EHA‘ fin. an. N M ' .1. VUIOIVCI§ Cl F“ PRO}... 5 box v. 5‘.¢J\'.u' ('7 BROADCASTING IN AFRICA: A STUDY OF BELGIAN, BRITISH AND FRENCH COLONIAL POLICIES By Geoffrey Z; Kucera A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in artial fulfillment of the requirements p for the degree of ' DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Communication 1968 u IN». . A ' H " tlcn, Cc--. 5-4:. H 3‘ ‘ 9"; ' ‘- ‘....'a“‘ the we \05-‘ e. S . l a. ..A “" :efiirerews fr e... ‘A “I ., .-‘. _ .x s, n . n‘fi "n. F u .. “CrittEE' l\ 5M138 Save? Accepted by the faculty of the Department of Communication, College of Communication Arts, Michigan State University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree. ”Jami 5 «tan Director of Thesis /— Guidance Committee: MBM , Chairman 7 ‘ It. . ' n.- . A. ‘ l--,_ \ V~ ‘A' .5 ‘- .~¢.. ~..~v.-. ~‘ - _ I C ‘ I‘ . _ g“ ' i. A ‘ cv- ‘ ~~ x" A C ‘....‘.‘ *‘-‘.4\. --~--._ ‘ I a ' . .. ‘ .U: A. 5.3 n‘_‘~-“~“ . ‘ .. .... ~s ...b “‘ ‘“.‘h. in. h '. I '.‘ ‘ .‘ ' ”A , . ' Obv- . .. U».- u." . ‘ . 'u an. .‘ ‘ I ‘ ’ A_.“ ‘ -“‘.‘ ‘ .o . ‘ ~-- I, . § C. i g; - ’A v .. :-..--‘-3_ e z.“ I ‘ . .Q-‘ ..|,_h_£ _ ,A‘.“' b b. ~--‘ ‘ . . R . .. '5 i 3 ‘ w. *. u! u *v . . . l :1: ‘f-i ,u." A: 3.:‘.~-‘ “5 vs ‘ . so- . ~ ' N... 2"” A: 0- . . \s.‘ V “ ~..":‘ .\ ' .A —‘ ._“ a '_' I" ‘ n, . \.‘_ a: s. II . *5 _~c~‘.r _: -~'~“~l_‘ no a) ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The writer would like to express many thanks to his Director of Thesis, Dr. Walter B. Emery, for his helpful suggestions, kind assistance, and patient guid- ance. Equally sincere thanks are expressed.to the mem— bers of the Guidance Committee, Drs. Harm J. deBlij, James R. Hooker, Hideya Kumata, J. Colby Lewis III and Donald W. Cunated, for their helpful criticism and kind expressions of confidence. A sincere appreciation is hereby expressed to Dr. Robert E. Potter, Associate Dean for Faculty Dev- elopment, and to Dr. Walter A. Wittich, Chairman of the Department of Educational Communications, both of the University of Hawaii, for their interest, encouragement and suggestions. Their understanding and help could ._. ‘ g ‘Q In "\c ." Q‘s A;.~__. --~ 5. , .§: Rh A—‘. 'r: .. a. obs kw.‘._. ~._ a v. 9 F~."“‘-‘ .-v -g-n‘~fl~- m. .. ‘ . :V o.‘_ .. ‘ -. F, n .‘.-'cnr.. s ‘ _ - o I. .v~f- ’ ‘v ' I b’ "F". V!- _ -.-.". ‘ a -_ ‘~ . -‘ .,,_ . ~‘A~ ‘ '. ..- ..,,_. ‘~:.‘H— ' ”s..‘~‘ ~-~.. .. . “ 5.. c . ..H":: P ‘A’~-' v Q ‘v‘. -‘ ‘- A I ~.~-- A..."- . ‘ ‘- ""~§.. y H a: ‘ -.< G v ' 1 Geoffrey Z. Yucera Broadcasting deveIOpment appears to have hinged to a greater degree upon other policies than on those specifically dealing with broadcasting. There appears to exist a direct relation between the colonial capability of receiving broadcasting and the directness and determination with which a colonial power addressed itself to the nature of future relations with its colony within some imperial structure. Modernization of attitudes is often mentioned as the underlying requirement for change, but it is assumed the reference is made to the attitudes of those under- going modernization. This study raises a question whether attitudes of former administrating countries ought not to be considered of at least equal importance. vii “‘9’ .1”. “A” ' '."-" . I O "....\. . "'"“-"~Lv nun Q-.‘ i . h... ‘:\ «M&. O .>\ ~ ‘I‘~~..‘. “on. ‘0 I. 00- A: -1“ . C . . . A:~ v. "'.—H“ . high-«u-.Av . ~o| .4..._,'... A. M PAP. I. . .. THC? ,__.'. ‘ ‘ No“ A, \'V\ ’l .u. I. CauQ.‘ ‘3‘ a...f ‘\0 “09“.'?:‘.. 5 ~ . _ r... V f “I ' --_' ’9 fl 0 ‘0 ‘? A, . no. KIT-‘Uf-X‘II‘.“ p \~‘ SxI;.L £21.: \\‘~ .. tar. 1‘. ~vt I c. Up. ha‘nyiv\..h‘~'A‘ “.3 ~ ' v“ \r'.‘ ~ :‘_v:,:?q s. . “.~ . Cu “‘5‘.“ ‘“.- U. ' "\ a». .. .0‘5' “.- . ‘v VA“ ‘ -. ~r IA "Tfi’.‘-"‘_‘I 00...! a I v.'~‘. U‘Qfi I’m Ltfio.‘ ‘.... 9" w A. "g C\ A,“"‘ P“. - V. A ~ ~- A Ah“‘\‘~h c s.‘.~ \ ~~¢C .. “ ' x“ i n “I :- :\ CM". ovl‘~\,§$\.“‘c \‘y ”‘iL P‘WA ’\ ‘s‘ ‘I. R.“ ::;“‘19 .~‘" . O . . . . \ (‘3‘. .‘\ , .'l'~‘::‘l . I TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOM’EDGMENT C I O I O C O C O O C C C I O O O . THESIS ABSTRACT o o o o o o o o o o o o o o ' o o 0 LIST OF TABLES o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 INTRODUCTION 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 PART I. COLONIALISM AND COMMUNICATIONS Chapter I. COLONIAL EXPANSION AND COMMUNICATIONS: AN OVERVIEW 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 II. COLONIAL POLICIES ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC ‘ SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . PART II. COLONIAL POWERS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS III. COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY IN THE SERVICE EMPIRES o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 IV. WIRES, CABLES AND WIRELESS . . . . . . . . V. RADIO BROADCASTING IN AND FOR THE COLONIES PART III. THE COLONIAL HERITAGE VI. COLONIAL POLICIES ON BROADCASTING: A COMPARISON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII. BROADCASTING IN THE LIGHT OF GENERAL COLO- NIAL AND IMPERIAL POLICIES . . . . . . . APPENDIX 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o BIBLIOGRAPHY O O I O O O O O O O O I O O O O O O 0 viii OF Page iii ix 19 36 107 147 200 261 336 369 373 LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Comparison of Colonial Policies . . . . . . . 99 2. Dates of Legislative Measures and of Begin- nings of National Systems in Telegraphy, Telephony and Wireless . . . . . . . . . . 189 3. Financing of Broadcasting through the Devel- opment Plans of the Colonies . . . . . . . 289 4. Import Duties and Taxes Affecting Broadcast- ing 0 O I O I O O O O I I O O C O C I O O O 300 S. Colonial Broadcasting Transmission and Reception Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . 311 6. Interrelationship of General Colonial Poli— cies with Policies on Development of Broadcasting O O O O I O O I I O O O O O O 349 7. Population Figures (in Thousands) for Belgian Congo, Middle Congo and Nigeria, 1918-1960 370 8. Exchange Rates of 0.8. and Selected Foreign Currencies, 1918—1960 . . . . . . . . . . . 371 ix INTRODUCTION Modernization is a process of transition —- transition of a society that is governed by traditions and customs into a society ruled by modern versions of law and reason; it is a change of "ancient lifeways" in— to new, modern modes of living. This process involves what Lerner terms "underlying tensions" -- tensions ex— pressed by "dichotomies such as land versus cash, illit- eracy versus enlightenment, resignation versus anbiticn, piety versus excitement."1 To Lerner, the central part of the modernization process is a set of changes in modes of communicating ideas.2 Pye says that it was the pressure of communica— tions which brought about the downfall of traditional . . 3 soc1eties. Millikan and Blackmer say that both disruption and the break—up of traditional so— cieties continue,heightened and speeded up in our time by the shrinkage of distances and by the exist- ence of the mass media and the instrumentalities of mass organization. lDaniel Lerner, The Passing of a Traditional So- ciety (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956), I4. 2 Ibid. 3Lucian W. Pye (ed.), Communications and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press,l963),3. 4Max F. Millikan and D. L. M. Blackmer (eds.), The Emerging Nations (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1961), I7. 1 They also say that there are three principal areas in which elements of resistance must be overcome if the modernization of a traditional society is to be carried through suc- cessfully: politics, economics, and social structure. The underlying requirement for change is the modern- ization of attitudes. Means of communication must be developed between th government and its citizens to convey to them that the national goals being pursued are ones they would sanction.l Schramm and Winfield simply state that if a nation, rather than merely an advanced society, is to be built, then the necessary knowledge of pub- lic affairs, the concepts of national loyalty, and empathy for fellow citizens must . . . be communi- cated . . . . Furthermore, if a nation is to play a significant part internationally, communication must weave the new State to other States, and the necessary understandings of international events and relationships must be communicated to the people. Thus it is clear that national development involves 2 serious and significant communication problems. . . . The Role of Colonial Powers Although the preceding statements are based on common knowledge of today, the present writer has discov— ered, by a careful review of the available literature, an almost universal lack of any reference which might re- late the changes in communications not only to the devel- Oping nations themselves, but also to those who controlled such countries in the earlier stages of development. The absence of scholarly efforts to investigate the role of lIbid., 19-20. 2Wilbur Schramm and G. F. Winfield, New Uses of Mass Communication for the Promotion of Economic and So— cial Develgpment (WS/1163.lO9/EC) (Paris:UNESCO, 1963), 2. 3 colonial powers in the field of communications, and especially in the field of radio broadcasting, is quite remarkable. It is true that one can -- if he looks long enough -— find that the wireless existed in one country earlier than in another, or that some developing country did not have a daily newspaper until after its independ- ence. What is not available, however, is mention of whether any action and/or policy of the metropolitan coun- try responsible for that territory until its independence had caused, or had contributed to, such results. A ques— tion is never asked why it is that one developing nation is well ahead of another in matters pertaining to commu- nications, though both might have had the same "mother country." No inquiries have been launched into what made one colonial power act differently in this field than another power. Indeed, hardly any concerted research exists of the colonial powers' interest in, or neglect of, the media of information and of communication in general. Lest this statement be misunderstood, it is nec— essary to reaffirm this writer's knowledge of many pub- lications, articles, scholarly studies and the like which deal with growth of developing countries. Almost all of the literature concerns itself with the goals that such countries established for themselves, particularly since they achieved independent nationhood. Such studies, even when concerning themselves with communications, do not estate the c: p y, - . t:‘LH1V~L‘ _.H C 3;, e ‘4 ‘4 a .... ‘.e.‘. . Z 4 evaluate the contribution of the colonial powers. Communications While the present study is concerned with only a small aspect of what is known as "communications," it is thought advisable to review the terminology of the whole field. Doob, in his recent work on Communication in Africa, spoke of basic and extended media: . . . basic media . . . are the original modes of communication between an infant and his mother or any of the human beings in his surroundings. Throughout life, too, the words, the gestures, the clothes, and the actions of a person all convey information and can be directly perceived by others in face-to-face contacts. Media which do not demand the actual presence of the communicator are herewith baptized extending media, for what they do is to extend the range of the original message in time or space. A special type of extending medium is a chan- gel of communication which by itself transmits no message other than that containid in a basic medium or in another extending medium. Lerner meant strictly the modes of communicating ideas and included what can be referred to as "channels."2 Pye, enlarging upon Lerner's frame of reference, talked about "the broader concepts of communications as all per- 3 vading aspects of social life" and included not only "the man's capacity to send and receive in countless ways both intended and unintended messages,"4 but also (though to a lesser degree) the industries or institutions such as 1Leonard Doob, Communication in Africa: A Search for Boundaries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 196i), 57. 2Lerner, 45. 3Pye, 4. 4Ibid. 5 the press, radio, etc. Millikan and Blackmer, however, clearly referred to the transportation media as well.1 Schramm subtitled his work "The Role of Infor- mation in the Developing Countries" and included edu— cation as one means of imparting such information.2 More- over, he alone among many was also concerned with non— mass media role in developing countries, and specifi- cally pointed out the importance of postal services, telephones and telegraphs to national development. Perhaps no one has made the term "media" more encompassing than Marshall McLuhan who in one of his Works4 gave an extremely wide interpretation to that term. He did this by including not only the electric media and the print, but also roads, paper routes, the th-el, the bicycle, the airplane, the photograph, and even lightbulbs. If "communications" or "media" are definable and d . . . . iSCussable in such a variety of ways, it becomes obVious t hat a clear understanding of the term has to be reached 1:) ef(Dre further exploration is undertaken. Furthermore, th 0 a a a e different contexts and differing scope of the field, \ lMillikan and Blackmer, 50. m 2Wilbur Schramm, Mass Media and National Develop— % (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 25—26. 31bid. 76. 4Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Exten— Sions of Man (New York: The McGraw—Hill Book Co., 1964). 6 as suggested in the brief discussion above, would in- dicate that considerable narrowing of the scope of this study is necessary. The present writer, though under- standably intrigued by the possibilities of viewing com— munications in what might be referred to as "total com- munications," recognized the impracticality of such an approach. For the purposes of a meaningful scholarly effort, the study focuses upon an aspect of communication which can be handled with efficacy. Even such term as "mass media" concerns too broad an area which therefore does not lend itself easily to a probe in depth. Radio broadcasting, as a medium of communication, is suitable for the purposes of this study for this reason, and one other: it alone among the so called mass media is SLllbject to regulation and policy by its very nature, and this even in societies where its development is left erl‘tirely to private interests. A generation ago, Edward Sapir warned that over— concern with what he termed secondary means or techniques in the communicative process, such as telephone, radio, and the railways was not advisable because it might lead ltlto a blind alley, as these were only technological means Qf communication. While today McLuhan's position is in direct juxtaposition to Sapir's point of view (what with MeLuhan's "medium is the message") , the present writer is Well aware that the Sapirian warning has been carried through to the Sixties. Sapir, for example, also stated ‘ .’:‘:'.‘ van. . only :4 a go. -4“ ‘ I “a: W :C-:.- . " uvu'u .u U - --n- O . .a . . .- finer; ‘ Q F! 31.» u.-.., -~ ..‘ .... v 1 ‘ .- A: w ‘- \ -"' alt LHOOE b- I l ‘ " co~ t,- u-nu’ a. y». -' .VA.V - 0 office A..- b.vt.l' ”‘3'": s" O‘ A V I! u.‘ ... 52. ~ .LQ V , F ' . ~.: ‘l‘ :-‘fllpn‘.“ .“u..“‘:‘-‘u. a =“.‘.:~ 4» I. \ - -A m... .C ”a“ in . Hy . _ I I a I g A O . t A _‘\‘ x ‘ I5 NCAA, wv“ 7 tliéit: a railroad was of no use unless there was some pur— pxpssee in someone wanting to get from one place to another.1 Vflutille there is no basic disagreement with this, attention nunest: be called to the possibility that if there is a rail- ICDEiCi, or some other means of transportation (communica— 'tj_<>r1), maybe someone will find a reason to go somewhere. In a somewhat similar vein, Doob, referring to tries relationship of formal schooling of a person and his access to mass media, pointed out that . . . it is not possible to determine the cause—and- effect sequence . . . . If the guiding hypothesis is 'valid, then it is possible that becoming literate increases people's alertness because they have access to more media of communication and perhaps to better jobs . . .; and yet it is also probable that the more alert peOple in the community responded to the Oppor- tunity to attend the literacy classes. Or perhaps 130th sequences occured: the initially more alert be- came literate and then having become literate, they could become still more alert.2 But Doob represents a new kind of sophisticated res . ‘ 3 Gaarchers. He can be contrasted Wlth Everett Hagen , on V9 . . . . hose communication Vl€WpOlnt Pool commented thus: Everett Hagen, among others, has suggested that, if certain other conditions of modernization are fulfilled, the development of communication system will somehow automatically follow. The necessary knowledge of tech- nology, and the necessary postal, telephone, telegraph, radio and printed channels, will emerge. Ideas for \ 1Edward Sapir, "Communication," Encyclopaedia of fri§§\_Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan Co., 1931), IV, “80 Note Sapir 9 primary and secondary means and Doob' s asic and extending media. 2Doob, 178. 3Everett E. Hagen, On a Theorygof Social Change: How I‘conomic Growth Begins (Homewood, 111.: n. n., 1962). 8 modernization will be significantly diffused to be available if people wish to adopt them. Those who hold this View do not believe that the communica— tion media can be the bottleneck that obstructs modernization. Apparently, the blind alley of which Sapir warned 11$; tearlier, continues to be a clear and present danger, aLLéass in a somewhat different manner. Underestimation of tliee value of communication media was replaced by over— aesssczssment of their power to develop "on their own." The Concerns of This Study According to this writer, the problem is at least tflzreuefold: (1) Studies of modernization often begin con- Sliciearably later than they should, and the role of former C<>ZLcn1ial masters is left unexplored; (2) aspects of com— Inllnication often are not fully explored in such moderni- 255111i43n studies; and (3) a conventional approach, usually tirléit: of economic development, is taken, even when the r I O O l O (5:143 of media of communications 18 recognized. w. The modernization process is usually, i.e., most C=C> ITmlonly, approached in terms of "economic development." 3? . 1"111% is a valid approach, but, as Moore says, it has no absol . . 3 . ute validity. Though such an approach 18 proper, it \ jkrl lIthiel de Sola Pool, "The Role of Communication 3113 ‘the Process of Modernization and Technological Change," 1.7Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilben:E. Moore (eds.), Industri- ‘\\3:§§tion and Society (Paris: UNESCO—Mouton, 1963), 281. hi 2Wilbur E. Moore, Social Change (Englewood Cliffs, 'J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963), 91. 3 Q Ibid. .. u g I .q a“. fif 0 CF I u 'bbr ‘60.».05‘ I ‘ ' ‘ ‘ " {n up-..n"\l .ZP‘ ~ ‘0'i‘JU‘. A- a»- (I: avhnncs Cf r '9 5Oybv~ o «4.0.:a'l {VIA-1 a f‘?‘ :I...‘ .‘V‘ V' 87.5238 37.3 2' ' ‘ ." RF.“ ‘.a. ”taco. R‘F at: “‘P~&£,.‘s ~ ah¢¢b.‘_..:“ A '.L;"L In LA l..&»h .,as ~\ NH." ‘ “-.. u..uu LC L”: C . - . Q . . n v .._n ‘ h.'eod ‘ ‘4‘!” V ‘n H A‘PN A 55.,"._’ . - l “a s... ‘ 'a \ I. A "wt" 5“ ’“30 . ‘ ‘Icg‘. In: I v- .“ -: .. c. ‘5 I .r a v. . " 0'53? ' , h‘” is ‘ e ‘i ~ Pa:‘=:fl ' . '5 V‘ . “F. I. ‘ _‘~. \. +. “V sue 6-,,“ c A" .; 1:-~'. ‘1“- I v‘oe‘za“nl ‘ ‘ .‘L‘ . 2‘1 . ‘ x . 5“‘I, A'A‘K- ‘:" . ‘V'=| r. ‘ u‘ 6“ F . 5‘yols 0c +L ‘ E 5.. 9 is; ‘Jery conventional, and most of the studies that take iricillstrialization (an even more conventional approach to t11<3 process of modernization) for the starting point, suffer from a common defect, . . . that of treating industrialization as a given change and recording or ordering of the consequen- tial changes that must then follow, by pursuing the functional model of an integrated social system, which has to achieve a new basis of integration owing to the introduction of a critically important alteration in a strategic sector of a society, the economy. The same author, in addition to pointing out this weakness of the studies of social change, suggested the SCOpe of alternatives: 'Ihe process of modernization is broad. . . . In one area at one time, the problem may be defined as that (of reducing illiteracy or providing potable water to 'urban slums or spraying mosquito-breeding swamps with chemicals to control malaria. In other places at other times, roads or hydro-electric power installations may 'be given tOp priority. In still other places, or in the same places at other times, precedence may go to capital-goods industries, light consumer-goods indus- tries, or a revamped civil service. What is involved in modernization is a'total' transformation of traditional or pre—modern society into the types of technology and associated social organization that characterize the 'advanced,‘ econo- mically prosperous, and relatively politically stable nations of the Western World. Similarly, Eisenstadt3 offered a criticism that I: esearch on development and modernization often has been \ lIbid., 20. 21bid., 90. 3S. E. Eisenstadt, "Social Change and Modernization," 'in Cahiers d‘Etudes Africaines, v, No. 3 (1965), 453— 471. lO gLLixied by assumption, often implicit, about the conditions cxf’ gyrowth. In particular, he seemed to be deploring the assssllmption of the primacy of the economic sphere in de- velopment and modernization, as well as the assumption of tliea relative assurance of the continuity of modernization. With the preceding background being firmly estab— lJiSSIIed, it is now possible to state, with considerable definitiveness, the concern of this study. The tOpic of this work can best be characterized by a single question: WTlat were the differences, explicit and implicit, in the C=C>143nial policies vis-a-vis radio broadcasting in selec- ted former colonies in Africa? Exploration of this basic tOpic is directly re- lated to the methodological approach, and boundary lines C315 ‘that approach. In order to obtain a detailed and accu- rate picture of the role of colonial powers in the devel— c>19rnent of radio broadcasting, delineation of time and s13a<2e covered had to be undertaken, as well as specific thethod of investigation thought out. Study Procedure Geographic Area Covered The three territories studied in this thesis are EilJl located in West Central Africa, and were formerly ad~ ministered by three colonial powers: The Federation of .Nigeria (British), the Republic of Congo (French) and the CCmgo Republic (Belgian). These three territories had been I“ ll chosen because of certain similarities, and at the same time because of certain substantial differences. Among the similarities, the following were considered important: the territories' geographical location, the year in which all three achieved independence (1960) , and the identical character of the political elite which mediated the West— ern impact (in all three, the so-called " alien colonial" served this purposel) . In the estimation of this writer, 211.1. these similarities help the validity of comparisons of the colonial policies and actions, and of their results. But as with the similarities, the differences were eCI‘JErlly important. In the selected territories, the mode of government of tribalized African mass was different. 111- bligeria, the indirect rule, that is working through, airiCi cieveloping, traditional political system prevailed, ‘vljiiile in the French territory of the so-called Middle Congo (“OW the Republic of the Congo), the rule was always direct, i "€3~, the traditional authorities, if used at all, were regarded only as subordinate officials in a monolithic C2<>fl113nial administration.2 In the Belgian Congo, the mode ()1? Eyovernment was mixed; as Coleman put it, in theory Belgian policy has been one of indirect rule, but in practice, . . . the authorities have inclined toward direct administration.3 \ P . lGabriel A. Almond and James 8. Coleman (eds.) , The $103 of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton Uni- VeI‘sity Press, 1960), 264. 21bid., 257. 31bid. ”Iva-HI t 6:,“ 'U- . > :"‘:‘F:"‘| :. ‘ ’Q-bb‘bifib. -¢. .\ ’ 1 iv». .5 . , ‘ "VR: a..- 5"".589U. n o: . . ":2: BA'nL. _.,, :p-u. Hy‘. .‘|VG- l 5'". ‘.I Q .- - pic 0 2 c‘ .'."' b.“ ‘H-ya - ‘ Q IFI.‘ I "ficr‘a. ...-."O .~~~ -tu ‘ “5" 5.0-“ I' n., I to b‘.. “.e.' ‘32" ‘ “ ME: .I' ‘g. :‘Pah‘ A ‘ ty syn. ‘ 4‘“ :- : ‘VQ “flu - cv.. E‘ a \ u . .‘ “ L‘. ks. ~i.‘ 9’2"" \ i i‘. ‘ ‘ \‘:: r L Q . " 5¢.e ‘ u k. h" I I 12 In reality, the policies within the three terri- tories towards the Westernized African class were also different. In Nigeria, the British had excluded this class from political participation, but by giving the African great political freedom, the British created for them- selves the later nationalistic demands; in 1945, the British accepted the new African elite as the successor of their own (i.e., British) rule. The same is not true about the Belgians in the Congo; there the acceptance came very much later, under pressure rather than spontaneously, and on a much smaller scale. In the French territory, the COlonial power subscribed to the policy of assimilation, i - e - , participation by elite in the higher bureaucracy and central institutions of the territorial governments. HoViaver, in practice, the new African elite there was e)‘teluded from effective participation just as completely as in the early days of the rule in the British territo- ries. In the Middle Congo, it was not until 1945 that the beg’-‘Lnning of the acceptance in practice could be observed. Political freedom, then, was also different in the three territories selected for this study. While in Nigeria there was considerable freedom for the European-educated z\fl‘ican to proclaim and seek his goals, the Belgian Congo proVided hardly any such freedom. In the French colony, the freedom began only after World War II. A number of other factors in which the three ter— ritories differed from each other could be mentioned, but 1 ‘4 , l..- l .. n“ h.‘: . k6 V. D s) l e o ‘1 . . ’ ~Q . st.“lc ~ A: .‘.A . “‘“NU V§ .. . “.z‘ "\ H ‘ 3 A? \\ . .e_, H‘ ‘S‘: I“ ‘ q‘A .N.:S C" “V'- ”v ' ‘ t~e-- . Mo no.9 a: ‘ .‘. l‘\~" . ."~ “‘ " c ‘Q .E' a ‘I u! N“ : n ‘ \- . \ -.n‘ r: g ‘ v ‘~‘ ‘ |_ ‘ § ". I. q ‘ ‘| _f‘ ‘ h . 5“ ‘ a a ‘&«‘S l‘ , .‘.§. ‘s. H I.“ ‘l.‘ “ ~ I ~“ 3 \ ‘I ) :'. =7 \ st "G”. v H; , H. r‘h‘ s‘v" § " :‘1:~ \ l‘ '5 ~"~:‘AC-‘ ‘ >‘C‘; 0c ‘ ‘ L I.‘ n n : "I“AV «.‘rc U. Hac‘ I a. ~‘ ‘ ‘U. u“ I .‘ 4‘ ‘ 7 ‘- 4‘» ‘5: Q‘ ‘ I 4'“ 4 ‘ w‘ n.‘ u ‘5‘ / 13 the aforementioned few were considered the most important for this study. Time Period Studied The period investigated for this study begins with the end of the First World War, since it was at approxi- mate ly that time that radio broadcasting emerged and that a. new approach to colonial problems was taken by various colonial powers. However, a brief summary of the expansio- nistic policies and of means of communication prior to the 1914 - 1918 war is provided, and references to pre— 19 18 years are frequently made. The time period covered ends with the independence day of each of the territories s‘~13E’Veyed, i.e., in 1960. Periodically, the years of 1939 (beginning of World War II), and 1945 (the end of World War II) are used for the determination of the relative s‘tages of progress. Organization and Treatment The approach to this study is historical with tiescriptive, analytical and evaluative phases. Descrip— % narrative is given of the background of those colo- nial policies not only directly pertaining to radio broad~ Qe‘53‘lzing but also those regarding political, economic and Social development of the colonies, and of the growth and fieVeIOpment of the institutions of broadcasting in the QC>lonies. Inasmuch as the relationship of the colonial POlicies, explicit or implied, to the actual develOpment l4 c>2f5 broadcasting is explored, the study assumes an analyt- :i.<:=.al form through which it is hOped to obtain consider— aaflk2>ile insight into the problems involved. Thirdly, the evaluative aspect is attempted to the extent allowed by the available data. Undoubtedly,it is this third dimension which is by far the most difficult t:<:> achieve, while at the same time it is the most inter- es ting to work with. Some evidence which might emerge that the policies of the colonial powers vis-a-vis broad- <245L25ting in the three territories had indeed been of primary importance and consequence to the development of 'tir1:is medium of communication could perhaps be of practical re levance to further planning by all developing nations, £1r1<3.especially by those colonial powers and their colonies tiriait still remain. Data Data on most communication aspects within emerg- ing nations are generally meager. In this observation, “time; present writer has only confirmed what other investi- gators noticed earlier. Doob, for example, remarked that . . . material on communications in Africa is lament- ably scarce, for not until recently has the rubric become sufficiently fashionable to encourage research and reports.1 lDoob, 13. There are, however, notable exceptions, Sugh as Lord Hailey's An African Survey (London: Oxford University Press ) which already in its first edition (1938) MBWEll as in the second edition (1957), contained invalu— afle information on the press, broadcasting, and cinema. 15 Nevertheless, several sources of information have been diligently perused for the purpose of this study. Fi :rst, reports and transcripts of Parliamentary debates haVe been searched for references and documentation of po licies. To the same category belong compilations of laws and statutes, of both the colonial powers and of the C o lonies . Travelers' and journalistic reports, and the like, also served as a considerably rich source of informa— tion. Though numerous, such reports often revealed only glimpses or pieces of information. Doob's remark that I' - in Africa . . . one must be grateful for the smallest bits of information"1 is most apprOpriate here. Political, economic and sociological treatises have proven to be of value in obtaining a solid background upon which exploration of the topic could be built. It has been this class of sources which often,‘ however, pertained not to the role of the colonial powers but strictly to the African territories, and especially to their functioning as independent nations. Nonetheless, substantial amount of useful background information has been obtained from them. The last, but not the least, important sources have been innumerable statistical compilations by individ- nal Countries or territories, international organizations, and even individuals. Though suffering from the common N 1Doob, 15. 16 de ficiency of non-uniform way of reporting various data, 5 1:. atistical publications have provided much needed basis fo :r intelligent interpretations of development of broad- casting. In all these cases, information has been viewed wi 11h caution and evaluated with detached objectivity. All 5 ources, including government documents and others which mi ght have been written with some ulterior motives, are valuable and cannot be dismissed lightly. Whenever pos— s ible, differing versions and/or data are recorded in this study. An extra reminder regards the data on the French territory. It was found in the study of the Middle Congo that data and references often pertained to the whole French Equatorial Africa (of which the Middle Congo was only one part, the others being Gabon, Chad, and Oubangi— Shari) and no breakdown was available. A note in the text or in the tables always calls attention to this fact. Population data. -—A special word is needed on population data. To arrive at the ”per capita" figures, p‘Oplllation information for the three territories was re— C{Hired for various points in time. In all cases, only e'Stimates were available, as they had been to the colonial authorities, and even at a very recent time. For example, in Nigeria the 1960 census discovered, and a later recount Confirmed, that the actual pOpulation that year was well over 50 million, while all statistical reports have based their data on the estimated figure of approximately l7 3 5 million. A decision had to be made whether the more accurate data should be given, or whether the error should be repeated for the sake of consistency. The more scholarly approach, demanding as accurate data as possible, won in 121115 investigation. Population data for the three terri- to :ries are given in the Appendix. Monetaryjinformation. —-Throughout the study, re :ferences are made to various currencies, whenever finan- cial data have been included. On occasions, there appeared a need for conversion of such financial data from one currency to another. As the exchange rates varied greatly during the period of time investigated in this report, all local currencies have been converted into units of U.S. currency of a given value at specific times of the period 1.9 18 - 1960. This information also is included in the Appendix . PART I COLONIALISM AND COMMUNICATIONS CHAPTER I COLONIAL EXPANSION AND COMMUNICATIONS: AN OVERVIEW The lack of concern with communications in the £5‘t114dy of colonial history of the major powers, as ex- ;pzrreassed in the introduction to this thesis, should not be interpreted as a total disregard of the importance of com— munications in the study of history of mankind. Robert liszzzra Park, of the Chicago school of sociological thought, 8 tated that . . . the role and function of communication . . . is obviously fundamental to the social process, and . . . extensions and improvements which the physical sci- ences have made to the means of communications are so vital to the existence of society and particularly to that more rationally organized form of society we call civilization.l As a prelude to the exploration of colonial policies regarding communications, the importance and role of com- ‘nuflruications in society should be briefly examined. Perhaps, a-historical perspective can be obtained if various stages (if civilization are surveyed to see whether Park was right when he said that 1Robert Ezra Park, Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955), 314. 19 20 technological devices have naturally changed men's habits and in doing so, they have necessarily modi- fied the structure and functions of society. . . . Every technical device, from the wheelbarrow to th aeroplane, in so far as it provided a new and more effective means of locomotion, has, or should have, marked an epoch in society. This is so far true of most other important changes in the means of trans— portation and communications.1 It is in the context of empires that the perma- nent maintenance of control over wide areas was seen to depend on the organization and continuance of rapid and ifzrreequent communication.2 The underlined terms in the pre- xr:i.<3us sentence are of import here. Political organiza— t::i.<3ns such as empires are, among other things, concerned va;i_1:h the territorial expansion of which they are capable, Eixdxiiialso with the length of time over which the organi— 2:ax1:ions can persist. The consideration here is not only *wrj_1:h the historically observable relationship between rneeéins of communications and imperial (i.e., colonial) Cij.f3fusion, but also with the suggested changes in, and deClines and demises of, empires as a result of changes in the technological development of such communication Infieauas. \ 21n the following discussion, "Communication" is bY necessity defined in its broadest sense. In later chap— 't?r5: the topic will be restricted to one means of commu- nication, namely radio broadcasting. Y“ :,. *st 3... 3:: :O"f."r;pv- ‘ “Vt/v...a‘,., b ' 1 . ‘ .:‘-'F ha. a - ~s.....v.v‘.\' ‘ 4 -:’ LF' .':‘I na- "..56 fl. "‘ . h "a..." W: 'nAy-a. .d‘vugbu V. ‘.-v‘: ' ha, . e ' H ‘AA‘ R ' .h “’ :.A\r»\d "C~Se . - ‘AA. . ' '-:'= 3" f!’ .- 1 ~-y¢oh k‘ ‘-E r... ~ 5a 3‘. v u A «.- Ne " a: ‘_ o.‘ ’n‘ ‘ ‘ I " a'r‘ h. «. ‘ ‘: ~‘ ‘5‘ t C . 5:)! I “ ~I 'I 'V“C"CAV " .‘IL I h ~*n..:‘|§“ ‘ h§\:‘. 2"“ ' L ~‘ 21 Empires and Communications In early civilizations, the success of expansion was dependent at least in part on such scientific and technological advances as the crossing of the light Afri~ can horse with the heavier Asiatic horse, and the intro- duction of horse riding and establishment of cavalry which replaced horse driving and chariots.l Similarly, the re- placement of heavy solid wheels by light spoked wheels can be said to have contributed to a more effective con— trol over territories.2 The interdependence of the wheel and the road and the effect of both upon political con- trol and its centralization has been noted by McLuhan who said, however, that a reverse dependence is also true. " Centralism depends on margins that are excessible by road ElI1<3 wheel."3 In the Roman Empire just as in the Persian Empire, dependence on roads facilitated not only invasion but also administration of foreign territories‘.1 The horse, the road and the wheel wiped out the independence of vil- lages, city states and conquered empires by speeding up 1 . Harold A. Innis, The Bias of Communication (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951) , 134. 2 V. Gordon Childe, What Happened in History “iarmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1942), 152. f. Frances Rodgers and Alice Beard, Heels, Wheels and Wire (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1935). 3McLuhan, 167. 4Innis, 15. "i. I ' ‘ ' in: bepnvu a: l u . Unanbvu- he Tu°fi'§'n a‘nlnva "dub“ ‘a- .u v - .HI‘ LI y: n. d. UA a $35.5. .....se wi atcut a we basic to 1'. Set a1 ammun: hat; F“ ‘ um. ‘u.\, -‘b.‘ 319399 Viewed .‘.'-'=: “a1 “VAL- “ :c~.u.b r‘ U~ ‘ :n :I;-I‘ . N‘““¢Ia“"‘\ b (v. C 5. '1 "u. A OF 1 ¢.b." u 'PA' b‘Hn‘. .N‘y 'fi‘ ‘ .‘V. 3 s C -y ~V“E’O‘ a ‘ L I EX; ‘ .r I A“; ‘ ‘wh.e.fi ‘L ' L._en . A i‘h 1“ b 1 U A ~ Cuntrcj 1“ '\ a ‘5 h. 5“‘}' ‘. 50 ‘y I- ‘ Q ‘oc\‘l 5“. ‘ V ‘ “33o. 1..! \ h \ ‘. I U|'ah “. ‘ r t.- 22 itilale technical means of communication. With increased mobility and improved means of com- munication, ideas of innovation and change gradually diffuse within the various rural groups and bring about a weakening of the cumulative unifying bonds basic to mechanical solidarity and control. Not all results of mechanization of the means of <::<:1mmunication can be said to be of one kind. Historian f1?<:>ynbee viewed the acceleration factor as translating the physical problems into moral ones, and pointed to the antique road crowded with dog—carts, wagons, and rickshaws 8153: full of minor nuisance as well as minor dangers.2 . . . as the forces impelling traffic mount in power, there is no more problem of hauling and carrying, but the physical problem is translated into a psychologi- cal one as the annihilation of space permits easy annihilation of travelers as well. This principle applies to all media study.3 McLuhan's choice of words is perhaps unfortunate, for airuxiihilation often is understood to mean "ultimate destruc— tion." When, however, annihilation is interpreted as " reduction to nothing," in terms of space it can mean its control, and in terms of travelers it can mean the exercise of power over them. When such explanation is a~<30pted, then it is indeed possible to apply the princi- IP1£2 of control not only to roads but to all media, and ruyt only to travelers but to media users and consumers as well. “a 1Joseph S. Roucek (ed.), Social Control (Princeton, N.J.:ILVan Nostrand Co., Inc., 1947),‘69. 2Cited in McLuhan, 95. 3Ibid. 23 The extension of empires was facilitated by various other means of communications. The function of tflnea ILibrary to operate as true instrument of imperial Power was established during the times of the Assyrians and perfected by the Egyptian king Ptolemy II who insti- tu‘ted the great library at Alexandria as the center of imperial power in the third century B.C. The scribes Occupied from then on until the development of the print— ing press a strategic position in imperial bureaucracies. Innis pointed to the adaptability of Roman Law in i:}1€3 oral tradition as facilitating the extension of the Ii(”nan Empire which followed the success of Roman arms.1 The development and use of papyrus helped solve adminis- ‘t11761tive problems of the Roman Empire in terms of space, :tD‘JIZ not in terms of time. A new medium was needed to meet ‘11163 limitations of papyrus, and was found in the more (1‘113ab1e parchment. The durability of parchment and the convenience of the codex for reference made it particularly suitable for the large books typical of scriptures and legal works. In turn, the difficulties of copying a large book limited the numbers produced. Small libraries with a small number of large books could be established over large areas. Since the material of a civilization dominated by the papyrus roll had to be recepied into the parchment codex a thorough system of censorship was involved. . . . The ban on secular learning gave a preponderance to theological studies and made Rome dominant. The monopoly of knowledge centering around parchment emphasized religion at the expense of law. \— 1" lInnis, 45. 21bid., 48—49. ‘4 n‘. \ ~\. c .v ' n ‘ ' \ 24 A new medium, paper, was discovered in China and greatly affected the balance of power between the Brahmins and the Buddhists in India. The monopoly of knowledge of the Brahmins was based on the oral tradition, thus cre— ating a gap between a small governing class and the mass Of the people. Buddhism grew at least partially because Of its emphasis on writing and therefore its accessibility to the lower classes. In the Chinese Empire, an elaborate system of pictoqraphs required a scholarly class of administrators, SeParated from the mass of people. The technological adVance manifested by the invention and availability of paper proved insufficient to maintain the Empire perma- 1uehtly without an alphabet system. From India, Buddhism I“igrated to China where access to supplies of paper en- a‘b led Chinese Buddhists to deve10p blockkprinting on a large scale in the eighth century. But the manufacturing of paper moved to Bagdad, sZEI'JI‘ead from there to the West and from the thirteenth QeI‘ttury on was confined to Western centers, at first especially in Italy. The commercial revolution beginning about 1275 paralleled the increasing production of paper, and the activity of Italian commercial cities in turn Weakened the Byzantine Empire. The development of other cities, particularly in France in the fourteenth century, again shifted the imperial power and even the papacy moved to Avignon in 1308. . , ' IAAIA ' -.~,. .'\ T ,. typed A: .._.\,_ a P . . on. .:’fl-'3Fv oi. “heed . -n'- . 4- -k c: :1 a “' vu .be 1, 34;”; "it-'1 L “‘V“ mpg; 05“ '5“. FA.- Vb bk. '0... ' . “'51”. «”5 .""‘°’-¢vu U; :5, 5'1" ,. ‘ "““~v“3. C a. an . P'- ,. . .« ~...'a..V'I y," C‘- 25 The Age of Printing Attempts to develop a system of reproduction of books by machine were stirred by the high price demanded for hand-reproduced books.1 The invention of printing in the fifteenth century was a technical achievement which until then had no precedent. It was the develop- ment of a complete manufacturing process rather than the invention of a single object or machine.2 It is also IPIKJbably not without significance that it was developed j_r1 Germany which lay on the outskirts, as it were, of the Eilflaa dominated by scribes, or c0pyists, as Innis called them.3 The interest in the use of paper steered others t:<> the invention of new printing types such as the gothic £3<3Iflpt in Germany and roman and italic types in Italian czj-t:i.es, and to the production of printed sheets and <3<3xzelopment of financial houses at Antwerp, Amsterdam, E‘rnd Utrecht, also lying outside the area controlled by £3cribes. Printing in France was delayed until 1469 and 1111 England until 1476.4 Postal services probably were established in the e=ar:1y days of the Persian and Roman Empires,5 but it was ‘1‘ 11bid., 53. 2Encyclopadia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XVIII, 3Innis, 53. 305. 4Ibid. 26 printing which signalled their growth.1 Printing also led to the establishment of the press and of strict govern— mental controls, especially in France and in England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuriesflte existence of the press eventually contributed to the development of POStal routes and the reduction of the postal rates in EI‘lgland in 1710, and "the market for newspapers and books had been widened . . . by an extension of the post office and a more frequent service from London."2 The post roads of England were, for the most part, paid for by the news- papers.3 In the American colonies a demand for printers 1:03: the publication of laws of the assemblies was followed by an interest in newspapers and in the post office.4 The history of shipping is undoubtedly an integral part of the history of civilization. All of the ancient e1“Fires were dependent upon shipping which was provided mOStly on short routes along the coasts. It was not until the Mediterranean world and the Near East were welded together under the authority of the Roman Empire that favorable conditions emerged for the development of trade.5 \ lEncyclOpaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (l959),XVIII, 306. 2Innis, 151. 3McLuhan, 101. 4Innis, 57. 541 5Encyc10paedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XX, 27 The growth of trade was accompanied by the development of legal and commercial institutions, and the Roman mari- time code (or at least its main features) survived the fall of Roman Empire itself, found its way into the English maritime law and formed the basic of modern mari time jurisprudence . l Oceanic exploration was pioneered by the Portu- guese who extended their imperial and commercial influ— ence into America, Africa, India and China. The techno- logical advancement, evident in the develOpment of the I"‘ar‘iner's compass (800 - 1200 A.D.), aided the extension of the Portuguese and Spanish powers to the New World. The gradual establishment of British dominance of the seas helped the regularization of the channels of trade, which in turn led to official British support by diplo- Inatic representatives abroad. Thus an extension of British pclitical power was brought into areas previously explored" or11y by private interests for commercial purposes. Later, as sea transport of passengers became lucrative, shipping <2Ompanies began to be subsidized by the governments, as was the case with the Cunard line in Britain specifically ' in order to ensure swift contact with the colonies."2 The development of steamships coincided with the I“Eimarkable growth of British shipping, which by the end 0f nineteenth century exceeded the total tonnage of all \ lIbid. 2McLuhan, lo3. 28 other foreign merchant fleets.l This pre-eminence was due directly to the technical revolution.2 It is signif— icant that whereas in the British Empire the imperial expansion grew with the development of shipping and trade routes, the trade of the Roman Empire dwindled as the Roman Empire itself declined.3 That one technological advance led to another has been further documented‘in the history of the United States where in the period of Western expansion, the technologies "1>I:ing the newspaper; the newspaper starts up politics, Eirlél a railroad."4 Similarly, in the territories across the <3<3€2ans the railways soon linked the shipping services and (z‘ellters with railroads to convey not only immigrants, but I“ail and goods as well.5 The need for existence of strong central govern- ment over a wide area, with power to command labor, explains the fact that the construction of an elaborate system of roads, for the most part paved, paralleled the growth in power of the Roman Empire. Roman roads and streets were uniform wherever they occurred. The decline of the roads \ 1Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), xx, 546. 21bid. 31bid., XXII, 370. 4Matthew Josephson, The Robber Barons: The Great Eflsgican Capitalists, 1861 — 1901 (New YorE: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1934), 27. 5McLuhan, 103. 29 is directly linked with the decline of papyrus supplies, which resulted from the Roman loss of Egypt. The govern- ment organization declined, army organization declined and as the army provided the labor, it is not surprising, then, that after the decline of the Roman Empire, Medieval EurOpe grew up without uniform roads or cities or bureauc— racies, and it fought the wheel, as later city forms fought the railways; and as we, today, fight the auto- mobile for new speed and power are never compatible with existing spacial and social arrangements. The social and governmental arrangements underwent S‘Jlbstantial changes. Just as the railway strengthened the I“(3‘1'10polies of political centers in England, the invention of the telegraph destroyed them because it encouraged pI‘Ovincial competition.2 The regional press in England no J‘<>1'lger had to rely on postal services and political control through the post office because of the new telegraph serv— ice. The independence from big metropolitan areas and their press was established by the advent of the first of ~tl'le electric means of communication. The independence of prOvincial cities from London paralleled the increased itlifluence of the French upon England through the medium of the telegraph and submarine cables. Lord Northcliffe in England made unprecedented use of the new medium in the Search for news as he exploited Paris as a vast and in- eXpensive source of journalistic wealth.3 ‘_ lIbid., 99. 2Innis, s9. 31bid., 60. 30 The Age of Electric Media Just as the development of paper and printing is said to have ushered in a new age, so the electric and later electronic media introduced a new era. Furthermore, the concerns and interests displayed by the different media of communication over problems of space (territo- rial expansion) and of time (duration) are markedly dif- ferent. While political organizations, whether monarchies <31? :republics, were obviously concerned with prospects for IpeIrmanency, printing and paper, and all the media which g3|?ve upon these inventions, exhibited marked concern1 with EBIPEice, and considerable neglect of concern with the limi- tzéi1zions of time.2 When the power of the printing media was , however, challenged by the invention and development (>15 the new ones (telegraph, radio, etc.), the press' mo- 1'1<31.3!<>1y of space weakened as the regionalism patterns of czCDIltinuity and time became even more conspicuous. The j‘FHE3act of any kind of printing was becoming less and less <1<3nrinating, and this in turn weakened the imperial structure (3f: centralized powers and their outside territories. In the British Empire the growth of autonomy and in- dependence among members of the Commonwealth may be attributed in part to the same develoPment.3 \ 1Innis used the term "obsession," 60. 21bid. 3Ibid., 77. 7"r*'- A ‘5 wt -. "tau. A. 1 U. a lit-A... I Q ' I squa- p“: a- ~ ""‘flfi'vtay’ . .‘ 'ha-. 6 ' H‘ ~.,_C‘_.‘a_e n u ...""‘ V A - - - a A“ n.. '.‘~“‘5 Pc‘.‘< ' n i-QA'AQ‘ .f‘. ' ”":‘:uh vb on .. ‘ J‘s-5’ ‘lr . “c‘: «is. h. ‘..~ ._ . I v ‘ . re, ‘ c e la «‘L‘F“ F DV.‘..V.‘ \, " " 5 ::~-. Aunt-b .“ -- t: C :“ h‘y.. C - ‘ Q.‘ 5 ‘ - “‘n a... nu bat-.3: ‘ CAAQ .. ‘ ‘1‘".9‘.’ a.- n ‘voo- \V “ . :‘hw R!- “" ‘QA‘ lV~Ca.. In. .- x ‘.‘e Mt, a. ‘ ~95. ‘0 E 4. 5 V .‘|“.‘e :00 8": . ~ 5‘ .‘, . \.~. ‘1 p ‘1 Ig‘ ‘ r~cCe. .‘v, "“‘I. h . tic“ “A'fi.‘:¥ s V ‘«S u I c...‘ Qb:u‘t A: C. " x .‘H ‘I ‘5‘ ‘ 31 Furthermore, the telegraph, by intensifying the volume of news, greatly crippled the role of editorial opinions, and by Speeding up of news, made them not only immediate but also "human." McLuhan said that the tele- graphic medium gives "that immediate dimension of human interest to news that does not belong to a point of View."1 When the instant speed of information movement begins, 'there is a collapse of delegated authority and a dis- solution of the pyramid and management structures Inade familiar in the organization chart. The separa- tion of functions and the division of stages, spaces, and tasks are characteristic of literate and visual society and of the Western world. These divisions tend to dissolve through the action of the instant and organic interrelations of electricity.2 The means of communications which until late nine— teenth and early twentieth centuries had been based pri— marily on the eye, deve10ped a power which threatened to change the structure of Western empires, first in war and then in peace.3 The imperial relationships between metro- p0lzitan powers and their territories began to change as Ei lfiesult of changes in the relationship between the powers tlrlennselves. Some major powers fought the Great War (1914- 191L8) to expand their colonial holdings, others defended the colonial status quo. But the viewpoint of yet other l"at—ions substantially modified the existing Opinion of ("DIOnialism, and the idea of self—determination was intro- chIced. The Treaty of Versailles, and the subsequently K 1McLuhan, 223. 