

A THEORY OF CREATIVE HUMAN RELATIONS
IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

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Edwin Reynolds Bailey

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
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ABSTRACT

A THEORY OF CREATIVE HUMAN RELATIONS; IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

by Edwin Reynolds Bailey

This study is an attempt to identify the conditions within which it becomes possible for human beings to creatively relate with their fellow human beings. The implications of this conceptual framework for educational administrators are also reviewed.

A rationale is provided at the outset of the study for the process of theory construction which is used. Based upon this rationale the study may be classified as social philosophical in nature.

The logic of the conceptual framework which the thesis constructs is based primarily upon analytical and deductive reasoning. Man as a creative entity is analyzed within four

conditions which determine his capacity to create. The first of these conditions is the Biological Condition which determines man's potential to become both more creative and more human. The second condition is identified as the Socio-Cultural which determines and shapes man's entry into the world of social relationships. The third condition is labeled as the Psycho-Physical Condition and is identified as the individuating condition in the growth of an individual toward self-expression. The final condition established is the Mental Condition in which man's intellectual powers enable him to move consciously toward his desired life's goals. Each of these conditions is recognized to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for man's creative expression. These conditions of man as creator are identified and analyzed with regard for their significance to the relationships between men.

The creation of relationships between men is also analyzed per se. The processes involved in these creative endeavors by men are analyzed in terms of their particularity. The difference between a "human" and an "inhuman" relationship is identified. The relationship between man's capacity to create and his ability to relate to his fellow man in a "human" relation is similarly analyzed. Based upon these analyses certain tentative conclusions are established. These conclusions are as follows:

Man creates processes, termed process-products, which are the means to his progress toward becoming human.

To become human, man must be communicative, creative, loving, and free, in his relations with his fellow man.

A creative human relation is one in which articulate, loving,

human beings are co-creating a positive relationship with their fellow human beings by their own free choice.

The implications of these tentative conclusions for the administrator of the educational enterprise are discussed. The following questions are asked as the basis for the investigation of these implications:

1. How can man learn to communicate with his fellow man; or conversely, how can modern man overcome the problem of limited communication?

2. How can modern man, in an increasingly impersonal and complex, technological age, acquire a true sense of creativeness?

3. How can man attain that sense of direction and meaning in life which preserves both individual integrity and the human society?

These questions are discussed in terms of the responsibilities of the administrator to himself and to the educational enterprise. The significance of these responsibilities are elaborated upon within the framework of the theory established by the study. The most basic principle identified for the educational administrator within the context of this study's theory is the continued creation of "human" means to fulfill his responsibilities to the educational enterprise of his society.

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IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

By

Edwin Reynolds Bailey

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Recognition of the highest order is due the author's loving wife, June, for her sustaining faith and patient understanding. Without her faith, patience, and understanding this study would not have been written. With her virtues its meaning attains a new reality and significance which might otherwise be unknown.

This thesis is dedicated to June.

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CHAPTER I

THE PURPOSE AND NATURE OF THE STUDY

Bid, then, the tender light of faith to shine
By which alone the mortal heart is led
Unto the thinking of the thought divine.
George Santayana, "O World"

A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

There is a growing sense of urgency in the world today. It is not the urgency compelled by the spectre of atomic warfare even though this does compound the problem; nor is it the urgency of resolving the tensions of ideological differences. It is, rather, the urgency of vast numbers of human beings, all over the face of the earth, seeking to achieve the dignity of being human.

This urgency is being expressed in a multitude of ways-- many of them futile and senseless to our western civilization. We find it difficult to comprehend the dynamics of these expressions of spontaneous social evolution. We fail to sense the urgency of the desire and the need of these human beings to equate themselves with their more fortunate brethren elsewhere on the earth. We fail to recognize the totally unique character of our times and constantly return to history's pages for answers which cannot appear. Ours are new conditions; we live in a world breached from its own history; we must build in the living present the pathways to the future without the comfort of the oft-trodden routes of the past.

In short, we must know ourselves and our world in the very process of its becoming, rather than as it was, or as we blindly hope that it is. Man has never been confronted with so profound a responsibility nor ever been so illy prepared to cope with a task. The challenge surrounds us, it is present in all ways, always. It awaits our acceptance and purposive action.

The purpose of this thesis is to accept this challenge. We propose to look at the creative capacities of man and determine their significance for the relationships between men. From the application of man's creativeness to the relationships between men we shall indicate what implications exist for the administration of education. While the avowed theme of this study is the ability of human beings to create, the underlying theme is to depict the dignity of human worth. What it means to be "human" is of the utmost importance to the fullest expression of man's ability to create. The ultimate purpose of this study, then, is not merely a conceptualization of human creativity, but rather it penetrates deeper to the essence of life itself by endeavoring to reveal the beauty and dignity of being human. The impact of our conclusions on the educational process and the reciprocal influence of education upon the progress of man are derivative concerns which also fall within the domain of this study. The limelight will focus upon the creative powers of man--the stage will be the world of men--the play will be about the beauty of life.

We must hasten, however, to delimit the magnitude of such exalted purposes lest we are committed to a task without termination. There are specific aims which exist within the broader context of our

purposes which can be spelled out. These aims comprise the skeletal framework around which we will construct the body of our study. The first of these aims is that of describing the conditions which determine man's creative capacities. What are the biological characteristics which man possesses which enable him to surpass all other members of the animal kingdom in creativeness? In what ways have the social and cultural forces controlled or shaped man as a creative being? How do the experiences of man enter into the kind and quality of his creativity? What is the relation of man's mind to his creative powers? These are the types of questions we must answer in our description of the conditions of man as creator.

The second aim of this study is that of identifying the specific nature of man. What are his biological birthrights? How is man similar to the animal kingdom? How does man contrast with other forms of animal life? What does it mean to be "human," or "inhuman?" What conditions enhance man's humanness? It can be seen by the types of questions to which we address our efforts that the distinction between man in his "human" sense is implicitly different from man in his "biological" sense, however much the latter is a necessary condition of the former. The drawing out of this distinction is imperative to the ultimate development of the major theme of this study, namely the creation of the relationships between "human" beings.

Still another aim of this study is that of relating the ability of humans to create the relationships which exist between human beings. To what extent is creativity applicable to the human community? What are the conditions necessary for the extension of

creativity to human relations? What product ensues from creative human relations? From these questions it is evident that value judgments are inextricably interwoven into any answers which might be given to these questions. It is our intent to remain as removed from value implication as is possible but at the same time we are fully conscious of the omnipresence of the judgmental elements and the necessity of facing them squarely when they arise.

The final aim of this study is value laden and must be considered for all the richness of its value content. This is the aim of drawing the implications of our conceptual framework of creative human relations for educational administration. Certain conclusions may undoubtedly be self-evident and need only minor elaboration in their application to public school administration. Contrasted to this, there will be other conclusions which are far less tenable and will require greater specificity of illustration to bring them to the threshold of meaningful application to educational administration. In either case there are values implicit in the conclusions and in their application to education in America today. It is not sufficient to assume that these values exist sui generis in our present system of American education. They must be reviewed, re-evaluated, and re-established with new significance, if they are worthy of the effort, at all.

The remaining three chapters encompass these aims. Chapter II deals with the creative aspects. Chapter III covers the identification of the specific nature of man and the relationships which exist between human beings. The final chapter is devoted to a discussion of the implications of our theory for the administrator of

the educational enterprise.

The remaining section of this chapter is devoted to the establishment of a theoretical framework for this study. Within this framework the overall purposes and the specific aims subsumed under them can take shape with the requisite clarity and precision.

B. THE NATURE OF THE STUDY

The title of this thesis indicates that it is theoretical in nature therefore connoting a research endeavor distinctly different from those which are based upon statistical correlations or experimentally obtained data. Yet to state that such a study as this is theoretical is to say nothing if the term theory is itself left undefined and subject to the guess of the reader. "Theory" means different things to different people. At times theory has been considered to be the final explanation; at other times it has been viewed as the antithesis of fact; today it is looked upon more as a provisional framework for the scientific or analytic procedures designed to improve predictability. Jahoda, Selltitz, Deutsch, and Cook¹ describe theory in precisely this fashion:

One other characteristic of theories in modern science should be noted: This is their provisional character. In earlier times, a theory was considered a final explanation. Today, a theory is always held with some tentativeness, no matter how great the accumulation of findings consistent with it. It is considered as the most probable or most efficient way of accounting for those findings in the light of present knowledge, but it is always open to revision. It is not a static or final formulation.

Theory has played an integral part in the functional growth

¹M. Jahoda, et. al., Research Methods in Social Relations (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959), p. 481.

of science. Similarly, theory is seminal in the modern day development of the behavioral sciences. It has always been the foundation for man's explanation of the unknown. Whether it has gone by the name "myth", "superstition", "guess", or "a fact", theory has existed in the minds of men. Sometimes it has been a kind of simple guesswork while at other times it has been an elaborate symbolic structure of great complexity. The important point is that theory is a significant characteristic of man's intellectual progress. The significance of theory in man's attempts to discover new facts about his world is aptly stated by Hall and Lindzey²:

There is no such thing as "no theory"; consequently, the moment we attempt to forget about theory "for the present" we are really using implicit, personally determined, and perhaps inconsistent assumptions concerning behavior and these unidentified assumptions will determine what will be studied and how. The observation of any concrete empirical event is carried out under the dictates of some "theory"--that is, certain things are attended to and certain things are overlooked--and one of the purposes of theorizing is to make explicit the rules determining this abstraction process. The possibility of improving under the assumptions that are controlling research is eliminated the moment one gives up the attempt to define the theoretical base from which he operates.

Theory, then, does exist centrally within current research. Whether theory performs the act of summarizing and synthesizing that data which has been collected or acts as a guiding framework for the procedures to be used in the collection of new data, it is nevertheless vital to the advancement of the frontiers of knowledge. These views are described by Cartwright and Zander³ who assert that

²Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1947), pp. 16-17.

³Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, Group Dynamics, Research and Theory (White Plains, New York: Row, Peterson and Company, 1958), p. 9.

"some investigators believe that such methodological problems as those of developing measuring instruments and of demonstrating their reliability should come before much theorizing." They also indicate that a second commonly held belief is that theory should exert a "more guiding influence" in the design of research. As they further indicate, "one cannot select devices for recording and measurement before knowing what it is that should be studied."

It is our opinion that the latter view is more appropriate to the types of research needed today. This seems particularly necessary in the behavioral sciences where the extensive atomistic studies which have been conducted for some time have failed to provide the broader clues to understanding behavior which man so fervently seeks. In this study our concern is with the second of Cartwright and Zander's two beliefs on theory's purpose, namely the description of what it is that should be studied. It is our belief that creativity is a much used but little understood term. Similarly, there is much discussion today of the values of "human relations" but relatively little insight into the meaning of the term "human". Everyone is usually born with some "relations", (at least a mother) but not everyone experiences or comprehends "human relations". To be sure they are quite different. A third concern of ours in what ought to be studied is the application of man's creative abilities to his relationships with other men. Finally we are concerned with the implications of what we say about these matters for that particular human endeavor called educational administration.

But we continue to use a term which is vague and ambivalent; what is theory and what is its function within this study? We have

already established that our theory must exert a "more guiding influence" in the design of research. The immediate problem, perhaps, deals more with the meaning of the term "research". Significantly the term "research" has come to signify both means and ends. We state that we research a particular subject at the same time that we refer to the results of that study as research.

According to Webster's New World Dictionary, research is defined as "careful, systematic, patient study and investigation in some field of knowledge, undertaken to establish facts or principles." In this instance the term has the connotation of "means". If we accept this definition as valid then we can see the relationship of theory to research as being that of a "more guiding influence." Research could indeed be done without an explicitly stated theory but the fact is that a theory is implicit in the very act of research itself. What remains is to define what theoretical orientation underlies any given piece of research.

It is evident from the above definition of the term "research" that no specifically designated method need apply to the term "research". The experimental method may be used; statistical method is another acceptable procedure; the comparative method is yet another method which may be adopted; and the method of analysis is still one more way by which "careful, systematic, patient study and investigation of some field of knowledge" can be "undertaken to establish facts or principles." In this study, the final method, that of analysis, is the formal method by which our theory is developed.

The task before us, then, is to construct a theory which

may serve as a guiding influence in establishing research problems pursuant to the content of this theory. We are not proposing to do the research at this time; we are merely proposing to define what our conception of a theory is, to construct that theory, and to suggest what it means to us for a very practical and empirical function in our society. This is the sum total of our intentions. The remainder of this section will be utilized in the establishment of our meaning of the term "theory" as the specific object of our analytic endeavors through the remainder of this study.

If this study were to be classified it would very likely fall under the nom-de-plume of social philosophy. If this is appropriate then our case with regard to theory construction is more closely allied to the concept of theory in the social sciences than in the physical sciences. Since the physical sciences have been in existence longer qua sciences, and since they have dealt primarily with phenomena which could be repeated with sufficient exactness to bear out predictions with a certain precision, it has been possible for the physical sciences to move toward increased standardization of the logico-mathematical formulae desired as a theoretical foundation for research. In the "social" or "behavioral sciences" the very complexity of human culture has precluded such refined efforts to crystallize theory construction into such symbolic forms. Social researchers have practiced these sorties into the land of scientific theory building but as yet with a modicum of success. The vast number of variables, the imprecision of mensuration in the behavioral sciences, the constantly changing actions and thoughts of men has limited such types of theory building to either far-reaching and

vague generalities or to minuscule formulations of limited applicability. The problem of the differences between the "natural sciences" and the "social sciences" is viewed as a problem of the respective disciplines by Crick⁴:

The obvious sharp difference between the precision of both the methods and the laws of the natural and the social sciences only deepens the question, What is it that the advocates of a science of politics mean by "scientific"? To ask this question now, after considering the diverse views of Feigl, Wiener and Cohen, is to raise at least the suspicion that the whole concern with methodology is a falsely posed question. For a general method of research can hardly be at stake. There is no contradiction involved in saying that all disciplines have, in some sense, a common method; but that equally they all have their own peculiar methods arising out of the peculiar nature of their subject matter.

Crick's description of the methodological inclinations of the numerous disciplines coincides with Read's⁵ belief:

We cannot eliminate ourselves from our observations, and even a scientific method depends on consciousness, which is an unstable element developed by man in the course of his physical evolution. . . . Language itself and the symbolic signs by means of which any logical analysis must proceed, are instruments developed by this organ for the control of man's environment; instruments conditioned by his environment, and still in a state of evolution. Sign systems are incomplete because our consciousness is incomplete; and the means by which man is continually extending the area of his consciousness, and concurrently his various means of communication, are not scientific but artistic.

Hall and Lindzey⁶ support this notion when they maintain that "there is no formula for fruitful theory construction any more than there is a formula for making enduring literary contributions." It is

⁴ Bernard Crick, *The American Science of Politics* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1959), p. 218.

⁵ Herbert Read, *The Forms of Things Unknown* (New York: Horizon Press, 1960), pp. 22-23.

⁶ Hall and Lindzey, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

apparent from these comments that there is little agreement (among those who consider it permissible to refer to themselves as scientists) on the exact meaning of the terms "scientific method" or "theory" or "fact". Or as Crick⁷ expresses it, "I think it is not amiss to stress an apperception of chaos more than of simplicity lurking behind the subject of 'logic and scientific method'."

There are undoubtedly a variety of factors contributing to this "chaos" to which Crick has referred. One factor is the relative newness of science itself, that is, when viewed on the long continuum of man's intellectual growth. Another factor is the disparity between the process of conceptualization and the actual practice of that which is being theorized about. The symbols tend to be viewed as ends rather than means. This process is partially responsible for another difficulty, namely that of language. The lack of logical consistency in language usage among the various disciplines creates barriers between the disciplines and the schools of theory. It is in this area that much needs to be done and can be done to bring about the kind of synthesizing referred to by Gross⁸:

We need empiricists who are committed with strong resolve to penetrate the full immediacy of human experience; systematizers who strive to perfect the elegance and precision of each new expression; integrators who have the breadth of vision to create ingenious connections between systems which seem to stand strangely apart in realms that are not now intelligibly related. Most of all, we need relatively unspecialized pioneers with the kind of flexible disposition that will enable them to range with advantage from any one aspect of the world of scientific endeavor to any other. Their function would be to examine with acute

⁷Crick, op. cit., p. 217.

⁸Llewellyn Gross, "An Epistemological View of Sociological Theory," American Journal of Sociology, 65:441-448, March, 1960.

concern the neglected hiatuses between the specialities and, when possible, to join the fixed boundaries that isolate sciences and scientists from one another.

While Gross is directing his comments toward sociologists it remains perhaps to the social philosopher to best perform this type of task. For it is the philosopher who permits himself total access to all the disciplines by his commitment to think through the relationships of facts to values. Jahoda, Selltitz, Deutsch, and Cook⁹ lend credence to this belief when they state that among the purposes of theory are "to summarize existing knowledge, to provide an explanation for observed events and relationships, and to predict the occurrence of as yet unobserved events and relationships on the basis of the explanatory principles embodied in the theory." Some, or all, of these purposes may be within the intention of the theorist as he constructs his theoretical construct. In this study our purposes will be those of summarizing existing knowledge and providing explanations for observed events and relationships. Since we have classified the study as social philosophic in nature, we shall be dealing constantly, with both facts and values. The facts will be those of others, the values will be our own. Such a personal involvement might seem non-scientific and non-theoretical. It may well be non-scientific but it cannot be construed to be non-theoretical for it is in the nature of theory building to be intensely personal as Rioch¹⁰ contends:

In other words, a theory is intensely personal, being a personal performance resulting from repeated experiences

⁹Jahoda, et. al., op. cit., p. 481.

¹⁰David Rioch, et. al., Current Trends in Psychological Theory (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1951), p. 142.

in participant observation, and at the same time it is intensely interpersonal, being determined by the relations of the original observer with his colleagues and by the interpersonal transactions of the group as a whole.

It is upon this purely individualized nature of theory construction that we, at last, move to the brief delineation of the elements of theory and subsequently to its definition.

There appear to be four elements basic to the establishment of a logical and coherent description of a particular phenomenon. These are the four pillars upon which theory must be grounded, they are:

1. A theory is made up of a system describing some phenomenon.
2. This descriptive system is derived from its sub-systems.
3. The sub-systems consist of propositions assumed to be true.
4. These sub-systems are logically inter-related within the total descriptive system.

From these elements may be established the following definition of theory:

A theory is a descriptive system derived from logically inter-related sub-systems assumed to be true.

By the substitution of terms and phrases we can visualize the development of our study within this definition. We are going to describe in a systematic form a conceptual framework called "creative human relations", which can be derived from the logical association between man's ability to create and the ability of human beings to relate to one another in particular ways, based on certain conditions of human life we believe to be true.

We do not pretend that this study is a scientific one, whatever that implies. This study is, rather, a personal endeavor to make sense by means of the logical analysis of certain relational events observable in the normative function of modern American society. It is toward this end that we dedicate our efforts.

CHAPTER II

THE CONDITIONS OF MAN AS CREATOR

Simply the self-interest of mankind calls for a more general effort to foster the invention of life. And that effort can be guided intelligently only by insight into the nature of the creative process.

Brewster Ghiselin, The Creative Process

Our purpose in this chapter is to establish and discuss the basic conditions which determine man's capacity to create. Our conclusions on the conditions of man's creativity inexorably lead us to the final construction of our theory on creative human relations. It remains to the next chapter to complete the union between man's creative powers and the establishment of human relations. Our present concern must focus on the conditions of man as creator.

Our consideration of the conditions within which man's creative capacities are established and developed is from a four point perspective: (1) The Biological Condition; (2) The Socio-Cultural Condition; (3) The Psycho-Physical Condition; and (4) The Mental Condition. These are arbitrary classifications into which we have divided the infinite number of total conditions which bear upon man as creator. Each of these four conditions is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for man's development as a creative being. Each condition is of such breadth that it may effectively stimulate and inhibit the creative tendencies of individual men at any given time. Our focus is, however, upon man, rather than

individual men; yet there is implicit in our discussion, the connotation that all men are, in all their ways, like man. In general, the Biological and Socio-Cultural Conditions tend to establish a basis for similarities among men, while the Psycho-Physical and Mental Conditions tend to identify the differences between men. All four conditions are inter-related and vital to the continued existence and progress of man as creator.

A. THE BIOLOGICAL CONDITION

No matter how one may wish to avoid the fact, it is ever true that man's creativeness is to a great extent governed by his biological nature. Man is conceived and his life processes commence. Man is born and confronts the world with his biological inheritance. The changes man subsequently brings about in his environment always remain dependent upon the biological origin of his capacity to create. Sinnott¹ goes so far as to suggest that it is life itself which is "anticonservative, original, creative."² Certainly the fundamental import of man's biological condition

¹Edmund Sinnott, "The Creativeness of Life," Creativity and Its' Cultivation, ed. Harold H. Anderson (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), Chapter 2, p. 13.

