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ABSTRACT

SOCIALIZATION, PERSONALITY AND THE ORIENTATION TOWARD CHANGE

by Joseph M. Allman

This research deals with differences in socialization experiences and psychological attributes related to an individual's ability to adjust to changing social and political conditions. In addition to a static analysis of the interrelationship of such variables, I have sought to capture some of the reality of becoming a person by examining impacts of varying sequential patterns of socialization upon sets of personality attributes.

The first chapter reviews both the psychoanalytic perspective upon human development with its attention to early learning in the family and attitudinal stability, and cognitive theoretical approaches which emphasize later learning and personality change. The balance of the literature review identifies socialization experiences and personality attributes expected to have an impact upon the orientation toward change.

Chapter II outlines a theoretical sketch which interrelates variables and generates hypotheses guiding the analysis. This sketch describes four patterns of socialization in relation to several sets of predispositions including the orientation toward change.

The study design and instrumentation are discussed and evaluated in the third chapter. The research population is a non-random group of young people (N = 241) from towns and cities throughout the state

of Michigan who has participated in summer training programs for political activists held on the campus of Michigan State University between 1963 and 1966.

The remaining three chapters present the data and analysis. Chapter IV contains a discussion of the interrelationship among the several psychological attributes observed in the study--(dogmatism, reliance upon authority, trust, liberalism and efficacy.) A multi-variate statistical model is used to evaluate the impact of these attributes upon the orientation toward change.

Chapter V discusses the (socialization variables) including: extent of communication with authorities in the immediate family and later in life outside of the family; degree of consistency between early and later experiences with authority; extent of crisis during socialization process; age; and education. Both multi-variate and analysis of variance models are used to examine the relationships among the socialization experiences, the psychological attributes and the impact of four sequential patterns of socialization upon the orientation toward change.

In the last chapter I have summarized findings and reformulated the theory to be consistent with these observations. (We find that trust, dogmatism, and reliance upon authority are greatly affected by early experience with authority in the family and are relatively resistant to change.) Liberalism, efficacy and orientation toward change appear to be results of later experiences with authority outside of the immediate family. (Crisis experience in socialization

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evidently has profound impacts upon the personality. Finally, and most importantly, we find that the four socialization patterns do produce significant variations in at least two of the personality attributes--reliance upon authority and the orientation toward change.

I conclude that the attempt to utilize a dynamic model of human development has shown the possibility for more realistic theorizing and research into the complex relationship of human learning, predispositions and behavior.

SOCIALIZATION, PERSONALITY AND THE
ORIENTATION TOWARD CHANGE

By

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Many have shared in this process and one generated it. Micky McCleery is of a lost genre--friend and teacher who makes the possible more probable.

My wife Judith, my sons Jim and Barrett, and my daughter Laura, each in their own very special way, have assured the dissertation's completion.

I have made mistakes in thinking about and doing this research. Some I have realized, some remain, but all, contrary to more customary refrain, I accept willingly as part of becoming a student.

Joe Allman
Eugene, Oregon, 1968

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CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND FOR STUDY

Statement of Problem

To begin with, I will sketch the problem with broad strokes. We as producers and products of our environment, are creating such rapid changes in our world that there exists the distinct possibility of our failing to adapt our world view and consequent behaviors rapidly enough to avoid our own extinction. The problem, then, that faces us is one of individual and social adjustment to change. The question we must answer is: What are the conditions that facilitate or inhibit individual ability to accept change?

The problem may be reduced to more manageable proportions. As an example I have chosen two quotes from public statements made during the "revolution" on the Berkeley campus in the fall of 1964. These statements represent what was said and heard during the most intense moments of the revolt, and further, they indicate the direction and degree of division in student opinion. It is as if we had a snapshot of a single event in the process of adjustment to change. This brief moment illustrates the problem of this study.

It is a bleak scene, but it is all a lot of us have to look forward to. Society provides no challenge. American society in the standard conception it has of itself is simply no longer exciting. The most exciting things going on in America today are movements to change America. America is becoming evermore the utopia of sterilized, automated contentment. The 'futures' and 'careers' for which American students now prepare are

for the most part intellectual and moral wastelands. This chrome-plated consumers' paradise would have us grow up to be well behaved children. But an important minority of men and women coming to the front today have shown that they will die rather than be standardized, replaceable, and irrelevant.

Mario Savio

The organization which I represent, University Students for Law and Order, was organized as an alternative course of action to the so-called Free Speech Movement. We believe that the FSM has exceeded the limits of protest acceptable to the majority of students at our university.

There is no need nor is there any excuse for civil disobedience on this campus. Those students involved demand protection of their rights while at the same time they are violating our rights.

As an organization USLO does not pretend to know solutions as to the varied and complex problems which presently confront us as students. But one fact is undeniably clear--that unless we are willing to express ourselves as a responsible body, we have no right to expect the continued financial support of the community at large.

As a course of action, USLO urges the students to support the legally constituted administration of this campus on all issues until such time as the civil judicial authorities dictate otherwise.

We therefore request that you express your moral support for our viewpoint by signing the petition which is now being circulated and by disassociating yourself from the FSM.

R. F. Dussault

These statements are almost pure expressions of polar types on an often noted continuum of orientation toward change.¹ Duverger reviewing some of the sociological conceptions of this "natural

¹S. M. Lipset and S. S. Wolin (eds.), The Berkeley Student Revolt (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1965), pp. 219, 226.

political dualism" suggests that, "It is a summary and approximate view but not altogether inaccurate."² He continues, "It is true that some find themselves completely at home amongst commonplace ideas, accepted traditions, and conventional habits, whereas others experience the compelling need to change everything, to modify everything, and to innovate in all domains."³ As a result of these basic orientations he sees a "natural movement of societies" toward a two-party system. He describes what may be called a collective or cultural orientation toward change in the following way. "Whenever public opinion is squarely faced with great fundamental problems it tends to crystallize around two opposing poles."⁴

This commonplace observation of the polarization of political cultures and sometimes (although not often) of the political system itself under the stress of accommodation to change is the impetus for the present study. In conflict situations, people tend to group themselves into those who resist change and those who are predisposed to accept it. Indeed, Huntington has suggested that acceptance of or resistance to change is the fundamental difference between the liberal and conservative ideologies.⁵ The present study is an attempt to understand individual response and predisposition to change.

²M. Duverger. Political Parties (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), p. 215.

³Ibid., pp. 215-216.

⁴Ibid., p. 216.

⁵S. P. Huntington. "Conservatism as an Ideology," in Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, ed. Macridis and Brown (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1961), pp. 276-284.

The present study builds upon research insights of The Authoritarian Personality, a study which directs attention to behaviors and psychological predispositions to act such as personality syndromes, belief systems, attitudes and orientations.⁶ A growing, though still fragmentary, body of empirical research is being done under the rubrics of political socialization, political culture and public opinion. This research inquires into attitudes and behaviors and their macro-variable counterparts--culture and system. If there need be rationale for inquiry Ithiel De Sola Pool one exponent of the approach adopted here--argues persuasively, I think that,

. . . it is common to assume that changes in men's actions are the really important objectives and that changes in attitudes are but means toward the desired actions. We would argue, however, that it is the other way around. It is, for example, relatively easy to get peasants to plant a particular kind of seed a foot apart instead of six inches apart. This action can be induced by money payments, by terror, by authority, by persuasion, by proving it to be the will of the gods, and by other means. But the improvement of one such practice does not mean that the peasant has been in any way modernized. A far more significant change would be the development of scientific attitudes toward the adoption of new practices. It is only that kind of internal changes in the latent structure of his attitudes that would produce self sustaining movement toward modernization.⁷

In summary my research deals with differences in socialization experiences and psychological attributes related to the individual's ability to adjust to change.

⁶T. W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson and R. N. Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1950).

⁷Ithiel De Sola Pool, "The Mass Media and Politics in the Modernization Process," in Communications and Political Development, ed. Pye (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 249.

My objectives in choosing this problem and approach are broad and largely unattainable, but they do serve to provide both context and direction to the effort.

A central problem for students of human behavior is to understand personality development and change. I have chosen to study the processes of learning and cognitive adaptation in order to identify some of the human conditions producing and changing personality. Ultimately the understanding of this problem can lead to information and skills necessary to facilitate personal change.

A second objective is to study political orientations as they relate to both personality and socialization experiences. Students of political socialization are generally interested in human learning, personality and behavior. Studies of the effects of socialization upon political attitudes or the effects of personality upon political behaviors are relatively numerous. But seldom do these studies attempt to bring these variables together in a single research effort.

A further objective needs to be included because most of the research in political socialization focuses upon young children or adolescents and not upon young adults. I propose to question the assumption underlying such research--the assumption that individual socialization is largely completed before the person is exposed to adult experiences. It seems important to inquire if later life experiences can or do affect citizen socialization.

A final objective is to understand some of the ingredients of an accommodative or "modernized" personality. The ability of individuals and groups to accept new ways of acting and thinking may be the single

most important precondition for the continuing development of our own country as well as the "new nations."

Political Socialization and Orientations

This literature review begins with the problem of determining what socialization experiences and psychological orientations may affect individual adjustment to change. Some clarification of the concepts of socialization and orientations as they will be used in this study is required.

Definitions of socialization are varied, as the following quotations illustrate.

. . . the whole process by which an individual born with behavior potentialities of enormously wide range, is led to develop actual behavior which is confined within a much narrower range--the range of what is customary and acceptable for him according to the standards of his group.⁸

Conformity to rules then, with the exception of special cases, ensured primarily by the process of socialization--that is, via the development in each individual of habits which lead him to make responses which conform to the rules instead of transgressing them.⁹

. . . his learning of social patterns (regularities of behavior) corresponding to his societal positions as mediated through various agencies of society.¹⁰

⁸I. L. Child, "Socialization," Handbook of Social Psychology ed. Lindzey (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison and Wesley Co., 1954), p. 655.

⁹I. Whiting and I. L. Child, Child Training and Personality: A Cross Cultural Study (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 221.

¹⁰J. Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), p. 25.

. . . it is useful to simplify the complex process of political socialization by viewing it as the means whereby members of a political system acquire the three types of basic orientations already mentioned.¹¹

For some socialization refers to learning predispositions to behave (e.g. habits, attitudes, orientations, or expectations) while others emphasize learning actual patterns of behavior. For present purposes socialization refers to experiences affecting the development of individual orientations.

There is enough ambiguity concerning the concept of orientation to require discussing its use in the present study. Smith, Bruner and White conceptualize three "action tendencies" (i.e., approach, avoidance and hostility) which are activated by objects in the person's psychological field.¹² They refer to these tendencies as the "orientations of the attitude." Easton and Hess posit three types of learned expectations which people use as cues for interpreting political situations. The latter study equates orientation and expectations, "These three kinds of expectations--that is, knowledge, values, and attitudes--we shall call the basic political orientations."¹³

¹¹D. Easton and R. Hess, "Youth and the Political System," Culture and Social Character, ed. Lipset and Lowenthal (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961), p. 229.

¹²B. Smith, J. Bruner and R. White, Opinions and Personality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956), p. 37.

¹³Easton and Hess, op. cit., p. 228.

Almond and Verba argue,

Orientations refer to the internalized aspects of objects and relationships. It includes: (1) "cognitive orientation," that is, knowledge of and beliefs about the political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs, and its outputs; (2) "affective orientations," or feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel, and performance; and (3) "evaluational orientations," the judgements and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings.¹⁴

In this definition the orientation becomes "the internalized aspects of objects and relationships." Orientation as used in the literature is synonymous with opinion, attitude, belief, expectations, character, style, predispositions, tendency, and in some cases, personality.

The concept requires some refinement.

One theme emerges from the variations. In most cases orientation refers to an internalized predisposition to behave. The term shares common attributes with the concept of attitude. We may gain clarity by examining a definition of attitude.

I have chosen to review Rokeach's formulation of attitude which is drawn from his broader analysis of belief systems.¹⁵ Rokeach uses the belief as the unit of analysis. He defines a belief, " . . . as any simple proposition, conscious or unconscious, inferred from what

¹⁴G. A. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 15.

¹⁵M. Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

a person says or does, capable of being preceded by the phrase 'I believe that'. . . ."¹⁶ Beliefs describe an object or situation as true or false, evaluate the situation or object as good or bad, or advocate a certain course of action as desirable or undesirable. Given these three types of beliefs, Rokeach argues, that each belief has three parts. First, the belief has a "cognitive" component representing a person's knowledge, second, an "affective" component capable of being aroused in varying degrees of intensity, and finally, a "behavioral" component directing the belief to action.

With the belief as a unit of analysis Rokeach constructs this definition of attitude, "An attitude is a relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner."¹⁷ This definition is representative of others in the literature.¹⁸

While an attitude is an organization of beliefs, a belief system is an organization of attitudes. Rokeach states, "We mean it (the belief system) to include each and every belief and disbelief of every sort the person may have built up about the physical and social

¹⁶M. Rokeach, "The Nature of Attitudes," International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (New York: MacMillan, 1966), p. 3.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁸For example see M. L. DeFluer and F. R. Westie, "Attitude as a Scientific Concept," Social Forces, Oct. 1963, pp. 21-36; H. Blumer, "Attitudes and the Social Act," Social Problems, 3, 1955, pp. 59-64; D. T. Campbell, "Social Attitudes and Other Acquired Behavioral Dispositions," Psychology: A Study of a Science, ed. Koch (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963); L. W. Doob, "The Behavior of Attitudes," Psychological Review, 1947, pp. 135-156; D. Krech and R. Crutchfield, Theory and Problems of Social Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948).

universe he lives in."¹⁹ While the belief system is the total framework man uses to understand his world, the attitude is a subsystem related to specific objects or situations. There are two types of attitudes: attitudes-toward-situations include beliefs concerning the event or ongoing activity in which the attitude-toward-object is activated, while attitudes-toward-objects includes beliefs about people, groups, institutions, or issues.²⁰

In analogous fashion, we may wish to define orientations as stable organizations of beliefs about political objects or situations. This is what some researchers have done. Consider, the following from an article by Easton and Dennis:

Even though the children tested assert a growing awareness of government as an idea and object, are they in fact, able to distinguish it as a sphere separate from other areas of social life? If attitudes toward the authorities as an object are to have relevance for later ties to the system, we need some evidence indicating that even in their earliest years children are, in fact, able to recognize some minimal difference between that which is governmental and that which is not. Only under such conditions could we infer that attitudes towards government--to which we shall turn in a moment--refer to distinctively political bonds.²¹

These authors are apparently arguing political beliefs can have relevance for later political behavior only if the individual distinguishes between political objects and other social phenomena. An

¹⁹M. Rokeach, op. cit., 1960, p. 35.

²⁰M. Rokeach, op. cit., 1966, p. 8.

²¹D. Easton and J. Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," The Annals (361, Sept. 1965), pp. 40-57 (this quote found on p. 49).

alternative to their argument is put forth as a major hypothesis of The Authoritarian Personality. "In short, ideology regarding each social area must be regarded as a facet of the total personality and an expression of more central 'sub-ideological' psychological dispositions."²² In other words there are nor "distinctively" political orientations.

This second position is a working assumption of the present study and leads to the following formulation of political orientation. To the extent that, at various times in their lives, objects or situations repeatedly induce people to behave in a particular manner it is appropriate to infer an orientation predisposing them to behave in this fashion. Similarly, when "political" objects or situations activate the same behaviors at different times one may infer political orientations.

We will now use these definitions to identify socialization experiences and psychological attributes which may affect the person's acceptance or resistance to change. Since such an effort is a part of a larger discussion of personality development, we will first examine alternative theoretical approaches to socialization and personality.

Theoretical Approaches to Personality Development and Change

Both psychoanalytic and cognitive theorists have contributed to the study of socialization and personality. According to the former

²²T. W. Adorno, et. al., op. cit., p. 207.

point of view personality is formed early and remains relatively stable. Cognitive theorists, on the other hand, emphasize the continual striving of individuals to adapt their beliefs and behaviors to changing conditions. In other words, changes in experiences lead to changes in personality. Greenstein refers to these two theories by distinguishing between "ego defensive" and "cognitive" personality development.

Personality formation may be along ego-defensive or more cognitive lines; the connections between personality and political belief need to be examined rather than assumed; both personality and beliefs must be examined in situations in order to understand behavior; the ways in which individual predispositions and actions aggregate and affect the political and social system need to be explicated. And, to turn the circle, it is the political and social systems which provide the socializing environment for 'politically relevant' personal development and the situations within which political action takes place.²³

A few citations from the literature reflecting each of these two approaches will help to throw light on this distinction.

The extensive literature flowing from The Authoritarian Personality concentrates on adult attitudes toward authority as a consequence of early childhood experiences with authority.²⁴ An inventory of many of these studies appears in an article by I. L. Child entitled "Socialization" and the entirety of the material cited utilizes psychoanalytic assumptions about personality.²⁵ A political science textbook by William Mitchell contains the following reference to socialization:

²³F. Greenstein, "Personality and Political Socialization: The Theories of Authoritarian and Democratic Character," The Annals, op. cit., p. 95.

²⁴T. W. Adorno, et. al., op. cit.

²⁵I. L. Child, op. cit., p. 655.

" . . . whether a child grows up to emphasize rights and demands on the government to fulfill his own obligations is surely strongly influenced, if not actually determined, by early family experiences."²⁶ Froman in an article entitled "Learning Political Attitudes" notes many psychoanalytically oriented writers (e.g., Erikson, Frenkel-Brunswik, Christie, and Jahoda) believe critical relationships exist between child rearing practices and later political behaviors.²⁷ Pye's²⁸ review of Erikson's The Young Man Luther²⁹ invites political scientists to examine early experiences as important for understanding later innovative behaviors. Hagen, in a major study of social change, concludes that changes result from forces altering family structure, thereby influencing the child's early development.³⁰ He believes social change is the summation of individual changes produced by alteration of family experiences. Change is gradual and requires the maturation of new generations. Clearly, the influence of

²⁶W. Mitchel, The American Polity (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1963), p. 164.

²⁷L. Froman, "Learning Political Attitudes," Western Political Quarterly (June, 1962), pp. 21-38.

²⁸L. A. Pye, "Personality, Identity, and Political Ideology," Political Decision Makers, ed. Marvick (New York: The Free Press, 1961).

²⁹E. H. Erikson, Young Man Luther (New York: Norton and Co., 1958).

³⁰E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change (Homewood, Ill., Dorsey Press, 1962).

psychoanalytic assumptions concerning the early formation and relative stability of political orientations is pervasive.

Studies emphasizing personality change after childhood have their roots in the cognitive theories of such theorists as Tolman, Lewin and Krech. From the standpoint of these theorists behavior is purposive and adaptive. Smith, Bruner and White clearly articulate these assumptions concerning personality development.

The human being, according to this approach, is not governed by a rational calculus, nor is he a blank slate on which experience traces its inexorable mark. Nor yet is man an ingenious machine translating physical stimuli into bodily responses. Like all animals, he is an organism, a system of life processes that somehow maintains its identity in active interplay with its environment. An organism is never passive, but survives and grows through constant striving, responding selectively to relevant aspects of its environment, and reaching out to incorporate, modify, fend off, or attain. Final passivity is death; in life there is always striving to maintain the delicate³¹ adaptation of needs of the organism to its environment.

The impact of cognitive theory can be found in several studies of political socialization. Hyman's inventory of political socialization studies finds parental influences are important determinants of adult behavior, but there is substantial evidence of "the attenuation of parental influence" given particular conditions and agencies of change. He shows, for example, that authoritarianism may develop independently of parental influences, and notes that certain conditions such as social and geographic mobility, strict parental control,

³¹B. Smith, et. al., op. cit., p. 30.

adolescent rebellion, aging and generational effects attenuate early experiences with parents.³²

Other studies support this general argument concerning the effects of later life experiences upon personality. Possibly the most persuasive among these is that of Almond and Verba. In their cross cultural study of political orientations they write:

. . . the importance of specific learning of orientations to politics and of experiences with the political system has been seriously underdeveloped. Such learning is not only cognitive in character, but involves political feelings, expectations, and evaluations that result largely from political experiences rather than from the simple projection into political orientations of basic needs and attitudes that are the product of childhood socialization.³³

Orientations and personality can change, and now we can approach the problem of identifying prerequisite conditions for change.

Eisenstadt in his study of the effects of age differences on behavior argues from his data that childhood experiences are likely to influence adult behavior only insofar as roles learned in the family are also useful in achieving social status in later life. But to the extent that roles acquired in childhood do not serve these needs, later experiences become important in affecting adult behavior.³⁴ Similarly, Davies theorizes that "political maturation" (i.e., the change from dependence to autonomy) may be either facilitated or

³² J. Hyman, op. cit., pp. 69-73.

³³ G. Almond and S. Verba, op. cit., p. 34.

³⁴ S. N. Eisenstadt, From Generation to Generation (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956).

retarded depending on early family relationships. However, when established family patterns of need satisfaction are dysfunctional in more adult roles anxiety results and changes are likely.³⁵

Both of these studies make the point that attitudes and behaviors which are appropriate in the family situation may not be appropriate to adult interaction in a more complex environment. Levine finds the reverse of this phenomenon in non-western culture. His data show familial experiences are predictive of adult behaviors in relatively static social situations. But, there is probably less tendency to generalize family experiences to adult relations in more differentiated social systems where dissimilarity exists between the family and community structures.³⁶

All of these studies demonstrate that early family experiences are most likely to affect adult behaviors when adult behaviors and expectations are similar to those in the family situation. However, where early family experiences are inconsistent or less similar to experiences in the larger community it is less likely that early learning determines adult behavior. To the extent that later life experiences are inconsistent with early experiences there is a greater probability of change in individual orientations and behaviors. Inconsistency between early and later socialization is a precondition of individual change of and, conceivably, also of ability to accept change.

