
MALAWIANS IN THE GREAT WAR AND AFTER, 1914-1925

Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
MELVIN EUGENE PAGE
1977





This is to certify that the thesis entitled

Malawians in the Great War and After, 1919-18

presented by

Melvin Eugene Page

has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in History

Date February 27, 1976

O-7639



APR 2 8 1999

ABSTRACT

MALAWIANS IN THE GREAT WAR AND AFTER, 1914-1925

Ву

Melvin Eugene Page

The purpose of this study is to survey and analyze the history of the African population of Malawi during and immediately after World War One. Drawing extensively upon oral historical sources, as well as archival and published materials, the important events and developments of the period 1914 to about 1925 are described. African viewpoints towards, and attitudes about, the period are given special emphasis. The conclusion reached is that the Great War marked a significant watershed in Malawi's history. Wartime demands upon the whole population and individual experiences served to both initiate changes and accelerate transformations which had already begun. In the process a reservoir of resentments was created which provided a focal point for various expressions of anti-European feeling.

After 1907, the consolidation of European rule in Nyasaland brought extensive demands for tax and labor, known to some Malawians as thangata. The tensions thus created were revealed in a number of widespread and varied millenial expectations of sudden and frequently cataclysmic change. Therefore, the coming of the First World War was not altogether a shock for Malawians. Demands for their service, as soldiers (askari) and, much more frequently, as carriers of supplies (tengatenga) grew so large and oppressive that resistance developed.

The faithe Croccasi

ryau s

gricu

milita

traine

Africa
create

მ:გე_ე. გ:გეეე. **მ**:გე

عرزي:

labor_e

epider.

t_{foogs}

distu .

offic:

iche.

8\$\$DZ

to je j

6/₁₄.

The failure of organized opposition to wartime recruitment, such as the Chilembwe rebellion, led to individual tactics of evasion, occasionally linked to traditional African institutions, such as the nyau societies among the Chewa.

In addition, Malawians were called upon to produce ever-increasing agricultural surpluses to provide foodstuffs for the soldiers and military laborers. Foreign troops, both African and European, trained and camped in the country, creating further dislocations in African life. Coincident with these pressures, unfavorable weather created crop losses which effected local, rather than military, food production. Weakened as a result of food shortages, the Malawian population suffered from the effects of epidemic disease, including plague and smallpox. Similar hardships—food shortages and disease—also undermined the effectiveness of Malawian soldiers and military laborers. And after 1918, the entire population was hard hit by epidemic influenza, carried throughout the country by demobilized troops.

The unexpected length and scope of the campaign profoundly disturbed Malawians, whose traditional leaders appealed to colonial officials for relief. Their petitions, though, had little effect.

Rather, the demands for men and foodstuffs continued and the hardships multiplied. So onerous were the exactions that Malawians came to associate the war with the worst features of British rule, referring to it as "the war of thangata." As such, the conflict and its associated experiences provided Malawians with their first national experience. In the years immediately following the war, this

fee

Afr

500

the

arti

Ma'a

.- :

feeling was expressed through the quasi-political activities of African "native associations," informal <u>beni</u> and similar dances societies, as well as increased <u>nyau</u> and Islamic activity. All of these, in one measure or another, were inspired by and reflected the anti-European resentments which were the principal result of Malawian experiences during the Great War.

MALAWIANS IN THE GREAT WAR AND AFTER, 1914-1925

Ву

Melvin Eugene Page

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1977

© Copyright by MELVIN EUGENE PAGE 1977

for my mother

archivist
States; t
a great d
first is
the stud;
halawi.
and encou

to me, ar

archivists in Malawi, Rhodesia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; too numerous to mention by name, I nonetheless owe them ail a great deal. Three persons, however, deserve special thanks. The first is the late Professor James R. Hooker, who introduced me to the study of central Africa and was instrumental in my coming to Malawi. Secondly, Professor George Shepperson offered kindly advice and encouragement when it was most needed and continued to assure me of the value of my undertaking. Finally, I owe the most to Professor Harold G. Marcus, who as friend and mentor has given more to me, and to this study, than perhaps even he would care to admit.

List of T

List of A

Chapter O

Crapter Ti

Capter T

littler F

ia ter F

thapter s

Paster S∈

list of pe

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables	vii
List of Abbreviations	viii
Chapter One: The Great Conflagration	1
Chapter Two: The War of <u>Thangata</u>	36
Chapter Three: The Machona Cohorts	86
Chapter Four: The Hungry War	114
Chapter Five: A Time of Fire	156
Chapter Six: Not a Complete Peace	20 ¹ 4
Chapter Seven: A Shame to People's Souls	246
List of References	260

Table 1.

Table 2.

Table 3.

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Malawian Askari, By Districts	50
Table 2.	Malawian Military Labor, By Districts	82
Table 3.	Malawian KAR Casualties	140

A.L.C.

C.L.A. 1. P

٤.١.٥.

:,0,

F.O.

H.M.S.C.

1,9,4,

K. F. R.

M.A.P.A.P

M.N.A.

M.A.R.

K.R.A.

t. n. c.

1. R. P.

1.7.2.

f.E.,

P.1.M.

÷.÷.c.

.

1.4.L.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A.L.C.	African Lakes Company
C.L.A.I.M.	Christian Literature Association in Malawi
C.I.D.	Criminal Investigation Department
C.O.	Colonial Office
F.O.	Foreign Office
H.M.S.O.	His/Her Majesty¹s Stationery Office
1.W.M.	Imperial War Museum (Library)
K.A.R.	King¹s African Rifles
M.A.P.A.R.O.	Malawi Army Pay and Records Office
M.N.A.	Malawi National Archives
M. N. R.	Museum of the Northamptonshire Regiment
M.R.A.	Malawi Railway Archives
N.A.R.	National Archives of Rhodesia
N.R.P.	Northern Rhodesia Police
N.V.R.	Nyasaland Volunteer Reserve
P.E.A.	Portuguese East Africe (Mozamibique)
P.1.M.	Providence Industrial Mission
P.R.O.	Public Record Office (London)
R.H.L.	Rhodes House Library (Oxford)

R.K.R.

S.M.L.

U.M.C.A.

¥.C.

R.N.R. Rhodesia Native Regiment

S.M.L. Society of Malawi Library

U.M.C.A. Universities' Mission to Central Africa

W.O. War Office

The dominate:

fratier

Stre riv

Forg, or

Post of t

Kithough

Central p

of the ri

For

اد-ر_{ال-۱۶} و

ièves no re

river and

Çesp'es.

Predomina

large nur

man the

rst in

the rela

o Mala.

ie.

CHAPTER ONE: THE GREAT CONFLAGRATION

The history of small, landlocked Malawi has, in a sense, been dominated by its waterways. Lake Malawi stretches along the eastern frontier for two-thirds of the country's length, spilling into the Shire river which then winds down to the nation's southern tip.

Along, over, and across this lake and river system have traveled most of the peoples who have deeply influenced Malawi's history.

Although settlement has concentrated in the northern highlands and central plateaus west of the lake and in the Shire highlands east of the river, the waterways have attracted the settlers.

For more than a millenium prior to the nineteenth century,
Bantu-speaking peoples came into Malawi, probably following the
lakeshore and river south, and settled in the country. Along the
river and in the Shire highlands were the Mang'anja and Nyanja
peoples. In the central plateaus the closely related Chewa peoples
predominated. Further north, along the lake and in the highlands, a
large number of interrelated, yet disparate, peoples settled, among
whom the Tumbuka, Tonga, and Ngonde speakers became perhaps the
most influential. These northern peoples were somewhat distinct from
the related Chewa, Nyanja, and Mang'anja of the southern two-thirds
of Malawi. In both clusters, however, cultural and societal
patterns developed which were often tied to the lake and river. In

the sout for pree Ву were to Around ti ciars wh was esseprimary : Standing forther a <u>Sertareio</u> intent up Po-tugles quarter o the power effects an Portugues Thas With car 1830s two Jaming : the Lake

the south, centralized political units grew and vied with each other for preeminence.

By the end of the eighteenth century the dynamic changes which were to effect Malawi's peoples over the next century had begun.

Around the northern end of the lake came the first of the Balokwa clans who established political and economic authority over what was essentially a trade route from the lake into Zambia. Their primary interest was trade, and hence they did not develop long-standing political hegemony over the region. In the south, probing further and further up the Shire river, came Portuguese African sertanejos, who there and elsewhere north of the Zambesi, were intent upon trade and the quest of precious minerals. These first Portuguese incursions may have had minimal effect, but by the first quarter of the nineteenth century they had succeeded in disrupting the power of the last Chewa paramountcy, that of Undi. One of the effects arising from that power was greater influence for the Portuguese and their African clients along the lower Shire. 2

These changes were inconsiderable, however, compared to those which came in the middle of the nineteenth century. In the late 1830s two groups of Ngoni came into the country from the southwest. Turning in front of the lake, one group continued northward into the Lake Malawi/Lake Tanganyika corridor. After internal divisions,

There is, at present, no good general overview of Malawi's pre-colonial history. The best available treatment of these trends, however, can be found in several of the articles in The Early History of Malawi, ed. B. Pachai (London: Longman, 1972).

²On the Portuguese themselves see M.D.D. Newitt, <u>Portuguese</u> <u>Settlement on the Zambesi</u> (London: Longman, 1973), pp. 277-84.

Mombera le his people One of Mon south into ment of to 1830s. Tr northward retraced reaches o area and river val following to dontina the disru firearms, Livingsto Wher from the has the r اواداً دو ج they emp 16 6.11 S tesirat rilled of the Kola

Chema co

** 54 52 }

Mombera led one segment south again; through military conquest his people dominated the northern highlands of Malawi by the 1870s. One of Mombera's Lieutenants, Ciwere, led a small group further south into the central plateau. That area was also the final settlement of the Maseko Ngoni who had initially come into Malawi in the 1830s. They, however, had gone south, around the lake, and then northward into the Songea region of Tanzania. Defeated, they retraced their steps around the lake, settling in the southern reaches of the central plateau. By the 1870s they dominated the area and began to expand into the Shire highlands. In the Shire river valley sixteen Kololo, who in 1864 chose to remain after following Livingstone on his explorations of the Malawi area, came to dominate many of the Mang'anja peoples of the region. Exploiting the disruptions of the Portuguese, these few men relied on their firearms, organizational abilities, and their connection with Livingstone to develop and control an effective state.

Wherever they settled in Malawi, the Ngoni and Kololo refugees from the Zulu <u>mfecane</u> were quite willing to use force. Conquest was the mode of establishing their power, which they sustained by raiding and further conquest. The highly organized military tactics they employed, and their superior military technology overwhelmed Malawi's peoples. Villages were utterly destroyed, the most desirable of the population taken as captives; the rest were killed or left to die. Terror of the Ngoni raiding parties and the Kololo-led warriors was widespread. Even the most powerful Chewa chief, Mwase Kasungu, was forced to reach an accommodation with the Ngoni. It was easily the most devastating experience

Malawians
the tota
Wher
David Liv
fact the
into Mala
was creat

sombet (ing Mazambila)

waterways

for slave Yes into

Misoni aft

the direc

serviced to be servic

And the second s

Malawians had then known and the foundation of their beliefs about the totality of war. 3

When he first saw the aftermath of Ngoni raiding among the Tonga, David Livingstone reported it as the results of the slave trade. In fact the slave trade came in the wake of Yao and Afro-Arab expansion into Malawi, and had a somewhat different impact. Much of this effect was created by the Yao, who after about 1860 were rapidly spreading into the area south of the lake and west of the Shire. These waterways afforded kinds of barriers, and still allowed the various competing Yao chieftancies access to their trading outlets in Mozambique and on the Indian Ocean. It was this trade, and the search for slaves to enlarge the followings of various chiefs, which drew the Yao into Malawi. But their arrival after 1860 was also part of the Ngoni aftermath: they were pushed from homes in Mozambique by both the direct and indirect effects of Ngoni raids in Tanzania.

The best general survey of the <u>mfecane</u> and its impact on central Africa is J.D. Omer-Cooper, <u>The Zulu Aftermath</u> (London: Longman, 1966). In addition to material in <u>The Early History of Malawi</u>, the Ngoni are treated by Ian Linden, "Some Oral Traditions from the Maseke Ngoni," <u>Society of Malawi Journal</u>, 24, 2(July 197!), 61-73. There is no comprehensive treatment of the Kolclo in Malawi; the best available, however, is Matthew Schoffeleers, "Livingstone and the Mang'anja Chiefs," in <u>Livingstone</u>: <u>Man of Africa</u>, ed.

B. Pachai (London: Longman, 1973), 111-130. Valuable commentary on Ngoni warfare and Malawi's peoples was developed in my interviews: 105, Diamond Caswell Chirwa, 1 August 1973; 111, Mugwinya Ngombe Nyirenda, 21 August 1973; 119, Village Headman Malomo, 7 August 1973; 170, Corporal Lipende, 14 September 1973.

The Yao are treated by Edward Alpers in The Early History of Malawi and in "Trade, State and Society amont the Yao in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of African History, 10(1969). Alpers is weakest, however, when dealing with the Yao in Malawi. A start on treating this important aspect of Yao history has been made by Y.M. Juwayeyi, "The Yao Chieftainship of Nkanda: a Preliminary History of its Origins and Growth to 1914." unpubl. University of Malawihis tory seminar paper, 1972-73.

The visient vithe vigon i

as suzera

Mgoni pre even if i

Yao and A lives of

dispair (

servitu-

Assess, revision Case State Case

Unaffected by the Ngoni, however, were the Swahili and Afro-Arabs from the east coast. Arriving at about mid-century, they established trading headquarters at the northern end of the lake and at Nkhotakota and also asserted their authority among Makanjira's Yao on the lake's eastern shore. They began, especially along the central lakeshore, to build dhows for lake transport to support their commercial activities. They also attempted to divert the trade in ivory and slaves to their own entrepôts, utilizing Lake Malawi as a kind of catchment to channel the commerce into their hands. This practice, of course, required establishing themselves as suzerains over the immediate areas of their commercial presence. 5

The Swahilis and Afro-Arabs, as the Yao, did not engage in violent warfare to establish and maintain their positions, unlike the Ngoni intervention in Malawi. In fact, the Yao feared Ngoni armies and attempted to avoid them; the Swahilis respected the Ngoni presence and did nothing to challenge Ngoni authority. But, even if ivory was the major item of trade, slaves, too, came to the Yao and Arabs. And slavery rightfully became a feared part of the lives of Malawians. Both those who were forced, for reasons of dispair or disruption, to enter themselves into relationships of servitude or those who were captured by slaving parties had untold

Malawi, and George Shepperson, "The Jumbe of Kota Kota and Some Aspects of the History of Islam in British Central Africa," in Islam in Tropical Africa, ed. by I.M. Lewis (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 194-205. Shepperson's account is in need of some revisions; see Melvin E. Page, "The Manyema Hordes of Tippu Tip: a Case Study in Social Stratification and the Slave Trade in Eastern Africa," International Journal of African Historical Studies, 7(1974), 83-84.

kionapped Along with wians.6 The ₩ro, as p of what h trade. F introduct Zation in an emotic Under the Malawi. sities! p and estab They face slavers a the more in a tim loci of

anxieties

livings:

 $^{\text{ing}}$ the

Withdre,

7. Is one. 1959). anxieties about their future. Children grew up in fear of being kidnapped or sent away forever with one of the slave caravans.

Along with the Ngoni wars, slavery became a living terror for Malawians.

These horrors had been seen by the humanitarian Livingstone who, as previously noted, assumed all such evils to be the results of what he perceived as the ubiquitous iniquities of the slave trade. From this view came a resolve to combat slavery through the introduction of Christianity, commerce--and through them--civilization into central Africa. Livingstone's eloquent appeal brought an emotional response from the United Kingdom's universities, and under their leadership the first European missionaries came to Malawi. Led by Livingstone himself, the young men of the Universities' Mission to Central Africa came up the Shire river in 1861 and established themselves at Magomero in the Shire highlands. They faced many difficulties, among them the conflicts between Yao slavers and Nyania victims. Conscience dictated intervention against the more powerful Yao, a decision which isolated the missionaries. In a time of conflict and associated famine, to be cut off from the loci of power was not only demoralizing but also dangerous. Following the death of the mission's leader, Bishop Mackenzie, the Europeans withdrew to the Shire valley, later to evacuate to Zanzibar.

In the wake of historiography dependent upon observations of Livingstone and his successors, this is a somewhat revisionist interpretation; see M.E. Page, "David Livingstone and the Jumbe of Nkhota-kota," Rhodesian History, 3(1972), 29-39.

⁷The best study of the Magomero missionaries, though popularized, is Owen Chadwick, <u>Mackenzie's Grave</u> (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1359).

to travel
the Free
Cape Mac l
Church of
Scottish
abandoned
Mew Living
cre-half (

Desp

ittroduced Comme

1878 the f

capitalize Detter kn

the Shire

tremendo.: transport

atting .

further :

h.c. c

ia) 541 -

ie cler

Despite its initial failure, the Universities' Mission in 1875 began to reestablish work in Malawi; these efforts were not complete until ten years later, when the mission steamer Charles Janson began to travel the lake. 1875 was also the year in which missionaries of the Free Church of Scotland began the Livingstonia mission, choosing Cape Maclear on the lake as their base. A year later the Established Church of Scotland also began a Malawi mission, located in the Shire highlands and named Blantyre, after Livingstone's birthplace. Both Scottish efforts succeeded, although the Cape Maclear location was abandoned in favor of more suitable sites at Bandawe and later the new Livingstonia near the northern end of the lake. By 1880 then, one-half of Livingstone's vision--Christianity--had been successfully introduced in Malawi.

Commerce, the other haif of the vision, was not far behind. In 1878 the first efforts of the Livingstonia Central Africa Company, capitalized in Scotland, were begun. This firm, later renamed and better known as the African Lakes Company, hoped to use the lake, the Shire, and the Zambesi to exploit what was believed to be a tremendous commercial potential. The A.L.C. took over all the transport for the Livingstonia mission, and much else as well, putting its own vessels on the waterways. Soon it was organizing further transportation and other enterprises. In the wake of the A.L.C. came others with their vessels on the lake and river, including the Universities' Mission, which hoped to use the water-ways as a highway into the interior, and at the same time to

eliminate trade. 8

With

became ine

missionary

rivalry be

was complidater by the

involvement

And the S

British g

Portugues

tish proti

the areas

torate.

Mala

tomever,

f; 52; f;

Part fro

eliminate Malawi as a focal point of the east African slave trade.

With so many of her subjects thrust into the region, Britain became inextricably involved. And with the access routes to the missionary spheres astride Portuguese territory, an understandable rivalry began between the two nations for the area. This competition was complicated first by the agressive activities of the Kololo, and later by the 1884 Massingire rebellion. Although the Portuguese put down the 1884 rising, the disruptions brought further British involvement. The African Lakes Company made agreements with the Kololo promising British protection (later temporarily retracted), and the Scots missionaries mounted a campaign at home to gain British government for the region. These pressures, and further Portuguese intrigues, led first to the 1889 declaration of a British protectorate over part of Malawi, followed in May 1891 by the inclusion of most of what is today Malawi within the Protectorate. Shortly thereafter an agreement was reached delineating the areas of Portuguese and British influence on the Shire. 9

Malawi thus became a part of the British Empire. It remained, however, for the first Commissioner and Consul-General, Harry Hamilton Johnston, to enforce London's rule in the country. The first five years were spent largely in accumulating revenue, in part from Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company, anxious to

These missionary and mercantile activities are described in B. Pachai, "Christianity and Commerce in Malawi: Some Pre-Colonial and Colonial Aspects," in Malawi Past and Present, ed. B. Pachai, G.W. Smith, and R.K. Tangri (Blantyre: C.L.A.I.M., 1971), pp. 37-68.

On these developments see P.R. Warhurst, "Portugal's Bid for Southern Malawi, 1882-1891," in Malawi Past and Present, pp. 20-36.

expand in as well, then the 1896 Joh Johnstun dent Col taxes. others fi by Europe before th rade, but ciples de Were not

Apa

of anothe atterpts

to Europe

¹⁸⁰⁶⁻³15t ^{issu}ed, y

sions sē;

ti_{ve.}

Ťήę ار را مان الم *e(\$ *6).

#¢-6 67-1

equeter eq

^भंड ∙्∫

expand north and east from Rhodesia. The first half decade was, as well, a period of conquest, as first reluctant Yao chiefs and then the Afro-Arabs of the northern lakeshore were subdued. After 1896 Johnston took steps to assure his control of the Protectorate.

Apart from the organization of a central administration, Johnston established a system of districts, in each of which resident Collectors maintained order, dispensed justice, and collected taxes. In addition, Johnston made efforts to stop Rhodes and others from alienating even more African land than had been acquired by Europeans prior to 1891 and to validate legitimate transfers made before that date. In these efforts extensive investigations were made, but only some land claims were recognized, based upon principles designed to ensure African rights. Naturally, these efforts were not uniformly effective, but probably did prevent the creation of another colony like Rhodesia. Less successful were Johnston's attempts to protect the rights of Africans resident on lands sold to Europeans. This goal was to have been accomplished through a "non-disturbance" clause included in all certificates of claim issued, but the changing African population soon made the provisions safequarding the original inhabitants almost totally ineffective.

The effect of Johnston's policies, then, was to make more and more demands upon Malawians. Those who resided on European lands--regardless of their rights under the "non-disturbance" clauses--were expected to pay rent, which for most meant a fixed period of labor each year, usually one month. Moreover, all males, no matter where they resided, were expected to pay tax on their dwellings.

generali it almos landlord found it such pra ensuring agricults such lab

The care to probably, in

sation. "

reflected

not what

|]•a•2a•

Without

Rever in the last section of the last section

Collination of the second of t

research of the clessing this congenerally referred to as "hut tax." For those on European estates, it almost always meant another month of working for their new landlords. In many cases Malawians not living on the estates found it necessary to seek employment in order to pay their taxes; such practices were encouraged by the government as a means of ensuring sufficient labor for European enterprise, commercial or agricultural. On some occasions government officials even required such labor of those otherwise unable to pay tax. 10

The demands for labor as a means of paying rent, and also tax, came to be known by the Chewa work thangata (lit. "help"). Originally, it referred to a system of "narrowly structured exchanges of services between chiefs and their dependents prior to British colonisation."

The application of the term to the colonial situation reflected a sense of new dependency and gradually came to represent not "help" but unwarranted demands for African service by Europeans.

"Thangata," asserted one of my informants, is "work which was done without real benefit."

In this context, the word came to symbolize,

In addition to articles by A.J. Dachs, R.H. Palmer, and C.A. Baker in The Early History of Malawi, see B. Pachai, "Land policies in Malawi: an examination of the colonial legacy," Journal of African History, 14(1973), 681-698; and Colin Baker, "Tax Collection in Malawi: An Administrative History, 1891-1972," International Journal of African Historical Studies, 8(1975), 40-62.

¹¹ J.A.K. Kandawire, "Local Leadership and Socio-Economic Changes in Chingale Area of Zomba District in Malawi," unpubl. Ph.D. diss., University of Edinburgh, 1972, p. 80.

Interview 26, Peter Nyimbiri, 13 September 1972. Throughout my research it was clear that Malawians had a generalized interpretation of the term thangata. Historiographically, however, it has been confined more to "labour-tenancy" on European estates; Pachai, "Land policies," p. 685. Also see B. Pachai, "The Issue of Thangata in the History of Nyasaland," Journal of Social Science (University of Malawi), 3(1975).

for all styled d little t that com subservia Teni century. efficier seers. F tore profor serv troublesc spread, w s'at'y ea and thenSouth Afr tion, tho فيشره ويو lf μ ^{\$5}_5h, b/ clated d the mort-13 The State of E

14 5.

for all Malawians, the worst features of British rule. Even the self-styled defenders of African rights, the missionaries, did and said little to counteract this belief. They, perhaps, had come to believe that commerce--ally of Christianity--benefited too much from African subservience.

Tenancy, taxation, and thangata continued into the twentieth century. Simultaneously, British administration became more "efficient," a goal both of local administrators and London overseers. For Malawians, of course, greater efficiency simply meant more pressures to meet requirements for tax, and even more important, for service. Not surprisingly means were sought to avoid these troublesome demands. Among the most effective, and the most widespread, was simple escape. Where it was possible, a few men would simply ease into Mozambique for brief stays to avoid tax payments and thangata. Many more sought work outside the protectorate, in South Africa, Rhodesia, and even a few in Mozambique. Labor migration, though, was continually opposed by a coalition of missionaries and commercial interests. 13

If Malawians themselves found their country a pathway to the south, better paying jobs, and escape from thangata and its associated demands, for Europeans Malawi was in some ways a "corridor to the north."

In part the latter view was due to the continued

The most comprehensive study of Malawian labor migration is Robert B. Boeder, "Malawians Abroad. The History of Labor Emigration from Malawi to its Neighbors, 1890 to the Present," unpubl. Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1974.

Norman H. Pollock, Jr., Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia: Corridor to the North (Pittsburgh: Duquensne University Press, 1971).

interest
Morthern
Africa.
Mighway,
relative
Even the
that Nya
ship, th
steamer,
vesselseasy acc
comerci
directly

Felations
and cool

1914, Ny.

between tainis c

Nesala.

or the o

throug-

اکر: و ا اوق و اوزوون اوزود: interest of Rhodes and others in using the protectorate, along with Northern Rhodesia, as a wedge to advance their interests in central Africa. But Nyasaland also continued to be valued as a commercial highway, its lake and river connections to the Zambesi providing a relatively easy transport route to the center of the continent.

Even the Germans, by 1890 established in Tanganyika, recognized that Nyasaland occupied such a position. Thus a German government ship, the Hermann von Wissmann, and for a time a Moravian mission steamer, joined the British government's Guendolen and several other vessels—government, commercial, and mission—on Lake Malawi. With easy access to the interior of their colony thus assured, German commercial interests also became involved in Nyasaland, both directly and through other firms.

Never openly hostile but generally suspicious, British-German relations in Nyasaland and on Lake Malawi gradually grew more formal and cool. 15 When war between the two countries did break out in 1914, Nyasaland naturally became a focal point, at least as far as the conflict spilled over into the colonies. Positioned as it was between Germany's most prized colony, German East Africa, and Britain's chief African interests in Rhodesia and South Africa, Nyasaland was a key corridor for carrying the war in one direction or the other. Whoever controlled the territory—and Britain remained throughout the war—would necessarily use its lake and river as an

¹⁵ This was noticed by the American missionary, Walter B. Cockerill; Berlin (Wisconsin) Courant, (24 June 1915), p. 1, as quoted in George Shepperson and Thomas Price, Independent African (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1958), p. 335.

world wa Tha elsenheri internat **t**trenera with proj the war I #illenia malified Predictio Europe. For t^i on, if Especia!| Foreign re keer drew oth it was b #€*e für

irportan

tion of

16 St. Lo. Notes, 1 St. Lo. Notes, 1 St. Seyon important transport and supply route; Malawi's importance to the
world was ensured.

That war, of course, did not come unexpectedly to Malawi. As elsewhere, there had been premonitions of trouble. In Europe, rising international tensions had anticipated the conflict. A large ephemeral literature appeared, both before and after 1914, dealing with prophecies of the war and its aftermath. Especially after the war had begun, it was easy to look back and see the "truth" in millenial and other visions of the projected hostilities. But even modified by hindsight, there was still an element of truth in the predictions, a sense of expectancy which had been felt not only in Europe.

For Malawians, there can be little questions of this anticipation, if not of the millenium, at least of a deepening crisis.

Especially after 1907, when control of Nyasaland passed from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office, European intervention was more keenly felt. More officials arrived, and commercial activities drew other Europeans into the country. If it were not clear before, it was becoming abundantly evident: the changes in Malawian life were fundamental, and probably irreversible. In such a world, the crisis of perogatives lost easily was transformed into an expectation of preeminence regained.

¹⁶ See, for example, [Walter Gorn Old], The Great Devastation (London: W. Foulsham, 1914); Thomas Graebner, Prophecy and the War (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1918); and Euston John Nurse, Prophecy and the War (London: Skeffington, 1915). Indicative of interest in such matters, the last work was, by 1918, appearing in a seventh and revised edition.

population officials conflict. fueled by Servan of the proxitive two Early collistrately and fueled by Surveyons 1901 Angli of the proposition of the proxitive two Early collistrates and the E

The

Concocted

the Gorma

heathen

Dogulat:

The

Ciquiet Lippear

ente-le-

\$10.gr (18 p.) \$10.ar (-) \$10.ar (-)

These anticipatory feelings were not confined to the African population of Nyasaland. Reflecting the concerns in Europe, officials, missionaries, planters--all had a sense of the impending conflict. Dr. Robert Laws recalled how his fears of war had been fueled by conversations with a "distinguished," yet intransiqent, German of some influence. 17 Such concerns were also developed from the proximity of German East Africa and the growing tensions between the two European peoples in central Africa. Even in the midst of early colonial cooperation there was a feeling of problems to come. Surveyors involved in the demarcation of the boundary prior to the 1901 Anglo-German Agreement were convinced that the northern border of the protectorate would eventually be embroiled in conflict with the Germans. 18 One expression of such fears was the scenario later concocted in some quarters of "a fratricidal combat on Lake Nyasa between the German and British gunboats, while crowds of astonished heathen lined the shore."19

These anxieties were not the sort to be shared with the African population, but there is little doubt that they contributed to the disquiet of the time. Moreover, however indirectly Malawians sensed European fears, their anxieties were undoubtedly intensified by the experience of those who directly experienced the growing Anglo-German

¹⁷W.P. Livingstone, <u>Laws of Livingstonia</u> (London: Hodder and Stoughton, n.d.), p. 349.

¹⁸ Personal communication from Mr. C.G.C. Martin, of the Malawi Department of Surveys, who is researching the history of geographical surveys in Malawi.

¹⁹ J.H. Morrison, Streams in the Desert: A Picture of Life in Livingstonia (1919; rpt. New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), p. 23.

tensions
who was lithe King!
Sharpe, a
excedition
Affred was
flooked a
to Nyasa
fears of

solidify
a series
coincide
fine met
many cla
in adjad
over the

expectat

21

#1957ar

tensions in east-central Africa. One of these was Aibu Chikwenga, who was later to become an influential non-commissioned officer in the King's African Rifles. In 1913 he was in the employ of Sir Alfred Sharpe, and accompanied the ex-Governor of Nyasaland on a hunting expedition in German East Africa. Aibu, his companions, and Sir Alfred were unaccountably arrested by the Germans, who kept them "locked up for four days and...shaved off the Governor's hair." Only after Sharpe "broke the lock of the place where he was being kept" and released his servants were they able to escape and return to Nyasaland. The circulation of such tales surely heightened the fears of Europeans, and doubtlessly influenced the growing sense of expectation within the African population.

There were other external and unrelated events which helped to solidify the troubled African mood. Among the most spectacular were a series of celestial phenomena beginning in 1907. In that year, coincident with Colonial Office control of the protectorate, "a very fine meteor burst with great explosion" over Ncheu. It was a signal, many claimed, and shortly thereafter a prophetess, Chanjiri, appeared in adjacent Portuguese East Africa. She promised to "send darkness over that portion of the country where the white men live (Shire Highlands)" and that if people would follow her she would "free

Aibu Chikwenga, "Aibu Chikwenga: An Autobiography," trans. and ed. C.A. Baker, Society of Malawi Journal, 25, 2(1972), 16. Sharpe's account of the journey does not mention this incident; The Backbone of Africa (London: Witherby, 1921), passim. It does not seem unduly out of the ordinary for Sharpe, who long labored in the shadow of Sir Harry Johnston, to have failed to write about so personally humiliating an incident; given the state of German-British relations, Aibu Chikwenga's account, even if exaggerated, remains plausible.

²¹Pearce to C.O., 31 August 1907, P.R.O., C.O. 525/18.

them for herself prophe words to heaven! Influential for the first heaven! When Charles two years the prophers two years.

Kan

He made

of [rar]

22

23 Sept 5 Sept 5

2L of 1-5 them from the tax and rule of the English and Portuguese."²² Though herself a Kunda, Chanjiri followed in a long tradition of Chewa prophets, and her name was one of the four traditional Chichewa words for the diety. These factors, along with the sign from the heavens, undoubtedly boosted her popularity. Many also were influenced by her millenial prophecies of a great conflagration and the imminent end of European rule.²³ On her suggestion, numbers of Africans were reported to have withheld their taxes and "remained in their houses...fasting and praying, expecting the second Advent."²⁴ Much to the relief of the government, these demonstrations passed when Chanjiri was moved deeper into Portuguese territory, away from the protectorate. But Chanjiri's comet was only one of several such phenomena in the few years prior to the war. A second appeared only two years later, and some associated it with the Watch Tower preacher Eliot Kamwana.

Kamwana, educated in the schools of the Livingstonia Mission, had broken with that institution over the imposition of school fees. He made his way to South Africa to work in the mines. In 1907 the ubiquitous Joseph Booth taught him the millenial Watch Tower doctrines of Charles Taze Russell. When Kamwana returned to Nyasaland the next

Zambesi Industrial Mission Occasional Paper (July-December 1909), p. 12.

Resistance in Nyasaland 1889-1939 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), p. 77; Jane and Ian Linden, "John Chilembwe and the New Jerusalem," Journal of African History, 12(1971), 631. Personal communication, Dr. Matthew Schoffeleers.

Question by A.M.D. Turnbull, oral evidence taken by Commission of Inquiry into the Chilembwe Rising, 6 July 1915, M.N.A., COM 6/2/1/2.

year, he the West successe people w of an er he claidawning.

fro Jes all

Des aries ateaching

of such

doon whi and he w

reporte:

the sky ^{desp}it€

tad app

25₅ 26₅ 51₁₀ 52/1/1

27.

25 26-64 20081

year, he began an extensive campaign of preaching and conversion in the West Nyasa district along the northern lakeshore. His greatest successes came in 1909, when he baptised an estimated ten thousand people who had been attracted by his preachings and his projections of an end to European rule. This culmination was to come about, he claimed, along with the great Russellite vision of the new age dawning, in October 1914:

I told them that in <code>[October]</code> 1914, as far as we understood from the Scriptures, was the full control of the world by Jesus Christ,...that gradually he would take control over all the world and that the blessing of the people would come.

- The beginning of the millenium <code>[sig].26</code>

Despite any of their own concerns about a possible war, missionaries and colonial functionaries alike were alarmed at Kamwana's teachings, especially since they were accompanied by the acquisition of such a huge following. Unmindful of the general sense of impending doom which Kamwana had merely exploited, the authorities arrested him and he was deported in June 1909. 27 Shortly thereafter, variously reported as late 1909 or early 1910, Halley's comet splashed across the sky above Malawi. 28 Reports are meager, but it seems that despite Kamwana's claims for a later arrival of Armageddon, many who had apparently heard his teachings took the fiery display as a signal

²⁵Shepperson and Price, pp. 150-56.

Testimony of Eliot Kamwana, oral evidence taken by Commission of Inquiry into the Chilembwe Rising, 15 July 1915, M.N.A., COM 6/2/1/3.

²⁷Shepperson and Price, p. 156.

According to several accounts found in the chronologies prepared for the 1966 Malawi Census and appearing in Malawi Calendar of Local and National Events (Zomba: National Statistical Office, 1966), n.p.

of an in area of all the Und this upf to make Similar Starli Wa just bef Atomisi, Micespre exceptat €andened in a Con sirply W Years in by Kam.

the int

Baptist

folio_{a :}

30, t-lots

32 \$4,000 \$4,000 of an immediate conflagration. Near Mua, south of Kamwana's chief area of influence, several hundred people fled their homes and made all the necessary preparations for the end of the world.

Undoubtedly the disappointment which followed in the wake of this unfulfilled expectation--and that following Chanjiri's failure to make good on her prophecies--lessened the importance of the similar celestial displays which followed. In 1912 a "shooting star" was one of the key events in Mzimba District and two years later. just before the outbreak of war, a "smoking star" was visible at Ntchisi, inland from Nkhotakota. Neither of these expressions stirred widespread excitement, but did serve to maintain the levels of expectations. 30 Likewise, the deportation of Kamwana only slightly dampened the enthusiasm of those Malawians who had come to believe in a Christian millenium dawning in 1914. Many Watch Tower adherents simply went underground, with groups functioning quietly for several years in Limbe and Ncheu. 31 Elsewhere the chiliastic ideas espoused by Kamwana and his followers were kept alive by the Seventh Day Baptists, without the previous "open militancy," largely through the influence of Charles Domingo and, indirectly, Joseph Booth. 32

The uneasy African mood was not only reflected among the followers of Chewa traditional religion and the relatively more

²⁹Linden, <u>Catholics</u>, p. 77; Linden, "John Chilembwe," p. 635.

³⁰ Malawi Calendar of Events, entries for Mzimba and Ntchisi districts.

Inden. "John Chilembwe." p. 636.

³²Kenneth Lohrentz, "Joseph Booth, Charles Domingo, and the Seventh Day Baptists in Northern Nyasaland, 1910-12," <u>Journal of African History</u>, 12(1971), 478 and <u>passim</u>.

recent (Muslim o religiou in Malav African These as with the the circ several

> Who pers Someth; was neve teach ing

ls:

in the y

from Cā Accordi

Manore, e

33

See or

Muslim communities of the country. Knowledge of the Islamic religious war of Seyyid Muhammed in Somalia undoubtedly circulated in Malawi, at least after 1910, when detachments of the King's African Rifles returned from service against the "mad mullah." 33 These askari, however, brought little sense of Mahdist expectations with them, and if they did such visions had no more impact than did the circulation within the country of similar Muslim millenial ideas several years earlier. 34

Islamic conversion and teaching nonetheless continued quietly in the years up to the war and alarmed the Christian missionaries who persisted in troubling the government with requests to do something about the situation. 35 But the threat to good order was never very real, and the only suggestion of serious millenial teaching within the Islamic community were some sketchy reports from Catholic mission stations in and around the Shire highlands. According to these accounts, "there was some agitation among Mahommedan people; they were saying that the Arabs will come and

³³Linden, Catholics, p. 75; Linden, "John Chilembwe," p. 641.

³⁴ Kota Kota Mission Diary, 5 October 1905, M.N.A., U.M.C.A. papers, KO 1/1/1; Nyasaland Diocesan Quarterly, 23(April 1909), 565. These events are discussed by Robert Greenstein, "The Nyasaland Government's Policy Towards African Muslims, 1900-1925," in From Nyasaland to Malawi, ed. R.J. Macdonald (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1975), pp. 144-158.

³⁵A.G. Blood, The History of the Universities' Mission to Central Africa, vol. 11, 1907-1932 (London: U.M.C.A., 1957), p. 62; also see Greenstein, "African Muslims," pp. 146-154.

we [if and na

were e

5

Msanje spirit

severa

in par

iceas.

tradit

to the

took a

iongst perhab

facuse

Serman

Would

E su-fac

Pose-t

36 POL 27

37 Correct Arrica

38 Servic

we [African Muslims] will join them and we will kill all Europeans and natives who refuse to accept our creed." 36

By 1914 the outlines of very real expectations of change again were emerging on the surface of Malawian life. In the south, around Nsanje, there seem to have been several changes within the traditional spirit mediumships. Although the evidence is not entirely uniform, several incumbent mediums were removed about this time, apparently in part due to their relatively close association with European ideas. This activity represented, of course, an assertion of traditional values in face of expanding European influence. The north, among the Ngonde around Karonga, the expectations took a more prophetic form. As the war drew closer, a series of longstanding, vague predictions concerning a great holocaust, perhaps fueled by experiences such as those of Aibu Chikwenga, were focused onto a projected conflict between the British and the Germans. The result, according to the prophets Njuli and Mwandisi, would be a German defeat and removal from the area.

Elsewhere in the country, similar revelations seem to have surfaced in the last weeks before the war. At Livingstonia, Robert Laws was told in August 1914, that local inhabitants

^{36&}lt;sub>L.T.</sub> Moggeridge to A.M.D. Turnbull, 3 February 1915, M.N.A. POL 2/8/1.

³⁷J.M. Schoffeleers, "The Prophets of Nsanje: A History of Spirit Mediumship in a Southern Malawian District," paper presented at the Conference on the Historical Study of African Religion in Eastern Africa, Nairobi, June 1974; and personal communication.

³⁸D.R. MacKenzie, The Spirit-Ridden Konde (London: Seeley, Service & Co., 1925), pp. 217-18, 222.

Accord

our holicoming

topen to

was life

worries

suppos

reactio An

the war

in wit:

their f

earlie:

of an A

spirit

sinile-

of pow.3

apiear.

35

() Sec

supposedly had known in advance of the approaching conflict.

According to his informants, "the foxes have been barking close to our houses, and even on the verandah. We knew that a war was coming."

Near the Catholic mission station at Utali, in the Upper Shire district, immediately before the war, African unease was likely heightened by European fears, particularly among the worried Dutch and French missionaries. There, a noticeable increase in witchcraft allegations capped an already rising and diverse reaction to the European presence.

Among independent African Christians, too, the weeks prior to the war brought a renewed interest in the apocalyptic aspects of their faith, and Watch Tower teachings again received considerable attention. Some may have heard of the appearance, a few months earlier among the Lamba people of the Northern Rhodesian copperbelt, of an African who claimed to be Christ and who promised a new law to govern the land. For others, the traditional stirrings—of spirit mediums in Nsange, Ngonde prophets in Karonga, and other similar indications—were enough to send them to their new source of power, the Bible, for confirmation of the troubled times which appeared to be ahead.

³⁹ Livingstone, Laws, p. 350.

⁴⁰ Linden, Catholics, pp. 79-80; Linden, "John Chilembwe," p. 636.

⁴¹ See the letter of H. Simon Achirwa in <u>The Watchtower</u>, 35, 17 (1 September 1914). The increased Malawian interest at this time in the apocalyptic books of the Bible is noted by the Lindens, "John Chilembwe," p. 636.

⁴² L.H. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, Early Days to 1953 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1964), p. 167.

Dâ

seems t

Islam.

and the

Christi

arms to

Zomba d

militan

KNOWN 8

the of

Msanje;

distric

the Euro

lert cr

Mauludi

a plot,

Country to ente

Al

in fact

Price,

Masari Bation 45]

!\$\\$,

of Ing

David Kaduva, one of the chief followers of John Chilembwe. seems to have tempered his Christian views with ideas from messianic Islam. Kaduya had been in Somaliland with the King's African Rifles. and the religious war which he saw there had its impact upon his own Christian faith. 43 In the middle of 1914 he was traveling about Zomba district, preaching the necessity for Africans to take up arms to bring the kingdom of God to an earthly reality. His militant approach to Christian eschatology was apparently widely known among members of Chilembwe's Providence Industrial Mission. One of them, Daniel Mungalama, was working as a clerk and typist at Nsanje; he wrote to Kaduya in June 1914, indicating that four of the district police had expressed a willingness to take up arms against the Europeans. 45 It was probably Kaduya's well-known militancy which lent credibility to reports reaching the Catholic missionaries at Nguludi in late July 1914. "that John Chilembwe was busy preparing a plot, his aim being the slaughtering of all Europeans of this Country, and even of those natives who would refuse to join him and to enter his sect."46

Although it is now impossible to determine if Chilembwe had, in fact, made plans for his January 1915 rising prior to the

⁴³ See Linden, "John Chilembwe," p. 641; and also Shepperson and Price, pp. 259, 484.

Statement of George Masangano, 26 January 1915, M.N.A., S 10/1/2. Masangano's statement was taken by E. Costley-White during the investigation into the Chilembwe rising.

⁴⁵ Assistant Chief Secretary to Resident, Port Herald, 19 February 1915, M.N.A., NSP 1/2/2.

⁴⁶ Testimony of Bishop Auneau, oral evidence taken by Commission of Inquiry into the Chilembwe Rising, 28 June 1915, M.N.A., COM 6/2/1/1.

outbre millen Provide Cathol would : the en Njilihi-sel brothe Chiler: Although Fillen widesp

> Mnenye Missio 42

to dis

43 ¹/1/1. 5.

resort howeve dent, Sover-associ Mosca Fisia Mator Statis Charles Charles

outbreak of the First World War, his followers did have serious millenial expectations before August 1914. In July, a member of the Providence Industrial Mission church warned Paulos Mwenye, a Catholic catechist, that since 1914 was the year in which Europeans would try to destroy the Africans, he should make preparations for the end. A similar warning was given to Gordon Mataka by Duncan Njilima at about the same time, perhaps in the presence of Chilembyle himself. And in a letter to Chilembwe late in July, Eliot Achirwa, brother of Eliot Kamwana, made reference to a discussion he and Chilembwe had earlier concerning the coming of Armageddon. Although he may not have believed personally in the imminent millenium, by war's eve Chilembwe certainly was aware of the widespread acceptance of such views and appears to have done nothing to discourage them.

⁴⁷ Statement of Paulos Mwenye, August 1914, M.N.A., S 10/1/6. Mwenye's encounter had given rise to the concerns of Catholic missionaries expressed by Bishop Auneau.

⁴⁸ Trial testimony of Gordon Mataka, M.N.A., S 10/1/3.

⁴⁹ Eliot Y. Achirwa to John Chilembwe, 26 July 1914, M.N.A., NCN 4/1/1.

⁵⁰Yotam Bango, questioned by L.T. Moggeridge in mid-October 1914, reported that Chilembwe expected the second coming in October 1914; however, it is not clear when Chilembwe made such statements. Resident, Blantyre, to Chief Secretary, 24 October 1914, M.N.A., S 10/1/6.

⁵¹ Clearly it was the accumulation of such evidence that led government authorities, and thus other contemporary observers, to associate Chilembwe and his rising with Watch Tower teachings. L.T. Moggeridge, Blantyre Resident, told the commission investigating the rising that "there is no doubt, I think, that Chilembwe like so many other ill-instructed native Christians, was much impressed by the Watch Tower prophecy of the end of the world in October, 1914"; statement, 28 June 1915, M.N.A., COM 6/2/1/1. Most historians have discounted this, and sought other explanations for Chilembwe's motives and actions. See Shepperson and Price, pp. 231-2;

Go

fo re

ca:

aro

Zon

fif

news

he-e

115

Robers
Chile
eds.
Press
to thisto
1966)
John
Mane
Prets
Prets
Crit
Some

1.4. So the State of

When the news of war reached Malawi, then, the very real anticipation felt by many sections of the populace served to help speed the news throughout the country. The first hint came on 29 July, when Governor Smith was ordered to mobilize the protectorate's defense forces. The next day regular King's African Rifles askari were recalled from leave, and K.A.R. reservists called up. Residents were cabled to effect the orders in their districts, and the small bomas far from Zomba were directed to keep their telegraph receivers operating around the clock for further instructions. By 1 August 1914, askari and reservists began to report to the military centers at Mangoche and Zomba; within three days most were available for duty. At Zomba, fifty-four unsolicited recruits were enlisted as gun bearers; already news of the emergency was reaching the villages, and some of the people were beginning to react. On 4 August the call-up was extended to include all civil police, seconded to Zomba for service as soldiers. 52

Robert I. Rotberg, "Psychological Stress and the Question of Identity: Chilembwe's Revolt Reconsidered," in Protest and Power in Black Africa, eds. R.I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 359; Roger K. Tangri, African Reaction and Resistance to the Early Colonial Situation in Malawi, 1891-1915, Central African Historical Association local series pamphlet, number 25 (Salisbury, 1968), p. 13; Bridglal Pachai, "An Assessment of the Events Leading to the Nyasaland Rising of 1915," in Malawi Past and Present, pp. 114-36. In their article on "John Chilembwe and the New Jerusalem," Jane and Ian Linden have successfully questioned these recent interpretations, once again stressing the millenial aspects, though not necessarily the Watch Tower connections, of Chilembwe's views. Their criticisms of Shepperson and Price and of Rotberg, however, are sometimes strained.

M.A.P.A.R.O.; "North Nyasa District and the War (1914-18)," Nyasaland Journal, 17, 1(January 1964), 16, 21; Colonel H.P. Williams, "An Account of the part played by the 1st Regiment of the King's African Rifles in the Conquest of German East Africa," undated mss. in First Battalion, King's African Rifles scrap book, M.A.P.A.R.O. According to one informant, the call-up of K.A.R. veterans and reservists prompted considerable interest in enlistment: interview 13, Daisa Songolo, 17 August 1972.

Germa

were

the g

editi

Degan

missi

the s

Bisno

the e

This

at Fo

W - _

ηρητη

Made

farij

to be

at la

heac.

14(1 Inst Me) -

8;₅;

Actual news of war was received early on 5 August 1914, as German forces in Europe were already well into Belgium. Telegrams were sent to all administrative centers in the protectorate, and the governor's proclamation of war was issued in a special abbreviated edition of the Nyasaland Government Gazette. 53 The district residents began to spread the word, first among the European population. The missionaries at Nkhotakota first heard about the war on 6 August, the same day that the Reverend G. H. Wilson wrote of the news to the Bishop of Nyasaland, sending his letter overland by messenger, along the eastern lakeshore, to U.M.C.A. headquarters on Likoma Island. 54 This route was necessary, as all lake vessels were being concentrated at Fort Johnston, first to find and destroy the German steamer Hermann von Wissmann, and second to transport the available forces northward for the defense of the country. These preparations also made it necessary for Mr. J. A. Griffiths, a veterinary officer familiar with the frontier region, to proceed overland from Zomba to begin intelligence work along the northern border. 55

From the bomas and the mission stations the word spread quickly, at least in some parts of the country. Chiefs and some village headmen were informed by European officials and government messengers.

^{53&}quot;North Nyasa and the War," p. 16; Nyasaland Government Gazette, 14(1914), 151. The news had reached the British official community in India several hours before it was known in Nyasaland; Colonel R. Meinertzhagen, Army Diary 1899-1926 (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1960), p. 79.

⁵⁴Kota Kota Mission diary, 6 August 1914, KO 1/1/2; Wilson to Bishop of Nyasaland, 6 August 1914, UN 1/1/2/15/1; Likoma Steamers Log, 15 August 1914, unclassified; all M.N.A., U.M.C.A. papers.

North Nyasa and the War," p. 16.

who d Wilso throu the K

The m

remot until

broug day b

> reach War n

Preci

trip

®ê Ç⊓

\$0ut}

1914, Kacor Petro

to since the terms of the terms

The missionaries, too, told many Africans and tried to reassure those who did not understand. 56 The journeys of Griffiths and Reverend Wilson's messenger also helped bring the news of war to the countryside through which they passed. By 8 August 1914, most of the villages in the Kasupe and Ncheu areas appear to have heard about the European war. 57 It took longer for the news to filter through to the more remote parts of the protectorate: the issolated Likoma did not know until the unscheduled return of the mission steamer Charles Janson brought word from Nkhotakota on 12 August; even so, it was the next day before all the Europeans were informed. (Wilson's letter did not reach the bishop until 15 August.)⁵⁸ Among the last to learn of the war may have been some of the K.A.R. askari, who were never told precisely what was happening, even as they were mobilized for the trip to the German East African boundary. A few understood the magnitude of the exercise when they observed German captives brought south after the destruction of the Hermann von Wissmann. 59

⁵⁶ Manning (Resident, Nkhotakota) to Bishop of Nyasaland, 7 August 1914, M.N.A., U.M.C.A. papers, UN 1/1/2/15/1. Interviews: 29, Belo Kaponya, 14 September 1972; 110, E. C. Banda, 15 August 1973; 118, Petro Zeni-zeni, 6 August 1973.

⁵⁷Linden, <u>Catholics</u>, p. 85. Although the Lindens cite no evidence to support their assertion, this seems consistent with other available information; perhaps Griffiths' journey, which must have taken him through some areas in the two districts, had a part in the quickness with which the news spread.

⁵⁸Likoma Steamers Log, 11-15 August 1914, M.N.A., U.M.C.A. papers, unclassified; St. Michael's College Logbook, 13 August 1914, in the possession of the College, Malindi. (In 1914, St. Michael's College was located on Likoma Island; subsequently, the College was transferred to Malindi, near the south end of Lake Malawi.)

⁵⁹Interview 23, Johnathon Phiri, 5 September 1972.

extrac

W

inform

about

sligh

The f

#cb;!

dispe

W22 1

c1.05€

ne:t

late

At :

۷۴۲۲

1 / a a c

Within a few weeks, most people were aware that something extraordinary was happening. "It is difficult not to know," an informant said, "that there is war somewhere; even the children heard about it." For Malawian society, it was a telling remark. At the slightest hint of some kind of trouble stories began to circulate. The first were "rumors of a native rising as the cause" of the troop mobilization; these apparently were not widespread and quickly dispelled by the district residents. But before long the country was rife with other rumors, many of them utterly fantastic. One close observer of the African population, a solitary, strange figure, neither missionary nor British colonialist—Hans Coudenhove—wrote later that

many different versions were current among natives as to the origin of the war...the most fantastic explanations being, of course, those which were most readily believed. One favorite and widely spread story was, that the son of the 'Sultan' of the English had owned a white mule, and the son of the 'Sultan' of the Germans a black one, that they had quarreled over the merits of their respective mounts, and that the war between the peoples followed as a consequence.62

At Nkhoma, the Dutch Reformed missionaries observed in their vernacular newspaper that many "lies" were being circulated and

⁶⁰ Interview 11, Maulidi Mwina, 15 August 1972.

⁶¹ Smith to C.O., 14 August 1914, P.R.O., C.O. 525/57. Smith's report brought the reaction, in the form of a minute by a lesser official of the Colonial Office, that "Nyasaland would be the last country in Africa where there would be any native trouble: the natives are all peacefully disposed & very well content with British administration."

Hans Coudenhove, My African Neighbors: Man, Bird, and Beast in Nyasaland (London: Jonathan Cape, 1925), pp. 69-70. Of German ancestry, Coudenhove was suspect during the war and detained as an alien enemy, although not interned, as were most who fell in this category.

cauti villa

missi not u

Smith at Go

Puzz l

Chris

the e

at a

was ,

were

disda

even

Popu

an in

Mand

ಕಿಗಿರ

(Je.

cautioned their readers to be wary of stories being spread about the villages. 63

Questions, too, were manifold and often embarrassing to missionaries, whose Christian pronouncements of love and peace had, not unnaturally, been associated with Europeans generally. Alexander Smith, whose small Baptist Industrial Mission of Scotland was located at Gowa in Ncheu district, recalled that Malawians whom he knew were puzzled by the war and asked many questions: "Are the Germans Christians? Why have the Christian countries gone to war? Have the evil spirits got into the hearts of the Kings?" Similar inquiries came to most of the European clergy and their lay helpers; at a time of government crisis, they alone were sources of news. It was received, we are told, "with eager interest," and the people were encouraged to depend upon the European churches for information, disdaining the famous "bush telegraph" as a channel for reports of events.

Even where information was available, the reactions of the populace were often severe. At Nkhotakota the news of war prompted an immediate consultation with "the oracle who told the villagers"

⁶³ Mthenga wa ku Nyasa, 3, 17 (October 1914), 15. Mr. E.C. Mandala kindly translated excerpts from this journal.

⁶⁴ Scottish Baptist Yearbook (1915), as quoted in Shepperson and Price, p. 230.

⁶⁵Alexander Hetherwick, quoted in <u>Life and Work in Nyasaland</u> (January-March 1915), p. 1.

⁶⁶ Mthenga wa ku Nyasa, 3, 17 (October 1914), 16.

recall
town
the b
Some
and g
week
Stat
have
away
down
of w

that

Popu

from

Haan

9200

Prie Prie Mis:

Yς

\$ h

that war would begin at noon, or 3:30 the next day!" Perhaps recalling Johnston's punitive expeditions, the inhabitants of the town feared an attack by lake steamer. Quickly they deserted into the bush, "leaving their possessions in charge of the mission." 68 Some returned the next day to collect food which they had left behind. and gradually the people came back. "But for the better part of a week there was scarcely a soul about the place except on the Mission station." Similar fears, though perhaps much more realistic, may have been felt around Karonga in the north, where refugees moved away from the frontier and some even took passage on vessels heading down the lake. 70 Much further to the south, around Zomba, the news of war brought fears of "the old horrors of war" which were remembered from the last days of the slave raiders. As they had years previously, "many sought safety in the woods," and it was some time before the populace slept soundly again. 71 It was, in short, "an event of apocalyptic magnitude."72

^{67 [}H.E. Munby], "In Troubled Times," <u>Central Africa</u>, 33(1915), 40. The article is signed only "M.," but it seems likely that Munby, the priest-in-charge at Nkhotakota during 1914, was the author; perhaps he wished to avoid any censorship problems, a difficulty mentioned in the article.

⁶⁸ Kota Kota Mission diary, 6 August 1914, M.N.A., U.M.C.A. papers, KO 1/1/2.

⁶⁹ Munby, "Troubled Times," p. 39.

^{70&}lt;sub>S.S.</sub> Chauncy Maples logbook, 27 August 1914, S.M.L.