²Brill would agree with Sinnott but presses the point further by suggesting that all biological variations and human inventions are "chance occurrences". John Brill, The Chance Character of Human Existence (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 12.

Schrödinger's view is diametrically opposite. He contends that "just as the political and social development and the sequence of historical events in general are not thrust upon us by the spinning of the Fates, but largely depend on our own doing, so our biological future, being nothing else but history on a large scale, must not be taken to be an unalterable destiny that is decided in advance by any law of Nature." Erwin Schrödinger, Mind and Matter (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1956), p.33.

commands our detailed consideration if we are to better understand the other conditions of man as creator.

The event of a human life is that of a total experience beginning at the moment of conception and continuing until the cessation of life. This total experience may be comprised of an infinite number of experiences which are, as Dewey³ says, "the result of interaction between a live creature and some aspect of the world in which he lives. . . . The process continues until a mutual adaptation of the self and the object emerges and that particular experience comes to a close."

Within the framework of Dewey's conception man's life experience is firmly rooted in his biological nature. Without eyes no man can see, without the internal ear no man can hear, without a brain no man can think. Thus the totality of man's interaction with his world is conditioned by the completeness of his biological inheritance.

Few scientists today doubt the truth of the Darwinian concept of biological evolution. Some deny the implications of the dog-eat-dog, survival-of-the-fittest basis upon which he founded his theory, but there are few who disavow the idea that man arrived at his present stage of biological development through a long series of gradual physiological changes. Even religionists who formerly denied the feasibility of such a theory because it was in conflict with a literal translation of The Bible now concur that evolution is one way of interpreting the Biblical story of man's creation. The

³John Dewey, et. al., A Modern Book of Esthetics, ed. Melvin Rader (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), pp. 72-73.

essential fact upon which agreement can usually be obtained is that however he arrived at his present level of development, man is a superior being when compared with other living creatures.

Man's superiority is manifested in various ways including certain biological characteristics. Paradoxically one of the ways in which man's superiority is evidenced is due to the lack of certain traits in man which are possessed by animals. Among these are inherited patterns of behavior. Man is born with few reflexes, the most important being contraction of the pupil of the eye in strong light, salivation when he is hungry and food is present, muscular contraction with a pain stimulus, and the effect of his nervous system on breathing, digestion, excretion, and heartbeat. The lack of extensively inherited behavior patterns plus the lack of specific biological compensations for environmental conditions (i.e. protective coloring, hairy covering for the body, fins and gills for the water, etc.) are believed responsible for man's creative adaptation and wide distribution over the earth's surface. One of the consequences of these biological conditions was that man became more flexible and adaptable to a wider variety of environmental conditions.⁴

There is, however, a positive side of the ledger when we compare the biological nature of man with all other members of the animal kingdom. Being less well endowed in certain ways, man was

⁴ Schneider supports this view when she says that "for all his powers, then, man is of all animals in certain ways the least at home with the external world when he first enters it. Yet he is so constituted that he must come to know it best." Elisabeth Schneider, Aesthetic Motive (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1939), p. 19.

compelled to rely on other characteristics in order to compensate for these deficiencies. Of special significance in this biological compensation was the fact that man's offspring were helpless for so long a period after birth. Without the inherited behavior patterns man found it increasingly necessary to find the means to insure the continued training and development of each succeeding generation. Thus man began to utilize in ever-greater measure those gradually evolving characteristics which could serve as compensatory attributes. Biesanz and Biesanz⁵ describe these physiological advantages of man:

He has a prehensile hand, with a thumb that he can oppose to each of his four long fingers. Thus he can grasp and manipulate and create with his hands. His hands are freed for doing work by his upright posture. He can stand on his two long legs because his curved spine and his arched foot cushion the shock of walking and prevent injury to his brain. His binocular vision can be focused for different distances. The higher primates, man's distant cousins, share these three attributes with him to some degree, but these traits alone are not sufficient to enable the great apes and monkeys to build culture.

What really sets man apart from the rest of the animal kingdom is his highly complex nervous system, including a large brain, and his vocal apparatus. Man's brain case is about three times as large as the gorilla's and is especially well-developed in the frontal area. This large brain is also very complex; there are perhaps 10 billion nerve endings embedded in the cerebral cortex.

Man's vocal apparatus enables him to speak articulately. Compared to the primates, his jaws are smaller and less protruding, and he has no obstructions (such as the simian plate) to interfere with the free movement of his tongue. His face is comparatively vertical, and his canine teeth are approximately the same size as his other teeth. This apparatus would, of course, be of no value to him if he did not have a highly developed speech area in his brain, which really makes it possible for him to symbolize and communicate, to learn, think, remember, and foresee. Thus he can

⁵ John Biesanz and Mavis Biesanz, Modern Society (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), p. 31.

create culture, acquire it from his fellows, and transmit it to others.

Scientists and philosophers have suggested at various times that certain of these characteristic advantages of man are more important than others. The power of speech is considered by some to be of the greatest importance.⁶ Others depict man's development as a consequence of his freedom from subjection to behavior predetermined by instinct.⁷ But most widely proclaimed as the biological advantage which elevates him above all other members of the animal kingdom, is man's brain. Scientists have been studying the brain of man with some degree of validity for only a short time. Such possibilities as brain size, relative and absolute sizes of association areas, the richness of fiber connections, the architectural intricacy, and activity level, have been studied with only tentative conclusions yet reached. Current and future research will, perhaps, someday provide the data which clarifies the precise physiological function of the human brain in the processes of reasoning and imaginative thinking. With specific regard to man's ability to

⁶Chase places speech first in importance when he states that "scientists are pretty well agreed today that what chiefly distinguishes humans from all other living creatures is the power to talk, to communicate in words, to use the words to form abstract ideas, and so to think." Stuart Chase, Roads to Agreement (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), p. 196.

⁷Stratton's beliefs support this view: "Man is in no such subjection to his biological inheritance as are the animals. He has it in him to turn upon his inherited impulses, his 'drives', and to put them in the place he chooses for them. Animals, in contrast, show no such power over their inherited impulses. They accept them and obey them as best they can." George Malcolm Stratton, Man: Creator or Destroyer (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1952), p. 20.

imagine, Gerard⁸ summarizes the problem in this way:

As the set of facts are brought together new understanding will arise. Possibly from this direction we shall get a clue as to the finer differential between brains: What gives one man a vivid imagination but a poor memory, another an encyclopedic memory but dull imagination? And when that answer is at hand science will indeed have established the biological basis of imagination.

Yet despite our present limitations we are aware that man's brain enables him to perform certain mental processes which are essential to his creative expression. Arendt⁹ suggests that it is the ability to remember that leads to the reification of his thoughts in tangible form. Without such ability man could, of course, never act in a constructive and directed manner, for his life could be only a series of spontaneous, unrelated acts.

This capacity to remember opens up to him vast possibilities for the mastery of detailed and differentiated learning sets which are basic to the development of complex intellectual processes. Harlow¹⁰ elaborates upon this capacity:

In deference to man we would suggest that the ability of the human animal to form and utilize multiple perceptual learning sets probably differentiates him from other animals to as great a degree as does the ability to utilize spoken language. . . . Man is defined as the speaking animal, but of equal importance is the fact that he is also the only animal capable of forming the detailed and differentiated perceptual learning sets that underlie a vast range of intellectual processes, including those of mastering or

⁸ Ralph Gerard, The Creative Process, ed. Brewster Ghiselin (New York: The New American Library, 1952), pp. 241-249.

⁹ Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 95.

¹⁰ Harry Harlow, et. al., Current Trends in Psychological Theory, ed. Wayne Dennis (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1951), p. 82.

being mastered by the printed page.¹¹

The value of language formation in the development of human culture is well known, thus Harlow's words have special importance as we conclude our discussion of the biological conditions of man as creator and prepare to look at the significance of the conditions of man's social and cultural environment.

Recapitulation

We have discussed how man's biological inheritance has enabled man to creatively adapt to, and alter, his environment. This, man is able to do more effectively and extensively than other members of the animal kingdom because he is capable of creating enduring patterns of behavior which are, in turn, subject to his creative capacity to revise or amend. It is within this conceptual view of man's power to create that we are able to visualize the tremendous potential of the human society. It is true that other members of the animal kingdom do live in societies and do possess intelligence but not to the degree of that possessed by man.

¹¹Gibson's thinking is closely aligned to Harlow's: "When an individual can identify the property among otherwise different objects and specify it with a verbal response, he is well on his way towards conceptual thinking. He becomes capable not only of finer differential reactions, but also of new integrating reactions; he can perceive the similarities as well as the differences among things. From the perceiving of similarities a new kind of naming emerges which enables him to react to classes of objects and events, that is to form categorical concepts. The new kind of reaction is better called a symbol than a name. In the logician's terminology, the reaction has connotation as well as denotation. The capacity to have symbolic reactions and the experiences that go with them is probably what makes the repertory of human acts so elaborate and the range of human experience so far reaching." James J. Gibson, et. al., Current Trends in Psychological Theory (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1951), p. 108.

The difference in degree is so great as to be referred to by many as a difference not of degree at all but of kind. We are of the belief that the difference is one of degree on a biological continuum but of such degree that it is appropriate for all intents and purposes to discuss the difference as being a difference in kind. That the results produced by the superiority of man on the continuum of biological evolution are so far-reaching as to be of a different order altogether is scarcely debatable. The biological nature of man which makes his social inheritance possible, with all that it encompasses, is the unique and distinct advantage which man has over any other living creature.

Man's superiority as a biological entity is best expressed in his ability to accumulate knowledge, to transmit it from generation to generation, and subsequently for each generation to depart from its past. We observe no such powers anywhere else in the animal kingdom. Thus man's biological inheritance is the springboard which projects him into a social and cultural environment of his own creation. It is this constantly evolving social environment with its enduring patterns of behavior which provides man an inheritance distinctly unique to man alone--the enduring culture.

Conclusion

The Biological Condition is the pre-condition of man's progress to new and higher levels of creative expression.

B. THE SOCIO-CULTURAL CONDITION

If the Biological Condition of man as creator is the pre-condition of man's progress toward new and higher levels of creative

expression then surely the Socio-Cultural Condition must be considered the "expediting" condition. For it is from the society, with its enduring cultural forms, that man gains access to the means by which he may create his own particular additions to the society. Unless the society elects to grant access to these means man is not able to develop beyond the infantile level of expression. In brief the Socio-Cultural Condition is the condition under which man expedites the transmission of his cultural means to each succeeding generation. It is this condition which makes man most man.

From birth until death every member of a human group is subjected to the pressure of that group to adopt certain patterns of behavior which tend to preserve the structure of the group. This is one of the major reasons why every society maintains certain institutions--they stabilize the culture of that society. It is, perhaps, a social process which could be compared to the biological function of preservation of species. Among these formal and preservative behavior patterns are language usage, familial organization, economic endeavor, regulatory and punitive behavior, and education of the young. These institutionalized behavior patterns permeate all facets of every society's culture and become the social milieu into which man is born. It is to this social milieu that man as creator owes a great debt. And it is this same milieu against which man as creator often vigorously rebels. One of the paradoxes of man as creator is evident in this reliance on culture combined with his disapproval and contention with the culture.

This paradox of reliance-disapproval becomes less confusing if we accept the notion that the human society is founded upon man's

biological capacity to create. With this concept in mind we are no longer amazed that the paradox of reliance-disapproval is constantly in effect, for man by nature of his physiology is predisposed to be inventive, original, and creative. Thus any culture possesses a kind of stability within a state of constant change. Certain of the institutionalized patterns of behavior tend to preserve the hierarchy at values which characterize any culture. At the same time the changing composition of the society tends to induce specific or broad changes into all facets of the culture thereby creating certain conflicts which in turn bring about change.

The magnitude of the changes which occur depends greatly upon the external world conditions with which the society as a whole must contend. Periods of war stimulate the search for technological advances which may lead to victory. Economic depression tends to precipitate abortive political changes designed to facilitate economic recovery. The introduction of certain scientific discoveries, such as the telescope, tends to pave the way for other related discoveries and technological advances. Changes tend to take place in response to social needs and in relationship to the level of cultural development of any society. Inventions, scientific discoveries, schools of artistic expression, and social dynamics are not mere accidents but rather the related effects of causal events in man's history.

But however much a society may "force" the patterns of man's creative expression it also provides him the means with which he may articulate his creative urge. We know that all human societies utilize language as a means for preserving, transmitting, and

elaborating their cultural forms. Without the power to speak and a language which possesses a more or less conventional relevance to life's problems man's "intellectual powers might not," as Chase¹² maintains, "much exceed those of a smart chimpanzee." Only from his society's culture is man able to acquire a language with all its immense benefits to his potential growth--as a creative being. For it is language which provides man access to the technological inheritance of his culture.

Culture also frees man to pursue his special interests by providing him with automatic behavior patterns for his daily existence. If it were necessary to have to "think through" how to dress, or tie our shoes, or walk, there would be little time remaining to concentrate on the more far-ranging problems man seeks to resolve. Man would, indeed, be scarcely more than a "thinking" simpleton if this were the case, so involved would he be in the constant effort to learn anew each simple task of daily existence. It is to man's credit and advantage that he is able to perform mechanically a vast number of functional tasks without continuous relearning once each skill is acquired. Freed from the mechanics of everyday affairs man is able to ponder far more challenging issues with their latent powers to alter the course of human affairs. Man becomes more creative because his socio-cultural conditions permit him the freedom to follow his desired pursuits.

We must be conscious of the fact, however, that what society grants man in this instance is only one kind of freedom. This is a

¹²Stuart Chase, Roads to Agreement (New York: Harper and Bros., 1951), p. 197.

"freedom from" the necessity of constantly learning anew those tasks which can become mechanical skills and recede below the conscious level of man's mind. But "freedom from" does not insure a "freedom for", which is another kind of freedom. This second freedom is that which enables man to develop special interests and to pursue these interests as a matter of choice. Both kinds of freedom are important to man's progress as a creative being. Without "freedom from" biological restrictions man does not have time to create. Without "freedom for" development of his particular selected pursuits man's creative expression is thwarted. But taking the first quite for granted man's conflict with his society centers around the latter kind of freedom.

The "freedom for" which society determines to a high degree for man may stem from several bases. Limitations may exist due to economic demands placed upon the members of a society. Man has little time or energy for creative thought when his survival demands a constant output of energy for this end. Or conversely his energy level may be so low that he becomes unable to waste energy on anything other than self-preservation. Such a state of affairs in any society is not conducive to "freedom for" the selection and development of interests which are not related in some way to the preservation of life itself.

There are also political restrictions which a society may impress upon its members. This is the regulation of "freedom for" about which we hear so much today. With two major alignments of the world's population struggling for political supremacy this determinant is having an impact beyond the boundaries of the two camps.

At stake in this colossal struggle is the autonomy of the individual as compared with that of the state. Again we see the perennial conflict between man and his society. Yet we also visualize in our present struggle the devastating potential of great masses of the world's population subjected to the arbitrary decisions of a few. A society based on such a value system appears inimical to the fullest development of man's creative potential. And conversely such a society is seemingly self-destructive if it would contain man's "freedom for" his creative self-expression.

The preceding examples of societal control of man's "freedom for" are only two of many which could be cited. Religion or morality are restrictive factors; the level of technology is another determinant; the processes of education must be recognized as important; in fact the prevailing value systems of any society influence, in one way or another, man's "freedom for" creative action. We must clarify one point before we proceed to other elements of the Socio-Cultural Condition of man as creator. The influence of society upon man as creator is never a one-way process. It is, rather, a matter of continuous interaction between a society and its members.

While we admit to the power of cultural influence we contend that the culture need not destroy man's capacity to be both subjugated to it and free from it as attested by Riesman¹³;

The character of the autonomous individual is derived from, hence in part determined by, the prevailing modes of conformity in the society in which he lives. Autonomy is never an "all or nothing" affair; it does not come about suddenly, but sometimes imperceptibly, and always as the result of a continual struggle with the forces of the

¹³David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 300.

culture which oppose it. I like to interpret the conception that "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains," to mean that man is born a slave--a slave to his biological and cultural inheritance--but that he can become, through experience and experiment, increasingly free. No one entirely lacks the capacity for autonomy and freedom, though people often willfully reject them. But even in those instances in which the struggle for freedom is abandoned, the rationalizations for denying freedom seem to testify to the pull of freedom--else why do the world's deniers of freedom argue so much and, in purely logical terms, so well? Men desire freedom through understanding and control of their ceaselessly changing and problematic inner and outer environment.

Society, with its enduring cultural forms, does possess a power to pattern its individual members but similarly its members are in the reciprocal position of being able to act upon the society and eventually alter the cultural patterns. Linton¹⁴ contends that:

In spite of the thorough enculturation of the individual, he still retains the capacity to think and to devise new forms of behavior in response to situations for which the patterns of his culture are inadequate. Enculturation merely limits the conceptual tools with which he can operate and the directions in which he will think. The individual is the irreducible variable in every social and cultural situation. He is the yeast in the cultural brew, and every new element of culture can be traced back ultimately to some individual's mind.

The society not only determines the amount of freedom available to its members it has a powerful effect upon their emotions and perceptions. The way man "feels" about his experiences and the forms of expression he uses to demonstrate his emotions and perceptions reveal the impact of his culture upon him. The temperament of man in Western civilization has its origin in the Greek tradition. The urge of the individual to express himself--to view

¹⁴Ralph Linton, The Tree of Culture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Co., 1955), p. 40.

himself as a unique being¹⁵--is characteristic of the Greek influence. In contrast we have the Oriental concept of man uniting in oneness with all men as the basic tradition. The differences between these views is reflected in the art and technology of the societies falling within these cultural traditions. Indeed the traditions permeate all facets of life within the cultures and shape the lives of their members.

While the culture gives to man those tools which enable him to perceive and react to his culture in a particular way, man is not necessarily limited to these tools, because he is able to creatively alter his environment by adding to it. As yet we know comparatively little about the total relationship between man and his culture. Many attempts have been made by the disciplines of psychology, sociology, and social psychology to discover certain types of relationships, but most of these studies have been limited in scope and applicability to a more comprehensive framework for understanding man's creative expression. We agree with Lasswell¹⁶ who feels that:

It would be a rewarding and gigantic task to appraise our entire civilization from this point of view. What are the facilitators of which innovations? What are the inhibitors of which? We need to examine every cluster of value-institution practices with these questions in mind. Beliefs,

¹⁵This is a problem which, in itself, deserves special consideration. When we speak of the "uniqueness" of the individual are we referring to his differences from other men? Or are we intending by his "uniqueness" a special set of properties which only that one individual could ever possess? These are questions which we are not prepared to discuss at this time but are of sufficient import to merit discussion at some time within the framework of man's creative capacities.

¹⁶Harold D. Lasswell, "The Social Setting of Creativity," Creativity and its Cultivation (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), Chapter 13, p. 210.

faiths and loyalties are relevant; so, too, are the operational arrangements of every organized body (and of every unorganized, though patterned, activity). Every structure contains specialized situations, and these situations contain roles, some of whose consequences put them among the facilitators or the inhibitors of recognition.¹⁷

Until a sufficient body of integrative evidence is accumulated however, we must tentatively rely on the available evidence. Among the more significant studies is that of Anderson¹⁸ whose data on integrative and dominative behavior support the following hypotheses:

1. integrative behavior in one child induced integrative in the companion.
2. domination incited domination.
3. integration and domination were psychologically different.

Northway and Rooks¹⁹ found that children who are better accepted socially tend to be the more creative students. They clarify the results of their experimental works as follows:

If results from such a situation are accepted as indicating creativity, it will be found that they fit well into the theoretical thinking on which sociometry is based, namely that creativity arises out of social integration, not as a compensation for it. The individual who has social bonds is not fettered by them, but rather supported. In his

¹⁷Such an effort was attempted by Nash in his study on American composers. Nash found that the contemporary composers he studied were dissatisfied with their social role, that they resented the necessity of toadying to managers, conductors, instrumentalists, and others in order to achieve performance of their musical works. His descriptive materials on the role situation of the composer, and especially on his adjustment to this situation by role versatility, are of considerable value for they offer proof of the effective social conditioning of the creative artist. Dennison J. Nash, "The Socialization of an Artist: The American Composer," Social Forces, 35:307-313, August, 1957.

¹⁸Harold H. Anderson (ed.), Creativity and its Cultivation (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 132.

¹⁹Mary L. Northway and Margaret McCallum Rooks, "Creativity and Sociometric Status in Children," Sociometry, 18:450-457, 1956.

dependency he achieves the freedom to be himself and to create in his own unique way.²⁰

We have previously indicated that the social milieu impresses upon man certain responsibilities and expectations which may influence his creative expression. The very act of creative expression may, of itself, tend to produce certain anticipations or reactions by the society. One reaction may be a tendency to alienate creative man. This is described by Bronowski²¹ who contends that:

We expect artists as well as scientists to be forward-looking, to fly in the face of what is established, and to create not what is acceptable but what will become accepted. One result of this prizing of originality is that the artist now shares the unpopularity of the scientist: the large public dislikes and fears the way that both of them look at the world.

