THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ABRAHAM MASLOW IN
EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: SELECTED
CRITICISMS AND APPLICATIONS

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
ROBERT EARL MACDONALD
1969

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

The Psychology of Abraham Maslow in Educational
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presented by

Robert Earl MacDonald

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ABSTRACT

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ABRAHAM MASLOW IN
EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: SELECTED
CRITICISMS AND APPLICATIONS

By

Robert Earl MacDonald

This dissertation is an examination of the psy-
chological doctrines of Abraham Maslow toward the end of
establishing their relevance to educational theory. The
first part of the dissertation, Chapters I and II, are
introductory, providing the reader with a survey descrip-
tion of Maslow's principal views. In particular, this
part of the dissertation treats of (1) Maslow as a
representative of a divergent trend of thought within
the main stream of professional psychology, (2) his hier-
archy of human needs, (3) his distinction between de-
ficiency motivation and growth motivation, (4) his con-
ceptions of the self-actualizing person and
peak-experiences, and (5) his theory of value.

The second part of this dissertation, Chapter III,
criticizes negatively and positively some of the doc-
trines described in Part I. In particular, Maslow's
ethical and metaethical views are scrutinized and shown
to be inadequate as currently formulated on an intui-
tionist basis. Some suggestions are offered to make
these views more acceptable.

Robert Earl MacDonald

The third and concluding section of the dissertation, Chapter IV, attempts to establish a nexus between Maslow's views and educational theory. This part suggests that Maslow's distinction between higher and lower needs calls for a radically different educational orientation in the United States, for an orientation that is not merely vocational but takes into account man's aesthetic sensitivities. This part of the dissertation also makes some suggestions, in a Maslovian vein, about teacher education. It suggests that candidates for teaching should exhibit dispositions toward self-actualization in addition to their academic competencies. This part also speaks to the difficulties involved in identifying persons who are self-actualizing.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ABRAHAM MASLOW IN

EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: SELECTED

CRITICISMS AND APPLICATIONS

By

Robert Earl MacDonald

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is an attempt to examine some of
the more fundamental aspects of the thought of Abraham
Maslow, and to arrive at a determination of the most
significant strengths and weaknesses contained in his
doctrines. Of particular interest here is the question
of what possible contribution his thought may offer to
our present-day perspectives in the field of education.

Maslow is an American psychologist who has written
extensively in his field and is probably one of the most
provocative thinkers in modern psychology. He has been
particularly vocal in his contention that psychology has
traditionally operated from too restrictive a model of
man's nature. He believes that human growth and achieve-
ment have been defined too narrowly; that man is capable
of becoming much more than we as a society are presently
aware of. Moreover, Maslow claims to have isolated a
small number of world citizens who are very close to
satisfying his criterion for optimum human growth. He
insists that his intensive studies of these "more fully-
evolved," or "self-actualizing," persons have produced

results which add considerably to our knowledge of human
nature.

On the basis of this research, Maslow has pro-
ceeded to offer what he considers to be more adequate
conceptions of "human wholeness" and "the full develop-
ment of human potentials." In this connection, one of
the perennial difficulties in American education has been
to move beyond nominal agreement that education should
facilitate greater human fulfillment, and to arrive at
a more adequate conception of what such fulfillment
would consist of from an operational frame of reference.
Some would immediately question the possibility of our
ever approaching substantial agreement on a notion of
what constitutes human growth and fulfillment. Yet,
ironically enough, any system of deliberate education
rests on a very pervasive set of assumptions regarding
man's capacities and abilities and his ultimate purposes.
Whatever we do as educators depends upon what we think
people are like. The goals we seek, the things we do,
the judgments we make, even the experiments we are will-
ing to try, are determined by beliefs about the nature of
man and his capacities. It has always been so. Teachers
who believe children can, will try to teach them.
Teachers who believe children are unable, give up trying
or spend their days on a treadmill, hopelessly making

motions they never expect will matter. It has been
argued that

> The beliefs we hold about people can serve as
> prison walls limiting us at every turn. They
> can also set us free from our shackles to con-
> front great new possibilities never dreamed of
> before. No beliefs will be more important to
> education than those we hold about the nature
> of man and the limits of his potentials. When-
> ever our ideals about human capacities change,
> the goals of teaching must change, too. What-
> ever we decide is the best that man can become
> must necessarily affect our goals for education.[1]

Admittedly, there are difficulties and frustrations in-
volved in any attempt to come to grips with such global
inquiries as "What is man capable of?" or "What can man
become?" On the other hand, to refuse to confront and
to question time-honored assumptions in this area is
to risk perpetuating a system of education whose under-
pinnings have become inadequate.

In the light of such considerations, this disser-
tation is based on the conviction that Maslow's bold
claims to a "new vision" of the possibilities of man and
his destiny ought to be allowed a hearing in educational
circles. In short, if Maslow does have new knowledge of
man's nature, the implications for education could be
significant ones.

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II is
devoted to an overview of Maslow's thought in which the
concern is to summarize as accurately as possible the
main aspects of his position. At the conclusion of this

summary chapter it becomes possible to delineate three main components of Maslow's doctrines, including a methodological-epistemological aspect, a positive psychology, and an ethical component. Chapter III will consist of a systematic critique of these main elements of his thought. Here the concern will be to size up the most prominent strengths and weaknesses connected with each of the major components that are cited in Chapter II. Special attention will be devoted in Chapter III to a review of Maslow's ethical doctrines. The main thrust of this critique will be to demonstrate that Maslow is not successful in his attempts to provide a scientific ethic which is grounded in man's nature. At the same time, it will be argued that his positive psychology suggests a more adequate view of human nature, and as such, that it offers a firmer position from which to attack ethical indeterminism. On the basis of this critique, the concern in Chapter IV will be to discuss the significance of Maslow's thought for contemporary education. At this point it will be suggested that his positive psychology provides a unique vantage from which to consider the adequacy of our current emphasis in American education. Also, Maslow's concept of positive growth, or self-actualization, will be recommended here as a personality model for American teachers.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER I

    [1]ASCD 1962 Yearbook Committee, Perceiving, Behaving, Becoming (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1962), p. 1.

CHAPTER II

A SUMMARY OF MASLOW'S DOCTRINES

The purpose of this chapter is twofold, namely, to provide an overview of Maslow's doctrines and to highlight the particular doctrines on which subsequent chapters will focus. The concern in this chapter is neither to recommend nor to find fault with Maslow's views, but rather, to attempt to summarize them accurately and in a manner which will lend itself to the treatment of the major questions around which the dissertation is organized.

For purposes of this initial overview, Maslow's doctrines will be approached according to the following classificatory scheme:

1. Maslow as a representative of a divergent trend of thought within the main stream of professional psychology. Here the concern will be to locate Maslow's ideas within a larger framework of thought which features a change in thinking about human nature. The primary purpose will be to provide a preliminary overview of the main themes in Maslow's platform, together with some conception of the chronological development of his thought.

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2. <u>The hierarchy of human needs</u>. Fundamental to Maslow's view of human nature is his notion of how it differs from animal nature. The basis for this distinction lies in a particular conception of "higher needs" and the relationships which prevail within a whole hierarchy of human needs. Maslow would claim that the possible ramifications of this theory of human needs are many and significant. Not only does it shed light on the possibility of a higher level of human experience, but it may have great utility for perceiving major barriers to human fulfillment, as he sees it.

3. <u>Deficiency motivation versus growth motivation</u>. Related to his theory of human needs, though probably qualifying as another of his major doctrines, is Maslow's rather comprehensive theory of motivation. As will become apparent, Maslow believes that many forms of human behavior (and especially some previously puzzling varieties) come into sharper focus as one becomes cognizant of two underlying trends in human motivation that have not been carefully distinguished. On the one hand, men may conduct their lives so as to merely make up for deficiencies, being largely preoccupied with the "lower needs" for safety and security. Growth motivation, however, is manifest in an ability to transcend to a great extent these "defensive tendencies" in a more spontaneous expression of one's powers and a disposition toward a

more "honest" confrontation with the world on its own
terms. It is within the context of this theory of motiva-
tion that Maslow's most recent major writing, The Psy-
chology of Science, becomes significant. Here Maslow
would appear to be addressing himself not to the questions
of "what is knowledge and what are legitimate paths to
it?" but rather to the questions of "what motivates men
to pursue knowledge and how does the quality of motiva-
tion affect the nature of what they find?"

4. The self-actualizing person and peak-experiences.
At this point attention turns to a characterization of the
self-actualizing person and the research which enabled
Maslow to describe such men. Within this context,
Maslow's notion of the "peak-experience" becomes signifi-
cant. Maslow's views of peak-experiences include the
claim that they may be moments of intellectual insight.
The concern here will be to focus more specifically on
what Maslow has to say in this connection, with a view
to determining what epistemological significance, if
any, his comments may have.

5. Maslow's theory of value. There is some evi-
dence to indicate that Maslow intended his ideas to reach
their culmination in a theory of value. He writes:

> Humanists for thousands of years have attempted
> to construct a naturalistic, psychological value
> system that could be derived from man's own
> nature . . . it is my belief that developments
> in the science and art of psychology, in the

last few decades, make it possible for us for
the first time to feel confident that this
age-old hope may be fulfilled if only we work
hard enough.[1]

At any rate, Maslow does offer a theory of value which he

considers to be very comprehensive and which I will

examine with some care because of its foundational

relationship to the central questions being raised in

this thesis.

Maslow as a Representative of a Divergent Trend of Thought Within the Main Stream of Professional Psychology

Maslow's ideas represent a new trend of thought

which has developed in the past decade or two within the

ranks of professional psychology, a trend which is also

discernable in the thinking of Erich Fromm, C. G. Jung,

Karen Horney, Carl Rogers, and other psychotherapists.

This recent development in psychological theory, often

referred to as the Third Force[2] movement in psychology,

may be broadly characterized as a rather dramatic change

in thinking about human nature. It represents, in large

part, a reaction to what Maslow considers "the gross in-

adequacies of behavioristic and Freudian psychologies in

their treatment of the higher nature of man."[3] He would

point out that these more traditional psychologies are

in effect two comprehensive theories of human nature

which tend to dominate psychology today.

The behavioristic approach is depicted by Maslow as:

> the associationistic, experimental, mechano-
> morphic psychology, the psychology which can
> be called 'classical' because it is in direct
> line with the classical concept of science
> which comes out of astronomy, mechanics,
> physics, chemistry, and geology.[4]

In addition, he sees this as the psychology which can be called "academic" because it has tended to emanate from and flourish in the undergraduate and graduate departments of psychology in our universities. Its wide scope of application becomes evident, according to Maslow, when one considers that since its first detailed and testable formulation by Watson, Hull, and Skinner, "classical," "academic" psychological theory has been widely applied beyond its original limited focus in such diverse areas as acquisition of motor skills, behavior disorders and therapy, and social psychology. In fact, behavioristic psychology is alleged to have answers to any questions that one may have about human nature. In that sense it is thought by Maslow to be a philosophy, a philosophy of psychology. Some initial insight into the evolution of his thought may be gained when one realizes the enthusiasm with which Maslow subscribed to the behavioristic approach at one early stage in his academic career.

> Indeed it was John B. Watson's optimistic credo
> (in Psychologies of 1925) that had brought me
> and many others into the field of psychology.
> His programmatic writings promised a clear road

ahead. I felt--with great exhilaration--that
it guaranteed progress. There could be a <u>real</u>
science of psychology, something solid and
reliable to depend on to advance steadily and
irreversibly from one certainty to the next.
It offered a technique (conditioning) which gave
promise of solving all problems and a wonder-
fully convincing philosophy (positivism, objec-
tivism) that was easy to understand and to
apply, that protected us against all the mis-
takes of the past.[5]

The second philosophy of psychology emerged

essentially from the work of Freud and his disciples and

antagonists and is seen by Maslow to dominate the whole

field of clinical psychology and social work. It too,

he would contend, tries to be a theory of art, of reli-

gion, of society, of education, of almost every major

human endeavor. Maslow is emphatic in stating that he

does not oppose such ambition in psychologists; on the

contrary, his own efforts become ample testimony to the

fact that he strongly encourages it. Rather, he would

argue that the essential issue here involves the relative

<u>adequacy</u> of the philosophical underpinnings from which

the psychologist operates. He contends that:

Every psychologist, however positivist and hard-
boiled and anti-theoretical he may claim to be,
nevertheless has a full blown philosophy of human
nature hidden away in a concealed place in his
guts. It is as if he guided himself by a half-
known map which he disavows and denies and which
is therefore absolutely immune to intrusion and
to correction by newly acquired knowledge. This
unconscious map or theory guides his reactions
and expectations far more than does his labor-
iously acquired experimental knowledge. The issue
then is not over whether or not to have a

philosophy of psychology, but whether to have
a conscious or an unconscious one.[6]

Maslow considers the behavioristic and Freudian

psychologies to be reflections of an inadequate view of

man and his world, a view which has allowed psychologists

to emulate "successful" mathematicians and physicists of

the 19th century with the underlying conviction that

"their success can also be our success." In attempting

to expose the fallacy involved in such reasoning, Maslow

argues that psychology as a science is in its infancy and

has to work out its own philosophy, its own methodology,

suitable to its own nature and problems and goals. The

world view which he feels to be inadequate for developing

a philosophy of psychology is that which assumes an

atomistic world where complex things are built up out of

simple elements. The philosophy of science which is

found to accompany this world view sees the first task

of the scientist as that of reducing the so-called com-

plex to the so-called simple. This is to be done by

analysis, by finer and finer separating, until we come

to the irreducible.[7] Maslow contends that this pre-

occupation which he labels "reductionism" has not only

hampered the growth of psychology, but has led to an

unnecessarily restrictive view of the nature of science:

> This task has succeeded well enough elsewhere in
> science, for a time at least. In psychology it
> has not. This conclusion exposes the essentially
> theoretical nature of the entire reductive effort.

It must be understood that this effort is <u>not</u>
the essential nature of science in general.
It is simply an atomistic, mechanical world
view that we now have good reason to doubt.
Attacking such reductive efforts is then not
an attack on science in general, but rather on
one of the possible attitudes towards science.[8]

The trouble with many psychologists, as Maslow

sees it, is that

they are content to work with but a portion of
the human being and, in fact, to make a virtue
and a desirable thing out of it. They forget
that ultimately their task is to give us a
unified, empirically based conception of the
whole human being, of human nature in general.
But this takes courage and demands sweep and
scope and willingness to step away from the
narrow platform of certainty. This certainty
is and must be narrow for the simple reason
that we just don't know enough about human
nature to be sure of anything but small bits
of knowledge.[9]

As a result, he believes that we may for a time have to

be content with inexactness and uncertainty in the early

stages of exploration. He perceives the necessity for

a move from "scientistic accuracy" to "scientific

adequacy" in the study of man.

Those who do insist on precision from the very
beginning can therefore never begin. All they
can do is to come in on the later stages of
development of the problem . . . it makes a
senseless game or ritual out of science if it
is defined primarily as method. What is it a
method for? If pertinence, worth, goal, value
are understressed, and validity and reliability
exclusively sought for, this is very much like
boasting 'I don't know or care what I'm doing,
but see how accurately I'm doing it.' The
situation in American psychology, in which most
researchers do what they can do well, rather
than what needs doing, is largely due, I think,

to this mistaken notion of what science is
and should be.[10]

Maslow takes this "preoccupation with accuracy at
the expense of adequacy" to be characteristic of the
laboratory psychologist who succumbs to the temptation
to use animal nature and animal behavior as a trustworthy
model for understanding human beings. "Classical academic
psychology has no systematic place for higher-order ele-
ments of the personality such as altruism and dignity,
or the search for truth and beauty," he would point out.
"You simply do not ask questions about ultimate human
values if you are working in an animal lab."[11] In trac-
ing the development of his inability to live with the
dominant psychologies of the day, Maslow attempts to
account for his original dissatisfaction with the
scientific world view assumed by the "classical" approach
to psychology:

> In my own history this clash in scientific world
> view first took the form of living simultaneously
> with two psychologies that had little to do with
> each other. In my career as an experimentalist
> in the laboratory, I felt quite comfortable and
> capable with my heritage of scientific orthodoxy.
> . . . But insofar as I was a psychotherapist, an
> analysand, a father, a teacher, a student of
> personality--that is, insofar as I dealt with
> whole persons--"scientific psychology" gradually
> proved itself to be of little use. In this realm
> of persons I found greater sustenance in "psycho-
> dynamics," especially the psychologies of Freud
> and Adler, psychologies that were clearly not
> "scientific" by the definitions of the day.[12]

Maslow further recalls that before this time Science had been One, and there was but one Science. Now it began to look to him as though there were two Sciences, one for his new problems, and one for everything else. Later, however, it began to appear to him that these two Sciences could be generalized into One Science again. From Maslow's perspective this new Science "looks different and promises to be more inclusive and more powerful than the old One Science."[13]

Maslow's dissatisfaction with "the limitations of current research techniques," then, has forced him to reappraise the enterprise of science itself. However, he warns against the dangers of "antiscientific attitudes" and voices a trust that his own ideas will not be understood to express such a spirit:

> I have been disturbed not only by the more 'anal'
> scientists and the dangers of their denial of
> human values in science, along with the conse-
> quent amoral technologizing of all science. Just
> as dangerous are some of the critics of orthodox
> science who find it too skeptical, too cool and
> nonhuman, and then reject it altogether as a
> danger to human values. They become "anti-
> scientific" and even anti-intellectual. This is
> a real danger among some psychotherapists and
> clinical psychologists, among artists, among some
> seriously religious people, among some of the
> people who are interested in Zen, in Taoism, in
> existentialism, "experientialism," and the like.
> Their alternative to science is often sheer
> freakishness and cultishness, uncritical and
> selfish exaltation of mere personal experiencing,
> over-reliance on impulsivity (which they confuse
> with spontaneity), arbitrary whimsicality and
> emotionality, unskeptical enthusiasm, and finally

navel-watching and solipsism. . . . I certainly
wish to be understood as trying to enlarge
science, not destroy it. It is not necessary
to choose between experiencing and abstracting.
Our task is to integrate them.[14]

Maslow would grant that Freudian psychology has

attempted to confront problems of the "higher nature" of

man. However, he contends that:

Until recently these have been handled by being
very cynical about them, that is to say, by
analyzing them away in a pessimistic, reductive
manner. Generosity is interpreted as a reaction-
formation against stinginess, which is deep down
and unconscious, and therefore somehow more real.
Kindliness tends to be seen as a defense mechanism
against violence, rage, and the tendency to
murder.[15]

In Maslow's view, psychology ought to be more positive

and less negative than it is. It should have higher

ceilings, and not be afraid of the "loftier possibili-

ties of the human being." He would contend that one

major shortcoming of research psychology (and of psy-

chiatry as well) is its pessimistic, negative and

limited conception of the full height to which the human

being can attain. "Partly because of this preconception,

it has so far revealed to us much about man's short-

comings, his illnesses, his sins and his weaknesses, but

rather little about his virtues, his potentialities, or

his highest aspirations."[16]

Maslow, then, challenges the prevailing tendency

in psychology to view man as though everything he does

is done simply for the sake of survival. Suitable for

creatures struggling merely to reduce threats to their

safety, it crowds out too much of actual human nature,

in his view. He finds that the data of human nature

cannot be adequately explained if one tries to under-

stand human experience and behavior by reference to

processes that take place, presumably, in animals.

This, of course, is not to say that Maslow and other

thinkers of similar persuasion are ungrateful for dis-

coveries about human nature that have resulted from com-

paring the behavior of animals and human beings. The

psychologist, however, cannot ask animals for their

introspective reports, so he is restricted to noting

the sequences in their behavior. Thus, the behavior of

animals can be studied without reference to motivation.

