A HISTORICAL AND LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VALUES-CLARIFICATION MOVEMENT

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ABSTRACT

A HISTORICAL AND LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VALUES-CLARIFICATION MOVEMENT

By

G. Curtis Smitch

The values-clarification approach is one of the more pervasive movements in the field of education today. There are, for example, a growing number of workshops on the values-clarification approach for public school teachers, elective courses on values-clarification for students, and instructional materials on values-clarification for the classroom. In addition, there are now two major centers for the study of the values-clarification approach: the Center for Humanistic Education, University of Massachusetts, and the National Humanistic Education Center, Upper Jay, New York.

There are two fundamental claims underlying the values-clarification approach. First, that most of the problems students have in school, behavioral, emotional and motivational, are the result of the students not being clear about their values. To help students get clear about their values and thereby resolve their problems, teachers are urged to implement the values-clarification

approach in their classroom. Simply stated this means having students answer questions and defend their positions on a variety of controversial topics, e.g., premarital sex, redistribution of the nation's wealth, grading practices, etc.. The second claim is that the values-clarification approach is "value-free," that is, it avoids making value judgments or moralizing (telling students what is "right" or "wrong"). The study examines the validity of the latter claim.

It is the contention of the study that the values-clarification approach is directly involved in moral education. It is not value-free, as the authors of the values-clarification literature assert. The values-clarification approach <u>does</u> make value judgments and it <u>does</u> prescribe proper modes of conduct for students in our society, that is, values-clarifiers attempt moral education.

The purpose of the study is to demonstrate that the values-clarification approach is simply another attempt to use the public schools to morally educate the young of our society. It is important to demonstrate this fact because the majority of educators who use or support the values-clarification approach are <u>unaware</u> that they are directly involved in moral education. As argued in the study, such a situation is very likely to provide, in the words of John Dewey, a "mis-educative experience" for students. In

other words, educators who are directly involved in moral education efforts ought to be aware of that fact.

It is the contention of the study that educators need to be made aware of the relationship between the values-clarification approach and moral education. This can be accomplished by making available a document that (1) elucidates the explicit and implicit moral claims made by the major values-clarifiers, and (2) describes the history of the major moral education movements in our society since the turn of the century. The latter provides a perspective which enables the concerned educator to better understand the historical tradition in which the values-clarification--moral education relationship is grounded.

The study demonstrates that: (1) the claim that the values-clarification approach is value-free, is false; (2) a number of basic values-clarification strategies, e.g., the values continuum, are illogical and actually serve to obfuscate the issues and mislead persons regarding the method and purpose of the values-clarification approach; and (3) there are a number of statements in the values-clarification literature which clearly reveal the moral nature of the values-clarification approach.

The study concludes that, although we can sympathize with the proponents of the values-clarification approach regarding the problems students face in society and the

schools, we can not commend or support their methods for resolving these problems. In fact, in the final analysis, the values-clarification approach is probably doing a disservice to teachers, students and ultimately the larger society because it has failed to understand the principles and purposes embodied in moral deliberations.

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G. Curtis Smitch

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The values-clarification approach is one of the more pervasive movements in the field of education today.[1] It holds as its guiding thesis the assumption that most of the problems that children have in the schools today are the result of the children not being clear about their values. "Could it be," ask the values-clarifiers,[2] "that a number of children's problems currently attributed to emotion. . . are more usefully seen as resulting from value disturbances?"[3] It is important to note that the kinds of problems which the values-clarifiers refer to are not only emotional but also problems concerned with why children "do not seem to learn

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[1]The values-clarification approach is also referred to as the values-clarification process, or simply values-clarification. The former was made popular by the major work in the field entitled, Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies for Teachers and Students, by Sidney B. Simon, Leland W. Howe, and Howard Kirschenbaum. (New York: Hart Publishing Co., Inc., 1972).

[2]The term values-clarifiers refers to those persons who use the values-clarification approach. For the purpose of this study I will restrict the use of the term to identify the authors of the major works in this area: Sidney B. Simon, Leland W. Howe, Howard Kirschenbaum, Merrill Harmin, Louis E. Raths, and James Raths.

[3]Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon, Values and Teaching: Working with Values in the Classroom (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1966), p.4.

as well as they might,"[4] as well as, problems of "apathy, confusion, and irrational behavior."[5] Indeed, claim the values-clarifiers, "the common malady of these children seems to be confusion of values."[6]

In order to help students become clear about their values, and thereby solve many of the problems which occur in the schools, teachers are urged to use the values-clarification approach in their classrooms. Simply stated this means that:

> The teacher uses approaches which help the students become aware of the beliefs and behaviors they prize and would be willing to stand up for in and out of the classroom. He uses materials and methods which encourage students to consider alternative modes of thinking and acting.[7]

As it is most commonly used, this approach means asking students to answer questions or defend and examine statements on a wide variety of topics and issues. In the language of the values-clarifiers it is referred to as conducting "values-clarification strategies."[8] By going through this process, i.e., engaging in various strategies,

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[4]Raths, Harmin and Simon, p. 7

[5]Raths, Harmin and Simon, p. 7.

[6]Raths, Harmin and Simon, p. 8. The way in which the values-clarifiers define the term "value" is discussed in chapter III.

[7]Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum, p. 20

[8]See Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum for a list of seventy-nine values-clarification strategies.

the values-clarifiers claim that the student will become clearer about his or her values.

For example, one of the popular strategies, entitled, "All About Me," directs the teacher as follows:

> Students write a story in their notebooks every other day. Stories are titled: (1) Who Am I? (2) Who Takes Care of Me? (3) I Am Proud... (4) Someday I Want to ... (5) My Funniest experience... (6) If I Could Change the World...(7) My Friend...
>
> The students may read their stories aloud to the class, or show them to a friend or their parents. They may add to them or organize them into an autobiography.[9]

The purpose of these activities is to "provide the students with an opportunity to think, and make statements, about their lives in a systematic, on-going way."[10]

Because of the obviously simplistic methodology involved in the values-clarification approach, the movement has rapidly spread throughout the educational community. The diffusion is aided by the fact that educators are explicitly assured by the leading values-clarifiers that they can use the values-clarification approach after having been exposed to a single workshop or course on the subject. In fact, in most cases educators are urged to try the values-clarification approach after simply reading any one of the major works on the topic.

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[9]Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum, pp. 234-235.

[10]Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum, pp. 234-235.

> The theory can be tested by any teacher in the classroom. Indeed, we strongly recommend that the reader who finds the theory at all worthy at first reading go so far as to give it a try in the classroom.[11]

The results readily demonstrate that the values-clarifiers have been successful in their efforts to persuade educators to use the values-clarification approach. There are, for example, a growing number of workshops on the values-clarification approach for teachers, administrators, and teacher educators,[12] as well as a significant number of schools that are using the values-clarification approach in their classrooms,[13] or are offering elective courses in values-clarification.[14] In addition there are catalogs from which to order values-clarification "materials,"[15] and two national centers for the study of the values-clarification approach.[16]

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[11] Raths, Harmin, and Simon, p. 8.

[12] Howard Kirschenbaum, "Recent Research in Values-Clarification," (New York: National Humanistic Education Center, 1974).

[13] In a personal communication with Sid Simon I was informed of the fact that he is now in the process of compiling a list of schools located throughout the country, which are using the values-clarification approach. In addition see Phi-Delta Kappan, Vol. 56 (June, 1975), pp. 679-683.

[14] Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum, p. 21.

[15] For Example, "Human Values in Conflict" (Spring 1975 Catalog; Anoka, Minnesota: Greenhaven Press, Inc., 1975). The catalog contains a list of books, simulation games, mini course study kits, photo study cards, and tape cassettes, all of which deal with values-clarification.

[16] There are two major centers for the study of values-clarification: The center for Humanistic Education, Sid Simon director, University of Massachusetts; and the National Humanistic Education Center, Howard Kirschenbaum, director, Upper Jay, New York.

Thus, it appears that the values-clarification approach can be readily introduced into the educational process with a minimum of effort (and knowledge?) on the part of the participating teachers, students, administrators, and teacher educators.

The significance of the values-clarification movement lies, in part, with its rapid growth and widespread popularity. The values-clarification movement, however, is significant in another way that is largely unrecognized: the movement is directly related to moral education. Additionally, the relationship between the values-clarification movement and moral education is unusual, if not extraordinary, because the leading values-clarifiers (1) deny that the relationship exists, and (2) argue that the explicit lack of such a relationship is one of the major strengths of the movement.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Values-clarification proponents are involved in matters directly pertaining to moral education: a situation this study will demonstrate is inevitable. The problem is that the majority of the educators who use the values-clarification approach are <u>unaware</u> that this practice has involved them directly and fundamentally in the realm of moral education.

The explicit assumption being made in this study is that educators who become involved in activities, such as values-clarification, which involve them directly and fundamentally

in moral education, should be fully cognizant of this fact. For it is neither desirable nor beneficial to have educators involved unknowingly in the area of moral education. In fact, it may be "miseducative" for those students who encounter educators that are unaware of the moral character of their instructional programs.[17]

Why the Problem Exists

There are two major reasons why many educators who use the values-clarification approach in their classrooms are unaware of the moral nature of their endeavor. First, many of these educators lack the necessary philosophical knowledge and skills which would enable them to recognize and analyze those statements in the values-clarification literature that have moral implications. In fairness to the uninformed educator it must be pointed out that the values-clarifiers go to considerable length to assure interested parties that the values-clarification approach is not concerned with moral matters. Thus they say:

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[17] The American philosopher, John Dewey, held that educational experiences should enable a person to fully benefit from other future experiences. This is a basic premise of his famous "Growth Doctrine." Dewey, however, was careful to stress the fact that persons can have "miseducative" experiences which seriously limit the probability of the person having additional "growing experiences." Said Dewey, "any experience is miseducative that has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of future experiences." This occurs when experiences are "disconnected from one another," a situation which is likely to occur when educators are involved in activities in the domain of moral education without being aware of the fact that they are involved in this area. John Dewey, Experience and Education, (Sixteenth Printing; New York: Collier Books, 1973). pp. 25-26.

> The clarifying response avoids moralizing, criticizing, giving values, or evaluating. The adult excludes all hints of 'good' and 'right' or 'acceptable' or their opposites, in such responses.[18]

In other words, according to the values-clarifiers, "values-clarification . . . is based on the premise that none of us has the 'right' set of values to pass to others."[19]

However, as will be clearly demonstrated in Chapter III, the careful and knowledgeable reader will find a number of statements in the values-clarification literature that are obviously of a direct moral nature.

The second major reason why many educators are often unaware of the direct and fundamental relationship that exists between the values-clarification approach and moral education is because they are uninformed about the history of moral education in American society. They are not able to make informed comparisons between the concerns of present day values-clarifiers, and the concerns that moral educators have expressed over the years.

For example, a recent book which utilizes the values-clarification approach begins with a strong statement lamenting the desperate condition of the world today, and then asserts that values-clarification may be one of the best solutions we have for solving our problems.

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[18]Raths, Harmin, and Simon, p. 53.

[19]Sidney B. Simon, "Values-Clarification vs. Indoctrination," Social Education (December, 1971), pp. 902-915.

> If humankind is to last beyond the next century, then the massive competitive value structure in which people see only parts of the puzzle of global survival must be dismantled and replaced. This value structure, which pits man against man in competition over limited resources, must give way to an understanding that the earth's limited resources must be shared by all if any are to survive. In a society based on human values, man's most precious resource is his fellow man. If the school has a function for the future it is to teach our young these human values, these survival skills.[20]

The history of moral education, however, clearly demonstrates that concern about the "deteriorating" global condition of man, with a concomitant appeal to the educational system to help improve the situation, was also being articulated vehemently in 1910.

> What is demanded by the most urgent considerations of social unrest today, and what is implied in the reconstructions of educational foundations, must be carried through in spite of the opposition of traditional institutions. The problem is not a local one, for the world is no longer made up of local and isolated communities. In reality, the problem includes the worldwode situation: . . . The problem of moral education is to determine how these moral relationships which are unrecognized and implicit in all our world-life, . . . shall become explicit . . .[21]

Similarly, the historical perspective helps us to recognize that the educational community's eagerness to assume a major role in moral issues, although use of the term moral may not

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[20]Robert C. Hawley and Isabel L. Hawley, Human Values in the classroom: A Handbook for Teachers (New York: Hart Publishing Co., Inc., 1975), p. 13.

[21]Joseph Kinmont Hart, A Critical Study of Current Theories of Moral Education (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1910), p. 4, 11.

be explicit, has remained very much the same over the past seventy years. For example, in 1909 the Commissioner of Education, Elmer Ellsworth Brown, noted that:

> The year 1909 has been marked in our educational history by an unusual emphasis upon the moral aspects of instruction.[22]

Nearly sixty five years later the identical message is conveyed, as the opening remarks of a recent conference of the American Association of Elementary - Kindergarten, and Nursery Educators, reveals:

> Has the United States ever lived through a period of time more provocative of questions of moral values than the year of 1973?[23]

NEED FOR THE STUDY

It is the contention of this study that there is a need to make available to educators who are involved or interested in the values-clarification approach, a document which will aid in making explicit the direct and fundamental relationship which exists between values-clarification and moral education.