³⁵J. Davies, "The Family's Role in Political Socialization," The Annals, op. cit., pp. 10-19.

³⁶M. Levine, "The Role of the Family in Authority Systems," Behavioral Science, V. (1960), pp. 20-42.

A further group of studies exists which suggest that cultural crisis or personal trauma are prerequisites of personality change. Wallace, reviewing work on social movements (e.g. nativistic movements, cargo cults, etc.), defines "revitalization" as " . . . a deliberate, organized, conscious, effort to construct a more satisfying culture", and concludes that it is possible to accomplish a basic transformation of an entire culture in a relatively short time. Given cultural crisis conditions and the advent of charismatic leadership in the culture revitalization can be achieved in a single generation.³⁷ Elkins presents substantial evidence suggesting that basic changes in adult personality can occur if individuals are forced to pass through sufficiently stressful circumstances. As evidence he cites changes that took place in Negro slaves during shipment from Africa, as well as among inmates of concentration camps.³⁸ Middleton and Putney studying 1440 college students find that generalized adolescent rebellion relates poorly with political rebellion (party preference different from that of the parent). Child-parent relations that are either overly strict or neglectful tend to increase the probability of "political rebellion," especially when the parents are political activists.³⁹

³⁷A. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," American Anthropologist, 58 (1956), pp. 12-26.

³⁸S. Elkins, "Slavery and Personality," Studying Personality Cross Culturally, ed. Kaplan (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1961).

³⁹R. Middleton and S. Putney, "Political Expression of Adolescent Rebellion," American Journal of Sociology, 68 (1963), pp. 527-535.

Several major hypotheses flow from this general review of personality development and change. Personality is affected by early family experiences and the impacts of such experiences are relatively stable and resistant to change. Two of these conditions are the degree of consistency between early and later socialization experiences, and the degree of trauma or crisis in the socialization processes. Two further conditions, age and education, are suggested by the studies of Anderson and Pressy. Anderson, in a sample of high school students, finds a decrease in dogmatism between the eighth and twelfth grades.⁴⁰ Pressy comparing data obtained on students over a span of three decades finds that societal changes in moral and religious norms alter the thinking of college students but not younger high school students.⁴¹ Young adults with some education may be more likely to change and therefore accept change than younger adolescents without education. The foregoing suggests the rudimentary outlines of a model of personality development.

We can conceptualize personality as a collection of orientations resulting from past experience. These orientations predispose individuals to respond in some particular fashion to new and changing situations which arise as the person matures. Some of these orientations are formed from the experiences in the family situation. If conditions

⁴⁰C. Anderson, "A Developmental Study of Dogmatism During Adolescence with Reference to Sex Differences," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 65 (1962), pp. 132-135.

⁴¹S. Pressy, "Changes from 1923 to 1943 in the Attitudes of Public School and University Students," Journal of Psychology, 21 (1946), pp. 173-188.

remain similar to those in early family these orientations will persist throughout the person's life. If, on the other hand, conditions change in later adult life we expect the individual to make adjustment by either changing orientations formed earlier or by developing new orientations from new experiences. It is possible that crisis, age and education may work to intensify or ensure this change process since such conditions appear to make adjustments and adaptations more likely. We assume that individuals who have made changes in their own personality are more likely to accept change generally. We can expand these notions in the theoretical chapter, but for present purposes the scheme directs attention to the effects of early childhood experiences (primary socialization), the effects of later experiences outside of the immediate family (secondary socialization), and the effects of personality upon specific orientations--in particular the orientation toward change.

Primary Socialization and Orientations

From this point on we will refer to early childhood socialization experiences as primary socialization. And the question must now be raised, what are the critical primary socialization experiences and what orientations result from particular conditions?

Easton and Hess in a quasi-longitudinal study of more than 700 midwestern school children conclude that young children develop positive and uncritical attitudes toward the political community and political parties based upon affective ties with the family. They hypothesize that these predispositions are generalizations of

relationships with family authorities.⁴² Greenstein, interviewing pre-adolescent school children replicates and confirms these findings. His subjects have extremely positive conceptions of political leaders which they can articulate at as early an age as seven years. He believes that youthful orientations formed in primary group relations are most durable.⁴³ An earlier study by Maccoby, Matthews, and Morton of high school students and their parents observes the same phenomenon. Student's candidate preference and party affiliations are related to family preferences, with highest conformity occurring in families where there is only moderate interest in politics.⁴⁴

From these studies we can infer childhood experience with family authorities greatly affects the orientation to trust and accept as legitimate political leaders and institutions. It is not entirely clear what specific relationships in the family produce these orientations, but several research studies have pointed out the critical significance of affective relationships with family authorities (presumably parents). Orientations resulting from these relationships appear to be most stable over time. We can hypothesize as a result of

⁴²D. Easton and R. Hess, op. cit., p. 227 ff; R. Hess and D. Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (1960), pp. 632-644.

⁴³F. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Image of Political Authority," American Political Science Review (December, 1960), pp. 934-943.

⁴⁴E. Maccoby, R. Matthews and A. Morton, "Youth and Political Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, 18 (1954), pp. 23-29.

these studies that authority relationships in primary socialization affect trust and belief in the legitimacy of political objects.

Further evidence of the effect of early authority relationships upon adult behavior can be found in ~~an article~~ by Willis who finds, in a sample of Swedish parents, that ~~those~~ who have a strict conception of their relationship to their children are more likely to have a similar conception of their own relationship to civil authorities.⁴⁵

A recent article by Pinner helps specify an important characteristic of authority relationships. He notes that parental overprotection may result in political orientations of distrust, " . . . where the transition from the intimacy of the home into the greater world is experienced as a difficult and fear arousing step, and where there is little experience in the solution of problems through direct communication."⁴⁶ Here again trust of politics and politicians appears to be affected by relationships with parental authority. But more specifically, as Pinner's study indicates, communication in problem solving situations may be a critical attribute of authority relationships.

The following hypothesis seems a plausible inference from this review of research on the effect of primary socialization upon political orientations. Political trust results from early authority

⁴⁵R. H. Willis, "Political and Child-Rearing Attributes in Sweden," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 53 (1956), pp. 531-535.

⁴⁶F. A. Pinner, "Parental Overprotection and Political Distrust," The Annals, op. cit., pp. 58-70 (this quote found on p. 46).

relationships characterized by more extensive communications between the child and his authorities.

We now turn to the identification of the effects of secondary socialization (i.e., socialization occurring later in life and outside of the immediate family) upon particular orientations.

Secondary Socialization and Orientations

Perhaps the most extensive empirical study in political socialization is The Civic Culture by Almond and Verba.⁴⁷ Their data are based upon respondent recall by subjects from national samples in five countries. An extensive summary of their work is beyond the scope of this review; we can describe only their findings concerning the effects of secondary socialization on political orientations.

The authors examine the relationship between authority experiences and sense of political efficacy. They present data intended to show that adult experiences with authorities proximate to political roles may influence political orientations more than do earlier family experiences. In their data, positive relationships between individual participation in family discussions and a sense of political efficacy exists only among subjects with little education. Possibly family experiences among the more educated have relatively little affect upon adult political competence. Almond and Verba summarize this relationship between family influences and political efficacy as follows:

⁴⁷G. Almond and S. Verba, op. cit.

To sum up the relationship between family participation and sense of political competence: there is some connection between democracy in the family and democratic behavior in politics. Those who had the opportunity to participate in the family are somewhat more likely than others to feel politically competent. But the relationship is a complex one, in which a number of intervening variables can blunt the impact of this democratic training on political attitudes. Family participation is not generalized to political participation among those with higher education, and in several countries this generalization is not made by our younger respondents. The reason may be that respondents whose political behavior is not affected by their family training do not need that training as a means of induction into a feeling of political competence. Younger respondents and those with higher education are subjected to numerous pressures leading to a sense of political competence, and the marginal effect of family participation is, under these circumstances, not very great.⁴⁸

This summary supports the thesis that later life experiences may have more impact upon the sense of efficacy than early family influences at least for younger individuals and those with more education.

The study goes on to consider the impact of participation in discussion and decision making in school and job situations. Considerable variation exists in the extent of influence of school experiences on efficacy (which probably indicates that schools in the five countries vary a great deal). The authors conclude that participation in school affairs has only marginal importance unless it is followed by experiences of effectiveness in post-school situations. When they investigate the effects of participation and discussion in decisions on the job they find the strongest evidence of the study.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 352.

People who report being consulted about decisions on the job also report a high sense of political and personal efficacy, and this relationship is independent of extent of education. Almond and Verba conclude that participation in decision making at the work place, in school, and in the early family are, in that order, important to the development of a sense of efficacy. Thus, communication with authorities in situations outside of the immediate family may greatly modify the early family influences. The authors account for the importance of these later experiences by noting they are more similar and more proximate to adult experiences in the political system. This suggests that generalization of the effects of early family experiences decreases with the amount of specialization in society. Theorists who believe early experiences create needs that are generalized or projected onto adult interactions may be overlooking the learning principle of discrimination while paying excessive attention to the principle of generalization. Possibly people find experiences with political authorities so entirely different from childhood experiences they are not able to generalize from early childhood to adult situations. As they accumulate experiences of effectiveness in their adult activities they may come to discriminate adult relationships with authority from childhood experiences and change their attitudes accordingly.

For our purposes the Almond and Verba study directs attention to the importance of secondary socialization for the development of a sense of political and personal efficacy. The critical variable appears to be that of authority relationships in school and on the job. Is it possible to specify this relationship further? In the

Almond and Verba study communication with authorities emerges as the major form of participation in decision making. Just as communication with early authorities is the critical primary socialization experience affecting trust, communication with authorities outside of the family appears to affect efficacy.

Communication with authorities in primary and secondary socialization is an important independent variable in the development of political trust and efficacy. We still have not established the existence of a relationship between either trust or efficacy and the person's ability to adjust to change. It is possible to speculate about such a relationship, but leaving the question open for further investigation seems a more prudent strategy.

The literature on liberal and conservative ideologies leaves little doubt that acceptance and resistance to change is one of the chief components of these ideologies. A review of this literature will help to identify correlates of the orientation toward change. Most of the research to be considered describes liberal and conservative orientations in the context of more general investigations of personality syndromes.

Personality and Orientations

What personality attributes are associated with acceptance or resistance to change? Much of the literature indicates an individual's orientation toward change is a central element of liberal and conservative thought.

The Authoritarian Personality⁴⁹ is the benchmark from which to begin a review of research on liberalism-conservatism. This work describes the "prototypic liberal and conservative" orientations in the following way.

The prototypic 'liberal' is, according to our guiding conception, an individual who actively seeks progressive social change, who can be militantly critical (though not necessarily totally rejective) of the present status quo who opposes or de-emphasizes numerous conservative values and beliefs regarding business, success, rugged individualism, human nature, and the like, and who would diminish the power of business by increasing the power of labor and the economic functions of government.⁵⁰

The prototypic 'conservative' in terms of the present scale, is one who supports the status quo and resists changes in existing politico-economic power arrangements, who supports conservative values and traditions, who believes that labor is properly subordinate to employer or management, and who wishes to minimize the economic functions of government in order that individual businessmen can, in free and equal competition provide goods of maximum quality at minimum cost to the consumer.⁵¹

In still another early research effort Eysenck factor analyzes responses of several political groups and detects two major factors which account for most of the variance. He identifies these factors as radicalism-conservatism and tough mindedness-tender mindedness. As we look more closely at the responses included in the radicalism factor it is clear that the radical is more receptive to changes in law and policy over a wide diversity of issues. Eysenck describes the poles on his "radicalism" factor in the following way.

⁴⁹T. W. Adorno, et. al., op. cit.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 176.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 177.

On the one hand, we find a belief that private property should be abolished, that the death penalty ought to go, that Sunday observance is old fashioned, that Jews are valuable citizens, that the divorce laws ought to be altered, that we should give up part of our sovereignty, that we should abolish abortion laws, that we should cure criminals rather than punish them, that laws favor the rich, that companionate marriages should be allowed, and that patriotism is a force that works against peace. On the other hand we have a belief that nationalization is inefficient, that compulsory religious education is desirable, that the Japanese are cruel by nature, that we should go back to religion, that Jews are too powerful in this country, that flogging should be retained as a deterrent, that war is inherent in human nature, that conscientious objectors are traitors, that birth control should be made illegal and that coloured peoples are inferior.⁵²

Eysenck does not isolate any personality characteristics which might account for radical and conservative attitudes since one of his major hypotheses is, " . . . there is in truth only one ideological factor present in the attitude field, namely that of Radicalism-Conservatism. The T-factor itself does not constitute an alternative ideological system but is rather the projection onto the social attitude field of a set of personality variables."⁵³ Tough mindedness correlates with extraversion, aggression, dominance, rigidity, intolerance of ambiguity, narrow-mindedness, and mental correctness.

Both the Adorno, et. al. and the Eysenck studies indicate that liberal orientations are associated with acceptance of change while conservatives tend to resist change. This calls for a more careful examination of other elements of conservative and liberal views, and

⁵² H. J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1954), p. 127.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 170.

for an investigation of social-psychological correlates of such views.

McClosky identifies major themes of conservatism as well as some of the correlates of conservative personalities. He lists the following value positions as basis of the conservative outlook.⁵⁴

Man is a creature of appetite and will, 'governed more by emotion than by reason' (Kirk), in whome 'wickedness, unreason, and the urge to violence lurk always behind the curtain of civilized behavior' (Rossiter). He is a fallen creature, doomed to imperfection, and inclined to license and anarchy.

Society is ruled by 'divine intent' (Kirk) and made legitimate by Providence and prescription. Religion 'is the foundation of civil society' (Huntington) and is man's ultimate defense against his own evil impulses.

Society is organic, plural, inordinately complex, and the product of a long and painful evolution, embodying the accumulated wisdom of previous historical ages. There is a presumption in favor of whatever has survived the ordeal of history, and of any institution that has been tried and found to work.

Man's traditional inheritance is rich, grand, endlessly proliferated, and mysterious, deserving of veneration, and not to be cast away lightly in favor of the narrow uniformity preached by sophisters and calculators' (Burke). Theory is to be distrusted since reason, which gives rise to theory, is a deceptive, shallow and limited instrument.

Change must therefore be resisted and the injunction heeded that, 'Unless it is necessary to change it is necessary not to change' (Hearnshaw). Innovation 'is a devouring conflagration more often than it is a torch of progress' (Kirk).

Men are naturally unequal, and society requires 'orders and classes' for the good of all. All efforts

⁵⁴H. McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," The American Political Science Review, 52 (1958) pp. 27-45.

at levelling are futile and lead to despair (Kirk and Rossiter), for they violate the natural hierarchy and frustrate man's longing for leadership. The superior classes must be allowed to differentiate themselves and to have a hand in the direction of the state, balancing the numerical superiority of the inferior classes.

Order, authority, and community are the primary defenses against the impulse to violence and anarchy. The superiority of duties over rights and the need to strengthen the stabilizing institutions of society especially the church, the family, and, above all, private property.⁵⁵

The resistance to change is clearly a part of the conservative value system, but another theme emerges--the reliance upon authority, order, and law over individual reasoning. This dependence upon authority may well be another important variable associated with individual acceptance or resistance to change.

The McClosky study also investigates the relationships among variables such as intelligence, social-psychological attributes, and clinical-personality variables and conservatism. The conservative is less educated, less socially aware and less intellectually oriented than the liberal. The conservative tends to be submissive, anomic, alienated, pessimistic, less socially responsible, less self confident, and more guilty. The findings concerning the clinical-personality variables and conservatism are summarized as follows:

. . . the extreme conservatives are easily the most hostile and suspicious, the most rigid and compulsive, the quickest to condemn others for imperfections or weaknesses, the most intolerant, the most easily moved

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 35.

to scorn and disappointment in others, the most inflexible and unyielding in their perceptions and judgements of others.⁵⁶

McClosky's study contains many variables which might prove useful in this study; certain ones appear to relate to the previous discussion of socialization experiences and personality. Earlier we noted that trust is affected by early authority experiences while efficacy is affected by experiences with authority outside of the immediate family. Several attributes in the McClosky study (e.g., alienation, pessimism, and "scorn and disappointment in others") represent characteristics which reasonably might be associated with trust, while others (particularly self confidence) might be expected to be associated with personal efficacy. It may well be the variables of trust and efficacy are not only related to socialization experiences but are also directly related to liberalism-conservatism and in turn may relate to the orientation toward change. Other variables in the McClosky study invite further investigation.

Such personality variables as hostility, rigidity and intolerance suggest an underlying attribute such as authoritarianism or dogmatism may distinguish liberals from conservatives. Since Rokeach's variable of dogmatism is developed from attempts to find a single dimension underlying both authoritarianism and intolerance, it appears useful to investigate this variable in relation to the acceptance or resistance to change.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 41.

Rokeach argues that the basic characteristic of a person's "belief system" affecting the extent of dogmatism is

. . . the extent to which the person can receive, evaluate, and act on relevant information received from the outside on its own intrinsic merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors in the situation⁵⁷ arising from within the person or from the outside.

According to Rokeach messages contain two kinds of information:

(1) information about the subject matter and (2) information about the source of the message. He continues, " . . . we see that there are two aspects to the communication, and in different people the dual aspects will be differentiated or fused together according to the degree to which their systems are open or closed."⁵⁸ The less dogmatic person (open belief system) receives, evaluates and acts on the basis of the content of the events and messages in a situation because he is able to distinguish between the content and the source of the message. To the contrary, the more dogmatic person (closed belief system) is unable to make such a distinction and is, therefore, guided in his interpretations by a fusion between subject matter and the source of the subject matter. Simply stated, dogmatic individuals are likely to react to the authority rather than to what the authority says. Rokeach (1960) makes explicit the importance of dogmatism for the present study when he states,

Reliance on authority, yielding, conformance, and resistance to acculturation all may have a common cognitive basis, namely, the ability (or inability) to

⁵⁷ M. Rokeach, op. cit., 1960, p. 57.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 60.

discriminate substantive information from information about the source, and to assess the two separately.⁵⁹

Aside from suggesting the theoretical importance of dogmatism for our present analysis the above quote also includes a theme appearing in several studies in this review--the reliance upon authority. This suggests that a person's dependence upon authority may be a critical personality attribute in the analysis of the orientation toward change. The following chapter presents a theoretical schema which includes this theme of reliance upon authority as a central dimension tying together the impacts of socialization and personality upon the acceptance or resistance to change. Before turning to this part of the presentation I will summarize the variables derived from this literature review.

Summary

At the outset of the literature review we defined socialization broadly as experiences affecting the development of individual personality. We discussed the concept of orientation as a predisposition to particular behaviors inferred when objects or situations activate people to behave in similar ways in different situations and at different times in their lives. We then examined theoretical approaches to the general problem of personality development and change. The major impact of psychoanalytic theory has been to focus attention upon the effects of early childhood experiences upon later adult behaviors. Such assumptions have led to many studies emphasizing the early formation and relative stability of orientations and personality. An

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 60.

alternative approach, cognitive theory, has directed attention to the preconditions of personality change. In this view personality is adaptive to later life experiences. We attempted to identify several conditions associated with such changes. One group of studies suggests inconsistencies between early experiences in the family and later experiences outside of the immediate family are likely to produce adjustment in personality. Another series of efforts were introduced to point out the importance of crisis or personal trauma as preconditions of change. We can summarize these studies with the general hypothesis that the greater the extent to inconsistency and discontinuity (more crisis events) in socialization the greater the likelihood of personality change. I further hypothesize that people who have experienced changes in their own personality are more likely to accept changes in the external world. Still other studies found age and level of formal education to be related to individual acceptance of change. In this study, we have an attempt to identify the effects of primary socialization, secondary socialization, and personality attributes upon the orientation toward change.

The review of the effects of primary socialization upon orientation of trust (political and general) results from early authority relationships characterized by more extensive communication between the child and his authorities. The review of studies concerning the effects to secondary socialization (experiences outside of the immediate family) found personal efficacy to be a result of communication with authorities and participation in decisions affecting the individual. Finally we discussed the literature on personality attributes related to particular orientations.

Since liberal and conservative political orientations have been found to be associated with the acceptance or resistance to change, much of the material reviewed dealt with correlates of conservative and liberal attitudes and personalities. The orientations of trust and efficacy were expected to be related to more liberal political views. Further, the studies suggest the variables of dogmatism and reliance upon authority are central to our analysis of the orientation toward change.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL CONCERNS IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE ORIENTATION TOWARD CHANGE

Personality, Socialization and the Orientation Toward Change

I have conceptualized the orientation toward change as a relatively enduring organization of beliefs predisposing the person to accept or resist change. This orientation is a general personality attribute affecting individual response across situations (e.g., social, political, economic, public, private, etc.) and through time in similar situations. I view the orientation toward change, as any orientation, to be a part of an interrelated set of predispositions composing the individual's personality. The set of orientations acts to predispose behavior of people as they confront new and changing conditions. With this conceptualization it is possible to view the orientation toward change as it is affected by personality attributes and socialization experiences acting upon the entire personality. This simple schema permits the classification of variables identified in the literature as relevant to the present study. The purpose here is to clarify the schema as a way of organizing and relating major variables, and to propose several hypotheses to guide the data analysis.

