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THE STABILITY OF THE SELF-CONCEPT
AND SELF-ESTEEM

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It is regretted that because of other demands upon his time Mr. Katz found that he was unable to continue the close working relationship after the initial scoring was completed. Thus his association with this study came to an end at the point where the initial scoring of the inventories was completed and where the statistical work had yet to begin.

ABSTRACT

The present research was designed to investigate the relationship of self-esteem to stability of the self-concept. In order to carry out this aim it was necessary to study the effectiveness of various methods of measuring the variables of self-esteem and stability. As a consequence of this study it was hoped to provide a clearer delineation of what it is that is measured by these devices. As a part of this problem an effort was made to develop a measure of self-concept stability that would be functionally independent of self-esteem.

Three hypotheses were tested by the research. The first hypothesis stated that self-esteem is the primary psychological dimension measured by Brownfain's index of self-concept stability. The second hypothesis was a formulation of the relationship of self-esteem to self-concept stability. It stated that those persons who have introjected or internalized contradictory systems of valuation will have unstable self-concepts. The third hypothesis dealt with the influence of ego-defensiveness on measures of self-esteem. It was proposed that the measure of self-esteem least influenced by ego-defensiveness will be the most effective measure of self-esteem.

Measures of the stability of the self-concept, of self-esteem, of ego defensiveness, of disturbance in family relationships and sociometric measures of adequacy in interpersonal relationships were administered to 81 graduating high school seniors. Information was also obtained concerning the intellectual ability, scholastic competence and adjustment of the students and the socio-economic status of the parents of the students. The above variables were intercorrelated and the resulting matrix of intercorrelations analyzed. Prior to collecting the data predictions were made as to the direction of the relationships for each correlation obtained from the intercorrelation of all the major variables. In addition hypotheses I and

III involved the making of predictions as to the relative magnitudes of the relevant correlation coefficients.

Two measures of the stability of the self-concept were developed that were completely free from contamination by the variable of self-esteem. These were the measures of temporal stability and intraparent discrepancy. The former is a measure of the amount of change in the ratings made of the actual self over time. The latter is a measure of inconsistency of parental attitudes toward the child. It is a measure of the discrepancy between the concept the student believes his mother has of him and the concept the student believes his father has of him.

The three hypotheses the research investigated appeared to be strongly supported by the results obtained. As a by-product of the study support was also found for the theoretical proposition that the stability of the self-concept is a dimension of personality closely related to feelings of self-esteem and to adjustment and interpersonal adequacy. An interpretation of self-esteem consistent with the results of the study was offered.

Because measures of self-concept stability which are based in part upon a rating of the actual or true self seem to be seriously contaminated by self-esteem, the results of the study seemed to justify question the adequacy of the Rogerian self ideal-self discrepancy as a measure of self-concept stability.

Ego defensiveness as measured by the K scale was not a critically important variable in the study. There are hints however that there may be some form of defensiveness not measured by the K scale but related rather to socio-economic status which entered into certain of the measures of self-esteem. The results seem also to suggest the possibility that individual test-retest measures of reliability of paper and pencil tests of personality may be good measures of personality in their own right.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

With the growing interest in phenom^{en}ological theories of personality and more particularly the self-concept has come a need for better measures of the self-concept. One prerequisite for the construction of better measures of the self-concept would be a clearer delineation of what it is that is measured. Generally some one aspect of the self-concept is selected for study. Thus the self-concept has been studied in terms of its perceived location, its stability, its divergence from the ideal self and of the value placed upon it by the individual. Probably the dimension of the self-concept most frequently selected for study has been that of stability. The dimension of value--termed "self-esteem" (positiveness or negativeness of feelings about one's self)--has been extensively discussed by the Neo-Freudians. In fact present dynamic theories of personality owe much to the writing of such people as Fromm, Sullivan, Horney and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann who have emphasized the role played by self-love in enabling one to relate to others in a healthy and productive manner.

This study developed out of an interest both in the stability of the self as treated in phenom^{en}ological personality theory and in self-esteem theory as presented by the Neo-Freudians mentioned above. The problem gained its specific formulation as a consequence of the

results of a Master's study in 1952 (22) and an exploratory study in 1953.* One of the results of these studies was to reveal the great degree in which self-esteem entered into (and contaminated) current measures of stability, especially that developed by Brownfain but also the method of measuring stability based upon "2 techniques." Because of this and other apparent defects in these techniques the question was asked, have we a good measure of self-concept stability? Indeed has stability, as such, been shown to be an independent psychological entity? That is, does it have a status independent of measures of self-esteem? Consequently a study was designed to consider critically the nature of the dimension of stability of the self-concept with special emphasis upon its relationship to self-esteem. Let us consider those aspects of self-concept and self-esteem theory pertinent to this study.

These concepts have been discussed by other writers. Both Taylor and Fitts present rather completely the background and history of phenom^{en}ology and self theory (39,13). Robinson in his dissertation reviews exhaustively the concept of the "ideal self" and the process of neurotic self-glorification (30). Morris Robert Short has reviewed the concept of self-esteem and its history (35).

The Problem and its Theoretical Background

A. The Self and Self-Concept Theory

The following paragraph is intended as a summary introduction to this section.

*

The Stability of the Self-Concept and its Correlates

Self-concept theory, which has its contemporary roots in the writings of Mead, James, Calkins and its recent revival in the work of Lecky, Raimy, Snygg and Combs, Rogers, Gordon Allport, Murphy and many others, emphasizes the importance of the person's concept of himself for understanding and predicting the behavior of individuals. One dimension of the self-concept that has been selected for intensive study has been that of the stability of the self-concept. The stability of the self-concept could be described in many terms. A measure of self-concept stability would, speaking roughly, indicate how consistently a person views himself. That is, a measure of stability would indicate how sure he is of how he really stands on various personality traits in relation to others. Stability could also be thought of as something that could be measured by the amount of change in one's opinions about oneself over a period of time. It is assumed that those more sure of themselves would change less than those less sure of themselves who would have greater fluctuation in their self-concepts from day to day. The dimension has been most commonly measured by the willingness of the subject to make divergent ratings of himself under different instructions. The assumption underlying this method is that the greater the uncertainty about the self, the larger will be the discrepancy between the two kinds of ratings that will be obtained. In the following passages of this section the self-concept is defined and self-concept theory distinguished from role taking theory. The self-concept then is distinguished from the concept of body image and, finally, the development and measurement of the self-concept is discussed.

Definitions of the Self-Concept

In recent years a variety of definitions of the self-concept have been offered. These definitions do not as a rule differ greatly from one another. This is generally true of those who like, Rogers, Snygg and Combs, Murphy and Allport are in the main stream of contemporary non-philosophical psychology. There is however one difference in definitions of some consequence. Rogers defines the self-concept as follows:

The self-concept, or self-structure, may be thought of as an organized configuration of perceptions of the self which are admissible to awareness. It is composed of such elements as the perception of one's characteristics and abilities; the percepts and concepts of the self in relation to others and to the environment; the value qualities which are perceived as associated with experiences and objects; and goals and ideals which are perceived as having positive or negative valence (31 p. 135-137).

Notice however that Raimy defines the self-concept in such a way as to include the possibility of unconscious or partly conscious elements:

The Self-Concept is the more or less organized perceptual object resulting from present and past self observation...(it is) what a person believes about himself....The self-concept is regarded as a learned perceptual system which functions as an object in the perceptual field....as an object in the perceptual field it is constantly used as a frame of reference when choices are to be made. Thus it serves to regulate behavior and may serve to account for observed uniformities in personality....since in whole or part the system is subject to symbolization or abbreviation, portions of it may be unverbalizable immediately or may be subject to the process of repression....(28 p. 154).

Thus Raimy (also Stephenson, Taylor and others), includes in the self-concept certain unconscious or relatively unconscious elements. Taylor does not think this one difference is of great importance.

He resolves the issue pragmatically in the following way. Taylor cites Horney as pointing out that a repressed impulse, as of hostility, may not only still affect behavior, but be available to the individual in some deeper level of consciousness. "We observe ourselves better than we are aware of doing." "Materials which are unverbalizable may still be at least dimly admissable to awareness and effective in influencing perception and behavior, including the self-descriptive behavior involved in a personality...[or self-rating] inventory" (39 p. 6).

Allport uses the term, "Self-Image," to refer to the self-concept: "The image has two aspects: the way the patient regards his present abilities, status, and roles and what he would like to become" (1 p. 47). Allport sees it as one of several "propriate" functions of the self. Yet the self-concept is something more than a bare self-image. It is, as Fitts defines it, "the phenomenological configuration of self-reflexive, affective-cognitive struction" (13 p. 16). The self-concept is, as Brownfain and Taylor say, also an affective structure. It is the individual's perception of himself and his feelings and evaluation of those perceptions.

Snygg and Combs postulate both an inclusive "Phenomenal Self" and an exclusive "Self-Concept." The later has much in common with the conceptions of Raimy, Fitts, and Taylor used in this study. The phenomenal self is defined as including all those parts of the phenomenal field which the individual experiences as part or characteristic of himself. It is not a functioning unit but an exceedingly

"complex function" composed of all the meanings which the individual has about himself and his relation to the world about him. However, "it is a highly organized function which operates in a consistent and predictable fashion" and is ordinarily quite stable and resistant to change. Thus the phenomenal self, is a broad term and includes aspects and relationships that are only infrequently or weakly in the phenomenal field (Allport's "Proprium" is a non-phenomenological version of this self). The self-concept refers to the elements in the field which most strongly and frequently affect behavior. It is defined as follows: "The self-concept includes those parts of the phenomenal field which the individual has differentiated as definite and fairly stable characteristics of himself" (36 p. 112).

In general self-concept theory differs considerably from role taking theory. Self-concept theorists are impressed with the consistency of behavior and postulate a relatively stable inner core of personality. Role taking theorists tend to be situationists and, like Sarbin or Sullivan, tend to minimize individuality. This is not to say that all persons act consistently upon all occasions. As Allport points out we do put on an appearance for the occasion (take a role in response to a situation) but "we know too that such appearance is a masklike expression of our persona and not central to our self-image. Much of our so-called 'role behavior' is of this sort" (1 p. 77).

The term, "self-concept," should be distinguished from another term, the "body image" or "body schema," which is sometimes used in

very similar contexts. The concept of the body image was originally developed by men in psychiatry and clinical neurology. Schilder (who uses the term "body image") and Head (who uses the term "body schema") come to mind in this connection. As used by Head the term refers to something like a plastic model of the individual's own body having spacial and temporal attributes and derived from visual, tactile and kinaesthetic cues. Bender similarly calls it "an integrated pattern biologically established by the laws of growth and constitutionally fixed" (2). Schilder expanded the concept to make it include libidinal drives and sociological factors. Used strictly in the sense of Bender and Head, as a physiological concept, there is only a limited relationship between the two. Thus Allport considers the self-concept and the body image to be just two of several separate functions of the Proprium: "Some psychotherapists are occupied chiefly with the self-image (what the knowing function makes of the remainder of the proprium)....some psychologists are concerned only with the coenesthetic components" (the body image) (1 p. 57).

Overlap between the two concepts does appear to the extent that the body image is viewed broadly as Scott does in his definition: "That conscious or unconscious integrate of sensations, perceptions, conceptions, affects, memories and images of the body from its surface to its depths and from its surface to the limits of space and time" (34). This confusion seems to arise most often in the minds of those who use the human figure drawing as a projective

technique. The confusion may well arise because in this test both the person's conception of his own body and his feelings about himself as a person contribute elements to the drawing produced. Apparently for this reason Brown (5) suggested that if the draw-a-person test were administered to blind-folded subjects more of the unconscious, internal factors (more of the body image?) and less of the conscious ego and superego activity (self-concept?) would emerge in the drawings.

Because human figure drawings are used as the source of one of the main variables in this study, Machover's discussion of this same point will be presented. She feels that the human figure drawing represents the "expression of the self, or the body, in the environment." The drawing that is produced reflects the body image. She defines the body image as "the complex reflection of self-regard--the self-image." She seems, then, to conceive of the body image broadly. Thus she says, "The body image--in broader terms, the self,--tends to develop slowly" and "is plastic" showing fluctuations as the individual's personality varies (21 p. 348). Thus she uses the two terms, "self" and "body image" interchangeably. She describes the self as an organization of central attitudes derived from experience, identifications, projections and introjections. Her discussion indicates that the self which is projected in these drawings is a composite of "social images," images from one's private experience and from the racial or genetic past or deep unconscious. She feels that the stability of the self and the stability of the body image

vary together. Thus she says, "With the increasing individuation, consolidation, and stability of the sense of self, body image projections become more stable and elaborated..." "The toying during adolescence with many selves that is seen...is reflected in variability of drawing projections. And she adds that self confident individuals--those who have accepted themselves--show stable drawings (21 p. 351).

Development of the Self-Concept

A variety of ways of looking at the development of the self-concept have been offered (29, 38, 3, 9). They have in common the idea of some process of internalization, introjection or identification and all are based in one way or another on the thinking of the person whose views are next to be discussed.

Probably the Social Behaviorist, George Herbert Mead (26) contributed more than any other single person to the development of a non-metaphysical concept of self--that is, the concept of self basic to current usage. Using only the methods of empirical naturalism, Mead set out to show how mind and self are social products. This opened the way for a scientific study of these entities and enabled those interested in these concepts to side step the problem of mind-body dualism. Mead stated that the individual comes to experience himself only indirectly; that is, from the particular standpoints of other individual members of his social group or of the larger social group of which he is a member. He thus becomes an object to himself, develops an awareness of self, only by taking the attitudes of other

individuals toward himself within a social environment in which both he and "they" are involved. In the behavior provided by the process of communication involving significant symbols (that is, communication which is directed not only to others but also to oneself) the individual learns to become an object to himself. The self (defined empirically as that which can be an object to itself) arises then out of social experiences.

Others have explained this process of internalization, as Taylor points out, in terms of Gestalt psychology, field theory, cognitive theory or psychoanalytic theory. A concise summary of this process of development is given by Taylor (39). He holds that: one, the self-concept is a product of the reflected attitudes and appraisals of others and that, two, the self as well as the self-concept, are gradually and continually differentiated from the remainder of the phenomenal field throughout the course of life. As Snygg and Combs say "...this concept can only be a function of the way he is treated by those who surround him. As he is loved or rejected, praised or punished, fails or is able to compete, he comes to regard himself as important or unimportant, adequate or inadequate, handsome or ugly, honest or dishonest, and even to describe himself in terms of those who surround him (36 p. 83)."

The Stability of the Self-Concept

Brownfain (6) proposed that the self-concept, being a social product and consisting of the system of central meanings an individual has about himself, may be regarded as more or less stable

and that the degree of this stability has an important relation to adjustment. Some support for the study of the stability dimension of the self-concept appears in the writings of Rogers and Snygg and Combs. Actually, however, many writers have spoken in general terms of some such concept as stability. That the degree of certainty about oneself, how one stands, and what one is, should be related to adjustment and success in interpersonal relations seems quite reasonable--the idea seems to have considerable "introspective" validity.

Cameron (8 p. 102) remarks: "The basis of much frustration and many conflicts is in this universal circumstance, that no man ever fuses all his self-reactions together into a single, unambiguous, coherent whole." A similar notion is implied by this often quoted passage of Rogers: "It would appear that when all of the ways in which the individual perceives himself--all perceptions of the qualities, abilities, impulses, and attitudes of the person, and all perceptions of himself in relation to others--are accepted into the organized conscious concept of the self, then this achievement is accompanied by feelings of comfort and freedom from tension which are experienced as psychological adjustment..." (32 p. 364).

As Snygg and Combs point out (36 p. 173), hebephrenics in particular and schizophrenics in general sometimes seem to have lost the inner stability characteristic of the normal individual. They appear to feel threatened in many aspects of self. So much so that they cannot accept any consistent evaluation of themselves. Lecky (and others later) postulated a drive towards self-consistency; that is,

a drive to maintain the integrity and unity of the organization of the self. It might be stated then that the less successfully this impulses proceeds the more inner disturbance is likely to be experienced by the organism. It is evident too that the effort to keep incompatible elements of the self-concept apart is costly to the organism.

Snygg and Combs note similarly that an integrated person can accept all his interpretations of reality; whereas the self-concept of the disintegrated person contains "enduring contradictions" which result in distorted interpretations of reality. Thus successful therapy, for example, would result in a person who perceives himself as more integrated.

This kind of reasoning led to the development by the Chicago Group of a measure of stability of the self-concept based upon the 2 technique of William Stephenson. Repeated sortings of the cards show changes in the self-concept through time. The directions for administration can be manipulated to produce a large variety of self pictures as (37 p. 256) the should self, the becoming self, mother wanted self and, of course, the ideal self. By correlating the results of two administrations given shortly after each other one can get what might be considered a measure of self-concept stability. Of these, the most commonly used measure has been based upon the degree of similarity of the ideal self to the actual self. This measure has been used both to judge the probable success of psychotherapy and to predict those most likely to succeed in therapy.

Brownfain's inventory method of getting at the stability of the self-concept is somewhat similar to the method derived from 2 technique methodology. Both techniques measure one's readiness to present divergent self-pictures at one point in time. One important difference is that in the Brownfain method both self descriptions are supposed to be "realistic" self-evaluations. But we are ahead of ourselves here. Brownfain's contribution needs to be discussed in some detail. Brownfain (6) in his dissertation presented a technique for operationally measuring the stability of the self-concept. In outline, the original research instrument consisted of a number of rating scales on which the subjects were to rate themselves four successive times in four different frames of judgment. The two frames of judgment used to obtain the index of stability were the "positive self"--a rating of the self slanted positively--and the "negative self"--a rating of the self slanted negatively. He found that those with stable self-concepts were better adjusted and he found that, as would be predicted from self-concept theory, a major correlate of the stable self is a high level of self-esteem. He concluded that an individual with a stable self-concept is an individual "who accepts himself, who values himself highly, who feels secure about himself" (6 p. 94). He also found that when certain aspects of the self were rated down a compensatory accentuation of other aspects of the self occurred. This tendency to make the upward rating he called, "idlerian compensation."