But we cannot tell from the overt behavior of a human

being what his needs and purposes are, according to

Maslow. Moreover, he would claim that to misunderstand

a person's inner motivation is to misunderstand his

behavior.

A second major theme in Maslow's campaign against

"reductionism" lies in his contention that whatever

similarities a human being may have to other human

beings, it is fatal to reduce him to one sample of human

nature. Each man must be understood on his own terms,

just as the species man must be understood on its own

terms. We may get a distorted conception of human beings

by assuming that what most often happens is the clue to
what infrequently happens, he would argue. If it is
dangerous to consider the animal as a norm for inter-
preting human behavior, it is also hazardous to allow
the average man to become the norm-al man or even the
healthy man.[17] Maslow's concern here resembles that of
Erich Fromm who also rails against the tendency to con-
ceive of human fulfillment in terms of the "ordinary"
or the "well-adjusted." Fromm expresses a belief that
the "average" man allows his desire for security in his
culture to keep him from productive self-fulfillment.[18]

Maslow criticizes Freudians for allowing their
analyses of sick minds to influence their view of the
total growth process and to, in effect, regard "normal-
ity as a special case of the abnormal."[19] Instead of
being content to regard a healthy human being as simply
"not very sick," he espouses a "health psychology" that
he believes will lead us to conclude that psychological
illness is primarily a struggle toward health.[20] In
keeping with his plea that psychologists allow them-
selves to become cognizant of "the whole man," Maslow
wants us to recognize that the human being has another
side, one characterized by "positive motivations" and the
actualization of potentials which too often become
obscured in the struggle to adjust. He argues:

> . . . there is another side to the human being
> and another set of motivations, the positive
> ones, the tending to grow stronger, wiser,
> healthier, to actualize one's potentialities,
> to be curious, to wonder, to be interested, to
> philosophize, to be creative, to have fun, to
> enjoy. Not only do we adjust, we also rebel.[21]

It is time, he contends, that psychologists do justice

to the person who is concerned not merely with meeting

emergencies and gratifying survival needs, but also in

experiencing life for its own sake.

Given this strong conviction, Maslow undertook to

identify and to study a number of such "psychologically

healthy individuals," whom he has labeled "self-

actualizing" persons. His original intention, he

claims, was not to engage in an ordinary research, but

to conduct this investigation for reasons of intrinsic

and personal interest. He explains, however, that his

findings exceeded all expectations and convinced him of

the advisability of a public report:

> The study is unusual in various ways. It was
> not planned as an ordinary research; it was not
> a social venture but a private one, motivated
> by my own curiosity and pointed toward the
> solution of various personal, moral, ethical,
> and scientific problems. I sought only to con-
> vince and teach myself (as is quite proper in
> a personal quest) rather than to prove or to
> demonstrate to others. Quite unexpectedly, how-
> ever, these studies have proved to be so en-
> lightening to me, and so laden with implications,
> that it seems fair that some sort of report
> should be made to others in spite of its
> methodological shortcomings.[22]

Maslow's studies of self-actualizing people have led him to speculate that such individuals may represent the end-product of the human growth process, since they bring into being potentialities not realized by others. As such, he believes that they may be the ones who can tell us the most about what human nature is and can be and thus throw light on the nature of development.

The Hierarchy of Human Needs

Maslow has become convinced that in order to view the human developmental process in best perspective we must focus on the end as well as on the beginning of that process. His studies of "self-actualizing persons" have led him to believe that these people represent the flowering of the human species. However, as a result of his research (to be considered in more detail later in this chapter), Maslow has concluded that such persons are relatively few in number at this juncture in man's evolution, and that they are difficult to select with the kind of precision that either the scientist or philosopher would like. In fact, his findings indicate that self-actualization of the sort found in his older subjects is hardly possible in our society for young, developing people.[23] If every human being has the capacity for self-fulfillment or self-actualization, and if this is indeed the goal of every person as Maslow

contends, some might consider it to be in order that he account for the scarcity of such fully-developed individuals in today's world.

Maslow would argue that this lack constitutes no dilemma when one takes into consideration the nature of human needs and the relationship which he believes to exist among these needs as the result of his theoretical and empirical work in the area of motivation. Here he would point out that, although the goal of each and every human life is self-fulfillment or "living up to his potentialities," human beings have many other problems they need to solve on the way to this goal. More specifically, men have "basic needs," each of which represents a special and basic universal personality problem that must be adequately satisfied before significant higher development can take place.[24] Maslow explains that:

> The human being has as part of his intrinsic
> construction, not only physiological needs,
> but truly psychological ones. They may be
> considered as deficiencies which must be
> optimally fulfilled by the environment to
> avoid sickness or to avoid subjective ill-
> being. They can be called basic, or biological,
> and likened to the need for salt, or calcium or
> vitamin D for the following reasons:
>
> 1. The person yearns for their gratifica-
>   tion persistently.
>
> 2. Their deprivation makes the person
>   sicken and wither, or stunts his
>   growth.

3. Gratifying them is therapeutic, curing
    the deficiency-illness.

4. Steady supplies forestall these
    illnesses.

5. Healthy people do not demonstrate
    these deficiencies.[25]

Maslow classifies man's basic needs as the phys-
iological needs, the safety needs, the belongingness
and love needs, the esteem needs, and the need for self-
actualization.[26] These needs are related to each other
in a hierarchical and developmental way, in an order of
strength and priority. Within this hierarchy, safety
is a more prepotent, or stronger, more pressing, earlier
appearing, more vital need than love, for instance, and
the need for food is usually stronger than either.
Furthermore, all these basic needs are considered by
Maslow to be simply steps along the time path to general
self-actualization, under which all basic needs can be
subsumed.[27]

Maslow believes that these needs are neither
necessarily conscious nor unconscious. On the whole,
however, in the average person he thinks them to be more
often unconscious than conscious. With "suitable tech-
niques" and with "sophisticated people," he feels they
may become conscious.[28] Generally, however, as Maslow
sees it, the individual is not aware of this intrinsic
drive toward self-actualization. He elaborates as follows:

> We, the psychologists observing and studying,
> have constructed this concept in order to inte-
> grate and explain lots of diverse data. So far
> as the person himself is concerned, all he knows
> is that he is desperate for love, and thinks he
> will be forever happy and content if he gets it.
> He does not know in advance that he will strive
> on after this gratification has come, and that
> gratification of one basic need opens con-
> sciousness to domination by another, "higher"
> need. So far as he is concerned, the absolute,
> ultimate value, synonymous with life itself, is
> whichever need in the hierarchy he is dominated
> by during a particular period. These basic
> needs therefore may be treated both as ends and
> as steps toward a single end-goal.[29]

Through this classification of basic needs, Maslow

attempts to take account of what he holds to be a rela-

tive unity behind the superficial differences in specific

desires from one culture to another. On the other hand,

he is not yet ready to claim that such a classification

is ultimate or universal for all cultures. He would

assert, however, that "it is _more_ ultimate, _more_ uni-

versal, _more_ basic than the superficial conscious de-

sires, and makes a closer approach to common human

characteristics."[30]

As Maslow proceeds to describe these "instinctoid"

needs, he believes it necessary to remain cognizant of

how they appear in human nature rather than in animal

nature. Thus he says that we must not be drawn into

thinking of human instincts as strong and overpowering,

as we may well find them to be in animals. After all,

a need may be innate and common to all men without being

given dominant expression in human life.[31] At the same

time, he wants to emphasize that these basic needs are

not learned in a culture, however influential environ-

ment and culture may be in directing the way and extent

to which they are gratified.[32]

Within Maslow's scheme, the physiological needs

are the most basic. These are the needs for food, water,

sleep, warmth, exercise, and procreation which serve the

homeostatic balance of the body and keep it alive. He

considers these physiological drives or needs to be

unusual rather than typical because they are independent

of each other and of other motivations, and because it is

possible to demonstrate a localized, underlying somatic

base for the drive. Yet, Maslow wants to make it clear

that these needs and the consummatory behavior involved

with them are not completely isolable since they may

serve as channels for all sorts of other needs as well.

That is to say, the person who thinks he is hungry may

actually be seeking more for comfort, or dependence, than

for vitamins or proteins.[33]

The capacity of the physiological needs to dominate

the human organism when unsatisfied is illustrated by

Maslow in his example of the person who is lacking food,

safety, love, and esteem.

A person who is lacking food, safety, love, and
esteem would most probably hunger for food more
strongly than for anything else. If all the needs
are unsatisfied, and the organism is then domi-
nated by the physiological needs, all other needs
may simple become nonexistent or be pushed into
the background. It is then fair to characterize
the whole organism by saying simply that it is
hungry, for consciousness is almost completely
preempted by hunger. All capacities are put into
the service of hunger-satisfaction, and the
organization of these capacities is almost en-
tirely determined by the one purpose of satisfy-
ing hunger. The receptors and effectors, the
intelligence, memory, habits, all may now be
defined simply as hunger-gratifying tools.
Capacities that are not useful for this purpose
lie dormant, or are pushed into the background.
The urge to write poetry, the desire to acquire
an automobile, the interest in American history,
the desire for a new pair of shoes are, in the
extreme case, forgotten or become of secondary
importance.[34]

Maslow contends that a good way to obscure the higher

motivations, and to get a lopsided view of human

capacities and human nature, is to make the organism

extremely and chronically hungry or thirsty. He asserts

that anyone who attempts to make an emergency picture

into a typical one, and who will measure all of man's

goals and desires by his behavior during extreme phys-

iological deprivation is being blind to many things.

"It is quite true that man lives by bread alone," Maslow

declares. That is indeed the case, he admits, "when

there is no bread. But what happens to man's desires

when there is plenty of bread and when his belly is

chronically filled?"[35] As already indicated, his answer

is that other (and higher) needs will soon emerge and

these, rather than physiological hungers, will dominate
the organism.

According to Maslow, one main implication of this
need hierarchy is that gratification becomes as important
a concept as deprivation in motivation theory; for it
releases the organism from the domination of a relatively
more physiological need, thereby permitting the emergence
of other more social goals. The physiological needs,
along with their partial goals, when chronically grati-
fied cease to exist as active determinants or organizers
of behavior. They now exist only in a potential fashion
in the sense that they may emerge again to dominate the
organism if they are thwarted.[36]

Maslow holds that the basic needs are "apparently
the only ends in themselves." However, there are cer-
tain conditions which he considers to be immediate pre-
requisites for the basic need satisfactions. Danger to
these is reacted to as if it were direct danger to the
basic needs themselves. He maintains that the enjoyment
of "a modicum at least" of freedom of speech and investi-
gation, along with freedom of action consistent with
similar demands of others, and freedom of self-defense
against injury are examples of such preconditions for
basic need satisfactions. These conditions are defended
by the individual as almost ends in themselves since they
are so closely related to the basic needs. Without them

the basic satisfactions are quite impossible, or at

least severely endangered, as Maslow sees it. He reasons

that:

> If we remember that the cognitive capacities
> (perceptual, intellectual, learning) are a set
> of adjustive tools, which have, among other
> functions, that of satisfaction of our basic
> needs, then it is clear that any danger to them,
> any deprivation or blocking of their free use,
> must also be indirectly threatening to the basic
> needs themselves.[37]

Maslow takes this statement to be a partial solution of

the general problem of curiosity, the search for knowl-

edge, truth and wisdom, and the urge to solve the cosmic

mysteries.

In discussing some further characteristics of the

basic needs, Maslow has seen fit to provide various

qualifications to what may otherwise appear to some as

entirely too simplistic a view of human motivation. For

one thing, he wants to dispel the possible impression

that he considers this hierarchy of needs to be a rigidly

fixed order. He explains that although the majority of

the people with whom he has worked have seemed to have

these basic needs in about the same order that has been

indicated, there have still been a number of exceptions.

Among the types of exceptions which Maslow has en-

countered are the following: (1) persons whose levels

of aspiration have been permanently deadened or lowered,

in which case the less prepotent goals are lost forever

and the individual remains satisfied at a low, subsistence level, (2) cases where martyrs will give up everything for the sake of a particular ideal or value. In such instances, he believes people develop exceptional power ("frustration tolerance") to withstand the thwarting of lower needs because early gratifications have allowed them to develop strong, healthy character structures, and (3) cases of apparent reversal of the hierarchy. Looking at behavior itself may give the wrong impression, Maslow contends. He considers it important to emphasize that the person will want the more basic of two needs when deprived in both. However, there is no necessary implication that he will act upon his desires, since there are many determinants of behavior other than the needs and desires.[38]

Another possible misconception which Maslow wants to avoid is the notion that a need must be 100 per cent satisfied before the next need emerges. He would acknowledge that most members of our society who are "normal" are partially satisfied and partially unsatisfied in all their basic needs at the same time. He would consider a more realistic description of the hierarchy to be in terms of decreasing percentages of satisfaction as we go up the hierarchy of prepotency. To illustrate, he offers the possibility that the average citizen may perhaps be 85 per cent satisfied in his physiological

needs, 70 per cent in his safety needs, 50 per cent in his love needs, 40 per cent in his self-esteem needs, and 10 per cent in his self-actualization needs.[39]

A third mistaken notion which Maslow cautions against is that these basic needs should be considered exclusive or single determiners of certain kinds of behavior. Instead, he wants to make clear his belief that most behavior is multimotivated. He explains that within the sphere of motivational determinants any behavior tends to be determined by several or all of the basic needs simultaneously rather than by only one of them. According to Maslow, this view contrasts sharply with "the more naive brand of trait psychology in which one trait or one motive accounts for a certain kind of act, i.e., an aggressive act is traced solely to a trait of aggressiveness."[40]

Finally, Maslow wants to emphasize that not all behavior is determined by the basic needs. In fact, one might even say that not all behavior is motivated, he contends, since there are many determinants of behavior other than motives. He points to the so-called "external field" as one other important class of determinants and argues that "theoretically, at least, behavior may be determined completely by the external field, or even by specific, isolated, external stimuli, as in association of ideas, or certain conditioned reflexes."[41] To the extent,

then, that it is unrelated to the basic needs of the
individual, Maslow chooses to consider such behavior
unmotivated.

Deficiency Motivation Versus
Growth Motivation

One of the more prominent themes emerging from
Maslow's discussion of human needs is his distinction
between two underlying trends in human motivation.
These two trends he has characterized more explicitly as
the forces within an individual impelling that person
forward toward growth and those intrinsic, though con-
flicting, forces of defense and protection which tend to
inhibit the drive toward self-actualization. This basic
conflict between the defensive forces and the growth
trends is thought by Maslow to be an existential one,
imbedded in the deepest nature of the human being.

> Every human being has both sets of forces within
> him. One set clings to safety and defensiveness
> out of fear, tending to regress, hanging on to
> the past, afraid to grow away from the primitive
> communion with the mother's uterus and breast,
> afraid to take chances, afraid to jeopardize
> what he already has, afraid of independence,
> freedom and separateness. The other set of
> forces impels him forward toward wholeness of
> Self and uniqueness of Self, toward full func-
> tioning of all his capacities, toward confi-
> dence in the face of the external world at the
> same time that he can accept his deepest, real,
> unconscious Self.[42]

In effect, the dominance of one or the other of these
forces within an individual marks the difference between

living and preparing to live, according to Maslow. It
is one thing to live merely to make up for deficiencies,
to live for safety now and "for the future." This kind
of living is thought to be quite different from that
which results when the individual is less preoccupied
by the "lower needs" and more disposed to trying out
his powers for their own sake ("exploring, manipulating,
experiencing, being interested, choosing, delighting,
enjoying")[43] without any hunger to feed.

Maslow believes that there are "anxieties and de-
lights" connected with both forces, those of safety and
those of growth. The process of healthy growth is con-
sidered to be

> a never ending series of free-choice situations
> confronting each individual at every point
> throughout his life, in which he must choose
> between the delights of safety and growth,
> dependence and independence, regression and
> progression, immaturity and maturity.[44]

We grow forward, he claims, when the delights of growth
and anxieties of safety are greater than the anxieties
of growth and the delights of safety. He recognizes
that this latter statement may sound like a truism. On
the other hand, he points out that such is not the case
in the eyes of behaviorists whose theories of need-
reduction are seen to preclude "free-choice" as a
behavioral determinant. This notion that we may rely on
individual free-choice to activate a process of

"growth-through-delight" Maslow bases on what he con-
ceives to be a relatively simple fact:

> . . . that growth takes place when the next
> step forward is subjectively more delightful,
> more joyous, more intrinsically satisfying
> than the last; that the only way we can ever
> know what is right for us is that it feels
> better subjectively than any alternative. The
> new experience validates itself rather than by
> any outside criterion. It is self-justifying,
> self-validating.[45]

In this view, growth experience is not chosen out of a

desire to achieve any sort of external reward or goal,

but rises out of "pure spontaneity" (from "within out-

ward") and is the way in which we discover the Self and

answer the ultimate questions Who am I? What am I?[46]

Maslow admits to placing his faith in the proposition

that "if free choice is really free and if the chooser

is not too sick or frightened to choose, he will choose

wisely, in a healthy and growthward direction."[47] He

claims that there is already much empirical support for

this postulation, although it is mostly at the animal

level and more detailed research is necessary with free

choice in humans.

We might pause, at this point, and attempt to pro-

ject some of the more important ramifications of this

dialectical relationship between safety and growth

forces which Maslow posits. For one thing, it would

appear that Maslow sees human nature as intrinsically

good and believes that if it is untampered with it

will produce wholesome fruit. If allowed the oppor-
tunity, then, to _freely_ contest with the forces of safety
and defense, the growthward influences can be counted
upon to win out and to move the organism toward self-
actualization. Would it not seem to follow from this
that the ultimate concern of the wise parent (or
teacher) must be to maximize free-choice and to avoid
imposing on the young any sort of external stimuli to
behave? Since Maslow, at other points, does advocate
that the environment be structured so as to promote
individual growth, how does he reconcile his ultimate
trust in the inner individual with the necessity for
help from the environment?

He would contend that this predominantly optimis-
tic characterization of the human growth process is in-
complete and unrealistic since it focuses primarily on
the potential of the individual for health and growth
and does not begin to account for the phenomenon of
failure to grow. In this connection, he criticizes the
extremists of the growth school who tend to view human
development "through rose-colored glasses and generally
slide over the problems of pathology and of weakness."[48]
They are no less vulnerable to criticism, he claims,
than the Freudians who tend to pathologize everything
and fail to see the healthward possibilities in the
human being. Maslow believes that the tendency to

glorify and to oversimplify the capacity of the indi-

vidual for growth reflects an inability to appreciate

the importance of an additional relationship which

exists between the safety and growth forces. His allu-

sion here is to the principle of prepotency which sees

safety needs as more powerful and compelling than

growth needs when both are ungratified. He explains

that one result of this relationship is that growth for-

ward customarily takes place in small steps. Each step

forward is made possible by the feeling of being safe,

of venturing out into the unknown from a safe home port,

of daring because retreat is possible. Maslow uses as

a paridigm the case of a toddler venturing away from

his mother's knee into strange surroundings:

> Characteristically, he first clings to his mother
> as he explores the room with his eyes. Then he
> dares a little excursion, continually reassuring
> himself that the mother-security is intact. These
> excursions get more and more extensive. In this
> way, the child can explore a dangerous and unknown
> world. If suddenly the mother were to disappear,
> he would be thrown into anxiety, would cease to
> be interested in exploring the world, would wish
> only the return of safety, and might even lose
> his abilities, e.g., instead of daring to walk,
> he might creep.[49]

From this example he generalizes that assured safety

permits higher needs and impulses to emerge and to grow

towards mastery. To endanger safety, on the other hand,

means regression and movement backward to the more basic

foundation.