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[22]The United States Bureau of Education, Report of the Commissioner of Education, Elmer Ellsworth Brown, Commissioner, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Vol. 1 (June 30, 1909), p. 2.

[23]Dwain D. Hearn and Sandy Nicholson (eds.), "Values, Feelings, Morals: Part 1 -- Research and Perspectives," American Association of Elementary-Kindergarten, and Nursery Educators, Washington D.C., 1973 National Research Committee Conference, Resources in Education, Vol. 10, No. 2 (February, 1975), Ed 097-269.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study will be to provide a document that (1) elucidates some of the major implicit and explicit moral claims in the values-clarification literature that have implications for moral education and, (2) offers a brief, but informative, descriptive history of the major moral education movements in the United States since the year 1900. The latter should enable the concerned educator to attain a perspective which is necessary in order to better understand the historical tradition in which the values-clarification--moral education relationship is grounded. As Landes and Tilly said:

> The contribution of history is perspective. This is no small matter. It is only too easy, too tempting for each generation . . . . to see the tests and troubles of their own time as unique.[24]

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

There are two limitations which are imposed on the study in order to attain a more precise focus on the problem under consideration. First, this review of the literature concerning the history of moral education in the United States is limited to the literature published after the year 1900. It does not appear necessary to include information prior to that time in order to provide a satisfactory description of major movements in moral education in this country. Secondly,

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[24]David S. Landes and Charles Tilly, History as Social Science (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1971), p. 6.

there is no attempt in this study to test experimentally the central claims made by the values-clarification approach. For example, there was no attempt to verify whether or not the values-clarification approach actually "clarifies values." Our concern in this study is analytical: to elucidate the explicit and implicit moral claims made by the values-clarifiers which in turn demonstrate the relationship that exists between the values-clarification approach and moral education.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The study is organized into four distinct chapters. In Chapter I a brief introduction and a statement of the problem under consideration are presented. In addition, the rationale for the study is given as well as the manner in which the study is to be organized. Also included in this chapter is a brief description of the limitations imposed on the study.

Chapter II is a description of the three major sub-movements in the history of the larger moral education movement covering the period from the turn of the century until the present time. The sub-movements are (1) the religious education movement, (2) the character education movement, and (3) the values-education movement. This information is necessary in order to explain most efficiently the historical relationship of the values-clarification approach to the larger moral education movement in this society.

In Chapter III an analysis of the explicit and implicit moral claims made by the values-clarifiers is conducted. In addition several fundamental premises of the values-clarification approach are analyzed for logical consistency. Both of these categories of statements are thought to establish, upon careful analysis, the relationship between the values-clarification approach and moral education.

Chapter IV, the final chapter, contains the summary and conclusions of the study.

CHAPTER II

A BRIEF HISTORICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE THREE MAJOR SUB-MOVEMENTS IN MORAL EDUCATION IN THE 20th CENTURY: RELIGIOUS EDUCATION, CHARACTER EDUCATION, AND VALUES EDUCATION

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the values-clarification approach, contrary to what the values-clarifiers claim, addresses some of the same issues with which moral educators have traditionally been concerned since the turn of the century. In order to support this assertion, historical descriptions are offered for each of the major movements in the history of moral education: the religious education movement, the character education movement, and the values education movement.

It is beyond the scope of this study to provide a comprehensive description of each of the three sub-movements. The body of relevant literature is simply too large. After a careful and extensive review of the literature it seems possible to say that the relationship between the values-clarification approach and the traditional domain of moral education could be established by including in the discussion information which appeared to be both common and of central importance in the deliberations of the three movements, as well as the values-clarification approach.

Using these criteria in the historical descriptions, it can be determined that information concerning the following

topical areas would allow for a satisfactory demonstration of the historical relationship which exists between the values-clarification approach and moral education: (1) information concerning the influence of the psychology and philosophy of John Dewey; (2) information concerning the appeal to science, particularly psychology, in order to support and guide various conceptions of moral education; (3) information concerning the reliance upon the public schools by those concerned with moral education; and (4) information concerning a basic assumption held by a significant number of moral educators, to the effect that all persons, especially the young, should be aware of their moral responsibility and obligation to society. In other words, it is the contention of those concerned with moral education, that:

> No society can survive without a moral order . . . . As social structures become more complex, as the welfare of all depends more upon the cooperation of all, the need for common moral principles becomes imperative. Especially in a society which cherishes the greatest possible degree of individual freedom, the allegiance of the individual to commonly approved moral standards is necessary.[1]

THE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION MOVEMENT

Prior to the twentieth century the teaching of "common moral principles" was a task carried out through the religious education programs of organized religion. Moral education was seen simply as an outgrowth of religious education. As

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[1] Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools, Education Policies Commission (2nd printing; Washington, D.C., The National Education Association, May, 1951), pp. 3-4.

society moved into this century, however, important changes were occurring that had a direct effect upon organized religion's conception of religious education. Society was becoming more complex and diverse. It was becoming increasingly industrialized and interested in modernization through the development and application of new technologies. In addition, and importantly for the religious education efforts of organized religion, society was coming to view public education as essential for the preservation and growth of democracy in the face of these powerful modernizing forces.

The consequence of these changes for organized religion was that society became more comfortable with, and convinced of the need for the separation of church educational programs and public education. A rapidly growing, complex, industrial/technological society demanded an education for its citizens that was free from the parochialisms of the church. A secular and scientifically based education, acceptable to a diverse ethnic and cultural population, was viewed as necessary for the survival of the democratic society.

Organized religion, faced with this situation, moved to expand and modify its conception of religious education. The first step was to move out of the "church" and into the public schools.

> The development of religious education as a fullscale and many-faceted movement is usually traced to the turn of the present century. Prior to this time, . . . churches tended to confine their programs to Sunday-school work largely lay-led and controlled. However, beginning with the 1900's, the scope of the church's educational interests was widened. . .[2]

The decision to emphasize religious education through the public schools in no way diminished the religious community's belief that morals and the moral life drew their sustenance from religion. The teaching of "common moral principles" in a secular environment was not viewed by the religious community as in any way an abdication of religious principles and beliefs. The following statement by the Commissioner of Education, in 1909, illustrates the position held by the majority of those involved in the newly-emerging religious education movement.

> Those who would maintain that the moral life has other rootings than that in religion, would, for the most part, admit that it is deeply rooted in religion, and that for many of our people its strongest motives are to be found in their religious convictions; that many, in fact, would regard it as insufficiently grounded and nourished without such religious convictions.[3]

In moving religious education into the public schools the church recognized that two major changes would be necessary in order for the new program to be successful. First, the

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[2]Marvin J. Taylor (ed.), Religious Education: A Comprehensive Survey (New York: Abingdon Press, 1960), p. 20.

[3]Report of the Commissioner of Education, 1909, p. 5.

religious education program had to adopt a non-sectarian, nondenominational position toward the teaching of moral principles. Secondly, it became necessary for religious education programs to incorporate the philosophy and methodology of contemporary public education practices. The latter move became, for all practical purposes, an endorsement of the philosophy of John Dewey.

> Both the philosophy of John Dewey and the progressive education movement must be included in an overview of the historical development of (education) in the church, because both made a heavy impact upon the religious education movement.[4,5]

The religious education movement, as it emerged in the early 1900's, reflected the church's willingness to work through the public schools in order to develop the religious, and, thereby, morally educated individual. It reflected, as the following statement illustrates, an understanding on the part of the church of the powerful influences that the public schools played in shaping moral principles and conduct:

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[4]J. Donald Butler, Religious Education: The Foundations and Practice of Nurture (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 105.

[5]As testimony to the importance of Dewey's thought to the religious education movement, George Albert Coe, professor of the Union Theological Seminary, New York, and central figure in the religious education movement, states the following in his book, A Social Theory of Religious Education (1st ed., 1917; New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1969), p. x: "Any reader who is familiar with present movements in educational thought will perceive, as this work proceeds, how much I owe to writers who have had in mind the public school rather than religious education. I am indebted most of all to John Dewey, who is foremost among those who have put education and industrial democracy into a single perspective."

> What parent is there who has felt no concern as to the moral effects of school life on his children? Religious education means not the formal teaching of the creeds or even religious history in the schools, but the aiding of schools to efficiency in making their courses and life, their teaching and environment fruitful in right moral character, so that our schools shall, whatever else they may do, send youth out with a keen sense of right, with moral judgment and worthy ideals, with love of truth and purity, honor, and kindness.[6]

The Religious Education Association

The religious community formally initiated the religious education movement with the founding of the Religious Education Association (REA) in February, 1903.[7] From its inception the REA served to define the methods and aims of the religious education movement.

The guiding purposes of the REA, as expressed by the founding fathers of the organization, were "(1) to inspire the religious forces of our country with the educational ideal, (2) to inspire the educational forces with the religious ideal, and (3) to keep before the public mind the ideal of moral and religious education and the sense of its need and value."[8]

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[6]"The Practical Aim," Religious Education, Vol. 4 (December, 1909), pp. 389-391.

[7]Herman E. Wornon, "The Religious Education Association," Religious Education: A Comprehensive Survey, ed., Marvin J. Taylor (New York: Abingdon Press, 1960), pp. 359-370.

[8]"Purposes of the Convention," Religious Education, Vol. 1 (April, 1906), p. 2.

The REA was to "teach and to disseminate correct thinking on all general subjects relating to religion and moral education . . . ."[9]

Although the REA was explicitly concerned with religion and religious education, it was still able to attract a significant number of major secular leaders and thinkers to its cause. In large part this was due to the Association's vigorous adherence to a non-denominational, non-sectarian position with regard to membership and participation in the organization and its activities.[10] For example, the director of the program at the founding convention in Chicago, in 1903, was William Rainy Harper, president of the University of Chicago. He was only one of 45 college presidents among the 1259 charter members present at the convention. In addition, there was a considerably larger number of deans and professors, representing colleges and universities from over 40 states included in the members present.

The most important of these, at least as far as providing legitimate sanction for the efforts and goals of the REA, was John Dewey. His presence at the founding convention served as few others could to notify the scholarly community of the "worthiness" of the Religious Education Association. Dewey's

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[9]Orville L. Davis, "A History of the Religious Education Association," Religious Education, Vol. 44 (January/February, 1949), pp. 43-56.

[10]Wornon, p. 361.

membership served to legitimize the REA's assertion that it relied upon the psychology and philosophy of education on which the public schools were purportedly based.

> John Dewey, a charter member, was influencial in changing the concept of education from that of formal discipline or the mere acquisition of knowledge to the concept of education as a social process with heredity and environment both as factors. Under this influence the REA sought to vitalize religious education by placing the child himself in the central place of importance and by making intelligent use of the laws of learning or growth. Thus, use was made of the findings of psychology, sociology and other specializations. . . .11,12

With the support of men like Dewey and Harper, the REA successfully directed the religious education movement for the next two decades. There was scarcely a significant effort concerning religious and moral education during this period that was not in some way influenced by the REA. For example,

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[11] Davis, p. 47.

[12] The extent to which Dewey influenced the Religious Education Association is succinctly illustrated in his address to the founding convention in 1903. In his address entitled "Religious Education as Conditioned by Modern Psychology and Pedagogy," Dewey states the following: "It is possible to approach the subject of religious instruction in the reverent spirit of science, making the same sort of study of this problem that is made of any other educational problem. If methods of teaching, principles of selecting and using subject-matter, in all supposedly secular branches of education, are being subjected to careful and systematic scientific study, how can those interested in religion--and who is not--justify neglect of the most fundamental of all educational questions, the moral and religious?" Reprinted from the Proceedings of the First Annual Convention of the Religious Education Association, February, 10-12, 1903, pp. 60-66; Religious Education, Vol. 69 (January-February, 1974), pp. 7-11.

in 1908, only five years after the inception of the Association, the REA was called upon by a wide and diverse cross-section of leaders and organizations, involved with religious and moral education, to send its president to the "First International Moral Congress, at the University of London, in England."[13] The participation of the REA's president was urged because "the Association had been recognized by organized agencies as the unifying agency for this effort."[14]

Early in the third decade of its existence, however, the REA suffered two major crises from which it never completely recovered. The first was the death, in 1923, of Frederick Cope, the assistant general secretary of the Association. Cope, who had been the general secretary since 1906, was without a doubt the guiding force of the REA during its first twenty years. In fact, according to Davis, "the history of the organization may logically be divided into two periods: that before and after this event."[15] The second crisis and one that was closely related to the first, was the loss of the religious community's support of the REA's programs and goals. There was a growing suspicion among the leadership of the religious community that the secular environment of

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[13] Report of the Commissioner of Education, p. 2.

[14] "The Association in 1908," report of the General Secretary, Religious Education, Vol. 4 (February, 1909), pp. 117-123.

[15] Davis, p. 46.

the public schools seriously restricted, and in many cases prevented "proper" moral and religious education. This concern was publicly expressed in 1922, the year prior to Cope's death, by the formation of the International Council of Religious Education.[16] The International Council, an organization representing Protestant denominational churches in Canada and the United States, was concerned with improving and initiating religious education in the church. Unlike the REA, the International Council was not interested in religious education in the public schools.

