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ABSTRACT

6mm DAWSON, m TIMES AND THE
FORMATION OF THE BRITISH
APPEASEMENI‘ POLICY TO 1936

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by Peter A5 ~McKinnon

The contention of this dissertation is that Geoffrey Dawson,
as editor of 1h: limes of London, influenced the formulation of
British foreign policy to a degree far greater than his qualifica-
tions merited during the 1930's. More particularly, it is shown
that from January, 1935, to July, 1936, the crucial months during
which Hitler Openly violated the treaties of Versailles and Locarno,
mwson used his position to promote a policy of appeasement. With-
out close rival, IE flags of Iondon in the 1930's was the most
paves-ml and influential news medium in Britain-~perhaps in all of
Europenand both at home and abroad it was recognized as the semi-
official voice of the British Government. During this time the
paper lay under the autocratic control of Geoffrey Dawson.

Dawson was singularly unqualified, both temperamentally and
intellectually, for the task of guiding British public opinion on
foreign affairs in a crisis era. Unread in European history,
unfamiliar with European political problems, and limited to the use
of his native language, he lacked the knowledge and wisdom neces-
sary to distinguish truth from fiction. He had achieved his role

Pet er A. McKinnon

as editor of m m, and all previous positions, not on the basis
of talent, but through the mediation of friends. Despite his limi-
tations, particularly in the field of international politics, he
monopolised the right to speak for 1113 Meg in foreign affairs.

(In the crucial German issue, Dawson failed to see Hitler as
arvthing but a potential friend, and he presented this opinion not
only to 12.! 11-221. readers but also to his may close friends and
associates in the British Cabinet. Thus, the British Prime Minister,
Stanlq Baldwin, a man with little or no capacity for the complexi-
ties of foreign affairs in a troubled Europe, depended heavily upon
mwson for advice. The editor responded with council by intuition,
offering opinions which could not be supported by evidence. Personal
values and prejudices easily colored his political judgments. In
particular, his highly developed sense of ethics led him to believe
that in her attitudes toward Germarw, Great Britain had to seek
expiation for her guilt in helping to impose the Treaty of Versailles.
These beliefs were reinforced by his friends in the Cliveden set,
even as their preconceptions were reaffirmed by reading IL? Meg.

In this way, a self-sustaining cycle of pro-German sentiments devel-
oped anong these influential Englishmen.

Although pro-Genan, mwson was not a Fhscist; at the same
time, he paid scant attention to Fascist ideology, believing that
it was peripheral to the main prohlms of international relations.

This attitude made it easier for Dawson and his associates to embrace
and promote appeasaent. By July, 1936, the fundamental features of

Peter A. McKinnon

appeasement had emerged, and Dawson had contributed significantly
to the formulation of that policy.

GEOFFREY DAWSON, m IIME§ AND THE
FORMATION OF THE BRITISH
APPEASEMENT POLICY TO 1936

By

\‘
\. 0
‘.

Pet er A2“ Mc Kimon

A.

A THESIS

Submitted to
Nfichigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1966

PREFACE

me of the most difficult historical probleas of European inter-
national relations in the 1930's concerns the emergence of the British
policy of appeaseuent. A key figure in the formulation of that policy
was Geoffrq Inwson, editor of 1'2! Lian of London. Although numerous
historians have called attention to the role of Geoffrey mwson, they
have only offered brief comments about his overall influence. Charles
W. Bowat, in m m LL! mg, 1218-MQ, hints at the role of
Dawson and suggests that it should be thoroughly investigated. In m
M: Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott also refer to Dawson's role,
but thq do not explore the significance of m m. Finally,
Hargaret George, in m m m, suggests the important part
played by hwson and kg 21-51!- However, no complete study of the
relationship of IQ; m and its editor to British foreign policy dur-
ing the 1930's appeared. This stuck is intmded to fill this gap, at
least partly, for it closes with the year 1936.

During the 1930's m 14!!! was under the overwhelming influence
of Geoffrq Dawson, who, as editor-in-chief, appointed himself foreign
affairs editor as well. His influence went bqond the published word
of m m; it went right into the British cabinet, which was com-
posed entirely of 1;.” readers and partially of Dawson's frimds. An
understanding of how the appeasuent policy was formed requires a

ii

iii

close examination of this man.

he purpose of this study is twofold. It is to investigate the
significance of m m, and the influences which worked upon Dawson
as man and editor. Furthermore, it will focus on the impact of Dawson
on m m, and m in!!! influence on the government and the
British public. More particularly, it concmtrates on the critical
months between January, 1935, and July, 1936. Ihese eighteen months
were crucial to the success of Hitler's program, because during this
time he developed the correct assumption that he would not be thwarted
by Britain, the most important Western power. Geofer Dawson con-
tributed significantly to the British policy that offered Hitler the
evidence for his asmption.

ACKNOMEIEMENTS

This dissertation, like most others, has benefitted from a
multitude of kindnesses. I would particularly like to express my
appreciation to the following people.

To Dre. Maurice Crane and John Reinoehl of the Department of
Humanities at Michigan State University, whose help and understanding
were ever-present.

To Dr. Vernon L. Lidtke, who directed and guided my work.

To the nubers of the Department of History at Michigan State
University with whom I have had contact during my academic career.

And finally, to my wife, who was a tower of strength. This
dedication should read: To Katherine, James, and mvid.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
MAE . O C C O O O O O O O O O O O C O O O O O O O O O O 0 ii

ACKmWWSeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee iv

Chapter

I. THE EHERGENCE or m m as BRITAIN'S PRESTIGE
WAFER» O O O O O O O O O O C C C O C C O O O O O 1

Be A SKEICH OFAN EDITOR-“GEDFFREI MWSON e e e e e e e e 21

III. PERSONAL DIPLOMACI--THE MAKING 01" m m FOREIGN
POLICIeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 42

IV. THE NATIONAL GOVERNIENI‘AND STANLEY BALDWIN. . . . . . 72

v. THE PRO-GERMANISH 01" m m AND DAWSON, JANUARY
To APRIL, 1935 O I I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O C O 91

VI. DAWSON'S PRO-GERMANISM, PART TWO, MAI TO JUNE, 1935. . 131
. DAWSONTHENON-FASCIST................ 153

VII
VIII. DAWSONANDTHERHINEIANDCRISIS............ 209
II. THE MERGE OFANAPPMSER O O O O O O O O O O O O O 2j4‘7

x. CONQIUSION O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 267
mmRAPHIe O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 272

CHAPTER I
THE mules or m m As BRITAIN'S PRESTIGE NmsPAPm

hiring the 1930's 111.! 11.5” of London had an authority which
was almost scriptural.1 than John Walter founded the paper in 1785
he could not foresee that his newspaper would become "paramount
among all the newspapers in the world" in the twentieth century.2

he now-Paper. originally called the 21.11 mime; mm. was
rammed E! m by Walter when it was only three years old.3 The

nail! m mm in not the first British daily nuspapor:

m m m was founiod in 1702.4 m m, however, n. to

become far more influential.

Until early in the nineteenth century newspapers had established
no traditions of political independence. They were the natural tools
of ministers, or of state-e1 who opposed the government of the day.
new people believed that a newspaper could be a useful ally, and,
therefore, Journalists were regarded as In that could be hired,

 

laonald Blythe, W (Boston: Houghton Hifflin
00., 19“), Fe 200.

    

I958, p. 1. 7

3John C. Merrill, Garter R. Bryan, and Marion Alialq, 11;;
W (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1961+),
p. 3e

“ml-11“., M, Fe 16.

(New York: The Macmillan 06.,

'\

.‘

2

managed, and mmtaP This was the newspaper world into which
John Halter introduced his unique press. Ironically, 133 may,
m m began with the principal idea of drawing attention
to Halter's new printing method, called the Logographic press':I which
he set up in Printing House Court in London and until 1790 booksell-
ing and publishing were more important to Walter than his newspaper.6

filter duanded qualities in m 1;!" that were differmt from
those of other newspapers. He wanted impartial reporting of all
events of public interest, ani he wanted the editor of the paper to
form his own opinion about each event and not bind the paper to the
views of one political party. Walter also felt a newspaper should
provide nothing for all tastes] Walter did not succeed in carry-
ing out his ambitious plans for IN! My he gradually allowed his
paper to be influenced by statesmen and ministers Just as all of the
other papers had hem.

John Walter II, who had worked for the paper since 1803, assumed
control of m m after his father died in 1812. Walter II wanted
the paper to have the qualities his father believed a paper should
have. Because he was bored with the technical aspects of the pub-
lishing business, Halter II devoted all of his time to the editorial

 

I'lngographic press means the use of the word as a type unit
instead of the letters.

5 1 8 (Tendon: The Times Publishing
(in-Perv. Ltdu 1935 . Po 12.

Gin-11h- D. Damn. W (New York: The
Dial Press, 1931): Po 37-

7nm ven Stuterheim, mm, Trans. w. A.
Johnaton (London: George Allan and Unwin Ltd., 1934), p. #8.

policy of the newspaper. Statesman and others found he could not be
managed or controlled. than he died in 18117, the prestige of m
m was so great it was known as «as. loading Journal of Dnepe.”8
filter II took over m m”, when the Napoleonic War was the
most important news of the day. At this time newspapers in mgland
depended on the hn-opean Journals for their news; the Journals arrived
in hgland where post effice clerks su-arised the news and sent their
edited versions to the newspapers. The owners of the newspapers paid
the governmmat a fee each year for this service. Walter II eschewed
this secend-hsnd method with its attmldant evils of censorship, stale-
ness, and partisanship. He believed that those papers who supported
the govermmt received their news su-aries before these papers who
did net, but, nevertheless, he stalwartly published his anti-government
opium in m m. Walter, by late 1812, decided to obtain his
ewnartieleetereportwhatwas really happeninginthewarandhe
established a note .uggling system from the Oontinmt, comprised of
a .all fleet of sailing vessels running betwem: Dover and the block-
aded Gontinut. John Walter, In sending rqaorters to countries to
report informtion first-hand, established the "germ of the modern
eoncqvtion of foreign eorrespondmce. '9
better than the govermmt's that Lord Castlereagh, the Foreign

His system worked be much

Secretary, sought out Walter when he needed news of the French defeat
at Dresden.

8W. P- 13.
9M. s P0 15-

The owner of m m believed that the paper's responsibility
was to act in the public interest evml if it hurt as m itself.
than, in the early 18110“ railroad speculation was rampant in EurOpe,
filter urned the public about the dangers of speculative invest-
mmlts and lost thousands of pounds in advertising revenue from the
railroads. Lloyds of London expressed the affection and gratitude
of the nation when thq presented Walter with a plaque honoring the
sense of the public responsibility shown in m 1133. men Walter
died In, an. had earned the title of ”the leviathan of the press."10

John Walter II alone did not develop the tradition of IQ: m;
capable people assisted him, most notably Thomas Barnes, the editor
from 1819 to 1841. A man of indepmdmt mind, acaduic rigor, and
literary talut, Brnes surprised his frimds by accepting the
appointment as editor of m m. lmey felt the appointment would
impair his chances for literary fame because “Journalism remained a
vual occupatien and that Journalists lmv opal to t-pting offers
fru hush Governmmtal as well as Englidl sources."n

hrnes sacrificed personal fame for the anommity of the editor' s
chair. He did not go out socially and avoided the public while keep-
ing in tend: with these people of political influmlce.12 The editor
insisted upon this right at anewmity; Barnes “made m m the
most ebstimtely snowmeus newspaper in the world. '13

 

”Shut-town. W. p. 507.
11W. p. 20.
12W. mm.“ 1» 122.

13W. v.1. I:
1% (NW 101*, Th. haw-11.3 00., 1935), p. 205e

This unsung editor fashioned the newspaper that "both in its
hens and foreign news, its Parliumtsry, Legal, Gonercial,
[sections] and the authority the weight of its caught, excelled .11
other Journals.” He believed the lission of a journalist ”was to
display the facts of a situation by early and accurate news, and to
point without fear or favor the most practical way of dealing with
thu. This scent that no party considerations and: interfere with
the public welfare. The party which in the hour of crisis was wise
and strmg was the party for his, and consequmtly for m ”9'15
The function of the press to Barnes was ”to obtain the earliest and
nest correct intelligmce of the events of the tins and instantly,
by dieclosixg thu, to asks th- the common property of the nation. "16

m Mus regarded by Barnes as an integral unit; it was
organised to have internal. consistency and to speak its own mind.

He sought the broadest possible audience, and it included all classes
of people to could read. an. editorial policy of 13.! flag; called
for action, ”m m spoke out, called out, shouted out, thundered
out with the intuition of sti-alsting public opinion towards public
action. '17

he tradition and rqautstien of m flag was establidted during
the years of Walter II's ownerdxip and Barnes' editorship. The
paper developed "the best of all tradition since honor and honesty

 

15W, v.1. :1. W
M N“ Iark: n. new 00., 1939 ’ pa IX. '

17W. I. 397.

6

are intertingled with it, the tradition of political independence. '18
Rmes elevated m m “from its collateral peers to a place of
lonely uinuce,“ where m m” judged good and evil "from its
high W49

Although John filter II and Thomas Barnes "made Lb; 11.12;: the
world's greatest and lost influutial newspaper," John Delane raised
it ”to still higher ma» of authority and power. ”2° After the
death of Barnes in 18%, John Delane became the editor of 11! 13;”.
Unlike hrnes he had wide social gifts, and he often dined at the
hyfair Clubs. People welcomed and recognised hin wherever he went.
‘nte ladies infer-ed hi- of happmixgs in court and society, and
state-m consulted his regularly. However, he resubled Barnes very
closely in that he Judged political parties by each issue and measure
thq stood for. Consequmtly, he was charged with being inconsistent,
as Barnes had also been charged. He was, of course, no more incon-
sistent than Barnes, and he was considerably more intuitive. He
possessed an uncanw talmt for deducing news from nothing sore than
the slightest hint.21

These qualities as well as other qualities bolstered Delane's
self-confidence. He respected the confidences of statesnm and
stated their views with noderstion and cannon ease; he never dis-

closed sw source of informtion obtained by m m. Delsne nade

 

18W. p- 12-
193mm“... W. p. 53.
”m.m m." p- 265.
21W. p. 35.

it clear to state-a1 that he could not be caJoled or influmced into
acting against his better Judgnut. He not great people of the land
as an equal, and increased the social status of mm. People
who had always believed a Journalist sold his pen to the highest bid-
der realised that s new era had begun with Delane. In the 1850's,
under Delano, the circulation of m m was three tines as large
as the circulation of all of the other daily papers in london put
together. In 1851 Lord John Russell stated m m was so powerful
“that once m m had passed the smtenoo of death on an adminis-
tration execution would speedily follow. ”22
‘mo Crineanarbrought asnarvvictories to Delano andmm
as it did to the allies. m m published the British-finch
ultinatun to Russia before the Tsar received it officially; in fact
the fear read it in m m before he received it through official
channels. Delano did not trust Napoleon III and sent non throughout
hence to check on the Mob nilitszy situation. he editor knew
Britain was not prepared and pleaded editorially for nere am. He
believedwarweuldceneandhewantedtonke suretho British public
got all. the facts as he eat an all over hropo to gather infornstion.
The Crineanflsr showed friend sndfoe alike "thatmmucould
asks gmerals, linstore, and governments. '23 'lho suffering and
nisery of the troops were shown to the people at hens, and the
responsibility was placed in the proper quarter-“that is, the govern-
nent. m m corresponth in the Orlaoan War, Willian Howard

 

22m.
2W. II. 166.

Russell, salt intention to Delano, telling of the horrid conditions
in the Crines. Delano always supported Russell and publidted his
correspendmt's articles, hoping to swakm the nation and its rulers
to the truth. For exanplo, this was how Florence Nightingale dis-
covered how such work had to be done at Scum?”

The power and influmco of m m extended throughout the
world. Presith Lincoln welconed Russell as 111.! my, war corre-
spondmt durim the Civil War and told Russell that m m "is one
of the greatest powers in the world, in fact I don't know anything
which has nuch nore power-except perhaps the Mississippi. '25
Lincoln, however, regretted that the sympathies of m m lay with
the Confederate cause.

In 1871, m m was regarded as the nonarch of the press and
Delane “was said to possess an .pire which is cc-extmsivo with the
area of civilisation. '26 Delano brought the editorial to maturity.
Although hrnes had pioneered the use of the editorial, Delane breathed
uniforlity into it; he has boo called the ”greatest editor not only
of m m but in the whole of Mglish Journalin. '27 Ministers,
albassaders, and people of inpertance sought his frimdship, for thq
knew m m was studied throughout the world "as though it were
the authentic voice of Downing Street.”28

 

“W. p- 36-
25911111.". m. p. 92.
26W. p. 35.
278tuttorheis, w, p. 65.
28M" p. 66.

While Delane's retirumt in 1877 dininished the editorial
voice, it did not weakm the prestige of 1133 flag; itself. Delane's
replacuent, Ther mornq, a m correspondent for twenty years,
did not have Delano's social gifts, genius for friendship, tact,
intuition, or personality; nor did he have Delano's curiosity.29
The control of m m reverted to its owner John Walter III.
Under mornq m m tended to support the Conservative Party and
to be nore interested in domestic affairs than international affairs.
Walter III 80.06. to guide this change of mm supporting a
political party. The political iniependenco established under the
strong editors, Barnes an! Delane, underwent a softming with the
lore passive Gurney. This change may have been a personal utter

rather than one of principle, for the official m 91 1'32 m

calcite that the editor renained independent and true to the paper's
traditions.”
After (homer resigned in 1894, George Buckle became the editor
until 1912. Bicklo believed the editor of The up; should consent
on aw affair, institution, or interest, and his wariness of becoming
involved in a conflict of interest caused hia to romeo to sit on
boards or condttees which he night have to criticize in print.31
m 2335, under Bickle, had the same independence as it had under

Barnes. The duty of m m renined that of obtaining ”authentic

 

29m. ”We.” p. 281.
30W: It. 521.

31mm, v.1. m: W
W (New Iork: The Macmillan 00., 191+? , p. 2.

10

intonation of political, social, and economic affairs and to consent
upon th- without regard to private ambitions or interests. "32
Politically, mckle leaned toward the Conservative Party; the editor
believed this leaning to be consistent with the proprietor's views as
well as with those of the reader with when m Lines and its proprie-
tors had idmtified th-selves.33

John Walter III died in 1891}, and his son Arthur Walter became
the nu owner. hiring the last decade of the nineteenth century, Th;
“3 found itself in economic trouble. The penrw newspaper had
bosons popular in the 1880's; m m sold for three tines as such,
and, as a result, the circulation of E! 11221 decreased. In the
late 1890's, sixty thousand copies of m m were sold daily while
the m “1 sold eight hundred thousand copies; therefore, the
profits of m m were very low.» Althoug1 m m had the
best staff, only those persons who were educated were attracted to
the paper. Buckle believed E! £2.01 was an institution that diould
be revered. Barnes had sea: m 1133.! in a sore prosaic light-~to
his m m was a newspaper and not an institution; it was a politi-
cal instrunent to express his ideas and views but the paper also had
tobepopularmoughtonakeaprofit. Hedidnotcarewhatpeoplo
saidaboutflgflmas long as they bought ani readit. In Barnos'
day reading m m had bwene a British habit, and, w the 1890's,

32m” p. 13.
33M" P0 16-
"m., p. m.

 

11

the habit had developed into a tradition. The "audimce for which
the paper was produced had gradually defined itself and had begun
ova in Delane's tins to exercise an influmcs upon the conductors
of the paper it chose to road. '35

“ms probl- of elite circulation and mall dividends caused a
great deal of concern sneng the shardoldors. The proprietors of
m m had givm shares of the paper away for years as occasional
gifts to frinds and relatives. In the 1890's one of the one hundred
shareholders, because he disagreed with m m policy, sought to
discover precisely who directed or ran the newspaper. The result was
a court case in which the court granted the dissolution of the part-
nership and ordered the property sold.36 Lord Northcliffe, who owned
a chain of newspapers which includedmmm: MRI-JIM:
andmmm, boughtmmin March, 1908. The
purchase of m m ended one hundred and twenty-three years of
autocratic control ty the Walter family.

Lord Northcliffe reigned over m Ell! fron 1908 to 1922. His
ownership has boa called the lurid period in the history of m My,”
One scholar refers to Northcliffo's control as m mgr ”Babylonian
Captivity."38 no official History of m m states that Northcliffo
never understood the established tradition of m m, which was

”me. . p. 15.

36W. p- 38.

37 John D. Scott, W (New York: Willis: Morrow and
cos, 19%)! Po 2330

BBSMter-hdl, We P- 95-

 

It)

l1-

1’.

12

Northcliffo's heavy hand was apparmt

Mty and indqendonoe.
He did not want to be

3.11 defiance of longstanding m tradition.
new as the heir of a tradition, but rather as the nan who saved

2;: Ease-39
Nerthcliffo succudod in solving the financial problems of 1h;

m, which was bankrupt whm he took over. Northcliffe revolu-

tionised the paper; be shortened articles and undo then lighter and
osssior to road. He smumarised the speeches of politicians, demanded
brevity and clarity from his writers, and established The Times
Pta'blishing Company. m m owes to Northcliffe "its being as a
national daily newspaper and register, the epitome of the world
dosignod for the infomtion of the whole range of executive, -pro-
fessional an'l political non and wonm who, by their calling, intelli-
gases and education, rank as the most influential constituency in

Grogt Britain. m m would have floundered without him.

1Vozltv'lchcliffe alone had the genius. It was be, his work, his invmtions,

C111 his changes that alone re-established the property.”

Although Northcliffe revived m m economically in the
Mtieth century, he never solved the problu of the relationship
bctveen hinsslf and the historic institution that was 13; mg. He

did not understand the tradition that had been established in the
P‘per; the chief proprietor tried "to impress his strong personality
“Id political prodilections upon a paper equally strong and

¥

39W. In. 581.
“W. m. 586.

"It

Is:

‘1'

13

politically mature."u1 Welding: that Northcliffe

aver succeeded in asking m m; his personal organ; he could not
gold it to his likeness. m “3' traditions of anonymity and
mopmdmce gave strength to those enployees whom Northcliffe
thought he could delinate, so that Northeliffe, while seeking hamory
found only disagreuent, the staff mulbers rejected his control
bocause they wanted no Times to raisin impersonal.“2 This constant
conflict characterised what is generally called the lurid period of
m 1332' history.

In the fmrtem years of Northcliffe's ownership there were
three editors of E: m: George Buckle (1884-1912), Geoffrey
Dawson (1912-1919), and Henry W. Steed (1919-1922). Whm Northcliffe
died in August, 1922, a struggle for the ownership of m 112.91
developed betwem Lord nether-ere, the brother of Lord Northcliffe,

and John Walter IV. John Walter IV won, and the Walter family
regained control of the paper, thus «ding the “Babylonian captivity”
of m m-

There were really two new owners of m Tings, John Walter IV

and a secret backer, )hJor John J. Astor. Astor becane the chair-an

of 'me Tiles Publishing Conpary, and the chief proprietor in October,
1922. He had underwrittm ninety per cent of the cost, and Walter

provided the renaining ten per out as well as the family name.“3

”W. 1»- 1+2.

”W. m. 582.

1.3““ 8. Wr-noh. We: (Iondom
hmnn, 1955), P. 205.

1h

Astor did not want to becono like Northcliffe; instead, he wanted to
remove "m m free the Northcliffian ashiuice. ““4 Walter and
Astor, therefore, established a pernanmt body of trustees so that

pcrsonsl interests in the paper should be forever subordinate to the

”intunce of its high traditions. As 1h; my permanent Board

of Trustees, they created a tradition which resins today. They
chose the rdgning Lord one: Justice, the Prosidmt of the Royal
Society, the Wanda of All Souls, Oxford, the Governor of the Bank

of hgland, and the President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants.
These all were ”as fornidable an sssubly of representative poten-
tntes as could well be found. '1‘5 Their Job, naturally, was to
approve or disapprove the sale of D... m to anyone.

According to
the novly drawn up charter, these an could not be stockholders in

The Tiles Publishing Csnpaxw.

Astor and Walter IV novod quickly; they ruevod Henry Wickhan
Steed from the editor's chair. no official W
Iaintains that the reason for this action was that Steed had left
his personal imprint on the paper, although the seas srguaent could
be used against sly capable editor.“6
Gsoffrq Dawson.

They replaced Steed with
Dawson in January, 1923, started his second tern

as editor of m m, and he held this position until 19151. hiring

the period of Dawson's editorship, m m mJoyod the period of

“W. v.1. Iv. Put :1. W
7 - (New York: Maclflllan o... 1955).
P0 0

“Ssoott. W. p. 23h.
“6W. IV. Part 11. 769.

15

its greatest glory.

m the 1930's m m of London had rise: ”to a position never
batters or since equaled by any other newspaper. "“7 This was amazing
bocause 1.5;! m was printed only in London and had no provincial
editions, as did nest other papers in England. The attention that
2.13;! m paid to Lonbn reflected the attitude that not only was
Radon the capital of the British Government, the home of the court,
the enter of finance and conorco, and "the great magnet for the
ambitious and successiul, the natural meeting place of all 'society,'”
boat also that other cities were insignificant by comparison.“8 Such
a. limiting of horisons can, of course, be a weakness as well as a

Strength.

m m is known as a "prestige" or "quality" paper, as dis-
tinguished from ”popular“ papers, which are for mass readership, and it
is an international as well as a national paper. The flu; is con-
eidered one of the three foreaost newspapers in the world.” Ithiel
doSola Pool, in his study of Mg: m, contends that in each
major power there is one single newspaper that stands out "as an
organ of elite opinion. '3) This newspaper is always very intimate
with, or close to, the government and it is read abroad as well as at

home by those whose business it is to keep track of world affairs.

“7m“89 m, P0 72e
“Scott. W. p- 3.
”non-111. W. p. 31.

5°Ithiel deSola Pool, W (Hoover Institute
Studies: Series C Symbols No. 2; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 1952), p. 1.

'-

D'-

16

U anally the prestige paper has a small circulation since it is aimed
‘1: the business comunity and the intelligentsia. It is read pri-
marily by public officials, scholars, business leaders, and profes-

ad—onal people. Although its circulation is small, its influence is

momma. In discussing prestige papers the Royal Commission stated

tahat "the relatively high purchasing power of their readers make
th- [prestige papers] a valuable advertising medium for the most
expansive goods and enables then to command a high advertisement

tar-venue. '5"

In nary respects prestige papers are the best index of elite
behavior. The prestige paper is produced by men who are "part of
the elite and share the typical life pattern of the elite” and write
for an elite audiuice.52 John D. Scott claims the appeal of the
prestige paper is that of an historical survival, going back to the
ninetemth cmtury, ubracing the idea "of those small circulation,
highly responsible political newspapers, whose interminable leaders

[editorials] were studied by ministers, diplomats, bishops, high
officials and a country gertry and merchant class who took a seni-
professional interest in politics. '53 It is a Journal for the reader
who "is alroaw well informed and wants new information and interpre-
tation to fell the gaps. '5“ It speaks with authority on all topics

51Great Britain, on on e -1

Raga, CED. 7700 (London: His MaJosty's Stationery Office, 1949 ,
p. 7.

gel-Sole Pool. We. p. 7.

”Scott. W. p. 232.

final-rill. W. 1»- 1+6.

17

or subjects through its staff.

The editor of the quality paper usually cones from the same

circle of the elite as his readers. Because of the power of a pres-

tige paper, the editor, by his selecting what is and what is not
:L-portant, is in an extraordinarily influential position. The edi-
torials are read with great care by governmmt personnel ani private
concerns throughout the world. 55
m m of London during the years treated in this investiga-
tden was the quality paper in Great Britain. The circulation of 3&9.
m alounted to approximately two per cent of the British press,
or about 191,271 daily issuesrfi6 £1; Ii_m_e§ had the reputation of
bdng a sci-governnmt organ.57 It was considered to be "definitely
the Journal of Britain's governing class. ”58
Perhaps a fair question would be how did 13.! m conceive of
itself durixg the years under investigation? In its one hundred and
fiftieth anniversary edition in January, 1935, m M21 stated,
”it's never hen the purpose of 1h; 1:91;; to capture a particular

kind of reader. '59 The readers of 113,; 11!”. are to be found ”wherever
the east chronicling of emts and authoritative cement upon them

are dnanded as essmtial, thq are rich men, poor non, bishops,

55deSola Pool, W. p. 12.
56W. p. 190. (Appendix 3)
57de Sela Pool, W, p. 1140.

53mm, W. p. 1+5.

59 (London). Anniversary Edition of 150 Years.
January 1, 1935, p. 8.

 

18

statesnm, scholars, artists, soldiers, sailors, trademen, teachers. "60
H‘s, the reader, is the empresmt Englishman, ”the great arbiter, to
«when this Journal for one hundred and fifty years has submitted its
sorvices so that he shall know elder truths, sad truths, joyful
truths, fearful truths, grand truths.”61 Q1 June 11, 1936, Lord
Chief Justice Lord Hewart, a nenber of lb; 113;; Board of Trustees,
speaking before an International Publishers Congress in London,
Stated, "he was sure they would agree that it was a nutter of no lit-
tle dignity and no little responsibility to be associated with that
unique newspaper of which it might be said without offense that it
minted day by day infallibility without arrogance, omniscience
without condensation, fastidiousness without severity, and that it
its monumental without heir; statuesque. '62 In both the view of m
m and that of Lord Howart, it is appaer that they believed that
the paper was for everyone. However, one seems to feel, in Lord
Helen's case, that it actually was meant for those who knew and
understood m m.
m m, however, appeared to present quite a differmt picture
to other readers. It was cemonplaoe in Britain for people to feel
that m m usually wrote what the goverment was thinki.ng.63 Sir

Anthem mien cemented in his m, ". . . 1‘23 Ill-Ell. was regarded

 

50m.
51m.

62% (Lona-n). Jun- 12. 1936. p. 18.

63Rebert Graves and Alan Baggy“ (New York:
We W. Norton & coo, Dee, 1963), Po 1e

 

19

3.1:: hope as the organ of the British Governmmt. ”6+

”W. net-d mtmmn th- ose of
fordgners was regarded as ropresmting the views of the British

Wheeler Bennett,

Governmut.65 he German Ambassador in Iondon, Leopold ven Hoesch,
wrote a letter to m m on its one hundred and fiftieth anniver-
sary, January it, 1935, noting that the Germans regarded In; may, as
the unofficial voice of educated opinion in Britain rather than one
of may voices competing in the cacapherv of the journalistic
marketplace.“

The press reached a position of unprecedented power as a creator
of opinion during the mid 1930's. In 1936 Thomas Harrison and Charles
Ihdge conducted an opinion poll and found that thirty-five per cent
of the people in Great Britain with am definite opinions received

them from the press.67 This was twice as much as the next closest
souroem-frimds—and three times as great as the next public source-
radio.68 The British Broadcasting Corporation was controlled by the
government, and its presmtation of news was never interpreted by
commuters. ‘Jhe only real source of opinionated news was the press,
and of all the newspapers the influence of 1113 M was the most

6“Sir Anthem Eda), The ageing of Anthem mg, Earl of Am.
W (Boston: Houghton Mi-fmn & 00.. 19 2). p. 197.

65.1mm w. wheeler-Bennett. Wm (man.
Sloan 3. Pierce, 1948), p. 96.

65mm (Iondon). January 4. 1935. p. 8.

67Glarles Madge and Thomas Harrison, n b tion
(W'Bu: PW 3001‘s, Ltd" 1939), pe 30o

68mg.

 

 

20

significant.
The man who would edit such a paper would have at his disposal

the greatest legacy of good will and trust ever afforded an editor
in British history. It is part of the tragedy of our times that this

demons trust fell to Geoffrey Dawson.

 

CHAPTER II

A SKETCH OF AN EDITOR--GEDFFREY DAWSON

John D. Scott, anther of m in main, and one of the most
rospected British historians, pointed at Geoffrey Ihwson, editor of
m m m during the 1930' s, and said, "there goes one of the

three most important men in England.'1 The fact that a member of

Britain's literary and scholarly establishment would rank 1h; mu
Cditor along with the Prime Minister and King indicates the awesome

"aspect with which m 13.52! was regarded as an institution, and

mm as a man. More modestly, Sir John E. Wrench, in his official

Megaphy of Geoffrey Dawson, listed the editor as one of the twelve

host important mglishmm in the 1930's. Wrench attributed to Dawson

Ms equalling those of the most powerful cabinet minister, and yet

duct-ibed him as “surrounded by a heavy curtain of secrecy. ”2

0f Dawson's early life, a few salient facts appear. He was born

Gun-go Geoffrey Robinson in Skeptcn-in- Cravm, West Riding , Yorkshire,
011 October 25, 187a.3 In August, 1917, he changed his name to

G.offrey mweon out of repeat for his aunt, who had raised him from
‘trly youth.

‘

By mlfilling her deathbed request to change his name,

lacott. W. 1:» 23+.

2km“! m, P0 3660

m. P0 190

 

 

22

he performed a smtimental act; although he was ruenbered generously

in his aunt's will, he was not motivated by economic gain as he was
mama-ll: wealthy in his own right by 1917.“ is a young boy of nine
he had left his aunt's home to attend Aysgarth Preparatory School.
htor he went to Eton as a scholarship boy, and he had made a fair
rmtation as a scholar.5 After Eton he matriculated at Magdalen
Gouge, Oxford. In 1898, he left Magdalen, and, having passed the
civil service examination, he took a job as a second-class mail clerk
1' or the Government Post Office. While working in this junior clerk-
ship he learned of his election as a Fellow of All Souls, Oxford.6
All Souls "has historically be associated with the State
religion. '7 It was only after 1854 that non-Anglicans could enter,
and even tho there were only a few. Oxford University has had very
Close associations with the classes which, through wealth, influmce,
‘nd social position, dominate British society. Oxford was for the
”collegiate, Anglican, ruling class."8
it All Souls, Dawson made friendships which lasted throughout
his lifetime, among then, John Simon, Edward Halifax, and Robert H.
Brand. The opportunity to associate closely with men of intelligence

‘hd high social rank gave nwson much satisfaction; his experience at

was P0 11‘6-

e, Po we
6M.» P0 29-
7mm. W. p. 175.

8Me, Po 176e

23

All Souls was one of the great mutants of his life.9 It was also a
very bareficial association for his later professional career in
Journalin, for at All Souls he gained entrance into a comparatively

 

/ exclusive circle of human“) Marv of the offices of the British
Govern-mt, Gnrlos W. Brodnib noted in 1932, were filled by mar who
“1'. the sign of the Mallard, the ancimt cables of All Souls. A

 

. M of the British syetu, Brodnib commuted with wry humor, might
be entitled "chermmt by MallardyuA Study of Political Ornithology, ..
1‘01' All Souls was an "unofficial club for running, or helping to run
“10 destinies of the British Enpire. "ll
hwoon's influmtial connections were soon to be useful to his
“Poor. He did not enjoy his work in the post office, and certain
‘Cll-placed frimds in the Colonial Office effected his transfer to
thint branch of the gevernmmt service.12 In March, 1899, when Dawson

We to the Colonial Office, relations betwem the British Government

 

 

W the Goverment of the Transvaal were strained. Dawson worked for
the next tote years at the South African desk of the "Office” ard
”flayed this Job. He read all the material he could firrl on South
Africa.
New opportunities for Inwson's advancenent emerged when Lord
Ifilner, the High Co-issioner in South Africa, wanted to strength.)
the civil service under his command. In October, 1901, Lord Milner

9M. m. p. 30.
mm.
11M” P0 290

HMO! P0 310

 

 

 

21;

held interviews in England with aspirants for these new positions,
and mwson, who had recently bear appointed assistant private secre-
tary to the colonial secretary, applied for an interview, although he
believed he had little chance of being accepted. He enjoyed worldng
for the Colonial Office, but believed this new position would be more
chillmging. Lord Hilner was attracted to him and accepted Dawson;
he nailed for South Africa in October, 1901.13 The official biOg-
1‘ilpher of Dawson says that with this Opportunity to serve Lord Milner
”circumstances were pushing him [Dawson] where his talents and tastes
could be shown. "11'" In 1903, Dawson became Lord Milner's private
39cm. Ilwson's promotion was more than a recognition of his
Pl‘Ofessional oompetmce; the relationship between the two men was
fl-lnost that of father and son. They seemed to understand each other
instinctively, and their biographers remark that each affected the
Views and the personality of the other.” No one left more of an
ilpression upon mwson than did Lord Milner.16 Their friendship cut-
l‘ived their professional association, lasting until Milner' s death
in 1921}.

Both mm were expansionists at a period in British history when
luv Englishmen turned with enthusiam toward enpire. Nearly twenty

million square miles were added to the Britidt Enpiro in the period

13John E. Wrench, 1‘ 0
1.2.2192: (London: ram and Spottistode , Ltd., 1958), p. 239.

Macho m: P0 3“-
15m" P0 36-
“Watch, w. P0 369-

 

 

 

25

from 1880 to 1900. Digland was happy to assume the burden of civi-

lining and cmverting to Christianity natives in distant lands.
The culmination of this imperialimn was the South African Boer

War, which caused mglishmm to re-evaluate their position with regard

to the value of expansion. The majority of the peeple and parliamen-

tary leaders were afraid of British isolation from Europe, and the
undesirable image as a bully. Those who believed in the Boer War,
“Id the willing mappert which the colonies gave to it, were reinforced
in their belief in the necessity of imperial unity and of empire to
B1gland's future as a great power.17

mlner was among the leading imperialists. ”Imperialisa," he
Wrote, 'which for so long appealed only to the farseedng few, hould
bfioome the accepted faith of the whole nation. "18 His "first great
Principle was follow the race,” by which he meant that "all of the
Pooples, of the United Kingdom and their descendants in other
Oountries [should be] under one flag," because this is "the bond of
canon blood, a canon language, common history and traditions. ”19

ulnar believed the upire should be "a group of states indepmd—
int of one another in their local affairs, but bound together for the

defuse of their own interests and the deveIOpmmt of a common civi-
lisation. '20

Hethoughtthatthiscomnitywouldnotbeboundby

17Goldwin earth,

(2111 do Rue: N“ Iarkl
Charles Soribner's Sons, 1949 , pp. -50.

mflrmch, W. p. 386.
19Lord nun»,

‘, Whit: (Iondom
0021mm. “d 00., Ltd... 1913 , Do We

20minor. Wm. pp. 90-91.

 

 

 

 

26

alliances, but would be in a perlanmt organic much and would play
an inportant role in preserving peace in the world.21

In South Africa, during the Boer War, Lord Hilner hoped that,
me peace was achieved, he could strengthm those eluents in South
Africa. that wished to be part of the British Enpire. He wanted a
Drona-ms South Africa that would attract British imigrants and tip
th. balance against the influmce of the Boers. With the numerical
helm. against the Boers, mlner hoped to absorb then into a pre-
da-umnuy British culture and civilisation. 22

In April, 1905, the hrl of Selborne replaced Milner as the
Governor of Transvaal and Orange River Golow. Various explanations
have been givm for Milner's exclusion. According to one view, he
retired because of exhaustion.23 Another view suggests that Milner
1% because he could not live down the Boers' feelings that he had
M the author of the Boer Wang“ A more convincing explanation,
however, would sec to be that the British Governumt, rejecting
Hilaer's one-1mm to Elglish supr-acy, wanted to foster a spirit
0! equality and cooperation betwem the hatch and English population
in South Africa.

mlner recognised that ence.:>.he..was deported from South Africa
his conception of the need for English racial supruacy might be in

 

albumin. m. p- 36.

Alfred L. Burt, e l on of i
‘; _ A 'i' '14 . “1121011 (Rm: De Ce Hath 11d

  

23m. . p. 610.

24Robert c. x. Ensor, mind 1820-1214 (Ipndon: Oxford
University Press, 1936), p. 389.

 

 

 

 

27

Jeoparth. For that reason, he took precautions to make sure that a
few stalwart supporters of his views would rain in influmtial
positions. mlner thus arranged for Dawson to becane the editor of
the W m in October, 1905. Under Dawson, Milner
balieved the m would be a rallying point for those South Africans
who fervmtly desired to keep South Africa in the unpire.25

Dawson was one of several men charged with keeping alive Milner's
“We during his exile. Milner had gathered around him a group of

young man whose devotion, both personal and political, had earned
than the title of Milner's Kindergarten. These men bore the brunt of
the fight for closer relations between South Africa and Great Britain
fitter Milner left in 1905. hey had a house in the suburbs of
JOl'aannes‘rmrg, called the "Moot House,” where they met regularly.26
The definition of a "Moot" has been described as a house of assanbly
Or a house of debate.27 These meetings would continue to be held

utter all of them had returned to England. Dawson's diary is filled
‘tlth Hoot meetings at Cliveden, and other locations in London and
England.

Usually, this group included, in addition to Inwsonx John Buchan,
who became the Governor General of Canada, 1935-1940; Robert Brand,
Dawson's friend at All Souls, and a Director of 1133 m during the
1920's; Dougal Mcoh, who became the future Sir. D. Malcolm, K.C.M.G.,

 

zmchs m: P- l"“-
26m-a P0 53-

27.1.... a. M. Butler. W
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960 , p. 19.

1.?

 

 

 

 

28

President of the British South African Oompary 1937-19 56; and Phillip
Kerr, eventually Elevmth Marquess of Lothian in 1930.28 These men
r-sined hwson's friends for life. They had all served their politi-
cal apprenticeship under mlner in South Africa, and they all held "a
firm fdth in the British Ehpire, evolvizg steadily by constitutional
and peaceful methods, into a commonwealth of sovereign, self-governing
notions linked by common ideals, aspirations and purposes, and a
con-on loyalty, ubraoixg and transcending but not obliterating les-
IO!‘ local loyalties. "29 They were part of the imperial federation
Went. Their faith reflects a sense of optimism about human
mun-e; they were willing to trust, to grant concessions, and to
increase local responsibility within the empire, feeling that the
lost practical solution would also be the most humane.30 Sir John
wIll‘uich believes the ideas of the Kindergarten were really the germ
COeds of what later became the British Commonwealth of Nations.31
Dawson worked hard as the editor of the W M to
kCop Lfilner's views in the press. Dweon believed in Milner's ideas
01’ the British hpire and imperialist, and Ihwson hoped that the
consolidation of dependencies and colonies would be the goal for
Britain in the twentieth cmtury. Dawson believed the old mpire

would become a new brotherhood of peoples symbolized by common loyalty

k

    

2JBJohn Connoll, th- 031 . - .

1 n' 'Q -1 L
Office 1212-12fl (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958
29:23.. p. 137.
30M-
31141-011ch, M3911. P0 730

       
  

‘f

I“

 

 

 

 

29

to the crown, and this would bring diverse races and traditions into
an .pire in which all the peoples would be citizens in a real sense.
He saw the upire as a group of states independent in local affairs,
but bound together for defuse of con-son interests and developmmt of
a oo-on language.32 nswson believed, as Milner had, that the hatch
in South Africa were trying to destroy or weaken the ties between
Britain and South Africa, am! this was, of course, against his ideas
for the upire. Sevm months after Dawson became the editor of the
W m, he accepted the additional duties of DP. my
correspondmt in South Africa.

Dawson, meanwhile, in the m, kept pressing for a closer union
in South Africa. The Kiniergarten wanted this in addition to the
Mann” and strengthening of the ties in every direction among
Obnonwealth meabers. 33 This group continuously kept in contact with
Lord Selborne, stressing the importance of a federation for South
Africa. heir work was completed by the Union Act of 1909, which
‘mt into effect in May, 1910. This act granted equal rights to the
has white national groups, and thus waded years of bitterness of the
Post-war period. The Kindergarten had helped to create the Union of

South Africa, and thq had helped to draft the Union's constitution?“
mweon resigned from the m in Septuaber, 1910, because he felt
his Job had bem accomplished with the passage of the Union Act.

 

32mg... p. 12.
3 e, Pe 75s
3am, W. p- 596-

I”!

I‘

1;:-

C.‘

I4'

I

30

After nwson resigned fro! the m he returned to England,
where Lord Miloer was anxious for him to assume the editorship of The
Egg, whose reporting of imperial matters was inconsistent with
Milner's views. The owner of Th3 31.31919 Lord Northcliffe, had been
interested in Dawson since 1908. In June, 1908, mwson had returned
to England for a vacation and had met Northcliffe, who was so
impressed by mwson's views of the mpire and imperialism that he
told Mr. Wrench in Septenber, 1908, that Dawson would be the next
editor of m $3.35 Dawson, who became editor in 1912, was
chosm because Northcliffe believed that they shared the same opin-
ions of the world. Their views on imperial matters were alike;
mwson had gone to Eton and Magdalen, and was a Fellow of All Souls.
Dawson had bee: a worlcing journalist as editor of the W
Star, and had also served as g; _Tim__g§ correspondent in South Africa.36
The staff of Th2 E4!!! was impressed with Dawson's background and,
since Northcliffe an! Dawson had a similar view of the world, the
staff felt that the relationship would be harmonious.” Dawson
assumed his responsibilities as editor on September 12, 1912.
Northcliffe, according to the official Eistogz 9; fig mu, believed
mweon, with his youth, proper education, and journalistic experience,
would cooperate with him and help to increase the prestige of mg
m. Northcliffe told Dawson to ignore all enlisting prejudices and

 

35wmch’ m: P- 66-

36M“ Pe-berton, LogI ljoflgliffg, A flemoi; (Iondon: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1922), p. 139.