Maslow believes that individuals, and particularly children, are frequently forced into difficult choice situations where they are called upon to choose between a "subjective delight experience" and the experience of approval from others. A child must generally choose approval, he maintains, since the fear of losing the love, respect, and admiration of others is such a fundamental, terrifying danger. He considers such a choice to be, in effect, a choice between "one's own self and the interiorized standards of others."

> The primal choice, the fork in the road, then, is between others' and one's own self. If the only way to maintain the self is to lose others, then the ordinary child will give up the self. This is true for the reason already mentioned that safety is a most basic and prepotent need for children, more important by far than independence and self-actualization. If adults force this choice upon him, of choosing between the loss of one vital necessity or another vital necessity, the child must choose safety even at the cost of giving up self and growth.[50]

Maslow would argue that, in principle, there is no need for forcing a person to make such a choice. It is possible, he claims, to set up an environment which features safety, love and respect, and at the same time allows the individual to sample and freely choose the "higher growthward delights."

> Here we can learn important lessons from the therapy situation, the creative education situation, creative art education, and I believe also creative dance education. Here where the situation is set up variously as permissive, admiring,

> praising, accepting, safe, gratifying, reassur-
> ing, supporting, unthreatening, non-valuing,
> non-comparing, that is, where the person can
> feel completely safe and unthreatened, then it
> becomes possible for him to work out and express
> all sorts of lesser delights, e.g., hostility,
> neurotic dependency. He then tends spontaneously
> to go on to other delights which outsiders per-
> ceive to be "higher" or growthward, e.g., love,
> creativeness, and which he himself will prefer
> to the previous delights, once he has experienced
> them both.[51]

Thus, Maslow sees no necessary paradox in his
concern to structure a particular quality of environ-
ment for the individual, while at the same time insist-
ing that growth can result only when the person is
allowed to "evolve from within" through choices which
are not externally influenced.[52] He does recognize
somewhat of a paradox, however, surrounding his further
contention that a "bad" choice may be "good for" the
neurotic chooser, or at least understandable in terms of
the particular dynamics involved. More specifically, he
explains that a good parent (or educator, or therapist)
will understand the naturalness of defensive and re-
gressive forces, and therefore will not threaten to
destroy the person's defenses by promoting too rapid a
growth pace. In fact, Maslow holds that "defensiveness
can be as wise as daring; it depends on the particular
situation in which he has to choose. The choice of safety
is wise when it avoids pain that may be more than the per-
son can bear at the moment."[53]

This latter point seems to be conveyed in succinct fashion by Maslow's statement that:

> We can't force him to grow, we can only coax
> him to; we can only make it more possible for
> him, in the trust that simply experiencing the
> new experience will make him prefer it. Only
> he can prefer it; no one can prefer it for him.
> If it is to become part of him, he must like it.
> If he doesn't, we must gracefully concede that
> it is not for him.[54]

In essence, Maslow considers his view of the genuine helping relationship to be a revision of Taoistic "let-be," which, he claims, often has not worked because the growing child needs help.

> It can be formalized as "helpful let-be." It
> is a loving and respecting Taoism. It recog-
> nizes not only growth and the specific mechanism
> which makes it move in the right direction, but
> it also recognizes and respects the fear of
> growth, the slow pace of growth, the blocks, the
> pathology, the reasons for not growing. It
> recognizes the place, the necessity and the help-
> fulness of the outer environment without yet
> giving it control. It implements inner growth
> by knowing its mechanisms and by being willing
> to help it instead of merely being hopeful or
> passively optimistic about it.[55]

What we wind up with then, according to Maslow, is a "subjective device" to add to the principle of the hierarchical arrangement of our various needs; a device which guides and directs the individual in the direction of "healthy growth." Moreover, the principle is thought to hold true at any age. Recovering the ability to per-ceive one's own delights, he believes, is the best way of rediscovering the sacrificed self even in adulthood.

The process of therapy (or the helping relationship)
allows the adult to discover that the childish (re-
pressed) necessity for the approval of others is no
longer as realistic and justifiable as it was for the
child.[56]

Maslow is convinced that one of the more signifi-
cant consequences deriving from his distinction between
deficiency-motivations and growth-motivations is that
it provides a more adequate vantage for viewing man's
cognitive activities. He believes that any cognitive
activities, whether institutionalized ones like scientific
work and philosophizing or personal ones like the search
for insight in psychotherapy, can be better understood
against this background. Whatever the activity, cogni-
tion may be more influenced by one of the two motiva-
tional trends than by the other. Where it is primarily
deficiency-motivated, it is more need-reductive, more
homeostatic, more the relief of felt deficit. When be-
havior is more growth-motivated, it is less need-
reductive and more a movement toward self-actualization
and fuller humaness, more expressive, more selfless,
more reality centered. According to Maslow, this is a
little like saying, "Once we get our personal problems
solved, then we can get truly interested in the world
for its own sake."[57]

In referring once again to the probing behavior of
a child confronted with a strange and potentially "un-
safe" environment, Maslow wants to emphasize that the
adult human being is far more subtle and concealed about
his anxieties and fears. If they do not overwhelm him
altogether, he is very apt to repress them, to deny even
to himself that they exist. There are many ways of
coping with such anxieties and, as Maslow points out,
some of these are cognitive. To such a person, the un-
familiar, the vaguely perceived, the mysterious, the
hidden, the unexpected are all apt to be threatening.
One way of rendering them familiar, predictable, manage-
able, controllable, i.e., unfrightening, and harmless,
is to know them and to understand them. And so knowledge
may have not only a growing-forward function, but also
an anxiety-reducing function, a protective homeostatic
function. The overt behavior may be very similar, but
the motivations may be extremely different.[58]

Maslow is particularly interested in considering
the consequences of these motivational differences when
they can be discerned in scientists, since he believes
such dispositions to represent the difference between a
problem-centered and an ego-centered approach to knowl-
edge.

> . . . the scientist can be seen as relatively
> defensive, deficiency-motivated, and safety-need
> motivated, moved largely by anxiety and behaving

in such a way as to allay it. Or he can be seen
as having mastered his anxieties, as coping posi-
tively with problems in order to be victorious
over them, as growth-motivated toward personal
fulfillment and fullest humaness, and therefore
as freed to turn outward toward an intrinsically
fascinating reality, in whole-hearted absorption
with it rather than with its relevance to his
personal emotional difficulties, i.e., he can be
problem-centered rather than ego-centered.[59]

In Maslow's view, working for certainty or exactness or

predictability may be either healthy or unhealthy, either

defense-motivated or growth-motivated, and may lead

either to the relief of anxiety or to the positive joy

of discovery and understanding. Science can be a de-

fense and it can also be a path to the fullest self-

actualization.

Maslow suggests that we look at the more courage-

ous, growth-motivated scientist in order to appreciate

this difference in orientation. Although this extreme

type can be found to share all of the same mechanisms

and goals as the defense-motivated scientist, the differ-

ence, Maslow would point out, is that he is not neuroti-

cized.

They are not compulsive, rigid, and uncontrol-
lable, nor is anxiety produced when these rewards
have to be postponed. They are not desperately
needed, nor are they exclusively needed. It is
possible for healthy scientists to enjoy not only
the beauties of precision but also the pleasures
of sloppiness, casualness, and ambiguity. They
are able to enjoy rationality and logic but are
also able to be pleasantly crazy, wild, or emo-
tional.[60]

In effect, Maslow sees the growth-motivated scientist as having achieved an integration of "cautious knowing" and "courageous knowing." He recommends that the education of young scientists begin to include both the techniques of caution and boldness. This personal integration he takes to be especially important in view of his findings that the scientific method as it is ideally conceived is considerably less influential in shaping the approach to inquiry than are the personality and values of the scientist.

Maslow finds much utility in this general theme, and has allowed it to serve as the basis for a theory of communication which he has developed.

> My general thesis is that many of the communica-
> tion difficulties between persons are the by-
> product of communication barriers within the
> person; and that communication between the per-
> son and the world, to and fro, depends largely
> on their isomorphism (or similarity of structure
> or form); that the world can communicate to a
> person only that of which he is worthy, that
> which he deserves or is "up to"; that to a large
> extent, he can receive from the world, and give
> to the world, only that which he himself is.[61]

Maslow's main point here is that one's needs and motiva-
tions have an important bearing on the particular quality of "give and take" which one is able to establish with his surroundings. Some persons will allow themselves to receive from their world only those signals which are somehow instrumental to the satisfaction of deficiency needs. Other potential communications either fall on

"deaf ears" or are quickly repressed. The growth-motivated person is likely to carry on a more honest and more adequate dialogue with his world since his ability to transcend primitive defenses and inhibitions allows him a wider range of interests and curiosities. For this reason, Maslow considers the study of the "innards" of the personality to be a necessary base for the understanding of what a person can communicate to the world, and what the world is able to communicate to him. He considers a main consequence of this general thesis--that difficulties with the outer parallel difficulties within the inner--to be that we should expect communication with the outer world to improve along with improvement in the development of the personality; along with its integration and wholeness, and along with freedom from civil war among the various portions of the personality.[62]

The Self-Actualizing Person
and Peak-Experiences

Maslow expresses his belief that a reasonable theoretical and empirical case has been made for the presence within the human being of a tendency toward, or need for, growing in a direction that can be summarized in general as self-actualization, or psychological health, or maturation. In his words, the human being has within him "a pressure (among other pressures) toward

unity of personality, toward spontaneous expressiveness, toward individuality and identity, toward seeing the truth rather than being blind, toward being creative, and a lot else."[63] Furthermore, he is convinced that, although they are few in number, there is a great deal to be learned from the direct study of these "most highly evolved, psychologically healthy" individuals.

Up to this point, Maslow's conception of self-actualization has been approached largely in terms of the motivational status which he ascribes to "healthy people." Self-actualizing persons have been characterized very generally as those who have sufficiently gratified their basic needs for safety, belongingness, love, respect, and self-esteem so that they are motivated primarily by growth needs, including the need to actualize their potentials. As a result of his intensive study of self-actualizing people, Maslow believes that he is able to offer a more descriptive and operational definition of the kind of persons that emerge when spontaneous growth tendencies are not choked off at the level of deficiency-defense motivation. Before reviewing some of the characteristics that Maslow finds in self-actualizing persons, a brief consideration of his research methods would seem to be in order.

The subjects for his study were selected by Maslow from among personal acquaintances and friends, and from

among public and historical figures. In addition, three

thousand college students were screened, but yielded only

one immediately usable subject and a dozen or two pos-

sible future subjects (as indicated earlier, Maslow has

ruled out the possibility of finding the same sort of

self-actualization in younger people that he has "dis-

covered" in his older subjects). Subjects were chosen

on the basis of both positive and negative criteria. The

negative criterion was "an absence of neurosis, psycho-

pathic personality, psychosis, or strong tendencies in

these directions."[64] Rorschach tests were given wherever

possible, but according to Maslow, were found to be more

useful in revealing concealed psychopathology than in

selecting healthy people.

The positive criterion for selection was "positive

evidence of self-actualization," which Maslow admits to

be as yet a difficult syndrome to describe accurately.

He says that it may be loosely described as "the full

use and exploitation of talents, capacities, potentiali-

ties, etc."[65] Such people, he asserts,

> seem to be fulfilling themselves and to be doing
> the best that they are capable of doing, remind-
> ing us of Nietzsche's exhortation, 'Become what
> thou art.' They are people who have developed
> or are developing to the full stature of which
> they are capable. These potentialities may be
> either idiosyncratic or species-wide, so that
> the self in self-actualization must not have too
> individualistic a flavor.[66]

He further explains that this criterion also implies either gratification, past or present, of the basic emotional needs for safety, belongingness, love, respect, and self-respect, and of the cognitive needs for knowledge and for understanding, or in a few cases, conquest of these needs. All subjects, he reports, "felt safe and unanxious, accepted, loved and loving, respect worthy and respected; and all had worked out their philosophical, religious, or axiological bearings." (Maslow considers it to be still an open question as to whether this basic gratification is a sufficient or only a prerequisite condition for self-actualization.)

The technique of selection used by Maslow was that of "iteration," a technique which he had previously employed in studies of the personality syndromes of self-esteem and of security. The first step in this selection process was to find a number of persons who appeared to be high in one of the personal qualities which Maslow considered desirable. For example, he might begin by seeking a group of people who, according to "folk definition," appeared to be "basically secure" individuals. The second phase involved the correction of the folk definition by eliminating certain "logical and factual inconsistencies," which, according to Maslow, are "customarily found in folk definitions." In this case, the study of underlying motivational dynamics may

indicate that some prospective subjects are more con-
sistently secure than others. On the basis of "careful
clinical study" some of the original group of subjects
are reselected, some are dropped, and some new ones are
added. Maslow describes this selection procedure as a
"spiral-like process of self-correction" in which the
particular quality being sought continues to be "re-
defined" and subjects continue to be reselected in
accordance with the new definition. It was through this
sort of process that Maslow converged on the people who
would ultimately become the subjects for his study.[67]

In regard to the gathering and presentation of his
data, Maslow makes the following statement:

> Data here consist not so much in the usual
> gathering of specific and discrete facts as
> in the slow development of a global or holistic
> impression of the sort that we form of our
> friends and acquaintances. It was rarely pos-
> sible to set up a situation, to ask pointed
> questions, or to do any testing with my older
> subjects (although this was possible and was
> done with younger subjects). Friends and rela-
> tives were questioned where this was possible.
> Because of this and also because of the small
> number of subjects as well as the incomplete-
> ness of the data for many subjects, any quanti-
> tative presentation is impossible: only com-
> posite impressions can be offered for whatever
> they may be worth (and of course they are worth
> much less than controlled objective observation,
> since the investigator is never quite certain
> about what is description and what is projec-
> tion).[68]

Maslow presents his report with "due apologies to those
who insist on conventional reliability, validity, and

sampling."[69]   Moreover, he acknowledges that his data

cannot be considered reliable until someone else repeats

the study.[70]

Based on this research, Maslow would consider

some of the most important and useful characteristics

of self-actualizing people to be the following:

1.   Self-actualizing people are more efficient in

seeing themselves and others as they are.   They do not

confuse wish with reality and are not frightened by the

unknown; they reason out their problems on the basis of

fact; and when faced with disorder and uncertainty, they

do not wish them away but make tentative decisions by

which they live until they have new evidence.

2.   Self-actualizers are able to accept their own

human nature, its weaknesses and good points, and live

with it.   They live without posing, without feeling

unnecessary guilt, and without exaggerating their own

good points and the weaknesses of others.

3.   They are spontaneous, that is, they are not

hampered by the artificialities of convention when an

important issue is at stake.   Yet, they do not buttress

themselves by being unconventional.

4.   Because they are problem centered and not ego

centered, they develop a concern for the basic issues of

life and "work within a framework of values that are

broad and not petty, universal and not local, and in terms of a century rather than the moment."[71]

5. Along with this sense of perspective, self-actualizing people are detached about their own problems and those of others without being diffident or indifferent. They are able to be alone and stand alone and do not need the constant reassurance and compliments of others.

6. Persons with the above traits become more autonomous or independent of their culture and environment. These characteristics are possible because they are dependent on themselves for their development and growth and not on circumstances. Furthermore, because they are beyond deficiency motivation in regard to love and safety, they do not think of other persons as the only source of their needs for safety, love, respect, prestige. They are growth motivated. The essentials of the good life for them do not depend on what other people can give. "Self-contained," these persons can maintain a relative serenity and stability in the midst of circumstances that would drive other people to distraction.

7. Although self-actualizers have been found to be relatively detached, autonomous, self-contained persons, it is not to be assumed that such people have no real concern for the welfare of others. As a matter of

fact, Maslow comments that the basic reason for their "getting to this point of independence from love and respect, is to have been given plenty of this very same love and respect in the past."[72] Despite the fact that they are "very different from other people in thought, impulse, behavior, emotions,"[73] they have a family feeling toward their weaker, foolish, and sometimes nasty and unsympathetic fellowmen. They are not condescending even though aware of the limited perspectives and appreciations of others.

8. As might be expected, self-actualizing persons are not only more selective in close friendships, but their ties are more obliterating of ego boundaries. Thus, widespread elder-brotherly feeling lives side by side with discriminating friendships. When these persons are hostile, the hostility is deserved and directed to the good of others rather than to mere self-defense.

9. Self-actualizing persons have a "democratic character structure." They are not authoritarian and "are friendly with anyone of suitable character regardless of class, education, political belief, race, or color.[74]

10. Several of the other characteristics which Maslow attributes to the self-actualizing person center upon the capacity of such a person to experience himself, others, events, and the whole of things differently.

Whether these people are experiencing an ordinary event,
beauty, sex, or knowledge, there is a creative quality
of wholeness and freshness in their experience. In
fact, it is to this quality that they are thought to owe
their strength. Most people tend to see things and
experiences as means to an end, to label them as "another
one of those." But self-actualizing people, Maslow has
found, "have the wonderful capacity to appreciate again
and again, freshly and naively, the basic goods of life,
with awe, pleasure, wonder, and even ecstasy, however
stale these experiences have become to others."[75]

Maslow claims to have discovered an interesting
affinity between these recreative or "oceanic" exper-
iences and the kind of experience that religious mystics
have reported.

> There were the same feelings of limitless hori-
> zons opening up to the vision, the feeling of
> being simultaneously more powerful and also
> more helpless than one ever was before, the
> feeling of great ecstasy and wonder and awe,
> the loss of placing in time and space with,
> finally, the conviction that something ex-
> tremely important and valuable had happened,
> so that the subject is to some extent trans-
> formed and strengthened even in his daily life
> by such experiences.[76]

He believes it necessary to point out, however,
that this experience must be "dissociated from any
theological or supernatural reference, even though for
thousands of years they have been linked."[77] He thinks
that if we divorce the experience from supernatural

reference we can reject the traditional theological
interpretation of mystical experience as qualitatively
different from all others and begin to consider it a
natural experience, well within the jurisdiction of
science.

> The very beginning, the intrinsic core, the
> essence, the universal nucleus of every known
> high religion (unless Confucianism is also
> called a religion) has been the private, lonely,
> personal illumination, revelation, or ecstasy
> of some acutely sensitive prophet or seer . . .
> it has recently begun to appear that these
> "revelations" or mystical illuminations can be
> subsumed under the head of the "peak-experiences"
> or "ecstasies" or "transcendent" experiences
> which are now being eagerly investigated by
> many psychologists. That is to say, it is very
> likely, indeed almost certain, that these older
> reports, phrased in terms of supernatural revela-
> tion, were, in fact, perfectly natural, human
> peak-experiences of the kind that can easily be
> examined today, which, however, were phrased in
> terms of whatever conceptual, cultural, and
> linguistic framework the particular seer had
> available in his time. . . . In a word, we can
> study today what happened in the past and was
> then explainable in supernatural terms only.
> By so doing, we are enabled to examine religion
> in all its facets and in all its meanings in a
> way that makes it a part of science rather than
> something outside and exclusive of it.[78]

According to Maslow, such oceanic or mystical
experiences are only one kind of "peak-experience."
Peak-experiences, furthermore, are not confined to self-
actualizing persons. They are "moments of highest happi-
ness and fulfillment," which may occur to many people
and which help to make self-actualizing persons. Peak-
experiences may be moments of love, of parental

experience, of aesthetic perception, of nature experi-

ences, or of intellectual insight. The important thing

about them is that they are not experiences that come

when the main interest is to "make ends meet." They come

when what is experienced is experienced "with complete

absorption, detached from possible usefulness, from

expediency, and from purpose."[79] As Maslow sees it, a

very important difference arises when one looks at life

from the perspective thus reached. For one thing, he

claims that at this level of awareness many dichotomies

become resolved, opposites are seen to be unities and

the whole dichotomous way of thinking is recognized to

be immature. For self-actualizing people (or during

"peak-moments"), there is a strong tendency for selfish-

ness and unselfishness to fuse into a higher, super-

ordinate unity. Work tends to be the same as play;

vocation and avocation become the same thing. When duty

is pleasant and pleasure is fulfillment of duty, they

lose their separateness and oppositeness. The highest

maturity is discovered to include a childlike quality,

and we discover healthy children to have some of the

qualities of mature self-actualization. The inner-outer

split, between self and all else, gets fuzzy and much

less sharp, and they are seen to be permeable to each

other at the highest level of personality development.