⁷¹ Life and Work in Nyasaland (January-March 1915), p. 20; questionnaire KS/12, Cross Mataka, 16 April 1974. Also see Pollock, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, p. 297.

⁷² Shepperson and Price, pp. 229-30.

mas s disti

neld

Attr at C

Afri arri

\$tep

unde

helo

and inte

Was

was it i

Mer,

f;_{re}

GSA

Among the active Watch Tower adherents, and among those who held similar views of the approaching Christian millenium, the war was seen as the beginning of the end. In the area around West Nyasa district, which had been the region of Eliot Kamwana's greatest influence, there was some evidence of "unrest" during August 1914.

Attributed by protectorate officials to Kamwana's continued detention at Chinde, 73 it seems more probable that this uncertainty among the African population was merely an expression of conviction in the arrival of Armageddon. Kamwana himself was of this opinion and took steps to make certain his followers were aware of events and understood their full implications. From Chinde, where he was being held, he wrote a letter, dated 9 August 1914, to his "Dear Brothers and Co-Labourers in the Harvest." The harvest symbolism was surely intentional, as Kamwana's message was of the great cataclysm which was propelling events toward the expected October climax. 74

Watch Tower adherents were certainly convinced. "Eliot Kamwana was right; the war and the troubles he prophesied had come true, and it was exactly 1914!" Others, previously skeptical, were willing now to believe. "We thought Eliot Kamwana was just dreaming, but we were wrong." Watch Tower congregations sang courses of "Fire, fire in Sodom." joined by new converts. But the expectations

 $^{^{73}}$ Undated memo by A.M.D. Turnbull on "Elliott Kamwana," M.N.A., GOA $^{2/4}/14$.

^{74&}lt;sub>M.N.A.</sub>, S 10/1/8/2.

⁷⁵ Interview 110, E.C. Banda, 15 August 1973.

⁷⁶ Interview 114, Kakalala Phiri, 27 August 1973.

fulfilled produced fears as well, terrors that "this war would wipe out all the human race." In the central region Dutch Reformed missionaries took special pains to discourage belief in reports that Europeans were coming to kill all the Africans, although they appear to have convinced few people. 78

At Chiradzulu John Chilembwe, whose flock received the news of war with some millenial sense, was also fearful. "I am afraid of the war," he wrote simply sometime in August. 79 These fears appear to have derived from his reported concern that "the Europeans were making slaves of us and getting us killed in war." Chilembwe expressed this view eloquently in a letter to the Nyasaland Times, probably written in November, but which was excised from the paper by the government censor. 81 In part, Chilembwe wrote:

We understand that we have been invited to shed our innocent blood in this world's war which is now in progress throughout the wide world...

A number of our people have already shed their blood, while some are crippled for life. And an open declaration has been issued. A number of Police are marching in various villages persuading well built natives to join in the war. The masses of our people are ready to put on uniforms ignorant of what they have to face or why they have to face it...

⁷⁷ Interview 105, Diamond Caswell Chirwa, 1 August 1973.

⁷⁸ Mthenga wa ku Nyasa, 3, 17 (October 1914), 15.

 $⁷⁹_{\underline{\text{The Mission Herald}}}$, 10(October 1914), 3, quoted in Shepperson and Price, p. 233.

⁸⁰ Statement of Abraham Chimbia, 24 February 1915, M.N.A., \$ 10/1/2. Also, the testimony of R.S. Hynde on 12 July 1915 before the commission investigating the rising that Chilembwe, in his sermons, was "constantly referring to the war"; M.N.A., COM 6/2/1/3.

⁸¹ The letter, a discussion of its probable date of authorship, and the story of its censorship can be found in Shepperson and Price, pp. 233-6. The text of the letter is also found in M.N.A., GOA 2/4/14.

Alth afte

Cawn

firs

P. E

info

'Az.

atta

fact

grov.

repo

0ff4

Ch.

the reg

wo.

the

Ş--

If it were a war...for honour, Government gain of riches, etc., we would have been boldly told: Let the rich men, bankers, titled men, storekeepers, farmers, and landlords go to war and get shot. Instead the poor Africans who have nothing to own in this present world, who in death leave only a long line of widows and orphans in utter want and dire distress, are invited to die for a cause which is not theirs. It is too late now to talk of what might or might not have been. Whatsoever be the reasons why we are invited to join in the war, the fact remains, we are invited to die for Nyasaland.

Although written after Malawian askari were killed at Karonga, and after October had passed without any further sign of the millenial dawn, Chilembwe almost certainly developed these ideas within the first month of the conflict.

Writing from Chiradzulu in mid-August, the Assistant Resident,

P. E. Mitchell (later Sir Phillip Mitchell, Governor of Kenya),
informed his superior officer, the Blantyre resident, that "the
'Azungu' [Europeans] are said by J. C. [Chilembwe] to be going to
attack the natives in November."

82 Little might be made of this--in
fact little was at the time--for sketchy reports of Chilembwe's
growing anti-European attitudes had been heard before. But Mitchell's
report on this occasion came only about a week after the governor's
official proclamation of war and the call-up of the K.A.R. reserves.

Chilembwe knew about these happenings and may even have read about
them in the Government Gazette, which he appears to have received
regularly. Undoubtedly he was also aware that a European war
would mean many more called, or taken, for service. His reaction,
then, might well have been as Mitchell reported. Duncan Njilima

⁸²Mitchell to Moggeridge, 18 August 1914, quoted in Governor Smith to Judge Lyall Grant, 5 June 1915, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/14.

recal

Janua

Gaze:

and A

nessa

Rumo: Indus

comin

Chile

eage

deve∣

unexp

m:1;

for p

gave

ಕಿರಿದ್ದ Noa-

Tac:

ta. N. A.

9 C F

recalled Chilembwe made a similar statement, though probably in January 1915, while holding what appeared to be a copy of the $\underline{\text{Gazette}}$.

and African suffering; his followers were known to be preaching a message of the coming blood bath in the villages around his church. However, and further afield as well, that Europeans were coming to kill all Africans, and further afield as well, that Europeans were coming to kill all Africans, and further afield as well, that Europeans were coming to kill all Africans, and further afield as well, that Europeans were coming to kill all Africans, and further afield as well, that Europeans were coming to kill all Africans, and easily transmuted version of Chilembwe's later letter to the Times. That his ideas, spread by eager young followers or simply by word of mouth, should be developed and transformed is not surprising. Nor would it be unexpected for his message to have a different, and probably more militant, form when presented to his own people than when polished for publication in the European press.

It may have been this message, or a distortion of it, which gave rise to another more comforting rumor making the rounds in and about Chiradzulu. Chilembwe's P.I.M., it was said, would be like Noah's Ark and rescue the people from the modern flood which was

⁸³ Statement of Duncan Njilima, 17 February 1915, M.N.A., S 2/18/22. It is possible that Njilima confused the dates, though other statements made by participants in the rising tend to confirm the January 1915 time, as does Pachai's analysis of the immediate cause of the outbreak of the rising on 23 January; "Nyasaland Rising," p. 130.

Testimony of Chiradzulu Police Sergeant Nkwanda, oral evidence taken by Commission of Inquiry into the Chilembwe Rising, July 1915, M.N.A., COM 6/2/1/3.

⁸⁵Assistant Resident, Chiradzulu, to Resident, Blantyre, 19 October 1914, M.N.A., S 10/1/6. These reports had been obtained by Church of Scotland (Blantyre Mission) native teachers in the district at the request of the assistant resident.

about Karon

was e

Sugge

in to

fate.

risin

the] adhit

leado

Cavio

probá Spod

P.1.

Whic

just

have is a

ext The Po.

0⊙-

about to engulf the country. After the reports of fighting at Karonga in early September, Chilembwe, the American-educated leader, was easily associated with further, more fantastic rumors. These suggested that Americans and not Germans were fighting the British in the north, having come to rescue the Africans from their terrible fate. 86

While they may not have presaged any plans for the January 1915 rising, such visions of Chilembwe the saviour were easily grasped by the local population. Frustrated by the millenium missed, forced to admit that "the prophecy has come to nothing," Kamwana urged the leader of the P.I.M. to continue waiting for the dawn. But David Kaduya, imbued with the visions of a religious war in Somalia, probably insisted that a violent struggle would be required to make good the expectations which now fell alone on Chilembwe and the P.I.M. 88

This feeling about Chilembwe, the last hope for the expectations which preceded the war and now were dashed by it, was not confined just to Chiradzulu, Blantyre, or the southern region. It seems to have spread over much of the country and, despite weakening memories, is a view reflected today. In all parts of the country, certainly

Resident, Blantyre, to Chief Secretary, 11 December 1914, extracted in Smith to Lyall Grant, 5 June 1915, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/14. These rumors are discussed <u>in extenso</u> by Linden, "John Chilembwe," pp. 637-9.

⁸⁷Testimony of Eliot Kamwana, 15 July 1915, oral evidence taken by Commission of Inquiry into the Chilembwe Rising, M.N.A., COM 6/2/1/3.

^{88&}lt;sub>On the conflicting views of Kamwana and Kaduya, and their influence upon Chilembwe, see Linden, "John Chilembwe," pp. 640-41, 646-7.</sub>

coe

as t

expe

of u

the

holo

worl

to t

litt the

∧-a

soug

lire

Wen fest

coexisting with other images, a few Malawians remember John Chilembwe as the cause, or the instigator, of the First World War. ⁸⁹ For them, this pre-nationalist figure, whose effort at asserting Malawian expectations and African rights was unsuccessful, is the only means of understanding the great conflict into which the country was plunged. Nothing short of such a cause could explain--or justify--the years of suffering which followed.

For many, perhaps most, Malawians that image of John Chilembwe holds little meaning. While they, too, suffered in the changing world of the pre-war years, theirs were inchoate expectations of change to come. The first news of war, though it trickled through to them, and even may have excited their fancy, initially meant little. The full impact came only with the suffering. For them, the memories of the coming of the war have little to do with Armageddon or John Chilembwe. Rather, it was when men were first sought out as askari and impressed for service on the almost endless lines of communications that the war had real meaning. Only then, when the great conflagration of pre-war expectations was openly manifest, did World War One truly engulf Malawi.

⁸⁹ Interview 49, Elias Makunganya, 4 January 1973. Questionnaires: DZ/1, Yohanne Kampelewera Chisale, 9 April 1973; DZ/5, Efremu Mthupi Chisale, 14 April 1973; MZ/4, Hunder Mahobe, 5 April 1973; NS/3, Johas Chiriwehka, 23 August 1973; TH/1, Mr. Maphazi, 21 April 1973. Also interview with Mr. Isaac Jeremani, broadcast 9 October 1972 by Malawi Broadcasting Corporation.

⁹⁰ Questionnaires: DZ/8, Village Headman Njati Phiri, 10 April 1974; DZ/18, Izeki Katsache, 15 April 1974; DZ/45, Charlesi Mbemba, 13 September 1974. Interviews: 82, Kalokwete Wadi Likwapi, 8 April 1973; 116, Amos Isaac, 14 July 1973; 131, Malowa Mwali, 6 December 1973.

War

fron King

> of t fro-

Defo

Supp

ca!;

offe Ti gh

the:

nuc:

₩ĉ. re:

1. ed (c)

CHAPTER TWO: THE WAR OF THANGATA

The first demand upon Nyasaland's manpower during the Great War was for soldiers to defend the protectorate's exposed northern frontier. No sooner had the askari and retired veterans of the King's African Rifles been mobilized, than the European population of the country was also called up for service. They came largely from the ranks of the Nyasaland Volunteer Reserve which had been, before the war, little more than a shooting club with ammunition supplied by the government. Although a number answered the call—some coming from both Northern and Southern Rhodesia to offer their services—the outpouring was not nearly so great as might be imagined. Not a few preferred to remain at the tasks of their estates and other enterprises.

African response to the demand for soldiers was initially much greater. As word of the mobilization spread, men found their way to Zomba to enlist, following the askari, retired veterans, and reservists who had been recalled. Some came from as far away as

Nyasaland Government Gazette, 21(1914), 161; Sir George Smith, "Nyasaland and General Northey's Campaign," in The Empire at War, ed. Sir Charles Lucas, vol. 4 (London: Oxford University Press, 1925), p. 273.

²Interview 13, Daisa Songolo, 17 August 1972.

nor any the Bia with the the

jou ent to the

no:

Cristo j

0ες

5 (5)

M. (3.

northern Mozambique, usually attracted by the far higher wages than any offered in Portuguese territory. The first few months of the war the response was almost overwhelming. In November the Blantyre resident, L. T. Moggeridge, reported that "from the readiness with which men are coming in here, I should judge that there will be no manner of difficulty in raising the number of recruits asked for."

In fact a number were rejected, with no apparent decline in the volume of volunteers.

Notwithstanding the initial response of African volunteers, it was not long before active recruitment began, first along the northern frontier. When J. A. Griffiths completed his overland journey to Karonga and the Songwe River, his immediate task was to enlist African assistants for his intelligence operations. He appealed to the local population to assist in the defense of their country from the German threat. Many were unimpressed by this argument, but Griffiths managed to persuade a number of Africans, some reluctantly, to join him. Later, other Africans were appalled by the vicious German attacks along the frontier and assisted, either as active scouts or occasional "spies." In September about one hundred and thirty Ngoni

³Frank Dupuis to Professor R. Coupland, 26 January 1959, M.N.A., Dupuis papers, DU 1/1/1; interview 18, Yosefe Chikoti, 22 August 1972.

Resident, Blantyre to Chief Secretary, 14 November 1914, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/2; underlining in original.

Colonel C.W. Barton, diaries, notebook 34, 2 December 1914, Museum of the Northamptonshire Regiment [hereafter M.N.R.], Northampton.

⁶Questionnaires: KR/6, G. Mukwasi Nyirenda, 9 April 1973; KR/8, Makanjira Chirwa, 11 April 1973. Both of these men served as scouts under Griffiths. Also see Nyasaland Field Force War Diary, 12 February 1915, M.A.P.A.R.O.

wer Mai Mifo sin com hav tha off the

> Afr Wool the

hea:

Reet ₩⊦en

46-6

lard the

30{

\$ c

9.

warriors, armed with their traditional spears, were recruited from Mzimba district for service on the northern frontier. Intended "for special service as scouts and skirmishers," they were singularly unsuccessful. From the start they impressed no one, the commander of the Field Force observing "these people might as well have stopped at home." In fact, they were sent home after less than a month of service.

Learning from the experience of these early recruitment efforts, officials ceased enlisting African irregulars in Nyasaland, although they continued to impress the nature of the German threat upon the protectorate's people. Throughout the country, chiefs and village headmen were requested to encourage young men to enlist in the King's African Rifles. The most effective argument was that the Germans would come into Nyasaland, take away the land, and enslave or kill the African population. Chiefs spread the word, often calling meetings of their followers to encourage enlistment, clarifying when necessary, and cajoling their subjects into agreement. Many were enticed by the fear of another conquest; others acquiesced in deference to their traditional leaders. "We wanted to defend our land," one informant explained, and another noted astutely that "if the land is taken away from our masters we too shall have no land."

^{7&}lt;sub>Smith</sub> to C.O., 12 September 1914, P.R.O., C.O. 537/27; questionnaire MZ/10, Eneya Lungu, 11 April 1973.

^{8&}lt;sub>Barton diaries</sub>, notebook 33, 24 September 1914, M.N.R.

⁹ Laws to Stuart, 23 September 1914, and Laws to McMinn, 19 October 1914, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission Papers, letter book no. 24.

Interview 105, Diamond Caswell Chirwa, 1 August 1973; questionnaire ZA/1, Che Lukose, 7 April 1973.

Alth

camp

the

the

leas

Ge rm K.A.

Germ

Ge T

Pret

sche

lear

Kana

أترو

inj.

Æ. LO,

th.

à:

Although little is said in official European accounts about this campaign, it is evident from African sources that such appeals were the major thrust of King's African Rifles recruiting efforts during the first year of the war.

In some African minds the German threat was real enough. At least one Malawian, a former askari of the K.A.R. serving with the German East African Schutztruppe, elected to desert and join the K.A.R. once again. His reason: he had seen "the real danger the Germans were to his mother country." For others, however, the German threat meant little. It was occasionally seen as a "false pretense" for engaging the population in yet another European scheme. In a few cases such suspicions were more well developed. Near Chinteche, Sam Kamanga recalled his reaction:

The government told the chief that there was war; the chief informed his people. He asked us young people to help the government in fighting the Germans. I lost confidence in the chief; he was a betrayer. He would make us die in the war. 13

Kamanga did ultimately serve in the K.A.R., enticed by later, more intense, recruitment efforts.

Additional encouragements were also necessary, even in this initial recruitment phase, to encourage young men into the King's African Rifles. For some the chance to be cast in the traditional role of brave warrior was sufficient. "We joined the war because we

¹¹ Interview 115, A.C. Ngoma, August 1973; Mr. Ngoma's father was the askari whose experience is described.

¹²Questionnaire DZ/12, Mwale Kuthemba, 12 April 1974.

¹³ Interview 107, Sam Kamanga, 4 August 1973. A number of K.A.R. askari had joined the Germans upon the demobilization of the Second Battalion in 1911; see chapter three.

уэ ''1

de

As be:

sei

thi so

rec Rad

Man ine:

the

Tre Exa-

but attr

SZ. Neglas as were men," not for any other motivation, claimed one informant. 14 One young Tonga from near Nkhata Bay was determined to become a soldier.
"I was ready to die," he said; "I wanted to test my manhood." This desire was surely encouraged openly by the chiefs and village headmen.
As a result not a few men went away to war hoping that they might become chiefs and rulers in their own right as reward for valorous service, an expectation which was seldom fulfilled. 16

Others were more interested in the financial rewards which this new employment opportunity promised. "What I needed was money, so I ran in haste to enroll my name as a soldier," one man recalled. 17 As the chiefs spread the word, large numbers of men made their way to government bomas in search of this new largess. Many ignored the all too obvious dangers of war, even the seeming inequities of being called upon to fight a European conflict, for the promise of greater financial rewards than available elsewhere. 18 The relatively highly paid African teachers in mission schools, for example, came to join. Not only promises of immediate high salaries, but also guarantees of jobs (usually as messengers) after the war, attracted many more poor men. The King's African Rifles became a

¹⁴ Interview 5, Dinala Ndala, 8 August 1972.

¹⁵ Interview 133, Alufeyo Banda, 8 September 1973.

¹⁶ Interview 14, Stambuli Likuleka, 17 August 1972; questionnaire DZ/7, Jekapu Maponya, 9 April 1974. On a few occasions, chiefs and headmen used more negative incentives to encourage enlistment, such as threats on a man's property; questionnaire DZ/47, Gonthi Chisale, 15 September 1974.

¹⁷ Interview 132, Ruben Longwe, 8 September 1973.

¹⁸ Interview 112, Fololiyani Longwe, 23 August 1973; questionnaire MC/4, Bendicto Mkumbi Jere, 14 April 1973.

kind mone

jus

in (

rei ask

Was

to eas

the

nor sai

Ker

to Jo

fa

B:

1,000,1

kind of haven for the poverty stricken. ¹⁹ "They joined for the money," remembered one man, noting a contemporary parallel: "It is just like the way people go to the mines in South Africa." ²⁰

The power of such financial incentive was not lost upon those in charge of recruiting. By August 1915 the situation on the Nyasaland frontier had stabilized with the promised arrival of reinforcements from South Africa. More immediate was the need for askari along the German border with British East Africa. Nyasaland was considered a prime possibility for recruiting, the hope being to attract men to join their countrymen who had been serving in east Africa at the outbreak of war. Negotiations were begun with the Nyasaland government and a decision quickly reached to use the monetary incentive—in the form of an extraordinary £1/1/4 monthly salary—as a further means of inducing men into service on the Kenyan front. 21

By October 1915 a recruiting officer had arrived in Nyasaland to begin the work. District residents between Zomba and Fort Johnston were urged by the government to "use every endeavor to facilitate the recruitment of suitable natives." Initially men

¹⁹ Questionnaires: DW/3, Zakeyo Jaziyele, 19 April 1974; MA/10, Bwanali Mdala, 18 July 1974; TH/5, Mr. Sankhulani, 21 September 1973.

Interview 83, Bamusi Awasi, 9 April 1973.

Colonel S.H. Sheppard (General Staff, Nairobi) to Chief Secretary, British East Africa, 31 August 1915, W.O. 106/276; Bonar Law to Smith, 8 September 1915, C.O. 534/19; both P.R.O. Charles Hordern, comp., Military Operations in East Africa, August 1914 to September 1916 (London: H.M.S.O., 1941), vol. 1, p. 565.

Assistant Chief Secretary to Assistant Resident, Liwonde, 11 November 1915, M.N.A., NCN 1/1/2; Barton diaries, notebook 36, 19 October 1915, M.N.R.

car
"Nee
car
by
eas
for
cor
or,

we the

ir.

re;

oդ tե

hā

1

came forward readily, attracted by the new, higher rates of pay.

"We felt the money was inviting and that we were real men so we came to enlist," recalled one former askari. 23 Few were deterred by the fact that they would have to serve outside their homeland in east Africa, at the Nairobi rather than the Karonga war. 24 The result was predictable: men were unwilling to continue enlistment for service in Nyasaland at lower rates of pay, a problem which concerned military and civilian officials until the end of 1916. 25

Throughout 1916 officials in Nyasaland were hard pressed to attract men to the financially less inviting first regiment, serving on the protectorate's northern border. This situation was intensified after January 1917, when two additional battalions were authorized for the first regiment, plus another battalion for the second regiment as well. Attempts were made to enlist men from the civil police with previous service in the K.A.R. Judging by the reports from Chinteche, the results were meager. Of the twenty former askari among the policemen serving the West Nyasa district, only two were willing to reenlist for even six months, and one of them just for service in Zomba. The only evidence that this appeal had any effect appears to be the Blantyre resident's disdainful

²³Interview 25, Disi Katita, 13 August 1972. Also questionnaire KS/5, Zikalindaine Katawala, 28 September 1973.

²⁴ Interviews: 2, Fulotiya Nsanama, 8 August 1972; 7, Useni
Makuta, 11 August 1972.

²⁵Smith to C.O., 25 November 1916, C.O. 534/20; Northey to Major-General A.R. Hoskins, n.d., in Hoskins to C.O., 22 March 1917, C.O. 534/24; both P.R.O.

â٢ **a**p Γę Ja 4 NS 15 56 15

report that one police private had become a sergeant in the $\text{K.A.R.}^{\,26}$

Out of desperation, all manner of chicanery was attempted.

In South Nyasa district recruiters spread work of disturbances in the northern part of the country, asking for volunteers to join the first regiment in putting down what was presented as a tax rebellion among Mombera's Ngoni. A number of Yao from the regions around Fort Johnston were enlisted with the expectation that they merely would help bring the defaulters into line, but instead found themselves at war with the Germans. In some parts of the country enlistment was undertaken at rates of pay higher than allowed, "in anticipation of a rise" being authorized in London. 28

Recruiters also looked beyond the traditional Nyasaland recruiting grounds, seeking unsuccessfully to gain permission for an enlistment campaign in Mozambique. ²⁹ Even without Portuguese approval or official British sanction the territory was combed for men, although the salary differential still had an effect. ³⁰ Those

²⁶ Acting Chief Secretary to residents, circular letter, 18 January 1917, NCK 1/1/3; Resident, Chinteche, to Chief Secretary, 4 February 1917, NNC 1/1/1; Blantyre District Annual Report, 1917/18, NSB 2/2/7; all M.N.A.

Interviews: 77, Stambuli Basale, 14 April 1973; 79, Mlekano Wadi Kalisinje, 4 April 1973; 85, Sheikh Mada Wadi Msamu, 12 April 1973. The reports of disturbances referred to a significant but not serious refusal by Chimtunga Jere to supply laborers and carriers for the war effort; this incident will be discussed fully below.

²⁸Barton diaries, notebook 39, 27 March 1917, M.N.R.

²⁹Smith to C.O., 16 August 1916; Sir L. Carnegie, Lisbon, to C.O., 19 September 1916; both P.R.O., C.O. 534/20.

³⁰ Barton diaries, notebook 39, 16 March 1917, M.N.R.

•
:
:
í
:
S
è
3
5
7
ē
ċ,
<u>.</u>
]
i

operations were not considered precisely secret but were keft quiet so that "nothing likely to embarrass those responsible" leaked out. 31 Another source of manpower was found among the ex-German askari being held in a prisoner-of-war camp at Zomba. Although some had been used as laborers, they generally had been ignored as potential soldiers for the King's African Rifles. There were, as Colonel C. W. Barton noted, "some good old soldiers amongst them but [the] general run looked inferior to our K.A.R. askari." Officials were sufficiently encouraged, however, to attempt to enlist some of them.

When Barton began to inquire among the former <u>Schutztruppe</u> askari if they would serve for the British, he found some willing, but only if the paper notes which the Germans had given them would be redeemed for "real money." Others demanded a higher salary. This reluctance seems to have had deeper implications which Barton either did not realize, or more likely, chose not to record. 33 One of the men recalled vivdly the recruiting efforts at the P.O.W. camp:

They said that we should become soldiers. We did not want to enlist for them but the colonel forced us to enlist. We asked them how much they would pay us if we enlisted. They said one pound, one shilling and four pence. We told them that we would not accept that. We told them that when we were on the German side we used to receive three pounds and ten shillings. We refused and there was great talk about it. When they saw that we were not willing to give way, they decided not to give us food. We stayed for three

³¹Acting Chief Secretary to Resident, Blantyre, 4 March 1918, M.N.A., NSB 1/2/5. Also see Smith to C.O., 23 April 1917, P.R.O., C.O. 525/73.

³²Barton diaries, notebook 39, 6 February 1917, M.N.R.

^{33&}lt;sub>Barton diaries</sub>, notebooks 39 and 40, 6 February through 12 April 1917, M.N.R.

E: : T. t of **C** 0 řę \$0 כת ē 5 Ţ-, to weeks without eating. So we used to go into the neighboring villages stealing other people's cassava. So the people complained. As a result we ended up by enlisting.³⁴

The promise of higher rank in British service may have enticed some experienced soldiers. 35 Such negotiations certainly convinced many Europeans in Nyasaland that Africans really cared little for whom they fought, and were merely mercenaries seeking the highest wage. 36

For many, perhaps most, of the Malawian askari it was not the money which was important, but what they saw as the guile employed to enlist them. "We attributed our joining of the army to the work of magic. We believed that we had been bewitched," one of them complained. The specific complaints also included the deception regarding a tax rebellion among Mombera's Ngoni and the charge that some district residents merely told them work was available, saying nothing about war. Much more widespread, however, were complaints about the use of the military band as an inducement to recruiting. The band, it was often said, "was parading tricks to coax young men to join them."

³⁴ Interview 31, Kazibule Dabi, 15 September 1972.

³⁵ Interview 30, Thom Sukala, 14 September 1972; he had been a corporal in the Schutztruppe and became a sergeant upon joining the K.A.R.

³⁶ Conversation with Mr. W.H. Gresty, 27 April 1914; interview 21, Sydney Chituta Nkanda, 28 August 1972.

³⁷ Interview 74, Anusa Makumba, 2 April 1973.

³⁸Interview 110, E.C. Banda, 15 August 1973.

³⁹Interview 169, James Mbalazo, 1 September 1973.

fron

used

and

enli

div:

\$276

and the

pri

:re

tru res

⊅ig

d∵l

6.7

0 10 15 C) L

()

By late 1915, when recruitment began for the British East African front, elements of the King's African Rifles marching band were being used to attract Malawian recruits. 40 The results were encouraging, and the band became a major part of the efforts to encourage enlistment throughout the rest of the war. In fact, the band was divided, and occasionally more than one group was operating at the same time. On 11 July 1916 part of the band was "dancing with drums and trumpets" near Lungwena, a U.M.C.A. mission station not far from the eastern lakeshore. 41 On the same day, directly across the lake, priests at the Roman Catholic mission station at Ntaka-taka observed the recruiting efforts and recorded in their diary: "Drums and trumpets, a real circus."42 Officials generally expected better results from recruiting campaigns when the band was present, and missionaries often encouraged its employment in their areas. 43

Despite both official and unofficial encouragement, and the division of the band into more than one group, it did not make appearances in all parts of the country, partly because of

Arriving in October 1914 to begin recruiting, Lt. Bevan led a recruiting party into South Nyasa district where his name still is associated with the early band displays. Barton diaries, notebook 36, 19 October 1915, M.N.R.; interview 170, Corporal Lipende, 14 September 1973.

Eustace Malisawa, Lungwena station notes, <u>Nyasaland Diocesan</u> Chronicle, 53(October 1916), 24.

⁴² Ntaka-taka station diary, 11 July 1916, quoted in Linden, Catholics, p. 115n.

⁴³ Resident, Chinteche, to Chief Secretary, 18 December 1917, M.N.A., NNC 1/1/1; H.E. Munby, Kota Kota station notes, Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 62(January 1919), 10.

tr 50 ۳a ادل MJ ap, ٧. ţ'n ħ.i: Ĝé So S٦ ₩ŝ CQ. t٥ iţ 20 μ, ď. transportation problems. 44 Throughout South Nyasa district (the southern lakeshore) the band appeared often, and as well along the main roads south. Many "performances" were held between Fort Johnston and Zomba, and almost as many in parts of Blantyre and Mulanje districts. In the northern areas of the protectorate, band appearances were confined to the lakeshore, especially in Dedza, Nkhotakota, West and North Nyasa districts. Seldom, however, did the musicians venture beyond the escarpment into the country's hinterland. These tendancies were further intensified by the generally held views that certain African groups made better soldiers. Particularly favored were the Yao of South Nyasa, Upper Shire, Zomba, and Mulanje districts and Chiradzulu sub-district as well as the Tonga of West Nyasa district. Recruiting efforts concentrated on these areas where, happily, the band was best able to travel.

Generally the band followed the roads through the areas where it was recruiting, only occasionally stopping at villages and other population centers along the way. 45 The mabaja—as the marching musicians were known in some Yao areas 46—attracted large followings during their perambulations about the countryside. "When soldiers

See Munby, Kota Kota station notes, <u>Nyasaland Diocesan</u> <u>Chronicle</u>, 62(January 1919), 10.

⁴⁵ Questionnaire CR/1, Grayson Jonamusi, 24 August 1973. Interviews: 75, Village Headman Makumbe, 3 April 1973; 15, Aroni Siyabu, 18 August 1972. Che Aroni Siyabu was a bugler in the King's African Rifles and participated in a number of recruiting campaigns as a member of the band.

⁴⁶ Questionnaire MA/11, Kamwana Ng'omba, 18 July 1974.

water reme tare band bray

para

peo: Oth and

the

As gla

fav Wor

to

\$ 0 (3')

D.

2

parade it is something to admire. You could see a swarm of people watching the soldiers parade," one man recalled. 47 Another remembered his own experience: "Suddenly we saw the army's band marching along the road neatly dressed in their khaki uniforms. The band's marching was really thrilling and it was irresistable for brave young men to join the army."

Some were attracted by the music, wanted to learn how to play the instruments, and therefore agreed to join the army. "The people did not actually know they were going to play in the band." Others admired the smart uniforms, especially the starched shorts, and hoped that by joining they might acquire such prized clothing. As if there were not enough inducements, women were attracted by the glamor of the band and pushed their men to join. The "buglers were favored by women," one of them remembered fondly. "You know what women are. When they saw the horns, they just offered themselves to us." One former askari stated, "you know things that women can

⁴⁷ Interview 88, Tambule Mbepule, 12 April 1973.

⁴⁸Interview 72, Chionda Alidi, 1 April 1973. On Likoma Island, where the band did not perform, some men were attracted by the drilling of the small squad of askari assigned to protect the island. Questionnaires: LK/1, D. Mandala, 9 August 1973; LK/7, Christopher Mataka, 3 September 1973.

⁴⁹Interview 37, Ndala Nyungwe, 28 September 1972; also questionnaire MA/7, Puleni Selemani, 16 July 1974.

⁵⁰Questionnaires: TH/4, Benjamin Chileka, 19 September 1973; TH/11, C.B. Chitofu, 27 September 1973. Interview 71, Harold Manawa, 1 April 1973.

⁵¹ Interview 15, Aroni Siyabu, 18 August 1972; also interview 37, Ndala Nyungwa, 28 September 1972.

do.

wer

for con

al:

Ny:

e:

es ca

ų,

b∈

Åf

P

15 P & C

CO 00 00 --- 1

do. They used to say, 'I wish my husband was a soldier.' And they were not wrong," he added, "because the band was very smart." 52

Whatever the reasons, there was a tremendous outpouring of men for the army. Throughout most of 1917 and into 1918 as well, a consistant average of more than 150 recruits were found each week, although close to thirty-five percent were rejected before completing training. She the end of 1917, more than 9,000 men were on duty in Nyasaland battalions, some of them recruits from outside the country. It is not possible to obtain an accurate count of enlistees from each district. Table 1. contains available estimates, she which tend to confirm that the largest numbers of men came from the areas of heaviest recruiting: Zomba, South Nyasa and West Nyasa districts, with Blantyre, Mulanje and Upper Shire not far behind. The total number of Malawians who served in the King's African Rifles reached almost 19,000 men, although that figure may

⁵² Interview 74, Anusa Makumba, 2 April 1973; also interview 86, Petro Mbwana, 12 April 1973.

⁵³Major R.E. Critchley-Salmonson (Staff Officer-Recruiting, K.A.R.), "Recruiting for the King's African Rifles: Progress, Situation and Prospects, 20th December 1917 to 25th May 1918," in Assistant Adjutant & Quartermaster General, K.A.R. to C.O., 6 September 1918, P.R.O., C.O. 534/26.

⁵⁴ Major R.E. Critchley-Salmonson, "Recruiting for the King's African Rifles: Progress, Situation and Prospects on 29th December 1917," in Bowring (Acting Governor, British East Africa) to C.O., 8 February 1918, P.R.O., C.O. 534/25. Besides those from Mozambique and among the captured German askari, others were recruited in Zambia; Sir L. Wallace, draft notes on the Great War, [c. 1920], N.A.R., B 1/5/7.

⁵⁵The figures in table one are intended only to be suggestive; they cannot be considered at all accurate. The 1918 administrative census differs in several important points of detail with the official returns for the same year found in the Nyasaland Government Blue Book for the Year ending 31st March 1918 (Zomba: Government Printer,

% of KAR Strength 4.53 3.34 2.78 22.81 11.53 8.43 20.03 Medal Rolls 1919 106 252 287 145 195 Askari KAR MALAWIAN ASKARI, BY DISTRICTS Strength % of KAR 3.37 8.08 8.48 6.71 4.75 13.15 * 6.02 6.1 22.73 Administrative Census % Males in KAR 9.73 3.91 4.34 3.50 2.49 2.16 . 16 9.26 3.09 1.33 1918 2,057 607 430 1,110 9,050 1,190 545 553 427 154 731 Askari TABLE 1. 15,520 9,899 34,017 21,923 25,607 25,059 11,610 7,430 11,988 23,252 7,496 7,295 5,074 25,056 8,678 16,214 21,143 292,656 Adult Males sub-district Chi radzulu Lower Shire Upper Shire South Nyasa North Nyasa West Shire Liwonde West Nyasa Mombera's Blantyre Li lougwe Ngara District Mulanje Marimba Totals Dedza Zomba Dowa Ruo

Sources: M.N.A., NSB 1/2/5; Smith to C.O., 1 December 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 534/34. * %s may not total 100

be slightly too high. ⁵⁶ Such a tremendous response had been encouraging enough, by January 1918, for both Governor Smith and General Northey to give their qualified approval to the limited use of Nyasaland askari outside of Africa at the conclusion of the German East African campaign, a decision initially opposed due to insufficient manpower. ⁵⁷

It is perhaps as well that the K.A.R. was not sent to Europe or the middle east, where it was expected that casualties--"wastage" was the official term--would be much higher than in east Africa. 58 Replacement might have proved difficult, for the recruiting efforts of the band, largely responsible for the consistently high number of Malawian enlistees, became increasingly suspect. Very few actively resisted the musicians' efforts, although occasionally

^{1918).} The 1919 medal rolls are obviously incomplete and were described in the Colonial Office as "quite hopeless"; unsigned minute of 16 January 1920 on Smith to C.O., 1 December 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 534/34.

The earliest estimates immediately after the war suggested only about 10,000 men, possibly extrapolating from Critchley-Salmonson's progress reports; Duff to C.O., 27 January 1919, C.O. 525/82; George Smith, draft chapter for The Empire at War, in C.P. Lucas to C.O., 19 June 1919, C.O. 525/87; both P.R.O. The final figure of almost 19,000 was compiled in 1922, and included almost 1,000 listed as rejects, most probably from the final groups of recruits; Chief Secretary, Nyasaland, to C.O., 23 February 1922, P.R.O., C.O. 534/49. Despite the inclusion of these nearly 1,000 men who did not serve, the final published figure was 19,000; Smith, "Nyasaland and General Northey's Campaign," p. 275; S.S. Murray, comp., A Handbook of Nyasaland (London: Crown Agents, 1922), p. 271.

⁵⁷Draft telegram, Smith to C.O., with minute approval by Northey, 24 January 1918, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/9. Europeans in Nyasaland had followed with interest the parliamentary discussion about raising an "almost limitless" African army for service in Europe; Nyasaland Times, 19, 36(7 September 1916), 3, and also 20, 2(11 January 1917), 6.

⁵⁸ General [van Deventer] Dar es Salaam, to Governor, Zomba, 18
July 1918, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/9.

somi sim

to

for

th

tho

in en:

cat

رر. ا

⊞ē. **e**≯

ŢĘ

₹e

P 3

some may have run away, boycotting the spectacle. Many more were simply mesmerized: "the beauty of the parading band would blind us to the real issues of war." Some Africans saw this as a kind of force, and such pressures increased as the war dragged on. A few thought they had been bewitched by the Europeans suddenly finding themselves training for war and amidst the horrors of battle, often in the front lines and among the first killed or wounded. A rare enlistee found to his gratitude that being left handed was sufficient cause for dismissal from service; others deliberately made errors during training as a desperate means of escaping from the trap into which they had been enticed.

Although these reservations and subsequent evasions grew in magnitude throughout the war, they never became endemic. Without exception, colonial officials were gratified and encouraged by the response of Malawians to army service. Six years after the war a report on the military conditions in Nyasaland noted a continuing pattern of voluntary enlistment, concluding with the observation that "military service with the King's African Rifles has never been unpopular." The same report, however, made it clear that the situation

⁵⁹Interview 111, Mugwinya Ngombe Nyirenda, 21 August 1973.

⁶⁰ Interview 170, Corporal Lipende, 14 September 1973.

Interview 62, McPhail Issa Kadewere, 3 February 1973; questionnaire KS/2, Harry Kuntaja, 12 April 1973.

⁶² Interview 88, Tambuli Mbepule, 12 April 1973: questionnaire RU/3, D.Y. Mhango, 10 August 1974.

⁶³ Questionnaires: BT/5, S.H. Makunje, 1 September 1973; DZ/49, Mateyo Kwayela Mbewe, 27 September 1974.

for

was diametrically different regarding carrier service:

Until the memories of the late war are completely oblitereated, which will not be for many years to come, it may be safely assumed that no natives will voluntarily present themselves for carrier transport work with troops in the field. For several reasons, which in the circumstances were unavoidable, this service became most unpopular during the war. 64

In fact, recruitment for the carrier corps—the tengatenga—and for other military labor purposes produced the most serious problems faced by Malawians during the Great War.

As late as 1913, military intelligence estimates indicated that only 1,692 carriers would be needed in Nyasaland should a war with Germany materialize. That this was an unrealistic figure was evident upon the outbreak of war, when the commander of Nyasaland forces called for more than two thousand tengatenga for the northern frontier alone. Even this number was difficult to recruit, especially in North Nyasa district. Almost immediately it was necessary to turn elsewhere in the country for the manpower to supply military labor needs. These very first demands were usually met without undue difficulty, with district residents exercising their personal influence to obtain recruits. Few, however, came from further afield than Nkhotakota, where the resident, G. F. Manning, found 190 men to accompany him to Karonga. 65

Major A. A. Finn, King's African Rifles Half Yearly Intelligence Report for 30 June 1924, enclosed in Bowring to C.O., 29 July 1924, P.R.O., C.O. 534/54.

⁶⁵Nyasaland Defense Scheme, 1913, M.N.A., K.A.R. 1/2/1; Barton diaries, notebook 33, 23 August and 7 September 1914, M.N.R.

to

ser ter

Sui.

W² 1

to

CO

of

έţ

ez

f

.

The need for manpower quickly grew, and recruitment spread to many parts of the country. Laborers were required not just for service as military carriers at the northern front, but also as tengatenga along the lines of communication, especially to carry supplies from Blantyre to the southern lakeshore at Fort Johnston. The government took steps to ensure that men could be found when and where needed, adopting the Nyasaland Defense Ordinance in December 1914. The law provided that "the Governor may require any person to do any work necessary to order in aid of or in connection with the defense of the Protectorate." This provision, replaced but not changed in 1916 by the British Protectorates (Defense) Order in Council, formed the foundation of recruitment for military labor of all types, though not for the King's African Rifles. 66 No attempt, however, was made to translate the ordinance or the order into any local language, and only limited efforts expended to explain the needs to local chiefs and headmen.

Requests for service thus came most unexpectedly and were frequently remembered as the first news of the war. Carrier service had never been exceptionally popular, an arduous job at best, often with few benefits, even including the meager wages paid. 67 It had

⁶⁶ Nyasaland Government Gazette, 21(1914), 241, and 23(1916), 170.

⁶⁷Alfred J. Swann's impassioned descriptions of tengatenga service, its hardships, and the resentments it engendered among Malawians, held as true on the eve of war as it had at the turn of the century. Swann to J. Nunan, 15 March 1901, M.N.A., J 2/9/1, printed as an appendix to Pachai, "Christianity and Commerce in Malawi," pp. 62-64. In a few cases, however, carrier service was seen as a more preferable, if still undesireable, way of paying taxes than labor on European estates; see M.A. Munthali, "The Issue of Labour in Nyasaland," unpubl. University of Malawi history seminar paper, 1968-1969, p. 7.

never been as popular as military service with the King's African Rifles. The demands for tengatenga, therefore, often resulted in panicked reactions, with men frequently running away from the unpopular work. In all parts of the country, without exception, men chose to flee into the bush rather than engage as military laborers. 8 In some quarters, however, the reactions were more forceful, and even occasionally violent.

Not unnaturally much of this early hostility was directed toward the local chiefs and headmen who were expected to produce carriers for military service. Chiefs and others urging war service were denounced, and threats were not uncommon: some headmen were told they would be killed if they persisted in sending men to war against their will. These were not idle machinations, either, and in at least one case a headman's house was burned in protest. The effect of these threats and attacks, of course, was negligible. Protesters were forced, by the very chiefs and headmen they opposed, to leave their villages, often finding themselves sent to war precisely because of their protest.

In some areas of the country initial opposition to tengatenga service took the form of physical violence directed at the recruiters themselves. Messengers from the Karonga boma were occasionally

This is confirmed by virtually all my interviews and questionnaires throughout the country. The "panic among the native populace" during some of the early tengatenga recruiting efforts was noted in a confidential circular letter from the Chief Secretary to all residents, 7 October 1915, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/3.

⁶⁹ Interview 66, Mrs. Useni Chisa, 10 April 1973. Questionnaires DZ/6, Ludaviko Chinyakula, 21 April 1973; DZ/26, Mr. Katawa, 19 April 1974; MZ/6 Zacharia Kaiwanawga Gondwe, 8 April 1973.

beaten by villagers as they attempted to remove men for war service. Similar incidents occurred in West Nyasa district, but as elsewhere were sporadic, infrequent, and only happened early in the war. 70 The continuation of such minor, disorganized resistance could not be maintained for long. One man remembered the situation in a parable: "You don't kill one bee, otherwise a host of others come to sting you." And as Malawians discovered, a concerted official reaction followed not just the isolated incidents involving headmen and African recruiting parties, but especially attempts at organized resistance.

The most widely known of the attempts at organized resistance to wartime recruitment in Nyasaland remains the January 1915 rebellion of John Chilembwe. To be sure, the motivations of Chilembwe and his followers were complex, even confused. As I have previously explained, a major factor was the millenial expectations current among followers of the Providence Industrial Mission. Other motives included the harsh and unfair labor requirements imposed by European estates, particularly those of A. L. Bruce. There is no doubt, though, that the coming of the Great War and particularly the demands for men was a major factor in prompting the uprising.

Chilembwe's views on war recruitment, written for public consumption but not published, have been quoted previously. He was most incensed about such service, coming on top of that required by the European estate owners. "We are," he also wrote, "imposed upon

⁷⁰ Questionnaires: KR/3, Peter G. Mbisa, 15 April 1973; MZ/7, Jam Jere, 8 April 1973. Interview 106, Kildon Wajiusa, 2 August 1973.

⁷¹ Interview 135, Austin Banda, 12 September 1973.

more than any other nationality under the sun."⁷² It was an opinion which was shared not only by many around him, but also may have represented the collective sentiments of many Malawian chiefs, headmen, and village elders.⁷³ Although Chilembwe wrote specifically of being "invited to die for Nyasaland" and was thinking, after the deaths of Malawian askari at Karonga, of military service, the demands for carriers distressed him as well. In the two or three months after he wrote his famous letter to the Nyasaland Times, and before the actual rising, it was carrier recruitment which was most important in Chiradzulu sub-district, around the P.I.M.

The rebellion, and Chilembwe's motives, are remembered today in Malawi in connection with war recruitment. Throughout the country, as far afield as Mzimba where little contemporary news of the rising reached African ears, the opposition to demands for askari and tengatenga is recalled as a prime factor in sparking the anti-colonial action. Hen close to Chilembwe and the Providence Industrial Mission well remember how important the European war and demands for African manpower weighed upon the rising's planners. The necessity for service in a white man's conflict was reason enough for consternation, but the continued removal, for military and labor service, of men whose presence was necessary for the success of the

^{72&}lt;sub>M.N.A., GOA 2/4/14.</sub>

⁷³George Simeon Mwase, Strike a Blow and Die, ed. R.I. Rotberg (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 35.

⁷⁴ Interview 104, Kathebu Agubiko, 25 July 1973. Questionnaires: MZ/31, Frank Moyo, 18 April 1974; TH/5, Sam Khulani, 21 September 1973; NC/13, V. Chungu, 19 August 1974; CR/3, Mr. Mopiha, 16 April 1974. Also see George Shepperson, "The Place of John Chilembwe in Malawi Historiography," in The Early History of Malawi, pp. 405-428 passim.

li Γi

fa

r

C

planned rebellion seems also to have alarmed Chilembwe and his lieutenants. 75

This concern of the plotters, well developed by the time of the rising in late January 1915, is reflected in the appeal for assistance which Chilembwe addressed to authorities in German East Africa. This fascinating letter, previously known only in terms of the non-commital reply it solicited, has been presented as evidence of both German complicity in the rebellion and Chilembwe's belief that with British troops absent from the southern region of the protectorate his rising might be successful. The late, the appeal was initiated by Chilembwe and his chief followers, who sent Yotam Bango through Portuguese territory with a letter for German officials. The letter itself offered little information, but most significantly listed the conspirators' chief complaint: that they were called upon by the British to assist in the war. The message also requested three hundred rifles and ammunition to aid in the defeat of the absent British. A non-commital reply was authorized by Governor

⁷⁵ Questionnaires: CR/8, Rev. W.B. Mtambo, 7 August 1974; CR/9, Serson Sukwambwe, 10 August 1974. As young men, both Rev. Mtambo and Mr. Sukwambwe served in domestic capacities at Chilembwe's Providence Industrial Mission.

⁷⁶See Shepperson and Price, pp. 255-57; Sir Hector Duff, "Nyasaland in the World War, 1914-1918," chapter four, unpubl. typescript, I.W.M.

⁷⁷ Questionnaire CR/8, Rev. W.B. Mtambo, 7 August 1974; Mwase, Strike a Blow and Die, pp. 51-2. The details of Bango's journey have been researched by Paul Cole-King, "A Letter to John Chilembwe," unpubl. typescript kindly made available by the author. Mr. Cole-King, however, did not discover a copy of Chilembwe's letter to the Germans.

5.6 f.a a ...

;

Schnee and General von Lettow-Vorbeck and sent on 17 March 1915, far too late to influence the abortive rebellion.⁷⁸

The details of the actual rising and its suppression need not be developed fully here. The should be noted, however, that not all the K.A.R. askari stationed at Karonga were anxious to assist in putting down the rebellion, particularly those from Chiradzulu and nearby areas. Perhaps their reluctance accounts for the Nyasaland Times incorrect report, later retracted, that a K.A.R. sergeant was to be court-martialed for "complicity in the Chilembwe affair." In fact, no askari were accused of taking part, and sufficient numbers of Tonga and other northern soldiers were found to aid in crushing the revolt. An indication of Chilembwe's failure to make good his protest against Africans in war service is to be found in the "friendlies," African irregulars

⁷⁸ The letter is paraphrased in General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, War Diary 1914-1918 (English translation), volume one, unpubl. typescript, I.W.M. To my knowledge, no previous writers on Nyasaland during this period have had access to this document or any other copy of Chilembwe's letter; according to both Robert Rotberg and Bridglal Pachai, copies of the letter had not been found. Rotberg, "Chilembwe's Revolt Reconsidered," p. 371; Pachai, Malawi, p. 215. The Swahili text of the German reply and an English translation may be found in the Malawi National Archives: District Magistrate, Tunduru, to "Sultani" John Chilembwe, 17 March 1915, L 2/3/1. A better translation is found in Cole-King, "Letter," p. 3.

⁷⁹ See especially Shapperson and Price, chapter VI.

⁸⁰ Interview 32, Khobviwa Juwa, 18 September 1972.

Nyasaland Times, 18, 8(25 February 1915), 3; and 18, 13(1 April 1915), 3. Shepperson and Price (p. 297) incorrectly record that the sergeant was accused, even though he was only temporarily serving with the Nyasaland Field Force. In fact, a temporary employee of the Field Force was accused, but not (according to the Nyasaland Times) a K.A.R. askari.

		h,
		g.
		٢
		Ş

Reserve and the King's African Rifles in rounding up the scattered rebels. 82 Moreover, throughout the war further recruitment was not slowed in Chiradzulu sub-district.

Although considerably less violent and probably less serious, the resistance to recruitment of military labor and carriers by Chief Chimtunga Jere and some of his followers among Mombera's Ngoni was treated as a major problem by the government. Upon receiving the demands for men, Chimtunga did not respond. Asked to explain his action, the chief sent a defiant reply, seen by the government as "insolent and insubordinate." In response, a half-company of askari from Karonga were dispatched to Mzimba, and Chimtunga surrendered to the district resident. His punishment was dismissal from office and deportation to the far south of the protectorate. Perhaps overreacting, Robert Laws congratulated the local missionary, Donald Fraser, on his role in defusing the situation: "I am glad that you managed to save bloodshed which might easily have taken place."

⁸² Interview 17, Tebulo Nkwanda, 22 August 1972; Nyasaland Times, 18, 1(4 February 1915), 1. Also see Phillip T. Sampson, The Conquest of German East (Cape Town: Argus Printing & Publishing Co., 1917), P. 7.

^{83&}lt;sub>Nyasaland Times</sub>, 18, 40(7 October 1915), 1.

The full investigation reports and memoranda are found in Smith to C.O., 17 January 1913, P.R.O., C.O. 525/66; a brief summary appeared in Smith, "Nyasaland and General Northey," p. 260. The only study of this incident, based almost entirely upon oral evidence, is H.W. Mhoni, "An Assessment of the Resistance and Banishment of Chimtunga Jere, 1914-1918," unpubl. University of Malawi history seminar paper, 1973-74.

^{85&}lt;sub>Laws</sub> to Fraser, [27 October 1915], M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission Papers, letter book no. 24.

Fraser's role was one of mediator, and it was through his good offices that Chimtunga was persuaded to give himself up. For Fraser, the whole affair seemed to be an unfortunate case of verbal excess on the part of an inebriated chief. So The evidence, however, indicates much more than that. In an already strained relationship with the colonial government, the demands for military labor were not well received. In particular, the Ngoni objected to going to war for the Europeans who had asserted opposition to warfare as a reason for colonial interference in Malawi. Their titular paramount's refusal to cooperate in the recruiting efforts of the Europeans was largely conditioned by such widespread feelings.

Such an appeal to popular opinion was also useful to Chimtunga as he attempted to consolidate his position as paramount; although recognized as such, he had never been officially accorded the title of MiMbelwa. Particular opposition came from Moses Jere, who had been one of the rival claimants to Chimtunga's office. Moses had provided the Ngoni spearmen for Karonga early in the war and, despite their ineffectiveness, had been praised and congratulated by the government. Seeing his rival's success as a threat to his own authority, Chimtunga resented Moses' activities. Hence he was quite willing to assert the power of the paramountcy in reaction to further demands for manpower, at the same time bowing to the genuine dissatisfactions of his people. 87

See Agnus R. Fraser's biography of her husband, <u>Donald Fraser</u> of <u>Livingstonia</u> (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1934), p. 227.

⁸⁷Questionnaire RU/4, Mr. P. Thawi, 15 August 1974; Mhoni, "Chimtunga Jere," <u>passim</u>; group interview, Embdagweni, Mzimba district, 16 September 1971, kindly supplied by Dr. Kings M. Phiri.

As was the case in Chiradzulu, the effort was fruitless. After giving himself up, Chimtunga was removed from his position and his people. His actions, far from preventing further recruitment, actually brought more. I have noted earlier the reports which were circulated in some areas of Chimtunga's resistance, calling for volunteers to help in ending his activities, described as tax evasion. Among his own people, however, Chimtunga became a symbol, not of resistance, but of the requirement for work. Many felt that should they continue to refuse recruitment their chief would never return to them from his exile. ⁸⁸ As a result, recruitment for carriers continued throughout the war, and not infrequently old and feeble men went forth to save their chief with little if any official concern for their welfare. ⁸⁹

Although the government's decisive and forceful action had put a stop to organized resistance, official policy in late 1915 and early 1916 was to avoid any demands which might cause a repeat of the Chilembwe or Chimtunga affairs. The chief secretary circularized district residents, noting firmly that any African unrest must be avoided. "The position," he directed, "should be quietly explained to the chiefs and headmen and the fullest assurance may be given

[&]quot;Jealousy among the chiefs" was recognized by European missionaries and officials as one of the chief causes of the resistance. Laws to Hetherwick, 30 October 1915, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission Papers, letter book no. 24; testimony of District Resident, Mzimba, concerning the "Behavior of Mombera's Ngoni," recorded by H.L. Duff and enclosed in Smith to C.O., 17 January 1916, P.R.O., C.O. 525/66.

⁸⁸ Questionnaires: MZ/1, Paulos Nthengwe, 1 April 1973; MZ/9, Jakopa Ngoma, 9 April 1973; MZ/35, Isaac Mbambo, 25 August 1974.

⁸⁹MacKenzie to Laws, 23 January 1916, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission Papers, letter book no. 25.

fi

that men engaged as carriers or laborers will not be required to fight." Early the next year the chief secretary again urged restraint and the exercise of "the personal influence of Residents" in recruitment. His expressed hope was that sufficient men could be procured "without obliging the Government to resort to its statutory powers of compulsion under the Defence Ordinance." The tone was low enough for the Blantyre Resident to suggest to his assistant in Chiradzulu that they not try too hard to recruit carriers as any success would undoubtedly only produce greater demands. 92

Despite such cynicism, during this period the government and its agents did attempt to attract more men into the carrier corps. Some residents expressed confidence that higher salaries would attract more men, and in fact they did draw a few into the tengatenga ranks. 93 Near Mzimba, in the wake of Chimtunga's resistance, a leading African Christian, Daniel Mtusu, exercised his considerable influence in persuading men to join. 94 In North Nyasa district, the

⁹⁰ Chief Secretary to residents, confidential circular letter, 7 October 1915, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/3.

⁹¹Chief Secretary to residents, circular letter, 16 February 1916, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/3. This was also echoed in a letter authorized by the governor and sent to the Blantyre resident; Chief Secretary to Resident, Blantyre, 2 February 1916, M.N.A., NSB 1/2/3.

⁹² Resident, Blantyre, to Assistant Resident, Chiradzulu, 8 February 1916, M.N.A., NSB 2/1/1.

⁹³ Resident, Ncheu, to Chief Secretary, 16 February 1916, M.N.A., NCN 1/1/3; Assistant Resident, Liwonde, to Chief Secretary, 3 February 1916, M.N.A., NCN 1/1/2. Questionnaires: BT/4, Dulamu Malonje, 31 August 1973; DW/13, Zakeyo Jaziyele, 19 April 1974; TH/9, Mr. Nseula, 25 September 1973.