We have seen then in the Brownfain and Stephenson techniques a kind of self-concept stability measured operationally by one's

tendency to give different pictures of one's self under differing instructions or "sets." McQuitty (25) has developed another method of measuring stability or integratedness within the self structure. He developed a method which is based upon the statistical analysis of responses to a type of personality inventory. "Disintegrated" personalities tend to mark an inventory in an inconsistent way. That is, they "give successive answers which are characteristic of diverse categories of people." He has devised a mathematical scheme which gives in one figure an index to the integration of the self-concept. McQuitty, in discussing the "disintegrated person," notes that he would have "contradictory acceptance--rejection attitudes about many opinions of himself. He seems to mean that a person unsure of who and what he is will fluctuate from minute to minute (and of course from day to day) in his attitude towards similar inventory items and that this uncertainty or inconsistency can be detected by an analysis of the pattern of responses on a personality inventory. This latter idea is actually not very different from the concept Brownfain had of stability (namely, that the greater uncertainty an individual has about himself the greater can two realistic estimates of that self be expected to differ).

Lecky (20) held that the high reliability coefficients often reported for personality inventories were evidence that a person's conception of himself tended toward stability. Taylor sought to find out through a comprehensive study just how stable the self-concept really was (39). His findings suggested that the self-concept has a great deal of stability.

B. Self-esteem and Self-esteem Theory

The following paragraph is a summary-introduction to this section.

The second area of personality theory that has contributed to this study has not been research oriented but has nevertheless produced much clinically fruitful theorizing about emotional health, productivity, maturity and interpersonal adequacy. Those identified with this area (Fromm, Sullivan, Horney, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann) make much of the concept of self-esteem. Every child either gets off to a good or bad start in life depending upon the amount of self-esteem he accrues in the primary mother-child relationship. Adequate amounts of self love assure that the individual will weather the later storms and trials without developing a crippling neurosis--will assure that the individual will have the capacity to accept and love others and to handle successfully his interpersonal relationships. One can also increase one's self-esteem by one's own efforts at mastery--that is, by one's achievements.

Definitions of Self-Esteem

Short feels strongly about the importance of the concept of self esteem and, in concerning himself with this concept, has formulated a definition that emphasizes this importance. Short begins his dissertation on the ethical significance of self-esteem with the following passage:

Self-Esteem is a continuing need in the life of each person. In order to maintain his ability to function effectively and appropriately under varying conditions, one

needs to have some good feelings about himself, preferably feelings growing out of realistic awareness of the goodness of his own state of being within his situation. It is true that other things beside self-esteem can serve after a fashion to maintain functional unity--for example, phantasies of glory, and hatred for others. Such things as these can help keep a person going but in general their effect is more destructive than constructive. When they do help keep the person functionally organized, they do so by making his experiences more restricted and rigid and generally less well adapted to his general situation. They can not provide a really satisfying way of life, as can realistic self-esteem (35 p. ii).

Stated directly, realistic self-esteem is a prerequisite for adjustment. Inferior brands (for example, Horney's neurotic self-glorification) rather than lead to a productive orientation towards the world (Fromm) or adequacy in interpersonal relations (Sullivan) will lead to a non-productive orientation towards the world and failure in interpersonal situations.

Short goes on to define self-esteem as "a realistic awareness of the goodness of one's actual state of being and the goodness of his situation." Self-esteem is distinguished from pride (neurotic pride) in that pride is "based on unrealistic notions about oneself and one's place in the scheme of things" (35 p. 35). Self-esteem is "self-appreciation on a reasonably realistic basis." Brownfain emphasizes simply the self-appreciation aspect of self-esteem and not its realism. It is felt that Short's two-fold definition is superior to Brownfain's because of this additional refinement. Brownfain said, "Just how much the self is liked and how much is expected from it is self-esteem as we define it...The self is something we like and from which we expect much" (6 p. 3). And it should

be noted further that it is genuine wholeheartedness which is characteristic of a healthy attitude towards the self. Ambivalence is characteristic of neurotic attitudes towards the self. Horney gives us one explanation of why it is that ambivalence about the self is characteristic of those with low self-esteem. She observed that the person who feels both neurotic pride and self-hate will not ordinarily be able to distinguish between the two feelings in himself (18 p. 111).

The Development of Self-Esteem

Agreement is well nigh universal concerning how feelings of low self-esteem develop in the child. This basic insecurity or "basic anxiety" is "invariably" caused, Horney states (17 p. 81), by a lack of genuine warmth and affection from the parents. Attitudes towards the child's needs she notes may vary all the way from "temporary inconsideration to a consistent interfering with the most legitimate wishes of the child, such as disturbing friendships, ridiculing independent thinking, spoiling its interest in its own pursuits, whether artistic, athletic or mechanical..." Thus it seems a child comes to have negative feelings about himself if he experiences little love or respect in his early years.

Sullivan (27 p. 296), along with Ribble and others holds that the factors forming the nucleus of the later level of self-esteem should be sought in the very earliest mother-child interactions. Because Sullivan's own works are so scattered we will cite Mullahy's discussion of Sullivan's theories. "There is said to be a 'peculiar emotional relationship' between the infant and those who take care

of him. Long before he can understand what is happening to him, this 'emotional contagion or communion' between him and the significant adult, the mother or nurse, exists." "This unclear mode of emotional communication is thought to be biological...Sullivan surmises its greatest importance is between the ages of six and twenty-seven months" (27, p. 285). These earliest attitudes (of euphoria, or good feeling about the self resulting from success in relieving physiological tensions) which are considered to be the most "deep-seated" and pervasive, are thus acquired unthinkingly. Note also the following: "By empathy, facial expression, gestures, words, deed they convey to him the attitudes they hold toward him and their regard or lack of it for him...These he 'naturally' accepts because he is not yet a questioning, evaluating being. If the significant people express a respecting, loving attitude toward him, he acquires a respecting, loving attitude toward himself. If they are derogatory and hateful, then he will acquire a derogatory and hateful attitude toward himself" (27 p. 298).

. From Mullahy's discussion we conclude that the infant and child is both biologically and psychologically helpless. Once started on its way in these early years the personality organization (and self-attitudes) tend to maintain its own form and direction: "...when the self is a derogatory and hateful system it will inhibit and misinterpret any disassociated feeling or experience of friendliness towards others; and it will misinterpret any gestures of friendliness from others. The direction and characteristics given to the self in

infancy and childhood are maintained year after year, at an extraordinary cost, so that most people in this culture, because of inadequate and unfortunate experience in early life, become 'inferior caricatures of what they might have been'..." (27 p. 297).

Apparently, however, Sullivan is not as fatalistic as the above passages would indicate. The somewhat contrasting contention that self-esteem may be partly a product of one's own efforts at mastery and that events in later life help to determine one's level of self-esteem gains support from the following passages describing Sullivan's position. "The fate of the child is not however absolutely decided at this early age. Significant adults (teachers for example) may be able to undo some of the harm" (27 p. 298). Sullivan elsewhere asserts that actions (at any period of life) taken which avoid or relieve tensions are experienced as continued or enhanced self-respect or self-esteem. Sullivan also feels that by achieving power or ability in interpersonal relations, one comes to respect oneself and therefore others. To quote Mullahy again: "While the attitude toward the self is first determined by the attitude of those who take care of the child, his subsequent attitude toward others is determined by the attitude he has toward himself. 'If there is a valid and real attitude toward the self, that attitude will manifest itself as valid and real toward others'" (27 p. 285). This latter statement has had a great deal of impact upon contemporary thought. As expressed by Fromm-Reichmann: "...one can respect others only to the extent that one respects oneself...one can love others only to the extent that one loves oneself." "Where there is low self-esteem there is low

esteem of others and fear of low appreciation by other people." Of the Neo-Freudians, Fromm was the first to give this formulation its proper emphasis (15).

It would seem to be a matter of great significance whether realistic self-esteem were conceived as originating primarily in the early empathetic relation to a mother figure or whether self-esteem may not be conceived as something that, within fairly wide limits, may rise and fall with experiences of success and failure in later childhood, adolescence and adult life. The former assumption fits the clinical observation that neurotic compensatory strivings often seem insatiable and that no matter how successful the neurotic character orientation seems to be the individual remains as neurotic as ever. Let us see how success in later life can lead to increased feelings of self-esteem.

According to analytic theory, the nursing mother is the first giver of narcissistic supplies to the infant. However, with the internalization of the superego, it becomes the source (giver) of self-esteem to the individual. Thus, according to Jaeger (19 p. 443), "The superego is composed of the introjected parental figures....pleasing the superego is necessary to maintain self-esteem. When the individual is plagued with frequent failures, severe frustrations or chronic stress, he feels abandoned by his superego, like the child abandoned by the parents, and becomes subject to depression" (feelings of low self-esteem). Self-esteem comes from pleasing one's parents. That is, living up to one's own (the introjected) standards gives rise to feelings of increased self-esteem.

The two different views of self-esteem discussed above can be synthesized if we conceive of self-esteem as a general level of goodness of feeling about the self that is more or less stable and primarily formed in the first years of life and that, further, this habitual level of self-esteem may be momentarily yet significantly heightened whenever the individual has a success experience. The resulting intense feeling should be called "euphoria." It is also likely that a person's general level of self-esteem varies somewhat from day to day depending upon the ebb and flow of vital forces related to the general health and overall metabolism of the organism.

Ego Defensiveness and Neurotic Self-Inflation

Hilgard (16) remarked that the Freudian defense mechanisms seem to function to bolster one's self-esteem through self-deception. It follows then that those who would mark a personality inventory in a manner indicating a high level of self-esteem would be of two kinds--well adjusted persons and not so well adjusted individuals whose defenses operate effectively. It is suggested then that, although the latter persons would so mark the conventional personality inventory as to suggest they regarded their selves warmly, indirect measures of self-esteem would show a truer picture of their actual level of self-esteem.

Werner Wolff (42) developed various techniques that seem to be able to measure this deeper aspect of the self-concept. Typically Wolff would present a subject with some form of his expressive behavior (the sound of his voice, handwriting presented tachistoscopically

or in a mirror reflection and so on) along with similar expressions from several others. Although the subject generally would not recognize his own production, strong emotional reactions were evoked by his productions which gave evidence concerning his own deeper self-feelings.

The results of Cowen's study (11) also suggest that a disguised measure of self-esteem may be more meaningful than a direct measure. Cowen correlated the Brownfain stability measure with that obtained from the inventory developed by Bills, Vance and McLean. He found that the "high" negative self score derived from Brownfain's inventory correlated higher with the various measures of adjustment used in the study than did any of the other measures derived from either inventory. He concluded that the power of this measure was "almost surprising." He thought that perhaps "the poorest rating that a person admits to on an inventory of this type may be actually the way he feels about himself." He felt too that the measure would be potentially most meaningful and discriminating when embedded in the context of a series of other self-ratings. It seems that Cowen has discovered a very good measure of the way a person feels about himself--that is, a good measure of a person's level of realistic self-esteem.

In order to make clear how this problem of unconscious self-feelings should be handled by a self theory of personality, Hilgard (16) offers the term, "inferred self." Hilgard feels that for a complete understanding of the personality, something more than the conscious self attitudes must be known--that is, "the genotypical

pattern of motives ("material excluded from self awareness") must (also) be inferred." The healthy self, he says, has an "integrative organization" but is not "integrated" in a rigid, maladaptive, defensive sense. This latter state is a product of defense mechanisms preventing the awareness of threatening self-evaluations. Thus he states that the goal of psychotherapy would be to bring together the self present in awareness with the inferred self so that, ideally the "self of which one is aware comes to correspond to the inferred self" or the self "as an informed other person sees him."

It is very evident then that any study of the stability (or intergratedness) of the self-concept and any study which deals with self-esteem must contain features designed to cope with the fact that the subjects tend to keep from awareness threatening self-perceptions and negative self-evaluations.

Horney would explain the presence of the rigidly stable self on the basis of the fact that the actual unity is achieved within the idealized image which becomes neurotically identified (confused) with the true self. The degree of neurosis is proportional to the degree of discrepancy of the idealized image from that of the real self. Thus "the idealized image serves as a substitute for realistic self-confidence and realistic pride." Actually, "the person feels weak and contemptible" (18 p. 100). The neurotic must therefore inflate his feeling of significance and power. You will recall that this Adlerian-like process of compensation was conceived by Brownfain to be the principle upon which his measure of self-concept stability

operated. Horney continues to explain the function of neurotic self-inflation:

Having placed himself on a pedestal, he can tolerate his real self still less and starts to rage against it, to despise himself and chafe under the yoke of his own unattainable demands upon himself. He wavers then between self-adoration and self-contempt, between his idealized image and his despised image with no solid middle ground to fall back on. The fear of humiliation comes from an injured self-esteem...both the creation of an idealized image and the process of externalization are attempts at repairing damaged self-respect, but as we have seen, both only injure it still further. In the course of a neurotic development the level of realistic self-esteem falls, up comes an unrealistic pride (18 p. 112).

Horney observes that the consequence of his idealization is an alienation from the self: "We cannot suppress or eliminate essential parts of ourselves without becoming estranged from ourselves. The person simply becomes oblivious to what he really feels, likes, rejects, believes--in short, to what he really is" (18 p.111).

Fromm also speaks of alienation or astrangement from the self but sees it as a cultural phenomenon. He also sees the sense of personal worth, in our culture, as dependent in certain ways upon external factors. Quoting from his latest book: "We do not submit to any-one personally; we do not go through conflicts with authority, but we have also no convictions of our own, almost no individuality, almost no sense of self" (14 p. 102). Continuing: "That is the way he experiences himself, not as a man, with love, fear, convictions, doubts, but as that abstraction, alienated from his real nature, which fulfills a certain function in the social system. His sense of value depends on his success; on whether he can sell himself favorably, whether he can make more of himself than he started out

with, whether he is a success." "If the individual fails in a profitable investment of himself, he feels that he is a failure; if he succeeds, he is a success. Clearly, his sense of his own value always depends on factors extraneous to himself, on the fickle judgment of the market, which decides about his value as it decides about the value of commodities" (14 p. 142). It might be added that since such a person has little true sense of self, his feelings of worth must be rather superficial and transient also.

In closing this section, let us turn to Allport's discussion of "conscience." He also describes self-esteem in terms of "success" yet here there is said to be an inner core to the personality and success is conceived in terms of conforming to this inner or "true self." Allport also points out that for the mature individual this inner core need not be simply the introjected parental standards to which Jaeger referred. He writes: "According to most current psychological theories the essence of conscience is a 'must'--a dread of punishment if one commits or omits an action. As we have seen, the early conscience of the child is undoubtedly of this order. But when conflicts and impulses come to be referred to the self-image (self-concept) and to propiate striving we find that the sense of obligation is no longer the same as a sense of compulsion; ought is not the same as must." "Whenever I make a self-referred value judgment--as if to say, 'This is in keeping with my self-image, that is not'--then I feel a sense of obligation that has no trace of fear in it." (It is this) "wholly positive and immediate sense of obligation, of self-consistency, that is clearly primary" (1 p. 72).

CHAPTER II

PRESENTATION OF THE HYPOTHESES

Having presented in the first chapter the background material necessary for an understanding of the concepts and procedures of the study, the most relevant of those points will now be brought together and related directly to the hypotheses of the study.

In using the Brownfain self-rating inventory in earlier research, the great significance of the downward contribution (the negative self-rating) to the final stability score was observed. The possible significance of this observation appeared to be confirmed by Cowen's findings concerning the value of the negative self as a personality measure in its own right. It was therefore concluded that Brownfain's measure of self-concept stability might be primarily a measure of self-esteem. Since this defect appeared to be present in Brownfain's method of measuring stability (and by analogy might possibly be present in the Rogerian self ideal-self discrepancy measure of stability), the question was asked, have we yet a good measure of self-concept stability? Indeed it is questionable whether Brownfain had shown that the dimension of stability was an independent psychological entity.

Brownfain's positive-self, negative-self discrepancy and the alternate-self ideal-self discrepancy did not seem satisfactory as measures of stability. The latter measure of stability has been

criticized because it is said that the "maladjusted" and those who simply (or mainly) have high aspirations and achievement needs for themselves are lumped together at the unstable end of the trait continuum. Results of studies by Chordokoff (10) and Bills (4) have tended to support this criticism. This feature of the measure might not be a liability if one were simply interested in predicting motivation for psychotherapy.

In view of the above it was wondered whether perhaps McQuitty's approach might be more fruitful; or, again, it might be better to follow Lecky's own suggestion. He felt, it will be remembered, that the reliability coefficients found for most personality inventories showed that the human personality had a stable core and that there must therefore exist an inner drive, or tendency, towards self-consistency. From this it was reasoned that, if a reliability coefficient could demonstrate personal consistency, might not it also be a measure of instability--instability of the self-concept?

This leads us to a statement of the first hypothesis

HYPOTHESIS I

Self-esteem is the primary psychological dimension
being measured by Brownfain's index of Self-Concept
Stability

It is necessary to explain what is intended by the phrase "primary psychological dimension." It is meant that self-esteem is the active component "in" the Brownfain measure of stability. And by "active component" is meant a psychological variable that is meaningful and potent. A meaningful variable is one that can be shown to be related

to other psychological variables in ways that are predictable from the postulated nature of the variable--is one that can be shown to encompass a meaningful or "real" psychological dimension. By "potent" is meant the centrality and generality of the dimension.

It is deduced that Cowen's negative self measure of self-esteem will be shown, when compared to Brownfain's measure of stability of the self-concept, to be a more meaningful and potent measure. Thus, it is predicted that, given a variety of measures theoretically related to self-esteem, the negative self will, as a measure of self-esteem, be found to correlate with these measures in the theoretically expected direction and the correlations will be greater than between these same variables and Brownfain's stability. Since it is postulated that the upward rise (defensive-compensatory rise) will have little relationship to self-esteem, the negative self will correlate higher even though it is hypothesized that Brownfain's measure is actually mainly a measure of the individual's tendency to rate himself downward when encouraged by the directions; that is, a measure of the negative self.

Hypothesis I can be stated in two alternate but essentially equivalent forms.

Form A: Brownfain's measure of stability is a contaminated measure of self-esteem

The hypothesis in this form needs no further explanation as it has been discussed in the preceding sections.

Form B: Brownfain's discrepancy measure of stability is a measure of self-concept stability which is contaminated by self-esteem

It was the hypothesis in the latter form (Form B) that lead to the questioning of whether an independent dimension of stability had been measured (and shown to "exist") by the studies of Brownfain and the Rogerians.

