ABSTRACT
TECHNOCRATS AS MIDDLEMEN AND THEIR NETWORKS IN THE

PHILIPPINE RICE PROJECT: THE CASE
OF THE MASAGANA 99

BY

Victoria M. Arcega

Modernizing societies have witnessed the rise of various roles
played by agents of development and change--foreign technical
assistants, extension agents, educators, etc. This is an exploratory
study of the origins and patterns of behavior of one type of emerging
agent of change in the Philippines--the technocrats--as they partici-
pate in a government project for attaining self-sufficiency in pro-
ducing the staple crop of rice.

Because of the non-institutional status of the technocrat in
the Philippines, 62 selected participants of the organization which
sustains the rice project, called the Masagana 99, were interviewed
for their perceptions of the characteristics of a technocrat. These
participants who served as the reputational panel members or infor-
mants for this study, have been involved in the planning and imple-
mentation of the project at the National Office in Metropolitan Manila
and in two provinces: one in Luzon and the other in the Visayas. The
participants were also asked to nominate persons in the project who

typify technocrats and who were involved at either one or two specific

Victoria M. Arcega

points in time in its conception and implementation. Among the 169
nominees, 24 about whom there was greatest consensus as to their being
technocrats, became the main focus of the study. These most often
cited 24 technocrats were operationally defined as "visible" to dis-
tinguish them from the "less visible" who received fewer nominations.
Several strategies were employed to obtain information about techno—
crats as persons and as a collectivity: in—depth interviews of each
technocrat with the aid of a schedule of open—ended questions, bio-
data sheets, and self-administered questionnaires.

The code word "technocrat" has emerged at a critical period
in Philippine history when the state and the public are searching
for new leadership which has the capabilities and competencies for
forging developmental plans and for implementing these plans to solve
problems of national polity. In this study, the aforementioned
reputational panel who characterized the technocrats, see them as dif-
fering from segments of society who are judged to have failed in
articulating the most recent scientific-technical information and
knowledge into practical endeavors which could be accepted by the
national centers of authority and by the individual farmers; and be
incorporated into the complex social structures of bureaucracy and
into the local patterns of different provinces.

The panel described two types of roles: administrator-
technocrats are seen as differing from conventional bureaucrats to
the extent that they are less completely entangled by "traditionalism,"
"rigidities" and "involvement in red-tape"; scientist-technocrats are

defined as persons who differ from the academic-research scientists in

Victoria M. Arcega

that they engage in the selective syntheses and organization of
knowledge for adoption by policy-makers. The label technocrat is here
used to indicate persons who are perceived by the panel as possessing
charisma because they are appraised as positively contributing to
developmental processes, by embodying a set of values:

1. 0bjectivity-—making decisions on a rational assessment of
the situation, the alternatives, and of the events as they in
fact occur;

2. Realism--making a decision in accordance with what is prag-
matically feasible;

3. Change—orientation--being flexible, innovative, dynamic and
open-minded;

4. Time perspective in problem—solving--having a sense of
urgency and of actively pursuing the direct solution of real
problems; and,

5. Collective orientation--giving primacy to the needs of
national polity.

Whether or not these values are actually realized as technocrats carry
out their roles is an open empirical question.

While competence is expected of persons who are recruited as
technocrats for the project, the system of recruitment follows
traditional patterns of personal sponsorship. This connotes the entry
of persons into the technocratic system through particularistic ties
established with an authority figure or his agent. These connections
are made at school, in an extended kin-group, in the professions, and

on the job. They are usually decisive in a sponsor's recruiting of

Victoria M. Arcega

prospective technocrats. Thus, modernity and tradition become mutually
reinforcing in generating technocratic patterns.

New paradigms are needed to examine the on-going processes in
which nascent elements of culture are formed and accommodated with
existing ones. The concept of "third culture" is adapted to depict
the norms governing the behavior of men-in-the-middle as they play
their roles in the brokerage of a public enterprise which binds
together disparate segments of the p0pulations of a national society.
Technocrats perform the role of middleman on one level, by linking
the scientific technical community and the policy—makers. This is
undertaken by effecting the adoption of the scientific-technical
culture relevant to the problem at hand. On a second level, techno-
crats link the policy-makers and the members of a bureaucracy both
at the national and provincial levels, by forging the implementation
of the scientific-technical proposals adopted by policy-makers. The
first type of brokers are those who have recently emerged from or have
current linkages with research-technical institutions. In contrast,
the second type of brokers are affiliated with government or private
business (both Filipino and foreign-related enterprises). The first
type of brokers in contrast with the second, are younger, have more
advanced education, and have more cross-cultural experiences through
the attendance of seminars or workshops in the last five years.

Personal networks are important matrices for technocratic
roles. Personal networks are the role-connected interpersonal ties
of technocrats who are engaged in situationally defined but goal-

related activities. Networks as social matrices, are Open-ended and

Victoria M. Arcega

without fixed boundaries. They do not consist of positions in which
duties and responsibilities are ascribed and codified. The sorts of
activities are primarily dependent on the persons initiating them
within the frame of reference of the mission. These networks differ
from corporate groups or formal organizations wherein positions are
embedded with well-delineated norms and rules for behavior.

This study has primarily examined the roles, networks, third
culture, and character of the technocrats involved in the particular
project in focus. It suggests, for a sociologist, future studies on
the relationship of technocracy and its accommodation to complex
social milieu. It invites further comparative studies of the com-
binings of persons, roles, networks and cultures of technocracy in

disparate ventures in development and change.

TECHNOCRATS AS MIDDLEMEN AND THEIR NETWORKS IN THE
PHILIPPINE RICE PROJECT: THE CASE

OF THE MASAGANA 99

BY

‘\\

«
'3

Victoria M. Arcega

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Sociology

1976

Copyright by
VICTORIA M. ARCEGA

1976

DEDICATION

In memory of my father whose encouragement

inspired this pursuit .

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are numerous persons and institutions I wish to
acknowledge for having substantially contributed not only to this
research undertaking but also to the process of my growth and develop-
ment as a sociologist.

Foremost are the combined efforts of Drs. John and Ruth Hill
Useem who conscientiously provided intellectually stimulating views
of the profession as well as encouragement and support during the
turmoils of my life as a graduate student--academic or otherwise.
Both Opened up my visions to new frontiers in sociology in relation-
ship to the central ideas of this dissertation. I am certainly
appreciative of their sensitiveness, sympathies, fresh insights, and
genuine concern and interest about the conditions in my country and
the other developing nations of the world. Their commitment and
dedication to the profession have provided a source of inspiration
for pursuing my future role in the same vein.

I wish to express my appreciation to the other members of my
guidance committee--Professors Richard C. Hill, James B. McKee and
Kay A. Snyder. They contributed insights to my research work. I
found their classes permeated by a scholarly atmosphere of challenge,

reflectiveness, and innovative thinking.

iii

Professor Thomas Nowak also shared his time in the formulation
of my research design. Having a concern for and knowledge about
Philippine conditions, he was helpful in suggesting approaches for
examining the problem area I have focused on.

The Agricultural Development Council Inc. generously extended
to me the fellowship that enabled me to pursue my doctoral studies
and this thesis. I am especially thankful to Drs. Raymond Borton and
Russell Stevenson for their personal guidance and interest.

The Filipino support contributed significantly to my pro-
fessional development and to undertaking this study. The leadership
and staff of the College of Public Administration of the University
of the Philippines provided the logistics and the professional
stimulation throughout my graduate studies including my field work
for this thesis. Dr. Raul de Guzman, Dean of the College, gave
valuable guidance on the content of this study and enthusiastic
support in my development as a professional sociologist. I am very
thankful to Professors Ledivina Carina, Gabriel Iglesias and Romeo
Ocampo for their assistance when I encountered complex problems in
the course of the field research.

I am grateful to Dr. Gelia T. Castillo of the University of
the Philippines at Los Bafios, my former mentor during my graduate
studies in the Philippines. As my professor, she introduced me to
the meaning of soundly constructed empirical research and initiated
me into being concerned about the future of sociology in the country
and the potential contributions of the profession to the problems of

development.

iv

Although few of the respondents and informants of this research
may read the detailed findings of this study, nevertheless, I wish to
express my sincere thanks to them. This study could not have
materialized without their cooperation, candor, knowledge and
unselfishly giving of their time in spite of busy schedules.

Dr. Edgardo Quisumbing, Mr. Hegino Orticio and Mrs. Socorro V.
Angeles of the National Food and Agriculture Council were especially
helpful in providing information regarding their organization. They
also assisted in introducing this researcher to the respondents and
the informants from the different parts of the country.

To Emma Boncaras and Amor Mitra, I am also thankful for pro-
viding assistance in obtaining relevant data and other forms of
support in the conduct of this study.

My special thanks are due to my family and friends who have.

given their encouragement and motivation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF FIGURES .
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION
Background of the Study .

Socio-cultural setting for the emergence
of technocrats . . . . . . . .

Statement of the Problem
Review of Literature . . .

Who are the technocrats as ideally

conceived? . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Communal vs. dominant class interests .
The realities of technocracy

Identification of the Technocrat: A Con-
ceptual and A Methodological Problem . . .
Framework for Analysis: Networks as the
"Social Space" of Technocracy . . . . . . . .
The Variables Under Study . . . . . . . . . . .
Operational Definition . . . . . . . . . . . .

II. THE PROJECT IN FOCUS: THE MASAGANA 99 RICE PROJECT
III. RESEARCH DESIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Characterizing and Nominating Technocrats . . . . .
Reputational panel (conception stage)
Reputational panel at the national
agency (implementation stage) .
Reputational panel from the provinces

(implementation stage) . . . . . . . . . .
Profile of the panel . . . . . . . . . . . .

vi

Page
xii

XV

12
14
16
19
23
29
33
37
45
46
48
48

49
52

CHAPTER
Universe of the Study: The Technocrats

Ethnography . .
Interview instrument
Background information

Data Collection Period . .
Interviewer-Interviewee Relationship

IV. TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF FILIPINO TECHNOCRATS

Characteristics of Technocrats as Perceived
by the Reputational Panel .

The technocrat and his functions with
respect to the organization in focus

Perspectives on technocrats by the two
broad community groupings of panel
members .

Perspectives on technocrats by panel
members stemming from the scientific
community. . . .

Per5pectives on technocrats from panel
members of the administrative

community. . .
Other perceived attributes of technocrats
as administrators . . . .

Perceived qualities of technocrats. in
administration as they relate with
selected social milieu . . . .

Non-behavioral indicators for technocrats
in administration .

Summary and Analysis
Conclusion . . . .

V. OF TECHNOCRATS AND TECHNOCRACY
Part A - Technocrats in General .
The Reactions of Panel Members to the

Nominating Process . .
The Technocrats at the Conception Stage .

The Technocrats at the Implementation Stage .

Broad origins of technocrats at the

Center . . . . . . . .
The visible technocrats (central)
Provincial technocrats

vii

Page
53
SS
57
58

S9
59

63

63

64

66

67

71

73

74
77

80
84

86
88
91

92
94

98
98
100

CHAPTER Page

The broad origins of the choices of

the central and provincial panels . . . . . 100
The visible technocrats (provincial)

from the perspective of the

central and provincial panels . . . . . . . 108

The Panel Members as Technocrats . . . . . . . . 109
Some Impressions on the Nature of

Technocracy as Observed in the

Aggregate Findings on the

Nominations for Technocrats . . . . . . . . . . 113

Part B - The Visible Technocrats in Focus: A
General Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

Origins of Technocrats . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Occupational histories of visible

technocrats . . . . . . . . . . . 119
The occupational histories of visible

technocrats, the less visibles and

the non-technocrats . . . . . . . . . 121
The major activities engaged in by

technocrats in their occupational

histories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

The Technocrats' Entry into the Project
and their Level of Participation . . . . . . . 125

A profile of the Filipino technocrats'
occupational history upon their
entry into the project . . . . . . . . . . 126
Profile of Technocrats . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Sex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

Educational attainment . . . . . . . . 133
Areas of specialization for higher
education . . . . . . . . 139

Institutions from which the visible

technocrats obtained their highest

degree or training . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
Cross-cultural experiences . . . . . . . . . 142
Professionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Socio-economic origins . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

viii

CHAPTER

Part C - The Visible Technocrats and their
Roles . . .

Organizing Concepts .
Catalyst role .
A Methodological Note on This Question,
and Insights on the Nature of
Technocracy .

The Visible Technocrats and their Roles .

Catalyst role . . . . .
The catalyst as broker

Brokerage and the process of influence

Foreign Technocrats .

Some hypotheses about the emergence of
foreign technocrats . . . . . .

Technocrats in Relation to Policy—Makers

Decision-making as a continuously
evolving process

Technocrats and Their Roles in the Two
Stages of the Project . .

The Less Visible Technocrats in Relation
to the Visible Counterparts .

Analysis of Findings

Part D - Personal Experiences of Visible
Technocrats in Relation to the Project

Entry into the Project of Visible
Technocrats . . . . . . . .

Modes for recruitment .
Summary .

Socialization of Visible Technocrats for
the Project .

Summary .

ix

Page

158
159

161

163
164

164
164
172

174

176

178
180
182
186
188
197
198
198

205

206

215

CHAPTER

Sources of Information Regarding One's
Area of Expertise: Role of Personal
Networks

Summary .

Socialization and the "Significant
Others" Network . . . . .

Central technocrats .
Provincial technocrats
Summary .

Plans for the Future Work Roles of
Technocrats .

Central technocrats .
Provincial technocrats
Foreign technocrats .
Summary .

Gratifications and Frustrations Encountered
in the Project . . . . . .

Gratifications . . .

Frustrations . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Technocrats with "waning commitments" .
Summary . . . . . . . . . .

Foreign Technocrats and Their Social
Interaction with Participants
in the Project . . . . . . .

Part E - The Self-Identities of Visible
Technocrats . . . . . . .

Self-Identities as Technocrats
Problems Typical to Integrated vs.
Fringe Technocrats . . . . .

Integrated technocrats
Fringe technocrats

Tensions Experienced by Technocrats
Engaged in a Conflictive Social Milieu
Summary . . . . .

Page

216

218

219
219
221
222
223
223
225
226
227
227
227
232

234
236

236

238
238
242
242
245

246
248

CHAPTER
VI. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The Experience of Philippine Technocracy and
Its Implications for Sociological Conceptual-
ization: The Role of a Third Culture
Third culture in relation to technocracy
Summary profile of technocrats and
technocracy in Masagana 99

The Social Matrix of Technocracy
Epilogue

BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX

A. FUNCTIONAL CHART OF MASAGANA 99 RICE PRODUCTION
PROGRAM .

B. INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (TECHNOCRATS IN A PROJECT) . . .

C. PERSONAL PROFILE OF RESPONDENT (BIO-DATA)

D. DISTRIBUTION OF TECHNOCRATS (CENTRAL AND
PROVINCIAL) ACCORDING TO VOTES OBTAINED

FROM REPUTATIONAL PANELS AT CONCEPTION
AND IMPLEMENTATION STAGES .

xi

Page

249

249
253
257

263
266

267

276
277

294

302

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page
1. General Characteristics of the Combined Panels . . . . . . S4
2. Persons Nominated as Technocrats . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

3. Perceived Indicators for a Technocrat by
Central and Provincial Panels Combined . . . . . . . . . 65

4. Specific Attributes of Technocrats by Functions
in the Bureaucracy as Perceived by Panels
by Communities of Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

S. Technocrats at the Conception Stage and their
Institutional Affiliations from the Per-
spective of the Reputational Panel . . . . . . . . . . . 95

6. Central Technocrats and their Institutional
Linkages Mentioned by the Reputational
Panels (Combined) at the Implementation
Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

7. Provincial Technocrats from the Perspective
of the Central Panel (Implementation) . . . . . . . . . . 105

8. Provincial Technocrats and their Institutional
Linkages from the Perspective of the
Provincial Panels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

9. A Profile of Nominations for Technocrats
(Central and Provincial) by Reputational
Panels at Conception and Implementation . . . . . . . . . 111

10. Origins of Nominees of Central and Provincial
Panels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

11. Institutional Affiliation for the Greater Part

of the Visible Technocrats' Occupational
Histories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

xii

Table Page

12. Institutional Affiliations for the Greater Part of
the Technocrats' and Non—Technocrats' Occupational
Histories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

13. Activities Engaged in by Technocrats and Non-
Technocrats for the Greater Part of their
Occupational Histories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

14. MObility of Visible Technocrats in the Project
in Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

15. Ages of Central and Provincial Visible Technocrats
as Compared with Less Visible Technocrats and
Non-Technocrats (Filipinos) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

16. Educational Attainment of Visible Technocrats
(Central and Provincial) as Compared with
Less Visibles and Non-Technocrats . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

17. Educational Attainment of Technocrats (Visible
and Less Visible Filipinos) by Parameter of
Participation in the Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

18. Areas of Specialization in Collegiate and Post-
Collegiate Education of Technocrats and Non-
Technocrats (Filipinos) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

19. Seminars and WorkshOps Attended by Technocrats
and Non-Technocrats in the Last Five Years
(Filipinos) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

20. Central and Provincial Technocrats Compared in
their Cross-Cultural Exposures (Visible and
Less Visible Filipinos) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

21. Countries Visited by Visible Filipino Technocrats
in the Last Five Years for Seminars and Workshops . . . . 146

22. Membership in Professional Organizations (Filipino
Technocrats and Non-Technocrats) . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

23. Socio-Economic Origins of Technocrats and Non-
Technocrats (Filipinos) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

24. Technocrats (Visible and Less Visible Filipinos)

in the Central and Provincial Settings,
Compared in their Socio-Economic Origins . . . . . . . . lSO

xiii

Table Page

25. Occupations of Fathers of Visible Filipino
Technocrats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

26. The Occupational History of the Visible
Technocrats (Filipinos) by Socio-Economic
Origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

27. The Types of Catalyst Roles Performed by
Visible Technocrats in the Project . . . . . . . . . . . 16S

28. Attributes Considered Important in the
Involvement with the Project by Visible
Technocrats (Central and Provincial) . . . . . . . . . . 208

29. Circumstances in the Development of Personal
Attributes of Visible Technocrats (N=24)
Considered Important in their Roles in
the Masagana 99 Involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

30. Sources Relied Upon for Information in One's
Area of Expertise by Central and
Provincial Technocrats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

31. Sources of Gratifications of Visible
Technocrats in Relation to the Project . . . . . . . . . 228

32. Comparison of the Sources of Frustration and
Gratification of Visible Technocrats in
the Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

33. Self-Perceptions as Technocrats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

xiv

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

1.

The Technocrats Cited by All Reputational Panels
(Combined) at Conception and Implementation
Stages . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total Number of Central Technocrats Mentioned by
the Three Panels (Implementation Stage) . . . . .

The Visible Central Technocrats from the Perspective
of the Three Panels (Implementation) . . . .

The Visible Central Technocrats at Conception and
Implementation from the Perspective of A11
Panels Combined (Central and Provincial)

Provincial Technocrats from the Perspective of the
Three Panels (Implementation Stage) . . . . . .

The Visible Technocrats (Provincial) from the
Perspective of the Three Panels .

The Panel Members in Relation to the Technocrats

Personal Networks in the Recruitment of Visible
Technocrats in Masagana 99 (National Technocrats)

XV

Page

90

97

101

102

103

110

112

203

. .
nab
I.‘ .1

01’.

“a!“

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

 

Modernizing societies have witnessed the rise of various
agents for development and modernization, e.g., foreign technical
assistants, extension specialists, professionals, scientists and
technicians. In the case of the Philippines, the catapulting of
such persons, called "technocrats," into the limelight in public
administration at the opening of the Seventies has been more prominent
than at any other time in her history. Technocrats were notably
brought to public attention by journalists of the Philippine media,
constituting one of the active sectors of the public in assessing the
on-going develOpments in the country (see, for example: Almario, 1971;
Beltran, 1972a, 1972b; Ibarra, 1971; Limlingan, 1974; Macatuno, 1969;
Tupas, 1969). Some of their advocates have almost euphorically
acclaimed the promise of technocrats' ability "to shorten the achieve-
ment of economic development objectives by several years" (Limlingan,
1974:4).

Some persons equipped with the most recently formulated or con-
ceptualized ideas and techniques obtained from prestigious schools
abroad in the areas of science and management, plus having had the
opportunity to practice their expertise in the private business sector,

1

have been recruited into public service to assume executive leadership.
Others called into service originate from the university departments
where they have made substantial contributions to research and adminis-
tration of projects relevant to the problems of Philippine national
life. Whether from the private sector or university circles, they

are considered a "special breed of men supposedly possessed of some
superior knowledge in specific and ever-widening fields of human
activity--in the social sciences, national and international politics,
education, culture, war, economics and other social and physical dis-
ciplines" (Almario, l97l:6). They are the "specialists, the acade-
micians, the technicians, whose common credentials to alleged expertise
is a string of diplomas and degrees from the universities" (Almario,
l97l:6).

It is argued that not only will developmental processes be
quickened because of the technical preparation of technocrats for
assuming roles in planning or administration, but also that certain
public objectives will be assured because of the personal qualities
and attributes which characterize technocrats. Competence is coupled
with a "higher standard of public morality and a deeper commitment to
public service" (Limlingan, 1974:4; see also, Macatuno, 1969:22).
According to Limlingan:

The secret of success of the technocrat lies in his living

in three different worlds--the Government, the University and the
Industry. From these three varied organizations, he shuttles back
and forth. From these, he is able to resolve: the basic contra-
diction inherent in having a hierarchy of human needs and a
diversity of human drives. He can seek financial security in
Business, public service in Government, and professional develop-
ment in the School. He can also seek a variety of roles and

responsibilities . . . [H]e serves in the Government to deal with
what is urgent, he goes to the University to consider what is

n-

important and joins the Business Corner to learn to distinguish
between the two (Limlingan, 1974:4).

As individuals committed to "systematic planning and the
scientific method" (Tupas, 1969:10), technocrats plan for the future
of the organization by making use of relevant information, data and
figures. They are held to have such foresight that they can anticipate
problems and are ready to cope with them correspondingly. They are
"young," "energetic," "innovative," "pragmatic," and "sweeping in
outlook." They can "do their jobs not within the narrow confines of
the responsibilities of their offices, but within the larger view of
the government functions as a whole, setting in realistic terms, their
small goals toward the direction the country takes" (Macatuno, 1969:
22).

The President himself has given impetus to the recruitment of
technocrats into public office mostly of "fresh young blood" from the
private sector. The outcry of the populace for filtering down economic
benefits has posed a challenge to government to improve its bureau-
cratic machinery. The President matched this challenge by openly
declaring that the career civil service system shall not be character-
ized by "incompetence" and "mediocrity" (Marcos, 1966:16). He has
espoused the interchange of talent between the public and private
sector. The government, he claims, must be regenerated to attain the
requirements of national growth. He says:

We must accept that the infusion of new blood is desirable

and necessary rather than just a concession to political
exigency . . . . To this end, I would like to see the infusion
of our career staff with "new blood" at all levels of the national

government and the interchange of all talent between government
and private employment and among government agencies in order to

enhance the responsiveness of our public service to the challenges
we face (Marcos, 1966:16).

Technocracy has been even further emphasized when the President
declared martial law in 1972. Upon the abolition of the American
inspired bicameral legislature responsible for the institutionalization
of public policies, supposedly initiated by the executive department,
the new political structure finds the President in the helm of policy-
making. He, in turn, encouraged an influx of technocrats from the
private sector into public service, principally those belonging to
his Cabinet, where they serve as key administrators of the executive
departments. The President relies on them to initiate plans for
adoption and, thereafter, to implement such plans (see de Guzman,
1974). Massive and broad planning is usually undertaken through task
forces or ad_hgg_bodies constituted also of Cabinet members in coor-
dination with and assisted by experts from various public and private
institutions (de Guzman, 1974; Stauffer, 1974).

Technocrats are not exempted from critics, however. Some
sectors of the public see technocracy as the perpetuation of the
economic interests of private business which are now readily protected
by the executive leaders who have established linkages with business
enterprises (Lichauco, 1973:65; Stauffer, 1974:10). A doubt is cast
over the policies and development plans generated by the pooled
talents of technocrats. The basic issue addressed is: "Who benefits
from the grand visions and plans for development?" "Have these plans

been able to redistribute the wealth of the limited few to the masses

of the people?"1 They are apt to question what, indeed, have tech-
nocrats contributed in a given period of time after they have assumed

leadership.

Socio-cultural setting for the emergence of technocrats. It is

 

paradoxical to note that while the government had been envisioned as
the unit to assume leadership in undertaking the tasks of economic
development, it is the very entity that has been discerned as serving
as a stumbling block for the attainment of this purpose (Gregorio, 1960;
Roxas, 1965; Salas, 1968). The underlying reason for this inability can
be attributed to its failure to conform to basic norms and rules with
which the organization had been established. Although its stated
purposes and structure emphasize merit as the basis for recruitment
of its personnel, this emerged more as a stated ideal than a fact.
Among scholarly explanations that burgeoned, the factor of traditional
culture interlacing with the modern ideal of merit, has been con-
sidered to be the reason for these incongruencies (Abueva, 1966;
Francisco, 1960; Hollnsteiner, 1966). As one aptly remarks:
It appears that Filipino culture has a superstructure of attitudes
and values of Western origin resting on a definitely indigenous
infra-structure. Among the former may be mentioned: a confidence
in the potency of the individual to solve his own problems, a high

respect for individual achievement, technical expertise and
scientific rationality in the social management of public affairs,

 

1See for example Macatuno's statement that the absorption of
technocrats into public service created a "tangle of economic ironies
. . . because, while they are acclaimed as production managers, their
much vaunted know-how and expertise have failed to escalate the Gross
National Product (GNP)" (l969:4). He further states that they have
produced a "reckless policy of over-spending and lack of fiscal
responsibility, produced a condition of economic imbalance in which
the poor become poorer and the rich become richer" (l969:4).

and a technique of enforcing social responsibility through
impersonal legal rules. The infra—structure, on the other hand,
has among its components: a strong sense of primary group
loyalties and interests as against those of the individual and
of the larger community, a particularistic view which leads to
the "privatization" of public affairs, and a style of social
morality based on personal and traditional or ethical norms
(Corpuz, 1960:306).

The attitude of "semi-paternal solicitude" in extending private
or public employment prevailed as an underlying norm (Corpuz, 1960:304).
This is a product of the influence of the strong familistic conside-
rations of the Filipinos. The bilaterally-extended structure of the
family, in which kinship ties are traced to the relatives of both
the father and the mother, is further ramified by the ritual rela-
tions in the "compadre complex." A friend or a relative who stands
as a sponsor or godparent to an offspring in the process of entry into
the religious circle expands the kinship network. Corpuz states: "It
is impossible to look anywhere in the political system without seeing
the family influence at work and established in some political custom
or practice. Kinship ties and loyalties have proved resistant to
political 'reforms' and to civil service rules on recruitment into
the bureaucracy, and nepotism is a notorious but ethically condoned
practice" (1960:304).

It was in the search for more meritorious public servants that
technocracy emerged in the Philippines. Leading proponents of this
outlook for government originated from the private business sector.

In 1965, Ocampo (1971:35) reports a Conference on Economic Development
being held among top business leaders, to determine the role that the

private sector should take in "rationalizing and hastening economic

development." Out of this Conference evolved a Council for Economic

Development (CED) to provide a national viewpoint for the private
sector and to express its position on vital issues. The first posi-
tion paper submitted by the Council urged all sectors of the country
to be engaged in a coordinated effort to establish an integrated plan
for development, and to assure that these plans were implementable.
Ocampo states:

. these imperatives consisted of improved efficiency,
expansion, and consolidation along broader development fronts
(production "complexes," investment in "packages" of capital
facilities and assets), and institution in all sectors of an
operational planning cycle from project identification to project
execution (1971:35).

The Council assailed the government for its inadequacy in understand-
ing the "technical and organizational intricacies and imperatives" of
business (Ocampo, 1971:35-36). The government was allegedly wanting
in capable people who were imbued with a sense of urgency to perform
these duties. Thereafter, CED avowed to have its position heard in
policy issues especially those "requiring public overhead and other
resources" (Ocampo, 1971:36).

The early beginnings of technocrats in the government can be
traced to the establishment in 1962 of an advisory staff by the first
economist President of the Philippines, Diosdado Macapagal. A Program
Implementation Agency (PIA) was created, at the helm of which was the
same person who later spearheaded the CED. He personally "handpicked"
new experts with unassailable technical credentials, and hired them
outside usual civil service restrictions. Most were fresh graduates
from highly respected schools and private enterprises (Ocampo, 1971:

38). The PIA served as a link between the National Economic Council

(NEG), the chief planning body of the government, and the operating

.
,- a"

.E‘x.

to

departments and agencies. Historically, the plans that were shaped
by NEC had difficulty in getting off the ground because of: changes in
leadership and conflicts among those who constituted the National
Economic Council, lack of support from the President and absence of
adequately trained people in management (Ocampo, 1971:33-34).

The Marcos Administration claims aspirations for recruiting
and deve10ping technocrats in the public sector. Inheriting a
bureaucracy which he wished to infuse with a technocratic outlook,
he has staffed his Cabinet with men who are held forth as personi-
fying the ideal figure of a technocrat. The Development Academy
of the Philippines (DAP), an institution which he created in
1974, undertakes a Career Executive Service Development Program,
which the proponent claims to be the "first in the world." The pro-
gram requires that the "entire corps of middle- and upper-level
executives go through an Executive Development Program which is
designed to enrich their management skills, utilizing the most modern
training concepts and methodologies, and to deliberately orient them
to the rich, warm and humane social purposes of government" (Marcos,
l974:5). By the opening of the Seventies, the image of a technocrat
has been incorporated as a charismatic figure into the modern sector

of the Philippines.

Statement of the Problem

The task which this research assumes is not to assess the
success or failure of technocrats. This study attempts to examine
the dynamics involved in the behaviors of technocrats (both as individ-

uals and as a collectivity), the variables related to their behavior,

and the social matrix in which technocrats operate and perform their
functions. Since the current administration assumes that technocrats
are important to the developmental processes in the Philippines, the
path for development in this country can hopefully be understood by
underscoring the patterns of behavior of these agents for modernization.
This research, therefore, explores the nature of technocracy
in the Philippines, and more particularly:
1. the circumstances under which technocrats originate and the
factors that lead to their emergence (both as individuals
and as a collectivity);
2. the functions they perform and who defines them;
3. the social space in which they operate and perform their
functions;
4. the life styles they exhibit in the context of their work,
the career aspirations they have set for themselves, the
frustrations and satisfactions they encounter as technocrats
and the norms they have for assessing their performance as
technocrats; and,
S. how technocrats can be differentiated or stratified and on
what bases.
This research examines the role of personal networks for
the emergence of technocrats and for the performance of their
functions. It explores how these networks are created and how
varying types of networks are used, depending upon the functions or
activities in which technocrats are engaged. This thrust is explained

in more detail in the Theoretical Framework. Briefly stated, however,

10

this focus rests on the proposition that networks are the very social

spaces within which technocrats emerge and/or operate to perform

their functions. Since the status of a technocrat is not institu-

tionalized, distinctive groups or organizations have not emerged to

govern the behaviors of technocrats. Technocrats, therefore, operate

according to a personal set of relationships and behave on the basis

of this set.

There are two levels of analysis for attaining these objectives.
The first, or micro-level approach, examines the technocrats themselves
and how their behaviors are influenced by networks as well as the

characteristics of the networks they have personally generated in the

performance of their functions. In so doing, the dynamics of tech-

n°<=racy in the Philippines can, hopefully, be underscored.
The second, or macro-level approach, attempts to define the
environmental settings--the socio-cultural milieu that pave the way

f .
or the emergence of technocrats and how thls relates to the character-

1 -
stlcs of their networks.

It is important to state at this juncture that this research
is a. study of a new kind of social patterning "111911: in the history
of s(Sciology, has not been of central concern. This research is
Inspi red by emerging studies on networks (Aronson, 1970a, 1970b;
Barnes, 1954; Mitchell, 1973; Wolfe, 1970), social structures that are

H
n
011‘ groups" (Boissevain, 1968). Among the generation of social

SQ ~
1§l'1tists pursuing this topic, there is an overall agreement that

H
b
e‘iayiour must no longer be regarded as a variable purely dependent

o
11 larger groups" but that groups themselves may be the products of

11

these "social forms" (Boissevain, 1968:544). The assumption is that

man as an interacting social being is capable of manipulating others

as well as being manipulated by them (Boissevain and Mitchell, 1973:

" This differs from the structural-functionalist conception of

vi 1).
the individual as being impinged upon by the "moral order"--the rules

or norms governing the group or society as a whole (Boissevain and

Mitchell, 1973 :vii) .
These "social forms" are different from groups because sets

of relationships established by ego are situationally defined and
proceed only for as long as ego chooses (see Anderson and Carlos,
There is lack of solidarity or "consciousness of kind,"

1974) .
t3’13'23.<:al of a group, among the individuals with whom ego interacts.

Int eraction is temporary and highly ephemeral.
The concept of network is pivotal in this research since, it

ls PrOposed, technocrats are not strictly governed by specific norms
or rules of groups or organizations, but rather they are generating

a. . . .
11d art1culat1ng new norms. The experlences that are found useful by

t
hem in performing these functions--their interpersonal interactions--

ar . . .
e explored for then characteristlcs and usefulness.

This research, therefore, is basically exploratory and does not

1
and itself to well-defined hypotheses. There is still a dearth of

d
at& from which to draw testable hypotheses about technocrats and the

he
tworks as social matrices within which they operate.

R§V ‘ ~
New of therature

Empirical and theoretical studies of technocracy are scanty,

s‘Decially for understanding its nature in developing societies.

12

There is little published on the patterns leading to the emergence of
technocrats; the functions they perform; the technocrats' life styles,
their self-identities and social identities; their personal outlook

for change; and their aspirations for themselves regarding their

future careers or occupations. Studies have been largely confined

to forecasting idealized imageries of technocratic behaviors in post-
industrial societies (Bell, 1973; Kleinberg, 1973; Roszak, 1968), or

of relating the experience of France where technocracy has had its

longest history (Meynaud, 1969; Ridley, 1966).

Who are the technocrats as ideally conceived? There is a con-

vergence among social scientists that technocrats are technologists,
technicians, scientists, engineers or intellectuals who become
inVt'leed in the decision-making process in the public or the private
sector (Bell, 1973; Kleinberg, 1973; Larson, 1972; Meynaud, 1969;
Ridley, 1966). Their being involved lies in the assumption that
decisions are best arrived at by the rational assessment of facts and

data
an
d their ability to use modern technologies, their involvements will

By virtue of the technocrats' competence in scientific methods
theli‘eby improve decision-making. Efficiency and accuracy characterize
their actions, for they are governed by a particular world-view which
deI)a-l‘ts from anything "religious, esthetic or intuitive" but rather
ass'~-‘~lhes a "logical, practical, problem-solving, instrumental, orderly
and disciplined approach to objectives" in their "reliance on
ca”1§Iltlus, on precision and measurement and a concept of a system"

(B
e11, 1973:349). Technique is not thought of as a "simple empirical

s s
klll or a pure routine, but a systematic effort to use scientific

13

discoveries" (Meynaud, 1969:23). They have "impenetrable skills"

(Roszak, 1968:10) which can translate into programs the solutions for

certain stated needs of man.

Roszak says:

the requirements of our humanity yield wholly to some manner of
formal analysis which can be carried out by specialists possessing
certain impenetrable skills and which can then be translated by
'them directly into a congeries of social and economic programs,

personnel management procedures, merchandise, and mechanical
gadgetry. If a problem does not have such a technical solution,

it must not be a gal problem (1968:10).

Their strategies are rooted basically in planning. By fore-
casting the results which might ensue if certain alternatives are
followed, they can choose the alternatives which make maximal use
Of resources and achieve desired results in the shortest possible

time, The attainment of these ends necessitates that technocrats

take an "over-all view, much broader than that taken by a mere
technician or expert," and hence, assume some qualities of a "manager"
(Memaud, 1969:208). In this way, they deviate from the basic mold
035 a. Specialist alone. They can assume both the functions of
"coordination and strategy mapping" (Larson, 1972-73:15). They are
Cone erned with the "organization of technical processes and functions

an
d With the mediation between different elements, including the

11
“man elements, involved in the realization of a given project"

(
I‘a‘l‘smn, 1972-73:15). Their functions, therefore, are "polyvalent"

8a
y s Larson for:

the notion of expertise is concerned with the "intelligence of
the whole" and is extended over the broad range of global policy-

planning (1972-73 : ll) .

14

Planning generally entails two types of activities: over-all esti-

mations and decisions on the one hand, and selective examinations and
choices on the other (Meynaud, 1969:256). Technocrats are equipped

with new techniques--systems analysis, linear programming, and program
budgeting which are the essentials in the formulation and analysis of

decisions on which political judgments are made (Bell, 1973:362).

Technocrats are not "ivory-tower-dwellers" mainly concerned

with theoretical abstractions for their own sake. The task is to

transform scientific knowledge for practical use and to apply it
meaningfully to day-to-day problems or future problems. Dreitzel

says :
Technological as well as social scientific knowledge can only be
used if mediated and transformed by a group of experts who under-

stand this kind of knowledge and can adjust it to the strategic
needs of those using it . . . . These experts who work as science

administrators, coordinators and advisers I shall call technocrats
(1972:170).

Communal vs. dominant class interests. The remarkable area

f . . . . .
or dlssensus among theoret1c1ans l1es 1n the assessment of the
IIrlication‘ of technocratic convergence in administration and planning.
1e school of thought, the leading spokesman of which is Bell (1973),

en . O O O O I I
H 1sions post-1ndustr1a1 soc1et1es as belng streamllned along "com-
mun . . .
a~31" or soc1etal 1nterests. Bell forecasts that 1n 30 to 50 years,

ad
Valued industrial societies will experience the rapid growth of
Se ~
1ence and technology and, correspondingly, the emergence of scien-
This

ti
sts, technicians and technocrats as dominant figures of power.

w-
11 1 usher in collective plans and orientations for the state because

Q1elitists and technicians are spirited by an ethos that is less

15

concerned with self-interest and profit than that guiding business

civilization (Bell, 1973:362). The rational world-view of the scien-

tific community enables the experts to make dispassionate assessments
of reality. For Bell, therefore, post-industrial societies will
experience a movement "away from governance by political economy to
. a turn to non-capitalist

governance by political philosophy .
Technocracy signifies the "end

modes of social thought" (1973:298).
of ideology" for the ethos of science governing the technocrat is

that it:
has no ideology, in that it has no postulated set of beliefs, but
it has an ethos which implicitly prescribes rule of conduct. It
is not a political movement that one joins by subscription, .

It is not a

yet one must make a commitment in order to belong.
Church where the element of faith rests on belief and is rooted
in mystery, yet faith, passion, and mystery are present, but they
are directed by the search for certified knowledge whose function

it is to test and discard old beliefs (Bell, 1973:380).

Contrary to this posture is the argument that technocrats are

themselves governed by an ideology--"the belief in science as the
ultimate guarantee of rationality" (Larson, 1972:25). This does not
11

e"fies-sarily assure the reign of a "communal" ethos as an "end of

id
eOlogy" adherent like Bell has postulated (Dreitzel, 1972; Klein-

bel‘g . . .
a 1973; Larson, 1972). The absorptlon of technocrats 1nto a g1ven

0r

gaJ‘aization connotes the acceptance of a structure of power with
Wh -

1Q}! their roles are defined. While it can be accepted that techno-
Cr

attic ideology becomes dominant, it can be used to bolster a structure

of
clOmination in which technocrats themselves play a crucial but

311
W role (Larson, 1972:25). The self-serving interest of

t
1‘6 dominant class, in fact, is legitimized and made acceptable under

t
he banner of the ideology of the technocrats' functional rationality.

16

The realities of technocragy. Literature on technocracy has

mainly drawn from the experience of France where technocracy has been

widely practiced and has had its longest history. Stretching back to

 

1793, the administrative elites of government, the Corps de 1'Etat,

have been largely recruited from the Ecole Polytechnique (later the

Ecole National d'Administration), purposely established as a center

of higher technical education (Bell, 1973:78). While the idea was

taken up by the United States during the Depression Period, and was,
in fact, responsible for originating the term ”technocracy," (coined
by William Smyth, an engineer from Berkeley, California [Elsner, 1967:

2]) , the concept had a more limited meaning than that elaborated by

the French or the post-World War II referent for the term in the

United States. Those who used the term technocracy, which had become

a "Social movement and a panacea for the depression" (Bell, 1973:349,

&- 3 . saw the technicians as planning and coordinating strategies to

c:OI‘I‘ect the inefficiency inhering in the conduct of the business of
industries (Elsner, 1967:31). Subsequent use of the term technocrat
has referred to the involvement of technicians in the political
decision-making process (Bell, 1973). Industrial civilization has
Seen a growing "technostructure" (Galbraith, 1970) constituted of a
core of men with specialized scientific and technical knowledge,
reI>1Eacing entrepreneurial leadership. Governmental machinery, too,

ha
8 Witnessed the need for technical expertise. The new ethos of

'i
S \
Q1entific management" of the state has demanded people who can plan
a
head and have visions of the future based on facts and data gathered

E
1.0“! rigorous research and measurement (Waldo, 1948:58).

HO

.L.

-
‘1-
AU.

17

Although materials have been written generally on the concept
of technocracy and the behavior of technocrats, there are gaps in
knowledge on the micro-level: the actual performance of technocrats;
the details or the intricacies of the process involved in influence;
the personal or group encounters to obtain resources necessary for
decision-making; the social variables affecting the technocrats'

emergence and performance; and, their life styles, ideals, and out-

looks as technocrats .
0n the macro-level, there are also as yet unanswered questions:

 

Is technocracy indicative of the birth of a new institution in society?

What historical circumstances or socio-cultural milieux pave the way

for the emergence of technocrats? Is there a community of techno-

crats? If so, is the technocratic community significantly different

from the scientific community or "estate" (Price, 1965), or is the
former just a sector of the scientific community? What are the
relationships of the technocrats to the power-holders or the "centres"
(Mehaud, 1969:31) of the decision-making process? Whom do the techno-
era"is influence? Are there some sectors or activities in which
technocrats are involved on a wider scale than others? If so, why?
Do ttechnocrats constitute a new ruling class in society? Can techno-
crats be differentiated from each other and on what bases?

The literature on technocracy in deve10ping societies is
ext:"Pemely scarce. The questions that can be raised, therefore, follow:
If technocracy is a feature of post-industrial societies, how do
en.QTI'Pging technocrats in developing societies compare with technocrats

i
11 the developed world with respect to their functions, performances,

18

life-styles, self-identities, social identities, and origins? If

technocrats are also emerging in other developing countries, how are

they alike or different from Filipino technocrats and why? What

socio-historical conditions and precipitating incidents lead to their

rise before modernization or development has taken place?

