

ROLE OF THE SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT  
IN COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS

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
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ABSTRACT

ROLE OF THE SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT IN  
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS

By

Frederic C. Windoes

The purpose of this study was to determine the expectations which school board members, teachers, and superintendents hold for the role of superintendent in the process of collective negotiations. Prime research questions were these:

- What is the superintendent's actual role in collective negotiations?
- How satisfied are school board members, teachers, and superintendents with the superintendent's actual negotiation role?
- What do they believe the superintendent's negotiation role should be?

Thus the superintendent's actual and preferred or ideal roles in negotiation were identified. In the context of role theory, incumbents of three social roles were asked to define the superintendent's role.

The study population was in Michigan where teacher organizations have bargained under labor law since 1965.



A questionnaire was sent to an unstratified random sample, one-fifth of the 504 K-12 districts affiliated with the Michigan Education Association. (Excluded were 40 districts which are Michigan Federation of Teachers locals, or bargain independently, or do not bargain.) Usable returns were received from 82 school board members, 86 superintendents, and 77 teacher organization presidents, an overall response rate of 81 percent. The following hypotheses were drawn and tested statistically:

1. School board members, teachers, and superintendents of K-12 districts report different expectations for the role of superintendent in the process of negotiation.
2. There are differences in what school board members, teachers, and superintendents report is the superintendent's *actual* role in negotiation.
3. There are differences in *satisfaction* among school board members, teachers, and superintendents regarding the superintendent's actual role.
4. There are differences in what school board members, teachers, and superintendents believe the superintendent's negotiation role should be, the preferred or *ideal* role.

In statistical treatment, the program employed was Finn's "Multivariate, Univariate and Multiple Analysis of Variance, Covariance, and Regression: A Fortran IV Program." Three hypotheses were accepted at the .05 level of confidence. Hypothesis Two was rejected. All three groups of role definers agreed in their perception of the superintendent's actual negotiation role, but differences in satisfaction were significant--board members being satisfied with the status quo, superintendents less so, and teacher representatives being quite unsatisfied. Board members and superintendents favored the role of advisor to board negotiators only as ideal for the superintendent, but teacher representatives failed to agree among themselves. In Michigan, the dual role of advisor to both sides is becoming rare. Predicted future adversaries: the teacher organization's negotiation professional *versus* management's outside negotiation professional.

Several ancillary questions were asked. In response, superintendents said that advisory consultation with teachers antedated mandatory bargaining and coexists with it. Most Michigan superintendents have had some training in negotiations. Superintendents are divided, whether or not university training programs have helped with negotiations. If they needed help with a negotiations problem, they would turn not to a university but to the Michigan Association

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of School Administrators and Michigan Association of School Boards. They assert that negotiations has changed working relationships with teachers and the board.

As implications from the data, it was concluded that universities might do more to help with negotiations by offering training in organization development, conflict management, and politics of education. Superintendents might act so as to reduce the adversary effect of bargaining. As teachers deny the superintendent's instructional leadership, the managerial role was posited as the future role for the superintendent.

ROLE OF THE SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT IN  
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By

Frederic C. Windoes

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## CHAPTER I

### THE PROBLEM

Traditionally the superintendent of schools has been, simultaneously, professional leader of the teachers and executive officer of the school board. Collective negotiations makes it difficult for him to perform in both roles, especially when teachers and board members hold contradictory expectations for the superintendent's professional behavior. Moreover the superintendent has a professional self-image, a set of expectations to guide his own behavior. The problem of this study, then, is conformity to role expectations: What is the superintendent's actual role in collective negotiations and what do board members, teachers, and superintendents think it should be?

#### Need

Collective negotiations (collective bargaining in education) is changing the relative power relationships which have long existed in public education among the board of education, administration, and teachers. Consequently, it seems that negotiations is transforming the role of school superintendent. More than ever subjected to

incompatible expectations for their behavior, superintendents nationally report that it is becoming increasingly difficult to perform *as superintendents*.

This is particularly true in Michigan where the legislature in 1965 passed an act authorizing public employees to bargain collectively. As a result, Michigan has been thrust into the forefront of social change in educational administration while the job of superintendent is operationally redefined. Teachers in 520 school districts now share in decision-making with their board-administration under substantial direction from the Michigan Education Association and the Michigan Federation of Teachers.<sup>1</sup>

Generally without training in negotiation, to their dismay, superintendents have found themselves "in the middle," unprepared to deal with this phenomenon. Some superintendents have chosen to be negotiators. Some have had the duty imposed on them. Some boards have hired professional negotiators.

After nine years of these changes, it seems useful to determine the current situation as it has evolved.<sup>2</sup> Michigan has seemed to be a forerunner of national trends. Whether or not this conjecture is valid, a study of the

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<sup>1</sup>In twelve additional districts the teachers bargain independently of the MEA or MFT. In another twelve districts the teachers have not chosen to bargain.

<sup>2</sup>The law had little discernible effect the first year after enactment.

superintendent's role in negotiations might contribute to current knowledge of educational administration.

### Purpose

The purpose of this study is to determine the expectations which school board members, teachers, and superintendents hold for the role of superintendent in the *process* of negotiation. The prime research questions are:

- What is the superintendent's actual role in collective negotiations?
- What do school board members, teachers, and superintendents think it should be?
- Who are likely to be the negotiators for each side in the future?

Thus the superintendent's *actual* and *preferred* (or ideal) roles in negotiation will be identified.

### Hypotheses

It is assumed that board members, teachers, and superintendents have expectations for the role of superintendent in the process of teacher-board negotiation. Put theoretically, to test hypotheses concerning expectations for the superintendent is to test theoretically derived hypotheses involving expectations for and the behavior of incumbents of positions in a social system.

Research hypotheses of the study are as follows:

- $H_1$  *School board members, teachers, and superintendents of K-12 districts in Michigan report different expectations for the role of the superintendent in the process of negotiation.*

- H<sub>2</sub> *There are differences in what school board members, teachers, and superintendents report is the superintendent's actual role in negotiations.*
- H<sub>3</sub> *There are differences in satisfaction among school board members, teachers, and superintendents with the superintendent's actual role in negotiation.*
- H<sub>4</sub> *There are differences in what school board members, teachers, and superintendents believe the negotiation role of the superintendent should be, the preferred or ideal role.*

### Theory and Definitions

The theoretical construct of the study is the social systems model of organizational behavior, in which the school is viewed as a social system (a little society); and administration is viewed as a social process. Participants in negotiation are regarded as members of an *ad hoc* social system.

Besides social systems theory, role theory provides conceptual tools for the investigation, including several of the following definitions:

An *expectation* is an evaluative standard applied to a position incumbent.

A *role* is a set of expectations applied to a position incumbent, the school superintendent in this case. Although the superintendent interacts with people in other positions, he is considered here only in relation to the counter positions of board member and teacher.

*Role conflict* is a position incumbent's awareness that he is confronted with incompatible expectations for his behavior.



The *managerial role* is one of planning, organizing, directing, and controlling activities which will lead to an effective fulfillment of the schools' objectives.

*Collective negotiations* (collective bargaining in education) is a process in which representatives of the teachers of a school district meet with representatives of the school board to make offers and counteroffers on "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment" (Michigan statute).

There is some confusion whether *collective negotiations* is a singular or plural term. By convention, it is becoming the practice to follow a procedure set forth by Lieberman and Moskow:

In this book, "collective negotiations" is treated as a singular subject when regarded as a process and as a plural subject when regarded as a number of discrete acts of negotiation.<sup>3</sup>

*Negotiation* (singular) in this study is limited to the process of across-the-table bargaining.

### Overview

This first chapter has been devoted to the rationale of the study, a statement of the problem, and an explication of the purpose of the study.

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<sup>3</sup>Myron Lieberman and Michael H. Moskow, *Collective Negotiations for Teachers: An Approach to School Administration* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966), p. 1.

In Chapter II, pertinent literature is reviewed-- bearing on social systems theory, role theory, negotiations, and the managerial role of the superintendent. Chapter III deals with politics of education and background of educational decision-making in Michigan. Chapter IV presents the design of the study. Chapter V presents an analysis of results. Finally, Chapter VI is a summary of the study and statement of conclusions.

## CHAPTER II

### REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In this chapter, topics to be treated are under the following headings:

1. The school as a social system.
2. Role theory and its application.
3. Collective negotiations and the changing role of the superintendent.
4. Joint decision-making outside negotiations.
5. The managerial role of the superintendent.

What is said under these rubrics is intended to provide a rationale for the study, hence discussion of previous research is combined with explication of the cited topics, which are generally related.

#### The School as a Social System

A social system is a patterned set of activities which are interdependent with respect to some common output. All social systems have two major concerns: accomplishing their objectives and maintaining themselves over time. A school, for example, must educate its students and maintain itself as a functioning organization in continual operation.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>David W. Johnson, *The Social Psychology of Education* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1970), p. 20.

In Chapter I it was said that the theoretical construct of this study is the social systems model of organizational behavior, in which the school is viewed as a social system and administration is viewed as a social process.

The conceptual tool that the school may be thought of as a social system in itself has proved of heuristic value for understanding the structure and functioning of that institution. The school has a formal structure with positions ranked on a descending scale as: school board, administrators, teachers, and pupils. Its primary principle of organization is authority. The community supports the school and is, in turn, served by it. The community's point of entry into the *system* is through the school board.

The school is a socialization agency of considerable importance in child rearing, especially in developed countries, where socialization via schools is undertaken on a broad scale. It is a web of interactions and associations, subject to internal stresses and tensions, both actual and potential. It is a formal organization with professional as well as bureaucratic aspects. Administrators outrank teachers, although both are employees of the school board. Both think of themselves as professionals but they are subject to control by the board, which is usually made up of "laymen."

Administrators and teachers must contend with contradictory demands and constraints.<sup>2</sup> The superintendent's professional career is largely influenced by lay control (more so than is the teacher's). Occasionally, therefore, he may accommodate to "unprofessional" criteria in the performance of his job. Teachers are professional employees in a bureaucracy whose functions are carried out according to prescribed routines. The school has its own internal life, a distinct culture with folkways, mores, and tradition. In other ways it mirrors the larger community of which it is a subunit.

An educational sociologist, Bidwell, says the classroom teacher is not readily subject to external discipline.<sup>3</sup> He cites Durkheim, who was critical of the possibility of control by colleagues, fearing that teacher organizations would become another source of "tyranny" over teachers. Attributing the thought to Durkheim, Bidwell continues:

With the appearance of teaching as an organized occupation comes a collective thrust toward autonomy. Teacher organizations sanctify teachers' moral and intellectual superiority and assert their right to

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<sup>2</sup>This is a principal theme of Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, and Alexander W. McEachern, *Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958). The Gross study is a landmark in administrative research, which has influenced a great number of studies including the present one.

<sup>3</sup>Charles Bidwell, "Sociology of Education," in *Encyclopedia of Education Research*, ed. by Robert L. Ebel (4th ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1969), p. 1249.

occupational autonomy as specialists and cultivated men. Hence this sense of superiority . . . sets the whole teaching occupation against the force of state supervision and public opinion.<sup>4</sup>

Teachers withdraw for mutual support and common defense into closed circles of fellow teachers.<sup>5</sup>

Bidwell cites what is purported to be a gap in knowledge of educational administration:

As for the characteristics of school administrators under varying social conditions, even informed speculation is lacking, despite an extensive literature on the administration of American school systems.<sup>6</sup>

#### Bureaucrats and Professionals

A characteristic feature of schools is that school administrators are executives of organizations staffed by professionals. This is the other side of the coin which says the teacher is a professional employee in a bureaucratic setting. The problem of bureaucratic and professional standards coexisting in schools has been given due attention.<sup>7</sup> Difficulty in resolving issues of authority and autonomy may have contributed to the movement for collective bargaining by "professionals." The negotiations movement tips the balance against the administrator's authority and leadership in favor of the teachers' autonomy.

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<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>See Myron Lieberman, *Education as a Profession* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956).



Although the formal organizational structure remains unchanged, the balance of power has shifted.

Foley<sup>8</sup> conceives of the environment of an educational system as having an internal professional component and an external public component, which influences change and the differentiation of function within the internal organization. One might ask the rhetorical question, does bargaining change the internal professional component? It would seem so, when powerful teacher organizations develop as agencies external to the local district.

Sexton offers evidence, now somewhat dated, which suggests that schools of education may not be doing an adequate job in preparing administrators to understand organizational realities:

Of fifteen standard textbooks on school administration selected at random, Daniel E. Griffiths found not a single source which devoted as much as a full chapter to organization, or the definition of duties, responsibilities, power, and authority.<sup>9</sup>

Sexton observes that "much unresolved conflict in the schools can be traced to the absence of judicial and appeals

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<sup>8</sup>Walter J. Foley, "The Future of Administration and Educational Evaluation," *Educational Technology*, X (7), (July 1970), 20-25.

<sup>9</sup>Patricia Cayo Sexton, *The American School: A Sociological Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), attributed to Daniel E. Griffiths *et al.*, *Organizing the Schools for Effective Education* (Danville, Ill.: Interstate Printers and Publishers, 1962), p. 3.

systems."<sup>10</sup> This lack may contribute to the growth of teacher unionism.

Increased size and impersonality in organizations like schools have their negative features. Presthus says, "Feelings of helplessness and of frustration occur as organizational power and demands checkmate the individual's claims for autonomy."<sup>11</sup> Too, this problem is exacerbated when the individuals concerned think of themselves as professionals.

#### A Social Systems Model

In a seminal work on the school as a social system, Jacob W. Getzels<sup>12</sup> asserts that *structurally* administration is the hierarchy of relationships between subordinates and superordinates within a social system. *Functionally* administration involves allocating and integrating roles and facilities to achieve particular goals of the *system*, commonly defined as a complex of elements in mutual interaction.

A social system has two dimensions of activity which are analytically distinct but actually interactive. One is the nomothetic or normative dimension of *institution, role,*

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<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 72.

<sup>11</sup> Robert Presthus, *The Organizational Society* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 17.

<sup>12</sup> Jacob W. Getzels, James M. Lipham, and Roald F. Campbell, *Educational Administration as a Social Process* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).

and *expectation* in which organizational goals are pre-eminent. The other is the idiographic or personal dimension of *individual, personality, and needs disposition* in which personal goals are pre-eminent. (As Getzels' model is generally familiar to students of educational administration, it is cited here because it assumes that the school is a social system. The model has proved useful to conceptualize conflict. As will be shown in the next section, study involving role theory incorporates the elements of institution, role, and expectation but ignores the personal dimension. In the constructive tension between organizational goals and personal goals, role theory focuses on the former.) Modifying a statement by Spindler,<sup>13</sup> the following definition is offered: A social system is a structure by which people are classified according to statuses and roles, aligned as to equivalent, superordinate or subordinate positions, and ranked according to their relative power or prestige.

In systems terms, the *external* political context in which education operates affects the *internal* leadership style of administrators. (This inference is drawn from "the politics of education" which is treated in Chapter III.)

Systems theory permits defining the boundary of the system under investigation. As the medical-surgical team in a hospital operating room may be conceptualized as a little

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<sup>13</sup> George D. Spindler, ed., *Education and Culture: Anthropological Approaches* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963).

social system, an empirically isolable system, the present study focuses on a similar system abstracted from a larger one. For purposes of analysis, the investigator has arbitrarily placed a boundary around three positions or roles which are functionally related: the school board member, superintendent, and teacher. Role theory provides a set of related concepts as well as empirical data to aid in understanding the relationships within the school system.

### Role Theory and Its Application

A social system is made up of a number of roles and role expectations. The "role" of the superintendent of schools is expounded at length in convention speeches, journal articles, and textbooks usually without explicit definition of what "role" means. In this section, several definitions are offered, as well as the rationale for the social scientist's use of role to study a social system. Role theory has been widely used in social psychology, sociology, and anthropology, particularly as applied to people in social institutions. Broadly speaking, "role" means what one does or is expected to do in a position.

### Background of Role Theory

Role theory has a fairly short history, which began with William James' originating the concept of the *social self* to account for the range of identities a person has



according to the groups he belongs to. Any one man may have multiple social selves, as many "as there are distinct *groups* of persons about whose opinion he cares," to each group of which he "shows a different side of himself."<sup>14</sup> If two or more selves are incompatible, he may have to choose between them.

So the individual selects what James called his "image," to which he conforms. This image derives from the expectations of others in his own "set," as well as from those others who have occasion to deal with his group. Thus, while the layman feels free to escape a cholera-ridden city, a medical practitioner considers himself bound to remain.<sup>15</sup>

In his use of "image" and "set," it is evident that James was a forerunner of role theory.

Another pioneer, Willard Waller, undertook to analyze the role of teachers in the social setting in which they work. Considering the interaction of self and others, Waller early demonstrated that the individual seldom responds exactly to the role demands of his group, which fact can lead to conflict. Waller made the succinct observation that "to play a role is to regulate one's behavior by the imagined judgments of others."<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Donald Thomas Williams, Jr., "The Concepts, Status and Role, as They Affect the Study of Higher Education" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1963), p. 69, citing William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1890), p. 294.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>16</sup> Willard Waller, *The Sociology of Teaching* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1932), p. 322. Waller was the first scholar to view the school as a social system.

George Herbert Mead helped make "role" a respectable subject of investigation and inspired a number of students to follow in his tradition.<sup>17</sup> He stressed the importance of role perception as a determinant of social action. In dealing with problems of interaction, Mead furthered the concepts of "role taking" and the "generalized other," which means substantially the same as "society," the German *man*, or the French *on*.

Ralph Linton conceived of the role concept as a means of connecting culture with social structure and offered these definitions which have become classic:

A status, as distinct from the individual who may occupy it, is simply a collection of rights and duties. . . . A *role* represents the dynamic aspect of a status. The individual is socially assigned to a status and occupies it with relation to other statuses. When he puts the rights and duties which constitute the status into effect, he is performing a role. Role and status are quite inseparable, and the distinction between them is of only academic interest. There are no roles without statuses or statuses without roles.<sup>18</sup>

Linton stimulated interest in the concepts of status and role. Although an individual may play various roles (in a contemporary metaphor he "puts on different hats," signifying a shift in role), he rarely enacts more than one role at a time. Ordinarily one role at a time is active, while the

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<sup>17</sup> George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

<sup>18</sup> Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1936), pp. 113-114.

others are latent. (In the same week, a school superintendent might play *ad seriatim* such roles as these: church deacon, fraternity brother, military reserve colonel, Rotarian, and United Fund committee member. Meanwhile, other identities continue, as: husband, father, son.)

Linton thought of a social system as embodying guidelines for the behavior of members of the system. He stressed the reciprocal aspect of behavior. He held that role meant the "legitimate expectations" of people toward those in other positions in the same social system.<sup>19</sup> Thus, role was a set of behavioral standards ascribed by society. In an effort to reflect Linton's viewpoint, Williams constructed the following definition. Role is "the sum total of socially-prescribed attitudes, values, and behavior his acceptance of which enables an individual through performance to validate his claim to statuses in his society."<sup>20</sup>

### Role Prescriptions

The keywords in defining role are prescriptions, perceptions, and performances. Neal Gross *et al.* place Linton's formulation under the rubric of normative culture

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<sup>19</sup> Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1945), p. 77.

<sup>20</sup> Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-103.

patterns<sup>21</sup> as one of three categories of role definitions which they analyze. Taking the normative culture pattern, an individual in a given situation is expected to behave according to norms ascribed by "society" for that position. Classified with Linton is Newcomb, who holds that "the ways of behaving which are expected of any individual who occupies a certain position constitute the role . . . associated with that position."<sup>22</sup> In this first category Gross *et al.* emphasize behavioral standards which describe the rights and duties (or obligations) of status and assert that role is "the behavior an individual must engage in 'to validate' incumbency of the status."<sup>23</sup> Over time we learn so well the prescriptions that guide our behavior we "internalize" them and, in fact, no longer need external promptings.

### Role Perceptions

In another category of role definitions are scholars who see role as "*an individual's definition of his situation with reference to his and others' social positions.*"<sup>24</sup> A criterion is that the person sees his behavior as "*situationally appropriate . . . in terms of the demands to*

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<sup>21</sup> Gross, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13, citing Theodore M. Newcomb, *Social Psychology* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1951), p. 280.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

*expectations of those in his group.*"<sup>25</sup> Thus the individual's perception of other people's expectations for him is salient.

Also in this category is Talcott Parsons, who has stated:

A role . . . is a sector of the total orientation system of an individual actor which is organized about expectations in relation to a particular interaction context, that is integrated with a particular set of value-standards which govern interaction with one or more alters in the appropriate complementary roles.<sup>26</sup>

"Alters" means others and "appropriate complementary roles" can be expressed as persons in *counter* or *reciprocal* positions. If *ego* is the superintendent of schools, then *alter* might be a school board member, who serves in a *counter* or *reciprocal* position.

Parsons is interested in the individual's system of orientation as he acts in ways which are normatively regulated and goal-seeking in character. In an effort to encompass Parsons' meaning, Gross *et al.* say that, "in an interaction situation each actor has an orientation to the other and is himself an object of orientation; both are part of his role."<sup>27</sup> *Perceptions of conflicting prescriptions*

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<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, attributed to Stansfeld Sargent, "Concepts of Role and Ego in Contemporary Psychology," in John H. Rohrer and Muzafer Sherif, eds., *Social Psychology at the Crossroads* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), p. 360.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, citing Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 38-39.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

held for them by others (including board members and teachers) constitute an operational definition of role conflict of school superintendents.

### Role Performance

In the remaining category of role definitions, Gross *et al.* classify definitions which conceive of role as the behavior of actors occupying social positions.<sup>28</sup> The hallmark is performance, action, actual behavior. This idea avoids an ambiguity which arises when a person says one thing but does another, and it avoids the amorphous character of what is "prescribed by society."

After offering a representative sample of varying concepts, Gross and his associates indicate that a commonality in definition is concern for the normative element of social behavior--for expectations as a force in shaping human conduct. They arrive at a conclusion which is succinct and operationally useful:

Three basic ideas which appear in most of the conceptualizations considered, if not in the definitions of role themselves, are that individuals: (1) in *social locations* (2) *behave* (3) with reference to *expectations*.<sup>29</sup>

In summing up the problem of definition, Gross' statement is quoted at some length:

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<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

Almost all of the authors have used the role concept to embrace the normative element of social behavior. People do not behave in a random manner; their behavior is influenced to some extent by their own expectations and those of others in the group or society in which they are participants. . . . Sometimes the expectations referred to are "ascribed by society"; in other formulations they are held by members of the group in which the actor participates. Regardless of their derivation, expectations are presumed by most role theorists to be an essential ingredient in any formula for predicting social behavior. Human conduct is in part a function of expectations.<sup>30</sup>

"Expectations" may be used in a future-time orientation or in a normative sense, what *should be*. As Gross *et al.* use it, a role is ". . . a set of expectations, or in terms of our definition of expectations, it is a set of evaluative standards applied to an incumbent of a particular position."<sup>31</sup> It is evident that "expectations" is defined in a normative and not in a predictive sense. Standards are ". . . a set of expectations applied to an incumbent of a position by some role definer or definers."<sup>32</sup> Obviously, such a definition is directed toward the *perceptions* of people who are the actual definers of the expectations. This is operationally useful, as will be shown.

The concept may consequently be used in analyses in which the incumbents of the position as well as non-incumbents of the position are the definers

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<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 324

of the role or, in general, in analyses of a role as defined by any population an investigator wishes to specify.<sup>33</sup>

### Heuristics of Role

Role study can contribute to the solution of problems in educational administration. Before Gross, most role literature uncritically accepted the postulate of role consensus, with expectations ascribed by "society." Gross tested this postulate and achieved findings which demonstrate that there are variations both within and between groups of role definers.

The assumption of consensus precludes the use of the degree of consensus on role definition as a variable that may enter into theoretical hypotheses of relevance to a number of important social science problems. The empirical research . . . suggests that the questioning of this postulate permits the investigation of potentially significant questions. . . .<sup>34</sup>

Newcomb once observed that there seems no end of definitions of role. Indeed, every scholar who deals with role appears to define its meaning to please himself. The near-truth of this becomes apparent in Biddle and Thomas, *Role Theory: Concepts and Research*,<sup>35</sup> as definitive a work on role as there is likely to be for years to come. This work is massively comprehensive, yet the authors complain

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 320.

<sup>35</sup> Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas, eds., *Role Theory: Concepts and Research* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966).

that "the methods, knowledge, and theory in role have not yet evolved into an articulate, defined, and well-integrated discipline" and there is "no comprehensive statement of its concepts, theory, and knowledge."<sup>36</sup> Nevertheless, more than a decade of role studies testify to the heuristic value of role concepts in research of educational administration. Role study can illuminate and contribute to the solving of problems. Its usefulness turns on its ability to explain what *is*, not merely to speculate on what *ought* to be. Role theory as applied has proved to be a useful formulation in uncovering potential and actual sources of conflict in organizations.

A useful concept in role theory is that of role conflict, which is treated next.

### Role Conflict

*Role conflict* is defined as a position incumbent's awareness that he is confronted with incompatible expectations for his behavior, so complete fulfillment of the expectations is impossible. In *inter-role* conflict, for example, an administrator perceives that his family expects him to spend evenings with them, but his employer expects him to spend after-office hours in community activities. The executive role and family role are in conflict, since

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<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. vii.

expectations from the two sources are contradictory. In *intra-role* conflict--the more common subject of research--the administrator perceives that different kinds of people have different expectations for his performing a single role. Teachers want him to press for salary increases, while other interest groups want him to hold salaries down. (Collective negotiations may be freeing superintendents from this dilemma, if the superintendent does not take part in the bargaining. In any event, conformity to both expectations is impossible.)

Parsons<sup>37</sup> has pointed out the added problem which occurs with conflict on the level of "institutionalized" or legitimated role expectations. He calls for establishing "motivationally acceptable alternatives" but does not explain what is meant.

With institutionalized role expectations, it seems that both sides claim legitimacy for conflicting expectations, as if the superintendent in negotiations attempts to perform in a dual role--executive officer of the school board *and* professional leader of the teachers. It is difficult enough to enact separately each part of the dual role but simultaneous enactment *in negotiations* seems impossible.

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<sup>37</sup> Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 280-283.

Moreover, to the extent that "dual role" carries the possibility of dual allegiance, there exists a strong potential for role conflict.

It should be clear that role conflict does not imply the existence of personal conflict but, rather, conflicting sets of expectations which have the potential to create difficulty. The effects of role conflict are usually costly, both in personal and organizational terms, leading to "tension, dissatisfaction with the job, lack of confidence in the organization, and distrust of and disrespect for colleagues."<sup>38</sup>

Contradictory role expectations impinging on the individual from any source produce role conflicts which yield, for the individual, intensified internal conflicts, increased tension, and reduced satisfaction. "It is quite clear that role conflicts are costly for the person in emotional and interpersonal terms," conclude Kahn *et al.*<sup>39</sup>

Parsons, too, is concerned with problems of the individual:

Role conflicts may be either internal or external integrative problems, depending on whether or not the roles in question have been

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<sup>38</sup> Robert L. Kahn and Donald Wolfe, "Role Conflict in Organizations," in Robert L. Kahn and Elise Boulding, eds., *Power and Conflict in Organizations* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964), p. 157.

<sup>39</sup> Robert L. Kahn *et al.*, *Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 71.

internalized. . . . If they are internalized, the actor wants to do two incompatible things at the same time and he has a conflict between need-dispositions.<sup>40</sup>

It was stated earlier that a person's behavior is a function of role *and* personality. The greater the intensity of role conflict, the less is his personal role effectiveness.

#### Administrator Perception of Role Conflict

Administrators of public agencies have a particular need to perceive accurately the expectations of others. Hencley<sup>41</sup> examined the conflict patterns of school superintendents. Of his sample of superintendents (in a year prior to negotiations), 72 per cent inaccurately perceived the expectations of reference groups in one or more of these ways:

- Although actual expectations of the reference group and the superintendent's preferred course were the same, the superintendent perceived them as different.
- Although the superintendent believed that his preferred course and expectations of others were the same, actually they differed.
- Although various groups strongly supported the superintendent's preferred course, he failed to perceive this.

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<sup>40</sup> Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 122.

<sup>41</sup> Stephen P. Hencley, "A Typology of Conflict Between School Superintendents and Their Reference Groups" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1960).

- The superintendent misjudged his reference groups' expectations which were the opposite of what he believed they were.<sup>42</sup>

With such gross misperception, one wonders about the accuracy with which these Midwestern superintendents presumed to "represent" their teachers.

In considering the performance of his sample of superintendents, Hencley reiterates the axiom that the administrator should know and understand his community. And he should be aware of the expectations which different reference groups hold for education. To safeguard against naiveté, Hencley urges that administrators-in-training be made aware of the working of their "perceptual screens," which distort perceptions of reality.

DeGood<sup>43</sup> demonstrated that a positive relationship exists between the effectiveness of a school administrator and his ability to perceive the values held in his community. Also, the effective administrator is not so likely to be influenced by his own values as is the less effective one. Successful administrators attempt to determine the *direction* of a group's expectations and, what is more difficult, the *intensity* with which those expectations are held. To be innocent or ignorant of the perceptions of significant others when there is conflict would seem more hazardous than

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<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> Kenneth C. DeGood, "The Perceptions of School Superintendents" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1958).

merely to perceive the existence of role conflict, but most observers insist that role conflict must be perceived to be so called.

Gross' study,<sup>44</sup> which was previously referred to, has provided a methodological referent for many dissertations and offers well substantiated evidence of the pervasiveness of role conflict in the professional life of school superintendents. In Massachusetts in 1953, prior to collective negotiations, 71 per cent of superintendents in the study perceived conflicting expectations for their behavior respecting personnel selection and promotion, 90 per cent perceived conflict in allocating their time between job and family and 88 per cent perceived conflict over salary recommendations.

Beyond all others, the primary source of role conflict for the superintendent was the school board. (One can speculate how this might change with negotiations. Probably the superintendent is now more likely to perceive conflict with his teachers than with his board, but this is conjecture.)

Among contributions of value from the Gross study are the following:

1. Recognition that consensus and convergence exist as matters of degree, which vary from one reference

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<sup>44</sup> Gross, *op. cit.*

group to another, so subject groups must be specified in each instance.

2. Rather than there being a "global" concept, *role* must be translated into substantive role sectors before generalizations can be made about points of conflict.

Elsewhere, Gross indicates he regards the lack of consensus on role definition in education as a major barrier to the effective functioning of schools.<sup>45</sup>

With similar and characteristic concern for the well-being of the organization, Chester I. Barnard observes that *anomie* (normlessness and alienation) may occur as "a sort of paralysis of action through inability to make choices, or it may be brought about by conflict of obligations."<sup>46</sup>

In operational terms, Getzels sums up the several kinds of conflict:

- Disagreement within the reference group defining a given role.
- Disagreement among or between reference groups, each defining expectations for the same role.

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<sup>45</sup> Neal Gross, "Some Contributions of Sociology to the Field of Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, 29 (Fall, 1959), 275-287.

<sup>46</sup> Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 118.

- Contradiction between expectations for two or more roles which one individual occupies.<sup>47</sup>

In educational administration, one source of potential strain is the fact that the superintendent, who regards himself as a professional, is subject to control by non-professional superiors--the board of education. This complicates the usual employer-employee relationships, since a professional is expected to internalize the norms and standards of fellow professionals who are, for him, a major reference group. Occasionally, professional expertise collides with hierarchical authority and gives way before it. In small districts particularly, school boards are reluctant to delegate authority to the superintendent.

Sletten expressed the problem this way:

In a sense the superintendent is confronted with two sets of social norms that act on the definition of his role, namely the professional criteria and the norms of the immediate group, the school board as representative of the social community. . . . To a degree . . . the role of the superintendent is professionally defined outside the immediate culture in which it operates.<sup>48</sup>

Teachers regard themselves as professionals, too, and insist that their new militancy seeks to secure their

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<sup>47</sup> Jacob W. Getzels, "Conflict and Role Behavior in the Educational Setting," in W. W. Charters, Jr., and N. L. Gage, eds., *Readings in the Social Psychology of Education* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1963), pp. 309-318.

<sup>48</sup> Vernon O. Sletten, "A Related Study of the Opinions of Montana School Board Members and Superintendents on Selected Board Policy Practices" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1954), p. 233.

recognition as professionals. This puts the superintendent in a possible double bind:

A crucial problem confronting school administrators involved in the throes of the new era of collective negotiations is how they may establish appropriate behavior patterns which will satisfy the expectations of both school board and teachers' organizations. . . . To the degree that a school administrator is able to establish a behavior pattern which is acceptable to both the school board and the teachers' organization, the presence of conflict will be minimized.<sup>49</sup>

It appears that collective negotiations has a polarizing effect and the superintendent, who formerly managed the dual role of executive officer of the school board and professional leader of the teachers, now finds that the teachers decline to acknowledge his leadership. The role of the superintendent is indeed undergoing a transformation. The transition toward an emergent role lends itself to "role study."

There is compelling reason behind this assertion by Miles and Charters:

*Role* is one of the oldest and most useful terms in social psychology. The fundamental insight the word captures is that the beliefs people around you have about how you should act are powerful forces affecting your behavior.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> David R. Cave, "A Critical Study of the Leader Behavior of School Administrators in Conflict with Teachers' Unions" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1967), p. 14.

<sup>50</sup> Matthew B. Miles and W. W. Charters, Jr., *Learning in Social Settings* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1970), p. 599.



### Role Expectations

It has already been stated that *expectations* may be used in a future-time sense of prediction or, as is customary in role studies, in a normative or evaluative sense. In a normative sense, expectations carry an element of what an actor is supposed to do. Following Gross, an *expectation* is defined as an evaluative standard applied to an incumbent of a position. It is expressed in terms of behaviors. Following the usage of Brookover and Gottlieb,<sup>51</sup> agreement in expectations between or among groups is called convergence. Its opposite is divergence. Agreement within a group is called consensus. Its opposite is dissensus.

Because they embody ideas of what the actor is supposed to do in performing a role, expectations are essential in regularizing human behavior, which is partially a function of expectations. Parsons and Shils use *role expectations* for the condition when "an organized system of interaction between ego and alter becomes stabilized," when the two "build up reciprocal expectations of each other's action and attitudes."<sup>52</sup>

The interaction of teachers and administrators is a case in point.

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<sup>51</sup> Wilbur B. Brookover and David Gottlieb, *A Sociology of Education* (New York: American Book Company, 1964), p. 332.

<sup>52</sup> Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 19.

Superintendents, who have usually undergone specialized training beyond that of teaching, regard their work as a profession. Their formal preparation, on-the-job experience, organization memberships, and work-group identification combine to acculturate and socialize them as superintendents. They develop evaluative standards, a professional ideology, and expectations for how things ought to be.