Dichotomizing seems, according to Maslow, now to be

characteristic of a lower level of personality develop-
ment and of psychological functioning.[80]

Maslow discusses two types of "knowledge" which he
believes may result from peak-experiences. In the first
place, the experience itself is thought by Maslow to
provide "self-validating" individual insights, often
resulting in significant changes in perception and
life-style.

> My feeling is that if it were never to happen
> again, the power of the experience could per-
> manently affect the attitude toward life. A
> single glimpse of heaven is enough to confirm
> its existence even if it is never experienced
> again. It is my strong suspicion that even one
> such experience might be able to prevent sui-
> cide, for instance, and perhaps many varieties
> of slow self-destruction, e.g., alcoholism,
> drug-addiction, addiction to violence, etc.
> I would guess also, on theoretical grounds,
> that peak-experiences might very well abort
> "existential meaningless," states of valueless-
> ness, etc., at least occasionally. . . . This
> then is one kind of peak-knowledge of whose
> validity and usefulness there can be no doubt,
> no more than there could be with discovering
> for the first time that the color "red" exists
> and is wonderful.[81]

On the other hand, Maslow admits that these sub-
jective "cognitive experiences" which he describes
cannot be a substitute for "the routine skeptical and
cautious procedures of science." However fruitful and
penetrating these cognitions may be (and possibly the
best or only way of discovering certain kinds of truth,
according to Maslow), he recognizes that the criteria
for judging the validity of knowledge which is to be

public knowledge lies in the objects or persons per-
ceived or in the products created.(82) As Maslow sees
it, they are, in principle, simple problems for cor-
relational research.

> More frequently, however, peak-knowledge does
> need external, independent validation, or at
> least the request for such validation is a
> meaningful request; for instance, falling in
> love leads not only to greater care, which
> means closer attention, examination, and,
> therefore, greater knowledge, but it may also
> lead to affirmative statements and judgements
> which may be untrue however touching and
> affecting they may also be, e.g., "my husband
> is a genius." . . . The history of science and
> invention is full of instances of validated
> peak-insights and also of "insights" that
> failed. At any rate, there are enough of the
> former to support the proposition that the
> knowledge obtained in peak-insight-experiences
> can be validated and valuable.[83]

Maslow's Theory of Value

Maslow espouses a theory of value which tends to

derive from his other doctrines, and, as such, may be

all but explicit at this point. It remains, however,

for us to focus more precisely on this conception of

value which he offers as the most significant by-

product of his earlier doctrines, a view which he be-

lieves to have revolutionary implications for value

theory.

Maslow has posited a biologically based, species-

wide, inner nature for man which, when encouraged rather

than suppressed, allows him to grow "healthy, fruitful

and happy." Although this inner nature is delicate and
subtle and easily overcome by habit, cultural pressure,
and wrong attitudes toward it, it is, nevertheless,
thought to persist "underground" forever pressing for
actualization. On the basis of such assumptions, which
he considers to be empirically verifiable, Maslow voices
his confidence that we are on the threshold of fulfilling
"an age-old hope" for the construction of a naturalistic
value system deriving from man's own nature.

> . . . if these assumptions are proven true, they
> promise a scientific ethic, a natural value
> system, a court of ultimate appeal for the
> determination of good and bad, right and wrong.
> The more we learn about man's natural tenden-
> cies, the easier it will be to tell him how to
> be good, how to be happy, how to be fruitful,
> how to respect himself, how to love, how to
> fulfill his highest potentialities.[84]

Maslow further asserts that a descriptive, naturalistic
science of human values will render the traditional dis-
tinction between "what is" and "what ought to be" a
false one; that we can study the highest values or goals
of human beings as we study the values of ants or horses
or oak trees. He believes that we can discover (rather
than create or invent) which values men trend toward and
yearn for as they improve themselves and which values
they lose as they get sick.[85]

As we have seen, Maslow is convinced that this can
be done fruitfully (at least at this time in history and
with the limited techniques at our disposal) only if we

differentiate "healthy specimens" from the rest of the population. We cannot, in his words, "average neurotic yearnings with healthy yearnings and come out with a useable product" (Maslow would illustrate this with an apothegm: "A biologist recently announced, 'I have discovered the missing link between the anthropoid apes and civilized men. It's us.'").[85] The task, then, is to study the free choices or preferences of various kinds of human beings, sick or healthy, old or young, and under various circumstances. Through this approach, Maslow believes that much of "the irrelevant and distracting" arguing over values can be avoided, thereby placing stress on the "scientific nature of the enterprise" and removing it altogether from the realm of the a priori.[87] His contention is that this "more naturalistic and descriptive" approach has the advantage of allowing us to shift from questions preladen with implicit, unexamined values to more empirically testable questions. Instead of having to deal with loaded "ought" and "should" type questions, we would now be in a position to focus on more typically empirical forms of questions of When? Where? To Whom? How much? Under what conditions?

Maslow hypothesizes that the so called "higher values" (or the "eternal virtues") are approximately what we find as the free choices of those people whom we call

relatively healthy ("mature, evolved, self-fulfilled,
individuated, etc.") when they are feeling at their best
and strongest. He attempts to phrase this in "a more
descriptive way" with the statement that:

> such people, when they feel strong, if really
> free choice is possible, tend spontaneously to
> choose the true rather than the false, good
> rather than evil, beauty rather than ugliness,
> integration rather than dissociation, joy rather
> than sorrow, aliveness rather than deadness, [88]
> uniqueness rather than stereotype, and so on.

A subsidiary hypothesis is that tendencies to choose
these higher values can be seen weakly and dimly in all
or most human beings (particularly in peak-experiences).
In other words, Maslow suggests that these may be
species-wide values which are seen most clearly and un-
mistakeably in healthy people, since in healthy people
these higher values are least alloyed by defensive
(anxiety-instigated) values.

Also in this connection, another of Maslow's pro-
positions is that healthy people choose what is on the
whole good for them not only in biological terms, but
perhaps in other senses. His explanation is that "good
for them" here means "conducing to their and others
self-actualization."[89] Furthermore, Maslow suspects
that what is good for the healthy person (chosen by
them) may be good for the less healthy people too, in
the long run, and what the sick ones would also choose
if they could become "better choosers." Maslow holds

that these propositions affirm the existence of the
highest values within human nature itself, to be dis-
covered there. This is in sharp contradiction to the
older and more customary beliefs that the highest values
can come only from a supernatural God, or from some
other source outside human nature itself.[90]

Maslow admits to recognizing some of "the real
theoretical and logical difficulties" that inhere in
some of these theses. He acknowledges that the most
significant research problem is "to choose the healthy
chooser," since this involves defining the "good human
being" which in turn takes us to the brink of circular-
ity. However, he argues that for the moment we shall
have to accept some circularity in this definition.

Maslow maintains that the "good human being" can
be defined only against some criterion of humanness,
and that this criterion will almost certainly be a
matter of degree. More specifically, he claims that
some people are more human than others, and "good" human
beings, the "good specimens," are very human. Those who
would qualify as "most fully human" are "those people
who have retained and developed all their human capaci-
ties, especially those capacities which define the human
being and differentiate him from let us say the monkey."[91]
Such a judgment is, he would point out, in principle no

different from that which confronts a taxonomist as he

selects a museum specimen.

> The taxonomist chooses for his "type specimen"
> of a new species, the one to be deposited in a
> museum, to be the exemplar for the whole species,
> the best specimen he can get, the most mature,
> the most uncrippled, the most typical of all the
> qualities that define the species. The same
> principle holds in choosing a "good Renoir," or
> "the best Rubens," etc. In exactly this same
> sense, we can pick the best specimens of the
> human species, people with all the parts proper
> to the species, with all the human capacities
> well developed and fully functioning, and with-
> out obvious illnesses of any kind, especially
> any that might harm the central, defining, sine
> qua non characteristics. These can be called
> "most fully human."[92]

We will, according to Maslow, encounter "additional

difficulties" in selecting the "most fully human" speci-

men. For one thing, we must consider the problem of

"arbitrary cultural standards which can overwhelm and

obliterate biopsychological determinants." He indi-

cates that another main difficulty is connected with the

need to differentiate the values of the "taxonomist"

from the values of the "specimen."[93]

To return to Maslow's characterization of the

valuational dispositions of "mature or healthier" people

under conditions of "really free choice," he observes

that such people are not likely to be entirely con-

sistent in their selection of "higher values." Rather,

he finds that such people value not only "truth, good-

ness, and beauty," but also the regressive, survival

and/or homeostatic values of peace and quiet, of sleep
and rest, of dependency and safety, or protection from
reality and relief from it, of retiring into fantasy,
even of wishing for death (peace). These two sorts of
values he labels "growth values" and "healthy-regressive"
or "coasting values," and points out further that the
more mature and healthy the person, the more he seeks
growth values and the less he seeks and needs "coasting"
values; but he still needs both. These two sets of
values are thought to stand always in a dialectical
relationship to each other, yielding up the dynamic
equilibrium that is overt behavior.

In this context, Maslow reiterates his fundamental
notion that the basic motivations supply ready-made a
hierarchy of values which are related to each other as
higher needs and lower needs, stronger and weaker, more
vital and more dispensable. Since these are arranged in
an integrated hierarchy rather than dichotomously, the
higher needs (i.e., for actualization of special talents)
rests upon the continued gratification of lower needs
(i.e., safety) which do not disappear even though in a
non-active state. This means that the process of regres-
sion to lower needs remains always a possibility, and
therefore, these "healthily regressive" value-choices
must be considered as natural and instinctoid as the
so-called "higher values." Maslow would derive a

"revolutionary conclusion" from this, one that he claims no other large culture has ever arrived at, namely, that our deepest needs are not, in themselves, dangerous or evil or bad. This, he believes, opens up the prospect of resolving the dichotomy between Apollonian and Dionysian, scientific and poetic, between reason and impulse, work and play, growth and regression, and many others.

Maslow expresses a concern to deal with the "clear, descriptive fact" that lower needs and values are pre-potent over higher needs and values most of the time for most of the population, thus exerting a strong regressive pull. This view he would summarize by saying that man's higher nature rests upon man's lower nature, needing it as a foundation and collapsing without this foundation. The best way to develop man's higher nature is to fulfill and gratify the lower nature first. Furthermore, he maintains that man's higher nature rests also on the existence of a good or fairly good environment, present and previous. From this point of view, a society or a culture can be either growth-fostering or growth-inhibiting. The sources of growth and of humanness are essentially within the human person and are not created or invented by society, which can only help or hinder the development of humanness, just as a gardener can help or hinder the growth of a rosebush, but cannot determine

that it shall be an oak tree. Maslow holds that this makes theoretically possible a comparative sociology, transcending and including cultural relativity. The "better" culture gratifies all basic human needs and permits self-actualization. The "poorer" cultures do not. The same is thought to be true for education. To the extent that it fosters growth toward self-actualization, it is "good" education.[94]

From the standpoint of a more technical-philosophical classification of Maslow's doctrines, the above summary scheme of this chapter might be further distilled to allow us to distinguish three major components of his work. The first section, having to do with Maslow's methodological approach and his criticisms of the more traditional "psychologies, may be thought to encompass the <u>methodological-epistemological</u> aspect of his thought. The second and third sections represent Maslow's efforts to broaden our knowledge of man's nature, particularly in the area of motivation theory, and might be termed his <u>positive psychology</u>. Sections four and five tend to represent the <u>ethical component</u> of Maslow's thought, including both a normative and a "meta-ethical" dimension.

[1]Abraham H. Maslow, "Psychological Data and Value Theory," in New Knowledge in Human Values (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 119.

[2]In contradistinction to behaviorism and orthodox psychoanalysis.

[3]Abraham H. Maslow, "Some Educational Implications of the Humanistic Psychologies," Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Fall, 1969), 686.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Abraham H. Maslow, The Psychology of Science (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 7.

[6]Abraham H. Maslow, "A Philosophy of Psychology," in Personal Problems and Psychological Frontiers, ed. by J. Fairchild (Chicago: Sheridan, 1957), p. 232.

[7]Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), p. 23.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Maslow, "A Philosophy of Psychology," p. 231.

[10]Ibid., p. 236.

[11]Maslow, "Some Educational Implications of the Humanistic Psychologies," p. 686.

[12]Maslow, The Psychology of Science, pp. 7-8.

[13]Ibid., p. xv.

[14]Ibid., pp. xv-xvi.

[15]Maslow, "Some Educational Implications of the Humanistic Psychologies," pp. 686-687.

[16]Maslow, "A Philosophy of Psychology, p. 23.

[17]Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962), p. 7.

[18]Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom (New York: Avon Books, 1941), see Chapter I.

[19]Maslow, "A Philosophy of Psychology, p. 237.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Ibid., p. 238.

[22]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 199.

[23]Ibid., p. 200.

[24]Ibid., see especially Chapter V.

[25]Maslow, "Psychological Data and Value Theory," p. 124.

[26]Although he continues to use the term "basic," even when referring to man's "higher needs," Maslow admits to being less certain about the pathological effects of the nongratification of such needs since he considers his data to be less conclusive here. Maslow does indicate, however, that the higher needs have "less ability to dominate, organize and press into their service the autonomic reactions and other capacities of the organism." Moreover, he believes that "deprivation of higher needs does not produce so desperate a defense and emergency reaction as is produced by low deprivations" (Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 147).

[27]Maslow, "Psychological Data and Value Theory," p. 123.

[28]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 101.

[29]Maslow, "Psychological Data and Value Theory," p. 124.

[30]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 102.

[31]Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, p. 179.

[32]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, see especially Chapter 7.

[33]Ibid., p. 81.

[34]Maslow, _Motivation and Personality_, p. 82.

[35]_Ibid._, p. 83.

[36]_Ibid._, p. 84.

[37]_Ibid._, p. 93.

[38]_Ibid._, pp. 98-99.

[39]_Ibid._, pp. 100-101.

[40]_Ibid._, p. 102.

[41]_Ibid._, p. 103.

[42]Abraham H. Maslow, "Defense and Growth," _Merrill-Palmer Quarterly_ (Fall, 1956), 38.

[43]_Ibid._, p. 37.

[44]_Ibid._, p. 38.

[45]_Ibid._, p. 36.

[46]_Ibid._, p. 3.

[47]_Ibid._, p. 39.

[48]_Ibid._

[49]_Ibid._, p. 40.

[50]_Ibid._, p. 42.

[51]_Ibid._, pp. 42-43.

[52]Carl Rogers would concur with Maslow on this point, since he also finds that it is possible to "establish by external control conditions which we predict will be followed by internal control by the individual, in pursuit of internally chosen goals" [Carl Rogers, _On Becoming a Person_ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), p. 397].

[53]Maslow, "Defense and Growth," p. 43.

[54]_Ibid._, p. 44.

[55]_Ibid._

[56]Maslow, "Defense and Growth, p. 46.

[57]Maslow, The Psychology of Science, p. 22.

[58]Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, p. 61.

[59]Maslow, The Psychology of Science, p. 23.

[60]Ibid., p. 31.

[61]Abraham H. Maslow, "Isomorphic Interrelationships Between Knower and Known," in The Human Dialogue: Perspectives on Communication, ed. by Floyd W. Matson (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 195.

[62]Ibid., p. 195.

[63]Maslow, "Psychological Data and Value Theory," p. 126.

[64]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 200.

[65]Ibid.

[66]Ibid., p. 201.

[67]Ibid.

[68]Ibid., p. 203.

[69]Ibid., pp. 199-200.

[70]Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, p. 23.

[71]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 212.

[72]Ibid., p. 214.

[73]Ibid., p. 217.

[74]Ibid., p. 220.

[75]Ibid., pp. 214-215.

[76]Ibid., p. 216.

[77]Ibid.

[78]Abraham H. Maslow, Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964), pp. 19-20.

[79] Maslow, _Toward a Psychology of Being_, p. 70.

[80] _Ibid._, p. 192.

[81] Maslow, _Religions, Values and Peak-Experiences_, pp. 76-76.

[82] Maslow, _Toward a Psychology of Being_, p. 92.

[83] Maslow, _Religions, Values and Peak-Experiences_, p. 97.

[84] Maslow, _Toward a Psychology of Being_, p. 4.

[85] _Ibid._, p. 157.

[86] _Ibid._

[87] _Ibid._, p. 158.

[88] _Ibid._

[89] _Ibid._, p. 159.

[90] _Ibid._, p. 160.

[91] Maslow, "Psychological Data and Value Theory," p. 126.

[92] Maslow, _Toward a Psychology of Being_, p. 161.

[93] _Ibid._

[94] _Ibid._, p. 197.

CHAPTER III

A CRITIQUE OF MASLOW'S DOCTRINES

In this chapter an attempt will be made to identify

some of the major strengths and weaknesses of Maslow's

doctrines. When considering the wide latitude of issues

encompassed by Maslow's thought, together with the rela-

tively limited scope of this dissertation, it becomes

apparent that this critique must necessarily be selective

and restrictive. With this in mind I will attempt to

discern at least one strength and one weakness relative

to each of the three main components of his thought,

while deciding to focus particularly on his ethical

doctrines for purposes of a fuller treatment here. The

need to limit this critique should not be seen as pre-

cluding the necessity for further investigation of those

Maslovian doctrines which receive, at most, cursory

attention here; nor should it lead one to believe that

Maslow's ethical views are entirely separable from the

other aspects of his thought.

Critique of Maslow's Methodological-
Epistemological Views

Upon examination, the aspect of Maslow's thought

which one can choose to label methodological-epistemological

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is vulnerable to at least two sorts of negative criticism. The first one is directed toward his failure to make explicit what he conceives to be the connection between an atomistic or analytic approach and the failure of traditional psychology to discuss growth motivation. His opposition to the classical scientific approach stems from his belief that it is too "impersonal" and that it will not facilitate the particular quality of "understanding" that is necessary for "knowing" a person sui generis. He argues:

> The customary scientific technique of dissection
> and reductive analysis that has worked so well
> in the inorganic world and not too badly even in
> the infrahuman world of living organisms, is just
> a nuisance when I seek knowledge of a person, and
> it has real deficiencies even for studying people
> in general . . . if I want to know a person, what
> is the best way to go about doing it? How good
> for this purpose are the usual procedures of
> normal physical science (which remember, is the
> widely accepted paradigm for all the sciences
> and even for all knowledge of any kind)? In
> general, my answer is that they are not very good
> at all. As a matter of fact, they are practically
> useless if I want not only to know about you but
> also to understand you. If I want to know a per-
> son in those aspects of personhood that are most
> important to me, I have learned that I must go
> about this task in a different way, use different
> techniques and operate upon profoundly different
> philosophical assumptions about the nature of
> detachment, objectivity, subjectivity, reliability
> of knowledge, value, and precision. . . . Any
> clinician knows that in getting to know another
> person it is best to keep your brain out of the
> way, to look and listen totally, to be completely
> absorbed, receptive, passive, patient, and waiting
> rather than eager, quick, and impatient. It does
> not help to start measuring, questioning, calculat-
> ing, or testing out theories, categorizing, or

> classifying. If your brain is too busy, you
> won't hear or see well. Freud's term "free-
> floating attention" describes well this noninter-
> fering, global, receptive, waiting kind of cog-
> nizing another person.[1]

Maslow claims that there is a difference <u>in kind</u> between

"nomothetic knowledge" which is a knowledge of laws, of

generalizations, and of averages, and "idiographic knowl-

edge" which amounts to an internalization of another

individual's "higher needs" and his most personal striv-

ings.[2] Maslow seems to be opting for a particular variety

of human "understanding" that would allow us to share

other's minds, an approach that has often been referred

to as "Verstehen," or more loosely, as empathy. Yet, he

does not appear to be entirely clear as to how this opera-

tion is performed, nor does he make explicit what he be-

lieves such knowledge would ultimately amount to.