Theoretically it would be very desirable if a measure of stability could be developed that would be free from direct contamination from the individual's level of self-esteem. Thus as one of the outcomes of this study, it was hoped that such a measure of stability would be found. Consequently the following question was formulated to be answered by this study:

Can there be found a measure of stability that is functionally independent of self-esteem?

In our earlier discussion suggestions were given for a formulation of the relationship of self-esteem to stability. It will be recalled that this relationship was explained in terms of the presence or relative absence of negative, threatening, unacceptable or contradictory elements within the self-picture which it is postulated would result in inability to wholeheartedly accept oneself and to ambivalence and uncertainty about who one really is (it is assumed few want to firmly accept the proposition that they are in certain respects "no good").

The assumption is made, following Taylor, that negative self feelings, uncertainty and ambivalence about the self, even if they are not clearly in awareness will tend to influence the manner in which the subject will respond to a sophisticated (and somewhat disguised) paper and pencil self-rating inventory. Thus the second hypothesis deals with the relationship of stability to self-esteem.

HYPOTHESIS II

Those persons who have introjected or internalized contradictory systems of valuation will have unstable self-concepts

It is deduced that those who have been exposed to relatively greater inconsistency in upbringing in terms of reflected self appraisals will have relatively more unstable self-concepts than those reared in an atmosphere of more or less consistent valuations. The individual with a very unstable self-concept will have much in the inferred (or unconscious) self that is not acceptable to himself. Hypothesis II thus implies that stability of the self-concept is a function of the discrepancy between the inferred and conscious selves.

As Hilgard stated, inferences are made about the contents of the inferred self from observation of the individual from an external frame of reference. Thus, to illustrate, it can be inferred that, when an individual expresses a desire to achieve one aim and acts in a way that defeats that aim or achieves an opposes aim, there exists a significant discrepancy between his self-concept and his inferred self. Similarly, if an individual views his parents as conceiving of himself in a way different from the way he conceives of himself there is likely to exist such a discrepancy. And the same would apply if he conceives of his peers as viewing himself differently from the way he views himself. The same also could be asserted if he perceived one parent as viewing him (and thus reacting to him) in a way different from that which the other parent views, and reacts to, him.

A stated divergence from, or rejection of, parental (early, unconsciously introjected) valuations might also be a sign that such

an underlying discrepancy exists and that, consequently, it could be predicted that the individual would have an unstable self-concept.

One might conceive of an individual who comes to develop an unstable self-concept yet had experienced a relatively secure and anxiety free early childhood (immigrant in a new culture, a child reared by parents of divergent cultural or religious backgrounds). is a rule, however, valuations which are not tinged with negative emotional overtones could be relatively easily integrated into the self-picture. In other words, unless they in some way carried with them the threat of rejection or punishment they would not need to be forced out of awareness and thence into the inferred self. This is one reason why theoretically low self-esteem and an unstable self-concept are so closely related.

Rarely would a child be exposed to negative, critical and belittling appraisals from those around him and not also be exposed to some positive (and hence conflicting) valuations. This is to say that what is called, "ambivalence" is the characteristic emotional atmosphere of the unhealthy (rejecting) family environment. An unvaried, extremely inhibiting, belittling and deflating atmosphere would be likely to result in a psychotic adaptation.

The third and final hypothesis deals with the influence of ego-defensiveness on measures of self-esteem. The reader may have surmised from the earlier discussion of self-esteem and neurotic pride (the reference is especially to Horney) that self-esteem would be a difficult variable to use in a study because one could never be entirely sure how much his measure of self-esteem actually reflected the

presence of neurotic pride and ego-defensiveness. Recall that Hilgard said that the ego defenses served to maintain feelings of "self-esteem." Some workers seem to have ignored this possibility in their studies (7). In order to study this confounding of genuine self-esteem by ego-defensiveness, five measures of self-esteem were included in the study which seemed to vary along a continuum of directness. It was felt that there might be an inverse relationship between their directness and their effectiveness. Thus the following hypothesis was formulated.

HYPOTHESIS III

The measure of self-esteem least influenced by ego-defensiveness will be the most effective ("potent") measure of self-esteem

CHAPTER III

PROCEDURES

The Procedures in Summary

The following steps were involved:

- Step one: the development of instruments appropriate to the purposes of the study.
- Step two: obtaining a population and administration of the test battery.
- Step three: the analysis of the data.
- Step four: interpretation of results.

Measures were needed of the stability of the self-concept, of self-esteem, of ego-defensiveness, of disturbance in family relationships and of adjustment, or better, adequacy in interpersonal relationships. Planned as supplements to these were measures of intellectual ability, scholastic competence and adjustment and socio-economic status of the parents of the subjects.

The above variables were intercorrelated with each other and the resulting table (or matrix) of intercorrelations was analyzed. Following directly from the theoretical formulations discussed in chapter one of this study, predictions were made as to the direction of the relationships for each correlation obtained from the intercorrelation of all the major variables. In the case of the negative self and the Brownfain stability index not only was the direction of the relationship between these two variables and the others predicted but

also it was predicted that the negative self would correlate higher with each of the other variables in the matrix than would Brownfain's stability measure. Similarly, the relative magnitude of the correlations of the self-esteem measures with the other major variables was predicted.

By an inspection of the magnitude and direction of the correlations obtained and of the consistency of the anticipated interrelationships among the variables, the questions asked of the data could be answered.

The Population

The battery of measures designed for this study were administered to four high school physical education classes. The subjects were all graduating seniors (graduation took place less than a week after they were administered the battery). The average age of the subjects, all males, was 18.29 years. The measuring instruments themselves were administered to the students during their regular class periods in two, fifty minute sessions three days apart. With the help of the school counselor (and group test administrator) the cooperation of the students was obtained. In the explanation to the students, anonymity of the results was stressed. It was explained that initials were necessary simply to enable the experimenters to match the various papers later.

Males were chosen as subjects both because this would facilitate theoretical analysis of the results and because it was required for the sociometric measures. In addition, the earlier work with

Brownfain's inventory suggested that the stability measure might be sensitive to sex differences.

There were 81 subjects. The four sections of senior boys were made up respectively of 17, 21, 19, and 24 students. Due to the scheduling of graduation activities on the same days as the testing, absences were minimized. There was no attrition among the subjects. That is, no students tested at the first session were absent for the second testing session. There were three or four students who had not been present for the initial session who were present at the second. The material gathered from these students was discarded. Even though, in three or four cases, it appeared that the validity of a particular measure from a subject might be questioned, no piece of data was omitted from the final calculations.

Description of the Instruments

A. The Self-Rating Inventory

The self-rating inventory is an adaptation of Brownfain's original self-rating inventory. Although the inventory was revised once, before being used in the pilot study and later revised again, it remains essentially similar to the inventory Brownfain developed in his dissertation.

It will be noted (see Appendix A) that the inventory consists of twenty traits or characteristics and that the extremes of each trait are described in two or three short sentences. The subjects are instructed to rate themselves on each item of the inventory according to a 10-point scale and told that the ratings would be made several

times following different instructions each time. A self rating of "10" is the highest or most desirable point on the scale and "1" is the lowest or least desirable point. In evaluating themselves, the subjects were instructed to compare themselves to the other students in their high school class (the senior class). The subjects were provided with six rating sheets upon which to record their responses. At the top of each of these rating sheets were the specific instructions as to the way in which the self-ratings were to be made.

Rating sheet "one" asked them to rate themselves on the twenty items of the inventory as they really think they are--to give their most accurate estimate of how they see themselves. Rating sheet "two" asked them to rate themselves the highest that they realistically think they are on each trait. They were to indicate how they saw themselves, giving themselves the benefit of any reasonable doubt. Rating sheet number 3 asked them to rate themselves the lowest that they realistically thought they were on each of the traits. They were to take an unfavorable view of themselves and were asked not to give themselves the benefit of any reasonable doubt. On rating sheet number 4 they were asked to rate themselves as they believed the other boys in their class would rate them. The fifth time they rated themselves they estimated how they thought their mothers would rate them on each trait, and on the sixth and last rating how their fathers would rate them.

From this inventory ten different scores were obtained. These ten are listed and described below.

1. The Private Self: The most accurate estimate of his self as he really believes it to be.

This score is the sum of the twenty self-ratings obtained from rating sheet number 1.

2. The Positive Self: The self as he really hoped it might be.

This score is the sum of the twenty self-ratings obtained from rating sheet number 2.

3. The Negative Self: The self as he was afraid it really might be.

This score is the sum of the twenty self-ratings obtained from rating sheet number 3.

4. Temporal Stability: Ambivalence and uncertainty about the self as a function of time.

This score is the sum of the absolute differences between two measures of the private self taken three days apart. A change or difference score is obtained separately for each of the twenty items and summed, without regard to direction, to obtain the temporal stability score.

5. Brownfain Stability: Ambivalence and uncertainty about the self as a function of readiness to alter one's self-description when asked to rate oneself in terms of two different yet "realistic" frames of judgment.

Brownfain's index of the stability of the self-concept is defined operationally as the absolute difference between positive and negative self-ratings on each item summed over all the items of the inventory. Thus it is a score that combines the amount the subject increased his self-ratings in response to the instructions on rating sheet number 2 and the amount he lowered his estimates of himself in response to the instructions on rating sheet number 3.

6. Peer Discrepancy: The discrepancy between the individual's private concept of himself and the concept he believes others (his classmates) have of him.

Brownfain called this discrepancy score the "social conflict index." It is operationally defined as the difference between private and peer self-ratings on each item summed over all the inventory items without regard to sign.

7. Mother Discrepancy: The discrepancy between the individual's private concept of himself and the concept he believes his mother has of him.

This discrepancy score is operationally defined as the difference between private and mother self-ratings on each item summed over all the inventory items without regard to sign.

8. Father Discrepancy: The discrepancy between the individual's private concept of himself and the concept he believes his father has of him.

This discrepancy score is operationally defined as the difference between private and father self-ratings on each item summed over all the inventory items without regard to sign.

9. Intra Parent Discrepancy: The discrepancy between the concept he believes his mother has of him and the concept he believes his father has of him.

This discrepancy score is operationally defined as the difference between father and mother self-ratings on each item summed over all the inventory items without regard to sign.

10. Self Range: A measure of variation within the self-concept.

The Self Range is operationally defined as the difference between the highest and the lowest self-rating given by an individual following the instructions to describe his private self or self as he really believes it is.

Brownfain's original index of stability had a split half reliability of .93. On the basis of this reliability figure (and of reliabilities computed earlier) it can be said that the discrepancy scores have odd-even reliabilities in the low .90's (.91 to .93). The separate "self" scores must have even higher reliabilities.

The following table presents a categorization of the variables in the study according to their primary characteristic.

TABLE OF VARIABLES

<u>Stability</u>	<u>Self-Esteem</u>
Brownfain Stability	Private Self
Temporal Stability	Positive Self
Peer Discrepancy	Negative Self
Mother Discrepancy	Self Evaluation Scale
Father Discrepancy	Part I
Intraparent Discrepancy	Unconscious Self Esteem
Self Range	
Kuder Interest Profile	<u>Adjustment</u>
<u>Control Measures</u>	Sociometric II
K - Scale	Sociometric IV
Socio-economic Status	Parental Marital Status
Intelligence Quotient	School Adjustment
Grade Point Average	Self Evaluation Part II
Detroit Aptitude Test	a) Conformity to Personal Standards
	b) Conformity to Parental Standards
	c) Conflict of Standards
	d) Conformity to Standards (a + b)

Certain comments are necessary concerning the above Table. We are hypothesizing that Brownfain stability is better considered a

measure of self-esteem. There would be some justification for viewing subscales (a) and (b) of Part II as measures of self-esteem. We could also have grouped together the variables which measure the degree to which contradictory systems of valuation have been introjected or internalized by the subject. If this had been done, Mother Discrepancy, Father Discrepancy, Intraparent Discrepancy and Conflict of Standards would have been grouped together. In other words, it is meant simply that there is a certain arbitrariness in the setting up of categories. The table is presented at this point rather than at the conclusion of this section in the hope that the reader, by referring to it, will find it easier to remember and keep separated in his mind the various measures discussed.

B. The Self Drawings and Unconscious Self-Esteem

From the analysis of the results of the pilot study it appeared that self-picture drawings reflected some characteristic of the individual which was also being measured by Brownfain's index of self-concept stability. It was hypothesized that this common characteristic might be self-esteem. Soon after the drawings were obtained and before the Brownfain inventory or any of the other measures were scored, the writer and Mr. Katz separately judged the drawings for the amount of self-esteem they reflected.

A five point rating scale was used. A rating of "five" indicated a judgment of unusually high self-esteem and a rating of "one," a judgment of unusually low self-esteem. Before the judging three general criteria of self-esteem were jointly decided upon. These were size of

the figure drawing, the expressive quality or energy quality of the drawing as indicated by firmness of line, and the stance of the figure. Thus, of two figures of the same size, the one drawn in firm, sweeping, bold strokes would be judged as expressing a higher level of self-esteem than one drawn in light, shaky, hesitant strokes. And similarly a figure drawn with an upright and solid stance would be rated higher than one with a weak and drooping or unstable stance.

Keeping these three criteria in mind, the judges, who both had used the Draw-A-Person Test regularly in their clinical training, were to decide rather quickly upon the level of self-esteem reflected by the drawing. The judgments were absolute and not relative in nature, That is, the drawings were not compared with one another. Each was judged solely upon its own qualities. The ratings of the two judges were combined to form the final estimate of self-esteem, or as it was called "unconscious self-esteem." Later the correlation between the two judges' ratings was computed. It was found to be .701--a fairly high correlation in view of the intuitive nature of the task.

C. The Self-Esteem Scale

The self-evaluation scale Part I (see Appendix B) was slightly adapted from a similar scale developed by McPartland and described in his dissertation which was concerned with the utility of the self-concept in sociological theory (24). McPartland reported that it was a scale which satisfied Guttman's criteria for a pure scale. Its coefficient of reproducibility was .912. As used it contains 11

series (or items); a twelfth was eliminated in order to reduce the length of the inventory and because of McPartland's suggestion that the elimination of this series might increase still further the purity of the scale. The questions in the scale are of the following nature: How often are you ashamed of yourself? How often are you displeased with yourself? How often are you proud of yourself? How satisfied with yourself are you?

The subject is to check one of four or five alternative statements such as "I am never displeased with myself," "I am rarely displeased with myself," "I am displeased with myself pretty often" and so forth. A self-esteem score was obtained from the scale by crediting a score of 4 (sometimes "five") for an answer indicating the most favorable attitude towards the self down to a score of "one" for checking the least favorable alternative provided. A subject's final self-esteem score was the sum of these eleven item scores.

D. The Self Evaluation Scale Part II

The self evaluation scale appeared in two sections as administered. The first section was McPartland's self-esteem scale described above. Pertinent to the present study are three subscales within this second scale composed of three items each (there was also included in the scale a variety of miscellaneous items of an exploratory nature). These three sets of items were modeled after those in McPartland's scale and asked the subjects in various ways just three questions.

The first sub-scale contained the following questions:

1. How often do you live up to your own standards for yourself?

2. How closely do you feel you have lived up to your own standards for yourself?
3. How consistently do you follow the standards and ideals you hold for yourself?

The second sub-scale contained the following questions:

1. How often do you live up to your parents ideals for you?
2. How closely do you feel you have lived up to your parents ideals for you?
3. How consistently do you follow the standards and ideals your parents hold for you?

The third sub-scale contained the following questions:

1. How much conflict do you feel exists between your own standards and ideals and those your parents follow?
2. How much are your own ideals and standards in harmony with those of your parents?
3. How different are your own ideals and standards from those your parents want you to have?

A fourth subscale was created out of the first two after the scale was administered. It appeared that the word, "consistently," in the first two subscales caused the item in which it appeared to be responded to in a way different from the manner in which the other two items were responded to. The fourth scale, then, consists of the first two items from the first two subscales. The two questions containing the word, "consistently" have been dropped. The method of scoring differed slightly from that of the structurally-similar McPartland scale. A check placed in a response category infrequently chosen was given a weight proportionally heavier than a check placed in a category very frequently selected. The score obtained from each of the three

items was then added. The four scales are titled in order: Conformity to Personal Standards, Conformity to Parental Standards, Conflict of Standards, and Conformity to Standards.

E. The K Scale

The K scale of the MMPI has long been used as a measure of test taking defensiveness. A more precise statement of what the K scale measures will not be undertaken because of the complexities entailed. For the purposes of this study the K scale is assumed to measure, at the high end, defensiveness against psychological weakness. That is, a defensiveness which motivates the subject to describe himself as more "normal" than he, at one level, feels he is. Similarly a low K score will be taken as indicating that the subject is open to self-criticism, is overly candid, and would tend to judge himself rather severely. The K scale was independently administered. Two filler items were added at the beginning of the scale, making a total of 32 items in all.

F. The Sociometric Measures

Studies which utilize phenomenological concepts and measuring devices particularly need an anchor in the non-phenomenological world. The anchors of this study were two measures of sociometric status. It was believed that interpersonal adequacy (and hence "adjustment") is most concretely measured by an individual's ability to establish friendly relationships with his peers.

The presence of a sociometric measure in this study is due to the efforts of Mr. Irving Katz. Mr. Katz will describe more fully

in his own dissertation the nature of this instrument. The particular method of obtaining and treating the sociometric data is based upon the work of Dr. Leo Katz.

It will be recalled that the battery of tests was administered to four senior high school classes. Most of these students had known each other for at least four years and during the past year had a chance to get to know each other more intimately through attending the same relatively small physical education classes. Out of classes of roughly twenty, the boys were asked to pick five with whom they would like to be friends and five with whom they would not want to be friends. Two indices of sociometric status were obtained from this measure. One, called in this study Sociometric II, was based upon the total number of choices as "desired friend" he received from the rest of his classmates. The other measure, called Sociometric IV, was based upon the number of choices he received as "wished friend" minus the number of negative choices or rejections he received; that is, the number of times he was picked as a "wished not friend." Each measure has a certain distinctive significance of its own but for the purposes of this study they were both considered to be simply measures of interpersonal adequacy and, of course, indirectly, adjustment.

G. Socio-economic Status

A questionnaire based upon the Warner method of measuring socio-economic status was given the subjects to be filled out by them. The questions were objective in nature and should have been answerable

on the basis of a modest acquaintance with their own households. There were seven questions in all. The subjects had to indicate by checking the appropriate space whether their household possessed a telephone, whether the family owned or rented its house, whether the family owned one or two automobiles and whether they were new or used, how far the chief wage earner went in school, and finally they had to describe briefly the chief wage earners occupation. The later description was scored by referring it to the Warner occupational classification to which it was judged to belong.

