

THE EFFECTS OF INFLUENCE FEEDBACK
AND NEED INFLUENCE ON THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCENTIVE
MAGNITUDE AND ATTITUDE CHANGE

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This is to certify that the

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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECTS OF INFLUENCE FEEDBACK AND NEED INFLUENCE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCENTIVE MAGNITUDE AND ATTITUDE CHANGE

by Charles R. Berger

Dissonance theorists suggest that the less the justification (e.g. monetary incentives) for engaging in belief-discrepant behavior, the more individuals' attitudes will change in the belief-discrepant direction. Incentive theorists posit the opposite relationship between incentive magnitude and self-persuasion. The present study sought to produce both dissonance and incentive effects, depending on persons' levels of need to influence (n Influence).

It was assumed that high n Influence persons would regard the opportunity to influence others as sufficient justification for engaging in belief-discrepant behavior; however, low n Influence persons should stress other loci of justification such as monetary incentives. Thus, it was predicted that at the level of simple commitment to engage in belief-discrepant behavior, there would be an inverse relationship between incentive magnitude and attitude change among persons with low n Influence, while this relationship would not hold for high n Influence persons.

It was further assumed that when compared to low n Influence persons, high n Influence individuals would be more sensitive to cues indicative of successful influence of others. It was hypothesized that if a person with high n Influence took a belief-discrepant position on



an issue and successfully persuaded another person to adopt that position, the high n Influence communicator would manifest greater self-persuasion than would a successful low n Influence communicator. Finally, in respect to overall self-persuasion, a third hypothesis predicted that high n Influence communicators would display greater self-persuasion than would low n Influence communicators.

Three hypotheses concerning message variables were also tested. Following dissonance theory, it was assumed that low n Influence persons encoding belief-discrepant messages under low incentive conditions would experience more cognitive stress than would high n Influence encoders or low n Influence persons encoding under high incentive conditions. Based on the results of prior studies, it was predicted that low n Influence persons encoding under low incentive conditions would make more cross-outs and insertions, use fewer first person pronouns, and encode longer sentences than would persons in the other three conditions.

Measures of n Influence and of attitudes toward college student draft deferments were initially obtained from undergraduate students during class time. Approximately three weeks later, subjects reported to the main experiment. Here, subjects were offered either \$2.50 or 50 cents to write essays favoring the elimination of draft deferments for college students. Most subjects strongly opposed this position initially. Subjects were told that their essays would be read and reacted to by other students who also opposed the elimination of deferments.



Subjects were paid before essay writing and their attitudes toward the draft deferment issue were assessed. After subjects wrote their essays, the essays were taken to another room where bogus information was put on each essay. Some subjects received comments and ratings which indicated successful influence, while other subjects received failure information. After subjects read the comments on their essays, attitudes toward the draft deferment issue were again measured.

At the level of simple commitment, no support was found for the predicted inverse relationship between incentive magnitude and attitude change among low n Influence persons. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, high n Influence persons who received success feedback tended to manifest greater self-persuasion than did successful low n Influence persons. As predicted by Hypothesis 3, high n Influence persons displayed greater self-persuasion than did low n Influence persons. Finally, two of the three message hypotheses were partially supported: Although no significant effects were found for the sentences length measure, low n Influence persons in the low incentive condition and high n Influence persons in the high incentive condition used fewer first person pronouns and made more cross-outs and insertions in their belief-discrepant messages than did persons in the other two conditions. The results were discussed in light of relevant dissonance and incentive theory interpretations.



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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

Most research in communication and persuasion has focused on audience effects; that is, situations in which some source attempts to change audience attitudes. A second concern of persuasion researchers has been with individual differences related to the acceptance of social influence (Hovland and Janis, 1959). But until recently, relatively little attention has been paid to the effects of sources' encoding persuasive messages on their own subsequent attitudes and behavior. Within this general framework, the present study examines the more specific issue of attitudinal consequences of belief-discrepant message encoding behavior. Quite frequently, persons are induced or required to behave at variance with their private beliefs. For example, debaters frequently argue a side of an issue which is at odds with their own attitudes, and persons in formal organizations take public stands that are contrary to their private beliefs. What are the effects of such counterattitudinal behavior on a person's private beliefs? Moreover, what variables maximize or minimize attitude change in this self-persuasion situation?

The present study examines several potentially relevant variables. In particular, the study deals with the effects of need to influence (n Influence), success at persuasion, and monetary incentives on the magnitude of attitude change following the encoding of a belief-discrepant message. Moreover, consideration is given to the possible joint effects

of n Influence and magnitude of monetary incentives on encoding performance. It should be noted that this study represents the first attempt to employ n Influence in a persuasion experiment. Furthermore, since the n Influence variable has been used in few prior studies, its use in the present study was considered exploratory. In this chapter, attention will be given to prior research relevant to the self-persuasion phenomenon. Also, a rationale and hypotheses will be presented for the present study.

Prior Research on Self-Persuasion

A current, controversial problem in the area of communication and persuasion concerns the relationship between incentives for engaging in counterattitudinal behavior and attitude change following the counterattitudinal act. Early studies related to the self-persuasion problem (Janis and King, 1954; King and Janis, 1956) found that persons who actively engaged in belief-discrepant behavior showed greater attitude change in the advocated direction than did persons who passively listened to a persuasive message. Furthermore, persons who improvised arguments in support of a belief-discrepant position changed their attitudes more than persons who merely read counterattitudinal materials.

When discussing the results of the two studies cited above, Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953), argue that the superiority of improvised role-playing over passive listening in inducing opinion change is due to the tendency for persons in the role-playing situation to associate themselves with the belief-discrepant statements they make through implicit labeling responses. Hovland, Janis, and Kelly (1953) further assert:

Thus the implicit labeling responses induced by improvisation might sometimes be a key mediating factor that helps to explain why certain methods of eliciting overt verbalization facilitate opinion change whereas other methods fail to do so. (p. 236)

This statement implies that when a person is induced to argue against his own beliefs, the more arguments he improvises supporting the belief-discrepant position and the more he associates himself with these arguments the greater his attitude change toward the new position.

The position outlined above has been extended and elaborated in recent years by Janis and Gilmore (1965) and Elms and Janis (1965). These researchers are the main proponents of so-called incentive theory. In discussing incentive theory, Janis and Gilmore (1965) assert:

According to this incentive theory, when a person accepts the task of improvising arguments in favor of a point of view at variance with his own personal convictions, he becomes temporarily motivated to think up all good positive arguments he can, and at the same time suppresses thoughts about the negative arguments which are supposedly irrelevant to the assigned task. This 'biased scanning' increases the salience of the positive arguments and therefore increases the chances of acceptance of the new attitude position. A gain in attitude change would not be expected, however, if resentment or other interfering affective reactions were aroused by negative incentives in the role-playing situation. (pp. 17-18)

Janis and Gilmore assume that by increasing monetary incentives for engaging in counterattitudinal behavior, or by making other aspects of the social situation within which belief-discrepant behavior occurs more desirable, persons will be more highly motivated to improvise arguments in favor of the belief-discrepant position and more willing to identify themselves with the arguments they improvise. Thus, as incentives increase, opinion change toward the position advocated should also increase.


In contrast to incentive theory, dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), clearly predicts an inverse relationship between incentive magnitude and attitude change following a belief-discrepant act. Festinger (1957) states,

"It also becomes apparent...that the magnitude of the reward or punishment, that is, the attractiveness and desirability of the offered reward or the unpleasantness and undesirability of the threatened punishment, is an important determinant of the magnitude of dissonance which exists once compliance is exhibited. Too great a reward or punishment will result in only little dissonance. (p. 91)"

The preceding statement implies that too much justification for engaging in belief-discrepant behavior will generate little dissonance and consequently result in little attitude change.

There is a body of evidence which bears on both incentive theory and dissonance theory predictions. Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) offered subjects either 20 dollars or one dollar to tell an incoming subject (actually an accomplice) that a dull, boring task they had just completed was interesting and enjoyable. After engaging in this belief-discrepant communication behavior, subjects rated the task a second time. The results indicate that subjects in the one dollar condition rated the task significantly more enjoyable than did subjects in the 20 dollar condition. Since subjects in the one dollar condition supposedly received less justification, this result lends support to dissonance theory.

In another study supportive of dissonance theory, Cohen (1962) offered subjects either 10 dollars, five dollars, one dollar, or 50 cents to write belief-discrepant essays. As in the Festinger and Carlsmith study, a significant inverse relationship was found between



incentive magnitude and attitude change; i.e. subjects receiving small rewards manifested significantly more attitude change than subjects who received large rewards.

Brehm and Cohen (1962) argue that under conditions of low justification, mere commitment to engage in a counterattitudinal behavior is sufficient to produce dissonance and subsequent attitude change. This position clearly runs counter to the incentive theory notion of improvisation as a mediating factor in the production of opinion change. Hunt and Miller (1968) found support for Brehm and Cohen's position. In their study, subjects were instructed to encode belief-discrepant statements on the issue of disarmament. Before actually encoding the statements, the subjects' attitudes toward disarmament were assessed. Hunt and Miller found that subjects who scored high on Rokeach's dogmatism scale changed their attitudes significantly more than low dogmatic scorers. Moreover, subjects who were instructed to encode belief-congruent or irrelevant statements did not manifest significant attitude change. Thus, it appears that commitment to encode belief-discrepant messages may be sufficient to produce attitude change, at least among close-minded individuals.

Rosenberg (1965) contends that subjects offered high rewards in the Festinger and Carlsmith study experienced evaluation apprehension. Evaluation apprehension is the tendency for participants in psychological experiments to think that the experimenter is evaluating their mental health. Rosenberg argues that under conditions such as being offered 20 dollars to lie, the subject may think that the experimenter is trying to determine whether he can be bribed. Thus, the subject perceives the

experiment as a test of his honesty or his autonomy and resists attitude change under high reward conditions. Rosenberg further suggests that by separating the commitment and the reward phases of the self-persuasion experiment from the attitude measurement phase, evaluation apprehension can be reduced in the high reward condition. As a consequence, more attitude change should be manifested in the high reward condition than in the low reward condition.

To test his position, Rosenberg (1965) conducted a study in which he employed a two experiment guise to separate the belief-discrepant essay writing task from attitude measurement. Upon arriving at the experimenter's office, subjects were told that they would have to wait for the experiment to begin. The experimenter suggested that instead of waiting they could participate in another experiment being conducted by a "graduate student" in the Education Department. Subjects then reported to the "graduate student," who asked them to write counter-attitudinal essays. Before writing their essays, subjects were promised either five dollars, one dollar, or 50 cents for their essay writing. After completing the task, subjects returned to the first experimenter. Subjects then filled out a questionnaire which contained items relevant to the belief-discrepant topic dealt with in their essays.