Despite this unpopularity among the masses, the artist, and others whose creativity tends to alienate them from their social environment, continue the search for the deeper meaning of their times. Perhaps it is the constant threat to the security of the known and

²⁰ Zeleny reports several studies which substantiate the idea that more creativity-productivity is released in groups organized upon the basis of "mutuality" than in groups organized upon a non-mutuality basis or by chance. He refers to the wealth of philosophical writings which also support this idea:

"A central theme seems to be that the self and society develop best when human beings live in a state of reciprocity . . . To repeat and expand the hypothesis a bit (without departing from what is found in it) we may say it recognizes:

1. The importance of the individual and his self-expression.
2. Respect for the dignity of each individual by every other individual or love.
3. The united of all individuals in some kind of a 'oneness'."

Leslie D. Zeleny, "Validity of a Sociometric Hypothesis--The Function of Creativity in Interpersonal and Group Relations," Sociometry, 18:439-449, 1956.

²¹ J. Bronowski, "The Creative Process," Scientific American, 199:3:60, September, 1958.

the accepted which makes the creative individual potentially disruptive to the normal course of events. Similarly it may be the paradoxical nature of man to seek the security of conformism while simultaneously desiring freedom. Indeed, it may well be that the culture which best "frees" man "securely" is that culture which is most capable of permanent tenure among the cultures of man.

Rogers²² concludes that the conditions which a society may provide which will foster creativity are "psychological safety" and "psychological freedom". To provide psychological safety the society must: (1) accept the individual as of unconditional worth; (2) provide a climate in which external evaluation is absent; and (3) understand the individual empathically. Rogers' psychological freedom closely resembles the "freedom for" which we described earlier. Whether any society would be completely amenable to, or could ever fulfill the trying demands of providing security and freedom simultaneously is subject only to speculation. Yet this is the goal which man as creator endeavors to reach. The fact that a certain amount of security and freedom are simultaneously provided by every society is, perhaps, the spur which goads man on toward his desired ideal.

Man creates and by so doing adds both to his culture and the complexity of his own struggle. It is within this broad paradox that we are able to identify the three paradoxes of culture which Herskowitz²³ has developed:

²²Carl Rogers, "Toward a Theory of Creativity," Creativity and Its Cultivation, ed. Harold H. Anderson (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), Chapter 6, p. 78.

²³Don Martindale, American Social Structure (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1960), p. 86.

1. Culture is universal in man's experience, yet each local or regional manifestation of it is unique.
2. Culture is stable, yet culture is also dynamic and manifest continuous and constant changes.
3. Culture fills and largely determines the course of our lives, yet rarely intrudes into conscious thought.

Recapitulation

The Socio-Cultural Condition enters into man's life as a result of man's biological capacity to establish enduring patterns of behavior which can be transmitted to, and altered by, each succeeding generation. Man, the social animal, is highly structured by the Socio-Cultural Condition into which he is born. The necessity for man to undergo a long period of integration into his society makes the establishment of cultural means to facilitate this integration imperative. Language, attitudes, roles, and skills are but a few of the requisite learnings for man if he is to become a functional member of his society. Indeed, it appears that without these forms of knowledge man qua man can not function at all in his social environment.

The Socio-Cultural Condition of man as creator is not, however, a one-way street. As man acquires the requisite learnings of his culture he becomes increasingly capable of exerting an influence on his society. His mere presence is an influencing factor but with his power to create man seeks to alter his Socio-Cultural Condition. This creative effort by man is met with some resistance in all societies to a greater or lesser degree. This situation appears to create the paradox of man reliant upon his society yet turning upon his society. It is this paradox which makes culture relatively stable while it is at the same time changing. Thus the

Socio-Cultural Condition of man as creator is both a facilitating and controlling condition of man's creative expression.

Conclusion

The Socio-Cultural Condition provides the means by which man is able to create more effectively and also establishes the limits of his creative expression.

C. THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL CONDITION

The discussion of the Biological and the Socio-Cultural Conditions has been centered around the development of mankind in general. It is now appropriate that we study the conditions of mankind more closely so that we might identify those forces which tend to make men different from one another. It is important that we recognize and accept the contributions of man's biological and social origins but we must not forget that the progress of man qua man has been the cumulative effect of the acts by individual men. Our intention in the remaining two sections is to ferret out the conditions which tend to create the far-ranging diversities among men.

The term Psycho-Physical as it is used in this section refers to the emotional, temperamental, motivational (Psycho-) and physiological (-Physical) characteristics of the personality. We do not use the term "personality" because (1) it is ambiguous in its conventional usage; and (2) it is too encompassing in its general meaning by personality theorists. With regard to the latter reason we wish to point out that our concern with the Psycho-Physical Conditions of man as creator does not include the conscious mental processes which are usually included in the term "personality".

Specifically our attention is concentrated on the conditions of which the individual creator may be completely unaware. The idea that an unconscious mind exists is not new; "even the ancients recognized that mental processes can and do go on below the level of our awareness" as Estabrooks and Gross²⁴ have noted. They emphasize the importance of this concept by insisting that "the time is long since past in which man was content to gear his explanations of the phenomena of life entirely to his feelings about them and his experience of them, and even if the concept of a dynamic unconscious mind is difficult to accept emotionally, it provides the most intellectually satisfying approach we have yet developed to an understanding of human behavior."

Accepting the belief in an unconscious mind or an "inner nature" of man, what, then, are the indicators of its particular concern for men in their creative endeavors? Barron²⁵ lists twelve hypotheses (based on the research conducted at the Institute of Personality Assessment and Research) which suggest possible answers to our question:

1. Creative people are more observant, and value accurate observation, truth-telling to themselves, more.
2. They often tell or express only part-truths, but vividly, but the part they express is the generally unrecognized--they point to the usually unobserved.
3. They see things as others do, but also as others do not.

²⁴George H. Estabrooks and Nancy Gross, The Future of the Human Mind (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1961), p. 26.

²⁵Frank Barron, "The Needs for Order and Disorder as Motives in Creative Activity," The Second Conference on the Identification of Creative Scientific Talent (Salt Lake City, Utah: University of Utah Press, 1957), pp. 119-128.

4. They are thus independent in their cognition, and also value clearer cognition, to that they will suffer great personal pains to testify correctly.

5. They are motivated both to this value and this talent (independent, sharp observation) for self-preservative reasons (the ego-instincts at work),

6. They are born with greater brain-capacity--more ability to hold a lot of ideas in their head at once, and to compare more ideas with one another, hence to make a richer synthesis.

7. In addition to unusual endowment in terms of the ego-instincts, they have much sexual drive as well (both pregenital and genital) because they are by constitution more vigorous organisms and more sensitive (nervous).

8. Their universe is thus naturally more complex, and in addition they usually have more complex lives, leading them to prefer much tension in the interest of the pleasure they obtain upon its discharge.

9. Hence, they also have more apprehensions of unconscious motives, fantasy life, etc. They note or observe their impulses more, and allow them expression in the interest of truth.

10. Creative people have exceptionally strong egos. The self is strongest when it can go far back regressively (to let primitive fantasies, tabooed impulses into consciousness and behavior) and yet return to a high degree of rationality. The creative person is both more primitive and more cultured, more destructive and more constructive, crazier and saner, than the average person.

11. When the distinction between subject (self and object is most secure, the distinction can with most security be allowed to disappear for a time (as in mysticism and in love). This is based on true sympathy with the not-self, or with the opposite of those things which comprise defensive self-definition. The strong ego realizes that it can afford to allow regression, because it is secure in the knowledge that it can correct itself.

12. The objective freedom of the organism is at a maximum when this capacity exists, and creative potential is directly a function of objective freedom.

From this list we can visualize the significance of such qualities as courage, inner-directedness, autonomy, and integrity for the more creative person as he flies in the face of the

established and the traditional. If the individual seeks to express his creative urges he must be capable of resisting the ostracism and alienation of a reticent, or even hostile, society. The strength of his abiding convictions is the reservoir of unconscious motivation which preserves his ego and supplies the courage and integrity to struggle against seemingly overwhelming odds. Nor is the struggle merely that of the creator versus society; it is at times the creator against himself. Fromm²⁶ stresses this point:

I refer to the willingness to be born every day. . . .
Every act of birth requires the courage to let go of something . . . to let go eventually of all certainties, and to rely upon the thing: one's own powers to be aware and to respond; that is, one's own creativity. To be creative means to consider the whole process of life as a process of birth, and not to take any stage of life as a final stage.

The "willingness to be born every day" which Fromm proposes is a part of the total process of self-discipline--of the effort to bring to fruition the fullest realization of the desired "self". This is a positive process, an affirmation of man's loftiest goal in life--"self-actualization" as it is called by Hall and Lindzey.²⁷ in reference to C. G. Jung's development of the concept:

Towards what end are man and mankind striving? The ultimate goal is summed up by the term self-actualization. Self-actualization means the fullest, most complete differentiation and harmonious blending of all aspects of man's total personality.

This view is in opposition, however, to the belief of most people who tend to look upon creative personalities as "different",

²⁶ Erich Fromm, "The Creative Attitude," Creativity and its Cultivation, ed. Harold Anderson (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), Chapter 4, p. 53.

²⁷ Calvin Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality (New York: Wiley Co., 1957), p. 96.

"odd", or "neurotic". Such a view is strongly opposed by May²⁸ who believes to the contrary that any "penetrating explanation of the creative process must take it as the expression of the normal man in the act of actualizing himself not as the product of sickness but as the representation of the highest degree of emotional health."²⁹

Our thinking is in accord with Fromm, Hall and Lindzey, and May. The creative expressions of men must be viewed as positive forces in the creative efforts of men to surpass their cultural inheritance. But differences do exist between men in their

²⁸ Rollo May, "The Nature of Creativity," Creativity and its Cultivation, ed. Harold H. Anderson (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), Chapter 5, p. 58.

²⁹ This belief is supported with equal fervor by Kubie: "Earlier studies of creativity had in common a recognition of that fact that, although conscious processes played an important role in the final shaping of the form of the creative product, the roots of creativity lie in deeper and more obscure processes which work with a speed far greater than can be achieved by that fragment of our psychological processes of which we are conscious. In early days the importance of the unconscious in the derivation and shaping of the neurotic process was still a fresh and astonishing discovery. Therefore it was natural to assume that it must also be the source of the creative drive and of the great creative inspiration in human life. It is out of this natural but fallacious deduction that many erroneous cliches have been drawn: such as the notion that a man produces only from his unconscious, that to be creative a man must be sick, and that consequently the artist, scientist, or writer had better guard and protect his neurosis from the therapeutic intervention of the psychiatrist.

The further fact that many creative people, whether in the arts or in science, or in other fields of life, have in truth been psychologically ill, has led to the easy but fallacious assumption that the coincidence of creativity and neurosis implied a direct necessary and causal relationship between them."

Lawrence S. Kubie, Neurotic Distortion of the Creative Process (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1958), pp. 47-48.

physiological abilities to express their inner selves. Gotshalk³⁰ describes the peculiarity of the artist which distinguishes him from other men:

The artist is not distinguished either by the quality or the amount of his feeling, but by the intensity and comprehensiveness of his unifying perception. Genius, considered in itself, is but superior perceptive power, coming from exaggerated excitability and elasticity in the nervous centres. More precisely, the peculiarity of the artist has an extraordinarily keen interest in, and power to assimilate phases of, the perceptual world--sounds, colors, lines, motions, the perceptible oddities of people--together with the capacity to create diverse perceptual systems which extend his original interest and power and satisfy in a superior way the deeply innate craving for novel and internally complete intrinsic perceptions.

Gotshalk intended to refer solely to the relation between the perceptual superiority of the artist and his ability to assimilate his perceptions into creative expression. By extension, however, we are able to visualize this relationship existing in all men to a greater or lesser degree. The artist is recognized to be exemplary of perceptual superiority, usually by demonstration in one area of creative expression. This superiority does not rule out the presence of this quality in all men. For most men the seeming dullness of their perceptual powers is due less to their absence than to their lack of development. This lack of development may be the result of deep-seated emotional scars which serve as barriers to the development of the special traits. It is easy enough to state categorically that everything is due to the pressures exerted by society but this does not explain away the fact that some men create despite these prohibitive forces. Why some

³⁰ D. W. Gotshalk, Art and the Social Order (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 54-55.

men possess these persisting well-springs of creation and others do not is still unknown to man.³¹

The process of creating may serve other functions for the creator than expression, but these functions are secondary and depend upon the primary function of expression. It is creativity as the expression of its creator which introduces the results of creation into the world of men. A thought unexpressed may exist in the unconscious of its potential creator, but it does not enter into the process phase until its creator expresses it, albeit only to himself. The signification of creativity, then, is made possible by and through the process of creating. The relationship between the individual's creative urge and its embodiment into stable form is made clear by Gilbert and Kuhn's³² explanation of R. G.

Collingwood's beliefs on the matter:

The "expression" then, is not of any personal urge in the artist, but of what the artist has had the gift to become aware of and the sensitiveness to be burdened by in the world of which he forms a part. He is the one who is able to utter what everybody senses, or feels but cannot find the words for. His "virtue" or "excellence" lies in incorruptibility of imagination. . . . Art's "truth" is the faithful transcription of the sense of surrounding events and transactions, and the compacting and welding of these transient essences into individual and relatively stable images.

Thus part of the total act of creation which each individual

³¹Theories have been introduced by various authors to shed light on this problem. Hall and Lindzey describe several of these theories. Foremost, in our opinion, are Freud's concept of the sex drive; Jung's collective unconscious; and Lewin's field theory. Hall and Lindzey, op. cit.: Freud: p. 78; Jung: p. 79; Lewin: p. 206.

³²Katharine E. Gilbert, and Helmut Kuhn, A History of Esthetics (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1953), p. 555.

performs has its origin in the totality of interaction, conscious and unconscious, between the individual and his environment. To the extent that each person has psychic and physical access to this interactive process is each man's experiential horizon expanded. To the extent that each individual is capable of translating his emotional and perceptual experiences into being does he fulfill the unconscious urge to express himself in creative form. To carry out this urge each man must proceed sequentially through a series of developmental stages which culminate in the tangible realization which we call the product of creation. Taylor's³³ four stages in the dynamics of the creative process indicate the progression which takes place:

The first is the preparatory, or as I prefer to call it, the exposure stage. During this initial period the individual collects raw material from the world about. How much material is collected and what is done with it will determine the quality and quantity of creative output.

The second phase is frequently termed the incubation stage.

The dynamic interactions of the milling parts or perceptions in the experience field of the potentially creative are largely an unconscious and uncomfortable phase. It is possible now for the mentally undigested parts to begin fitting together into new relations. The organizations are essentially new, and in general a certain period of time is necessary before parts become meaningfully united. The larger the number of free parts, the more significant may be the creative achievement. Where much prior stereotyping occurs, obviously, little or no incubation is possible.

Incubation is followed by the illumination phase, sometimes referred to as the moment of insight, the "aha!" or "Eureka" experience. It is largely an involuntary act.

³³ Irving A. Taylor, et. al., Creativity, ed. Paul Smith (New York: Hastings House, 1959), pp. 62-66.

The experience of insight occurs when the incubated parts form into a recognizable and meaningful experience.

The final state, known as elaboration, although I prefer to call it the execution phase, involves the difficult communicative task of transforming implicit experiences into objective symbolic form. A great deal of changing usually precedes the actual execution. The final phase of the creative process, therefore, involves additional skills in translating subjective notions into objective form.³⁴

The first three stages described by Taylor correspond indirectly to the psycho-physical conditions which we have been analyzing. The fourth stage might also be included except for the fact that it involves conscious effort which falls outside the pale of this section. At any rate it is clearly evident that the Psycho-Physical Condition promotes the individualization of man and is present in all men's lives whether visible or covert. Rogers³⁵ summarizes the crucial fact of the Psycho-Physical Condition when he refers to the "I" of creation:

³⁴Tumin's steps in the creative process resemble Taylor's but involve also the social interaction processes:

"1. There is first the perception of the field, what the individual knows or thinks he knows about the situation. Actually, it relates to how he defines the matter. He will act on his definition. And so we had better be concerned with his definition, his orientation, what he thinks is in store for him, the goals he seeks.

2. There is his attitude, his readiness to act, his pre-dispositions to respond.

3. There is the kind of action he takes in fulfillment of his perception and his attitudes.

4. There are the consequences upon him of the experience of acting in this fashion.

5. There are the consequences upon others with whom he is in relation.

6. Finally, there is any product which results: a painting, a poem, a tool, a stage setting, a solution to a mathematical problem, a re-formulation of a social relationship."

Melvin M. Tumin, et. al., Aesthetic Form and Education, ed. Michael Andrews (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1958), p. 30.

³⁵Rogers, op. cit., p. 77.

In almost all the products of creation we note a selectivity, or emphasis, and evidence of discipline, an attempt to bring out the essence. . . . We may say that this is the influence of the specific person, of the "I". Reality exists in a multiplicity of confusing facts, but "I" brings a structure to my relationship to reality; I have "my" way of perceiving reality, and it is this (unconsciously?) disciplined personal selectivity or abstraction which gives to creative products their esthetic quality.

Recapitulation

The Psycho-Physical Condition is a synthesis of the Biological Condition and the Socio-Cultural Condition and has its impact upon the unconscious mind of the individual. Its relevance to man as creator is evident in the emotions, temperament, motivations, and physiological structure of the individual which influence and color his creative inclinations. The Psycho-Physical Condition is greatly responsible for the diversity of man. While the Psycho-Physical Conditions colors man's urge to create it may also dis-color or inhibit his creative tendencies by the barriers it places against certain forms of behavior. The Psycho-Physical Condition expands as man's interaction with his world increases. It is the "I" of man as creator.

Conclusion

The Psycho-Physical Condition is a product of man's Biological and Socio-Cultural interaction with his world and shapes the particularity of his creative expression.

D. THE MENTAL CONDITION

We have emphasized the biological superiority of man's brain over those of the other members of the animal kingdom. Yet

we also discovered that without the proper exercise and development of this superior brain man can make practically no mental progress. And we similarly found out that men differed greatly in their creative expressions even when apparently "exposed" to exercise and development afforded them by society. This we concluded is a result of the great diversity among all men in the nature of their psychic structure. The unconscious elements in the personalities of men are strong influences in their physical behavior and mental processes. We must not lose sight of the fact, however, that even though the conscious mind is a relatively small part of the total mind it is a most important part. It is the conscious mind which enables men to weigh the values of an event and establish a course of direction for their lives. It is the conscious mind which enables man to acquire sets of facts or related data which he may utilize to acquire more facts. A child in the early years of school learns basic mathematical and language skills for precisely this reason. It is the conscious mind which enables man to wonder more effectively. And this same conscious mind provides man with an awareness of commitments beyond the immediate functions of his daily life--commitments which can alter the entire meaning of his life. These are the powers of the conscious mind. These are the matters which concern us in our analysis of the Mental Condition of man as creator.³⁶

The significance of the biological origins of mental

³⁶Much of our discussion on the mental conditions of homo sapiens as nature's most creative species appears to treat "mind" as a separate entity from man as a physical entity. This is an accident of our language rather than a product of our intentions. We firmly believe in the Gestalt concept of the whole man in a total environment. When we refer to the "mind" of man as creator, we are always using the term within the Gestalt view of man.

processes cannot be ignored. Sinnott³⁷ relates creativeness to the "richness and variety of mental life" but also emphasizes that "its basis is in the genetic constitution of the individual, but its changes are not dependent on genetic change. Rather are they the result of the enormously varied responses of a given genetic constitution to environmental differences . . ."

Also important in the function of the mental processes are such factors as brain size, activity level and drugs. Gerard³⁸ discusses these factors:

What is the neural basis for the striking quantitative differences between man and man in intelligence or in the several abilities which constitute intelligence or its component, imagination? Surely brain size as such is not the answer, as many studies have demonstrated. Perhaps absolute or relative size of the association areas would show better correlation with intelligence; or perhaps the richness of fiber connections and the architectural intricacy And the factor of activity level is almost surely involved; not only the size and number of nerve cells but their rates of beat, maintained potentials, irritabilities, their functional vigor. This, in turn, depends on their composition (make what you will of the fact that the brains of women contain a higher percentage of lipins--fats--than those of men) and on their metabolism; and this, on the blood supply and the amount of oxygen and sugar it brings, on the salt and acid and other components of the tissue fluids, on particular stimulants or depressants, as the thyroid hormone or anesthetic drugs, and the like. The influence of caffeine, alcohol, strychnine, cocaine, morphine, hashish, absinthe, and mescaline on brain metabolism and activity are being steadily worked out; their dramatic effects on the mind, especially on hallucinations and imaginings, are commonly enough known and are also being further studied (Kluever). As the sets of facts are brought together new understanding will arise. Possibly from this direction we shall get a clue as to the finer differential between brains. . . .

³⁷Sinnott, op. cit., p. 19.

³⁸Gerard, op. cit., pp. 246-249.

