SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS CONSISTENCY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR-ATTITUDE CONSISTENCY

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ABSTRACT

SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS CONSISTENCY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR-ATTITUDE CONSISTENCY

By

George Franklin Bishop

This dissertation had three original purposes: (a) to develop a precise conceptual and operational definition of the social-psychological construct of cognitive or attitudinal consistency within a field survey context, (b) to integrate this definition with the conceptualization and measurement of the sociological construct of status consistency, and (c) to test the social cross-pressures hypothesis that the greater an individual's socioeconomic status inconsistency, the greater will be his cognitive or attitudinal inconsistency with respect to relevant political attitude objects, such as presidential candidates.

Methodologically, the research design involved a secondary analysis of sample survey data from the 1968 American National Election Study conducted originally by the Survey Research Center of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. The data drawn

from this national election study included the traditional measures of an individual's socioeconomic status--level of education, income level, and occupational prestige--and "feeling thermometer" measures of an individual's affective attitudes toward the three major 1968 presidential candidates: Hubert Humphrey, Richard Nixon, and George Wallace. These measures, in turn, were used to construct the indices of status and attitude consistency, both of which were defined conceptually in terms of deviance and operationally by simple differences between standard scores.

The results, in summary, showed that there was a negligible relationship between the variables of socioeconomic status consistency and consistency of affective attitudes toward the three 1968 presidential candidates, as well as between status inconsistency and actual voting behavior or preference in 1968, although there were some slight but inconclusive trends in these relationships among those who were highly status inconsistent; that is, the most deviant status types.

Additional secondary analyses of the 1968 election data showed, moreover, that there was a statistically significant positive relationship between voting behavior and candidate attitude consistency, with those who voted in the election being more attitudinally consistent than those

who did not vote. It was also found that those who were more behaviorally involved in politics, as measured by participation in the election, were more psychologically involved or interested in politics. And, finally, it was discovered that cognitive or attitudinal consistency was greatest among those individuals who had a high level of interest in government and public affairs and were behaviorally involved in the election through the overt act of voting.

Theoretically, it was concluded that the most important reason why the findings on status consistency did not turn out as predicted was an inadequate account of the psychological reality of various socioeconomic status discrepancies to the individual. Thus it was suggested that future research on this subject should focus upon whether or not the individual is aware of being in an inconsistent status position and on the degree of importance it has for him or her personally. And, finally, the positive evidence for a consistent relationship between voting behavior and affective candidate attitudes was interpreted in terms of the self-perception principle that attitudes-follow-behavior.

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George Franklin Bishop

A DISSERTATION

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To my father and mother,

GEORGE AND MARY BISHOP

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Over the past twenty-five years or so American social psychologists interested in the nature of attitudes and attitude change have developed a number of middle-range theories of the structure and dynamics of human social cognition, generally called theories of cognitive consistency (see Abelson et al., 1968, for an interpretative summary). Although there are some important differences in basic constructs and propositions among the major consistency models--balance, congruity, and dissonance--they commonly assume that a person's cognitions (beliefs, attitudes, values) will tend to be logically or psychologically consistent with one another and with his overt behavior (Jones and Gerard, 1967; Shaw and Costanzo, 1970). And, further, they assume that if a person's cognitions are inconsistently related to one another or to his overt behavior, he will experience some form of psychological tension or discomfort which will then motivate him to reduce the tension by changing one or more of

his cognitions or his overt behavior in the direction of greater cognitive consistency.

This, in brief, is the general consistency notion common to most contemporary theories of attitude structure and attitude change. We now turn our attention to some important problems of conceptualization and measurement in the study of cognitive (or attitudinal) consistency.

Conceptual and Methodological Problems in the Study of Cognitive Inconsistency[1]

While the general consistency notion has aided in the discovery of many new empirical facts and relationships concerning attitude structure and change, there are some major problems of conceptualization and measurement associated with the various theories of consistency, problems which tend to limit their testability, scope, and general explanatory capacity. As identified and discussed by Pepitone (1966), and reviewed more recently by Shaw and Costanzo (1970), these problems include: (a) definition of the elements or components involved in the cognitive inconsistency, (b) definition and measurement of cognitive inconsistency itself, (c) the problem of mutually relevant or irrelevant relations between two or

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[1]When the term inconsistency is used in this paper, it should be clear that both consistency and inconsistency are intended as component reference terms.

more cognitions, (d) the problem of importance or personal significance that inconsistency has for an individual, and (e) the problem of uncertainty; i.e., the degree of certainty an individual attaches to his attitudes or cognitions.

In this paper, we will focus upon the most central of these problems: the definition and measurement of cognitive inconsistency itself. Further, in discussing this problem, we will follow on Pepitone's (1966) analysis and also focus on Leon Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance as an example.

The Problem of Defining and Measuring Cognitive Inconsistency

The problem of defining and measuring cognitive inconsistency itself can be seen most clearly in Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory, which defines inconsistency in terms of "ill-fitting" or "non-fitting" relations among cognitive elements. Specifically, the theory states that there are three basic types of relations that may exist between pairs of cognitive elements:

1. Consonance (consistency)--"Two cognitive elements are in a consonant relation if, considering these

two alone, one element follows from the other [Festinger, 1957, p. 260]."

2. Dissonance (inconsistency)--"Two cognitive elements are in a dissonant relation if, considering these two alone, the obverse of one element follows from the other [pp. 260-61]."
3. Irrelevance (nonconsistency)--"Two cognitive elements are in an irrelevant relation if they have nothing to do with one another [p. 261]."

But what, we may ask immediately, is the conceptual and operational meaning of "follows from," "obverse of," or "have nothing to do with," or even "relation"? Nowhere does dissonance theory define these terms operationally or provide adequate guiding conceptual definitions, including the most recent reformulations of the theory by Brehm and Cohen (1962), Festinger himself (1964), and Aronson (1969). Pepitone's (1966) discussion of these problems is particularly relevant here. On the problem of defining dissonance in terms of "obverseness," for example, he writes:

> Obviously, this is the most abstract conception of inconsistency encountered in the models discussed; there are no indications as to the empirical meaning of "obverseness." Whereas balance specifies some types of unit formations--e.g., ownership, neighboring, belonging, etc.--and "neobalance" lists some of the positive or negative attitude relations which can exist between two cognitive elements,

> dissonance theory specifies no rules of correspondence with the empirical plane. In such a circumstance, how does one proceed to define obverseness in the laboratory? How, indeed, can one formulate and test dissonance hypotheses at all, if the model does not say how to define dissonance empirically? The absence of a definition of obverseness can only mean that dissonance experiments are generated by intuition and by extrapolation from other experiments. (pp. 265-66)

In lieu of such needed operational definitions, however, dissonance theorists and researchers typically give some examples of what they mean, such as the following (see Aronson, 1969):

1. The cognition that "smoking cigarettes causes cancer" would be consonant with the cognition that a person "does not smoke cigarettes," but dissonant with the cognition that he "does smoke cigarettes," and irrelevant to the cognition that he "plans to go to Europe next summer."
2. The cognition that a person "has voted for George McGovern" would be consonant with the cognition that he "is a liberal democrat," but dissonant with the cognition that he "likes Richard Nixon (or George Wallace)," and irrelevant to the cognition that he "believes in flying saucers."

But these intuitively reasonable examples--describing cognitive situations which almost everyone would agree are consonant, dissonant, or irrelevant--still do not provide us with any useful operational clues to the meaning of "follows from," "obverse of," or "have nothing to do with." What, for instance, is the empirical basis for saying that the cognition that a person "likes Richard Nixon" does not follow from the cognition that he "has voted for George McGovern"? Dissonance theory provides none, but it does suggest a simple rule of thumb for saying so: violation of an expectancy (Aronson, 1969). Thus if we know that a person is a liberal democrat, for example, we expect that he will be more likely to vote for or like George McGovern than Richard Nixon. But if he tells us that he intends to vote for or likes Richard Nixon, this (according to the theory) would violate our expectations about the behavior of liberal democrats. Yet, we may ask further of the theory: What is the empirical foundation for these psychological expectations? How can they be defined, operationally? What is the conceptual and operational meaning of the terms "violation of an expectancy"?

A Conformity and Deviance Model of Cognitive Inconsistency

The empirical or experiential foundation for such expectations would seem to be that we have observed that certain combinations of cognitions (or attitudes and behavior) tend to be quite common or frequent; that being a liberal democrat, for example, tends to be frequently associated with voting for or liking liberal democratic presidential candidates such as George McGovern; and, conversely, not associated or infrequently associated with voting for or liking conservative republicans such as Richard Nixon.[2] Thus a liberal democrat who votes for or likes Nixon violates our expectancy concerning the typical or usual combination of attitudes and behavior. To put it differently, frequently observed combinations of attitudes and behavior tend to be seen and assumed as going together or "consistent," and infrequently observed combinations, as not going together or "inconsistent" (or even "nonconsistent").

Conceptually speaking, these notions form the basis for taking what can be called a conformity and deviance approach to the analysis of cognitive or

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[2]This frequency of combinations notion is based, in part, on Jackson and Curtis' (1968) conceptualization of status consistency dimensions.

attitudinal inconsistency. To illustrate this approach, let us consider the hypothetical relationship presented in Table 1.1. As shown in this illustrative table, persons who like McGovern definitely tend to dislike Nixon and vice versa. That is, in terms of our typical or common frequency approach, the combination of attitudes "like McGovern" and "dislike Nixon" may be seen as going together or consistent; and, the combination of "like McGovern" and "like Nixon," as not going together or inconsistent.

When we consider this approach more carefully, it becomes apparent that we are actually describing a certain kind of conformity or deviance (or nonconformity)![3] This assertion is based on an important distinction between two different descriptive criteria of conformity and nonconformity: what Beloff (1958) has called "conventionality" and "acquiescence" and, more recently, what Hollander and Willis (1967) have called "congruence" and "movement" conformity. Operationally, Beloff has defined conventionality as "high agreement between an individual's response and the mean or modal response of his group or class"--and acquiescence as "the amount of shift from

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[3]Conformity here means conformity to the population of which an individual is a part; that is, conformity to a membership rather than a reference group. This method of conceptualizing and measuring consistency has also been characterized by McGuire (1960) as "the population parameter method."

Table 1.1

Hypothetical Relationship Between Attitudes Toward George McGovern and Richard Nixon

DO YOU LIKE OR DISLIKE RICHARD NIXON?	DO YOU LIKE OR DISLIKE GEORGE McGOVERN?	
	Like George McGovern	Dislike George McGovern
Like Richard Nixon	20%	80%
Dislike Richard Nixon	80	20
Total Percent	100%	100%
Number	(50)	(50)

NOTE: The Yule's Q coefficient for this hypothetical relationship would be -.88.

private to public opinion [Hollander and Willis, 1967, p. 64]." Similarly, Hollander and Willis have defined congruence conformity (or deviance) "in terms of the extent of agreement between a given response and the normative ideal--and movement conformity "in terms of a change in response resulting in a greater or lesser degree of congruence [p. 64]."