37W. m, 742-

31

opinions and to form his own judgment.38 Dawson was just as respon-
sible as Northcliffe for the editorial policy of E9. Tings from 1912
to 1919.39

A gap between the editor and publisher began to appear, however,
as early as 1911+. mwson complained that Northcliffe's heavy-handed
influmce in the paper seriously restricted his own professional
control.“ When m 11mg; Military Correspondent, Colonel Charles
Ropington, ferreted out the scandal of shell shortages in May, 1915,
Northcliffe wanted 1113 Tina to print the details, but mwson would
not agree even though the story was true. How, asked Dawson, could
the paper print an expos‘ of the failures of Lord Kitchener, the
Secretary of State for War, the hero of Fashoda and Khartum and a
Field Marshal in the British Army? The English people, Dawson feared,
would rise in patriotic anger against Northcliffe if Kitchener's
weakness were revealed.”1

Lord Northcliffe, meanwhile, felt Dawson to be overly pacifistic,
and in Novaber, 1917, wrote a memorandum to The 119.”. saying that
pacifistic words and ideas occurred far too often in the paper.“2
Ropington, who had discovered the shell shortage, was a trusted vet-

eran on m m, having come to the paper in 1905. Northcliffe

 

38m. . p. 769
”Wrench, m, P- 88-

“Roginsm Pound and Geoffrey Harmsworth, W (London:
Gassell, 1959), p. 1448.

“We, Do “‘78e

“2m. , p. 991».

32

admired his military eocpert and adviser very much, and he supported
Repizgton's campaign in mg mg; in February, 1918, for new ideas
for the military. Dawson did not like the military correspondent,
or his Journalistic assertions about the ineptitude of the British
military establishment, and in 1918 he pressured Northcliffe to fire
Repington. mwson reasoned that he wanted to prevent the Germans
from learning about British military ideas from 1112 1912!.- He wanted
to keep "the paper's reputation for good sense and consistency: and
submitted the Military Correspondent's articles to frequent and
drastic change. 4‘3 This policy forced Repington to resign and go
over to the m M-

I.ord Northcliffe became increasingly angrier with his editor,
and he wrote to Ihwson on May 1+, 1918, saying .1112 11111.91 had not been
critical for months and people could not help but regard the paper
as a government organ. E: 11593 lacked independence, and the Prime
Minister thought he had the paper in his pocket.‘m The official
m 21 m 2122.! shows another letter that Northcliffe wrote to
hwson, dated July 5, 1918, and again the charge is made that the
attitude of m m is such that it is known as a government organ!”
In Nov-aber, 1918, Lovat Fraser, a correspondent for 322.! 1.111.159 dis-
covered black nrketeering, graft, and corruption in the Slough war

depot. Fraser told Dawson to expose this news; but the story was

 

“Mom: 3. Olurchill, Lo o e (New
IGrR‘ Ge Po Putnal's Son, 1960 ’ 13. Bus

“Pound. W. p. 637.
“W. III. 363.

33

never printed. The reason that Dawson ignored Frazer's plea is
understandable; Lord Milner, the Secretary of State for War and
mwson's closest friend and political mentor, was implicated, and so
hwson refused to act. By this actionthe editor placed private
interests above national int crest.“6

hwson's heavy editing, tailoring, and ignoring of his corre-
spondents' articles would become 113 mg editor's hallmark during

the 1930's. lhstead of analyzing the news sent to him by his report-
ers, Dawson attenpted to change the news to be consistent with what
he instinctively felt to be right. mwson relentlessly pursued this
policy until the Cid of his editorship.

As hwson's relationship with Northcliffe cooled, he entered
more deeply into Hilner's sphere of influence. The members of this
circle became a formal group when the Ginger Group was organized in
early 1916.“7
"to work for the most effective conduct of the war, and, above all,

somehow or another, to secure a change of governmmt. "1+8 By 1916,

The purpose of this group was to inspire each member

Britain's war effort had been under the direction of Prime Minister
Asquith and his coalition government, composed mostly of liberals and
Conservatives. In 1916, however, the people were wearying of the war
because of Britain's failure to ad the conflict. People felt that
the cabinet had the power, but Asquith did not vigorously prosecute
the war because of his concern for constitutional liberties, and thus

 

“PM. W. p. 739
“7mm. mun-ssh. p. 306.
“mu-r. W. p. 62.

31*

he appeared hesitant. 0n the other hand, David Lloyd George, the
Minister of lbnitions in Asquith's Cabinet, seemed prepared to ignore
the peoples' liberties to bring about victory. The Ginger Group pro-
moted the idea of a small, powerful war cabinet, to be headed by
Lloyd George; their efforts were successful and Lloyd George replaced
Asquith as Prime Minister in December, 1916.

The most prominent members of the group were Phillip Kerr, Lloyd
George's Private Secretary; Lord Milner, Dawson's mentor and the
Secretary of State for War in Lloyd George's Cabinet; Waldorf Astor,
H.P.; and Geoffrey mwson, the editor of The fines. This group held
meetings on Monday nights, and they continued to meet after Decanber,
1916, when Lloyd George became Prime Minister. Sir John E. Wrench,
Dawson's official biographer, states that the Ginger Group had a
great advantage in that its decisions and plans could be furthered
unobtrusively and constantly in I_h_e_ Mfg Wrmch also says that
hwson, until the death of Lord Milner, consistently backed Lord
Milner and his ideas in the columns of 313 M.50 An example of
this relationship was observed earlier in the Slough scandal, which
Ihwson refused to publish in 31;; 52-1135. because of his friendship for
Milner.

hwson's use of his position as editor of TE Mg to protect
his friends and to air their opinions in print again brought him into
conflict with his publisher ani enployer, Lord Northcliffe. ‘Jhe
owner of m m distrusted his editor for five interconnected

lama" W: P0 306-
mm... p. 305.

35

reasons: (1). his frimdship with the Ginger Group and his willing-
ness to discuss personalities with than; (2) his support of Lloyd
George; (3) his alleged pro-Germanisn; (1+) his unwillingness to use
the press to further Northcliffe's own political ambitions; and (5)
his dependmce on Astor and others, thus robbing 2133 121393 of its
traditional independence.

As Dawson's friendship with Milner and the Ginger Group grew,
Northcliffe decided that a change of editors would be desirable. The
final break between Northcliffe and Ihwson came in February 24, 1919,
whm Dawson resigned as editor of 1t_x_e_ M9..- The official W
W states hwson left because he would not accept Northcliffe
as his political mentor.$l‘ The owner did not approve of Lloyd George
and resulted mwson's udng 1'_h_g M to support Lloyd George in the
1918 election. Northcliffe decided that, as publisher, he would have
more voice in the future about the policy of 111.: up»?

Northcliffe did not like Ihwson's friends-Joni Milner, the Astors,
and Kerr. He knew that Dawson had talked to his friends about his
publisher, and this set had gossiped about him in their various clubs.
The biographer of Lord Northcliffe traces Dawson's downfall to his
social ani political circles, which were filled with people whom
Northcliffe neither liked nor trusted.

mwson's biographer and personal friend, Sir John Wrench,
believed one reason for Dawson's resignation was that Northcliffe
wanted to dominate the paper, and to use it for his own political

 

flmmmnm. IV. Part I. as.
52m. p. l«So.

36

ads. Northcliffe supposedly wanted to be at the peace conference at
the end of the war as a British Plenipotentiary and Dawson would not
help him to achieve this ambition.53 Lord Northcliffe's biographer
denies this charge on the grouni that Northcliffe was very ill at

this time, and had no desire for such a position, and also Northcliffe
knew the rest of the British press would have been outraged.§+
Another reason for Diwson's resignation, according to Wrench, is that
he wanted to preserve the integrity and tradition of independence of
the editor of Th3 Mpg.

Die influence of Dawson on In_e_ Time-g from 1912 to 1919 was infi-
nitely greater than that of Northcliffe, although during this period
new people erroneously regarded Northcliffe as the man responsible
for the actions of the paper. Actually, Northcliffe's ”part was so
loll; absurdly so compared with that. of Dawson. ”55 Dawson ”had an
infinitely greater understanding of the real nature of political
power and a mob more subtle comprehension of the springs of politi-
cal action than Northcliffe had. '56

After Daweon resigned, Henry W. Steed once again became the
editor of m m“. In June, 1921, Dawson became the Secretary of
the Rhodes Trust. Lord Northcliffe died in August, 1922, and in
October Robert H. Brand, Dawson's old friend, asked Dawson if he

wanted to become m my editor under the paper's new owners,

 

”munch. m. p. 175.

8mm. mm. 1» 683.
55Williams, m, p. 257.

56mm-

1:1

0
1*.
('0-

I.
4.1

‘3,

37

hjor John Astor and John Walter IV.

Dawson was not eager to return to Printing House Square; he was
happily married now, with two children, and he had no desire to
return to The flag; if it would mean aggravation and unpleasantness.
Dawson still rune-bored the difficulties with Lord Northcliffe.57 He
felt he might wish to return to 13;; m, however, if he could be
suprese in the editor's chair. The eat-editor spoke to his closest
fridd, Lord fiber, about the offer from 1113 11.1991, ard Lord Milner
told him to accept it only if the conditions 232 Times promised were

 

satisfactory.58

In the meantime, on November 5, 1922, at one of John Astor's
hones, Hover Castle, both Astor and Walter outlined what kind of an
editor they wanted for 232 meg; they wanted a man in whom they were
confidmt, that is, an editor completely free to exercise his Judg-
mmt and independent in the fullest sense. His sole responsibility
would be to the proprietors and not to the Board of Directors or to
the Managing Ill.rector.59

On Novanber 18, 1922, DawsOn and Lord Milner sent a memorandum
to the owners of E... line—s which laid down the conditions under which
Dawson would accept the editorship. This memorandum explicitly
stated what the future relations betwem the owners and editor, and
the managerial department ani the editor would be. The memorandum

 

57mm, 12211592. 13- 208.

58W. IV. Part II. 7711.
59mg" pp. 774-75.

ha

If

r1

1",

38

stated that the editor was not to be employed merely to reflect the
views of the managaent, nor was his responsibility to be limited to
the editorial page. The editor's power was to include exclusive con-
trol of everything presented in the news columns as well as complete
control of the staff, that is, the power to hire and fire at will.
Dawson never asked for a contract with the owners; he felt that his
usefulness to IE. ms would last only as long as he enjoyed the
owners' confidence because his terms were such that Ihg 12mg: would
be run, in effect, by the editor.60

Major Astor and John Walter IV answered Dawson's memorandum on
Novesber 22, 1922, and they told him that his memorandum "represents
the traditional Constitution of _T_1_1_g mg as far as it is possible to
define it, and it conveys a true idea of the lines upon which we
intmd that the paper shall be conducted in the future. "61 Both
Astor ani Walter IV accepted Dawson's conditions, and he returned as
editor of IQ; m in January, 1923.

Whm Dawson became editor for the second time his policy for Ihg
EM presumably was to give fair play to the government of the day,
without following it at every turn.62 ‘Ihe m 2; 1h; Meg,
however, suggests that if Lord Northcliffe had been alive he would
not have believed Dawson capable of being so independent or impartial.
Dawson's principle of fair play would only operate so long as the

government of the day was either Conservative or a National

 

6°23» .. pp. 777-78.
51mg” p. 783.
62mm“, m: P0 21‘3-

39

Government; Dawson had no respect for the Labor Party. Dawson was a
”Conservative of the Right with a loyalty to party greater than

63

felt by any predecessors.” Dawson was less interested in policy

than in the anatorror of the government. To Dawson the art of politics,
according to the m g 139 Meg, was the "finding and fitting
the man to the required job rather than in the excogitation and formu-
lation of measures in advance.”

The foreign policy supported by Th; m during Dawson's
mbsmce rested on Anglo-French solidarity and the Treaty of Versailles;
this was the basis of British foreign policy as long as Britain
belonged to the League of Nations. The Treaty of Versailles, even
with its faults, was considered to be the law, which could be changed
only by France and Britain acting jointly in agreement.65

Under Ikwson IE2 [Egg continued to support this policy for five
years because Harold mlliams, the head of 13g figs; foreign depart-
mmt, and highly regarded as an expert on foreign affairs, moulded
m m foreign policy.66 His death in Novenber, 1928, was disas-
trous for m Meg. For the next thirteen years 1h; ms fouxd no
one to replace Williams, and Dawson only want through the motions of
seeking a highly qualified replacuent. Wrench, Dawson's biographer,
says the reason the editor never found a replacenmt was that Dawson,

as a forceful editor, would never agree to divide control of the

 

63m 9;. m m, Iv, Part II, 783.
611M.
6 d., p. 795.
66m” p. 796.

no

paper and, of course, he wanted all final responsibility.67 Thus,
Dawson assumd the foreign editor's desk.

What Dawson appointed himself foreign editor, he completely
changed the foreign policy of 1113 _Ti_1_n_e_s_. Dawson, in judging himself
responsible for the foreign affairs post on The meg, publicly
declared such normally expected prerequisites as the ability to speak
foreign languages, apprmticeship in foreign correspondence, an under-
standing of European history and peoples, and a personal lmowledge of
the Continent to be considerably less important than literary skill
and intuition, which he felt he possessed in abundance.68 Actually,
he knew dominion and domestic affairs much better than he understood
foreign affairs. Dawson was not committed to journalistic principles;
he appeared to be more committed to his friends, and became more
intimate and friendly with statesman. He whispered advice here, and
cornered someone else there, and he preferred to identify with those
ministers of whom he approved, or who would confide in him. The
editor knew that politicians are'naturally more swayed by editors who
can talk to the world, than by public servants who cannot.69 Dawson's
action of becoming his own foreign editor created a large vacuum at
m m foreign desk. The foreign correspondents of 1h; 1;!”
worked under an editor in London with when nobody could discuss ideas

 

67wm°h9 m: P0 “650

20231301131118 Rood. mm (“mm “mm “P" 1939)’
p. e

69.1mm 3mm (m). W (madam am and
Spottiswo0de,Ltdu 1960), p. 172.

1+1

on a basis of intiaate knowledge.” By the 1930's, then, m m
was dominated w the personality of Geoffrey Dawson, and its stance
in fordgn affairs was merely the public pronouncenmt of his private

political convictions.

.r—

7°Rud. m. p. 208.

CHAPTER III

PERSONAL DIPLOMACY--THE MAKING OF

1111; m5 FOREIGN POLICY

The foreign policy of The Ting; during 1935-1936 was not the
policy of the Foreign Office; the official Histom 9_f_‘ Th2 Mg;
declares that ”at no time during this period did Printing House
Square follow the inspirations of the Foreign Office."1 What inspira-
tions did it follow then? A search for the sources of 1113 Ma?
foreign policy must begin with an investigation of the influences
that worked on Geoffrey Dawson, the singleminded editor of 3,113 was.

In foreign policy Dawson was predominantly influenced by his
belief in the British Commonwealth of Nations. Dawson, as was pointed
out in the last chapter, had accepted and absorbed Lord Milner's COD!
cept of the British Eupire. The goal in the twentieth century that
Dawson strove for was that ”British Civilization, prosperity, power
firmly established in the four corners of the earth, would justify
itself in its capacity as a guarantor of peace."2 This goal called
for the consolidation of colonies and dependencies so that the old
alpire would become a new brotherhood of peoples, symbolized by a

common loyalty to the crown, and bringing diverse races and traditions

 

1W. IV. Part II. 931.
212191.. p. 1.

142

43

into an expire in which all the people would be citizens. A group of
states would be indepmdent in local affairs, but bound together for
defense of common interests and develOpment of a common civilization.3
This goal was achieved in 1931 when the Statute of Westminster was
passed.

In; Mg editor was primarily interested in the Commonwealth of
Nations, and he renained ever watchful. for anything that might die-
turb this body, while he was blind to events on the Ehropean conti-
nent, except insofar as they might upset the equilibrium within the
Commonwealth or empire.“L

mwson wanted to avoid all Continental commitments; no single
point of British policy was more important to him than the "consolida-
tion of British Imperial sentiment and Dominion power. "5 He looked
on Eirope's troubles as being closely analogous to those he had
experienced in South Africa, and he believed that Britain's success
in dealing with the Boers in South Africa could be used as a guide
for British foreign policy generally. Britain's African policy had
demonstrated a willingness to trust, grant concessions, and hand over
responsibility to the Boer leaders. Dawson felt this pattern of
political behavior would be successful with Hitler and Missolini, and
he was shocked whm it was not. Thus, he believed that if Britain
acted resolutely in Europe during 1935-1936, she risked starting a

war, which might thm "endanger ani perhaps destroy the unity of the

3M" P0 2-
“Wrcnch. Mass. p. 76.

5W. IV. Part II. 832.

 

Enpire and Commonwealth. "6

Another major factor which influenced the formulation of Dawson's
ideas about foreign policy was the fear of Communism. Dawson's anti-
Conmlunim began with the Russian Revolution of 1917. When the
February Revolution broke out The 31361 supported it because The Mg
believed the revolution would help inspire the Russians to defeat the
Germans.7 Ihwson believed that the new Russian leaders would make
the Russian am more efficient, and 1113 ling; was convinced that the
idea of constitutionalimn would really fortify the Russian people.

The October Revolution of 1917 received an entirely different
treatment in 1113 m. flg Tile; viewed Lenin and his comparw as a
band of extremists seeking economic justice, and Dawson felt this was
irrelevant to the war effort. Lenin and the Bolsheviks were prepared
to and the war on the Russian front, even if it meant an inglorious
peace with Gem. Therefore, the October Revolution in Russia was
violently attacked in m Lines from the beginning.8 Lord Milner
felt only a miracle could save Russia from total collapse, and be
conveyed these pessimistic views to mwson, although, evidmtly,
never in writing.9 Dawson must have thought immediately of the
upiro, and how its manpower would be strained if the Russians aban-
doned the Eastern front, thus freeing German troops to fight in the

"Ste

 

6mm: W! Po 137.
7W. Iv, Part I. 2111.
8:21.91.

9III-«ml» m. p. 149-

45

He understood neither the social nor the economic implications
of the October Revolution: "the subject was not one that interested
hwson. ”10 So little did it concern bin that be ignored the regular
reports smut by his Petrograd correspondent. The official gm 2;
m m charitably suggests that the Correspondent's letters may
not have arrived.n One cannot help thinking, however, that whether
they arrived or not made little difference to Dawson.

By June, 1918, 1113 1.1.2:; was attacking the Bolshevik policies.
1h; 1.1.33 called them fatal to Russia, and said that their domestic
policy was ruining the country. £2 11393 claimed that the Bolsheviks
were Gennan agmts who had destroyed the Russian any, had made a
separate peace, and had broken their pledges to their allies. Thus,
3; m urged immediate intervention because "the allies cannot
wash their hands of Russia."l2 T_hg Lime; held to this view after
lbwson left the editorship in 1919. Under Henry W. Steed, Th3 Ii_n.1_e_§
aroused public opinion to keep Russia out of the League of Nations.
m 1132! editorialized that the key to future European recovery lay
in a France-British understanding, rather than in a pan-Diropean com-
unity; so an m rulained anti-Bolshevik.13

This fear of Communism continued to haunt the British after the
close of World War I, and was especially heightened by the evidence

of Red infiltration in the trade unions at the time of the General

 

10W. IV. Part I. 3+2.
HMS-a F. 2+3-
12M” p. 267.

l d., pp. l467-68.

1+6

Strike in 1926. In subsequent years the anxiety about the Bolshevik
threat rose still higher as Britain faced serious economic and social
problens in the depression years. In this context, many Britishers
ultertained the idea that a reamed Germany might offer international
insurance against a potential threat of Russian Communism in Europe.
Some reasmed that if "two people disliked the same thing, they must
necessarily like each other," and that British anti-Communism should
send the nation into Hitler's and Mussolini's arms.1’+ Mary leading
English intellectuals, such as Lord Halifax, Lord Lothian, Lord
Londonderry, and Anthony Eden, were impressed during 1933-1936 by
Hitler's avowed stand against Communism.15 Geoffrey Dawson, too, was
convinced that a Nazi Germarw would serve as a barrier against the
spread of Communism in theW'est.16

Lord Londonderry, a member of the cabinet of the National
Government from 1931-1935 (as Secretary of State for Air), frequently
met with his friend mwson to discuss their common fear of Communism.
In March, 1938, Londonderry published a book, Ourselves 5113‘ Gonna ,
which recounts interviews during his visit to Germary in 1936. On
January 28, 1936, General Go'ring told him that the main problem was
not colonies or arms, but the danger of Bolshevism. Goring argued
that figland had made a mistake in judging Communism by the tiny hand-
M of Communists in England... He said England and the British

 

“Dennis Burdens, Portrait of‘gjtatesman (New York:
Philosophical Library, Inc., 1956), p. 108.

15Thomas Jones, 110E George (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1951), p. 21+2.

1J6Wrench, neon, p. 376.

I"Goring believed there were twenty-six thousand Communists in
Britain.

47

Empire should cast their lot with Germany and halt the spread of
Commie: throughout Eastern Europe. Britain, Goring insisted, could
learn from Hitlu- that Communism can be killed by raising the stand-
ard of living. Londonderry believed this and was even more impressed
when on February 1+, 1936, he had an interview with Hitler himself.17
The Nehrer, Londonderry wrote, sees the problem of this world more

18 The growth of

clearly than the rest of us do: it is Bolshevism.
Russia and the instability of France bothered Hitler, and it bothered
Londonderry as well.

In the summer of 1936, Londonderry suggested that British for-
sign policy seemed to condone Commie!!! by its association with
France. He declared that people in Britain smb a healthy Germany,
Italy, and Japan, which wholeheartedly fight Comnmnian an! Bolshevism,
realising that the Communists are tryirg to destroy by "internal dis-
ruption" all modern goverments--our own as well as theirs--by means
of world revolution}9 In December, 1936, Londonderry said he could
not understand British complacency toward Conmtunism, and, as long as
the English ignored or condoned it, they would not be able to deal
with Comm. He did not understand why Britain had not taken a
stand against Communiu before this time.20

then William L. Shirer, an American newspaper man in Berlin in

 

vibe Marquis of Londonderry, Qualveg and Gem (London:
ROM m0, Ltde’ 1938), pa 90o

18m" p. 95.
19M" P- 21-
20213.. p. 129.

1+8

1936, learned that Lord Londonderry had visited Goring and Hitler, be
counted critically that lendmdeny ”hasn't beat up to am good.
a. is an all out pro-lasi."21 Paul Schwartz, author of m; m
M m m m m, describes the Marquess of Londonderry
during his Berlin visit of 1936 as a man "known for his anti-Bolshevik
auntiaahta and . . . fascist sympathies.”22

Another of Dawson's friends, Lord Halifax, went to Ger-saw in
nova-bar, 1937. ch Noveaber 19 h. spoke with Hitler, praising the
new services he had performed for Germazw, but singling out the anti-
Co-unist drive as the most important. “By destroying Communia in
his country,” he said, Hitler "had barred its road to Western Elrope
ami. . . Gmthereforecouldrightlyberegardedasabulwarkof
the West against Boldieviu."23 Lord Halifax, who replaced Anthem
mm as Britidi Foreign Secretary in 1938, was a personal frimd of
hwson' s, an All Souls man, an! Deweon's neighbor in Yorkshire?”
Equally close to the inner circle was Thomas Jones, who more than
once stated that mwson would never offend aw goverment of which

Lord Halifax was a m.ber.25 hwson's official biographer, Sir John

 

23-minu- L. Slirer, .-.

    

”Iona Halifax, W (New Iork: Dodd Mead and Co.,
1957): P0 “’0

2slim-as Jones, W (London: Oxford University
MS, 199.), pa “20o

1+9

E. Wrench, published in 1940 a book with the damning title I Lam
German. He agreed that Hitler had prevented Commism in Germany
and that all of Western Elrope should be grateful, and that Englishmen
especially should try to understand the Communist menace as the
Germans had.26 These were not the only men in mwson's circle but
they were, however, the men he chose to listen to.

How important were the Communists in Great Britain in the 1930's?
The eleven thousand Commists in Britain by 1937, less than half the
figure Goring mentioned to Londonderry, posed no threat in British
political and intellectual life in this period.27 This was not a red
decade nor is there any evidence to support a threat of Communism in

this period. 28

Douglas Reed, the former Mes journalist, says of
the role of Communism in Great Britain and the anpire during 1935
that Commism ”was the least of the anxieties of the police through-
out the British Enpire" and that "Communist propaganda financed and
controlled from Russia . . . \was}. . . in these days about as danger—
ous to Englanduin peace--as an attack by Martians. "29
Even though Communism was no threat to Blgland, Lord Lothian
chose to visit Germany and the German Ambassador in Great Britain

wrote to the German Foreign Minister in Berlin, on January 17, 1935,

 

26John E. Wrench, W (London: Michael Joseph, Ltd.,
19%), P0 137-

27Philip Gibbs, ggoal in angling (New York: Doubleday, Doran &
Co., 1937): P- 161.

2BINIeeSI. Wood, Qm' g ag hitigh Qtellgtualg (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959), p. '73.

29mins Rad, Iggnitz Igir (New York: Covici FrsidOa 1938),
p. 75o

50

informing him that Lord Lothian would arrive at the end of the month.
The ambassador requested that Lord Lothian be allowed to meet with
the Glancellor and the Foreign Minister. He characterized Lord Lothian
as being ”along the highly influential non-official Englishmen who {has}
so far asked to be received by the Chancellor. He is favorably
inclined towards Germany and wished to contribute to promoting better
understanding betweul Germany and England. "30 The ambassador reported
Lord Lothian's boast that at a recent luncheon meeting, Sir John
Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, had asked him "to give him a
report of his Berlin impressions."31
Phillip Kerr (Lord Lothian) was a friend of Geoffrey lhwson and
his chief informant on German affairs during the 1930's, as noted by
Lothian's biographer.32 Sir John E. Wrench, the official biographer
of hwson agrees.33 Lord Iothian's influence on the ideas of Dawson
and his notions of foreign policy had grown through many years of
close frimdship, which had originally been formed in Lord Milner's
”Kindergarten" in South Africa during the early years of the twenti-
eth culturypu Since that time Lothian's career in the government

had steadily risen through a series of personal contacts.

 

”mmgtg op Going; Eogeigg £01191 1218-12158, Series 0, Vol.
III, June 14, 1931} - March 31, 1935 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1962), p. 837. From the Ambassador in Great Britain to the
Foreign Ministry Janol7a1935. Hereafter cited as D.G.F.P.

319—1-.

32mm», Long Iathian, p. 237.
”Wrench, M2999 p. 360.
3"('Jonnell, The Office, p. 136.

51

When David Lloyd George became Prime Minister of Great Britain in

Decalber, 1916, he sought Lord Milner's advice about recommending a
private secretary who could do research, and Milner suggested Phillip

Kerr. It was in this way that Kerr became the Prime Minister's
Private Secretary.” During this time he had become part of the
Ginger Group, along with Dawson, Milner, Astor, and several others.36
Lord Lothian was the Prime Minister's secretary at the peace
confermces in 1919. He had helped draft the allied answer to the
Germans, and he was among those who stressed the "War Guilt" clause
of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Later, when he became fanatic
about appeasaent, he tried to discredit the treaty he had helped to
write.” He rusained with Lloyd George until May, 1921, during which
time he was known as a "confidant in foreign affairs and a go-betwem
in relation to the Foreign Office. "38 Winston Churchill, in July,
1920, resulted Lothian's growing significance because he felt that
Lothian was permitted to exercise too much influence on important
questions of policy. Churchill castigated Lothian, reminding him
that a confidential secretary had "no real responsibility," and, if
awthirg went wrong, the Prime Minister would be held accountable.39

By March, 1922, Phillip Kerr was an important public figure. He had

 

35Bltler, 391g Lgthian, p. 63.
macho 31322. P0 307-

37Alan J. P. Taylor, e ouble ke t ove orei n
Egg 1222-1929 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1957;, p. 180.

38mm». Milan. p. so.

391mm-

52

beal at the heart of politics in London and Paris, and he was the
confidant and constant companion of Lloyd George, who stood alone as
the world's greatest political figure after the collapse of Woodrow
Wilson.“0

After Geoffrey Dawson resumed control of E2 1% in January,
1923, Robert H. Brand, who had restored him to the editorial post,
offered Phillip Kerr the foreign editorship of 1112 Megfll All three
men had been friends in South Africa early in the century. Obviously
Brand or hwson, or perhaps both, thought about renoving Harold
Williams from his position, thus leaving a triumvirate of mlner's
disciples in charge. Kerr, however, refused Brand's offer. His
recent conversion from Roman Catholicism to Christian Science caused
him to apply religious teaching in practical affairs--pub1ic as well
as private--and to seek solutions to the political and economic prob-
luns in the world in the progress of morals and religion; he consid-
ered politics as a minor branch of theology. Because he felt he
could not affect human affairs by working at the foreign affairs desk
of 132 mg, he refused the position.“2 Lothian's conversion to
Christian Science had an important impact on his mind, and he tended
to ignore evil and see only good. This euphoric view of life 111-
suited him for his new roles as General Secretary of the Board of
Rhodes Trustees (July, 1925 to 1939), where he served alongside

Geoffrey Dawson, and as the eleventh Marquess of Lothian (March, 1930),

 

“1133.. p. 85.

“1.12.1.4... p. 92.

“2M-

53

because of which he served as a member of the House of Lords.

Lord Lothian's moralistic philosophy of the world (or government)
was supported by the influence of the imperial experience in South
Africa which he shared with Dawson during the "Kindergarten period. "
Lothian felt that the benefits of the voluntary political and economic
union of communities, which, unassociated, faced the constant threat
of war, were very great. He thought that war could be avoided only
by a just peace, and he believed this required a single world govern-
mm‘t. Lothian was not so unrealistic as to expect a world government
in his own time, but he hOped that there might be a federation
"between friendly governments representing a large preportion of the
‘world's inhabitants.”3 He thought that such a group of nations,
co-operating for mutual advantage, not unlike the British Commonwealth
of Nations, would be a beginning. mring the meantime, he wanted the
Genomealth nations to keep workirg and developing harmoniously, and
to attupt to get the other nations to work for a closer union for
their own sake. lhe growing involvement of Commonwealth members in
events on the Continent of Europe dismayed him.“ The Great War and
the peace conferences which followed made him realize the importance
of the United States and its possible role in world affairs. The
Dominions and America had similar interests, and a closer union of
the Dominions meant a closer union with the United States. Lord
Lothian believed that this union of English-speaking peoples ”would
not only increase their own prosperity but by their example and

 

1+ e9 Pe lOZe

Mme: Po 103.

54

leadership promote peace and happiness of other nations."u5 He
believed the promotion of this unity would promote peace, and to this
did he would dedicate his life.

Lord Lothian also had reservations about the League of Nations.
He thought that the League could never end war; it could only prevent
war by going to war, and to Lothian this meant the League could turn
a local conflict into a world war. Lothian believed that the idea of
collective security was scarcely more than a military alliance to pre-
vent the status quo from being altered by war. He felt that, if a
major power decided to act, and the League of Nations applied mili-
tary sanctions to it, a world war could develop. He saw the mnction
of the League as the bringing about of peaceful revisions, and the
prevention of change by force. But at best he believed the League
could never eliminate the possibility of war, and thus the real value

of the League of Nations would lay in promoting discussion.“6

He
thought that use of sanctions or attmpting to force compulsory arbi-
tration was wrong, and, if there were to be sanctions or other action
by the League, the Dominions and Great Britain must look at the merits
of each case.47 Lothian's view of the League of Nations did not rec-
ognise the potmtial of the League's peace-maintaining mechanism.
Lothian, during the l920's,was pro-German, and he believed that
Gm was the key to European political stability. He felt that

German wanted peace, although she would not want to remain disarmed

“m.
“6&0: P0 2070
“7m" 1:». 112.

 

55

forever and he believed those who thought otherwise were ”living in a
fool's paradise. ””8 He thought if Russia should recover her strength
and try to dominate the West, Germany would be a usefill ally to
Britain and, as such, must be given her place in the sun, ”not so
much a territorial as an economic place, the secure right to the open
door, to raw materials and markets. "“9 When France marched into the
Iblhr in January, 1923, Lothian wrote that Germarw ”was sinner against
as well as the sinner. ”50

During the 1930's, Lothian continually called for ”justice" to
Ger-am. In 1931, he believed that Germamr should be allowed to
rearm, and that Britain should give no more security to France than
that provided for under the Treaty of Locarno. Once Germarv felt
secure, said Lothian, she would drop her demands for equality.51 In
Novelber, 1933, Lord Lothian, while speaking at an Armistice Day
runbrance in Nottingham, England, again stated that there would be
no Blrepean peace until Germary was given equality.52 When the
Germans left the Disammmt Conference in December, 1933, Lothian
argued that Britain should try and get than back to the conference
table, and that German disarmament dlould be backed with universal
guarantees. He said it would be better for Germany to be allowed to
rearm than to be forced to rearm illegally and that there was no use

 

mm.
“9%.
501213., p. 111+.
51mg" p. 123.
52M» p- 19?.

56

in pointing the finger at Nazi excesses because he believed that they
resulted from the same "sense of injustice and inferiority" which had
helped create the Nazi dictatorship in the first place. 53 Although
baffled by many of theractions of the Nazi leaders, Lothian wrote
that ”there is much that is healthy and self-respecting about the
popular aspects of the Nazi renaissance. ”51+ He defended Germany for
leaving the disarmament conference; he felt Germany Should not be
made to promise not to rearm when she had legally been forbidden to
do so. Lothian thought that "Equality in arms would be . . .
Justice. "55 By September, 1934, Lothian stated that the British peo-
ple felt that the peace treaties signed in 1919 had been "dictated
and severe and required some, though not much, revision by agreement."56
He thought the Treaty of Locarno was unworkable and that no British
army'would stop Germany from reclaiming her own territory. This atti-
tude was far different from his stand in 1919 for a strong peace
treaty. He was not classed as the head of the sentimentalists because
he saw "something heroic in Germany's resurgence from.the awful
humiliation of l.9l8."57

Lothian's official biographer, James Butler, points out that

Lothian did not know the German language, its peeples, nor did he

 

53m.
$112514-

55M'a.rtin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appggsegs (London:
hhidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963), p. 30.

SsButler, Loyd Lgthian, p. 199.

57George M. Young, Stanley glean (London: Rupert Hart-Davis,
19.52), Fe 1&e

57

know or understani the character of Hitler, to whom supreme power was
mtrusted in January, 1933. As a remlt of this ignorance, he
"fatally misjudged the situation and applied maxims in the present
instance which were irrelevant. "58 His judgment was incorrect on for-
eign affairs, and he never claimed to be an expert on German affairs.59
Despite Lothian's lack of real knowledge, Dawson, according to his
biographer, was greatly influmced by Lothian's opinions on Germany.
The consensus of informed Opinion regarded Lothian as being very
unstable; Stanley Baldwin, the Prime Minister, called Lothian a ”rum
core" and a ”queer bird," and regarded him as completely useless
inside the cabinet, although sometimes useml outside.6o Thomas Jones,
the author of a m _w_i_t_h_ Letters, cited Phillip Kerr's ability,
intelligence, and unstable judgment-4nd called him a man apt to be a
victim of his most recent experience.61 Jones, in 1932, believed
that Lothian had no interest in the art of politics, but rather inter-
ested himself in the more abstract areas of religion, Communism, and

62 Lord Percy of Newcastle said that he was told that Lothian's

ideas.
mind was ”like a fresh pat of butter, which would take an impress and
record it diarply and accurately. ”63 Lothian's frimd, the historian

Alfred L. Rowse, delicately observed that "of his gifts of mind and

 

Samtler, m, p. 190.
593.14., p. 159.

6°Jones, m, p. an.

61:91-2-

62;§_d._d., p. 1+8.

53mm», m, p. 242.

58

personality, stability of judgment was not one. "64 To the American
Ambassador, fillies: Dodd, whom Lothian told, on their first meeting
in May, 1936, that Hitler had saved Germany, Lothian appeared "more
Fascist than any other Englishman I have met. "65 Robert Boothby, an
H.P. during the 1930's, said that Lothian could not bring himself to
enter the rigorous life of trying to stand for Parliament; Boothby
felt that, if Lothian had run for office, he would have encountered
mm with equal minds who might have convinced him how wrong he was.66
His systu-marbitrary, mercurial, and highly opinionated-would not
have withstood public scrutiny and attack.

Nonetheless, Lord Lothian did enter public life when he became
Ambassador to the United States in 1939. Lord Halifax, the Foreign
Secretary who appointed him, shared his views to some extent on

67

Gemarw. What Lothian presented himself to Presidmt Roosevelt, the

President rusrked half-jokingly that "Britain had suffered from an
inferiority complex" and from an unrealistically magnified fear of
Commg, which had caused the wealthy classes to rush the nation

68

into the arms of the Nazis. Since the outbreak of war in Septenber,

1939, the upper classes had been caught in a snare of their own making.

 

“Alfred L. Rowse, Ihe m o; 95 Each (London: Macbflllan a 00.,
Ltd., 1947). p. 109.

65hrtha Dodd and William E. Dodd, Jr. (£11.), W
W (New York: Harcourt, Brace 8c 00., 1941 , p. 40?.

661mm. Boothby, ; fight to Live ve(Loncbn: Victor Gallancz, Ltd.,
191*?» Po 520

67mm». W. p. 257.

68Hawom L. Ickes. WW. v.1. II:
ng9. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 195M, p.571.

59

The American President's analysis contained more than a kernel of
truth. The fear of Commnimn had certainly influenced hwson, and it
was also influential in Lothian's pro—Germanism. When Lothian died in
1940, his friend Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, said in the
eulog that "no one was ever less prone to temptation of thinking
wishfully or of underrating difficulties. "69 p! mortuis p_i_1, _nis_i_
Me-

Like Lothian, hwson detested the Treaty of Versailles, and, in
fact, this hatred became a major influence on his foreign policy.
How he felt when the treaty was signed we do not know, but, since his
opinions were not recorded at the time (Henry W. Steed was editor in
1919), he was free to condemn the treaty later. And this is pre-
cisely what he did. By the early 1930's, Dawson was convinced the
treaty was unjust, and he felt Germamr had a good case for revision
and frimdly treatment. 1113 limes argued that concessions should be
made even to an unfriendly government; it stated that "agreements
freely concluded" were better than the insistence on the strict
7° By 1929.
Dawson already believed that France wanted to perpetuate the dictated

observance of those agreements that had been dictated.

peace treaty, and he felt that British industry might have recovered
sooner and EhroPean peace might have been accomplished earlier if it
were not for the "recalcitrance of the French and their unwise treat-

ment of the Germans."71 The reader will recall that in 1929 Dawson

 

69But1er, Lord Lothig, p. 313.

7o(hurries L. Mowat, Britain etween the We 1 18-1 no (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1955 , p. 5 .

nfiigton a; :he gig es, Iv, Part II, 817.

60

was not only the editor of m m, but also its foreign affairs
“expert.“ Public opinion in Great Britain had become more favorable
toward Ger-mew after the Germans signed the Incarno Treaty, and
lib-ween, like Lothian, felt that Gerun grievances could be redressed
at the confermce table, and he championed this cause in his news-
paper. By Dec-ber, 1932, Dawson believed that pro-World War I pros-
perity would be possible if hrope, and particularly Genera, could
be pacified, and he decided that m m should promote this
policy.72
Another defect Lothian aphasised in the Treaty of Versailles,
am! which Dawson believed, was the creation of the hetern Diropean
nations. The evil in the world according to Lothian was nationalism
and the insistence on state sovereignty. This doctrine made it impos-
sible to have peace and progress.73 The East European nations, which
had beat created by the Treaty of Versailles, were ignored and insulted
by Ipthian. He even denied their snatches, claiming they were mere
political fictions, created in part to punish German and Austria.
He believed that these countries could only be in danger from Germarv
and that the British should really welcome Gem's drive to the
East for three reasons: (1) it would help divert Germany from
Britain, (2) it would brim unity and order out of the chaos in
Eastern Did-ope, and (3) if Russia decided to move westward, she would
be hlocked.7u

 

72m" Po 880-
73nd», mm. p. 208.
7‘60“. M. p. “9-

61

The American Ambassador to Germany recalled a meeting with Lord
Lothian on February 12, 1936 and he commented that "Lothian preferred
to let Genny go on her conquering way towards mropean domination
rather than impose limitations upon Germamr by his country. "75 The
Ambassador said that Lothian was vehement against France, and
expressed hatred for France twice in the short conversation.76
Lothian believed that France was evil because she had formed military
alliances with the Eastern Diropean nations and in time of war threat-
med to involve Britain in their defense.

m 1933, the Treaty of Versailles seened, to people like Dawson,
an overriding political evil in Eirope. Dawson believed that France
wanted to perpetuate this injustice and that Germany was strong while
France was weak and under the control of left-wing politicians. Many
mglishmen did not like France because of her weakness, which, they
thought, offered a great opportunity for Moscow's agents to infiltrate
the West. To many, an agreement with France was considered, there-
fore, an agreenmt with Communism. The Germans, on the other hand,
were considered to be stronger, wiser, and anti-Communist. Marv
Englishmen felt that trade with Gel-mam would be economically benefi-
cial, and German and the British Commonwealth could make a common
cause, thus forming a potmt force in the world for peace. The
United States was seen as isolated while Russia was devoured by
Comnimn. From this vantage point, the German revolution of 1933,
therefore, looked very promising. Many Diglishmm thought that, if

 

75%, W. p. 309.
751mm p. M6.

62

the German programs looked violent and wild, this effect was partially
England's fault because England had helped to drive Germany "into con-
fusion and anarchy, by agreeing with France to the severe terms of
Vbrsailles."77 These same Britons thought that Britain must try to
understand Germany and Hitler because the Fuehrer had been wronged,
and he surely had the right to justify his country in heroic terms.

They also felt, in partial restitution, Germamr should be given the
benefit of any doubt and out of a sense of fair play Britain must

right the wrongs by changing the Treaty of Versailles.78 In writing
to Ambassador Dodd on May 5, 1935, Lothian identified the pro-French
attitude as the chief failure in British foreign policy, a posture
that perpetuated the injustice toward Germany. With his awareness of
the difficulties that the Treaty of Versailles created for Germamr,
Lothian hoped that Hitler would turn to the East, thus solving German
problus without creating trouble for Great Britain. At the same
time, Lothian built mob of his thinking on the assumption that the
Duocrades had to find a ”stronger place [for the Germans] in world
affairs to which, in his opinion, they are entitled because of their
power and tradition."79 In a later context, Lothian addressed a
similar statement to President Roosevelt, niggesting that "Hitler
should be allowed his head in order to repair the crime of
Versailles. "80

Another factor which moulded the mind of Geoffrey mwson was his

 

77Gott, w, p. 26.
7832“.

79m, W. p. 241.
BOIckee, gazold Ickgs, II, 571.

63

participation in the exclusive gatherings of the Cliveden "Moots" in
the 1930's and particularly after 1937. The popular reaction to the
snobbish "Moots” at that time tmded to ridicule them. One thinks
particularly of the David Low Cartoons that appeared in the m
M. The first of these cartoons appeared in December, 1937, and
it showed the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, walking along a
tightrope holding a pole depicted as Lord Halifax. At one end of the
pole were Dawson, Lothian, and Lady Astor; on the other end were Low's
famous Blimp Brothers. The caption read "concessions and the devil
take the hindmost." Another famous Low cartoon in January, 1938,
showed Goebbels, German Minister of Propaganda, winding up a grana-
phone and teaching girls how to dance to the music; the girls are
represented as Lothian, Dawson, and Lady Astor. These cartoons
reflect a general dislike for the Cliveden set. A Labor M.P. stood
in mfde Park, in February, 1938, and stated that "the foreign policy
of this country is no longer settled in the Cabinet in Downing Street

but at the cmmtry home of Lady Astor at Cliveden."81

Sir Stafford
Cripps, in March, 1938, accused the Cliveden set of running foreign
policy behind Prime Minister Chamberlain's back, and wanting Britain
to become a Fascist state.82
The attacks on the Cliveden set became so vicious that Lord
Lothian in Glasgow, Scotland, on April 28, 1938, felt forced to

reply. He publicly announced that the set was not pro-Fascist, and

 

8:l-Maurice Collie, Nangy Asto; (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc.,
1960), p. 185.

82mm.

61;

that it did not work behind the Prime Mutister's back. He said "The
whole thing is a mare's nest originally invented by the Communist edi-
tor of the m M and spread in pamphlets issued by the
Commast Party."83 Despite this statement, the attacks on the
(Iliveden set did not cease. In September, 1938, Colonel Lindbergh,
who already being accused of pro-Fascist sentiments in his own coun-
try, was invited to Cliveden, and many of the British people felt
that "Lindy" was a clear-cut Fascist. Because he had received medals
from Hitler, mamr people assumed that he was one of Hitler's agents.
They felt that, obviously, Lindbergh would not visit people unfrierflly
to him, and thus his visit to Cliveden proved it was a Fascist den.
This was the reaction of many people to the Cliveden set after the
publicity received in 1937-1938. However, in the years 1935-1936,
most peeple were not even aware that the set existed; nonetheless, it
already had an influence.

Chveden was one of the homes of the Lord and Lady Astor,
located about one hour from London. On the eve of the first World
War a group of young men frequently came to Cliveden for the week-end,
and in this group were Geoffrey Dawson, Phillip Kerr, and Robert
Brand. All of then, one will recall, were members of the Kindergar-
tm, imbued with the idea of the empire and how it might develop into
a Comonwealth of Nations, leading the world toward universal peace.
They all considered thuselves experts on Commonwealth affairs, but
their influence was not readily seen because they worked behind the

 

83mm». Mae. 1:. 250.