Thus, with the loss of Cope's vigorous leadership, the International Council, along with the religious community in general, felt that it was a propitious time to examine "whether the REA had finished its task and should dissolve."[17]

The response of the REA to this situation was to call for an outside assessment of the Association and its programs. The Institute of Social and Religious Research was asked to make a thorough investigation and report to the REA. Three years later, in 1926, the Institute concluded its examination and gave the REA an overwhelming endorsement, and recommended

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[16]Lawrence C. Little, "The Objectives of Protestant Religious Education," in Religious Education: A Comprehensive Survey, p. 70.

[17]Wornom, p. 362.

that the Association continue its "services" in moral and religious education.[18,19]

The endorsement of the Institute of Social and Religious Research seemed for a time to revitalize the REA. A new general secretary was appointed, increased amounts of funding were acquired,[20] and new goals were enthusiastically selected. But it was simply too late. Like the International Council of Churches, though for different reasons, society as a whole had also come to view religious education efforts in public schools as less than satisfactory. The result was the loss of status and influence of the REA in matters pertaining to the public schools.

This situation was, of course, immediately reflected in the religious education movement as a whole. As the credibility of the REA diminished, so did the credibility and utility of the religious education movement wane. In fact, even as the REA was in the process of trying to pull itself together, following the investigation by the Institute of Social and

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[18] A major reason for the endorsement of the REA by the Institute was because the REA was the only non-denominational religious organization of consequence involved with religious and moral education. "The Association is an inter-faith organization; it is not Protestant alone, as was the case with the International Council of Religious Education, and is also now the case with its successor, the National Council of Churches." In Butler, p. 114.

[19] Davis, p. 50.

[20] The fact is that the income of the REA actually doubled with the help of the Rockefeller and Carnegie Funds. Davis, p. 50.

Religious Research, the society was turning to what was to be the next major movement in moral education; the character education movement.[21]

The rise of the character education movement signaled the end of the religious education movement as a force in moral education. Although the REA attempted to maintain a position of influence in moral and religious education, it became immediately apparent that the Association could do so only by subordinating itself to character education. Thus, for the REA in the third decade of its existence, "Character inquiry was accepted as the most feasible approach to an understanding of the process of religious and moral education."[22]

The extent to which the REA came to support character education is demonstrated by the fact that within ten years after its investigation by the Institute of Social and Religious Research, the Association had elected as president,

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[21]The majority of the authors writing in this area place the beginning of the character education movement in the middle to late 1920's. See, for example, Henery Lester Smith, Robert Stewart McElhinney, and George Renwick Steele, "Character Development Through Religious and Moral Education in the Public Schools of the United States," Bulletin of the School of Education Indiana University, Vol. 13 (June, 1937), pp. 3-134; Francis F. Powers, Character Training (New York: A. S. Barnes and Company, Inc., 1932), p. 109; and George A. Coe, Educating for Citizenship: The Sovereign State as Ruler and as Teacher (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), pp. 33-34.

[22]Davis, p. 50.

Hugh H. Hartshorne, one of the most important leaders in the character education movement.[23] Furthermore, from that time until the early 1960's, the REA was involved in only one significant program in moral education: the Character Research Project, at Union College, Schenectedy, New York.[24]

Even though it supported character education, the REA never gave up its desire to "disseminate correct thinking," regarding moral and religious education. Instead of trying to formulate programs in moral and religious education, the main attempt to exert its influence came through the publication of the Journal of Religious Education. A number of historians in this field have claimed that the publication of Religious Education constitutes the most important contribution of the REA to moral and religious education.

> It has been published continuously for more than fifty years--a significant achievement since this journal represents the only approximation of a research journal in the field of religious education. . . . Had the Religious Education Association not done anything else during its existence since 1903, it would have been important for its contribution in the continuing publication of this journal.[25]

The REA eventually demonstrated some support for the values education movement, but it was not until the 1970's. This is interesting since there has been considerable

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[23]Davis, p. 51.

[24]Walter Houston Clark, "Research in Religious Education," in Religious Education: A Comprehensive Survey, pp. 78-86.

[25]Butler, p. 114.

information available on values education since the 1950's. The first article I was able to locate in Religious Education concerning values education was for the month of January, 1970.[26] More significant is the fact that it was not until March of 1975, that the REA formally acknowledged values education.

> The focus of this issue is on value education in various kinds of school settings. There is a good deal of research on the development of the capacity for moral judgment, but we know much less about the educational side of it in spite of efforts over the years to discover a dependable program.[27]

In summary: the religious education movement, directed by the Religious Education Association, dominated the moral education movement in this country from the turn of the century until the late 1920's. In doing so it established a number of precedents in the domain of moral education. Most important of these for the purposes of this study were that moral education ought to (1) be based on the methods and principles of science, (2) incorporate the educational theory of John Dewey, (3) recognize the public schools as the agency in society most likely and most desirable to accomplish "proper" moral education, and in accordance with the previous three, (4) concentrate on the young of society. Together they form a theme that is played out in each of the successive major movements in moral education.

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[26] David E. Engel, "Some Issues in Teaching Values," Religious Education, Vol 65 (January-February, 1970), pp. 9-13.

[27] Editorial, Religious Education, Vol. 70 (March-April, 1975), p. 114.

THE CHARACTER EDUCATION MOVEMENT

If the religious education movement can be seen as having initiated the idea that moral education ought to be scientifically grounded, the character education movement must be seen as having put this idea into practice. There was always an underlying suspicion among many of those concerned with conducting moral education programs in the public schools that the religious education movement could never completely accept the causal principles of science which it professed to embrace. It was one thing to examine religious education from the perspective of science, as Dewey had suggested,[28] it was entirely another matter to use science to accomplish religious ends. Thus, as the character education movement began to emerge there was "a decreasing inclination to accept unquestioned former traditional materials and methods and an increasing employment of scientific research to determine the most profitable of these."[29]

The challenge to support character education efforts through scientific research fell to those in the field of psychology; particularly those in the areas of tests and measurements, and personality theory. From the late 1920's

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[28]Dewey, "Religious Education as Conditioned by Modern Psychology and Pedagogy," pp. 60-66.

[29]Harry C. McKown, Character Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1935), p. 93.

until the late 1930's the most intense and comprehensive research efforts in the history of moral education were conducted by psychologists involved in the character education movement.

Tests and Measurements

One of the more striking features of the character education movement was the attempt to quantify morals. By 1926, according to the Committee on Character Education of the National Education Association, "the number of books and articles purporting to embody the results of testing and measuring alone, was very large, perhaps running well over a thousand,"[30] It was believed by those concerned with character education that if "morals" could be tested and measured, then "moral educators" would know when they had succeeded in teaching "morals" to a child.

The extent to which this belief was held by those supporting the character education movement is poignantly illustrated in an article published in Collier's Magazine, January, 1925. The article, entitled, "The Story of the Moral Code," describes the events that took place after Collier's had solicited its readers' help, in September of 1924, in order to devise a "moral code" for the nation's

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[30]Department of the Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin No. 7, 1926, Character Education, Report of the Sub-committee on Character Tests and Measurements, of the Committee on Character Education of the National Education Association (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1926), p. 36.

children. The article begins by stating that "Yes, children can be taught to be upright. Consider Jimmy. He lied and cheated, but wise teachers increased his honesty score 200 percent in three months."[31]

Jimmy was a boy who, in the words of the author, had a "slippery philosophy of life." This was soon changed in a special classroom referred to as the "laboratory."

> Laboratory work sometimes isn't very pretty, and I wouldn't want to have my boys go through this sort of thing. But there is a brighter side to this story, or I shouldn't have told it. These same scientists began to see what they could do to improve the state of Jimmy's morals and strengthen his trustworthiness.[32]

Jimmy spent three months in the special classroom while "special, careful teachers, sympathetic yet seemingly artless, pounded decency into Jimmy's head and soul; and they did it for the other boys in the class."[33] At the end of the three months tests showed that Jimmy's score in trustworthiness rose 52 points, from 23 to 75. Concludes the author:

> You couldn't have boosted Jimmy from a mark of 23 to a mark of 75 in the subjects of history or arithmetic or geography within the space of three months, but you could boost him over 200 percent in morals. Yes morals can be taught.[34]

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[31]William G. Shephard, "The Story of the Moral Code," Collier's, The National Weekly (January 17, 1925), pp. 5-6, 43.

[32]Shephard, pp. 5-6, 43.

[33]Shephard, pp. 5-6, 43.

[34]Shephard, pp. 5-6, 43.

If parents were concerned about their "Jimmys" or "Susies" being taught morals under laboratory conditions they were quickly consoled by the authoritative science of psychology. No lesser a personage than Edward L. Thorndike, the major figure in field of tests and measurements for most of this century, fully supported the moral education efforts of the character education movement. When the Character Education Inquiry Project[35] was organized in 1924 at Teacher's College, Columbia University, "it was placed under the immediate supervision of Professor Edward L. Thorndike as Director of the Division of Psychology of the Institute of Educational Research."[36]

The combination of the involvement of scientists such as Thorndike and the emphasis on tests and measurements, added another important dimension to the character education movement which also helped to placate concerned parents and other critics. This was the creation of the belief that character education was so complex, so "scientific," that it warranted the knowledge and skills of an "expert."

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[35]The Character Education Inquiry Project was one of the major research efforts in the character education movement. It will be discussed later in this section of the study.

[36]Hugh Hartshorne and Mark A. May, Studies in Deceit, Character Education Inquiry, Teachers College, Columbia University in cooperation with the Institute of Social and Religious Research (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1928), p. vi.

> It seems clear that the leadership in this field must for the present remain in the hands of specialists. . . . It cannot be too much stressed that the study of character and the problems of character training are providing highly specialized disciplines that cannot be readily mastered by the average teacher. They are comparable to biochemistry in its relation to the gardener, and of astronomy for the use of the navigator.[37]

In fairness to those persons who supported the idea of the need for experts in character education, it must be pointed out that they were actually only reflecting the biases and sentiments of the larger scholarly community. The science of psychology was in full bloom. There was no reason to doubt that psychologists were well on the way to understanding, and, consequently, modifying and controlling, all facets of human behavior, including moral behavior. For, as the proponent of the scientific method, John Dewey, had argued in support of this contention:

> Without competent psychological knowledge the force of the human factors which interact with environing nonhuman conditions to produce consequences cannot be estimated. This statement is purely truistic, since knowledge of the human conditions <u>is</u> psychological science.[38]

Personality Theory

In addition to the area of psychology concerned with testing and measuring of human behaviors, the other area of

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[37]"Report of the Subcommittee on Character Tests and Measurements," Bureau of Education, Bulletin No. 7, 1926, p. 36.

[38]John Dewey, "Theory of Valuation," <u>International Encyclopedia of Unified Science</u>, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939), pp. 62-63.

psychology which had a significant influence on the character education movement was that of personality theory. Embodied in personality theory, is the idea of "ends;" how persons live their lives in response to their environment, how others perceive them as persons, and, most important, how others feel they ought to act or behave as an individual and member of society.

As the character education movement attempted, with varying degrees of success, to replace religious education's notion of moral education, it did so by substituting the concept of "character." In both movements the assumption was made that the morally educated life was simply not sufficient. You needed, from the perspective of the religious education movement, a morally educated man or woman who is also religious. In the character education movement, you needed a morally educated man or woman who had character.

For example, it was no secret that many of those persons involved in the religious education movement felt that the secular education provided in the public schools was inadequate for the development of the "whole person." "In short," said Sherwood, "secularization of education robbed it of an emphasis without which life is incomplete."[39] It was not enough to have an educated individual, nor was it sufficient to know the difference between right and wrong.

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[39]Henry Noble Sherwood, "Character in the Schools," Religious Education, Vol. 24 (January, 1929), pp. 71-74.

> We must have an intelligence so intimately bound to God that every citizen has written on his heart 'If I forget thee, let my right hand forget its cunning and my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth.' We must have an intelligent citizenship that is righteous.[40]

Similarly, the character education movement held that the development of "character" was superior in desirability to the moral education of an individual. In fact, those in character education felt that the development of character was more important than both the moral and religious education of an individual.

> Morality and religion should not be confused with character, . . . Morality is the sense of right and wrong as learned from experience and from the rules and regulations of society. It develops from a knowledge of the customs of the people one associates with. Thus a man might be said to have good morals because he is following the standards of this people, and yet he might not be developing a good character. Morality is what one ought to do, according to social standards. It is an ethical code, derived from customs. Character goes deeper. It is the spirit and mind-set of the individual. It is his predisposition to will to do things.
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> Religion is more than morality. While morality lacks warmth, life, and affectual devotion, and lies largely in the field of reason, religion is largely in the field of emotion. . . . Religion includes morality but goes further. . . . Both morality and religion are factors in the make-up of that quality of personality which we call character [Emphasis mine].[41]

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[40] Sherwood, pp. 71-74.