Rosenberg's results strongly support the incentive theory position. Subjects in the five dollar condition changed their attitudes significantly more than subjects who received one dollar or 50 cents. While this evidence supports Rosenberg's prediction regarding the effects of evaluation apprehension, Aronson (1966) points to some problems in the Rosenberg experiment. Aronson argues that in the Cohen (1962)

experiment, in which an inverse relationship was found between incentive magnitude and attitude change, the project was attributed to a prestigious sponsor. By contrast, Rosenberg's (1965) subjects were asked to participate in a little project being conducted by a "graduate student" in the Education Department. Aronson asserts that this induction lowered the prestige of the sponsor in the Rosenberg study. Aronson further suggests that subjects in the 50 cents condition did not take the essay writing task seriously because the 50 cent payment suggested that the experiment was a trivial one being conducted in a low prestige department. In the case of the high reward subjects, the five dollar payment indicated that the experiment was important, even though it was being conducted in a low prestige department. Thus, the five dollar subjects tried harder and changed their attitudes more. It seems that Aronson's explanation for Rosenberg's results is very similar to the incentive theory position which Aronson himself opposes.

Studies performed by Janis and Gilmore (1965) and Elms and Janis (1965) shed some light on the sponsorship issue mentioned above, as well as the commitment only versus actual performance issue discussed earlier. Janis and Gilmore offered subjects either 20 dollars or one dollar to write counterattitudinal essays about disliked college courses. In addition, at each of the two levels of monetary incentive, some subjects were told that the experimenter was collecting information to be used by leading universities in the country (favorable sponsorship), while other subjects were informed that the essays would be used in an advertising campaign to be conducted by a book publisher (unfavorable sponsorship). Finally, some subjects actually wrote essays, while others did not.

The findings indicate that subjects in the active writing-favorable sponsorship group changed their attitudes most, but the monetary reward variable had no significant effect on attitude change. Moreover, while not significant, attitude change among subjects who only committed themselves to write was consistent with dissonance expectations, i.e., the unfavorable sponsorship subjects showed more change.

Elms and Janis (1965) conducted a study similar to that of Janis and Gilmore. Again, Elms and Janis manipulated favorability of sponsorship, overt versus no overt role-playing, and monetary incentive. Since Elms and Janis felt that the 20 dollar offer in the Janis and Gilmore study may have made subjects suspicious, thus interfering with improvisation and attitude change, subjects were offered a lower range of monetary incentives for their essay writing. The findings indicate that subjects who actually wrote essays for a favorable sponsor under conditions of high monetary reward showed the greatest attitude change. This pattern was not replicated in the no overt role-playing group.

Both the Janis and Gilmore and the Elms and Janis studies support the incentive theory viewpoint regarding the relationship between justification and self-persuasion. In addition, the results cast some doubt on the generality of Brehm and Cohen's argument that mere commitment to engage in belief-discrepant behavior is sufficient to produce attitude change. It is, of course, seemingly difficult to reconcile the results of these two studies with the findings of the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) and the Cohen (1962) studies cited earlier. In attempting such a reconciliation, Rosenberg (1966), argues that Festinger and Carlsmith subjects were set to deceive the "new subject." He asserts that this deception set will lead to an inverse relationship between

incentive magnitude and attitude change. However, when a subject is asked to write a belief-discrepant essay, he must examine his position more closely. Rosenberg contends that this self-examining set results in a positive relationship between level of incentive and attitude change. But in developing this rationale, Rosenberg overlooks the findings obtained by Cohen (1962) which support an inverse relationship between incentive magnitude and attitude change in an essay writing situation.

A study conducted by Carlsmith, Collins, and Helmreich (1966) bears directly on the issue raised by Rosenberg. In one-half of their experiment, Carlsmith et. al. essentially replicated the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) study. Subjects were given a dull task to perform and were offered either five dollars, one dollar and 50 cents, or 50 cents to tell an incoming subject (a confederate) that the experiment was interesting, exciting, and enjoyable. In the other half of the experiment, subjects performed the same dull task. But these subjects were then offered the same range of monetary incentives to write an essay about the positive nature of the experiment. Subjects in this condition were told that some ideas and points from their essays might be used to construct a new description of the task which would be read to succeeding subjects. However, they were assured that they would not be identified in any way. After the role-players had told the accomplice that the experiment was interesting and after the essay writers had finished their essays, ratings of the task were obtained in "another experiment" - a procedure employed to minimize the effects of Rosenberg's evaluation apprehension.

The results obtained by Carlsmith et. al. are relatively clear. Significant inverse relationships between incentive magnitude and ratings of interest and of fun were obtained in the face-to-face role-playing condition, while significant positive relationships between incentive level and ratings of interest and of fun were obtained in the essay-writing condition. Thus, the role-playing findings support dissonance theory, while the essay findings support incentive theory predictions. Taken as a whole, the findings seem to support Rosenberg's notions of deception set and self-examining set as determinants of the relationship between incentive magnitude and attitude change.

However, a study conducted by Linder, Cooper, and Jones (1967) casts doubt on Rosenberg's (1966) distinction between deception set and self-examining set. Linder et. al. reason that in the Cohen (1962) study discussed above, subjects had a relatively large amount of freedom to choose not to comply when asked to write belief-discrepant essays. In the Rosenberg study (1965) subjects had relatively little freedom to choose not to engage in the essay writing task. Linder et. al. argue that a person who has relatively greater freedom of choice to engage in belief-discrepant behavior will experience more dissonance than when he has little decision freedom.

In their experiments Linder et. al. offered subjects either two dollars and 50 cents or 50 cents to write belief-discrepant essays. After the task was explained and the money offered, some subjects were explicitly advised that they could choose not to write the essay and could leave the experimental room. Other subjects were not explicitly given this option. Linder et. al.'s results clearly support their

hypotheses: In the high choice groups significant inverse relationships between incentive magnitude and attitude change were obtained, but this relationship was reversed in the low choice group.

In contrast to the studies cited above, other researchers have found relationships between attitude change following a belief-discrepant act and positive or negative reinforcement given after performance of the behavior. Experiments performed by Scott (1957), Scott (1959), and Bostrom, Vlandis, and Rosenbaum (1961) support the notion that positive reinforcement of belief-discrepant behavior leads to greater attitude change than does negative or no reinforcement. However, a study by Wallace (1966) suggests that rewarding different aspects of counterattitudinal performance may yield differential amounts of attitude change. In his study, Wallace had subjects assume a counterattitudinal position in a debate. At the conclusion of the debate some subjects received "audience ratings" indicating that their style of presentation was superior to other students, but that the content of their presentation was average. Other subjects were told that their style was average but that the content of their presentation was superior. A control group was told that they were average on both dimensions. Wallace found that subjects in the superior style-average content group manifested significantly more attitude change than did subjects in the other conditions.

Several considerations emerge from this brief review of the self-persuasion literature. First, as Insko (1967) has pointed out, it appears that dissonance theory needs revision, at least in terms of predicting the relationship between incentive magnitude and attitude

change in the self-persuasion situation. Of course, this same need for revision is also relevant to incentive theory. Second, the results obtained by Carlsmith et. al. (1966) and Linder et. al. (1967) point to the necessity for searching out relevant variables that will delineate the circumstances under which incentive theory predictions will hold and the circumstances under which dissonance theory predictions will hold. It appears that neither theory is "correct," and that both seem to predict rather well in different situations.

A final point concerns the attention that prior researchers have paid to subjects' message output. Both dissonance and incentive theories appear to have implications regarding encoding performance; however, relatively little effort has been directed at the investigation of message differences among various treatment groups. Most of the attention given to such differences has involved the measurement of somewhat gross, subjective ratings of subjects' verbal output.

Given the assumption that dissonance is tension producing, it seems reasonable to suggest that as tension increases, encoding performance should be impaired. Studies conducted by Stolz and Tannenbaum (1963), Miller (1964), and Combs (1968) generally support the proposition that negative audience feedback disrupts encoding performance. Greenberg (1960) found that subjects who encoded written messages under high cognitive stress took more encoding time, had lower rates of production (words/minute), made more grammatical, spelling and punctuation errors, produced less readable messages, relied more heavily on substantive parts of speech (nouns, pronouns, and verbs), and relied less on descriptive parts of speech (adjectives and adverbs) than did subjects who encoded under low stress conditions. Bettinghaus and Preston (1964)

reported that subjects encoded belief-congruent statements more rapidly than belief-discrepant statements. This evidence suggests that subjects who encode belief-discrepant essays under conditions of low justification should display quite different encoding patterns than those who encode under conditions of high justification. This expectation is based on the assumption that subjects who encode belief-discrepant essays under low justification conditions experience more stress than subjects who encode under high justification conditions. Thus, according to dissonance theory, maximal decrement in encoding performance should be observed in the low justification (low reward) group. Incentive theory predicts better encoding performance in the self-persuasion situation as incentives are increased, at least up to some optimal point.

Table 1 contains the results of message analyses performed on the verbal output of subjects in several of the self-persuasion experiments cited earlier.

Table 1. Results of Message Analyses Performed in Six Self-Persuasion Studies

<u>STUDY</u>	<u>VARIABLES</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
Festinger-Carlsmith	1. "Strength" of S's positive statements about the task.	NSD
	2. Rating of overall content	NSD
	3. Rating of persuasiveness of S	NSD
	4. Amount of time S spent discussing task (not actual time, but rated)	NSD
Janis-Gilmore	1. Arguments supporting position	SS in public sponsor - \$20.00 condition gave the largest number
	2. Arguments against position	NSD

Table 1 (con't)

<u>STUDY</u>	<u>VARIABLES</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
Elms- Janis	1. Quality of arguments	Overt role-players gave higher quality arguments in the favorable sponsorship condition.
	2. Length of essay	Higher paid <u>Ss</u> produced longer essays.
Rosenberg	1. Length of essay	Higher paid <u>Ss</u> produced longer essays
	2. Basic persuasiveness of essay	Higher paid <u>Ss</u> produced more persuasive essays
Carlsmith <u>et. al.</u>	1. Role-play performance	
	a. Persuasiveness	NSD
	b. Overall positiveness	NSD
	c. Overall positiveness and conviction	NSD
	d. Time spent on topic	NSD
	e. Dissociation of self from content	NSD
	2. Accomplice's ratings of <u>S</u>	
	a. Rated <u>Ss</u> on l.a., l.b., and l.c.	NSD
	b. Apparent conflict	\$.50 <u>Ss</u> displayed more conflict
	c. Signs of discomfort	NSD
	3. Essay performance	
	a. Emphasis used in making points	NSD
	b. Elaboration of general theme	NSD
	c. Overall quality and persuasiveness	NSD
	d. Apparent effort	NSD
Linder <u>et. al.</u>	1. Experiment #1	
	a. Number of words per essay	NSD
	b. Degree of organization	NSD
	c. Intent of persuade	NSD
	2. Experiment #2	
	a. Persuasiveness	NSD
	b. Degree of organization	NSD
	c. Number of words	NSD
	d. Extremity of position advocated	NSD

It should be noted that many of the measures contained in Table 1 are based on judge's ratings, while few of the variables are counting measures such as those used by Greenberg (1960). Moreover, it is evident that in a majority of the experiments reported in Table 1, no significant differences among experimental conditions were found.

Rationale and Hypotheses

It was suggested above that one approach which would aid in clarifying the relationship between incentive magnitude and attitude change following belief-discrepant behavior would be to seek variables that would yield interaction effects with the monetary incentive variable such that dissonance relationships would be obtained at one level of the variable and incentive effects at the other level. An alternative strategy would be to look for variables which yield neither dissonance nor incentive effects at one level of the variable and a dissonance or an incentive effect at the other level. The former strategy was chosen for the present study. The particular variable considered was n Influence.