In the Philippines, Ocampo's (1971) exploratory study provides
insights on the lateral mobility from the private to the public sector

of technocrats who are occupying key positions in the government as

secretary or under-secretary of departments or as head or director

of national governmental agencies or units. He discloses that they

originate mainly from the non-governmental institutions (mainly
coIl‘porate organizations or universities) where they had established

POSitions. In this respect, the key technocrats are unlike their

French counterparts who emerge vertically or are recruited freshly
from the prestigious Ecole National d'Administration. Filipino tech-
nocrats are now helping to "mobilize" the bureaucracy, are providing
new directions for the society, and are bypassing traditional con-
sti‘llaencies who inhibited action in the bureaucracy. The technocrats'
I)Ol‘icies for development have influenced the programs for the nation
and their managerial techniques, bred in corporate organizations and
other related private institutions, are being adopted in the public
sector. Ocampo further reports that the primary basis for their
recl‘laitment is their "know-how" as suggested by their attainment of
j.‘:ec<5gnition for exceptional achievements in education and occupation.
The)? have laudes attached to their academic credentials which were

0
btadined from "high-standard" schools. They have received some kind

19

of award or recognition in their field of specialization (such as the

prestigious Ten Outstanding YounggMen Award1 or having been elevated

 

at a very early age into positions of prominence in organizations with
which they were formerly affiliated). They are primarily in the
fields of economics, finance, or business administration. They are
mostly foreign-educated primarily in Western developed nations, unlike
French or American counterparts who are educated within their own
nations.

Filipino technocrats are held to be anti-political in the
sense that they have been providing alternative modes of action to
the sleeping giant of bureaucracy in their concepts of objective,
rational and economically-efficient, "scientific management" tech-
niques (Ocampo, 1971:44). But the claims that they are value-free do
not necessarily coincide with the experience of Filipino technocrats.
Their being catapulted into the limelight rests on their commitment
to building a nation by locally-inspired reforms for a capitalist mode
of economic life (Ocampo, 1971:62).
Identification of the Technocrat: A

Conceptual and A Methodological
Problem

 

 

The objective of this research is to examine the realities of

technocratic behaviors within the context of a particular project in

 

1Castro (1966:77) notes of the Ten Outstanding Young Men
(TOYM): "Considered the most prestigious and most popular annual
recognition program of youth leadership ever set up here, the TOYM
year after year seeks to focus public attention and to confer national
recognition to the country's young men whose unstinting dedication
to their particular fields of endeavor has resulted in exceptional
achievements which have significantly contributed in service redound-
ing to the welfare of their communities and their countrymen."

20

the Philippines. These realities were planned to be drawn from
persons identified as technocrats: their experiences with reference
to their emergence, functions, frustrations and gratifications;
their assessment of their own performance and hopes for change; and,
the plans for the future for themselves as technocrats or in other
occupations or careers. This research, therefore, called for the
identification of technocrats participating in a selected government
project.

Determining who the technocrats are posed not only a con-
ceptual but also a methodological problem for this researcher.
Perhaps, this could be attributed to an absence of consensus regarding
who constitutes a technocrat inasmuch as the role is only emerging
in the Philippines. Secondly, the nature of the roles performed by
technocrats have made their positions flexible such that their iden-
tities cannot be fully grasped by those around them. Because tech-
nocrats are introducing new ideas, values, technologies or strategies
within a framework of scientific problem-solving approaches, the
functions they assume are not rigidly definable in the organization
or group that serves as the selected adoptor of what is catalyzed.
Because technocrats create their roles, their positions have an
"unbounded" nature.

The approach adopted in the initial study design was an
objective one. This approach had to be re-defined to incorporate

the over-all View of a reputational_panel, constituted mostly of

 

participants of the project, of their own perceptions of the embodi-

ment of a technocrat. This was resorted to after the first operational

21

definition generated comments among key informants who had been
initially interviewed, that it was a very limited criterion for a
technocrat.

In the objective approach, the researcher established a
criterion by which technocrats participating in a selected government
project were to be identified. The first plan operationally defined
technocrats as those involved in the planning of a selected government
project in the Philippines whose ideas had been incorporated in the
program of the government--whether technical or administrative. This
focus was made on the assumption that planners are a pool of experts,
technicians or administrators who have been tapped on the basis of
their specific areas of competence in the field of science or manage-
ment--whether as a regular participant in the bureaucracy in which the
project is embedded or as consultant or adviser to public adminis-
trators. Key informants rejected the conceptualization of expertise
being the sole indicator of a technocrat. They envisioned numerous
qualities as being part of the profile of an ideal technocrat. The

pool of indicators subsequently derived from the reputational panel

 

became the basis for identification of technocrats. The same panel
was used to cast nominations for names of technocrats involved in
the project. The procedure is discussed in more detail in the next
chapter.

The pool of indicators for technocracy is considered another
important finding of this research, since this depicts the reality in
which participants of the project view the involvement of techno-

crats. Most importantly, this reveals the socio-cultural

22

expectations of others which have to be grappled with for one to be
considered as a technocrat.

For purposes of this research, however, the technocrat is con-
ceptually defined in the following paragraph. The other attributes
which are considered important in the interactions of technocrats are
described in a separate chapter, as they are considered to be signifi-
cant findings of this research.

Technocrats are, herein defined as experts who subscribe to a
particular perspective of solving societal problems by employing the
methodologies of science and the techniques of management. They
include those who make decisions regarding a problem at hand from the
viewpoint of a given discipline where they have expertise and also
those who are skillful in putting together data and the expertise
of others into alternatives for making technocratic decisions. It is
important to take note that persons are considered technocrats only
when persons higher in status or in the center of power, specifically
those formally located in government, rely on them and accept them
as capable of putting together new approaches to a problem or antici-
pating how these can be done.

Technocrats may be distinguished according to the level of

intervention in the bureaucracy. Non-bureau-technocrats are those

 

formally linked with other organizations but who are involved in
advisory or consulting tasks to public officials. They may be
employed in an gg_hgg_or temporary capacity until given tasks have
been completed. Others may remain outside of the structure within

which the issue or task is confronted but may influence the outcome of

23

the activity within the jurisdiction of the public official (or
officials) who recognize the technocrats' involvement.
Technocrats who hold formal positions in the bureaucracy,

hereafter referred to as bureau-technocrats, are not managing or

 

administering organizations in the conventional sense; rather, they
have been asked to undertake positions without the usual restrictions
on the functions of these positions. They are, in Ilchman's terms,
"rational-productivity bureaucrats" rather than the Weberian model

of "rational-legal bureaucrats" in directing the future of organi-
zations or of society as a whole beyond the routines and formalized
procedures of bureaucracies (Ilchman et a1., 1969:60). Because they
have been empowered to define the new essentials for desired future
states, the "ambit" of their responsibilities are "wider than that of
conventional bureaucrats" (Ilchman et a1., 1969:60).

The status of technocrat does not connote the assumption of
specific duties or responsibilities which are predictable. Specifics
of the duties are often created or defined by technocrats themselves.
However, these should fall within the range or framework set by those
higher in status or in the center of power, or technocrats have them-
selves convinced the latter that the chosen tasks are worthwhile
accomplishing.

Framework for Analysis: Networks as the
"Social Space" of Technocracy

Focusing on personal networks to analyze the nature of tech-

nocracy rests on the pr0position that networks are the very social

spaces within which technocrats emerge and/or operate to perform their

24

functions. Because the status is accorded by specific persons higher
in status or in the center of power, the basis for recruitment and the
parameters of technocratic functions vary according to the person
determining it. The criteria for the emergence of technocrats and

the functions they will be performing depends upon the person who

will be extending this recognition. Technocrats do not attain posi-
tions with a clear identity as technocrats at this point in time.
Responsibilities are not predictable because their definition is
determined by the person awarding the status along with the specifics
developed by the technocrat.

The entry of the technocrat into this status, therefore, is
based on the principle of "sponsorship mobility" where "recruits are
chosen by the established elites or their agents, and elite status is
given on the basis of some criterion of supposed merit" (Turner, 1960:
856). What this criterion is and who bestows the recognition on
technocrats have been the appropriate concern in this research. The
personalized set of relationships that pave the way for the attainment

of technocratic status is one's sponsorship network which may provide

 

either a direct or indirect link with the person bestowing the status.

Technocrats also operate in other networks. A network of

 

"significant others" may constitute the locus for the assessment of

 

performance as technocrat. Inasmuch as technocratic performance cannot
be strictly enforced in more defined forms like the rewards or negative
incentives instituted by a group to a member who complies or fails to
comply with expected behavioral patterns, technocrats depend upon a

diffused personal set of relations who assess the criteria for their

25

behavior. The persons considered by the technocrats as important for
their self-conception constitute their "significant others" network.
This may or may not include the person who has recruited them and has
defined the parameters for their actions. Whether or not the "signifi-
cant others" networks coincide with the sponsorship network is an
empirical concern of this research, and what the implication is of
consonance or non-consonance with technocratic status.

Furthermore, there are work-related networks which are the

 

social spaces within which functions are performed. Technocrats rely
on them for bridging disparate or disjointed structures. Technocrats
provide links among these structures (e.g., groups or organizations)
by introducing new ideas, values and resources that mediate for group
or organizational differences. In a sense, technocrats are herein
proposed as examples of "men-in-the—middle" (J. Useem and R. Useem, 1968)
because they are moving in-between and bridging these structures.

The role of the technocrat with respect to the bureaucracy may
be categorized into two functions:

1. to introduce new ideas, values and resources where the bureauc-
racy is the end-user; and,

2. to establish new strategies so that the products of the
bureaucracy may be diffused to selected sectors of the public
who are the end-users.

Technocrats are linking the institutions that are the sources
of new ideas, values or resources and the bureaucracy that implements
them. This is assumed by infusing these inputs to the latter or when

these inputs serve as the bases for technocratic decisions in

26

confronting certain issues or problems of concern to the bureaucracy.

Linkages are also established between the bureaucracy and selected

sectors of the public by defining strategies with which the product

of technocratic action adopted by the bureaucracy, will be acceptable

to and can be accepted by the

end-users.

In other words, technocrats

make new ideas comprehensible to the decision-makers and selected

sectors of the public. Technocrats act as mediators or brokers.

As mediators or brokers, technocrats are not necessarily

devoid of new ideas in a given line of expertise.

They may also be

sources of new ideas, values or resources which they personally con-

tribute to the bureaucracy or communicate to the policy-makers. They

can also create knowledge which can be an aspect of the whole package

of technology or practices which they have themselves put together

into a comprehensible whole. They may also participate as policy-

makers in legitimizing the adoption of the new inputs or they may

themselves supervise the adoption of these inputs as administrators.

Briefly, the role of technocrats may be diagrammatically pre-

sented as follows:

 

 

 

Source of new ideas,
values and resources

(Technocrat as
creator of inputs)

 

 

 

Bureaucracy

(Technocrat as ""’9
policy-maker or

implementor)

 

 

 

 

\
\
\

\ Technocra
as Broker

/
/
t/

Selected sectors
of the public

 

ea

/
/

‘JTechnocrat, ’

as Broker

 

27

The transfer of new ideas, values or resources do not occur on
the institutional leve1--between organizations or groups per se.
Broker roles are performed by the technocrats through the connection
they establish between the end-users and the sources of the new ideas,
values and resources. There are two levels of end-users with whom
technocrats are diffusing the new inputs. The first level is the
bureaucracy, which legitimizes the adoption of these new inputs. The
second level is comprised of the selected sectors of the public which
utilizes or adopts the complex of outputs disseminated by the bureauc-
racy as conveyed by the technocrats. The linkage between the sectors
of the public and the bureaucracy is also forged by the technocrat
who designs strategies for the bureaucracy for infusing new inputs
into the public sector. It is the content or thgmg_of ideas, strat-
egies and resources diffused which distinguishes the broker role per-
formed by the technocrats from other broker roles. The inputs convey
the language of science and management into practical political and
economic affairs.

Technocrats, therefore, necessarily originate from institutions
(whether in-school or on-the-job) that provide the appropriate
training, background or experience for applying expert knowledge and
skill. With an appropriate linkage to a sponsor who considers that
such knowledge can contribute to the solution of problems confronting
a bureaucracy, technocrats can make a mark by their influence in the
decision-making process.

In the case of the Philippines, it is hypothesized that most

technocrats originate from business, industrial or educational

28

institutions that are generally deemed as providing the most advanced
training and experience for the application of expertise and skill.
The business/industrial concerns are usually the profitable ones which
have adopted modern technologies and procedures from Western indus-
trial nations, predominantly America. The educational institutions
at which technocrats have been trained are either Western foreign or
local ones which are the most advanced in infusing new methodologies,
attitudes and resources rooted in science. Usually, these local
institutions of higher education have established connections abroad
and are renowned for having a strong staff in science and the appli-
cation of science and technology for practical use.

Expertise plus the appropriate linkage with the person
bestowing the status are the important avenues for gaining a techno-
cratic position. (The importance of specific attitudes and the socio-
cultural concerns held by the recruit for the attainment of the status
of technocrat is an empirical question explored in this research.)

The networks generated by Filipino technocrats may and
probably do transcend the national scene, because the original source
of expertise in the use and application of scientific knowledge is
foreign, and because the locus of their work ties them into the
Southeast Asian regional and international activities. America is
the primary reference for Filipinos, although this may have undergone
some changes after the Sixties when the thrust for national identity
has required a Southeast Asian reference.

For a developing country like the Philippines, foreign linkage

of'technocrats is inevitable because the bureaucracy has maintained

29

an "open-door" policy with respect to the inflow of resources (especially
financial) to augment the scarcities that are experienced in the
country. The perceived potential of technocrats to establish linkages
with foreign institutions (multinational or national) via their per-
sonal connections may be one of their assets for the attainment of
this status.

To summarize, therefore, networks perform various functions
for technocrats, namely, (1) for their recruitment into the status,
(2) as a reference point for the assessment of their performance, and,
(3) for providing the necessary resources to attain specific goals.

The first two functions are encompassed by the network of influence on

 

technocrats, and the last, the network of influence by technocrats.

 

Each may overlap in the sense that constituents of the networks who
influence may also be generated by the technocrats to attain their

ends.

The Variables Under Study
Mere specifically, the variables examined in this research
are as follows:
1. The origins of the technocrats
a. Educational background
b. Occupational background - single and multiple occupations
c. Socio-economic origins
d. Continuing ties with sectors or organizations with which
they are identified - foreign or local
2. Experiences of the technocrat with the project in focus

a. Nature of involvement with the project

d.

30

(1) Content of participation with the project

(2) Level of participation

(3) Parameter of participation

(4) Agency linkage of technocrat at the time of involve-
ment with the project

Factors for involvement with the project

(1) Respondent's perception of factors considered most
important for recruitment or involvement in this
activity (i.e., personal abilities, educational back-
ground, occupational background)

(2) Person(s) recruiting respondent for the activity

(3) Role of sponsorship network for the technocrat's
emergence

Role of the technocrat in the context of an interdependent

world

(1) Interaction of technocrats with foreign representatives
of institutions (Southeast Asian agencies, inter-
national agencies, foreign national agencies, etc.) and
the context within which this takes place (e.g.,
obtaining ideas, funds, other resources, etc. in
connection with this project)

(2) Networks built around the world or revitalized in
connection with this project

Processes for attaining stated goals or objectives re: the

project - technocratic work styles

31

(1) Sources of ideas or information regarding the activ-
ities in connection with the project

(2) Factors related to one's background considered most
important in the attainment of stated objectives
(educational experience, occupational experience,
personal encounters with experts, etc.)

(3) The role of networks for the performance of stated
objectives - foreign and national

Assessment of performance as a technocrat

(1) Criteria for assessment as technocrat

(2) "Significant others" network considered important to
this assessment - foreign and local

Frustrations and satisfactions in connection with the

project

Conflicts encountered

(l) Conflicts encountered in personal relations with
people involved in the project (e.g., between bureau-
crat and technocrat) and source of conflict or
rivalries with individuals in other organizations

(2) Conflicts encountered for multiple roles
(a) The extent to which work intervenes with or sup-

ports one's personal life
(b) Relations affected by this infringement (if there
is) and how

(c) How this infringement is affecting one's involve-

ment in the sphere of technocracy

32

(d) What is considered to be the "ceiling" to his/her
involvement as a technocrat within which he/she
can work efficiently and effectively

Accompanying social activities as a technocrat of the

project

(1) The development of other social obligations not related
to the work-roles but which have become a necessary
adjunct to the status of technocrat

Models for change or development

(1) The country or countries that serve as the models for
change or development as they relate to the project

in focus

(2) The basis for this choice

Current activities as a technocrat (on top of or following

the involvement with the project in focus)

Plans for the future for himself/herself

Future plan for contribution as technocrat

Length of time involved as technocrat

Desired career or occupations

Plans to attain this aspiration

Factors facilitating or impeding the attainment of these

plans

Possible variations in technocratic behaviors are explored

according to the level of participation of technocrats in the bureauc-

 

racy (bureau-technocrat or non-bureau-technocrat) and the parameter of

 

participation (central or provincial) for most of their current

 

33

activities as technocrats. Differences are examined for edu-

cational background, occupational background, nature of personal

networks, age and socio-economic status.

Operational Definition

 

1.

Technocrats are those nominated by a reputational panel on the

 

bases of certain criteria the panel has defined.

The rgputational panel is interchangeably referred to as

 

informants or participants in the project. The panel con-

 

 

stitutes those who were at one time or another involved as
advisers, administrators or consultants in the conception,
planning and implementation of the project called Masagana 99.
The details for drawing up the panel are defined in Chapter II.
The panel members performed the task of characterizing and
nominating the technocrats of the project.

Educational background is indicated by the level of educa-

 

tional attainment, the number of academic and professional
recognitions (honors and awards), the schools attended and

the seminars or workshops participated in, in relation to one's
field of interest.

Occupational background is indicated by the level of involve-

 

ment in occupational institutions (the positions held in them),
the location of institutions to which respondent is formally
linked, and any honors or recognitions obtained for occupa-

tional performance.

34

 

5. Level of participation of technocrats refers to the position
held by technocrats on the project. This may be categorized
into:

a. Key bureau-technocrats are the technocrats linked with

 

the project by virtue of their occupancy of key positions
in departmental agencies (i.e., secretary or under-
secretary of the department, or as director/head or
assistant director/assistant head of national departmental
agencies).

b. Intermediate bureau-technocrats are the technocrats

 

linked with the project by their occupancy of middle-
level positions of administration in the government,
below those mentioned in 5a.

c. Non-bureau-technocrats are the technocrats linked with

 

the project but not holding formal positions with depart-
mental agencies at the national or provincial level.
This category may include individuals serving on temporary
or ad hoc bodies created by the government but who are
not in specific departments and also those who are con-
nected with private or public institutions which are not
part of the regular civil service. Public institutions
of this sort include a state-owned university such as the
University of the Philippines.

6. Technocrats are divided into two types depending upon their

parameter of participation:

10.

11.

35

a. Central technocrats are those whose activities primarily

 

have a national-scale type of implication.

b. Provincial technocrats are those whose activities center

 

outside of the National Office and are within local areas

legally defined as a region or a province.

Center refers to the Central Office of the National Food and
Agriculture Council (NFAC).

NFAC_(Nationa1 Food and Agriculture Council) is the imple-
mentation structure of the project in focus for this research--
the Masagana 99.

A project is a well-defined plan for implementation of

certain stated goals and include the complex of details such
as objectives, organizational structure, financial resources,

technical resources, and implementation strategies.

 

Socio-economic origig_is indicated by the occupation engaged
in by a technocrat's father for the most part of the latter's
life history. This is further classified into one of the
four socio-economic levels adopted by Carroll (1973:129-130)
in his study of manufacturing entrepreneurs. See Chapter IV,

Part II for elaboration.

Networks are the technocrats' sets of personal relationships

in specified situations:

a. "Sponsorship network" is the network for recruitment to

 

the project.

b. "Significant others network" is the network of persons

 

who serve as reference points for the modeling behaviors

of technocrats.

36

c. "Work-related network" is the network generated by techno-

 

crats in the performance of their roles.

GMNERII

THE PROJECT IN FOCUS: THE MASAGANA 99 RICE PROGRAM

This is a study of the processes in which development takes
place as it is undertaken by one emerging change agent in the
Philippines--the technocrats. This also explores the factors influ-
encing the behaviors of technocrats and the roles performed as agents
of change. More specifically, this focuses on the involvement of
technocrats in a selected government project in the Philippines begin-
ning with the evolution of the objectives from the national agency,
then with the construction of implementation strategies and their
execution in two selected provinces.1 In examining the series of
steps involved from the time a particular project is conceptualized
until its implementation, enables one to examine the various levels
of technocratic involvement and the various processes taking place in
the performance of technocratic functions. This attempts to ascertain

where the technocrats are located in the long line from original

 

1National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) accounts: "The
country is politically divided into three parts--Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao--which, in turn, are divided into sub-political units for
administrative purposes, each enjoying a certain degree of autonomy
in local affairs. The sub-political organization of the Philippines
consists of 74 provinces (Manila is considered a province for census
purposes) which are grouped systematically into eleven regions as per
latest grouping of the integrated Reorganization Plan, 61 cities
(including Manila), 1,439 municipalities, 21 municipal districts and
33,776 barrios" (NEDA, l975:2).

37

38

policy—making through implementation and what this means to their
roles. Project focus provides a vantage for identifying not only
those who are discernible because of their linkage with the government
in their assumption of key positions in departmental agencies, but
also of those who are "behind-the-scenes" at the national and the pro-
vincial levels, and are not linked with key positions in the govern-
ment. These include those who have no formal positions with any
departmental agency but who become involved with the project in
various ways.

Furthermore, this approach enables one to reconstruct the
behavioral patterns typical of a technocrat within a given concrete
activity, i.e., it provides an understanding of the linkages estab-
lished by technocrats in this sector.

The initial choice for a departmental focus was agriculture.
This was deliberate because the current state of the country's
economy is still basically dependent on this sector. As Agriculture
Secretary reports: "The agriculture sector accounts for one-third of
net domestic product, one-half of total employment, and 75 percent of
earnings of the Philippines. It is clear, therefore, that the develop-
mental thrust for the remainder of the decade must--and will continue
to revolve--around agriculture" (Tanco, 1973:9).

The project selected for this research, as the immediate
setting for the involvement and participation of technocrats, is the

Masagana 99 Rice Program, the government's project for attaining self-

 

sufficiency in rice production to meet local consumption needs. Masagana

is a Pilipino word meaning bountiful. The 99 is for ninety-nine

39

cavans1 per hectare, which is equivalent to 4.4 tons, 1.9 tons above
the normal average yield. Thus Masagana 99 stands for the targeted
production goal of the administration (Santos, 1974:13). The emphasis
given to rice as one of the projects in the food self-sufficiency pro-
gram can be attributed to the fact that it is the main item in the
diet of some 75 to 80 percent of the people (Drilon, Jr., 1973azl6).
Because the country has been perennially short in meeting local con-
sumption needs, it is towards this end that the Masagana 99 Rice
Program addresses its implementation.

While rice production has always been a high priority project
of past presidential administrations, Masagana 99 has been proclaimed
as the "most massive and the most intensive rice production program
ever attempted by the government" (Drilon, Jr., 1973b:1). Launched by
President Ferdinand Marcos in May 1973, the attainment of the goal
is assumed to depend upon encouragement of farmers in targeted pro-
vinces to adopt a package of technology of selected varieties of rice,
fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides based on a recommended set of
cultural practices for rice production. A significant feature of the
project, as compared to the past projects, is the massive support
for noncollateral credit extended to farmer cooperators, "an unprece-
dented liberality" (Santos, 1973:14) on the part of the administration.
A formidable stumbling block in past projects, was the collateral
orientation for extending loans to farmers, who have few personal

belongings of value, let alone real properties (Antonio, 1973:23).

 

1Cavan is a Spanish measure of weight which, applied to milled
rice, is equivalent to 75 liters or 25 gantas or 56 kilos.

40

Under the Masagana 99, farmers are required to form seldas or coop-
eratives and ggld§_members can obtain their loans on the strength of
mutual guarantees. The project initially earmarked a production credit
support of at least 420 million pesos ($60 million) on the basis of a
700 pesos ($100) loan per hectare for the 600,000 hectare coverage pro-
grammed in 53 provinces. A large scale information and extension cam-
paign, manned by about 3,200 farm technologists, disseminates the
package of technology to about 600,000 farmers (Santos, 1974:15).

Masagana 99 can also be distinguished from the other rice
projects for its pioneering effort to include rice varieties that are
suitable to irrigated as well as rainfed conditions. Prior to this,
rice projects concentrated on the dissemination of rice technology and
production practices to irrigated lands, where the growing conditions
are more predictable, manageable and favorable (Cuyno, 1974:137).
Considering that 74 percent of the country is planted on non-irrigated
lands, Masagana 99 evolved practices to cover these areas also.

Masagana 99 also introduced a package of technology that
makes rice growing resistant to the viral disease of tungro, that
struck ricelands in 1972.

The organizational structure that supervises the implementation

of the project is the National Food and Agriculture Council (NFAC)

 

under the leadership of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture.
This organization is also responsible for the direction, control and
implementation of other food programs such as feedgrains, livestock,
fish, fruits and vegetables. Insofar as rice production is concerned,

supervision is undertaken by an inter-agency committee numbering

41

about 18, called the National Management Committee (NMC), that draws

 

representations from both the public and the private sectors. This
Committee takes charge "in designing operational strategies to be
adopted and formulates guidelines in solving major problems in the
process of program implementation" (NFAC, 1975:18). Representatives
from the public sector are those chiefly involved in research,
extension, credit and marketing. Private firms, especially those
engaged in the production of such chemical products as pesticides and
fertilizers, participate also. The project also draws substantially
from the expertise and the knowledge base of the key institutions for
research and training in agriculture in the Philippines--the Inter—
national Rice Research Institute (IRRI)1 and the College of Agricul-

ture of the University of the Philippines at Los Bafios (UPLB).z

 

1The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) was estab-
lished in 1960 by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation
with the c00peration of the Republic of the Philippines. Its primary
objective is "the study and improvement of rice" (IRRI, 1973z3). IRRI
has noted itself for continuously evolving varieties of rice popularly
known as the "miracle varieties." These promise the "reduction in
the length of the growing period of the rice plant which will enable
the farmer to increase the cropping intensity in the same piece of
land" (Castillo, 1975:39). The past rice projects of the government
incorporated the "miracle varieties" initially developed by the
Institute for dissemination to farmers in the Philippines.

2The University of the Philippines at Los Bafios (UPLB) traces
its beginnings to the agricultural college, the first in the Philip-
pines. This was established in 1909 by the American colonial powers.
The College of Agriculture boasts of having conducted about "80 per-
cent of all the agricultural research in the country" and a "strong
faculty to assure its high instructional standards" (Jamias, 1975:20-21).
It has been reported to have ". . . the greatest concentration of
Ph.D.‘s and other highly trained specialists in Southeast Asia. Close
to 600 personnel compose the teaching staff. Thirty percent of these
have the Ph.D. degree, 32 percent have masters degrees, while the

42

Significantly, it was the applied research and extension strategies
conceptualized by a technocrat from the IRRI which served as a pre-
cursor to the development of the Masagana 99. As we shall see later
in the discussion of the backgrounds of technocrats, the IRRI-UPLB
complexes are the most common structural matrices for the training of
Filipino technocrats in the field of agriculture and the base in
which personal networks are generated for the future roles of a
technocrat.

As one of the sources of financial and technical support for
the project, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
also had an active input in the decision-making process pertinent to
the activities of the project through its representatives in the

different working committees of the project.

 

rest have bachelor's degrees and extensive professional experience"
(Jamias, 1975:20).

In 1972, the College of Agriculture was established as an
autonomous unit from its parent organization in Diliman, Quezon City.
It is now officially called as the University of the Philippines at
Los Bafios. In addition to agriculture and forestry, academic programs
in the natural sciences, social sciences and humanities have been
created.

Other international centers or local centers for research
located in or adjacent to UPLB support or complement its research
activities. Other than IRRI, these institutions are the Southeast
Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture
(SEARCA), the Rodent Research Center and Forest Products Research
and Industries Deve10pment Commission.

In 1972, UPLB began to assume a primary role in research
coordination when the Philippine Council for Agricultural Research
(PCAR) was established to unify and oversee the planning, adminis-
tration, and implementation of the government's research programs in
agriculture, forestry and fisheries. The Secretariat which imple-
ments the policies and guidelines of the governing council draws
from the staff of UPLB.

‘ I
r ’I
we in

15;;

01.1
o
‘1.

..__
s92.

lfiA.

J's»:

I31.

ZCII

43

The Executive Director and the Assistant Executive Director
of the NFAC serve as the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, respectively,
of the NMC.

While a full-time technical and administrative staff of
about 400 (Panganiban, 1973:55) provide assistance to the NMC in
planning, implementation and evaluation of the project, three
committees were also created to backstop it. These committees are
occasionally solicited for support on matters pertaining to decision-

making about key inputs for production--fertilizers and pesticides, and

 

 

for the promotional campaigp_of the project. The three committees,

 

namely--Fertilizers, Pesticides and National Information-~draw
representations from both the public and the private sectors.
To provide for planning and close supervision of the implemen-

tation in the different provinces under the project, replicas of the

 

NMC were created. Each province is supervised by a Prpvincial Action
Committee (PAC), spearheaded by the Governor1 as the chairman. He is

assisted by the Provincial Prggram Officer for Rice (PPO), NFAC's

 

designated administrative link with the province (Iglesias, 1975:4).
He serves as the PAC's vice chairman. Heads or representatives of
agencies in the provinces that have something to do with rice pro-
duction and its market, both in the public and the private sectors,
are called upon to constitute the PAC. The number varies according to

the availability of related agencies in a province.

 

1The Governor is the chief executive of a province. He was,
prior to the declaration of martial law in September 1972, an elective
official. At present, governors who were retained by the President
maintain the same title.

44

The PAC is accountable to a Eggional Coordinator who super-
vises a group of provinces. In actual implementation, however,
linkage between the national and the provincial offices is commonly
undertaken through the Provincial Program Officers (PPOs).

The smaller political unit in the province (the municipality)

is supervised by a Municipal Action Team (MAT) under the joint leader-

 

ship of another elective officia1--the mayor--and a production tech-
nician, NFAC's designated administrative link with the farmers. Other
constituencies include the leaders of farmer cooperators and repre-
sentatives from credit institutions. (See Appendix A for a diagram-
matic presentation of NFAC's organizational machinery for Masagana 99.)
The organizational structure which undertakes the task of
supervising the implementation of the project is unique in the sense
of being able to pioneer in bringing together many disparate insti-
tutions and groupings to accomplish a specific purpose. The NFAC
historically evolved from the Rice and Corn Production Coordinating
Council (RCPCC) which was established in 1958, with the aim of
attaining self-sufficiency of the staple crops of rice and corn.
Because of the subsequent breakthroughs of the coordinated approach in
attaining the task of self-sufficiency after many years, the RCPCC
was enlarged to incorporate the other food development projects. The
Masagana 99 represents the creation of a new set of roles and system
that is congruent with Philippine traditions yet innovative in the

context of its mission.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

This is primarily a study of the involvement of technocrats in

the Masagana 99 Rice Program in the Philippines. They are examined

for:

the parameter of their participation in the project-~whether
central or provincial; and,

their involvement at specific points in time at two stages of
the development of the project--at conception before May 1973
and at implementation from February 1, 1975 to August 31, 1975.

Because of the initial problems encountered in the operational

definition of a technocrat earlier mentioned in Chapter I, the research

strategies were formulated, therefore, according to three research

objectives:

1.

to obtain the perceptions of the participants of the project
about the characteristics of a technocrat;

to obtain nominations of participants of the project about

who typifies the characteristics of a technocrat based on
these perceptions; and,

to study the background and behaviors of the nominated techno-
crats according to the specific variables outlined in

Chapter I.

45

46

The strategies to obtain the data to pursue the aforementioned
objectives are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. The findings
for each of these objectives are separately discussed in Chapter IV
(for the definition of technocrats) and Chapter V (for the nominations

for technocrats and the behaviors of the reputed technocrats).

Characterizipg and Nominating Technocrats

Selected participants of the project were probed for
their perceptions about characteristics typifying technocrats. They
were asked the question: What do you think are the characteristics
of a technocrat? The same participants on the project who were queried
for their perceptions of a technocrat were also asked to nominate
persons involved in the Masagana 99 Rice Program who they thought had
these characteristics. They were further asked: Who do you consider
to be the technocrats in the project portraying the characteristics
you have mentioned? They were also probed for:

l. the parameter of participation of technocrats--whether central
or provincial; and,

2. the technocrats involved at the conception of the project
before May 1973 and the technocrats involved at the imple-
mentation stage (from February 1, 1975 to August 31, 1975).
The participants of the project who were asked to define and

nominate technocrats in connection with the project are interchange-

ably referred to as informants or repptational panel members. They

 

 

are mainly members of the National Management Committee (NMC) and

 

the three committees backstopping it--Fertilizers, Pesticides and

National Information. Two Provincial Action Committees (PAC) in

 

47

different regions were selected to provide a comparative perspective
to the points of view of the informants at the national office. In
addition, selected individuals were also tapped as informants accord-
ing to their knowledge of the conception and/or implementation of
the project.

The selection of the NMC, the three committees backstopping
the NMC and the PAC as the panel of informants, was made on the basis
of their assumed knowledge of the project. All were participants in
‘the planning and implementation process. Second, the members provided
various institutional perspectives on the participation of technocrats.

The perceptions of the panel about the characteristics which
distinguish a technocrat and nominations for names of persons who
typified a technocrat were drawn from them. The panel members were
asked to identify:

1. the technocrats who became involved in the conception of the
project prior to its adoption in 1973, and
2. the technocrats who were involved in the project at the time

the study was conducted (from February 1975 to August 1975).

There was a total of 16 informants who were knowledgeable
about the persons engaged in the conception of the project. They also
constitute part of the 30 members of the panel from the national
agency who were requested to define and nominate central and pro-
vincial technocrats in the implementation phase.

Thirty-two other informants form the provincial panel for
defining and nominating central and provincial technocrats at the

implementation phase.

48

Reputational panel (conception stage). Twelve of the 16 infor-

 

mants at the conception stage of the project were directly involved

through membership in working committees that planned the package of

technology to be adopted and the details attendant to the implementa-

tion process. Four were indirectly involved through engagement in

research activities, the results of which were adopted in the project.
Five of the 16 were regularly employed by NFAC at the con-

ception of the project. The rest served as advisers or consultants

or as members of working committees that precipitated the project. Of

the remaining 11, 3 were connected with the private business sector,

4 with foreign institutions (e.g., IRRI and USAID), and 4 with other

public institutions.

Reputationa1_panel at the national agency (implementation

 

ggggg). There was a total of 40 positions open for representation to
various agencies in the NMC and the three supporting committees--
Pesticides, Fertilizer and National Information. Only 32 informants,
however, were considered for interviewing since three were members on
two committees and one was a member of all four. Of this total, only
22 were successfully contacted. The remaining ten were not available
at the time interview sessions were set. As far as can be ascertained,
the ten who were not successfully interviewed do not represent a
special category of people. They were, rather, missed at random and
therefore would not have biased the quality of the aggregate responses
of those who were interviewed.

Eight other informants were considered for the interview who

were not formal members of the aforementioned committees but were

49

administrators of the project when the interview was conducted, or
became actively involved as adviser or consultant in the conception of
the plan and its implementation.

Five of the eight were actively involved with the project
when the study was undertaken--2 were upper-level administrators, 1
was a middle-level administrator and 2 others were technical con-
sultants. The remaining 3 were no longer directly involved when the
interview was conducted but actively participated in the conception
of the plan or its implementation. One was an upper-level adminis-
trator of NFAC at the conception of Masagana 99. The second partici-
pated in the applied research that served as the precursor for the
project and also joined NFAC for a brief period of 6 months when the
upper-level administrator mentioned above, decided to join an inter-
national organization. The third had always been connected with an
international organization and was considered the "moving spirit"
behind the applied research that paved the way for the adoption of
the project.

Altogether, there are 30 informants from the national agency,
16 of whom form the reputational panel for the conception stage of

the project.

Reputational panel from the provinces (implementation stage).

 

There are a total of 32 informants from the provinces. Seventeen are
members of the PAC of Province A (from the Visayas) and 15 are members
of the PAC of Province B (from Luzon).

Before explaining the universe from which provincial infor-

mants were drawn, this section will explain the basis for choosing

50

the two provinces in focus, and thereafter, the typical structure of
the committees which gave distinctive features to the manner by which
informants were selected.

The rationale for having a provincial thrust in this research
is to examine whether there are similarities or differences in the
perceptions and nominations of technocrats by informants at the center
and in the provinces; and, to explore some distinguishing features in
the behaviors and background of technocrats linked with the national
office and located in a primate city and those located in the pro-
vinces. Furthermore, the provincial case studies enable this
researcher to explore some socio-historical incidents in the community
which give some distinctive features in the operation of technocrats
in each province.

There were two provinces targeted to serve as cases in point
for the research. This limitation in number was made on the basis of
the restricted time allotted for the conduct of the research.

The provinces chosen were made according to the following
criteria:

1. that the two provinces were envisioned by the reputational
panel from Manila as having reputed technocrats; and,

2. that one province would be located in Luzon where the national
agency is located, while another one would be located in
either Visayas or Mindanao.

The provinces chosen as cases in point both belong to the
upper quartile in terms of production of rice at the time the research

was undertaken, using a baseline date as March 1975. Both have

51

technocrats according to the national panel. Furthermore, both are
also prominent for growing sugar (an export commodity of the economy).
Selected sugar producers were noted to have affected the operations
of the rice program by pressuring for the diversion to sugar pro-
duction of the government subsidized fertilizers earmarked for use in
rice production by farmer cooperators.

The PAC in the two provinces provide distinct cases, for each
differed in strategies for convening with c00perating agencies.
Province A (in the Visayas) has a well-organized committee, in the
sense that it is the major vehicle by which most of the problems or
issues pertaining to field and organizational problems are resolved.
The Governor and the PPO (Provincial Program Officer for Rice) serve
as the nucleus. It has a well-kept record of the minutes of its
regular monthly meetings. The universe of informants, therefore,
were drawn from the records of attendance. There is a total of 27
institutional representations from the public and the private sectors
since the time the committee was convened until the period when this
research was conducted. The difficulty in defining who would consti-
tute the panel of informants in this province stemmed from the fact
that membership in the committee did not call for specific individuals
but whomever agency heads designated as representatives. The main-
stays were those in extension, credit and marketing. Secondly, some
representatives did not regularly attend the meetings of the com-
mittees. They either participated indirectly by communicating their
views via some channels other than the meetings (e.g., by phone or by

memoranda). The order of priorities in setting the interview was

52

made, therefore, according to the most recent participant from an
agency and those most actively involved in terms of attendance of
committee meetings.

Altogether, there were 17 interviewed out of a total of 27
institutional representatives. Three others were contacted but were
not available for the interview. Seven were not sought as they had
minimal attendance in the meetings (by less than a fourth of the total
number of times the committee met).

Unlike Province A, Province B (in Luzon) does not have a well
structured committee. The PAC relies on the existing structure of
a rural information council whose constituents also include the
members of the PAC. In cases where immediate response is necessary
on the part of certain selected agencies, the PPO is the one most
actively engaged in soliciting their comments or views either by
consulting with individuals personally, convening several of them as
a group, or communicating by phone. More informal channels for
communication are relied upon than those resorted to by Province A.

The universe of informants was obtained from the PPO as
there is no record of the minutes of the meetings of the PAC since
it had not met as one body. As a whole there are 17 names included
on the list, of which fifteen were interviewed. The other two were
not available for the interview during the period the study was con-

ducted.

Profile of the panel. Informants of this project are pre-

 

dominantly male (only two are females), concentrated in the age ranges

of 35 to 54 and have relatively high educational attainment (only

53

two are without any collegiate education). For a summary of this
profile, see Table 1. Six of the 62 are foreigners--three Americans,
one Scot, one Canadian and one Indian, all of whom are linked with
the conception or implementation of the project at the Central Office.
Four of the six are connected with the IRRI; one with the USAID;

and, one with a private advertising firm.

Universe of the Study: The Technocrats

 

The universe of the study are all persons considered to be
technocrats in the public sector in the various activities in which
they could possibly engage in the Philippines. For purposes of this
research, the focus is limited to technocrats involved in the selected
government project of Masagana 99 Rice Program in the Philippines.
More specifically, the subjects of the study are all persons per-
ceived by the reputational panels to be technocrats engaged in the
conception of the Masagana 99 project in May 1973; and, the central
and provincial technocrats engaged in the implementation process in
the period February 1, 1975 to August 31, 1975. The central techno-
crat is one primarily linked in operation with the NFAC office in
Metropolitan Manila where national decision-making for planning and
implementation takes place. The provincial technocrat is one pri-
marily linked with the provinces and/or other political units beyond
the domain of the national office.

Altogether, there are 33 names mentioned by the reputational
panel as technocrats involved in the conception of the project.
Twenty-three of the 33 are once again mentioned in the list of central

technocrats involved at the implementation stage, drawn by central

54

Table l.--General Characteristics of the Combined Panels.

 

 

Characteristic Total
1. Sex
Female 2
Male _69
Total 62
2. Age Range
25-34 8
35-44 27
45—54 27
55-64 .10
Total 62

3. Educational Attainment

No collegiate training 2
College graduate 34
M.S. degree holder or pursuing this degree 17
Ph.D. graduate or pursuing this degree _31
Total 62
4. Locus of operation in the project
Center 30
Province 32
Province A (17)
Province B .__(15)

Total 62

 

55

and provincial panels. There is a total of 61 names indicated as
central technocrats by both central and provincial panels. And
finally, there are 98 reputed provincial technocrats at implementation
cited by the central and provincial panels. See a summary of this

profile in Table 2.

Table 2.--Persons Nominated as Technocrats.

 

 

Total
1. Persons perceived as central technocrats
. 33
at the concept1on stage
2. Persons perceived as central technocrats 61
at the implementation stage
3. Persons perceived as central technocrats
at the conception and at the implementation 23
stages
4. Persons perceived as provincial technocrats 98

at the implementation stage

 

Twenty—four persons who are visible to the central and pro-
vincial panels serve as cases in focus for examining the dynamics
involved for the behaviors of technocrats. The details for the choice
are indicated in Chapter III. Thirteen are, at one time or another
linked with the national agency in the conception and/or implemen-
tation stages. Eleven of them are involved in implementation at the

provincial level.

Ethnography. Ethnographic study was conducted to examine the

general setting that paved the way for the emergence of technocrats

56

in the field of Philippine public administration. This was mainly
drawn from a review of existing literature on the nature of public
bureaucracy that precipitated the convergence of technocrats in this
sector.