[41] Henry Lester Smith, Robert Stewart EcElhinney, and George Renwick Steele, "Character Development Through Religious and Moral Education in the Public Schools of the United States," Bulletin of the School of Education Indiana University, Vol. 13, No. 3 (June, 1937), pp. 3-134.

Thus, a psychology of personality was able to provide those in the character education movement with a theoretical and philosophical framework for the subsequent justification of character education programs in the public schools.

> Recent though it is, however, the interest of science in personality has directly begun to permeate the work of education. The so-called progressive movement in education illustrates this tendency, . . . as it affects secular and religious, from the nursery through the graduate and professional levels.[42]

For, "character" was perceived as the goal of all education.

> If we consider character as the resultant of all life's experiences, . . . we must think of it as the goal of all educational effort. It is the ultimate end in all true education.[43]

Major Research Projects in Character Education

There were three major research projects in the history of the character education movement. Together they served to convince the educational community and the public in general that character education was firmly supported by the science of psychology.

The Institute of Character Research

The first major research effort in character education was the Institute of Character Research located at the University of Iowa. The project was begun in 1921 shortly

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[42]Hugh Hartshorne, Character in Human Relations (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), p. vii.

[43]Smith, McElhinney, and Steele, p. 16.

after an anonymous donor offered, "$20,000 for the best method of educating children morally."[44] The offer was made in the form of a nationwide contest. Competing groups of persons from the various states submitted proposals for "moral education programs" to the National Institute for Moral Instruction.[45] A group from Iowa, under the leadership of professor Edward Starbuck, eventually won the prize. The money was awarded in 1922. In the following year a "Research Station in Character Education and in Religious Education was established. In 1927 it was made an integral part of the University and officially designated the Institute of Character Research."[46, 47]

The Character Education Inquiry

The most extensive research project was the Character Education Inquiry. As previously mentioned this project was located at Teacher's College, Columbia University. The program was begun in September of 1924, under the co-directorships of Dr. Hugh Hartshorne, professor of religious education at the University of Southern California, and Dr. Mark A. May, professor of psychology at Syracuse University.

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[44]McKown, p. 78.

[45]Herbert Martin, Formative Factors in Character: A Psychological Study in the Moral Development of Childhood (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1926), p. 227.

[46]Sherwood, p. 73.

[47]It is pointed out for the reader's benefit that the contest was most often referred to in the literature as the "Iowa Plan." It was an exceedingly popular model of a moral education program and was copied by a number of other states.

Edward Thorndike was supervisor of the overall project. The project was to last five years.[48]

The goal of the project was to quantify and evaluate "certain forms of conduct and areas of attitude and opinion which had demonstrable significance for the maintenance and growth of the social order."[49] In conjunction with this goal the researchers developed tests and techniques that purportedly measured "the modes of conduct classified as deceit (or honesty), helpfulness and cooperation, inhibition, and persistence."[50]

By far the most controversial aspect of the research concerned the studies in deceit, honesty and deception. Over ten thousand students were subjected to a rather intensive battery of techniques and tests that were developed "to measure their deceptive tendencies."[51]

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[48]The story of the Character Education Inquiry project is engrossingly captured in three volumes that have become a landmark in the history of the character education movement and the larger moral education movement. The three volumes are properly referred to under the title, "Studies in the Nature of Character," published by the Macmillan Company. However, because of the distinct differences in the kind of information presented in each volume they are usually listed in the literature as follows:

Volume I -- Studies in Deceit, Hugh Hartshorne and Mark A. May; 1923.

Volume II -- Statistical Methods and Results, Mark A. May and Hugh Hartshorne; 1929.

Volume III -- Studies in the Organization of Character, Hartshorne, May and Frank K. Shuttleworth; 1930.

[49]Volume III p. 361.

[50]Volume III, p. 365.

[51]Studies in Deceit, p. 313.

> As one reads Studies in Deceit, he will be intrigued by the ingenious devices used to measure honesty in children. Such techniques require considerable skill, complex experimental setups, careful control of possible errors, and no little deceit on the part of the experimenter himself.[52]

For the most part the controversy surrounding the project did not become significant until the latter years of the character education movement; sometime in the early 1950's. The major reason for the controversy was that the researchers claimed to adhere vigorously to the methods and principles of science, when in fact the experiments themselves involved the deception of the students. The Character Education Inquiry Project was seen as settling, once and for all, the problem of identifying and quantifying morals. The culture was grateful.

> By far the most careful and comprehensive scientific investigations thus far made of character are those of the Character Education Inquiry. These researches were evaluated by Albert Edward Wiggam, in Better Homes and Gardens, April, 1931, as follows: 'Far and away the most conclusive tests of character ever made since Adam and Eve reared Cain and Abel and made a moral success of one and a moral failure of the other were the elaborate studies undertaken by Dr. Hugh Hartshorne of Columbia and Dr. Mark A. May, psychologist, of Yale.'[53]

Support of the Character Education Inquiry project was not just limited to the lay community. The scientific community was equally enthusiastic in its endorsement of the study.

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[52]Ernest M. Ligon, William A. Koppe, and Leonard A. Sibley, Jr., "Evaluation of Religious Education," Religious Education: A Comprehensive Survey, pp. 316-325.

[53]McKown, p. 433.

Noteworthy among the supporters in the scientific community were those scientists involved in the testing and measurement of intelligence. Hartshorne, May and Shuttleworth had asserted that "it is equally true that a high score on an ethical discrimination test is an indication of high intelligence."[54] Thus, it was not surprising when the unparalleled longitudinal studies in intelligence, conducted by Lewis Terman, included among the variety of data obtained from the participants in the study a comprehensive "character evaluation."

> A battery of seven character tests was given to 550 gifted subjects and 553 unselected children of a control group. These included two tests of overstatement; three tests of questionable interests, preferences, and attitudes; a test of trustworthiness under temptation to cheat; and a test of emotional stability.[55]

The Character Research Project

The Character Research Project was the last major research effort in the character education movement. It began in 1935, under the direction of Ernest M. Ligon, at Union College, Schenectady, New York.[56] The Character Research Project was the most religiously oriented of the research projects in the character education movement. Ligon firmly believed that

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[54] Studies in the Organization of Character, p. 33.

[55] Lewis M. Terman, Genetic Studies in Genius: Volume V: The Gifted Group at Midlife, Thirty-Five Years' Followup of the Superior Child (California: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 5.

[56] Ernest M. Ligon, Dimensions of Character (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1956).

science and religion, working together, would be able to produce men and women capable of saving the world from "destruction."

> The methods are now available making it possible to bring up a greater generation of men of good will with strong character sufficient for the task of world leadership so needed today to save our civilization from the destruction toward which it seems so obviously headed, finer men and women capable of living happy useful lives. It is the thesis of this book that this can be accomplished through the application of the scientific method and the concepts of the Christian religion.[57]

The goal of the Project was to identify those factors in the home, the church and other socializing agencies that contributed to character development. Because of the strong religious influence most of the "experimental" programs carried out by the Project centered on the "personality traits" of the great religious leaders in history. The operating assumption behind the experiments was that the "traits" which identified these men as great religious leaders could be taught to young men and women of society once the "traits" had been identified.[58]

The religious orientation of the Character Research Project significantly reduced the effectiveness of its programs for character education in the public schools. In

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[57] Ernest M. Ligon, A Greater Generation (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948), p. 5.

[58] Ligon claimed "that the great ethical principles taught by Jesus," actually formed the basis of all the curriculum programs developed by the Project for the public schools. p. viii.

fact, the most important contribution of the Project to the character education movement was the column written by Ligon for the Journal of Religious Education.

The column, entitled, "Significant Evidence," was begun in May, 1948 and continued until 1964. It reported the research in the field of psychology which had a relationship to religious and character education.[59] It was also the culmination of efforts by the Religious Education Association to maintain an active role in the character education movement. Because of Ligon's religious proclivities the Association felt a partnership between the two organizations would be mutually beneficial. Thus, in 1941, with the active assistance of the Religious Education Association, the Project received what Butler characterized as "heavy foundations investments" which helped the Character Education Project and Ligon's column to survive over the two decades.[60, 61]

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[59] Herman E. Wornom, "The Religious Education Association," Religious Education: A Comprehensive Survey, pp. 359-370. According to Wornom, "All the material in Ligon's column was excerpted from the Psychological Abstracts."

[60] Butler, Religious Education: The Foundations and Practice of Nurture, p. 116.

[61] The major foundation supporting the Character Research Project was the Lilly Endowment, Inc., of Indianapolis, Indiana. In the preface of his last book Ligon acknowledges this fact: "The continuing faith of Lilly Endowment in their support of the Project has, of course, made this book possible." Dimensions of Character, p. viii.

It is important for the purposes of the study to mention at this time the fact that the Lilly Endowment has also funded major programs in values education. One of the latest has been the Values Development Education program which existed in the College of Education, at Michigan State University from August, 1973 to August, 1975. Lilly's funding of values education programs helps to illustrate another facet of commonality between the major movements in moral education.

Character Education and the Education Community

Character education received the complete support of the educational community. One of the most visible and important examples of this support came from the National Education Association (NEA). The NEA endorsed character education from the beginning of the movement. By 1924 the NEA had appointed a standing committee on character education, and in 1926 this committee published what is considered to be one of the most comprehensive evaluations of character education found in the literature.[62, 63] The importance of the NEA's endorsement to character education was that it helped to convince the American public that character education programs were suitable for the public schools. If the oldest, most prestigious and most powerful organization in the education community was so enthusiastic about character education, then it must be all right.

For example, after Collier's had derived a "moral code" from reader solicitations in January of 1925, it contracted

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[62]Bureau of Education, Bulletin No. 7, 1926, Character Education, Report of the Committee on Character Education of the National Education Association.

[63]Laird V. Glasscock, "The History of Character Education," Education Method (March, 1932), pp. 351-356. Said Glasscock: "Of the great mass of literature that has been written on character education, the best modern material is given in Bulletin No. 7 of the United States Department of Education, 1926."

with the NEA "to determine with what success the Code could be used as a basis for character education in schools."[64] Subsequently, Collier's arranged with the NEA to offer one thousand dollars in prizes to teachers throughout the nation for the "ten best essays on how to teach the moral code."[65]

In conjunction with, and in addition to, the efforts of the National Education Association, the education community responded to character education by enacting a large number of statewide plans in character education, and publishing a vast assortment of books, pamphlets, bulletins, teacher's manuals, game strategies, character trait lists, and moral codes, all of which were to enable the public schools to successfully implement and conduct character education programs.[66]

An obvious and important outcome of these activities was the creation of several student organizations which later became institutionalized in the overwhelming majority of schools throughout the country. Specifically these include the National Junior Honor Society, the National Honor Society, and student councils.

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[64]"The Best Moral Code is a Two-Legged Moral Code," Collier's, The National Weekly (July 18, 1925), p. 6.

[65]Collier's, (July 18, 1925), p. 6.

[66]McKown, pp. 81-87.

> A 'recent' development in character education is the student council. . . . It is probably safe to say that at the present time [1935] 90 percent of the junior and senior high schools throughout the country have some form of student participation.[67]

Other Organizations Significantly Influenced by Character Education

In addition to those organizations in the public schools, the character education movement also influenced a considerable number of organizations outside the public schools. Familiar among them are the Boy Scouts,[68] the Girl Scouts, the Junior Red Cross, the Girls Reserve Movement, 4-H clubs, Camp Fire Girls, Junior Achievement, the Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A..[69]

THE VALUES EDUCATION MOVEMENT

Interest in character education steadily declined after the 1930's. In part the decline can probably be attributed to the impact on the academic community of the Hartshorne and May study, the Character Education Inquiry project, at Teacher's College, Columbia University. After conducting the most intensive and comprehensive research program in the history of moral education in the United States, the authors concluded

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[67] McKown, p. 89.

[68] R. L. Finney, A Brief History of the American Public School (New York: Macmillan Co., 1925), p. 252. Finney reports that Dean Russell of Teachers' College, Columbia University stated the following with regards to the Boy Scouts: "I declare the Boy Scout movement to be the most significant educational contribution of our time."

[69] Bureau of Education, Bulletin No. 7, pp. 85-86.

that moral conduct, especially in regard to "deceit (or honesty), helpfulness and cooperation, inhibition, and persistence,"[70] was relative to the situation in which an individual found him or herself.

> It seems to be a fair conclusion from our data that honest and deceptive tendencies represent not general traits nor action guided by general ideals, but specific habits learned in relation to specific situations which have made the one or the other mode of response successful . . . .
>
> Whatever behavior is studied, the general picture holds true. Conduct represents an achieved association between a certain type of situation and a certain type of response.[71]

Instead of demonstrating, conclusively, that moral conduct could be taught by the systematic teaching of scientifically validated moral traits, the science of psychology had endorsed a type of "moral relativism."[72]

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[70] Studies in the Organization of Character, p. 365.

[71] Studies in the Organization of Character, pp. 372-373.

