired minister. The motorman said of the clergyman that he used

to smile at them before he retired. In this case, obviously, the role he played as minister was quite different from that which he really was. He wore a mask.

Theodore Solotaroff in analyzing the situation of modern graduate students sees this very process taking place to the detriment of the student. The student in graduate school burdened with family and other commitments that force him to "get ahead" in this world follows the line of least resistance and does that which is expected of him. He enters with enthusiasm, with vitality, with curiosity, but soon learns to put on a mask to curb his enthusiasm, to check his curiosity, to do that which is expected of him.

> "The gain in his ability to contribute to the learned journals can involve the loss of the intellectual energy or confidence to communicate beyond them. Five or six years is a long time. The graduate student who once cynically put on the mask of the conventional scholar, planning in his heart to remove it as soon as he has his degree, finds often enough that his face... has grown to fit it. Even--judging by Berelson's Ph.D.'s--to grin through it."*

---

*Solotaroff, Theodore, "The Graduate Student: A Profile," Commentary XXXII, 6 (December, 1961), p. 490.

In this case the roles called forth by the society through higher education tend to influence the person in a markedly negative manner.

On the other hand, Max Beerbohm in his witty and delightful novelette, The Happy Hypocrite,* follows the life of the wicked Lord

---

*Beerbohm, Max, The Happy Hypocrite (Dodd, Mead and Company: New York, 1931).

George Hell who falls in love with a charming actress, Jenny Mere. Because his wickedness shows in his face, Miss Mere spurns his offer of

marriage. So our hero obtains a mask of sainthood that completely transforms his appearance, and as he appears before his beloved again he wins the hand of the heroine. The hero, in turn, acts according to the mask so that he may not be found out. After some time when the mask is ripped from his face the beholders are startled to find that his face now conforms to the mask. The role has transformed the player.

In both of these accounts the difference between person and persona or personage is quite obvious. In both of them the person and the personage come closer and closer together. In one, the results are quite laudable. In the other, the person is harmed through change wrought by the persona. Tournier says that one of our tasks is to bring into harmony the person and the personage or, in the words of Pindar, "become what you are." Tournier says,

> "We must boldly undertake the formation of a personage for ourselves, seeking to form it in accordance with our sincerest convictions, so that it will express and show forth the person that we are."*

---

*Tournier, Paul, op. cit., p. 81.

The society must call forth or determine an environment of expectation calling forth roles that are proper to the person itself. And the person himself must take upon himself roles that are good and proper and that are harmonious with his person.

B. Characteristics of a Person

The consideration of these four distinctions between persons and other entities has been fruitful, but it has not been adequate. There is no indication in these distinctions of the basic nature of the person. The following five characteristics will deal with that which is essential

to, or are necessary constituents of, a person. The first, that man is inherently a moral being, is the basis for the other four; i.e., man is free; is rational; must commune; and is ultimately responsible for his acts. The acceptance or denial of the first necessarily includes the acceptance or denial of the other four. For this reason there will be a more detailed consideration of this first characteristic than of the others.

1. A Person is a Moral Being

The basis of the concept of a human person herein developed is the assertion that the person is inherently and necessarily a moral being. A protracted and prolonged definition does not fall within the purview of this paper. It seems sufficient to say that the moral nature of man encompasses the matter of deliberate choice--that is, the moral nature is in some way related to man's necessity to make choices based upon values springing in some way from purposes. These choices are determined by some form of good-bad or right-wrong relationships. They are based upon the relationship of a person to God, himself, or to other persons.

It appears quite impossible to conclusively prove that this assertion is true. There is not sufficient empirical evidence to verify conclusively the assertion, and perhaps such an assertion is not amenable to empirical proof. Also logic is not convincing to all, since all will not accept the assumptions.* However, though the evidence may not

---

*Cf. statement by B. F. Skinner, page 42.

---

convince all, it is still very strong, and the assertion does, indeed, have good grounds for affirmation. The evidence presented will be

drawn from four primary fields: law, the social sciences, philosophy, and religion.

In the legal definition given by Thomas Holland,* the words

*Holland, Thomas E., op. cit., pages 80-81.

"rights" and "duties" refer to values and purposes. According to Kant's formulation, acting from duty is moral action. Thus, this legal definition is based upon a moral nature. In fact, in this legal definition it is moral nature itself that distinguishes persons from things. Even legal persons made up of groups of persons are distinguished from things by the fact that they have rights and duties. Holland defines a right as "the name given to the advantage a man has when he is so circumstanced that a general feeling of approval, or at least of acquiescence, results when he does or abstains from doing certain acts, and when other people act, or forebear to act, in accordance with his wishes...."* As Kant

*Loc. cit., p. 70.

has shown, a duty is the obligation to act not out of or because of pleasure or impulse, but because it is right.

The fact that men whenever they join themselves together form some kind of regulations, formal or informal, to guide their relationships one with the other, and then provide some form of judgment of men's actions in accordance with these regulations, is a further indication of the generality within mankind of the concepts of right and wrong. It is not necessary for present purposes that all formulations be the same nor that things judged right be judged right in all areas

or in all societies. It is only necessary to show that men do make deliberate choices based upon values. Animals, too, band together and there is leadership, but this leadership usually comes through inheritance, as the queen bee, or through power and superior strength, as the bull elephant. But men, acting as persons, determine the form of the relationship amongst themselves. Lewis Feuer, a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, says,

> "The universal ethics, which is the outcome of psychoanalysis, rests on the scientific belief that there is a common biological foundation in all the branches of the human race. Psychoanalysis confirms the basis for ethical universalism, and therefore can guide, without inconsistency, the efforts of applied anthropology. The great contemporary programs of technical aid and medical assistance to the world's backward areas are founded on such a common ethical philosophy."*

---

*Feuer, Lewis, Psychoanalysis and Ethics (Charles C. Thomas: Springfield, Illinois, 1955), pp. 118.

In speaking of "ethical universalism," "evaluation," and "cultural values" Dr. Feuer gives witness to man's moral nature.

Paul Tournier, another psychiatrist, says, "True personal relationship, of the sort that makes the person, involves both choice and risk; it lays one open to a reply, and to the necessity of replying in turn: it is a dialogue."* Here once again, choice, responsibility,

---

*Tournier, Paul, op. cit., pp. 128-129.

---

risk refer to a basic moral nature.

Robert Redfield, an anthropoligist, also sees the fundamental moral character of man. In arguing against the position taken by Professor Childe that early man was not basically different from lower forms of life, he says,

> "Even the little glimpses of religion and sense of obligation to do right which are accorded the archaeologists show us that twenty-five thousand years ago the order of society was moral order. That of wolves or sheep is not. Childe's facts prove that this was so, and that his comparison of precivilized society with that of animals is misleading... A people's conceptions as to the good are only meagerly represented in the material things that they make. A tribe of western Australia, the Pitjendadjara, today carry on a religious and moral life of great intensity, but they make and use material objects so few and so perishable that were these people exhibited to us only through archaeology, we would barely know that they had existed and we would know nothing of their moral life... it is certainly true that naked and wandering, with almost none of the material possessions and power which we associate with the development of humanity, they are nevertheless as human as are you and I."*

---

*Redfield, Robert, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

In a later portion of the same book, Redfield speaks of Utopias, of freedom, of human rights, of human responsibility, all of which lie within the general purview of the moral nature. He says,

> "So, following Whitehead's lead, we may suspect that other ideas of corresponding power and endurance are already at work among us: the idea of permanent peace, also the idea of universal human rights. The existence of these ideas does not allow us to predict that they will one day be realized in fact, for, to some of us at least, man's freedom includes the possibility and the power to destroy himself, and the possibility and the power to continue somehow to muddle along."*

---

*Loc. cit., p. 83.

Philosophers also proclaim the basic moral nature of man as has been demonstrated through the examination of the few representative philosophic positions in the previous chapter. Again it is not necessary to demonstrate that all positions are identical or similar and indeed this would be impossible to do, but it is of more than passing interest that the problem of values and choices, the problem of how persons ought

to live together has been of primary interest throughout the ages. It is significant that there are such positions as hedonism, stoicism, humanism, the ethics of power, religious ethics, and that the consideration and evaluation of these positions is as pertinent and important today as it was when each of them was first promulgated.

William Ernest Hocking writes,

> "Man thus becomes for himself an object of artful reconstruction, and this is an art peculiar to man. Whatever is done in the world by way of producing better human individuals, whether for the benefit of the species or for the ends of individuals themselves, man is an agent in it: it is done not merely to him but by him. He has become judge of his own nature and its possibilities. 'Evolution' leaves its work in his hands--so far as he is concerned.
>
> "I do not say that man is the only creature that has a part in its own making. Every organism may be said (with due interpretation of terms) to build itself, to regenerate itself when injured, to recreate itself and, in striving for its numerous ends, to develop itself--to grow. It may be, as we were saying, an agent in evolution. But in all likelihood, it is only the human being that does these things with conscious intention, that examines and revises his mental as well as his physical self, and that proceeds according to a preformed idea of what this self should be. To be human is to be self-conscious; and to be self-conscious is to bring one's self into the sphere of art, as an object to be judged, altered, improved."*

---

*Hocking, William Ernest, Human Nature and Its Remaking (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1929), pp. 6-7.

Robert Ulich writes,

> "When a person acts out of a genuine moral impulse, he does not deliberate about social advantages, nor is he interested in moral 'theories'--just as little as the artist during the act of creation is interested in esthetic theory. Moral man does not obey external authority or the whims of his ego. He is 'bound to do'; yet he is in freedom. His selfness is gone, for his self has grown together with the creative forces of the world... If you wish to define it, say that he listens to life which wishes to preserve itself in its unity and integrity, and which has an inner urge towards excellence."*

*Ulich, Robert, The Human Career (Harper and Brothers: New York, 1955), p. 153.

In another place he says, "But whereas man can delegate and divide labor, administration, and even research, there is one thing he cannot delegate without surrender of self, namely his moral and intellectual integrity."*

*Loc. cit., p. 172.

The evident concern of all of the religions in the question of how men ought to act gives further demonstration of the basic moral nature of man. Again, religions do not all give the same answers or formulations, but they do deal with this question, each one formulating a system of ethics giving guidance to man's life. The Lord, in the Old Testament, said to the children of Israel, "Be ye holy; for I am holy."* This same command of the Lord is quoted in the New Testament.

*Leviticus 11:44.

The Apostle Paul presents the new birth through Jesus Christ as a change in the orientation or direction of man's life. For he says, "Do not be conformed to this world but be transformed by the renewal of your mind, that you may prove what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect."*

*Romans 12:2 (Revised Standard Version)

The Apostle Peter writes,

"Having purified your souls by your obedience to the truth for a sincere love of the brethren, love one another earnestly from the heart. You have been born anew, not of perishable seed but of imperishable, through the living and abiding word of God;.... So put away all malice and all guile and insincerity and envy and all slander."*

---

*First Peter 1:22--2:1 (Revised Standard Version)

The story of the fall of Adam as given in the first chapter of Genesis again demonstrates the conception of man as a moral being. Man in the person of Adam and Eve was given a choice--a choice of being obedient to God or of following themselves, making a God of themselves. This was a moral matter. From this beginning the biblical story leads us to the New Testament account, which has just been quoted, that through Jesus Christ our moral orientation is changed.

The other religions, large and small, also deal with this same matter. Some hold out the promise of a better state through obedience to a code or ethical formulation whereas Christianity presents the possibility of obedience to the Christian Ethic through the Grace of God as seen in Jesus Christ. The point, however, seems evident that all are concerned with this matter of the person being basically a moral being.

2. A Person is Free

Once it is accepted that the person is essentially a moral being, and this has been given as a basic assumption of this paper, then of necessity man must be free. Morality assumes the ability to do right or wrong--that is, the ability to choose courses of action. As the Florentine humanist, Pico Della Mirandola, wrote in 1486,

"We have made thee neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, so that with freedom of choice and with honor, as though the maker and molder of thyself, thou mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape thou shalt prefer. Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul's judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms....

"O supreme generosity of God the Father, O highest and most marvelous felicity of man! To him it is granted to have whatever he chooses, to be whatever he wills....Whatever seeds each man cultivates will grow to maturity and bear in him their own fruit."*

---

*Cassirer, Ernst; Kristeller, Paul O.; and Randall, John H., Jr. (ed.), The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1948), p. 225.