Sinnett has supplied us with the biological basis for man's creative mental processes. Gerard has suggested other determinant elements which may excite or depress mentality. Let us turn to Eccles³⁹ for a synthesis of our view on the antecedent conditions which shape man's ability to reason and imagine:

The way to the imagination, the highest level of mental experience, lies through the lower levels of sensory experience, imagery, hallucination and memory, and that is the path we shall traverse. All that we shall learn must itself, of course, be the product of perceiving, reasoning and imagining by our brains.

Actually a long period of education is required before the brain events produced by the sensory organs can be interpreted as belonging to an external world and so be useful in sensing this world.

The repeated use of the term "imagination" by these authors necessitates our identification of the types of mental processes which are generally attributed to man. Schneider⁴⁰ identifies

two more or less distinguishable ways in which we bring to conscious use that which had been unconscious. One is primarily logical and analytic; the other is not. It is this other non-logical way that we call imaginative. We seem to have the power of subjecting this material to our attention, and yet at the same time of allowing it to remain free of the mind's rational control.

The value of logical reasoning must be recognized for its important contribution to man's capacity to stockpile knowledge and to order this knowledge into differentiated sets, as Harlow⁴¹ indicated. With this mental capacity of connotation-denotation man is able to learn more meaningfully than would otherwise be possible. In short, man's power of logical reason makes him the superb

³⁹John C. Eccles, "The Physiology of Imagination," Scientific American, 199:3:135-146, September, 1958.

⁴⁰Schneider, op. cit., p. 58.

⁴¹Harlow, loc. cit.

rational being which he is. Without this power his ability to imagine, to originate new ideas, to establish new concepts, to create new processes would not progress far. It is his rationality which anchors man to reality while preparing him for that bold stroke of imaginative inspiration. The significance of this relationship for creativity is described by Northrop.⁴²

Here, I think, we have the essence of creativity in Western scientific knowledge. It centers in the relation between pure fact and our concepts by postulation. This relation is not that of logical necessity. It is rather that of an imaginative leap to a speculatively conceived hypothesis. . . .

While fully accepting the basic necessity of logical reasoning for the acquisition of advanced mental processes our interest is more closely aligned in this section with those mental processes which are more immediately associated with man as a creative being than with rational man. It is Northrop's imaginative leap that intrigues us. What is this process called imagination? Porterfield⁴³ defines it as follows:

Imagination is the ability to perceive configurations or wholes of reality in space and time, to observe the relations within each configuration as changing with the total situation, to be able to experience insight into and to be able to anticipate, reconstruct the process by which the changes take place, to segregate out components of the evolving Gestalt as new wholes, and to re-integrate these new wholes in a more inclusive, ever-growing configuration of entities, processes, and relations.

The definition which Porterfield has given us has striking

⁴²F. S. C. Northrop, "Philosophy's Statement of the Problem of Creativity," The Nature of Creative Thinking (A Monograph, Sponsored by Industrial Research Institute, Inc., 1952), p. 20.

⁴³Austin L. Porterfield, Creative Factors in Scientific Research (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1941), p. 282.

similarity to the list Lowenfeld⁴⁴ provides of the character traits of the creative artist:

1. Sensitivity to problems
2. Fluency of ideas
3. Flexibility
4. Originality
5. Redefinition and the Ability to Rearrange
6. Analysis or the Ability to Abstract
7. Synthesis and Closure
8. Coherence of Organization.

We can see from these authors' comments that imagination is inextricably related to the mental process of logical analysis yet it is more than this. Imagination is the capacity to make a courageous leap to a tentative conclusion. It is the ability to find a new unity in the variety of nature. It is the power to conceive new relationships between what appear to be totally unrelated objects, persons, or events. Imagination is the connecting link between man's realized past and his anticipated future. Imagination is the spark which ignites the fire of man's creative potential.

Our discussion of the importance of imagination as the crucial mental process for man as creator would fall short of its mark if we did not suggest that imagination is not a mental process accessible only to the greatest artists or geniuses of history. Imagination is practiced by every normal person to a greater or lesser degree. Children are notorious for their imaginations, probably because they have not yet been conditioned to say "no, this can't be, it is simply too absurd." Indeed, many very

⁴⁴Viktor Lowenfeld, "Current Research on Creativity," National Education Association Journal, 47:538-540, November, 1958.

intelligent people are not particularly creative as the research of Getzels and Jackson⁴⁵ indicates. The important matter is, however, that there are levels of creativity. Our brief description of Taylor's⁴⁶ five levels of creative expression serve to illustrate the point. Taylor's first level is termed expressive creativity in which spontaneity and freedom are the important characteristics. The spontaneous drawings of children are examples of expressive creativity. A second is that of productive creativity. On this level some mastery of technique is involved. An apprentice craftsman might illustrate this level. The third level proposed by Taylor is inventive creativity which is typified by the display of some ingenuity with materials, techniques, and methods. New uses of tools exemplify inventive creativity. A fourth level can be termed innovative creativity. When the basic assumptions of a field are sufficiently understood so that improvement through modification is possible, innovative creativity is involved. The skilled artisans of a particular "school" of art serve to illustrate this level. Taylor's fifth, and highest, level of creativity is called emergentive creativity. The emergence of an entirely new principle or assumption around which new schools flourish is characteristic of this level. Einstein, Freud, and Picasso personify the creators on this level of creativity.

Granting the validity of Taylor's arbitrarily established

⁴⁵J. W. Getzels and P. W. Jackson, "The Highly Intelligent and the Highly Creative Adolescent: A Summary of Some Research Findings," The Third Conference on the Identification of Creative Scientific Talent (Salt Lake City, Utah: University of Utah Press, 1959), pp. 46-57.

⁴⁶Taylor, op. cit., pp. 52-82.

levels of creativity we wish to add one level beyond his highest level. Our sixth level is the "creativity of human relations".⁴⁷ It is on this level that man's fullest powers of creation are called into play. It is this level of creative endeavor which is most challenging to man. The level of creative human relations is most demanding of man's mental processes because it involves a plasticity inherent in the relationships between human beings. On the level of creative human relations it becomes constantly necessary for man to create new means because the relational conditions are never static but rather flexible and dynamic. Change is the only constant on the level of creative human relations. For it is on this plane that the Mental Condition exerts its greatest impact; and in so doing it creates a new set of conditions which necessitate, in their turn, more rigorous creations by man. Thus the Mental Condition is the culmination of all the conditions of creative man and in its function it brings about its own extension within the life of man as creator.

Recapitulation

The Mental Condition is the final synthesis into conscious awareness of the Biological, Socio-Cultural, and Psycho-Physical Conditions. There are two types of mental processes which man

⁴⁷ Anderson also recognizes the significance of this level of creativity: "There is another kind of creativity, which we may call psychological or social invention, whose product is not an object as such. This creativity not with objects but with persons; creativity in human relations."

Harmony is achieved through the discovery of common purposes with others and with the invention of means for attaining them. This is the meaning of socially integrative behavior."

Harold Anderson (ed.), Creativity and its Cultivation (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), p. 119.

appears to utilize to bring experiences in ideational form to conscious awareness. One is logical reasoning which proceeds in an orderly manner as man gains access to certain knowledge. This mental process is vital to man's capacity to acquire language and the other tools with which he may then proceed to higher levels of logical analysis.

The second type of mental process we refer to as imagination. This mental process is disordered and unpredictable. Imagination enables man to leap a time span (that required to gain new sets of facts and order them into a coherent pattern) and suddenly grasp a new concept or relationship. Both types of mental processes are important although imagination seems to be most vital to man as creator.

Conclusion

The Mental Condition is that which assigns meaning to all the conditions of man as creator by means of its own creative function.

Summary

Man's power to create is a product of his Biological, Socio-Cultural, Psycho-Physical, and Mental Conditions. These are the conditions which grant to man the gift of creation as it is known to no other living creature or thing on this earth. All of these conditions are necessary and interrelated. None are sufficient or isolated. Together they comprise more than the conditions of man as creator; indeed, they form the condition of human life itself.

The words of Arendt⁴⁸ serve as a summary of this chapter and a prelude to our next chapter which focuses upon man as the creator of his own humanity:

The human condition comprehends more than the conditions under which life has been given to man. Men are conditioned beings because everything they come in contact with turns immediately into a condition of their existence. . . . In addition to the conditions under which life is given to man on earth, and partly out of them, men constantly create their own, self-made conditions, which, their human origin and their variability notwithstanding, possess the same conditioning power as natural things. . . . Whatever enters the human world of its own accord or is drawn into it by human effort becomes part of the human condition.

⁴⁸ Arendt, op. cit., p. 9.

MAN AS CREATOR OF HUMAN RELATIONS

Only man can be an enemy for man; only he can rob him of the meaning of his acts and his life because it also belongs only to him to confirm it in its existence, to recognize it in actual fact as a freedom . . . my freedom, in order to fulfill itself, requires that it emerge into an open future; it is other men who open the future to me, it is they who, setting up the world of tomorrow, define my future; but if, instead of allowing me to participate in this constructive movement, they oblige me to consume my transcendence in vain, if they keep me below the level which they have conquered and on the basis of which new conquests will be achieved, then they are cutting me off from the future, they are changing me into a thing. Life is occupied in both perpetuating itself and in surpassing itself; if all it does is maintain itself, then living is only not dying, and human existence is indistinguishable from an absurd vegetation . . .

Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity

INTRODUCTION

Man's creative power enables him to produce that higher level of his own being which we call humanity. This power to create himself in a new image is the wondrous gift nature has bestowed upon man. Yet this gift is not unencumbered for it confers upon man a grave and abiding responsibility. For as man is capable of elevating himself to the superior form of being called human, so is he also capable of becoming far less than human. Our concern in this chapter is with the way man faces the mature responsibility for the exercise of his gift of self-creation.

Our approach to this problem is triangular. In Section A, "The Creation of Means", we describe the processes man has

created as the formal means by which he becomes capable of the upward progression toward his humanity. The second section, "To Become Human", deals with the end results of the processes. And in the final section, "Through Creative Human Relations", we describe both means and ends in terms of the medium which embodies them in human form.

A. THE CREATION OF MEANS

There is evident in much of man's growth and development a tendency toward orderly progression from the simple to the complex. This is particularly evident in the case of normal physical maturation. The power of locomotion, eye-hand coordination, and speech are examples of maturational patterns which proceed from the simple to the complex. The development of mental skills correlates to this same pattern to a certain extent.

We alluded to this logical progression when we described Taylor's five levels of creativity and added a sixth of our own. We also noted that as man's mental powers are developed this progression from the simple to the complex is not inviolable. The most striking example of this is man's intuitive powers which enable him to leap across the abyss of the unknown and arrive at solutions with suddenness where a patterned progression of logical analysis might take infinitely longer. The human imagination ignores progression.

We must be cautious, however, not to misunderstand this power to imagine and use it as an excuse to overthrow order. Even the most creative men known to human history were disciplined in

logic. The tribute which must be paid to them is that they were not slaves to order but used logical progression as the means for acquiring skills which enabled them to leap across the abyss of the unknown.

We must also recognize that the upward progression of such creative individuals is a relatively persistent one if we define creativity as the means by which the unique experiences of man are unified in expressive form. For within the framework of such a definition of creativity we can visualize the ever-expanding, outward extension of creativity itself. From the simplest adaptive behavior found in the newborn infant, to the most complex expression of man's creativity, there is present in the growth of man a procedural development from one stage of growth to the next. Where certain skills are needed to move from one stage of growth to the next, progression cannot take place until the skills have been acquired. This is attested to by the arrested development of many adults in one sphere or another of human endeavor.

The outward extension of humanizing skills in the individual depends greatly upon the transmission of these skills to the individual by the society and culture which nourishes him to some measure of self-reliance. If the individual is incapable of acquiring these skills we conclude that his growth is internally arrested. If the culture of his society does not possess, or will not transmit, these skills then the cause of arrestment is outside the individual, or external. Combinations of internal and external factors are also possible and similarly can have confining effect upon growth. It is also equally possible for an individual to elect to

return to certain kinds of behavior which he has surpassed. It becomes evident that there are almost an infinite number of factors which bear upon man's acquisition of learnable behavior. It becomes all the more amazing, when viewed in this light, that man continues to grow and to refine his growth. This is, indeed, the highest testimony to man's creative capacities.

It is this urge to create which makes its appearance in man with increasing power as man gains access to the tools by which he is figuratively able to lift himself up by his bootstraps. As man acquires the communication skills of his language and the capacity of ordered thought he is able to create new means to project himself to still higher planes of awareness. Processes, in effect, are products as man continues to talk to himself and others, in his continual struggle to grasp that which is beyond his immediate reach. In his effort to find meaning in life he creates the processes which aid him in his eternal and restless search.

In one sense we could say that all processes which are created by man serve him in his life's seeking. But this is far too simple a suggestion for surely the invention of suicide can not be conceived as a process contributing to man's search for the meaning of life. It is a process contributing to death's meaning, perhaps, but for life's meaning it hardly seems possible. There are other processes which must be ruled out as well, for they add nothing to the potential which man realizes he possesses. The processes of fulfilling one's biological necessities perform no other function than to maintain life for man. And regardless of the absolute necessity of such processes they are devoid of significance

for man in his commitment to seek life's ultimate purpose.

What, then, are the processes man does create as basic means for the further creation of more complex processes to aid him in his search? Certainly many of the enduring patterns of culture exemplify the means man has created which render him capable of a more penetrating inquiry into life's meaning. Such behavioral products as language, patterns of education, religion, mythology, superstitions, technology, philosophy, love, and art expression are examples of processes which represent means in man's effort to transcend his biological exigencies and find the raison d'être of his being. These processes enable man to formulate more complex and higher level processes which are more refined and rewarding to him in his life's seeking. Without this sequential creation of more refined and more meaningful processes man could not proceed far along the journey he has established for himself.

One fact must be emphasized as we study these processes and that is, they originate with man. Despite their changing character, their temporality, and their evolving purposes, these processes are the products of man's creative efforts. As such we must recognize that these special products of human creation are simultaneously means and ends. They are, to be precise, process-products.

The profundity of this fact does not strike us with any force until we realize the potential which process-products possess for man. One fact stands above all others: man is the only living organism which possesses the power to create process-products, so far as we know. And it is with process-products that man establishes his superiority. By means of these distinctly

human creations man becomes the time-binding class of life as Korzybski refers to him. Montagu¹ describes Korzybski's classification system and his explanation of time-binding:

Korzybski distinguished between the classes of life in the following manner: Since plants captured one kind of energy, converted it into another, and stored it up, he defined the plant class of life as the chemistry-binding class of life. Since animals were characterized by the freedom and faculty to move about in space, he defined animals as the space-binding class of life. He continues:

"And now what shall we say of human beings? What is to be our definition of Man? Like the animals, human beings do indeed possess the space-binding capacity but, over and above that, human beings possess a most remarkable capacity which is entirely peculiar to them--I mean the capacity to summarize, digest, and appropriate the labors and experiences of the past; I mean the capacity to use the fruits of past labors and experiences as intellectual or spiritual capital for the developments in the present; I mean the capacity to employ as instruments of increasing power the accumulated achievements of the all-precious lives of the past generations spent in trial and error, trial and success; I mean the capacity of human beings to conduct their lives in the ever-increasing light of inherited wisdom; I mean the capacity in virtue of which man is at once the heritor of the by-gone ages and the trustee of posterity. And because humanity is just this magnificent natural agency by which the past lives in the present and the present for the future, I define HUMANITY, in the universal tongue of mathematics and mechanics, to be the TIME-BINDING CLASS OF LIFE."

It is evident from Korzybski's comments that he is fully aware that man's capacity to create enduring patterns of behavior is the singular power which projected man beyond any other form of life. One caution must be noted, however, and that is Korzybski defines "HUMANITY" to be the "TIME-BINDING CLASS OF LIFE". Man, he is careful to distinguish is capable of space-binding but he uses the term "humanity" when he speaks of the time-binding class of life. This differentiation is a noteworthy one and merits our

¹ Ashley Montagu, Education and Human Relations (New York: Groves Press, 1958), pp. 102-103.

special consideration. Indeed it is this distinction to which we now turn in our discussion "To Become Human".

Recapitulation

Man possesses the capacity to create processes which he utilizes as the means for higher levels of creation. As man progresses from more simple to more complex means he is creating processes which are therefore products. We refer to these unique creations of man as his process-products. It is man's capacity to create process-products which subsequently enable him to attain constantly higher levels of understanding himself and his life's meaning. Process-products distinguish man from all other living creatures. They contribute to the development of his humanity by the creation of enduring patterns of behavior.

Conclusion

Man creates processes, termed process-products, which are the means to his progress toward becoming human.

B. TO BECOME HUMAN

The creation by man of processes to be used as the means of his progress toward becoming human was our conclusion in the preceding section. But such a conclusion conjures up for us a host of problems which demand clarification. Do we mean by "human" the presence of a certain state of affairs? Is being human the same as acting human? What relationship exists between man's capacity to create process-products and his capacity to become human? Other questions arise which are puzzling but let us first consider the

origin of our title phrase "To Become Human". With this explanation we may be in a better position to eliminate some of our present confusion.

In our description of the Biological Condition of man as creator we emphasized that man's biological superiority enabled him to creatively adapt to, and alter, his environment. We indicated that even though other members of the animal kingdom did, in fact, live in societies, the difference between these societies and that of man was characterized by man's creation of enduring patterns of behavior which we called his culture. The development of man's culture is, according to Linton², the outcome of three revolutionary technological advances by man:

If one observes the development of culture as a whole, three really revolutionary technological advances can be recognized. First, the epoch-making potentialities opened up with the first human departure from the animal condition, the use of tools and the domestication of fire. Second, the domestication of plants and animals followed in various places in both the Old and New World by exceedingly rapid cultural advances leading eventually to the development of the city, one of the most revolutionary social inventions in the whole of human history. Third, what may be termed the domestication of power based upon the ability of man to produce power at will and, with few exceptions, wherever he needed it, as distinct from the earlier use of the wild power of wind or water at the points where it was available. Intimately linked with this has been the invention of the scientific method, which promises increasing control of many other aspects of nature. We are now in the early phases of this third period and are only beginning to explore the potentialities which it offers for developments in our culture outside technology, particularly in the social, political, and economic fields.

Technology, in the sense that Linton uses it, must be identified as a process-product in the sense in which we have

²Ralph Linton, The Tree of Culture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Co., 1955), p. 48.

previously utilized this term. As a process, technology has provided man's environment with many artifacts of his own creation. Among these products are those which have revolutionized man's way of life and thought; Euclidean geometry, the telescope, Newtonian physics and the theory of relativity serve as specific examples. As a product technology has also been an end in itself at various stages of human history. Phlogiston, phrenology, blood-letting, and the Ptolemaic system of astronomy are illustrations of technology in product form which have since been replaced by more "scientific" product forms in technology. And the marvels of our age may well be to the future what the invention of the first crude implements in the dawning of man represent to our current stage of progress; for in the words of Whitehead, "Heaven knows what seeming nonsense may not tomorrow be demonstrated truth."

Each of the technological advances described above were the product of man's creative mind. The full extent of man's capacity to use his mental powers is emphasized by Stratton³:

Men are not mere receivers through their sense organs of impressions from without, nor are they mere bundles of nerves and muscles reacting reflexively to external stimulation. Men, it is true, do receive certain stimulations from without, and sensations of many kinds in us are the result; they receive other stimulations, and reflex muscular acts of ours are the result. But this is not all. In the full picture is the power of man to initiate trains of events that are of a character quite different from our rudimentary responses of senses and muscles and biological drives . . . Man initiates changes in the realm of the lifeless, of earth, air, and water. He brings his mind to bear on his own society, and gives it new customs, institutions, and aims; and he extends the range of co-operation.

³George M. Stratton, Man: Creator or Destroyer (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1952), pp. 26-27.

In all these enlargements of what has already existed, men's minds played the leading part . . . The feet, hands, voice and neural substance were indispensable, as were tools and instruments and a multitude of physical aids; but all these were subservient. The mind was their master and gave them its command.

Stratton's use of the term "mind" is comparable to our use of the phrase Mental Condition. In either of the two terms mind can be defined as a broad, intensional term which refers to the ability of man to be consciously aware of certain conditions and to be able to separate these conditions into classes which designate their similarities and differences. We have specifically used the term "consciously" because our concern here is with human culture and the human "mind", in our opinion, requires conscious awareness before effective transmission can take place between it and the other "minds" comprising man's social environment. That man may have preconscious, subconscious, or unconscious "minds" is irrelevant for the matter at hand. What does matter is that human beings possess readiness to receive and the power to transmit enduring cultural forms. The human "mind" as we have referred to it is that which makes these processes of reception and transmission possible--and perhaps necessary. Mind, then, as we use it is associated with the conscious mental processes which result in the formulation of relationships and classifications; for these formulations are, we believe, the crux of the problem of creating and transmitting culture. It is the creation and transmission of human culture which conditions man's progression toward humanity.