[72] It is important to note at this time that "moral relativism," as used by Hartshorne and May, is not the same type of moral relativism as the critics attribute to the values-clarification approach. See, for example, the criticism leveled by Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," Phi Delta Kappan, Vol. 56 (June, 1975), pp. 670-677. Hartshorne and May used the term to describe the fact that a person's moral behavior is relative to the situation in which they find themselves. The values-clarifiers on the other hand, while admittingly holding a relativistic position, assert that moral behavior is relative to the individual's wants and needs, and not to the situation. Individuals who are "clear" about their values are expected to behave the same across differing situations. Thus, one type of moral relativism sees moral behavior as relative to the situation, the other type sees it as relative to the person, consistent across situations.

The lack of interest in character education is not to be interpreted as a lack of interest in moral education. Even as the character education movement was dying, another major movement in moral education, values education, was emerging. For example, reporting on a national conference in higher education in 1947, Willis Moore notes that:

> It was the solemn conviction of a recent conference of educators that a major task of contemporary education is the inculcation of values that experience has proved essential to satisfactory living.[73]

By the early 1950's, values education had become the major force in moral education. The educational community had formally announced its endorsement, as the following statement by the president of the Department of Elementary School Principles of the National Education Association demonstrates.

> In choosing Spiritual Values in the Elementary School as the topic of the 1947 yearbook, the editorial committee seems to have forseen the moral crisis that faces us today. As we turn from the passions of war to the confusion of reconstruction we sense with deep conviction the need for built-in values in human lives that will lead to individual self-realization at high levels, and to a creative society of brotherhood, peace and security.[74]

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[73]Willis Moore, "The Teaching of Values," The Educational Record, Vol. 28 (October, 1947), pp. 412-419.

[74]Marjorie Walters, "President's Message," Spiritual Values in the Elementary School, Twenty-Sixth Yearbook of the Department of Elementary School Principals (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, September, 1947), p. 6.

The strongest statement of support of values education from the educational community was to come four years later. The Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association had been charged with determining what the role of the public schools ought to be in the development of "moral and spiritual values." The Commission, composed of such men as James B. Conant and Dwight D. Eisenhower, issued the following statement in the final report.

> This report deals with a problem of utmost importance. Intelligent and fervent loyalty to moral and spiritual values is essential to the survival of this nation. The Commission hopes that this report will encourage in homes, churches, and schools a nationwide renaissance of interest in education for moral and spiritual values. Out of such interest the public schools should receive a clear mandate to continue to strengthen their efforts in teaching the values which have made America great.[75]

The sense of urgency and emotion with which the culture turned to values education was a reflection of the socio/political melieu of that period in our nation's history. World War II had just ended and ideological cold war with Russia was maturing into what was perceived as another major confrontation with the forces of totalitarianism. A significant number of leaders in this country earnestly believed that in order for the free world to remain free and democratic, the United States would have to renew and strengthen the moral

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[75] Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools, Educational Policies Commission (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1951), p. vi.

foundations upon which this country was built. The alternative was the collapse of the civilization.[76]

> There is a crisis of values in contemporary civilization. That crisis is massive, comprehensive, and pervasive. To contemplate it responsibly is to risk paralysis of the will. Not to contemplate it is to risk the loss of all that is valued in contemporary civilization--perhaps to risk the loss of that civilization and of human life itself.[77]

Faced with this situation the country once again turned to the public schools. The nation needed men and women who believed in the "values" that had made America great. The public schools would lead the effort to instill those values

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[76]In order to further emphasize the powerful influence which the cold war was having on the educational community in that period of our nations' history, I have here included a statement from the second edition of John Dewey's book The Public and Its Problems (1st edition 1927; Chicago: The Swallow Press, Inc., 1954), p. 228. In the Afterword to the second edition, written in 1946, Dewey said: "For Soviet Russia has now arrived at a state of power and influence in which an intrinsically totalitarian philosophy has passed from the realm of theory into the practical political relations of the nation states of the globe. The problem of adjusting the relations of states sufficiently democratic to put a considerable measure of trust in free inquiry and open discussion, . . . , is now a vital one."

[77]Buell G. Gallagher, "The Crisis of Values in Contemporary Civilization and the Responsibility of Higher Education," Religious Education Vol. 50 (September/October, 1955), pp. 291-297.

in the young of our society.[78] An article in the Journal of General Education typified the tenor of the times.

> We face today a world revolution; and thinking men hope that wisdom rather than force will resolve the issues, which are many and complex. . . . The student must learn what the Russians have given no indication of believing, even if they know; that the end of knowledge is truth . . . The student must acquire a set of values of the past but which because of the nature of the continuing processes of education may change. [Thus] the question of values is much discussed by educators today.[79]

Although there was unanimity regarding the fact that society needed some sort of values education program which could be implemented in the public schools, there was serious disagreement as to how such a program should be carried out. The result was that by the early 1960's the values education movement had diverged into two distinctly differing schools of thought, both of which exist today and, taken together, serve to define the contemporary values education movement. The two schools are (1) the cognitive-developmental approach to values education, and (2) the values-clarification approach to values education.

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[78]Robert Michaelsen, "Moral and spiritual Values revisited," Religious Education, Vol. 62 (July/August, 1967), pp. 344-347. According to professor Michaelsen, chairman of the Department of Religious Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara, the appeal to values education in the public schools, "is an example of a type of . . . ideological rationale which appears frequently in the history of American education. The community's common faith--beliefs, principles, standards, values--is affirmed and the school is called upon to instill this faith and to develop a keen loyalty to it."

[79]Reubin Frodin, "Editorial Comment," The Journal of General Education, Vol. 5 (April, 1951), pp. 165-167.

I do not wish to examine the cognitive-developmental approach to values education, yet some mention of it is helpful for the purpose of comparison between the two approaches to values education.

The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Values Education

Lawrence Kohlberg, now Director of the Center for Moral Education, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, is generally recognized as the founder and spokesman for the cognitive-developmental approach to values education.[80] He began his work in this area in 1955, formally introducing his theory to the academic community with the completion of his dissertation at the University of Chicago in 1958.[81]

The cognitive-developmental approach to values education is explicitly concerned with moral education. In fact, Kohlberg calls his theory "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education."[82] Based on the psychological theories

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[80] See R. S. Peters, Psychological and Ethical Development: A Collection of Articles and Psychological Theories, Ethical Development and Human Understanding (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1974). See especially Chapter 15, "Moral Development: A Plea for Pluralism," pp. 301-335.

[81] Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Modes of Moral Thinking and Choice in the Years Ten to Sixteen," (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1958.)

[82] Lawrence Kohlberg, "A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Moral Education," The Humanist (November/December. 1972), pp. 13-16.

of John Dewey and Jean Piaget,[83] it holds that moral development, that is, the ability to reason morally and make moral judgments, is represented in nature by a "six-stage invariant hierarchy."[84] The stages are seen as universal, cutting across all cultures.

> A stage concept implies universality of sequence under varying cultural conditions. It implies that moral development is not merely a matter of learning the verbal values or rules of the child's culture, but reflects something more universal in development, something which would occur in any culture.[85]

Individuals do not merely "learn" moral values from experiencing their environment; their moral values are a reflection of the natural structural level or stage of moral development at which they are then located.

> In the cognitive-developmental view, morality is a natural product of a universal tendency toward empathy or role taking, toward putting oneself in the shoes of other human beings. It is also a product of a universal concern for justice, for reciprocity or equality in the relation of one person to another.[86]

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[83]Says Kohlberg: "The theory of moral psychology we shall use in presenting the facts is basically that of John Dewey, more recently elaborated by Jean Piaget . . .," The Humanist, pp. 13-16.

[84]Kohlberg, unpublished doctoral dissertation.

[85]Lawrence Kohlberg, "From is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and get away with it in the Study of Moral Development," Cognitive Development and Epistemology, ed., Theodore Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971), p. 171.

[86]Kohlberg, Phi Delta Kappan, p. 675.

and public concern with moral education; (2) its belief in "natural stages" of moral development, that is, moral reasoning, and (3) its belief in universal moral values.[87]

The Values-Clarification Approach to Values Education

Louis Raths is considered to be the father of the Values-clarification approach. He was writing about education and "values" in the early 1940's.[88] His earliest concern appears to have been with the measurement of values. Regarding values, he explained in his early writings that "the initial job for the evaluator and for all others who are concerned with guiding students is to get a record of their

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[87] I personally do not believe Kohlberg's theory to be either methodologically or philosophically sound, though it is not the purpose of this study to critique his theory. Nevertheless, I will suggest that the reader who is interested in reading serious criticisms of Kohlberg's work begin with the following writings: William Kurtines and Esther Blank Grief, "The Development of Moral Thought: Review and Evaluation of Kohlberg's Approach," Psychological Bulletin (1974); Theodore Mischel, Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971); R. S. Peters, "A Reply to Kohlberg," Phi Delta Kappan (June, 1975), p. 678; R. S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1974); Elizabeth Leonie Simpson, "Moral Development Research: A Case Study of Scientific Cultural Bias," Human Development, Vol. 17 (1974), pp. 81-106.

[88] Louis Raths, "Approaches to the Measurement of Values," Educational Research Bulletin Vol. 19 (May, 1940) pp. 275-281.

behavior in situations where there is opportunity for this comprehensive interaction to take place."[89]

By the late 1950's Raths had moved away from the measurement of values. He had become concerned with helping children to develop a better self-concept, a better image of themselves. Said Raths: "If we are to help children in this most difficult of all tasks, the building of a self, we must place greater emphasis on values."[90]

Rath's emphasis on values, in order to improve self-concept, laid the foundation for the values-clarification approach. A good self-concept was seen as being dependent on a child's acquisition of the right values. Thus, teachers and other adults had to help children become clear about what they valued. "We used to think," said Raths, "that an environment rich in alternatives was rich in potential for child growth. But choices can be overwhelming. Choices are good but they need clarification."[91]

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[89]Raths, "Approaches to the Measurement of Values." It is completely understandable that Raths would be concerned with the measurement of values at this period in his career. The character education movement, although on the wane, was still the dominant school of thought in regard to changing persons moral behavior. It in turn still relied significantly on the tests and measurement school of psychology. Raths was simply reflecting a major scientific trend of his time.

[90]Louis Raths, "Values are Fundamental," Childhood Education, Vol. 35 (February, 1959), pp. 246,247.

[91]Raths, "Values are Fundamental," pp. 246-247.

Seven years later, in 1966, Raths, Harmin, and Simon published what is now considered to be the foundational work in the values-clarification literature, Values and Teaching: Working with Values in the Classroom.[92]

The values-clarification approach has been heavily influenced by the humanistic school of psychology. Among the psychologists who have contributed to the values-clarification approach, the values-clarifiers cite Gordon Allport, Gardner Murphy, Edgar Friedenberg, Carl Rogers, Erich Fromm, David Reisman and Allen Wheelis.[93] In addition, they list John Dewey as a primary theoretical contributor to the values-clarification approach.[94]

SUMMARY

Since the turn of the century there have been three distinct movements in moral education: the religious education movement, the character education movement, and the values education movement. The values-clarification approach is simply one important aspect of the latest of these three movements, i.e., the values education movement.

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[92] Raths, Harmin, and Simon.

[93] Raths, Harmin, and Simon, p. 9

[94] According to the values-clarifiers, "the values-clarification approach . . . is based on the approach formulated by Raths, who in turn built upon the thinking of John Dewey." Simon, Howe and Kirschenbaum, p. 19.

The history of moral education in this society allows us to verify the commonality that exists between the values-clarification approach and the other efforts in moral education. By carefully reviewing the historical literature we find that each of the major movements, including the values-clarification approach (1) incorporated the theories of John Dewey, (2) endorsed the need for a science of psychology for their respective programs, (3) saw the public schools as the focus of moral education efforts, and (4) focused on the young of society.

In addition to the historical evidence, I will attempt in the next chapter to add further documentation to support the claim that the values-clarification approach is concerned with moral education. This will be accomplished by analysis of selected statements in the values-clarification literature which reveal its patently moral character.

CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS OF THE VALUES-CLARIFICATION APPROACH DEMONSTRATES ITS MORAL CHARACTER AND CONCOMITANTLY ESTABLISHES ITS RELATIONSHIP TO MORAL EDUCATION

Careful analysis of the values-clarification approach reveals statements and terms that are distinctly moral in nature, that is, statements which reflect an obvious concern about how persons ought to behave or conduct themselves. This situation is significant because (1) the major values-clarifiers deny that the values-clarification approach is concerned with moral matters, and (2) the growing number of public school teachers who are using the values-clarification approach have tended to believe the values-clarifiers and consequently are unaware of the relationship that exists between the values-clarification approach and moral education.

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate, through careful analysis of selected statements in the values-clarification literature, the moral nature of the values-clarification approach, there, in turn, establishing its relationship to moral education. The term "moral education," as used here, is defined as a programatic educational effort, concerned with how students ought to behave, that is conducted in the public schools.