While attempting to devise a more reliable measure of Veroff's n Power (1955, 1958), Uleman (1965) found evidence for a new power-related motive which he has labeled need to influence (n Influence). Uleman's research stems from the work of McClelland on need for achievement (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, and Lowell, 1953; McClelland, 1961), and the research on needs for affiliation and power (Atkinson, 1958). Uleman's n Influence measure is based upon content analysis of Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) protocols. The n Influence scoring system can be found in Uleman (1965).

Based on the results of several studies and correlations with extant personality inventories, Uleman (1965) characterizes persons with high n Influence as follows:

those high in Uleman's n Power do seem to enjoy the exercise of power for its own sake. They win more money in gambling games, even though the money is not 'real' and there is no explicit incentive for winning...They are rated as more dominant by peers when dominance is defined in terms of self-confident mastery of others...power seems to be something to be used, rather than conserved defensively; and the goal is to see one's influence on others, rather than to avoid being influenced...Uleman's n Power might be described as a need to influence others for whatever purpose or goal. (p. 207)

Uleman further points out that while Veroff's measure of n Power apparently taps a person's need not to be influenced, high n Influence persons seem to be oriented toward influencing others, rather than defending themselves against influence attempts.

Given Uleman's evidence and his characterization of persons with high n Influence, two assumptions seem reasonable. Assumption 1: high n Influence individuals will be more sensitive to feedback regarding their success or failure at influencing another person or persons. Assumption 2: high n Influence persons will be less sensitive to the need for other justifications for engaging in belief-discrepant behavior, if they think they might influence another person or persons by producing belief-discrepant arguments. Furthermore, it is also reasonable to expect persons with high n Influence to put forth more effort than low n Influence persons when attempting to persuade others.

Next, consider some implications of the above-mentioned assumptions when applied to the relationship between incentive magnitude and attitude change following belief-discrepant behavior. First, if

Assumption 2 is tenable, monetary incentives should have little, if any, effect on attitude change among persons with high n Influence; provided such persons perceive that the belief-discrepant material they encode may potentially influence other persons' attitudes and/or behavior. In contrast, low n Influence persons should view the opportunity to effect another's attitudes or behavior as relatively less important than the monetary incentives offered for engaging in belief-discrepant behavior. Thus, the monetary incentive variable should have maximal effects on attitude change, or self-persuasion, among low n Influence persons and minimal effects for high n Influence persons.

Following Linder et. al.'s (1967) findings, an inverse relationship between incentive magnitude and attitude change would be expected among low n Influence persons, if these persons felt that they had a choice not to engage in the belief-discrepant behavior. Moreover, if Brehm and Cohen's (1962) arguments are tenable, this inverse relationship should be observed at the level of simple commitment. These considerations lead to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: At the level of simple commitment to engage in belief-discrepant behavior, there will be an inverse relationship between incentive magnitude and attitude change among persons with low n Influence. This inverse relationship will not hold among persons with high n Influence.

The relationships suggested in the above hypothesis will hold in the situation in which persons perceive that their belief-discrepant behavior might influence others' attitudes and/or behavior; that is, one would not expect to find differences in attitude change between high and low n Influence groups if the opportunity to exert influence were not part of the social situation within which the belief-discrepant behavior is performed.

It was suggested above that persons with high n Influence will be more sensitive to feedback regarding their success or failure at influencing another person or persons. The Scott (1957), Scott (1959), Bostrom et. al. (1961), and Wallace (1966) studies all suggest that certain types of positive reinforcement for belief-discrepant behavior lead to greater attitude change than does negative or no reinforcement. In terms of n Influence, positive reinforcement in the form of successful influence of another person should have more reinforcing value among high n Influence persons than among low n Influence persons.

Uleman (1965) has pointed out that in contrast to those with high n Power persons with high n Influence are not oriented toward defending themselves against other persons' influence attempts. Thus, if a person with high n Influence takes a belief-discrepant position on an issue and he successfully persuades another person to adopt that belief-discrepant position, the high n Influence communicator should manifest greater attitude change toward the position advocated than a low n Influence communicator who is also successful at persuasion. These relationships are stated in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: After taking a belief-discrepant position, persons with high n Influence who successfully persuade another to adopt that position will report greater attitude change in the belief-discrepant direction than successful low n Influence persuaders. However, there will be little difference in amount of attitude change between high and low n Influence individuals who fail to persuade others to accept a belief-discrepant position.

The above hypothesis further implies that differences in attitude change between low n Influence persons who fail and low n Influence persons who succeed in persuading should be small, but persons with high n Influence who succeed should display significantly greater attitude change than the highs who fail.

A main effects hypothesis, which follows from Hypothesis 2, deals with differences in the amount of attitude change between high and low n Influence persons. Assuming that persons with high n Influence put forth greater persuasive efforts, dissonance theory predicts greater attitude change among high n Influence individuals. Greater effort in supporting a counterattitudinal position produces more dissonance and leads to more dissonance reducing attitude change. Evidence supporting this position has been reported in a study by Zimbardo (1965). This line of reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: After taking a belief-discrepant position, persons with high n Influence will report greater attitude change in the belief-discrepant than will persons with low n Influence.

Next, consider some predictions concerning message differences among persons encoding belief-discrepant messages under the various conditions discussed above. Hypothesis 1 states that low n Influence individuals who encode under low justification conditions (low monetary incentive) should experience the greatest amount of dissonance. This suggests that these persons will experience maximum tension, and that this tension will be reflected in their message output. The variables to be used to assess the level of this tension are taken from Greenberg (1960).

Greenberg (1960) found that journalism students who encoded messages under cognitive stress produced messages with more words per sentence, more cross-outs and insertions, and fewer first person pronouns per total words. These results are consistent with his predictions; however, Greenberg does point out that the first person pronoun per total words prediction might be reversed in populations other than journalism students, since journalism students are explicitly discouraged from using first person references in their writing.

While this researcher believes that long sentences and high rates of cross-outs and insertions in messages may be indicants of stress, it is felt that the first person pronoun per total words ratio may function somewhat differently in the present study. Previously, it was argued that high n Influence persons should try harder to persuade others than individuals with low n Influence. If this is the case, highs might therefore be more willing to identify themselves with their belief-discrepant arguments than lows. Thus, first person pronoun per total words ratios for the highs should be generally higher than for lows. However, persons with low n Influence who receive high justification for engaging in counterattitudinal behavior should also be more willing to identify themselves with their belief-discrepant arguments, while the lows who receive little justification should be less willing to engage in such identification.

The above arguments suggest the following hypotheses for the following four experimental conditions: Low n Influence-High Justification, Low n Influence-Low Justification, High n Influence-High Justification, and High n Influence-Low Justification:

- Hypothesis 4: Belief-discrepant messages encoded by persons with low n Influence under conditions of low justification will contain significantly fewer first person pronouns than belief-discrepant messages encoded in the other three conditions.
- Hypothesis 5: Belief-discrepant messages encoded by persons with low n Influence under conditions of low justification will contain significantly longer sentences than belief-discrepant messages encoded in the other three conditions.
- Hypothesis 6: Belief-discrepant messages encoded by persons with low n Influence under conditions of low justification will contain significantly more cross-outs and insertions than belief-discrepant messages encoded in the other three conditions.

It should be emphasized that a given of the above three hypotheses is that the persons involved in encoding belief-discrepant communications perceive that they have the opportunity to influence other persons. It should also be noted that the feedback variable is not a part of these hypotheses, since its manipulation follows message encoding.



Chapter 2

Methods and Procedures

Overview

To test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 1, this study was conducted in several steps: First, measures of attitudes and of n Influence were obtained during regular class time from students in communication and business writing courses. About three weeks later, most students tested in the classes were contacted by telephone and asked to participate in the second part of the study. This second part was actually conducted about four weeks after the in-class measures were taken. In this phase of the study, the students reported to classrooms in a campus building and were then tested in small groups. After completion of the second part of the study all students were debriefed in their classes during regular class hours.

Time I Procedures

Before conducting the actual study, several pretests were carried out in order to identify an issue on which there was both general attitudinal agreement and considerable polarity. The issue which best met these two criteria was draft deferments for college students. Most students indicated that they strongly favored draft exemptions for college students. Based on the pretests two, seven category, Likert-type items dealing with student draft deferments were retained for further use.

The procedures for collecting Time 1 attitude measures and the n Influence measure were as follows. The E was introduced by the regular

classroom instructor as a researcher from the Department of Communication. After this brief introduction, E explained that Ss were to complete two tasks. The E then distributed the booklets for the story writing (n Influence measure) task. When all booklets were distributed, the instructions appearing on the front of the booklet were read aloud by the E (Appendix A). The story writing task required about 20 minutes.

At the conclusion of the story writing session, Ss were given a 25 item questionnaire, which contained the two draft deferment items for measuring Time 1 attitudes (Appendix B, Items, 14 and 23) above. Most Ss completed this questionnaire in about 10 minutes. After its completion, materials were collected and the E thanked the class for their cooperation. The E then left the room.

n Influence Measure

The procedure used to measure n Influence involved the use of four of the slide pictures used by Uleman (1965):

1. The Army picture: Several military-looking men watching another soldier point to what looks like a map.
2. The Conference picture: Several men in business suits gathered around a conference table.
3. The Two Man picture: One man is seated, and the other is standing. The man who is standing is pointing to some papers the seated man is holding.
4. The Newspaper picture: Man is seated reading a newspaper.

The slides were shown to Ss in the above order. The Ss were instructed not to write their story while the slide was on the screen. After one minute of exposure, the slide was removed and the Ss were given four minutes to write a story about it. In order to guide the S in his writing, four questions were asked on each writing sheet (Appendix A). This procedure was repeated for the other three pictures. Thus, each S wrote four stories.

Three female graduate students were trained to code the stories for n Influence. A brief description of the coding categories taken from Uleman (1966) appears in Appendix C. The score range for a particular story is zero through nine, where zero represents no influence imagery and nine represents maximum n Influence. Thus, when scores for the four stories are summed, an individual's total n Influence score may range from zero to 36. The results of inter-coder reliability checks on samples of the stories are presented in Chapter 3.

Time II Design and Procedures

One criterion was used to select Ss for the experimental phase of the study. Only Ss who favored draft deferments for college students were used. Since two seven point items were used to assess attitudes toward draft deferments for college students, an individual's score could range from two to 14: a score of two represented strong opposition to the elimination of draft deferments, while a score of 14 indicated strong endorsement of the idea of doing away with deferments. Any person who scored eight or more on the scale was not used in the experimental phase. Applying this criterion to the initial subject pool left 225 useable Ss.

The n Influence scores for the 225 Ss were split at the median. Ss in the high and the low n Influence groups were then randomly assigned to one of the following four treatment combinations: High Incentive (\$2.50)-Success Feedback, High Incentive-Failure Feedback, Low Incentive (50 cents)-Success Feedback, or Low Incentive-Failure Feedback.