Yet, despite his being a professional, the superintendent is subject to lay evaluation. His career depends largely on how he is evaluated by "laymen," who constitute the school board. Occasional disparity between board members and the superintendent in their perception of their interactive roles may trigger conflict in the lay-professional relationship. Not to speak of difficulties which arise between administrators and teachers.

The increasing restiveness of teachers is partly a response to bureaucratic aspects of school systems, which leave the comparatively well-trained teacher with less professional autonomy than he feels is his due. When so many elements of his job are carefully prescribed and specified, the teacher's "professional" values and expectations are frustrated.

As "professional" employees, teachers feel that administrators often implement bureaucratic principles at the expense of educational principles. Whether correct or

not, they are obviously determined to extend the scope of their own decision-making. As Solomon observes:

Perhaps the most crucial fact to be reckoned with in public education organization is the contradiction between the teacher's role as a subordinate employee and his role as a professional person. This contradiction affects significantly the teacher's relationships with administrators and with fellow teachers. . . .<sup>53</sup>

In their own way, both teachers and administrators have been intent on furthering professionalism in education. Ironically, the need superintendents feel to professionalize administration, to wrest operational control from the school board in some cases, coincides with teachers' felt need to extend their discretionary powers in the classroom and to reduce bureaucratic control. What often appear as jurisdictional disputes are symptomatic of conflicts in values and expectations.

One observer, Christian Bay, cautions against uncritical dependence on role expectations in social criticism. He criticizes the use of role as a concept to analyze the behavior of individuals in social systems "because the individual's scope for challenging conventional expectations and for creative redefinitions of his role is either discounted or unduly de-emphasized."<sup>54</sup> In contrast, many

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<sup>53</sup> Benjamin Solomon, "A Profession Taken for Granted," *School Review*, LXIX (1961), 286-299.

<sup>54</sup> Christian Bay, "A Social Theory of Intellectual Development," in Nevitt Sanford, ed., *The American College* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 972-1005.

scholars believe that the usual looseness in role definition permits an individual some latitude in expressing himself in the role.

The point is well taken but does not necessarily diminish the usefulness of role theory for the study of administration, as review of selected studies in administration reveals.

#### Role Subjects Other Than Superintendents

In a study of elementary school principals in Michigan, Hood<sup>55</sup> found that, when conflict concerning needs satisfaction increases, the role effectiveness of principals decreases. Similarly, when role ambiguity increases, role effectiveness of principals decreases, as does organizational effectiveness. When various role definers prescribe how principals "need to change," this itself becomes a dimension of role conflict. Hood offers suggestions how principals and teachers can deal with discrepant role expectations. Key words are communication, feedback, and arbitration.

Kraut<sup>56</sup> made a study whose contribution is largely theoretical. He calls attention to possible disagreement

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<sup>55</sup> John Joseph Hood, "Role Effectiveness, Conflict, and Ambiguity in the Organizational Setting: An Empirical Study of the School Principal Role" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1969).

<sup>56</sup> Allen I. Kraut, "A Study of Role Conflicts and Their Relationship to Job Satisfaction, Tension, and Performance" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1965).

between an actor's expectations for his own behavior and the expectations which he *believes* a role definer holds for him. He urges that it is necessary to consider which particular role expectations are used to measure role conflict and warns against lumping substantive differences into global categories--a methodological caveat like that of Gross'.

The difference between what a principal should do (as perceived by four populations) and what he can and does do may be a source of role conflict. Lassanske<sup>57</sup> concluded this from studying ideal role and actual role of the principal in church-related schools.

In a relatively early role study, Doyle<sup>58</sup> probed the expectations which teachers believe others hold for the teacher's role. In asking for "definitions of the situation," the expectations of others, Doyle shows how beliefs imputed to significant others may be a source of error in role expectations if the imputations are invalid. (Doyle's research method is a variation from that of most role studies. He probed one population's perception of

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<sup>57</sup> Roland R. Lassanske, "A Comparative Study of the Ideal Role and the Actual Role of the Lutheran Elementary Principal in Southern California" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1970).

<sup>58</sup> Louis Andrew Doyle, "A Study of the Expectations Which Elementary Teachers, Administrators, School Board Members and Parents Have of the Elementary Teachers' Roles" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1956).

another's expectations, which is more feasible in interview than in a questionnaire study where "rapport" is lacking.)

Bidwell<sup>59</sup> studied the causes of conflicts and tensions among teachers. Dissatisfied teachers believed their administrators act unpredictably. Satisfied teachers felt that expectations for behavior were fairly stable and predictable. Ironically both sets of teachers were working with the same administrators. Bidwell does not focus on that irony but concludes, with becoming restraint, that a teacher's feeling of security on the job is related to his confidence in his administrators.

Fink<sup>60</sup> studied complementary role expectations of elementary principals and parents. While racial mix was not a significant factor, he found that parents and principals hold different expectations for the role of parents in school-community relations.

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<sup>59</sup> Charles E. Bidwell, "Some Causes of Conflicts and Tensions Among Teachers," *Administrator's Notebook*, IV (7), (March 1956).

<sup>60</sup> Newton W. Fink, "Role Expectations of the Elementary Principal and Parent as Perceived by Elementary Principals and Parents of Selected School-Communities Differing in Racial Composition" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1970).

Erickson,<sup>61</sup> who investigated the perceptions which principals have of their role, proposes six self-images of principals:

- housekeeper--keeps the school in "running order."
- daddy--protects his teachers and identifies with them.
- superteacher--passes on his expertise to others.
- foreman--administers the rules and supervises the teachers.
- change agent--applies leadership strategies to effect change.
- systems analyst--knows how to work with goals, performance levels, and feedback devices.

Although Erickson did not obtain data by applying this typology, Hencley, McCleary, and McGrath<sup>62</sup> suggest that the principal's role can be considered in the context of organizational conflict; conflict management and resolution are areas of skills of great potential value to educational administration.

Lipham *et al.*<sup>63</sup> applied role theory to a study of functions of a sample of twelve Wisconsin school boards. The study, firmly grounded in theory and operationally well-developed, arrived at the conclusion that school board role

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<sup>61</sup> Donald Erickson, "The Principal as Administrator" (mimeographed manuscript, undated), quoted in Stephen P. Hencley, Lloyd E. McCleary, and J. H. McGrath, *The Elementary School Principalship* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1970), p. 43.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>63</sup> James M. Lipham *et al.*, "The School Board as an Agency for Resolving Conflict," Research Project OE 5-10-001. Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1967.

expectations need continued assessment. Further, there is need for determining *why* particular expectations are held and in what way these relate to performance. Although the study conclusions are inconsequential, some elements of the theoretical base are noteworthy: Lipham conceived of the school board as an interstitial body mediating between the organization and the community. Thus the board mediates between extra-organizational and intra-organizational expectations for the school. (This means the board is located *outside* the social system of the school. Other constructs assume it is inside.)

Lipham's team investigated the kinds of issues about which school boards make decisions and found they cluster, as follows:<sup>64</sup>

|                                     | <u>Per Cent</u> |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------|
| School Plant . . . . .              | 23              |
| Staff Personnel . . . . .           | 23              |
| Finance . . . . .                   | 21              |
| Pupil Personnel . . . . .           | 15              |
| Instructional Program . . . . .     | 7               |
| Unclassified (all others) . . . . . | 9               |

It may be seen that 67 per cent of all board actions relate to only three areas of activity. Lipham observes that school boards give attention to three times as many issues dealing with the school plant as to the educational program

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<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 87.

of the schools. (This is in Wisconsin where teachers negotiate by statute, although under a "softer" law than Michigan's. One can speculate whether, with negotiation, the bargaining pressure of teacher organizations will force a shift in these issues, perhaps to increase concern for the instructional program--in keeping with teachers' public posture that they are professionals.)

Morton<sup>65</sup> studied shifts in decision-making roles before and after negotiations in Colorado. Although there was no significant difference for elementary principals, he found that the central office lost in decision-making power while the teachers gained.

Biddle investigated shared inaccuracies in role relationships.<sup>66</sup> School officials, teachers, parents, pupils, and the general public were asked to attribute norms or value judgments to each other. Of the five groups, greatest inaccuracy was among school officials asked to attribute norms to other school officials. They erred by attributing conservatism to each other while actual norms indicate considerable liberalism. As members of a "professional" group

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<sup>65</sup> Richard J. Morton, "Decision-Making Responsibilities of the Elementary School Principal Before and After Professional Negotiations Agreements" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of Northern Colorado, 1972).

<sup>66</sup> Bruce J. Biddle *et al.*, "Shared Inaccuracies in the Role of the Teacher," in Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas, eds., *Role Theory: Concepts and Research* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), pp. 302-310.

might be expected normally to take an accurate reading of the values of their peers, this is doubly ironic. Moreover, training in administration emphasizes the need to assess properly the opinion of others. Of the five subject groups, in norms which they attributed to people in general, school officials were the most mistaken.

Biddle *et al.* offer an explanation:

It is possible that shared inaccuracies of a conservative type are endemic to the maintenance of authority within an hierarchically ordered institution. It is also possible that contemporary leaders will generally tend to underestimate the degree to which their constituents are ready for change.<sup>67</sup>

Pylman<sup>68</sup> investigated expectations for the high school principal's role in negotiations in Michigan, where the issue had not been adjudicated by the courts. He asked what principals, teachers, superintendents, and board members thought the role should be. The groups agreed that principals should be involved in negotiations when administrative, curricular, or evaluative policies are determined but should not negotiate teacher salaries. Principals themselves wished to be involved in this area, but no other group agreed. Results of the study suggest that principals

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<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 309.

<sup>68</sup> John H. Pylman, "Expectations of High School Principals and Relevant Others for the Role of High School Principals in Teacher-Board Negotiations" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1968).

might advise both sides when administrative, curricular, or evaluative issues are negotiated but not teacher salaries.

In a parallel study, Trost<sup>69</sup> attempted to discover what effects negotiations were having on the role of secondary school principals in Michigan. He found that principals reported poorer personal relationships with teachers but better relations with other principals and the superintendent. (Such is the polarizing effect of negotiations, principals are part of management.) He reported that ironically principals say they are embarrassed at salary gains they have made on the efforts of teachers and the practice of tying principals' salaries to an index ratio.

Studies in administration bearing on role or negotiation are too numerous to be reviewed here. Those selected were chosen because of their presumed relevance to the present study. At this point, what conclusions can one draw from empirical data derived through studies which are substantially unconnected in time or place? These studies make it clear that role conflict in educational administration is associated with decreased satisfaction and increased anxiety for the individual, and with coping behavior which is dysfunctional for the organization. The studies cited above lead to the following generalizations:

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<sup>69</sup> James R. Trost, "The Effects of Negotiations Upon the Role of Selected Michigan Secondary School Principals" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1969).

- However an administrator actually performs, different populations will hold different and possibly conflicting ideas of how he *should* perform.
- The extent to which an administrator is subject to role conflict varies from one role sector to another.
- When role ambiguity of administrators increases, role effectiveness decreases.
- Ineffective administrators misperceive the attitudes of others, but effective administrators do not.
- Dissatisfied teachers believe their administrators act unpredictably, but satisfied teachers believe the *same* administrators are predictable.
- School boards should periodically re-assess their role expectations, both for themselves and for the administration.
- In the social system of the school, any one group may be grossly mistaken about the attitudes attributed to others.

#### Superintendents Prior to Negotiation

Although collective negotiations has changed the role of the superintendent, as noted earlier, a number of research studies which were made prior to negotiations are relevant to the current situation.

In the human relations era of school administration, Daniel Griffiths<sup>70</sup> observed the practices of successful and unsuccessful superintendents. He found that successful superintendents use more democratic methods in administration,

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<sup>70</sup> Daniel E. Griffiths, *Human Relations in School Administration* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956).

delegate authority more often, handle personnel matters better, and use their faculty and staff more fully than do unsuccessful superintendents.

In another study whose theoretical base is as noteworthy as its empirical data, Beynon<sup>71</sup> queried people within school systems, people outside, and school board members concerning the role of the superintendent. He found little agreement among respondent groups in their expectations for the superintendency.

Boss<sup>72</sup> studied the role of the intermediate district superintendent in Michigan to determine the expectations of incumbent superintendents, board members, and professors of education. He found particular disagreement among board members and potential role conflict in more than a third of the role categories analyzed.

Shanks<sup>73</sup> investigated expectations held by school board members and superintendents for the superintendency role in California prior to negotiations. He found no more consensus among superintendents than among board members

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<sup>71</sup> Robert P. Beynon, "Role Theory: Its Implications for School Administration" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1965).

<sup>72</sup> LaVerne H. Boss, "Role Expectations Held for the Intermediate School District Superintendent in Michigan" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1963).

<sup>73</sup> Robert E. Shanks, "Expectations for the School Superintendency Role" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1966).

concerning a superintendent's responsibilities. As a conclusion, Shanks recommended that superintendents and their boards periodically discuss their expectations for the superintendent's role. Superintendents should familiarize their significant others with the "role conflict" nature of their position and administrator training programs should give it attention.

In a now classic study, Halpin<sup>74</sup> found that within the separate groups of board members, superintendents, and staff members, there was considerable agreement within groups about the superintendent's leadership role, but the groups did not agree with each other. Superintendents may agree among themselves and school board members among themselves, but the two can be at loggerheads. In that case, conflict is not easily resolved.

Edson<sup>75</sup> showed that professors of educational administration believe that, considering the several areas of superintendents' responsibilities, they are least competent in the area of instruction--administration of the school program. Moreover, superintendents themselves are least satisfied with their own performance in the area of instruction. This finding, just prior to the advent of negotiations,

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<sup>74</sup>Andrew W. Halpin, *The Leadership Behavior of School Superintendents* (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1956).

<sup>75</sup>Gilmore Edson, "An Analysis of the Perceptions of Administrative Activity by Michigan School Superintendents and Professors of Educational Administration" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1963).

could be used to support the claim of teachers *as professionals* to gain control of the instructional decision area.

In moving to conclude this treatment of role theory and its application, it is appropriate to review the linkage between *role* and *social system*, the concept which preceded it. As a social system, the school evidently meets the definitional standards of Parsons, which have become classic:

A social system is a system of the actions of individuals, the principal unit of which are roles and constellations of roles.<sup>76</sup>

The role is that organized sector of an actor's orientation which constitutes and defines his participation in an interactive process. It involves a set of complementary expectations concerning his own actions and those of others with whom he interacts.<sup>77</sup>

The fundamental starting point is the concept of social systems of action. The *interaction* of individual actors, that is, takes place under such conditions that it is possible to treat such a process of interaction as a system in the scientific sense. . . .<sup>78</sup>

Parsons and Shils insist that members of a social system must share value orientations so that the role structure of that system may have coherence. Considering the realities of role-conflict--which acknowledge that school board members, teachers, and superintendent view school

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<sup>76</sup> Parsons and Shils, *Toward a General Theory of Action*, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>78</sup> Parsons, *The Social System*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

matters differently by reason of their respective *roles*-- the idea of "sharing value orientations" seems contradictory or academic at best. Perhaps it is enough to urge that there be clarity of role definition, so that organizations may function effectively and efficiently. A major theme of this dissertation is that negotiations has prompted a split in the education profession, so that administrators no longer identify with teachers but ally instead with the school board under the general rubric of "management."

It is appropriate now to address the question whether negotiations is changing the role of the school superintendent.

Collective Negotiations and the Changing  
Role of the Superintendent

The single most significant determinant of the character of the superintendency in the foreseeable future will be teacher militance and its chief instrument--collective bargaining.<sup>79</sup>

Ask a Michigan superintendent in what way negotiations has changed the superintendency and he is likely to answer, "In every way. It's a whole new game." (This assertion is based on a number of random interviews.) Probably he will say that the superintendent's authority has been eroded and his leadership compromised, as teachers

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<sup>79</sup> Charles R. Young in Patrick W. Carlton and Harold I. Goodwin, *The Collective Dilemma: Negotiations in Education* (Worthington, Ohio: C. A. Jones Publishing Co., 1969), p. 102.

now refuse to acknowledge that a superintendent has the power to issue orders or give directions beyond exact stipulations of their negotiated contract. Most of all, superintendents deplore the distrust and near hostility which, in their view, negotiation has fomented. What used to go unchallenged as an administrative prerogative now may lead to the teacher organization's filing a grievance against management. Since 1965 this familiar story has been playing itself out in Michigan. Some superintendents have quit, some have moved to other states, hoping to escape a climate of contention between teachers and administrators or at least to "buy time" before becoming engulfed again. Others are trying to adapt to the new circumstance of the superintendency, which is undergoing what is variously defined as "substantial" change or "radical" change.

By the end of 1975, 46 states had laws authorizing teachers to bargain collectively. In many states the superintendent's role is little changed. It is possible to have militant organizations and teacher strikes without a state law on negotiation. (Illinois is an example.) Some states have a relatively benign law and administrative milieu. In contrast are states in which teachers bargain according to so-called "labor law"--Wisconsin, Michigan, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. It is questionable which makes more difference, time itself or the nature of the law and climate for administration. A state with a *benign* law permitting

teacher bargaining is likely to remain placid several years later. (Like Iowa, where teachers bargain but without contention.) In one view, a state whose law permits considerable teacher power may not become placid until or unless the flow of power from management to the teacher is reversed by subsequent legislative act or court decree. In another view, there is equity of power when opposing sides achieve a negotiated contract.

The phenomenon of collective negotiations has spawned a substantial number of research studies, largely doctoral dissertations. The first appeared in 1962. In the single year 1968, there were 65 dissertations (apparently the high-water mark).<sup>80</sup> The flow continues but at a reduced level. Inspection of studies leads to this finding: because bargaining laws and the climate for administration vary so from state to state, it is possible to make only a few generalizations of *national* import. The climate for negotiations in, say, Indiana in 1974 may have been like Michigan in 1965. As most research is confined to a single state, to generalize about national trends is somewhat complicated. In a sense, each researcher "re-invents the wheel" to fit his milieu.

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<sup>80</sup> Conversation with Albert Blum, November 30, 1972.

Soon after the emergence of negotiations as a fact of life in school administration, Scott<sup>81</sup> undertook to survey preparation programs for school administrators in ten Midwestern universities. He sought to find if departments of educational administration had begun to prepare administrators-in-training to deal with collective bargaining in education and, if not, were they developing plans to do so in the foreseeable future. He found no graduate programs existed dealing with negotiations in education (in 1966). More surprisingly, professors with an interest in staff personnel had barely begun *planning* to deal with negotiations in training programs. Scott concluded:

From the data as reported by the professors it appears that to prepare school administrators in the area of collective negotiation the body of knowledge generally has not been selected nor organized, skills defined, nor the need for practice and experience established.<sup>82</sup>

Scott asked superintendents if they believed negotiations had changed the superintendent's role. A majority reported that their administrative role had indeed changed and they wanted help in learning to deal with negotiations. All agreed that study and preparation in negotiations should be an integral part of training program for administrators.

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<sup>81</sup> Walter W. Scott, "A Study of Preparation Programs in School Administration as Affected by Collective Negotiations" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1966).

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

A substantial value of Scott's study lies in its providing a baseline from which change in courses in the administration of staff personnel may be measured. It is widely acknowledged that curriculum change in universities is a slow process. It may be optimistic to expect professors to realign courses within a year or so of major events affecting their area of specialization. But it seems likely that a decade later some of these universities are not yet dealing with negotiations for school administrators. (Scott's study could be duplicated to find out.)

#### Skills of Conflict Management

Administrators' experiences under the condition of negotiations are yielding a wealth of empirical data, potentially useful to departments of educational administration. Using a Michigan population, Cave<sup>83</sup> studied the leader behavior of school administrators in conflict with teacher unions. Deliberately seeking ten districts in which teachers had gone on strike, (after considerable difficulty in gaining access) he interviewed school board members, superintendents, and teachers' union representatives. Respondents were asked to describe *ideal* administrator behavior, then the *actual* behavior of their administrator. Cave found that "inappropriate" behavior of administrators often leads to

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<sup>83</sup> David R. Cave, "A Critical Study of the Leader Behavior of School Administrators in Conflict with Teachers' Unions" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1967).

conflict with teachers. But negotiations do not allow the administrator to play an effective leadership role. He concluded that subject superintendents--in districts with teachers' strikes--were lacking in group skills, such as skills in conflict resolution, and called for schools of education to develop needed training programs.

In another study concerned with the management of conflict, Snow<sup>84</sup> found a linkage between level of financial support for schools and the absence of conflict in educational matters. Analysis of four suburbs in Illinois revealed that the superintendent's leadership correlated with the amount of resources made available for education *and* with skills of conflict management.

Similarly, Stephen K. Bailey,<sup>85</sup> in an essay, defined the criteria for successful conflict management in education, urging that the successful conflict manager is realistic about his personal and role limitations. He substitutes collective judgment for personal discretion when it is appropriate to do so and refuses to be discouraged at frequent defeat which goes with the job. Bailey cites the "artistry" of conflict management and states the usual

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<sup>84</sup> R. J. Snow, "Community Resources and Conflict Propensity as Sources for Constraints on the Local School Administrator," paper presented at American Educational Research Association meeting, February 1967.

<sup>85</sup> Stephen K. Bailey, "Preparing Educational Administrators for Conflict Resolution," paper presented at American Educational Research Association meeting, February 1971.

recommendation of experts that one manages crises by redressing the grievances which cause them.

Rodriguez<sup>86</sup> observes that conflicts between teacher organizations and school boards are basically power conflicts which can be resolved through negotiation, arbitration, and mediation. But modes of conflict resolution which schools customarily use are highly normative; they carry a sense of what ought to be. He concludes that both parties in negotiation usually lack knowledge of the expected outcomes. As in most school crises, the superintendent is expected to act to resolve the crisis, whether or not he has skills for conflict resolution. Training in such skills is rarely part of the administrator's preparation.

#### Superintendents Negotiating Under Benign Conditions

Surprisingly, several research studies reveal that collective bargaining with teachers has had little effect on the superintendent's role. This is true where teacher militancy is at a low level and/or state law governing negotiations does not follow labor law. In these instances, the superintendent's right to "administer" is generally unchallenged. The following illustrate existing attitudes under such relatively benign conditions:

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<sup>86</sup> John H. Rodriguez, "Superintendent Behavior in Crisis Situations" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1973).

Urich<sup>87</sup> investigated the extent of agreement on the role of the superintendent in negotiations in Iowa. While there was internal agreement among board members, superintendents, and teachers of similar districts, there were significant differences between people with rural backgrounds and urban backgrounds. The individual's *role* did not make the difference. Board members, superintendents, and teachers in rural districts tended to agree with each other, seeing the superintendent in his traditional role as a channel of communications from teachers to school board and from board to teachers. Those from central city districts--50,000 or more residents--disagreed among themselves and with their rural counterparts. Urban respondents favored the teacher organization's playing a role in determining the educational program. So it appears that any break in unity among school personnel in Iowa would start in the largest urban areas.

Borger<sup>88</sup> queried board members and superintendents, also in Iowa, asking what should be their roles in negotiation and what should be negotiable. Among other findings, he found the two populations disagree on the role of both

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<sup>87</sup> Ted R. Urich, "A Q-Sort Analysis of the Role of the Superintendent in Collective Negotiations as Perceived by School Personnel" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1967).

<sup>88</sup> Henry J. Borger, Jr., "Collective Negotiations as Perceived by Iowa Board Members and Superintendents" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Iowa State University, 1969).

the board and the superintendent in negotiating with teachers. Board members are relatively certain while superintendents are uncertain of their respective roles. (Such a difference suggests that the superintendent experiences greater role conflict in negotiation than does the board member, perhaps straining ties to his former fellows, the teachers. Borger does not make this interpretation, however.)

Trenholm<sup>89</sup> surveyed the extent of agreement on the role of the superintendent in negotiations in Oregon, where negotiations are permitted by law but not mandated. School board presidents and teacher representatives were queried but not superintendents. Trenholm found that, although it was recognized the superintendent's main responsibility is with the board, teachers still view the superintendent as "a sage advisor" mediating between the board and teachers. Trenholm inferred that in Oregon neither side wants negotiations in the adversary sense of collective bargaining. Although both board presidents and teachers want superintendents trained in negotiations, board presidents do not want teachers to have such training.

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<sup>89</sup> Donald B. Trenholm, "The Superintendent's Role in Teacher Negotiations as Perceived by School Board Chairmen and Representatives of Teacher Groups" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Colorado State College, 1968).

Fjeran<sup>90</sup> conducted a similar study in the state of Washington, where negotiations are equally benign following passage of a teacher negotiation law in 1965. He found that board members, superintendents, and teachers expected the superintendent to perform a dual role in negotiations, to be a resource to both sides. Although teachers did not believe the superintendent's move to the board's side was inevitable, those from districts with more negotiation experience insisted that the superintendent be neutral in negotiations, instead of being the board's advisor.

Hartl<sup>91</sup> queried Washington board presidents and superintendents, asking their opinion of a number of statutory provisions for the role of superintendent in states with professional negotiation laws. Both groups agreed with a definition of the superintendent as leader of the professional staff but were opposed to defining the position by statute. (Nor is the position defined by statute in "labor law" states.)

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<sup>90</sup> Orin B. Fjeran, "Role Expectation of the Superintendent in Teacher Negotiation" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1968).

<sup>91</sup> David C. Hartl, "An Analysis of the Opinions of Washington State School Board Chairmen and Superintendents Regarding Statutory Provisions for the Role of the Superintendent in States with Professional Negotiation Laws" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Washington State University, 1971).

In Connecticut, where teachers bargain according to a professional negotiation law, Robinson<sup>92</sup> found board members did *not* believe that negotiations had led to an erosion of their powers in decision-making. He concluded that the superintendent's role, however, is shifting gradually from that of teacher spokesman to "adviser-consultant."

In New Jersey, Cornell<sup>93</sup> examined the relationship between negotiation functions and leadership behavior of superintendents. Querying board presidents, superintendents, and teacher organization presidents, he found that superintendents did not agree on any *one* position as best for them in negotiations. He concluded that New Jersey superintendents were fairly free to choose their role in negotiations, but that the role of advisor to school board only was costly in professional leadership.

A 1970 study illustrates how benign law and a non-militant milieu create a work setting for the superintendent which contrasts with Michigan's. McDonald<sup>94</sup> analyzed the superintendent's role in negotiations in Texas, according

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<sup>92</sup> Charles A. Robinson, "The Effect of Professional Negotiations on Educational Decision Making" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1970).

<sup>93</sup> Joseph P. Cornell, "Relationship Between Negotiation Function and Leadership Behavior of Superintendents of School Districts in the State of New Jersey" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham University, 1972).

<sup>94</sup> Rudy L. McDonald, "An Analysis of the Role of the Superintendent of Schools in Professional Negotiations in Texas Schools" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of Houston, 1970).

to board members, superintendents, and teacher representatives. He found board members and superintendents preferred "executive officer of the board" as the *ideal* role, while teachers favored a dual role for the superintendent. *Actual* and *ideal* roles tended to be the same. McDonald concluded that teachers were unrealistic in expecting the superintendent to be able to perform a dual role. His own preference was that the superintendent should negotiate as the board's agent.

Similarly, Powell<sup>95</sup> analyzed the superintendent's negotiation role in the five states of the Mid-Atlantic region. More than any other, he found superintendents usually serving in the dual role. Neither the board nor teacher side made much use of outside negotiators. As the ideal role, Powell urged that the superintendent be the school board's representative exclusively. He rejected the idea that the superintendent could successfully be a third party in disputes.

Mayfield<sup>96</sup> explored superintendents' feelings toward teacher militancy in Oregon by comparing districts according to presence or absence of teacher militancy.

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<sup>95</sup> James R. Powell, "The Role of the Superintendent in Collective Negotiations Between Teachers and Boards of Education" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Temple University, 1968).

<sup>96</sup> Harlan N. Mayfield, "An Exploratory Study of Superintendents' Feelings Toward Teacher Militancy" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1972).

Superintendents who had *not* experienced militancy were undisturbed about it. They cited the values which should follow when teachers share in decision-making and regarded militancy as a step forward for the common profession of education. In contrast, superintendents who had experienced militancy responded more like superintendents in labor-law states. They were quite disturbed about it.

#### Negotiations with Teacher Militancy

The foregoing review of literature has focused on research conducted state by state or in a limited geographical area, as that served by a regional accrediting association. It is apparent there are substantial differences among the states as to the effect of negotiations on relationships among the school board, superintendent, and teachers. Few studies attempt to interpret such trends on a national basis. One which does, by Hazard,<sup>97</sup> was a status study (as of 1966) which drew some interesting implications.

In Hazard's interpretation, teacher militancy is a manifestation of unresolved teacher-school board conflict. With prescience, he predicts that administrators will be forced by circumstance to identify with the school board's

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<sup>97</sup> William R. Hazard, "The Legal Status of Collective Negotiations by Public School Teachers and Implications for Public School Administration" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1966).

position in negotiations. (There is evidence that this is happening.) Teacher participation in policy-making will move beyond salary and working conditions to encompass class size, curriculum, educational objectives, and operational policies. Hazard foresees danger in partisan interpretation of educational problems, suggesting that neither side may be able to keep the public interest paramount.

Blakesley<sup>98</sup> sought to determine whether there is a relationship between community characteristics and teacher militancy in suburban Chicago, a limited geographical area where the level of militancy varies greatly and no law mandates negotiation. As predicted, he found a positive correlation between *high* socio-economic status of residents, *high* distribution of decision-making authority between administrators and teachers, and *low* teacher militancy. It can be said that in executive-residential communities, there are organizational and communication skills and an understanding of professionalism, so board members "invest" decision-making authority in administrators who "reinvest" such authority in teachers. Teachers therefore have a low level of militancy. Existing arrangements permit some degree of joint decision-making *outside* negotiations.

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<sup>98</sup> Lance H. Blakesley, "The Relationship Between School District Socio-Economic Status, the Distribution of Decision-Making Authority Between Administrators and Teachers, and Collective Teacher Militancy" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1971).

Conversely, in communities with low socio-economic status, there is a deficit of organizational and communication skills; board members are disinclined to invest much authority in their administrators who, in turn, are not able to reinvest authority in teachers. Teachers therefore have a high level of militancy. (Blakesley does not point out that the Illinois Education Association had not yet become a militant organization, a fact which might overcome the strong differential factor of community character.) As a secondary finding, Blakesley found that districts represented by the American Federation of Teachers were more militant than those represented by NEA affiliates.

To uncover what selected respondents think the role of the superintendent in negotiations should be, Heim<sup>99</sup> sampled North Central Association districts. He queried board presidents, superintendents, and teacher representatives, asking them to choose among five possible roles: dual, managerial, professional staff leader, pragmatic, or no role. Districts represented a range from no experience in negotiations to experience with great teacher militancy including strikes. Where negotiation had not been experienced, the dual role was first choice; but where negotiation had been experienced, the managerial role was

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<sup>99</sup> Max O. Heim, "A Study of What Selected Respondents Think the Role of the Superintendent Should Be in the Negotiating Process" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of Kansas, 1967).

first choice. Significantly, Michigan was the only state where a majority of respondents--board presidents, superintendents, and teacher representatives--selected the managerial role as their preference. (This finding of 1967 suggested the possible value of replicating this research.) The greatest degree of support for the managerial role came from board presidents, which Heim attributes to support by the National School Boards Association.

Heim stressed that his investigation showed what respondents believe is the *ideal* role for the superintendent in the negotiating process. He recommended a parallel study to determine the superintendent's *actual* role. He said, "There is a definite need to design and execute detailed and objective research describing how the superintendent of schools functions in the managerial role."<sup>100</sup> One might speculate, for instance, why a majority of all three respondent populations in Michigan prefer the managerial role and to a greater extent than in any of the nineteen states of the North Central Association.

In Wisconsin, where teachers negotiate according to labor law, Waier<sup>101</sup> compared the *actual* and *ideal*

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<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> Raymond D. Waier, "The Role of School Superintendents in the Negotiation Process" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970).

negotiation roles of superintendents as perceived by board members, superintendents, and teacher negotiators. He reasoned that negotiations forces superintendents into adaptive behavior to meet conflicting expectations of relevant groups. Curiously, teachers did not agree with board members and superintendents in their perception of the superintendents' *actual* role. For the *ideal*, teachers selected the dual role as most appropriate, board members chose a non-participant role, while superintendents narrowly favored the dual role over a non-participant role. No respondent group chose the managerial role as *ideal* or as describing the present reality for superintendents. As Waier noted, there tended to be a close fit between *actual* and *ideal* role in the perception of respondent groups. Since Wisconsin and Michigan follow labor law in collective negotiation, it is puzzling why there are such great differences between Waier's findings and that part of Heim's which was from Michigan.

In a national study, Caldwell<sup>102</sup> examined the superintendent's negotiation role and found great confusion among superintendents, board members, and teachers as to the *actual* role assigned the superintendent. In only about 5 per cent of districts was there total agreement. In general, Caldwell

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<sup>102</sup> William E. Caldwell, "The Role of the Superintendent in Negotiations Between Teachers' Organizations and Boards of Education" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1968).

found that the larger the district, the more authority for negotiations is delegated to the superintendent. Board members prefer that the superintendent be their advisor only. Teachers do not want the superintendent to participate in negotiations. There is no significant relationship between the superintendent's negotiation role and his feeling of satisfaction with that role.

Lall<sup>103</sup> studied the extent of agreement on the superintendent's role among superintendents, principals, teachers, and board members in Saskatchewan, which has had years of experience with negotiations. He found that all groups favor the superintendent's being the board's professional advisor and its executive officer. None favored a role in which the superintendent served as a liaison person between the board and teachers. The implication is that, where negotiations are firmly established, the superintendent cannot continue to function as professional leader of the teachers. Whether or not one can generalize from it, the Canadian experience is informative.

In a 1968 study, Talty<sup>104</sup> sought to determine role expectations for the superintendent in negotiations in

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<sup>103</sup> Bernard M. Lall, "Role Expectations of the School Superintendent as Perceived by Superintendents, Principals, Teachers, and Board Members in the Province of Saskatchewan" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1968).


<sup>104</sup> Michael R. Talty, "Role Expectations for the Superintendent in Collective Negotiations Between School Boards and Nonunion Teachers Organizations in New York State" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, St. John's University, 1968).

New York State. Although the state is governed by a professional negotiations law (the Taylor law), it does not mandate a specific role for the superintendent. Examination of negotiation agreements failed to reveal a consensus on expectations for the superintendent's role. Teacher negotiators rejected the superintendent as their advisor, while superintendents tended to identify more with the board than with teachers. The concept of the superintendent as an independent third party, the role then recommended by the American Association of School Administrators, was rarely practiced. Talty concluded that the emerging role is that of the superintendent as agent of the board in negotiations.