In order for this purpose to be successful it is necessary to demonstrate the following: (1) First, that the fundamental claim made by the values-clarifiers, that the values-clarification approach is "value-free," is false. It is crucial to the integrity of the values-clarification approach to claim that it is value-free, that it does not attempt to get students "to accept some predetermined set of values."[1] Or, as stated earlier in the study, "values-clarification . . . is based on the premise that none of us has the 'right' set of values to pass on to others."[2] By maintaining a position of "value neutrality" the values-clarifiers are able to assert that the values-clarification approach is disassociated from the "error and transgressions" of traditional approaches to moral education, for example, "indoctrination,"[3] "direct inculcation of values,"[4] and "moralizing."[5] (2) Second, that there are several basic assertions made by values-clarifiers that are illogical, or, at the very least, compromise the method and purpose of the values-clarification approach. Careful reading of the literature

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[1]Raths, Harmin, and Simon, p. 34.

[2]Simon, Howe and Kirschenbaum, p. 17.

[3]Simon, "Values-Clarification vs Indoctrination," pp. 902-915.

[4]Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum, p. 17.

[5]Sidney P. Simon and Polly deSherbinin, "Values-Clarification: It Can Start Gently and Grow Deep," Phi Delta Kappan (June, 1975), pp. 679-683.

discloses a number of statements which act to obfuscate the issues and mislead persons regarding the purpose of the values-clarification approach. Although these statements in and of themselves may not necessarily be moral in disposition, they nevertheless contribute to the lack of understanding about the moral character of the values-clarification approach.

(3) Finally, that there are a number of statements in the literature that are clearly of a moral nature. These are statements that are concerned with how persons ought to behave - the proper or desirable manner in which an individual should conduct his or herself. They are statements which, upon examination, help us to understand the relationship which exists between the values-clarification approach and moral education.

PROCEDURE OF ANALYSIS

It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze all the statements in the values-clarification literature that can be categorized in one or the other of the two classes of statements. Therefore, after careful and extensive reading of the relevant literature, a small number of statements which seem to represent each class of statements, that is, (1) statements exhibiting problems of logic in the values-clarification approach, and (2) statements demonstrating the moral nature of the values-clarification approach, were selected for analysis.

The statements selected for analysis are quoted directly from the literature and then analyzed. In all cases it is my intent to let the values-clarifiers speak for themselves, and, thus, avoid paraphrasing.

PROBLEMS OF LOGIC IN THE VALUES-CLARIFICATION APPROACH

To a significant degree the validity and usefulness of the values-clarification approach depends on whether or not basic premises are logical. Analysis of the statements quoted below suggests they are not.[6]

Statement:

"There is no right way to use these strategies."[7]

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[6]Ultimately, of course, the acid test of a theory is whether or not it is empirically verified. However, before empirical testing there is the assumption of internal logical consistency in the theory. The analysis of the statements in this part of the chapter challenges this assumption with regard to the values-clarification approach. For those readers unfamiliar with the area of theory and theory construction let me add that the values-clarifiers do in fact consider the values-clarification approach to be a theory in the scientific sense of the term "theory." For example, they say in the work, Values and Teaching, that "this theory is particularly noteworthy in the sense that it is a teaching theory and, as such, is easily tested (page 8)." In addition, in a recent paper the values-clarifiers cite twelve studies which are reported to offer support for Raths theoretical framework: "Although the results were not totally consistent, the directionality of the findings tended to support Rath's theory." Howard Kirschenbaum, "Recent Research in Values Clarification," (Unpublished paper, National Humanistic Education Center, Upper Jay, New York, 1974).

[7]Simon, Howe and Kirschenbaum, pp. 23-24.

This statement is representative of attempts by the values-clarifiers to assure teachers that the values-clarification approach is "value free." It is to emphasize to teachers the fact that they must be "nonjudgmental" while conducting values-clarification strategies with their students.[8] If we examine this statement, however, and others like it, we find that it simply does not make sense as stated.

To say that there is no right way to use the values-clarification strategies is also to say that there is no wrong way to use them. To recommend to teachers that they include in their instructional program a method or technique which can not be used rightly or wrongly, is, in effect, to recommend no method at all. It would be similar to telling mathematics and reading teachers that there is no right or wrong way to teach these subjects.

It is as if the values-clarifiers were urging teachers to conduct an activity with their students that carries, as a basic premise, the notion that the strategies cannot be misused and, furthermore, that all notions as to how to do values-clarification strategies are of equal worth. It is not hard to imagine what would occur if teachers were to inform parents that there is no right or wrong way to teach

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[8]James Raths, "A Strategy for Developing Values," Educational Leadership (May, 1964), pp. 509-514.

their children. Yet this is precisely what the values-clarifiers have told teachers with respect to the values-clarification approach.

So, to recapitulate: To state that there is no right way to do values-clarification strategies does not offer evidence in support of the fundamental claim of "value neutrality," that is made by the values-clarifiers. Instead, it contradicts the basic assumption that there are "strategies" at all.

Statement:

> Among the techniques, there is one which helps a teacher avoid grinding his own personal ax while raising controversial issues. It is called the values continuum.[9]

The "values continuum" is a favorite and important technique of the values-clarifiers. It is described and discussed in nearly all of their major works. It involves asking students to respond to the question of where they stand on a given controversial issue, for example, where they stand on the issue of legalized abortion or capital punishment.[10] In addition, the technique requires that the teacher define the

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[9]Merrill Harmin and Sidney B. Simon, "Values and Teaching: A Humane Process," Educational Leadership (March, 1967), pp. 517-525.

[10]A critical aspect of what it means to "take a stand" is that the student exhibit the chosen behaviors both inside and outside the classroom: "The teacher uses approaches which help students become aware of the beliefs and behaviors they prize and would be willing to stand up for in and out of the classroom." Simon, et. al., p. 20. There is no point in belaboring the problems inherent in attempting to observe what students do away from the classroom. Instead, the lesson to be learned here is the ease with which the values-clarification approach reduces complex problems and issues to apparently simple, straightforward procedures.

boundaries of the issue by stating what are thought to be extreme positions which can be taken on that particular issue. Thus, a "continuum" of positions is established for that particular controversial issue.

The assumption underlying this technique is that the student will take a stand somewhere along the values continuum, thereby enabling the teacher to identify the student's values. Once the student's values have been identified the teacher can help the student to understand his or her values. In the words of the values-clarifiers, the teacher can help the student clarify his or her values.

The contradiction inherent in this technique is that it is impossible to stipulate the polar positions on a given controversial issue without reflecting the biases (values) of the person who decides what constitute the "extreme positions." To illustrate this point we can look at a typical values continuum strategy.

> Here is a values continuum which is often highly charged and emotional about military service. At the one end you have, 'I would rather go to jail than have anything to do with the draft.' Way at the other end of the line is the statement, 'I would lie about my age and enlist the minute I looked old enough to get away with it.'[11]

I contend that you can readily alter the scope and direction of this exercise simply by including the admission that you would also kill, in addition to lying. Or, conversely, that you would not go to jail, but would go to Canada, or obtain

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[11] Harmin and Simon, p. 20.

a fraudulant medical deferment from a doctor who disliked the draft and was willing to help young men illegally escape from it.

The point is obvious. The teacher can not satisfy the fundamental principle of "value neutrality" by establishing a values continuum. Someone must decide what constitutes a controversial issue. In addition, someone must decide what are the extreme positions on the given issue. Both decisions reflect the values of the individual making the decisions.

It is quite possible, for example, that a given group of students might simply disagree with a teacher over whether or not an issue is even controversial. The teacher might ask the students to take a stand on the issue of legalizing marijuana. The students however, might hold that the use of marijuana is no different from drinking beer, and might fail to see this question as an issue. In other words, what the teacher perceived as a perfect controversial issue for forming the basis of a values continuum strategy, could actually be a reflection of his own beliefs and values.

A further problem of the values continuum strategy is that students may be confronted with issues about which they know little or nothing. A good example of this situation is the strategy employed by the values-clarifiers that requires students to state whether or not they would "encourage premarital sex" for their sons and daughters.[12] No indication

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[12]Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum. p. 20.

is given by the values-clarifiers as to the age level at which this discussion (which they would call a "strategy") would be most appropriate. As a parent and former middle school teacher, I am convinced that the age at which students can intelligently participate in discussions of this sort varies considerably among individuals of the same age group, as well as for individuals of differing age levels. Thus, it seems warranted to conclude that some students will become involved in values continuum exercises for which they are not prepared.

A further illustration of the inherent contradiction involved in trying to maintain a position of value neutrality and at the same time employing values continuum strategies, is readily apparent in the directions regarding how best to use this technique. According to the values-clarifiers, one should "set up preposterous positions at either end of the continuum. The hope is that these positions will be so far out that no one would dare support them."[13]

It takes imagination and a considerable extension of the canons of logic to assert that the values-clarification approach is value-free when the values-clarifiers make statements like the above. How, we must ask, can a teacher even pretend to be carrying out an exercise with his or her students that is value free, when the values-clarification

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[13]Sidney B. Simon, "Your Values are Showing," Colloquy, Vol. 3 (January, 1970), pp. 6-19.

strategy being employed is arranged in such a manner that the students who defend either end of the continuum, are, by definition, being "preposterous."

Summary:

This examination is not exhaustive of the class of statements in the values-clarification literature that are either misleading, or, more importantly, contradictory of the fundamental assertion made by the values-clarifiers that the values-clarification approach is value-free. Yet, they exemplify this class of statements. The extent to which the analysis of these statements is accurate is the extent to which one must seriously question the internal consistency of the values-clarification approach.

STATEMENTS SHOWING THE MORAL CHARACTER OF THE VALUES-CLARIFICATION APPROACH

Most people are aware that the word "moral" has something to do with questions and statements about right and wrong, good and bad, should and should not. In fact, discussions about morals, according to John Dewey, "[begin], in germ, when anyone asks, 'why should I act thus and not otherwise? Why is this right and that wrong?'"[14] Such questions take on meaning for most persons when they are associated with conduct, that is, according to O'Conner, "words like

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[14]John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life, (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1908, 1932, 1960), p. 5.

'good' and 'bad,' 'right' and 'wrong,' have both a meaning and a proper application when used to refer to human conduct."[15]

All of us, simply because we live in a social situation, enter into deliberations and make decisions about what constitutes proper and desirable behavior or conduct for ourselves and others. We make rules, state guidelines, and commend certain principles of behavior that reflect our beliefs and values about what should be.

It is in this sense that I refer to the "moral nature" of the values-clarification approach. When persons exhort and persuade others to behave in one way as opposed to another, they are engaging in moral deliberations. As will be shown in the analysis of subsequent statements, the values-clarifiers are clearly concerned with how persons ought to conduct themselves. In other words, they are obviously concerned with moral issues.

The statements in the values-clarification literature that are concerned with moral matters can be divided into two groups: Those that are explicitly moral and those that are implicitly moral in character. Even though the distinction between the two is not always precise, it is, nevertheless, a useful distinction for the purposes of analysis. Essentially, such a distinction helps to illustrate more completely the

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[15]D. J. O'Conner, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957, Sixth Regression, 1967), p. 4.

extent to which moral matters permeate the values-clarification approach.

Explicit Statements

Explicit moral claims are statements in which the moral disposition is obvious as opposed to vague. They are characterized by such distinctly moral terms as "right," "wrong," "good," "bad," "should," "ought," "must," etc.. The following statements that are analyzed are explicitly moral in nature.

Statement:

> Teachers must organize their courses in such a way that children have the opportunity to express their opinions, purposes, feelings, beliefs, hunches, goals, and interests, about moral issues [emphasis added].[16]

The above statement by James Raths, 1964, is a clear and direct reference to the moral nature of the values-clarification approach. It is important to emphasize, however, that such a statement is not unique in the values-clarification literature. Over ten years later, we still find statements that are equally explicit about moral matters. The following statement by Simon and deSherbinin is a good example: "Although values-clarification is basically moral, it tries not to push any single set of answers."[17]

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[16] James Raths, "A Strategy for Developing Values," 1964, pp. 509-514.

[17] Sidney B. Simon and Polly deSherbinin, Phi Delta Kappan (June, 1975), pp. 674-683.

I am not here concerned with whether or not Simon and deSherbinin can logically argue that on the one hand the values-clarification approach is "basically moral," and at the same time assert that it is value-free. The extent to which the word "moral" is understood by most persons in the manner I described earlier, is the extent to which such a position is untenable. Instead, the aim here is merely to document the fact that careful reading of the values-clarification literature readily reveals statements which directly inform the reader that the values-clarification approach is concerned with moral issues.

Statement:

> Teachers should encourage a classroom atmosphere of openness, honesty, acceptance and respect [emphasis added].[18]

Statements prescribing what persons should do are, as Dewey advised, a priori of moral claims. The above statement is an obvious example of this type of statement and clearly illustrates that the values-clarifiers do, in fact, make explicit moral claims.

Statement:

> . . .In these troubled, confused, and conflicted times. . . , we desperately need men and women who know who they are, who know what they want out of life, and who can name their names when controversy

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[18]Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum, p. 16.