The socio-historical conditions that paved the way for the
emergence of technocrats in the field of agriculture and more specific-
ally the rice project, are also examined. Such general questions were
asked as: What is the general social setting influencing the emergence
and the performance of technocrats in the project? What is the
institutional or organizational machinery with which technocrats in
this research gravitate to perform their functions? Data for these
were obtained from published literature, agency reports and in-depth
interview of informants.

In-depth interviews were conducted with administrators of the
project—-five from Manila and two from each of the two provinces.
Selected individuals (six) who were involved in the conception and/or
who served as consultants in the implementation stage were also inter-
viewed. All of the informants also served as members of the reputa-
tional panel. They were asked for the particular circumstances that
paved the way for the emergence of the project, the institutional
setting for its operation, and the conditions which led to the emer-
gence of technocrats. It was through these initial encounters that
the strategy to operationally define technocrats on the basis of the
involvement of individuals in the technical and administrative

planning of the project was revised. A pool of indicators which

57

informants consider as characterizing a technocrat had to be

incorporated as well.

Interview instrument. An interview instrument was devised to

 

explore the theoretical concerns in the paradigm of the study as out-
lined in Chapter 1. During the initial phases of the field work, the
concepts it represented were reviewed in Manila with the help of a
series of social scientists. It was field-tested with four reputed
technocrats in an irrigation project, on the basis of which both the
initial design and instrument were refined to make them manageable
and sensitive to the prevailing social situation.

The variables which were discarded because of time limitation
were:

1. the technocrats' models and plans for the change with respect
to the project, and
2. the country or countries that serve as the technocrats'

model with respect to agriculture.

The items modified because the respondents did not know how
to react to them as they did not clearly identify themselves as
technocrats, were:

1. the circumstances that paved the way for their emergence as
technocrats, and

2. the future plans about their roles as technocrats in the
public sector.

Subsequent questions raised with respondents refer mainly to
the circumstances that paved the way for their involvement in the

project and their future plans for their occupational careers.

58

To explore the experiences of the technocrats, the instrument
finally adopted in this research had a series of open—ended questions
arranged under the following topics (see Appendix B):

1. The nature of involvement with the project

2. The factors considered important in the involvement with the
project

3. The processes involved for attaining stated goals or objectives
as technocrats of the project

4. The assessment of one's performance as a technocrat

5. The frustrations and gratifications encountered in connection
with the project

6. The conflicts or problems encountered with persons in one's
work milieu

7. The general background for one's emergence as a technocrat and
future plans as such

8. The perceptions of and nominations for technocrats in the
project

With the exception of certain questions which the respondent
elected to "put off the record," the interviews were conducted with
the aid of a tape-recorder. All of the interviews were carried out

in English.

Background information. Background information was collected

 

on age, educational background, occupational experiences, educational
honors and awards, occupational recognition, publications, significant
achievements (including special studies and other training) and

origins of fathers of technocrats. For some, these data were secured

59

from the bio-data sheets provided by respondents. Respondents who
did not have the desired information on their bio-data sheets or who
did not have one at all, were asked to fill out blank information
sheets (see Appendix C). In addition, information was also obtained
by this researcher from other sources if the preceding strategies did
not work. The other sources of information were the respondents'
file in the personnel office, and individuals who worked directly
with the technocrat and had access to some of this information, e.g.,

the secretary.

Data Collection Period

 

Data collection was carried over a period of seven months--
from February to August, 1975. Roughly, about a fourth of this
period was devoted to collecting materials and ethnography. Three-
fourths of the period was engaged in interviews of informants and the
nominated technocrats. Half of this period was used for interviews
of central technocrats and informants. Another half was utilized for
the visits with and interviews of technocrats and informants in the

provinces.

Interviewer-Interviewee Relationship

 

The strategy adopted in setting the interview was to personally
communicate with the respondents the purposes and objectives of the
project either by phone or by personal visits in their offices. This
enabled the researcher to convey the urgency with which the interview
was sought. A letter of introduction written by the adviser of this

research was useful in introducing the interviewer on occasions where

60

preliminary calls found the respondents unavailable. This was
followed up by phone calls or personal visits.

Provincial respondents were contacted through the institutional
sponsorship of NFAC (by radio-phone or by telegraphic transfers).
Usually, the name of an administrator from Manila was used to intro-
duce the researcher to the province through the provincial NFAC
representative--the PPO. Thereafter, other PAC members were person-
ally contacted by this researcher.

Most of the interviews with technocrats and informants were
undertaken in their offices, except for a few who preferred interviews
to be held at their homes or outside the premises of their place of
work (e.g., a dining place). Inasmuch as the informants and respon-
dents were mostly middle-level and upper-level administrators of
institutions, interruptions in the interview commonly took place.

This was especially so during peak hours of work when various individ-
uals sought the attention of the interviewee. It was important,
therefore, to indicate to the interviewee that subsequent appointments
for interviews be scheduled during hours that had the least influx

of visitors. When interviewed outside of their place of work,
interviewees were generally found to be quite relaxed, responsive and
very amenable to further probing questions. Inasmuch as there were

few Opportunities for these people to talk about their occupation, they
welcomed the occasion to express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction
about their work.

Most of the interviews averaged about an hour and 45 minutes.

More extended sessions were held with key informants who were very

61

knowledgeable about the different phases of the program commencing
with its implementation. One interview ran to a total of eight hours,
in which case, sessions were scheduled at different times. When
found necessary, some follow-up questions were pursued by phone.

The greatest difficulty encountered was in setting interview
times with key administrators. On certain occasions, it was even
necessary to obtain "sponsorship" of another administrator who had
access to the interviewee in order to get a favorable acceptance.
Generally, however, respondents were cooperative and responsive
especially when they learned about the academic nature of the research.
It appeared that being introduced as a researcher from the University
of the Philippines and as a graduate student from an American univer-
sity readily eased the way in seeking interviews.

Inasmuch as Masagana 99 is a priority program of the govern-
ment, most informants and technocrats had been exposed to a barrage of
interviews in the past. They were apt to refer this researcher to a
"right hand" person thinking that the interest pertained to the project
itself. Realizing that the objective was to gain an understanding of
their own experiences and participation, most readily agreed to be
interviewed. Assurance of anonymity enabled the respondent to openly
express their feelings about sensitive topics particularly those con-
cerning problems with a superior or a consociate and those encountered
with persons or individuals in other agencies.

There were a few instances when provincial respondents

initially were reluctant to openly express themselves, having mistaken

62

the researcher for a member of the performance audit team from the
Central Office.

Nominations for names of technocrats was a touchy subject
matter. This was especially the case when middle-level administrators
did not include the names of their superiors. They must have felt
obligated to consider their superior in the nominations. In cases

like this, some elected to have the interview "put off the record."

CHAPTER IV

TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF FILIPINO TECHNOCRATS

The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the perceptions
of the reputational panel members about the personal characteristics
of technocrats and more particularly those in the Masagana 99.

This delineates the perception for the different patterns of
expectancies for a scientist who becomes a technocrat and an adminis-
trator in the public sector who becomes a technocrat. The patterns
of expectancies are drawn from the perspectives of members of the
reputational panel stemming from two communities-~scientific and
administrative. These are the communities with which they have been
linked for the most part of their occupational histories.

This also discusses the implications of these expectancies for
the roles of technocrats originating from these two communities. An
analysis is made at the end of chapter by tying the perceived qualities
of technocrats' behaviors with illuminating themes in developmental
literature.

Characteristics of Technocrats as
Perceived by the Reputational Panel

 

The 62 members of the reputational panel were queried for
their perception about the characteristics of a technocrat. They were
asked: "How do you characterize a technocrat of the Masagana 99?"

63

64

There are different ways with which the panel members respond
to this question. These are examined in detail in succeeding
sections.

One indicator pertains to the specific functions in the
bureaucracy or organization of the Masagana 99 where technocrats are
linked. Forty eight of the 62 mentioned this.

The second indicator pertains to the complex of personal
attributes of a technocrat. These attributes refer to a given set
of knowledge, skills and attitudes with reference to a technocrat's
work or interactions with a given social milieu. Fifty seven of the
62 panel members mention this pool of indicators for a technocrat.

The third pool of indicators refers to non-behaviorally-
related characteristics. This depicts the origins of technocrats
that are perceived by the panel members as enabling the former to
acquire the recognition. Seventeen of the 62 panel members cite this
indicator.

Only two out of the 62 panel members do not give an answer to
the question--one provincial participant of the program and a foreign
scientist, both of whom claim lack of familiarity with the term or
its use in the Philippines. The latter also averred that the term

is not commonly used in his country. See Table 3 for clarification.

The technocrat and his functions with respect to the

 

organization in focus. There seems to be an agreement among panelists

 

that a technocrat engages in various phases of the project but this
involvement may be as policy-maker, planner, administrator or a com-

bination of these. Among the 48 of 62 informants who locate

65

Table 3.-—Perceived Indicators for a Technocrat by Central and
Provincial Panels Combined.

 

Total Frequency
Perceived Indicators of Mention
(Total N = 62)

 

1. Assumption of key positions

in the organization 48
2. A complex of personal attributes 57
3. Others 17
4. No answer 2

 

technocrats according to their functions, more than half (25 of the
48) see him as being engaged in any one of these functions or com-
binations of them. Twenty-three perceive him as being engaged in one
specific activity only--in policy-making, planning or administration.
Only one includes an "extension" man or a "technician" who directly
engages in the dissemination of the package of technology to the
farmers and who is, therefore, dependent on the pooled effort for
decision—making among policy-makers, planners and administrators.
Irrespective of the location of an individual in the organi-
zation, the overriding criterion for one to be considered as a techno-
crat is the quality of work one performs in a given position. This
is reflected in the statement of a respondent who says that "it is
performance rather than the position that makes a technocrat." He is
labelled as such because of "how he operates, thinks and is trained
as an individual." The position that one assumes in the organization

is not the primary basis for the attainment of the status of

66

technocrat. It rather "depends upon how he applies his expertise . .
a designation extended to someone based on his achievement." To be a
technocrat, therefore, is to acquire a status and prestige from the
point of view of participants of a program such as this. It is
accorded to a person based on a criterion of performance in certain
positions. No empirical studies have been undertaken of this
prestige system. This falls outside the scope of this particular
study.

What then are the criteria for performance enabling one to be
accorded the status of a technocrat by the informants? Sixty infor-
mants who convey their perceptions, identify qualities of behaviors
rather than merely locating a technocrat in certain positions. This,
therefore, further reinforces the notion that attaining the status of
technocrat is tied to holding certain positions in an organization but
sheer occupancy of these positions is not sufficient in itself to be
so classified; the person must also exhibit quality behavior in that

role.

Perspectives on technocrats by the two broad communityggroup-

 

ings of panel members. There is a tendency among the informants from

 

the scientific community (those with established linkages with
research or educational institutions at which they have engaged for
most of their occupational careers with research and/or teaching
tasks) to convey an ideal concept of the technocrat based on the
norms of the scientific community. On the other hand, those with

established backgrounds in administration in the public or the

67

private sectors are more inclined to abstract technocratic behaviors
within the purview of their own origins.

For example, among the panel members from the administrative
community (44 of the total of 62), more than half describe technocrats
as administrators (24 of the 44). Among the panel members originating
from the scientific community (18 of the 62), nearly a third describe
technocrats as those having scientific knowledge. The panel members
from the scientific community, however, have less consensus in
describing technocrats as coming from their community than do those
from the administrative community. Eight of the total number of
panel members from the scientific community describe technocrats as
administrators; and, both as administrators and scientists. Perhaps,
this signifies the perception among the panel members of the variety
of roles which a scientist-technocrat can assume in addition to

teaching and research. See Table 4 for clarification.

Perspectives on technocrats by panel members stemming from the

 

scientific community. The panel members who themselves stem from the

 

scientific community put emphasis upon how technocrats differ from

the ordinary behavior of a research or an academic scientist. Panelists
describe the sense of urgency on the part of the "scientist-turned-
technocrat" to respond to problems in "day-to-day" world. He is held

to be committed to activities that have relevance to reality problems,
and to be able to arrive at appropriate and practical answers to

these problems. A member of one of the technical committees who
originates from the university says that a scientist can be a techno-

crat only if he does not indulge in some "esoteric field" and that he

68

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:OHumHuomov ace mcH>Hm usozuHs mpmuoonsoeu mo :OHumooH HecoHuHmom ou causeway cho mucmenomzHe

 

No N m w m mm m HmuOH
zuHcseaou
we H n m m cm N e>HumuuchHao<

ece>Hec\oHHcsc .~

 

 

qucsssoo
wH H H m m m m UHMHHCOHom .H
coda xHeo oz» omen» mo noumnuchHev< umHuceHem
nezmc< . e . meHuHHwov mcoHueewnaou as m< a m<
Hench oz mHuomeu oz Hmuocou xwmwuamousm on» cH mcoHuo::m an :HwHuo .munmeuomcH

 

mumuoocnoob momcoHumHuemea .muemauomcH

 

.chHno mo meHuHcsaaou an
mHoeem so co>Hoouoa mm somuuseowom one :H meoHuucsm an mueuooeaeoe mo mouanuuu< UHMHoemmuu.v pomh

69

engages in endeavors that have "useful and practical" implications.
It is often said that: "He is a hybrid between a scientist and a

common man. He is able to translate what comes out of the scien-

tific world into something useful in time and space. He knows how a
scientist thinks, what a scientist does, and who are to be affected
by such an activity." With reference to the project in focus, a
respondent sees the technocrat as being able to "respond to the needs
of the end-users, the farmers." He cannot be a technocrat if he is
"isolated in the four-walls of his room."

A commitment and empathy for the public's needs is considered
an important attribute. This is the underlying force behind the
nature of activities engaged in by the technocrat. One respondent
from the IRRI asserts: ”A technology that should be evolved
must be one that should be borne out of our present condition in
life and a projection of what would logically be the needs of our
people."

Researches that have practical implications cannot be a
technocrat's domain, however, if the results are not conveyed to
decision-makers responsible for the adoption of the complex of outputs
generated from his endeavors. "A technocrat is a person with technical
knowledge and he conveys this knowledge on a policy-level." He is
one who can communicate ideas or resources in such a manner that they
can be implemented. "He knows how to communicate them and is per-
suasive enough for these ideas to be adopted." One even strongly
argues that the immediate concern of a scientist is to convey exist-

ing technologies for adoption rather than "uncovering" new ones, for

70

as it is, a big discrepancy is already noticeable "between the adoption
of available technology and what the farmers are practicing." What
should be done, he claims is to "encourage the removal of the con-
straints . . . to get our presently known technology adopted."

In summary, a "scientist-turned-technocrat" possesses the
following ideal-type characteristics as perceived by panel members:

1. Competence or knowledge in a given area or field as a basic
foundation for action,

2. Commitment to deliver the complex of knowledge to decision-
makers,

3. Awareness of the needs and problems of the everyday world,
specifically that of "abstract collectivity," and

4. Capacity to anticipate future problems arising in a sector
of the society perceived by these informants as the "real
world."

Various new sets of roles, therefore, are introduced into
the norms of the technocratic community. There are not only demands
to conform to the rigors of one's own endeavors as members of the
scientific community. Membership in the technocratic community
challenges one to develop a sense of commitment to the national polity
and a sense of relevance among members' action, by translating the
complex of outputs from the scientific domain into the solution of
the selected real problems. A scientist-turned-technocrat performs
a "political function" in a sense. For ideas do not remain in the
boundaries of the scientific world but they are transmitted to

selected sectors of the public for adoption. It is important for a

71

technocrat to consider the relational aspect with an existing political

 

machinery to be able to communicate the complex of outputs for legiti-
mation by policy-makers. He also has to consider this aspect in
transmitting the complex of outputs from the scientific community

to make it comprehensible to the end-users of selected sectors of

the public. He resolves the issue about whom to approach to get ideas
accepted and in what manner these ideas will be presented to make

them acceptable.

Perspectives on technocrats from panel members of the adminis-

 

trative community. Informants with administrative backgrounds have

 

imageries of technocrats which reflect the shortcomings of public
administrators. In a capsule, a technocrat is aptly viewed as having
value orientations or commitments which make him more than a "bureau-
crat" but less than a "politician."

A bureaucrat, used in a derogatory sense by the informants,
is generally seen as prone to "inaction," "entanglement in red-tape,"
"conservatism," "rigid conformity to the rules of the system," and
"detachment from the real problems encountered by technicians in the
field." He is held by one to be a "prisoner of the rules of the
bureaucracy." In contradistinction, a technocrat is "action-
oriented," "innovative," "open to new ideas," "down-to-earth," and
a "fast worker." A technocrat "bends the bureaucracy to attain
certain goals . . . . He can break old and make new rules." As a
case in point, one informant cites the apparent "Openness" of a key
administrator of NFAC, whom he labels a technocrat, to adopt a new

strategy to wage a campaign for the program. Instead of relying on

72

existing informational machinery, which the technocrat assesses as
being inadequate for coping with the magnitude of the program, he
tapped a renowned private advertising firm to structure the strategies.
He was "willing to take the risk of being unpopular" among those
within the bureaucracy who usually performed the function of dis-
semination in the bureaucracy.

Another case cited as exemplifying technocratic behavior is
that of a designated technocrat who had previously been an adminis-
trator of a region devastated by a typhoon. To enable the community
to immediately secure the staple crop it needed, he procured millions
of cavans of rice from a trade association initially unwilling to
deliver the rice until funds were available. The said administrator
gave an assurance that this obligation could be met by signing a
post-dated check. According to bureaucratic procedures, issuance of
a substantial amount of money by a regional administrator would
require a lengthy process of clearance with the center before a
decision could be made. He "took the risk of being jailed or being
fired" from office should the national office decide not to honor the
check.

Furthermore, a technocrat has to play politics in certain
respects, although he cannot engage in "too much of it." He should
only be "ten percent of a politician." "Politics" is deemed necessary
to generate resources that are requisites for pursuing certain stated
goals. "He should kowtow at times with the powers-that-be." He
should, for example, know "whom to approach to have a budget

approved." But to play politics should not overwhelm his motives

 

 

73

and purposes for then he ceases being a technocrat. "A politician is
concerned with power-~his capacity to move people as an end in itself.
A technocrat is concerned with how to reach a goal and not to maintain
power." "He can be distinguished from a politician in that he decides
objectively what is good for a community. The politician's considera-
tion is that of pleasing people even if economically unsound." "A
technocrat may make decisions that are 'painful' to the majority in
the short-run, but are beneficial to the community in the long-run."
In other words, what is conveyed here is that a technocrat
has commitments beyond the "power" interests and motives identified
with a "politician." A technocrat identifies with the goals and
interests of a national polity. He "puts a bit of sacrifice of his
personal time, effort and even money to get the program off the
ground. He is selfless. He is not concerned with making money out

of his job. He has an unblemished reputation and morality."

Other perceived attributes of technocrats as administrators.

 

Panelists with an administrative background have a more elaborate
conception of the characteristics of a technocrat as an administrator
than of one introducing scientific concepts. Other than the normative
orientations or values of administrator-technocrats to change or
innovate and the commitment to the attainment of the goals for the
interest of an abstract majority, the following orientations are
also perceived as being held as a technocrat:

l. Objectivity--the technocrat makes decisions on the basis of a

rational assessment of the situation and evaluates events as

74

they occur. One said, "a technocrat can make decisions with
no political shades. He has real facts in his forehead."

2. Realism-~he is "down-to-earth and practical," he can "balance
the situation with what is realistically possible." This
does not imply, however, that he should "discredit theories
as the basis for his work" but that "he is also involved in
the practical side of it. Theories should serve as guidelines."

3. Foresight--he has the capability of anticipating the future
and of "projecting what would logically be the needs of the
people." He is "even able to jump ahead of the problems
before they can occur. If he can 'circumvent' them, he tries
to do so." "He is forward-looking in making a decision."

4. Sense of urgency and immediacy of problems-~the technocrat
responds to problems immediately "without much ado." He
does his job "today rather than tomorrow." He has a well-
developed commitment to the "speedy" attainment of the goals
of the program.

5. Professionalism--he is able to keep abreast of the latest
trend in his area of expertise. "He cannot afford to 'sit' on

his knowledge. Initial preparation is not enough."

Perceived qualities of technocrats in administration as they

 

relate with selected social milieu. As an administrator, a techno-

 

crat demonstrates other qualities pertaining to his relationships

with his subordinates, his peers, and the end-users of the organi-

 

zation's complex of outputs.

7S

1. Relationship with subordinates - The attributes concerning

 

relationships with subordinates mentioned by informants include:
a rational basis for recruitment of personnel; the encouragement for
participativeness and professional growth among them; and, the concern
for the "right approach to obtain followership for subordinates."

It is argued by panel members that the ability of the techno-
crat to have a strong support from the bureaucracy in attaining
stated task goals hinges on the "rational" basis by which subordinates
are chosen. "Competence and expertise" must be the major point for
consideration. While "political favors" may be unavoidable at times,
the basic criterion for consideration of a candidate must still be
his qualification. A respondent asserts: "Politics is not the name
of the game when you deal with them. While a technocrat may extend
favors by considering a recommendee of a friend, qualification is
the basic criterion for recruitment."

Competencies among subordinates may be encouraged by being

open to participativeness. From the perspective of the panel members,

 

this generally refers to the technocrats' expanding Opportunities for
involving subordinates in the decision—making process. This is indi-
cated by the statement of a panel member as he describes one nominee
to the position of a technocrat: "He can entrust work to his sub-
ordinates who, in turn, can use his name, the powers and the preroga-
tives of his office." Another informant from the private sector
comments, "§_is a technocrat because he can manage an organization by
delegation. Most of the private sector people operate by delegating

functions." The important factor, however, is that a technocrat can

76

"take the risk by employing and trusting people who he judges to be
able to perform the right thing. Recruits have acquired expertise."

Since learning is held to be an on-going process, a techno-
crat is also viewed by respondents as being receptive to infusing the
organization with new ideas and the latest information in various
areas of expertise. "Keeping attuned with the latest trend, therefore,
necessitates that the technocrats show concern for developing the
capabilities of their people." "Professionalism in management must
be filtered down the line."

As a leader, the technocrat must also have the ability to "push
people to move or to encourage 'followership.'" Some of the qualities
mentioned by informants which enable the technocrat to attain this
are as follows:

1. A "demonstrator"--he can "push people to move because he is
both a follower and a leader. He is able to do and demon-
strate the work to his subordinates. He can be a follower in
that he listens to the suggestions and advice of peOple but
he is more than a follower because he strives to learn more
than his subordinates to gain their respect and maintain their
faith in him."

2. Sensitive to and perceptive of the feelings and needs of his
subordinates--he has a "way of telling people their weaknesses
without hurting them. Failure to take into consideration

the feelings of people may lead to non-cooperation."

77

3. Dispels the myth of having his office secluded from his sub-
ordinates--he is "approachable, humble and is within the

reach of people."

2. Relationship with peers - The relationship with one's peers

 

is also considered important in pursuing the functions of a technocrat.
He "can never push the program unless he knows the other technocrats
who can assist him." "It is imperative that he establishes good
working relationships with the other technocrats of the government.

He must, therefore, have a 'knack' for good human relations."

3. Relationship with end-users - The relationship with the

 

end-users is also considered an important aspect of a technocrat's
mold. An ideal technocrat is one who dispels the myth of an adminis-
trator's being secluded from the end-users of the organization's
complex of outputs. In the case of the project in focus, a techno-
crat is viewed as one who keeps "close watch of the on-goings in the
field. He sees for himself how implementation takes place and how
farmers respond to the program." He conducts "on-the-spot visits in a
locality that is saddled with problems or simply sees for himself

how the program is progressing--whether it is indicating success or

failure."

Non-behavioral indicators for technocrats in administration.

 

Other than the aforementioned attributes, panelists include other
indicators concerning the training obtained by technocrats in prepara-
tion for their roles. Panelists indicate the importance of the link-

ages of technocrats with institutions that are generally held to

78

provide appropriate preparations for technocracy. Technocrats are
perceived as having been "trained or educated in quality institutions
in agriculture or management," complete with high educational achieve-
ments such as an "M.S." or a "Ph.D." They are usually educated

either "abroad" or in prestigeful institutions of the Philippines. If
the degree or training in agriculture is obtained in the Philippines,
this has been acquired from the "University of the Philippines at Los
Bafios" and the "International Rice Research Institute." Some have been
trained in managerial roles in the "private sector" where they have
learned "not to be saddled with bureaucratic procedures." These per-
ceptions further indicate the importance given to the competence of
the person considered a technocrat. It is felt that by having
acquired his education and training in institutions that assures
inculcation of the most recent and the most appropriate knowledge and
skills for technocracy, the person must be competent.

Furthermore, panelists also consider youthfulness an indi-
cator for involvement in technocracy. Technocrats are perceived as
being "generally young and yet accomplished, as evidenced by the
strings of diplomas they have garnered and the impressive vitae
indicating their achievements." The "young" emerge from institu-
tions that allows them to acquire the most recent knowledge, tech-
niques and skills and they have shown fast upward mobility in their
careers.

It is the impression among the panel members that the qualities
distinguishing a technocrat are more likely to be exhibited by a man

from the private sector who joins public service than an upwardly

79

mobile man of the public sector. About the latter there is still some
suspicion that he has the capacity to exhibit a technocratic outlook.
The laterally-mobile person from the private sector (one who assumes a
key position in the bureaucracy) is viewed as having lesser stake in
making his position a career than is the vertically mobile individual
from within the bureaucracy. The temporary nature of the laterally
mobile's linkage with the bureaucracy means they can pursue their
functions with greater interest and enthusiasm for the stated goals
without fear Of loss of security or reputation. Typical of this
impression is the statement:

A technocrat has more enthusiasm for his job than a bureaucrat.

A technocrat usually has a fall-back position. If he joins a

particular outfit, it is simply because he likes the job. If

it doesn't work, he simply goes back to a fall-back position.

Bureaucrats are only in the bureaucracy because they landed the

job. A technocrat has his thinking geared to action, which is not

the case with bureaucrats.

One question that has been harbored by some respondents is

the equality of access of meritorious individuals to the status of
technocrat. One says that its attainment can be made on basis of the
"political workings" also. Assuming that one has merit, it is also
suggested that how one acquires the status of a technocrat depends
upon whom one knows. One respondent comments:

Gaining the status of a technocrat is made possible by establishing

the "right connections." Even if you are the best, you cannot "get

up" if you do not have connections. If you are against the system,

you cannot get anything from it. They get technocrats on their

connections. 'They' say: "Kanino bang bata 'yan? 'San ba galing

'yan?" (Meaning: "Who recruited this person? Where does he
originate from?").

80

Summary and Analysis

This part has indicated the perceptions among panel members
about the characteristics of a technocrat. There seems to be an
agreement among them that technocrats perform such various roles in
the project as policy-maker, planner, administrator or a combination
of these. The actual position in the organization is less crucial for
being designated a technocrat than the qualities of behavior displayed
by the person. Technocrats combine such attribures as:

1. Intellectual orientation--knowledge or competence in a given
area of expertise;

2. Processing orientation-~the ability to translate ideas,
techniques or technology into activities related to polity;

3. Relational orientation--the ability to articulate these
outputs with the immediate end-users; and,

4. Normative orientation--the commitment and dedication for the
attainment of goals related to national polity.

It appears that the emergence of the code word "technocrat"
signifies conceptions on the part of panel members of the project in
focus, Masagana 99, about how persons stemming from the scientific
and administrative communities Operate when they become involved with
the bureaucracy. Panelists express a model for behavior that
envision the persons as departing in specific ways from the usual
patterns of behavior that are manifest in their communities Of origin.
The scientist-technocrat differs from the ordinary behavior or stereo-
type held of a research or an academic scientist. An administrator-

technocrat departs from the negative connotations held of a bureaucrat.

81

With respect to the scientific community, there is posed a
challenge for answers to polity-oriented questions. The ideal
scientist-technocrat is portrayed as a person who avoids being
entrapped in what is called by panel members as "esoteric fields" or
"ivory-tower-dwelling abstractions." He is one who is highly
responsive to "real life problems." The concept of what constitutes
a real life problem is tied into the central values and concerns of
technocracy.

A political role is further performed by scientist-technocrats
by articulating the outputs generated from the complex of activities
of research undertakings, and the institutions responsible for the
adoption of these outputs. It becomes a "political role" in the
sense that the technocrat becomes perceptive Of the "relational
channel" for the introduction of these ideas. To whom are ideas
communicated and what strategies are adopted become very critical
issues for him to resolve.

With respect to the administrator-technocrat, the roles
related to Schumpeter's (1938:87) idea of an entrepreneur has been
perceived as governing their actions. An administrator-technocrat is
adept in introducing innovations and is not encapsulated by bureau-
cratic rigidities or rules. However, a technocrat in the public
sector should deviate in certain respects from the entrepreneurial
mold conceived by Schumpeter. Entrepreneurship, as has been tradi-
tionally viewed by this theorist, refers to workings of the business
sector and, therefore, implies directions for greater profitability.

A technocrat in the public sector is ideally typified by panelists

82

as being "able to run the organization between a charity ward and a
profit organization." The idea is not to reap profits but to
"deliver service to the community" which is the "basis for which it
should exist." But the services should be rendered efficiently
within the stated purposes. One key administrator of the project
who originates from the private sector, who is himself nominated as a
technocrat, wails about the possible misconceptions that could be
held about technocrats who come from business. He says:
I do not like the term technocrat because the implication is
that we don't think of feelings, sentiments and human beings, and
that we only think in terms of pesos, centavos and production.
But this is not true. The real technocrat has to have a broad
perspective and has to take into account the feelings of people
. . . . You have to set a goal which is essentially good for
the people.

The suggestion that a technocrat is able to lead the organi-
zation beyond the "charity ward" seems to denote a reaction against
the widespread notion of the government being a "patron" and a
"dispenser" of goods for the public. In a survey of studies by Dia
(1965) on the farmers' image of government in the Philippines, there
was a general tendency to consider the government as a source of
"dole, the source of jobs, the solver of problems, and a form of
institutionalized philanthropy" (Dia, 1965:154). The informant's
statement seems to challenge technocrats to generate greater reliance
on the part of the public to make their own contributions towards
improving their conditions of life.

An administrator-technocrat may also be equated with Hahn-

Been Lee's concept of development administrator who is supposedly

"perceptive" of the "static administrative ethos and structure" in

83

develOping countries (1972:390). An ideal development administrator

is one who is capable of performing the tasks of "positively meeting"

the "environmental demands with a conscious goal of achieving some

definite progress in their respective fields by introduction of

deliberate changes in the very ethos and procedures of bureaucracy"

(1972:390). He embodies a combination of attributes which are deemed

important in attaining certain tasks such as:

1.

include:

1.

defining the redefining goals and anticipating new tasks under
changing environments;

initiating new plans and policies or reformulating existing
policies;

adapting and restructuring organization for new tasks;
motivating and energizing people toward task goals;
cultivating favorable task environments;

mobilizing resources to carry-out tasks; and,

giving meaning to on-going tasks (Lee, 1972:391-395).

The clusters of desired attributes to meet the above demands

Intellectual attributes (knowledge)--a combination of analytic
faculty, grasp of the situation as a whole, knowledge of
substantive policies, and knowledge about human behaviors

and relations generally acquired in formal curricular programs;
Operational capability (skills)--a combination of organiza-
tional skills, skills in human relations, communication and
political sensitivity best learned through practical experi-

ences;

84

3. Orientational attributes (values and attitudes)--a combina-
tion of a future outlook, innovative mind, positive view of
human nature, entrepreneurial will and power motive formed
since childhood throughout the earlier educational and
character formation process;

4. Ethical attributes (phiIOSOphy and standards)--a combination
of normative conviction, philosophy of life, sense of public
responsibility and ethical standards mostly derivatives of
the earlier process of character formation and education
(Lee, 1972:396-397).

From the respondents' standpoint, the conception of techno-
crats in public administration seems to be a close realization of

Lee's ideal of development administrators.

Conclusion

 

What this pool of characteristics indicate is the importance
given to qualification and performance as a basis for technocracy.
As a society that traditionally views age as a factor for vertical
differentiation, the importance given to technocracy provides promise
for persons who are young and competent to gain this recognition.
As we shall see in a later discussion, the age structure of the techno-
crats in focus vary from those of the existing bureaucratic structures
in the Philippines.

While this chapter has shown the convergence in the image of
technocrats, which is filtered through by panel members and as depicted
by selected theorists, it is still important to take account of the

sociO-cultural context within which technocrats in the Philippines

85

perform their roles and what backgrounds they have which enable them
to acquire the recognition. It is along this vein that the succeed-
ing chapters are addressed, with emphasis on the technocrats and their
experiences in the context of the specific project in focus, Masagana

99.

CHAPTER V

OF TECHNOCRATS AND TECHNOCRACY

The purposes of this chapter are to examine: the backgrounds
and origins of technocrats involved in Masagana 99; the various
experiences of the technocrats with the project in focus-~the nature
of their involvement, the factors that led to this involvement, the
processes for attaining stated goals and objectives; the assessment
of their performance as technocrats; the frustrations and satis-
factions encountered in this involvement; the personal conflicts
encountered in their work milieu; their current activities as techno-
crats (other than those engaged in with the project); and, their
plans for the future for themselves as technocrats.

Variations in the technocrats' behavior are examined accord-
ing to the parameter of participation in the project (central or pro-

vincial); the level of participation in the bureaucracy within which_

 

the project in focus is embedded (whether as bureau-technocrats or

non-bureau-technocrats); and the nature of participation at the differ-

 

ent stages of the project.
This highlights the role of networks as the social space
within which technocrats operate. For technocrats, the nature and

function of networks is connected with the existing social milieu in

86

87

which they emerge--the peculiar setting of the agricultural environment
for rice culture that distinguishes the nature of their participation.

The technocrats in primary focus are those visibly involved
in the project at two stages of its development:

1. the technocrats at the conception stage before the project's
adoption in May 1973; and,
2. the technocrats at the implementation stage (February 1 to

August 31, 1975).

The visible technocrats are the selected focus, because they
were most frequently mentioned in nominations of the reputational
panels and, therefore, suggest a consensus among the panel members
about who comply with the criteria mentioned in Chapter III. And,
secondly, highlighting the visible technocrats can reveal the most
central roles of technocrats and the most influential in the decision-
making process.

A technocrat has been counted as visible if he received at
least half as many nominations as the person most cited from a
roster of technocrats. Those who were chosen by both central and
provincial panels, and by each panel at the different stages of the
project, were pooled together and examined for the mode and patterning
of their behavior. Attempts are made to illuminate the backgrounds of
technocrats according to how highly they were placed in the bureauc-
racy, how and where they participated in the project and at what
stages in the development of the project they participated.

There are five major parts in this chapter. The first dis-

cusses the broad origins of those who all the panels nominated as

88

technocrats, and how the panels can be distinguished in their choices.
It also examines the social milieu as a factor in influencing the
nominations. How the visible technocrats were drawn from the total
number of nominees is also explained in this part.

The second part discusses the origins of visible technocrats--
their occupational background, educational attainment, institutional
linkages and socio-economic origins. They are differentiated from
other panel members who did not satisfy the criteria for visibility
as has been operationally defined in this research.

The third part deals with the roles of the visible technocrats
in the project and how they relate with those who do not have the
visible status.

The fourth dwells on the experiences of visible technocrats
in relation to the project--the patterns for recruitment and social-
ization, and the sources of gratifications and frustrations.

The fifth focuses on the identities of technocrats--whether
they perceive themselves as technocrats.

In each of these parts, attempts are made to incorporate

sociological Observations of the findings in relation to technocracy.

Part A — Technocrats in General

 

The succeeding sub-sections examine the broad groupings of
affiliations--public or private-~and the activities of institutions
represented by all the technocrats mentioned by the members of the
reputational panel. The description of the number and origins of
technocrats is made according to the two stages in the development of

the project--its conception and implementation. Distinctions are

89

made in the nominations for central and provincial technocrats by
panel members at the Center and the provinces.

This part initially suggests that the emergence of a techno-
crat depends upon a combination of the social milieu and the performance
of a person in a given activity. There are some technocrats who are
visible in all the different stages of the program; and there
are also those who are visible at both the central and provincial
settings. Some technocrats are visible only at a certain time or
place.

The 62 members of the combined central and provincial panels
mention a total of 169 different names of technocrats involved at
the conception and during the implementation of the project. Of the
169, 71 were considered to be participants at the Center at varying
stages of conception and implementation. Ninety-eight emerged as
provincial technocrats participating mainly at the implementation
stage.

Thirty-three of the 71 central technocrats were participants
at the conception stage. Twenty-three of the 33 were again mentioned
as participants at the implementation stage. (See Figure l for
clarification.)

From the rosters of the reputational panels for central and
provincial technocrats at conception and implementation, a total of
27 emerged as visible. Thirteen of the 27 were central technocrats,
while the rest (14 of them) were from the provinces. Altogether,
however, there were only 24 visible technocrats who were interviewed

in this research. Three of the 27 were not available when they were

90

     
 
 

Central
Technocrats

  
 

     
 

 

 
    
  
 

NNM = 33 Central
Technocrats
// NNM = 61

 

  

Provincial
Technocrats
NNM = 98

 
   

Legend: A - Conception Stage
0 - Implementation Stage
NNM - Total Number of Names Mentioned
23 - Total Number of Names Mentioned

in Both Stages

Fig. l.--The Technocrats Cited by All Reputational Panels (Combined)
at Conception and Implementation Stages.

91

sought for the interviews. (A distribution of the central and pro-
vincial technocrats according to the votes obtained by reputational
panels is presented in Appendix D.)

The limited number of technocrats at the conception stage
reflects the highly concentrated nature of the initial planning for
the project. There were 33 cited technocrats in the conception stage,
as against 169 cited at implementation. Vertical integration of pro-
vincial technocrats is suggested by the concentration among central
technocrats at the conception stage of the project.

The Reactions of Panel Members to
the Nominating_Process

 

 

The task of identifying specific persons as technocrats was a
difficult one for panel members. This was so because, first, the
methodology depended on recall of their interactions with others who
met the criteria which they set for nominations (as generally outlined
in Chapter III). Others relied on what they heard of other people's
impressions about certain individuals' embodying the qualities of a
technocrat. To indicate their nominations, they needed some time for
deliberation. One panel member even claimed: "It is easy to define
who is a technocrat but when you get down to people, the line is so
thin."

A strategy for relating to the question found useful by some
panel members was to mention a name of a technocrat who, from their
perspective, embodies the ideal. This person did not necessarily
engage in the project but would be someone around whom other persons

in the project patterned themselves after as technocrats.

92

The foreign nationality of some participants created a problem
for three panel members when they were deliberating on the names to be
included in their respective rosters. While they recognized the
appearance of foreigners at the different stages of the development
of the project, they did not cast a "no" or a "yes" vote for such
persons. Typical of the comments among these three was: "I prefer a
Filipino to be actively involved in the project. It is about time that
we manage our own affairs."

There were also cited technocrats about whom panel members had
ambivalent reactions. Four of the persons mentioned were not granted
technocratic status on the project because it was thought that their
performance did not warrant this recognition. These were Provincial
Program Officers of some provinces who were considered "politicians" by
some panel members from both the central and the provincial Offices.
They were described as "talkers" rather than "doers." One was even
noted to have spent his time more with his own farm lands than pur-
suing the interest Of the project.

In cases where there were negative opinions openly expressed,
the standard rule adopted was to deduct one point from the total
number of points gained by the same technocrat. Three of the four
technocrats about whom panel members had ambivalent reactions did not
meet the criteria for visibility at all. One, for whom the affirma-

tive votes overwhelmed the negative opinions, was included.

The Technocrats at the Conception Stage

 

Thirty-three names were mentioned as technocrats by the

reputational panel for the conception stage. However, only a small

93

proportion of them were visible to all the panel members. Among the
33 names mentioned, only 8 (or nearly a fourth) garnered as many as
half of the votes as the person most frequently mentioned.

All technocrats perceived to be engaged at the conception
stage of the project, came from two broad segments of Philippine
society--governmental or non-governmental entities. Of the 33 persons
cited, 23 represented 10 institutions which were incorporated in the
government, mainly undertaking service functions for delivery of
resources (technical or non-technical) to sectors of the public. Ten
were employed in non-governmental institutions. All 33 were involved
in some kind of administrative work in the institutions they repre-
sented, in the sense of supervising the activities of a group of
people in the attainment of some stated goals or objectives.

The 23 technocrats who represented governmental service insti-
tutions were those involved in the direct supervision of an existing
rice project prior to Masagana 99 and of other projects under the
broad category of food programs (six of them from NFAC). The rest
came from institutions concerned with combined research-extension,
financing, marketing, agricultural statistics, and a coordinating
institution for agricultural research. All the representatives
operated out of the central office.

The 10 non-governmental representatives were from agencies
and organizations engaged in the research on rice culture, trade
organization for private financiers in the rural areas, foreign

technical assistance program, private advertising firms, and private

94

chemical companies (manufacturing fertilizers and pesticides). (See
Table 5 for a summary.)

Notably, the process of the conception of the project gene-
rated the interrelated efforts of representatives from both the public
and private sectors, providing resources (human and material) in the
attainment of the goals and purposes of the project. The influx of
these individuals had been catalyzed by the peculiar aspects of the
technology which required selected inputs for production and for
distribution. The "rice technology" came in the form of a "package"
inasmuch as the adoption or non-adoption of the whole complex of
inputs recommended within a set of rice production rules, led either
to success or failure of the project. The rice varieties recommended
under the Masagana 99 required the application of specific components
Of chemical fertilizers, herbicides and insecticides within a set of
"culture management practices" (Cuyno, 1974:77). The intricacies and
complexities involved in its adoption tied various institutions
together and marshalled the talents and competencies available in
individuals from these institutions. The task was further magnified

by the human aspects in the implementation process.

The Technocrats at the Implementation

Stage

 

Altogether, there were 61 names mentioned by the central and
provincial panels as linked primarily with the national center for
decision-making at the implementation stage of the project. Six of
them were identified by all members of the three panels. Eight were

cited by Province A and central panels. Two were mentioned by

95

Table S.--Technocrats at the Conception Stage and their Institutional
Affiliations from the Perspective of the Reputational Panel.

 

Number of
Institutions
Technocrats are
Affiliated with
or Representing

Number of
Technocrats
Mentioned by
Panel Members

Specific Activities of
Institutional Linkages
of Technocrats

 

A. Governmental

1. NFAC 6 1
2. Extension-Research 7 2
3. Financing 7 5
4. Marketing 1 l
5. Research Coordination 1 1
6. Statistics 1 1

Sub-Total 23 11

B. Non-Governmental

1. Advertising 1 1
2. Chemical Industry 3 2
3. Foreign Aid 3 l
4. Research 3 l

Sub-Total 10 5

TOTAL 33 16

 

96

Province B and central panels. The rest (45 of them) were mentioned
by only one of the three specific panels (32 by the central panels, 13
by Province A and two by Province B). See Figure 2.