H. Kuder Vocational Preference Inventory

Wiener (40) developed a system for coding Kuder Preference profiles in a way parallel to Hathaway's coding system for the MMPI. It was thought that one consequence of a highly organized and integrated self-concept might be highly developed, or organized, patterns of interest. A person who has uncertainty about what kind of a person he is might also possess scattered interests or be ambivalent about his interests. Such an individual might therefore show a relatively undifferentiated pattern of vocational interests. It was observed that people in occupations requiring a considerable amount of initiative and drive (a high degree of life organization around the pursuit of specific goals) tend to have patterns with several peaks of interest. On the other hand unskilled workers and workers in occupations calling for no special combination of skills seemed to have occupational profiles with few or no peaks. It was thought that, on the basis of the Kuder vocational interest profiles, the subjects could be divided

into two groups according to whether they showed differentiated or undifferentiated interest patterns. Following the practice of Wiener, cut off points at the 75th and 25th percentiles were used to establish the number of "peaks" (or valleys) in the interest pattern. The average number of peaks per record was calculated and the subjects were then sorted into one or the other category depending upon whether they showed a lesser or greater number of "peaks" than the average.

Information Obtained from the School Records

The following items of data about the subjects were obtained directly from the files of the high school: grade point averages, intelligence quotients (test used was the California Test of Mental Maturity--and in a few cases, the Stanford Binet), the Differential Aptitude Test, parental marital status and the Kuder Vocational Interest Profiles discussed above.

The grade point averages and intelligence quotients require no further comment. Of the eight scores on the differential aptitude test only two were used. The scores from the subtests measuring verbal and numerical reasoning were averaged to obtain the score used in the study. A comment appeared on the student's record if the parents were divorced, one parent deceased, or the student under a guardianship. If such a comment was noted the subject was placed in what was called the "Broken Home" category.

At the end of each year a note is placed in the student's record containing his teacher's comments about him as a student. The comments

generally were of the following nature: "Is an industrious, hard working, quiet boy," "Lazy, causes trouble in class," "Timid, a dreamer," "Causes trouble for others," "Pleasant, well liked." From these comments the students were rated as to their school adjustment. A five point scale was used. Comments that reflected poor motivation for school work or difficulty with the school authorities were given ratings of 1 or 2. Such comments as "average" or "ordinary" were taken as evidence for a neutral rating (3). Favorable comments related to willingness to cooperate with the programs and activities of the school were considered evidence of good school adjustment.

Statistical Treatment

It will be recalled that the design of the study required obtaining intercorrelations between the major variables of the study (the measures of stability, self-esteem and interpersonal adequacy). Dr. Leo Katz of the Mathematics Department of Michigan State University was consulted as to the legitimacy of this design. After evaluating the kinds of measures used, he expressed the opinion that the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient would be an appropriate statistic.

The assumptions which underlie the use of Pearson product moment correlation coefficient depend to some extent upon the interpretations placed upon the obtained correlations. The method of interpretation which deals with the fact that r is associated with the rate at which one variable changes with another assumes that the regression line so interpreted is linear. There is one other interpretation of the

correlations that will be utilized in this study. r^2 can be interpreted as giving the proportion of variance in Y predictable from, or attributable to, variation in X. This interpretation also assumes linearity for the regression of Y on X and, as McNemar notes, "requires caution in assuming the direction of cause and effect" (23 p. 120). Thus it is seen that the use of the product moment correlation coefficient depends in this study upon the assumption of linearity of regression. The tenability of this assumption is to be tested through the plotting of scatter diagrams of the relationships between the major variables.

The correlations were computed by means of the gross score formula. The particular formula used was that given by McNemar (23 p. 96). The .05 level of confidence was used to establish the significance of the obtained correlations. The table appearing in Edwards' text (12 p. 502) was used for this purpose. According to this table, for a one tail test of significance with a df of 80, the correlation should be .183 or greater to be significant at the .05 level. With the same df, a correlation had to be of the magnitude of .256 or greater to be significant at the .01 level. The one tail test of significance was chosen because it is the appropriate test when a-priori predictions (derived from a definite theoretical rationale) about the sign of the obtained correlations are made.

In view of the large number of correlations obtained in the study, a certain number could be expected to attain a significant size by chance. Fortunately this problem in the interpretation of confidence

levels failed to arise. The reason for this is seen when it is revealed that of the ninety correlations obtained between the major variables in the study, only three for which predictions were made in terms of the hypotheses of the study failed to attain a magnitude of .183 or higher.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

The results of the study are presented in TABLE I which follows. In the table are contained all the correlations computed in the study.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
	PRIVATE SELF																					MOTHER DISCREPANCY	FATHER DISCREPANCY							
PRIVATE SELF	1																													
	2																													
POSITIVE SELF	3																													
	4																													
NEGATIVE SELF	5																													
TEMPORAL	6																													
STABILITY	7																													
BROWNFAIN	8																													
STABILITY	9																													
PEER	10																													
DISCREPANCY	11																													
MOTHER	12																													
DISCREPANCY	13																													
FATHER	14																													
DISCREPANCY	15																													
INTRA-PAR.	16																													
DISCREPANCY	17																													
	18																													
SELF RANGE	19																													
PART I	20																													
S. E. S.	21																													
UNCONSCIOUS	22																													
SELF ESTEEM	23																													
SOCIO-	24																													
METRIC IV	25																													
CONFORMITY	26																													
PERSON. STAND.	27																													
CONFORMITY	28																													
PARENT. STAND.	29																													
CONFORMITY	30																													
STANDARDS	31																													
CONFLICT	32																													
OF STANDARDS	33																													
	34																													
"K" SCALE	35																													
SOCIO-ECON.	36																													
SCHOOL ADJ.	37																													
I. Q.	38																													
	39																													
	40																													

[illegible]

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

It was deduced from Hypothesis I that Cowen's negative self measure of self-esteem will be shown, when compared to Brownfain's measure of stability of the self-concept, to be a more meaningful and potent measure. It will be recalled that a meaningful psychological variable is one that can be shown to be related to other psychological variables in ways that are predictable from the postulated nature of the variable. By "potent" is meant the centrality and generality of the dimension. In order to see if this deduction is true we should consider the correlations of the negative self and Brownfain stability with the other variables of the study. Remember that a correlation of .183 or greater is significant at the .05 level.

Table II reveals, as predicted, that the negative self is a measure exceeding in potency the Brownfain stability measure. In only one of the total of 17 comparisons did the Brownfain stability measure correlate higher with another variable. Brownfain stability correlated with peer discrepancy .467 where as negative self correlated with the same variable -.441 (comprehension of the directional nature of the relationships will be facilitated if it is kept in mind that measures of self-esteem should correlate negatively with measures of stability and positively with other measures of self-esteem). The negative self, as predicted, does correlate in this way. However two

TABLE II

A COMPARISON OF THE RELATIVE MEANINGFULNESS AND POTENCY OF THE BROWNFAIN MEASURE OF STABILITY AND THE NEGATIVE SELF SHOWING THE CORRELATION OF THESE TWO VARIABLES WITH OTHER VARIABLES IN THE STUDY

	Brownfain Stability	Negative Self
Private Self	-.428	.751
Positive Self	.154	.605
Temporal Stability	.425	-.564
Peer Discrepancy	.467	-.441
Mother Discrepancy	.437	-.569
Father Discrepancy	.382	-.611
Intra-Parent Discrepancy	.392	-.574
Self Range	.363	-.565
Self Evaluation Part I	-.093	.393
Unconscious Self Esteem	-.148	.370
Sociometric IV	-.268	.444
Sociometric II	-.273	.404
Conformity to Personal Standards	-.021	-.179
Conformity to Parental Standards	.085	-.354
Conformity to Standards	.035	-.289
Conflict of Standards	.066	-.299
School Adjustment	.054	.092

of the correlations of Brownfain stability with the variables are in the unanticipated direction. These are the correlations with conformity to personal standards (-.021) and school adjustment (.054). It can also be seen however that neither of these correlations is statistically significant.

It might be thought that the correlation of positive self with Brownfain stability is in the wrong direction (although here also not statistically significant). However, when it is remembered that Brownfain stability is a measure (assuming the private self as base line)

resulting from a tendency to rate the self downward and a compensating tendency to rate the self upward (positive self) it can be seen that a rise in positive self above the base line of the private self yields a larger self-concept discrepancy (Brownfain stability score). Thus one could expect a large positive self score to be associated with a large Brownfain stability score even though the positive self is a measure (a poor one) of self-esteem. That the positive self is a measure of self-esteem is clear when we consider that its magnitude is dependent also upon the height of the base line (size of the private self) as well as measuring the tendency to change self ratings upward in response to instructions. The obtained correlation is quite in line with the deduction made from Hypothesis I that the upward rise (defensive-compensatory rise) will have little relationship to self-esteem. In fact, when it is noted that the positive self correlates lower with the negative self than does the private self (.751 versus .605) it can be surmized that the relationship between compensatory rise and self-esteem is negative.

The above discussion leads directly to a consideration of Hypothesis I as stated in alternate forms A and B. But first one additional correlation needs to be presented from Table I. The negative self correlates with Brownfain stability .691 and we have already seen that the positive self correlates with Brownfain stability .154. Hypothesis I Form A was to the effect that Brownfain's measure of stability is a contaminated measure of self-esteem. The correlation of .691 suggests that Brownfain stability is a measure of self-esteem. We have just

4. Intra-Parent Discrepancy with: Temporal (.609),
Brownfain (.399), Peer (.597), Mother (.725), Father (.696),
Self Range (.670).
5. Self Range with: Temporal (.681), Brownfain (.363), Peer
(.662), Mother (.611), Father (.699), Intra-Parent (.670).
6. Temporal Stability with: Brownfain (.425), Peer (.747),
Mother (.664), Father (.654), Intra-Parent (.609).

It is seen that in every case it correlates lowest with the other measures of stability.

Brownfain had assumed that the contribution of the negative and positive self-ratings to the "limits index" (Brownfain stability) would be approximately equal. That this actually is far from the case is shown by the correlation of positive self with Brownfain stability of .154 and the correlation of negative self with Brownfain stability of .691. Squaring the two correlations, it is seen that instead of each contributing equally to the total variance, the positive self contributes .024 of the variance while the negative self accounts for 19 times as much or .477 of the total variance. Thus Brownfain's explanation in terms of Adlerian compensation of the rationale behind why this measure could be viewed as a measure of self-concept stability does not seem correct.

Hypothesis I Form A stated that the Brownfain stability measure is a contaminated measure of self-esteem and Hypothesis I Form B stated that it was a measure of stability contaminated by self-esteem. It is, as we have seen, neither a particularly efficient measure of stability or self-esteem. Hypothesis I you will remember stated that self-esteem is the primary psychological dimension being measured by

the Brownfain index of stability. Thus we saw that whatever merit the Brownfain stability measure has is due to its close association in terms of the operations involved in its measurement with the negative self--a measure of self-esteem.

This brings us to a consideration of the question posed for this research. Namely, can there be found a measure of stability that is functionally independent of self-esteem?

Two different methods of measuring self-concept stability were found that are operationally free from contamination by self-esteem. These are Temporal Stability and Intra-Parent Discrepancy. (The former, you will recall, is a stability score based upon the sum of the absolute differences between two measures of the private self taken three days apart. In other words, the test-retest reliability of the private ("actual") self-rating.) The latter, (intra-parent discrepancy, is the discrepancy between the concept he believes his mother has of him and the concept he believes his father has of him. It was defined operationally as the difference between father and mother self-rating on each item summed over all the inventory items without regard to sign. It is seen, in summary, that the question posed for the research is answered in the affirmative. There can be found measures of stability which are functionally independent of self-esteem.)

How effective (potent) were these independent measures of stability? Again referring to Table I, it is seen that the correlation between the two measures of stability was .609. On page 56 we saw what was the nature of the relationship of these two variables to

the other measures of stability. Below it can be seen how these two variables are related to the measures of self-esteem and interpersonal adequacy.

TABLE III
CORRELATION OF TEMPORAL STABILITY AND INTRA-PARENT DISCREPANCY
WITH MEASURES OF SELF ESTEEM AND ADJUSTMENT

	Temporal Stability	Intra-Parent Discrepancy
Positive Self	-.318	-.365
Private Self	-.405	-.482
Negative Self	-.564	-.574
Self Evaluation Part I	-.156	-.313
Unconscious Self-Esteem	-.413	-.453
Sociometric II	-.262	-.240
Sociometric IV	-.265	-.238

The correlations are all in the expected direction and significant with the exception of the correlation between self evaluation part I and temporal stability. Table III shows that measures of stability which are functionally independent of self-esteem correlate significantly with measures of self-esteem and with measures of the capacity to develop friendly human relationships. Thus it can be concluded that the theoretical proposition that stability of the self-concept is a dimension of personality closely related to feelings of self-esteem and to adjustment and interpersonal adequacy is supported.

The other measures of self-concept stability (peer discrepancy, mother discrepancy, father discrepancy and self range) also correlated significantly with the variables of self-esteem and adjustment in all

cases--again with the exception of three correlations with self evaluation part I. These results could also have been cited to support the above theoretical proposition. However, these measures have in common with the Rogerian self ideal-self discrepancy measure of stability the characteristic that they are not completely independent measures of stability of the self-concept. To illustrate this point, one component of the peer, mother, father and Rogerian discrepancy scores is the private or actual self-rating. In other words, these discrepancy measures include a measure of self-esteem. The very fact that the respondents have negative feelings about themselves is going to increase their discrepancy scores. We saw that the correlation between the negative self and the private self was .751.

For a somewhat different reason the self range score may be contaminated with self-esteem. Here the lower the subject rates himself generally the more likelihood there is that he would obtain, as measured, a wider self range. This is not to say necessarily that because the above measures of stability have this theoretical limitation they are not in the main effective measures of uncertainty and ambivalence about the self. The manner in which they correlated with the other variables in the study shows that they are effective.

The surprising effectiveness of the temporal stability measure needs to be considered further. These results seem to suggest that individual test-retest measures of reliability of paper and pencil tests of personality may be good measures of personality in their

own right. It seems surprising that this has not evidently been clearly realized before. Particularly is this so since the idea was contained implicitly in Lecky's writings. It seems then that reliability is not something "in" or characteristic of a particular tests but is an individual difference variable--in other words, something brought to the test by the subjects. Certain tests (those called unreliable) have a greater capacity than others to elicit or measure this individual trait of stability.

Certain of the implications of the findings related to temporal stability have been considered. Yet to be considered, however, are the implications of the finding that intra-parent discrepancy is an effective measure of self-concept stability. Consideration of this leads us to the second hypothesis; namely, that those who have introjected or internalized contradictory systems of valuation will have unstable self-concepts. Because of limitations in the design of this study,* Hypothesis II can only be tested indirectly. Certain deductions were made from Hypothesis II (these deductions are discussed in detail on page 30) concerned with the making of inferences from present behavior and self-attitudes to the nature of a subject's relationship with his parents now and, it is assumed, also in the past.

When a subject responds to the self-rating inventory in a manner which gives him a large intra-parent discrepancy score it can be

*

As originally designed the study included a measure of accepting and rejecting attitudes to be administered to the parents of the subjects. This was an area of the study in which Mr. Katz was particularly interested. Unfortunately school administrators declined to give permission for this portion of the study.

concluded that the subject perceives one parent as viewing him (and hence reacting to him) in a way different from that which the other parent views and reacts to him. When the two significant figures in the child's environment react to the child differentially there is a strong likelihood that "contradictory systems of valuation" will be internalized. Thus it is concluded that, because the intra-parent discrepancy measure of stability was found to be a very successful measure of self-concept stability, Hypothesis II is supported. If the stability of the self-concept were not related to the introjection of contradictory systems of evaluation, one would be hard pressed to explain the results obtained.

The simple three item scale, "Conflict of Standards" correlates significantly with measures of stability and self-esteem. The scale correlates $-.299$ with the negative self; $-.333$ with positive self; $-.385$ with private self; $.243$ with mother discrepancy; $.268$ with father discrepancy; $.214$ with intra-parent discrepancy; $.172$ (border-line significance) with temporal stability; and $-.408$ with self evaluation scale Part I. You will remember that it was felt a stated divergence from, or rejection of, parental (early, unconsciously internalized) valuations might also be a sign that there existed an underlying discrepancy between the inferred and conscious selves. When a subject tells us that his own values are in conflict with those of his parents we can be fairly certain that he consciously rejects certain parental values. This is additional evidence that the stability of the self-concept is a function of the discrepancy between the

inferred and conscious selves; that is, that in the process of personality development contradictory or inconsistent systems of valuation have been internalized.

Finally, the significant correlations of mother and father discrepancy with the measures of stability, self-esteem, and interpersonal adequacy can be viewed as supporting this hypothesis. They could also be considered (but to a lesser extent than "Conflict of Standards" and Intra-Parent Discrepancy) to be measures of a stated divergence from and possibly rejection of parental valuations and thus might point to the existence of an underlying discrepancy between inferred and conscious selves.

It will be recalled that the third and final hypothesis dealt with the interaction of ego defensiveness with measures of self-esteem. The hypothesis stated that the measure of self-esteem least influenced by ego-defensiveness will be the most effective ("potent") measure of self-esteem. Before we turn to Table I we should order the measures of self-esteem used in this study in terms of their "directness" or susceptibility to influence by test-taking defensiveness of the subjects. As can be seen from an inspection of the items, the most obvious and direct measure was the self-evaluation scale part I (Appendix B). Defensiveness tended to be elicited to such a great extent that it was feared the scale would be valueless because of massing of the responses in the most favorable categories. As a result those scoring as "low" in self-esteem were actually those who were just willing to admit they were average in certain of the

characteristics. This scale then was considered the most direct or surface measure of self-esteem.

The next three self-rating measures of self-esteem in order of susceptibility to defensiveness were: 2. The positive self 3. the private self 4. the negative self.

The positive self was placed above the private self because it encourages self-inflating tendencies. The negative self was placed fourth because, as it will be recalled, Cowen found it seemed to disarm the defensive subjects. The most indirect and disguised measure is the measure, "unconscious self-esteem." Having ordered the measures as to predicted potency, let us turn to Table I. We observe the following correlations which are summarized in Table IV.