We can begin by organizing variables as either personality attributes or socialization experiences. We have identified the

following variables in the literature as socialization experiences:

(1) extent of communication with authorities in the early childhood-family situation; (2) extent of communication with authorities in relationships established at the present time in the person's life; (3) the extent of consistency (i.e., similarity) between the experiences in the early family and experiences in the broader community of adult interaction; (4) extent of continuity (i.e., traumatic or crisis events) in the socialization process; (5) age; and (6) extent of formal education.

The balance of variables critical to the present investigation can be grouped as personality attributes. These variables appear to result from socialization and to predispose the individual to particular responses in varying situations. The personality attributes include both structural and substantive properties. Rokeach's work on dogmatism is a specific attempt to understand the structure rather than the content of personality. He describes his effort in the following way: "The discrepancy we may note between what is said and the way it is said is a discrepancy between content and structure. Our theoretical task, then, is to formulate the formal and structural properties of belief systems apart from specific content, and in such a way that they can be measured."¹

Reliance upon authority is a second attribute which I believe to be a part of personality structure. As dogmatism describes a person's ability to differentiate source and message and act on either a fusion or separation of the two, reliance upon authority describes the extent to which the individual accepts opinions of others. For theoretical

¹M. Rokeach, op. cit., 1960, p. 15.

purposes I am using reliance upon authority in a very broad sense. Authority can be represented by people, established ways of doing things, law, social norms and expectations or any one of a variety of sources external to the situation and providing cues about appropriate behaviors for particular situations. Given this broad definition it is apparent that all people more or less rely upon authority in any situation. This is the attribute I want to investigate--the extent to which individuals rely upon external cues in determining their behavior rather than issues and activities in the situation itself. For the purposes of this study I have operationalized reliance upon authority in much narrower terms. It is defined as the extent to which an individual agrees with the opinions of his authorities (people influential in his life) in the secondary environment. That is, I want to investigate the extent to which people agree with the opinions of their own authorities on a wide variety of issues and matters of mutual concern. Those subjects who agree more are considered more dependent upon authority.

With this description of dogmatism and reliance upon authority clarifying the structural attributes of personality, we can further examine the attributes of personality content in relation to the orientation toward change. Several studies suggest what people believe about particular social objects and situations may influence their beliefs about change. The orientation toward change appears to be a major criterion distinguishing liberal from conservative views of politics.² Liberals are more likely to accept change in social and

²Adorno, et. al., op. cit., 1950; Eysenck, op. cit., 1954; Huntington, op. cit., 1961; and McClosky, op. cit., 1958.

political life. If liberalism is related to the acceptance of change then we might expect to find other correlates of liberalism to affect the orientation toward change. For instance, McClosky finds the conservative to be more alienated, less self confident, and more likely to scorn others in their interpersonal relations. This suggests the variables of personal efficacy and trust may be important correlates of acceptance of change.³ These three variables are part of the personality content which is to be investigated in the present study.

With the forgoing clarification we can now attempt to bring together these theoretical notions and specify specific hypotheses reflecting both the theory and the findings in the literature.

Theoretical Sketch

Before attempting to state hypotheses it may be useful to present an intuitive theoretical sketch of how these variables interrelate. Perhaps this sketch can make more realistic the skeletal framework uncovered to this point.

The first socialization variable, extent of communication with authorities in the early family situation, draws attention to the possibility a person may have either open, communicative, interpersonal relations with early authorities or a closed, non-communicative relationship. Both types of early experiences surely have profound effects upon the child. If early experiences are such that the child finds authorities to be accessible and communicative he learns to respond to

³McClosky, op. cit., 1958.

authority with more information and understanding of both the authority as a person and of what the authority says. Such interpersonal contact generates less reliance upon the authority, qua authority, and more dependence upon what the authority, as a knowable and therefore more real person, communicates about himself and the world. The growing dependence upon what is communicated rather than upon who communicates contributes to the child's ability to distinguish between authority and what the authority says (this ability to distinguish message from source of message is the essential characteristic of the less dogmatic person). These more open and communicative experiences may lead to early formed orientation to trust others generally since those closest to the child have proven trustworthy.

On the other hand, if the early authority experiences involve but little interaction or communication we can reasonably expect the child to learn different ways of relating to authority. Without communicative, interpersonal relations the child responds to an object which he knows little about but upon which he depends greatly. He is taught to respond to arbitrary dictates of authority by blind obedience rather than by persuasion and information. His identification with and dependence upon the authorities, in a vacuum of communicated understanding, leads to a growing dependence upon authority generally and an inability to differentiate between the authority as an object (rather than an understandable person) and what the authority communicates. In other words, since the child does not have information or understanding of the authorities, he can respond to authority only with obedience or disobedience. Without communication, the child can not learn to respond

to authority as a source of information about people and events in his world. Such arbitrary and unpredictable experiences may engender distrust toward other people generally.

As the child moves beyond the immediate family experience into relationships with other authorities (the second socialization variable-- extent of communication with authorities at the present time in the subject's life) he may find his early experiences, either communicative or non-communicative, reinforced. On the other hand, he may find his early experiences are quite different from those of later relationships. In the latter case we expect an adjustment in personality to conform to the requirements arising from the new experiences. Logically this transition from early to later experiences with authority can develop in any one of four possible patterns: (1) both early and later experiences with authority are communicative and open; (2) both early and later experiences with authority are non-communicative and closed; (3) early experiences are communicative but later experiences are non-communicative; and finally (4) early experiences are non-communicative but later experiences are open and communicative. Each of these four possible patterns of socialization can be expected to produce different personality attributes and different orientations toward change.

At this point we can introduce the third major variable--extent of consistency between early and later experiences. The greater the inconsistency or dissimilarity between early and later experiences the more likely a person will be to make adjustments in his personality. In the first two patterns, with greater consistency between early and later experiences (either both communicative or both non-communicative),

we expect little change in personality. That is, the early formed personality is reinforced and supplemented but not changed. In the first socialization pattern (both early and later experiences with authority are communicative) we expect personality to be less dependent upon authority as an object, to be able to differentiate between the authority and what the authority communicates, and to trust other people. Further we can expect these later communicative relations with authority to give the individual a growing sense of personal efficacy in his interactions outside the immediate family. Our hypothetical individual, with consistently communicative authority relations, is less reliant upon authority, trusting of other people, able to differentiate the authority from what the authority says (i.e., less dogmatic) and likely to have a stronger sense of personal efficacy. We can further speculate that such a person would be likely to have liberal political views because authority (e.g., strong central government) is not a thing to be feared. And because the person is less reliant upon the authority of custom, law and usual ways of doing things, he is more able to accept change in varying situations.

Now let us construct the second hypothetical socialization pattern where early and later experiences with authority are consistently non-communicative or closed. In the case of consistent, non-communicative relations we expect orientations which are formed early to remain relatively constant. But we expect a different set of attributes to develop. If the child grows up in non-communicative relations he is more likely to be dependent upon authority as an object rather than a source of information and understanding, less able to differentiate the

authority from what the authority communicates (i.e., more dogmatic), and, because of early arbitrary experiences with people, less trusting of others generally. The lack of communication in later experiences may also produce a sense that he can not control or affect his new environment of interaction any better than he could in the early family situation. This leads to a lesser sense of personal efficacy. The person with consistently closed (non-communicative) experiences is more reliant upon authority as an object, more likely to fuse authority with messages from the authority (more dogmatic), less trusting of other people, and less personally efficacious. This person may well adopt more conservative political attitudes since he has reason to fear strong and potentially arbitrary authority (e.g., strong central government). And, because he relies upon the authority of tradition, law and usual patterns of behavior, he is less able to accept change in various life situations. There are two further socialization patterns (3 and 4) which involve greater inconsistency or dissimilarity between early and later authority relationships.

The individual may move from open, communicative relations in the family to closed and non-communicative relations in later life, or to the contrary, from non-communicative relations in early life to open, communicative ones in later life. In both cases the inconsistency in socialization may produce adjustments and change in personality. We hypothesize that individuals making such adjustments in their own personality are more likely to accept change in the external world as well. If we expect changes we must specify what change seems likely. In both cases the changes in orientations are

likely to be contrary to the ones formed early in life. We can discuss this more easily by continuing to develop personality profiles resulting from particular socialization patterns. First, the socialization pattern involving non-communicative early experiences and communicative adolescent and young adult relations.

As in the second socialization pattern we expect the early, non-communicative relations to produce more reliance upon authority, less ability to differentiate source and message (more dogmatic) and less trust in other people. But because of the adjustments required by the transition from the closed family situation to open and communicative authority relations later in life we expect an attenuation of early effects. The individual becomes less reliant upon authority, less dogmatic, more trusting of others, and in addition, develops a sense of efficacy from his communicative experiences in later life. We seem to have constructed an adjusted hypothetical personality very similar to the one developing from the first socialization pattern, and we therefore, expect results similar to the ones found in the first process although they may be less pronounced than the attributes produced in consistently open relations. This person is also expected to be more liberal about politics and more likely to accept change for the reasons discussed previously. Again, these orientations may be less intense because of the adjustments made in the personality.

Finally, we consider the fourth socialization pattern--early authority relations are communicative but later experiences are closed and non-communicative. The early communicative experiences are expected

to produce less reliance upon authority, less dogmatism, and more trust of people. In this case the adjustments required by the transition to a closed environment of young adult relations with authority diminish the effects of early experiences and lead to the following changes in personality. The individual becomes more reliant upon authority, more dogmatic, and less trusting. He develops less of a sense of personal efficacy because of unsuccessful communication and participation in later life situations. The emerging profile is similar to the one produced by the second process. And again we expect a similar set of attributes to ones produced by the second process but they should be less intense because of the transition. This person is expected to be conservative and less accepting of change, and again, for reasons similar to ones argued in the discussion of the second socialization process.

We have developed a theoretical sketch of personality attributes emerging from four different types of socialization patterns. In this effort we have specified relationships among the major variables with the exception of age, extent of education, and extent of personally felt crisis (degree of continuity). We are led to expect discontinuity to contribute to a more accepting orientation toward change since discontinuity should relate to personality change which in turn is expected to relate to acceptance of change in the external world. Age is important in that it is usually not until late adolescence that the individual has experiences beyond those of the immediate family and can, at least potentially, experience inconsistency in socialization. The last variable, education, may serve to extend the

effects of inconsistency between early and later life experiences, and to facilitate individual abilities to communicate with authority generally.

This completes the theoretical sketch to be used in the present study. The sketch has been developed to organize and relate both the variables and findings identified in the literature review. It would be unrealistic indeed to expect such a theoretical view to describe accurately the complex reality of personality development and change. It is an attempt to capture the process of human development by constructing a more dynamic model relating socialization and personality. It would be even more unrealistic to expect the present study to produce data supporting all the details considered here. A more practical use of the schema is to organize the analysis and to generate hypotheses. The testing of these hypotheses may in turn produce a reformulated framework closer to reality and further from this speculation.

Statement of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: ✓ The greater the degree of dogmatism the greater the degree of resistance to change.

The second structural attribute, reliance upon authority, is also expected to relate to the acceptance of change. In this case a person who is more dependent upon authority generally (e.g., custom, usual ways of doing things, influential others, etc.) might be expected to be less likely to accept changing situations which require departures from normal or usual patterns of thought and action. A second hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 2: The greater the reliance upon authority the greater the resistance to change.

We can now develop some expectations concerning the content variables (i.e., trust, efficacy, and liberalism) in relation to the orientation toward change. The variables of trust, efficacy and liberalism appear to be related as evidenced by McClosky's study (1958) of conservatism. Basic elements of the conservative ideology are the resistance to change, dependence upon authority, and rigidity. All of this suggests a set of orientations likely to be associated with the orientation toward change in the following manner:

Hypothesis 3: / Greater personal efficacy, more trust of other people, and liberal political views are more likely to be associated with the acceptance of change.

If dogmatism and reliance upon authority relate to the orientation toward change, and trust, efficacy, and liberalism related to the same orientation then these variables should relate to each other. To test this speculation we might generally hypothesize:

Hypothesis 4: High dogmatism, dependence upon authority, low trust, less efficacy and low liberalism relate positively to resistance to change.

We can now move on to the second question concerning the effects of socialization experiences upon the orientation toward change. Five attributes of the socialization which we think are related to the acceptance of change have been identified: (1) extent of communication with authorities in the primary environment; (2) extent of communication with authorities in the secondary environment; (3) the degree of

consistency between the communication patterns in the primary and secondary environments; (4) the extent of discontinuity in socialization experiences and (5) level of formal education achieved.

The review of literature can be interpreted as demonstrating two alternative hypotheses concerning the relationship of socialization and personality. The first hypothesis, from psychoanalytic assumptions, posits that the type of individual experiences (e.g., disciplinary or permissive, communicative or non-communicative, etc.) determines orientations composing personality. This places primary emphasis upon experiences occurring early in childhood. A second view of the relationship between socialization and personality places more emphasis upon experiences in later life (outside the immediate family) and argues that personality is affected by the joint operation of early and later life experiences. That is, the greater the dissimilarity between experiences in early and later life the more likely the effects of early family influences will be altered or changed.

The present theoretical schema can be used to partially test these rather broad hypotheses in the context of the analysis of acceptance of change. With this intent I have constructed the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 5: If the type of socialization experience has more influence upon personality than the variation in early and later experiences then we should find the greater differences in the orientations toward change occurring between consistently open and consistently closed socialization patterns.

Hypothesis 6: If instead, dissimilarity between early and later experiences has more effect upon personality than type of experience then we expect to find the greater differences in the orientations toward change occurring between the consistent (i.e., both environmental open or closed) and the inconsistent (one environment open and the other closed) socialization patterns.

There is some literature suggesting communicative experiences with authorities in the family and later associations are important determinates of the trust of other people and sense of efficacy, respectively. Two hypotheses seem appropriate.

Hypothesis 7: A more open primary environment should relate to more trust of other people.

Hypothesis 8: A more open secondary environment should relate to a higher sense of personal efficacy.

Since efficacy and trust are expected to be correlates of the acceptance of change we can further hypothesize:

Hypothesis 9: Groups from more open primary and secondary environments should be more accepting of change than those from more closed primary and secondary environments.

Still other studies suggest crisis events and formal education relate to personality change and the acceptance of changing social values, respectively. We can investigate the following hypotheses in the present analysis.

Hypothesis 10: ✓ The greater the degree of discontinuity the greater the degree of acceptance of change.

Hypothesis 11: The more education (years of high school and college) the greater the acceptance of change.

We have tried to consider in the foregoing hypotheses how some of the personality attributes and socialization experiences might affect the orientation toward change. The third question concerns how socialization patterns, personality attributes and the orientation toward change may interrelate. For this purpose I have tried to formalize the above theoretical sketch in a table (Table 1) specifying interrelationships among the major variables.

This completes the presentation of hypotheses to be used in guiding and organizing the analysis, and we can now appropriately discuss the study design for the investigation.

TABLE 1.--Socialization patterns and related Personality attributes

Primary Socialization Environment Open		Primary Socialization Environment Closed	
Secondary Soc. Envir. Open (Consistency)	Secondary Soc. Envir. Closed (Inconsistency)	Secondary Soc. Envir. Open (Inconsistency)	Secondary Soc. Envir. Closed (Consistency)
1. Low dogmatism	1. Moderately high dogmatism	1. Moderately low dogmatism	1. High dogmatism
2. Independence of authority	2. Moderate depend- ence on authority	2. Moderate independ- ence of authority	2. Dependent on authority
3. High trust	3. Moderate low trust	3. Moderate high trust	3. Low trust
4. High personal efficacy	4. Moderate low personal efficacy	4. Moderate high personal efficacy	4. Low personal efficacy
5. High liberalism	5. Moderate low liberalism	5. Moderate high liberalism	5. Low liberalism
6. Accept change	6. Moderate resist- ance to change	6. Moderate accept- ance of change	6. Resist change

CHAPTER III

STUDY DESIGN

Subjects

This research was carried out with the cooperation of young adults who participated in a three-week political training program held during the summers over a four-year period. Each of the four programs involved some one hundred high school graduates from the state of Michigan. The students were selected by their teachers to attend these training sessions on the operation of state and local governments. The explicit purpose of the program was to recruit and encourage capable young people to become active in political affairs. To be selected the students had to demonstrate their potential for such involvement by their interests and activities in high school. These young people, judging from my experiences as an advisor to each of the sessions, are politically active, articulate, and intensely aware of their world and its problems.

There were several reasons, aside from their accessibility and awareness, for using these groups as subjects for research. The theoretical view adopted in the present study suggests the period of late adolescence, when the person emerges from the immediate family, to be a crucial time of personality adjustment--a time for the individual to entertain new ideas, experience new relationships, and

change old and long held beliefs. Further, the research in socialization and political attitudes to date has involved for the most part either the very young or older adults. The present study provides some insight into an important and as yet inadequately examined link in the development of political orientations.

I directly administered questionnaires to the subjects in the most recent program and mailed questionnaires to those previously involved. The returns were unusually high for such voluntary research groups. Over 70% of the directly administered interviews and nearly 65% of the mailed questionnaires are included in the analysis. As a result the study is based upon the completed interviews from 241 respondents. Additionally, I gave a post-test questionnaire to the most recent program participants to measure the stability of instrumentation. All of the Likert type items were post-tested as an analysis of test-retest reliability. The period between tests was approximately three weeks. Before continuing, it may be useful for the reader to be aware of some population characteristics in order to make explicit any biases entrenched in the study.

The subjects were 49% males and 51% females. They ranged in ages from seventeen to twenty-one years. The distribution by age was: 13% seventeen years; 25% eighteen years; 27% nineteen years; 24% twenty years; and 11% twenty-one years. These young people are, for the most part, from small towns (82% are from towns under 10,000); of the protestant faith (26% are Catholics and 6% list no religion); from large universities (about a fourth of those in college are from schools of less than 10,000 students); and from affluent families (more than

half have family incomes in excess of \$7,500). Almost a third of the total group had not entered college at the time of the study. The balance is divided in the following way on the variable of years of college: 26% had one year of college; 24% two years; and 17% three years.

Though not a cross-section of college students this group of young people seems a suitable source of data on the research problem. But since no sampling procedures have been followed the conclusions are necessarily limited to the present group.

Instrumentation

The questionnaire for this research is composed primarily of structured instruments supplemented by open ended items. A ten page questionnaire has been developed and pretested upon twenty-five undergraduates in an introductory political science course. The final form described here is a result of that pretesting.

Each of the personality variables and the dependent variable (orientation toward change) are measured by Likert type agree-disagree opinion items. These items are presented randomly in the questionnaire and are preceded by the following statement.

THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS ABOUT A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT SOCIAL AND PERSONAL QUESTIONS. THE BEST ANSWER TO EACH STATEMENT BELOW IS YOUR PERSONAL OPINION. WE HAVE TRIED TO COVER MANY DIFFERENT AND OPPOSING POINTS OF VIEW. YOU MAY FIND YOURSELF AGREEING STRONGLY WITH SOME OF THE STATEMENTS, DISAGREEING JUST AS STRONGLY WITH OTHERS, AND PERHAPS UNCERTAIN ABOUT OTHERS. WHETHER YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH ANY STATEMENT, YOU CAN BE SURE THAT MANY PEOPLE FEEL THE SAME AS YOU DO.

MARK EACH STATEMENT IN THE LEFT MARGIN ACCORDING TO HOW MUCH YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH IT. PLEASE MARK EVERY ONE. MARK 1, 2, 3 OR 4, 5, 6 DEPENDING ON HOW YOU FEEL IN EACH CASE.

- | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. I DISAGREE VERY STRONGLY | 4. I AGREE A LITTLE |
| 2. I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE | 5. I AGREE ON THE WHOLE |
| 3. I DISAGREE A LITTLE | 6. I AGREE VERY MUCH |

Beginning with the items to measure the orientation toward change, we can discuss each set of opinion statements designed to indicate the personality attributes.

Orientation Toward Change

The orientation toward change, as conceptualized in this study, is a general predisposition to accept or resist change across a wide range of public and private situations. I have tried to construct items which direct the respondent's attention to a variety of situations in which change may take place. Disagreement with these items indicates a readiness to accept change while agreement indicates a resistance to change. The questionnaire contains the following eleven items.

1. Legislative apportionment is a complex matter, and the changes that have been made are probably going to make things worse.
2. It is never wise to introduce changes rapidly in social policy, government, economics or in most things for that matter.
3. I don't think we should try to politically change the racial situation in this country any more than we already have.
4. More often than not when you change things they get worse rather than better.
5. I think there are many things in society that just should not be changed.
6. I feel that one of the most important aims in life is to settle down in a community.
7. It is better to stick with the way things are usually done than to try new ways.
8. Generally politics are so complex that if you attempt to change some things you are likely to upset the entire system.

9. The best job for me would be one which allows me to stay in the area where my parents, sisters and brother, etc. live.
10. Considering everything there are usually more advantages gained by staying in the same job than by moving around.
11. I don't think we need to change our foreign policy toward Viet Nam in any way.