It should be clear from these definitions, then, that there is a close correspondence between our frequent combinations conception of cognitive consistency and Hollander's and Willis' concept of congruence conformity (and Beloff's conventionality). In terms of our example in Table 1.1, we would say that individuals who "like McGovern" and "dislike Nixon" (or vice versa) are exhibiting congruence conformity, while those who "like McGovern and also "like Nixon" (or dislike both) are exhibiting incongruence or deviance.

To further increase the convergence between these conceptions, we can operationally define cognitive inconsistency as: the degree of agreement (or difference) between an individual's combination of cognitions (beliefs, attitudes, values) and the mean or modal combination of cognitions for his population group or subgroup. Methodologically and statistically speaking, this operational definition means that cognitive inconsistency should be

measured in terms of some type of deviation or difference score; for example, residual deviation from a linear regression prediction for the relation between two or more cognitions (i.e., the difference between an individual's predicted score and his actual score); or, simply, the difference between an individual's scores on two related cognitive dimensions. Thus, the greater the deviation or difference score, the greater the cognitive inconsistency and vice versa.

In summary, we have seen that one possible solution to the problem of defining and measuring cognitive inconsistency is to use a simple conformity and deviance model. In the following two chapters on Method and Results, we will, in fact, apply this approach. But first we need to briefly consider some conceptually and methodologically related problems in the sociological study of status inconsistency.

Conceptual and Methodological Problems in the Study of Status Inconsistency

Beginning with Benoit-Smullyan's (1944) article on "Status, Status Types and Status Interrelationships," the general notion of consistency among an individual's ranks on various dimensions of social status (e.g., income, education, occupational prestige) has been of central

importance in the analysis of social stratification. Historically, however, Gerhard Lenski (1954) has been credited with the theoretical identification of the status consistency construct--which he formulated as follows:

> Theoretically it becomes possible to conceive of a nonvertical dimension to individual or family status--that is, a consistency dimension. In this dimension units may be compared with respect to the degree of consistency of their positions in the several vertical hierarchies. In other words, certain units may be consistently high or consistently low, while others may combine high standing with respect to certain status variables with low standing with respect to others [Lenski, 1954, p. 405].

Lenski's original (1954) research on status consistency (or status crystallization as he also called it) showed that it accounted for some of the previously unexplained variance in American political behavior. For example, he found that status inconsistency, regardless of the type of inconsistency, tended to be associated with liberal political attitudes and behavior such as support for the democratic party.

But while Lenski's formulation and findings have stimulated a large amount of empirical research on the relationship between status consistency and various socio-political attitudes and behavior (see, for example, Broom, 1970; Goffman, 1957; Kelly, 1966; Kenkel, 1956; Laumann and Segal, 1971; Lenski, 1956 and 1967; Olsen and Tully, 1972; Rush, 1967; Segal, 1969, Smith, 1969; and Treiman,

1966), this area of research has been plagued concomitantly with many conceptual and methodological problems (see, for example, Blalock, 1966; Jackson and Curtis, 1968; Kasl, 1969; Mitchell, 1964; and Nam and Powers, 1965). As identified and summarized by Kasl (1969), the major problems in this area include: (a) the problem of choice of the status components or dimensions to be used in measuring status inconsistency (e.g., whether to include ethnic characteristics such as race or nationality in a status inconsistency index); (b) the problem of association between certain types of status inconsistency and stages of the life cycle (e.g., low income and high education is a common type of status inconsistency for family heads under 35); (c) the problem of the size of the intercorrelations between the various dimensions of status (i.e., the correlations may be too high or too low); (d) the problem of control for overall socioeconomic status in relating status inconsistency to selected dependent variables (e.g., individuals who are very high or very low on overall socioeconomic status cannot be very status inconsistent); and, finally, (e) the problem of defining and measuring status inconsistency, given the conceptual and methodological complexities in this area.

Needless to say, we will not attempt to solve all or even most of these problems as they are beyond the

scope of the present research. Rather, we will be concerned now with defining and measuring status inconsistency, and interrelating it--operationally and empirically--to cognitive or attitude inconsistency.

Defining and Measuring Status Inconsistency in Terms of Deviance or Difference

Probably the most efficient way of operationally defining the construct of status inconsistency is in terms of the simple conformity and deviance model used to operationally define the construct of cognitive inconsistency. That is, we can operationally define status inconsistency as: the degree of agreement (or difference) between an individual's combination of statuses (e.g., education and income) and the mean or modal combination of statuses for his population group or class. Similarly, this operational definition dictates that status inconsistency should also be measured in terms of some type of deviation or difference score. And, correspondingly, the greater the deviation or difference score, the greater the status inconsistency and vice versa.

New or efficient operational definitions alone, however, are not sufficient for the purpose of scientific research. To gain acceptance, they must sooner or later be empirically illustrated and tested as part of a

hypothesis or theory. We now turn our attention to this task; that is, to constructing an hypothesis which empirically relates the variables status inconsistency and cognitive or attitude inconsistency within an overall theoretical framework.

Hypothesis: Status Inconsistency and Cognitive Inconsistency

The correspondence between our operational definitions of status inconsistency and cognitive inconsistency would, itself, suggest a simple hypothesis: The greater an individual's status inconsistency, the greater will be his cognitive or attitudinal inconsistency with respect to relevant cognitive (attitude) objects.

Status Inconsistency as Social Cross-Pressure

One theoretical foundation for this hypothesis is that status inconsistency is a special case of the more general phenomenon of social cross-pressure. As originally formulated by Lazarsfeld and his co-workers (Berelson et al., 1954; Lazarsfeld et al., 1944), the social cross-pressure hypothesis states that individuals whose social characteristics (e.g., occupation, race, religion) predispose them in different directions (e.g., both pro-democratic and pro-republican) will tend to have more conflicting or

inconsistent attitudes, for example, than individuals whose sociodemographic characteristics predispose them in the same partisan direction (see Flanigan, 1972; Sperlich, 1971). Thus, status inconsistency can be conceptualized in terms of socioeconomic characteristics (education, income, and occupation) which may predispose an individual in various partisan directions. For example, previous research on American voting behavior (Berelson et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960; Lazarsfeld et al., 1944) would suggest that individuals of high socioeconomic status or class are predisposed in a republican or conservative direction, while those of low socioeconomic class status are predisposed in a democratic or liberal direction. Thus an individual who is high on one status dimension (e.g., income) predisposing him in a republican or "right" direction and low an another status dimension (e.g., education level) predisposing him in a democratic or "left" direction could be said to be under social cross-pressure. Such an individual, according to theory, would be expected to have some inconsistent or conflicting attitudes toward each party, their left-right policy positions, or their candidates--e.g., having positive and/or negative attitudes toward the presidential candidates of both parties or other candidates along a general left-right continuum.

To summarize, one theoretical foundation for our hypothesis is that status inconsistency is a special type of social cross-pressure which tends to produce conflicting or inconsistent attitudes in individuals who are differentially predisposed by such pressures in both left-liberal-democratic and right-conservative-republican partisan directions, for instance, rather than in the same "consistent" partisan direction. In brief, we have formulated a more refined operational test of Paul Lazarsfeld's seminal social cross-pressures hypothesis.

We will now describe the data, methods of measurement, and analyses used to test the status inconsistency-cognitive or attitude inconsistency hypothesis, as well as additional secondary analyses of the present data.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

Methodologically speaking, the present research involved what is called a secondary analysis of sample survey data (see especially Hyman, 1972). More specifically, the data used in the present research were drawn from the 1968 American National Election Study conducted by the Survey Research Center Political Behavior Program of the Institute for Social Research at The University of Michigan.[1] For a detailed description of the 1968 election study design and relevant sampling information, the reader should see the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research's codebook for The SRC 1968 American National Election Study (1971)--to be designated hereafter as simply the Codebook. And for a background description and discussion of the major substantive findings for the 1968 election study, the reader is referred

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[1]These data were made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research and provided locally by the Michigan State University Political Science Data Archive. Needless to say, neither the original collectors of the data nor the consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.

to Converse et al. (1969); see also, Bishop et al. (1972).

Cases and Dataset

The total number of data cases used in the present study was 1168, reduced from an original total of 1673 cases available in the 1968 election dataset. The raw N of 1673 consisted of: (a) A national cross-section sample of 1557 respondents and (b) A black supplement sample of 116 respondents. The reduced working N of 1168 was obtained by excluding those cases containing missing data codes for any one of the following six main study variables: education level, income level, occupational prestige, and attitudes toward the three major 1968 presidential candidates Humphrey, Nixon, and Wallace. Thus the data reported in this paper are not technically based on a valid cross-sectional sample of United States citizens. However, since the present research was focused on the relationships among these variables, rather than on precisely estimating their distributions in the American adult population, the resultant reduction in external validity (Campbell and Stanley, 1963) or generalizability is of somewhat lesser significance than in a more conventional survey research design.

Variables and Indices

The indices of the main variables used to test the primary hypothesis of the present study--socioeconomic status, status inconsistency, attitudes toward presidential candidates Humphrey, Nixon, and Wallace, and attitude or cognitive inconsistency--were constructed in the following manner.

Socioeconomic Status and Status Inconsistency

First, the three traditional indicators of an individual's general socioeconomic status were used:

1. Level of Education--measured by the total number of grades of school completed plus any non-college vocational or technical training (Codebook, 1971, pp. 82-84).
2. Income Level--measured by total family income for the current year (Codebook, 1971, pp. 132-33).
3. Occupational Prestige--measured by Duncan's (1961) index of occupational prestige (Codebook, 1971, pp. 91-92).

For a more detailed description of these three variables, including their means and standard deviations,

the reader is referred to Appendix A of the present dissertation.

A Regression Approach to Measuring Status Inconsistency.--Originally, the writer had planned to use a simple linear regression approach to the measurement of status inconsistency suggested by Kasl (1969). This approach would have involved obtaining a linear regression equation for the relation between education level (X) and income level (Y), for example, and then deriving a status inconsistency score for each individual by taking the difference between his predicted (expected) and obtained (actual) score--with a status inconsistency score defined as = $Y-\hat{Y}$, where:

$\hat{Y} = a+bX$ = predicted income level

Y = obtained income level

X = obtained education level

a = a coefficient in a linear regression equation

b = coefficient for linear regression of Y on X

Following Kasl (1969), a positive status inconsistency score in this example would indicate that an individual's income level is higher than expected on the basis of his education level and vice versa; that is, the higher the score (positive or negative), the greater the status inconsistency. To put it differently, the absolute

size of the score would measure the amount of status inconsistency; and the sign of the score, the type of status inconsistency. Finally, some arbitrary low score would have to be defined as the cutoff-point for "status consistency."