In a somewhat comparable study, Roberts<sup>105</sup> asked superintendents in Western New York if the professional negotiations law had caused a change in their "role choice" as superintendent. Two-thirds reported "no change." But there was an interesting finding in regard to superintendents' age and experience. Younger and less experienced superintendents were quite willing to serve as the board's chief negotiator; in fact, they chose this role 7-1. In contrast, older and more experienced superintendents preferred the role of consultant-at-large. Roberts'

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<sup>105</sup> George F. Roberts, "Role Choice of Chief School Officers in Collective Negotiations: Analysis and Description," paper presented at American Educational Research Association meeting, February 1971.



interpretation: an inverse relationship exists between length of experience in position as superintendent and choosing a more active role in negotiations.

Roberts found that the superintendent's *actual* role coincided with perceived board expectations in 78 per cent of all cases, with perceived superintendent expectations in 69 per cent of cases, and with perceived teacher expectations in 60 per cent of cases. This indicates that, whatever role the superintendent actually performs, the board's choice is what obtains. Roberts concluded that older superintendents retain something of a collegial feeling for teachers. Younger superintendents may have entered the superintendency after negotiations became a factor in the superintendent's work life, so they make an easier adjustment.

Knighton<sup>106</sup> compared fourteen strike with fourteen non-strike districts in Michigan to see if they differed in negotiation attitudes and relationships within management. He found that board presidents, superintendents, and management's negotiators were substantially alike in their labor-management attitudes, whether in strike or non-strike districts. But in strike districts, negotiating team decisions were largely influenced by board members; in non-strike

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<sup>106</sup> Burton S. Knighton, "A Study of School Management Negotiating Attitudes and Relationships in Selected Strike and Non-Strike Michigan School Districts" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1972).

districts, by superintendents. In both districts, superintendents were alike in attitude toward negotiation and management's role in negotiation.

Strom<sup>107</sup> made an early study of changes which collective negotiations made in its first year or two in Michigan. Although his data may not warrant the title, an "analysis of trends," he was among the first to observe that the changed power relationship between school board and teacher organization alters the superintendent's role. No longer can the superintendent claim to be the teachers' spokesman. Strom concluded that, like it or not, the superintendent must modify his administrative style to share power with the teacher organization.

Conclusions drawn from research findings are not always "compelled" by the data. Researchers are tempted to select facts to fit their biases and array them for display as evidence, perhaps ignoring data which run counter to the researcher's bias. The writer has reported a number of studies which purport to show that collective negotiations changes the leadership role of the school superintendent. He has not found one study which shows that persevering with old-style "leadership" based on a rigid concept of authority

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<sup>107</sup>David W. Strom, "Analysis of Trends in Power Relationships between Boards of Education and Teacher Organizations" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Wayne State University, 1967).

can effectively meet the challenge of the negotiations movement. Whereas militant teacher organizations seek to arrogate authority, it remains as before, vested by law in the school board.

### The Shifting Climate for Administration

Taken together, the foregoing reflect a shift in the climate for administration which departs substantially from the days when a superintendent could confidently speak for "his" teachers. Now administrators must learn to live with restraints and ambiguities, with trade-offs and compromises. Or so it appears. Roberts,<sup>108</sup> who studied the role choice of superintendents in negotiations, found considerable ambiguity and ambivalence among superintendents as to what their role should be. Even when superintendents actually are performing "the managerial role," which Roberts believes is the emerging role, they still express a preference for the traditional role of "instructional" leader. Roberts predicts that administrators in negotiations will increasingly identify with the school board. This is so, he forecasts, as older superintendents retire or otherwise leave the superintendency.

One study explored the role of the school district personnel director as a negotiation specialist who can

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<sup>108</sup>George F. Roberts, *op. cit.*



relieve the superintendent or outside negotiator of this task. Jackson<sup>109</sup> found that by 1972 in larger districts of Michigan (3000 students or more) negotiation was the responsibility of the school personnel director, whose usual title is assistant superintendent of/for personnel. Superintendents favor this arrangement. In 1971-72 there were 54 such full-time personnel directors with every prospect for increase in their ranks.

Their opposite number (or adversary) has also been studied. Medford and Miskel<sup>110</sup> compared teacher-negotiators with other teachers in the rather conservative climate of Kansas. They found that negotiators are less security-minded than regular classroom teachers. Being relatively unconcerned about job security, they tend to enjoy competitive situations--like bargaining.

Opinions differ as to who should be chief negotiator for the board-administration side. A close observer of negotiations, Wesley A. Wildman, addresses the question of the superintendent's negotiation role:

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<sup>109</sup>Allen Jackson, "A Comparison of the Role Concept of the District Personnel Director by Certain Michigan Superintendents and Selected Authorities in School Personnel Administration" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1972).

<sup>110</sup>Robert E. Medford and Cecil Miskel, "The Professional Negotiator: Role Conflict, Role Ambiguity and Motivation to Work" (paper presented at American Educational Research Association meeting, February 26, 1973).

Although strong feeling is frequently expressed within the profession that the adversary role in the negotiation relationship should not be assumed by the superintendent, surveys indicate that in a majority of bargaining situations, the superintendent bears at least the initial responsibility for conduct of the relationship on the management side. There is some evidence that as relationships mature, boards of education find negotiating too time-consuming and are glad to delegate the chore, while the superintendent finds that if he wishes to maintain a desired degree of control over the administration of his system, he had better assume responsibility for the negotiation relationship even though he may not actually conduct the face-to-face bargaining sessions.<sup>111</sup>


Even if superintendents are loath to abandon their self-image as instructional leader, teacher organizations insist that teachers *as professionals* claim their proper right to greater control of the decision-making processes of the school. Corwin, who investigated the contradiction between the teacher's role as subordinate employee and as professional, makes this observation:

Centralized authority and system-wide uniformity are difficult to reconcile with decentralized decision-making authority--the central component of professionalism. If classroom teachers are to professionalize, therefore, they must gain more control, perhaps the primary control, over key matters.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>111</sup>Wesley A. Wildman, "Teachers and Collective Negotiations," in Albert A. Blum (ed.), *White Collar Workers* (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 160.

<sup>112</sup>Ronald G. Corwin, *Militant Professionalism* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), p. 327.



Although it is not given top priority in the organization's action program, the Michigan Education Association favors the idea of negotiating instructional matters and promotes instructional councils as one means by which teachers influence educational policy.

At the annual conference of the National Commission on Teacher Education and Professional Standards (NEA), in 1970 the theme was Negotiating for Professionalization, which has become a goal of the commission. Roy Edelfelt stated what may be an operational definition of "professionalism" in the future:

It is conceivable, for example, that a school faculty could so perfect a system of governance that they become wholly accountable for collective decisions through democratic professional procedures as members of a faculty.<sup>113</sup>

At this conference, Anthony West<sup>114</sup> reported his study of conflicting perceptions among board members, superintendents, and teacher representatives concerning the scope of negotiations. Differences between board members and superintendents were insignificant, but those between superintendents and teachers were significant to a point

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<sup>113</sup> *Negotiating for Professionalization*, Report of the Twentieth National TEPS Conference (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, National Commission on Teacher Education and Professional Standards, 1970), p. vii.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.

suggesting need to re-evaluate the superintendent's role in negotiation. There is an obvious weakening of the traditional position that the superintendent can represent the staff's interest in negotiation. Negotiating for professionalization marks the end of thinking the superintendent is still the teachers' spokesman.

Leadership of educational administrators is threatened in other ways. In *Newsweek* it was said that

big-city superintendents are the most vulnerable of public servants. In the last three years, chief executives have been forced out of more than half of the largest school systems in the country. . . . The school superintendent's job is becoming more impossible every day.<sup>115</sup>

Again *Newsweek* profiled a man who was called "the single most powerful figure in public education." Significantly he is not an educational administrator but a leading adversary of school management, Albert Shanker, president of New York's United Federation of Teachers.<sup>116</sup>

In the past, the superintendent's leadership was generally assumed, unchallenged, and unexamined. Whether the negotiations movement is the logical outcome of teachers' drive for professional recognition or merely a device for one sector of public employees to increase their income, negotiations causes superintendents to lose power. Although evidence is scant, it appears that superintendents initiate

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<sup>115</sup>*Newsweek*, January 8, 1973, pp. 65-66.

<sup>116</sup>*Ibid.*, August 27, 1973, p. 64.

policy matters less frequently than before. Bargaining gives new powers of initiative to teacher organizations, as they begin bringing issues to the bargaining table-- usually by-passing the superintendent--and using negotiation as a means of changing curriculum and instruction. The superintendent as instructional leader may be an endangered species, particularly when teacher organizations succeed in bargaining instructional matters in their effort to enlarge the realm of teacher decision-making.

Professionalization involves both a drive for status and an effort of employees to get greater control over their work. It does not appear that teachers have felt a mutual-ity of interest with administration to the degree that administrators had believed they did. Negotiations has ended the pretense that teachers and administrators inter-acted, not as employees and employers but being somehow united into a single "teaching" profession. There has been substantial change since 1956 when Griffiths said, "Teachers as a group have little or no say in the formulation of school policy."<sup>117</sup>

In many districts the teacher organization now wants to extend the scope of bargaining beyond wages, hours, and conditions of employment. It seeks to negotiate the

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<sup>117</sup>Daniel E. Griffiths, *Human Relations in School Administration* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956), p. 106.

instructional program, arguing that if teachers are to be accorded full stature as professionals, they must make operational decisions concerning teaching and learning. The administrative consequences of bargaining are substantial. ("According to union leaders in Chicago, it would cost \$3 million to reduce class size throughout the city by one pupil."<sup>118</sup> In New York City, for each \$100 the union wins in salary increases, three teachers with low seniority are dismissed. In 1972 the city had 8,000 fewer teachers than in 1970.)<sup>119</sup>

#### The Authority Problem

As school systems grew, they became bureaucracies with organizational authority carried via bureaucratic rules. Teachers were left with little professional autonomy (disregarding the question of when teachers were first entitled to be considered "professionals"). Over time, conflict developed between teachers' professional values and expectations of their administrative superiors in the bureaucracy. While administrators are challenged to secure control over the bureaucracies which they head, bargaining gives the employee group a direct means to counter bureaucracy's

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<sup>118</sup> *Negotiating for Professionalization, op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

<sup>119</sup> Albert Shanker at University of Michigan, November 30, 1972.

unresponsiveness. Bargaining collectively is a way to cope with the bureaucratic rigidity of a school system, possibly replacing it with the rigidity of a union.

Among changes wrought by the negotiations movement, the educational administrator cannot expect to be the controlling force in educational decisions. Rather he is to become a participant in a complex decision-making process which involves subordinate administrators, teachers, students (when appropriate), and community groups.

The superintendent's position is at the interface, the common boundary between two "systems" which are in contact. To the school board, he represents the teachers; to the teachers, he represents the board. As he does not perceive the board and teachers as equal clients, the superintendent cannot perform both sets of role prescriptions *if* they are conflicting. Indeed, his performance seems more congruent with the board's expectations than with the teachers'. As *role sender* the board exerts more pressure on the superintendent than do the teachers. Besides the board's being the superintendent's immediate superordinate, negotiations has a polarizing effect--one is either a worker or he is *management*.

Griffiths acknowledges an important difference between educational administrators and their counterpart in other fields:

One clue to the difference is found in the degree to which administrators in education participate in the policy-making of the organization. Policy in business, industry, and the military is not made by the professional manager. Although the superintendent does not *make* policy in education, he does help form it to a far greater degree than does his counterpart in business, industry, and the military.<sup>120</sup>

While official expectations for the behavior of subordinates are formally passed down the chain of authority, it is generally true that subordinates work best in a climate where the superior acts in keeping with subordinates' expectations for his behavior. In a variety of settings, research attests that the satisfaction of subordinates increases when they feel they can influence the organization's decision-making.<sup>121</sup> Teachers report satisfaction with their principal *and the school system* when they feel that the principal and they are mutually influential in decision-making. In this respect, relationships between superordinates and subordinates in schools are similar to those in other organizations. Seeman<sup>122</sup> found that teachers work best where the administrator's behavior "fits" the

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<sup>120</sup>Daniel E. Griffiths *et al.*, *Organizing Schools for Effective Education* (Danville, Ill.: Interstate Printers and Publishers, 1962), p. 163.

<sup>121</sup>Harvey A. Hornstein *et al.*, "Influence and Satisfaction in Organizations: A Replication," *Sociology of Education*, 41 (4), 380-389.

<sup>122</sup>Melvin Seeman, *Social Status and Leadership: The Case of the School Executive* (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1960).

teachers' expectations. When administrators perceive potential *role conflict* in their job, they report they have difficulty in making decisions. Role conflict eventually has adverse effects on subordinate administrators, teachers, and pupils, so some superintendents report.

It is logical that, as the teacher organization under negotiations becomes a powerful source of role expectations for its membership, the superintendent should be aware of teachers' expectations for *his* behavior. He is not required to *act* accordingly but to be aware. The action he chooses reflects his balanced judgment of the best course realistically open. Because the superintendent has probably developed a "professional" viewpoint, he may have to alter some part of the occupational culture he has internalized. Caught between old myths and new realities, to paraphrase Eric Fromm, he may not yet want to act as he has to act. This could be part of his authority problem.

March and Simon<sup>123</sup> demonstrate that increasing the influence of people in lower echelons need not reduce the control of persons in higher echelons of an organization. It is not a zero-sum game. Rather, people at all levels of hierarchy usually gain power when the influence of subordinates is increased. As March and Simon put it:

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<sup>123</sup>James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958).

"Participative management" can be viewed as a device for permitting management to participate more fully in the making of decisions as well as a means for expanding the influence of lower echelons in the organization.<sup>124</sup>

The more usual concept of power applied to adversaries in negotiation does not assume that both sides will gain.

Within the classroom, teachers have varying degrees of autonomy (behavior not controlled by an external agency). Across time they have gained special knowledge and skills on which they base their claim to professional status, thus entitling them to less discipline and control by administrators. If teachers are truly professional, this poses problems for administrators who have an undeniable responsibility for coordinating their work but should not supervise as closely as non-professionals require. Teachers' drive for professional independence collides with administrative responsibility for dependable performance.

Unionization can speed the movement for greater "colleague authority," as in higher education with its academic freedom and relatively low administrative control over teachers. The teacher union or association can be a rival to a teacher's "total" commitment to the school, especially when administrators regard the union as alien to the school organization. With its sense of teacher power,

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<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54.

the union provides autonomy and a degree of freedom from management control. (Whether this is good or not can be argued case by case.)

Dual loyalty is possible. Purcell<sup>125</sup> found that 73 percent of employees at Swift and Company indicate "positive loyalties" to both the company and union. Although teachers and packinghouse workers have different social statuses, the question is researchable: To what extent do teachers indicate they have loyalty to both school management and the teacher organization?

The authority problem is further exacerbated as school boards insist that they have a right and duty to manage the schools, a statutory authority and responsibility which may not be abrogated and which pose constraints on how far bargaining can go. Reutter and Hamilton point out that

local boards of education cannot divest themselves of their discretionary authority by agreeing to be bound by agreements reached through other than legally sanctioned processes. It becomes obvious that there is some nicety to the determination of when a board is divesting itself of its statutory duties, and when it is merely being persuaded by the logic of the employees' position.<sup>126</sup>

Like most states, Michigan's Constitution prohibits strikes by public employees, but the state Supreme Court has

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<sup>125</sup>T. V. Purcell, *Blue Collar Man* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

<sup>126</sup>E. Edmund Reutter, Jr. and Robert R. Hamilton, *The Law of Public Education* (Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1970), p. 411.

softened the effect of the law. If a school board seeks to enjoin teachers from striking, it must make a proper showing of "violence, irreparable injury, or breach of the peace." Injunctions in labor disputes on other grounds are "basically contrary to public policy" in Michigan.<sup>127</sup> Reutter and Hamilton observe that "Michigan courts have gone much further than those in any other state" in such a requirement.<sup>128</sup>

The recent shift in power from school management to the teachers leads to some ambiguity:

The board has run the schools for many, many years under the direction of a state law which still says they will run the schools and which has been compromised by a law saying the teachers will share in it.<sup>129</sup>

Moreover there is ambiguity about the superintendent's authority. Legally the superintendent is merely the board's agent who discharges his duties at their discretion. He may claim certain rights as a professional but, in most states, in comparison with the school board he has little standing before the law. Since he has little real power, he must amass an authority out of good relations and consensus. In

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<sup>127</sup>Holland School District v. Holland Education Association, 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W. 2d 206 (1968).

<sup>128</sup>Reutter and Hamilton, *op. cit.*, p. 413.

<sup>129</sup>American Association of School Administrators, *Critical Incidents in Negotiations* (Washington, D.C.: The Association, 1971), p. 46.

Michigan, as elsewhere when teachers bargain according to labor law, teachers would further reduce the superintendent's power.

It seems appropriate to consider next the statute which has worked such changes in the role of the superintendent of schools in Michigan.

#### Michigan's Public Law 379

It is beyond the scope of this study to describe all the effects of Michigan's Public Employment Relations Act except those having implications for the superintendent's role. The law groups teachers with other public employees. Its drafters may have concluded that similarities among various kinds of public employees are greater than their differences, as the law does not give teachers separate statutory treatment. Employment relations are administered through the labor mediation board rather than through a specialized "professional" agency.

The scope of the law, expressly limited to "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment," has been broadly interpreted. A trial examiner of the Public Employment Relations Commission decided that the rubric "conditions of employment" properly includes all of the following as bargainable subjects:

. . . the right of the teachers to evaluate curriculum and class schedule, size of classes, selection of textbooks, materials, supplies, planning of facilities and special education, establishment of in-service training of teachers, procedures for the rating of effectiveness of teachers, the establishment of self-sustaining summer school programs for remedial purposes, and severance pay.<sup>130</sup>

At best, the analogy between teachers and industrial workers is inexact. As an education association official concludes:

"Conditions of employment" in the field of education is so broad that it's almost impossible to separate what is good for the teacher from what is good for the pupil. Smaller class size, for example, . . . .<sup>131</sup>

In adapting labor law to an education setting, a trial examiner broadens the legislature's definition of the statute. When teacher organizations seek to extend the scope of bargaining, trial examiners are as potent in *their* decision-making as the legislators who are formally empowered to amend the law.

There is a high level of involvement by state organizations (both the Michigan Education Association and Michigan Federation of Teachers) in bargaining activity of local units. The MEA operates statewide in an active advisory capacity and seeks to have local associations submit

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<sup>130</sup>Daniel H. Kruger and Charles T. Schmidt, Jr. (eds.), *Collective Bargaining in the Public Service* (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 180.

<sup>131</sup>*Critical Incidents in Negotiation, op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

agreements to state headquarters before they are signed. It develops "suggested" master agreements as models and decides which are to be "target" districts. The similarity of many local agreements in a given year is more than coincidental, given the MEA's bargaining structure.<sup>132</sup> Formally the fiction is maintained that initiative rests with the local association and state headquarters merely provides technical assistance. (On the other side, school management is now doing something similar but lacks comparable resources for assistance.) However, the ideology of collective bargaining still exalts an agreement worked out by local parties, uniquely adapted to local needs.

Michigan's Public Law 379 does not authorize the filing of unfair labor charges against *employee* organizations, thus giving rise to the charge that the law is tilted in favor of public employees as against management. The American Federation of Teachers calls the Michigan statute "the strongest collective bargaining law" of any state.

#### Effects on the Superintendent's Role

Michigan's negotiations law follows the dichotomous model of labor law. It speaks of public employers and

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<sup>132</sup>Charles T. Schmidt, Jr., Hyman Parker, and Bob Repas, *A Guide to Collective Negotiations in Education* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1967), p. 13.

public employees. On the possible existence of an intermediate party (e.g., the superintendent) the law is silent. Thus the statute is structured against the superintendent's playing a "dual" role of advisor in negotiation to both the school board and teacher organization. In the first year or two of negotiation, boards frequently *directed* the superintendent to act as their chief negotiator but this practice is decreasing and superintendents are freer to choose their role.

The law assigns no explicit role to the superintendent; in fact, he is not mentioned. In practice, many superintendents *advise* the board in negotiation and merely transmit information to the teachers. The superintendent continues to be the board's executive officer. To the extent the teacher organization takes grievances directly to the board, the superintendent's authority is reduced. Militant teachers may insist the superintendent has always been "the board's man." But the law's effect is to meld the school board and administration into a single entity--*management*.

Some Michigan superintendents say that bargaining has brought deeply painful experiences:

- To be required to be the teachers' "adversary," the target of militants bent on confrontation policies.
- To be excluded from teacher associations which they used to lead.

- To conclude that professional unity was an unrealistic goal or mere rhetoric.

As they see it, the negotiations movement has yet to demonstrate its benefit to boys and girls in school.

If this assessment puts the superintendent's situation in a gloomy light, it may forecast conditions which are likely to overtake other states. In fairness, it must be acknowledged that there are about a dozen Michigan districts whose teachers have not chosen to bargain collectively. And there are doubtless others which do bargain but feel uncomfortable with an arrangement which structures a fair and reasonable school board as the teachers' "adversary."

A small number of superintendents appear to favor negotiations, at least in principle. Some of them equate negotiations with democratic administration. Some believe in uncovering latent antagonisms which are hidden in the usual interaction of teachers and administrators. One Michigan superintendent, John English, claims that bargaining has *improved* educational administration.<sup>133</sup> He says that bargaining assures employee participation in policy-making which can benefit the enterprise. It increases funds for education when money is "found"

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<sup>133</sup>John W. English, "Collective Bargaining Has Improved Educational Administration," *ISR Journal*, 2 (1), (Winter 1970), 37-42.

in response to teacher demands. When communication flows two ways, administrative inefficiency is challenged, often through grievance procedures.

English observes that introducing the adversary relationship between administrators and school employees requires that educational administrators learn to use management techniques (borrowed from business and public administration) which are new to them. Principals are being trained to be managers; financial pressures may lead to better supervision by state and county offices. Teachers even negotiate curriculum matters. English concludes that negotiations may help teachers develop pride in being professionals.<sup>134</sup>

Whether favorable to the idea of negotiations or not, superintendents may agree that the movement stands as a major force affecting the superintendent's role today. Such substantial change often leads to role-personality incongruence or alienation. There is uncertainty as to the superintendent's *best possible* role. An influential textbook puts it well:

Collective negotiations have changed the world of most school administrators. At its worst, negotiated agreements can negate any

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<sup>134</sup>Although this view is not representative of Michigan superintendents, since the author *is* a superintendent, the article is noteworthy in its uniqueness.

leadership role the administrator may attempt to play. At its best, negotiated agreements can clarify the roles of teachers and administrators and provide for each.<sup>135</sup>

Leaders of the school administrators' professional association, Forrest E. Conner and George B. Redfern, are equally sanguine in their belief

that negotiation is not necessarily a destructive process and there is a distinct possibility that it may be shaped so that it may actually strengthen teacher-administrator-board member relationships.<sup>136</sup>

While negotiation is a relatively recent force in the administration of schools, the manner in which administrators accept and adjust to its challenges will largely determine whether it develops into a persistently disruptive influence or becomes a constructive element in the administrative process.<sup>137</sup>

The trained superintendent has a concept of his proper role based on professional preparation, prior experience as a teacher, interaction with other superintendents, and on-the-job experience with staff, school board, and the community. Even if the negotiations movement challenges the superintendent's leadership, other modes of joint decision-making can co-exist with negotiations. Both administrators and employees find it to their advantage to deal with local

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<sup>135</sup>Roald F. Campbell *et al.* *Introduction to Educational Administration* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971), p. 156.

<sup>136</sup>American Association of School Administrators, *The School Administrator and Negotiations* (Washington, D.C.: The Association, 1968), p. 5.

<sup>137</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 6.

issues at unit or building level. This is the subject of the next section.

Joint Decision-Making Outside  
Negotiations

Years before negotiation was mandated, in many districts teachers participated in decision-making on an informal basis known variously as *advisory consultation*, *joint committees*, or *informal negotiation*--different terms for substantially the same thing. As there was no legal requirement to do so, this began as a good-will gesture of the board or administration when it was approached by a representative group of teachers. The usual practice was limited to considerations of a salary committee, through which teacher representatives advised the board of their salary hopes for the upcoming year. Such advisory bodies have a long if obscure history.<sup>138</sup> Both sides recognize that real decision powers remain with the board, but this gesture in the human relations tradition may have a positive effect on teacher morale.

Richard Wynn<sup>139</sup> has urged the spread of *informal negotiation*, which he defines as "informal customs of

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<sup>138</sup>To the writer's knowledge, this practice existed in Winnetka, Illinois, in 1930. Other districts may have preceded it.

<sup>139</sup>D. Richard Wynn, *Policies of Educational Negotiation Problems and Issues* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1967).

faculty-board collaboration in attempting to reach agreement on matters of mutual concern."<sup>140</sup> With no official agreement nor impasse procedure, no formal designation of spokesmen nor threat of strike or lockout, the board "negotiates" (Wynn's term) with teachers as a faculty, not as a teacher organization. Complexities of formal bargaining are put aside in favor of informal discussion. Wynn does not say if such a low-key approach is feasible after both sides experience bargaining. In fact, although informal negotiation embodies some of the best features of conflict resolution, the national trend is toward an increase in adversary-type collective bargaining.

Advisory consultation is not a thing of the past, however. Thomas Love<sup>141</sup> surveyed the extent to which such "alternate decision processes" coexist with collective negotiations. Nationally he found that personnel policy, especially salary, is negotiated to a much greater extent than is educational policy, although bargaining of the latter is growing. Love distinguishes between bargaining *personnel* policies of teacher welfare and conditions of employment (per statute) and bargaining *educational* policies,

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<sup>140</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>141</sup>Thomas M. Love, "The Impact of Teacher Negotiations on School System Decision-Making" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1968).

whose negotiability is not mandated. He claims that the case for negotiating *educational* policies turns on recognition of teachers' training and professional experience. Because such recognition is slow in coming, teachers must rely on non-negotiation processes (like advisory consultation or informal negotiation) to help make educational decisions:

The enlargement of the teachers' role gives them greater control over decision processes and greater influence over the outcome of decision-making by imposing constraints on the discretion of administrators and school boards.<sup>142</sup>

As one who favors negotiation in principle, Love says that "negotiation can enlarge the teachers' role without hampering or destroying the functions of administration or the school board."<sup>143</sup> He acknowledges, however, that administrators fear negotiation will impair their managerial function.

It might seem that if education management had made judicious use of advisory consultation in the past, the confrontation aspects of subsequent hard bargaining could be reduced or avoided altogether. However, an authority on negotiation, Wesley A. Wildman, observes an interesting paradox in the use of consultation, an adjunct of what he calls "democratic administration":

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<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 179.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181.

It appears at least conceivable that in some situations democratic administration of any enterprise may actually hasten the process of organization and power accumulation. There are indications that where democratic administration is practiced, participation of subordinates is often an uncertain privilege and that unless the right is guaranteed, it tends to be withdrawn; strong desire may exist within homogeneous employee groups to convert privilege to right.<sup>144</sup>

So there is some belief that consultation, whatever its label, has speeded the process of teachers' organizing for bargaining and accumulating power. Although employees would not choose consultation as a substitute for bargaining, this does not rule out its co-existence as a supplement. Professional employees particularly want to be consulted, to feel they have a voice in decision-making.

#### Joint Committees for Consultation

While Love's study was under way, Groty<sup>145</sup> undertook a similar investigation limited to Southeastern Michigan and using different terminology. Instead of advisory consultation, he speaks of teacher-administration *joint committees*. Groty found that, since negotiation was mandated in Michigan in 1965, many districts have formed joint committees to

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<sup>144</sup>Wesley A. Wildman, "Implications of Teacher Bargaining for School Administration," *Phi Delta Kappan*, XLVI (4), (December 1964), 152-158, p. 154.

<sup>145</sup>Charles Keith Groty, "The Utilization of Contractually Established Joint Committees in Selected Michigan School Districts" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1970).

discuss a range of issues, especially working conditions and curriculum--an odd pairing. This procedure has its virtues. The school board nearly always accepts the resultant recommendations and the confrontation aspect of bargaining is avoided.

Although joint committees operate outside the bargaining process, teacher members are chosen by the teacher organization which is recognized for bargaining. Groty, who sees promise in expanding this kind of decision-making to coexist with negotiations, says of his findings, "at least half the joint committee recommendations accepted by the board of education were on topics for which the school district administration formerly had the sole responsibility in decision-making."<sup>146</sup>

Non-negotiation decision processes, by whatever term they are known, have much to commend them. Participants are almost always from the local district. There is less of the strain which occurs when board and superintendent encounter "their" teachers as adversaries. (In formal negotiations in Michigan, specialists from outside the district are widely used. With a budget of \$7 million, the Michigan Education Association has about a hundred negotiation specialists on call to local associations. Typically an MEA Uniserv specialist confronts the school board's outside negotiation

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<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

specialist. This highly institutionalized arrangement has evolved partly from the need for a teacher and his administrative superior to sit down and discuss problems of immediate concern as fellow professionals.)

Over the years, school systems have grown into hierarchies. Education management has possibly failed to recognize fully the expertise of better-educated teachers. That teachers have a right to participate in policy formation is now generally acknowledged. There may be need for an accommodation between hierarchical and collegial control. (Recall Durkheim's fear of "tightly knit colleague groups, eager to defend occupational prerogatives from invasion.") Teachers are turned off by pseudo-participation, like faculty meetings to choose the decor of the teachers' lounge. For now, negotiation appears to be the primary means of getting this accommodation since, in the public interest, abuses of power can be remedied by corrective legislative action or court decisions. As an adjunct to bargaining, advisory consultation--which runs from paternalism to truly democratic administration--might seem outdated. When consultation is not mandatory, management simply "forgets" to consult.

Wildman observes that procedures for consultation are being *negotiated*, procedures to give teachers a share in matters of concern outside the negotiated agreement:

For instance, a number of contracts have provided for the establishment of committees for a wide variety of research, deliberative, and decision-making purposes embracing such subjects as curriculum, methodology, textbook selection, promotion to the principalship, screening and recommendations of candidates for openings at any level in the system, including the superintendency, methods of achieving pupil and teacher integration in the system, pupil discipline, and many more.<sup>147</sup>

Advisory consultation does not contribute to a climate of rancor, confrontation, and showdown which frequently characterize adversary relationships. It obviates an organization's need to demonstrate annually its ability to make gains, justifying itself with the membership. In the extreme when authority is confused with absolute power and the thought of compromise via negotiation is repugnant, consultation offers an alternative. It avoids legalistic hangups over what is personnel policy and what is educational policy. It does not require a show of power before either side can present matters of vital concern. When management's undeniable legal duty to manage is questioned or when the state teachers' organization is viewed as an alien influence, advisory consultation (informal negotiation, joint committees) among local people is a benign and non-threatening supplement to bargaining.

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<sup>147</sup>Wesley A. Wildman, "Teachers and Collective Negotiations," in Albert A. Blum (ed.), *White Collar Workers, op. cit.*, p. 156.

Groty's research, cited above, found that joint committees or advisory consultation not only coexist but "enhance" collective negotiations in Michigan. Although the quality of such arrangements is not easily determined, the extent of consultation statewide is a subject of inquiry in the present study.

#### Management by Objectives

One scheme of joint decision-making which is favorably regarded in business and industry is *management by objectives*. It is gaining currency in educational administration through the interest of the American Association of School Administrators, which published *Management by Objectives and Results*.<sup>148</sup> This booklet acknowledges that MBO/R is difficult to apply, partly because of the requisite "paper work" and because employees are generally resistant to performance appraisal. AASA further acknowledges that "some teacher organizations have gone on record as resisting the introduction of MBO/R."<sup>149</sup>

Perhaps the best definition of this process is the one developed by its originator, George Odiorne:

The system of management by objective can be described as a process whereby the superior and subordinate jointly identify goals, define individual major areas of responsibility in terms of

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<sup>148</sup> Arlington, Va.: The Association, 1973.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

results expected of him, and use these measures as guides for operating the unit and assessing the contribution of each of its members.<sup>150</sup>

Like accountability schemes, there is nothing in management by objectives which is intrinsically contrary to employees' particular interests, but impetus to apply either of them is more likely to originate with management than with employees. Thus, as a process of joint decision-making outside negotiations, management by objectives is included because it permits the individuals affected to share in decision-making and related strategies of implementation. Even the *process* itself can be the subject of negotiation. To the extent there is recognition of the "importance of having subordinates participate in the determination of objectives,"<sup>151</sup> management by objectives is one form of participative management--joint decision-making outside negotiations.

#### Managerial Role of the Superintendent

By virtue of his occupational role, the school superintendent is considered a leader. Whether or not it is coercive, his ability to exert leadership is subject to various constraints, collective negotiations being among

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<sup>150</sup>George S. Odiorne, *Management by Objectives* (New York: Pitman Publishing Co., 1965), p. 55.

<sup>151</sup>*Management by Objectives and Results, op. cit.*, p. 44.

them. There is some belief the emergent role of the superintendent will be that of *manager*, in which case instructional leadership is played down or abandoned completely. In this section, these possibilities are examined, along with the supporting evidence.

#### Leader Behavior of Superintendents

It is generally believed that we need enlightened and responsible leaders--at every level and in every phase of our national life. Everyone says so. But the nature of leadership in our society is very imperfectly understood, and many of the public statements about it are utter nonsense [John W. Gardner].

Superintendents--like military officers--are endowed with "leadership," a quality which, until the emergence of administrative theory, went largely undefined because its meaning was believed self-evident. A characteristic of definitions which focus on the relationship between leaders and followers (superiors and subordinates) is that leadership is recognized and conferred by followers. If the follower declines to recognize the other--his symbiotic partner--as a leader, that individual cannot insist on some vague right of recognition as his due. With collective bargaining, militant teachers decline to recognize the superintendent's leadership, particularly his instructional leadership. In some quarters, there is conjecture that this may lead to redefining the superintendent's role so he becomes more of

a general manager and less of an instructional leader.<sup>152</sup> The term *managerial role* of the superintendent is gaining currency as a design for the future, especially because collective negotiations has led to an erosion of the chief school officer's discretionary power.

For years, empirical research into leadership has moved away from the morass of personality traits and has focused instead on leader behavior. An Ohio State research group undertook several studies of leader behavior and developed a Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire. In one study Andrew Halpin<sup>153</sup> investigated leader behavior and leadership ideology of school superintendents. He identified the potential role conflict which occurs when the superintendent's two major reference groups--the school board and the professional staff--hold incompatible expectations for how the superintendent should behave:

Should he respond principally to the expectations of his board or to those of his staff? Or should he "be his own man" and persist in his own style of leadership irrespective of what either board or staff may wish? These practical questions plague most school administrators and are of equal concern to those responsible for their pre-service and in-service training.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>152</sup>Peter Coleman, "The Future Role of the School Administrator," *Interchange*, 3 (4), (1972), 53-64.