Some philosophers of science who have been con-

cerned to examine with a degree of care the possibility

of a fundamental epistemological difference between the

operation called Verstehen and the classical approach to

scientific inquiry, have generally concluded that the

operations involved are basically similar. The findings

of one such investigation were summarized as follows:

> The operation of Verstehen is performed by
> analyzing a behavior situation in such a way--
> usually in terms of general "feeling-states"--
> that it parallels some personal experience of
> the interpreter. Primarily the operation of
> Verstehen does two things: It relieves us of
> a sense of apprehension in connection with

behavior that is unfamiliar or unexpected and
it is a source of "hunches," which help us in
the formulation of hypotheses. . . . The opera-
tion of Verstehen does not, however, add to our
store of knowledge already validated by personal
experience; nor does it serve as a means of
verification. The probability of a connection
can be ascertained only by means of objective,
experimental, and statistical tests.[3]

Contrary to Maslow's notion, the analytical or classical

scientific approach does not necessarily preclude the

growth of knowledge of the "higher-order" elements of

the human personality, including man's "higher needs

and motives."[4] The fact that these areas of human nature

have been neglected by the traditional psychologies may

be attributable to other factors, perhaps including the

relative scarcity of models of "growth motivated" be-

havior to date.

Another significant weakness connected with the

methodological-epistemological component of Maslow's

work is one which becomes discernable in the research

which enables him to reveal the characteristics of the

self-actualizing person. Although Maslow insists he is

engaged only in "neutral description," his normative

biases tend to be couched in his selection process,

thus imposing a circularity which becomes more evident

as one examines his findings in the light of the

selection criteria. More specifically, Maslow operates

from a preconception of what constitutes self-actualizing

behavior, this preconception being implicitly normative.

This original bias can be found in the somewhat obscure criteria which he employs in selecting his subjects, appearing again, as one might expect, in his "clinical definition" of self-actualization. To illustrate, Maslow indicates his positive criterion of selection was "positive evidence of self-actualization," which he admits to be "as yet a difficult syndrome to describe accurately." However, he attempts to get closer to his criterion by explaining that he sought subjects who showed evidence of "the full use and exploitation of talents, capacities, potentialities, etc." He goes on to point out that he was seeking people who had developed or were developing "to the full stature of which they are capable." Furthermore, this positive criterion was to have implied that "all subjects felt safe and un-anxious, accepted, loved and loving, respect-worthy and respected, and that they had worked out their philo-sophical religious, and axiological bearings."[5]

We might, at this point, reiterate Maslow's stated objective in undertaking this study, which was to gain "some notion of the characteristics of the healthy, fully-evolved human being." Having utilized the above positive criteria to select a number of "healthy human specimens," Maslow was in fact able to concentrate on the descriptive aspect of his task. However, among the "objectively describable and measurable" characteristics

which emerged were traits which together constituted a
syndrome whose striking resemblance to the selection
criteria should not be entirely surprising. Some of
these more prominent characteristics included "a full-
functioning aliveness, a firm identity, ability to love,
increased wholeness and unity," and other attributes
which tend to reinforce the circularity charge.

As indicated earlier, Maslow does acknowledge
that in a study of this sort the investigator cannot be
certain about what is description and what is projec-
tion. However, his unwillingness to treat the possi-
bility of pervasive bias with other than passing conjec-
ture results in his offering his normative-clad views
under the guise of his own conception of descriptive
psychology. Some of the more important ramifications
of this apparent confusion will be encountered in a
critique of his ethical doctrines.

In selecting one of the most recommendable fea-
tures of Maslow's methodological-epistemological per-
spectives, I would cite his recognition of the psy-
chologist's own needs and motivations as having an
important bearing on the methodology which is adopted
as well as on the nature of the "knowledge" which is
derived from psychological research. He exhorts psy-
chologists to become sophisticated enough philosophers
of science that they are able to recognize the

value-laden premises which guide them in their pro-

fessional activities. In Maslow's words:

> We must help the "scientific" psychologists to
> realize that they are working on the basis of
> a philosophy of science, not the philosophy of
> science, and that any philosophy of science
> which serves primarily an excluding function
> is a set of blinders, a handicap rather than
> a help.[6]

Ironically enough, one can note that Maslow's own

theoretical-empirical work reflects a failure to take

sufficient account of the normative variables that he

himself introduces into his research, some of which have

great influence on his conclusions. However, to allow

Maslow's own methodological shortcomings to reflect on

the desirability of the ideal which he urges is to fall

into the "genetic fallacy." The genetic fallacy has been

defined as "a methodological failure to distinguish be-

tween the origins of an institution or an ideal and its

developed character and potentialities."[7] Maslow's

delinquency in complying with the ideal to which he him-

self calls attention may serve as further testimony to

the strong tendency for psychologists to violate such a

standard, thus making it the more imperative that it be

constantly articulated. In short, his concern that psy-

chologists develop the capacity to move beyond those

narrow vested interests which tend to preclude the ques-

tioning of fundamental premises and an expanded view of

the whole enterprise is, in my opinion, a worthy one.

It tends to parallel the recent growth of philosophy of science as a deliberate activity, devoted to exposing and examining the most primitive underpinnings of the scientific approach. His stated objective is to see the psychologist as a generalist who is able to examine his own fundamental assumptions and assume a share of the responsibility for the evolution of this vital area of inquiry.

Review of Maslow's Positive Psychology

A brief critique of Maslow's positive psychology begins with a concern to throw into serious question his assumption that we may rely on the "free" choices of individuals to direct the process of healthy human growth. He maintains that in the constant conflict that goes on internally between the "defense forces" and "growth trends," a child, for instance, will be freer to choose unknown "growth-through-delight" if parents and environment generally can gratify his basic needs for safety, belongingness, love and respect. For thus the child is released from the threats and insecurities that discourage venturesomeness. Maslow appears to be introducing here, beyond his principle of prepotency, a principle of subjective preference. This becomes especially evident in the following statement:

> . . . growth takes place when the next step forward
> is subjectively more delightful, more joyous,

> more intrinsically satisfying than the last;
> . . . the only way we can ever know what is
> right for us is that it feels better sub-
> jectively than any alternative. The new ex-
> perience validates itself rather than by any
> outside criterion. It is self-justifying,
> self-validating.[8]

This particular passage seems to indicate Maslow's

sympathy for intuitionism. In effect, then, he leaves

us with an especially flimsy criterion by which we are

to evaluate experiences. As he would admit, "We rest

here on the faith that if free choice is really free and

if the chooser is not too sick or frightened to choose,

he will choose wisely, in a healthy and growthward

direction."[9] We might agree with Maslow that all our

valuations are based on actual experiences of "delight,"

while at the same time pointing out that we have learned

through experience to look beyond the face value of

experiences before giving them a final assessment. Dewey

cautions against the more subtle form of tyranny which

can result when one's conduct becomes dictated by im-

pulse and desire rather than by intelligent judgment

based on a disposition to project the consequences of

one's choices:

> Natural impulses and desires constitute the
> starting point. But there is no intellectual
> growth without some reconstruction, some remak-
> ing, of impulses and desires in the form in
> which they first show themselves. This remaking
> involves inhibition of impulse in its first
> estate. The alternative to externally imposed
> inhibition is inhibition through an individual's

own reflection and judgement. The old phrase
"stop and think" is sound psychology. For
thinking is stoppage of the immediate manifes-
tation of impulse until that impulse has been
brought into connection with other possible
tendencies to action so that a more comprehen-
sive and coherent plant of action is formed.
. . . Impulses and desires that are not ordered
by intelligence are under the control of acci-
dental circumstances. It may be a loss rather
than a gain to escape from the control of another
person only to find one's conduct dictated by
immediate whim and caprice; that is, at the
mercy of impulses into whose formation intelli-
gent judgement has not entered. A person whose
conduct is controlled in this way has at most
only the illusion of freedom. Actually he is
directed by forces over which he has no com-
mand.[10]

In a favorable vein, one finds Maslow offering
several promising contributions to contemporary psy-
chology, some of which are considered later in terms
of their possible bearing on ethical thought. At this
point I would suggest that Maslow has developed a more
adequate theory of human nature than that which the more
traditional psychologies provided. His psychology,
rather than constituting a refutation of the Freudian
and behavioristic approaches, tends to move beyond the
theoretical frameworks of these psychologies and, in a
sense, to encompass them. Maslow's theory is an improve-
ment over the older theories of human nature, since it is
more inclusive, since it opens avenues for inquiry which
have been neglected by traditional psychology. In effect,
he has attempted to show that human nature is not just a
list of "D-needs," but in order to understand man's true

nature one must also take into account those special

needs which he has labeled "B-needs" or "growth needs."

The behavior of an individual who is, in Maslow's terms,

self-actualizing is simply not explained by an approach

which takes, for instance, tension reduction to consti-

tute the primary motivational spring for all human

behavior.

In addition, Maslow's hierarchy of human needs,

including his principle of prepotency, may provide more

adequate psychological explanations of such behavioral

phenomena as the evolution or dissolution of an indi-

vidual's vocational, and avocational "interests," or

the disinclination of some members of "underdeveloped"

societies to crave American affluence. As argued later,

the observed tendency for certain "higher" needs to

emerge once the more prepotent needs have been gratified

does not in itself confer ethical priority on the later

stage of need development. However, it does allow us

to define within rather narrow limits the necessary

psychological preconditions that must prevail in order

for certain "higher" needs and motivations to emerge.

The recommendability of such a motivational transition

will remain an open question for the moment.

One further aspect of Maslow's positive psychology

meriting specific attention is his concept of the "peak-

experience." In his study of peak-experiences, Maslow

notes that during these peak-moments individuals exhibit
such characteristics as giving up the past and future,
loss of ego, loss of self-consciousness, lessening of
defenses and inhibitions, acceptance, strong aesthetic
perception instead of abstraction, and trust versus try-
ing and controlling.[11] From his description it seems
that the peak-experience does somehow constitute a state
of relatively "unpolluted," and thus "heightened,"
awareness, it being a relatively common occurrence for
some persons while representing a rare moment for others.
If further research should confirm that such experiences
do tend to mark the removal of distorting conditions of
self and culture, thus allowing the individual to en-
counter greater depths of cognition and perception, we
might find a good deal of utility in such peak moments.
Besides the enhanced aesthetic sensitivity which sup-
posedly accompanies such psychological "high-points,"
peak-experiences might be found to represent moments of
illumination for the individual in which significant
cognitive and personal growth takes place. Moreover,
should it prove possible to establish causation for
peak-experiences, such knowledge could conceivably be-
come a significant asset to the behavioral sciences.

Critique of Maslow's Ethics

In turning to a review of the ethical component of
Maslow's thought, it becomes evident at the outset that
his approach tends to be broad and all-encompassing, much
in the "classical" tradition of ethical theory. Maslow,
as a matter of fact, displays little appreciation or
regard for the particularly restrictive ground-rules which
have come to distinguish present-day conceptions of moral
philosophy on the Anglo-American scene. On the contrary,
Maslow has, with sweeping strokes, composed a theory of
value characterized by its comprehensiveness and its
almost singular disregard for certain logical and
linguistic distinctions which are considered revolutionary
in their impact on 20th century ethical thought. It be-
comes clear that Maslow's unbridled enthusiasm has moved
him to tread heavily and irreverently into high-risk
surroundings which many would consider off-limits to
professional philosophers, and particularly so for an
adventuring psychologist. The concern here will be to
determine whether Maslow's ambition does in fact result
in a carelessly constructed theory of value, and if this
be the case, to determine what the extent of the damages
are to his ethical doctrines. Such an assessment will
require an attempt to view, in large perspective, the
most salient assets as well as the prominent weaknesses
in Maslow's ethical thought.

As pointed out earlier, there are indications that
Maslow sees in his value theory the culmination of a
rather lengthy series of personal deliberations and re-
searches, a sort of capstone project to signal the
achievement of a significant personal objective. On the
one hand, it seems that he intends for his ethical doc-
trines to represent a grand synthesis of his many
"scientific" endeavors, yet more, since he has chosen to
encompass such traditionally sticky normative issues as
what constitutes the good life and what constitutes
obligation for man. At the same time, however, Maslow
consistently maintains that it is not his intention to
become involved in normative ethics in the traditional
sense. In fact, he wants to declare the age-old distinc-
tion between "what is" and "what ought to be "a false
one. It is his contention that, by carefully studying
the actual value choices or goals of individuals, we can
uncover and describe certain biologically and genetically
based valuing tendencies in human beings, thus avoiding
the more usual disposition to project or wish our own
values on human nature. In such an endeavor "the
management assumes no responsibility for what is found,"
he would assert.[12]

Maslow would give us to understand that he wishes
to engage only in a descriptive and neutral ethical
activity. Some professional ethical theorists acknowledge

descriptive empirical inquiry, such as is done by anthro-
pologists, psychologists and sociologists, as a distinct
and legitimate brand of ethical inquiry.[13] They would
point out that usually the goal of such inquiry is to
describe or explain the phenomena of morality or to
work out a theory of human nature which bears on ethical
questions. It has been suggested, however, that the task
which Maslow sets for himself appears to be considerably
more ambitious than this. In fact, his later attempts
to size up the ethical enterprise in the largest pos-
sible perspective could be better characterized as the
approach which many contemporary ethical theorists have
come to label "analytical," "critical," or "meta-
ethical." This activity in itself does not consist of
empirical or historical inquiries and theories, nor does
it involve making or defending any normative or value
judgments, except by way of implication. Rather, it
asks and tries to answer logical, epistemological, or
semantical questions like: What is the meaning or use
of the expression "(morally) right or good"? or, How
can ethical and value judgments be established or
justified?

Maslow's claim that "we can in principle have a
descriptive, naturalistic science of human values" is,
in effect, a meta-ethical statement indicating his con-
tention that moral and other value judgments are actually

rooted in facts or in "the nature of things." The nature
of things is to be determined, according to Maslow, not
by metaphysical construction or by divine revelation,
but by an empirical inquiry which is much more inclusive
than ordinary positivistic inquiry. Here we are reminded
of his claim that "we can study the highest values or
goals of human beings as we study the values of ants or
horses or oak trees." Thus, it may be said that Maslow
subscribes to a particular meta-ethical theory of justi-
fication which commits him to the proposition that
ethical and value judgments can be derived logically
from factual ones.

Some opponents to such a view have countered by
contending this cannot be done, since one cannot get an
Ought out of an Is or a Value out of a Fact. To take
such a step would mean that conclusions with terms like
"ought" and "good" in them can be logically inferred
from premises, none of which contain these terms. Such
a move has been labeled "the Naturalistic Fallacy."
This, they would argue, cannot be done by the rules of
ordinary inductive or deductive logic. To try to do so
is essentially to argue that A is B, therefore A is C,
without introducing any premise connecting B and C.[14]
To introduce a more basic ethical premise, however,
would be to engage in normative ethics and to immediately
forfeit any claim to a neutral or meta-ethical approach.

On the other hand, it has been suggested by some
recent writers that there may be a special "third logic"
which would sanction certain direct inferences from
factual premises to conclusions about what is right or
good. A brief consideration of one such pioneering
effort in this regard may shed some light on the rather
obscure system of moral reasoning that Maslow is attempt-
ing to convey. Reference is made here to the view,
advanced by proponents of "Definist" theories, that
Ought can be defined in terms of Is, and Value in terms
of Fact. Those who take this position argue as follows:
if such definitions are acceptable, then, by virtue of
them, one can go logically from Is to Ought or from Fact
to Value. For example, R. B. Perry proposes such defi-
nitions as these:

> "good" means "being an object of favorable
> interest (desire),"
>
> "right" means "being conducive to harmonious
> happiness,"[15]

On such a view, ethical and value judgments are really
disguised assertions of fact of some kind. In some cases,
the definition presented may be advanced as a reportive
one, simply explicating what is ordinarily meant by the
term being defined. Many different theories of this
kind are possible, depending on the definitions proposed.

It appears that Maslow is attempting to employ a
tactic similar to that advanced by the definists when he

construes "the good" and "the right" in terms of "that which is chosen by our most healthy human specimens." Recall, here, Maslow's contention that his use of such seemingly value-laden expressions is not to be taken as reflecting personal bias on his part, but rather he is simply reporting behavioral dispositions which can be shown to be firmly grounded in man's nature. In his words, "The highest values exist within human nature itself to be discovered there." Since Maslow has in a sense chosen to do his own spade-work, the most important empirical task which he sets for himself is to study the value choices of "the most perfect human specimens."[16]

Without attempting to pass judgment on meta-ethical approaches in general or on definist positions in particular, except possibly by way of implication, I hope to point out two main difficulties which one finds embodied in Maslow's meta-ethical posture. The first has to do with the adequacy of the definition of "good" or "right" which Maslow proposes. Since for him "the good" means "that which is chosen by the good or healthy person," a circularity is encountered here which first becomes evident in the research methods employed by Maslow in connection with his studies of self-actualizing persons. His argument is that one's notion of what constitutes a "good man" is logically equivalent to one's

implicit conception of the perfect or mature of magnificent human specimen. Since this is a definition that can be made explicit, Maslow reasons that we can end the regress here and define human values in terms of "the facts" of man's nature. His difficulty derives from his failure to recognize the typically normative character of most attempts to define what one would take to be a "good specimen of humanity." He is probably correct in asserting that we all carry with us, at some level of consciousness, such a conception, and that with proper effort it can be brought to the surface in some articulate form. The problem, however, is that such definitions will in all probability point to the good man as one who exhibits characteristics which the person doing the defining considers "good ones." In effect, then, such a definition is likely to become nothing more than a poorly disguised tautology which reduces ultimately to the assertion that "good" means "good."

To expect a more objective definition of a "good man," is to believe that men ordinarily approach ethical and value judgments in a detached, indifferent manner. It is to believe that ethical and value terms constitute merely an alternative vocabulary for reporting facts. The difference, though, is that when we are making merely factual assertions we are not thereby taking any pro or con attitude toward what we are talking about; we are not

recommending it, prescribing it, or anything of the sort.
But when we make an ethical or a value judgment we are
not neutral in this way. In this connection, Frankena
reasons that:

> . . . it would seem paradoxical if one were to
> say "X is good" or "Y is right" but be absolutely
> indifferent to its being sought or done by him-
> self or anyone else. If he were indifferent in
> this way, we would take him to mean that it is
> generally regarded as good or right, but that he
> did not so regard it himself. We may be making
> or implying factual assertions in some of our
> value judgements--when we say, "He was a good
> man," we do seem to imply that he was honest,
> kind, etc.--but this is not all that we are
> doing.[17]

Were Maslow more of a student of ordinary language in
the Wittgenstein tradition, he almost certainly would
have displayed a sensitivity to such distinctions in
meaning and would have recognized the essentially pre-
scriptive character of such a judgment. Just as im-
portant, he might have been more disposed to appreciate
the role of his own normative interests in shaping some
of the conclusions he ultimately draws regarding the
valuing tendencies of human beings.