This freedom is essentially a freedom of choice. It includes a freedom of action, but the freedom of action depends upon the possibility of alternative actions and this requires a choice and, thus, essentially the freedom of the person is a freedom of choice. Man stands in a peculiar position. Animals may be domesticated, but only man may be enslaved or enslave himself. Animals may, through lack of adaptation, become extinct, but man can choose in such a manner as to annihilate himself. He can choose that which will cause him to grow or improve or to deteriorate and, as is starkly apparent today, destroy himself. Thus, man's existence as a free being is an existence of anxiety, of fearful choice and consequence. This freedom of the person, a freedom to choose, implies a freedom to choose the freedoms to be maintained. Man is free to give up his political freedom for security, to give up his intellectual freedom for position--in short, he must choose the freedoms that he wishes to maintain. Thus, man is forced to choose on the basis of some hierarchy of values. The question is, what, indeed, for the person are the real values of life?

This freedom is not a freedom of the mind and the slavery to the body. The body, though it be material, cannot be thought of as being a prison of the soul--something foreign to the person. It is not merely caused, that is, a slave; it is an integral part of the person.

If man is not free, if there are not genuine choices, then there can be no morality. If man is not a moral being, education becomes, at most, mere training. It becomes comparable, if not identical, to that which Pavlov did with his dogs--the conditioning of responses to external stimuli. It must be accepted that man is in some sense free if we are to declare that man is essentially a moral being, and it must be accepted that man is a moral being if education is to mean anything more than mere training.

3. A Person Possesses Reason

In some sense freedom is directly related to knowledge. The choices in true freedom must be genuine choices. There must be real alternatives and there must be some criteria of choice. To blindly accept whether by chance or by external authority is not free action. The mere fact that there may be unknown paths ahead does not lead to freedom. Only when alternatives are known can there be true free choice, and then there must be some knowledge of criteria of selection. Jesus Christ said, "Know the truth and the truth shall make you free." Though the Lord Jesus was speaking of himself as a person and as the source of truth, the statement may be accepted as a general statement in that truth leads to freedom. The knowledge of alternatives and the selection of criteria of choice is a matter of reason. Reason has been defined as "drawing conclusions by reflection."* Wheelright says of

*Keary, Charles Francis, The Pursuit of Reason (University Press: Cambridge, 1910), p. 5.

man and reflection,

> "Man is the animal who can reflect. Like other animals, no doubt, he spends much of his time in merely reacting to the pressures and urgencies of his environment. But being a man, he has moments also of conscious stocktaking, when he becomes aware not only of his world but of himself confronting his world, evaluating it, and making choices with regard to it. It is this ability to know himself and on the basis of self-knowledge to make evaluations and reflective choices that differentiates man from his subhuman cousins."*

*Wheelwright, Philip, A Critical Introduction to Ethics (The Odyssey Press, Inc.: New York, 1959), p. 3.

Brand Blanshard describes thought as, "That activity of mind which aims directly at truth."* It is that which has been identified

*Blanshard, Brand, The Nature of Thought (The Macmillan Co.: New York, 1940), Volume I, p. 51.

as reason or rationality and is made up of perceptions, ideas and reflection. Ideas, theoretic impulses to give the object a place within our experience, are developed out of perceptions. This is culminated in reflection, or "apprehending something in a system which renders it necessary."* Reflection is a movement toward self-completion

*Loc. cit., Vol. II, p. 24.

and intelligibility.

Reason or thought might be summarized in reflection which includes the capabilities of abstraction, generalization, symbolization,

and as one enters the area of science and ethics, prediction. Out of the use of these capabilities the person develops a meaningful ordered gestalt of experience, past, present, and future.

Logic, the formulation of rules governing reason, or the scientific study of such rules, while not the all encompassing human endeavor, is the necessary condition for all that is substantial. It is not accepted as a permanent thing, but a continuous task and a condition for all truth.

4. A Person Can Communicate and Commune

To communicate is to give and receive information, signals, or messages in any way. It may be done through talking, writing, motions, looks, signals of various kinds. Within this broad definition dogs are able to communicate with other dogs, and they are, in a rather forcible manner, able to communicate with cats. Likewise dogs are able to communicate with human beings and human beings with dogs. The important elements in communication are: there must be a sender or an author; a sign or signal; and a receiver who observes the sign or signal. The mere fact of speaking, of writing, or of giving does not guarantee communication. There must be the counterpart of the speaking, the writing, the giving, namely, the receiving in some manner whether it be by understanding, reading, or accepting on the part of the second party.

Language is a highly developed form of communication. As Professor Leonard says,

> "At least one reason why man has so far outrun the lower animals in his knowledge of the universe rests in his ability to use complicated forms of language. To be sure, the lower animals do communicate with one another by the use of visual and auditory signs. But the capacity to use language is enormously greater in the case of man. He can, and does, learn to use languages of great

> complexity and subtlety. These more complex languages can much more nearly reproduce the intricacies and fine distinctions in the world he represents by them. To a great extent, he can make his use of language serve as a substitute for thinking, and so leave his actual thought free to deal with and to master the still deeper and more intricate mysteries of the world."*

---

*Leonard, Henry S., An Introduction to Principles of Right Reason (Henry Holt and Company: New York, 1957), p. 13.

A language is defined as the use of sign-types "such that the several tokens of it mean what they mean in virtue of an agreement among the wills of the several producers of those tokens."* This definition would

---

*Loc. cit., p. 157.

---

exclude the noises made by sub-rational and sub-moral animals since their meaning is not derived from the agreement among the wills of the several producers. Only man is able to voluntarily ally himself with others to make such intricate formulations as our various languages. The values of such voluntary membership are obviously great. It is through language that we are able to accumulate knowledge, paving the way for long range, deliberative attacks on problems. It also enlarges the possibilities for collaborative efforts, for men to work together. Language, finally, provides us with a tool which, by its intricacies and distinctions, makes possible both comprehensive and detailed thought.

Communication in the form of intricate language is indeed a truly human endeavor, but it does not plumb the depths of humanity; communion does. While dogs communicate with other dogs and also with men, and indeed, this is genuine communication, dogs do not commune with dogs nor dogs with men for communion is sharing of the person,

the impartation of the person and the receiving of the person. Thus, communion is possible only between persons--man and man or man and God--and not only is possible, but is necessary for the development of the person. Communication may be done between individuals, as Martin Buber states in the I-It relationship.

> "The attitude of man is twofold, in accordance with the twofold nature of the primary words which he speaks. The primary words are not isolated words, but combined words. The one primary word is a combination I-Thou. The other primary word is a combination I-It; wherein, without a change in the primary word, one of the words He and She can replace It. Hence the I of man is also twofold. For the I of the primary word I-Thou is a different I from that of the primary word I-It. Primary words do not signify things, but they intimate relations."*

---

*Buber, Martin, I and Thou (Charles Scribner's Sons: New York, 1958), p. 3.

This relationship between a person and a thing, the I-It relationship, is an objective, intellectual, informational communication, but the relationship of communion, the I-Thou relationship, is a communication of a different order--of the person rather than a bit of news, fact, etc. It is the person to person or human encounter; it is the being-together, or togetherness as described by Remy Kwant.* Such an encounter

---

*"Encounter with the other man is the fundamental sphere of our existence. Meaningful behavior is communicable only within an encounter, through being-together. We do not learn to live together because we learn to exist in the world, but within and because of interhuman encounter we begin to live in the same world. The child is taken into the human sphere to the extent that he learns being-together....We understand the human world because we understand man, and not vice versa."

Kwant, Remy, Encounter, Duquesne Studies, Philosophical Series, Number 11, translated by Robert Adolfs (Duquesne University Press: Pittsburg, 1960), p. 31.

---

or communion demands an object of knowledge, but it goes beyond the object of knowledge of the person into a subject of understanding. While information is intellectual, communion is spiritual, yet information is a necessary condition for communion. Information tends to speak of personages or roles, whereas communion reaches directly to the person. By information one can understand the situation as it is, but only through communion can one understand the person. Communion demands that I open up myself, that I take the risk of not pretending I am that which I am not--of not hiding what I am. Only in these terms can there be a personal encounter--can there be communion between persons. Such a communion or encounter has been described as a responsible dialogue in that one takes upon himself the responsibility of honesty and openness, of self-knowledge and knowledge of the other.

As many writers have pointed out, it is part of being human that the person relate himself. Erich Fromm says,

> "...man cannot live alone and unrelated to others. He has to associate with others for defense, for work, for sexual satisfaction, for play, for the upbringing of the young, for the transmission of knowledge and material possessions. But beyond that, it is necessary for him to be related to others, one with them, part of a group. Complete isolation is unbearable and incompatible with sanity."*

---

*Fromm, Erich, Man for Himself (Rinehart and Company: New York, 1947), p. 58.

Major William Mayer, an army psychiatrist, has pointed out the results of the psychological isolation brought about so systematically upon our own prisoners of war by the Red Chinese during the Korean conflict. When such isolation was achieved, the possibility of cooperative action was eliminated and the individuals, being dehumanized,

very often gave up and died.*

---

*Taken from a speech.

An individual isolated, either physically or psychologically, is denied the possibilities of full personal attainment. Such a one is cut off not only from the access to accumulated knowledge, but more importantly, from that richness of person that comes through communion so necessary for personal development. Psychological isolation such as that of the "other directed" person who receives his norms from outside himself but enters into no dialogue--that is, he takes from others, whether they be his own group or a higher group, but in no ways gives of himself, is seen in the very title of the book describing such "other directed" individuals--"The Lonely Crowd."*

---

*Riesman, David; Glazer, Nathan; Denney, Reuel, The Lonely Crowd (Doubleday Anchor Books: New York, 1953).

How persons relate to one another and to God is a moral question. Man may relate himself to others on the basis of hate or love, by competition or cooperation; by oppressing or freeing; but relate himself he must. John Locke saw man entering into a society primarily for the protection of property, and it is distinctly human that man can form a society for such a reason. Aristotle describes three types of friendships or three ways in which men can relate themselves: the relationship of utility where a friendship is dependent upon utilitarian gain on the part of each of the participants; friendship for pleasure, wherein each of the participants derives pleasure from the other; and

friendship on the basis of character, an outgoing friendship that is the result of the good character of both of the participants. Certainly the last of these is of a higher order than Locke's or the two previously mentioned ones of Aristotle.

The description of the highest order of relationship between persons, the most profound communion between men, is that of Agape as described in the New Testament. This order of love goes beyond the friendship of Aristotle in that Agape loves everybody--it loves what other love has to reject. It needs no sympathy in order to love. It is a rational relationship, not a passion into which one falls, but a matter of the will to open oneself to others in an I-Thou relationship. It is the relationship that the Apostle Paul speaks of when he says, "If one member suffers, all suffer together; if one member is honored, all rejoice together."* The picture here is of a body vitally connected,

*First Corinthians 12:26.

each part or member dependent upon the others and each contributing for the benefit of the others. It is that love which is patient and kind, not jealous or boastful, not arrogant or rude--love which does not insist on its own way, is not irritable or resentful and does not rejoice at wrong, but rejoices in the right.* Such a relationship is one of complete openness, perfect communion.

*First Corinthians 13:4-6.

A man is born an individual and becomes a person, and correspondingly a richer person, as he comes into genuine encounter or dialogue

with other persons, as he enters as a person into the society which is larger than he is, but is made up of persons such as he is, as he communes in I-Thou relationship with other persons.

5.• A Person Stands Alone

All men are born under the sentence of death, a death that inexorably approaches from the moment of birth and is at all times starkly imminent. Such a condition determines that one's life must be judged by its quality rather than its quantity. The relevant question is, "what is the quality of life at any given moment?" This is the basis of judgment.

In this I stand alone. The quality of life may certainly be enhanced through responsiveness to knowledge and reason; through the accumulated culture and through communication and communion with other persons, but essentially and ultimately I stand responsible for my life. I am forced to act--even in choosing not to act in a given situation I do indeed act. Each act is uniquely "my act." It is what I am and it shapes what I shall become, but it is "my act" and as such I stand responsible. I may choose to go the way of others, to conform, and as such I make my decision--I act. Or I may say with Martin Luther, "Here I stand, I can do no other," and in this, too, I act, but in each act I value. I say " this" is more important than "that," whether consciously or unconsciously, and as such each decision becomes a moral act, and I, as a moral being, am responsible for moral acts.