<sup>153</sup>Andrew W. Halpin, *The Leadership Behavior of School Superintendents* (Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago, 1959).

<sup>154</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 4.

Halpin points out that how people believe a superintendent *should* behave is related to how they perceive he *does* behave. Thus, *ideal* and *real* behavior are linked. Also the superintendent's description of his own behavior may not accord with the perceptions of his board and teachers. A leader must contribute to the dual objectives of goal achievement and group maintenance, to score high in initiating structure and consideration. To define these two concepts:

Initiating Structure refers to the leader's behavior in delineating the relationship between himself and members of the work group, and in endeavoring to establish well-defined patterns of organization, channels of communication, and methods of procedure. Consideration refers to behavior indicative of friendship, mutual trust, respect, and warmth in the relationship between the leader and the members of his staff.<sup>155</sup>

When Halpin applied the instrument to fifty superintendents (in Ohio prior to collective negotiations), it was found

the leader's description of his own leadership behavior and his concept of what his behavior should be, have little relationship to others' perceptions of his behavior. In the case of school superintendents, this is especially true in respect to Consideration.<sup>156</sup>

This is to say that the individual administrator rates himself higher on consideration than his subordinates rate him.

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<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.

The twin dimensions of initiating structure and consideration are not ranked along a continuum but are separate and discrete dimensions. The ideal leader scores high on both dimensions, adjusting his behavior between them as the situation requires. Taken together, initiating structure and consideration actually account for a small percentage of the superintendent's total behavior, but strength in one or the other provides a line of demarcation for characterizing types of administrators. Modern concepts of leadership are not limited to behavior of the organization's nominal head but also give attention to the quality of group leadership. This is especially relevant for groups of "professionals" like teachers.

#### Leadership, Administration and Management

What Warren Bennis once said may still be true: "Probably more has been written and less is known about leadership than about any other topic in the behavioral sciences." Bennis defines leadership as "the process by which an agent induces a subordinate to behave in a desired manner."<sup>157</sup> The context indicates that the superintendent can be considered the agent of school management.

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<sup>157</sup>Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth Benne, and Robert Chin, *The Planning of Change* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), p. 440.

The concept of leadership is elusive, particularly the relationship between the leader and his constituent group. It has been said (source unknown) that the leader is not different from the group; he is the same "only more so." Whether or not such a cryptic comment is informative, in most concepts the leader is held responsible for the organizational climate, the pattern of social interaction which characterizes an organization. One observation on organizational climate points up the difference between reality and people's perception of reality. Halpin and Croft offer an important postulate which influenced their research:

We have assumed that how the leader *really* behaves is less important than how the members of his group perceive that he behaves; it is their perception of this behavior that will determine the behavior of the group members, and will hence define the Organizational Climate.<sup>158</sup>

Some observers distinguish between leader behavior and administrative behavior:

. . . Leaders are direction changers, pace setters, and catalysts for change. Administrators, on the other hand, are employed to *maintain* an organization, to keep it on a predetermined course, and to be effective and efficient within an established framework. Good administrators are valuable and

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<sup>158</sup>Andrew W. Halpin and Don B. Croft, *The Organizational Climate of Schools* (Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago, 1963), p. 12.

many exist. Leaders, though more essential to survival, are scarce. . . .<sup>159</sup>

Such a distinction permits the conception of leadership *beyond administration* if the superintendent is to be the director of change. (The literature of educational administration, however, usually treats leadership as subsumed under administration.)

Among others, Lipham<sup>160</sup> distinguishes between leadership and administration. In his formulation, the leader initiates new structures and changes existing arrangements. In contrast, the administrator maintains existing structures to achieve an organizational goal. So one is concerned with effecting change and the other, with maintaining stability. Although Lipham's view is not dominant in educational administration, it seems that the negotiations movement has reduced the superintendent's leadership, since it has reduced his initiative to make changes unilaterally and since militant teachers now decline to confer leadership on him. Of course, expectations for the superintendent's leadership vary from one community to another.

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<sup>159</sup>John A. Granito, "Preparing School Leaders for Educational Change," *Journal of Research and Development in Education*, 5 (3), (Spring, 1972), 67.

<sup>160</sup>James M. Lipham, "Leadership and Administration," in *Behavioral Science and Educational Administration* (Chicago: National Society for the Study of Education, 1964), pp. 119-141.

Egon Guba also distinguishes between administration and leadership.<sup>161</sup> As Guba conceives it, administration is concerned with implementing present policy--with goal attainment. Leadership is concerned with examining and improving existing goals--with goal setting. Thus administration operates in a time frame of here and now, while leadership operates in a future time frame and would change the here and now by improving it.

It is difficult for any group to "accept" leadership which does not fit its expectations. It seems likely that school administrators will encounter increased difficulty in asserting their "right" to set new goals for the schools. Even prior to collective negotiations, if teachers were determined to do so, they could make the most exemplary principal look ineffectual.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> Referred to in Fred D. Carver and Thomas J. Sergiovanni (eds.), *Organizations and Human Behavior: Focus on Schools* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1969), p. 180.

<sup>162</sup> At Ohio State University, research into leader behavior of principals led to one unsettling finding: "Experience had shown us how futile it was to assign a principal with high scores on both Consideration and Initiating Structure to a school whose faculty was not quite ready to accept a leader who, at least from our point of view, was likely to be effective. The group could immobilize him, especially in a situation where the teachers held tenure and the principal did not." [Andrew W. Halpin, *Theory and Research in Administration* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966), p. 132.]

In a similar vein, Getzels, Lipham, and Campbell<sup>163</sup> point out that the superintendent's right to authority is based on rational grounds, as opposed to traditional or charismatic grounds. It rests on superior knowledge and skill which are legitimate forms of power. But increased size of school systems increases the social distance between superintendent and teacher, which can create tension in the organization. Corwin<sup>164</sup> studied routine staff conflicts in public high schools in Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana. He found that the rate of authority problems and the rate of conflict between administrators and teachers increase with "layering," the number of authority levels in the system. As educational organizations grow larger, an increase in "layering" is to be expected, bringing with it a concern for territoriality or boundary maintenance. People develop impulses to protect their "turf," to protect what they perceive as self interest without regard for the greater public interest.

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<sup>163</sup> Jacob W. Getzels, James M. Lipham, and Roald F. Campbell, *Educational Administration as a Social Process* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 133-150.

<sup>164</sup> Ronald G. Corwin, "Patterns of Organizational Systems," in Koya Azumi and Jerald Hage, *Organizational Systems* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1973), pp. 397-411.

In a study of the elementary school principalship, Gross and Herriott<sup>165</sup> offer a definition which also applies to superintendents. What they call Executive Professional Leadership refers to

the efforts of an executive of a professionally staffed organization to conform to a definition of his role that stresses his obligation to improve the quality of staff performance.<sup>166</sup>

This definition clearly focuses on leader *behavior* as the mark of leadership and is consistent with the thought that leadership is a dyadic influence process.

Unfortunately the social change which the negotiation movement wrought has led many superintendents to perceive the sharing of power with teachers as a derogation of administration. Traditionally the superintendent has played a balancing role as he deals with different demands from his several audiences. What is new is that teacher power for the first time gives teachers parity with the school board and powerful community groups. An anthropologist, George Spindler, comments on the school administrator's role:

His job is in large part that of maintaining a working equilibrium of at best antagonistically cooperative forces. This is one of the reasons why school administrators are rarely outspoken protagonists of a consistent and vigorously

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<sup>165</sup>Neal Gross and Robert E. Herriott, *Staff Leadership in Public Schools: A Sociological Inquiry* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965).

<sup>166</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 22.

profiled point of view. Given the nature of our culture and social system, and the close connection between the public and the schools he cannot alienate significant segments of that public and stay in business.<sup>167</sup>

Not every observer would agree with the force of this judgment but having to play "a balancing role" places leadership under considerable constraint.

A school board attorney and close observer of negotiations, Thomas A. Shannon, claims there are several ways in which today's school administrator differs from the administrator of a decade ago. Among them, Shannon cites the following:

- He is under the law; he may no longer safely presume that he *is* the law.
- He has had to abandon a paternalistic stance and endorse participatory democracy; but he must still be a leader.
- He is exposed to a great many pressures from militant groups and must develop expertise in working closely and effectively with a wide spectrum of citizen groups.
- He works under a school board that is closer to the people and more political than boards used to be.<sup>168</sup>

Although it has not developed much strength, a movement is under way which questions the necessity of

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<sup>167</sup>George Spindler (ed.), *Education and Culture: Anthropological Approaches* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963), p. 238.

<sup>168</sup>Thomas A. Shannon, "The New Professionalism of School Administration--A School Attorney's Point of View," *Thrust*, 2 (3), (Winter 1972), 38-42.

superintendents' being "educators." An article in an influential journal<sup>169</sup> claims that, among the general public and among school boards, there are growing suggestions that persons trained in business administration may make better superintendents than those trained in educational administration. The rise of teacher militancy is cited as a reason for this belief. One California district ignored state certification requirements to appoint a person with a business background. (In Michigan, there is no license requirement for a superintendent beyond teacher certification, so state law poses a minimal barrier.)

#### Defining the Managerial Role

From the full range of definitions of *management* and *managerial role*, it is possible to select for display those which fit particular biases. For example:

Management is defined here as the accomplishment of desired objectives by establishing an environment favorable to performance by people operating in organized groups.<sup>170</sup>

In any organization, management's task is to develop and coordinate the willing efforts of employees in accomplishing organizational aims.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> "Would Your District Be Better Off with a Superintendent Who's a Businessman--Not an Educator?" *American School Board Journal*, 160 (2), (February 1973), 19-25.

<sup>170</sup> Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, *Principles of Management* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), p. 1.

<sup>171</sup> Paul Pigors (ed.), *Management of Human Resources* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), p. 1.

The role of the manager can be visualized as a dynamic interplay between environmental forces and pressures operating on the manager and forces originating from within the manager, his values, personality, and aspirations. Role conflict is inescapable, for there is really no way that a manager can harmonize perfectly the competing pressures emanating from within and from without.<sup>172</sup>

When authority is applied in an organization according to Douglas McGregor's Theory Y,<sup>173</sup> the manager-as-leader induces others to work to achieve the organization's purposes. Both his and the subordinates' jobs focus on goal attainment, but this is not set as a personal requirement of the manager. The interdependence of leader and subordinates is acknowledged; the leader acts to give evidence of his dependence on the subordinates. Also, he integrates the needs of subordinates with those of management. In playing the dual role of representing management to the subordinates and representing the subordinates to management, in a forced choice he must give higher value to the latter role, in McGregor's opinion.

McGregor urged that "management by objectives" is one way of acting according to Theory Y:

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<sup>172</sup> Douglas McGregor, *The Professional Manager* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), p. 55.

<sup>173</sup> The system of democratic-humanitarian values in which conditions are created so members can achieve personal goals by directing effort toward organizational goals.

The motivation, the potential for development, the capacity for assuming responsibility, the readiness to direct behavior toward organizational goals are all present in people. Management does not put them there. It is a responsibility of management to make it possible for people to recognize and develop these human characteristics for themselves.<sup>174</sup>

It would seem that *if* collective negotiations can further the professionalization of teaching, then shared decision-making by education management and professional employees is consistent with McGregor's idea of participatory and consultative management. In McGregor's view, the professionalization of management has not yet been achieved.

Prior to the onset of teacher negotiations, Roald Campbell observed a characteristic of educational administration which makes it different from administration in other areas. As Campbell noted:

The staff . . . appears to be somewhat different for the educational administrator than for many other administrators. In the first place, many members of the staff have had as much formal training as the administrator. Often this training and subsequent experience give these staff members considerable confidence in how well they are doing their jobs. The educational administrator, then, is working with professionals who feel, often rightly, that they know more about teaching and learning than he does.<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>174</sup>Pigors, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

<sup>175</sup>Roald F. Campbell, "What Peculiarities in Educational Administration Make It a Special Case?" in Andrew W. Halpin (ed.), *Administrative Theory in Education* (Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago, 1958), p. 178.

In defining the managerial role, it may be noted that management and administration have not always meant the same thing nor been regarded as equally favorable terms. In a recent publication of the American Association of School Administrators, it is said,

Until recently school executives viewed *management* as a demeaning term that emphasized the mechanical aspects and failed to recognize the leadership dimensions of their positions.<sup>176</sup>

Now the word is used increasingly and interchangeably with administration. Oddly, Ronald Corwin defines administration as "activity devoted simply to maintaining the day-to-day operation of the organization."<sup>177</sup> This seems to be a minimal sort of caretaker activity, devoid of leadership, a discount. Perhaps the matter should be decided not by words but by *operational* definitions.

Abandoning a traditional concern for the substance of education, if the superintendent gives up being an "educational expert"--which is how the community probably regards him--he would be embarking on a course whose full implications are hard to foresee. It was stated earlier that a managerial role for the superintendent minimizes

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<sup>176</sup>American Association of School Administrators, *Management by Objectives and Results* (Arlington, Va.: The Association, 1973), p. 1.

<sup>177</sup>Ronald G. Corwin, "Education and the Sociology of Complex Organizations," in Donald A. Hansen and Joel E. Gerstl (eds.), *On Education--Sociological Perspectives* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 177.

instructional leadership if "leadership" means recognition which followers or subordinates freely give. But how a managerial role for the school superintendent will evolve is not clear.

The question arises: If superintendents adopt a managerial role, *in ideology* will they be more like managers in other fields or like teachers? In one study, Miner compared "managerial motivation" of managers in business with students of education and students of educational administration.<sup>178</sup> Using the characteristics of managers in business as criteria, he found that students with career goals in education administration had no more managerial motivation than those primarily interested in teaching. Although this study ignores the question of "fit" between criteria from business and from education, it suggests there is little difference between would-be teachers and would-be managers among education students. While Miner does not make this interpretation, it seems likely that such differences as develop may be attributed in some degree to the effects of *role*.

Since the phenomenon of teacher negotiations effectively ended the assumption that administrators

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<sup>178</sup>John B. Miner, "The Managerial Motivation of School Administrators," *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 4 (1), (Winter 1968), 55-71.

are the teachers' chosen leaders and spokesmen, an alternative role is for administrators to become managers in Max Weber's bureaucratic sense. As the formal organization, the school board conferred on the administrators their status as *officers* which continues, while the teacher organization now withdraws their status as *leaders*.

Prior to negotiations, in the past, superintendent and school board occasionally had difficulty defining their respective jurisdictions. The literature of administration often concerned drawing the line between the superintendent's and the board's areas of responsibility. This has proved to be a highly permeable boundary, since the board-administration increasingly functions as a single entity--management. The real boundary is between education management and employees. Former concern for the relationship between the professional executive and his lay bosses is now moot.

A legalistic view of the superintendent's status as manager is not especially informative. Writing on "The Statutory Status of the Public School Superintendent," Vlaanderen offers the following opinion:

Legislatures, for the most part, see superintendents as management but without management's prerogatives. State statutes leave the role of the superintendent in negotiation to the discretion of each local board. . . . Early bargaining sessions between boards and teachers found the superintendent serving in an advisory capacity

to both parties. The trend since then has been for the superintendent to serve the board only, and in some instances to have negotiating authority. The schism between teacher and superintendent, then, is broadening in practice and is being widened by legislation.<sup>179</sup>

In time, a "new breed" of superintendents, who have known the office only under conditions of negotiation (since 1965), will succeed those who went to the bargaining table with little preparation for what lay in store. Perhaps by what they do they will define the managerial role. (In the extensive literature of educational administration, despite frequent reference to it, there is no discernible effort to define the term.) Acknowledging the need for something better, the definition which appears earlier in the present study is repeated:

The *managerial role* is one of planning, organizing, directing, and controlling activities which will lead to an effective fulfillment of the schools' objectives.<sup>180</sup>

#### Controversy over the Managerial Role

Acknowledging that the school superintendent's role in instructional leadership is under attack, some observers express serious doubts about embracing a managerial role

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<sup>179</sup>Russell B. Vlaanderen in M. Chester Nolte (ed.), *Law and the School Superintendent* (Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Co., 1971), pp. 37-38.

<sup>180</sup>Chapter I, p. 5.

which all but eliminates concern for the substance of education:

There are those who maintain that the contemporary administrator is a manager, and the schools would be better served if administration were divorced from program leadership, evaluation, and development. Like the hospital administrator, who performs managerial responsibilities, the educational administrator should really be a manager. . . .<sup>181</sup>

Goldhammer and his survey team reveal what seems to be their preference:

There are still others who maintain that the educational enterprise is unique among the governmental functions of society, and the role of the educational administrator continues to be one which relates all aspects of management and operations to instructional effectiveness. The educational administrator, they hold, is primarily the administrator of an educational program, and he can be proficient in managing all other phases of the school program only to the extent that his central focus and competency are in the field of education.<sup>182</sup>

As of 1967, the Goldhammer team reported that superintendents nationally perceive teacher militancy as a major problem for the superintendent. Boards and superintendents often described themselves as "neophytes and amateurs" in bargaining. It was also said that "the role of educational management in the negotiations process is not, as yet, well

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<sup>181</sup>Keith Goldhammer *et al.* *Issues and Problems in Contemporary Educational Administration* (Eugene, Oregon: Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, University of Oregon, 1967), pp. 2-3.

<sup>182</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 3.

established."<sup>183</sup> A few metropolitan districts reported that as many as 600 clock hours per year are spent in negotiation, raising the question whether board members and superintendents can afford to spend so many hours in direct involvement. (Perhaps such expenditures of time speed the development of the new profession of negotiation specialists.) The Goldhammer team reported that some superintendents welcomed teacher militancy, saying that "the participation of teachers in the decision-making processes . . . is something which they have been trying to accomplish for a long time."<sup>184</sup>

Goldhammer *et al.* conclude that

management in education is considerably behind industry which . . . has come to accept unionism as an instrument for protecting the workers' proprietary interest in their jobs. . . .

Even if superintendents want to deal effectively with teacher groups in the new fashion, they find virtually no established technology or experience in education which they can use as guides for establishing procedures for negotiations, grievance committees, consultative management, and group decision-making.<sup>185</sup>

### The Manager as Leader

Among other ways of considering it, management may be thought of as a process of leadership. Cummings provides an interesting definition:

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<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 132.

Leadership is the process of interaction wherein one person influences thoughts, feelings and behavior of another person or persons (e.g., a group of subordinates) in the pursuit of a common goal. The manager as a leader utilizes the resources at his command to motivate and direct the activities of others toward the achievement of the aims of a goal-oriented organization. . . .<sup>186</sup>

Besides setting goals, the leader mediates between potentially conflicting perceptions of what the organization should be doing.

Luvern Cunningham, borrowing from Milton Rokeach, applies the concept of "open" and "closed" belief systems to administration.<sup>187</sup> Administrators with "open" belief systems regard authority in terms of cognitive correctness, have a rational understanding of power, a positive feeling toward others regardless of their beliefs, and seldom feel self-esteem is threatened. In contrast, administrators with "closed" belief systems regard authority as absolute. He describes an encounter with such a person, a principal:

The thought of bargaining with teachers on matters traditionally considered to be in his domain was obviously repugnant. In this case, clear indicators of a "closed" belief system were present: authority was absolute, resided in the office, and was presently being threatened.<sup>188</sup>

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<sup>186</sup>L. L. Cummings in Walter G. Hack (ed.), *Educational Administration* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971), pp. 186-187.

<sup>187</sup>Luvern L. Cunningham, "Collective Negotiations and the Principalship," *Theory into Practice*, 7 (April 1968), 62-70.

<sup>188</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 66.

Cunningham cites the administrator's ability to manipulate his administrative environment:

He can accept collective action on the part of teachers as another fact of administrative life and incorporate that phenomenon into the leadership strategies he has developed through experience.<sup>188</sup>

Departing from concern with the present, Cunningham predicts:

Preparation programs for administrative posts in education, especially the principalship and superintendency level positions, will need to include substantial work in superior-subordinate relationships in complex social organizations.<sup>190</sup>

In conclusion, Cunningham cites what he views as growing tension between legal or bureaucratic authority *and* collegial or professional authority. He sees a need for research on negotiation's impact on school system productivity and on the possibility that negotiations may lead to some positive benefits.

Looking beyond what he calls "bureaucratic leadership," Warren Bennis observes that every age develops organizational forms which are appropriate to its life and time.<sup>191</sup> Doubting that bureaucracy is consistent with contemporary reality, Bennis cites a change in managerial values toward humanistic-democratic practices. Accordingly

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<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>191</sup> Warren G. Bennis, "Post-Bureaucratic Leadership," *Trans-action*, 6 (9), (July-August 1969), 44-51, 61.

he sees a change in the leadership requirements for organizations of the future. Leadership will increasingly be a process which requires at least as much managerial as substantive competence:

It can also be said that leadership of modern organizations depends on new forms of knowledge and skills not necessarily related to the primary task of the organization. In short, the pivotal function in the leader's role has changed away from a sole concern with the substantive to an emphasis on the interpersonal and organizational processes.<sup>192</sup>

. . . It is quaint to think that one man, no matter how omniscient and omnipotent, can comprehend, let alone control, the diversity and complexity of the modern organization.<sup>193</sup>

In Mary Parker Follett's term, a leader is one who can bring about a "creative synthesis" among differing codes of conduct. To borrow Clark Kerr's description of the ideal university president, perhaps the superintendent, too, should be a "mediator-initiator." Similarly, Bennis has said that "effective leadership depends primarily on mediating between the individual and the organization in such a way that both can obtain maximum satisfaction."<sup>194</sup> Aside

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<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46. If this generalization were applied to the management of schools, the superintendent of the future need not be an expert on "education."

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>194</sup> Warren G. Bennis, *Changing Organizations* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966), p. 66.

from being nicely turned, what these and similar expressions have in common is that leadership does not rely on position authority. Indeed the latest idea in organization development, Bennis has said, focuses on *mutual* influence between leaders and followers. Whether this may develop from (or is precluded by) collective negotiations remains to be seen. This much is known: The illusion that teachers freely accept the superintendent's professional leadership has been destroyed.

#### Predicting the Future

In an excursion into educational futurism, the 1985 committee of the National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration predicts the concept of administration as a process of conflict resolution will be well-established by then.<sup>195</sup> Forecasting the nature of "The School Administrator in 1985," Robert Ohm looks for a surge of interest in administration for conflict resolution.<sup>196</sup> He sees older human relations and participatory modes operating by grace of management, quite different from collective power which the new militancy has won for subordinates:

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<sup>195</sup>In Walter G. Hack (ed.), *Educational Futurism 1985* (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Co., 1971).

<sup>196</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 93-108.

The administrator of the future will work in a changing, conflictive decision system so complex and sophisticated that the old notions of hierarchy and authority will hardly apply.<sup>197</sup>

Ohm foresees greater use of strategic game theory but, because role overload is endemic in administration, administrators will need "self-insight as well as extensive coping mechanisms for the increase in stress that can be predicted for educational organizations of the future."<sup>198</sup> He visualizes the administrator working in organization development, as the need for goal setting increases beyond current levels.

Ohm forecasts several related concepts will be thriving by 1985:

- The administrator as organizational diagnostician or clinical student of organization, hence as trainer in organizational processes;
- Twin concepts of administration as a research process and research as an administrative process;
- Future educational organizations will be open systems.

One notes that these functions can be subsumed within the managerial role. It seems probable that the superintendency will move toward greater concern for organization development, systems analysis, conflict resolution, and the like.

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<sup>197</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 101.

<sup>198</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 102.

It is said that education management is promulgating teacher accountability as a counterforce to negotiations. Administrators criticize "the union" (now a generic term) and question that collective bargaining and professionalism are compatible. While the long trend toward professionalizing teaching continues, educators differ as to negotiations' effects on professionalism. Some accountability proposals limit teacher autonomy and technical authority, by introducing external controls and reverting to close supervision. Considering the general rise in teacher competence over years, such accountability proposals may be considered regressive.

On the other hand, a union's prime obligation is to serve its members' welfare. It remains to be seen if this purpose can be combined with a *professional* association's capacity to be self-regulating and sensitive to the public interest. Observers note that schools are moving toward collegial authority--colleague control--like that in higher education.<sup>199</sup> As in the university, accountability proposals would arrest that movement.

Accountability has important implications for the superintendent's role. In the tension between teacher autonomy and managerial control, the superintendent is on the side of control as an assertion of administrative

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<sup>199</sup>Jean Hills, "On Accountability in Education," *Administrator's Notebook*, 21 (6), (1973), 1-4.

authority. Hanson argues that an impending collision between accountability and collective bargaining will lead to a dual authority structure, in which formal authority will be divided between administrators and teachers:

The practice of negotiating agreements between administrators and teachers endows the latter with status as a parallel source of managerial control.<sup>200</sup>

Collegial authority may be set back in education just as it is coming on in business. There, collegial or participatory management is loosely structured, playing down hierarchical authority but maintaining centralized budget and financial controls. Middle managers are encouraged to take new initiatives which impact on the total organization.

Harlan Cleveland foresees collegial management as the way of the future. He predicts many kinds of organizations will become "interlaced webs of tension in which control is loose, power diffused, and centers of decision plural."<sup>201</sup> The vertical organization, he predicts, will wither with the emergence of the horizontal, into which more people can inject their views for decision-making. The future public executive should be willing to maintain viable disagreements whose complexity goes beyond mere

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<sup>200</sup>Mark Hanson, "The Emerging Control Structure of Schools," *Administrator's Notebook*, 21 (2), (1972), 3.

<sup>201</sup>Harlan Cleveland, *The Future Executive: A Guide for Tomorrow's Managers* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 13.

two-sidedness. This implies change in the usual executive role. Collective bargaining has a different effect, consolidating authority on two sides and even causing it to peak, as when big union and big management engage each other as adversaries. In public education, an increase in multi-district bargaining may take this form.

For years teachers have expected to be meaningfully involved in professional decisions. To be regarded as true professionals, they are not properly the object of educational decision-making but participants in it. Corwin's research<sup>202</sup> shows that the more professional the teacher, the more militant he is in relationships with others. If teachers sent out warnings of discontent before they moved to get bargaining power, school management generally missed their signals. (Yet, in Michigan as Chapter III details, collective negotiations and its accompanying power came to teachers largely as a windfall.)

To survive in the future, the administrator needs to understand the dynamics of teacher-administrator conflict and the nature of organized power. He needs to know how to avoid contributing to teacher militancy. If this seems a one-sided burden, the well-known vulnerability of administrators has no counterpart for teachers.

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<sup>202</sup>Willard R. Lane, Ronald G. Corwin, and William G. Monahan, *Foundations of Educational Administration* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967), pp. 409-419.

In *The School Managers*, McCarty and Ramsey offer a succinct comment on the administrator's vulnerability:

The average tenure of the superintendent in the United States is 3.7 years, hardly a satisfactory basis for the chief administrator of such an important agency. Such brief tenure hardly encourages long range plans, experimental programs which may fail, or leadership on controversial issues.<sup>203</sup>

(A) superintendent of schools is obliged to choose how he will act if conflict arises. It is our contention that there are at least a few who consciously, or unconsciously, solve this dilemma by succumbing to the dominant ethos.<sup>204</sup>

When superintendents reflect how negotiations has changed their job, the operative word usually is "authority." They feel they have the same responsibility as before but operate now with diminished authority. New superintendents, accepting negotiations as a fact of their worklife, do not have to make the adjustments of those who were already in place when bargaining engulfed them. There may be major changes in the structures by which educational services are provided. As collective negotiations matures, new and creative resolutions to power inequity will emerge, especially if they carry the prospect of better serving

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<sup>203</sup> Donald J. McCarty and Charles E. Ramsey, *The School Managers: Power and Conflict in American Public Education* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Co., 1971), p. 205.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59.

the community. The public interest, of course, has primacy over special interests of teachers and school managers.

### The Emerging Role

Despite widespread agreement that negotiations is changing the superintendency, the nature of the emerging role is not clear. What is clear is that, in his professional ideology, the superintendent has moved farther from his teachers and closer to his board. Board and administration are becoming fused as a single entity which is called *management*.

Teachers reject the role of the superintendent as instructional leader. Superintendents themselves have felt they perform this duty inadequately. In some teacher groups there is feisty talk that teachers must insist on their "rights" as professionals to work free of all supervisory constraints. Administration would then be limited to a kind of logistical support role--keeping the budget, ordering chalk, and seeing that buses run. It will be some time before an ultimate answer emerges. But, feeling beleaguered, his administrative power diminished, teachers denying his leadership, with no counterforce to relieve his vulnerability, the superintendent may willingly shift to a *managerial* role.

The extent to which teacher interests and those of school management agree *or disagree* is not always treated with candor. Doherty and Oberer make this observation:

It is true that school boards, administrators, and teachers constitute an educational team with a wide range of common interests. But it is also true that when it comes to working conditions they divide into employers and employees with significant areas of conflicting interests. Collective bargaining is not designed to remove these differences but to establish rules of the game whereby the means of resolution of conflict may be institutionalized.<sup>205</sup>

The superintendent cannot regard negotiations with Olympian detachment, seeking to stay neutral. If he does not somehow involve himself, the decision flow may pass him by.

Campbell and Layton call for innovation in school management:

*We recommend that school systems move toward a new accommodation between hierarchical and collegial control.*

Traditionally, school systems have tended to follow hierarchical patterns of organization and have given little recognition to the expertise found in the teaching staff. . . . More effective relationships should be established between school administrators and teachers' organizations. The press for participation from these organizations should be accepted as a legitimate one.<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> Robert E. Doherty and Walter E. Oberer, *Teachers, School Boards, and Collective Bargaining* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 124.

<sup>206</sup> Roald F. Campbell and Donald H. Layton, *Policy Making for American Education* (Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago, 1969), pp. 99-100.

If "a new accommodation" can evolve from or coexist with negotiations, school managers will need to act according to this belief:

The most productive man is one with substantial control over his goals, but who allows those goals to be influenced by others. The deadly condition is one in which goals are set by the boss alone.<sup>207</sup>

Because the public interest is substantially involved, school managers are not free to define their own role. (For example, Erickson<sup>208</sup> predicts that a new common law deriving from grievance arbitration will help define the role of school management. A new source of authority in school districts, grievance arbitration recognizes the right of management to manage.)

It appears that superintendents generally were unprepared, by formal training or by prescience, for the milieu into which negotiations thrust them. They were surprised at the strength of power motives among teachers. Problems of authority are common. Few superintendents have had the training which can help them expand control without increasing domination. Not being part of a zero-sum game, "organizational training" can increase influence at *all*

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<sup>207</sup>Douglas McGregor, *op. cit.*, p. 128, attributed to Donald Pelz.

<sup>208</sup>Kai Erickson, "A Study of Grievance Arbitration Awards in Michigan Public Schools" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1970).

levels of an organization.<sup>209</sup> Many organizations need to build appropriate conflict-management components, negotiation being one possibility, but school administrators who are capable in conflict management are scarce. (One resource on managing conflict with teacher unions is by McGrath.)<sup>210</sup> Adaptive administrators are able to pursue organizational goals within a changing environment. In an investigative report on Chicago schools, Prof. Mark Krug says principals agree that, when teachers complain to the union about needed facilities, the matter is remedied faster than when the principal acts through normal administrative channels.<sup>211</sup>

In the several areas of public administration, as crises and confrontations become an integral part of the administrator's life, there is growing recognition that he needs skill in conflict resolution, which is a step beyond conflict management. Derr urges that administrators,

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<sup>209</sup>Richard A. Schmuck *et al.*, *Handbook of Organization Development in Schools* (Palo Alto: National Press Books, 1972).

<sup>210</sup>Joseph E. McGrath, *Social and Psychological Factors in Stress* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970). McGrath states that a prime source of conflict in schools concerns disagreement about one's role.

<sup>211</sup>*Chicago Tribune*, March 11, 1974.

including school managers, be able to prepare appropriate conflict resolution strategies when needed.<sup>212</sup>

Apparently past superintendents have not performed the "link-pin function" (the term is Rensis Likert's) of participating in both teachers' and management's communication networks, carrying information across groups.

It is likely that school administrators do not voluntarily involve teachers in making major decisions. Unless it is shared as through bargaining, power remains with management. But pseudo-collegiality can give subordinates a psychological sense of participation, and joint committees or advisory consultation are often used for this purpose.

The union will continue to press to gain control over "everything which concerns the teacher's working life," in the American Federation of Teachers' phrase. The 1972 president of the National Education Association said, "We are determined to control the direction of education." But the superintendent can do more than react defensively. Even if the teacher organization does not recognize his instructional leadership, he must not abandon a concern for the education of children. To meet the contemporary challenge, he may need a more sophisticated repertory of management

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<sup>212</sup>C. Brooklyn Derr, "Conflict Resolution in Organizations: Views from the Field of Educational Administration," *Public Administration Review*, 32 (5), (September-October 1972), 495-501.

skills than he has now. Probably the superintendent needs to know systems analysis, organizational training and development, conflict resolution, management by objectives--all adapted from general management. However, he is not completely free to choose his role:

In a sense the superintendent is confronted with two sets of social norms that act on the definition of his role; namely, the professional criteria and the norms of the immediate group, the school board as representative of the social community. . . . To a degree . . . the role of the superintendency is professionally defined outside the immediate culture in which it operates.<sup>213</sup>

If the superintendent becomes a professional manager, there is danger he may lose a concern for the education of young people, which hopefully was why he first became a teacher. But to draw upon the expertise of *generic* management does not require that he give up an *educational* model of administration.

Perry and Wildman<sup>214</sup> argue that research in educational administration has neglected problems of formalized *group conflict*. There has been a failure to recognize

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<sup>213</sup>Vernon O. Sletten, "A Related Study of the Opinions of Montana School Board Members and Superintendents on Selected Board Policy Practices" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1954), p. 233.

<sup>214</sup>Charles R. Perry and Wesley A. Wildman, *The Impact of Negotiations in Public Education* (Worthington, Ohio: Charles A. Jones Publishing Co., 1970).

. . . the absence of a true community of interests within the school organization and the profession.

This discontinuity serves to establish strong challenges to the colleague and leadership roles of administrative personnel. The adversary character of the bargaining process requires that someone play the role of adversary. . . .

The result will be a tendency for school administrators to become managers in the traditional bureaucratic sense.<sup>215</sup>

More affirmatively, Perry and Wildman foresee a possibility that, beside the system of adversary-type bargaining over salary and working conditions, a "parallel interaction structure" may evolve to deal with professional and policy matters. Although the terms are not used, such a structure would resemble advisory consultation or joint committees described earlier in this chapter.

The emergence of a managerial role might help clarify what *effective* educational administration is. In 1958, Halpin said:

At the present time effectiveness is what people think it is. Since the people making such judgments have different orientations or represent different reference groups, success in educational administration is defined quite differently, for example, by school board members and by school staffs.<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 219.