65

scmes.8l+ Lady Astor's husband, not yet "Lord" Astor, was then a mem-
ber of Parliament and "Waldorf Astor, as a member of Parliament, was
the link betwem them [the group] and Commons. ”85 Thus the germ seed
for the future Cliveden set of the 1930's was planted. These people
met regularly at Clivedm. The reader will recall the formation of
the Ginger Group, which included the same people. Dawson was then in
his first term as the editor of fig m. The social, intellectual,
and political interrelationships of these people go back to the first
World War. This was not just a social group; it had definite politi-
cal interests far beyond the hunt and party. Its spokesman was the
editor of E2 m, Geoffrey Dawson, and its voice in the Prime
Mirfister's office was Phillip Kerr, his private secretary.

'me menber of the group who really captured Lady Astor's mind,
according to Maurice Collis,-her official biographer, was Phillip
Kerr. She considered him ”a man of charm, talmt, sense, and warmth,

rmarkably unambitious, modest and frank. "86

Phillip Kerr would be
". . . the greatest influence on her life. "87 Kerr was to have great
influnce on two tubers of this group, Geoffrey Dawson and Lady
Astor, until his death in 1940.

Waldorf Astor mjoyed being an M.P. His father's peerage dated

only to 1917. In 1919, when his father died, Waldorf had to give up

 

a‘Coflis, Agtog, pe Sue

853mg.
86M" P0 530

87m.

66

his position in the House of Demons and move to the House of Lords,
with reduced political powers. Lady Astor decided to run for her
husband's House of Commons seat in Plymouth, and she won in 1919.

She held the seat for more than twenty-five years. During 1935—1936,
there were six Astor's and their relatives in the Houses of Parliament.
Lady Astor, her son, brother-in-law, son-in-law, and nephew were in
Commons; her husband sat in the House of 102115.88

Although the Cliveden set, hosted magnanimously by Lady Astor,

, was most active in the 1930's, the precise nature of the group's
thinking and influence is difficult to define. Estimations of the
Cliveden influence vary, some believing that it had a great and disas-
trous impact, others that its reputation is much exaggerated.

Lord Halifax, who observed the Cliveden set from the inside,
found the rumors of its political influence ludicrous, "Cliveden was
another hospitable house, where Lord and Lady Astor loved to assenble
friends. "89 Halifax had attended parties occasionally, although not
frequmtly enough to feel he was a member of a set. He doubted that
the Cliveden set as a political entity even existed; he felt that
there were too many people of various interests, occupations, politi-
cal ideas, and beliefs to form a set. He believed that the group's
supposed ”corporate feelings of tenderness towards Nazi Germany was a
pure invention of some journalistic brain. "90 Thomas Jones said the

Cliveden meetings were an ”unplanned setting for informal talk, a

 

881mm, p. 194.
89Halifax, §u1__lne§§ of Days, p. 155.
90Lbid” p. 156.

 

‘-O'

0!

6?

comfortable theatre for the conversational interplay of political
personalities."91 Men from Parliament, Whitehall, Cabinet Ministers,
the Foreign Office, Empire, France, England, America, and Royalty
all came to Cliveden. Lord Lothian's official biographer notes that
it was neither a group of reactionaries exercising influence on

British politics, nor was it pro-Fascist or pro-Hitler.
Such disclaimers of Cliveden's influence were not universally

accepted. Charles Mowat, the British historian, saw Cliveden as dark,
sinister, and evil, the principal meeting place for menbers of the
upper class such as Lothian, Dawson, and the Astors, who had a love
for the Nazis.92 The inner Cabinet of Chamberlain's government also
gathered at Cliveden; they included Dawson, Halifax, Hoare, Simon,
and Lothian. Marv pe0p1e in England thought that the Astors provided
the central meeting place where all the pro-Nazi elements in govern-
ment and the press could gather.93

In a less damaging analysis, Hugh Thomas, author of The
Esgbligh_ment, found no evil political intent or active subversion at
Cliveden; he felt that the Cliveden set was more concerned with seek-
ing pleasure than with the needs of the nation. He affirmed, however,
that by their collective status the set had a great deal of influence
on the politics of Great Britain. "They enjoyed, even worshipped,

power, but the idea that the purpose of political power is consciously

 

9lJones, m, p. xxx-viii.

92Mowat, main Between War, p. 592.
93:33.31-9 P0 593-

68

to seek to make the world a better place never occurred to them. "94

The Cliveden set was dominated in the 1930's by the mind of Lord
Lothian, the intellectual star of the group, who influenced the group
to believe that Germary was harmless and Hitler should not be criti-

Cisdegs

When on June 2, 1936, Joachim von Ribbentrop went to
England as Hitler's roving Ambassador, Jones arranged for him to go
to Cliveden and meet Lothian, as well as the Astors and Sir Thomas
Inskip, the Minister for the Coordination of Defense. (When Baldwin
elevated Insldp to this sensitive post, Alan J .P. Taylor compared the
appointment to Caligula's appointing his horse Consul.) Daring this
meeting Jones praised Lothian's ability in foreign affairs. Lady
Astor, in support of Jones, declared Lothian had not been wrong in

96 Perhaps she had forgotten or

foreign affairs in twenty years.

ignored the role Lothian played in drawing up the Treaty of Versailles.
The rise of Hitler in 1933 was really at the heart of the dis-

cussions that took place at Cliveden. The rhetorical questions

raised at every session were: Had Hitler arisen because of the harsh

terms of the Treaty of Versailles? Was he the countermovemaat?

Could German animosity be softened by concessions? Should not the

British people be more fair to the Germans? Should the Nazis be

cleaned out? Was Russia and her Bolshevism more dangerous than Nazi
Germany?

 

9“Hugh Thomas, as Egtablishllent (London: Anthony mend, Ltd.,
19$), P0 190

95Boothby, Eight to Live, p. 52.
96Jones, m, p. 215-

69

“ha German left the League of Nations in late December, 1933,
the "set" was shocked. Led by Lord Lothian, they felt England must
bring German back into the fold. They believed that the way to
achieve this would be to satisfy Germarv's reasonable aspirations and
restore Germany's confidence in Britain's fairness. Lord Lothian, as
stated previously, regretted his role in the Treaty of Versailles.

He thought Germany had been punished too harshly and that it was not
"too late to make true friends of then. ”97 The set believed that the
possibility of another world war was too horrible to consider because
the Great War had cost millions of lives, and this sacrifice would be
meaningless if the peace was not kept. They felt that the new genera-
tion must avoid the mistakes of the past; they wanted international
agrements to halt a possible arms race and aveid war. The set also
wanted Gem to be treated as an equal. Lady Astor's official
biographer commented that as late as the spring of 1937 she and her
friends still believed the League of Nations could control Hitler.98
Very few persons acquainted with the facts could be so optimistic,
because for all practical purposes the League had died in June, 1936.
It had failed in Ethopia and the Rhineland.

The last influmce on Dawson was his assistant, Harrington Ward,
who became Dawson's assistant in October, 1927. He agreed with Dawson
on foreign policy, especially in international and continmtal affairs,
and he fortified Dawson's outlook of the world at large.99 Ward saw

 

97001—113, m, p. l8le

981mg" p. 182.
99fligtozz o; The Times, IV, Part II, 810.

70

everything in relation to a higher principle, in moralistic terms.loo
To Whrd Journalism was a calling. He was a fervent apostle of the
moral factors ”standard of honor,” ”rule of ethics," "international
morality," "public opinion,” and "world opinion." These factors were
"destined to be given increasing weight at Printing Heuse Square as
it dealt with France and Germarv."101 The emphasis on these ethical
ideas is especially noticeable in Ihgliimgg attitude toward the
Treaty of versailles as it affected Germany. Whrd felt that the
cruel error of Versailles had to be redressed by the allies, and this
remained one of his deepest convictions. He believed that anything
Hitler did, however immoral, was to be suffered and later neither
facts, nor evidence of violence, cruelty, and aggression changed his
mind. Whrd could not refuse Hitler the conclusions he had arrived at
before Hitler came to power because ward had felt this way since
1927.102

As Dawson's assistant, Barrington Whrd only reinforced Dawson's
ideas, as Dawson, too, was a moralist. His Anglican upbringing and
his attendance at Oxford had strengthened his strong moralistic feel-
ings and he saw the world as black and white, or good and evil.

The factors that influenced Dawson in formulating £13 Egg
policy in 1935-1936 were a belief in.the Commonwealth, fear of

Communism, respect for the Opinions of Lord Lothian, the desire to

 

“oxen. p. 811.

101331., p. 805.

kozAlfred L. Rowse, Appeasement; A Study of Political Decline,
1933-1939 (New Yerk: W. W. Norton and Co., 1961), p. 7.

71

balance injustices of the Treaty of Versailles with regard to Germany,
fear of another war, as felt by the Cliveden set, hatred of France,
and the support of Barrington Ward. Dawson was committed to the views
of those with whom he was friendly, regardless of their competence;
he was committed to Eton, All Souls, The Kindergarten, The Ginger
Group, mlner, Lothian, the Cliveden set, Moots, certain London clubs,
and those ministers with whom he agreed. Although these were limited
groups or circles, Dawson thought they represented the average British
Opinion, and he followed and encouraged them.103
113 Meg stated in its eulogy to Dawson, when he retired in
October, 1941, that his intimate connections were with "the heredi-
tary English governing class, the middle class gentry, and their
ennobled offspring."lou Without intentional irony, fig _Ti_n_12§_ cited
him as a man who "delighted and keenly enjoyed the opportunity his
position opened to him of influencing the trends of politics and the
careers of his friends. No man was more faithful to family, village,

country, school, college, and university. "105

 

103Mowa‘t, Bzitain Between War, p. 536.
Manon of The Lines, IV, Part II, 981.
“592.-

CHAPTER IV

THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND STANLEY BALDWIN

From August, 1931, until the end of World War II, the British
peeple were governed by a National Government; this government was
born in the economic crisis of 1931. Britain suffered a major finan-
cial crisis as a result of the United States stock market crash in
1929. Compared with other countries the balance of payments was
adverse; exports‘by volume had dropped thirty per cent from 1929 to
1931 and by June, 1931, 2,800,000, or twenty-three per cent, of the

1 The British Government's chief

insured workers were unemployed.
concern was how to keep the country solvent.
The Labour Party under Ramsay MacDonald was caught unprepared by

this crisis. The menbers of the government were ignorant of econom-

ics and, therefore, incompetent to deal with the severe problem of

unemployment.2

The financial crisis was acute, and MacDonald, together with his
Gnncellor of the Exchequer Phillip Snowden, was convinced that the
only cure for the fiscal malaise was adherence to the principle that

the government must pay its way. They wanted to reduce governmmt

 

1mm F. Emmet. W (Evanston. 111.:
Row, Peterson 8: Co., 1962), p. 220.

2m" P0 2260

72

73

spuiding, and to restrict the Labour Party's program of social security,
especially the benefits received, by the unenployed. MacDonald's cabi-
net split over this issue, and eleven members, includirg MacDonald,
were in favor of a cutback in the social security program while eight
other cabinet menbers refused to follow their leader. Parliament was
not in sesdon at this time, but may people believed MacDonald's pro-
gram would have been repugnant to most members of the labour Party. 3‘
At an rate, there was not a clearcut vote of confidence and
MacDonald, lacking support, resigned on August 21+, 1931. The Labour
Party forced him and his followers out of the party. Nonetheless,

the King, George V, after consulting with the leaders of the .
Conservatives (W) and the Liberals (Samuel), asked MacDonald to '
form a National Government comprised of menbers of the three parties
to deal with the financial crisis. MacDonald became Prime Minister
and formed a new cabinet, containing four labourites, four
Conservatives, and two Liberals. The Conservatives, who a few days '
before had opposed MacDonald, now became his strong supporters.“

Most of the Labour Party opposed MacDonald's actions, and considered
him a traitor.

On October 27, 1931, the National Government went to the country
to get a ”doctor's mandate” to promote economic recovery, and the
election resulted in a complete victory for the National Government.
The National Governmait won five hundred and fifty-six seats; which

consisted of four hundred ani seventy-three Conservatives, sixty-eight

 

3mm. We p. 7%.

u
Ibldo

7t

Liberals, thirtem National labourites, and two Nationalists. The
opposition received fifty-six seats, which included fifty-two Labour-
ites and four Liberals.5 The only issue of the campaign was whether
it would be wise or not to form a National Government, which itself
had no specific program.

‘lhe key mm in the National Government were Ramsey MacDonald,
Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, Lord President of the Council, °
Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John Simon,
Foreign Secretary, and Sir Herbert Samuel, Home Secretary. The ques-
tion of the necessity of the formation of a National Government
should be considered. The Labour Cabinet and the ”city bankers“
agreed that it was necessary but the Labour Party called it a "bank-
ers' scare,” and claimed that the National Government of August, 1931,
exploited the atmosphere of crisis. Labour conceded that an economic
probla existed but hardly one "demanding extraordinary political
action. "6 Dawson did not agree. The reader will recall that a
National Govermnent or a Conservative Government was the kind of gov-
erment that mwson could gladly support.7 Alfred L. Rowse, the
Oxford historian, argues that the idea of a National Government under-
mined and helped to destroy parliamentary democracy. He believes it
was created to swaddle and sooth British public opinion, and "to let
no clear ideas of thelissues at home and abroad get hold of the minds

of the people, to lull than into a sense of false security when the

 

., p. 71W.
5mvimrst. Wines. 1» 225.
7W. IV. Part II. 794.

75

gravest dangers were accumulating for our country abroad. "8 The
National Government, he continues, had no principle except "that of
holding on to what they or their supporters had got."9 He feels it
was open to pressures, concessions, weaknesses, all from the fear of
losing office, and anyone who differed with the government was
branded an alarmist, or warmonger.lo
The National Government was dominated from 1931 until November,
1935, by the Conservatives, who occupied eighty-five per cent of the
seats in the House of Commons. Simon Haxey, a Conservative M.P., '
listed several characteristics of his colleagues during the 1930's:
they were all very wealthy, the employers of labor and the captains
of industries, and they had "little in common with the man in the
street."11 The links of the Conservative Party with wealth and big .
business were very'strong. The party, according to R. Scott, also
”maintains its historical connection with the Church of England,"

omitting Jews and nonpconformists from its candidates.12

The Tories,
during the 1930's, controlled the press, and they used it to "enable
public Opinion to be swayed to suit Tory policy. "13 Douglas Reed, a

former 11.13133 correspondent, argues that me Ii_._r_nes was the Conservative

 

8Rowae. W. p. 68.
9mg.” p. 71.
10M" P- 680

nSimon Haxey, Eglang's Money Lords (London: Harrison Hilton
Books. 1939). p- 35-

12$cott, Life in mtein, p. 150.
13mm. emanates. p. mo.

76

organ, and one should "read 111; _T_i;n_§_§ if you wish to know what is
actually going to happen [or] what a Conservative Government will do
whm a crisis comes.”lh

The real power in the National Government after 1933 was not the
Prime Minister; although MacDonald was the titular head of the group,
he only "preserved the fiction of a non-partisan government."15 The
man actually in charge was Baldwin; however, he liked standing behind
the throne in order to avoid the responsibility of making final deci-
sions. Despite this, in May, 1933, Inwson editorialized that
MacDonald was Britain's one indispensable man and that it was
MacDonald who had decided to face the country with a National
Government.16 The year of 193+ was the lull before the storm; the
worst of the depression had almost ended, and the international cri-
sis had hardly begun.l7
clear to persons in the government that MacDonald was becoming unfit

By the end of 1934, however, it became very

for duty. His speeches in the House of Commons were growing increas-
ingly vague, and people gossiped about his incompetence.18 Finally
in June, 1935, MacDonald stepped down and Baldwin became Prime
Minister.

Stanley Baldwin, in June, 1935, became Prime Minister for a

third time, but he had never been far from power. Winston Churchill

 

“Reed, W: p. 20”..

lSHavighurst, mating Century mtain, p. 241.
16Wrmch, m, p. 299.

17Graves, 129g yegk-eng, p. 315.

18mg" p. 318.

77

correctly observed that Baldwin "became the ruling force in British
politics from October, 1922, when he ousted Lloyd George, until May,
1937."'19 Despite his significant position in public life, Baldwin is
still an migma; he kept no diary, circulated no memoranda to his
colleagues, and very rarely wrote a political letter. Most of his
papers have been destroyed. 20

Baldwin was born in 1867, into a wealthy family that made its
fortune from iron and steel mills.21 His early upbringing was in an
atmosphere of piety, frugality, and wealth. At Harrow, Baldwin was
caught with a piece of "juvenile pornography," and punished so severely
that he lost interest in his work and ceased to try to excell. None-
theless, he was accepted at Cambridge, where he took a third-class
degree, "a result clearly below his capacity. ”22 At Cambridge he was
"shy, diffident, and bad at coping with energencies. "23 After gradu-
ating from Cambridge, in 1888, Baldwin went to work in the family
steel mills at Wilder, Worcestershire. Baldwin's father had been a
Conservative M.P. from 1892, until his death in 1908. In that year
Baldwin was offered his father's safe seat in Bewdley, Worcestershire,
and he won unopposed.

Baldwin was forty when he entered the House of Commons, and

 

19marten 3. Churchill, 1112 gathegng Stem (New York: Bantam
Books, 1.961), p. we

201m. W: P0 11-
21mm. W. p. 26.
222mm. p. 28.

2312.19.-

78

appeared to be a plodding, upper-middle-cla ss Tory, representing a
safe Conservative seat. Daring the next six years he made five unim-
pressive speeches?“ Baldwin worked hard on committees, but, by
1916, he had not been recognized and he had become discouraged: he
thought of leaving the House of Commons.

The Great War had left its mark on his character; the waste,
wickedness, misery, and the tragedy of it "affected him like a spirit-
ual conversion. "25 Baldwin believed that he had to pave the way
toward creating a better government and a safe peace for the school-
boys who were too yourg to fight. He felt that another war would be
a disaster to avoid at almost any cost.

Baldwin, as President of the Board of Trade, and a cabinet man-
benr, felt by March, 1921, that the real control of'affairs lay in the
hands of a few people, namely, George, Churchill, and Birkenhead. He
did not think these mm were serious enough about problcns of the
state.26 Because he lacked "repartee," he was unable to communicate
his resutnent, and he did not recognise that these men were more
experienced than he and just as dedicated.

The coalition government of Lloyd George was dissolved in 1922,
and after the election in November, 1922, A. Boner Law became the new
Prime Minister, and Baldwin his Chancellor of the Exchequer. After
seven months, Law retired because of illness and Baldwin became the

new Prime Minister. Baldwin, although very colorless and lacking in

 

mag" p. 32.
25M, P0 330
261134" P0 35.

79

political astutmess, was selected Prime Minister as a compromise
candidate between the two Conservative factions. Baldwin was Prime
Minister from May, 1923, until January, 1924. The Labour Government
came in until Novenber, 1921+, under Ramsey MacDonald. Baldwin
replaced MacDonald as Prime Minister for a second time and held the
reins of government until June, 1929. MacDonald returned as Prime
Minister until August, 1931, at which time he resigned, and then he
formed the National Government with Baldwin as second in command.
However, as stated above, by 1933, Baldwin had already become the
dominating force in the government although he did not officially
replace MacDonald until June, 1935. He was now almost seventy years
old.

Baldwin's thirty-year career in politics had bem spent almost
exclusively in shaping domestic policy, and his long experience in
Oomons was of no real help in the tasks he had to face in foreign
affairs during the trying years of 1935-1936. He did not believe the
League of Nations could be an effective force in the affairs of the

27 The Great War had disillusioned him; he believed war to be

28

world.
"the worst of all possible evils that might befall the human race."
This belief, in turn, generated a tremendous distrust and suspicion
of am step that might lead to war.

Contenporaries of Baldwin agree that his knowledge of foreign
affairs was very slight. One of his foreign secretaries, Samuel
Hoare, noted that Baldwin knew no foreign languages and had little in

 

27Young, fldwin, p. 173.
28m... p. 177.

80

common with foreigners, and it was this "insularity that obscured his
view of the changing world. "29 Hoare says Baldwin loathed foreign
affairs, and Thomas Jones, Baldwin's private secretary, points out
that Baldwin knew no European history.30 His biographer, George
Young, says Baldwin would or could not bring his mind to bear on amy-
thing he was not interested in; he did not try to understand how
other people felt or thought, and "foreigners made him peevish or
salt him to sleep.”31 Even more damaging, Young reports that, when
the cabinet discussed foreign affairs, Baldwin would say "wake me up
when you're finished with that," and thus the foreign policy of
Britain was drawn from this attitude of indifference.32 Neville
Chamberlain, Baldwin's Chancellor of the Ecchequer, noted on March 8,
1935, svm before he became Prime Minister, that Baldwin was “tired
and won't apply his mind to problems. ”33 Anthony Eden recalled that
in foreign affairs Baldwin was "a passive listener rather than an
active contributor. "31+ Another contenporary, Diff Cooper, argued
“foreign affairs was so uncongenial to his [Baldwin's] mind he

 

29Viscount Tenplewood, Nine Imblgd Igr; (London: Wm. Collins,
195“), P0 136-

mJones, m, p. 173-
31mins. m. p. 61.
32m: P0 63.

33mm Fanning. MW (London: mm
‘m 00., 1966), p. 242.

3”sz W: P- 33140

81

preferred to ignore it. "35 Lord Vansittart, the Permanent Under
Secretary for the Foreign Office believed Baldwin could not "find time
to masticate the mass of our Foreign Office papers. ”36 A Prime
Minister who did not read the reports prepared for him by his own
Foreign Office left much to be desired. John F. Kennedy argued that
Baldwin ”should be condenned for his blindness and his unwillingness
to face unpleasant facts. "37 And finally, Baldwin's friend, Thomas
Jones, noted sarcastically in his diary on March 19,. 1935, that
”Baldwin is a gmial sucker tho promises everything and forgets every-
Mabefi

What merges from these quotations is a consensus that Baldwin
was insular, uninterested in foreign affairs, and given to underesti-
mating their importance in the policy of the British Government. He
was, in short, the wrong man to lead Britain through the series of
crises which she was to face in the years 1935, 1936, and 1937.

Baldwin was not likely to read or comprehend the intelligmce
reports that came from qualified observers of the European scene, and
the evidmce of his failure to examine reports on Gemaxv is over-
whelnng. In 1933, Sir Horace Rumbold, the Britida Ambassador in
Berlin, told the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Simon, that the

 

35111:: Cooper, 01 tobio ra o
.W (Ionian: Rupert Hart-Davis. 1953). p- 2M-

361m vansiturt. .Wmmmm
W (London: Hutchinson. 1958). p- 352-

37John 1“. Kennedy, W (London: Hutchinson 8. Co.,
Ltde, 1%), Po lfi‘

38Jones, m, p. 143-

82

German people were beirg sowed, and that the Jews ani others were
being suit to cmcentration camps. Humbold maintained that Hitler
was devious and harmful, but London did not or would not believe this
to be true.39 After Germany suddenly left the Disarmament Confermce
in December, 1933, James Herring, British Air Attache, spoke to the
wife of a German air official at an air display in Berlin; she
pointed to a two-seater "mail" plane and suggested it was probably a
new type of fighter plane. He reported this to London but his infor-
mation was ignored.“0 The reports of Sir Eric Phipps, the British
Ambassador in Berlin from 1931} until 1937, also were ignored. The
French Ambassador, Andre Francois-Poncet suggests that "he [Phipps]
had sec: through Hitler's real nature" from the beginning and "he had
never bee: the dupe of the Third Reich."h1 Phipps told the Ambassador
from the United States, William Dodd, in August, 1931+, that Hitler
would gladly go to war if he had the power, and that Eirope must
either unite or fall. Dodd quotes Phipps as warning that "Europe
must watch Germazw day and night. "’42 Ivone Kirkpatrick, a profes-
donal civil servant in the British Foreign Office, agrees that
Phipps hated the Nazis, and grew sick watching Germary prepare for

war. He became even more discouraged when the British government

 

3960’“. lemma. 1» 27.
“this” p. 32. '

ulAndre’ Fran ois-Poncet, ate ea emo' of
W (New York: Harcourt. Brace & 00-.
19"9 a P0 1120

42Dodd. Wm. 13- 139.

83

ignored his warnings of Germany's military buildup.43 The Germans
cleverly understood how to reach Baldwin, and, in May, 1936, Ribbentrop
asked Jones to visit Berlin, feeling that he could talk to Jones as
he could not talk to Phipps. Ribbentrop knew Jones was close to
Baldwin.“ Baldwin did not respect his ambassador, Phipps, because
Phipps was anti-German, and Baldwin believed he was hampered by diplo-
matic traditionfis Baldwin would not listen to his Permanent Under
Secretary of the Foreign Office, Vansittart, who was strongly anti-
Gm, but also an informed diplomat.

mile ignoring the intelligence reports from qualified sources,
Baldwin preferred to receive his information from more compatible
authorities. The Prime Minister was subject to the influence of a
small and largely secret group of people ”whose proper fields of
responsibility did not lie in foreign affairs. "46 Baldwin craved
friendship, but he chose his "intimate friends outside of politics. ”1&7
Forenost among these close associates was Geoffrey Dawson, who had
been Baldwin's friend for many years.

From 1922-l9hl, Geoffrey mwson came very close to exercising
"direct influence on the government. "48 _T_h_e_ Him 2; _T.h_e_ £11125

 

“Blvone Kirkpatrick, The Igez giggle; Memoir; of. none
W (New York: St. Martins Press, 1959), p. 90.

“Jones, m, p. 200.
“560th masts. p. 51.
“éconneu, :he Office, p. 2A3.

47Percy of Newcastle, §ome Memg’ies (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode,
1958), P- 192-

48Vhlliams, m, p. 270.

81+

agrees that Dawson was a close personal frieml of Baldwin's, and sup-
ported him at every turn.“9 The biographer of lord Beaverbrook,
Thomas Driberg, says Beaverbrook believed Dawson was more "important
than any of the Prime Minister's colleagues" and that "Dawson was
invariably consulted first" in time of trouble; when Baldwin appeared

hesitant, Dawson comforted and encouraged him.50

Dawson conducted
himself in his relations with Baldwin "as though he were a confiden-
tial adviser, a superior civil servant," and Dawson's influence was
not so much that of a journalist, but "of an eminence ggi_s_e_ of poli-
tics, the confidant and go—between of men of power."51 lilo editor of
1113 _'_Timg§_ was the bellwether for the Prime Minister.52 Thomas Jones
says that Baldwin, when bored with ordinary "yes-men" in the civil
service, needed Dawson as a confident.53 In return, Dawson, who had
complete faith in Baldwin's common sense and integrity, said ”yes"
from sincere conviction. 5“
The friendship betwem Dawson and Baldwin began in May, 1923,
and a possible reason for the friendship might have been that Baldwin

liked a Fellow of All Souls "better than my other fellow. "55

 

“9W. Iv. Part II. 892.
5°Tom Driberg, ea b ck owe d
(as... warm... W
fireman. W. p. 176.
52Randolph 8. Churchill, e o c en

(New York: G. P. Putnam and Son, 1959 , p. 68.
53Jones, M, p. m.

fiW. Iv, Part II. 825.
55Vansittart, m. p- 359-

85

Eyen after Baldwin had become Prime Minister, Dawson believed him to
be unchanged, that is, a politician ”singularly free from self-
advertisuent,” and not forgetful of old friends.56 Dawson's diary
recorded a two-hour meeting with Baldwin on June 7, 1923, at which
tine thq spoke on many subjects, such as the squabbles in the cabi-
net, the public's reaction to the new Prime Minister, the problems
about the Ruhr, who should be named the new British Ambassador to the
United States, the problems of the Dominions, and, finally, Baldwin's
admitted ignorance of the empire.57 Dawson recorded another meeting
on Novuaber 4, 1921+, the eve of Baldwin's second ten in office, and
Dawson stated that "he tried to give him [Baldwin] some wise advice
about his government, [of] which he took only part. ”58 Dawson
recorded still. another meeting on November 6, 1921+, when he identi-
fied the good and bad numbers in Baldwin's Cabinet.99 Baldwin and
hwson met regularly during Baldwin's second term, and the editor
said that, when he felt there was too much complacency in Downing
Street, he would meet Baldwin and prod his old friend along.60 In
Septnber, 1928, mwson again discussed members of the cabinet, and
told Baldwin that if he wished to win the forthcoming election, he

should tell the people that there would be changes in his team.61

 

56Wunch, m, p. 218.
57mg" pp. 218-19.
58mm, D. 233.

59mg.

60m” p. 236.

61m" p. 265.

86

On the eve of the election of April, 1929, Baldwin spoke to
Dawson about reconstruction of the cabinet. On April 13, 1929, 11h;
m published an article about why reconstruction would be advis-

able at the time.62

Dawson noted in his diary in October, 1930, that
it was very hard to commit Baldwin to an east statement of his views,
and he feared that Baldwin never really rose to his fill]. capacity
until the causes for which he stood were almost desperate.63 His own
tremendous influence on Baldwin, in foreign affairs, turned out to be
an asset neither to Baldwin nor to the British peOple.

Ihwson's advice, whether good or bad, opinionated or factual,
had to be judged by Baldwin in the light of his own characterand
experiences; Baldwin at this time was too tired, physically and men-
tally, to attend carefully to advice from any source. Baldwin was a
product of militant Christianity, with a "strong sense of tradition
and reveration for the past," and his conscience was more active than
his intellect.64 He was more of a preacher than a statesman; he
should not be called lazy for he ”was a ruminant. "65 Baldwin was
"inclined to live in the past" and "his heart was more with the coun-
tryside ad the pigs than with the devious speeches and machinations of

poutidans e "66

 

62mg" p. 274.

63M" p. 287.

6“Jones, M, p. xxvi.

65%., pe we
“Bard-as. W: p. 167.

87

Neville Olamberlain, Baldwin's successor in 1937, threw light on
Baldwin's essential character when he told the story of Baldwin after
his defeat in 1923. Baldwin believed that the cabinet had plotted
against him and Chamberlain believed that when Baldwin asked him to
go for a walk so that Baldwin could ask him about political problans;
however, there was "Not a bit of it. He talked pelicans, and the
beauty of spring at Astley, and I [Chamberlain] had the utmost diffi-
culty in dragging in politics. "67 Baldwin perplexed, charmed, and
exasperated Chamberlain; he liked Baldwin as an individual, but felt
that he was not a positive leader.68

hon the other side of the aisle Baldwin looked less whimsical
and more senile. Aneurin Bevan became infuriated with Baldwin on the
rare occasion at which he spoke in Parliament. Bevan called his
speeches "audible reveries' which were Baldwin's substitute for ora-
tory on grave occasions." Bevan saw in than a "shambling gate of
pedestrian thought." "It is medicine man talk," he said. "It lifts
discussion on to so abstract a plane that the minds of the hearers are
relieved of the effort of considering the details of the immediate
problems. It imposes no intellectual strain because thought drifts
from thought, assemblingmd dissolving like clouds in the upper air,
having no connection with earthly obstacles. It flatters, because it
appears to offer intimate companionship with a rare and noble spirit.
It pleases the unskeptical, because it blurs the outline of unpleas-

ant fact in a mass of meaningless generalities. Mummrs of admiration

 

67pm, We p. m.
68m. p. 164.

88

break out as this second-rate orator trails his tawdry wisps of mist
over the parliamentary scene."69
Baldwin conceived the role of the Prime Minister as that of a
person apart from others with no colleagues of equal rank; he
believed that all the decisions were to be made by him. Of all the
gifts that a Prime Minister should have, Baldwin felt he possessed,
to a pre-eninent degree, the ability to understand the people; he
said ”my worst enemy could never say that I do not understand the
peeple of England. ”70 Because he saw his duty in terms of his inti-

mate and unquestioned knowledge of his countrymen, he brought this
concept into cabinet meetings and made "it tell in the deliberations

of his colleagues. ”71 He believed he did not have to do or say much
and he thought the less he interfered the better it was; however, he
felt his colleagues had to know that he embodied "the force to which
thq owe their offices: the will of the people, the sense of the
nation. "72

Baldwin's biographer, Young, says that eventually everyone who
knew him concluded that he was indolent. Dawson's influence burgeoned
in proportion to Baldwin's indolence because the Prime Minister, not
willing to sift a great variety of conflicting advice from those
trained professionally in government, more and more came to depend on

his private source for advice and comfort. The English historian,

 

69Michael Foot, An n 18 -l 0 (London:
Macgibbon & Kee, 1962 , p. 25?.

”Iowa. Balm. p. 54.
711291.51-
72inch

89

Sir Charles Petrie, says Baldwin was the laziest Prime Minister in
the twentieth century.73 Baldwin preferred to do nothing rather than
act; he took over a great empire, supreme in power, secure in its
liberty, and led it almost to annihilation.74 Winston Churchill says
Baldwin ”preferred the substance to the form of power, and reigned
placidly in the background."75 Churchill, on November 12, 1936, in
the House of Commons, summarized Baldwin's leadership; he said the
government had indicated that it has "decided only to be undecided,"
”resolved to be irresolute," "solid to fluidity," and "all powerful
to be impotent. "76 Mien Baldwin resigned in May, 1937, Churchill
described him as laying down "the wide authority he had gathered and
carefully maintained, but had used as little as possible," a man with-
out detailed executive ability, a man who knew little of Europe, and
disliked what he knew, a man detached from a concern of foreign
affairs of his country.77
This description summarized Baldwin very adequately; it is under-
standable that the people of Britain, victimized, by a recent European
war, wanted to ignore the entire field of foreign affairs, but it is

hardly justifiable for a political leader with responsibility for the
nation's welfare to ignore these problems. The only advice Baldwin

 

733ir Charles Petrie, Ihe Powegs Behind the lame wit-egg
(London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1958), p. 58.

7“onto [Frank Owen, Peter Howard and Michael Macintosh Foot],
Eflt! Men (New York: FrairiCk As Stokes COe’ 19%), Fe 14.

75Churchill, §torm, p. 60.
7621214.. p. 193.
77M” pp. 197-98-

90

left to his followers was to "use your common sense, avoid logic,
love your fellow men; have faith in your own people. "78 From the man
who had, in effect, been the National Government for the four years

of Hitler's greatest growth, this advice was hardly adequate.

 

78Young, Egldwin, p. 209.

CHAPTERV

THE PRO-GERMANISM or 1133 ms AND DAWSON,
JANUARY TO APRIL, 1935

The main problem in foreign affairs confronting The _Ti_m_§_s_ and
its European expert, Geoffrey Dawson, in the first half of 1935 was
German rearmament. Until January, 1935, The Ii__r_n_e_s_' police was unset-
tled, but, after the New Year, it began to assume a pro-German shape
and by June it was obvious that the basis of its foreign policy was
the appeasenent of Hitler. wring the first six months of 1935,
there were two climactic events; Germany broke the Treaty of
Versailles in March, and Great Britain signed a Naval Agreanent with
Germamr in June. Both of these events called for editorial cement
because of their importance; The __Ti_n_1_e_s_ condoned Germany for breaking
the Treaty of Versailles and supported the Naval Agreement. These
attitudes were no surprise to the perceptive reader of I93 1.21;:
because it was apparent that the paper was following a non-critical
pattern toward Germany. Whatever the issue, foreign affairs, rearma-
mmt, or even Geman internal affairs, 1'93 jugs was either decisively
pro-German or, at very least, non-committal. Based on his influences,
this attitude was not unexpected of Dawson. The most bitterly ironic
fact was that Dawson, gullible and susceptible as he was to unsup-
ported opinions from "prOper" sources, was himself the largest single

influence on British public Opinion at this time.

91

92

At the beginning of 1935, The Egg; was universally regarded as
the sati-official paper of the British Governmmt, and "it was cemen-
plaoe that what £2 E; was writing the government was usually think-
ing."1 From inside the govermmt Anthom' Eden, too, observed that
”m m was widely regarded in EurOpe as the organ of the British

2 This fact was even more obvious to an objective scholar,

Government."
R. A. Scott, who said that the editor and the political. line of m
m have "led to the belief, quite widely held in Britain, and very
widely held indeed outside of Britain that Ir_1_e {rings is nothing more
or less than the mouthpiece of the Government. ”3 Foreigners believed
1'93 125;; "to be inspired by the British Government of that dam“
Douglas Reed, a former limes journalist, says that E9 line; is unique
among the world's newspapers at this time because “it is more objec-
tively studied in foreign countries than any other" and one should
read m m if ”you wish to know what is actually going to happm,
[or] what a Conservative government will do whm a crisis comes. "5
Thus, 1]}; m, in early 1935, was the most powerful editorial voice
in England. Mary of the world's leading figures read 1h; unto
learn the policy of the British Government.

men Hitler came to power in January, 1933, as Chancellor of

Germ-xv, the attitude of the paper was to treat his government like

 

lGraves, We P- 351-
2Eden,flggiug Po 197-;

3Scott, mm, p. 231+.
"Wheeler-Bennett» W. p. 96.
5Reed, m, p. 20h.

93

aw other, based on its performance and merit. Dawson believed that
one could not speculate about the future behavior of Hitler's govern-
muit until Hitler could be judged on performance, ”for cooperation
with allies or colleagues, which are the real tests of a ruler."6 W
February, 1933, m Mgr correspondents wrote that the German
Governmait, its chiefs, and its supporters were acting in an abnomal
way. The correspondents told Dawson that German wanted to ream and
use her anned strength as she pleased, and also to obtain modifica-
tions of the Treaty of Versailles, but there was no comment from £2
15531.7 On June 28, 1933, the fourteenth anniversary of the Treaty
of Versailles, 12.9. Mg used the occasion for an attack on the
treaty. The paper stated that Eirope was in a dilema and must
choose either ”to refuse to force what reason suggests in part be con-
ceded, or else yielding to extranism what earlier was refused to mod-
eration. ”8 The newspaper, and Dawson, by June of 1933 saw "no reason
win an action that was justified by ethics ani politics before
January, 1933, should be held to be falsified by events of the 30th
of that month."9 Dawson and the British Government had been told
that Hitler was preparing to rearm, but both ranained silent. On
October 14, 1933, when it was learned that Hitler withdrew from the
Disarmament Conference and Germazw resigned from the League of Nations

as of October 28, Dawson remained unperturbed and believed that now,

 

6W. Iv. Part II. 881.
7&9... p. 882.

3mm.

9mm. We p- 7-

94

more than ever, treaty revision was of primary importance. Dawson
complained on Novanber 27 that British disarmament proposals had
never hem precisely stated to the world. mwson believed the world
deserved to know what, in Britain's Opinion, would represent a fair
and reasonable offer to Germary. He believed that one did not know
whether Hitler wanted peace, as his speeches indicated, or was only
hiding behind oratory while preparing for war; he knew Britain would
have to deal with Hitler in either event, and he felt Britain should
be open.10

mwson, as noted by his biographer, encountered much difficulty
and indecisiveness in writing of the past events of 1933. In his
diary he noted in 1933 that there was a great deal of indecision in
high government places about Germarv. The National Government, Dawson
believed, was adequate to the task for which it had been famed--
solving Britain's economic problansubut was not capable of dealing
with the difficulties of E1rope.ll To Dawson and many intelligent
Englishmen at the end of 1933, Hitler's apparent ravings were not the
war cries of a wicked man, but rather the reasonable complaints of a
man who had been wronged}:2

On March 1, 1934, Dawson wrote to his Berlin correspondent that
Hitler would find sympathy in England if he were really to help the

youth of Gemarw. Dawson also said that he believed ”Hitler might

 

”Wrench, Dim. p- 309.
11m" P0 30“-
1zGott. imam. p. 26-

95

not be so bad if he were delivered from the influence of some of his
wicked associates" but Dawson noted that even at their worst the Nazis
were behaving no differently from any other politicians.13 Dawson at
no time in the early period relayed the frightened reports of his
European correspondents telling of Germaxv's buildup of air power,

and that German commercial planes were really military planes in
disguise.

Hitler, on June 30, 193+, purged mg of the high affidals of
the Nazi party. Ernest Roehm, a high official in the party, was
killed. mwson was at his country estate at the time of this news
release, but 332 m did not censure this act; in fact the paper
almost condoned it, saying that Hitler was trying to impose a high
standard of conduct on the officials of the National Socialist move-
mmtfm Dawson noted in his diary that, whm he heard about this
Nazi act, he believed Germany had been reduced to barbarian, which
was in sharp contrast to 1'22 My report.15 Lord Lothian, Dawson's
chief source of knowledge on German affairs, believed the Germans
were mad gunman.16 The official Mn 91 1'1_1_e_ 113g pointed out
that mwson was recorded as opposing the editorial which almost con-
doned this brutal action. However, it is reasonable to assume that
the anemone writer who wrote the editorial which placed Hitler in

 

13mm, Iv, Part II, 886.
“my" p. 887.

15Wrmch, m, p. 316.

“Rowse, W, p. 31.

96

such a favorable light must have done so in the expectation of his
editor's approval.

_At the and of 1934, m m published its review of the year;
1931}, said the paper, was a year of nary discomforts and afflictions,
but the inhabitants of Great Britain might note with pride that,
despite its faults, their country was still the best country in the
world to live in, especially in view of the plight of the rest of the
worl.d.]'7 The review of the year indicates more clearly than am
other evidence the indomitable optimism of $13.2 My} editor.

The British Government on the eve of 1935 was tranquil in the
hands of Baldwin; although MacDonald was the had of the National
Government, as previously pointed out, it was actually Baldwin who
guided the affairs of state after 1933. British foreign policy from
1931-1935 appears to be essentially negative; the greatest attention
was paid to domestic problens in Great Britain, and inside the govern-
mmt any conflict as to what should be done in foreign affairs was
resolved by the fear of the Comunists, thus minimizing the dangers

18 The major negative factor was the lack of loyal Opposi-

of Fascism.
tion. 'nie National Governnmt had more than eighty-five per cent of
the seats in the House of Commons, and the opposition was impotent,
leaderless, and chaotic. Consequently, the leaders of the National
Goverment could afford to ignore amr criticism from the floor and
they did so.

The one positive factor seened to be that, since World War I,

 

l7Wrench. Dams. p- 310.
laHavishurste We 1» 2A1.

97

British Governmmts agreed that their foreign policy rested "upon
the Covalent of the League of Nations and the theory of collective
security; in doing so they were reflectim the beliefs and wishes of
ninetybfive per cent of the electorate. "19 Collective security might
be defined as the attanpt to keep international order by consent
rather than by compulsion; for example, if a state became belligerent,
it would soon find the rest of the members of the League of Nations
against it. These nations would place emotions on the disruptive
nation as a means of coercion. Collective security meant that nations
would not have to be heavily armed, with huge military buildnps, and
tax mnds would be released for more humane purposes}0

The National Government under MacDonald adhered to the policy of
the League of Nations, as did Baldwin, but Baldwin also had to deal
with the problem of German rearmament. It is fair to recall Baldwin's
violent dislike for foreign affairs, and he and the National
Government, warned by representatives on the Continent that Hitler
was reaming, still chose to ignore the problem.

German rearmament, however, had advanced by 1935 far beyond the
point it had occupied in 1933. The only reason for the British

Government not acting on Germany before 1935 was that the governing
classes wanted to retain power, and could do so only by ignoring ”the
German problen. "21 Winston Churchill summed up the feeling in the

country on the eve of 1935. The desire for peace "which animated the

19Harold Nicolson, m George no fifth; g; 5 Life g; Beign
(Lawn: “muble and Coo, Ltda, 1952 9 pa 527e
2033.2-
21
Boothby, Light to Live, p. 132.

 

98

uninformed, misinformed majority of British people" was disastrous,
and it appeared to be political suicide for aryone to try to awaken
thu; however, continued Churchill, it ”is no excuse for political
leaders who fell short of their duty."22

Whether the British Government and 11; 1213s recognized it or
not, Hitler had been very busy in 1933-1934. Dining this period his
foreign policy was to act in such a way as to avoid disturbing the
powers who had signed the Treaty of Versailles. This tactic allowed
him to rearm with time and freedom and to build German military
power.23 He wanted to create a "Great German Army" and then make
Germany the most important power in Eirope, which, of course, meant
utterly destroying the Treaty of Versailles?”

here is a difference of opinion among scholars as to the means
to Hitler's and. One school of thought is represented by the idea
that Hitler had a planned foreign policy, that is, a blueprint which
he followed accordingly.25 Another interpretation insists that
Hitler was a unique phenomenon in foreign policy and that he "trans-
lated commonplace thoughts into action,” appearing as the "master in
the game of waiting”; the proponents of this view believe that in for-

eign affairs Hitler recognized that his opponents were utterly

 

22mmh111, £22211: p. 100.

23Alan Bullock, tle u (lst ed. rev.; New
York: H‘rp’r ROW & C0.’ 19 2), Do 3210

2“Alan J.P. Taylor, e 0 o e econ We 1
(Greenwich, Conn.: Fhwoett Publications, Inc., 19 l , p. 70.

253cm. Wins. 13. us.

99

confused and that they literally forced success upon him.26 Regard-

less of the interpretation, it is clear that by the eve of 1935,
German rear-ament was well underway, and Hitler could no longer hope
to keep it a ”secret.”

The British Foreign Secretary, who would have to deal with the
problu of German rearmament during the first half of 1935, was Sir
John Simon. He was an All. Souls man, and a very close friend of
Dawson' 8. Simon, Foreign Secretary since the founding of the
National Government and a key figure in that government, was very
indecisive. Anthem Eden recalls that Simon had a "brilliant, ana-
lytical mind [but] hated to make decisions,” and that he would
attulpt to dodge decision-making while giving "an ingenious reason"
for delay.27 Another view says that he lacked the two essential
qualifications for the job: (1) he did not have the knowledge neces-
sary for his position, and (2) he did not have the aptitude for long-
range policy-making; he saw each episode as detached from all others;

28

for him the art of diplomacy was relying on one's instinct. An

official in the German Enbassy in London, describing Simon, said that

he really represmted the "British mentality which preferred a bad
compromise to a straight solution, if that solution involves the

assumption of am responsibility. "29 Besides his indecision and

 

25km». W. p. 72.
27mm. retain. p- 32-

23“er L. Kennedy. W (London: word
University Press, 1937), p. 108.