2Ibid., 217. 3Innis, 80. 32 established League of Nations, both accepted this prin— ciple, and actually broke up and destroyed large politi— cal systems such as the Empires of Germany, Austria- Hungary, and of the Turks. But the emphasis by the printed media on nationalism and imperialistic ambitions, which resulted in the international instability and contributed tr) tile start of the Great War, also hastened the develop— ment of a competitive type of communication which was to be based on the ear. This function, scope, and impact of the radio and time later electronic media has not yet been fully inves- thgated.in terms of their contribution to the decline of cxolonial empires. Perhaps, it is still too early to say Vvith any degree of definitiveness what the return to the nuedia based on the ear has signified. Innis, though, had Some ideas on that score: In EurOpe an appeal to the ear made it possible to destroy the results of the Treaty of Versailles as registered in the political map based on self-deter- mination. The rise of Hitler to power was facilitated by the use of loud speaker and the radio. . . . Political boundaries related to the demands of the Printing industry disappgared with the new instrument of communication . . . . He went also a little further and surmised that the radio aPPealed to vast areas, overcame the division between classes in its escape from literacy, and "favoured cen- tralization and bureaucracy."2 It is with this last state- “Nun” that McLuhan disagreed rather vehemently and criti— \\ l 2 Ibid., 81. Ibid., 82. . q ' ..-a~ .- -.-v— -‘tob- -4 n p bur-5" U. u~-. bone...“ LIV v s F: “n .v u. ...e 6:. . c‘rsnL-.,: 'VO‘Ub-l.“ .fl' 0! r- “to..\' e d a. Wilt...‘ V‘P- 'aunc‘ ‘u 0.0-." “5.. .‘I-uu ~v*\ ' o ‘3'; Y'v-{ “way ‘....- .. . ’fi u c ‘Iua ..‘ 5-0,». ‘1 .A.‘ ‘ " 4 :V‘n ‘ ..__‘.‘ .. ‘— a. ,_. .sl ...v C ' v- . I x - . V v- ‘ L O l l") 33 Cized Innis from not having applied his own (Innis') method of using history as an instrument of research: IXfter many historical demonstrations of the space- kiinding power of the eye and the time—binding power CJf the ear, Innis refrains from applying these si:ructural principles to the action of radio. Sud- denly, he shifts the ear world of radio into the \risual orbit, attributing to radio all the central— ijzing powers of the eye and of visual culture. rhsre Innis was misled by the ordinary concensus of Iris time. Electric light and power, like all electric nuedia are profoundly decentralizing and separatist iJi their psychic and social consequences. \Lisual technology creates a center—margin of organi- :zation whether by literacy or by industry and a price system. But electric technology is instant and omni- 'present and creates multiple centers-without-margins. ‘Visual technology . . . creates nations as spatially uniform and homogeneous and connected. But electric technology creates not the nation but the tribe —— not the superficial association of equals but the cohesive depth pattern of the totally involved kin- ship groups.l Communications and the Rise of Self-Determinism Obviously, the sketchy narrative on the preceding FN39eS can not be thought of as being a complete history of emPires and communications. There were, naturally, many other means of communication utilized by the various enmdres. In the twentieth century, air—tranSportation and ‘thfls further extension of postal services, as well as of tr‘ade, etc., could be documented. After the development of thBrPress, merging of the visual medium with the aural was accomPlished, and utilized, in the medium of film. Even later: the various improvements of the telegraph system, K McLuhan in his introduction to Innis, xii-xiv. . _ , .. = as 9-6 I'll O \— .I‘ ’ . . . a ~~—:-~m~ a . anvuo-‘vgvfl O .« . _ ua qnfi “'1‘“ ‘ ‘oH “J. 9&‘5 .r: | . O "'p!‘ ‘F‘A c; “"5. but _\_ w.“ o‘uvae L 9":LAV ‘ ' u M‘ .I‘ ‘. vch‘..‘a. t; .‘S I ‘0 HA. 5... LI». I ' . ~.- :1, ”hr. N?" u... .. 'L~.~‘_ u. ' Ar~fin .0- ‘ VI:AI ~.“C‘~V‘. I 'u . IN! ‘ w" 5% ”2":n.. U 'nuwv; YR'LA“, A . H ‘ nude. Dur' I I “‘0. ‘ II c F‘rfii- p ‘0‘ ~-": .U &,. 5‘ 'Va AA- M.V::. .‘ “A ‘ ‘ Nu fly... ”at +F h ‘ g. .I .. “ "a: .‘h| 0 "~‘ ' 34 stncfl as Telex, have been in evidence. What is very often considered a culmination (at the present time, of course) (3f ‘tlie development of communications media, television, djxi riot come into the picture of imperial communications turtifll the second half of the present century, and in the three territories surveyed in this thesis until after the cx>lcn1ial ties had been superseded by independence. The point to be made is that the era of radio Inigflrt have contributed to the decline of imperialism even though Emerson suggested that just as we do not really llonia1 empires should provide the necessary background against which explicit communications policies can be jUdged. The British Colonial Policy More often than not, whenever a chance presents itself to compare the British national characteristics with any other, British empiricism is contrasted with Latin rationalism; and the British suspicion of the abstract is H 8‘ Mary Evelyn Townsend, European Colonial Expansion M (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1941), 183. " 39 contrasted with the fascination which the abstract has for the "more logical" and the "more systematic" minds of the Latins. Similarly, in the political Sphere, the same distinction in mental habit is detected in the contrast between the alleged Latin attachment to centralization and the alleged British attachment to decentralization. Such distinctions can easily be overemphasized. The British concept of decentralization has always been modified by the British devotion to precedents rather than to principles, as the striking feature of the British common law amply demonstrates. But, as Evans pointed out, both precedents and principles end in systems; they have the same unifying influence, they both lead to identity of methods and performance. Thus, it is not surprising, that despite the great diversity among the various parts of the British Empire, just about all the British overseas territories exhibited much that had a common form, common principle or common Precedent. Similarly, it should not suprise anyone that the deClared policy of Great Britain displayed very much the Same goals and employed similar means in most of their dependencies . \K t . ].-E. W. Evans, "Principles and Methods of Adminis- ration in the British Colonial Empire," in C. M. MacInnes Cedo), Principles and Methods of Colonial Administration, olston Papers, III (London: Butterworth Scientific Ublications, 1950), 9. ‘ a. \ :1 5 .— a n q . Q. Ar. q s n— 4 \ bVéVo-ouoivy V I . . on. ".‘. n" A u - D .. '"V “Oct. at» . awry-Ana ‘F -— ' .UV:\' »-.c.. 0 u . t“ ’ . ”CI *r:o ,. so. ‘..'~ ~- . o‘.5. :4 "’ a 3": r~ “5“, . Q I 3.5:: "‘ :. VII. 5.. " FH- _ ‘ H1536 “a. a , ‘ it: .‘y unche I 'c H. c. “.5 ~m.e re.'~ 55"“q .. u H.‘ “ .:":v ',_ . a..n-‘ h-.:“ 1 u... ‘n . u. u T In, ..... “a ‘P. _ V “V - a A R H h 5 £1; I‘r\’~ k y. H, I ‘ .N': A‘ ‘ .V‘F ~ 40 Political Development A substantial part of the long history of British colonialism includes that period of time when not even the Britishers themselves were thinking of any other purpose than "imperialistic" for being in the colonies in the first place . 'There was a time when in the British Empire, as else- Vvhere, colonies were regarded merely as a source of idealth and a place of settlement for Europeans. You liave only to read any of the colonial literature of those days to see how little counted the rights and \Melfare of the Natives.l TTua time referred to the period up to the beginning of true second half of the nineteenth century. British colonization was the effort of the peOple :rather than the government, an activity and an accomplish- Inent due to British temperament at least as much as to lingland's need for expansion of food, raw materials and Ccmmmrcial markets. The British government followed rather 'than led the colonization process, partially upon urgings Of her own peOple. When, in 1883, John Seeley published his The Expansion of Englandz, he expounded the history ‘1 Lord Halifax, quoted in H. A. Wieschhoff, Colo— nial Policies in Africa ("African Handbook No. 5", Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press and the University Museum, 1944): 52- 1 2A series of lectures given in 1883 published in 902 by Macmillan Co. of New York. Seeley was knighted fer his work in 1894. Encyc10paedia Britannica, 27th ed., 41 of the Empire "to stir pride in the part and ambition for the future."1 The growth of militarism and nationalism in Europe were among the causes of the re—appraisal of the colxznies' values to Great Britain. Concurrently with the nullitary and the economic reappraisals, a new look of the polritical future of the dependencies also emerged: already tiuere was evidence that some of the dependencies were on their'way to self—government (Canada, for example), and . . . nothing was more certain that as time went on there would be further development in that direction. This, however, from the new vieWpoint did not neces- sarily imply independence; it need involve nothing more than progressive readjustment of the relations between colonies and mother country while all remained under a common flag and loyal to a common crown.2 It was at this time, also, that much effort began to be poured into finding a way in which an imperial Organizational framework could be formed. A series of Imperial Conferences began in 1887, and has continued, 'though under a different name3, till the present. From a treatise of the British colonial policy the Ilame of Joseph Chamberlain cannot be omitted. His tenure \ 1Frederic Austin Ogg, English Government and :Politics,(2nd. ed.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1944), 750. 21bid., 750-51. 3The last Imperial Conference was held in 1937. Since then, there have been Prime Ministers', Defense Ministers' and Finance Ministers' Meetings; Economic Con— ferences, Commonwealth Conferences, etc. Great Britain, British Information Services, The Commonwealth Association in Brief (London: B.I.S., 1958), 9-10. 42 of the office of colonial secretary between 1895 and 1900, though brief, is regarded as a turning point in tine history of the relations between the British colonies anui the mother country. He worked for the establishment cfif friendly relations among all parts of the empire, espxecially for the purposes of defense and commerce. In..1895, he based his proposals for preferential tariff CH1 the economic necessities of the world—wide empire. lflxyve all, he set out to work on the task of educating the British public opinion into understanding that the responsibilities of the mother country are not merely to be constructed according to the selfish ‘interests of a nation of consumers.2 EVen after he left the Cabinet, he worked for his ideals Of a colonial empire, for the establishment of a prefer- ential tarifffbr the empire, and -- on the foreign affairs front -— against the policies of "splendid isolation." I11.1904, he admonished his fellow Englishmen to "think ianerially."3 Certainly, the development as described above Stignified a notable departure from an announced desire to Withdraw completely from the coastal trading posts, as ‘1 Select Committee of the House of Commons advocated in 1865. The responsibilities of the mother country that \ 2 1EncyclOpaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), V, 04. 21bid. 3In the speech at the Guildhall, in the City of London, January 18, 1904. ‘ . 2.43,. . ,. ynu‘umhyoé ‘ao I a -,:--'w~ tpat. — r‘ nit-.005. w‘du- ‘ ' 9‘ D! '4 ‘i-u- ..' V A ”65*: 61.. f r IA o.'~:‘. H -»-.-u-- g. .' ‘ 5.23: WCIfi C - “"“nL fl. . ,5- viny_y~ U. c a J . . ‘Ilp “’3 “F. R. H.» vy.V“-;‘ ‘ l ~’.~.V\ n ""..tae Cf "‘0 5: fl .‘1 U. crea‘ \ ht. : I A ‘ W :2; at u :‘~:A “ \ bcsVQ::' tfle 5: §~ . .‘ ‘ v t W sa‘ as ‘o— ¥e I . . ‘ I L ‘C “5“ O \‘5‘.t A: v‘ ‘ V6 ‘lec‘ v “| 8 '2‘, ‘ s..\‘r C h‘ I C..:“n‘ . 5 ~ “Ee:fi~ I Pp. ‘L§t‘ ~V- V :‘A ““63“ I ‘a \ :- h A 4., ‘h‘ :*.: w, bs.e Q“‘ ‘C 8 3»:‘ s‘ h ‘~S n: ”s C. e , l. “‘5' ‘~!\ I\\‘.’\: {. v ~ \ \uf“ v.‘ Y VT. 43 Chamberlain was talking about were exemplified by the administration of Sir Frederick (later Lord) Lugard, when he became High Commissioner of Nigeria in 1900 and which he formalized in his writings, especially in the well known work on The Dual Mandate in British Africa.1 The concept of a trust for the welfare of the inhabitants of the colonial territories was explained in Lugard's doctrine of the dual mandate which posited the View that Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit of her own industrial classes, and of the native races in their progress to a higher plane; that the benefit can be made reciprocal, and that it is the aim and desire of civilized administration to fulfill this dual mandate. The doctrine of dual mandate has become the official pol— icy of Great Britain, and when the League of Nations be- gan formulating its policies on the former German depend- encies, the term mandate appeared to gather momentum. But as far as the British were concerned, . . . it was the free and generous assistance given to mother country by the colonies in that great hour of need. [i.e. World War I] that finally clinched their claims not only to a more direct voice in the conduct of Empire foreign affairs but to further freedom in the management of their own relations with foreign states, and to clearer recognition of their domestic autonomy.3 A number of Imperial Conferences made this official, and the statements by successive United Kingdom Secre— taries of State for the Colonies reaffirmed that lLord Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London: Wm. Blackwood and Sons, Ltdi, 1929). 2Lord Hailey, (1938), 133. 3Ogg, 725. 44 the policy for the dependencies is to help them to attain self-government within the Commonwealth, and to pursue their economic and social development so that it keeps pace with their political advance.1 Perhaps, a brief explanation of the term "British Commonwealth and "British Empire" is in order at this point. The first mention of the term Commonwealth as pertaining to the British was in 1884.2 It was revived in 1917 by General J. C. Smuts, and also by the Imperial war Conference that same year when the dominions were referred to as "autonomous nations of an Imperial Common- wealth."3 The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 spoke of the 'British Commonwealth of Nations,"4 and the 1926 Imperial Conference, summarized in the so-called Balfour Reports, referred to the autonomous communities within the British Commonwealth of Nations. . . . The use of both descriptions was deliberate, the term 'British Empire' being used to describe the British political organism as a whole, and the designation 'British Commonwealth' to denote within that wider whole the smallerGgroup of fully self- governing communities. . . . 1Great Britain, British Information Services, The U. K. Dependencies in Brief (London: B. I. S., 1960), 3. 2Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), IV, 175. 31bid. 4D. Figgis, The Irish Constitution (Dublin: n.n., 1923). 96. Cf. The Times (London); December 7, 1921 5Great Britain, Colonial Office, Summary of Pro— ceedings of the Imperial Conference of 1926; Cmd. 2768 (London: H. M. S. 0., 1926). 6EncyclOpaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), IV, 175-76. 45 The Statute of Westminster, in 1931, specified which countries were members of the Commonwealth, but that list has been altered by a few additions and two with- drawals (Eire and Union of South Africa). Non-self— governing territories formed a part of the British Commonwealth, but upon achieving its independence, the new nation could choose to become a member. By the time the Second World War began in 1939, the policy of self-determination had been fully estab- lished. A View was accepted that the well-being and development of "people not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" is "sacred trust of civilization." That trust has been steadily ful- filled since the War [1914 — 1918] in the case of mandated territories, on which the operation of the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant [of the League of Nations] has conferred immense Benefits. The British Commonwealth is fully aware of the heavy responsibility resting upon it to see that, through respect for these principles, continuity and develOpment is assured to the native popula— tions. The mandatory system, in fact, derives from exactly the same inspirations as that which governs British colonial administrative policy.1 It is significant that the international bodies established as a result of the two wars formulated their ideals on the British pattern, the League of Nations by 2 "Mandates" and the United Nations by "Trusteeship."3 lLord Halifax, quoted in Wieschhoff, 62. 2Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Na- tions. 3Articles 75 - 85 of the United Nations Charter. I ' ' V I set up its own factories, utilizing part of its own raw nmaterial which until then had been reserved for export, and tr) take care of the needs of its own market. These and similar economic changes created an awareness among the Changolese of their country's possibilities in the world. Socially, the most important changes that occured “Kare:(l) the diminishing of the strong ties that existed lDe‘tween the members of different tribes and clans; and (2) the growing of individualism, and of awareness of it. TTuere was a big departure from the native centers to towns axufl cities. The population of Leopoldville increased from 4C),000 to 100,000 between the years 1939 and 1945.2 The grxmwth of urban communities produced in the natives the desire for organizations, eSpecially labor organizations. _ 1Godding in Royal Institute of International Affats, Eglgpial Administration by European Powers, 63. 2Hennesy, 54. 95 (The Belgian authorities allowed some labor unions to be fcumed.in.l946, but these had to be only local in scope eand.were strictly controlled by the administration. After World War II, the Congo entered a period nuarked by a steady increase of exports, extremely sound fiJiancial conditions, and great increase in public and private investments.l This favorable situation lasted lnTtil 1956-1957 when a worldwide depression affected the Cknngolese economy. Citing the official documents of the Belxgian administrationz, Bustin described the bleak picture of 1957: . . . The price of c0pper had steadily declined from $1.12 per kilogram at the end of February 1956 to $0.505 at the end of December 1957. The favorable balance of trade had shrunk from $134,430,000 in 1956 to $47,760,000 in 1957; and the balance of payments, which had already slumped from a $17,100,000 credit in 1955 to a $5,880,000 drain in 1956, now plummeted down to the unprecedented deficit of $129,640,000 for 1957. The repatriation of investment return and European salaries for 1957 amounted to a net leakage of nearly $100,000,000 and the gap in the balance of payments had to be stopped by taking $146,540,000 from the colony's reserve. Bustin adds that these figures explain the understandable, if not completely justified, fear of the government b even contemplate x 1Government investments increased by 350% and PrIVate investments by 50%, between 1950 and 1954. InforCongo, II, 77. 2Belgium, MinistEre Des Colonies, La Situation ECOnomique Du Congo Belge Et Du Ruanda—Urundi En 1957 Bruxelles: Ministere Des Colonies, 1958). 3Bustin in Carter, 51. 96 . . . sweeping political measures that might further shake the confidence of the business world in the Congo's economic future. Tfiiis, he thinks, explains the minimal changes in local government administration . Economic Planning The economic development that had been taking plxace in the Congo before 1950 was not the result of con- sisstent planning. The richness of the country, especially 1J1 ndneral wealth, its long tradition of favorable business almost 51 billion francs ($1 billion). Unlike the British and the French economic plans, tiua Belgian Congo plan had been financed without grants or subsidies from the metropolitan country. The capital for the plan was raised either by budget surpluses, that is of the budget of the Belgian Congo itself, and by loans floated on the markets of the Congo, Belgium and R lPlan Decennal Du Congo Belgg. 98 some foreign countries. The loans were sometimes guar- anteed by Belgium, this guarantee being the only form of direct assistance by the Belgian government to the financing of the plan.1 Similarities and Differences of Colonial PoliCies The narrative describing the historical devel— opment of British, French, and Belgian colonialism, and their respective policies and actions, provides a basis for some comparisons of the policies in the three African territories. For better understanding of the differences as well as of the similarities, the highlights of the narrative have been assembled into a tabular form (Table 1). In the political develOpment, the difference be— tween the approaches are clear. Great Britain came, at the turn of the present century, to the conclusion that she should lead her colonies toward self-government, and eventual independence within the broad framework of the Commonwealth of Nations. The British thought of the Commonwealth as a loose association of nations. The fact that the indigenous pOpulations of the colonies were given the status of British subjects did not imply any political rights for them, but served well to emphasize the belong- ingness to the family of all British subjects. 1U. N., Special Study on Economic Conditions in Noanelf-Governing»Territories (New York: U. N., 1958), 32. rucwhvi Haw: fifty Cnvnrvc \LC 26:». m L Cities?» - a I g I (L. 99 pmnweficwfi mmz Hmsom menu .mwwuwhonusm m>wumc mo newkummwaouo mumumnwamo mo pan .ommcmno mm3 mowuomum .meH CH “poms uo: mum3 mmwufiuozusm Honwuu mofluowuo cw tosses locumu mHHmfiowmmo smooch cowumanmom mo ummu may on cowumuwaw>wo noamum mummmooum cu coma popcwmmw on fiasco 053 was .musuHSU can momso land nocmum omQHOmnm mommuac m>ms 0:3 mmDHo>m 0:» pwnwawus mwumm cw mafiuonusm Hmuucwo unoficuo>omlmamm Ham cowumumaonm "Hmoo comm unsound usn Umsoaam Mano no: zmfiuwum Guru Hmcuo newumuumwcwfipm Hmwowosm can 3nd mo mmpoo upmaammm hamsofiunmfiomnoo can hamsowomcoo mash uomufioaH poqnaw aAtqsxqsyurmpv 93.3w: mo .0. mcwuwuwo Hana %HHEMM m cu mmmcmcwononn 1 .mmsao>w .muomeSm mo mmswammm on pmusnwuv 3"“ "mommoao mouse 1:00 pa "omflamfiw mucowu www snow mcouwuwo socwhh mo HMOwuwHOQ oz .cowumHsmom n.» lumuoaoum gonama "mm>wu maumum mcw>ofinom pumzou msocwmepcw Ham on nonmemmm 8mm In: on» How mucowu oz am>wm wocmumfimmm o>wuo¢ .muomnnsm smfiUHHm mo maumum .d moms House doom muoseuas mos paws n.m Emwamcuoumm pmuopwmcoo no: >Eocous¢ Icum>omtmamm .ao mHmH Eouh menu“ ucoao>ocmn mo aowaom awn: Houmoum m macaoo 3.614 mp pmumcfiuom mmmalhama Once 3093: mocmum can can 050m soon How ”Sum Wmtm. “mama Hausa cowumawEwmmm mmwcoHoo mo :ofiumumwunH [mama Hooves "mumpcms Hose .bww suasoeumauso mo oomuem s V was Emwcmflumuwcmess "scan mamomm mufl mo muHOMMm wflm nouwamcofiumm .mHou an“: ummsoaoo mumuwflwa cowumnwcoHoo pad can» no Trn noHoo possumm aamcwaaw3ca "unflccmHm acmumwmuwm (such pmsoaaom ucwficnw>oo w.fl swamamm nocohm nmwufium EmuH mmaowaoo HmwcoHoo mo somfiummEOUnl.H mqmom on whoa Imumsu can .mummwofiuam ou suaflesmsH “suaassooauo .GOwumcmeEw .ocsoum Ixomn awesoHoo mo xomn “mueuoaumesw mo mosueuus GOEEoonn uo: mommwuumfi InmucH “mmwa obeys: cw macaw can ccnumuwpcs on mueaens “moans“ (mum HoHoo mo monomnm mmwcmoon HMHOOm “much mquMHHMEkuaH “wand Ixnwnuca muwamaoo Hmwoom «mcwxoma wamaosowmmnoo owed m>wuwc mo mnwpcmum lumocs noes: a“ mocaumaoa Kuettaasrw mmuwnmm fiMfiOOM Monuo can Space: a“ ummnuuom Godunov Emwdmcuoumm “coflumuumflcwfipm MOEHOM Moon: 0:00 mmmawp >memH on mm3 doom .moma scum muauaso gunman mo mcwpmmumm can .mmmsmcoH nocouh mo om: unoumemcoo 1%Humw wmnwcmooou unwEmon>mU owsocoom mam Hmowufiaom sufi3 uncapmuwaouumuCH musuaso can mmmsmcma nowamcm nuw3 mash uoouwpcw mo unwamsoo “coma meson ucmsmoao>mp owaoaoou nua3.©wflmsoo quamdoteAeq IPTOOS mmouzmumsu coca wane .mmwpwmnom no mucmuo oz u"6:0va may :a comma coauMNfiHMfluumsch “mcowumowcsafioo mcwpsfiocw .mxuo3 uwanam mo Emumoum .mHmH Scum “mocmpcmompcfi umumm Hawu pouwcwaaam uoz “um3om a“ no: #59 Hogan: 2% mouse Ion mmwcwmfioo scammmocou ucwEQOHm>op HMfiUOm can owfiosoom .Hmuwuflaom mo mwsmcowumamu mo :oHuwcmoomu "mama moawm mswcsmHm unoficum>ow “mama scum pouomuuoo on cu swoon homage “mmfiHOUHuumu QOHm>op ou pmuoomxm moficmmeoo cofimmwocoo .mmma monfim mamoH .pwmucwlmucmuw uome wocflm mamom Hmwucmumnsm co ucwEm>Ho>cw .mNmH woswm mcficcmam ucmficum>ow “mmfiumhmucm mum>fluo fin poocmcwm .mnmaowumu opm>wnm mo pwum>fiuofi ucmEQOHm>op .umuwm yd xmcoflmmwocoo cozy .mmwcmmfioo mcwomua quemdotaneq armouooa nmwmamm gunman EmpH Gwflcwunovll.a mamfifi 101 France had as her ultimate goal the formation of a unified whole of her own nation with the colonies. France talked about integration of colonies with the metropolitan France into a Greater France, or Empire, and since 1946 spoke of the French Union. Not until 1959 was there any talk of individual independence, though. The policy of autonomy was accepted in 1958, only to be replaced with a sort of federalism in 1960. Belgian Congo was treated as part of the family, but an inferior, less capable and less grown-up member, as the policy of paternalism implied. The idea of filial maturity did not occur until too late to result in a desirable family relationship. The citizenship rights of native peoples in French colonies and territories were distinctly different from what the British used for their dependent peoples. The "British subject" designation implied belongingness, a desirable thing from the British point of view, and one Which did not cost anything. The French offered active assistance to, or at least made it possible for, the indigenous peoples to achieve full French citizenship Which was deemed desirable not only by the French but by the native populations as well. This, coupled with the availability of a lesser status of evolués, which also Was regarded highly by both groups,was for the French Empire what the status of "British Subjects" was meant to be in the British Empire. In the Belgian Congo the 102 local populath1was kept at "the level of a great black proletariat,"l and the citizenship rights of the natives were nonexistent until 1957 when first municipal elections were held. Local administrative practices of the three powers also were vastly different from each other. England's skillful use of the indirect rule effectively utilized native institutions, including the codes of law and ju- dicial administrative systems, again with the idea in mind (among others) that the native administrations will serve as necessary preparation for eventual self—govern- ment. The Belgian non-use of indigeneous authorities sin- gularly contributed to the unpreparedness of the Congolese to take over their affairs when called upon to do so. France, on her part, trained the elite for local adminis- tration, and by coupling the citizenship rights with status and position among the natives, can be said to have contributed significantly toward the fulfillment of her imperial policies. Economic development in all three territories began under the auspices of concession companies which appeared to be, but actually were not, less significant in the British dependencies.2 Planning by governments of Britain and France did not begin until after World War I. l Townsend, 187. 2Wieschhoff, 82. 103 The Belgians, on the other hand, started planning eco- nomic development as soon as the State assumed control over the colony in 1908. The main difference between the three powers' approach to economic growth of their de- pendent territories can be seen in the financing of plans and projects. Great Britain and France used grants and subsidies, as well as governrental loans, while the Belgians only guaranteed loans which the Belgian Congo government arranged on world markets. No direct financing by Belgium occured, except in a few instances of making up of budgetary deficits. Similarly, in building up of social services, including education, the differences existed in financing. The French approach, in addition, differed from the British method in that the policy of assimilation was based (x1 adoption by natives of French language, culture and civilization, and thus contributed to similarity With France and other French dependencies, while the Brit- ish concept and use of the indirect rule created conflicts of language and of culture. Among other differences between the colonization Patterns of the three powers were the methods in which the territories had been acquired, the emphasis put upon the militarization of the natives, and even desires of the colonizers to enter and participate in the life of the natives. In attitudes as well as in actions, the British, 104 the French, and the Belgians were as different from each other as night and day. The British, in a polite manner, emphasized fundamental racial distinctions between them— selves and the natives; the Belgians continued a marked social cleavage between races but the French didn't mind 1 While the French considered intermarriage "going native." as fairly normal, the Belgians as a whole thought of it as undesirable, but individual intermarriages of Belgians and Negroes were not infrequent. The British dismissed the possibility of its happening with typical aloofness.2 The background provided in this chapter allows this writer to proceed with the investigation of colonial policies on communications, particularly radio broadcasting. But there, too, the historical evolvement of radio com— munications, from line telegraphy and telephony to long- distance cable systems to "beam" radio, needs to be explored first in ordertn obtain a valid perspective of the policies which determined the develOpment of the various communi- cation means. The purpose of the next part, then, will be to describe the beginning of the growth of telecommunications in the metropolitan countries of the three powers, and their policies and actions through which the telecommuni— cation media were to be extended to the three African 'termitories. In addition, the policies and actions will lTownsend, 184—85; Wieschhoff, 106. 2Townsend, 185; Wieschhoff, 27-28, 95. 105 be related to the actual growth and utilization of telecommunications, and specifically broadcasting, in Nigeria, Belgian Congo and the Middle Congo. Comparison of the British, French and Belgian communication policies will be completed by an attempt to see them in light of overall colonial policies. By "superimposing" the communication policies over the general policies on political, economic and social devel- opment, a composite picture should emerge in which the interrelationship of various policies, and similarities and differences between policies of the three Powers, would be clearly recognizable. PART II COLONIAL POWERS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS CHAPTER III COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY IN THE SERVICE OF EMPIRES The subject of empires, their growth and devel- opment, and the forces that have contributed to their enrolution and that have molded their external as well as irrternal relations often are presented either in terms of auctions by national leaders, or in terms of ideological Extinciples. Examples of both methods have been given in tflie previous chapter on colonial policies of Great Britain, France and Belgium. The purpose of this and the following two chap- tfiers is to introduce the concept of feasibility and plau- E3libi1ity of considering technological advances, and par- tlicularly the advances of technology of communications, 3&3 being at least equally valid and important in the area or? imperial growth. Furthermore, the policies of communi- cnations rather than only the policies of human choice, Vflill and action are thought to be of considerable impor- tance. The ultimate purpose is not, however, to arrive at a definite classification or enumeration of social Changes resulting from technological advances, nor is it 107 108 'tc>establish relationships of causations and effects. Shach a task is plainly beyond the sc0pe of this work, EEVED though some such relationships might be hinted at as they come to the surface during the systematic pur- smiance of the major task, namely the discovery of dif- fterences, if any, in the colonial policies of the three pnowers vis—a—vis communications. When it is postulated that technology affects ianerial relations (just as it affected international Irelationsl), it is not being implied that other factors mnere not influential. Political leadership, political and scxcial movement, organizations and institutions were, axud continue to be, among the variables that have to be \riewed as important when actions and achievements (or ftor that matter non—action and non—achievement) are sought tn: be explained. It still remains, however, that the Etignificance of such other variables ought not to obscure tile significance of the technological variations, i.e., developments . Development of Communications Technology and Its Imperial Use No documentation is necessary for the statement tfllat communication of intelligence has been the center of ‘ 1William F. Ogburn, "The Process of Adjustment to NewInventions," Technology and International Relations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), I6. 109 truman endeavor from the very beginning of mankind. In (order to transmit news, thoughts, and ideas from one Inlace to another, man first employed an intermediary, such as a courier, first on foot (cf. Pheidippides in 490 B.C.) 811d later on horseback (cf. Paul Revere in 1775). But SllCh an intermediary depended upon memory and also was ixiefficient because of lack of_speed. Among the devel- a number of receiving sets within a large radius. Ffiioneered in the early 1900's, radio broadcasting got established soon after the end of World War I and within than years or so the radio waves spanned all the continents and oceans. At approximately the same time motion pictures Were being developed. This is the only non-electric medium among all communication means, but its distribution does 111 depend on electricity. With the addition of sound in the late 1920's and of color in the 1930's it blossomed into an entertainment medium and later was channeled also into an informational means through its documentary form. The electric and electronic communications in- ‘ventions have continued. Facsimile transmission process, the multiple—address transmission, walkie-talkie radio, and television are some of the types which need to be Inentioned. The totality of these changes, as outlined afloove is now commonly referred to as "Communication Revolution. " The Equilibfinm Role of Technology Several assumptions can be made upon which a study C3f’ colonial communications should rest. Such assumptions are derived from the findings of other disciplines,especially SOcziology and psychology. One such assumption states that tlflee existence of national as well as inter-national so- czj-Erties and institutions is made possible only if communi— cation allows an inter-action among the societies, and pe rmits a sharing of ideas and information. Another assump- th-CDII maintains that the existence of communication between ‘ tlr1€3 imperial societies as well as within the national so— <23L€3ties themselves enables the formation of attitudes and (DEDIiluions through which the societies and their members (3 . . . 13€313n12e for soc1etal action. 112 Both of these assumptions rest upon the history facts of geological discovery, technological invention, and the international organ— ization, which have been increasing the radius and rapidity of transmission and the abundance, pervasi- thus veness, and accuracy of communications . . ., facilitating the acceptance of [common] standards and goals of action by the . . . community as a whole. Imperially linked societies do not remain static. .A sturdy progress in their development can be documented from the beginnings of transportation with slow and infrequent sailboats to the speedy airplanes, from the locally circulating pamphlets to the "pennypost," and to ‘the instantaneous communication through the telegraph and Jaadio. Other aspects of technology are observable from the existence and development of trade and diplomatic nuissions, through inter—national conferences, through the establishment of international organizations to facilitate IPcnstal and telegraph communication, to the organizations' (Di? imperial institutions designed to assure peace, security, Eirnd the achievement of economic and social goals. Other assumptions need to be mentioned because of 1illeir relevance to the topic under discussion. Developing (>15 common interests, attitudes and values, and establishing (’15 jprocedures and institutions for realization of social 93(36113 under optimum conditions will ideally lead to either \ 1Quincy Wright, The Study of International .112}: éations (New York: AppIeton - Century-Crofts , Inc. , 1955) , 113 internalized or sentimentalized symbolism used in com— munications, with the result that the integration and solidarity of societies within the colonial (imperial) organization will increase. Itshould follow that adaptive- ness Of actions of such societies as well as of individ— uals within those societies is dependent upon the currency and accuracy of communication between them, and upon standards of education and experience of The degree of solidarity between an empire depends to a large extent upon internalization Of the key value symbols eties' populations. But it is society members. societies of the amount of among the soci— only an international [not integrated] community whose value symbols, though formally accepted by governments, are not sentimentally accepted by the peoples who eventually control the governments. It rests, therefore, on government Opinion, not on personal attitudes. Transnational communications are therefore interpreted by the peoples in the light of their national cultures, national Opinions, and national beliefs, and tend to increase mis- understanding and conflict rather to further under— standing and cooperation. The diversity in the cultures and conditions of tiles peoples Of different societies would indicate, then, 'tllért a common imperial culture will probably be relatively aLnthiguous and loose, and the common imperial polity relatively weak when compared with culture and polity of Iléitzional states. Similarly, comparison of national com— n‘u-lnications with trans-national (imperial) communications \ lIbid., 275. 114 and their relative effects upon societal structures and cultures contribute to such great diversities. The sentiment of nationalism continues to grow and develop much more rapidly than the sentiment of imperial com— monality. Throughout the colonial period these obviously opposing tendencies have continued alongside one another. The technological and material progress has contributed to the imperial unity which the sentimental and moral tendencies have made for national societies. Many writers seem to support the thesis that world communication, COOperation, culture and institutions are developed as a result of material progress which favors cosmOpoli- tanism, and that these tendencies stimulate reactions 'toward traditional beliefs and national barriers, differ- entiations and conflicts. But to pinpoint the causation aJnd effects in such a direct way is to forget that Airrteraction is a two—way street. Communications between nEitions can in turn contribute to material progress while national differentiations and artificial barriers (such as telegraphic rates) between nations can rekindle the nEltionalistic loyalties and thus negate the progress made :111 inter-national communications. Obviously the tendencies ought to be kept in £33:<¥per balance, though this was difficult to achieve when t:}1€3 colonial powers possessed the scientific and techno- logical know-how and a substantial advantage over the 115 colonial nations, not only in trade, but in transporta— tion and communication. The tendency of the colonial peoples to develop equivalent proficiency and skill was helped by their coming in contact with, or becoming aware of, the techniques and means of their colonial masters; this led to the attempts to equalize the relative standings of, or at least reduce the gap between, the governing and the governed. These efforts eventually resulted in the demands for more rights, then autonomy, and eventually became an important factor in the ultimate breakup of empires. Imperial Needs for Communication In his historical study of the doctrine of impe- .rialism, Thornton1 postulated three main doctrines which clondnated the actions of all imperial powers: the doctrines cxf power, of profit, and of civilization. Though this Seems to be an oversimplifi‘cation, it might be said that 11143 thesis reduces rather remarkably the complexity en- CKDIintered in any study Of imperial relations. It might even be said that there is a considerable overlap in the 'tllzree doctrines and that the doctrines of profit and cxi‘filization are to a great extent actually only parts <31? an overall doctrine of power. When studying imperial \ 1A. P. Thornton, Doctrines of Imperialism (New 35(31:k; John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965). 116 communications this writer has approached the problem in a similar manner. A view can be posited that the pri- mary needs of imperial powers for safe, efficient and as rapid as possible communications were dictated by three factors present in imperial policies of every major power, that of defense, of trade, and of cultural ex— pansion. But again, a considerable overlap was found to exist especially between needs of defense and of trade. Communication Needs for the Purposes of Defense and Trade The gradual acquisition of overseas territories was naturally accompanied by the initiation and expansion of the external trade Of the various powers, and in turn .required intensified transport over the existing routes, rand establishing of new ones, in order to provide better 43nd preferably faster communication. From the outset, the 11rade between the European powers and their overseas terri— tflbries took the form of the exchange of raw materials for nHanufactured goods. Strong trading and other links de- A vGiloped under such arrangements and remained between most territories and their metropolitan countries. Britain's needs for rapid communications. -— Pre- servation of the establishment of a sphere of influence £153 :far as trade and commerce were concerned inevitably led r1531: only to the problems of preserving the territorial 71*r113egrity of the colonial possessions, but also to the need for rapid communication that would stand ready 117 to assist in such defense as might be necessary. Thus defense and trade as reasons for develOping communications were not mutually exclusive. Specifically in case of Great Britain, the question of defense always had raised a corollary question -- defense Of what, with the Obvious answer "defense of the trade," especially of free—trade. And yet, tc>many people free trade seemed to ignore vital aspects of the problem of defence -- Britain's increasing dependence on foreign nations for her food supply as her pOpulation grew and her agriculture declined, and also for the supply Of certain goods essential for the purpose of war. Carried logically through, free trade sacrificed military security in favor of maximum economic efficiency. Defence, wrote Adam Smith, is"of much more importance than Opulence"; but Britain seemed rather to be following the princi- ple that Opulence would be her best defence. Her accumulated wealth was to give her a marvellous power of endurance in the strain of war, and though her economic policy did not enable her to avoid war it contributed to her final victory when war came. [hiring the last thirty years or so of the nineteenth cen— tniry the imperial affairs of Britain centered around the debate between the Consolidationists (led by W. E. Glad- stone) to whom . . . the United Kingdom's interests outside the Empire seemed far to outweigh those within it; and while they valued the great colonies they were re- signed to their drift into full national independence. They looked to the Empire's future as a league of freely associated sovereign states,2 \ c) 1E. A. Benians et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History ~?£§;_the British Empire, III: The Empire-Commonwealth 1870—Efl9 czarmbridge: University Press, 1959), 224-25. 2 Ibid. p 176-770 118 and the imperialists (Lord Salisbury, Chamberlain, et al.) who advocated extensions of imperial boundary lines to meet challenges of foreign policy. The scales of the de- bate were tipping from one position to another, depending on the composition of the Cabinet at any particular time. The question of defense, i.e., military intervention or troop build—up, arose on several occasions (in case Of Egypt, and of East Africa, for example) but generally it was agreed that attempts at setting constitutional bounds to the growth of autonomy of the colonies would not preserve but rather disrupt the Empire. The question of defense and trade had thus become questions of closer union which in turn became intertwined issues of a "common tariff" policy and of sharing the burdens of defense. The debate continued, in and out of Parliament and in the Colonial Conferences, and though at one time it seemed that imperial consolidation and liberation of the existing colonial order would set in, territorial expansion but with conservative reaction actually began. The old laissez-faire policies remained unimpaired, tempering the expansionist policy which <3eveloped particularly vis-a-vis Africa. Thus, both sides <3f the debaters won, for the loyalty to free trade pre- Vnented the strengthening of the central imperial authority, antlthe territorial acquisitions multiplied because of tflle desire to strengthen the free trade. The old liberal 119 ideal of the form of Commonwealth as an association of free, independent and sovereign states continued on its way to become a reality. The "informal empire," evident in the last years of the Victorian era, had seen Britain only reluctantly assume administrative responsibility in the annexed territories. Then, in the early 1900's, it began slowly giving way to a new aggressive kind, nourished especially by the speculative fevers and by self—confidence. The transition from the Old status quo consolidationism to the expansionism was marred for a while by a "jingo" im— perialism, altogether uncharacteristic Of British "impe— rial thinking" because it departed from accepted stand- ards of British imperial morality and deep-felt humani- tarianism. The self-confidence was at that time made more impudent and shameless and was helped on its way not only by economic depressions which periodically hit Britain, 3 but by manhood suffrage and by "the new sensational Yellow Press and the popular music—hall."1 Industrial imperialism which replaced the mercan— tilist approach was in turn being replaced in the twentieth (century by a new kind -- financial. The British role as eXporter of capital remained supreme, in spite of the Ifact that Pax Britannica, particularly in Africa,‘was Imeing challenged, just as the British monOpoly of commerce lIbid., 342. 120 was challenged. These factors, and the emerging nation- alism among some Of the colonies as well as among foreign powers, required an adjustment of imperial policies. It was under such circumstances that Joseph Chamberlain entered the Colonial Office in 1895. In the multiplicity of the divisions of opinion, though, the issues could be seen clearly and the influ- ence of four main streams upon Britain's conception of the Empire is quite distinguishable: The Free Traders made a contribution pre-eminently political: the loose elastic form of Commonwealth consultation and the voluntary co-Operative nature of full membership. The others demonstrated that political evolution in the self-governing Empire was not enough: the 'Radical Imperialists' by quickening a sense of positive economic development in the dependent Empire, and the 'Socialists' by pre- paring for replacement of an often complacent trustee— ship by the more dynamic ideal of senior and junior partnership. There was, moreover, one factor that could not be overlooked. The humanitarian conscience, deeply but unpredictably indoctrinated by a small devoted evangelical leadership, cut across party allegiance and drew strength as a political force from [all three] alike.l If not imperialism itself, then at least some of its forms and expressions were being questioned. Hobson, though basically anti-imperialist by branding imperialism as appealing to the lust of qnntitative acquisitiveness and of forceful domination, and as breeding Speculation and war, nonetheless realized that an immediate liquidation (of the British Empire would be "a barbarous dereliction Of a.pub1ic duty on behalf of humanity and the civilization ‘- lIbid., 344—45. 121 of the world."1 In order to solve the Obvious dilemma, Hobson devised the concept Of a "sane and legitimate imperialism" to be conducted under international super— vision and for the benefit Of all mankind. Such soul- searching, and prodding of Government by the Yellow Press as well as by the Chambers of Commerce, led to a gradual assumption of responsibility not only for administration (of dependent territories but also for their economic 23nd social develOpment, until now entrusted to chartered (zompanies. "Imperial development, the driving of furrows rwither than the planting of flags, had become in this Exeriod a necessity as much as a duty."3 Chamberlain gave this new policy a direction in ‘vfrich he stressed the responsibility of the government for e c onomi c deve lopment . . . . He believed passionately in improved communica- tions as essentially an im erial responsibility, because they would be the means of unlocking vast regions which, though potentially rich for humanity as a whole, were hitherto unused, or4misused, by a backward, 'savage' minority. . . . 'TC) him,"legitimate imperialism"imp1ied building up of com— mlJlnications as well as imperial "slum clearance." His Stuccessors in the Colonial Office (Lyttleton and later 1J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (3rd. ed.; LOl’ldon: George Allen and Unwih, Ltd., 1948), 368. 2Benians et al., III, 381. 3Ibid. 41bid., 384. 122 Harcourt) shared his devotion to communications, partic- ularly railways. Railways served as means of asserting territorial authority, and in case of West Africa, includ— ing Nigeria, "the railways that secured peace were meant also to stimulate prosperity."1 The problems of Imperial defense were in reality, to the chagrin of Britain, the problems of England alone. The strength of colonial autonomy was responsible for the squashing of the British Government's plans for an Imperial Defense Council, first proposed at the 1887 Colonial Conference, and resubmitted at the 1897, 1902 and 1907 subsequent meetings. Defense was the subject on ‘which the British Government laid most emphasis but the Ihopes of spreading the burden Of imperial defense were :not fully satisfied. Just as in trade, in defense,also 'the colonies didn't always see eyefito-eye with Britain. (21amoring for preferential tariff and rights to settle ‘their trade policies in their own way, the colonies were also . . . thinking in terms of local defence forces of their own over the disposal of which they would have complete control.2 Ehlt the colonies recognized with Britain that the command <3f the sea and control over sea (and cable) communications ‘Vas paramount in importance. All Colonial Conferences 1 Ibid., 390. 2Benians et al., 419. 123 ciealt with the problems and the Committee of Imperial lDefence (a structure of lesser formal stature than the Iproposed and rejected council) dealt with the subject ccupied far away from the French metropole.l All of the arguments brought out by Ferry in the .1880's continued, in various degrees of intensity, through— <3ut the rest of the duration of the French Colonial Empire. 