⁹⁴Donald Fraser, The Autobiography of an African: Retold in Biographical Form & in the Wild African Setting of the Life of Daniel Mtusu (London: Seeley, Service & Co., 1925), pp. 205-6.

br

re

ţ;

brother of the influential chief Kyungu was employed as an efficial recruiter. 95 Elsewhere the situation was "quietly explained" to the chiefs: either they and their relatives, or their subjects, would have to serve. The responses were varied, but the men appeared. 96 The military authorities also took a direct hand, sending into the growing ranks of tengatenga those who intentionally or otherwise failed askari training. 97 All the measures had a kind of cumulative effect upon some of the Malawian population who saw the demands for manpower as exactly that and responded, "very philosophically."

What recruiting successes had been achieved by early 1916, however, were very small in comparison to the needs which developed by the end of that year. In large measure these demands were due to the arrival of a new military commander, Brigadier General Edward Northey, on the Nyasaland-Northern Rhodesia border with German East Africa. Plunging into his command, Northey made plans for the growth of his forces, their supply network, and an invasion of German territory. All of these operations, of course, would

Mission teachers aided recruiting in other areas too; Laws to Wells, 2 May 1916, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission Papers, letter book no. 25.

⁹⁵ Questionnaire KR/3, Amon M. Ng'ambi, 6 April 1973.

⁹⁶ Interviews: 68, Mr. Kili, 12 April 1973; 116, Amos Isaac, 14 July 1973; 124, Augustine Paliya Chirwa, 16 August 1973.

⁹⁷ Interviews: 4, Efraim Mangani, 10 August 1972; 12, Mbaisa Mbaisa, 15 August 1972.

⁹⁸A.G.B. Glossop, Likoma and Nkhata Bay station notes, Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 61 (October 1915), pp. 8-9. Questionnaires: KS/1, William Chipanda, 6 April 1973; DZ/15, Mr. Nyale, 14 April 1974; DW/9, Jasoni Mpotandebvu, 17 April 1974; NS/1, Johnson Mpachika, 12 August 1973.

requi

voice Smith

he wr

arriv

naval

shore

Roads

the q

pris

also

the

cour the

cons

Nort

Ton

NNC

Res M.I. No. 197

72,

require considerable military labor. Throughout the year Northey voiced his needs--and complaints when they were unfilled--to Governor Smith. He required an unending flow of labor, and in December 1916, he wrote, "We want more carriers and more carriers and more carriers!"

The demands did not end there. The Rhodesia Native Regiment arrived and began to recruit local carriers in Nyasaland. 100 The naval department also needed more men for its lake steamers and shore operations, enlisting sailors directly from the tengatenga. 101 Roads and telegraph lines, both essential to communication during the campaign, demanded labor, as did the growing internment and prisoner-of-war camps in Blantyre and Zomba. 102 Military labor was also diverted to the construction of temporary buildings to house the growing number of soldiers and allied personnel arriving in the country. 103 Considerable numbers also were necessary for work in the highlands from Zomba south, cutting and carrying timber for the construction projects as well as for fuel to keep the lake and river

⁹⁹ Northey to Smith, 4 and 25 April 1916, M.N.A., GOA 1/1/1; Northey to Smith, 4 May and 14 December 1916, M.N.A., GOA 2/3/1.

 $^{^{100}}$ War diaries, Rhodesia Native Regiment, 11 August 1916, N.A.R., Tomlinson papers, TO 1/2/1/1.

¹⁰¹ Resident, Chinteche, to Chief Secretary, 29 April 1916, M.N.A., NNC 1/1/1; interview 42, Gogo Dorothy Liwewe, 28 December 1972.

¹⁰²Blantyre district Annual Report, 1916/17, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/6; Resident, Blantyre, to Acting Chief Secretary, 18 August 1916, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/6; Chalmers to Hughes (Resident, Karonga), 6 November 1916, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission Papers, letter book no. 25. Questionnaire CR/11, Suwedi Daisani Nakoli, 1 August 1974.

¹⁰³ Questionnaire CR/5, Robert Katembo, 1 August 1974; interview 72, Che Chionda Alidi, 1 April 1973.

steam:

teach:

clerk

occas

exper

reorg

E. Co

as so

trans

Othe

the

LEC

Eli. Mta

191 13 Mis Cer (00

s;

19

steamers operating at full capacity. 104 Even the educated--mission teachers and the like--were drawn upon for service as interpreters, clerks, hospital orderlies, stretcher bearers, and similar duties, occasionally overlapping these with more menial tasks. 105

Since demands far outstripped the supply, greater efforts were expended on recruiting. The entire "tenga tenga service" was reorganized and an experienced colonial (not military) official,

E. Costley-White, put in charge. New areas were investigated as sources for carrier and other labor, as made clear by a military transport officer when writing to the Anglican Bishop of Nyasaland:

We have employed carriers from many parts of Nyasaland during the past two years but it has only recently come to my notice that there is a large native population on the Likoma Island which has not been represented. 107

Other, remote parts of the protectorate were also called upon, for the first time, to supply men. With or without permission, recruiters went into Mozambique seeking tengatenga. Even the

¹⁰⁴ Interviews: 21, Sidney Chituta Nkanda, 28 August 1972; 49, Elias Makunganya, 4 January 1973. Questionnaires: TH/8, Mr. Mtaphiko, 23 September 1973; MU/1, Mr. Masanso, 5 April 1973.

¹⁰⁵ Overtoun Institution Senatus Minutes, book two, 12 April 1916; Laws to Alexander, 6 October 1915 and Laws to Colonel Hawthorne, 13 May 1916, letter books nos. 24 and 27; all M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers. William Cecil Wigan, "Medical Work in Nyasaland," Central Africa, 37(1919), 69; Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 57 (October 1917), 11. Interview 87, Che Chiosya Wadi Mtuluke, 12 April 1973.

¹⁰⁶Undated sometime in mid-1916 notes on the military transport situation by Governor Smith, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/3.

Capt. B.G.K. Markham to Bishop of Nyasaland, 19 November 1916. M.N.A., U.M.C.A. papers, UN 1/1/2/15/1.

Euro part

> rand this

nent Octo

war

appı

mili acce

resi

reci seri

for

recr

(2 N Bla: Bla: NS3 (B1)

Sec

Jar the end Red Red

European planters in the Shire highlands were expected to provide part of their work force to help meet the military requirements. 108

This last attempt produced, as the war continued, growing rancor among the European estate owners and managers. Anticipating this reaction, the Blantyre resident, L. T. Moggeridge, met with members of the Nyasaland Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce in October 1916 to explain the need for their thangata laborers in the war effort. His suggestion to them, made with the government's approval, was that labor from farther afield—but unsuited to military needs—be utilized on the estates. 109 The cautious acceptance of this idea gradually turned to resentment as district residents found it necessary to prohibit all private labor recruitment. The planters, however, did not respond with any serious suggestions or demands that the government conscript labor for their needs. 110 Rather, many tried to protect their workers from recruitment. A few even encouraged men to escape the recruiting

¹⁰⁸ Nyasaland Times, 19, 43(26 October 1916), 1, and 19, 44 (2 November 1916), 2; November sic, should be October 1916
Blantyre district monthly report, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/6; Resident, Blantyre, to Assistant Resident, Chiradzulu, 9 November 1917, M.N.A., NSB 2/1/1; L.M. Bandawe, Memoirs of a Malawian, ed. B. Pachai (Blantyre: C.L.A.I.M., 1971), p. 80.

¹⁰⁹ Nyasaland Times, 19, 43(26 October 1916), 1; Acting Chief Secretary to Resident, Blantyre, 18 October 1916, M.N.A., NSB 1/2/4.

Illo Nyasaland Times, 20, 30(26 July 1917), 1, and 21, 5(31 January 1918), 1. European planters in Kenya adopted the position that government should conscript labor for their needs and by the end of the war were arguing for the extension of such conscription into peacetime; Donald C. Savage and J. Forbes Munro, "Carrier Corps Recruitment in the British East Africa Protectorate, 1914-1918," Journal of African History, 7(1966), 336-37.

parti

near

the A

carr

whic run

Rhod

effe

on t

off:

apaq

in

Mpc bob

av∈

8/11/8 M.

P....∂

parties by taking refuge on the estates; Mr. Evans and Mr. Blair near Thyolo and Mr. Sabatini north of Blantyre were well known among the African population for such activities.

Given the substantial increases in the government's demands for carriers and other laborers, Malawians jumped at the opportunities which the planters offered. Others continued simply to try and run away, in extreme cases escaping into Mozambique and even to Rhodesia and South Africa hoping to avoid recruitment. The effect, in a wartime situation, was to stimulate stronger efforts on the part of both military and civilian authorities to meet their labor demands. Once having escalated the pressure, protectorate officials found the methods of avoiding recruitment had developed apace.

One of the first devices used by the protectorate government in finding manpower for military needs was the hut tax. Never very popular, and occasionally subject to abuses by the African agents who often collected the tax, many Malawians had tried for years to avoid payment. During the war these tax defaulters were hunted

Nyasaland Protectorate, Report of a Commission to Enquire into and Report upon Certain Matters Connected with the Occupation of Land in the Nyasaland Protectorate (Zomba: Government Printer, 1920), p. 12; Assistant Resident, Chiradzulu, to Resident, Blantyre, 11 January 1918, M.N.A., NSB 7/3/3; questionnaire TH/10, Mr. Mlolo, 26 September 1973.

Assistant Chief Secretary to residents, circular letter, 7 June 1916, M.N.A., NCK 1/1/3; West Nyasa district Annual Report, 1917/18, M.N.A., NNC 3/1/3. Questionnaires: CK/2, Lyson Chauma, 12 August 1973; MA/7, Che Puleni Selemani, 16 July 1974; NU/1, Mastoni Patana, 4 April 1973. Also see chapter three.

¹¹³ See Bandawe, Memoirs, pp. 70-71; Mwase, Strike a Blow and Die, p. 28. The use of the taxation system for wartime labor recruitment is ignored by Baker, "Tax Collection in Malawi," pp. 40-62 passim; Baker mentions some abuses, but is concerned most with taxes qua taxes.

down

they

be r

To a

only elec

Cour

recr

infr So e

lcq

male

off Can.

occ.

Thi

WOM

for

Ch:

S∈ S

M. /-B --

down more enthusiastically than ever. Once found they could easily be required to serve as carriers or as road workers; in this way they would not only be made to pay their tax, but also be punished. To avoid such treatment in the future many were happy to receive only a tax receipt in payment for their labor, occasionally even electing that form of payment rather than cash. Some men, of course, were more skillful at avoiding the tax collectors and recruiters than others. To combat their success, wives were not infrequently captured, to be released only after the men surrendered. So effective was this technique that it was adopted as official policy by the government immediately following the war.

Such abuses of their women were not appreciated by Malawian males, and served as much to engender hostility as to accomplish the official goal of providing labor for the war. Further resentment came on demands, isolated but not uncommon, that women--and even occasionally children--should be drawn into the wartime labor pool. This practice was especially prevalent in Blantyre district, where women and children were recruited for work in the internment camps for German subjects. 116 At one point in 1917, the Blantyre resident

¹¹⁴ Interviews: 2, Fulotiya Nsanama, 8 August 1972; 5, Mwenyedawa Chitala, 10 August 1972; 15, Aroni Siyabu, 18 August 1972. Questionnaire NS/10, David Makoko, 20 September 1974.

Interview 84, Abiti Maunde (female), 9 April 1973; Chief Secretary to residents, circular letter, 24 October 1921, M.N.A., \$ 1/312/23; also see Linden, Catholics, p. 75.

¹¹⁶ Resident, Blantyre, to Acting Chief Secretary, 18 August 1916, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/6; Malawi Department of Antiquities Oral Records, BT 3, Chief Swedi Somba, interviewed 30 July 1970. As a small child, Chief Somba worked in a German internment camp.

even.
"imp
such;
wome
at Li
recri

exe Whe

fur

Mr. "pe

> ins Ref

sud

al: we

re

Cq

Q.

١

even authorized the employment of 153 children by a Mr. Hayter on "important government work." Elsewhere in the country, too, such desperate labor demands were enforced. In Lilongwe district women were recruited to carry loads of war rations to the lake, and, at Livingstonia, Robert Laws at one point asked for police help in recruiting "men or women" to help bring in war-related loads. 118

The utilization of women and children to meet manpower needs, however, was not the answer protectorate officials sought. And while the pursuit of tax defaulters had yielded some results, further pressures were felt necessary. Some compulsion was exercised through the European missionaries. On Likoma Island, when the demands for carriers came, it was Archdeacon Glossup and Mr. Ayerton, both U.M.C.A. missionaries, who exerted considerable "persuasive powers" upon the local population and their leaders, insisting on a quota of men from each village. 119 The Dutch Reformed missionaries acted similarly in Lilongwe district and the surrounding areas. Missionaries from both of these, as well as almost all other, denominations were called into service; most were assigned to carrier transport duties and often engaged in recruiting. 120

¹¹⁷ May 1917 Blantyre district monthly report, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/7.

Questionnaire LL/2, Mr. Yohane, 8 April 1973; Laws to Webb, 30 October 1915, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission Papers, letter book no. 24.

Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 54(January 1917), 3; Bishop of Nyasaland to Duff, 18 May 1917, M.N.A., U.M.C.A. papers, UN 1/1/2/15/1; questionnaire LK/8, Alan M. Chapola, 5 September 1973.

¹²⁰ Benford Mtalimanja, "The Dutch Reformed Church (Nkhoma Synod) and the Development of Rural Society in the Central Region of Malawi," unpubl. University of Malawi history seminar paper, 1972-73, p. 6;

At Nkoma, Livingstonia, and many other mission headquarters and outstations, mission teachers also were demanded by the government, not as interpreters or clerks, but for ordinary tengatenga duties. ¹²¹ The missionaries did not hesitate to send their converts, often seeing this gesture as a demonstration of their loyalty to the government. They made strong representations to their flocks regarding the Christian duty to serve, and pointed out that evasion was contrary to good, Christian principles. ¹²²

Chiefs and headmen, too, were called upon to exercise more "influence" to aid in obtaining men. The traditional leaders often acted reluctantly because of the very real pressures they also felt from their own people. To overcome this natural reticence, protectorate officials resorted to "compulsion applied...through chiefs and headmen with a few instances of punishment of individuals." The compulsion included threats of removal from office as well as possible bodily harm. In some cases headmen actually were whipped for their failures to produce

questionnaire DW/1, Mrs. Ndiingo Naphiri, 8 April 1973; list of civilian population employed with the military as at 19 September 1917, encl. in Acting Chief Secretary to Bishop of Nyasaland, 8 October 1917, M.N.A., U.M.C.A. papers, UN 1/1/2/15/1; Bandawe, Memoirs, p. 80.

Resident, Nkhotakota, to Rev. C.J. van Wijk, 2 August 1917, M.N.A., NCK 2/3/1; Laws to Hetherwick, 28 November 1917, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 27.

¹²² Interview 118, Petro Zeni-zeni, 6 August 1973; Laws to Soloman Nkandawiri, 21 April 1916, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 25.

¹²³Smith to C.O., 30 May 1917, P.R.O., C.O. 525/73.

men for the carrier corps. 124 "Chiefs were puppets of the government," one informant remembered sadly; "they suffered intimidation so they helped the recruiters to take people to war." 125 Drawn by old loyalties in one direction and by new demands in another, Malawi's traditional leaders were not long able to function as effective military labor recruiters. Their authority severely deteriorated in most cases, they were ignored by government officials, who in turn brought their techniques of intimidation directly to the people. 126

No longer content to corral only tax defaulters, the government's agents actively hunted out those who had run away from their homes to avoid recruitment. "There was no friendliness in it," a woman recalled; "they were just capturing people." The boma messengers who served as recruiters would often wait for men near gathering places, at churches or near beer-drinking ceremonies. When the men emerged it was an easy matter to seize them and take them away, "to go to war." More often, though, it was simply a matter of tracking down and capturing those who had run away; among the Tumbuka-speaking people the process was known as

¹²⁴ Interview 109, Pilato Kalizonkho, 6 August 1973. Questionnaires: DZ/22, Mr. Hauya, 17 April 1974; NC/18, George Manase, 27 August 1974; KR/4, Thomas Simwaba, 7 April 1973.

¹²⁵ Interview 126, Karonga Nkhata, 10 August 1973.

¹²⁶ Questionnaire DW/7, Paulo Golovana Fulatira, 17 April 1974; Resident, Chinteche, to Chief Secretary, 18 September 1917, M.N.A., NNC 1/1/1.

¹²⁷ Interview 42, Gogo Dorothy Liwewe, 28 December 1972.

¹²⁸ Questionnaires: MZ/40, Simeon Kamanga, 27 September 1974; DZ/41, Defina Jonasi (female), 29 August 1974.

chisokole—the chase—in the manner of a fox hunt. 129 One informant from the Shire valley put it in more familiar terms: "They used to chase people as if they were chasing chickens." 130 All too often when they were caught, the men not only were forced to engage in some form of military labor but also were whipped or otherwise abused. 131

Despite such offensive measures, demands for labor always seemed to run ahead of the available manpower. In early 1917, some thought was given to recruiting carriers in West Africa for Nyasaland, but the ida was rejected as inadvisable. Additional tengatenga were requested from Northern Rhodesia, much to the dismay of authorities there. The only answer to the increasing needs, of course, had to come from the protectorate itself. This meant still further requisitions, with tactics which reminded Europeans of the "press gang" and seemed to the Africans more like the slavery which colonialism was supposed to have ended. 132

Often the recruiting parties, led by district police, would sneak into villages at night. Making their way from house to house, they would rouse the inhabitants and capture any adult males found inside. These men would then be bound with ropes or

¹²⁹ Questionnaire MZ/37, Robert Chirambo, 28 August 1974.

¹³⁰ Interview 103, Wilson Dolobeni, 5 May 1973.

¹³¹ Questionnaires: RU/5, Simeon Kabuzi Nyirenda, 16 August 1974; RU/10, Mesheck K. Mwanza, 12 September 1974.

 $^{^{132}}$ Dispatch and associated minutes, Smith to C.O., 19 January 1917, P.R.O., C.O. 525/72; Nyasaland Times, 20, 40(4 October 1917), 3; questionnaire DW/4, Mr. D. Mpinga, 14 April 1973.

even wooden yokes and marched off for service, usually as tengatenga. 133 European missionaries who observed the night raids were deeply disturbed by the proceedings. One wrote to Robert Laws, "no matter what the need this is not a pleasant happening." 134 Moreover, many district residents also became uneasy. The Chinteche Resident was forthright in reporting his misgivings to the chief secretary: "I loathed having to levy by night." The Scottish missionary Alexander Hetherwick summed it up well, observing succinctly that "from all parts of Nyasaland they were recruited-pressed rather--into the service." 136

Despite such widespread recognition of what were really the techniques of forced labor, the authorities sometimes tried to wash their own hands of the excesses. As these activities were only beginning Governor Smith minuted wryly, "I recognize...that the police of Nyasaland are capable of gross irregularities if left too much by themselves." Of course, he had ordered military

¹³³ Interviews: 23, Johnathon Phiri, 5 September 1972; 64, Vmande Kaombe, 9 April 1973; 65, Gogo Gomani Yatina, 10 April 1973. Questionnaire MW/l, Julio Chinkhamdwe, 21 August 1973. Precisely these same recruitment techniques were used by British propagandists to condemn German wartime activities in East Africa; "Africanus," The Prussian Lash in Africa (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1918), p. 126.

¹³⁴ Turner to Laws, 14 March 1917, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 26.

¹³⁵ Resident, Chinteche, to Chief Secretary, 18 September 1917, M.N.A., NNC 1/1/1.

¹³⁶ Alexander Hetherwick, <u>Robert Hellier Napier in Nyasaland</u> (London: William Blackwood, 1925), p. 114.

¹³⁷ Minute by Smith, 4 June 1916, extracted in Assistant Chief Secretary to Resident, Zomba, 6 June 1916, M.N.A., NSZ 1/1/1.

intervention in recruitment during the resistance of Chimtunga Jere and was quite prepared to intervene whenever necessary. The police were put under tremendous pressures by their European superiors; in Ncheu district two were fined in May 1918 for "delay in getting carriers." In such circumstances, there can be little wonder that excessive force was often employed, not infrequently with the knowledge and even under the orders of protectorate authorities.

It mattered little to most Malawians who had ordered, authorized, or acquiesced in the night raids and in the binding or yoking captives. For them, such activities could only be representative of the government; the agents—the district police, messengers, and special recruiters—became feared men. A man who performed such tasks recalled that he was known as ching'ani—ng'ani (lit. lightening), one who struck terror into the populace, as if a thunderbolt. There was terror everywhere and people did not feel safe. Many recalled the days of the slave trade and drew the appropriate analogy; "slavery was the actual way people were taken to war." The fear was therefore great; the expectations

¹³⁸ Ncheu district, Civil Police, Record of Summary Punishments, M.N.A., NCN 3/1/1; also Resident, Chinteche, to Chief Secretary, 2 August 1918, M.N.A., NNC 1/1/1. Pressures undoubtedly also came from London, where colonial military staff officers were most disdainful of voluntary, non-forced labor recruitment; M.O. 2 (Colonial) Intelligence Memo, 28 July 1917, P.R.O., W.O. 106/259.

¹³⁹ Questionnaire NC/2, Chief Chilooko, 13 April 1974; Chief Chilooko has achieved his present office since 1918. Also, questionnaire MZ/34, Nelson Nkhata, 18 August 1974.

 $^{^{140}}$ Questionnaire NK/7, Chief Malengachanzi, 18 April 1973.

¹⁴¹ Interview 116, Amos Isaac, 14 July 1973; also interview 105, Diamond Caswell Chirwa, 1 August 1973. The Malawian writer,

were colored by the realization that virtually none of the slaves captured in the nineteenth century ever returned. Many, then, went to war's labors "blindly, as if pursuing a darkness." And even when some did return, their reports of hardships did nothing to reassure those who still faced the prospect of unwelcome service. 143

The odium of military labor demands and civil oppression reached a climax expressible only in the one term which Malawians continue to associate with the greatest burdens of colonial rule: thangata. This system of "help" for estate owners, enforced by the government—help for the war—became known as thangata. In fact, for the first time the term came to have real meaning outside the Shire highlands as men were taken for tengatenga service.

"Mtengatenga is thangata," insisted an informant from far up the eastern lakeshore; "we used to call it thangata in those days. We were forced to work." Not uncommonly the entire war became

S.Y. Ntara, captured this same feeling in his fictionalized biography, Man of Africa, trans. T. Cullen Young (London: Religious Tract Society, 1934), p. 138.

¹⁴² Questionnaire NK/I, Jaffari Sefi, 2 April 1973.

¹⁴³ Questionnaires: CR/7, Chimbonda Chiwala, 7 August 1974; DZ/12, Mr. M. Kuthemba, 12 April 1974; MZ/32, Makwelero Mwenzi, 25 September 1974. District residents observed that such reports hindered recruiting efforts throughout the war. Resident, Lilongwe, to Chief Secretary, 17 December 1915, M.N.A., NCK 1/1/3; Assistant Resident, Chiradzulu, to Chief Secretary, 26 January 1916, M.N.A., NSB 7/3/2; West Nyasa district Annual Report, 1918/19, M.N.A., S 1/920/19.

¹⁴⁴ Interview 72, Che Chionda Alidi, 1 April 1973. Questionnaires: MZ/39, Timoti Chipeta, 2 September 1974; NS/3, Johas Chiriwekha, 23 August 1973. June 1919 Upper Shire district monthly report, M.N.A., S 1/1005/19. Malawi Calendar of Events, sections for Nsanje and Ntchisi districts.

associated with the unpopular military labor demands. "They called it the war of thangata." 145

Once the brutality of war manpower requisitioning became fully apparent, Malawians stiffened their determination not to serve. It seemed clear that violent, even organized, resistance would meet with little success; the civilian and military officials had convincingly demonstrated that they were willing to exert whatever countermeasures were necessary. The answer, it seemed to many, might lie in more subtle means, of simply avoiding tengatenga service. Quietly, this is what some chiefs, headmen, and elders urged upon their subjects, even giving such advice to leading African Christians connected with the European missions. Some independent African ministers, as the Watch Tower preacher Sam Amanda in West Nyasa district, also urged passive resistance but were quickly silenced by government action. 148

Many Malawians, whether by such urgings or simply out of their own frustrations, did take individual action to avoid recruitment.

¹⁴⁵ Questionnaire MC/9, Chikani Mtali, 21 April 1973; also interview 118, Petro Zeni-zeni, 6 August 1973.

¹⁴⁶ Nyasaland authorities, however, continued to be concerned about organized resistance, especially following the 1917 Makombe rebellion in Mozambique, which had been sparked by wartime military labor demands; Smith to C.O., 30 May 1917, P.R.O., C.O. 525/73. The Mozambique rebellion is discussed in Newitt, Portuguese Settlement, pp. 366-7.

¹⁴⁷ Interview 133, Alufeyo Banda, 8 September 1973; Laws to Resident, Karonga, 12 March 1918, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 27.

¹⁴⁸ Resident, Chinteche, to Chief Secretary, 2 May 1918, M.N.A., NNC 1/1/1. A similar situation developed in neighboring Zambia; see R.L. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa (1928; rpt. London: Frank Cass, 1965), vol. 1, p. 243.

Feigned illness was a favorite ruse, although rarely successful, in part because medical examination was certainly not a part of the usual recruitment procedures. More fruitful was the appearance of madness, sanctioned in most Malawian societies as spirit possession; this became an especially effective means of avoiding wartime recruitment for a very few individuals. 149 Others, perhaps more desperate, attempted to disable themselves. Sand or certain herbal preparations, dropped in the eyes, would make one appear to be blind; the self-amputation of toes or fingers might exempt one from the arduous military labor, but undoubtedly, was infrequently employed. 150

Escape from the village still seemed the safest way to avoid service, and refinements on this alternative were the most wide-spread. Hiding places included grain stores, overgrowth along river banks, and caves located in nearby hills. Such lairs were not certain escapes, and good fortune or quick thinking was always an added advantage. One man recalled, with some glee, his experience.

I escaped and hid in a river and my parents, since I had not married yet, secretly brought food to me. They were [asked about my absence] but they said they did not know what had become of me. They even accused the whites for my disappearance. 151

¹⁴⁹ Questionnaires: DZ/16, Lilifodi Kadiguduli, 14 April 1974; DZ/18, Izeki Katsache, 15 April 1974. Laws to Jones, 15 January 1916, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 25. One case of madness is documented in Bishop Cathrew [Fisher], Particulars of Fifty Marriage Cases in the Diocese of Nyasaland (Likoma: Universities' Mission Press, 1926), p. 70.

¹⁵⁰ Questionnaires: MZ/27, Bisidi Chirambo, 17 April 1974; MZ/28, Nkhweta Lupunga, 18 April 1974; MZ/36, Lupofya Africa Mwale, 27 August 1974.

¹⁵¹ Interview 64, Vmande Kaombe, 9 April 1973.

For him, the clever ploy worked, and he did not become another of the countless tengatenga. Other individuals were less fortunate and sought, usually without success, some collective means of avoiding military labor.

In the central region some Malawians found an effective means of group action in the nyau societies, secret religious groups among the Chewa. Long an integral part of Chewa life, the nyau took on renewed importance during World War One as a focal point of opposition not only to recruitment, but also to European institutions generally. 152 The overt expression of the society is in its dances, performed at important transitional ceremonies, especially funerals and female initiation. During the dances some of the men put on masks representing animals and other figures and are thereby subsumed in their spirit identities. In such circumstances, a dancer's behavior is no longer controlled by the usual societal sanctions; a special set of nyau rules apply instead. Likewise, the places where the societies met and where they kept their masks and other paraphernalia were subject to special restrictions; only members might enter, and trespassers were subject to severe punishments, originally death. 153 It was in these special rules and

¹⁵² See especially Matthew Schoffeleers and I. Linden, "The Resistance of Nyau Societies to the Roman Catholic Missions in Colonial Malawi," in The Historical Study of African Religion, eds. T.O. Ranger and Isaria Kimambo (London: Heinemann, 1972), pp. 252-273.

¹⁵³ Schoffeleers and Linden, "Nyau," pp. 257-9; M.G. Marwick, "Notes on Some Cewa Rituals," <u>African Studies</u>, 27(1968), 6; W.H.J. Rangeley, "Notes on Cewa Tribal Law," <u>Nyasaland Journal</u>, 1, 3(1948), 63.

sanctions that the \underline{nyau} became important for those wishing to avoid wartime recruitment for military labor. 154

Nyau members would escape from their villages and hide in the special caves in the hills where the masks were stored, or in the nearby graveyards which were also part of the societies¹ spheres of influence. So there made their own hiding places in the bush, digging small-holes about three feet deep and about one and a half feet in diameter. The men would crawl into these machemba and then don masks or other disguises. Occasionally they would appear as bushes, but more often in the form of chickens or other animals, standard nyau masks. Whether in mountain caves, graveyards, or in their own small holes, these men were counting on the special position of the nyau to protect them. And although many of the recruiters were also nyau members, it was not the protection afforded by sacrosanct locations and garb but the suspension of societal rules which they counted on for protection. For many it

As the <u>nyau's</u> historic anti-European role has given it contemporary political as well as cultural importance, I encountered great reluctance among Malawians to discuss the role of the societies in opposition to military labor recruitment during the Great War. What follows, then, is an extrapolation from indirect evidence, which is cited. I am most grateful to Matthew Schoffeleers for a number of conversations and communications which have made this analysis possible.

¹⁵⁵ Questionnaires: DZ/16, Lilifodi Kadiguduli, 14 April 1974; DZ/45, Charlesi Mbemba, 13 September 1974; NC/22, F.K. Cheketeni, 18 September 1974.

¹⁵⁶ Questionnaires: DZ/31, Simon Njobvu, 3 August 1974; DZ/37, Solomoni Gangata, 10 August 1974; DZ/40, Patrick Gunda Kuyendakwina, 19 August 1974.

^{157&}lt;sub>Questionnaire NC/20</sub>, Zeffati Khinda, 29 August 1974.

was successful. This achievement, more than any other factor, may have accounted for the rising popularity of the societies during and after the First World War. 158

It is impossible to calculate the impact of <u>nyau</u> evasion on war recruitment, since at the time record-keeping was so poor.

Table 2., however, does suggest that in one area, Dedza district, where <u>nyau</u> activity was especially high during the war, military labor service as a percentage of the adult male population was very much lower than in adjacent areas and well below the average for the entire country. It may be tentatively concluded, therefore, that although the evidence is indirect the Chewa <u>nyau</u> societies were the focal point of the most effective attempts to avoid tengatenga and other military labor service.

Not even the <u>nyau</u> societies were able to counteract completely the intensive recruitment efforts. A contemporary observer correctly noted that "tenga-tenga were recruited in their thousands from all the majisterial districts in Nyasaland." As Table 2. also suggests, however, there were areas of Malawi where recruitment and military labor service were heavier than elsewhere. The greatest

¹⁵⁸ Linden, <u>Catholics</u>, p. 120.

Table 2., as was the case with Table 1., must not be considered as being at all accurate; it is designed only to assist in offering some suggestive conclusions. The statistical problems are much the same as those for Table 1. given above. In addition, some exaggerations and omissions in the military labor figures certainly occurred; Acting Resident, Blantyre, to Chief Secretary, 16 July 1918, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/8; Resident, Chinteche, to Chief Secretary, 20 March 1918, M.N.A., NNC 1/1/1.

¹⁶⁰T. Cullen Young, "Nyasaland Operations During the World War, 1914-1918," unpubl. typescript, Society of Malawi Library, Blantyre, [p. xiii].

Ratio: KAR to Military 6.18 24.03 218.92 56.69 9.69 7.75 1.76 21.45 16.91 Labor MALAWIAN MILITARY LABOR, BY DISTRICTS Military Labor uo % 31.9 31.9 35.4 18.2 15.7 2.1 26.1 .9 17.0 52.4 76.6 54.7 42.0 16.3 16.8 1918 Administrative Census Military Laborers 6,542 3,600 8,135 7,580 9,216 4,288 8,005 3,700 1,956 3,005 3,005 1,460 149 105 7,496 7,295 5,074 8,678 8,678 16,214 15,520 25,607 25,607 11,610 11,610 11,988 11,988 292,656 Adult Males TABLE 2. sub-district Chi radzulu Lower Shire Upper Shire South Nyasa North Nyasa Liwonde West Shire West Nyasa Mombers 1s Blantyre Lilongwe Ngara District Mulanje Marimba Totals Zomba Dedza Dowa Ruo

Source: M.N.A., NSB 1/2/5; also see Table 1.

concentrations were along the communication lines between Blantyre and the southern lakeshore. Military labor also was recruited heavily in the districts on the central lakeshore (except Dedza) and involved largely with the transport of foodstuffs from the rich African agricultural sections of the central region to the lake. Finally, North Nyasa district had a high percentage of men on war work, even in 1918 when the fighting had moved far from the frontier. This probably reflects a sizeable number of front line carriers serving with battalions in the field.

In all, close to 200,000 Malawians saw service with the tengatenga legions and in other labor capacities. For those intimately involved in the campaign they may have seemed like many more. One supposedly humorous, European account of the "tango tangos" suggested that even in late 1915 "there are at least six millions of the Tango tribe in Nyasaland," an obvious exaggeration, but cognizant of the difficulties in arriving at an accurate estimate. One problem is the enormous fluctuation in the manpower actually employed. A semi-official reckoning put the highest number of carriers actually serving at 70,000, a figure that coincides well with the administrative census of all military laborers in early 1918 (see Table 2.). The problem of accuracy is further complicated by the factor of multiple tours of duty; many men served

¹⁶¹ Karonga Kronikal, 2, 2(n.d.), 41. The Kronikal was the not very official humor sheet published by European troops stationed at Karonga prior to the invasion of German East Africa.

¹⁶² Nyasaland Times, 21, 15(12 December 1918), 2.

twice, and quite a few three or more times. ¹⁶³ All official counts, unrevised after the war, put the total--including those serving more than once--at nearly 257,250. An extrapolation of this figure gives nearly 191,500 individuals serving in military labor positions. ¹⁶⁴ When women and children are added, and corrections for certain errors allowed for, the total must have reached 200,000 individuals; it easily could have been higher.

These thousands of laborers, along with the many fewer askari, constituted the vast bulk of Nyasaland's war effort. All experienced the traumas of war, but the tengatenga especially suffered the terrors of recruitment at home and the rigors of the march in the field. In 1925 Sir Hector L. Duff reflected on this aspect of recruitment and service, drawing upon his wartime years as chief secretary, acting governor of Nyasaland, and chief political officer in occupied southwest Tanganyika.

You can't afford to pick and choose and call for volunteers; you must get hold of your carriers when and how you can, and, having got them, you must see to it that they keep up with the troops whatever happens, through forced marches, bad weather and everything, for if they fall behind with their precious loads the fighting men will be paralyzed in a few hours.

¹⁶³ Interview 117, Village Headman Mpanangombe, 17 August 1973; Duff to C.O., 27 January 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 525/82.

¹⁶⁴ Duff to C.O., 17 December 1918, P.R.O., C.O. 525/80, gave initial estimates; these were repeated exactly, with notations of percentages on multiple tours in Duff to C.O., 27 January 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 525/82. In the latter dispatch Duff added a cautionary note; "I cannot guarantee the absolute accuracy of the above figures.... have had to work it out from various Secretariat and Treasury Minute Papers." Despite this disclaimer, apparently rounded out versions of Duff's calculations were published in Murray, Handbook, p. 271.

^{165&}lt;sub>H.L.</sub> Duff, "White Men's Wars in Black Men's Countries," <u>The National Review</u> (U.K.), 84(1925), 909.

They, literally, made the war go; and along with fellow Malawians in the King's African Rifles and in regiments and legions from farther afield, they were drawn into experiences of a truly global nature.

CHAPTER THREE: THE MACHONA COHORTS

The recruitment of Malawians into war service, whether as soldiers or military laborers, should be seen as part of a long-standing and larger phenomenon: Malawian emigration for work and schooling. In two important ways, however, the First World War modified the labor migration patterns which had been developing since the 1890s. Apart from those whose military service took them out of Malawi, others left the country seeking new, war-inspired advantages, beyond the traditional goals of education and employment. Furthermore, many of those who were outside the protectorate in 1914 (as well as some who left later) found themselves caught up in the war experience, being drawn, both physically and emotionally, into the experiences of their countrymen at home.

Although the massive movement of Malawians to work in the mines and on the farms of South Africa and Rhodesia was largely a development of the inter-war years, the patterns of Malawian emigration were clearly established by the beginning of the Great War. It is difficult even to estimate the extent of this pre-war migration, due to the fragmentary and frequently inaccurate

Boeder, "Malawians Abroad," pp. 3, 99-104.

²F.E. Sanderson, "The Development of Labour Migration from Nyasaland, 1891-1914," <u>Journal of African History</u>, 2(1961), 259.

recordkeeping in Nyasaland and elsewhere. Robert Boeder, however, has suggested that about 25,500 Malawians were outside the country in 1914, distributed as follows: 20,000 in Rhodesia, about half working in the mines; 2,000 in Zambia, mostly employed as clerks in the civil service and with the Northern Rhodesia Police; 2,000 on the sugar estates of the Zambezi valley; 200 in Katanga; only 1,000 in South Africa, none working on the mines due to the closing of emigration in 1909; and 300 elsewhere. While this estimate is as accurate an accounting as is likely to be produced, it needs several clarifications, if not modifications.

The employment of Malawians on the Witwatersrand mines undoubtedly had declined following 1909, when official recruitment of Malawian labor ended after the unfortunate experiments begun in 1903. Some remained working on the mines, however, as U.M.C.A. Padre Henry Munby found in 1914, when he visited South Africa en route to Malawi from furlough in Britain. The numbers were undoubtedly small, as Munby noted, in part due to the circuitous routes which the migrants took to South Africa and the often complicated means they used to obtain travel documents. Their presence, though, cannot be doubted; neither can the presence of a number of Malawians in German East Africa, most of them serving in

Boeder, "Malawians Abroad," p. 95.

H.E. Munby, "Nyasaland Boys in South Rhodesia," Central Africa, 39(1921), 200.

⁵Sanderson, "Labour Migration," p. 268. The estimate that "by 1914, about ten thousand Malawians were working in the Transvaal mines" seems much exaggerated; Bridglal Pachai, Malawi: The History of the Nation (London: Longman, 1973), p. 126.

the colony's military forces. Recruitment from British territory had gone on for a number of years, with both new enlistees and veteran K.A.R. askari serving with the Germans. After the disbandment of the Second Battalion of the King's African Rifles in 1911, a considerable number of the former British askaris joined the German ranks and were serving in the Schutztruppe on the eve of war. There were Malawians, too, serving in Zanzibar, the remnants of the Nyasaland military band, discharged in 1911. Others were working in Great Britain, and a few were studying in the United States.

Officially, the government of Nyasaland contended that emigration from the country had slowed dramatically between 1914 and 1919. Of an administrative census in 1918 estimated that 12,569 menother than those in military employ-were outside the protectorate, 11

Alfred Sharpe to Sir Clement Hill, 10 March 1897, P.R.O., F.O. 2/127; King's African Rifles Intelligence Reports, 1908-1914, M.N.A., KAR 3/1/1.

⁷Lieutenant-Colonel H. Moyse-Bartlett, <u>The King's African Rifles</u> (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1956), p. 153.

⁸Moyse Bartlett, <u>King's African Rifles</u>, p. 694.

⁹It would appear that at least one Malawian in 1919 had been working for several years on the Glasgow docks; see Glasgow Police C.I.D. Report, 25 December 1919, in A.M. Dodds (Scottish Office) to C.O., 31 December 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 525/86.

¹⁰ Drafts for 1919-1920 Blue Book, in Duff to C.O., 10 February 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 525/82.

^{11&}quot;Summary of Census of the Protectorate," n.d., M.N.A., NSB 1/2/5. This "census" was produced by the guesswork of district residents and was subject to apparently arbitrary modification; see Assistant Resident, Chiradzulu, to Resident, Blantyre, 21 January 1918 and 5 March 1918, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/7.

a figure lower than in any year since 1905. ¹² But the flow of migrants, to Rhodesia at least, seemed to reach "record numbers" by the middle of the war and was a cause of concern both there and in Nyasaland. ¹³

Despite posturing to the contrary, Nyasaland's administration was deeply concerned over the continuing migration after the outbreak of hostilities. District residents were directed to stop the flow, since all possible manpower was needed in the war effort. This policy was not motivated solely by the unfavorable Rhodesian reactions to increasing Malawian migration. In the first half of 1915, the number of emigration passes issued to Africans had increased markedly in Dowa, Lilongwe, and Marimba districts and was a puzzling concern to the governor. If Similar increases were reported for 1914-1916 in Chinteche district, with a total of 2,161 passes being issued for travel outside the protectorate during the two-year period. This number was more than twice the total for the previous biennium, an exceptionally sharp increase even for an area of usually high labor migration. Nonetheless, after the warnings some residents continued

¹² Boeder, "Malawians Abroad," p. 289.

¹³Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau Report (Confidential), 11 February 1916, N.A.R., N 3/22/11; Assistant Chief Secretary to district residents, circular letter, 7 June 1916, M.N.A., NCK 1/1/3; Sanderson, "Labour Migration," p. 226. In a secret dispatch late in 1915, Governor Smith admitted that the number of migrants was "somewhat larger than usual;" Smith to C.O., 15 November 1915, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/13.

¹⁴ Assistant Chief Secretary to district residents, circular letter, 7 June 1916, M.N.A., NCK 1/1/3; Smith to C.O., 19 July 1915, P.R.O., C.O., 525/62.

¹⁵ Resident, Chinteche, to Chief Secretary, 19 June 1916, M.N.A., NNC 1/1/1.

to issue passes. In 1918 a number of men from the North Nyasa district, who had completed some war service, were given permission to work in Katanga, ¹⁶ despite the common practice of multiple tours for military laborers.

The real problem was not the increased number of passes, but the growing number of men who left the territory without official permission or travel documents. A few may have been attracted by the high wages paid in the Rhodesia Native Regiments. Most, however, were simply taking advantage not only of well established practice but also of well traveled routes across Zambia and Mozambique to Rhodesia and Zaire. Some merely crossed the frontier into Mozambique, returning when they believed they had safely avoided the recruiting teams. Similar tactics had long been employed to escape the government tax collectors, and, in fact, served to reduce revenue collections in some areas during the war. Many

¹⁶ Laws to Springer, 24 May 1918, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 27.

¹⁷ Assistant Chief Secretary to district residents, circular letter, 7 June 1916, M.N.A., NCK 1/1/3.

¹⁸ Smith to C.O., 23 August 1920, M.N.A., S 1/716/20.

¹⁹ Questionnaires: CK/2, Lyson Chauma, 12 August 1973; DZ/13, Nakhumayo Solofina, 13 April 1974; DZ/30, Yatesi Kusamba, 2 August 1974; DZ/39, Filipo Khezala, 14 August 1974; NU/1, Mastoni Patana, 4 April 1973; TH/14, Kaiser Mandaadzauka, 24 September 1974. Ruo district Annual Report, 1919/20, M.N.A., S 1/1041/19. The practice of fleeing across the border from the tax collectors is described by Pachai, Malawi, p. 119. Little evasion of wartime labor in this manner appears to have taken place along the eastern frontiers of the country, for two reasons: at times much of that area was a combat zone, and considerable recruitment of askari and tengatenga was carried out east of the Malawi frontier in Mozambique by both British and Portuguese officials. See Smith to C.O., 16 October 1917, P.R.O., C.O. 525/75; Smith to C.O., 14 January 1918 and 25 February 1918, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/2.

others simply followed the footsteps of previous Malawians and escaped the onerous obligations of wartime labor by going to Rhodesia, or perhaps Katanga. 20

Although not motivated primarily by the desire for employment, most of the wartime migrants appear to have sought work and perhaps education. Some Rhodesian authorities thought otherwise and considered that the Malawians posed a threat to peace and good order. This view was undoubtedly influenced by the concerns of Rhodesian whites following the Chilembwe rebellion of January 1915. Chilembwe's actions did cast suspicion upon Malawian migrants in Katanga, who responded by fostering the idea that the rising was the work of German intrigues in Nyasaland. 24

There is almost no evidence that such European fears were well founded. During the war Malawians outside the country did little that could be construed as threatening either peace or good order.

Questionnaire MA/7, Pulene Selemani, 16 July 1974. Resident, Lilongwe, to Chief Secretary, 17 December 1915, M.N.A., NCK 1/1/3; Laws to J.E. Stephenson, 25 April 1916, M.N.A., Livingstone Mission papers, letter book no. 25.

The motivations of one famous wartime migrant, H. Kamuzu Banda, now President of the Republic of Malawi, were primarily educational and little related to the demands for war manpower, although the latter factor has never been fully explored. Cullen Young and Hastings Banda, eds., Our African Way of Life (London and Redhill: Lutterworth Press, 1946), pp. 26-27. For a discussion of the date of Banda's departure from Malawi, see Phillip Short, Banda (London and Boston: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 12.

Assistant Chief Secretary to district residents, circular letter, June 1916, M.N.A., NCK 1/1/3.

²³See Detective Sergeant F.G. Garton to Superintendent, C.I.D., Bulawayo, 23 February 1915, N.A.R., N 3/21/3.

²⁴Nyasaland Times, 18, 17(29 April 1915), 3.

One small group of Malawians, however, did attempt to exploit the situation to their own advantage. Calling themselves the "Nyasaland Scholars Club," J. G. Asa, Allan Tawako, and M. M. Ammon applied to the Superintendent of Natives in both Salisbury and Bulawayo for permission to hold dinners for the benefit of the Red Cross. Once assent was obtained, the three men circularized mining camps and African locations, advertising "the Dinner we are going to make in a unity to all nations of the black Race it is meant to unite us Tsic]."25 At the dinners little if any mention was made of the Red Cross, or of African unity. Rather, after a miniscule meal, a system of challenges was begun, with money being offered by some of those present for such privileges as the right to sing, the pleasure of hearing the women present sing, or even the opportunity of going outside with the ladies. But, if challenged by another offering a higher sum--even one of the organizers--the original payment was forfeited. Apart from the questionable nature of the proceedings, officials suspected that the money collected was being misappropriated; Asa, Tawako, and Ammon, however, claimed that their expenses were too high to permit any donations to the Red Cross. Without firm evidence the matter was in doubt, the "scholars" were simply warned to end their "perambulating peculations" and were apparently not heard from again. 26

²⁵Nyasaland Scholars Club circular (typewritten), n.d., in Superintendent, C.I.D. to Superintendent of Natives, Bulawayo, 31 January 1917, N.A.R., N 3/21/3. In typical Native Department fashion, this file is labeled "Nyasaland Boys Club."

Superintendent, C.I.D. to Superintendent of Natives, Bulawayo, 31 January 1917 and 2 February 1917, N.A.R., N 3/21/3.

Such a petty exercise in extortion was, of course, not typical of the advantages which Malawians made of the migrant experience during the war. By far, their response was to use the precedents of emigration as a vehicle to move away from the pressures of war at home. At the same time, those who were already abroad found themselves, in this truly world war, caught up in experiences very similar to those found in their homeland. Any many were, literally as well as figuratively, drawn back into the mainstream of the Malawian experience which, to greater or lesser degrees, they had left behind. 27

For a few this meant a conscious return to the land of their birth and the place of their education. They had gone south to jobs as clerks and other functionaries, primarily on the Rhodesian and South African mines. Malawians were especially sought for such positions since they were often better educated and were generally considered to be more conscientious than local workers. But with the war, similar jobs for the first time were created in Malawi. Many who had experiences abroad returned to take the highest paying, most senior, positions and often elected to remain in their homeland after the war. ²⁹ For others, the homecoming was not so voluntary.

²⁷Compare the observation of Shepperson and Price (p. 412) on Malawian expatriates: "in the country which they have left they are <u>machona</u>, 'the lost legion', many of whom never return."

²⁸Boeder, "Malawians Abroad," p. 116. Requests, which could not be met, for trained personnel continued to reach Livingstonia Mission even after the war had begun; Laws to Stephenson, 25 April 1916, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission Papers, letter book no. 25.

²⁹ Nyasaland Protectorate, Annual Report, 1917-18 (London: H.M.S.O., 1919), p. 10. A typical example was Manfred Raphel Mandambwe, who returned after several years in Johannesburg to work

From Rhodesia, Zambia, Zaire, and even South Africa and Tanganyika, Malawians returned in military units recruited outside the country and, through their participation in the East African campaign, shared the experiences which touched their compatriots at home.

Many of those Malawians who served with the German East African Schutztruppe had been, for many years, assigned to units closest to British territory, especially at Neu Langenburg in southwest

Tanzania, where English was sometimes used as the language of command. Despite the reorganization of the German forces undertaken in 1914 by Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, it appears that, at the outbreak of the war, most of the Malawians remained in German companies near the Nyasaland-Northern Rhodesian frontier. There was even concern, within K.A.R. intelligence, that some African reservists of the German forces might be living in British territory. Some intelligence officers, however, expected that German askari who were British subjects, especially those who previously had been in the King's African Rifles, would refuse to serve their "German masters and desert to the British."

There were reports reaching Nyasaland that Malawians serving with the Germans wanted little to do with the war, and one African soldier from the Neu Langenburg garrison was court-martialed in

as an interpreter; he later bacame a lay leader in the U.M.C.A. See Register of Readers, p. 59, M.N.A., U.M.C.A. papers, unclassified, box 2.

³⁰King's African Rifles Intelligence Reports, 1908-1914, M.N.A. KAR 3/1/1; Moyse-Bartlett, King's African Rifles, pp. 261, 265.

³¹W. Lloyd-Jones, <u>K.A.R.</u> (London: Arrowsmith, 1926), p. 168.

August 1914 for "cowardice in action" along the Nyasaland frontier. 32 One former K.A.R. askari deserted, returning to his old Nyasaland unit. 33 These actions, however, seem to have been exceptions. More commonly, the Malawians serving in the <u>Schutztruppe</u> appear to have been especially important to German tactics along the border with Nyasaland. Not only did they fight well in various engagements, including the affair at Karonga and Kasoa, 34 but they also seem to have utilized to great advantage what special local knowledge they may have possessed regarding the frontier districts.

The use of Malawians as scouts and intelligence agents was most certainly a common German practice during the first eighteen months of the war, accounting for the extremely accurate intelligence estimates which reached German commanders. These included information on troop dispositions and strengths along the Nyasaland and Rhodesian border and an amazingly accurate understanding of British propaganda efforts among the African population. That the Germans were also more readily able to solicit information from the local population is revealed by the much less useful and often highly suspect data that reached British military intelligence along the

³²King's African Rifles Intelligence Report, 24 September 1915, M.N.A., KAR 3/1/2; it must be remembered that British intelligence was not very reliable. Fifth Field Company Report, 29 August 1914, in von Lettow-Vorbeck war diary, volume one, I.W.M.

³³Interview 115, A.C. Ngoma, August 1973; Mr. Ngoma's father was the soldier in question.

³⁴ Colonel Colin Harding, <u>Frontier Patrols</u> (London: G. Bell, 1937), pp. 232-3.

³⁵von Lettow-Vorbeck war diary, volume one, I.W.M.

southern border with German East Africa. Such cooperation cannot be attributed solely to local expectations of a German victory, but is indicative of the role played by Malawian (and perhaps Zambian) askaris for the Germans. 36

Malawians may also have been responsible for much of the raiding and plundering which was undertaken in British territory by the Germans. Cattle and other animals were seized, and villages were terrorized to induce cooperation, causing many to take refuge in the nearby hills. Chiefs were singled out readily, and several were executed. The Although it may seem strange that Malawians would participate in such attacks on their own people, it appears that, in fact, the raids were led by men familiar to the local population. The Certainly, they were trained soldiers, following orders sustained by the threat of court-martial and execution. More importantly, few of the German askari came from the small ethnic groups which lived along the frontier and their immediate local attachments were minimal; their local knowledge had been acquired during previous K.A.R. duty along the far northern frontier of Nyasaland.

³⁶ Intelligence Officer, Fife, to Defence Headquarters, Salisbury, 7 September 1914, N.A.R., RC 3/9/10/2; Edward Northey, "The East African Campaign," The African World Annual (1918), p. 75. Brigadier General Northey arrived on the frontier in January 1916, and by May had concluded that his intelligence estimates were highly suspect.

³⁷See F.S. Kalikene Chiwona, "The Impact of the First World War on Northern Chitipa," unpubl. University of Malawi history seminar paper, 1972-73; Intelligence Officer, Fife, to Commandant General, Salisbury, 6 September 1914, N.A.R., RC 3/9/10/2; Duff to Smith, 27 August 1914, M.N.A., GOA 2/2/1.

³⁸ Questionnaire KR/9, Peter G. Mbisa, 15 April 1973.

³⁹ Resident, Karonga, to Intelligence Officer, Zomba, 11 May 1914, M.N.A., KAR 3/1/1.

Moreover, as the Germans were driven from the Nyasaland-Northern Rhodesia border in mid-1916, few if any of their Malawian askari deserted. Rather, they continued to fight for their German commanders and served them well throughout the campaign. 40 Their experiences in the German cause were, undoubtedly, similar to those of Malawians fighting for the British. If anything, their experiences were more intense, and they may have suffered more. General Jan C. Smuts wrote in September 1916, "We are having a terrible hard time. But how much harder a time the fleeing Germans and [their] Askaris are having." Whatever the qualitative judgment made of their experiences, Malawians on the German side shared common problems and situations with their compatriots on the other side.

There can be little question concerning the shared experiences of another group of Malawians who were almost immediately drawn into the war: those serving with the Northern Rhodesia Police. Malawians had participated in military operations in Northeastern Rhodesia since about 1893, and were among the first members of the Northeastern Rhodesia Constabulary when it was established in 1895.

Malawians also seem to have served with the Barotse Native Police from about 1902. 42 By 1914, a sizeable number of Malawian K.A.R.

⁴⁰See Lloyd-Jones, <u>K.A.R.</u>, p. 168.

⁴¹ J.C. Smuts to S.M. Smuts, 26 September 1916, in <u>Selections</u> from the <u>Smuts Papers</u>, eds. W.K. Hancock and J. van der Poel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), vol. 3, p. 700.

⁴²W.V. Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1954), pp. 3, 6, 21; Boeder, "Malawians Abroad," p. 95.

veterans also had joined the Northern Rhodesia Police, which had been created in 1912 by the amalgamation of the two previously established units. 43 With the declaration of war, the N.R.P. were immediately mobilized and detachments sent to the border point with German Southwest Africa and the northern frontier with German East Africa. But it was in the latter area where they were to serve throughout the campaign, including a brief rest and recreation stay at Fort Johnston in September 1918.44

The men of the Northern Rhodesia Police served with their Malawian colleagues for the more than four years of the East African campaign. Most were closely associated with the First Regiment of the King's African Rifles, although one company served through much of the campaign with the Rhodesia Native Regiment (which also had a large Malawian component). In Northern Rhodesian service, the Malawians held more senior positions, owing to their relatively longer military experience. Many were non-commissioned officers, and not a few of them sergeants with the police. One of these was Sergeant Magombo, whose experience dated to the expedition of

⁴³ Hordern, Military Operations, vol. 1, p. 169.

Brelsford, Northern Rhodesia Regiment, p. 46.

⁴⁵ Brelsford, Northern Rhodesia Regiment, p. 67. The relationship between the Northern Rhodesia Police and the 1st King's African Rifles remained close; the K.A.R. officers presented the N.R.P. with a silver statuette of an askari and a regimental drum major's parade cane in recognition of the association of the two units during the First World War.

⁴⁶ R.W.M. Langham, "Memories of the 1914-1918 Campaign," Northern Rhodesia Journal, 3, 3(1957), 258.

Captain Maguire against the Yao ruler Makanjira in 1891, and who had served with the King's African Rifles. 47 These men must have been good leaders, for it has been reported that General Northey thought the Northern Rhodesia Police to have been consistantly the best troops under his command; among their German adversaries, the "old askari" of the N.R.P. were particularly respected. 48 Whatever the value of such judgments, the men of the Northern Rhodesia Police were also drawn into the wartime experiences of the country which they had left behind.

As military men, however, it might be expected that duty would call Malawians, whether serving in German East Africa or Northern Rhodesia, back into the affairs of their homeland. But many other Malawians in the diaspora, including some who left to avoid war service, found themselves involved as well. The wartime needs of Nyasaland were great, and the demands for imperial defense such that they--often most unexpectedly--were drawn into military units directly or indirectly defending their country.