> "The bad man is the man who no matter how good he <u>has</u> been is beginning to deteriorate, to grow less good. The good man is a man who no matter how morally unworthy he <u>has</u> been is moving to become better. Such a conception makes one severe in judging himself and humane in judging others...Not perfection as a final

goal, but the ever-enduring process of perfecting, maturing, refining is the aim in living."*

---

*Dewey, John, Reconstruction in Philosophy (The Beacon Press: Boston, 1948), pp. 176-177.

In summation, a person may be distinguished from:

1. a thing, a person being the subject of rights and duties, whereas a thing is the object of rights.
2. a group, a person being logically prior to the group. Thus the group exists for the person, not the person for the group.
3. an individual, for an individual is a replaceable ultimate unit of a class whose worth is determined by its function within the class, whereas a person is irreplaceable, with worth and dignity by virtue of his being a person.
4. a persona, personage or role, for while all men play many roles at the same time and at various times, they still <u>are</u> a continuing though ever changing person.

It has further been said that a person:

5. is ultimately and inherently a moral being, who is continually confronted with the necessity of making choices on the basis of values arising from purposes or goals.
6. is in some sense free, since to deny freedom would at the same time deny the moral nature of the person and reduce him to the level of the brute creation. This freedom is basically a freedom of choice.

7. has, to a greater or lesser degree, intellect or rationality. The person is able to reflect, to form abstractions and generalizations, to form a meaningful gestalt of experience.
8. can communicate, or by agreement among men develop symbols that carry a common meaning, and commune, that is enter into a person-to-person, I-Thou relationship culminating in a rational, outgoing love.
9. may choose the quality of life he wants to develop and is ultimately responsible for this choice.

CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATION FOR HIGHER EDUCATION

A. General principles

A working formulation has now been evolved through the development of nine points, four distinctions, and five necessary characteristics. The application of this working formulation to a system of higher education will of necessity be very general in nature. The formulation itself was by intention drawn in a very broad scale constituted of elements acceptable by and large. It was meant to include many philosophical systems and many philosophies of education. Such a broad consideration means that its application to a system of higher education would also be very broad.

This broad formulation with the resultant general principles cannot be so broad that it has no meaning, that it does not differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable, between right and wrong within this framework, and thus after the general principles have been evolved, there must needs be a more particular application of these principles. This application will have to deal with particulars if it is to be of any value, but again in dealing with particulars it still must deal with them in a general way. This, indeed, is a difficulty in any such consideration as this, not to prescribe and proscribe so rigidly that the application is unacceptable to any but the author and on the other hand, not to be so general that it may be accepted by all yet meaningless to all.

The nine general principles will follow the pattern of the distinctions and the necessary characteristics of the previous chapter. Each principle in turn will be directly related to the distinction or

the characteristic. The discussion following each principle will deal largely with those issues not related to curriculum, admissions, and evaluation, since these will be dealt with more particularly in the latter part of the chapter.

1. The development of persons shall be viewed as the end of the educational process. All parts and functions of the community--that is, the community of higher education--must be evaluated in the light of their contribution to this goal. Within the educational system there should be the encouragement of the assumption of greater rights and corresponding duties or responsibilities on the part of the persons.

Discussion: This principle, applied to the various areas of the community of higher education, says in essence that these areas are to be judged by their total contribution to the development of the persons or students involved. Administration would not exist for its own sake; it would never be an end in itself, but always considered as a means and only a means. The function of administration would be to facilitate the development of the persons. Those who have most direct contact with students, in particular the teachers, would be considered perhaps the most important members of the community as regarding function. All efforts would be made to facilitate their work. Thus administration would become a facilitating agency for the promotion of the teacher-pupil relationship and rather than adding details and additional work to the load of the teacher, it would in every way possible remove unessential or trivial things in order that the time and energy of those working directly with students might be conserved for that work which more directly relates to their function. The buildings would be constructed

and the campus maintained with the student in mind. Since the person involves more than intellect but emotions and aesthetic appreciation as well, the buildings and the grounds would, of necessity, be attractive and artful. Convenience of movement of the student would be taken into account. Buildings would be arranged so as to facilitate the kind of contact essential to the teacher-pupil confrontation. Buildings would be located in such a manner as to provide accessibility to students so that students would be encouraged to enter into broad areas of knowledge rather than to become specialized to the exclusion of liberal education at an early time in their academic careers.

Regulations governing the life of the students would be formulated with the development of the student primarily in view. The students could not be viewed as means for the development of greater housing or ease of administration. Regulations would be such as to expect of students an increasing assumption of duties and corresponding rights as the students mature or develop. Thus, an entering student would have greater rights and responsibilities the second year than the first, and even greater responsibilities the fourth year over the first, and by the end of the fourth year the students, who will now be thrust upon society and enter into the freedom of other citizens, would be enjoying that personal freedom within the community in which they are then existing, that is, within the college community.

Extracurricular activities would also be encouraged in the light of what they add to the development of persons. Those activities that do not contribute to the development of students but may contribute in other areas would not be encouraged by the college community. They may

well be encouraged by other agencies, but they would not be encouraged by the college community. The question of participation or nonparticipation would be determined by the total effect upon the persons involved.

In no area and at no time should the students be viewed merely as means. They must not be used to build departments although a department may well become strong as it works with students, but students are not to be merely means to this end. Nor should they be used merely for publicity purposes, whether this come through high scholastic achievement or high achievement in athletics or other areas. They must not be viewed as cogs in a machine, in a system that becomes ritualized, whether this be in registration or in the system of excuses and absences or in the application of regulations regarding conduct. Once they are seen as numbers, they are dehumanized and are no longer thought of as persons.

Students, as persons, are not to be something to be merely studied or manipulated. One might feel no qualms in experimenting with white rats, but if persons are of infinite worth then it is impossible to manipulate one or a group for whatever purpose. They must not be studied merely as objects, but at all times they must be considered as persons.

Class size would also be governed by the question of what happens to persons as they go through the experiences the school provides for them. Size would not be determined by cost per student or merely by the results of research aimed at the amount of "learning" absorbed through various methods or techniques. Such considerations as: what kind of impression is left with the student? Do students continue studies

in this area or do they become disinterested through the use of various techniques? Do they have opportunity to come into personal relationship with significant persons in this area? would all be taken into consideration. Thus, the question would not be determined upon the basis of achievement tests alone, but the total effect upon the students as persons--their reactions, the development or lack of development of appetites for learning in the area and their satisfactions or dissatisfactions would all be taken into account.

2. In a society made up of persons, the person is always prior to the society. Though the society as a structure is necessary for the development of the person, the person does not exist for the society, but the society for the person.

Discussion: Governing rules or codes of conduct must not be made only in order that administration may be eased through the conformity of the persons. There must be the actual encouragement of the various uniquenesses of both staff and students. Rules must be set up in such a manner that they deal with moral issues--good and bad and right and wrong--rather than ease and conformity. The enforcement of the rules must be made in the light of the priority of the persons. Jesus said of the Sabbath, "Man was not made for the Sabbath, but the Sabbath for man." In a similar manner, all rules and regulations must be made for the persons involved and not the persons made for them. This would mean that there must be considerable flexibility in all rules and regulations in order to provide for the uniquenesses of the persons involved and the uniqueness of the situation in each case. Such individual or personal consideration is extremely difficult in large

organizations when the persons making the decisions regarding others or that involve others are unable to know the persons their decisions affect. This might well mean that the administrative organization of a person-centered higher educational system would have to be broken down into units small enough that those administering the rules and regulations would be able to take into account the persons and situations involved.

Even as persons live by making moral commitments, so the community which is made up of persons must order itself in the light of moral commitments. Groups and the community, that is the community of higher education as a whole, must be encouraged to make choices upon the basis of values and the determination of the values to be considered should have high priority. The community must not just grow, but be consciously ordered so as to provide the milieu that encourages the development of the persons comprising the community. Thus, the community must not only make allowance for, but actively encourage the participation of persons in the making of decisions. Persons as such do not live to be governed only but are also governors and thus the students would enter into the formulation of the regulations governing the behavior and even goals.

The degree to which the various members should participate and the kind of participation, advising or actual decision making, of each member would be directly related to maturity and the assumption of responsibility. As Kant wrote,

> "The practical necessity of acting on this principle, i.e., duty does not rest at all on feelings, impulses, or inclinations, but solely on the relation of rational beings to one another, a relation

in which the will of a rational being must always be regarded as legislative, since otherwise it could not be conceived as an end in itself."*

---

*Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Practical Reason, translated by Thomas Abbott, (Longmans, Green, & Co.: London, 1889), pp 52-53.

---

3. The person under all circumstances must be considered as a person and not as an individual, as merely a number or a series of numbers or as a replaceable unit of the species Homo sapiens.

Discussion: The student as a person must never be thought of as a composite of a series of numbers, whether these be a student number and test scores or numbers of any other sort. When the community becomes so large that it is required that identification be made only or primarily through numbers, then the community is too large to be person-centered. This also might indicate that the administrative units within a person-centered system of higher education would have to be broken down into small enough units that the administration of the rules can be done in the light of the persons involved, not individuals, nor numbers. Test scores may well be useful in determining that which may be helpful in the development of the person, but they are never to be confused with a total description of the person.

Kant distinguishes between person and individual or person and thing in the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. He wrote, "In the kingdom of ends everything has either Value or Dignity. Whatever has a value can be replaced by something else which is equivalent; whatever, on the other hand, is above all value, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity."*

*Ibid.

This dignity or intrinsic worth, must be the basis upon which men deal with men, or persons with persons.

A person as a person is not replaceable. He is unique and he fills a unique place. Thus, it is of considerable import as to whether a student remains in school or drops out, whether while in school he functions well or not. It is on the basis of the principle that persons have infinite worth, that admissions policies must be determined (a consideration of admissions policies will be discussed later in this chapter). Whatever the policies may be, once a student has been accepted a great responsibility to see that the student succeeds, matures and develops, then devolves upon the community. It is not a light matter whether 20 per cent fail or not. It is not a light matter whether 2 per cent drop out because of sheer boredom. As persons these two per cent are of great value, and whether the institution presents a challenge or not is of utmost importance.

The worth of the individual, in distinction to the person, may be determined by his function in the total group, that is, in the college community, and therefore there will, indeed, be differences in function. Some will play football; some will be student leaders; some will be neither, and thus come about differences in function. But as far as intrinsic worth is concerned, there can be no difference and one member can have no advantages because of his extrinsic function that another member has not. Those things that are necessary for the proper function of his place in the community are of necessity not only to be allowed but

to be encouraged, but these relate only to function and not to the basic worth of the person. This would mean that students would not be shown greater leniency as regards admissions and withdrawals, as regards classroom accomplishments, or in other areas because they perform some function useful to the community. But great allowance for difference and for flexibility in the administration of the rules must be made on the basis of the persons as persons and such flexibility would be due every person without respect of worth to the community. Thus, in this light the fact that the football player in the fall term spends hours in practices and his energy is expended in violent exercise would be taken into account in determining the level of work he should achieve and the type of work he should enter into, but not because of his value to the university as a football player but because he is a person. The same consideration should be taken for one who spends his energies of necessity in working long hours or in other things that are proper and good.

The person must never be thought of as merely a replaceable unit or as an item to be placed in a particular slot. If music is worth while and it is good for the person to participate in it, then there must be means for such participation whether this be of professional quality or not. There may be groups for the benefit of the community as a whole, such as a high quality orchestra or choral group, but these are not to be confused with that which is aimed at the betterment of the persons through participation. Artistotle says that we should play for the purpose of enjoyment, but to do this professionally makes us slaves to others and thus tends towards dehumanization. This would pertain equally to athletics, dramatics, and music. The organization,

then, whether it be a musical group or a team or any other organization, is a means to the continuation of personal relationships, a means to the development of appreciations of an ever increasing level and is not to be viewed as an end in itself.