29mm, 52mm. p- 66-

100

predilection for intuition he had no knowledge of Eirope, its history,
or its peoples, and he believed that the French cries for security
were romantic fantasies.”

On January 16, 1935, 1113 times printed the story of Hitler's Joy-
ous speech after ninety per cent of the Saarlanders in a plebiscite
agreed to return the Saar to Germarw. The paper quoted Hitler as say-
ing he would "raise no further territorial claims against France" and
that the way was now clear for a F‘ranoo-German understanding and that
”the complicated international settlements of German equality of sta-
tus is regarded as a condition" for such talks to begin.31 The edi-
torial of the same day spoke of Hitler's speech and his intentions
for peace, implying that this would strengthen peace among the
European nations. Dawson said that the British people should believe
Hitler and his peaceful intentions because "there is no reason to
doubt than. "32 By Hitler's action in the Saar, Dawson believed
Hitler would be placing himself in close accord with Britain and
France, which would create harmonious relations in Europe. it this
time no one could see that this legal move was the first stage of
Hitler's expansion in Europe.

The German concentration camps came under the scrutirw of m
m in 1935, but only in their relationship to foreign affairs. On
January 2A The Egg; said that these ”are instruments not of law but
of terrorism, and tend to breed cases of personal cruelty and random

 

mT‘ylar’ Qégylfl 2: afiozg Halli El, pa 6?.
31mm (London). Jewry 16. 1935. p. 10.
3211214.. p. 11.

lOl

oppression." However, the paper continued, this does not mean the
Nazi regime should abandon "the use of the 'strong hand' against its
political opponmts." Dawson reasoned ”that it is not lightly to be
believed that they [the authors of the systan] delight in harshness
and cruelty." ”May not we, as foreigners who admire and love so much
that is German, who wish to remove causes of misunderstanding between
our peoples," appeal to Hitler, and hope he will look anew at these
camps because this would "strengthen his moral position both at home
and abroad. "33 Although this article was at first critical, it later
weakened its criticism so that, in effect, 1119 Meg almost apolo-
gised for German barbarian.

Geoffrey Dawson's friend Sir Edward Grigg spoke on foreign
affairs before the University Conservative Club at Oxford on
January 25. Dawson commented on this speech in an editorial and
agreed with Grigg's views, which were that the Treaty of Locarno was
the focal point of British foreign policy. However, there are limits,
even here, Inwson injected, because no country can be expected to
undertake ”conitmmrts in cases where its own interests are not
affected." The editorial pointed to the coming British visit of
M ministers Flandin and Laval, and the paper said that Britain
should not make further promises to France. m Tim observed that
”German rearmament is the central fact of European politics, and
German equality within a vstem of security is a principle that has
been accepted by all." Ihwson said that now was the time for the

restrictions upon arms to be removed because these restrictions were

 

33W (London). January 21+. 1935. pp. 13-11».

102

never meant to be permanent and, until equality was really recognized,
there would be ”no stable international systen.”3’+ This editorial is
interesting because it was directed to the Frnmh, letting thu know
what 139 Time; and, perhaps the governmmt, thought of their forthcom-
ing British visit.

”Two years of National Socialism" was the headline for January 30
editorial; it showed how Hitler had reduced unemployment in Germany
and returned self-respect, direction, and discipline to Germans. The
paper also said that Hitler desired peace, and that now he was "pursu-
ing more moderate courses, and is obviously trying to substitute the
evolutionary process for the revolutionary methods of his earlier
”was

1113 112319 on January 30, noted that Lord Lothian had visited
Hitler and other influential members of the regime in Germany. The
reader will recall that the German Ambassador arranged this visit
because Lothian was sympathetic to Germany. In the January 31 edi-
tion there appeared the first of two long articles written by Lothian.
By placing these articles on the editorial page, Dawson reflected the
importance fig flags gave them. Lothian called his articles "Germary
and France." After his discussion with Hitler and heads of the for-
eign service and the army, he believed that there were now great
prospects for peace. However, he felt these prospects would only be
realized if the British government grappled with the situation; he
said that there was fear in Europe, arising from the Franco-German

 

“mm (London), January 26, 1935, p. 13.
3% (London). January 30. 1935. p- 13.

103

issue. Because Germary had been defeated and the punitive Treaty of
Versailles was "made at her eacpmse,” she was reaming in defiance of
it, and nary people feared trouble. France, continued Lothian, had
sought security for fifteen years, knowmg she could not count on
help against Germarw. Thus, the equality France sought implied infe-
riority for Germany because France wanted equality with security,
including an alliance system which would give her military aid in the
event of another war. Germany's complaint was that the Treaty of
Versailles imposed huge losses on her. These included reduction of
territory, loss of colonies, and reparations. In addition, Germary
was defmsdess against her neighbors because of the disarmammt
clauses of Part 5 of the Treaty of Versailles. Consequently, Lothian
said, this prostrate position of Germary, this inequality, had meant
security for France since 1918. Germany wanted an equality which
would be obtained only when she had "military power equivalent to
that of her neighbors." This was the reason why she had left the
League of Nations, and why she was reaming. "This [was] now the
only read to equality," which would provide security to the regime.
The danger was that, when Gemary seized equality of arms, France
felt threatened. Thus France increased her arms and sought new mili-
tary alliances with other nations who feared Germary, and who wanted
the Treaty of Versailles obeyed. The danger lay in the possible
chance of a buildup of arms and a "repetition of the situation of
l911+-in which Europe rushed headlong into war without anyone deliber-
ately pressing the button for war." Although he saw the possibility
of war, Lothian believed that there was a way of squaring this

101+

circle.36

He had a solution to the problem of the arms race. "Germarw,"
said Lothian, ”[did] not want war and [was] prepared to renounce it
absolutely as a method of settling her disputes with her neighbors,"
provided she was granted equality, which of course meant equality in
arms with her neighbors. Lothian addressed himself to the people who
asked ”should we trust Germarw?" and answered that there were two
reasons why England should. The first was ”the emphatic declaration
of Herr Hitler himself--the undisputed leader of Germany today,” that
he would renounce war if he got equality. As evidence of Hitler's
good faith, Lothian noted that Hitler had removed the problem of the
Polish Corridor with the January, 1934, treaty with Poland, which
provided for non-aggression and respect for existing territorial
rights for ten years. Lothian neglected to mention the breach this
treaty caused in the French alliance system of Eastern Europe by pull-
ing Poland out of the Franch orbit. With regard to the French,
Lothian said that Hitler "accepts the incorporation of Alsace and
Lorraine in France," and also cited Hitler's pledge "not to interfere
in his beloved Austria by force." The second reason Lothian suggested
for trusting Hitler was that he announced his readiness to sign "pacts
of nonaggression with all Gemarw's neighbors" and in the field of
armaments he, too, would submit to international inspection if every-
one else agreed to do the same. Lothian felt Hitler's sincerity
should not be doubted because in wanting to "unite the young genera-

tion in peace" it would take ten years for Germany to recover

 

36W: (Iowan). January 31. 1935. p- 15.

105

economically and eight years to restore the efficiency of the German
army and, if war were to come before that time, Communism would wipe
out Germany's National Socialism. Lothian stressed Germany's desire
to avoid the war which all Europe feared; he believed she would surely
not go to war to change the Treaty of Versailles, and there were no
other reasons.37 Lothian was correct in sqying Germany would not go
to war to change the Treaty of versailles; why should she, when she
had been building arms with impunity in direct violation of that
treaty?

Fbr Lothian the key to the European puzzle rested with Britain,
the impartial state that other powers looked up to and followed. He
thought she should renove herself from "the method of the Diktat of
Versailles" and make sure that Germany was invited to take part in
any European discussions as an equal with other nations. For, if
Britain could ensure Germany peace and security, Lothian believed
that Germarv could change "those features of her internal regime
which most pain. her friends, alarm. her neighbors, and discredit'
her fair name." In this way, he felt, Britain would give ”equality
to Germany and security to France. ”38

Lothian raised the old scourge of Communism. Hitler, said
Lothian, felt that Russian Communism was ”essentially a militant reli-
gion,” always expanding, and despite Russia's vast internal resources
and population, a threat to Europe. How would Germany be regarded,
Lothian asked, if Russia decided to expand? would she be considered

 

37The Ting; (London), February 1, 1935, p. 15.
38mm.

106

as the ”potential erreuy of Eur0pe or as the Bulwark of Eirope, as the
menace or protector of the new nations of Eastern lilurOpel'"39

These two articles are very important because they reveal what
11;; Ting; editor was thinking, namely, that the Treaty of Versailles
was wrong, that Hitler was a fine and honorable man, and that Russia
was a gmuine threat. Dawson would adopt Lothian's suggestion to
lake Britain the mediator in obtaining German equality. Lothian's
proposal of Germarw as a possible protector of the new Eastern
European Nations was an absolute reversal of his earlier estimate of
these states as non-entities, which had only Germany to fear. Also,
the early February talks between Britain and France were about to
start and these editorials appeared as a warning to the Franch of
Britain's changing attitude.

The British held a conference with France, on the 1st and 2nd of
February, called primarily because of German rearmament. France had,
on January 7, held talks in Rome with Mussolini, which guaranteed
further Franco-Italian talks if Austria's independence were threat-
med, and both denied to arw country the right of repudiating arms
obligations; ”any country" was directed at Germary. m: 11.31: said,
as a result of this conference, France and Italy have improved "the
mole outlook in Europe. "1+0 Anthorv Eden called the Franoo-Italian
talks an "important contribution for European stability." British
foreign policy was based on the League of Nations, and the maintenance

of collective security, which he described as the abolition of force

 

391mm. 1» 16.
“0w (London), January 8, 1935, p. 12.

107

and substituting the rule of law.ul

The results of the Anglo-French February talks were threefold:
both countries agreed, first, that countries whose armaments have
bear limited by peace treaties could not rearm but that France and
Britain would allow Germamr to revise the current treaty. Second,
Britain and France hoped that Germamr might agree to pacts of mutual
assistance with the new nations of East Eirope. Third, the two
powers hoped for a possible trilateral air pact with Germary, and
they wanted Germany to rejoin the League of Nations. France and
Britain offered this as a package proposal.

{133 Egg reported that the German reaction to the British-
French talks was cautious. The paper said, however, that the Germans
liked the suggestion of Lord Lothian for a direct British-German con-
fermce as a means of helping Germany to reply to the British-French
proposals, and that "a visit to Berlin by Sir John Simon or Anthony
de might contribute largely to advancing matters." Without naming
specific persons, lhg Ting: suggested that this idea had already been
discussed in political circles in Britain.“2 This is the first indi-
cation of a possible trip to Germany by the British Foreign Secretary;
soon thereafter the Foreign Secretary announced publicly in the House
of Commons that he hoped to go to Germary shortly. This points up
two facts: (1) Dawson knew what was happming in the British
Government before other newspapermen, and (2) the Germans had kept
abreast of Lothian's articles that appeared in Ihg Tings.

 

“mamas: (London). January 9.1935. 13. 12.
MW (London). February 5. 1935. p. 1n.

108

11;; 119.23 cemented editorially on the France-British talks,
stating "there is not the slightest effort to rush Germany, or to
offer her a finished product . . . for her to take or leave it.” If
German refused to enter into the general Ehrepean negotiations, "the
whole process of negotiation must begin all over again. Europe has
done with DiktatsflflB Again on February 6, £13 £933 emphasized that
Germany would really feel like an equal from "a visit by Sir John
amen to Berlin. "“4 The editorial of the neact day noted that the
Germans liked the ideas proposed in the London agreement, and thought
perhaps as a result of the agreement ". . . a breach is being closed
in the West, so a breach in the East (i. e., between France and Russia]
is being opened." Dawson saw Russia as the only unhappy country in
Europe, and he suggested that if France were to give up her interest
in Germany's eastern border France and Germary could live peacefully
side by side. Dawson would have liked to ignore or isolate Russia in
the East, and he was evidently working to do 30.45 I132 M25 pub-
lished an article sympathizing the Germany in her fears of Russia,
noting that Germany has always been aware of the military and economic
expansion of Russia, and fearful of her wild revolutionary doctrine.“6

The official German reply to the British-French commniqtfe, pub-
lished on February 16, declared that Germany wanted peace, security,

and a cessation of the armament race, and stated that this could be

 

uBMe, Pe 15e
“We (London). February 6. 1935. p- 12-
“tmau p. 13.

“6The Time! (London), February 9, 1935, p. 12.

109

achieved only when there was "free agreement between sovereign states. "47

The reply continued that Germarv would like some kind of air
agreenmt, but not until she had talked with the countries separately,
and suggested that Britain send a representative to Berlin. Dawson
wrote an editorial about this reply and said that he approved of
Germany's position; he stated that this was a new and fairer start
"for fresh diplomatic negotiations, and that, after all is the main
thing." 115 Eggs asserted that the Germans had shown a sincere readi-
ness to negotiate and that they wanted only to be an equal among
nations without resorting to an arms race. fig I‘ll-iii reasoned that
if Germany were equal in air power, she might go back to Geneva and
become active again in the League of Nations. The article concluded
that "there is no obstacle which cannot be overcome if all set them-
selves together to remove it."“8 On March 27, only five weeks after
this editorial appeared, Germarv was to tell Britain, when Simon and
Eden met Hitler, that she had achieved equality of arms. Equality in
five weeks! Germany had been building arms all along, a fact Dawson
knew but ignored.

The next round of European talks had already started with the
Franco-British talks in early February. The Germans wanted British
representatives to visit them to negotiate freely; however, the British
ani Frenoh, by- holding consultations and dispatching and receiving
notes, appeared to be acting in a sinister manner. Dawson wanted the
British Cabinet to send someone to molliiy Hitler ani remove his fear

 

“7W (London), February 169 1935, p. Re
“822251" Po 13-

110

of‘what he regarded as clandestine Franco-British deliberations.
Dawson asserted that Germany knew exactly what Britain had told Italy
and other powers about the Franco-British agreement of early February,
but one had to "look at the matter in the light in which it is seen
from Gemany.” In other words, one had to look at this from Germamr's
point of view. There had been important meetirgs held in Home and
London, but ”Germarw [has] not been present,” nor was she represented
at Geneva. As a result of these talks, France and Italy appeared to
be closer than at any time since the war, France and Britain also
'were'very close, and France and Russia seemed to be agreeing more and
more. Thus, with the exception of Germany all of the major powers
scanned to be friendly. To be sure, Dawson conceded, Germany had
stalked out of Geneva, and had engaged in belligerent chauvinistic
propaganda in the early days of Hitler, but, today, however, Hitler
sought to collaborate with other governments, especially with Britain,
the guarantor of both the German and the French frontiers. He said
the British, therefore, should go to see Hitler, and ”the sooner the
better"; ”this Opportunity simply must not be missed." He believed
Germany wanted, deserved, and would attain equality in arms and.in
negotiation and it would be better fer her to obtain them by consent
rather than by defiance. He thought Britain should show France her
optimism about initial negotiations with Germany, and as a result
France would follow the British example.” 1113 M, once more, was
pro-German. Dawson was making a case that the German fear, although

psychological, was nonetheless real, and Britain should try to

 

“9m (London),February 20. 1935. p. 15.

understand the mind of Germarv.

Sir John Simon told the British House of Commons on February 2 5
that he hoped to visit Germany shortly with the knowledge and consent
of Britain's French and Italian allies. He added that a visit to
Moscow was also under consideration. £13 13163 reported this deci-
sion by Simon, and also the news that some members in the cabinet
wanted him to go to Moscow; however, Egg lilo}; believed that Simon
should return to London and send an aide to Moscow. Ill! Sim—es wanted
the visit of Simon to Berlin not to lose any of its significance in
the minds of the Germans by being followed by a visit to lbscow by
Simon.50

This visit was "if arything, overdue," agreed Dawson. Again, he
stressed the fact that other states had been trying to settle "prob-
lens that still cause misgivings and apprehensions and divisions
among States that should normally be united," but the Germans had
been left out. Even the Franco-British decisions have been inter-
preted in Berlin as commands, arri, in light of the rivalry between
Germany and France, the Germans had justifiable misgivings. France
had been very suspicious of Germany because the Germans had stressed
the proposed air convention for Western Eucpe, but the Germans had
not mmtioned their part in the proposed Eastern European pact. Dawson
said this fear was complete nonsense because the Germans wanted to
talk about all aspects of the British-French agreement and were using
the air convention as a logical beginning. The editorial continued

that the Germans were not demanding too much because, after all, the

 

50W (London):Febmr.v 26. 1935. p- 6-

ll2

French had gone to see Mussolini, the man in charge of Italian for-
eign policy, and, thus, it was not asking too much for Britain to see
the man in charge of German foreign policy. It was only natural that
the Germans should request Simon's visit and that this request should
find support "in public opinion and [in] the columns of the British
Press, and that it should be adopted by the British Government."5]'

The mphasis here again is that Germany, cut off from the nego-
tiations, was reacting out of fear, and with admirable restraint.
The fantastic suspicions of France were without supporting evidence,
argued Dawson, and he appealed to the rationality of "public opinion"
to recognize this position. This term was supposed to reflect the
good common sense of the British man-in—the-street, whom Dawson did
not know. Dawson stated that "public opinion" supported Simon's
visit, although Simon had only made the announcement on February 25,
the day before the editorial appeared.

For 319 flag; the month of March was very eventful. The Saar

was transferred to Germary in March, and 2113 Times editorialized that

 

the credit for this belonged to the League of Nations, and noted that
Hitler had taken the Opportunity to address a kind word to France.52
m M officially announced that Simon and Eden would go to Berlin
on March 7-9.

Dawson praised this decision elaborately. He felt this visit
would be an act of diplomacy, and that there had been much diplomatic

travel abroad to Rome, Paris, and London in the past few months, but

 

5111333., p. 15. >
52W (London). March 2. 1935. p. 13.

113

”no French or British Ministers have visited Berlin," which was
particularly insulting because Hitler did not like to travel abroad.
Simon's visit was to "dispel embarrassment and bring Berlin wall into
the diplomatic orbit," and Dawson said "equality in negotiations will
be re-established in regard to Germany.” Toward the end of this edi-
torial, Dawson expressed his anti-Russianism; he said that, if the
Berlin trip had been taken "on the way to Moscow, the visit would
have lost nmch of its importance and psychological value. "53 To whom
would the psychological value be lost? If Simon continued to Moscow,
German would think Russia was her equal and Dawson, of course, did
not believe that.

Ihwson's hopes were not immediately realized because the govern-
ment had published a wrdte Paper [cm 4827] on March a and the House
of Commons prepared to debate an increase in arms; the government
document argued that an arms increase was necessary as a result of
Germany's reaming in violation of the limitations set by the Treaty
of Versailles. The White Paper sufficiently annoyed Hitler so that
German cancelled the visit by Simon and Eden, allegedly because
Hitler had caught a cold.5u

mwson denied that Hitler was annoyed by the White Paper, and
claimed that he was really ill. Hitler, said Dawson, had caught a
cold whu) he was in Saarbrucken for the ramification festivities.
Dawson thought that Simon and Eden had been invited to Berlin by the

German Government to exchange questions and answers with Hitler

 

53W (London), March 4, 1935, p. 14,
9’Poncet. W. p. 167.

114

himself, and it would hardly be in Germany's self-interest to cancel
the v1s1t.55

The very next day Ihwson defended the White Paper, stating that
Baldwin had said in November, 1931+, that Britain needed more planes.
Dawson said there was no reason to believe that this increase in air
power was ”prompted by, or had reference to, the projected visit of
British Ministers to Berlin." Dawson declared that Britain was only
correcting the deficiencies pointed out by Baldwin and that the talks
could be held when Hitler recovered.56

The German Foreign Minister, Konstantin von Neurath, told the
British Ambassador that Hitler expected to be "cured” by the Zl+th to
28th, and the visit could still be made if Britain were still in
agreement. Meanwhile, the real head of the British Government,
Baldwin, was reported to be "tired and {unable to] apply his mind to
problans. "57

The House of Commons was scheduled to debate the White Paper,
and, in an editorial on the forthcoming debate, Dawson said that the
government's plan to modernize and renovate the country's defenses
was the right course even if it were not papular. An increase in arms
was not popular because people did not like to see their hard-earned
tax money go for arms, and also marry people felt that national arma-
ment was contrary to the spirit of the League of Nations. Dawson

replied by saying that Britain was not following an aggressive policy,

 

55% (London). March 6. 1935. p. 14.
56% (Loreen). March 7. 1935. p. 15.
57 Failing, meezlain, p. 242.

115

and, by being better equipped, would be able to play her full part in
collective security. The second group of critics came from abroad,
especially from Germany, and Dawson answered them by saying that
Germany did not have to worry, for Britain recognized the principle
of German equality; the postponement of the Anglo-German talks "will
only play into the hands of the isolationistsfiand hurt the collective
security of the Continent.58

Lord Lothian, who did not believe Hitler had a cold, wrote a
long letter to the editor on the same day, explaining why Hitler took
offense at the White Paper. Germany, Lothian said, felt her armed
neighbors had broken the disarmament provisions of the League of
Nations, as well as its promises in the Covenant, and Germany would
gain equality only by arming, believing that equal power would buy
her equal status inside the League of Nations. Lothian said, when
the White Paper called German rearmament a threat to the peace,
Hitler saw a revival of "the Versailles Diktat" which blamed Germany
for the war. Lothian said friendly discussion would remove Germany's
isolation, and the future of Europe would be based on equality.
Lothian was convinced that if Hitler had equality in arms he would
want a stabilized Europe, and would rejoin the League of Nations to
discuss his grievances in a peaceful manner.59

Baldwin defended the White Paper on the 11th. He declared that
Britain was only replacing its old weapons, and that this action was

in accordance with the League of Nations. Baldwin, too, was convinced

 

58113. mes (London), March 11, 1935, p. 13.
59:91 .

116

that Hitler had a cold.60 Perhaps Dawson told him.

he government did not think the White Paper was anti-German
because it was officially announced that Simon and Eden would go to
see Hitler on March 26-27, and that only Eden would go to missia
afterward. No doubt, Dawson was pleased that the Foreign Secretary
would return to London, thus not losing any of the psychological
value gained from his Berlin trip.

On March 16, which was a Saturday, German}r formally repudiated
the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles ard reintroduced
conscription, stating that there would be a peacetime arm of 600,000
men in thirty-six divisions. The reasons Hitler offered were that
Russia was reaming, and that France had, on March 12, increased the
period of military service from one to two years, and therefore,
Germany had to rearm.6l Another factor, of course, was the British
White Paper. 2119 Times, which has no Sunday editions, had to wait
until the edition of the 18th to comment.

Meantime, on the 17th, Dawson spoke with Baldwin, and told him
there was no need to be afraid.62 115 Tim on the 18th reported the
event of the 16th; the full text of Hitler's speech was given, in
addition to the high points of future German policy. Briefly these
were: (1) Germany wanted peace; (2) Germary was prepared to offer

non-aggression pacts to her neighbors; (3) Germany had no claims

 

6ofle Times (London), March 12, 1935, p. 16.
61Eden, gemoirg, P. 11+3.

62Wrench, gwson, p. 321.

117

against France; (h) Germany wanted respect and to be a guarantor of
peace; and ( 5) Germany reamed to protect herself.

Dawson's editorial declared that German rearmament had been
accepted by Western diplomats, and "there is something to be said on
general grounds for having the German cards on the table" because it
might help the negotiations amorg Britain, Germarw, and France to
have each know where the other two stood. Dawson agreed that this
flagrant violation of a treaty could not be passed over in silence,
and Germany, by acting unilaterally, had broken the British-Franco
agreement of February with which Germany appeared to agree. However,
Dawson continued, if this was a crude method of asserting German
equality ”no harm is done,” and Britain should still go on with her
planned visit to Berlin.63

Dawson's belief that "no harm is done" is a classic instance of
diplomatic misunderstanding. To the Germans, the defeat and humilia-
tion had been thrown off, and Hitler was the hero. He had gained
more for Germany than the Republican Government; he had restored the
nation's honor, all without foreign intervention.6l+

The British Government sent a strong note of protest to Germany,
but undercut its effect by asking if Germarv still wanted the British
visit to take place; the Germans said yes.

mwson justified Britain's sending a note of protest by arguing
that, if the unilateral breaking of treaties became commonplace, it

would and diplomatic relations among civilized countries. However,

 

63w (Iondon). March 18. 1935. p. 13.

6“William L. Shirer, The 3;” so and {fall of the mm fieich. A
Histog of Nazi Gem (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 281+.

118

continued Dawson, there might be occasions when one party had not
really been represented in a treaty, thus inferring that Germany had
been justified in breaking the Treaty of Versailles. In this article,
Dawson admitted that relations between France and Germany were
strained, but Hitler really believed that the situation was not
inscluble.65 This editorial attempted to diminish the force of the
day's news from Germany.

The Italians and French reacted to Germany's action, and they
wanted to confer with Britain before Simon and Eden visited Germany.
No conference was necessary, argued Dawson, because everyone knew
that British policy was "not to take sides for or against any particu-
lar country, but to work steadily for the inclusion of all in some
sort of collective system." The editor seemed to ignore British and
almost worldwide.membership in the League of Nations as a collective

system. The purpose of the Berlin visit, reasoned Dawson, was to get

Germany to enter a "pact or pacts of this nature"; this visit had
been arranged some time ago because "Berlin.had been left out of the
recent series of diplomatic calls and conferences." Some people
believed that Simon should stop in Italy or Paris before going to
Berlin, but the Foreign Secretary felt he was not a messenger. "The
British public” wanted him to carry "out an agreement with his own
colleagues, a considered policy deliberately settled."66
The French and Italians protested to Berlin on the 20th and

France declared.that she would take her case to the League of Nations.

 

65mm (London). March 19. 1935. p. 17.
66W (London). March 20. 1935. p. 15.

119

France emphasized four major objections. The first was that Germany
had brekm international law with her unilateral breaking of the
Treaty of Versailles. Second, Germany, by using force instead of
negotiation, was making negotiations very difficult. Third, Germamr
was building a large army. And fourth, Germany's actions of March 16
were not acceptable to France. The French argument rested on Articles
10, 11, and 17 of the League of Nations.

The future Foreign Secretary, Samuel Hoare, noted that 2133 m
stressed the value of getting Germany back into a disarmament confer-
ence, and that only trouble would result from agreeing with France to
take this matter before the League. 1113 times insisted that the
British diplomatic visit must be made to Germany, and the government
agreed with 1119 M that Simon and Eden should go to Berlin, with
the understanding that Eden would stop in Paris and allay French-
Italian feers.67

Dawson's March 21 editorial, "A Good and a Bad Decision," com-
menting on the French appeal to the League of Nations, affirmed that
Eden would stop in Paris and clarify Britain's investigation of
Hitler's readiness to take part in the collective system, explaining
whether Hitler would use his new power for evil "as his critics
believe" or "play a leading part in establishing a new international
order.” France had taken the violation of Versailles before the
League of Nations; people in Britain wanted Gemany to rejoin the
League of Nations, but Dawson feared that a Germany indicted for

breaking the treaty would shun Geneva. Therefore, he suggested that

 

67Templewood, Aline 3%le Ieazg, p. 131.

120

the Council "consider equity as well as purely legal argument." The
League of Nations was to agree to the obvious German violation of the
Treaty of Versailles but "that [however] is not the dispute. The
real question is whether Germany for the last fifteen years has had a
square deal, and whether the treaty itself, which was imposed upon
her in 1919, was in all respects a fair one. That question cannot be
answered by any Court of Arbitration in the world." Dawson believed
the only thing that would be accomplished by bringing Germany before
the League of Nations would be to document the League's anti-German
smtiment; therefore, France's decision to go before the League of
Nations was a bad one.68

This statement showed most clearly Dawson's pro-Germanism, as
the dispute centered on the Treaty of Versailles itself and not its
violation.

Anthony Eden arrived in Paris on March 23, and, after a meeting
with the French Foreign Minister Laval and Italy's Luvick, all agreed
to meet at Stress with Mussolini on April 11. Eden then went to
Berlin and not Simon, where both met with Hitler. m3, $2319.52 reported
that both talked with Hitler for seven hours "dispelling misapprehen-
69

sions." They reconvened on I-iarch 26, and it was at this meeting
that Simon questioned Hitler about the size of Germany's air force.
Hitler answered frankly that Germany had ”already achieved parity

with Great Britain. "7° Neither Simon nor Eden replied. Hitler then

 

682p 1‘; mes (London), March 21, 1935, p. 15.
69W (Iondon), March 26, 1935, p. 16.

7°Peul Schmidt, Hitler's Interpreter (New York: The Macmillan
Co., 1951). P- 24-

121

talked about German naval strength, and suggested that thirty-five
per cart of Britain's fleet would be a fair figure for Germany.

Again Simon made no comment; in fact, according to Hitler's transla-
tor, he believed "they [both Simon and Eden} were inwardly in agree-
mmt with it" since they had raised no objections.71 Hitler also
told the British diplomats that he did not care for an Eastern pact
because he hated Russia, and Simon's silence appeared to indicate his
benign feelings toward Hitler.72 Eden, on the other hand, concluded
privately that the talks had failed, for Germany was rearming "with
the old Prussian spirit" while Britain gained nothing.73 When Simon
and Eden went to Berlin after Germany had broken the Treaty of
Versailles, it was as if Britain had come with hat in hand, thus
achieving a major triumph for German diplomacy. Hitler was now equal
in prestige and in arms, and he felt that he would gain more.

The French were not disappointed with the Berlin talks, as they
had had no eXpectations of success. France wanted closer cooperation
with Russia which she considered a lesser threat than Germany}!+

Dawson editorialized on Simon's visit to Berlin, and noted these
talks showed that the anti-Communist Hitler was not interested in an
Eastern pact; Hitler did not care for multilateral talks, but rather
for bilateral talks. The German leader, like other "national leaders

at this moment, insisted Germany must be able to rely on herself to

 

711bid.
72mge, Pe 25e
731nm, Manoigg, p. 151+.

”matinee (London). March 28, 1935, p. in.

122

defmd herself," and this belief explained his danands for parity of
air, land, and naval power with other Continental powers. A vital
question was whether or not Hitler was a supporter of the collective
systan. The answer might appear to be negative, said Dawson, but
Hitler "did not Oppose the thesis of the League of Nations," and he
seaned to want to return to the League some day. But "national pride
and sense of bargaining, made him pose certain conditions," mainly
concerned with equal treatment. Dawson said"there is nothing inher-
artly unreasonable in any one of then.” Hitler wanted arms limita-
tion and was villirg to sign a Western air pact, limiting Germany to
what the other nations had. Dawson believed Britain must not lose
this opportunity, considering the destructive power of airplanes.75
The Germans approved of this editorial of March 29.76

Although Dawson and Britain had accepted Germany's action of

March 16, and Hitler had achieved equality, the German nation and its
leader still had to worry about the results of the Stresa and League

Council meetings, scheduled for April. In April Dawson declared what
Britain's role in policy should be; he said British policy was one of
collective security but this was limited because Britain "is specifi-
cally committed to more than diplomatic support in Western Europe
only." This editorial betrayed Dawson's disinterest in Eastern
Dlrope. Dawson said that collective security was defined in new
ways. For example, Poland preferred bilateral talks as opposed to

multilateral talks and, yet she had not been accused of being against

 

75m (London), March 29, 1935, p. 17.
76w (London). March 30. 1935. p. 13.

123

collective security, whereas Hitler, by following the same policy,
had been condanned, although his acts, like those of the Poles, were
in hamozw with the League of Nations. mwson agreed with Lothian
that Britain's role was one of mediating and educating (presumably
all Europeans, including the British public). Britain, declared
Dawson, should show France that she was ignoring Hitler's positive
comments to Simon while stressing the negative ranarks. He said
Germazv would arm no more than her neighbors, would accept arms
inspection, and had agreed to a Western air pact, and, if Britain
obtained an agreanent, she would have "performed an inestimable serv-
ice to Europe. "77

On April 8, 1113. Times announced that Italy wanted France and

 

Britain to warn Germany that she faced a united front at the Stresa
Conference and that Germany mst be told that these powers had agreed
to the Rome-London talks and had opposed unilateral breaking of
treaties.78
The editorial on the same day argued that Mussolini wanted a
strong stand in Europe, and he prompted France to call the meeting
of the League Council after the Stresa Conference. France wanted to
Join into an alliance with Russia and Czechoslovakia. Dawson wrote
that Britain did not want Eirope divided into hostile camps; he found
(intuitively, one suspects) little "public support" for more British
comitments in Europe. He said Britain felt that she must get

Germaxv into the collective security system of the League of Nations

 

77W (London). April 1+. 1935. p. 15.
78w (London). April 9. 1935. p. 11+.

124

but Hitler, however, had shown no desire for this. Hitler, according
to Dawson, only wanted an amy and navy equal to that of any
Continental power; he wanted entrance into the mandate system. He
had an air force equal to Britain's and he had agreed to the limita-
tion of arms with inspections. Dawson continued that some of Hitler's
"duands are high, but there is nothing really incompatible with the
agreed principle of equality, reckoned on any fair basis of national
size ani national needs. "79 British "public opinion" wanted Britain
to work impartially for peace and Britain was obliged to get Germany
into the collective systan, regardless of the price; of course, this
meant Hitler's price.

Stanley Baldwin, speaking before the National Council of Free
Churches, agreed that Versailles was a mistake, the nationality prin-
ciple did not work. He said Germany now, "smarting under the humilia-
tion" of the Treaty of Versailles, had "refused the lot assigned to
her and [has] reamed." Baldwin showed that he had not lost hope for
arms limitation and would "stick to Germany until she had told us
straight that she would not have anything to do with it."80 Baldwin
continued that he did not want war, but, if an aggressor had to be
stopped, Britain would do her part; however, like all The Egg
readers, Baldwin was convinced that no aggression would take place.

It was officially announced on April 8 that Simon and MacDonald
would represent Britain at Stresa. Simon, who believed French fears

of Germany were romantic fantasies and who had had a paternalistic

 

79min” p. 15.
some fines (London), April 18, 1935, p. 18.

125

attitude toward Hitler in Berlin, was the Foreign Secretary. Ramsay
MacDonald, whom most people in Parliament knew was only the titular
head of the government, a man whose "health, eyesight, and mental
powers were evidently failing," was the other British representative
at Stresa.8l In effect, Britain was represented by men who were pre-
disposed in Hitler's favor, with neither willing to support the French
and Italian position against Gemany.

On the eve of the Stresa Conference, _Th_e_ Lime-g emphasized that
these talks were to be exploratory and that Britain would not acquire
fresh commitments. Dawson noted that Baldwin's speech of April 8 was
significant because it showed that Britain was trying to help the
League of Nations. Britain, continued Dawson, should be impartial,
independent, and unbiased on the "conflicting views of the countries
whether present or absent," and British ministers had the united sup-
port of their country for this policy.82 This obviously meant that
Britain should represent, or take into consideration, Germarw's point
of view, and diould educate the French and Italians as to the point
of view. One assumes that by emphasizing the exploratory nature of
the talks, Dawson was sure no new commitments would be made by Britain.

The next day it was announced that France and Russia had agreed
to a mutual assistance pact based on Articles 10, 11, and 17 of the
League of Nations. The M' editorial called this an alliance "in
the garb of the League” and said the drawback in this agreement was

that Europe would be divided into two camps. 1113 Times said what was

 

81Churchill, Stem, p. 119.
82g. limes (London), April 10, 1935, p. 15.

126

really needed was a peace system with "no distinctions based on the
last war" and which "renders future wars superfluous by ensuring
change without violence. "83 Dawson ignored the potential of the
League as an instrument for ensuring change without violence.
Britain, France, and Italy convened at Stresa, and MacDonald
declared that the governments were united, that they would not be
divided on peace and the strengthening of Europe, and that no country
should think differently. Britain wanted Germalv to come back to the
League of Nations and to help build peace in Europe, and Britain
wanted a peace based on the League of Nations. On the 12th, the
Stresa powers agreed to put a resolution before the Council of the
League of Nations condenning the German repudiation of the Treaty of
Versailles.8u'
Dawson noted what had happened in Stresa, but did not like to
see Germarw as the victim. He argued that there was no "chance of a
true peace unless Germarqr is an equal partner in it." He claimed the
last peace treaty had forced Germaxv at the "point of a bayonet" and
"imposed an inferior position upon her," and she never really accepted
this treaty. Britain, he continued, must try to understand how the
Germans felt; because they had been down so long any concessions only
appeared as ”tardy acts of justice." More important to Dawson was
"what is Germany going to do what she has got her equality not what

she had to do to get it.”85 He had not seen the obvious point, that

 

83W (London). April 11. 1935. p. 15.
8“The Times (London), April 12, 1935, p. 12.
85W (London). April 13. 1935. p. 13.

127

is, Germarv would reenter the League and become part of collective
security, but completely on her own toms.

The Stresa Conference ended on the 14th, and the three powers
all agreed to the following four points: (1) to the condennation of
Germany for breaking the Treaty of Versailles; (2) to the repudiation
of the unilateral brealdng of treaties; (3) to a consultation if
Austrian independence and integrity were threatened; and (1+) to a
British-Italian agreement that they intended to fulfill their Locarno
obligations. The principle of containing Germany appeared in the
above declaration, and it seemed that the line was drawn by the three
powers against Hitler's ambitions.

Wat was really important about the Stresa Conference, however,
was what was not said. As a result of these conversations, Mussolini
believed that Britain and France had given him approval for his move-
ments in Africa. In a later chapter, this conference and its African
implications will be discussed.

After this conference was concluded, the Council of the League
of Nations was to take up Franoe's protest against Germarv for break-
ing the Treaty of Versailles. This meeting was to be held between
the 16th and the 18th of April. In the meantime, "From Stresa to
Geneva" was the editorial that appeared on April 15; it agreed that
Britain, France, and Italy together had helped the system of collec-
tive security, and thus had guaranteed peace, but Britain would have
to plead Germatv's case at Geneva, if she were to be a real mediator
to other powers. It continued that Germany really wanted peace but
she still adhered to Locarno and wanted an air pact and to collaborate

with her neighbors. _T_h_e_ Times said France had a legal but not a moral

128

point in her protest to the Council against Germany for breaking the
Treaty of Versailles and "every fair minded person must acknowledge
that the violation of a dictated treaty is not the same as the viola-
tion of a freely negotiated agreement." The allies implied they
would reduce their own armament, but they had not; Germany was prom-
ised equality by 1932, but had not received it. Therefore, 1113 ms
continued, "what other method [was] in practice possible to a dis-
armed country to whom parity had been promised?"86 This was an excel-
lent defense of Germany's violation of the Treaty of Versailles.
Dawson felt that, although a treaty might be legal, if it were signed
under duress it was not binding.

In Parliament, on April 17, the Prime Minister spoke about the
conference at Stresa. He reiterated the declarations of the three
powers, but haped that Germany would enter the collective systen of
Europe; he said the door was still Open.

On the same day the Germans were condemned by the League's
Council for breaking the Treaty of Versailles. _T_h_9 Eggs reported
the French reaction as "a triumph for the principle of international
morality and the sanctity of treaties" and that "the easiest way to
preserve peace" was not to yield to violence.87 The Italians were
reported to be equally pleased. The German reaction was one of anger
and exasperation; they still believed the League maintained the men-
tality of Versailles, and that the League was an instrument to be

used against Germany. They felt that the Stresa powers were behind

 

86mm (London). April 15. 1935. p. 15.
87W (London). April 18, 1935. p. 11.

129

the Council's decision.88

Dawson also disliked the Council's decision; it was "regrettable
that no allowance should have been made by a body like the League
Council for the special circumstances in which Germany incurred her
obligations." He felt it would have been better if "one voice at
least had been raised to recall the manner in which this particular
treaty had been imposed" because it was "at the point of a bayonet."
No doubt Dawson believed it should have been Britain's voice. He con-
tinued that the German representatives at Versailles stated Germany
could not carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, and
they were not allowed to sit at the table, but were given a fully
drafted agreement. Today, Dawson believed, the injustice of Versailles
was burnt into the minds of Germans, and "Hitlerism is largely a
revolt against Versailles." He believed Europe should have recognized
this and, if she did not eventually recognize it, there could never
peace.89

By the end of April it was possible that Hitler and Germany were
Justified in feeling angry at Britain because in March the British
Foreign Secretary had seemingly approved of Gennany's action; in fact,
it was the British Government that had saked for the March discussions
after Hitler had broken the Treaty of Versailles. But, when Simon
went to Stresa and agreed with the French proposal, it appeared as if
he were perfidious in drawing a line of containment against German

with France and Italy. Britain, posing as a mediator, was now a

 

88:21..
89mg 11.! es (London), April 18, 1935, p. 13.

130

partisan and as guilty to Germamr as the other powers. The Stresa
Conference and the Council's decision were two unpleasant blows to
Hitler; Th; m, on April 20, said: "Germany feels surrounded by a

hostile world. "90

 

90% (London). April 20. 1935. p. 12.

CHAPTERVI

mwson's PRO-GERMANISM, PART Two
MA! T0 JUNE, 1935

Although it seaed that Germany had been given a serious setback
with Stresa and the League Council's condemnation, Dawson andwlhg
1253;,renained steadfast in their pro-Germanism. Thetnaval conversa-
tions raised in March were not allowed to dissipate, and, by the end
of June, Genarw and Britain would be in a Naval Agreement, which not
even the most optimistic pro-German Briton would have dared predict.

In the last week of April, The m noted that British-German
naval conversations were being held and that German experts would
arrive in London for infernal talks in the middle of May. Hitler had
suggested one third of British tonnage when he had met Simon in March;
however, I'M L152; added, "the British Government does not accept
these figures as a basis for negotiations.*1 in.thin two months, how-
ever, these figures were the basis for negotiations.

News came to Britain on the 29th that Gem was preparing to
build twelve submarines. This was surprising because Genarw was for-
bidden su‘uaarines by the Treaty of Versailles; 1113 Ml. reasoned
that Hitler was doing this because he did not recognize the disarmament

 

1The a; (London), April 26, 1935, p. 16.

131

132

clauses of Versailles. Sir John Simon, because of The flag; article,
confined m my, story the same afternoon in the House of Comons.
Again, m m was slightly ahead of the government.

Daring May m m and Dawson became louder in their pro-
Gernan utterances. Also, the Abyssirfian crisis was beginning to be
evident. Dawson argued if the British-French agreement of February 3
had been carried out, there might have been agreement with Gemanv by
this time. The proposed air agreement, which Dawson believed to be
forfeited by British fumbling, was actually part of a package pro-
posal, which was to be accepted or rejected in 1.313. The editor fear-
fully cited Germany's "kicking over the traces right and left,"
creating an arm, attaining air parity with Britain, and ordering
submarines without even waiting for the British-German naval talks to
begin. Ihwson acted mrprised and as if he had never been warned by
his correspondent, Norman Ebbuitt, on German rearmament. The editorial
indicated Britain's righteous indignation at the persecution of the
destruction of civil rights, the disregard for international law, and
the rise of the cult of force. Dawson argued that all countries
shared ”the responsibility for the growth of this [Gem' 3] defiant
spirit, and . . . the failure to make timely concessions has contrib-
uted greatly to the present tragic confusion." "The real business of
statesmnship is still to negotiate a peace with Gemarw strong
instead of the peace which was imposed upon a Germazw prostrate.”
Britain could be a mediator, he continued, if British ministers lost
”the Versailles habit of mind," which was only ”one sided prejudice,"
and agreed to a peace "freely negotiated on equal terms, which Europe

133

has never yet had since the war."2 Dawson himself was now willing to
sacrifice the British-French communique of February 3 for peace, and,
although he felt Hitler's demands might be high, the cruelty of

Versailles put the moral burden on Britain and the other signatories.

Hitler at a~ May Day rally reiterated Germany's desire for peace.
On the same day, Prime Minister 1430de stated in Parliament that
Britain wanted to strengthen her defenses, to reduce arms, and to
obtain an air pact; he said Britain and the Western powers wanted to
be strong, but the door was still open for Germany to help in the
cause of peace.

France and Russia had officially signed their mutual assistance
pact, but it had to be ratified by the French Senate and Chamber.
Both agreed to consult in case of "danger of aggression" or to give
"mutual assistance in case of unprovoked aggression. "3 Lord
Londonderry, Dawson's friend, said that this pact only increased
Germany's fears of being surrounded by hostile powers.“

The editorial section of that day, although not mentioning the
Franco-Russian alliance, discussed Britain's role in foreign affairs.
It applauded Lord Lothian's May 1 stand in the House of Lords, that
is, Germany must be "given a position appropriate to a nation which
is normally the most powerful single state in Europe" because any-
thing less was false. _‘I‘_h_e_ Limes said the "Versailles system has been

tried, and it has not given mrope peace"; only a treaty with Germany

 

2The $.12 as (London), May 1, 1935, p. 17.
3The Times (London), MAy 3, 1935, p. 15.

u'Londonderry, Ourselves, p. 72.