<sup>216</sup> Andrew W. Halpin (ed.), *Administrative Theory in Education* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1958), p. 182.

It seems improbable that future board members, superintendents, and teachers will agree on what constitutes effective administration. If the professionalization of school administration is to continue, there is need for updating a conception of the superintendent's role in light of collective negotiations.

Whether it is to be a managerial role or some other, the people best qualified to define the emerging role of the superintendent *in operational terms* are the school superintendents themselves.

#### Summary

This review provides the rationale for examining expectations for the school superintendent's role in collective negotiations. There was review-discussion of the school as a social system and of role theory, the basis for using expectations as a unit of measure in social analysis. Role conflict was described as a source of stress in administration.

Collective negotiations was explicated as a force which changes the superintendent's role, reduces his discretionary power, and aligns him with the school board and opposite the teachers as employees. To mitigate the adversary quality of negotiations, such non-negotiation decision-making arrangements as advisory consultation (or

joint committees) were explored, along with the possibility that they might co-exist with collective negotiations. Finally it was predicted that, with militant teachers denying the superintendent's instructional leadership, the superintendency will evolve into a *managerial* role. The superintendent will move from a position of expertise in substantive matters of education and adopt a position more akin to management in general. He may need to have certain management skills which were probably not in his training in educational administration. The problem of this study is not that of futurism in educational administration. Rather, it is concerned with three important groups of role definers who have differing expectations *now* for the superintendent's role in collective negotiations.

## CHAPTER III

### POLITICS OF MICHIGAN'S COLLECTIVE

#### NEGOTIATIONS LAW

Public education in the United States is obviously political, in the broad sense, for it is carried on by the formal political government, enmeshed in a framework of laws, supported from the public treasury, and directed by public officials in the form of school board members and administrators.<sup>1</sup>

Although education operates within a political milieu, it is a widely held article of faith that public schools must be kept free of politics. Patronage should give way to merit; schools should be sanctuaries of non-partisanship. At the same time, the recognition grows that public education is a political enterprise. In little more than a decade, the *politics* of education has developed as a legitimate area of scholarly interest, recognition of the process by which social pressures are translated into public policy. As yet, it rests on meager theory and a modest empirical base.

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<sup>1</sup>Donald E. Tope, ed., *The Social Sciences View School Administration* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 213.

In this chapter, events leading to the passage of Michigan's Public Employment Relations Act (Public Law 379) will be related, with emphasis on how education interest groups used their influence in the legislature. The theme to be developed is that a lack of unity among education groups contributed to the kind of law which passed in 1965 and is the operative law today. This climate persists in the conflict and fragmentation which still mark educational decision-making in Michigan. And it substantially affects the occupational role of the superintendent of schools, the focal position of the present study.

#### Historical Background of Collective Negotiations

The definitive history of how collective negotiations came to Michigan schools is yet unwritten. But there are sufficient public documents, scholarly reports, and unpublished studies<sup>2</sup> to provide a case study in the politics of education. When the Michigan legislature passed an act authorizing public employees to bargain collectively, this precipitate action gave teachers a windfall out of proportion

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<sup>2</sup>Charles T. Schmidt, Jr., "Organizing for Collective Bargaining in Michigan Education, 1965-1967" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1968); Frank H. Hartman, "The Political Evolution of Public Act 379 of the 1965 Michigan Legislature" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1968); and Floyd M. Adams, "The Development and Operation of Collective Bargaining Among Public School Teachers in Detroit" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Wayne State University, 1967).

to their previous success with the legislature. Certain background factors partially account for the event, factors operating concomitantly in the state and in the nation.

Thus, in treating the history of how teachers gained the right of collective bargaining, both historical events and underlying attitudes are considered. Taken together, they are transforming school board-teacher relationships as well as the occupational role of the school superintendent.

The chronology logically begins in 1961 when the United Federation of Teachers won a collective bargaining election in New York City. It was a signal victory for teacher power, which had national ramifications. A year later this union went on strike, demonstrating in a way the plight of all public employees while showing that a strike can bring economic gains where moderate measures have failed. In 1962 President Kennedy issued an executive order giving federal employees the right to organize and to bargain collectively, thus extending to the public sector certain rights which had applied to industry since 1935. Subsequently state governments began to grant similar rights to their employees, sometimes to all employees and sometimes only to teachers.

Since 1947 Michigan had been operating under a law--the Hutchinson Act--which prohibited strikes by public employees, set penalties for violations, and provided for

the mediation of grievances. The right to form an organization resembling a labor union of the private sector was generally restricted. In retrospect, the Hutchinson Act appears clearly intended more to "protect" the public interest than to advance the interest of public employees.

Under Governor Romney in 1962, a citizens' committee set out to liberalize existing law. The committee attempted to marshal broad support from interested organizations, but it was unable to get consensus among education interest groups.<sup>3</sup> The Michigan Education Association, Michigan Federation of Teachers, and Michigan Association of School Boards were not inclined to subordinate ideological differences for a common cause. The citizens' committee proposed that disputes involving teachers *as employees* would utilize procedures (a fact-finding panel, for example) which recognized the teachers' special status as "professionals." But the Michigan Education Association (MEA) was not ready to support bargaining and offered little cooperation.

Michigan Education Association Versus  
the Federation of Teachers

In Detroit, a stronghold of organized labor, the Detroit Federation of Teachers won a representation election against a satellite of the MEA in May 1964. This was more

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<sup>3</sup>Schmidt, p. 17. This study is a comprehensive analysis of the historical development of collective bargaining in Michigan education. The present writer acknowledges the helpfulness of Schmidt's research in primary sources.

than a year before negotiations would be mandated by state law. It was a significant gain for the union. Even now the DFT is the principal power base of the Michigan Federation of Teachers (MFT), "unlike the MEA where the power, strategy, and influence are directed to the locals from the state-level organization."<sup>4</sup> The running contest prompted both organizations to take a tougher position in favor of bargaining. As the DFT gained membership, its show of strength was influential in the MFT membership campaign in metropolitan Detroit.

By early 1964 the MEA's board of directors, frustrated over the slow progress of voluntary negotiations, stated that there was need for a law to improve "the process of professional negotiations." In line with the National Education Association, the MEA insisted that the model of employer-employee relationships taken from industry was inappropriate in education where "professionalism" should obtain. By early 1965 the Association began earnestly to work for a law which would follow a professional model. To this end, the MEA directed its considerable resources to secure enactment of its legislative proposal to give teachers the right to organize and require that teacher organizations and school boards bargain in good faith. Departing from labor legislation, the MEA favored a professional

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<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 91.

negotiations commission to hear appeals from impasse situations and to appoint an "intervenor" as an intermediate step before fact-finding.

As the result of legislative reapportionment and President Johnson's election landslide, in 1964 Democrats gained control of the Michigan legislature for the first time in thirty years. This provided opportunity for the state AFL-CIO to exert its influence. The labor bloc decided to unite behind a single legislative proposal. A task force of public employee unions, called the Public Employment Legislative Committee, prepared a bill which resembled the National Labor Relations Act and was widely called a "little Wagner Act." In this, the Michigan Federation of Teachers was a prime mover. The Michigan Education Association, whose membership included teachers *and* administrators, rejected the proposed bill which followed a labor relations model. The Association offered a substitute. Endorsed in principle only by the Michigan Association of School Boards and lacking other support, the MEA bill did not catch on in the legislature.

Whereas the MEA had failed to use its power with the citizens' committee in 1962, now it was unable to influence events in the legislature. Schmidt explains how a group representing a minority of teachers bested its larger and presumably more powerful rival:

The MFT, by its association with labor, "represented" teachers on the policy formulating body [of the Public Employment Legislative Committee] which was to write and implement legislation. By this affiliation teachers became written into the law as part of the body of public employees generally, in spite of the opposition of the MEA, which was the spokesman for a significantly larger number of teachers.<sup>5</sup>

For the first time, the Federation of Teachers was clearly more influential in the Capitol than was the Michigan Education Association.

The MEA had worked well with traditional Republican legislatures. Now, confronting the Democratic-labor coalition which took over in 1964, it found itself shut out. Its proposed bill, which provided that negotiations should not come within the purview of the Labor Mediation Board, did not get out of the House Labor Committee. When it was apparent that the Public Employment Legislative Committee would win (with the MFT as a key member), the MEA caught the bandwagon in time to join in proclaiming victory.

Hartman quotes leaders of the legislature as recalling that only the Association of School Boards and Association of School Administrators lobbied against the proposed bargaining law before it passed.<sup>6</sup> By the rules of politics, these associations invested their power and prestige in this contest and lost. Their experience dramatizes the difficulty

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<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>6</sup>Hartman, *op. cit.*

and risk involved when interest groups are unable to maintain a united front in legislative matters.

### Ideology of Interest Groups

In a given state, the statute governing negotiation will reflect the realities of competing organizational philosophies, rivalry between organizations, the strength of political allies, and the dynamics of power in the legislature. Besides formal legal arrangements, ideologies and symbols have their impact on political behavior.

The ethos of public education in Michigan had great bearing on the advent of negotiations. The passage of negotiations legislation may be seen against a larger context of disunity among teacher organizations. Although the MEA for years had stressed the commonalties of objectives which should unite teachers, administrators, and boards, administrators and board members had grown anxious over possible consequences of MEA's goal--"a written procedure for professional negotiations and bargaining representation in every school district in Michigan."<sup>7</sup> Perhaps sensing this anxiety, the MEA's executive secretary recommended that the organization should "develop new and stronger relationships with the

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<sup>7</sup>*Michigan Education Association Journal*, XLI (April 20, 1964), 24.

Michigan Association of School Boards at the state level and encourage improved relationships at the local level."<sup>8</sup>

It appears that in a state where education interest groups had seldom united in common cause, as will be shown, such unity as did exist was in danger of being shattered over the prospect of negotiations. Most administrators at this time were members of the MEA. But the MEA was in danger of losing teacher locals to the MFT, which was flushed with its victory in Detroit and making inroads into smaller districts in the metropolitan area. The dilemma confronting the Association was how to stress *teacher benefits* enough to contain the union rival without offending administrators and board members.

The MEA strongly opposed use of the Labor Mediation Board ostensibly because mediators would lack expert knowledge of education, regarded as requisite in dealing with "professional" matters, and because of the reality of delays before mediators could get around to acting.<sup>9</sup> (Hyman Parker, Chief Mediation Officer of the Michigan Labor Mediation Board, acknowledges that mediators have had to build a knowledge base of school problems. There is an inexact parallel between education and problems of labor and

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<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup>*Michigan Education Association Journal*, XLII (February 1, 1965), 19.

management in other areas.)<sup>10</sup> Fortunately, the first year or two, problems for mediation seldom involved substantive matters unique to education.

After the labor-type bill was signed into law, the MEA acted pragmatically. Its board saw the choice as either to take advantage of the new law despite its defects or "to abdicate the Association's position on professional negotiation."<sup>11</sup> The MEA board then mounted a campaign for its local affiliates to be elected exclusive bargaining representative in every school district in Michigan. Clearly the Association was ready to shift tactics and move, in light of the new reality. In the absence of a contest with the union, a school board could recognize the Association affiliate by stipulation. Doubtless some boards acted expediently, recognizing the MEA affiliate in order to head off the more militant MFT's organizing, campaigning, and winning. This "lesser of evils" theory holds that the MEA was the less unacceptable choice facing the school boards. By the spring of 1966, over 51,000 teachers in MEA units were covered by negotiated agreements.

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<sup>10</sup>Interview with Hyman Parker, January 22, 1972. There are problems in adapting labor law to an education setting. A trial examiner may make a judgment which substantially alters the legislature's definition of a statute expressly limited to "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment."

<sup>11</sup>Minutes of MEA Board of Directors meeting, August 26-27, 1965, p. 15.

Some of the early difficulties with negotiations probably were inevitable, considering inexperience of the parties involved and the considerable stakes. These problems, among others, were encountered:

- Charges that the MFT was using delaying tactics to gain strength before asking for an election.
- An acute shortage of trained negotiators.
- School board reluctance to give its negotiators sufficient authority.
- Boards which persisted in issuing teachers individual contracts before negotiating the master agreement--an unfair labor practice but done as much out of ignorance as of guile.<sup>12</sup>

Perhaps the most salient ideological effect of negotiations was the bitter resentment and disillusion of superintendents who were now forced to confront their teachers as "adversaries."

Teachers in Flint went on strike for two days but, despite the action's being illegal, there was no punishment. This may have emboldened other teachers to take a tougher line. In any event, the Michigan Association of School Boards urged a blacklisting of teachers who struck or encouraged striking. This had its effect on teachers generally. An acute sense of adversary relationships

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<sup>12</sup>Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-119.

was in the making. This feeling, which runs deeper than the *pro forma* adversary posture of courtroom lawyers, persists as a side effect of Public Law 379.

Based on research, Schmidt constructed a profile of teacher organization activists in the metropolitan Detroit area. As have other studies, he found that the prototype of activists is a young male secondary teacher of social studies, native-born Protestant from a blue-collar family. What was not anticipated is that a surprising number were reared in towns with population between ten and fifty thousand. He found no discernible difference between MEA and MFT activists. Schmidt concludes that "they probably would have become 'activists' in either organization and their present affiliation is more accidental than ideological."<sup>13</sup> Except for his lacking administrative experience, it seems likely that the archetypal teacher is not much different from the archetypal administrator, but this is a conjecture which goes beyond the data.

The finding of no significant differences between teachers who join the association and those who join the union is in line with other studies, one from Minnesota and one from New York.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 145.

<sup>14</sup>Oria A. Brinkmeier, Gerald C. Ubben, and Richard C. Williams, *Inside the Organization Teacher* (Minneapolis: Educational Research and Development Council, 1967); and William T. Lowe, "Who Joins Which Teachers' Group?" *Teachers College Record*, LXVI (April, 1965), 614-619.

School Board and Administrator  
Organizations

The Michigan Association of School Boards has 580 member districts out of a possible 604 districts. The unit of membership is the local school board; any district may join. In the annual assembly or convention, each district has one vote. MASB is affiliated with the National School Boards Association, a confederation of state groups in which authority is delegated upward, from local to state to national level.

Like counterpart organizations in most states, the MASB places high value on the principle of local control of schools. Belief in this principle goes beyond the legalism that, indeed, the state's power--based on its constitutional mandate to provide public education--flows down to the local district. The school board is a creature of the legislature, with power confined to education but spelled out by statute. Almost all authority to operate schools is delegated to the local board:

That local boards see themselves as lawful sub-divisions of the state is probably the single most important factor bearing on the general policies and practices of an individual board or an association of boards. . . . They have jealously guarded their decision-making authority; their position has been that, because their authority and responsibility are established by law, they cannot legally (or morally, they believe) delegate them to others.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

Board members are strongly oriented to the local community. They think of themselves as citizen volunteers performing a community service. It is likely that board members are less affected by the outlook of their state and national associations than are teachers. This has been particularly true in recent years, as teacher organizations increasingly concern themselves with matters of members' welfare. The polarizing effect of collective negotiations is such that, to meet the challenge of militant teacher organizations, both state and national school board associations are gaining strength--whether measured in influence, budget, or membership.

Like most school boards throughout the United States, in the recent past Michigan boards unilaterally set salaries, chose textbooks, and hired and fired both teachers and administrators. (Indeed, as a superintendent in Michigan has no credential other than that of a teacher, he may be *more* expendable than a teacher because of the greater vulnerability of his job.) In the years before 1965, before teachers gained the considerable power they now command, personnel management in public education might well have been characterized by "take it or leave it." Not that board members were animated by wrongful motives. They were busy dealing with shortages of school facilities and qualified teachers and problems of finance. An undetermined number of school

boards voluntarily invited teacher representatives to consult with them through teacher advisory councils or joint committees.<sup>16</sup> A few districts voluntarily bargained collectively with non-instructional employees. As school boards were not compelled to share their decision-making power with teachers, most of them did not do so. They took a strict constructionist view, relying on the authority and responsibility which were theirs by statute.

In various ways, as an indication of "professional" authority, Michigan teachers have attempted to enlarge the scope of their autonomy. In 1961, in response to a proposal that teachers be regarded as qualified to choose their textbooks, the directors of the Michigan Association of School Boards formally resolved that it "will strongly resist any and all attempts to infringe upon the authority of school boards in the selection and adoption of textbooks and other instructional materials."<sup>17</sup> Such insistence on maintaining unilateral power in decisions on educational matters belies the notion that teachers were regarded as true professionals. When the MEA passed its first resolution on negotiations, also in 1961, the MASB's response was predictable:

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<sup>16</sup>C. Keith Groty, "The Utilization of Contractually Established Joint Committees in Selected Michigan School Districts" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1970). Groty urges that joint committees be used to enhance negotiations.

<sup>17</sup>*Michigan School Boards Journal*, VII (October 1961), 14.

Whereas we believe that ultimate decisions on all matters affecting local public schools should rest solely on school boards as representatives of the people . . . members of this association [should] resist by all lawful means the enactment of laws which would compel them to surrender any part of this responsibility.<sup>18</sup>

What teachers perceived as partial recognition for having achieved status as professionals, the boards perceived as challenges to *their authority*.

Although school boards tend to hold that power conferred by statute cannot be yielded, at the MEA's invitation the MASB named representatives to a joint committee to determine what principles of negotiation, if any, might be mutually acceptable. The committee developed procedures for negotiations, but the MASB board did not ratify them, thus ending one attempt at cooperation between the associations.

On the positive side, in 1961 a joint committee of the Michigan Association of School Boards and Michigan Association of School Administrators developed a proposed code of ethics for board and superintendent relations but this did not directly concern teachers. (In that year a joint committee also testified before the education committee of the Michigan Constitutional Convention.)

When the National School Boards Association liberalized its stance, the MSBA went along. The idea of joint

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<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*

consultation with teachers was regarded favorably in 1963-- procedures which would actively involve school boards, administrators, and teachers in discussing budget needs, especially salaries, but also grievances.<sup>19</sup> Obviously, there is a difference between consultation or "sharing joint concerns" and bilateral decision-making.

The past president of the NSBA, Mrs. Fred A. Radke, stated the organization's policy position in 1964. Citing its "vigorous" opposition to bargaining, she said, "We recognize many areas of mutual concern but not of joint responsibility with teacher organizations."<sup>20</sup> She warned against bypassing the school administration and offered this admonition:

A bargaining agreement between a school board and a teacher organization is very apt to dilute the delegated authority of the superintendent of schools, rendering him less effective at a time when his leadership is more important than ever before.<sup>21</sup>

In 1965, when it became apparent that some kind of legislation for public employees would be passed, the Michigan Association of School Boards testified in favor of the MEA-sponsored bill, instead of mounting a campaign against

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<sup>19</sup>*Michigan School Boards Journal*, X, No. 5 (July, 1963), 5.

<sup>20</sup>Mrs. Fred A. Radke, "The Real Significance of Collective Bargaining for Teachers," Labor Law Journal, XV, No. 12 (December, 1964), 795.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 797.

the alternate bill which was offensive to the Association but which eventually passed. Following enactment of the Public Employment Relations Act, the MASB's president deplored the passage of the new law, reiterated the view that a board's authority cannot be delegated, and hinted at the possibility of joint effort to turn back the legislature's action by counter-legislation. Although the statement followed soon after passage of the law, it implied that a bill which passed the legislature so easily could be reversed just as easily.<sup>22</sup> The School Boards Association did not waste effort on fruitless quests and by January 1966 it was retaining legal counsel to deal with negotiations.

#### Cooperation Within Management

In 1966 the Michigan Association of School Boards and Michigan Association of School Administrators jointly published the *Labor Relations Handbook for School Boards and Administrators*. Aside from the publication's functional value in dealing with a common problem, this cooperation illustrates a growing affinity between school boards and superintendents. In 1961 they had begun holding joint conventions every two years, a practice which continues. Both associations separately offered workshops on collective negotiations, an effort to help their members cope with

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<sup>22</sup>*Michigan School Boards Journal*, XII (September, 1965), 5.

the new reality which confronted them. (Similarly, the Michigan Department of Education financed a School Employee-Management Relations Information Program which operated for the first two years of negotiations. This provided programs for teachers and administrators involved with negotiation. By contract, the School of Labor and Industrial Relations of Michigan State University conducted the training, a rare involvement of a Michigan university with the substance of collective negotiations up to this time. During 1966-67, 259 training sessions were held throughout the state. Perhaps this activity pre-empted the need for similar offerings by universities.)

Such efforts were undoubtedly helpful. But organizations tended to remain separate and aloof from each other. No *ad hoc* committee was formed, composed of *all* education groups, so that the best "know-how" on problems of teacher-board negotiations might be shared by concerned people regardless of role. One can guess at possible explanations:

- Membership organizations have an obligation to show their members that the organization is active in its own right and is maintaining institutional identity. This encourages independent programs and conduces against cooperative effort in which organization identity is muted.
- Perhaps some people believed the new law *created* divisiveness, conflict, and awareness of the interest of one's own group *versus* opponents.

If such siege mentality were operating, it might partially explain why board members, administrators, and teachers were

disinclined to cooperate. Although the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act changed the relationships among them, even information-sharing in common meetings might seem to give "the other side" a tactical advantage.

At the beginning of the 1967-68 school year, in about a third of all Michigan districts the board and teachers had yet to sign a master contract. The Michigan Association of School Boards urged that teachers be present to open school in exchange for contracts being made retro-active, emphasizing obligation to the public interest. But teachers adopted the "no contract, no work" stance of organized labor, a position which the MEA assumed. Thus voluntary organizations, which had failed to work together when it might have been mutually advantageous, moved toward increasingly rigid positions as adversaries. Microanalysis of incidents, of moves and countermoves, reveals general trends which help to account for the position which education interest groups in Michigan hold today vis-à-vis each other.

If the MASB was reacting to events it could not contain, it was running ahead of its national counterpart. Two years after the advent of collective negotiations in Michigan, the National School Boards Association modified its policies and recognized that teachers had a right to organize and confer on conditions of employment. (As an

indication of its gradual shift from resistance to reluctant acceptance, in 1967 the NSBA had said flatly, "We are against collective negotiations." By 1970, the Association resolved that "the establishment of guidelines for the conduct of school board-teacher negotiations should be a state and local responsibility.")<sup>23</sup>

Michigan Association of School  
Administrators

Collective negotiations has caused MASA to shift positions drastically. Until January 1967 it was a unit of the Michigan Education Association and located within the MEA headquarters building. The executive secretary divided his time between MASA and MEA duties. Now it occupies space immediately adjacent to the Michigan Association of School Boards. Although each association is autonomous, their proximity is appropriate. Today they are considerably closer in ideology and willingness to cooperate (some teacher militants regard them as interchangeable) than was the case before negotiations. Without forcing the analogy, the physical proximity of MASB and MASA may reflect the extent to which superintendents have shifted from the teachers' side (and hope for a unified education profession) to the school board's side.

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<sup>23</sup>National School Boards Association, *Official Report for 1970*, pp. 33-35.

Like MASB, the Michigan Association of School Administrators made its adjustment to the facts of bargaining before its national counterpart did. MASA withdrew from MEA in 1967, two years before the American Association of School Administrators withdrew as a department of the National Education Association and became an "associated" organization in the NEA building. MASA's break was more complete. Michigan was the first state in which the superintendents' association broke from the teacher organization.

Early in 1965, as interest in negotiations legislation was intensifying, a spokesman for MASA said, "We favor legislation that will give boards of education the necessary authority to operate schools efficiently." While the union-directed Public Employment Legislative Committee was mounting its campaign and legislative committees were active, MASA stayed out of the contest, largely because of its incongruous position as part of the MEA. Whether temporizing or not, the superintendents' association did little as a proactive body and seems to have reacted slowly to events which quickly engulfed its membership. MASA has yet to take an official position on collective negotiations.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>Interview with Austin F. Bates, executive secretary, Michigan Association of School Administrators, March 1, 1972. MASA's national counterpart, the American Association of School Administrators resolved "that every school district develop a written statement, approved by the administration, the appropriate employees' organization, and the board of education, that outlines the procedures by which they will

As previously noted, MASA and MASB jointly published the *Labor Relations Handbook for School Boards and Administrators*. They engaged the same legal counsel to advise boards and administrators on negotiations.

From the advantage of hindsight, it is tempting to charge the Michigan Association of School Administrators with a timid and uncertain reaction to changing circumstance. In fairness, the Association's gradual move from being a department of the Michigan Education Association to its present position of autonomy but affinity with the school board association merely reflects the changing role of the school superintendent in Michigan. People seldom realize the magnitude of events which overtake them until much later.

The Public Employment Relations Act transformed old patterns of teacher-administrator-school board interaction. At the onset of negotiations, superintendents were confident they could perform in a *dual role*--as resource person to both the teachers' negotiating committee and the school board. This position implies that the superintendent can be, simultaneously, the educational leader of teachers and executive officer of the board. From experience in negotiations, especially under labor law like Michigan's, the

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participate in decision-making." American Association of School Administrators, *Resolutions for 1971* (Washington, D.C.: American Association of School Administrators, 1971), p. 4.

impossibility of performing the dual role becomes apparent, but only with experience.

With the paucity of policy statements from MASA, it is not clear who really speaks for the Michigan school superintendent today. Obviously the Michigan Education Association no longer does. Besides having a smaller staff and smaller budget, MASA acts like a junior partner of the MASB. Although the two organizations frequently work in tandem on matters of common interest, particularly legislative matters,<sup>25</sup> the Michigan Association of School Boards is becoming the spokesman for the board-administration team. The polarizing effect of the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act, in barring "supervisors" from the teacher bargaining unit, was to move superintendents to the school board side of the bargaining table. The result seems to be that only the school board association is an effective challenger--in the legislature--to the powerful and dominant teacher organization, the Michigan Education Association.

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<sup>25</sup>Dr. Bates cited aid to parochial schools, teacher tenure and retirement as matters on which the school board and administrators' associations and both teacher organizations had taken a united stand in recent years.

Power Politics and Legislative Process

Hartman<sup>26</sup> studied the dynamics of interplay between education interest groups and the Democratic-labor coalition which passed the Public Employment Relations Act in the 1965 Michigan legislature. Using official records and unpublished memoranda, two years after passage of the act, he interviewed legislative leaders and lobbyists. Although his partiality for teachers occasionally shows through (as in his calling Public Act 379 "the Magna Charta for public employees in Michigan"),<sup>27</sup> his is a useful and revealing study.

Hartman observes ruefully that, while the official title of the act does not even refer to collective bargaining, "approximately seventy-five percent of the entire text"<sup>28</sup> prescribes bargaining. He observes how burden of proof has been shifted: "Boards of education are now having to show cause why they cannot concede benefits to teachers."<sup>29</sup> He recalls the ethos of the legislature at the time of passage. Governor Romney favored the bill and signed it with an expression of hope and satisfaction. William G. Milliken, then lieutenant governor and also a Republican, had strongly

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<sup>26</sup>Hartman, *op. cit.*

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 4.

urged that public employees be given the right of collective bargaining.

Hartman asks how such important legislation could have moved through the legislature with so little debate and attention. He answers, "The legislators did not recognize the impact of the act."<sup>30</sup> He concludes with this observation of the vagaries of interest groups and the legislative process:

The MEA went into the 1965 legislative session with its hopes on a bill which was education in structure, terminology, administration, and philosophy; it came out with an act which was union labor. . . . Yet the MEA is prospering. . . .<sup>31</sup>

#### Politics of Education in Michigan

As the structure of education is a fundamental part of our political system, there is growing recognition of the interplay between education and government. It is through the political process that education and politics meet, witness the widespread effects of the passage of collective bargaining legislation in a state legislature. The politics of education here concerns the politics of interest groups operating at state level.

This section will develop the theme that both the *fact* of the Public Employment Relations Act and underlying

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<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 109.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 119.

attitudes among education interest groups reflect the lack of *consensus* in Michigan education. This is to say, there are no long-term alliances nor effective machinery for harmonizing the interests of major education groups in the state. This condition existed before the advent of collective negotiations and it continues to exist.<sup>32</sup>

The Carnegie corporation supported research on how educational-political decisions are made in the capitols of Michigan, Illinois, and Missouri. The resultant study is a landmark in the politics of education. The investigators<sup>33</sup> made their study just *before* the onset of negotiations. Disunity among education interest groups particularly characterized Michigan. There was little effort to achieve consensus *outside* the legislature. In the dynamics of educational policy-making, Masters *et al.* stated that education interests in Michigan

are fragmented; each tends to have its own design for public school improvement or acts independently of the others. . . . Education leaders view the political environment in which they operate as riddled with partisan conflicts,

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<sup>32</sup>Being essentially labor relations law, Public Law 379 confounds the usual textbook example wherein the legislature mediates among conflicting interest groups and comes up with a compromise. The Democratic-labor majority in 1965 may have used its power simply to promote the interest of public employees in general. This is speculative but consistent with labor's interest in increasing its membership by organizing white-collar and professional workers.

<sup>33</sup>Nicholas A. Masters, Robert H. Salisbury, and Thomas H. Eliot, *State Politics and the Public Schools* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964).

which makes it impossible to depoliticize crucial public school issues, particularly those relating to finance. . . . Stable and durable structures are needed for decision-making in the public school field.<sup>34</sup>

### Ideologies and Dissensus

Interest groups develop symbols and ideologies which exert a strong influence on their behavior and occasionally threaten the possibility that competing groups can compromise differences for the sake even of short-term gains. After a two year field study, Masters *et al.* made these assertions about Michigan:

- There is no group that has come to represent the best thinking possible to solve the state's educational problems.<sup>35</sup>
- There is no established process in Michigan to eliminate or modify the factors that cause conflict over education issues.<sup>36</sup>
- Michigan has no dominant spokesman for the public schools.<sup>37</sup> [No] effective alliance in which differences can be absorbed or reconciled.<sup>38</sup> No stable education power structure.<sup>39</sup>
- Stable and durable structures are needed for decision-making in the public school field.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 255.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 179.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 180.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 181-182.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 197.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 205.

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 255.

Michigan Education Association

As of 1964, Masters *et al.* said that "the MEA comes closest to representing all phases of the public schools."<sup>41</sup> They cited the legislators' great respect for MEA's help in providing information about schools. "Its major resource is its ability to supply this information to decision-making."<sup>42</sup> A few legislators who spoke favorably of MEA as a reliable source of "information" expressed resentment at the Association's "lobbying."

To keep teachers' unions from making gains, it was said that MEA had become more actively concerned with teacher welfare matters, whose increased costs alienate superintendents and school boards. Thus the more active MEA is in behalf of teacher welfare, the less credibility it has as spokesman for *all* education interests. MEA's success is frequently attributed to its "outunioning the union," a general comment on its militancy, expansiveness, member loyalty, and ability to deal with school management while containing the union. In one point of difference, the MFT would be less hesitant about allying with certain non-education groups in the legislature, as forming a coalition with labor and urban representatives.

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<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 183.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*

Michigan Federation of Teachers

Before negotiations were mandated, the MFT defined its role as that of bargaining agent for classroom teachers vis-à-vis the administration. It did not insist that "professionalism" was a requisite of the proposed law. The Federation was widely referred to as "the teachers' union." (For some people, this now is a generic or omnibus term which applies equally to the MEA.)

Identification with labor has been both the MFT's strength and its weakness. This gives it "clout" with some legislators, primarily Democrats from metropolitan Detroit. Conversely, it limits the Federation's effectiveness with outstate Republicans who are responsive to business and agricultural interests. Since the Masters' study, other observers have come to believe there is no fundamental "philosophical" difference between the Michigan Federation of Teachers and the Michigan Education Association.

The MFT was a prime mover in securing the Public Employment Relations Act, but the competing MEA was its prime beneficiary. The Federation has hardly varied in size since the first year of negotiation. In 1972-73 it numbered sixteen districts out of 544. It is difficult to foresee the circumstances under which it will expand further. The possibility of its taking over the MEA is extremely remote, but it might be willing to merge sometime in the future. The MEA, too, is receptive to the possibility of merger.

Michigan Association of School  
Boards

In 1964 the Masters' research team called the MASB "the most rapidly growing" of education interest groups. They predicted it might become the most influential, largely because "it has access to the legislators and other public school groups view it as their strongest competitor for the legislature's attention."<sup>43</sup> (This prediction did not foresee the effect of collective negotiations which made the MEA the most powerful statewide education group with the MASB as a strong counterforce. Such ranking leaves out the Detroit Federation of Teachers, which has substantial power but is not statewide in influence.)

The Masters' characterization is as follows:

The Michigan Association of School Boards makes policy proposals only rarely. It has no research facilities to support such activity. Rather it acts as a watchdog over public school legislation that is introduced and offers its support or opposition as appropriate.

The organization sees itself as the only major education interest group that is not on the public payroll. . . .<sup>44</sup>

MASB members are quite sanguine about the identity between their Association's interest and the public interest. They emphasize their status as duly *elected* officials, a fact which impresses the legislature, in contrast to teachers and administrators who are *their* employees. Of the failure of MEA to organize the School Boards Association as a

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<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 195.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 196.

department in 1948, an MASB leader reportedly said, "It was just like General Motors operating as a branch of the United Auto Workers." <sup>45</sup>

The Masters' investigators cited past instances where MASB leaders warned their membership against a "prospective MEA-MASA coalition." <sup>46</sup> From a perspective in 1976, this admonition seems unusual in view of present relationships between the Michigan Association of School Boards and the Michigan Association of School Administrators, an affinity prompted largely by Public Act 379 which brought them together in common cause against newly militant teacher organizations.

Michigan Association of School Administrators

In Masters' lexicon of superlatives, it will be recalled, the Michigan Education Association was cited for coming closest to representing all phases of public schools. The Michigan Association of School Boards was regarded as the most rapidly growing education interest group. As of 1964, the Michigan Association of School Administrators was singled out by the House and Senate Education Committees of the legislature as "potentially the most influential education group" in the state. <sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 197.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 187.

MASA was then part of the MEA. Both associations underwent strain when differences occurred between their respective constituencies of administrators and teachers. The Masters' study claimed that this separation, in the eyes of the legislators, "has tended to place the MASA in a stronger bargaining position for the schools as a whole."<sup>48</sup>

The strength of the administrators' association lies in the nature of its membership. Superintendents are regarded locally as authorities on education. They hold positions of community leadership. And they have ready access to legislators.

Besides the personal influence which its members have as individuals, MASA as an organization uses occasional leverage on superintendents to contact their local legislators. It has its own communication network to accomplish this but hesitates to activate the membership often, thus conserving its influence for critical matters. There is yet another consideration: "The association states that it does not want its members characterized as politicians but rather as educational statesmen."<sup>49</sup>

The term "educational statesmen" is used sparingly these days, especially in states where collective negotiations are mandatory and the superintendent's role is changing.

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<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 188.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 190.