13ut not until the time after the First World War were the interests of the colonial possessions even considered. (Fhe free-trade of the 1860's, the protective policy of the 1890's were examples of . . . not a colonial measure but a metropolitan one: it affected the colonies but was determined by and for the interests of France.2 Tile communication needs of France also played, until the 11920'3, a far greater role than the develomental needs of iJadividual colonies. The French Empire, however, at no izime presented a clear picture of imperial planning, except Sin the area of naval needs for bases (originally ten Eggmws d'appui de la flotte were established,3 but later ireduced to six, then to five, and finally, by 1931, to four4) iand, unlike the British but reminiscent of the Romans, in 1the development of roads. Of the maritime service between tflae metrOpOle and the rest of the Empire, not much had been \ lThorton, 23. 2Roberts, I, 45. 3Decree of October 4, 1892. 4Dareste, I, 616. 130 said, and what had, had not been too complimentary to the constructeurs de la France d'outre-mer. Service was slow and expensive, and the merchant marine was not being replaced as fast as it was becoming obsolescent.l Both the British and the French contemplated railroad connections Of their strongholds across the Africa continent . . . . The British dream of a Cape—to—Cairo railway and the French hope of a trans-Saharan line are the best known (and also the most fanciful) of the rail- building projects. buone of them realized their ambitions of such a railroad, knit the French succeeded in crossing the Continent by rxaad. The French can be said to have had a penchant for roads, quite unlike the British who always preferred railroads.3 Not surprisingly, it was in Africa where the French Exassessions were to a great extent contiguous that the network of imperial routes could be observed. In Morocco, tflle direction and speed of construction of roads were directed by military reasons, and special designation was aIl'plied to such road: La route type "legion." The rest cf the French Empire developed what was called the \ 1Girault, Principes de Colonisation, . . ., III., 2Enpyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), I, 298..Also Camille Fidel, La Paix Coloniale Francaise (Paris: Librairie Recueil Sirey, 1918) , 164-65. 3De la Roche and Gottman, 179. 131 administrative type (la route type "administrateur"), involving less haste and more detours. One other distinction was made by the French in regards to their roads: the internal system of roads was developed by each colony independently of, but never contrary to, the interests of the French Empire. The main routes were conceived of as being imperial roads. Pertinent to the French Equatorial Africa, the so called Route Im- 3periale NO. 2 led from Algiers and the Hoggar Road to 2 lKano in Nigeria, and hence to Fort—Lamy in Chad. The most interesting fact about this Imperial Fuoad NO. 2 is that it connects Nigeria (from Kano) with time French Equatorial Africa, and then through Fort Zkzcchambault and the Central African Republic (formerly (311bangi—Chari) with the Belgian Congo. It is via this 1?C>ad.that a motorist can traverse the African continent from Cairo to the Cape.3 International connection is made 13)? highway (if that is the prOper term) rather than by (Dizlaer means, such as the railways, though the French and tillee Belgian Congos have their rail systems connected EirlCi the Belgian Congo is hooked up with Angola and the E31?i.tish East African territories. \ 1Ibid., 180. 2Ibid.,183. Kimble, I, Land and Livelihood, 467, SPEaks of this same route as No. 5. 3Kimble, I, 469. 132 The accounts of the French colonial expansion are mute on the role of the telegraphic communications. The importance of the telegraph is mentioned in the con— nection with Egypt and Tunisl, and the New Worldz, but the cable connection with the latter was the only one in which France was fully self-sufficient even as late as 1930.3 The appraisal of the importance of the various communication means has, however, been attempted, and particularly in case of France's holdings in North Africa. . . . The conquest was achieved by effective organi- zation of communications and vigorous policing of nomadic tribes. The telegraph and the fast mehari camel were the chief agents of control. Subsequently motor routes were laid out, and . . . rail and river transportation were combined to bridge the desert. To these improved means of overland communication was added the aeroplane. Together they promised to prevent the reassertion of the Sahara as a political barrier.4 The prospects did not turn, though , into reality. The Sahara, in spite of some valiant efforts of the French, as well as the British, has never ceased to be in the way of an efficient overland communication link. Traffic moves either in the air, or by sea around the continent. Culturally, politically, and economically, the French possessions in Africa formed three distinct environments, loosely trapped into the French Empire. lPriestley, 164-209. 2Girault, Principes de Colonisation, . . ., III, 499. 3Ibid. - 4Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), I,330D. 133 Trade, defense, and Communications in the Belgian Empire. --In comparison with the situation in the British and French Empires, the communications needs of Belgium (in regard to its colonial possession in Africa) are much easier to understand and to describe. The existence and operation of that territory was always regulated by an international agreement, first the Act of Berlin of 1885, then the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye (1919), the Covenant of League of Nations (1919) and the United Nations Charter (1945), thus eliminating the frequent policy changes, or at least the possibility of such changes, which characterized the problems of other colonial powers. Under the Act of Berlin in 1885, two important freedoms were agreed on, and established, for the whole area of the Congo Basin: that of navigation and of trade. As far as the policy of free trade was concerned, the Congo Independent State was forbidden to levy customs' duties of any kind, but the Act of Brussels in 1889 resulted in a new rule and from then on, the African state was allowed to charge a ten per cent ad valorem duty on goods entering the Congolese territories. That was the .heritage passed on Belgium when it assumed its colonial role in 1908.1 The freedom of navigation and the policy of "open door" was promulgated by the Convention of —._ 1Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), VI, 246. 134 St. Germain—en—Laye, replacing the Act of Berlin whose 'validity had been destroyed by the Great War. The system (of free trade in the Congo Basin (including the French and Portuguese territories) was reserved exclusively for the signatory countries and for the members of the League of Nations adhering to the Convention. In this, the 1919 Convention differed from the 1885 provisions which applied to all nations. A number of countries, among them the United States, chose not to belong to the League of Nations. The Convention also authorized Belgium to fix customs duties for ships as well as merchandise. The institution of all of these changes . . . was unquestionably one of the reasons for [an] increased prosperity which was accompanied by tremendous progress in administrative organization, social life, and scientific research. The freedom of navigation and of trade in the IBelgian Congo was scrupulously adhered to, and provided, (of course, most of the communication means which Belgium Iieeded to administer its African colony. Belgium's own Ilaval and armed forces were stationed in the Belgian Congo, lDut the neutrality imposed upon the Congo Independent EState by the Act of Berlin was respected by Belgium. Throughout the history, the Belgian Congo depended lxpon its foreign trade, but remained very independent of tflne foreign trade with the mother country. \ lInforCongo, I, 110. 2Ibid., 108, 199. 135 Systems of Empire Communications. -—The signifi— cance of the communications technology can be realized when it is recalled that the technology of the telegraph, the telephone, the wireless and broadcasting took place in an age marked by strong currents of‘nationalism, im— perialism, and frequent wars. It ought not to be too surprising that these media were utilized mainly by govern- mental and business interests not only within national boundaries, but also for the purposes of consolidation of imperialist and colonial gains. During the very early part of this period Great Britain was the leading power, and London the world's <3enter of commerce, of finance, of sea-going transporta- ‘tion. destined to become a dominant center of communication. CPhe British were the first ones to realize the importance c>f submarine cables and undertook the building of an over- smeas network which connected them with the major parts of ‘tlleir far-flung Empire. The British system of telegraphic <2c>mmunication was dominant in international press commu- rlication as well. The develOpment of the wireless telegraph after World War I was a natural extension of the existing network, followed by an equally natural union of the two slfstens into a single private but government subsidized n£i‘twork (Cable and Wireless, Ltd.), meant primarily to Searve the Empire but also open to others. Later (in 1959) tile Post Office took over all external telecommunication S'ervices, except those offered by foreign companies 136 operating under United Kingdom license.l In the radio broadcasting area,it was also Great Britain where both domestic service and the Empire service develOped on large scales. When these systems were added to the publishing network and the news gathering services, an impressive array of communication system linked practically all parts f’ freeing Africa from slavery and of introducing civili- zation; in spite of his continued professing of such knannanitarian principles, the evidence, as has already been pointed out in Chapter II, told an entirely different story.2 Abuses of the civilizing mission led to the even- tual take-over of the LeOpold's domain by Belgium. A former Governor—General of the Belgian Congo inmplied the civilizing duty of Belgium when he asked . . . what would have happened in Africa, . . . had the European nations abstained from intervening? Ought the natives to have been left in the condition in which we found them, and which [the] great Living— stone and Stanley have so eloquently described? Could the improvement of their conditions have been achieved without the establishment of European rule, without the assistance and supervision of Europeans? The experiment of leaving the natives to administer themselves has been made in two African Countries; they are in many respects the most backward countries in Africa. . . . As could be expected, there existed critical Voices in the various Empires who could not with clear \ 1Speech at the Royal Institute, March 31, 1897, <3uoted in Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan Schmidt, Imperial- ELgm: The Study and Significance of a Political Word, 1840- 1960 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1964), 210. 2 2Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), VI, 46-470 Godding in Royal Institute of International Af- lfairs, 40—41. Godding was Governor-General of the Belgian (longo in 1945-46. The two countries referred to in the above quotation were Ethiopia and Liberia. 142 cxonscience subscribe to such dominating point of view. .AJaatole France, for example, rejected the idea that colo- nialism carried the mission of civilization and preferred 'tc> call it a "new barbarism."l Another kind of opposition ‘tc> the idea of spreading a superior civilization can be detected from the contempt which the representatives of a colonizing power had for the natives: To inculcate the principles of one's own civilization in men whose company was felt at best a deep bewilderment, and at worst as deep an antipathy, was a task always too great for the pragmatic, non- philosophic rulers of India, who assumed that their own degree of civilization was so self-evidgnt as not to need any propaganda on its behalf. . . . The content of the civilizing mission. —-What were some of the aspects of civilization which the Imperial Phawers intended to proselytize in their vast colonial Yualdings? If we accept the definition of civilization as the state of human society regarded as having reached a high level of intellectual, social, and cultural development, (and it is precisely this that the colonizing powers <=onsidered themselves to excell at), it is possible to arrive at some of the traits characterizing the content of the civilizing mission. ‘ 1Anatole France, "La Folie Coloniale," Trente Ans g9 la Vie Sociale (Paris: Editions Emile-Pau1 Fréres, 1949), I, 207L09. Cf. Harvey Goldberg, French Colonialism: Progress 5g1Poverty? (New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1959), 9. 2 Thornton, 176-77. 3Standard Dictionary of the English Language,(l958), 243. 143 Among such items it is necessary to mention rteligion, and specifically Christianity. Inmany cases, as a matter of fact, colonial expansion startedthrough ‘tlre activities of Christian missionaries. Humanitarian leStiCe also was seen as an essential aspect of a super— icaxrcivilization, and suppression of slavery and other inhumanities was considered a sacred duty of the colo- ni zers. Progress, not only economic and agricultural, buit in standards of living and in health and sanitation, cxften formed a corollary with the economic rationales <>f'colonial expansion: . . . no more of "the right of the strongest," but the "right of the strong to help the weak," that is the truly noblest and the highest right of all.1 Peace and security also were included in the list of desirable civilizing qualities, and though in Inany areas of the empires imposition of peace resulted in.much-needed tranquility, in many others imperial 'Civilization had -- at least at certain times -- entirely different impact. It is said that France has brought overseas peace, progress, and life. . . . Now, somewhat everywhere, it is war, regression, and death!2 At last, but not the least, a mention needs to be made of the importance of bringing to the overseas possessions a language through which understanding,Chris- tianizing, and efficient governing might be obtainedJMmdmme k 1Sarraut, 88. 2Grenier, 35. 144 was the stress upon language greater than in the French Empire, for Frenchmen have always displayed a particular attachment to their mother tongue: If by culture is meant that richness of l'es rit reflected in painting, architecture, music, Ies lettres and the arts, it seems that the proper contribution of France is due primarily to its lan- guage. The French culture, that's the Western culture of French expression. Admittedly, all these are only a host of civili— zation aspects that the imperial nations planted in the metropolitan extensions. It is not considered necessary to enumerate all the possible ways in which the superior lcruawledge, including technology, was used. It is thought arxropos, however, to raise in this study the question of the techniques, or means, through which this "mission Séggilisatrice" was made possible, or at least made avail— akfile faster and to a greater number of peOple than would be the case had such means not existed. Technology of cultural expansion. —- Among the means that were used in the spreading of civilizations 5J3 the more primitive, or less developed, areas of the various empires, language itself must be mentioned. But “that is not the kind of means which can be identified VVith technological advancement of societies. 1Ibid., 131. France's attempt to impart to the Siifted African the French attachment to the arts is wellattested to by the prominence of poets, novelists,’ Eind playwrights in the leadership role. Cf. Sékou Toure (bf Guinea and LéOpold Sédar Sénghor of Senegal. 145 Neither, of course, can be special institutions of the colonial powers designed specifically, or at least primarily, for the purpose of achieving the aims and goals of the acculturating (and often assimilating) efforts. Among these are, undoubtedly, not only schools of various levels, scientific and research institutes, judicial systems, military establishments, etc., but such special- ized agencies as the British Council, the Alliance Francaise, or Centre Belge des Echanges Culturels. It is at this point that the role of technological inventions, and especially telegraphic and wireless com- munications that later evolved into point—to—point and broadcast communication, can begin to be explored. This Will be done by tracing the development of the telegraph, through new discoveries and inventions, into the medium of radio broadcasting. Policies on communications of the three colonial powers will be extrapolated, and compared with political, economic and social background .of the times. It has been said that a big factor in nationalism is the lack of effective communication between the governed and the governing.1 It also has been stated (and by the Same author, incidentally) that a growing state must be \_ 1Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communi- cation (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1953), 113. 146 able to change its own pattern of communication in order to combat successfully the threats of overloading the media channels.1 Implied by both, in fact preceding both but seldom mentioned in a much more basic criterion of a successfull nationalism (or, if you will, achieve— ment of self—government): How big and how efficient a communication system had been readied for such eventual self—government, and had it been brought to the colonies by the superior peoples as part of their contribution to the "mission civilisatrice? " 1Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models c3‘1:'_Political Communication and Control TGIencoe: The Free Press, 1963), 251} CHAPTER IV WIRES, CABLES AND WIRELESS By the time the first public supply of electricity was established in Great Britain in 1881 (having preceded tlléit of the United States by one year)1, telegraphy, in Practical form, had been in operation for more than thirty IYfiéirs and had grown considerably during the intervening YTEEIrS on national as well as on international scale. The growth of the first electric means of communication and 11:3 importance to the imperial relations of the three EEuropean colonial powers is of interest here, as it led tI) the development of radio broadcasting not only in the txachnological sense, but also in the concept of the need, zr a patent, and sailed to Europe to seek patents and financial backing for his invention. Abroad he met with interest but could not find alry’financial backers, and "legal difficulties prevented his obtaining any overseas patents."2 . . . In England, his application was refused, and while he obtained a patent in France, it was subsequently appropriated by the French Government without compensation to himself. His negotiations with Russia proved futile, . . .3 and upon his return to the United States, he asked for tile patent to be issued, which finally happened on June 20, 1840.4 Funds for a demonstration ($30,000) were appropriated by Congress in 1843, and on May 24, 1844, I"Iorse sent his famous "What hath God wrought" message (Tver the 40 miles of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad \ 8 1Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959) XV, 24. 2King, 298. 8 3Encyc10paedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XV, 24. 4U. S. Patent No. 1647, June 20, 1840. The patent ‘Vas reissued in 1846 and 1848, following a legal litigation in the U. s. 153 between Washington and Baltimore. In spite of the demon- strated success of his telegraph, the immediate reaction of the general public was not too gratifying. So little confidence did the public have in the telegraph that 2 years after the line had been installed, the receipts for one quarter were only $203.43, at the rate of 1 cent for four characters. But Morse was not discouraged and with his associates formed a private company to exploit the inven- tion. The Magnetic Telegraph Company set out to expand the facilities. The U. S. - Mexican War gave additional impetus to the use of the telegraph system and other Companies were formed in competition with the Morse's, among them the New York Associated Press.2 Unlike tele- graph development in other countries, in the United States the railroad companies did not perceive the value of the telegraph for the control of traffic until the early 1850's, but from then on, the railroad and the tele— graph worked side by side helping to Open the western Part of the American continent. Among the foreign nations, England was the one which did not need to use the Morse patent. Wheatstone's Patent was followed by Bain's in 1846 in which the Morse key was replaced by an automatic device using punched Paper. This in turn was improved by another patent by \ 1U. S. National Resources Committee, Technologi— c{lTrends and National Policy (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Overnment Printing Office, 1937) , 49. 2The Associated Press, Handbook for Correspond- .ents (New York: The Associated Press—1955) I T. 154 by Wheatstone in 1858, allowing to send and receive messages at the rate of between 50 and 150 words per minute.1 In 1876 Thomson invented the "siphon-recorder" in which signals were recorded on paper tape by indicat- ing dots and dashes (a code developed in 1837 by Morse). Improvements in telegraphy. -- The telegraph system utilizing wires was being continually improved by further experimentation and modification on both sides of the Atlantic: automatic transmission and reception, letter- printing telegraph, and above all the use of a single wire for more than a single message at a time. An Austrian, Wilhelm Gintl, developed the first so-called duplex system in which two messages, one in each direction, could be sent over a single line.3 This led to eventual doubling of the potential, with two messages in each direction on a s ingle line, by an invention of Thomas Alva Edison in 5 18744, to the carrier systems, as envisaged by Elisha Gray , and to the improvement of the system develOped originally by Jean M. E. Baudot.6 The result was that \ 1King, 294. 2British Patent No. 2147, July 23, 1867. 3Encyclgpaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XXI, 884 : also King, 308. 18 4U. S. Patents Nos. 207723 and 207724, September 3, '753: and 209241, October 22, 1878. 5Encyc10peadia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959) , XXI, 888. “a 6French patents Nos. 103898, June 17, 1874; 11719, ‘ aI‘Ch 2, 1876; and 146716, January 6, 1882. 155 while the Morse system could send up to 25 dis- patches per hour and the EurOpeanl Hughes machine could send 60 dispatches per hour, the duplex process enabled them to transmit 45 and 110 dis- patches per hour, respectively. The quadruplex process as applied to the Wheatstone automatic telegraph could send 90 dispatches per hour, and 160 dispatches per hour if the system was duplexed again. A hundred dispatches per hour could be sent by the Meyer multiplex system, and 160 by the Baudot system and almost double that if duplexed. Use of the Baudot system spread in France in the 1880's, and in the late 1890's it was introduced into England. Further improvements in the Baudot system and its combination with other systems led to the modern printing telegraph system.2 Submarine Cables The very beginning of telegraphic systems were no 111c>re than connections of one locality with another, of 5.11dustrial, commercial or financial centers with others, k>tit all within the confines of national boundaries. Soon, i.rideed almost simultaneously, there developed a desire, and in many instances a need, to interconnect two or more leantional systems. There was no technical difficulty in Such an arrangement whereby overhead telegraph lines c3.‘-I=“<:>ssed the national frontiers and connected widely 8E>atially separated empires. But in case of England in its totality, and in (Dillner parts of the world to lesser degrees, "a fresh ele- rueP-I'itwas involved when the sea had to be crossed." \ 1Hughes was an American, but his system was widely ‘18 ed in EurOpe. 2King, 308—09. 3Frank James Brown, The Cable and Wireless Commu— IEEgptions of the World (London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, Ltd. , 19273 , 2. 156 The idea had been investigated even before Morse's Baltimore-Washington line was put in operation in 1844, and Morse himself in 1842 experimented with submarine cable telegraphy.1 The problem with cables centered around the coating with which the copper wires had to be surrounded. Before 1849, many materials had been tried as insulants but none of them had lasted 1:119 in sea water. The goal of a successful laying of a cable was not attained until gutta—percha was applied. Gutta—percha is the gum from Malayan tree, and was exhibited at the Royal Society of Arts in 1843.2 Michael Faraday suggested its use as an insulator to William Siemens, and in January 1849, a cab 1e insulated by gutta-percha was laid along a two- mile coastal stretch of the English Channel.3 That the gutta—percha happened to be developed into insulating material in England was a happenstance. Brought to England by John Tradescant, an English traveller and gardener (1608-1662) in middle of the seventeenth century,4 it ca-Ine from Malayasia, which came under the British rule only a. century later. But from this happenstance, the British were able, from 1850's on, to command a decisive \\ 1EncycloPaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XV, 824 . 2B. I. 8., Commonwealth Telecommunications, 4. 3King, 305. 14 4Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), II, ‘ XXII, 372. 157 position in the manufacture of submarine (and under- ground) cables for almost one hundred years. This, perhaps more than anything alse but certainly not less importantly, contributed to make London a center of cable communications. Gutta-percha's replacement, polyethylene (or polythene), a synthetic insulating material was also discovered in Britain, in 1933.:L After the unsuccessful attempt in 1850 to cross the English Channel with a cable, the first reliable submarine cable linked England with France in 1851. It consisted of four copper wires each separately covered with fwo layers of gutta-percha, and then twisted together into a rOpe which was armored by ten galvanized iron wires laid helically around it.2 This design remained relatively unchanged until the end of the century, when the need to establish voice links across oceans neces- sitated modifications in cable construction. Telephony Just as the electric telegraph had been preceded by many non-electric methods of transmission of sound, telephony also began as a non-electric communication means - C. G. Page in the United States already in 1837 and Charles Borseul in France in 1854 suggested methods emPlOYing the "make and break" principle of the telegraph \ 1B. I. 8., Commonwealth Telecommunications, 11. 21bid., 4.‘ 158 to transmit sound in the form of pitch though not as articulated speech.1 Closer to the real thing came a German high school science teacher, Philipp Reis, who in 1860 devised an electric instrument, referred to as the telephone. Though some scientists and inventors on both sides of the Atlantic claimed the Reis device, with proper adjustment,cou1d work, the German Patent Office in the 1880's carefully investigated the patent applica- tion and decided the instrument was not a "speaking telephone."2 During the long litigation on the Bell in— strument patent, the American courts arrived at the same decision.3 In February 1876, two American inventors approched the U. S. Patent Office: Elisha Gray, at that time super- intendent of the Western Electric Manufacturing Company,4 applied for a caveat (i.e., a notice of intent to perfect his ideas and file a patent application within three months) for an electric telephone. Unfortunately for himself, Gray was about two hours too late, for on the same day, Alexander Graham Bell had filed his application for a telephone patent. On March 7, Patent No. 174465 was issued to him, 1Engyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XXI, 895. 21bid. 3King, 313-14. 4Gray's Company was later (1881) purchased by Bell's Company. W. Rupert Maclaurin, Invention and Innovation in the Radio Industry (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1949),*27. 159 a number which came to represent one of the most valuable patents ever issued.l It was only two days after the patent was granted that Bell's instrument worked as specified in the drawings and application for the patent. On March 9, 18762, the now well-known command,"Mr. Watson, come here; I want you£"summoned Bell's assistant from one room of Bell's laboratory to another. Needless to say, others challenged the validity of Bell's patent, including Gray, in spite of his reputed disclaimer of any credit as to the invention in a letter to Bell himself.3 The litigation involved some 600 in-' dividual suits, but all of them withstood the challenge. Actually, Patent No. 174465 pertained to voice transmission and it was not until January 30, 1878 when Bell obtained a patent No. 186787, "the fundamental one for the construction of receivers."4 Business, backed by invention competition, started in earnest, followed by court suits and counter— suits, and by out-of-court settlements. The subsequent technical improvements were accompanied by a great in- crease in the number of telephone instruments as well 1King, 318. 2Ibid., 32. One source gives March 10 as the correct date of this event. Cf. U. S. National Resources Committee, 251. 3Encyclgpaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XXI, 4 869. King, 322. This was the so called box telephone. 160 as of the area interconnected by telephones. The new invention was brought by Bell to England, where scientists such as Francis Blake (1878) and Henry Hunnings (1878) made improvements upon the designs of telephone trans- mitters.1 At the same time, the Continent also began to see demonstrations of the new communication instrument, for example at the Paris World's Fair in 1878.2 Slowly but surely, Bell's predicted maze of cables, underground or suspended overhead, connecting "private dwellings, country houses, shops, manufactories, etc., . . . with a central office"3 began to become a reality. Not only so, but . . . in the future, wires will unite . . . different cities, and a man in one part of the country may communicate by word of mouth with another in a distant place. Technical improvements occurred, such as "phantoming" (i.e., increasing the inductance of the lines), or multiplying the circuit capacity by carrier systems, similar to those used in telegraphy, but long—distance submarine telephony remained limited because of the relative unsuitability of the telegraphic cables.5 lIbid., 330. 2Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XXI, 3 897. Ibid., 896. 4Ibid. SIbid., 901-03. 161 Cables of such construction were suitable for shallow water and relatively short distances, and though uti- lized across the English Channel, they were unsuitable for transoceanic telephone traffic. The first submarine telephone cable was not put into service until 1921 (between Key West, Florida and Havana, Cuba), six years after successful demonstration of radiotelephony and six years before the first commercial overseas radio- telephone circuit between U. S. and England was opened.1 By that time, the third electric communication invention was beginning to make profound changes upon the existing two in point—to-point communication, and its newly discov- ered use as a means of broadcasting was being eXplored. The Wireless In order to begin the story of wireless, one must go back at least to the historic prediction of James Clerk Maxwell, the British scientist, who in 1873 pointed to the probability of the existence of electromagnetic waves.2 Maxwell died without actual test of his theory, but others, especially Heinrich Hertz in Germany, experimented with Maxwell's ideas. In 1889 Hertz was able to produce in a laboratory the radio, or Hertzian, waves.3 Hertz, lIbid., 902. Also, James M; Herring and Gerald C. Gross, Telecommunications: Economics and Regulation (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1936), 72. 2Encyclgpaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XV, 120; XVIII, 907A,B. 3 Ibid., XVIII, 884. 162 however, did not pursue his discovery to its practical application; that idea came to Guglielmo Marconi. Even before the work on electromagnetic waves began, other approaches had been studied. In 1842 Samuel F. B. Morse established the principle of conduction,1 and in 1831, Michael Faraday discovered the phenomenon of electrostatic induction.2 Sixty years later, Thomas A. Edison was granted a patent for a signaling system using the principle of induction, and demonstrated its use for communication between a railroad station and moving trains.3 Both conduction and induction, however exciting and promising they were as means of communication without wires, eclipsed eventually into oblivion, when the exist- ence of electromagnetic radio waves was discovered. Unlike Morse and Bell and their predecessors, Marconi was not an originator. He coordinated the prin- ciples of others, improved upon their devices, invented some of his own, and above all decided to turn the re- sults into a commercial enterprise. Though also an in- ventor, he was primarily an entrepreneur, an innovator. Like Morse and Bell, and like Fulton with his steamboat and Stevenson with his locomotive, Marconi met with criticism and scepticism. In his native Italy he found 1Hiram L. Jome, Economics of the Radio Industry (New York: A. S. Shaw Co., 1925), 6. 2Maclaurin, 11. 3U. 5. Patent 465971 (December 29, 1891) was applied for in 1885. Jome, 314. 163 very little encouragement, and moved to England. His mother's aristocratic relations in Ireland helped him to move in the "best circles"1 in London where he met William Preece (Later Sir William), Chief Engineer of the British Post Office. With Preece's assistance, he successfully demonstrated that telegraphic messages could be sent over a distance of almost eight miles.2 With Marconi's business acumen, it is not surprising that this demonstration took place only after he had filed an application for his first patent.3 After several such successes, considerable pub— licity in England and abroad resulted in his being invit- ed by the Italian government to return. He visited Italy in 1897, demonstrated his system by establishing commu- nication over twelve miles of sea with Italian warships, but returned to England the same year to form the Wire- less Telegraph and Signal Company, Ltd. His primary energies were devoted to efforts to show the full possi- bilities of wireless. Soon (1899) he increased the dis— tance of his communications to thirty-one miles between England and France, and then to seventy-five miles be- tween British warships.4 Changing the name of his company 1Maclaurin, 32. 21bid., 33. 3British Patent No. 12039, 1896; cf. Jome, 321. 4Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XIV, 869. 164 to Marconi's Wireless Telegraph Company, Ltd. (referred to, however, simply as "British Marconi"), he also formed the American Marconi Company, the Marconi International Marine Communication Company, Ltd., and as the time went on, subsidiaries in Spain, Canada, Austria, Switzerland, South Africa, Belgium, France and elsewhere. From the very start, the emphasis was on long- distance communication. In 1901, radio telegraphic commu- nication was established between England and Newfoundland, when "three low clicks, signifying the letter 'S'"1 were flashed. In order to obtain permission for building his transmitting and receiving stations, and in spite of great objections by line and especially cable companies, Marconi reduced telegraphic rates (in case of England - Canada route, e.g., from 25 cents a word for cable to 10 cents a word for radiogram)2. But the low rates and small volume Of traffic due to reception difficulties, caused by atmos- pheric conditions, resulted in financial difficulties of the British Marconi. Also, the Opposition of the British Post Office played a substantial part in the difficulties. William Preece's superior, the Postmaster—General Austen Chamberlain3 . . . saw the Marconi company as a potential competi- tor Of the government-controlled [since 1869] 1Jome, 13. 2Maclaurin, 36. 3(Joseph) Austen Chamberlain was the eldest son of Joseph Chamberlain who headed the Colonial Office at that time (1902). 165 telegraph industry, and adamantly refused to connect the Marconi overseas service with the post office telegraph lines. If someone in London wished to send a Marconigram to Paris, he had to go to a local Marconi office; the Office would send a messenger to the post office to telegraph the Marconi Broadcast- ing [sic] station in Dover, South Foreland. The message—was then relayed across the Channel and sent to its final destination through the French telegraph office -- in all, a slow and expensive procedure. The cross-channel cable companies, by contrast, had a direct connection with the post Office.1 This apparently was an illegal situation in that Section 12 of the Telegraph Act of 1869 provided that the postmaster—general may, upon reasonable request of any company constituted for the transmission of telegrams to and from places abroad, make all neces- sary arrangements for the transmission of such tele— grams within Great Britain, and for the connection of such company's system with the postmaster-generals telegraphs. Furthermore, any disputes in this matter were to be set— tled by arbitration. The situation was finally corrected by signing an agreement between the Post Office and the Marconi Company in 1904.3 Meanwhile, Marconi turned his attention to wire— less communication with and between ships. Through the years, Marconi equipment was being installed on passen— ger and cargo ships as well as on naval vessels Of many nations, though German and American competitors made 1Maclaurin, 36—37. 2Brown, 120. 3Maclaurin, 37. 166 considerable gains. The main advantage of the British Marconi was in the fact that "English stations all over the world"1 refused to enter into communication with vessels equipped with other than Marconi equipment. International Wireless Conference was called to Berlin in 1903 to deal with this problem, but the Convention eventually drawn up was not ratified by Great Britain and other governments and the problem remained until 1912.2 Wireless as applied to telegraphy in the early 1900's was basically a broadcasting system in that the messages were addressed to no one in particular and in that anyone who had the necessary apparatus, skill, ambition and interest could hear, provided of course that he was within the range of the transmitting station. By accident, Marconi discovered in 1902 that he could receive signals at night from distances far greater than he could during the day.3 About the same time the British scientist Oliver Heaviside and, in the U. S., A. E. Ken- nelly confirmed the existence of a reflecting layer of the ionosphere postulated in 1893 by Nicola Tesla.4 All this time radio communication depended upon long waves lIbid., 39. 2John D. Tomlinson, The International Control of Radiocommunications (Ann Arbor: J. W. Edwards,_l945), 29.-3O o 3Encyclgpaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XIV, 870. 4Maclaurin, 59. 167 but in 1916 Marconi experimented with medium and short waves which method permitted the use Of reflectors around the aerial, thus minimizing the interception of the transmitted signals. This was a very important develop- ment for the conduct of the war, and signalled the de— velopment Of short wave "beam" radio communication.1 Point-to-point radiotelegraphy was born. The application of wireless to long distance tel- ephony also began during WOrld War I though the American inventor Reginald Fessenden first transmitted speech already in 1900.2 The invention that was to revolution- ize the wireless industry was the develOpment of a three- element tube (triode) by Lee de Forest, patented in 1908.3 Eventually it was possible to transmit experi- mentally intelligible speech from U. S. to Paris and also to Hawaii (in 1915)4, but it was not until 1928 when a regular radiotelephonic service between two con- tinents (EurOpe and South America) began. lEncyclOpaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XIV, 870. 2Maclaurin, 59. 3U. 8. Patent No. 879532 (February 18, 1908). Reportedly it took de Forest three weeks to raise the fifteen dollars necessary for the patent application. 4Arno Huth, Radiodiffusion, Puissance Mondiale (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1937), 27. 168 Wireless transmission of voice in the form of broadcasting also began in the United States, for Marconi failed entirely to envisage this form of wireless. De Forest already before World War I made several attempts at public broadcasting, and David Sarnoff's vision of a "radio music box" was expressed as a suggestion in 1916 to the American Marconi. World War I delayed broad- casting development, but afterwards the phenomenal growth of broadcasting and its develOpment from a hobby of many to the business of a relatively few spread across the ocean and within two years after the first U. S. com- mercial radio station beganl, the first license was granted to the newly formed (1922) British Broadcasting Companyz. Soon the development reached continental EurOpe: France in 1922? and Belgium in 1923 (after early 1913 experiments)4. This aspect of wireless will be explored in the next chapter. lKDKA Pittsburg, Pa., 1920. 2The BBC was formed on October 18, 1922, regis- tered on December 15, 1922, but its license from the Post Office was not issued until January 18, 1923. Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, I: The Birth of Broadcasting (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 123. 3Tomlinson, 51. After a 1908 demonstration from the Eiffel Tower by de Forest; Briggs, 29. 4Walter B. Emery, "Five European Broadcasting Systems," Journalism Monographs; NO. 1 (August, 1966), 3. 169 Telegraphy, Telephony and the Wireless in the Three Colonies Land and Cable Telegraph With the British Empire being the largest and also because of the heavy concentration of submarine cable com- munication in London, it is not surprising that it was England which first extended such communication to the African continent.After the 1879 laying of cables along- side the east coast of Africa from Adenl, the British settlements on the west coast Of the continent were since 1886 linked together from Bathurst in Gambia to Cape Town, and thus to Great Britain. More direct communication with England was achieved in 1901 when a cable originating in Cornwall and touching on Madeira, St. Vincent, Ascencion and at St. Helena ended at Cape Town and provided a trib- utary line from Ascencion to Sierra Leone.2 Internally, Nigeria was provided with her first telegraph line in 1895, and at the end of World War I there [were] several thousand miles of telegraph wires, and the system [was] connected with the French Dahomey system. The first line between Lagos and Abeokuta must have been constructed mainly for the use during 1Brown, 11-12.. 2B. I. 8., Commonwealth Telecommunications, 7. 3Statesman's Yearbook, 1921, 246. 170 the construction of the railway line between the two towns in that year.1 As the railroad itself progressed, so did the telegraph line, and Ibadan was connected with Lagos in 1898. At least four other towns in the Nonmern part could commu- nicate with Lagos since that year. Around this period also, telegraph communications had sprung up in the Eastern part of Nigeria.2 In French Equatorial Africa, telegraphy was first introduced in Gabon in 1898. Brazzaville was connected 3 and thus with Libreville. The over- with Loango in 1901 all picture at the end of World War I was described as follows: The Central African telegraph line connects Brazza- ville with Loango, and is in communication with the English Atlantic Cable. . . .4 The date of the first telegraphic connection be- tween France and French Equatorial Africa remains doubt- ful, though several sources place it at the end of the last century. Submarine cable connected the French pos- sessions from Dakar to Libreville in Gabons, but this was an English, not a French connection. The French Colonial 1Letter from the Nigerian Postmaster-General, March 24, 1965. 21bid. 3Eugene Guernier, Afrigue quatoriale Francaise, VII, EncyglOpédie de 1'Union Francaise: E‘EncyCIOpédie ColoniaIe et Maritime (Paris: EncyclOpédie Coloniale et Maritime,il950), 489. 4The Statesman's Yearbook, 1919, 862. 171 Encyclopaedia states that . . . from the end of the last century, Gabon has been connected with the MetrOpole by a submarine cable which festoons all along the West African coast,1 but does not deal with the question of cable ownership. By interconnection with the English cable system, direct communication was of course possible. Indeed the French possessions in Africa depended upon the British cable system, just as they had to depend upon it in Indo-China, and the Pacific.2 The unilateral, but legally proper action of the British in 1899, to which reference has already been made3,resulted in extra efforts of other Powers to establish their own communication links. Girauhn whose expertness in colonial matters is well known, specifically states that "no French cable [connecting the Metropole] touched West Africa . . . [at the end of the nineteenth century]." 4 The original English cable by the West African Telegraph Company was purchased by the French Governments 1Guernier, 489—90. 2J. Charles-Roux, Les Colonies Francaises (Publi- cation de la commission chargée de preparer 1a participa- tion du Ministere des Colonies a l'Exposition Universelle de 1900) (Paris: Augustin Challamel, Librairie Maritime et Coloniale, 1901), 187-88. 3Supra, 137. 4Girault, Principes de Colonisation . . ., 111,499. 5Law Of July 25, 1901. 172 in 1901, and soon after the construction Of direct cable between Dakar and Brest was authorized.1 Before the war, another direct cable was laid, landing at Casablanca, and the original cable was extended to Pointe—Noire in the Middle Congo.2 The Congo Independent State entered the telegraph- ic communication era at an early date. The first line was established between Boma and Matadi, two ports in the Congo estuary, in 1894,3 and an extension to Leopoldville provided just four years later. The start could have come even earlier, had King Leopold, and other powers as well, acted on a proposal by British colonists in South Africa for an overland telegraph between Cape Town and Cairo. The promoters Of this "practical, natural, necessary and profitable" scheme deemed their project to be of such vast importance to Africa and to Europe that they ventured to present their proposal before the International Conference invited by . . . the King Of the Belgians to meet at Brussels, September 12, 1876. The plan was presented but it never found its way into the minutes of the conference.4 Had the overland telegraph line been established across the vast territory Of the newly established International African Association, quite conceivably an earlier develop- ment Of an internal telegraph system would have followed. ‘ 1Law Of November 23, 1903. Cf. Girault, Principes g3 Colonisation . . ., 111, 500-01. 2 Ibid., 501. 3InforCongo, I, 234. 4Lois A. C. Raphael, The Cape-to—Cairo Dream: ELStudy in British Imperialism (New York: Columbia Uni— versity Press, 1936), 54, 173 Wireless Telegraphy in the Colonies It is curious to Observe that while the wire— less had its origins of widespread use in England, it was France and Belgiumvhrh began to experiment with the application of wireless telegraphy for internal colonial communication. Belgian Congo, after an early start, had about ten wireless stations by 1912,1 and at the end of World War I, a network of fifteen stations provided a completely interconnected radiotelegraphic system. In the French territories of the Equatorial Africa, radiotelegraphic experiments were authorized in 1910, and . . . in 1912, radiotelegraphic stations in Brazza- ville and Loango—Pointe—Noire opened for general public correspondence. In the French Congo, all public activity with wireless transmissions ceased for the duration of the 1914—1918 war, but military stations which had been established in Chad, in 1919 passed intO'the hands of the telegraphic service of the Federation.3 The first lInforCongo, I, 234. 2Guernier, 489; Decree Of May 15, 1910 authori— zed experimental transmission. Cf. International Colo- nial Institute, International Colonial Library, Yearbook Of Compared Colonial Documentation (Brussels: International CO1Onial Institute,i1927~l938), 1932, II, 301.Henceforth referred to as I.C.I., Compared Colonial Documentation. 31bid. 174 recorded internal use of wireless telegraphy in Nigeria occurred in 1913.1. Telephones In Nigeria, the telephone system began in 1908 by the opening of a ZOO-line exchange in Lagos, followed by the opening Of a 50-1ine board at Apobo in 1909. In 1919, there were 920 telephones in Nigeria with public telephone exchanges in 11 towns.2 Brazzaville's first exchange in 1910 was followed slowly by systems in other localities, but no public long-distance lines were available.3 In Belgian Congo, no firm date of introduction of telephones could be established, but by 1918 there were 179 instruments in Operation.4 The National and Imperial Policies Of Great Britain, France and Belgium on Telecommunications National Policies The needs and desires for international connec- tions Of telegraph lines and later of wireless were, sim- ilarly to the needs for imperial expansion, of three basic kinds, though Often not easily distinguishable lStatesman's Yearbook, 1915, 239. 2Letter from the Nigerian Postmaster-General, March 24, 1965. 3Grenier, 490. 4Letter from the A. T. & T., November 13, 1964. 175 from each other. The commercial desires and needs were being promoted by inventors, innovators, and especially by entrepreneurs. The second need for expansion of tele- graphy and wireless can,for the lack Of a better term, be called "journalistic." The changes in the Press brought about by the use Of telegraphy led in turn to the changes in the social and even economic situation. Thirdly, the military needs of national governments cannot be overlooked. These three kinds of needs very Often functioned side-by—side, and it is sometimes very difficult, if not impossible, to determine where one need ended and another started. The journalistic and military needs for long-distance telegraphy were well illustrated by the events Of 1854 and 1855, during the Crimean War.1 All this is not intended to imply that no other factors were Of import to the wide spread of the new communication means.2 It is only suggested that these were the paramount factors, playing a crucial role in the extent and speed with which the means were employed. Finally, it is important to remember that it is in the context of society, and specifically Of government, that the needs and desires have to be examined. Just as 1Cf. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (l959),VI, 707-08; XVI, 445A,B; XIX, 681. Aiso, McLuhan, 222-23. 2Two early cases Of apprehending criminals due to fast telegraphic communications are frequently cited. Cf. Briggs, 36; McLuhan,217. 176 the political aims of imperial governments differed from each other, so did the needs for communication. Further— more, even when the needs and desires were substantially the same, the reasons for them did differ, and the actions taken toward reaching and accomplishing them varied. It is, therefore, necessary, especially for under- standing Of the later develOpments of wireless in the form of broadcasting, to examine the role of the governments of the three powers, and their ways in which they went about influencing the develOpments of telegraphy, submarine cables and wireless. Economic development experts distinguish between many functions of government which are relevant to the economy as a whole. Lewis specifically cites nine function- al categories.1 Of particular interest in this context seem to be the government functions of influencing atti- tudes, the use of resources and the level of investment, and the function of establishing and maintaining public services. The manner in which the three governments ap— proached these functions was often well reflected in legislative measures. Governmental support of telecommunications. —- The British Government supported those enterprises which es- tablished and assured control Of the new media in British lW. Arthur Lewis, The Theory Of Economic Growth (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955),i376—77} 177 hands. The submarine cable-lying and cable-Operating companies in the second half of the nineteenth century were mostly British. The British early assumed leadership in the laying Of transatlantic cables, a leadership that they have never relinquished. The British also actively supported the inven- tions and discoveries of their own nationals rather than allowing those of others to be legalized in England. By refusing to register Morse's telegraph patent, the British helped Wheatstone, Cooke, Bain, and others. Bell's inven— tion was strongly supported by many distinguished scien- tists (Thomson, Preece) and even by Queen Victoriaz, but the instrument finally used in Great Britain (as well as in the United States) was that improved by successive British inventions of Hughes, Blake and Hunnings in the late 1870's.3 The fact that William Thomson, William Preece, J. Ambrose Fleming, Oliver Lodge and even Godfrey Isaac were eventually knighted for their contributions to the develOpment of telegraphic and/or wireless commu- nication also indicates somewhat the official British recognition Of the domestic effort. In wireless, Marconi's interests received considerable support not only on the national level, but particularly in the international anana. 