All activities within the community of higher education are not to be encouraged. It is obviously impossible for an institution of higher education to do all things, and indeed it would be contrary to the purpose of the institution to encourage all things. The decision as to what activities are to be encouraged should be made in the light of what they contribute to the quality of life at that time and for future times. The community must make a choice as to that which contributes most to the quality of life. It may well be that football does present a general rallying cry or emotional center for the entire community and thus becomes the unifying element. While it may do this, if it does not contribute in a very real way to the quality of life of the persons involved and the quality of life of the community as a whole, then it is not adequate for this task. The community must make a choice of something that does contribute more to the quality of life and this might well mean that quantity and enthusiasm and other aspects would necessarily be diminished. It seems incongruous to say that the unifying element of a community of persons is something that is by nature a spectator activity and is not an activity that calls primarily upon the intellect in the making of moral choices.

4. The life of the community--in this case, the community of higher education--must be so ordered as to promote the synthesis of that which the persons are inherently with the roles they are called upon to play.

Since it is inevitable and proper that persons play various roles, there must be the encouragement for both faculty and students to genuineness so that the roles played harmonize with the basic values and attitudes of the persons playing them and likewise the roles encouraged are of such a nature as to produce the enrichment rather than the degradation of the persons.

Discussion: The culture--that is, the community as self-consciously constituted--should be of such an order as to encourage proper roles by the students or persons. Martin Trow has defined four types of expectations or sub-cultures in higher education today: the "collegiate culture," which centers in football, sororities and fraternities, dates, cars, drinking and campus fun; the "vocational culture," which centers in a curriculum that leads to a diploma and a better job; the "academic culture," which identifies with the intellectual concerns of the serious faculty members; and the "nonconformist culture," which centers in an aggressive nonconformism, a critical detachment from the college and faculty and a generalized hostility to the college administration.* All of these expectations are not of equal value, and it is

*Trow, Martin, "The Campus Viewed as a Culture," Research on College Students (The Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education: Boulder, Colorado, 1960), pp. 105-110.

a matter of no little concern that the community determine which of these expectations are proper and good, and then so arrange all that it does and is that these become the expectations of the group and bring about the call for good and desirable roles on the part of the individual persons. The collegiate expectation, the "rah-rah boy," the well-rounded

social conformist is not a role to be promoted. Likewise a student who sees the diploma as the ultimate goal because of doors it opens, that is the vocational expectation, is not looking to the quality of life involved and as such would not be an expectation promoted by the community. Nonconformity for nonconformity's sake produces a conformity, a conformity not to the codes or mores of the society in general, but to an out-group within the larger society. Such nonconformity when it has no greater basis than this, is also not to be encouraged, although nonconformity upon reflective, purposeful basis is highly desirable. The fourth role, that of the academic, if thought of in broad enough terms, can indeed be considered a desirable role and the college should so order its activities as to encourage this role on the part of students. The role of a scholar as the one who searches after truth in order to open up new areas of freedom and responsibility, conforms to the definition of person as given in the previous chapter. In order to accomplish this, the unifying element of the community must consist in something that deals with the intellect as related to freedom and responsibility. This might be a series of lectures and accompanying discussions built about some themes worthy of the attention of all mankind, or it might be courses developed for the same purpose or, as one school now employs, common readings for the whole student body. But whatever this unifying element might be, it must appeal to the intellect and deal with that which is of moral concern to the students and faculty involved.

Since the role of the advisor is of very great importance, the college must, in whatever ways possible, through advancement policies, through pay increases, and other means encourage the members of the

faculty to play this role in a genuine way. Likewise, since good teaching is important the expectation for this must be evident in the community as a whole. But the community must not encourage things that are quite outside the values or the abilities of the persons involved so that they take on an artificial activity, an artificial role. Thus, one who is not and will not become a good teacher and does not want to teach should not be encouraged to teach, to take on this role which, though very important, is unpleasant or is seen by the person as unimportant. For one who is not equipped to enter into genuine research or the advancement of knowledge in a significant way, this should not be an expectation. That is to say that there must be diverse expectations within a community so that the persons involved may find satisfying roles. But these diverse expectations of the community must all be of such a nature as to enrich the persons involved. Certainly one cannot teach well without being involved in a deeply intellectual process and likewise one cannot enter into genuine research and the advancement of knowledge in a significant way as a person without relating this in some way to others. But the ways in which these are done should be broad enough to fit within the basic value and character systems of the persons involved.

Extracurricular activities would be limited to only those activities calling forth roles that enrich the life of the person. These would be approved or promoted by the community as a whole. There are other agencies outside of a community of higher education that can work with other roles.

The community encourages certain expectations or roles through the activities sponsored and the services rendered or subsidized. It is entirely proper that the college sponsor and subsidize the arts that so enrich the life. It is also right that the physical health of the student be protected through various health services, and that mental health be maintained through counseling and psychiatric help. But, would it not be proper to sponsor and if necessary subsidize a book store so that students might leisurely browse and select books to buy at a reduced rate. Or, perhaps the encouragement of a student cooperative book store would be more suitable, for not only would the books be procured at a reduced price, but the students would be accepting genuine responsibility. The library provides a vast storehouse of knowledge, but it does not become the students', so that while the library is essential it is not sufficient. Students must be encouraged to build their own libraries, and the college should do whatever necessary to encourage this.

The issue is simply this: that unless the community as a whole acts rationally and morally, unless it plays roles compatible with and reinforcing to its character or nature, it cannot expect the students, as persons involved, to act rationally and morally, to take on roles consistent with that which is distinctly human. Unless the community as a whole determines its goals and consciously constitutes itself in the light of these goals, it cannot expect the students to do so.

5. The community, the higher educational unit, must realize that its decisions are inevitably moral decisions involving right and wrong, good or bad, and it must so constitute itself that it encourages the same

realization and the same action, upon the part of all the persons constituting it.

Discussion: This principle is central--all others relate to it. If man is inherently and inevitably a moral being, then when men join together their collective decisions are also inherently and inevitably moral decisions. The community, as the individual, must not just grow, but the growth must be guided. The curriculum (to be discussed later in the chapter) must be developed with a view as to what is good and bad or right and wrong. Not all things are suitable for reflection and study in higher education and some things are more suitable than others. Likewise, extracurricular activities must be chosen on this basis. Many activities are good, but all activities cannot or should not be entered into by a college community. The activities must be selected upon the basis of values, the contributions to the quality of life of the persons involved. Participation sports which seem to contribute directly to the person would be of more importance than spectator sports. This is not to say that spectator sports have no value, but it is to say that participation sports have more value than spectator sports and thus must have priority. Likewise, participation groups in music and drama and other areas would be of more importance than spectator activities in these same areas. Those things in which the person does play the part of a spectator must also be carefully chosen on the basis of what they contribute to the enrichment of life and the discrimination of standards. That which encourages reflection, understanding, and promotes a broadening of appreciations and attitudes would take priority over that which is only passing entertainment. Music

and drama which call forth reflection and point out moral choices would be chosen on this basis. It is of utmost importance that choices be evident, that the community make choices upon values and in this manner the individuals be encouraged to do the same.

Methods of teaching must be selected on the basis of how they contribute to the enrichment of the person, whether they develop understandings, attitudes and appreciations, whether they require reflection and the development of ideas, whether they touch basic value systems. The way students and faculty are looked upon is not only an administrative matter, it is a moral question. It is a moral choice, whether students are thought of as numbers or replaceable units or whether they are thought of as ends or goals in themselves. Likewise, it is a moral matter whether faculty are considered as employees subject to the control or manipulation of administration, and as such are to be "administered," or whether they, too, are considered persons, goals in themselves, of inestimable worth. It is a moral matter when either faculty or students are manipulated in order to accomplish the purposes of any other individual or group. It is a moral matter whether the coaches are chosen because of their ability to produce winners or because of that which they contribute to those with whom they come in contact. These issues must be made clear. The community must be consciously aware that these are not neutral matters and that the choices involved inevitably become moral choices.

Since the community is constituted for the purpose of the development of the persons, and much of this work is done through emulation and the encouragement produced by the culture, the college must be true

to itself. No part or phase of its operation may be divorced from moral commitments. Thus it becomes a matter of some importance whether the budget appears to be made for the faculty and students or whether the students and faculty seem subject to the budget, that is, whether an initial budget consideration or determination is ultimate or whether the wisdom of the people involved shall govern. Likewise, it is of great import whether administration is seen as a means for the encouragement of the ultimately final work, the person-to-person contact between students, and between students and faculty, or whether it is seen as that which drains off the energies in such a manner as to debilitate this activity.

6. The community of higher education must encourage and provide for increasing freedom on the part of all persons within the community. This freedom must not be limited to those issues which are trivial, where no danger or risk is involved or where the consequences are of little import. There must be genuine and important alternatives. However, since freedom inevitably demands responsibility, the degree of freedom must be in accord with the degree of responsibility taken on.

Discussion: The community must be consistent in its behavior, that is, it cannot expect the development of freedom among students while prohibiting or limiting freedom on the part of faculty. Thus, the issue of faculty freedom becomes one of real significance. The faculty should be encouraged to take a greater voice and indeed ultimately to have control in those areas relating to the educational process, such as admissions, curriculum, athletics, etc. In order to avail themselves of these freedoms, the faculty must assume the responsibilities

essential to such functions. This would include both a willingness to become informed about and genuinely concerned about the entire community and its various parts. The faculty would also be encouraged to enjoy and employ their freedom both as citizens and as scholars, freedom to speak out as other citizens in matters of government and politics and freedom to study and report in those areas of interest and concern to the individual members of the faculty.

This freedom would not only relate to the students and faculty in groups or organizations, but to the individual persons involved. Faculty members would be given greater freedom within their own classrooms. In such a circumstance, the selection of both faculty and students would be of signal importance for both would have to be genuinely desirous of learning, of studying areas of real human import. There are real possibilities for failure in such an arrangement or perhaps lack of arrangement, but this is essential to real freedom. Freedom of such an order that mistakes, and important mistakes, cannot be made is not freedom. Images, what people will think, and such should not be relevant factors or, if relevant, certainly not supreme.

Student government, if it is to exist at all, must have important areas of freedom and authority. This is doubtless risky, for students lack experience, maturity, and sometimes even insight, but if it is trivial freedom only, if it is not risky, it may do more harm than good, for it may act as a pacifier and leave the persons unprepared for real issues. Trivial issues, in creating the illusion of freedom, may well be destructive.

It seems peculiar that we accord to many very recent high school graduates a rather extreme degree of freedom. They marry, establish their own residences, become employed or even set up their own businesses, etc., immediately after high school graduation. Yet, the group that one would assume to be more mature and capable, the group that goes on in higher education, we control and limit to a very great extent. This is doubtless in part due to the peculiar situation under which they live, in large groups of the same age and sex and often more heavily subsidized by the state than other citizens. But these reasons hardly seem adequate. Furthermore, there is little more freedom for a senior than a sophomore or a freshman, yet such a student has had two or three more years of maturation and education. There ought to be progressively greater freedom, greater freedom as a freshman in college than as a senior in high school and certainly greater freedom as a senior in college than as a freshman, and this progressive development ought not to include any great disjunctive steps, i.e., the steps between high school and college and between undergraduate and graduate or professional training, or between undergraduate and post-graduate employment. However, if we are to assume that this is to be a person-centered education, we nevertheless cannot assume that all persons of the same age are equally mature and can take on equal responsibility. Thus, all freshmen or, indeed, all seniors should not have the same freedoms. The kinds and degrees of freedom would be dependent upon the responsibility undertaken by the one to whom the freedom is given. It would seem feasible, however, to make some generalizations about freshmen who have had somewhat the same experiences and senior students who

likewise have had some common experiences, and these generalizations could be stated in terms of some rules and regulations. However, these would only be guides and must always be thought of a such, flexible enough to be applicable in individual cases. Unless it is assumed that education has no part in the maturation of the students, that students do not become more responsible as they progress (in such a case, there is no such thing as person-centered education) then each student must be encouraged to take on greater freedom and responsibility in each succeeding year.

Since learning will not be guided by a mentor or teacher after graduation, systematic learning, if there is to be any, will have to be self-motivated and self-conducted. Students ought to be prepared for this by the senior year. Thus, guidance would be greater at the freshman year and accordingly classes would be smaller and contact with faculty greater than in succeeding years. Such contacts and guidance might even decrease and class size increase in the ensuing years of study until by the time the senior year is completed, most of the studying could be done with a minimum of direct supervision or control. It may well be that it is difficult to learn freedom and responsibility in large groups where one tends to feel he can play no part and have no influence, where the regulations must be of such rigidity as to be able to control large groups. If so, this would mean that the units--academic, housing, and any other areas in which the students should have freedom and responsibility--would have to be broken down into small enough groupings that the students may indeed have a genuine voice, genuine control and genuine freedom. This might mean that houseing regulations would not be

campuswide, but might be determined within a particular house or unit. This would be confusing, but one of the major criteria is not the issue of confusion, but the development of the person.