134

could do that. Dawson argued that, although Britain was not commit-
ted by treaty to fight for Austrian or Eastern Mope frontiers, she
supported their integrity, and this was the sensible course to follow,
and one which "the British peOple will endorse." He said the Germans,
who were also honorable, would comply with good faith.5

Dawson's defense of Hitler was very clear now. On the 13th, he
raised the question whether Hitler was really after power or not, and
he answered it negatively. Dawson claimed that, if Hitler had bem
abrupt in his methods, ”the blame is not entirely on him but must be
shared by those who realised that Germany was entitled to equality"
and by those powers which promised equality but had not kept their
word. Germany, therefore, he believed, had an excuse "for resorting
to subterfuge and force in order to establish claims which were gener-
ally regarded as legitimate." m 2139; continued that Hitler had
not put forth ”ary claim that is wholely unreasonable” and the inter-
national obligations which he defied were those Germary had never
accepted in the first place. The editor noted that, if Hitler's
forthcoming speech would contain his usual frankness, others would
see exactly what German wanted before he came to the confer-ace
table.6

The major speech that Dawson expected Hitler to make came on
May 21; Hitler said that both he and Gemary had been misunlerstood
and that all Germazv wanted was to be an equal, and not a second-
class nation. Germary broke the articles of the Treaty of Versailles

 

Me: (London). May 3. 1935. p. 17.
6mm (London). May 13. 1935. p. 17.

135

because these articles discriminated against her, but for further
revisions Germany would rely on peaceful negotiation. Germany wanted
a Western air agreumt that would supplement Locarno, and Germany
would like and would accept arms limitations if other powers were
similarly limited. Germarv did not want a naval race such as that
before 19% and would settle for thirty-five per cent of British ton-
nage. Gemary accepted the demilitarization of the Rhinelland.7 When
Hitler made this address to the Reichstag, his more cautious genesz
and foreign service officers were afraid the Stresa powers and the
French and Russians would send armies in compliance with their pacts,
but no one called Hitler's bluff.8

With this speech Hitler lulled the suspicions and raised the
hopes of the gullible, and sowed discord among those who were lined
up against him.

Lb; M, the most influential paper in the British Isles, and
perhaps all of Europe, was almost hysterical with Joy. The editorial
of the 22nd said that after the recent Earopean developments, that
is, the Council's denouncenent of German rearmament, the signing of

the Russo-French pact, and some "less prudent utterances of British
statemen," Germany's mood looked rather bellicose to some. The

editor, however, believed that ”this speech turns out to be reason-
able, straightforward, comprehensive"; and nobocbr with ”an impartial
mind can doubt that the points of policy laid down by Herr Hitler may

fairly constitute the basis of a complete settlement with Germarvua

 

7mm» (Radon). my 22. 1935. p. 16.
89.1.... W. p. 286.

136

free, equal and strong Germary instead of a prostrate Germany [upon]
when peace was imposed sixteen years ago." He said Germany would
reenter the League as an equal, promising to adhere to all treaties,
including the unreasonable demand for demilitarization of the
Rhinelnnd. The editor continued, ”It is hoped that this speech will
be taken everywhere as a sincere and well considered utterance, mean-
ing precisely what it says. ”9

Reaction to Hitler's speech was divided; the French were split
and the Italians non-commital. Speaking for Britain in the House of
Commons, Baldwin welcomed Hitler's "striking declaration." He admit-
ted that Germarv now had air parity with Britain, and that earlier,
in November, 1931+, the British Government had miscalculated, but
there was no cause for alarm since "the whole Government took respon-
sibility for not doing more in the past" and would strive for more

10 Some in Parliament felt that such a prom-

accuracy in the future.
ise was very unlikely to be fulfilled.

0n Novenber 28, 1934, Baldwin had been forced to reply to
mnston Churchill. because Grurchill had charged throughout the summer
and autumn that Germany had built a secret, illegal air force and
that it was almost as large as Britain's. Within twelve months, con-
tinued (burchill, it would equal Britain's; within twenty-four months
it would be fifty per cent greater than Britain's, and in thirty-six

months it would be twice the size of Britain' 3.11 Baldwin, after

 

9% (10111011), May 229 19359 P- 17.
10W (London). May 23. 1935. p. 16.

nCato, lety gen, p. 3’4.

13?

much hesitation, replied to Grurchill by saying that the "real
strength [of Germany] is not fifty per cent of [Britain's] air
strmgth today," and that Britain would never be inferior to arwone
in air power.12 Hitler, in March, 1935, had told Simon and Eden that
Germary had air parity. Baldwin attempted to alleviate public fear
by statirg it was not the fault of ary one individual, but rather
that of the government. Baldwin was well warned about Germary's air
buildup, but, as stated before, these warnings were not noticed by
the government. That the government ignored these warnings was in
itself incredible, considering the importance, arri the availability
of this information. Baldwin had left the impression that Britain
planned to step up her own buildup, but she did not.

th 2159; defense of Baldwin's speech showed Dawson's unwaver-
ing confidence; "Mr. Baldwin seldom fails to rise to a great occasion,
and the impression which he made in the House of Commons is rightly
described as profound.” Dawson agreed that Hitler's speech was an
”elaborate striking declaration" and a genuine response from Germarw
in helping to solve European difficulties. Baldwin paid no attention
"to the absurd criticism already heard in Paris, and even in some
parts of this country, that the Chancellor's proposals were too vague
to be of value." The frankness Baldwin wanted between Germany and
Britain was possible now that the truth of Germarw's rearmammt was
publicly lcnown.l3

The real result, however, was that Hitler had succeeded in

 

RIMS9 m: P0 1820
”manage (London). May 23. 1935. p. 17.

138

placating the gullible, and nobody could have been ary more taken in
than Baldwin and mwson; Britain had accepted the unilateral breaking
of a treaty.

German reaction to Baldwin's speech was favorable, from the
Fuhrer to the "man-in-the-street." fire Germans hoped for a British-
German understanding, and 33 Eggs was happy to report this reaction.l’+

hiring June Baldwin became Prime Minister officially, and the
Germans obtained a naval treaty with Britain. The effects of the
treaty, however, were not recorded in the paper. Lord Halifax, on
June 1, aphasised the British people's desire for peace, and asked
the: to try to understand "the mind and feelings of other nations.”
World peace, continued Halifax, cannot be achieved by a systu of
"discriminating alliances between certain powers leading to other
alliances between other powers.” Halifax declared that the only way
world peace could come about was by all nations acting for a common
interest. He believed Britain had a very heavy obligation; she
"right under Providence be the link to draw other nations together. "15

The House of Commons held a foreign policy debate on the same
day. The Foreign Secretary, Simon, told the House that Britain was
pursuing a Western air pact, and, reported 133 m, "the whole
House of Commons couples a vigorously conciliatory policy in Errope
with no suspension of the preparation to expand the British Air Force."
Only "Mr. murchill was gloom," and that notable malcontent still

 

MW (London). May 2“. 1935. p- 16.
1W (London), JunO 1e 1935’ P0 9.

139

pointed out that Britain was weaker than Germany.l6

Dawson, commenting on this debate, said that this pact was one
”upon which public opinion in this country has instinctively seized
as the most practical and promising proposal of all those which were
contained in the Anglo-French Communiun of February 3. " Now, said
Dawson, finally, the goverment had seen the light, but it had allowed
an air pact with Germany to slip past because the proposals of
February 3 were all tied together. The Russian Government had urged
France and Britain to regard the Eastern security pact as important
as the Western air pact and to consider all proposals as tied together.
Now, continued Dawson, four months had passed, and there was no doubt
that, from a British viewpoint, that this "air pact has the greatest
value. Britain would like this, it would be such a deterrent nobody
would dare bother anyone. “17 Dawson showed that he would gladly
destroy the February 3 proposals to get a German air agreement, ignor-
ing what such a breach of faith would do to French, Russian, and
Italian feelings.

Meanwhile, the German Special Commissioner, Herr vcn Ribbentrop,
arrived in Britain on June 2 for informal naval talksto lay the
groundwork for the formal talks to follow. The June llr editorial
addressed itself to the ”Naval Conversations," and it said that
Ribbmtrop would be sure Britain welcomed a frank discussion with him
on "the possible limitation of future [naval] strengths.” The
Germans, with self-restraint, asked only thirty-five per cent of

 

161mg... p. 14.
"Imus p. 15.

1’40

Britidl tonnage because Hitler wanted to avoid a pro-1914 kind of
naval race. Thus, continued Dawson, "there should be little diffi-
culty, so far as Great Britain and Germany are concerned, in arriving
at an understandirg on naval programs." No excuse should be given to
the charge of the skeptical that Gemary was seeking her self-
interest, Dawson said, ignoring the Stresa front and the fact that by
now Britain sanctioned Germany's breaking the Treaty of Versailles.18

On the same day, T_11_e m reported that Ribbentrop's host,
Ramsay MacDonald, would resign as Prime Minister. The asslmpticn was
that Baldwin would be the new Prime Minister, and, of course, this
was correct. Baldwin on May ll, 1935, had spoken with Dawson on the
makeup of the new cabinet, and both agreed to exclude Winston
Churchill because he was too disruptive in foreign affairs.19

1133 21332;, on June 7, wrote an editorial called "Grange-Over
Day.” Dawson said that MacDonald did not resign because of political
pressure, but because of his health; his eyesight was bad and he suf-
fered from insomnia. With admirable gentility the article avoided
martian of his mental health, stating that the National Government
had worked for all the people and was solid. The Time: said that
Baldwin "is entirely devoid of self seeking, and loyal service comes
as second nature to him. ”20

men Baldwin became Prime Minister, the cabinet was reshuffled,
but not really changed; Baldwin still waited for evarts to unfold

 

18W (London). June 4. 1935. p. 17.

19W. IV. Part II. 892.
20M (Iondon). June 7. 1935. p. 17.

11+].

rather than attenpting to master than. Sir John Simon, the Foreign
Secretary, became the new Secretary of State for Home Affairs, and
The ILJLQQ believed this position was more suited to Simon's talents.21
Dawson was not pleased with what he considered Simon's slowness in
recognizing Hitler's obvious trustworthiness. Baldwin appointed Sir
Samuel Hoare as the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at
the suggestion of Dawson and Lothian.22 Anthory Eden recorded in his
36min that Hoare was selected Foreign Minister because the Prime
Minister's personal friend had interceded for him. Dawson thought
Hoare's policy toward Germany was closer to his own than Simon's had
been. 23 Neville Chamberlain believed Hoare to be a man of "imagina-
tive shrewdness. "2“ Because Hoare was flexible and not an absolutist,
Baldwin believed Hoare's talent for accommodation might "find a way
through and save Baldwin and the government from what must otherwise
be disagreeable decisions in a dangerous future. "25

To assist the new Foreign Secretary, Anthory Men was made
Minister without Portfolio for League of Nation Affairs. Eden's job
was never really defined, but it appeared to marry that there were
actually two foreign secretaries. Winston Churchill believed Baldwin
appointed Eden to the job "to conciliate the strong tide of public

opinion associated with the League of Nations” in Great Britain by

 

21Kennedy, W. p. 107.
22Templewood, fling imblg Ieazg, p. 109.
ZBEden, gm, p. 245.

2“Failing. W: p. 165.

25Fden, m, p. 2%.

142

"showing the importance which he [Baldwin] attached to the League and
to the conduct of our affairs in Generva."26
The newly arranged government was intimately known to Dawson.

The Prime Minister (Baldwin), Chancellor of the Ebcchequer (Q1amberlain),

the Secretary of State for War (Halifax), Foreign Secretary (Hoare),
and Secretary of State for Home Affairs (Simon) were all Dawson's
frimds. Because Dawson influenced all of these people, as editor of
1119 _T1._m_e_s, he could be rightfully regarded as the public voice of the
governmmt.

The June 8 editorial, ”Mr. Baldwin's Problan,” said that the
short duration of elective office could not attract men like Lloyd
George, and that Baldwin and MacDonald were merely changing roles.
Despite this, Dawson predicted that Baldwin would do an excellent job,
capably assisted by his new foreign secretary, Samuel Hoare, whose
"reputation for resource and determination has grown out of all recog-
nition,” and for whom no place in government was "bqond his deserts
or his capacity. "27

Speaking the same day in defense of the National Governmmt
before an audience of 15,000 in Worcestershire, Baldwin said the
government wanted peace, which could best be achieved if Europe joined
in the systm of collective security. In his, editorial on Baldwin's
speech, Dawson also defended the National Government and the one-

party mtm: "No pure party government could have done half so much,

 

26mmh111’ StOIE, p0 1%.
27W (Iondon). June 8. 1935. p. 15.

143

nor done it half so smoothly. "28

Dawson again praised the National Government and Baldwin in the
June 13 editorial; he said ”striking proof" that Mr. Baldwin was
doing a magnificent job was that "the opposition can find so little
to say against it" and the changes that Baldwin made had left the
Labour Party grasping at straws.29 Obviously, Dawson ignored the
impotmce of the Labour Party, which constituted an opposition of
slightly more than ten per cent of Commons.

A small article entitled "Germany and Locarno" appeared on
June 12, criticizing the new Franco-Russian pact as a military offen-
sive and defensive alliance, draped in the words of the League of
Nations, and directed against Germany. It said Germarw had no war-
like inturtions; she did not want to change the darllitarized zone,
nor did she want a free hand in the East. This article was signed by
the "Berlin Correspondent," but it had passed untouched through the
editor's hands.30

On the same day, the paper announced that the British-German
naval talks would begin on June 15. It declared that Germany would
get thirty-five per cent of British tonnage in each category, but not
more than thirty-five per cent of the total British tonnage, and that
German would not speed up her naval building.31

Ribbentrop arrived in Britain on June 13 to continue the naval

 

28w (London). June 10. 1935. p. 11.
29% (Ipndon), June 139 19359 Po 13-
30m (London), June 12: 1935: P0 11-
m-mdeg p. 12.

1144

talks; word also came that the other signatories of the Washington
and London Naval Agreenents were notified of the Anglo-German arrange-
ment ard that the United States and Japan approved. 1113 Tings, how-
ever, did not martian the reaction of two other signers: France and
Italy.

On the eve of the resumption of the naval talks, mg flags, in
its editorial, virtually told the people of Britain that a naval
agreement would be signed and that Germary would accept thirty-five
per cart of Britain's tonnage, and that this was to be used exclu-
sively for Germarw's defenses. This agreement would be "equally bind-
ing” on both Germany and Great Britain for an indefinite period "even
if Germany received overseas possessions, or if other nations
increased their relative strength at Germary's expense.” 133 me;
knew that Britain could not afford to pass by so favorable a proposal
and predicted that an "agreement [would] be reached between two

governments." 1133 Times suggested that the British Government was

 

not only talking about peace, for this agreement showed that peace
could be achieved.32

3113 _Ti_g;e_§ stated that the next agreemmt should be a Western air
pact, and, if this were forthcoming, "it will be generally welcomed
in this country" and should be recognized everywhere "as a contribu-
tion to pacification and stability.” In practice, "it involves a
tacit disregard of the Treaty of Versailles," yet "it will constitute
an important advance in the process of getting peace established upon

a firm ground of agreements freely concluded." "There are parts of

 

32W (roman). June 14. 1935. p. 15.

11+ 5

the Treaty of Versailles which it is best to forget about." Dawson
said, of course, the treaty still exists but just as the war was now
a memory, so, too, "with the passage of time both are seen from a
very different perspective." Britain's agreement "does not denote
the cooling of British frimdship elsewhere, but Britain feels it is
time for Errope to settle down" and "to live no more as past or
future marries." Dawson continued, if there were more understanding
betwem Germarw and Britain, Britain might be able to "carry out fur-
ther suggestions of Herr Hitler” and get an air pact. Sich a pact
added to France' 3 defensive agreements along her frontier would give
the French, said Dawson, a sense of security. It was a "nobler and
more constructive activity than exclusive concentration on negative
plans for preventirg war. "33

The naval talks continued, however, and France told Britain on
the 18th that she refused to approve a percentage increase of the
German navy, for it was a flagrant violation of the Treaty of
Versailles, and, if Britain should agree to this violation, France
would feel free to increase her own naval tonnage unilaterally?” The
French were vociferously antagonistic while the Italians were silent.

The naval talks were concluded on June 18 and reported in E;
21411;; on the 19th. Hoare and Ribbentrop signed the agreenent, giving
Germary thirty-five per cent of the British Commonwealth's naval ton-
nage, in each category of ships except submarines, and, under certain
specified conditions, Germary could build up to one hundred per cent

”Ina.

3am (100M011), June 18a 19359 P0 160

 

1146

of Britain's tonnage in submarines.

1113 m reported the dismay of the French caused by Britain's
action, which threatened all the Treaty of Versailles powers.

Britain was acting as though her dealings with Germary were a private
affair; France recalled the common front of Stresa, and stated that
rearmammt on land, sea, or in the air had to be treated collectively.
I93 1‘i_._m_e_§ concluded its comment on the French position by the observa-
tion that "viewed on the whole the note could not be considered dis-
couraging, in spite of’its superficial lack of enthusiasm," implying
that the French did not really mean what they said.”

313 Egg; also pointed out German reaction; the Germans offi-
cially and unofficially were delighted because they knew it was a
freely negotiated agreement and the psychological effect was probably
greater than the treaty itself, probably relaxing tension and creat-
ing a comfortable atmosphere for the negotiation of an air pact.36
The German reaction duplicated Dawson's own feelings; he said as much
in his editorial of June 19.

The conversations between Britain and Germany had "culminated in
a far more definite and comprehensive agreement than was oontanplated
at first." This "agreement” was only an exchange of notes, but both
countries agreed to regard it as fixed, permanent, and definite. Now,
reasoned Dawson, people might be surprised that Germany was able to
build submarines because they still renenbered the submarine menace

of the Great War, but there were other considerations to "take into

 

35mm (London). June 19. 1935. p. 14.
36IEQ-

1w;

account which must moderate this first impression." The first was
that "submarines are not antidotes to submarines, and reciprocal
equality in their numbers or tonnage bears little relation to the
measures-~known to have been greatly improved in recent years--which
can parry their activities." The admirality, which attended the con-
versations, would not have given its approval if there were arw risks
to British security. The second consideration was that Britain was
short on submarines-u-she had only fifty-one--but France had ninety-
six, and there was no reason to assume that Russia had none. France,
therefore, was still stronger on the sea than Germany. Dawson felt
these two factors would remove am fear of Germany's increased under-
water strength.”
This navalagreanent, affirmed Dawson, came about because both
sides wanted an understanding in order to avoid a naval race such as
that before 1914. He believed this agreanent would serve as an exam-
ple for all Diropean countries wishing to enjoy naval limitations;
Britain would determine her fleet size, and Germamr would follow with
her "modest tonnage," approximately one German Slip for three British.
He said Britain would like France, Italy, and even Russia to join in
this agreenent. The French, however, objected to this plan, insist-
ing that it was contrary to the Treaty of Versailles and to the multi-
lateral system of negotiating naval agreements. Dawson found that
the "Anglo-German rapprochment [was] not wholly congenial to French
susceptibilities.” He was irritated to discover that the French had

even hinted at expanding their fleet in violation of the spirit of

 

371113121293 (London), June 19, 1935, p. 15.

1&8

the Anglo-German agreenent, which, after all, still left Germany infe-
rior to France. If France persisted in her selfish naval aggrandise-
mmt, Britain and Germany would be forced to bolster their navies.
Britain did not believe that this agreement would hurt British, French,
and Italian relations, and Britain did ”not seek new understandings

at the «panes of old friendships." The new British Government under
Baldwin had "suspiciously begun their work for stabilization and
peace," and Hoare must have felt very proud of his accomplishment.38

Dawson denied the threat of the submarine, which was diminished
by the modest agreement on tonnage. He found the French fears to be
romantic notions, while Britain was now freed to achieve new under-
standings even at the expense of old friendships. He stepped care-
fully around the Treaty of Versailles, the February 3 Franco-British
agreement, and Stresa, all of which were violated by this latest
agreement. It pleased former foes and angered former allies.
Baldwin, Samuel Hoare, and Dawson were delighted.

Ch June 20, _'131_e Lime; reported that the Germans were pleased
with the agreement for two reasons; first, it had denonstrated to the
world Hitler's successful method of diplomacy, and, second, it had
broken the ice of EurOpean misunderstanding. The Germans praised the
British for overcoming the Versailles mentality; Germany placed more
faith in bilateral talks than in multilateral talks because two-way
agreenmts could serve the national interests of both countries.39

The French, too, liked bilateral agreements, and complained that

38mm.

39W (London), June 20, 1935, p. 11;,

 

149

Britain had departed from.Anglo-French cOOperation of February 3 and
that the united "front of Stresa no longer exists." The French
believed that the agreement was a diplomatic triumph for Germany.

The other party at Stresa, the Italians, also were annoyed at Britain
for acting alone,and they felt that this "had dealt a further blow to
the unity of the front established at Stresa.” Although the naval
agreement was at Britain's initiative, Britain had failed to fully
inform France and Italy of what was happening.“0 1‘39 Meg had no
editorial on France's or Italy's sharp reaction.

Anthony Eden went to both Paris and Rome to try to conciliate
these capitals; he arrived in Paris on the 20th, and on the following
day Dawson attacked the French. He said the French resented the
naval agreement, but "in British opinion the [French reasons Ede not
override the benefits actual and potential of the Anglo-German schene
of limitations." With irony, Dawson found that the French love of
"logic and.law combines with a sense of practical benefits received
from the Treaty of Versailles.” He further stated that to break
these terms was to France a more serious matter "than it some to
BritiSh public opinion, which recognizes that its [the Treaty of
Versailles] disarmament clauses were not meant to establish a perma-
nent disproportion.of force." This new agreement replaced the "dic-
tated settlement of 1919.” Dawson predicted that Paris and Rome
would acknowledge that Britain had acted wisely}+1

Anthony Eden left Paris for Rome on June 23; about the Paris

 

“Lee...

41W (London). June 21. 1935. p. 17.

150

discussions E2 11.132; story stated that the result of these talks
"have gone far to justify faith in the shock absorbing capacity of
the Franco-British relations." "The principle of collaboration has
been reestablished," and, although France had not fully changed her
mind, she was willing to "let bygones be bygones."42 The editorial
about the Paris visit said that it was evident that the sincerity of
the British Minister "has once more triumphed over French scepticism,"
and in British Opinion there was no contradiction between ”a settle-
ment with one country and a collective system," rather, bilateral
talks could strengthen such a system. It continued that the policy
of Britain "has regained its independence" and was determined ”to
make gains where these are possible if it will help collective secu-
ity.” It also said that, vhen Eden talked in Rome, it would be about
the naval agreement and the Western air pact; he would tell the
Italians that "Britain sees the air pact as a concrete result" of the
naval agreement,”
The June 27 editorial about the Rome talks stated that Eden had
convinced the Italians that Britain was not deserting France and
Italy for Germany. It also stated that Mussolini was a very realis-
tic man in matters of rearmament and could appreciate the naval agree-
ment since it was the "first practical measure of limitation in which
Germamr has voluntarily agreed," and Germaxw would never resort to

“unrestricted warfare. "M

 

uglha_lisss.(London). June 2“. 1935. p- 1“-

“3Ib1d., p. 15.

“The Mes (London), June 27, 1935, p. 17.

151

The House of Lords debated the naval agreement between England
and Germarw, and Dawson's political mentor, Lord Lothian, defended
the agreement ”as the first concrete achievement in limitation of
arms." Dawson's friend Lord Londonderry agreed wholeheartedly that
it removed the threat of another naval race. Dawson's friends
rejoiced that Britain had supported unilateral breaking of a multi-
laterally signed treaty,”

m the end of June, 1935, Dawson was pleased to find the Diktat
of Versailles in disgrace, and the British Government agreeing with
his stated position. He believed Germarw was now going to be a good
neighbor and a probable British ally because the Germans now had
equality in arms, which meant security for than. With this equality
and security Dawson believed that the extrenes of Nazism would natu-
rally wither away; Britain, France, and Italy were, accordirg to
Dawson's reasoning, still allies, and if Germazmr returned to mmal,
perhaps all four countries could unite against the menace of the
East, that is, Russia. He felt that France may have been annoyed
with Britain, but she would recognize that Britain was only correct-
ing the injustice of the Treaty of Versailles, and that her own fears
of Germarw were mostly imagined. It seems Dawson never realized that
Hitler had driven a wedge between the united front of Stresa by maneu-
vering Britain into condoning Germarv's unilateral breaking of the
Treaty of Versailles, which Stresa and the League ofNations had
denounced. Dawson did not recognize that neither France nor Italy
would like Britain's dealing behind their backs, nor did he see the

“5M0: Po 16-

 

152

actions of Gemary as a blow to the League of Nations. France, how-
ever, believed that Britain's action of June 18 was contrary to
French vital interests.

Britain's action divided allies and friends and threatened the
concept of collective security. Britain appeared to act from
national self-interest, to the exclusion of French or Italian inter-
ests. limiting the German navy to one-third of Britain's was satis-
factory for Britain, but, because France and Italy were land powers,
they were concerned about German rearmament in general.

The Russians must have been suspicious of Britain's actions
because they believed if Germany had a navy one-third the size of
Britain's, it would be able to dominate the Baltic region. Dawson
did not consider the possible reaction of Russia worth mentioning.

1h_g tings foreign affairs expert failed to realize that Germany's
navy, whatever its size, would be new and would incorporate the
latest technical developments.

Dawson saw no reason to fear the future; however, as a result of
the British naval agreement, Italy worried about the selfish attitude
of Britain, and decided that she, too, would have to act on her own
behalf.

Lord Londonderry said that people really thought little or
nothing about this paper agreement with Germany because it was only a

statesmanlike gesture and Germany had no ships at see.“6

But no
treaty is ever merely a gesture, and this treaty created a problu

for Britain in her relations with Italy.

 

n6Londonderry, Mselveg, p. 72.

CHAPTER VII
DAWSON THE NON-FASCIST

Dawson's pro-Germanism cannot be construed as intellectual pro-
Fascism, as events later in 1935 were to prove. He believed that
Hitler's actions, although illegal, were morally correct because
Germarw had been wrongly humiliated since 1919 and the means Hitler
employed to remove this humiliation, although technically wrong, were
justified by the ends of equality and justice. Hitler, in mwson's
eyes, was interested only in Continental Europe, and primarily the
German-speaking area of Eastern Europe, which represented no danger
to Britain. Although‘Dawson attempted to placate British public
opinion when Germany broke the Treaty of Versailles and he defended
the German-British naval agreement, he violently opposed Italian ambi-
tions in Ethiopia.

Mussolini's interests were in Africa and not Europe. Dawson, as
an imperialist, felt Mussolini sought territory where he had no busi-
ness or interest legally or morally, and Dawson feared that
Mussolini's presence in Africa would disturb British interests or
colonies. Dawson always considered the welfare of the British
Commonwealth first in his attitude toward foreign affairs. Dawson
had only contempt for the Italians, who were neither strong nor sol-

vent; they were not as powerful as the Germans, who stood against

153

154

Bolshevism in the West, and there was more possibility of economic
benefit from Germarv than Italy.

The rumblings over Ethiopia were very faint during the first
half of 1935 because during this period Dawson and 139 19.1.9.8 were
busy appeasing Hitler and they tended to ignore them. In December,
193% Italy stated that Ethiopians were violating the border and that
this action would have to be punished. Ethiopia protested to the
League of Nations, whose delay was tantamount to no action.

Meanwhile, motivated by fear of Germany, Franee wooed Italy. On
January 7 the two powers signed an agreanent, which gave Italy almost
45,000 square miles of desert on the southeast border of Libya. Both
agreed to guarantee Austrian independence on the Continent. 13g
Ling; commented happily on this agreement as having ”improved the
whole outlook in Errope."1 Lord Amery demurred, calling it a tacit
French agreanmt approving of Mussolini's future plans for Ethiopia.
Italy felt the European balance would be intact, and France thought
of her eighteen divisions that could be moved from the Italian to the
German frontier.2 Anthony Eden believed this agreement to be an
important step in achieving European stability.3 gag my optimism
reflected that of the Foreign Office and of the two signatories.

Dawson, on February 1h, referred to the Foreign Secretary's

speech before the House of Commons, saying that ”so far there is no

 

lThe Meg (London), January 8, 1935, p. 12.

2Lionel S. Amery, M! Bolitical Life, Vol, III: Ihe Ugfogim
lean 1222 - 1240 (London: Hutchinson, 1955), p. 164.

312° Limes (London), January 9, 1935, p. 12.

155

indication that Italian military preparations, which have aroused a
natural anxiety here and elsewhere, are of an aggressive nature. "1+

In March Hitler had aroused anxiety when he had broken part of
the Treaty of Versailles, which France protested to the Council of
the League of Nations. France, Italy, and Britain agreed to discuss
Hitler's action in April at Stresa. Dawson's editorial, "Preparing
for Stresa," accused Mussolini of instigating France's protest to the
League and of "anbarlcmg upon what appears to be a warlike enterprise
in East Africa."5 This was the first mention by Dawson of Mussolini's
plans in Africa.

The rearlts of the Stresa Conference were published in 111.9. Meg,
but there was no mention that the three powers had raised the ques-
tion of Italian ambitions for Ethiopia. Laval, the French Minister,
at Stresa, recalled in 1940 that Errope could have been saved; he
said Italy could have saved Austria, and France and Italy would have
been allies, with Abyssinia as the price. "That was the whole point
of the Stresa Conference---J\.byss:i.nia."6

Mussolini believed that he had French approval to act in
Abyssinia, and, when Prime Minister MacDonald and Simon did not raise
the point at Stresa, Mus solini reasoned that Britain, concerned with
German rearmament, "would turn a blind eye" to Italy's African ambi-

tions.7 The British Government must have been aware of the Italian

 

“The Times (London), February 11+, 1935, p. 13.
M (london), April 8, 1935, p. 15.
6Boothby, fight to Live, p. 205.

7Nicolson, Qg geogge V, p. 528.

156

aims in East Africa, but the subject was never raised at the confer-
ence. ‘When the three powers stated that they Opposed unilateral
repudiation of treaties that might endanger Europe, Italy was con-
vinced that this had no bearing on Africa.8 Therefore, Mussolini was
certain that Britain and France would stand aside and let him devour
Ethiopia. Mussolini was extremely well pleased with the conference,
assuming tacit support from the other conferees.

Dawson.was still uncertain about Italian arms in May. 0n the
15th, fig 11% declared that the January Rome Pact, between France
and Italy, "tacitly recognized the new position of Italy in East
Africa."9 The next day Dawson wrote an editorial entitled "Italy and
EthiOpia"; he believed that the dispute was growing all out of propor-
tion because of the Decanber, 1931b, incident at Walwal. The British,
Dawson pointed out, had had incidents with the same tribes, but it
had not bothered them. He stated the country was backward but
reforms were taking place, and Italy did not need to build.up mili-
tarily. Ebih Italy and Ethiopia were members of the League of
Nations, and both had signed the Kellogg Pact.lo

Dawson stated that the Rome Pact of January 8 did not grant
Italy a free hand in Ethiopia; however, Dawson.must have forgotten
that on the previous day'Ihglgimg§_had acknowledged that Italy had
been given tacit approval to continue her plans for'Emhiopia. No

doubt he was a little confused about this issue because his main

 

8(llurchill, Else ang ELI; of Eden, p. 85.
9W (London). May 15. 1935. p. 13.
10% (London), May 169 19359 P0 17.

157

concern was with Ger-nary. The editorial concluded by saying that
neither Britain nor France desired Italy to use force against a fel-
low League of Nations menber.ll
The Council of the League of Nations agreed to hear Ethiopia's
case on May 21+ against Italy. Eden was to represent Britain, and
Dawson declared that Eden's role was that of a mediator.12 The
Council, however, appeared to be deadlocked, but on the 27th both
Italy and EthiOpia agreed to arbitrate the issue based on their 1928
Treaty. Both countries would select two representatives, and would
agree to a fifth member. If they could not agree by July 5, 1935,
then the Council would select a fifth member, and they would have
until August 25 to work out a settlement.13 Mussolini's statement,
released on the same day, said that "he will judge European States by
thdr attitude towards this problem,” and E2 Tings showed editorial
pleasure with Italy's agreement to consult with Ethiopia.lu Dawson
believed Italy was influenced by Eden to abandon her militant posi-
‘tion.15 Dawson ignored Mussolini's statement, and never suggested
that it might be a maneuver on Mussolini's part to delay League action.
Although Dawson was pleased, the Italians were not. This was
the beginning of Anglo-Italian friction. The Italian press insulted

Anthory Eden, in particular, and the British attitude toward Italy in

 

llIhid.

12W (London). May 20. 1935. p. 11+.

13M (London). May 27. 1935. p. 11+.

1421.

152.31» P0 15-

158

general. The attack on Eden was "scurrilous and vulgar," but Th2
112193 knew that most educated people did not believe it. M 1:12;;
noted that in the last few days nary Italians felt that the ”united
front of Stresa has been broken." Italians, had they read mg lines,
could have seen the truth of this by Ih_e_ flagg' attitude toward
Germary, the flagrant violator of the Treaty of Versailles. The arti-
cle continued that some Italians believed Italy might be better off
with Germary for a friend, if Italy did not get satisfactory agree-
ment.]'6

mwson was too preoccupied with the German-British naval talks
that were underway to comment on Italy. Hitler, however, probably
was delighted when he heard of this Italian hesitation; after all,
Germary had faced Stress. and Geneva, and with British relations
improving, and a possible shift in Italy's position, Hitler recog-
nized that Ger-nary had nothing to fear.

The Labour Party stated on June 7 that it wanted Britain to urge
the League to hold fast the Abyssinian dispute; Eden replied to the
Labour demnds.l7 2113 [Ling vigorously attacked the Labour Party,
saying ”The Labour Party, with some outside support, urged the most
bellicose measures in order to assert the League's authority in the
Italic-Abyssinian dispute." The Labour Party wanted Britain to close
the Suez, bar Italian planes from flying over Egypt, and close British
ports to Italian ships. However, kg Lime; said "these eccartrics

were corrected in an admirable speech." Eden slowed that it would be

 

16W (London), May 31, 1935, p, 15,
17W (London), June 8, 1935, p. 14,

199

economically disastrous for Italy to undertake each an adventure, and
that Britain would not take sides in advance of any conflict.18
mwson, within a month, would join these eccentrics, but for the
moment he was only concerned with getting the naval agreement signed.

The Italian press still attacked Britain, and an article of
June 12 noted that France did not like this difference between her
allies.19 Another article appeared the next day, stating Italy's
readiness to meet W aggression in East Africa, and her criticism of
the League of Nations. To Italians, the ”League is an insurance
among the established empires.” The League gave Japan a free hand in
China, and, according to Mussolini's paper, £22922 _d_: w, it
appeared that the only cbfnamic powers, Germany and Japan, were out-
side of the League.20 1123 M38. offered no cement.

Germany signed the naval agreement with Britain on June 18 and,
as pointed out previously, Dawson was ecstatic. Italy, however, did
not share the same views. The flags. on the 20th recognized that ”the
conclusion of the agreement has been received here [in Italy] with
amthing but favor." The Italians believed that this pact "has dealt
a further blow to the united front established at Stresa." The sub-
marine issue, to the Italians, meant that Germany had hoodwinked
Britain. Italy was angered at British initiative and, specifically,

at her not consulting Italy.21

1821—.

19W (London), June 12, 1935, p. 12.
20w (London), June 13, 1935, p. 12.
21W (London), June 20, 1935, p. 14.

 

160

There was no editorial on Italian displeasure with Britain's
agreanent. This action of Britain's must undoubtedly have made
Mussolini angry, for he could see that Britain tried hard to placate
Ger-mam, who had broken the Treaty of Versailles and had been
denounced by the League Council. Now, since Britain had signed a
treaty approving Germany's actions, Mussolini must have thought
Britain, analogously, could be expected to give tacit approval of his
ambitions in Ethiopia, or at the most to react mildly. Therefore, he
believed that London might ignore his breaking the League of Nation's
treaty. He believed Britain surely would not break the Stresa front
and lose his friendship; however, Mussolini did not know that the
editor of Britain's most powerful. paper was an imperialist and a
moralist who did not want to see Italy in or near British African
interests. After the naval agreement was signed Dawson turned his
attmtion to Italy and directed the attention of fig limes; to
Mussolini. in particular.

Anthoror Eden was smt by the British Government to Paris and
Rome to eacplain why Britain had acted unilaterally. After leaving
Paris, Eden spoke with Mussolini on June 21+ and 25, and Fden recorded
in his diary that Mussolini told him that France, as he understood it,
was or had "disinterested herself from Abyssinia."22 Eden told the
cabinet that Mussolini must be warned that Britain would not support
Italy against the League and a peaceful mrope. The cabinet took no

23

action.

 

22Eden, Memoizg, p. 25]..

23mm. , p. 273.

161

1112 Eggs editorial on Eden's visit said that he had tried to
halt a possible war in Abyssinia, but Mussolini did not appear to be
interested. Mussolini had chosen "singularly flimsy excuses for
threatening the independence of Abyssinia." Dawson continued that
EthiOpia had tried to have her case arbitrated, and she had even
offered economic concessions to Italy, but, according to Mussolini,
it was not enough. However, 115 time; concluded that Eden's mission
was a success; he had convinced the Italians of Britain's good
faith?!+ In the latter point, however, Dawson seans to have been
mistaken.

mile Eden was in Europe, the results of British Peace Ballot
were announced on June 27. This ballot had been conducted after
November, 1934, by people who were supporters of the League of
Nations; forty per cent of all registered voters were polled. Ninety
to ninety-five per cent voted positively for international disarma-
ment, for Britain to be in the League, and for economic sanctions to
be applied to any aggressor nation. Clause five was of particular
interest; it asked if nations should combine to stop another nation,
even if military measures were required. then the votes were counted,
it was found that sixty per cent voted yes, twenty per cent voted no,

and twenty per cent were non-comittal.25

The Time; almost ignored
the results, and Dawson editorialized that the government had learned

nothing from the ballot that it did not already know, and "it is hard

 

2AM (London), June 27, 1935, p. 17.
25Haflghur8t, Iflentietl; gmtgz! 332%. 19 pe ZMe

162

to see what good the ballot has done. "26 This appeared to be an
understatement because this ballot, carried out by private organiza-
tions, showed that the British people favored a strong stand by the
League. These people knew what was happening in EthiOpia, and indi-
cated their positive stand for League action. There is no doubt that
it did inspire the government, and possibly even Q13 Times, to take a
strong stand on Ethiopia. Both knew with an election shortly impend-
ing that the League of Nations would be a good issue, and this was
exactly what occurred.

Baldwin, on June 29, in Yorkshire, stated, while defending the
British-German naval agreement, that the "Covenant of the League of
Nations is the sheet anchor of British polioy."27 Baldwin, when he

8 Neville

first heard of the Peace Ballot, laughed and ridiculed it.2
Chamberlain, on the same day, declared that Britain would work "for
the attainment of security by collective action through the League of
Nations."29 As a very close friend of mwson, Chamberlain made the
mistake of believing that "public opinion is what I_h_g Times tells him
it is. "30 These statements demonstrated just how much the government
had learned from the ballot; they made the League the issue in the
November, 1935, general election.

Eden reported to the House of Commons on his visit to Paris and

 

26% (London), June 28, 1935, p. 17.
27M (London), July 1, 1935, p. 10.
28Havighurst, henjgi‘eth Qentum mm, p. 241+.
29% (London), July 1, 1935, p. 10.
30Cooper, 019, gen Eomgt, p. 255.

163

Rome. He said that he told Mussolini that Britain's interest in
Abyssinia and her foreign policy were based only on British member-
ship in the League of Nations, and for no other reason. British pub-
1ic Opinion was very strong on this issue, he said, overlooking the
ballot just as the government (and Dawson) had.done. Eden informed
the House that he had suggested a solution. If Abyssinia accepted it
she would have to give up some economic and territorial rights, and
in return Britain would concede to Abyssinia same land that would
have granted.her access to the sea. Mussolini declined}:1
Dawson editorialized on Eden's speech, saying that the "House
was astonished and slightly displeased" with Britain's offer.
Dawson, however, continued that the government only made this offer
because "British policy is and must be founded upon the League."
Dawson said, if this question were not solved, the feared breakdown
of collective security would occur, and Italy should see that Britain
wanted "a reasonable solution, the preservation of peace, and the
maintenance of the position of the League of Nations.” Mussolini
wanted to control all or part of Ethiopia, said Dawson. Italy may
have entered the colonial race late and with a handicap and she may
have been irritated by the Ethiopians, but she had.no right to ”run
counter to the treaties and other agreemmts she has signed.” Her
policy, reasoned Dawson, defied her 1928 treaty with Abyssinia,
Britain, and France, the Kellogg Pact, the League of Nations, and the
very foundations of the collective system. Such a policy ”casts

renewed doubts upon the value of treaties." "British public opinion

 

31W (Ionian). July 2. 1935. p. 16.

161+

views with profound misgivings the Italian policy towards EthiOpia,"
and would support the government in seeking any honorable peace.32
Every argument Dawson used could have been applied against Germany
for her actions during the first six months of 1935 but he chose to
use none.

France, in the meantime, appeared to be in a dilemma about
recmt British activities with Gemany and Italy. France, still suf-
fering from the shock of the German-British naval agreement, did not
trust British diplomatic methods. Eden never told the French that
Britain was prepared to make a deal with Mussolini to solve the
Ethiopian problen, and France believed that the big issues were being
solved without her approval. Now Britain asked France what her posi-
tion and attitude on Abyssinia was and she requested France's strong
support for the League of Nations. 33

IE Ii_m_e_s on July 5 acknowledged France's "Italian" dilanma.
Dawson believed that France did not want to give Italy a free hand in
EthiOpia, and neither did she want to Oppose her new ally. Britain,
said Dawson, had tried to solve the problem but failed, and now the
League had the responsibility of settling the issue. France, rea-
soned Dawson, believed in the League, and if Mussolini flouted the
League France had nothing. To Dawson the obvious course for Frame
to follow was to back up the League of Nations. Dawson ignored the
real reason for France's dilemma, that is, France mistrusted Britain

and not Italy. l'h_e $13 es and the British Government had countenanced

 

32%" Po 17e
”lain—ma: (Inndon). July 5, 1935. p. 1n.

165

the German defiance of the League so why should France trust British
action in the League? Dawson concluded that "public opinion will
best be pleased if Britain can show herself firm, independent,
inspired by faithfulness to the League and devotion to British inter-
ests, ready to take action for the maintenance of justice."3b’
Mussolinitold a rally on July 7 that "Italians prefer a life of
heroism to one that is insipid” and "all the world must recognize the
will and the spirit of Fascist Italy."35 mwson's response to
Mussolini's speech recognized that Italy wanted to dominate Ethiopia.
Regardless of the cost, declared Dawson, Mussolini's plans had been
made to the last detail and it was useless to offer any more sugges-
tions to ease the problem. The major powers should keep in contact
with each other because "the situation is intensely distasteful and
disturbing.” Their ”opportunity to limit the mischief may come," ani
they should stand together and exercise "their united influence when
it does come." Britain must, however, keep in mind "the simple truth
that the League of Nations is a league for peace and not a league for
war.” It cannot extend the area of conflict, and, if all its members
act in unison, they "could prevent conflict altogether.” The atti-
tude of France was most important, continued Dawson. British feelers
to France had met with little response. Since May, when France
backed the principles of the League of Nations, she had begun to
waver. Italy and France had signed an agreement in the hopes of

establishing better relations; both had an interest in Africa, as

 

3“'Ibig." p. 15.
35M (London). July 8, 1935. p. 11+.

166

well as in Austria. Naturally, both France and Italy saw Britain as
performing an unfriendly act by interesting herself in Abyssinia when
she was not prepared to commit herself on Austria. But the British
people, said mwson, believed that the "Austrian people are not
averse" to joining in some type of union with Germaxw. Abyssinia was
quite another matter; she was in a crisis; she had appealed to the
League of Nations, and to the powers that signed the Kellogg Pact.
The British people wanted Britain to renain vigilant and ready to
enter collective action.36

mwson recognized Italian plans, and he believed that the mem-
bers of the League must act in accord against then. He was afraid
that France did not see the possible danger of the Ethiopian problan.
Ihwson did not say that this reluctance of France night be explained
by her distrust of Britain, and her clandestine naval agreeuent of
June. The French obsession with Germany and the Continent explained
their position. The possibility of Austria's joining Germany had
been suggested, but never in 1:13 Tings. m Eggs again found ”pub-
lic opinion" useful to emphasize its own position as spokesman for
the common voice of British people.

The Abyssinian-Italian Arbitration Commission, which was meeting
in the Hague from June 25, collapsed on July 9. The conmfi.ssion could
not reach a decision as to who the fifth member would be, nor could
they agree on the frontier isme. Abyssinia wanted to discuss the
entire frontier problem whereas the Italians pressed for a discussion
of individual incidents.

 

36mg... p. 15.

167

Shortly after these talks collapsed, Hoare spoke before the
House of Commons (July 11) in defense of the German-British naval
agreement. He devoted a small portion of his address to Italy; he
believed that the Italians should recognize the fact that Britain did
not want to trouble them, but Britain could not ignore her obliga-
tions to the League.37 One cannot be impressed with the wavering
position of Sir Samuel Hoare. He was prepared to ignore the German
breach of the Treaty of Versailles, with its consequences to the col-
lective systen, but now he put particular emphasis on how Britain
would carry her weight in that system!

The Italian reaction was one of amazanent. If Britain did not
want to disturb Italy, then why did she create this fuss over
Ethiopia? The Italians felt that Hoare's statement needed clarifica-
tion; they wanted acts of proof, not statements of Britain's good
will. Would Britain help or hinder Italian ambitions? Was Britain
prepared to let Stresa go? The Italians recognized the value of the
collective system in Earope but did Britain want this carried into
Africa too?38

The answers to these Italian questions came in part on July 15
in the editorial "Italy, Abyssinia, and the League." Dawson praised
Hoare's speech and said, if chances of preventing hostilities were
dim, "the reason is not to be found in any weakness or ineptitude of
Britain's policy, but in the obstinacy of Signor Mussolini." Dawson

also said that only Italy considered war a feasible solution and that

 

37W (London), July 129 19359 P0 1""-
38The Times (London), July 13, 1935, p. 12.