Although this approach was quite sufficient for the purpose of measuring status inconsistency, it was abandoned because of problems of zero correlation and non-linearity in the presidential candidate attitude data (see the section below on attitude inconsistency). That is, originally the writer had intended to use a regression approach to the measurement of both status inconsistency and cognitive or attitude inconsistency, an approach which assumed that the form of the relationship between variables is linear. This assumption was sufficiently met for the relationships among the three status dimensions, but only partially or hardly at all for the relationships among some of the three candidate attitude variables. Thus the regression approach was discarded and another approach attempted.

A Subgroup Approach to Measuring Status Inconsistency.--Another approach which was used to measure status inconsistency involved breaking down both the status and attitude dimensions into a number of ordered subgroups and

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combinations of subgroups (see Kasl, 1969) and, then, examining the relationships between pairs of status and attitude dimensions within each combination of subgroups (for a more detailed description of this approach and the results that were generated by it, the reader should see Appendix B).

While this subgroup approach resulted in some rather interesting findings, it was considered too cumbersome for the purpose of the present research, since it involved a heavy reliance on traditional countersorter techniques of data processing (see Appendix B). However, it does represent a potentially useful technique (albeit in rudimentary form) for studying deviant subgroups and combinations of subgroup interaction effects. In any case, a third approach to measuring status inconsistency was tried and adopted.

A Difference Score Measure of Status Inconsistency.--The third and final approach that was used to measure status inconsistency involved the use of simple difference scores (see Magnusson, 1967). Specifically, status inconsistency was defined as the difference between an individual's scores on each of the following pairs of status dimensions: (a) Education level and occupational prestige, (b) Education level and income level, and

(c) Income level and occupational prestige. This approach assumed, of course, that these three status dimensions were significantly related to one another. Table 2.1 shows the Pearson product-moment correlations among the status variables of education level, income level, and occupational prestige.

As shown in Table 2.1, there were moderately substantial, statistically significant correlations among the three socioeconomic status variables.[2] These results permitted construction of the following difference score index of status inconsistency. First, each individual's score(s) on the variables of education level, income level, and occupational prestige were transformed into comparable units: standard(Z) scores. Next, status inconsistency scores were obtained for each individual

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[2]Some readers may feel that while these correlations are statistically significant, they are not particularly high in terms of percentage of variance accounted for; that is, they are not substantively significant. It should be noted, however, that a moderate level of correlation (.40 to .60) among these variables is desirable for two main reasons. For one, if the correlations are too high, only a very small proportion of the sample will qualify as status inconsistent; on the other hand, if the correlations are too low, consistency between unrelated or negligibly related status dimensions becomes meaningless. For another, the difference scores indices of inconsistency described below can be assumed to be more reliable, if the separate scores on which they are based are less correlated or even uncorrelated with one another (see, for example, Magnusson, 1967, pp. 93-94). Thus it would seem that these variables should be moderately correlated with one another.

Table 2.1

Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Among Status Variables: Education Level, Income Level, and Occupational Prestige

(N = 1168)

STATUS VARIABLE	Education Level	Income Level	Occupational Prestige
Education Level	----	.52*	.55*
Income Level		----	.49*
Occupational Prestige			----

* P < .001

by taking the difference(s) between his Z-scores on each of the three possible pairs of status variables: (a) Education level-occupational prestige, (b) Education level-income level, and (c) Income level-occupational prestige. For example, a difference score for income level and occupational prestige is defined here as = Z_1-Z_2, where:

Z_1 = a standard score for income level

Z_2 = a standard score for occupational prestige

Thus, as in the regression approach described previously,[3] a positive difference score would indicate that an individual's occupational prestige is higher than expected on the basis of his income level and vice versa for a negative difference score. Or, as expressed similarly before, the absolute size of the difference score measures the amount or level of status inconsistency--i.e., the higher the difference score, the greater the status inconsistency--while the sign or direction of the score (+ or -) indicates the type of status inconsistency.

To summarize, three difference score indicators of an individual's status inconsistency were obtained:

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[3]The careful reader will note the essential statistical equivalencies between these two approaches; e.g., index scores from both methods would be very highly intercorrelated.

1. Education level Z-score minus occupational prestige Z-score
2. Education level Z-score minus income level Z-score
3. Income level Z-score minus occupational prestige Z-score

While these difference score indicators are obviously empirically related to one another, they may represent quite different psychological realities to particular individuals; for example, the high occupational prestige-low income minister or the high income-low education truck driver. That is to say, status inconsistency, like most things, is relative to the individual perceiver.

Candidate Attitudes and Attitude Inconsistency

The "cognitions" used in this study were attitudes toward the three major presidential candidates in the 1968 American national election: Hubert Humphrey, Richard Nixon, and George Wallace. These attitudes were measured in a post-election survey by a "feeling thermometer" which involved having respondents indicate their warm or cold feelings toward each candidate along a 0 to 100 degrees rating scale, with 50 degrees representing a neutral point or absence of feeling for the candidate;

51 to 100 degrees, warm feelings; and 0 to 49 degrees, cold feelings (see Appendix A for a detailed description of this instrument). Table 2.2 shows the feeling thermometer means and standard deviations for candidates Humphrey, Nixon, and Wallace.

As shown in Table 2.2, the respondents in the present study had moderately favorable feelings, on the average, toward both Humphrey and Nixon and fairly cold or unfavorable feelings toward Wallace.[4] It is also interesting to note here that Wallace as an attitude object apparently elicited the strongest feeling reactions in either direction, as indicated by a large standard deviation compared to Humphrey and Nixon.

A Difference Score Measure of Attitude Inconsistency.--As mentioned previously, the writer had originally intended to use a regression approach to the measurement of both status and attitude inconsistency. However, as noted, problems of zero correlation and

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[4]The similarity between the overall mean ratings for Humphrey and Nixon raise several interesting points; for example, how much of Nixon's positive rating is due to post-election halo effects with regard to winning presidential candidates? Or are the closeness of these two ratings due to an even more general constant error of positive or negative tendencies to evaluate politicians as all good or bad? For another possible interpretation still, see the discussion section of this dissertation, concerning behavior-attitude consistency among voters and non-voters.

Table 2.2

Feeling Thermometer Means and Standard Deviations for 1968 Presidential Candidates: Humphrey, Nixon, and Wallace

(N = 1168)

1968 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE	FEELING THERMOMETER RATINGS	
	Arithmetic Mean	Standard Deviation
Hubert Humphrey	60.76	27.95
Richard Nixon	65.41	23.13
George Wallace	31.17	30.57

NOTE: The feeling thermometer means for Humphrey, Nixon, and Wallace in the national cross-section sample (Converse et al., 1969) were 61.7, 66.5, and 31.4, respectively. Standard deviations were not reported by these researchers, however.

non-linearity were found for some of the relationships among candidate attitudes. Table 2.3 shows the Pearson product-moment and eta correlations among affective attitudes (feelings) toward Humphrey, Nixon, and Wallace.

The data presented in Table 2.3 show that the only relationship which was both sufficiently linear in nature and statistically significant was that between attitude toward Humphrey and attitude toward Wallace. And while the eta values shown for the Humphrey-Nixon and Nixon-Wallace pairs were undoubtedly inflated, to some extent, due to the continuous nature of these variables, they indicated a large enough departure from linearity so as to rule out any simple linear regression approach to the measurement of candidate attitude inconsistency.

For these and other reasons noted earlier, the simple difference score approach was adopted to measure attitude, as well as status, inconsistency. However, this measure was applicable only to the Humphrey-Wallace pair since it represented the one significant linear relationship between candidate attitudes. In other words, difference scores as indices of inconsistency are meaningful only to the extent that they are based on correlated variables. Thus since the Humphrey-Nixon and Nixon-Wallace pairs were uncorrelated, difference scores for

Table 2.3

Pearson Product-Moment and Eta Correlations
Among Affective Attitudes Toward
Humphrey, Nixon, and Wallace

(N = 1168)

AFFECTIVE ATTITUDE VARIABLE	Humphrey		Nixon		Wallace	
	R =	Eta =	R =	Eta =	R =	Eta =
Humphrey	----	----	.00	.45[a]	-.29	.33[b]
Nixon			----	----	.00	.20[c]
Wallace					----	----

* P < .001

[a] The eta value shown is for Nixon as independent variable and Humphrey as dependent variable. The converse eta is .34.

[b] The eta is for Wallace as independent variable and Humphrey as dependent variable. The converse value is .31.

[c] The eta is for Wallace as independent variable and Nixon as dependent variable. The converse value is .09.

these pairs should represent mostly random errors. In short, the measure of candidate attitude inconsistency in the present research had to be limited to Humphrey-Wallace attitude inconsistency.

The difference score measure of Humphrey-Wallace attitude inconsistency was constructed as follows. First, each individual's scores on attitudes toward Humphrey and Wallace were transformed into standard (Z) score form. Then, an attitude inconsistency score was obtained for each respondent from the difference between his Z-score on Humphrey and his Z-score on Wallace, with the difference score defined as = Z_1-Z_2, where:

Z_1 = a standard score for Wallace

Z_2 = a standard score for Humphrey

Because the correlation between attitude toward Humphrey and Wallace was in negative direction, however, large difference scores here represent attitude consistency; small difference scores, attitude inconsistency. Thus, a high positive difference score would indicate that an individual has a consistent attitude which is relatively positive toward Wallace and negative toward Humphrey, while a high negative difference score would show that he has a consistent attitude which is relatively positive toward Humphrey and negative toward Wallace. On the other hand,

a small positive difference score would show that a person has an inconsistent attitude which is relatively positive toward both Humphrey and Wallace; and a small negative difference score, an inconsistent attitude which is relatively negative toward both Humphrey and Wallace.

To summarize, the absolute size of the difference score here measures the amount or level of Humphrey-Wallace attitude inconsistency--i.e., the larger the difference score, the greater the attitude consistency--while the sign or direction of the difference score (+ or -) indicates the type of Humphrey-Wallace attitude inconsistency.

Data Transformations

To keep track of the direction and qualitative types of status and attitude inconsistency (as well as the possibility of additional non-linear relationships), the status and attitude difference scores data were transformed into a set of categories according to level and type of inconsistency as follows.

Status Consistency-Inconsistency Types

The status inconsistency difference scores were recoded into six categories according to the following rules:

1. If the difference score was less than -1.00 standard deviation below the mean of the difference scores (M = 0.00), it was recoded into the category: status inconsistent-high negative type.

2. If the difference score was greater than -1.00 standard deviation and less than -.50 standard deviation below the mean, it was recoded into: status inconsistent-medium negative type.

3. If the difference score was greater than -.50 and less than .00 standard deviation(s), it was recoded into: status consistent-low negative type.

4. If the difference score was greater than .00 and less than +.50 standard deviation(s), it was recoded into: status consistent-low positive type.

5. If the difference score was greater than +.50 and less than +1.00 standard deviation(s), it was recoded into: status inconsistent-medium positive type.