Instead, Maslow is reluctant to acknowledge, in
explicit fashion, any special affinity for the particular
personality characteristics exhibited by those whom he
has chosen to call self-actualizing. But, as previously
noted, his pervasive biases first become evident as one
examines the normatively charged selection criteria which

he employs in his studies of self-actualizing people.

Moreover, upon reviewing his description of the behavioral

dispositions exhibited by these people, one comes away

with the impression that Maslow was not in fact taking a

disinterested, "let the chips fall where they may" ap-

proach to this research. His manifest attitude toward

such personality orientations might better be character-

ized as one of appreciation and recommendation, as evi-

denced by the following statements selected at random

from his research report:

> They work within a framework of values that are
> broad and not petty. . . . Self-actualizing
> people have the wonderful capacity to appreciate
> . . . the motivational life of self-actualizing
> people is not only quantitatively different but
> also qualitatively different from that of
> ordinary people.[18]

The other inadequately resolved problem that is

suggested by Maslow's meta-ethical views lies in the meta-

ethical theory of justification itself which he is pro-

posing. Had Maslow succeeded in convincing us that his

definition of "good" was in fact an acceptable one, could

we not continue to question the logic which causes him

to seek such a definition in the first place? More spe-

cifically, if we were to accept his view that men do

generally construe "the good" and "the right" in terms

of "the facts of human nature," we might still ask how

the facts of human nature are related to the values of

human conduct. This, of course, is not to deny the

possibility that such a relationship might be demonstrated. The point is that Maslow's meta-ethic is not successful in accomplishing it. His appeal to a definition in support of a principle places the whole burden of justification on the definition, and leaves open the question of how the definition is justified or why we should accept it. In other words the definition itself needs to be justified, and justifying it involves the same problems that justifying a principle does.

We are led, then, to conclude that our basic ethical norms and values cannot be justified by grounding them in the nature of things in any strictly logical sense. This can be done logically only if "right," "good," and "ought" can be defined in nonethical terms. Such definitions, however, turn out to be disguised ethical principles or value judgments which cannot themselves be deduced logically from the nature of things. It follows that ethics does not depend logically on facts about man and the world, whether empirical or otherwise.

In retrospect, it appears that Maslow's difficulties begin when he tries to account for his normative views in terms of a simplistic logic which moves him altogether too quickly from the "is" to the "ought." It might be worthwhile at this point to consider the possibility that Maslow in his ambition, has attempted to accomplish too much from his platform as a psychologist.

That is to say, a case might be made that his meta-
ethical position carries him beyond the particular sphere
of competence from which he is most likely to contribute
significantly to ethical theory. As indicated, Maslow
is of the opinion that psychologists have traditionally
operated from too narrow a frame of reference. Moreover,
he has confessed to a belief that the contemporary psy-
chologist is in a unique position to control the future
of mankind, thereby necessitating psychologists to begin
to develop much higher levels of awareness than has
traditionally been the case. The burden of responsibility
that he would assume for psychology tends to be conveyed
by his following statement:

> To put it very bluntly, I believe that the world
> will either be saved by the psychologists or it
> won't be saved at all. I think psychologists are
> the most important people living today. I think
> the fate of the human species rests more upon
> their shoulders than upon any group of people now
> living. I believe that all the important prob-
> lems of war and peace, exploitation and brother-
> hood, hatred and love, sickness and health, mis-
> understanding and understanding, of the happiness
> and unhappiness of mankind will yield only to a
> better understanding of human nature. . . . The
> only way to heal evil men's sickness is to create
> good men. To understand them better, to know
> what creates them, and to know how to cure the
> evil and let the good come out, we must know what
> evil is and what good is, that is, what psycholog-
> ical health is, and what psychological sickness is.
> And this is the job for the psychologist. . . .
> The psychologist has a call then, in the same
> sense that a minister should have. . . . He has
> special responsibilities to the human race. He
> ought to feel the weight of duty upon his
> shoulders as no other scientist needs to. He
> ought to have a sense of mission, of dedication.[19]

This declaration, revealing the almost Messianic commitment that Maslow takes on relatively early in his academic career, may help to account for the logical confusions which we are able to discern later on in his ethical doctrines. For one thing, Maslow indicates his strong dissatisfaction with current perspectives on human nature and undertakes to further our understanding in his area. His approach at this point can hardly be considered a "neutral" one, though, since he testifies here to an interest in discovering the nature of good and evil in men as a necessary precondition to the promotion of individual growth and the welfare of the species. We see in Maslow's original commitment, then, not only a statement of his intention to further our knowledge of man's nature and its relationship to man's valuing tendencies, but also a concern to become involved in the less empirical task of recommending certain aspects of human nature as more worthy of pursuit than others. Yet, he does not want to consider the possibility that in order to do justice to the latter interest it will be necessary to depart significantly from a strictly logical-empirical thesis and to come to grips with certain problematic but unavoidable normative issues suggested by his ethical doctrines.

In a sense, Maslow has become involved in a conflict of interests. His concern as a psychologist to

maintain a relatively disinterested, scientific approach toward man's nature comes into conflict with his strong disposition to play the role of the moral philosopher and to offer his normative views on how man ought to live. This may help to account for Maslow's attempt to remove the less desired prescriptive elements from his discourse by disguising them in a weak meta-ethic that does little to enhance the ultimate stature of his ethical doctrines.

Having once established that Maslow's meta-ethic does not successfully resolve the "is-ought" dichotomy, it remains for us to determine what contribution, if any, he may still have to offer to our contemporary ethical perspectives. Earlier, it was suggested that Maslow's main difficulties in the area of ethical theory result from his attempting to encompass too much from too narrow a platform. Instead of applying his energies to exploring the more "modest" ramifications of his positive psychology for ethics, Maslow feels compelled to offer final solutions to long-standing ethical problems which will ultimately require the cooperation of several disciplines before they can be resolved.

On the other hand, there remains the conviction that Maslow's most fundamental premise is a sound one which has been too much neglected by ethical relativists and by "other-worldly" moralities: The good life for human beings must be an ideal firmly grounded in human

nature. What we ought to do is greatly influenced by
what we are capable of doing; and that in turn depends
on our nature. Maslow recognizes empirical inquiry into
man's nature to be necessarily foundational to the
development of sound ethical theory. His greatest mis-
take, however, is to believe that there is a simple
logical relationship between the facts of human nature
and the values of human conduct. It is one thing to be
committed to the proposition that ethical theory to be
sound must be grounded in human nature. It is quite
another to conclude that a natural bent to behave in a
certain way can in itself endow a course of action with
moral value.

Inasmuch as man's nature is one vitally important,
though generally misunderstood, determining agent in the
formation of an adequate system of human values, Maslow's
efforts have broadened the base of our knowledge in this
area and thereby provided a firmer position from which
to approach ethical inquiry. One important impact of
his theory of needs on ethics is that it throws into
serious question the central thesis of descriptive ethi-
cal relativism which holds that men's needs and values
can be found to derive entirely from the particular socio-
cultural context with which an individual is associated.
The merely general assertion that there are fundamental
human needs opposes the relativist's stance in that it

demonstrates that man is not wholly plastic. It does not oppose the relativist's position that values are relative to needs. The discovery of particular "instinctoid" needs, such as the need for creative expression, and their pervasive effect when distorted, however, carry us forward to a remarkable degree. It provides a basis for ethical judgment between many alternatives previously regarded as equally arbitrary or a matter of cultural "taste." For example, Maslow's theory of needs suggests that the "right" approach to child-raising is not entirely relative to the particular mores and folkways which happen to prevail in the various cultures of the world. Whether or not extreme permissiveness in dealing with children has more to recommend it that a rigid, Spartan-like approach to child-raising cannot be considered a moot question once we accept the premise that human growth is dependent on the proper gratifications of basic human needs at a time when they are most prepotent.

Furthermore, Maslow offers some empirical evidence to counter the relativist argument that most human "needs" are secondary and derivative rather than primary and autonomous. For instance, it has often been claimed that all needs are inherently egoistic, even though they may be manifest in a number of different behavioral dispositions, including affiliative tendencies. The individual's relation to the human environment as well as to

the material surroundings remains fundamentally exploitive, however, according to this view. The outcome of such a stance has been to sweep the whole of a "needs" approach into the camp of an individual arbitrary relativism on the basis of an unavoidable egoism. Maslow's approach is cast in empirical terms, however, and features a distinction between prepotent and less prepotent needs as opposed to the relativistic distinction between primary and secondary needs. Through this approach he attempts to demonstrate the essential autonomy of the various human needs by producing evidence that there is, for example, a genuine interpersonal and social quality to the affiliative needs. At the same time, Maslow's principle of prepotency allows him to account for the egoistic syndrome, by providing an accurate account of the processes that go astray to produce an exploitative or grasping quality of feeling.

In essence then, Maslow's efforts to demonstrate the distinctiveness and the relative autonomy of certain basic "instinctoid" needs in man may have consequences in reducing the "indeterminacy" which seems to be the heart of the relativist position in ethical theory. In this respect, Adel has testified to the important role psychology can play in "rendering ethical judgement more determinate," a move which he believes would allow us to

converge on a scientific "valuational base" for con-

temporary ethics. He argues:

> . . . no a priori bars should be set up to the
> contributions that the several sciences can make
> to rendering ethical judgement more determinate.
> . . . Central in such an approach is the mainte-
> nance of an open door to new findings on the part
> of the sciences and new formulations on the part
> of ethical theory. . . . It must reckon not
> merely with new hypotheses but with constantly
> changing conditions that provide fresh ground for
> testing its established views. Fresh evidence
> about human needs or psychological dynamics may
> have fresh implications. . . . The concept of the
> valuational base is intended to point to the
> crystallization of the determinate elements we
> have found, and to suggest that these may play
> a fundamental role in evaluative processes.[20]

Another important consequence deriving from Maslow's

positive psychology is that it may provide the groundwork

allowing us to converge on an ethical concept of human

growth and maturity. That specific concepts of growth

require evaluation is clear enough from the familiar fact

that there may be harmful growth as in cancers, or ex-

cessive growth. In this connection, some have been con-

cerned to point out that John Dewey's growth doctrine

contains one rather large area of indeterminacy, since it

provides us with little in the way of a positive standard

to serve as a directive force for the growth process.

Archambault, in referring to Dewey's concept of growth,

offers the following observation:

> Dewey points out quite justifiably that the true
> meaning of growth implies a dynamic process of
> positive and healthy development. Hence the
> criticisms which point to "destructive growth"

and "malignant growth" fail to recognize the
essential meaning of the concept. This can be
admitted. But this is merely a precondition
for any healthy activity--that it must not be
self-defeating. It points to the necessity for
an examination of long-run consequences as well
as the need for an observation of the merely
immediate effects of a course of action. In
essence, however, insistence upon education to
further growth is a negative concept in that
it merely calls for the abandonment of imposed
goals which might deter the growth process. We
can all admit that nothing must be allowed to
interfere with healthy development, but we are
still left with the need for establishing a
standard for ascertaining exactly what <u>is</u>
healthy in a given instance.[21]

Dewey's preoccupation, as well as that of most growth

psychologists, has been largely with determining the

preconditions for "healthy" growth. At present, the

negative approach still prevails in psychological

criteria of health. Literally, more is known about the

conditions of pain than about the conditions of pleasure.

Such criteria as breaking points and inability to func-

tion, intense anxiety, difficulty in inter-personal

relations, sense of compulsion, are all definite enough.

They are not mere absence of pleasure. But as means of

formulating a standard of psychological health as a good,

they are negative, that is, states to be avoided as evil.

Maslow's concept of human growth may constitute a

significant breakthrough in this continuing dilemma, how-

ever, since it suggests a much-needed positive approach

to psychological health. In positing two distinct under-

lying trends in human motivation, he offers a potentially

strong challenge to the more simplistic and negativistic

psychologies of motivation that can be found to underlie

our most dominant mental health ethics. The implications

of Maslow's discovery of "growth motivation" as a quali-

tatively distinct psychological state would appear to

dispute the often tacit assumption that human growth and

mental health must in one way or another be construed

as a function of one's ability to satisfy such "deficiency

needs" as those for safety, love, belongingness, or self-

esteem. Maslow's notion is that deficiency motivation

of this sort may allow the individual to avoid illness;

but at the same time, it does not yet create positive

mental health. His rationale for making this claim is

that he has been able to find a relatively small number

of persons who exhibit almost entirely different motiva-

tional characteristics. This in itself represents a

bold departure from the "reductionist" tendencies of

traditional psychology which would regard all human be-

havior as stemming from a small common core of motiva-

tional springs. Maslow's intensive investigations have

revealed that some persons are not stimulated to behave

primarily by a drive to reduce tensions, but that their

behavior is better described as "expressive" in contra-

distinction to "striving" or "coping." Furthermore, he

has been able to demonstrate that the individual is

likely to enter this latter motivational state only

after he has successfully gratified his more prepotent deficiency needs.

If other investigators are able to concur with Maslow that it is possible to distinguish between two rather pervasive and in some senses conflicting motivational states, each of which has a capacity to dominate the human organism, we are then in a position to turn to the value-laden question of whether one or the other of these conditions is more worth pursuing. The effect of Maslow's research to date has been to suggest that the choice between maturity and immaturity, or in this case between the "growth-motivated" condition and the "deficiency-motivated" condition, is not likely to be an arbitrary preference. Since the desire not to grow up is likely to represent a fear reaction or some other basic need deficiency, rather than an extreme qualitative appreciation of an earlier need lasting into a later one, the element of indeterminancy (in our conception of goodness) would seem to be reduced considerably.

Moreover, further investigation of the motivational and behavioral condition which Maslow calls self-actualization may reveal that it has more to recommend it as a standard of growth than the norms which we may find to be inherent in a scientific account of such personality development. The suggestion here is that it may be possible to support the condition of

self-actualization as an ethical concept of maturity not only on psychological grounds, but also in terms of more pragmatic criteria. The task here might be to demonstrate that the self-actualizing person is one who not only lives up to his own innate potentialities, but that he is also able to come to terms with his external environment in a relationship reflecting an advanced awareness of certain fundamental "realities" of his contemporary world.

The main criticism of Maslow's ethical doctrines has centered on an effort to show that his most deliberate attempts to justify self-actualization as a model for human growth are quite inadequate. However, there remains a suspicion that Maslow, in discussing the behavioral characteristics of self-actualizing persons, does, perhaps inadvertently, suggest a more pragmatic sort of justification for this concept of fulfillment than his logical thesis would indicate. In other words, Maslow may, either consciously or unconsciously, be telling us that man should become self-actualizing because it is possible to become self-actualizing, but that this is not the only reason. The other reason is that such persons are better equipped to promote honesty, responsibility, and sanity in a world where mankind's most vital interests continue to be forestalled by fear, prejudice, and other neurotic conditions.

The suggestion here is that the behavioral characteristics exhibited by self-actualizing persons may be found to satisfy several important criteria which might be included in an operational standard for healthy human growth. The desirability of a multiple-criteria approach to psychological growth has come to be recognized by those who would conceive of such growth in large perspective. In this connection, Dewey's growth doctrine includes several important criteria which must be met, including a stipulation that the individual's relationship with his surroundings must be a balanced one. That is to say, Dewey believes neither the individual and his needs nor the environment with which he interacts should be allowed to play a dominating role in the relationship. For Dewey, then, growth is not to be characterized simply as the fulfillment of one's innate human needs and potentials at the expense of the environment, nor, on the other hand, is it to be construed merely as a successful "adjustment" to deterministic surroundings. However, as suggested earlier, Dewey's criteria tend to represent preconditions for human growth rather than a revelation of the various ways in which the underlying quality of positive growth can manifest itself.

Maslow's idea of self-actualization, while appearing, on the one hand, to fulfill the Deweyan criteria of "continuity" and "interaction," may also be found to

transcend the most significant limitation of Dewey's
growth doctrine by providing a multiple-criterion ap-
proach to positive health which is amenable to empirical
research. According to Maslow, a self-actualizing per-
son not only is motivated to strive for always higher
goals but also has an adequate self-image, is autonomous,
creative, and spontaneous, has a reality-oriented per-
ception of the world, enjoys love, work and play, and
has a well developed individualistic ethic. In this
case, his multiple criterion approach is similar to the
notion of a syndrome--as used in medicine, for example,
when one speaks about the "TB syndrome."

In summary, Maslow's ethical doctrines are far
from being closed pages of knowledge. His attempt to
provide a naturalistic science of human values flies in
the face of some basic clarifications found throughout
the history of ethical philosophy. However, his
theoretical-empirical work in the area of human motivation
has opened promising new avenues for a much-needed ex-
pansion of our knowledge of human nature. As such,
Maslow's psychology may have important implications for
ethics since it suggests that man's innate potential for
growth and achievement is much greater than many have been
led to imagine. Moreover, Maslow offers a positive
approach to human growth and maturity which, upon further
investigation, may have more to recommend it than his

naturalistic thesis would indicate. His notion of self-actualization represents a significant departure from our characteristically negative approaches to psychological health, while appearing in certain other respects to be quite compatible with Dewey's growth doctrine. Maslow's unorthodox research methods and his unwillingness to make explicit his most foundational normative premises make it imperative that other investigators follow him up with similar projects.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER III

[1]Abraham H. Maslow, The Psychology of Science
(New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 10-11.

[2]Ibid., pp. 8-9.

[3]Theodore Abel, "The Operation Called Verstehen,"
in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, ed. by Herbert
Feigl and May Brodbeck (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1953), pp. 686-687.

[4]It may be the case that Maslow's confusion here
is a more fundamental one than our brief criticism would
tend to convey. For instance, the particular senses in
which Maslow would use the term "know" might be found to
reflect a more serious epistemological weakness than
we have suggested. This is no doubt one aspect of
Maslow's thought which deserves a more intensive exami-
nation than we have provided here.

[5]Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality
(New York: Harper and Row, 1954), pp. 200 and 201.

[6]Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being
(Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc.,
1962), p. 204.

[7]Philip Wheelwright, A Critical Introduction to
Ethics (New York: The Odyssey Press, Inc., 1959),
pp. 86-87.

[8]Abraham H. Maslow, "Defense and Growth,"
Merrill-Palmer Quarterly (Fall, 1956), 36.

[9]Ibid., p. 39.

[10]John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York:
Collier Books, 1938), pp. 64-65. (While in other parts
of his writing Maslow would obviously concur with the
judgment Dewey is here making, it seems contradictory
to the above passage which we have taken to represent
Maslow's intuitionism).

[11]Abraham H. Maslow, "The Creative Attitude," The Structurist, III (1963), 4-10.

[12]Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, p. 157.

[13]William K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 4.

[14]Ibid., p. 80.

[15]R. B. Perry, Realms of Value (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 107, 109. This is a restatement of the position Perry took in General Theory of Value (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926).

[16]Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, pp. 160-161.

[17]Frankena, Ethics, p. 83.

[18]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 212, 214, 210.

[19]Abraham H. Maslow, "A Philosophy of Psychology," in Personal Problems and Psychological Frontiers, ed. by J. Fairchild (Chicago: Sheridan, 1957), pp. 225-227.