Into such durable and complex cultural forms man is born, not by choice, but, rather, by chance. Man does not select his heredity, nor the environment of his birth, nor the character of

his early training, nor the larger conditions of his time on earth. This by no means, however, presumes the total subjugation of the individual to all the chance factors of his life. While certain aspects of his life are beyond man's poor power to add or detract, the one fact yet remains that the supraordinate experiences of mankind are the results of creations by individual human beings. Thus the single human being is both dispensable and indispensable to the patterns of living which precede him, exist concurrently with him, and follow him.⁴

It is the condition of mutual recognition which binds man to man and ultimately society to society. For implicit in the mutuality of man to man is the idea that each potential member must first be accepted by the society and integrated into it if he is to contribute to the progress and preservation of that society. This acceptance and integration process is subject to the decision of society rather than the individual.

Acceptance of the society's potential member is not

⁴This interdependency between individual men and the societies and cultures into which they are thrust without choice is clearly established by MacIver and Page: "Individuals do not belong to society as the cells 'belong' to the organism. The only centers of activity, of feeling, of function, of purpose that we know are individual selves. The only society we know is one in which these selves are bound together, through time and space, by the relations of each to each which they themselves create or inherit. The only experience we know is the experience of individuals. It is only in the light of their struggles, their interests, their aspirations, their hopes and their fears, that we can assign any function and any goal to society. And conversely, it is only because they are a part of society that individuals are endowed with interests, with aspirations, with goals. It is only in society that human nature can thrive. The relationship between individual and society is not one-sided: both are essential for the comprehension of either."

R. M. MacIver and Charles Page, Society (New York: Reinhart and Company, 1949), p. 48.

compulsory under the cultural norms of every society, and the contrary may even be the case. There may, in fact, be processes of selectivity established which precede the acceptance and integration processes. The practice of infanticide by various societies is an example of an institutionalized selection process. Indeed, birth control may, in an extreme sense, be considered an example of pre-selectivity. In addition to these procedures there have been isolated instances in which children were born into a society but were almost completely isolated for several years before they were discovered and brought into the wider sphere of human contact. In such instances the ability to use language was missing when the children were discovered but after sustained contact with other persons, speech became possible. Acceptance and integration are necessary for the humanizing process.

The relationship between the new-born babe and his parents becomes one of mutuality when the parents elect to tend and love the child. In the process of electing to care for the child, to nurture it, to educate it, to love it, the parents have, with conscious or unconscious deliberation, created a process-product for themselves. This product of their election is the process of responsibly creating a human being in their presence. By this token the relationship becomes mutual for the child reciprocates by responding to their creative endeavors.⁵ It is at this point that

⁵Montagu is especially emphatic in his description of this reciprocation: "The organism is born with certain basic needs which must be satisfied if it is to survive. These needs are: oxygen, food and liquids, bowel and bladder elimination, activity, rest, sleep, avoidance of pain and danger. It has been discovered that these basic needs must be satisfied in a dependency relationship such that the organism becomes increasingly aware of the fact

human relations have their origin.

Having elected to receive this new individual, the society is then compelled to direct the growth of this potentially productive member toward that level of fulfillment which the society deems adequate. This process varies in length and formality from society to society but basically it involves acquainting the new member with his responsibilities and rights as a member of that society. These responsibilities and rights are expressed in the cultural network which binds every human society together. To become familiar with them the individual is exposed to a long period of enculturation which is sometimes referred to as the process of socialization. Hall and Lindzey⁶ cite Murray's description of the socialization process as it relates to the integration of the individual into the life stream of his society:

Beginning in the nursery, the process of socialization continues throughout life. Among other things, what must be learned are: the power to inhibit, or to moderate, the expression of unacceptable needs; the ability to transfer cathexis from a prohibited goal-object to an acceptable substitute; the habitual and automatic use of a large number of approved action patterns (methods, manners, and

that it is receiving its satisfactions whenever it requires them in a supportative manner; that it is being satisfied by persons who want to satisfy it, and who are--to put it in the best way I know--all for it; that it is being satisfied by persons on whom it can rely in the increasing awareness that its expected satisfactions will be met and not thwarted, that is to say, not frustrated. This is what every baby, every child, every adolescent, and every adult wants, and this is love. The synonyms are security, support, co-operation, the confidence that other human beings will support one actively and interestedly, the confidence that no one will ever willingly commit the supreme of all treasons against one, that is, to let one down when most needed."

Montagu, op. cit., p. 35.

⁶ Calvin Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality (New York: Wiley Co., 1957), p. 190.

emotional attitudes); and the ability to adapt to schedules (to do things at the proper time, keep appointments, etc.).

The socialization process described by Murray contains many of the elements to which we referred in our prior analysis of the Socio-Cultural Condition of man as creator. Also implicit in Murray's description is the connotation of "freedom from", that is, freedom from the necessity to continuously relearn "the habitual and automatic use of a large number of approved action patterns." But again we must ask if there is also implicit in the process of enculturation a "freedom for" and, if so, freedom for "What"?

In the answer to the above question is the key to man's humanity. For there is pervasive throughout this discussion the implicit suggestion of the ultimate revelation of man. Man's biological inheritance gives him the capacity to learn and to create; his society facilitates this ultimate revelation by giving him the tools of culture; his unconscious mind acts as the reservoir of his total life's experiences; and his conscious mind enables him to reveal himself in his power to act and to speak. It is in acting and speaking that men show who they are, according to Arendt⁷:

Men reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world, while their physical identities appear without any activity of their own in the unique shape of the body and sound of the voice. This disclosure of "who" in contradistinction to "what" somebody is--his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hide--is implicit in everything somebody says and does. It can be hidden only in complete silence and perfect passivity, but its disclosure can almost never be achieved as a wilful purpose, as though one possessed and could dispose of this "who" in the same manner he has and can dispose of his qualities.

⁷ Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 179.

The process of man's disclosure of "who" he is has as its antecedent process man's relationship with man. Again we return to Arendt⁸, for whom this relationship has as much reality as the relationship between man and the objective physical world:

Action and speech go on between men, as they are directed toward them, and they retain their agent-revealing capacity even if their content is exclusively "objective," concerned with the matters of the world of things in which men move, which physically lies between them and out of which arise their specific, objective, worldly interests. These interests constitute, in the word's most literal significance, something which inter-est which lies between people and therefore can relate and bind them together. Most action and speech is concerned with this in-between, which varies with each group of people, so that most words and deeds are about some worldly objective reality in addition to being a disclosure of the acting and speaking agent. Since this disclosure of the subject is an integral part of all, even the most "objective" intercourse, the physical, worldly in-between along with its interests is overlaid and, as it were, overgrown with an altogether different in-between which consists of deeds and words and owes its origin exclusively to men's acting and speaking directly to one another. This second, subjective in-between is not tangible, since there are no tangible objects into which it could solidify; the process of acting and speaking can leave behind no such results and end products. But for all its intangibility, this in-between is no less real than the world of things we visibly have in common. We call this reality the "web" of human relationships, indicating by the metaphor its somewhat intangible quality.

We have arrived at last at the point of man's entry into the human community. This man is able to do by means of his power of self-revelation. This power of self-revelation is achieved through the processes of action and speech. Man acquires these processes in his relationship with man. Man's relationship with man has its origin in the cultural patterns which society transmits to the members it elects to accept into its membership. The processes of transmission are made possible because man is endowed with a

⁸ Ibid, pp. 182-183.

biological inheritance by means of which he is able to create. Thus the antecedent conditions of man's entry into the human community as a human being are the same conditions which establish man as creator.

The question which remains yet to be resolved is: What are the processes man creates which enable him to reveal his humanity? We have depicted the conditions of man's humanity as being identical with the conditions of man as creator. If we grant the Biological Condition the distinction of being the pre-condition of man's creative powers then we must turn to the remaining three conditions of man as creator in order to find the specific answer to our question.

The most basic of the conditions of man as creator is the Socio-Cultural Condition. By basic we mean necessary to the presence of the remaining two conditions. We have already indicated that unless man is accepted by, and integrated into, society there is little likelihood of his development beyond the infantile level of behavior. When man is at the threshold of his life it is society which determines whether the door remains open, or is closed to him forever. Figuratively we are simply stating that man's admission to society and, indeed, his very right to life itself is adjudicated for him. Having made the decision to accept him into its membership the society thereupon becomes responsible for his training toward this end. The processes created for this purpose vary greatly from society to society but in all cases they involve a range of behavioral patterns which, as Biesanz and Biesanz⁹ contend, serves man by (1) adapting him as a biological species to

⁹John Biesanz and Mavis Biesanz, Modern Society (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), p. 47.

his environment; (2) provides him with ready-made adjustments to his natural environment, his fellows, and his own biological and psychological needs and drives; and (3) ensures the unity and survival of the social group.

Of special importance among these processes are those related to man's associations with "his fellows". These associations are the crucial factors because man is completely reliant upon his fellow man for so long a period after birth. Where other members of the animal kingdom seem to possess inborn behavior patterns man must "learn" nearly all of his behavior patterns. The essential point we wish to emphasize is the need for association with his fellow man if man is to survive as man. Carrying our point a step beyond this, we would contend that if man is to survive as a "human being" then he needs association with human beings. Schutz¹⁰ identifies these needs as interpersonal needs and describes them as follows:

The interpersonal need for inclusion is defined behaviorally as the need to establish and maintain a satisfactory relation with people with respect to interaction and association.

On the level of feelings the need for inclusion is defined as the need to establish and maintain a feeling of mutual interest with other people. This feeling includes (1) being able to take an interest in other people to a satisfactory degree and (2) having other people interested in the self to a satisfactory degree.

With regard to the self-concept, the need for inclusion is the need to feel that the self is significant and worth while.

The interpersonal need for control is defined behaviorally as the need to establish and maintain a satisfactory

¹⁰William C. Schutz, FIRO: A Three Dimensional Theory of Interpersonal Behavior (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1958), pp. 18-20.

relation with people with respect to control and power.

With regard to feelings, the need for control is defined as the need to establish and maintain a feeling of mutual respect for the competence and responsibility of others. This feeling includes (1) being able to respect others to a satisfactory degree and (2) having others respect the self to a satisfactory degree.

The need for control, defined at the level of perceiving the self, is the need to feel that one is a competent, responsible person.

The interpersonal need for affection is defined behaviorally as the need to establish and maintain a satisfactory relation with others with respect to love and affection.

At the feeling level the need for affection is defined as the need to establish and maintain a feeling of mutual affection with others. This feeling includes (1) being able to love other people to a satisfactory degree and (2) having others love the self to a satisfactory degree.

The need for affection, defined at the level of the self-concept, is the need to feel that the self is lovable.

Schutz's description of the interpersonal needs of man are adequate but lack a quality of direction. We agree that the individual needs to be included, as a member of society; and that he needs to establish a psychologically satisfactory relation with people in terms of control over, or by, them; and finally that he needs to establish a satisfactory relation of affection with others. But what we do not know is, how does man become "human", rather than just another living creature with needs which happen to fall within the classification of satisfactory interpersonal relations? Might we not ask whether these same three needs could also apply to dogs or horses or apes or as far as we know to almost any creature in the animal kingdom?

We have seen numerous examples of animals moving together in large numbers apparently "interacting". We have detected

leadership in these same clusters of animals which suggest the presence of a control system. And surely we are equally aware of the "affection" of a dog or a cat for its offspring which suggests love's presence. On the extension of Schutz's theory we find that interpersonal needs also apply to animals who appear to be acting "human". But again we ask is "acting human" the same as "being human" and we find that we must answer in the negative. For to act human is only to appear human, as the actors on the stage appear to be the character they are dramatizing. Despite the seeming reality of the "acting out" the characteristic of being human can not adhere to any other creature than the one who can be human, namely man.

Within this differentiation of terms, "being human" comes to mean the power of man to become a certain kind of person which we call human. This connotes, indeed it demands, the presence of certain qualities in man which distinguish him from his biological presence on earth, which is like that of all other living creatures. Being human, then, is a state of becoming which man must demonstrate if he is to continue to be human. Crick¹¹ states our case with precision when he contends that "it is a proper usage of words when we say of a murderer, 'he is less than a man', or 'he is inhuman.' For there are some things within the physical capability of a man that he cannot do and still be regarded as human."

The key to our problem of what is human is found in the words of Crick, when he states that, "There are some things within

¹¹ Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1959), p. 221.

the physical capability of a man that he cannot do and still be regarded as human." Murder is the example which Crick cites to substantiate his point. We recognize, however, that there are, in reality, many kinds of behavior which could be used to illustrate the point. This hardly seems the most appropriate way to consider a matter of this significance. For it is the positive aspect that we must consider when we ask "What is human?"

To become human, in our thinking, demands that man acquire certain qualities of being. One of these is being able to communicate by means of language symbols. This is the power of speech. The question might arise in this regard whether or not a parrot might then be deserving of the title "human". The answer is, of course, an unequivocal "no" for the simple reason that a parrot does not actually possess the power of communication by means of language symbols. A parrot knows no language symbols, it merely has the power to produce sounds which resemble the sounds which man creates to articulate his language symbols. The level of verbal comprehension of the parrot is at such a low level that for all intents and purposes it does not exist. This, plus the fact that possession of one or a few characteristics of a complex class of characteristics does not constitute the whole class, leads us to believe that symbolic language is a distinctly human quality of being.

A second quality of being which makes man human is that of being able to create. We have discussed this trait at considerable length and have identified the conditions which apply to man as creator. It has also been noted that these same conditions are

those which make man most man. If we extend this capacity for creation to all facets of man's life we must then accept its direct relationship to man's humanity. Indeed we may even state that man's capacity to create is the source of his humanity. We again suggest that man's constant creation of ever more complex processes is the very means by which he arrived at his present level of humanity. Hopefully, man's creation of humanizing processes will ultimately outstrip his equally potent ability to create products of destruction. The creative effort expended toward this end may be the determinant which swings the balance in favor of man's complete humanization. When this has occurred the chances of a total nuclear war, or any other yet unknown form of destruction, will diminish rapidly and perhaps disappear. This must be recognized as an ideal but within the range of man's creative powers.¹²

The third quality of being which is required in order for man to be human is that of being able to love. Perhaps no other word in the English language has the power of suggestion that the

¹²The solution is in the common sharing of man's creativeness according to Read, who says, "the artist of today is isolated, alienated from his fellow men and from nature. The effort he makes is a conscious effort, an assertion of the self, often an angry protest against his impotency. He has this great healing power in his possession, but no one comes to him for help. He cannot act alone, even for his own salvation. His true work is communal. Other artists must be with him, working on the same project. Indeed, all men must be with him, each an artist according to his kind, all men artists participating in the work that has to be done, all work being done as art." Herbert Read, "The Creative Arts and Peace," Saturday Review, December 24, 1960, p. 11.

For Guggenheimer the issue is one in which man has the power of choice: "A higher human stability may be on the way as man is lifted out of his sense of temporality, impermanency, vulnerability, toward a conviction that the self is as enduring as it longs to be." Richard Guggenheimer, Creative Vision (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), pp. 136-137.

word "love" possesses. Yet for all the confusion and ambiguity which surrounds the term it also possesses a significance which we must pursue.

For Montagu¹³, to be human means "to be a lover of one's fellow human beings." He defines love as follows:

Love is the deep involvement of the self in others, and the conveying of that feeling of involvement to others. It is the feeling of profound emotional interest in others, the conveying of that feeling, the feeling you inspire in others that they can depend upon you, that you will support them in their needs, and that you will never let them down, but that you will give them all the encouragements and stimulations and supports that it is within your power to give.

Montagu's definition of love agrees with Fromm's¹⁴ definition of mature love which he describes as,

Union under the condition of preserving one's integrity, one's individuality. Love is an active power in man; a power which breaks through the walls which separate man from his fellow men, which unites him with others; love makes him overcome the sense of isolation and separateness, yet it permits him to be himself, to retain his integrity. In love the paradox occurs that two beings become one and yet remain two.

Love, in the sense that it is used by both Montagu and Fromm, represents the power to act in a particular manner. The power of love is revealed when man acts in a positive way toward his fellow man. By positive is meant that through his love he adds to, rather than takes from, the quality of life. Man's humanity is revealed when man shows who he is as a loving being. Thus by demonstrating love in revealing who he is, man is teaching, by example, what it means to be human.

¹³ Ashley Montagu, Education and Human Relations (New York: Groves Press, 1958), pp. 54-55.

¹⁴ Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. 6.

Our fourth, and final, quality of being is that of being free. The quality of being free is the capstone of man's humanity. But as we have mentioned more than once before the real significance of man's freedom is that he has "freedom for" action of a particular kind. It is man's freedom for communication, for creation, for love, for action which constitutes the basis for his being human. For to be sure man cannot be forced to "act" human and yet be classed as a human "being". Under such coercion he is merely "acting" rather than "being" human. The difference is such that in the former he is not "human" at all while he is completely so in the latter. Weil's¹⁵ definition of true liberty illustrates our point well:

True liberty is not defined by a relationship between desire and its satisfaction, but by a relationship between thought and action; the absolutely free man would be he whose every action proceeded from a preliminary judgment concerning the end which he set himself and the sequence of means suitable for attaining this end. It matters little whether the actions in themselves are easy or painful, or even whether they are crowned with success; pain and failure can make a man unhappy, but cannot humiliate him as long as it is he himself who disposes of his own capacity for action.

It is not possible to conceive of a nobler destiny for man than that which brings him directly to grips with naked necessity, without his being able to expect anything except through his own exertions, and such that his life is a continual creation of himself by himself. Man is a limited being to whom it is not given to be, as in the case of the God of the theologians, the direct author of his own existence; but he would possess the human equivalent of that divine power if the material conditions that enable him to exist were exclusively the work of his mind directing the effort of his muscles. This would be true liberty.

Weil's description is of the ideal case, of perfect

¹⁵ Simone Weil, *Oppression and Liberty* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1958), pp. 85-87.

liberty which, of course, does not exist, as she explicitly states. And since man is a limited being he will continue to err in the use of his freedom. His actions and his speech will not exemplify the humanity of which he is capable for the very honest reason that man's judgment can be faulty. The latitude provided man in his "freedom for" action is of great magnitude and thus increases the potential for error. It is this latitude with its subsequent potential for giving rise to error which Arendt¹⁶ recognizes when she states that:

The possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility--of being unable to undo what one has done though one did not, and could not, have known what he was doing--is the faculty of forgiving. . .

Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever, not unlike the sorcerer's apprentice who lacked the magic formula to break the spell. Without being bound to the fulfilment of promises, we would never be able to keep our identities, we would be condemned to wander helplessly and without direction in the darkness of each man's lonely heart, caught in its contradictions and equivocalities--a darkness which only the light shed over the public realm through the presence of others, who confirm the identity between the one who promises and the one who fulfils, can dispel. Both faculties, therefore, depend on plurality, on the presence and acting of others, for no one can forgive himself and no one can feel bound by a promise made only to himself; forgiving and promising enacted in solitude or isolation remain without reality and can signify no more than a role played before one's self.

If we now pause to determine where we have arrived in our thinking we see certain facts which stand out powerfully. If man is to be human he must possess certain states of being. First is that of being in communication with his fellow man. Second is

¹⁶ Arendt, op. cit., pp. 236-237.

being creative. Third is being loving of his fellow man. Fourth is being free with his fellow man. Since man does not possess the power of all-knowingness he therefore cannot predetermine the effect of his action and speech. Lacking omniscience man does, and will, commit errors. Since man is not able to undo what he has done the only redemption from this irreversibility is his power to forgive. Without his fellow man it is not possible for man either to promise or to forgive. Without being bound to promise man is without direction, owing allegiance to no quarters. Without being forgiven man is bound forever to his errors, paralyzed by the writ of an unyielding past, knowing no present or future. If man is to discover the power of speech; if man is to acquire the power of mature love; if man is to attain the powers of a creative being free to act, he must be able to relate to his fellow man in such a way that he may become human, which is all of these things. This man is able to do only in creative human relations with his fellow human beings.

Recapitulation

The capacity of man to become human is conditioned by several factors. Most basic is his biological potential because it enables man to create enduring patterns of behavior and to transmit and alter these behavioral patterns. In order to acquire these patterns of behavior man must be accepted by, and integrated into, his society. Four patterns of behavior are necessary in order for man to become human. The first is being able to communicate with his fellow man in such a way that his intentions are comprehensible. The second is being able to create with

ever-increasing complexity. Third is being able to love his fellow man in such a way that he retains his individuality while gaining a new unity with his fellow man. Finally man must be free for action, therefore making him responsible for his presence among men. The process of becoming human is possible because man comes to know his humanity only through creative human relations with his fellow man.

Conclusion

To become human, man must be communicative, creative, loving, and free, in his relations with his fellow man.

C. THROUGH CREATIVE HUMAN RELATIONS

We have thus far discussed man's creation of processes by which he is able to progress toward his humanity. We have also discussed what processes man must acquire and demonstrate in order to become human. We are now at the final step in the construction of our "Theory of Creative Human Relations". Having discussed the terms "Theory", "Creative", and "Human", there remains only the final term of our title phrase to be analyzed. What do we mean by the term "Relations" as it is used within the context of the title of this study? Let us now turn to this question and the application of its answer to the framework of our theoretical formulation.