168

Italian aims were simply to seize Abyssinia but Britain knew that the
Ethiopians were not the best of colonial neighbors for they robbed,
raided, and plundered. He continued, saying Italy needed to expand,
and she might obtain econodc advantages in Abyssinia and due might
introduce an amount of civilisation. Britain did not mind the civi-
liaing of a backward nation, llwson said, but Abysdnia was a member
of the League, and a "brutal and unprovoked assault“ on her would be
an unusual way of civilising her. He continued that the British
Governaent never wanted Abyssinia in the League, Italy instigated its
admittance, and therefore, the British Govern-ant could not "ignore
the Abyssinian appeal to the League. ”39 Dawson said that Britain
backed Abyssinia and her claims in the League because these were
"legal" as well as "moral” claias; thus, Stresa was gone, and Britain
was prepared to deter the Italian ambitions.

For the neurt two weeks 1113 E31! reported but did not editorial-
ise upon what was happening in Italy or Abyssinia. It was during
this time that the position of both these countries became clear,
that is, Italy wanted nothing less than complete mastuy over
Ethiopia while EthiOpia insisted on couplete indepmdmce and terri-
torial integrity. Sir Samuel Hoare announced in the House on July 25
that Britain would not send arms to either Italy or Ethiopia. he
Cmmcil of the League agreed to meet on July 31 in Geneva to attupt
a peaceful settl-ent.

Dawson editorialised on the eve of the contermce that noboch

 

”W (Wm). M 159 19359 P0 15-

169

could foretell the effect the dispute might have on the Continent
regarding the "validity of treaties, the future of the League of
Nations, and upon the relations of the black races with the white all
over the world." The Cmmonirealth with its large non-Caucasian popu-
lations in Africa and India, and its traditional friendship with
Italy, was in a diluma. m m restrained itself for two weeks
against countering the accusations of the ”ill natured and fantastic
truculence of the Italian newspapers." Dawson said that the people
of Britain should not be critical of the governmmt for having no
precise policy because efforts had hem made to secure a peaceful
settlumt on the hole issue; Britain wanted the Italians to solve
their grievances with Ethiopia, but "they have never formally stated”
what these were. The Council was now meeting to appoint a fifth
arbitrator to the conciliation coamission, based on the 1928 agree-
mmt between Italy and Ethiopia. Mussolini wanted to take Ethiopia
by force; this was "a challenge to the universal rmouncenent of war
as an instrument of policy, enshrined in the Kellogg Pact.”uo

the) the Council called its first session on August 1}, it was
agreed that Britain, France, and Italy should discuss this prole
based on their 1906 Agreuut. If they could not agree, the Council
would study the Ethiopian prole on Septuber 9. These three powers
had agreed in 1906 to provide for Ethiopian indepmdmce and integ-
rity, but had divided the land into spheres of influence in the event
it should collapse. Meanwhile, Massolini and m m continued

 

mm (“monk July 31s 19359 P0 13-

170

their dialOgue; Mussolini said that Italy alone was the "judge of her
security in East Africa." He also said that "put in military terms
the Italio-Abyssinian problem is simple and logical. It admits with
Geneva, without Geneva, against Geneva," there was only one solution,
and this "can only be totalitarian. "1+1

Samuel Hoare spoke before the House of Commons on August I,
saying that the British Government would not take any rash action,
but was "determined to do [its] duty under the Covenant of the
League," and, if Italy had an complaints, the League would give them
an impartial hearing.”2 £1113 Time; supported Hoare's stand, adding
that Italy liked to use force to settle disagreements and therefore
preferred to ignore the League's peaceful overtures. Dawson again
noted that the "Italian grievances against the Ethiopian Government
are so far as they have been made known, singularly flimsy.”3

Although Dawson supported the League of Nations, he never
defined the extent of his support and neither did Hoare. Dawson rec-
ognized that the body was needed, but he did not believe am? one
nation should tell the others what to do. By the end of August, how-
ever, Dawson reversed his position and pressed for British leadership.

The three powers agreed to meet and discuss the Ethiopian dis-
pute in Paris on August 16. The editorial on the eve of these talks
discussed the 1906 treaty, and how it could not be changed without

the approval of the other two powers. Dawson emphasized the validity

 

41M (London). August 1. 1935. 13- 1th

WM (London)! All-811513 2: 1935a Po 12.
“3.1m... p. 13.

171

of the treaty, and how it was being used in a concerted effort to
make Italy change her warlike course. However, he said, if Italy
proceeded with her plans she would be breaking all of her prior agree-
ments, and he was certain that Britain could not consent "to the law
of force, and condone the resort to war.” he Italians, continued
Dawson, made the mistake of believing that Britain opposed Italy for
election purposes and selfish interests, which was not true. The
British people, he said, would sacrifice amthing for the League, and
welcomed ”a suprene effort to establish the Covenant as a substitute
for war in the settlement of international disputes." mwson con-
tinued, saying there were may people in Britain who were not against
Italy's economic and commercial claims in Miopia because they
believed that Ethiopia would bmefit from th. but the only British
objection was over thapossible loss of Ethiopian integrity. If
Mussolini refused the French and British offer, Dawson stated, he
would incur world resentmmt that would be "strongly and widely felt,
and had a crystallisation point in Geneva. "“4 his article by mwson
infoned Italy that if she caused the conference to fail, she would
face a united and hostile League.

The Italian seni-governmmt paper, Signor Gayda's m g;
M, rose to the challmge of It! 113” and mwson. It dmounced
m m "on account of its alleged threats made on Italy," which it
called "political blackmail." be m 1; m declared that
“m m [was] conmitting a grave error by its attack on Italy."

In their view, Dawson had threatened Italy before the conference

 

“maxim (undo-n). August 1A. 1935. p. 13.

172

opened and had give: the impression that Britain would impose a ”pre-
arranged solution" upon Italy. The Italian paper said that [Lh_e m
had showed "with decisive proof that Britain is far from being dis-
interested in the Italic-Abyssinian dispute,” and, by acting in this
way, £13 Mg had only hindered the possibilities of a peace settle-
ment.“5
When the talks opened, a 121.39; article noted that there appeared
to be no change in the position of either side. E2 flag; said that
Britain's case was based on the contention that Italy had resorted to
arms, in "disregard of several treaties," and felt this ". . . ruth-
less aggression by one League munber on another . . . cannot be
approved [under] ary circumstances." If Italy pursues this course,
2h: meg continued, then action must be impleaented as directed; the
story also pointed out that, since the League would meet on
Septuber 1}, the Italians might still retreat.“6 This happy prospect
was wishful thinking because another article from Italy indicated
that Italy had no interest in changing her course. The next day the
Italian press accused Britain of using the conference, the League,
and the 1906 treaty as a camouflage to hide British interests in
Abyssinian?
The three-power conference collapsed on August 18, and Dawson

attacked the Italians in his editorial of the 19th, chargirg that

 

“5W (103103): 5118““ 15a 19359 P0 9-
“We: (London). August 16. 1935. p. 10.
“7W (London). August 17. 1935. p.10.

173

Italy had "brusquely rejected" the reasonable prOposals offered her
by Britain and France as a means of settling the dispute. Dawson
said Mussolini showed no respect for France or Britain, and, after
having accepted the August decision of the League of Nations Council
at Geneva and having agreed to the tripartite conference, he came
unprepared to contribute to the solution. Dawson conceded that Italy
had complaints, and possibly even economic rights in Ethiopia, but he
added that she had signed the pact against war and.was now behaving
in a bellicose fashion. "She has ignored her pledges and contemptu-
ously flouted the League." As of September ’4, there seemed to be an
imminent battle brewing between Italy and the League and Dawson felt
a solution must be found that was not contrary to the principles of
the League or it might mean its demise. Dawson noted that this was a
grave time for Britain, but more so for France, whose foreign policy
was based on the League. To preserve the Opportunity for peaceful
settlements which were at the heart of the League, Dawson urged dur-
ing this period (August to September h) that the British be deliber-
ate and calm.48
During the Parliamentary adjournment (August 2 until October 29),
there were no speeches made by menbers of the government; however, a
few members corresponded and left a record of their private opinions.
Hoare, for example, told Chamberlain that Baldwin, who was about to

go on a holiday, "would think of nothing but his holiday, and the

 

usThe Iimeg (London), August 19, 1935, p. 11.

17a

necessity of keeping out of the whole business at arm cost."l+9 On
August 20, Eden recorded that both he and Hoare agreed that Italy
would declare war on Ethiopia by September.50

The historian, Alfred Rowse, had recalled telling mwson at the
time that the Germans were the real threat to Britain, not the
Italians. Dawson's retort was: "If the Germans are so powerful as
you say, oughtn't we to go in with than?”fl In other words, Dawson,
who opposed the Italians on ethical grounds, was willing to join the
Germany-Eight g; muss an expediency.

In late August, 13 m proclaimed thatBritain had to take the
lead at Geneva. Baldwin returned from his vacation and called a cabi-
net aeeting for August 22 to discuss the Ethiopian problu. In
addressing the nesting, Dawson in 1h; m saw the dispute as "a
conflict between the method of using war as an instrument of policy
and the method of settling an international dispute by arbitration,
diplomatic conciliation, or international conference." He said Italy
had signed treaties against war, and ”the British public instinctively
felt" that unless the League of Nation's prestige was restored "the
world will be back in the days when national ambition was considered
a legitimate reason for making war." that, Dawson asked, would
Baldwin and Hoare, who supported the principles of the League of
Nations, do if sanctions were asked on September 4, or if Italy were
dmounced as the aggressor? He said there was no doubt that "a

 

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175

strong lead by Great Britain at Geneva would be followed by the other
nubers of the League." He continued, saying ”the conscience of this
country has been touched and there is probably very widespread sup-
port of the view of the Archbishop of York." The cleric had said
that ”to fail now in loyalty to the League , because that loyalty
might have grave consequences, would involve indelible disgrace. ”52

After the cabinet meeting of the 22nd Dawson attacked the cabi-
net for not being more forthright in declaring that Britain would
take the lead at Geneva to impose sanctions on Italy, stating that,
if they failed to do so, "mamy people will be disappointed.” He said
Britain understood the French dilema, that is, France did not want
to impose sanctions and lose her ally, nor did she want the conflict
extended, and, consequently, she delayed her intention of inposing
sanctions out of the fear of angering Italy. Dawson asked how the
British Government could allow Italy to go to war "after the repeated
declarations by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary in favor
of the League of Nations." Hoare, said Ihwson, stated that the
British Government consciously recognised the Italian needs for new
materials, but Italy's economic nationalism was ”a reaction by a
depraved country." He continued, regardless, Britain neither would
approve of this crude violation of peace treaties nor watch a leading
nenber of the League of Nations "revert to the simple method of spo-
liation for the gratification of its desires" and "the govern-mt
will fail its duty if they do not uphold this principle. '53

 

52W (Lemon). August 22. 1935. p. 13.
53W (London). August 23. 1935. p. 11.

176

m Eggs, and Dawson in particular, attacked the government for
not taking a position on sanctions and taldng the lead at Geneva.
This was unusual. Ilwson declared ”the systan of sanctions that com-
mends itself increasingly to public opinion today is the withholding
of supplies of all sorts to am country mich has deliberately chosen
war as an instrument of National Policy. " If the British Government
had made this declaration "it would have been gratifying,” hit the
government's unwillingness to make a statenent on sanctions ”will be
misconstrued if it is taken to be an unwillingness to apply sanctions
in any circumstances. "51;

Both the French and Italian cabinets met on August 28; the
French were reported to have adopted a waiting position whereas Italy
declared that she would tell the world and the Council of her posi-
tion. She also made it known that Britain had nothing to fear from
Italy and their friendship dated from before 1911}, linked by Locarno
and Stresa.

Dawson commented on these cabinet sessions; again he was extruely
pointed regarding Italy. It was obvious to him what Italy intended
to do, and, although Mussolini wanted a peaceful settluent, he felt
it would be at Ethiopia's expense because Mussolini had dmonstrated
that "he prefers the ways of war to the ways of peace. "55

Then Dawson reflected on the French meeting; he said the French
knew that Britain would support the League in this dispute, but
France wanted to avoid the use of sanctions against Italy in view of

$1131.51-

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177

the length of time it had taken to gain friendship with Italy. The
French, however, did express surprise at the strong feeling expressed
by the British people on the Ethiopian issue; they could not under-
stand why Britain did not denounce German rearmament, which also was
against the League of Nations. Dawson replied, to the amasuamt of
the French, that there was an easy explanation for this difference in
Britain's attitude, that is, "Germany waited very patiently for tax
years while the League tried to solve the problu.” He said, in
principle the right of equality had bear recognised and only after
waiting for years for the principle to be put into practice, ”did
Germany take matters into her own hands in violation of a treaty of
which, in that respect, she had never admitted the validity.” This
answer was actually intended to clear up the doubt that lingered in
the minds of the French officials. Dawson said Italy, on the other
hand, had hem offered economic concessions, which Mussolini had
rejected, and now he wanted to conquer a nation that was prepared to
arbitrate. Dawson continued, that mssolini wanted to impose Italian
will by force, to revenge Adowa, to impose the world with his
fascist regine, to stake a claim for Italy in Africa, to use Ethiopia
as a source of raw materials, to supply space for her extra popula-
tion, to ignore treaties that he had signed, and to get Masada out
of the League after he had gotten her in. "his is the country and

that is its mood. "56

On August 29 and 30, W published statuents by many coun-
tries on their stands in regards to the League of Nations. All

 

56mm.

178

pledged support for that body in its decisions.

hwson, on the 30th, warned mesolini of British public opposi-
tion to his position. He said hissolini was going to the Council,
but he did not have a case. Mussolini told Britain not to worry.
Britain did not fear Italy, said Dawson, but "an ingrained love of
Justice and peace" moves British opinion to dislike war as an instru-
ment of national policy. The British people were watching Italy with
ever increasingfanxiety, and they, continued Dawson, eXpected their
government to play the game by the rules set up by the League.

Dawson said the British delegates at Gmeva were not deceived by
”this universal solicitude of their countryman for the future world
order. ”57 Dawson could have added that these delegates knew the
attitude of 11h; flag, which spoke for Britain.

Anthony Eden left on September 4 for the conference at Geneva,
and Dawson reiterated $113 1391' position that Eden had "beyond all
question the backing of public Opinion" in Great Britain. Dian, mp-
ported by the cabinet as well as the public, would have a strong hand
at Geneva, and it would be stronger when France saw Britain's sincere
opposition to war. Britain was aware of the French dilmma: France
must either condemn Italy as an aggressor or let Italy go unpunished,
and permit "the opming of an indefinite era of licensed spoliation. ”58

On the eve of the Council's meeting, Dawson commented on the
possible lack of confidence in the future of the League "if it should

completely fail to produce a solution on this occasion." He said

 

57W (London). August 30. 1935. p- 13.
58W (London), Septeaber 2, 1935. Po ll.

179

there is ”an instinctive feeling in this country” which Earope did
not understand-«Britain saw the choice as between war and concilia-
tion as a means of settling issues, which was also the position of
the League. However, he continued, Mussolini stood for war and was
prepared to challenge the League, and the British policy had ”a clear
cause to uphold-«the cause of the League. ”59

The Council meetings were held on the 6th. Dawson editorialised
that the Italians had been obnoxious and used obstructionist tactics;
Italy was trying to present "a novel, arrogant, and inadmissible
argument" that Abyssinia was not fit to sit in the League. Again,
Dawson pointed out that it was Italy who secured her admittance into
the League in the first place.60

The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel. Hoare, arrived in
Gmeva on the 8th to support Eden. Surprisingly, on Septenber ll, he
took the podium himself and shocked the Council by reaffirming
British support of the League's collective systea. He proclaimed
that the obligations of the Covenant remained for all its numbers;
"if risks for peace are to be run, they must be run by all.” He said
it was very unjust and dangerously misleading to believe that Britain
was in the League solely for her own interest and the British govern-
ment's attitude toward the League was one of "unwavering fidelity to
the League and all it stands for, and the case now before us is no

exception, but on the contrary, the continuance of that rule. '61

 

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60% (London), September 6, 1935, p. 13.
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180

E! 11.”; said this was the "true range and depth of British
policy and British feeling," and there was no longer any doubt of
Britain's anger. m m also said Hoare's speech was "an authori-
tative and historic declaration of British Policy” and that Hoare
had eotpressed the views of the government and "of the country as a
whole. ”62 This had been Dawson's view since August.

Hoare's speech was not created on the spur of the moment; he had
shown Baldwin a preview of it. Baldwin, who had returned from his
holiday, glanced at it and said "that is all right,” but he did not
seen to recognise its real importance.63 The effect of the speech
was electrifying. Italy was practically alone, France did not care
for Mussolini or his insults, Russia did not feel particularly
frimdly toward him, most of Errope did not care for Italy, and all
were prepared to follow Britain' s leadership in the belief that Italy
would bow to sanctions.6u The people in Britain were aroused; it
”united all those forces in Britain which stood for a fearless combi-
nation of righteousness and strength. Here was at least a policy“
for Britain.65 It was Dawson's policy and now the governmmt
declared support for it.

On September 12, Hoare spoke by radio to the British people and
said that Britain and the British Espire were now highly regarded and
respected “by the world" and that he and Eden were still worldng for

 

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181

a solution to the Ethiopian problen.66 In an editorial on the broad!
cast, Dawson said he recognized the statumt of Labour leader
Herbert Mbrrison, who, in.Fulhan, said that Hoare's speech commanded
the overwhelming support of British public opinion. Dawson said that
Hoare also "spoke . . . not only the mind of his own country, but
[for] the great majority of the nations represented in the League.”67
This was a stern warning to Mussolini that Britain and the other
League nations were not bluffing.

French Minister Laval, at the League of Nations on Septuaber 13,
declared that France was faithml to the Covenant ani pledged to ful-
fill.her obligations to the League. Laval's speech brought forth an
editorial by Dawson on its significance in which he said France, who
could not commit herself to a policy befordiand, now through Laval
"came out for the Covenant, the whole Covenant, and nothing but the
Covmant" because that was the international law. Dawson continued
that ”unless Signor Mussolini has lost all sense of proportion," he
should realize that France and Britain wanted peace, and there was
more to gain by "timely cooperation with Great Britain and France
than by an insensate policy which they can have no choice but to
oppose. ”68

Mussolini, however, was not thinking about cooperation. He
declared on the 13th that there could be no compromise on the dispute.
Dawson again answered him in an editorial, saying that Italy only

 

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182

wanted deliberate and unnecessary war and that Mussolini was reckless,
ignoring the possibilities of what light happen as a result of his
action. Dawson also said the British Empire and most nations at
Geneva were aware of ”the risks of peace," and, if Mussolini should
make good his threats, it would be the League's task to "bring its
united weight to bear for the earliest possible restoration of order
and justice. '69

How far was Britain prepared to go? mat was 1113 flags, and
Dawson prepared to say? ms reader of W at the end of
September had no doubt about the British Government's policy or that
of 1113 mg; both wanted strong support for the League of Nations,
especially in its stand against ary Italian threat to Abyssinia. If
this was not the policy, what else could explain the belligermt
stance of 9:3 _’1‘i__a_1_e_s_ from late July to September? The real question
was one of Dawson's motives; he viewed Italy's presence in Africa as
unwarranted, for the reasons mentioned above.

Another reason for Dawson' 3 anti-Italian stand was the upcoming
election. In June, he suspected that there would be an election, but
he never said when it would be called. The anti-Italian and pro-
League positions were recognized as the great issues on which the
National Government would stand. fig filings had stated in June that
the Peace Ballot was not important, but, when Dawson learned that
most people backed the League, he recognized that a strong pro-League
position had unlimited possibilities as a campaign issue. Neville
Chamberlain, mwson's friend, also recognized this; Chamberlain told

 

69W (London). September 16. 1935. p. 13-

183

Lord Amery that he agreed with Hoare's speech of Septanber ll, adding
that ”we were bound to try out the League of Nations, for political
reasons at home, and there was no question of going beyond the mild-
eat of economic sanctions such as an embargo on the prrchase of
Italian goods or sale of munitions to Italy. "70 Chamberlain had two
positions, then, a strong one for elections, and a mild one in prac-
tice; flag Til-£1.23 reader knew only the former.

If m M' stand at the end of Septanber was in part for
elections purposes, the National Governmmt was givm an added advan-
tage on October 3. Italy attacked Abyssinia without a declaration of
war, claiming self-defense. Dawson vociferously denounced Italy in
2133 _'I_‘i_m_e§_; he said the Italian claim against Abyssinia was ridiculous
and ”no one, from Swift to Lewis Carroll, could improve this argu-
ment." He stated that the invasion ran counter to League policy and
"if the members of the League are prepared to tolerate inactively a
concrete and unequivocal act of unprovoked aggresdon, then the
Covenant and the Pact of Paris are dead. ~71 Dawson said Britain's
policy was clear and the area of conflict could be restricted; he was
prepared to act, up to the point of actual war.

Q) the day the war broke out, October 3, 1935, the Conservative
Party held its annual conference at Bournenouth. All the speakers
stated their support for the League, and for strengthening Britain's
armaments. Chamberlain said that the government knew "its duty to

the nation,” which was to boost defenses, preserve the empire, honor

 

70mm, m ganged Life, 101, EL, pp. 174-75.
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184

its obligations to other nations, and support the League in estab-
lishing peace by collective action.72

fig m agreed with memberlain's position that Britain could
either live in splendid isolation or intervene in ”international
affairs through the League," on the assumption that these events
would sooner or later affect the empire. In order tofollow either
position, Britain should be strong, and, because the National
Government has chosen the path of intervention, and correctly so,
said Dawson, he never mentioned the nation's weakened military condi-
tion nor did he denounce the British Government for allowing such a
state to comm-u73

Baldwin came out strongly for the League of Nations at the
annual conference on October 4. He attacked those who advocated isola-
tion while he pointed out that the events in Africa could pose a
threat to the anpire. He declared that "we camot afford, either
nationally or as an Empire, to refuse to play our part in the
Continent [Africa] in which the hand of God had placed us." He said
Britain was a member of the League, and "this country resented the
doubts that had been cast on its integrity in default; the Covenant.”
He also said Britain would not act alone as ”action must be taken
totally by all. ”7b This was a forceful declaration, and very similar
to what Dawson had written the previous day. Dawson was delighted

with Baldwin's statements; Baldwin, reasoned Dawson, had now silenced

 

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185

the critics of the British Government and was respected beyond the
party and as the unchallenged leader of the country. Dawson wrote
that Baldwin showed that Britain could not afford isolation, and that
there ”cannot be one law for Africa and another for Errope.” Dawson
declared further that Baldwin favored economic and financial measures
to another the war, and, although British forces were weak, she would
carry out her obligations to the League (neither Baldwin nor Dawson
had mmtioned military sanctions) .75

The League's Council on October 7 accused Italy of being the
aggressor, and the Council agreed that Article 16 should be invoked,
which would place economic and financial sanctions on Italy. This
decision was binding on all League membership. A coordinating coar-
mittee would be set up to devise economic measures. m m was
very pleased with the League Council's decision; it stated that the
measures to be applied would be slow but that the League by nature
was slow. It further stated that British opinion, however, "stands
firm behind its representatives" while ”the Covenant calls the
nations vhich have signed it to the crucial test of collaboration and
good faith."76

While 11:; gym agreed that the Britiér public supported its
government at Geneva, Dawson believed that the formal stamp of
approval in the form of a general election in Novanber would rein-
force the government's position. This appeared to be a feeler to
probe public opinion. Dawson had been talking with Baldwin, and

 

75%., P0 13-
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186

noted how worried he appeared over the EthiOpian crisis and the upcom-
ing election. Dawson told Baldwin that the sooner the election came
the better.”

The mulbers of the government became more vocal in their support
of the League. In Geneva, the Assanbly of the League voted 50-2 in
support of the Council's action. Eden recalled that the assanbly
knew how Britain felt, that is, there must be peace, and if not,
action must be taken as it "is our duty to take action; it is essm—
tial that such action be prompt."78 The Secretary of State for War,
Lord Halifax, declared that Britain's friendship for Italy "could not
discharge this country from an honorable bond that she had under-
taken. "79

labour leader Herbert Morrison accused the government of using
the League as an election issue. He said, that ”it seared certain the
Tory wire pullers had persuaded the Prime Minister and the government
to plunge the country into a general election almost at once.” He
felt that the Tories would utilize Britain's stand on the League of
Nations as the issue, saying ”the patriotism of the Tory Party was
always a hypocritical patriotism. "80

mwson denied Morrison's charge, saying this type of statenent
was expected from Opposition parties, as this "is one of the illogi-
calities to which all oppositions are prone.” The Opposition, noted

 

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187

nwson, accused the government of having no support but this was
untrue because the government had considered this election before the
EthiOpian crisis, for there were also domestic problens and the gov-
ernment wanted national approval. The government, however, said
Dawson, would carry more weight in foreign affairs if it could show
the world that the people approved of its action and foreigners would
realize that the British people were the inspiration for the govern-
ment's policy, which would answer "once and for all the malicious
insinuations of insincerity" from Italy and other critics. He said
the sooner the British people could publicly manifest their support
the better.81

Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, went to Glasgow,
Scotland, to plead for unanimous popular support. He denounced those
who advised Britain to ignore the problen, pointing out that the
issue was not merely Abyssinia, but the "fate of the League itself."
He said Britain supported the League and the anpire mpported Britain,
and this was better protection than what the obsolescent alliance
system could offer.82 This was said by the man who had told Amery
that the League would be good for election purposes at home! Neither
Chamberlain, nor anyone else in the government, had stated how far
Britain was prepared to go. The peOple did not know, and could only
assume that there were no limitations.

Since the middle of September, the British had reinforced the
Mediterranean fleet for possible action. The French, by the middle

 

81mm (London). October 15. 1935. p. 15.
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188

of October, fearing that British leadership at Geneva was really a
subterfuge to protect British imperial interests in Africa, asked the
British to reduce their Mediterranean fleet, and hoped that Italy in
return might reduce her activity in EthiOpia, laying the groundwork
for peaceful negotiations. Dawson, on October 18, criticized the
French for this request; he said they were blind and could not see
that it was Italy who challenged the League, who had broken the
Covalent, and who used war as an instrument of national policy.
Britain, said Dawson, recognised the French interest in Italy, but
France refused to see the British point of view, which supported the
League's collective action.83

In spite of the strong stand of both the government and 1113
m in support of the League, neither had clearly defined their
actual position toward the League. The Foreign Secretary, speaking
before Parliament on October 22, reiterated the old theme that
Britain, with Dominion and Parliamentary support, was not opposed to
star fom of government and only wanted to support the League. The
_Ti£_g_s_ and Dawson agreed with Hoare that Britain was not against fas-
cism m 5.9.: nor was she selfishly interfering in this dispute.
Mussolini, however, made the mistake of doubting that the British
Government had the support of the peOple, said Dawsomau

The government, in order to obtain the official approval of the
British public, declared on October 23 that November 11+ would be

election day. (2.2 Times had printed this information on October 18.)

 

 

83The Mes (London), October 18, 1935, p. 15.
mme fines (London), October 23, 1935, p. 15.

189

Dawson defended this impending election against its critics, saying
there were a few who were calling this a ”stunt election" but "no
election in history has ever justified the epithet less.” Dawson
illustrated what he believed to be the two key issues, namely, the
League of Nations and Britain's continued economic recovery.85 How-
ever, the issue that the election focused on was the League.

The election campaign began on October 26 when Parliament re-
cessed. The National Government published a manifesto which declared
its program for foreign and domestic affairs and reiterated the well-
worn line that the League of Nations was the keystone of British for-
eign policy.

Influential members of the government echoed their support of
the government's policy for the League. Baldwin, on the eve of
Parliament's recess, stressed over the air that Britain would not
shirk her duty to the League of Nations.86 Eden, on October 28, at
Coventry, re—emphasized Britain's support for the League.87 Foreign
Secretary Hoare, on the 30th, at Chelsea, declared that British
policy was "perfectly simple”: "loyalty to the League. "88 Sir John
Simon, Foreign Secretary, 1931 to 1935, on the Blst, said ”put your
trust in Mr. Baldwin" and his foreign policy.89 Baldwin, on the same

day, mphasized in particular that the League issue was not a party

 

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190

issue, but a national issue.90

The Opposition contended that Britain was insincere in her motives
toward the League. They asked, where was the British Governmmt dur-
ing the Manchurian crisis of 1931? They also charged that Britain
had not specified what her course of action muld be if Italy vio-
lated Ethiopian's political and territorial integrity. In rebuttal,
Dawson editorialized in defense of the government's role in the
League, stating that the government was sincere because it believed
in the principle of collective action, and Britain did not act alone
in Hanchuria for there had been no concerted action against Japan as
there was against Italy.9l

Ihwson turned his attention to the Opposition's second charge
that Britain was ambiguous in her League policy toward Italy. Italy
knew of Britain's position since last winter, said Dawson. Mussolini
was guilty, because he believed that Britain could not make the
League effective. In evaluating the opposition's claims, Dawson rea-
soned that they had no grounds for a case.92 Contemptuously, Dawson
had noted before that Britain's foreign policy was "clear mough for
everyone to understand. NO intelligent elector can say he does not
know for what he is being asked to vote,” for or against.93

Dawson's argument was aided by the League itself during the

British election campaign. Hoare had returned to Geneva, and, on

 

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191

Novenber 3, the League decided to impose sanctions on Italy, effec-
tive as of the 18th. At this meeting, Hoare said that the League was
reluctant to take each measures but that they were necessary for
League survival. Hoare pointed out that Britain, France, and Italy
were still holding talks, in the hope of ending the war, and, if any
agremaent could be reached, they would bring their plan before the
Council. Dawson was very pleased with the position the League had
taken; he felt it showed that the amber states were detemined "to
maintain the high principles of collective security,“ and this was a
great achievement?)"
The campaign continued, increasingly focusing on the League as
the key issue. Baldwin spoke on the nth in Liverpool, and "appealed
for a mandate to enable the National Government to be the makers of
the new state, and if God willed, a new Europe." He said Europe
wanted peace and deedred British leadership.95 On the 6th, Baldwin
sent a letter to all National Government candidates, defining "tested
leaders" as those who ”stood united in defense of the League of
Nations, and world peace. ”96 On November 10 Eden told a Warwickshire
audience that the League would be victorious in EthiOpia, and Hoare
told the Lord Mayor's banquet in London that the British Government
with popular support would carry out her Obligations ”wherever they
exist, and strive for peace wherever peace [was] threatened.” "We

[have] given our word in the Covenant, and we [are] bound to keep it,"

 

91"The Times (London), November 4, 1935, p. 13.

95M (Iowan). November 5. 1935. p. 16.

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192

and Britain.will not sacrifice her friends. If Britain.had to fight
to ”defend the cause of peace" she would.97 On November 12 in
Newcastle Baldwin appealed for re-election on the grounds that a sta-
ble government ”in this country will be a vital factor in the preser-
vation of world peace through the League of Nations. "98 The 11.393,
supporting Baldwin's position, called Baldwin the reason behind the
rise of Britain's prestige at home and abroad.99

The election was a complete victory for the National Government;
it won by a majority of‘th to 179. Dawson.called this a "triumph of
steadiness" in a troubled time, and said this not only was a triumph
for the government, but also for the British peeple. It showed the
world their solid support of the government. He said this was the
first time since Wbrld wer I that a government had.won consecutive
victories and the credit belonged to Baldwin; he was "the man who
[bed] given this constructive turn to his party's outlook. "10° Dawson
also found the combination of Hoare and Eden “a trump card of Mr.
Baldwin's new deal,” and the greatest assets Baldwin had in the elec-
tion. Baldwin was indifferent "to the glamour of office," and Dawson
speculated that this would probably be Baldwin's last term.101
Dawson probably knew more than he wrote in 115 1129;; his diaxy at

this time records a talk with Baldwin, in which Dawson suggested men

 

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101W (London), November 189 19359 P0 15°

193

for his new cabinet and a plan for reorganization of defenses.102

Throughout the whole election, Baldwin had been pictured in £13
Line; as the man upon whom the British people could rely and, now 11;;
flags, after the election, introduced the suggestion that Baldwin
really did not care for the job. Furthermore, of the two key cam-
paign issues, one, economic progress, disappeared from 139 Time;
early in the campaign, leaving the League as sole issue.

Ihwson recognized this on the 19th when‘he wrote an editorial
entitled "As Others See Us"; he said the world had bee: greatly
impressed by the victory of the National Government and the public
support for the "firm and unequivocal foreign policy of recent
months." He continued, saying British prestige was now ”much higher
than even people at home" were apt to realize and Britain was
respected even at places where she formerly had been criticized. He
felt Germany would "have to reckon on that fact" of British grass-
roots approval of the League because everywhere it was assumed that
the British Government would "continue its foreign policy with greater
assurance and authority. "103

The League of Nations in Geneva voted on the 18th to apply sanc-
tions on Italy, prohibiting imports and eacports, declaring an arms
anbargo and a financial enbargo. At the same time, France and Britain
were still trying to work out an agreement which would be acceptable
to the League, Italy, and Abyssinia. Although there was no oil

enhargo, the League Council agreed to meet on the 29th to discuss the

 

102Wrench. m9 P0 325'
103113. was (London), November 199 1935, Po 15-

191+

possibility of adding iron and oil to the sanction list. On the 25th,
Dawson noted this and predicted it would make Italy realize that the
League was stronger than she had realized and the pressures on Italy
would soon make her "recognize the wisdom of negotiating for a solu-
tion satisfactory to herself, to Abyssinia, and the League.” Mean-
time, Dawson noted, Britain and France were still searching for
peace.1ol+

When France asked to postpone the meeting on oil sanctions until
Decenber 12, Dawson hoped that the French ”would not . . . Justify
postponenent indefinitely" because the economic measures must be put
into effect as soon as possible.105

Novmnber, 1935, saw the British Government at its zenith in
prestige and influence around the world. Britain, from September to
the end of November, was the main force bdnind the action of the
League and its stand against the naked aggression of Mussolini.
Before the end of Decuber, however, all this would change as Britain's
reputation and prestige, which was created by her support of the
League, would be destroyed when she abandoned it.

These events began innocently. On December 3, Hoare was consid-
ering his doctor's suggestion that he take a rest in Switzerland.
_'I_h;_e_ 1139; saw British foreign policy moving "steadily forward in an
orderly plan” despite Hoare's incapacity and predicted that, when the

Decmber 12 meeting came, Britain, with League approval, would place

 

WW (lender). November 25. 1935. p. 13.
105W (louder). November 27. 1935. p. 15.

195

oil and other fuels on the subargo list.106 Dawson stated that the
delay of the League in acting was a sign of conscientious delibera-
tion rather than weakness and that the British unanimously backed the
League.107

The British Foreign Secretary told the House of Comons on
Decunber 5 that Britain was ”prepared to play our part fully" with
regard to oil sanctions, but would not act alone. Britain did not
want to destroy Italy, but merely show Missolini that he could not
flout the League with impunity. Seconding Hoare, Eden told Comons
that there was "no change in the government's policy. "108 Dawson,
noting the House's favorable reaction to both speeches, said Hoare's
policy reflected "the feelings and wishes of the country.” He said,
distasteful as they were, sanctions vindicated the collective secu-
rity principle. Britain and France were still working on a solution,
which would not reward violence, and the League hoped that they would
come to some agreeable conclusion. Hoare recognized that the British
people were prepared to support sanctions, and that Britain was pre-
pared to follow any action determined by the League on Decenber 12.
Dawson suggested that Hoare, on his way to Switzerland, might visit
with the French Foreign Minister Laval.109 Hoare took this advice.
Just before he left for Switzerland via Paris, Hoare spoke vdth
Baldwin, who advised him to push Laval as hard as he could--but "on

 

10531. fimeg (London), Decanber 3. 1935. p- 1“-
107mg., p. 15.
108W (London), December 6, 19359 Po 16-
loglbige’ p. 170

196

no account get this country into war."110

Hoare and Laval held discussions on the 7th and 8th, and then
Hoare went on to Switzerland. Ih_e m in an article on the 9th
noted that an agreement had been reached on the Ethiopian-Italian
dispute. The next day 1h; m outlined the following proposals,
which in effect made Ethiopia the victim: (1) Italy would receive
Danakil and the Eastern part of Tigr‘ including Adowa, Makole, but
not Aksum; (2) in the South, Italy would getall the land between the
frontier of British Somaliland, the 8th parallel of latitude in the
North, and the 36th degree of longitude in the west, including most
of Ogaden; (3) EthiOpia would receive the part of Asseb in Eritera,
and a corridor to this port through Italian land, or she would get
Port Zedla; (4) Ethiopia would be independent, and the League would
assist in carrying out reforms and to help in her development.

The British cabinet met on the 9th to discuss the proposals,
than Hoare offered his counsel, Baldwin told him to stay in
Switzerland and that he [Baldwin] ”was in complete control of the
situation. "312 1h; m noted that the cabinet met on the 9th and
discussed and approved the proposals, and decided to forward thu to
the Council. It must be said, 239 m continued, that there was
not much support for these proposals in the press, House of Genome,
or the cabinet. 33 mg concluded that the French reaction to
these talks was one of "astonishment" and disbelief that the British

 

uoTenplewood, Nine Troubled 233;, p. 178.
111W (London), December 10, 1935, p. 16.

112Tauplewood, Eng Izoublg 1323, p. 183.

197

Government would go so far along the road of concession.113

The cabinet met again on the 10th, and 2213 1:112; noted that
there "was no question at am time of refuting the proposals towhich
the Foreign Secretary had assented" because these were only the basis
upon which the League, France, and Italy were to war-Inna

On the same day, Baldwin refused to disclose the proposals in
the House. He finally stated, however, in a very cryptic manner, that
his lips were sealed but, "if he could tell the whole story, not a
vote would be given against the government." Baldwin was visibly
annoyed that the proposals leaked out in France. Manbers of the
House learned the proposals from .2... ME: and most of then believed
"the proposals were a breach of the Covenant and a betrayal of the
government's pledges at the election.” The menbers felt that the
election gave "a mandate [for] its [governments] strong foreign
policy" to obtain justice through the League; "justice" did not mean
rewarding the aggressorlol5

Dawson tried to minimize the seriousness of the whole affair but
it was evident he did not like the proposals. 0n the 11th, in his
first editorial about the agreement and the subsequent indignation of
the House of Commons, Dawson said that the British people should not
be angry with the opposition for questioning the Prime Minister
because "the picture was certainly of a kind to arouse misgivings." To

Dawson, the proposed agreenent constituted "a premium upon armed

 

HBW (London), December 10, 1935, p. 16.
mm (Imam). December 11. 1935. p. 16.

“512m.

198

aggression" and "served as an encouragement to every future law-
breaker."1‘16

_Th_g Egg reported world reaction to the proposals, which damned
the British; it appeared to most nations that aggression was met with
approval. Marv League manbers were disgusted and distrustful. The
people of Great Britain flooded the House of Commons with mail Oppos-
ing the proposals. Dawson, during this period, was extrenely worried
about the fate of the British Government.

Dawson tried to shift the blame from Britain to France, and he
said on the 13th that "the prOposals of Paris" were not reconcilable
"with the obligations ofthe Covenant" and that the Laval attenpt had
”in fact failed already." Laval's lealcing the prOposals to the press
"was calculated to plunge the British Government, with its hands more
than half-tied, into an acute dilunma," as was ”common knowledge in
this and every country." Dawson said Britain's drive for peace was
hampered by her conciliation of France and now she must vindicate pub-
lic Opinion at home and prove "that aggression does not pay,” and sup-
port the League to the end. If the British Govermmt weakmed in
its support for the League, he continued, it would cause bitter "dis-
illusionment and resentment at home, and lamentable injury overseas"
to British sincerity and statesnanship.117

The official proposals were published in The $23.8. on December 14,
corresponding enctly to what 1:133 Lima had published in its

December 10 issue. Dawson recognized that Italy would get "the

 

nélbide’ Pe 170
11711121222: (London). December 13. 1935. p. 15.

199

effective ownership and control of a good half of Abyssinian terri-
tory. "118 Dawson was troubled; the same night he wrote in his diary
that he was trying "to write something useful about the deplorable
plight of the government. ”119

The goverment published a White Paper [CMDSOU-t] of documents
important to the Italian-Abyssinian dispute. One important cable
showed that Hoare, on the 10th, urged the British Minister, Sir Sidney
Burton, in Addis Ababa to "use his utmost influence to induce the
nuperor to give careful and favorable consideration to [the] propos-
als. "120

Dawson's editorial of the 16th, "A Corridor for Camels,” damned
the White Paper and the proposals. The only advantage Dawson saw for
Ethiopia was that she would have an outlet to the sea. Dawson re-
marked that Hoare and Laval must have believed that Ethiopia's step
toward civilization was worth the surrmder of much Ethiopian land
and integrity. Enperor Haile Selassie was forbidden to build a rail-
road along his corridor and thus the land was "restricted to the sort
of traffic which Lhed] entered Ethiopia from the day of King Solomon,
a corridor for camels." To Dawson the whole proposal appeared incred-
ible, for it was even contrary to the most "cynical interpretation"
of a dvilining mission. Dawson continued that the proposals were
dead "the moment their general tenor was known.” He believed British

public opinion would never ask the League for these proposals as a

 

118W (London), December 1t, 1935, p. 13,
'n9wrmch. m. p. 325.
120W (London). December 16, 1935, p. 14,

200

basis for negotiation; they wanted a solution, but not the one pro-
posed. Dawson said excuses could be offered about press leaks, haste
in meeting, etc., but the fact ranained that the British Government
"endorsed the peace proposals as an opportunity of negotiation" and
the British Ministers had only thunselves to blame, although Dawson,
it will be raumbered, had attanpted to blame Laval.121
These proposals had been refuted in the House of Commons, the
country, Dominions, and the world, and British mnisters could not
press for League acceptance. The British Government, according to
Dawson, should show that "Hoare's acquiescence in Laval's proposals
was enforced by a fear of extending the war to Europe.” Dawson con-
curred that there might be a ruote possibility of such a war, but
Britain was not alone; she was part of the League. Even if Britain

122 This editorial was

were attacked, she could take care of herself.
a very strong indictment against the proposals and the action of the
British cabinet.

Inwson's editorial reflected the mood of British official and
unofficial public opinion. Baldwin himself recognized the fact that
he had lost the support of the public, the press, and the House of
Comonsuhe was bewildered after the 10th.123 He was afraid he could
not stun this tidal wave of public disapproval, which threatened to
discredit the government and possibly dissolve it. He decided, there-

fore, to act and asked Hoare to recent; Hoare refused. Baldwin

 

121.33.13.09 P0 15-
12%.
123Y°unse made. p. 217.

201

explained that he did not wish Hoare's resignation, but Hoare resigned
on the 18th.124

Baldwin's friend, Jones, commmted that it was the press led by
Dawson that had worked up the sentiment against the proposals in the
country.125 Dawson urged Hoare to resign.126 Hoare recalled that
Dawson came "like one of Job's comforters to mourn over our sins and
misfortunes. "127 Dawson originally pudled Hoare's appointment as
Foreign Secretary because he felt Hoare would aid in his policy of
German appeasement, and, as Hoare had failed, Dawson now wanted Hoare
ousted.

Foreign Secretary Hoare reasoned that the Franco-British agree-
ment would save the Stresa front and keep Italy as an ally without
Italy drawing any closer to Germany. This was why he asked the cabi-
net to accept the prOposals. However, this line of reasoning ran
counter to Dawson's pro-German policy, and the idea of holding the
Stresa front, which was primarily directed against Germany, angered
Dawson. He believed that Germany wanted to settle down and become a
good European neighbor and there was no reason "to keep Italy out of
her orbit. "128 Therefore, Dawson savagely attacked the proposals; he
expressed not only righteous indignation, but also made it clear that

the governmmt policy had strayed too far from that of the "peOple,"

 

124Templewood, Ning Troubled Igg, p.185.
125Jones, M, p. 161.

126Wreech. m. p. 327.
127Temp1ewood. W. p. 186.
128Connell, The Office, p. 209.

202

as expressed in Thg Mes.

.‘I_‘h_g Lilies resumed its attack on the British Government on the
18th. Dawson said Britain should not have given these proposals her
approval because to admit that this was all that could be offered was
one thing but to approve it was another. He declared that "public
opinion in this country, let there be no mistake, will not tolerate
the present terms as expressing British notions of justice." There
would be a debate on the 19th in the House of Comons, and the govern-
mmt would make a mistake if it succeeded in gaining a majority vote
in support of its position. If it did get a majority it would be
"utterly barren and unconvincing." Why did this action take place
when Hoare was out of the counter "The only answer," said Dawson,
was that the Cabinet believed these terms, however unsatisfactory,
"would be a basis for negotiation," but these were not British notions
of justice and they were unacceptable terms.129

The British Government had found its scapegoat; Hoare resigned
formally on the 18th, and Dawson commented editorially that this was
correct since Hoare was at fault. m 2E9; stated that a blunder
had been made in foreign policy, for which Hoare was responsible, and
"some sacrifice" was denanded by the "growing tide of resentmmt at
the apparent acceptance by the British Government" of the proposals.130
Now, :3 11m continued, Britain must show the world that her policy
to the League had not changed.

Hoare, defrocked, appeared before Parliament on the 19th and gave

 

129The Mes (London), December 18, 1935, p. 13.
130W (London). December 19. 1935. p- 13.