Five paid undergraduate students contacted the 225 Ss by telephone. The telephoners read a prepared script (Appendix D), which stated that the caller was from the production staff of WMSB television. The telephoners told the prospective Ss that WMSB, in collaboration with WKAR radio and the Television-Radio Department, would be producing a series of shows dealing with students' problems. Furthermore, the Ss were told that they had been selected randomly to give their opinions and ideas on these problems. Ss were asked to report to a specific room in a campus building, and were given a choice among several nights and times to participate in the project. Telephoners were directed not to mention the terms experiment or study in connection with the project. Ss were told that they would receive payment for their time, but they were not told how much money they would receive. Also, Ss were not informed about the particular issue they would be dealing with or the exact nature of the task they would be asked to perform. The telephoners were able to contact 190 of the original 225 Ss. Only 10 of the 190 Ss contacted indicated that they would be unable to participate in the project. Of the 180 who agreed to participate, 134 actually came to the experiment.

Upon arriving at the designated room, Ss were directed to report to one of two rooms. Ss assigned to the High Incentive condition were sent to one room, while Low Incentive condition Ss were sent to the other. Two Es were used in each room. The first E to enter each room (E₁) read the following instructions:

"I'm _____ from the production staff of WKAR radio. We would like to thank you for coming to our project. I am assisting the project director, and he will be here in a few minutes to explain what we will be doing for the next 30 minutes or so.

While we are waiting for the project director to come, we would appreciate it if you would fill out this short campus poll being conducted by WKAR radio. Please read the instructions carefully before filling out the poll."

After these instructions were read, E₁ distributed the WKAR questionnaire (Appendix E). This questionnaire contained the two critical items from the Time 1 instrument as well as numerous filler items.

A few seconds after the Ss began filling out their questionnaires, the project director (E₂) entered the room. E₁ directed the Ss to stop writing and to listen to E₂'s instructions. E₁ then introduced E₂ who read the following instructions:

"First, I would like to express my thanks for your coming here this evening. I hope that you will find this project interesting as well as enjoyable.

Let me tell you about the first part of the project. WMSB-TV is producing a series of shows about problems students face. One problem we have chosen to deal with is the military draft. We are particularly interested in the issue of draft deferments for college students. In order to gather material on this issue, we are paying selected students to write scripts in which they present arguments for and against draft deferments for college students. We are asking you to write scripts which contain only arguments advocating the elimination of draft deferments for college students; that is, you are to argue that college student draft deferments should be done away with. We are paying you each (\$2.50 or 50 cents) to write your scripts.

It is important that your scripts be as persuasive as possible, since we are going to test your arguments on a group of students down the hall. This is why some of you were assigned to this room and other students were assigned to other rooms. After you finish writing your scripts, they will be taken to the reading group down the hall. Each script will be read by a few students. They will react to your arguments and indicate whether your script persuaded them that college students should not receive draft deferments. Most of the students in the reading group favor the system of draft exemptions for college students, so it is your job to persuade them to accept the opposite view. After your scripts have been read by the reading group, they will be returned to you with the readers' reactions.

Now that you know the nature of the project, if any of you do not wish to participate, you may leave at this time."

After the instructions were read, Ss were paid either \$2.50 or 50 cents, depending on the condition to which they were assigned. After payment, the Ss finished filling out the WKAR questionnaire. Since Ss were interrupted before they filled out the items dealing with draft deferments, responses to these crucial items in the WKAR questionnaire were compared with responses made to the same items at Time 1, in order to assess attitude change as related to incentive magnitude and level of n Influence. It should be kept in mind that at the time of this measurement, no essays had been written by any Ss.

After the Ss finished the WKAR questionnaire, they were handed three 8 1/2 x 11 sheets of paper on which to write their essays. Ss were given about 10 minutes to complete the task. During this time E₁ and E₂ worked together handing out and collecting materials. When the 10 minutes were up, the essays were collected and E₁ took the essays to another room. After E₁ left the room with the essays, E₂ read the following instructions:

"While we are waiting for your scripts to come back, we are going to tape record some free discussion among you. The program board of WMBS-TV is interested in improving the quality of so-called educational television. Perhaps some of you are aware of the fact the educational television is a relatively unpopular concept in this country. Our programming board would like to know why, so we would like you to give us your ideas about why educational television programs are not as popular as regular commercial television programs.

I'll give you a few minutes to think about some possible reasons. Then we will turn the tape recorder on. This tape will be played back to the WMSB-TV program board. Of course, it will not be played on the air.

Please don't hesitate to give us your ideas even if you have had little experience with educational TV. All ideas are welcome. Remember, we want to know why educational TV programs are less popular than regular commercial programs. Now, take a few minutes to think about the issue.

After reading these instructions, E₂ waited for about one minute and then turned on the tape recorder. E₂ was instructed to keep the group discussion on the topic and not to allow the group to wander into issues related to draft deferments.

While the discussions were in progress in the experimental rooms, the two E_s and two graduate students wrote bogus comments on the essays. The following four comments were written on the essays of those Ss in the Success Feedback condition:

1. Your arguments were very strong, and they really changed my mind.
2. Your script sure sold me, maybe college draft deferments should be eliminated.
3. You convinced me.
4. You changed my mind. You made very good points.

Ss in the Failure Feedback condition received the following four comments on their essays:

1. Your points were very weak. Your script didn't change my mind a bit.
2. Your arguments were poor. I'm not convinced.
3. You must be kidding. Your script is bad.
4. You didn't convince me at all.

Care was taken to use different pencils and pens, and different writing styles for each of the comments.

In addition to written comments a set of bogus rating scales (See Appendix F) was also given to each S. Each supposed reader of the essay indicated his attitude toward the elimination of draft deferments for college students before and after reading the essay. The before and after ratings were recorded on two bipolar adjective scales (good-bad). Since there were four sets of before-after scales on each sheet, Ss were led to believe that four persons had read and rated their essays. Ss in the Success Feedback condition received sets of scales indicating marked before-after change in the belief-discrepant direction. Failure Feedback condition Ss received sets of scales with patterns of markings indicating little or no change. Both the success and failure marking patterns were the same for Ss in the respective treatments, but the ordering of the marking differences varied among Ss in each of the two conditions.

After the comments were written on the essays, the two E₁s returned to their respective rooms. When E₁ entered the room, E₂ said:

"Here are the scripts you wrote along with the comments of the students who read them. It looks as if some of you really convinced your readers, while some of you didn't. I'll hand back the scripts so that you can see how well you did."

The essays were returned, and the Ss were given about two minutes to read the comments and to look at the rating scales. The essays were then collected and E₂ read the following instructions:

"For the final task this evening, we would like to have your opinions on some issues we are planning to use in some programs. This is a short questionnaire, which will only take a few minutes to fill out. Please read the instructions on the cover carefully before you begin. Please answer all of the questions and put your name and student number in the spaces provided."

This final questionnaire also contained the same two crucial items on draft deferments and was attributed to WMSB-TV (Appendix G). Ss responses to these two items were used to assess post-encoding attitude change following success or failure feedback.

After filling out this questionnaire, Ss were thanked for their help. Ss in the 50 cent condition were given an additional two dollars for their participation; hence, all Ss were eventually paid \$2.50 for their participation. Ss were asked not to tell their friends about the project, since advanced knowledge of the task might influence the kinds of essays written. The entire experimental procedure took about 45 minutes to complete. Throughout the experimental phase, E₁-E₂ pairs were alternated between incentive conditions in order to distribute possible biasing effects equally across the two treatments.

Chapter 3

Results

n Influence Intercoder Reliability

Two separate reliability checks were run on the three females who coded the 225 subjects' n Influence protocols. During the coding procedure, the three coders scored the same 40 subjects (160 stories). The total score rankings of these 40 subjects were compared among the three coders. Thus, approximately 17 percent of the 225 subjects' n Influence protocols were scored by all three coders.

Generally, the intercoder reliabilities, expressed in terms of Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, were rather low. The intercorrelations among the three coders for each set of 20 subjects and the overall correlations across both sets are summarized in Table 2. Kendall's W (Siegel, 1956) was also used to assess the amount of agreement among all three coders.

Table 2. Intercorrelations (r_s) and Kendall's W for Three n Influence Coders Over Two Samples

	Sample 1 (<u>n</u> =20)	Sample 2 (<u>n</u> =20)	Total (N=40)
r_s (1-2)	.52*	.33	.47****
r_s (2-3)	.79**	.39*	.62****
r_s (1-3)	.56**	.39*	.55****
Kendall's W	.73**	.56*	.69***

*p <.05

**p <.01

***p <.001

****p <.0005

In addition to the correlational data presented above, disagreements between pairs of coders were also analyzed for the total sample ($N=40$). When coders disagreed to the extent that one coder placed a given subject in the high n Influence group, while the other coder placed the same subject in the low n Influence group (high-low split based on the grand median), the direction of the disagreement was noted. Among the three pairs of coders there was no systematic bias in the direction of these disagreements as determined by the Binomial test (Siegel, 1956); that is, when disagreements involving a median cross-over occurred, the two possible directions of disagreement between coder pairs were approximately equally likely.

While Table 2 indicates that the three coders were not making random judgments, the magnitude of the correlations are below the generally accepted level of .80 to .85. The correlations for Sample 2 are especially low. However, low reliability in the n Influence measure lowers the probability of finding significant differences between n Influence groups. Thus, if significant differences between n Influence groups are observed, it can be concluded that level of n Influence is a powerful predictor.

Manipulation Checks

The last item on the final questionnaire was an open-minded item which asked each subject to indicate what he thought the project was about. Of the 134 subjects who participated in the experimental phase of the study, five gave responses which strongly indicated knowledge of the real purpose of the project. These subjects were eliminated from the analysis. Thus, data for 129 subjects - 92 males and 37 females - were analyzed.

In addition to the preceding question, subjects rated the adequacy of payment for the essay writing task. Adequacy of payment was measured on a four point scale ranging from Very Adequate (4) to Very Inadequate (1). Since adequacy of payment measures were obtained after the success-failure manipulation, the effects of this manipulation on the adequacy of payment ratings must be considered.

The means and standard deviations of the adequacy of payment ratings across the eight experimental conditions are shown in Table 3. The data reflect a relative lack of variability in the adequacy ratings. Thus, even though mean differences are small, some of the differences are significant. In addition, it can be noted that no group rated the payment below the theoretic median of the adequacy scale (2.5).

Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of Adequacy of Payment Ratings Across Eight Experimental Conditions*

n Influence	Success Feedback		Failure Feedback	
	High Incentive	Low Incentive	High Incentive	Low Incentive
High	\bar{X} = 3.58 S = .74 \underline{n} = 19	3.65 .58 17	3.80 .60 10	3.25 .69 20
Low	\bar{X} = 4.00 S = .00 \underline{n} = 11	3.05 .54 18	4.00 .00 17	3.14 .83 14

*Three of the 129 subjects did not complete this item.

In terms of Hypothesis 1, little difference in perceived adequacy of payment should be expected among high n Influence subjects, but a large difference in perceived adequacy should be observed among the lows; that is, an interaction between n Influence and monetary incentives. Of course, subjects who were paid \$2.50 would be expected to rate their payment as more adequate than would subjects who received the 50 cent payment.

Since there was no variability in two of the eight treatment groups, it was inappropriate to perform an overall analysis of variance of the eight mean ratings of payment adequacy. However, a t-test of the differences between the mean adequacy ratings for High versus Low Monetary Incentive conditions was calculated. The mean adequacy rating for the High Monetary Incentive condition was 3.83, while the mean for the Low Monetary Incentive group was 3.27. The difference between the two means is significant beyond the .0005 level, one-tailed test. Thus, subjects who received \$2.50 perceived the payment as more adequate than did subjects who received 50 cents. It should be noted, however, that the Low Monetary Incentive group did not rate their payment below the theoretic midpoint of the adequacy scale.