The central panel made the most designations (totalling 45),
perhaps signifying the access of the panel members to the different
processes of the technocrats' behaviors which were mostly confined in
the Center.

Province A had a total of 24 nominations, as against Province
B's total of 10. Province 8 panel members coincided in their choices
with those of the Center (where 8 Of the 10 technocrats chosen by the
members were also nominated by the central panel). Province A had a
wider number of choices; but in proportion to the convergence of
choices with the central panel, their nominations were less integrated
than could be observed in Province B. There were more technocrats
perceived by Province A who did not coincide with the choices of the
central panel (13 of the 24 choices). This distinction may be
attributed to two factors:

1. The geographical proximity Of Province B to the Center for
decision-making would have enabled the panel members to
develop clearer perceptions of the identities of technocrats
with a national scOpe.

2. Province B would have more readily relied on the central
expertise than Province A. Its geographic proximity to the

Center abetted this dependence on central expertise.

97

Central Panel

 

Number of Nominations - 45

32

    
 

13 2

Province A Panel

  
 
       

Province B Panel

 

 

Number of
Nominations - 24

—

  

Number of
Nominations - 10

Legend: The numbers in the overlap of circles represent the areas of

convergence in choices by respective panels. The numbers out-

side the overlap represent the total number of choices by a
single panel.

Fig. 2.--Tota1 Number of Central Technocrats Mentioned by the Three
Panels (Implementation Stage).

98

Broad origins of technocrats at the Center. As at the con-

 

ception stage, there was convergence among the public and the private
sector technocrats in the implementation of the project at the national
setting. A total of 44 names were indicated as representatives of the
government from 18 institutions during the data-collection period.
Eleven of the 44 were directly involved with the NFAC as regular
members of the staff, while 20 represented institutions engaged in
extension-research, financing, marketing, statistics and irrigation.
Four originated from governmental institutions charged variously with
the responsibilities of overseeing agricultural research, planning
and fertilizer distribution. The state-supported pioneering agricul-
tural college of the University of the Philippines at Los Bafios stood
out as the single institution with the most representatives among the
central technocrats, totalling 8. One mentioned the President as the
"highest technocrat" in Masagana 99.

Nominations for the private sector totalled 17 names from
7 institutions. Eleven out of 17 represented institutions engaged in
advertising, the agricultural chemical industry, and trade organi-
zations for bankers and pesticide dealers. The International Rice
Research Institute was distinguished as the institution with the most

technocrats cited. (See Table 6.)

The visible technocrats (central). Summing up all the

 

choices of the three panels, there were a total of 8 visible techno-
crats. The three panels converged in the choice of two of the eight.
Six others met the criteria for visibility from the perspective of

the central panel. No other names met the criteria for visibility

99

Table 6.--Central Technocrats and their Institutional Linkages
Mentioned by the Reputational Panels (Combined) at the

Implementation Stage.

 

 

Number of
Specific Activities of Number of Institutions
Institutional Linkages Mentioned Represented
of Technocrats (Central) Technocrats by Central
Technocrats
A. Governmental
l. NFAC 11 l
2. Coordination 4 3
(i.e., fertilizer
distribution,
planning, research)
3. Education 8 1
4. Extension-Research 11 5
5. Financing 5 4
6. Irrigation 1 1
7. Marketing 2 l
8. Statistics 1 l
9. The President 1 1
Sub-Total 44 18
B. Non-Governmental
1. Advertising 2 l
2. Chemical Industry 1 1
3. Foreign Aid 6 2
4. Research 6 1
5. Trade Organizations 2 2
Sub-Total 17 7
TOTAL 61 25

 

(A;
‘II

4
y-

if

1

100

among the two provincial panels. (See a summary of the choices of
the three panels in Figure 3.) Three of the eight were also mentioned

as visible technocrats at the conception stage. (See Figure 4.)

Provincial technocrats. There were a total of 98 persons

 

indicated as provincial technocrats by the combined central and pro-
vincial panels. Of the 98, there were 14 who emerged as -visible
technocrats.

Compared with the designation of central technocrats, however,
there was less convergence among the three panels in nominations for
provincial technocrats. There were nominees common to the central
panel and Provincial A panel, and to the central panel and Provincial B
panel. There were no nominees common to all the three (see Figure 5).
This suggests the vertical integration of the provinces with the
national center for decision-making. The provincial panels had greater
identification with the Center than with the other provinces. However,
Province A is more self-generating than B, as indicated by the greater

number of persons chosen for provincial technocrats.

The broad origins of the choices of the central and provincial

 

panels. The nominations of the central panel can be distinguished

from the provincial panels. The selections made of provincial techno-
crats by the central panel were from the government sector, principally
persons directly linked with the NFAC. On the other hand, the two
provincial panels drew their nominations for technocrats from both

the governmental and the private sectors.

101

   
 
      
  
   
 
       

Central Panel

 

Number of Nominations - 4S

   

\\\\

\‘.,

Province A Panel Province B Panel

 

 

  

Number of
Nominations - 10

Number of
Nominations - 24

Fig. 3.--The Visible Central Technocrats from the Perspective of the

Three Panels (Implementation).

102

     
   
   
 

IMPLEMENTATION
STAGE

4

CONCEPTION STAGE

 

Number of Technocrats
Mentioned - §l_

 

/ Number of Technocrats
[_ Mentioned -.33

Legend: A - Conception Stage
<:> - Implementation Stage

<> - Visible Technocrats

Fig. 4.—-The Visible Central Technocrats at Conception and Implementa-
tion from the Perspective of All Panels Combined (Central

and Provincial).

103

Central Panel

 

Number of Nominations - 74

n m?

Province A Panel Province B Panel

      
 

 

 

Number of Number of
Nominations - 25 Nominations - 4

Fig. 5.--Provincial Technocrats from the Perspective of the Three
Panels (Implementation Stage).

104

The central panel had a total of 74 nominations. The majority
of the choices were those persons directly responsible for overseeing
the implementation of the project in the provinces. They were 9 of

11 Regional Coordinators (responsible for supervising the project in

 

a group of provinces according to geographic proximity and ethno-

linguistic backgrounds), and 53 of the 66 Provincial Program Officers

 

for Rice (responsible for supervising the implementation of the project
in the provinces). Only 12 of the Chairmen of the Provincial Action
Committees (who were elective officials totalling 66) were mentioned

as technocrats. Fourteen of the 74 emerged as "visible" ones. (See
Table 7 for clarification.)

The limited number of votes cast for Governors could be
attributed to the non-technical responsibility attached to their
roles. The Governor was held to be "titular head" rather than "per-
forming a centrally functional role" in a "highly technical project."
However, one PPO considered this participation important especially
in presiding over the meetings of the PAC. Since the PPO was only
co-equal in status with other agency representatives, more cooperation
could readily be elicited by a person of higher status, through the
participation of the Governor.

The choices of both Provinces A and B included private and
public sector representatives other than those directly connected with
the NFAC administrative structure. However, Province A had a wider
range of choices. Of the 25 nominations in Province A, 18 were drawn
from the same province--two from NFAC; eight from other government

institutions of extension-research, marketing and agricultural

105

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mo nonazz Honezz

 

.HeoHumueeaoneHu Hocad Hmnucou on» we O>Huoemmwom 9:» Eonm mumwooogoeh HmHocH>ouauu.n OHQHH

106

education; four elective officials; and, five from the private sector
engaged in financing and agricultural chemical manufacturing.

The selection of technocrats outside the boundaries of one's
province included three persons connected with a regional extension
office. One was a Regional Coordinator for the Rice Program where
Province A was subsumed. Three rice specialists from the same office
were also mentioned.

Two nominees came from two other provinces within the same
region of which Province A was a part. These choices were made by the
Regional Coordinator and the Governor (who was concurrently the
Presidential Action Officer for Food Production)--both of whom had a
greater trans-provincial thrust than the other members of the panel.
This is indicative of the identification of these two with other
provinces beyond A--an identification not apparent among other panel
members.

Province B had a smaller number of choices and more limited
sectoral involvement of technocrats than did Province A (see Table 8).
This could perhaps be attributed to the fact that Province A has more
institutions from which technocrats could be generated. For example,
five technocrats mentioned in Province A were drawn from a regional
institution engaged in extension and from a local university with a
college of agriculture. These were not indicated as institutions
represented by technocrats in Province B. First, the regional office
which could be a counterpart to the extension office mentioned in A
was not located in the same geographic locale of Province B. While

there was a college of agriculture in Province B as well, no mention

107

Table 8.--Provincial Technocrats and their Institutional Linkages from
the Perspective of the Provincial Panels.

 

 

 

Number of
Institutional Linkages of Technocrats Provincial Choices
A B
A. Within the Province
1. Government
a. NFAC 2 l
b. Educational Institutions 2 -
c. Elective Officials 4 l
d. Extension-Research 5 1
e. Marketing 1 -
2. Non-Government
a. Chemical Industry 2
b. Financing 3
TOTAL 19 4
B. Outside the Province
1. NFAC
a. Provincial Program 2
Officer for Rice
b. Regional Coordinator 1
2. Regional Extension (Government) 3

TOTAL 6

 

108

was made of its being able to generate technocrats for the project.
This could possibly be attributed to the accessibility of B to the
national office that can readily draw from the expertise of leading
centers for research and training in agriculture--UPLB and IRRI.

Other entities with concerns in agriculture also converge in the
primate city of Manila. As a case in point, Province B mentioned two
scientist-technocrats in the roster who happened to visit the area
when the rice lands of farmer-cooperators of the project were infested
with disease. These two were from the IRRI who were reputed to have

expertise in this problem area.

The visible technocrats (provincial) from the perspective
of the central and provincial panels. Of the total number of 98
names mentioned by all panels, 13 met the criteria of visibility.
However, three were not successfully interviewed. Of the 10 inter-
viewed, one was visible in both the Province B and central panels.
Nine others met only the criteria of the central panel. The nominee
of Province A did not reach the criteria for visibility in the two
other panels. However, it should be noted that the visible technocrat
of Province A (who was a Governor) was also able to obtain the highest
number of nominations for this particular category (as an elective
official) among the central panel members. While the Provincial
Program Officer was also mentioned, he did not meet the criteria for
visibility for both central and Province A panels. There were even
negative mentions of this particular person.

As indicated earlier, Province A had an additional visible

technocrat from the perspective of the central panel. This was the

109

Regional Coordinator who subsumed Province A in his jurisdiction along
with the other five provinces he coordinated.

To summarize, there were 11 visible technocrats from the
provinces who were interviewed for this research. One was visible to
Province A and the central panel; 9 were visible only to the central
panel; and another one was visible to Province B (see Figure 6).

A summary of the profile of the nominations for technocrats by the
central and provincial panels at the conception and implementation

stages is presented in Table 9.

The Panel Members as Technocrats

 

The panel members constituted a very rich base for the genera-
tion of technocrats. Among the 30 panel members from Manila, 29 of
the 52 technocrats cited at conception and implementation were from
the panel itself.

Among the two provinces, eight of the 17 panel members of A
were included in the 25 provincial technocrats they cited. All of the
provincial technocrats mentioned in B were on its reputational panel.

All of the visible technocrats in the center and the pro-
vinces arose from each of their panels. The members of the panel
constituted the committees in charge of the planning and implementation
of the project in their respective domains-~the National Management
Committee and the three technical committees backing it up (Fertili-
zers, Pesticides and Information), and the two Provincial Action

Committees of A and B. (See Figure 7.)

110

    
    
  
   
      
   

Central Panel

 

Number of Nominations - 74

\V
\ Province 8 Panel

Number of nominations v Number of nominations
25 4

Province A Panel

 

 

Legend:

<3> - The Visible Technocrats

Fig. 6.--The Visible Technocrats (Provincial) from the Perspective

of the Three Panels.

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111

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umuoocsoeu
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manhoocnoeu
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:Omuem Hem .umuoocnoou

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:Omuom Hem .umuoocnoeu

m 0H HH 0 m cm mH eHnHmH> mm :oHumeHsoc
mo socoscepm umest: .m

cHeHmH> we eechee

 

 

 

 

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mudhoocnoou
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mumnoocnoeh HmHocH>opa mumnooccooh Hmpuceu :oHumooeou OHumHhouomnwgo OHmHoemm
:oHuwueoseHmeH

 

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mHecmm HmcoHumuzdem so HHmHocH>oum was Heupeouv mumuooecooh pom mcoHumcHaoz mo OHHmoua <n-.m oHan

112

Central Panel

 

 

NPM - 30
NN - 52 (including the
conception
stage)
29
-\\\\
Technocrats
Mentioned
/ 8 \ 4
Province A Panel Province B Panel
NPM - 17 NPM - 15
NN - 25 NN - 4

 

Legend: NPM - Number of Panel Members

NN - Number of Nominations for Technocrats

Fig. 7.--The Panel Members in Relation to the Technocrats.

113

Some Impressions on the Nature of

 

Technocracy as Observed in the

 

Aggregate Findings on the
Nominations for Technocrats

 

 

Some impressions from the encounters with the reputational

panels, the choices they have made for technocrats in general, and

personal observations of the social milieu of the technocrats can be

summed up in the following proposition: The socio-historical setting

influences the rise of technocrats and the qualities of the technocrats

who will emerge. More specifically:

I.

The influx of technocrats from different domains into such a
project can be attributed to the presidential support that allows
for the interchange of talents among the different institu-
tions that could possibly extend their cooperation in the
attainment of the goal. Masagana 99 has a prior history,

going back to 1958, of presidential endorsement for having
coordinated the different entities and instrumentalities of
the governmental structure and the private sectors to
participate in the attainment of rice self-sufficiency. It

was only in 1966, however, that there were the first signs of
a more effective coordination among the different agencies to
cooperate with the extant projects for rice production.

This hinged on the noted "technocratic" outlook of its over-all
coordinator and administrator, who was considered to be the
"most effective" (Iglesias, 1976; Arcega, 1969) the rice pro-
jects had ever had. Having inherited a machinery reputed for
dissension and competition among personalities in the pros-

pectively cooperating agencies, the new coordinator for the

114

project provided a neutral locus for career administrators
from the cooperating instrumentalities of the government. To
reinforce this coordinator's managerial expertise,1 the
President delegated to him the responsibility of making
decisions requiring immediate attention. As a person with a
Cabinet position (he was concurrently the Executive Secretary),
he had the authority over the budget and other resources of
the COOperating agencies where bottlenecks and problems seemed
to arise in implementation (Iglesias, 1967:16). He manifested
"commitment" (Arcega, 1969) that was entirely new to the

ethos of the old bureaucracy.

2. The number of persons who are potentially able to perform the
roles of technocrats depends upon the availability of persons
with the appropriate knowledge, skills and attitudes.

In the case of Province B, the limited numbers of techno—
crats mentioned by the panel members could suggest that such
persons did not abound in the locality. This could lead to

the third proposition.

 

1He was noted to have exercised not only "political but also
moral leadership in the bureaucracy" with a "well-conceived plan of
action" and introduction of "innovations" (Marcial, 1967:32). He was
a "thorough planner and thoroughly management conscious . . . (he
obtained his master's degree in public administration from the
Littauer Center of Public Administration in Harvard University in
1955, and was an ICA-NEC fellow on local government development
planning, also in Harvard, in 1958—1959) and saw the problem as it
would apply to any big corporation" (Marcial, 1967:32). He distin-
guished himself both in the government and in academic institutions.

115

If there is a dearth of technocrats in a given area of
expertise, there is a dependence on other entities or
institutions able to supply these persons.

In the case of Province B, the involvement of certain
technocrats mentioned came about because of the outbreak of
diseases in the rice lands of farmer-cooperators. They were
tapped from the Central Office to lend support to this
particular locality.

These two technocrats were mentioned only by certain
individuals from Province B who were familiar with the
participation of these two. This signals another feature of
technocracy which can be stated in the fourth proposition
that follows.

There are some aspects of the technocrats' behavior that are
not observable to a wide range of people.

For example, the scientist who visited Province B during
the outbreak of a disease performed less "noticeably" than
the Provincial Program Officer of the same locality who was
considered a technocrat. The latter was more visible in the
organizational structure of the project.

There are technocrats who come to the fore or remain in the
background depending upon the circumstances that demand or
call for a particular type of expertise or competency.

In the Masagana 99 project, different types of techno-
crats were central in the different stages of its development.

This reveals the different demands for a given competency in

116

the several phases. The visible technocrats in the imple—
mentation of the project were those concerned with its
management and coordination, whether at the central or pro-
vincial levels. The conception stage drew technocrats from
differing backgrounds who had links with institutions connected
with research, financing, extension and project administration.
The convergence of centrally-based technocrats at the con-
ception stage of Masagana 99 manifest the highly centralized
nature of planning and a concentration among the central
technocrats in shaping the directions and goals of the pro-
ject for the provincial concerns. This can be attributed to
the concentration of institutions generating technocrats in
the primate city and, correspondingly, the vertical inte—
gration of technocrats in the provinces with the directions
and goals set by the central technocrats.

Varying degrees of integration with the center may be
apparent, depending upon certain factors which were prelim-
inarily identified here. These are: (l) the self-sufficiency
of an area in generating its own technocrats--who in turn
could be spawned to be self-integrating because of (2) the
distance of an area to the center for technocracy.

While Provinces A and B each suggested vertical integration
with the national office, Province B exhibited more of it than
did A. Greater identification is apparent in relation to the

Center, as indicated by the fact that 11 of the 12 who

117

nominated mentioned the appearance of central technocrats.
Only one drew mainly from his own province.

On the other hand, 12 of the 15 who nominated in Province A
mentioned central technocrats. Three of the 15 drew mainly
‘from their own province and did not identify central techno-
crats at all (see Table 10). This is indicative of a lack of
"consciousness of kind" among the horizontal alignments of
provincial technocrats. This is reflective of the traditional
posture of Filipinos, who are characterized as having vertical
attachments to a person in power within organizations (Holln-
steiner, 1966:3). This has implications for the socialization
process. Instead of benefitting from and identifying with the
experiences of other provincial technocrats in similar circum-
stances, greater affinity is thought to be shared with a central

technocrat.

Table lO.--Origins of Nominees of Central and Provincial Panels.

Origins of Nominees

 

 

. No
Origlns of Central Pro- No .
Panels and Pro- Cgfipral vincial Answer ngzggns Total
vincial y Only
1- Center 12 16 0 l 1 30
2. Province A 6 6 3 0 2 17
3. Province 8 8 3 l l 2 15
TOTAL 26 25 4 2 5 62

\

118

Part B - The Visible Technocrats in Focus:
A General Profile

 

 

While the previous part has centered mainly on the broad
origins of all technocrats nominated by panel members, the succeed-

ing sub-sections examine the personal profile of visible techno-

 

crats--their occupational history, level of participation in the
project, sex, age, educational attainment and socio-economic origins.
It also points out the distinctiveness of their backgrounds on

selected aspects by comparing them with the data on the less visible

 

technocrats and the participants of the project who were not con-

sidered as technocrats by the panel members.

The visible technocrats are the persons who were nominated at

 

least half as often as the person most often cited in the roster of
technocrats. These are the combined names mentioned by the reputa-
tional panels in the conception and implementation of the project.

Out of a total 27, 24 visibles were interviewed. Sixteen of the 24
were also members of the reputational panels. Three of the 24 were
foreigners whose backgrounds are examined separately from Filipinos
when distinctiveness in national identity become the basis for differ-
entiation.

The less visible technocrats are the 25 of the remaining 46

 

panel members who were mentioned as technocrats but who do not meet
the criterion for visibility operationally defined in this research.
Three of these 25 were foreigners.

Of the 46 panel members, the 21 who did not obtain any nomi-

nations whatsoever are labelled non-technocrats.

 

119

Origins of Technocrats

 

Occupational histories of visible technocrats. The visible

 

technocrats are not homogeneous in their origins. While a majority
of the 24 have spent most of their working life in government service,
the rest come from other segments of society--two from private
business, six from academic-research-consultative organizations (e.g.,
UPLB, IRRI, and USAID), and one from an elective position.

In comparing the origins of central and provincial techno-
crats, a more heterogeneous core is apparent among the former (see
Table 11 for specifications). Only five of the 13 from the Center
can be considered to have come out of government. The majority come
either from business or from academic-research-consultative bodies

combined (e.g., UPLB, IRRI, and USAID).

Table 11.--Institutional Affiliation for the Greater Part of the
Visible Technocrats' Occupational Histories.

 

Institutional Affiliations

 

 

for the Greater Part of the Parameter of Participation
. . . . . Total
Occupatlonal Hlstor1es Central Prov1nc1al
of Technocrats
Government 5 9 14

Academic-research-
consultative bodies 6 l 7
(UPLB, IRRI, USAID, etc.)

Private business 2 0 2

p—a

Elective office 0 1

TOTAL 13 11 24

 

120

By contrast, 9 of the 11 from the provinces are connected
with the government where, they have spent the greater part of their
professional life. One is an elective official. The other one worked
in a public school before he joined government service.

Noteworthy is the fact that the persons engaged in national
decision-making have been drawn from institutions that are centers
for the activity in which they have been engaged. These institutional
linkages provide excellent potentials for enabling one to keep abreast
of one's area of expertise or to enable one to practice the skills
pertinent to a given line of work. Two became or were concurrently
members of the faculty of the College of Agriculture of the University
of the Philippines at Los Bafios at the time of the interview. They
held administrative positions as chairmen of their respective depart-
ments or as heads of units within a department of affiliations. Two
are connected with the International Rice Research Institute. One is
affiliated with three different institutions (IRRI, UPLB, and USAID).
Another one is affiliated with two institutions (USAID and U.P.
Diliman).

One of the two from the private business sector has been a key
administrator in a management consulting firm as well as being
responsible for promoting its establishment. According to one infor-
mant, this firm is also reputed for taking over the management of
"several big companies in trouble and turning them into profitable
gains." He had been a consultant and served on the board of 17
establishments--some private Filipino-owned, some multinational

corporations. Four of the 17 were consistently in the list of the t0p

121

30 in sales of 1,000 corporations of the post-war period, as reported
by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The 17 corporations
engaged in such activities as investments, mining, transportation,
project development, construction, dairying, food processing and tele-
communications. Before obtaining a full-time position as adminis-
trator of the food program of which rice was a part, he was also a
consultant to six governmental bodies.

One other private sector representative is a director of a
financing and an advertising firm. He is also a farmer-owner of

ricelands in Luzon of more than 150 hectares.

The occupational histories of visible technocrats, the less

visibles and the non-technocrats. Like the visible technocrats, the

 

majority of the 25 less visibles and the 21 non-technocrats have

spent most of their professional lives in the government (60% of

25 less visibles, and 76.2% of 21 non-technocrats). However, less
visible technocrats from the Center are closer to the central visibles
in having generated representatives from the academic-research setting
and from private business. Five less visibles come from IRRI and
UPLB. Three are from private business. Like their visible counter-
parts, the majority of the less visible technocrats from the pro-

vinces also come out of government (see Table 12 for clarification).

The major activities engaged in by technocrats in their

occupational histories. The major activities engaged in by all

 

visible technocrats for the greater part of their occupational his-

tories were research and extension. Among the 20 who engaged in

122

 

 

 

 

on HN mN a oH eN HH mH H<HOH
m o N N o H H o OOHmmo O>HuoeHm
m w m H N N o N mmoeHmsp oom>Hum
mOHeon e>Huequmcoo
mH H m o m n H o -ceneomeuuoHEOemu<
me 0H mH o m vH m m ucoscuo>ou
mOHnouer
HmeoHquSOoo mo
Hench mongoocnooe Hooch HmHoeH>ona Hauucou Hench HmaoeH>ona Hanucou
.111. . open gouache one
HHmno>o neoz muwuoo:AOOH OHnHmH> mmoq mo¢uoo¢goop OHnHmH>

you mcoHumHHHmw<
HmcoHuzuHumcH

 

-coz use

.mOHnoumH: Hm:OHpmm:ouo .mumuoocsoeh
.mumuooccooh on» we puma noumouu ecu mom meoHpmHHHmm< He:OHu:uHum:Huu.NH OHnmh

123

these, two were active mainly in research; 12 in extension (including
consultation); and 6 in combinations of research, teaching and/or
extension.

Two of the remaining 4 were primarily administrators. The
third was an elective official, while the fourth was engaged in
teaching.

The distinctive orientations and involvement in research of
most of the technocrats at the Center (8 of the 13) suggest their
access to the latest mainstream of knowledge and activities in their
area of expertise. This is in contrast to provincial technocrats who
were more marginal to research, but deeply involved in extension (9
of the 11). Linkages with research become important in technocracy
because of the potential for generating innovations. Extension work,
by its very nature, draws upon the research undertaken by institu-
tions from the Center rather than from the provinces. This is a form

of vertical integration.

 

Less visible technocrats at the Center are closer in character
to the central visible technocrats than are their counterparts in the
provinces. Half of the less visibles at the Center are engaged in
research. By contrast, only one from the provinces has spent the
greater part of his professional life in research. (See Table 13 for
clarification.)

The majority of the non-technocrats are from the provinces
(20 of 21). Some non—technocrats engage in research but they are just
a small proportion (only a fourth), compared with the visible and

less-visible technocrats. However, they are not mentioned as

124

 

on

NH

om

NH

HN

mN

0H

0H

VN

NH

HH

mH

H<HOH

OOHmmo o>Huoon

:oHumuuchHEem
Heuecou

fiOH.” mGO HKQ\£OHNOQO

mcHzomob
\coHumuuchHEee
unuuwomem

wcHnoth

:oHpmuHsmcoo
mcHosHoch
:oHumauchHeom
neonceuxm

:oHumuuchHEem
-zoumomom

 

HmHOH
cameo

manhoocsooh
Icoz

HmHOH HmHocH>oaa Hahueeu

Hence HmHocH>oum

Hanucou

 

mumuooesoeb OHpHmH> mmOH

mumuoocnooh OHnHmH>

 

moHuH>Huo< OHHHoomw :H eo>Ho>cH meomnem mo nonssz

meHuoumH: Hm:OHu
-mmsooo HHezu we

when uoumeuu on» how

mpmuooesoohucoz use
mpmwuo::OOh an :H

pommmcm mOHuH>Huo<

 

.mOHnoumH: HmcoHummnooo

HHecu mo puma Houmono map How mumnoo::OOHnnoz one manhoocsooh an :H oommwem mOHuH>Hpo<iu.mH oHan

125

technocrats unlike most of their counterparts at the Center. This
could be attributed to the peripheral role in which these persons are
engaged in the project. While most of the research undertaken by
these persons is related to rice production and relevant fields (e.g.,
soil chemistry, plant pathology), the kind of research undertaken in
the provinces is determined at the Center. Furthermore, it is also
the character of the researcher's role (or a scientist in general) as
he relates with policy-makers, that sometimes distinguishes him as a
technocrat. This will be elaborated on in Part 111.

At the outset, it can be stated that a scientist emerges as a
technocrat by actively introducing to a policy-maker an idea, value
or resource in an implementable plan. This is what distinguishes

him from a researcher.

The Technocrats' Entry into the Prqject
and their Level of Participation

 

 

A total of 13 individuals from among the 24 visible technocrats
of the project were laterally mobile within the organization. Three
of the 13 attained key administrative positions in virtue of being,
for example, Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, or Director/
Deputy Director of the rice project's organization (NFAC). From

hereon they will be referred to as key bureau-technocrats. Two of

 

the eight are intermediate bureau-technocrats who are linked with the

 

organizational machinery by their occupancy of middle-level positions
of administration--as head/assistant head of a unit in the national

office or in the province.

126

Seven are laterally mobile as non-bureau-technocrats--

 

serving as advisers or consultants in relation with the project.
Three are foreigners from the USAID and IRRI. Five are Filipinos,
three of whom are from cooperating governmental agencies of NFAC
engaged in marketing, extension and financing; and, two are from the
private sector--research and business. (See Table 14 for specifics.)
One of the remaining 11 is an elective official and the
majority (10 of them) have been upwardly mobile in the organization,
rising on the various rungs of the civil service career ladder. One
from the pool of upwardly mobile technocrats occupies a key adminis-
trative position at the Center. The rest are intermediate bureau-

technocrats in the provinces.

A profile of the Filipino technocrats' occupational history

 

upon their entry into the project. As a group, Filipino visible

 

technocrats at the Center were more upwardly mobile than their
counterparts in the provinces. Of the total number of visibles at

the Center, the median years of work experience is 17, and ranges from
9 to 25. This makes them comparatively young, considering the nature
of decisions they make in the project. Provincial visible technocrats
have longer occupational histories--an average of 21 years, and a
range from 15 to 36.

The early achievement of the central technocrats can perhaps
be attributed to early access to the Center: it provides the most
adequate information about a given area of expertise, and access
to training institutions that enable technocrats to utilize their

skill and the opportunity related to power. For example, among the

127

.HeHoHHHo e>HeceHm.

 

 

 

«N H w m N oH H<Hoe
HH H o o H m HmHocH>ona
mH o w m H H Hmhucou
monsoocnoek mumnoocnOOH
OHHnoz poenonm one :H
manhooecoeh sex oumHvosnoucH .
Hmuoe emnecuo smousmueoz OHHnoz xHHmuoueH HHeumzma :oHuemHOHuumm

 

o no means
mueuooczooeismeusm m p a

 

.msoom :H weenoum one cH muenoocsOOh OHnHmH> mo quHHn02uu.vH oHan

128

10 central technocrats (Filipinos), 8 have had institutional affili-

ations in Manila or primate institutions in the nearby provinces

(e.g., UPLB, IRRI). Only two have gotten their start in the provinces

.and later found their place in the Center. Among the provincial

‘technocrats, only one has had an initial exposure in Metropolitan

Bdanila which led into a Regional position, a higher post than the

loositions of the majority of the provincial technocrats who are

I’rovincial Program Officers for Rice. The rest (10 of them) have

sspent their professional life in the provinces outside of Metropolitan

Manila. One had a brief stint in the NFAC Central Office but

irtrturned to the province because he felt that his mobility was

1:}nreatened in the organization. He perceives his technical preparation

as inadequate, compared to those around him. He says:

I feel that my capacity is limited as far as the Central Office
is concerned. In the province, there is not much difference.
There are not too many Ph.D.'s and M.S. graduates. Besides, my
previous exposure to the Central Office will be a great help to
the province. Furthermore, I have had a previous experience as a
technician which shall also be a great help to the province.
Even among less visible technocrats from the Center, the
majority have had institutional affiliations in Manila or primate
jL315512itutions in the nearby provinces (e.g., UPLB), before their
Masagana 99 involvement. Nine of the thirteen began their occupa-
‘ZjL()IIaJ histories in this locality. Only four began in the provinces

we . . . . . .
1‘53' Ilater on moved 1nto pOSltlons 1n the Center. All prov1nc1a1

Jl . . . . .
e88 Vls1bles commenced their careers in the provmces where they

participated in past rice projects.

129

Profile of Technocrats

Sex. Technocracy in this project is a sex-linked activity. All

of the visible and all but one of the less visible technocrats are males.
While it is premature to generalize for all other agricultural projects

21nd other sectors that technocracy is a sex-linked activity, it may be
liypothesized that it is male-dominated. This is because women usually

play a less prominent role when decisions are related to the center of

A study on national influentials reveals

power in the public domain.
The influentials are "persons who are able

that the majority are males.
to move others to think and act in a way that notably affects the affairs

of the Philippines" in agriculture, industry, transportation, communica-
tion, banking and finance, commerce and trade, peace and order, public
opinion, elections, social justice and welfare, foreign affairs, edu-

cation, religion, the professions, and government and politics (Makil

and Lynch, 1972:3-6). To further substantiate this proposition, a
research on higher civil servants1 found only 3 out of 127, or 2.4 per-
cent of the public administrators to be women (Francisco, 1960). Even
if women do not openly hold the visible status of technocrat, however,

One could inquire into the extent to which wives of technocrats affect
the performance of the husbands' roles. Among wives of public adminis-
trators, one study shows that it is not uncommon for them to extend
"t

heir husband's patronage and services" (Abueva, 1965:16). This is

eIslectlve of a tradltlonal system where the pos1t1ons of husbands

\—
A stratified random sample of 127 of a population of 318

1
t g ‘ er c1v11 servants dlstrlbuted as follows: 6 department secre-
1‘les, 8 undersecretaries, 41 directors, 38 assistant directors,

a
11d 34 administrative officers of the government.

 

130

spill into the kinship system some of their rights and responsibilities.

Among wives of technocrats, there are incidents reported where roles
of technocrats involve the extended family. Some wives take over some

responsibilities, e.g., representing a husband in agricultural trade

iFairs, symposia, farmers' clubs or meetings.

Among the 21 Filipino visible technocrats, younger age

5.33-

grades are most represented.
That the young have achieved such recognition suggests

About 76 percent of the 21 are below 45

y ears of age .
The preponderance of the young is greater

the potential for mobility.
in the "visibles" than in the "less visible" technocrats and the "non-

technocrats." The median age for visible technocrats is 40.09, as
against 45.2 for the less visibles and 45.9 for the non-technocrats.

This suggests a lesser premium put upon seniority, which traditionally

has been the basis for the attainment of a position in power in the

Philippine bureaucratic structure. Higher civil servants of the

government are usually in the older set (45 years old and above),
comprising about 79.7 percent (Francisco, 1960:117). The entry of

young technocrats into various roles in the project (which is dis-
cusSed in a later section) shows what "young" embodies and can do.
BeCause of the importance given to expertise in a technocratic system,
as Suggested by the panels' perceptions of technocrats, it is not so

In .
uch age that matters but what each person 15 seen as capable of

d -
olng. They are the bearers of the latest knowledge and the latest

te . .
thiques, hav1ng recently emerged from a university setting that

SL1
bSCribes to the most recent trends in expertise.

131

In comparing the provincial and the central technocrats who

are visible, the former were found to be closer in age to the less

visible and the non-technocrats (see Table 15). The mean age of the

visible technocrats from the provinces is 42.54, while of those from

the Center it is 37.4. The less visibles and the non-technocrats

have average ages of 45.2 and 45.9, respectively. Perhaps the higher
proportion of younger persons among central visibles is to be
zattributed to the premium placed on their educational and occupational

zichievements. As will be suggested in the succeeding sections, the

visible technocrats at the Center engage in decisions requiring access

to the more recent scientific-technical information. They perform the

task of determining the technological and administrative framework

for the central and provincial settings. They may be contrasted

with the provincial technocrats who articulate to local participants

the technological-administrative framework formulated by central

t echnocrats .
All three foreign visible technocrats are 45 and above. This

sL‘ggests that the foreigners come from an older crop than their
‘F:j-1:ipino counterparts. This pattern may have emerged because
1F<>Jre3igners are judged not only on their theoretical knowledge but
61130 on the basis of their cross-cultural experiences in developing
c"'()llntries outside of the Philippines that have allowed them to tie
theoretical knowledge to the conditions of a developing world. They
are persons "seasoned" in cross-cultural experiences. As will be

I:'°j-111:ed out in Part III, they perform primary roles in introducing

5L
r1r‘ovat ions .

132

 

 

 

 

m.mv «.mv mo.oe vm.mv v.5m z<Hom2
Hm mm Hm HH oH a<b0k
m m o o o o>onm cam mm
m o m w H vmumv
n w ma 5 o vvumm
N m m o m zoaon cam em
mumhoocnooh manhoocnoob HMHOH Hawocw>ona Hanucou mow<
ucoz ofipwmfl>ummoq manhoocnooh canflmm>
.mmocwmfiawmv manhoozgoohucoz van mpmnooccooh
ofinfimw>

mmmg no“: wonmmeou mm manhooczooh ofinfimfl> waocw>opm flew ~wgp=mu Mo mmm<uu.m~ omnms

133

Educational attainment. The education of technocrats is

another variable examined. Education is not only an indicator of one's

competence but also of affiliation with prestigeful academic insti—

tutions (both graduate and undergraduate) that enables one to establish

networks with significant others. Going to the right University also

enables one to acquire a style of behavior which is associated with

both upper class economic origin and formal education.

The Filipino visible technocrats at the Center have the

liighest educational attainment, compared with the visible provincial,

the less visible and the non-technocrats. Eight of the 10 central
technocrats have more than an undergraduate education. In contra-

distinction, provincial visibles are mostly college graduates (8 of

1 1). The educational level of the provincial visibles closely

resembled that of the non-technocrats, whose educational attainment
clustered similarly (17 college graduates among the 21). See Table 16

for specifications .
However, non—technocrats show greater variety than the pro-

Vincial visible technocrats. Among the non-technocrats' pool are two

high school graduates and one with a Ph.D. The exclusion of the two
high school graduates from the category of technocrats in spite of

their reported "commitment" to the project, reveals the premium placed

on higher education. However, securing a higher degree does not

automatically make one a technocrat. Closer examination of the back-
ground of the Ph.D. graduate who is categorized as a non-technocrat

s . . .
eellls to reveal that he was not identified as a technocrat because of

h ‘ . .
13 non-conformity to the norms for interpersonal behavior among

134

 

 

 

Hm NN Hm HH oH H<Hop
H N m o m oumeHucau Ho mumsumuu .a.ga
H a m m m Hamesum Ho mumseauu .m.z
NH mH 0H m N cumsemuo ommHHou
N o o o o oumsemuu Hoocum cmH:
mumhooccuoh mumuoocnooh HmuOH Hmfio:w>oum Hanucoo unoecflmuu< Hmcoflumosvm
-coz oHnHmH> mmoq mpmuuoczooe oHnwmfi>

 

.mumuoocnoohucoz and moHnme> mmoq
no“: woummsou mm nHmfiocfi>oum new Hanucouv mpmuuoccook oHnfimfi> mo pcoecfimuu< Hm:0wumoscmuu.oH oHQmH

135

This person himself reports that he has been "objective"

technocrats.
He has "tried hard to be a

and "rational" in making his decisions.

technocrat" but he is, in his own assessment, an "unpopular techno-

crat," and "perhaps, not even a technocrat." He claims that he has

zaired ideas that contradicted the opinions of the majority, and that
118 is quite "frank" and "open" about conveying his feelings at the

risk of sowing "dissension" among others (referring to the members of

a Provincial Action Committee). What this experience has shown is

that a technocrat in the Philippine technocratic setting cannot

totally disregard the Philippine cultural traditions of interpersonal

behavior, even in a modern environment. Filipinos as a people value

self-esteem to the extent that when someone's "right" ideas contradict

another's, they are stated in a euphemistic manner to avoid hurting

the other person's "ego" (Lynch, 1973:11). An unpleasant truth,

opinion, or request is stated as "pleasantly as possible" (Lynch,

1973:11).
There are indications also among technocrats that leeway is

g iVen for a person who has power and authority and who has the
appropriate social credentials in relationship to Philippine values,
"to be able to make a decision at the risk of sowing negative feelings."
He can still expect to be respected and exact deference from sub-
c’1?<liilaates.' Such has been the experience of a key bureau-technocrat
who secured the services of a private advertising company to map out
the dissemination campaign for the project even though there was a
l”‘<)s1::i.le feeling among the members of an existing unit in the bureauc-

r
aQY that used to undertake this function. This technocrat combines

136

"the authority, the right social class, the academic preparation, and
exemplary occupational achievements" to be able to enlist the esteem
and the acceptance of those around him for whatever decisions he has
made. By contrast, the Ph.D. holder among the non-technocrats is
still new in the province (having been active in the past as a pro-
fessor in private schools and as management consultant of private
establishments in Manila). He has considerably higher educational
attainment than the other members of the Provincial Action Committee
of which he is a part, but he attained it in Spain which is not the
center of science and technology. All the other Ph.D.'s were edu-
cated in the United States.

In comparison with the less visible technocrats combined
(central and provincial), the provincial visibles have even less
academic achievements, and yet acquired a "visible" status. Only
27.3 percent of provincial visibles have more-than-a-college educa-
tion as against 40 percent of the 22 less visible technocrats.
Failure to attain the status of a visible technocrat in spite of a
high educational attainment can be attributed to such factors as:
(1) not having the right academic preparation for a particular task
performed, (2) not having exhibited the "right" attitudes and inter—
personal behaviors, and (3) performing functions that are peripheral
to the sphere of technocracy. For example, one FPO has received
negative votes because he is considered a "politician" rather than a
technocrat. One reports:

He cannot be an effective leader. He always visits his prop-

erties in the middle of the week or during the weekend. The
job that he holds does not have weekends or even holidays.

137

Two other men nominated have distinguished themselves in the past by
receiving presidential citations for exemplary performance. But these
awards are granted for achievements not central to rice production
itself but in specialized areas in agriculture such as irrigation and
crap protection. There are scientists attached to centers for agri-
cultural research and training (e.g., UPLB and IRRI) who do not

emerge as visible technocrats. They only supplied the data and infor-
mation from special fields in agriculture (e.g., entomology, soils,
etc.) but did not "push forward" their ideas for adoption as some of
the visible technocrats who had origins distinct from the scientific
circle had achieved. The specific roles performed by the technocrats
shall be the appropriate concern in the succeeding section.

The less visible technocrats at the Center have more educa-
tion than the visible provincial technocrats. More than half of the
central less visibles (7 out of 13) have more-than-college education,
as against 8 out of 11 visible provincial technocrats with only-college
education (see Table 17). Provincial technocrats (visible and less
visible) are even closer to each other in educational level than the
visibles and the less visibles at the Center. The majority cluster
in the two middle levels (collegiate education but less than a Ph.D.).
Central technocrats (visible and less visible) have a higher proportion
of Ph.D.'s. The higher achievements among central visible and less
visible technocrats in comparison to the provincial visible and less
Visible technocrats, can perhaps be explained by the wide-ranging
sCOpe of functions extended to the national committees with which the

central technocrats are a part. The pooled activities of the central

 

138

mm a ma Hm AM OH 4<HOH

 

N o N m o m manpwvcmu no ouMSpmno .Q.:m

a N m N m m acousum Ho mumsumnu .m.z

HH 5 o 0H m N consumuu mmoHHou

o o o o o o :oHumosem opmHmoHHou oz
Haney Hmfiocfi>oum Hmuuaou Hench Hmfiucfl>onm Hmuucou

 

 

mumuuoccoob oHpfimfi> mmoq mumuoocnooh oHnwmw> ucoecwmuu< HmGOMumosvm

 

.uoonopm on» :M coflummwofiuuwm mo Houosmumm
an Amocfimeflm oHnHmfi> mmoa paw oHnwmw>u manhoocnooh mo ucoaefimpu< Hmeomumosumnu.nH oHan

139

technocrats (visible and less visible) determine the over-all frame-
work for the technological and administrative aspects of the project
in the provinces. The project has been selective of advanced
scientific-technical expertise in those who would be involved at the
Center. Besides, the influx of the more educated at the Center could
have also provided greater options for choice by those recruiting
technocrats. In contrast, the limited number of the educated in the
provinces could have limited the pool to those with no more than
collegiate training. Furthermore, provincial technocrats, as earlier
mentioned, perform a different role that requires skills in articulating
the scientific-technical culture pre-determined at the Center to the

varying groups or organizations at the provinces.