TABLE IV
POTENCY OF THE SELF-ESTEEM MEASURES RELATIVE TO THEIR DIRECTNESS

	Part I	Positive Self	Private Self	Negative Self	Unconscious Self-Esteem
Temporal Stability	-.156	-.318	-.405	-.564	-.413
Peer Discrepancy	-.122	-.231	-.289	-.441	-.411
Mother Discrepancy	-.387	-.341	-.445	-.569	-.419
Father Discrepancy	-.386	-.446	-.599	-.611	-.417
Intra-Parent Disc.	-.313	-.365	-.482	-.574	-.453
Self Range	-.168	-.404	-.505	-.565	-.413
Sociometric IV	.245	.312	.329	.444	.398
Sociometric II	.254	.262	.336	.404	.344

If we consider only the paper and pencil measures of self-esteem (the first four measures of self-esteem) we see at once that the hypothesis is substantiated. There is a progression in the size of

the correlations that coincides with the dimension of directness of the measure (one exception to this trend is noted in the correlation of positive self with mother discrepancy). It is felt that the hypothesis receives strong support from the above data even though the unconscious self fails to maintain the trend. Rather than give up the hypothesis it seems more reasonable to assume that in the very subtlety (and subjectivity) of the measure (that characteristic which makes it a good indirect measure of self-esteem) lies the explanation for its failure to correlate higher than the negative self measure. The reference is here of course to the error (revealed in part by the correlation of .701 between the judges ratings) that seems an unavoidable part of the intuitive process. There are several other possible sources of error that could have lowered these correlations. Some evidence concerning at least one of these sources of error will be presented in a later section.

CHAPTER VI

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS AND FURTHER IMPLICATIONS

The K Scale

The K scale was included in the study because it was a measure of ego-defensiveness and, thus, also a measure of the defensively stable (rigid) self-concept. Findings related to stability of the self-concept and rigidity have been contradictory. Cowen (11) found that Brownfain stability was not related to rigidity as measured by the "F" scale of Frenkel-Brunswick. The results of Brownfain's own study suggested that it may not actually have been necessary to control for "rigidity" as he had done in his design. Certainly there continues to be much confusion in the thinking about "rigidity" and there is by no means agreement as to how it can best be measured. No attempt will be made to settle these issues here. Let us turn to Table V (on page 67) which summarizes the results in terms of the K scale.

The first thing to be noticed is that all the correlations are in the anticipated direction. That is to say, measures of stability correlated negatively with the K scale and measures of self-esteem correlate positively. It was assumed that measures of self-esteem are in part measures of ego-strength (this is also an interpretation commonly given high scores on the K scale). In other words, as Hilgard might say, a high score on a self-esteem scale is evidence of the adequate functioning of the ego-defenses. Those who, on the

TABLE V
CORRELATION OF EGO-DEFENSIVENESS WITH OTHER VARIABLES

	The K Scale
Private Self	.080
Positive Self	.059
Negative Self	.114
Temporal Stability	-.246
Brownfain Stability	-.096
Peer Discrepancy	-.195
Mother Discrepancy	-.200
Father Discrepancy	-.133
Intra-Parent Discrepancy	-.080
Self Range	-.238
Self Evaluation Scale Part I	.151
Unconscious Self-Esteem	.004
Socio-economic Status	.167
Conformity to Parental Standards	-.160
Conflict of Standards	-.057

various measures used in this study, more or less readily admit to statements carrying derogatory implications will tend to earn relatively larger discrepancy or stability scores than those who don't—all other factors being equal. The same principle applies in reverse for the measures of self-esteem. The one measure for which this could not be said is that of unconscious self-esteem and here as would be expected we see that there is no relationship (a correlation of .004). In general the actual magnitude of the relationship of ego-defensiveness to these measures is not very large. Only four of the correlations are significant at the five percent level. Since all the major variables with the exception of unconscious self-esteem show some slight tendency to vary with an individual's level of ego-defensiveness, one may wonder what would be the nature of the

relationships between the variables if this factor were held constant. If the partial correlation technique is applied to the two variables most affected by ego-defensiveness, it is found that the correlations are not significantly reduced. Thus, the correlation between temporal stability and negative self with ego-defensiveness partialled out is reduced from $-.564$ to $-.557$ and the correlation between temporal stability and self range is changed from $.681$ to $.663$. It is concluded that, although the obscuring influence of ego-defensiveness can be traced in various ways by its effects on the measures used, it is not a critically important variable in this study.

An explanation for the above conclusion in regard to ego-defensiveness may lie in the fact that, although phenomenological measures were used, the scoring on all the scales was of a relative rather than an absolute nature. That is to say, the subjects' statements about themselves were in no case taken at their face value but were used instead to rank the subjects along the dimension in question. This procedure would tend, to some extent, to reduce the effect of ego-defensiveness.

Origin of Self-Esteem

There are two additional "control" measures that could have theoretical significance. These are socio-economic status and intelligence. Both may have pertinence to the two opposed views of the origin of self-esteem discussed earlier. Let us consider first socio-economic status. Looking at Table I it is seen that ten variables

correlate significantly with this measure. Socio-economic status correlated .224 with negative self, .301 with positive self, .334 with private self, -.242 with temporal stability, -.191 with self range, .353 with self evaluation scale part I, -.224 with conformity to parental standards, -.185 with conformity to standards, -.210 with conflict of standards, and .259 with intelligence.

The correlation of socio-economic status with intelligence needs no comment. It is seen from these results that there is some relationship between one's socio-economic status, one's self-esteem and the certainty with which one views one's self. This is perhaps not surprising in our "marketing oriented" culture. To quote again Fromm: "Man has transformed himself into a commodity, experiences his life as capital to be invested profitably; if he succeeds in this, he is 'successful,' and his life has meaning; if not, 'he is a failure.' His 'value' lies in his salability, not in his human qualities of love and reason or in his artistic capacities. Hence his sense of his own value depends on extraneous factors, his success, the judgment of others" (14 p. 30).

Fromm then feels one's feeling of self-esteem lies in the external signs of "success"--in social recognition as an "important" person. That is, in this view self-esteem hinges upon external social and economic marks of status whose attainment is only partly in the control of the individual himself. When one considers how much more rewarding our materialistic culture is to those higher in socio-economic status, how much easier it is for them to succeed in

terms of the economic goals of the culture because of the additional advantages their high status gives them, then this interpretation seems reasonable.

However, it is observed also that the most subtle measure of self-esteem, unconscious self-esteem, correlates not at all (.039) with socio-economic status. It seems then that self-esteem as revealed by expressive behavior may be a more fundamental kind of self-esteem. These findings are consistent with the synthesis of the two notions of self-esteem offered on page 21. It will be recalled there was postulated a characteristic level of self-esteem which may vary within limits depending upon current influences. This synthesis will be recognized as an integration of the genetic or historical approach of psychoanalytic personality theory and the field theoretical approach of Lewin and the contemporary phenomenologists (such as Symgg and Combs, Rogers).

There is other evidence that leads us to make this complex interpretation of self-esteem. Because of this interest in the question of the origin of self-esteem the three subscales concerned with conformity to standards were devised. These scales should measure conscious feelings of mastery and be a reflection of current success experiences. Those who received a low score score on these scales felt that they were doing successfully the things that they had set themselves to do. Such success should be experienced as a feeling of enhanced self-esteem. The results show that indeed these persons do tend to be high in self-esteem and are significantly better

resulting from a tendency to rate the self downward and a compensating tendency to rate the self upward (positive self) it can be seen that a rise in positive self above the base line of the private self yields a larger self-concept discrepancy (Brownfain stability score). Thus one could expect a large positive self score to be associated with a large Brownfain stability score even though the positive self is a measure (a poor one) of self-esteem. That the positive self is a measure of self-esteem is clear when we consider that its magnitude is dependent also upon the height of the base line (size of the private self) as well as measuring the tendency to change self ratings upward in response to instructions. The obtained correlation is quite in line with the deduction made from Hypothesis I that the upward rise (defensive-compensatory rise) will have little relationship to self-esteem. In fact, when it is noted that the positive self correlates lower with the negative self than does the private self (.751 versus .605) it can be surmized that the relationship between compensatory rise and self-esteem is negative.

The above discussion leads directly to a consideration of Hypothesis I as stated in alternate forms A and B. But first one additional correlation needs to be presented from Table I. The negative self correlates with Brownfain stability .691 and we have already seen that the positive self correlates with Brownfain stability .154. Hypothesis I Form A was to the effect that Brownfain's measure of stability is a contaminated measure of self-esteem. The correlation of .691 suggests that Brownfain stability is a measure of self-esteem. We have just

shown that it is also a measure of something related (negatively) to self-esteem. Thus we can conclude that Hypothesis I Form B is completely supported by the obtained correlations.

The correlation of .691 also suggests that, as Hypothesis I stated, self-esteem is the primary psychological dimension being measured by Brownfain's index of self-concept stability. The reader may question this latter statement since, as McNemar pointed out, the presence of a correlation does not tell us the direction of the causal relationship. It tells us only that there is concomitant variation. It might be argued that since the measure was developed to measure stability it should be closely associated with self-esteem, as Brownfain found, but it should not be viewed, just because of this, simply as a measure of self-esteem. This point might have some validity if it were found that the variable actually were a good measure of stability. Analysis of the correlations shows however that this is not the case. Out of the seven measures of stability in the intercorrelational table it stands out as the poorest. It is "poorest" in terms of correlating lower with the other measures of stability. Careful study of Table I will show this quite clearly. Observe the following sets of relationships.

1. Peer Discrepancy with: Temporal (.747), Brownfain (.467), Mother (.763), Father (.684), Intra-Parent (.597), Self Range (.662).
2. Mother Discrepancy with: Temporal (.664), Brownfain (.437), Peer (.763), Father (.894), Intra-Parent (.725), Self Range (.611).
3. Father Discrepancy with: Temporal (.654), Brownfain (.382), Peer (.684), Mother (.894), Intra-Parent (.696), Self Range (.699).

4. Intra-Parent Discrepancy with: Temporal (.609),
Brownfain (.399), Peer (.597), Mother (.725), Father (.696),
Self Range (.670).
5. Self Range with: Temporal (.681), Brownfain (.363), Peer
(.662), Mother (.611), Father (.699), Intra-Parent (.670).
6. Temporal Stability with: Brownfain (.425), Peer (.747),
Mother (.664), Father (.654), Intra-Parent (.609).

It is seen that in every case it correlates lowest with the other measures of stability.

Brownfain had assumed that the contribution of the negative and positive self-ratings to the "limits index" (Brownfain stability) would be approximately equal. That this actually is far from the case is shown by the correlation of positive self with Brownfain stability of .154 and the correlation of negative self with Brownfain stability of .691. Squaring the two correlations, it is seen that instead of each contributing equally to the total variance, the positive self contributes .024 of the variance while the negative self accounts for 19 times as much or .477 of the total variance. Thus Brownfain's explanation in terms of Adlerian compensation of the rationale behind why this measure could be viewed as a measure of self-concept stability does not seem correct.

Hypothesis I Form A stated that the Brownfain stability measure is a contaminated measure of self-esteem and Hypothesis I Form B stated that it was a measure of stability contaminated by self-esteem. It is, as we have seen, neither a particularly efficient measure of stability or self-esteem. Hypothesis I you will remember stated that self-esteem is the primary psychological dimension being measured by

the Brownfain index of stability. Thus we saw that whatever merit the Brownfain stability measure has is due to its close association in terms of the operations involved in its measurement with the negative self--a measure of self-esteem.

This brings us to a consideration of the question posed for this research. Namely, can there be found a measure of stability that is functionally independent of self-esteem?

Two different methods of measuring self-concept stability were found that are operationally free from contamination by self-esteem. These are Temporal Stability and Intra-Parent Discrepancy. (The former, you will recall, is a stability score based upon the sum of the absolute differences between two measures of the private self taken three days apart. In other words, the test-retest reliability of the private ("actual") self-rating.) The latter (intra-parent discrepancy, is the discrepancy between the concept he believes his mother has of him and the concept he believes his father has of him. It was defined operationally as the difference between father and mother self-rating on each item summed over all the inventory items without regard to sign. It is seen, in summary, that the question posed for the research is answered in the affirmative. There can be found measures of stability which are functionally independent of self-esteem.)

How effective (potent) were these independent measures of stability? Again referring to Table I, it is seen that the correlation between the two measures of stability was .609. On page 56 we saw what was the nature of the relationship of these two variables to

the other measures of stability. Below it can be seen how these two variables are related to the measures of self-esteem and interpersonal adequacy.

TABLE III
CORRELATION OF TEMPORAL STABILITY AND INTRA-PARENT DISCREPANCY
WITH MEASURES OF SELF ESTEEM AND ADJUSTMENT

	Temporal Stability	Intra-Parent Discrepancy
Positive Self	-.318	-.365
Private Self	-.405	-.482
Negative Self	-.564	-.574
Self Evaluation Part I	-.156	-.313
Unconscious Self-Esteem	-.413	-.453
Sociometric II	-.262	-.240
Sociometric IV	-.265	-.238

The correlations are all in the expected direction and significant with the exception of the correlation between self evaluation part I and temporal stability. Table III shows that measures of stability which are functionally independent of self-esteem correlate significantly with measures of self-esteem and with measures of the capacity to develop friendly human relationships. Thus it can be concluded that the theoretical proposition that stability of the self-concept is a dimension of personality closely related to feelings of self-esteem and to adjustment and interpersonal adequacy is supported.

The other measures of self-concept stability (peer discrepancy, mother discrepancy, father discrepancy and self range) also correlated significantly with the variables of self-esteem and adjustment in all

cases--again with the exception of three correlations with self evaluation part I. These results could also have been cited to support the above theoretical proposition. However, these measures have in common with the Rogerian self ideal-self discrepancy measure of stability the characteristic that they are not completely independent measures of stability of the self-concept. To illustrate this point, one component of the peer, mother, father and Rogerian discrepancy scores is the private or actual self-rating. In other words, these discrepancy measures include a measure of self-esteem. The very fact that the respondents have negative feelings about themselves is going to increase their discrepancy scores. We saw that the correlation between the negative self and the private self was .751.

For a somewhat different reason the self range score may be contaminated with self-esteem. Here the lower the subject rates himself generally the more likelihood there is that he would obtain, as measured, a wider self range. This is not to say necessarily that because the above measures of stability have this theoretical limitation they are not in the main effective measures of uncertainty and ambivalence about the self. The manner in which they correlated with the other variables in the study shows that they are effective.

The surprising effectiveness of the temporal stability measure needs to be considered further. These results seem to suggest that individual test-retest measures of reliability of paper and pencil tests of personality may be good measures of personality in their

own right. It seems surprising that this has not evidently been clearly realized before. Particularly is this so since the idea was contained implicitly in Lecky's writings. It seems then that reliability is not something "in" or characteristic of a particular tests but is an individual difference variable--in other words, something brought to the test by the subjects. Certain tests (those called unreliable) have a greater capacity than others to elicit or measure this individual trait of stability.

Certain of the implications of the findings related to temporal stability have been considered. Yet to be considered, however, are the implications of the finding that intra-parent discrepancy is an effective measure of self-concept stability. Consideration of this leads us to the second hypothesis; namely, that those who have introjected or internalized contradictory systems of valuation will have unstable self-concepts. Because of limitations in the design of this study,^{*} Hypothesis II can only be tested indirectly. Certain deductions were made from Hypothesis II (these deductions are discussed in detail on page 30) concerned with the making of inferences from present behavior and self-attitudes to the nature of a subject's relationship with his parents now and, it is assumed, also in the past.

When a subject responds to the self-rating inventory in a manner which gives him a large intra-parent discrepancy score it can be

*

As originally designed the study included a measure of accepting and rejecting attitudes to be administered to the parents of the subjects. This was an area of the study in which Mr. Katz was particularly interested. Unfortunately school administrators declined to give permission for this portion of the study.

concluded that the subject perceives one parent as viewing him (and hence reacting to him) in a way different from that which the other parent views and reacts to him. When the two significant figures in the child's environment react to the child differentially there is a strong likelihood that "contradictory systems of valuation" will be internalized. Thus it is concluded that, because the intra-parent discrepancy measure of stability was found to be a very successful measure of self-concept stability, Hypothesis II is supported. If the stability of the self-concept were not related to the introjection of contradictory systems of evaluation, one would be hard pressed to explain the results obtained.

The simple three item scale, "Conflict of Standards" correlates significantly with measures of stability and self-esteem. The scale correlates $-.299$ with the negative self; $-.333$ with positive self; $-.385$ with private self; $.243$ with mother discrepancy; $.268$ with father discrepancy; $.214$ with intra-parent discrepancy; $.172$ (border-line significance) with temporal stability; and $-.408$ with self evaluation scale Part I. You will remember that it was felt a stated divergence from, or rejection of, parental (early, unconsciously internalized) valuations might also be a sign that there existed an underlying discrepancy between the inferred and conscious selves. When a subject tells us that his own values are in conflict with those of his parents we can be fairly certain that he consciously rejects certain parental values. This is additional evidence that the stability of the self-concept is a function of the discrepancy between the

inferred and conscious selves; that is, that in the process of personality development contradictory or inconsistent systems of valuation have been internalized.

Finally, the significant correlations of mother and father discrepancy with the measures of stability, self-esteem, and interpersonal adequacy can be viewed as supporting this hypothesis. They could also be considered (but to a lesser extent than "Conflict of Standards" and Intra-Parent Discrepancy) to be measures of a stated divergence from and possibly rejection of parental valuations and thus might point to the existence of an underlying discrepancy between inferred and conscious selves.

It will be recalled that the third and final hypothesis dealt with the interaction of ego defensiveness with measures of self-esteem. The hypothesis stated that the measure of self-esteem least influenced by ego-defensiveness will be the most effective ("potent") measure of self-esteem. Before we turn to Table I we should order the measures of self-esteem used in this study in terms of their "directness" or susceptibility to influence by test-taking defensiveness of the subjects. As can be seen from an inspection of the items, the most obvious and direct measure was the self-evaluation scale part I (Appendix B). Defensiveness tended to be elicited to such a great extent that it was feared the scale would be valueless because of massing of the responses in the most favorable categories. As a result those scoring as "low" in self-esteem were actually those who were just willing to admit they were average in certain of the

characteristics. This scale then was considered the most direct or surface measure of self-esteem.