203

his reason for'having accepted the proposals. He said he had been
afraid of war breaking out in Europe, which would mean the end of the
League, and he took the minimum terms France would accept to achieve
British-French solidarity. Attlee, the Labour Party leader, wanted
to know why the whole government did not resign. Baldwin replied to
Attlee that he and the cabinet had to support an absent colleague,
and he noted he should.have called Hoare back from Switzerland for
more consultation. Now, Baldwin said, the Foreign Secretary would
travel no more and, because of the feeling against flhe proposals in
the country, the proposals were dead.131
The House of Lords debated the proposals and.lord Halifax tried
to defend the government. He said the terms of the proposals were
not as bad ”as public opinion had represented them to be”; the govern-
ment acted in support of an absent colleague from its cabinet discus-
sion. It was an honest error, and the whole government accepted the
blame; the League still was the keystone of British foreign.policy.
Halifax's explanation did not satisfy the members of Lords. Lord
Snell told him it was not all Hoare's mistake; the Prime Minister was
involved, and Baldwin did not get a "mandate for trickery." The
Archbishop of Canterbury stated that he was not "wholly relieved" by
Halifax's statements. Lord Lothian.unleashed his oratory on Halifax,
sgying "the Fbreign Secretary had been made the scapegoat for responp
sibilities which rested on other shoulders," and noted the government
would not be absolved by Hoare's resignation. Lothian charged that

Britain had run away from Mussolini when she should have called his

 

1311;“. Times (London), Decanber 20, 1935. p. 6.

201+

bluff.132

Dawson treated Hoare sympathetically after his resignation and
said that this was not the end of his distinguished career. He
recalled that in September Hoare had "rallied the world, and his own
countrymen" to the League's cause. Dawson added that this, more than
anything else, "determined the issue of the General Election."133

Dawson foolishly believed that telling the world that Baldwin
admitted that the cabinet had not really discussed these proposals,
and only agreed to them to support an absent colleague, would free
the cabinet of complicity. Dawson felt Baldwin had now restored much
of the British Government's prestige and recognized the power of
British public Opinion, by which Dawson surely meant that Baldwin

recognized the power of m Times. Dawson said the British Government

 

had profited by its mistake and realised Geneva was the only place to
hold peace talks; the cabinet would now control British foreign policy
and the Prime Minister would be present. The British Government
would always be honest with the League and the public.134 Dawson had
forgiven Baldwin and the government and believed that the government's
position was "almost as strong" as that before December 8.

0n the let, 1113 ME: reported a statement by Chamberlain that
"those proposals are dead" and "we [British Government} agree now . . .
we made a mistake." British foreign policy had returned to the posi-

tion it had held from September, in Geneva, until the election in

 

132mm.
133Ibid., p. 15.

134m..-

205

135

Novanber.
After Parliament recessed on December 21, it was announced that
Anthony Eden would be the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Times quickly pointed out the reaction of the powers at Geneva,
that is, they now believed that Britain really stood for the League
and collective security and they were pleased because they knew Eden
to be a strong League supporter. Dawson agreed wholeheartedly with
the appointment of Eden, who represented the necessary reconstruction
in the British Government. Dawson believed Eden would please the
British public, would answer the debates in Parliament, and would
carry out the true desires of the House.136

Baldwin, and no doubt Dawson, believed that Eden's appointment
would be "a guarantee to the country that the policy of collective
security on which the election had been fought and won was to be
adhered to in the future. "137 To Dawson, British policy had been
vindicated. He believed the war would be ended by a fair settlement
and the British policy against aggression would prevail.

A strong case can be made to support the contention that Dawson
was a non-Fascist, and indeed, philosophically, anti-Fascist, by fol-
lowing the disapproving position 1113 m took on racial and reli-
gious persecution of German nationals by the Hitler government. So
strong was this expression of British fair play in Dawson's editorials

and in the columns of __T_t_1_e_ Times that the Nazis, on Christmas Eve,

 

135The m es (London), December 219 1935: Po 10-
136mg EM (london), December 23. 1935. p. 13.
137Churchill, fise and 21.311 of men, Po 258-

206

1935, compared fiIhg‘Iymgg reports on the persecution of the Churches
in Germany with a serial thrilled."138 Dawson, however, could not be
put off with ridicule; his sense of decency and his sincere
Christianity recoiled at the news from the German.cmncentration camps,
and he became especially vocal in the last half of‘l935. He was pri-
marily a moralist and he could forgive the crimes of the Germans, but
not their sins. Although he could approve the breaking of the Treaty
of Versailles because he believed the original terms to be unfair, he
could not overlook flagrant disregard for human life, liberty, and
property, justified on the flimsy grounds of racial superiority and
ferced unanimity, religious and political. Mfith regard to freedom.of
conscience in the religious and political spheres, Dawson must be
considered an anti-Fascist.

Although the attacks on German persecution had no serious conse-
quences, neither _T_h_§ m nor Dawson realized what the possible
results of their anti-Italian stand would be. A major factor which
influenced these results was the collapse of’the Hoare-Laval propos-
als, and I_h_e_ Tiles had led in their destruction. The British
Government, inspired by Dawson, saw the advantages of a strong anti-
Italian and pro-League stand for the November General Election.

After Britain's initial acceptance and subsequent rejection of the
December 8 proposals, many countries‘were unsure about what stand
Britain would take next. Advocacy of the League wasthe cry from Egg
Times, and those persons who read it and believed it must have bem

shocked by the proposals of Decanber 8. Dawson himself was shocked

 

138W (Iondon). Decanber 21+. 1935, p. 9.

207

and angry, and, as a result, he helped to bring about Hoare's down-
fall. Dawson and Egg Egggg told the government that BritiSh public
opinion backed the League, and they forced the appointment of Eden, a
strong League man, as Hoare's replacanent. Dawson, by the end of
December, was sure that Britain had regained the eminence of her
September 11 Geneva position. In Dawson's mind Europe and most
League members, at the end of 1935, were still in full support of
British leadership in the League of Nations. Dawson, the foreign
affairs expert, never once during this time tried to analyze the
effects of British leadership on the rest of the world, Europe, or
the League at the end of 1935.

Hoare was prepared to sacrifice Abyssinia to preserve the united
front at Stresa, but Dawson was not because this would undercut his
pro-Germanisn. Favoring Germany was paramount in Dawson's mind, and
he did not fear Italy.

The French believed that Britain was using the League's machine
ery against Italy to protect her imperial interest, and to the French
Germany was the real danger to Europe. After Britain had signed the
naval agreement allowing Germany to rearm, the French had no reason
to trust Britain. Consequently, France was prepared to do anything
to keep Italy as her ally, especially in view of the strained Anglo-
French relations resulting from Britain's breach of the Stresa front.

The effects of British action, and her lead in the call for
sanctions, only antagonized Mussolini. Since the sanctions did not
cut off his oil supply, he was free to be aggressive. He knew the

Stress front was gone, and he did not care.

208

To the small nations who were looking for strength and direction,
Britain appeared as ”a friend not to be relied upon, and a foe not to
be feared. "139

For Germany, 1935 was a very good year. Britain had ignored her
breaking the Treaty of Versailles in March, and Germany had obtained
a naval agreement in June, which meant military equality and eventual
military superiority. Hitler's success was due "less to his own
statecraft" than "to the lack of decision and unity among his oppo-
nents."140 Hitler was very happy; France and Italy were divided,
Britain had helped to tear down the Stresa front, and Germany and
Britain appeared to be very good friends. All of this had changed
his misfortune; at Stresa and at the Council of the League, his
actions had been condemned, but now the Frmch-Italian-British coali-
tion was falling apart and the barrier against Gem had been
lowered.

The biggest loser at the end of 1935 was the League of Nations:
the Abyssinian crisis showed how impotent the League was and how its
complete failure would be only a matter of time. To mglishmen, it
was the beginning of the end of an institution which all British gov-
ernments had said was a keystone of their foreign policy since 1919.

Not once did Dawson take cognizance of any of the above ramifica-
tions in his policy; he believed everything was fine, and that he
could take a great deal of credit for Britain's position at the end

or 1935e

 

139Cooper, Old Men Eprget, p. 193.
luoSchmidt, Hitler: Interpreter, p. 38.

CHAPTER VIII
DAWSON AND THE RHINEAND CRISIS

Dawson, on the eve of the New Year, 1936, was singularly unaware
of the significance of the events of 1935. He remained pro-German
and anti-Italian; he believed and publicly stated that, when the gov-
ernment denounced the Hoare-Laval agreement and replaced Hoare with
Eden, Britain regained whatever prestige it might have lost since
September 11, 1935. This, of course, was a disastrous assumption.

The British Government at the beginning of 1936 shared Dawson's
belief in its regained prestige. In all fairness to Baldwin, however,
one must mention that his health was failing and he looked forward to

early retirement.1 His colleagues noted ”his lack of interest in day

to day affairs, his absence from important debates, [and] his impa-
tience with criticism."2 Baldwin's friend, Jones, believed that
there was nothing organically wrong with him except "he has lost his
nerve and every burden became a nightmare. "3 His prestige declined,
and many of the wrong people, including Dawson, had his ear. This
was the situation on the eve of 1936.

The first real crisis for Dawson and 1113 Timas in early 1936 was

 

lPercy, Some Memoges, p. 165.
ZHavighurst, Twentieth Qentug; Britain, p. 2 50.
3Jones, M, p. 273.

209

210

the German seizure of the Rhineland on March 7, which theoretically
meant immediate war under Article 2 of the Locarno Agreement and
Articles 1+2 and 1+3 of the Treaty of Versailles. This news was sur-

prising to _‘I_h_e_ Times readers, but the event did not happen in a

 

vacuum. Dawson, however, evidently failed to see the significance of
what had been happening in Germany, even though _'I_h_§ Lime}; news col-
umns reported the facts.

111ng January and February, there was, for all intents and
purposes, a lull in the news. The attention of mwson and 1132 ling-e;
was focused primarily on Italy and the League. Dawson, like the gov-
ernment, reiterated the traditional line of support for the League
and denunciation of Italian action in Ethiopia.

hiring the last six months of 1935, Germany was not active in
foreign affairs. Missolini was the center of attention, and Germany
was content to watch and see what would happen. However, nothing hap-
pened; the handling of the Italic-Ethiopian affair by the League and
Britain showed Germany that talk was very plentiful but action was
not forthcoming.

1113 m, on January 18, noted that Germany was in a ”negative
phase" in foreign affairs.“ This was only partially true because, by
early January, Germany began to be active again and her activity
would eventually culminate in the German seizure of the Rhineland.
Dawson, of course, could not report what he did not recognize.

The Germans were suspicious of the close cooperation between

France and Britain. They believed that the terms of the Locarno

 

“The Time; (London), January 18, 1936, p. 12.

211

Treaty were not being maintained, because the guarantor powers were
supposed to be impartial, and they believed there were clandestine
agrounents between France and Britain.5 1113 _T_i_m_e_§, on January 18,
reported that Germany worried France because of her anti-French press.
The paper noted that ”responsible opinion feels that Germany" was
willing "to use arwthing in the way of an excuse" that would weaken
the demilitarized "zone provisions of Locarno."6 This was the first
suggestion of a possible move on Germarv's part in the direction of
the Rhineland but Dawson did not comment.

In an article on the same day, _T_1;1_e_ Time; noted that the British
and French ambassadors had paid a visit to the Geman foreign office
and had told the. Germans that British and French conversations dealt
not with the Rhineland but with plans for the Mediterranean Sea. The
Germans accepted this statement, and as a result the German press
eased its anti-French assault. _1_‘_h_§_ my article continued that
may Germans were not looking wishfully at the Rhineland, but that
Hitler would follow his Locarno obligations if the other powers con-
tinued to do 30.7

Goebbels, on the 17th, made a speech entitled "I Prefer to Rely
on Guns," in which he emphasized Germany's need for colonies because,
as a poor nation, she required raw materials. He stated that Germany
was neutral in the Ethiopian crisis "but we understand a nation like
Italy must live.” In addition, Goebbels declared that Germany had

 

W (London). Jamey 11. 1936, p. 11.
674.112.1192; (London). January 18. 1936. p. 11.
7pm., p. 12.

212

learned from the British-Ethiopian-Italian crisis "that a nation with-
out power is not able to preserve peace even if she is willing to do

‘ so, and that we can not rely on the League of Nations."8 The real
lesson that Germany learned was that Britain had danonstrated her
umillingness to support League commitments with arms. Italy had
marched into Ethiopia in spite of Great Britain and the League.

th Eng; editorial of the 20th showed its concern with Goebbels'
speech and attempted to lessen its significance. mwson noted that
this speech ”seens deliberately designed to check the growth of amr
sympathy for Germany in other countries"; Dawson was concerned with
its effect in Britain. Dawson said although Goebbels was the German
Minister of Propaganda it was ”an embarrassment that the outside
world never knows whether he {Goebbels} is the authentic voice of the
German Government or not. "9 Somehow, Dawson believed, Goebbels was
really not speaking for the government and suggested that Goebbels
did not always enjoy Hitler's corfidence when, in fact, he was actually
the voice of Hitler.

Dawson failed to see the end of the German "negative phase" in
foreign affairs. He did not commit on the fact that the German
press bombarded the public with the necessity of Germarw obtaining
colonies.lo He was not aware of the importance of the speech by

Austria's Chancellor Schuschnigg on the 19th, declaring that Nazi

 

31pm.
9me fines (London), Jamar-y 20, 1936, p. 13.
10W (Iondon). January 3. 1936. p- 11-

213

propaganda had infiltrated Austria, and that the Austrians opposed
any union between Austria and Crew, and that ”they would never
become a province of greater Gem, or rather greater Prussia."n
Finally, Dawson made another grave error in judgment on a key issue.
On the let, he published the letter which Hugh Lester, High
Connnissioner of the Free City of Danzig, had sent to the League
Council. Lester complained that German National Socialists in that
city were ignoring the League's representative and were trying to con-
trol the city by unconstitutional means; they attempted to halt free-
dom of the press, they controlled the Senate, and they dominated the
local government, ignoring the opposition. The key figure was Albert
Forster, "a German national, and Deputy of the German Rdchstag, and
district leader for the Nazi party of Danzig." The Nazi party in
Wig, said Lester, was a branch of the German party. The Ihnzig
Nazis took an oath to the German state. Every government mmber was
a menber of the Nazi party, and citizens were assaulted for refusing

to salute the Nazi flag.12

Such activity outside the German borders
could hardly be construed as innocent. Nor could the German reaction
to this article in 2133 15.-919.3 the Nazis confiscated all editions of
the paper in which it appeared.13
mwson commmted on the Danzig issue and said that ”once again
it sears Nazi extrmists [such as Goebbels] by crude methods are

repulsing those in other lands" who have been trying to understand

 

11% (London): January 209 19369 P0 11.
”me Time; (London), January 21, 1936, p. 11.
13W (Ionian). January 24. 1936. p. 11.

211+

the post-war German people. These extremists were riding over the
minority; they had censored the press, threatened leaders of the

opposition, and even denied meeting halls to the opposition. The
constitution, said Dawson, could only be changed by law after the
Nazi Party had won a two-thirds majority. Until then it was still a
League question or consideration. Dawson, however, saw a "hopeful
factor," for when Hitler came to power he had agreed to observe the
Danzig Constitution. Dawson believed someone failed to commnicate
to the Danzig Nazis the Fuehrer's respect for constitutionality and
Dawson was sure that either Hitler did not know what was happening or,
if he did know, he would have disapproved.“ Dawson saw two types of
Nazis, the moderates, represented by Hitler, and the radicals, repre-
sented by Goebbels' madness.

Dawson editorialized happily on the Danzig question again on
January 25. He said that, as a result of Eden's "tact and persever-
ance" at Geneva, the Germans in Danzig were going to adhere to the
constitution as the Treaty of Versailles planned it. "Nothing wait
to show that the unzig Nazis had been encouraged. to {ignore} it by
Berlin. "15 Obviously, Dawson cho se to ignore the High Commissioner's
letter which accused the Berlin Nazis of being at the seat of the
trouble.

Nazi foreign policy received unexpected help from the collapse
of the Laval Government in France on the 22nd. It was replaced on

the 214th after a vote of no confidence by delegates who believed

 

mIbid., p. 13.
152:; Times (London), January 25, 1936, p. 11.

215

Laval was the villain of the Italic-Abyssinian war in which they
throught he had givm Italy a free hand in Abyssinia.l6 The new
Prime Minister was Sarrout, and the new Foreign Minister was Flandin.

0n the last day of the month, The ling; reported that Hitler
spoke on the third anniversary of his taking office; he claimed that
Germans wanted and sought peace "because they loved peace," but not a
peace without honor. ”The world must realize that Germany would be
peace loving as only one people could be if her honor was not touched."
Hitler said Germamr hoped for general understanding for the rights of
all peoples in the world to be recognized; this would be a prime con-
dition for world peace. He noted that the Germans could be proud of
their world position as they had had "their honor restored before the
world. ”17 This had come about in the three years since he had been
in power. What Hitler meant by honor became clearer in later weeks
when he entered the Hhineland, long considered essential to the rights
of Germans and their honor. ’

In February, Germamr's interest in the Rhineland became more
pronounced, and The Egg; noted on February 1 that the price of a
settlanmt between Germany and the Western powers might be the
Rhineland. "Germarw might take matters into her own hands” if the
Locarno Pact were disturbed.18 When the Franco-Russian alliance was
due for discussion in the French Chamber and Senate on the 11th, E!
Ting; pointed out that most Frenchmen favored final ratification as a

 

mks fimgg (London), January 23, 1936, p. 9.
171112.222; (Iowan). January 31. 1936. p. 1n.
18% (London), February 1, 1936, p. 12.

216

lever against Germany. When the agreanent had been signed in May,
1935, 1112 filing accused it of being couched in the words of the League
of Nations. Dawson, however, commented on the nth-that it was
designed to "fit the Covenant of the League.“ 'me Germans, said
Dawson, had criticized this alliance but Germarw herself was "chiefly
responsible for whatever modicum cf truth the charge contains."
Germarw, according to Dawson, was the cause of the alliance because
France and Russia were frightened of German activity in 1935. The
treaty was open to other nations if they wished to join. mwson
found French and Russian ”desire to protect thmselves against a coun-
try which is openly reverting to power policy [to] be readily under-
stood." It did not conflict with the Treaty of Iocarno and it did
not undercut the League.19 The editorial position of 1113 11.39; had
shifted mu circle in one year but mwson, however, would reverse
himself againwithin a month.

The Germans, of course, were not pleased with the possibility of
the Franco-Russian treaty being ratified. German commt rose to a
“crescmdo of bitterness" in the German press, and Great Britain
appeared to be "the villain of the piece." Germany believed that if
this pact were ratified "Great Britain was in a large degree respon-
sible,” andthat the ”Western Powers preferred to believe in Russia
rather than in Germany." The Russians, said Ger-mam, only wanted to
use it to further their own revolutionary goals, and, thus, the pact
wmfld not help to unite Europe. They also said morsetions among

Britain, France, and Germany would be more difficult. “me Germans

 

19W (London). February 11. 1936. p- 15.

217

accused this pact of being diametrically opposed to the "spirit of
I..ocarno."2o

1h; 1i_m_e_§_, which took an identical stand a year earlier, now
pointed out that the Germans had no basis for the charge, and it
appeared that Britain stood prepared to approve the pact.

Ellen, in the House of Commons on the 214th, while defending the
government's Ethiopian policy, made a statment that appeared to com-
fort the Germans. The British Government, said linen, wanted to dis-
tinguish between collective security (which was defensive) and
encirclement (which was aggressive) and the government would "have
neither lot nor part of encirclanmt." The hOpe of Britain was that
there would be worldwide collective security, "the authority of which
is unchallenged and unchallengeable.“ Britain had the power and was
reaw to help fully in the development of the League, and die must
play her role and would work at "Geneva in an attenpt to build up a
new world order. "21

Dawson recorded, in his editorial of Eden's speech, that Eden
gave "a statement of policy drafted to embrace and express the opin-
ions of the cabinet as a whole." The editor continued that there
would be "no future for the League merely as an armed protector of
the status quo," for Britain wanted the League to be all-inclusive
and Opposed "any conversion of security into moirclement. "22

The Germans reacted to both Eden's speech and Dawson's editorial.

 

20The Times (London), February 12, 1936, p. 11+.

21The Times (London), February 25, 1936, p. 8.

22mg. . p. 14.

218

Officially and unofficially they were pleased with the sharp distinc-
tion drawn between moirclement and security, and they were especially
pleased with the insistence "of The Ting; that the League will have
no future if it acts merely as a protector of the status quo."23

While Germany approved of Britain's League position as stated by
Eden and Dawson, the Germans and the French disagreed on the proposed
French-Russian treaty. On the 22nd _'1_'_h_e_ £1193 reported that the
Germans were most interested in the French Chamber's debate on the
Franco-Russian alliance; the German hostility was "compounded of
indignation, fear, and genuine regret." France, by linking herself
to Eastern Europe and a Communist state, was "making an understanding
in Western Europe more difficult." The Germans despised the
Communists so much that the suggestion of their joining this pact was
"dinnissed as ridiculous." Russia was the anew, and Stalin and the
International were trying to dominate the world, said the Germans.
Germamr believed that if this pact were ratified, it would be anti-
Locarno, if not in word, at least in spirit.24

M. Herriot in the French Chamber said "that the German Government
acknowledged in a menorandum on May 23, 1935, that Locarno was not
affected by the Franch-Russian pact. France had smt a copy to all
interested Locarno powers. The Franch believed that Germany was try-
ing to weaken Locarno, and "the German Government may therefore rest
assured of a grim interest in arw further developments" in Errope.
The French counted on Britain to follow Locarno, and consequently

 

23W (London). February 26. 1936. p. 12.

zthe 123' es (London), February 22, 1936, p. ll.

219

frighten the Germans into keeping this agreanmt; the German attitude
toward the Franco-Russian pact was wrong, but the Germans needed an
excuse to remove the barrier to the Rhineland. The French acknowl-
edged that Stalin was a Communist, but France believed "she could
look after herself in this respect." On what, asked the French, did
"Nazi Germany base its sense of superiority of Soviet Russia?" The
only reason Germany was annoyed, said the French, was that she could
not get an agreement with Russia herself. Hitler, said the French,
accepted Locarno when he came to power, and if Germany had any’interb
est in collective security she would not be anxious for Eastern
Europe and would remain.within her bounds.25 Dawson did not comment
on this German-French disagreement.

As the Germans and the French disagreed, the Germans and the
Italians appeared to be drawing closer. The German Ambassador to
Rome, having just arrived from Berlin, visited Missolini on
February 2h. Th2,$img§ noted that many people assumed the Ambassador
told Mussolini what effect the ratification of the French-Russian
pact would have on the Treaty of Locarno and that Mussolini told him
that Italy would not join Britain and France as long as sanctions
were in effect against Italy, if Germany ”were to violate her under-
takings in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. "26

France reacted to this report by offering to send the proposed
pact to the International Court at the Hague to see if it was income

patible with Locarno. Flandin declared that Russia was a League

 

25W (London). February 2149 1936. p. 13-
26W (Iondon). February 25. 1936. p. 13.

220

member and she supported that body and had signed non-aggression
pacts. Germany, on the other hand, he said, was completely opposite
and would not try to work for collective peace.27 No answer came
from Berlin to this offer, and again Dawson said nothing on the issue.

_T_h_g gags, released the news that the French Ambassador to Rome
had asked Mussolini for clarification on the recent German-Italian
talks because it appeared to be a German-Italian rapprochment.
Missolini told him the air had been cleared between the two countries
but nothing had been settled. He warned that, if France agreed to
support more sanctions against Italy, this would change the Franco-
Italian agreement of January, 1935, and there would "be a new balance
of power in EurOpe. "28

On the same day fie _Tir_n_e_2§ printed an article called ”Doubts in
Berlin"; it referred to the German-Italian talks as only an exchange
of views on the Franco-Soviet pact. Namr German officials believed
that Italy was placing more importance on the conversations than they
deserved because Italy wanted Germary to try to ”relieve sanction
pressure" from Italy.29

The Germans were aware that Mussolini had declared that the
Franco-Russian pact did not infringe upon Locarno, and as a result
they questioned the military and political value of Italy. What
could they do to help each other? The Germans believed that Italy
would forget her obligations to Austria if Germamr moved into the

 

27W (London). February 26. 1936. p. 12.
28W (London), February 28, 1936, p. 15.

29am.

221

Rhineland. This, in turn, they believed, would divert British-French
attention from the Ethiopian crisis and relieve the pressure of san@
tions. The author of this article, however, stated that Germatw
would not want to "estrange Britain and France" by moving into the
Rhineland. He continued that, if Genamr's policy of c00peration
with the West failed, the Germans believe an alliance with Italy
"might be better than nothing" because Italy could be used as a lever
to either kill the Franco-Russian pact or to change Locarno. The
article concluded with the belief that these talks would amount to
nothing.30 If this anonymous author was not Dawson, the author
surely published the article with his editor's approval.

The Franco-Soviet pact was passed in the French member of
Deputies by a huge majority. Germarv violently protested, and the
German press accused the ”youthful Mr. Eden" of having had his hand
in this agreement. The Germans declared that Britain's desire for
the "security for her Eknpire is held to be responsible for the policy
which is encircling Germany." By the end of February, both Germany
and Italy shared this view while the Russians, on the other hand,
were extruely pleased. They said that the pact promoted peace and
was not "against a peaceful Gemny. "31

Not once during the last week in February did Dawson cement edi-
torially on the Franco-Russian pact. Why? Possibly he and the
British Government, disapproving of the final ratification but fearful

of alienating France, preferred silence to hypocrisy. Nor had Dawson

 

”mg.
31mm.

222

at any time suggested what Britain might do if Germany marched into
the Rhineland.

mring March, 1936, events started innocently. The League
Council planned to meet March 2 in Geneva to consider the possibility
of applying oil sanctions against Italy, but this meeting was post-
poned until the 13th because the French urged that one more effort be
made to solve the dispute between Ethiopia and Italy.

‘_I'_h_e Meg noted that the League Council would attempt to make
one more effort to halt the Abyssinian dispute at the next meeting.
France, said gh_e _Ti_mgs_, would have no choice but to support an oil
anbargo if Mussolini ignored this final attempt to obtain peace. The
French, however, lmew what Mussolini might do in such an event, that
is, Mussolini could leave the League of Nations, ignore the Treaty of
Locarno, or denounce the French-Italian military agreement, and roman
their common frontier. The conjecture was that the French Minister
probably asked Eden if Britain would support France if she were
attacked by Germany; the problem "which overshadows everything else

is Germany. "32

Previously, on the 3rd the French Premier, Mr. Serraut, had
placed the Franco-Russian pact before the Senate for approval. There
were, however, Frenchmen who believed that this action might be a
”pretext for hostility in Germarv. "33 France knew that with her
Italian alliance she did not have to worry about remanning their com-

mon frontier, and could concentrate on Germany. There is no evidence

 

32M (London). March 5. 1936. p. 11+.
33W (London), March a, 1936. p. 13.

223

to report what Eien told France, except perhaps that they should wait
and see. Dawson did not comment on the French dilemma or her fears.

_Th_g M stated in the edition of the 7th that Hitler would
give a foreign policy address before the Reichstag; they predicted
its content. Hitler was expected to specify what Germarv would do in
the event that the Franco-Soviet pact were signed, that is, he was
expected to ignore the Locarno obligation, including the Rhineland
demilitarizationfiu This article was based on the assumption the
pact, which had not yet been signed, would be signed,

On Saturday, March 7, Hitler told the Reichstag not what he
would, but rather what he had already done, and kg m; had to wait
forty-eight hours until Monday, March 9, to report this news. Hitler
had moved troops into the Rhineland and the Reichstag was told that
"Germany was no longer bound by the extinct Treaty of Locarno," which
had been nullified by the Franco-Russian pact. Hitler also broke the
Treaty of Versailles. In place of the two treaties he offered a "new
agreement for European security." Hitler suggested Germarw, France,
Belgium, and perhaps Holland conclude a non-aggression pact for
twenty-five years, guaranteeing the inviolability and integrity of
Western frontiers, with Britain and Italy as guarantors; Gemam was
also prepared to enter non-aggression pacts with her Eastern neigh-
bors. Finally, Hitler suggested that Germany was ready to re-enter
the League of Nations.35

Eden had been told about Hitler's declaration by the German

 

WW (London), March 7, 1936, p. 12,
35% (London), March 9, 1936, p, 11,,

22h

Ambassador Von Hoesch at about the same time that Hitler reported to
the Reichstag. The German Ambassador told Eden thatthe Franco-Soviet
pact had cancelled Germarw's obligation to Locarno, and Germany was
free to act in her own interests. Eden replied that Britain would
"take a most serious view of the German Government's violation of
solann pledges." Egg _‘I_‘_1:_I_l;_e_s reported that Eden had conferred with the
Locarno powers, Foreign Office officials, and with Baldwin. They
deplored and condemned this action of Germany and Hitler's renuncia-
tion of Locarno; they believed that the Germans could have followed
the provisions of that treaty to change what she did not like. Th2
_Ti_£§_§ suggested, however, that high British officials, although con-
danning Germany's breaking of the treaty, thought that Hitler's
speech had merit. Baldwin told Eden that Britain would not back up
any French military action.36

_T_h__e_ _Ti_m_e§ Berlin correspondent, who was present in the Reiohstag,
noted that on the 7th, when Hitler spoke before that bocbr in the
"presence of Ministers whose earnest faces betrayed their natural
anxiety about the outcome of what is legally an act of aggression,
Herr Hitler looked pale and drawn. "37 This correspondent suggested
that Hitler's action was a bluff.

[1333 .T_i_m_e_s_ could not report this event until the 9th, which gave
Dawson two days to fomulate his own thoughts, which turned out to be
strikingly pro-German. Dawson recorded in his diary that there was a

"great hubbub in erpe, and the French were growing more and more

L

36th-
3719.1...

225

excited. "38 fig Tings correspondents in France and Germany, accord-
ing to Dawson, were inclined to be unduly excited. He noted that he
spoke with Eden at the Foreign Office, and had found Baldwin in good
health and "determined to bring good out of evil. "39

'me ”Cliveden set" gathered at Lord Lothian's home, Blickling,
in Norfork on the 8th. Lothian, Dawson's foreign affairs expert on
Germarw, believed that Germany was justified in seizing the Hhineland;
he felt that the Franco-Russian pact, "morally if not legally," was
inconsistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations]+0 He be-
lieved that nobody should turn Hitler out of his "own backyard. "#1
Lothian said, if Hitler would agree to a limitation of military and
air armaments with some type of inspection, and would also return to
the League of Nations with its obligations, the situation would be
highly satisfactory. Lothian opposed Britain's possible involvement
in war to keep the status quo in the continent}+2 Lothian sent
Hitler a cable of congratulations.

Thomas Jones, present at the meeting, recorded that the "set"
phoned Baldwin and told him to accept Hitler's peace proposals. They
said Germany was wrong, indeed, but the proposals should be considered
a gain, and they would curry public favor. Jones continued that

Baldwin must try to convince France of Germany's sincerity because

 

38Wrench, Dawson, p. 331.
39mm

MButler, Log chian, p. 212.
“1:93;” p. 213.

”2.1.;le-

 

226

Hitler would be needed to halt the spread of Russian Bolshevism.)+3

Baldwin was informed that he should accept Hitler at face value before
he entered a cabinet meeting where he would encounter differences of
opinion. Jones noted that the consensus of the "set's" Opinion was
that Versailles was dead and should be buriedfm

Another manber of the set, although not present at Lothian's
home, was Lord Inndonderry. He also agreed with Hitler that the
Franco-Soviet pact was the immediate cause of the Rhineland action,
and he believed this troublesome pact “was obviously directed against
Germany and in violation of Locarno," and to its effective destmc-
tion.a5 He thought Germany had the right to defend herself and her
frontiers, and in so doing she decided to assume the sovereignty of
the Rhinelland.’+6

Baldwin seemed to agree with the position of Lothian and
Londonderry. He even echoed Lothian's diction: "why shouldn't a man

walk into his own backyard?"47

Baldwin believed that France must
realize that a "Germany crushed by France and Russia would be a
Communist Germarw. "“8 In late February Baldwin was already a sick

man; his friend Jones noted that Baldwin had no longer a "sense of

 

“3Jones, M, p. 180

““gp;g., p. 181.

“slondonderry, Ou;sel.ve§, p. 115.
“6gpgg., p. 116.

47Young, B_al_c_1_wi_n, p. 223.

“81bid.

 

227

49

time of instinct for swift and decisive action." He was morose and
downhearted and his popularity had ebbed to its lowest point, as had
his Parliamentary aki11.5° daurehin in March, 1936, declared that
Chamberlain "was certain to succeed Baldwin in the immediate future."51
'Thg Tings, led by Dawson, reiterated the theme that Hitler was
correct in denouncing Locarno and Versailles. Dawson's editorial of
the 9th was titled "A Chance to Rebuild"; he defended the German
action by saying that the Treaty of Locarno never allowed France and
Germarv to discuss their differences. He declared that the treaty
failed to help the Germans because it appeared to embody those
clauses from the Treaty of Versailles that seemed to guarantee, in
German eyes,"inequalities in which the Nazi movement of resurgence
and revolt had its birth." Dawson also said people in Britain had
recognized "that the discriminatory demilitarization in the Rhineland
was not destined to endure forever.” Hitler ended this, Dawson con-
tinued, by an act that was not aimed so much at Locarno ”as at the
particular servitude which it borrowed from the Versailles Treaty.”
Dawson recognized, however, that the Locarno Treaty had been broken,
and he noticed that "the most sensational minded” had stated it to be
"an act of aggression." He said a distinction had to be.made "between

the march of detachments of German troops sent to reoccupy territory

indisputably under German sovereignty and an act which carries fire

 

”Jones, M, pa l77e
50Young. .Baiciwin. p. 226.

51Churchill, Storm, p. 179.

 

228

and sword into a neighbour's territory."52

Dwson, Lothian, Londonderry, and Baldwin all believed that
Britain must remain calm in scrutinizing German policy, as Germarv's
action was caused by the Franco-Soviet pact. They felt the pact was
born out of fear of Germany while Germarw's action in taking the
Rhineland was out of fear of encirclement, and Germarw recognized a
demilitarized Rhineland as an example of national shame. They
believed her method of regaining her honor, albeit technically ille-
gal, was justified, and they felt, if Germany signed non-aggression
pacts with her Eastern neighbors and entered the League and conformed
to its commitments, her impetuous nationalism in the Rhineland affair
could be overlooked.

Hitler's offer was made subject to "no condition that can be
ruled out as arbitrary or inadmissible.” mwson was sure that British
opinion would be unanimous in seizing this opportunity to accept
Hitler's proposals for "broadening and strmgthening the collective
system which opens with this German offer." "It is a moment not to
despair, but to rebuild.”3 This editorial only reiterated what the
"Cliveden set" and Ihwson believed.

The French appealed to theLeague Council, the little Entente,
and, of course, to Britain; however, if the Frmch read the March 9
editorial they would have realized that Britain would not asdst then.

The reaction of the major powers on the Continent was noted by

3114 Times on the 10th. The Russians believed that this was part of

 

521119 flmeg (London), March 9, 1936, p. 15.

53mg.

229

Germarw's "aggressive plans against the [1.8. S.R." and that Germarw
was only trying to "hoodwink" the interested powers by her proposals.
Poland did not care for Germany's action?“ There was no comment
from Italy.

Eden spoke before the House of Commons on the 9th denouncing
Germarv's seizure of the Rhineland, and he stated that the government
and the British people abhorred this action. Flier: said that a main
foundation of peace had been destroyed but there was "a manifest duty
to rebuild." Eden also said the German proposals would be studied to
see if they "contained any possible chance of rebuilding the shaken
peace structure," but he saw no reason to suppose that hostilities
would ensue, declaring that, however, if Germany attacked France or
Belgium, Britain would honor her comitments. Baldwin also addressed
the House and declared that British foreign policy was still based on
the collective system; he said Britain's role would be to bring
Germany, France, and Britain into some type of tripartite agreement. 55
Eden and Baldwin were in complete agreement with Ihwson on the matter
Lthat there was no reason for fear. Hitler must have been delighted
to hear Eden's and Baldwin's speeches, and of course to see Dawson's
printed word.

_'I;‘_1_1_e_ Meg, the next day, commented in an article from Germany
that the German officials were scanning the foreign press to see the
reaction to her denouncement of Locarno. The article continued that

the Germans were pleased with Eden's suggestion that the proposals

 

5“The Times (London), March 10, 1936, p. 15.
55Ibid., p. 8.

230

should be studied and said the Germans believed that her willingness
to return to the League would help bring about peace. The article
stated that the Germans believed that "war or sanction could be
safely ruled out on the ground British public opinion would revolt at
the idea of drastic action against Germarw for sending troops into
her own territory.” Hitler and the Germans probably based this con-

jecture on m Times editorial of the 9th.56

 

Dawson's editorial of the same day strongly defended Eden's posi-
tion in the House and of Gemany's action in the Rhineland. The
editor argued there was no threat of hostilities and that Britain
would aid France and Belgium if attacked. He hoped to calm the excit-
able and allow "a dispassionate examination of the new situation.”
Dawson said it was not mough to deplore Germarw's action, but Britain
must also rebuild the edifice for peace. He said the proposals of
Hitler must be examined to see what they can do to strengthen peace,
and the "government will have the full support of public opinion."
Dawson believed Britain's role was to bring France and Germany to-
gether to calm French worries over security and German worries of
encirclement.57

Dawson neither suggested a concrete reason for Britain to trust
Germany, now why France should not fear Germany. Ihwson believed
Germany's seizure of her own land had been approved. Treaty obliga-
tions, honor, and integrity were important factors for countries in

their diplomacy. but these factors, however, were ignored by Dawson

 

56Ibid. , p. 16.

57Ibid., p. 17.

231

and the British Government.‘

The French continued their protests against Germany, and stated
that they would confer with Germany when they were assured that inter-
national law would be respected. The German Minister of Propaganda,
Goebbels, spoke on the radio on the 10th and in effect replied to the
French. He said Germany was only "restoring Germany's defense, free-
dom, honor, and her sovereignty over her own territory.” He also
said Hitler's foreign policy was supported by the German people and
was not a threat to France. Goebbels declared that these were the
”first steps towards the establishmmt of a new order in Europe," and
France should recognize that Germany could be trusted. To Goebbels,
”French policy today was in a blind alley." Goebbels believed Germany's
seizure of the Rhineland was ”a valuable contribution to peace,” and
Hitler's offers were the solutions to world peace.58

There were men in other countries who doubted Germarw's honesty;
Goebbels was received skeptically in Czechoslovakia, Austria, Belgium,
Poland, and Russia. Italy did not cement. Britain, which was repre-
sented by the most important British newspaper, however, expressed
trust and confidence.

In the meantime France had called for the Locarno powers to meet
in Paris on the 10th, but after the first meeting they all agreed to
meet in London on the 12th, where they believed the atmosphere would

be calmer. The Council meeting of the 13th was also moved to London

 

‘11}; Times, on the 11th, noted that the Germans believed that
Britain desired to show a "willingness to understand" Gemany, and
that they were highly pleased with 1113 Times editorials of the 9th
and lOthe

 

58The Mes (London), March 11, 1936, p. 15.

232

from Geneva.

Dawson was pleased that the Locarno powers and the League Council
meetings were to be held in Iondon, for he believed it would be easier
for the Germans to send a representative to London to discuss
Germarv's position. Dawson was also pleased that Baldwin would be
able "to participate in than or at any rate be available for consulta-
tion. "59 The ailing Baldwin--Dawson felt-would be an asset for
Britain, if he, Dawson, were able to guide his actions.

Dawson continued to promote the German position because, to him,
it was not the legality of German's action that was in dispute, but
rather what could be done to repair the damage to that treaty and at
the same time further peace. He believed Germany's proposals were
not unreasonable and, if she were really sincere in her desire for
peace, then what statesman "in such circumstances [would follow the]
wholly negative process of law." Ihwson could not understand who
would propose war, justifiable war, when peace was so obtainable?
Dawson measured the German use of force against the German proposals
of peace and found that together they "demand question rather than
counterblow. "60

The Locarno powers held their meeting and they all agreed that
Germany had violated the Locarno Treaty arm! Articles 42 and 43 of the
Treaty of Versailles. France declared that she was not prepared to
talk with Ger-mamr until the Rhineland situation was clarified.

That same night French Foreign Minister Flandin spoke with

 

59;pid., p. 17.
éofle fines (London), March 12, 1936, p. 15.

233

Chamberlain, who was then "the most effective menber of the govern-
mMJa mundaanJMMthmifgfimHfihrawhm
would maintain peace, then he would consider it. Flandin also spoke
with Baldwin, telling him that France wanted moral support rather
than material help, and that France wanted to have a free hand.
Baldwin replied that, although France might be right in her desired
action, if there were "one chance in a hundred" that this could cause
a war, Baldwin would not back her.62 Within a week after Hitler's
seizure of the Rhineland, England broke her pledge of Locarno.

Daring the Iocarno talks Eden suggested that Germany might agree
not to reinforce her troops already in the Rhineland during the nego-
tiations. The Germans answered no, mich did not surprise the French.
France now took the position that she would not talk until the German
troops were removed from the Rhineland. The __Ti_m_e_s_ noted that France's
allies supported her position, but France was still looking to
Britain for political sipport. The Germans grew alarmed at this
French position, but Hitler was sure of English approval.63 From the
position assumed by 1113 M639 the Germans would seem justified in
their conclusion.

Vhile the Locarno powers were gathered, the League's Council met
on the lath and asked Germany to send a representative. The Germans
agreed, provided Germany would be equal with other representatives at

the meetings and the agenda would include a discussion of the German

 

61Churchill, Stogm, p. 176.
62in" p. 177.
63% (London), March 14, 1936, p. 12.

234

proposals to keep permanent control of the Rhineland. France vio-
lently Opposed the second condition because she wanted to talk only
about the violation of Locarno.64

_Tt_1_e_ Tings supported Germany's presence at the conference as an
aid to achieve peace, which, after all, it believed, was the League's
business. g3 gags said the League could condemn German action, but
to ignore Hitler's proposals would be unreasmable and unthinkable.
Dawson continued that, if peace could be achieved, the mechanics of
how it was achieved would not be important. "In the course of a year
or two, the man-in-the-street would remember nothing of the moves or
countermoves, the considerations of honor and prestige, and fomal
tests of good faith, out of which negotiation eventually emerged. "65

_Th_e_ _T_i=m_§§ reported that Ribbentrop would represent Germarw at
the Council sessions, for the Germans believed that their conditions
had been met; mg 1.111;; no doubt reinforced German Opinion. Ihwson
was very pleased that Germany had decided to come to the sessions
because he felt now there was "hope of a rational end" to the problem.
By "all the evidence the belief is mw widely and firmly held in this
country that a breach of law must be measured by its occasions, by
its intentions and by its consequences, and that it is of no service
to peace to insist that the breach is infinitely graver than any rea-
sonable interpretation will make it. "66

Dawson continued that, when Britain signed the Locarno agrounent,

 

6n'1‘he fl mes (London), March 16, 1936, p. 12.
65.13.35.109 P0 13-
66M (London), March 18, 1936, p. 15.

235

it was designed to keep the peace between Germany and France; it was
not made with the idea of creating a crisis. "British opinion," said
Dawson, did not. justify Germany's action, but neither did it accept
the position that "Germany's treaty partners have contributed nothing
to the infringement of Locarno." The record of the Locarno powers on
disarmament would not stand up to impartial scrutiny. "'me task of
the Powers is to secure from Germany obligations more reasonable and
more valid in themselves and therefore more binding, than those which
she has infringed." Dawson believed it was Britain's task to promote
security; the "basis of security is consent and the way to consent is
by negotiation."67

Dawson ignored the letter of the treaty, or the manner in which
that treaty was broken. How did one interpret the intentions or con-
sequences? He never stated how the other signatories of the Treaty
of Locarno had infringed on that treaty. Dawson believed Britain
wanted security and consent based on negotiations that would provide
that security, but was he willing to have peace at any price? Dawson
set no limit on these possibilities.

Eden addressed the Council on the 18th and argued that it should
declare that Germany had violated the treaty and inform the Locarno
powers of this declaration. He again commented that confidence in
peace had been shaken, but that the present problem was how to rebuild
this confidence, provide for the sanctity of agreements, and secure
the rule of law in international affairs. However, he continued, this

German breach of treaties did not threaten hostilities. He said the

 

67mm.

236

Council should try to prepare some way for peace and honor to be
restored in international law. The French representative, Paul
Boncour, noted that Britain appeared to be acting as a mediator and
not as the guarantor of the treaty.68

Dawson comented on this Council session, expressing his pleas-
ure with Eden's reassurance that there was no immediate threat of
hostilities. Dawson also defended Germany noting that Ribbentrop
would present Germarv's case and there were great possibilities for a
settlement of the issue. Although Dawson agreed that Germany had
broken the treaty, he said "it has not been broken without provoca-
tion, whether in the realm of fact or of sentiment." He continued,
the Germans knew they had broken it and had offered to replace "the
shattered obligation immediately with others that reach farther and
[are] more difficult to escape." France, however, said Dawson,
wanted satisfaction regardless of the justification, even though it
was certain to result in "German humiliation." Dawson said there was
no doubt that, if Germany agreed to go to the Hague Court, Germany
would be found guilty. But, said Dawson, the Hague Court could not
answer the key question--”is there a historical fear of encirclement
in Germany and was the Pact [French-Russian] calculated to increase
it?" This was a question of "psychology, new law.” Regardless,
Dawson said, the whole question must be settled, for it cannot "bar
the work of peace making which is the hope of every intelligent man
69

and woman in Ell-ape.”

 

68% (London), MarCh 199 19369 P0 160
69g 1 .

237

Ribbentrop presented the German case before the Council. He
said that Locarno had burdened Germany and that it had kept the
Rhineland demilitarized "as dictated in the Treaty of Versailles.”