Even before the fortuitous victory at Karonga and Kasoa in early September 1914, it was apparent that reinforcements would be needed to supplement Nyasaland's forces. Brigadier General A. H. M. Edwards, Commandant General of Rhodesia, proposed that troops be called from India, an idea twice seconded by Governor Smith, the

⁴⁷Frank Dupuis, "A Nobody in a Forgotten Campaign: a personal narrative on an adventurous voyage to East Africa sixty years ago, residence as a planter in Nyasaland, and service in the East Africa Campaign of World War I," unpubl. typescript, chapter six, privately held.

⁴⁸ Kenneth Bradley, "The 1914-18 Campaign," in Brelsford, Northern Rhodesia Regiment, p. 48; Langham, "Memories" (1957), p. 257.

second time just after the Chilembwe rebellion. 49 On the heels of the disastrous Tanga expedition, the Colonial Office raised serious objections and declined to approve the request, bringing pleas from Smith for "some force from outside" to aid the protectorate. 50 This need was in part met with the arrival of South African and Rhodesian white forces on the frontier, but the situation still called for additional reinforcements. General Edwards seems to have suggested raising a force of Africans from Rhodesia in November 1915, although he continued to hope for additional troops from India. 51 General Northey, however, put the matter to rest, appealing for a reserve: "If Rhodesia will not enlist them please allow us to recruit in Rhodesia for the King's African Rifles. I do not want Indian troops."⁵² In response, the Rhodesia Native Regiment was authorized, and recruitment began in April 1916. But the R.N.R. may not have been quite the "force from outside" which Governor Smith had in mind.

From the start, Nyasaland men in large numbers joined the Rhodesia Native Regiment. When the unit appeared in Nyasaland early

⁴⁹Edwards to Resident Commissioner, Salisbury, 2 September 1914, N.A.R., RC 3/9/10/2; Smith to C.O., 31 December 1914, P.R.O., C.O. 525/58, and Smith to C.O., 17 February 1915, P.R.O., C.O. 525/61.

⁵⁰Minutes by H.J. Read and the Secretary of State for the Colonies on Smith to C.O., 17 February 1915, P.R.O., C.O. 525/61. Smith to C.O., 8 May 1915, P.R.O., C.O. 525/61, and also Smith to C.O., 9 July 1915, P.R.O., C.O. 525/62.

⁵¹Hordern, <u>Military Operations</u>, vol I, pp. 188-189; High Commissioner, Capetown, to Governor, Nyasaland, for Northey, 8 April 1916, M.N.A., GOA 1/1/1.

⁵²Northey to High Commissioner, Capetown, 12 April 1916, N.A.R., A 3/11/20/2.

in August 1916, after only hasty training in Salisbury, one Nyasaland K.A.R. officer noted that although the troops had been recruited in Southern Rhodesia, there was a "large proportion of natives from Nyasaland who had gone south to the mines." Indeed, recruiters seem to have looked for "alien natives" from both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Among the first recruits from Que Que, all fifteen were "foreigners and ex K.A.R.s," and at Umvuma nine "Blantyre natives" were recruited but only one Shona. This pattern was repeated to some degree throughout the country. The result was that about fifty percent of the regiment who marched to Fort Johnston at the end of August 1916 were from outside Southern Rhodesia, most probably from Nyasaland. 55

Recruitment for a short-lived second battalion, which was later merged with the first, began in early 1917. This effort concentrated on alien Africans whom General Edwards felt were:

more intelligent, are keener, and are more readily adaptable to conditions of the life of a soldier than the native of Southern Rhodesia, and again because experience has proved the desireability of having a mixture of tribes in a Native Regiment as opposed to having a Regiment entirely composed of one class or tribe.56

⁵³Barton diaries, notebook 38, 28 August 1916, M.N.R.

⁵⁴ Superintendent of Natives, Gwelo, to Chief Native Commissioner, 14 July 1916, and Assistant Native Commissioner, Umvuma, to Native Commissioner, Chilimanzi, 13 July 1916, N.A.R., N 3/32/4; though incomplete, this file contains much suggestive material on this point.

have been a prejudice against the "poor physique" of Zambian recruits; copy of unaddressed letter by F.D.P. Chaplin, Administrator, Southern Rhodesia, 4 February 1916, N.A.R., A 3/11/20/2.

⁵⁶Edwards to Administrator, Southern Rhodesia, 14 February 1917, N.A.R., A 3/11/20/4.

The last reason, of course, contradicted almost all regimental organization and recruiting practices in East Africa during the First World War.

It seems likely that Edwards was merely trying to smooth over a number of recruiting problems encountered in Rhodesia. In some areas men refused to enlist until the soldiers of the first regiment returned, in the words of one recruiter because there were "rumours to the effect that most of the natives of the first regiment were dead were current in certain parts." In other cases the Rhodesian Africans simply followed a precedent set in Nyasaland; "numbers of the young men appeared to be sleeping out in the veld or otherwise making themselves scarce." Since, however, Nyasaland migrants and other foreigners were often clustered and confined on the mines, they were more easily recruited. It was even reported in some quarters that the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau had supplied men directly to the regiment. 59

Despite the overwhelming evidence of Nyasaland men in the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, an accurate count of their numbers is presently impossible. Rhodesian war accounts tended to minimize not only the participation of Malawians and Zambians in the regiment, but also the role of the unit. 60 Another factor is the complicated

⁵⁷P.W.G. Jackson to Chief Native Commissioner, 11 May 1917, N.A.R., A 3/11/20/4.

⁵⁸A.S. Cripps to Resident Commissioner, Salisbury, 28 March 1917, N.A.R., A 3/11/20/1.

⁵⁹Langham, ''Memories'' (1957), p. 257.

⁶⁰Colin Harding, "Rhodesia's War Services," The Outpost, 14, 9(March 1937), 16. The Outpost is the official magazine of Rhodesia's British South Africa Police.

record-keeping involving migrants generally, especially since many of them were, in fact, outside their home countries without any kind of official permission. The nominal roles of the regiment, prepared in 1918, do not indicate the birthplace or homes of the more than 2,600 men listed; thirty-two are shown as having previous service with the King's African Rifles, a figure that must be too low. 61

Malawian sources offer little more by way of assistance. One obviously incomplete list, compiled in 1920 or 1921, gives seventy-six names of former R.N.R. askari, but virtually all are from the Southern Province. The only available data about R.N.R. veterans from the northern two-thirds of the country, which usually had a higher migration rate, is extremely fragmentary: guesses by the Chinteche resident in late 1917 and early 1918 that thirty or forty from his district had joined the regiment. At the end of the war, however, 406 men of the regiment elected to take their discharge in Zomba rather than return to Salisbury. Their commanding officer at the time, Colonel C. L. Carbutt, suggested the men's homes were in Nyasaland. Other Malawians, of course, may have elected to

⁶¹ Nominal Rolls, Rhodesia Native Regiment, N.A.R., A 3/11/24/7.

^{62&}lt;sub>11</sub>List of Names of discharged Rhodesia Native Regiment," n.d., M.N.A., S 1/716/20.

Resident, Chinteche, to Chief Secretary, 18 December 1917 and 2 May 1918, M.N.A., NNC 1/1/1.

⁶⁴C.L. Carbutt, "History, 1st Rhodesia Native Regiment," in Carbutt to Secretary for Defense, Salisbury, 20 December 1921, N.A.R., B 1/5/10. This file is entitled "Notes for a book by General Edwards" despite the fact that almost nothing in it was authored by Edwards nor was such a book completed.

return to Rhodesia and the generally more lucrative employment to be found there.

In all, probably more than 1,000 Malawians joined the Rhodesia Native Regiment. In mnay ways--beyond the decision of some to take their discharge in Nyasaland--they were drawn into the war experiences of their homeland more intensely than other migrants. Almost immediately upon recruitment, with only basic drill instruction, they set off for Nyasaland. Most of their training was in Zomba, where they also paraded on several dress occasions. The temptations of their homeland seem to have been relatively great. While in Nyasaland the regiment experienced several desertions and not a few incidents of askari violence which disrupted local villages more than had occurred among other African regiments on the Northern Rhodesia-Nyasaland front. 65 Their combat experiences, too, were atypical. More than once the regiment was nearly routed--with some of its men in disorganized retreat--and only prompt reinforcement on several occasions kept the R.N.R. from abject defeat; 66 neither was this the usual experience of British askaris during the East African campaign. There can be no doubt, though, that the Rhodesia Native Regiment played a major role in bringing Malawian migrants back into the mainstream of the Malawian experience.

Some Malawians were drawn into the East African campaign in other ways, from other places in the diaspora. A few probably were

Rhodesia Native Regiment war diaries, August to October 1916, N.A.R., A.J. Tomlinson Papers, TO 1/2/1/1. Tomlinson was commanding officer of the regiment until April 1917.

^{66&}lt;sub>Langham, ''Memories''</sub> (1957), p. 257.

in units of the King's African Rifles other than the First and Second regiments, which were primarily recruited from Nyasaland. Some joined Kenyan K.A.R. battalions, but most were probably in the Third or Seventh regiments, recruited in part on Zanzibar, where a number of Malawians were serving in military capacities. 67 Others may well have seen service with the Force Publique of the Belgian Congo.

Askari from outside the Congo had for many years joined the Belgian force, although by 1900 their numbers had decreased to a small fraction of total manpower. Identification of these men is very difficult as they were euphemistically referred to as "volunteers from the coast." But the diversity—in manpower as well as in training, armament, and organization—of the Force Publique was still evident at the outbreak of the war. At least one Malawian in the Congo is known to have joined the British Naval African Expedition once it reached eastern Zaire. And in the wake of the rapid Belgian expansion of the Force Publique late in 1914, it seems likely that a few Malawians joined the ranks of "les soldats"

⁶⁷ Interview 28, Saidi Buni Mchawala, 14 September 1972; Moyse-Bartlett, King's African Rifles, pp. 260, 301, 334-35.

⁶⁸ Congo Belgique. Force Publique, <u>La Force Publique</u> [Léopoldville: Force Publique, 1956?], n.p.

⁶⁹ Belgique. Ministère de la Défense Nationale, <u>Les Campagnes</u> Coloniales Belges (Bruxelles, 1927), t. 1, p. 27.

⁷⁰Peter Shankland, <u>The Phantom Flotilla</u> (London: Collins, 1968), p. 56.

de Bula Matari,"⁷¹ known to their countrymen as the fearsome ambulamatali.⁷²

Still more Malawians may have served the Belgians and others, but in the capacity of tengatenga. Transport was a problem for the Belgian forces throughout the war, as it was for all the combatants, but during the operations on the Rhodesian frontier in 1914-1915, it was particularly acute. At that time some local recruitment was undertaken along the border, and it seems likely that Malawians were called into the Belgian carrier service. Malawians may also have been among the carriers secured from the Sena sugar estates by the lst/lst King's African Rifles late in the war, and among the tengatenga other Mozambique companies supplied to British and

⁷¹ Charles Stiénon, La Campagne Anglo-Belge de l'Afrique Orientale Allemande (Paris et Nancy: Berger-Levrault, 1918), pp. 74-75. Stiénon identifies Bula Matari as "the name given to the King of the Belgians by the indigenous Congolese." (p. 74n). It seems more likely, however, that the term derives from that given to Henry Morton Stanley by the people of Manyema in the eastern Congo. The name may have been transferred to the Belgian King, for whom Stanley worked. On the other hand, identification of the askari of the Force Publique as soldiers of Bula Matari may have its origins in Stanley's early travels and operations in the Congo Basin, many of his followers having stayed in the service of the Congo Free State which he did much to help create.

⁷² Throughout my research, both interviews and questionnaires solicited the opinion that the <u>ambulamatali</u> were the most memorable "new people" who were met during the war. Usually they were identified as being, often due to attributed cannibalism, an especially feared group. The origins of this belief are obscure. It seems unlikely to have come from the war itself; Belgian troops were far from the most feared in the field. Perhaps these ideas, too, can be traced to stories which were circulated in the late nineteenth century. See Melvin E. Page, "Tippu Tip and the Arab 'Defense' of the East African Slave Trade," Etudes d'Histoire Africaine, 6(1974), 110-111.

⁷³ Emmanual Muller, <u>Les Troupes du Katanga et Les Campagnes</u>
<u>d'Afrique 1914-1918</u> (Bruxelles: Establishments Généraux d'Imprimerie, 1937), t. 1, p. 61.

Portuguese forces.⁷⁴ It is also clear that Malawian non-combatants, some serving as carriers, were provided to Rhodesian authorities through the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau, even though many had left Malawi to escape such service.⁷⁵

The number of Malawians who--as personal servants, orderlies, and other classes of non-combatants--followed their employers into the East African campaign is impossible to calculate. Besides the numbers who began such odysseys to the front in Nyasaland, there were others in the diaspora who became involved in such service during the war. One of these was Allan Chelemu, a Nyasaland Yao working for the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia, who spent the war as a clerk in the wartime boma of Chinungu. 76 Another may have been Daniel Angloma, a Tonga from Chinteche. By his own account, he left his work on a mine in Kimberly to fight in South-West Africa as well as East Africa. This seems improbable, as Africans were not accepted into the South African armed forces, and the Cape Corps of colored soldiers was not recruited on the Witwatersrand. More likely, he served as an orderly to a South African officer or in some other non-combatant capacity. But despite sharing experiences of his countrymen, he did not return to

⁷⁴ Dupuis, "A Nobody in a Forgotten Campaign," chapter eleven; Nyasaland Times, 21, 45(7 November 1918), 3.

⁷⁵ Nominal Rolls of Africans in war service, exclusive of those in the Rhodesian Native Regiment, n.d., N.A.R., A 3/11/24/5; and unattributed note, about September 1915, in administrator's correspondence files concerning the Great War, N.A.R., A 3/11/16.

⁷⁶Allan Chelemu, "Chinungu: A 1914-18 War Time Boma," Northern Rhodesia Journal, 4, 4(1960), 347; G. Stokes to editor, Northern Rhodesia Journal, 4, 5(1961), 501.

Nyasaland, preferring to remain after the war in South Africa. 77

The experiences of Daniel Angloma were, in a sense, midway between those of his migrant countrymen who served in East Africa and those few who served in Europe. The latter mostly entered the war from South Africa, probably as members of the South African Native Labour_Contigent which was sent to France. This unit was recruited from among "almost every aboriginal tribe in South Africa." 78 including migrant groups. Some of these individuals were undoubtedly from Nyasaland, probably including the unknown Malawian whom Donald Fraser met on the Cape Town docks after the war. He had, according to Fraser, been given "an intensive education...in Flanders."79 Like his fellow Malawians, and the many others who served with the Native Labour Contingent, he may have brought back to South Africa. and carried to Nyasaland, "a new sense of racial unity and amity quite unknown heretofore." Although these feelings were "largely not expressed." they did not go unnoticed among the concerned European populations of southern and central Africa. 80

Such awareness, but not apparently in the guise of racial hatred, also came to the handful of Africans who managed to join British

⁷⁷ Nkhani za Nyasaland (December 1937), p. 4. Translation by Mr. Nicholas Tembo kindly provided by Dr. Robert B. Boeder.

⁷⁸H.C. Sloley, "The African Native Labour Contingent and the Welfare Committee," <u>Journal of the African Society</u>, 17(1917-1918), 203.

⁷⁹Donald Fraser, The New African (New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1928), pp. 1-2.

⁸⁰ J.E.T. Phillips, "The Tide of Colour," <u>Journal of the African Society</u>, 21(1921-1922), 131.

regiments and actually fought in France. 81 Among these may have been a son of John Chilembwe. Sir Hector Livingstone Duff recorded that he received a letter from one of Chilembwe's sons apologizing for his father's action "and adding that, in order to make what reparation he could, he intended to volunteer for service with the British troops in France." There is nothing to confirm that either of Chilembwe's sons actually did serve in France, though if one of them did it seems most likely that it would have been Donald Chilembwe. More probably, however, Duff's account confuses Chilembwe's son with Frederick Njilima, son of Chilembwe's executed lieutenant, Duncan Njilima, who did in fact see combat with the British Army in Europe. 83

Frederick Njilima 84 grew up in Chiradzulu and received his primary education at a Providence Industrial Mission school. In

⁸¹ Lloyd-Jones, K.A.R., p. 174n.

⁸²Duff, "Nyasaland in the World War," chapter four, I.W.M. The same account, but mentioning the American rather than the British Army, is found in Hector Duff, Africa Small Chop (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1930), p. 51.

⁸³Personal communication from Professor George Shepperson, 18
September 1974. Some of the confusion is explained in Shepperson and Price, p. 495. It is also worth noting that in Africa Small Chop (p. 51), Duff quotes Chilembwe's son as referring to his father as "that late perfideous man," but in the earlier "Nyasaland in the World War," Duff attributes the same statement to "a local chief."

Principal sources for the life of Frederick Njilima, upon which the following sketch is based, include: Bishop Wilfred Hornby to Bishop Cathrew Fisher, 3 February 1919, and Vice Consul, Chinde to Chief Secretary, Zomba, 29 September 1919, both M.N.A., S 2/18/22; A.S. Mbegu, "The Life of Frederick Njilima," history essay, University of Dar es Salaam, 1969, privately held. The Mbegu essay, which is based upon interviews with Njilima, was not available to the previous writers who have published accounts of Frederick Njilima; their works, nonetheless, contain some bits of additional information: Pachai, Malawi, p. 134; Shepperson and Price, p. 142; Roderick J. MacDonald, "The socio-political significance of educational initiatives in

1906 or 1907, at his father's request, both he and his brother
Matthew traveled to the United States in the company of Reverend
L. N. Cheek, a black American missionary, returning after service
with Chilembwe's church. Both of the young men attended Natchez
College High School in Mississippi, and then Frederick continued
his own education in Kentucky, first at the privately supported
State University for blacks and later at Lincoln Institute. The
days of study in the American South profoundly effected Frederick,
who did not forget the restrictions which racial segregation imposed
on a young African trying to obtain an education. Perhaps it was
these constraints that led him to ask Bishop Wilfred Hornby, his
father's old employer and formerly Bishop of Nyasaland, what chances
he would have to further his education in England.

The bishop, mindful of Duncan Njilima's involvement in the Chilembwe rebellion in Nyasaland, wrote to Frederick: "Before you think of further education, you must purge your father's offence. Enlist in the British Army." By Frederick's account, he did make his way to England, but remained hopeful of attending Cambridge, perhaps to train as a missionary. While waiting for admission, he recalled years later, he was "struck by war-fever. I decided to join the White war. I also did so because I am a brave man and for fun."

Malawi, 1899-1939," <u>Transafrican Journal of History</u>, 2, 2(1972), pp. 78, 90; and Robert I. Rotberg, <u>The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa</u> (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), 1967, p. 119.

⁸⁵Bishop Hornby to Bishop Fisher, 3 February 1919, M.N.A., S 2/18/22.

⁸⁶ Quoted in Mbegu, "Life of Frederick Njilima," p. 2.

It might well be that Njilima initially acted upon Bishop Hornby's advice, and it was possibly a letter from him which Hector Duff received. Whatever the case, he did join the 5th (Reserve)

Battalion of the Machine Gun Corps, apparently under the name Frederick Gresham. After training in Nottingham, he was sent to France where, having served in several areas, he was wounded in fighting along the Soissons-Rheims front. He distinguished himself in combat and was awarded the Military Medal for gallantry in action.

Shortly after his recovery the war ended, and Njilima attempted once again to find a place at a Cambridge college. Frustrated, he applied for and, as a veteran, was granted a government travel warrant, returning to Nyasaland in 1919. 87 Indirectly, the war had brought him home. His experiences did not go unnoticed among his countrymen. Soon he was asked to join the Southern Province Native Association, and by 1924 his command of the English language led to being named secretary and spokesman for the association. To what extent his educational and military background contributed to his influence and effectiveness in the association is difficult to say. In later years, though, when settled in Tanganyika, he also served as secretary of the Tanganyika African Government Servants Association, and still later, in retirement, was a local political leader.

⁸⁷For some inexplicable reason he claimed, for a time, that he also had briefly returned to Nyasaland in 1915; Vice Consul, Chinde, to Chief Secretary, Zomba, 29 September 1919, M.N.A., S 2/18/22.

If the war brought Frederick Njilima and many other Malawian migrants back to Nyasaland and associated them with their homeland, it brought to others in the diaspora the suffering and death of war and its aftermath. Without joining the ranks of any regiment or the nearly endless lines of carriers, some Malawians still felt the presence of the war as did those at home. Most of these were living in Zambia and Mozambique. A few may have been effected by the early stalemate on the Anglo-German frontier between Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika. Most, however, were caught up in the last phases of the campaign, as von Lettow-Vorbeck's diminished force fled into Mozambique, then northward along the eastern shore of Lake Nyasa, and around its northern tip into Zambia. Villages--and especially mission stations—in the German path were disrupted, 88 and a few individuals like John Banda, a Malawian Tonga working at Mwenzo in Northern Rhodesia, were even killed as the war came directly to their new homes.89

But it was the worldwide influenza pandemic of 1918-1919 that hit the Malawians abroad the hardest. In England, Frederick Njilima contracted the disease, but in the comparatively well equipped military hospital at Crantham he quickly recovered. 90 In the crowded mining compounds of southern and central Africa, Malawians

Bandawe, Memoirs, pp. 78-85; Y.B. Abdallah to Bishop of Nyasa-land, 25 May and 5 June 1917, M.N.A., U.M.C.A. papers, UN 1/1/2/15/1.

⁸⁹ John V. Taylor and Dorothea A. Lehmann, <u>Christians of the Copperbelt</u> (London: SCM Press, 1961), p. 22.

⁹⁰ Mbegu, "Life of Frederick Njilima," p. 3.

did not fare so well. In Rhodesia, they suffered the highest death rate as the disease swept the country. 91 In South Africa, too, the mining compounds were affected most by the disease, and death rates there were the highest in the country. 92 Several Malawians working on the Witwatersrand mines were among the dead, as were some migrants living in Zaire. When reports of these deaths reached Nyasaland, before the epidemic itself, they served to help authorities make the seriousness of the situation clear to inhabitants. 93

Even in its finality, then, the war and the aftermath of war brought Malawians back, out of the migrant experience, into the life of the land of their birth. A few managed to use the war--and the traditional patterns of travel for work--to their own advantage. But most were simply caught up in the worldwide conflict, many actually returning to Malawi during and after the prolonged hostilities in East Africa. A few shared only in spirit what had been happening at home. All, however, in various ways had experienced a war that they never had imagined and never would see again.

^{91.}R. Phimister, "The 'Spanish' Influenza Pandemic of 1918 and its impact on the Southern Rhodesian Mining Industry," The Central African Journal of Medicine, 19(1973), 148n.

^{92&}quot;Influenza Epidemic in South Africa," The Hospital, 65(1919), 305.

^{93&}lt;sub>Laws</sub> to C. Stuart, 5 December 19¹³, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 27.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE HUNGRY WAR

Recruited as askari, most Malawians joined the King's African Rifles, a force distinguished even before its outstanding service during the First World War. In campaigns throughout Africa, K.A.R. men from all of Britain's east and central African dependencies had proven their worth as soldiers. During the east African campaign, their high quality became even more evident. Of that distant theater of the world war, the regimental historian, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Moyse-Bartlett, wrote:

In 1914, while practically alone in the field, the K.A.R. began the campaign, and in 1918 was called upon to finish it. In the period between, the regiment formed part of a polyglot army more varied in race, language, training and experience than was grouped elsewhere under British command in any theatre of the war.

Those aspects of the K.A.R.'s service had a profound impact on the askari, even more than Moyse-Bartlett may have realized, for the severest tests of the men came precisely in those years when they fought almost alone, in 1914 and again in 1918.

Among the units of the K.A.R., it is not unreasonable to single out the soldiers of Malawi for special praise. Their battalions, the first and second, saw the bulk of the regiment's duty outside

Moyse-Bartlett, King's African Rifles, p. 262.

eastern Africa, a fact alluded to by John Chilembwe and left unchallenged by protectorate and colonial office officials. The Malawian askari thus had a "commanding reputation throughout Africa." During the east African campaign, the Malawian battalions—increased to regimental size—were recognized as perhaps the best of the K.A.R. troops in the field. "The Malawians are like wasps," recalled one askari of the-fighting quality of his regiment. The praise was not only self-styled; it came as well from fellow imperial soldiers, and even from the opposing commander, General von Lettow-Vorbeck. The accolades were borne out by the campaign itself when, as before, the two Malawian units carried the heaviest burdens of all the King's African Rifles battalions in the field.

Among the ranks of non-combatants, too, Malawians played a major role. In east and central Africa they, along with the Nyamwezi of German territory and the Kamba of British East Africa, were known for their work as carriers. It would be difficult, though, to single them out especially, but during the campaign itself Malawian tengatenga did become justly famed for the rigors

Unpublished letter to the Nyasaland Times, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/14.

³L.S. Norman, <u>Nyasaland without Prejudice</u> (London: East Africa, 1934), p. 134.

⁴ Interview 20, Imani Makwinja, 25 August 1972.

⁵Wynn E. Wynn, <u>Ambush</u> (London: Hutchinson, 1937), p. 105; J.R. Sibley, <u>Tanganyikan Guerrilla: East Africa Campaign 1914-18</u> (London: Pan/Ballantine, 1973), p. 131; J.J. O'Sull ivan, ''Campaign on German East Africa-Rhodesia Border,' <u>Journal of the African Society</u>, 15(1916), 211; 'North Nyasa and the War,' p. 22.

Moyse-Bartlett, <u>King's African Rifles</u>, p. 414. It is not intended here to give anything approaching a military history of the east African campaign, or even of the Malawian units in the campaign,

they endured to keep open General Northey's lines of communication, the longest in the entire theater of operations. Malawi may have provided the most manpower, if fragmentary figures can be believed, with nearly forty percent of all non-combatants employed by the British and Belgian forces coming from Nyasaland.

The fame and the praise did little to lessen the fears of Malawians who were called--or taken--for service, many of whom had tried to avoid participation. Even those who volunteered were aware of the dangers of war, although they could not have imagined the nature of this conflict. Yet there were many ways to avoid injury and death at war, and a great many of Malawians sought them.

Amulets and herbal preparations were acquired to be worn, applied to the skin, or taken in various prescribed ways to prevent wounds and other injury. Occasionally these were applied by wives to their husbands, more frequently by traditional figures within the community. Sacrifices, too, were made for the safety of the men. Precautions were also taken that relatives, and especially wives, would remain ritually

already to some extent achieved elsewhere: see Moyse-Bartlett, King's African Rifles, pp. 257-415; Hordern, Military Operations, voi. 1; and drafts for volume two of the official British military history of the campaign, P.R.O., CAB 44/4-10, inclusive.

⁷See, for example, the moving short story, "His Last Safari," by Owen Letcher in his collection <u>Africa Unveiled</u> (London: Waterlow & Sons, 1931), pp. 92-96.

⁸See Table 2. and Moyse-Bartlett, <u>King's African Rifles</u>, p. 414. As yet, nothing approaching a history of the tengatenga in the east African campaign has appeared; see George Shepperson, "The Military History of British Central Africa," <u>Rhodes-Livingstone Journal</u>, 26 (1959), 30-31.

pure during the absence of the men at war. Of critical importance, many believed, was the avoidance of adultery, an act which would ensure the death or wounding of the offender's askari husband.

European officials generally placed greater faith in the careful training of the soldiers to ensure their greatest safety. ¹⁰ To this end, a series of training camps were established in and outside of the protectorate. Almost all the K.A.R. recruits passed through the base camp at Zomba, and a considerable number were trained there, especially early in the war. Later, special facilities were created near Zomba for more advanced instruction, and with the rapid expansion of the first regiment in 1916 and 1917, still further training camps were built in Blantyre. Most of the second regiment only underwent basic drill instruction in Nyasaland, usually at Zomba, before going to Kenya. There, officers at the K.A.R. base at Mbagathi outside Nairobi guided the men through their basic musketry course and introduced them to more advanced military tactics and drills. ¹¹

The experiences of Malawian askari at the training camps, of course, were highly varied. Much depended on the particular circumstances and the officers in charge. As the war progressed, fewer European officers with the K.A.R. could speak the language of

 ⁹ Interviews: 32, Khobviwa Juwa, 18 September 1972; 103, Wilson Dolobeni, 5 May 1973. Questionnaires: BT/2, Fafi Kachikira, 14 August 1973; MZ/22, Efulaim Gondwe, 15 April 1974; NC/1, J. Ching'ombe, 13 April 1974.

¹⁰Some Africans, though, believed that Europeans also had faith in the value of traditional precautions and even used them at times. Interviews: 20, Imani Makwinja, 25 August 1972; 89, Madi Wadi Selemani, 12 April 1972.

¹¹ Interview 12, Mbaisa Mbaisa, 15 August 1972.

their men, and little time was available for them to learn. More than once units went into battle with officers who could not communicate with their askari, except by sign language and through interpreters. 12 It was a situation which led, particularly during drill instruction, to good humor on the part of the soldiers. Songs quickly were invented and sung on parade mocking the more obvious features and defects of young subalterns, who in turn often joined in, unaware of what was happening. Senior officers frequently did little to end the mockery, preferring to see the situations as good for askari spirit. 13

Various means were used to keep morale high during training, and in so doing to encourage the kind of camaraderie that would help to sustain the young soldiers through battle. At one point these efforts led to arrangements for a special "Kinema exhibition" for some of the recruits then at the Zomba base. 14 The results were most amusing, especially when the askari watched a film of a young Italian child trying to follow his father's unit near Tripoli. Colonel Barton described the reactions:

As the Italian uniform for Africa looks like that of the German the scene was greeted with great applause as the apparently German soldiers were seen on the run hotly pursued by what the askari took to be one small Engligh child. We thought we were not bound to explain otherwise.

^{12&}lt;sub>Moyse-Bartlett, King's African Rifles</sub>, p. 333n.

¹³Dupuis, "A Nobody in a Forgotten Campaign," chapter nine, p. 2.

¹⁴Nyasaland <u>Times</u>, 20, 6(8 February 1917), 1.

¹⁵ Barton diaries, notebook 39, 10 February 1917, M.N.R.

Although usually more well planned in advanced, such propaganda efforts were a large measure of the training program, and askari were usually given the worst possible impression of their German enemies. 16

The net effect of this training for many of the askari, at least early in the war, was positive. One wrote later, "We were treated very well and I enjoyed myself." Later drafts of men, though, were not so enamoured with their instruction. Many were not so fit nor quite so willing to serve; the training, too, was not so lavish nor so comprehensive, and was plagued with other difficulties. One Christian wrote the priests at Mua that "his rifle is too heavy and his food inadequate." Others were not totally convinced of the adequacy of what they had learned, especially when they boarded ships for Nairobi, having carried only sticks for rifles and worn only rags for uniforms.

The genuine concern of men who felt under-trained was perhaps misdirected to obvious and solvable problems, but the inadequate preparations of the troops was noticeable to European officers in 1916 and had become acute the next year. Northey's exposed lines of communications were for a time protected only by raw recruits from Zomba who were supposed to be training while carrying out their considerable garrison and guard duties. In May 1917 unequipped and untrained men were prepared to set out from Blantyre to protect the

¹⁷Chikwenga, "Autobiography," p. 17.

¹⁸ Mua Mission Diary, September 1917, quoted in Linden, Catholics, p. 111.

Shire highlands from a possible German invasion. ¹⁹ And when the 3/1 K.A.R. actually did go into action in Mozambique, its commanding officer noted in his war diaries that "under the circumstances it was better to have a large number of men with some knowledge of how to fire a rifle than a few who had completed a full musketry course."

Where possible, some men received a little additional training on their way to the front, usually on the vessels which transported them. This procedure was largely true for the second regiment, who boarded Indian Ocean coastal ships at Beira for the journey to Mombasa. A few from the first regiment were given such instruction, but their journeys were much shorter, on the steam vessels plying lake Malawi. If this extra training was intended to increase the confidence and reduce the apprehensions of the new askari, it seems to have had little of the intended effect.

Particularly on the small ships of the lake fleet, wartime transport conditions were appalling. All of the ships--even the mission steamers seized for the duration of the conflict--were consistently loaded not just to, but far beyond capacity. This situation was noted in 1916, by the senior naval officer on the lake, Commander Dennistoun, and is confirmed by the log of one of the craft concerned. The crowding was particularly upsetting to

¹⁹ Moyse-Bartlett, King's African Rifles, p. 329; P.W. Martin to Governor Smith, 5 May 1917, M.N.A., GOA 1/2/2.

²⁰Colonel C.W. Barton, War Diaries (3/1 K.A.R.), June 1917, P.R.O., CAB 45/22.

Dennistoun, "Details of Steam Vessels on Lake Nyasa," 2 November 1916, enclosed in Smith to C.O., 6 November 1916, P.R.O., C.O. 525/69; S.S. Chauncy Maples logbook, 19 October 1917, S.M.L.

captains who were responsible for their ships and passengers. Fears of men lost overboard were common, and such occurrences were much more frequent than anyone would have wished. Sanitary arrangements were outrageously inadequate, with cases of seasickness and worse spilling out indiscriminantly into the overcrowded decks. On the much larger vessels of the Indian Ocean the conditions were not significantly better. On one 1916 journey from Tanga to Kilwa, as troops were transferred for duty elsewhere, "Africans, Europeans, Indians all crowded together" on the transports. Many of the ships were very old, poorly ventilated, and men became ill--from far more than just the motion of the sea--for entire voyages.

From the trauma of such conditions, the frequently ill-trained askari were often plunged directly into combat. There is little wonder many Malawians placed faith in their survival not on their training or their officers but upon traditional practices which at least had societal acceptance. Nor were their experiences outside combat and the battlefield any help in convincing them the Europeans had taken any better precautions for their safety. In fact, not

Nyasaland Field Force war diary, 19 August 1914, M.A.P.A.R.O.; S.S. Chauncy Maples logbook, 16 August, 20 September, and 27 November 1918, S.M.L.

²³Conversation with Mrs. G.H. Snowden, Blantyre, 15 July 1974; Mrs. Snowden's husband served as temporary sub-engineer on most of the lake vessels during the war, filling in for men ill or on leave.

^{242/2} King's African Rifles war diary, 22 September 1916, P.R.O., W.O. 95/5341.

²⁵Interviews: 12, Mbaisa Mbaisa, 15 August 1972; 26, Peter Nyimbiri, 13 September 1972.

a few were persuaded just to the contrary; though voluntary enlistees, they increasingly felt treated more as slaves.

In the provision of hygienic conditions, however, some askari felt they were well taken care of. The Malawian soldiers were impressed that drinking water was sometimes inspected for purity, and that disposal of food wastes was made the subject of special concern and care. For many, too, the use of pit latrines was a new experience, one that was believed to be an improvement over the more casual approach to human waste disposal in the villages. These efforts were not, however, universally appreciated. One man recalled with disgust the pit latrines in his area, inadequately prepared and fouling the air for a wide area. The Medical inspection of the facilities, as well, revealed that despite askari impressions, most sanitary precautions were grossly inadequate and contributed greatly to the spread of disease among the troops. 28

Inadequate as well, but more noticeable to the men, were their uniforms. The standard K.A.R. issue of the day, khaki shorts and tunic, was well enough suited to the climate and conditions of most of the campaign. Uniforms of the other African services were similarly styled and equally adequate. For all, provisions were made for special wartime caps, replacing the traditional fez, which

Questionnaires: NS/9, Joe Mulira, 20 September 1974; DZ/11, Kadewere Moyo, 12 April 1974; MZ/10, Eneya Lungu, 11 April 1973.

²⁷Interview 114, Kakalala Phiri, 27 August 1973.

²⁸ Major General Sir W.G. Macpherson and Major T.J. Mitchell, History of the Great War: Medical Services, General History, vol. IV (London: H.M.S.O., 1924), 465.

better enabled the askari to conceal themselves in the bush. The real problem, however, was more basic: the lack of sufficient uniform issues. Troops marched for months with the same single set of shorts and tunic, if they could be so described after many weeks of continuous campaigning.²⁹

of special complaint for the askari, though, were boots. In a sense the symbol of new status, most of the men looked forward to having and wearing them. Not all units were issued such footwear, many drawing instead leggings to protect the lower leg while marching in the bush, but with no coverings for the feet. In some battalions boots already in the possession of the soldiers were handed in, as officials believed that "advantages gained from wearing boots [in thick bush] were more than contradicted by handicap to marching powers in other country." The askari simply did not agree, and recalled especially that they were denied boots to wear while at war. 31

Such complaints were not merely symbolic. In fact, the K.A.R.-- as well as the Northern Rhodesia Police and the Rhodesian Native

²⁹Colonel Giffard, KARTUCOL, to EDFORCE Headquarters, 6 October 1918, P.R.O., W.O. 95/5328; Duff, "Nyasaland in the World War," chapter 6, I.W.M.

^{303/1} King's African Rifles war diary, 17 December 1917, P.R.O., W.O. 95/5369.

³¹ Chikwenga, "Autobiography," p. 18; interview 32, Khobviwa Juwa, 18 September 1972; questionnaire KS/12, Cross Mataka, 16 April 1974. A plan to make special, light-weight boots with canvas tops, especially for K.A.R. issue, came to nothing, perhaps due to poor planning; one helpful officer attempted to expedite the project by providing "two tracings giving exact shape of average native feet, which will serve as a guide." Assistant Adjutant & Quartermaster General, K.A.R., to Director, Ordinance Stores, Dar es Salaam, 8 February 1918, P.R.O., C.O. 534/29.

Regiment—were involved in many long and arduous marches through difficult country. Particularly in 1917 and 1918, as General von Lettow-Vorbeck's tiny remnant twisted its way through Mozambique, the askari marched and marched, almost endlessly chasing the elusive Germans. It is likely that boots alone would have done little to ease the burdens those hard marches brought to the men. Relief for many was only_available with removal from the field, and many were sent out of combat because of simple exhaustion. In early October 1918, when the difficulties had reached a peak, the second regiment sent forty-four askari home from its depleted battalions in only four days. 32

To make matters worse, there were often shortages of food as well. From mid-1916 on, the forces operating from Nyasaland frequently were on short rations. These conditions became most severe in 1918, as King's African Rifles units operated almost alone in Mozambique. Fast marches outpaced supplies, and battalions were forced to halt and wait for food. More frequently, men were put on three-quarter, half, or even further reduced rations. "At war we really starved," one recalled. Some men were allowed to hunt game to supplement the meager supplies of maize and rice, but the hunger persisted. When food was available, there was little

^{32&}lt;sub>Giffard to EDFORCE</sub>, 6 October 1918, P.R.O., W.O. 95/5328; 3/1 King's African Rifles war diary, 27 July 1918, P.R.O., W.O. 95/5331.

³³Interview 133, Alufeyo Banda, 8 September 1973; questionnaire LL/8, Alena Banda, 16 April 1974. Northey to C.O., secret, 22 March 1916, M.N.A., GOA 4/1/1; 2/1 King's African Rifles war diary, 21 September 1917 to 14 May 1918, M.A.P.A.R.O.; 1/2 King's African Rifles war diary, July 1918, P.R.O., W.O. 95/5328.

temptation to save it. Often it was doled out in little packets; were it not measured carefully, it most certainly would not be saved. One interviewee claimed that on some occasions when ample food was available "you could see people gulping huge quantities of rice in fear you might die the following day." 35

The shortages of rations which contributed to such behavior were never really ameliorated. To the last days of the campaign, even during demobilization, men went hungry. In some units marching songs were composed which highlighted the problem: ³⁶

When I die, bury me at Zomba,
So that my heart should pain.
Hunger, hunger is painful.
Yes, when I die, bury me at Zomba,
So that my heart should pain.
Yes, hunger is painful, hunger,
I feel hungry.
Bury me, bury me.
Hunger is painful, hunger,
I feel hungry.

In other versions, the askari sung their complaints that those officers at base camps—and their servants—had plenty to eat while the men in the field suffered. 37 The food problems became

³⁴ Interviews: 9, Kampila Kaputa, 11 August 1972; 31, Kasibule Dabi, 15 September 1972.

³⁵ Interview 107, Sam Kamanga, 4 August 1973.

This song was recorded twice, and is presented here in a form derived and modified from both versions; interviews: 11, Maulidi Mwina, 15 August 1972; 106, Kildon Wajiusa, 2 August 1973.

³⁷Arnold Wienholt, <u>The Story of a Lion Hunt</u> (London: Andrew Melrose, 1922), p. 249.

so widespread that in its final phases the campaign became known to many of its participants as "the hungry war." 38

Hunger, exposure, long marches—each took its toll on the askari. But collectively their greatest effect was to undermine the health of the men and leave them more susceptible to disease. Some accounts of the campaign have claimed that the African troops "if not absolutely immune from deadly tropical disease, were far less affected by it than were Europeans." Even at the time the bankruptcy of this view was evident, although political decisions dictated its propagation. Thus South Africans were removed from the campaign, and African troops had to bear the brunt of the fighting because they were claimed to be immune to malaria and other maladies and thus better suited to battle in East Africa's tropical climate.

Given the conditions in which they found themselves, the Malawian and other soldiers of the King's African Rifles suffered mightily. Underfed and overworked, with little training and without adequate uniform, the askari succumbed. All the more tragic, little was done to protect them. Medical reports from the campaign indicate that "even the simplest measures were lacking for the spread of tropical disease." Nor were these the only disorders

³⁸ Brian Gardner, <u>German East:</u> The Story of the First World War in East Africa (London: Cassell, 1963), p. 148.

Smuts in German East Africa (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1929), p. 168. This impression has been conveyed as well in more recent works; see Sibley, Tanganyikan Guerrilla, p. 111.

Macpherson and Mitchell, <u>Medical Services</u>, vol. IV, p. 466.

the men faced. Dysentery was widespread and bronchial pneumonia was not uncommon. More serious were occasional yet apparently not isolated occurrences of bubonic plague and smallpox, both of which occurred in Malawian units. 41

The askari were quite naturally demoralized by these conditions, but all the more so for lack of news from home. Most understood that, in the conditions under which they campaigned, letters--even if they could be written--were not likely to arrive. "But how I longed to hear from brother and parents," remembered one veteran, reflecting the typical attitude. Many worried about their wives and children, as do soldiers everywhere. But theirs was a special worry, connected in part to the fear that any "misbehavior" might lead to their own injury. They were concerned, too, about their crops; this was the news they cherished most, when in fact they received news. A K.A.R. officer, writing of another world war nearly three decades later, captured the spirit of the men as they waited for action:

⁴¹ General Officer Commanding, East Africa, to C.O., 29 September 1917, P.R.O., C.O. 534/24. 1/2 King's African Rifles war diary, 1 March 1918, and 2/2 King's African Rifles war diary, 30 June 1918, both P.R.O., W.O. 95/5326. The best available guide to the level of sickness among the troops is given by Macpherson and Mitchell for January to May 1917, indicating a rate among both African and European forces in the field equivalent to 20.6% each month: Medical Services, vol. IV, pp. 478-79. Similar situations with respect to disease also applied to the German forces; M. Taute, "A German account of the medical side of the war in East Africa, 1914-18," Tanganyika Notes and Records, 8(1939), 1-20.

⁴² Interview 112, Foloiyani Longwe, 23 August 1973.

⁴³ Interview 23, Johnathon Phiri, 5 September 1972.

⁴⁴ George Shepperson, "Rain," Phylon, 12(1951), 171; a poem.

Expectation and dispair combined to drive some men to extreme action. Against the traditions of African-European relations and sometimes treading perilously close to the bounds of military dicipline, they complained of the situation. Individual Malawians drew their officers' attention to the great shortage of rations, hardly necessary because the Europeans, too, were ill-fed in the closing stages of the campaign. 45 More extraordinary was the response of one group of veteran Malawian askari, whose action came after months of hard marching and food shortages in Portuguese territory. The commander of their battalion, the 2/1 King's African Rifles, recorded their endeavor without comment in his war diary: "Petition from 'C' Company to return to Nyasaland."

The sympathy which officers felt for their men--and it was undoubtedly great--could not extend to the granting of such requests. Not unnaturally, this stance led to greater resentment and bitterness, a situation in which only the power of military discipline on one side and the overwhelming numerical superiority on the other kept any serious incidents from occurring. 47 To be sure, insubordination on a minor level occasionally did develop, often from askari whose courage was bolstered by alcohol. 48 Less frequently, but more

^{45 3/2} King's African Rifles war diary, 21 October 1917, P.R.O., W.O. 95/5324.

^{46&}lt;sub>2/1</sub> King's African Rifles war diary, 12 May 1918, M.A.P.A.R.O.

⁴⁷ Interview 23, Johnathon Phiri, 5 September 1972; questionnaire KS/2, Harry Kuntaja, 12 April 1973.

⁴⁸ Interview 112, Fololiyani Longwe, 23 August 1973.

directly in response to conditions, some men deserted their units; such incidents were believed by officers to be particularly high when the course of march took the men closer to their homes.

There seems little doubt that many of the desertions noted in battalion and other official records were motivated by a genuine frustration and felt need to escape. It is true that some men simply slipped out of camp for an evening and were then punished for desertion, a far more serious offense than simply being absent without leave. Others later claimed they were trying to persuade real deserters to return. A few men may actually have been lost, an understandable occurrence in the unfamiliar bush country of Mozambique; nonetheless, they were treated as if they had deliberately violated military discipline. Askari opinion, however skeptical of such defenses, troubled over the punishments exacted, as this moving account of two deserters from the second regiment indicates:

They were asked where they had been. They told lies and pretended that they had gone astray. They were arrested. The officers were asking bosses what to do with them. They were told that the two people should be killed. On the following day, nearly at dawn when the first crow was crowing, we were asked to wake up and stood straight in lines. Meanwhile, two people were digging pits. Afterwards the two people came. The officers said to us, 'You see your friends here! They ran away from fighting. Soldiers are not supposed to run away from fighting. Now

^{49 2/2} King's African Rifles war diary, 31 July 1918, P.R.O., W.O. 95/5328; 1/2 King's African Rifles war diary, 30 October 1918, P.R.O., W.O. 95/5331.

⁵⁰"Field General Court Martial Proceedings of No. 832 Pte. Matope 1/1 K.A.R.," 4 January 1918, M.N.A., L 1/8/1; questionnaire MA/7, Puleni Selemani, 16 July 1974.

Twaya Namonde, "The Story of Twaya Namonde as told by himself," Nyasaland Journal, 16, 1(1963), 53; 1/4 King's African Rifles war

we want to punish them.' When the officer was saying this the two were securely tied to a tree. So, he took a gun and shouted, 'present fire!' One of the two died, but the other one did not die. So one white officer went and finished him off. The two were untied. They were buried. We, too, were worried that such should have been their punishment.52

Faced with dehumanizing conditions, the negative reactions of Malawian askari--including their troubled acquiesence to military discipline--is understandable. It was not, however, their only response to the new war in which they found themselves. Many threw themselves into combat with an abandon which surprised and at the same time pleased their European superiors. One K.A.R. officer, upon inquiring at a Nairobi military hospital if there were any Nyasaland patients, was told: 53

Nyasas, sir? Yes, sir, a whole ward of them. Some very bad cases too. Them's all 2nd K.A.R.'s sir; most of those we get here belongs to that regiment, sir. Whenever we hears there's a trainload of wounded coming, in, we know it's Nyasas, sir.

Wounds alone were not all the Malawians received for their bravery.

Many were decorated for gallantry in action, a number on more than one occasion. 54 Even the European newspaper of Nyasaland noted

diary, 9 August 1918, P.R.O., W.O. 95/5328; Dupuis, "A Nobody in a Forgotten Campaign," chapter twelve, p. 4.

⁵² Interview 29, Belo Kaponya, 14 September 1972.

^{53&}quot;Maulana," <u>East Africa</u>, 1(1924), 208. Written by an anonymous K.A.R. officer of some Nyasaland experience under the pseudonym "Kalambo," this account is somewhat dramatized.

⁵⁴Lists of awards, many including the full citations, can be found in the Nyasaland Government Gazette, 23(1916), 229-30, 309-10; 24(1917), 36-7, 160-1; 25(1918), 3, 5, 120, 137-8, 205-07, 297-300; 26(1919), 70.

that "it is highly gratifying to know that the K.A.R. have so greatly distinguished themselves." 55

Beyond being just a contrast to the demoralization and desertion of some, Malawian gallantry was all the more amazing considering the magnitude of the horrors which the askari faced. The only standard by which they might judge this war was the experience of Ngoni and Yao raids which they, or certainly their fathers, had seen. There was, in fact, no comparison; it stood as a unique experience. "War itself is bad," one veteran explained, and then tried to recount the nature of his experience:

Think of lying on the ground where the hot sun is beating directly on your backs; think of yourself buried in a hole with only your head and hands outside, holding a gun. Imagine yourself facing this situation for seven days, no food, no water, yet you don't feel hungry; only death smelling all over the place. Listen to the sound from exploding bombs and machine guns, smoke all over and the vegetation burnt and of course deforested. Look at your relatives getting killed, crying and finally dead. These things we did, experienced, and saw. 56

Flanders it may not have been, but the effects were much the same, including the terror of the trenches.⁵⁷ Little wonder that recruits

⁵⁵Nyasaland Times, 19, 16(20 April 1916), 6.

⁵⁶Interview 112, Fololiyani Longwe, 23 August 1973.

⁵⁷Sir Hector Duff, chief political officer with Northey's forces, later wrote that "there was no trench fighting in East Africa;" <u>Africa Small Chop</u>, p. 175. Both European and African combat sources disagree: 1/2 King's African Rifles war diary, December 1916, P.R.O., W.O. 95/5340; interview 78, Joseph Mandanda, 4 April 1973; questionnaire MZ/17, George Phiri, 12 April 1974.

occasionally balked at their first assault, a hesitancy that became less a stigma upon them than upon their officers. ⁵⁸

The askari often bolstered their courage with a return to the ways of war that they had previously known. On one occasion a junior N.C.O. of 2/2 K.A.R. took the unusual step of dancing an ngoma in front of his men--while under fire--in an attempt to inspire them to greater effort. So In fact, the askari were well known to prefer close-quarters, hand-to-hand combat, more akin to what their fathers had taught them about fighting. To relieve the tension of waiting for battle, the men also were known to compose songs insulting the enemy and praising themselves, singing these as loudly as possible. Frequently, memories of previous victories would be recalled:

He has failed, the German has failed.
He has failed, the German has failed.
German has failed.
Take the machine gun and leave it on the door.'
German has failed, Oye! Oye!
We are the lions.
We're the lions of the white men.

⁵⁸One incident, involving a Lieutenant Pease-Watkin, only recently attached to the K.A.R., is fully described in the Nyasaland Field Force war diary, 26 October 1914, M.A.P.A.R.O. Not only were his askari officially absolved, but Lieutenant Pease-Watkin also had to endure only sightly disguised barbs concerning his leadership delivered by the mischievous editors of the <u>Karonga Kronikal</u>, 1, 2(n.d.), 2; 1, 3(n.d.), 39; and 1, 4(n.d.), 57.

⁵⁹Moyse-Bartlett, <u>King's African Rifles</u>, p. 392.

⁶⁰Colonel Barton to Governor, 21 September 1914, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/23; Lionel Cripps, unaddressed letter of 21 February 1916, N.A.R., Lionel Cripps papers, CR 1/7/1; T. Cullen Young, "Nyasaland Operations during the World War, 1914-1918," unpubl. typescript, S.M.L.

⁶¹ Interview 74, Anusa Makumba, 2 April 1973.

Often, however, the singing would degenerate into exchanges across the lines of little more than threats and abuse, usually cast in tones of the warfare of days gone by. 62

While attempts to adapt old ways to this new war did succeed in raising askari spirits, such efforts could not keep them from becoming nearly overwhelmed by their experiences. The technology of war, even short of the horrible gases of Europe, was a wonderment to Malawians, and all the African combatants. Likewise the unending nature of modern war, and the all consuming demands it made upon men, were new and difficult to fathom. But most shocking, perhaps, was the death and the killing, made more confusing because the Europeans beside and opposite them engaged in the same activities.

A few askaris were introduced to the world of "tinned" food and pronounced it quite inferior, but acceptable when hungry. 63

Some African soldiers, including the Malawians who were actively recruited for such service, came into direct contact with the telegraph and the telephone, noting with some interest that the wires might be laid across the ground in order to speed the movement of signalling stations. 64 Messages could also be carried by airplanes, which astounded most who saw the mechanical birds and

⁶² Questionnaire DW/11, Mlumbwila Thantwe, 18 April 1974; F. Dupuis to Mrs. Chilver, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 26 February 1959, M.N.A., Dupuis papers, DU 1/1/2.

⁶³ Questionnaires: DZ/35, Sampson Chewe, 8 August 1974; MA/1, Muselemu Mukatotola, 10 April 1974.

Nyasaland Times, 21, 38(19 September 1918), 2. Questionnaires: DZ/1, Yohane Kampelewera Chisale, 9 April 1973; MZ/7, Robert Chirambo, 28 August 1974; TH/13, E.M. Katimba, 17 April 1974.

terrified those who watched them drop bombs--very bad eggs--as well. 65 Most of the soldiers had seen guns, even cannon and machine guns in a few cases, and these do not seem to have been especially disquieting. But the automobiles, making almost their first appearance in eastern Africa, were a problem. Men would dash across a road to join their friends, oblivious to oncoming motor traffic. Worse yet, askari would attempt to board the vehicles at almost any juncture, and to exit on their own whims. It is fortunate there were few accidents. 66

These were the white man's inventions, ideas and items which threatened their lives probably as much as did the white men's war. True, there were other people of greater kinship to meet and see during the conflict. The askari came into contact with soldiers from throughout the British Empire, including Africans from Nigeria and Ghana. There was little real interaction, however, except among the officers, though many assumed that "a species of blood-brother-hood" developed among the African troops. Even among the various peoples of Malawi there was not always much contact, since tribal organization within the battalions was retained as much as possible. In large measure the opportunities for greater communication was lost in the demands of war, but it was also discouraged by the presence of Europeans in positions of authority. 67

⁶⁵ Questionnaire DZ/29, William Kayesa, 15 July 1974. Interviews: 89, Madi Wadi Selemani, 12 April 1973; 171, Weston Kamwendo, 17 September 1973.

⁶⁶ R.L. Furness, "Notes on Mechanical Transport," 1918, N.A.R., B 1/5/6; Hetherwick, Napier, p. 125.

⁶⁷Sir Hugh Clifford, The Gold Coast Regiment in the East African Campaign (London: John Murray, 1920), p. 273. Questionnaire CR/1, Grayson Jonamusi, 24 August 1973.

If fraternization with allied Africans was minimal, the askari were frequently at a loss to understand what seemed to them unusually kind treatment given prisoners. Drawing on their own experiences, they expected prisoners-of-war, especially the wounded, to be killed, or at least held captive in humiliating subjugation. This idea was to some extent encouraged by their European officers who apparently held, and passed on to their men, fears that death would await any prisoners taken by the Germans. On more than one occasion Malawian askari attempted to take revenge on their enemies, even without orders to do so. Wynn E. Wynn recorded one moving situation involving men of the second regiment:

I noticed a couple of our Nyasaland askaris about to bayonet a badly wounded askari in the German service. I told them to leave the man alone, that good soldiers did not kill wounded enemies. They understood that, but this *** (unprintable English words) was a friend of theirs, he came from their village.

Wynn did not mention the final outcome of their rage. 70

The anger of soldiers at such perceived treachery was perhaps understandable, but did not alone account for such incidents. One man recalled for me his father's experience, as it had been told to him:

Germans came all over our place and we were ordered to charge with bayonets. We killed a lot of them and others put their hands up in surrender. We captured them

⁶⁸ Questionnaires: NB/2, John Samson Nkhoma, 8 September 1974; TH/9, Mr. Nesula, 25 September 1973.

⁶⁹Interview 25, Disi Katita, 13 August 1972; Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, My Reminiscences of East Africa (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1920), p. 107; von Lettow-Vorbeck insisted (p. 221) that "English prisoners were always humanely treated by us."

⁷⁰Wynn, <u>Ambush</u>, p. 105; censorship in original.

and we stayed with them there for 4 days. I did not understand why we should not kill them and so was every soldier perplexed. During the third night the soldiers conspired and agreed to eliminate them and by morning, every captive was dead. The Officer Commanding went mad and scared of our act and was fuming to our misunderstanding, as to why we should do it. Being white, we thought he did not like us killing his fellow whiteman. We almost shot him too because to us, we were at war in which enemies were to be killed. ... Those Germans killed our companions yesterday and for what reason we should tame them and herd them was beyond our capacity to accept. 71

I have been unable to locate any official confirmation of this incident, although there is much suggestive testimony to maintain the veracity of the account.

Clearly this story implies far more than the bemused attitude of the askari toward their prisoners. It illustrates as well the predominate conception the soldiers came to have of their officers, and of Europeans generally. In wartime situations their remembered interaction with Europeans was, paradoxically, greater than that with almost all other groups. And their views about these powerful people were well thought out. The overwhelming askari impression was that Europeans were human beings, subject to the same frailties and same strengths as the Africans they commanded. They were, therefore, vulnerable and liable to the same kind of physical and emotional pressures which they had brought to bear upon the Africans. 72

Europeans troubled over this growing sense of equality, but more feared that Africans would come not only to accept, but also to enjoy,

⁷¹ D.M. Bandawe, letter to the author, 5 June 1974.