As the job of superintendent changes, it seems likely that his professional association is changing, too. In the foregoing analysis of the leading education interest groups in Michigan, their present status was compared with their position just prior to the onset of negotiations. Only the Michigan Association of School Administrators appears to have lost power *relatively*. It was forced by circumstances to sever ties to the Michigan Education Association. It now appears to be a virtual partner of the Michigan Association of School Boards--and a rather junior partner it seems.

If this analysis is correct, the shift was inevitable and does not reflect on the quality of the organization's leadership. The two-sided shape of the bargaining table--the polarizing effect of collective negotiations--places the superintendent on the school board's side. The well being of a professional group depends upon its ability to respond successfully to the challenges of rival groups with which it competes for resources, public recognition, and for power. In Michigan, the shift of the administrators' association from unity with the teacher organization to near unity with the school board association (together constituting "management") was a logical outcome.

Since the research by Masters *et al.* another study has sought to check and update their findings. Usdan and

his associates<sup>50</sup> found little change in Michigan's climate for decision-making in education at state level. They assert that legislators generally ignore recommendations of the State Board of Education, an agency which Masters did not study. (It was then quite new.) Nor is the legislature influenced by the Michigan Education Council, an unofficial clearinghouse where education groups discuss their policy positions but which fails to be an arena for achieving consensus.

In a light touch, it was said that "three jolly fishermen," who are powerful in the legislature because of membership on key committees, determine fiscal and educational policy during fishing trips in the North country.

Usdan's principal finding is similar to Masters':

Thus education in Michigan is without structure and appears to be almost without direction. This conclusion was supported by the lobbyists, bureaucrats, and legislators who were interviewed for this study. Most interviewers suggested that education was not under rational control and in fact that education politics in Michigan might be referred to politely as extremely pluralistic.<sup>51</sup>

Wirt and Kirst suggest that "monolithic" coalitions, in which education interest groups resolve their differences and present the legislature with a united front, may soon

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<sup>50</sup>Michael D. Usdan, David W. Minar, and Emanuel Hurwitz, Jr., *Education and State Politics* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1969).

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 99.

become a thing of the past. They cite Michigan's political pattern as the likely future trend:

Here the various interest groups cannot agree on a common policy proposal, so each approaches the legislature and governor in open conflict with competing proposals of other groups. Any compromise must take place *within* the conversion process, and not before. The arguments among competing teachers, administrators, and board members do not generate an image of educational experts 'above politics.'<sup>52</sup>

In a similar research study, Scribner<sup>53</sup> examined the politics of federal aid to education in Michigan. He observed that

Michigan's political culture is composed of sharply distinguishable political parties with markedly different ideologies. . . .<sup>54</sup>

. . . [A] lack of consensus among the interests of educational organizations lessens the bargaining power of any one group and leaves little structure for aggregating potential influence into major policy proposals. . . .<sup>55</sup>

To a great extent, education policy at state level in Michigan has been shaped by influences *outside* education. Given the political climate and in the absence of traditional alliances of consequence among education groups,

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<sup>52</sup>Frederick M. Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, *The Political Web of American Schools* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1972), p. 126.

<sup>53</sup>Jay D. Scribner, "State Allocations of Federal Aid: A Brief Synopsis of the Political Context and Value Orientations in Michigan," paper presented at annual conference of the American Educational Research Association, February 4-7, 1971, 11 pp.

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 4.

perhaps it was a logical outcome--a negotiations law which casts school management and teacher organizations as adversaries.

Statewide the Michigan Education Association and the Michigan Association of School Boards appear to be the most powerful education groups now. Between them are the less powerful superintendents and their association, once close to teachers and now just a deviation away from the school boards in ideology.

#### Conclusion

Summing up the main substantive points of this chapter: Study of the politics of education reveals how education is bound up in the political setting in which it functions. At the time that collective negotiations legislation was considered in Michigan, a particular disunity characterized education groups. The structure for decision-making was fragmented. This probably contributed to a law which polarizes teacher organizations and school boards, forcing superintendents to find a new position for themselves, separate from the highly politicized teachers. Collective bargaining has had an enormous influence on the character of the school system and is transforming the role of the school superintendent. It may be that the divisiveness of education groups which was already present at the

onset of negotiations in Michigan created problems for superintendents. With little to guide them, they have adapted to great changes in their worklife.

## CHAPTER IV

### DESIGN OF THE STUDY

#### Purpose

The purpose of this study is to determine the expectations which Michigan school board members, teachers, and superintendents hold for the *role of superintendent* in the process of collective negotiations, as well as the role which superintendents actually perform. The prime research questions are these:

- What is the superintendent's actual role in collective negotiations?
- How satisfied are school board members, teachers, and superintendents with the superintendent's actual negotiation role?
- What do they believe the superintendent's negotiation role should be?

Thus the superintendent's *actual* and *preferred* (or *ideal*) roles in negotiation will be identified. Answers to several ancillary questions will also be sought from these role definers.<sup>1</sup> This chapter describes the method used to secure data for answering questions which the study poses.

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<sup>1</sup>Individuals in a position to have considerable knowledge of a social role are called *role definers*. If they have the power to affect the way another person performs his role, they may be called *role senders*, who "send"

### Rationale of the Study

Design of the present study was greatly influenced by research undertaken in states other than Michigan. The rationale derives principally from Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, and Alexander W. McEachern, *Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role*.<sup>2</sup> Besides developing a research design to analyze role consensus and role conflict, these researchers probed expectations which superintendents and school board members have for each other. Collective negotiations suggests the inclusion of another role definer, the leader of the teacher organization which is recognized for bargaining. This teacher representative is likely to have expectations for the superintendent's role in negotiations. The negotiations movement has all but rendered obsolete the assumption that the superintendent is the teachers' recognized leader. Although conflicting expectations have long been an integral part of the superintendent's work life, negotiation seems to have increased the problem.

In the language of role theory, as applied to this study, superintendents occupy the *focal* position (the role

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their expectations to the focal person for whom sent roles are pressures. There may also be a received role, determined by an individual's perception of what is sent plus his conception of his proper role. In the present case, this conception is affected by the superintendent's self-definition as a professional.

<sup>2</sup>New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958.

under consideration) which is considered in relationship to significant *counter* positions of school board president and teacher representative. A more complete relational specification would include such positions as principals, other board members, etc. As Pylman<sup>3</sup> has studied principals in Michigan, they are not included in the present study. The teacher representative, usually a teacher employed in the school district, is two or more levels below the superintendent in a line of authority. His perception of school management may be "contaminated" by his principal's administrative style but, by virtue of his organizational position, the teacher representative has direct access to the superintendent. He is sometimes called a teacher leader.

The amount of pressure which a role sender sends to a focal person is often a direct function of their proximity in the organization. A focal person usually receives the greatest pressure from his superiors. As applied to superintendents, teacher militancy seems to contradict this principle. The teacher organization may have more power or potential pressure than does the school board.

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<sup>3</sup>John H. Pylman, "Expectations of High School Principals and Relevant Others for the Role of High School Principals in Teacher-Board Negotiations" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1968).

*Role conflict* is defined (after Kahn *et al.*)<sup>4</sup> as mutually competing demands by role senders, persons who can communicate or send their expectations for another's role performance. In *role conflict* one is caught between two or more conflicting expectations for what he should do. The consequences of conflict are low job satisfaction, low confidence in the organization, and a high level of job-connected tension. Role conflict is one part of role theory which focuses on situations in which members of a social system experience incompatible expectations for their behavior as occupants of a position within the system. Role conflict situations often come with the job, as the school superintendent whose teachers for years wanted him to push for higher salaries while the school board wanted him to push for economy.

People tend to behave according to their perception of their proper role. Role performance is greatly affected by self-expectations and one's perception of the expectations of others. Studies reviewed in Chapter II indicate that in several states there is considerable disagreement over the superintendent's role. Among incumbent superintendents, board members, and teacher leaders, perceptions of the superintendent's proper role are conflicting.

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<sup>4</sup>These conclusions are from Robert L. Kahn *et al.*, *Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964).

In the present study, role senders are asked questions dealing with the focal person: What is the superintendent's actual role in negotiation? How satisfied are you with this role? What is the best role for the superintendent? Individuals in three different social roles thus are asked to define the superintendent's role. If there are significant differences among them, the data should lead to a measure of conflict of expectations for the superintendent's role.

#### Selection of the Sample

The population under study consists of Michigan school board presidents, superintendents, and teacher representatives.

There are 544 K-12 school districts operating in Michigan. Of these, teachers in 504 local "associations" are affiliated with the Michigan Education Association; teachers in 16 local "unions" are affiliated with the Michigan Federation of Teachers. Teachers bargain independently in 12 districts. In an additional 12 districts, teachers have not chosen to bargain. Only MEA districts are included in the study.

To be surveyed are a one-fifth unstratified systematic random sample--101 districts--of the 504 MEA affiliates. The sample was drawn according to a table of

random numbers from listings in the Michigan Education Directory, which lists superintendents by district. Names of teacher association presidents are on file at headquarters of the Michigan Education Association.

Since interaction process analysis was not being studied, there was no effort made to compare responses from individuals of the same district (microscopic analysis), nor were respondents asked their perception of the views of other role definers. In the sample as drawn, 55 of the 83 counties in Michigan are represented. However, special stratification criteria were not used.

Within the limits of sampling error, findings may be generalized to all but 16 districts which are locals of the Michigan Federation of Teachers, 12 districts which bargain independently of a statewide organization, and another 12 districts whose teachers have declined to bargain. Findings may thus be generalized to 504 districts which are affiliated with the Michigan Education Association.

Usable returns were received from 82 school board presidents (81 percent), 86 superintendents (85 percent), and 77 teacher association presidents (76 percent) of MEA districts. Most failure to respond occurred in small districts, which therefore are under-represented in the achieved sample.

It is postulated that the president of the school board is representative of the board. Similarly, the president of the teacher organization *as a leader* is presumed to be representative of the district's teachers. In support of these postulates, Lipham's data show that, to a significant degree, "more effective board members served as board presidents than did ineffective members."<sup>5</sup> Brubacher found that the president's opinion is rated by co-members as more valuable than that of any other board member.<sup>6</sup> Studies in social psychology show that the leader is perceived by those he leads as "one of us" and as usually embodying the norms and values of the group.

#### General Methods of the Study

A mail questionnaire (Appendix B) was designed to elicit similar information from the sample of role definers. One open-ended question was directed to superintendents, while a similar question was directed to both board members and teacher representatives. The superintendent was asked additional questions about the school district and matters

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<sup>5</sup>James M. Lipham and others, "The School Board as an Agency for Resolving Conflict," Report No. BR-5-0338 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1967).

<sup>6</sup>John W. Brubacher, "An Analysis of the Decision-Making Process of School Boards" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1962).

bearing on negotiations and the superintendency. The questionnaire was pretested in a pilot study from a smaller sample drawn from the same population. No subsequent revisions were made.

With the superintendent as primary addressee, a letter of transmittal asked him to complete one copy of the questionnaire--the research instrument--and to forward a second copy to the school board president. This cover letter (Appendix A) was signed jointly by the study committee chairman and the executive director of the Michigan Association of School Boards. The investigator mailed a third copy to the president of the teacher organization recognized for collective bargaining. Benson Munger, MEA director of negotiations, agreed to ask local association presidents to cooperate with the study (Appendix A) and supplied their names. Separate envelopes provided for direct return to the investigator at a Michigan State University address. Nonrespondents were followed up with a reminder two weeks later. Responses to the questionnaire were coded and punched on cards to be treated statistically.

Although interaction process analysis is not being measured, all three role definers are from the same school district. The study is subject to the usual limitations of a mail questionnaire. Findings and conclusions should not

be generalized beyond the study population, 504 K-12 districts in Michigan.

#### Assumptions Underlying the Study

It is assumed that Michigan school board members, teachers, and superintendents have expectations for the role of the superintendent in the process of teacher-board negotiations. The focal figure is the superintendent. *Theoretically*, the question being asked is this: To what extent do different sets of role definers hold the same definition for the school superintendent's role in collective negotiations? *Operationally*, the question is: How much convergence is there among school board members, teachers, and superintendents themselves as to their expectations for the superintendent's role in negotiations?

There are several underlying assumptions:

1. That the "profession" of educational administration has an ideology, a body of literature, and a repertory of strategies covering the behavior expected of a superintendent. But collective negotiations came on so suddenly, superintendents were caught without knowledge of how to cope with it. Many of them were dismayed at the first signs of teacher militancy.
2. That "ideal" roles are seldom enacted because of situational constraints, so the "actual" role is a kind of compromise.
3. That the state of role congruence--where board members, superintendents, and teachers share identical expectations for the superintendent's behavior--is virtually impossible.

4. That within a criterion group there is a force pulling toward consensus despite incongruence between groups. Halpin found that school staff members and board members usually agreed within their respective groups in describing the leadership behavior of superintendents, but that the two groups did not agree with each other.<sup>7</sup>
5. That there is a relationship between *evaluation* and *satisfaction*. The more consensus there is between the incumbents of two positions on their definitions of each other's roles, the more highly they will rate one another's performance.<sup>8</sup>
6. That in defining adequate role performance, the expectations of some role senders are more important than others. Often the former have sanctions readily available to assure an adequate performance.
7. That in organizations which are successful in achieving their goals people are likely to have accurate inter-personal perceptions.<sup>9</sup>

### Testable Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were drawn and statistically tested:

- H<sub>1</sub> *School board members, teachers, and superintendents of K-12 districts in Michigan report different expectations for the role of the superintendent in the process of negotiation.*
- H<sub>2</sub> *There are differences in what school board members, teachers, and superintendents report is the superintendent's actual role in negotiation.*

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<sup>7</sup>Andrew W. Halpin, *The Leadership Behavior of School Superintendents*, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

<sup>8</sup>Neal Gross, *Explorations in Role Analysis*, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

<sup>9</sup>This postulate is generally attributed to Chester I. Barnard.

- $H_3$  *There are differences in satisfaction among school board members, teachers, and superintendents regarding the superintendent's actual role in negotiation.*
- $H_4$  *There are differences in what school board members, teachers, and superintendents believe the negotiation role of the superintendent should be, the preferred or ideal role.*

### Research Questions of the Study

The overall question of the study is this: In Michigan K-12 school districts, what are expectations of school board members, teachers, and superintendents for the superintendent's role in the process of negotiation?

Besides testing the above four hypotheses, answers are sought for the following substantive questions:

1. Who is usually the chief negotiator for the board-administrative team?
2. Who do board members, teachers, and superintendents predict will be the future chief negotiator for the board-administration?
3. Who do board members, teachers, and superintendents predict will be the future chief negotiator for the teacher organization?
4. In what way would superintendents like to perform differently, insofar as negotiations affects their role?
5. In what way would board members and teachers like the superintendent to perform differently, insofar as negotiations affects his role?
6. To what extent do teachers participate in decision-making by *nonnegotiation* processes, such as advisory consultation or joint committees?
7. To what extent have superintendents had training in negotiation?

8. To what extent do superintendents believe that university training programs are meeting their needs for help with negotiation?
9. Where do superintendents say they would go for help with a problem of negotiations?
10. In what way do superintendents perceive that negotiations has changed their working relationships with teachers and with the school board?

### Statistical Treatment

In statistical analysis of the data, the program employed was "Multivariate, Univariate and Multivariate Analysis of Variance, Covariance, and Regression: A Fortran IV Program," version 4, June 1968, developed by Jeremy D. Finn, State University of New York at Buffalo.

The Finn program utilizes a two-way (3 X 3) factorial design with unequal cell frequencies. In this study, independent variables are status groups or *role definers* (board presidents, superintendents, and teacher representatives) and *size* of district (large, medium, and small). Dependent variables are what these role definers perceive as the superintendent's *actual* role in negotiation, their *satisfaction* with his actual role, and their perception of the *ideal* or *preferred* role, the best role for the superintendent under existing law.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> The *actual-ideal* dichotomy is conventional in research. In a situation they do not like, Michigan superintendents and board presidents may be choosing the "least bad" of undesirable choices since they are unlikely to regard bargaining in any form as "ideal."

A multivariate ANOVA was computed which compared the responses of board presidents, superintendents, and teachers on *actual* role, *satisfaction*, and *ideal* role of the superintendent according to size of school districts. The following categories were used, per pupil enrollment:

|        |                            |
|--------|----------------------------|
| Large  | 3,500 or more students     |
| Medium | 1,500-3,499 students       |
| Small  | Fewer than 1,500 students. |

In statistical treatment, the level of confidence was set at the .05 level. Computations were made at the Computer Center of the University of Cincinnati.

Other data, not amenable to statistical treatment, provided answers to substantive research questions of the study. These data were treated by simple addition or by analysis of responses to open-ended questions.

### Summary

In this chapter, the purpose of the study was restated. The bases of sample selection and procedures were described. Several postulates and underlying hypotheses were related. Hypotheses to be treated statistically were set out, along with substantive questions which the study seeks to answer. The next chapter will present a statistical analysis of data, research hypotheses to be supported or not, and a quantification of data obtained from the respondents.

## CHAPTER V

### DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

#### Introduction

This study concerns the school superintendent's role under the condition of collective negotiations, how his role is defined by three groups of role definers: school board presidents, teacher representatives, and superintendents themselves. As is customary in a study based on role theory, it was assumed that the three groups would hold divergent expectations for the superintendent's role. Usable returns were received from 245 of 303 possible respondents, an overall response rate of 81 percent, which meets usual standards of acceptability in educational research. Data were subjected to macroscopic analysis, in which the means of responding board presidents,<sup>1</sup> teacher representatives, and superintendents were compared for the degree of convergence among them.

The primary research hypothesis ( $H_1$ : *School board members, teachers, and superintendents of K-12 districts in*

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<sup>1</sup>As a premise of the study, it is assumed that the president is representative of the entire school board. No distinction is made between the president and any other board member.

*Michigan report different expectations for the role of the superintendent in the process of negotiation)* is global in nature; that is, acceptance or rejection depends on results of testing the other three hypotheses. If any one of these three were accepted, then the first hypothesis would also be accepted.

#### Extent of Participation

It was said in Chapter IV that teachers in 504 local "associations" are affiliated with the Michigan Education Association, while teachers in 16 local "unions" are affiliated with the Michigan Federation of Teachers. Since there are 544 K-12 school districts operating, it is apparent that in most of them (92 percent) teachers are organized as associations. If numbers of teachers are taken as a measure, the Detroit Federation of Teachers (10,500 teachers) accounts for nearly 10 percent of all teachers in the state. But Detroit is not included in the study.

Neither Detroit nor the 15 other union districts were included in statistical tests of research hypotheses. As policy, Detroit school headquarters does not respond to survey requests. When a letter of interest asking cooperation of union locals was not readily forthcoming from the Michigan Federation of Teachers, it was decided to proceed with MEA units. Acceptance or rejection of the four research hypotheses is based solely on association (MEA)

units which account for 92 percent of teacher-bargaining districts of Michigan.

Role Expectations Held for Superintendents

A major premise of this study is that people's expectations for the superintendency will vary according to their social role (*who* is defining) and according to the size of school districts. Distributing the three kinds of role definers according to three categories of district size yields 3 X 3 matrix, as follows in Table 1.

Table 1. Distribution of Role Definers According to District Size

| (n = 245)<br>District Size <sup>a</sup> | Role Definers      |                |                           | Total     |
|---|--------------------|----------------|---------------------------|-----------|
|   | Board<br>President | Superintendent | Teacher<br>Representative |           |
| Large (3,500 pupils<br>or more)         | 25                 | 30             | 26                        | 81        |
| Medium (1,500-3,499<br>pupils)          | 25                 | 24             | 23                        | 72        |
| Small (Fewer than<br>1,500 pupils)      | <u>32</u>          | <u>32</u>      | <u>28</u>                 | <u>92</u> |
| Total                                   | 82                 | 86             | 77                        | 245       |
| Percentage returned                     | (81%)              | (85%)          | (76%)                     |           |

<sup>a</sup>Size categories were determined prior to data collection.

### Convergence-Divergence in Expectations

Two research studies<sup>2</sup> report that incumbents in different roles differ significantly in their perception of the superintendent's *actual* role in collective negotiation. It seemed unlikely that this would happen in Michigan, where bargaining has been contentious from the start. In such an atmosphere there would be little doubt about actual roles. Nevertheless, it was decided to test this hypothesis. Table 2 presents responses of the three classes of role definers in districts of varying size on *actual* role, *satisfaction*, and *ideal* or *preferred* role of the superintendent.

Summary data presented in Table 2 include cell means, row means, column means, as well as cell frequencies. It should be noted that, across the groups of role definers, *satisfaction* score means and *ideal* role means are most divergent in the teacher group (3.299 and 3.532, respectively).<sup>3</sup> Variation across district size is not great.

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<sup>2</sup>Raymond D. Waier, "The Role of School Superintendents in the Negotiation Process" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970), and William E. Caldwell, "The Role of the Superintendent in Negotiations Between Teachers' Organizations and Boards of Education" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1968).

<sup>3</sup>Owing to how data were coded, the group with high mean scores is considered to have low satisfaction and, conversely, the group with low mean scores is considered to have high satisfaction.

Table 2. Perceptions of Role Definers According to District Size--Cell Means and Cell Frequencies

| Role Definer           | Perception   | District Size <sup>a</sup>   |                              |                              | Total                         |
|------------------------|--------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
|                        |              | Large                        | Medium                       | Small                        |                               |
| Board president        | Actual role  | $\bar{X}_1 = 3.32$           | $\bar{X}_1 = 2.32$           | $\bar{X}_1 = 2.47$           | $\bar{X}_1 = 2.683$           |
|                        | Satisfaction | $\bar{X}_2 = 1.40$           | $\bar{X}_2 = 1.79$           | $\bar{X}_2 = 1.75$           | $\bar{X}_2 = 1.659$           |
|                        | Ideal role   | $\bar{X}_3 = 3.28$<br>n = 25 | $\bar{X}_3 = 2.71$<br>n = 25 | $\bar{X}_3 = 2.81$<br>n = 32 | $\bar{X}_3 = 2.927$<br>n = 82 |
| Superintendent         | Actual role  | $\bar{X}_1 = 2.63$           | $\bar{X}_1 = 2.50$           | $\bar{X}_1 = 2.34$           | $\bar{X}_1 = 2.488$           |
|                        | Satisfaction | $\bar{X}_2 = 1.83$           | $\bar{X}_2 = 2.12$           | $\bar{X}_2 = 2.25$           | $\bar{X}_2 = 2.070$           |
|                        | Ideal role   | $\bar{X}_3 = 3.09$<br>n = 30 | $\bar{X}_3 = 2.96$<br>n = 24 | $\bar{X}_3 = 3.03$<br>n = 32 | $\bar{X}_3 = 3.035$<br>n = 86 |
| Teacher representative | Actual role  | $\bar{X}_1 = 2.73$           | $\bar{X}_1 = 2.60$           | $\bar{X}_1 = 2.57$           | $\bar{X}_1 = 2.636$           |
|                        | Satisfaction | $\bar{X}_2 = 2.96$           | $\bar{X}_2 = 3.34$           | $\bar{X}_2 = 3.57$           | $\bar{X}_2 = 3.299$           |
|                        | Ideal role   | $\bar{X}_3 = 2.92$<br>n = 26 | $\bar{X}_3 = 3.69$<br>n = 23 | $\bar{X}_3 = 3.97$<br>n = 28 | $\bar{X}_3 = 3.532$<br>n = 77 |
| Total                  | Actual role  | $\bar{X}_1 = 2.88$           | $\bar{X}_1 = 2.48$           | $\bar{X}_1 = 2.46$           | $\bar{X}_1 = 2.61$            |
|                        | Satisfaction | $\bar{X}_2 = 2.06$           | $\bar{X}_2 = 2.40$           | $\bar{X}_2 = 2.48$           | $\bar{X}_2 = 2.34$            |
|                        | Ideal role   | $\bar{X}_3 = 3.09$<br>n = 81 | $\bar{X}_3 = 3.11$<br>n = 72 | $\bar{X}_3 = 3.23$<br>n = 92 | $\bar{X}_3 = 3.17$<br>n = 245 |

<sup>a</sup>Large = 3,500 pupils or more; Medium = 1,500-3,499 pupils; Small = Fewer than 1,500.

Means of the three dependent variables in small and medium districts are close. Means of large districts are highest on *actual* role but lowest of the three on both *satisfaction* and *ideal* role (2.88, 2.06, and 3.09, respectively). On *actual* role, there is no interaction between role definers and district size.

It may be observed that the three lowest cell means on *satisfaction* are in the school board row across district size (1.40, 1.79, and 1.75, respectively). Highest cell means are in the teacher group (2.96, 3.34, and 3.57, respectively). Teachers are less satisfied with the superintendent's actual role in collective negotiations in Michigan than are superintendents, while school board presidents are the most satisfied. (The superintendent is least involved with negotiations in large districts, where this duty increasingly devolves on a negotiation specialist.)

#### Acceptance-Rejection of Hypotheses

$H_2$  *There are differences in what school board members, teachers, and superintendents report is the superintendent's actual role in negotiation.*

The mean of assigned authority--the actual role--as perceived by school board members, teachers, and superintendents (2.68, 2.48, and 2.63, respectively) fell short of statistical significance at the .05 level of confidence (Table 2). There is no discernible significant difference

among the three parties as to the superintendent's *actual* role. The data do not support the hypothesis.

*H<sub>3</sub> There are differences in satisfaction among school board members, teachers, and superintendents regarding the superintendent's actual role in negotiation.*

School board members, teachers, and superintendents expressed differences in *satisfaction* (1.66, 2.07, and 3.29, respectively) which reached statistical significance at the .05 level. Therefore, the data support the hypothesis.

*H<sub>4</sub> There are differences in what school board members, teachers, and superintendents believe the negotiation role of the superintendent should be, the preferred or ideal role.*

Differences in what board members, teachers, and superintendents perceive as the superintendent's *ideal* role (2.93, 3.03, and 3.53, respectively) also reached statistical significance at the .05 level. The "role definers" do not agree in their preference. The data support the hypothesis.

It was stated in the introduction to this chapter that the primary hypothesis is global in nature; acceptance or rejection depends on results of testing the other three hypotheses. The primary hypothesis is repeated with the finding, thus:

*H<sub>1</sub> School board members, teachers, and superintendents of K-12 districts in Michigan report different expectations for the role of the superintendent in the process of negotiation.*

It was necessary to accept only one other hypothesis for the primary hypothesis to be accepted. Actually two others were supported (though one was not supported), so the primary hypothesis is accepted.

There are no discernible significant differences in how the superintendent's *actual* role is perceived. But when the question is asked, "How satisfied are you with the superintendent's actual role in negotiations?" there are significant differences in *satisfaction*. Variations among classes of role definers are illustrated in Figure 1.

District size makes little difference in *satisfaction* with the superintendent's actual role, but there are substantial differences among classes of role definers (Figure 1). Board presidents are most satisfied with the status quo, followed by superintendents, whose attitudes are closer to the board presidents' than to the teachers'. Teacher representatives are the least satisfied. Farthest apart in satisfaction with the superintendent's actual role are teacher representatives and board presidents in small districts. If there is any surprise, it may be with the extent of divergence in small districts.

In Figure 2 it is apparent that variation among role definers increases across district size from large to small. In large districts there is substantial agreement




Figure 1. Interaction of Role Definers and District Size in Satisfaction with the Superintendent's Actual Role.




Figure 2. Interaction of Role Definers and District Size in Ideal Role of the Superintendent.

among role definers,<sup>4</sup> but in medium and small districts perceptions of the superintendent's *ideal* role diverge considerably. It may be noted that superintendents' perceptions of ideal role are remarkably stable regardless of district size. Teachers in large districts hold differing views of the superintendent's ideal role from teachers in small districts.

### Intercorrelations

Intercorrelations permit a testing of the possible relationship between negotiation role and satisfaction of the parties with negotiation. What relationship, if any, is there among role definers' feeling of *satisfaction* with the superintendent's actual role and the superintendent's *actual* and *ideal* (imputed) role in negotiation? Data bearing on this question are shown in Table 3 which presents intercorrelations among the three dependent variables, a feature of the program used in statistical analysis.<sup>5</sup> The only significant correlation is between *actual* role and *ideal* role, at the .05 level of confidence. Correlations between *satisfaction* and these positions are not significant

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<sup>4</sup>No explanation is offered for this phenomenon.

<sup>5</sup>The program employed was "Multivariate, Univariate and Multiple Analysis of Variance, Covariance, and Regression: A Fortran IV Program," version 4, June 1968, developed by Finn.

Table 3. Sample Correlation Matrix for Dependent Variables

|                | 1<br>Actual | 2<br>Satisfaction | 3<br>Ideal |
|----------------|-------------|-------------------|------------|
| 1 Actual       | 1.000000    |                   |            |
| 2 Satisfaction | -0.058874   | 1.000000          |            |
| 3 Ideal        | 0.420703    | 0.105423          | 1.000000   |

and indeed are essentially uncorrelated. The conclusion: one cannot predict a subject role definer's satisfaction level from his response on actual and ideal roles.

Multivariate analysis of variance was employed to test the hypotheses of research interest. In Table 4 are reported multivariate F ratios to test the effect of school district size, the effect of social role (*who* the definer is), and interaction between the two. At the .05 level of confidence, two multivariate F ratios were significant (Table 4). These are main effect for district size ( $F = 2.5143$ ,  $P < .021$ ) and main effect for social role ( $F = 17.8047$ ,  $P < .0001$ ). The multivariate F ratio for testing the interaction of these two variables was not significant.

Table 4. Multivariate and Univariate Analysis of Variance

| Sources of Variation                       | df         | MS      | F       | P     |
|--|------------|---------|---------|-------|
| Main effect for size of district           | 6 and 468  |         |         |       |
| Actual role                                | 2          | 4.6320  | 2.5143  | .021  |
| Satisfaction                               | 2          | 4.1000  | 3.0665  | .04   |
| Ideal role                                 | 2          | 0.5230  | 4.0346  | .01   |
|  |            |         | 0.2747  | .76   |
| Main effect for social role                | 6 and 468  |         |         |       |
| Actual role                                | 2          | 1.0124  | 17.8047 | .0001 |
| Satisfaction                               | 2          | 58.1904 | 0.6703  | .5126 |
| Ideal role                                 | 2          | 8.3255  | 57.2616 | .0001 |
|  |            |         | 4.3734  | .0137 |
| Interaction: Social role and district size | 12 and 619 |         |         |       |
| Actual role                                | 4          | 1.7565  | 1.0856  | .3693 |
| Satisfaction                               | 4          | 0.1897  | 1.1629  | .3280 |
| Ideal role                                 | 4          | 4.7868  | 0.1867  | .9452 |
|  |            |         | 2.5145  | .0424 |

### The Superintendent's Actual Role

The superintendent's actual negotiation role ranges from negotiator with full authority to nonparticipant. As stated previously, the three classes of role definers are in substantial agreement (no significant difference) in response to the basic question: *Which statement best describes what the superintendent actually does in your school district now?* Although they are not matched by district, respondents share similar perceptions of what the superintendent does. Findings are tabulated in Table 5.

As expected, Table 5 indicates that advisor to school board negotiators only is the one role which superintendents perform most frequently, cited by 96 respondents. This result is consistent with other studies<sup>6</sup> which show that Michigan superintendents most often perform this role. In the present study, if taken together, the two roles of negotiator are reported as often as the two roles of advisor. Teacher representatives may not know if the negotiator for the other side is acting with full or limited authority. The distinction between degrees of authority is thus qualified.

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<sup>6</sup>"School Board Members and School Administrators as Negotiators," *Negotiation Research Digest*, 6 (January 1973), 11-17. The investigator does not know of more recent research like this.

Table 5. Actual Negotiation Role of Superintendents

| Actual Role                              | Respondents        |                |                           |
|--|--------------------|----------------|---------------------------|
|  | Board<br>President | Superintendent | Teacher<br>Representative |
| Negotiator with full authority           | 12                 | 17             | 16                        |
| Negotiator with limited authority        | 24                 | 20             | 24                        |
| Advisor to school board negotiators only | 34                 | 36             | 26                        |
| Advisor to board and teacher negotiators | 3                  | 11             | 4                         |
| Neutral resource person                  | 2                  | 1              | 0                         |
| Nonparticipant                           | 4                  | 0              | 4                         |
| Other (describe)                         | <u>1</u>           | <u>0</u>       | <u>3</u>                  |
| Total                                    | 80                 | 85             | 77                        |
|  |                    |                | <u>4</u>                  |
|  |                    |                | 242                       |

(n = 242) <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Not all respondents answered every question, so answers in this section seldom total 245.

Eighteen respondents cited the "dual" role--advisor to both sides in negotiation--usually in large districts where an assistant superintendent or personnel director is now chief negotiator.

#### Satisfaction with the Actual Role

If not actually determined by the school board, the superintendent's negotiation role is at least acceptable to the board. Thus, whatever his role, one might expect the board to be relatively satisfied with it, the superintendent less so, and the teacher representative least satisfied. Closely following the superintendent's actual role, the question is then asked: *How satisfied are you with this as the superintendent's actual role in negotiations?* Answers reflect a continuum of feelings from very positive to very negative (Table 6).

Responses are in the predicted direction, but their meaning is not clear. Does the board presidents' modal answer of "very satisfied" mean that, whatever the superintendent's role, boardmen like things as they are? Why do so many superintendents eschew "dissatisfied" and "very dissatisfied" and take a noncommittal stance? Why are teacher representatives so dissatisfied? Bargaining gives them new power and access to the board. Are they just against the superintendent as a doctrinaire matter, whatever

Table 6. Satisfaction with Superintendent's Actual Role

| Relative Satisfaction              | Respondents        |                |                           | Total     |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------|---------------------------|-----------|
|                                    | Board<br>President | Superintendent | Teacher<br>Representative |           |
| Very satisfied                     | 43                 | 21             | 8                         | 72        |
| Satisfied                          | 27                 | 37             | 18                        | 82        |
| Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied | 9                  | 22             | 11                        | 42        |
| Dissatisfied                       | 2                  | 5              | 27                        | 34        |
| Very dissatisfied                  | <u>1</u>           | <u>0</u>       | <u>13</u>                 | <u>14</u> |
| Total                              | 82                 | 85             | 77                        | 244       |

(n = 244)

he does in negotiation? In the absence of probes and in-depth interviews, one can only speculate. What is known is that board presidents are generally satisfied with the superintendent's actual negotiation role while teacher representatives are not. Differences are striking.

#### The Superintendent's Ideal Role

The question was asked: *Given the present law, what do you think is the best role for the superintendent in the negotiating process?* From the same categories offered with the superintendent's *actual* role, role definers selected an *ideal* or preferred role. Findings are tabulated in Table 7. Compared with the superintendent's actual negotiation role, all classes of role definers ideally would have him do less negotiating. They would place him on management's side of the bargaining table. It is not known if their preferences are influenced by superintendents' actual performance or, in the case of teacher leaders, are projections of what these spokesmen believe is the special interest of their constituency.