Such conceptions as stated herein are indeed precarious. The chance for failure is very great, for they demand great responsibility on the part of all who administer the governing principles. This would include both faculty and students, for all must act both as legislators and subjects to the law. But for this no excuse is offered, for person-centered education by definition demands a self-government and is indeed precarious even as life itself is precarious.

7. The object of the curriculum both in its extracurricular and curricular aspects, is the development of a meaningful ordered gestalt of experience, past, present, and future, which will provide a guide for conduct. Perception, abstraction, generalization, symbolization, prediction are all tools leading to this end. This gestalt might be termed wisdom; the perceptions and ideas leading to it, knowledge. Knowledge as such cannot be the goal of the curriculum, whereas wisdom may well be. Wisdom in these terms is impossible without knowledge, and the greater the knowledge, the greater the possibilities of wisdom, but there may be great knowledge with little wisdom or reason.

Discussion: No study should end as only a survey or an encyclopedia of facts. All study must culminate in the integration of knowledge within a particular field, and finally within the field of knowledge and experience as a whole. Since particular knowledge must be integrated into the total field of human knowledge and man is basically moral, such an integration cannot be divorced from value.

The study that did not require that which is uniquely human, i.e., reason resulting in wisdom, would not be worth doing. Thus, analysis, synthesis, and integration would all be required. The methods of teaching would be those requiring response from reason on the part of the learners. Lectures might well be used to provide background material, acquaint others with significant persons, and to provide living illustrations of the application of reason to fundamental issues, but under normal conditions, teaching would demand a response from the learner in the form of a thoughtful paper or in espousing and defense of ideas in the seminar.

The course of study as outlined by student and advisor would necessitate some unifying factor. It would include the means for gathering data or perceptions, but it would also have to include the integration of this matter within the field of study and within the whole field of human experience. Such an endeavor requires reflection and thus a course could not be built up of minute segments of knowledge demanding a scurrying from class to class and from source to source, but would require a time for thoughtful reflection or the making of judgments, for abstraction and generalization. The senior year might especially be set aside for this very endeavor. It would provide a time when the students would be encouraged to slow their pace in some respects, to study in depth those things of genuine concern, to reflect and to bring together their experience into a philosophy of life that gives meaning to life and guidance for conduct.

Some means must be found for the encouragement of both faculty and students to spend time in meditation and reflection. This means that

administration must so constitute itself and the school as a whole in such a manner that such endeavor is encouraged. Meetings and committees would be held to a minimum. Writings would be encouraged not for their own sake, but for that which they contribute to knowledge and specifically to mankind. Howard Mumford tells of the seminar he held with a group of educators, most of them doctors of philosophy, people who had already achieved eminence in their profession. When he asked them how many spent as much as half an hour a day in complete solitude or reflection with no outside interruption, most reported that they had never even considered the need for such a period and if they came upon such an "empty" time, they felt compelled to "do something" with it. No self-directed thought, no reverie, no subjective art, no prayer, and only one participant, by general agreement the most brilliant mind in the group, confessed to do anything but the most cursory and passive activity, as he bashfully admitted that he prayed. Mumford says of these educators, "As a result, these well-intentioned men and women were always reacting and responding to something outside themselves: adjusting and conforming, without any ability to take the initiative and to make a genuine departure of their own."* Person-centered higher educa-

*Mumford, Lewis, The Conduct of Life (Harcourt, Brace and Company: New York, 1951), pp 255-256.

tion must in some way or ways encourage the ultimate in human reason, reflection resulting in a meaningful whole of man's experience.

It seems apparent that the total program of the school must be developed rationally. This would mean not only that things were chosen on the basis of values, as is inevitably the case, but that there must

be some rational approach to the determination of values and their application to the total picture of higher education. Thus, at any time one ought to be able to raise questions regarding activities, as to their rightness, their goodness, their priority, their place in the educational picture. Finally, both teachers and students must be protected from the encroachments of power groups without the community and from within in order that they may probe and share and hypothesize, in order that they may in uninhibited expression, in thinking out loud, reach tentative and spontaneous ideas. This is dangerous, for not always are the ideas controllable or predictable, nor indeed should they be, but such is a part of learning, and freedom for this must be encouraged and guaranteed.

8. The university is a place for communication. This may be in the form of writing, and as such the library is perhaps central to the whole university, but there must also be the live communication--student to student and faculty to student and student to faculty. All communication is not of equal merit, and one of the functions of the community of higher education would be to sort out those things that are relevant, pertinent, important, and to provide whatever means possible for the communication of these matters. But communication is not enough. A person-centered education must go beyond communication to communion. The community must develop an environment that will encourage person-to-person encounters.

Discussion: Since communication is of such vital importance in the development of mankind and individual persons, the usual forms of mass communication must be employed. Thus, radio, TV, audio-visual aids, and newspapers would all be important. The point of difference

between these means of mass communication as employed by the university and as employed outside the university would be primarily in the matter of selection of material to be communicated, as this material relates to the highest forms of human activity. A system of higher education may be as well evaluated by what it does not communicate as by what it does. Since the accumulation of knowledge is of such great importance in the continued technological and ideological development of mankind, the library would be of central concern. The use of the library would be encouraged by faculty and the development of the library would take a high priority in budget considerations. The use of language would also take a very important place within the curriculum. The students in all areas would be encouraged to develop their skill in communication, both spoken and written, and yet communication is not to be considered as an end in itself, but as a vehicle for the transmission of information, data, ideas, conceptions, in general, human thought. Thus neither writing for writing's sake nor talking for talking's sake would be encouraged. Communication would be a part of every class, and not relegated to only one area of study.

But above and beyond the area of communication is the area of communion, that which is so distinctively human and to be encouraged at all costs. The school must be so arranged as to bring about the possibility of person-to-person encounter. There must be provisions within classes for this kind of an encounter, and this would probably mean that the students would have to be at some time in classes of quite limited size. There must also be opportunity outside of class for informal person-to-person encounter. This might be encouraged through a more leisurely dining hour and the participation of faculty in student dining,

or it might be done through coffee hours, or more informally, by providing a gathering place for faculty and students where there might be a sense of freedom and assurance so that the persons encountering each other may open themselves without fear of reprisal or loss of status. Administrators must be absolutely "above-board" in planning and not only communicate with others of the faculty, but expose themselves and their ideas to the faculty for judgment and evaluation. The faculty must then be encouraged to be honest in their appraisals. Students also should be involved in this process. Their participation would not only be permitted, but be felt essential. The atmosphere should be one of such freedom that faculty would be free to expose themselves and their work to other faculty members. Faculty members would not feel it necessary to build up islands of knowledge where they are supreme because nobody else has knowledge in that particular area. They would not feel it necessary to have such islands in order to maintain rank and status within the disciplines, but on the contrary, such isolation would be discouraged. One would feel it essential to encounter others with his ideas and work.

Likewise, students would be encouraged with complete openness and honesty to submit themselves and their ideas to an encounter with their peers and with the faculty. They must be able to question, without fear, statements and ideas of faculty, and faculty must be able to question and sharpen the views of students. This would mean that teaching could not consist merely of the pouring out of facts and the regurgitation of the same facts in the form of tests, but that both faculty and students would have to make conclusions and commitments and submit these to the scrutiny of the other members of the community.

Since a person-to-person encounter and I-Thou relationship demands commitment on the part of the persons involved, such commitments would be encouraged by the school and the school would itself make commitments. It would say, "these" are things we are seeking after or we count "these" to be good, and likewise faculty members would be encouraged to make such commitments. They would be encouraged to participate in government. The architects and urban planners would dare to criticize public housing in those areas in which it failed. The Journalism Department would speak out against the evils of advertising and the inadequacies of newspapers. The Physics Department would have something to say about the matter of competition or cooperation in international science and the uses to which its knowledge is put. Finally, students would be encouraged to make commitments and though their views at times would be embarrassing and the stands possibly contrary to those of their elders and specifically the administration, still such commitments would be encouraged. For only as these commitments would deal with matters that might embarrass and might be contrary to the views of others within the community in important areas would the commitments of the students be important.

Such an environment is possible when the various persons view the others, not as individuals or objects to be used for their own aggrandizement or benefit, but as persons worthy of respect and dignity, who not only have the rights of personal development, free communication, and commitment, but who have also the obligation for these because only in this manner may each of the persons be beneficial to the others within the community.

9. Each person must stand alone, he must be responsible for his acts. The community should provide an environment which encourages

knowledge, wisdom, the mutually beneficial life of communication and communion, that is, the development of the person. But then each person must be ultimately responsible for what he does and what he is. Students and faculty must be encouraged to act according to knowledge, on the basis of values developed through reason, and then each be responsible for his acts.

Discussion:

Faculty and students can be encouraged to act and be responsible for their acts only as the community acts and is responsible for its acts. As Paul Goodman points out,

> "...there are 1900 American colleges and universities; several hundreds of these have collected in one place many learned, free, and creative adults, and all of them are centers of lively and promising youth; yet one could not name a dozen that strongly stand for anything, whether idiosyncratic, peculiarly wise, dangerous, adventurous, or even exceptionally licentious or stupid. This is astounding, that there should be so many communities and so much conformity to the national norms;....*

*Goodman, Paul, "The Community of Scholars," Commentary, Volume 33, 3 (March, 1962), p. 208.

The community must be willing to stand for that which it holds. Once it has made a commitment, and in this case it would be the commitment to a person-centered education, then it must not be forced into patterns of conformity to other schools of higher education. Granted that universities are tending to leave the person-centered education for the sake of greater specialization and graduate education; granted that such a procedure is almost requisite for high status in the world of higher education; granted that person-centered education would be difficult and expensive; that faculty willing to enter into such an endeavor are hard to obtain and perhaps harder still to hold, still once the commit-

ment is made, the school must act accordingly. How can we encourage responsible action on the part of persons when the schools themselves refuse to act responsibly? Likewise, if it is determined that football is not a proper unifying center for the school, in that it does not meet the prerequisites for such an element, then in spite of the fact that legislators and alumni will vigorously oppose such action, the school must in its integrity develop a center that more aptly meets the requirements for a person-centered community. If a school is not able to exist without making intellectual compromises, and moral compromises, then perhaps it should not exist at all. If grading is found to be inimical to the goals of a person-centered higher education, then it must be abolished. Goodman, in the same article, tells about the lunch he had with six senior professors from a big midwestern university, including some chairmen of departments. All of them verbally opposed grading as being injurious to teaching and learning and yet none of them was willing to speak out for the abolition of grading, upon the basis of various rationalizations. Such action can only encourage the individuals within a community to like action. Certainly it is easier to offer factual information and only factual information, not to encourage the student in the forming of concepts and the integrating of knowledge into the larger body of knowledge and values. Certainly, such information can be more readily graded through machine tests and short answer examinations. But if such testing and such teaching is found to be inimical to the development of persons as persons, then the school must take a stand opposing such procedures. To compromise on the basis of expediency or ease is to encourage the same type of behavior on the part of both students and faculty.

The encouragement to act responsibly upon the basis of a rational value system cannot take place when there is the fear of vindictive retribution, when the climate promotes the idea that failure inevitably brings punishment and that nonconformity leads to dismissal. Responsible activity certainly will lead to failure and sometimes major failure, and it may well encourage nonconforming action, but such is the price of person-centered education. Laws must be upheld and rules followed, but when either laws or rules are of such an order or number as to inhibit freedom then the call to responsible action becomes quite meaningless. Ultimately, both the society and the person must choose and in choosing, they not only show what they are but what they will become, and for this they are responsible. Just as the person is responsible for his individual acts, in spite of the environment in which he was brought up and the difficult situations he has faced, even so, the community of higher education must be responsible for its actions. The question for higher education is not how much will society give in the way of financial assistance. This is a question for the society. The question is, how will it use that which they do give. The university community cannot say that this or that was added or done because of pressure from outside, for in acceding to this pressure it chooses, and is responsible for this choice. The outside pressures are not responsible. Likewise, the faculty member must be responsible for what he does in his classroom. He may find the situation such that he must protest, or so intolerable that he must move on, but whatever the choice, he must act responsibly. Students, too, must be expected to become more and more responsible. They must be left with real alternatives and then be held responsible for their choices and their actions. They must choose between formal and

informal classwork, between community and non-community activities. These must be real alternatives. But when faced with such alternatives, the student must stand responsible for his choice.