⁷² Questionnaires: DZ/9, Z. Chikeya, 11 April 1974; DZ/25, Kaulalo Ngozo, 18 April 1974; NC/10, Village Headman Chingombe, 17 August 1974; KS/5, Zikalindaine Katawala, 28 September 1973.

the killing of whitemen. Actually, that was something the Malawian askari at first were most reluctant to do. The tragic ambivalence of the situation was expressed eloquently by one veteran askari to his wife after his first battle, at Karonga. His letter was never delivered, having been intercepted and seized by an awe-struck censor. 74

It is very sad but I may as well tell you that I killed one German (European) myself. I am not sleeping well. I am sleeping very badly. I am afraid because I killed him and I got my head muddled when I think of it... I am a soldier and delight in war. I have killed many black men and not felt like this, but that one white man I killed has made me afriad--why I don't know. I am must telling you so that you will know how worried I am.

As the war continued, of course, the trepidations diminished somewhat, but there is little to suggest that askari were really "boasting eagerly among themselves of the number of white men who had falled to their rifles." Actually, the killing of Europeans became a necessary part of the war. "They were no more important," asserted a veteran of both the German and British forces, "it was just a matter of kill or die."

The killing and dying, without doubt, overshadowed all else in the wartime experience of the askari. Neither the exposure of

⁷³ Duff, Africa Small Chop, pp. 192-3; also see Duff to Officer Commanding, German troops, 3 October 1914, M.N.A., GOA 2/2/1.

⁷⁴Corporal Eleija-Kimu to his wife, 23 October 1914, translation included as appendiz I/B in Duff, "Nyasaland in the World War," I.W.M. For commentary on the letter, see Duff, "White Men's Wars," p. 905.

^{75&}lt;sub>Duff, Africa Small Chop</sub>, p. 193.

⁷⁶ Interview 104, Kathebu Agubiko, 25 July 1973.

European frailty nor the conditions of combat--much less the hunger and new technology--could compare to the massive toll in lives.

"This was in the power of the devil himself. There was no sorrow, no mercy in killing," remembered one man. 77 Many could not endure the holocaust, and, like the soldiers in the trenches of Europe, tried anything to escape. "The people used to be drunk, or they smoked something so that they looked like one who had been intoxicated." 8 But the killing and dying did not stop, and its sights and sounds could not be avoided. "The hugeness of the number of dead," and the many more wounded, left deep scars on Malawian soldiers, often shutting out other memories for years to come.

Medical attention did little to relieve the suffering.

Wounded men remained in agony for long periods, their cries and convulsions only adding to the impressions of everpresent mortality. A few lucky ones might be eased in their misery, as officers were known occasionally to offer whiskey to their wounded men; others were mercifully shot on the spot by their comrades. Most of the wounded, though, faced long journeys on machila-type-stretchers or in the primitive motor transport of the day; neither was conducive to eased pain or quick recovery, nor were medical services particularly effective. ⁸⁰ There were shortages of doctors, and

⁷⁷ Interview 132, Ruben Longwe, 8 September 1973.

⁷⁸ Interview 103, Wilson Dolobeni, 5 May 1973.

⁷⁹ Interview 25, Disi Katita, 13 August 1972.

⁸⁰ Questionnaire DZ/18, Iseki Katsache, 15 April 1974. Interviews: 5, Mwenyedawa Chitala, 10 August 1972; 25, Disi Katita, 13 August 1972. F.E. Bailey, Twenty-Nine Years Hard Labour (London: Hutchinson, 1934), p. 96.

orderlies alone manned some field hospitals. Supplies, too, were often grossly inadequate, but perhaps none so horrendous as that of 2/2 K.A.R. on operations near Kilwa. The recently arrived medical officer observed that the battalion had gone into the field anticipating combat, and "there was not a single bandage among them!"

Even the_burial of the dead contributed to the overall impressions of horror. Men accustomed to elaborate, even simple, rituals for burial found that none were provided. Not only was there little time, but there were so many different people with divergent customs that few could be satisfied. Often the bodies were merely sorted, Africans on one side, Europeans on the other, and laid to rest in common graves, occasionally the trenches which had originally been dug to protect the men in battle. There could be little comfort in that, with each dead compatriot now nothing more than "a heap of lifelessness."

The magnitude of the casualties, too, made the impressions of combat even more terrifying. Nyasaland's battalions suffered large numbers of killed and wounded, and considerable deaths due to disease as well. Various estimates and tabulations are offered concerning the casualties, and none agree with the others. Table 3.

⁸¹ Dr. Gordon Colville, notes on East Africa campaign, October-November 1916, R.H.L., Sir Gordon Coville papers, MSS. Afr. s. 386. Laws to Fraser, 1 March 1916, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 25. Nyasaland Times, 21, 12(21 March 1918), 2.

⁸² Interviews: 82, Kalokwete Wadi Likwapi, 8 April 1973; 12, Mbaisa Mbaisa, 15 August 1972; 116, Amos Isaac, 14 July 1973. Questionnaire DZ/14, Mr. Danite, 14 April 1974.

is suggestive of the toll suffered by the two regiments of largely Malawian askari, to which would have to be added those serving in other units and with the Germans. 83

TABLE 3. MALAWIAN KAR CASUALTIES

	lst KAR	2nd KAR	Total
total strength	8,370	6,650	14,920
died	710	1,031	1,741
deaths as % of strength	8.5%	15.5%	11.7%
wounded	488	1,707	2,195
wounded as % of strength	5.8%	25.7%	14.7%
total casualties	1,198	2,738	3,936
casualties as % of strength	14.3%	41.1%	26.4%

Source: Chief Secretary to C.O., 23 February 1922, P.R.O., C.O. 534/9.

Other figures indicate that of those who died, just under half succumbed to disease, particularly among the two training battalions still in Nyasaland at the armistice. 84 A comparison of these sources and others would suggest that Malawian units bore the greater brunt of the King's African Rifles participation in the campaign. Between thirty and forty percent of K.A.R. deaths, and between fifty and

⁸³As with previous statistics, Table 3. cannot be considered as being at all accurate; the figures given here have been selected from among available sources as they represent a compilation made several years after the war, when the long term effects of some wounds and disease might best be reflected. A nominal roll of all K.A.R. casualties, transmitted to the Colonial Office by the K.A.R. Commandant, General Lewellyn, on 11 October 1919, is no longer with the covering dispatch in Colonial Office records; P.R.O., C.O. 534/12.

Nominal rolls engraved on the King's African Rifles Memorial, Zomba, yield this data.

sixty percent of K.A.R. wounded, came from the first and second regiments. 85 Such a record was not lost on those Malawian askari who did return home at the end of the war, and contributed greatly to their impressions of the arduous campaign they had just completed. 86

The experiences of battle, and of casualties, were not confined to the askari: Carriers as well were exposed to hostile fire, although the Nyasaland government for long denied that they were, thereby justifying much lower salaries and less care in recruitment of the tengatenga. The Certainly British porters were not usually armed, as were their German counterparts. They did, however, occasionally take on the duties of askari, but only in extreme circumstances. If was a mtengatenga, a veteran told me, but whenever the fighting was heavy, and many of the soldiers were dead, they took the guns and gave them to us. No attempts were made to provide instruction, and carriers turned askari were not

These estimates are derived from the above figures, plus those given by the Acting Chief Secretary to the Nyasaland Legislative Council on 16 July 1919; Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Nyasaland, 21st session (July 1919), p. 4; and Moyse-Bartlett, King's African Rifles, p. 701

⁸⁶ D.M. Bandawe, letter to the author, 5 June 1974.

⁸⁷Chief Secretary to Resident, Ncheu, 2 February 1916, M.N.A., NCN 1/1/3.

⁸⁸ Hector Croad, letter to <u>East Africa and Rhodesia</u>, 14(1937), p. 94.

⁸⁹Interview 9, Kampila Kaputa, 11 August 1972, and letter to the author, 10 August 1972 (translated by Y.M. Juwayeyi). Also interview 116, Amos Isaac, 14 August 1973; questionnaire MZ/15, Menard J.K. Tembo, 10 April 1974.

among the most efficient fighting men. My informant remained in the field three days until shot in the buttocks, an unceremonious end for any warrior.

If few of the carriers actually became soldiers, they still found themselves in combat situations. This was particularly true of the Lewis gun and machine gun porter who actually went into the front lines as part of the gun crew. He had no direct means of defending himself, yet was expected to retrieve the gun should the askari operating it fall. Many carriers suffered greatly under such conditions and not a few were killed in action. Frequently under fire, too, were the bakasi, or stretcher bearers, whose duties often demanded the removal of men from the battlefield while combat continued. 91

Those front-line carriers who traveled with the battalions in the field were also exposed to hostile fire. In theory, they were to remain in the rear during the fighting, but often that was an impossibility, especially in the bush warfare which characterized the last year of the campaign. Frequently they were caught in the midst of combat and "just lay down on their bellies while the soldiers fought the battles." Some, of course, were wounded and

⁹⁰ Interview 110, E.C. Banda, 15 August 1973. Questionnaires: MA/5, Mgodi Mbeko, 15 July 1974; MZ/22, Efulaim Gondwe, 15 April 1974. The roll of deaths from the first and second regiments on the King's African Rifles Memorial, Zomba, include thirty-one machine gun porters and one Lewis gun porter. Also see Nyasaland Government Gazette, 25(1918), 5.

⁹¹ Interviews: 13, Daisa Songolo, 17 August 1972; 16, Taulo Guja, 18 August 1972.

⁹² Interview 116, Amos Isaac, 14 July 1973.

a few killed in action. Many, however, took any opportunity to flee from the fighting. Throughout the war in east Africa both sides complained of their carriers throwing down loads and fleeing as soon as the first shots were fired. Most would return to the battalions they served when the battle was over and were seldom blamed for their reactions. 93

Those carriers whose duties put them into combat situations were a minority, and their impressions of the war were much like those of the askari. The most widespread tengatenga experience was that of those who served on the long lines of communications. Although they might occasionally be ambushed and suffer casualties, they had, in the words of a later government account, "none of the compensating excitements of active warfare," only the monotonous job of continuing porterage. They were truly tengatenga, as Robert Hellier Napier defined the term: "Tenga, in our local <u>lingua franca</u> [Chichewa], means 'take' or 'carry.' By saying it twice you imply that after taking you go on carrying, yes, on and on and on."

There was, unfortunately, little official concern for these men as they were sent off to "do their bit" for the war. Called out--coerced, more likely--by district residents, they came

⁹³Dupuis, "A Nobody in a Forgotten Campaign," chapter twelve; P.D. Bishop diary, 8 September 1914, M.N.A., Bishop papers, BI 1/1/1; Rhodesia Native Regiment war diaries, 9 November 1916 and 17 March 1917, N.A.R., A.J. Tomlinson papers, TO 1/2/1/2 and TO 1/2/1/4; Moyse-Bartlett, King's African Rifles, pp. 291-2.

⁹⁴Murray, <u>Handbook</u>, p. 271; also Dupuis, ''A Nobody in a Forgotten Campaign,'' chapter five.

⁹⁵ Robert Hellier Napier, "The 'Tenga-Tenga'," in Hetherwick, Napier, p. 143.

unwillingly. Virtually no medical attention was given to them.

Few were examined to determine their fitness, and no precautionary measures were taken to ensure their health. They seldom were issued any equipment, and then almost never more than a single blanket to last their entire tour, which might extend to six months or more. Such inattention did little to build the confidence which compulsion had already made next to impossible. "There is little doubt," wrote Nyasaland's acting governor in 1919, "that they intensely dislike and fear the work of military porterage." 97

From men who were so hesitant, much indeed was expected. Loads assigned to them were supposed to weigh about fifty pounds. It was not unusual, in fact, for a typical load to exceed sixty pounds, and as a caravan progressed it might get heavier should large numbers of tengatenga fall by the wayside and their loads be redistributed among the remaining carriers. They generally marched about five hours each day, with breaks every hour; however, they often had to go for seven hours or more. It was expected that they would cover fifteen to eighteen miles each day. In the mountains, though, the distance traveled was frequently less than ten miles, and had to be made up later with longer marches that might be twenty-five miles or more. 98

^{96&}lt;sub>Nyasaland Times</sub>, 21, 7(14 February 1918), 2; and 21, 14(4 April 1918), 2.

⁹⁷Duff to C.O., 27 January 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 525/82.

⁹⁸ Smith, "Nyasaland and General Northey," pp. 269-70; Dupuis, "A Nobody in a Forgotten Campaign," chapter six; Nyasaland Times, 20, 17(26 April 1917), 1; Elanor Coffin, "A Dental Officer, W.F. MacKeown, in the 1914-18 War," Zambia Journal, 6, 1(1965), 90.

Typically, the tengatenga devised means to make their tasks easier. In the mornings they would wake as early as possible, hoping to claim a lighter load then they had carried the previous day. ⁹⁹ On the march itself, the carriers found means to lighten their burdens, as one European carrier "conductor" observed:

A carrier would take a bamboo about 5 feet long and split it for nearly half its length. He would then strip a suitable tree and make and twist bark rope. A short length he would tie on to the bamboo to prevent the split extending further; a longer length he would tie on to one of the ends of the split and after inserting his load between the splits tie it firmly into position. ...having made an 'mkhata" or circlet of twisted leaves he would put his load on to his head. The mkhata both cushioned his head and helped him to balance his load which he held with one hand while with the other hand he grasped a stout stick to save himself if he happened to trip on a tree-root or other obstacle. When came a halt he would lean his load against a tree with the unsplit part of the bamboo downward so that when he started again it was an easy matter to put his load on to his head again. 100

These small devices, though, were of little practical value to the tengatenga, who faced above all the most demanding of obstacles: "military exigencies." In the name of meeting whatever military demand might come from headquarters—including the necessity of whiskey for the officers—any treatment of the carriers might be justified. What resulted were the most deplorable of conditions and the most grievious hardships, all, noted the acting chief

⁹⁹ Hetherwick, Napier, p. 120.

Dupuis, "A Nobody in a Forgotten Campaign," chapter six; also interview 117. Village Headman Mpanangombe, 17 August 1973.

¹⁰¹ Rev. Canon Thomas Hicks, letter to the author, 4 February 1975.

secretary early in 1918, "inseparable from the conduct of hostilities." Europeans in charge of the carrier conveys did-or could do--little to alter the situation. The tengatenga, therefore, unwilling as he was, faced a period of service that was "at the best eminently purgatorial." 103

Carriers suffered from shortages of food, just as did the soldiers. One missionary recalled seeing tengatenga "picking up the seeds of millet, one by one, that had fallen on the ground" in order to supplement their meager rations. 104 They did, however, carry food, and many in such positions received what appeared to be adequate issues each day. Yet many still suffered the effects of an inadequate diet. One British general concluded, typically, that they simply were unable to cook properly for themselves while away from home. 105 The problem was much simpler. "Yes, we had enough food to fill our bellies," one former carrier recalled, "but a lot of it was rotten." 106 Beyond that, there were reports that maize for the tengatenga was "ground up, dirt, husks, and all, and then issued as

Acting Chief Secretary to residents, confidential circular letter, 23 February 1918, M.N.A., NCN 1/1/2.

¹⁰³Bishop Frank Weston, "The Bishop of Zanzibar in German East Africa," <u>Central Africa</u>, 35(1917), 27.

Rev. Canon Thomas Hicks, letter to the author, 4 February 1975; questionnaire NC/3, N. Chitukwawa, 18 April 1974.

¹⁰⁵ Brigadier General C.P. Fendall, <u>The East African Force 1915-1919</u> (London: Witherby, 1921), pp. 206-7.

¹⁰⁶ Interview 116, Kakalala Phiri, 27 August 1973.

rations." Little wonder their diet, or lack of it, caused men to become sick; for them, too, it was a "hungry war."

Underfed and pushed to limits they might not have been expected to endure, the tengatenga were also exposed—almost literally—to the elements. In the highlands of southwest Tanzania and northwest Mozambique they met an enemy which many Eutopeans, even afterwards, refused to admit existed in east Africa: cold. There, on the "big mountains," whose passes climbed in places to almost 9,000 feet, men from the lakeshore and plateau of Malawi struggled to carry loads, and to survive. None had been told of the danger, and few had been prepared for it. Having left their homes with little clothing, they were without adequate protection from the chill at night. "I had seen no issue of blankets to them," recalled one European conductor, and supplies of such necessities were not available for the miserable porters.

Disease, of course, was much more liable to strike carriers debilitated by such conditions. In addition to the dysentery brought on by poor and inadequate food, the cold and dew of the mountains encouraged pneumonia and other respiratory ailments.

Frank Dupuis recalled listening at night to the "very grim"

¹⁰⁷ Nyasaland Times, 21, 7(14 February 1918), 2.

¹⁰⁸ W.D. Downes, With the Nigerians in German East Africa (London: Methuen, 1919), p. 269.

¹⁰⁹ Interview 171, Weston Kamwendo, 17 September 1973. Nyasaland-Northern Rhodesia Field Force war diary, 30 November and 13 December 1916, M.N.A., GOA 4/1/1; Nyasaland Times, 20, 17(26 April 1917), 1.

Rev. Canon Thomas Hicks, letter to the author, 4 February 1975; Nyasaland Times, 21, 7(14 February 1918), 2; Leo Walmsley, Flying and Sport in East Africa (Oxford: Blackwood, 1920), p. 218.

coughing of the tengatenga assigned to his caravan, and seeing the men grow weaker each day under the effects of disease. Ill In their enfeebled state, they were also more likely to contract other diseases current in east Africa. Smallpox was discovered among one group, and plague was not unknown. At least one case of leprosy was discovered among Malawians on tengatenga service, reflecting the extremely lax-recruitment requirements.

The high rate of disease was magnified by the nature of the medical facilities provided for the carriers. Officially, there were many "special arrangements" made to care for the tengatenga, and impressive lists of hospitals, personnel "available," and medical supplies were published. Most of these were only last minute efforts, and even then did not often operate as the organizational plans projected. Italy For example medical services were frequently less than professional. As a missionary—though not of the medical variety—Robert Hellier Napier became de facto doctor to many carriers on the routes into southwest Tanzania; he recorded in his diary some impressions of his "practice":

Out of the profundity of my medical knowledge I have to diagnose cases, who in their most plaintive accents recount their aches and pains. Each having been accurately (?) diagnosed, my chemists show is called upon.

Conversation with Frank Dupuis, Ruthin, Wales, 15 September 1974.

Nyasaland-Northern Rhodesia Field Force war diary, 21 October 1918, M.N.A., GOA 4/1/3; Colonel Murray's column, weekly reports, 20 October 1917, N.A.R., BC 5/2/2.

¹¹³ Macpherson and Mitchell, Medical Services, pp. 477-9;
Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Nyasaland, 20th session (November 1918), p. 6; Acting Chief Secretary to residents, confidential circular letter, 23 February 1918, M.N.A., NCN 1/1/2.

It contains salts, Livingstone's rouser pills, quinine, boric powder and dressings and bandages. These will soon be done.

Additional medicines were given me by two medical attendants far apart, and some more I looted from a mission which had a fine assortment of medicines but nearly all with German titles. That handicap, with my meagre knowledge of things medical, prevented my risking things.

I have a case which I call bronchitis, and others that suggest pneumonia, so a medical ignoramus is a bit at sea. War is hard. 114

Napier's experiences may have been more dramatic than others, but certainly they were not unique; missionaries often were thrust into such positions with little regard for their training and knowledge. 115

Even where doctors, nurses, and highly trained medical orderlies were available, care for the tengatenga was not substantially improved because of the tremendous numbers of sick and the inadequacy of facilities. A Roman Catholic missionary nurse, Sister Jacques du Sauveur, was appalled at the conditions she faced in caring for the porters. "What an existence! Our hospital is so crammed that patients sleep on top of one another. We have a dysentery epidemic and most patients have fever." When the difficulties became even more accute, cases were turned away, as at Mwenzo in 1917, where only the very worst patients were admitted.

¹¹⁴Quoted in Hetherwick, Napier, pp. 118-19.

¹¹⁵ Nyasaland Times, 21, 7(14 February 1918), 2.

¹¹⁶ Quoted in Linden, Catholics, p. 110.

¹¹⁷ R.M. Smith, carrier transport, to Colonel Murray, 7 May 1917, N.A.R., BC 1/8/1.

Some Europeans tried to find what small ways they could to assist the unfortunate tengatenga. Napier, whose medical efforts have been mentioned, was well respected for such efforts among the Malawians along the lines of communication. Others disobeyed orders to protect their carriers from overwork or to obtain additional food or other benefits for them. These Europeans were not forgotten by the porters, who even today remember that some whites "were both considerate and generous." There were anomalies, however, expressed by one Malawian carrier who recalled that although Europeans "were very kind indeed, it was only when you misbehaved that they whipped you."

Unfortunately, the latter seems to have been the predominate impression the white conductors and directors made upon the tengatenga. Even Napier wielded a stick and admitted to using it freely on some occassions. Malawians recalled their surprise at seeing the kind missionaries they knew at home beating tired, hungry, and sick men. Hector Duff remembered one White Father assigned to carrier duty who was "rather too martially minded for his job." That priest, and several of his fellows, may have

Dupuis, "A Nobody in a Forgotten Campaign," chapter seven; Rev. Canon Thomas Hicks, letter to the author, 19 March 1975.

¹¹⁹ Interviews: 114, Kakalala Phiri, 27 August 1973; 130, Kagunda Chirwa, 1 September 1973; 132, Ruben Longwe, 6 September 1973.

¹²⁰ Interview 87, Chisoya Wadi Mtuluko, 12 April 1973.

Duff, Africa Small Chop, p. 58; Hetherwick, Napier, p. 86. Questionnaires: MC/8, Melesiano Kanoni, 20 April 1973; MZ/31, Frank Moyo, 18 April 1974.

been trying to end doubts about their loyalty, questioned since others of their order worked for the Germans. One means of accomplishing that goal in the carrier service was to exact greater performances from their men. 122

Far more feared than the missionaries, however, were the South African and some other soldiers of the Nyasaland-Northern Rhodesia Field Force. Priests on carrier convoys often got the most from their men by threatening to turn them over to South African officers, whose brutality was widely reported and believed. The discipline they exacted was severe, took no notice of a carrier's condition and was not tempered by any measures of humanitarian concern. The South Africans' disdain for the tengatenga was quite evident. Similar fears on the part of the carriers seem to have been transferred to at least one British officer, John Archer. His service as Nyasaland's official executioner, it was rumored, was not lost upon the tengatenga, who would overcome any obstacle so as to avoid his disfavor.

Some carriers, of course, could be pushed no further. Even the kindest of the European conductors could do little to help them.

Canon Hicks recalled with great feeling that he often witnessed "a

laws to Chisholm, 24 February 1916, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 25; Owen Letcher, "The N.V.R.," Nyasaland Times, 20, 39(27 September 1917), 3.

West Nyasa district Annual Report, 1917/18, M.N.A., NNC 3/1/3; Nyasaland Times, 20, 45(8 November 1917), 1; Linden, Catholics, p. 110. Interview 112, Fololiyani Longwe, 23 August 1973; questionnaire MZ/14, M. Mkandawire, 9 April 1974.

¹²⁴ Owen Letcher, <u>Cohort of the Tropics</u> (London: Waterlow, 1930), p. 10; this legend is discussed by Shepperson and Price, p. 319.

porter here and there, alongside the road, who had been abandoned to die." ¹²⁵ Men who served and returned remembered the 'mass suffering and death of the carriers." ¹²⁶ Indeed, there was little to commend wartime tengatenga service to the men who engaged in it. Hardly a means of employment, it was more a method of punishment, as Robert Laws seemed to suggest in a letter to the district resident at Karonga: "If_criminals got a dose of tengatenga at the front, it strikes me, there would be a decrease in the number of thieves and their like." ¹²⁷

Ironically, in view of Laws' suggestion, one of the few ways carriers might protest their conditions was, in effect, to become criminals. Pilferring from the loads was quite common, and presented the carriers with a means not only of striking back at the Europeans, but also of improving their own conditions as well. "Some of us just made a hole in the bag to let rice grains pour out," recounted one tengatenga; their attempts were "to make the load lighter or a little less heavy." Europeans marched behind every caravan to prevent such practices, but were not extremely successful. Theft of food was widespread; canned goods were sometimes opened, eaten, and the empty tins refilled with dirt or rocks. Carriers

¹²⁵ Rev. Canon Thomas Hicks, letter to the author, 4 February 1975.

¹²⁶ Interview 109, Pilato Kalinzonkho, 6 August 1973.

¹²⁷ Laws to Storrs, 21 March 1918, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 27.

¹²⁸ Interview 114, Kakalala Phiri, 27 August 1973.

with access to motor transport depots were even known to search for a little extra motor oil to use as a salve on their feet. 129

There was nothing, though, that could salve their minds, remove the thoughts of suffering, and reassure the fears of problems at home. Most were simple farmers and fishermen who had been made to carry loads, and having faced the horrors, wanted to return. In desperation, sick men even deserted from hospitals, hoping somehow to make their way to their villages. They were aghast to find the punishments meted out to those who left their tasks. If caught soon after leaving, they were frequently beaten; if they arrived home, they were sentenced to still further service and sent back to work.

The threat of punishment did little to stop the tengatenga from fleeing their caravans. Realizing they would be arrested upon returning home, they tried to live in the bush and once in their home districts, only made occasional contact with their relatives. In effect, though they had been taken to serve, they joined those who hid in the countryside to escape recruitment. Their clandestine journeys, however, were arduous, and they were not able to sustain

¹²⁹ Furness, "Mechanical Transport," N.A.R., B 1/5/6; Dupuis, "A Nobody in a Forgotten Campaign," chapter six; questionnaire MZ/23, Yoram Ngulube, 15 April 1974.

¹³⁰ Interview 111, Mugwinya Ngombe Nyirenda, 21 August 1973;
Nyasaland Times, 21, 34(22 August 1918), 3; Bishop of Nyasaland to
Chief Political Officer, Neu Langenburg, 18 May 1917, M.N.A., U.M.C.A.
papers, UN 1/1/2/15/1; Recruiting Officer, carrier transport, to
residents, circular letter, 8 March 1918, M.N.A., NSB 3/9/1.

¹³¹ Interview 114, Kakalala Phiri, 27 August 1973; Resident, Chinteche, to Chief Secretary, 16 November 1917, M.N.A., NNC 1/1/1.

themselves for long. Not a few died in these attempts to escape, and district residents complained that many captured deserters were far too sick to undertake the additional service which would be levied on them. 132

At the conclusion of the war, significant numbers of tengatenga were unaccounted for, and it was assumed they were among those who had deserted and died enroute to their homes. The government estimated, after several upward revisions, that 4,440 carriers died. 133 Like others, it is a most provisional estimate and must be used with caution. Not included, for example, are deaths among military laborers within Nyasaland, although these were probably not very high. The figure does, however, suggest a death rate among carriers of something more than two and one-half percent. Governor Smith indicated that he believed the rate in 1917-18, when the work was most strenuous and the conditions most severe, to be between four and five percent. 134

To be sure, the percentage of deaths was much lower than among Malawian askari, but it was, as Hector Duff observed, "a bloody tale for a bush campaign." And the statistics alone hardly tell of the

¹³² Interview 119, Village Headman Malomo, 7 August 1973; questionnaire KS/7, Saidi Kambwenbwe, 10 April 1974; January 1918 Blantyre district monthly report, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/7.

¹³³ These were offered to the Legislative Council by the Acting Chief Secretary on 16 July 1919; Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Nyasaland, 21st session (July 1919), 4.

¹³⁴ Smith, "Nyasaland and General Northey," p. 272.

¹³⁵ Duff, Africa Small Chop, p. 175.

Ì
i
1
i
1
1

ı

real casualties, suffered not just at war but at home as well and extending for many years beyond the armistice. Without the tengatenga and all they endured, though, there would have been no campaign. General Northey, upon leaving his command, appreciatively noted their contributions. One of his intelligence officers, the missionary T. Cullen Young, perhaps put it best when he wrote that "without exaggeration, they carried us to victory upon their heads."

Nyasaland Government Gazette, 25(1918), 174.

¹³⁷ Young, "Nyasaland Operations," S.M.L.

CHAPTER FIVE: A TIME OF FIRE

Much of what troubled the askari and the tengatenga, as they were away at war, was shared by those at home. Certainly there was a spirit of disquiet throughout the country which, though it often could not be precisely defined, related directly to the conflict that had engulfed Nyasaland. In part, the uncertainities which Malawians felt were a reflection of the sense of impending crisis which had been widespread prior to September 1914. Many believed that Satanic powers were at work, ready to consume all in their path. As the imminence of such destruction waned, though, so did the fear associated with it, to be replaced by a desire for understanding: what did the war mean?

The quest for information on the local campaign did not diminish, although few Malawians shared the Europeans! interest in the wider conduct of the war. The missionaries, early a source of news, became more reticent in explaining the details of growing casualties without an end to the fighting. The government did little, as Governor Smith

Interview 108, Dear Banda, 7 August 1973; statements of Witness Mangasanjado, John Kosam, and Isaac Chambo, n.d., M.N.A., POL 2/8/1; testimony of Rev. A.M. Jenkins, oral evidence taken by Commission of Inquiry into the Chilembwe Rising, 21 June 1915, M.N.A., COM 6/2/1/3; M.B.W. Wilson, "Up at Chowe's," <u>Central Africa</u>, 33(1915), 98.

later claimed, "to keep the native population fully informed," although it did attempt successfully to forestall any apprehensions associated with the July 1917 lunar eclipse which was visible in the protectorate. In the absence of the reports they sought, the African population had "just baseless, terrifying rumors,...all lies."

There was little to inspire confidence. In fact, the activities of the government and its African agents contributed to the general sense of unrest. The increasing levels of violence and intimidation associated with recruitment made people wary. School boys and girls feared to attend classes, and large meetings were avoided. Government messengers were suspect wherever they went, and even women were unwilling to make trips to the boma. There was little confidence to gain from the chiefs, either, who were often unable to mitigate the difficulties of those who stayed at home. Despite their closer identification with the government, "the chiefs...complained they did not know why the war was taking place." As did their subjects, most merely were trying to make the best of a bad situation.

²George Smith, draft chapter for <u>The Empire at War</u>, in C.P. Lucas to C.O., 19 June 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 525/87; also see West Nyasa district Annual Report, 1915/16, M.N.A., NNC 3/1/3, and Resident, Blantyre, to Chief Secretary, 18 June 1915, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/4.

³Chief Secretary to residents, circular letter, 20 June 1917, M.N.A., NCN 1/1/3; July 1917 Blantyre district monthly report, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/7.

Interview 125, J.B.C. Mankhuzu Chirwa, 9 August 1973.

⁵Interview 129, A.G.Mugomo Mwali, 29 August 1973. Questionnaires: NC/4, Donald Kadanmila, 18 April 1974; MZ/35, Isaac Mbambo, 25 August 1974. Marimba district Annual Report, 1918/19, M.N.A., NCK 5/1/2.

⁶ Interviews: 12, Mbasia Mbaisa, 15 August 1972; 111, Mugwinya Ngombe Nyirenda, 21 August 1973; 127, Benjamin Kamanga, 13 August 1973.

⁷ Interview 103, Wilson Dolobeni, 6 May 1973; also see Marimba district Annual Report, 1917/18, M.N.A., NCK 5/1/2.

The feeling of helplessness was widespread. The men away at war sent few letters home to reassure their friends and relatives.

Were they literate, censorship regulations frightened most into inaction. Those few who did write could say disappointingly little.

The only messages which were received came via the returned tengatenga and askari, who also brought back the frightful tales of their experiences which inspired resistance to further recruitment. News accompanied by such accounts offered little comfort, nor did the sounds of battle in Mozambique and Tanzania which were heard in the villages across the lake.

Many women were in near mourning, crying and moaning, wondering if their menfolk would come home alive. Their only concern--and the chief worry of almost all other Malawians--was the safe return of the soldiers and carriers. Most wives who considered it important resisted temptations of adultery to protect their husbands. Out of similar beliefs, some women refused to pound maize and cassava into flour at night in order to ensure the safe return of fathers, husbands, and sons. One group in Dedza district attempted to carry food to their absent men at Karonga, only to grieve further at their lack of success. 9

To provide some sense of participation for the Africans who were not taken into war service, the missionaries encouraged donations

⁸ Interviews: 77, Stambuli Basale, 14 April 1973; 119, Village Headman Malomo, 7 August 1973; 124, Augustine Paliya Chirwa, 16 August 1973; 110, E.C. Banda, 15 August 1973.

⁹Interviews: 105, Diamond Caswell Chirwa, 1 August 1973; 126,
Karonga Nkhata, 10 August 1973. Questionnaires: MA/10, Bwanali Mdala,
18 July 1974; MZ/16, Osiya Moyo, 12 April 1974; DZ/41 Defnia Jonasi (female), 29 August 1974; MC/2, Marosio Tembwe, 11 April 1973.

		i

to various relief funds. The vernacular newspaper of the Dutch Reformed mission solicited gifts to aid war widows in Europe, and similar appeals were made by European and African Christians of the Blantyre mission. The resulting donations, "almost entirely in coppers," were not inconsiderable, and some were acknowledged by Governor Smith in a dispatch to the Colonial Office. 10 Appeals for funds to aid the askari of Nyasaland, however, were relatively late in coming.

The "Native Red Cross" was not begun until mid-1917, organized to allow Malawians to make contributions for the relief of their own men. Colonel C. W. Barton opened the initial bazaar, a "native sale of work," with a speech in Chichewa assuring that "the askari would no doubt redouble their efforts when they knew they were not forgotten." Malawians, of course, knew that they had not forgotten the soldiers; however, the Native Red Cross offered a new opportunity to express their concerns. "We must know," wrote Robertson Namate in an appeal for support, "that merely grateful and thankful in words does not help, but to give something would help most." This effort was a more direct way of easing the feelings of helplessness, and African contributions came from all parts of the protectorate. 13

¹⁰ Mthenga wa ku Nyasa, 4, 23 (September-October 1915), 3; Life and Work in Nyasaland (April-June 1915), p. 6, and (September-December 1914), p. 4; Smith to C.O., 19 December 1917, P.R.O., C.O. 525/18.

Nyasaland Times, 20, 37(13 September 1917), 3; also 20, 30(26 July 1917), 2. The collections for this Red Cross fund were used for the purposes intended, unlike the questionable Red Cross project of Malawians in Rhodesia; Nyasaland Times, 21, 45(7 November 1918), 3.

¹² Quoted in Nyasaland Times, 21, 13(28 March 1918), 2.

¹³ Nyasaland Times, 20, 37(13 September 1917), 3; 21, 42(13 October

The charitable donations, without doubt, provided a kind of relief to some who were able, in that way, to reach out to their absent relatives, friends, and countrymen. The majority of Malawians did not really have that chance, and in fact were caught up in the greater complications of the war effort. A view often expressed was that, with the war raging and the men gone, the only thing left in the villages was trouble. W. P. Johnson, whose missionary endeavors in the region went back many years, observed the situation with near despair: "Alas; the war...is always a time of fire to try the natives everywhere."

Official fears about the war, and about the possibilities of invasion, spies, and subversion, must have added to the concerns of those in the villages. Even during the last months of 1914, the government acted as if it were convinced something untoward were to happen in the country. African vessels on the lake, dhows mostly, were seized or rendered unable to sail, eliminating them as possible vehicles of subversion. Officials carefully investigated even the most vague rumors of German intrigues around the eastern and southern lakeshore, certain that the enemy would be able to effect some sort of trouble. These early scares were climaxed by preparations for an imminent German invasion at Fort Johnston. 'The military men really

^{1918), 3; 21, 48(28} November 1918), 3. Contributions to the Native Red Cross, from both Africans and Europeans, totaled \$803/8/2 for the entire war period; Duff to C.O., 27 January 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 525/82.

¹⁴w.P. Johnson, "Mala to Msinje," <u>Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle</u>, 55 (April 1917), 16; questionnaire MZ/40, Simeon Kamanga, 37 September 1974. Johnson's statement was repeated under the title "The 'Chauncy Maples'," in <u>Central Africa</u>, 35(1917), 198.

consider this <u>serious</u>," wrote a missionary, only to discover a few days later it had been little more than misplaced panic. 15

After the Chilembwe rising, however, officials were even more concerned about the internal security of the protectorate, and their concerns were made evident to the African populations. All firearms in the hands of villagers were confiscated, and warnings went out to ensure particular watchfulness against the theft of guns. Vigilance was also demanded to prevent any tampering with the wood stored at many points along the lake and river for collection by the steamers to fire their boilers. A special circular was issued to residents and others in authority (including, apparently, missionaries) concerning "Precautions Against African and Asiatic Spies." The inquiries which followed upon this notice involved many Malawians in the spotting of suspicious characters and reporting on their activities. In fact, the latter effort was not altogether inexpedient, as German officers did make use of spies in Nyasaland and the surrounding areas, frequently selecting their agents from

¹⁵G.H. Wilson to Bishop of Nyasaland, 31 December 1914 and 9 January 1915, M.N.A., U.M.C.A. papers, UN 1/1/2/15/1; Volunteer Boardman to Officer Commanding, Nyasaland Volunteer Reserve, 7 October 1914, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/24; Assistant Chief Secretary to G.H. Wilson, 18 December 1914, M.N.A., U.M.C.A. papers, UN 1/1/2/15/1.

¹⁶ Smith to C.O., 18 September 1915, P.R.O., C.O. 525/62; Chief Secretary to residents, circular letters, 8 February 1915 and 26 August 1915, M.N.A., NCK 1/1/2 and NSB 1/2/2.

¹⁷Government Circular no. 8 of 1915, 15 April 1915, M.N.A., NCN 1/1/2; Laws to Hawthorne, 4 June 1915, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 24.

among the Muslim populations whom they assumed would be more willing to inform on the British. 18

The loyalty of Nyasaland's Islamic population was questioned within the protectorate as well. At first this was an extension of the accusations and complaints which had been voiced prior to, and continued after, the January 1915 Chilembwe rising. 19 There may have been some basis in the concern, as Governor Schnee of German East Africa had, in February 1915, issued a proclamation calling upon Muslims to join in the holy war which the Sultan of Constantinople had proclaimed. This news was carried to the shaykhs and waalimu of adjacent Portuguese territory; among them was Mwalimu Issa Chikoka, whose connections with the Islamic communities of Nyasaland were very close. 20 Word of the proclaimed jihad seems to have spread to villages around the southern lakeshore, and perhaps further into the country as well; Alexander Hetherwick in June 1915 reported that "natives are saying that this is not a war between Europeans. It is a war between Christianity and Islam."

¹⁸ von Lettow-Vorbeck war diary, 24 May 1915, volume one, and annexures 31 and 41 (statements of Halfani and Juma, 10 May 1915, and Ambari, 21 June 1915), I.W.M.

¹⁹ Laws to Webb, 26 July 1915, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 24; testimony of Rev. A.M. Anderson, oral evidence taken by Commission of Inquiry into the Chilembwe Rising, 5 July 1915, M.N.A., COM 6/2/1/2.

²⁰Schnee Proclamation of 25 February 1915, copy in Northey to C.O., 25 June 1916, P.R.O., C.O. 525/68; statement of Ambari, 21 June 1915, annexure 41, von Lettow-Vorbeck war diary, I.W.M.; Greenstein, "African Muslims," p. 161. Greenstein, apparently unaware of the German evidence, suggests that Mwalimu Issa Chikoka had not received news of Governor Schnee's proclamation and therefore had little to do with the dissemination of such ideas in Nyasaland.

²¹Testimony of Hetherwick, oral evidence taken by Commission of

The government, aware of some of these developments, and generally wishing to take all precautions, drew upon a letter which the Sultan of Zanzibar had written to the Muslims of East Africa, supporting the British. Copies were sent to residents, and the letter was read in most Islamic congregations. There was some interest in the Sultan's message; at least two replies were received and forwarded to Zanzibar. -The Sultan responded with further assurances that "it behooves you to keep loyal to the British." In 1916 a pamphlet outlining German anti-Islamic activities in East Africa prior to the war also was sent to residents and "discretely" shown to some influential Muslim headmen. 23

The worst fears of everyone came together with the discovery, in mid-July 1915, of a man believed to be a German agent traveling south through Portuguese territory toward Nyasaland. He was seized and taken by some U.M.C.A. Christians to Likoma Island where the agitated missionary, Frank Winspear, reported to the protectorate government. The man was said to have given his name as Ndelemani, which means dynamite; it may have been a pseudonym as he was carrying explosives, fuses, and a brace and bit--presumably to

Inquiry into the Chilembwe Rising, 29 June 1915, M.N.A., COM 6/2/1/1; also interview 86, Petro Mbwana, 12 April 1973.

²²Copies of a letter from Seyyid Khalifa bin Said, 30th M'funguo Mosi, year 1333, M.N.A., NSB 1/2/2 and NCK 1/1/2. Also Chief Secretary to residents, circular letter, 1 June 1915 and Chief Secretary to Resident, Nkhotakota, 25 October 1915, both M.N.A., NCK 1/1/2; Chief Secretary to Resident, Blantyre, 16 July 1915, M.N.A., NSB 1/1/2; Resident, Zomba, to Chief Secretary, 24 June 1915, M.N.A., NSZ 1/1/1.

²³ Acting Chief Secretary to residents, confidential circular letter, 24 October 1916, M.N.A., NCN 1/1/3.

sabotage firewood intended for the lake steamers. He was also in the possession of several tracts concerning the holy war, letters addressed to Mwalimu Issa Chikota from Count (Captain) Falkenstein, a green flag with a red crescent, and nearly \$5 in British coin.

"The dynamite man," as the Bishop of Nyasaland called him, was believed to have been in German military employ; therefore, he was summarily courtmartialed and executed at Fort Johnston before "the leading Mahomedan Yaos of that area." It was a spectacle which made a profound impression upon the populace. 25

Official concern ran high and a number of actions were taken which, over and above the shock of the execution, served to make manifest the extent of official fears. Two senior residents, having a familiarity with the inhabitants and the language, independently toured the southern lakeshore questioning as well as reassuring the sizeable Muslim population. Although both reported favorably on African loyalty to the government, warnings were issued expressing concern within the official community that Ramadan celebrations might bring adverse reactions. When they did not, a relieved governor and his residents received the principal Islamic chiefs and teachers in

²⁴ Smith to C.O., 15 November 1915, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/13; Frank Winspear to Resident, Chinteche, 15 July 1915, and Bishop of Nyasaland to H.L. Duff, 18 August 1915, M.N.A., U.M.C.A. papers, 1/1/2/15/1; register of readers, M.N.A., U.M.C.A. papers, box two.

²⁵Questionnaires: LK/2, Johns Ndazamu, 22 August 1973; MA/8, Amidu Katunga, 16 July 1974; MA/10, Bwanali Mdala, 18 July 1974.

formal--and thankful--receptions. 26 Less flamboyantly, but with perhaps more real effect, one of the leading Muslims, Shaykh Abdallah bin Haji Mkwanda, was sought out as a governmental advisor, to guide and ensure the loyalty of his co-religionists. 27

There was little throughout the remainder of the war to question Islamic allegiance, although two foreign Muslims came under suspicion. One of these, accused of spreading disloyal propaganda, was deported, there being insufficient evidence to convict him on any formal charges. Deportation orders were also issued for Charles Domingo (who had just previously been allowed to leave the country) following discovery of his association with Joseph Booth's "British African Congress Appeal." The appeal, a petition to the king, was typical of many earlier efforts on behalf of Africans, but this representation also included the suggestion that those who suffered for the empire in the world war deserved equal rewards when the fighting ceased.

²⁶Chief Secretary to residents, confidential circular letter, 22 July 1915, M.N.A., NCN 1/1/1; Smith to C.O., 15 November 1915, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/13; Resident, Zomba, to Chief Secretary, 10 August 1915, M.N.A., NSZ 1/1/1.

²⁷ Robert C. Greenstein, "Early Malawian Shaykhs and Tariqa Developments, c. 1890-1949," lecture given to the Society of Malawi, Limbe, 30 May 1974. There is little official discussion of this affair, probably because the Colonial Office rejected Governor Smith's request to appoint an official head for the Islamic community in Nyasaland; Smith to C.O., 16 October 1916, and associated minutes, P.R.O., C.O. 525/69. Mkwanda does lead the list of influential Muslims of South Nyasa district prepared by E. Costley-White, who termed him "a very clever rogue"; Resident, Zomba, to Chief Secretary, 24 July 1915, M.N.A., NSZ 1/1/1.

²⁸Smith to C.O., 15 November 1915, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/13; Resident, Zomba, to Chief Secretary, 23 August 1915, M.N.A., NSZ 1/1/1. These, the above, and other relationships between the Nyasaland government and Muslims during the war period are discussed more extensively in Greenstein, "African Muslims," pp. 159-166.

Governor Smith regarded that idea as seditious and considered

Domingo's support of the appeal equally so: "by word of mouth, in

his capacity as a preacher and teacher, he could doubtless incite

many to acts of open rebellion."

29

There seems little evidence that Domingo, or anyone else for that matter, was about to incite rebellion in Nyasaland after 1915. Late in that year the governor, however, had noted his impressions of the troubled mood abroad in the country:

In conversations between natives overheard and in correspondence intercepted there are still indications of unrest and uneasiness, extending in some cases to veiled threats or predictions of further risings. Undue weight must not be attached to such vapourings, although they stand as symptoms of the present mental attitude of some people.30

Indeed, they were symptomatic. Far more than Smith was likely aware, the government's continual concerns about internal security came to the attention of Malawians, and they could not have been reassured by such machinations.

At a time when most of the news was bad, and when even the powerful were fearful of the future, precious little reassurance was available to Malawians. For the wives of some soldiers, there may have been a bit of encouragement in the money which was occasionally paid to them, allotments from their husbands! army salary. Though the

²⁹Smith to C.O., 28 August 1916, with three enclosures, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/13. Booth's British African Congress Appeal is discussed in George Shepperson, "Joseph Booth and the Africanist Diaspora," tenth Melville J. Herskovits Memorial Lecture, 6 March 1972(Evanston: Northwestern University Program of African Studies, n.d.), p. 15.

³⁰Smith to C.O., 15 November 1915, M.N.A., GOA 2/4/13.

efficiency of such a system might be questioned, my informants were uniform in asserting that most askari wives benefited by it. The women of the tengatenga, however, had no such advantage. The cases of infidelity which were reported came largely from among their numbers, though some involved askari wives. In either case, the women concerned seem to have felt that whatever effect their actions might have on their husbands, such irregular unions were necessary to ensure their own present—and perhaps future—well—being in a time of troubles. 32

Whatever the public interest in such affairs, and it could be considerable, 33 greater attention was paid to news of casualties. This was an area where the government might well have both reassured and consoled the African population, but the actions which it did take were ill-considered and often ineffective. Special forms were printed for notifying relatives of the dead, complete with details of residence and other data--all taken from tax records! Civil police were to use this information to take notifications of deaths to the relatives in their villages, complete with a form letter of sympathy from Governor Smith. The bereaved were then expected to come to the boma to receive death gratuities due them, from \$3 for

³¹ Interviews: 1, Dinala Ndala, 8 August 1972; 75, Village Headman Makumba, 3 April 1973. Questionnaires: RU/1, W.P. Kamanga, 6 April 1973; MA/7, Puleni Selemani, 16 July 1974; NU/7 Besiya Mpoma (female), 10 April 1973.

³² Questionnaire DZ/21, P. Chimkanda, 16 April 1974. Interview 32, Khobviwa Juwa, 18 September 1972. [Fisher], Marriage Cases, p. 19.

 $^{^{33}}$ Resident, Chinteche, to Chief Secretary, 23 February 1918, M.N.A., NNC 1/1/1.

a tengatenga to \$24 for a sergeant in the King's African Rifles. 34

Given the widespread attempts to avoid tax, information gleaned from the taxation rolls could hardly have been much help in finding relatives of deceased carriers and askari, and the system, in fact, operated much differently.

Few Malawians recall police visits to notify relatives of war casualties; all too often the police were not welcome in the villages. Some people do remember being called to the boma to be told, but I have found no one who received a letter of sympathy from the governor, let alone anyone who saw such a letter. For most, the sad news seems to have come with the men who were returning from their own tours of service; occasionally the government confirmed the deaths, but not until the war was well over. The when official agents did come into the villages, they were known to place red flags on the houses of the deceased's closest relatives, making a public display of their grief. Such open expressions were not uncommon in Malawian societies, but in the central region where this governmental practice seems to have been most widespread, the effect was to put pressure upon the relatives to make elaborate funeral preparations. Increasingly, as the flags and the wails of mourning identified

³⁴ Acting Chief Secretary to residents, circular letter, 15 September 1916, and Resident, Chinteche, to Chief Secretary, 27 August 1918, M.N.A., NCK 1/1/3 and NNC 1/1/1. Copies of the death notification form can be found in Blantyre district records, M.N.A., NSB 3/9/1.

³⁵ Interviews: 42, Dorothy Liwewe, 28 December 1972; 69, Mr. Kaunda, 15 April 1973; 116, Amos Isaac, 14 July 1973. Questionnaire BT/2, Faifi Kadikira, 14 August 1973.

those with gratuities, <u>nyau</u> societies began to expect and even demand larger and larger cash payments for their dances, an integral and essential part of the funerary celebrations. ³⁶

The government's intended compassion was, in practice, largely absent. Even the meager gratuities, meant to ease the early financial burden of widows and other relatives, were not infrequently expended before the funeral rites were completed. Such circumstances, in part, account for the overwhelming impression that the government did nothing for war widows. Bitterness regarding these policies went even deeper, however; one man told me "the British people did not know how sorry we felt for the loss of these men." Nor did it seem to the bewildered and uninformed Malawians that the government, or the missions, understood what personal tragedy death brought to the villages. One man recalled the simple perceptions of his boyhood: "I had lost father and the family was in disorder." 38

Even apart from recruitment, fears, and death, the years of war were difficult ones for the villages of Malawi. African industry was turned to food production for the war effort, despite the great strains upon the fabric of African life. Although some military foodstuffs were drawn from local production from the very beginning of hostilities, greater attention was turned to these sources as the

³⁶Interviews: 68, Mr. Kili, 12 April 1973; 119, Village Headman Malomo, 7 August 1973. Questionnaire DZ/13, Mayi Nakhumayo Solofina (female), 13 April 1974. The Lindens mention nyau emphasis on cash payment, but do not connect it with the gratuities paid to bereaved families; Catholics, p. 131.

³⁷Interview 128, Mr. Sekapachanya, 20 August 1973.

³⁸ Interview 126, Karonga Nkhata, 10 August 1973.

continued importation of grain, particularly rice, was threatened. The maize production of the central plateau was tapped heavily, with great encouragement given there as elsewhere for the sale of all possible "surplus" to the government. ³⁹ In a few cases this surplus came to the government in the form of "voluntary" donations from chiefs and headmen, although these may not have appeared so voluntary to the farmers who grew the crops. ⁴⁰ In perhaps most instances payment was made, but that fact did not lessen the sense of undoubted obligation, even coercion, which many felt.

The government first made this obligation clear by requisitioning the entire 1916 rice crop and continued the trend in May 1917 appointing a food commissioner, to be replaced by a committee a year later. District residents, and in some places special agents, were empowered to buy as much grain as possible, and increased African cultivation of saleable crops was particularly encouraged. It was intended, throughout this period, that "no pressure should be used to try to force natives to sell grain as it is only the

³⁹ Nyasaland Times, 18, 39(30 September 1915), 3; Chief Secretary to Resident, Blantyre, 28 December 1915, M.N.A., NSB 1/2/3; "Record of service rendered by Chiefs and Headmen," Upper Shire district, 21 August 1916, M.N.A., NCN 1/1/3.

⁴⁰ Interview 135, Austin Manda, 12 September 1973; questionnaire MZ/28, Nkhweta Lupunga, 18 April 1974; Resident, Chinteche, to Chief Secretary, 16 May, 7 June, 4 October, and 6 October 1917, and 13 July 1918, M.N.A., NNC 1/1/1.

Nyasaland Government Gazette, 23(1916), 95; 24(1917), 141; 25(1918), 117. Interview 122, Olivia Tambala, 1 August 1973; questionnaire DZ/7, Jekapu Maponya, 9 April 1974. Acting Chief Secretary to residents, circular letter, 17 April 1918, M.N.A., NSB 1/2/5; Linden, Catholics, p. 109.

disposable surplus which is wanted." The chief secretary, however, made a mockery of such precautions by suggesting "capitaos at police wages" be used in Nkhotakota to ensure greater rice production in 1916-1917, an idea the resident rejected. Elsewhere, police did enter villages and seize crops, sometimes paying and sometimes not, occasionally leaving only a tax receipt.

Whatever_official policy, the government was widely believed, even in the European press, to have been "practically commandeering for military use all the available native [agricultura]] surplus." In such circumstances there was little question about accepting the prices set by the government, which were admitted to be "much below those at which such commodities can be purchased in other parts of Africa." Nonetheless, it was widely believed, and officially reported, that Malawians had "oversold" their produce due to high prices offered, an explanation relatively bankrupt in the face of the overwhelming pressures applied upon all concerned to meet military needs.

⁴² Nyasaland Times, 21, 21(23 May 1918), 2.

⁴³ Chief Secretary to Resident, Nkhotakota, 16 May 1916, with associated minute by resident, M.N.A., NCK 1/1/3.

⁴⁴ Questionnaires: TH/11, C.B. Chitofu, 27 September 1973; NC/2, Chief Chilooko, 13 April 1974.

⁴⁵ Nyasaland Times, 20, 23(7 June 1917), 2.

⁴⁶Nyasaland Protectorate, Annual Report of the Department of
Agriculture for the year ending 31st March 1917 (Zomba: Government
Printer, 1917), p. 4.

⁴⁷ Nyasaland Times, 20, 52(27 December 1917), 2; Nyasaland Protectorate, Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture for the year ending 31st March 1919 (Zomba: Government Printer, 1919), p. 2.

A similar situation obtained with regard to Malawian cattle. The greatest herds were in the northern highlands of the country, with some as well among the Ngoni of the Dowa/Lilongwe area. All of these herds were drawn upon from the earliest days of the war, both for slaughter and for transport purposes. As early as 1916 one report noted that in the North Nyasa district "slaughter cattle are practically exhausted," and a serious depletion of stock was evident by the middle of 1917. In these circumstances it was necessary to move herds overland, at first relatively short distances to the north, but later even through tsetse fly belts south to Neno and on to Blantyre.

As with foodstuffs, the government acknowledged paying low prices for the cattle, in part made possible by at least occasional excessive persuasion. Even so, the protectorate auditor was certain too much money had been expended on the purchases; he reasoned that perhaps some profiteering had taken place. This idea was also entertained by Livingstonia missionaries, who suspected that trusted African cattle buyers had been lining their own

Nyasaland Field Force, intelligence report no. 3, 1-20
January 1916, M.N.A., GOA 5/2/1; Nyasaland Times, 20, 22(31 May 1917), 3; interview 119, Village Headman Malomo, 7 August 1973. Questionnaires: MZ/32, Makwelero Mwanza, 25 September 1974; LL/6, Lauson Mwale, 9 April 1974; DW/9, Jasoni Mpotandebvu, 17 April 1974.

⁴⁹ Nyasaland Protectorate, Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture for the year ending 31st March 1918 (Zomba: Government Printer, 1918), p. 18. Questionnaire RU/11, Jonathan Mvalo, 18 September 1974; as a young cowherd, Mvalo participated in some of these drives.

Director of Agriculture to Acting Chief Secretary, 16 February 1920, copied in Smith to C.O., 8 March 1920, P.R.O., C.O. 525/88; Chiwona, "Northern Chitipa," p. 3; questionnaire DZ/10, Kasakamula Chirikutali, 11 April 1974.

pockets, buying at low prices from their countrymen and selling as high as possible to the <u>azungu</u>. The abuses were sufficient to cause a major shift in cattle purchasing after early 1918, involving government officials more directly. ⁵¹ By that time, however, most of the damage had been done. A few may have profited, but at the expense of others whose most valued possessions, their cattle, had been taken for cash payments even lower than an economy-minded food commissioner had intended.

The final figures submitted to the Colonial Office show that about 13,000 head of cattle were requisitioned for food during the war, although that number is probably inclusive of transport requirements as well. Vegetable produce included over 10,000 tons of maize and millet, and more than 1,000 tons of rice, all necessary to feed troops and carriers in the field. In addition some sheep and goats, and smaller quantities of wheat, beans, and groundnuts were taken for wartime consumption. Though long accustomed to production of food for exchange, the magnitude of such demands put an exceptionally heavy strain on African agriculture and dangerously depleted the livestock population. While insisting government had been "paying liberally" for commodities it had demanded, Hector

⁵¹ Auditor, Nyasaland, to Director of Colonial Audit, 22 February 1918, P.R.O., C.O. 525/81; Laws to Young, 18 March 1918, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 27; Nyasaland Protectorate, Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture ...1918, p. 4.