> rages. We need people who know what is significant and what is trash, and who are not so vulnerable to demogoguery, blandness, or safety.[19]

Statement:

> Teachers who think their students are too young and inexperienced to have developed worthwhile ideas should not use the values-clarification approach [emphasis mine].[20]

The term "worthwhile" is patently moral. Like the terms "good," "bad," "right," and "wrong," its use always signals the fact that a moral claim is being considered. In other words, the above statement by the values-clarifiers is explicitly concerned with moral matters. What makes this claim so extraordinary, at least in my judgment, is that it reveals the fact that the values-clarifiers extend the range of moral considerations of the values-clarification approach to include those persons who are not yet involved in the program. They have told teachers to make moral judgments about their students prior to the time students become involved in the values-clarification approach; that is, they have directed teachers to find

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[19]For an informative discussion of the use of the term "need," see B. Paul Komisar, "'Need' and the needs-curriculum, in Language and Conceptions in Education, eds. B. Othanel Smith and Robert H. Ennis (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1961), pp. 24-42. In this work Komisar explains that there are two senses of "need": the prescriptive sense and the motivational sense. The latter sense is concerned with what persons want or desire and is related to the "psychological condition" of the person who has the "need." The former or prescriptive sense, as the word "prescriptive" implies, is concerned with what persons should do. For example, says Komisar, to say "he needs discipline" is roughly equivalent to "He must have discipline" or "Discipline is necessary for him."

[20]Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum, p. 26.

out which of their students have "worthwhile" ideas and which do not, and to exclude the latter group from participating in the values-clarification approach.

Implicit Assumptions

There are a number of statements in the values-clarification literature that are implicitly moral. They are statements that do not include precise moral terms such as "good," "right," "should," "best," etc., yet are still obligatory and prescriptive with regards to moral conduct and standards. They are statements that imply what should be done. They are statements that include oblique assumptions about what is right. It is to these statements I now turn.

Statement:

> To get at a central idea of this book, let us make use of an image. Imagine a great continuum with persons standing at various points along it, some in clusters, some alone, some in motion, and some quite immobile. And imagine a sign above the people's heads that says, CLARITY OF RELATIONSHIP TO SOCIETY. At one end of the continuum, we see a smaller sign that says, simply CLEAR, while at the other end is similarly labeled unclear.[21]

The notion that persons ought to be clear about their relationship to society is a fundamental premise of the values-clarification approach. In fact, it defines what the values-clarifiers intend by the phrase "values-clarification." In order to become "clear" about your relationship to society, claim the values-clarifiers, you must first be clear about

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[21]Raths, Harmin, and Simon, p. 4.

your values. Becoming clear about your values occurs as a result of engaging in the process of values-clarification.

In actuality, the phrase "clarity of relationship to society" tells us very little about the values-clarification approach until we understand the implicit assumptions that are buried in the term "clarity."

According to the values-clarifiers, persons who are clear about their values are "positive, purposeful, enthusiastic, proud." On the other hand, persons who are unclear about their values are "apathetic, flighty, very uncertain, very inconsistent, drifters, overconformers, over dissenters and poseurs or role players."[22]

To have "clarity," then, implies that an individual is purposeful, positive, enthusiastic and proud. The "lack of clarity" implies that persons behave in very

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[22]Raths, Harmin, Simon, pp. 5-7. Although my concern is analytical regarding the manner in which the values-clarifiers use the terms "clear" and "unclear," it is important to point out that their use of these terms includes another significant dimension: they appear to use these terms as though they were empirical statements of fact. They state that persons who are "clear" are "positive," "purposeful," etc., and conversely, that persons who are "unclear" are "flighty," apathetic," "over-conforming"etc.. In doing so they have demonstrated a tautological argument. For in order to verify these purported empirical claims we would first have to accept their definitions of "purposeful," "positive," "flighty," "overconforming," etc...If we do that we are, ipso-facto, locked into accepting the evidence which they report substantiates their claims. (see, "Recent Research in Values-clarification," 1974). Thus, by making statements that are supposedly based on empirical evidence the values-clarifiers have obfuscated the inherently normative character of the terms "clear" and "unclear."

different ways; they are apathetic, flighty, over-conforming, and so on.

Important to our purpose is the fact that these sorts of terms used by the values-clarifiers to describe persons who are "clear" and those that are "unclear" are not purely descriptive terms. They are terms that, as the philosopher Herbert Feigl explains, are intrinsically "value-charged terms."[23] When we attempt to define them in any precise way, as we might attempt to define the word "chair," we find that our efforts eventually reveal that these sorts of words are little more than, in the words of Feigl, "equivalents of the bald adjectives 'good,' 'bad,' 'better,' 'worse,' 'just,' 'unjust,' 'right,' 'wrong,' etc.."[24]

The prescriptive character of these terms becomes obvious when we see how the values-clarifiers actually use them. For example, in responding to the perceived needs of a group of fifth through eighth grade public school teachers, who "felt that their students tended to approach learning in a rather frivolous and superficial way,"[25] the values-clarifiers offered the following decription of the problem:

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[23]Herbert Feigl, "The Difference Between Knowledge and Valuation," Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1950, pp. 39-44.

[24]Feigl, pp. 39-44.

[25]James Raths "Clarifying Children's Values," The National Elementary Principal (November, 1962), pp. 35-39.

> While the students' scores on the standardized tests reflected a general over-all quality of work, the students manifested a lack of purposefulness in their behavior around school generally, and in learning activities specifically. They did not seem to be genuinely involved in their school work.[26]

Implicit in their diagnosis is the assumption that doing well on standardized tests is not sufficient. Students must also show "purposefulness" in their behavior and be "genuinely" involved in school activities. "Purposeful" and "genuine" are, in this case, clearly the "bald faced moral adjectives" Feigl described. They prescribe and recommend that students behave in a particular manner.

The point is inescapable: the fundamental premise of the values-clarification approach that persons ought to be "clear" about their values and their relationship to society, is itself founded upon a set of "value-charged terms" that are implicitly concerned with moral issues.

Statement:

> The definition of this book . . . is closest to ones used by those who talk of the process valuing, rather than of a value in any identifiable institutional sense.[27]

If we look closely at how the values-clarifiers use their definition of value we find that, there are a number of less than obvious assumptions built into the definition.

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[26] Raths, pp. 35-39.

[27] Raths, Harmin and Simon, p. 10.

Let me emphasize that I am not at all quarrelling with the definition of "value" which they selected. For I readily agree with the values-clarifiers that "the meaning of the term 'value' is by no means clear in the social sciences or in philosophy. One can find consensus for no definition."[28] My concern is with their not making clear some of their implicit assumptions.

The values-clarifiers claim that their definition of "value," as a process of valuing, was derived primarily from John Dewey's work, Theory of Valuation.[29] It seems that they interpreted Dewey's report that "human beings are continually engaged in valuations," to mean that persons are involved in a process of valuing.[30]

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[28]Raths, Harmin and Simon, p. 9.

[29]John Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939).

[30]Dewey, p. 58. Although this study is not directly concerned with the question of whether or not the values-clarifiers are actually true to Dewey's conception of values, it is, nevertheless, an important question since Dewey's theory of value is purported to provide the basis for the values-clarifier's theory of value. My own reading leads me to believe that they have not been accurate in their representation of Dewey's position. For example, if the values-clarifiers had understood Dewey's conception of a "process" of valuing, I do not think they would have made the indefensible claim that the values-clarification approach is value free. Dewey made it quite clear that simply because persons have biological and psychological needs they are given to making valuations about what they desire. Said Dewey, "Valuation-phenomena are seen to have their immediate source in biological modes of behavior and their concrete content to the influence of cultural conditions (p. 74)." Furthermore, Dewey argued that there was an important distinction to be made between those valuations that sprang from immediate needs (the desired) and those valuations that were arrived at after careful and intelligent reflection (the desriable). Nowhere did Dewey imply that such a process was value-free.

This interpretation is understandable since this perspective of "value" is absolutely critical to the basic assertion made by the values-clarifiers that the values-clarification approach is value free. A process of valuing allows the values-clarifiers to assert that no specific value or set of values is being thrust on teachers or their students. A process approach to values enables teachers and students to simply clarify the values they already have. The process approach to values does not indoctrinate or dictate values.

> In place of indoctrination, my associates and I are substituting a process approach to the entire area dealing with values in the schools, which focuses on the process of valuing, not on the transmission of the 'right' set of values.[30]

A serious challenge to this claim is raised as soon as the values-clarifiers move beyond their definition of value as a process of valuing, and stipulate a set of criteria which must be used in order to determine whether or not a particular behavior is in fact a "value." The stipulation of a set of criteria that must be satisfied before something can be called a value means that no longer are the values-clarifiers dealing with process in valuing but the process of valuing; a process of valuing conciously constructed by the values-clarifiers.

The situation is analogous to that involving the "values continuum strategy" discussed earlier in this chapter.

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[31]Simon, "Values-Clarification vs Indoctrination," p. 902.

In the case of the values continuum exercise the values-clarifiers had failed to realize that when boundaries or ends were identified for a particular values continuum the values of the person establishing the boundries were automatically exercised. The same is true in the case of the "process of valuing." As soon as criteria are stipulated for the process, the values of the person or persons formulating the criteria are called out. This fact is succinctly illustrated when we observe the disagreements among the values-clarifiers regarding the number of criteria that are necessary and sufficient for constituting a value.

In 1962, James Raths, paraphrasing Louis Raths, stated that there were five criteria which needed to be satisfied if we were going to call something a value. "A value, said James Raths, "is a belief, attitude, purpose, feeling, or goal that 1) is prized; 2) is chosen after consideration of alternatives; 3) is affirmed upon challenge; 4) is recurring; and 5) penetrates [into] life."[32]

In 1966, with the publication of Values and Teaching: Working With Values in the Classroom, the number of criteria was raised to seven.

> We have said that it would be well to reserve the term 'value' for those individual beliefs, attitudes, activities or feelings that satisfy the criteria of (1) having been freely chosen, (2) having been chosen among alternatives,

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[32]James Raths, "Clarifying Children's Values," pp. 35-39.

> (3) having been chosen after due reflection, (4) having been prized and cherished, (5) having been publicly affirmed, (6) having been incorporated into actual behavior, and (7) having been repeated in one's life.[33]

By 1973 the number of criteria needed to be satisfied in order for a given behavior to be called a value had risen to seventeen.[34]

If different values-clarifiers at different times have differing ideas about the number of necessary and sufficient criteria, it seems justified to assume that at some point in the valuing process individual perceptions and values are involved in the stipulation of the criteria.

In addition to the problem of how many criteria are both necessary and sufficient in order to constitute a value, there is the equally serious problem of who decides when a criteria has been satisfied. For instance, who decides when something has been "freely chosen" as opposed to not being freely chosen? Who decides when something has been "chosen from alternatives"? Do children under the obligation of compulsory attendance laws, adult authority, and organizational constraints of the schools, really have "alternatives" in the sense the values-clarifiers use the

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[33] Raths, Harmin and Simon, p. 46. It should be pointed out that the same set of criteria is also used in the other major work in the values-clarification literature; Values-Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies for Teachers and Students, 1972.

[34] Howard Kirschenbaum, Merril Harmin, Leland Howe, and Sidney B. Simon, "In Defense of Values-Clarification: A Position Paper," (Unpublished paper, National Humanistic Education Center, New York, 1975).

term? Who decides when a student has "publicly affirmed" something? Dewey would ask what "public" we are talking about.[35]

We could ask these sorts of questions about each and every one of the criteria stipulated by the values-clarifiers, but it does not appear necessary. The answer to our question, "who decides when a criteria is satisfied?" is that it is the particular individual (teacher) who is cast in the role of helping others to clarify their values that decides. Whomever conducts a values-clarification exercise is obligated, by the nature of the process, to be the one who informs the participants whether or not they are "progressing" towards clarity in their values, that is whether they are getting clearer about their values, or remaining unclear.

It seems from the previous discussion that it is warranted to conclude that a process approach to values, as described and endorsed by the values-clarifiers, is incapable of being value-free when put into practice. Not only are the values and biases of the values-clarifiers

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[35]Dewey, in his work, The Public and its Problems (Chicago: The Swallow-Press Inc., 1954), pp. 16-17, defined the term "public" in the following manner: A "public consists of all those persons who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for." I was unable to learn if the values-clarifiers understood the problem Dewey was speaking of in regard to the use of the term "public."

implicitly revealed in their attempts to establish the number of criteria needed to have a "value," but the very act of evaluation itself constitutes a series of normative judgments. Someone decides when the criteria are satisfied. When this occurs with children in the public schools, moral issues are necessarily involved. It is simply impossible to make stipulations about what behaviors constitute a value, and then pass judgment on an individual's performance with regard to these behaviors, without becoming involved in moral-value questions. The implicit assumptions involved in the conception of value, as used by the values-clarifiers, demonstrate once again the moral nature of the values-clarification approach.

Statement:

> How can we get fathers and mothers to see that high college entrance scores are not the end of a high school education? How can we get people to see that getting a high-paying job is not the final regard of a college degree?[35]

The above statement is important because it illustrates one way in which the values-clarifiers use the forum provided by the values-clarification literature to proselytize their philosophy of education. It is obvious that they are talking about the "ends" or "purposes" of education. Such questions are, ipso facto, of concern to philosophers of education.