[20]Abraham Edel, Ethical Judgment: The Use of Science in Ethics (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-MacMillan Limited., 1955), pp. 295-297.

[21]Reginald D. Arehambault, "The Philosophical Bases of the Experiences Curriculum," in Dewey on Education (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 177.

CHAPTER IV

THE ADEQUACY OF MASLOW'S PSYCHOLOGY AS

A BASIS FOR EDUCATIONAL THEORY

On the basis of the preceding critique of Maslow's

doctrines, this chapter will attempt to determine the

import of his thought for contemporary education. In

brief, the concern here will be to demonstrate that

Maslow does have something significant to say to formal

education, and that his thought has application to at

least two prominent issues involving basic educational

philosophy. In the first place, it can be argued that

Maslow's expanded view of human nature suggests a sounder

perspective from which to assess the adequacy of present

school programs at all levels of American education. In

addition it may be possible to demonstrate that Maslow's

concept of positive growth and maturity, as exemplified

in the self-actualizing personality, can have great

significance for the education of future American teachers.

Implications of Maslow's Psychology
for the Larger Emphasis in
American Education

In considering the main implications of Maslow's

positive psychology for curriculum construction, we find

ourselves operating from a major premise that has been
bandied about a great deal by curriculum "experts," often
as a vehicle for achieving nominal agreement on the
desirability of any number of educational programs and
projects. Reference is made here to the proposition that
deliberate education must somehow have its roots in a
conception of student needs and motivations. The ambi-
guity residing in such a premise becomes apparent when we
realize the various senses in which the term "need" has
been employed in educational discourse. In pointing out
the importance of clarity in the use of such educational
language, Kneller suggests that the concept of "need" has
two basic uses, prescriptive and motivational:

> In its prescriptive sense need means something
> like "must have" or "requires." For example, "he
> needs discipline" means "he must have discipline"
> or "he requires discipline" or "discipline is
> necessary for him." Now, it has sometimes been
> asserted that the public school curriculum should
> "meet the needs" of the students. These needs
> may be either their school requirements or their
> social requirements. If the former, then all that
> is entailed in the sentence "The school curriculum
> should meet the needs of students" is that the
> school curriculum should meet the requirements of
> the school--that is, the school should do what it
> should do--which is a tautology. If the needs of
> the students are interpreted to mean all the re-
> quirements imposed on children by society, the
> proposal becomes impossible to realize, since
> these requirements are infinite. . . . In its
> motivational sense, need means either "crave" or
> "lack." Thus "he needs play" means "he desires
> (or craves) to play" or "he lacks opportunity to
> play." But this sense of need is no more satis-
> factory to education than the other. If needs
> are interpreted to mean general (or basic) wants

or deficiencies, it is difficult to imagine any
curriculum that does not meet a student's needs,
because the latter are so general and embracing
that no experience as broad and sustaining as
school could fail in some way to satisfy them.[1]

Maslow, of course, employs the term "need" in the motiva-

tional sense. He conceives of a human need as a basic

physiological or psychological deficiency which must be

"optimally fulfilled by the environment" in order that an

individual may "avoid sickness or subjective ill-being."

However, Kneller has argued that to interpret needs in

terms of basic wants or deficiencies is to offer nothing

of value for education, since according to Kneller it is

difficult to imagine any contemporary curriculum that

does not allow a student to satisfy in some way these

general needs. My suspicion is that Kneller and Maslow

are far from conceptual agreement as to what constitutes

the category of "basic" or "deficiency" needs. Judging

from his brief analysis of need in the motivational sense,

Kneller appears disposed to construe a "basic need" in

terms of those most obvious and most prepotent physio-

logical and psychological needs constituting the lower

levels of Maslow's hierarchy. Kneller's only example of

a basic need is the "desire" or "craving" that a school

child may have for play, a deficiency which is, in

Kneller's view, certain to be gratified in one way or

another within the typical school setting. From the

standpoint of Maslow's scheme, this deficiency would be

classified among the most basic or "physiological" needs.
For those who would conceive of man's basic needs as
being largely encompassed by Maslow's three lower cate-
gories (i.e., physiological needs, safety and security
needs, and belongingness and love needs), a case might
be made that our present school programs are, in fact,
instrumental in allowing for the gratification of such
need deficiencies when they emerge.

On the other hand, the singularity of Maslow's
approach lies in his conception of an evolutionary pro-
cess whereby "new" and qualitatively different needs
and motivations continue to emerge to replace suffi-
ciently gratified and more prepotent earlier needs. This
theory represents a radical departure from the typically
more conservative descriptions of intrinsic human needs,
such as reflected in Kneller's arguments, in that it
posits levels of need and fulfillment which American
education has hardly begun to acknowledge. Although some
psychologists may give the impression that man's "lower
needs" are the really crucial ones for "health and happi-
ness," Maslow insists that self-actualizing needs and
peak-experiences are just as important, and indeed more
so, to satisfied living. The "higher needs," in other
words, are not simply "frosting on the cake" but are
capable of lifting the whole experience of life to a
higher level.

It is important that we pause to note the importance of this point, as a whole conception of education and social planning could be at stake. For if the higher needs are as important to human fulfillment as "the lower," the differences are bound to be felt, sooner or later, in the lives of students who make the search for knowledge and for aesthetic appreciation a serious goal in their education. Nor can a society intent on developing wholesome persons make technical training primary and "pure investigation" and aesthetic sensitivity secondary.

Regardless of the degree of importance or priority that we may attach to these "higher needs," either now or in the future, it would seem significant to recognize that American education has been and continues to be largely directed to the satisfaction of those individual needs which Maslow labels D-needs. One indication of this is the strong vocational emphasis in our education, beginning with the secondary school and characterizing most of American higher education. In short, there is much evidence to indicate that American education continues to be oriented primarily to the end of getting a job. Eble contends that this "distinctly vocational" orientation in our education stems largely from an American disposition to think of social mobility in terms of a "better," or less physically demanding job:

> There is, of course, a rough gradation in the
> value commonly placed upon work, from the most
> wearying kind of simple physical labor to the
> most complex kind of abstract thought. In
> general, this country honors an education that
> moves man up the scale. Simply put, a man seeks
> education to avoid dull, hard work. The more
> education he gets, the less physical are the
> demands made upon him. . . . American education
> is strongly vocational. The father who schooled
> his son in the art of hunting or the art of war
> was preparing him for the most elementary kind
> of work necessary to his self-preservation. The
> high school student drawn to electronics or auto
> mechanics is almost as directly preparing him-
> self for survival. . . . The common and most
> valid criticism of vocationalism in education is
> that it narrowly trains for work to the exclu-
> sion of the large development of the person,
> which we fondly and rightly expect of a proper
> education.[2]

If this characterization is at all accurate, it would lend

substance to the contention that the true ordering prin-

ciples for American education tend to be cast in negative

terms. In this case, education is thought to represent

a means of avoiding the physical and psychological dis-

comforts connected with "dull," "hard" labor. In approxi-

mately the same vein, Fromm calls attention to the often

prevailing disposition to measure the worth of one's edu-

cation in terms of its "exchange value on the market."

This "marketing orientation," he would assert, dictates

that education function to develop only those individual

qualities which are highly salable and capable of chang-

ing in accordance with the peculiarities of the market.

The narrowly instrumental role which education is thought

to occupy in such a climate is conveyed by Fromm as

follows:

> Thinking as well as feeling is determined by
> the marketing orientation. Thinking assumes the
> function of grasping things quickly so as to be
> able to manipulate them successfully. . . . Evi-
> dently this type of thinking has a profound
> effect on our educational system. From grade
> school to graduate school, the aim of learning
> is to gather as much information as possible
> that is mainly useful for the purposes of the
> market. Students are supposed to learn so many
> things that they have hardly time and energy
> left to think. Not the interest in the subjects
> taught or in knowledge and insight as such, but
> the enhanced exchange value knowledge gives is
> the main incentive for wanting more and better
> education. We find today a tremendous enthusi-
> asm for knowledge and education, but at the
> same time a skeptical or contemptous attitude
> toward the allegedly impractical and useless
> thinking which is concerned "only" with the
> truth and which has no exchange value on the
> market.[3]

When viewed from the perspective of Maslow's ex-

panded version of human needs and motivations, it is

difficult not to conclude that American education is

presently "tuned in" to only a portion of man's nature.

If this be the case, one immediate implication may be

that our educational institutions have become dysfunc-

tional for some of our students. For example, the person

whose primary motivation does not derive from the need

to get a job may find that much of our education makes

little sense to him. In other words, if he should be

one of the presently small minority of students who finds

himself driven by a relatively disinterested curiosity

to know more about his world or by a desire to engage
in some sort of creative self expression, he will more
than likely discover that his school environment does in
fact provide little encouragement and few rewards for
such yearnings. Furthermore, if we are able to rely on
Maslow's rather comprehensive descriptions of the route
to self-actualization, we can expect the contemporary
growth-motivated student to experience serious communica-
tion problems. For one thing, his educational predica-
ment is not likely to be appreciated by persons who are
unable to conceive of needs other than those which are
narrowly egoistic and tension-reducing. That is to say,
those who are themselves preoccupied with deficiency
needs (presumably including the great majority of those
with whom he will come in contact, judging from Maslow's
accounts), will in all probability interpret the un-
conventional behavior of a growth-motivated person in
terms of the frustrations and distortions which accompany
the inability to gratify deficiency needs.[4] Thus, we
find many who are readily disposed to view as pathologi-
cal the behavior of any student who would dare to exhibit
frustration and discontent upon a prolonged exposure to
the American system of education.

In this connection, an important consequence of
Maslow's theory of motivation is to caution against pre-
mature and superficial "explanations" of behavioral

phenomena which can have widely differing meanings psy-

chologically. For example, he maintains that "radical

behavior" is a form of expression that may come from

completely different underlying motivations:

> If it (radical behavior) is taken per se, that
> is to say behaviorally, discretely out of con-
> text, we get the most confusing results when we
> study its relation to security feelings. Some
> radicals are at the extreme of security, others
> are at the extreme of insecurity. But if we
> analyze this radicalism in its total context we
> can learn easily that one person may be a radi-
> cal because life is not good to him, because
> he is bitter, disappointed, or frustrated, be-
> cause he does not have what others have. Care-
> ful study of such people shows them to be very
> hostile to their fellow men in general, some-
> times consciously, sometimes unconsciously. It
> has been said aptly of this kind of person that
> he tends to perceive his personal difficulties
> as a world crisis. . . . But there is another
> type of radical who is a very different kind of
> individual even though he votes, behaves, and
> talks in the same way as the one we have just
> described. For him, however, radicalism may
> have a completely different, even opposite
> motivation or meaning. These people are secure,
> happy, personally contented people, who, how-
> ever, out of a deep love for their fellow men,
> feel impelled to improve the lot of the less
> fortunate, to fight injustice even if it does
> not touch them directly. Such people may ex-
> press this urge in any one of a dozen ways:
> through personal philanthropy, or religious
> exhortation, or patient teaching, or radical
> political activity. Their political beliefs
> tend to be independent of fluctuations of income,
> of personal calamity, and the like.[5]

The relevance of this analysis to our present discussion

is its suggestion that the growth-motivated student's

strivings may be manifest in "radical" behavior which is

easily misunderstood to reflect the frustration of lower

level deficiency needs. Moreover, it points up the
necessity for moving beyond our truncated and anachron-
istic conceptions of human nature if we are to gain an
accurate perception of the most recent student chal-
lenges to our system of education.

Up to this point, we have been considering the
possibility that the prevailing thrust of American edu-
cation to date has tended to preclude the recognition
and promotion of positive human fulfillment in the
Maslovian sense. Furthermore, it was suggested that
Maslow's theory of human needs may offer valuable insight
into much of the student discontent and resistance which
has become increasingly pervasive at the university level.
And yet, the specific prescriptive implications which
Maslow's thought might carry for education tend to remain
somewhat obscure. In the previous chapter an attempt was
made to point out the fallacy involved in a simple deduc-
tive step from man's nature to man's duties. By the same
token, the discovery that men have distinct needs above
and beyond those which our education has been serving,
does not in itself confer upon education the task of
catering to these "higher needs." Nor would Maslow's
theory of human needs lend itself to the proposition that
all formal education, regardless of time or place, ought
to be devoted to the promotion of self-actualization.
His principle of need prepotency suggests the utter

futility of any attempt to foster growth-motivated be-
havior in those many societies of the world where vir-
tually the entire population remains saddled with the
most fundamental subsistence needs. One important cri-
terion, then, has to be the "readiness" of a particular
society to direct its educational efforts toward the
fulfillment of man's "higher needs." In most societies
of the past there has been little chance to do this, or
even to think about it very much. The struggle for mere
physical existence was so intense and protracted that
the individual organism fought all its lifetime for mere
survival and equilibrium. Its higher, and distinctive,
needs were necessarily subordinated to its primitive
demands for life, for a kind of liberty, for a measure
of security.

It is important, then, to recognize that when pre-
scribing a course of action for a society as well as for
a person, ought assumes can. In this case, to recommend
that a nation undertake in its educational system to
develop the "higher needs" of its citizenry is to im-
plicitly suggest that these people are presently in a
position to attend to such needs. Otherwise, such an
educational emphasis becomes completely non-functional
in terms of the immediate needs of the society.[6]

The relatively recent emergence of the United States
as a society in which the majority finds sufficient

gratification of material and security wants may help to
account for the lingering preoccupation with the economic-
material phase of life which is so discernable in our
education. Dewey, like Maslow, recognizes the economic
as well as educational preconditions which must be met
in order that individuals and societies may be "liberated"
from the domination of deficiency needs. Dewey writes:

> The liberal spirit is marked by its own picture
> of the pattern that is required: a social
> organization that will make possible effective
> liberty and opportunity for personal growth in
> mind and spirit in all individuals. Its present
> need is recognition that established material
> security is a prerequisite of the ends which it
> cherishes, so that, the basis of life being
> secure, individuals may actively share in the
> wealth of cultural resources that now exist and
> may contribute, each in his own way, to their
> further enrichment. . . . Civilization existed
> for most of human history in a state of scarcity
> in the material basis for a humane life. Our ways
> of thinking, planning and working have been at-
> tuned to this fact. Thanks to science and tech-
> nology we now live in an age of potential plenty.
> . . . The habits of desire and effort that were
> bred in the age of scarcity do not readily sub-
> ordinate themselves and take the place of the
> matter-of-course routine that becomes appropriate
> to them when machines and impersonal power have
> the capacity to liberate man from bondage to the
> strivings that were once needed to make secure
> his physical basis. Even now when there is a
> vision of an age of abundance and when the vision
> is supported by hard fact, it is material security
> as an end that appeals to most rather than the way
> of living which this security makes possible. Men's
> minds are still pathetically held in the clutch of
> old habits and haunted by old memories.[7]

At the same time, Dewey offers a possible explanation for
the failure of new needs and values to immediately become
operational upon the satisfaction of lower needs. He

points out that the transition is slow-moving since men's minds as well as their biological equipment must become attuned to drastically changing material circumstances in their lives. Dewey would seem to suggest that this transition is in large part an educational one, that men must somehow become cognizant that the gratification of deficiency needs does not constitute an end in itself, but, rather, that it serves as a means to new horizons and higher needs. This leads us to posit the notion that, paradoxically, men may be "ready" in one important sense to take on new needs and new perspectives, yet unprepared in another sense which is just as vital.

From the standpoint of Maslow's psychology it may be possible to support the contention that one of the most important functions of education is to teach men and societies to appreciate their own needs. This would appear, to me, to be the most vital educational problem facing us today as a nation. As Dewey well recognized, the educational task involved in bringing men to outgrow their anachronistic conceptions of human nature and human potentialities will be an enormous one. The scarcity of living models of growth-motivated behavior makes it especially difficult to convince the contemporary non-believer that self-actualization is a viable alternative to an existence characterized by the absorption with

lower need satisfaction. In a sense, then, we are hampered by a vicious-circle phenomenon which works to perpetuate our educational preoccupation with man's lower needs.

Yet, Maslow's psychology may give us reason to speculate that the continued evolution of American technology and affluence will produce an ever greater proportion of persons who have reached the point of satiation with deficiency need satisfactions, thereby increasing the probability that self-actualizing behavior will become a more common phenomenon. An increased exposure to growth motivated behavior may facilitate an increased awareness of human potentialities on the part of those who would minimize man's capacity for positive growth.

It is also conceivable that, given an appreciation of higher human needs and motivations, some might still maintain that the only business of American education is to prepare men to cope with vocational chores and other immediately pressing needs. Anyone taking this stance might easily write off the "problem" of today's discontented growth-motivated student as actually a pseudo-problem, since in reality this student would demand more of his education than it should be expected to deliver. The main difficulty embodied in this brand of educational conservatism is, again, an unwillingness to recognize

that men's and society's needs and values change, and
sometimes, as in the case of the "electronic era" which
we are presently experiencing, very rapidly.

If the concern of the educational conservative is
to keep formal education as "functional" as possible in
terms of the most pressing needs of our technological
society, it might, in turn, be argued that the dis-
tinctly vocational emphasis in American education be-
comes more dysfunctional as days go by. With the ever
increasing amount of leisure which is being "thrust"
upon Americans by rampant technology, it becomes apparent
that man is not, and cannot continue to regard himself
as, simply an economic being. The necessary role which
education must play in helping to effect this conceptual
transition becomes apparent from the following char-
acterization of the most problematic aspect of increased
leisure:

> For centuries man has dreamed of an era where
> there would be enough time, after daily work
> tasks were completed, to devote to the things
> that he really enjoys doing. Through a Puritani-
> cal devotion to work for work's sake, Americans
> have finally succeeded in realizing this cherished
> dream--leisure time. But now that they have it,
> there seem to be few who are able to enjoy it. It
> is difficult for a people to adjust their pattern
> of living to more leisure than they had antici-
> pated, especially in a society that lacks a tradi-
> tion for leisure. . . . It is precisely at this
> point that the significance of increasing leisure
> time emerges clearly. The United States is now
> capable of increasing production levels and in-
> creasing available leisure at the same time.

> Indeed, this has been happening for several
> decades. But the results can serve to com-
> pound problems as well as point the way to new
> potentialities. When the four-day week arrives,
> and it appears inevitable, will it contribute
> to greater happiness or greater anxiety? Will
> it bring about more enthusiasm or more boredom?
> Can a meaningful nonwork ethic be developed that
> will enable Americans to make better use of
> their industrial achievement?[8]

In short, if formal education is to continue to have a

"function" in the lives of contemporary Americans it must

move quickly to reorient itself to the notion that

American avocational needs and interests are vigorously

competing for center stage with the too long-incumbent

vocational emphasis. In this connection, Keniston points

to the fallacy involved in the belief that this society

and its institutions can remain forever preoccupied with

old, "unfinished business." He appeals to Americans to

recognize that this society's future has to lie somewhere

beyond the "triumph of technology" and "abundance" and

"full employment" and "more of the same in our education."