1Herring and Gross, 19. 2Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XXI, 897. 3King, 329-330. 178 The previously mentioned Post Office Opposition to the British Marconi stemmed from the official point- Of—view of Marconi's Telegraph Company as a competitor Of the Post Office and not from any desire to stiffle the develOpment of telegraphy, and in any case was soon changed into a cooperative effort. Altogether, the rea- sons for British leadership in cable and telegraphic com— munication were due to the above factors, as well as to the abundance of capital available in England, to the interest in the realization of importance to the conduct of their commercial and shipping enterprises, to the desire of bringing into contact all parts of the Empire, and not less importantly to the monopolistic position of England in the manufacture of cables based upon the exclusive availability of the insulating material, first the gutta—percha and then polyethylene. Many Of these supporting factors were found lack— ing in France1 and in Belgium. The latter country con- trolled enough capital to help its sovereign overcome his financial difficulties in the Congo Independent State by loaning him 25 million francs in 1891 but the need for telegraphic or wireless communication with the African territory was not felt until Belgium formally assumed the responsibility for its develOpment. lFrance, however, also bestowed civil decorations upon some individuals who distinguished themselves in com- munication and other fields, but used this means much more sparingly. Cf.,E.B.U. Review (Part B), NO. 84, 44. 179 In France, the conditions were different from both England and Belgium. In the first place, the French government was reluctant to exert influence in the field of telegraphic, telephonic and cable communications, and this reluctance drew Often-expressed comments on commu- nication dependence on British systems. After citing a dozen or so instances over the previous thirty years or so when the governments of France, Spain, Holland and Italy had been unable to communicate with some of their colonies and possessions because of the British tele- graphic traffic having been given preference on the Brit- ish-owned lines, a spokesman for an Official French Gov- ernment Commission asked in 1900 what had been the attitude of [the French] govern— ment to the question Of escaping this dependence? It would be unfair to say that it had done nothing but it is here that the inferiorty of [the French] po- litical method appears when compared to that Of the English. Instead of an energetic effort, constant and consistent, . . . we don't find but intermittant efforts, timid and without results. A similar comment was made in 1930 by Giraultz, and im- plied in 1956 by Grenier3. Secondly, one other aSpect of the French policy deserving to be mentioned is that of the general economic policy of France. At the time of the telegraph and tele— phone develOpment, the policies of France toward her co- lonies Operated under the influence Of the so-called _'_ 1Charles-Roux, 194. 2Girault, Principes de Colonisation . . ., 111,502. BGrenier, 213. 180 Pacte—Coloniall, of which one premise stated that all transport was to be in French hands.2 Similarly, the French also intended to retain control of communication means, though the small degree of determination on the part of the government to make it so prevented this from becoming a reality. In addition, the financial difficul- ties in the last quarter of the century, as a result of the Franco-German war, found France "on a downward curve of the economic cycle."3 While the 20 years before 1873 had been a period of ex- pansion and prOSperity interrupted by short, sharp periods of crisis and slump, the 20 years after 1873 were a period Of depression interrupted by short periods Of sudden prosperity.4 Under such conditions, not much could have been invested in expansion Of existing communication, in the develop- ment Of the colonies, or put to the diSposition Of science and inventions.5 For that reason, the French scientific progress is the more remarkable. The 1870-1914 period produced in France not only writers and artists, but scientists and inventors: 1A summary of that policy is contained in Journal Officiel,(Docts. parl., Sess. Ord., Senat), 1888, 54ff. 2Roberts, 1, 40. 3 . . 631 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), IX, 4 . Ibid., 633. 5Troux et Girard, 504. 181 . . . the research Of Edouard Branly permitted the invention of wireless; . . . [we] owe the cinema- tography to Marey and Louis Lumiere; the rotary- press . . . to Marinoni; the principle Of the tele- phone tO [Charles] Bourseul. Private versus state ownership. --The beginnings of telegraphy were everywhere associated with private ownership. As the importance of telegraphy became to be recognized and as the telegraph lines in existence needed to be linked into national telegraph system, most gov- ernments began to consider owning and operating the lines themselves, and having them maintained and Operated by public corporations as public service (utility). It was quite natural that the postal systems, themselves originally private but by then already devel- oped as public utilities, were asked to assume the respon- sibility for the new means through which to move infor- mation. Most Often, the governmental entry into telegraphy was done in competition with the already existing private Operations, but this fairly soon changed as the service became recognized as requiring centralization, and eventually the establishing of governmental monOpOly. An early, but contrary to the popular belief not the first, legislation to that effect took place in England with the Telegraph Act of 1869. The extent of monopoly granted the Postmaster-General was, however, limited in lIbid. Branly, develOped "coherers," the tube- like containers carrying loose particles responding to the currents set Off by the Hertzian waves. Briggs, I, 26.27. 182 this act to internal telegraph communication, specifical- ly excluding telegraph communication to and from foreign places from the application Of the legislation.1 The French also added the telegraph service to the functions of their postal administration. The first legislation of telegraphy there, and perhaps anywhere, took 2 the form Of a law in 1837. This law is Often cited as establishing government monopoly in telegraphy, though at least one source asserted soberly that the appointment Of Claude Chappe as the State telegraph engineer had accom- 3 plished that already in 1793. Chappe, as will be recalled‘,l developed the semaphor telegraph, or as the Franch called it, te'légraph aérien Optique.5 The French legislation on this matter is inter- esting for at least three reasons: it is the first legis- lation establishing the principle of state monopoly, and m- perhaps even more important —- its wording permitted later communication means to be covered by its sc0pe. ‘ 1Telegraph Act Of 1869, Sec. 12; Cf., Brown, 115-20. ’ 2Law Of May 6, 1837. Cf., Grand Laromse. En clo- Eedigue (Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1960—I964), VIII, 995; 30 n Lee, Economics of Telegraphs and Telephones (London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, 1913), 7. 3Nouveau Lgrousse Illustré (Paris: Librairie L"51I£'Ousse,n.d.) , VII, 948. 4Supra, 148 . 5La Grande EncyclOpédie (Paris: Société Anonyme ‘16 la Grande EncyclOpédie, n.d.)-, XXX, 1035. 183 The law of May 2, 1837 punishes by imprisonment for the period Of from one month up to one year, and by a fine of from 1,000 to 10,000 francs, anyone who transmits, without authorization, signals from one place to another, whether through the devices Of telegraphic machines or through whatever other means, {Though this act pertained to non-electric telegraph, the :Eoresight of including other means Of signalling made this legislation unique. Later, the decree—law Of December 27, 1851 reiter- zrted this principle and applied it to electric telegraph vfliile also reemphasizing the prescribed penalties for non- obeyance Of the law.2 First administered by the War blinistry, then by the Ministry of the Interior, later by Public Works and then again by the Interior Ministry,3 telegraphy in France was incorporated into the Administra- jgion Générale des Postes et Messageries in 1877. The tele- phone service which was added tO the postal authorities in 11881 continued for a while to exist alongside a private company (Société Générale des Telephones), but that enter- Prise was absorbed into one state service in 1889. That Year also, a special administration of Postes, Telegraphs Egyg_Telephones was created, formalizing the use of the Well-known combination of the three letters (P.T.T.). \ 1Ibid., 1032. 2Ibid. Cf., Fernand Terrou and Lucien Solal, €§fliislation fgr Press, Film and_RadiO ("Press, Film. Radio 11 the World—Today; Pafis: UNESCO,—I951), 180. 3Nouveau Larousse Illustré, VII, 948. 184 .A.separate ministry (Ministere des P.T.T.) appeared in 1925.1 The third interesting point about the early French JlegislatiOn Of telegraphy stems from the fact that not tintil 1850 were private citiZens allowed to use the service. [On] the 20th Of November, 1850, . . . a law was made permitting private persons to send dispatches over the wires (the State hitherto was the only party using it) after rigorous investigation of their identity.2 Somewhat different develOpment occurred in Belgium, vflnere the telegraph service became subject to governmen- tal monopoly in 1850, after a private British Company 3 The Operated between Brussels and Antwerp since 1846. lBelgians put the telegraph service under the administra— 1Lion of the Department of Public Works, as one Of the iaight bureaus of the general direction of railways, posts and telegraphs . 4 In 1873, the responsibility for the telegraph service transferred to postal authorities, “fluere it formed a separate branch (Régie des Telegraphs). \ 1Marcel Martin (ed.), Les Institutions Politiques Ska_la France ("Le Monde ContemporainfiPafis: La Documen- tation Francaise, 1961), II, 436. 2W. Lodian, "Century of the Telegraph in France," POular Science Monthl (New York: D. Appleton & CO.), Apr , 8 4 , . Cf., Donald E. Smith (ed.), The New Lazrned History for Ready Reference, Reading and Research 4th.rev.ed.; Springfield Mass.: C. A. Nichols Co.,‘l922~ 1924), x, 8230. 3Encyclopaedia Britannica, 9th ed., (1878),III, 4Smith, x, 8232. 525 185 The telephone service was added to that Of the tele— graph in 1893—1896.1 Telephony in England has a somewhat different history. While in 1880 the British courts held that the telephone system was legally a telegraph system under an antecedent [1869] law which made the telegraph a government monopoly under the Postmaster—General, the Post Office Officials, unwilling to risk involvement in the new medium, preferred to issue licenses to private companies. Only when the potential Of telephone began to be realized did the government take over first the long- distance lines (1896) and in 1912 all private telephone prOperties. Legal bases of wireless. —- The wireless activity in England was such that a definite need arose for set- ting a legal framework within which wireless transmission and reception would be governed. Though a number Of countries participated in an international conference which was called forthe purpose of drafting international regulation3, the legislation Of wireless was pioneered 1Encyclopgedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XXI, 898. The 1893 date is from H. L. Webb, Development of the Telephone in Europe (n.n., n.d.), 60. 2 Ibid., 896. 3This was the first Berlin Conference of 1903. Tomlinson suggested that the conference was called "more in view of the imminent stranglehold Of the Marconi interest in wireless communication" than because Of an actual need for regulation. Tomlinson, 13. 186 by Great Britain which in 1904 passed the Wireless Tele— graphy Act, formally called an "act to provide for the 1 This act established regulation of Wireless Telegraphy." the wireless to be an extension of telegraphy (and tele- phony), and as such radio communication fell under the established government monopolies of 1869 and 1880. Licensing was prescribed, and though the act spoke of transmitting only, the Post Office interpreted this as also including receiving aparatus. That interpretation was formally and informally challenged by individuals, business, the Press and even the Parliament.2 In a manner similar to the Telegraph Act Of 1869, the wireless legislation accepted the principle that com- munication with other parts of the Empire was to be in the hands of the Post Office, and while private companies were to be free to establish communication with foreign countries out— side Europe, . . . communication with the Continent [was] to be shared between private companies and the Post Office.3 This principle also applied in France and Belgium, and eXplains why British Marconi's subsidiary companies could be established and after 1904 maintained abroad. Marconi's subsidiary in Belgium was the Société Anonyme Internationale de Télégraphie sans Fil, established in 1901;4 a French subsidiary was founded in l903?’and ten lIbid., 20. 2Briggs, I, 95, 159, 193. 4 5 3Brown, 121. Jome, 32,34. Maclaurin, 43. 187 years later absorbed the private Compagnie Universelle de Télégraphie et Téléphonie sans Fil.l The provisions of the English original act were amplified by another act in 1925, known as the Wireless Telegraphy (Explanation) Act, but only after a much more comprehensive bill had been withdrawn from consideration by the House of Commons because of very strong objections 2 The items which this 1925 (Short) Act explained to it. pertained to the applicability of the 1904 Act to receiv— ing apparatus, and to telephony, and therefore directly to broadcasting. These two Acts, however unsatisfactory they did appear to various sectors of the public, served well until another comprehensive Act was passed in 1949.3 This was later complemented by two specialized Acts, in 1954 (Validation Of Charges) and 1955 (Blind Persons). The pioneering in telegraph regulation in France was not duplicated in matters Of wireless. Though tech- nically covered already by the 1837 law, it took France almost twenty years longer than England to specify a legal base upon which radio communications were to develop. The 1923 law confirmed the established principle of radio 1 2 Jome, 33. Briggs, I, 193-94. 3Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Sougd and Television Broadcasting in Britain (London: B. I. S., Central Office of Informatibn,’1963), 35. Henceforth referred to as C. O. 1., Sound and Television Broadcasting in Britain. Also, Terrou and Solal, 158. 188 to be an extension of telegraphy and telephony, by stating that the provisions Of the decree of December 27, 1851, regarding the monOpOly and control Of telegraph lines were applicable to the transmission apd reception of radio-electric signals of every kind. The additional time which it took the French to pass the legislation apparently served well as this law clearly spoke of transmission and reception and Of its origin in both telegraphic and telephonic communication regulation.2 Belgium also set up its international telegraph system as a public enterprise earlier than Britain, when 3 The Belgian it began regulating that service in 1850. Wireless Telegraphy Act4 followed by two years the 1906 Radio-Telegraphy Convention which culminated the second Berlin Conference on Radio-Telegraphy. In summary, two aspects Of telegraph and wireless communication need to be pointed out: (1) National systems, i.e., the establishment of internal lines Of communica- tion by wire or wireless in a coordinated and connected monopoly system, did not always coincide with the legis- lative (regulatory) measures that established governmen- tal control: and (2) Governmental control did not 1Law of June30, 1923, Art. 85; quoted in Terrou and Solal, 180. 2Grand Larousse EncyOIOpédique, VIII, 995. 3Francis Williams, Transmitting World News (Paris: UNESCO, 1953), 20. 4 Emery, Journalism Monographs, No. 1, 3. 189 necessarily imply governmental ownership and/or Operation. If put in a form of a table, different emphases at differ- ent times of the three powers will be immediately recog- nized (Table 2). TABLE 2.--Dates Of legislative measures and of beginnings of national systems in telegraphy, telephony and wireless National MonOpOlistic . . . System of First Legislation Country Comnmnication Tele- Tele- Tele- Wire- graphy Telephony graphy phony less France 1879 1883-1889 1837 1851a 1923a Belgium 1850 1893—1896 1850 1850 1908 Gt. Britain 1869 1896—1912 1869 1880b 1904 aTechnically, the 1837 law applied also to tele- phony and wireless. bA court ruling in 1880 declared that telephony was an extension of telegraphy and as such was covered by the 1869 law. Imperial Systems of Telegraph and Wireless Communicafion It has been pointed out in the previous chapter that the communication needs Of all empires required con- stant improvement of communication lines. On the other hand, new technological develOpment indicated to the em- pires the potential speed-up of communication, and various empires took advantage Of such developments, though not at the same time or to the same extent. In communication 190 matters, the imperial policies of the empires have quite naturally always been influenced not only by technologi- cal, but also by economic, political and strategical con- siderations. England, in the first half of the nineteenth cen- tury the strongest and the most extended Empire in the world, realized early in the era of the telegraph that there was a medium extremely well suitable for connecting the Empire with the mother country. From the first, the British thought of submarine cables for that purpose, and naturally, when wireless communication became a reality, Marconi himself prepared a plan to that effect. His company in March 1910 submitted to the Coloni- al Office a detailed plan for linking, by means Of a net- work Of wireless stations, the whole British Empire. As the British Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1904 required licensing of wireless stations, the company's plan was actually a request for licenses, and for support in ob- taining licenses from the governments of the self-govern- ing colonies. The company was prepared to erect, maintain, and Operate the stations entirely at its own expense. Altogether eighteen stations were prOposed to be located in Egypt, India, Malaya, China, Australia, and Africa. A standing committee of the House Of Commons reported favorably on this plan, but disagreed with the suggestion that the Marconi Company should own and Operate the stations. Instead.a state owned system was recommended, 191 to be erected by the British Marconi. The same year the Imperial Conference endorsed the plan and a committee headed by the Postmaster-General was formed to begin negotiations. On March 7, 1912, a tender (a formal state- ment Of the clauses which were to be embodied later in a legal contract) was signed, providing for the erection of the first six stations (one each in England, Egypt, East and South Africa, India, and Singapore). The tender was widely publicised but was Opposed by the Press. Many believed that the tender was actually a contract and that the provisions were too generous to the Marconi Company ( ten per cent of the gross receipts). But even more important reasomsfor the Opposition were the growing rumors which surrounded the tender. The announcement of the tender resulted in an extraordinary boom in Marconi shares. Charges that the market had been rigged were raised by many who had failed to get in on the rise and by those who lost money in the fall which followed. In the House of Commons, accusations of grave corruption were raised against the Postmaster-General who headed the government side in the negotiations against Godfrey Charles Isaacs, Managing Director Of the Marconi Company, and his brother Sir Rufus Isaacs, who,as Attorney General, was to approve the contract. In spite Of all this, the actual contract was signed on July 7, 1912.1 1Frances Donaldson, The Marconi Scandal (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962), 20. 192 The government was forced to investigate, and so a Parliamentary Committee was appointed to conduct an in- quiry. The charges were found to be unsubstantiated, all three Officials exonerated and the carrying out of the agreement recommended.1 A new contract was signed in July, 1913, but the work on the stations barely started when World War I began. In August of 1914 the contract for the 2 Imperial Chain was cancelled. After the World War I. ——The agitation, on the part of England and France, for eventual redistribution Of German submarine cables was stepped up just prior to the end Of hostilities, and increased even further before and during the Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919. In spite Of the U. S. efforts, the British and French plans to apprOpriate the cables won in the Conference, though the U. 8. Government succeeded in eliminating these provisions from the Treaty Of Versailles itself. Instead, the distribution was handled by an Internation- al Conference of Communications in Washington in 1920.3 The cable known as the German South Atlantic system, running to Casablanca, Dakar and Monrovia went 1Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons) XLI, 893—926. 2A compensation of 590,000 British pounds was given the Marconi Company in 1919. Jome, 39. 3Tomlinson, 48. Cf. O.W. Riegel, Mobilizing for Chaos (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), 32-33. 193 to France, while all other ex—German cables in the Atlan- tic went to Great Britain.1 In the Far East, through later negotiations, the German cables were divided between the U. 8., Japan, and the Netherlands.2 The cables continued to play an important role, the development of radio (wireless) communication notwith- standing. The main innovation in the period between the two World Wars was the installation Of regenerative re- peaters after their introduction in 1924.3 Installed at terminal and intermediate stations, the repeaters resulted in a considerably accelerated service; an impulse could be transmitted over the line London—Bombay, for example, in a fraction of a second, while in 1870, the first cable on that route required almost four-and-a—half minutes to transmit and acknowledge a brief message.4 But the inability of the existing cables to handle the requited volume of traffic, together with the reali- zation that cables could very easily be cut during a con— flict, gave a new urgency to the attempts to seek new, alternate systems of communication. Wireless provided this alternative service. Great Britain returned to the Marconi prOposal of 1910. 1Brown, 4. 2Ibid. 3B. I. 8., Commonwealth Telecommunications, 14. 4Ibid. 194 A high-power long—wave transmitter capable Of com- municating with all the Dominions and other parts of the British Empire Opened at Rugby in January, 1926 with power of 500 kw. Similar stations were built in South Africa and Australia.1 France had similar plans for its Empire communi— cations. An intercolonial network (the so called Plan Ferrie) included a station in Brazzaville and begun, in 1920, with Paris to Brazzaville service; traffic in the Opposite direction was inaugurated in 1927. It works with an arc set; steam engines of imposing dimensions form its source of energy; and its only correspondent is Pagis, with transit at Bamako [French West Africa]. The French plans, and early accomplishments, apparently had the British worried. A report of the Im- perial Wireless Telegraphy Committee was quoted thus: The French Government has a State wireless service which embraces all the French colonies. [The] particulars . . . show how seriously France regard- ed her colonial obligations. This colonial service reaches such far-distant places as Indo—China, the West Indies and French Guiana. Reunion and Madagas- car. It is particularly complete in Northern and Equatorial Africa. . . .3 The Brussels—LeOpoldville wireless service was envisaged at the time of the 1912 Radiotelegraphic Con- ference in London; it was the prOposal of Belgian Congo to include long distance service between fixed (rather 1Ibid. 2Guernier, 490. 3The Times (London), March 1, 1924, 9:3. 195 than just mobile) stations which was considered indicative of the plans of the Belgian Congoleseadministration.1 While the long-wave, long-distance radio communi- cations were being installed, the advantages of low cost and reliability provided by short-wave "beam' system of transmission were being proven. From 1927, Great Britain began developing, together with other Commonwealth gov- ernments, a separate "beam" system with stations in England, Canada, South Africa, India and Australia. This, also, was an idea of the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company. This radio-telephony system was complete by 1930 with more than 100,000 circuit miles Of channels in Operation.2 Inasmuch as both long—wave and "beam" network included the African continent, Nigeria had full access to this system via its land and cable lines connecting it with Cape Town. France also added the newer shortwave network to its imperial communications, and in 1932, Brazzaville station was capable Of Operating with both methods. The "beam" system, furthermore, provided the French Equatori- al Africa with more contact points. Besides Paris, Braz- zaville was now in communication with Bamako, Dakar, Tananarive and Djibouti. In 1938 the station in Brazzaville was modernized. 1Documents de Conférence Radiotélégrgphigue Internationale de Londres, 1912 (London: n.n., 1912), 8. 2 B. I. 5., Commonwealth Telecommunications, 14. 196 During World War II and Afterwards. --The compe- tition between the beam wireless and the cable services, of course, was inevitable, and arose immediately in the 1920's and continued into the 1930's. The competition develOped from the discrepancies in speed and rates, but as time went on, these problems were fairly successfully solved by both services in all countries. When the war broke out, however, the terrific demand resulted in a great increase Of traffic, especially as access to some radio and cable routes were interrupted by the changes in territorial status of countries or their parts in EurOpe and elsewhere. Britain dealt with the situation immediately and decided to establish further direct radio telegraph and telephone circuits even though this happened to be contrary to the existing policy Of the governments Of the Empire as stated in 1928.1 After World War II, the Commonwealth governments decided on some fundamental changes in the structure of and control over the communi- cations systems. A Commonwealth Telecommunications Board brought together the national bodies in charge Of Tele- communications in various Commonwealth as well as non— self-governing countries, and Nigerian External Services ILtd., a public corporation, adhered to the 1948 agreement 2 and became a member. k 1B. I. 5., Commonwealth Telecommunications, 17. 2Ibid., 18. 197 But the development Of cables continued alongside new routes of radio communication, though no new cable was laid between the mother country and its African terri- tory by either of the three powers. The distinct emphasis existed upon radio communication, and special plans in all three territories devoted considerable attention and funds to such development. The British Colonial and Development Welfare Acts supplemented the Nigerian devel— Opment plan which started in 1951.1 France had its own ten-year plan of Equipment and of Economic and Social Deve10pment (Plan Pleven), but changed it to several four- year plans.2 Belgian Congo's ten—year plan of development3 also intended to help in this area. In terminologies, the three plans differed widely and no specific comparison can be made, but if "infrastructure" or social overhead capital is accepted, and this includes means of communi- cations, it is evident that in all three territories, this rubrique received greater emphasis in terms Of funds allocated. For the Middle Congo, 59.9 per cent of all funds were reserved for the develOpment Of infrastructure; 40.3 per cent in Belgian Congo; and 33.54 per cent in Nigeria. h 1B. I. 8., Economic Development in the U. K. De- Eendencies , 9 . 2Economic Bulletin for Africa, 11, NO. 2 , 1962, 30-310 3InforCongo, I, 371; 11, 127-29. 198 The problem with long-distance communications to and from the colonial territories could not be said, however, to be only financial. At mid-century, the limi- tations Of radio became apparent when during the winter months of 1950-1951 severe ionospheric storms caused bad reception: . . . radio prOpagation conditions at times became very bad and many radio circuits were adversely affected. The poor radio conditions necessitated the transfer of some radio traffic to the cable system.1 The situation, as well as the overcrowded condi- tions Of the frequency spectrum, led to a Commonwealth decision in 19582 to establish round—the-world system of large-capacity cables; in this system, the South Atlantic Ocean link of Britain with West and South Africa was to be regarded as the first part, ready for completion in 1963. The French Equatorial Africa and Belgian Congo continued with the building up of their radio communica- tion system. Apparently unaffected by the ionospheric storms (these were particularly disruptive to communica- tions to Australia and New Zealand)2, Brazzaville intend- ed to maintain radio contact with other parts of Africa, as well as to serve the center point of radio communica- 'tion between the capitals of the neighboring countries ¥ vw 1B. I. 8., Commonwealth Telecommunications, 21. 2Ibid., 22. 3 Ibid., 21. 199 and Paris.1 Leopoldville in Belgian Congo became the pivot of a network that reached every part of its own territory and which connected various points and other African countries as well as other continents. All 180 state- Owned and about 100 private radio stations participated in a network by 1960.2 ' 1France, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et 9 Iliformation, The Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville): §§E§_your of Independence (New York: Ambassade de France, 961), 24. 2InforCongo, I, 234. CHAPTER V RADIO BROADCASTING IN AND FOR THE COLONIES Each of the three major powers approached the establishing of broadcasting service in their respective colonial territories differently. In order to understand why this was so, a description of how the develOpment of their own broadcasting had been handled is perhaps the most revealing approach. Even though the service was con- sidered by all three to require monopolistic status vested in the State, each governmenttnok a different route to arrive at such a status. Besides the organization Of domestic broadcasting, crther facts played important roles in determining when, tn) what extent, and in what form broadcasting should be urudertaken in each of the three colonies. One of these factors, playing a dominant role in every case, was the broadcasting service directed to the colonies from the caPitals of the metropolitan countries. A section Of this Chapter is, accordingly, devoted to a review of this activ- itY' on the part of the British, the Belgians, and the Ftench. 200 201 Lastly, the description of the broadcasting Opera— tions in the colonial possessions is provided. That section actually is a brief historical narrative outlining the highlights of achievements as well as tracing some of the most pronounced problems. It is, by design, a restricted description, as.some of the activities, and the policies from which they stemmed, are to be subject to an analysis and comparison in the following part of this writing. Nevertheless, this particular section, and the whole chap— ter as well, provides a well-documented overview of the main forces which contributed to a particular pattern which colonial broadcasting assumed, and which affected the method, speed, and extensiveness with which the three broadcasting services were developed in the African terri— tories. In each Of the three sections of this chapter, 'the events are described primarily in their chronological (order. While England, among the three powers, appears to llave bid first on the domestic broadcasting service, in case Of broadcasting to the colonies was forced to Observe the French initiative (as well as that of one other Colo- “1431 Power not subject to this study). In order to errIpihasize such facts, yet without attaching to them un- nexzessarily too much importance, a chronological, rather thian alphabetical or any other, order has been employed in the organization of this chapter. 202 Domestic Broadcasting Services of the Three Powers England When broadcasting began in England in the early 1920's, it was primarily an experimental and private enter- prise. And yet, the government already had legal power to regulate the new service. The Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1904, in its statement that every . . . license shall be in such form and for such a period as the Postmaster-General may determine, and shall contain the terms, conditions, and restrictions on, and subject to which the license is granted, clearly indicated it would be in the power of the Post- master-General to decide, on May 4, 19222 that only a limited number of the broadcasting (or "radio-telephone broadcasting," as the description read) stations would be allowed from then on. Eventually, his decisions, backed by Parliament?, resulted in the issuance of only one, collective license for that purpose. The British Broadcasting Company. --The license was to be issued to the British Broadcasting Company, an enterprise combining the broadcasting interests Of a number of radio (wireless) apparatus manufacturers, which lBriggs, I, 95. 2Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CLIII (1922), 1600. 3C. O. 1., Sound and Television ngadcasting in Britain, 2. 203 was established towards the end of 1922. The broadcasting license, dated January 18, 19231, assured the British Broadcasdng Company of a monOpOly for a period of two years. Due to a number of friction points that develOped almost immediately between the company and the Post Office, an official committee of inquiry considered alternatives for broadcasting in the United Kingdom. This committee (known by the name Of its Chairman, Major-General Sir Frederick Sykes, M.P.) endorsed the principle of the State regulating broadcasting, but recommended that the State should not itself Operate broadcasting stations.2 It sug- gested extending the existing system by the establishment of a number of local or relay stations in order to reach wider audiences. The company's license was renewed for another two years. Some of the Old problems continued, and so a new committee, under the chairmanship Of the Earl of Crawford and Belcarres, was appointed to make recommendations for the constitution Of a national broadcasting service. Very muchifike its predecessor, the Crawford Committee did not 1By coincidence, another Chamberlain signed the license as Postmaster—General; Arthur Neville Chamberlain was a younger son of Joseph Chamberlain, and half-brother Of Austin Chamberlain. 2Great Britain, Broadcasting Committee Report [The Sykes Committee Report](Cmd. 1951), 1923. 204 endorse the idea Of State Operated service, but in addition it also did not favor the existing arrangement of a company Operating for profit. The committee's recommendation was for a public corporation, a permanent body Operating under a Royal Charter, and acting as a trustee for the national interest.1A1though a few members of Parliament and some newspapers were against these recommendations, the majority of the House member- ship was satisfied with the report , as was the Post- master—General who announced to the House in July 1926 that the government accepted the recommendations.2 Without much debate, the government's plan was agreed on. In January, 1927, the company's assets, staff and equipment were taken over by a new public corporation, the British Broadcasting Corporation. The company's managing director, J. C. W. Reith, was appointed Director- General. The public service character Of broadcasting which he helped mold was thus transferred to the new BBC. The British Broadcasting Corporation. --In theory, the government had by virtue of the Royal Charter of 1927 and the License and Agreement between the Postmaster- General and the BBC , full powers over the corporation and over broadcasting. The governors of the corporation 1Great Britain, Report Of the Broadcasting Committee [The Crowford CommitteeliTCmd. 2599),’l925. 2Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CIIC (1926), 448. 205 could be removed and replaced, and the license could be revoked . . . if, at any time, the corporation, in the Opinion of the Postmaster-General, failed in its duties.1 Furthermore, any department of the government could re- quire the BBC to broadcast any matter or announcement as the department desired. Under such conditions, it could have been expected that the BBC would have developed into another government department. In practice, this did not happen, partially be- cause the successive governments, with consent Of Par— liament, agreed to grant the corporation absolute inde- pendence, and respect it and to consider the inherent power to remain in reserve, and partially because of the ability of various Directors-General of the Corporation to maintain its political independence, to continue its 'freedom from commercial pressures, and to establish, and at least maintain if not upgrade, the standards of integ- rity, efficiency and quality Of its service.2 1C. O. 1., Sound and Television Broadcasting in Britain, 3. 2Most writers agree that the personality Of J. C. W. Reith had been responsible for the BBC's inde- pendence, and its maintenance for the first eleven years. Reith who had previously served for four years as the Managing Director Of the British Broadcasting Company, was later knighted for his services to British broadcast- ing. 206 But Parliament, of course, reserved for itself the ultimate power. Through the government and its Post— master-General, Parliament has the last word on what may and what must not be broadcast.1 The original clause (4) of the License and Agreement of 1927 has been incorporated into every new license.This clause only established the power; the restrictions on program content were always set up by special memoranda. Broadcasting in the United Kingdom continued to grow while it continued to be revised periodically. In 1935, Viscount Ullswater headed a committee looking into the internal working of the BBC. Lord Beveridge chaired another committee in 1951, and in 1960, the future of all broadcasting services were considered by the Pilkington Committee. On each occasion the BBC's ficense was renewed. Until 1960, the BBC Operated under four Charters, the third and fourth with additional extentions until the next one could be decided on. Throughout this period, technical improvements were made, alongside with extension Of domestic services. From the National and Regional Services developed three major program services, with both distinct and overlapping 1For a while (until 1928) broadcasting of contro- versial items were prohibited. Since 1927, no editoriali— zing is allowed, and since 1955, no discussions are allow- ed for two weeks before, and during, their debate in Par— liament. BBC, BBC Handbook, 1964 (London:BBC, 1963), 133-34. Cf. Maurice GorHam, Broadcasting and Television since 1900 (London: Andrew Dakers Ltd., 1952), 81. 207 components. Number of licenses grew steadily, from two million at the end of the British Broadcasting Company's era in 1926, to almost nine million at the beginning and 9,700,000 at the end of World War 11. After the 1954 introduction of the second TV service the number of "sound only" licenses declined to barely four-and-a-half million.l Broadcasting to other parts of the Empire, and later to foreign countries as well, develOped, beginning in 1932 and growing in scope and importance especially during the years of World War II. But the independence and basic structure of the British Broadcasting Corporation did not change, except in the area of television, in which the monopoly of the BBC was not maintained.2 What the Sykes, and later the Crawford Committees envisaged has proven to be a function- al design of organization, fully acceptable to the gov- ernment and the majority Of the people. Although the BBC has served, over the years, as a model for other nation- al broadcasting organizations, it had never been fully duplicated anywhere. The BBC represents a unique broad- casting organization. Financing of domestic broadcasting service in Britain has since 1922 been done out Of the revenue from 1BBC,Handbook, 1964, 186. 2Television Act, 1954 established the Independent Television Authority and charged it with the task of providing television broadcasting services additional to those Of the BBC. 208 the issue of broadcast receiving licenses. Commonwealth and foreign broadcasting servicesare funded by the British Government by Grants-in-Aid.1 As far as the technical facilities are concerned, the number Of radio broadcasting stations in Great Britain has grown substantially. From three stations on November 15, 19222, to nine in 19333, thirteen in 19374, and forty- eights in 19505 , the United Kingdom possessed 256 radio stations in 1960, of which 160 were frequency-modulated.6 In just eight years since the Stockholm Conference has assigned 190 FM frequencies to Great Britain7, the country operated on 84 per cent of them. France Broadcasting under the postal authorities. -- First broadcast in France took place, on a coordinated level, in 1BBC,HandbOOk, 1964, 128. 2Gorham, 30. 3"Rundfunk," Der Grosse Brockhaus (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1935), XVI, 209. Henceforth referred to as Brockhaus, 1935. 4"Rundfunk," Der Grosse Brockhaus (Wiesbaden: F. A. Brockhaus, 1956), XX, 153. Henceforth referred to as Brockhaus, 1956. 5 UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio ("Reports on the Faci- lities of Mass Communication;“ Paris: UNESCO, 1948-1951), IV, 572-730 6 UNESCO, World Communications: Press, Radio, Tele- vision, Film (Paris: UNESCO, 1964), 335-37. Henceforih re- ferred to as UNESCO, World Communications, 1964. 7European Broadcasting Conference, Stockholm, 1952, Agreement, Plans, Final Protocol and Recommendation (Geneva: International Teiecommunication Union, 1952), 29-70. 209 19221, when the administration of P. T. T. set up a trans- mitter atop the Eiffel Tower. In 1923, the activities were given a firm legal base by the law of June 30, at which time the concept Of privately Operated stations were dis- allowed.2 State monOpOly of transmission and reception of radio-electric signals was reaffirmed by this act, based upon the law of telegraphy of 1837 and 1851.3 The disallowance was theoretical, though, for . . . from 1923 to 194l,there was a mixed system, involving on the one hand State radio stations run by the Postal and Telegraph Service, and on other hand various private stations run by private commercial companies which were atfirit granted authorization and then concessions. . . . Three legislative measures5 assured such arrangement during those years, but the most significant was the Decree Of December 28, 1926 which created a "Broadcasting Service" within the Postal and Telegraphic Administration.6 Originally administered on a decentralized base, the French Broadcasting Service was slowly becoming a centralized operation in the early 1930's. In 1934, the 1George A. Codding, Jr., Broadcasting without Barriers (Paris: UNESCO, 1959), 18. 2Terrou and Solal, 180. 3 . Grand Larousse Encyclopedique, VIII, 995. 4Terrou and Solal, 180. 5Decree of November 23, 1923; Decree of December 28, 1926; Law of March 19, 1928. 6 I 0 Grand Larousse Encyclopedique, VIII, 995. 210 transmitter atop the Eiffel Tower ceased broadcasting and was to be used for experimental purposes only. That same year, two governmental decrees were issued and the Minister of P. T. T., Mallarmé, announced the increase of State cOntrol over broadcasting with the purpose Of providing for a greater coordination Of the activities. A central Broadcasting Office was then set up, with technical, financial, musical, and information departments. The central office was to be administered by a broadcasting council composed of thirty members, and each station by a managing committee on which representatives Of the listeners were to be included. The Minister, however, retained the power of veto.1 The Broadcasting Council was nominated in April 19, 1935, and consisted of five committees: one for literary and artistic matters, one for administrative affairs, and the remaining three representing the listeners, public interests, and the Ministry of Finance, respectively.2 Reception in France was not legislated on until 1933, at which time licensing fees on receiver sets were 3 established. In 1936, a law4 stated that further private 1Keesing's Contemporary Archives (Weekly Diary of World Events; London: Keesing's Publications Limited, Annual), 11 (1934-1937), 1404K. 2 Ibid., 1604A. 3Grand Larouse Encyclopédique, VIII, 995. 4Law of March 20, 1936. 211 broadcasting stations could be established only by Special legislation. When private ownership was discontinued in 19411 , twelve private stations were absorbed by the state system which consisted at that time Of twenty stations.2 On December 18, 1938, a decree gave the Prime Minister a complete control over all news broadcast in France, whether transmitted from private or government— Owned stations. This control was exercised by Chief Broad— cast Control Officer who had been previously appointed and who came under the authority of the Secretary General of the Prime-Minister's Office. Besides news, this office exercised complete control over all talk programs dealing with internal and foreign affairs and with economic and social questions.3 Broadcasting as an autonomous service. -— In 1939, broadcasting was separated from the postal services and transformed into an autonomous administration. A national broadcasting service, La Radiodiffusion Francaise, created by the Law—Decree of July 29, 19394, was placed under the authority Of the French Premier. Television service was already then enumerated among its chief responsibilities; 1 7, 1942). Law Of October 1, 1941 (supplemented on November 2Terrou and Solal, 180. 3Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 111 (1937-1940), 33731E. 4Codding, 4o. 212 the service also had to oversee the Operation of privately owned stations, and carry on the news service of the newly established information branch of the government.1 The 1941 and 1942 measures reaffirmed the basic organizational structure of the service. The former Director- General became the General Administrator (after World War II, his tile again became Director-General), his appointment being made by a decree, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, to whom he was responsible. From 19422 , the Prime Minister was for this purpose represented by the Minister in Charge of Information.3 The Chief Administrator was to be assisted by a Higher Council (Conseil Supérieur des Emissions) composed of four appointed members and by a Program council of six— teen members, all appointed by the Prime Minister. Four specialized committees, one each for music, literature and drama, science, and light entertainment, were also set up. The original role Of the Higher Council was [to be] responsible for the general organization and the working Of the broadcasting service as a whole; [to be] consulted on all questions relating to the general organization Of the services, the trend and arrangement Of the broadcasts, budget proposals, accounts, etc. . . . [and to] supervise the work, programmes and all requisitions and sales.4 Private broadcasting stations existed side by side with 1Terrou and Solal, 180—81. 2Law of November 7, 1942. 3Terrou and Solal, 182. 4 Ibid., 181. Cf. Brockhaus, 1956, X, 152. 213 government-owned facilities, but their further development was curtailed when in 1936 a law was passed stating that further private radio facilities could be authorized only by an enactment of a special law.1 Just before the War, twelve radio stations out of the total of thirty-two, were privately owned, and "were not subject to any strict re— 2 It was not until 1945, that the private gulations." stations were abolished by the Law of March 23 which decreed the withdrawal of all existing authorizations of 0 O O 3 private radio Operations. The same law also changed the name Of Radiodiffu- sion Francaise (RDF)tO Radiodiffusion et Television Francaise, and made the organization an Administration Specialisée, a government agency with a budget accessory 4 to the state budget. Otherwise, the Operation of the new RTF was not changed. During the succeeding years, though, the role of the Higher Council (of Broadcasting) has diminished considerably in stature, and its "functions have been appreciably curtailed."5 The criticismsof the French broadcasting adminis- tration have been frequent. In 1959 it was said that 1Terrou and Solal, 180. 2Ibid. 3 Ibid., 181. Cf. Codding, 40. 4Codding, 40. 5Ibid. Cf. Grand Larousse Encyclopedique, VIII, 995. 214 although the legal framework would appear to offer possibilities for almost unlimited governmental con— trol, such control as exists has usually been exercised discreetly. However, it cannot be denied that broad- casting tends tO be regarded rather as the handmaiden of the government. . . .1 In a study of French public administration, an ob- servation was made that the control of broadcasting has been one of the thorny problems of both the Fourth and the Fifth Republics. Although Radiodiffusion-Television—Fran- caise is a public corporation,git comes under the direct control of the government and the government intervenes actively in its programmes and in the employment of its staff. Broadcasting has been used by the government for political purposes, particularly in recent years. There has been a growing demand for greater independence, but it is difficult to see that this will be achieved.2 This statement was made in 1964, in the same year that a new broadcasting law was passed in France. Act NO. 64-621, of June 27, 1964, attempted to mold the organi— zation . . . into the shape of a public state establishment of an industrial and commercial character.3 Inasmuch as the Office de Radiodiffusion-Television-Fran- caise (QBT£)_has come into existence after the Independ- ence of the African territory of Congo, the features Of the new organization are not discussed further in this treatise. ‘ 1Codding, 41. . 2F. Ridley and J. Blondel, Public Administration in France (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), 73. 3Albert Namurois, Problems of Structure and Organi- Eggion Of Broadcasting in the Framework Of Radiocommunica- tions ("Legal Monograph, No. 2"; Geneva: EurOpean Broad- casting Union, December, 1964), 70. 215 The growth of facilities. ——The growth of the French broadcasting system has been considerable. Twelve years after the first experimental broadcast from the Eiffel Tower in 1921, France had five radio stations, of which one Operated on long—wavelength, with a total power 1 of 222 kw. In 1950, the power increased to almost 1200 kW, divided among 53 medium-wave and one long~wave 2 The Stockholm P1an3assigned 178 FM frequencies stations. to France, Of which 29 were put in operation by 1960. Together with 66 AM stations at that time, the RTF con- trolled broadcasting system with more than 2,630 kW transmitting power. Belgium Among the three Powers under discussion in this work, Belgium alone faced, in broadcasting services, the problems of linguistic and cultural dualism inherent in the societal make-up of the country. Dual—lingual5 1Brockhaus, 1935, XVI, 210. 2UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio,2nd Supplement, 68-69. 3EurOpean Broadcasting Conference, Stockholm 1952, Agreement, . . ., 29—70. France reserved the right to use the assigned frequencies for amplitude modulation stations, "should it prove necessary." Ibi 4 UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 280, 283-84. 5Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), III, 216 Parliament, Flemish and wauoon Press, separate educational system have all been in Operation since the establishment of the Belgian State in 1830. Commercial and private system Of broadcasting. -- When wireless broadcasting developed, it was pursued in Belgium, as in other countries of the world, by amateur operators whose activities were since 1908 regulated by the wireless legislation. It was this legislation, also, which empowered the Belgian Government to suspend all wireless broadcasting activities at the outbreak of World War 1.1 Not surprisingly, the first Official activities in broadcasting reflected the cultural and linguistic quality of the nation. The government authorized, in 1923, the formation Of a private company, "Radio Belgique," and granted this company a license to Operate a commercial broadcasting service in French.2 Later, a second broad— casting company, "N.V. Radio," for the Dutch speaking pOpulation, was authorized3. Both companies were supported by the advertising revenue, and also by voluntary contribu— tions of the listening public.4 le. Emery, Journalism Monggraph, No. 1, 3. 2UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, I, 111. 3Ibid. 4 Albert Namurois, "The Charter for Broadcasting in Belgium," E. B. U. Review, Part B, No. 63 (September, 1960), 2. 217 Under the then existing allocations, Belgium broadcasting companies operated on frequencies not specif— ically assigned to either broadcasting or to Belgium. At that time, indeed, no frequencies were assigned to sta- tions but rather to a type of service, and until 1927, only to the mobile (maritime) service, and to the trans- mission of weather reports.1 As late as 1920 (at the Preliminary Conference on Electric Communication in Wash- ington) and in 1921 (at the meeting of the Technical Com- mittee of Radiocommunications in Paris), "broadcasting services had not been contemplated."2 Licensing by the contracting governments of all radio—communication trans- mitting stations was incorporated, as an agreement of signatories, into the Washington Conference of 1927, and has been part of all subsequent Radiocommunication Regula- tions ever since.3 Special European Conferences attempted to solve the problem of mutual interference between Euro- pean broadcasting stations: the Geneva Plan of 1926, the Brussels Plan of 1929, the Plan of Prague of 1929? It was 1Tomlinson, 131. 2 Ibid., 134. 3International Radiotelegraph Conference, Washing- ton, 1927 Upcuments (Geneva: I. T. U., n.d.), II, 188. Though the I. T. U. had not been in existence in 1927, the Documents of this and other conferences were republished later under its auspices. 4Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), III, 207. Tomlinson, 181-881 Other conferences took place in 1933 (Lucerne), 1939 (Montreux), 1948 (Copenhagen) and 1952 (Stockholm). 218 the last plan which assigned to Belgium two exclusive frequencies, plus another one which was to be shared with other countries.1 In order "to justify retention of these frequencies, Belgian officials were eager to activate them 2 as soon as possible." Broadcasting as a state enterprise. -- It was for this reason that the Belgian Government and Parliament decided to assure the state of complete control of broad- casting. In 1930, Belgian Parliament established by law3 a state monOpOly of broadcasting and entrusted a new pub- lic corporation, the Institut National Belge de Radiodif- fusion, with the service. The I. N. R. was administered by a board of governors which consisted of Minister of Posts, Telegraph and Telephones (later Minister of Com- munications), and nine other members, of which three were appointed by the King, three by the Senate and three by the Chamber of Representatives.4The Senate and Chamber of Representatives' Appointees then elected from among the nine board members a permanent committee in charge of administration, over which presided the delegate of the 1UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, I, 112. 2Emery, Journalism Monograph, No. 1, 4. 3Law of June 18, 1930, Bulletin usuel des lois 4Emery, Journalism Monograph, No. 1, 5—7: Terrou and Solal, 168. 219 . . l minister. Implementation of the new act was put into effect by a royal decree which outlined the responsibility of the I. N. R.: to provide educational, that is scientific, artistic, literary and philosophical programsz; an object- ive and impartial news service3; and to make available to the government at least twelve hours of broadcasting time per month for official communications4. Above all, the parliamentary concern for linguistic and cultural duality was reflected in the legislation and the I. N. R. broad- casts were required to treat both national languages in an equal manners. Though the monopoly of broadcast trans— mission was reserved for the state, Parliament also wanted to guarantee that segments of society other than government had Opportunity to broadcast, and specified in the law that the insti- tute was required to make air-time available to organ- izations, groups, and individuals having messages of interest to the public.6 The 1930 legislation also established licensing 1Great Britain, Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Di- vision, Belgium (B.R. 521, "Restricted" Geographical Handbook Series; London: Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division, 1944), 579.(The number of governors was later (1945) increased to 16.) Henceforth referred to as British Naval Intelligence, Belgium. 2Terrou and Solal, 170-71. 3Ibid., 171 4Emery, Journalism Monograph, No. l, 4. Cf. Terrou and Solal, 171, say "up to a monthly total of 10 hours per station." 5 6 Terrou and Solal, 170. Emery, Journalism Monograph, No. l, 4. 220 fees on receivers. Originally set at 60 Belgian francs ($1.66) per annum,1 the fees were increased during the occupation to 70 francsz; and in 1947 to 144 francs3($2.88). Though the Charter given the I. N. R. in 1930 was for twelve years, the war and subsequent German occupation of Belgium interrupted the orderly functioning of the service. A special commission administered broad— casting for the German military government. Howeven,some of the staff escaped to France where it continued broad— casting for a limited time. When Belgian government in exile was organized in London, it established an official broadcasting agency of which more will be said in the next section of this chapter. At the conclusion of World War II, this new agency and the re-established I. N. R. Operated jointly until September 14, 1965 when the I. N. R. was again given the sole reSponsibility for broadcasting in Belgium.4 The basic provision of the 1930 statute were re- confirmed, though some modifications were made relat— ing to the organization and administration of the institute. 1Bulletin usuel des lois et arrétés.l930, 1097. 2British Naval Intelligence, Belgium, 579. 3Bulletin usuel des lois et arrétés, 1947, 651. 41bid., 1945, 591. 5Emery, Journalism Monograph, No. l, 6. 221 Technical facilities. -—Bv 1945, Belgium had six— teen low-power regional transmitters, but in 1948, the so- called Copenhagen Plan assigned only four frequencies to the countrv, with a combined authorized power of 340 kW. The regional stations will have either to use inter- national common frequencies (1,484 kc and 1,594 kc) or operate as a synchronized network on the assigned four frequencies. The Stockholm Conference, which concerned itself with assignment of frequencies for television as well as for FM radio, made twenty-four FM assignments to Belgium.2 As some other delegations, notably France and Monaco, Belgium also had serious reservations. FM broadcasting had been no certainty in the minds of the Belgian authorities. Should it be officially decided in Belgium to use amplitude modulation for sound broadcasting in the 87.5 — 100 mc/s band, the Belgian Administration reserves the right to set up an amplitude modulation network without thereby causing greater interference to neighboring countries that than which would be caused by the frequency modulation transmitters pro- vided for Belgium in the present assignment plan.3 The decision went to frequencv modulation. Belgium's first FM station went on the air in 1954, but at the end of the period of concern here (1960), fourteen transmitters ‘were operating with 293 kw power.4 There were at that time l UNESCO: Press, Film, Radio, 2nd Supplement, 61. 2European Broadcasting Conference, Stockholm, 1952, Agreement . . ., 29—70. 3 Ibid. 4UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 32, 286; cf. IWicro Magazine (Official Weekly of the Belgian National Broadcastihg Service), X, No. 482, (July 4, 1954), 15. 222 actually twice as many FM stations as medium—wave (AM) stations, which totalled 342 kW power.1 The advent of television, as well as the radio growth of sound broadcasting made the I. N. R. insuffi- ciently organized. The basic 1930 law was outmoded and inadequate to meet the com- munication needs of Belgium . . . . and Parliament attempted to enact new legislation. A number of bills were introduced and debated, but all were laid on the table. It was not until 1958 that the government took effective steps which resulted in the passage of a new law. In a fairly rapid succession, the following steps were taken in Belgium: A study was made (1958—1959) proposing a new radio-television organization, and an act was passed (1959) giving the chairmanship of the I. N. R. Board of Governors to the Minister of National Education rather than to Minister of Communications, or even earlier the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. But the legislation re- organizing the I. N. R. took another full year to crystal- lize in Parliament, and a new law finally passed on May 18, 1960.3 The new organization, Radiodiffusion—Television Belge, actually consists of three separate sections, Institutes, again reflecting the desires of Parliament that 1UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 286. 2Emery, Journalism Monograph, No. 1, ll. 3 355-61. Bulletin usuel des lois et des arrétés, 1960, 223 cultural and linguistic duality be respected: 32B (the French Section), B3: (The Flemish Section), and the Insti- tute of Common Services. This latter section carries full responsibility not only for administration, but for all technical and financial affairs of the organization, and for the foreign broadcasts.1 The Three Powers' Broadcasting to the Colonies It might be a coincidence that the technical de- velopment of broadcasting in the late 1910's concurred with the political disintegration of some established empires, but it appears to have been no ordinary coincidence that the use of shortwave broadcasting occurred first in the countries which possessed important colonial holdings across the oceans. International broadcasting, in the broad- est sense of the term, can be traced as far back as World War I, when Germany, through her radio amateurs, provided interested parties abroad, including newspapers, with daily news reports. In strictly colonial sense, . . . short-wave broadcasting in the later 'twenties coincided with the growing threat to colonial empires of the disintegrating forces of autonomy, native nationalism and race consciousness of colored pOpula- tions. . . . 1Namurois, E. B. U. Review (Part B), No. 63, 6. 2 Huth, 32. 3John B. Whitton and John H. Herz, "Radio in Inter- national Politics," in Harwood L. Childs and John B. Whit- ton (eds.), Propaganda by Short-Wave (Princeton:University Press, 1942), 8. 224 Soon, virtually all countries with significant colonial holdings began considering the use of short-wave broad— casting services, though such service was directed pri— marily to the EurOpean "ruling" classes, and only second— arily to the native populations. France From among the three powers under discussion, it was France which inaugurated its regular colonial service first.1 On the occasion of the Colonial Exposition in Paris in 1931, a short-wave station Paris-Colonial was established at Pontoise, about 32 km northwest of Paris.2 Until 1937, it was the only short—wave transmitter in France. From the very outset, the French decided to use not only the French language in their colonial broadcasts, but also local languages, at least those most frequently spoken in the colonial territories. This was said to have been a living "testimony to the French colonial principle of assimilation,"3 but in reality the French colonial broad— casting service suffered from some serious deficiencies. 1The very first colonial broadcasting was that of the Netherlands, since 1927.Ibid., 8. 2Arturo Mathieu, "Paris-Mondial," in Childs and Whitton, 183. 3Whitton and Herz, in Childs and Whitton, 9. 225 Though it avoided political prOpaganda and for that, as well as for its high cultural level, was well liked by educated listeners within and without the empire, its transmissions were weak, reception bad, administration and service poorly organized, its equipment deficient, its finances insufficient.1 It appears to be an understatement to say that as a whole . . . the French colonial broadcasting service did not seem to have been very successful. First attempts at correcting these deficiencies appeared just before the Second World War. A new short-wave station, 45 km southwest from Paris, at Essarts-Le-Roi, complemented the Pontoise station with 25 kw of power.3 Together with the first station, whose power was increased to 15 kW, it formed the new international broadcasting service under the name of Paris-Mondial since November, 19374. Short time later (Spring, 1938), the international broadcasting service was divided into four zones, one of which being Africa.5 A new powerful transmitter (100 kW) lIbid., 34; Mathieu, in Childs and Whitton, 183. Some of these problems were acknowledged even by the Brit- ish; cf. "British News by Wireless," Round Table, XXIX, (1938-1939), 726—27. 2Whitton and Herz, in Childs and Whitton, 9. 3Broadcasting Yearbook, 1939, 351. 4Mathieu, 184; Harold N. Graves, Jr., War on the Short Wave ("Headline Series“No. 30; New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1941), 19. 5 Whitton and Herz, 34; Mathieu, 184; Codding, 23. 226 went on the air in October, 1939, some fifteen months be- hind schedule,1 at Allouis, near Bourges in the center of the country (220 km due south of Paris). To the maze of decrees by which French radio had been administered, a new one was added2 which attempted to reorganize the broadcasting service in the colonies. This decree, however, pertained only to North Africa as that was the area in which the French felt the propaganda impact of the Italians at the early stages of the development toward the global war.3 The empire aspect of the service was replaced by that of propaganda which had become far more important. The administrative and legislative directives, combined with a number of difficulties in other areas, seemed to be at the root of inefficiency of the French international broadcasting service, regardless of the geographical area to which it was directed. On the adminis- trative question, a comment was made that . . . the State Broadcasting System, not unlike the whole French Republic, was divided into various factions each absolutely independent of the other and all irreconcilable enemies, to the extent of having 1Mathieu, 184; cf. Thomas Grandin, The Political Use of the Radio (Geneva Studies, X, No. 3; Geneva: Geneva Research Center, August, 1939), 33. 2Journal Officiel, March 27, 1939 (Decree of March 26, 1939). 3Mathieu, 184. 227 a different address a separate budget, and a separate staff of personnel.1 Similarly, a French broadcasting official was reported to have said that the French radio lacks sufficient offices, material, personnel, and money. . . the work is paralyzed by the interpretation of the mysterious and inextricable decrees, . . . and inventive intelligence . . . is always hampered by the most deadly‘routine. . . . Any man who accepts work there must consent to waste 90% of his effort in vain and absurd quarrels.2 Ironically, it was the French military defeat3 which contributed to the improvement of the overall French situation as far as international broadcasting was concern- ed. After the capitulation Of France in June 1940, a found- ation to a new international broadcasting service was laid in the French Equatorial Africa, when the territory joined the Free French movement of General De Gaulle. At first operating only as a radio-telegraphic transmitters with power of 8 kW (in October, 1940), the station was trans- formed for broadcasting use by local technicians, though with reduced power of 3 kW.4 English complemented French lIbid., 183. 2George Duhamel, ex—Director of the French Broad— casting Administration, in Le Figaro, April 9, 1940, quoted in ibid., 188. 3Paris-Mondial passed into German hands after its staff had first fled to Bordeaux on June 16, 1940. 4UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 405: cf. Guernier, 497, who mentionsfilZ kW as the power of the original sta- tion. 228 as the language used for broadcasting by this station. Early in 1941, a decision was made by the French Government in exile to establish a strong broadcasting station in Brazzaville, under the administration of 1 Radiodiffusion Francaise. A 50 kW transmitter began operating under the name Radio-Brazzaville on June 18, 2 1943 , almost exactly three years after the Franco—German armistice. It was destined to broadcast as both the national ABE transmitter and the international broad— casting station beamed its programs toward Europe and North Africa, as well as the United States and French Canada. With a companion transmitter of 7.5 kW of power, the international service broadcast in French, English, German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, and Roumanian.3 After the liberation of France, Radio—Brazzaville was attached to the French metropolitan broadcasting organ- ization, and it has remained under its control even after the independence of the French Congo was proclaimed. When World War II ended, the French—based transmit- ters were all located at Allouis. Their power increased to 910 kW in 1950 (10 transmitters)4, and to 1,310 kW in 1960 1Francis Bebey, La Radiodiffusion en Afrique noire (Issy-les—Moulineaux, France: Editions Saint-Paul]fil963), 48. 2UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 405. 31bid. Also Bebey, 47. 4UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, 2nd Supplement, 69. 229 (fourteen transmitters, thirteen of which possessed 100 kW of power each).1 United Kingdom As it was with the French colonial broadcasting service, the British attempts at international broadcast- ing also were intended to serve the Empire. Though the original Charter and License and Agreement of 1927 had nothing to say about broadcasting to the Empire, the BBC began experimenting, by arrangement with the British Marconi, with a short—wave transmitter located at Chelms— ford, the hometown of the Marconi Company, 29 miles E.N.E. of London. From the day of the first broadcast, on Novem— ber 5, 19272, Chelmsford stations's call—sign 5 SW soon became familiar to listeners abroad.3 It must be emphasized that even on this experimen- tal occasion, as well as later when the Empire Service was inaugurated, it was not a direct government policy which put the service into Operation. The BBC engaged in a series of discussions with the Colonial Office, and later within 1UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 284. 2"Empire Broadcasting: PrOposals submitted by the BBC of the U.K. in November, 1929" in Gt. Britain, Imperial Conference, 1930: Appendices to the Summary of Proceedings (Cmd. 3717; London: H. M. S. 0., 1930), 138-39. Gorham, 100, records November 11 as the date of first broadcast, as does BBC,Handbook, 1964, 213. Which BBC source is correct is not known. 3Thomas Owen Beachcroft, British Broadcasting ("British Life and Thought," No. 25; London:Longsmans Green & Co., for the British Council, 1946), 28. 230 the framework of the Imperial Conference of 1930, and on the basis of these discussions, decided to establish the new service. A powerful station begun broadcasting from Daventry on December 19, 1932, thus initiating a regular service with a program output of ten hours a day.1 The lack of official government sanction carried with it the inevitable lack of funds. The problem of financing the new service was solved by deciding to allot a small proportion of the Home Listeners' licence fee to this purpose. It was thus the money of the British public and the enterprise of the BBC that were the driving force in the enormously important Opening years of the BBC's Overseas Services . . . because these years laid the fundations, on which the broadcasEing structure of the war years could firmly stand. Luckily enough, this part of the service was staffed by enthusiasts, and though a very small part of the BBC, the service was said to have achieved creditable results.3 Between the end of 1932 and the end of 1937 additional high-power transmitters were brought into service and programme output was extended -— still exclusively in English -— to more than seventeen hours daily. 1 Gorham, 101. C. I. 0., Sound and Television Broad- casting in Britain, 4.Gt. Britain, Summary of the Report of the Independent Committee of Enquiry into the Overseas Information Service (Cmd.9l38), April,—i954, 41.Henceforth referred to as Gt. Britain, Cmd. 9138. 2Beachcroft, 28. 3Gorham, 101. 4Gt. Britain, Cmd. 9138, 41. 231 In 1936, the Government accepted the recommenda— tion of the Ullswater Committee to extend the BBC Charter. One of the accepted recommendations was the request that the Empire Service be specifically authorized. The govern— ment and Parliament thus assumed responsibility for a service which in a few years was to become the interna— 1 With the official tional broadcasting service for the BBC. sanction came financial support in the form of a subsidy (Grant-in-Aid)2, and the Government's first demand: a foreign-language broadcast service, in Arabic, and later in Spanish and Portuguese. Later that same year (1938), at the time of Munich, the first French, German, and Italian broadcasts originated, directed to the EurOpean Continent.3 With other languages being added, the BBC Operated, in addition to the Empire Service, nine foreign language services to Europe and elsewhere besides a service in English, on thirteen transmitters. The peak of the war-time operations of the BBC was reached in 1944 when the output in nearly 50 languages amounted in aggregate to about 130 programme hours daily over a total of 43 short-wave transmitters.4 1UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, IV, 553-54; author- ization of the television and film production services was recommended, and incorporated into the 1936 Charter. 2BBC, Handbook, 1964, 81. 3Gt. Britain, Cmd. 9138, 41. The British Government reserved for itself the right to specify the languages, but not the content of the broadcast services. 4Ibid.; UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, IV, 560, Specifically mentions 46 foreign languages having been used in the summer of 1944. w 232 The growth of the foreign-language broadcasts should not overshadow the continued develOpment of the original Empire Service to the colonies and the countries of the Commonwealth. The British continued to use broad- casting to the Empire . . . as an instrument that could allow a common feeling, a common culture, to express itself gradually and without self-conscious forcing. It [had] the appearance of a natural, rather than a deliberate, process. The spirit behind the programs did not change, just because the name of the service did (this activity has been since World War II referred to as "External Broad- casting," with the Overseas Services being directed toward the Commonwealth countries and the colonies, and the European Services covering practically the whole Continent). The rationale for the successor of the pre-war Empire service remained: it was to continue as an extension of the British Home Service "to the entire British family overseas."2 [The Empire transmissions as a public spirited act of service] was essentially a by-product of the spirit of the Commonwealth itself, the spirit of belonging to- gether and not counting too closely the cost of mutual service. Who knows how much, in return, B.B.C. short- wave broadcasts may not have contributed, . . . to preserving and strengthening that spirit? By assuming it, they have built it up. . . .3 1Beachcroft, 30. 26t. Britain, Cmd. 9138, 45. 3H. V. Hodson, "Broadcasting and the Commonwealth," The B. B. C. Quarterly, VI, NO. 1 (Spring, 1951), 2. ‘— 233 In its broadcasts to Africa, only three1 local languages have been used by the BBC, one of them from West Africa, Hausa. This is the most important language in the Northern Nigeria, extending beyond the limits of that territory. It has obtained the rank Of a Lingua Franca, . . , and it is the general vehicle Oficommunication between tribes speaking different languages.2 The Hausa language service began March 13, 1957, and though the British claim that such programs (as well as those in English) have been rebroadcast regularly by local stationsB, a very comprehensive history of radio in Nigeria4 does not contain a single reference to this fact. Up to that time (1957), however, the BBC programs in English had been utilized. There was . . . considerable emphasis on BBC program- mes and these were featured continuously from 2 p.m. until 5 p.m. daily. The BBC news bulletins always had pride of place. . . .5 The BBC programs,in addition to their informative content, were valued by the British colonial authorities, 1Service in Africaans was discontinued in 1957, BBC, Handbook, 1964, 214. 2Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed. (1959), XI, 254. 3 BBC, Handbook, 1964, 84. 4Ian K. Mackay, Broadcasting in Nigeria (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1964). Mr. Mackay was the last non-Nigerian Director—General of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (1961—1964). 5 Ibid., 34. 234 and others, primarily because they were in the English language: The use of English as a means of international and cultural intercourse throughout the Commonwealth is a powerful guarantee that the sense of belonging together will remain, and that, even it we do not agree,we shall at least see each other's points of View. Transmitting facilities. -- From a single-station Operation, the Overseas Service of the BBC (excluding the European Service) grew to 31 transmitters with a combined power of 2,740 kW in 19502 and to 39 transmitters with 3,100 kW of power in 1960.3 Belgium Broadcasting to Belgian Congo. —-When Belgium inaugurated its colonial broadcasts, on a daily basis, in 19344 the timing coincided with the passage of a decree authorizing the Government of the Belgian Congo to nego— tiate with the I. N. R. to establish such services, lHodson, The BBC Quarterly, VI, No. l, 5. 2 UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, IV, 573. 3UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 336. 4Codding, 23; Whitton and Herz, in Childs and Whitton, 9. Experimentation with broadcasting was conducted by radio-beam (Belradio) since 1932. I. C. 1., Compared Colonial Documentation (1934), I, 78; (1936), I, 127. 5Bulletin Officiel du Congo Belge, August 15, 1934, No. 8, 727. ‘— 235 to be paid for, at least partially, by a newly established tax (i.e., license fees) on receivers in the Belgian Congo} . . . This broadcasting service, which at first ran for an hour and a half, consisted of 15 minutes of news in Flemish, 15 minutes of news in French, and one hour of music. In 1935 the Belgian programme had about eight hundred and fifty listeners. The broadcasting service continued to operate from the original short—wave transmitter at Ruysselede until the fall of Belgium in World War II, at which time some of the I. N. R. staff moved to France from where they continued broadcasting, this time also to the home country. Broadcasting from Belgian Congo. —-During the war, the roles of the home country and its colony were reversed. The loss of the daily colonial service of the I. N. R. to the African colony was deplored, but the unavailability of a strong broadcasting coverage for the pOpulation of the occupied Belgium was_considered even more in need of correc— tion. In 1941, the exiled Belgian government decided to establish on the Congolese territory a strong enough station which could beam news and other programs to Belgium as well as to other parts of the world. By special agree- ment between the Minister of Information and the Minister 1The actual title of the 1934 decree was "Tax on Wireless Receiver Apparatus" (Redevance sur appareils recepteurs radioélectriques). 2 Codding, 23. 236 for the Colonies, both Of whom were in London, arrange— ments were made to build a SO-kW short-wave transmitter at Leopoldville. Put into service in March, 1943, it was operated from the Congo by a newly established Office de Radiodiffusion National Belge but administratively re- sponsible directly to the London-based government, not to the Colonial Government.1 A year later, by a further agreement, this time between the Belgian and the Colonial governments, pooling of staff and other resources of the Congolese and Belgian broadcasting service was affected.2 1945 - 1960. --After the war, Belgium's I. N. R. owned two transmitting sites. One at Ruysselede, with 5 kW, however, . . . [did] not broadcast programmes to other countries but [ensured] liaison between Belgium and the Congo by beam.3 ' It was the transmitter at Leopoldville which used its 50 kW of power to function as the main disseminator of international programs of the Belgians. There were consid— erable changes planned in the post-war situation: The station Operates under the direct control of the Foreign Broadcast Department of the INR in 1Bulletin usuel des lois et arrété§,May, 1940 - December,1943, 106-07. 2 UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 396. 3Ibid., 2nd Supplement, 59. 237 Brussels, and although programmes still originate in Le0poldville it is planned that when the powerful, short-wave transmitters now under construction in Belgium come into operation all programme staff will be withdrawn from Leopoldville, leaving transmitter to act as a relay centre only. When this happened in the mid—1950's, not much was made of it; the transmitter was still available. The fact, however, that by 1960, Belgium had four short—wave transmit- ters with a total power of 240 sz, simplified for the Belgian broadcasting service the adjustment which was necessary due to the political unheaval in the Congo im— mediately after the Independence Day. The Leopoldville transmitter was no longer available to the Belgians. Domestic Broadcasting Service in the Colonies Middle Congo -- The French Equatorial Africa Of the three colonial territories surveyed in this work, it was the French possession in Tropical Africa which first broadcast to the general public, albeit on the amateur level. With the power of 50 watts, a transmitter belonging to a small "radio—club" began broadcasting, on a wavelength 3 in the 36-meter band, in 1935. The station Operated from 1Ibid., v, 397. 2UNESCO, World Communigations, 1964, 268. Emery, Journalism Monograph, No. l, 18, states that in 1964-1965 RTE-BRT Operatedithree short-wave transmitters with a combined power of 220 kW. 3Guernier, 497; UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 405; Bebey, 47. 238 Brazzaville, capital of the territory. Radio—Brazzaville. -— When France fell in June of 1£94(), the station went "underground," but with the align- rneuit: of the A.E.F. with the Free French Movement on August 263 cxf that year the facilities were formally taken over in tflie: 11ame of the movement and of General De Gaule just two days later.1 At about the same time, an international sta- thDrl'was constructed by transforming a radio-telegraphic transmitter for broadcasts to Metropolitan France.2 This weis 'the true beginning of Radio—Brazzaville. In 1941, the Station broadcast for three-and-a-half hours daily, in French and English, and could be heard in the territory as Well as Metropolitan France, French Canada and the U. 8.3 The Comité National Francais Libre de Londres then decalded to install a SO-kw transmitter, using equipment Ordered in the United States. The project was carried out in 1943. Added to this was a 7.5 kW transmitter.4 The local population also was served by an increase if! time number of transmitters of the "radio-club," which oPerated from mid-1941 with 4 transmitters (900 kW total power) , and from 1942 with 6 transmitters, totalling 2,900 kW: of which 5 operated simultaneously.5 “5“ lGuernier, 497. 2Supra, 227. 3UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 405. 4Ibid. 5Ibid. Cf. Guernier, 498. 239 At the end of the Second World War, Radio— Brazzaville, six transmitters strong (62.3 kW)1, became an integral part of Radiodiffusion Francaisez, and thereafter its policy was formulated by the Quai d'Orsay and its operation was financed by the French treasury.3 Three more short—wave transmitters were added between then and 1960, and the end of the colonial regime saw Radio- Ig’azzaville operating twenty—four hours a day, with a total power of 125.8 kw.4 Radio A.E.F. -—Although the reception of Radio- graxzzaville's programs was possible in French Equatorial Africa, its programs were destined for non—AER audiences, and it soon became clear that a purely local service was nBeaded. In 1946, the government of the AB}: Federation de- clicied to ask the _R_'I;F_ to help establish, operate and main— tain a number of transmitters for local as well as federal broadcasting. On a distinctly territorial initiative, the x 1Guernier, 498. 2UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 405. 3Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Emerging m of French Equatorial Africa (Palo Alto: Stanford UnJ-V€2:l:sity Press, 1960) , 315. Quai d'Orsay, the address of the French Foreign Office, is synonymous with that Ministry. AS Pointed out earlier, the RDF and then. RTF was attached to tIhe Office of the Prime Minister (supraT-le-lZ) but nternational aspects of broadcasting undoubtedly were of COncern to the Foreign Office as was the case of news agen- Cies, Cf. O.W. Riegel, Mobilizing for Chaos: The Story of the New Pro a anda New Haven- Yale Universit Press 1934) 11 —124 p g ( . Y I 4UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 79. 240 plan for Radio-ABE developed over the years, until an agreement was signed in September, 1950 in which the French broadcasting organization undertook to operate the service for the Federation. On December 9, 1950, Radio-ABE broad- casts were inaugurated on two 4—kW and one 1.5-kW instal- lations.l All three transmitters Operated on short-waves. Studio as well as personnel belonged to the _R_T_F__'s Radio- Egazzaville.2 Reponsibility for programs also belonged to E131. through its director in Brazzaville, who submitted all PrOgrams to the Governor-General for prior approval.3 At first, broadcasting Operated only in Middle Congo; on May 1, 1951 a special section of the service oPened its broadcast facility as Radio-Tchad.4 But it must be kept in mind that Radio-AEF was intended to address it— self to the population of all four territories federated in the French Equatorial Africa, including Oubangi-Chari and c5abon. Stations with such small transmitting power could not deliver a dependable coverage of the vast geographical area of almost the same size as Alaska, Texas and Califor- nia. put together.5 In 1957, an arrangement was worked out With Radio-Brazzaville to use the strong transmitter of the Station between 6 p.m. and 7:55 p.m. daily, in order to l 2 UNESCO, Press, Film! Radio, V, 406. Bebey, 48. 3UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 405. 4Codding, 55. E 5The AEF covered 969,111 sq. miles of territory. wpaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), IX, 7563. 241 allow the local inhabitants to benefit from the Radio-ABE transmissions.1 But the mediocrity of the reception became only more pronounced when the powerful transmitter ceased at 7:55 p.m. While substantially improving the conditions of reception, the maneuver also exposed the pretense of total coverage of the territory. The authorities of the four individual territories thought of . . . installing new transmitters, more powerful, so that Radio-A.E.F. could fulfill its important mission: instruct, educate and inform the inhabitants of its vast territory.2 Radio-Congo. --Assembled at Brazzaville, the four administrations met for the purposes of signing a conven- tion to deve10p Radio-AEF. As the date was June 23, 1959, French possessions had already become Republics within the French Community, and the AEF as an entity had ceased to exist. Radio-AEF changed its name, therefore, to Radio- 3 I_nter-Egllatoriale, known as Radio—Inter . With the help of an official French governmental organization (SORAFOM)4 a studio building was built, and the power of transmitters brought up to 50 kW. From an organizational point Of view, Radio-Inter acquired complete autonomy and independence from Radio-Brazzaville, a station of the national (metro- l 3 Bebey, 48. 2Ibid. Ibid., 49. . 4SORAFOM (Société de Radiodiffusion de la France ‘1 Outre-mer) was established in 1955 as a state company, Wit nancial autonomy, for the purpose of facilitating improvements and develOpments of radio broadcasting, and 0f establishing an imperial network. SORAFOM was eventually (April, 1962) replaced by OCORA (Office de Cooperation LadiOEhonigue) . Ambassade de France, Aid and Cooperation, 43: Cf. Bebey, 31-33, 161. 242 politan) Radiodiffusion-Television Francaisei‘. The idea behind Radio—Inter—Equatoriale was, of (course, to serve all four States equally. In reality, each [of the States expressed a desire to operate its own broad— lcasting service; already Oubangi-Chari (known as the Central African Republic) and Chad had such service, and Gabon was about to start one.2 The Congo Republic there- fore decided to disband Radio—Inter, distribute its tech— nical assets and personnel, and with a major portion Of those facilities created a national broadcasting service, xvith three transmitters of 25 kW power.3 Radio-Congo was born on May 23, 1960, three months before the independence <3f the Republic was proclaimed. Belgian Congo Broadcast receiving licenses. -- When the Govern- :nusnt.of Belgian Congo issued a Decree in 19244 laying down ‘tlme principle that a permission was needed by anyone wish- ing to Operate a radio transmitters, undoubtedly it was a.f any administrative announcement, and the licensee 1UNESCO, Press! Film, Radio, V, 396. 21bid. 247 (of the production studio) would have been obligated to .incorporate such announcement, up to five per cent of the 'total length of the program.1 At the time of achieving independence, of the 'twelve government stations five were situated in LeOpold- xrille, two in Elizabethville, two in Stanleyville, and one [each in Luluabourg, Coquilhatville, and Bukavu, with a (combined power of 191.25 kW. The three private stations, all operating with authorizations issued prior to 1947, together had 8.75 kW of power.2 To these, the metrOpolitan transmitter of 50 kW should be added. Five production studios owned by three private organizations were in Ope- zration in five provincial capitals.3 Nigeria When broadcasting is defined as transmission of asignals for reception by the general public, Nigeria, the llargest African state and under its former colonial status the largest British non-self-governing territory, must be said to have been among the last countries to get a broad- casting service of its own. ¥ 1Ibid. None of the provisions of this act applied tn: the LeOpoldville station belonging to the metrOpolitan broadcasting service . 21bid. 3The only province not having such private produc— tlion studio was Leopoldville. InforCongo, II, 175. 248 The Nigerian Broadcasting Service commenced operations on April 1, 1951, in a world situation growing more alarming day by day, with limited money and purchasing power which had fallen drastically since the original estimates had been prepared, and in a Nigeria with constitutional difficulties which threatened the very existence of the NBS before it even started.1 It might be assumed that when it is stated that "a broadcasting service commenced Operations,"it could be 'understood that the first program was transmitted. Not so in case of Nigeria, which had considerable problems with its first transmitter. The first national program.went on the air almost fifteen months later, on June 27, 1952. But the history is much richer than the above paragraphs would indicate. On December 19, 1932, when the BBC commenced its Empire Service, a station 1; Lagos was ready: The Lagos wireless station receives all Empire broad- cast news. Shortage Of staff has prevented a continua- tion of the experiments in broadcasting from Lagos,2 reported the Colonial Office in 1933. This was the first nuantion of broadcasting in Nigeria: it also was the last nuention of an Operational broadcasting station there until .1949. Wired Wireless. --It was the Colonial Office which, 0n the basis of its discussions with the BBC, began to eXplore the possibilities of radio broadcasting in the °°lonies. The Nigerian Posts and Telegraph Department was \ 1Mackay, 15. 2Great Britain, Colonial Office, Colonial Report 932-193 (London: H. M. s. 0., 1933), 19. 249 (iirected to develOp a wired wireless system, a method of diistributing, but not as yet originating, suitable programs to those who subscribed to such service.1 The service, according to the directives of the Colonial Office, was to Operate in conjunction with the Empire Service of the BBC, in other words the service was to be confined to rebroadcast of BBC programmes.2 The wired wireless system was, for the British, Iiothing new. It had been develOped about a dozen years be- fore in Great Britain, and one of the British wireless :110neers, Peter P. Eckersley, Chief Engineer of the British Iiroadcasting Company3, later of the British Broadcasting Corporation, improved upon it by changing the original system which required special wiring for each subscriber, idato another system by using ordinary electric mains.4 A wireless distribution station was set up in Lagos 111 December 1935: in due time other RES (Radio Distribu- tion Service) stations were erected. The diffusion service 6 grew from three in 19395 to thirteen in 1951 . Until then, x 1Letter from the Nigerian Postmaster—General, March 24, 1965. 2Mackay, 2. 3Briggs, Appendix 4. 5Mackay, 4. 6 UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 427. 250 twired service was Operated and maintained by the Post and fPelegraphs. Since 1939, the newly established Public Re- 1ations Office in the colony originated local programs to lee used on the RDS stations, and although these locally produced programs were few (in 1948, some RDS stations «Operated for as long as eighteen-and-a-half hours daily, ‘vith only one hour of Public Relations Office programs), ‘the future pattern of the Nigerian broadcasting was thus .shaped. Each RDS station was from 1951 controlled by «a.broadcasting officer of the Public Relations Office, the :function of each station was extended to include local production, Nigerian artists and talents were provided with an outlet -- and the program structure was considerably laroadened, a fact which could not but benefit the sub- scribers and other audience.l Only the maintenance of the Ilines connecting subscribers to the rediffusion centers remained as the responsibility of the Post Office after 1951. The Nigerian BroadcastinggService. --While the RDS I grew and prospered, direct broadcasting fell into oblivion ul’ltil after World War II when . . . the urgent need to build new broadcasting stations in the colonies was . . . reCOgnized. In 1948, the Secretary of State for the Colonies addressed Colonial Governments asking them to consider 1Mackay, 3-4, 6-7. In 1948 it was assumed that at least six persons listened on each receiver (wired loud- sBeaker) . 251 whether their existing arrangements for broadcasting were adequate and, in the case of those colonies without services, whether some action would be taken to provide them. He endorsed the recommendations of the 1936 Plymouth Committee that broadcasting should be oper- ated by Governments as a public service, and stressed the need for broadcasting services to be the in- struments of social and educational advancement.1 (One immediate result was the commissioning of the BBC to 2 conduct a survey in West Africa. This basically engineer— ing survey "levelled a devastating criticism at Nigerian 'broadcasting:" . . . It was in a'retarded state of develOpment or non-existent} the low-powered short—wave transmit- ters were quite inadequate, the site was unsatis- factory, studio arrangements were poor, and out-of- date equipment was in bad condition.3 .Among the recommendations made by the survey team was that ‘the four surveyed territories (Gambia, Gold Coast -— to- njecture. The criticism,offered by the report in 1949, remained unanswered for several years. In 1949, Great Britain passed its first significant <2c>lonial Development and Welfare Act. Together with the iliterest indicated by the Colonial Office, its passage pubinted the way toward realization of a plan to establish a national, as well as regional, broadcasting service in Nigeria. On local initiative, a decision was made to convert the RBS stations into a full-fledged broadcasting System. With local funds totalling 150,000 pounds and CD&W Funds amounting to 190,000 (later increased to 2()5,000)pounds and with the BBC's promise to help in 'tlaaining Nigerians for broadcastingz, the Nigerian Govern— ment felt it was in a position to build a comprehensive broadcasting system. A Broadcasting Department was estab— lished under the direct control of the Chief Secretary of the territory; at its helm was to be a Director—General, to be'appointed by the Governor-General.3 The first man to l 2 MaCkaY, 4 0 Ibid. ' 13-14 0 3 UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 427. 254 (accupy that position was T. W. Chalmers, of the BBC, who, 1:0gether with another BBC man, J. W. Murray, an engineer, \vas brought to Nigeria for the specific purpose of formu- lating a broadcasting plan acceptable to the government. ‘The Chalmers' Plan, calling for a capital expenditure over the subsequent three years of 335,000 pounds and recon- ciling the actual situation with the 1948 Turner-Byron Report, was acceptedl, and the Nigerian Broadcasting Service was born. Nigerian Broadcasting, 1951-1956. --The develOp- ment was slow, basically because of the financial situation «of Nigeria at that time, and also because of material shortages caused by the Korean War. One of the big prob— Jlems was to obtain a suitable transmitter. The famous Normandy Beachhed mobile transmitter of the BBC was available for purchase . . .. This unit consisted of an RCA 7 and a half kW HF transmit— ter with rectifier unit,mounted in two extremely large mobile vans, which also housed a mobile diesel generator. . . Apparently it was in a reasonable state of repair. . . .2 The unit was purchased and with difficulty and dielays transported to Lagos. After a complete overhaul, :it finally went on-the-air in June, 1952. Its life expect- ancy of about a year had been well figured out, for "it literally collapsed on May 10, 1953."3 L 1Mackay, 14, pointed out that the actual govern- 1menta1 acceptance was 100 pounds less than the recom- mended amount. 2 3 Ibid., 17. Ibid., 18. 255 There were other problems as well. Prices on the Vvorld markets went up because of the war conflict in the IFar East, certain parts and materials were in short supply or unobtainable, sites for transmitters (recommended by the 1948 survey) no longer available, technical staff un- available. Furthermore, political events in Nigeria itself whenathe regions were demanding more power and autonomy, threatened the new Service.1 The RDS Operations, formally taken over in toto by the broadcasting service from the Post and Telegraphs Department in 19522, formed the nucleus of the system. New IRDS stations appeared, but the one which almost created .a crisis was a commercial enterprise of a London firm, (Overseas Rediffusion, Ltd. Granted a fifteen-year franchise to operate in Lagos and the Western Region, the company ¢entered the scene amidst great confusion and furor. Apparently, the franchise had been issued before the plans :for the establishment of the NBS were made and, indeed, laefore the Director-General-Designate, T. W. Chalmers, x 1For the technical difficulties, an excellent ssource is B.C. Milton's Survey of the Technical Develop— gpent of the Nigerian Broadcasting Service (Lagos: Nigerian IBroadcasting Service, 1955). For the internal difficulties, 1anning activities of the three powers, and into the pol- icies on programming, audiences, and personnel of broad- <:asting institutions in Belgian and French Congo as well as in Nigeria. ' Earlier in this study a statement was made that the inter-relationships of communication policies and general development policies of the colonial powers might become recognizable if the former were "superimposed" over the 265 latter.l This,toc» will be attempted on the pages which. follow. Policies on Internal Broadcasting in the Colonies The colonial authorities, as has been documented in the previous chapter, fashioned broadcasting services in their respective territories well before their colonies reached political maturity and national independence. The development of broadcasting took in each case a somewhat different route, began at different time, proceeded at different pace. Policies which determined the organizational and operational structures; ideas which expanded into plans of broadcasting systems, both internal and imperial; the degree of willingness or capability, or both, to help the broadcasting ventures financially; intention to prescribe or proscribe the content of broadcasts; desire to help train technical, programming and administrative staff from among the natives; facilitating the availability of re- ceivers, and their acquisition by the general population, or devising alternate methods of reception; these are perhaps the most important among the factors which contrib- uted to broadcasting develOpment in the African territories. They are also the factors on which the three colonial 1Supra, 105. 266 powers differed as to their sc0pe and expediency. In that light, the policies on these and related matters of Belgium, France and Great Britain will be compared. Ownership and Operational Policies By the time the three powers took their first steps toward establishing of broadcasting services in their Afri- can possessions, the fundamental question Of control had long been settled. From the early days of wireless, and firmly based on the situation which developed in their own countries as regards the telegraph systems, Great Britain, France and Belgium maintained the State's right to control the newest communication medium. The authorities Of all three powers made this clear in the legislative measures governing radiocommunications: Belgian Congo's Decrees of 1924 and 19341, French Congo's Decree of 19302, and 3 Nigeria's of 1935 . All these measures, and others which 1Decree of September 29, 1924; and Decree of August 15, 1934. I. C. 1., Compared Colonial Documentation, (1934), I, 226. 2French Decree of March 10, 1930, actually enforced the 1923 Law (of June 30) and the Decree-Law of December 27, 1851 in the whole of the French Colonies and African Terri- tories under French Mandate. The language of the measure spoke of "emission and reception of all and any kind" and reiterated the concept of state monOpOly in radiocommunica- tions. Ibid., (1930), II, 63. 3The Wireless Telegraphy Ordinance of April 1, 1935, NO. 3. Collated Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, cap. 213. 