6. If the difference score was greater than +1.00 standard deviation, it was recoded into: status inconsistent-high positive type.

Figure 1 shows a schematic diagram of the level and type of status consistency-inconsistency.

Finally, these rules were applied to each of the three possible forms of status inconsistency: (a) Education-occupational prestige status inconsistency, (b) Education-income status inconsistency, and (c) Income-occupational prestige status inconsistency.



Figure 1

Schematic Diagram of Level and Type of Status Consistency-Inconsistency

Attitude Consistency-
Inconsistency Types

Similarly, the attitude inconsistency difference scores were recoded into six categories according to the following rules:

1. If the difference score was less than -1.00 standard deviation below the mean of the difference scores (M = 0.00) it was recoded into the category: attitude consistent-high negative type.

2. If the difference score was greater than -1.00 standard deviation and less than -.50 standard deviation below the mean, it was recoded into: attitude consistent-medium negative type.

3. If the difference score was greater than -.50 and less than .00 standard deviation(s), it was recoded into: attitude inconsistent-low negative type.

4. If the difference score was greater than .00 and less than +.50 standard deviation(s), it was recoded into: attitude inconsistent-low positive type.

5. If the difference score was greater than +.50 and less than +1.00 standard deviation(s), it was recoded into: attitude consistent-medium positive type.

6. If the difference score was greater than +1.00 standard deviation, it was recoded into: attitude consistent-high positive type.

Figure 2 shows a schematic diagram of the level and type of attitude consistency-inconsistency.

Finally, these rules were applied to the attitude inconsistency scores for the Humphrey-Wallace form of attitude consistency-inconsistency.



Figure 2

Schematic Diagram of Level and Type of Attitude Consistency-Inconsistency

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

We can best begin this chapter by restating the primary hypothesis tested in terms of the variables operationalized in the previous chapter: The greater an individual's socioeconomic status inconsistency, the greater will be his cognitive or attitudinal inconsistency with respect to the 1968 presidential candidates--Humphrey, (Nixon), and Wallace.

Status Inconsistency and Humphrey-Wallace Attitude Inconsistency

Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 summarize the relationships between the level and type of status inconsistency for the three possible forms of status inconsistency (i.e., education-occupational prestige, education-income, and income-occupational prestige) and the level and type of Humphrey-Wallace attitude inconsistency.

Examination of the data presented in these three tables reveals negative or negligible support for the status inconsistency-attitude inconsistency hypothesis. And although one of the chi-square tests (Table 3.1)

Table 3.1

Table 3.1

Relationship Between Level and Type of Education-Occupational Prestige Status Inconsistency and Level and Type of Humphrey-Wallace Attitude Inconsistency

Level and Type of Humphrey-Wallace Attitude Inconsistency	Level and Type of Education-Occupational Prestige Status Inconsistency					
	STATUS INCONSISTENT[a]		STATUS CONSISTENT		STATUS INCONSISTENT[b]	
	High Neg N = 173	Med Neg N = 170	Low Neg N = 250	Low Pos N = 232	Med Pos N = 141	High Pos N = 202
ATTITUDE CONSISTENT[c]						
High Positive	16%	18%	18%	13%	16%	13%
Medium Positive	20	12	13	13	13	7
ATTITUDE INCONSISTENT						
Low Positive	16	16	14	20	12	18
Low Negative	15	21	16	20	21	20
ATTITUDE CONSISTENT[d]						
Medium Negative	21	15	19	21	20	19
High Negative	12	18	20	13	18	23
TOTAL PERCENT	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

NOTE: $X^2 = 38.54$, df = 25, $P < .05$, contingency coefficient (C) = .18.

[a] Occupational prestige is greater than education level.

[b] Education level is greater than occupational prestige.

[c] Positive Wallace attitude and negative Humphrey attitude.

[d] Positive Humphrey attitude and negative Wallace attitude.

Table 3.2

Relationship Betweel Level and Type of Education-Income Status Inconsistency and Level and Type of Humphrey-Wallace Attitude Inconsistency

Level and Type of Humphrey-Wallace Attitude Inconsistency	Level and Type of Education-Income Status Inconsistency					
	STATUS INCONSISTENT[a]		STATUS CONSISTENT		STATUS INCONSISTENT[b]	
	High Neg N = 141	Med Neg N = 192	Low Neg N = 257	Low Pos N = 241	Med Pos N = 163	High Pos N = 174
ATTITUDE CONSISTENT[c]						
High Positive	20%	14%	11%	19%	18%	14%
Medium Positive	15	15	17	14	9	6
ATTITUDE INCONSISTENT						
Low Positive	18	18	16	14	15	19
Low Negative	16	16	19	18	16	25
ATTITUDE CONSISTENT[d]						
Medium Negative	18	20	20	18	24	15
High Negative	13	17	17	17	18	21
TOTAL PERCENT	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

NOTE: $X^2 = 35.96$, df = 25, $P > .05$, contingency coefficient = .17.

[a] Income level is greater than education level.

[b] Education is greater than income level.

[c] Positive Wallace attitude and negative Humphrey attitude.

[d] Positive Humphrey attitude and negative Wallace attitude.

Table 3.3

Relationship Between Level and Type of Income-Occupational Prestige Status Inconsistency and Level and Type of Humphrey-Wallace Attitude Inconsistency

Level and Type of Humphrey-Wallace Attitude Inconsistency	Level and Type of Income-Occupational Prestige Status Inconsistency					
	STATUS INCONSISTENT[a]		STATUS CONSISTENT		STATUS INCONSISTENT[b]	
	High Neg N = 179	Med Neg N = 163	Low Neg N = 247	Low Pos N = 246	Med Pos N = 142	High Pos N = 191
ATTITUDE CONSISTENT[c]						
High Positive	15%	19%	18%	14%	14%	14%
Medium Positive	13	13	13	13	20	8
ATTITUDE INCONSISTENT						
Low Positive	17	12	17	19	13	18
Low Negative	22	20	17	17	16	18
ATTITUDE CONSISTENT[d]						
Medium Negative	19	20	14	23	17	23
High Negative	14	16	21	14	20	19
TOTAL PERCENT	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

NOTE: $X^2 = 30.64$, df = 25, $P > .10$, contingency coefficient = .16.

[a] Occupational prestige is greater than income level.

[b] Income level is greater than occupational prestige.

[c] Positive Wallace attitude and negative Humphrey attitude.

[d] Positive Humphrey attitude and negative Wallace attitude.

indicated that there was some type of significant relationship between education-occupational prestige status inconsistency and the Humphrey-Wallace attitude inconsistency, the degree of relationship between these variables, as shown by the contingency coefficient, was quite low. Moreover, when we consider the extremely large size of the present sample (N = 1168) and also the large size of the contingency table here (6 x 6)--two factors which tend to spuriously inflate the value, and thus the significance, of chi-square and related statistics such as the contingency coefficient--the statistical significance of this result becomes trifling compared to its substantive significance; that is, percentage of variance accounted for. Finally, it is worth noting that, among the high status inconsistents in Table 3.1 there was a slight tendency for those whose occupational prestige was much lower than their education level to have a "consistent" attitude which was positive toward Wallace and negative toward Humphrey--a trend which runs counter to the originally hypothesized direction of relationship. That is, it was found here that extreme status inconsistency tended to be associated with attitude consistency rather than inconsistency. In brief, the findings on the main hypothesis were disconfirming.

Additional Analyses of the Data

In this section, we will do some additional analyses of the data in order to explore some unhypothesized relationships of interest. First, we will investigate the relationships between the various types of status inconsistency and presidential voting behavior or preference in 1968; and second, the relationships among voting behavior, attitude inconsistency, and psychological involvement in politics.

Status Inconsistency and Voting Behavior

Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 summarize the relationships between the various types of status inconsistency and presidential voting behavior or preference for Humphrey, Nixon, and Wallace in 1968.[1] As shown in these three tables, the relationships between the various types of status inconsistency and presidential voting behavior or preference in 1968 were not statistically significant.

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[1]This variable was measured in the post-election survey by the following question: "Who did you vote for in the election for president?" (If didn't vote) "Who would you have voted for for president if you had voted? [Codebook, 1971, pp. 174-75]." For the present analysis, respondents who did not vote, nor indicate a preference, for Humphrey, Nixon, or Wallace (e.g., voted for some other candidates, refused to say for who, etc.) were recoded into a general residual category: other.

Table 3.4

Relationship Between Level and Type of Education-Occupational Prestige Status Inconsistency and Presidential Voting Behavior or Preference in 1968

Presidential Voting Behavior or Preference in 1968	Level and Type of Education-Occupational Prestige Status Inconsistency					
	STATUS INCONSISTENT[a]		STATUS CONSISTENT		STATUS INCONSISTENT[b]	
	High Neg N = 173	Med Neg N = 170	Low Neg N = 250	Low Pos N = 232	Med Pos N = 141	High Pos N = 232
Voted for Humphrey	30%	30%	36%	35%	29%	34%
Non-Voter: Humphrey Preference	10	8	9	7	11	10
Non-Voter: Nixon Preference	10	7	5	9	6	8
Voted for Nixon	28	36	36	35	36	33
Non-Voter: Wallace Preference	6	2	2	2	6	2
Voted for Wallace	9	8	8	8	8	7
Residual: Other	7	9	4	4	4	6
TOTAL PERCENT	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

NOTE: $X^2 = 30.34$, df = 30, $P > .25$, contingency coefficient = .16.

[a] Occupational prestige is greater than education level.

[b] Education level is greater than occupational prestige.

Table 3.5

Relationship Between Level and Type of Education-Income Status Inconsistency and Presidential Voting Behavior or Preference in 1968

Presidential Voting Behavior or Preference in 1968	Level and Type of Education-Income Status Inconsistency					
	STATUS INCONSISTENT[a]		STATUS CONSISTENT		STATUS INCONSISTENT[b]	
	High Neg N = 141	Med Neg N = 192	Low Neg N = 257	Low Pos N = 241	Med Pos N = 163	High Pos N = 174
Voted for Humphrey	42%	29%	35%	33%	31%	29%
Non-Voter: Humphrey Preference	6	8	8	8	12	12
Non-Voter: Nixon Preference	7	9	8	8	5	8
Voted for Nixon	21	37	34	34	36	39
Non-Voter: Wallace Preference	5	4	2	3	4	2
Voted for Wallace	12	10	7	7	7	5
Residual: Other	7	3	6	7	5	5
TOTAL PERCENT	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

NOTE: $X^2 = 37.35$, df = 30, $P > .10$, contingency coefficient = .18.

[a] Income level is greater than education level.

[b] Education level is greater than income level.