B. General principles applied to entrance and retention policies.

The application of the general principles as developed in this dissertation thus far has been overlapping and sometimes repetitive. This is in part due to the nature of the principles themselves, for they, too, are sometimes overlapping and often closely inter-related. The application has been in those parts of the total program of higher education often thought of as peripheral--housing, athletics, student government, etc. These, in truth, are neither peripheral nor trivial, for an integrity and consistency within the college as a whole is demanded, and thus nothing may be considered trivial.

The following consideration will deal with three issues generally recognized to be pivotal in an educational system--admission and retention of students, curriculum, and student evaluation. The principles; as developed, will be applied to these areas, not one at a time as in the previous section, but in quite general terms.

In general, present policies for entrance and retention in higher education seem to emphasize or conform to the nonperson-centered functions of higher education or training rather than the person-centered function. This is not surprising, since person-centered practices are difficult and open to much error and are perhaps more time consuming and expensive. Secondly, much of higher education is rightfully nonperson-centered, that is, it is centered in the needs of society or in truth. Professional education of all kinds is of this order. For the protection

and good of the society, certain standards of performance and knowledge must be maintained. We are not primarily interested in how rich the lives of doctors as persons are, or what the quality of their life at a given moment is, but we are tremendously interested in whether they have certain skills, proficiencies, and knowledge. With teachers, too, there is certain knowledge they must have regarding the nature of children, the nature of learning, and the subject matter taught. Likewise, for architects and engineers, there is a minimum standard, both as to skills and to knowledge that must be maintained for the sake and the protection of society. For the sake of the society, we must encourage individuals who will become productive members. We must see that they become proficient scientists and engineers to meet the needs of the rapidly expanding technical world about us. As Ortega y Gasset points out, the number who are capable of becoming true scientists is very limited. But, it would appear that there are ways of predicting the probabilities of the achievement of such knowledge and skills. There are tests that are fairly accurate predictors of eventual achievement in such areas as these. It is true that these tests are only fairly good predictors, that without a doubt many students are eliminated who eventually could achieve the minimum requirements, and that many students are encouraged to undertake professional studies who fail to make good professional people. But, if society is to train people for its own good and is to do this to a large extent at the society's cost, it has the right and even the duty to screen out those that apparently have no possibility of achieving the minimum required for society's protection. Thus, students entering into such professional areas must prove a certain

academic ability on the basis of past achievements and score above minimum levels on tests used as predictors of success. We may be able to argue about the general merits of the particular tests and their reliability and validity, but the right of the society to protect itself by such means is beyond dispute.

The same principles and practices are not appropriate for person-centered education, however. Who can determine what the minimum standard of academic success is in order to be a person or a good person? Is there, indeed, a minimum acceptable for a person? Are there certain skills and knowledge that must be achieved within a specified time, notably four years, for a person to be a good, an adequate person? It would appear that here our predictors of success are not sufficient. There is no necessary correlation between test scores, high school achievement and that which is so necessary in a person-centered education, that is, "human concern." Because a person has done well in high school and performs well on tests we have no grounds for assuming that the student is interested in his own development as a person, or that he is interested in the great problems of truly human concern. The basis for acceptance or entrance in a person-centered school of higher education might be these: 1) a determination that this is the best program of study for the student. This would be judged from both what the student desires and what he appears to be able to do. It has been assumed that person-centered education is only one of the functions of higher education, and it is only right that there be others. The question then devolves to the determination of what type of higher education is right for what person. It is rather foolish to encourage a student in endeavors which are both unappealing and appear to be

unfruitful to him or are beyond his ability. The program offered at any institution must be within the reasonable expectations of the students encouraged to participate in such programs. However, since tests are fallible and give only generalized guidance, the desires of the students would ultimately override the results of "objective" tests. The question for both the student and the school to answer is, is this the best program for the student in question? Does it offer that which he can grasp and gain therefrom? Even a person-centered educational institution may not be ideal for every person. Because of human frailities and limitations it may be necessary to have many different schools so as to encompass all the levels of development and the unique aspects of various persons.

Students who give no indication of ability to comprehend or benefit from programs offered in person-centered higher education might be encouraged to enter other endeavors, and at a later time they might find the benefits of a person-centered program most helpful. A person-centered program of higher education would be both broad and flexible enough to be adaptable to the needs of students from various backgrounds and at various ages. It is not necessary that students must be seventeen or eighteen to benefit from higher education. Those with lesser capacities might well benefit from such education at a later time in their lives after they have gained further maturation through other types of experiences.

It is doubtless legitimate for government and industry to provide special inducements for students to enter those professional areas of peculiar need to the society at the time, but no such inducements

should be offered to persons who are interested in more general education such as is outlined within this consideration. Person-centered education requires that the final criterion be not that which is good for the society as a structure, but that which is good for the person in his intra-personal relationships within the society, i.e., the society as a true community. Good persons will make a better society.

2) The second element to be considered as a determining factor in entrance requirements for students is the desire on the part of the student to participate in experiences aimed primarily at developing the person. It may well be that tests and grades are not the best ways to determine this desire. The most important factor might be the conclusions drawn by faculty persons interviewing students desirous of entering--interviews aimed at gaining evidence of books read recently, questions the student would like to pursue, and other evidences of general curiosity and human concern. Upon the basis of such an interview, the faculty member then would make a judgment as to whether this student is genuinely interested in learning and is prepared to enter into study. The faculty member might then become advisor or tutor for the student.

The administrative officers dealing with admissions might look for evidences of the use of freedom and the acceptance of responsibility, and such evidence might have little relationship or even a negative relationship to grades. It is possible that grades in high school may be achieved through the loss of freedom, through a lack of personal involvement, or the suppression of intellectual curiosity. In education today, it is possible that the conformer, the regurgitator of fact, the apathetic may achieve on our evaluation instruments at a

higher level than the nonconforming, original, creative thinker. So, the schools might look for evidences of radicalism in some respect, the "offbeat," the nonconformist in some area or another. These in themselves give no guarantee that such a student would gain from the education offered, but evaluated in their context, they might give some indication as to the intellectual curiosity, the desire to develop and learn and to confront new ideas and other people. Evidences of responsibility and the proper use of freedom would be more readily ascertainable and, indeed, be more genuine after the student is out of high school some time. The application of these ideas might demand a radical change in our view of higher education. We have traditionally viewed person-centered higher education as preceding professional education. Perhaps this need not be the case, but a rigorous, well-developed, person-centered higher education might be more profitable when studied either simultaneously or after professional training, after a student has matured and is prepared to examine the questions of freedom and responsibility and has shown evidence of the assumption of the same.

Retention policies today are also based primarily upon the professional concept. Usually there are certain minimum requirements that must be met within a specified time, and the total task must be completed in four years or less. To complete it, one must accumulate a certain number of credits. This may well be material that was learned beforehand and, thus, very little actual learning need take place. It is assumed that all learning is equally good and that any credit is of equal value. That which is required is a minimum number of hours of credit. A student is evaluated only on the basis of that which takes

place within the classroom, usually over a given body of knowledge and in some areas certain skills.

Person-centered higher education should proceed on quite a different basis. The question is not whether a student at a given moment has attained certain minimum requirements, but whether the student is profiting sufficiently from the experiences offered to him. Such a judgment must be made by a person having close contact with the student, knowing him well as a person. It might be that the student started with a very poor background and, thus, within two years might not reach the minimum requirements usually expected of students. But, if in those two years he has given evidence of growth, maturity, of the acceptance of greater freedoms and responsibilities, if he now sees greater questions, if his human concern has increased, if his intellectual curiosity has grown, then what reason is there for rejecting him? On the other hand, a student who may be meeting all of the minimum requirements that have been set up, but still shows no human concern, no interest in great questions, no development of new appreciations and interests, may be actually impoverishing himself. What reason is there for encouraging and maintaining such a student? Such a student is in desperate need of such education, but even though a particular school cannot accomplish that which is necessary, and such a case is entirely possible, another school or other experiences might.

Evaluation on such broad terms as these probably cannot be done through classwork examinations alone. For one thing, much of the value of a person-centered education would necessarily take place outside a classroom. The lectures, concerts, coffee hours, seminars, symposia,

informal discussions of all types would be an integral part of an education. The amount and type of reading and the development of a student's own library would also be a part of this education. In such a program, the development of the student as a person can only be judged through a personal contact with others, with someone who knows the student in such terms that he can tell whether he is developing or not.

A person-centered system of higher education might have not only to tolerate, but even encourage the student who for some time may find the work in the classroom quite boring, or not meeting his intellectual needs, and so, spends his time in the library learning exceedingly valuable things and providing for himself the background for further seminar and class work. It might have not only to tolerate but encourage the student who suddenly becomes involved in social justice and enters into some activist phase of life. That, indeed, becomes a part of his maturation and development. For such students the school should understand that this is a part of their development rather than a time of declension and loss in their education. A student who comes from a geographical area or class group that has kept him from many of the riches of human experience and enters into them at the university for the first time, who begins enjoying music and art, who finds excitement in sitting down with exciting people and discussing with them things of import, may be profiting tremendously from his university experience. At the same time, as courses are now set up, he may be doing somewhat less than acceptable work. On the other hand, a student may come and impoverish himself while here, yet do very acceptable work within the classroom. The point is simply this, that grades over specified materials

may not be sufficient indicators for either retention or expulsion of students, that the only way such an evaluation can be made is through the personal contact and evaluation of an advisor, faculty member, or counselor.

C. General principles applied to curriculum

The curriculum may be thought of as either the formal classes constituted of students, the teacher, and a formal body of knowledge to be considered, or it may be thought of as those experiences coming under the guidance and determination of the school which are intended for the purpose of learning. In the latter case, the formal classes would be included, but they would not constitute the entirety of the curriculum. The college, being an institution for education or learning, a community of scholars, would so constitute all of its activities that they would result in education and learning, and that in these terms, the first definition would be inadequate. The previous discussion or consideration of the general principles governing a person-centered higher education has, to a degree, considered the non-classroom areas of higher education. A few additional remarks would be appropriate. Whatever form these activities might take, whether it be in the field of athletics, or the art forms, or clubs and societies, or any other activity under the guidance of the school, they ought to bring people into direct contact with others, either through listening, watching or reading, through actual person-to-person encounter. These activities ought, in some way, to lead to participation and eventual personal commitment. This participation need not be physical, for it is impossible for all to play the violin because Isaac Stern visits the campus,

or all to give lectures because Ralph Bunche lectures. But the activities should be of such an order as to lead one into intellectual activity and eventual personal commitment, they are not to be mere entertainment. They must all be chosen in terms of their contribution to the quality of life of the persons participating and watching.

A more formal and detailed consideration of the classroom aspects is appropriate. The curriculum, in these terms, is composed of students, teachers, and the content of knowledge--a thing studied. The matter of the selection of students has already been considered. Though it is of vital importance and cannot be separated from the determination of the curriculum, it will not be considered again. The teacher must be considered as a more experienced learner and the student a less experienced learner. Both teachers and students should consciously be learning and maturing. Both must manifest curiosity and concern in things human, in their relationships to the world, to others, and to God. Viewing both faculty and students as basically learners would mean that they, together, form a community. Activities within this community would be for the community, not just a class within the community. Religious groups would not be student religious groups, but they would be constituted of members from the total community, that is both faculty members and students. Other organizations would also be expressions of this community of learners, and would not be limited to students only. This community would be composed of students, teachers, staff, and families or others with a common interest in learning.