There appear to be two conventional uses of the term "relation", each with its specific meaning. One of these meanings is that which is descriptive of a fact of nature. When used in this way the term "relation" becomes a concept which does not admit of degrees. It corresponds to an empirical fact of the world; it has

no moral implications. A person is, or is not, a member of such relation. The biological fact of parenthood or brotherhood can be denied but it cannot alter the fact of its natural occurrence. The mother, father, brother, and sister of a person always remain in this relation to that person, within this connotation of the word. The conditions of this meaning of "relation" are ineluctability and absence of choice in membership.

The presence of these conditions does not necessarily signify the quality judgment which can be applied to a relation of this type. There can be either a positive quality of relation which adheres to the natural relation of mother-offspring, father-offspring, brother-brother, brother-sister, etc., depending on the presence of other elements such as love, nurture, and respect. Similarly there can be a negative quality to the relation when the conditions inhibit or endanger the natural development of one member of the relation.

We must also be conscious of the fact that this meaning of relation can be applied, in effect, to relations between men which derive from the conditions of this type of relation. Any relation between two or more men, which is unchanging, and in which at least one member of the relation does not have the power of choice of membership, must be classified as this type of relation. The relation of master and slave can be cited as the classic illustration of this type of relation within the meaning which we have just defined. It becomes readily apparent that this connotation of the term "relation" is not what we intend when we refer to our title phrase "creative human relations".

A second connotation of the term "relation", and that which is intended, in our title phrase, is its ethical meaning. When we speak of a "relation" in this sense we are referring to a social relation which admits of degrees of membership. Used in this way the term "relation" contains the meaning primarily of a certain quality of relationship which does allow for a dynamism in the relation. Basic to the dynamic character of this type of relation is the power of choice of membership of all the members of the relation. For only in their freedom to act as they choose can the members of this type of relation maintain the self-integrity which is vital to the quality of this connotation of the term "relation". For it is through a growing awareness of self in relation to other selves that man is able to visualize the meaning of his presence among the plurality of men. But this growing consciousness of self and other possesses meaning only if man is free to become what he believes he may become.

If man aspires to humanity and seeks to transmit this humanity to each succeeding generation he must do so within a creative human relation with his fellow man. For man must be free to create if he is to become as capable (or more so) as his predecessors of transmitting and improving his humanity. Man must likewise become human if he is to reveal the meaning of humanity to his successors. And finally man must relate to his fellow man in such a way that choice of membership is present both for himself and his fellow man. However much this type of relation possesses the potential for its own self-annihilation it is, none the less, the necessary condition for man to become most human. Thus we see

that the only way in which man can acquire, transmit, and improve his humanity is within the context of that relation which we define as the creative human relation.

Conclusion

A creative human relation is one in which articulate, loving, human beings are co-creating a positive relationship with their fellow human beings by their own free choice.

CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

This above all: to thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.
William Shakespeare, "Hamlet"

INTRODUCTION

If the significance of our theory is to extend beyond that small handful of professional educators whose thoughts and actions have brought it to its present state of being, there must be extracted from it a life-form for the affairs of men. We agree with Jenkins¹ who maintains:

In the final analysis, all creativity has a pragmatic basis: it is initiated and continued in order to improve the quality of man's transactions with the environment, to extend and refine his grasp of things, and to permit him to come to grips with the world more effectively. . . . Creation, whether artistic, theoretic, or technological, should never be the making of objects that are their own excuse for being. This concern with the intrinsic character of what is being done and made creeps into all human activity: even apart from the demands of circumstances, man complicates everything he touches, from government to the rules of whist, because complication makes things more interesting. . . . Internal elaboration is, within limits, both a necessity and an ornament of man's activities and artifacts; it enhances their effectiveness as well as their interestingness. But if creative activity dissipates too much of its energy in this direction it evades its prime responsibility, which, as a refined employment of experience, is to serve as an instrument of life.

¹Iredell Jenkins, Art and the Human Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 115-117.

Much of the responsibility for evincing the practical implications of any theory rests with its author. If he wishes to breathe life into his theory he must be willing to couch his theory in the language of those to whom he addresses himself. This, then, is the task before us. Our specific audience is the public school administrator but we are sanguine enough to believe that our theory has relevance in the affairs of all men who seek more from life than the mere mechanics of existence. To the extent that our theory's meaning reaches this wider audience will our pragmatic intentions in its creation be achieved.

The implications for educational administration are treated in two ways in this chapter. In the first part, "Within the Conditions of Our Times" we delineate the problems currently prevalent in our society which are related to the structure of our theory. We conclude each of the problems which we define with a question regarding its possible solution.

The second section, "For the Administrator", deals with these questions within the scope of educational administration. We do not endeavor to answer each of our own questions definitively but rather to suggest answers inherent within our theory which the administrator might consider. We recognize the fact that others may read into our theory solutions, or possible means to solutions, which we do not suggest. This is both fitting and proper for it implies that our theory has served in some measure as the means to the ends for which it was created.

A. WITHIN THE CONDITIONS OF OUR TIMES

Much has been written and said about the complexity of the age in which we live. The onrush of science to new discoveries, the increase of automation, the extension of leisure time for the masses, the ever-tightening web of human interaction throughout the world, the intermingling and conflicting ideologies in existence, the speed and confusion of modern living, the diversities in human welfare--the list is endless. But what does it all mean? Where is it leading us? Where are our values? What have we to cling to for the security which has been wrenched from our grasp? What becomes important now that our struggles are less with the objective than with the invisible? Read² poses similar questions:

But what are the values of a technological civilization? What wisdom has it to offer us? It has a philosophy which is called scientific to correspond with a social organization that is functional, but does this philosophy answer those questions that have puzzled humanity throughout the ages, and that still puzzle any thoughtful man or woman today--the questions asked by the earliest Greek philosophers, by Pythagoras and Heraclitus, Zeno and Parmenides, Thales and Empedocles: the only questions worthy of the strife of thought: Why does anything exist? Why does not nothing exist? What elements in existence justify the absurdity of continuing to live? To which I have added this final question: Is it possible that life acquires meaning only to the extent that man is creative?

Read's suggested answer that it is to the extent that man is creative is, of course, in keeping with the fundamental structure of our theory, in which we propose that as man creates the processes which pave the way to higher levels of purposive endeavor, he comes to discover life's meaning in the essence of creation itself.³

²Herbert Read, The Forms of Things Unknown (New York: Horizon Press, 1960), pp. 31-32.

³Arendt refers to it as the faculty of beginning something

Indeed, it is to the extent that man is capable of creating ways to communicate with his fellow man and ways to demonstrate his mature love for his fellow man that he becomes able to realize the meaning and purpose of being that higher form of man we call "human". Through his co-creation of a "human" relation with his fellow man it becomes possible for man to realize his own unique potential while sharing a bond of unity in the plurality of man.

Yet there exists today an alienation of man from man and nation from nation. While this might be understandable for the non-creative individual it seems a perplexing state of affairs for that creative individual who is giving to his fellow man the fruit of his creation. Why is this so? Why do those creators, such as artists and scientists, reap a harvest of unpopularity, which today seems their lot?

There are many possible answers to our questions, some of which are implicit in the structure of our theory. Bronowski⁴ indicated that artist and scientist share a kind of unpopularity because "the large public dislikes and fears the way that both of them look at the world." Rogers⁵ suggested that the society needs to provide a climate which fosters creativity. It seems feasible to conclude

new when she states that "the life span of man running toward death would inevitably carry everything human to ruin and destruction if it were not for the faculty of interrupting it and beginning something new, a faculty which is inherent in action like an ever-present reminder that men, though they must die, are not born in order to die but in order to begin." Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 246.

⁴Jacob Bronowski, "The Creative Process," Saturday Review, 199:3:60, September, 1958.

⁵Carl Rogers, et. al., "Toward a Theory of Creativity," Creativity and its Cultivation, ed. Harold H. Anderson (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959), Chapter 6, p. 79.

from this that our society does not now provide this climate and that artists and scientists are creating despite the limiting forces of the society. This being so, then these creators are "different" from the masses who are succumbing to the enervating and debilitating forces of modern society. And since the large public is less familiar and secure with changes induced by creation it views the creative individual as a threat to their security. It is this search for security which drives man blindly to conformity with its illusion of togetherness. But the illusion cannot make real that which can not be. It is in Fromm's⁶ definition of mature love that we are able to visualize, "union under the condition of preserving one's integrity, one's individuality." As Fromm indicates, "love is an active power in man; a power which breaks through the walls which separate men from his fellow men, which unites him with others; love makes him overcome the sense of isolation and separateness, yet it permits him to be himself, to retain his integrity. In love the paradox occurs that two beings become one and yet remain two."

If this retreat from individualism, this escape from freedom, this seeking of security in the womb of conformity exists today, how did it come to be, we must ask. Part of our answer is derivable from the assumption that man in our modern industrial society is becoming more and more removed from the conditions which lead him to his humanity. It is becoming increasingly difficult for man to communicate with his fellow man, especially the artist and the scientist. The reason for this is both simple and complex. It

⁶Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. 9.

is simple in that it is easily discernible that the artist and scientist of today are speaking a language which is peculiar to their own specialties. It is complex in that the range of these new languages is becoming ever greater with the result being less and less commonality of understanding among the disciplines which create them. This produces, therefore, less communication between the creators themselves. In the case of the average man, the man lost in the teeming masses, there is virtually no communication at all between himself and the creative member of the highly specialized area of human endeavor, be it art, music, nuclear physics, or whatever. In short the total body of human knowledge has increased with such fantastic proportions that it is becoming absolutely impossible for any one individual to be totally conversant with all, or even more than a few, of the specialized creators of our modern world of technology.

Coupled with this mounting stockpile of human knowledge, with its expanding symbolic forms of communication, is a decrease in the contributions of modern philosophy to the problems arising from this situation. Piatt⁷ refers to the particular problem of philosophy's role with regard to these problems:

The biggest problem confronting men today is the utter indeterminateness of their situation, the fact that they are so burdened, so fed up with futile thinking, that they are no longer able even to locate or define their problems. Pushed around like "things," they react like "things." Exploited, they exploit. And, taught that philosophy is no longer regarded by professional philosophers as in any way a way of life but rather as a way of thought, a respectable

⁷ Piatt, "Import of the Word 'Transaction'," ETC.: A Review of General Semantics, 12:4:300-308, Summer, 1955.

way of retiring from life and putting inhibitions to prestigious purpose, increasingly technical, increasingly abstract, increasingly couched in an esoteric language that manages to escape confusion--if at all--only by losing its audience along the way, men feel that life has become too damned complicated and incomprehensible.

The question, then, which confronts the educational administrator of today is this:

How can man learn to communicate with his fellow man, or conversely, how can modern man overcome the problem of limited communication?

A second possible factor in man's retreat from the integrity of self to the false security of conformity resides in the nature of our economy today. With the beginning of modern industrialism man began to lose those elements of workmanship which enabled him to feel a sense of creative achievement. Man today is "giving" less of himself as he becomes a less significant contributor to the final end product with which he associated. The complexity and advanced technology of today has decreased man's capacity to give, in such a way that he no longer feels responsible for the end product. Arendt⁸ credits Aristotle with saying that "the benefactor always loves those he has helped more than he is loved by them. He then goes on to explain that this is only natural, since the benefactor has done a work, an ergon while the recipient has only endured his beneficence." The meaning of Aristotle's words hold even greater power for us today in the midst of the depersonalization process induced by industrialization and enormously increased by

⁸ Arendt, op. cit., p. 196.

automation. Where the earlier craftsman could sense achievement and even esthetic beauty in the finished product of his craft there can be no such feeling for today's laborer on the assembly line. The task he labors at in the endless chain of production deprives him of his "gift" to the world.

The modern laborer is becoming increasingly swept up in the tide of consumption, whether in his daily labors or in his daily leisure. This concern with consumption in the total biological life cycle takes man away from the real sources of life's meaning and tends to produce a society bereft of creators. The standards of life become toil without self-contribution and consumption without self-satisfaction. If we add to this emptiness of existence a resentment growing from the inability to articulate their frustrations at not being able to give, at not being able to find satisfaction in consumption, at not being able to create the means to escape their endless treadmill, we find ample reason for modern man's dilemma. Small wonder that he both envies and disdains the gift-giving powers of creative men. Not knowing the way to his own creative self-realization man struggles to preserve his ego by deprecating this creative ability in those who somehow manage to achieve it.

Another question which the educational administrator must face squarely is:

How can modern man, in an increasingly impersonal, and complex, technological age, acquire a true sense of creativeness?

Yet another problem confronts man within the conditions of

our times which causes him to run from himself. This problem is the failure of modern man to know himself. Certainly this failure to know himself is not unique to modern man for men through all the ages have been grappling with the question of their own being. Why then is the issue more pressing for man today than in any previous time in his history?

There can be little doubt that with the advance of the frontiers of technology man has had to face the rising crescendo of chaos and uncertainty in the world. The words of John Donne telling us that, "no man is an island" have more meaning today than ever before. The pace of life's tempo brought about by the automobile and the airplane and the stimulation of international contacts through improved forms of communication have in effect, eliminated the physical isolation of all men in the world. The growing interdependency of men due to the complex and diffuse economy brought on by modern technology has similarly stricken the concept of self-sustaining independence from the books. Man, today, must rely on his fellow man for his very existence.

We have previously described man's movement toward conformity as a false solution in the search for self. The effect of this absorption of self in the anonymity of the crowd is described by Guggenheimer⁹:

In our day to day existence we get whirled away from the innermost life of ourselves as we take on the feeling of the group patterns to which we belong. In many respects we properly consider our self similar to multitudes of other selves performing roles in life not very different from our own. But in the humility of assigning ourselves

⁹Richard Guggenheimer, Creative Vision (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), p. 140.

a modest place in the crowd, we often compromise the purity of our selfhood. That is, we permit ourselves to take on the coloration of our surroundings and surrender some of the uniqueness which makes any self truly worthwhile. We get immersed in social routine and fall into the habit of evaluating ourselves in a manner and at the level of the majority of others. There is a regrettable compulsion toward mediocrity exerted on individuals by themselves-in-accumulation.

The problem of finding meaning and direction in life which can restore the integrity of the self for modern man has other dimensions than those related to technology. There is no other period in human history which can be compared with the current age regarding global turmoil. We must come to know the relationship of this problem to modern technology for it is indeed the advanced levels of transportation and communication which force this turmoil upon us. What happens in the Congo is as much a concern of ours as what happens in our own community. For we have arrived at the point in history where we must think in terms of the world community of man, rather than the national or local community of only a small portion of the world's population.

In view of the reality of today's one world, at least in the physical sense, we must recognize that local mores and customs are no longer the prevailing long-range ideological bases for human behavior. Today it is the conflicting global ideologies which command the attention of uncommitted men all over the world. Nor are Americans exempt from this same search for a way out of this dilemma as attested to by Murphy's¹⁰ description of the major issues of our times:

¹⁰Gardner Murphy, Human Potentialities (New York: Basic Books, 1958), p. 6.

It is a period of seething new nationalism over half the earth's surface; almost universal problems of poverty and disease; the inevitable new awareness of the have-nots that their lives are barren, as they cast a hungry look at those whose lives are lived in gentler circumstances. We face the struggle for power between economic and ethnic groups within and among nations, and with this a rapid realignment of forces; great instability in each momentary power aggregation; and through it all the continuous search for ways in which the mass, though always relatively slow and handicapped, can in some sense regulate or control the elite leadership which would so like to claim power over human destiny. All of these problems have their solemn messages and they must be heard for decades, yes if not for centuries. . . .

Despite all this, we have a kind of strength to which we have given little heed: the fact that human nature is changing at an extraordinary pace; that a new kind of humanity is coming into existence, rooted in current historical trends, especially trends arising from science and the urge toward discovery. Discovery of our own identity, belief in ourselves and in the use of the intellectual weapons of a democratic society--a science-minded and technology-minded society--can strengthen those moral, intellectual, and social devices without which, in such a world as this, there is no strength at all.

There are two elements suggested in Murphy's delineation of today's global issues which man must endeavor to resolve. There is the fact of a human society, a conceptual entity which we may regard as the totality of man on this earth. Realistically we are cognizant that the total society of man has many subgroups of men which are variously called East and West, nations, colonies, states, cities, neighborhoods, families, etc., each of which plays its part in the dynamics of the total society. We are not proposing that these subgroups be ignored but rather that they be considered within the total context which is the society of man.

The second element in Murphy's description is, perhaps, the one most overlooked in a world now numbering billions of people. This element is man himself; man as an individual; man as the

eminent being above all else of eminence in this world. We must consider man in the full glory of himself. We must face the challenge of man's eminence as nature's supreme creation.

Thus we have arrived at our final question:

How can man attain that sense of direction and meaning in life which preserves both individual integrity and the human society?

Recapitulation

The conditions of our times have alienated modern man from himself by impairing his power to communicate with his fellow men; by depriving him of the sense of creative contribution; and by confusing him with a plethora of ideologies without providing him with the necessary means to make adequate decisions as an individual. Three questions arise from these debilitating conditions which the educational administrator must endeavor to answer within the framework of the educational enterprise that he leads, they are:

1. How can man learn to communicate with his fellow man; or conversely; how can modern man overcome the problem of limited communication?
2. How can modern man, in an increasingly impersonal, and complex, technological age, acquire a true sense of creativeness?
3. How can man attain that sense of direction and meaning in life which preserves both individual integrity and the human society?

Conclusion

The problems of communication, creation, direction and meaning in life, are problems all men must endeavor to resolve for themselves; but the means for their resolution must originate in the formal structure of the educational enterprise as a result of the stimulating and creative leadership of the educational administrator.

B. FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR

Our primary objective for this final section of our study is the suggestion of means which educational administrators might utilize in their efforts to answer the questions which our theory has posed for them. There are no panaceas for the problems we have raised. The dynamic nature of man precludes the possibility of simple-minded solutions. Similarly we must accept the fact that yesterday's solution cannot be applied to our current problems, nor that tomorrow we may rest secure on today's satisfactions. If there is a constant in all of the questions we have posed it is that of change. All elements of every life situation are variable and diverse, and challenge the full powers of all leaders in the educational process. This is the challenge which must be confronted and conquered if humanity is to survive.

Question 1: How can man learn to communicate with his fellow man, or conversely, how can modern man overcome the problem of limited communication?

The problem of communication would seem, at first glance,

to be merely the task of acquiring a language and then utilizing the language with one's fellow man. So naive an explanation, however, does not take into account the origin or function of language. In fact, such a proposal fails to include the factors of individual differences in physiological and psychological make-up, or the problems of learning, or the processes of symbol formation, or any of the myriad factors which relate to the acquisition of knowledge by man. Our concern at the moment is not with an extensive description of the processes of acquiring language but rather with the problems of its usage.

We have suggested previously that man's capacity for symbol formation is the basis of his capacity to create enduring patterns of behavior. Cassirer¹¹ describes this time-binding capacity of man:

Man has, as it were, discovered a new method of adapting himself to his environment. Between the receptor system and the effector system, which are to be found in all animal species, we find in man a third link which we may describe as the symbolic system. This new acquisition transforms the whole of human life. As compared with the other animals man lives not merely in a broader reality; he lives, so to speak in a new dimension of reality . . . Reason is a very inadequate term with which to comprehend the forms of man's cultural life in all their richness and variety. But all these forms are symbolic forms. Hence, instead of defining man as an animal rationale, we should define him as an animal symbolicum. By so doing we can designate his specific difference, and we can understand the new way open to man--the way to civilization.

The way to civilization is open to man because he has the ability to construct symbolic forms which comprise linguistic systems. By means of these linguistic systems man is able to transmit

¹¹Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1944), pp. 24-26.

knowledge from one generation to another. Education as a formal institution of society is devised to insure the transmission of knowledge in an acceptable manner for the society. Durkheim¹² provides the following definition:

Education is the influence exercised by adult generations on those that are not yet ready for social life. Its object is to arouse and to develop in the child a certain number of physical, intellectual and moral states which are demanded of him by both the political society as a whole and the special milieu for which he is specifically destined.

Although Durkheim does not refer to language as the means by which the ends of education are attained there are certain implications for language in his definition. One implication centers around "the influence exercised by adult generations on those that are not yet ready for social life." Is the process of transmitting knowledge insured by the use of language? The answer is, of course, yes, or no, depending upon what is meant by the term language. If language is construed to be only a formal, structured pattern of symbolization the answer must be no. For much is communicated between men beyond the pale of formal language--a fact too frequently ignored by educators, to their discredit. If language is recognized as man's total means of communication--including gestures, bodily movements, sounds, silence, etc.,--then the answer to our question is yes. For influence can indeed be exercised between men without the use of formal language. The individual today who cannot read, or write, the language of his society may still exert enormous influence over his family or community. Conversely the individual

¹²Emile Durkheim, Education and Sociology (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), p. 71.

who has a powerful grasp of language symbols may not be able to influence others to any extent. The point of our discussion is perhaps by now quite obvious, namely that communication is made infinitely more possible by formal language (in its limited connotation) but formal language is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for communication between men.