Areas of specialization for higher education. Data on the
areas of specialization of technocrats suggest that to be qualified
as a technocrat in the project, one must be dead-center in agriculture
or in management. Non-technocrats, who are mostly from the provinces,
have diverse backgrounds rather than a concentration on a few
delineated fields tied to agricultural production and management.
More specifically, 19 of the 21 Filipino visibles (central and pro-
vincial) have had training of some kind in agriculture in college and/
or in post-graduate work. Only one pursued law and another one
business administration.

The visible trecnocrats have a more homogeneous background in
agriculture than the less visibles and the non-technocrats. Only 13
‘15 the 22 less visible ones have training in agriculturally-related

SCEiences. Seven of the 19 non-technocrats with a college education

140

have been exposed to the agricultural sciences. The most variability
can be noticed among the non-technocrats, who received an education in
business administration, public administration, pharmacy, law,
humanities and engineering (see Table 18). Variability is also
apparent among the less visible technocrats but is not as distinct
as among the non-technocrats.

Two of the foreign technocrats are trained in agriculture

and one in public administration.

Institutions from which the visible technocrats obtained their

highest degree or trainigg, Among Filipinos, one's institutional

 

affiliations during one's academic training facilitate obtaining
central position as a visible technocrat. The visible technocrats
from the Center had undertaken training in their fields of special-
ization either abroad or in local institutions or both. Only a
smaller number from the provinces have had this privilege.

Two of the 10 Filipino central technocrats have taken their
education at the undergraduate and graduate levels in the United
States (one in agriculture and another one in business administration).
All of the remaining eight who have pursued agriculturally-related
courses at one time or another, obtained their training at the primate
agricultural college of the University of the Philippines at Los Bafios.
Two of the eight have pursued doctoral degrees in the United States,
both in the field of agriculture also.

Only four of the ten from the provinces with agricultural
trwaining have obtained it from the College of Agriculture of UPLB.

The rest have pursued it in other colleges of agriculture (three in a

141

Table 18.--Areas of Specialization in Collegiate and Post-Collegiate
Education of Technocrats and Non-Technocrats (Filipinos).

 

 

Areas of Visible Less Visible Non-
. . . Technocrats Technocrats Technocrats Total
Spec1alization _ _ _
n - 21 n - 22 n - 21
1. No Collegiate
Education 0 0 2 2
2. Agriculture and 19 13 7 39

related sciences
(e.g., agricul-
tural engi-
neering)

3. Business admin-
istration, 2 2 3 7
management and
related programs
(e.g., account-

ing)
4. Public

administration 1 2 1 4
5. Natural sciences 2 l l 4
6. Social sciences l l 0 2
7. Law 1 2 3 6
8. Humanities 0 1 3 4

(e.g., History,

English)
9. Others 0 l 2 3

(Dentistry,

Civil Engi-

neering)

TOTAL 26 23 22 71

g

DKTTE: The total does not equal n in each column, as some of the
respondents had more than one area of specialization.

142

university in Metropolitan Manila and three others in universities
outside the boundaries of the primate university or of Metropolitan
Manila).

One of the provincial technocrats in the field of law has

obtained it from U.P. Diliman. This is the elective official.

Cross-cultural experiences. While the majority of Filipino

 

visible technocrats have not obtained degrees from foreign insti-
tutions, most acquired a cross-cultural experience in their area of
expertise by attending seminars and workshops abroad. Their per-
spectives on their field, therefore, have been more transnational in
scope than the less visible or the non-technocrats. Fifteen of the

20 visibles who have had attended seminars and workshops in the last
five years have had foreign experience. Only 11 of the 21 less
visibles have had the same opportunity. Non-technocrats have the most
limited exposures. Only one among the 20 who has attended seminars

or workshops in the last five years have gone abroad (see Table 19).

Table 19.--Seminars and Workshops Attended by Technocrats and Non-
Technocrats in the Last Five Years (Filipinos).

 

Seminars or Workshops

 

Attend? in the La“ T932331. ¥§§§nXii§3i° miss...
Five Years
1. Abroad 15 ll 1
2. Only local s 10 19
3- None 0 l 0
4- No information 1 O 1
TOTAL 21 22 21

143

However, proportionately more of the less visible technocrats
at the Center have attended seminars or workshops abroad than the
technocrats at the provinces (visible and less visible combined).
However, more of the visible provincial technocrats (10 out of 13),
have this experience. Nine out of 10 Filipino visibles at the Center
have attended seminars or workshops, while of the provincial visibles,
10 out of 13 have (see Table 20).

The relative advantage of central technocrats (visible and
less visible combined) over the provincial technocrats (visible and
less visible combined) suggests the more limited opportunities
afforded by their institutional affiliations. The technocrats from
the provinces are limited to gaining visions of the developments out-
side the country indirectly only. This limits potential for develop-
ing personal ties abroad which can provide a very rich base for
developing a perspective about the leading trends in a given area of
expertise around the world. Of course such exposure need not neces-
sarily give the details of the local situation needed for successful
implementation.

The countries visited by the visible technocrats extend
beyond the United States where all the visibles with a foreign higher
education obtained their degrees. This may be explained by the surge
of interest in learning about aspects of life more related to con-
ditions in the Philippines. Further, this may also be explained by
the numerous opportunities which have recently opened for travel
‘around the world: scholarships, grants and awards from multinational

(e.g., United Nations, Colombo) or regional (e.g., SEARCA, ASEAN)

144

 

 

 

 

mm m mH Hm HH oH H<eob
:oHumahomcH
H H o H H o ouonaoo oz .n
oH n m m w H Hmooq .m
oucoHuomxo
HH H oH mH o m :mHonow m :qu .H
oHnHmH> oHnHmH> mnmo> o>Hm
Hayes mmoH oHnHmH> Hmpoe mmoH oHnHmH> umaH as» :H voccoup<
mpmuooenooh HmHocH>onm mumuooeauoe Hanueoo mmonmxnoz can mumcHEom

 

.HmocHaHHHa oHpHmH> mmmH ecu
oHaHmH>U mousmomxm HanspHsu-mmouu uHonu :H vonmmaou mumuoocnooh HmHo=H>onm van HmuucoUuu.om oHnmb

145

organizations. Of the 15 visible technocrats who attended seminars
and workshops abroad, the countries most often visited have been
those in the developing regions of Asia (principally Thailand, India,
Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Indonesia--ranked from
highest to lowest in frequency of mention). Other places visited in
the developing world are Puerto Rico, Malta, Mexico and Nigeria. The
United States and Japan stand out as the countries among the
developed nations most visited by Filipino technocrats. The reliance
on the former can be attributed to the post-colonial ties forged by
this country even after independence had been granted to the Philip-
pines. Japan, on the other hand, is the most developed country in
Asia. Other visits have been made also to Italy, Germany, and Israel.

(See Table 21 for specifics.)

Professionalism. Professionalism is further indicated among

 

the visible and less visible technocrats through their participation
in related organizations in their areas of expertise. This expands
the base with which networks can be generated whenever there is
information that needs to be drawn upon in connection with their
roles as technocrats. Half of the technocrats (visibles and less
visibles) are affiliated with professional organizations. In con-
trast, only about a third of the non—technocrats report this sort of
affiliation. (See Table 22 for clarification.)

Among 22 of the 43 visible and less visible technocrats with
attachments to a professional organization, 10 report that the
Organization is American-based. These 10 technocrats are mostly those

who have acquired their higher education in the United States.

146

Table 21.--Countries Visited by Visible Filipino Technocrats in the
Last Five Years for Seminars and Workshops.

 

Number of Technocrats
Visiting These Countries
in the Last Five Years

Countries Visited for
Seminars and Workshops

 

I. Developing World
A. Asia

Thailand
India
Taiwan
Singapore
Malaysia

Sri Lanka

\loxmava-a
HHNNMO‘V

Indonesia
TOTAL 43

B. Others

1 Puerto Rico
2 Malta
3. Mexico
4

Nigeria

u: p. hi h‘ k)

TOTAL
11. Developed World

United States
Japan
Italy

. Israel

U'IdbMNr-fi
HNNUIU'I

West Germany
TOTAL 15

147

Table 22.--Membership in Professional Organizations (Filipino
Technocrats and Non-Technocrats).

 

 

Affiliation Visible Less Visible Non-
Technocrats Technocrats Technocrats
Member 11 ll 6
Non-Member 10 ll 14
NCI (No Complete 0 0 1
Information)
TOTAL 21 22 21

 

Significantly, more visible technocrats are "outwardly" directed in
their affiliations. Of the ten with American membership, seven are

visible technocrats.

Socio-economic origins. One of the questions that can be

 

raised is: To what extent is the status of a technocrat Open to
persons who come from the various social strata? An answer to this
question has been pursued by looking at the mobility of Filipino
technocrats and the socio-economic class of their fathers. The
respondents were queried about the occupations their fathers engaged
in for the greater part of their lives. Responses were classified
in one of the following levels, which Carroll (1973:129-130) adopted
for the study of Philippine manufacturing entrepreneurs:

Level I (Lower Class) - unskilled and semi-skilled laborers;

businessmen without employees (peddlers and sari-

sari* store owners), tenant farmers and owner
cultivators without tenants.

. *A sari-sari store retails durable and perishable goods and
15 llsually run by members of the family.

148

Level 11 (Lower Middle Class) - those with white collar or
technical skills; first level supervisors, owners
of retail businesses with a few employees; land-
owners with less than 25 hectares but with some
tenants.

Level III (Upper Middle Class) - professionals (other than
grade-school teachers), executive and officials in
large business or government; owners of import-
export, wholesale, or large retail businesses;
landowners with 125-150 hectares.

Level IV (Upper Class) - owners of major businesses; land-
owners with more than 150 hectares.

(In cases where respondents mentioned that their fathers' agricultural
lands were declared as land reform areas, they were asked about the
‘total number of hectares owned before the area was declared as land
reform.)

In viewing the table (Table 23) summarizing the socio-
economic origins of the respondents, one gains the impression that it
is not impossible for Filipinos of modest origins to gain the status
of’technocrat. For example, seven out of the 20 visible technocrats
‘who indicated the occupation of their fathers, come from the lower
.socio-economic stratum. On the average, however, visible technocrats
(:luster in the lower-middle stratum, with a mean of 2.15.

As a group, visible technocrats are closer to the less
\Iisibles in origins, having an average socio-economic level of 2.27,
FVith the former even having a slightly lower origin. By contrast,
non-technocrats are predominantly of Level I origin, with an average
Of 1.6 (see Table 23).

As can be seen in Table 24, provincial visible technocrats
nnanifest lower socio-economic origins than the central technocrats,

llaying an average level of 1.9, as against 2.4 for the latter. From

149

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HH 4 N mmmHu Hoon - H Ho>mH .H
mumwmwmcooh ommmmmwcmmww muwmmmmmwoh muocumm mo maumpm oHEocoumnoHoom

 

.HmochHHHmV mumuuoczuoeucoz wen mumuooenoob mo «mcHMHHo oHsoaoomuoHoomuu.m~ oHnmb

150

.HomH-mNHumNmHv HHoHHmu acne wouaoe<.

 

 

 

 

 

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mm m mH HN HH oH H<HOH
o o o H H o :oHuaanomaH mHoHaaou oz - Huz
H H o N o N mmmHu team: - >H Ho>oH
w m m o m m mmmHu onvH: yoga: . HHH Hm>mq
m e m m m N mmmHu mvaHz pogo; . HH Ho>ma
v H m n v m mmmHu nozoq . H Ho>mq
Hmuoe HmHocH>onm Hmuucou HNHOH HmHocH>oaa Hanucou mcameo oHeocoomuoHoom
mumpuoczooe oHnHmH> mmoa mumuooccooa oHnHmH> .
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HmHocH>onm ecu Hanucou on» :H HmochHHHm oHnHmH> mmoq can oHnHmH>V mumuuoegoohu-.v~ oHnme

151

the uppermost stratum there are some visible central technocrats, but
no visible provincials at all. This contrast can be explained if the
following proposition is borne out: that provincial technocrats are
predominantly generated from career civil servants with less than
upper class origins. Since decision-making in the provinces is more
limited in technical scope than that demanded of central technocrats,
the major part of provincial decisions pertain to administration
where knowledge of local conditions are more pertinent. There is
very little participation called for from the local technocrats of the
private sector, which participation is more apparent in the national
setting and where the two central technocrats with an upper class
status originate. The vertical integration of the operations of the
project in the provinces in relationship to the Center provided less
leeway for the more economically secure person in the province to
exert as much influence as his counterpart in the Center. The
functions of the provincial technocrats, in general, are limited by
the parameters of action defined by the Center.

Furthermore, persons in the private sector with upper-class
origins in the provinces may not find congenial the kinds of decisions
that local technocrats make. If wide-ranging shifts are suggested in
the project's technological or administrative framework, this is com-
municated to the Center rather than to the provincial offices.

However, this should not convey the impression that the pro-
Vincial elites have little influence in the project itself. While it
is beyond the scope of the research to describe how local influence

is exerted by provincial elites, it is in itself a reality that

152

technocrats have to deal with, whether of facilitating or hindering
local implementation. In the course of data-collection in the two
provincial cases, the most commonly expressed problems were the
attempts of "sugar oligarchs" to gain access to the government sub-
sidized fertilizers intended for rice production. "Oligarchs"
reportedly offered farmer cooperators a higher price for fertilizers,

but less than they would have to pay in the free market.

1. The occupations of the fathers of visible Filipino

technocrats - There is no neat occupational distribution among the

 

fathers of technocrats. The fathers varied in their work. The work
most commonly mentioned is farming. The rest have had fathers
engaged in politics, unskilled or semi-skilled work, business,
government service, education and professional service--arranged from
highest to lowest in frequency of mention (see Table 25 for

specifications).

2. Socio-economic origins of Filipino technocrats and extent
of participation in the organization of the project - Upon closer
scrutiny of the relationship of visible technocrats with the organi-
zational structure in focus, one gets a dimmer picture of the level
of participation of those with modest origins. Looking at class
origin and mobility within the governmental structure, we find that
lateral entry is more common among those with higher socio-economic
origins. To amplify this point: the two who belong to Level IV of
the socio-economic class have been laterally mobile in the sense

that normal career ladders of the civil service have not been assumed.

’ 153

Table 25.--Occupations of Fathers of Visible Filipino Technocrats.

 

 

Occupation of Technocrats' Fathers Frequency of Mention
l. Farming 7
2. Politics (as elective official) 4
3. Business . 4
4. Unskilled or semi-skilled work 3
5. Career civil service 3
6. Teaching 2
7. Professional 2

(i.e., engineering, medicine)

TOTAL 25

 

One of the two is a key bureau-technocrat and another is a non-bureau-
technocrat with respect to the project. To further stress the
importance of higher-than-average socio-economic origins for one‘s
occupational history: these two persons obtained their undergraduate
as well as graduate degrees abroad. Furthermore, it was through
family support that their educational advancement was pursued. One
completed all Ph.D. work except for the thesis, and another is an M.S.
These two have held important positions in private firms which they
inherited and/or established. They started at the top, assuming key
roles by serving as President, Manager and/or Member of Corporate
Boards. One organized and headed a management firm that was recog-
nized as the "Management Firm of the Year" at one time by a trade
lorganization. This gave him an excellent vantage point to practice

liis profession as management consultant. He assumed key roles in

154

numerous bodies in the private sector and involved himself in various
activities such as manufacturing, mining, investments, agricultural
machinery, project development, food processing, construction and
telecommunications. He was subsequently involved in the government,
even prior to the Masagana 99 Project, in different areas of activities
such as forestry, food production, irrigation, oil exploration,
marketing, agricultural research and the coordination of economic
development planning. To further ramify these extensive linkages

were the other multinational agencies locally or foreign-based with
which he had ties before or during his involvement with the government

sector. He could be considered an integrated technocrat in the sense

 

that his emergence into this position practically started in the
beginning of his occupational history in the private sector, set in
place by the appropriate socio-economic background that enabled him

to attain further education and other occupational opportunities to
practice his profession. His identity had not been built into a single
field of activity in one sector, but of several activities in the
public and the private sectors.

The other one of the two did not have as wide-ranging con-
nections as the first. His involvement stemmed primarily from the
family landholdings he inherited and businesses he founded (in
marketing, advertising and investments).

The upper class (i.e., Level IV) had a more definite pattern of
entry, that of lateral mobility. They entered into positions offered
them with wide arching responsibilities at the Center. They came

:from private business, which has been historically most prominent in

155

producing management experts (Carroll, 1973). There is a dearth of
such expertise in public administration (Gregorio, 1960; Salas, 1968).

Classes I to III together have experienced upward mobility.
Some have done so by entering into one of the scientific professions
in the academic community, which provided them with an entree into
the project. Others were upwardly mobile administrators in the public
sector. The key bureau-technocrats or non-bureau-technocrats with
origins below those of the uppermost stratum have been drawn from
different segments than the private sector--the government itself and
the academic-research (including technical-consultative) circles.

These were the primary settings for their social mobility.

Summary

What this part has shown is that seniority in age is not an
important variable for the attainment of the status of a Filipino
visible technocrat (76% were less than 45 years old). This is a
drastic departure from the characteristics of higher civil servants,
who were relatively older as a group (79.9% of the sample of
Francisco's study being 45 and above) (1960:87). A more important
consideration, it seems, for being considered a technocrat is what
is embodied by a person in terms of education, occupational history
and reputation for competence in one's area of work from the per-
Spective of the person recruiting.

The initial impression that can be gathered from the profile
Of’technocrats is that socio-economic origins had been an over-

étrching predictor for creating earlier opportunities for the social-

jJZation of technocrats. The technocrats with upper class origins had

156

been educated in foreign institutions and had the opportunity to
acquire more than an undergraduate education in a continuous process
of schooling. They were initially involved in key positions of
administration when they began their professional lives. The upper
class technocrats come mainly from the private business sectors (see
Table 26).

Those below the upper class also found opportunities for
attaining more-than-college-education through the joint sponsorship of
local and foreign institutions. They were mostly those affiliated
with academic-research institutions (e.g., UPLB) and the government
service sector.

While this part has indicated that technocrats can be assumed
to have competence because of higher education in agriculture and
management science, there still remains to be answered such questions
as:

1. What roles do technocrats perform which make them a collectivity
distinct from the administrative or scientific communities where
they emerge?

2. What is the social matrix in which technocrats emerge or per-
form their functions?

As had been earlier argued in the opening paradigm of this
research, personal networks are the bases for: the entry of techno-
crats into the project, the performance of their functions and the
assessment of their performance. It is with this prOposition in view

that the succeeding analysis is made. Competence is an important but

157

Table 26.--The Occupational History of the Visible Technocrats
(Filipinos) by Socio-Economic Origins.

 

Socio-Economic Origins

 

 

. . Level Level Level Level NCI* Total
Occupational History I II III IV n=l n=21
n=7 n=5 n=6 n=2
Parameter of
Participation
with the project
Central 0 10
Provincial 4 3 3 0 11
Level of Participation
on the project
Upwardly mobile 2 3 0 10
Laterally mobile 3 3 3 0 ll
1 Intermediate
( ) Bureau-Technocrat (2) (0) (0) (0) (0) (2)
2 Re -Bureau-
( ) Teihnocrat (0) (1) (1) (1) (0) (3)
3 Non-Bureau-
( ) Technocrat (1) (1) (2) (1) (0) (s)
(4) Elective Position (0) (l) (0) (O) (O) (1)
Position of technocrat
with respect to first
institutional
affiliation for work
Upwardly mobile 6 0 l7
Laterally mobile 3
1 Intermediate
( ) executive (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (1)
(2) Key executive (0) ’(O) (O) (2) (0) (2)
Elective Official l O 0 0 O 1

‘

*No Complete Information.

158

not the single criterion for the emergence and performance as a
technocrat.

The personal experiences of technocrats in connection with
the project are also discussed and what the implications are for

their identities as technocrats.

Part C - The Visible Technocrats and their Roles

 

There are two objectives for this part. The first is to
examine the roles visible technocrats perform in their involvement
with the project. The second is to identify the roles of technocrats
by parameter of their participation (central or provincial) in the
two stages of the development of the project. Attempts are made to
delineate the roles of visible technocrats from those who are less
visible with respect to how they differ and how they complement each
other. Finally, the roles of the foreign technocrats connected with
the project are depicted.

Knowledge of the roles performed by technocrats in each stage
was gained through the question raised: "What do you consider to be
your most important contribution to the project?" The focus on roles
stems from the assumption that technocrats are not occupying posi-
tions wherein they may only perform highly defined and particularized
sets of duties and responsibilities, such that the content of their
role-related behavior becomes predictable irrespective of the person
occupying the position. Technocrats, rather, are given the opportunity
to define or create their roles in the project. Hence, the functions
selectively performed are with reference to the specific person who

generates and participates in a given activity. But these role

159

behaviors and activities are, nevertheless, not idiosyncratic but

reflect a complex combination of cultures.

Organizing Concepts

 

The general perceptions of technocrats by reputational panel
members discussed in Chapter III serve to distinguish two communities
from which technocrats emerge. These are the administrative and
scientific communities of society. To recapitulate, panel members
impute to technocrats certain characteristics that deviate from the
mold which each of these communities was considered prone to exhibit.
Among scientist-technocrats, a "political role" is pursued by estab-
lishing linkage between the outputs that are generated from the
complex of activities engaged in in research and the related insti-
tutions responsible for the adoption of these complex of outcomes.
The administrator-technocrat is painted as an "entrepreneur" who
is willing to innovate in establishing means for the expeditious
attainment of the goals of the organization.

Panel members suggest two distinct but necessarily intertwined
roles for technocrats (whether scientists or administrators). One is

as catalyst and the other is as mediator or broker. A catalyst role

 

is performed when one adopts or synthesizes something new which is
perceived as improving, clarifying, strengthening or refining an

idea, social technology, norm, value or strategy. A broker role is

 

performed when anything new that is adopted or synthesized is trans-
mitted by the technocrat to existing bodies or sectors of the public.
The part of a scientist is to transmit to policy-makers for

legitimation, the synthesized information derived from the

160

scientific-technical community. See the following diagram to

elucidate this point:

 

 

 

5 Scientific- 1 Scientist- f 1

Technical ’ Technocrat ‘ Policy-Maker(s) !
a Community ' ‘
l—_._..._.._,........-- . ......-..--- . .-- J

 

 

Why brokerage of this sort is necessary can be related to the
following prOpositions:

1. There is an increasing flow of data or information from the
scientific circle or related institutions that require
interpretation into a language comprehensible to policy-
makers, if these data are to be made implementable.

2. There is a need to organize the centers of work around a
particular problem at issue.

The part of the administrator-technocrat is to define new
ways to facilitate the attainment of the goals of the organization,
those legitimized by policy-makers. Brokerage comes to the fore by
communicating the goals among participants of the organization and
selected sectors of the public. Brokerage may also come about in
introducing new adaptations or syntheses that may shape the directions
and goals of the organization which are communicated to policy-makers.

See the following diagram to elucidate this point:

161

 

    
   

Participants of
the organization
and/or selected 1
sector of the .
gpublic ’

   
  

--__--.J

I
. o
I
l

Policy-Maker(s) Administrator-i
i

 

Technocrat

 

 

In going through the responses of the visible technocrats,
the following emerged as some organizing concepts to categorize the
types of catalyst roles they have performed. These elaborate on the
previous concepts defined here, as well as on the paradigm presented

in the first chapter of this research.

Catalyst role. Catalysts may vary in their roles according

 

to the type of adaptations or syntheses being forged:

1. "Technical" catalysts are those who predominantly center
their efforts in the technical aspects of rice production
and culture of practices, e.g., combining a number of rice
varieties and selections, herbicides, fertilizers, and
pesticides in a given set of production practices.

2. "Administrative" catalysts are those who are mainly engaged
in forming new combinations of systems for the dissemination
of the technical solutions which have been introduced by
technical catalysts, e.g., defining the credit scheme that
involved different banking institutions from both the public

and the private sectors, setting up the organizational network

162

for the implementation of the project, determining the target
areas for the dissemination of the technology, etc.
"Human-relations-directed" catalysts are those who primarily
concentrate their efforts in improving the process of
"linking" groups of people or institutions to facilitate the
dissemination of technical administrative innovations and any
related resources that are important for the viability of

the project, e.g., learning to speak the local dialect to
facilitate transmission of the policies formulated at the
Center to participants in the project at the provincial level.

Catalysts may also be distinguished according to the sc0pe

or level of complexity of either the technical or administrative

combinations articulated. There are catalysts who introduce:

1.

An institutional innovation - when a new complex of ideas,
social technology, norms, values or any combinations of these
are synthesized within a given organizational structure, e.g.,
the introduction of Management Information Systems where
data are organized at the Central office for decision—making
purposes, incorporating suggestions for the qualifications

of the staff to undertake this function.

A series of non-institutional innovations - when a new idea,
value, norm, social technology and strategy are disseminated
in any of the two stages of the project, e.g., determining
the requirements of such resources as fertilizers and

pesticides in the rice production process.

163

 

A Methodological Note on This Question,
Efid Insights on the Nature of
Technocracy

 

 

Some of the respondents found difficulty in responding to the
query about what they consider their most important individual con-
tribution to the project because of the very nature of the catalysts
roles which they have played. For the effort resulted mainly in a
collective rather than an individual accomplishment. One said, "It
is difficult to answer. Masagana 99 is a result of a joint effort
. . . . It is hard to say what particular idea I have contributed

. . . Ideas are being thrown all the time and you just have to
filter them and find out which one would be workable."

Furthermore, revisions were occasionally made in the imple-
mentation guidelines of the project which put a strain on some in
recalling what they perceive to be a most important role performed in
connection with it. One remarked:

I have completely overhauled the program since I assumed my
post. We do not have everything fixed. We try something new.
If it works, we continue. If it does not work, we do something
else . . . . Planning is not any one man's job.

The visible technocrats who most easily identified their
roles were the two who contributed institutional types of innovation.
All the others who participated in generating a series of non-
institutional types of innovations had difficulty responding to this
question. It was easier to grasp the impact of the actions of the
institutional catalysts who made a single but more observable con-

tribution than the non-institutional catalysts who had a series of

smaller involvements.

164

The Visible Technocrats and
their Roles

 

 

Catalyst role. Most of the technocrats at the Center serve a

 

catalyst role in the technical and administrative aspects of the
project. Nine of the thirteen reported these. Two of the thirteen
intersected administrative and human-relations roles. The remaining
two of the thirteen performed human-relations roles. In contrast to
all of the 13 at the Center, provincial technocrats cited their
primary contributions as mainly in human-relations catalyst roles.

(See Table 27 for clarification.)

The catalyst as broker. The broker role is necessarily inter—

 

twined with a catalyst role, because anything new that is generated
or synthesized has to be articulated with selected groups of people
for it to be considered meaningful. Brokerage becomes imperative
between social structures that are disjointed and have to be inter-
connected for anything significant to develop.

Among the catalysts in this research who made the administrative-
technical type of innovations, brokerage was forged between the research-
scientific-technical circle and the policy-makers. The task was to
selectively synthesize from an existing fund of ideas, social tech—
nology, values, norms and strategy made available by the research-
scientific circle. The synthesized combination (technical or adminis-
trative) was, thereafter, disseminated in a language comprehensible
to policy-makers. Policy-makers legitimized the innovations trans-

mitted by technocrats.

165

 

 

 

VN HH mH m w H<HOH
moHou umNHmpmo mcoHumHoH
N o N N o ucossn one o>HuoupchHEom
mo mcoHuoeHneou Hoscm
mH HH N N o mcoHpmHoH-:me::
Has Hey How HHV Hmv HacoHHsqumcH-:oz .N
HHV HOV HOV Hog HHV HmcoHusuHomcH .H
m o m H v o>HumuuchHEo<
Hmv Hog Hmv Hog Hmv HmcoHosuHumcH-coz .N
HHV HOV HHV How HHV HmcoHpsuHomcH .H
v o v o v HooHecooH
uwuooecooh wouooesoob
Hmuoh HmHosH>oua Hooch nomouzm unmonsmueoz
ocouo Hmuueou mumuoocnooe an oosnomnom

 

poohoum on“ cH manhoocgooh mo
:oHummHoHuumm mo Ho>oH one uouoemnom

moHoa pmwauou mo momxb

 

.uoononm onu :H muouooccooh oHnHmH> Np ooahomnom moHom ummeuou mo momxe onhuu.NN oHan

166

Among the catalyst-technocrats who were mainly strategists in
the "human-relations" aspect or "brokerage" itself, mediation among
participants of the organization was the primary objective. This is
the core of the work of technocrats who promoted the adoption of the
administrative-technical innovations legitimized by policy-makers and
other related resources considered important for the viability of

the organization's project.

1. Technical-administrative catalysts as mediators -

 

Technical-administrative innovators mediated between the scientific-
technical segment and the policy-makers by selecting, combining and
interpreting the results or outcomes of the activities of the
scientific-technical circle into a format that was within the range of
understanding of the policy-makers. The strategies adopted by techno-
crats (whether Operating as individual or as a group) for seeking

out information to be synthesized were: inviting specialists or
experts to meet in the technocrat's office, personally meeting with
resource persons in their respective offices, contacting by phone to
check data or figures, and sending memoranda or circulars to refer

to specialists the alternatives that had been selected for their
reaction or advice. Technocrats (singly or in concert) collate,

select, amplify and/or simplify the data obtained from the research-

 

scientific segment. For example, one informant described the behavior
of a scientist-technocrat who contributed a series of non—institutional
innovations and mainly performed this role by serving as "liaison

officer" between NFAC and other research institutions. This informant

said:

167

My most important contribution was with regards to the principle
of applying the pest control chemical . . . . l was a member

of the Pesticides Committee, but I could not recall any regular
meeting being conducted. §_calls for a meeting when there is a
job to be done. For example, in 1974, we were invited about
five times to attend a meeting in Manila because of the infesta-
tion of brown plant hopper on the rice plants. On other occa-
sions, we spent hours and hours on the phone. §_would come over,
and I would help him prepare the draft and, thereafter, send
copies to other members of the Pesticides Committee. Then we
made revisions and prepared another draft. In most occasions, we
prepared reports individually and, somehow, §_kept us connected.
He was running around and travelling a lot to maintain the con-
tact. He finally had the last copy drafted up here in my

office. That became the official basis for the recommendation.

Communicating the synthesized information to the policy-makers
meant being able to formulate it in a language that would be compre—
hensible and persuasive enough to put across the significance of the
message. These were in the form of carefully prepared documents,
slide presentations, bulletins, pamphlets or handouts which were
presented directly to policy-makers or through some personal channels
who were influential enough to convey the message.

For example, one scientist-technocrat who introduced the
institutional innovation that gave rise to the project itself mentioned
such strategies as dissemination of mimeographed papers which he
prepared suggesting the use of the new set of technology derived from
applied research. This highlighted the profits that would accrue
to farmers with its adoption. He employed the service of an adver-
tising firm to set up a slide presentation of the results of the
applied-research extension trials, invited policy-makers for field
trips to research plots, and "sat down" with a key administrator to

serve as the "sounding board" to a top level administrator of NFAC

(a former colleague from the university where both used to teach).

168

2. Human-relations catalysts as mediators - Bureau-technocrats

 

who were directly responsible for the implementation of the project
served as catalysts mainly in improving the brokerage of project
participants in undertaking the tasks of disseminating the
administrative-technical innovations adopted by policy-makers. This
was the major contribution of all the eleven technocrats from the
provinces and two key bureau—technocrats at the Center. This was
also part of the contribution of two other key bureau-technocrats at
the Center. The other contribution was in serving as administrative
catalyst. To give one a sense of what units the bureau-technocrats
mediated between and how the process of brokerage was undertaken, the
following are some examples:

a. Linking NFAC and non-agriculturally-related agencies that are
nevertheless important in providing resources needed for the
on-going activities of the project-~this was the task per-
formed by one key bureau-technocrat, who served more as an
"external strategist." He described his role as follows:

I am the only Cabinet member who personally puts the budget

together of 11 bureaus, and then who sits at all the budget

hearings because money is one of the critical ingredients for

the success of the program. In fact, I am the only one I know

of who personally presents the budget of the whole department.

In the past, they've gone bureau by bureau.

b. Linking participants from various agriculturally-related
agencies involved in planning and the decision-making process--
this was performed by another key bureau-technocrat who more
simply described his contribution as:

I handle all of the planning aspects--the behind-the-scenes

work. I take care of the office-~planning, everything that
supports the program. X is the one who goes out and implements.

169

I make sure the program will work by planning it the way it
should be and taking care of all the details, then somebody else
takes these plans out in the field. I tap people on certain
things depending upon the problems. These people, trained in
their area of expertise, analyze the problem. A core group (of

4 or 5 people) make the decisions thereafter. We tap everybody

on the problem at hand—-to get a feel of the situation. But

when decisions have to be made, we make the decisions.

c. Linking the Central Office and the participants in the
provinces--this was the task undertaken by another key bureau-
technocrat. He reported that the strategy he adopted to
articulate the goals identified by NFAC was to establish a
"close link between the Central Office and the provinces."
He saw for himself what went on in the field through "on-the-
spot visits" he conducted. This was facilitated by the
"numerous dialects" he learned to speak when he served as
provincial administrator of the rice project in the past.

He spent more of his time "in the field rather than in the
Office, to see how the program is being operated."

d. Linking the participants in the provinces involved in program
implementation--some of the strategies adopted by the pro-
vincial technocrats were as follows:

One established a "reportorial team" that served to com-
municate with him whether the implementing guidelines are
being followed by technicians in the field.

Another bureau-technocrat from a province that was noted
as a "melting pot" of various linguistic groups divided the

province into "districts" to coincide with these cultural

variations, with each being headed by "mini-FPO."

170

Another obtained the full cooperation and participation
of agency heads with the project by presenting himself not
as their "leader" but by going "into their respective levels."
He did not use his "full authority to control them." Since
the PAC is composed mostly of heads of agencies, like himself,
in the locality, he "took pains not to step on their toes."
Besides sending them a memo or a letter seeking their support
for certain matters concerning their respective agencies, he
personally phoned them or visited them in their offices to

indicate his interest in eliciting their participation.

3. A profile of technocrats who performed technical-
administrative catalyst roles vis-a-vis human-relations catalysts -
The eleven technocrats who perform technical-administrative catalyst
roles are mostly scientists or technical experts who are active
and well-informed in their fields and professionally competent
to serve as brokers between the fields of Research and Development.
The majority have backgrounds either in management science or agricul-
ture that enable them to selectively incorporate information from
related centers of knowledge. Nine of the 11 have more than a college
education. Ten of the 11 were educated and/or affiliated with local
scientific-technical institutions such as UPLB, IRRI, and USAID.

These linkages are important, as they provide the base for access to
personal networks embodying various sources of information of impor-
tance to technical-administrative catalysts. Nine out of 11 are
actively involved in applied research activities in each of their

areas of specialization. In the last five years, everyone attended

171

seminars or workshOps that extended beyond the national setting.
Most of the eleven were from the academic-research-technical setting
and private business.

Thirteen of the human-relations catalyst technocrats are
chiefly government extension administrators who were crossing various
cultural milieus to disseminate the technical-administrative inno—
vations that had been generated at the Center. In contrast to the
technical-administrative catalysts, the majority of the human-
relations-directed catalysts have only a college education (8 out of
13). Only a small proportion have more than a bachelor's degree.
While most have a background in agricultural science (11 of the 13)
that gave them an understanding of the technology (the primary
content for the extension work of the project) an M.S. or a Ph.D.
does not seem as necessary as it is for technical-administrative
catalysts, whose main role is to synthesize information from numerous
centers of knowledge. What seems to be important for human-relations-
technocrats is the ability to define a "cross-cultural language" and
practices that enable them to effectively transmit the innovations
that have been generated by technical-administrative catalysts. The
majority (10 out of 13) spent most of their working life in extension,
in contrast with research that engaged most of the technical-
administrative technocrats.

It is significant to note, however, that the two at the Center
of the thirteen human-relations catalysts have a more advanced
education than the majority of those in the provinces. These two

technocrats hold M.S. and Ph.D. degrees, in contrast with the majority

172

of provincial technocrats who have only an undergraduate education

(8 of the 11). This could perhaps be attributed to the fact that

the two central technocrats also mediated among persons who serve to
catalyze technical-administrative innovations and are themselves
participants in the policy-making process. It is also important

that they know the technical language of the segments they articulate,
as well as to be sensitive to the cultural settings into which

technical innovations are being introduced.

Brokerage and the process of influence. In the performance of

 

' their brokerage roles, technocrats cannot totally disregard the
socio-cultural milieu in which the segments being linked are embedded.
It is in the brokerage process that socio-cultural confrontations
come about and, therefore, have implications for the adaptations in
behavior among technocrats for the purpose of attaining stated
objectives. Being a successful broker requires being able to perceive
the right channels for obtaining information as well as for gaining
access to the persons who will be legitimizing or adopting inno-
vations. For example, the foreign technocrat who is responsible for
introducing institutional innovations tapped the superior in his
institution who was a former colleague of a bureau-technocrat in
NFAC, one of the policy-makers of the project.

In cases where existing personal networks are not available
and must be created, there are attributes that can serve as social
capital to facilitate the brokerage process. Persons with high
reputation or prestige can more readily forge connections than those

with less established reputation. Technocrats enjoying high prestige

173

are those who have (or have had) linkages with prestigious organi-
zations in the past, have assumed key positions of administration in
the different organizations of their origin (whether in research-
academic circle or private business) and have received their higher
education in leading institutions of their profession in the country
and abroad.

For example, one lateral entrant to the project who is a key
bureau-technocrat claims that he has a "free hand" in contacting
persons he feels have knowledge about problems confronted in the
project. He says, "Most of the problems encountered are referred to
appropriate agencies directly involved in the project. If it is
credit, I refer the matter to a 'credit man.'" He remarks, "Not
being identified with any agency of the government in the past
facilitated the coordinating functions which were entrusted to me.
Being a UPLB professor--UPLB being a prestigious university--helped me
in trying to coordinate the different agencies." He has a Ph.D. from
an American institution, became a department chairman of the afore-
mentioned academic institution and had been renowned for participating
in applied researches on crop production and breeding.

A foreign technocrat claims to have kept in touch with numerous
persons both from public and private agencies. "I consult specialists,
depending upon the problems encountered in the project. They range
from heads of agencies to their subordinates." He attributes the
ease of this mobility to his reputation in his field-~"By being known
in the field, one does not have to strive aggressively to get what

one wants." He is a Ph.D. from a university of his home country,

174

became a visiting professor at UPLB, and served as consultant or
adviser on various occasions to IRRI, USAID and the past rice project.
He even claims that his institutional affiliation facilitated the
brokerage process. He says: "Being an IRRI representative in the
project seems to spell a certain magic. Even if some NMC representa-
tives have something to say during its meetings, they remain quiet,
especially if I am around. UPLB representatives also have the same

magic."

Foreign Technocrats

 

Within the limited time scope of the study, the structure of
dependence on foreign technocrats has been indicated. Two of them
introduced institutional innovations. The third was involved in
generating a series of non-institutional innovations.

One of the two foreigners who forged an institutional inno-
vation was considered by one informant as the "moving spirit" behind
the conception of the project itself. As put by one informant, "he
pushed forward the idea of the applied research and pilot extension
work that gave birth to the package of practices" for Masagana 99,
including some suggestions for the extension strategies and the
structure for the organizational framework to undertake the dissemi-
nation campaign. He "took the initiative of conveying the research
results to policy-makers." While it is generally recognized that
he did not "discover" the different resources that went into the
package in the field trial, he utilized existing technologies based
on the most recent findings about them from the "researches of

colleagues from the International Rice Research Institute and experts

175

from the College of Agriculture from the University of the Philip-
pines at Los Bafios." He combined "a number of rice varieties and
selections, promising herbicides, and other emerging technologies" and
tested their comparative effectivity in rice yields. Built into the
experimental trial of the technologies were the extension strategies
within a given organizational framework that involved selected farmers
who were willing to cooperate with the research-extension phase.

The second foreigner contributed an institutional type of
administrative innovation--the Management Information System. This
was designed "for obtaining and processing only specifically pre-
designated elements of data for managers to use in implementing pro-
grams, and for indicating when corrective action may be necessary.

The data are assembled from several sources and organized for inte-
grated analysis at a centralized point, for management decision-making
purposes and feedback to subordinate levels for their information and
action." He helped "build a permanent staff" to undertake the tasks
of management information as well as to spearhead the training pro-
grams for the new personnel.

While the third foreigner made a series of non-institutional
innovations of a technical sort, he was the only technocrat among
the core of non-institutional technical catalysts who became the
most active "external strategist." He describes his important con-
tribution to the project by acting as "liaison officer" among the
different agencies engaged in agricultural research in order to syn—
thesize available and up-dated research results in soils, fertilizers,

rice varieties, methods of production and other aspects of rice and

176

its culture. His role was to bring "a large number of individual
recommendations into a common recommendation." The modes for con-
tributing the synthesized information were leaflets, hand-outs,
memoranda, brochures and position papers. There were informal con-
sultative meetings held with individuals or groups to review figures
or data to be incorporated in a final report. There were also
occasions when telephone calls become a recourse to obtain an imme-
diate feedback about a report. To record his achievement, be dis—
seminated from the period 1972 to 1975, about "50 leaflets and mimeo-
graphs as co-author or author in support of the national rice pro-
duction program." Among all the foreign technocrats, he became the
most visible by serving as a member of the national planning body and

of the three technical committees backing it up.

Some hypotheses about the emerggnce of foreign technocrats.

 

Why have foreigners held primary roles in the generation of technical-
administrative innovations? A first preposition is that a "foreigner"
who participates in a host country's social system has less at stake
in terms of risking and possibly losing his identity when mistakes
occur. He may readily exit from a society that injures his self-
respect and reputation. Filipinos, as members of the same social
system, are more apt to be calculating in their involvement, lest
they commit errors and, thereby, put into jeopardy their reputations
and be well remembered for their mistakes. Making a mistake creates
a stigma which can carry over into future occupational roles. Thus,
one Filipino bureau-technocrat who purposely exited from his involve-

ment at the "height of the success of the project," said:

177

What I have done by "leaving" the project is often cited as

"the thing." They say, "You are already on top, and Masagana 99
is successful. People do not say anything. When you leave at
the time it has its problems, peOple say a lot of things."

Second, the premium given to persons who have the most recent
relevant information enables foreign technocrats with access to the
centers of knowledge to have important roles in selecting and synthe—
sizing among all the available alternatives. One of the two technocrats
who contributed technical innovations was affiliated with IRRI. The
second had close ties with both IRRI and UPLB. The third was affili-
ated with USAID. In addition, all have had extensive cross-cultural
exposures in other developing countries which have broadened the base
of their personal networks to other knowledge centers.