While it was not possible to directly test the interaction due to lack of within cell variability, the data found in Table 4 shed some light on this issue. The difference between the means for the High n Influence-High Monetary Incentive and the High n Influence-Low Monetary Incentive groups was not significant (t = 1.24, df = 64). While no test of the difference between the means for the two Low n Influence groups was possible, it is apparent that Low n Influence

subjects who received \$2.50 for their essay writing perceived their payment as more adequate than did the Low n Influence subjects who received 50 cents. These findings are consistent with the assumption that magnitude of monetary incentive is more important to low n Influence than to high n Influence subjects, given that both types perceive that they have an opportunity to exert social influence. Generally, then, the results indicate that the monetary incentive manipulation was successful, and that the pre-conditions for attitude change predicted by Hypothesis 1 were met.

Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations of Perceived Adequacy Ratings Disregarding Feedback

<u>n</u> Influence	High Incentive	Low Incentive
High	\bar{X} = 3.65 S = .72 <u>n</u> = 29	3.43 .69 37
Low	\bar{X} = 4.00 S = .00 <u>n</u> = 28	3.09 .68 32

A second manipulation check was also included in the final questionnaire. All subjects were asked to indicate on a four point scale the extent to which they felt that they had influenced the script readers' opinions on the draft deferment issue. This check served to test the effectiveness of the success-failure manipulation. A score of four on the item indicated very high perceived influence, while a score of one indicated very low perceived influence.

Table 5 summarizes the means and standard deviations for the perceived influence ratings for the eight conditions. As in the case of the perceived adequacy of payment measure, it was not possible to calculate an overall analysis of variance of the eight means, due to the absence of variability in one of the cells. It was possible, however, to carry out an analysis of variance using n Influence and Feedback as independent variables, ignoring the monetary incentive classification. This analysis seemed appropriate, since the major purpose was to assess the effectiveness of the feedback manipulation.

Table 5. Means and Standard Deviations of Perceived Influence Measure Across Eight Conditions*

<u>n</u> Influence	Success Feedback		Failure Feedback	
	High Incentive	Low Incentive	High Incentive	Low Incentive
High	\bar{X} = 3.58 S = .59 <u>n</u> = 19	3.32 .56 19	1.00 .00 10	1.20 .51 20
Low	\bar{X} = 3.36 S = .64 <u>n</u> = 11	2.61 .95 18	1.12 .32 17	1.14 .35 14

*One of the 129 subjects did not complete this item.

The means and standard deviations of the perceived persuasiveness measures ignoring the monetary incentive classification are found in Table 6. These measures were analyzed using an approximation procedure for unequal n's suggested by Winer (1962).

Table 6. Means and Standard Deviations of Perceived Persuasiveness Ratings Disregarding Monetary Incentive

<u>n</u> Influence	Success Feedback	Failure Feedback
High	\bar{X} = 3.44 S = .60 <u>n</u> = 38	1.33 .38 30
Low	\bar{X} = 2.90 S = .76 <u>n</u> = 29	1.12 .34 31

The results of this analysis, summarized in Table 7, clearly indicate that the feedback manipulation generated perceptions of successful influence in the Success group and of failure in the Failure group. Moreover, consider the significant interaction between n Influence and Feedback. It will be recalled that Hypothesis 2 states that high n Influence persons who take a belief-discrepant stand and who persuade another to adopt that position will manifest greater attitude change toward the belief-discrepant position than will low n Influence persons who succeed at the same task. Moreover, Hypothesis 2 predicts that high and low n Influence individuals who fail will display about the same amount of change, but that this change will be minor compared with those who succeed.

Table 7. Summary Analysis of Variance of Perceived Persuasiveness Means

Source of Variation	ss	df	MS	F
<u>n</u> Influence (A)	0.0770	1	0.0770	6.47*
Feedback (B)	4.1644	1	4.1644	349.95**
A x B	0.0748	1	0.0748	6.29*
Error		124	0.0119	

*p <.025

**p <.001

The pattern of the mean perceived persuasiveness ratings found in Table 6 and the significant interaction obtained for these means support the assertion that the preconditions for the pattern of attitude change predicted in Hypothesis 2 were met. Using the error term from the analysis of variance of perceived persuasiveness means (Table 7), multiple t-tests were calculated for the perceived persuasiveness means presented in Table 6. As would be expected, the difference between the means for the high and low n Influence subjects who failed was not significant (t = .027, df = 59). The difference between the Success and the Failure means for the High n Influence and the Low n Influence groups was highly significant, confirming the effectiveness of the feedback manipulation. The most important test involves comparison of the mean perceived persuasiveness rating of the High n Influence-Success group with the mean rating of the Low n Influence-Success group. This comparison yielded a significant difference (t = 3.63; df = 65; p <.0005, one-tailed). Thus, the feedback manipulation was not only successful in creating differential perceptions of success or failure to influence, but in addition, the effect was not equally distributed across the two n Influence groups. High n Influence

subjects who received success feedback felt that they had persuaded their essay readers more than did low n Influence subjects who received success feedback. However, highs and lows who failed had similar perceptions of the persuasive impact of their essays.

Taken as a whole, the results presented in this section indicate that the monetary incentive and the feedback manipulations were effective. In addition, it appears that the preconditions were established for the attitude changes predicted in Hypotheses 1 and 2. In the following sections the results for each hypothesis are considered.

Hypothesis 1: At the level of simple commitment to engage in belief-discrepant behavior, there will be an inverse relationship between incentive magnitude and attitude change among persons with low n Influence. This inverse relationship will not hold among persons with high n Influence.

Since Hypothesis 1 is concerned with attitude change at the simple commitment level, the measure to assess this change was taken before the feedback variable was manipulated. Table 8 summarizes the amount of pretest-simple commitment posttest change for subjects in the four conditions. It can be seen that little change occurred in any of the groups. Correlated t-tests for each of the four conditions revealed no significant changes. In addition, an analysis of variance on the mean change scores for the four groups yielded no significant differences. Thus, the data provide no support for Hypothesis 1.

Table 8. Pretest-Simple Commitment Posttest Mean
Attitude Change Scores and Amount of Change
for Subjects in the Four Conditions

Condition	Pretest	Simple Commitment	Change
High <u>n</u> Influence			
High Incentive (<u>n</u> =29)	3.97	4.28	+0.31
Low Incentive (<u>n</u> =39)	3.12	3.17	+0.05
Low <u>n</u> Influence			
High Incentive (<u>n</u> =28)	3.25	3.75	+0.50
Low Incentive (<u>n</u> =33)	3.36	3.88	+0.52

Hypothesis 2: After taking a belief-discrepant position, persons with high n Influence who successfully persuade another to adopt that position will report greater attitude change in the belief-discrepant direction than successful low n Influence persuaders. However, there will be little difference in amount of attitude change between high and low n Influence individuals who fail to persuade others to accept a belief-discrepant position.

Hypothesis 2 predicts maximum attitude change, or self-persuasion, among high n Influence persons who are successful in influencing others. Although the monetary incentive variable is not specifically involved in this prediction, it might somehow interact with the feedback variable; thus, monetary incentive was also included in the analysis for Hypothesis 2.

Table 9 contains the simple commitment posttest-post-feedback posttest attitude change scores for subjects in the eight conditions. It can be seen that a relatively large amount of attitude change occurred in both incentive conditions of the High n Influence-Success group. This pattern of self-persuasion was not observed in the Low n Influence-Success group. Here, High Incentive subjects manifested significant attitude change, while Low Incentive subjects did not.

Table 9. Simple Commitment Posttest-Post-Feedback Posttest Mean Attitude Change Scores and Amount of Change for Subjects in the Eight Conditions

Condition	Simple Commitment	Post- Feedback	Change
High <u>n</u> Influence			
Success			
High Incentive (<u>n</u> =19)	4.32	6.32	+2.00***
Low Incentive (<u>n</u> =19)	3.42	5.05	+1.63***
Failure			
High Incentive (<u>n</u> =10)	4.20	5.00	+0.80*
Low Incentive (<u>n</u> =20)	2.95	3.45	+0.50

Table 9 (con't)

Condition	Simple Commitment	Post- Feedback	Change
Low <u>n</u> Influence			
Success			
High Incentive (<u>n</u> =11)	3.81	4.81	+1.00**
Low Incentive (<u>n</u> =19)	4.42	4.63	+0.21
Failure			
High Incentive (<u>n</u> =17)	3.71	4.52	+0.81*
Low Incentive (<u>n</u> =14)	3.14	3.35	+0.21
* <u>p</u> <.05 (one-tailed)			
** <u>p</u> <.01 (one-tailed)			
*** <u>p</u> <.005 (one-tailed)			

While the mean change scores presented in Table 9 provide some confirmation for Hypothesis 2, the major test of the hypothesis required a test of the relative change among the eight conditions. Thus, the simple commitment-post-feedback change scores for subjects in the eight conditions were analyzed, again using the approximation procedure recommended by Winer.

Table 10. Summary Analysis of Variance of Mean Simple
Commitment-Post-Feedback Attitude
Change Scores for Subjects in the Eight Conditions

Source of Variation	ss	df	MS	F
<u>n</u> Influence (A)	0.9000	1	0.9000	4.01***
Incentive (B)	0.5342	1	0.5342	2.38*
Feedback (C)	0.7839	1	0.7839	3.49**
A x B	0.0666	1	0.0666	0.30
A x C	0.5825	1	0.5825	2.60*
B x C	0.0077	1	0.0077	0.03
A x B x C	0.0015	1	0.0015	0.006
Error		121	0.2245	
* <u>p</u> <.20				
** <u>p</u> <.10				
*** <u>p</u> <.05				

This analysis (Table 10) indicated that only the main effect for n Influence was significant at the .05 level. The predicted interaction between n Influence and Feedback was not significant; however, as Table 11 reveals, the differences predicted by Hypothesis 2 are in the right direction. High n Influence subjects who were successful at influencing their readers changed their attitudes more than successful low n Influence subjects. Moreover, it is interesting to note that this pattern of results is consistent with the findings concerning the perceived persuasiveness ratings (Table 6 and 7). Thus, successful high n Influence subjects not only saw themselves as more influential than their low n Influence counterparts, they also changed their attitudes more; that is, demonstrated greater self-persuasion than successful low n Influence subjects.

Table 11. Mean Simple Commitment-Post-Feedback Attitude Change Scores Disregarding Monetary Incentive

<u>n</u> Influence	Success Feedback	Failure Feedback
High	\bar{X} = +1.83 S = 2.32 <u>n</u> = 38	+0.60 1.86 30
Low	\bar{X} = +0.50 S = 0.94 <u>n</u> = 28	+0.54 1.76 31

The preceding results provide some support for Hypothesis 2, but it is clear that the data represent only a trend in the predicted direction. The findings presented in Table 9 are encouraging, but the crucial test of relative change presented in Table 10 is somewhat

disappointing. Finally, examination of Table 11 reveals that the low n Influence subjects who succeeded changed their attitudes about as much as the low n Influence and high n Influence subjects who failed. Clearly, these data suggest the need for further experimentation regarding the relationship between n Influence, feedback regarding the outcomes of influence attempts, and attitude change following a belief-discrepant act.