One of the groups used in the study was available at the time I carried out the research, and I was able to retest all of the opinion items on the same individuals after a lapse of three weeks which should have reduced recall effects. The eleven items in this set obtain a test-retest reliability coefficient of .75 indicating substantial response stability over time. The same set of items has been tested as to the degree of internal consistency (equivalence rather than stability) in a single test situation.¹ The Kuder-Richardson reliability coefficient (formula 20) for the eleven items is .482. Since this moderate level of internal consistency seemed insufficient to argue a psychologically interpretable orientation, a Likert item analysis (item score correlated with test score) has been performed, and seven items have been eliminated as not meeting the desired significance level. The remaining four items (2, 6, 10, 11) appear to adequately reflect the general predisposition toward change under a variety of conditions, and result in an equivalence coefficient of .61. Scores from these four items are used as measures of acceptance or resistance toward change.

¹L. J. Cronbach, "Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Structure of Tests," Psychometrika, 16, No. 3 (Sept., 1951), pp. 297-334; A. R. Baggaley, Intermediate Correlational Methods (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).

Some contrasts between coefficients of equivalence and stability as indicants of reliability are discussed in the last portion of this chapter.

Dogmatism

I have measured the first structural attribute of personality (i.e., the way people believe rather than what they believe) with an abbreviated form of Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale (1960). The essential characteristic of the dogmatic person is the inability to differentiate message and source. The less dogmatic person is able to separate source and message and in turn able to act on the content of the messages in the environment relatively free of his evaluation of the source of the message. Troidahl and Powell (1965) have designed a shorter form of the Rokeach scale appropriate for field studies. They have ranked the twenty items with highest degree of correlation with test score; these twenty items adequately reflect the theoretical dimensions of the original dogmatism scale.

1. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.
2. I believe that most people just don't know what's good for them.
3. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.
4. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.
5. I feel that of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.
6. I think there are two kinds of people in this world; those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

7. I believe that man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.
8. I think that even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.
9. I believe that while I don't like to admit this even to myself my secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.
10. I believe that the main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.
11. I feel that it is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.
12. I think that the United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.
13. I feel that most people just don't give a "damnn" for others.
14. I feel that it is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.
15. I believe that most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.
16. I believe that in this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.
17. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.
18. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.
19. I believe that to compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.
20. I think that the highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are the most intelligent.

The Dogmatism Scale is presented in the literature with reliability coefficients in excess of .75.² In the present analysis the items produce a stability coefficient of .65 and a coefficient of equivalence of .56. Part of the reason for the lower internal consistency resulting from the present analysis may be the type of reliability measure. I have used the Kuder-Richardson coefficient which is the mean of all possible split halves tests. Rokeach's reliability coefficients are derived from split halves tests. The items are believed to have sufficient stability and equivalence for the purposes of the study, and higher scores from these items indicate a higher degree of dogmatism.

Reliance Upon Authority

Reliance upon authority has been conceptualized as the extent to which an individual accepts or relies upon authorities external to a situation in determining his own opinions. It seems reasonable to assume that people who agree more often with authorities about a wide variety of issues and situations are more reliant, generally, upon external authority in the determination of their opinions. The respondents were requested to list the people most influential in their lives at the present time, and then to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with these individuals about the following subjects: (1) religion, (2) politics, (3) social problems, (4) choosing a spouse, (5) raising children, (6) choosing a job, (7) social groups to belong to, (8) foreign affairs, (9) way of living, and (10) organizations to belong to. To standardize the scoring

²M. Rokeach, *op. cit.*, 1960, pp. 71-97; U. C. Troidahl and F. A. Powell, "A Short-Form Dogmatism Scale for Use in Field Studies," Social Forces, 44 (December, 1965), pp. 221-214.

of the instrument I have divided the number of disagreements by the number of authorities listed, and this standardized score is used to classify the individual as more or less reliant upon authority. Those subjects with higher scores are classified as being less reliant upon authority.

The instruments measuring the content attributes (what the person believes rather than how he believes) of personality can now be considered. The content attributes are efficacy, trust, and liberalism.

Personal Efficacy

I have measured this attribute with the personal efficacy scale developed in the Campbell, et. al., voting study.³ The scale is a four item Guttman scale. As the items indicate, the scale attempts to measure the extent to which the individual feels he has control over his personal environment.

1. I seem to be the kind of person who has more bad luck than good luck.
2. I have often had the feeling that it is no use to try to get anywhere in this life.
3. I would rather decide things when they come up rather than always plan ahead.
4. There's not much use for me to plan ahead because there's usually something that makes me change my plans.

In the present study these items resulted in a stability coefficient of .61 and an equivalence coefficient of .42. The item

³A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller and D. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964).

with lowest correlation with test score has been eliminated, and the three remaining items (1, 2 and 4) have a coefficient of equivalence of .76. In this scale high scores indicate lower personal efficacy.

Trust

This attribute has been measured by two separate scales. One scale indicates general trust of other people, while the other is designed to measure trust of politics and politicians. I have used Rosenberg's Misanthropy scale to measure the general trust attribute.⁴ It is described as a five item Guttman scale.

1. Human nature is fundamentally cooperative.
2. Most people can be trusted.
3. If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you.
4. Most people are more inclined to help others rather than think of themselves first.
5. No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it.

The present analysis finds the scale to have a coefficient of stability of .58 and an equivalence coefficient of .36. Item analysis resulted in dropping two items not meeting the desired significance level, and the remaining items (2, 3 and 5) have a coefficient of equivalence of .49. This scale has the lowest level of internal consistency of any of the instruments. To further reduce items in

⁴M. Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," American Sociological Review, 21 (1956), pp. 690-695.

order to improve equivalence substantially reduces the possible scale score variance, so I have retained the scale in its present form.

In addition, a measure of political cynicism has been developed using items from two different sources.⁵ The following four items have coefficients of stability of .58 and equivalence of .55.

1. Money is the most important factor influencing public policy.
2. Politicians never tell us what they really think.
3. It seems to me that politicians lack the education and knowledge necessary to make intelligent decisions.
4. To be a really successful politician one has to give up all morality.

Liberalism

The items here have been selected to indicate various liberal and conservative views, and have been taken from several sources (Eysenck, 1954; Adorno, et. al., 1950; Rokeach, 1960; and McClosky, 1958). They cover a wide variety of beliefs about political issues, relationship of individuals and government, human nature, etc. Disagreement with odd numbered items and agreement with even numbered items indicates less liberalism.

1. Present laws favor the rich as against the poor.
2. It is right and proper that religious education in schools should be compulsory.
3. I believe that the death penalty is barbaric, and should be abolished.

⁵F. A. Pinner, op. cit., 1965; Agger, Goldstein and Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," The Journal of Politics, XXIII (August), pp. 477-506.

4. I believe that war is inherent in human nature.
5. I think that the civil rights organizations should become stronger, have more influence generally.
6. I doubt very much that government supported medical aid programs will solve this country's health problems.
7. I believe that our containment of communism foreign policy is outmoded by present day conditions.
8. I feel that men like Henry Ford or J. P. Morgan, who overcame all competition on the road to success, are models for all young people to admire and imitate.
9. I feel that the President has the right to tell big business to reduce their prices in order to prevent economic problems.
10. America may not be perfect, but the American Way has brought us about as close as human beings can get to a perfect society.

These ten items have a coefficient of stability of .67, but the degree of item equivalence is relatively low. The item analysis eliminated all but three items (3, 4 and 5) which are used in the present analysis. These three items obtain a coefficient of equivalence of .61.

Primary and Secondary Environments

The following instruments are designed to measure the socialization variables. The first two instruments measure the extent of communication with authorities in the primary and secondary environments. The open socialization environment is conceptualized as involving more communication with authorities while the more closed environment involves less communication. It is necessary to identify the subject's authorities and measure the extent of communication with those authorities. To measure the number of authorities the subjects were requested to list "the most influential adults" in their life.

For the primary environment the subjects were to recall those adults influential "at about the time you entered first grade" while for the secondary environment they list people influential at the present time in their life. Then the subjects were asked to think about these relationships and to respond affirmatively or negatively to a list of possible characterizations of those relationships. Even numbered characteristics are indicative of a more communicative relationship while odd numbered items reflect less communicative relations. The instrument appears in the questionnaire in the following form.

THESE QUESTIONS ARE ABOUT YOUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHERS WHEN YOU WERE VERY YOUNG -- AGAIN ABOUT THE TIME YOU ENTERED FIRST GRADE OR AS EARLY AS YOU CAN REMEMBER. AS YOU ANSWER THE QUESTIONS TRY TO RECALL HOW THINGS WERE AT THAT TIME IN YOUR LIFE AND NOT SO MUCH HOW THEY ARE NOW.

1. Who were the most important or influential adults in your life during this period of your life prior to entering the first grade? List as many as you really consider to be important to you at that time in your life. _____
2. Now carefully consider your relationship to each of these adults during this period of your life. For each person listed in the above questions please indicate by writing in the appropriate letter (Y for yes and N for no) which of the following items seem to apply to your relationship to that person. In order not to become confused about which adult you are answering the questions for it may be helpful to copy the adults listed above in the blank spaces provided below.

PERSONS LISTED ABOVE

- _____
1. Difficult to be close to.
 2. Easy for me to talk with.
 3. Generally impatient with me.
 4. An affectionate person.
 5. A person some people might be afraid of.

PERSONS LISTED ABOVE

-
6. Seldom got angry with me even when I gave reason to be
 7. Most conversations were about my discipline.
 8. Usually considerate to me.
 9. Convinced that he (she) knew what was best for me.
 10. Often around so I could talk or do things with him (her).

The instrument for the secondary environment is presented in the following form in the questionnaire. The major difference between this and the preceding item battery is that the subject is to list the adults important in their life at present, and the ten characterizations of the relationship are changed somewhat. The even numbered items indicating less communication with the authority and odd numbers indicating more communication.

NOW I WOULD LIKE YOU TO READ AND ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW THINGS ARE IN YOUR LIFE AT PRESENT.

1. Who are the most important and influential adults in your life at the present time? _____
2. Carefully consider your relationship with each of these adults at this time in your life. Again, for each person that you have listed above please indicate by writing in the appropriate letter (Y for yes and N for no) which of the following items seem to apply to your relationship with that person. Once again it may be helpful to copy the persons listed above in the spaces provided.

PERSONS LISTED ABOVE

-
1. Pretty hard for some people to get to know.
 2. A person you can talk to even about the most difficult personal problems.
 3. Believes most of the same things as I believe.
 4. Considers my opinion to be important.
 5. The source of most of my ways of thinking about things.
 6. Disagrees with me on many important matters.
 7. Seldom asks my advice on important matters.
 8. A person involved in a variety of things.
 9. A person who knows what is really good for me.
 10. A person to whom I often go for advice, although I don't necessarily follow it.

Each of these ten characterizations is designed to measure the extent of communication with authorities in the two environments. In order to measure the extent of internal consistency a split halves reliability coefficient has been calculated after the items are corrected for direction. The primary environment instrument has a coefficient of .64 and the secondary environment instrument obtains a coefficient of .55. The scoring of these instruments presents some

problems. Since I am only interested in the extent of communication it is necessary to standardize each subject's score on both instruments. In each case I have added the number of negative responses to even numbered items and the affirmative responses to odd numbered items, and then divided by the number of authorities listed. Each resulting score is the average number of communicative responses per authority. High scores indicate a more open socialization environment.

Consistency and Continuity

Consistency refers to the extent of similarity between the kind of communication the subjects have with authority in the primary and secondary environments. To measure the effects of consistency it is necessary to combine primary and secondary environments. I have combined the more open and more closed subjects from each of the environments into the following four experimental groups: (1) subjects with high scores in both environments (i.e., open primary and secondary); (2) subjects with low scores in both environments (i.e., closed primary and secondary environment); (3) subjects with high scores in the primary environment and low scores in the secondary (open primary and closed secondary); and (4) subjects with low scores in the primary and high scores in the secondary environment (i.e., closed primary and open secondary). It is possible to compare these four groups as to the differences in acceptance or resistance to change among subjects from each of the four socialization patterns.

The variable of continuity refers to the extent of individually perceived trauma or crisis in socialization. I have asked the subjects

to "Think about the experiences that you have had from childhood to the present, and list below the ten most important experiences that you have had." Most of the experiences listed by the subjects are such events as eighth grade graduation, first date, driving the family car, vacations, etc. However, other experiences were listed which seem to indicate the type of traumatic or disorientating events I am seeking to measure. These experiences include such events as "being lonely," "getting in several scraps," "parent's divorce," "death in the family," etc. Subjects are classified as experiencing discontinuity if they list one or more of the latter type of experiences. Sixty-nine subjects are classified as experiencing discontinuity in socialization.

The last socialization variable, extent of formal education, is measured in years of college completed by the respondent. More than two thirds of these subjects have completed some college, while about a third had not entered college at the time of the study.

This completes the presentation of instrumentation for the study. Before going on to the data analysis I have included a discussion of one of the problems of determining instrument reliability which has plagued this and most attitudinal research.

Reliability and the Inference of Attitudes

Any research effort based upon measurement rests upon an all-too-often-unverified assumption concerning the accuracy or dependability of the measuring devices. The "reliability coefficient" is a means of demonstrating the degree of confidence the researcher may have in this

assumption. As Cronbach states, "A reliability coefficient demonstrates whether the test designer was correct in expecting a certain collection of items to yield interpretable statements about individual differences."⁶ Cronbach further argues two alternative approaches to the measurement of reliability.

A retest after an interval using the identical tests, indicates how stable scores are and therefore can be called a coefficient of stability. The correlation between two forms given virtually at the same time, is a coefficient of equivalence, showing how nearly two measures of the same general trait agree.⁷

Apparently Cronbach's suggestion finds favor generally among researchers. Baggaley (1964) makes reference to a joint publication of the American Psychological Association, the American Educational Research Association and the National Council of Measurements Used in Education which attempts to standardize terms being used as estimates of reliability. Their publication suggests the following procedures are in common use for this purpose: (1) temporal (i.e., retest); (2) interobserver agreement; (3) internal consistency which in turn can be measured by equivalence, split-halves procedures, or Kuder-Richardson formulas.⁸

Given these different procedures it becomes of critical importance to understand which of the methods are most appropriate for inferring attitudes and what is the relationship among the different

⁶Cronbach, op. cit., p. 297.

⁷Ibid., p. 298.

⁸Baggaley, op. cit., p. 61.

methods. Cronbach argues retest procedures may be the preferred method for estimating instrument reliability, but because it is difficult to recapture subjects for the post test (after a lapse of time necessary to reduce recall effects), it may be more practical to use measures of internal consistency as estimates of reliability.⁹

Baggaley offers another caution about the use of retest procedures in estimating reliability. He notes that if the lapsed time before retest is too long there may be genuine changes in the population interfering with the estimate or reliability. On the other hand if the retest is made too soon (e.g., less than one week) the subject's recall of the previous test may influence reliability. He suggests the period between tests should be specified, and that it should be not less than one week nor more than six months.¹⁰ Even if retest methods are the preferred way of estimating reliability they are still the less practical. Given this practical problem many researchers have adopted the practice of using measures of internal consistency to estimate reliability. They assume a positive relationship between these different procedures. This assumption has been debated, as we will see, but it also appears amenable to empirical testing which is the purpose of this portion of the chapter.

⁹Cronbach, op. cit., p. 298.

¹⁰Baggaley, op. cit., p. 62.

Cronbach cites both Guttman and Guilford in the debate. Guttman argues,

. . . we have the assurance that if the items are approximately scalable, then they necessarily have very substantial test-retest reliability.¹¹

Guilford takes the opposite view that,

There can be very low internal consistency and yet substantial or high retest reliability. It is probably not true, however, that there can be high internal consistency and at the same time low retest reliability, except after very long time intervals.¹²

And Cronbach concludes, "The only proper conclusion is that alpha (his term for the Kuder-Richardson coefficient measuring internal consistency) may be either higher or lower than the coefficient of stability over an interval of time."¹³

The implication of this debate and its assumptions are clearly critical for attitudinal research. On the one hand there are those who claim measures of internal consistency are not only adequate for assuming stability of items over time, but are the best criterion for inferring an attitude. An attitude is a hypothetical construct. It must be inferred from either verbal or overt behaviors. The usual practice is to infer an attitude when individuals respond to items on a questionnaire (or in some other manner) in an internally consistent manner. For example, Guttman argues items must associate closely enough

¹¹Cronbach, op. cit., p. 308.

¹²Ibid., p. 308.

¹³Ibid., p. 309.

to meet the arbitrary criterion of a coefficient of reproducibility of .90 or better. The argument is that if all the items designed to measure a particular attitude are interrelated or internally consistent to this degree then it is acceptable to infer that the attitude being measured actually exists in a given population.

There are problems with this argument from my point-of-view. First--What level of internal consistency is required to infer an underlying attitude, and second, do not most definitions of attitude require stability over time as well as internal consistency? We need to examine both questions.

Cronbach argues "psychological interpretability" can be based upon a less severe criterion than scalability. He says, "In view of the relations detailed above, we find it unnecessary to create homogeneous scales such as Guttman, Loevinger, and others have urged."¹⁴ The argument here is that the researcher does not have to infer the person's score on each item from his score on the total test which seems to be the purpose of attaining unidimensionality. Some lower level of internal consistency may well be psychologically as interpretable as a "Guttman scale." Cronbach further argues that such interpretability may be assumed when the score is obtained from, ". . . a set of items having a substantial alpha and not capable of division into discrete item clusters which themselves have high alpha."¹⁵

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 330.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 330.

If coefficients of equivalence are to be used in the interpretation or inference of attitudes then scalability may be too severe a criterion. Lower degrees of internal consistency may be acceptable for the interpretation of attitudes from questionnaire items. This conclusion may resolve some practical problems in the measurement of attitudes, but it does not confront the more difficult problem as to what criteria are appropriate for the inference of attitude.

To examine this question more closely I return for a moment to the definition of orientation (attitude) as used in this study. "An attitude is a relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an object or situation which predisposes one to act in some preferential manner."¹⁶ The definition does not require the "organization of beliefs around an object or situation" to be internally consistent at any particular level, although it does require some degree of relation to the objects or situations. The definition does require the organization of beliefs to be "relatively enduring." That is, the definition seems to require some level of stability over time (i.e., retest reliability). Evidently both coefficients of stability and equivalence are required for the inference of an attitude. This conclusion focuses our attention on the comparability of these two coefficients. If the two measures produce similar results then either may be used in the interpretation of attitudes underlying behavioral responses. If they are not similar in result, then it may be

¹⁶M. Rokeach, op. cit., 1966, p. 3.

necessary to obtain both measurements of internal consistency and stability before appropriately inferring an attitude.

Because seventy of the respondents in this study were available for retesting, it was possible to obtain retest scores after a period of approximately three weeks. Retest reliability coefficients have been calculated for the scales measuring the orientation toward change, liberalism, dogmatism, personal efficacy, political cynicism, and misanthropy (general trust of other people). In order to shed some light on the problem of the comparability of coefficients of stability and equivalence, I have further calculated both Kuder-Richardson and split-halves reliability coefficients for the same scales. It is useful to recall that two of these instruments are presented in the literature as Guttman scales (i.e., personal efficacy and misanthropy). The following table compares these coefficients.

TABLE 2.--Comparison of coefficients of stability and equivalence

	Test- Retest	Kuder- Richardson	Split Halves
1. Orientation toward Change	.75	.48	.03
2. Liberalism	.67	.30	-.22
3. Dogmatism	.65	.56	.66
4. Personal Efficacy (Guttman scale)	.61	.42	.49
5. Political Cynicism	.58	.55	.58
6. Misanthropy (Guttman scale)	.58	.36	-.58

The measurements of internal consistency are those calculated before item analysis improved the levels of internal consistency for the scales being used in the present analysis. These data are meant to compare different reliability estimates, and not to argue the reliability of instruments used in the analysis.

The table reveals some disconcerting relationships among the different coefficients. The comparison of coefficients cast real doubt on the use of measurements of internal consistency to approximate retest reliability. I have computed Spearman rank order correlations among the three modes of reliability estimation. I first ranked the sets of items from highest to lowest reliability for each of the three methods, and then correlated these rankings. The two measures of internal consistency (i.e., Kuder-Richardson and Split-Halves) correlate at the .60 level. However, when the two measures of internal consistency are compared with the retest coefficient the results are clearly inconsistent with the assumption that one type of reliability estimate can approximate the other. The correlation between Kuder-Richardson and retest coefficients is .03, and the correlation between split-halves and retest coefficients is -.60. Both of these latter correlations are difficult to accept, and the negative correlation between split-halves procedures and retest is incredible. Such findings demand replications with other data. If these findings survive replications, then a great deal of attitudinal research based upon split-halves reliability estimates is drawn into serious question.

The explanation of this serious discrepancy between measurements of internal consistency and retest reliability may lie in the type of variance each test is designed to measure. Measurements of internal

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consistency are designed to reflect the degree to which each item varies from each other item or from the score for the total items (i.e., inter-item variance). The retest reliability is based on the variance in total score from one situation to another (i.e., inter-score variance). As Cronbach has suggested these are different measurements and not mathematical approximations of one another, although they may be empirically associated. As we have seen here they are neither mathematical or empirical approximations of one another. The question becomes which of the types of reliability estimates are most appropriate for the inference of attitudes. I have argued earlier the definition of attitude being used here places more emphasis upon stability over time than upon equivalence within a particular situation. That is, we need to measure inter-score variance more importantly than inter-item variance. The organization of beliefs which make up the attitude or orientation in a particular situation may be relatively loose (i.e., lower internal consistency), but this is a characterization of the attitude not an indication that the attitude does not exist. If the same relatively loose organization of beliefs is found to exist on different occasions with the same people (retest reliability) then we have evidence that the attitude does exist even in its relatively inconsistent form. The authors of The Authoritarian Personality note the same phenomenon.