Table 3.6

Relationship Between Level and Type of Income-Occupational Prestige Status Inconsistency and Presidential Voting Behavior or Preference in 1968

Presidential Voting Behavior or Preference in 1968	Level and Type of Income-Occupational Prestige Status Inconsistency					
	STATUS INCONSISTENT[a]		STATUS CONSISTENT		STATUS INCONSISTENT[b]	
	High Neg N = 179	Med Neg N = 163	Low Neg N = 247	Low Pos N = 246	Med Pos N = 142	High Pos N = 191
Voted for Humphrey	28%	26%	34%	33%	33%	41%
Non-Voter: Humphrey Preference	9	10	12	11	6	4
Non-Voter: Nixon Preference	9	8	7	6	12	6
Voted for Nixon	38	39	33	33	30	31
Non-Voter: Wallace Preference	2	3	3	2	3	4
Voted for Wallace	8	7	7	7	11	9
Residual: Other	6	7	4	8	5	5
TOTAL PERCENT	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

NOTE: $X^2 = 38.25$, df = 30, $P > .10$, contingency coefficient = .18.

[a] Occupational prestige is greater than income level.

[b] Income level is greater than occupational prestige.

There are, however, some trends in these data worth noting. For example, among the high status inconsistents in Table 3.5 there was a tendency for those whose education level was much lower than their income level to vote for Humphrey over Nixon, while those whose education level was much higher than their income level tended to vote for Nixon over Humphrey. And, also, among the high status inconsistents (Table 3.6) there was a tendency for those whose occupational prestige was much lower than their income to vote for Humphrey over Nixon, while those whose occupational prestige was much higher than their income level tended to vote for Nixon over Humphrey. Such "trends" should, of course, be cautiously regarded given the general pattern of negative results presented previously.

Voting Behavior and Attitude Inconsistency

Table 3.7 shows the relationship between presidential voting behavior or preference in 1968 and the level and type of Humphrey-Wallace attitude inconsistency.

When we examine these data, it can be clearly seen that attitudinal consistency was greater among those who voted for either Humphrey or Wallace than those who "would have voted" for or preferred either Humphrey or

Table 3.7

Relationship Between Presidential Voting Behavior or Preference in 1968 and Level and Type of Humphrey-Wallace Attitude Inconsistency

Level and Type of Humphrey-Wallace Attitude Inconsistency	Presidential Voting Behavior or Preference in 1968						
	Voted for Humphrey N = 383	Non-Voter: Humphrey Preference N = 104	Non-Voter: Nixon Preference N = 91	Voted for Nixon N = 397	Non-Voter: Wallace Preference N = 34	Voted for Wallace N = 93	Residual: Other N = 66
ATTITUDE CONSISTENT[a]							
High Positive	1%	4%	7%	15%	74%	83%	14%
Medium Positive	4	7	28	16	23	15	20
ATTITUDE INCONSISTENT							
Low Positive	8	11	31	28	3	1	12
Low Negative	19	25	22	21	0	1	24
ATTITUDE CONSISTENT[b]							
Medium Negative	28	26	10	18	0	0	18
High Negative	40	27	2	2	0	0	12
TOTAL PERCENT	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

NOTE: $X^2 = 822.98$, df = 30, $P < .001$, contingency coefficient = .64.

[a] Positive Wallace attitude and negative Humphrey attitude.

[b] Positive Humphrey attitude and negative Wallace attitude.

Wallace.[2] It can also be seen that attitudinal consistency was higher among Wallace supporters than Humphrey supporters. And, finally, it is also interesting to note that Nixon supporters, as might be expected, were highly attitude inconsistent (or, better, "nonconsistent") with respect to Humphrey-Wallace attitudes.

Behavioral-Psychological Involvement in Politics

Previous research (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964; Milbrath, 1965) has shown that the greater the behavioral political involvement of an individual--as measured by his vote participation, for example--the greater will be his psychological interest or involvement in politics. The data in Table 3.8, showing the relationship between presidential voting behavior or preference in 1968 and level of interest in government and public affairs, provide a further test of this hypothesis.[3]

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[2]A further analysis of these relationships showed that there was a significant positive (product-moment) correlation between voting behavior (or preference) and attitude inconsistency among both Humphrey supporters ($r = .17$, $P < .001$) and Wallace supporters ($r = .15$, $P < .10$); that is, voters were more attitude consistent than non-voters, controlling for candidate subgroup.

[3]This variable was measured in the post-election survey by the following question: "Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you

Table 3.8

Relationship Between Presidential Voting Behavior or Preference in 1968 and Level of Interest in Government and Public Affairs

Level of Interest in Government and Public Affairs	Presidential Voting Behavior or Preference in 1968						
	Voted for Humphrey N = 383	Non-Voter: Humphrey Preference N = 104	Non-Voter: Nixon Preference N = 91	Voted for Nixon N = 397	Non-Voter: Wallace Preference N = 34	Voted for Wallace N = 93	Residual: Other N = 66
HIGH:							
Follows most of the time	37%	13%	24%	37%	21%	49%	27%
MEDIUM:							
Follows some of the time	34	26	24	37	29	22	32
LOW:							
Follows only now and then	16	32	27	16	21	20	15
VERY LOW:							
Follows hardly at all	13	29	25	10	29	9	26
TOTAL PERCENT	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

NOTE: $X^2 = 91.23$, df = 18, $P < .001$, contingency coefficient = .27.

As shown in Table 3.8, there was a highly significant relationship between these two variables. More specifically, it can be seen that those who voted for Humphrey, Nixon, or Wallace were much more interested in government and public affairs than those who "preferred" Humphrey, Nixon, or Wallace. More importantly--for the purpose of the present research--it can be seen that the highest level of interest or involvement in politics was among Wallace voters (49%) who were also the highest in level of Humphrey-Wallace attitude inconsistency (see Table 3.7).

Finally, Table 3.9 summarizes the multivariate[4] relationships among presidential vote or preference for Humphrey or Wallace, level of interest in government and public affairs,[5] and level and type of Humphrey-Wallace attitude inconsistency. As indicated in Table 3.9, there

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follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all? [Codebook, 1971, p. 246]." For the present analysis, missing data respondents were recoded into the "follows some of the time" category (the modal response category).

[4]The analysis-of-variance oriented researcher will recognize here that the elaboration model analysis (see, for example, Rosenberg, 1968) presented in Table 3.9 is essentially an analogue of a three-factor (non-randomized) design.

[5]High interest was defined in this analysis as follows "most of the time" and "some of the time," while low was defined as follows "only now and then" and "hardly at all" (see Table 3.8 and Appendix A).

Table 3.9

Multivariate Relationships Among Presidential Vote or Preference for Humphrey or Wallace, Level of Interest in Government and Public Affairs, and Level and Type of Hymphrey-Wallace Attitude Inconsistency

Level and Type of Humphrey-Wallace Attitude Inconsistency	Voted for Humphrey		Non-Voter: Humphrey Preference		Voted for Wallace		Non-Voter: Wallace Preference	
	Level of Interest in Government and Public Affairs							
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
ATTITUDE CONSISTENT[a]								
High Negative	43%	35%	28%	27%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Medium Negative	27	30	29	24	0	0	0	0
ATTITUDE INCONSISTENT								
Low Negative	16	24	29	22	1	0	0	0
Low Positive	7	9	7	14	1	0	0	6
ATTITUDE CONSISTENT[b]								
Medium Positive	6	2	5	8	11	26	24	23
High Positive	1	0	2	5	87	74	76	71
TOTAL PERCENT	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number	(271)	(112)	(41)	(63)	(66)	(27)	(17)	(17)

[a] Positive Humphrey attitude and negative Wallace attitude.

[b] Positive Wallace attitude and negative Humphrey attitude.

were strong interactions among these variables such that, for example, Humphrey-Wallace attitude consistency was highest among Wallace supporters with a high level of interest in government and public affairs and lowest among Humphrey non-voters with a low level of interest in government and public affairs. The reader is encouraged to make further examinations of the data presented in Table 3.9.

Behavioral Involvement and Level of Constraint

The relationship between behavioral political involvement (vote participation) and attitudes toward the three 1968 presidential candidates can also be analyzed in terms of Converse's (1964) concept of constraint, a notion which refers to the amount of "functional interdependence" or interconnectedness among elements in a belief-attitude system. Operationally, Converse has defined constraint in terms of the absolute degree of intercorrelation between items measuring various beliefs and attitudes. Thus the higher the absolute amount of correlation, the greater the level of constraint. Using this operational definition, Converse (1964) found, for example, that the level of constraint between various issue beliefs (e.g., domestic issues such as federal welfare spending, school desegregation) was much higher among

the politically involved elite (congressional candidates) than among the political mass (national cross-section sample, 1958).

From Converse's findings, we would expect that the level of constraint between attitudes toward Humphrey, Nixon, and Wallace--as measured by the sbsolute amount of correlation--would be higher among those who voted for these candidates (i.e., the more politically involved group) than those who did not vote, but "preferred" these candidates. Table 3.10 shows the Pearson product-moment correlations among attitudes toward Humphrey, Nixon, and Wallace--by presidential voting behavior or preference in 1968.

Examination of the data in Table 3.10 shows that there was no systematic pattern of differences between voters and non-voters in the level of constraint among attitudes toward Humphrey, Nixon, and Wallace. That is, the absolute amount of correlation for the Humphrey-Wallace pair was higher among voters (.31) than non-voters (.21), while the Humphrey-Nixon correlation was higher among non-voters (.21) than voters (.09);[6] and,

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[6]An additional analysis of these data showed that the difference between the correlations for voters and non-voters on the Humphrey-Wallace pair was not statistically significant ($Z = 1.46$, $P > .10$, two-tailed test), while the difference on the Humphrey-Nixon pair approached statistical significance ($Z = 1.66$, $P < .10$, two-tailed test).

Table 3.10

Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Among Attitudes Toward Humphrey, Nixon, and Wallace--By Presidential Voting Behavior or Preference in 1968

PRESIDENTIAL VOTING BEHAVIOR OR PREFERENCE IN 1968			
Voted for Humphrey, Nixon, or Wallace N = 873			
	Humphrey	Nixon	Wallace
Humphrey	------	+.09*	-.31**
Nixon		------	-.01
Wallace			------
Non-Voter: Preferred Humphrey, Nixon, or Wallace N = 229			
	Humphrey	Nixon	Wallace
Humphrey	------	+.21*	-.21*
Nixon		------	+.06
Wallace			------
Residual: Other N = 66			
	Humphrey	Nixon	Wallace
Humphrey	------	+.45**	-.32*
Nixon		------	+.06
Wallace			------

* P < .01

** P < .001

the difference on the Nixon-Wallace pair was negligible. Finally, further examination shows that the level of constraint on the Humphrey-Nixon and Humphrey-Wallace pairs was actually highest among those in the residual group!