If the teachers are not learners, if they are not excited and stimulated through their learning, they can be of little stimulation to

the students. The teacher must, first of all, be one worthy of emulation, and especially emulation in the active process of learning. There seems to be little doubt now but that most factual knowledge, if not all, can be gained as easily and cheaply through the various aides growing out of our technical skills, through teaching machines, television, radio, programmed learning, and such, as through classroom experience with teachers. It may well be that classrooms and teachers are a thing of the past--an outmoded instrument--if the goal of education is only the learning of factual material or the development of concepts. The one area left to the teacher, then, is the area of human art--the art of being human. Data, information, generalizations, and laws can all be learned through other means than through the use of the time of teachers. But, human activity within these areas cannot be learned through machines, but is learned through emulation and participation. Thus, a student truly learns--learns that which is significant--as he works with a more experienced learner in the gathering of data, in making generalizations, in discriminating values, in demonstrating the beautiful, in formulating hypotheses, and in other things that are distinctly human. For this, a teacher is essential.

Even the library fails to distinguish between that which is significant and that which is trivial. It is a storage house for knowledge, including every shade and every degree of importance, and yet, the distinction between triviality and significance is one of great importance. It is the teacher who must lead into subjects of importance and encourage the student to make distinctions between that which is of relative unimportance and that which is of distinctly human importance. For such activity, nothing can substitute for a teacher.

This teacher must be, first of all, a person--not a computer that accumulates and then spews forth information, but one that has a love for general truths, and unites with this love a sense of what every student is there for, common understandings. He need not be a first-hand investigator, although if one can draw students into investigation, or create in them a desire to inquire through one's own inquiry, then certainly teaching has been enhanced. But, whether a firsthand investigator or not, a teacher must be one who synthesizes, relates, correlates, interprets, interrelates within and between the various realms of knowledge--he must be a scholar. He must be one who draws out a fresh, creative synthesis of knowledge. His primary commitment must be to teaching. This will not prohibit research, in fact, it will encourage research. But, it may well determine or limit such research. Such a person must find his satisfaction in the work he does, for if there is no such satisfaction, then he no longer becomes a proper person for emulation on the part of the students. The university, on its part, must reward, in whatever ways it has at its disposal, such a teacher. While a dedicated teacher may indeed teach without due reward, or at least exterior reward, for the sake of the university and the commitments it makes it must reward such people and reward them well.

Courses composed mainly of factual material, material to be memorized and held ready at one's disposal, i.e., survey courses, could be taught in various ways. Language courses and certain speech courses might well be taught through language teaching aids, such as tape recorders or disks. Material that must be demonstrated can very often be more graphically demonstrated through television. Other material

that traditionally has been given through lecture might be better printed or mimeographed and given out to the students. In none of these three would there be need for classes, that is, definite times and places when the students and a faculty member must get together. The television could be in the student's room, the printed material obtained through a bookstore, and tests taken and sent in to a central testing agency. The languages could be taped and graded at an instructor's leisure. While such learning is essential, it should be recognized that it is not person-centered education, but is that which is preparatory for such education.

Such an arrangement would leave both the students' and faculty members' time free to meet either individually or in groups in such a manner as to encourage an I-Thou relationship. It would leave the faculty free to encourage, to criticize, to lead on the students--in general to confront the students with both the joys and pains of learning. This would have to be done in fairly small groups. It might well be that much of this could be done with only a minimum guidance on the part of the faculty. It could be assumed that as students become more experienced learners, more mature in their learning process, they might become more independent and spend more and more of their time on projects of special and perhaps individual interest to them. Other formal learning situations might be developed with students only and without the presence and direct guidance of any faculty member.

The faculty in such a school would have to form some kind of a genuine unity. It has been said of Johns Hopkins in its early stages that the faculty did form such a unity, that it was indeed a universe.

Scholars like Professor Gildersleeve, or Dr. Osler, or President Gilman sat in with other members of the faculty on the various lectures. Thus, the best minds were continually stimulating one another instead of working always in departmental isolation. Certainly this would stimulate intellectual vitality, it would raise the sights of both faculty and students. It would be immoral to encourage such a procedure if the lectures dealt with trivial matters, for to waste the time of students or teachers would be a matter of utmost concern.

The curriculum would present not only the chief works of the human arts, but also the noblest of the humans. Arts, in this sense, would include more than the performing arts, but would include that work of man which is distinctively human. Thus, such a curriculum would present all of the areas of human endeavor--science, history, art, literature, religion, wherever human beings have worked with rationality, insight and skill. Someone has suggested that amazing lists could be made of the little things with which the graduate's head is stored and the important things from which it is free. A person-centered education would consciously and actively discourage such an "education." There should be provision, perhaps at the very center of the study, for contact with those persons who have so greatly influenced human life, whose ideas have had an impact upon the stream of human thought. This can hardly be done through secondary texts, but would have to be done through contact with the original writings themselves.

The curriculum should also deal with the various modes of thought and knowledge. Science, as one of the ways of thinking and investigating, must become a part of the equipment of a student, not

because all students will be scientists, but because this is a manner of human thinking. For this reason it should be considered as a liberal rather than a technical subject. It should be an inquiry into the subject for the light it casts on the nature of the physical world, and not for the sake of something else such as engineering or medicine. The purpose of science must be humane and virtuous. In a person-centered education, science cannot be thought of as "domestic science" but instead should result in an intelligent appreciation of a method of learning and a body of knowledge which are of great value for human purposes. Revelation, as another way or source of human knowledge, must also be considered. Religion cannot be divorced from the consideration of the human condition, a consideration of how we have arrived at the place we are, or the direction we should take. Certainly revelation as a means of knowledge should have its place in the curriculum. Likewise, literature as a mode of thought and knowledge would be considered. Literature would not be studied with the exclusive devotion to the history of literature, but the principle emphasis being centered on literature as art and as an interpretation of life. As Gordon Chalmers says, "Poetry is a way to think, and it is available to every man. Its chief practical usefulness to us lies in improving our ability to see the world as in itself it really is."* He goes on to say that poetry

*Chalmers, Gordon, The Republic and the Person (Henry Regnery Company: Chicago, 1952), p. 71

cannot be known merely by describing poems. They must be spoken, written,

and ruminated upon, and, to teach many people poetry requires not only a great deal of knowledge, but a vivid imagination. Anthony Standen, in demonstrating that literature is an important way of knowing and expressing human thought, points out that great novelists are great because they are good psychologists, and that if we want to understand human beings we ought to read good literature. He points out that the great psychological insights cannot be expressed as so many propositions. If Shakespeare could have described what it feels like to be a murderer or to be mad, he would have done so in clear terms, but such feelings cannot be expressed in propositions, so he wrote Macbeth and other studies in madness.* The visual arts are another form of human

*Standen, Anthony, Science is a Sacred Cow, (E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc.: New York, 1950), p. 131.

thought and expression, and a direct acquaintance with them would be one of the goals of a person-centered education. Such an acquaintanceship would not be gained only through formal classes in art theory and art appreciation or history, but would include the prominent display in all parts of the campus of worthy objects of art. The study of art in its various forms involves not only the intellect, but also the heart, and thus is especially humane.

The curriculum would deal with both general education and liberal education. General education, as its name implies, is education common to our genus or kind. It is that education needed to enable an individual to become an intelligent and cooperative member of the society and does not emphasize the distinctive features of his own personality. General education sometimes tends to be superficial since it deals with

broad areas and broad generalities in a very limited time. Such need not be the case, but often is. A prerequisite for both general and liberal education would be that the courses be not limited to any specified number of hours because of the ease of arrangement in scheduling. But, rather, it should be determined what time is necessary to teach an area and then set the course up accordingly. Courses might take two hours of time, and others might demand a much larger block of time, such as eight or ten hours. The content should determine the number of hours required and the credits given rather than that ease in scheduling of courses be the determining factor.

Liberal education aims at the distinctive features of each person's personality. True liberal education is much more difficult than general education, both to teach and to attain. It places greater emphasis upon higher mental powers. As Cowling and Davidson say,

> "The facts and values of general education can be assimilated by the mind of the student chiefly through observation, association, or memory; they can be tested objectively. But liberal education demands logical reasoning and creative imagination; these cannot be absorbed by mere contact, but must grow within the mind; imagination is too unstandardized to be tested on a Hollorith machine."*

---

*Cowling, Donald J., and Davidson, Carter, Colleges for Freedom (Harper and Brothers: New York, 1947), pp. 47-48.

The task of liberal education is to lead the student to see what the teacher himself sees and then go on through problems, questions, tasks, challenges, through discussions, through puzzlements. The teacher must mercilessly criticize, the student must define and defend himself and try conclusions. Vagueness and inaccuracy dare not be allowed. Thoroughness and clearness must be emphasized. Such is the work of liberal education.

In the world today the only ones we need fear are those who have received technical training. Technology gives tools, and powerful tools, which may be used for good or for bad, for that which edifies or that which destroys. The question of how or for what purposes to use our knowledge and skills becomes a matter of vital concern. Thus, person-centered education may not deal only with the technologies, but must deal primarily with values, the discrimination of good from bad, of joy from pleasure, of right from wrong. The goal of a person-centered education is thus closely linked to human values. Such an education should lead to a full and rich life. This would include careful and prolonged discipline in learning to discriminate between the good and the inferior in every line of experience. The result is joy, the final test and reward of achievement.

D. General principles applied to student evaluation

Evaluation, as everything else in a person-centered higher education, must have as its goal the development of the student. Thus, evaluation cannot be primarily for teachers or for discipline, but must somehow be centered in the student. Testing may point out to the teachers areas where greater emphasis need be given. This may be valuable for the teacher and, thus, for the whole class as well as the individual student. For the student, it should point out areas of weakness and strength so as to encourage him in what has been learned and to motivate him to greater efforts, not as a club, but as a device for seeing himself as he is. The test may also cause him to systematically consider the study he has already undertaken. But, it is hard to see how tests at the end of a given study, a study which will

not be continued, help the student, or the faculty. That particular part of the education is over, so what advantage is gained by knowing the relative standing of each student? The education tends to be discontinuous, and thus, the evaluation of one course has little to do with the next course. This form of evaluation may be legitimate in other forms of education, but does not seem to be legitimate in person-centered education.

Evaluation often determines both the curriculum and the methodology. We tend to evaluate that which we think can be evaluated, and since testing has such an important place in the total program of higher education today, we want to do it where it can be done easily and fairly. Lacking both time and skill to test in depth, the tendency is to short answer, objective tests. This may be done because such a procedure seems to deal more fairly with the students, and it may well be that short answer objective tests do measure very well indeed. There are two objections to this. One is that most teachers do not have the skill to compose objective tests that are fair and which do measure accurately. Such test making is much more complex and difficult than usually supposed. The second objection is that no matter what level of learning is aimed at in an objective test the impression left with the student, and very often the teacher, is that the matters dealt with are somewhat disconnected, discrete, factual material. The question is not whether this is the case or not, though far too often it is the case, but what is the impression left with the student? Teachers, being honest, teach for that which they evaluate, and if they believe they are evaluating for factual data, then they teach at this same level of learning. To do

otherwise would be immoral. Students soon learn what is expected, they study for that which is evaluated. The result is that in general a low level of learning is the expectation of both the faculty and the students.

Would it not be better to acknowledge that we do a poor job of evaluation at any level of learning, that objective tests usually deal with factual material, that they cannot measure the imagination, creativity, or other distinctly human aspects, and that if they could measure this, our skill at test making is poor enough that the average teacher could not construct such tests. Once acknowledging this, we are then left free to do a poor job at a significant level. If the goal of person-centered education is a person who commits himself to his work and thinks clearly and concisely and imaginatively or creatively, then we must test for this learning, acknowledging that our testing will not be adequate for making a rank ordering of students, but may be adequate to point out strengths and weaknesses to both the students and the teachers. It would seem better to do a poor job at a significant level of learning than a good job at an insignificant level. It is better to raise the expectations of the students and not be able to differentiate exactly between them or to place them in some kind of a rank order, than it is to lower their expectations and at the same time more exactly measure something of far less significance. This is to say that, as everything else in our person-centered system of higher education, evaluation must be personal. It must be so on two counts. Its purpose resides in the student, not in records, reports, curves, or anything else. Secondly, it must be personal in that it is a personal evaluation,

one person so raising significant questions to another that in answering, both the student and instructor have a clearer idea of who they are and where they are in their development.