The reliability and internal consistency of the PEC scales suggest, on the one hand, that liberalism and conservatism are relatively organized and measureable patterns of current politico-economic thought; and, on the other hand, that within each of these broad patterns there is considerable sub-pattern inconsistency, and simple

ignorance. To ignore either the relative generality or the relative inconsistency would, it seems, lead to serious misunderstanding of the problem.¹⁷

Clearly some level of internal consistency is required to avoid the inference of an attitude when in fact the scale measures several different objects or represents several different attitudes, but I am arguing that too severe a criterion for internal consistency may well rule out the existence of an attitude when in fact it merely reflects the relatively unorganized state of the beliefs composing the attitude. On the basis of these findings it is difficult to argue the existence of an attitude or orientation without both retest and equivalence coefficients. The scales in the present analysis have met both criteria, and therefore, I have considerable confidence in the reliability of these instruments.

We can move to the data presentation with these considerations of study design and instrument reliability complete.

¹⁷T. W. Adorno, et. al., op. cit., p. 176.

CHAPTER IV

PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES AND THE ORIENTATION TOWARD CHANGE

The theoretical framework guiding the organization and presentation of data directs attention to the effects of personality attributes and socialization experiences upon the orientation toward change. In this chapter I first discuss the relationships among the personality variables being used, and second, the impact of these attributes upon the acceptance of change.

Structural and Substantive Orientations

The general problem is the investigation of the existence and extent of relationships among the structural and substantive personality attributes. As a first step, the correlation matrix (product moment correlations) in Table 1 gives some idea of the degree of relationship among the variables.

As Table 3 indicates there are significant relationships between dogmatism and political cynicism, orientation toward change, personal efficacy and trust. Liberalism relates to the variables personal efficacy and trust, and efficacy, in turn, relates to trust.

These correlations only identify linear relationships. To further probe the data, I have used four by four contingency tables.

TABLE 3.--Correlation matrix of personality variables

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
1. Dogmatism	-	.00	+.35*	-.25*	-.33*	-.16*	.06
2. Liberalism	-	-	.02	+.15*	.09	.05	.08
3. Pol. Cynicism	-	-	-	.05	-.26*	-.26*	.04
4. Orientation toward Change	-	-	-	-	.00	.08	.10
5. Personal Eff.	-	-	-	-	-	+.13*	.01
6. Trust	-	-	-	-	-	-	.07
7. Reliance upon Authority	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

*Significant beyond the .05 level

This use of variables in cross-breaks permits the identification of non-linear relationships. Kendall tau correlation coefficients have been computed in order to indicate the extent of association utilizing a non-parametric technique requiring assumptions more closely approximated by the data.

The substantive orientations include trust, sense of efficacy, and the degree of liberalism in one's political views. Table 4 below relates dogmatism with the personality attributes. Dogmatism does not correlate with liberalism.

The strongest evidence is found relating dogmatism with personal efficacy and political cynicism. Individuals who are less dogmatic are likely to be personally efficacious and less likely to be cynical about politics and politicians. The chi-square for the relations of

TABLE 4.--Dogmatism and related personality attributes

	Dogmatism			
	Lo. Dog. (N=43)	Mod. Lo. (N=81)	Mod. Hi. (N=74)	Hi. Dog. (N=43)
Personal Efficacy				
%HI	25.6	21.0	13.5	11.6
%MOD HI	44.2	33.3	32.4	14.0
%MOD LO	27.9	34.6	35.1	44.2
%LO	2.3	11.1	18.9	30.2
Political Cynicism				
%LO	30.2	16.0	9.5	9.3
%MOD LO	44.2	38.3	28.4	18.6
%MOD HI	16.3	30.9	48.6	34.9
%HI	9.3	18.6	34.9	37.2
Trust				
%HI	27.9	18.5	21.6	9.3
%MOD HI	44.2	32.1	32.4	30.2
%MOD LO	23.3	34.6	31.1	44.2
%LO	4.7	14.8	14.9	16.3
Reliance upon Authority				
%DEPENDENT	7.0	8.7	13.5	2.3
%MOD DEP	25.6	18.8	31.1	30.2
%MOD	30.2	26.3	18.9	34.9
%MOD INDEP	14.0	38.8	28.4	20.9
%INDEPENDENT	23.3	7.5	8.1	11.6

dogmatism with personal efficacy is significant beyond the .01 level, and the Kendall's tau for the relationship is .235. Dogmatism and political cynicism have a relationship significant at the .001 level with a tau of .262. Trust and dogmatism do not produce a significant relationship, but the directions evident in the data and the correlation coefficient suggest further analysis. When the extremely high and low dogmatic groups are related with two categories of trust (high and low) rather than four (hi, mod. hi, mod. lo, and lo) we find a relationship

which is significant beyond the .01 level with a tau of .134. Both political trust and trust of others relate positively with low dogmatism.

The cross-classification of dogmatism by reliance upon authority yields a non-linear relationship which explains the lack of correlation in the matrix. Upon first glance the relationship appears linear, and in comparing the more extreme classifications of the two variable I find a relationship significant at the .10 level. However, when the data are grouped with high and low dogmatics in one group and moderately high, moderately low dogmatics in another and then examined in relation to extreme independence against the other four categories of reliance upon authority grouped as dependence, we find individuals with moderate levels of dogmatism (rather than extremely high or low) are more likely to be independent of authority. This relationship is significant at the .05 level.

Table 5 shows the second attribute of personality structure with other related personality variables. Reliance upon authority relates to all other variables except personal efficacy. Dogmatism, it will be recalled, relates to all other variables except liberalism; we now find the second structural attribute relating to all other variables (including liberalism) except personal efficacy.

The relationships in this table yield no significant chi-squares given the four by four classifications, but again, the directions seem important. We do find a relationship between reliance upon authority and liberalism after collapsing categories. I have combined the dependent and moderately dependent subjects into one group and the other three categories into another. The two groups are then related

TABLE 5.--Reliance upon authority by related personality attributes

	Reliance upon Authority				
	Dependent (N=21)	Mod. Dep. (N=62)	Mod. (N=63)	Mod. Indep. (N=67)	Independent (N=27)
Liberalism					
% LO	9.5	9.7	15.9	4.5	18.5
% MOD LO	42.9	53.2	36.5	38.8	29.6
% MOD HI	38.1	24.2	33.3	40.3	40.7
% HI	9.5	12.9	14.3	16.4	11.1
Trust					
% HI	14.3	27.4	40.6	14.9	14.8
% MOD HI	42.9	27.4	36.5	26.9	55.6
% MOD LO	38.6	38.7	28.6	37.3	22.2
% LO	14.3	6.4	14.3	20.9	7.4
Political Cynicism					
% LO	14.3	14.5	19.0	11.9	18.5
% MOD LO	28.6	30.6	34.9	35.8	25.9
% MOD HI	47.6	38.7	33.3	31.3	25.9
% HI	9.5	16.1	12.7	20.9	29.6

to liberalism (low and moderately low in one group and high and moderately high in another) at the .05 level. The direction of the relationship indicates that the more liberal the groups are in their political views the more likely they are to be independent of their authorities.

It is also necessary to collapse classifications to find a relationship between reliance upon authority and the two variables trust and political cynicism. This time reliance upon authority is divided into two groups (dependent, moderately dependent and moderate against moderately independent and independent) and related to trust (low trust against high) and political cynicism (low, moderately low and moderately high against high cynicism). These relationship are

significant at the .05 level for political cynicism and at the .10 level for general trust of other people. In both cases the direction of the relationship suggests that the politically cynical and the least trusting groups are likely to be independent of their authorities.

When we examine the data on personality content variables--trust, liberalism and political cynicism--and related attributes, we find the following.

Trust relates to dogmatism and reliance upon authority, which has been discussed, to personal efficacy and political cynicism discussed here, and to the orientation toward change to be discussed later. Trust does not relate to the extent of liberalism characterizing one's political beliefs.

In Table 6 we find relationships well beyond the .05 level. The directions indicate that subjects characterized by trust of other

TABLE 6.--Trust by related personality attributes

	Trust			
	High (N=47)	Mod. Hi. (N=82)	Mod. Lo. (N=80)	Low (N=32)
Personal Efficacy				
% HI	27.7	12.2	15.0	25.0
% MOD HI	36.2	36.6	30.0	15.6
% MOD LO	23.4	39.0	41.2	28.1
% LO	12.8	12.2	13.8	31.3
Political Cynicism				
% LO	27.7	12.2	11.2	15.6
% MOD LO	40.4	37.8	31.3	12.5
% MOD HI	21.3	34.1	42.5	34.4
% HI	10.6	15.9	15.0	37.5

people are less likely to be cynical about political affairs and personalities. General trust of other people is clearly related to trust of politics and politicians. The tau for the relationship is .191. The relationship between trust and personal efficacy is also clear; there is a tendency for groups who trust others to be personally efficacious (tau = .110).

The second content variable of personality, liberalism, is found to relate to only three other attributes--efficacy, reliance upon authority (discussed above), and orientation toward change (discussed below).

TABLE 7.--Liberalism by related personality attributes

	Liberalism			
	Lo. Lib. (N=26)	Mod. Lo. (N=100)	Mod. Hi. (N=82)	Hi. Lib. (N=33)
Personal Efficacy				
% HI	23.1	25.0	11.0	9.1
% MOD HI	30.8	27.0	34.1	39.4
% MOD LO	30.8	35.0	36.1	36.4
% LO	15.4	13.0	18.3	15.2

As the distribution is presented, there is no relationship in the data; however, when the extreme groups of the efficacy variable are related with only two classifications of liberalism (low and moderately low against moderately high and high) the relationship is significant at the .05 level (N = 80). Conservatives (less liberal subjects) are more apt to be personally efficacious than are the liberal subjects.

The last variable in this part of the presentation is political cynicism. Individuals who are cynical about politics, as previously found, are more likely to be dogmatic, less trusting of others and independent from their authorities.

In Table 8 cynicism is strongly related to efficacy.

TABLE 8.--Political cynicism by related personality attributes

	Political Cynicism			
	Lo. Cyn. (N=37)	Mod. Lo. (N=79)	Mod. Hi. (N=83)	Hi. Cyn. (N=42)
Personal Efficacy				
% HI	37.8	13.9	18.1	7.1
% MOD HI	24.3	39.2	32.5	21.4
% MOD LO	32.4	36.7	34.9	35.7
% LO	5.4	10.1	14.9	35.7

This relationship is significant beyond the .001 level ($\tau = .203$) and the direction clearly suggests the groups with less political cynicism are more personally efficacious.

With this presentation of data on the relationships among the various personality attributes completed, we can discuss these attributes in relation to the orientation toward change.

Correlates of Orientation Toward Change

What is the impact of the various personality attributes upon the individual's acceptance of change? We have developed four hypotheses in the earlier theoretical chapter. The first three hypotheses led to the general expectation that high levels of dogmatism positively relate to

dependence upon authorities, less trust of people and politics, less personal efficacy, less liberal beliefs, and finally, greater resistance to change.

This statement of the general hypothesis for this portion of the analysis requires a multi-variate statistical model. We have expected the acceptance of change (i.e. the criterion variable) to be affected by several personality attributes (i.e. the independent variables). I have used multiple regression and multiple correlation analysis to test this hypothesis. The following table presents the simple (zero-order) correlations between the criterion variable and each of the independent variables, the regression coefficient (beta weights) of each independent variable holding others constant, and the computed t-value for each of the beta weights. The t-value for the beta weights has been computed by dividing the beta weight by estimated standard error of the partial regression.

Before presenting the table it is necessary to discuss briefly the interpretation of both the regression coefficients and the multiple correlation coefficient. Blalock compares the two coefficients in the following manner.¹

The partial correlation is a measure of the amount of variation explained by one independent variable after the others have explained all they could. The beta weights, on the other hand, indicate how much change in the dependent variable is produced by the standardized change in one of the independent variables when the others are controlled.²

¹H. M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).

²Ibid., p. 345.

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Blalock's reference to "standardized change" points out the essential characteristic of the beta weights. Since the independent and dependent variables being compared are often measures of different kinds of data it is necessary to standardize units so the comparison is meaningful. To do this each variable is divided by its standard deviation, and "We thus measure changes in the dependent variable in terms of standard-deviation units for each of the other variables, a fact which assures the same variability in each of these variables. These adjusted partial slopes are called beta weights."³ In more intuitive language, the beta weights indicate how many units (or parts of a unit) of change one can expect in the dependent variable by one unit of change in the independent variable, holding other independent variables constant. Blalock notes beta weights and partial correlations are different types of measures of association but they do render comparable results. He concludes, "... they will not give exactly the same results although usually they rank variables in the same order of importance."⁴

The multiple correlation in the analysis indicates how much of the total variation in the criterion variable can be explained by all of the independent variables acting together. We can now examine Table 9 more closely to determine the impact of the various personality attributes upon the acceptance of change.

³Ibid., p. 345.

⁴Ibid., p. 345.

TABLE 9.--Regression coefficients, zero-order correlations and t-values for orientation toward change related to other personality attributes

Variables	Correlation with orientation toward change	Regression Coefficient (beta weight)	t-values
Dogmatism	.2524	.0951	4.0159
Liberalism	.1417	.1358	2.0602
Political Cynicism	.0537	.0276	0.3729
Personal Efficacy	.0065	.1074	1.2753
Trust	.0582	.0582	0.7471
Reliance upon Authority	.1036	.1553	1.2524

The test of significance for the total regression produces an F-ratio of 4.3297 (df = 6, 234) which is significant beyond the .001 level. The multiple correlation resulting from the regression analysis is .3161. Computing the coefficient of determination (or alienation) we find approximately 10% of the total variance in the orientation toward change is explained using the six personality attributes in the table. This is, indeed, a disappointingly small amount of explained variation. Perhaps it is to be expected given the relatively complex psychological predisposition being predicted.

The beta weights and associated t-values lead to the conclusion that dogmatism, liberalism, personal efficacy and reliance upon authority are the most important contributors to the variance in the acceptance of change. The fact that some of the independent variables are confounded affects the results of the regression analysis. As Blalock

states, "On the other hand, if the intercorrelations among the independent variables are quite high in magnitude the multiple R will ordinarily not be much larger than the largest total correlation with the dependent variable."⁵ In this context it is important to recall that dogmatism and personal efficacy correlate with a coefficient of .33. There are also significant correlations among trust, personal efficacy and political cynicism, but these variables contribute little to the change in the criterion variable.

With these reservations explicit it is still clear that we have substantially improved the amount of variance explained by these variables by using the combination of variables in the regression model.

In order to examine more closely the relationship between the personality attributes and the acceptance of change, I have also constructed contingency tables for each of the personality attributes related to the orientation toward change. This analysis may clarify both the existing relationships and the lack of relationship among the variables.

Table 10 shows orientation toward change cross-classified with four personality attributes. Acceptance of change does not correlate with personal efficacy or political cynicism (although it does relate to general trust of others). The fact that the present analysis does not find a relationship between efficacy and acceptance of change points out the less powerful nature of the statistical model being used. The previous regression model did suggest efficacy as a contributor to acceptance of change. These relationships are not strong, but it is important to note they are not consistent with either the theoretical

TABLE 10.--The orientation toward change by related personality attributes

	Orientation Toward Change			
	Accept (N=44)	Mod. Accept (N=83)	Mod. Resist (N=78)	Resist (N=36)
Dogmatism				
% LO	29.5	19.3	10.3	16.7
% MOD LO	38.6	39.8	28.2	25.0
% MOD HI	20.5	27.7	37.2	36.1
% HI	11.4	13.3	24.4	22.2
Liberalism				
% LO	13.6	6.0	15.4	8.3
% MOD LO	22.7	48.2	48.7	33.3
% MOD HI	47.7	32.5	20.5	50.0
% HI	15.9	13.3	15.4	8.3
Trust				
% HI	12.8	25.6	20.0	3.1
% MOD HI	38.3	31.7	33.7	37.5
% MOD LO	27.7	30.5	33.7	40.6
% LO	21.3	12.2	12.5	18.8
Reliance upon Authority				
% DEPENDENT	6.8	11.0	7.7	8.3
% MOD DEP.	27.3	19.5	29.5	30.6
% MOD	18.2	28.0	28.2	27.8
% MOD INDEP.	29.5	31.7	24.4	25.0
% INDEPENDENT	18.2	9.8	10.3	8.3

expectations or the results of the regression analysis. The following serves to underscore the caution which must be used in interpreting the results of the foregoing analysis.

Dogmatism and orientation toward change in Table 10 do not yield a statistically significant relationship, although both the directions in the data and a tau of .183 suggest a relationship can be found if the classifications are re-ordered. In a two by two cross-break (low

and moderately low dogmatism against moderately high and high; accept, moderately accept against moderately resist and resist) there is substantial relationship, significant beyond the .001 level. The direction is consistent with the first hypothesis. Groups with subjects likely to be less dogmatic also contain subjects who accept change. Our first hypothesis is supported by the present data, so we may turn to the second hypothesis in this search for problems contributing to the lack of support for the general hypothesis.

In testing the second hypothesis there is no relationship in the above table as the data are ordered. When the data are reordered into the following groups: accept and moderately accept as one group; resist and moderately resist as another; three classifications of dependence the third group; and two classifications of independence as the fourth; we discover a chi-square for the two by two table of 2.238. A chi-square of 2.7 is required for statistical significance at the .05 level since the direction has been predicted, so the resulting relationship is not statistically significant. I do consider this supportive of the second hypothesis since the relationship does approach statistical significance and is in the predicted direction. We conclude that there is only modest support for the contention that subjects who are more independent from their authorities are also likely to accept change.

When the relationship between the acceptance of change, liberalism and trust is examined, we again discover what appears to be curvilinear relationships. There is in the regression analysis no evidence of relationship between the acceptance of change and trust, although there is evidence of linear relation between liberalism and acceptance of

change. Since the regression model is sensitive only to linear relationships it is not surprising that we have found a curvilinear relation between trust and acceptance of change not reflected in the previous analysis. However, it is surprising to find strong evidence of a curvilinear relation between liberalism and acceptance of change since we have had previous indication of a linear relationship.

The analysis of these two relationships again involves constructing two by two contingency tables from the data in Table 10. I have regrouped the data with low and moderately low liberalism as one classification, high and moderately high liberalism as another, groups accepting and resisting change as a third, and finally those who moderately accept or resist as the fourth classification. The chi-square for this analysis is significant at the .01 level, and the direction of the relationship suggests that subjects with more liberal political views are more likely to either accept or resist change while those with less liberal views are more moderate in their acceptance or resistance of change. This is clearly inconsistent with the expectation that liberalism relates to acceptance of change in a linear fashion.

I have also found a curvilinear relation between trust and acceptance of change. This relationship is obtained by using only the extreme groups on the orientation toward change variable (i.e. most accepting and most resisting) and cross-classifying these groups with two classifications of the trust variable (e.g. high and low trust subjects in one group and moderately high and moderately low subjects in another). This results in a chi-square significant at the .01 level ($N = 80$). The direction indicates subjects from the moderate categories

on the variable of trust are more likely to accept change than are either the most trusting or the most distrusting subjects.

Testing the third hypothesis, personal efficacy and political cynicism are not related to orientation toward change as expected. General trust of others and liberalism are related, but not in the expected manner.

Our general expectation was that subjects who tend to be dogmatic also tend to be dependent upon authorities, less personally efficacious, less trusting of people and politics, conservative in political beliefs, and finally, resistant to change. Less dogmatic subjects are likely to accept change, and there is moderate support for the belief that individuals who are independent of their authorities are likely to accept change. We can only conclude from the previous analyses that personal efficacy and political cynicism are not related to the individual's ability to adjust to change. Finally, we have seen in the contingency analysis that the most liberal subjects are apt to either accept or resist change, while moderately trusting subjects are likely to accept change. All of these findings suggest the acceptance of change is most affected by dogmatism, liberalism, independence of authority and moderate levels of trust of people generally.

Summary

The first problem in this chapter is the examination of inter-relationships among the various personality attributes. We find people with less dogmatic belief systems are more likely to be

personally efficacious and more trusting of politics and people. Also, those who are more efficacious are less liberal in political views. (Independence of authority is positively related to more liberal views and a greater degree of distrust of politics and people.) Both low and high dogmatic subjects are likely to be more independent of their authorities.) Next we have examined the question: Do personality attributes affect the orientation toward change?

We find, here, liberalism, dogmatism, reliance upon authority and moderate levels of trust have the most impact upon the acceptance of change. Personal efficacy and political cynicism apparently have no effect upon our dependent variable. (It appears that individuals characterized by low dogmatism, moderate trust of people, and independence from their authorities probably accept change most easily.)^{*} Evidently liberals are either most likely to accept or most likely to resist change.