The next three self-rating measures of self-esteem in order of susceptibility to defensiveness were: 2. The positive self 3. the private self 4. the negative self.

The positive self was placed above the private self because it encourages self-inflating tendencies. The negative self was placed fourth because, as it will be recalled, Cowen found it seemed to disarm the defensive subjects. The most indirect and disguised measure is the measure, "unconscious self-esteem." Having ordered the measures as to predicted potency, let us turn to Table I. We observe the following correlations which are summarized in Table IV.

TABLE IV
POTENCY OF THE SELF-ESTEEM MEASURES RELATIVE TO THEIR DIRECTNESS

	Part I	Positive Self	Private Self	Negative Self	Unconscious Self-Esteem
Temporal Stability	-.156	-.318	-.405	-.564	-.413
Peer Discrepancy	-.122	-.231	-.289	-.441	-.411
Mother Discrepancy	-.387	-.341	-.445	-.569	-.419
Father Discrepancy	-.386	-.446	-.599	-.611	-.417
Intra-Parent Disc.	-.313	-.365	-.482	-.574	-.453
Self Range	-.168	-.404	-.505	-.565	-.413
Sociometric IV	.245	.312	.329	.444	.398
Sociometric II	.254	.262	.336	.404	.344

If we consider only the paper and pencil measures of self-esteem (the first four measures of self-esteem) we see at once that the hypothesis is substantiated. There is a progression in the size of

the correlations that coincides with the dimension of directness of the measure (one exception to this trend is noted in the correlation of positive self with mother discrepancy). It is felt that the hypothesis receives strong support from the above data even though the unconscious self fails to maintain the trend. Rather than give up the hypothesis it seems more reasonable to assume that in the very subtlety (and subjectivity) of the measure (that characteristic which makes it a good indirect measure of self-esteem) lies the explanation for its failure to correlate higher than the negative self measure. The reference is here of course to the error (revealed in part by the correlation of .701 between the judges ratings) that seems an unavoidable part of the intuitive process. There are several other possible sources of error that could have lowered these correlations. Some evidence concerning at least one of these sources of error will be presented in a later section.

CHAPTER VI

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS AND FURTHER IMPLICATIONS

The K Scale

The K scale was included in the study because it was a measure of ego-defensiveness and, thus, also a measure of the defensively stable (rigid) self-concept. Findings related to stability of the self-concept and rigidity have been contradictory. Cowen (11) found that Brownfain stability was not related to rigidity as measured by the "F" scale of Frenkel-Brunswick. The results of Brownfain's own study suggested that it may not actually have been necessary to control for "rigidity" as he had done in his design. Certainly there continues to be much confusion in the thinking about "rigidity" and there is by no means agreement as to how it can best be measured. No attempt will be made to settle these issues here. Let us turn to Table V (on page 67) which summarizes the results in terms of the K scale.

The first thing to be noticed is that all the correlations are in the anticipated direction. That is to say, measures of stability correlated negatively with the K scale and measures of self-esteem correlate positively. It was assumed that measures of self-esteem are in part measures of ego-strength (this is also an interpretation commonly given high scores on the K scale). In other words, as Hilgard might say, a high score on a self-esteem scale is evidence of the adequate functioning of the ego-defenses. Those who, on the

TABLE V
CORRELATION OF EGO-DEFENSIVENESS WITH OTHER VARIABLES

	The K Scale
Private Self	.080
Positive Self	.059
Negative Self	.114
Temporal Stability	-.246
Brownfain Stability	-.096
Peer Discrepancy	-.195
Mother Discrepancy	-.200
Father Discrepancy	-.133
Intra-Parent Discrepancy	-.080
Self Range	-.238
Self Evaluation Scale Part I	.151
Unconscious Self-Esteem	.004
Socio-economic Status	.167
Conformity to Parental Standards	-.160
Conflict of Standards	-.057

various measures used in this study, more or less readily admit to statements carrying derogatory implications will tend to earn relatively larger discrepancy or stability scores than those who don't—all other factors being equal. The same principle applies in reverse for the measures of self-esteem. The one measure for which this could not be said is that of unconscious self-esteem and here as would be expected we see that there is no relationship (a correlation of .004). In general the actual magnitude of the relationship of ego-defensiveness to these measures is not very large. Only four of the correlations are significant at the five percent level. Since all the major variables with the exception of unconscious self-esteem show some slight tendency to vary with an individual's level of ego-defensiveness, one may wonder what would be the nature of the

relationships between the variables if this factor were held constant. If the partial correlation technique is applied to the two variables most affected by ego-defensiveness, it is found that the correlations are not significantly reduced. Thus, the correlation between temporal stability and negative self with ego-defensiveness partialled out is reduced from $-.564$ to $-.557$ and the correlation between temporal stability and self range is changed from $.681$ to $.663$. It is concluded that, although the obscuring influence of ego-defensiveness can be traced in various ways by its effects on the measures used, it is not a critically important variable in this study.

An explanation for the above conclusion in regard to ego-defensiveness may lie in the fact that, although phenomenological measures were used, the scoring on all the scales was of a relative rather than an absolute nature. That is to say, the subjects' statements about themselves were in no case taken at their face value but were used instead to rank the subjects along the dimension in question. This procedure would tend, to some extent, to reduce the effect of ego-defensiveness.

Origin of Self-Esteem

There are two additional "control" measures that could have theoretical significance. These are socio-economic status and intelligence. Both may have pertinence to the two opposed views of the origin of self-esteem discussed earlier. Let us consider first socio-economic status. Looking at Table I it is seen that ten variables

correlate significantly with this measure. Socio-economic status correlated .224 with negative self, .301 with positive self, .334 with private self, -.242 with temporal stability, -.191 with self range, .353 with self evaluation scale part I, -.224 with conformity to parental standards, -.185 with conformity to standards, -.210 with conflict of standards, and .259 with intelligence.

The correlation of socio-economic status with intelligence needs no comment. It is seen from these results that there is some relationship between one's socio-economic status, one's self-esteem and the certainty with which one views one's self. This is perhaps not surprising in our "marketing oriented" culture. To quote again Fromm: "Man has transformed himself into a commodity, experiences his life as capital to be invested profitably; if he succeeds in this, he is 'successful,' and his life has meaning; if not, 'he is a failure.' His 'value' lies in his salability, not in his human qualities of love and reason or in his artistic capacities. Hence his sense of his own value depends on extraneous factors, his success, the judgment of others" (14 p. 30).

Fromm then feels one's feeling of self-esteem lies in the external signs of "success"--in social recognition as an "important" person. That is, in this view self-esteem hinges upon external social and economic marks of status whose attainment is only partly in the control of the individual himself. When one considers how much more rewarding our materialistic culture is to those higher in socio-economic status, how much easier it is for them to succeed in

terms of the economic goals of the culture because of the additional advantages their high status gives them, then this interpretation seems reasonable.

However, it is observed also that the most subtle measure of self-esteem, unconscious self-esteem, correlates not at all (.039) with socio-economic status. It seems then that self-esteem as revealed by expressive behavior may be a more fundamental kind of self-esteem. These findings are consistent with the synthesis of the two notions of self-esteem offered on page 21. It will be recalled there was postulated a characteristic level of self-esteem which may vary within limits depending upon current influences. This synthesis will be recognized as an integration of the genetic or historical approach of psychoanalytic personality theory and the field theoretical approach of Lewin and the contemporary phenomenologists (such as Symgg and Combs, Rogers).

There is other evidence that leads us to make this complex interpretation of self-esteem. Because of this interest in the question of the origin of self-esteem the three subscales concerned with conformity to standards were devised. These scales should measure conscious feelings of mastery and be a reflection of current success experiences. Those who received a low score score on these scales felt that they were doing successfully the things that they had set themselves to do. Such success should be experienced as a feeling of enhanced self-esteem. The results show that indeed these persons do tend to be high in self-esteem and are significantly better

adjusted in terms of their success in interpersonal relations.

"Conformity to parental standards" correlated $-.354$ with negative self and $-.261$ with sociometric IV. The combined scale, "conformity to standards," correlated with negative self $-.289$ and $-.191$ with sociometric IV. More will be said of these scales later.

We turn now to the control variable of intelligence. It is seen from Table I that the correlations of intelligence with negative self and Brownfain stability ($.151$ and $.011$) were not significant. It is also seen, however, that the McPartland measure of self-esteem and unconscious self-esteem are significantly related to intelligence. This is also true of the measure of interpersonal adequacy. The correlations are, respectively: $.200$, $.257$, and $.274$.

It seems that intelligence as well as socio-economic status are rather complexly related to self-esteem and adjustment. It is difficult to know whether one should consider these correlations evidence of the impurity of the measures or not. This dilemma is best illustrated by pointing to the correlation of $.257$ between intelligence and unconscious self-esteem. This correlation could reasonably suggest that Mr. Katz and the present writer were being, to some extent, influenced by the drawing skill of the subjects (and this would not be the first time such a finding has been reported). However, it could also be reasonably asserted that some relationship is to be expected between the two variables since academic and social achievement are in part dependent upon intelligence (general adequacy, ego capacity). We have just seen in the preceding paragraphs some

evidence that points in this direction. This to some extent self-esteem is gained in our culture by achievement--whether achievement in terms of social (material) status or simply, for the student, in terms of good grades. This interpretation becomes unavoidable when it is seen that interpersonal adequacy ("success" in interpersonal relations) is also related to intelligence. The conclusion we are faced with is that intelligence and socio-economic status seem to have a relationship to both ego-defensiveness and real adequacy and genuine self-esteem. Certain of Brownfain's results can be so interpreted. It may well be that in terms of "getting along" the important thing is self-esteem and that the padding of the fundamental self-esteem with superficial or less fundamental attitudes of self-liking can help the individual appear fairly adequate and well adjusted. In the case of the correlation of intelligence with unconscious self-esteem, however, there is other evidence (the lack of correlation of unconscious self-esteem with socio-economic status) which suggests that the raters did allow themselves to be influenced by features of the drawings which reflected intellectual capacity. This may have been the other source of error mentioned in the discussion of Hypothesis III that prevented the measure of unconscious self-esteem from being the most potent measure of self-esteem.

Additional Findings in Terms of Measuring Instruments

A. Grade Point Average and Differential Aptitude Test

Although three measures of intellectual functioning were included in the study it was decided, for reasons of economy, to deal

extensively with only one. Intelligence was chosen instead of the grade point average or the composite score from the differential aptitude test because of its status as a psychological variable and because it correlated highest with the negative self. It was reasoned that the measure correlating highest with the negative self would have the greater likelihood of also correlating significantly with the other variables in the study if it turned out that intellectual functioning was in any way related to the variables in the study. It is of interest to note that correlation of intelligence with grade point average is only .132. It is seen that even in the case of a strong and fairly direct psychological relationship one doesn't obtain extremely high correlations because of the confounding effects of error and the operation of other factors (in this instance, of course, motivation would be one of these). It is these troublesome "other factors" which make the relationships found in human behavior so complex and difficult to study.

B. School Adjustment and Marital Status

The measure of school adjustment which was developed failed to correlate significantly with the negative self. For this reason it was concluded that it was probably too gross and inaccurate a measure to be worth considering further. The reason why it failed to correlate with the negative self could be attributed either to the low validity of the teacher's written comments about the students or to the experimenter's incorrect judgments as to how much these rather general comments reflected poor school adjustment.

Early in the analysis of the data it was realized that the index of parental marital status was also a failure. Only 15 of the 81 subjects fell into the "Broken Home" category. It was therefore felt that this measure could not serve as an accurate index of disruptive factors in the home environment. Hence its relationship to the other variables was not studied.

C. Coding of the Kuder Vocational Interest Profiles

You will remember that information derived from the Kuder profiles was to be used as another independent measure of stability of the self-concept. Since only categorical information was obtained from this coding ("differentiated" and "undifferentiated" profiles) it could not be included in the matrix of intercorrelations. The individual scores on temporal stability and negative self were each divided into two groups on the basis of whether the subject who earned that score possessed a differentiated or undifferentiated Kuder interest profile. The "t" test was used to discover if the means of the two groups differed significantly from one another. The mean of the undifferentiated Kuder profile group on temporal stability was 18.387 and for the differentiated group 20.342. It is seen that the difference found is in a direction opposite from that predicted. It was not tested for significance. The same procedure yielded the following means for the two groups on the negative self measure: undifferentiated 117.70; differentiated 122.57. This time the difference was in the predicted direction and the "t" of this difference was 2.966 significant at the .01 level of confidence. Even though

the difference was significant it can be seen that it is not large. The difference between the two means would had to have been considerably larger before the Kuder differentiation variable could have been considered a success.

D. Self Evaluation Scale Part II

It is necessary to consider the greater effectiveness of the three item subscale, Conformity of Parental Standards, as compared to the effectiveness of the Conformity to Personal Standards subscale. In structure the two scales are very similar. It was already mentioned that in scoring these scales it was observed that the third item in each scale contained the word, "consistently," which appeared to cause a differential response to that item. For some reason it was only the item as it appeared on the subscale, Conformity to Personal Standards, that showed these extremely prominent deviations. Some but less effect was observed on the item in the parental standards subscale. And the functioning of this latter scale seemed not to be adversely effected by the phenomenon. Why the three item scale conformity to parental standards should be so much more effective than the conformity to personal standards scale is difficult to explain. The failure of the later scale is only partly to be blamed on the ambiguous item. Thus it is seen that the subscale, conformity to standards, which was based equally upon the two scales (with the two apparently ambiguous items eliminated) does well in terms of correlating significantly with the other variables but does not do as well as conformity to parental standards alone.

Apparently there seems to be for adolescents a unique importance just in the fact that it is parental standards that are or are not lived up to. It might also be that adolescents more readily admit they do not live up to their parents standards and values for them than admit they fail to live up to their own. It was found both in the pilot study and in this study that a larger proportion of the subjects tend to admit failure to conform to parental standards than will admit failure to live up to personal standards. Thus the "parental" subscale may tend to elicit more honest responses.

There is one other plausible explanation of this paradox. The two subscales, conformity to parental standards and conflict of standards, both relate to the parent-child interaction. Just as the findings concerning mother and father discrepancy support hypothesis II, so may this finding. The fact that the subject does not feel he lives up to his parental standards may be evidence (inferential evidence) of conscious rejection of and ambivalence about parental standards. This is, of course, the kind of parent-child interaction that, as has been hypothesized, leads to a large discrepancy between the inferred and conscious selves.

It is interesting to observe that the measures of current "success" (the conformity to parental standards and conformity to standards subscales) correlated with the measures of stability, paper and pencil measures of self-esteem and interpersonal adequacy but did not correlate significantly with the deeper, projective measure of self-esteem. And consistent with this it is seen also that the conformity to

standards scale correlates higher with private and positive self than with negative self. These two subscales correlated $-.584$ and $-.571$ with McPartland's self-esteem scale (Part I) and $-.151$ and $-.108$ with unconscious self-esteem. We again, possibly, see evidence for a two factor theory of self-esteem.

Other Implications of the Findings

It is felt that the findings of this study (such as the quite substantial correlation of negative self with interpersonal adequacy) give support to the phenomenological approach to the study of personality. A person's statements about himself seem to give us very useful information about the real interpersonal world in which he moves.

It was seen also that the projective measure, unconscious self-esteem, correlated $.398$ with sociometric measure IV (number of choices for friend). This, for one of the least validated of clinical tools, is felt to be a real achievement. Certainly this finding gives support to the projective approach to the study of personality. The unexpectedly good results were especially gratifying because this particular projective technique has been, on occasion, harshly criticized by non-dynamically oriented psychologists. It would seem that one reason for the failure of this tool in the hands of others can be traced to their taking an atomistic approach to its validation. Perhaps it would also have been found in this study that no single measure of line length, height of figure or what have you would have succeeded. This is not to say that the draw-a-person test has not been used successfully

in research before. One need only refer to the recent studies of Witkins et al. (41). It would seem to be a reasonable conclusion that both phenomenological measures (the persons own self-report) and deeper projective measures are required for a thorough understanding of the human personality.

It is felt that the results of this study justify questioning the adequacy of the Rogerian self ideal-self discrepancy as a measure of self-concept stability. It is felt that had each of the many studies reported from Chicago used instead of the self ideal-self discrepancy, a good measure of self-esteem (for example, the negative self) they would have increased the significance of the results obtained. Their stability measure, like the Brownfain measure, may be essentially a measure of self-esteem plus some error (it is guessed that the error in the Rogerian measure may not generally be excessive because of the presence of rather stable and definite cultural values that tell us what the "ideal self" should be like. If, instead, the ideal self measures, as Horney states, neurotic self-inflation or if it measures, as certain studies have concluded, a high level of aspiration, the error involved in considering this discrepancy a measure of self-concept stability becomes greater.

It should finally be observed that the two "good" measures of self-esteem (Hypothesis III) correlated with the criterion variable of interpersonal adequacy higher in each of the four cases (.444, .404; .398, .344) than did any stability measure in the study. It is hypothesized from this observation that, all things considered,

self-esteem is a somewhat more central personality variable than stability of the self-concept--it may be of course that we simply have better measures of self-esteem than stability.

What do these four correlations suggest to us? We might hypothesize that a person's fundamental liking and respect for himself is noted by others consciously or unconsciously and that it is the recognition of this attitude by others that determines the amount of success he will have in gaining the love, confidence and respect of others. Few would see reason to like someone who can not find sound reasons for liking himself.

An explanation of the relationship of self-concept stability to interpersonal adequacy can also be offered. (Neither the explanation to be given or the one above is offered as the definitive one. There exists a variety of mutually compatible and interrelated interpretations of these two sets of findings). It may be that a person with an unstable self-concept would probably be inconsistent in the ways he reacted interpersonally--might be, for example, a social "chameleon"--and this characteristic would reduce his ability to form deep and lasting human relations.

Sources of Error

The interpretation of correlation coefficients is not an easy matter. For one thing, two variables may be related to each other for reasons other than those supposed by the experimenter. In this study the high degree of internal consistency of the results seems to be evidence that in most cases the relationships that are revealed reflect what they are said to reflect.