Third, there is greater Opportunity for a foreign technocrat to
gain access to both the local centers of knowledge and power. He is
less perceived as a competitor than a local counterpart who is identified
by his peers as a possible rival for a limited opportunity for recog-
nition and high status. A foreigner can cross more readily different
levels of authority and administrative jurisdiction in different organi-
zations. This is where he can be insensitive and still be excused for
his ignorance and non—conformity to patterned interpersonal channels
which a person of the same socio-cultural milieu has to confront.

Fourth, there is a neo-colonial set of attitudes which are
latent in the relationship with foreigners, often with professional and
"seasoned" Americans. In the social milieu of technocrats, they are
commonly held with considerable respect and there is confidence in

their judgments giving them a special measure of authenticity. This

attitude does not assume that Americans are indispensable, and indeed,

178

there are some sentiments that they have fulfilled their purposes and

are no longer needed in the project.

Technocrats in Relation to
Poligy-Makers

 

 

While this study has not explored the scope of articulation
of technocrats with policy-makers, the role of technocrats as influ-
ential in the decision-making process has been indicated here. What
occurs in most instances is that policy-makers only legitimize or

formalize what in reality are the results of the decisions formulated
by technocrats. This is especially the case among technocrats at
the Center, most of whom directly influenced policy-makers by forming
a core of decision-makers whose suggestions are adopted by the latter.
Policy—makers only serve as titular heads, by emerging as a "referral
body" who accept whatever suggestions are presented by technocrats.
One bureau-technocrat said of the National Management Committee,
which was theoretically established to serve as the policy-making
body of the rice project:
The Management Committee legitimates the guidelines, but we
usually decide what to do and present it formally to the
Management Committee. "We" refers to myself, A (bureau-
technocrat), B (non-bureau-technocrat) and others who can help
make decisions--usually constituted by a core of 4 or 5 people
. . . . We make most of the decisions and we present them to
the Management Committee. More often than not, our suggestions
are accepted. After all, we know more about these things than
they do. Sometimes they do make suggestions to improve on what
we have done . . . . But everything is lutong makag} here in
NFAC. Most often, it goes as we propose . . . . The Management
Committee can still object, but the members do not have time to

study the problem in depth as we have . . . . We tap people
for certain things, depending on certain problems. For example,

 

 

1This refers to undertaking a "mock process" that has a pre-
determined results.

179

there was the big issue of fertilizer price. We called on the
top economist of the country to help give us the options in
what to do.

Eleven of the thirteen Center technocrats were at one time or another

participants in the decision-making process.

The remaining two of the thirteen at the Center were indirectly

 

involved, in the sense of paving the way through existing interper-
sonal channels to gain access to policy-makers to legitimize the
innovations they have mediated. This was the experience of the insti-
tutional catalysts. Decision-makers were constituted by policy-makers
to review, evaluate, reformulate, refine, and add some features to
the innovations mediated by institutional catalysts. As one bureau-
technocrat recounted, the Masagana 99 project which was conceived
and mediated by the foreign technocrat resulting from applied experi-
mental trials, had to undergo "several revisions and refinements"
before the final plan had been adopted as a program in May 1973.
He said:
In the initial stages of the planning process, I worked closely
with X, Y, and Z (all technocrats identified in this research
also) . . . . The proponents of Masagana 99 envisioned the
involvement of 19 provinces. But we eventually pushed for
carrying out the project in 56 provinces.
This same key bureau-technocrat indicates that his involvement in the
conception stage of the project was primarily in supervising its
over-all planning. His most important contribution was with respect
to the way the project was handled. He says: "I discuss with those
I work closely with, what will be done, what we are going to do, what

are the strategies." The important consideration for him was to

"minimize and possibly avoid decisions reached through any form of

180

politics." Since the applied research draw substantially upon the
chemical components produced by manufacturing industries, chemical
recommendations were the most vulnerable to pressures from the
industrial sector. So, "Technical Committees" were created by this
bureau-technocrat to assist the policy-makers and the planners in
identifying the different trademarks bearing the chemical component
of importance to rice production. This prevented bias for a single
trademark.

One non-bureau-technocrat affiliated with a cooperating
government agency of NFAC in the area of financing describes his role
as "lending a hand in defining the credit scheme that involved
different banking institutions from the public and the private
sectors." He participated in designing the procedures which enable
the big banks to reach the small farmers. An important innovation
was minimizing documentation, since farmers are not proficient in
writing.

An intermediate bureau-technocrat of NFAC participated in
numerous ways "to spell out the national guidelines based on the
results of the applied research." He assisted in the determination of
target areas by province, the requirements of such resources as
fertilizers and pesticides, the deployment patterns of technicians,

and the organizational network of the project.

Decision-making as a continuously evolving process. The

 

decision-making process is a continuously evolving one and draws on
the technocrats at the different phases. Hence, while the focus for

this research is limited primarily to the technocrats who were

181

operationally defined as visible at two points in time, at conception
and implementation, their participation is not necessarily confined

to a single and continuous time in each of these stages. Rather,

they are called upon by policy-makers to participate in certain
activities for which their recognized competences have relevancy.

In other instances, some technocrats personally initiate participation
in the decision-making process at various points in time at conception
and implementation. As one non-bureau-technocrat said: "I was every-
where in the formulation and implementation phase of the project.

I cannot exactly recall what my most important contribution was. But,
what I can say is that I became involved with the project when the
so-called 'package of technology' was 'sold' to us by §_(referring to
the foreign technocrat who introduced the technical innovation).

We* just had to find out what should be adopted on a nationwide scale.
From January to May 1973, we did the refinements of the program in
preparation for the implementation on a nationwide basis."

As has been mentioned earlier by one key bureau-technocrat,
persons are drawn into the process with specific areas of expertise
where they are deemed capable of making a contribution. To reiterate,
he said: "The Management Committee legitimates the guidelines, but we
usually decide what to do and present it formally to the Management
Committee. 'We' refers to myself, B (a non-bureau-technocrat), and
others who can help make decisions--usually constituted by a core of

4 or 5 pe0ple."

 

*"We" referred to three other visible technocrats at the con-
ception stage.

182

As a creative activity, the decision-makers or brokers are
enmeshed in social units that are open-ended, unbounded and temporary.
They can be differentiated from a formal bureaucratic structure, in
that they have no organized set of statuses or positions which persons
can assume or fill. Rather, technocracy evolves in accordance with
certain activities engaged in by technocrats at a particular time.
Thus, there is no systematic pattern of career progression within a
system. This is because technocrats do not fill positions with
formally assigned responsibilities in a career ladder. Technocrats
create or define their roles. They may, therefore, emerge into or
fade from the scene, depending upon the kinds of decisions that they
are deemed competent to make.

Technocrats and Their Roles in the
Two Staggs of the Project

 

 

What roles did technocrats perform in each stage of the pro-
ject? Was there a continuity in their participation in the project?
If not, why not?

Technocrats who perform both institutional and non-
institutional types of catalyst roles (technical and administrative)
are more dominant in the conception stage. More specifically, seven
of the eight technocrats who were considered visible at conception
primarily performed technical and administrative types of catalyst
roles. Only one intersected administrative and human relations
catalyst roles.

In contrast, only five of the 19 technocrats who are visible

during the specific points in time at the implementation stage,

183

perform technical-administrative types of catalyst roles. The
majority (13 out of 19) perform roles in human-relations. Only one
intersected administrative and human-relations catalyst roles.

If the participation of the technocrats were to be plotted
out in a diagram, their involvements in each of the two stages would

appear as follows:

   
     
    
 

®®®
@CSD

CONCEPTION
(Center)

(06)

STAGE

\/~ 1
00®®00
00@®®

// (Province)
:/ IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

Eight of the visible technocrats who are prominent during the con-
ception stage are located at the Center. Among the 19 who are visible
at the implementation stage, three are also visible at conception

(#6, #7, and #8). Of the 19, eight are participants at the Center.

The rest of the 19 (ll of them) are participants in the project at

the provincial level only. All of the provincial technocrats primarily

perform human-relations catalyst roles. The majority at the Center

184

serve as catalysts of technical-administrative innovations. Only two
at the Center mainly perform roles in human-relations.

Provincial technocrats are vertically integrated by central
technocrats because certain aspects of decisions pertaining to the
project are determined at the Center, e.g., the "package of tech-
nology," organizational machinery, and the overall rules for program
implementation. Provincial decisions pertain to designing strategies
for implementation based on the area's own peculiarities but conforming
to the broader guidelines defined at the Center.

A question that persists after examining the composition of
technocrats in the two stages is: Why do some technocrats become
visible in both and others lose their prominence in the other stage
of the project development? As can be gleaned from the preceding
diagram, there are five of the eight visible technocrats at conception
stage who do not appear in the implementation stage. The experiences
of the five who lost visibility are as follows:

1. Two scientist-technocrats were engaged more in undertaking
applied research on rice production and in the training of
rice extension participants in the project. This does not
discount, however, the possibility of their rising into
prominence should new innovations be precipitated in the
organization.

2. Two voluntarily left the project, joining an international
research organization and a foreign business corporation,

both based in the Philippines.*

 

*It can be questioned to what extent public technocracy can
be maintained by their exit from the governmental setting. Do these

185

3. One of the five "fell out of the network” by the exit of

the sponsor for his involvement in the project. This

respondent claims: "I am no longer consulted as often as I

was when §_was involved with this project."

What the preceding experiences suggest is that continuity
as a technocrat depends not only on sustained performance as a
catalyst but also on personal-social connections. To be a catalyst
does not depend solely on one's abilities or competency but also on
the kinds of interpersonal relationships which are maintained with
the person higher in status who has the authority to decide one's
participation in the project. This proposition is further sub-
stantiated by the case of the scientist-technocrat who introduced an
institutional innovation (of a technical nature) by seeking the "right
channel" to convey the "package of technology" to the decision-makers.
He sought various persons who had access to key decision-makers: his
own superior who was a former colleague of a key bureau-technocrat,
and the wife of a participant in his research who had access to the
Chief Executive as the top policy-maker of the present political
régime.

Being tied with a person of higher status gives one a sense

of authenticity in the Philippine social system. There are no

 

involvements put them into a new arena of technocracy? One of these
two clearly has been transformed into a regional (e.g., Southeast
Asian) type of technocrat. He has been engaged in formulating plans
to consolidate research results of the various countries in a specific
area of food production and has instigated the adoption of these

plans through conferences held jointly with policy-makers of countries
in Southeast Asia.

186

ready-made channels for finding out what people are doing. Filipinos
are continuously left to probe for the right person to approach, to
gain access to the person in power. Hence, technocracy is like the
old Filipino organizational structure in which charts of the bureauc—
racy do not reveal the complex of interpersonal relations in its
operation. As one sociologist aptly remarked:

. . . while the Filipino company or government agency may dis-
play beautifully drawn charts complete with the usual line and
staff organization, these charts do not detail the really
meaningful relationships in the operation of this structure,
namely the vertical alignments spanning the ranks from manage-
ment to worker, nurtured by personal attachments and reciprocal
actions. The viewer from outside cannot tell just by looking
that the workers or supervisors represented by these boxes are
"close" to the executive in that particular box (Hollnsteiner,
1966:4).

The Less Visible Technocrats in Relation
to the Visible Counterparts

 

 

It has been mentioned earlier in the discussion of the profile
of technocrats that the less visible ones are closer to, if not on,
equal footing with the visible technocrats in age, educational back-
ground and socio-economic origins. The question is: what roles do
they perform or what qualities do they manifest that make them
peripheral to technocracy?

Two propositions can be formulated about less visible techno-
crats:

First proposition: A peripheral status is attained because

 

less visibles serve as "accessories" to the roles of the visible
technocrats. Twenty of the 25 less visibles provided information
during the interview about a specific area of expertise or data on

agency activities in support of the project. These were ten

187

research-scientists and ten administrators of cooperating agencies in
the public and the private sectors. While these persons do not
perform roles as technocrats, they are part and parcel of the tech-
nocratic structure. Visible technocrats who perform the role of a
catalyst cannot do so successfully if there are no human "accessories"
who supply the needed information, data and knowledge. These less
visibles are vital parts of the social unit in which acknowledged
technocrats appear as the central actors and give meaning to its
existence. For example, the less visible scientist-technocrats who
are identified at the Center serve as "accessories" to the foreign
technocrat who reportedly synthesized the most recent researches
conducted in the different areas of rice production. The foreign
technocrat conferred with them about the expertise which each must
contribute--singly or as a group. In amplification of this point,
one "accessory" scientist from an academic-research circle remarks:
My most important contribution was with regards to the principle
in applying the pest control chemical . . . . I was a member
of the Pesticides Committee, but I could not recall any regular
meeting being conducted. It is called upon when there is a job
to be done.
In other words, the less visible technocrats constitute the network
of personal consultants and advisers to visible technocrats. This
network becomes operational when a particular activity is at issue

for which their expertise is needed.

Second proposition: A less visible status results when

 

individuals fail to comply or cannot fulfill certain attributes
expected of technocrats. Five of the less visible technocrats who

do not exhibit the visible technocratic norms are those whose

188

"commitment" to the goals and purposes of the project is question-
able or whose competencies to serve as catalysts are in doubt. One
Provincial Program Officer for Rice is considered to be "like an
ordinary bureaucrat" rather than a technocrat because he spends more
time "overseeing his farmlands than performing his role as adminis-
trator of the project in the province." Two have interests conflict-
ing with the goals of the project. Both are administrators from the
private sector who are viewed as being identified with the concerns
of their own organizations (chemical companies). One of the two is
even reported to have been excluded from meetings of the Technical
Committee of which he is a member designate. Two others are the
oldest among the less visible Filipinos and are key administrators
of two cooperating agencies of NFAC. But they have only an under-
graduate education. And they have not actively participated in
seminars or workshops to up-date their knowledge in the last five

years.

Analysis of Findingg

 

The findings in this part purport the applicability of and
elaborate on the opening paradigm of this research outlined in the
first chapter. Furthermore, the findings also show the importance
of the socio-cultural milieu in distinguishing technocracy in the
Philippine context. More explicitly, the findings may be summarized
according to the following generalizations. Some further propositions

are stated to explain the nature of technocracy.

189

1. Networks as the social matrix of technocragy - The social

 

matrix of technocracy in the Philippines is basically that of net-
works, because constituents are organized according to specific
activities created or initiated by technocrats. Technocrats are not
restricted by established norms or rules of groups or organizations,
but rather they generate new ones. The social unit of technocracy
is tenuous because it is specific to the person who initiates the
activity and the constituents are linked together with respect to
these activities. The social unit, therefore, does not embody
formal positions for which duties or responsibilities are stated.
Performance is situationally defined.

Thus, technocracy can be distinguished from a formal bureau-
cratic structure with a hierarchy and an established pattern of career
progression for its members. Technocrats emerge according to activ-
ities that they personally initiate. They are not filling or assuming
positions, but are creating or generating their roles. As a social
unit engaged in a creative activity, technocracy's constituents are
continuously in flux. A social unit emerges according to the types
of activities that are developed or created. The social unit is,
therefore, evolving and open-ended. It does not have a tightly-
bounded structure like groups, organizations, or bureaucracies.
Responsibilities and norms governing behaviors are not clearly

circumscribed. Specifics of the duties are defined by the technocrats.

2. The influence of personal networks on the nature of the

 

catalyst roles of a technocrat - The findings of this part suggest

 

(and it will be borne out in succeeding parts) that the constituencies

190

of personal networks influence the nature of catalyst roles performed
by technocrats. Whether or not one has access to and is able to tap
the appropriate network of persons who are "accessories" to the per-
formance of one's role as catalyst affects the type of innovations
that can be created. Further, whether or not one emerges as a
technical-administrative catalyst depends upon the accessibility of
the accessories who are necessary components of the matrix in which
technocrats are the central actors. Technocrats at the National Office
who have access to leading centers for relevant knowledge are the

most productive in introducing technical-administrative types of
innovations. Technocrats in the provinces have a dearth of encounters
with persons who could lend support in the transmission of innovations.
This is because of the structure of knowledge-creation itself, which
concentrates in single centers located in or near the area for
national decision-making in the capital. On the other hand, pro-
vincial technocrats have ties with local accessories who are crucial
for implementation.

Among technocrats who participated in catalyzing administrative-
technical types of innovations, 10 out of 11 have established linkages
with research-technical-academic institutions obtaining generous
support for research in rice production and its administrative com-
plements. These linkages are with institutions such as the state-
supported UPLB, the multinational organization of IRRI, and an American
technical agency like USAID. The technical-administrative brokers
were, at one time or another, students, trainees, and/or affiliates

in research, extension, teaching and/or administration in these

191

institutions. Only one of the 11 did not have initial linkage with
any of these institutions prior to involvement in the project. These
linkages are important, for they provide access to networks of persons
with relevant data on whom technocrats may rely. Further signifying
the on-going exposures of administrative-technical catalysts is

the fact that 9 of the 10 have current attachments as affiliates in
research, extension, teaching and/or administration activities with
these institutions.

One of the 11 who does not have the prior linkage with the
aforementioned institutions was, however, affiliated with modern
business institutions. These are entities which he partly or singly
owned, such as advertising, agricultural, financial and marketing
corporations. One was listed in the top 1,000 corporations in sales
reported by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the Philippines.

In contrast, provincial technocrats who are primarily human-
relations catalysts do not have current affiliations with these
institutions (e.g., IRRI, UPLB) in research-extension-administration
activities. Only four of the 11 had a bachelor's degree from UPLB.
Six of the 11 were trained at either UPLB or IRRI, in rice production
or its related practices.

Two at the Center who are primarily human-relations catalysts
have current linkages with IRRI and UPLB in some kind of administrative-
related role. One of the two obtained a bachelor's degree in
agriculture from UPLB. The other one emerged from the private

business sector. Five of the businesses he was affiliated with were

192

listed in the top 1,000 in sales reported by Securities and Exchange

Commission.

3. Technocracy as a multi—dimensional social unit -

 

Technocracy is a multi-dimensional social unit. It may appear as
horizontal or vertical, depending upon what aspect of the catalyst
role is viewed. The horizontal dimension of technocracy is the matrix
that evolves when specific activities are engaged in by technocrats

in generating an innovation, whether singly or in concert with two or

 

more technocrats. The vertical dimension is the stratification among
technocrats according to the nature of the catalyst role performed.
Technocrats who successfully work for the legitimation of innovations
vertically integrate those who primarily perform the task of dis-
seminating the innovations adopted by policy-makers. This is the
experience among the provincial technocrats of the project who are
dependent on the center technocrats for technical innovations. Their
catalyst roles are ones of implementation, using their human-relations

skills and competence.

 

4. Technocracy as an emerging adaptation in the Philippine

 

bureaucracy - Technocracy is a new adaptation in the Philippine

 

governmental system. While the old structure of the bureaucracy has
been noted for the interlacing of personal-social factors in the
recruitment process that militated against its efficiency, technocracy
has as the primary basis for recruitment, competence or expertise.
Although technocracy indicates a "modern" trend by its emphasis on

merit, a continuation of traditional patterns is still suggested in

193

that the competition is open to only certain candidates. The recruit-
ment patterns, rather, typify the "sponsorship mobility" system where
an "elite or their agents, deemed to be best qualified to judge merit,
choose individuals for elite status who have the appropriate qualities"
(Turner, 1960:857). The process of entry indicates an "enclosed
type" of social unit, in limiting the field of selection to persons
with close "connections" with the one recruiting. As we shall see

in the succeeding part on the recruitment process, technocrats are
mostly those who have school, work-related and particularistic

(e.g., family or friendship) ties with the one recruiting. Further-
more, we shall see how the role of "sponsorship network" varies at
different levels. At the outset, it can be stated that the "sponsor-
ship network" among provincial technocrats is not as important in
their entry into the project as it is among central technocrats.
Technocrats from the provinces are those linked with existing govern-
mental bureaus by virtue of previous positions they held in them.
Technocrats at the Center were mostly sponsored in their initial
participation to the project.

Why is "sponsorship mobility" resorted to rather than reliance
on existing rules in the recruitment process? First, the formal
criteria for sorting out personnel may adequately discriminate
technical competencies, but they do not distinguish those unique
qualities that are crucial for the successful performance of the
nascent technocratic roles--namely, catalyzing and brokering.
Technocracy presumes the performance of creative roles such that

formalized rules cannot specify the kinds of responsibilities

194

prospective candidates will be assuming. The sponsor makes initial
presumptions about what a recruit can do or will be doing in certain
specified tasks or activities. Prospective candidates are envisioned
as creating their roles rather than as assuming clearly defined
duties.

Second, "sponsorship mobility" also favors the sponsor's having
close working associations with recruits in whom he has established
trust, confidence, and with whom he has smooth-interpersonal-
relationship.* In a society that values personal types of inter-
actions, what seems to be important in the recruitment process is not

only what a person can do but with the particularistic ties estab-

 

lished bygthe recruit with the sponsor and the latter's networks. In

 

other words, cultural norms also play an important role in the
selection process. Technocracy, by reaching out for talented persons
who have the credentials, "the right kind of personal behavior" and

"the right sponsorship," is the Filipino answer to cultural change.

5. Socio-cultural factors in the brokerageprocess - The

 

brokerage role performed by technocrats cannot totally disregard the
socio-cultural milieu in which the groups of people being articulated
are embedded. It is the brokerage process in which socio-cultural

confrontations come about and, therefore, necessitate adaptations in

 

*Smooth-interpersonal-relationship (SIR) is a word coined by
Lynch to indicate one of the social values that dominate Philippine
interpersonal behavior. SIR has been defined as the "facility at
getting along with others in such a way as to avoid outward signs of
conflict . . . . It means being agreeable, even under difficult
circumstances, and of keeping quiet or out of sight when discretion
passes the word" (Lynch, 1973:10).

195

the behaviors of technocrats to forge the acceptance of innovations
they have generated or are disseminating.

If the competencies of persons are equal, how the social
milieu responds to brokers depends upon certain attributes that are,
from the Filipino standpoint, important social capital. In general,
persons with authority, high reputation, or status can more readily
undertake a broker role than those without such established reputation.
Persons who have high socio-economic standing, who have advanced
degrees from prestigious institutions (foreign universities or such
local ones as the UPLB for agriculture), who have assumed key adminis-
trative roles in prestigious organizations (e.g., big business
institutions or prestigious academic-research institutions) can readily
undertake the mediation process. They can even consolidate a network
of technocrats.

Lacking such background, the competent but young person with
a low socio-economic status gains access to technocracy through
sponsorship by a person in authority or power. The right sponsorship
is also an important avenue for the intelligent but poor man to
obtain scholarships and grants for graduate education and thus gain

initial socialization for technocracy.

6. Technocracy as a monopoly rather than a competitive

 

process - It can be proposed that the typical structure of knowledge-
creation of a scientific-technical nature may affect the processes
involved in technocratic participation for policy-making. In a
setting where the base for knowledge is concentrated, there is less

indication for competition and more for monopoly of technocratic

196

brokerage in the decision—making process. In the case of the pro-
ject in focus, technocratic participation has been the domain of
persons with established linkages to specific centers of knowledge
rather than to a diffuse base. Technocrats with expertise in
agriculturally-related sciences and management were educated or
trained at academic-research institutions and/or had ties to parts of
the private business sector that are reputed to purvey the most
recently developed knowledge and technologies. The scientist-
technocrats in agriculturally-related sciences were persons with
linkages with academic-research institutions such as UPLB and IRRI.
The corporate business/industrial concerns from which management
experts in the project originated are those having long-standing

profitable gains.

7. The nature of technocracy as influenced by the socio-

 

historical setting - The social-historical influences on the nature

 

of Philippine technocracy must be adequately understood. In the
Philippine experience, the American colonial heritage is a particular
historical circumstance that paved the way for the establishment of
local educational institutions for the socialization of potential
technocrats. The content of education in these institutions was

also initially structured and shaped according to the experiences of
its first mentors. In certain instances, the "first generation" of
Filipino technocrats were educated in the same institutions as their
foreign counterparts. Foreigners not only trained specialists and
the "future technocrats," they also performed technocratic roles in

the public sector. Hence, American colonization of the Philippines

197

affected the content of socialization of training institutions and

also the composition of technocracy itself.

 

The awakening of nationalism and the search for national
identity has not spared the dominant power role of Americans in the
post-colonial days from criticism. The search for more self-
generating human resources to spearhead the country's development
led to a surge of interest in developing and training local talents
according to norms considered more relevant to a "transitional"
society or the "Third World" than were the colonial and neo-colonial
patterns. The massive influx of technical assistance, foreign aid,
visiting professorial programs, and research supports were re-
examined for their implications for the entrenchment of dependence on
former colonists. As this research has not examined the dynamic
interplay of technocracy with the structure of power (external and
internal), this is an important aspect that still needs to be explored
especially with respect to the extent to which external linkages will

influence the composition of technocracy and constituencies of the

 

 

work-related networks of technocrats.

Part D - Personal Experiences of Visible
Technocrats in Relation to the Project

 

 

This part examines further the nature of technocracy and the
personal experiences of visible technocrats as they participate in
the project. It explores:

l. the mode of entry into the project,

2. the socialization of technocrats for the project,

198

3. the sources of information for up-dating technocrats' areas
of expertise,

4. the sources of gratifications and frustrations, and

5. the distinctive experiences of foreign technocrats in their
interaction with Filipino counterparts.

Entry into the Project of
Visible Technocrats

 

 

Modes for recruitment. What are the circumstances that

 

opened the way for the visible technocrats' involvement in the pro-
ject? Is there a distinct pattern that can be observed in the entry
of technocrats into their roles according to the nature of their
origins?

The pattern of entry of visible technocrats from the Center
is more heterogeneous than of those from the provinces. Technocrats
at the Center became involved in the project through the positions
they held in the pre-existing governmental structure of the earlier
rice project, through the recruitment or recommendations made by
certain individuals, or through the technocrat's personal initiative.
All provincial technocrats came into Masagana 99 by virtue of holding
certain positions in pro-existing governmental structure for the rice

project.

1. Central technocrats: modes of entry into the Masagspa 99 -

 

The visible technocrats from the Center entered the project in various

ways. Four of the 13 central technocrats who are visible in

 

Masagana 99 were alreadysparticipants of the earlier rice project.

 

All four had executive positions--three top-level ones and one

199

middle—level. However, three of the four moved laterally into the
project (specifically with the rice production program of the admin-
istration). They were recruited by certain individuals rather than
themselves initiating their own participation. One was invited by
the President to assume the position of Undersecretary for the
Agriculture Department because of his "reputed management skills"
which had been gained in his executive leadership of private business
establishments. This stint was culminated by his assuming the
Secretary's position in the Department, and it was this position he
held when Masagana 99 was adopted. Among all the other visible
technocrats who obtained awards for their occupational achievements,
he had the longest professional history. He was extended the TOYM
Award (Ten Outstanding Young Men) for business management seven years
after he began his professional life.

The second was recruited by the first to join public service
because of his past involvement in drafting the plan for the corn
program in the same department. He was then affiliated with UPLB and
became prominent for developing eight corn varieties. He subsequently
assumed Corn Coordinator's status and later the Executive Directorship
of the NFAC, which embraced the rice project.

The third was sponsored by the Executive Director who knew
him as a former student whose research revolved around corn marketing.
His initial participation with NFAC was as a consultant in corn
marketing, but later he moved into a middle-level position of adminis-

tration in planning that encompassed the rice production project.

200

The fourth was upwardly mobile in the government. He com-
menced his service with the government in the provinces but was later
promoted to a key executive position at the Center. He had a
"meteoric" rise to the position as a top level executive, in com—
parison with the other provincial technocrats. He spent a total of
only 14 years of service in the government, in contrast with the
visible provincial technocrats (the elective official excepted) whose
average was 19.3 years of occupational history and all of whom are
still in middle-level positions. The entry of this visible techno-
crat into the national scene was attributed to "record-breaking
experiences" in the earlier rice project in three different regions of
the country. "Performance" was considered his vantage point and was
duly recognized by a former key bureau-technocrat from NFAC who
sponsored his entry into the Center. He also became a recipient of
the TOYM Award in Agriculture and a Presidential Plaque of Merit
for "initiative, skill, industry and sturdy virtues." This technocrat
recounts:

After 1968, a series of floods and typhoons swept the country.
You must be aware of how typhoon Yoling had set foot in Region

X . . . . A_(a top-level executive of NFAC) did get me, knowing
that I had some experience in field operations, to head the
Rehabilitation Program in Region X. My involvement in the
national scene started here. In 1970, I was in Region X and the
instruction given to me by A was to make the Region green in 60
days. I do thank a lot of people for helping me to accomplish

that task in a matter of 59 days.

Eight of the 9 remaining central technocrats who did not hold

 

executive level positions with the organizational machinery of the
rice project when Masagana 99 was adopted were also recruited by

Specific bureau-technocrats. Three of the eight were connected with

201

the governmental agencies cooperating with the project. The rest
were from research-academic and business institutions. Two of the
five from non-governmental service institutions became bureau-
technocrats of NFAC, one of whom later joined a private business
organization. All of the eight reported the recruitment to be in
cognizance of the expertise they can offer to the project. One of
the eight considered the "sheer chance" of his recruitment in addition
to his sponsor's knowledge of his competence. He had been "stripped
of his management functions on his farms" upon the declaration of
land reform. A key bureau-technocrat learned about this and personally
solicited his support to engage in the project. He relates:

A_(a Secretary of another Department of the Administration), a

close friend of the family inquired what I was doing . . . . I

jokingly asked him instead, what I can do in his Department.

But he referred me to the Department of Agriculture. He asked

me, "Do you know B?" I said, "Yes, he was a former classmate

in grade school." A must have called §_that I was available.

It was §_who gave me a call some time later, inviting me to

serve as Technical Consultant in his Department.

Only one of the thirteen personally initiated involvement in

 

the project. This occurred in the case of the scientist-technocrat

 

who introduced the technical innovation of an institutional type that

paved the way for the emergence of Masagana 99.

2. Central technocrats: character of sponsorship networks -
Among central technocrats, participation in the project was initially
attained through the ”sponsorship" by a person who had access to or
knowledge of one's expertise and what could be potentially contributed

to a given activity. Sponsorship occurred either through the

202

initiative of the person recruiting or through an intermediary who
has access to the one recruiting.

While personal networks have been the mode of access for
laterally mobile technocrats into the project, they are not of
necessity parts of kinship networks which have been so commonly the
initial means of entry into public service of career civil servants
(Francisco, 1960). Personal networks are those generated from
institutional linkages that have been responsible for socializing
technocrats into their roles. They were constituted of colleagues
in institutions for educational or professional training.

Among the visible technocrats of the project, the development
of the "sponsorship" network was initially opened by a key bureau-
technocrat (#9, see Figure 8) who is also a policy-maker. This was
instigated by the introduction of the institutional innovation of a
technical type synthesized by a foreign technocrat (#1, in Figure 8
also). Numerous persons were solicited for support by #9 in the
different phases of the project--in the re-examination and revisions
of the aforementioned innovation for final adoption; and, in the
implementation of the project. Among the core of visible technocrats
who emerged during the specific periods in time in focus for this
project, there was a total of five of them at the Center who were
directly recruited by #9 (see Figure 8). Others gained entry by an
intermediary (upon the recommendation of heads of agencies invited
by #9 to participate in the activities of the project). There were
three technocrats who gained access to this project by this type of

sponsorship (#7, #11, and #13).

203

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204

There are some technocrats who gained access to the chain
and also developed the opportunity to recruit other technocrats.
Number 5 was able to do so for three other technocrats who were visible
in the project during the period of the study. One of the three
sponsored by #5 bureau-technocrat, became a middle-level bureau-
technocrat of the NFAC. He was a former graduate student from the
University with which Number 5 was affiliated. Two others were
recruited to participate as Technical Consultants in the revisions of
the plan for the final adoption as a national project (see Figure 8).
The latter two were participants in the applied research-extension

project that paved the way for the birth of Masagana 99 itself.

3. Provincial technocrats - All of the visible provincial
technocrats hold certain positions which conform with certain modes
for entry defined by the National Office. The positions of these
technocrats concern administrative tasks in the implementation of
the project in the two provinces selected for this study. There are
9 Provincial Program Officers, one Regional Coordinator and one
Governor. The Provincial Program Officer's status is usually open
for assumption by one or the other of the heads of the two extension
agencies in a province. The second head spearheads the corn project,
which is also under the food program supervised by the NFAC. This
rule is a carry over from the earlier rice project.

The position of the Governor as Coordinator and Chairman of
the Provincial Action Committee also conforms to an earlier pattern
adopted by the project's local unit for implementation. The inclusion

of an elective official in the Provincial Action Committee was made

205
fbr ”political reasons." Inasmuch as the PAC is composed mostly of

agency heads who are considered interrelated in their functions in

support of the rice project, the coordinator's role is assumed by

someone who holds a position "higher in status." In practice,

however, the Provincial Program Officer is directly responsible to

the NFAC Office for overseeing the implementation of the project at

the local level. The Governor usually serves as the titular head

of the project in the province. However, in the case of the Governor

who is cited as a technocrat for one of the provinces in focus, he is

reported as performing a "more dynamic role" than the PPO. He took

it upon himself to oversee how the extension activities are being

undertaken in his locality. As a technocrat, the PPO in this

particular province received negative mentions. The Governor performs

the functions for which the PPO failed to take the initiative.
The position of Regional Coordinator is a recently created

one. This is a position opened with the adoption of the Masagana 99

project. Its creation subsumes the task of coordination of the PPO's

in a number of provinces under one Regional Coordinator.

Sponsorship networks for visible technocrats at

Summa y.

the provincial levels is not as important for their initial entry into

the project as it is among central technocrats. Provincial technocrats

are those linked with existing governmental bureaus by virtue of the

positions they already hold in them. The importance of sponsorship

networks for central technocrats can be attributed to the fact that

they are expected to perform more complex types of creative roles than

are the provincial technocrats. Recruitment is more ad hoc and is

206

made according to the tasks that are confronted. Technocrats at the

Center are those expected to catalyze recent scientific-technical

innovations.
Provincial technocrats, on the other hand, are confronting

traditional systems in articulating the innovations formulated at the

Center. Brokerage of these innovations necessitates a grasp of the

socio-cultural milieu in which the end-users of these innovations are

immersed. Hence, provincial technocrats are participants of the

pro-existing rice project and are mainstays in the government. But

not all such position holders become technocrats. They are considered
technocrats only if they are highly knowledgeable of the existing

socio-cultural milieu of the end-users of the innovations legitimized

by policy-makers and unusually adept at creating conditions for

adoption of the practices.

Socialization of Visible Technocrats
for the Project

Particular incidents and histories in the lives of visible
technocrats have been examined for their contribution in preparing
the technocrats for their involvement in the Masagana 99. Technocrats

were asked about what factors they perceive as most useful in their

involvement with the project.

'The technocrats replied to this question by identifying
certain qualities which they considered important for their success-

ful participation, as well as identifying the circumstances under

which these qualities were developed.

207

The combination of qualities ascribed to technocrats
reputational panels discussed in Chapter II, were also the attributes
which visible technocrats themselves consider meaningful and useful
in performing their roles.

As a group, visible technocrats consider a combination of
personal attributes as "useful" for their participation in the pro-

These attributes included basic knowledge, appropriate

Basic knowledgs_include technical information

 

ject.

attitudes, and skills.

(e.g., about rice production and culture; and/or organizational
techniques) and non-technical information (e.g., about human relations

and behavior). Appropriate attitudes have to do with the outlook on

one's work (e.g., "diligence," "patience," "sincerity," "dedication,"

"willingness to sacrifice," etc.). Skills are the techniques acquired

not only with reference to the performance of particular tasks (e.g.,
"the ability to analyze a situation," "being well-organized in

reporting," "having a total picture of the planning process," "knowl-

edge of PERT/CPM," "being adept in research activities"). These also

include one's capability in relating with people, which is central to
the role of a technocrat as "broker" (i.e., "the ability to meet and
speak with people to make them believe you," "the ability to yield
without sacrificing the interest of the goals of the organization,"
"to know how to speak in the right way, at the right time," etc.).
In a country that places high emphasis on interpersonal relationship
in any type of institutional activity, technocracy has not been

exempted from this sort of value and, indeed, is crucial in the

development of networks. Knowledge and technical skills do not only

208

indicate a technocratic prowess but also necessarily incorporate
being an effective strategist in initiating and maintaining SIR
(smooth-interpersonal-relationship).

The frequency of mention of these attributes are as follows,
ranked from highest to lowest in the order of frequency:

Table 28.--Attributes Considered Important in the Involvement with
the Project by Visible Technocrats (Central and Pro-

 

 

vincial).
Attributes Frequency of Mention
1. Skills 24
2. Basic Knowledge 18
3. Appropriate Attitudes ll
4. Others 3

TOTAL 56

 

A small number cited certain non-behavioral characteristics as
useful for reinforcing the attributes indicated previously. Three
considered non-governmental origins as an effective means for accom-
plishing the brokerage. They indicate that because they were less
associated with political alignments, which characterize some techno-
crats coming from the civil service, they were less circumscribed.

Some of the comments made by two bureau-technocrats from the university
circle illuminate this point:

Not being identified with any agency of the government facili-
tated the coordinating function which was entrusted to me.
Being a professor at a prestigious university helped me in
trying to coordinate the different agencies.

209

I hope I can stay with a more effective role as an in-between
permML In my case, I am on neutral grounds because I come from
a university. Others have established lines of loyalties which
can create jealousies or dissensions if they are asked to

coordinate the program.

Technocrats seem to have a well-developed sense of the
origins of the knowledge and skills they find useful for their

involvement with the project, but they have blurred memories when

tracing the acquisition of their appropriate attitudes. The circum-

stances under which the latter evolved are the least dealt with by

the technocrats (see Table 29).

The experiences contributing to the acquisition by the individ-
ual of skills and knowledge and which later proved of significance to
their roles in the project are attributed to a combination of factors:

learning about certain techniques, theories, or skills in universities

as part of regular course work or in seminars and workshops. These

institutional exposures were coupled with actual application of

these technologies and modes of interactions, so that abstractions

are made concrete in practical work and experience. "On-the-job"

training is meaningful in learning how to apply basic knowledge or

skills, and in modifying abstractions to suit reality. For example,

one respondent claimed:

I went to i_(a university) where I took a formal program in
systems analysis. I found that most researches that people

get involved in in universities are too sophisticated for
application. It is great to sit down in a planning environ-
ment and utilize all these techniques. But I feel that it is
on-the-job that the various fundamentals can be put into use.
In my case, I have used a lot of PERT/CPM. In theory PERT/CPM
uses a three-time estimating system. In practice, I found this
method more confusing than helpful. There are a very few
places where it can be employed. But the fundamental concepts
are useful if it is not applied in a sophisticated way. As far
as I zun concerned, management concepts are useful when I can

210

Table 29.--Circumstances in the Development of Personal Attributes of
Visible Technocrats (N=24) Considered Important in their
Roles in the Masagana 99 Involvement.

 

 

 

, , Attributes
Circumstances 1n the Development . .
of Attributes Ba51c Appropriate Skills
Knowledge Attitude
1. Institutional Settings
a. School 5 5
b. On-the-job 10 12
c. Training/workshops 7 4
TOTAL 22 21
2. Interpersonal Exposures
a. Institutional Setting 3 5 3
b. Family Setting 1 3 O
c. Others 0 2 2
TOTAL 4 10 5
3. Others
a. Reading books 1 0
b. Observation trips 3 2
TOTAL 4 2

 

211

apply them . . . . I find techniques, try to simplify them and
apply them to the real world. Just getting techniques in the
abstract is not very useful. You have to find a situation
*where you can apply them. The Masagana system has allowed me
to put different ideas together and try to very logically see
what it is we need to do, how we can do it, what can we do

with it. It is an eclectic sort of thing. We get it from many
different areas and try to put it together.

In addition to institutional exposures (whether in-school,
on-the-job, or in training sessions/workshops attended), personal
encounters with specific individuals also provided enriching experi-
ences in the development of their knowledge and skills. In most
instances, personal encounters were those generated from the insti-
tutional linkages mentioned previously. This further signifies the
burgeoning role of personal networks of a non-familial type that are
considered important in the development of the professional identities
of technocrats. Kinsmen were emulated only when they exhibited
certain attributes typifing the qualities of technocrats considered
worth expressing. Some statements to exemplify the importance and
selectivity given to personal encounters of technocrats are as follows:

A stands out as a person worth modelling one's behavior after.
His influence on me is largely in the area of administration--
‘how the program is managed, how he has shown interest in
developing people, how he delegates authority. It is more in
the management of an organization that he has created an
impact. He was not an expert in as far as agriculture is con-

cerned but he knows how to get the most out of people in work-
ing with them.

When I worked with the private sector, I happened to be associ-
ated with my brother-in-law (President and Manager of a certain
bank). He gave me the opportunity to discuss and negotiate with
private sectors here and abroad on various aspects of the busi-
ness. I came to learn how to discuss issues with people wherein

I am able to yield without sacrificing the interest of the
company.

212

Reading about "other people's work" is also resorted to
toccasionally3 although this was not as common as personally dealing
‘with individuals who generated ideas that are considered relevant
to the specific area one deals with. Some bewail the lack of time
to keep abreast with the latest information about an area of expertise
by reading about them in professional journals or books. Quite
often, technocrats resort to personal interchanges with people who
represent certain lines of expertise and who are up-to-date on the
most recent trends. One non—bureau-technocrat comments:

It is a very unfortunate thing. There is really no time to

keep abreast. I find that when I was at school I had to study
and learn a lot of things. I got a basic set of tools, and
after that I found very little time for reading and continued
growth. I found that interaction with people is the main thing.
Somebody comes along and shows me how they are doing it and

finds some modifications for what we are doing on-the-job. There
is very little time or opportunity to get involved with pure
learning. I occasionally pick up a textbook and try to read
through it . . . . The people I work with on the job and the
applications of stock ideas I have on the job are my basic sources
of information. When we have a real problem, we sit down and
discuss it. We see how we can solve it. We formalize it and

it becomes a new technique. I am not in an academic environment
in search for new things. I am in an operational environment
where we got something to sell, we got something to do, we know

what to do and how to do it. The problems are really problems
of implementation of existing concepts.

Observation trips to various places within or outside the
country are also mentioned as profitable experiences, for they
enable technocrats "to observe other people's behavior and thereafter
be able to put into practice what has been observed."

Appropriate attitudes about work are mostly acquired through
institutional exposures with selected individuals on the job or
through the emulation of qualities of outstanding members of the

family. There are also instances of two "self-made" persons who

213

attribute the drive and motivation for work to "awakening" and "self-
choice." One said: "I am basically a hard worker, and this quality
had been developed in the early stage of my life when I started to
be independent and was subjected to hardships in finishing an educa-
tion. My intention to complete a higher education made me very keen
in finishing my work."