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[36]Simon, "Values-Clarification vs Indoctrination," p. 905.

Values-clarifiers, however, fail to inform the reader when they are making these sorts of philosophical claims. More importantly, they fail to acknowledge that philosophical statements about educational purposes always involve normative considerations. In nearly all discussions about the goals or ends of education there comes a point at which reasonable, intelligent, and informed individuals are sure to have significant differences of opinion about what the purposes of education ought to be. This is why D. J. O'Conner emphasized the fact that these are the sorts of questions "that are felt most acutely as problems by students of education and educational theorists."[37]

John Dewey would have added another dimension to our criticism of the values-clarifiers on this point. Dewey would have had them admit that, at rock bottom, the issues they raised about educational ends are really issues concerning what is the "ideal" or "good" society. As Dewey convincingly argued, "the conception of education as a social process and function has no definite meaning until we define the kind of society we have in mind."[38] In other words, for the values-clarifiers to say that we need to convince parents that there is more to education than high achievement scores and high paying jobs, implies that there is something better

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[37] O'Conner, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, p. 6.

[38] John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 97.

as a goal of education, and at the same time obligates the values-clarifiers to describe not only what this end is, but the kind of society which would nurture it.

SUMMARY

Analysis of selected statements in the values-clarification literature reveals the moral character of the values-clarification approach. These statements, upon close examination, contradict the fundamental premise that the values-clarification approach is value-free. They also illustrate the explicit and implicit moral concerns of the values-clarifiers. Taken together, these statements argue convincingly that the values-clarification approach, because it is used in the public schools, is in fact concerned with moral education.

In the next chapter, "Summary and Conclusions," I will discuss the implications of the conclusion of the study. Specifically I will argue that the values-clarification approach has done a disservice to teachers and students.

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In Chapter 1, I documented the fact that the values-clarification approach is one of the more pervasive movements in the field of education today. I pointed out that this was largely the result of the simple methodology of the values-clarification approach. According to the major values-clarifiers, teachers can use the values-clarification approach in their classrooms immediately after being exposed to it.

I acknowledged that, although the growing popularity of the values-clarification approach was a significant occurrence in the field of education, there was another little-known aspect of the values-clarification approach which was important to the educational process - the fact that the values-clarification approach is related to moral education. I argued that what makes this fact important, if not extraordinary, is that (1) the values-clarifiers deny that the relationship exists, and (2) the growing number of teachers who are using the values-clarification approach may be inclined to believe the values-clarifiers and consequently are unaware that the relationship exists.

I argued that such a situation was not desirable and proposed that it could be rectified by providing teachers who are involved or interested in the values-clarification

approach with a document that demonstrates the relationship which exists between the values-clarification approach and moral education.

I argued that the document, in order to be successful, should (1) elucidate the explicit and implicit moral claims made by the values-clarifiers, and (2) provide a brief descriptive history of the major moral education movements that have occurred in this society since the turn of the century. The latter was thought to be helpful in providing perspective for the teachers regarding the traditional concerns of moral education in our society.

In Chapter II, I presented a brief description of the major moral education movements; the religious education movement, the character education movement, and the values education movement. I selected information about each movement in order to show a commonality that exists between all of them. I noted that each movement was (1) influenced by the philosophy and psychology of John Dewey; (2) concerned with the science of psychology, in order to support the various conceptions of moral education; (3) oriented toward moral education efforts in the public schools; and (4) concerned with the idea that all persons, particularly the young, must learn about their moral responsibility and obligation to society.

I concluded that the values-clarification approach had these same things in common and, therefore, could justifiably be seen as simply one of the more recent efforts in the history of the larger moral education movement.

In Chapter III, I analyzed selected statements in the values-clarification literature in order to demonstrate the inherently moral nature of the values-clarification approach and thereby establish its relationship to moral education. I examined statements that contradicted the central premise of the values-clarification approach, that is, that it is value-free, and I examined statements which clearly revealed the explicit and implicit character of the values-clarification approach.

In short, I have been able to demonstrate that the values-clarification approach is clearly related to and involved in moral education.

Earlier in the study I stated that it was not desirable to have teachers involved in moral education efforts while being unaware of their involvement. I would like at this time to elaborate on this point - that the values-clarification approach is in fact clearly related to and involved in moral education - and relate this to my conclusion.

It is easy to share the concerns that the values-clarifiers have about the present condition of society and the

world in general. We can even sympathize with them about the need for persons to be aware of the serious and complex problems that confront us all as we move into the final quarter of the twentieth century. But it is my contention that we can not commend or even support their method for resolving this condition and the concomitant problems which define our period in history. In fact, I will be even more emphatic and and argue that, in the final analysis, the values-clarifiers are probably doing a disservice to teachers, students and ultimately the larger society.

The disservice of which I speak is the result of the values-clarifiers failure to understand the function and purpose of moral deliberations in our society. They vigorously denounce "moralizing," characterizing it as "the direct, although sometimes subtle, inculcation of the adult's values upon the young."[1] They argue that moralizing is not only wrong, but ineffective. Thus, they proposed to help persons (teachers) change other person's (student's) values with a "value-free," "non-directive," "non-threatening" instructional process called values-clarification.

The problem with their assertion is that moralizing is a respectable endeavor, and furthermore, it is both natural and necessary to modern democratic societies such as ours. For as Chazan and Soltis argue,

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[1]Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum, pp. 15-16.

> 'Moralizing' refers to the offering of judgments about specific principles, values, and behaviors deemed as 'immoral' or 'moral' in a particular society. Thus, moralizing is a dominant form of criticism of a society and is used as a means to urge a change in the moral point of view of members of the society.[2]

Therefore:

> Moralizing is an indispensable aspect of social life, for it is a means of evaluating adherence to accepted principles, of preventing too dangerous deviation from accepted principles, and of enabling periodic modifications of accepted principles.[3]

The fact that the values-clarifiers fail to recognize this is a serious indictment of them and their program.

When the values-clarifiers tell us that children have problems caused "by a lack of values,"[4] or that children have "almost valueless behavior"[5] what they are in fact saying is that the children of today have values which are in conflict with the dominant values of the culture. In other words, as Chazan and Soltis explain: "the 'valuelessness' of modern culture (means that modern culture is not consistent with traditionally held values)."[6]

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[2]Barry I. Chazan and Jonas F. Soltis, eds., Moral Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 1973), pp.2-3.

[3]Chazan and Soltis, pp. 2-3 In fairness to the values-clarifiers it should be noted that the term "moralizing" may carry certain negative connotations. For instance, to many people the term "moralizing" means that someone is attempting to coerce another person into accepting his or her moral values. However, as I have argued above, the term "moralizing also has a very positive meaning.

[4]Raths, Harmin and Simon, p. 4

[5]James Raths, "A Strategy for Developing Values," p. 514.

[6]Chazan and Soltis, p. 3.

Let me emphasize that I am not saying that the traditional values are wrong and the modern values are right. My argument here is that each generation of a modern free society must develop its own values, and that moralizing is a normal and necessary part of this process. In fact, I would agree with Chazan and Soltis that "a tradition of thoughtful moralizing is the crucial mechanism a creative society utilizes for the prevention of moral anarchy or moral totalitarianism [emphasis mine]."[7]

By failing to recognize that moralizing is a natural and valuable function in our culture, and, at the same time asserting that they can accomplish similar results without moralizing, that is, (that they can help children to become clear about their relationship to society), the values-clarifiers have confused teachers and students about the entire area of ethical and moral philosophy, as well as the domain of moral education.

This point was recently underscored in an article by Michael Scriven, professor of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley. Professor Scriven, one of the more acerbic critics of the values-clarification approach, which he calls "affective" or "humanistic education,"[8] argues that

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[7] Chazan and Soltis, p. 3

[8] See page 53 of this study for the list of humanistic psychologists whom the values-clarifiers report as significantly influencing their work.

> The hard-core affectivists [the major values-clarifiers] are a bunch of do-gooders whose highest aim is to develop a 'positive attitude' in some direction which is either undefined or undefended, and is very likely to be different in itself or in its specific implications for every authority on affective education [emphasis mine].[9]

In other words, says Scriven, "the basic moral problem with affective 'education' (in the moral domain) is that it consists of the attempted modification of affect/attitudes/Values in other ways than through the use of reason [emphasis mine]."[10]

Moralizing is not an easy task when done with care and concern for the process as well as the outcome. It demands, ideally, that persons be logical and reasonable. It requires that persons have some understanding of ethical and moral philosophy, and, optimally, that they have some of the skills germane to analytical philosophy. Thus, by denying the moral nature of the values-clarification approach, and at the same time telling teachers how simple it is to "clarify values," the values-clarifiers have, in all probability, increased the confusion and misinformation about morals, moral philosophy, and moral education among teachers and students.

One wonders how the values-clarifiers would react to teachers who reminded them of John Dewey's remark that "a narrow and moralistic view of morals is responsible for the failure to recognize that all the aims and values which are

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[9]Michael Scriven, "Cognitive Moral Education," Phi-Delta Kappan (June, 1975), pp. 689-694.

[10]Scriven, pp. 689-694.

desirable in education are themselves moral."[11] And, furthermore, that "all education which develops power to share effectively in social life is moral."[12] The distressing problem is of course that those teachers who are seriously involved with the values-clarification approach are not likely to know that Dewey made these remarks, and, importantly, that what he said applies directly to the values-clarification approach.

There are signs that the values-clarification approach is having to attend to these sorts of questions. One of the most significant indications of this is found in the recent remarks made by one of the major values-clarifiers:

> In many ways, I wonder if values-clarification, when thought of as a separate educational approach, is any longer a useful concept.[13]

The answer, as Dewey already stated, is no.

There is little doubt that our culture is presently very concerned about morals and moral education. A recent Gallup poll (April, 1976) reported that "an overwhelming majority--79 percent--of all major groups in the population favor instruction in morals and moral behavior in the public schools."[14] As the history of the moral education movement in this country

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[11] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 359.

[12] Dewey, p. 360.

[13] Howard Kirschenbaum, "Clarifying Values-Clarification: Some Theoretical Issues," (New York: National Humanistic Education Center, 1975).

[14] "Public Wants Morals Taught in Classrooms," Detroit Free Press (April 18, 1976), editorial page; reported by George Gallup.

clearly reveals, there are no easy answers in this area. I would, however, venture to make two recommendations with regard to moral education efforts in the public schools. First, I would urge parents and teachers to avoid simplistic programs, such as the values-clarification approach, that purport to offer an easy way to morally educate students. There is no such program. Secondly, I would recommend that persons who are going to be involved in conducting moral education programs in the public schools be qualified in ethical and moral philosophy. There is a growing recognition among some sectors of the public and the educational community that this criterion has been missing from the vast majority of moral education efforts in the public schools. Derek Bok, current president of Harvard University, stated in a recent article:

> To put it bluntly, much of the skepticism about these courses probably arises not from doubts about their potential value but from deeper reservations as to whether those who teach the courses are really qualified to do so. Unfortunately, it is simply a fact that many courses in applied ethics have been taught by persons with little qualification beyond a strongly developed social conscience. Of all the problems that have been considered, this is the most substantial. Poor instruction can harm any class. But it is devastating to a course on ethics, for it confirms the prejudices of those students and faculty who suspect that moral reasoning is inherently inconclusive and that courses on moral issues will soon become vehicles for transmitting the private prejudices of the instructor.

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[15] Derek C. Bok, "Can Ethics Be Taught?", Change (October, 1976), pp. 26-30.

The answer to this problem, according to Bok, is a conscious effort to prepare educators with the necessary skills in ethical philosophy.

Another aspect of the movement toward moral education programs that concentrate on the methods and principles of ethical philosophy has been the "philosophy for children project" conducted by the Montclair State College Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children. According to professor Matthew Lipman, director of the Institute:

> The basic method and concepts of the program are derived from the subject of philosophy, which until recently had been taught only in colleges and universities. Philosophical thinking, however can be encouraged and developed among children of virtually any age. And any qualified elementary school teacher has the potential to encourage philosophical thinking among children [emphasis mine].[16]

In concluding let me add that my recommendations can in no way resolve the fundamental problem in moral philosophy and moral education: there simply may not be any rational way to resolve basic differences between conflicting values and perceptions of the world. The philosopher, Arthur Pap, captured this problem succinctly:

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[16]Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp, Instructional Manual (Caldwell, New Jersey: Universal Diversified Services, Inc., 1975), Preface.

> While reasoning based upon factual knowledge . . . is instrumental to the resolution of ethical disagreements, it is not sufficient; as a rule ethical agreement will not be established unless some consequence of x is by both A and B admitted to be good without proof. How could I dissuade a man from indulging in excessive absorption of opium by calling attention to the bodily deterioration it leads to, unless he cherished health as good?[17]

At least, as Lipman points out, teachers would become aware of the fact "that no educational process is 'value-free.'"[18]

I would argue that some knowledge of ethical philosophy is a necessary if not sufficient base from which a teacher might attempt to deal with moral education in the public schools.

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[17]Arthur Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy (1st edition, 1949; New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1972), p. 25.

[18]Lipman and Sharp, p. 3.

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