Inspection of Table 7 reveals substantial agreement between board presidents and superintendents, both favoring the role of "advisor to school board negotiators only." Among teacher representatives there is no clear consensus. This is apparent in microscopic analysis when responses are arrayed according to school district size as in Table 8.

Table 7. Ideal Negotiation Role for Superintendent

| Ideal Role (Imputed)                     | Respondents        |                |                           | Total    |
|--|--------------------|----------------|---------------------------|----------|
|  | Board<br>President | Superintendent | Teacher<br>Representative |          |
| (n = 243)                                |                    |                |                           |          |
| Negotiator with full authority           | 12                 | 8              | 14                        | 34       |
| Negotiator with limited authority        | 16                 | 9              | 6                         | 31       |
| Advisor to school board negotiators only | 37                 | 49             | 16                        | 102      |
| Advisor to board and teacher negotiators | 5                  | 8              | 15                        | 28       |
| Neutral resource person                  | 8                  | 7              | 18                        | 33       |
| Nonparticipant                           | 2                  | 2              | 8                         | 12       |
| Other (describe)                         | <u>2</u>           | <u>1</u>       | <u>0</u>                  | <u>3</u> |
| Total                                    | 82                 | 84             | 77                        | 243      |

Table 8. Teacher Representatives' Choice of Ideal Role

| (n = 77)<br>Ideal Role (Imputed)         | District Size |          |          |          |
|--|---------------|----------|----------|----------|
|  | Large         | Medium   | Small    | Total    |
| Negotiator with full authority           | 9             | 2        | 3        | 14       |
| Negotiator with limited authority        | 0             | 4        | 2        | 6        |
| Advisor to school board negotiators only | 8             | 5        | 3        | 16       |
| Advisor to board and teacher negotiators | 4             | 3        | 8        | 15       |
| Neutral resource person                  | 3             | 6        | 9        | 18       |
| Nonparticipant                           | 2             | 3        | 3        | 8        |
| Other (describe)                         | <u>0</u>      | <u>0</u> | <u>0</u> | <u>0</u> |
| Total                                    | 26            | 23       | 28       | 77       |

Teacher representatives in large districts favor the superintendent's being active in negotiations on behalf of management, but those in small districts prefer that he be a neutral resource or perform the dual role of advisor to both sides. Lack of consensus suggests that the Michigan Education Association has not instructed local teacher leaders to affirm one best role for the superintendent.

#### Management's Chief Negotiator

An open-ended question was asked: *Who is chief negotiator now for your district's board-administration team?*<sup>7</sup> Responses were clustered. Inspection reveals

<sup>7</sup>Questions of the superintendent's actual role and *who is the board's negotiator* may seem somewhat redundant but they have different foci.

similar findings across classes of respondents, but practices vary according to size of the district. In Table 9 results are arranged by both district size and kinds of respondents.

Table 9. Chief Negotiator for Management Now

| (n = 242) <sup>a</sup><br>Chief Negotiator                 | District Size |        |       |          |
|--|---------------|--------|-------|----------|
|  | Large         | Medium | Small | Total    |
| Board member   | 6             | 16     | 35    | 57       |
| Superintendent   | 17            | 23     | 48    | 88       |
| Asst. superintendent, personnel director, admin. assistant | 32            | 15     | 0     | 47       |
| Professional negotiator (not an attorney)                  | 8             | 7      | 4     | 19       |
| Attorney   | 14            | 4      | 5     | 23       |
| Other  | 3             | 5      | 0     | <u>8</u> |
| Total  |               |        |       | 242      |

<sup>a</sup>Board presidents, n = 81; superintendents, n = 85; and teacher representatives, n = 76.

In small districts, the board's negotiator is usually the superintendent; board members are mentioned second. Others are seldom mentioned. In medium districts, too, the negotiator is usually the superintendent but by a narrower margin. The director of personnel is cited here, as likely to negotiate as is a board member. In large

districts, the superintendent is unlikely to be negotiator. The task goes to a negotiation specialist, often the director of personnel who may be titled assistant superintendent. A labor attorney may be employed or, less often, a professional negotiator who is not a lawyer. (Labels are not mutually exclusive; some board members who are chief negotiator may be attorneys but they were not so reported.)

#### Chief Negotiators of the Future

What authorities foresee and what people "on the line" predict for the future may not agree. To see if three classes of role definers have differing perceptions, this question was asked: *Looking ahead, whether you like it or not, who do you foresee as chief negotiator of each side in districts like yours? (Choose one for each side.)* Results are shown in Table 10.

For the teacher side, across district size, board presidents and superintendents agree that the future chief negotiator will be an MEA professional. But teacher representatives maintain it will still be a teacher designated by the teacher organization.

For the board-administration side, there is less agreement. The "outside" independent professional negotiator--a growing position in Michigan--is forecast as management's negotiator, closely followed by the "inside" negotiation specialist, although small districts do not

Table 10. Predictions for Future Chief Negotiator

| Predicted Negotiator                       | (n = 242) <sup>a</sup> | Teacher Side |       |        |       | Total |
|--|------------------------|--------------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
|  |                        | Respondent   | Large | Medium | Small |       |
| Teacher designated by teacher organization | Board president        | 11           | 8     | 10     | 29    |       |
|  | Superintendent         | 6            | 8     | 10     | 24    |       |
|  | Teacher rep.           | 16           | 10    | 18     | 44    |       |
| Independent professional negotiator        | Board president        | 1            | 1     | 3      | 5     |       |
|  | Superintendent         | 4            | 2     | 2      | 8     |       |
|  | Teacher rep.           | 5            | 2     | 1      | 8     |       |
| MEA professional                           | Board president        | 11           | 15    | 17     | 43    |       |
|  | Superintendent         | 16           | 13    | 20     | 49    |       |
|  | Teacher rep.           | 6            | 10    | 6      | 22    |       |
| MFT professional                           | Board president        | —            | —     | 1      | 1     |       |
|  | Superintendent         | —            | —     | —      | —     |       |
|  | Teacher rep.           | —            | —     | —      | —     |       |
| Other                                      | Board president        | 1            | 1     | —      | 2     |       |
|  | Superintendent         | 3            | —     | —      | 3     |       |
|  | Teacher rep.           | —            | —     | —      | —     |       |
| Board-Administration Side                  |                        |              |       |        |       |       |
| Board member                               | Board president        | 3            | 1     | 9      | 13    |       |
|  | Superintendent         | 1            | 3     | 7      | 11    |       |
|  | Teacher rep.           | 1            | 1     | 8      | 10    |       |
| Superintendent                             | Board president        | 1            | 5     | 7      | 13    |       |
|  | Superintendent         | 1            | 4     | 11     | 16    |       |
|  | Teacher rep.           | 8            | 5     | 12     | 25    |       |
| Negotiation specialist                     | Board president        | 12           | 5     | 3      | 20    |       |
|  | Superintendent         | 12           | 6     | 4      | 22    |       |
|  | Teacher rep.           | 11           | 3     | 14     | 28    |       |
| Independent professional negotiator        | Board president        | 8            | 8     | 9      | 25    |       |
|  | Superintendent         | 11           | 9     | 6      | 26    |       |
|  | Teacher rep.           | 5            | 4     | 3      | 12    |       |
| MASB professional                          | Board president        | —            | 5     | 4      | 9     |       |
|  | Superintendent         | 2            | 2     | 4      | 8     |       |
|  | Teacher rep.           | 1            | 9     | 2      | 12    |       |
| MASA professional                          | Board president        | —            | —     | —      | —     |       |
|  | Superintendent         | —            | —     | —      | —     |       |
|  | Teacher rep.           | —            | —     | —      | —     |       |
| Other                                      | Board president        | 1            | 1     | —      | 2     |       |
|  | Superintendent         | 2            | —     | —      | 2     |       |
|  | Teacher rep.           | 1            | 1     | 1      | 3     |       |

<sup>a</sup> Board president, n = 82; Superintendent, n = 85; Teacher representative, n = 75.

foresee their employing the latter. Superintendents and board members would be less likely to be chief negotiator than they are now. A position just emerging, the Michigan Association of School Board's professional, is expected to grow as management's negotiator, like his Michigan Education Association counterpart who has been longer in the field.

In general, when adversaries are invited to predict each other's future, they may project onto the other a position which is not sustainable in the public interest. In this instance, opponents have made predictions which appear to be moderate and without surprise.

### Role Conflict and Need for Change

#### Superintendents' Preferred Behavior

Asking a member of a social system how he would like another member of the system to "change" for the good of the whole is a useful research device, applied in this study through two related questions. Directed to the superintendent only, one question asks him to reflect on his own behavior: *With reference to negotiations, in what way(s) would you like to perform now?* As open-end questions may be hard to quantify, especially if they do not readily "cluster," sampling individual responses is often the best treatment.

In answer to the given question, there is no real consensus among superintendents. Instead of commenting broadly on their altered role, most of them answered within the limited context of the role they prefer in negotiation. Out of 81 respondents, 16 indicated "no change"; they would not like to perform differently from how they perform now, assuming that negotiation is here to stay. Eleven of the 16 are not chief negotiator. An additional six superintendents who are chief negotiator would rather be advisor to board negotiators only. Five would be neutral resource persons. Two others complained they had too little time to prepare for negotiating. One superintendent whose district employs an outside attorney prefers that all negotiators "be from within the system, no outsiders," while another who negotiates wants a professional negotiator to replace him.

Several superintendents want a reduced role without indicating who would fill the gap: "be less involved in face-to-face bargaining," "be uninvolved with wages and fringe benefits," "not be chief negotiator," "have someone else negotiate," "have no part in it." A few want an expanded role. Two who have limited authority want to be negotiator with full authority. One would "not have board members on the negotiating team," while another would "have a board member attend each session." One wants "financial information available prior to beginning negotiation." A

superintendent who negotiates with limited authority wants "clearer guidelines as to what the settlement can be, plus authority to settle at the right moment." Another superintendent who negotiates would rather be "advisor to an independent professional negotiator."

Several superintendents express a desire for improved relations with teachers: "more input to the teacher group but have it clearly understood that I am management," "be able to present data to teachers without counterinfluence of the teacher organization," "be able to communicate with teachers on instructional matters without union interference," "have less district-wide strife." One superintendent suggests that negotiations are needlessly attenuated: "Both sides feel that the [negotiating] process must be dragged out for three months or so. Except for this posturing, I believe we could settle in three meetings." Another would like to have "more input to the board on working conditions."

Clearly, superintendents are not completely free to choose their own role in negotiation. Since there is little agreement among them as to how they would like to perform, the research plan to count and classify the number of proposed role changes was abandoned.

Superintendent Behavior Which Boardmen Prefer

Parallel to the question asking superintendents how they would like to perform differently is a second question directed to both the board president and teacher representative: *With reference to negotiations, how would you like your superintendent to perform differently from how he performs now?* As with the previous question, respondents answered in terms of the actual negotiating process rather than the more general condition.

While 13 of the 85 board presidents did not respond to this question, 50 of them used the open-end question to offer strong affirmation of satisfaction with their superintendent and/or present arrangements for negotiating. Most common answers were: "no change," "no differently," and "satisfactory." The rationale may be expressed by one who said, "Since the superintendent reports to the board, he performs now as we wish," perhaps implying that the question is academic. There were a few scattered criticisms:

Prefer that he act as an advisor and that we hire a professional negotiator. [Superintendent negotiates.]

Wish the superintendent would use a few more facts and figures and hold the teacher organization to the contract.

Focus more on our own district rather than what surrounding districts are doing.

He should present some proposals; all proposals come from the teachers' side.

He is anti-board and pro-teacher, which causes feelings.

Prefer that the superintendent be less vocal during negotiations; he should be a quiet advisor and resource. [Attorney negotiates.]

Occasionally respondents expressed opposite views. A board president who is chief negotiator said, "Instead of the superintendent, I like to take a strong stand when necessary." One whose board hires a professional negotiator prefers that the superintendent negotiate. Where the superintendent does negotiate, one board president said, "He should become advisor to a professional negotiator; the union has gone to this." In two instances it was urged that the superintendent not negotiate but become advisor to both school board and teacher negotiators.

Several board presidents showed consideration for their superintendent. To give the flavor of the responses, a few are listed:

He should not bear the main burden of negotiations as this could hurt his effectiveness with teachers after settlement.

Prefer to keep the superintendent out of negotiation so as not to create large differences between teachers and the administration.

No reason for him to become involved more deeply in the negotiation battle.

Wish negotiation did not cause the superintendent so much fatigue.

Differences in focus among board presidents were evident. Many views were uniquely singular. The only show of consensus was that 50 of 85 board presidents affirmed their satisfaction with the status quo, as cited earlier. There was scant criticism of superintendents' performance. No board president saw this as an opportunity to inveigh against collective bargaining.

#### Superintendent Behavior Which Teachers Prefer

Teacher representatives were asked the same question as board presidents: *With reference to negotiations, how would you like your superintendent to perform differently from how he performs now?* Because negotiations makes adversaries of teachers and school managers, it was expected that criticism would be severe. Results confirm this but many comments were moderate and even sympathetic to the superintendent. In small districts, many teacher leaders yearn for the days before the superintendent was cast as the teachers' adversary. Regardless of district size, teacher representatives are extremely critical of outside negotiators, especially "labor attorneys." Whether this reflects deplorable feelings at the bargaining table or that such professionals are effective adversaries is conjectural.

Of 77 teacher representatives in the study, 14 did not respond to the question. While their attitudes are imponderable, others run the range from warm support to strong disapproval of the superintendent's performance. Feelings differ according to who performs as management's chief negotiator. No *one* choice of negotiator role gets consistently high or low marks. Consensus is approached only to the extent teacher representatives want management's power reduced, the counterpart of management's feeling about teacher power. To give the flavor of responses, a number are quoted below.

Cutting across district size, eight representatives would have the superintendent do no differently. One said, "I can now predict his stand on negotiable items." Teacher representatives are contented in several cities where negotiation is a ritual encounter between the director of employee relations and the executive director of the teacher organization. A dozen teacher representatives would *increase* the superintendent's involvement in negotiations, where the superintendent negotiates:

The superintendent should have more power in negotiation, subject to board approval.

He should have authority to make decisions, not be running back to the board.

Where he does not negotiate:

Superintendent should be involved as advisor to board negotiators or as an intermediary.

He should openly take part, not pull strings from an office chair.

He should mediate between negotiators to promote healthier relationships between the superintendent and teachers.

A similar number of teacher representatives would *decrease* the superintendent's involvement, where he now negotiates:

We prefer leaving negotiation to teachers and the board, the administrator being a neutral resource.

He should be advisor to the board, not negotiator.

We would like the superintendent to work with us, not against us.

We wish he had less authority, was more truthful, and neutral.

Because the superintendent knows the situation on both sides and has to work closely with teachers, he should not oppose them in negotiating but be advisor to both sides. [Rationale for the dual role.]

Where he does not negotiate:

We would prefer that the superintendent be less influential with the board.

Be more neutral to stop alienation of his teachers.

Wish the superintendent would aid teachers overtly and in spirit.

Whether he negotiates or sits at the table now, some representatives want the superintendent to be a nonparticipant. Others want him to be a neutral resource person.

Some teacher representatives make unique and singular observations:

The superintendent is caught in the middle when he has to negotiate for the board.

He should be forthright about being on management's side.

He should be more like a mediator or researcher for both sides.

Not be able to formulate the contract, then interpret it operationally.

He should stop fence-sitting when he knows facts have been misstated.

Would like him to be part of a regional negotiating team.

Superintendent is all right if the board would listen to him.

By the superintendent's being directly involved, we have a better relationship.

Some are bitterly critical:

He plays off both sides for his benefit.

Instead of being the hidden power, he should assume his proper role at the table.

Less verbosity, intimidation, stalling, and misrepresentation.

As data feedback, more responses of teacher representatives than board presidents and superintendents have been quoted in order to show the variety of views which teacher leaders hold. There is little consensus, so the range of attitudes has been stressed rather than the numbers

holding each position. Given the adversarial structure of collective bargaining, superintendents do not deliberately choose a role to please teachers.

### Advisory Consultation

In Chapter II, *advisory consultation* was described as a non-negotiation process by which teachers share in school board decision-making through an act of grace on the board's part. Since it is not mandated by law, the board may grant teachers' requests to be consulted or not and, if granted, to terminate consultations at will. Little is known about the extent of such practices in Michigan except that they antedate collective negotiations by many years. Groty<sup>8</sup> has set forth the rationale for the co-existence of advisory consultation with collective negotiations.

The present study sought to determine the extent of advisory consultation both *before* and *since* negotiation was mandated. The following question was asked of superintendents: *BEFORE negotiation was mandated, did your teachers participate in advisory consultation (also called joint committees) in which teachers, administrators, and*

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<sup>8</sup>Charles Keith Groty, "The Utilization of Contractually Established Joint Committees in Selected Michigan School Districts" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1970).

supervisors would meet and make recommendations to the superintendent and board of education? Responses are tabulated in Table 11.

Table 11. Extent of Advisory Consultation Before Collective Negotiation

| (n = 86) | Question   | Superintendents' Response | Number    |
|----------|--|---------------------------|-----------|
|          | <i>BEFORE negotiation was mandated, did your teachers participate in <u>advisory consultation</u> (also called <u>joint committees</u>) in which teachers, administrators, and supervisors would meet and make recommendations to the superintendent and board of education?</i> | Yes                       | 52        |
|          |  | No                        | 23        |
|          |  | Don't Know and no answer  | <u>11</u> |
|          |  | Total                     | 86        |

Results indicate that more than half of Michigan school districts utilized advisory consultation (or something like it) before 1965, when collective negotiation was mandated. Recent comparison may be made by asking the parallel question: *SINCE negotiation was mandated, do your teachers participate in such advisory consultation (joint committees) outside the negotiating process?* Responses are tabulated in Table 12.

Table 12. Extent of Advisory Consultation Since Collective Negotiation

| (n = 86) | Question   | Superintendents' Response | Number   |
|----------|--|---------------------------|----------|
|          | <i>SINCE negotiation was mandated, do your teachers participate in such <u>advisory consultation</u> (joint committees) outside the negotiating process?</i> | Yes                       | 49       |
|          |  | No                        | 35       |
|          |  | Don't know and no answer  | <u>2</u> |
|          |  | Total                     | 86       |

The extent of consultation as reported (comparing Tables 11 and 12) does not differ greatly before and since negotiation was mandated. Although advisory consultation can co-exist with bargaining, apparently it is not growing.

#### Superintendents' Training in Negotiation

The onset of collective negotiations in Michigan in 1965 caught school managers unprepared to act as the board's negotiator and to alter their role as executive. Among current superintendents are some who formerly negotiated but no longer do so, others who negotiate without benefit of training, and a few who are negotiation specialists. To determine the extent of their training, superintendents in the present study were asked: *Have you had any training in collective negotiations?* Their responses are tabulated in Table 13.

Table 13. Extent of Superintendents' Training in Collective Negotiations

| (n = 86) | Question   | Superintendents' Response | Number   |
|----------|--|---------------------------|----------|
|          | <i>Have you had any training in collective negotiations?</i> | Yes                       | 57       |
|          |  | No                        | 28       |
|          |  | no answer                 | <u>1</u> |
|          |  | Total                     | 86       |
|          | <i>If YES, under what auspices?</i>                          |                           |          |
|          | University course for credit . . . . .                       |                           | 6        |
|          | University short course, seminar, workshop . . . . .         |                           | 29       |
|          | MASA and/or MASB . . . . .                                   |                           | 18       |
|          | Other (please specify)                                       |                           |          |
|          | Private workshops, convention seminars and workshops . .     |                           | 1        |
|          | Michigan Negotiation Association . . . . .                   |                           | 1        |
|          | Detroit Metropolitan Bureau . . . . .                        |                           | <u>2</u> |
|          |  | Total                     | 57       |

Responses were examined for the effect of district size on superintendents' training in negotiations. It was found that superintendents with training were distributed quite evenly among large, medium, and small districts (21, 18, and 18, respectively), but those without negotiation training were more likely to be in small districts (8, 6, and 14, respectively).

Fifteen superintendents who report they are chief negotiator with full or limited authority have not had training in negotiations. Projecting from the one-fifth

sample, this means an estimated 75 superintendents in Michigan who act as chief negotiator have not had training in negotiation. While their present performance may be completely adequate, in relation to resources which the teacher organization can call on, they may be at a disadvantage in the future.

### Universities as Resources

Besides programs to prepare superintendents, universities usually are sources of help in solving school problems. Departments of school administration, however, seldom have any systematic means of identifying the matters of greatest concern to superintendents. Professors may be unaware of problems in the field. Seldom do they consult with practicing administrators about university offerings.<sup>9</sup> Where universities can be of help, there is often a communications problem in getting the word out.

A decade ago, Scott<sup>10</sup> reported: "Superintendents now in service . . . are unanimous in believing that study

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<sup>9</sup>Keith Goldhammer, John E. Suttle, William D. Aldridge, and Gerald L. Becker, *Issues and Problems in Contemporary Educational Administration* (Eugene, Ore.: Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, University of Oregon, 1967).

<sup>10</sup>Walter W. Scott, "A Study of Preparation Programs in School Administration as Affected by Collective Negotiations" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1966), p. 167.

and preparation in collective negotiation should be part of the preparation program for school administrators." Professors were then formulating plans to deal with this. Short of investigating the current status of preparation programs, the present study addresses the related question: *To what extent do superintendents believe that university training programs in general are meeting their needs for help with negotiation?* Answers to this query are tabulated in Table 14.

Table 14. Superintendents' Satisfaction with Training for Negotiation

| (n = 86) | Question   | Superintendents'<br>Responses |
|----------|--|-------------------------------|
|          | <i>In your judgment, how well are university training programs in school administration meeting the superintendent's needs for help with negotiations?</i> |                               |
|          | Very adequately . . . . .  | 1                             |
|          | Adequately . . . . .   | 31                            |
|          | Inadequately . . . . .   | 24                            |
|          | Very inadequately . . . . .  | 7                             |
|          | *Don't know . . . . .  | 15                            |
|          | No answer . . . . .  | 5                             |
|          | *Other:  |                               |
|          | As usual, they don't know local situations . . .   | 1                             |
|          | I have not had an opportunity to participate<br>in programs where negotiations was a topic . .   | 1                             |
|          | My experience is limited to workshops, so I<br>do not feel qualified to answer . . . . .   | <u>1</u>                      |
|          | Total . . . . .  | 86                            |

\*These categories were not provided in the questionnaire. Answers were written in.

Superintendents divided evenly between those who regard university training programs in negotiations as adequate and those who regard them as inadequate. It is noteworthy that there are so many thoughtful responses, witness the number who wrote in "don't know" when this category was not provided. The given question is interpreted to subsume preparation programs only, neither in-service training of practicing administrators nor school study councils under university auspices. Presumably only preparation programs are considered but one cannot be sure if respondents made this distinction or were offering a more generalized evaluation. In any case, low marks balance high marks. As many superintendents are dissatisfied as are satisfied, while a substantial third group are not informed.

#### Sources of Help

Superintendents were asked where they would go for help if they had a problem of negotiations. Responses are tabulated in Table 15.

In their thinking, superintendents apparently bracket MASA and MASB as if to minimize the distinction between them. By a substantial margin, these are the sources cited most frequently. Neither universities nor the state Department of Education is often cited as a resource. Although 86 superintendents reported a total of 10 lawyers as chief negotiator, lawyers are mentioned

Table 15. Sources of Help with Negotiation

| (n = 86)  | Question   | Superintendents'<br>Responses |
|---|--|-------------------------------|
| <i>IF you had a problem involving negotiations, where would you turn for professional assistance?</i> |  |                               |
|   | *Michigan Association of School Administrators . . . . .               | 31                            |
|   | *Michigan Association of School Boards . . . . .                       | 24                            |
|   | Michigan Department of Education . . . . .                             | 9                             |
|   | A university . . . . .   | 10                            |
|   | Other:   |                               |
|   | MASA 1/3, MASB 1/3, lawyer 1/3 . . . . .                               | 6                             |
|   | University 1/2, lawyer 1/2 . . . . .                                   | 2                             |
|   | MASA 1/3, MASB 1/3, negotiation assn. 1/3 . . . . .                    | 1                             |
|   | MASA 1/3, Michigan Department of Education 1/3<br>lawyer 1/3 . . . . . | 1                             |
|   | Lawyer . . . . .   | <u>1</u>                      |
|   | Total . . . . .  | 86                            |

\*Includes 16 superintendents who specified MASA 1/2 and MASB 1/2.

infrequently as a resource which superintendents would turn to with a problem of negotiations. (The number might be larger if the category "lawyer" had been included in the questionnaire.) In terms of research interest, the conclusion is inescapable that Michigan superintendents do not think of universities as a prime source of help with problems involving negotiations.

Changed Working Relationships

If there is a single theme which runs through this study, it is that collective negotiations has changed the school superintendent's role. People in different roles perceive the direction of change differently. To find how the sample of superintendents feel, the present study addresses this question: *In what way do superintendents perceive that negotiations has changed their working relationships with teachers and with the school board?* Their answers are tabulated in Table 16.

Table 16. Changes in Superintendents' Working Relationships

| (n = 86)   | Question   | Superintendents' Responses |
|--|------------|----------------------------|
| <i>Has negotiation changed your working relationships with teachers and with the school board? (yes, no)</i> |            |                            |
| <i>If YES, in what way?</i>  |            |                            |
| Yes . . . . .  |            | 60                         |
| No . . . . .   |            | 22                         |
| No answer . . . . .  |            | 4                          |
| <br>Experience as superintendent:  |            |                            |
|  | <u>Yes</u> | <u>No</u>                  |
| 1-5 years . . . . .  | 20         | 10                         |
| 6-10 years . . . . .   | 14         | 5                          |
| 11-15 years . . . . .  | 10         | 2                          |
| 16-20 years . . . . .  | 6          | 4                          |
| Over 20 years . . . . .  | <u>10</u>  | <u>1</u>                   |
| Total . . . . .  | 60         | 22                         |

Of those answering "yes," most superintendents (55 out of 60) used the provided space to tell how negotiations has changed their working relationships, with teachers especially and with the school board to a lesser extent. (Of superintendents answering "no," only one explained, saying: "The change has been with the union leadership.") Three first-year superintendents declined comment, claiming limited experience. Among superintendents answering "yes," the dominant theme is that negotiations is divisive. It casts people as adversaries, isolates administrators, and creates a gulf between them and teachers. A composite statement in their own words reveals how superintendents feel:

Before negotiations, teachers and administrators were a team. Now we oppose each other on almost every occasion. Teachers are disassociated from the superintendent. They have built a wall between him and themselves. It is now a hard-core employer-employee relationship, a two-camp operation. I have had to develop a hard-nosed attitude toward the local education association. To the teaching fraternity, I am an outsider, the teachers' foe, not an educational leader.

In many ways superintendents say the administrator's powers are reduced:

The master contract reduces a superintendent's flexibility in managing. No longer do I have the power to conciliate. Everything is according to the agreement--no individual consideration. There is not much you can do to reward the good teacher or discipline the poor one. I am less able to work with individual teachers or to make independent decisions. Boards are more involved in administration

now, so relations with the board can be strained. Teacher power influences the board more than the superintendent does.

Many superintendents cited a climate of distrust which has developed:

There used to be trust between administrators and teachers but no longer. They just don't trust me. There is distrust and reluctance to make commitments freely. It is difficult to keep former relationships when we are now adversaries. It is difficult to support teachers, to stimulate or give direction and to get positive feedback. I cannot speak for teachers as I used to. The teacher organization discredits all voices except their own. There is less rapport and a chillier atmosphere, particularly in negotiations. It is hard to maintain friendly relations while saying at the table, "This is a strike issue."

Personal relationships have changed greatly. There is resentment toward administration. Negotiation has totally destroyed what community of interest I once had with the faculty as a group and thrown me into an adversary position. It has complicated my relations with the board, because they have been slow in seeing this change and have not always seen their position as "management." The board sometimes expects the impossible.

Relations with teachers are detached and less friendly. Grievances are handled on a more formal basis. Things are formalized, documented, and legalistic. My recommendations are questioned more. Hostility is commonplace. I believe it was there before but covered up.

Believing that negotiations puts them in a "can't win" position, some superintendents cited these negative effects.

Again, in their composite words:

The board has seen its authority erode. Matters which could easily be agreed on are saved for bargaining. Both sides are mad at me, the board for being a spendthrift and the teachers

for being stingy. Teachers feel the superintendent has assumed an adversary role, while the board feels they should protect him from problems of negotiation. All this narrows the superintendent's running room, the room for maneuver which is essential to management.

Despite the problems it has brought, negotiations is not without its good points, as superintendents acknowledge:

Positions are more clearly established now. Relationships were strained the first two years; since then, they have returned to normal. There may be hard feelings with the staff but not with the board. The board now knows how much it needs the superintendent. Management rights have to be protected. Actions have to be examined to see if they set a precedent. I touch base more often with officers of the local group. Where someone else negotiates, the superintendent is no longer in the middle. He can learn a great deal about staff personnel by being a free agent. Besides, new teachers are better qualified and superintendents' salaries have doubled in six years.

Summing up, the typical superintendent feels that negotiations has deteriorated working relationships with teachers but may have brought the board and superintendent closer. Ending once friendly contacts, negotiations is a barrier between administrators and teachers. It foments distrust, isolates superintendents, turns former colleagues into adversaries, and upsets traditional concepts of administrative leadership. Still, it ended paternalism and uncovered discontent which festered below the surface of relationships with teachers. "Sometimes I wonder why negotiations didn't come sooner," is the solitary comment of one superintendent. Few of his fellow superintendents would agree.

Trends Affecting Educational  
Administration

Going beyond the substantive data of the present study, it seems reasonable to observe that the determination of teachers to have power through teacher organization may have been the major trend affecting the superintendency in the past decade. (However, finance continues to be the most difficult *operational* area of administration. Studies show that more time is spent in fiscal management and budget planning than in any other activity.) Much of what superintendents have learned about negotiation was learned on the job. Improvisation can be frustrating and costly. It has been said:

Even if superintendents want to deal effectively with teacher groups in the new fashion, they find virtually no established technology or experience in education which they can use as guides for establishing procedures for negotiations, grievance committees, consultative management, and group decision-making.<sup>11</sup>

Despite the teachers' embracing unionism, other conflict-management structures may supplement negotiation. There is movement away from a strict constructionist view of authority and from one-man decision-making (a characterization which superintendents might insist never applied to them), forcing change in the nature of administrative leadership. Challenged by teacher organizations, administrators are urged to remain flexible, to respond creatively

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<sup>11</sup> Goldhammer *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

rather than defensively. Without help, this is expecting a great deal of them.

Teachers now bargain collectively according to law in all but a handful of states. Without redrawn flow charts or reallocated responsibilities, the trend is running toward some form of shared management. No longer is the superintendent the teachers' spokesman. Some superintendents may willingly serve as management's negotiator, but school personnel administrators who are negotiation specialists are coming to free the superintendent of this time-consuming task. Based on the claim that teachers are professionals, highly politicized teacher organizations, with strong central control, push for collegial management. Insisting that virtually everything is negotiable, they would confine the administrator to administrative affairs, excluding him from "professional" matters. Since it causes a fundamental change in the structure of authority, collective bargaining is inherently threatening to management.

In response, the board-administration turns to trained negotiation specialists. Multi-district or joint bargaining, increasing the size of bargaining units, has begun. Associations of administrators and school boards often unite in common cause. Boards coordinate bargaining tactics among them and review the results:

An increasing number of school systems find it helpful to convene groups of administrators, after negotiations have been completed and the contract has been successfully consummated, to analyze actions at the table. Not only do these post-mortem sessions serve to brief administrators about the contents of the contract, they also can be useful in planning strategies and tactics for subsequent negotiation sessions.<sup>12</sup>

The rapid development of collective negotiations has followed on a long-range trend toward cooperative decision-making in various kinds of organizations. As an act of grace, administrators permit those who will be affected by decisions to share in making them. With the advent of bargaining in education, what was once granted as a privilege has become a right in most states. Superintendents used to believe that teachers regarded them as the teachers' professional leader, *primus inter pares*, who was somehow different from other bosses. Collective bargaining makes the old assumption unworkable. The assumption that administrators and teachers share an identity of interest as members of the same profession is also going. A few behavioral scientists (W. W. Charters, Jr., among them)<sup>13</sup> doubt that the concept of "leadership" was ever appropriately applied in such a bureaucratic setting as the

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<sup>12</sup> American Association of School Administrators, *Critical Incidents in Negotiation* (Washington, D.C.: The Association, 1971), pp. 91-92.

<sup>13</sup> W. W. Charters, Jr., "Teacher Perceptions of Administrator Behavior," Cooperative Research Project No. 929 (St. Louis: Washington University, 1964).

school. In any case, this ritual of mutual pretense is over. Administrators have given up the rhetoric of pseudo-collegiality, the idea of the professional education "team," and are turning to the professional *manager* as their model. Teacher-activists have replaced self-effacing teachers, upsetting the norm that it is illegitimate to disagree openly with an administrator and ending the fiction that a superintendent adequately represents teacher interests to the school board.

In the past, teacher discontent seldom surfaced but was reflected indirectly, as through job-turnover rates. Teachers lacked sanctions over administrative actions. As *role sender* to the superintendent, the board's influence probably still outweighs teacher attempts at influence. Because a superintendent is dependent on the board's evaluation, his actions necessarily are more congruent with board expectations than with teachers', as the present study demonstrates. If superintendents have trouble with the board, their subordinates show little concern for them; negotiations does not seem to change this. Some years ago, Holloway<sup>14</sup> asked board members in Michigan the reasons for

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<sup>14</sup>Hugh H. Holloway, "Why School Superintendents Are Dismissed or Encouraged to Leave Their Positions--A Study as Expressed by Members of Boards of Education Involved in Selected Cases in Michigan" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1966).

superintendents' losing their job. In reply, as the primary reason, board members cited the superintendent's lack of responsiveness and failure to carry out board policy. Holloway concluded that, where superintendents fail, the board and superintendent hold conflicting views of their respective roles; failing superintendents are seldom told the real reason for their dismissal. Similarly, Hencley<sup>15</sup> found that where superintendents are in conflict with others, most differences arise from their misperceiving the reality of the situation which confronts them.