We have confirmed the hypothesis that the greater the degree of dogmatism the greater the degree of resistance to change. There is some evidence, although not strong, to support the hypothesis that the greater the reliance upon authority the greater the resistance to change. The third hypothesis is not supported by the data. (It was expected that the greater the personal efficacy, the more trust of other people, the more liberal the political beliefs, the more likely the acceptance of change.) In reality, efficacy does not relate to acceptance of change, moderate levels of trust rather than high or low relate to acceptance of change, and liberals are either accepting or resisting of change.

The only conclusion appropriate at this point is that dogmatism, liberalism, moderate levels of trust, and independence of authority (at least disagreement with the opinions of authorities) contribute to the existence of a psychological predisposition to accept change in various social and personal situations. In recalling the results of the regression and multiple correlation analysis we are reminded that only a very small portion of the variance in this complex predisposition has been explained with these variables.

CHAPTER V

SOCIALIZATION EXPERIENCES AND THE ORIENTATION

TOWARD CHANGE

The foregoing has been an examination of the effects of personality attributes upon the orientation toward change. The present chapter examines the impact of various socialization experiences upon the personality attributes and the predisposition to accept change.

Theoretically we have given closest attention to the authority relations a person forms both in early family situations and at the present time in their life. Specifically, we wish to examine the extent of communication with these authorities. The primary environment is the set of authority relations formed early in life while the secondary socialization environment is the collection of authority relations at the present time in the person's life.

What are the effects of the primary and secondary environments upon various personality attributes including the acceptance of change? What are the effects of discontinuity and education upon the personality attributes? Do the four combined socialization processes produce differences in the various personality attributes, particularly the orientation toward change? What is the combined effect of the socialization variables and the personality attributes upon the orientations toward

change? The balance of the theoretical expectations are tested in the discussion of these questions.

A first exploratory step before investigating the separate relationships among these variables involves gaining some insight into the correlations among the variables. Table 11 presents a matrix of correlations between these variables.

TABLE 11.--Correlation matrix of the socialization variables

	Pri. Env.	Sec. Env.	Cont.	Educa.
Primary Environment	-	.18*	.04	.09
Secondary Environment	-	-	.07	.17*
Continuity	-	-	-	.08
Level of Education	-	-	-	-

*Significant beyond .05 level

Primary and secondary environments are significantly related as well as continuity and level of education. These intercorrelations must be kept in mind as we proceed with the analysis. First, then, we investigate the impact of the primary and secondary environments upon the various personality attributes.

Primary and Secondary Environments
and Personality Attributes

Two theoretical hypotheses are tested in the following analysis. First, more open primary socialization should relate positively to a greater capacity to trust other people. Second, the more open the secondary environment the higher the sense of personal efficacy.

Table 12 relates the primary environment to personality attributes and enables us to test these hypotheses as well as discuss several other relationships which appear in the analysis.

TABLE 12.--Primary environment by related personality attributes

	Primary Environment				
	Closed (N=18)	Mod. Closed (N=59)	Mod. (N=71)	Mod. Open (N=64)	Open (N=28)
Reliance upon Authority					
% DEPENDENT	5.6	5.1	8.5	7.9	21.4
% MOD DEP	27.8	22.0	22.5	30.2	32.1
% MOD	11.1	23.7	31.0	23.8	32.1
% MOD INDEP	27.8	28.8	31.0	30.2	14.3
% INDEPENDENT	27.8	20.3	7.0	7.9	0.0
Liberalism					
% LO	22.2	11.9	7.0	6.2	21.4
% MOD LO	33.3	23.7	56.3	50.0	28.6
% MOD HI	38.9	42.4	23.9	32.8	42.9
% HI	5.6	22.0	12.7	10.9	7.1
Political Cynicism					
% LO	11.1	11.9	19.7	10.9	21.4
% MOD LO	22.2	30.5	33.8	35.9	35.7
% MOD HI	50.0	32.2	31.0	34.4	39.3
% HI	16.7	25.4	15.5	18.8	3.6
Dogmatism					
% LO	33.3	20.3	12.7	12.5	25.0
% MOD LO	16.7	30.5	36.6	35.9	39.3
% MOD HI	38.9	32.2	35.2	26.6	21.4
% HI	11.1	16.9	15.5	25.0	14.3

There are no significant relationships among the variables in Table 12. However, upon more careful examination several important relationships are revealed. When we collapse the classifications of both variables (i.e. dependent, moderately dependent and moderate in

one group against moderately independent and independent in another; and closed, moderately closed primary experiences against moderate, moderately open and open experiences) we find a relationship between primary environment and reliance upon authority which is significant at the .02 level. The direction of the relationship in the two-by-two cross break indicates that subjects from open primary environments are likely to be dependent upon authority.

Cross-classifying primary environment and liberalism (closed and moderately closed primary against three categories of subjects with more open primary experiences; and high and moderately high liberalism against moderately low and low liberalism) reveals a relationship which is significant at the .05 level. In this case, groups with liberal subjects are likely to be from closed primary environments.

The third cross-classification permits testing the first theoretical hypothesis. Open primary environment should relate positively to trust of others. No such relationship is found. However, when primary environment (closed, moderately closed and three classifications of openness; and low, moderately low against high and moderately high cynicism) and political cynicism are cross-classified we find a relationship significant at the .05 level and in the predicted direction. If political trust is substituted for the general variable trust, people from open primary environments are found to be trusting. We must keep in mind that the general variable of trust does not relate to primary environment, although political trust does. We have some evidence to support the first hypothesis.

The last relationship in the table involves dogmatism and the primary environment. Once again we appear to have a curvilinear relationship significant beyond the .05 level. In this comparison I group closed, moderately closed and open subjects in one category and moderately open and moderate in another and compare these groups with the least dogmatic subjects against three categories of more dogmatic subjects. The least dogmatic subjects are more likely to come from either the more open or the more closed primary socialization environments.

Table 13 presents data used in the second part of this investigation concerning the impact of socialization environments upon personality attributes. Here the extent of communication with authorities in the secondary environment is related to personality characteristics.

After collapsing categories, secondary socialization does relate to orientation toward change, liberalism, and personal efficacy. To find a relationship between acceptance of change and secondary socialization I combine closed, moderately closed and moderate subjects in one group and moderately open and open in another and cross-classify these groups with those accepting of change against three categories of resistance to change and find a relationship beyond the .01 level of significance. The direction of the relationship indicates that subjects from open secondary socialization experiences with authority are likely to accept change.

Communication with authorities in the secondary environment also is associated with the degree of liberalism characteristic of the subject's political views. In this case it is necessary to drop the moderate

TABLE 13.--Secondary environment by related personality attributes

	Secondary Environment				
	Closed (N=17)	Mod. Closed (N=29)	Mod. (N=83)	Mod. Open (N=102)	Open (N=10)
Orientation toward					
Change					
% ACCEPT	5.9	13.8	12.0	26.5	20.0
% MOD ACCEPT	47.1	41.4	32.5	32.4	30.0
% MOD RESIST	29.4	34.5	36.1	29.4	30.0
% RESIST	17.6	10.3	19.3	11.8	20.0
Liberalism					
% LO	5.9	10.3	9.6	13.7	0.0
% MOD LO	58.8	48.3	44.6	34.3	40.0
% MOD HI	35.3	37.9	30.1	35.3	40.0
% HI	0.0	3.4	15.7	16.7	20.0
Personal Efficacy					
% HI	23.5	17.2	16.9	19.6	0.0
% MOD HI	29.4	34.5	30.1	31.4	40.0
% MOD LO	35.3	27.6	34.9	36.3	50.0
% LO	11.8	20.7	18.1	12.7	10.0

category of the secondary environment and use only the more open and the more closed run against the least and most liberal as a group and the moderate levels (either moderately high or moderately low) of liberalism. The relationship is significant at the .05 level (N = 158) using the Yates correction for cases with individual cells having relatively few observations. Subjects who are either the least or most liberal seem to come from relatively open communicative relations with their authorities at the present time in their lives (i.e. open secondary socialization).

The final relationship in the table permits investigation of the second hypothesis in this portion of the analysis--open secondary

socialization should relate positively to sense of personal efficacy. Relating variables (using only closed and moderately closed subjects against only the most open subjects in comparison with high and moderately high efficacy and low, moderately low efficacy) we find a Yates corrected chi-square of 2.746 ($N = 56$) which permits the acceptance of the hypothesis since both the direction is as predicted and the level of significance (one-tailed test) is beyond the .05 level.

Thus far we have confirmed our first two hypotheses at modest but acceptable levels of significance, and can now discuss the variables of continuity and level of education in relation to the personality attributes.

After a presentation of the data on the socialization variables of continuity and education the findings and examination of the relationship between the four experimental socialization processes and resulting personality attributes is summarized. The final portion of the chapter is a discussion of the findings and their significance in terms of the theoretical considerations.

Continuity, Education and Personality Attributes

Two hypotheses are tested in the following presentation. First, individuals experiencing higher levels of discontinuity (more personally felt crises) are likely to accept change. Second, education is associated with greater acceptance of change. In addition, several other relationships which are found among these socialization experiences and the various personality attributes are examined.

First, continuity is related to the personality attributes.

TABLE 14.--Continuity by related personality attributes

	Discontinuity	
	High (N=69)	Low (N=170)
Orientation toward Change		
% ACCEPT	29.0	13.5
% MOD ACCEPT	29.0	37.1
% MOD RESIST	30.4	33.5
% RESIST	11.6	15.9
Dogmatism		
% LO	21.7	16.5
% MOD LO	40.6	31.2
% MOD HI	20.3	34.1
% HI	17.4	18.2
Reliance upon Authority		
% DEPENDENT	2.9	11.2
% MOD DEP	17.4	29.6
% MOD	24.6	26.6
% MOD INDEP	39.1	23.7
% INDEPENDENT	15.9	8.9
Liberalism		
% LO	7.2	11.8
% MOD LO	31.9	45.9
% MOD HI	42.0	30.6
% HI	18.8	11.8
Personal Efficacy		
% HI	11.6	20.6
% MOD HI	34.8	29.4
% MOD LO	30.4	37.6
% LO	23.2	12.4
Trust		
% HI	13.0	21.2
% MOD HI	46.4	29.4
% MOD LO	30.4	34.7
% LO	10.1	14.7

We first relate degree of continuity and the predisposition to accept change. The relationship is significant beyond the .05 level and consistent with the hypothesis. Clearly, the subjects who respond in the questionnaire as having some form of personally felt crisis are more likely to accept change in personal and social situations.

Several other relationships exist between the extent of discontinuity and the personality attributes. Subjects having discontinuity are apt to be less dogmatic. This relationship is significant at the .05 level when high, moderately high levels of dogmatism are combined in one group and low, moderately low dogmatics in another and these two groups run against high and low discontinuity.

Discontinuity relates to reliance upon authority, with a significance beyond the .02 level. Those subjects experiencing some kind of discontinuity are likely to be independent from their authorities, as measured by their agreement with those authorities on several different issues and opinions. The Kendall tau for this relationship is .235.

The three remaining relationships provide further information on the effects of discontinuity upon personality. When low and moderately low liberals are grouped and high and moderately high combined and these groups run against continuity we find subjects experiencing discontinuity are likely to be liberal, significant at the .01 level. There is some tendency for those experiencing discontinuity to be personally less efficacious. As presented in the table, the relationship is significant at the .10 level, and when those scoring in the extremely high or low categories of efficacy are compared on degree of continuity we find the relationship is significant at the

.02 level. Personally felt crisis tends to decrease the person's sense of personal efficacy. When discontinuity and trust are related it is significant at the .10 level which indicates some linear relationship may be present, however closer analysis suggests another curvilinear relationship. When the two groups (high, low trust subjects and mod. high, low) are related with discontinuity, we find subjects with higher discontinuity more moderate rather than extremely trusting or distrusting.

The last socialization variable we consider in this portion of the analysis is the level of education in relation to the various personality attributes. We hypothesize that education should relate to the acceptance of change. Referring to Table 15, when level of education is cross-classified with acceptance of change there are important directions apparent in the data but as ordered they are not significantly related. Reclassifying the data into two groups (college and no college) we find a highly significant relationship (.01 level). Those with college experiences are more accepting of change than those with no college.

The strongest relationship in the table is between educational level and sense of personal efficacy (significant at the .001 level), but it is a rather complex and non-linear relationship. Those having no college experience are much more likely to score as highly efficacious, while those having one year of college are less likely to be efficacious. Subjects with two years of college once again seem more efficacious while there is no relationship between three years of college and efficacy. This is difficult to interpret, but unless there is a systematic bias

TABLE 15.--Education level by related personality attributes

	Education (Years of College)			
	No College (N=74)	One Yr. (N=66)	Two Yrs. (N=56)	Three Yrs. (N=43)
Orientation toward Change				
% ACCEPT	12.2	19.7	21.4	23.3
% MOD ACCEPT	28.4	37.9	37.5	37.2
% MOD RESIST	37.8	34.8	25.0	30.2
% RESIST	21.6	7.6	16.1	9.3
Personal Efficacy				
% HI	29.7	9.1	19.6	7.0
% MOD HI	20.3	25.8	39.3	48.8
% MOD LO	35.1	51.5	23.2	27.9
% LO	14.9	13.6	17.9	16.3
Liberalism				
% LO	20.3	10.6	3.6	4.7
% MOD LO	40.5	40.9	41.1	44.2
% MOD HI	28.5	34.8	37.5	37.5
% HI	10.8	13.6	17.9	14.0
Reliance upon Authority				
% DEPENDENT	6.8	9.2	5.4	14.0
% MOD DEP	31.1	23.1	25.0	23.3
% MOD	35.1	21.5	30.4	11.6
% MOD INDEP	18.9	30.8	32.1	34.9
% INDEP	8.1	15.4	7.1	16.3

in these groups of which I am unaware, there is some tendency for efficacy to decrease in college then to increase with more education and finally the relationship disappears with still more education.

By comparing the least liberal group with all other and classifying the level of education between no college, one year of college and two or more years of college I find a relationship significant beyond the .01 level (using Yates correction). The tendency is for those having more education to be more liberal.

Finally, there is a curvilinear relationship between education and reliance upon authority significant beyond the .01 level. When the following are compared: subjects having no college and those with most college; subjects with most and least dependence upon authority; and those moderately dependent and independent; there results a tendency for those with three years of college to have greater reliance upon their authorities. Those with more years of education are either the most dependent or the most independent of their authorities while those with no college are more moderate in their reliance upon authorities. There are two further questions for analysis before proceeding to the concluding discussion. What is the combined impact of the personality attributes and the socialization experiences upon the orientation toward change? What is the effect of consistency in socialization (e.g. the four socialization patterns) upon the orientation toward change and other personality attributes?

Socialization Patterns, Personality and the Orientation toward Change

We find in the previous chapter the combined impact of personality attributes upon the orientation toward change explains some 10% of the variance in this predisposition. Now we can discuss the results of a regression and multiple correlation analysis of both the personality attributes and the socialization experiences using the predisposition to accept change as the dependent or criterion variable. Table 16 presents the total correlations, beta weights and the tests of significance for the beta weights (t-values).

TABLE 16.--Regression coefficients, zero-order correlations, and t-values for orientation toward change related to socialization experiences and personality attributes

Variable	Total correlations with orientations toward change	Regression Coefficients (beta weights)	T-Values
<u>Socialization:</u>			
Continuity	.1384	.5892	1.3423
Primary Environment	.0326	.0401	0.2842
Secondary Environment	.1538	.2803	1.8304*
<u>Psychological:</u>			
Reliance upon Authority	.1036	.1216	0.9209
Liberalism	.1471	.1140	1.7248*
Personal Efficacy	.0065	.1038	1.2322
Dogmatism	.2524	.0917	3.8910**
Trust	.0749	.0481	0.6203
Political Cynicism	.0537	.0245	0.3320

*Significant beyond .10 level

**Significant beyond .05 level

The total regression analysis is significant beyond the .001 level with an F ratio (df 9,231) = 3.5866. The multiple correlation resulting from the analysis is .3502 which in turn has a coefficient of determination of 12.3. The addition of the socialization variables to the personality attributes increases the percent of variance explained by about 2.5%. It is clear that the personality attributes are the more important predictor variables but it is also clear that the

socialization variables do add somewhat to our ability to explain this relatively complex predisposition to accept change.

Considering both the beta weights and their tests of significance we can conclude that only the variable of dogmatism produces a change in the criterion which is significant beyond the .05 level. Both liberalism and secondary environment produce changes significant at the .10 level. The balance of the variables do produce some changes but it is difficult to argue these changes could not have occurred by chance alone. In any case the variables of dogmatism, liberalism, and secondary environment and continuity appear to be the most important in the analysis.

The second question to be investigated in this portion of the chapter is: What are the effects of consistency upon the various personality attributes, particularly the acceptance of change? There are several specific hypotheses to be investigated in this portion of the analysis. First, we hypothesize that if the type of socialization experience has more influence than the variation in early and later experiences, then we should find the greater differences in the orientations toward change occurring between the consistently open and consistently closed socialization patterns. Second, if instead, dissimilarity between early and later experiences has more effect upon personality than type of experiences then we expect to find the greater differences in the orientations toward change occurring between the consistent (i.e. both environments open or closed) and the inconsistent (i.e. one environment open and the other closed) socialization patterns. We also have hypothesized that groups from open primary

and secondary environments should be more accepting of change than those from closed primary and secondary environments. The balance of the expected relationships between socialization patterns and personality attributes are summarized in Table 1 (Chapter II).

To test these hypotheses I have utilized the more powerful statistical model of testing differences in means by analysis of variance rather than the more appropriate non-parametric statistics previously in use in this analysis. There are reservations which must be made explicit about meeting the assumptions of this analysis of variance model as well as the regression model previously used. The data in this study may not satisfy all assumptions of these models, but for the present exploratory purposes it seems justifiable to use these techniques to identify any findings which might otherwise be lost to the less powerful, if more appropriate, non-parametric modes of analysis.

I have divided the total population into four experimental groups, each group representing one of the four socialization patterns. Group 1 (N = 50) is composed of subjects scoring either in open or moderately open classifications on both the primary and secondary environment variables. Group 4 (N = 21), on the other hand, includes the subjects scoring either closed or moderately closed on both of the environment variables. These two groups represent consistent socialization patterns, but different types of experiences (i.e. group 1 has open communicative experiences with authority throughout their life to present, while group 4 has consistently closed and non-communicative relations with their authorities).

Group 2 (N = 42) is made up of subjects scoring open or moderately open on the primary environment variable and moderate, moderately closed or closed on the secondary environment variable. Group 3 (N = 29) is composed of subjects scoring closed or moderately closed on the primary relationship variable and open or moderately open on the secondary variable. These two groups represent the more inconsistent socialization patterns. The second group represents those who have moved from open to closed relationships with their authorities while group 3 represents those who have moved from closed to open communicative relations with authority. We expect these transitions from one type of socialization experience to another to produce the most acceptance of change in the individual's orientation. Those who have made more adjustments or changes in their personality can be expected to accept change in personal and social situations more easily than those whose life path was unbroken.

Table 17 presents the means for the various personality attributes within each of the four experimental groups. The table also includes an F-ratio for each of the comparisons and the means for the total group to give the reader some indication of the personality attributes most strongly affected by the different types of socialization patterns and the directions of the differences from the means of the total group.

Table 17 indicates that the four socialization patterns produce significant variations in the means for two of the personality attributes. Reliance upon authority and the orientation toward change result in differences in means among the four groups which could not have arisen

TABLE 17.--Analysis of variance within personality attributes and between experimental socialization patterns

Variables	Means for Experimental Groups					F-Ratios (df=3,138)
	Group 1 (N=50)	Group 2 (N=42)	Group 3 (N=29)	Group 4 (N=21)	Total (N=142)	
Dogmatism	61.82	64.17	61.79	60.33	62.69	0.9
Liberalism	9.34	8.93	9.59	8.10	9.09	1.1
Political Cynicism	10.86	10.74	11.55	10.52	10.92	0.6
Personal Efficacy	6.96	7.05	6.52	7.86	7.03	1.1
Trust	8.18	8.55	9.35	8.86	8.63	1.3
Reliance upon Authority	2.94	2.91	4.24	3.67	3.30	5.1*
Orientation toward Change	13.68	14.79	13.52	15.34	14.23	2.3**

*Significant at the .01 level

**Significant at the .10 level

by chance more than one time in a thousand and one time in ten, respectively. Before analyzing these findings in relation to the theoretical model in chapter two it is useful to show the t-values for the comparison of means among the four experimental groups. The F-ratio indicates some degree of variation among the four groups while the t-value indicates which means are contributing most to the total variance measured by the F test.

TABLE 18.--Matrix of t-values resulting from the comparison of means of personality attributes among the experimental groups

	Group 1 (OXO)	Group 2 (OXC)	Group 3 (CXO)	Group 4 (CXC)
Group 1				
Dogmatism	-	1.1762	.0365	.6346
Liberalism	-	.6695	.3159	1.5856
Political Cyn.	-	.2433	.9157	.4744
Personal Eff.	-	.1334	.8333	1.1544
Trust	-	.7597	1.9075	.9857
Reliance upon Authority	-	.2470	3.2073	1.6678
Orientation toward Change	-	1.6369	.2164	1.7562
Group 2				
Dogmatism	-	-	.9854	1.5274
Liberalism	-	-	.8742	1.0906
Political Cyn.	-	-	1.1377	.2742
Personal Eff.	-	-	.9908	1.0681
Trust	-	-	1.3305	.4586
Reliance upon Authority	-	-	3.2441	1.7810
Orientation toward Change	-	-	1.9668	.7614
Group 3				
Dogmatism	-	-	-	.4912
Liberalism	-	-	-	1.6013
Political Cyn.	-	-	-	1.3128
Personal Eff.	-	-	-	1.6325
Trust	-	-	-	.5858
Reliance upon Authority	-	--	-	1.0189
Orientation toward Change	-	-	-	2.0300

Although only two personality attributes show significant variation among the four experimental groups, we can discuss each attribute in turn to examine the extent of variation from the theoretical model proposed in Chapter II (Table 1). To facilitate

the comparison of observed and expected classifications of personality attributes for the experimental groups I have constructed Table 19 comparing the predicted classifications of each attribute with that level actually obtained.