⁵²Duff to C.O., 27 January 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 525/82.

⁵³McCall to C.O., 11 June 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 525/87.

Duff acknowledged that "the money which we gave...in return was of little use at such a time." 54

With restrictions placed upon the sale of food, the money was even more limited in value, and Malawians had to depend upon their own production for immediate needs as well. The fear of some Malawians even to leave their homes to work in their fields was occasionally a difficulty, although the general depletion of the labor force was a more serious problem. Heavy burdens fell upon the women of the country; although many were accustomed to agricultural labor, in some areas the entire spectrum of village activities became their responsibilities. Particular duties were especially difficult, such as the trapping of wild animals to prevent ravaging of the gardens, tasks few women had ever before attempted. As one woman who was just emerging from girlhood during the war remembered, "Women were in trouble here in the villages."

To callous European observers, the problems of production which women faced were largely of their own making.

There are no men in the villages to press the women to work in their gardens, and the women are having a good time, never dreaming of working in their gardens, and all are expecting their husbands back with money to buy the food, and nobody is taking the trouble of producing. 50

⁵⁴ Duff, "Nyasaland in the World War," chapter eleven, I.W.M.

⁵⁵ Interviews: 42, Dorothy Liwewe, 28 December 1972; 68, Mr. Kili, 12 April 1973; 110, E.C. Banda, 15 August 1973; 111, Mugwinya Ngombe Nyirenda, 21 August 1973; 116, Amos Isaac, 14 July 1973. "Notes from Nyasaland," Central Africa, 36(1918), 45.

⁵⁶ Anonymous letter in <u>Nyasaland Times</u>, 21, 34(22 August 1918), 3.

While such behavior may have been true in isolated cases, it was certainly not widespread. Perhaps the critics were observing the attempts of women to use traditional labor-gathering devices as a means of coping with the current crisis. As part of the communal aspect of life in most Malawian societies, it had been the practice for individuals to brew sweet beer, prepare food, and offer it to anyone who would assist in the agricultural tasks. These activities were attempted in many parts of the country during the war, and could easily have been interpreted—especially the brewing of beer—as "having a good time" instead of working hard in the fields. 57

That impression was no doubt confirmed as communal farming efforts met with little success in a number of areas. This was less evident in the first two years of the war; but as the absolute local manpower shortage was increased during the expanded military operations of 1916, labor-gathering institutions were necessarily less effective. Missionaries early noted the decreased acreage under cultivation, a situation which continued into 1918. The natural effect was an absolute decline in African agricultural production, according to government calculations, the opposite of what was desired and had been planned. 58

⁵⁷Questionnaires: MZ/36, Lupofya Africa Mwale, 27 August 1974; MC/7, Verdiana Chamdimba (female), 19 April 1973; CR/5, Robert Katembo, 1 August 1974. Throughout the war, Europeans decried the use of grain for what Donald Fraser called "the enormous wastage in beer," apparently without realizing the purposefulness of at least some of the brewing; Fraser letter in Nyasaland Times, 20, 28(12 July 1917), 2.

⁵⁸Questionnaires: LL/2, Mr. Yohane, 8 April 1973; MC/2, Davide Maleka, 10 April 1973; DZ/16, Lilifodi Kadiguduli, 14 April 1974.

Labor was not the only problem which affected the growing of foodstuffs, nor was it the only one induced by the war. As the possibility of imports were reduced, Nyasaland experienced a shortage of hoes, essential implements which Malawians had come to expect from European sources rather than from their own iron smiths. By early 1917 this shortage was critical, and many anticipated that it would be a_serious detriment to cultivation. ⁵⁹ Initial efforts to meet the crisis focused on revival of the local African iron industry, and the results in some areas were encouraging to the government. Africans, however, recalled the tools they subsequently were expected to use as being most inferior and inefficient. ⁶⁰ The "industry," it would appear, also included the theft of iron--and especially of railroad spikes--which could be converted by talented smiths into the desired implements. ⁶¹ This shortage diminished by

Statement of Governor Smith to the Legislative Council, 9 March 1915, Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Nyasaland, 14th session (March 1915), p. 4; Laws to Resident, Karonga, 19 December 1916, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 25; H.E. Munby, Kota Kota station notes, Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 61 (October 1918), 10; Nyasaland Times, 21, 50 (12 December 1918), 2.

⁵⁹ Nyasaland Times, 20, 5(1 February 1917), 1; 20, 27(5 July 1917), 3. Questionnaire RU/3, D.Y. Mhango, 10 August 1974.

Acting Chief Secretary to residents, circular letter, 18 January 1917, and Resident, Chinteche, to Chief Secretary, 1 February 1917, M.N.A., NCK 1/1/4 and NNC 1/1/1. Questionnaire DZ/28, Dedele Chitsonga Mbewe, 20 April 1974.

Resident, Blantyre, to Chief Secretary, 23 January 1917, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/6; Laws to Storrs, 11 May 1918, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 27. Theft of the railway spikes ("sleeper keys") had occurred early in the war, and was especially noticed again during the hoe shortage; General Manager, Shire Highlands Railway, to Assistant Chief Secretary, 1 January 1915, M.R.A., and General Manager, Shire Highlands Railway, to Acting Chief Secretary, 3 May 1918, M.N.A., NSB 1/2/5.

mid-1918, with the receipt of imported hoes, but not before even this bizarre sidelight to the war had a hand in limiting the available foodstuffs. 62

Undoubtedly of greater significance were elements which bore no direct relationship to the world conflict, but which unhappily coincided with it. Most important was a complex of unusual weather conditions, particularly from 1916 onward, which had an adverse impact upon crops. 63 In the southern third of the country, rainfall fell below the usual volume in the 1915-16 season, and in the Shire highlands an abnormal late frost further reduced the yields of maize. 64 During the same season many northern portions of the protectorate experienced moderately high rainfall, followed in 1916-17 by even higher precipitation levels. The resultant runoff, and higher 1916-17 rainfall in the southern highlands and central plateaus, led to flooding along the lake and the middle and upper Shire. 65 These conditions produced floods on the lower river during the early part of the 1917-1918 season, damaging many fields. At that same time there was also insufficient rain on the central

Acting Chief Secretary to residents, circular letter, 18 June 1918, M.N.A., NSB 1/2/5.

⁶³Unless otherwise indicated, what follows is derived from details contained in crop prospects reports appearing in the Nyasaland Government Gazette during each growing season, November through April.

⁶⁴ Nyasaland Times, 19, 24(15 June 1916), 1; details of minimum temperatures in the highlands can be found in J.G. Pike and G.T. Rimmington, Malawi: A Geographical Study (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 60-61.

⁶⁵U.M.C.A. stations on the lake and river uniformly reported such conditions; Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 55(April 1917), 25, 28-9, 34; 56(July 1917), 16.

lakeshore and in the northern portions of the country; particularly hard hit was the large rice growing region around Nkhotakota.

These conditions—coming as they did on top of food requisitions, labor limitations, and agricultural implement shortages—led to ever increasing famine throughout the country. The hunger, as Malawians remember it, was noticeable in some areas after the shortfall harvests of 1916 and 1917. The seriousness of the situation was not widely evident, however, until well into the 1917-18 crop year, when the lack of sufficient food reserves from the previous seasons became widely felt. At that point the government felt compelled to act, officially declaring all the districts along the Shire and the southern lakeshore to be suffering from severe shortages of foodstuffs. 67

As the situation did not materially improve, agricultural officials intervened to set prices for the commercial sale of grain, as well as to make available additional supplies for government sale to Africans at or below the fixed price. Despite these measures, some Indian shopkeepers attempted to take advantage of continued demands for food, selling at well above the maximum rate. The conviction of several of these merchants for contravening posted

⁶⁶ Interviews: 106, Kildon Wajiusa, 2 August 1973; 121, Mr. Chabwinka, 21 July 1973. Questionnaires: ZA/9, Village Headman Jauma, 27 September 1973; CR/8, W.B. Mtambo, 7 August 1974; KS/3, Leonard Chitenjele, 12 April 1973. Chalmers to Hughes, 21 August 1916, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 25; Eustace Malisawa, Lugwena station notes, Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 51(April 1916), 21; Nyasaland Times, 20, 21(24 May 1917), 3.

^{67&}lt;sub>Nyasaland Government Gazette</sub>, 24(1917), 323-4.

regulations may have protected Malawians from undue exploitation, but did little to relieve the famine. 68 The continued shortage of food in the villages did, in fact, 'militate against a good native crop' in the 1917-18 season, and led to considerable fears for future crops as well. 69

Although they well remember government efforts to alleviate the famine, Malawians did not passively accept the hunger and wait for assistance. It would appear that a few tengatenga attempted to deal with the problem by absconding with some of the grain they were to carry to war, bringing it instead to their hungry relatives at home. The following the foods for those in short supply. In some places along the lake, fish became more a staple than an ancillary portion of the diet, although in some quarters the increased lake levels also disrupted fishing and decreased the size of the catch.

The primary substitutions, however, were of other grains and grasses, fruits, and roots, all pounded to make flour when maize and cassava were not available. On the eastern lakeshore, millet (mapemba) had long been used as a maize substitute and was counted

⁶⁸ Nyasaland Government Gazette, 25(1918), 9-10; Nyasaland Times, 3(17 January 1918), 2, and 21, 21(23 May 1918), 3; Linden, Catholics, p. 110.

⁶⁹ Nyasaland Times, 20, 45(8 November 1917), 3; A.C. Churchward, Likwenu station notes, Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 60(July 1918), 20.

⁷⁰ Questionnaire KS/8, Mr. Chilunga, 13 April 1974.

⁷¹ Interview 133, Alufeyo Banda, 8 September 1973; questionnaire LK/9, Y.S. Malibisa, 6 September 1973; H.E. Munby, Kota Kota station notes, Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 61(October 1918), 10.

on during the shortage. Its availability was limited, however, and many people in the southern lakeshore and the Shire highlands turned to the collection of wild grass seeds to provide the otherwise absent flour necessary for the preparation of the staple nsima. To the central region, and undoubtedly the north as well, banana (nthochi) flour was frequently utilized, as it had been in the past during times of extreme need; so were sweet potatoes (imbatata), boiled and eaten in place of porridge. Evidence of the extreme nature of the food shortage in a few places is the reliance upon flour made from wild roots (<a href="name="nam

Officials who noted this practice rightly concluded that drastic measures on the part of government might be required; likewise, military authorities were anxious to find even more food to meet the constant shortages in the field. Beyond the calls, and requirements, for greater African agricultural production, the response was slow in coming. Governor Smith finally suggested, in a special May 1917 message, that greater sacrifice was called for on the part of all aspects of the community. European farmers, as a result, resolved to cut back planting of their export crops and put twenty-five

⁷² Questionnaire CR/7, Chimbonda Chiwala, 7 August 1974; E.W.C. Horner, Monkey Bay station notes, Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 51 (April 1916), 29; R.A. Russell, Malindi station notes, Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 60 (July 1918), 17. Jessie Williamson, Useful Plants of Malawi (Zomba: Government Printer, 1972), p. 111.

^{73&}lt;sub>Questionnaires:</sub> DW/6, Mr. Jombo, 16 April 1974; DW/11, Mlumbwila Thantwe, 18 April 1974. Williamson, <u>Useful Plants</u>, pp. 34, 57, 69, 84.

percent of their total acreage into maize, and perhaps beans, for the war effort. As their land constituted some of the most fertile areas of the protectorate, much was expected of their efforts. ⁷⁴

The outcome of this voluntary effort during the 1917-18 season, however, was very disappointing, and the shortages had increased. In July 1918 the governor acted to empower the food production and collection committee to require plantation owners to keep a quarter of their cultivable land in maize. The planters objected strongly, insisting that military labor demands had made the recruitment of necessary field workers virtually impossible; even high wages to attract men and the employment of women still left the estates short-handed. In turn, the government offered to assist in the provision of labor, with the proviso that an additional acre of grain be planted for each new worker so obtained. With an agreement reached on those terms, the food committee moved forward, demanding the full twenty-five percent of estate acreage to be sown in food crops to meet military needs; it was to prove a fortuitous move. 76

Famine, despite all attempts to ease its affects, certainly intensified the trauma of war, as did the serious outbreaks of disease which struck the country. In 1915 the principal medical

⁷⁴ Northey to Smith, 23 April 1917, M.N.A., GOA 2/3/1; Nyasaland Government Gazette, 24(1917), 141; Nyasaland Times, 20, 22(31 May 1917), 3.

^{75&}lt;sub>Nyasaland Times</sub>, 21, 28(11 July 1918), 2, and 21, 37(12 September 1918), 3; questionnaire TH/1, Mr. Maphazi, 21 April 1973.

^{76&}lt;sub>Nyasaland Times</sub>, 21, 43(24 October 1918), 4, and 21, 45(7 November 1918), 2; interview 25, Disi Katita, 13 August 1972.

officer was moved to declare that the health of the protectorate was bad, due primarily to the war. The greater mobility of the African population was one important factor, as well as the greater than normal shortage of medical and allied health personnel. At least twice the cases reached epidemic proportions in some areas, serious enough for the promulgation of strict epidemic and contagious disease rules and their application, in 1915, to Lilongwe and Dowa districts, and in 1917 to both North and West Nyasa districts. Restricting as they did the usual lively intercourse within the country, while allowing the wartime traffic to continue, these regulations are remembered with at least some bitterness. 77

Smallpox, the great scourge of African village life, was a serious problem throughout the war years. Only forty cases were recorded in 1914, and only one death as a result. But with the rapid spread of the disease in Lilongwe, Dowa, and elsewhere in the central region, the 1915 figures showed that well over three thousand individuals contracted smallpox, and nearly a third of those died. In 1916 and 1917 outbreaks continued, but the total number of cases decreased by more than a thousand each year with even fewer deaths, despite the appearance of the disease in several other portions of the protectorate. ⁷⁸ The trend, however, could not be

⁷⁷ Smith to C.O., 27 November 1916, P.R.O., C.O. 525/69; Nyasaland Government Gazette, 22(1915), 174, and 24(1917), 285, 298. Questionnaires: LL/8, Alena Banda (female), 16 April 1974; DW/7, Paulo Golovana Fulatira, 17 April 1974.

⁷⁸Smith to C.O., 10 November 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 525/84; North Nyasa district Annual Report, 1916/17, M.N.A., NNK 2/1/2. Interview 119, Village Headman Malomo, 7 August 1973. Questionnaires: NC/7, Jonasi Zaonde, 10 August 1974; NC/18, George Manage, 27 August 1974.

maintained in a population weakened by famine, regardless of the precautions taken; six thousand cases were registered for 1918, spreading along the lakeshore and into the southern highlands.

Intensive vaccination campaigns in some areas, particularly in the Shire highlands, may have had at least a limited effect, as the number of deaths did not increase proportionately. 79

The other epidemic, so defined by the government, was of bubonic plague, occurring in the northernmost districts of the protectorate. First noticed in November 1916, thirty-seven cases were "authenticated" in the next five months, with a death rate running well over fifty percent. In terms of the Malawian population, the situation was not nearly so serious as that involving smallpox further south. The area which was infected, however, was on the main supply route for Northey's forces. As a result, immediate measures were taken; in addition to the usual quarantine provisions, a rat kill was organized in hopes of removing the major source of infection. Although more than two million rats were destroyed in the two years of the campaign, several cases of plague were reported each year from 1917 to 1919, usually at the end of the dry season. 80

⁷⁹Smith to C.O., 10 November 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 525/84; Laws to Innes, 14 February 1918, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 27; H.E. Munby, Kota Kota station notes, <u>Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle</u>, 61 (October 1918), 9; <u>Nyasaland Times</u>, 21, 43(24 October 1918), 3.

⁸⁰ Smith to C.O., 14 January 1918 and 19 January 1920, P.R.O., C.O. 525/78 and C.O. 525/88; October 1919 North Nyasa district monthly report, M.N.A., S 1/1172/19.

Although plague and smallpox were the most serious of the diseases to strike Nyasaland up to 1918, there were others. Beriberi was reported early in 1916 in the region of Ngara, east of Nkhotakota. During 1917 cerebro-spinal meningitis was discovered among the German askari in the Zomba prisoner-of-war camp; fears that it would spread to the African population of Zomba district were largely unfounded. In the same year, however, there were a number of typhoid and typhoid-like cases near Zomba. In Mombera's district, Donald Fraser noted that some of the returning tengatenga had brought a near-epidemic of dysentery. ⁸¹ The latter was, perhaps, a precursor of the most serious health problem to face the country as a result of the war, the world-wide influenza pandemic which for Malawians coincided with the end of the conflict.

The governmental response to these epidemics and other serious occurrences of disease was, during wartime, necessarily limited.

Nearly all the doctors in the protectorate, whether in official service or connected with the missions, were taken into the army.

Many of the nurses, as well, were required for work in military hospitals, along with most highly skilled African medical orderlies.

82 Training of paramedical personnel, too, focused on the demands of the troops. As a result, the African quarantine guards, plague capitaos, and others assigned to help in the crises were

⁸¹ Chief Secretary to Resident, Nkhotakota, 16 March 1916, M.N.A., NCK 1/1/3; Nyasaland Times, 20, 15(12 April 1917), 1, and 20, 16(19 April 1917), 1; Fraser, Autobiography of an African, p. 207.

⁸² See Wigan, "Medical Work," p. 38.

inadequately prepared for the difficult tasks they faced. Their numbers were also limited, and some infected areas did not receive even a small measure of attention.

In such circumstances, many Malawians felt little attention was paid to their real and legitimate needs. Often the quarantine guards, with a great deal of authority over the movement of individuals in and about areas where smallpox and plague were epidemic, were unable to resist temptations to abuse their powers. Plague capitaos, responsible for supervising and paying for the destruction of rats, occasionally may have used their positions to enrich themselves.

And where these African agents of government did not appear, although disease was rampant, the populace was aware of being overlooked--except for the continuous demands for more men and greater food production. 83

Reflecting the common attitude, one informant insisted that "the government couldn't think of anything else but the war." ⁸⁴

These efforts, it seemed to many, left little time for attention to the affairs of Africans in the villages, while Europeans still in the protectorate obviously were making out very well. The contrast was not lost upon Malawians who not infrequently likened it to the demands for taxes, which also seemed to bring them few apparent

⁸³ Questionnaires: LL/8, Alena Banda (female), 16 April 1974; DW/11, Mlumbwila Thantwe, 18 April 1974; NK/2, Zaidi Lipende, 3 April 1973; MZ/31, Frank Moyo, 18 April 1974. Smith to C.O., 10 November 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 525/84.

⁸⁴ Interview 128, Mr. Sekapachanya, 20 August 1973.

benefits. ⁸⁵ Perhaps more disappointing to many, though, were the European missionaries who were also caught up in the war, participated in it, and may have been seen to benefit from it. ⁸⁶ The conflict had become all-consuming, with a momentum of its own inexoribly dragging the African population along in its wake.

Although there were few, if any, Malawians who did not share in experiences of the war, for some the impact was far greater. Among these, only the askari and tengatenga directly knew the rigors of war. But even at home there were those who exposure to the conflict and its consequences was much more immediate. This was true especially in those areas where troops were stationed for extended periods and which formed the chief bases for training and the forwarding of men and material. These "impacted areas" ⁸⁷--the northern border, the southern lakeshore, and the Blantyre-Limbe environs--afforded the chief opportunities for Malawian civilians to come into direct contact with the war effort.

Being on the frontier with German East Africa, North Nyasa district was perhaps naturally drawn into the most intense wartime experience. The early engagements, at Karonga and Kasoa, amply

⁸⁵ Questionnaires: BT/1, Justus Mkwezalamba, 8 August 1973; MU/2, Canaan Mabvuto, 22 April 1973; MZ/6, Zacharia Kaiwananga Gondwe, 8 April 1973; RU/6, C. Mkandawire, 18 August 1974. Dupuis, "A Nobody in a Forgotten Campaign," chapter nine.

⁸⁶Interview 135, Austin Manda, 12 September 1973; questionnaire MZ/14, M. Mkandawire, 9 April 1974; Laws to F. Ashcroft, 24 May 1915, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 24.

⁸⁷I have adopted the term used by the American military to designate civilian areas where the military have made a particular impact.

demonstrated to the population the violence which they came to associate with the conflict. In some quarters they called it the chiwaya war, after the name given to the devastating machine guns which were first seen in action at Karonga. Of course, the fact of British victory produced an initial surge of confidence and popularity for the government. Likewise, the appearance in the district of the extremely ineffectual Ngoni spearmen from Mombera's served to bolster confidence in the population, whose memory of fierce Ngoni warriors represented their only previous experiences with total war.

Whatever confidence these early experiences may have generated were, to some extent, offset by the disruption the military operations caused. With troops marching and fighting through the bush, many were forced to flee their homes. The refugees, streaming south to Karonga and on down the lakeshore, constitute one of the most vivid memories of people from eastern areas of the district. Among these who fled from the frontier area was one group of about two hundred, led by their headman, who escaped from across the Songwe to settle at Hara, near Karonga, on the lake. ⁸⁹ For them, the violence was left behind, but not the war itself, as the Nyasaland Field Force began to assemble at Vua, Karonga, and some points further north.

Questionnaires: KR/5, Kapawike Mwalilino, 7 April 1973, KR/6, G. Mukwasi Nyirenda, 9 April 1973. Interview 181, Konsala Mwakisahi, 12 September 1973; MacKenzie, Spirit-Ridden Konde, p. 176; Young, "Nyasaland Operations," p. viii, S.M.L.

⁸⁹Questionnaires: KR/3, Amon M. Ng'ambi, 6 April 1973; KR/5, Kapawike Mwalilino, 7 April 1973; DR/8, Makanjira Chirwa, 11 April 1973. North Nyasa district Annual Report, 1914/15, M.N.A., NNK 2/1/2.

The camps seemed idle enough, with European officers and men seeking out local lads as servants, and some among the fresh South African and Nyasaland white forces joking about the absence of war. In the wartime lull, there were also attendant distractions which the nearby Livingstonia missionaries frequently decried. 90

For most in the district, however, the war was far from over. Although there were no major engagements until the invasion of German East Africa in May 1916, frequent German raids across the frontier harassed the African population. "These Germans were thieves at times," one man remembered bitterly. "You just heard that he was there and that he has stolen cows." The schutztruppe raiders did, in fact, steal cattle from British subjects across the Songwe, but also did much more. Occasionally, children were abducted, either for service or held for ransom. Chiefs were singled out and killed, as were Africans in British employ; at least one postal runner was captured, executed, and his mail pouch taken. Telegraph wires connecting Karonga with British outposts in Northern Rhodesia were frequently cut. British control of some areas were so tenuous that it was even reported the Germans were collecting Hut Tax in some areas of Nyasaland. 92

⁹⁰ Karonga Kronikal, 1, 1(n.d.), n.p., and 1, 2(n.d.), 5. Laws to H.T. Reynolds, 5 February 1917, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 25. Also see Letcher, Cohort of the Tropics, pp. 15-30.

⁹¹ Interview 89, Madi Wadi Selemani, 12 April 1973.

⁹²Chiwona, "Northern Chitipa," pp. 3-4; Young, "Nyasaland Operations," [p. x], S.M.L.; North Nyasa district Annual Report, 1915/16, M.N.A., NNK 2/1/2; Smith to C.O., 12 September 1914, P.R.O., C.O. 537/27; Laws to Stuart, 24 February 1915, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 24.

The terror which accompanied these operations was widespread, an effect which pleased the German officers. One of them noted proudly in his diary, "panics occur so easily with such nocturnal expeditions!" There were reports that British askari occasionally exploited the situation to plunder on their own, although these activities were undoubtedly limited. The Malawians whose homes were along the frontier fled into the hills to escape the devastations, often unable to take any possessions with them. Until April 1916, little was done by the British military forces to end the raids, and, contrary to some observations, they were not kept "within reasonable limits." The North Nyasa district resident was well aware of the continuing problems which the people under his charge faced. He recognized that "it would not be fair to the natives to demand payment of hut taxes," a measure which was about all a harrassed population could take cheer in. 95

Forced out of their homes, either as refugees along the lake or into temporary villages in the Misuku hills, North Nyasa residents were particularly effected by the shortages of food

⁹³Lieutenant Markgraff diary, 2 July 1915, (English translation), M.N.A., NVR 4/1/1. Markgraff was captured during the advance into German territory and his diary confiscated by a member of the Nyasa-land Volunteer Reserve.

⁹⁴ Young, "Nyasaland Operations," [p. ix], S.M.L.; Chiwona, "Northern Chitipa," pp. 3-4; Northey, "East African Campaign," p. 75; Laws to Captain Barton, 25 November 1914, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 24.

⁹⁵ North Nyasa district Annual Report, 1914/15, M.N.A., NNK 2/1/2. Interviews: 180, Isaac Mogha, September 1973; 182, Kennani Mwenebwisi, September 1973.

which confronted the entire country. The 1,500 who were temporarily residing around Karonga boma early in 1915 were given some food by the government, although there were official fears that even such aid might not avoid starvation. A few of the women were moved south, with intentions that they might remain at Livingstonia, but the plan failed to materialize due to dissatisfaction with it among the refugees. 96

To the west, in the hill country, those who had fled the German riads were also facing famine, but there was no government aid for them. Many suffered, and a number of children and elderly persons died from acute hunger. In desperation some turned to substitute foods, even eating what cassava leaves (<u>iciqwada</u>) were available, not as the usual side dish or relish, but as a staple. ⁹⁷ Cattle, of course, provided little additional food, as many were taken by the Germans or requisitioned by the British. Those that remained were driven away, south as ordered by government (to create a zone free from suspected rinderpest), or north into German territory once the invasion had begun. The killing of game, made possible by the suspension of hunting restrictions in 1917, was never an effective substitute. ⁹⁸

Questionnaire KR/8, Makajira Chirwa, 11 April 1973; North Nyasa district Annual Report, 1915/16, M.N.A., NNK 2/1/2; Laws to J. Riddle Henderson, 22 February 1915, and Laws to Baxter, 29 June 1915, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 24.

⁹⁷Chiwona, "Northern Chitipa," p. 3; questionnaire KR/7, Wilson Kapenda Simkonda, 9 April 1973; Williamson, <u>Useful Plants</u>, p. 80.

⁹⁸ Governor Smith's address, 9 March 1915, <u>Proceedings of the</u> Legislative Council of Nyasaland, 14th session (1915), p. 5;

Even as the war was carried into German East African after May 1916, and Karonga ceased to be a military base on 31 July of that year, problems still plagued the frontier district. Chief among these was the outbreak of bubonic plaque, a legacy of the constant carrier traffic which continued to pass through the region. The difficulties of that epidemic have been mentioned above, but it brought as well the only real advantage that the war bestowed on North Nyasa: the rat kill. Government offered to pay one-quarter pence for each rat destroyed, and by mid-1918 over one thousand pounds had been given out to diligent and efficient rat trappers. In one sense, they may have taken advantage of a government unable to police the program adequately: field rats, unaffected by the plague epizootic but easier to kill, constituted the vast majority of those rodents for whom the reward was claimed. 99 As angry as that made medical officers, it was little consolation to a population who rightly felt that they had borne the brunt of war.

Far removed from the front line at any time in the war, the area around Blantyre and Limbe was no less an impacted area during the course of the conflict. As the protectorate's largest area of European settlement, it naturally drew particular wartime attention.

Of first concern were the German subjects resident in Nyasaland, whose

questionnaire KR/9, Peter G. Mbisa, 15 April 1973; Nyasaland Government Gazette, 24(1917), 58.

⁹⁹North Nyasa district Annual Reports, 1916/17 and 1917/18, M.N.A., NNK 2/1/2; Laws to Chisholm, 9 June 1916, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 25; Dr. W.A. Lamborn to Principal Medical Officer, 1 December 1919, copy in Smith to C.O., 19 January 1920, P.R.O., C.O. 525/88.

continued freedom became a matter of anxiety to the town council, which seems to have feared, especially after the Chilembwe rising, that they might seek to influence the African population. As a result, internment camps were established, one for men, including European prisoners-of-war, and another for women and children (the latter on the grounds of Government House). While this isolation did remove German and Austrian subjects from public view, it also brought them into more initimate contact with at least some Malawians--those who accepted jobs working in the camps as cooks, orderlies, and the like.

Limbe, as the country's railhead, also attracted considerable attention. There the South African contingent raised for Nyasaland service first arrived in the country, and the motor transport units made their base. All these white troops spent at least some time in the Limbe and Blantyre area, and their presence was not always appreciated by the protectorate's settlers. "A rough & uncouth lot--Drink too much & many of them are absolutely untrained," observed the Rhodesian military commandant, General Edwards.

¹⁰⁰Blantyre Town Council minute books, 30 August and 27 September 1915, and 7 November 1916, M.N.A., Blantyre Town Council papers, BTC/2 (temporary classification). Nyasaland Government Gazette, 22 (1915), 128-30, and 23(1916), 164-5; Duff, "Nyasaland in the World War," chapter nine, I.W.M. There was also a camp for German askari prisoners-of-war near Zomba and another facility at Dowa, though both seem to have been of less local importance than the facilities in Blantyre; Smith to C.O., 9 May 1917, P.R.O., C.O. 525/73; Nyasaland Government Gazette, 21(1914), 262-4; questionnaire DW/2, A.B. Mazuma, 9 April 1973.

¹⁰¹ Edwards to Chaplin, 5 October 1915, N.A.R., F.D.P. Chaplin papers, CH 8/2/1; also Northey to C.O., 7 February 1916, P.R.O., C.O. 525/66.

They were not always as careful in dealing with Africans as the Nyasaland Europeans would have liked, and were responsible for initiating and spreading one of the more fantastic rumors of the war, that General Smuts and 14,000 British troops had surrendered in abject defeat. Such people were clearly not the sort whom the government felt offered good examples for Malawians, and were it not for their role in the defense of the country they should have been most unwelcome. 102

Of much more importance, though, was the stationing after 1917 of a number of training and leave battalions of the King's African Rifles, and the Cape Corps, at points around the city. Not wanted, and just barely tolerated, these camps ringed the two towns; the location of the Cape Corps depot, on the Mudi river, was particularly galling to the European inhabitants of Blantyre. These men were to be bivouacked on the community's water supply! 103 There were, of course, more serious consequences. One of these, still remembered by some Africans, was a large explosion and fire in July 1917, at the 3/1 K.A.R. training base in Limbe, caused by an untrained askari carelessly tossing away a cigarette while on guard duty at a gasoline storage area. Fortunately, the flames were contained

Assistant Resident, Blantyre, to Chief Secretary, 24 May 1916, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/5; Blantyre district Annual Report, 1918/19, M.N.A., NSB 7/3/3. Some of this feeling, though with regard to Zomba, was captured in fiction by Owen Letcher, Cohort of the Tropics, pp. 8-9.

¹⁰³Blantyre Town Council minute books, 24 September 1917, M.N.A., Blantyre Town Council papers, BTC/2 (temporary classification); Nyasaland Times, 20, 24(14 June 1917), 1; questionnaire BT/9, Mary Tippa, 14 August 1974.

and little additional damage, beyond the military camp, was done. 104

Whatever the impact such happenings in and around the military encampments may have had upon both European and African populations. it was in the disruption of village life that the troops had their greatest impact on Blantyre, Limbe, and the surrounding areas. The Blantyre resident described the effect as being "prejudicial, the presence of large numbers of highly paid askari, the majority of whom had not their wives with them, encouraging harlotry and every form of irregular union." Women would come to the camps to sell grain and not infrequently beer, often remaining after their wares were sold. Complaints were loudly voiced by African men and their chiefs, but the resident and his staff felt there was little they could do, hoping the military officers would deal with the problem. Colonel W. J. T. Shorthose, commanding a Ugandan K.A.R. battalion, officially suggested that licensed prostitutes be authorized for his men. The idea, supported by the resident, was rejected by secretariate officials; no alternative was even suggested. 106

^{104&}quot;Proceeding of a Board of Officers... nquiring into a fire which occurred at Limbe on the 22nd July, 1917, by which 1773 cases and 1270 drums of petrol were destroyed," in Smith to C.O., 26 November 1917, P.R.O., C.O. 525/75; Namonde, "The Story of Twaya Namonde," p. 52.

¹⁰⁵Blantyre district Annual Report, 1918/19, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/8.

Blantyre district Annual Report, 1917/18; Resident to Acting Chief Secretary, 23 March 1918; September 1918 Blantyre district monthly report; Wade to Triscott, 19 October 1918; Triscott to Wade, 21 October 1918; all M.N.A., NSB 2/2/7 and NSB 7/3/3.

In the absence of any real policy, the situation only deteriorated. Feelings ran high, both in the soldiers' camps and in the villages. To avoid trouble, the resident did "warn local natives against allowing their women to travel alone on roads near Limbe." But regardless of the effort, there were a number of confrontations between askari and local men, the most serious an August 1917 rampage by some ex-German askari of 3/1 K.A.R. in which one villager was killed and a number injured. Although one of the offenders was executed and eighteen imprisoned, the problems did not totally subside. A year later a "prostitute" was killed near the 1/4 K.A.R. camp, but no case could be made to bring anyone to trial. 108

In the circumstances, any absences from the military compounds were not only treated as serious breaches of discipline, but were also of grave concern. Courts-martial were regularly convened to deal with the offenders, and special courts of inquiry were also established to investigate the causes of frequent absence. Not all, it was discovered, were just absent without leave; some were simply deserters. Instructions were issued to chiefs and headmen to be especially watchful for these deserters, and several were in this way discovered and returned to their units for punishment. 109

¹⁰⁷ July 1917 Blantyre district monthly report, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/7.

August 1917 and May 1918 Blantyre district monthly reports; Blantyre district Annual Report, 1917/18; M.N.A., NSB 2/2/7 and NSB 2/2/8. Barton diaries, notebook 40, 27 August and 28 September 1917, M.N.R.

^{1092/4} King's African Rifles war diary, 8 February 1918, P.R.O., W.O. 95/5331. Malawi Department of Antiquities Oral Records, NC 1, Chief Symon, n.d.

Compared to the impact of the war in Karonga, the effects in Blantyre and Limbe were more on the order of annoyances. They were, however, not of the type which brought many tangible benefits. Only around the southern lakeshore were there many obvious rewards to be gained from the war. These benefits resulted from the great concentration of troops which were often found there, ready to be moved elsewhere, and the use of the Bar (where the lake and the Shire met) as the staging area for most supplies going to the Nyasaland-Northern Rhodesia Field Force. It was here, too, that most Malawians came into contact with the majoni, white South African soldiers who had come to join the Field Force. The result was a not infrequent carnival atmosphere which was collapsed only in the closing year of the war.

Once reinforcements began arriving to aid in the defense of the protectorate, and preparations were underway for the invasion of German East Africa, there were many jobs to be had all around the southern end of the lake. Men were required for loading supplies on ships carrying the provisions to the north; others served in the building and maintenance of facilities to house the troops in transit through the region. Men were required, too, for training in various skills necessitated by the war: as mechanics, signallers, storekeepers, and as the more traditional domestics. The latter

¹¹⁰ Interviews: 169, James Mbalazo, 1 September 1973; 171, Western Kamwendo, 17 September 1973.

Ill Interview 72, Chionda Alidi, 1 April 1973; questionnaire MA/2, Master Koma-Koma, 13 April 1974; conversation with Mrs. G.H. Snowden, 27 June 1974; E.W.C. Horner, Monkey Bay station notes, Nyasaland

category attracted many boys--too young for other service--but willing to try their hand at being cooks and orderlies not merely to European officers, but also to the private soldiers. "Even quite small boys are able to find odd jobs," reported a U.M.C.A. missionary. "They have gone ku-ngondo [it. to war], as they say with pride at home in the village."

The impact of these experiences, most especially on the young lads, worried the missionaries. "The temptation for the boy is great. Alas, too, sometimes they learn from the soldiers things which are not good, and so they are led into sin." That interpretation, however, was not always shared by Malawians, who saw the experience as one of adventure and opportunity. They found the majoni, though South Africans, to be easy-going and friendly, especially in master/servant relationships. "These majoni also worked for the British; they were slaves like us," one man explained. "This time it was a slave working for a fellow slave. But they were not cruel; they were friendly." Too, the new influx of jobs meant money, and often high wages, sufficient not only to attract

Diocesan Chronicle, 51 (April 1916), 29; A.T. [sic] Matthew, anniversary speech, Central Africa, 36(1918), 145

¹¹² G.H. Wilson, Mponda's station notes, <u>Nyasaland Diocesan</u> Chronicle, 52(July 1916), 21; interview 75, Village Headman Makumba, 3 April 1973; conversation with Mr. W.H. Gresty, 27 April 1974.

^{113&}quot;Our African Boys," Central Africa, 35(1917), 286.

¹¹⁴ Interview 72, Chionda Alidi, 1 April 1973.

those from villages near the Bar but from much further afield as well. 115

Nor were Malawian men the only ones attracted by the new experiences and the explosion of wealth which encompassed the southern lakeshore. Women also looked for ways to profit from the new situation, and it was not difficult to discover the activities which produced the greatest rewards. In the euphemistic language of the missionary G. H. Wilson, "one saw only too sadly how fatal these temptations [of village life] were to many a white man, with a thousand years of Christianity behind him." The women who constituted those temptations were, of course, also tempted. One female informant from the southern lakeshore recalled that "women were going for the majoni for two reasons, to make money, and just to know what type of people they were, but mostly money." Malawian men had mixed feelings about such liaisons, but were surprisingly understanding of their women's motives.

¹¹⁵ Matthew, anniversary speech, p. 145; H.E. Munby, Kota Kota station notes, Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 60 (July 1918), 11; conversation with Mr. S. Chindambo, 15 July 1974.

¹¹⁶ G.H. Wilson, A Missionary's Life in Nyasaland (London: U.M.C.A., 1920), p. 81. The government attempted to forestall such activities with the passage of the Protection of Women Ordinance (1915) which formally outlawed prostitution, but predictably did not make it a crime for a man to pay a woman over the age of twenty, as long as no force or fraud were involved; Nyasaland Government Gazette, supplement to 22(1915), pp. 5-6.

¹¹⁷ Interview 73, Manamu Abiti Mbali, 1 April 1973.

¹¹⁸ Interviews: 71, Harold Manawa, 1 April 1973; 72, Chionda Alidi, 1 April 1917; 79, Mlekano Wadi Kalisinje, 4 April 1973.

Such close contact with Europeans by all sections of the African community had an affect noticeable all around the southern end of the lake. "War, we are continually told, is a great leveller," mused the U.M.C.A. missionary at Malindi. 119 What he had in mind. however, was probably not the intimate relationships which led Africans to speak of the majoni "not as enemies, but as friends." 120 His conception was more of the continued high-spirited interactions which occasionally took place at Malindi, a rest station for less seriously wounded Europeans, and elsewhere. Games of football, enthusiastically enjoyed by all, were a part of this ambiance, as were some rather small hunting expeditions, and donations of labor as well as money for the reconstruction of the Malindi African hospital which had been destroyed by fire. 121 The "sins" in this interaction were certainly not foremost in his mind. As did many Malawians, though, he may have felt the lower class South Africans did bring an epidemic of theft, a crime little known in the area before their arrival. 122

¹¹⁹ R.A. Russell, Malindi station notes, <u>Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle</u>, 56(July 1917), 13.

¹²⁰ Interview 71, Harold Manawa, 1 April 1973.

^{121&}lt;sub>T</sub>. Hannay, Mponda's station notes, <u>Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle</u>, 50(January 1916), 26; Arthur J. Beet, "South African Troops at Malindi," <u>Central Africa</u>, 35(1917), 103-108; U.M.C.A. <u>Report for 1918</u> (London, U.M.C.A., 1919), p. xvii.

¹²² Interviews: 62, McPhail Issa Kadewere, 3 February 1973; 89, Madi Wadi Selemani, 12 April 1973. Nyasaland Times, 21, 40(3 October 1918), 2; conversation with Mrs. G.H. Snowden, 27 June 1974. Similar problems with theft were reported for a brief time at Zomba; Nyasaland Times, 20, 48(29 November 1917), 3.

All of this activity, however assessed, lent a part to the circus atmosphere in the region. But there was much more, too. "Motor-cars! Motor-bicycles! and motor-lorries run to and fro along the road. Excitement is in the air." There was also the excitement of an airplane which landed near Fort Johnston and was seen "moving gracefully" all around the southern lakeshore. This reaction, though, may have been somewhat muted by the biplane's later crash north of Malindi, an event which many Malawians viewed as not in the least unexpected. Nonetheless, they cheerfully gathered around to direct the pilot to the mission, right the craft, and assist in sending it off again. 124

The seriousness of war was not always evident in the carnival atmosphere which permeated the area. When the German spy and potential dynamiter, Ndelemani, was executed at Fort Johnston, some people made it an occasion for special celebration. They taunted the man, dancing about the tree where he was tied, right up to the time of his execution. 125 It was just as likely that the light-hearted should be the subject of serious concern; the Malawian missionary Eustace Malisawa reported from his station on the eastern shore of

¹²³G.H. Wilson, Mponda's station notes, <u>Nyasaland Diocesan</u> Chronicle, 52(July 1916), 21.

¹²⁴ G.H. Wilson, Mponda's station notes, <u>Nyasaland Diocesan</u> Chronicle, 56(July 1917), 15; Walmsley, <u>Flying and Sport</u>, pp. 240, 246; conversation with Mrs. G.H. Snowden, 27 June 1974.

¹²⁵ Questionnaire MA/10, Bwanali Mdala, 18 July 1974.

the lake:

We were very much made afriad for a ball fell from the the south, and we were afraid for it is a time of war and we did not know the meaning of it but we said as it is a wonderful thing from heaven and it was a boy who saw it named Gabriel...! sent it to the chief capitao to show it to him and he did not know meaning of it and so I wrote a letter to the Resident at Fort Johnston and I sent two boys with it to Resident Armbruster and...he wrote me letter to let me know that it was only a golf ball that the English use to play with. 126

Playing, and playing at war, seemed to be the order of things around the southern tip of Lake Malawi, probably accounting for the usually favorable impressions of the war people of the area often still hold.

Among the few attempts to break through this atmosphere of excitement were some of the actions considered by the Fort Johnston Town Council. The small community was overwhelmed by the war and all that it brought, and sought to instill some sense of normalcy. The council was asked to establish a fixed African "location," or segregated community, outside the town; it was intended to separate the casual African labor, which was attracted by wartime jobs, from the established centers of community life. The attempt was unsuccessful and finally rejected as impractical. Likewise, an effort late in the war to prevent the burial of a Cape Corps colored soldier in the town's European cemetery was set aside, a complication arising from the war for which no one was prepared. 127

¹²⁶ Eustace Malisawa, Lungwena station notes, Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 52(July 1916), 18-19.

¹²⁷ Fort Johnston Town Council minutes, 1 September 1915 and 7 August 1918, M.N.A., NSF 2/1/1.

Trivial matters such as those the council considered could not bring out the seriousness of the situation when spirits ran high.

Nor was there much of the hunger, or disease, which haunted many other Malawian centers during the course of the conflict. Not even threatened German invasions of the protectorate, believed aimed at the Mangoche/Fort Johnston region, dampened spirits. The scares were little believable after the December 1914 fiasco, and the concentration of troops in the area was nothing new and therefore caused little alarm. In fact, the threats were probably not much more than German propaganda sputterings, an eventuality more appreciated at the War Office in London than among Nyasaland's military and civilian officials. 128

Only as the war wound to a close in the last months of 1918, did the southern lakeshore come to appreciate the conflict's implications, as had much of the rest of the country. It was then that troops, war-weary after months of hard marching and fighting, came to Mangoche and other camps to rest and to hope the war would somehow end before they were once again off to the front lines. 129 Carriers, too, began to return in large numbers, very many of them so ill they could not continue on to their homes. Thousands of

¹²⁸ Smith to C.O., 21 March 1917, with associated Colonial Office minutes, P.R.O., C.O. 525/72; NORFORCE, Njombe, to BASE, Zomba, 4 May 1917, M.N.A., GOA 1/2/2; 3/1 King's African Rifles war diary, 10 December 1917, P.R.O., W.O. 95/5396.

¹²⁹ Brelsford, Northern Rhodesia Regiment, p. 46; Nyasaland Times, 21, 24(13 June 1918), 3.

tengatenga were confined to hospitals at Fort Johnston and the Bar, and the disease which they and the askari carried with them began to infect the local people. 130 The greatest realization, though, came with the casualties—the dead and seriously wounded—who came down the lake on their way to burial or to hospital in Zomba. So frequently did the largest of the lake craft, the <u>Guendolen</u>, appear at the Bar on such missions that she came to be known sadly, there and elsewhere, as <u>chitenga maliro</u>, the bringer of mourning. 131

Even in this region, the most advantaged of the impacted areas, the harsh realities of the war finally punctuated the excitements which it also brought. Then, like Malawians everywhere, those of the southern lakeshore—and of the northern frontier and the Blantyre/Limbe area—found little to cheer about in the conflict and its consequences. Even with an end to the fighting, there were sorrows, as men crippled in mind and body struggled home, and a new devastation, influenza, swept the land.

¹³⁰ Laws to Stuart, 6 May 1918, M.N.A., Livingstonia Mission papers, letter book no. 27; Kota Kota Mission diary, 8 September 1918, M.N.A., U.M.C.A. papers, KO 1/1/2.

¹³¹ Questionnaire RU/9, Matthew Mzumara, 11 September 1974.

CHAPTER SIX: NOT A COMPLETE PEACE

Unlike the impressions of some in the impacted areas, most
Malawians only saw the continuing hardships of war and wondered
when it would end. In fact, operations involving Nyasaland forces,
and directed from the protectorate and neighboring Northern Rhodesia,
continued longer than on any other front in the world; General von
Lettow-Vorbeck, long out of touch with Europe, could not comply with
the armistice until 14 November 1918. Within Malawi itself, active
expressions of discontent over the prolonged hostilities were rare,
having been forestalled by the government's early decisive actions.
Rather, African opinion became at first resigned, and then
bewildered.

One unidentified headman in the Shire highlands wrote to Hector Duff, expressing what were very common views:

We natives know about war because in the old times there was much fighting in this country. ...But those wars were not like this war, for they finished quickly; only a few men died in them. Now this war has lasted perhaps three years—I don't know—and many men are dying, so we are wondering when the war will end because the women are alone, and there is hunger in our villages.

Sir Hector Livingstone Duff, This Small World of Mine (London: Nelson, 1936), pp. 245-6; Charles Miller, Battle for the Bundu (New York: Macmillan, 1974), p. 323. The armistice agreement made a special provision for the fighting in east Africa, authorizing an end to hostilities at any time up to thirty days after the effective date in Europe.

We are troubled about not being able to buy calico. It is said because of the war there is no calico now nor any hoes for digging in our fields; but we are thinking the Government will help us in this great difficulty...and that the English Governor will say to the German Governor 'You are beaten'; and so at once the war will stop.²

Ironically, it was almost exactly under those conditions, informed of the armistice in Europe, that von Lettow-Vorbeck and his tiny force finally-gave up. 3

The first Malawians to hear the news were those serving in military units and those on transport duty. As was the case throughout the world, the men who had borne the brunt of the war felt a tremendous exhilaration in the knowledge that the fighting had ended. Among the Northern Rhodesian Police, whose numbers included many Malawians, "the excitement and general feeling of relief [was] intense." At the 3/1 K.A.R. rest camp at Mangoche similar feelings were expressed, only more loudly, "with bugles blowing and rifles, machine guns, Lewis Guns, and Stokes Mortars firing." Among the more than 3,000 tengatenga then at the supply base at the Bar, and the hundreds more in civilian employ there,

²Quoted in Duff, "Nyasaland and the World War," appendix I/D, I.W.M. A somewhat different form of the letter appears in Duff, Africa Small Chop, pp. 187-8.

³von Lettow-Vorbeck, <u>Reminisences</u>, pp. 317-18.

⁴E.A. Russell, "The Last Phase of the East African Campaign, 1914-18," Rhodesiana, 17(1967), 47; this is an eye-witness account.

⁵Namonde, "Story of Twaya Namonde," p. 54; interview 170, Corporal Lipende, 14 September 1973.

celebrations were organized. These included competitive sports and the unusual provision of "a good ration of meat at night," a fitting way to end the hungry war.

Throughout the rest of the country the news spread less quickly. Around the European population centers, missionaries, district residents, and even majoni spread the word. At first, it seemed that the news brought little cheer, perhaps understandable in a population accustomed to relatively intense propaganda efforts from the government and those associated with it. One missionary, though, noted the armistice was much more readily understood when he informed members of his congregation that it would mean an end to tengatenga service. TiThe news means peace. A Nkhotakota missionary observed, adding in the same vein that "the final settlement is of small account" to the local people. 8 In the outlying areas, though, even assurances of an end to labor demands were not so easily given, as chiefs were relied upon to disseminate the information. The result was often the spread of further rumors in an environment already rife with that sort of interference to the usually reliable "bush telegraph." People sought more definite evidence, as did one man

⁶ Nyasaland Times, 22, 7(13 February 1919), 3.

⁷Interviews: 76, Amisi Saidi, 3 April 1973; 118, Petro Zeni-zeni, 6 August 1973; 126, Karonga Nkhata, 10 August 1973. A.C. Churchward, Likwenu station notes, <u>Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle</u>, 63(April 1919), 35.

⁸ The Armistice in Africa, Central Africa, 37(1919), 32.

who became convinced only when he could no longer hear the sounds of battle echoing across the lake and through the hills.

For most, the best evidence was the return of men who had been away on war work, in some areas the only clear information the people received. One was their return really overwhelming proof that the conflict had ceased. The problems of demobilization were enormous, and_doubly complicated as the appearance of influenza in Nyasaland coincided almost precisely with the end of the war. The carriers were sent home as soon as possible, though having been scattered over many long lines of communication, they seemed to their friends and relatives to arrive in a continual series of small groups. The discharged askari were even slower in returning to their homes, owing to an extended period of disbandment for the King's African Rifles and other battalions, carrying over to April 1919 in some cases. The ill and wounded, of course, had even longer to wait, despite their overwhelming desire to return to their homes, if even to die. 12

⁹Interviews: 66, Mrs. Useni Chisa, 10 April 1973; 116, Amos Isaac, 14 July 1973; 128, Mr. Sekapachanya, 20 August 1973.

¹⁰ Interviews: 113, Ham Nkhata, 25 August 1973; 119, Village Headman Malomo, 7 August 1973; 121, Mr. Chabwinkha, 21 July 1973.

¹¹ Questionnaires: DZ/20, Chimphalika Betha, 16 April 1974; NS/4, Zembezi Msangiza, 24 August 1973. Duff to C.O., 19 December 1918, P.R.O., C.O. 525/80; Nyasaland Times, 21, 47(14 November 1918), 2; Colonel Soames to Acting Chief Secretary, enclosed in Duff to C.O., 12 May 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 534/34.

¹² Laws to Resident, Karonga, 10 December 1918, M.N.A., Living-stonia Mission papers, letter book no. 27; "Maulana," pp. 208-9; questionnaire NC/9, Samueli Botolo, 15 August 1974.

ā		

When the men did appear, they seldom came as anything approaching conquering heroes, which undoubtedly contributed to uncertainties as to the outcome of the conflict. Unlike the warriors of past victorious campaigns, they brought few souvenirs or other rewards. Most of the really valuable booty had been taken by the European officers, although some men did try to conceal small items ranging from spoons to bullets, and occasionally even guns, to take home. Most of these things were seized during inspections prior to demobilization, and the few dangerous articles, such as guns, which did reach the villages were often as not sought out and confiscated. ¹³ In some cases even soldiers uniforms and carriers blankets were taken from them, usually to be burnt as a precaution against influenza. Although new clothing might be provided, seldom were new blankets issued, and men came home empty-handed. ¹⁴

Attempts were made to pay off numbers of the carriers so that they could at least take their wages with them, although these efforts were not uniformly successful. General headquarters in Dar es Salaam reported as late as March 1919 that there were 120,000 carriers on the rolls to whom money was owed and who could not be located.

¹³ Questionnaires: KR/4, Thomas Simwaba, 7 April 1973; KR/10, Village Headman Lameck Mwenitanga, 16 April 1973; NC/2, Chief Chilooko, 13 April 1974; NK/9, Village Headman Chipala, 18 April 1973. The continued African possession of guns was an especial concern of the government after the war; Acting Chief Secretary to residents, confidential circular letter, 3 April 1919, M.N.A., NCN 1/1/2.

¹⁴ Questionnaires: KR/8, Makanjira Chirwa, 11 April 1973; LL/3, Mr. Khwathali, 9 April 1973; DZ/42, Kumimba Chisale, 4 September 1974; NS/3, Johas Chiriwekha, 23 August 1973.

While it is likely few of these men were from Nyasaland, it seems certain that similar problems faced officials of the protectorate in their attempts to pay the tengatenga. Askari did receive what monthly salary was due them, and were thus able to return to their homes relatively well off. But the bulk of their financial rewards had already been paid, in previous monthly salaries and allotments for their relatives. War gratuities, which all registered soldiers were to receive, were not paid until several years later. ¹⁵ As one man later observed, he had only one truly valuable possession with which to return to his village: "The most precious thing is life; this I carried back home."

In the conditions under which some of the men, particularly carriers, were demobilized, it was difficult enough just to sustain life itself on the homeward journey. Without rest and proper food, many men suffered from dysentery or even influenza; however, there were simply insufficient facilities to care for any but the most seriously ill. Once officially dropped from the rolls, men were landed at ports along the lake and expected to trek inland to their villages; many others were discharged at Fort Johnston and sent overland to their homes, as far away as Karonga. Among the askari, the recruit battalions of both the first and second K.A.R. regiments

Officer Commanding, East Africa, to W.O., 22 March 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 534/38; Secretariat Memorandum, "King's African Rifles Gratuities No. 1," n.d. [probably about mid-1919], M.N.A., NSB 1/2/6.

¹⁶ Interview 11, Kakalala Phiri, 27 August 1973.

were held in camp until the influenza had run through the ranks, and then, weakened by the disease, they were discharged.

One woman recalled, as a girl working in her garden near Nkhotakota, having seen some of the men return home.

Most of them were very thin when they came back. They wore cloth made from sacks. They also had some sacks on their shoulders, probably those bags in which they were given magiwa maize flour. The few that came back on their way home took the old road to Ntchisi from here. If they found you digging out cassava and they found you there, they would ask you for a lot of cassava, and if you would be too lenient, all the cassava would finish. Even if the cassava was sufficient, they would still chew it as they went their way. As they went through Nkugi, they died as they went along. 17

All along the lakeshore, similar callous conditions prevailed. One informant recalled bitterly that he was sent out on foot, even though officials were aware that he had a badly swollen leg. Deaths were reported as men struggled to get to their homes beyond the escarpment. A few found their way into mission hospitals, often guided by total strangers who had taken sympathy with their plight. Even then, they all too frequently succumbed, and the missionaries who had nursed them were indignant. Robert Laws wrote officially, yet forcefully, about several such cases: "the discharge of men in such a condition with fatal results is a serious matter which needs to be inquired into."

¹⁷ Interview 42, Dorothy Liwewe, 28 December 1972.

¹⁸ Interviews: 70, Gogo Jumayani (female), 14 April 1973; 105, Diamond Caswell Chirwa, 1 August 1973; 130, Kagunda Chirwa, 1 September 1973.

¹⁹ Laws to Resident, Karonga, 24 November 1918, M.N.A., Living-stonia Mission papers, letter book no. 27; also see <u>Nyasaland Diocesan</u> Chronicle, 59(April 1918), 7.

There was only one official investigation of such conditions, and it may have been indirectly due to Laws' complaints, although it concerned a separate matter. The particular incident involved was the march of 1/2 King's African Rifles from Bismarkburg, in German East Africa, to Vua, on Lake Malawi. The column's two or three thousand carriers suffered tremendous hardships on the journey, were largely ignored by the medical officers, and those who were sick were whipped as punishment for being unable to carry on. The Karonga resident, F. J. T. Storrs, perhaps alerted by Laws' earlier complaint, was appalled at the situation, especially since carriers were falling out, hiding in the bush, even dying there, and exposing the local population to disease.

Storrs' direct appeals to the governor and other officials were spurned as "irregular," although an investigation was launched. The court of inquiry finally reported that the situation should have been improved upon, and the K.A.R. Commandant concluded that the battalion commander, Major Bevan, and the medical officer, as well as the assistant director of carrier transport, should share responsibility. Bevan, son-in-law of Governor Smith, defended himself by claiming ignorance of the condition of his tengatenga, even though his battalion war diary recorded they "were in a very

Material on this incident is derived largely from two sources; the first is a file, "Carriers, 1919-1921," in the Malawi National Archives (S 2/5/19) which contains much correspondence and several reports on the situation; the second, which includes the findings of a Court of Inquiry, is a dispatch and related enclosures from Governor Smith to the Colonial Office, 18 August 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 534/34.