When we also consider the direction of these correlations, it becomes clear that there were more than simple differences (or non-differences) in the level of constraint among these groups. For example, it can be seen that the Humphrey-Nixon pattern of correlation was slightly negative for the voting group (-.09), low positive for the non-voters (+.21), and moderately positive for the residual group (+.45). That is, there was a slight tendency for those who voted to have a positive attitude toward Humphrey and a negative attitude toward Nixon (and vice versa), while among those who didn't vote and the residual group there was a definite tendency to have either a positive or negative attitude toward both Humphrey and Nixon!

Behavior-Attitude Consistency

The somewhat surprising finding for the pattern of Humphrey-Nixon correlation suggested a further analysis of the relationships between voting behavior (or preference) and candidate attitudes. Table 3.11 shows the

Table 3.11

Relationships Among Candidate Attitudes and Presidential Voting Behavior or Preference in 1968

PRESIDENTIAL VOTING BEHAVIOR OR PREFERENCE IN 1968									
Voted for Humphrey or Nixon N = 780					Non-Voter: Preferred Humphrey or Nixon N = 195				
	H	N	W	H-N[a]		H	N	W	H-N[a]
H	------	-.20**	-.17*	-.65***	H	------	.14	-.04	-.45***
N		------	.16*	.60***	N		------	.22*	.57***
W			------	.18*	W			------	.17
H-N				------	H-N				------
Voted for Humphrey or Wallace N = 476					Non-Voter: Preferred Humphrey or Wallace N = 138				
	H	N	W	H-W[b]		H	N	W	H-W[b]
H	------	.32***	-.49***	-.66***	H	------	.57***	-.34***	-.49***
N		------	.06	-.04	N		------	.15	.00
W			------	.75***	W			------	.74***
H-N				------	H-N				------

Voted for Nixon or Wallace N = 490					Non-Voter: Preferred Nixon or Wallace N = 125				
	H	N	W	N-W[c]		H	N	W	N-W[c]
H	------	.21**	-.22**	-.21**	H	------	.32***	-.12	-.18*
N		------	-.41***	-.58***	N		------	-.35***	-.62***
W			------	.65***	W			------	.68***
N-W				------	N-W				------

* P < .05
** P < .01
*** P < .001

[a] H-N is a dichotomous variable with the number 2 representing either a vote or preference for Nixon and the number 1 a vote or preference for Humphrey.

[b] H-W is a dichotomous variable with the number 2 representing either a vote or preference for Wallace and the number 1 a vote or preference for Humphrey.

[c] N-W is a dichotomous variable with the number 2 representing either a vote or preference for Wallace and the number 1 a vote or preference for Nixon.

relationships among candidate attitudes and voting behavior or preference in 1968 for three possible candidate combinations: Humphrey-Nixon, Humphrey-Wallace, and Nixon-Wallace. And, finally, Table 3.12 shows the relationships among candidate attitudes by each presidential voting behavior or preference group, separately; that is, holding candidate group constant.

Inspection of these two tables shows that the tendency to have either a positive or negative attitude toward all three candidates--particularly toward both Humphrey and Nixon--was much stronger among non-voters than voters, especially among those who preferred either Humphrey or Wallace (see Table 3.12). The latter two groups were also more likely to have either a positive or negative attitude toward both Nixon and Wallace, although this was also the case for Humphrey voters. Finally, it can be seen that voting behavior was more strongly associated with the appropriate candidate attitudes than was non-voter "preferences." For example (Table 3.11), "voting" for Humphrey or Nixon was more highly correlated with affective attitudes toward Humphrey ($r = -.65$) and Nixon ($r = .60$) than was "preference" for Humphrey or Nixon with the corresponding attitudes toward Humphrey ($r = -.45$) and

Table 3.12

Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Among Affective Candidate Attitudes--Controlling for Presidential Voting Behavior or Preference Group in 1968

PRESIDENTIAL VOTING BEHAVIOR OR PREFERENCE GROUP IN 1968

Voted for Humphrey (N = 383)				Non-Voter: Preferred Humphrey (N = 104)			
	H	N	W		H	N	W
H	------	.49***	.02	H	------	.68***	.05
N		------	.17**	N		------	.20*
W			------	W			------

Voted for Nixon (N = 397)				Non-Voter: Preferred Nixon (N = 91)			
	H	N	W		H	N	W
H	------	.09	-.14**	H	------	.16	.03
N		------	.06	N		------	.09
W			------	W			------

Voted for Wallace (N = 93)				Non-Voter: Preferred Wallace (N = 34)			
	H	N	W		H	N	W
H	------	.14	.03	H	------	.51**	-.10
N		------	-.03	N		------	.29
W			------	W			------

* P < .05
** P < .01
*** P < .001

NOTE: H, N, and W again represent affective attitudes toward Humphrey, Nixon, and Wallace, respectively.

Nixon (r = .57). In brief, these data furnished further evidence for behavior-attitude consistency.[7]

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[7]These data may also help to explain, in part, why the original correlations for the Humphrey-Nixon and Nixon-Wallace affective attitudes were .00 (see Table 2.3). That is, voting and non-voting may have been a suppressor variable acting to partially cancel out the true relationships between these attitude variables (see Table 3.12). For further interpretation of these relations, see the Discussion.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

As one writer has recently noted, "negative or inconclusive results are much harder to interpret than positive results [Kerlinger, 1973, p. 154]." Yet, as Kerlinger has also pointed out, "If we can be fairly sure that the methodology, the measurement, and the analysis are adequate, then negative results can be definite contributions to scientific advance, since only then can we have some confidence that our hypotheses are not correct [p. 154]."

We begin this chapter with a discussion of some negative evidence for the correlates or effects of status inconsistency in the present study.

Negative Evidence for the Correlates or Effects of Status Inconsistency

The present research was designed originally to test the hypothesis: the greater an individual's (socio-economic) status inconsistency, the greater will be his cognitive or attitudinal inconsistency with respect to relevant attitude objects (e.g., Humphrey, Nixon, and

Wallace in 1968). The data presented here, however, suggest that except at the extremes of status inconsistency (where the results actually ran slightly counter to the hypothesized direction) there was a negligible relationship between status inconsistency and (Humphrey-Wallace) attitude inconsistency.

Additional analyses of the 1968 election data also suggested there was a negligible relationship between status inconsistency and presidential voting behavior or preference, except again at the extremes of status inconsistency, where some small but inconclusive trends did emerge. In brief, the evidence for the correlates or effects of status inconsistency in the present study was trifling at best.

Interestingly, these findings and conclusions are congruent with a recently growing body of negative evidence for the effects of status inconsistency and related constructs such as vertical mobility (Eitzen, 1973; Jackson and Curtis, 1972; Olsen and Tully, 1972). For example, Jackson and Curtis (1972) recently found little or no relationship between status inconsistency and forty-three dependent variables (e.g., political liberalism, racial prejudice) suggested as correlates in previous research. And even more relevant to the present research results, Eitzen (1973) found that general

socioeconomic status--rather than status inconsistency itself--accounted for consistency among liberal-conservative political attitudes. Thus the status inconsistency construct does not seem particularly useful for explaining variations in contemporary American political behavior.

Inadequate Data, Methodology, or Theory?

Before concluding our discussion of status inconsistency, we need to consider why the results did not turn out as expected. One possible reason is that there were very low correlations between the various status dimensions and candidate attitudes,[1] which precluded the occurrence of cross-pressure effects from inconsistent statuses. That is, for status inconsistency--which is essentially a special case of the more general phenomenon of social cross-pressure--to have an effect, there must be at least a moderate sized relationship between the different dimensions of status from which inconsistency is derived and the predicted or dependent variables of interest (e.g., candidate attitudes). To put it another way, inconsistent status cannot lead to very much conflict

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[1]The average Pearson product-moment correlation between these two clusters was approximately .11, with a range from .05 to .16.

or inconsistency in attitudes which are largely unrelated or irrelevant to the separate status characteristics themselves. This, then, was the implicit meaning of "with respect to relevant cognitive or attitude objects" in the original formulation of the hypothesis.

In other words, the writer had originally assumed, on the basis of previous research (Berelson et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960; Lazarsfeld et al., 1944), that there was at least a moderate sized relationship between socioeconomic status or social class and political attitudes or behavior, and thus that there would be some degree of relationship between socioeconomic status inconsistency and political (candidate) attitude inconsistency. But, as we have seen from the data, this assumption was not fully justified since the correlations between these two clusters were quite low.

Another possible reason for these negative results is that the measure of status inconsistency used in the present study--the difference score technique--was not a valid one. It can be shown, however, that this difference score measure is similarly related to the correlates of status inconsistency established in previous research (Kasl, 1969; Nam and Powers, 1965). For example, previous research (Kasl, 1969) has shown that there is a significant relationship between the life cycle and various types

of status inconsistency such as the association of high education and low income among individuals under the age of 35. More generally, the data in the present research show that there was a significant relationship between age and education-occupational prestige status inconsistency, for example ($r = -.24$, $P < .001$). In short, the difference score measure of status inconsistency would appear to have some empirical validity, at least.

But both of the foregoing reasons--as well as the original formulation of the status inconsistency hypothesis--are too methodological, too statistical; that is, too atheoretical in the psychological sense. This criticism also applies to the status inconsistency literature in general which has tended to reduce this problem to one of mostly methodological and statistical considerations (see, for example, Jackson and Curtis, 1972). More specifically, previous research (and the present research) on status inconsistency has assumed that discrepancies among broad socioeconomic characteristics such as education, income, and occupational prestige will have certain effects for various individuals or subgroups without determining whether such "status inconsistencies" have any particular psychological reality for the individuals affected. That is, most

of the research in this area has involved correlating and regressing selected dependent variables such as political attitudes on pairs of abstract demographic indicators of socioeconomic status.

In other words, status inconsistency may only have effects on individuals who are psychologically aware of the inconsistencies among their status characteristics and for whom status consistency is personally significant and thus worth achieving. To put it another way, status inconsistency may only have consequences for an individual when it is translated into cognitive inconsistency. Given this assumption and those of cognitive consistency theory in general (Shaw and Costanzo, 1970), we would hypothesize that individuals who are aware of their status inconsistency and consider it important will experience some form of psychological tension which will motivate them to reduce the tension through changing one or more of their status characteristics (e.g., earning more money to bring one's income status in line with one's education level) in the direction of greater status consistency. Another hypothesis of relevance here would be that the greater an individual's status inconsistency, the more likely he will be to become psychologically aware of it. Or it may be that there is a threshold at which status inconsistency is sufficiently great to begin to produce

an awareness effect; i.e., only at the extremes of status inconsistency (e.g., among highly deviant individuals such as self-made millionaires or college-educated garbage collectors).

In summary, probably the most important reason why the present results did not turn out as expected, as well as those of many previous studies, is an inadequate theoretical analysis and accounting of the psychological reality of status inconsistency to the individual.