267 amended or superseded them, required that specific author- ization be obtained from the state (usually represented by its postal authority) by anyone wanting to Operate wire- less equipment, always transmitting, and often, even though later, also receiving equipment. That no one was exempt from the provisions of such legislation can be observed, for example, in this provision regulating the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation: 27. The Corporation shall Operate all the broadcasting services provided by it in accordance with the terms, conditions and restrictions of a licence or licences granted under the Wireless Telegraphy Ordinance, which the Director of Posts and Telegraphs is hereby author- ized and required to grant.1 Ownership vs. control. --But the control of broad- casting vested in the State did not rule out the possibil- ity that ownership other than by the State could not be authorized. It was this aspect in which the three powers differed from each other. The British, basing their opinion on the experience with the BBC, thought that there was [not],in regard to most dependencies, much to be said in favor of [conduct of broadcasting serv- ices wholly or partly by companies or individuals licensed to do so]; the profit . . . is clearly a necessary condition of any company undertaking such a project . . . and private control has obvious (though not unsuperable) obstacles to the develop- ment of the service as a social and administrative service . . . . It may be desirable to set up an organization on the lines of the British Broadcasting Corporation.2 1Section 27 of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corpora- tion Ordinance, 1956, No. 39 as amended. 2British Colonial Office, Colonial No. 139 (1937), Sec. 25. 268 The only exception in the British territories was in Kenya where the Cable and Wireless Company Ltd. Operated a broad— casting service for the Colonial Government under a Charter since 1931.1 Both French-speaking territories, like their respective mother countries, allowed private broadcasting Operations —— indeed, without such private initiative, broadcasting quite probably would have come to those col- onies much later than it actually did. In both cases, private broadcasting did not neces- sarily mean that the Operations were commercial enterprises. Reasons for this were both legal and practical. Legally, advertising was prohibited in both territories (unlike the very beginning in France and Belgium.where commercially motivated broadcasting services by private companies were allowed)2. This, in turn, resulted in a situation where either an organization of radio "hams" (as in the Middle Congo) or an educational institution (as in Belgian Congo) spearheaded the establishment of radio broadcasting. 1UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, IV, 426; Bebey, 21; Codding, 51. Actually,charter was’in the name of Imperial and International Communications Company which in 1932 changed its name . Tomlinson, 56. 2Supra, 209-13, 216-17. Cf. Bulletin Officiel du Con o Bel e, November 1, 1947, which published the text of Act 373 of October 31, 1947 specifically stating that "Commercial advertising by any means of transmission what- soever is forbidded." Cf. UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 396. 269 The other reason for non-commercial Operation, whether by private concerns operated with governmental authorization or by the states themselves, appears to have been simply the lack of profitable "markets" in that part of the world, and consequently the lack of "sponsors" willing to Spend considerable sums of money on what is really advertising and what the French call publicité.1 That this was the case in the 1930's when radio made its appearance in the French and Belgian Congos can only be deduced from the fact that it was so in the mid-50's, a far more prosperous time than the thirties: . . . Operating costs must be met. The ideal solution would be to have an independent broadcasting service supported primarily by local resources. This is pos- sible, however, only where costs can be met from the sale of advertising time or from listeners . . . . The basic difficulty with commercial services is that in most of the less advanced countries, few markets for products are sufficiently developed to interest advertisers.2 Even where they might have been interested, the legal barriers stood in their way. Kimble, in 1960, made this observation: In most territories the radio program is still out of bounds to the advertiser , but his trumpetings have tumbled stronger walls than Jericho's, and in time he will surely be granted entry into all broadcasting strongholds of Africa.3 lBebey, l3. 2Codding, 50. 3Kimble, I, 472. 270 Politics and broadcasting: a Nigerian parallel. -- The British authorities insisted from the very beginning on non-commercial broadcasting activities in Nigeria, even though they tolerated the development and considerable expansion of commercially motivated, privately owned wired wireless (distribution) operations. Nigeria also, alone among the three territories, decided to eXplore the pos- sibilities of commercial broadcasting (on the Federal level) when it authorized for one year a trial of such operation six months before it achieved independence.1 Eventually, this trial period led to a full blown commercial service.2 All this happened, however, only after the Federal broadcasting service ceased to hold its monOpO- thic position. In 1954, the third Nigerian Constitution contained a provision which, on the insistence of the Regional Governments, established emphatically a provision for broadcasting to be a concurrent subject, i.e., within the competence of the Central and Regional Governments.3 Regional competition began fiveyears later, but the above mentioned provision created a schism which, while reflect- ing the political division of the territory, probably 1Mackay, 72. 2Ibid., 73. Cf. UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 103. 3Mackay, 58. 271 halso contributed to it. After the Western Region Govern- ment set up its own broadcasting (and incidentally also its television -- first in Nigeria) service in 1959, the Eastern Region followed suit in 1960, and the Northern Region in 1962. This broadcasting develOpment can be traced to a historical develOpment of Nigeria as a geo— graphical unit. The artificial political boundaries of Nigeria did not correspond to the tribal boundaries of those populations put together into a single would-be polity. It was for this reason that the first Nigerian Constitution of 19461 worked for only a short while, even though some regionalization was provided for. As region- alism intensified, it interrupted the trend toward uni- fication; while regionalism was designed to give expres- sion to ethnic and traditional diversity within Nigeria, it felt short of reflecting the genuine ethnic grouping. Nationalistic tendencies in the Regions grew, and national consciousness and unity of Nigeria declined. The 1951 Constitution2 emphasized both major strands of constitutional evolution, i.e., unification on the national level and autonomy of the Regions. The result 1The Richards Constitution; Cf. Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Information, Nigerian Constitutional Develop- ment, 1861-1960 (Lagos: Féderal Ministry Of Information, 1960), 23. 2The Macpherson Constitution, in ibid., 28. 272 was that the concept of national unity competed, Often unsuccessfully, with regional demands. In 1954, the federal principle was firmly established, but so were the Regions. The 1958 Constitution again sharpened the dis— tinctions. Actually, Nigeria had one Federal and three Regional Constitutions when it reached its independent status on October 1, 1960. These political develOpments, the insistence of the British to govern through traditional African chiefs (the indirect rule), and the natural enmity between various ethnic groups, especially Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba, eventually led, in mid-sixties, to serious disturbances and actual disintegration of Nigeria.1 But the fact that the British were unable, in the decade prior to Independence, to resist regionalism in the broadcasting operation, or unable to make it work better than it did, confronted Nigeria with broadcasting problems not present in other territories, British or otherwise. Perhaps, the beginning of the prob— lems lay in the late start: ' Had a national broadcasting service been established in, say 1947 or 1948, it could have emerged as a prime medium of information at a time when it was needed most, i.e., from 1952 onwards. Instead it arrived on the scene too late, too little was offered, and too much was expected. The NBC Charter gave the Corporation a chance of succeeding, but in the long run, the - emotional forces against a single corporation were too great. The hardening political climate made the 1There obviously were other factors involved, among them the fact that the Ibo tribesmen of the Eastern Region were the most mobile group, the most enterpreneur- like, and very active in national politics. 273 emergence of separate regional broadcasting organiza- tions inevitable and so, instead of one all-Nigerian broadcasting and television organization, we have four. 0 O 0 Thus, it is in Nigeria where the interrelationship between the political development and broadcasting can best be observed. The split of Radio-AEF and later of Radio-Inter also shows such interrelationship, but with— out tragic consequences. The French "direct-rule." —-As seen earlier, the French legislation was applicable to the overseas territo- ries. It is in this that France differed from other powers; in broadcasting, as in all telecommunications matters, the early (1837 and 1851) foresight of the French to include regulation of all kinds of transmission and reception in one statute, and promulgating it to all overseas territo- ries, often in one single law, simplified the Operational regulations of broadcasting in the French Congo before and during World War II. After the world conflict, metropolitan legislation was supplemented by special laws, such as that of 1955 which created the Société de Radiodiffusion de la France d'Outre-Mer (SORAFOM). But while the legislation simplified regulation of broadcasting, it complicated its operation, both in France and in the colonies. The French authorities constituted 1Mackay, 60. 274 over the years a number of special commissions or commit- tees which were charged with one thing or another. In 1930, a Commité de Radiodiffusion was established within the Ministry of Colonies, charged to advise on questions submitted to it regard- ing the development of colonial broadcasting. This committee consisted originally of 19 members, later 2 increased to 27 , of which only one represented the "Union Coloniale." In 1938 -- at the time when colonial broadcasting of the French faced its first great challenge3 -- two addi- tional commissions were formed: an interministerial com- mission consisting of representatives of the Ministries of Colonies, Foreign Affairs, Finance, the P. T. T., Inte- rior and War, and having as its task to prepare and specify the programs to be broadcast as colonial prOpaganda in the metropole, and as the liaison between France and her overseas territories.4 At the same time, the Ministry of Colonies, established its own Permanent Commission on Broadcasting with prac— tically identicaltasks.5 lArrété du 6 juin 1930, Journal Officiel, June 9, 1930, 6418. 2Arréte' du 4 décembre 1930, Journal Officiel,Dec- ember 6, 1930, 13371. 3Supra, 226. 4Arrété Ministeriel du 7 avril 1938, Journal Off- iciel, April 10, 1938, 4298. SIbid., 4299. 275 This represented another difference in the methods of approaching the same problem. In Belgium, the broad— casting service to the colonies was a matter of negotia- tion between the established domestic broadcasting enter- prise (INR) and the Government of the colony. In Great Britain, it was a matter initiated and pursued by the BBC. Only in 1938 did the British Government change its finan- cial policy, and reserved for itself the right to pre— scribe the languages which such foreign broadcasting serv- ice should utilize. The involvement of the Colonial Office in either of these two countries was minimal. In France, on the other hand, the Colonial Broadcasting began as a direct result of the push by the Colonial Ministry in 1930. Whether the real reason for this was the determina- tion of the colonial authorities, or whether the method was due to the less firmly established domestic broadcast- ing institution (1a Radiodiffusion Francaise was not formed until 1939) cannot be said with any degree of certainty. Broadcasting in the imperial context. --In com— paring the broadcasting policies of the three powers, whether dealing with services to or in the given colonies, some observations can be made regarding the imperial aspects of broadcasting. No truly imperial aspiration of 276 the Belgians can be found to be in evidence, with the possible exception of the original Empire Service. Though some striking similarities between Belgium and its colony can be noted, there was nothing in Belgian Congo's broad- casting at the time of independence which could compare with the ties, both tangible and intangible, present in Nigeria and the French Congo. When Belgium's idea of a Belgian-Congolese Community jelled in 1958 it was too late to make any difference. Nigeria's ties were established through the decade of direct cooperation with the BBC personnel.1 Britain had no desire to form an imperial network of broadcasting (other than that provided by the BBC through live and recorded programs) even though there had been individuals with such plans: The war 1939-45 brought an immense stimulus to the idea of broadcasting within the British Commonwealth of Nations. . . . PeOple who have thought most deeply about the possibilities of commonwealth broadcasting look forward to a far greater degree of sharing and exchange of programmes. There could well be an or- ganization with its headquarters outside Great Britain. The BBC would then become simply a partner with the other Commonwealth broadcasting organiza- tions in building up a new type of Empire—wide broad- casting service -- created by all and available to all.2 But at best such dreams were unofficial. Officially, 1The so-called "secondment" of BBC officers must be considered a unique and.significant characteristic of Britain's develOpment of broadcasting in Nigeria, as well as in many other British overseas dependencies. 2Beachcroft, 31-32. 277 only regional broadcasting was thought of (immediately after WWII)for both West and East Africa, but when the plans proved to be unworkable, even regional arrangements were dropped. From then on, practically everywhere a national service became the goal for each non-self—govern- ing territory. There were still regional arrangements within the boundaries of individual territories, such as Nigeria, but this was thought to present a challenge simi- lar to the regional situation facing the BBC. As pointed out, this challenge was far more serious.1 It was the BBC, and especially its own uniqueness among all broadcasting organizations -- its expertness in broadcasting techniques, its "Mother of Broadcasting Organizations"-type of uniquee ness -- and above all, its programming policies of both domestic and external services which were looked upon by colonial possessions of Britain, including Nigeria, as contributing most mightily to the common bond Of the Empire. The French administrative concern with imperial possibilities of broadcasting, though real from the 1930's on, was not immediately reflected in either the number or the quality of established facilities. Only from 1946 (Plan Pleven) and particularly since 1950, a serious attempt and a coordinated effort were made to establish an Empire broadcasting network of the French colonies; 1Supra, 257-58. 278 this effort culminated when the undistinquished record of the post-war Service de Radiodiffusion d'Outre—Mer was replaced by successes of the SORAFOM, established in order to facilitate improvement and development of broad- casting in the territories under the Ministry of Overseas France, through establishing equipment of the Network and through assuring its eventual functioning.1 ~ The concept of this empire network, primarily intended for Africa, was best explained by the French colonial authorities in 1955: A reconciliation of the principles of political decentralization [with] the necessity for profes— sional coordination inherent in broadcasting tech- niques [led to the] concept not of territorial stations without relations among themselves, but of a chain of stations spread over the total of French territory in Africa. This network would function because Of the coordination assured by a "central echelon" situated in Paris, the seat of SORAFOM.2 Who helped whom? --The question of the relation- ship, and its direction, of the metrOpole and the depend- ency, inasmuch as broadcasting was concerned can be analyzed in the financial context, as well as in the context of Operational sphere. The answer is, perhaps, even more revealing here as it provides an insight into the very basic attitudes of the colonial authorities towards their possessions, and as it contrasts each power's policies with its practices and at the same time 1Bebey, 32. 2France, Ministere de la France d'Outre-Her, Vers un réseau de Radiodiffusion de la France d'Outre Mer TParis: Ministere de la France dTOutre-Mer, 1955), l2. 279 shows the differences between each other's modus gperandi. Great Britain, it was already said, offered its particular broadcasting talents through the devise of seconding the BBC's high officials sent to Nigeria "on loan" and paid for by grants or subsidies lest the local treasury be unduly taxed.1 The French policy established a direct help to her overseas territories through the Radiodiffusion (and later also Television)Francaise which in many instances was reSponsible for the creation, ad- ministration, and operation (including the supplying of programs)2 of colonial broadcasting systems.3 In the French Congo, specifically, the 323' had undertaken, in 4 1950, to create and administer Radio-AEF , and though there later developed some misunderstanding because of the money involved the arrangement was able to be continued until 1958.5 In contrast to these approaches, and particularly to those of the French, the method used by the Belgian authorities had been vastly different. It started in 1934 1Mackay, 79. 2Programs were also supplied to Nigeria by the British; Belgium's INR programs were rebroadcast in Belgian Congo only on rare occasions. 3Cf. Francois Luchaire, Droit D'Outre-Mer (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), 293. 4 UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 405. 5Thompson and Adloff, 316. _280 when the colony was "authorized" to contribute to the cost of broadcasting by the metrOpole to the colony.1 It continued during the war when the cost of broadcasting to the metrOpole (as all other cost of the Belgian effort) was financed by Belgian Congo.2 After the war, it was not the INR, the owner and programmer of its "Goodwill" sta- tion in Leopoldville, who operated the station, however. It was the Telecommunication Department of the Congo Government which was responsible for technical Operation of the metropolitan stations, while it was also operating Radio-Congo-Belge, and maintaining the studios which were shared by both organizations.3 While the French RTF housed the infant Radio-AEF; the infant Radio-Congo-Belge ‘hosted the metropolitan "Goodwill" station of the INR4. A funda- mental difference in handling a basically identical situ- ation by the two powers, neighbors both in EurOpe and Africa. Planning and Financial Policies Under the auspices of UNESCO. a number of meetings of experts were held within the last decade to survey the status and explore the possibilities of help to media of mass communications in developing countries. Whether in 1Supra, 234-3s. 2Supra, 93-94, 236. 3UNESCO, press, Film, Radio, v, 396-97, 399. 4Ibid., 405; Bebey, 48. 281 South East Asia, in Latin America or in Africa, the ex- perts in their final reports invariably agreed that "plan- ning for media Of information should be a part of the planning for social and economic develOpment by the gov-, l ernments of the underdevelOped countries." And even though the meetings operated in the atmosphere modified by statements such as that the underdeveloped countries are seeking to attain in a matter of years a level of advancement which it has taken the developed countries centuries to achieve,2 there could be no doubt that the "planning that should be" actually also referred to "planning that should have been." The expansion of telecommunication facilities, including broadcasting, should be considered part of the overall social, economic and educational plan— ning. The extension of the mass media should there- fore be linked to the planning and expansion of other services. . . . Governments should give particula atten- tion to the establishment of broadcasting organiza- tions with adequate production and transmission fa- cilities to meet the social, educational and cultural 1UNESCO, Mass Media in the Developing Countries, Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, No. 33 (Paris: UNESCO, 1961). UNESCO, Developing Mass Media in Asia, Re- ports and Papers on Mass Communication, NO. 30)(PEris: UNESCO, 1960). UNESCO, Developing Information Media in Africa, Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, No. 37 (Paris: UNESCO, 1962). UNESCO, Radio Broadcasting Serves Rural Development, Reports and Papers on Mass Communica- tion, No. 48 (Paris: UNESCO, 1965). UNESCO, Radio and Television in the Service of Educatigp_and Deve10pment in Asia, Reports and Papers on Mass Communicafion, NO. 49 (Paris: UNESCO, 1967). 2Rene Maheu, Acting Director-General of UNESCO to Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations, cited in U. N., Economic and Social Counciltireedom of Information . . .,ii. 282 needs of all sections of the community. The struc- ture and Objectives of broadcasting organizations should serve the overall purpose of the country... . . . . . Broadcasting should not be considered a lux- ury but a vital necessity in the development of the country. . . . It could not fulfill its task of in- forming and educating the general public in devel- Oping countries unless it were available to all.1 To what extent had the colonial powers measured up to these standards? Had there been any planning, and if so, had it been adequate? These are some of the ques- tions which can legitimally be asked, and which can to a certain degree be answered in terms of the policies and practices of the powers in the three African territories. It was the First World War which caused practi- cally all major colonial powers to reconsider their basic development policy. This was well illustrated in Great Britain where hitherto it had been the accepted view . . . that a dependency should have the communication, social services, and so forth which it could afford out of its own revenues. . . .2 France and Belgium also professed this policy, though only the latter power adhered to it until the end. When applied to development of broadcasting, cer- tainly the Belgian Decree of 1934 calling for at least partial payment toward a broadcasting service to the col- ony points out that the old policy wasstill very much alive. In Belgian Congo, all development was paid for by 1UNESCO, Developipg Information Media in Africa, 25. 28.1.5., The CD&W Acts,5. British Colonial Office, Colonial No. 139 (l937), Sec. 12. 283 the colony. A look at the trend of the Belgian Congo budg— ets reveals that though [they] at certain times showed a deficit that Belgium had to make good [and though] the situation was par- ticularly critical at the time of the great depressions of the years 1932 and 1953, . . . since the war, budg- etary equilibrium has been established. . . .1 From 1934 on, only the last three years of the Belgian regime in the Congo were marked by the budgetary deficits.2 The surpluses of the ordinary budgets allowed for setting up of reserves in a special fund, to be used in case of a depression, and also to be invested, through a special budget, in the economic equipment of the country. Between the years 1939 and 1959, the surplus of the ordi- nary budgets amounted to 14,171 million of Belgian Congo francs.3 Except for the amount which had to be transfer- red into the Special (Equalization) Fund (three per cent of the ordinary budgetary expenses, as prescribed by law), the surpluses financed the expenses of special budgets and constituted investments in an economic and social infra- structure. They were supplemented by Ioans, and it was at that point that Belgium's contribution began through the guarantees of loans. Thus, Belgium could plan the Congo's economic and other develOpment without direct monetary contributions. In Spite of this policy and indeed in spite of the opportunity this policy Offered, no broadcasting plan was formulated until 1949, when a four—phase devel- ¥ 3 1inforCongo, I, 177. 2Ibid., 11, 54. Ibid. 284 Opment was included in the proposed Ten-Year Plan.1 The British policy, though changing in the early 1920's, did not affect planning of broadcasting in the colonies until 19492, and in Nigeria until 19503 , when bulk of Britain's financial contribution to Nigerian broadcasting (190,000 pounds out of 205,000) was provided under the CD&W Acts4. There are two aspects of British planning of broadcasting in the colonies which deserve some emphasis here. Firstly, it is a fact that out of the total amount of .t205,060 expended by Britain on Nigerian broadcasting, JLl94,000 were given to pre-Federation Nigeria, i.e., to Nigeria prior to the passage of the 1951 (Manherson) Constitutions. This fact further supports the contentions made in the previous section on the interrelationship of constitutional and broadcasting development in Nigeria. In the second place, financial support cannot be equated with planning which began, as pointed out, in 1937 with the Plymouth Committee. The time lag, however, 1J. Grenfell Williams, Radio in Fundameptal Edu- cation in UnderdeveIOped Area,(Press, Film and Radio in the World Today7(Paris: UNE§CO, 1950), 28—30. 2British Colonial Office, Handbook of Colonial Eroadcasting(l964), 2. 3Mackay, 10. 4Gt. Britain, Colonial Deve10pment and welfare Acts (Cmd. 672), 1959, I6. 51bid. 285 between the first planning, the second planning (1948) and the establishment in Nigeria of the NBS (1951) serves as indication of just one characteristic in colonial dev— elopment of a medium of information which should have been considered part of overall social and economic plan- ning. The early broadcasting policy of France in Africa in general, and in the Middle Congo in particular, did not distinguish itself over the early policies of Britain and Belgium. Though the talking stage was reached in the early years of the 1930's, only Madagascar and the Middle Congo could boast of a transmitting station prior to 1939 . But there, as in Dakar,in French West Africa in 1939, the broadcasting stations were set up not because of a particular French policy and plan but rather inde— pendently: by the Government-General Of Madagascar, by a group of radio "hams" in the Congo, by the French army in 59:, The loss of the international broadcasting sta- tion at Allouis in occupied France in 1940 reversed the prevalent policy of "no policy," and in Plan Pleven a broadcasting system for the French Union made its ap— pearance. The next conscious effort by the French to help broadcasting in the French Union, and especially in the overseas territories, in a systematic way came in 1954, as a result of the difficulties with Plan Pleven. The 286 original Ten—Year Plan, formalized in 1947, had to be changed to several four-year plans which were to be pre- ferred.The first four-year period was scheduled to end on June 30, 1953, but the date had to be deferred until June 30, 1954.1 The second four-year plan, though already late, was delayed even more and its financial authoriza- tion did not come until 1956. In the interim, special de- crees were issued to enable the execution of the economic projects. If the difficulties appeared in the general dev- elopment plan, they certainly were present in the broad— casting sphere. The Service de la radiodiffusion d'outre— mer_was helping and directing ’ several stations scattered in Africa, in the Antilles and in the Pacific. The majority of these stations functioned with equipment Of bad quality and with personnel often haphazardly selected.2 In 1950, an interdepartmental commission was instituted to study the problem of French Overseas broadcasting.3 Among the recommendations made by this commission were the following: 1United Nations, Progress of the Non-Self-Govern- ing Territories under the Charter (ST7TRI7SER.A.I5, I960- 1964) (New York: United Nations, 1959-1964), II, 87. Henceforth referred to as U.N., Progress . . . . 2 Bebey, 32. 3The Commission memfloned included representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance, Overseas France, Information, Minister of State charged with administering the relations with the Associated Sta- tes (of Indo-China). Journal Officiel,February 21,1950,876. 876. 287 (1) That the develOpment of broadcasting means he made an Object of a total plan in which considerations will be made not only of technical installations but also the conditions of utilizing such installations, and the creating of personnel who will operate them; (2) That apprOpriate measures be taken to facilitate supplying the stations with programs. (The suggested measures are the establishment of regular circuit for exchange of prerecorded programs or of relaying of metropolitan programs); (3) That an effort is made in the area of reception, through distribution of popular radio sets.1 These and other recommendations were passed on to SOFIRAD (Société Financiere de Radiodiffusion), but be- cause Of its inexperience in colonial matters, this or- 2 ganization could not discharge its new task. The Ministry of Overseas France then created SORAFOM (Société de Radio- 3 diffusion de la France d'Outre-Mar) in 1955 and formal- ized its legal standing as a state company with legal entity and financial autonomy, in 1956.4 France's attitude toward financial aid for her overseas territories is well expressed by the following post-1960 statement: In the technical and cultural domain, even more than in the purely financial and economic domain, France considers it appropriate to speak of 1Bebey, 31. 2Ibid., 32. 3France, Services de la France d'outre-mer, Outre— Mer 1958 (Paris: Service des Statistiques d'outre-mer, 03. ' 4Arréte' du 18 janvier, 1956 (application of the law of January 30, 1946), Journal Officiel, January 20, 1956, 347. This ministerial order was later amended, on November 17, 1956 and May 5, 1958. France, Outre-Mer 1958, 506. 288 "cooperation" rather than "assistance." . . . .1 But in spite of France's deemphasis of "assistance; the term is fitting, especially in financial aspects of aid to its overseas territories. The importance of how much money was to go to develOp broadcasting, and how much of it would be forthcoming from the mother countries should not be underemphasized either in case of France or of Great Britain and Belgium. Table 3 summarizes the data available on this sub- ject. In the total planning as has been stated already, there were substantial differences. These are vividly illustrated when actual sums Of money directed toward the building up of broadcasting are examined. Equally illu- minating are the percentages which the total economic development plans reserved for "a vital necessity in the development of a country."2 The per cent of the total plan ranges from .04 in Belgian Congo to 1.2 in French Congo and to 2.85 in Nigeria. But among the figures that could be considered the most valuable comparisons are the per capita figures. The range of these is considerable but the data favor the French territory which between 1946 and 1960 spent on broadcasting about $2.00 per person, while Nigeria in its Ten-Year Plan of 1951-1960, spent only about 56¢ per 1Ambassade de France, Aid and Cooperation, 42. 2UNESCO, Develgping Information Media in Africa, 25. 289 =.soeumsuousH use -ose pom seam .osauuouosoums posse» assess s no name use oe omuusauumu .suco GOwusHsmom coma mo wanna use so ocucaooamu n .ooaauamas .maumoaz ea tooaauoeoa .xmoauua Hoeuoussom Hafiuoumaom bosons mo puma moo oocoo access may as “mmmanomma .omnoo cowoaom may as ”mcwuouwuumu mau macaw omeuc> mssaa usmEmonbco can no panama cram OHH 0cm Hfig 0000000000000 nmuflgwu Hm“ WON W NONH W H“: 0000000000 GmHm ”a“ lumsoocoum mo cocuscoucm mom w p.ma w He: .....Amo:cmooru cw. Houoa mswumcowsOMMLou sowuoamuucoo m.huucsoo :muwaomouuoz ONOmm OOCN omom soooooooosoooonflufimmo “mm mm.~ N.H so. ...... scam mo omcusmoumm OH.m~ m m.H w v.mm m .......Amc0fiHH«E :6 Hence mafiunmcomoum How moam< umm mH w wVH W V“ W 000000000000 Q muflmmo “mm m.mmm m sea m ovo.H w .......au:OeHHas cwoflmuoe a scam “EOEQOH o>mn omcoo oozou canwowz socmum :sflmamm EcuH OOHGOHOO can no woman unwEmon>mo or» annoys» mswumsoosoun mo onenessfimll.m memes 290 person on the same item. In Belgian Congo, during the last decade of the colonial regime, only 3.5¢ per capita were spent on broadcasting. When the actual contribution of colonial powers to broadcasting development is viewed, Belgium, by virtue of its prevailing policy relying on local Belgian Congo resources to finance the total plan, can be observed to have given no direct monetary aid. Great Britain, through the CD&W grants, supported the substantial Nigerian plan- ning, but over the total post—WWII period contributed only two per cent of the budgeted expenditures on broadcasting, though slightly more than ten per cent of the whole Niger- ian Ten-Year Plan came from CD&W funds.l By far the larg- est financial support of broadcasting was given by France, both in terms of percentage of the total French Congo's planned expenditures (12.2 per cent) and in terms of per capita contribution (24¢ for every inhabitant of the terri- tory). The per capita figure in Nigeria amounted to only 11¢. The question of the pOpulation numbers is often brought out in defense of such data as recorded above. Specifically, however, it must be reemphasized that in Nigeria, the authorities had no accurate figures on Nigeria's total population, and though that fact alone can be used as a rationalization, it appears to be a poor excuse for a colonial power. Belgium, with a far smaller population 1B. I. S. The CD & W Acts, 23. 291 than Nigeria, devoted even less money per capita. Also, it has to be borne in mind that in the twentieth century there were substantial differences in the financial capabilities and willingness of the various powers, and also that the observations recorded in the Table 3 are based upon the 1960 data when broadcasting was nothing new. It is the emphasis on planning fbr broad- casting which is of concern here, and as reflected by various data, the British in Nigeria and the Belgians in the Congo can be said not to have done as well as the French in the Middle Congo. Some further conclusions regarding finances will be brought up in the next Chapter. The data indicate that the broadcasting services develOped according to the general policies Of the three powers on economic develOpment. There was Belgium's ex- pressed desire to have its colony pay for all its needs. Britain maintained a cautious approach claiming that plan- ning, administering, and managing finances were experi- ences which the Africans had to acquire as part of their training for independence.1 The French kept insisting on two principles, namely, that the progress of the economy must keep pace with po- litical progress if stability is to be maintained: [and that] public investments must serve as primer if private capital is to invest in a manner benefi- cial to [the overseas] countries [associated with 1Ibid., 3. Coping with the difficulties of obtain- ing sufficient finances apparently was included in the training process. 292 FranceJI. All these characteristics can be observed in the field of broadcasting and in its development in Africa. Rapid development of radio services indeed seem to have coincided with speedy change in the French territory from ' assimilation to autonomy, the former leading to the French Community and the latter to independence with this Com- munity. The British doubled their CD & W grants between 1948-1949 and 1949—1950. It was in that latter period that the first significant contribution to radio broadcasting occurred in Africa (the Rhodesias and Naysaland)2. But on the basis of available data, broadcasting continued, in spite of the increased support of it, to be regarded as a nonessential service and one which the British depend— encies should finance themselves. Of almost £190 million in CD & W commitments between 1946 and 1959 (March 31), only 2.88 million pounds were allocated by Britain to broadcasting develOpment in all her territories, i. e., 1.5 per cent.3 Before leaving the tOpic of planning, and before considering some other financial aspects of the colonial _vj— 1Ambassade de France, Aid and Cooperation, 9. 28. I. S., The CD 8 W Acts, 27. Gt. Britain, Cmd. 672, 16. UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, IV, 429. The grants jumped from less than $6.5 million to almost 113 million in the periods mentioned. Cf. Peter Frankel, Wayaleshi (London: Fakenham and Reading, 1959). 3B. I. S., The CD & W Acts, 16, 22. 293 policies on broadcasting, a mention needs to be made of the way in which the powers fulfilled or completed the prerequisite of any planning, viz. surveying, or taking stock of, the existing communication and other situation. No inventory of mass communications and planning for the whole mass communication area is known to have existed in the three territories during the colonial re— gimes. Primarily, this seems to be because certain media of mass communication have been traditionally regarded as being in the private, rather than the public,sphere (news- papers and magazines, books, and to a great degree, films). There were other factors, such as mentioned earlier in this section, contributing to the lack of such stock— taking activity. In their general economic surveys, the three powers generally were unconcerned with broadcasting, though other communications matters, such as postal and telegraph and telephonic communications, both wire and wireless, were included. It was not until the "big" dev- 1 elopment plans were being drawn that broadcasting appeared 1Belgium, Ministere des Colonies, Flap Decennal ppur 1e Développment économigue et social dggCongoBel e (Bruxelles: Mihistere des COlonies, 1949). France, Fongs d'Inyestissement pour le Développment économi e et social deg Territoires d'OutrefMer (Law of April 30, l946, Plan Pleven). Nigeria,The Ten-Year Plan of Development and welfare (Revised, l95l-l955). 294 in any of them. Britain, as noted in the previous Chapter, surveyed broadcasting needs in West African colonies, in- cluding Nigeria, in 1948 -- and the Ten-Year Plan reflect- ed the thinking which grew out of that survey. France, in early 1950's, conducted her most comprehensive stock- 1, including broadcasting. Belgian Congo taking survey prepared its Ten-Year Plan, and its four-stage develop- ment plan for broadcasting, in 1949. Unlike the other two powers, however, the Belgian authorities in the Congo concerned themselves to a great degree (in financial estimates, to almost one third) with developing listen- ing posts for collective listening, and also with wired wireless.2 License fees for receivers. -- The decision in all three territories not to allow commercial advertising resulted in the elimination of a possible source of broad- casting revenue. Though the instituting of receiver set license fees was nowhere thought of as being the best method of financing the broadcasting services, it most certainly was designed to offset the capital and espe- cially recurring costs of the national service. As Codding pointed out, 1France, Ministere de la France d'Outre-Mer, Inventaire Social et Economigue des Territoires d'Outre- Mer TParis: Ministere de la France d‘Outre-Mer,“l935). 2Williams, 29-30. 295 . . . receiver license fees are no better than adver- tising as a source of revenue, since listeners are too poor to provide the necessary funds. They do provide some income, and payment doubtless gives the listener the feeling that the system actually belongs to him. But the yield remains inadequate.1 Following the pattern established in the home countries, the three territories established the license fee system: Belgium's fee originated in 1930, Belgian Congo's in 19342; in 1935 Nigeria's receiver licenses were established, thirteen years later than in Great Britain, but only three years after the start of the colonial serv- ice3; the French Congo's fees came into effect after 1938.4 It is to be noted that in the case of Belgian Congo and Nigeria the fees had been established not to pay for the local (national) broadcasting service, but were di- rectly connected with the empire services of the reSpec— tbmametropolitan broadcasting organizations; only in Belgian Congo, however, did the colonial authorities appear eager to collect the fees in order to offset the cost of the colonial broadcasting. A few more explanations need to be made on the subject of license fees. To begin with, a question 1Codding, 51. 2Decree of August 15, 1934, No. 8; cf. upra, 235. 3Gt. Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Re ort on the Social and Economic Progress of the Peo 1e 0 Nigeria, 1935 (No. I763; LondOn: H. M. S. 0., I935), 72 4 UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 406. 296 undoubtedly arose whether the fees were to apply to the set itself, or the place where it was used, or the physi- cal person of the owner. In England, the second alterna- tive has been used, and the term "household" employed in the definition. In that country, "household" now includes a car, and therefore car radio, as well as portable, es- pecially transistor,sets are considered covered by a sin— gle license issued to a household. In the other two Con- tinental countries, and all three dependencies in Africa, license fees referred to a receiver set. Though the regulation apparently is legal, it is 1 unenforceable, as some legal experts pointed out. What is aprOpos here is that the British Officials in Nigeria promulgated a system unlike that of Britain, even though the advantages of the "per household" system must have been known. The advantage is, of course, from the point of view of the listeners; it must be assumed, then, that the license fee was destined to contribute to the State reve- nue. In that case, however, the authorities should have anticipated that either some sets would not be declared, or that the growth of broadcasting and its availability to great masses would suffer, or both. In either event, the policy on licensing fees, as practiced not only in Nigeria, but also in the two Congos, produced one or the other undesirable effect. 1Eugene Pons, License Fees fgr Radio and Television Sets, Legal Monograph No. 1 (Geneva: E. B. U., 1964), l}. 297 The fact that in Belgian Congo the Congolese own- ers of receivers paid substantially lesser fees than the EurOpeans (except during the early years when the fees were not differentiated) is interesting in that it could have been potentially very beneficial to the growth of broad- casting in that territory. The African paid only one-fifth of the fee assessed on a set owned by a European, 48 BC francs as Opposed to 240 BC francs per annum. The poten- tial, however, was never realized for this fee was still very high in relation to the income of the Congolese. Yet, at least that much was done for the African by the Belgians, while France and Britain had done nothing comparable. In Nigeria, the original lO-shilling fee re- mained unchanged during the colonial regime; in the French territory of the Congo, it changed almost as Often as it did in France. The financial aspect of the licensing fees will be taken up again in the discussion of the policies on listenership. No less interesting is the number of undeclared receiver sets. As Codding suggested, the yield of the fees had been inadequate. In the post-WWII survey of the UNESCO the undeclared receivers represented the following per- centages of the total estimated number of sets: in Belgian Congo 27 per cent; in French Congo about 60 per cent; and in Nigeria some 50 per cent.1 The comparatively small 1UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, v, 399, 406, 429. 298 percentage figure for Belgian Congo can, perhaps, be explained by noting that . . . at the present time the majority of the sets in use are owned by Euorpeans, so that it may be roughly estimated that there is one set for every four mem— bers of the non—African pOpulation. . . . With approximately 35,000 white settlers in Belgian Congo in 1950, the ratio of EurOpeans vs. African-owned receiv- ers can be estimated at close to nine to two. With this ratio and less than 8,000 declared, that is licensed sets, the receipts from the fees amounted to just over 1.5 mil- lion BCFrs, only about 15 per cent of the Radio—Congo- Belge budget that year (1950).2 In the French Congo, only 2 per cent, approximately, of the total budget (CFA Frs. 13.14 million) of Radio-AEF in 1951 came from the 850 paid for receiver licensesB, and in Nigeria, in 1955- 1956, even less than that: 1.6 per cent <.t4,180) of the budget of $256,580 was brought in from 8,360 licenses.4 The licensing policy of the three powers, then, actually ended in three undesirable results: (1) there were substantial numbers of undeclared sets; (2) licens- ing mitigated against widespread ownership of receivers; and (3) the revenue from the licensing fees was negli- gible. Vt Ibid., 399. 2 1 Ibid., 396. 3Ibid., 405. 4Codding, 51. 299 Supporting financial policies. --Fina11y, the tariff and fiscal policies of the colonial powers ought to be mentioned. UNESCO in 1948 recommended that governments of the underdevelOped countries might consider reviewing their tariff and fiscal policies with a view to facilitating the development of the information media and the free flow of information within and between countries.1 The so-called Agreement on the Importation of Education- al, Scientific and Cultural Materials constituted an inter- national convention designed to eliminate trade barriers to the free flow of such materials. By 1960, all three powers ratified this Agreement but failed to extend it to the three territories in question. The importance of thispolicy comes to the fore when it is viewed in relation to the practices pertain- ing to custom dUties, and to the imposition of other taxes or fees. In Table 4, information as of mid-1950's is assembled. It can be seen that the highest aggregate of taxes at that time existed in the French territory, amounting to, for radio receivers, more than 21 per cent of the set value. Nigeria possessed the second highest rate, though special sets (and parts), valued at no more than «£15 were exempt from custom duties. With the exception of Nigeria, where 1UNESCO, Mass Media in the Developing Countries, 39. 300 only materials of an essential nature that cannot be obtained elsewhere are licensed to be imported from dollar and other non-sterling sources,1 the other two colonies made no legal distinction of the place of origination, though in the AER, imports from non- French franc area depended on the availability of foreign exchange. In Belgian Congo, the long-established require- ment of "open-door" trade policy remained in force until the end of the colonial era. TABLE 4.-—Import duties and taxes affecting broadcasting Item Belgian Congo French Congo Nigeria Radio 15% ad val. 12% ad val. Up to 415 Receiv— value: exempt ing .05% stat. tax .75% ad val. Wired-wireless Sets stat. tax sets: exempt 2% stamp duty 6 . 38% sales t. Radio same as same as Up to.L15 Parts above above value: exempt Other: 20% ad valorem Sound same as same as Educational, Record- above above scientific ings and cultural materials: exempt Other: 20% ad valorem Based on UNESCO, Trade Barriers to Knowledge(1955b 38-39, 113-15, 208-09, 333-35. 1UNESCO, Trade Barriers to Epowledge: A Manual of Regulations Affecting Educational, Scigntific and Cultural Material; 72nd ed. revised; Paris: UNESCO, 1955),‘208. 301 Policies on Programming, Professional Training and Audiences Three distinct and yet interdependent factors are the subject of this section. undoubtedly, programming and the quality of it is directly related to the quality of the professional staff, which depends on the training programs available to those who work in broadcasting. Audiences, i.e., their numbers, also depend on the pro— gramming which is available to them, though this is true more of advanced societies than of those where radio own- ership is in many cases still a luxury, and where listener- ship still is something of a novelty. But even to the African who is affluent enough to have had the Opportunity of being a listener for a long time, radio broadcasting was still very important because, as one Of them said, . . . it corresponds perfectly with our African civi- lizations which are not civilizations of the written word but Of the spoken language. We like this form of disseminating news and ideas, because it is addressed at each one of us, and because we do not need, neces- sarily, to learn to read and write to understand the message which comes to us.1 With what kinds of audiences were the colonial powers concerned? What type of programming did they make available to the native pOpulation? In which way was the problem of training the Africans for broadcasting handled? Some tentative answers are provided on the following pages. 1Bebey, 5. Francis Bebey is an African, born in Douala in the former French Cameroon. 302 Policies on listenership. -—The problem of reaching an audience, though it does have its particular aspects in less develOped countries, had been sufficiently familiar to the major powers by the time broadcasting reached their colonies. Basically, in all countries, this problem is twofold: the broadcasting service must be made very widely available, and the programs produced for the audience must be apprOpriate to that audience. Undoubtedly, all three colonial powers solved the problems at home relatively soon. This is not to say that the metropolitan audiences have always been satisfied; but a look at the availability of transmission facilities, number of listeners or at least of licensed sets, and the type of programming broadcast by the stations in Great Britain, France and Belgium in the early 1930's, some seven or eight years after the very first local station went on the air, would reveal that both aspects of the problem had been fairly satisfactorily solved long before broadcasting activities began in the dependencies. If the suggested minimum (i.e., S receivers per 100 pOpulation) facilities, as expounded by UNESCO, be applied to the met- ropolitan countries, Great Britain would be found to have reached it approximately in 1927; France and Belgium in the 1930's, i.e., within five to ten years of the begin- ning of broadcasting in those countries.1 188C, Handbook, 1964, 186; Brockhaus, 193s, xvx, 209. 303 In Africa, the policy on listenership took three available routes: (1) the ownership of individual broadcast receiving sets in the homes; (2) subscription to wired wireless systems; and (3) collective, sometimes called group or community, listening.1 The first alternative might seem, at least in a democratic society, to be the most desirable. It existed in all three territories, but as mentioned above, at the beginning and in some instances for quite some time, the ownership remained to a large degree in the hands of the European pOpulations. The observation that in Belgian Congo the license fee was considerably less for African than for EurOpean owners would indicate a desire on the part of the Belgian authorities to make the ownership easier to achieve by Africans. The truth of the matter is, however, that the annual tax of BC francs 48 ( approximate— ly $1.00)2, alone amounted to more than four per cent of the per capita personal income in 1950, and between 1.3 and 2.3 per cent in 1957, depending on whose data are used.3 In addition, it will be seen that collective listening was considered the most desirable form, and actually could be 1Williams, 138-39, makes a distinction between community and group listening, but this distinction is not of too great importance in this discussion. Under both kinds of listening, large numbers of peOple listen to broadcasts on one set only. 2UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 399. 3U. N. Progress, . . ., II, 19; Kimble, II, 482. 