· poor state, weak & emaciated." As was often the case with such investigations, the matter was dropped as the Colonial Office felt they would "get nothing useful out of it." 22

In fact, the only outcome of the entire affair, and others similar if not so blatant, was exactly that which had motivated the Karonga resident to action in the first place. "The people of this district," he had originally written, "are thoroughly upset when they see this scandalous and brutal treatment meted out to themselves and others."

Throughout Malawi this reaction colored the receptions which returnees received, and, of course, the general impressions of the end of the war. The result was a generally ambivalent feeling on the part of Malawians which, at least in some parts of the country, became submerged in a sort of large scale societal transition ceremony.

Of course, those who did manage to arrive home safely were warmly greeted. Women--many more than just wives and mothers--greeted the men with ululated expressions of joy. Animals were slaughtered and beer brewed; feasts were held in celebration.

"They were treated as if they had risen from the dead," recalled one man, perhaps drawing an analogy to the parable of the prodigal

²¹ 1/2 King's African Rifles war diary, 4 December 1918, P.R.O., W.O. 95/5331.

²²Minute by W.A. Bottomley, 13 April 1920, on Colonel G. Phillips, Commandant, K.A.R., to C.O., 27 February 1920, P.R.O., C.O. 534/39.

²³ Storrs to Duff, 10 January 1919, M.N.A., \$ 2/5/19.

• son. ²⁴ In some areas where relations between traditional rulers and their subjects were not seriously eroded, chiefs and headmen also welcomed the returned askari and carriers. They brought presents for the men and expected, in usual fashion, that they would receive comparable gifts in return. But above all was the relief that some, at least, had come home. ²⁵

Village eelebrations, though, were not just of joy. Often these were mixed with the traditional ceremonies of grief as well. For many, the end of the war brought the final realization that loved ones were, in fact, never going to return. Often local homecoming feasts were as well memorials to those who had died. The food often included ritual funeral fare, and the beer helped to drown sorrows. Songs and dances, too, were not just expressions of joy, but also of sadness. The intent, clearly, was to provide a means of bridging the difficult gap between years of war and the expected peace, "so we could forget about what happened at the war." So great were these desires, that occasionally funeral rites were begun too soon, and men returned to find relatives, believing them dead, engaged in ceremonies and feasts of mourning. ²⁶

Questionnaire DW/14, Filimoni Batileti, 12 August 1974. Also interview 51, Bamusi Selemani, 5 January 1973; and questionnaire DZ/45, Charlesi Mbemba, 13 September 1974.

²⁵Interviews: 13, Daisa Songolo, 17 August 1972; 14, Stambuli Likuleka, 17 August 1972; 26, Peter Nyimbiri, 13 September 1972. Questionnaire MZ/26, Mateyu Nyirenda, 17 April 1974.

²⁶ Interviews: 116, Amos Isaac, 14 July 1975; 71, Harold Manawa, 1 April 1973; 117, Village Headman Mpanangombe, 17 August 1973. Questionnaires: DZ/8, Village Headman Njati Phiri, 10 April 1974; DZ/18, Izeki Katsache, 15 April 1974.

A crucial aspect of this celebration seems to have been found, throughout Chewa areas, in the <u>nyau</u> dances. Long associated with the important transition ceremonies of death and female initiation, <u>nyau</u> roles were clearly expanding in the years just before and extending through the Great War. As I have indicated, the societies played an important part in resistance to military labor recruitment. At the end of the conflict, as had happened during the war, it was natural that the <u>nyau</u> dancers would perform at funeral ceremonies. ²⁷ Less expected, perhaps, but equally clear, the dances also were undertaken as a means of celebration, an expression of the victory which both death and homecoming marked in the special context of the war. The <u>nyau</u> became an expression of a greater kind of transition and, as such, marked a new and at least partially political role for the societies. ²⁸

In the hectic years of 1918 and 1919, such subleties were lost upon European missionaries, planters, and government officials. They were able, however, to discern the ambiguities felt by many Africans concerning the end of the war, especially in the wake of a difficult demobilization. The European newspaper caught the mood, urging "that the native mind should see some outward and visible sign of victory." Taking up the suggestion, the acting Governor requested

²⁷Interviews: 116, Amos Isaac, 14 July 1973; 119, Village Headman Malomo, 7 August 1973.

²⁸ Questionnaires: DW/7, Paulo Golovana Fulatira, 17 April 1974; NC/18, George Manage, 27 August 1974.

²⁹ Nyasaland Times, 21, 51(19 December 1918), 2. Africans were, in fact, concerned that the war might not really be over; interview 79, Mlekano Wadi Kalisinge, 4 April 1973.

and was authorized an expenditure of \$750 for "a certain amount of demonstration...to bring the fact of victory home to the native." In keeping with a decision made for the United Kingdom, peace celebrations in Nyasaland were scheduled and held on 16 July 1919.

Suggestions that the influenza epidemic might lead to curtailment of the programs met with great opposition, especially among the Africans. Thus, throughout the country people gathered at the district residencies for a day of rejoicing. Chiefs were honored for their part in the war, and veteran askari were often asked to pass in review. Games were organized for the amusement of all present, African and European, and in some cases food was provided as well. Dances were also a common feature, including the occasional introduction of new, military styled dance forms. These were borrowings from east Africa, brought to Malawi in the wake of the war, and would make a lasting impact on the protectorate. 32

The key feature of the celebrations, however, and the one which most clearly had the desired effect upon Malawians, was a series of bonfires on hills throughout the country. "They just lit fire all over the highest hills in the world," recalled one man. 33 Another

³⁰Minute by W.A. Bottomley, 28 January 1919, on Duff to C.O., 23 January 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 525/82.

Nyasaland Government Gazette, 26(1919), 164; Kota Kota mission diary, 19 July 1919, M.N.A., U.M.C.A. papers, KO 1/1/2.

³²H [enry] E. M [unby], "Peace Rejoicings at Kota Kota," <u>Central Africa</u>, 37(1919), 165-6. Interviews: 74, Anusa Makumba, 2 April 1973; 132, Reuben Longwe, 8 September 1973; 135, Austin Manda, 12 September 1973. Questionnaire LL/1, Miss Sayamika Nabnda, 5 April 1973.

³³ Interview 89, Madi Wadi Selemani, 12 April 1973. Also interviews: 110, E.C. Banda, 15 August 1973; 116, Amos Isaac, 14 July 1973.

remembered them as a final and positive confirmation that the war was over, indicating "happiness and success on the side of the British." The use of fire as a sign of victory was extremely apt. Among Chichewa-speaking peoples in Malawi, fire had long been an indicator of transition, and could widely be interpreted as "a symbolic statement about the beginning of a new era." In such a context, fire might also be associated with the transitional importance of nyau ceremonies. Though they may not have intended to do so, and there is no clear evidence to suggest such a conscious realization, the European celebrations were likely taken as confirmation of the newly significant and enlarged role of the nyau societies.

Despite the symbols of a transition, for most Malawians "the end of the war was not a complete peace. There was another battle to fight, and that was the diseases brought by the people who had been to war." Although not a result of the end of the war, some people may have felt the continued smallpox epidemics of 1919 were a part of continuing difficulties. 8 Certainly, venereal disease

³⁴ Interview 79, Mlekano Wadi Kalisinje, 4 April 1973.

³⁵ J.M. Schoffeleers, "The Meaning and Use of the Name Malawi in Oral Traditions and Precolonial Documents" in Early History of Malawi, pp. 98-9. The quotation cited refers specifically to the precolonial political ascendancy of the Phiri clan in Chichewa-speaking areas, but is equally applicable in the present context.

The initial suggestion seems to have come from the <u>Nyasaland</u> <u>Times</u>, 21, 51(19 December 1918), 2; however, nothing in the newspaper's proposal would indicate appreciation of the symbolic significance of the fires.

³⁷ Interview 105, Diamond Caswell Chirwa, 1 August 1973.

³⁸ Nyasaland Government Gazette, 26(1919), 186; H.E. Arbuckle to Principal Medical Officer, 28 July 1919, M.N.A., M 1/3/1.

was one of these problems. Large numbers of askari and tengatenga contracted both syphilis and gonorrhea, as did European soldiers, and as a result the diseases spread in all sections of the protectorate. ³⁹ Official concerns about the problem were matched by African worries as well, and led to some government efforts at treatment and prevention. ⁴⁰

Although smallpox and venereal disease were of concern, the great new battle was directed against influenza. The first wave of this worldwide pandemic reached Malawi from the south, following the river and rail transport links. The first cases were reported in October 1918, and the disease was widespread by January 1918, when the 1/2 K.A.R. carriers succumbed as they entered the country from the north. There is no doubt that influenza came into Malawi through the military lines of communication linking the protectorate to South Africa. Army camps provided fertile ground for the spread of infection, and the demobilization of soldiers undoubtedly aided in carrying the disease further, especially the second wave of cases in 1919 which had a particularly severe impact upon country villages. 42

³⁹Questionnaires: DZ/30, Yatesi Kumsamba, 2 August 1974; DZ/36, Mr. Katawa, 19 April 1974. Zomba weekly medical report, 5 March 1919, M.N.A., S 1/1128/19; Mulanje district Annual Report, 1919/20, M.N.A., S 1/1040/19; Mombera Native Association minute books, 28, 29 and 31 July 1922, M.N.A., Mombera Native Association papers.

Smith to C.O., 15 September 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 525/84; A.M.D. Turnbull, notebook 1916-18, S.M.L.; March 1920 West Nyasa district monthly report, M.N.A., S 1/1204/19; questionnaire NC/5, Village Headman Kadundwe, 5 August 1974.

⁴¹ Nyasaland Times, 21, 44(31 October 1918), 2.

⁴²Interview 9, Kampila Kaputa, 11 August 1972; questionnaire KR/3, Amon N. Ng¹ambi, 6 April 1973; Lilongwe district Annual Report 1919/20, M.N.A., S 1/1073/19.

In the minds of Malawians, the connection between the war and the epidemic of influenza were not only immediate, but also causal. A common expression was that the "war air" had brought the new and devastating disease, blown in by winds from the front. 43 "Maybe it was the smoke and blood of the dead that made us suffer so much," recalled one man who remained for the entire war in Malawi. 44 Those abstractions, though not always present in memories of the epidemic, serve to underscore the widespread and bitter belief that it was a trick of the Germans or more likely, the protracted conflict itself which had unleashed this new suffering upon the land. 45

Although the disease, of itself, was not often deadly, by leaving its victims in an emaciated state they often contracted other, fatal ailments, particularly pneumonia. In a population affected by shortages of food and in some cases debilitated by military labor service, the risks of complications were high.

Africans seemed to recognize this, sometimes noting that should one survive three days of the "coughing disease," he would not die. 46 The seriousness, too, was well understood, as expressed in

⁴³ Questionnaires: DZ/8, Village Headman Njati Phiri, 10 April 1974; DZ/47, Gonthi Chisale, 15 September 1974. Interview 33, Danda Linyama, 18 September 1972.

Interview 116, Amos Isaac, 14 July 1973.

⁴⁵ Minute by Acting Governor Duff, 23 December 1918, copied in Acting Chief Secretary to Acting Resident, Blantyre, 25 December 1918, M.N.A., NSB 1/2/5; interview 38, Samuel Chaima, 28 September 1972. Questionnaires: KR/9, Peter G. Mbisa, 15 April 1973; MZ/1, Paulos Nthengwe, 1 April 1973.

⁴⁶ Malawi Department of Antiquities oral records, BT 9, Group Village Headman Gomeza, interviewed 4 August 1970; G.H. Wilson, Mponda's station notes, Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 62 (January 1919), 21; interview 33, Danda Linyama, 15 September 1972.

a common description of influenza symptoms: "You coughed once; on the second time blood would come out and then the person would die." 47

The <u>fluenza</u>, as it was sometimes called, was far more serious than even the smallpox scourge present in the protectorate. Malawians felt that, as had been the case during the war, all too little concern was evidenced_for their medical needs in this crisis. The government attempted to advise the population on preventive measures and, along with missionaries and even planters, sought to treat as many cases as possible. But the speed with which the virus spread through the country and the incredibly large number of cases, combined to make medical attention all but impossible for the vast majority of Malawians. Even these meager attempts, for all the complaints of inattention, were not infrequently met with refusals to be treated. A Chewa headman told the U.M.C.A. nurse, Alice Simpkin, "Do not my people prefer to die of the sickness rather than of the European medicine?"

In part the reaction derived from a long-standing suspicion of European medical treatment and was undoubtedly also aggrevated by the

⁴⁷ Interview 31, Kazibule Dabi, 15 September 1974.

⁴⁸ Interview 129, A.G. Mugomo Mwali, 29 August 1973; Nyasaland Times, 21, 46(14 November 1918), 3, and 22, 8(20 February 1919), 3; H.E. Munby, Kota Kota station notes, Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 64(July 1919), 16.

⁴⁹ Alice Simpkin, <u>Nursing in Nyasaland</u> (London: U.M.C.A., n.d.), p. 52.

bitterness of wartime experiences and their aftermath. Perhaps Malawians also felt that the cures offered little more than they might have effected from their own knowledge. In the absence of other medicines, some officials suggested to Africans that they combat the influenza by dissolving wood ash in water, sieving the solution, and drinking the solute. While well within the scope of contemporary western medical knowledge, to many villagers it probably appeared similar to infusions which they traditionally prepared to cure colds, coughs, and pneumonia.

The effectiveness of such alkaline treatments was minimal, ⁵² as were most medicines, and the disease continued to spread. All manner of provisional "cures" were attempted, some of which may have been as serious as the disease itself. One was the drinking of kerosene, which offered little to recommend it beyond the magic

⁵⁰Questionnaire DZ/12, M. Kuthembe, 12 April 1974. This advice was apparently not widespread, and a missionary in Malawi at the time has informed me he thinks the suggestion "most unlikely"; Rev. Canon Thomas Hicks, letter to the author, 19 March 1975. Difficulties in obtaining medical supplies to combat the epidemic were manifest by the middle of 1919 when, through complex negotiations, they were at last secured through the Southern Rhodesian government; the Rhodesian National Archives holds a file, "Drugs for Nyasaland Government, 1919 July 16-October 8" (H 2/7/1), containing much material on this point.

⁵¹ Anstruther Davidson, "Alkalis in the Treatment of Influenza," <u>Journal of the American Medical Association</u>, 71(1918), 1603; T.C. Ely, "Alkali treatment applied to the acidosis of epidemic influenza," <u>New York Medical Journal</u>, 109(1919), 574; Williamson, <u>Useful Plants</u>, pp. 19, 59, 106.

⁵²See T.C. Ely, "Alkalis in the Treatment of Influenza," <u>Journal</u> of the American Medical Association, 71(1918), 1603.

of having been introduced by the Europeans.⁵³ Traditional nostrums were also tried, usually associated with witchcraft allegations in cases of deaths due to influenza and its complications. Reports from most districts indicate that many accused of being responsible were forced to undergo a poison ordeal (<u>mwabvi</u>) to prove their innocence. A few deaths-from the poison were reported, but others surely must have escaped the attention of the residents.⁵⁴

With both European medicines and local cures ineffective in combating the disease, the influenza toll mounted. Sir Hector Duff, who served as Acting Governor of Nyasaland during the worst periods of the epidemic, put the number of cases at something more than 15,000 and deaths at about 1,700. As calamitous as those figures may appear, they can be nothing but gross underestimates. In Dowa and Lilongwe districts alone, very incomplete returns from the district residents indicated in excess of eight thousand Malawians died as a result of the epidemic, which devastated entire villages. 56

⁵³Interview 17, Tebulo Nkwanda, 22 August 1972; Malawi Department of Antiquities oral records, BT 9, Group Village Headman Gomeza, interviewed 4 August 1970.

The following are suggestive of reports from throughout the protectorate: Acting Resident, Blantyre, to Chief Secretary, 20 December 1918, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/8; October 1919 Upper Shire district monthly report, M.N.A., S 1/1005/19; May 1919 Ruo district monthly report, M.N.A., S 1/1041/19; July 1919 Mombera district monthly report, M.N.A., S 1/1140/19.

⁵⁵ Duff, "Nyasaland and the World War," chapter eleven, I.W.M.

⁵⁶August 1919 Dowa district monthly report, M.N.A., S 1/1076/19; Lilongwe district Annual Report, 1919/20, M.N.A., S 1/1073/19; Andrew Balfour and Henry Harold Scott, <u>Health Problems of the Empire: Past</u>, Present. and Future (New York: Henry Holt, 1924), p. 219.

"There is no question," Governor Smith reported to the legislative council in 1919, "that the loss of life was high." ⁵⁷

As with any statistics for Africa of this period, accuracy is little more than a chimera, but the total impact of the influenza outbreaks was probably much greater than even Governor Smith had imagined. Projections of mortality, made as the disease first appeared in the protectorate, had suggested a death rate of less than one percent. The actual figure was about five percent, and some estimates claimed it was as high as six percent. The total number of deaths, extracted and extrapolated from census data, may actually have been as high as 50,000. And if the five percent mortality rate is accepted as reasonable, it would mean that more than three-quarters of the country's population suffered from influenza to some degree, an estimate which the Blantyre resident actually made of cases in his district. If even fifty percent of

⁵⁷ Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Nyasaland, 21st session (July 1919), p. 2.

⁵⁸ Nyasaland Times, 21, 45(7 November 1918), 1; December 1918 and January 1919 Blantyre district monthly reports, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/8.

⁵⁹G. Coleman, "The African Population of Malawi: An Analysis of the Censuses between 1901 and 1966. Part 1: The Level of Population," Society of Malawi Journal, 27, 1(1974), 32. At the other extreme was an estimate that "over a fifth of the total number of the inhabitants [of Nyasaland] were swept away" by influenza, a fraction which would equal more than 200,000 deaths; Joseph Beuniol, The White Fathers and Their Missions (London: Sands & Co., 1929), p. 270.

December 1918 Blantyre district monthly report, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/8. The calculations are based upon population levels reported in the administrative census of 1918; M.N.A., NSB 1/2/5.

the people contracted influenza, the nature of this further battle is clear; one Malawian reflected on the epidemic and concluded, "God was angry from 1918 to 1919."

The high level of mortality was magnified by continued famine during the year after hostilities ended. The influenza epidemic and the food shortage bore reciprocal effects, each causing the other to increase in geometric proportions. Men, women, and children weakened by hunger were more easily stricken by the virus, and more likely to encounter complications and even die. Likewise, those suffering from fluenza were unable to work in their fields producing grain and other foodstuffs. This inability to work was, in fact, a crucial matter as the flu struck Malawi just in time for plowing and planting during the 1918-19 season. 62

Late floods had damaged the previous year's crops along the lower river, eliminating practically the only African food reserves which remained. With labor again in short supply in 1918-19, due to the ravages of disease, and with the combination of floods and insufficient precipitation also repeated, the situation was indeed serious. 63 The government was compelled to treat the entire

⁶¹ Interview 116, Amos Isaac, 14 July 1973.

⁶²A.C. Churchward, Likwenu station notes, <u>Nyasaland Diocesan</u>
<u>Chronicle</u>, 63(April 1919), 34; interview 119, Village Headman Malomo, 7 August 1973.

⁶³ Nyasaland Times, 21, 17(25 April 1918), 2; G.H. Wilson, Mponda's station notes, Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 61(October 1918), 19; H.E. Munby, Kota Kota Station notes, Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 63(April 1919), 20.

protectorate as suffering from a shortage of food, and to institute relief measures. ⁶⁴ Fortunately, there was grain available, grown under official directives by the European planters. With the war over, these military stores were turned to civilian needs, and military transport—both human and mechanical—distributed grain throughout the country for sale at near cost. Malawians well remember the value of that relief, for "otherwise it could be death." ⁶⁵

The famine contributed to the sense of an incomplete peace which Malawians felt. It was not, however, the last of the further battles which they faced after the war. Another was the steady inflation which plagued the country, as it did most of the world. Wartime earnings, which had seemed enormous when the conflict had begun, diminished in the face of rising prices; any real gains were minimal indeed. At the same time, few Malawians were interested in still further disillusioning employment with the Europeans of the protectorate. Instead, many turned elsewhere for income and employment to meet the problem of post-war inflation.

Ouff to C.O., 14 April 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 525/82; L.H. Nyirenda, "Development of Mzimba Township," The Malawian Geographer, 11(1972), n.p.

⁶⁵ Nyasaland Protectorate, Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture...1919, p. 2; Acting Director of Agriculture to Resident, Blantyre, 18 December 1918, M.N.A., NSB 1/1/1; interview 75, Village Headman Makumba, 3 April 1973; questionnaire NS/2, Chief Kapusi Chimombo, 13 August 1973.

What small amounts of money and other material wealth the demobilized askari and tengatenga were able to take home were jealously guarded. One man remembered that those returning often planned to enter their villages at night so that others would not see what they actually had brought back with them. The demands on those meager resources, with relatives and village officials demanding a share, were great. "We told them that the money was our blood, and so we must enjoy it to the full," recalled a veteran, but he acknowledged eventually sharing his new wealth. Not that the money went far. In a time of famine, much went to feed families whose only source of food was government grain sold at prices which, though set at about current market rates, seemed excessive to many. The salaries were quickly gone: "We ate it, at times with our relatives. We just ate."

Literally, the money was eaten; the African metaphor matched the reality of families being fed. More foolish men, perhaps in bitterness from war memories or at finding unfaithful wives at home, 69 squandered their remaining wages on gifts to attract women; others, also literally, drank it away. 70 "After spending the money

⁶⁶ Questionnaire NC/17, Bandali Yosefe, 24 August 1974.

⁶⁷ Interview 74, Anusa Makumba, 2 April 1973.

⁶⁸ Interview 89, Madi Wadi Selemani, 12 April 1973; also question-naire MA/12, Mr. Mtambalika, 17 July 1974.

⁶⁹ Questionnaires: DZ/11, Kadewere Moyo, 12 April 1974; MA/8, Amidu Katunga, 16 July 1974; DZ/31, Simon Njobvu, 3 August 1974.

⁷⁰ Questionnaires: DZ/14, Mr. Davite, 14 April 1974; TH/6, Mr. Bula, 22 September 1973; KR/2, Lameck Mwalwimba, 6 April 1973; NU/1, Mastoni Patana, 4 April 1973.

uselessly, then we began to realize how stupid we had been in not thinking of doing something really constructive with the money," a former askari lamented. Their funds rapidly expended, many veterans came to the district residencies seeking the war gratuities which they had been promised. Few were paid before 1920, when protectorate officials began a program of payments at Zomba, Fort Johnston, and Nkhata Bay. The amounts, even then, were small and had been reduced by the War Office to half of what had originally been requested by the Colonial Office. 73

A minority did manage to husband their wages and gratuities, and, of these, most invested in traditional measures of wealth, particularly cattle and occasionally goats. In the inflated economy of the post-war years, they were among the very few who could afford to pay the higher prices demanded for livestock. Others tried to adapt to the new economic patterns, opening small stores in competition

⁷¹ Interview 25, Disi Katita, 13 August 1972.

⁷²Nkhotakota district Annual Report, 1918/19, M.N.A., NCK 5/1/2; secretariat memorandum, "King's African Rifles War Gratuities No. 1," M.N.A., NSB 1/2/6.

⁷³ Questionnaires; ZA/10, Che Faya, 29 September 1973; KS/3, Leonard Chitenjele, 12 April 1973. Colonial Office to Commandant, King's African Rifles, 19 June 1919, and War Office to Colonial Office, 13 December 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 534/36 and C.O. 534/38. Some animosities developed when Malawian veterans of the Rhodesian Native Regiment were denied gratuities, on the grounds that they had received higher monthly pay during the war; Smith to C.O., 23 August 1920, M.N.A.. S 1/716/20.

⁷⁴ Questionnaires: MZ/14, M. Mkandawire, 9 April 1974; DZ/13, Mayi Nakhumayo Solofina, 13 April 1974; DZ/22, Mr. Hauya, 17 April 1974. Chiwona, "Northern Chitipa," p. 7.

with European and Asian merchants.⁷⁵ These men, whether choosing the old or new standards, were those who "became very rich so that they were respected."⁷⁶

The few newly rich were perhaps the only ones among the returned askari and tengatenga who did not suffer from the problems of inflation which followed the war. Complaints focused especially upon cloth, one of the major items purchased by Malawians. In 1914 a standard length of calico (about a yard) sold for six pence; by the end of the war the price had increased threefold, and in some cases even more. Foodstuffs, too, were more expensive. Grain, in short supply due to poor harvests, was not the only item higher in price. Near Nkhata Bay fish, generally considered plentiful, also cost more; a penny bought twenty small fish before the war, but only six or seven once the fighting ceased. As is usual with such increases, the rate--here approximately three hundred percent--is not nearly as significant as its application to what had been a very inexpensive item, the effect being, of course, to penalize those least able to pay.

Although they may not have been able to articulate the precise nature of the problem, Malawians were aware of the higher prices, and were most upset about them. Complaints were voiced to many of

⁷⁵ Ouestionnaire MU/1, Mr. Masanso, 5 April 1973.

⁷⁶ Interview 105, Diamond Caswell Chirwa, 1 August 1973.

⁷⁷ Questionnaire MZ/10, Eneya Lungu, 11 April 1973; interview 106, Kildon Wajiusa, 2 August 1973.

the district residents, and the problem was discussed by the government's executive council. Governor Smith reported to the Colonial Office that "excessive prices [were] causing unrest among [the] native population." Continued pressure from the district residents for some relief for the Africans was acknowledged in a secretariat circular letter:

It was perhaps not unnatural on their part to expect that with peace there would be a reversion to pre-war prices, and it was not to be expected that, as a body, they would be able to understand and appreciate the many causes operating to defeat this expectation.79

At the same time, residents were cautioned that government could do little to ease the situation, a decision reached by the executive council despite recognition of profiteering by some merchants. 80

Further complicating the financial picture, African wages did not respond to the increase in prices. Even the higher salaries paid for clerks, masons, and other skilled manpower did not hold up; complaints were voiced by Malawians in such positions that their earnings had in fact declined. Wages for agricultural labor on European estates, by far the largest category of African employment, did rise following the war. Even that increase, though, from a previous minimum of four to six shillings per month, reflected a

⁷⁸Smith to C.O., 18 August 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 525/83; Nyasaland Executive Council minutes, 7 August 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 626/2.

⁷⁹ Acting Chief Secretary to residents, circular letter, 20 August 1919, M.N.A., NCN 1/1/2.

⁸⁰ Nyasaland Executive Council minutes, 11-13 December 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 626/2.

⁸¹ Mombera Native Association minute books, 27 September 1921, M.N.A., Mombera Native Association papers.

drop from the still higher estate wages paid during the conflict. It was obvious that for such workers, and the even larger numbers not in European employment, the increased prices were a special burden. 82

The official response concerning wages was, first, that

Africans should be encouraged to view the matter from the bright

side: compensation for their labor had increased. Drawing from

this fact, the second official response was to call for higher hut

taxes, even on the heels of a postal rate increase which was expected

to hit hard at African correspondents. The new tax rates, set at

a flat six shillings per dwelling, were intended to reflect, as

previously, a single month's minimum wage. They were, however,

instituted without any appreciable consultation with Malawians, or

even with the district residents, which caused some bitterness.

"Only the tax section of the government got stern," replied a former

medical orderly when asked about the events of the immediate post-war

years. Yeterans, especially, felt betrayed when they were called

upon to pay any taxes, let alone at higher rates; only those wounded

⁸² Interview 43, Joswa Mahere, 4 January 1973; Mulanje district Annual Report, 1919/20, M.N.A., S 1/1040/19; Resident, Ncheu, to Chief Secretary, 17 March 1920, M.N.A., NCN 1/1/3.

⁸³Acting Chief Secretary to residents, circular letter, 20 August 1919, M.N.A., NCN 1/1/2; Smith to C.O., 17 November 1919, P.R.O., C.O. 525/84; Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 61 (October 1918), 5.

⁸⁴ Interview 86, Petro Mbwana, 12 April 1973; Resident, Ncheu, to Chief Secretary, 17 March 1920, M.N.A., NCN 1/1/3. In the first year the new rate was applied, tax collections were up \$26,612/-, an increase of almost one-third over the previous high level of hut tax revenue realization.

during the conflict or veteran askari of very long service (usually more than ten years) were exempt. Disgusted, one veteran only remarked, "Tax never ends."

Despite the higher taxes and inflated prices, there was little rush by Malawians to find new jobs immediately after the war. A few, usually the higher ranking ex-askari, were employed as policemen, prison warders, night watchmen, and the like, but even the response to such offers were not always positive. Most preferred to remain at home, working at their homes and in the fields, repairing and renewing what had fallen into disuse and disrepair during the war. Not many wanted to undertake employment in Nyasaland after their wartime experiences, especially as they frequently thought the Europeans "robbed us of our efforts." Some of the jobs offered, such as carrier work on the Lilongwe to Fort Jameson road, were extremely distasteful, and "natives refused to leave their villages to walk yet more endless miles month after month."

Government officials troubled over this problem, and some expressed an inability to understand why Malawians should choose not

⁸⁵ Interviews: 89, Madi Wadi Selemani, 12 April 1973; 114, Ham Nkhata, 25 August 1973; 13, Daisa Songolo, 17 August 1973. Nyasaland Government Gazette, supplement to 27(1920), p. 1.

⁸⁶ Questionnaires: BT/2, Faifi Kachikira, 14 August 1973; KS/2, Harry Kuntaja, 12 April 1973; CR/10, Enoch Kachiwawa, 13 August 1974. Interview 82, Kalokwete Wadi Likwapi, 8 April 1973.

⁸⁷ Interview 78, Joseph Mandanda, 4 April 1973. Questionnaires: CK/l, Petro Paketi, 9 August 1973; DW/9, Jasoni Mptandebvu, 17 April 1974.

⁸⁸H.J. van Breda, "Some Reminiscences," <u>Northern Rhodesia</u> <u>Journal</u>, 5, 3(1963), 290.

to seek employment on the estates, with commercial companies, or with government. Others cynically passed off the matter as explainable in terms of the large numbers who earned wages, many for the first time, during the war. "The villages...are full of money," the Blantyre resident stated categorically. ⁸⁹ Other, more thoughtful, officials realized that local employment offered few attractions after the perceived exploitation of the war and that local wages were not at all attractive in the inflated economy which Malawians then faced. ⁹⁰

One very real alternative was migration to find higher paid positions outside the country. The search for jobs elsewhere had been a feature of Malawian life since the 1890s, but the war greatly encouraged the practice. Not only had tens of thousands been exposed to foreign travel for the first time, but they also had encountered numbers of their countrymen who had returned from abroad to take jobs in Malawi during the campaign. Encouraged by these contacts, thousands left the protectorate after 1919, beginning the period of modern, large-scale labor emigration. 91

The major attraction was, undoubtedly, the expectation of higher wages. "Discharged askari who are accustomed to a rate of

⁸⁹Blantyre district Annual Report, 1918/19, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/8; May 1922 Kasungu district monthly report, M.N.A., NCG, 3/2/1; Dowa district Annual Report, 1919/20, M.N.A., S 1/1076/19; May 1919 Dedza district monthly report, M.N.A., S 1/1072/19.

⁹⁰See, for example, the April 1920 Chiradzulu sub-district monthly report, M.N.A., NSB 7/3/4.

⁹¹ Questionnaire KR/5, Kapawike Mwalilino, 7 April 1973; South Nyasa district Annual Report, 1919/20, M.N.A., S 1/1066/19; Sanderson, "Labour Migration," p. 259.

£1-1-4 per month in military employment...are not inclined to work locally for 6/- to 8/- per month," one district resident reported. 92 Men who had served as tengatenga, too, were attracted by the prospect of making more money and also ensuring that they would not again be impressed into service. Some were probably encouraged by their wives to go to South Africa and Rhodesia in search of the welcome money, and others elected to seek jobs in Mozambique and Zaire. A few veteran askari even went to Zanzibar and joined the highly paid police force there. 93

Another, in a sense opposite, reaction to the problems of inflation involved a turn to crime. European settlers and government officials decried what they called "the increase of serious crime which war conditions had...been largely responsible for."

Actually, protectorate criminal statistics indicate that only offenses against property increased to any significant degree during and after the conflict; Malawian memories suggest that this was due mainly to larger numbers of thefts among the African population. 95

⁹²Upper Shire district Annual Report, 1919/20, M.N.A., S 1/1005/19; also questionnaire NK/1, Jaffari Sefi, 2 April 1973.

⁹³ Questionnaires: NU/5, Binton Kaiya, 9 April 1973; LL/7, Chikhutu Nkhwazi, 16 April 1974; DW/6, Mr. Jombe, 16 April 1974; LK/1, D. Mandala, 9 August 1973; MC/5, Michael Saidi, 16 April 1973. Interview 5, Mwenyedawa Chitala, 10 August 1972; Robert B. Boeder, "The Effects of Labor Emigration on Rural Life in Malawi," Rural Africana, 20(1973), 40-41.

⁹⁴ Nyasaland Times, 21, 50(12 December 1918), 2: Lilongwe district Annual Report, 1919/20, M.N.A., S 1/1073/19.

⁹⁵ Nyasaland Protectorate, <u>Blue Book for the Year Ending 31st March</u>
1920 (Zomba: Government Printer, 1920), p. Ca3; Nyasaland Protectorate,
<u>Blue Book for the Year Ending 31st December 1922</u> (Zomba: Government
Printer, 1923), p. Y3. Interview 62, McPhail Issa Kadewere, 3 February 1973; questionnaire DZ/25, Kaulale Ngoze, 18 April 1974.

This increased criminal activity may be explained in great measure by the attempts of a few to combat lowered wages and higher prices; however, the disruptions and temptations caused by outside forces, particularly foreign troops in the impacted areas, cannot be overlooked.

If some Malawians were upset about the increasing incedence of theft by their countrymen, ⁹⁶ they also objected strongly to what they saw as continued governmental abuses following the war. While they might grumble at more efficient tax collection, the imposition of apparently widespread forced public works labor was particularly galling. In June 1919, a government circular acknowledged during the war 'more coercive measures than usual were necessary to obtain... labor," but insisted that the practice must not continue. ⁹⁷ There seems, however, to have been little change in this regard for the Africans of the protectorate.

Although the scale of manpower requisitions was lowered considerably, men were still forced into government service after the war. The public works and other departments expected residents to turn out any number of men required for whatever projects might be underway. Although there was some opposition from district officials, this became common practice. 98 Fears were expressed by some chiefs

⁹⁶ Interview 12, Mbaisa Mbaisa, 15 August 1972

⁹⁷ Governor's Circular (Confidential) No. 6 of 1919, 24 June 1919, M.N.A., NCN 1/1/2.

⁹⁸ Blantyre district Annual Report, 1918/19, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/8.

that the 1920 census would be viewed as further indication of government demands for labor, a not unreasonable conclusion as enumerators spread over the country for the first time. Into the 1920s, official and unofficial reports, though differing in tone, all reflect continued demands for involuntary labor. 99 As late as 1927 the Mombera Native Association petitioned the governor concerning the problem. "During the Great War, under martial law," they acknowledged, "it was a different thing for any strong man to be forced," but in peacetime such practices should cease. 100

The struggles which persisted during the peace embittered many Malawians. They had gone to war with at least passing, and perhaps self-serving, assurances from their European rulers of the necessity to defend the country. In the process, though, many had died, on the battlefields, along the lines of communications, as well as in Nyasaland. Afterwards, the sacrifices seemed to bring few rewards, and some expressed in song their deep-seated frustrations: 101

At Karonga People perished there. Why did they perish?

At Karonga Many young men died there. Why did many die?

⁹⁹Nkhotakota district Annual Report, 1919/20, M.N.A., NCK 5/1/2; Central Province Annual Report, 1921/22, M.N.A., NC 2/1/1; Mulange district Annual Report, 1922/23, M.N.A., NSM 3/1/1; Smith to C.O., 21 February 1921, plus enclosures, P.R.O., C.O. 525/95.

Mombera Native Association minute book, 25 May 1927, M.N.A., Mombera Native Association papers.

This song was recorded twice, and mentioned once in a questionnaire response. It is presented here in a derived and modified version. Interviews: 116, Amos Isaac, 14 July 1973; 122, Olivia

There were few satisfactory answers. The new and continuing problems seemed a poor return for what Africans had suffered, and did little more than continue to turn men away from their homes. The war was, truly, "a scatterer of men." 102

While a few may have benefited from better jobs following their service or from carefully managed wages and gratuities, most

Malawians felt they had nothing to show for their efforts during the war. "You see," a veteran explained to me, "we were like a dog following its master to hunt game. When the hunter is successful, even if the game is caught by the dog, all it gets are bones." 103

If there were to be any benefits, they could only come from some sort of collective expression or action. In the years after 1918, many Malawians actively sought such means of providing some consolation in the face of inadequate compensation.

Perhaps naturally, one focus of group reaction came through the traditional <u>nyau</u> societies. Having been a central factor in the resistance to war recruitment, and having marked out a new role in the transition to peacetime after the war, the societies continued as expressions of resentment to European position and privilege. The missionaries, fearful of losing hard won adherents, were concerned about these groups and their overt expressions, the dances. Throughout the central region, Anglican, Dutch Reformed, and Roman Catholic clergymen noted heightened <u>nyau</u> activity during

Tambala, 1 August 1973. Questionnaire NC/22, F. Cheketeni, 18 September 1974.

¹⁰² Questionnaire DZ/15, Mr. Nyale, 14 April 1974.

¹⁰³ Interview 2, Fulotiya Nsanama, 8 August 1972.

the 1920s. ¹⁰⁴ In fact, the <u>nyau</u> resurgence was largely a reaction to the missions. Missionaries were the most direct expression of European civilization most Africans faced and often seemed most hypocritical during the war, having talked of peace and encouraged war.

Complaining vociferously to government authorities concerning the <u>nyau</u> organizations, especially their apparent absence from all social sanctions, the missions tried to paint them as "certainly... opposed to European influence." While some district and provincial officers were sympathetic, they did not share the grave concern about the societies as "the strongest and most aggressive enemy of civilization and education in the land," a picture which the churchmen tried to present. That there was little truly seditious, the officials were probably correct. In the context of the war and its aftermath, however, there can be little doubt that the <u>nyau</u> societies represented the most significant traditional expressions of general discontent.

Acting Central Province Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 23 June 1922, and 14 August 1922, including enclosures, M.N.A., NC 1/21/2; H.E. Munby, "Heathenism in the Hill Districts," Central Africa, 41(1923), 77-8; Schoffeleers and Linden, "Nyau," pp. 260-68.

¹⁰⁵ M. Guillemé, "Notes on Zinyao," 15 May 1924, M.N.A., NC 1/21/2.

Rev. W.H. Murray to W. Kirby Green (Central Province Commissioner), 14 September 1922, and Acting Central Province Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 23 June 1922, both M.N.A., NC 1/21/2.

See Linden, <u>Catholics</u>, pp. 125, 131; the Lindens, concerned with the <u>nyau</u> as peasant resistance to Catholic missionary endeavor, do not fully explore the other implications of the societies! post-war activities.

In the minds of the missionaries, though, the disquiet expressed through <u>nyau</u> activities was also associated with rising interest in Islam. ¹⁰⁸ After the war, Muslim conversion seems for the first time to have been significantly on the rise in Malawi. Coinciding with the post-war resentments of European rule, undoubtedly exploiting it, the first real attempts at Islamic teachings began in the country. Numbers of <u>shaykhs</u> and <u>waalimu</u> returned from Zanzibar and attempted to convert their countrymen. The intensity of these efforts, often accompanied by demonstrations of strength and support in the villages, alarmed even government officials. As was the case with the <u>nyau</u>, however, these Islamic teachers posed no overt threat, and likely reflected more the rivalry between competing <u>tariquas</u> (Islamic brotherhoods) for members and converts. ¹⁰⁹

Yet another expression of the post-war mood was found in the native associations, the most outwardly political of all Malawian activities at that time. The first, the North Nyasa Native Association, was founded in 1912. Most, however, were organized (or began functioning, as was the case with the West Nyasa Native Association, which was actually founded in 1914) during the 1920s. The experiences of the war years, though not often cited as motive

^{108&}lt;sub>H.E.</sub> Munby, Kota Kota station notes, <u>Nyasaland Diocesan</u> Chronicle, 62(January 1919), 11.

¹⁰⁹ Greenstein, "African Muslims," passim, and Greenstein, "Malawian Shaykhs"; also see Edward A. Alpers, "Towards a History of the Expansion of Islam in East Africa: the Matrilineal Peoples of the Southern Interior," in The Historical Study of African Religion, p. 191.

forces in the development of these organizations, 110 certainly influenced their growth. The Mombera Native Association, founded in 1920, was inspired in large part by the plight of Chief Chimtunga Jere, exiled from his people for resistance to war recruitment. In Blantyre, several key individuals behind the formation in 1923 of the Nyasaland (Southern Province) Native Association had, four years earlier, been the moving forces in a victory congratulation and petition of grievances sent to the governor.

The purposes of the associations were designed to allow communication concerning African grievances to pass between organized groups of Malawians and the government. The societies were, however, largely representative of the more educated and widely experienced Africans in the protectorate. This meant, of course, that those with wartime service were especially well represented. The North Nyasa association listed among its members at least thirty-eight with "active and military service" during the war. Other associations included among their members men like Frederick Njilima, who brought wartime experiences from elsewhere to the deliberations of the organizations.

Pachai, Malawi, pp. 225-230; J. Van Velson, "Some Early Pressure Groups in Malawi," in <u>The Zambezian Past</u>, eds. E. Stokes and R. Brown (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966), pp. 376-81, 385.

¹¹¹ Mhoni, "Chimtunga Jere," p. 9; Acting Resident, Blantyre, to Chief Secretary, 9 April 1919, enclosing a message and petition to the Governor, M.N.A., NSB 2/2/8; Levi S. Mumba, "Native Associations in Nyasaland," South African Outlook (2 June 1924), pp. 140-41.

¹¹² Extract from the Minutes of the North Nyasa Native Association, n.d., M.N.A., S 1/1481/19. On Njilima, see chapter three.

Native associations had a broad range of interests, and "nothing of any worth escaped their notice." Their petitions included concerns about local matters, such as fishing and forests, as well as broader problems, especially proposals for and enforcement of protectorate legislation. Among immediate post-war interests were bonuses for war service, appropriate provision for widows of deceased askari and tengatenga, and the continuing policy of forced labor. During the 1920s, their net effect was certainly minimal, at least in terms of influence on government policies. The organizations were, however, "a valuable safety valve for the escape of grievances."

A similar outlet was found in the new dances which appeared in Malawi as the war ended and whose popularity spread widely and continues even now. These are the <u>beni</u>, <u>mganda</u>, <u>malipenga</u>, and the associated women's <u>chiwoda</u> dance societies. The organizations, once tightly knit, have become less so today, and their dances, originally close parodies of European military parades, are not as obviously associated with that form in their contemporary performances. Without doubt, these dances were introduced into Malawi as a result of the Great War. Their origins, though, must be traced to dances and associated performance societies developing

¹¹³ Pachai, <u>Malawi</u>, p. 228.

¹¹⁴ See Van Velson, "Early Pressure Groups," p. 386.

¹¹⁵ January 1920 Mombera district monthly report, M.N.A., S 1/1140/19.

on the Swahili coast of east Africa in the 1890s, and particularly to the competing <u>marini</u> and <u>arinoti</u> groups which were organized early in the twentieth century. 116

The dances first appeared in the northern part of the country, and were known as "bands"; their initial noteworthy performances were during peace celebrations in a few districts. 117 In the northern highlands and in parts of the central plateau, these groups came to be known as mganda and malipenga. Some historians have suggested that the origins of these groups may be independent of east African antecedents, being instead innovations modeled on wartime military displays. 118 Although some oral historical data may support this view, 119 it does not seem to be a full explanation for their appearance. A provincial commissioner's investigation in 1927 discovered that the groups were originally known as "Marini

¹¹⁶T.O. Ranger, <u>Dance and Society in Eastern Africa</u>, 1890-1970: The Beni Ngoma (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 1-76, <u>passim</u>; interview 75, Village Headman Makumba, 3 April 1973.

¹¹⁷ July 1919 West Nyasa district monthly report, M.N.A., S 1/1204/19; interview 112, Fololiyani Longwe, 23 August 1973.

¹¹⁸ W.P. Koma-Koma, M'ganda Kapena Malipenga (Limbe: Malawi Publications and Literature Bureau, 1965), pp. 34-5; Ranger, Dance and Society, pp. 117-120. Ranger, drawing upon Koma-Koma, suggests the possibility of independent origins of mganda, particularly noting that it does not have associated women's groups as in the case of beni. In this Ranger is incorrect, as the chiwoda women's dance associations are allied with both malipenga and mganda dance groups; Alifeyo Chilivumbo, "Chiwoda: A Dance and a Way of Life," unpubl. typescript kindly made available by the author.

¹¹⁹ Interviews: 129, A.G. Mugomo Mwali, 29 August 1973; 110, E.C. Banda, 15 August 1973.

bands," and some informants distinctly recall that <u>beni</u> dances, about whose east African roots there is no question, arrived before <u>mganda</u> and <u>malipenga</u> but did not survive. 120 Together, this evidence seems to remove any doubt about origins, although it remains possible that in northern and central Malawi, military experiences may have been drawn upon to modify the dances which some askari had observed and only partially remembered. 121

Around the southern lakeshore, and into the Shire highlands, the beni forms of these dances spread, clearly drawn from east African roots. In Chiradzulu, the resident reported that they were also known as Alubi, a corruption of Nairobi where the societies were prominent during the war and where many Malawians must have encountered them. 122 At Zomba, the first performances were by German askari prisoners-of-war, whose displays were observed with interest and contributed to the spread of beni. 123 Around the

Northern Province Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 8 November 1927, M.N.A., NN 1/24/1. Interviews: 106, Kildon Wajiusa, 2 August 1973; 135, Austin Manda, 12 September 1973. Questionnaire KR/11, Aldin Kayira, 15 April 1974.

The possibility of such modification is suggested by the experiences of at least one man who saw but did not participate in the dances during the war, only actively joining in them after the war was over; questionnaire LK/ll, Uleji Chimutha, 12 September 1973.

¹²² Assistant Resident, Chiradzulu, to Chief Secretary, 11 March 1921, M.N.A., S 2/1/21; on beni in wartime Nairobi, see Ranger, Dance and Society, pp. 48-51.

¹²³ Chief Commissioner of Police to Chief Secretary, 19 February 1921, M.N.A., NCF 1/7/1; interview 104, Kathebu Agubiko, 25 July 1974. The role of German prisoners-of-war in the diffusion of beni was not uncommon; see Ranger, Dance and Society, p. 49.

southern lakeshore, where the dance is widely known today, it is remembered as coming from <u>mbwani</u> (the east African coast) shortly after the war. Informants recall that originally there were elements of both <u>marini</u> and <u>arinoti</u> versions, but the competition between these, or any other <u>beni</u> groups, was soon lost. 124

As far as the government of Nyasaland was concerned, the dances were not only-to be tolerated, but in some cases also encouraged. The only official concern seems to have been that, since dancers especially valued being able to appear in military costumes as authentic as possible, increased performances might lead to theft of military apparel and insignia. While some district residents could find no evidence of such stealing, others--frequently urged on by missionaries--reported cases of theft and decried the temptations which might produce further stealing. The actual occurrence of theft was later confirmed by the unnamed informant who provided J. Clyde Mitchell with details of beni in Nyasaland. 125 Although there may have been some early worries that the wearing of

¹²⁴ Interviews: 170, Corporal Lipende, 14 September 1973; 76, Amisi Saidi, 3 April 1973; 77, Sitambuli Basale, 14 April 1973. Questionnaire MA/2, Master Koma-Koma, 13 April 1974. Ranger (<u>Dance and Society</u>, p. 72) indicates that the loss of "the full competitive apparatus of <u>Marini</u> and <u>Arinoti</u>" also occurred elsewhere.

¹²⁵ Resident, Fort Johnston, to Chief Secretary, 10 March 1921; Assistant Resident, Chiradzulu, to Chief Secretary, 11 March 1921, Resident, Zomba, to Chief Secretary, 9 March 1921; January 1921; Zomba district monthly report; all M.N.A., S 2/1/21. Chief Commissioner of Police to Chief Secretary, 19 February 1921, M.N.A., NCF 1/7/1. J. Clyde Mitchell, The Kalela Dance (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956), p. 11.

British military uniforms might in itself cause problems, these concerns apparently dealt with by the passage and enforcement of the Uniforms (Restriction of Wearing) Ordinance. 126

There was much less concern about the dances as expressions of dissatisfaction with European rule. In some areas they were seen as "tending to bring authority into disrespect," but this was usually taken_as reflecting upon traditional chiefs and headmen rather than the colonial government. The chiefs, and even native associations, did file complaints about the activities of the "bands," as the officials continued to call them. They were accused of being "subversive of the authority of the Chiefs and Headmen," and were also seen as "a hindrance to all useful work, for where bands are schools are not attended, the sick are left helpless, and work which is deemed useful in the eyes of the wise is neglected." As might be expected, missionaries, too, called attention to these aspects of the societies. Their objections prompted little official concern, as did the other petitions, largely because the government felt the missions, native

Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Nyasaland, 22nd session (1920), p. 15; Chief Commissioner of Police to Chief Secretary, 19 February 1921, M.N.A., NCF 1/7/1.

¹²⁷ Resident, Fort Johnston, to Chief Secretary, 10 March 1921, M.N.A., S 2/1/21.

Resident, Chinteche, to Provincial Commissioner, 18 February 1925, M.N.A., NN 1/24/1.

Mombera Native Association minute book, 26 May 1926, M.N.A., Mombera Native Association papers.

associations, and even the chiefs were merely jealous of the new groups.

Despite the lack of any real governmental concern, <u>beni</u>, <u>mganda</u>, and <u>malipenga</u> were all a part of the reactions following the world war. The songs associated with the dances often carried messages of discontent, such as that already cited which commented on the hunger experienced during the war. Another lyric mentioned the "war at Nairobi," lamenting "as if when they die they'll come back." ¹³¹
Members of societies were also known to taunt and otherwise harass government police and messengers engaged in tax and labor collection after the war, although such overt expressions were uncommon. ¹³²
The roles of the <u>beni</u> and other societies were summarized by a former carrier on Likoma Island:

After the war we learned <u>beni</u> dance, and when we came here, I, personally, taught the people of my village how to dance it. Some of the songs we used were those we had been singing during the war while carrying our luggage....We feared the European no longer, though we never showed it openly, afraid of being arrested.

As T. O. Ranger notes in his study of the <u>beni</u> in east Africa, it is in the "informal, the festive, the apparently escapist" that

¹³⁰ See J.M. Schoffeleers, "From Socialization to Personal Enterprise: A History of the Nomi Labor Societies in the Nsanje District of Malawi, c. 1891 to 1972," Rural Africana, 20(1973), 19.

¹³¹ Interviews: 103, Wilson Dolobeni, 5 May 1973; 106, Kildon Wajiusa, 2 August 1973. The text of the other song may be found in chapter four.

¹³² Resident, Chinteche, to Provincial Commissioner, 18 February 1925, M.N.A., NN 1/24/1.

¹³³ Questionnaire LK/8, Alan M. Chapola, 5 September 1973.

the greatest expressions of "real experience and real response" can be found. 134 In Malawi, at the conclusion of the Great War, that seems certainly to have been the case. With the possible exception of the mildly political native associations, it is in social institutions that the sense of post-war frustration must be sought. Particularly in the nyau dances, a reassertion of traditional roles in a modern setting, and in the near burlesque of the beni, mganda, and malipenga, Malawians again sought the prerogatives which they had lost to colonialism. This time, however, there was little expectation of a universal cataclysm propelling themselves again to positions of preeminence.

¹³⁴ Dance and Society, p. 3.

CHAPTER SEVEN: A SHAME TO PEOPLE'S SOULS

In a sense, the experiences of the Great War in Malawi were a part of the historical patterns which preceded it. This was another in what had been a series of conflicts that had swept through the region for nearly a century. This war, too, had so completely embroiled Malawi largely because of the historic river and lake transportation routes into the interior. As if to emphasize that, the associated clamity of influenza also followed those same routes, perhaps more than ever before leading directly into even the smallest villages. At the same time, this was a war unlike any Malawians had known, both in its intensity and the scope of its implications.

Some of the alterations taking place in Malawian society, to which the war contributed, were also part of pre-existing trends.

"The war had merely speeded up the processes of change already in evidence before its outbreak," a historian of the country has concluded. One of these processes involved the continuing and increasing demands which Europeans made upon the African population

Pollock, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, p. 302; more than any other general history of Malawi, Pollock's work touches (even though briefly) on the role of World War One upon the country. Similar arguments for Kenya are made by G.W.T. Hodges, "African Responses to European Rule in Kenya (to 1914)," in Hadith 3, ed. B.A. Ogot (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1971), pp. 82-3.

of the Nyasaland protectorate. Without a doubt, the proximity of the east African campaign intensified the claims upon Malawians for both tax and thangata, a pattern which continued even after the armistice. An associated effect of these demands—migration—was also clearly accelerated by the war, despite the frequent return of many itinerant Malawian laborers to the land of their birth during the conflict.

As true as this pattern of continuing change clearly was, the Great War meant more to Malawi than simply further development of previously evident historical patterns and processes. It was, however, probably less a force for new directions than the pre-war predictions and inchoate expectations had anticipated. The country's participation in the world conflict, though, can best be seen as the first truly national experience for Malawians. Neither the slave trade, which was essentially devisive, nor British colonialism, with differential applications throughout the protectorate, had provided the same communality of experience.

As a unifying force, the war was certainly more important than John Chilembwe's abortive rebellion in 1915, which is frequently seen, particularly within the country, as a pre-nationalist expression on the horizon of independence a half century later. My research has shown, predictably, that in 1915 Chilembwe and his followers were not widely known outside the areas of the actual rising, let alone were their efforts widely applauded. Even where

²See Pachai, Malawi, pp. 224, 253.

people were aware of the rebellion, its meaning was defined in terms of the war. Either as the clarion of an approaching armageddon or as a protest against enforced military recruitment, the Chilembwe incident must be placed within the praxis of the great conflagration engulfing Malawi.

It was precisely this overwhelming power of the war to dominate people and events no matter how far afield, that made it, for Malawians, national in scope as nothing previously had been.

"The events of these recent years of the war," wrote a former Anglican Bishop of Nyasaland, "have done much to break down old tribal jealousies and animities." Although there may have been less fraternization between various Malawian peoples than the bishop envisioned, they unquestionably shared for the first time a collective appreciation of both the power and the vulnerabilities of their European overlords.

Equally, maybe more, important was the shared suffering. If nationalism is often born of common complaint, there was sufficient misery in Malawi to draw people together. As happened even in German East Africa following the conflict, "the blacks recalled not the achievements of the whites but the suffering and misery consequent upon war." If the recitation of these troubles appeared to be a litany, in fact it did become one, providing not

³J.E. Hine, <u>Days Gone By</u> (London: John Murray, 1924), p. 307.

Robert Cornevin, "The Germans in Africa before 1918," in Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, eds. L.H. Gann and P. Duignan, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 415.

just comraderie for veterans but also a focal point for future resentments.

Seen as Malawi's first national experience, the Great War marked a watershed in the nation's history as significant as the creation of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland in 1953, which crystallized resistance to European rule. Equally, it served to lessen fears of the future and to bring Malawians closer to the imposed, European conception of 'modernity.'' Thus the First World War may be seen as a transitional epoch in Malawi's history, on the one hand bringing to fruition and on the other initiating trends which marked a break with many of the values of the past.

Of critical importance among the former was a quickening in the erosion of the power of chiefs and headmen. In virtually all districts of the protectorate, traditional authorities had been pressured and coerced into meeting the government's demands for the war, and in the process often unwillingly alienated their people. As if this were not enough, after the war they had to confront the demobilized tengatenga and askari whom they had frequently sent to war. The ex-servicemen, flush with their experiences if little else, were held in awe about the villages, often simply because of their safe return and despite their frequently poor physical condition. "I feel people rather feared the soldiers," one man recalled; "they looked quite superior to us."

⁵Interview 129, A.G. Mugomo Mwali, 29 August 1973. Also questionnaires: DZ/41, Defina Jonasi (female), 29 August 1974; MZ/17, George Phiri, 12 April 1974.

In the circumstances, such attitudes were often a real challenge to the authority of the chief; "he could give you nothing, totally nothing," a veteran remembered.