Positive Evidence for Behavior-Attitude Consistency

Beginning with LaPiere's classic (1934) study of "attitudes vs. actions," social psychologists have been concerned with finding evidence for the degree of consistency or inconsistency between attitudes and behavior in both laboratory and naturalistic situations. As reviewed by Kiesler et al. (1969), the empirical studies most frequently cited as evidence for an inconsistent relation between attitudes and behavior are those by LaPiere (1934), Kutner et al. (1952), and Minard (1952), while those by Nettler and Golding (1946), DeFleur and Westie (1958), and Sherif and Hovland (1961) are frequently

cited as evidence for consistency between attitudes and behavior.[2]

Accordingly, within this general context, the data presented here can be seen as providing some field survey evidence for a consistent relationship between behavior and attitudes. Specifically, the present research demonstrates that there is a more consistent relationship between behavior and attitudes among those who participate in an election by voting for a presidential candidate than among those who do not participate (see Table 3.11). The present data also demonstrate (Tables 3.11 and 3.12) that non-voters are less consistently discriminating in their overall attitudes in that they tend to have either a positive or negative attitude toward all presidential candidates, although this might also be due, in part, to a constant response set to evaluate politicians as all positive or all negative (see, for example, Guilford, 1954).

But more importantly, other data in the present study (Table 3.7) furnish evidence for a consistent relationship between behavior and attitude inconsistency itself (as measured by the difference score technique).

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[2]For a detailed review of this evidence and the factors affecting the relationship between attitudes and behavior (e.g., situational differences), the reader is referred directly to Kiesler et al. (1969); see also Campbell (1963) and Rokeach (1968).

Specifically, these data show that there was a significant relationship between presidential voting behavior or preference in 1968 and Humphrey-Wallace attitude inconsistency, with those who voted for either Humphrey or Wallace being more attitude consistent than their non-voting counterparts. To express it another way, whereas previous research has focussed on obtaining evidence for a correlation between attitudes and behavior, the present study has provided evidence for a direct relationship between behavior (voting, non-voting) and attitudinal consistency (Humphrey-Wallace) per se.

Finally, the data showing a significant relationship between behavioral involvement in politics (voting) and psychological involvement or interest in politics (Table 3.8), as well as those demonstrating the multivariabe relationships among these variables (Table 3.9), provide further evidence for consistency between behavior and psychological states such as attitudes, interests, and motivation. These data also suggest that one reason why voters are more consistent in their candidate attitudes than non-voters is that they are generally more interested and informed about politics which, according to previous research (Converse, 1964), tends to be associated with a higher level of ideological conceptualization; that is, greater political attitude consistency. However, as we

have also seen (Table 3.10), Converse's (1964) conceptualization of this relationship in terms of simple absolute differences in the level of constraint is inadequate. Rather, one needs to take into account the direction and pattern of relations between behavior and attitudes, as well as other psychological states such as interests.

Attitudes-Follow-Behavior

The behavior and attitude data in the present study can probably best be interpreted in terms of Bem's (1970) self-perception theory which is based on the notion that beliefs, attitudes, values, and other psychological states tend to follow behavior. For example, one study cited by Bem (Lieberman, 1956) showed that a factory worker's attitudes changed in the pro-management direction if he was promoted to foreman, but became more pro-union if he was elected as union steward. But even more important, perhaps, Lieberman's data showed that when those who had been promoted to foremen were forced to resume their previous position of factory workers, their attitudes reverted to their previous pro-union direction. In short, Lieberman's study provided strong evidence for the notion that attitudes or attitude change follow behavior or behavior change.

Similarly, in the present study, those who voted for Humphrey, Nixon, or Wallace can be seen as bringing their affective attitudes toward each candidate in line with their own recent behavior in the election--i.e., by expressing more consistently pro or con feelings on the feeling thermometer during the post-election interview--while those who didn't vote but rather "preferred" Humphrey, Nixon, or Wallace can be seen as expressing the same attitude in two different ways: affectively on the feeling thermometer and cognitively in a verbal statement of candidate preference--both of which are lacking behavioral foundation; i.e., links with the overt act of voting.[3]

Finally, the data on behavioral and psychological involvement or interest in politics can also be interpreted, in part, in terms of Bem's self-perception theory. That is, those who voted for Humphrey, Nixon, or Wallace in the election can be viewed as inferring their interest in politics, to some extent, from their own recent behavioral participation, while those who did not vote

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[3]The act or self-report of voting can also be viewed as a third (behavioral) component of the same attitude. However, the present writer feels that the analytical distinction between inner psychological states such as (affective) attitudes and overt non-psychological actions, including verbal statements about such behavior, is a useful one and should be maintained (but see also Kiesler et al., 1969; and Rokeach, 1968).

would tend to see their recent non-participation as evidence (or further evidence) of their general lack of interest in political affairs.

In summary, the present research provides some field survey support for the principle of attitudes-follow-behavior.[4]

Some Directions for Future Research

As suggested indirectly before, one possible direction for future research in the area of status inconsistency is to determine its psychological significance for the individual. This would involve measuring two components: (a) awareness of the status inconsistency itself and (b) the personal importance of the status inconsistency to the individual. Given these measurements and the general assumptions of cognitive consistency theory, we would, again, hypothesize that the greater an individual's awareness of status inconsistency and the greater its personal importance to him, the more likely

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[4]The attitudes-follow-behavior interpretation here should be qualified, however, by pointing out that these data are, again, from a post-election survey. That is, they do not provide evidence that attitudes always follow behavior; rather, they illustrate a special case of this general principle. A more rigorous test of this relation would, of course, use a panel study design in order to determine whether attitudes are more consistently related to voting behavior before or after an election, for example.

he will be to attempt to change one or more of his status characteristics in the direction of greater status consistency. Testing this hypothesis in a field research study would, of course, involve the use of some type of panel or longitudinal design. On the other hand, an experimental test of this hypothesis can probably best be achieved through the use of small groups (see Sampson, 1969, for a review of some efforts in this direction).

In general, this direction for new research on status inconsistency would seem to be worth exploring. As this writer sees it, the choice in this research area is between reducing a substantative sociological problem to a methodological-statistical one, as many previous researchers in this area have done (e.g., Jackson and Curtis, 1972; Olsen and Tully, 1972), and reducing it, or better, reformulating it into a truly social-psychological one as outlined above.

In the area of attitude consistency, there are several potentially fruitful directions for future research. For one, it would seem worthwhile to further explore the degree of consistency among the affective and cognitive components of attitudes and overt behavior, using the difference score measure of consistency developed here. For example, it would be hypothesized that individuals who are behaviorally involved in

politics would not only show more consistent affective attitudes toward candidates in an election, as measured by the feeling thermometer, but also more consistent cognitive beliefs about the candidates' policy positions or stands on issues. And the greater the behavioral political involvement (e.g., voting, attending a political meeting, becoming an active member of a political party), the greater would be the affective and cognitive consistency. Such an hypothesis could be tested directly in most cross-sectional surveys and secondary analysis designs of the type used here.

Another possible direction in this general area would be to study individual differences in affective or cognitive consistency over time. That is, another aspect or meaning of consistency which we have not explored is the degree to which an individual's beliefs, attitudes, and values are stable, reliable, dependable, or predictable over a particular time period (e.g., 3 months before to 3 months after an election). For instance, it might be hypothesized that the greater the behavioral involvement of an individual in an election campaign, the more (consistent) stable his cognitive and affective attitude components would be over the course of the campaign. This hypothesis could be tested by using a simple test-retest

design with Pearson product-moment correlations, for example, as coefficients of stability.

Finally, in the area of attitude change, it might be hypothesized that attitude change, in either a field or laboratory situation, would be greatest among those individuals who are, initially, most inconsistent in their beliefs and attitudes as measured by the difference score indicator of cognitive consistency. In other words, it would be predicted that it is easier to change those individuals whose attitudes are less consistent or integrated with one another to begin with than those whose attitudes are highly integrated and consistent. That is to say, in summary, that consistency and stability and inconsistency and change are companion pairs of constructs.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY

In summary, this dissertation had three original purposes: (a) to develop a precise conceptual and operational definition of the social-psychological construct of cognitive or attitudinal consistency within a field survey context, (b) to integrate this definition with the conceptualization and measurement of the sociological construct of status consistency, and (c) to test the social cross-pressures hypothesis that the greater an individual's socioeconomic status inconsistency, the greater will be his cognitive or attitudinal inconsistency with respect to relevant political attitude objects, such as presidential candidates.

Methodologically, the research design involved a secondary analysis of sample survey data from the 1968 American National Election Study conducted originally by the Survey Research Center of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. The data drawn from this national election study included the traditional measures of an individual's socioeconomic status--level

of education, income level, and occupational prestige--and "feeling thermometer" measures of an individual's affective attitudes toward the three major 1968 presidential candidates: Hubert Humphrey, Richard Nixon, and George Wallace. These measures, in turn, were used to construct the indices of status and attitude consistency, both of which were defined conceptually in terms of deviance and operationally by simple differences between standard scores.

The results, in summary, showed that there was a negligible relationship between the variables of socioeconomic status consistency and consistency of affective attitudes toward the three 1968 presidential candidates, as well as between status inconsistency and actual voting behavior or preference in 1968, although there were some slight but inconclusive trends in these relationships among those who were highly status inconsistent; that is, the most deviant status types.

Additional secondary analyses of the 1968 election data showed, moreover, that there was a statistically significant positive relationship between voting behavior and candidate attitude consistency, with those who voted in the election being more attitudinally consistent than those who did not vote. It was also found that those who were more behaviorally involved in politics, as measured by

participation in the election, were more psychologically involved or interested in politics. And, finally, it was discovered that cognitive or attitudinal consistency was greatest among those individuals who had a high level of interest in government and public affairs and were behaviorally involved in the election through the overt act of voting.

Theoretically, it was concluded that the most important reason why the findings on status consistency did not turn out as predicted was an inadequate account of the psychological reality of various socioeconomic status discrepancies to the individual. Accordingly, it was suggested that future research on this subject should focus upon whether or not the individual is aware of being in an inconsistent status position and on the degree of importance it has for him or her personally. And last and most important, the positive evidence for a consistent relationship between voting behavior and affective candidate attitudes was interpreted in terms of the self-perception principle that attitudes-follow-behavior. Suggestions for future research in this area included: (a) investigating the degree of consistency between affective and cognitive components of attitudes as a function of behavioral involvement, (b) studying the degree of individual attitude stability or consistency

over time, and (c) examining the relationship between attitude inconsistency, as measured by difference score indices, and attitude change in both laboratory and naturalistic settings.

Thus, to a great extent, the present study can be seen as an exploratory one, the true purpose of which was to become more familiar with the phenomena of status and cognitive or attitude consistency, such that a future study can be designed with greater theoretical and methodological sophistication.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

CODEBOOK FOR THE STUDY VARIABLES

APPENDIX A

CODEBOOK FOR THE STUDY VARIABLES

In this section, the main variables used in the present study are described and their location by both variable number and page number in the original codebook for The SRC 1968 American National Election Study (1971) provided. The code values shown for the variables below represent those used in the present research.