He said Germany complied because she haped that others "would fulfill
lighter obligations." However, continued Ribbentrop, the French-
Russian pact was directed against Germany; Germany had no military
alliances, and, as far as Germarw was concerned, the pact terminated
the Locarno agreement. The problem created by Germany's action was
not a legal one, but a political, military, and psychological problem,
Germarw was sovereign, said Ribbentrop, and now the German peOple
wanted to "close the sad chapter of moral and legal confusions and
misunderstandings in Europe," as she had been the main victim of this
period. He continued that "peace and friendship with neighbors" was
Germarw's policy, and she wanted to end the tension between France
and Germarv.7o The arguments used by Ribbentrop might have been
taken from Dawson's editorials.

That same afternoon the Council met and condemned Germamr's
March 7 action. The Council agreed that Germany had violated the
Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaty and sent this news to the
Locarno powers. These powers decided that the Hague Court should
decide if the French-Soviet pact was anti-Locarno and that Germany
should accept the Court's decision. They also decided that a neutral
force should police the demilitarized zone while peace talks were
being held and new measures for security were being discussed. They

said, if Germany were prepared to do this, there would be more talks.

 

70M (undon). Mamh 20. 1936. p. 14.

238

Dawson commented that the discussion should not end until a sta-
ble agreement was reached. He said Ribbentrop's "contentions . . .
were not a challenge to law," but Locarno was modified to Germany's
disadvantage, especially with the pact. Dawson noted the political
and psychological factors underlying the legal argument of the agree-
ment, and Dawson agreed with Ribbentrop that it was time to clarify
the moral and legal confusion. The offer of Germarv, said mwson,
toned down the German action and "promises a new foundation for the
law of Europe and its observants." Dawson commented on the Locarno
powers' proposals to which Germany had to agree as a basis for dis-
cussion. He believed the Hague Court should cause no problen, and
thus no delay, and he believed the others could be handled with dis-

patch.71

Dawson again campaigned for Germany.

On the night of the 20th, after dinner with Fden, Dawson spoke
with Ribbentrop for an hour. Dawson recorded in his diary that
Ribbentrop was upset and presented a very good case for Hitler's
action. Dawson comforted Ribbentrop and told him to pursue the
negotiations.72

1113 Ling reported that France expected Eden to encourage Germany
to accept these proposals. The French Chamber was told by Flandin
that the proposals were a British-French compromise. France accepted

them, said Flandin, because of the "assurance of immediate sipport

from Great Britain in case of aggression. "73 The French deputies

 

7llbid., p. 15.
72Wrench, gwson, p. 332.
73W (London). March 21, 1936, p. 12.

239

were heartened when they heard this. Britain, on the other hand,
hoped the Germans would say what they would accept if the offer did
not please them.7i+

0n the 20th, Eden spoke before the House of Commons and told how
he had requested the Locarno powers and League Council to come to
Britain. The Council, continued Eden, would only'have to vote;yes or
no on Germany's breaking of the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty
of Locarno. For the Locarno powers the task would be more difficult
as Germany had a £213} accom li, which would make negotiations harder.
He said the Locarno proposals offered Germany were reasonable and
that Germany should accept them. The British Government had two
objectives: the first was to "restore confidence in international
law,” rudely shaken by Germany's action; and the second.was to ”seize
every chance to rebuild peace (n1 securer foundations."75

Dawson stressed editorially on the let that Germany was only
offered proposals ”and not the last stage of an agreement,” and thus
”further discussion is inevitable.” He pointed out that if Germany
did not like the offer she should not, however, say no finally, for
it would be a discredit to her country. He suggested that, instead,
she should "offer her own alternatives."76 Dawson was prepared to
bargain even though he knew the French governmmt was not.

Although the official German reply was very slow, E9. Time;

reported that the German press was not pleased with the proposals.

 

74Ibid.
751bid., p. 7.
76M- a Po 13-

2.40

It questioned Italy's role in a system of guarantees when she herself
had ignored the Treaty of Versailles. The German press claimed that
the proposals were a disguise for something to replace the Treaty of
Versailles.77 The press promised little or no h0pe for Germany's
acceptance of the proposals; only Dawson was hopeful.

To Dawson the angry comments from the German press were deceive
ing, for he believed both sides wanted an agreement. He knew France
at first wanted to retaliate with violence, but she was dissuaded
from this by her friends, and now was prepared to negotiate, setting
an example of moderation. "It is too much to hope, no doubt that the
[first] German reply Should be a simple acceptance" of the proposals.
Dawson said the Locarno proposals “were not an ultimatum," and were
open to discussion and amendment. He noted that some of flhe propos-
als "are disliked in this country little less than they are in
Germans," but the French expected some guarantee of German good faith
after March 7. Dawson concluded that Englishmen needed to be patient
and to do or say nothing that would add to the difficulties in reach-
ing an agreement.78

The German answer still had not come by the 23rd, but Goebbels
spoke before a large audience in.Frankfurt, suggesting what the
answer might be. "People abroad were under an illusion if they
believed the Fuehrer would give way on any of his main points." The
international zone, continued Goebbels, sounded like 1919, ard not

1936; Germarv wanted an ”honest peace," not "a Diktat." ”German

 

77W (London). March 23. 1936. p. 12.
7823121., p. 13.

2A1

trOOps were now in the Rhineland. They would remain there and not a
single one Of than would be withdrawn." Goebbels contimed that "the
nations would have to negotiate with Germany on her peace proposals
during the next few months whether they wished to or not. "79 Although
Goebbels invited other nations to negotiate, he gave every indication
that the German position was not Open to change.

In {fig Ting it was pointed out that the Germans did not like the
proposals, but did not want to reject them outright. The Germans
believed that British Opinion supported Germany and that a flat rejec-
tion might mean that the four Locarno powers might join a military
alliance. The Germans, however, rejected the international zone, and
Hitler's diplomatic methods had convinced the ordinary German that he
was right.80

The French were alarmed by the idea Of Germainr making counter
proposals; the French interpretation of the Locarno proposals was
"that they must be taken as a whole, and the British view that they
can be modified to suit German exigencies has caused bitter dis-
appointment and some indignation." Britain, said the French, should
support the proposals, and the international zone was part of them.
The French feared that Hitler would impose his will on Earope if no
line were drawn, and France believed that Britain should stand by her
pledges.81

Lord Lothian, on the same day, demanded in the House of Lords

 

79w (London). March 21+. 1936. p. 15.

80Ibid., p. 16.

81w (London). March 25. 1936. p- 12.

242

that Britain deny that she had promised any military alliance with
France and declared that the French interpretation was wrong. He
noted that the breakdown of the Locarno policy was “inherently inevi-
table." The only stumbling block he saw to friendship with "the

great German people" was the policy of the German Government in insist-
ing on persecuting Christians, Jews, and others. On the other hand,

he believed France, Russia, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia were all
allied while "Germamr . . . was immeasurably weaker than before the

82 Iothian, like Dawson, was not interested or aware Of this

war."
position in its relationship to French national interest.

French pessimism grew, and they doubted if arything constructive
would be found, believing that the Germans were more "clever than
candid." Gemany lied, said the French, when she said she only took
the Rhineland to be equal because France had always been prepared tO
discuss their differences and it was not necessary for Gemary to act
so. The Fi-ench were concerned about the strength of Britain's pledge
Of support. If England failed then, France was prepared to settle
with Germany ”without taldng England into account." In marry quarters
the French believed that, if Germany broke another agreemmt, France
would ignore the League, ”seek safety in [her] alliance system," and

then, backed by force, talk to Germany.83

France was showing the
strain which Britain had placed on her. There was no editorial com-
ment from 1h_e_ Tim s.

Ezien went before the House of Commons on the 26th and discussed

 

82;bid., p. 7.

83IhsLIiass (London), March 26, 1936, p. 1a.

243

diplomacy; he said that Locarno was not a Diktat peace treaty, and
agreed that Germany could.have arbitrated the French-Russian pact.
Eden deplored the use of force regardless of the reason but he said
Britain had commitments as guarantor of Locarno, and he would not go
back on Britain's pledge. He said the proposals were not excessive
and were consistent with the treaty. He believed that Germany should
make counter Offers, so at least there would be a basis from which to
work, which Of course was completely Opposite to French belief. He
defended Locarno as a defensive agreenent, which the League had
approved, and said Britain would not get involved in aggressive agree-
ments. He stated that Britain's policy was the League, and.was not
pro-German.or pro-French. Eden declared that Britain only wanted
peace, and peace would require unity on the part Of all powers con-
cerned.

Dawson agreed with everything Eden said.85 The French were
impressed by Eden's speech because they were sure that Germany would
not present any gesture of peace and that, after the French election
in Mny, a confident French government would be prepared to talk busi-
ness to Germany.86

The Germans responded differently to Eden's speech. Garing
declared that Germarv would not leave the Rhineland and asked, "Does
Mr. Eden think we are the same sort of cowards as our predecessors

whom we drove out of office?" If so, he ”is certainly mistaken."

 

8“Ihe fl mes (London), March 27, 1936, p. 7.
85Ibide, p. lSe
86me Times (London), March 28, 1936, p. 12.

..]Illl.ll|1

 

244

Goring continued that "peace can be maintained only if one carries a
sword at one's side."87

On April 1, Ribbentrop listed the long-awaited German counter
proposals. They were: (1) Germany would not go to the Hague,
(2) would not attack Belgium or France, (3) wanted a four months
standstill along her Western Frontier, to be guaranteed by Britain
and Italy, (U) wanted to conclude the security pacts that Hitler
spoke of, and (5) wanted to discuss and negotiate disarmament. Eden
received these proposals and sent copies to the other Locarno powers.
The cabinet met and discussed them and noted that they were "concilia-
tory in tone" but did not suggest any gesture of good will. Egg
Tings noted that the cabinet felt there were still questions to be
settled. The paper said the cabinet was convinced these German pro-
posals were directed "more towards public opinion in this country
than in France or Belgium."88

Dawson believed that Hitler really desired peace and the propos-
als only reinforced his conviction. "Never before has Europe been
offered a chance on this scale of agreeing to ferestall and avert the
next war.” Dawson stated that Hitler would help peace, but Germany
must not be discriminated against. Dawson believed that "no serious
Frenchmen" could think Germany would attack France in the next few
months and "practically all Englishmen accept Herr Hitler's assurance"
that Germany would not attack "France or Belgium again." Dawson felt

Hitler's proposals should be welcomed; however, he thought there was

 

87Ibid. , p. 11.

8§Ihs_liaaa (London), April 2, 1936, p. 14,

245

one omission because they did not mention that Germany would not rein-
force the Rhineland during the four-month period of discussion.
Dawson noted this was not a big problan because little could be done
during four months.89

France, he believed, should not be frightened for she still had
her Russian alliance and the League as well as Britain's guarantee.
The British people believed that "mere suspicion, or mere prejudice"
should not-bar "the approach of an agreement to agree. ”90 Dawson
still believed firmly in Hitler's honesty. Dawson's friend, 10rd
Londonderry, just returned from Germany and was quoted in _Tl;e_ Tings,
editorial section to the effect that Hitler's "proposals gave him
ground for great hope. "91

Ribbentrop could offer these proposals with certainty because on
March 29 Hitler was almost unanimously re-elected. Dawson said the
election was a farce since there was no way of voting against Hitler;
he stated that Hitler's speeches were impassioned and "the stage man-
agement of Goebbels" was very elaborate. Regardless, continued mwson,
Hitler's popularity was very high, and the Germans alpported his poli-
cies. Dawson announced that "the present crisis [Rhinelandl was pre-
cipitated in order to divert public attention from the growing economic
distress" and to raise issues in foreign policy, which Hitler knew the

people would support.92

 

89lpid., p. 15.
90% (London). April 3. 1936. p. 17.
glIbid.

92% (London), March 30, 1936, p. 13.

2%

The landslide election of Hitler signified much more than the
mere distraction of the German people from their economic troubles.
Hitler was now at his zenith of power; he had broken the resistance
of the Western powers by violating the Treaty of Versailles, the
League of Nations, and the Treaty of Locarno with impunity. He recog-
nized that his proposals had deceived Britain and therefore it was
not surprising when the Germans failed to respond to or even acknowl-
edge the questionnaire on German intent drawn up by the British on
behalf of the Locarno powers on April 10.

As long as the Rhineland ranained unfortified, France could use
her influence. But now, she could not interfere, unless her own secu-
rity were threatened because this would mean a war, which France
could not fight without British support. The result was that her
Eastern alliance systen was allowed to come apart.

For Mussolini, the Rhineland crisis diverted the League powers
from Italy and made sanctions very difficult to impose. Since he was
already annoyed at Britain over its African stand, he would not sup-
port the Locarnoposition.

For Britain, it was a grave blunder. Perhaps she feared being
allied with Russia; nevertheless, Dawson led the readers of he Eggs
to believe that Hitler was only going into his own backyard. mwson
and 1119 T_i_m§§ were willing to accommodate themselves to a Germany
which they sincerely felt to be honorable, peaceful, and victimized
by its neighbors. Dawson's pro-Germanism had intensified during the

la st year.

CHAPTER IX
THE EMERGENCE OF AN APPEASER

The Rhineland crisis had turned the focus of the world from
Italy to Germany. In Africa Italy went her own way but in Europe she
waited to see what would happen. Although she was a guarantor of the
Locarno Treaty, she took no initiative whatever during the Locarno
conferences convened to deal with the Rhineland crisis. Because she
objected to Britain and France's stand against her in EthiOpia, she
did not intend to support them in the Rhineland crisis.

Ihgwgimgg continued to protest Italy's activities in Africa. It
pointed out that Ethiopia on the 22nd and 30th of March had sent a
note to the League protesting the Italians' use of poison gas as well
as their bombing, which killed women, children, and the aged. The
note also mentioned that for fifteen months Ethiopia had appealed to
the League but that no effective action had been taken.1 In the
House of Commons, Eden, on the 30th, acknowledged that the League
Council had received the protest, and that the Council would act
after Italy had been given a chance to reply.2

Dawson in his first editorial on the Italian-Abyssinian conflict

 

11m Times (London), March 23, 1936, p. 11.

2The Times (London), March 31, 1936, p. 16.

247

2h8

since the Rhineland crisis was indignant at Italy's action. "Public
opinion is shocked by reports that Italy has used gas"; and it "will
be pleased to know the House of Commons, and House of Lords are check-
ing to see it this is true." If the facts were verified, "they [the
British] will take the only practical course open to them by way of
protest," which would be of no little comfort to the EthiOpians.3
Dawson also said most people were skeptical of the reports at first
because they found it difficult to believe that Italy would ignore
the Kellogg Pact, the Covenant, and the Geneva protocol of 1925. It
is puzzling why Dawson found this hard to believe as Italy had ignored
the same pacts when she went to war in October.

Dawson believed there were three dangers in Mussolini's action.
First, he thought Mussolini had committed a crime against humanity,
but more important he used poisonous gas, which the world had out-
lawed. Second, Dawson felt problems between the races might arise if
the "voice of collective civilization should remain silent in the
presence of such horrors.” Third, Dawson believed that, when "the
League fails to check one dictator in his disregard of treaty obliga-
tions, there is—-and has already been--a direct encouragement to
others to follow his example."l+

Although Dawson.was blind to the role he had played in support-
ing Germany when she had broken treaty obligations, Winston Churchill
on April 6 attacked the Baldwin administration fer its role in the

Ethiopian affair. He said the Prime Minister's prestige had dropped

 

3;b1d., p. 17.
“Lbid.

249

since last December and, if Abyssinia fell, "it will be the most mel-
ancholy chapter” in British history; "the aggressor would be trium-
phant" and would gain.more than Hoare ever thought of granting.
Churchill also said the only thing Britain would have achieved "was
to earn the undying hostility of Italy," as well as Hitler's complete
disregard for the Rhineland treaty. Churchill predicted that Germany
would fortify the Rhineland, close the door on the west, and turn
East. He stated that the responsibility for Britain's pitiful role
and position ”must rest in a direct manner on the government; nor
could he exclude the Prime Minister from his share of the responsi-
bility."5

In answer to Churchill, Dawson proclaimed that the British
Government still enjoyed great prestige, and he also defended Baldwin,
saying "no section of the House has lost confidence in the Minister
[on] whom the main responsibility for foreign policy in these anxious
days must fall."6

While the Locarno powers were examining Germany's counter pro-
posals the League Council met on April 8 to try to settle the
Ethiopian dispute. Dawson commented editorially, accusing Mussolini
of being the aggressor, and adding that Hussolini would pay someday.
He declared that Italy's use of poison gas had placed her "zero in
the scale" of a power claiming to be civilized. Dawson noted that
there were no agreements left for Italy to break. Dawson suggested

that, although Mussolini was in financial trouble, his armies had

 

5The Times (London), April 7, 1936, p. 8.

61bide, p. 170

250

almost conquered the country. Dawson said, however, Emperor Haile
Selassie had won admiration for his leadership, statesmanship, and he
"alone comes with credit out of this test of civilization."7

The League Council would meet, said Dawson, when there would be
proposals for a new statute for peace in Europe, but meanwhile the
League should not abandon its policy against Italy.' He agreed that
the League had been right in acting against Italy from.the beginning,
for, if it had not, the League would have collapsed. He also said it
had been right in rejecting the December Hoare-Laval proposals, for
otherwise it would have condoned war, and the League must "hold
together and play the hand out.” Even in April, Dawson still believed
the League was a viable institution.8

Eflen, at the Council, denounced Italy's use of gas, and her lack
of response in bringing about a peace settlement. Paradoxically, on
the same day, April 8, Mussolini declared that he wanted "total anni-
lation of Abyssinian forces."9 Lord Halifax, in the House of Lords,
noted that Britain had done everything but go to war to stop Italy
and that the League would not have followed Britain on a course of
war. Lord Lothian, in the House of Lords, condemned Italy in a
speech directed mainly at Germany; he believed that the British
Government should "not spend so much [time] casting aspersions on the

trustworthiness of the Chancellor of the German Reich." Lothian

believed the government should be more concerned with Italy, which

 

7The Times (London), April 8, 1936, p. 15.

831:1.

9The Times (London), April 9, 1936, p. 14.

251

had done everything contrary to humanity.10 To Lothian as to Dawson,

Mussolini was the villain while Hitler was a misunderstood German
nationalist.

Meanwhile, Th9 _T__1_m_g_s reported French dissatisfaction with the
League and the growing feeling that France felt she should base her
foreign policy on her alliance system.11 The French, in the midst of
a hotly contested election, believed that the "time has gone" for any
League action to hurt Italy; France wanted peace, the removal of sanc-
tions, and "the restoration of the Stresa Front. "12

France may have wanted to revive the Stresa front, but Dawson on
the eve of the Council's meeting of the 20th wanted to hold on to the
sanctions and the League. Dawson argued that the League must not
loosen the current economic sanctions en Italy; he said the League
"should refuse to be divided by an illusory and dangerous policy of
peace at any price." He believed that, although conciliation had
failed to establish peace, the League should still continue to try;
because Italy had forced the League to act, the League could not
retreat and it must defend the principle that "war must not again
become a recognized means of asserting or securing national aims,
material or other, to be used as a country pleases and in its own
time." Dawson felt Great Britain and other members of the League were
defending avital position, that is, wars of aggression are wrong.

Dawson recognized the League might have done more for Abyssinia but

 

10I'bid., p. 70
llThe m es (London), April 13, 1936, p. 10.
lzfle Times (London), April 15, 1936, p. 10.

252

"the least it can do now-~for him [Haile Selassie] and for future
peace--is to maintain and, if needs must, increase its support. "13
Although Abyssinia was almost conquered, Dawson still believed that
the League must support her with public pronouncements. Dawson did
not recognize that his strong anti-Italian stand was playing into the
hands of Hitler, thus making any meaningful discussion on the
Rhineland impossible.

Baldwin, realizing that his government was under fire, told an
audience on the 18th that he would resign when he wanted to and not
when others thought he should. He said the British Government's
policy was based on the League of Nations and Britain wanted "the
Covenant of the League to become the law of the world. ”14 He reiter-
ated the viewpoint that collective security would work when all were
prepared to fight for it to work. Dawson, of course, agreed with
Baldwin.

The League could not come to a conclusion, according to Dawson,
because Germarv had seized the Rhineland and France was in the midst
of elections. Inwson noted that "Italian policy has relied upon the
embarrassments and the ambiguities of French policy," and after the
election Dawson hoped that France would clarify her position.15

On the 20th the Council acknowledged that it could not solve the
dispute. Eden declared that the British Government wanted to maintain

the sanctions on Italy and that, "if there is to be a lasting peace,

 

13% (London), April 18, 1936, p, 13,
”Mes (London), April 20, 1936, p. 1».
ISIbid.’ p. 15.

253

the Covenant must be respected."16 Dawson supported Eden's speech as
representive of the government's foreign policy, and the editor noted
that the League could still be the best instrument for "the preserva-
tion of international peace."17

The Italian and German reaction to the Council's failure differed
from Dawson's; the Italians knew the economic sanctions had failed,
and the Germans believed that the "moral ruin of the League of Nations
is, in German eyes, complete, as is the defeat which British poliey in
the Abyssinian dispute is believed to have suffered."18 The Germans
were delighted when the sanctions failed because a precedent had been
set, and, therefore, they knew that the Rhineland would not be touched.

Eden reported to the cabinet on the Geneva failure. He hoped
that by the next Council meeting the French elections would be over
and Germany would have replied to Britain's questionnaire. Dawson, in
an editorial on the 23rd, again attacked France; he said after the
elections France would have to face the issue of whether or not aggres-
sive war by one League member against another was compatible with the
Covenant. Dawson said the "BritiSh public" would like to know, and,
if France did not agree, what was she prepared to do? As France knew
that Britain opposed any unexcused act of aggression, Dawson believed
that Britain could not ignore this or she ”would forfeit [her] own

self-respect and face genuine humiliation and ignominy."l9

 

16.11% (London). April 21. 1936. p. 14.
17mm, p. 17.
18W (London). April 22. 1936. po 13.

”We (London). April 23. 1936. p. 15.

29+

Ihwson said Britain would learn which powers were against war and
which powers Britain could rely on; if it became necessary to "turn
away from the League as now constituted in order to save the princi-
ples of the Covenant, this experience will not be wasted. "20 This
statement was the first public indication that Dawson realized the
League's faltering position.

Nevertheless, on May Day Hitler and Baldwin each spoke for peace.
Hitler said Germany had not threatened any nation in the past three
years, and, in truth, she "offered the hand of friendship to others
repeatedly"; but to no avail. Similarly, Baldwin declared that
Britain wanted peace and his aim as "Prime Minister is peace. "21

On May 1, as Hitler and Baldwin spoke, file Emperor of Ethiopia
was forced to flee his capital; the Italians were at his doorstep.
Dawson, as expected, was very sympathetic to the Buperor. On May 2,
when news came of the Emperor's flight, he was at Cliveden and he
spent the evening worrying about British foreign policy.22 Two days
later, Dawson commented on the Enperor's plight, saying the EthiOpians
led a gallant fight but the decisive factor had been Italy's use of
poison gas; "it was a needless act of bad faith and barbarity."

Dawson addressed himself to those who felt Britain should have acted
against Italy; Britain, he said, had no quarrel with Italy. He noted
Italy had quarreled with the League and Britain was only a member. He

continued that there was never "the smallest question of a British

 

ZOIbid.
21The Iimeg (London), May 2, 1936, p. 14.

ZZWrench, gwscn, p. 332.

255

declaration of war on Italy," which would have been diametrically
opposed to Britain's policy of peace.‘?3 Many who had read Dawson's
editorials from August to April had been convinced of Britain's actual
leadership in the League and had been certain that Britain would stand
firm in her responsibility.

Dawson now spoke quite differently, asserting that the British
Government had discharged its obligations to the League. He concluded
by declaring that the League was not finished because it had failed
only this time. He said Geneva had solved many problems and Britain
would continue to make her influence "effective in the League of the
future.” Meantime Britain, according to Dawson, would have to bring
nations outside of the League into that body,"particularly Germany. ”21+

Meanwhile, during the Rhineland crisis and the collapse of
Ethiopia the French were holding an election. On May 5 a victory for
the Left was announced. Dawson's editorial, "France Goes Left," dis-
cussed whether or not the election result would make it easier or more
difficult for France to come to terms with Germany. He noted that the
Left favored a strong League and "mated resistance to aggression by
force" if necessary. Since the League had failed to halt aggression,
Dawson regarded this as an academic question. He was convinced that
the new French government could not get France to go to war if French
interests were not involved, and, although the Rhineland was of vital

interest to France, Dawson knew the British Government would not lend

 

231m Times (London), May 1+, 1936, p. 15.
24mm.

25W (London). May 5. 1936. p. 17.

256

25

moral support for this cause.

Throughout the campaign, Dawson noted, the Left had deplored dic-
tatorship, and "Hitlerite Germany was the favorite bogey man." But,
said Dawson contemptuously, Russia was a dictatorship, a fact the
French conveniently ignored. He did not believe that the FYench atti-
tude would be conducive to a German-French compromise although he
heped that France would work for peace in Ehrope "and for reconcilia-
tion with Germany."26

The German press reacted to the French election results as
expected and the headlines read "Victory for Moscow," "Red Elections,"
and "Fruits of the Franco-Soviet Pact." The Germans believed that
Hitler was correct on March 7 when he suggested that Germany had to
consider a "Red regime in France."27

On the same day the editorial page carried a long letter from
Lord Lothian which stated that the main problem of the League was its
ultimate reliance on war, as Articles 10 and 16 suggested, as a means
of halting aggression. Lothian said security should be organized on a
regional basis and the League should get rid of collective security
because the roots of Europe's trouble had been caused by the encircle-
ment of Germany. He also declared that Germany should take her right-
ful place in Europe under a revised League but this would depend on
how Britain would negotiate when she and Germany talked about Hitler's

proposals; if Britain were free of any prior comnfitments, she might be

 

25% (London): May 5’ 19369 P0 17.

26 Ibid .

27I§id., p. 15.

257

able to convince Germarw of the League's importance. Dawson most
likely agreed with Lothian.28

The Italians marched into Addis Ababa on May 5. Although 1h};
_Tim__e_s_ was silent, in the House of Commons Churchill declared that the
fall of Abyssinia was a "mournful occasion" and that "everyone knew
how lamentable that British leadership had been." He wanted the
Prime Minister to speak because "he was the man with all the power and
one could not have the power without having the responsibility." Hugh
Dalton, the Labour M.P., blamed the government for the Ethiopian disas-
ter, the destruction of the League, and of the shame brought to the
British public. He insisted that, while Britain's policy angered Italy,
it did not help Abyssinia.29

Dawson defended the British Government in his editorial, declar-
ing that Dalton was completely wrong and merely blamed the cabinet to
bolster the labour Party. The League failed "for the lack of the col-
lective world to work it," and, said Dawson, it might never have been
tested if it were not for British leadership.30 This point was very
debatable.

The British Government waited another month before acknowledging
the League's failure. Baldwin, who was unable to decide upon amrthing,
spoke in Albert Hall on May 14, again stating that, because the League
had failed once, it was not ended, nor did he believe the League should

end.31

 

Zaibmu p. 17.
29% (London), May 7’ 19369 P0 9.
30.113220: Po 17-

31The Times (London), May 15, 1936, p. 16.

258

Dawson defended Baldwin again.32

Baldwin's friend, Jones, went

to Germany to see Hitler on May 16 and told him it was one of Baldwin's
desires "to get alongside Hitler."33 After Jones returned, giving
Baldwin a glowing report of Hitler, Baldwin told Jones he wished
Hitler could come to Chequers.3u Jones met Dawson on may 21 and told
him of his German visit; Dawson, according to Jones, "was all for
c00peration with Germany, but was worried over Baldwin's inertia."35

On the let, Baldwin, at a private'dinner with a select group of
Conservatives in the House of Commons, stated that the National
Government had to carry out the duty of the mandate it had received.
He declared that Britain was the "greatest safeguard to peace in
Europe and the world."36 He completely ignored his critics.

Dawson wrote about Baldwin's speech on the 25th in an editorial
called, "Mr. Baldwin," characterizing Baldwin as "vigourous, alert,
and deeply concerned.with events at home and abroad," this, despite
the fact that Dawson told Jones on the 21st that he was worried over

Baldwin's inertia. The critics of Baldwin, said Dawson, wrongly
believed "he had lost his grip on affairs and ceased to function at

all.” Lawson declared that "his {Baldwin's} hold on the confidence of
the country remains unchallenged to an extent which is not always

appreciated in London." Baldwin's role, said Lawson, was "to make

 

32;p;g., p. 17.
33Jones, M, p. 200.
Bulbid., p. 203.
35Ibid., p. 202.

36The Times (London), May 22, 1936, p. 14.

259

some definite contribution to the appeasement of Europe." For Britain,
he said this would mean the promoting of better relations between
France and Germany, which was "a task after Baldwin's own heart."
About the German proposals, Dawson mused that "it would be profound
misfortune if there were to be any change in British leadership when
that discussion seems to be in sight." This was the first suggestion
of Baldwin's retirement.37

Chamberlain, at a dinner at the 1900 Club in London on June 10,
declared that to continue the policy of sanctions toward Italy was
"the very midsummer of madness" because Italy had won. Chamberlain
thought regional pacts might be more successful in halting war.38 One
recalls Lothian stated exactly the same principle in _Th_g 3112.3.-

This speech caused a violent debate in the House the next day,
when Attlee asked Baldwin if this was the government's policy, and
Baldwin said it was not. Baldwin stated that Chamberlain spoke as an
individual but the idea had merit. When Attlee pressed him further,
Baldwin refused to reply.39

Dawson defended Chamberlain by declaring that far too much was
read into Chamberlain's speech and it was only Chamberlain's personal
opinion and not government policy. Dawson commented that sanctions

would end when the League of Nations so specified and Britain could

not end then alone. Dawson knew this was untrue for Britain had the

 

37 The gmes (London), May 25, 1936, p. 14.
38The Times (London), June 11, 1936, p. 10.
39The Times (London), June 12, 1936, p. 8.

260

power to sway the League vote.“o Mfithin.a week, Britain would reverse
herself and lift sanctions.

The Italians were bewildered by the comments of .'_I‘_h_§ Limes; they
believed Chamberlain's speech was the turning point in British-Italian
relations for the abolition of sanctions. They wanted to know who was
"standing behind Ihg.gimg§, that organ of clandestine relations." By
mid-June they regarded T113 gigg' plea for German, French, and British
unity as "the height of hostility towards Italy."’+1

On the 18th, Eden told the House that sanctions had failed in
their purpose and that Britain.would inform the League Council of this
in July, even though Britain would abide by the Council's decision
should it wish to keep sanctions in force.

Dawson defended the government's proposed action to remove sanc-
tions and declared that "public opinion" would support the government.
Lawson declared that France was guilty because, if she had really
helped between September and December, the League would have won. He
said Laval was the father of the proposals of December 8, and ”they
were the sure beginning of the end." He continued that Italy was not
forgiven, for she had broken her pledges, and nobody had confidence in
her. Britain would not recognize her'conquest; "it leaves in ruin the
mischievous structure of the so-called Stresa front." Dawson believed
the peeple of Britain wanted British leadership and powers strengthened
and British policy in the future, especially in Europe, would only be

strengthened by obtaining political and economic cooperation with and

 

uoThe Times (London), June 13, 1936, p. 15.

“W (London). June 15. 1936. p. 12.

261

from Germany.’+2

On June 3, Dawson stated what Britain's foreign policy was to be,
namely, Britain should tell the world of (1) her commitments in
Western and Mediterranean Europe, (2) her plans for imperial defense,
and (3) her "firm grasp of the negotiations with Germamn'x“3

The Germans were so pleased with this editorial that they repro-
duced it in their papers; the stress on Western and Mediterranean
Ehrope particularly pleased them as they felt that they could look to
Eastern Europe, especially Central and Southeast Eirope, now that
Britain declared herself disinterestedfm

11$ 21.1193. noted that Germany was not prepared to accept the pres-
ent boundaries of Dirope--"the impression here in Germany is that
Great Britain is not closely interested in Central or in Eastern
Europe." This observation was strengthened by Dawson's editorial, and
perhaps Chamberlain's speech of the 10th. _T_h_e_ Tings continued that,
to many Germans, Austria was a German question because of the strong
idea of racial affinity; Germany might offer in her proposals to hold
plebiscites "among Germans of neighbouring lands. "“5

T_h_e_ _T_i_g_n_e_§_ stated that there would be more emphasis placed on the
question of Germany obtaim’ng colonies because the Germans thought

that Hitler believed that "the more Germany says about colonies the

 

”magmas (London). June 19. 1936. p. 17.

“3% (London), June 14, 1936, p. 13.

“The Lilies (London), June 5, 1936, p. 13.

“SThe Ti mes (London), June 12, 1936, p. 16.

262

more ready will Great Britain be to give her scope in Europe. "1+6

One sign of closer German-Italian relations was noted by the
German Ambassador to Rome and Countess Ciano, wife of the Italian
Foreign Secretary and Mussolini's daughter, both in Berlin; the
Ambassador said that Italy had survived very well against British pub-

lic Opinion.W

Another sign of closer German-Italian relations was
seen in the Italian press, where it was stated that the Italians knew
they had defeated the sanctionist countries, and they recognized the
good "impartial, honest, and often friendly attitude" of Germany
towards Italy.b(8

The Italians were delighted when Eden told the House on the 18th
that the British Government recognized the failure of sanctions
against Italy. They believed Eden's words were an "expectedly frank
and courageous" confession of miscalculation.’+9 However, Dawson's
editorial on the 19th left no doubt that Italy was still a pariah, for
Dawson said Italy had not restored British confidence in her as she
had broken her pledges. He stated Britain's policy for the future of
EirOpe would be found by obtaining political and economic negotiations
with Germany. As far as Dawson was concerned, Italy was to be ignored.

The Italian press was pleased that sanctions were removed but it
did not like Th3 1122.5. editorial, especially its emphasis on a British-

German rapprochement. The Italians stated that Th3 Times was indifferent

 

“61119 Times (London), June 13, 1936, p. 13.

“7Ias_liaas (London). June 15. 1936, p. 12.

48The 1133' as (London), June 17, 1936, p. 16.

“9The Times (London), June 19, 1936, p. 16.

263

to Italy and did not care to improve British-Italian relations.50 The
Italians correctly recognized Dawson's attitude.

On the 20th Baldwin.defended the British action of lifting sanc-
tions by saying they were removed because he was afraid of war in
Europe and wanted to avoid its consequent horrors. Baldwin concluded
by saying, "I have nothing to apologize for."51

The Labour Party called for a vote of censure against the govern-
ment on June 23 but it was defeated. Dawson, who was delighted with
this defeat of the opposition, called his editorial "Towards a New
Policy." He said Britain must not condone Italian actions. He sug-
gested that Britain state where her interests lie and, where she had
an interest, military force would be used to defend it. He believed
it was the "German-French disunion that broke down the sanctions
policy,” and there would be no League until a union was achieved;
Britain should act and let nothing deter her from negotiations with
Germany.52

The Council met on June 25, the first time since May 13. Dawson's
editorial, "The League of Tomorrow," said that the Councilrwould be
concluding the action it took last October, and, because the League
had failed and Italy had won, the League would have to make a change.
This meeting, declared Dawson, must look to the future and not the

past; reconstruction must be undertaken, and the basic ingredient for

 

50The Times (London), June 20, 1936, p. 12.
51The Times (London), June 22, 1936, p. 1h.
52The Times (London), June 24, 1936, p. 17.

264

this would be German, British, and French cooperation.53

No of Dawson's friends spoke on the 26th, and their talks were
recorded in 1113 Meg. Lord Londonderry wanted the government to fol-
low a straightforward policy of cooperation among France, Germany,
and Britain. Lately, said Londonderry, the government appeared to
lack direction, and he believed that Britain acted in a timid way
which was costing her prestige. Londonderry continued that Britain
should not be "niggardly" with the German gestures but drould look on
them with hope; bilateral talks were desirable and inspired confi-
dence. He opposed those who said that Germany could not be trustedju

Lord Lothian believed that peace could be obtained "by good will,
not force." He said too marry people thought of the League as a war
office, rather than a diplomatic office. He stated that war was ter-
rible and Abyssinia not worth a war, as it was "a feudal and slave-
owning state, not yet a nation." War would be justified, said
Lothian, if there were a threat to Western Denocracy or the British
Bnpire, and he noted that he was not a pacifist. He declared that
Britain had to tell the League where she would draw the line and
where she would fight. Germany, said Lothian, might cause trouble,
but justice was due her; Lothian believed Germany should get Eastern
Europe and maybe Austria because her demands were just. He believed
Britain and the League would have to settle these points of German

justice.” Both of these speeches stressed the value of Germany and

 

53ihaulia2§ (London). June 26. 1936. p- 1?.

541he mics (London), June 27, 1936, p. 8.
55Ibid.

265

her role in promoting peace.

Lothian had arrived at this position by June 1 when he had spent
an evening with Ribbentrop at Sandwich. On the day after this meet-
ing Lothian wrote to men, suggestirg that, if Britain were to con-
cede the Continent to Germany, Britain and Germany could get along
together.56 Lothian sent a copy of the note to Chamberlain, who
fully agreed with this position.37 This fact would explain
Chamberlain's speech of June 10, in which he mentioned the "midsummer
of madness." Lothian told Baldwin of his plans and emphasized the
need for German justice, which would mean a new direction for Britain
in foreign affairs;8 A fair assumption to make is that Dawson him-
self adOpted the same position as Lothian on German foreign affairs.
Dawson met Ribbentrop on June 3 and, if he agreed with Lothian and
Ribbentrop about accommodating Germam7 at Eastern Ehrepe's expense,
this would explain Dawson's deliberate policy of May and June in
emphasizing British-German relations to the exclusion of Italy.59

On June 24, Duff Cooper, Secretary for War, spoke in Paris and he
said that the future of civilization would be determined by France and
Britain. The Times, later on the 29th, reported that in the speeches
of Chamberlain, Cooper, Londonderry, and Lothian there was a suggestion

of a "lack of coherent policy, particularly in foreign affairs."60

 

56Butler, Lord Lothian, p. 215.
5711-14.

58939,, p. 216.

59Jones, M, p. 216.

60W (London). June 29. 1936. p. 14.

266

This was a valid observation, for Chamberlain noted in his diary that
"we have no policy."61
On July h, the League withdrew its sanctions on Italy and agreed
to reconvene in September. On July 6 Dawson's editorial, "The League
and Germany," explicitly declared how British foreign policy would be
directed until 1939. He said the League would make a new beginning in
September and there would be hepe for the future. "The key to a
stronger peace system still lies in the relations of Germany and her
neighbours." Dawson noted that British opinion accepted as axiomatic
the friendship of France because this was the nation's instinct. He
said Britain was prepared to help guarantee the integrity of France,
Belgium, and the Netherlands in accordance with time—honored policy
but British Opinion did not accept and would not accept French leader-
ship in the whole field of Ioreign policy. Dawson declared that
Britain would not be tied to France's liabilities "in the shape of
alliances on the farther side of Germany." He continued that British
opinion was determined to come to grips with Hitler's peace proposals
as "the best immediate hope of the stabilization of Western Europe."
"A clear understanding with Germany would not solve all the problems
of the world, but it would be a strong foundation on which to build,

and British Opinion means to try it out."62 Thus appeasement had

bWe

 

61Fedling, @ambezlgn, p. 295.
62The Times (London), July 6, 1936, p. 15.

CHAPTER 1
CONCLUSION

The main purpose of this dissertation has been to show that The
£153; of London played an influential role in the formulation of the
British policy of appeasenmt end that, in turn, the foreign policy
orientation of the paper reflected almost exclusively the conceptions
of its autocratic editor, Geoffrey Dawson. The study does not recount
the full story of the eppeesment policy, but focuses rather on the
months of its initial conception. This is not to suggest that the
British Government could not have changed from a policy of eppeesesent
after the middle of 1936, but only to dmonstrete that the practical
and more} reesons for its acceptance had been by that time well circu-
lated in the nation's leading newspaper and tentatively applied by
the Baldwin administration. One of the selimt features of Dawson's
thought, especielly striking on proble of foreign affairs, was his
failure to give careful consideration to possible alternative poli-
cies. If the course of British foreign policy was not set by the
middle of 1936, the assumptions, expectations, and goals of Dawson
were.

Dwson was not simply the editor of m m, he was also one
of Prime muster Baldwin's most trusted and long-standing advisers
on questions of foreign policy. Marv of the other men who influmced

26?

268

Baldwin in foreign affairs shared the editor's fundamental assump-
tions. The few dissenters who doubted Dawson's wisdom were in turn
doubted by the Prime Minister. The impact of this clique was all the
more significant, because Baldwin was not equipped by tenperammt to
grapple with the conpleacities of international problems. He looked
upon mwson as an export, and the self-confident editor gladly
offered easy solutions, regardless of the intricacies involved or the
limitations of his knowledge. nwson gave to Baldwin and 111.: my
readership the best information he had and the fruits of his own judg-
ment. This, unfortunately, was information from a man who read no
language other than English, who knew little history, and who lacked
an elmentary knowledge of the European peoples. So much did mwson
control Baldwin's judgments that the position of the British
Governmmt in foreign affairs during 193 5-1936 followed the lines of
action set forth in 11;; 111191. 1113 flag; was a major instrummt in
policy formation.

The editorship of a great newspaper is not a proper training
school in political science, for, unlike other institutions, it fails
to provide an essential elasent of education, that is, a master who
can tell the pupil that he is in error. Dawson may have learned some-
thing about politics while he was editor of kg m, but the job of
chief administrator of am major institution is not conducive to
teaching the concept that humility is necessary to true learning.

The blamo cannot be placed on mwson alone, for the whole of
British tradition was to some extent built into the man. hwson was
educated at Oxford, which for centuries has supplied Great Britain

269

with gentl-en and scholars; his education made him a gentleman, not
a scholar. He was destined, in the centuries-old tradition of his
university, to seek his career on the basis of his social rank, rather
than his intellectual education. His advancement rested on who he
knew, and not my, he knew. His biograplv substantiates the fact that
every step of his career was paved with introductions from social
frimdships dating to college days.

The forces that inpelled Dawson to conceive of British policy as
he did, in the 1930's, were also part of the British syst- to which
he contributed by his participation in it. mwson was in one of the
major Iainstreens of British thought in his anti-conunist stand. It
was the major cause for his pro-Germanism and his early acceptance of
Hitler. It is no surprise that he feared that Bolshevisn would spread
to the West, and he regarded Gen-aw as the bulwark which could stop
it. Dawson's imperialistic experience made the welfare of the British
Commonwealth the chief assumption upon which his ideas on foreign
affairs were built and it was the second major factor that led to his
pro-Gerlanin. Every issue in foreign affairs was subordinated to the
welfare of the Commonwealth. Reinforcing these two najor elaents in
his acceptance of German, his anti-communism and his imperialism, was
a cluster of other pressures or influences, all of which were really
social. For his inforlation on Ger-law, he relied on Lord Lothian;
the "Cliveden set" of Lord and Lady Astor, which counted Joachim Von
Ribbentrop among its guests, found Dawson in its inner sanctum. This
”set” also regarded Lothian as its foreign affairs snort.

Although pro-German, it would be unfair to call Dawson a fascist

270

in ideology. He opposed Italy's imperialistic conquest in Africa
because it ran counter to Britain's imperial interests. He even
brought about the downfall of Britain' s Foreign Secretary, Samuel
Hoare, in Decuber, 1935, because Hoare had tried to appease Italy at
the expense of Ethiopia. He opposed Hitler's racial and religious
persecutions on moral grounds but never objected to German imperial-
ism, because it did not threaten British interests. It is logical to
assert that he opposed only those things which affronted British
national policy or British moral sentiments. For him, abstract politi-
cal theory had no relevance. His position, both public and private,
was a moral one. When the moral position was incompatible with the
acceptance of fascism, he always opted against the fascist position.
When, on the other hand, the interests of Britain, as he conceived
them, called for cooperation with a fascist government, questions of
morality gave way to eacpedimcy.

The pro-Germanic: of Dawson and 133 mg became appaer by the
end of June, 1935. He first defended German for breaking the Treaty
of Versailles in March, and again, after the April meetings of the
Stresa Confermce, and the League Council, after both groups had con-
duned Germaxv's action. The height of his pro-Germani- was expressed
in his stand on the British-German Naval Agrement in June.

Since fascism as such was not an issue, Dawson could draw the
conclusion that Britain's only hope was Germany. By July, 1936, It:
113...! made it very clear that its future policy would be to press for
harmonious relations with Germary regardless of the price. Dawson
recognised that Hitler would denaui territories in Eastern Eirope, but

271

this made no difference to him. In this, he contributed to the initia-
tion of the policy of appeasement in Britain.

One of the last to acknowledge the failure of appeasumt, Dawson
defended it adamantly through late 19110. On May 23, 1937, he wrote to
111.9. gig” Berlin Correspondent, Ebbuitt, and begged him to work for a
better understanding with Germazw. The editor admitted how hard he
worked to make the Germans sea: frimdly toward Britain. He noted
that he spurt half the night deleting everything from the copy that
”might hurt their susceptibilities.”1 Only the Battle of Britain con-
vinced him that war could not be averted, but even that he mdorsed
the Munich agreenent, as he assured Chamberlain on Novuber 8 that ”we
owe it to you that it [war] " ~ [came] later rather than sooner and that

we are assuredly going to win. "2

 

1W. IV. Part II. 909.
ZWTGDCha m, P0 1‘33-

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I“Great Britain. ent o ei n Ii 18- .
($011.98 C 0 e I“: e
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l"Great Britain. a1 Commi sion on The Pros 1 4 -1
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