The point we have just made must be recognized by educational administrators if they are to facilitate in any measure the responsibilities assigned to the educational institutions which they direct. Miel¹³ indicates two considerations of this problem with regard to social change:

The difficulty of helping knowledge to play its full role in hastening social change points to the fact that much more social invention is needed in the field of communication. We have the mechanical means to facilitate the spread of knowledge as a part of the process of bringing social change under greater social control. The other problem is to learn more of the art of communication among persons in actual contact with one another.

With regard to mechanical means great strides have been made in education in recent years. Radio, television, telephone, films, recording machines, phonographs, and teaching machines have been introduced with the primary purpose of improving the teaching process. Properly used some of these mechanical devices have broadened educational horizons and speeded up the process of learning. They have, to be sure, increased the capacity for communication within formal education. When we view the increasing rate of production of human knowledge we can see the value of these devices from the perspective of keeping pace with this mounting stockpile of data.

¹³Alice Miel, The Changing Curriculum (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1946), p. 109.

But there are also problems associated with these teaching devices which merit the sober reflection and research of today's educational leaders. The words of Bruner¹⁴ give cause for this reflection and analysis of the problem:

Films, audio-visual aids, and other such devices may have the short-run effect of catching attention. In the long run, they may produce a passive person waiting for some sort of curtain to go up to arouse him. We do not know. Perhaps anything that holds the child's attention is justified on the ground that eventually the child will develop a taste for more self-controlled attention--a point on which there is no evidence. The issue is particularly relevant in an entertainment-oriented, mass-communication culture where passivity and "spectatorship" are dangers. Perhaps it is in the technique of arousing attention in school that first steps can be taken to establish that active autonomy of attention that is the antithesis of the spectator's passivity.

Miel's suggested use of mechanical devices to stimulate and "facilitate the spread of knowledge as a part of the process of bringing social change under greater social control" certainly warrants and has received the consideration of educational leaders. Yet the administrator must be sensitive to the problems inherent in the use of these types of educational aids as Bruner cautions. For there is inherent in any means of communication the impact of the means itself, as well as that knowledge which is transmitted. It is this variable which is omitted in much of the analysis of the communication process. And it can be reasoned that if mechanical devices for communicating knowledge possess a change inducing quality then human beings possess this quality to an infinitely greater degree.

The capacity of human beings to induce change in other

¹⁴Jerome Bruner, The Process of Education (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 72.

human beings, without conscious intent or awareness, is implied in Miel's second problem concerning communication among persons. On this function of the communication process the educational administrator must be particularly knowledgeable. This knowledge stems from two sources: (1) the administrator's knowledge of language structure and usage; and (2) his knowledge of human relations. These forms of knowledge may be generally classed as scientific and humanistic.

Panofsky¹⁵ indicates the difference in the approaches of each:

The scientist, with natural phenomena, can at once proceed to analyze them. The humanist, dealing as he does with human actions and creations, has to engage in a mental process of a synthetic and subjective character: he has mentally to re-enact the actions and to re-create the creations. It is in fact by this process that the real objects of the humanities come into being.

One of the major obstacles to human communication exists in the nature of language itself. At times vague and ambiguous, language possesses the potential for misinterpretation by individuals or groups with varying backgrounds, experiences, and levels of language skills. This condition does not include one more element which tends to increase even more the potential for communications break-down. This is the element of human intent. For the moment, however, let us by-pass the element of intent and focus upon the function of language itself. Chase¹⁶ lists the following important semantic principles which must be recognized as relevant

¹⁵Erwin Panofsky, "On Intentions," Problems in Aesthetics, ed. Morris Wietz (New York: MacMillan Co., 1959), pp. 288-295.

¹⁶Stuart Chase, Roads to Agreement (New York: Harper & Bros., 1951), pp. 207-208.

to most cases of human communication:

1. Every event and every object is a process; beware of absolutes.
2. Things with the same name seldom have precisely the same characteristics: Adam, is not Adam. Beware of treating them as such.
3. Events are always changing. In passing judgment allow for the change.
4. Events usually have many sides, not just two sides. Beware of two-valued judgments.
5. Try to get all the main characteristics in before coming to a conclusion.
6. A fact is not an inference; an inference is not a value judgment. Keep them separate.
7. At some level, agreement is always possible. Keep looking for it.
8. A person with a mature mind . . . is adjusted to uncertainty, not to fixed verities. Like a good driver at the wheel of his car, he is safe to the extent that he is ready for anything.

If we heed Chase's advice we recognize the need for a thorough knowledge of language origin, structure, and function by the educational administrator. This knowledge is not identical with knowing all languages nor all symbolic functions but rather it is equivalent to knowing the means of recognizing linguistic obstacles as they occur plus knowing the means which ultimately lead to their elimination. With these means well in hand the administrator becomes more capable of articulating his own thoughts and comprehending the difficulties others may have in their attempts to communicate. If this problem of semantics is effectively treated by the administrator it may have positive results extending far beyond the communication process itself. It may, to be certain, become the basis for higher levels of human relations between student,

teacher, administrator, and community.

The component of the communication process which is most likely to create unforeseen results is that of the relations existing between the persons who seek to communicate with one another. The reason for the unpredictability of this factor is intrinsic within the nature of man's relation with his fellow man. When man, who is constantly changing, confronts his fellow man, who is likewise in a state of dynamic flux, a process results which reveals the force of this dynamism. This process is the relation which exists between the participants. In a relationship based upon the association of creative human beings the relational process has the potential for vastly superior levels of communication. This potentially superior communication is not based upon the intelligence of the individuals involved, nor is it necessarily a product of the knowledge they have accumulated.

We state these facts, because they are important matters to be kept in mind. Even though superior intelligence may be helpful it by no means insures communication if openness to new ideas and new conditions do not accompany it. There must be a willingness to create new patterns of thought and new perspectives on the traditional patterns of behavior. And similarly the accumulation of knowledge may serve as a kind of hardening of the arteries of thought. Often this knowledge is the product of an intense specialization process which tends to facilitate the learning of more and more about less and less. The concomitant of this specialization is frequently the development of a new language of symbols which admits only its closest followers to the inner sanctum of its meaning.

Gross¹⁷ explains this phenomenon:

Independent groups of men strive to order their experiences by inventing languages that tend toward consistency and completion and that, typically, pass through a succession of life-histories with origins, developmental elaborations and periods of relative closure. . . . The tendency of these languages toward self-determined criteria of consistency that are largely independent of concrete reality explains behavior as different as physics is from advertising.

Based on the current trend toward increased precision of language structure and usage in all disciplines there seems to be a need for certain efforts on the part of educational administrators. One such need is cited by Gross¹⁸:

We need empiricists who are committed with strong resolve to penetrate the full immediacy of human experience; systematizers who strive to perfect the elegance and precision of each new expression; integrators who have the breadth of vision to create ingenious connections between systems which seem to stand strangely apart in realms that are not now intelligibly related. Most of all, we need relatively unspecialized pioneers with the kind of flexible disposition that will enable them to range with advantage from any one aspect of the world of scientific endeavor to any other. Their function would be to examine with acute concern the neglected hiatuses between the specialities and, when possible, to join the fixed boundaries that isolate sciences and scientists from one another.

From this we see that the task of the administrator is that of providing the means by which the processes of synthesizing may be more effectively established. Such a task involves far more than the mere addition of a course to the curriculum. It also must be more than a sporadic endeavor to bring together the persons who are in a position to effect the synthesis. The administrator must

¹⁷Llewellyn Gross, "An Epistemological View of Sociological Theory," American Journal of Sociology, 65:441-448, March, 1960.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 448.

be able to lead the way in an on-going process of synthesis through the purposive inter-relationships of the several disciplines. He must be prepared to defend this inter-relational function of the disciplines against the attacks from within his staff and against the dissident hue and cry of the professional organizations outside his staff. And to make his responsibilities still more difficult he must encourage the filtering of this process to the student body and direct the communication of its purposes and goals to the controlling body of his institution.

The establishment of means for the synthesis of knowledge among the disciplines calls for the highest level of creativity by the administrator. He is dealing with the two sources of knowledge to which we have previously referred, these being the knowledge of language structure and usage, and the knowledge of human relations. The first is by far the easier to cope with for it permits of systematic study; and while the knowledge of human relations allows for systematic study it also demands a kind of intuitive analysis which, for some, proves exceedingly difficult to acquire. In the study of human relations it is possible to acquire a vast amount of knowledge about man through such disciplines as philosophy, psychology, history, sociology, anthropology, physiology, etc., but the lessons learned from these areas of human knowledge are to no avail if they are not practiced. And if the lessons about man are not practiced with "human" purposes in mind they may, indeed, become either meaningless academic exercises or extremely dangerous avenues toward human destruction.

The administrator must gain access to the knowledge of human

relations but he must also practice "human" relations if he is to become more than an interested by-stander in the communication processes he endeavors to initiate among men. For it is only through the practice of "human" relations that the administrator gains access to the "human" experiences which provide direction and meaning to his effort. The acquisition of these means is not a temporary matter--it is a part of life's function itself. Hutchins¹⁹ describes the minimum qualifications of an administrator in dealing with means.

The minimum qualifications of an administrator in his dealings with the means are four. They are courage, fortitude, justice, and prudence or practical wisdom.

When I say that the administrator should have courage, fortitude, justice, and prudence, I am saying only that he should be a good man. If the administrator is to function at all, he must have prudence or practical wisdom, the habit of selecting the right means to the end. But the administrator's life reveals that, though the virtues may be separated for purposes of analysis, they are one in practice. The administrator cannot exercise prudence without courage, which is the habit of taking responsibility; fortitude, which is the habit of bearing the consequences; and justice, which is the habit of giving equal treatment to equals.

If we return at this point to the questions we posed at the outset of this section we discover that certain answers now appear eminent. Our first question was: How can man learn to communicate with his fellow man, or conversely, how can modern man overcome the problem of limited communication?

In answer to the first part of the question dealing with "how can man learn to communicate with his fellow man," a brief

¹⁹Robert Hutchins, et. al., The Works of the Mind, ed. Robert Heywood (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 137-138.

review suggests several means. The establishment of these means are basically the responsibility of the educational administrator. Among the more significant of these means are:

1. Acquiring the basic skills of the common language of the society.
2. Acquiring a basic understanding of human relationships.
3. Practicing "human" relations with courage, fortitude, justice, and practical wisdom.

It is necessary to mention two facts regarding the answers we have proposed relevant to our initial question for administrators to consider. One fact is that the processes we have proposed as possible means for resolving the problems implicit in our question are at best tentative. They can not be otherwise for the simple reason that the question begs tentative answers to the changing problems which are behind the question itself. The other fact is that the answers we have proposed are for all men but especially for the administrator of the educational enterprise. For not only must the administrator possess these skills; he must also be able to implement them within his staff and the educational enterprise, He must likewise be able to articulate on many different levels the necessity of these means and the ends which must ultimately be consummated by them. To accomplish all of these goals the administrator must indeed exemplify that rarest kind of leadership--the leadership emanating from "human" wisdom.

Question 2: How can modern man, in an increasingly impersonal, and complex technological age, acquire a true sense of creativeness?

In establishing the basis for the above question we identified several features of contemporary American society which seem to be precipitating the problems suggested by the question. One is the problem produced by the assembly line's destruction of a sense of relatedness to the final product. There is the problem of increasing inter-dependence of all people due to our complex economic society. There are problems produced by mass production, mass marketing, and mass communication which eliminate the extremes and press all things and all people toward the middle. We have also the problem of the impersonality of a vast and complex economy which leaves the "average man" awed and subdued. The increase of buying power has swept up the laborer of our society in a continual round of biological flux between non-creative production and non-satisfying consumption. In short, our point is that today's average man is becoming better and better cared for yet with less and less self-satisfaction to fill his life.

It is becoming more evident that materialism can not fill to completion the total needs of man. Improved standards of living are important; higher levels of physical health are much to be desired; freedom from want is necessary for all men--but these alone do not protect man from the psychic insecurities which derive from needs other than these. The need to give to his fellow man of himself, to contribute his unique share toward human posterity, to feel a deep sense of esthetic satisfaction in life--these are the needs of man which transcend the present levels of physical well-being. These are the needs of man which deserve our intense reconsideration in view of the conditions imposed by our modern society.

If the administrator is to obtain a grasp of the current plight of modern man he must study the historical evolution of human society. Wieman²⁰ discusses this problem from its long-range perspective by describing five creative transformations in the history of man. The first was the development of man as the kind of organism capable of extensive creative interchange and integration of meaning. The second transformation was the establishment of civilization with its characteristic features of written language and social organization. A third condition was the extension of man over all parts of the earth. The fourth transformation Wieman describes as the development of modern technology. He describes this technology and the transformation which is needed to counterbalance its force:

Such a technology carries with it a system of communication and interdependence reaching all people on the planet. This magnified power of control and this world wide interdependence can bring on great evils and can reduce creativity to a minimum. In many cases such has been the consequence and it will continue to be so, with greater evils yet to come, unless a fifth condition is added to this fourth. On the other hand this magnified power to produce good, to organize, to administer, and to communicate, are indispensable to the end of enabling all people to contribute to, and to participate in, the creative transformation of human life.

This brings us to the fifth condition. This is what our period during the next two or three hundred years must bring forth.

The fifth condition is what we have been describing throughout this writing. It is change of institutions and action of individuals resulting from recognition of the moral predicament of man and from practice of personal commitment. It is a change in institutions and action of individuals which will bring into the lives of many people that

²⁰ Henry Nelson Wieman, Man's Ultimate Commitment (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958), pp. 301-305.

higher dominance of creativity which in the past has occurred only in the lives of a few.

The secure establishment of all five of the over-all conditions needed for the fullest measure of creative interchange and integration of meanings will not bring man's work and responsibility to an end. Exactly the opposite is true. Only after these conditions have been established will men be able to provide the ever-changing, detailed and local conditions required for this creativity in the family, in the neighborhood, between members in the industrial plant and in the classroom, between the various specialized kinds of work and research, between political units and cultures, and elsewhere throughout the multiform existence of humanity. Men may not live up to this responsibility. Certainly they will not do it perfectly. But after the five conditions prevail, men will have this responsibility because they will then have the power to meet the demands of creativity as they could not previous to the establishment of these over-all conditions.

Wieman's fifth transformation proposing "change of institutions and action of individuals resulting from recognition of the moral predicament of man and from practice of personal commitment," must be particularly heeded by administrators. It is worth noting that Wieman emphasizes not only "recognition" but "practice" as well. The leader of the educational enterprise is faced with two simultaneous and challenging tasks. The first task is that of recognizing as best as is humanly possible the moral predicaments which modern society is producing. This requires that particularly high level of creative awareness which is demanded of the individual who must know the problems of men. But, again, not only is awareness a prerequisite for solving the problem but the practice of creative attempts to resolve it must be effected also. This is the second demanding task of the administrator. Demonstrating his leadership, making decisions, practicing human relations, creating new processes; all are necessary forms of action which must be carried on while the administrator is trying to assess the conditions which

will lead him to new decisions and new practices.

Thus far we have discussed only the administrator as a person and not in terms of the educational process he leads. In addition to his efforts to become aware of the moral predicaments of modern man and his practice of creative possible solutions to these predicaments, the administrator must lead the cause for a new perspective in education. This new perspective is what Iglehart²¹ refers to as the preparation of children, "not for the passive acceptance of the world, but for the creation of worlds." This new concept calls for an image of the child who is himself a creator. Iglehart goes on to say that "if parents misunderstand the concept of the child as creator, as a source of whatever world there is or will be, then the work of the schools becomes infinitely harder. If the teachers misunderstand the nature of this necessary image of childhood, the work of the schools becomes impossible; we can only teach the child whom we, as teachers, can visualize. If we see the children in our classrooms in the light of an image out of keeping with the rest of contemporary thought, or with the tasks of our culture, we are in trouble. We find ourselves educating children who are not really there."

It is easy enough, however, to talk of establishing a new image of the child as a creative being but it is indescribably more difficult to bring this to pass. Munro²² indicates some of the "unknowns" in education for creativity:

²¹Robert Iglehart, et. al., Aesthetic Form in Education, ed. Michael F. Andrews (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1958), p. 21.

²²Thomas Munro, Toward Science in Aesthetics (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956), p. 60.

We know so little of the factors determining creative genius that it is impossible to say with confidence that any given method will stimulate it. Even "free expression" has not been an unqualified success along this line, after the first few years of childish interest. Genius has flowered from educational methods that would now be considered narrow and repressive in the extreme. Oftentimes it seems as though some cramping, irritating counterforce were necessary to urge it into animated reaction. We cannot be sure that rationality, tolerance, catholicity of taste, lack of dogmatism--any of the aims now sought in general education--will be more an advantage than a drawback in a given case. Perhaps the creative mind needs other educational methods than the appreciative. Perhaps, as often charged, our whole system of education in the arts, especially in colleges, is such as to make critics rather than artists. Perhaps education can have little effect one way or the other, and the appearance of creativeness will always be an unpredictable, uncontrollable miracle. Perhaps that quality can be influenced through eugenics; or through proper conditioning of reflexes in infancy, as the behaviorists believe. But we have not experimented enough with educational methods to give up hope that they may sometime become reliable means of development of creative originality.

While Munro expresses a reluctance to suggest a specific form of education to develop creative genius there are indications that certain conditions tend to be conducive to creativity in our society. Strang²³ states that "among the conditions conducive to creativity are environmental factors that permit freedom of thought and action within reasonable limits, encourage individuality, welcome new ideas and self-direction, require ingenuity, provide opportunity to observe, explore, and participate, and give recognition and approval of creative efforts. Order and discipline, space and time, background knowledge and skill, and specific stimuli to creativity--all these are vital components of an environment hospitable to creative effort."

²³ Paul Witty, James B. Conant, and Ruth Strang, Creativity of Gifted and Talented Children (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1959), p. 30.

If the conditions suggested by Strang are to be found within the environment of the classroom the administrator must accept the responsibility for making it possible. Once more the administrator must be willing to take the lead in effecting the means to this end. One of the means toward this end is acquiring teachers who are creative teachers. Again the educational leader is faced with the necessity of knowing the human qualities of the teacher which will complement and re-inforce the creative efforts demonstrated in the classroom. It is not sufficient that a teacher be only inventive for creative teaching requires more than technical ingenuity. Indeed, creative teaching, in the opinion of Zirbes²⁴, is both

an art and a science, for it is not possible without the insights and understandings of the human or behavioral sciences on the one hand, and the high aspiration of the creative artist-teacher whose vision guides his impacts on the lives of learners in their becoming. The creative teacher's highest incentives and rewards are the intrinsic satisfactions of this vital role in human fulfillment and advance.

If the administrator is to fulfill the critical function of acquiring creative artist-teachers he must certainly know the qualities which are characteristic of such teachers, and furthermore he must be able to discover their presence with a limited time for observation. Still more important, however, is the climate which the administrator provides for the creative artist-teacher. It is in this regard that he must demonstrate the true quality of his creative potential. For it is in his relationship with the artist-teacher that he establishes the "human" climate of co-creation.

²⁴ Laura Zirbes, et. al., Aesthetic Form in Education, ed. Michael Andrews (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1958), p. 41.

The teacher and the administrator can only come to know the truly cooperative nature of the educational enterprise as they share their respective responsibilities within the full power of the creative human relation.

The sharing process which can be known fully only within the creative human relation centers basically around the teacher and the administrator. Yet it extends outward from this nucleus to the students, parents, community, nation, and world in concentric fashion. The teacher is responsible for sharing her creativity primarily with her students, and also for recognizing, acknowledging, stimulating and sharing their creativity. She must also be willing to articulate the total creative efforts of her class and herself to the children's parents. The major responsibilities of the administrator are to identify the creative processes in the educational life of the child and to articulate them to that greater public to whom he is responsible.

By means of these processes the administrator is able to lead, as well as follow, that public to whom he owes allegiance. In the sense that he endeavors to transmit the values and wisdom of the society he represents does the administrator follow his society. But when he endeavors to establish creativity as a fundamental process within the educational enterprise the administrator has assumed a role of leadership which can not be denied. Corbett²⁵ describes the philosophical imperatives which the acceptance of innovation makes necessary:

²⁵J. P. Corbett, "Innovation and Philosophy," Mind 68:271:289-308, July, 1959.

Thus, from the moment that innovation has been accepted as the form of life, there seems to be only one possible set of general philosophical imperatives: seek out the deepest contradictions and inhibiting confusions within the current movements of the world; do not try to stay on the heights of pure philosophy where the air is so rarefied that it cannot be breathed; get down into the stuff of change; find where the forms of language are inhibiting the flow of novel thought and action; employ whatever means seem likely to release those jams of understanding; admit that in the nature of the case there can be nothing permanent in your aims, in your methods or in your results; at the level of those fundamental abstractions upon which all the order of our thought depends, seek out, not the permanent fixation of ideas, but their permanent revolution!