Description of Variable	Var. No.	Page No.
Respondent's Education Level:[1]	0156	82-84
1. None		
2. 1 grade		
3. 2 grades		
4. 3 grades		
5. 4 grades		
6. 5 grades		
7. 6 grades		
8. 7 grades		
9. 7 grades plus non-college training		

[1]The mean of this variable for the present sample (N = 1168) was 16.17 and the standard deviation was 4.80.

Description of Variable	Var. No.	Page No.
10. 8 grades		
11. 8 grades plus non-college training		
12. 9 grades		
13. 10 grades		
14. 11 grades		
15. 9 grades plus non-college training		
16. 10 grades plus non-college training		
17. 11 grades plus non-college training		
18. 12 grades		
19. 12 grades plus non-college training		
20. Some college		
21. Bachelor's degree (4 or 5 years college)		
22. Master's degree or equivalent		
23. Ph.D. or equivalent		
24. J.D. or equivalent		
25. M.D. or equivalent		
26. J.C.D. or equivalent		
27. Honorary degree (LLD, DD, LHD)		
Head's Occupational Prestige:[2]	0171	92
00. Lowest (e.g., tobacco manufacturing laborer)		
.		
. Etc.		
.		
96. Highest (e.g., dentist, osteopath)		

[2]The mean of this variable for the present sample (N = 1168) was 40.12 and the standard deviation was 25.14.

Description of Variable	Var. No.	Page No.
Respondent and Family's Total Annual Income:[3]		
10. Under $1000		
11. $1,000 - 1,999		
12. $2,000 - 2,999		
13. $3,000 - 3,999		
14. $4,000 - 4,999		
15. $5,000 - 5,999		
16. $6,000 - 6,999		
17. $7,000 - 7,999		
18. $8,000 - 8,999		
19. $9,000 - 9,999		
20. $10,000 - 11,999		
21. $12,000 - 14,999		
22. $15,000 - 19,999		
23. $20,000 - 24,999		
24. $25,000 and over		
Presidential Vote or Preference in 1968:	0316	174-175
1. Voted for Humphrey		
2. Non-Voter: Humphrey preference		
3. Non-Voter: Nixon preference		
4. Voted for Nixon		
5. Non-Voter: Wallace preference		
6. Voted for Wallace		
7. Residual: Other		

[3]The mean of this variable for the present sample (N = 1168) was 17.18 and the standard deviation was 3.62.

Description of Variable	Var. No.	Page No.
Interest in Government and Public Affairs:	0430	246

1. Follows most of the time
2. Follows some of the time
3. Follows only now and then
4. Follows hardly at all

Feeling Thermometer Rating of Humphrey:	0479	274

00. Zero degrees (very cold feeling)
01. One degree
02. Two degrees
03. Three degrees

. Etc.

15. Fifteen degrees (quite cold feeling)
30. Thirty degrees
40. Forty degrees (a bit more cold feeling than 50 degrees)
50. Fifty degrees (no feeling at all)
60. Sixty degrees (a bit more warm feeling than 50 degrees)
70. Seventy degrees (fairly warm feeling)
85. Eighty-five degrees (good warm feeling)
97.[4] Ninety-seven degrees (very warm feeling)

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[4]Responses of 97, 98, 99, or 100 degrees on the thermometer were coded as 97 in the SRC Election Study.

Description of Variable	Var. No.	Page No.
Feeling Thermometer Rating of Nixon:	0480	274

00. Zero degrees (very cold feeling)
01. One degree
02. Two degrees
03. Three degrees
.
. Etc.
.
15. Fifteen degrees (quite cold feeling)
30. Thirty degrees (fairly cold feeling)
40. Forty degrees (a bit more cold feeling than 50 degrees)
50. Fifty degrees (no feeling at all)
60. Sixty degrees (a bit more warm feeling than 50 degrees)
70. Seventy degrees (fairly warm feeling)
85. Eighty-five degrees (good warm feeling)
97. Ninety-seven degrees (very warm feeling)

Feeling Thermometer Rating of Wallace:	0478	274

00. Zero degrees (very cold feeling)
01. One degree
02. Two degrees
03. Three degrees
.
. Etc.
.
15. Fifteen degrees (quite cold feeling)
30. Thirty degrees (fairly cold feeling)

Description of Variable	Var. No.	Page No.
40. Forty degrees (a bit more cold feeling than 50 degrees)		
50. Fifty degrees (no feeling at all)		
60. Sixty degrees (a bit more warm feeling than 50 degrees		
70. Seventy degrees (fairly warm feeling)		
85. Eighty-five degrees (good warm feeling)		
97. Ninety-seven degrees (very warm feeling)		
Respondent's Age:	0533	302
21. Twenty-one years		
.		
. Etc.		
.		
98. Ninety-eight years		
99. Not applicable		

APPENDIX B

SUBGROUP CLASSIFICATION APPROACH TO STATUS AND ATTITUDE INCONSISTENCY

APPENDIX B

SUBGROUP CLASSIFICATION[1] APPROACH TO STATUS AND ATTITUDE INCONSISTENCY

As noted in Chapter II on Methods, a second approach to the analysis of both status and candidate attitude inconsistency involved breaking down the status and candidate attitude dimensions into a number of subgroups and then examining the relationships between pairs of status and attitude variables within various combinations of subgroups. This subgroup classification approach will now be illustrated.

For example, one analysis involved examining the relationship between occupational prestige and attitude toward Humphrey within subgroup combinations of level and type of education and level and type of Wallace attitude. This analysis was done as follows:

1. First, level of education was broken down into five naturalistic control categories: (a) Grade

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[1]For a more detailed discussion of the use of subgroup classification techniques in survey research, see Morris Rosenberg, The Logic of Survey Analysis (New York: Basic Books, 1968).

school education, (b) Some high school, (c) High school education, (d) Some college, and (e) College education. Then, the average occupational prestige and standard deviation for each of these five categories was computed. Finally, standard (Z) scores on occupational prestige for individuals within each of these categories were obtained.

2. Second, Wallace attitude (as measured by the feeling thermometer) was broken down into six naturalistic control categories: (a) Less than 10 degrees--very cold feeling, (b) 10 to 29 degrees--quite cold feeling, (c) 30 to 49 degrees--fairly cold feeling, (d) 50 degrees--neutral or no feeling at all, (e) 51 to 74 degrees--moderately warm feeling, and (f) 75 degrees and over--good or very warm feeling. Then, the mean Humphrey attitude and standard deviation for each of these six categories was computed. Finally, standard (Z) scores on Humphrey attitude for individuals within each of these categories were obtained.

3. Third, each of the five categories of education level was cross-classified (using the counter-sorter) by each of the six categories of Wallace

attitude, resulting in 30 separate subgroup combinations of education level X Wallace attitude.

ASIDE. At this stage in the analysis, it was intended to index status and attitude inconsistency as follows (see Kasl, 1969): first, define those cases that are + or -.50 or 1.00 standard deviation above and below the mean for each category type as "inconsistent" (e.g., +1.67 Z on occupational prestige for high school education and -1.43 Z on Humphrey attitude for the category of fairly cold feeling toward Wallace) and those within these limits as "consistent"; and, then examine the relation between these status and attitude inconsistency types (occupational prestige, Humphrey) within each subgroup combination (high school education X Wallace attitude). However, it was realized that this additional breakdown procedure would result in too few cases for an appropriate analysis (e.g., chi-square of the relationship between status and attitude inconsistency types within each of the 30 subgroup combinations (see Table B.1 below). Thus it was decided to simply explore the relationship between occupational prestige and Humphrey attitude within the subgroup combinations of education level X Wallace attitude, for example.

4. Fourth, the Pearson product-moment correlation(s) between occupational prestige and attitude toward

Humphrey was obtained within each of the 30 separate subgroup combinations of education level X Wallace attitude.[2]

Table B.1 shows the Pearson product-moment correlations between occupational prestige and attitude toward Humphrey within each of the subgroup combinations of level and type of education X level and type of Wallace attitude. As shown in Table B.1, only one of the correlations was statistically significant at the conventional .05 level, a negative correlation for the subgroup of high school education X neutral Wallace attitude. It can also be seen that most of the correlations--like the correlation for the sample as a whole ($r = -.15$, $N = 1168$)--are in the negative direction; that is, the greater the occupational prestige, the more negative the attitude toward Humphrey and vice versa. Thus these findings are not particularly surprising or interesting in themselves.

Further analysis of these data, however, show that there was a statistically significant inverse relationship between the size of the subgroup combination and the absolute size of the correlation (rho = -.59, Z = 3.18,

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[2]The reader may note that this particular aspect of the analysis is somewhat analogous to the parametric technique of semipartial correlation (see Jum C. Nunnaly, Psychometric Theory [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967], pp. 154-55).

Table B.1

Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Between Occupational Prestige and Humphrey Attitude Within Level and Type of Education X Level and Type of Wallace Attitude

Level and Type of Wallace Attitude	Level and Type of Education									
	GRADE SCHOOL		SOME HIGH SCHOOL		HIGH SCHOOL		SOME COLLEGE		COLLEGE EDUCATION	
	R =	N =	R =	N =	R =	N =	R =	N =	R =	N =
Very Cold or Unfavorable Feeling	-.07	63	.05	74	-.15	155	-.12	56	-.01	92
Quite Cold or Unfavorable Feeling	-.15	28	-.42	21	-.05	46	.13	20	-.35	18
Fairly Cold or Unfavorable Feeling	-.17	37	-.11	30	.12	55	-.17	33	-.07	22
Neutral or No Feeling At All	-.16	46	-.01	35	-.35*	42	-.51	14	-.16	10
Moderately Warm or Favorable Feeling	-.28	29	-.19	28	-.14	51	-.16	23	-.34	19
Quite Warm or Favorable Feeling	.04	35	-.19	20	-.16	37	.14	24	-.63	5

* $P < .05$

$P < .01$).[3] Although this relationship can be seen as a somewhat spurious one because of the greater sampling error associated with the small N-values, it can also be interpreted in terms of a sort of deviant subgroup interaction effect. That is, the stronger relationships between occupational prestige and Humphrey attitude in the small subcells are due to the unusual (deviant) combinations of education level and Wallace attitude; for example, the deviant combination of college education X quite warm or favorable feeling toward Wallace ($r = -.63$, $N = 5$). In brief, this technique would seem to be a potentially useful one (albeit rudimentary) for detecting interaction type effects which would not be picked up by standard semipartial correlation analysis, for example.

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[3]It should be noted here that this pattern of relationship was also found for other subgroup combinations; for example, there was a significant inverse relationship between the size of the subgroup combination and the absolute size of the correlation (rho = -.50, $Z = 2.69$, $P < .01$)--for the correlation between income level and Humphrey attitude within the subgroup combinations of level and type of education X level and type of Nixon attitude.