Government attempts to co-opt the powers of the chiefs and headmen--strengthen their rule was the official conception--had antedated the war. The initial pacification campaigns had already undermined chiefly power, and the District Administration (Native) Ordinance of 1912 was intended to further the process by bringing traditional authority more into official protectorate service. The ordinance, however, was barely in effect by 1918, and then only in selected areas. The impact of war, though, provided a situation in which chiefs and headmen attempted to use the government as a means of regaining lost prestige. Little could be done, and in many areas power and privilege continued to erode, a not uncommon occurrence elsewhere on the continent during and after the conflict. 7

This process affected more than just traditional power; in some areas the entire social fabric was modified following the war.

Widespread change was most evident where the effects were the greatest, particularly in the impacted areas. Blantyre and Limbe, of course,

⁶ Interview 87, Chisoya Wadi Mtuluko, 12 April 1973.

Dedza district Annual Reports, 1921/22 and 1922/23, M.N.A., NCD 2/1/1; Dowa district Annual Report, 1923/24, M.N.A., NCE 4/1/1. Questionnaires: MZ/15, Menard J.K. Tembo, 10 April 1974; DZ/7, Jekapu Maponya, 9 April 1974; MC/9, Chikani Mtali, 21 April 1973. Traditional authority was eroded in Cameroon as well; Frederick Quinn, "An African Reaction to World War I: the Beti of Cameroon," Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines 13(1973), 725.

had long known a considerable European presence; a certain measure of societal change had already begun there. The northern frontier and the southern lakeshore, however, had not experienced such intensive European settlement, and long-term changes in those areas were more definitely associated with the impact of the war.

Around Fort Johnston and the Bar, fanning out through the South Nyasa district, many new and heterogeneous inhabitants settled after the war. Most were men attracted to the area by wartime employment, or were askari who had been quartered there. Commonly, they married local women and remained after the war, and the jobs, were over. While traditionally the Yao chieftainships around the lake had been able creatively to absorb aliens into their society, in the more rigid environment of a colonial setting this was more difficult. It was further complicated during the 1920s as the government, rewarding the industry of the new settlers, gave them special positions, even including chieftaincies. Thus, while the new settlers served to develop a somewhat more cosmopolitan African community, they also undermined the traditional values and associations of the people of the area.

Along the northern frontier, where the population was cleared and scattered by the war, the changes were somewhat different. There, many people lost everything they had; hard hit were those of wealth, whose great possessions, their cattle, were almost entirely taken

Alpers, "Trade, State, and Society among the Yao," passim.

⁹Fort Johnston (previously South Nyasa) district Annual Report, 1923/24, M.N.A., NSF 4/1/1.

from them. They were repaid, of course, but at the uninflated prices of the pre- and early war years. When the conflict was over and those of wealth and status went about the tasks of reconstruction, they discovered that cattle, once plentiful in the protectorate, were now in short supply and prices were high.

One of the only ways to rebuild their herds was for chiefs, headmen, and others to marry their daughters to men who were now wealthy, who possessed cattle, and who would pay excessively high bride prices. These, often as not, were the veterans of war, sons of poor and lowly families whose earnings during and immediately after the conflict allowed them to acquire livestock, even in the inflated economy. Some appear to have carefully nurtured their savings for just such purposes. 10 The results, more than they undoubtedly imagined, significantly altered the traditional social balance among the peoples of Malawi's northernmost region. These changes were reflected not only in the post-war patterns of prestige and wealth, but also in all that money could buy, including education. 11

Chiwona, "Northern Chitipa," p. 7. Somewhat suggestive, though certainly not conclusive, evidence of careful saving can also be found in the statistics of the protectorate's Post Office Savings Bank, the only such facility readily available to Africans (although also used by some Europeans). During the war, total deposits continued to grow at a steady and impressive rate, with deposits easily exceeding withdrawals; in the immediate post-war years, these trends were dramatically reversed. Nyasaland Protectorate, Post Office Savings Bank, Report for the Year 1920 (Zomba: Government Printer, 1921), appendix II.

The conclusions of the previous two paragraphs were initially developed by one of my students at the University of Malawi, F.S.K. Chiwona, and have been substantially corroborated by further investigation. Chiwona, "Northern Chitipa," pp. 6-8.

The patterns of transference of wealth, which can be documented for the northern frontier reaches of Malawi, seem to have been repeated elsewhere. They did represent a break with the past, but they also provided one of the vehicles for easing Malawians into the future. For the first time, during the war, the modern money economy became a reality throughout the country. The wider circulation of currency as wage payments for wartime work made this evident to many, as did the trends of the immediate post-war years, particularly the cash sale of food for famine relief. There was as well an increased desire, within a few years following the war, to work for wages, in part motivated by a wish to pay taxes in cash rather than through labor on Nyasaland¹s European estates. 12

As the accumulation of wealth had helped in breaking down traditional social patterns, so the widespread appearance and acceptance of money--and the cash economy--opened new possibilities and provided a link to the future. A few far-sighted veterans chose to enter this new world headlong, opening small shops in competition with European and Asian traders. Most Malawians, however, were content simply with the new opportunities which they now enjoyed. For them, the appearance of money in the villages, where there had been little or none prior to 1918, signaled the arrival of a new element in economic life, one which opened the possibility of greater personal control over their own labor.

¹² Interview 76, Amisi Saidi, 3 April 1973. Questionnaires: KR/7, Wilson Kapenda Simkonda, 9 April 1973; MC/7, Verdiana Chamdimba, 19 April 1973; DZ/12, M. Kuthemba, 12 April 1974; ZA/14, Richard Msauka, 1 August 1974.

The knowledge that a money economy opened doors to the new world impinging upon African societies was accompanied by other war-inspired changes which lessened fears of the future. Most important were altered African perceptions of Europeans. The sheer destructiveness of war had made a profound impression, of course, reinforcing the conception of near absolute governmental power, particularly in the organization of violence. This seems to have encouraged a kind of collective African ambivalence, with both hatred and respect for the Europeans widespread and not infrequently present at the same time.

Regardless of whether hated or respected, Europeans were no longer feared. Hector Duff was correct when he observed that the war taught Africans that the British, the Germans, the Belgians, and the Portuguese 'were merely tribes,' quite capable of arguing among themselves. As individuals, too, whites were seen as just 'like any other man,' vulnerable and fearing death. A sense of equality came from these perceptions, fostered also by the spirit of having shared in the common battle and successful defense of the country. Little happened after the war to confirm these egalitarian attitudes, but they did provide Malawians with a confidence in their ability to survive in what was clearly a rapidly changing world.

Sir Charles Lucas, historian of the British empire at war, observed in 1921, that "what the War has done brutally and in haste

¹³Duff, "Nyasaland and the World War," chapter eleven, I.W.M.; questionnaire KS/5, Zikalindaine Katawala. 28 September 1973.

to increase knowledge and to engender a spirit of equality, missionary effort and education have long been doing in a better way." Perhaps Lucas was unaware that the same wartime processes he described, in fact undermined the mission programs he also praised. The teachings of European Christians, frequestly called into question by their African converts even before, as well as during, the war, provided little that Malawians could seize upon as effective aid in easing through the time of transition. Nor did the independent African Christians, whose one opportunity to fill such a role was dashed along with the Chilembwe rebellion, seem well fitted to bridging the chasm between past and future which was so apparent after the Great War.

In coming to grips with this transition, Malawians turned instead to forms of expression which had real roots in their traditions and could be adapted to the changes necessary for the future, or which were manifestly new and yet might be linked with more traditional expressions. The former can be seen in the revival of the <u>nyau</u> societies among the Chewa and related peoples. Just as secret societies grew up amid the post-war transformations of west Africa, attempting to alter society, ¹⁵ so Malawians drew upon their past and utilized a similar institution as an assertion of their confrontation with and even conquest of the European modes which symbolized the future.

¹⁴ Sir Charles Lucas, <u>The Partition & Colonization of Africa</u> (0xford: Clarendon Press, 1922), pp. 201-2.

¹⁵ Quinn, "The Beti of Cameroon," p. 725.

Conversely, the beni, mganda, and malipenga organizations throughout the country took strength from their expression of what was new and modified it to fit within the creative patterns of the past. Shepperson has suggested that these dances indicated "the confusion into which the white man's new order plunged Africans and their attempts to pull themselves out of it." The dance societies, however, reflected far more than confusion. Their stylized mockery of European officialdom and ceremony, no less than the nyau incorporation of Christian symbols within their ceremonies, were thoughtful, yet relatively quiet, demonstrations of keenly felt dissatisfaction.

The Nyasaland government recognized, even during the war, that "a growing spirit of independence" such as demonstrated in the <u>nyau</u>, <u>beni</u>, and related groups might develop. ¹⁷ But what did emerge in those organizations—and significantly it did not grow elsewhere—was a far cry from the panicked predictions by Colonial Office consultants of new and revived African "institutions through which consolidated race consciousness is being born, tribal barriers broken down, and coherence being established." ¹⁸ Actually, there was little overt political expression on the part of Africans following the war. Not even the native associations, usually

¹⁶ George Shepperson, Myth and Reality in Malawi (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 20.

¹⁷Smith to C.O., 13 August 1917, P.R.O., C.O. 525/74.

¹⁸ Phillips, "Tide of Colour," p. 130.

described as the seedbeds of Malawian politics, presented the "coherence" of political action which many expected, and their impact was unquestionably small. Of far more immediate effectiveness were the isolated and infrequent demonstrations of a decided minority of veterans who, disgusted at local conditions, might march to Government House in Zomba proudly wearing their old uniforms and medals, demanding changes which were sometimes made. 19

That the isolated individual, rather than any society or association, might make a political statement which would be translated into governmental action speaks volumes. Most of the Malawians who had been to the war, and most who stayed at home, were not active participants in any of the organized "safety valves" which were developed and nourished immediately after the armistice. The vast majority remained at their homes, working in their fields, and if they did anything extraordinary at all, it was to leave the country seeking work.

Not only were most Malawians not members of the various social and political groups formed in the aftermath of the conflict, but many were also unwilling to discuss the events of the campaign, even with friends and relatives. These men frequently thought their experiences too terrifying to share; a few may have been unwilling to disclose secrets about their own behavior. Often their reluctance was explained as if the war had been an initiation,

¹⁹D.M. Bandawe, letter to the <u>Malawi News</u> (12 October 1973), p. 10.

the secrets of which they could not pass on to others.²⁰ During festive occasions, though, and at reunions or even occasionally when inebriated, a few remembrances might slip out. Fathers, too, might tell their sons a little of what happened, perhaps even concluding with the telling remark that Europeans "all were fools."²¹

Without direct discussion and cross-fertilization of experiences, the resentments of the war were seldom translated into political expressions after the 1920s. Even in the native associations, nyau societies, and beni dance groups the relationship between the war and dissent from the actuality of European rule became further removed. This probably accounts for the anomolous judgment of some ex-servicemen that the Great War did little to change Malawian life. Despite those impressions, the war's impact was clearly immense. What happened--beyond the dances, the prayers, and the petitions--was an internalization of experience. What a man did, and what he suffered, was kept close to his heart. Actions based upon and even the full expression of these experiences, and feelings derived from them, waited upon later events, sometimes personal but ultimately in the rejections of European rule associated with the growth of widespread Malawian nationalism in the 1950s.

²⁰ Interviews: 6, Mwachande Makupete, 10 August 1972; 31, Kazibule Dabi, 15 September 1972. Questionnaires: MZ/28, Nkhweta Lupunga, 18 April 1974; PEA/2 Mr. Maumbo, 13 April 1974.

Interview 110, E.C. Banda, 15 August 1973. Also, interviews: 14, Stambuli Likuleka, 17 August 1972; 81; Mbwana Mdoka, 4 April 1973; 88, Tambuli Mbepule, 12 April 1973; 124, Augustine Paliya Chirwa, 16 August 1973. Questionnaires: TH/5, Mr. Sankhulani, 21 September 1973; TH/9 Mr. Nesula, 25 September 1973.

Questionnaires: LK/2, Patson Malata, 31 August 1973; TH/10, Mr. Mlolo, 26 September 1973.

In some cases individuals drew upon this reservoir of resentment to take their own actions, as did those who marched before the Governor's residence seeking redress. Into the 1930s, some Malawians penned tirades on the war when motivated only by requests for information on tribal history. "You should honour the owners of the country who helped you fight," wrote G. M. Kayima Wavyenji to the Mzimba_district commissioner. He continued:

We have died for you, but you have no gratitude, you are only grateful to strangers. Alas but all have died for nothing. We have died in the war and there have been strangers who have not died like ourselves.... Now at the end of your wars our children have been finished. Can't you give us something, say honour?

Many felt that even honor did not come, and their bitter memories were secreted until the nationalism of a new era brought them forth, although they were then "unduly overshadowed by the influence of the Second World War." The experiences of the first war, though, had marked the transition to a new era. And if those experiences did not remain at the forefront of African life thereafter, they did remain "a shame to people's souls." 25

²³Undated, untitled mss. by G.M. Kayima Wavyenji, with English translation, M.N.A., NNM 1/14/6.

George Shepperson, "Pan-Africanism and 'Pan-Africanism': Some Historical Notes," Phylon, 23(1962), 349.

²⁵Interview 126, Karonga Nkhata, 10 August 1973.

LIST OF REFERENCES

LIST OF REFERENCES

Beyond the usual published and archival sources, this study leans heavily-upon private source materials, most notably oral historical data developed, almost entirely, for the particular project. Throughout, I have attempted to balance these less traditional historical sources with others. This has not meant eschewing contradictory statements as irreconcilable or as undermining oral data. Rather, I have tried to understand the outlook and motives of each source, in this light assessing how each enriches the total picture. This approach, though hardly unique, has validity only to the extent that the sources themselves—described below—are of historical value.

Oral Historical Sources.

All of the oral data developed in my research reflects the remembered experiences of participants in events, or the retold recollections of the immediately preceding generation, usually of the fathers or uncles of my informants. Thus, these are not oral traditions, as properly understood. They do, however, represent probably the most literally accurate of all forms of oral testimony.

Interviews.

The foundation of my oral data is approximately one hundred eighty interviews, structured yet open-ended discussions, generally covering the broad range of wartime experiences. The first interviews, and about one-third of the total, were conducted by myself and by research assistants under my supervision at the two Malawi Army Old Soldiers' Homes, at Zomba and Mzuzu. Mr. Y. M. Juwayeyi and Mr. Solomon Liwewe were ideal assistants, not only interpreting and aiding but also conducting interviews in their own right. All of these interviews were recorded on tape, and transcribed directly into English.

Once these interviews were well under way, I began a program to conduct interviews in other areas of the country where it seemed the results would be most profitable: Mulanje, Mangoche, Nkhata Bay, Nkhotakota, Ntchisi, Nsanje, and Karonga districts. Mr. Juwayeyi and Mr. Liwewe ably undertook some of these without direct supervision. They also assisted in training three additional research assistants, Mr. S. J. Chilole, Mr. C. M. Manda, and Mr. A. K. Mbisa. In addition, Mr. E. C. Mandala, who had previous interviewing experience with Dr. J. M. Schoffeleers, agreed to undertake some research on my behalf.

For reasons both related to my time, largely taken up by teaching responsibilities, and the research climate within the country, these men undertook interviewing without direct supervision.

Mr. Chilole and Mr. Manda, who did most of this work, on several occasions early in their research did discuss with me at great

iength the questioning procedures and the individual interview process. Well over half of these interviews were recorded on tape and transcribed directly into English; the remainder were recorded in writing, in English and vernacular languages, by the interviewers and later transcribed into English scripts.

I have not undertaken here to list all the interviews. The ninety-three which have been actually cited appear in the various chapter notes, identified by reference number, the name of the respondent, and the date of the interview. Originals of the transcribed scripts remain in my possession. A copy of each will be deposited in the University of Malawi Library under an agreement whereby the University financed a considerable portion of this part of my research. Another copy of these interviews will be deposited with the Malawi National Archives. Further copies, subject to some restrictions on use, may be acquired directly from me by educational institutions willing to pay the costs of reproduction.

Questionnaires.

Early in my investigations, it became clear that the study would ideally need some information from all parts of the country. Yet limitations on time, resources, and fully reliable independent research assistants seemed to offer obstacles to the realization of that goal. In an attempt to overcome these difficulties and advance the research, I decided to undertake the preparation of and to arrange the administration of survey questionnaires concerning the First World War in Malawi, to be administered to those who had personal memories of the Great War as it related to the country.

The questionnaire developed had seventeen basic questions, including some biographical inquiries. The substantive questions were designed to elicit information which would compliment that being derived from the interviews. Each question was broad in scope (eg. "What happened in your village and other villages while the men were away at war?") to allow the greatest latitude in response. The possibility of limited answers was recognized, and a series of secondary questions also provided (eg. "Were there enough workers? Was there enough food? Was there enough money? What did the government do?") By using this range of primary and secondary questioning it was hoped to acquire more information within the relatively brief question schedule; this appears to have been largely realized.

I made a conscious decision to avoid questions of a particularized type which might be reducible to statistical analysis. Two questions, however, were inserted attempting to ascertain the numbers of men recruited from each village and chief's area; these proved to be of almost no use. The remainder of the questions were more of an anthropological survey type, with the content of each answer recorded as fully as possible. Since a body of full interviews existed as a control on the questionnaire data, analysis of the subjective responses was possible, and proved not only useful but vital, particularly in verifying and extending the scope of the study.

Questionnaire administrators were selected almost entirely from among my history students at the University of Malawi. Criteria for

selection were ability to work independently and area of the country to which the student had access. The students were given limited training, were told the purpose of the project, and were provided with instructions (which could be consulted as they worked) and letters of permission (to show to those whom they questioned). Each student was initially given a limited number of questionnaires to complete, usually ten; only those whose completed forms showed an ability to effectively solicit information were asked to undertake additional questioning. Understandably, the results were not always outstanding. On the whole, however, the questionnaires were reasonably well administered and the most useful responses recorded. Little verbatum quotation was set down, but in some cases this was done and was so indicated (as per the instructions). Only these quoted materials are used as such in the text of the study, whereas interviews, with benefit of direct transcripts, are quoted more liberally.

Just over three hundred questionnaires were completed from all but three of Malawi's twenty-four current districts, plus Mozambique. Of these more than one hundred seventy-five have actually been cited in the text, using a reference letter/number combination, the name of the respondent, and the date of questioning. I have not listed all the questionnaires here, but I have included a list of reference letters to aid the reader. Only the original questionnaires exist, in my possession. As with the interviews, though, they are available subject to restrictions to any educational institution willing to undertake the costs of reproduction.

The following list of reference numbers generally refer to present districts in Malawi, but reflect (in almost all cases) the residence of the respondent during the First World War.

- BT Blantyre
- CK Chikwawa
- CR Chiradzulu
- DW Dowa
- DZ Dedza
- KR Karonga
- KS Kasupe
- KU Kasungu
- LK Likoma Island
- LL Lilongwe
- MA Mangoche
- MC Mchinji
- MU Mulanji
- MW Mwanza
- MZ Mzimba
- NB Nkhata Bay
- NC Ntchisi
- NK Nkhotakota
- NS Nsanji
- NU Ncheu
- PEA Mozambique
- RU Rumphi
- SA Salima
- TH Thyolo
- ZA Zomba

Conversations.

In a very few cases, it was impossible to either tape record or write down the text of an interview. All of these interviews were

١

conducted by myself, and almost all with Europeans who were participants in the events they described or resident in wartime Nyasaland. My talks with these persons were more informal than the bulk of the interviews and more in the nature of conversations, which I have chosen to call them here. Although there exist no direct records of the proceedings, I did take copious notes of each conversation, which I have retained. When cited in the text, these conversations have been mentioned by the name of the person involved and the date and place the discussion took place.

Other Oral Historical Sources.

In three cases oral data has been used which was developed by other persons. The most important of these sources are the oral records of the Malawi Department of Antiquities. These are interviews conducted by members of the Department's staff which have been translated and transcribed; they are available in the Department's offices in Lilongwe and in the Library of Chancellor College, University of Malawi. In the text these have been identified by the name of the person interviewed, the date of the interview, and the Department of Antiquities oral records reference number. Two interviews were made available to me by Dr. K. M. Phiri from among those which he conducted in Mzimba district; these have been clearly identified in citations in the text. I am very grateful to Dr. Phiri for his kindness in this regard. Finally, I have used an interview with Mr. Isaac Jeremani, conducted by Mr. Masanya Banda on the

the M.B.C. and Mr. Banda for making a recording of the interview available to me.

Archival Sources.

A substantial portion of the research for this study was done in various archival collections. All of these are listed below, with appropriate expressions of my gratitude to the agencies and officials who made my work possible. I have not attempted to list all of the file numbers and series consulted in each archive, but have indicated the most important sources consulted in each place. Full citations, complete with file numbers where appropriate, have been given in the text.

Malawi National Archives.

The major archival sources are the Public Archives and the Historical Manuscripts collection of the Malawi National Archives, Zomba. I am grateful to the Government of Malawi for permission to consult materials in the Public Archives, and to the various authorities listed for permission to read in the Historical Manuscripts collections deposited in the National Archives.

Principal materials used from the Public Archives include:

A series, Department of Agriculture;

COM series, Commissions, but chiefly the records and documents of the Commission of Inquiry into the Native Rising Instigated by John Chilembwe;

GOA series, Office of His Excellency the Governor, which consists almost entirely of documents from the term of Governor Sir George Smith, from 1913 to 1923;

KAR series, King's African Rifles;

L series, Legal Department;

M series, Medical Department;

N series, Province and District Administration;

NVR series, Nyasaland Volunteer Reserve;

POL series, Police Department;

PWD series, Public Works Department; and

S series, Secretariat, a consolidated series consisting of documents concerning all matters of government business from, usually, 1919 forward.

Despite the effects of a spectacular fire in 1919 which destroyed the Secretariat building, and with it many of the Government's records, there are considerable materials in the Public Archives from the war years. None of the series, or individual files, are truly complete, but they do offer substantial source material for the period under study.

In addition, a number of the Historical Manuscripts collections, listed below, offer important information:

Philip Dunstan Bishop Papers, including a personal diary with eyewitness accounts of the battle of Karonga;

Frank Dupuis Papers, consisting of letters written in 1959 concerning personal experiences in Nyasaland and Mozambique during the First World War:

Universities Mission to Central Africa, Diocese of Malawi, and
Kota Kota Mission Papers, all consulted with the kind permission of
the Bishop of Central Africa, and consisting of correspondence files,

station log books, and other mission records from 1913 to 1925;

Mombera Native Association Minute Books, 1920-1925;

Blantyre Town Council Minute Books, 1915-1924; consulted with the consent of the Blantyre City Clerk; and

Livingstonia Mission Papers, consulted by permission of the General Secretary, Synod of Livingstonia, Church of Central Africa Presbyterian, containing minute books, station and school rolls and records, and letter books for the years 1913-1919.

National Archives of Rhodesia.

Although few materials directly concerning Nyasaland affairs remain in the National Archives of Rhodesia, having been transferred to the Malawi National Archives at the time of independence, there is considerable material on the First World War in central Africa. Most of these documents, whether in the Public Archives or the Historical Manuscripts collections, concern Southern and Northern Rhodesian participation in the defense of the Nyasaland-Rhodesian border with German East Africa and in the east African campaign. There are also some materials concerning Malawian migrants in the Rhodesias during wartime.

The most important materials used from the Public Archives include:

A series, Administrator's Office, mostly correspondence about the war in east and central Africa and official records concerning the Rhodesia Native Regiment;

B series, Defence Headquarters, including records of Colonel Murray's Column which operated from Nyasaland; and

N series, Chief Native Commissioner, especially files on war recruitment among the African population and on Malawians in Rhodesia during the war.

Of the Historical Manuscripts collections, the following were the most helpful:

Sir F. P. D. Chaplin Papers, personal correspondence of the administrator of Rhodesia during the war;

Lionel Cripps Papers, the correspondence and other materials of an outspoken missionary and African sympathizer;

William Joseph Ferguson Mackeoun Papers, diaries of a European officer serving in the east African campaign;

Alfred James Tomlinson Papers, including the war diaries of Tomlinson while he was Lieutenant Colonel and commanding officer of the Rhodesia Native Regiment;

Hugh Gerald Jones Papers, mostly photograph albums of the east African campaign;

Henry Rangeley Papers, reminiscences of a European wartime resident of Northern Rhodesia; and

Vernon Arthur New Papers, photograph albums from the period 1914-1918.

Public Record Office.

!nvaluable in completing the documentary picture of Nyasaland and east Africa during the Great War are the materials held by the Public Record Office, London. Files consulted for this study are:

C.O. 525, Colonial Office, Nyasaland correspondence;

- C.O. 537, Colonial Office, supplementary correspondence, east Africa:
 - C.O. 626, Colonial Office, Nyasaland sessional papers;
 - C.O. 534, Colonial Office, King's African Rifles correspondence;
 - W.O. 95, War Office, war diaries 1914-18;
- W.O. 106, War Office, Directorates of Military Operations and Intelligence, reports and correspondence;
- CAB 44, Cabinet Office, official war histories, compilations;
- CAB 45, Cabinet Office, official war histories, correspondence and papers.

Imperial War Museum.

The Library of the Imperial War Museum, London, holds several manuscripts which provide important material for this study; these are:

- H. L. Duff, "Nyasaland and the World War, 1914-1918," unpublished typescript;
- Edward G. Fenning Papers, letters of a Captain in the East.

 African Transport Corps; and

Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, war diaries, 1914-1918, four volumes of typescript translations into English.

Society of Malawi Library.

A variety of unclassified manuscript materials relating in part to the First World War in Malawi are held by the Society of Malawi, Blantyre. I am grateful to the Society, and to its Librarian,

- Mr. P. V. Turner, for permission to consult these materials. Those used in this study include:
- G. L. Baxter diaries, with material briefly relating to the Great War and the Chilembwe rising;
- S. S. <u>Chauncy Maples</u> logbook, with entries from 1914 to 1918 while the vessel was in government service on Lake Malawi;
- W. H. J. Rangeley Papers, including historical and anthropological materials relating to the war years; and

Aubrey Marriott Dalway Turnbull Papers, consisting of diaries, notebooks, photographs and various materials relating to Turnbull's government service in Nyasaland and occupied German East Africa from 1914 to 1919.

Malawi Army Pay and Records Office.

Through the kind permission of Major-General G. C. Matewere,
Commander of the Malawi Army, and the gracious assistance of Major
John Faithful, then officer commanding the Malawi Army Pay and
Records Office, Zomba, I was able to consult a number of files
relating to the history of the Malawi Army. These include:

Regimental Historical Records, First Battalion, King's African Rifles;

Nyasaland Field Force War Diary, 1914-1915;

- 2/1 King's African Rifles war diary, 1917-1918;
- 3/1 King's African Rifles war diary, 1918; and

Colonel H. P. Williams, "An Account of the part played by the 1st Regiment of the King's African Rifles in the Conquest of German East Africa," unpublished manuscript.

Museum of the Northamptonshire Regiment.

Among the memorabilia held by the Museum of the Northamptonshire Regiment are the extensive personal diaries of Colonel C. W. Barton.

During the First World War, Barton, an officer of the Northamptonshire Regiment, was seconded to the King's African Rifles and commanded several units of the First Regiment. I am grateful to Major D.

Baxter, Curator of the Museum, and his staff for their assistance in my research.

Rhodes House Library, Oxford University.

The extensive collection of African manuscripts held by Rhodes House Library, Oxford University, includes the following used in this study:

Sir Gordon Colville Papers, including unpublished manuscript and letters relating to experiences as a medical officer with 2/2 King's African Rifles during World War One; and

Hugh Stannus Stannus Papers, mostly photographs concerning medical service in east Africa and Nyasaland during the First World War.

Malawi Railways Archives.

By permission of the General Manager, Malawi Railways, I was able to consult materials in the company's historical records. These included correspondence, memorandums, and reports relating to railway operations during the period 1915-1925 and to the Chilembwe rising.

Other Unpublished Sources.

Privately Held Manuscripts and Materials.

Several privately held manuscripts were consulted for this study. I am extremely grateful to the holders of these manuscripts for their cooperation in allowing to consult the documents in their possession. The most valuable of these are:

Paul Cole-King, "A Letter to John Chilembwe," unpublished typescript in the possession of the author;

Frank Dupuis, "A Nobody in a Forgotten Campaign: A personal narrative on an adventurous voyage to East Africa sixty years ago, residence as a planter in Nyasaland, and service in the East African Campaign of World War I," undated, unpublished typescript held by the author;

Photograph collection, concerning wartime activities at the southern end of Lake Malawi, held by Mrs. G. H. Snowden, Blantyre;

H. J. P. Mathews, "History of Zomba Gymkhana Club (1906-1945)," unpublished typescript in the possession of John Faithful; and

St. Michael's College logbook, in the possession of the College, Malindi, Malawi.

Letters to the Author.

In several cases, when it was impossible to interview persons whose experiences related to the war years in Malawi, I attempted to contact them by letter. Two or three responded with lengthy letters, answering my questions about their experiences. In the text these

- have been clearly identified as letters, with their author and the date.
 - Unpublished Papers, Teses, and Dissertations.
- Boeder, Robert B. 'Malawians Abroad: The History of Labor Emigration from Malawi to Its Neighbors, 1890 to the Present.' Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1974.
- Chilivumbo, Alifeyo. "Chiwoda: A Dance and a Way of Life."
 Unpublished, mimeographed paper, University of Malawi. 1974.
- Chiwona, F. S. Kalikene. "The Impact of the First World War on Northern Chitipa." Unpublished history seminar paper, University of Malawi, 1972-1973.
- Juwayeyi, Y. M. "The Yao Chieftainship of Nkanda: A Preliminary History of its Origins and Growth to 1914." Unpublished history seminar paper, University of Malawi, 1972-1973.
- Kandawire, J. A. K. "Local Leadership and Socio-Economic Changes in Chingale Area of Zomba District in Malawi." Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1972.
- Mbegu, A. S. "The Life of Frederick Njilima." Unpublished history seminar paper, University of Dar es Salaam, n.d.
- Mhoni, H. W. "An Assessment of the Resistance and Banishment of Chimtunga Jere, 1914-1918." Unpublished history seminar paper, University of Malawi, 1973-1974.
- Mphande, C. Z. "Some Aspects of the History of the Tonga up to 1934." Unpublished history seminar paper, University of Malawi, 1968-1969.
- Mtalimanja, Benford. "The Dutch Reformed Church (Nkhoma Synod) and the Development of Rural Society in the Central Region of Malawi." Unpublished history seminar paper, University of Malawi, 1972-1973.
- Munthali, M. A. "The Issue of Labour in Nyasaland." Unpublished history seminar paper, University of Malawi, 1968-1969.
- Thawale, Tiyifyanji D. "The Impact of the Roman Catholic Church on the Life of the People of Mchinji District." Unpublished history seminar paper, University of Malawi, 1972-1973.

Newspapers and Serials.

Draft Estimates, Nyasaland Protectorate. 1919-1922.

Life and Work in Nyasaland. 1914-1919.

Mthenga wa ku Nyasa. 1914-1917.

Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle. 1910-1925.

Nyasaland Government Gazette. 1914-1920.

Nyasaland Protectorate. Annual Medical Report. 1918-1922.

Nyasaland Protectorate. Annual Report. 1916-1921.

Nyasaland Protectorate. Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture. 1916-1920.

Nyasaland Protectorate. Blue Book for the Year. 1914-1925.

Nyasaland Protectorate. Report of the Treasurer with the Financial Statements of the Protectorate. 1917.

Nyasaland Times. 1914-1923.

Rhodesia Defense Force Journal. 1914-1918.

Summary of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Nyasaland. 1914-1923.

Published Sources.

Primary Source Materials.

Achirwa, H. Simon. Letter to the Editor. <u>The Watchtower</u>, 35, 17 (1 September 1914).

Anon. (''Kalambo''). ''Maulana.'' <u>East Africa</u>, 1, 8(November 13, 1924), 208-9.

_____. "North Nyasa District and the War (1914-18)." Nyasaland Journal, 17, 1(January 1964), 16-23.

"Notes from Nyasaland." <u>Central Africa</u>, 36(1918),

_____. ("Africanus"). <u>The Prussian Lash in Africa</u>. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1918.

- Bailey, F. E. <u>Twenty-nine Years</u> Hard <u>Labour</u>. London: Hutchinson, n.d. (1934).
- Bandawe, Lewis M. <u>Memories of a Malawian</u>. Ed. B. Pachai. Blantyre: C.L.A.I.M., 1971.
- Chelemu, Allan. "Chinungu: A 1914-18 War Time Boma." Northern Rhodesia Journal, 4, 4(1960), 347-50.
- Chikwenga, Aibu. 'Aibu Chikwenga: An Autobiography.' Ed. C. A. Baker. Society of Malawi Journal, 25, 2(July 1972), 11-21.
- Chingota, Jailos. "An Autobiography." Nyasaland Journal, 14, 2 (July 1961), 13-26.
- [Churchward, A. C.]. "Influenza at Likwenu." <u>Central Africa</u>, 37 (1919), 92-3.
- Coudenhove, Hans. My African Neighbors: Man, Bird and Beast in Nyasaland. London: Jonathan Cape, 1925.
- Duff, Hector. Africa Small Chop. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1932.
- [Fisher], Bishop Cathrew. <u>Particulars of Fifty Marriage Cases in the Diocese of Nyasaland</u>. <u>Likoma: Universities Mission Press, 1926.</u>
- Hancock, W. K. and Jean van der Poel, eds. <u>Selections from the Smuts Papers</u>, Vol. III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.
- Hicks, Thomas H. <u>Hornbill Hill</u>. London: Central Africa House Press, 1953.
- J[ohnson], Archdeacon W. P. 'The 'Chauncy Maples'." Central Africa, 35(1917), 197-200.
- . ''Mala to Msinje.'' <u>Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle</u>, 55 (April 1917), 16.
- Langham, R. W. M. "Memories of the 1914-1918 Campaign." Northern Rhodesia Journal, 2, 1(1953), 49-60; 2, 4(1954), 79-92; 3, 3 (1957), 253-67; 4, 2(1959), 166-79.
- Laws, Robert. Reminiscences of Livingstonia. Edinburgh & London: Oliver and Boyd, 1934.
- Lettow-Vorbeck, Paul von (General). My Reminiscences of East Africa. London: Hurst and Blackett, 1920.
- Matthew, A Lustin F. "The Witness of the Chuncy Maples." Central Africa, 37(1919), 121-2.

- Mlenga, Ardwell. "Ardwell Mlenga: An Autobiography." Nyasaland Journal, 17, 2(July 1964), 25-8.
- Munby, Henry E. . "In Troubled Times." <u>Central Africa</u>, 33(1915), 39-40.
- M[unby], H[enry] E. "Peace Rejoicings at Kota Kota." <u>Central Africa</u>, 37(1919), 165-6.
- Mwase, George Simeon. Strike a Blow and Die. Ed. R. I. Rotberg. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967.
- Namonde, Twaya. "The Story of Twaya Namonde as Told by Himself."

 Nyasaland Journal, 16, 1(1963), 49-61.
- Napier, R. H. "The 'Tenga-Tenga'." In <u>Robert Helier Napier in Nyasaland</u>. Ed. A. Hetherwick. London: William Blackwood, 1925. Pp. 142-8.
- Northey, Edward. 'The East African Campaign.' African World Annual, 1918, pp. 75-6.
- Phillips, J. E. T. "The Tide of Colour." <u>Journal of the African</u> Society, 21(1921-1922), 129-35, 309-15.
- Shepperson, George. "Rain." Phylon, 12(1951), 171.
- Simpkin, Alice. Nursing in Nyasaland. London: U.M.C.A., n.d.
- Wigan, William Cecil. "Medical Work in Nyasaland." <u>Central Africa</u>, 37(1919), 68-9.
- Wilson, G. H. A Missionary's Life in Nyasaland. London: U.M.C.A., 1920(?).
- Winspear, Frank. <u>Some Reminiscences of Nyasaland</u>. Likoma: U.M.C.A., 1957.
- Wynn, W. E. Ambush. London: Hutchinson, 1937.

Secondary Materials.

- Alpers, Edward A. "Towards a History of the Expansion of Islam in East Africa: the Matrilineal Peoples of the Southern Interior." In The Historical Study of African Religion. Ed. T. O. Ranger and I. Kimambo. London: Heinemann, 1972. Pp. 172-201.
- . "Trade, State and Society among the Yao in the Nineteenth Century." Journal of African History, 10(1969), 405-20.
- Anon. "The Armistice in Africa." Central Africa, 37(1919), 31-2.

- Anon. 'The Asikari.' <u>Life and Work</u>, 2(Sept.-Oct., 1908), 234-5.
- . "The Campaign in East Africa, with special reference to the operations from the N.E. Rhodesia-Nyasaland Border, under Brigadier-General Edward Northey, C.B., A.D.C." Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 62(1917), 269-85.
- . "A German Appeal to Mohammedans in Africa." The Moslem World, 9(1919), 188-9.
- . "Influenza Epidemic in South Africa." The Hospital, (London), 65(1919), 305-6.
- _____. "Islam in Nyasaland." The Moslem World, 8(1918), 200-2.
- Printer, 1917.

 Nigerian Soldiers in East Africa. Lagos: Government
- ______. 'Our African Boys.'' <u>Central Africa</u>, 35(1917), 286-7.
- . "South African Engineers--lst Imperial Detachment--Nyasaland Field Force." South African Railways and Harbours Magazine, 12(1918), 89-91.
- Baker, Colin. "Tax Collection in Malawi: An Administrative History, 1891-1972." <u>International Journal of African Historical Studies</u>, 8(1975), 40-62.
- Balfour, Andrew and Henry Harold Scott. <u>Health Problems of the Empire</u>: Past, Present and Future. New York: Henry Holt, 1924.
- Barnekov, Timothy. "An Inquiry into the Development of Native Administration in Nyasaland, 1888-1939." Syracuse University Eastern Africa Occasional Paper no. 48.
- Belgique. Ministère de la Défense Nationale. <u>Les Campagnes</u> <u>Coloniales Belges, 1914-1918</u>, 3 tomes. Bruxelles, 1927.
- Africa, vol. 11, 1907-1932. London: U.M.C.A., 1957.
- Boeder, Robert B. "The Effects of Labor Emigration on Rural Life in Malawi." Rural Africana, 20(1973), 37-46.
- Bouniol, Joseph. The White Fathers and Their Missions. London: Sands and Co., 1929.
- Brawley, Benjamin G. Africa and the War. New York: Duffield, 1918.

- van Breda, H. J. "Some Reminiscences." <u>Northern Rhodesia Journal</u>, 5, 3(1963), 290-1.
- Brelsford, W. V., ed. <u>The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment</u>. Lusaka: Government Printer, 1954.
- Buell, Raymond Leslie. <u>The Native Problem in Africa</u>, 2 vols. 1928; rpt. London: Frank Cass, 1965.
- Capell, Lt. Col. A. E. <u>The 2nd Rhodesia Regiment in East Africa</u>. London: Simpson and Co., 1923.
- Chadwick, Owen. <u>Mackenziels Grave</u>. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959.
- Clifford, Hugh (Sir). The Gold Coast Regiment in the East African Campaign. London: John Murray, 1920.
- Coffin, Elanor. "A Dental Officer, W. F. MacKeown, in the 1914-18 War." Northern Rhodesian Journal, 5, 6(1964), 595-600, part 1; Zambia Journal, 6, 1(1965), 87-94, part 2.
- Coleman, G. "The African Population of Malawi: An Analysis of the Censuses between 1901 and 1966. Part One: The Level of Population." Society of Malawi Journal, 27, 1(1974), 27-45.
- Collyer, Brig. Gen. J. J. The South Africans with General Smuts in German East Africa, 1916. Pretoria: Government Printer, 1939.
- Congo, Belgique. Force Publique. <u>La Force Publique</u>. Léopoldville: Force Publique, 1956?
- Cornevin, Robert. "The Germans in Africa before 1918." Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, vol. I. (The History and Politics of Colonialism 1870-1914) ed. L. H. Gann and P. Duignan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Pp. 383-419.
- [Cripwell, H. A.?]. ("Regulus"). "Aids to Footslogging." The Outpost, 36, 1(Jan. 1958), 43-4; 36, 2(Feb. 1958), 26-7.
- Dane, Edmund. <u>British Campaigns in Africa and the Pacific, 1914-1918</u>. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1919.
- Davidson, Anstruther (Dr.). "Alkalis in the Treatment of Influenza."

 Journal of the American Medical Association, 71(1918), 1603.
- Downes, W. D. <u>With the Nigerians in German East Africa</u>. London: Methuen, 1919.
- Duff, Sir Hector Livingstone. This Small World of Mine. London: Nelson, 1936.

- Duff, Sir Hector Livingstone. "White Men's Wars in Black Men's Countries." The National Review (U.K.), 84(1925), 902-11.
- Ely, T. C. "Alkali Treatment Applied to the Acidosis of Epidemic Influenza." New York Medical Journal, 109(1919), 573-6.
- . "Alkalis in the Treatment of Influenza." <u>Journal of</u> the American Medical Association, 71(1918), 1431, 1603.
- Fendall, Brig. Gen. C. P. <u>The East African Force 1915-1919</u>. London: Witherby, 1921.
- Fox, H. Wilson. "Rhodesia and the War." <u>Journal of the African</u> Society, 14(1914-1915), 345-54.
- Fraser, Agnes R. <u>Donald Fraser of Livingstonia</u>. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1934.
- Fraser, Donald. <u>The New Africa</u>. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1928.
- Form and in the Wild African Setting of the Life of Daniel

 Mtusu. London: Seeley, Service and Co., 1925.
- Gann, L. H. A History of Northern Rhodesia, Early Days to 1953.

 London: Chatto and Windus, 1964.
- Gardner, Brian. German East: The Story of the First World War in East Africa. London: Cassell, 1963.
- Graebner, Thomas. <u>Prophecy and the War</u>. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1918.
- Greenstein, Robert. "The Nyasaland Government's policy toward African Muslims, 1900-25." In <u>From Nyasaland to Malawi</u>. Ed. Roderick
 J. Macdonald. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1975.
 Pp. 144-68.
- Gulliver, Pamela. "Dancing Clubs of the Nyasa." <u>Tanganyika Notes</u> and <u>Records</u>, 41(1955), 58-9.
- Harding, Col. Colin. Frontier Patrols. London: G. Bell, 1937.
- . "Rhodesia's War Services." The Outpost, 14, 9(Mar. 1937), 15-16.
- Hatchell, G. W. "The British Occupation of the Southwestern Area of Tanganyika Territory." <u>Tanganyika Notes and Records</u>, 51(1958), 131-55.

- Hayes, G. D. "Lake Nyasa and the 1914-18 War." Nyasaland Journal, 17, 2(July 1964), 17-24.
- Hazelton, P. 0. "Organization and Administration of Supply and Transport in the East African Campaign." The Royal Army Service Corps Quarterly, 2, 8(1920), 6-12.
- Hetherwick, A. "Nyasaland To-day and To-morrow." <u>Journal of the African Society</u>, 17(1917-1918), 11-19.
- , ed. <u>Robert Hellier Napier in Nyasaland</u>. London: William Blackwood, 1925.
- Hine, J. E. Days Gone By. London: John Murray, 1924.
- Hodges, G. W. T. "African Responses to European Rule in Kenya (to 1914)." In <u>Hadith 3</u>, ed. B. A. Ogot. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1971. Pp. 82-102.
- Hooker, J. R. 'Welfare Associations and other Instruments of Accommodation in the Rhodesias between the World Wars.' Comparative Studies in Society and History, 9(1965), 51-63.
- Journal of African History, 6(1965), 91-106.
- Hordern, Charles comp. <u>Military Operations in East Africa</u>, vol. I (August 1914 to September 1916). London: H. M. S. O. 1941.
- Johnston, Sir Harry H. <u>The Black Man's Part in the War</u>. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent, 1917.
- Koma-Koma, W. P. <u>M'ganda Kapena Malipenga</u>. Limbe: Malawi Publications and Literature Bureau, 1965.
- Letcher, Owen. Africa Unveiled. London: Waterlow and Sons, 1931.
- . Cohort of the Tropics. London: Waterlow and Sons, and Johannesburg: the Author, 1930.
- . ''German East Africa: the Southern Campaign.'' African World Annual, 1916, p. 99.
- _____. "The N. V. R." <u>The Nyasaland Times</u>, 20, 39(27 Sep. 1917),
- Linden, Ian. "Some Oral Traditions from the Maseko Ngoni." <u>Society</u> of Malawi Journal, 24, 2(July 1971), 61-73.
- Linden, Ian with Jane Linden. <u>Catholics, Peasants and Chewa</u>
 <u>Resistance in Nyasaland 1889-1939</u>. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
 University of California Press, 1974.

- Linden, Jane and Ian. "John Chilembwe and the New Jerusalem."

 <u>Journal of African History</u>, 12(1971), 629-51.
- Livingstone, W. P. <u>Laws of Livingstonia</u>. London: Hodder and Stoughton, n.d.
- Lloyd-Jones, W. K.A.R. London: Arrowsmith, 1926.
- Lohrentz, Kenneth P. "Joseph Booth, Charles Domingo, and the Seventh Day Baptists in Northern Nyasaland, 1910-12." <u>Journal of African History</u>, 12(1971), 461-80.
- Lucas, Sir Charles. The Empire at War, vol. IV. London: Oxford University Press, 1925(?).
- . The Partition and Colonization of Africa. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922.
- MacDonald, Roderick J. "The Socio-political Significance of Educational Initiatives in Malawi, 1899-1939." <u>Transafrican Journal of History</u>, 2, 2(1972), 69-93.
- MacKenzie, D. R. <u>The Spirit-Ridden Konde</u>. London: Seeley, Service and Co., 1925.
- Macpherson, Major-General Sir W. G. and Major T. J. Mitchell.

 <u>History of the Great War: Medical Services, General History</u>,
 vol. IV. London: H. M. S. O., 1924.
- Malawi. National Statistical Office. <u>Malawi Calendar of Local and National Events</u>. Zomba: National Statistical Office, 1966.
- Marwick, M. G. ''Notes on Some Chewa Rituals.'' <u>African Studies</u>, 27 (1968), 1-14.
- Mathews, J. J. P. "Forty Years On." Empire and Commonwealth, 30, 9(1954), 19-20.
- Meinertzhagen, Col. R. <u>Army Diary 1899-1926</u>. London: Oliver and Boyd, 1960.
- Melland, F. H.]. "Reconstruction in Central Africa." <u>Journal of the African Society</u>, 19(1919-1920), 92-100.
- Miller, Charles. Battle for the Bundu. New York: Macmillan, 1974.
- Mitchell, J. Clyde. <u>The Kalela Dance</u>. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956.
- Molyneux, C. F. "The History of the Northern Rhodesia Rifles."
 Northern Rhodesia Journal, 5, 2(1962), 161-9.

- Morrison, J. H. <u>Streams in the Desert: A Picture of Life in Livingstonia</u>. 1919; rpt. New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969.
- Moyse-Bartlett, Lt. Col. H. The King's African Rifles. Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1956.
- Muller, Emmanual. <u>Les Troupes du Katanqa et les Campagnes D'Afrique</u>
 1914-1918, 2 tomes. Bruxelles: Establishments Généraux
 d'Imprimerie, 1937.
- Mumba, Levi S. "Native Associations in Nyasaland." South African Outlook. 2 June 1924, pp. 140-1.
- Munby, H. E. 'Heathenism in the Hill Districts.' Central Africa, 41(1923), 77-8.
- . "Nyasaland Boys in South Rhodesia." <u>Central Africa</u>, 39 (1921), 200.
- Murray, S. S., comp. <u>A Handbook of Nyasaland</u>. London: Crown Agents, 1922.
- Newitt, M. D. D. <u>Portuguese Settlement on the Zambezi</u>. London: Longman, 1973.
- Norman, L. S. <u>Nyasaland without Prejudice</u>. London: East Africa, 1934.
- _____. "Rebellion." <u>Blackwood's Magazine</u>, 230(1931), 268-73.
- Ntara, S. Y. Man of Africa. Trans. T. Cullen Young. London: Religious Tract Society, 1934.
- Nurse, Euston John. <u>Prophecy and the War</u>. London: Skeffington, 1915.
- Nyasaland Protectorate. <u>Census of the Nyasaland Protectorate, 1921.</u>
 Zomba: Government Printer, 1921.
- . Report of a Commission to Enquire into and Report upon Certain Matters Connected with the Occupation of Land in the Nyasaland Protectorate. Zomba: Government Printer, 1920.
- Nyirenda, L. H. "Development of Mzimba Township." <u>The Malawian</u> <u>Geographer</u>, 11(1972), n.p.
- [01d, Walter Gorn]. The Great Devastation. London: W. Foulsham, 1914.
- Omer-Cooper, J. D. The Zulu Aftermath. London: Longman, 1966.

- Orr, G. M. 'Operations on Interior Lines in Bush Warfare.' <u>Journal</u> of the Royal United Service Institution, 70 (Feb. 1925), 127-34.
- O'Sullivan, J. J. "Campaign on German East Africa-Rhodesia Border."

 The Journal of the African Society, 15(1916), 209-215.
- Pachai, B. "An Assessment of the Events Leading to the Nyasaland Rising of 1915." In Malawi Past and Present. Ed. G. W. Smith, B. Pachai, and R. K. Tangri. Blantyre: C.L.A.I.M., 1971. Pp. 114-36.
- Aspects. In Malawi Past and Present. Eds. G. W. Smith, B. Pachai, and R. K. Tangri. Blantyre: C.L.A.I.M., 1971. Pp. 37-68.
- _____, Ed. The Early History of Malawi. London: Longman, 1972.
- _____. "The Issue of <u>Thangata</u> in the History of Malawi." <u>Journal of Social Science</u> (University of Malawi), 3(1975).
- Legacy." Journal of African History, 14(1973), 681-98.
- . Malawi: The History of the Nation. London: Longman, 1973.
- Page, M. E. "David Livingstone and the Jumbe of Nkhotakota."

 Rhodesian History, 3(1972), 29-39.
- . "The Manyema Hordes of Tippu Tip: A Case Study in Social Stratification and the Slave Trade in Eastern Africa." International Journal of African Historical Studies, 7(1974), 69-84.
- Slave Trade." Etudes D'Histoire Africaine, 6(1974), 105-17.
- Phimister, I. R. "The 'Spanish' Influenza Pandemic of 1918 and its Impact on the Southern Rhodesian Mining Industry." The Central African Journal of Medicine, 19(1973), 143-8.
- Phiri, D. D. James Frederick Sangala. Blantyre: Longman, 1974.
- Pike, I. G. and G. T. Rimmington. <u>Malawi: A Geographical Study</u>. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Pollard, A. F. The Commonwealth at War. London: Longman, 1917.
- Pollock, Norman H., Jr. <u>Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia</u>: <u>Corridor to the North</u>. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1971.

- Quinn, Frederick. "An African Reaction to World War I: the Beti of Cameroon." Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, 13(1973), 722-31.
- Rangeley, W. H. J. "Notes on Cewa Tribal Law." <u>Nyasaland Journal</u>, 1, 3(1948), 1-68.
- Ranger, T. O. "African Attempts to Control Education in East and Central Africa, 1900-1939." Past and Present, 32(1965).
- Beni Ngoma. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975.
- Rotberg, Robert I. "Psychological Stress and the Question of Identity: Chilembwe's Revolt Reconsidered." Protest and Power in Black
 Africa. Eds. R. I. Rotberg and A. A. Mazrui. New York: Oxford
 University Press, 1970. Pp. 337-73.
- . The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967.
- Russell, E. A. "The Last Phase of the East African Campaign, 1914-18." Rhodesiana, 17(1967), 41-55.
- Sampson, Phillip J. The Conquest of German East. Cape Town: Argus Printing and Publishing Co., 1917.
- Sanderson, F. E. "The Development of Labour Migration from Nyasaland, 1891-1914." <u>Journal of African History</u>, 2(1961), 259-71.
- Savage, Donald C. and J. Forbes Monroe. "Carrier Corps Recruitment in the British East Africa Protectorate, 1914-1918." <u>Journal of African History</u>, 7(1966), 313-42.
- Schoffeleers, Matthew. "Livingstone and the Mang'anja Chiefs." In Livingstone: Man of Africa. Ed. B. Pachai. London: Longman, 1975. Pp. 111-30.
- and Pre-colonial Documents." In <u>Early History of Malawi</u>. Ed.

 B. Pachai. London: Longman, 1972. Pp. 91-103.
- of the Nomi Labor Societies in the Nsanje District of Malawi, c. 1891 to 1972." Rural Africana, 20(1973), 11-25.
- Schoffeleers, Matthew and Ian Linden. 'The Resistance of Nyau Societies to the Roman Catholic Missions in Colonial Malawi.' In The Historical Study of African Religion. Ed. T. O. Ranger and Isaria Kimambo. London: Heinemann, 1972. Pp. 252-73.

- Shankland, Peter. The Phantom, Flotilla. London: Collins, 1968.
- Sharpe, Alfred. The Backbone of Africa. London: Witherby, 1921.
- Shepperson, George. "The African Abroad or the African Diaspora."

 In Emerging Themes of African History. Ed. T. O. Ranger.

 Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968. Pp. 152-76.
- . Joseph Booth and the Africanist Diaspora. Evanston:
 Northwestern University Program of African Studies, 1972.
- of Islam_in British Central Africa." In Islam in Tropical
 Africa. Ed. I. M. Lewis. London: Oxford University Press,
 1966. Pp. 194-205.
- Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, 23(June 1958), 12-46.
- Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, 26(1959), 23-33.
- University Press, 1966. Evanston: Northwestern
- in Action. Ed. Sylvia L. Thrupp. The Hague: Mouton, 1962.

 Pp. 144-59.
- Notes." Phylon, 23(1962), 346-58.
- In The Early History of Malawi. Ed. B. Pachai. London: Longman, 1972. Pp. 405-28.
- Shepperson, George and Thomas Price. <u>Independent African</u>. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1958.
- Short, Phillip. <u>Banda</u>. London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974.
- Sibley, J. R. <u>Tanganyikan Guerrilla</u>: <u>Fast Africa Campaign 1914-18</u>. London: Paul Ballantine, 1973.
- Sloley, H. C. "The African Native Labour Contingent and the Welfare Committee." <u>Journal of the African Society</u>, 17(1917-1918), 199-211.
- Smith, Sir George. "Nyasaland and General Northey's Campaign." In The Empire at War. Ed. Sir Charles Lucas. London: Oxford University Press, 1925(?). IV, 253-80.

- Stiénon, Charles. <u>La Campagne Anglo-Belge de l'Afrique Orientale</u>
 Allemande. Paris et Nancy: Berger-Levrault, 1918.
- Tangri, R. African Reaction and Resistance to the Early Colonial
 Situation in Malawi, 1891-1915. Central Africa Historical
 Association Local Series Pamphlet No. 25. Salisbury, 1968.
- Taute, M. "A German Account of the Medical Side of the War in East Africa, 1914-18." <u>Tanganyika Notes and Records</u>, 8(1939), 1-20.
- Taylor, John V. and Dorothea A. Lehmann. <u>Christians of the Copperbelt</u>. London: SCM Press, 1961.
- Turnbull, A. M. D. "Extract from the Diary of the Late A. M. D. Turnbull." Nyasaland Journal, 15, 2(July 1962), 35-7.
- Union of South Africa. Ministry of Defense. The Union of South Africa and the Great War, 1914-1918. Pretoria: Government Printer, 1924.
- Van Velson, J. "Some Early Pressure Groups in Malawi." In <u>The Zambesian Past</u>. Ed. E. Stokes and R. Brown. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966. Pp. 376-412.
- Walmsley, Leo. <u>Flying and Sport in East Africa</u>. Oxford: Blackwood, 1920.
- Warhurst, P. R. "Portugal's Bid for Southern Malawi, 1882-1891."

 In Malawi Past and Present. Eds. G. W. Smith, B. Pachai, and R. K. Tangri. Blantyre: C.L.A.I.M., 1971. Pp. 20-36.
- Weston, Frank (Bishop of Zanzibar). "The Bishop of Zanzibar in German East Africa." <u>Central Africa</u>, 35(1917), 27-36.
- Wienholt, Arnold. The Story of a Lion Hunt. London: Andrew Melrose, 1922.
- Willan, R. G. M. "The Road Up Zomba Mountain." <u>Nyasaland Journal</u>, 16, 1(1963), 62-70.
- Williamson, Jesse. <u>Usefu! Plants of Malawi</u>. Zomba: Government Printer, 1972.
- Wilson, G. H. "The Labour Problem in Nyasaland." The East and the West, January 1921, pp. 27-38.
- Wilson, M. B. W. "Up at Chowe's." Central Africa, 33(1915), 97-8.
- Young, Cullen and Hastings Banda, eds. <u>Our African Way of Life</u>. London and Redhill: Lutterworth Press, 1946.