Hypothesis 3: After taking a belief-discrepant position, persons with high n Influence will report greater attitude change in the belief-discrepant direction than will persons with low n Influence.

The results presented in Table 10 are directly relevant to the test of Hypothesis 3. The mean attitude change for the high n Influence subjects was +1.27, while the mean change for the low n Influence subjects was +0.53. As Table 10 indicates, this difference is significant. Thus, the data support Hypothesis 3.

Hypothesis 4: Belief-discrepant messages encoded by persons with low n Influence under conditions of low justification will contain significantly fewer first person pronouns than belief-discrepant messages encoded in the other three conditions.

Hypothesis 4 is the first hypothesis concerned with the effects of n Influence and monetary incentives on belief-discrepant encoding behavior. None of these hypotheses involve the feedback variable, since feedback was not manipulated until after the essays had been written.

Table 12 contains the mean first person pronoun/total words ratios and the standard deviations of these ratios for subjects in the four experimental conditions.

Table 12. Means and Standard Deviations of First Person Pronoun/
Total Words Ratios Across Four Experimental Conditions

<u>n</u> Influence	High Incentive	Low Incentive
High	\bar{X} = 0.0131 S = 0.0141 <u>n</u> = 29	0.0210 0.0173 39
Low	\bar{X} = 0.0202 S = 0.0200 <u>n</u> = 28	0.0148 0.0100 33

Inspection of these means reveals that the pattern predicted in Hypothesis 4 was not obtained. As predicted, the means for the High n Influence-Low Incentive and the Low n Influence-High Incentive groups are greater than the mean for the Low n Influence-Low Incentive group. However, the mean for the Low n Influence-Low Incentive group is higher than the mean for the High n Influence-High Incentive group, a difference that runs counter to Hypothesis 4.

Analysis of variance of the first person pronoun/total words ratios (Table 13) revealed a significant interaction between n Influence and Monetary Incentive. These results suggest the question of why subjects with high n Influence who received high incentives did not use a large number of first person pronouns. Consideration of the results obtained for Hypotheses 5 and 6 may shed further light on this question, for Greenberg (1960) has suggested that the results observed for one index of cognitive stress may or may not be consistent with other stress indices, depending on the situation in which encoding takes place.

Table 13. Summary Analysis of Variance of Mean First
Person Pronoun/Total Words Ratios

Source of Variation	ss	df	MS	F
<u>n</u> Influence (A)	0.0000002	1	0.0000002	0.02
Incentive (B)	0.0000015	1	0.0000015	0.16
A x B	0.0000442	1	0.0000442	4.85*
Error		125	0.0000091	

*p <.05

Hypothesis 5: Belief-discrepant messages encoded by persons with low n Influence under conditions of low justification will contain significantly longer sentences than belief-discrepant messages encoded in the other three conditions.

The means and standard deviations for the words/sentence measure for subjects in the four experimental conditions are presented in Table 14. An analysis of variance yielded no significant effects. This lack of significance is partially due to the rather high variances in each of the four conditions. The pattern of means is consistent with Hypothesis 5; that is, low n Influence subjects in the Low Incentive condition wrote essays containing sentences that were somewhat longer than the sentences contained in the essays of the other three experimental groups. However, since these differences were not significant, it must be concluded that the results fail to support Hypothesis 5.

Table 14. Means and Standard Deviations of Words/Sentence Ratios Across Four Experimental Conditions

<u>n</u> Influence	High Incentive	Low Incentive
High	\bar{X} = 19,30 S = 5,24 <u>n</u> = 29	19,42 4,30 39
Low	\bar{X} = 19,34 S = 4,35 <u>n</u> = 28	20,38 4,88 33

Hypothesis 6: Belief-discrepant messages encoded by persons with low n Influence under conditions of low justification will contain significantly more cross-outs and insertions than belief-discrepant messages encoded in the other three conditions.

Table 15 contains a summary of the mean cross-outs and insertions/total words for subjects in the four experimental conditions. It can be seen that high n Influence subjects writing under conditions of High Incentive and low n Influence subjects writing in the Low Incentive group made more errors (cross-outs and insertions) than subjects writing in the other two conditions.

Table 15. Means and Standard Deviations of Cross-Outs and Insertions/Total Words Ratios Across Four Experimental Conditions

<u>n</u> Influence	High Incentive	Low Incentive
High	\bar{X} = 0,0143 S = 0,0153 <u>n</u> = 29	0,0090 0,0124 39
Low	\bar{X} = 0,0074 S = 0,0084 <u>n</u> = 28	0,0114 0,0133 33

An analysis of variance of the mean error ratios (Table 16) revealed a significant interaction between n Influence and monetary incentive. It is interesting to compare the error ratio results with the findings on use of first person pronouns. If one is willing to accept error rate as an indicant of cognitive stress, then the data presented in Table 15 indicate that subjects in the High n Influence-High Incentive and the Low n Influence-Low Incentive groups experienced more stress than subjects in the other two conditions.

Moreover, if we consider the use of first person pronouns an indicant of willingness of a person to identify himself with his belief-discrepant arguments, then Table 12 indicates that subjects in the Low n Influence-High Incentive and the High n Influence-Low Incentive groups identified themselves with their belief-discrepant arguments more than did subjects in the other two conditions. Thus, the findings obtained for Hypotheses 4 and 6 suggest that persons who experienced relatively more cognitive stress were less apt to identify themselves with their belief-discrepant arguments, while persons who experienced less stress were more willing to identify themselves with their arguments.

Table 16. Summary Analysis of Variance of Mean Error Ratios

Source of Variation	ss	df	MS	F
<u>n</u> Influence (A)	0.0000050	1	0.0000050	0.96
Incentive (B)	0.0000003	1	0.0000003	0.05
A x B	0.0000216	1	0.0000216	4.15*
Error		125	0.0000052	

*p <.05

Chapter 4

Discussion

In general, the three hypotheses concerning attitude change, or self-persuasion, are only partially supported by the findings of the present study. The results obtained for Hypothesis 1 are particularly discouraging. Neither level of n Influence nor magnitude or monetary incentive were found to be related to attitude change after commitment to engage in belief-discrepant communication behavior. There are several possible explanations for this failure to confirm Hypothesis 1.

Although the perceived adequacy of payment manipulation check revealed that persons in the 50 cent group rated their payment significantly less adequate than did persons in the \$2.50 group, the mean rating of the 50 cent group was above the theoretic midpoint of the adequacy scale. Thus, persons in the 50 cent condition saw their payment as somewhat adequate. Comments made by subjects in the class debriefing sessions provide further insight into the adequacy of payment problem. Several persons who received the 50 cent payment said that this sum was about as much money as they expected to receive; however, others remarked that they expected to receive more than 50 cents for their participation. Still other persons reported that 50 cents was not a bad wage for 10 minutes of work. These persons said that if the essay writing task had been longer, they would have considered the 50 cent payment inadequate. A final possibility involves the spread of information about the experiment. Since all persons who received 50 cents for their essay writing were subsequently paid

an additional \$2.00, it is possible that some persons assigned to the 50 cent condition learned of the additional \$2.00 payment before they participated in the experiment. If a subject in the 50 cent group obtained such information, he might rate the 50 cent payment as quite adequate because of his expectations regarding the \$2.00 payment.

Other comments made in the debriefing sessions indicated that some persons justified their belief-discrepant communication behavior in still other ways. Several persons indicated that because the sponsor of the project was important, they agreed to do the essay writing task. In fact, a few individuals wrote comments on their final questionnaires stating that they would have participated in the project even if a monetary payment had not been offered. Since 74 percent of the persons who agreed to participate in the project actually arrived even though they did not know how much they would be paid and they did not receive extra grade credit or other such incentives for their participation -- it appears that many persons thought the project was important.

Some of the individuals in the 50 cent group said that although they were given the option of leaving the experiment after learning about the payment for the task, they stayed because they had expended considerable effort walking to the building where the experiment was conducted. Moreover, others pointed out that they had reserved a certain period of time for participating in the project; thus, they felt that receiving 50 cents for the time spent was better than receiving no money at all.

It is evident from the pretest data reported in Chapter 3 that most students were extremely opposed to the idea of eliminating college student draft deferments. Several persuasion studies suggest that persons with extreme positions on an issue are less likely to change their attitudes than are persons with moderate positions. Thus, one would expect relatively little change in attitudes toward the elimination of draft deferments given the students' extreme initial positions. However, it should be noted that while there was little attitude change in the test of Hypothesis 1, significant changes in attitudes were observed in the tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3. These results would suggest that the manipulations used to test Hypotheses 2 and 3 were somewhat more effective than the manipulations used to test Hypothesis 1.

Another possible explanation for the failure to confirm Hypothesis 1 concerns subjects' levels of ego involvement in the draft deferment issue. Prior self-persuasion experiments have employed such issues as, preventing the Ohio State University football team from going to the Rose Bowl, and banning known Communists from speaking at state-sponsored institutions. In contrast to these issues, the draft deferment issue would seem to be more ego involving, since most college males must face the possibility of being drafted. Females might also be highly involved in the draft deferment issue because the draft could interfere with their social life and their marriage plans. Data gathered by Rebach (1968) from Michigan State University students after the present study was completed indicate that the draft deferment issue is extremely ego involving.

It should be pointed out that if the above ego involvement explanation has validity, then a possible weakness of dissonance theory has been exposed. The results obtained for Hypothesis 1 suggest that dissonance theory cannot accurately predict the relationship between justification and self-persuasion at the simple commitment level, if the attitudinal issue used in the experimental test is highly ego involving. Of course, the preceding assertion assumes that factors other than ego involvement with the issue did not operate to a significant degree and that ego involvement was one of the chief reasons for the lack of attitude change in the test of Hypothesis 1. The validity of these assumptions rests upon a test of the ego involvement hypothesis.

One final explanation for the failure to confirm Hypothesis 1 is the relatively low reliability of the n Influence measure. It will be recalled that the analyses of the n Influence measure indicated considerable disagreement between coder pairs; thus producing low intercoder reliabilities. It is possible that the effects predicted in Hypothesis 1 were not powerful enough to overcome this lack of reliability.

In contrast to the results obtained for Hypothesis 1, the findings for Hypotheses 2 and 3 are encouraging. Support was found for the notion that high n Influence individuals are more responsive to successful influence of others than are persons with low n Influence. Specifically, after taking a belief-discrepant stand, high n Influence persons who successfully persuaded others to adopt that position manifested greater self-persuasion than successful low n Influence

persuaders. By contrast, there is little difference in the amount of self-persuasion between high and low n Influence persons who failed to persuade. The difference in attitude change between the high and low n Influence persons who succeeded was large enough to result in a significant n Influence main effect; thus confirming Hypothesis 3.

The findings for Hypothesis 2 support those of earlier studies (Scott, 1957; Scott, 1959; Bostrom et. al., 1961; and Wallace, 1966) which found a positive relationship between reinforcement and magnitude of self-persuasion following belief-discrepant behavior. Moreover, the present findings further suggest that when successful persuasion is employed as a reinforcing contingency in the self-persuasion situation, successful high n Influence persons will manifest more self-persuasion than successful low n Influence persons. It should be emphasized, however, that the findings for Hypothesis 2 are tentative at best and that further study is needed regarding the relationships among n Influence, influence feedback, and self-persuasion.