In Keniston's words:

> Perhaps the most potent deterrent of all to any
> fresh thinking about the purposes of our lives
> and our society is the fallacy of unfinished
> business--exclusive concentration on the remain-
> ing problem of productivity, poverty, education,
> and inequality as defined by technological
> values. . . . The "unfinished business" of tech-
> nological society is, on a historical scale, in-
> creasingly vestigial, a "mopping-up operation."
> Revolutionary causes lose their impact when they
> have been largely accomplished; men are seldom
> stirred to arms in a cause already victorious
> . . . our technological accomplishments mean that

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if real "new frontiers" are to be found, they must
lie beyond technology; and that if we do not now
live in a "Great Society," then expanded Medicare,
poverty programs, job-retraining, and anti-dropout
campaigns will not suffice to create it . . . the
fallacy of unfinished business overlooks the cru-
cial questions for most Americans today: What lies
beyond the triumph of technology? After racial
equality has been achieved, what then? Abundance
for all for what? Full employment for today's
empty jobs? More education that instills an ever
more cognitive outlook?[9]

To briefly review the normative implications for
education which we have discerned in Maslow's psychology,
we suggested that: (1) The educational emphasis of any
society must somehow be geared to the particular level of
human need at which the majority of its members are
presently operating. A societal preoccupation with
deficiency needs precludes the possibility of an educa-
tional approach which is addressed primarily to man's
"higher needs." (2) A society's "readiness" to promote
positive growth in its education implies not only that
the majority of its citizens have sufficiently gratified
basic deficiency needs, but also that they have become
aware of newly emerging "higher needs" and of the desir-
ability of promoting them through formal education.
(3) It is highly imperative that American education begin
to address itself to "new business." That is to say, our
continued educational emphasis on man's lower needs, as
reflected in a distinctly vocational orientation, is
becoming increasingly dysfunctional in a day when

individual and societal needs are undergoing a radical
transformation. It is past time that we move beyond the
encapsulated views of man and his world which have be-
come anachronistic in this time and allow ourselves to
envision qualitatively new horizons for our society and
its educational system.

At this stage, any attempt to characterize a "new"
approach to education in the spirit of Maslow's expanded
views of human nature is admittedly speculative. In
general, there is reason to believe that a Maslovian
brand of education would depart rather drastically from
the more common tendency to construe "education" in
instrumental terms and to equate it with "training" or
with preparation for life chores. It would deemphasize
the role of external rewards and punishments and would
instead place a premium on individual "free-choice" as
the means of facilitating healthy growth. This new
education would in many respects incorporate the thinking
of the "free university" advocates. The particular
activities that a student might pursue would become
largely a function of individual interests and impulses
rather than being determined primarily by the teacher
or by the larger society. Such an emphasis would be in
keeping with Maslow's notion that externally imposed
goals and rewards can only distort the growth process,
since in his view healthy growth is dependent on a maximum

of individual free-choice. As a result, great stress
would be placed on aesthetic expression and on the
development of the student's non-cognitive capacities in
general. Students would be allowed and encouraged to
pursue knowledge for its own sake rather than as an
instrument for the satisfaction of lower needs such as
the need to earn a living.

A strong Maslovian emphasis in education might
further suggest that the role of the teacher become
closer to that of the counselor or the clinician as
opposed to that of the authority-figure and knowledge-
dispenser. One of the teacher's main tasks would be to
assist the student in identifying present needs and to
help him to effect a smooth transition from one level of
need to another. In addition, it is quite conceivable
that a student's needs and interests might frequently
take him beyond the confines of the traditional school
complex for their satisfaction. A capacity to diverge
when necessary from the traditional classroom-centered
and group-centered approaches to education becomes
essential here. In short, we are led to suggest the
proposition that this new variety of education must be
especially flexible and open-ended in order to accommo-
date the higher needs and motivations of students.

For some important reasons, however, this essen-
tially laissez-faire approach cannot be the complete

answer to our most pressing educational problems. As
was argued in Chapter III, Maslow's intuitionism will not
suffice as a sole criterion for healthy human growth.
Nor will it suffice as the major ordering principle for
American education. The premise that educational
growth can proceed on a non-cognitive foundation without
the constant intervention of a mature and cognitive re-
construction of one's experiences is, as Dewey so aptly
pointed out, a short-sighted one. Maslow's difficulty
is that he does not recognize this intuitive foundation
for what it is. As was indicated earlier, Maslow's
mistaken notion that he is simply describing human nature
is responsible for his failure to come to grips with the
essentially normative underpinnings of his growth concept.
This is an especially significant oversight considering
the fact that any system of deliberate education rests
on goals and purposes which are ultimately normative.
Since any system of formal education proceeds from firmly
entrenched conceptions of what ought to be as well as
from notions of what is, educational policy makers must
be prepared to defend their prescriptions on normative
grounds. Once we are disposed to wrestle with the ques-
tion of educational value priorities, one can marshall
strong argument to support the notion that our contempor-
ary education ought to be addressed at least in part to
various fundamental and inescapable problems of the age.[10]
While the interests and desires of today's students must

also be taken into consideration, our system of education
cannot afford to simply cater to the student's impulses.

On the other hand, Maslow's psychology does suggest
an approach which would take us away from our strict
vocational orientation and toward a more adequate edu-
cation for a future which promises ever greater leisure.
His belief in the capacity of growing individuals to
direct their own lives toward further growth is a worthy
one. To the extent that more people are able to move
beyond the level of deficiency-motivation, we may
eventually find a greater utility in Maslow's intuitive
approach to growth and educaiton.

The Self-Actualizing Personality as a Model for American Teachers

At this point we will turn to a consideration of
Maslow's self-actualizing person as a personality model
for American teachers. One of the main results of
Maslow's efforts has been to demonstrate that the self-
actualizing, or growth-motivated, syndrome can be a
reality for contemporary man; that persons exhibiting
these personality characteristics do exist, however rare
they may be at this time. Furthermore, his positive
psychology attempts to explicate the particular personal
and environmental circumstances which allow some to
achieve this level of personal growth and those condi-
tions which cause others to remain governed by defi-
ciency needs.

Given the assumption that Maslow's brand of posi-
tive growth is attainable, my concern here is to show
that American education is presently in need of a greater
number of self-actualizing teachers in order that it
might begin to move beyond the narrow preoccupations
which were discussed earlier in this chapter. This con-
viction derives from the major premise that such insti-
tutional progress if it is to come about is dependent on
two fundamental dispositions which our present-day
educators too often fail to demonstrate. One of these is
the capacity to become genuinely involved with today's
students and their needs. This, of course, has been a
perennial difficulty in our efforts to implement a
"progressive" type of education. Dewey emphasized the
necessity for insight into the past experiences and
present needs of students as a "jumping-off point" for
providing further educational experiences. He argues
that:

> It is a cardinal precept of the newer school of
> education that the beginning of instruction
> shall be made with the experience learners al-
> ready have; that this experience and the capaci-
> ties that have been developed during its course
> provide the starting point for all further
> learning . . . the problem for the progressive
> educator is more difficult than that for the
> teacher in the traditional school. . . . He must
> be aware of the potentialities for leading stu-
> dents into new fields which belong to experiences
> already had, and must use this knowledge as his
> criterion for selection and arrangement of the
> conditions that influence their present experi-
> ence.[11]

Some contend that the failure of the Deweyan variety of progressive education to become a reality in this country is, in large part, attributable to the non-proficiency of American educators to effect this "more difficult" form of education. In concurring with this stance, I would further suggest that one main roadblock has been the inability of our teachers to develop the cognitive and perceptual equipment necessary to arrive at an enhanced appreciation of today's student and his educational requirements. This becomes especially evident when one considers the current educational plight of the "inner-city" child as well as the failure of our educators to recognize and provide for the "higher needs" of students.

The same lack of awareness which precludes an accurate perception of the student and his needs also prevents teachers from viewing the whole educational enterprise in sufficiently large perspective. The second basic proposition which is being advanced here is that American education is not likely to evolve to a more functional status in this day of rapid societal and world flux until individual educators burst out of their capsules of tribal conditioning and begin to exhibit a greater sensitivity toward the realities of man's contemporary existence. At a time when the greater pressures and rewards would move teachers toward increased

specialization and a jealous preoccupation with narrow

academic pursuits, we cry for the "generalist," for the

"unencapsulated man" who is able to discern the educa-

tional forest from the educational trees. One such

"unencapsulated reality image" has been characterized

as follows:

> To begin with, he would be liberally educated as
> opposed to narrowly educated, generalist-
> integrated educated as opposed to specialist-
> fragmentary educated. If he were a specialist,
> he would be a generalist-specialist rather than
> a specialist-specialist. Presumably this broad
> outlook would minimize the probability of provin-
> cialism on social and political issues. We
> should expect him, therefore, to be relatively
> free of the currently prevalent petty prejudices
> of race, color, religion, political party, and
> country. We would see him, then, as essentially
> a free citizen of the world or the universe, with
> his loyalties moving down from the highest unity
> of universal, planetary, or world government. His
> depth of understanding and breadth of vision would
> certainly not allow him to stumble over the petty
> business of depriving others of freedom also, even
> though they may look different, talk differently,
> dress differently, and come from afar. Presumably
> he would be able to live out the idea of unity
> within diversity.[12]

The adoption of the hypothesis that this society's

educational progress will ultimately depend upon the

recruitment of teachers who are able to operate from more

advanced levels of awareness, would seem to go a long

way toward recommending the search for teacher candidates

who demonstrate self-actualizing qualities. For one thing,

we have indicated the necessity for developing teachers

with heightened perceptivity, the urgency for staffing

our schools with sensitive people who are able to pene-
trate facade and to relate to students in terms of the
student's unique needs. According to Maslow, the success
of the self-actualizing person in transcending his own
lower needs and defenses is responsible for his ability
to maintain a relatively disinterested approach in his
relationships with other people. That is to say, his
perceptions are less likely to be governed by his own
insecurities and "hangups." One result is that his view
of another individual is better characterized in terms
of a "spontaneous," or perhaps even "creative" approach
which allows him to detect in this other person those
often dormant characteristics which are less common,
less "useful," and above all, less obvious to most
teachers. Persons with such perceptual attributes are,
in Maslow's words, "far more apt to perceive what is
there rather than their own wishes, hopes, fears,
anxieties, their own theories and beliefs, or those of
their cultural group."[13] Moreover, he would attest to
their "unusual ability to detect the spurious, the fake,
and the dishonest in personality, and in general to
judge people correctly and efficiently."[14]

For our own educational purposes, one of the en-
couraging aspects of this more adequate state of con-
sciousness which we are prescribing for American
teachers, is that it does not reflect a mystical power

possessed by some and denied to others. Instead, Maslow
would give us to understand that it represents a wider
and more intense development of the perceptive power
present in all healthy individuals. It is wider and
more intense because it is not dissipated in wasteful
defenses of either oneself or one's view of man.

The other especially essential attribute which the
self-actualizing person might supply to the American
teaching profession, is a measure of personal autonomy
which would allow him to conceive of long range as well
as short range goals for our education from a relatively
disinterested perspective. Hook calls attention to the
essential distinction between the teacher who "serves"
society and the one who is simply a "servant" of society,
and in so doing argues that the responsible educator
operates from "a set of ideals" which reflect courage and
a relatively high degree of autonomy. Hook writes:

> In a democracy, educators as a group have a
> greater opportunity to influence society, and
> therefore a greater responsibility for what they
> do or fail to do, than in any other political
> order. Like all educators, the democratic educa-
> tor serves society. But to serve society does
> not mean to be a servant of society or of the
> most influential classes within it. An educator
> who accepts the philosophy of democracy owes
> allegiance not to one group in the community or
> even primarily to the community as it is com-
> posed at any particular moment, but to a set of
> ideals and to a method which he believes commen-
> surate to the task of validating these ideals.[15]

One might find, however, a great deal of evidence to indicate that in spite of this ideal our schools continue to be staffed by persons who are much more disposed to follow than to lead, by teachers who are content to play the role of the "cultural witch-doctor" rather than that of the social gadfly and critical innovator.

Nor has teacher education in this country reflected a serious concern to supply our schools with teachers who are more than "skilled manipulators" and "able technicians." Blackington points to the tendency for our teacher training institutions to "neglect or bypass," rather than encourage prospective teachers to come to grips with, important normative and other philosophical aspects of education:

> Those schools and educators stressing teacher
> training draw heavily upon those aspects of
> history, sociology, and history of education
> that orient students to the present. They tend
> to neglect or bypass those aspects that would
> require prospective teachers to examine their
> commitments about what ought to be the rela-
> tionship between the schools and society. In
> short, teacher training neglects this whole
> foundational area. Our contention is that
> unless the philosophical questions are explored
> and developed, the program of preparation is
> none other than training.[16]

Some might wish to question the extent to which a genuine concern to explore and to criticize the philosophical underpinnings of our educational system can be "taught" in a formal educational setting. Maslow's positive psychology would seem to suggest that such a

disposition reflects individual needs that are later
appearing and less prepotent than other more immediate
needs which often tend to monopolize the consciousness
of our teacher candidates. For example, the beginning
teacher whose most immediate preoccupation is with
securing a job, or perhaps with her ability to "handle"
a class of thirty-five high school students, is less
likely to become absorbed in a disinterested concern
for the future of this society and its institutions than
a person who has achieved a greater degree of satisfac-
tion of these lower needs and tensions. On the other
hand, we might have good reason to expect that the
growth-motivated teacher will approach the business of
education from a frame of reference that is more problem-
centered and less ego and culture bound than the more
restrictive Weltanschauung of the deficiency motivated
teacher. This problem-centered orientation of the self-
actualizing person is described by Maslow as follows:

> Our subjects are in general strongly focused on
> problems outside themselves. In current termi-
> nology they are problem centered rather than ego
> centered. They generally are not problems for
> themselves; e.g., as contrasted with the ordinary
> introspectiveness that one finds in insecure
> people. These individuals customarily have some
> mission in life, some task to fulfill, some prob-
> lem outside themselves which enlists much of
> their energies. . . . In general these tasks are
> nonpersonal or unselfish, concerned rather with
> the good of mankind in general, or of a nation
> in general, or of a few individuals in the sub-
> ject's family. With a few exceptions we can say

that our subjects are ordinarily concerned with
basic issues and eternal questions of the type
that we have learned to call philosophical or
ethical. Such people live customarily in the
widest possible frame of reference. They seem
never to get so close to the trees that they
fail to see the forest. They work within a
framework of values that are broad and not petty,
universal and not local, and in terms of a
century rather than the moment. In a word, these
people are all in one sense or another philoso-
phers, however homely.[17]

In this same regard, a strong case might be made
that the capacity of the self-actualizing person to pro-
vide a more autonomous and less ethnocentric approach to
education is especially "functional" in a world where
provincialism and isolationism have become dangerous
anachronisms. This more cosmopolitan orientation de-
rives from the fact that self-actualizers are, in
Maslow's words, "ruled by the laws of their own character
rather than by the rules of society. It is in this sense
that they are not only or merely Americans, but also to a
greater degree than others, members at large of the human
species."[18] Maslow also suspects that "those individuals
in different cultures who are more detached from their
own culture should not only have less national character
but also should be more like each other in certain re-
spects than they are like the less developed members of
their own societies."

In summary, it has been argued that American educa-
tion is presently in need of a greater number of teachers

who exhibit the motivational and behavioral characteris-
tics of the self-actualizing personality. The tendency
for such persons to be governed by growth needs rather
than by deficiency needs would allow them to transcend
the debilitating preoccupations which so often prevent
educators from attaining a more adequate level of con-
sciousness. Not only is the growth-motivated teacher
capable of developing a more honest and perceptive rela-
tionship with students but his greater base of security
and autonomy allows him to take a more responsible,
problem-centered approach to the educational enterprise.
In recommending the self-actualizing personality as a
model for American teachers, it is important that we
bear in mind Maslow's description of the underlying
motivational transition which allows this condition of
positive growth to emerge. Once aware of the necessary
preconditions for growth-motivated behavior, we may have
reason to doubt the possibility that teachers can be
"trained" to behave in this manner. This is to suggest
that a deficiency-motivated person cannot simply be
taught or exhorted to become more perceptive or to adopt
a more disinterested view of his world. Here the import
of Maslow's psychology might be to demonstrate that some
persons are psychologically incapable, at least during
certain stages of their lives, of exhibiting such per-
sonal qualities as compassion or basic honesty

or disinterested curiosity. If this should be the case, the implications for teacher education may be tremendous. For example, we may be forced to conclude that teacher training in the traditional sense is for all purposes a hopeless task until we are able and willing to develop a more sophisticated initial screening procedure for our teacher applicants. In other words, given the objective of staffing our schools with self-actualizing teachers, we might also recognize the futility in attempting to "educate" some of our would-be teachers toward behavioral goals which are too far removed from their present motivational levels.

From this point of view the business of selection becomes possibly the most important phase of the entire teacher-preparation program. Moreover, any serious concern to staff our schools with adequate personalities will require that we develop effective devices for measuring the psychological variables which Maslow deems significant. Our present tendency to rely on indications of academic aptitude derived from past records and tests of academic ability is hardly sufficient to allow us to make crucial judgments about personality and adjustment. Tests of academic aptitude can tell us something about the individual's probable success in acquiring subject matter. However, they tell us little about a person's motivational attributes or about the kinds of perceptual

organization we want to know about in judging probable
success in teaching. Our apparent need, then, is to move
in the direction of a psychological test that would allow
us to assess the level of growth at which the prospective
teacher is presently operating, and to determine his
chances of becoming self-actualizing prior to his enter-
ing the profession. At the present time we do have pro-
jective devices such as the Rorchach test and the TAT
which might after sufficient research be employed for
purposes of teacher selection. That is to say, we have
psychological tests that may be appropriate for our pur-
poses here, tests that we have not yet had occasion to
use in this area. The more objective sorts of screening
instruments that we do use are of course also necessary,
although they are in need of improvement in the direction
described by Maslow. Here we might explore the possi-
bility of developing an objective test that would measure
not only an individual's present store of knowledge and
skills, but also his prevailing motivational and ethical
dispositions. This is an area in which we need a great
deal more research. Meanwhile, if we are to improve our
selective processes it will be necessary for us to cope
with the subjective aspects of any psychological screen-
ing instrument. Furthermore, any drastic revision of
our selection procedures is almost certain to require a

major political battle which, ironically enough, is not
likely to be won without the support of a greater number
of growth-motivated educators.

[1]George F. Kneller, _Logic and Language of Education_ (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 211.

[2]Kenneth E. Eble, _A Perfect Education_ (New York: Collier Books, 1966), pp. 206, 209.

[3]Erich Fromm, _Man for Himself_, A Premier Book (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1947), pp. 82-84.

[4]The difficulties that a growth-motivated student would encounter in attempting to communicate his atypical needs to a basically unsympathetic and inattentive audience are likely to be compounded by his own inability to clearly articulate newly acquired wants and newly emerging perspectives (Maslow believes that the basic needs are "neither necessarily conscious nor unconscious." This would seem to indicate that a person in the process of a significant motivational transition might be unable, for a time at least, to clearly convey new "feelings" or a new Weltanschauung).

[5]Abraham H. Maslow, _Motivation and Personality_ (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), p. 26.

[6]This points up the error involved in the assumption that educational systems can be "exported" from one world society to another, particularly when it is from a "developed" to an "underdeveloped" country.

[7]John Dewey, _Liberalism and Social Action_ (New York: Capricorn Books, 1935), pp. 57-59.

[8]Russell R. Dynes, _et al._, _Social Problems: Dissensus and Deviation In An Industrial Society_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 300-301.

[9]Kenneth Keniston, "Toward a More Human Society," in _Contemporary Moral Issues_, ed. by Harry K. Girvetz (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1968), pp. 555-556.

[10]Sidney Hook, _Education for Modern Man_ (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1966), p. 122.

[11]John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: Collier Books, 1938), pp. 74, 76.

[12]Joseph R. Royce, The Encapsulated Man (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1964), p. 195.

[13]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 205.

[14]Ibid., p. 203.

[15]Hook, Education for Modern Man, p. 92.

[16]Frank H. Blackington III and Robert S. Patterson, School, Society, and the Professional Educator (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1968), p. 4.

[17]Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 211-212.

[18]Ibid., p. 227.

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