Most correlations found in psychological research are not very high and often the researcher is happy if his findings are simply statistically significant. Low correlations between two variables may be the result of the low reliability of the measuring instruments or of their low validity for the use to which they are put. It is thought that, of the instruments employed in this study, the measure of unconscious self-esteem and the three and four item scales are probably the least reliable. In general, however, it is felt that low reliability of measuring instruments was not a major source of error in the study. In contrast to the reliability of the measures, the validity of the measures of self-esteem and stability is relatively little known. It is assumed that their less than perfect validity has caused the correlations obtained to be underestimates of the strength of the relationships between the various variables. The great many significant correlations obtained in the study do, of course, suggest that the measures employed are of at least adequate validity. It is thought that the sociometric measures have probably the most validity (were the most direct measures) while the measures of stability and of parental inconsistency (mother and father discrepancy, intra-parent discrepancy, conflict of standards scale) were probably least valid because of their relative indirectness.

Failure to meet the assumption of linearity does not seem to have been a significant source of error. In no case did inspection of the scatter diagrams reveal evidence of nonlinearity of regression. There was, however, evidence in many cases that the variation about

the regression line deviated to some extent from normality and homoscedasticity.

Tendencies toward lack of homoscedasticity were more evident in some kinds of relationships and less (or not) evident in other kinds. Thus, for example, the scatter diagrams of the relationships of the several measures of self-esteem to each other appeared to be relatively normal whereas there was a slight but definite funneling effect seen in the scatter diagrams of the relationship of the Brownfain inventory measures of self-esteem to the measures of self-concept stability. Those high in self-esteem as measured by the private, positive, and negative selves quite consistently possessed stable self-concepts whereas those low in self-esteem somewhat less consistently possessed unstable self-concepts. It is thought that this tendency for the relationship between self-esteem and stability to become somewhat weaker at the low end of the self-esteem continuum is an artifice of measures of self-esteem derived from the Brownfain inventory. Measures of self-esteem not derived from this inventory (the McPartland scale and the figure drawing test) were fairly normally related to the measures of stability.

Not yet fully understood and requiring further study are the relatively very high correlations of McPartland's self-esteem scale (self evaluation scale, part I) with the three subscales of self evaluation scale, part II and socio-economic status and the private and positive selves. These variables all appear to have something in common with each other which may possibly be some kind of defensiveness--a kind of defensiveness however which is not related to the test taking defensiveness measured by the K scale.

It should be kept in mind that the findings of the study have direct application only to comparable populations of male high school students. It is conceivable that certain of the findings--for example, that of the correlation of intelligence with the sociometric measure of interpersonal adequacy--might be fairly specific to the age group studied. However, in view of current educational practices, a high school population will be in general a more representative (more heterogeneous) sample of normal individuals than are the college populations generally used in studies of the normal personality.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The present research was designed to investigate the relationship of self-esteem to stability of the self-concept. In order to carry out this aim it was necessary to study the effectiveness of various methods of measuring the variables of self-esteem and stability. As a consequence of this study it was hoped to provide a clearer delineation of what it is that is measured by these devices. As a part of this problem an effort was made to develop a measure of self-concept stability that would be functionally independent of self-esteem.

Three hypotheses were tested by the research. The first hypothesis grew out of the results of a pilot study which seemed to reveal the great degree to which self-esteem entered into (and contaminated) current measures of self-concept stability. This first hypothesis stated that self-esteem is the primary psychological dimension measured by Brownfain's index of self-concept stability. The second hypothesis was a formulation of the relationship of self-esteem to self-concept stability. It stated that those persons who have introjected or internalized contradictory systems of valuation will have unstable self-concepts. The third hypothesis dealt with the influence of ego-defensiveness on measures of self-esteem. It was proposed that the measure of self-esteem least influenced by ego-defensiveness will be the most effective measure of self-esteem.

Measures of the stability of the self-concept, of self-esteem, of ego defensiveness, of disturbance in family relationships and sociometric measures of adequacy in interpersonal relationships were administered to 81 graduating high school seniors. Information was also obtained concerning the intellectual ability, scholastic competence and adjustment of the students and the socio-economic status of the parents of the students. The above variables were inter-correlated and the resulting matrix of intercorrelations analyzed. Prior to collecting the data predictions were made as to the direction of the relationships for each correlation obtained from the inter-correlation of all the major variables. In addition hypotheses I and III involved the making of predictions as to the relative magnitudes of the relevant correlation coefficients.

Two measures of the stability of the self-concept were developed that were completely free from contamination by the variable of self-esteem. These were the measures of temporal stability and intra-parent discrepancy. The former is a measure of the amount of change in the ratings made of the actual self over time. The latter is a measure of inconsistency of parental attitudes toward the child. It is a measure of the discrepancy between the concept the student believes his mother has of him and the concept the student believes his father has of him.

The three hypotheses the research investigated appeared to be strongly supported by the results obtained. As by-product of the study support was also found for the theoretical proposition that

the stability of the self-concept is a dimension of personality closely related to feelings of self-esteem and to adjustment and interpersonal adequacy. It was also concluded that both the projective and phenomenological approaches to the study of personality gain support from the results of the study. The results have implications for a general theory of self-esteem. Accordingly an interpretation of self-esteem in terms of the results of the study was offered.

Because measures of self-concept stability which are based in part upon a rating of the actual or true self seem to be seriously contaminated by self-esteem, the results of the study seemed to justify questioning the adequacy of the Rogerian self ideal-self discrepancy as a measure of self-concept stability. Ego defensiveness as measured by the K scale was not a critically important variable in the study. There are hints however that there may be some form of defensiveness not measured by the K scale but related rather to socio-economic status which entered into certain of the measures of self-esteem. It is felt that the relationship of socio-economic status to stability and self-esteem needs further study.

Another suggestion for further research, arising from the data, is the possibility that individual test-retest measures of reliability of paper and pencil tests of personality may be good measures of personality in their own right.

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APPENDIX A

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR SELF RATING

We want to find out what kind of person YOU REALLY THINK YOU ARE. We are therefore, asking you to evaluate yourself on various personality traits. Since YOU will be rating YOURSELF, it will be necessary to follow these instructions carefully in order to achieve the greatest degree of accuracy.

1. You are to rate yourself on each item of the inventory according to a 10-point scale. "1" is the low or least desirable point on the scale, and "10" is the high or most desirable point. In evaluating your position on the scale on any trait, compare yourself to those in your class.

2. Use a fresh approach on each item. Your rating on one trait should not influence your rating on other traits. There is no reason why you might not see yourself low on some items, high on others, and in-between on still others. People, after all, rarely stand uniformly high or low in all qualities.

3. You are asked to rate yourself on the inventory several times, each time following the different instructions on the rating blanks. It is important that you make each set of ratings without referring to the others. Therefore, after you have completed one set of ratings, fold back the sheet and DO NOT REFER to it again when you make your later ratings.

Your ratings will be of value only insofar as you are frank and honest in evaluating yourself. Remember, these ratings will be kept entirely confidential. You are not being evaluated by me in any sense. You are simply evaluating yourself as a contribution to psychological research and to your self-understanding. The results will be reported in terms of the group and not by individuals. I will be happy to discuss the results or any questions you might have concerning this inventory with you privately.

Thank you for your cooperation.

SELF RATING INVENTORY

Every person has a picture of himself or a way he sees himself. This inventory consists of 20 traits which all people possess to a greater or lesser degree. These traits are used by persons in order to paint this picture of themselves. Only the extremes of each trait are described. The low end, "1", describes in approximate terms the students who stand lowest on a particular trait, while the high end, "10", describes the people who stand highest on the trait. To simplify matters the masculine pronoun (he) is used to refer to both girls and boys.

LOW END (1)

-versus-

HIGH END (10)

1. INTELLIGENCE

Is among the least bright of his classmates. Is not especially quick or alert in grasping complicated ideas and tasks.

Is among the most brilliant of his class. Is alert, quick, and imaginative in understanding complicated ideas and tasks.

2. MATURITY

In many ways is "childish" and seems younger than actual age. Simply is not "grown-up". Is among the least mature in the group.

Acts his age and is not at all childish. Is among the most grown-up and mature in his class.

3. AT EASE SOCIALLY

Tends to be awkward and clumsy in social situations; seems embarrassed or shy in mixing with classmates and adults.

Acts skillfully and smoothly in social situations; is confident and at ease in meeting and mixing with classmates and adults.

4. PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS

Is among those in the class who are physically most homely or plain-looking.

Is among the physically most attractive in the class. Could be considered quite handsome or, if a girl, beautiful.

5. GENEROSITY

Tends to be selfish with money and possessions; not helpful to others; self-centered and thinks of self first.

Gives generously of possessions and money; wants to help other people; usually thinks first of the welfare of others.

6. CHEERFULNESS

Tends to be gloomy and "sour" about life; is something of a "wet-blanket" in social groups.

Is very cheerful and optimistic about things; tends to spread good will in a group.

7. SINCERITY

Is insincere: you can't tell whether or not he is kidding or means what he says or does.

Is sincere in what he says and does: you can always tell whether he is being earnest or is kidding.

8. INITIATIVE

Is dependent upon others; has trouble making up his mind; seems to need reassurance and

Is self-reliant; makes up own mind without difficulty; does not lean on others in situations where he could

- | | |
|---|--|
| 9. TRUSTFULNESS
Is suspicious of others and looks for hidden reasons; might feel mistreated or disliked without good reason. | Trusts other people without being fooled by them; gives people the benefit of the doubt without looking for hidden motives. |
| 10. ADAPTABLE

Is among the most stubborn in the class. Sticks to own ideas and ways of doing things even though they may not be suitable to the situation. |

Is among the most readily adjustable to changing conditions; accepts compromises and suggestions where needed. |
| 11. SPORTSMANSHIP
Can't take a joke; tends to hold a grudge; is a poor loser and a boastful winner. | Can take a joke and give one; takes victory and defeat in stride. |
| 12. INDIVIDUALITY
Conforms very closely to what the class expects; is quite conservative and cautious, and afraid to be different. | Expresses feelings and opinions easily and freely; is not a rebel or a radical but is not afraid to be different. |
| 13. SELF-UNDERSTANDING
Does not understand or recognize his weak and strong points. Is uncertain of own abilities and not aware of personality handicaps. | Understands own weak and strong points especially well. Is well aware of his shortcomings and personality handicaps. |
| 14. INTEREST IN OPPOSITE SEX
Talks very little about opposite sex. Does not use opportunities for contact and may avoid association with opposite sex. | Associates a great deal and talks a lot about the opposite sex. Well aware of the opposite sex and enjoys being with them. |
| 15. DEPENDABILITY
Is among the least reliable in a number of ways. Might fail to keep promises, appointments, or to return borrowed things. Lacks a sense of responsibility to others. | Is among the most dependable; can be relied upon to meet promises and to fulfil responsibilities to others. |
| 16. UNDERSTANDING OF OTHERS
Tends to be indifferent and blind to the needs and feelings of others; doesn't understand what makes other people "tick". | Is very aware of the needs and feelings of other people and shows good understanding of their personality. |
| 17. ACCEPTING ONESELF
Is very dissatisfied to be the kind of person he is; wants very much to be a different kind of person; doesn't accept self. | Is generally pleased (but not conceited) about being the person he is; accepts himself; feels no need to be like a different person. |

LOW END (1)

-versus-

HIGH END (10)

18. POPULARITY

Has very few close friends and few acquaintances, tends to be disliked by others.

Has many friends and acquaintances; is among the best liked in the class.

19. PERSISTENCE

Does not "stick" to his work; delays or treats lightly his assignments and under-takings.

Works consistently, attentively and industriously at any task undertaken or assigned, without slighting or postponing the task.

20. SELF-CONTROL

Loses temper easily; becomes upset when angered or cannot get his way.

Has very good control of temper and emotions; calmly attempts to find solutions to frustrating events.

Rating Sheet No. 1

Sex: MALE
FEMALE

Initials: 1st Middle Last

Birthdate: Mo. Day Year

Now, keeping the general instructions in mind, rate yourself on each of the items making up the inventory as YOU REALLY THINK YOU ARE. Make the most accurate estimate of HOW YOU SEE YOURSELF and write the numerical scale value (from 1 to 10) of this self-rating on the little line opposite each trait name.

SELF-RATING INVENTORY

RATING SCALE

<u> </u> 1. INTELLIGENCE		
<u> </u> 2. MATURITY	10 -	In the top 10% of your High School Class
<u> </u> 3. AT EASE SOCIALLY		
<u> </u> 4. PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS	9 -	In the Second 10% from the top
<u> </u> 5. GENEROSITY	8 -	In the Third 10% from the top
<u> </u> 6. CHEERFULNESS		
<u> </u> 7. SINCERITY	7 -	In the Fourth 10% from the top
<u> </u> 8. INITIATIVE	6 -	In the 10% just above the Middle
<u> </u> 9. TRUSTWORTHINESS	Middle	
<u> </u> 10. ADAPTABLE	5 -	In the 10% just below the Middle
<u> </u> 11. SPORTSMANSHIP	4 -	In the Fourth 10% from the Bottom
<u> </u> 12. INDIVIDUALITY		
<u> </u> 13. SELF-UNDERSTANDING	3 -	In the Third 10% from the Bottom
<u> </u> 14. INTEREST IN OPPOSITE SEX	2 -	In the Second 10% from the Bottom
<u> </u> 15. DEPENDABILITY		
<u> </u> 16. UNDERSTANDING OF OTHERS	1 -	In the Bottom 10% of your High School class
<u> </u> 17. ACCEPTING ONESELF		
<u> </u> 18. POPULARITY		
<u> </u> 19. PERSISTENCE		
<u> </u> 20. SELF-CONTROL		

PLEASE DO NOT REFER BACK TO PREVIOUS RATINGS FOR GUIDANCE.

Rating Sheet No. 2

Most people are not entirely certain as to exactly where they stand on these traits as compared to other people. We still want to know HOW YOU SEE YOURSELF, but with this difference. This time rate yourself taking a favorable view of yourself. Give yourself the benefit of any reasonable doubt you might have on any trait and rate yourself in the HIGHEST THAT YOU REALISTICALLY THINK YOU ARE on that trait. Remember, be realistic in your favorable self-rating. Do not, without careful consideration, give yourself a high rating on every trait.

NOTE: On some traits, you may see yourself as higher than any member in the class. In this case, you may use an "11" to rate your standing on that trait instead of a "10".

SELF-RATING INVENTORY

RATING SCALE

_____ 1. INTELLIGENCE		
_____ 2. MACHINITY	10	In the top 10% of your High School Class
_____ 3. ABLE TO GET ALONG SOCIALLY	9	In the Second 10% from the top
_____ 4. PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS	8	In the Third 10% from the top
_____ 5. GENEROSITY	7	In the Fourth 10% from the top
_____ 6. ORIGINAILITY	6	In the 10% just above the Middle
_____ 7. SINCERITY	5	In the 10% just below the Middle
_____ 8. INITIATIVE	4	In the Fourth 10% from the Bottom
_____ 9. TRUSTWORTHINESS	3	In the Third 10% from the Bottom
_____ 10. ADAPTABILITY	2	In the Second 10% from the Bottom
_____ 11. SPORTSMANSHIP	1	In the Bottom 10% of your High School Class
_____ 12. INDIVIDUALITY		
_____ 13. SELF - UNDERSTANDING		
_____ 14. INTEREST IN OPPOSITE SEX		
_____ 15. DEPENDABILITY		
_____ 16. UNDERSTANDING OF OTHERS		
_____ 17. ACCEPTING ONESELF		
_____ 18. POPULARITY		
_____ 19. PERSISTENCE		
_____ 20. SELF-CONTROL		

PLEASE DO NOT REFER BACK TO PREVIOUS RATINGS FOR GUIDANCE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Rating Sheet No. 3

This time, when you are uncertain as to exactly where you stand on each trait as compared to other people in the group, rate yourself taking an unfavorable view of yourself. Do not give yourself the benefit of any reasonable doubt you might have on any trait. Instead, rate yourself the **LOWEST** that you **REALISTICALLY** **THINK** YOU ARE on that trait. But remember to be realistic. Do not, without careful consideration, give yourself a low rating on every item.

NOTE: On some items, you may see yourself as lower than any member in the group. In this case, you may use a zero (0) to rate your standing on that item instead of a "1".

SELF-RATING INVENTORY

RATING SCALE

_____ 1. INTELLIGENCE		
_____ 2. SECURITY	10	In the top 10% of your high School Class
_____ 3. APPEAL SOCIALLY	9	In the Second 10% from the top
_____ 4. PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS	8	In the Third 10% from the top
_____ 5. GENEROSITY	7	In the Fourth 10% from the top
_____ 6. CAREFULNESS	6	In the 10% just above the Middle
_____ 7. SINCERITY	5	In the 10% just below the Middle
_____ 8. ENTERPRISER	4	In the Fourth 10% from the Bottom
_____ 9. TRUSTWORTHINESS	3	In the Third 10% from the Bottom
_____ 10. ADAPTABILITY	2	In the Second 10% from the Bottom
_____ 11. STONTS/SHINSHIP	1	In the Bottom 10% of your high School Class
_____ 12. INDIVIDUALITY		
_____ 13. SELF-UNDERSTANDING		
_____ 14. INTEREST IN OPPOSITE SEX		
_____ 15. DEPENDABILITY		
_____ 16. UNDERSTANDING OF OTHERS		
_____ 17. AGREEING ORNABLE		
_____ 18. POPULARITY		
_____ 19. PERSISTENCE		
_____ 20. SELF-CONTROL		

PLEASE DO NOT REFER BACK TO PREVIOUS RATINGS FOR GUIDANCE.

Rating Sheet No. 4

This time we want you to estimate as accurately as you can HOW THE BOYS IN YOUR CLASS WOULD RATE YOU on all the items. This how you believe OTHERS OF YOUR AGE GROUP would see you.

SELF-RATING INVENTORY

RATING SCALE

_____ 1. INTELLIGENCE	
_____ 2. ACTIVITY	10 - In the top 10% of your High School Class
_____ 3. AT EASE SOCIALLY	9 - In the Second 10% from the top
_____ 4. PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS	8 - In the Third 10% from the top
_____ 5. GENEROSITY	7 - In the Fourth 10% from the top
_____ 6. CHEERFULNESS	6 - In the 10% just above the Middle
_____ 7. SINCERITY	5 - In the 10% just below the Middle
_____ 8. INITIATIVE	4 - In the Fourth 10% from the Bottom
_____ 9. TRUSTWORTHINESS	3 - In the Third 10% from the Bottom
_____ 10. ADAPTABILITY	2 - In the Second 10% from the Bottom
_____ 11. SPORTSMANSHIP	1 - In the Bottom 10% of your High School Class
_____ 12. INDIVIDUALITY	
_____ 13. SELF-UNDERSTANDING	
_____ 14. INTEREST IN OPPOSITE SEX	
_____ 15. DEPENDABILITY	
_____ 16. UNDERSTANDING OF OTHERS	
_____ 17. ACCEPTING ONESELF	
_____ 18. POPULARITY	
_____ 19. PERSISTENCE	
_____ 20. SELF-CONTROL	

PLEASE DO NOT REFER BACK TO PREVIOUS RATINGS FOR GUIDANCE.