304 said to have been the official policy of the authorities. In Nigeria, similar economic problems had to be overcome. As late as 1948 when the Turner—Byron Report on West African broadcasting was made, millions of rural Africans had income approximating one shilling a day, . . .1 while in the urban areas ‘ weekly incomes were in the range from twenty-five shillings for an artisan, to 1.7 for a first-grade government clerk.2 The majority of those who would have benefited from own— ing broadcast receivers earned thus about.£15 or 300 shil- lings a year, and the license fee amounted to 10 shillings per year, that is 3.3 per cent of their income. The French authorities in the Congo faced similar problem. The tax of CFA francs 300 in 1950 (i.e., $1.70) represented a substantial portion of per capita income of less than $100.3 But the license fee, in Spite of the fact that it represented a burden to the African and for that reason had often been ignored by him, emerged in the African broadcasting situation as only a small problem. The pur— chase of the set was a far greater obstacle to the African pOpulation, as was the difficulty of finding a relatively inexpensive receiver suitable for use in tropical climate. 1 2 Mackay, 7. Ibid. 3Kimble, II, 482. 305 The first receiving set especially made for tropi- cal Africa was the "Saucepan Special," so called on account of its shape. The surprising thing about the history of this receiver is not the shape or other technical charac- teristics, but rather the difficulty which the broadcast- ing official in Northern Rhodesia (it was there that the request originated) had in pursuading manufacturers to produce the set. Designed in Northern Rhodesia by an engi- neer with long experience in the colony, for more than three years the set could not find a manufacturer —- a surprising fact considering the potentialities of the African market.1 By 1949, the first sets were made and delivered, and though the Northern and Southern Rhodesias and Nyasaland obtained most of them at first, some of the sets eventually found their way to other countries, in- cluding Belgian Congo and Nigeria.2 In Belgian Congo, these "Saucepan Specials" must have been very few and far between, if, in 1950, 5,226 receiving sets were imported [and] the .average sales price of the receiving set [was] 5,000 ![BC] francs (U.S. $100).3 This would indicate that it had not been the policy of the Belgian to encourage individual ownership of sets by Africans. 1Codding, 52; cf. Williams, 61-64. Frankel, assim. In French, the set was called "Radio-Casserole," Bebey, 62. 2 UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 399, 429. 31bid., 400. 306 Another instance of the lack of interest on the part of manufacturers was demonstrated in the early fifties when the Nigerian Government wanted to supply the market with receivers suited to local needs.1 Sets selling in Nigeria for .£5 and 10 shillings ($15.40) began entering the country, and between 1953 and 1958 almost 140,000 radios (battery Operated, short-wave sets) were imported. Nigeria, however, also needed more expensive sets for its medium-wave broadcasting service, and despite [some] attempts, much has yet to be done to assure provision of an inexpensive and reliable set for the underdevelOped countries. Many cheap sets have too narrow a frequency range and are often un- pleasingly designed . . . . It is strange that no manufacturersor group of manufacturers has made any serious effort to capture the African market. . . . Governments, on the other hand, could do much to encourage the production and sale of a low-cost set. . . Above all, why do governments stress the need to provide people of little means with an inexpensive set and at the same time impose on receivers import duties of as much as 60 per cent?2 None of the three territories imposed such high import duty, but only Nigeria exempted the low-cost re- ceivers from any tax. But why indeed did the colonial au- thorities concern themselves so little with a medium of which they all said it can educate and inform better than any other? The other two methods of listening should have been, at best, alternatives, not substitutes. Again, dif- ferent policies that were Operative at the period are now 1Codding, 52. 2Ibid., 53. 307 observable. In wired wireless listening, Nigeria without question made the greatest stride as it had the longest history of that type of broadcasting service. Already in 1948, the British policy was to allow wired wireless to function side by side with regular broadcasting. Actual data on facilities in Nigeria at the time of independence indicate that the growth of the broadcasting service did not result in the suffocation of rediffusion. On the con- trary, the rediffusion service grew from serving less than 1,000 subscribers in 19391, to serve 74,000 subscribersz; in broadcast receivers, comparative figures would be less 3 and 143,000 in 19604. The rate of than 2,000 in 1939 growth was almost identical. The two Congo territories also considered employ- ing radiodiffusion system in the 1950's, but only the French colony put the scheme into operation, and only on a very small scale. Belgian authorities in the Congo only planned, within the broadcasting program of the Ten-Year Plan, such wired wireless systems, but no further mention of it could be found anywhere.5 1Mackay, 3. 2Royal Institute of International Affairs, Nigeria . . . . ., 120. 3 4 Mackay, 3. UNESCO, R-TV Statistics, 50. 5Only the UNESCO survey of all countries and terri— tories (1947-1951) reported the use of wired wireless in the French Equatorial Africa and the intended use of it in Belgian Congo. UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 399, 405. 308 By far the greatest supporter of "community lis- tening" was the Belgian Congo. The authorities there, according to Kimble, had taken the view that . . . the needs of the peOple are best served by providing community listening facilities in the rural areas and rediffusion systems in the larger centers, . . .1 But as noted above, the wired wireless system did not get very far. The government concentrated on "community lis- tening," and in 1951 Operated 50 such centersz, a number which increased towards the end of colonial times to 61.3 The equipment was a combination receiver-public address system, thus allowing not only broadcast relays from a distant station, but also origination of local "pro— grams," i.e., local news, talks and even music.4 Nigerian experience with community listening was not too good. Six sets of collective listening apparatus (a receiver and a loud-speaker) were put into Operation in the rural areas but the Post Office [did] not intend to increase the number of collective-listening centers. The results [were] not encouraging; too many staff [were] needed, repairs [were] difficult and the population [did] not seem greatly interested in this form of reception.5 In toto, the British, in their policy enunciated in 1937, Kimble, II, 155. UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 399. UNESCO, R-TV Statistics, 46. bWNP 5 UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 399. Ibid., 429. 309 clearly indicated that in their thinking, "community lis- tening" was the most economical method of listening; they did not, however, prescribe it as the one to be preferred?’ The French did believe in community listening, and established listening centers at all larger towns in the 2 The French, however, were sympathetic to AEF Federation. the idea of the private ownership of radio receivers: for some years the Grand Councilors3 urged the govern- ment of the federated territory to distribute to Africans without charge several thousands battery- Operated sets. . . .4 "Such largesse of free sets was clearly beyond the Feder- ation's means,"5 and so only a few free receivers were ever distributed. A logical place in AEF for such commu- nity receivers was in the cenfles culturels, meeting places of the community groups which had been established by the French for the purposes of adult education.6 The number of 1British Colonial Office, Colonial No. 139 (1937), Sec. 19. 2 . UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 407. 3Members of Grands Conseils, a political organ of the AEF Federation in which’representatives, selected from the ElEcted Territorial Assemblies, met to discuss those aspects pertaining to the Federation which were analaguous to those of the local territorial assemblies. No legislative power resided in the Grands Conseils. Luchaire, 374. 4Thompson and Adloff, 317. SIbid. 6This was the more popular method of adult education in the French territories. Another one consisted of mobile teams which visited various villages and initi- ated a variety of improvement projects. Pierre Fourré, Rapport sur l'experience d'education de base organisée par lé gouvernement ,general de l‘Afii ue E uatoriale Francaise en Oubangui-Chari (Paris: n.n.,ll952 , f} 310 receivers made available under the Grand Conseil's recommendation could not amount to too many, as there were, in 1956, only thirteen such cercles culturels.1 As far as policies were concerned, the French ideas of free sets, the British desire to make available fairly large numbers of reasonably inexpensive receivers, and the average price of a radio set in Belgian Congo, can be laid side by side and compared with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information in 1948 which recommended measures to enable the general public to obtain radio sets at low prices and to reduce the inequalities in information facilities, inter a1.2 The number of receivers and the number and powers of transmitting facilities in the three territories are represented in Table 5. It has been suggested3 that because of the variations in the types of listenership, assess- ments of the comparative reach of radio broadcasts made on the number of receiving sets per given number of pOpu- lation should always be treated with caution if not with distrust. Though this premise is true, it is nonetheless 1United Nations, Special Study on Social Conditions in Non-Self-Governing,Terfitories (New York: U. N., 1958), 11. 2United Nations, United Nations Conferepce on Free- dom of Information, Geneva, 1948 (No. l948.XIV.2) TGeneva: U. N., 1948). 3 Codding, 27—28. . .oo .H .woomfi .mcowwwz owned: uxuow 3mzo uwuucso may soon: mcwuouwuuma mcmcumboolmacmucoz one no wmcumoum.m20mucz owned: .omumwo .Avoma .m:0wumz popes: "show 3mzw,mmma .MOOAHMOM Hmomwmmwmum ensemucz ocMHcD.om .mm .Aamma .oommza ”mwucmo oomanomma cofims>caca can carom mo muauuauoum .oommzo .mwunmv .oovnmoe .oovamom .> .Aamma .oommzo newness omomm .EHmh .mmmum .oommza .bm .Ammma .umucco noncommm c>mcco uc>mcmoo awocm m0 cm: accouflHcm .cmpcuo mseora .HMimv .mm . moma .Hscmlucwmm meowuwom uchOCstozInmanhmmHo cuwoz unwound cm cesmommwoOwomm cg .mwnmm meccsuh mumfiwumoo wvan mvmflc ow. mm..." mm. oceans” oooJH coofim a: £3 mNHmH hm m NH com." mHo. MN. amo. 256 com...” cons.“ cmA cm .3 on m N. meme Q oao. we . mmHo. Ooooem com cow?” 0 mo. H o H m mmma m N H N H N H N 8 38 T. .d g .m. on. mm. m. on mm m. on o... 6 or o... a we as. a we as a he as. a we a... O . 5 O O p. T: 50 On. a an 6e a. an e a. 3. u .. 8. u .88 ”an..wwmmmmwwn ........a last ....a CHOW“ MO .02 OflUMm MO .02 UCHHHHEWCMHB mHQHHHEMfiMHE wwwuwawomm newuaoowu can sawmwdfimccuu mi/l/rl/f . :Hummco it. some wacoflooii.m Sea 312 thought that in a study dealing with the policies, and their results, it is valid to look comparatively on the growth of the radio broadcasting medium in the three colo- nies. So far, an attempt has been made to look at the policies of "having an audience;" "reaching the audience" is an entirely different, and much more difficult if not impossible task. This is a question of programming. Programming policies. --In all three territories, the authorities were insisting on certain standards which the programs of the local radio stations had to meet. The Belgians stated that in Belgian Congo, programmes must have a real educational moral, artistic, literary or scientific value,1 which is very much like the prescription decreed in Belgium itself in 1930. Belgian Congo's broadcasting organization, Radio-Congo—Belge, was assisted by special consultative boards, one for European broadcasts and the other for broadcasts to Africans, just as in Belgium, the .2930 legislation directed the _I_N_R to draw upon the resources of organizations whose messages might be of special interest to the public.2 This, in turn, can be compared with the develOpment in Belgian Congo of production studios owned and Operated lBulletin Officiel du Congo Belge, November 2, 1947, No. 370, 1131. 2Emery, Journalism Monographs, No. l, 5. 313 by recognized organizations and groups to whom licenses could be issued to Operate production studios, in accord- ance with the 1947 legislation. Such groups were mostly private, but sometimes semi-official, organizations, and among those which were authorized to operate studios and produce programs were the Ex—Servicemen's Association (Union des fraternelles des anciens combattants de 1940- 124;), a high school association (Les Amis de l'Athenée), and a Jesuit College.1 The programming in the French territory of the Congo was guided by the maxim "Instruct, Educate, and Inform," on the Radio-AEF, later on Radio—Inter-Equator- iale; not too long after Independence, it had to be re- ported, though, that the programs produced or transmitted by Radio-Congo consisted in 1960, of about 80 per cent 5? musical programs. The news did not occupy but 12 per cent of the time.2 This attempt to depart from the prescription could have been a natural result of several years of "French- 'oype" broadcasting which was considered highly "talkative" in its programming.3 Radio-AEF, as noted,4 was born through an agreement between the Governorate-General of AEF and Radio Television Francaise in 1950.Administrative, technical 1InforCongo, II, 175; cf. UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 397. 2Bebey, 93. 3cr. Mathieu in Childs and Whitton, passim. 4Supra, 239-4o. 314 and programming functions were all placed under the met— rOpolitan broadcasting organization, but the financial burden was on the colony. In 1951, for example, over 13 million CFA francs was paid to 335.1 Barely three years after Radio-AEF had begun op- erating, the RTF cancelled the agreement, charging that the subsidies were not sufficient. The loss Of Radio-Tchad the members of the Grand_ggnseil did not mourn, but a desperate effort was launched to save the all-territory station. After lengthy negotiations, a new agreement was reached, and a two-hour daily broadcast schedule for 10,000,000 CFA francs per year began. Thus, the bill was reduced by one-third approximately, but the service was reduced by two-thirds, as a six-hour daily schedule had been in operation earlier.2 The basis for the Nigerian broadcasting, as far as programming is concerned, was laid almost fifteen years Ibefore the service began. Said the Report of the Plymouth Committee: We envisaged the development of Colonial broadcasting -- and its justification -- . . . also as an instru- ment of advanced administration, an instrument not only and perhaps not even primarily for the enter- tainment, but rather for the enlightenment and educa- tion of the more backward sections of the population 1UNESCO, press, Film, Radio, v, 405.(Additional CFA francs 2.75 million were paid for the operation of Radio-Tchad) . 2Thompsonand Adloff, 316. 315 and for their instrpction in public health, agri- culture, etc. . . . In 1951, the first Director-General-designate of the NBS indicated that though entertainment will "naturally"2 always be radids luggest selling point to the public, the NBS was to concentrate on three phases, entertainment, news, and information, each designed and presented to raise standards and appreciation. . . . Broadcasting was to play a dominant and vital role in spreading knowledge and understanding.3 And though the ordinance did not mention (nor did the 1956 ordinance creating the Nigerian Broadcasting Corpo- ration) any Specific kind or type of programming, the basis laid by Britain in 1937 remained. As already indi- cated, the desire by Nigeria to emulate the BBC resulted in a very similar type of programming structure. In ad- dition, the NBS and later NBC always were attempting to ensure that the services which it provides when considered as a whole, reflect the unity of Nigeria as a Federation and at the same time give adequate expression to the culture, characteristics, affairs and Opinions of the people of each Region or part of the Federation.4 This programming Obligation had no parallel in the two Congos, even though the French, of course, admin- istered a Federation of four territories of which all :were served from the Middle Congo by Radio-AEF and later by Radio-Inter. Other obligations, however, were in "v 1 Sec. 14. 2Quoted in Mackay, 14. Ibid., 32. 4Sec.-10,(3),of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corpo- ration Ordinance, 1956. British Colonial Office, Colonial No. 139 (1937), 3 316 existence there. In the French Congo, the RTF, the Operating agent, had been subject to a myriad of restrictions spelled out by a great number of legislative or ministerial enactments. From 1939, e.g., a rule existed that all broadcasting stations which do not fulfill a na- tional purpose will be suppressed.1 Altogether, the review of the obligations and restrictions can be supplemented by saying that nothing contrary to laws, public order, decency, national safety, and nothing offensive in any way was allowable for broadcasting pur- poses. In this respect, no difference existed between broadcasting in both the African territories and in the metropolitan countries. No special requirements regarding news programs 'were in existence: in Belgian Congo, where from 1944 to 1945 Radio-Congp-Belge had been operated by the wartime Belgian National Broadcasting Service, the ideal of an impartial news broadcasts was accepted as heritage of the INR.2 The heritage of BBC in Nigeria broadcasting could not but include the news ,3 for 1Decree of August 29, 1939, quoted in Mathieu, in Childs and Whitton, 185. 2UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 396. Cf. Emery, Journalism Monograph, No. 1, 5. 3Mackay, 94. 317 [the] long association [between NBC and BBC] was responsible for establishing a pattern of public service broadcasting which has remained unchanged for the last thirteen years. It is as ingrained today as when first introduced by the BBC adminis- trators who served [in Nigeria]. 1 The reputation of French (metropolitan) news pro- grams had never been too high,2 but no serious criticism of news broadcasts coming from Brazzaville could be found. On the contrary, the absence of complaints about Radio-AEF in the territorial assemblies and in the Grand Council was thought to be significant, and a statement was made that Radio-AEF was giving more satisfaction to its audiences in the late 1950's than at any other time.3 With regard to news, two more items are worth reporting here. While in Nigeria broadcasting news was reSpected, and actualy emerged as a model for Africa4, an evaluation of the Belgian Congo newscasts presented a dif- ferent picture in that part of the continent: Radio Congo Belge was perhaps a greater success with its African than with its Belgian listeners. Most, though not all of the Belgians I knew were somewhat suspicious of the Congo radio and preferred to listen to Radio-Brazzaville, which they felt gave better, more detailed, more accurate, and more frequent news programs. Africans did not seem to be so involved with this particular problem, but they, too, listened to Radio-Brazzaville as well as Radio-Congo-Belge. Other 1Ibid. The author wrote this in 1964. 2Mathieu, in Childs and Whitton, passim. 3Thompson and Adloff, 316. 4Mackay, 36. 3l8 other stations were heard in the Congo, too, . . Radio-Congo-Belge was, of course, as tightly control- led as was the press in the Congo, and the result was that the listeners turned to other channels; this is not so say, of course, that it was not heard in the Congo -- it was widely heard, but it was not widely trusted.1 Kimble also suggested that the role of radio in tropical Africa should not be judged solely on the basis of territorial facilities.2 How some colonial powers felt about this prospect can perhaps be seen from the policies on broadcast receiving sets. Africans themselves apparent- ly did not feel that way. A Nigerian radio official when confronted with a question suggesting that receivers in the hands of ordinary peOple might lead to a full grown broadcasting system but produce no regular domestic lis- tehers, a Nigerian official replied: Well, it‘s up to us to deliver a program that will hold their attention. What is democracy for, if it doesn't mean the right of peOple to listen to any station they want to?3 Other officials —— and authorities -- felt ap- parently the same way about the need for attention-getting programs. In Belgian Congo, for example, the 1947 Legis- lation stipulated that the programs (which had to have a real educational, moral, artistic, literary or scien- tific value) had to be "prepared and produced in such 4 a way as to interest the public." But then, all -.’— lMerriam, 55, 56. 2Kimble, II, 153. 31bid., 154. 4UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 396. r”’ I P ”’l’”’ Ill‘ I‘I‘IIII‘ Iillllll‘ll‘llil 319 broadcasting activity anywhere needs to be concerned with this.1 The colonial authorities in Belgian Congo specified such a concern in an enactment, obviously for the benefit of the Operators of private stations and production studios. The other two colonies needed no such specific measures, as they operated exclusively state broadcasting systems. The molding of the colonial broadcasting in the image of the metrOpolitan service can also be observed in the requirements of all to include in the broadcast sched- ules certain government announcements, as the authorities might from time to time request. In France and in the French Congo, this was implied by the solid monopolistic position of the state; in Belgian Congo, as in Belgium, 2 The this was included in the legislative measures. Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation Ordinance also included 3 which in Britain has consistently been such provision, "License and Agreement" between the Postmaster part of the General and the BBC.4 1Williams, 109—123. 2Bulletin Officiel du Congo Belge, November 2, 1947, 1132‘. Bulletin usuefdes lois et arrétés, 1930, No. 370, 1044. Cf. Emery, Journalism Monographs, No. 1, 5. 3Sec. 19 (l) , The Nigerian Broadcasting Corpora- tion Ordinance, 1956, No. 39. 15 (3) of the 1952 License and Agreement. 4Sec. 320 Languages used in broadcast programming. --The language policy of the broadcasting organizations reflected well the general policy relative to the mother tongues of the metropolitan countries and the spreading of that tongue to the colonial possessions. In all three cases, the colonial powers began broadcasting in only the lan- guage of the colonizers: French and Flemish in the Belgian Congo, French in the French Congo, and English in Nigeria. In the domestic broadcasting, the need for the use of vernacular languages soon was felt, and since 1949 in Belgian Congo at least four main native languages were used, even though the African programs amounted to only about 20 per cent of the total programming of Radio-Congo- 1 In the use of vernaculars, the Belgians built Belge. upon the educational system which taught, at its elemen- tary level, a great number of peeple in the native mother- tongues. The direct rule, though, even when modified, required knowledge of French on the part of at least some Congolese; the authorities, however, were not interested in assimilating the natives, and certainly not in the creation of an elite:2 -- and the teaching of French (and Flemish) was not encouraged. The British also used vernaculars in their education 1UNESCO, Press, Film,FRadio, V, 39?. 2Helen Kitchen (ed.), The Educated African (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 192. 321 of the native Africans, but only on the very primary level; the English language was regarded as a necessity In broadcasting, in all schooling above primary grades. English was used throughout the broadcast schedule, though newscasts and certain other programs were broadcast in number of vernaculars, by 1960 amounting to seventeen. But even in broadcasts to schools, Nigerian government officials and the broadcasting organizations stressed the need for programs in English.2 Broadcasting in English was for Great Britain a wonderful opportunity to carry out its work of civilization. No other colonial power felt such opportunity more strongly, however, than did France. Their deep commitment to using French as the carrier and disseminator of culture and western civilization could not produce a vernacular broadcasting service, as it would have led to "an indirect 3 To French- encouragement of the citizenry's disunion." men, and to Africans in any French territory, that would be like [asking] the French network [to] ovencal or in breton, thus broadcast daily in r indicating to the people of these two provinces that th. Britain, Colonial Office, The Place of the Vernacular in Native Education (African, No. 1110; London 0. , 1927] , 4. Mackay, 81. The first Ford Foundation Grant to 2 Nigerian educational radio programs stated that "the programs should primarily be designed to improve English H. M. 8. language usage." 3Bebey, 15 8 . 322 they are finding themselves on French soil just be- cause they are not somewhere else. The language is the first ingredient of unity of a country. While the French were willing to concede that any modern language was better than any vernacular in scien- tific instruction, they were convinced that no other language could surpass French as the most effective means of comunicating the literary, spiritual and humanistic treasures of civilization which -- according to them —- reached its peak in the French culture. The French were proud of their language's richness of vocabulary, order and clarity of its syntax, the harmony of its pronounciation. It is no wonder that at the 1944 Brazzaville Conference it was decided that it was most desirable to use French exclusively as the language of instruction at all levels and in all territoriesz, even though other civilizing and acculturating programs could be modified by special adaptations to local conditions.3 Equally understandable is the French belief that . . no reconciliation, i. e., assimilation of the Metropolitans and the natives is in effect possible when both are hitting against impassable barriers of linguistics.4 To them, the French language has been much more than that: it has become the language of all humanity. lIbid. 2France, Ministere des Colonies, Conference Afric; aine (Paris: Ministere de la France d' Outre—Mer, 1937.12- 'I‘ s was simply a reiteration of the official policy since 1890' s. 4 Grenier, 132. Ibid., 133. It?”””’i v I 1‘ illwi‘ll‘ll‘lll‘i 323 Policies on professional training for radio broad- casting. -—Radio broadcasting is not unique in its demands for trained personnel, but as a new activity in which the colonial governments had engaged, the new medium possessed a very low priority in the total develOpment programs. This was quite naturally reflected in the low priority as far as training was concerned. And yet, it was pointed out that the first essential in organizing a broadcasting system in an underdeveloped area is a local staff skilled and experienced in the fundamental art of presentation,1 and, it could be added, in the technical operation and maintenance of the system. At the very beginning, all three colonial powers relied on staff brought from the mother country. The dif— ference between the training policies of Great Britain, Belgium and France can be seen in the degree in which the colonial authorities were willing to train local staff, and in the method through which this was to be accomplish- ed. Again, the overall colonial policy on political develOpment can be easily seen in the area of staff train- ing for broadcasting. The British policy, as can be re- called, directed itself to an eventual self-government. The complete "Nigerianization" of the broadcasting service, as in other governmental and non—governmental activities, lCodding , 54 . 324 was the ultimate goal.1 Already the first Director-General of the Nigerian Broadcasting Service, T. W. Chalmers (1951-1957), stated that the declared aim of the NBS is to train Nigerians to run the service with the same standards as those set by the BBC. Nothing less is worthy of this country and people.2 As the broadcaster-historian commented, this statement was made just one year after the establishment of the service, and at that time ten per cent of the staff were the so-called "expatriates," mostly the British on second- ment from the BBC.3 The training method employed by the British was the "on—the-job" instruction by experienced BBC staff members who conducted workshops or training sessions in the African countries: Staff training and development had to proceed simultaneously, and shortage of teachers, facilities and equipment made the utmost demands on the peOple involved. Training was to be in Nigeria where Nigeri- ans would learn by actual operation and example and at times this was accomplished at the expense of listeners. The advantage of course was the immediate evaluation in learning by actual performance and personal application to the problems. This more than offset the disadvantage of having semi-trained staff on the air.4 1Bebey, 158. 2T. W. Chalmers, Five Years of Broadcastin 1951- Federal Information SerVice, n.d.T, I . 1956 (Lagos: 3Mackay, 38. Mackay himself was an expatriate, but a New Zealander. He was the last expatriate Director- General of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation from 1961 to 1964. 41b1a.,39. 325 The emphasis on training within Nigeria increased as time went on, but it was by no means the only training scheme put into operation. Provision was made for select- ed candidates to undertake the BBC courses in Great Britain. The Staff Training Department of BBC, established in 19362, was reorganized in 1941 to be able to absorb personnel from other Commonwealth countries.3 The program of Nigerianization progressed slowly in all departments (programming,administration, news) with the exception of engineering where it proceeded too quickly, and where consequently the degree of competence declined. The total broadcasting operation of the NBC achieved full Nigerianization by 1964 when E. V. Badejo took over as the first native Director-General of the Corporation. The system of training in the French-oriented and associated territories took an entirely different route. Though from the first, some Africans had been employed by the regional management of the Radio—Television Francaise in Brazzaville (which also operated the Radio-AEF until lIn Nigeria, the employment in broadcasting was associated with educational achievements, and a fixed pattern of selection and recruitment, based on listed qualifications, was established. Ibid., 40. 2313c, Handbook, 1964, 155. 31bid., 75; Mackay, 4o. 4Mackay, 154. 326 1957) , the training within a French overseas territory was minimal. The Metropolitan Broadcasting Organization trained some Africans, in production and technical serv- ices, on the spot, but the unique training scheme was developed in 1954 when the Studio-School of Overseas Broadcasting (Le Studio-Ecole de la Radiodif fusion Outre— {435) was established: In France, a novel experiment was begun . when a broadcasting station was constructed in the Forest of St. Germain, near Paris, for the training of staff for overseas stations. The station, whose transmitter caters for listeners in the neighbourhood, includes studios and other equipment. An attempt is made to reproduce the actual conditions which trainees will encounter in their home territories . . . . One of the centre's major purposes is to make possible the "steady Africanization" of higher level staffs of overseas territories.l The selection of candidates for the Studio-School is by competition. The idea behind the training at this school, which preceded the establishment of the SORAFOM just by a very few months, was the need to localize (Africanize) the middle- and upper-echelon personnel. In this, the concept was similar to that of the British, but unfortunately, this apparent analogy remained theoretical only during the first few years of existence of the studio- school; during those years, the competition for entry into the school was Open to Africans as well as -- to young Frenchmen, to be exact. That Europeans was an error for it needs to be recognized that the Africans and the Madagascarians recruited from the training, being almost always less educated than the Frenchmen, were because of it destined to hold only 1 Codding, 54; cf. France, Outre-Mer, 1958, 504. 327 secondary positions in the overseas radio stations, whose directorial positions were entrusted to the more educated former students, the Frenchmen. In spite of this problem,the efforts of the Studio-School appear to have been appreciated. From the French point of view, perhaps, the mixing of the French and territorial students only supported the long-standing French notion that they all were Frenchmen. Thus, it might be concluded that Africanization, though practiced in broadcasting training by both France and Britain, did not mean the same thing to both. For Belgium, however, Africanization was a term practically unknown, and creation of an elite -- strongly implied in any organized training for positions of responsibility in broadcasting -- considered undesirable. The 1920 premise of the Belgians . . . not [tolattempt to form Europeanized natives but to train Africans better equipped for life, pos- sessing greater skill, and instructed in the know- ledge that suits their mentality and their environ- ment, :mas pursued throughout the colonial regime whose . . . aim was to lead the Congolese toward a measure of civilization and progress rather than to form a small group of ersatz European elite who would not be likely to have an interest in the welfare of the masses of Africans.3 1Bebey, 159-160. 2Kitchen, 142. 3Pierre Ryckmans, former Governor-General of the Belgian Congo, in 1953, quoted in ibid., 192. 328 For broadcasting, there was no formal or informal .training scheme ever established by the Belgians. Engi- neers and technicians for the Telecommunications Depart- ment of the colonial government were trained at the Colonial School in Belgium, but they all were Belgian nationals.1 At one time, a privately organized course, with some relevance to broadcasting, was offered by a Belgian journalist: . . .[the] nine—weeks' course in journalism which included a Special lecture on broadcasting . . . was opened only to Africans working in press and radio. It was attended by three members of the African Broadcasts staff of Radio-Congo—Belge and four members of the Colonial Army engaged in the preparation of the army's educational programmes. So far this is the only form of professional training for radio that has been given in the Congo itself . . ... Programme staff for Radio- Congo-Belge is engaged by the Ministry for Colonies, but there’Is no organized training course. In retrospect, the lack of policy, on the part of the Belgians, for training Africans in broadcasting, is i3: sharp contrast to the other two powers' policies, but in complete agreement with the Belgian point of view pursued in the sphere of political and educational deve lopment . 1UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 400. 21bid. 329 International Involvement of Colonial Powers and Their Colonies in Broadcastihg Matters In the process of doing this study, a number of rather interesting discoveries were made pertaining to the involvement of colonial powers with radio communication matters on the international level. When probing the areas of international organization and of regulation in the field of telegraphic as well as radio communications, the possibilities were revealed of discovering striking dif- ferences in the approaches of the major powers to commu— nication problems in the international arena. Clearly, it was outside the sc0pe of this work to include a substantial discussion of this nature. On the other hand, a complete neglect and disregard of the existence of a promisingly fertile field of study seemed equally unthinkable. The compromise resulted in brief [descriptions of some of the most intriguing aspects which ‘wiJJ.have to await further attention -— by this or some ¢other writer -- at a more opportune time. The Wireless (Pre-Broadcast) Era In most instances, there appears to have been clifferences of opinion between Great Britain and France in matters involving wireless and its international regula- tion. From the time of the first Radiotelegraph Conference 111 1903 at Berlin, these two powers, with very few 330 exceptions, stood on the opposing sides of most arguments. While Britain was intent on preserving the lead of the British Marconi over its non-British competitors, France, often with considerable support of other nations, was equally intent on breaking the British Marconi‘s monopoly. The study of what today appears to have been a tug-of- war between the two major powers tends to provide some support to the contentions made earlier in this chapter, as well as to explain further the reasons why each power acted the way it did at any given time in its colonies and other extensions of its empire. Not only the major powers, but even a small col- ony like Belgian Congo could be discovered to have made a significant contribution to radiotelegraphic regulation of service between fixed (as Opposed to ship—to-ship or ship-to—shore) stations. In 1912, Belgian Congo was look- ing ahead and toward the day when it would have a direct communication with Belgium.1 Together with its mother country, it planned to span almost 3,800 miles between Brussels and Boma, the then capital of Belgian Congo.2 Belgian Congo, therefore, suggested that the .service between fixed points be provided for in the :regulations that were being drawn up in London. The British 1Bureau of International Telegraphic Union, - Documents: Confe’rence Radiotelegraph%que Internationale gi Londres (Geneva:]:. T. U., 1912), . 2 The Statesman's Yearbook, lgld, 702. 331 objected but a recommendation to the effect that no inter- communication could be allowed to be refused because of the use of apparatus of different makes, was put forth. Great Britain refused to allow the interpretation of this recommendation to imply an obligatory service, and final— ly prOposed a regulation which gave each country the right to organize the services between fixed points. Though in this argument there were no winners, the fact that Great Britain was not permitted to "steal another 1was considered very significant. march on other powers" No less significant was the Belgian Congo's plan itself, especially because of its early introduction into the sphere of communication possibilities. The First World ‘War delayed considerably its fulfillment but the service 'was finally reported to be in operation in 1925.2 The Broadcasting Era, 1927 On Early after the introduction of broadcasting as a form of communication, problems began presenting them- selves and began also posing a new challenge to inter- :national legislation. In addition to technical questions, such as assignments of wave-lengths specifically reserved :for'broadcasting, there were problems of copyright to be settled, and also the international aspects (from the 1Tomlinson, 36. 2The Statesman’s Yearbook, 1925, 703. 332 audiences' point of view) to be recognized and solved. Even the League of Nations became concerned with the issues, especially the last mentioned.1 Some Continental concerns suggested an internation- al conference at Geneva, but an insistence was expressed on participation by the British Broadcasting Company. J. C. W. Reith, the BBC's Managing Director,declined to participate mainly because the sponsoring Swiss organi- zation showed a greater interest in proselytizing Esperanto as an international language than in solving broadcasting matters. . . . Why not spread British thought in English or French which are increasingly understood?2 Reith noted on that occasion. From this humble beginning in 1925 grew a number of related issues which put the British interests often at odds with the interests of other nations, and particu- larly those of France. The imperial rivalry between the two powers in the field of international regulation of ibroadcasting as well as of other telecommunications could easily be documented from the reportscf various confer- ences, from the 1903 Berlin Conference on. One instance of this rivalry involved international broadcasting, and 'though it concerned primarily (but not exclusively) the lxroadcasting station Radio—Luxembourg, which beamed com- xmercial programs -- to England -- in English, it deserves lBriggs, I, 310. 21bid., 311. 333 a further mention here because Of the principle which was at stake. The principle was that of the right to engage in broadcasting to other countries in whatever language. It seems safe to conclude that France was actually defending commercial interests in broadcasting; on the other hand, it also must be stated that France did not attempt to prohibit the practice of commercial international broad- casting even though it was also directed against their own State broadcasting service -— in French. The British, however, appear to have altogether discarded the principle primarily because the financial benefits accrued to the competitors. Some British companies were in on the deal together with the French but . . . it was naturally a matter of some distress to the companies to be dependent on a French group, and they made strenuous efforts [in 1937] to extend the scope of their Operations. . . .1 It was at this time that the British commercial interests proposed the operation of a broadcasting station from aboard ships, an effort which did not succeed and which smas outlawed —— on the insistence of the British Govern- Iment —- at the 1938 Telecommunications Conference at Cairo. But the whole episode is puzzling for one major reason -- that of the British insistence at 1932 and 1938 ccurferences that broadcasting ought to be considered only Sir Osborne Mance, International Telecommunica- tions (London: Oxford University Press, 1913), 39. 334 a national service,1while the British Broadcasting Company in 1924-1925 fought for the establishment of an interna- tional body on the basis that broadcasting is internation- al in scope. J. C. W. Reith himself stated in 1923 that he would have liked to organize broadcasting in India from London.2 The late 1920's were filled with plans for international broadcasting by the British Broadcasting Corporation. Why should it be right "to spread British 3 thought in English or French" in 1924, in Arabic in 1938, and in some 40 other languages in 1960, but no foreign thoughts in English in the 1930's? Though it might appear that the difference was considered important on account of the type of propaganda used, it seems highly probable that the place of origination had always been of primary import.4 As already indicated, the inclusion of the commu- nication policies of colonial powers on the international level should be used as illustrative Of the differences among the powers in attitudessas well as methods, and at 1Tomlinson, 160, 224. 2J. C. W. Reith, Into the Wind (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1949), 113. 3Supra,332. 4Cf. supra, 333. 5Note that attitudes of the three powers toward internal systems of broadcasting also differed signifi— cant1y:infra, 341. 335 the same time exemplifying the relationship of their poli- cies in communication matters with those pertaining to other areas of colonial and imperial endeavor. Business, shipping, monopolistic and imperial considerations dictated the international actions of perhaps most powers, but certainly and especially those of Great Britain. CHAPTER VII BROADCASTING IN THE LIGHT OF GENERAL COLONIAL AND IMPERIAL POLICIES The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has concerned itself since its inception in 1946 with the standards of various mass media in all countries, and on the basis of many surveys, it determined which nations provided for their populations a sufficient access to news and information. In one such survey, UNESCO adopted the criterion that a country is in— adequately supplied with information media if it has less than 10 copies of daily newspapers, less than five radio receivers and less than two cinema seats per 100 inhabitants.1 The survey found that there existed a wide gap between the standards of developed countries andfliose of the so called develOping nations. It also found that in the field of broadcasting, as of other media,Africa is by far the worst equipped. With [a few exceptions], few countries have as many as one receiver per 100 inhabitants.2 Many factors have since been cited as having 1Codding, 48. This criterion was first mentioned in UNESCO, World Communications, 1959 (3rd ed.), 48-49. 2 Codding, 48. 336 337 contributed toward this wide gap between countries and continents, and some correlations were found between number of receiver sets and some economic and educa- tional indicators, such as per capita income and the level of literacy.1 A question, however, which might -- and should -- be raised is whether colonial policies of the metropolitan countries had been among the contributing factors. In a simple language, this question can be re- phrased to read "Why did the colonial powers not reach these minima in their respective dependencies?" Why, indeed,did the Independence Day in Nigeria, the French Congo and Belgian Congo in 1960 see the number of radio receivers at such a lOw level, when broadcast- ing had already such a long history there? Broadcasting was introduced to the three African territories, in one form or another, some twenty-five years before the terri- tories achieved independence. If the colonial powers themselves could have achieved almost six times the minimal standard in receiver setsz, why had not even the bare minimum been reached in the dependencies? The question in the above paragraph is indeed raised in a serious vein. It has been generated by such ‘— 1Cf., UNESCO, Mass Media in the DevelOping Countries, 16ff. 2The 1960 data for number of receivers per 100 pOpulation in Belgium, France and the United Kingdom ‘were 28.9, 28.5, and 29.3, respectively. UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 266, 280, 332. 338 comments as that of a UNESCO official who stated that the underdevelOped countries were attempting to attain in just a few years, what had taken the develOped countries 1 centuries to achieve. In broadcasting, this clearly could not be the case. An analogy can perhaps also be made with the dev— elOpment of roads and railroads. Though obviously begun later in the colonies than in the mother countries, the difference in time certainly did not amount to centuries. There had been considerable growth of roads and railroads in all three territories, and even though in neither of them these communication means were as develOped as in the metropolitan countries, the gap was substantially less pronounced there than in number of radio receivers per capita. What it amounts to is perhaps the fact that the benefit of the develOpment had to accrue primarily to the colonial powers rather than to the population of the col- ony itself. Undoubtedly, railroads were built in the first place for the benefit of the commercial interests which at the beginning were indeed not in the hands of the natives. The benefit of radio broadcasting, however, would have accrued to the colonial pOpulations. Radio broadcast-— ing could not compete with railroads and other developments, as far as their importance, as perceived by the colonial powers, was concerned. _i 1Supra, 179. 339 Perceived importance leads to the establishment of priorities and this becomes an important aspect of policy- making, if it is not in itself a policy. The previous chapters discussed the main policies which operated in the development of broadcasting. Were some of these pol— icies of such a nature that they did not allow for the minimum to be reached? Is there something to the dif— ference between the develOped and the developing, between the governing and the governed, between the "haves" and l the "have nots" than can be explained by the policies? Pace of Broadcasting Development The growth of broadcasting facilities was summa- rized in Table 5.2 A look at the data reveals that the initial thrust on develOping broadcasting in the French and Belgian Congos had occurnaiduring the Second World ‘War. A relatively great increase in the number and power of transmitters took place there between 1939 and 1946, i.e., in about six years of time marked by the national and international emergencies. If no other data were available, this might quite possibly be interpreted as a tremendously good achievement in the betterment of the inhabitants in the two territories. Such an interpreta- ‘tion might, on the other hand, be misleading, if a reali- *zation were made that the reasons for such rapid and ~—-—— 1Schramm, 9-17. ZSupra, 311. 340 substantial development had not been based primarily upon the concern of the authorities for the native populations but for the pOpulations Of the metrOpolitan areas of France and Belgium, respectively. The growth in the num- ber of receiver sets undoubtedly occurred, and in percent- ages this growth had been substantial (in both territori- es, the number of receivers per 100 inhabitants grew by approximately 213 per cent during the war years). This occurrence, however, was incidental rather than a result of a deliberate policy; as already pointed out, the receivers were more often than not in the hands of Euro— peans rather than Africans. Under the circumstances of war, the purposes and rationales of the colonial powers must be considered in [a somewhat different light. The gravity of the situation on the Euorpean continent at that time required that some such steps be taken. Yet, the fact remains that the policy (If the colonial powers at that time considered radio broadcasting not as a medium of information for the African dependencies but for the European powers and their own home pOpulations, just as it had been the policy in. the thirties to introduce the medium as an extension of the domestic broadcasting service primarily for the bene— fii: of the colonialist (i.e., non-African) inhabitants. The situation in Nigeria was somewhat different, but it too can serve to emphasize a similar point. The 341 British territory had no broadcasting transmitters on the air until well after the World War II. During the war, there appeared to be no need for Great Britain to do what farthe exiled French and Belgians had been imperative: to Obtain a strong voice that could be used not only for propaganda and counterpropaganda purposes, but also as rallying point for the domestic pOpulations in the war efforts on the side of the Allies. It could, perhaps, be argued -- and it is suSpected, argued quite convincingly-- that while Britain did not need Nigeria for broadcasting, maybe Nigeria needed Britain: history seems to rule out an absolute need of this medium in Nigeria, as the task at hand apparently had been performed well by other media, 1, but that broadcasting, had it existed especially by film in Nigeria at that time, could have contributed substan- tially cannot be doubted; it has never been officially explained why broadcasting had not been brought into the picture at such an opportune time. The delay before the war led to another after the war. Broadcasting for the Nigerians did not become a reality until some thirty years after the medium had been "discovered" -- and Nigeria was one of the largest and the second most populous of all British Colonies, after India. The pace of development is often explained by the availability or non-availability of financial resources. 1UNESCO, The Use of Mobile Cinema and Radio Vans .in Fundamental Education (London: UNESCO, Film Centre, I§Z§5, 54. 