Ohm's<sup>16</sup> excursion into futurism develops twin themes: administration as a process of conflicting resolution and administration as a process of research and training. Ohm cites the new militancy as reviving administrative concern for the involvement of organization members in decision processes. He prophesies that future administrators will work "in a changing, conflictive decision system so complex and sophisticated that the old notions of hierarchy and authority will hardly apply."<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Hencley, *op. cit.*

<sup>16</sup> Robert E. Ohm, "The School Administrator in 1985," in Walter G. Hack (ed.), *Educational Futurism 1985*, Report of the 1985 Committee of the National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 94-108.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

One administrative task will be to construct new forms of ritualizing conflict in ways which are both therapeutic and solution-oriented. But administrators will not experience less stress. Ohm projects a model of the administrator as organizational diagnostician and architect (borrowing from Goldhammer's administrator-as-diagnostician). Such projections go beyond the codewords of democracy in administration.

#### Negotiation Shifts the Power

Without changing the statutory responsibility of school boards to operate schools, collective negotiations causes a shift in power from board to teacher organization. Sometimes this is a shift from board dominance to teacher dominance. Believers in bargaining insist that a successfully negotiated agreement is proof itself that power is equalized, although power motives are no less present. Superintendent dominance is becoming rarer. Much conflict within schools originates in sources external to the schools.

State associations exert a strong advisory influence over their affiliates, "suggesting" master contracts and specifying "target" districts. Local autonomy, the ostensible purpose of bargaining, may give way before central control. The Uniserv division of the Michigan Education Association has some 90 field representatives distributed throughout the state, readily available to assist local associations in bargaining. This structure makes for great

uniformity in proposals which local associations bring to the bargaining table and provides the state organization with considerable ability to influence the locals. In response, school boards are banding together into loosely knit groups which the MEA calls "coalitions" and "unholy alliances." Multi-district bargaining is likely to increase and there is a distinct possibility of statewide negotiation of some items. In a few districts, power struggles have erupted between the superintendent and the chief negotiator for the board. These are indicators of the superintendent's reduced influence as chief architect of the educational program. Although a clear trend is not yet discernible, chances are that the superintendency will be divested of instructional leadership and evolve as a general *managerial role*.

Ylvisaker<sup>18</sup> offers this observation:

We are within a few years of the potential of national strikes. In the future, educational reforms will be won only with arduous and prolonged negotiation.

Myron Lieberman, a close observer and advocate of negotiations, uses the term *unionization* to define teacher group activity. Some advocates avoid this term but Lieberman does not (nor does Terry Herndon of the National Education

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<sup>18</sup>Paul N. Ylvisaker, "Beyond '72: Strategies for Schools," *Saturday Review*, 55 (November 11, 1972), 33-34.

Association). Lieberman asserts that the negotiations movement has caused a gain in power for administrators(!) with a comparable loss in power for school boards.<sup>19</sup> This is a singular and anomalous observation.

Will there be further change in the relations between teachers and school management? It is difficult to say. Lohr<sup>20</sup> found that both teacher organization negotiators and board negotiators *in Michigan* prefer the present model of bargaining to alternative models. This suggests that individuals who are intimately involved in bargaining as now constituted are learning to live with those arrangements. Indeed, in the present study respondents did not use the opportunity to hurl anathemas at each other. The climate for bargaining may be improving.

Despite the charged polarities of bosses and employees, not all of negotiation's effects on the superintendency are negative. Some authorities believe the superintendent is now free of pressures which formerly impinged on him. Prior to collective negotiations, Neal Gross' study identified 19 groups which exerted "pressure"

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<sup>19</sup> Myron Lieberman, "The Future of Collective Negotiations," *Phi Delta Kappan*, 53 (December 1971), 214-216.

<sup>20</sup> Seibert R. Lohr, "Perceptions of School Negotiators Toward Specific Provisions in Collective Negotiation Models" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973).

(demands backed up by threats) on superintendents and board members. These groups represented almost everyone in the community. The new teacher power may be a counterforce against such instances of community pressure on school management. Between the board and administration, the level of trust, support, and mutual respect should be at a new high.

The negotiations movement takes the superintendent off the hook of "dual allegiance," with its potential for role conflict. As between school board or teachers, his loyalty is with the board. While retaining overall responsibility for negotiations, many superintendents have been freed of the task of across-the-table bargaining. This may abate personal feelings of frustration and bitterness.

Does bargaining cause teachers to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the instructional program? The answer is a tentative "no." Clearly, the first two years of bargaining led Michigan teachers to make financial gains at double and even triple the usual gain, but increases in teacher salaries were not at the expense of other parts of the budget.<sup>21</sup> Because of the practice of "indexing," tying administrators' salaries to a proportional level above the

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<sup>21</sup> Charles M. Rehmus and Evan Wilner, *The Economic Results of Teacher Bargaining: Michigan's First Two Years* (Ann Arbor: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Michigan, 1968). This study might well be brought up to date.

teacher base, many administrators are indirect beneficiaries of teacher bargaining. As the saying goes, "a rising tide raises all boats." However, the maintenance of salary differentials does not mean that administrators have no reason to resist salary demands of their employees.

From his perspective as Michigan's (then) state superintendent, evaluating the effects of negotiations, Polley<sup>22</sup> concluded that bargaining will lead to increased funds for school support with the state assuming an ever-increasing share.

Like other executives, superintendents try to reserve time for long-range planning. Frequently they operate on an emergency basis, managing by crisis. Derr's study<sup>23</sup> of Boston school headquarters reveals that top-echelon administrators spent about 80 percent of their working time on matters requiring immediate attention, such as confrontations and demonstrations. Preparation for bargaining involves considerable planning and "homework" for both sides. Thus, if it were not for bargaining, those

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<sup>22</sup> Ira Polley, "Collective Negotiations--A View from a State Department of Education," *State Government*, 42 (Spring 1969), 131-136.

<sup>23</sup> C. Brooklyn Derr, "Conflict Resolution in Organizations: Views from the Field of Educational Administration," *Public Administration Review*, 32 (September-October 1972), 495-501.

school systems which continually manage by crisis might do even less planning.

### Politics of Education

The present study's treatment of *politics of education* demonstrated that, besides being fragmented, education interest groups did not show much mastery of political process in the Michigan legislature. Despite the lessons of 1965, the superintendents' association is only marginally effective in the legislature, according to one research study.<sup>24</sup> DePree found that Michigan superintendents lack understanding of legislative process and are not well organized to influence legislation. Few superintendents are involved in "communications" about legislation. This fact is not lost on legislators. DePree found a significant relationship between the frequency of superintendents' attempts to influence legislators and the legislators' perception of this use. (Obviously teachers have an advantage over superintendents, being numerous enough to constitute a voting bloc.)

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<sup>24</sup>Kenneth R. DePree, "Michigan Public School Superintendents and the State Legislature: An Analysis of the Superintendents' Understanding of and Participation in the Legislative Policy Making Process" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1971).

Michigan was one of twelve states in a recent study<sup>25</sup> of politics of education. Despite the persistence of "statewide fragmented" education politics and with no effective education coalition, the education lobby ranked third (of twelve) in influence with the legislature. Ranking was based on influence of the teacher association, teacher union, and administrator association acting *separately*. The school boards association was not considered. Coincidentally the Michigan governor's office also ranked third (of twelve) as an influence in school policymaking. To the extent this study investigated the administrator association, it conflicts with DePree's.

A trend toward professionalizing teaching is likely to continue. If teacher organizations can combine the member-benefit concerns of a union with concern for standards appropriate to a professional association, professionalization will be speeded. While teachers increase their autonomy through aggressive bargaining, superintendents will continue to lose power as the control center but will probably learn to live with ambiguities and with constraints on administrative authority. An astute observer of the politics of education, Ralph B. Kimbrough

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<sup>25</sup>Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr., and Roald F. Campbell, "Influentials in State Policymaking for the Public Schools," *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 12 (Winter 1976), 1-26.

makes this observation: "What many persons do not realize is that formal adversary-type negotiations are a political process. If you do not have power, you do not negotiate."<sup>26</sup> Demonstrably bargaining is a power relationship and a process of compromise. It assumes implicitly that there is a basic conflict between labor and management (read teachers and school administration) inherent in their differing expectations for the allocation of resources, primarily money. Even with a relatively high level of such "conflict," the two sides may learn to work together productively, moved perhaps by concern for the public interest or less altruistically by sanctions which the public might apply. The battle for bargaining does not have to be fought again. It is not useful to replay the history of the past decade nor can one extrapolate from it into the future.

As one scans the long-term prospect, the question may fairly be asked: What is the ultimate consequence of the present structure for teachers' "sharing in decision-making" through negotiations? It appears not to be the second-grade teacher and her superintendent in collegial dialogue but their representatives--two negotiation professionals faced off in an adversary proceeding.

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<sup>26</sup> In Kenneth H. Hansen (ed.), *The Governance of State Education Systems: Pressures, Problems, Options* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1972), p. 14.

They represent interacting powers which are competitive but respectful of each other's interests.

As Lortie observes, the political effect of teaching's being a high turnover occupation is that people with only limited work experience have considerable voice within teacher organizations. Indeed, by force of numbers, they may "tilt" policy in their favor. He does not see great change in how school policy is made, however:

Teacher organizations have made some demands for inclusion in school system decision-making, but they have not pressed such demands very hard. Nor is there evidence that their claims and victories have made any fundamental difference in the way school systems make major policy decisions. . . . Teachers have not used collective bargaining to challenge the way public school systems are organized; they have worked *within* the prevailing structure.<sup>27</sup>

Everything points to continued growth of bargaining. Teaching will continue, as Lortie characterizes it, being "middle-class work in which more and more participants use bargaining strategies developed by wage-earners in factories."<sup>28</sup> Bargaining in the future will not remain as it has been. Since teachers have made significant gains through bargaining, in Lortie's scenario the public may begin to insist on higher performance standards and more vigorous scrutiny of the quality of teachers' work.

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<sup>27</sup>Dan C. Lortie, *Schoolteacher: A Sociological Study* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 205.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 10.

Although he does not forecast the superintendent's role, Lortie visualizes tougher bargaining by school boards; "should current patterns of teacher oversupply continue, teacher organizations may find bargaining increasingly difficult."<sup>29</sup> Illustrating the problem, at the start of the 1975-76 school year, 6,000 Michigan teachers had been given layoff notices. Not a time for hard bargaining by teacher organizations.

#### The Superintendent of the Future

Perhaps no innovation in public education diffused more rapidly than did collective negotiations. It also transformed the leadership function of the educational administrator. Expanding teacher power revealed long-standing grievances against school management as well as the fragile basis of the superintendent's leadership. Bargaining reshapes the decision-making structure of school systems. With the curtailment of managerial discretion, a gradual and unofficial transfer of power takes place, which alters the superintendent's role. Whether the superintendent is the board's negotiator or not, it is important that he maintain control over negotiation, not permitting another person to bypass him with the board.

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<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 221.

The managerial role is forecast as the way of the future for the superintendent, as he abandons the instructional-leader role. He may then direct his total effort toward being the board's executive officer. There may be little need for claiming competence in substantive areas of instruction. Except for what is state-mandated, even now he is unable to impose much of anything on his subordinates when proposals for change have to be bargained. What happens to administrative leadership if, as teacher organizations would have it, final decisions in professional matters are made by teachers-as-professionals while the administrator is confined to administrative affairs? With teachers' refusing to accept the superintendent's leadership, he needs to be expert in setting and altering goals and in the private arts of accommodation and compromise. Future administrators may specialize in organization development, helping people to interact effectively in combining the pursuit of organizational goals with personal goals, self-actualization, and work satisfaction.

The superintendent will perceive himself as a public executive who has more in common with other executives than with teachers from whose ranks he rose. Other routes besides teaching will lead to the superintendency. As authoritarianism and paternalism become obsolete, the educational administrator may become skilled in ways of

working--a convener of organizational problem-solving or "mediator-initiator" as Clark Kerr once characterized the president of a university.

School managers will still have to determine when demands represent true feelings of local teachers and when demands originate with state or national organizations. Administrators can distinguish between teacher organizations and teachers as people. They may have different aims and goals but to try to divide them is fruitless. They will not dispute each other. The history of once radical movements suggests that militancy will abate as teacher organizations achieve their goals and become part of the establishment. If negotiation does not provide the framework for dialogue between employer and employee locally, another means probably will. Just as doctors, lawyers, and similar professionals need postprofessional continuing education to stay abreast of developments in their field, so do educational administrators.

It remains to be seen whether collective negotiations enhances the autonomy of the teacher. In some instances, union autocracy has supplanted management's autocracy; the individual has little real voice. The concept of the public interest's being paramount is largely ignored.

### Summary

In this chapter, results of testing the research hypotheses were described. The primary research hypothesis (*School board members, teachers, and superintendents of K-12 districts in Michigan report different expectations for the role of the superintendent in negotiation*) was accepted. Another hypothesis (*There are differences in what board members, teachers, and superintendents report is the superintendent's actual role in negotiation*) was rejected. Another (*There are differences in satisfaction among board members, teachers, and superintendents regarding the superintendent's actual role in negotiation*) was accepted. The final hypothesis (*There are differences in what board members, teachers, and superintendents perceive as the superintendent's ideal role*) was accepted.

A Michigan superintendent is as likely to be negotiator as advisor in negotiations. Advisor to board negotiators only is most frequent. While all three classes of role definers agree on the superintendent's actual role, they are not equally satisfied with it. In modal responses, board presidents are very satisfied, superintendents are merely satisfied, and teacher representatives are dissatisfied. Boardmen and superintendents endorse the most common role as the ideal role. Teacher representatives do not agree among themselves on an ideal role. The superintendent is now most likely to be management's

negotiator but, in the future, an outside professional for management and an MEA professional are the predicted adversaries.

With reference to negotiations, superintendents do not agree on how they would like to change their behavior, boardmen are satisfied with the superintendent's behavior, while teacher representatives disagree among themselves over what the superintendent should do. Superintendents say that advisory consultation with teachers went on before mandatory negotiation and continues, to about the same extent. Most superintendents have had some training in negotiations. Whether universities have helped with negotiations, superintendents split evenly between yes and no responses. If they had a negotiations problem, for help superintendents would turn to the Michigan Association of School Administrators and Michigan Association of School Boards.

Superintendents confirm that negotiations has changed their working relationships, especially with teachers (and the board to lesser extent). The superintendent's future role was discussed with its possible implications. The managerial role seems likely to supplant the instructional leader role, if present trends continue. It was suggested that trends affecting educational administration call for new models of administration and consequent changes in university preparation and in-service training programs.

## CHAPTER VI

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

#### Purpose

The purpose of this study was to determine the expectations which Michigan school board members, teacher representatives, and superintendents hold for the role of the superintendent in collective negotiations. Prime research questions were: What is the superintendent's actual role in collective negotiations? How satisfied are school board members, teachers, and superintendents with the superintendent's actual negotiation role? What do they believe the superintendent's negotiation role should be?

Several related questions were asked of these respondents who, in the language of role theory, were called *role definers*. One purpose was to see if the superintendent experiences *role conflict*, incompatible expectations for his actions as superintendent. Teachers have gained power through collective negotiations (as bargaining in public education is called) which has contributed to conflict for the superintendent, the central figure of the study.

### Conceptual Framework

The study was based on social-systems theory and role theory, described in the review of literature along with studies of negotiations. Bargaining's effect in transforming the superintendent's role was discussed, as was advisory consultation--a process which can co-exist with bargaining. With the anomaly of teachers' *refusing* the superintendent's instructional leadership, it was predicted that the superintendency will evolve into a managerial role.

In the context of politics of education, the history of Michigan's collective negotiations law was reviewed, demonstrating the disunity of education interest groups in 1965 when the law was enacted. With the education lobby fragmented, a Democratic-labor coalition passed a labor relations bill (not a professional negotiations bill) to govern teacher bargaining. The law polarizes school boards and teacher organizations, eliminating a middle ground, so administrators have had to find a new position. In this sense, bargaining transforms the superintendent's role, raising a question whether people important to the superintendent have similar or different expectations for what he should do.

Substantive Findings

All three groups of role definers (board members, superintendents, and teacher representatives) agreed in their perception of the superintendent's actual negotiation role. But differences in their satisfaction with this role were significant--board members being most satisfied, superintendents less so, and teacher representatives being quite unsatisfied. There were significant differences in perception of an ideal role for the superintendent; board members and superintendents both favored the role of advisor to board negotiators only, but teacher representatives failed to agree among themselves. Thus, the primary research hypothesis was accepted: *School board members, teachers, and superintendents of K-12 districts in Michigan report different expectations for the role of the superintendent in the process of negotiation.*

In general, the superintendent is now the chief negotiator for school management but, in large districts, the task goes to an "inside" negotiation specialist. Predicted as future adversaries: the teacher organization's negotiation professional *versus* management's "outside" negotiation professional. Most Michigan superintendents have had some training in negotiations. Whether or not university training programs have helped with negotiations, superintendents are evenly divided. If they needed help

with a negotiations problem, they would turn not to a university but to the Michigan Association of School Administrators and Michigan Association of School Boards. They assert that negotiations has changed working relationships both with teachers and the board.

### Conclusions

The study provided an analysis of the school superintendent's changing role from the viewpoint of incumbents of two counter positions--board member and teacher representative--as well as superintendents themselves. The investigator approached his subject in an even-handed manner and believes the following conclusions are warranted by the data:

1. Role definers (board members, superintendents, and teacher representatives) agree about the superintendent's *actual* role in negotiation.
2. They disagree in their *satisfaction* with the role.
3. They disagree as to what role would be *ideal* for the superintendent.
4. Because of these disagreements (and several others which were described) it is concluded, therefore, that the superintendent is indeed subject to differing role expectations, largely as an effect of collective negotiations, thus creating possibilities of role conflict.

### Related Research

Study of the superintendent's role in negotiations reveals that key people in closely related positions--his role set--have incongruent expectations for what the superintendent should do. While the negotiations movement has changed the superintendent's role by modifying his "leadership," there is further need to study the characteristics of administrators under varying social conditions. Comprehensive study of the superintendency could contribute to the literature of occupations and professions. Little is known about the professional socialization of educational administrators, the regularities of career development, how one moves from teacher to principal to superintendent, perhaps shifting from one reference group to another as he moves. The question whether school administration is developing a new breed of professional managers merits investigation, as does the overall process by which a professional identity is developed. (In moving from teaching to administration, does one abandon his previous occupational identity or merely modify it?)

### What Universities Might Do

Universities, which have not provided much help with negotiations, might do more in organizing programs for the continuing education of superintendents, for life-long professional education, retraining and renewal, which

is no less essential for school administrators than for physicians and lawyers.<sup>1</sup> There are skills and understandings for which administrators are not "ready" until they are on the job. Similarly, between universities and state departments of education, consultant services *in administration* might be expanded. Acknowledging the problem of funding, there might be comparative study of the support capability of the United States Office of Education, state departments of education, schools of education, and professional associations. As Goldhammer et al.<sup>2</sup> point out, administrators do not give high marks to the usual in-service programs which universities provide for superintendents. Knowledge of what practicing administrators

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<sup>1</sup>The American Association of School Administrators now offers opportunities for superintendents to attend short-course workshops and regional conferences. The offerings pale in comparison with the American Medical Association which annually sponsors more than 1,000 conferences and study sessions for physicians to keep abreast of developments in their field. Similarly, bar associations in several states are beginning to require that lawyers complete an amount of course work, prescribed by a state board, to hold their license. This is called mandatory continuing legal education. (Cf. *Newsweek*, January 12, 1976, p. 71).

<sup>2</sup>Keith Goldhammer, John E. Suttle, William D. Aldridge, and Gerald L. Becker, *Issues and Problems in Contemporary Educational Administration* (Eugene, Oregon: Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, University of Oregon, 1967).

perceive as problems could be useful inputs for program development in educational administration.

There is need to develop strategies for conflict management and resolution. Game theory and gaming can teach this. Schools of education can help administrators-in-training to learn conflict management, since crises and confrontations are part of an administrator's way of life. Programs can be developed to train specialties in school personnel administration as a substantive career field. Probably all professionals in education should be made familiar with the negotiations movement.

In the politics of education, there might be proposals for new ways of achieving consensus on education to influence state legislatures, study of power structures affecting public education, and how educational decisions are made at state level. A course in "politics of education" might be part of an administrator's preparation. There could be study of the feasibility of merging the state school boards association and the association of school administrators, whose present relationship in Michigan is one of autonomy with affinity. Despite their having separate constituencies, the idea of merger is consistent with the concept of unitary management.

To what extent do administrators take the teachers' view into account *outside* matters agreed upon through the

negotiated contract? Because they reduce the adversary effect on the superintendent's role, there might be on-going study of joint decision-making outside negotiations and exploration of ways that negotiation may strengthen teacher-management relationships. Although advisory consultation proved inconclusive in the present study, such structures can co-exist with negotiations. (There is a parallel with university departmental committees and faculty senates. Considering the interest in bargaining in higher education, the comparison may not be persuasive.)

New models of teacher organizations might combine a *union's* concern for its members' welfare with a *professional* organization's capacity to be self-regulating yet sensitive to the public interest.<sup>3</sup> If the superintendent no longer is professional leader of the teachers, what will be his new leadership role? Among several ways of looking at it, management may be regarded as a *process* of leadership. The concept of the superintendent-as-manager thus incorporates leadership. While the practice of administration has changed, preparation programs for administrators are

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<sup>3</sup>Much literature in the past assumed that teacher negotiations and professionalism were incompatible. Some writers now contend that the negotiations movement grows out of increased professionalism of teachers. There is no hard evidence of this. (Cf. Richard B. Peterson, and H. Dean Smith, "Making Sense Out of Teacher Professionalism, Job Satisfaction, and Attitudes Toward Collective Negotiations," *Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector*, 3 (Summer 1974), 227-239.)

*relatively* unchanged. As Griffiths says, "There are even more questions today about the efficiency of preparation programs than there were twenty years ago, and there appears to be less discussion between professors and practitioners."<sup>4</sup>

Finally, it would be useful to follow up Scott's 1966 study<sup>5</sup> to determine how major Midwestern universities have helped superintendents to deal with collective negotiations.

#### Organization Development

In preparation programs for school administrators, it is often noted that a fruitful area of study is organization development (OD). This is defined as "any planned effort directed at helping the members of an organization to interact more effectively in the pursuit of their personal goals and the goals of the organization."<sup>6</sup> OD uses findings from the behavioral sciences to improve an organization's functioning. The key is to give equal

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<sup>4</sup>Daniel E. Griffiths, editor's comment in *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 12 (Winter 1976), iii.

<sup>5</sup>Walter W. Scott, "A Study of Preparation Programs in School Administration as Affected by Collective Negotiations" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1966).

<sup>6</sup>Daniel A. Tagliere, *People, Power, and Organization* (New York: American Management Association, 1973), p. viii.

attention to *both* organizational goals and individual needs of employees. One aspect is to train people to respond to environmental change by altering their ways of working. Little has been done to introduce OD to school administrators, but the belief exists that this is a good idea.<sup>7</sup> Applications of organization development to educational administration provide an area for further study.

#### What Superintendents Might Do

Michigan superintendents have now had a decade of experience with collective negotiations. An undetermined number who could not or would not adjust to a changed superintendency have left the profession. The shakeout is now past. Counting replacements for those who took normal retirement, a "new breed" of superintendent is in the field.

While it seems likely that negotiations is here to stay, the prudent superintendent has a number of options (besides organization development described above) which are appropriate to a managerial role. One of them may be "management by objectives," a process by which a manager and subordinate jointly develop goals for a given time frame, as well as the ways of reaching them. Through this strategem, the organization as a whole engages in systematic goal setting. He may become skilled in conflict management

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<sup>7</sup>Richard A. Schmuck et al., *Handbook of Organization Development in Schools* (Palo Alto: National Press Books, 1972).

and resolution, in systems analysis, working with goals, performance levels, and feedback devices. He needs managerial motivation and the ability to maintain a working equilibrium of "antagonistically cooperative forces." He needs to understand the dynamics of teacher-administrator conflict and the nature of organized power.

The superintendent cannot expect to be the controlling force in all educational decisions. But, whether or not he actually negotiates, he maintains control of negotiations--with all employees, not just teachers. He is involved in setting the direction of negotiations and in other aspects of management planning. Nothing in negotiations negates the truth that a commendable way to manage crises is by redressing the grievances which cause them. To minimize the confrontation of adversaries, he may try to achieve the greatest possible degree of joint decision-making outside negotiations.

Although teachers and similar public employees are determined to have more power, negotiation is not the only way to broaden participation in decision-making. (In the auto industry, non-adversary *discussions* throughout the year co-exist with hard bargaining.) Besides traditional hierarchical control and the collegial control which teachers are demanding, there might be some accommodation between the two, especially if it can be shown that the

public interest is well served. The adversary relationship of negotiations places bargainers *across* the table.<sup>8</sup> Other modes might be explored, alternative arrangements which put the bargainers *around* the table. Physical arrangements make a difference; social psychology provides evidence that such structuring is important.

Superintendents might work diligently to maintain trust between school management and the teacher organization, assuring that the two organizations fully accept and plan to follow through on their agreement in the best of faith. They should not lose sight of the possibilities of non-zero-sum gains for both sides by shared power. Assuming that teacher welfare is the teacher organization's prime interest and institutional welfare is school management's prime interest, one is not obtainable regardless of the other.

The superintendent is not completely free to define his professional rights and obligations. As in politics, he

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<sup>8</sup>A respected superintendent recalls his district's first experience with the mechanics of bargaining. An official of the state labor relations board instructed the interested parties on the seating arrangement, saying, "Now Mr. Superintendent, your place is here, opposite the leader of your teachers." To which the superintendent cried out, "I will not sit where I am 'the other side' from my teachers. I am their friend, not their adversary." He was sincere. The anecdote is a metaphor for the disillusion which many superintendents encountered in the early days of negotiations. (Superintendents from the pre-bargaining era have had to reverse fields. Under negotiations, the superintendent argues *against* teacher salary increases and smaller class size.)

learns to live with restraints and ambiguities, with trade-offs and compromises. He avoids a rigid concept of authority and "prerogatives" and learns to share power with the teacher organization as well as the board. The interface between the administrator's realm and the teacher's is fluid and subject to bargaining. If the union is powerful, even management's right to manage may be challenged (but should not be given up). One way to head off extremely tough bargaining by intransigent union leaders is to anticipate their demands, to use joint decision-making as a benign process in which the antecedents of demands are dealt with in an uncontentious atmosphere. On the other hand, unions must keep showing the rank and file they can get results. An authority says, in corporations, the old system under which management ruled alone is being supplanted by a new ideology in which the source of authority is consensus between management and labor.<sup>9</sup>

If superintendents do not know when differences exist between themselves and significant others, ignorance can jeopardize their career and threaten the well-being of the school system. Frequent monitoring of the norms and values of others is important so as to assess them accurately. The superintendent must accommodate to incompatible

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<sup>9</sup>George Cabot Lodge, *The New American Ideology* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975).

expectations, such that fulfillment of one makes it impossible to fulfill another.

In time, as he identifies less with teachers and more with other managers, he will come to see that the interests of management and of employees are not always the same. Nor is management always the best judge of its employees' interests. He will recognize the need to give attention to *both* the individual needs of teachers and organizational goals, not relying on the codewords of "what is best for kids" as an administrative control.

There are unresolved problems of the managerial role which go beyond the purview of this study. Granted that educational administration does not differ greatly from business, military, or hospital administration (to paraphrase Griffiths), can the administrative processes of setting goals, building morale, and initiating change be separated from the substance of *education*? Can a general-purpose administrator lead a community and persuade its school board to a higher vision of what schools ought to be? Hard data on this are lacking.

#### Questions for Future Research

This study provides baseline data for future research. It could be replicated, perhaps including school principals and *all* board members to test the range

of attitudes to be accommodated in the decision process. At this level of analysis, study design might get at the superintendent's "definition" of others' role expectations-- to test how accurately people perceive the expectations of others. It was shown that various reference groups have differing expectations for the superintendent's role. Here "teacher representative" meant the president of the organization which is recognized for collective bargaining. If, instead, the teachers' chief negotiator had been specified, there might be different results. (Often the same person performs both roles but study design did not allow for this distinction.) Another study might not rely on self reports (with no cross-check on validity) regarding advisory consultation.

The study sought to capture salient aspects of the social role of the school superintendent in Michigan at a given point in time, after collective negotiations curtailed his powers of administrative decision-making. It would be speculative and beyond the purview of the study to predict what form this role will ultimately take. As subjects for broadly related research, these questions are commended:

- Why does one teacher seek to become an administrator while his cohort remains a teacher? Do they have different orientations to the teaching role?

- Does the new breed of teacher perceive the employing organization (the school) as a prime source of reward and satisfaction? How can the school compete with the teacher organization?
- Given the function of school management, can there be a balance of control and autonomy in teaching (to paraphrase Lortie) as teachers look not to administrators but to their peers as a reference group?
- If militant teachers believe everything is negotiable, how can school managers insist on administrative prerogatives, on "boundary maintenance"? Is anything absolutely nonnegotiable?
- How does the demand for teacher accountability act as a counterforce to teacher power through collective bargaining?
- Does bargaining distort the allocation of resources toward ever-increasing salaries, actually depriving pupils of instructional materials?
- Should there be multi-district and even statewide bargaining of some items, supplemented by local bargaining of other items as in the auto industry? How would statewide negotiation affect the superintendent's role?

- Should universities help school managers to cope with negotiations, providing centers for study and resolution of school disputes, or can associations of school boards and administrators best meet this need? Should administrative training include conflict management and conflict resolution? Must superintendents have expertise in "education"?
- Is it true that the longer the members of a social system interact with one another, the more they will agree on role expectations for each other? Does experience with bargaining break down stereotypes each side has about the other?
- Does bargaining have such a polarizing effect that other constituents are cut out of the decision-making process? Should citizens advisory committees, broadly representing the total community, present to both sides the community's views on issues in negotiation? As teacher organizations become unionized, can they also be professional?
- Does teacher militancy really come down to demand for more money, part of a widespread "revolution of rising entitlements"? Thus, all the rest is merely rhetoric?

Other challenges will succeed negotiations as problems. The problem of what superintendents might do to live with collective negotiations is as much one of attributes as of behavior. The kind of person the superintendent should be is as important as what he might do. He may expect to feel as isolated as the top man in most formal organizations. One hopes he does not regret his choice of career. Up to now, polls of educational administrators consistently record a high level of career satisfaction.

**APPENDIX A**

**COVER LETTERS TO SUPERINTENDENTS,  
BOARD PRESIDENTS AND  
TEACHER REPRESENTATIVES**

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COLLEGE OF EDUCATION • ERICKSON HALL

Dear Board President:

At Michigan State University, we are making a study of the superintendent's role in the process of negotiations--to find out what he actually does and what people think he should do. Through sampling, your district was chosen for the study. (You may have received a similar letter from us but we have no record of your reply.)


Will you take ten or fifteen minutes--and that is all you will be asked for--to complete the enclosed questionnaire, entitled ROLE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT IN NEGOTIATIONS.

An envelope is provided for direct return to the project director. Responses will be kept confidential, so that neither you nor your district will be identified. With your cooperation, more can be known about a subject of importance to everyone concerned with public education in Michigan.

Sincerely yours,



NORMAN P. WEINHEIMER  
Executive Director  
Mich. Assn. of School Boards



WALTER W. SCOTT  
Associate Professor of Education  
Michigan State University

WWS:gsr

Enclosures

**APPENDIX B**

**QUESTIONNAIRES**

For the Superintendent

The requested information is needed to analyze data; it will not be used for any other purpose. Each set of responses will be given a code number. The study report will not identify individuals or school districts. Nor will respondents from the same district see each other's response.

SUPERINTENDENT'S QUESTIONS

1. Name \_\_\_\_\_

2. School district \_\_\_\_\_

3. Size of district--membership for 1972-73: \_\_\_\_\_ pupils

4. BEFORE negotiation was mandated, did your teachers participate in advisory consultation (also called joint committees) in which teachers, administrators, and supervisors would meet and make recommendations to the superintendent and board of education?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

5. SINCE negotiation was mandated, do your teachers participate in such advisory consultation (joint committees) outside the negotiating process?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

6. Have you had any training in collective negotiations?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

If YES, under what auspices?

University course for credit . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_

University short course, seminar, workshop . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_

MASA and/or MASB . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_

Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

7. In your judgment, how well are university training programs in school administration meeting the superintendent's needs for help with negotiations?

Very adequately \_\_\_\_\_

Adequately \_\_\_\_\_

Inadequately \_\_\_\_\_

Very inadequately \_\_\_\_\_

8. IF you had a problem involving negotiations, where would you turn for professional assistance?

- Michigan Association of School Administrators . . . \_\_\_\_\_
  - Michigan Association of School Boards . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_
  - Michigan Department of Education . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_
  - A university . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_
  - Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

9. Has negotiation changed your working relationships with teachers and with school board?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

If YES, in what way? \_\_\_\_\_

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10. Please indicate your total years of service as a superintendent (including the present year): \_\_\_\_\_ years.

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR HELP. If there is anything you would like to say about collective negotiations, please do so.

For Board President, Superintendent and Teacher Representative

ROLE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT IN NEGOTIATIONS

1. What the superintendent actually does regarding negotiations and what you think he should do may be different. Which statement best describes what the superintendent actually does in your school district now? (Check one.)
  - a. Negotiator with full authority
  - b. Negotiator with limited authority
  - c. Advisor to school board negotiators only
  - d. Advisor to school board and teacher negotiators
  - e. Neutral resource person
  - f. Nonparticipant
  - g. Other (describe): \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_
  
2. How satisfied are you with this as the superintendent's actual role in negotiations?
  - a. Very satisfied
  - b. Satisfied
  - c. Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
  - d. Dissatisfied
  - e. Very dissatisfied
  
3. Given the present law, what do you think is the best role for the superintendent in the negotiating process?
  - a. Negotiator with full authority
  - b. Negotiator with limited authority
  - c. Advisor to school board negotiators only
  - d. Advisor to school board and teacher negotiators
  - e. Neutral resource person
  - f. Nonparticipant
  - g. Other (describe): \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_



4. Who (position, not name) is chief negotiator now for your district's board-administration team?

\_\_\_\_\_

5. Looking ahead, whether you like it or not, who do you foresee as chief negotiator of each side in districts like yours? (Choose one for each side.)

Teacher Side

In-district person:

teacher designated by teacher organization . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_

Outside person:

independent professional negotiator . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_

MEA professional . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_

MFT professional . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_

Other (describe): \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Board-Administration Side

In-district person:

board member . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_

superintendent . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_

negotiation specialist . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_

Outside person:

independent professional negotiator . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_

MASB professional . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_

MASA professional . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_

Other (describe): \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

6. QUESTION TO SUPERINTENDENT: With reference to negotiations, in what way(s) would you like to perform differently from how you perform now?

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

7. QUESTION TO BOARD MEMBER AND TEACHER REPRESENTATIVE: With reference to negotiations, how would you like your superintendent to perform differently from how he performs now?

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

8. Your position:

School board president . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_

Superintendent . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_

President of education association/union . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_

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