It is common among technocrats who actively participate in
performing catalyst roles with a technical thrust to consider knowl-
edge in rice technology (e.g., about soils, rice production, rice
craps) an important attribute. The institutional linkages considered
important are with those offering training along this line or pro-
viding access to the most recent research in rice technology. These
technocrats often cite the importance of having had the occasion
to be attached to such institutions as the IRRI and UPLB. One of

the four from this group remarks:

I usually read the results of the research work of my colleagues,
but most of the time I rely on personal contact with them. My
link with IRRI has provided the avenue for this. Furthermore,
the international conferences sponsored by IRRI promote cross-

country contacts.

There are two technocrats from scientific circles who actively
participate in decision-making pertaining to the implementation
strategies for the project and the coordination of the different
agency heads participating in the project. They consider technical
background in agriculture important but less significant than what
this background symbolizes as they serve as "interlink" persons (from
different agencies). They feel that having this background let

them emerge as a neutral locus among people with "established lines

214

of loyalties." A Ph.D. is considered important "but not necessary."

What is suggested is that having the title could forestall one's

being identified with agency "bickerings," "dissensions," and

"jealousiesfl' In other words, the title is more symbolic than sub-

stantively functional to their roles.

Five other technocrats who perform as catalysts in the
administrative aspects of the project attribute their attainment of

"basic knowledge" and "skills" important in organizational planning

to on-the-job experiences. One foreigner considers his consultative

tasks in other countries "an Opportunity to gather quite a lot of

different ways of doing things." A non-bureau-technocrat cites the

management of his own farm a most useful experience. Another non-

bureau-technocrat considers his involvement with a government financing

institution to be most profitable in providing him "background

knowledge" for his involvement with the project. Two of the five

mention involvement with NFAC itself as significant. One is a "first-

timer" in government service who has a middle-level position in the
organizational machinery; and another one is a key bureau-technocrat

in the earlier rice project who later joined a government agency in

The latter reports his having been exposed to

He

the area of marketing.

a "top-rate technocrat," the "first one" the rice project had.

says of this person:

The is a very inspiring man. He is honest, straight, and very
sincere. When you work with a boss like that, you cannot help

but do as he does.
Onertechnocrat who serves as a "broker" between NFAC and

other institutions considers "management skills" as significant. This

215

quality had been primarily'developed in his involvement as consultant
nmnager,cu'adviser in the public and the private sectors. The
technical aspects of rice production are not as important for him as
it is to the broker for NFAC and the field personnel who are in "first
lines" in the campaign for dissemination of the package of technology
to the farmers.

Provincial technocrats are inclined to indicate that a balance

of technical and administrative preparations is important in their

work. Because of the highly centralized way in which the technical
package has been generated, updating their knowledge about it depends

largely on the seminars conducted by the Central Office, the brochures
or materials that are sent, the organized training sessions where

they are given the opportunity to be exposed to other institutions

cooperating with NFAC, and/or the visitations made by technical

experts from the Central Office in the provinces. The occasions to

contribute to revising technical plans for the province depend only

on reports of technicians that indicate that an aspect of the tech-

nology is inapplicable. In most cases, the area for contribution of

provincial technocrats as catalysts is mainly in being innovative

about strategies for disseminating the technical package to the end-
users.

Summary. Acquiring knowledge, attitudes and skills come not
only from formal training in occupational and educational settings but
also from personal encounters with individuals who originate from

the aforementioned institutions as well as the kinship system.

216

Sources of Information Regarding One's

Area of Expertise: Role of Personal
Networks

The preceding section has focused on past experiences of
technocrats which are perceived to be useful upon their entry into
the project. It reveals that a combination of institutional and
personal exposures have been important in providing the basic
knowledge, appropriate attitudes and skills for the project. In
examining, however, the manner in which technocrats update their
knowledge about an area of expertise, it was found that information
has been drawn from personal networks, actual research, publications,
travels outside of the country, visits to local experiment stations
and attendance at seminars and workshOps.

Technocrats at the Center may be distinguished from those in
the provinces by their reliance, for the most part, on personal
encounters with others to gain their updated expertise. Those in the
provinces obtain information from printed matters or brochures which
are mostly generated by the Center. (See Table 30 for specifications.)

The fact of dependence on personal networks for the latest
information is an interesting pattern for knowledge generation among
central technocrats. This is due to the primary roles performed by
them in the integration of information and decisions that are finally
incorporated into implementable guidelines. They draw from the
results of research undertaken by scientists on specialized topics
which form essential aspects of the innovations that are being syn-
thesized for adoption by policy-makers. Their most important role

is in making a decision about what data are to be adopted among all

217

Table 30.--Sources Relied Upon for Information in One's Area of
Expertise by Central and Provincial Technocrats.

 

 

Central Provincial
Sources of Information Technocrat Technocrat
n=l3 n=ll
1. Personal encounters with experts ll 2
2. One's own research 3 O
3. Printed material 3 8
4. Travels to centers in other 1 0
countries
5. Seminars and workshops O 3
6. Visits to experiment stations 0 ll
7. No information 1 O

 

the available alternatives they have tapped. The extensiveness of
the networks used by the central technocrats is suggested by their
inclusion of names of persons to whom they turned for information.
These are persons not only affiliated with local institutions other
than NFAC but also connected with international organizations, e.g.,
IRRI and USAID. Only one of the 13 technocrats at the Center does
not mention any foreign network. This is the same person who is
averse to the involvement of foreign technocrats in the project. He
says, "We already have the manpower. We need not depend on them
anymore."

The dependency of the provincial technocrats on the Center is
indicated by the sources from which they draw for science-derived

knowledge and information. They rely on "printed materials,"

218

"brochures," "handouts," and "pamphlets" which are disseminated by

the Central Office or other cooperating institutions such as those from
the private sector, in both the academic-research setting (e.g., IRRI
and UPLB) and private business (e.g., chemical companies). The
potential for activating networks comes about whenever problems are

encountered in one's work about which printed materials are not able to

supply answers. However, the networks of provincial technocrats seem

to be more limited to those within the institution of NFAC itself.
References to central administrators are made (mostly key bureau-

technocrats) whenever interpretations are needed about the project

in keeping with the framework defined by the Center. Networks of

local experts are also tapped, but these are mainly for obtaining a

pool of ideas for identifying alternative solutions to local "bottle-

necks" in the project implementation.

Summary. Central and provincial technocrats vary in their

sources of information to update their knowledge about a line of

expertise. Central technocrats mostly rely on personal encounters

for the latest information. This is due to the primary roles they

perform in the integration of information and decisions that are

incorporated into implementable guidelines for adoption by policy-

makers. Provincial technocrats, on the other hand, rely on materials

printed by the Central Office. This is because the content of

extenshnnactivities depend on the decisions formulated at the Center.

219

Socialization and the "Significant
Others" Network

Further probes have been made to identify whether selected
persons constitute a "significant others" network of technocrats.

Who constitutes this network is an important issue in the social-
ization process, for persons tend to pattern their behavior after
those with whom they identify. The visible technocrats were asked
about the "person who profoundly affects one's ideas or thoughts in
one's involvement with the project."

Among the Filipino visibles, 9 of the 21 do not identify any
specific person whom they consider important or whose behavior is
worth modelling after in relation to the project. Eight of these
nine are provincial technocrats and one is a technocrat at the Center.

Of the 12 with "significant others," eleven cite superiors
from school or work, and not from the family. Only one mentions a
blood relative. This is a non—bureau-technocrat from private business
who identifies his father and grandmother for having the "knack for

administering" their business after whom he models his behavior.

Central technocrats. Only one Filipino visible at the Center
does not specify any reference group. This same person is mentioned
by five others (3 in the Center and 2 in the provinces) as part of
their "significant others" network. The rest, nine of them, do
mention names of significant persons. Six of the nine cite other

visible technocrats of the project, all of whom served as sponsors

for these central technocrats.

220

'There are two "star technocrats" in the "significant others"

network chain. These are two persons who do not select their own

'Nsignificant others" but with whom other technocrats identify-~one
is a foreigner; and, another one is a Filipino. See the following

diagram fer clarification:

 

Technocrat #1 is the foreigner who introduced the institutional inno-
vation (technical type) for adoption as a national project. He

recruited #2 and #3 to be involved in the applied-research phase before

the package was catalyzed. Number 9 is a Filipino. He is the reputed

management expert from the private business sector with whom three

key bureau-technocrats identify because of what they, as adminis-

trators, feel they could emulate of this person. In academic

preparation, the three bureau-technocrats are not dead-center to

221

management, for they are all graduates in agriculture. Number 8

identifies with #5, his professor in college and graduate school.
'Three others do not identify their "significant others" from

among the core of existing Masagana 99 technocrats but mention names

of other persons who influenced their lives. One identifies with the

person who served as intermediary for his entry into the project (a
superior in a cooperating governmental agency from which he came);
another names a former superior whom this respondent considers a
technocrat while he was involved in the earlier rice project; and the

third, identifies with his father, a noted management expert in

private business.

Provincial technocrats. The predominance of provincial

visibles who have an absence of "significant others" is perhaps

indicative of the relative sterility of their associations in the

local setting. This is further suggested by the fact that two of

the three technocrats who mention having emulated the behaviors of

specific persons, name as their significant others central technocrats

who are visible in the project. One of the two had a close inter-

action with the key bureau-technocrat with whom he identifies, when

he was a Regional Director of the earlier rice program. The other

named a key technocrat who was his superior at the Central Office

when the respondent had a brief stint in it.

Only one mentions a local "expert" as an excellent example

of an administrator "attested by a presidential award he has attained,"

although this person was concerned with a different project of the

food program.

222

Summary. The responses of the visible technocrats reveal
that the nature of environment determines the dearth or predominance
of persons with whom technocrats can identify or after whom they can
model their behaviors. Perhaps, the failure of most respondents from
the provinces to specify any person who profoundly influenced their
"ideas or thoughts" in connection with the project reveals the relative
absence of an "enriching" environment of unusual persons whom they
can use as models.

Filipino respondents from the Center mostly indicate persons
who influenced their thinking as they participated in the project.
The "significant others" network is composed mostly of those who are
or were their superiors at school or at work.

Possible distinctions in the constituents of "significant
others" network for the socialization of technocrats are indicated by
socio-economic origins of the technocrats. One of the two from the
upper classes and who came from the private corporate sector,
mentioned the managerial expertise of a parent and a grandparent who
established a family enterprise. The other did not mention any
"significant other" but is, rather, the person with whom others
identify. It can be proposed that the early socialization for technoc-
racy can be predicted of persons whose families provide access to and
opportunities for using science-derived technology, information and
administration. These are usually the persons with a high socio-
economic background. Later socialization for technocracy can be pre-

dicted of persons who, lacking in family connection, rely on schools,

223

universities, and work. These are usually persons with low socio-

economic backgrounds .

Plans for the Future Work Roles
of Technocrats

It is characteristic in the newer and modern segments of

Philippine managerial and technical leadership to exhibit a life
style and a supporting culture which enables talented individuals to

be mobile and to actively engage in one set of work roles after

another. These shifts are sought for professional challenges,

opportunities and commensurate rewards. This pattern has been found

to occur among the leadership of the scientific community (Useem,

1971) and the private business community (Carroll, 1973). They are

usually committed in what they do, and yet this does not imply any

commitment to stay permanently in the positions they held. In the

case of the technocrats in focus, it is not surprising that the

majority of them also see their involvement with the project as

temporary.

Central technocrats. When asked about the kind of work they

liked best, none of the ten Filipino visibles at the Center saw them-

selves as remaining in the same positions during their entire work

life. In fact, two who were bureau-technocrats of NFAC have already

joined other institutions—-one, an international research organization

9
and Huaother, a private business establishment. The "economic
incentives" are more attractive than the positions they held as

bureau-technocrats of NFAC. One says, "I have given my service to

the government and it is about time that I think of my family

224

already." Another also notes the financial benefits that would

accrue to his family if he joined a non-governmental enterprise.

Furthermore, the new position is in line with his area of interest:

"It is also a coordinating job, where I have had quite a bit of

experience." Besides, there is also an "avoidance syndrome" for

anticipating the risk of future failures. The time to "exit" is

when one has reaped favorable recognition for one's participation in

the project. This respondent comments: "What I have done by exiting

from the project is often cited as 'the thing.' My friends say, 'You

are already on top, and the project is successful.

People do not say
anything.

If you leave when it has its problems, peOple say a lot of
things.‘ I left the project when I knew I had contributed in laying

its foundations."

Three central technocrats prefer to work in an international

organization (e.g., the Asian Development Bank).

Another one is interested in joining a semi—government corpor-
ation which has promised "much better incentives," but he "could not

leave the program yet," as he found his services still "needed."

Two central technocrats have ready jobs in private business

anytime they choose to depart from the public scene permanently.

Two of the remaining ten who do not express any preferences
for work in other particular organizations are leaving themselves open

for recruitment for as long as they find themselves useful in their

future roles. One of the two says, "Since the President issued a

225

I've received 'offers' from a number of

decree on corporate farming,
I am keeping my doors open

companies to be involved in their outfits.

for such a possibility, although service to the public is my first

choice. When it gets to a point where I should be thinking of the
service to myself and my only child, I'll consider these 'offers. '"

Another says, "I am open to anything for as long as I can be useful."

Provincial technocrats. Only four of the 11 Filipino pro-

vincial technocrats prefer to remain in the government office they
now occupy and continue the plans they have in the project. Three

of the four are involved in extension-administration, and one is an

elective official. The relative satisfaction of these four provincial
technocrats compared with the other seven located in the provinces

may be associated with the fact that these four are nearing the com-
pletion of their careers in public service. All four have the
longest years of service in government, and they have decided to
complete their careers in it. Two see themselves engaging in farming
after retirement, and two others do not visualize themselves engaging

in any other occupation upon retirement.
Three of the remaining seven provincial technocrats would

prefer to take an administrative technical job in the national office
Four want to

of the government or an international organization.
The rationale

engage in a different type of work, mainly farming.

 

lCorporate farming is embodied in General Order 47 of the
President which has made it mandatory for all corporations and partner-
ships operating for profit and with 500 employees or more to provide
for rice and corn requirements of their employees and the latter's

immediate families (Leones, 1975:4).

226

commonly given for shifts in institutional affiliation involves the

perceived Opportunities for "better remuneration" in pursuing their

Another is the "opportunity to utilize" their expertise

preferences.
Two who mention the latter are among those who

to "its fullest."
have advanced training in administration abroad and indicate prefer-

ences for "enriching opportunities" to make use of the professional
training they acquired. These "opportunities" have been perceived

as limited in the provinces.

The roles of foreigners in a techno-

Foreign technocrats.
cratic system, as in the case of most other bilateral and multi-

lateral enterprises in the public sector of a country, are usually

defined as of short duration. This holds for this case.

One of the three foreign technocrats, a visible at the con-

ception phase, has already become, at the implementation phase, a
His most important contribution has been

less visible technocrat.

in serving as catalyst of institutional innovation resulting from
His potential

the applied-research-extension work he spearheaded.

to rise to the fore as a catalyst is disclosed by his interest and

commitment in undertaking applied research and in conveying the

results to policy-makers.
The other two foreign consultants view their participation

with the project as necessary until local capabilities become more

significantly available to assume a comparable set of roles. One

"We are trying several ways to develop Filipino capabilities,

says,
I will be sorry to

so that they should not need me in the future.

leave, but my job is really to work myself out of it."

227

The majority of the technocrats have indicated a

Summary .

preference for being engaged in private business or international types
Of work roles rather than being involved in government sector activ-

ities. This pattern is understandable for technocrats who are
lateral entrants to the project and are sought to participate in
complex types of creative roles, e.g., formulation of technical-
administrative innovations. Participation in the project should be
temporary. The problem of the bureaucracy is how it can attract a

continuous interchange of talents who can offer fresh approaches and
However, for

ideas to the changing problems being confronted.

technocrats who undertake administrative roles, and on whom the con-

tinuity and maintenance of the system rely, outflow of competent
persons can become a problem. Provincial technocrats who are mostly
career civil servants, have communicated their dissatisfactions over

non-commensurate rewards existing in the government. If brighter

opportunities are offered, they are likely to exit from positions they

The problem of the bureaucracy is how it can maintain a

are holding.
pool of bureau-technocrats to assure the continuity of the functions

it performs .

Gratifications and Frustrations
Encountered in the Project

Experiences can be meaningful and profitable

Grat if icat ions .
What ways they become

for individuals in various aspects of life.
meaningful and how, are also examined for the visible technocrats.
How has their participation in the project contributed to them as

persons, or is their participation mainly functional for the

228

organization? Respondents were asked--"What do you consider to be

gratifying experiences in your involvement in the proj ect?"

0f the 22 who responded to this question, the majority (12)
see personal gains accruing from their participation. Five of the
remaining 10 cite gratifications that are altruistic in nature; they

experience satisfaction in that the benefits of their participation

do not redound to themselves personally but to others. Five see a

combination of both personal gains and altruistic ends. Two do not

mention any gratifying experience whatsoever. (See Table 31 for

specifications.)

Table 31.—-Sources of Gratifications of Visible Technocrats in
Relation to the Project.

 

Parameter of Participation
of Technocrats

 

 

Sources of Gratification--
Its Nature Central Provincial Total
I. Altruistic Benefits 3 2 S
2. Personal Gains 7 S 12
3. #1 and #2 Combined 3 2 5
4. No Answer 0 2 2
13 ll 24

TOTAL

 

l. Altruistic sources of giptifications - Technocrats who

consider participation in the project as an opportunity for contribut-

 

ing to the betterment of those around them have an organizational,

national, or transnational perspective.

229

One technocrat who has an organizational thrust perceives

his involvement with the project as beneficial to the agency of his

affiliation. His involvement with the Management Committee enables

him to interact with heads or representatives of the different

agencies, and the occasions serve to "thresh out problems not even

related with the project itself."
For others, satisfaction stems from being able to contribute

to the "bigger community." Statements of this sort are as follows:

I am a native of the province. I am from a farm family. I
have learned the problems and difficulties of the rural areas.

I have actually experienced them. If I will be able to help
in a small way in improving the food production in the area,
it shall bring enough satisfaction for me. I consider it a
privilege to be able to help in a small way in the food pro-
duction program.

My work in developing countries has been a very exciting and
rewarding experience. I get closer to the job and see people

use and benefit from what I have designed . . . . My satis-
faction comes from the opportunity to work with people and see

them use what you have taught them.

I am happy to see a farmer who used to be in a nipa hut with
half of the walls of his house with hollow blocks now able to
send his children to school because the program has helped him

to improve his capacity to earn a living.

One foreign technocrat has a transnational perspective in

that he considers the successful adoption of the institutional inno-

vation of a technical type as a "leverage for its dissemination to

other countriesfl'
Personalgratifications - A majority of the technocrats

2.
consider their participation as beneficial to their personal develop-

ment for several reasons:

230

First, the project itself served as an informational source

about other aspects beyond the concerns of one's agency. This is

because of the unique structure of the organizational machinery of

NFAC which has consolidated the efforts of various organizations

into one coordinated body. The following statements elaborate on

this category:

This involvement has given me the opportunity to learn from the
experiences of a lot of individuals in a field related to my
profession. Exposure to Masagana 99 has extended my horizons
by learning the various phases of the production process.

This participation has given me the opportunity to work with
other people and to be able to share ideas with them.

Masagana 99 has given me the opportunity to gain experience in
a different system. I am proud of this association. It is
not a perfect program but it is unique, among programs I have

seen, in magnitude and duration.

Second, participation gives some an opportunity to display

their capabilities in spearheading a "massive program." Respondents

say:
This has given me the opportunity to display my capabilities and

commitment in running a big program. There were, therefore,
outfits from the private and the public sectors that showed

interest in recruiting me.

My involvement in the program is a test of my capabilities and,
I feel, will pave the way for a better future for me in the

institution.
Third, the "rare opportunity" of being able to interact with

middle—level and upper-level executives from the different agencies
widened the possibilities for obtaining "better jobs." This is

because of the organizational structure of NFAC itself which ramifies

one's personal networks to include various individuals with key

positions in different organizations. Persons in these networks

231

become aware of one's potentialities. This may be witnessed in the

following statements:
This involvement has enabled me to get to know people from all
kinds of organizations. They are not just ordinary kinds of
people but top-level people . . . . People get to know you .
When you do a good job, they get to know you. Lots of oppor-
tunities are opened up to you when they get to know about it . .

. But then, it can also be bad at times. When you do a bad

job, they also get to know you and you will be remembered for
it.

My involvement with Masagana 99 has paved the way for my involve-
ment with i_(an international research organization). Other
international organizations have recognized Masagana 99 as a
good program. Because of my exposure to this program and the
type of job that goes with my new position in trying to coor-
dinate people, I was recruited.

Fourth, involvement with the project accrues prestige to
some technocrats because of the reputation attached to the roles they
performed in it. One provincial bureau-technocrat says--"The Pro-
vincial Program Officer's position is a much sought-after one.
Perhaps, this is because of the program. One is exposed to dignitaries
from Manila or from other countries."

Lastly, there are also other personal benefits perceived in
their participation. Because of the priorities extended by the
Administration to the project, incentives are also given to partici-
pants in the form of extra remunerations, opportunities for travels
abroad, and attendance at seminars or workshops. The ad hoc nature
of the organizational machinery enable participants to obtain "extra

incentives" in addition to the salaries they obtain from permanent

positions held in other organizations.

3. Some expianations for variations in gratifications of

 

technocrats - There are indications that those who have reached the

 

232

peak of their careers view altruistic motives as a source for grati-
fication for this involvement more than others who are only beginning
and see the import of this participation more as a beneficial experi-
ence for future occupational roles. Ten who mention altruistic con-
cerns are: (1) two with permanent and secure private businesses
awaiting their full-time return (they also see their involvement more
as a "personal sacrifice than a personal gain"). (2) three foreigners
who are catalysts of institutional and non-institutional innovations,
(3) three provincial technocrats who have spent the longest service
in the government and are nearing the end of their career in it,

(4) an upwardly mobile bureau-technocrat from the province whose
involvement in the public sector could already have satisfied his
definition of achievement and social mobility, and (5) a bureau-
technocrat at the Center who could have perceived his involvement
with the government as a rewarding experience as well.

Hence, contrary to the romanticized notions of technocrats
being primarily committed to public service, as reputational panels
have pictured them (see Chapter III), the majority of the technocrats
also have personal interests and motives, and rendering public service
is not the overriding criterion that governs their participation in
the project. There are manifestations of the importance given to
this organizational involvement as a means for personal development

also.

Frustrations. Further examination, however, of the commit-

 

ments of the technocrats for the project, does not reveal totally self-

serving motives on the part of the majority who identify personal

233

gains as their sources of gratification. Sources of frustration are
also related to altruistic motives. Seven of the twelve technocrats
who mentioned personal gains as gratifications also indicated frus-
trations stemming from perceived impediments in implementation, which
suggests their identifications with the project (see Table 32). Three

Table 32.--Comparison of the Sources of Frustration and Gratification
of Visible Technocrats in the Project.

 

Sources of Frustrations

 

 

Sources of Gratifications Altruistic Personal No Total
Failures Losses Answer

Altruistic Benefits 3 0 2 5

Personal Gains 7 3 2 12

Altruistic and Personal 3 1 1 5

Benefits Combined

No Answer 1 0 l 2
Total 14 4 6 24

 

of the seven cited frustrations originating from the organization of
NFAC itself (e.g., that it does not provide enough logistic support

to the provinces, to the point where some of the PPO's reported that
the money for program implementation was "drawn from their own pockets;"
that technicians are not adequate to implement the program in the
field). One attributed frustrations to environmental occurrences that
are beyond the control of the organization itself (e.g., "Calamities
such as typhoons and floods are devastating to rice lands. They are
unpredictable."). Three others were frustrated when they encountered

problems hindering the "speedy implementation of the project," the

234

sources of which were not specifically identified. One says, "It
frustrates me when I cannot solve a problem immediately. Any problem
that could be solved in a day or two but in fact takes two or three

weeks to solve makes me unhappy."

Technocrats with "waning commitments." There are three

 

technocrats who could be considered as "waning" in their commitments
to the project because their frustrations and satisfactions in their
involvement concern only factors that are personally related. These
are the technocrats who communicate anxieties over their reputations.
One is "unhappy" because he has not often been consulted by a key
bureau-technocrat who replaced a former sponsor for his entry into
the project as a middle-level bureau-technocrat. The benefactor
decided to join an international research organization on a full-time
basis.

The second is frustrated because his ideas are not acceptable
to some decision-makers. He used to be a key bureau-technocrat of
the earlier rice project but was subsequently recruited by another
government agency.

The third is concerned over what he considers to be unfounded
criticisms that reflect on the morality of his administration in the
province. According to this technocrat, an auditor of a cooperating
agency made a report to the NFAC Central Office of certain incrimi-
nating circumstances that would lead to questions about his honesty,
integrity and objectivity as an administrator, without due investigation

of its veracity.

235

These experiences that were personally frustrating are
indicative of some factors that lead to the failure of some techno-
crats.

The case of the rising technocrat who complains about lack of
recognition of his competence by a key bureau-technocrat who replaced
his former sponsor, is reminiscent of the traditional "alliance system"
that has widely governed Philippine political life. Vertical inte-
gration of the economically deprived classes are forged by the "more
powerful and wealthy relatives or other patrons" (Araneta and Carroll,
1970:137) as a means of competing with other political candidates.

In the case of the rising technocrat, falling out of recognition

could have been also a function of not being part of the network of

the new technocrat. This further serves to illuminate that technocracy
is also governed by an alliance system where the most "integrated"
technocrat-~one who is most central in the dissemination of an insti-
tutional or non-institutional innovations (technical or administrative)--
recruits an upcoming one into his fold. The technocrat rising from

a powerless base who enters into this "system" becomes dependent on it
for his identity. Unless he does "record-breaking" work that enable him
to reap personal recognition, financial support for furthering his
expertise and, thereafter, developing a network of his own, he drops

out of the system when his sponsor departs.

The case of the technocrat who became frustrated because his
decisions were no longer as popularly "accepted" is indicative of
the importance given to continuity and maintenance of expertise.

Inasmuch as this bureau-technocrat has embraced a new type of activity

236

which is not central to rice production itself, he has put himself
far enough outside of the mainstream of recent innovations developed
in it that expertise in this particular area may be on the verge of
being lost.

The third technocrat is concerned over his reputation as an
administrator. This is maintained by conformity to certain relational
norms--"objectivity," "morality," and "incorruptibility." Failure
as a technocrat may result from one's inability to uphold norms per-

taining to one's interrelationship with people.

Summa y. This section further substantiates the proposition
earlier mentioned that the emergence of a technocrat is a function
of a complex of factors such as competency, personal attributes, and
the right sponsorship. One's inability to maintain a complex of
these factors may lead to one's failure as a technocrat.

Forsign Technocrats and Their Social

Interaction with Participants
in the Project

 

 

 

In general, foreign visible technocrats found "ease" in their
mobility into the project and "sensed" overall, an attitude of
"acceptance" among the Filipinos for their participation. In fact,
one who serves as the liaison officer between the different agencies
in synthesizing research results, finds the task "too easy." This
is because he is associated with a "neutral" posture and has not been
identified with "vested interests." As an "outsider," he is immune
from being linked with any agency which had in the past struggled

competitively to assume lead roles in coordinating the rice project.

237

He bewails this role, for he recognizes that there are already com-
petent persons who can assume the task of "bringing a large number of
recommendations into a common recommendation." "After all," he goes
on, "the problems are the Philippines'. I feel that I am referred

to more often than I should be."

The major difficulty in a foreigner's involvement is language.
One says, "My biggest problem in the Philippines is that I don't
understand the language. If Filipinos see this difficulty, they
readily talk my language." However, in cases where encounters with
peeple would demand speaking the local language or dialect, one
foreigner resorted to employing "local counterparts" to undertake
research activities in selected provinces.

Furthermore, there are cultural nuances one has to contend
with in pursuing certain stated tasks. As an American, one learned to
be "frank" and "outright" when he "sees something wrong." But in the
Philippines such direct expression was often mistaken as a reaction
"against the person" rather than as an assessment of how the other
person met certain expectations. This foreigner reports having made
adjustments in the manner of communicating his own feelings. There
are occasions, however, when those around him also adapt to his ways,
especially when he feels he cannot "compromise" with theirs, and when
the importance of what he opted for is understood. He recounts:

I am very much concerned about time schedules and deadlines.
But the people I have worked with have not been brought up
under this American time pressure culture. Sometimes, the
program does not run as smoothly as we intend it to. I have
been working with them two years now. So, after the first

few weeks of adjustment, they know that when I yell, it is not

necessarily that I am mad at them personally but that I am
frustrated. This is my way of doing things. Timing is a very

238

important part of the program. If people do not accept discipline,
we cannot progress. The Filipinos have also adjusted to my
idiosyncracy. When I have scheduled conferences or meetings,

they come on time for the appointments set. People have learned
to accept my ways.

Part E - The Self—Identities of Visible Technocrats

 

Whether or not persons perceived by others as technocrats so
perceive themselves is an important issue in the socialization process.
For those who are interested in maintaining this recognition, knowl-
edge of how one stands in relation to this status can enable one to
make corresponding adjustments to approximate the attributes considered
important in a technocrat.

This part, therefore, examines whether persons seen as techno-
crats by others on the project have such clear identities themselves.
Further, this part discusses the problems encountered by persons who

gain the status of a technocrat.

Self-Identities as Technocrats

 

Technocrats were queried about their self-identities. They
were asked: "Do you consider yourself as a technocrat?"

It seems that there is still an ambiguity in the self-
perceptions among the visible technocrats. Among the 24 visible
technocrats, only seven mentioned themselves as being one of whom six
were at the Center; one was at the province. Of the remaining 17,
eight did not consider themselves as such, and nine preferred not to
comment on themselves on this score (see Table 33).

Four of the six at the Center who designated themselves as

technocrats are mostly those who perform key roles in introducing

239

Table 33.--Self—Perceptions as Technocrats.

 

 

 

Parameter of Participation Self-Identities as Technocrats Total
of Technocrats Yes No No Comment

Central 6 4 3 13

Provincial 1 4 6 11

TOTAL 7 8 9 24

 

institutional innovations or are integrated into both stages of the
development of the project studied. Two others who only appear in one
of the two stages can also be distinguished from the rest for having
occupied key administrative posts in the organizational machinery and
having consolidated the other visible technocrats who were identified
in each of the two stages. Three of the six are foreigners, two

are Filipinos who originate from private business, and one is a
Filipino from the scientific circle.

The one from the provinces who has a firm self-concept as
technocrat is a Provincial Program Officer for Rice who is distin-
guished as a model administrator of the project for which he received
two Presidential Awards.

Eight in the Center and the provinces did not cast votes for
themselves as technocrats. The most often cited reasons are those
related to weaknesses in their academic background or training (7 out
of 8 identified.these). The emphasis is given to the attainment of
more-than-college education that enables one to have a grasp of
"theoretical knowledge." Some comments to elaborate on this point

are as follows:

 

 

Ch
( brl'

240

A technocrat is one who has attained a Master's degree or a
Ph.D.

I do not consider myself a technocrat. My theoretical knowledge
is weak. I need further training in agronomy and plant breeding.

I do not qualify myself at this level. I have to do a lot of
research work to know the latest trend in agriculture.

I need further studies. I have to acquire more book theories.
One of the eight voted himself out as he perceived that only
those with key administrative positions in the project could be
classified as technocrats. He says:

I do not consider myself as a technocrat because I belong to a
core of implementors. To my mind, a technocrat is one who pos-
sesses the characteristics of being a thinker, administrator,

not necessarily an operator. At the same time, he has the will
to implement the project to satisfy the successful implementation
of the program. A successful technocrat is embodied by A, No-
where can you see a man who would delegate work to subordinates
and who allows the use of his name, the powers and the preroga-
tives of his office in getting things done. He is one man, I
feel, who has made and contributed a lot in fulfilling the pledge
of what this program should be. §_accepted Masagana 99, gathered
all ideas, put them all into one, and submitted them to the
President for approval.

Nine of the 24 did not communicate a firm perspective about
themselves as technocrats. One remarked that "it is for others to
judge if I am one." Another said he is aspiring to be so regarded
but did not vote firmly on whether or not he is one. He says:

I don't think I am a technocrat but I have been trying to be
one. All that I can say is that I have been effective as a
liaison officer between top management and my people. I have
been able to translate quite effectively what Manila people want
from my people here. I have been able to translate to manage-
ment what my people needed.

It appears that the lack of an institutionalized status has

created variable self-perceptions as technocrats. This does not only

bring problems as far as asserting one's identity. It also and more

241

critically is a problem in defining this identity. Because of the
dependence on the assessment of other people about their performance
as technocrats, persons in the fringes or still beginning to assert
their identities of a technocrat, have still fallen into uncertainties
about their identities. Unless one is clearly defined as a techno-
crat by others, his actions are not perceived as legitimate. This
uncertainty leads to hesitation in marking themselves as technocrats.
Clearly, the technocrats with the most firm concept about

themselves (the "integrated" technocrats) are the ones most commonly

 

chosen by others. These are the technocrats who performed catalyst
roles of an institutional type of innovation and serve as "brokers"
among different institutions important for the viability of the
organization as an entity. These are the persons who see their roles
with the project mainly as temporary and will remain in it only so
long as their services are considered "important" for its continuity.
They do not see their involvement in Masagana 99 as a means of
establishing their identities. They attained this firm self-concept
prior to their involvement in it. These are also the technocrats
with the fastest upward mobility in both the public and the private
sector. They are all key administrators or technical consultants of
the project. All attained more than an undergraduate education, all
from American institutions.

Persons defined as technocrats by others but are without
firm self-concepts (the "fringe" technocrats) are either upcoming or
late-starters in the process. The upcoming constituted the young

generation of highly educated who are 35 and below and gained on the

242

project their first recognition for being catalysts of a technical
type. Late starters are the older generation of persons who are

noted for their performance as catalysts (mainly of the brokerage
process) but are not as well or as recently technically trained. They
still see room for advancement in "abstract" or "theoretical"
knowledge by furthering their education. Those who attained more

than an undergraduate education pursued it later in their life
histories.

Problems Typical to Integrated vs.
FringpsTechnocrats

 

 

Being integrated into or on the fringe of the technocratic
process created varying responses to the social milieu within which
they were enmeshed. Among integrated technocrats, the problems are
with respect to coping with ever-widening responsibilities that are
accompaniments of acquiring a higher status and a reputation. In
contrast, fringe technocrats experience more tensions about being

recognized for their competencies and accomplishments.

Integiated technocrats. A society and especially the techno-

 

cratic aspects of that society which puts such a high premium on
personal power and reputation becomes problematic to persons who, in
acquiring power and prestige also face corresponding demands on their
time. This is because, attachments to persons of power is regarded
as a valued experience and hence, everyone who can gain access to
this person makes demands on the individual for his recognition

(Bulatao, 1973:102—105).

243

Among integrated technocrats, not only are there the demands
for participation in relation to the project which create strains but
also, being reputed to be persons with concerns about the application
of expertise to existing problems, opens them to claims for time for
professional advice by other institutions. One scientist-technocrat
remarks:

My position has gradually changed and I am really concerned
about this because where I am most effective is in working in
the field and observing the constraints in setting up every
simple kind of research to answer certain questions. Now, I am
too much of a desk-man. I do not get to the field as often.
This is going to change. I simply refuse to be crowded into
this kind of job. I shall look for an administrative assistant
to answer people certain questions.

There are numerous instances also when having the recognized
status of a technocrat meant they are called upon to perform certain
socially-related obligations which encroach on the time available for
occupationally-related roles. One says:

I am invited as speaker twice or three times a week in different
places. Even Saturdays and Sundays are booked. Most invitations
are in agriculturally-related activities, although at times, the
t0pic may not be related to our project anyway. Sometimes, I

cut ribbons to open an agricultural fair--social functions I
cannot do away with because it is part and parcel of program
promotion. There are even occasions when I am invited to stand
as sponsor to weddings and baptisms.

The question for further inquiry is: To what extent can social
obligations be maintained without infringing on one's effectiveness
as a technocrat? What is the ceiling level for performing these
multiple roles and still not sacrifice the competence of one's role
as a technocrat?

For a person with status in the Philippine social system,

being able to cope with one's social obligations which are not

244

coterminous with work-related roles seems to be regular requirement
of persons if such recognition is to be maintained. How to strike
a balance between the two is an important issue to be dealt with by
the technocrat. Upholding competence in an area of expertise also
requires time to sort increasing amounts of information which is
important in the successful performance of one's roles.

There are instances when parts of work-related roles sought by
other Organizations are handled by "trusted" and "competent,"
"right-hand" persons who become beneficiaries also of the reputation
and recognition held by technocrats. There is a case of an integrated
technocrat in this research who sponsored the entry of a university
professor to serve as key administrator of the project. He delegated
public relations type of work to the latter such as delivering
speeches in seminars, worksh0ps or meetings of professional and social
clubs. The sponsored administrator remarks, "This involvement is a
fortunate one. People get to know you. They are not just ordinary
people."

There are certain occasions when some of the technocrats'
roles are fulfilled by members of the kinship system which is reflective
of a traditional structure. These instances are more likely to occur
in the socially-related demands on the technocrats' time. There are
instances when their schedule of activities is too cramped, they
personally "volunteer" the appearance of their wives for social
obligations requiring their representation (e.g., opening agricultural

fairs, representations in civic organizations). Hence, while women

245

may not be visible as technocrats, they, as wives of technocrats
ofacilitate or hinder the performance of their husbands' technocratic
and related roles.

In other occasions, the prestige of a technocrat spills over
a kin-related network. Correspondingly, this also stakes a claim on
the time of a relative. For example, a bureau-technocrat reports
that his wife has also been constantly sought by his subordinates
and those around the community to serve as "sponsor" for baptisms

and weddings.

Fringe technocrats. In contrast, fringe technocrats who are

 

"upcoming" encounter more anxieties about their identities because
they are young and are still in the process of creating an image about
their competencies. This is felt when upcoming technocrats relate
with people who belong to an older generation of experienced partici-
pant; in the rice project. One 33-year old non-bureau-technocrat
remarks: "Some old-timers questioned my assignment as technical
consultant to the project. But I consider them as intrigues because
they come from frustrated status-seekers who are middle-aged or those
who are ready to retire. They kept on asking 'Why choose this guy not
me? He is too young to be there.'"

It is more difficult for a young person to gain a following
than an older one with established reputation. But the prospect for
recognition is not an entirely closed possibility among the former
especially when unusual cempetencies are manifested. This is when

some titles or symbols of competencies become handy to serve as a

vantage point for recognition among "old-hands" in the bureaucracy.

246

A 35-year-old bureau-technocrat considers a doctoral degree
an important symbol to indicate what one can do. He says: "I had
been able to cope with the old-hands in the bureaucracy with my Ph.D.
My Ph.D. helps. When you are young and you have that qualifi-
cation, you know that they can rely on you. If you do not have that
qualification, they will always suspect your capability to do things."
One informant reports of another 32 year-old key bureau-
technocrat who readily eased his way among older participants of the
project because of the endorsement of his competencies by persons with
power. This informant remarks:
§_has other qualifications that make him acceptable to the old-
hands. He has Presidential citations, a TOYM (Ten Outstanding
Young Men Award), and a very good record of performance. This
is known by his colleagues. His problem is when somebody who
does not know him, talks to him and just looks at his bio-data.
He may not be impressed with what he will see because §_does not

have a Ph.D. But, if he will look deeper into ifs experience,
he will see that §_is adept in implementation.

Tensions Experienced by_Technocrats
Engaged in a Conflictive Social Milieu

 

 

Technocrats are not enmeshed in a social setting that is
largely facilitative of attaining their goals and purposes. They are
also continuously embattled by various segments and forces in a social
setting that infringe on their performance in introducing innovations
that serve the concerns of limited sectoral interests.

For instance, what went into the recommendations for the
"package of technology" disseminated for adoption in this project has
been the focus of "pressures" among segments of people who have
vested interests. One bureau-technocrat recounts of his experiences

with private business institutions which worked through the

247

introduction of specific products manufactured by their companies

for inclusion in the package of practices. He said:
I had huggled with i_company. They wanted their own brand to
be included in the "package" of recommended technologies. I
said: "We cannot just do that!" What I did was to create a
Technical Committee composed of technical people from different
agencies. They decide what chemicals to adopt involving dif-
ferent trademarks.

It may, however, be questioned to what extent the attempt to
be rational in top-level decision-making can be filtered down in the
implementation process, where technocratic decisions are being con-
cretized. It is in the implementation stage when an established power
base can circumvent the attainment of the project goals and purposes,
with the end in view of gaining their own interests. For example, PAC
members in Provinces A and B report the wide-scale practice of big
chemical companies providing "incentive payments" to government
technicians to campaign for the adoption of their own products among
the farmer cooperators of the project. Technicians are expected to
maintain a neutral position about what trademarks should be adopted
by the farmers. Farmers should, theoretically, be left on their own
to decide what specific products they will use in the production
process.

Informants also reported cases of private sector people who
channel the resources intended to benefit the project's farmer
cooperators to their own use. In the two provinces that were studied,
established sugar plantation owners procured government subsidized

fertilizers from farmers themselves or even government officials who

were entrusted to release this resource only to the rice farmers.

248

Summary

This part has shown that the status of a technocrat is not a
clear self-identity among the majority who were nominated as such by
the reputational panels. The implication of this for the socialization
process as well as the control of the technocrats' behaviors have been
raised.

Technocrats who are integrated or have been the longest in
their roles have problems relating to a status of high reputation.
Fringe technocrats, or those only beginning to build an image as one,
experience tensions in establishing their identities both to them-
selves and others.

The issue of whether or not the results of technocratic
decisions can be perpetuated has been raised. It appears that the
concretization of decisions made by technocrats largely rests on the
implementation process and what complementary personnel in the
structure can do to facilitate or circumvent these decisions.
Furthermore, there are existing forces in the environment that influ-
ence the attainment of the goals and purposes of the project. The
outcome is a function of the dynamic interplay with the power

structure .

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

The Experience of Philippine Technocracy
and Its Implications for Sociological
Conceptualization: The Role of a

Third Culture

 

 

 

 

Students of Philippine administrative culture and behavior
have often lamented over the dysfunctions created by traditional
culture in the efficient workings of organizations (Corpuz, 1960;
Francisco, 1960). Some are Of the opinion that the personalistic or
particularistic complexes of norms (e.g., familism, patron-client
relationship, compadre system) militate against the recruitment of
personnel on the basis of merit and the objective assessment of the
credentials of a potential entrant. The pervading influences of the
traditional culture allegedly circumvents the impartial operation of
the bureaucracy because the recruits, oftentimes, do not match the
qualifications called for in certain positions. In spite of the
formal rules established for career civil service, which are aimed
at assuring the entry of competent persons, numerous provisions under-
gird the bureaucratic processes which allow for a patronage mode of
entry into the organization. Because of the dominant influence with
which traditional norms have had in the operation of bureaucracy, it

has been argued that a gap opens between what a bureaucracy purports

249

250

to be and how it operates in reality. Hence, while Philippine
bureaucracy has been patterned after the Western model in values,
norms and structure (i.e., rationality, formalism, merit, functional
specificity), the Western complexes of norms remain primarily as
ideal culture. One can easily be misled by the complicated structure
which are relayed by formal organizational charts but which, in
reality, do not work as such. There are various mixes and matches of
personalities which the boxes in these organizational charts do not
manifest. As Hollnsteiner aptly remarks: "The viewer from the outside
cannot tell just by looking that the workers or supervisors repre-
sented by these boxes are 'close' to the executive in ihs£_particular
box. Listening will inform the outsider that company personnel speak
less often of 'we the workers' and 'they the management,‘ and vice
versa, than in terms of personal identifications" (1966:4).