There are several difficult problems which confront the administrator who has committed himself to a role of leadership in his society. Overcoming his own tradition-bound experiences is one of the most demanding, for there must be a "willingness to be born every day" as Fromm²⁶ suggested. There is the problem of effective communication which we have previously described. Also vital to this role of leadership for creativity is a thorough understanding of man and its translation into creative human relations. Finally there is a need for meaning in what is being undertaken by the educational enterprise.

It is the final problem which the administrator can neither avoid nor ignore if he wishes to assume leadership in our society today. For without meaning or direction, no activity, creative or otherwise, can assume its proper perspective within the life of man. It is upon this basis that Tumin²⁷ defends the challenge of creative living:

²⁶Fromm, loc. cit.

²⁷Melvin M. Tumin, et. al., Aesthetic Form in Education, ed. Michael F. Andrews (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1958), pp. 27-28.

I think this is why I can feel sure in saying that when we take up arms on behalf of creative activity, we are literally fighting for our lives. We are fighting to give meaning to our lives. We are fighting for the chance to be more fully human. We are asking for half a try at something more than sheer existence. We are expressing our discontent with the cliches and ruts of traditional orderliness.

This is not something to be condemned as long-haired and crack-potted and radical and subversive. This is something to be praised as absolutely indispensable to the sanity of any society. If we want to turn out automatons who will respond with nice little polite grimaces and make their proper bows and subserviences, and who will do as they are told by their betters, that's easy. All we need for that is a good, strong dictator, a splendid secret police, a bunch of big brothers. And, if those don't work, one can always try cutting out the grey matter from the heads of the discontents.

But if we're interested in taking our years on earth seriously, and to take up the challenge which our very existences toss down to us, and to try to justify our lives to ourselves, then, there is nothing else to do except to push just as hard and as frequently and as effectively as we can for the idea that change, growth, development, emergence--creative living, in short--is the only kind of living worth caring about.

The struggle to give meaning to life; the fight for a chance to be more fully human; the try at something more than sheer existence; these are the challenges which lead man toward creative living. For it is in the struggle to give meaning to life, and to be more fully human that man discovers the philosophical imperative of creative living. By means of his creative search for meaning in life and by means of his creative efforts to become more fully human does man rise above those conditions in his times which would deprive him of life's meaning or of his humanity. It is the responsibility of the administrator to facilitate these creative endeavors within the educational enterprise. It is to the creation of these processes that the administrator, who aspires to more than a managerial function in this enterprise, must dedicate his own

creative life.

If we now return to our second question we find certain responsibilities for the educational administrator which may serve to answer the question: How can modern man, in an increasingly impersonal, and complex, technological age, acquire a true sense of creativeness?

As we indicated in our answer to the first question the problems implicit within the second question can best be resolved through the means made possible by the leadership of the educational administrator. Thus the administrator must help modern man in achieving the following processes leading to creativity:

1. Acquiring an awareness of the conditions of the times and their impact upon him.
2. Acquiring the unique creative skills available to him within the framework of his particular nature as an individual.
3. Acquiring an image of himself as a creative being.
4. Acquiring a sense of meaning in life through creative living.

Question 3: How can man attain that sense of direction and meaning in life which preserves both individual integrity and the human society?

The final question of this study now challenging our thinking has, to a large degree, been answered in our consideration of the two preceding questions. The problem of communication is central to the problems which arise within the question and in our discussion of it. To be sure, man must communicate with his fellow

man. There must exist a common language, or the means for developing a common language, if communication is to proceed to ever higher levels of abstraction. There must also be content in the communication process other than the symbolic forms of the language itself. Finally we must come to know the answer to the question "Communication for what end?" For it is not enough that man becomes proficient in the communication process if it all has no meaning beyond its own function. Communication between men which is devoid of purpose becomes mere babble and reduces man's life to a series of animalistic functions.

Looking at the other side of the coin we see that communication is the key to man's fantastic growth potential which leads him to new horizons. Through his power to speak and form symbols man is able to create an enduring language which enables him to preserve and transmit the cultural forms of his society. By the same token man is able to assign meaning to, and alter the meaning of, these forms. Through these variations in meaning of the conventional forms of language does it become possible for men to differ in their interpretation of linguistic forms. It is precisely this point which led us to suggest that the administrator must be conscious of the potential for varied interpretations. And, as we also suggested, he must know the means by which these differences in the meaning and use of language could be resolved by the communicants. Thus one of the means by which man can try to gain a sense of direction and meaning in life is learning how to understand the words of men who have described their beliefs on the subject.

The means we have just proposed must be viewed as a means

available to those who are capable of choice in the matter. What of those, we must ask, who, by virtue of their immaturity or emotional inhibitions are not capable of choice? What of the child, especially, who has yet to acquire the skills of language usage or the maturity to comprehend the deeper meanings and power of words? Must the infant and pre-school child wait for this level of communication before direction and meaning in life can be communicated? Quite obviously the answer is in the negative. Communication, in its most comprehensive sense, must, and does, take place in these early years of life, with or without the conscious awareness of the child's parents and others with whom he has contact. Every emotion expressed by a human being to the child is sensed and becomes part of the psycho-physical condition of that child's being and becoming. Indeed all experiences become a part of the total reservoir of man's psychic life which plays so significant a part in the course of human events. All that man's life is exists in his being and becoming. The educator must accept this fact and be continually seeking its implications for the responsibility which society has formally delegated to him.

The role of the administrator in the formal institution of education is, of course, shaped and determined for him by the society. This society has certain expectations and role behaviors which tradition and current conditions tend to develop. It is within this framework that today's educational leader must make certain decisions. He must decide to what degree he is going to follow or lead the progress of his chosen profession. If he decides to follow he elects the managerial path and by so doing must regard

himself as an object of utility. For within this function the primary emphasis is on the objective, mechanical operations of education. By electing this form of action he must reconcile himself to eventual replacement by educational vending machines because the tasks he elects to perform are objective and utilitarian, and as such they can probably be performed with greater objectivity and efficiency in the automation process. This choice is open to every administrator for there are a multitude of tasks in formal education today (and they will increase) which lend themselves to the fullest absorption of the individual's time and energy. With this decision the administrator has elected to limit the structure, form, and extent of communication to an absolute minimum. It might even be said that he has decided not to communicate at all for the ultimate effect is the eventual dissolution of the means of "human" inter-action, which is the foundation of communication among men.

On the other hand, if the administrator makes the decision to lead the educational enterprise he assumes a responsibility of infinite magnitude for the communication process. By this decision he is forced to make many more decisions, each of great significance for the ends he ultimately seeks to achieve. Indeed, the decision as to what end he wishes to lead the educational enterprise is, in itself, the most vital decision he must make. For if he is to lead then he must know the direction and meaning of the end to which he aspires.

The decision to lead automatically forces the administrator into the subjective processes of communication. He can not retreat into the managerial functions but rather he must advance to the

processes of "human" inter-action. He must visualize the end of education as the "human" end and establish the means which make possible the achievement of that end. Arendt²⁸ describes this transformation:

The only way out of the dilemma of meaninglessness in all strictly utilitarian philosophy is to turn away from the objective world of use things and fall back upon the subjectivity of use itself. Only in a strictly anthropocentric world, where the user, that is, man himself, becomes the ultimate end which puts a stop to the unending chain of ends and means, can utility as such acquire the dignity of meaningfulness.

With the dilemma of meaninglessness creeping into our times there has been an increased pressure upon formal education for leadership toward meaning. This has placed severe demands upon education which educators were neither prepared to cope with, nor totally free to act upon. While the pressure for schools to provide moral and ethical leadership has derived from general sources, there has been a tendency for individuals and groups to deny this pressure or resist facing up to the responsibilities it implies for them. Thus one of the major problems of communication faced by today's educational leader is that of communicating the meaning he has assigned to the formal process of education. Fischer²⁹ defines the significance of this need for communication:

If, as a profession and as individuals, we are to give the leadership and counsel reasonably to be expected of us, we shall first have to clarify our own thinking on important issues. It is sometimes argued that teachers, being public servants, should be entirely subject to the desires of their communities. This view seriously undervalues the

²⁸ Arendt, op. cit., p. 155.

²⁹ John H. Fischer, "Our Changing Conception of Education," Phi Delta Kappan, October, 1960, pp. 16-19.

expert's place in democracy and diminishes his usefulness to the public he serves.

Obviously, public policy must finally be sanctioned by the public, but the quality of any popular decision always reveals something more than the unalloyed wisdom of the electorate. Public action invariably reflects the kind of information the public has received, the nature of the alternatives offered for approval, and the respect the public has for its advisors and their advice.

Part of the answer to our third major question of this section is, then, the communication of the purposes and ends of education. These purposes and ends must be known by the public which formal education is serving. It is the responsibility of the administrator to communicate these purposes and ends to the public in such a way that he leads them to a higher level of understanding of, and participation in, the processes by which the purposes and ends are established. This communication process, between the leaders of the educational enterprise and the public whose sanction must ultimately be acquired, is a never-ending process. The task is as the poet Quasimodo³⁰ has stated:

The image of man is no eternal thing. We must
remake it generation by generation.

Not only must the individual today become conscious of the direction and meaning of the educational processes in his life but he must also create the means which enrich the processes as he experiences them. We emphasize again that this creative endeavor can not begin full blown at age twenty-one or at any time in life. It is a process, or to be more explicit, it is a series of created processes which are themselves elements in the creative life

³⁰ Salvatore Quasimodo, "Internal Man and External World," Saturday Review, July 11, 1960, pp. 15-16, 39-40.

process. Since it is a process it must have a beginning. This beginning for man is really two beginnings. The first is the biological beginning which is conception. The second beginning is the integration of the new-born babe into the society which follows his acceptance as a potential member of the society. While both beginnings are important it is the second beginning, the social beginning, which must command our full attention at this time.

The processes of communication become vastly different in education when the administrator elects to lead rather than follow. It necessitates the establishment of ends with society's participation and sanction. It also necessitates the constant communication of these ends not only to parents who need to be sharing in their establishment but to the new generation as well. The educational processes must build a maturing sense of direction and meaning in life for the new generation. While this responsibility is not alone formal education's task, the fact remains that formal education must fulfill to the utmost that portion of the task which the ends prescribe. Wieman³¹ describes this indispensable function:

It is not asserted that the school alone can impart to the people the unifying and directing faith which the society must have to survive and realize its potential values. This the school cannot do. This must be done by the daily interchange going on in society. But the school is needed to interpret to the youth the sustaining faith and direction of life which are implicit in the complexities of the social process. If the school does not lift out and make explicit this faith and direction of life, the rising generation will not find them nor follow them amid the great complexity and diversity and power of our society. Not to find them and not to follow them will lead to disintegration of the developing personality of the individual and the social system itself. But if the school is to serve this indispensable

³¹Wieman, op. cit., pp. 188-189.

function it must have as central to its entire undertaking a commitment of faith which gives unity and direction to the developing mind of the individual and to the entire social process.

The fulfillment of this "indispensable function" tests not only the faith but the creative powers of the administrator as well. This challenge to the administrator has greater significance today because there is clear evidence that without a constant and creative effort to provide direction and meaning in life the debilitating forces of our complex, impersonal technology tend to drive the individual away from his self-integrity and toward a mold of conformity. As Guggenheimer³² contends, the concept of the infinite and everlasting value of the individual "has little meaning until thoroughly believed in by individuals, and the more an individual is surrounded by skepticism the more difficult for him to hold the gift of this conviction. We either have societies in which faith predominate, wherein individuals fortify each others' convictions, or we have societies of doubters and believers, in which case there is far deeper and more serious conflict than may be apparent on the surface."

The difficult task of the leader of today's educational enterprise is to develop the means by which the new generation may learn to live creatively. Living creatively suggests remaining alive to the dynamics of a world which is itself changing constantly. Guggenheimer³³ states the problem and suggests its solution:

The fact is that most human beings waver between the safe attraction of what is securely, familiarly possessed and the lure of change, the feel and smell of the new. The

³²Guggenheimer, op. cit., p. 137.

³³Ibid., p. 145.

pleasant solution does not lie in pretending or in sniffing out new charms like a beast on the prowl, but rather in cultivating the ability to stay enchanted with all things by virtue of one's own continuing development vis-a-vis the evolving world. A truly alive person is a growing, changing person with a growing, changing, avid vision. Such vision is incapable of boredom because itself and all that it sees are forever involved in the magical continuum of progressive being. To be is to be evolving, and whatever is evolving is never long the same but forever becoming new. It is far truer to say that everything, rather than nothing, under the sun is new.

What the administrator must build into the educational process is a kind of self-induced evolution. By means of this evolution the teacher is free to create new educational processes and the student is free to create the processes of learning and seeking. Only as each succeeding generation learns to live with change and to create change in the direction it desires can man achieve his ultimate human dignity.³⁴ The effect of this type of education is described by Mearns³⁵:

Creative education is the name now given to the training that first finds and then preserves and strengthens the better artistry in us, our native truth-seeking and truth-loving personality. If we speak here of individuality as a creative spirit, it is because its distinguishing quality

³⁴Murphy depicts this creative thrust of understanding as a third human nature. (The others are derived from biological evolution and the establishment of culture.) "There are deep forces within us that strive fundamentally for gratification of the need to understand; forces resistant to standardization and the molding process; forces that nervously and restlessly cut through the chrysalis of culture. It is just as human to fight against cultural standardization as it is to submit to it; and, under conditions of modern living, the creative forces of curiosity and of artistic and scientific reorganization of the materials and ways of life may overpower many of the massive conservative forces of culture. This creative thrust of understanding is a third human nature."

Gardner Murphy, Human Potentialities (New York: Basic Books, 1958), p. 18.

³⁵Hughes Mearns, The Creative Adult (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1940), p. 9.

is artistic, it manipulates the material of experience for its own delight but remains itself independent and unmanipulated.

Thus far our attempt to answer our third and final question has focused on the communicative and creative processes. We must now turn to the processes which enable man to discover what ultimate purposes his powers to communicate must serve for himself and his society. The keynote to our concluding discussion is suggested by Gray³⁶:

I fear that we human creatures do not forget cleanly, as the animals presumably do. What protrudes and does not fit in our pasts rises to haunt us and make us spiritually unwell in the present. The discontinuities in contemporary life are cutting us off from our roots and threatening us with the dread evil of nihilism in the twentieth century. We may become refugees in an inner sense unless we remember to some purpose. . . . If we could gain only a modicum of greater wisdom concerning what manner of men we are, what effect might it not have on future events?

If the administrator of modern education is to prevent the coming generation from being refugees, in the inner sense to which Gray has referred, he must create the means of forestalling this possibility. He must devise new programs and facilitate new experiences which make it possible for the coming generation to acquire a sense of individuality and yet remain conscious of the rights of others. Montagu³⁷ describes this process and its implications for education as it is presently functioning:

From the very first, the emphasis should be on the art of human relations, which is nothing more than the art of loving. Thus, teachers should be specially chosen for

³⁶J. Glenn Gray, *The Warriors* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959), p. 24.

³⁷Ashley Montagu, *Education and Human Relations* (New York: Groves Press, 1958), pp. 162-163.

their ability to love, this being the primary requirement in the equipment of the teacher. Where anything that is taught has any relation to human life, then it should be taught within the matrix of love. The referent in the education of the child should always be how what is being taught contributes toward the development of the child as a healthy human being--to repeat, health consists in the ability to love and the ability to work.

What I am suggesting, in fact, is nothing less than a revolution in our attitudes toward education; I am suggesting that we regard education as the drawing out, nourishment, and development of the potentialities of every individual for being a loving human being who co-operatively realizes himself in relation to the welfare of his fellows and thus of his own best self. According to this view, the principal purpose of our schools should be education in human relations by drawing out and nourishing the innate capacities of every human being for relatedness. The teaching of the three R's should constitute a secondary but complementary process in the interest of rendering more efficient the functioning of such relatedness.

Despite our allegations concerning contemporary American society with its cry for conformity and its increasing complexity and impersonality we recognize that there is also an American tradition which makes possible the creation of Montagu's concept of education. This tradition is described by Anderson³⁸ who contends that,

Americans have sought the necessary resolution of human conflicts in the terms of a human community, where, in principle, the allegiance of the individual was obtained by the assurance of the progressive accumulation of human values and the further release of individual and individualizing energies. They have sought to formulate the nature of this progress on the ground of a common humanity. The idea of mankind has seemed to them to provide the key to a consolidation of human power which could support human effort and release it, which could provide for the rebirth of the individual in the supporting context of his relations with his fellows.

Within the American tradition and despite certain of the

³⁸ John M. Anderson, The Individual and The New World (State College, Pa.: Bald Eagle Press, 1955), p. 161.

restricting conditions of our times there is a latitude of action which is still available to the educational leader if he seizes the initiative. There is still much room for a more meaningful comprehension of the lessons which the humanities can offer us. The creative arts afford unlimited possibilities for self-expression. Yet the most significant and creative revisions of modern education are still comparatively undeveloped. These are the revisions which can be made in the creation of human relations and in the development of an awareness of their significance for the individual and his society. The most pertinent question may very well be: Whose responsibility is it to bring about these necessary developments in our educational program? Our answer is specific--the administrator of the educational enterprise. We recognize, however, that the administrator does not operate in a vacuum, and that in the final analysis all men must share in this vital reconstruction of education. Toynbee³⁹ discusses the problem from the long-range point of view:

This immense and growing mass of knowledge about man and his non-human environment daunts the minds that are exposed to it and throws them on the defensive. In self-defense we are tempted to ask ourselves again whether our institutions for formal education cannot simply reject the greater part of this formidable load, or, short of that, divide it up into packages that can be distributed among different pairs of shoulders without risk of breaking any backs. The reply to this cry of distress has to be in the negative: "Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto" ("I am a human being, so I cannot be indifferent to anything that has to do with human life and human nature"). Every man, woman, and child alive today is living in a world in which mankind is faced with the extreme choice between learning to live together as one family and committing

³⁹Arnold Toynbee, "Education: The Long View," Saturday Review, 43:58-81, September, 1960.

genocide on a planetary scale. Neither the human race nor any living member of it can afford to ignore the present human situation. We must cope with it if we are not to destroy ourselves; in order to cope with it we must understand it; and trying to understand it commits each and all of us to making some acquaintance with at least three vast realms of knowledge: a knowledge of nonhuman nature; a knowledge of human nature; and a knowledge of the characters and histories of the local and temporary cultures--some relatively primitive, others relatively advanced--that man has created and transmitted and modified and discarded in the course of the ages that have passed since his pre-human ancestors became human. Formal education's minimum task has thus become a big undertaking in our day; and every child will have a strenuous course of formal as well as informal education to run in order to grow up into being an effective citizen of our new world.

If man is to live as one family and if man is to realize his potential value as an individual, he must endeavor to create those means which will lead him to his humanity. Failure to act may, indeed, result in the failure of man to continue his existence as man. On the contrary, action guided by the humanity man now possesses holds the promise of a future which unites man, as an individual, with all men in a human society.

We return at last to our third, and final, question: How can man attain that sense of direction and meaning in life which preserves both individual integrity and the human society?

Our persistent theme throughout this chapter has emphasized the responsibility of the administrator of the educational enterprise for the establishment of those means by which the problems implicit in our three questions might be resolved. We again suggest that the answer to our final question is best stated in the following means which the administrator must create in order to fulfill his responsibilities as the leader of the formal institution of education:

1. Acquiring the capacity to communicate.
2. Acquiring a sense of individual creativeness.
3. Acquiring an understanding of man and his conditions on this earth.
4. Acquiring the skills needed to relate to others in a human way.
5. Acquiring a love of oneself and of one's fellow man.

This study has been an attempt to establish a viable theory of creative human relations. The scope of its content is broad and far-reaching. In such a theoretical structure as we have herein created there is considerable latitude for differences of opinion. In our thinking this is both understandable and good. Today's leaders of the American educational enterprise must be willing to deal with problems of these proportions and perplexity. Only by coming to grips with such problems can we insert into the educational process the meaning and purpose it must ultimately possess if America's struggle for world peace is to be more than one of mere re-action. The vitality of American education depends upon the kind of leadership which educational administrators can provide.

Education today is big business but vastly different from Big Business. The product of the business of education is a dynamically, growing human being. Our responsibility as leaders in the educational enterprise is to promote this dynamic, growth in such a way that it has direction and meaning for all involved. It is toward the mature acceptance of this responsibility that this thesis has been dedicated. For education is, in the final analysis,

of, by, and for the people. If education is going to be improved, then it must be directed by leaders with a sufficient understanding of humanity to bring about changes within people for the good of all. This is today's challenge to the administrator-leader of the educational enterprise.

Wherein lies happiness? In that which becks
Our ready minds to fellowship divine,
A fellowship with essence.

John Keats, "Endymion"

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