In presenting the rationale for Hypothesis 3, it was suggested that persons with high n Influence would exert more effort at persuading than would persons with low n Influence. Greater effort should lead to more dissonance; thus, persons with high n Influence should change their attitudes more than individuals with low n Influence. This prediction was confirmed. It was expected, however, that differences in effort expended by the high and the low n Influence groups would be reflected by variations in their message outputs. Since there were no significant main effects differences between n Influence groups in the tests performed for Hypotheses 4 through 6,

it is difficult to attribute the differences in attitude change to difference in effort on the part of the two n Influence groups. It should be noted that such criteria as essay length and encoding time could not be used as indices of effort in the present study. Consideration of these particular criteria might have shed further light on the effort hypothesis.

While none of the message hypotheses (Hypotheses 4 through 6) received full support, the results indicate that high n Influence persons who encoded belief-discrepant messages under low justification conditions and low n Influence persons who encoded under high justification conditions experienced less cognitive stress and were more willing to identify themselves with their belief-discrepant arguments than were persons in the other two conditions. Contrary to the predictions made in Hypotheses 4 and 6, persons with high n Influence who received high justification manifested relatively more cognitive stress and were less willing to identify themselves with their belief-discrepant arguments than were high n Influence persons who received low justification and low n Influence individuals who received high justification.

Perhaps the high n Influence persons who were paid \$2.50 to write their belief-discrepant essays perceived their payment as recompense for persuading their readers, while the low n Influence persons who received the \$2.50 payment saw it as a reward for merely writing the essay itself. Knowing that it is difficult to change others' attitudes with one message, the High Incentive-High n Influence persons were under more pressure to persuade members of their

audience than were the highs who received only 50 cents. Thus, the high n Influence persons who received \$2.50 might have been "overly motivated" to persuade and more afraid of failure than the highs who received only 50 cents. This interpretation is supported by the fact that high n Influence persons in the high justification condition manifested a high level of cognitive stress and were less willing to identify themselves with their belief-discrepant arguments.

The preceding interpretation is also partially supported by the findings concerning adequacy of payment. Persons in the High n Influence-High Incentive condition rated their payment less adequate than did Low n Influence-High Incentive persons. It is possible that the high n Influence persons' lower ratings of payment adequacy were due to their perceptions of the relationship between the payment and the task. Specifically, high n Influence individuals may have regarded the \$2.50 as a somewhat less than adequate sum when the task was to persuade others to adopt an unpopular position on an important issue. The same \$2.50 payment may have been perceived as relatively more adequate by the low n Influence group because they saw the payment as a reward for merely writing their essays.

The preceding explanation of the results obtained in the tests of Hypotheses 4 and 6 for the High n Influence-High Incentive condition exposes one of the chief problems in the justification-self-persuasion controversy discussed earlier. This problem centers on the rather vague nature of the justification concept itself. As indicated above, it is clear that persons who participated in the present study justified their belief-discrepant communication behavior in a

multitude of different ways. While some of these loci of justification might possibly been better controlled, it is exceedingly difficult to eliminate all possible sources of justification other than the one being manipulated by the experimenter.

Moreover, when money is employed as a source of justification, further problems are introduced. For example, in the Carlsmith et. al. (1966) study, subjects who wrote belief-discrepant essays and subjects who deceived a confederate were all offered the same range of monetary rewards for task performance. However, a five dollar payment for writing a belief-discrepant essay may well be seen as a less adequate payment than a five dollar payment for face-to-face deception, since face-to-face deception may be perceived as a less difficult task than essay writing. In turn, these discrepancies between perceived task difficulty and amount of money offered to perform the task might possibly affect the subsequent magnitude of self-persuasion.

It is obvious from the above discussion that the relationship between justification and self-persuasion after counterattitudinal behavior is a complex one. While the present study employed a rather elaborate design to study this complex phenomenon, an alternative strategy lies in performing a series of smaller, related studies which assess attitude change at different stages of the self-persuasion process. This approach actually might be preferable to the one taken in the present study, since several repeated measures on the same subjects within the same experiment generate sensitization problems which are difficult to control.

For instance, at least three relatively simple studies could be performed to determine more clearly the relationships among n Influence, influence feedback, justification, and self-persuasion. The first study could investigate the interaction between n Influence and justification on self-persuasion after simple commitment to engage in belief-discrepant behavior. The paradigm for this experiment would be similar to that used to test Hypothesis 1 of the present study.

A second study could then employ the same independent variables as those used in the first, but measures of self-persuasion would be obtained immediately following performance of the belief-discrepant act, for example, after encoding a counterattitudinal essay. This experiment would, perhaps, provide a better test of the relationship between n Influence and persuasive effort than was provided in the present study.

Finally, a third study could be concerned with the possible interaction between n Influence and influence feedback on self-persuasion after engaging in belief-discrepant behavior. This study would serve to provide further data relevant to Hypothesis 2 of the present study. In this particular study, justification would not be used as an independent variable.

It was stated in Chapter 1 that the use of n Influence in the present study was considered exploratory. Now that this particular exploration is completed, the utility of the variable must be assessed. It was noted that the coding system for scoring n Influence is somewhat complex; as a result, high interjudge reliabilities were difficult to

obtain. But in spite of this reliability problem, n Influence did a fairly good job of predicting in Hypotheses 2 and 3 and yielded some interesting interactions with monetary incentives in Hypotheses 4 and 6. These results suggest that n Influence is a useful variable for studying the self-persuasion phenomenon, particularly if a more reliable coding scheme can be developed.

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
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APPENDIX A



Name _____

Student # _____

TEST OF CREATIVE IMAGINATION

INSTRUCTIONS: This is a test of your creative imagination. Four pictures will be projected on the screen before you. You will then have 60 seconds to look at the picture and then four minutes to make up a story about it. Notice that there is one page for each picture. The same four questions are asked. They will guide your thinking and enable you to cover all the elements of a plot in the time allotted. Plan to spend about a minute on each question. I will keep time and tell you when it is about time to go on to the next question for each story. You will have a little time to finish your story before the next picture is shown.

Obviously there are no right or wrong answers, so you may feel free to make up any kind of a story about the pictures that you choose. Try to make them vivid and dramatic, for this is a test of creative imagination. Do not merely describe the picture you see. Tell a story about it. Work as fast as you can in order to finish in time. Make the stories interesting.

PICTURE 1.

What is happening? Who are the people?

What has led up to this situation? That is, what has happened in the past?

What is being thought? What is wanted? By whom?

What will happen? What will be done?

PICTURE 2.

What is happening? Who are the people?

What has led up to this situation? That is, what has happened in the past?

What is being thought? What is wanted? By whom?

What will happen? What will be done?

PICTURE 3.

What is happening? Who are the people?

What has led up to this situation? That is, what has happened in the past?

What is being thought? What is wanted? By whom?

What will happen? What will be done?

PICTURE 4.

What is happening? Who are the people?

What has led up to this situation? That is, what has happened in the past?

What is being thought? What is being done? By whom?

What will happen? What will be done?

APPENDIX B

Name _____

Student # _____

Opinion Profile

Instructions

The items contained in this booklet are concerned with your opinions and feelings about various matters. Please read each statement carefully, and then indicate your feeling about the statement on the scale provided. Place an "X" in the space which best represents your view on the statement. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers. Your opinions and feelings are what matter.

Please make sure to print your name and student number at the top of this page. You may now begin.

1. The United States should pull all of its military forces out of Viet Nam immediately.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

2. The United States will be involved in more wars like Viet Nam and Korea within the next few years.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

3. Military force is a useful instrument of national policy in some cases.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

4. Draft deferments for college students should be eliminated.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

5. The United States should have used military force to rescue the men of the intelligence ship Pueblo.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

6. We should pay more attention to our country's problems than to the problems of other countries.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

7. The Republican and Democratic parties, as they now operate, do not adequately represent the wishes of the public in terms of candidate choice.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

8. There is a need for a strong third political party in the United States.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

9. Neither the Republican party nor the Democratic party takes into account the opinions and view of college students in this country.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

10. If Robert Kennedy runs against Richard Nixon in the November election, Kennedy will probably win.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

11. It is probable that Eugene McCarthy will be nominated by the Democratic party as its presidential candidate.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

12. Nelson Rockefeller of New York would probably beat Robert Kennedy in a presidential election.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

13. The voting age should be lowered to 18 years of age.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

14. College students, like non-college students under 26 years of age, should be subject to the draft at any time.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

15. Communist China should be admitted to the United Nations.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

16. The United States should decrease its military commitments overseas.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

17. There will be more riots in cities this summer than there were last summer.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

18. Persons between the ages of 18 and 21 years know enough about political issues to make wise choices among political candidates in elections.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

19. The United States should increase its military commitment in Viet Nam.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

20. The war in Viet Nam will probably end within the next year.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

21. Laws should be enacted to prevent newspaper strikes such as those which have occurred in Detroit.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

22. When foreign nations request U.S. military aid, the U.S. should refuse to render such assistance.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

23. College students should be exempt from the draft while they are attending school.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

24. Increased federal aid to poor persons will do little to prevent riots in cities.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

25. Federal aid to education should be greatly increased.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

APPENDIX C

Table I

N Influence Scoring Categories, Brief Definitions, and Probabilities

That Each Was More Frequent on Aroused TAT₂ by Chance

<u>Category</u>	<u>Scored if...</u>	<u>P value*</u>
I Im (Influence Imagery)	there are two people in the story who interact, so that one's action produces a reaction by the other.	0.117
PR (Prestige)	I Im is scored, and the story involves an important person, as indicated by his position, wealth, fame or glamour.	0.001
OR (Organization)	I Im is scored, and an organization or hierarchy is involved in the story.	0.003
NS (No Self-Deprecation)	I Im is scored, and there is no criticism, humiliation, or mention of personal weakness of a character by himself or author.	0.009
NR (No Reminiscence)	I Im is scored, and there is no idle thinking about past experience.	0.016
ND (No Dread)	I Im is scored, and there is no fear or criticism of the future or future plans.	0.004
CR (Counter-Reaction)	I Im is scored, and one persons does something to another, who reacts in some way that relates back to the first person.	0.004
CO (Consultation)	I Im is scored, and people are consulting about the future, planning, or seeking and/or giving advice.	0.001
TH (Threat)	I Im is scored, and one person threatens another's vital interests, so that he acts to counter that threat.	0.027
SE (Separation)	I Im is scored, and two people are actively separated, leave each other, or are kept apart.	0.005

Total Score: Aroused subjects' total scores on TAT₂ were greater than non-aroused scores at the 0.00016 level (1-tail Mann-Whitney U Test, N = 42).

*exact p values from the Wilcoxon average rank test, computed according to Klotz (Klotz, in press).

APPENDIX D

Telephone Appointment Script

Hello , I'm _____ from the production staff of WMSB television. WMSB-TV and WKAR radio, in cooperation with the Television-Radio Department at Michigan State, are producing a series of programs dealing with students' problems. We are gathering material for these shows from a representative sample of students. Your name was chosen randomly as a part of this sample.

We would greatly appreciate your cooperation. We hope that you will decide to participate, since we are trying to get a representative and unbiased sampling of students' views.