TABLE 19.--Comparison of predicted and observed classifications of personality attributes for each of the four experimental groups

Variables	Group 1 (Pred./Obs.)	Group 2 (Pred./Obs.)	Group 3 (Pred./Obs.)	Group 4 (Pred./Obs.)
Dogmatism	(LO/MOD HI)	(MOD HI/HI)	(MOD LO/MOD LO)	(HI/LO)
Liberalism	(HI/MOD HI)	(MOD LO/MOD LO)	(MOD HI/HI)	(LO/LO)
Political Cynicism	(LO/MOD HI)	(MOD HI/MOD LO)	(MOD LO/HI)	(HI/LO)
Trust	(HI/HI)	(MOD LO/MOD HI)	(MOD HI/LO)	(LO/MOD LO)
Personal Efficacy	(HI/MOD HI)	(MOD LO/MOD LO)	(MOD HI/HI)	(LO/LO)
Reliance upon Authority	(LO/MOD HI)	(MOD HI/HI)	(MOD LO/LO)	(HI/MOD LO)
Orientation toward Change	(ACCEPT/ MOD ACC)	(MOD RES/MOD RES)	(MOD ACC/ ACCEPT)	(RESIST/ RESIST)

A review of the table suggests that the theory holds for the variables personal efficacy, liberalism, trust and orientation toward change. Reliance upon authority, dogmatism and political cynicism appear to depart from our expectations so substantially as to require basic reformulation of that part of the theoretical sketch. Further, we must keep in mind the differences we have

found in the orientation toward change not only conform relatively well to the theory, but are significant at the .10 level. We also find significant differences in the reliance upon authority (significant beyond the .01 level). This statistical significance requires a re-examination of the theory in light of the existing pattern of relationship between the socialization processes and reliance upon authority, since the variable obviously does relate but not in a manner consistent with the theory. We will discuss each personality attribute in turn to gain insight into the usefulness of the theory and ways it may be reformulated to more closely account for these observations.

When we examine dogmatism we find no differences among the means of the groups which are not reasonably attributable to chance alone. But it may be of theoretical importance that lower levels of dogmatism appear to result from the third and fourth groups which share closed primary socialization experiences with authority. It also seems important that group 2 has the most dogmatic subjects and group 4 the least. Political cynicism fares little better than dogmatism. Here the only point of interest is the relatively large differences between groups 3 and 4. Group 3 has the most cynical subjects while group 4 has the most trusting subjects, but again the differences may be due to chance alone.

Reliance upon authority departs from theoretical expectations, but the differences in these means requires a closer look at the results. We have found lower degrees of dogmatism in group 3 and 4 and also subjects who are independent of authority in the same groups. We find

no difference between group 1 and 2 or between 3 and 4 which could not have arisen by chance alone, but we do find more significant differences between groups 1 and 3, 1 and 4, 2 and 3, and 2 and 4. The differences suggest a complete revision in the theory. Group 1 produces more dependent subjects than either 3 or 4 and the differences are significant. Group 2 produces more dependent subjects than 3 or 4 and again the differences are not readily attributable to chance. It appears the first two socialization patterns (both environments open; and primary open and secondary closed) tend toward a greater reliance upon authority while the latter two processes (closed primary and open secondary, and both environments closed) produce more independent subjects. More specifically, group 3 produces the most independent while group 2 produces the most dependent subjects. Since both processes involve inconsistency we can only deduce inconsistency does not contribute to reliance upon authority. We can suggest early family situations which are characterized by more open communications between the authorities and the child appear to develop individuals who are more rather than less dependent upon authority, while the reverse happens in early family situations with little communication. It seems that inconsistency tends to extend the effects of the early family experience rather than attenuate them. The implications of this for the theory are great, but it also raises the question of instrument validity. This can be discussed in the final portions of the chapter.

The balance of personality attributes appear to conform more closely to the theory. More liberal orientations result from groups 1

and 3, group 3 (inconsistency) having the most liberal subjects. The less liberal orientations result from group 2 and 4 with group 4 having the least liberal subjects. The only discrepancy from the theory here is pattern 3 which appears to produce a more liberal group than does the first process. Again, inconsistency extends the effects of early childhood experiences rather than reducing them. Personal efficacy results in exactly the same pattern as liberalism, with high efficacy in group 3 and lowest in group 4. The variable trust departs a bit further from expectations. We predict high trust for group 1 and find that to be the case, low trust for group 4 and find only moderately low. Groups 2 and 3 reverse our expectations. Group 3 has more cynical subjects than we expect while group 2 has less. The only difference here that appears statistically important is that between 1 and 3. The first process does produce more trusting subjects while the third process produces less trusting subjects.

Finally, the orientation toward change conforms well to our expectations with the only exception being the third group which is higher in acceptance than group 1. Again the inconsistency produces a more pronounced effect than the more consistent processes. Several of the differences we find here approach statistical significance. There is little difference between 1 and 3 or 2 and 4 but there is substantial differences between 1 and 2, and 1 and 4, 2 and 3 and 3 and 4.

With these comments on the findings and the theory complete we can test the several specific hypotheses constructed in the theoretical chapter.

We have hypothesized groups from more open primary and secondary environments should be more accepting of change than those from more closed environments. When we compare group 1 and 4 substantial support for this speculation is found. Group 1 (both environments open) is more likely to have subjects accepting change than group 4 and the difference is significant at the .05 level using a one-tailed test of significance appropriate to a hypothesis predicting direction.

Finally, we have attempted to construct a critical hypothesis which permits the investigation of two broad conceptual approaches to personality development. If the type of socialization experience has more influence upon personality than the variation in early and later experiences then we should find the greater differences in the orientations toward change occurring between consistently open and consistently closed socialization patterns. If instead, dissimilarity between early and later experiences has more effect upon personality than type of experiences, we expect to find the greater differences in the orientation toward change occurring between the consistent (i.e. both environments open or closed) and the inconsistent (one environment open and the other closed) socialization patterns.

As one might expect, the critical hypotheses do not yield the desired results. We do in fact find significant differences in the means of orientations toward change for the consistently open and consistently closed socialization patterns, which confirms the first hypothesis. However, we also find one of the processes involving inconsistency, group 3, produces more acceptance of change than the

consistently open environment pattern. On the other hand, the other group involving inconsistency produces less acceptance of change than any other group except the consistently closed pattern. Our second hypothesis is partially confirmed and partially rejected. When the individual moves from open to closed socialization experiences with authority he becomes less accepting of change, but when he moves from closed to open experiences he becomes more accepting of change--more so than those with consistently open experiences.

Summary

We have confirmed several hypotheses in this section of the data analysis. One of the first hypotheses investigated has been developed to test the notion that early communications with authorities in the family situation is likely to develop a trusting orientation toward authority generally. A significant relationship between open primary environment and the variable of political cynicism is found--the more open and communicative the environment, the more likely the individual is to trust politics and politicians. A second hypothesis has been used to test the idea that open communication with authorities in the secondary environment (i.e. outside of the immediate family and later in life) is related to the individual's sense of personal efficacy. We again find a relationship which supports this thinking--the more open the secondary environment, the higher the sense of personal efficacy. It is important to note that no relationship between secondary environment and trust or between primary environment and efficacy is present.

(Further, individuals with greater degrees of discontinuity (i.e. personally felt crisis) in socialization should be more likely to make personality adjustments and therefore more likely to accept change in social and personal situations). Discontinuity relates positively to acceptance of change, confirming the hypothesis. We also expect those with more education to be more likely to accept change. When we contrast individuals having no college and those with some college education a significant difference, which is consistent with this hypothesis, results.

Before discussing the several hypotheses concerning consistency it is necessary to consider some of the observed relationships which do not conform to expectations.

Primary socialization environment relates to reliance upon authority, liberalism, and dogmatism. (Individuals emerging from early family situations characterized by more communication and interaction with their authorities are more likely to be dependent upon authority, while those from closed and non-communicative early environments are more apt to be liberal.) Evidently, the least dogmatic subjects are likely to come from either most open or most closed primary environments. (People from open secondary relations are more probably accepting of change and either most or least liberal in their politics.) Individuals with greater discontinuity in socialization are less dogmatic, less dependent upon authority, liberal, less efficacious, and moderately trusting (rather than high or low in trust) toward other people. Finally, education tends to increase

liberalism and the probability of being either extremely independent or extremely dependent in authority relationships.

(Communication with authorities in early family situations has several lasting effects.) Individuals having more communication are more apt to remain dependent upon these authorities for their opinions later in life, they are less likely to be liberal and they are less dogmatic, although, closed and non-communicative relationships may also result in less dogmatic persons.

(Those subjects who have established greater interaction and communication with authorities in their later life are more likely to accept change, but are either extremely liberal or extremely conservative in their political views.) In this case a conservative political orientation may be accepting of change. The presence of open secondary interaction and communication evidently permits the individual a clearer definition of his political views, as evidenced by these groups being more extreme and less moderate in stating their political opinions. But in both cases they are more able to adjust to change.

Discontinuity and education tend to make people liberal.

* (Perceived crisis decreases the individual's sense of efficacy and makes him only moderately trusting of others, but in both cases he is still accommodative to change.) Education also has the effect of making the individual more or less dependent upon his authorities. Again this may be due to the fact that those with education have clearer ideas about their relationship with their authorities and are

therefore able to indicate either agreement or disagreement with the opinions of their authorities.

Finally, we have investigated the effects of consistency in socialization upon the several personality attributes. (Those subjects having consistently open socialization are more accepting of change than those with consistently closed socialization, which is consistent with another of our theoretical notions.) We have also tested the idea that either the type of experience or contrast between early and later experiences has the greatest effect upon personality. We find both of these factors to have considerable effect upon the acceptance of change as one orientation which is investigated under both conditions. (The type of experience (i.e. communicative relations with authority) appears to increase the acceptance of change, however, if the subject moves from a closed environment to an open environment he is even more likely to accept change.) Inconsistency is not the important variable since those experiencing inconsistency in the opposite direction (i.e. open to closed environments) are least likely to accept change. In conclusion, if the type of experience in socialization is communicative then the person is likely to be accepting of change, and if the socialization process involves inconsistency from closed to open relationships then the effects of the secondary environment are extended or made more pronounced. (That is, if the inconsistency results in an open secondary environment the subject is more accepting of change, whereas, if the inconsistency results in a closed secondary relationship then the individual is least likely to accept change.) Obviously both the type

of experiences and the inconsistency between early and later experiences are important, and it appears inconsistency works to emphasize the effects of the type of experiences existing presently in the person's life.

The last chapter summarizes the findings of this study and uses the data in the reformulation of the theoretical sketch guiding this present study.

CHAPTER VI

EVALUATION OF THE THEORY

Review of Expectations and Observations

Three questions will guide this review of theory and data. These are: (1) What are the effects of early socialization upon personality attributes? (2) What are the effects of later socialization upon personality attributes? (3) What are the effects of different patterns of primary and secondary socialization upon the personality variables under consideration?

We have theorized early authority relationships vary between open, communicative and closed, non-communicative interpersonal contact between the child and his authorities. If early relations are relatively open the child learns to relate to authority with more information and understanding of both the authority as a person and what the authority communicates about himself and the world. This type of authority relationship generates less reliance upon authority, as authority, and more dependence upon what the authority communicates. The dependency upon the authoritative communication rather than the authority object contributes to an ability to distinguish messages from the source of the message--the essential characteristic of a less dogmatic personality. Further, these early open relationships with authority lead to a more trusting orientation

toward both authority and other people generally since early contact in previous experiences has proven both to be trustworthy. This is the first part of our theoretical sketch, and the relevant analysis is now considered.

Primary socialization relates with reliance upon authority, liberalism, political cynicism (although not with general trust of others), and dogmatism. But the relationships we find are not consistent with the above. First, we find subjects who report their early relationships with authority as being more communicative tend to be more dependent rather than less dependent upon their present authorities for opinions about various social and political issues. Further, these same subjects (i.e. with more open primary socialization) are more likely to be less dogmatic, but, those subjects from closed primary relations are also less likely to be dogmatic. In fact, the subjects from moderate classifications of openness and closedness appear to be the most dogmatic subjects in the population. That early communicative relations engender trust of generalized authority is supported to some extent. The politically most trusting subjects tend to have more open primary socialization. However, no relationship is seen between primary environment and the general trust of others. Subjects classified as more liberal in political values have closed primary relations. Obviously, such findings require reformulation of the present theory, and this is to be the central concern following this comparison of theory and data. The next question is--What are the effects of secondary socialization upon personality?

The only major impact of secondary socialization we expect is in regard to the attribute of personal efficacy. More open communications in secondary authority relations should lead to a higher sense of personal efficacy. There is modest support of this expectation. It is noteworthy that efficacy does not relate to primary socialization but does relate to open secondary relations, while political trust relates to open primary experiences but not to secondary experiences.

In addition, open secondary experiences with authority relate substantially with acceptance of change, and subjects who are most conservative (i.e. least liberal) and most liberal are apt to be classified as having open socialization experiences at the present time in their lives.

Two other major socialization variables are appropriately discussed at this point--degree of continuity and level of education. We have hypothesized that people experiencing more crisis situations in their lives (i.e. greater discontinuity) are most likely to have made psychological changes and adjustments to these demands, and are in turn, more likely to accept change in the external world. Those in our study who are classified as experiencing discontinuity are significantly more likely to accept change than those without discontinuity. Perhaps it is even more interesting that we find the continuity relating to most of the personality attributes.

There is evidence to support the following propositions concerning perceived crisis and personality. Those who report more crisis in socialization are also: (1) less dogmatic, (2) more independent of

authority, (3) more liberal in political beliefs, (4) personally less efficacious, and (5) moderately trusting of others rather than extremely trusting or distrusting.

We have further speculated that those with more education are likely to relate well with authority and therefore can be more accepting of change. The findings show subjects with college to be more likely to accept change than those without college, and there are several other relationships involving level of education.

There appears to be a most complex relationship between sense of personal efficacy and level of education. I am uncertain whether this is a genuine finding or an artifact of the particular groups used in this analysis. We find strongest evidence of high personal efficacy among those with no college, one year of college substantially reduces the number of efficacious people, a second year of college increases efficacy once again, and there is no relationship between efficacy and education in the group with three years of college.

A tendency exists for those with more education (i.e. two or more years of college) to be more liberal. Those with most years of college education are likely to be either most dependent or most independent of authority for their opinions.

Before examining the last question guiding this evaluation, it is appropriate to summarize briefly data concerning relationships among the various personality variables independent of the socialization experiences.

Less dogmatic people tend to be more efficacious and more trusting of people as well as politics. There is some indication

that efficacy relates positively to conservative political views. The second structural attribute of personality, reliance upon authority, relates to liberal political values and distrust of people and cynicism about politics. Evidently both least and most dogmatic subjects are likely to be independent of their authorities.

We have confirmed two hypotheses. Those who are less rigid internally (e.g. less dogmatic) are likely to be less rigid about external situations as well (i.e. more accepting of change). Also, modest support exists for the idea that those who are independent of authorities external to a situation are accepting of changes in these situations. The third theoretical expectation finds little support in this analysis. We have speculated that both efficacy and trust in people relate to liberal beliefs, and liberals are more accepting of change, so we expect efficacy, trust and liberalism to positively relate to acceptance of change. However, efficacy does not relate to acceptance of change and there is a tendency for conservatives to be more efficacious. Moderately trusting subjects are more likely to accept change than either extremely trusting or or distrusting subjects, and finally, liberals accept change but are also likely to be most resistant to it.

In regression analysis, dogmatism, liberalism and independence of authority contribute most to the orientation toward change. The contingency analysis suggests moderate levels of trust are also important to the acceptance of change. The major conclusion of this part of the analysis is that the several psychological attributes explain most of the variance in our predisposition to accept or resist

change. With these comments on relationships among the personality variables and the orientation toward change, the final question is discussed--What are the effects of the four socialization patterns upon the various personality attributes?

Previously, the separate impact of primary and secondary socialization upon personality has been considered. The present discussion reviews the portions of the theory concerning interdependencies among primary, secondary socialization experiences and personality. We have argued that the child as he matures and interacts with people beyond the immediate family may find his early experiences either reinforced or, on the other hand, later experiences may be quite dissimilar and non-reinforcing. Such dissimilarity or inconsistency in experiences between primary and secondary relations requires personality adjustments and change. However, if the secondary experiences reinforce earlier learning then little change in personality can be expected. Also, when socialization is more consistent the type of experiences are most determinative of later personality, but when the socialization process is more inconsistent the succession of early and later experiences may be critical in determining adult personality attributes, specifically the orientation to accept or resist change. Four socialization patterns result from the logically possible combinations of the two dichotomized variables of primary and secondary environments. Dividing our total population into four groups corresponding to these theoretical patterns, this portion of the theory has been tested. Group 1 has open primary and secondary socialization experiences. Group 2 has primary open

but secondary closed. Group 3 has primary closed and secondary open. And group 4 has both environments closed.

Each of the four socialization patterns, as represented by the experimental groups, is discussed in terms of predicted and observed personality attributes resulting from each of the processes.

The first process is composed entirely of open and communicative relations with authority. Since this process represents consistent socialization the characteristics of early childhood relations will be reinforced and stable. Therefore, the first process should produce subjects who are less dependent upon authority, less dogmatic, more trusting, and, since the open secondary relations should contribute to a higher sense of personal efficacy, the subject should also be more efficacious. Further, the subjects should be liberal since their early personal relations with authority have been open and less likely to generate a generalized fear about authority. Because of the greater independence of authority as an object the subjects can more readily accept change in a particular situation.

It must be noted that the four socialization patterns (i.e. experimental groups) produce significant variation in only two of the several personality attributes--the orientation toward change and reliance upon authority. The balance of this discussion is for the most part based on findings in the data which may well be attributable to chance alone. I believe there is justification in discussing such admittedly weak evidence on the basis of the

existence of predicted directions which for these exploratory purposes can be sifted carefully for insights into the present problem.

The first experimental group contains subjects who are moderately accepting of change and moderately high in their dependence upon authority. These subjects tend to be moderately high in dogmatism, high in trust (moderately high in political trust) and moderately high in personal efficacy and liberal values. Although we are not concerned with the reformulation of theory here, it is appropriate to point out the impact of primary experiences upon personality. These data serve to guide the following reformulation.

Open primary environment tends to produce more dependent, less liberal, more politically trusting and less dogmatic subjects. The effects of primary environment are relatively stable when socialization is more consistent. Dependence upon authority and trust remain constant, but extent of liberalism increases as a result of the secondary experiences. Dogmatism also shifts from more to less in this socialization process, but again, these findings may be due to chance alone.

This portion of the theory is supported by the outcomes for the variables trust, efficacy and orientation toward change. The theory does not do well for dogmatism, reliance upon authority or political cynicism and liberalism. Reliance upon authority so severely departs from the theory that it must be considered in detail in the following portion of the chapter.

The second socialization pattern under consideration involves early and later experiences with authority which were closed and non-communicative. It has been our thinking that if the child grows up in such non-communicative relations he is more likely to be dependent upon authority, less able to differentiate the authority from what the authority says (i.e. more dogmatic), and, because of the early and arbitrary experiences with authority less trusting of others generally. Closed secondary relations should lead to low sense of efficacy. Such a person may adopt more conservative attitudes since his experiences with authority generate fear and anxiety about authority (e.g. strong central government). And because he relies upon the authority of tradition, custom and usual ways of doing and thinking, he is less likely to be able to accept change.

We find, in fact, people classified as having consistently closed experiences (group 4) are moderately low in their dependence upon authority, low in dogmatism and moderately low in trust of others. They are low on the scale of liberal values, low in trust but also low in political cynicism, low in personal efficacy and finally, highly resistant to change. Again, reliance upon authority, dogmatism and political cynicism depart from expectations. Whereas, the variables of trust, efficacy and orientation toward change are relatively consistent with the theory. Liberalism appears to change since closed primary relates to liberalism, but consistently closed socialization tends to produce more conservative subjects.

The second two socialization patterns (represented by groups 2 and 3) involve the variable of inconsistency in socialization. These

patterns are expected to result in a greater likelihood of personality adjustment. We have hypothesized people making such adjustment internally are more likely to accept change in the external world as well. Further, the changes in personality are expected to be away from the orientations formed in childhood and toward those predispositions expected as a result of the type of secondary environment. First, then, the socialization pattern involving the transition from closed childhood relations to open secondary experiences with authority is discussed.