342 To say that money was not important would be unrealistic, but to explain delays and even non-action on the part of the colonial powers simply by the lack of money is only a rationalization. In transportation, fOr example, the French in the AEF spent more money per capita than did the British and the Belgians in their respective colo- nies, but transportation facilities not only did not grow more but actually declined (in terms of mileage per 1 In education, a simi- capita) over the post-WWII data. lar occurrence could be observed in Nigeria: less money was poured into educational development by the British there than by the other two powers in the two Congos, but the education index of elementary enrollment ratio2 showed an achievement in that area of endeavor higher than in the two Congos where the colonial powers spent considerably more per capita on education.3 1Based on data taken from the development plans for the three territories, and from United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1963, 319, 373, 378—79, 389, 391. 2This ratio eXpresses elementary school enndflment as a percentage of the population between the ages 5 and 14. Cf. UNESCO, World Survey of Education (Paris: UNESCO, 1960)'I' 58-600 _' 3Based on data of the development plans. Nigeria spent only 41¢ (U.S.) per capita on education, the French Congo $1.24, and Belgian Congo $3.85. The education index :for'the Belgian colony in 1960 stood at the lowest level (If all three territories, 56 compared to 75 in the French Congo and 80 in Nigeria. 343 It could well be that financial expenditures should not be considered as important as some other fac- tors, such as attitudes Of colonial powers toward a par- ticular sphere of development or their perception of the attitudes' importance. A positive and enthusiastic atti- tude quite conceivably could have resulted in a greater achievement and a negative, apathetic attitude led to less achievement than money could buy. In other words, it might indeed be true that money was not everything. The attitudes, perceptions, and commitments of colonial powers played a crucial part in broadcasting dev- elOpment on the local (colonial) level. The absence of concern for the indigenous populations, the lack of the powers' perceptiveness of the importance of broadcasting to those pOpulations, and the powers' unwillingness to make a commitment and consider broadcasting a vital force in nation-building, these seem to emerge as the most important among the dominant factors affecting par- ticularly the early stages of colonial policies on broadcasting. These factors were reflected either in the procrastinations with which the develOpment of broadcast- ing had to contend, or in the lack of policies which would facilitate such development, or in a combination of'both. The want of the concern, of the perceptiveness [and.of the commitments did not, however, manifest itself 344 to the same degree in every case. Often, the need had been modified by the overall imperial philosOphies of the colo— nial policies on political, economic and social matters, and by their particular administrative ways and methods. The relationship between the general colonial policies and the develOpment of broadcasting was pointed to at the outset. It was suggested that by "superimposing" the communication policies over the general policies on political, economic and social development, a composite picture should emerge in which the interrelationship of various policies, and similarities and differences between policies of the three Powers, will be clearly recognizable.1 The "superimposure" will be attempted in the following section of this chapter. Immediately afterwards, the imperial philosOphies and their reflections in the field of broadcasting will be discussed as a climax of the investigation, for it is the contention of this writer that the development of broadcasting, the degree of rapidity land.intensity of its develOpment, and the place which lxroadcasting was allocated in the social, economic and political life of the colonies was primarily a function of the imperial plans and practices of the three colonial powers . Supra, 68. 345 The Interrelationship of General Colonial Policies with Policies on the -fievelopment of Broadcasting To view the policies on and practices in broad— casting against the background of general colonial pol- icies seems to Offer a very profitable way of analyzing the development of broadcasting in the colonies. The approach actually appears to reinforce the notion that broadcasting, just as other electric communication means which preceded it, had been conceived and utilized not at par with other social develOpments or economic institu- tions but only as channels useful for nothhximore than helping to carry through other policies, practices and develOpments which on the whole were judged more important. In other words, broadcasting appeared at the conclusion of the colonial era in the three dependencies to be not agents of social and political and economic interaction, but at best as channels used in such interaction, and molded in the image of political structure within which .it was to be used. Policies on Political Development Policies and practices of colonial powers in political develOpment of colonies are reflected in the publicies and practices in broadcasting. For example, the idea to federate the colony of South Nigeria and Protec- torate of Lagos with Northern Nigeria was within a few l-|1|.||.lu|lp|l.lll!|1 346 years paralleled by the concept of regional broadcasting, later changed, as the autonomy of various regions changed, into several independent broadcasting services. In the French territory of the Congo, the assimi- lation policies, as far as political institutions as well as broadcasting services were concerned, resulted in organizational structures and operating procedures iden— tical with those found in the metropolitan country. In Belgian Congo, broadcasting, though controlled by the state, could not be said to have formed a unified struc- ture under the Belgian administration; serious, con- scientiously applied planning was missing in that terri- tory in broadcasting as it was on political level. Policies on and practices in political and edu— cational development are also reflected in the kind and (degree of training made available for broadcasting person- nel. Nigerianization was the announced goal, and train- ing program designed toward reaching that goal. The French, Inaintaining the assimilation goal even through the stages of policy of association, conveniently applied the prin- ciples of equality also in training, so that in many instances Frenchmen were trained alongside the Africans, aJui were allowed to compete on an equal footing with them. 131 the Belgian Congo, no plans for equality or "Congoliza- ‘ticu1" existed on political level and no training scheme for broadcasting was developed. 347 The Administration Methods An application of the administrative methods used by the colonial powers can also be seen in the broadcast- ing field. Nigerian regionalization of broadcasting serv- ices is an example of the indirect method; direct admin- istration and control of broadcasting could be seen in the French Congo; mixed administration methods were present in the Belgian territory, where direct control was inter- Spread with indirect control, e.g., in the state and private broadcasting structure. Use of the vernacular languages likewise can be paralleled with the method of administration. In Nigeria, though English was used throughout the colonial period, many vernaculars were introduced into the broadcasting schedules on a regular basis. In the French Congo broad- casting vernaculars were relatively unimportant, though they became more important after the French Community was established. The mixed administrative method in Belgian Congo showed through in the separate programming services for EurOpean and African audiences. The Economic and Social Deve10pment The economic develOpment policies also provide examples of parallelism with broadcasting. In the British situation, all communication links between the home country and the colonies were considered mainly to the extent in 348 which they contributed to the enhancement of trade, in- dustry or financial imperialism of Britain. Broadcasting also formed such a link, and was originally meant to enhance cultural imperialism. In the strictly economic sense, broadcasting facilities were to be preferably of British origin, though some non-British equipment had to be used. The French established their own protective economic policies, designed to benefit the whole French empire but often enhancing only the interests of metro- politan France. Tariff and fiscal policies as applied to radio receivers and radio parts, as well as to educational program materials, can be cited as examples. Economic policies regulating the Belgian colony reflected the international concern with that part of Africa, where the ideal of an "Open-door" trade policy was to remain. Eco- nomic profits, however, were deliberately applied toward the social and health benefits of the Congolese, and not to any communication media. As in trade, Congolese broad— casting depended more on contacts with the rest of Africa and the world than with Belgium itself. The summary of the few observations and conclusions as well as some others, is recapitulated in Table 6, and includes information on the interrelationship of broad- casting develOpment with colonial policies on Empire relations. This relationship is judged to be of such 349 i, mowOfiHOA cmfiuaom cw mowOHHOA cocmum monumeoe smashes vooufipcw can on .ccwummo oocmum smegma Aucwummo mHo>oH soon so .HchHm Wd upooun a“ O>Humuomo comm tuneup coo ucoEOOHOmet Ion mmuau can Hmuopom WWW on can Enwamcuouma mawrz mfiOHumm a weary mm3 ouco oco .mEmumww mcwummo enur: .mowuwuonusm ofi powwow afico .ocwummoomoun we upmoun 5" pouomamou mugs mum...” uw mm pmumuwmo was» counumnmmo paw :ofiumnwcmm .EmfiHmGOwoom Hmofluwaoa Wren .mcfiunm0pmoun cw “omcoo 3H0 wnu cw pmuoonmu no; on» .pouuoaasm maummum Ho 9.: cmwmamm a“ poocwpw>w mmfiuouauumu may mcwuwu .Oucw swam cofiumuumacws "no nos coHumuuuwcwfipm p932 Indie—pm mo cornea uomuwo not m0 @059: uomufiocH mu .ocwunoo upmoun Ga escrow mcwcwmuu .mcwummo oz .omwsuosuo no Hana upmoun aw meowuwmom nuance .muwao ounmuo ou mmmum now How pwuomfioo .Hoom ups» mo ucoew>mwnom daemon oz .owma ou Hague uaaocucm>o 0:3 .swE m mru pum3ou pumw>op .u d umsn Hausa ommaomcoo may Inasmum Ham on :muwacsvoe mcwcwmua .Aposmusm a.ao mo magmas Hmofiufiaom oz wanes cu aaucmwco>coo mamsouoow> mmmum mcfiummo mmwnu outflow oocmum momma—were no Inboun mo COAuMNflcmwummufiz mtum. .ocaumMOUmoun coowumd mo moacofloo mo unmocoo one Hmuouc uneconommsm .cT:e mcwccmHm nsowucmfiomcoo Imamm Snow on .ocfiummo wws .msuu oz .mcwumamewucoo .coHummoxm 0c upmoun cw aucmficum>om W.Lm pcomon wauuwa auo> can on on mp3 mcwumoopmoum Imawm ou mwuocfiz wowsm macwmamm may mowuooum .owuw cmufiaomouuwfi Ga 0» vacuum nsowomcoo aw .ucoemOHm>mp onwummo wmocu mxwa umsm chHusu upmoun mo noon on uoccmo Iwumcw aufi3 mommuo>o HHOm .Emumam HMOHuHHom menu access .mcmonmm gunmen umsn muo3 mow: suds mafia so pmcmwmoc Emu can an pmumHmEmucoo IOHOO hangaom cocoum mo 1m>m mcwummopmoun tam .co unmemofizrmp Hmowuflnoa 02 fine: on» m9: cowumawsfimmd powwow coHuoHOpmm mo Enos omcou cowmflmm cw occou maps“: on» owuwoflz aw EmvH mo useEcOHo>wp so mowOHHOQ cues mowowaom Hmwcoaoo Hmuocom mo mwrmcowuwaouuoucHuu.o Manda mcfiuwMOOMOHn 350 popcmmmp oocou cmfimaom .wanwhmpwm Icoo pmuoasmou nmz mcmmfi cOwumEHOMcw ou mmmooo usn .muwuocon anamon can Hmaoom a“ omoHomcou may on co @8me woman no muwmoum can Honouwaom .Ofifiocoow mo mmamwocwum may .moowu locum on» uo: «H .Ammflu louwuuwu .Hocwc mocmum maoz3 can no mummumu law may oocmncm Ou Mocha CH pormflflnmumo mmOw>mp can mowowaom o>ouowuonm one oedema sore soars cw ucmuxm or» on Mano ncofiumuooflmcoo OHEocooo so cassava“ :OwumOHGsEEOO .mcfiummupmoun coca ucmuuome OHOE mum3 AfloaoamCMM no Hmwuumspcw .umwafiucmouoav nwwowaom ormouooa uo SBIOIIOd quemdotanaa .Amcwumo0pmoun mo :OHuOHomo mumum can muo>wuao Ewumwm pmxwz .ucmuuomE« oou cocoon no: muouwcoHOO may mo mommamcma .pomnouum mamasomcum> ”mcmofiu 1mm can mcmomOHSM How mumummmm ocfiEEoumoum .Awnoaomcou man an moaumwmumm OGADmMOOMOHQ Chum: mo mucwcwucwoe .moo madam seam one on House Home 0» come mums omeomcoo soars sosounu uposuma .Emummm ccfifimoopnoun Gonzo septum awesome vomuwa .muouuos ocwunoopooun tam Hana nuwaom so Hmucwtwosw >aco memosucma umasoocum> unocwuh m>m3am mmmamcmn =.Houucoo pocket smooco #0:: coon m>mn ou warm on canon sown sumac ca manna era has IOHOO or» an no: .Ouuwz can an powwow mp3 uw can 1: ochU socmum can .GOAUMHOQHOO owansm o co o0a>uon Hmucwficum>om o Eoum "mcwummopwoun cw cascade coflumuwmo mo EMOm so ucmpw>m panama uoouach .pcsoum ween umOH II momsmsma :maamcm In Houomm ucwhmacs ucmuuomfiw umOE mamcwm one .mcwumwopmoun so mean “moonsmcma unasomcuo> poms cofiumuumwcwEtm uoouwch .ouw mocmpcmamchIUmom or» cw moocmsommcoo mSOwumm to: EmeMGOwowm .Amcw lummopoonn can Hoowuwaoac (Denatzuoo) Spoqnaw eAruezqsrurmpv uo serortod omcou cowmamm cw mowOfiHom cmfimaom canoe cases: was GM moonwaom nocmuh "i 1“ manomfiz aw mofiowdom :mwuwum EmuH pma:wu:00|l.m mamde 351 .wcfiumoopmoun cw uo>o pmwuumo no: was was» non nu engages» Howummfia mo mmmfimam oEOm .owpmu :Emon: can mcamnmmaou mmoaouwz cH .mano .bnmoom on on newuow>coo mHupHH nuw3 tam ODMH 00» pomomoum nm3 ave: IOEEOO ommaomcoolomamm .Hmzoa Hoocoaoo m on on .aufiaflnm mauuwa m .mocm Ifiuomxo o: .muwmmc oz .anwcmufluwo nmsouny .OHQOOQ co mmmuum .mcwummo upmoun savanna 5:3 msoeta Iconwm wm3 oaawbouuwum Iofitnm .mcwumoopmoun cH .GOAumeHw>wo nocwuh muauwaomoua 0» Oman «mnemmou wmcwmop can moon» MOM mcofluoofic nsEEOO twpsaocw use: Issac aneummfiw nocmum .OHOM anacoHoo oucw oocmum poouow coumo tuna loam sues :Oaueuonsoo i = o 203 : saws moamomm HmflcoHoo vomccoo ou enemas co uoc.mmcommp was woman so comma mnmz wowowaom newuouwcsfieoo wauwQEH .muowumoumms umos pmuopfiucoo was ncofiuoc mo cofiuoumpmm mmooH m .stom HMfl:OHoo m on on .pwpooc paw .pwusmz :wmuflum umouu eardmg uo_seportoa suoraetau .Esfimamm O O O )a d mo mm z W mmmcwmuupauow ...—0.30m 0: not: when? my Mo 3 m. an m p a «c m monomp uwnuocm MOM van u a o I. mucosamcw “mummum moo» . a. To 0 mums» unaummopmoun CH mcwummooooun cousins; rum u .... . u o.o .Esamamm «0 women scam .mnon3huo>m cwficocmuh madam Oweocooo Hmong hummus. luom mo ucwpcwmoocw mp3 an noon: mum3 noun» .Emwamwuwm Ww wro van .mpmuu cbwouom :0 ImeEwmmo COwumowCSEEoo IE“ Owfiocoom mo mocm>po (.1 u omcou cowmaom cw Occoo capo“: on» ofiummfiz cw EmuH mowudaom cmficamm cw mmwowHom socwum moaoeaoe smashes ooscaucoouu.o mamas 352 interest and import that a discussion of it is contained in a separate section. Broadcastipgand the Empire POIicies“" l The earlier description of imperial policies on communications suggested that imperial cohesion was enhanced by the availability of communication links. This was stated to have been particularly the case in the British Empire where the communication system "was valu- able in serving the cause of national and imperial soli- darity."2 In the French Empire, communication links helped establish the idea of commonality, of being a part of one France, one French culture.3 Solidarity Within The Empires But the two largest Empires were just as dis- similar in structure as they were in the policies and jphilosOphies governing the structures. The degree of soli- hom.uozlmuuso.c mocmum cw mmLOMwumwsmz "mwmmmc mmma noxiouuso .H0210uu50rmxmocoum mm mm movabuwm .mocmum .mmmH .xoonuoom Housemauoum .mcoeuoz oouHoo .Nmm .HomH .uoo» 0:» mo soom ooaccouHum .oHuHHo .x uomm .xH .Ammmac ..pm spam .mowccmuwum wwcmmmOHuNUGm "so comma oeoHo ompo coma .H massage Eoum Aocmum 302v ocmum smo>sozm . NH swarm 34mm new new Omoe are are some at. a: o u Hg. nfiowm somm. mmmm. mew. rem. Omen. «om. sow. reom. HHN. ..... .wn.H¢ .s.o oo.~ oo.m oo.~ Rota Ea Ré 24. mm.m EN o u up H oEood om om om we as as as em on .... one u Hm cmmmwm as «so H u out m as «so H u as H meoH .uonouoo sous reoH .uonsmuamm HHuc: was «so and O 0.00 O O O a o o 0000 0 n a” o a om firm com 83 mHom m or m on 3 o s H 6.8.8 «.83 omm o2 oHH 8.? com 3.3 mH.m one u Hm . umom HE . omn— Hflam mmwocouuso $2 83 $3 meow 38H $2 £3 33 owmaumama .mowocouuso coHOHON cmuuwaom can .m.D mo nouns om:mnoxm::.m wands BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Public Documents Belgian Congo. Bulletin Officiel du Copgo Belge. 1908—1960. Belgian Congo and Ruandi-Urundi Information and Public Re- lations Office. Belgian Congo. 2 vols. Brussels: InforCongo, 1959. Belgium. Bulletin usuel des lois et arrétés. 1900-1960. France. Journal Officiel de la Republigue Francaise. 1870- 1900. France. Ministere de la France d'Outre-Mer. Inventaire Spcial et Egonomique de§_Territoires d'Outre—Mer. Paris: Hinistére de la France dTOutre—Mer, 1955. France. Service de la France d'Outre—Mer. Outre—Mer 1958. Paris: Service des Statistiques d'outre—mer, 1959. French Equatorial Africa. Journal Officiel de l'AEF. 1929— 1960. Great Britain. Broadcasting Committee Report. The Sykes Committee Report. Cmd. 1951. 1923. Great Britain. Colonial Deve10pment and Welfare Acts. Cmd. 672. 1959. Great Britain. Imperial Conference, 1930: Appendices to the Summary of Proceedings. Cmd. 3717. November, 1930. Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (5th series). (Com- Great Britain. Report by the Resumed Conference 9n the Nigerian Constitution held in LonHOn in January and Fehruary, 1954. Cmd. 9059.ww Great Britain. Report of the Broadcasting Committee. [The Crowford Committee]. Cmd.72599. 1925. 373 374 Great Britain. Report of the Commission of Higher Educa— tion in West Africa. Cmd. 6655. 1945. Great Britain. Summarygof the Report of the Independent Committee of‘Enquiry ihto the Overseas Information Service. Cmd. 9138. April,ll954. Great Britain. Colonial Office. Annual Report on the So- cial andiEconomic Progress of the Peoplg;_of Nigeria,—l935. No. 1763. London: H. M. S. O., 1935. Great Britain. Colonial Office. The Colonial Empire, 1947— 1948. Cmd. 7433. June, 1948. Great Britain. Colonial Office. Colonial Report 1932—1933. London: H. M. S. 0., 1933. Great Britain. Colonial Office. Interim Report of a Com— mittee on Broadcasting_Services in the Colonies and BroadcastingServicesin the Colonies: lst Supplement to the Interim Rgport of the Committee. Colonial No. 139. London: ColonialOifice, 1937- 1939. Great Britain. Colonial Office. Report by thg_Conference on the Nigerian Constipptibn Held in London in July and August, 1953. Cmd. 89342 1953. ‘Great Britain. Colonial Office. Repprt of the Commission on Enquiry into the Discoveries in the Eastern Provinces of Nigeria, November, 1949. COlonial No. 256. London: Colonial Office, I950. Great Britain. Colonial Office. Summary of Proggedings of the Imperial Conference of 1926. Cmd. 2768. 1926. Nigeria. Collated Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos. Lagos: Feredal Government Printer, n.d. Nigeria. House of Representatives: Debates. The Third Session, March 6-25, 1954. Lagos: Federal Govern— ment Printer, 1954. Nigeria. Department of Statistics. POpulation Census of Ni eria, 1963. Lagos: Federal Government Printer, l964. Nigeria. The Federal Information Service for the Chief Federal Advisor on Education. Digest of Statistics, 1960. Lagos, 1960. I 375 Books Almond, Gabriel A. and Coleman, James S. (eds.). The Po- litics of the Develgping Areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, I960. Barnes, Harry Elmer. Society in Transition; Problems of a Changing Age. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939. Batten, T. R. Problems of African Development. London: Oxford University Press,ll947. . Thoughts on African Citizenship. London: Oxford Uhiversity Press, 1944. Beaulieu, Paul Leroy. De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes.(n.p., n.n.), 1874. Bebey, Francis. La Radiodiffusion en Afrique noire. Issy- les-Moulineaux, France: Editions Saint-Paul, 1963. Belgium. Academie Royale des Science d'outre-mer. Livre Blanc: Apport scientifigue de la Belgiqge au developpement de l‘Afrique centrale. 3 vOls. Bruxelles: Academie Royale des Sciences d'outre- mer, 1963. Benians, E. A. et al. (eds). The Empire -- Commonwealth, l870—l9l9. Vol. III of The Cambridge History of the British Empire. CamEfidge:*UhIVersity Press, 1959. Briggs, Asa. The History of Broadcasting in the Unitgg Kin dom. Vol. I: The Birthlof Broadcastipg. London: Oxford University Press, I961. Brown, Frank James. The Cable and Wireless Communications of the World. London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, f Ltd., 19270 Brown, William 0. (ed.). Contemporary Africa: Trends and Issues. Philadelphia: The Annals of the American Association of Political and Social Sciences. Vol. CCIIC, March, 1955. Bruel, George. La France Equatoriale Africaine. Paris: Larose Editeur, 1935. 376 Brunschwig, Henri. Mythes et Réalités de l'Imperialisme Colonial Francais, 1871-1914. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1960. Bryson, Lyman (ed.). The Communication of Ideas. A Series of Addresses. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1964. Burns, A. C. Histopy of Nigeria. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1942. Busia, K. A. The Challenge of Africa. New York: F. A. Praega', Inc., 1962. Callaway, Archibald, et.al. The Nigerian Political Scene. New York: Duke University Press, Dufham and Cambridge University Press, 1962. Carter, Gwendolene M. (ed). Five African States: Responses to Diversity. Ithaca, New York} Cornell University Press,’i963T Charles-Roux, J. Les Colonies Francaises. Publication de la commission chargee de preparer la participa- tion du Ministere des Colonies a l' Exposition Universelle de 1900. Paris: Austin Challamel, Librairie Maritime et Coloniale, 1901. Childe, Gordon V. What Happened in_History. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd.,ll942. Childs, Harold L. and Whitton, John B. (eds.). Pro a anda by Short-Wave. Princeton: University Press, I942. Codding, George A. Jr. Broadcasting Without Barriers. Paris: UNESCO, 1959. Coleman, James S. Nigeria: Background to Napionalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, I960. Dareste, Pierre. Traité de Droit Colonial. Paris: n.n., 1931. ‘1 Davis, Jackson, et al. Africa Advancing; A Study of Rural Education and Agriculture in West Airica and‘the Belgian Congo. London: The Internatibnal Committee on Christian Literature for Africa, 1945. Delavignette, Robert. Servige Africain.(Problemes et Documents.) 3d ed. Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1946. 377 Deutsch, Karl W. Nationalism and Social Communication. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,41953. . The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963. Donaldson, Frances. The Marconi Scandal. New York: Har- court, Brace and World, Inc.,“l962. Doob, Leonard. Communication in Africa: A Search for Boundaries. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961. Dunand, Louis. La Conférence de Brazzaville: Orientations Sociales. Paris: Action POpulaire, 1945. DUttr Palme R. Britain's Crisis of Empire. New York: International Publishers, 1950. Easton, Stewart C. The Rise and Fall of Western Coloniahsnn New York: F. A. Praeger,Inc., I964. . The Twilight of European Colonialism. New York: HOlt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960. Emerson, Rupert. Fppm Empire to Nation: The Rise and Self- Assertion of Asian and African Peoples. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. II Fidel, Camille.La Paix Coloniale Francaise. Paris: Librai— rie Recueil Sirey, I918. Figgis, D. The Irish Constitution. Dublin: n.n., 1923. Foster M. George. Traditional Cultures; and the Impact of Technological Change. New York: Harper & Bros., Inc., 1962. Fourre, Pierre. Rapport sur l'experience d'education de base organisée par le gouvernement_genéral de l‘Afriqpe Equatoriale Francaise en oubangui—Chari. Paris: n.n., 1952. ‘ France, Anatole. La Folie Coloniale: Trente Ans de la Vie Sociale. Paris: Editions Emile—Pafil Prefes, 1949. Frankel, Peter. Wayaleshi. London: Frankenham and Reading, 1959. Girault, Arthur. The Colonial Tariff Policy of France. Oxford: Claredom Press, 1916. 378 Girault, Arthur. Principes de Colonisation et de Legis— lation Col6hiale. Vol. III: Notions Economigues. 5th ed. revised. Paris: Librairie du Recueil? Sirey, 1926-1930. Goldberry, Harvey. French Colonialism: Progress or Poverty? New York: Rihehart & Co., Inc., 1959. Gorham, Maurice. Broadcasting and Television since 1900. London: Andrew Dakers Ltd., 1952. Gould,Peter R. Africa: Continent of Change. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publications Co., 1961. Grandin, Thomas. The Political Use of the Radio.(Geneva: Studies, Vo1.X, No. 3J‘Geneva: Geneva Research Center, August, 1939. Graves, Harold N. Jr. War on the Short Wave. (Headline Series, No. 3077 New York: Foreign Policy Associa- tion, Inc., 1941. Grenier, Rene. L'Union Francaise Sera Fédérale ou Ne Sera Pas. Paris: Les Edition as Scorpion, 1956. Gruber, Ruth (ed.). Spience and the New Nations. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 196I. Gunther, John. Inside Africa. New York: Harper & Bros., 1953. Hagen, Everett E. On a Theory of Social Change: How Economic GrowthIBegins. Homewood, Iil.: n.n., 1962. Hailey, Lord. An African Survey. 2d ed. revised. London: Oxford University Press, 1957. (First edition published in 1938.) Harbison, Frederick, Myers, Charles A. Education, Manpower and Economic Growth: Strategies of Human Resources Deve10pment. New York: McGraw—Hill Inc., I964. Harmand, Jules. Domination et Colonisation. Paris: Ernest Flammarion, I919. Hayes, Carlton, J. H. A Generation of Materialism, 187l— l900. New York: Harper & Bros., 1941. Hennessy, Maurice N. The Congo: A Brief History and Apprais- 31. New York: F. A. Praeger,I96l. 379 Herring, James M. and Gross, Gerald C. Telecommunica- tions: Economics and Regulation. New York} McGraw- Hill Co., 1936. Herskovits, Merville J., Horwitz, Mitchell (eds.). Eco- nomic Transition in Africa. Evanston, Ill.: North— western University Press, 1961. Hobson, J. A. Imperialism: A Study. 3d ed. revised. Lon- don: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1948. Hodgin, Thomas. Nationalism in Colonial Africa. London: F. Mueller, 1956. Huth, Arno. Radiodiffusion, Puissance Mondiale.Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1937. ' Innis, Harold A. The Bias of Communication. Toronto: Univ- ersity of Toronto Press, 1951. Johnston, Sir Henry J. A History of the Colonization of Africa byAlien Races. cambridge: C. J. Clay and Sons, Cambridge University Press, 1899. Jome, Hiram L. Economics of the Radio Industgy. New York: A. 8. Shaw Co., 1925. Josephson, Matthew. The Robber Barons: The Great American Capitalists,—I86l — 1901. New York: Harcourt, Biace and'Co., 1934. Judd, Peter. African Independence; The Exploring Emergence of the New African Nations. New York: Dell Publish- ing Co., 1963. Keith, Arthur Berriendall (ed.). British Colonial Policy 1263~l9l7. (Selected Speeches and Documents.) London: Oxford University Press, 1948. Kimble, George H.T. TrOpical Africa. Vol. I: Land and Livelihood. Vol. II: Spciety and Polity. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund,‘1960. King, James W. The Deve10pment of Electrical Technolpgy in the 19th—Century. Part 2: The TEIegraph and the TEIephone. Bulletin 228. Contributions fihm the MuséfimWOf'History and Technology. Washington, D.C.: United States National Museum, Smithsonian Institu- tion, 1962. 380 Kitchen, Helen (ed.). The Educated African. New York: F. A. Praeger,I962. . The Press in Africa. Washington, D.C.: Ruth Sloan Associates, Inc., 1956. Koebner, Richard and Schmidt, Helmut Dan. Imperialism: The Study and Significance of a PoliticaI'Word, 1840 - 1960. Cambridge: The University Press, 1964. Lagrange, Maurice. Le NouveauRegime Legislatif de la France d'outre-mer. Paris: Libraifie du Recueil Sirey, 1948. Landor, A. H. Savage. Across Widest Africa. London: n.n., 1907. Lee, John. Economics of Telegraphs and Telephones. London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, 1913. Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of a Traditional Sociepy. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956. Lerner,Daniel and Scfliramun , Wilbur (eds.) Communication and Change in the Develpping Countries. Honolulu: East—-West Center Press, 1967. Levargne, Bernard. Une Revolution Dans la Politique Coloniale de la France. Paris: Editibns Librai- Eie Mercure, 1948. Lewis, Arthur W. The Theopy of Economic Growth. Homewood, 111.: Richard D. IrWing, Inc.,—1955. Lindley, Mark Frank. The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in InternationaI’Law.(A Trea- tise on the Law and Practice Relating to Colonial EXpansion.) London: Longsmann, Green and Co., Ltd., 1926. Luchaire, Francois. Droit d'Outre-Mer. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959. Lugard, Lord. The Dual Mandate in Britisp Tropical Africa. London: Wm. Blackwood and Sons, Ltd., 1929. Maalem, Ali. Colonialisme1Trusteeship, Independance, Paris: Defense de la France, 1946. 381 MacInnes, C. M. Principles and Methods of Colonial Adminis- tration. (Colston Papers, Vol..III3 London: Butterworth Scientific Publications, 1950. Mackay, Ian K. Broadcasting in Nigeria. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1964. Maclaurin, Rupert W. Invention and Innovation in the Radio Industry. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949. Macmillan, W. M. Africa Emergent: A Survey of Social, Political and Economic Trends in British Africa. London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1938. Maigret, Julien. Afrique Eguatoriale Francaise. Paris: Sociéte d'Editions Geographiques, Maritime et Coloniales, 1931. Mance, Sir Osborne. International Telecommunications. London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943. Martin, Marcel (ed.). Les Institutions Politiques de la France (Le Monde Contemporain, Vol. II.) Paris:' La Documentation Francaise, 1961. McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961: Merat, Louis. Fictions . . . et Realites Coloniales. Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1947. Merriam, Allan P. Congo: Background and Conflict. Evan- ston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1961. Miller, Walter R. Have We Failed in Nigeria? London: United Society for Christian Literature, Butter— worth Press, 1947. Millikan, Max F. and Blackmer, D. L. M. (eds.). The Emerging Nations. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., l§61. Mills, Saxon J. The Press and Communications of the Empire. Vol. VI of The British Emfiire. Edited by Hugh Gunn. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1924. Moore, Wilbefi2E. Social Change. Englewood, N.J.: Prentice— Hall Inc., 1963. *as, 4.....- .._.— .—. m.- - 382 Mumford, Lewis. Technics and Civilizatign. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 193?} Namurois, Albert. Problems of Structure and Organization of Broadcasting in the Framework of Radiocommuni— cations. (Legal Mohograph, No. 2) Geneva: Euro- pean Broadcasting Union, December, 1964. Nigeria. The Federal Ministry of Economic Deve10pment. National Development Plan, 1962 - 1968. Lagos: The Federal Government Printer,—1962. Ogburn,William, F. (ed.)‘Technology and International Relations. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949. Ogg, Frederic Austin. English_Government and Politics. 2d ed. New York: The MaCmillan Co., 1944. Padmore, George. How Britain Rules Africa. London:Wishart Books Ltd., 1936. Paillard, Jean. L'Empire Francais de Demain.Paris: Institut d'Etudes Corporatives et Sociales, 1943. Palmer, Gerald E. H.(comp.). Consultation and Co-opera- tion in the British Commonwealth.(A Handbook on the Methods and Practice of Communication and Consultation between the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.) London: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1934. Park, Robert Ezra. Societ . Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, I§55. Park Robert E. and Burgess, Ernest W. Introduction to the ScienceZQf Sociolggy. Chicago: University of_’ Chicago Press, 192 . Perham, Margery. Africans and British Rule. London: Oxford University Press, 1941. Pons, Eugene. License Fees for Radio and Television Sets. (Legal Monograph, Noiii.) Geneva: E. B. U., 1964. Priestley, Herbert Ingram. France Overseas: A Study of Mgdern Imperialism. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1938. Pye, Lucian W. (ed.). Communications and Political Devel- o ment. (Studies in Political Development, No. 1.) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. 383 Ragatz, Lowell. March of Empire: The EurOpean Overseas Possessions on the Eve of the First World War. New York: H. L. Linguist, 1948. Raphael, Lois A. C. The Cape—Cairo Dream: A Study in British Imperialism. New York: Columbia Univer- sity Press, 1936. Reinsch, Paul Samuel. colonial Administration. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1905. . Colonial Government: An Introduction to the Study of Colonial Institutions. New Yofk:fiThe Macmillan Co., 1906. . World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1908. Reith, J. C. W. Into the Wind. London: Hoddler and Stoughton, 1949. Ridley, F. and Blondel J. Public Administration in France. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963. Riegel, O.W. Mobilizing for Chaos: The Story of the New PrOpaganda. New Haven: Yale University Press, l§34. Rivkin, Arnold. Africa and the West: Elements of Free— World Policy. London: Thames and'Hudson, 1962. Roberts, Steven H. History of French Colonial Policy 1870 — 1925. 2 vols. London: P. S. King and Son, 1929. Roberts-Wray, Sir Kenneth. Commonwealth and Colonial Law. New York: F. A. Praeger,il966. de la Roche, Jean and Gottmann,Jean. La Federation Francaise. Montreal: Editions de]?Afbre,‘l§45, Rogers, Frances and Beard, Alice. Heels, Wheels and Wire. New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1935. Rogerson, Sidney. Propaganda in the Ngxt War.(The Next War Series?) London: Geoff?Ey Bles, 1938. Roucek, Joseph S. (ed.). Social Control. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1947. 384 Royal Institute of International Affairs. Colonial Admin- istration by EurOpean Powers. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1947. Royal Institute of International Affairs. Nigeria: The Political and Economic Background. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1960. Sarraut, Albert. La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Francaises. Paris: Payot et Companie, 1923. Schramm, Wilbur. Mass Media and National Development. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. Schwarz, Frederick, A. 0. Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation, or the Race -— the Politics oi Independence. Cambridge, Mass.: The M. I. T. Press, 1965. Scientific American Book Editors. Technology and Eco- nomic Deve10pment. New York: Alfred A. KnOpf, 1963. Seeley, Sir John. The Expansion of England. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Shannon, Lyle W. Underdevelgped Areas. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Stanley, Eugene. The Future of Underdeve10ped Countries. Revised ed. New York: F. A. Praeger, Inc.,—l961. Stenmans, Alain. La Reprise du Congo par la Belgique: Essai d'Histoire Parlementaire et Diplomatigue. Bruxelles:iEditions Techniques et Scientiiiques, 1949. Terrou, Fernard and Solal, Lucien. Legislation for Press, Film, and Radio. (Press, Film and Radio in the World Today.) Paris: UNESCO. 1951. Thompson, Virginia and Adloff, Richard. The Emerging States of French Eguatorial Africa. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1960. Thornton, A. P. Doctrines of Imperialism. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965. Tomlinson, John D. The International_Control of Radio- communicationg. Ann Arbor: J. W. Edwards, 1945. Townsend, Mary Evelyn. EurOpean Colonial Expansion Since 1871. New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 184l2 385 Trézenem, Edouard. La France Eguatoriale d'Afrique Equatoriale Francaise. Paris: Societe d'Editions Geographiques Maritimes et Coloniales, 1950. Tribolet, Leslie Bennet. The International Aspects of Electrical CommuniEations in the PaEific Area. Baltimore:’The JOhns Hopkins University Press, 1929. Troux, Albert, and Girard, Albert. Histoire de la France. Paris: Librairie Hachette, Ighil Truth About the Civilization in Congo—Land. N.p.: n.n., I903. Webb, H. L. Development of the Telephone in Europe. N.p.: n.n., n.d. Wieschhoff, H. A. Colonial Policies in_§frica. (African Handbook, No. 5) Philadelphia: The University of Pemuadvania Press and the University Museum, 1944. Williams, Francis. Transmittigg World News. Paris: UNESCO, 1953. Williams, J. Grenfell. Radio in Fundamental Education in Underdeveloped AreasJPress, Film and Radio ih the WorldiToday.) Paris: UNESCO, 1950. Williams, Raymond. Culture and Society, 1780 - 1950. London: Chatto and Windus, 1958. Wilson, Godfrey, and Wilson, Monica. The Analysis of Social Change Based on Observations in Central Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945. Winch, Donald, Classical Political Economy and Colonies. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. Wright, Harrison M. (ed.) The "New Imperialism:" Analysis of Late Nineteenth Captury Expansion. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1961. Wright, Quincy. The Study of International Relations. New York: Appleton—Century-Crofts, Inc., 1935. 386 Articles and Periodicals f The American Behavioral Scientist, V (December, 1961). Apter, David A. and Rosberg, Carl G. "Nationalism and Models of Political Change in Africa," The Polit- ical Economy of Contemporary Africa. Washington, D. C.: George Washington University, 1959. "British News by Wireless," Round Table, XXIX (1938—1939), 726—27. "La Conference Imperiale depose ses conclusions; 1a parole est au gouvernement," Le Monde Colonial Illustre (May, 1935). Ching, James C. "Mass Communications in the Republic of the Congo (LeOpoldville)," Journalism Quarterl , XLI, No. 2 (Spring, 1964), 237—44. Dalton, John H. "Colony and Metropolis. Some Aspects of British Rule in Gold Coast and their implica- tions for an Understanding of Ghana Today," The Journal of Economic History, XXI, No. 4 (Decembre, 1961), 552-65. Economic Bulletin for Africa, I (1961) — VII (1967). E. B. U. Review, Nos. 1 - 106 (1955—1967). Eisenstadt, S. N. "Communication Systems and Social Structure: An Exploratory Comparative Study," Public Opinion Quarterly, XIX (Summer, 1955), 135—164. . "Social Change and Modernization in African Societies South of the Sahara," Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, V, No. 3 (1965), 453—7l} Emery, Walter B. "Five European Broadcasting Systems," Journalism Monographs, No. 1 (August, 1966). Hailey, Lord. "The Colonies and the Atlantic Charter," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Sociepy, (1943), 233—46} Hamburger, Ernest,"Constitutional Thought and Aims in Former French Africa," Social Research, XXVIII, NO. 4, 415-426. 387 Hodson, H. V. "Broadcasting and the Commonwealth," The B. B. C. Quarterly, VI, No. 1 (Spring, 19515, 2—7. Home, The Earl of. "Interdependence: The British Role," International Affairs, XXXVII, No. 2 (April, 1961L Jackson, W. K. "Some Problems of Nationalism and Inde— pendence in Africa," Political Science, XIII, No. 1 (March, 1961), 63-79. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (Weekly Diary of World Eventsl] II (1934-1937), II (1937-1940). Lodian, W. "Century of the Telegraph in France," Popular Science Monthly (April, 1894), 790—803. Marcson, Simon. "Social Change and Social Structure in Transitional Societies," International Journal of Comparative Sociology,—l, No. 2 (September,l960) 1960), 248—53. Micro Magazine (Official Weekly of the Belgian National BroadEasting Service), X, No. 482 (July, 4, 1954). Namurois, Albert. "The Charter for Broadcasting in Belgium," E. B. U. Review, Part B, No. 63 (September, 1960), 1-7. The New York Times. 1914 - 1967. Nigerian Trade Journal (Special Independence Issue), September, 1960. Pleven, Rene. "Evolution of the French Empire towards a French Union," Journal of the Anti-Slavery Society (July, 1949), 32-41. Pool, Ithiel de Sola. "The Role of Communication in the Process of Modernization and Technological Change," Industrialization and Society. Edited by Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbur E. Moore. Paris: UNESCO» Mouton, 1963. Rivkin, Arnold. "Nigeria's National Development Plan," Current History, January, 1963. Rudin, Harry R. "The Republic of Congo," Current History, January, 1963. 388 Senghor, Leopold Sédar. ”Vues sur l'Afrigue Noire, ou Assimiler, Non Etre Assimiles," La Communauté Imperiale Francaise. Paris: Editions Alsatia, 1945. The Times (London), 1914-1967. Ukeje O. "The Role of Education in an Emergent Nation," Journal of Human Relations, X, No. 1 (August, 1961), 13—22. ll Wallerstein, Immanuel. "Evolving Patterns of African Society," The Political Economyof Contemporapy Africa. Washington, D.C.: George WaShington University, 1959. Reports American Telephone and Telegraph Company. Telephone and Telegraph Statistics of the World, 1931-1934; 193641940:_l949-l953. New York: AmericanTEle- graph and Telephone Company. Belgium. Ministere des Colonies. Enseignment et Eguca— tion au gongo Belge et au Ruanda-UrundiTBruxelles: 11:11., 1959]. Belgium, Ministere des Colonies. Plan Decennal pour le Deve10pment économigue et socigl du Congo Belge. Bruxelles: Ministere des Colonies, I949. Belgium, Ministere des Colonies, La Situation économi ue du Congo Belge et du Ruanga-Urundi en 1957. Bruxelles: Mihistére des Colonies, 1958. Buisseret, M. A. The Policy of Belgium in her Overseas Territories. An Address to the House of Repre- sentatives in Brussels on June 26, 1957. Brussels: InforCongo, 1957. Centre d'Information Interprofessionnel. L'Empire Fran- cais et ses resourdes (Conferences en février- mars, 1942) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1942. Conference Radiotelegraphique de Londres, 1912. Docu— ments de la Conference radiotélégraphique internationale de Londres. Berne:_lhternational Telegraphic Union, l9l3. 389 Conference Radiotelegraphigue de Washington, 1927. Council France. France. France . France. Documents de la Conference radiotelegraphigue intrrrationale de Washington, 1927. llvols. Berne: International Telegraphic Union[—l928. of Europe. Consultative Assembly. The Development of Africa. A Report of the Study Group of Experts, presented to the Consultative Assembly, 1957. Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe Publica— tions, 1957. Ambassade de France. Service de Presse et d'Infor- mation. Aid and Cooperation. New York: Ambassade de France, December, 1962. Ambassade de France. Service de Presse et d'Infor~ mation. The Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville): The Hour of Independence. New York: Ambassade de _—.-—_r —._-_—,— France, l86l. Ministere de la France d'Outre-Mer. Vers un réseau de radiodiffusion de la Franceld'Outre-Mer. Paris: M.de la France d'Outre—Mer, 1958: Ministere des Colonies. Conférenge Africaine. Paris: Ministere de la France d‘Outre-Mer, I945. Ginzberg, Eli (ed.). Technology and Social Change (The Columbia University Seminar on Technology and Social Change, [1962]). New York: Columbia Univer— sity Press, 1964. Great Britain. Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division. The Belgian Congo (Restricted Geographical Series). London: Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division, 1944. . Belgium (B. R. 52L Restricted Geographical Series). London: Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division,l942. . British Information service. Britain and Com- monwealth Telecommunications. London: B. I. S., 1963. . The Commonwealth Association in Brief. thdoh: B. I. 8., 1958. . Economic Development in the United Kingdom Dopendencies. London: B. I. S., 1959. . The U. K. Colonial Development and Welfare Acts. London: B. I. S., 1960. 390 . The U. K. Dependencies in Brief. London: B. I. S.,‘l960. ' . Central Office of Information. Sound and Tele— ViSion Broadcasting in Britain. London: C. O. I., 1963. . Colonial Office. Sound and Television Broad- castingin the OverseasvTerritories, Handbodk. London: Colonial Office, 1964. . Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Sum- marygof the Report of the Independent Committee of Engfiiry into the Overseasllnfbrmation SerVices (April, 1954). Reprint. London: H. M. S. O.,ll957. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Economic Development of Nigeria. Baltimore: Johns HOpkins University Press, 1955. International Telecommunication Union. Agreement, Plans, Final Protocol and Recommendation. (European Broadcasting Conference, Stockholm, 1952). Geneva: International Telecommunication Union, 1952. Jacob, Sir Ian. The BBC: A National and an International Force. An Addressito the Eighth Annual CCnference of the Institute of Public Relations. London: B.B.C., 1957. Kimble, David, and Kimble, Helen. Adult Education in a Changing Africa. A Report of the Inter-African Seminar Heldlin the Gold Coast from December 10 — 23, 1954. London: International Federation of Worker's Educational Association, 1955. Milton, E.C. Survey of the Technical Development of the Nigerian Broadcasting Seryice. Lagos: Nigerian Broadcasting Service, 1935. Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Education. Investment in Education. The Report of the Commission on Post- School Certificate and Higher Education in Nigeria. Lagos:Federa1 Ministry of Education, 1960. . Federal Ministry of Information. Nigerian anstitutional Development, 186171960. Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1960. f 391 Nuffield Foundation and the Colonial Office. African Edu- cation: A Study of Educational Policy and Practi- ces in BritiSh Tropical Affica. LondOn: Oxford University Press, 1953. Organization for EurOpean Economic Co-operation. La Situa- tion économigue dans les territoires d'Outre—Mer. Paris: Orgahization for European Economic Co-Ope- ration, 1954. Turner, L. W. and Byron F. A. W. BroadcastingSurvey of British West African Colonies. London: The Crown Agents,l949. UNESCO. Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulaiion of Visual andAuditory Materials of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Character: A Guide tohits Operation. Paris: UNESCO, 1954. . Developing Information Media in Africa.(Report and Papers on Mass Communication, No. 37.) Paris: UNESCO, 1962. . Developing Mass Media in Asia.(Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, No. 30.) Paris: UNESCO, 1960. . Mass Media in the Deve10ping Countries. (Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, No. 33.) Paris: UNESCO, 1961. . Press, Film, Radio. (Reports on the Facilities of Mass Communibations.) Paris: UNESCO, 1948-1951. . Radio and Television in the Service of Educa- tion and Developmentin ASia.‘TReports andPapers on Mass Communication, Nb. 49.) Paris: UNESCO, 1967. . Radio Broadcasting Serves Rural Developmept. Reports and Papers on Mass Commuhication, No. 48.) Paris: UNESCO, 1965. . Statistics on Radio and Television 1950-1960. iStatistical Reportsiand Studies.) Paris: UNESCO, 1963. . Trade Barriers to Knowledge: A Manual of Regula— tions Affecting Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials. 2d ed: revised. Paris: UNESCO, l9SS.ll 392 . The Use of Mobile Cinema and Radio Vans in Fundamental Education. London: UNESCO, Film Centre,ll949. . World Communications: Press, Radio, Television, Film. Paris: UNESCO, 1964. . World Survey of Education. 3 vols. Paris: UNESCO, 1959 -ll963l United Nations, Progress of the Non-Self—Governing Terri— tories under the Charter.(ST/TRU/SER.A.15,‘l960- I963.) 6 vOls. New Yofk:U. N., 1959-1964. . Special Studyon Economic Conditions in Non- Self—Governing Territories. New York: U. N.,l958. . Special Stugy on Social Conditions in Non— Self—Governing Territofies. New York} U. N., 1958. . United Nations Conxkrence on Freedom of Informa— ElofiiGeneva: U. N., I948. . Economic and Social Council. Freedom of Informa- tion: Development of Information Media in Under- developed Countries. New York: U. N., 1961 .The Problems of Transmitting Press Messages. A Study Submittednby UNESCO and the International Telecommunication Union to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Paris: UNESCO, 1956. , and International African Institute, London. Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbani- zation in Africa South of the Sahara. Paris: UNESCO, 1956. U. S. National Resources Committee. Technological Trends and National Policy. Washington,D.C.: Government Printing Of fice, 1937. U. 8. Senate. Study Mission to Africa: September - October, 1961. Report of Senators Albert Gore, Philip A. Hart and Maurine B. Neuberger. Washington, D.C.: Govern- ment Printing Office, January 14, 1962. 393 Encyclopaedias, Yearbooks and Handbooks The American University. Foreign Areas Studies Division. U. S. Army Area Handbook for Nigeria. 2d ed.revised. TWashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office], 1964. The Association Press. Handbookfkm'Correspondents. New York: The Associated Press, I935. Benveniste,Guy and Moran, William E. Jr. Handbook of African Economic Development. New York: F. A. Praeger, Inc., 1962. Britannica Book of the Year. 1960—1967. British Broadcasting Corporation, Handbook, 1964. London: BBC, 1963. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 9th ed. (1878). Encyclopgedia Britannica, 27th ed. (1959). Encyc10paedia of the Social Sciences. 15 vols. 1930—1935. La Grande Eggyclgpedie..31 vols. Paris: Societe Anonyme de ‘la Grande Encyc10pédie, n.d. Grand Larousse Encyglopegigue. 12 vols. Paris: Librairie Larousse,il960-l964. Der Grossegrockhaus. 20 vols. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1935. Der Grosse Brockhaus. 32 vols. Wiesbaden: F. A. Brockhaus, ” 1936. Guernier, Eugene. Afrique Eguatoriale Francaise. Vol.VII of Encyclopédie de l'Union Francaise: f'Encyclopédie Coloniale et Maritime. Paris: Encyc10pédie COlo- niale et Maritime, 1960. International Colonial Institute. International Colonial Library. Yearbook of Compared ColonialDocumenta- tion. Brussels: International Colonial Institute, Nigeria. The Federal Ministry of Information for the Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Handbook of Commerce and Industry in Nigeria. Lagos: Federal Government Printer, I962. 394 Nouveau Larousse Illustre. 10 vols. Paris: Librairie Larousse, n.d. Smith, Donald E. (ed.) The New Larned History for Ready Reference, Reading and Research. 4th ed. revised. 12 vols. Springfield, Mass.: C. A. Nichols Co., 1922-1924. The Statesman's Yearbook. 1915-1960. United Nations, Statistical_Yearbook. 1946-1965. Unpublished Material Bradley, C. Paul. "New Trends in British Colonial Policies.” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1955. Cook, Arthur Norton. "Nigeria: A Study in British Imperialism." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Pennsylvania, 1927. Gelston-Gelles, Robert Hans. "The Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries and Education." Unpub- lished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1953. Graves, Wallace, B. "The United Nations, Great Britain, and the British Non-Self—Governing Territories." Unpublished Ph;D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1953. Fagen, Richard Fees. "Politics and Communication in the New States: Burma and Ghana.” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1962. fielley,George H. "The Political Development of the French Overseas Empire." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1955. Kessler, Jane S. "Educating the Black Frenchman." Unpub- 1ished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1958. Moore, Malvin E. "A Survey of Education in the Belgian Congo." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Peabody College, 1959. Odenigwe, Godwin A. "The Constitutional Development of Nigeria: The Origin of Federalism, 1862—1954. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Clark University, 1957. Okonwu, 395 Nnodu Joel. "Education in Nigeria (1842—l942l" Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York Univer- sity, 1946. Other Sources Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, New York. Correspondence with Roger Vaurs and Yvonne Daumarie, 1964-1967. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, New York. Belgian British Chambre Letter from Walter A. Stevens, Director of Business Research, November 13, 1964. Government Information Center, New York. Corres- pondence with Joseph Kadijk, Assistant Commissioner of Information, 1964—1967. Information Service, New York. Correspondence with Florence Armitage, Reference Librarian, 1964-1967. Syndicale Belge de la Cinematographie, Bruxelles. Letter from A. Dehalu, Secretary-General, Novem- ber 25, 1964. Commonwealth Press Union, London. Letter from L.L. Cross, Secretary, November 2, 1964. Embassy of Nigeria, Washington, D.C. Correspondence with O. S. Coker, Press Attache, 1964-1967. Nigeria, Federation of, Lagos. Communication from the Postmaster-Genera1,March 24, 1965. Republique Democratique du Congo, Le Ministere des Postes, Telephones, Telegraphs, Leopoldville. Letter from I. Mbayo, Chief of Cabinet, December 12, 1964. "IT'llllllll'illlllll