We are asking students to give us about 30 minutes of their time to help us obtain material for these programs. You will be paid for your participation. At this time I cannot tell you the exact amount you will be paid because we are still in the process of getting funds for the project.

The project will be conducted in C-215 Wells Hall. Well Hall is located just across the Red Cedar River from the Computer Center. In order to make it more convenient for you to come, we have arranged seven different times during which you can participate.

APPENDIX E

Name _____

Student NO. _____

WKAR RADIO CAMPUS POLL

WKAR radio is conducting a student opinion poll on a randomly selected group of students. Your name was chosen as a part of this sample. It is important that you participate, since the data gathered in this poll will be used as an aid to future program development.

The questions contained in this booklet concern your feelings and views about various issues. Also, there are some questions about your radio listening habits. Please answer all questions. Also, please put your name and student number in the spaces provided above. The data gathered in this poll will be reported on a group basis. Your answers will be kept in strict confidence

You may now turn the page and begin.

First, we would like to ask you a few questions about yourself.

1. What was your age on your last birthday? _____

2. What is your current class standing? (Place an "X" in the appropriate box)

- ☐ Freshman
☐ Sophomore
☐ Junior
☐ Senior
☐ Graduate Student

3. Are you:

- ☐ Male
☐ Female

4. Do you intend to go on to graduate school?

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

5. How many radios do you have in your apartment or dormitory room?

- ☐ None
☐ One
☐ Two
☐ Three
☐ Four or more

6. Do you own a portable radio?

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

7. About how much time did you spend listening to the radio yesterday?

☐ Didn't listen at all
☐ Less than 1 hour
☐ Between 1 and 2 hours
☐ Between 2 and 3 hours
☐ Between 3 and 4 hours
☐ Four hours or more

8. About how often would you say you listen to WKAR radio?

☐ Very often
☐ Sometimes
☐ Not very often
☐ Never

9. About how many news broadcasts did you listen to on the radio yesterday?

☐ None
☐ One
☐ Two
☐ Three
☐ Four
☐ Five
☐ Six or more

10. When you listen to the radio, which one of the following stations do you listen to most frequently?

☐ WKAR
☐ WJIM
☐ WILS
☐ WVIC
☐ WJR
☐ OTHER

Specify _____

11. Given that you have free time, which one of the following activities do you prefer?

☐ Radio listening
☐ Television viewing
☐ Book reading
☐ Discussing issues with friends

12. When you discuss problems with friends, do you try to convince them of your ideas, or do you mostly listen to their point of view?

☐ Try to convince
☐ Mostly listen
☐ Do both equally

How do you feel about the following statements?

13. The sale of liquor should be legalized in East Lansing.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

14. All students at M.S.U. should be required to take at least a year of foreign language.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

15. M.S.U. ought to raise its entrance requirements.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

16. College students should be exempt from the draft while they are attending school.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

17. Standards for admission to graduate schools are too high and should be lowered.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

18. Student government at M.S.U. is relatively ineffective in terms of getting things done.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

19. All students at M.S.U. should be required to take at least one year of mathematics and physics courses.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

20. The United States should cease all bombing of North Viet Nam.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

21. College students, like non-college students under 26 years of age, should be subject to the draft at any time.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

22. Which one of the following candidates do you think has the best chance of becoming the next President of the United States?

☐ George Wallace
☐ Robert Kennedy
☐ Richard Nixon
☐ Eugene McCarthy
☐ Nelson Rockefeller
☐ Hubert Humphrey

23. Which one of the following issues do you think is the most important in this year's election?



Riots in big cities
War in Viet Nam
Control of atomic weapons
Rising prices

24. How justified were the actions of the students who rioted at Columbia University a few weeks ago?



Very justified
Somewhat justified
Not at all justified

25. If the United States were to invade North Viet Nam, the Chinese Communists would probably enter the war.



Agree Strongly
Agree Moderately
Agree Slightly
Don't Know, Neutral
Disagree Slightly
Disagree Moderately
Disagree Strongly

26. East Lansing merchants take advantage of students by charging them excessively high prices.



Agree Strongly
Agree Moderately
Agree Slightly
Don't Know, Neutral
Disagree Slightly
Disagree Moderately
Disagree Strongly

27. Rents in the East Lansing area are excessive.



Agree Strongly
Agree Moderately
Agree Slightly
Don't Know, Neutral
Disagree Slightly
Disagree Moderately
Disagree Strongly

28. Students at M.S.U. are generally apathetic when it comes to taking action against such problems as high prices and high rents.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

29. Olin Health Center should dispense birth control pills to all female students who request them.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

30. Draft deferments for college students should be eliminated.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

31. In the future, the United States should not become involved in small wars like Viet Nam and Korea.

☐ Agree Strongly
☐ Agree Moderately
☐ Agree Slightly
☐ Don't Know, Neutral
☐ Disagree Slightly
☐ Disagree Moderately
☐ Disagree Strongly

APPENDIX F

Reader Reaction Sheet

This tells how well you persuaded the students who read your script. The rating scales below tell you how the reader felt before he read your script and how he felt after he read your script. If, for example, the reader felt that the elimination of draft deferments for college students was a bad thing before he read your script, his check-mark appears on the bad side of the scale. If your script persuaded him, his check-mark on the after reading rating should have moved to the good side of the scale; that is, after reading your script the reader changed his mind and now thinks that eliminating draft deferments would be a good thing. If you did not persuade the reader, his marks will be at the same position on both the before reading and the after reading scales.

Elimination of College Student Draft Deferments

Reader #1

Before Reading: Good Bad

After Reading: Good Bad

Reader #2

Before Reading: Good Bad

After Reading: Good Bad

Reader #3


Before Reading: Good Bad

After Reading: Good Bad

Reader #4

Before Reading: Good Bad

After Reading: Good Bad



APPENDIX G

WMSB-TV STUDENT OPINION SURVEY

In an attempt to find out how students feel about several different problems, WMSB-TV is conducting this survey of student opinion. Also, we are interested in students' television viewing patterns, so that we can do a better job of programming.

Please answer all of the questions in this booklet. Your responses will be reported on a group basis. Please put your name and student number in the space provided below. After recording your name and student number, please turn the page and begin.

NAME _____

STUDENT NUMBER _____



1. Do you have a television set in your apartment or dormitory room?

_____ Yes

_____ No

2. About how much time did you devote to television viewing yesterday?

_____ None

_____ Less than 1/2 hour

_____ Between 1/2 hour and 1 hour

_____ Between 1 and 2 hours

_____ Between 2 and 3 hours

_____ More than 3 hours

3. How often do you listen to WILX/WMSB-TV (Channel 10)?

_____ Very often

_____ Sometimes

_____ Not very often

_____ Never

4. Between what hours do you watch television most on the average day?

_____ to _____

5. Which one of the following television stations do you think is most popular among students?

_____ WJIM (Channel 6)

_____ WILX/WMSB (Channel 10)

_____ WJRT (Channel 12)

_____ Other _____
(specify)

NOW, WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS?

6. Olin Health Center should dispense birth control pills to all female students who request them.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Agree	Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree
Strongly	Moderately	Slightly	Neutral	Slightly	Moderately	Strongly

7. The United States should pull out of Viet Nam immediately.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Agree	Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree
Strongly	Moderately	Slightly	Neutral	Slightly	Moderately	Strongly

8. The United States should not be responsible for providing military aid to other nations.

Agree	Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree
Strongly	Moderately	Slightly	Neutral	Slightly	Moderately	Strongly

9. Students should resist the draft by all means available.

Agree	Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree
Strongly	Moderately	Slightly	Neutral	Slightly	Moderately	Strongly

10. College students, like non-college students under 26 years of age, should be subject to the draft at any time.

Agree	Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree
Strongly	Moderately	Slightly	Neutral	Slightly	Moderately	Strongly

11. Open housing laws violate an individual's rights.

Agree	Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree
Strongly	Moderately	Slightly	Neutral	Slightly	Moderately	Strongly

12. Television coverage of riots helps to spread rioting throughout the country.

Agree	Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree
Strongly	Moderately	Slightly	Neutral	Slightly	Moderately	Strongly

13. Early predictions of election winners on television influences the outcomes of elections.

Agree	Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree
Strongly	Moderately	Slightly	Neutral	Slightly	Moderately	Strongly

14. Violent programs on television cause some children to become criminals in later life.

Agree	Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree
Strongly	Moderately	Slightly	Neutral	Slightly	Moderately	Strongly

15. The United States should invade North Viet Nam in order to shorten the war.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Don't Know Neutral	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly
----------------	------------------	----------------	--------------------	-------------------	---------------------	-------------------

16. Students should have a greater voice in the making of university policy.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Don't Know Neutral	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly
----------------	------------------	----------------	--------------------	-------------------	---------------------	-------------------

17. College students should be exempt from the draft while they are attending school.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Don't Know Neutral	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly
----------------	------------------	----------------	--------------------	-------------------	---------------------	-------------------

18. The war in Viet Nam will end within the next six months.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Don't Know Neutral	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly
----------------	------------------	----------------	--------------------	-------------------	---------------------	-------------------

19. Persons caught with marijuana in their possession should receive stiff jail sentences.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Don't Know Neutral	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly
----------------	------------------	----------------	--------------------	-------------------	---------------------	-------------------

20. Michigan State University should totally eliminate football in order to improve its academic image.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Don't Know Neutral	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly
----------------	------------------	----------------	--------------------	-------------------	---------------------	-------------------

21. Laws should be enacted to ban anti-war demonstrations.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Don't Know Neutral	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly
----------------	------------------	----------------	--------------------	-------------------	---------------------	-------------------

22. No restrictions should be placed on students visiting members of the opposite sex in dormitory rooms at any time.

Agree Strongly	Agree Moderately	Agree Slightly	Don't Know Neutral	Disagree Slightly	Disagree Moderately	Disagree Strongly
----------------	------------------	----------------	--------------------	-------------------	---------------------	-------------------

23. Physical force should be used to prevent riots.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Agree	Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree
Strongly	Moderately	Slightly	Neutral	Slightly	Moderately	Strongly

24. Draft deferments for college students should be eliminated.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Agree	Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree
Strongly	Moderately	Slightly	Neutral	Slightly	Moderately	Strongly

25. Persons who avoid the draft should receive long jail sentences.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Agree	Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree
Strongly	Moderately	Slightly	Neutral	Slightly	Moderately	Strongly

Finally, we would like to have your evaluation of this method of gathering material for programs.

26. How adequate was the money payment for the script writing part of the project?

- _____ Very adequate
- _____ Somewhat adequate
- _____ Somewhat inadequate
- _____ Very inadequate

27. Based on the readers' reactions to your script, how persuasive would you say your script was?

- _____ Very persuasive
- _____ Somewhat persuasive
- _____ Not very persuasive
- _____ Not at all persuasive

28. How much do you think your written script influenced the readers' opinions?


- ☐ Influenced them a lot
- ☐ Influenced them somewhat
- ☐ Influenced them a little
- ☐ Didn't influence them at all

29. How enjoyable was it to take part in this project?

- ☐ Very enjoyable
- ☐ Somewhat enjoyable
- ☐ Somewhat unenjoyable
- ☐ Very unenjoyable

30. What do you think is the purpose of this project?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION





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