Such principles put into operation might well mean the abandonment of letter grades, of discrimination between persons on the basis of achievement. Such evaluation, that is letter grade evaluation over a specific content, can only have meaning when a certain subject content is considered within a limited time, when all students are expected to move along in their intellectual development at the same rate. A person-centered education denies this conception.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY

It is the task of the community, that is the college, to so constitute itself as to evoke from both students and faculty those roles which will enrich the person. Using another figure, the college must call upon the persons to put on the masks (personae) and play parts that befit persons. A person-centered higher education must have a genuine function, namely do that which could not be done otherwise, or do that which might be done by other agencies, but do it better. That is, person-centered education must somehow bring about the development or growth of persons in a way or to a degree that would not obtain without such a community. This task is accomplished as the community consciously constitutes itself as the extension of an ideal or mature person. To the extent that the community does this, that which it does and the expectations it calls forth are all befitting a person, and that which would be unbecoming to the person would be unbecoming to the community or artificial person. Thus by an examination of what is fitting for a person we can learn a great deal about how the community should constitute itself.

The community must first of all be moral, it must make its choices upon the basis of values, the values deriving from purposes or goals. Thus it must always act in ways that will enrich the person, since this is the goal of such education. The development of the person necessitates the assumption of more and greater freedoms and responsibilities. The community, too, must act as free yet responsible. It must not be hamstrung by tradition, or conformed to other institutions, yet

it must not be different merely for the sake of being different, or for the sake of fame and fortune.

Certainly the community cannot be free and responsible if the persons constituting it are not free and responsible. Thus the community must encourage both faculty and students in freedom, while at the same time requiring of them greater responsibility. Since freedom and responsibility are dependent upon reason, the community must act according to reason, and this, of course, is dependent upon the use of reason by the persons constituting it. The community must act upon the basis of reflective thought, and demand a like action on the part of its members. It must, on the basis of reflection, determine what it should do and be, and act accordingly.

What should such a community be? It should, first of all, be a genuine community of persons, not merely a bundling or grouping of individuals. It must be constituted of persons with a unity of purpose--the development of free, responsible, rational and wise people. Thus the selection of both faculty and students is of utmost importance. It must furthermore be a community in the sense of an open communion, constituted of persons willing to commune, to give of themselves. They must be willing to enter into the human encounter, the exposing of oneself and one's ideas to others. This, of course, necessitates a spirit of freedom and a sense of security. The threat of failure or shame is hardly conducive to a real person-to-person encounter. It must be a community willing to commit itself, to make an unqualified commitment to persons as persons.

Such an education may be both inconvenient and expensive. But we do not ask of the person only that which is convenient, we ask for that which is right and good. Likewise the community cannot seek only that which is convenient, but must also seek that which is right and good.

The cost can only be considered in relationship to something else. To say that education which develops the person as a person is too costly is to say that either there are other things of more value than the development of persons, or there are more efficient ways of doing it. If there are other ways more efficient, then there is no place for person-centered education. But if such an education is too costly for other reasons, it can only be assumed that there are other things of more value than the person. To admit that there is something of equivalent or greater value than the person is to deny the dignity and worth of the person, and ultimately destroy the concept of a person.

Upon this basis, the financing of person-centered education would have a high priority for both the community and the persons. All forms of formal education are expensive, that is they are expensive in terms of some other things. But we hardly complain about the price to the society for luxuries or temporary and transitory pleasures. In comparison with these, education is not expensive. One can hardly compare the worth of a person with ease in travel or exterior beauty and not accept the fact that education deserves priority. Thus person-centered education cannot be termed expensive.

It may be unfair to consider person-centered education as expensive even in terms of other forms of education. It is true that

administrative units might have to be reduced in size and thus increased in number so that persons could be treated as persons. But this might be compensated for by dispersing administrative duties, by giving faculty members and advisors more responsibility and by expecting more responsibility on the part of the students. Small classes would also be required so that faculty and students might enter into genuine human dialogue. But this could be compensated for by not requiring teachers to deal with those areas wherein the students can learn without supervision. In such a system teachers would be needed only in the truly human arts and not those human activities which can be duplicated by machines.

The complaint that a person-centered education is risky or precarious must, indeed, be considered. It has already been conceded that such is the case. The possibility of failure is very great. The very number of persons acting both as legislators and subjects involves risk. There are so many that certainly some will fail, and it is entirely possible that the whole venture may fail. But this is only the risk of human life. It certainly is no greater than faces all mankind today. Is it not better to fail in that which affirms the dignity of the person and is in general uplifting and worthy, than to either succeed or fail in that which ultimately dehumanizes and denies the dignity of the person?

A person-centered education corresponds with a democratic system. Democracy demands of persons that they act as persons, i.e., they act morally, responsibly, on the basis of reason. It accords to them great freedom, yet freedom proportional to the degree of responsibility one can and will assume and it demands an attitude of "I am my brother's keeper," that is a true community. This is only what has been said of

a person-centered education. Since both a democratic society and a person-centered educational community are extensions of the person, it is not to be wondered at that they so readily harmonize.

It is entirely possible that all education need not be built upon the principles developed within this dissertation. Traditionally the military services have not dealt with people on these terms since the function of the military is not the development of the person but is the protection of the society. Perhaps professional or vocational education can parallel the military and not deal with persons as persons. If this be the case, then it would be difficult to maintain both types of education under the same administration or in the same location.

There still remains a very major question. Can any educational institution afford to treat persons in any way other than as persons?

When persons are not treated as persons are they not dehumanized and lowered to the level of other members of the animal kingdom? Is not such action necessarily destructive to the ones so treating others, that is, to the school? Finally, how can a society, the larger community, be strengthened and at the same time the person debased? Thus it might be well to question whether any educational or training institution can legitimately act on principles other than those developed out of the meaning of person. The function of the society or community is the development of persons and thus every agency of it and within it must also contribute to this general goal.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Allport, Gordon, Personality, A Psychological Interpretation. Henry Holt and Co: New York, 1937.

Aristotle, Aristotle's Psychology. Translated by William A. Hammond. Swan Sonnenschein and Co., Ltd.: London, 1902.

Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by J. E. C. Welldon. Macmillan and Co.: London, 1892.

Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle. Translated by Ernest Barker. Oxford: London, 1952.

Augustine, St., The City of God. Translated by Marcus Dods. The Modern Library: New York, 1950.

Beerbohm, Max, The Happy Hypocrite. Dodd Mead and Co.: New York, 1931.

Blanshard, Brand, The Nature of Thought. The Macmillan Co.: New York, 1940. Vol. I.

Buber, Martin, Between Man and Man. Translated by Ronald Smith. Kegan Paul: London, 1947.

Buber, Martin, I and Thou. Translated by Ronald Smith. Charles Scribner's Sons: New York, 1958.

Calvin, John, Institutes of the Christian Religion. Translated by John Allen. Presbyterian Board of Christian Education: Philadelphia, n.d.

Casserley, J. V. Langmead, Morals and Man in the Social Sciences. Longmans, Green and Company: London, 1951.

Cassirer, Ernst; Kristeller, Paul; and Randall, John H., Jr. (ed.). The Renaissance Philosophy of Man. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1948.

Chalmers, Gordon, The Republic and the Person: A Discussion of Necessities in Modern American Education. Henry Regnery Co.: Chicago, 1952.

Cowling, Donald J. and Davidson, Carter, Colleges for Freedom. Harper and Brothers: New York, 1947.

Dewey, John, Democracy and Education. The Macmillan Co.: New York, 1916.

Dewey, John, Ethics. Henry Holt and Co.: New York, 1926.

Dewey, John, Human Nature and Conduct. The Modern Library: New York, 1950.

Dewey, John, Reconstruction in Philosophy. The Beacon Press: Boston, 1948.

Eby, Kermit, Protests of an Ex-Organization Man. The Beacon Press: Boston, 1961.

Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Macmillan Co.: New York, 1937.

Feuer, Lewis, Psychoanalysis and Ethics. Charles C. Thomas: Springfield, Ill., 1955.

Fromm, Erich, Man for Himself. Rinehart and Company: New York, 1947.

Gilby, Thomas, Between Community and Society: A Philosophy and Theology of the State. Longmans, Green and Co.: New York, 1953.

Gould, Samuel B., Knowledge is not Enough. Antioch Press: Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1959.

Grierson, Herbert John C., The University and a Liberal Education. Oliver Boyd: London, n.d.

Hocking, William Ernest, Human Nature and its Remaking. Yale University Press: New Haven, 1929.

Holland, Thomas Erskine, The Elements of Jurisprudence. The Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1890.

Huxley, Aldous, Brave New World. Bantam Books: New York, 1958.

Jaeger, Werner, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, Vol. I. Translated by Gilbert Highet. Oxford University Press: New York, 1945.

Jaspers, Karl, The Idea of the University. Ed. Karl Deutsch. Translated by H.A.T. Reiche and H. F. Vanderschmidt. Beacon Press: Boston, 1959.

Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by Thomas Abbott. Longmans, Green and Company: London, 1889.

Keary, Charles Francis, The Pursuit of Reason. University Press: Cambridge, 1910.

Kinsey, Alfred C.; Pomeroy, Wardell B.; and Martin, Clyde E., Sexual Behavior in the Human Male. W. B. Saunders Co.: Philadelphia, 1948.

Kluckhohn, Clyde and Murray, Henry, Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture. Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 1949.

Kwant, Remy C., Duquesne Studies, Philosophical Series No. 11, Encounter. Translated by Robert Adolfs. Duquesne University Press: Pittsburgh, 1960.

Leonard, Henry S., An Introduction to Principles of Right Reason. Henry Holt and Company: New York, 1957.

Lewis, William M., From a College Platform. Lincoln MacVeagh, Dial Press, Inc.: New York, 1932.

Locke, John, The Educational Writings of John Locke. Ed. by John William Adamson. University Press: Cambridge, 1922.

Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. James Kay, Jr., and Co.: Philadelphia, n.d.

Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government. Hafner Publishing Co.: New York, 1947.

Mannheim, Karl, Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology. Oxford University Press: New York, 1953.

Mannheim, Karl, Systematic Sociology. Philosophical Library: New York, 1958.

Maritain, Jacques, The Person and the Common Good. Charles Scribner's Sons: New York, 1947.

Mumford, Lewis, The Conduct of Life. Harcourt, Brace and Co.: New York, 1951.

Neilson, William A. and Wittke, Carl F., The Function of Higher Education. Northwestern University: Evanston, 1943.

Ortega y Gasset, Jose, Mission of the University. Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J., 1944.

Parsons, Talcott, Essays in Sociological Theory--Revised Edition. The Free Press: Glencoe, 1954.

Parsons, Talcott, The Structure of Social Action. The Free Press: Glencoe, 1949.

Redfield, Robert, The Primitive World and its Transformations. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, N.Y., 1953.

Riesman, David; Glazer, Nathan; and Reuel, Denny, The Lonely Crowd, A Study of the Changing American Character. Abridged. Doubleday and Co., Inc: Garden City, N.Y., 1953.

Skinner, B. F., Science and Human Behavior. The Macmillan Co.: New York, 1953.

Standen, Anthony, Science is a Sacred Cow. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc.: New York, 1950.

Strong, Augustus Hopkins, Systematic Theology. The Judson Press: Philadelphia, 1946.

Thorndike, Robert L. and Hagen, Elizabeth, Measurement and Evaluation in Psychology and Education. John Wiley and Sons, Inc.: New York, 1956.

Tillich, Paul, Love, Power, and Justice. Oxford University Press: New York, 1960.

Tillich, Paul, Systematic Theology, Vol. II. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1957.

Tournier, Paul, The Meaning of Persons. Harper and Brothers: New York, 1957.

Trow, Martain, "The Campus Viewed as a Culture," Research on College Students. The Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education: Boulder, Colorado, 1960.

Trueblood, Elton, The Idea of a College. Harper and Brothers: New York, 1959.

Tussman, Joseph, Obligation and the Body Politic. Oxford University Press: New York, 1960.

Ulich, Robert, The Human Career. Harper and Bros.: New York, 1955.

VanDoren, Mark, Liberal Education. Beacon Press: Boston, 1959.

Wheelwright, Philip, A Critical Introduction to Ethics. The Odyssey Press, Inc.: New York, 1959.

Whyte, William H., The Organization Man. Simon and Schuster: New York, 1956.

Wild, John, The Challenge of Existentialism. Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1955.

PERIODICALS

Goodman, Paul, "The Community of Scholars," Commentary XXXIII, 3 (March, 1962).

Solotaroff, Theodore, "The Graduate Student: A Profile," Commentary XXXII, 6 (December, 1961).