We expect the early non-communicative relations of this process to produce more reliance upon authority, less ability to differentiate source and message (more dogmatic) and less trust in other people. But because of the adjustments required by the dissimilar secondary experiences we expect an attenuation of orientations formed early. The individual should become less reliant upon authority, less dogmatic, more trusting of others, and in addition, he should develop a greater sense of efficacy from the open secondary environment. He should be more liberal and more accepting of change for the same reasons discussed in relation to the first process. This hypothetical set of personality attributes are much the same as those resulting from the consistently open process, but we expect the various orientations to be less extreme than those from the open process because of the changes required by the transition.

In fact, the results from this socialization process are more extreme than the consistently open process. The group is characterized by moderately low dogmatism, high liberalism, high cynicism, low

trust, high efficacy, high independence of authority and the most acceptance of change of any of the four groups.

Generally our predictions of personality orientations from this particular process are sound. We have predicted the correct direction (e.g. high or low) for dogmatism, reliance upon authority, liberalism, efficacy, and orientation toward change. We missed most clearly on the variables of trust and political cynicism. The inconsistency does have the theorized results but as will be seen later, it is a case of the results being right and the reasoning wrong.

Trust is the most important departure from the theory and these people (group 3) are distrusting of politics and people. This appears to be a result of the primary environment which is not affected by the inconsistency in socialization to an open secondary environment. Evidently, trust, both political and general, is more resistant to change than the other variables used in the present analysis.

The last socialization pattern involves the transition from open and communicative primary relations to closed and non-communicative secondary relations. The open early experiences are expected to produce less reliance upon authority, less dogmatism, and more trust. The transition to a closed secondary environment should make the person more reliant upon authority, more dogmatic, and less trusting. Additionally, the closed secondary environment should reduce the sense of efficacy, and increase the likelihood that the person is conservative and resistant to change.

The experimental group representing this process is characterized by high dogmatism, moderately low liberalism, moderately low cynicism,

moderately high trust, moderately low efficacy, high dependence upon authority and moderate resistance to change.

Correct directions are predicted for the variables of dogmatism, liberalism, efficacy, reliance upon authority and orientation toward change. We have had poorer results with cynicism and trust.

We have compared the findings with the theory in this portion of the chapter and now proceed to a reformulation of the model from these findings and a discussion of the major conclusions. It is necessary to remind the reader that all of the attributes except the orientation toward change and the reliance upon authority being discussed in terms of the predicted directions could have resulted from chance alone. We feel justified in discussing these directional differences even though they are not statistically significant in all cases as a basis for evaluating an exploratory theory. We are going to consider the logic of our model which has led to relatively good predictions for several of the variables, but has led to many unsupported hypotheses along the way.

Discussion and Reformulation

To present I have evaluated the theoretical model by presenting statistically confirmed propositions for each of the theoretical expectations. However, I have initiated this study with an intuitive sketch based on bits and pieces of a literature review concerning the effects of socialization and personality attributes upon the predisposition to accept change. At this point it seems feasible to relax this analytic posture and stray from statistical analysis toward a more interpretative

reformulation of the present model in the presence of findings and considered speculation. The weaknesses and strengths of the data have been made explicit, and although the following interpretations are mine they can be measured against objective criteria. I offer the following as much from the research gestalt of my own effort as from statistical evidence with the goal of constructing a closer approximation of personality formation and change and as a basis for further and less exploratory efforts.

First to be discussed is the variable, communication with authorities in both early family and later life situations. We thought that if the child's early experiences with authority were open and communicative the subject would learn to respond to authority with more information and understanding of the authority and what the authority communicates about the world. These interpersonal relations should generate less reliance upon authority as an object and lead to more dependence upon what the authority communicates about himself and the world. This growing dependency upon what is communicated rather than who communicates should in turn lead to a greater ability to differentiate messages from sources of messages and thus to a less dogmatic personality.

When this speculation is tested, we find individuals from more open primary environments are more dependent upon their authorities for opinions about various issues, and subjects from closed environments are the more independent of these opinions. In other words, we find the opposite of what we expect and it is strongly supported in the analysis. Consider alternative explanations. First we need to

question the assumption underlying our operationalization of reliance upon authority. We have assumed that subjects who agree with their authorities on several different kinds of issues are more dependent upon authority, and disagreement with these authorities indicates independence of authority. Perhaps this assumption is not warranted and we are measuring the extent a subject does depend on what is communicated (e.g. adult opinions) rather than adult authority, qua authority. But let us examine the evidence a bit more closely.

Low dogmatism is apparently characteristic of subjects from both most open and most closed primary relations (e.g. a curvilinear relation). We have subjects who are less dogmatic and tending to agree with their authorities later in life and others who are also less dogmatic but who tend to disagree with authorities in later life. Assuming dogmatism is affected by the ability to evaluate messages separately from source, it appears that there are two alternative results of being able to make the distinction. Those from open early relations make this distinction and evidently are still able to agree with their authorities while those from closed primary relations make the distinction and form opinions more at variance with their authorities later in life. The logic leads to the conclusion that the assumption is in error. If the low dogmatic does differentiate messages from source and therefore evaluates events and issues unencumbered by his evaluation of the source, we should not expect to find this systematic relationship between reliance upon authority (i.e. agreement with authority) for one kind of low dogmatic and not for the other. In other words, we would expect a higher correlation (i.e. linear relation) between reliance

upon authority and dogmatism (which we do not find), or no linear relationship between reliance upon authority and primary environment (which we do find). In fact, it is the moderately dogmatic subjects who are least reliant upon authority while the extremely high and low dogmatics are the more dependent. Low dogmatism in this study apparently does not relate to the ability to differentiate between source and message and evaluate them separately. Low dogmatics from open family situations tend to agree with the opinions of their authorities while low dogmatics from closed family situations tend to disagree with their authorities. This raises the question of what does underlie the intolerance and authoritarianism represented by the dogmatism variable if not the ability to distinguish authorities and messages and evaluate them separately.

I suggest that the low dogmatics appear to have stronger opinions either disagreeing or agreeing with their authorities while higher dogmatics are less certain about their position in regard to their authorities. Low dogmatics appear to be the more opinionated, or at least they have a clearer understanding of their own opinions and those of their authorities.

Early relations with authority which are more communicative seem to produce less dogmatic subjects who are likely to agree with authorities in later life. If early relations with authority are more closed and non-communicative the subjects tend to be less dogmatic and more independent of their authorities' opinions later in life. Moderately open and closed relations in the primary environment tend to produce

dogmatic subjects who are evidently no more or less likely to agree with authority opinion.

It may be that the subjects with close, interpersonal communications with early authorities form clearer impressions of their authorities' opinions and are therefore more able to accept the opinions of others when they are involved in similarly open relations in later life. The subjects from closed early relations do not have any communicated understanding of authority opinions. They are aware of dictates from authoritative sources and tend to reject the opinions of any authority which is seen as an arbitrary source of directives and not as a source of information and understanding. This would help explain how people from these two different primary environments both have clearer definitions of their opinions, either to agree or disagree, in relation to those of their authorities. In one case they agree because they understand and accept, and in the other case they disagree because they reject the authority source. This suggests that dogmatism may measure intolerance and authoritarianism, but it has little to do with the ability to distinguish and separately evaluate source and messages from source. Some are more tolerant and less authoritarian because they have a better understanding of authority and others are more tolerant because they tend to reject authority generally. Those who have no clear impressions of authority, either positive or negative, are more likely to be dogmatic (i.e. intolerant and authoritarian).

Other effects of early communication with authorities must be considered. Those from open primary relations are more trusting of

of politics and politicians, and the reverse is true of those with closed early relations. The most important point here is that this trust of politics is not affected by later experiences with authority. Those with open primary environments whether they continue to have open relations or not are more trusting later in life. Those with closed early relations are more cynical whether the secondary experiences change or not. Political trust evidently is formed from open interpersonal relations in early life and is relatively stable throughout the subjects' life regardless of later experiences.

We also find those with open primary relations tend to be more conservative (e.g. less liberal), although this orientation does seem to be more affected by later secondary experiences.

Open communication in the family tends to produce trusting views of politics, less liberal values, dependence upon authorities and less dogmatism. Closed early relations tend to produce less trusting political orientations, liberal beliefs, independence of authority opinion and again, less dogmatism.

The other variables which seem to be affected by the secondary environment independently of early environments are personal efficacy, liberalism, and acceptance of change. Those with open relations in the secondary environment regardless of the type of primary experiences are efficacious, most liberal or most conservative (another curvilinear relationship) and accepting of change. This indicates that later life experiences can have substantial effect upon personality beyond the impact of early family situation.

With the above findings as a basis for the reformulation of our theory concerning the effects of early and later experiences, the results of the variable of inconsistency in socialization are observed. The only personality attributes that vary significantly over the four hypothetical socialization patterns are reliance upon authority and acceptance of change. We can use these orientations for a partial test of the consistency hypothesis.

The patterns of open primary and open secondary should produce subjects who are most like what would be expected from early childhood experiences. We find that people from consistently open socialization are moderately high in reliance upon authority and moderately accepting of change. They are dependent upon authority from their primary experiences and remain so throughout their secondary experiences. The acceptance of change results from the open secondary experiences, since we do not find any relationship between acceptance of change and primary environment. The consistently closed socialization pattern produces moderately low reliance upon authority and the greatest resistance to change. Again we find the early effects of the primary relations upon reliance upon authority are sustained and the resistance to change develops from the secondary experiences.

When we investigate the process involving inconsistency we find those with open primary relations (who should be dependent) are highest in dependency, and those with closed primary relations are most independent in later life. No changes have occurred but the effects of the inconsistency are to increase the intensity of the early formed orientations, at least for this one orientation. The impact of the secondary

experiences are consistent with our expectation that an open secondary environment increases acceptance of change. Those with open primary and closed secondary relations are moderately resistant to change while the group with closed primary and open secondary environments are most accepting of change. We find some evidence that liberals come from closed primary relations but with inconsistency (i.e. closed to open environments) the subjects are most liberal and when the process is consistent (i.e. closed to closed) the subjects are least liberal. This suggests that consistency tends to change the orientation from liberal to conservative while inconsistency tends to increase the effects of early childhood relations. Both of the suggestions must be considered in the concluding statement. Before we consider this we need to discuss two more socialization variables--continuity and level of education.

Discontinuity (e.g. experiences of crisis or trauma in the socialization process) is expected to bring about personality adjustments and these internal adjustments are expected to permit individuals to be more likely to accept change in the external world as well. Further, higher levels of education are expected to increase the acceptance of change. Both discontinuity and more education tend to increase the acceptance of change. Discontinuity contributes to lower dogmatism, independence of authority, more liberalism, and reduced efficacy, while it appears to associate with moderate levels of trust toward others. Those with more education are more liberal and likely to be either most or least dependent of authority for opinions at the present time in their life.

We now attempt to summarize these conclusions and offer some general thoughts for further analysis.

When the child has open and communicative interpersonal relations with authority in childhood he forms some orientations which are relatively stable and persist throughout life regardless of later experiences. For example, trust of politics relates to open primary environment and cynicism relates to closed primary environment regardless of the type of secondary experiences. With open primary experiences the individual remains trusting of politics even though his secondary experiences may be closed; the reverse is also true if the early experiences are closed the subject remains distrusting even if the secondary experiences are open.

Other orientations appear to develop as a result of later life experiences. The orientations to accept change, liberalism, and personal efficacy are apparently products of the secondary environment. People are most accepting of change when they have open secondary environment following a closed primary environment. The same is true of the sense of efficacy and extent of liberalism. Acceptance of change, more liberal attitudes toward politics and higher sense of efficacy result from more extensive communications with authority in later life.

We also have suggested that open relations with authority tend to make individuals more able to understand and accept authority and this in turn leads to more tolerance and less authoritarianism (i.e. less dogmatism). On the other hand closed childhood relations lead to negative reaction to and rejection of authority generally, and this appears to be associated with being less dogmatic. Both understanding of

authority and rejection of authority contribute to more open and less dogmatic personalities. We find negative evidence that the ability to evaluate source and message independently underlie dogmatism.

If the individual experiences discontinuity in his socialization it appears to have considerable effect upon personality. We find the degree of discontinuity relates to six of the seven orientations measured in the study. It does not related to political cynicism. Discontinuity makes individuals accepting of change in the external world and less rigid in their internal view of the world. These experiences contribute to less extreme positions concerning trust (neither high or low) and a reduced sense of personal efficacy. Both of these findings could be interpreted as a more realistic assessment of people and the individual capacity to control their environment. Finally, these people experiencing discontinuity are more liberal in political beliefs.

The resulting picture is a person who experiences difficulty in life and makes adjustments to these experiences and is therefore more likely to be less rigid about his beliefs generally and more likely to be more accepting of changes in situations arising in his external world. He is more tolerant of others (but not more trusting) because he has come to be more tolerant of himself as a result of his own experiences with crisis situations which have exposed his own weaknesses. He tends to reject authority and feels less efficacious which may be no more than an accurate appraisal of his experiences with people. Because of his own difficulties he is more likely to accept weaknesses in others and want government to do something to aid people in stressful situations,

thus the liberal political views. Education may increase liberalism and evidently permits the person a clearer impression of their authorities' opinions (i.e. more education relates to both extreme agreement and disagreement with authorities). The educated are more able to accept change in the world even though they are not necessarily less dogmatic. This suggests that education may be a very important contributor to the acceptance of change at the level of cognitive experiences above and beyond the results of early learning.

We find some evidence that inconsistency in socialization does not change early formed orientations but does have the effect of a more receptive cognitive structure for the effects of the secondary environment if the transition is from closed primary to open secondary. This particular socialization pattern (e.g. closed primary and open secondary) appears most important as a source of acceptance of change, and tends to produce the most intense orientations on all of the attributes studied except dogmatism. People with consistently open socialization are accepting of change, but those from closed primary and open secondary are most accepting of change.

The regression analysis has shown that personality contributes most to the prediction of the orientation toward change, but that socialization experiences do contribute to better understanding and explanation of this relatively complex predisposition. The evidence is not impressive but does seem to support the idea that both personality variables and socialization experiences are necessary to the explanation of the orientation toward change even though in this study the psychological attributes are doing most of the predictive work. We are able

to get substantial variation from our four experimental groups for at least two of the personality attributes which suggests that the juxtaposition of early and later experiences does have an impact upon personality.

The inconsistency does not change the early formed orientations but tends to render the person more receptive to secondary experiences. Perhaps secondary experiences have the effect of expanding the personality. The expansion takes the form of new orientations derived from the type of secondary experiences. It may be that inconsistency and discontinuity do lead to change in personality, but not change in the sense we have thought of it. These variables appear to have the effect of facilitating the expansion of personality under the impact of secondary experiences.

Conclusions

Early child-authority relations characterized by intense communication and interaction have several profound effects upon the formation of personality. In the present study we find the child learns from these relationships several orientations which are resistant to change under the impact of later socialization. (The child learns to trust authority or to distrust authority depending upon the type of early relations with his immediate authorities, and this orientation persists into later life regardless of the type of later experiences with authority.) If early authorities are open and accessible to the child, he learns to trust political authority, while if they are (closed and non-communicative) he learns to distrust politics and

politicians. There is some indication that liberal political orientations are more likely to emerge from closed primary socialization, but liberalism appears to be more affected by events and relationships in the secondary environment.

Dogmatism and reliance upon authority are molded by these same early experiences with authorities, although not in the way we had expected. Less dogmatic subjects are products of either extremely open or extremely closed early relations, and again, the effects seem to be resistant to change. The subjects from open primary environments tend to be more dependent upon the opinions of their authorities for their own thinking about various social and political issues later in life. Those with closed interpersonal contact in childhood are more independent of authority opinion in later life. We should point out that both reliance upon authority and dogmatism are presently conceptualized as being structural attributes of personality that affect the way a person believes rather than what he believes. We can conclude with some confidence from the present study that the child does learn to relate to authority in the early family situation (i.e. learns to trust or distrust authority; to accept opinions or reject opinions of authority; and to be more or less tolerant and authoritarian /more or less dogmatic/) and the orientations formed at this point in the child's life are relatively resistant to change from later socialization. Also we can point out here that both dogmatism and reliance upon authority show substantial relationship to the various substantive or content orientations (what the person believes). Dogmatism relates positively to efficacious attitudes

about personal environment and trust of people and politics. Independence of authority relates positively to liberalism, distrust of people and cynicism about politics. The curvilinear relation between the two structural attributes (i.e. dogmatism and reliance upon authority) leads to one of the more exciting theoretical suggestions of the study.

Rokeach¹ has suggested that the underlying variable affecting dogmatism is the ability to distinguish messages from source of message and evaluate the two separately. The more dogmatic person operates on a fusion of source and message and the less dogmatic person evaluates events in the situation separately from his evaluation of the source of the messages in the situations. We find negative evidence concerning this argument in the present study.

This analysis shows low dogmatics emerge from both extremely closed and extremely open primary relations with authority; however, low dogmatics from open primary relations are more likely to agree with the opinions of their authorities in later life while low dogmatics from closed family situations are more likely to disagree with authorities later in life. We have theorized that dogmatism is not related to ability to distinguish source and message, but instead, it appears to be an outgrowth of two entirely different modes of relating to authority generally. Low dogmatism (tolerance and less authoritarianism) may result from relationships which are characterized

¹M. Rokeach, op. cit., 1960.

by communication and understanding of the authority and what the authority says, or from situations in which there is no information and understanding and only rejection of the source of arbitrary dictates. Intolerance and authoritarianism appear likely only when there is no clear impression of the authority. When there is either positive understanding or negative rejection the individuals are more likely to be less dogmatic (i.e. less authoritarian and more tolerant).

As the psychoanalytic perspective has directed our attention to the impact of primary relations upon personality, the cognitive approach has led us to look for effects of later life socialization. We have relatively strong evidence concerning the impact of secondary socialization upon personality and particularly upon the substantive attributes of personality.

Theoretically, we had expected to find open, communicative relations with authority in later life to have the effect of increasing personal efficacy. We have found this to be the case. Efficacy is related to open secondary experiences while not related to the type of primary experiences. More importantly we find even more substantial effect from secondary relations upon other attributes of personality.

We find relationship between open primary relations with authority and the variables of liberalism and acceptance of change. Open communications and interpersonal relations with authority in later life do have an impact upon personality supporting the notion that later life

experiences are of critical importance to the development of orientations relevant to political behavior.

We have theorized discontinuity in socialization as having the effect of changing orientations formed early. That is, experiences of crisis or personal trauma require internal adjustments in personality, and they are expected to have the additional effect of making individuals more receptive to change in external situations, as well. In fact the variable of discontinuity has substantial impact upon the personality attributes presently studied. Subjects who have reported at least one crisis event (e.g. one or more such events in the list of ten most important events in their lives) are more likely to be less dogmatic internally and more accepting of change externally. They are also less dependent upon authority, more liberal, less efficacious and moderately trusting of other people. Discontinuity has the predicted effect upon personality. Evidently, people experiencing such crisis events are changed by the experiences.

We also thought level of education might contribute to the development of orientations and particularly to the acceptance of change. We find evidence of this as well as those with more education being more liberal and more likely to be either most or least dependent upon their authorities. Again this suggests that later life experiences (i.e. secondary experiences with authority, discontinuity, and education) all have substantial effects upon the formation of personality.

Finally, we had thought that inconsistency between early and later socialization experiences with authority should produce changes in personality and acceptance of change in the external world. The

findings require a re-evaluation of our conceptualization of personality change. Rather than conceptualize change as from one type of orientation formed in childhood to an opposite view in later life, we have come to view change as an expansion process. When the transition (inconsistency) from early to later experiences involves open primary to closed secondary there appears to be a contraction effect. Although the personality does absorb new orientations from the secondary environment, the effects are not as strong or the person does not seem to be as receptive to the new environmental circumstance and experiences. When the inconsistency is from closed primary to open secondary the person is most sensitive to the impact of later socialization and develops more intense orientations as a result of the type of secondary experiences with authority. We cannot conclude that consistency tends to make personality more stable as we had expected. In fact, we find the orientation of liberalism switches direction from more liberal to more conservative in the consistently closed socialization pattern while the opposite occurs in the consistently open pattern. It may be that liberalism is more affected by later experiences and therefore the evident change is not so real, but we can only conclude that if the socialization pattern is more consistent then the type of socialization experiences becomes the more important determinant of personality.

Another general conclusion of the study has to do with usefulness of conceptualizing personality orientations as a product of both socialization experiences and other personality attributes. We have substantial evidence that varying patterns of socialization have impacts upon personality. The four experimental groups in our study

(representing each of the theoretical socialization patterns) do produce significant variation in the orientation toward change and reliance upon authority. This multivariate model appears to have merit in the explanation of the particular orientation to accept change.

The results of the regression analysis and multiple correlations suggest the psychological variables are the most important contributors to the acceptance of or resistance to change, but our predictive capacity is improved by utilizing the combination of socialization and personality variables. The variables dogmatism, liberalism, secondary environment and continuity are the most important predictors of the predisposition to accept or resist change.

In final evaluation of this study I offer the following major conclusions. We have found personality predispositions are relatively complex phenomena and even the use of multi-variate schemes of analysis provide only limited insight into their formation and operation. We have demonstrated the utility of using such models in the more important quest for understanding of the process of becoming a person. Perhaps the most suggestive portion of the study has been the use of the four sequential patterns of socialization experiences in relation to varying personality attributes. Clearly, if further research into the relationship of socialization, personality and behavior is to be meaningful it must be conceptualized as an ongoing and changing process rather than a static set of relationships existing at some moment.

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
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