Rating Sheet No. 5

This time we want you to estimate as accurately as you can HOW YOUR HOLDER WOULD RATE YOU on all the items. This is your self-picture as you believe your HOLDER sees it.

SELF-RATING INVENTORY

RATING SCALE

_____ 1. INTELLIGENCE	
_____ 2. LARGHEITY	10- In the top 10% of your High School Class
_____ 3. AFFABLE SOCIABILITY	
_____ 4. PHYSICAL ATTR. CIVILITY	9 - In the Second 10% from the top
_____ 5. GENTLENESS	
_____ 6. GRATEFULNESS	8 - In the Third 10% from the top
_____ 7. SINCERITY	
_____ 8. INITIATIVE	7 - In the Fourth 10% from the top
_____ 9. TRUTHFULNESS	
_____ 10. AFFABILITY	6 - In the 10% just above the Middle
_____ 11. SPONSORSHIP	
_____ 12. INDIVIDUALITY	5 - In the 10% just below the Middle
_____ 13. SELF-UNDERSTANDING	
_____ 14. INTEREST IN OPPOSITE SEX	4 - In the Fourth 10% from the Bottom
_____ 15. DEMIDABILITY	
_____ 16. UNDERSTANDING OF OTHERS	3 - In the Third 10% from the Bottom
_____ 17. ACCEPTING ONESELF	
_____ 18. POPULARITY	2 - In the Second 10% from the Bottom
_____ 19. PERSISTENCE	
_____ 20. SELF-CONTROL	1 - In the Bottom 10% of your High School Class

PLEASE DO NOT REFER BACK TO PREVIOUS RATINGS FOR GUIDANCE.

Rating Sheet No. 6

This time we want you to estimate as accurately as you can HOW YOUR FATHER WOULD RATE YOU on all the items. This is your self-picture as you believe your FATHER sees it.

SELF-TESTING INVENTORY

RATING SCALE

_____ 1. INTELLIGENCE	
_____ 2. TENDENCY	10 - In the top 10% of your high School Class
_____ 3. AFFECTION SOCIALLY	9 - In the Second 10% from the top
_____ 4. PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS	8 - In the Third 10% from the top
_____ 5. GENEROSITY	7 - In the Fourth 10% from the top
_____ 6. CHEERFULNESS	6 - In the 10% just above the middle
_____ 7. SINCERITY	5 - In the 10% just below the middle
_____ 8. INITIATIVE	4 - In the Fourth 10% from the bottom
_____ 9. TRUSTFULNESS	3 - In the Third 10% from the bottom
_____ 10. ADAPTABILITY	2 - In the Second 10% from the bottom
_____ 11. STORMINESS	1 - In the Bottom 10% of your high School Class
_____ 12. INDIVIDUALITY	
_____ 13. SELF-UNDERSTANDING	
_____ 14. INTEREST IN OPPOSITE SEX	
_____ 15. DEPENDABILITY	
_____ 16. UNDERSTANDING OF OTHERS	
_____ 17. ACCEPTING ONESELF	
_____ 18. POPULARITY	
_____ 19. PERSISTENCE	
_____ 20. SELF-CONTROL	

PLEASE DO NOT REFER BACK TO PREVIOUS TESTS FOR GUIDANCE.

APPENDIX B

SELF EVALUATION SCALE

Part I

Initials
1st Middle Last

Sex: MALE
FEMALE

Birthdate
Mo. Day year

In answering these questions about yourself, please just CHECK ONE of the answers to each question.

1. How pleased are you with yourself?
☐ I am almost never pleased with myself.
☐ I am not often pleased with myself.
☐ I am pleased with myself about as often as I am displeased.
☐ I am usually pleased with myself.
☐ I always think well of myself.
2. How intelligent are you?
☐ I have a first rate mind.
☐ I have very high intelligence.
☐ I have only average intelligence.
☐ I have less than average intelligence compared to my classmates.
3. How talented are you?
☐ I have few talents.
☐ I have only ordinary talents.
☐ I have a good deal of talent in some fields.
☐ I have very unusual talents.
4. How often are you ashamed of yourself?
☐ I am never ashamed of myself.
☐ I am ashamed of myself only rarely.
☐ I am ashamed of myself sometimes, but not often.
☐ I often feel ashamed of things I have done.
☐ I am always ashamed of myself.
5. What kind of a family do you come from?
☐ My family is below average.
☐ I come from an average family.
☐ I come from a good, but not exceptional family.
☐ My family is an exceptionally good one.
6. How often are you displeased with yourself?
☐ I am never displeased with myself.
☐ I am rarely displeased with myself.
☐ I am displeased with myself pretty often.
☐ I seem to be always displeased with myself.
7. How often are you proud of yourself?
☐ I am never proud of myself.
☐ I am seldom proud of myself.
☐ I am proud of myself about half the time.
☐ I am proud of myself most of the time.
☐ I am always proud of myself.

8. How does your personal appearance compare with others?

- ☐ I have an excellent personal appearance.
- ☐ My personal appearance is better than average.
- ☐ My personal appearance is as good as the average.
- ☐ My personal appearance is something of a handicap to me.

9. How satisfied with yourself are you?

- ☐ I am never satisfied with myself.
- ☐ I am seldom satisfied with myself.
- ☐ I am satisfied with myself sometimes, but not often.
- ☐ I am usually satisfied with myself.
- ☐ I am always satisfied with myself.

10. How often do you live up to your capabilities?

- ☐ I always live up to my capabilities.
- ☐ I usually live up to my capabilities.
- ☐ I seldom live up to my capabilities.
- ☐ I always seem to fail somehow to live up to my capabilities.

11. How often are you disappointed with yourself?

- ☐ I am always disappointed in myself.
- ☐ I am usually disappointed in myself.
- ☐ I am rarely disappointed in myself.
- ☐ I am never disappointed in myself.

LOOK BACK TO MAKE SURE THAT YOU HAVE CHECKED ONLY ONE ANSWER TO EACH QUESTION.
ALSO BE SURE YOU HAVE CHECKED AN ANSWER FOR EVERY QUESTION.

SELF EVALUATION SCALE

Part II

Initials

Sex M F

1st MIDDLE LAST

Birthdate

Mo. Day Year

Note: On this part, if each of your parents had really different ideals about what you should be like (what standards and ideals you should have), answer the following questions according to the view of the parent you feel (or felt) closest to. PLEASE CHECK ONLY ONE ANSWER FOR EACH QUESTION.

1. How strong a desire do you have to live up to the standards and ideals of your parents? (Check only one)

☐ I have a very strong desire to live up to the standards and ideals of my parents.

☐ I have considerably more than an average desire to live up to my parents standards and ideals for me.

☐ I have an average desire to live up to my parents standards for me.

☐ I have little desire to live up to my parents standards for me.

☐ I have no desire what ever to live up to the ideals and standards my parents have held for me.

2. How often do you live up to your own standards for yourself?

☐ I almost always seem to fail to live up to my own standards for myself.

☐ I seldom am able to live up to my own standards for myself.

☐ I usually am able to live up to my own standards.

☐ I almost always am able to live up to my own standards for myself.

3. How important an influence are your standards and ideals in the things you do?

☐ The standards I hold for myself are always an important influence in the things I do.

☐ The standards I hold for myself are usually an important influence in the things I do.

☐ The standards I hold for myself are seldom an important influence in the things I do.

☐ The standards I hold for myself are almost never an important influence in the things I do.

4. How strong a desire to you have to live up to the standards and ideals of your high school class?

☐ I have a very strong desire to live up to the standards and ideals of my class mates.

☐ I have considerably more than an average desire to live up to my class mates' standards and ideals.

☐ I have an average desire to live up to the standards and ideals of my class mates.

☐ I have little desire to live up to the standards and ideals of my class mates.

☐ I have no desire what ever to live up to the ideals and standards of those in my high school class.

5. How often do you live up to your parents ideals for you?

- ☐ I always seem to lose sight of the ideals and standards my parents hoped I would follow.
- ☐ I seldom live up to the standards and ideals my parents have tried to give me.
- ☐ about one half the time I live up to the standards and ideals my parents have for me.
- ☐ I usually live up to the ideals and standards my parents have held for me.
- ☐ I almost always live up to the standards and ideals my parents have held for me.

6. How much meaning do the words, "ideals and standards", have for you?

- ☐ I have a very clear idea of the kinds of things these words refer to.
- ☐ I have a rather good notion of the general meaning of these words.
- ☐ I am rather uncertain as to what these words really mean.
- ☐ I have almost no idea at all about what these words refer to.

7. How much conflict do you feel exists between your own standards and ideals and those your parents follow?

- ☐ My own ideals and standards are in very little conflict with those of my parents.
- ☐ My own ideals and standards are in some, but really not very much, conflict with those my parents hold.
- ☐ My own ideals and standards are in considerable conflict with those belonging to my parents.
- ☐ My own ideals and standards are in great conflict with those belonging to my parents.

8. How often do your parents standards differ from those of your age group (your high school class)?

- ☐ My parents standards never differ from my age group's standards.
- ☐ My parents standards seldom differ from my age group's standards.
- ☐ My parents standards differ about half the time from the standards and ideals of my age group.
- ☐ My parents standards differ from the standards of my age group (class mates) most of the time.
- ☐ My parents standards always differ from the standards and ideals of my age group.

9. How much importance does a personal code of standards and ideals have for you?

- ☐ They have a very deep and personal importance to me.
- ☐ They have considerable personal importance to me.
- ☐ They have not very much personal importance to me.
- ☐ They have almost no personal importance to me.

10. How consistently do you follow the standards and ideals you hold for yourself?
____ I am extremely consistent in following my own ideals and standards.
____ I am very consistent in following the standards and ideals I hold for myself.
____ I am fairly consistent in following my own ideals and standards.
____ I am only a little consistent in following my own ideals and standards.
____ I am not at all consistent in following my own ideals and standards.
- 11.a How different are your own ideals and standards from those your parents want you to have?
____ Completely different
____ Very different
____ Somewhat different
____ A little different
____ Not at all different
- 11b. How strongly do you feel about this?
____ Very strongly
____ Fairly strongly
____ Not so strongly
____ Not strongly at all
____ No answer
12. How closely do you feel you have lived up to your parents ideals for you?
____ Very closely
____ Rather closely
____ Somewhat
____ Only a little
____ Not at all
- 13a. How often do you feel one should follow one's ideals and standards?
____ Should be strictly followed in all situations.
____ Should be strictly followed in most situations.
____ Should be strictly followed in some situations.
____ Should be strictly followed in very few situations.
- 13b. How strongly do you feel about this?
____ No answer
____ Not strongly at all
____ Not so strongly
____ Fairly strongly
____ Very strongly

14. How similar are your own standards and ideals to those of your parents?

- ☐ Not at all similar
- ☐ A little similar
- ☐ Somewhat similar
- ☐ Very similar
- ☐ Completely similar

15.a Do you feel there is a difference between the kind of person you would like to be like and the kind of person you feel you ought to be like?

- ☐ The kind of person I would like to be like and the kind of person I feel I ought to be like are very similar.
- ☐ The kind of person I would like to be like and the kind of person I feel I ought to be like are fairly similar.
- ☐ The kind of person I would like to be like and the kind of person I feel I ought to be like are fairly different.
- ☐ The kind of person I would like to be like and the kind of person I feel I ought to be like are very different.

15.b How strongly do you feel about this?

- ☐ Very strongly
- ☐ Fairly strongly
- ☐ Not so strongly
- ☐ Not strongly at all
- ☐ No answer

16. How much are your own ideals and standards in harmony with those of your parents?

- ☐ A great deal of harmony exists between my standards and ideals and those of my parents.
- ☐ Considerable harmony exists between my own standards and ideals and those of my parents.
- ☐ Some harmony exists between my own standards and ideals and those of my parents.
- ☐ Little harmony exists between my own standards and ideals and those of my parents.
- ☐ Almost no harmony exists between my own standards and ideals and those of my parents.

17. Which of your parents has had the most influence on your character? (Check one)

- ☐ Mother ☐ Father ☐ Both the same ☐ Some one else had more influence (who?)

18. How consistently do you follow the standards and ideals your parents hold for you?

- ☐ I am extremely consistent in following the ideals and standards my parents have wished me to have.
- ☐ I am very consistent in following the ideals and standards my parents hold for me.
- ☐ I am fairly consistent in following the ideals and standards my parents have held up for me.
- ☐ I am only a little consistent in following the ideals and standards my

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19. Which of your parents do you feel closest to? (Check one)

☐ Father ☐ Mother ☐ Both the same ☐ Don't feel close to either

20. How closely do you feel you have lived up to your own standards for yourself?

☐ Very closely

☐ Rather closely

☐ Somewhat

☐ Only a little

☐ Not at all

21. Which of your parents is the dominant member of the family? (Check one)

☐ Mother ☐ Father ☐ Both the same ☐ Some one else tends to
dominate the household.

LOOK BACK TO MAKE SURE THAT YOU HAVE CHECKED ONLY ONE ANSWER TO EACH QUESTION.
ALSO BE SURE YOU HAVE CHECKED AN ANSWER FOR EVERY QUESTION.

APPENDIX C

Section _____

Initials: _____
1st Middle Last

Birthdate: _____
Mo. Day Year

I

- A. Write in the space below, the numbers of five boys from the list that you would choose for your five best friends.

(1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____ (4) _____ (5) _____

- B. Write the numbers below of the five boys, from the same list, who you would be least likely to choose as a friend.

(1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____ (4) _____ (5) _____

List of Classmates

____ 1. Biedermann, Fred
____ 2. Braitwaite, Dave
____ 3. Brochie, Gerald
____ 4. Greery, Albert
____ 5. Dexter, Gerald
____ 6. Lverard, Jerry
____ 7. Lverett, David
____ 8. Georgopoulos, Bill
____ 9. Nelson, Glen

____ 10. Palmer, Allen
____ 11. Savage, Robert
____ 12. Shadley, Miles
____ 13. Stetler, William
____ 14. Verspoor, John
____ 15. Waller, Carl
____ 16. Waterhouse, Larry
____ 17. Williams, Jack

II

- C. Which boys in the List of Classmates do you think would include you in their answer to Question A? Next to these boys place a + sign in the space which is provided to the left of their names.

- D. Which boys in the List of Classmates do you think would include you in their answer to Question B? Next to these boys place a - sign in the space which is provided to the left of their names.

- E. Write an O sign next to those boys that you feel would neither include you in their answer to Question A nor Question B.

CHECK TO SEE THAT EACH BOY HAS EITHER A + , - , OR O NEXT TO HIS NAME.

The K Scale

Sex: Male Initials: 1st Middle Last
Female Birthdate: Mo. Day Year

This inventory consists of a number of statements. Read each statement and decide whether it is true as applied to you or false as applied to you. If a statement is TRUE or MOSTLY TRUE, as applied to you, CIRCLE the letter "T" at the beginning of the statement. If a statement is FALSE or NOT USUALLY TRUE, as applied to you, CIRCLE the letter "F" at the beginning of the statement. Remember to give YOUR OWN opinion of yourself and also be sure to give an answer to every statement.

1. T F I enjoy social gatherings just to be with people
2. T F I wish I were not so shy.
3. T F I think a great many people exaggerate their misfortunes in order to gain the sympathy and help of others.
4. T F It takes a lot of argument to convince most people of the truth.
5. T F I have very few quarrels with members of my family.
6. T F Most people will use somewhat unfair means to gain profit or an advantage rather than to lose it.
7. T F Often I can't understand why I have been so cross and grouchy.
8. T F At times my thoughts have raced ahead faster than I could speak them.
9. T F Criticism or scolding hurts me terribly.
10. T F I certainly feel useless at times.
11. T F It makes me impatient to have people ask my advice or otherwise interrupt me when I am working on something important.
12. T F I have never felt better in my life than I do now.
13. T F What others think of me does not bother me.
14. T F It makes me uncomfortable to put on a stunt at a party even when others are doing the same sort of things.
15. T F At times I feel like swearing.
16. T F I find it hard to make talk when I meet new people.
17. T F I am against giving money to beggars.
18. T F I frequently find myself worrying about something.
19. T F I get mad easily and then get over it.
20. T F When in a group of people I have trouble thinking of the right things to say.
21. T F At times I am all full of energy.
22. T F I have periods in which I feel unusually cheerful without any special reason.
23. T F At times I feel like smashing things.
24. T F I think nearly anyone would tell a lie to keep out of trouble.
25. T F I worry over money and business.
26. T F At periods my mind seems to work more slowly than usual.
27. T F People often disappoint me.
28. T F I have sometimes felt that difficulties were piling up so high that I could not overcome them.
29. T F I often think, "I wish I were a child again."
30. T F I have often met people who were supposed to be experts who were not better than I.
31. T F I find it hard to set aside a task that I have undertaken, even for a short time.
32. T F I like to let people know where I stand on things.

Questions on Household Characteristics

Initials:
 1st middle last

Birthdate: _____
Day Mo. Year

Please be as accurate as you possibly can in answering these questions. The information you give us will be held in strictest confidence and will be used only in the making of group comparisons. In each case, place a check by the correct answer.

1. Is there a telephone in your home? Yes____ No____ . Is it on a private or a party line? Private____ Party____ .
2. Do your parents own or rent their own home? Own____ Rent____ .
3. Does someone in your home own an automobile? Yes____ No____ .
4. Was the car new or used when it was bought? New____ Used____ .
5. Does your home have two or more passenger cars? Yes____ No____ .
6. About how far did the chief wage earner in your family go in school?

Eighth grade or less _____ Some high school but not high school graduate _____
Completed high school but not college graduate _____ Completed college _____.

7. What is the occupation of the chief wage earner in the household? Please describe in two or three sentences the kind of occupation it is. _____
- _____
- _____
- _____

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