What then is the relationship of technocracy to the existing
bureaucratic culture? Technocracy is a new adaptation in the Philippine
state—system. While the past structure of the bureaucracy has been
noted for the interlacing of personal social factors in the recruitment
process that often has reduced its capabilities, in contrast
technocracy has as its primary basis of recruiting, persons with unusual
competence and expertise. Although technocracy indicates a "modern"
trend by its emphasis on merit, a continuation of traditional pattern
is still suggested by the fact that the recruitment is limited to
certain candidates only. The process of entry, in limiting the field
of selection to persons with particular connections with the sponsor

or the person recruiting, indicates an "enclosed type" of social unit.

251

Technocracy is a structural adaptation which necessarily blends
"modernity" with the existing norms and values of Filipinos. While
competence is the important criterion for admission to the status of
a technocrat, traditional norms of personalism and segmentation also
come into the fore. Considerations for recruitment are access to and
recognition by a person in power. Recruits are usually part of the
network of interpersonal ties of the sponsor or the person recruiting.
These ties are developed from a school, work, professional organiza-
tion, friendship or kinship setting, in various periods in the life-
time of an individual.

What this study suggests is, first, the need for new para-
digms to indicate the importance of culture in the complex of change
and development in the uses of knowledge, technology and modern
organizations. This paradigm should transcend the "ethnocentric"
and "universalistic" bias (Inayatullah, 1975) assigned to
culture in classical theories in developmental literature. The
implicit assumption inherent in these conventional theories is that
change from the traditional to a modern form of social organization
can be managed in the less-developed world by assuming as essential
the values of Western developed nations which generally incorporate
such orientations as universalism, impersonalism and affective
neutrality. Holding value orientations to the contrary are often seen
as an impediment rather than as facilitative of developmental pro-
cesses. It can be argued, however, that there are value patterns
which are labelled as traditional which can still be adapted to sustain

the process of development or modernization. It can, therefore, be

252

argued, as some scholars who have studied other historical situations
have pointed out (Abueva, 1966; Inayatullah, 1975; Riggs, 1964;

Sinha, 1970), that traditional culture is not necessarily dysfunctional
but that it can be selectively combined with new elements being
develOped.

Second, the concept of culture must include the aspect of
creativity by which groups of persons are capable of forging new
combinations of social, technological, economic, organizational and
political patterns. Culture should be understood as not simply
embodying the elements that can be passed intact from one generation
to the next. As a paradigm, it must incorporate on-going changes
and innovation in its elements and thereby, include the search for
new cultures. We should shy away from the traditional notion of
culture as static in the uses of knowledge, technology and modern
organizations. Culture is not simply a social heritage that provides
". . . ordinary members with ready-made answers to the commonplace
questions which people are apt to ask themselves about their collective
identity, abOut who they are as members of a particular human group,
and about their relationship to outsiders" (Useem, 1971:5). The

concept of a national society and its culture needs to be viewed

in new ways to fit the present definition of the situation. What is
occurring in our times is a merger or a convergence of both develOp-
ment and crisis in the political economy. This invites the search
for new models of how men and institutions respond to conflict, to

change, and to fresh opportunities for creativity.

253

Third culture in relation to technocraoy. The concept of
third culture has recently been developed in sociological literature
(J. Useem, R. Useem and Donoghue, 1963; J. Useem and R. Useem, 1968)
to refer to the behavioral patterns of persons who are intercon-
necting societies or its segments that are necessarily interdependent
but are disjointed. It denotes the "selective modifications and
adaptations" undertaken by persons linking institutions or groups of
people which have diverse traditions. It reveals the creative pro-
cesses persons undertake in the task of coordinating groups of people.
The third culture reflects the "ways in which men-in-the-middle of
intersecting societies or segments thereof, perform their roles while
engaged in the process of representing larger collectivities, the
social systems in which these roles are embedded, the life styles and
institutions which are found in the interstitial sectors between the
connected societies or their segments and their total consequences for
the values of the interdependent societies or their segments (Useem,

1971:15; J. Useem, R. Useem and Donoghue, 1963:169).

What the accommodations and adaptations imply when technocrats
serve as brokers or "men-in-the-middle" to interconnect two or more
segments of society is the possible emergence of a new type of cultural
heritage and new social patterns among this group of people. The
culture of technocracy as a third culture is generic to the networks
of people who emerge between two or more organizations or segments
of people that are being connected and have different cultures. It
is a selective combination of the first and the second resulting in

a new set of norms, values and status systems among persons in the

254

intersections of these organizations or segments of them. Thus, the
scientist-technocrats of the project under study who synthesize inno-
vations of a technical type, mediate the research-scientific circle
(first culture) and the policy-makers (second culture). The role-
related behavioral patterns emergent in the mediation process is one
part of the third culture.1 See the diagram below to elucidate this

point.

 

 

First Culture Thlrd Second Culture
Culture

(Research- (Policy-makers)

Scientific Circle Technocracy)

 

 

 

 

 

The brokerage is an attempt of the constituents to articulate the
culture of the scientific-technical community into a form comprehensible
to policy-makers. A similar brokerage is undertaken by administrator-
technocrats between the policy-makers and selected participants in
the implementation of the project.

In the Philippine context where the roles of technocrats are

created to confront the pervading crises of a state and society, a

 

1This study has only examined the character of the third cul-
ture of technocrats and have not dwelled into the character of the
first and the second cultures. Recent studies have, however, indi-
cated the global network of the Philippine scientific community
(Useem, 1971). The first culture is a part of the world-wide culture
of science, higher education, research centers, technical assistance
programs, programs among scholars working on applied problems, etc.
The second culture is embedded in the wider structures of the poli-
tical economy. It, too, contains both national and global encom-
passing dimensions.

255

commonality of values permeate the emerging technocratic system. None
of them are unique to technocracy but the way they occur together and
are juxtaposed as being at the center of what is shared and held in
common, they command a measure of acceptance among those who partici-
pate in its central activities. While technocrats of the particular

project in focus come out of diverse institutions, they are held by

these general orientations. These selectively combine scientific
technical culture and civic culture such as:

l. Objectivity—-that one is committed to make decisions on the
basis of a rational assessment of the situation, of the alter-
natives, and of the events as they in fact occur;

2. Realism--that one makes a decision in accordance with what is
pragmatically feasible;

3. Change-orientation--that one can be flexible, innovative,
dynamic and open-minded;

4. Time perspective in problem solving--that one has a sense of
urgency and of actively pursuing the direct solution of real
problems; and,

5. Collective orientation--that one gives primacy to and is
sensitive to the needs of national polity.

Whether or not individual technocrats fulfill these values in their
everyday behavior, they still represent the shared values of those
who participate in technocracy and they are woven into the fabric
of technocratic patterns of behavior. While this research has not
attempted to evaluate outcomes of technocratic schemes and the

objectives they have been designed to fulfill, it has examined some

256

of the emerging third culture of technocrats and the behavior of the
people who are part of it.

Technocrats do not operate in a self-contained manner. While
they are held by or presumed to hold a commonality of values,
technocrats have to accommodate with the larger cultural values of
society to undertake the tasks of brokerage. Thus, in the process of
articulating the existing structural base of the knowledge community
with those of other groups or segments of society, socio-cultural
situations have to be grappled with to facilitate the brokerage
process. The technocrats of this study perform the task of selectively
combining and adapting the larger Philippine traditions in dis-
seminating innovations to the groups they are trying to reach.
Technocrats are highly sensitive, for instance, to the importance of
what studies of Philippine culture refer to as "smooth-interpersonal-
relations" (SIR). There are interpersonal sets of local values which
permeate the interaction among and between technocrats and between
various groups of the society. The technocratic values are not absent
in these transactions but they are normally melded with preferred
norms of Philippine conduct. In the Philippine setting, presentation
of the self calls for well-formulated arguments, respect for the
points of view of others, reliance on informal discussion and oral
commitments. In sum, technocrats must have the imagination and the
knowledge of the social norms for interpersonal behavior in order to
work among and between complex series of particular relationships.

There are instances, however, in which the individual behavior

of the technocrats in this study varies in accordance with the person

257

undertaking the brokerage process. In a social setting where social
status largely gives persons their identity, brokerage is readily
accomplished by one who has a complex of characteristics signifying
"high status," SIR promoting behaviors notwithstanding. Chief among
these characteristics are being male, having a high socio-economic

origin, having an influential sponsor, having access to political

power or authority, being highly educated, and being linked with
prestigious organizations or institutions (e.g., private corporate
business sector, academic-research institutions such as UPLB and IRRI).
This combined identity enables the individual both to enter the role
with confidence and support and to undertake the mediation process.
Considering that these attributes are not equally distributed among
technocrats, among those who do not have them, other compensating
attributes become more essential. This means that one should be
extra sophisticated and careful about the norms for behavior and
interpersonal relations. It means being especially sensitive to the
alignments, sponsorship relationships and factional conflicts. In a
culture that gives primary consideration to personalized relationships
in transactions, whether in the public or the private sector, it is
crucial to find out "who is closer to the person in power" or has
control of a particular decision and can legitimize to a particular

group what one is disseminating.

Summary profile of technocrats and technocracy in Masagana 99.
This study has examined the profile of the technocrats and the
technocratic patterns found in a critical project in the 19705 in the

Philippines--the Masagana 99 Rice Program.

258

Among the twenty-four visible technocrats interviewed in
depth, thirteen are mainly involved in activities centered in the
National Office during the various phases of conception and imple-
mentation. The rest, eleven of them, are involved with the imple-

mentation activities in the provinces. Three of the thirteen at the

Center are foreigners. There are no foreigners who emerge as visible
in the provinces.

The findings can be generalized as follows:

1. Technocrats emerge from three groups of institutions--
government service, academic-research-technical organization and
private corporate business. Altogether, they participate by being
involved as decision-makers, policy-makers and/or administrators of
the project.

The varied institutional origins of technocrats stem from the
fact that there is a dearth of persons in the government service
sector with the appropriate talents, experience, competencies and
networks to fulfill the ever-changing roles and expectations for
technocrats. Technocrats must have a combination of knowledge,
skills, attitudes and interpersonal ties to enable them to carry—out
diffuse and open-ended roles. Technocrats often perform such inter-
twined roles as catalysts and brokers. As catalysts, they selectively
organize, synthesize and refine the knowledge which has been generated
from the scientific-technical community. As brokers they convey
innovations to existing entities or sectors of the public. At one
level, technocrats articulate the scientific-technical culture with

policy-makers. Policy-makers legitimize the adoption of these

259

innovations. On the second level, technocrats articulate the
scientific-technical innovations legitimized by policy-makers to
persons who undertake the implementation process.

Furthermore, there is an increasing reliance on professional

persons from the non-governmental service institutions because of the

increasing interdependencies of various institutions in undertaking

the complex task of development. Effective attainment of developmental
goals necessitates the involvement of persons with scientific,
managerial and administrative backgrounds. These are persons with
perspectives and competencies in articulating the rapidly developing
information and knowledge to the appropriate social structure in a
heterogeneous civic culture.

It is not uncommon for technocrats to hold multiple positions
concurrently. Most of the technocrats at the Center are identified
with the non-governmental service sector. The two institutions that
are generative of central technocrats with agricultural background are
the main centers for advance training and research in agriculture--
the International Rice Research Institute and the College of Agricul-
ture of the University of the Philippines at Los Bafios. The techno-
crats have been at one time or another, students, trainees, staff
members, and/or affiliates in varying combinations of research,
teaching, extension and administration in these institutions. Another
institutional source is the private corporate sector and encompasses
both multinational and Filipino-owned firms. This sector has his-
torically been renowned for attracting and developing managerial

expertise and has generated future technocrats whose main experience

260

is in management. Some central technocrats enter the project laterally,
assuming key or middle-level types of position as bureau-technocrats.
Others continue in their regular position while functioning in the

capacity of full-time or part-time advisers and consultants in the

decision-making at the conception and/or implementation of the project
as non—bureau-technocrats.

Provincial technocrats enter the project via their positions
in pro-existing governmental bureaus. They are mostly upwardly mobile
in the sense of going up the different rungs of the career civil
service.

2. Filipino technocrats in the studied project have a college
education or more. Nearly a fourth have some foreign education and
about three-fourths have cross-cultural experiences in the last five
years, in the attendance of seminars and workshops in the fields of
specialization, primarily in the developing countries of the world.

3. Seniority in age is not important for the attainment of
the status of a Filipino visible technocrat. Among 76 percent of
the 21 are below 45 years of age. This is a drastic contrast to the
higher civil servants of the government 79.7 percent of whom are in
the older set (45 years old and above), according to Francisco's
study (1960:117).

4. Socio-economic origin is an over-arching predictor of
the kinds of earlier opportunities for socialization which help in
preparing persons for future roles in technocracy. The two technocrats
at the Center with upper class origins were educated in American

institutions and acquired more than an undergraduate education in a

261

continuous process of schooling. They mainly obtained their education
through family assistance. They have been involved from the outset
of their work career in key positions of administration in the private
sector in institutions they partly own and have helped in founding.
Those with middle class and lower class origins also had
opportunities for attaining more-than-college education. This they
acquired through sources of financial assistance other than the
family. Support for advance education they have obtained through
varying sources such as the work organization, foreign foundation,
aid provided by a university in a foreign country, and their own
savings. They pursue advanced education later in their work life
than technocrats emerging from the uppermost social class. These
technocrats are mostly affiliated with academic-research institutions
and the government service sector. Altogether they experience upward
mobility rather than lateral mobility, by going up the graded rungs
of a career ladder in an organization. However, in both classes,
persons in applied research move upward earlier in their work life
than among those in extension administration. The difference in the
mobility pattern can be related to the nature of technocracy itself.
That is, if technocracy can be considered a structure with a hierarchy
based on the complexity of innovations introduced, technocrats tied
into applied research activities become more pre-eminent earlier in
their work life than those in extension administration. Individuals
who are in extension administration have a slower pattern of upward
mobility in the career civil service. This is because extension work

depends upon the scientific-technical innovations generally evolving

262

from research activities in which young and talented persons may be
able to participate. On the other hand, implementing them requires
more intimate knowledge of end-users which cannot be secured in

colleges.

5. Technocracy in this project is sex-linked. All of the
technocrats are men. This is because technocrats operate in the
center of state-related power that it tends to be a male-dominated
activity. Historically, key positions in politics and government
(Abueva, 1965:16) and the roles played in influencing decision-making
process concerning national issues (Makil and Lynch, 1972) are com-
monly held by men. But this is not to say that women do not get
involved in technocracy. There are indications that women in kinship
networks provide support to technocrats.

6. Further differentiations can be seen in the personal pro-
file among Filipino technocrats by locale of their involvement in the
project. Central and provincial technocrats can be distinguished by
age, levels of education, institutions in which they were educated,
and foreign cross-cultural experiences. Central technocrats are
younger (37.4 vis-a-vis 42.54 for provincial technocrats), more often
have more than an undergraduate education (8 out of 10 vis-a-vis 3
out of 11 for provincial technocrats), more often have obtained their
education in local primate institutions or abroad or both (all of
the 10 central technocrats vis-a-vis S of the 11 in the provinces),
and have gained cross—cultural experiences through the attendance of
seminars and workshOps abroad in the last five years (9 out of 10

vis-a-vis 6 out of 11 provincial technocrats). As already noted,

263

provincial technocrats are predominantly from the career civil
service, have lower than upper class origins and have also been linked
with institutions that provide fewer opportunities for socialization
into technocratic culture.

7. The entry of foreign technocrats has occurred primarily
at the Center rather than at the provinces. They have performed the
function of articulating technical-administrative innovations rather
than being engaged in disseminating these innovations to cross-cultural
situations in the provinces. Extension work can be more effectively
undertaken by Filipinos who know the local language, traditional

leadership and local culture.

The Social Matrix of Technocraoy

 

While the previous section has characterized the third culture
of technocracy and the persons who embody the roles of technocrats
in a selected government project in the Philippines, the social matrix
in which technocrats think and act must also be taken into con-
sideration. What is the social matrix of technocracy?

As has been argued in the opening paradigm of this study and
as the data obtained in this research indicate, the social matrix of
technocracy is that of networks of constituents who are organized
according to specific activities created or initiated by technocrats.
Although technocrats must take into account the specific norms or
rules governing formal groups or organizations, they generate and
articulate new ones. The social matrix of technocracy is without
fixed boundaries because it is specific to the person who initiates

the activity within the broad goals envisioned for the program or

264

plan. The social matrix, therefore, does not embody positions for
which duties or responsibilities are completely predetermined. Roles
are dependent on the person creating them. Technocracy can be dis-

tinguished from bureaucracies, corporate groups or organizations which

have codified, ascribed duties and responsibilities assumed by its
members and passed on from one generation to the next. Technocracy
consists of persons whose roles are created to fit their missions
and are shaped by their actions. They are tied together by networks.
Innovations can be generated by an individual only to the
extent that he can mobilize the appropriate network of persons who
can be "accessories" to and supportive of his part of the larger
scheme. Thus, the emergence of an individual as a technocrat depends
upon his having access to persons necessary in the performance of a
particular catalytic role. More specifically, those who are reputed
as central technocrats in the project have access to persons in the
leading centers of research and private corporations, and to national
figures of power. The innovations generated by these technocrats
are primarily of the technical-administrative type. Those who emerge
as provincial technocrats are individuals who successfully put together
networks concerned with the dissemination of the innovations forged
by central technocrats. Their networks include linkages to techno-
crats at the Center, to the extension workers who disseminate the
"package of technology," to provincial figures of power in the local
political economy and to persons knowledgeable about influence in
local infrastructures. Thus, the network for each technocrat varies

with his role in the larger scheme. The role of a technocrat and his

265

charisma are dependent on the existence and availability of such
persons and knowledge.
Technocracy is not a self-generating social unit. Its purpose

for being, its personnel, its body of knowledge and its authority all

stem from outside the network. What enables the networks to come into
existence and to hold persons together are their ties with centers

of authority that give their acts legitimacy. While networks are
formed in the various processes of articulating such social groups as
the scientific-technical community, policy-makers, and the bureaucracy
at the central and provincial levels, it only finds its authenticity
by having access and the sanction of those with the power of the
state.

Because technocracy is not a self-generating social unit, vari-
ous symbiotic systems contribute components to its functioning.
Although the composition of the symbiotic systems that are of importance
to the viability of networks in technocracy falls outside the scope
of this study, an understanding of how a particular technocratic
pattern develops and works cannot ignore these sustaining patterns.

The disparate support systems for Masagana 99 which the technocrats
have attempted to articulate include the research-scientific insti-
tutions, the business sector, the national and provincial government
implementing the project, the policy-makers, the binational and
multinational agencies in the Philippines, the universities abroad
and in the country, and the historical traditions and life styles of

farmers. How these many-sided systems can be connected into

266

technocratic networks and how these networks, in turn, influence the

systems are beyond the purview of this study.

Epilogpe

This is a case study of a small number of men working on a very

large-scale and complex technological and administrative problem.

This study has centered on one special kind of created third culture
which put together a whole combination of ideas, technology, profes-
sional competence and power. It has to a major extent examined the
internal dynamics of technocracy and the backgrounds of those con—
stituting it. It has to a limited extent examined the technocrats'
accommodations within a complex social milieu. This suggests for a
sociologist, further comparative studies of the combinings of per-
sons, roles, networks and cultures of technocracy in the disparate

ventures in development and change.

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1973 "Agricultural Strategies for the Seventies." Accent I,
4 (August-September): 9 ff.

Tupas, Rodolfo G.
1969 "A Runaway Population Ushers in a Time for Technocrats."
Sunday Times Magazine (August 24): 10-11.

Turner, Ralph
1960 "Sponsored Mobility and the School System." American
Sociological Review XXV, 6 (December): 855-867.

Useem, John

1971 "The Study of Cultures." Sociological Focus IV, 4
(Summer): 3-26.

Useem, John and Ruth Hill Useem
1968 "American Educated Indians and Americans in India: A
Comparison of Two Modernizing Roles." The Journal of
Social Issues XXIV, 4 (October): 143-158.

27S

Useem, John, Ruth Hill Useem and John Donoghue
1963 "Men in the Middle of the Third Culture: The Roles of
American and Non-Western People in Cross-Cultural
Administration." Human Organization XXII, 3 (Fall):
169-179.

Waldo, Dwight
1948 The Administrative State. New York: The Ronald Press Co.

Wolfe, Alvin

1970 "On Structural Comparisons of Networks." The Canadian
Review of Sociology and Anthropology VII, 4 (November):
226-244.

Wolfinger, Raymond
1968 "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power."
Pp. 159-170 in Willis D. Hawley and Frederick M. Wirt
(eds.), The Search for Community Power. New Jersey:
Prentice Hall Inc.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

FUNCTIONAL CHART OF MASAGANA 99 RICE PRODUCTION PROGRAM

APPENDIX A

FUNCTIONAL CHART OF MASAGANA 99 RICE PRODUCTION PROGRAM

 

 

National Management Committee

 

 

 

 

Staff Support

 

Technical Committee

 

 

 

Information Committee

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Regional Coordinators

 

 

 

 

 

M-99 Provincial Action
Committee

 

 

 

 

 

M-99 Municipal Action
Team

 

 

 

 

 

Production Group Leaders
(Farmer COOperators)

 

 

 

Source: NFAC, 1975: 17.

276

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (TECHNOCRATS IN A PROJECT)

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (TECHNOCRATS IN A PROJECT)

Page 1

Nature of Involvement with the Project

1. Length of time
involved with the
project

2. Level of intervention

3. Agency linkage(s) of
respondent at the
time of involvement
with the project

4. Content of partici-
pation

S. The work-group
the respondent was
involved in

6 . Most important
contribution to
the project

7. General outcome
of the activity

 

A1.

Ala.

Alb.

A2.

A3a.

*A4.

A4a.

*A5.

A53.

ASb.

A6.

A6a.

A7.

"Since when did you become involved with this
project?"

Probe for the rationale if no longer involved.

Probe for stage of project's development
when respondent became involved.

"In what capacity were you participating (or
are you participating) in this project?"

(Interviewer: Categorize into techno-bureaucrat
Or non-bureau-technocrat)

"What agency (or organization) do you come from
when you became involved with this project?"

"Are (were) you involved in this project to
represent the views of your agency or as an
individual?"

"In connection with this project, could you
describe what you do (or did)?"

Probe for the introduction of new ideas,
resources and/or the introduction of strategies
by which the new ideas or resources are adapted.

 

"In connection with this project, who did you
work with?"

Probe for division of work. (Lead question:
For what reason were each chosen?)

 

Probe for work-related activities engaged as a
group, i.e., meetings, submission of position

papers, telephone communications, home-works,

etc. (Lead question: What kind of activities

did you do as a group?")

 

"Among all the activities you have mentioned
(referring to 51), what do you consider to be
your most important contribution?"

Probe for rationale for mention of 59:

"Is this (most important contribution) being
implemented at present?"

*Does not apply to KEY TECHNOCRATS. See questions on la.

 

277

FOR KEY TECHNOCRATS ONLY

 

A4.

A9.

Content of Participation

Supplementary questions:

 

Visions of the future
about the project

A4.

A4a.

A4b.

A4c.

A9.

A93.

A9b.

278

Page la

"What specific contributions have you made
in connection with this project?"

Probe for the role of mediator between
different organizations or institutions
(local and foreign).

"HOw do you go about doing this?"

Probe for conflict or competition with other

organizations and what respondent does (or
did) about this.

"How does the project fit into the development
priorities of the government?"

"What are your visions about its future?"
(Probe for success or failure.)

Probe for rationale behind the answer.

A7a.

A7b.

8. "End-Users" A8.

2279

Page 2

"If yes, does it conform with what you
want it to be?"

Probe for rationale if it is not the case.

"Who do you think benefits from this project?"

8. Factors for Involvement With the Project

1. Role of sponsorship 1"Bl.
network

*Bla.

*Blb.

*Blc.

CARD

*Bld.

*Ble.

*Blf.

 

*For KEY TECHNOCRATS) see 3a.

 

"Who do you think was responsible for your
involvement in this project?"

Probe the relationship with person mentioned
in Bi, Possible categories: relative, business
associate, school friend, town-mate, etc.

"In what way has this come about? Would you
mind describing how this person(s) paved the
way for your involvement into this activity?"

FLASH CARD. "How did this person go about
recruiting you? Here is a card indicating
some possible procedures this person followed
to get you involved with this project. Which
of these apply to you?"

READS: What procedure did you undergo

before you were involved into this project?"

(il_0ral Interview

L31_Review of one's background by person
recruiting based on other sources of
information than respondent

L§l_0thers (specify)

Probe the details of factors mentioned in Blc,
paying special attention to the personal ‘—_—
encounters involved in each factor. Consider
the positioning of the person in organizations
or agencies, the relationship with the respondent,
and the circumstances under which the process of
recruitment is undertaken. Avoid mention of
specific names.

"Would you have refused the involvement if given
the chance to do so?"

Probe for the reason behind the answer.

280

Page 3

2. Factors for involvement *82. USE FLASH CARD. "In connection with this
project, what about your background do you
think was considered by this person in
recruiting you? The following are some
categories of factors for recruitment. Which
of these apply to you?"

CARD READS: What factors do you think were
considered important when you were involved
in this project? (PLEASE RANK ORDER)

_L£L Knowledge
Lg Skills

) Attitudes

Lfil_"Record-breaking" experience
L§l_0thers (specify)

*BZa. Probe specifics for each category mentioned in B3,

82b. USE FLASH CARD: "In connection with this
project, what experiences have proved most
fruitful for you? Do you think, some of the
following categories apply to you?"

CARD READS: Which of your different experiences
have in your valuation proved most fruitful for
you in your involvement with this project?
(Please rank in the ORDER OF IMPORTANCE)

Lil_Education

Lil Training other than in-school

(3 Attending conferences and meetings abroad

_gl_Attending conferences and meetings in the
country

$§2_Job experience

£§l_0thers (specify)

(Note: Respondent can use the same card to mark responses.)

82c. Probe for specifics for factor(s) mentioned

in 82b.
3. Person bestowing B3. "To whom are you personally responsible in your
status of technocrat involvement with this project?"

83a. "Who defines what you are supposed to do in
this project?"

83b. Probe if he (she) allows innovativeness.

281

Page 33

FOR KEY TECHNO-BUREAUCRATS ONLY

B. Factors for involvement Bl. "How did you happen to be involved in
with the Project this project?"

Bla. Probe for the origins of the idea of
the project.

82. "What about your personal background
prove most useful for you in connection
with this project?"

C.

282

Page 4

Processes for Attaining Stated Goals or Objectives as Technocrats of this Project.

1.

Sources of new ideas *CI.
of information regarding

the activities in

connection with this

project

*Cla.

*Clb.

*Clc.

*Cld.

*Cle.

*le.

Clg.

Clh.

 

USE FLASH CARD. "People have different ways

of doing things. What do you (or did you)

most prefer to do in obtaining information you
needed in connection with this project. In
this card are some choices. Which of them are
you most inclined to rely on. Please rank them
in the order of their importance to you."

CARD READS: Which of the following categories
do you most refer (or did you most prefer) to
rely on in oEtaining ideas or information in
connection with the activities engaged in in
this project? (PLEASE RANK IN THE ORDER OF
IMPORTANCE.)

(i)_Conduct the research myself to gather
information

(2) Rely on existing publications

E Obtain views of experts

£11 Others (specify)

Probe for origin of resources (whether
foreign or national).

"In connection with this project, what did
you actually do in obtaining the information
you needed?"

Probe for "word-of-mouth" information,
impressionistic studies, and other
unorthodox approaches.

"Why does it differ, if it does, from those
you have mentioned (referring to Cl)?"

"Is it a (are they) good source(s) of
information for you?"

"If not, what did you do about it?"

"In connection with this project, do you
have anybody in mind who you can consult
should you feel troubled about your work?"

Probe for relationship to respondent (i.e.,
former professor, classmate, business
associate, etc.)

*For KEY TECHNOCRATS, see page 4a.

 

FOR KEY TECHNOCRATS

 

10

Sources of new ideas

or information regarding
the activities in
connection with this
project

283

Page 4a

Cl. "Which in your own experience have
been useful in providing you with new
ideas in connection with your work?"

Cla. "What are the most important things
to learn in connection with your work?"
(If foreigner: ". . . in connection
with your work with Filipinos?")

Clb. "What do you think are the strategies
that may facilitate conveying ideas which
other consultants (or as the case may be)
may learn from?"

*2.

*3.

284

Page 5

Cli. "In connection with this project, what
travels to places have you made?"

Clj. Probe purpose of travel.

Clk. "In connection with this project, have you
referred to the experiences of other countries
which you think can serve as a pattern for
own country?"

Influence on and C2. "Is there any person who has profoundly affected
influence by respondent your ideas or thoughts which you have pursued
in the activities related to this project?"

C2a. Probe for relationship to respondent.

C2b. "In connection with this project, who do you
consider to be the most important person who
should hear your ideas or views for them
to be adopted?"

C2c. "How would you go about getting your ideas
or views to him/her/them?"

Role of personal networks C3. "Did you tap the services of specific individuals
for the attainment of so you could carry out the activities you were
stated objectives. engaged in in connection with this project?"

C3a. Probe for relationship to respondent.

C3b. "In your work with this project, was it necessary
for you to relate with other organizations or
agencies outside of those the project is
embedded?"

C3c. If yes to C3c, "What agencies or organizations
are these?"

C3d. Probe for personal connection in these institutions.
(Lead question: "How did you go about getting
what you want from these institutions, agencies
or organizations?"

or
"Is the accomplishment of your tasks facilitated

by kn°"i"8 people in other agencies or institutions
to provide the resources that you need?")

 

*Questions for all key technocrats on page Be.

FOR ALL KEY TECHNOCRATS ONLY

3. Role of personal
networks for the
attainment of stated
objectives

C2d.

C3.

C3a.

C3b.

C3c.

285

Page 5a

"Who normally consults you in the problems
they encounter in the project?"

"Did you tap the services of specific
individuals in connection with this
project?"

"What specific attributes do you look for
in recruiting them?"

"Where do you look for them?"
or

"What specific organizations or institutions
could these men or women be found?"

"How do you go about doing this?"

*4.

Center-regional
interaction

Role of technocrat
in the context of an
interdependent world
(Not for foreign
technocrats)

 

C3e.

C4.

C4a.

C4b.

C4c.

C5.

CSa.

CSb.
C5c.
C5d.

CSe.

CSf.

286

Page 6

Probe for the context within which linkages
are made with these institutions or
organizations.

Probe for interactions with people in the
center or periphery (i.e., region, province
or locality--paying special attention to
the region or locality in focus).

(Lead question: "In connection with this
project, did you experience going to Manila
(for peripheral technocrat) or to a regional
center (province or locality for center-
technocrats)?"

"For what purpose has this been made?"

Probe for personal connections in the
Center or Periphery.

 

(Lead question: "How did you go about
getting what you want.)

Probe how respondent confronted cultural
differences if they were apparent, i.e.,
language or dialect differences, differences
in style or life.

"Do you relate with foreign representatives

of organizations or institutions to obtain
funds, other resources, and/or ideas in
connection with this project?"

"If yes, who do these men or women represent?"
"For what purposes did you relate with them?"
"Have you known them before hand?"

If yes, "How?"

If not, "How did you go about getting to
know them?"

"Did you feel that you have to make corres-
ponding adjustments in your tasks in order
to comply with the foreign institutional
demands?"

*Separate questions for KEY TECHNOCRATS In Region, see p. 6a.

 

287

 

Page 6a
FOR KEY TECHNOCRATS IN THE REGION (IF NOT INDIGENOUS TO THIS REGION)
4. Center-regional C4. "What different sectors or organizations
interaction do you have to relate in connection with

your work with this project?"
C4a. "How do you go about doing this?"

C4b. "What happens to your life style here in
contrast to your lifestyle in the place
where you originate before this work?"

C4c. "Did you bring along with you your
'work-pool' whom you work with in this
project?"

C4d. Probe for the origins of the work pool if
ever there is, where and for what they are
being tapped for in this project.

 

C4c. "How do you communicate with Manila (if
this is the former place of affiliation)?"

C4f. "If you are not from this region, who was
the first person you looked up to to get to
know about the place you were going to work?"

288

Page 7

CSg. "What are their demands?"
CSh. "What adjustments did you make?"
0. Assessment of performance
1. Significant others 01. "In your work with this project, whose
network _ opinion about your performance mattered
a lot to you?"
Dla. "Has this person made an assessment?
le. "How did you know?"
ch. "Did you make an adjustment about
your work to take into consideration

the weakness or preference of this person?"

Dld. Probe for a case to illustrate this
point (ch) if it applies to respondent.

 

Dle. "What do you think this person considers
important in making an opinion about your
performance?"

le. If different from person bestowing the
status, probe effect on respondent.

E. Frustrations and Satisfactions in Connection With this Project

1. Opportunities opened El. "In connection with this project, what do you
in the involvement think are the opportunities opened to you which
with this project you consider to be the most important?" FLASH

CARD. "In this card, which of the following
categories apply to you?"

CARD READS: In connection with this project,
what opportunities have been opened up for you
which you consider to be the most important?

53)_Additional status

2 Additional income
(§__Necessary for my professional development
331 Others (specify)

Ela. Probe the details for the answer to El.

289

Page 8
2. Gratifications Elb. "What is your most gratifying experience in
your involvement with this project?"
or

"In connection with this project, what is an
experience for you that is worth remembering?"

Elc. "What is your most frustrating experience?"

Eld. "What did you do when you encountered
this frustrating experience?"

F. Conflicts encountered

1. Personal conflict Fl. Probe for conflicts between technocrats and
bureaucrat in the project. (Lead questions:
did you encounter any strains in relationship
with people in your involvement with this
project?")

Fla. Probe for strains of relationship with other
technocrats in the Project.

Flb. Probe for strains of relationship with people
not directly involved in the project (i.e.,
those competing with in other agencies).

Flc. "What did or would you do to confront this

problem?"
2. Social responsibi- F2. "In connection with this project, what social
lities as a technocrat obligations have become the necessary accompa-
of a project niment to your work, i.e., dinner engagement,

being invited as a speaker, etc."

G. General Background for Technocratic Emergence

1. History of technocratic 61. Probe for initial experience as technocrat --
emergence where, when and for what particular purpose.

(Lead questions: When was your first experience
as consultant or adviser to a government official?")

"For what specific area were you engaged in?"

"To whom did you serve as consultant or adviser?"

ii'z.

3.

Gla.

Glb.

Glc.

Current activities as 62.
technocrat

GZbl.

GZbZ.

czbs.

02c.

Plans for the future G3a.
as technocrat

63b.

63c.

63d.

G3e.

 

29()

Page 9
"What is the 'turning point' in your life
that merited your first experience as consultant?"
"Who do you think was responsible for paving
the way for your first work as consultant or

adviser to this government official?"

"In what way has this come about?"

"Are you still engaged in other activities as
consultant or adviser to any government official?"

(Interviewer: If yes, proceed to number 4)

If no, "why not?"

"What type of occupation or work do you
prefer to concentrate your efforts on?"

"Why?"
(Interviewer: Proceed with number 4)

"Please indicate all the consultative or advisory
tasks you are engaged in at present, to whom, and
for what specific areas of specialization?"

(THIS INFORMATION WILL BE OBTAINED FROM THE
BIO-DATA SHEET, IF POSSIBLE.)

"How long do you wish to be engaged as adviser
or consultant of government activities?"

(If wish is to remain) "For what reasons do
you wish to remain as adviser or consultant?"

(If wish is to immediately "step-out" of the status)
"For what reason are you stepping out of this status
if given the chance to do so?"

"What kind of job or occupation do you wish
to be engaged on full-time at present?"
(Probe regional or in-the-country choice.)

"Are you doing anything about this?"

**See additional questions for Bureau-Technocrats on 9a.

FOR BUREAU-TECHNOCRATS ONLY

 

2. Current activities as 02d.

technocrat (continuing
ties with sector affi—
liated with in the past)

62f.

291

Page 9a

"00 you maintain continuing ties with the
organization (or sector) you were involved

in in the past?" (Mention the sector

whether business, educational institution, etc.)

"For what purpose is this done?" (Probe for
contribution to one's work as technocrat,
and/or to the maintenance of the tie to still
feel "in" as respondent may still find the
need to return to the same organization or
sector.)

"In what way is this undertaken?"

H0

4. Perceptions of technocracy

The Respondent as
Informant

G4.

64a.
64b.

G4e.

G4d.

G4e.

G4f.

G4g.

64h.

G4i.

G4j.

G4k.

H1.

292

Page 10

"A number of people have referred to
certain individuals as technocrats. What
is your opinion about who is a technocrat?"

"Do you consider yourself as one?"
If no, "Why not?"

"What are the characteristics of a
successful technocrat?"

"What do you think leads to failures
of some technocrats?"

"How do you know about how you perform
as a technocrat?"

Probe for person considered as frame
of reference in the assessment of one's
performance as technocrat.

"In general, whose opinion do you consider
most important in making an assessment of
your performance as a technocrat?"

"What do you like to be remembered for
as a technocrat?"

"Do you think you come up to what you
want to be remembered for?"

"How do you distinguish a technocrat
from a bureaucrat?"

"How do you distinguish a technocrat
from a politician?"

(If the definition by respondent of a
technocrat complies with this research)
"Who do you think are the other technocrats
involved with this project?"

(Probe for their knowledge of technocrats
from the center and the selected region
and locality.)

293

Page 11

H2. (If respondent's definition does not comply with
the operational statement) "Who do you think are
certain problems or issues that have technical
implications confronted in the various phases
of this project? 00 these men have the knowledge,
expertise and skills or were (are) capable of
generating the appropriate knowledge, expertise
and skills of others?"

(Probe for their knowledge of technocrats from
the center and the selected region and locality.)

COWENTS REGARDING THE INTERVIEW:

10

2.

10.

When it took place.

Where? (Describe the setting and what exactly the place functions
for the technocrat.

How many interruptions transpired while the interview was in session?
What constituted these interruptions?

How many sessions did this interview with this particular respondent
involve?

Describe the reactions of the technocrat while being interviewed:
a. Generally -- hurried? responsive? vocal?

b. To specific questions (where he reacted favorably and animatedly?
unfavorably?)

Describe the physical appearance of the technocrat.
Describe the manner of talking.
Total number of hours the interview was undertaken.

How many steps did it take to be able to get in touch with the
respondent for the interview?

Over-all category of this technocrat
- national or peripheral

- key techno-bureaucrat, intermediate techno-bureaucrat,
non-bureau-technocrat

APPENDIX C

PERSONAL PROFILE OF RESPONDENT (BIO-DATA)

APPENDIX C

PERSONAL PROFILE OF RESPONDENT (BIO-DATA)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Page 1
Date of birth:
Place of birth: __ jg _j
(Town) (Province or City)
Home Address: .L, _ ‘
(Town) (Province or City)
Gender: Male Female
Marital Status: Single Married Divorced
Separated
Number of dependents:
Educational Baciground -- Educational institutions attended

 

(including for vocations) beginning with elementary education:

 

Inclusive Degree or
Location dates certificate
attended received

Area of
Specialization

Institutions
attended

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

294

 

295

 

Page 2
8. Occupational Background -- Past and present occupations, beginning
with the very first, and indicating the following:
Positions . N396 of Indicate If EUblic L . Dates of
hand/or rank institution or private, oreign ocation involvement

or employer

or national

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

296

 

Page 3
9. Other Training -- (including in-service and special studies).
. . . Inclusive Area of
Institutions Attended Location dates attended specialization

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

297

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Page 4
10. Educational Honors and Awards -- Educational honors, recog-
nitions or awards earned (including scholarships):
Award Purpose Source ‘ When
4
11. Occupational Honors and Awards —- Distinctions, awards or

recognitions earned as they relate to respondent's job, pro-
fession or area of specialization:

 

2: Award Purpose Source When

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

298

 

 

 

Page 5
12. List of Publications
. Where Published
Titlgrogociticle Name of Journals Country Puggighed
or Magazine Publishing

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

13.

299

Page 6

Conferences attended (including travels to places made in
connection with one's work or profession in the last five years).

 

 

Where

6

1
7

When

Nature of:*
Participation

Subject Matter

 

“cow‘n- ' -

 

.J

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

300

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Page 7
14. Papers and Lectures Delivered in Conferences and Meeting and
Related Activities (in the last five yeais):
Where When Subject Matter
15. Current Membership in Professional Organizations.

 

Name of Organization

Position/Titles Held

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

301

Page 8

16. Work as Consultant or Adviser, and/or Membership in Technical
Advisory Committees to Public or Private Agencies and/or
Officials (with or without formal designation in the last 5 yeais):

 

Indicate if Name of Indicate ifT“S ecific

Member of Organization Public or ' Agea of Dates of
Committee and/or Title Private/ 8 ecial- Involve-
or as an of Person Foreign or igation ment

 

i
1
Individual Advising_ National j
I
I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX D

DISTRIBUTION OF TECHNOCRATS (CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL)
ACCORDING TO VOTES OBTAINED FROM REPUTATIONAL PANELS

AT CONCEPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION STAGES

APPENDIX D

DISTRIBUTION OF TECHNOCRATS (CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL)
ACCORDING TO VOTES OBTAINED FROM REPUTATIONAL PANELS
AT CONCEPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION STAGES

 

Number
of Votes
Obtained
from
Highest
to
Lowest

Technocrats
Cited at
Conception

Stage

Implementation Sta e

 

CentraliTEchnocrats

 

Provincial Technocrats

 

Central
Panel

Provincial
Panels

 

A

Central
Panel

Provincial

Panels

 

A

B

 

20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11

H
O

NMbU‘IO‘Vm‘O

1
Total

 

0: hi
bola. a. h) on sales -

 

IH...

4b
unlax a: N: a. on on n: a.

 

NN
AIOHHI

 

H
out-0H

 

 

‘ONIHNHNUMN

Nut-0
0103‘!

 

20
25

.2
4

1

 

NOTE: The number above t‘

 

302

he bar indicates the technocrats who fal
the operational criterion for visibility.

 

1 into