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BROADCASTING IN AFRICA: A STUDY
OF BELGIAN, BRITISH AND FRENCH
COLONIAL POLICIES

By

Geoffrey Z. Kucera

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Communication

1968

Accepted by the
Communication, College
Michigan State University
The requirements for
degree.

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Dr. Robert E. Potter
Director, and to Dr.
Department of Educat
University of Hawaii
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer would like to express many thanks to his Director of Thesis, Dr. Walter B. Emery, for his helpful suggestions, kind assistance, and patient guidance. Equally sincere thanks are expressed to the members of the Guidance Committee, Drs. Harm J. deBlij, James R. Hooker, Hideya Kumata, J. Colby Lewis III and Donald W. Olmsted, for their helpful criticism and kind expressions of confidence.

A sincere appreciation is hereby expressed to Dr. Robert E. Potter, Associate Dean for Faculty Development, and to Dr. Walter A. Wittich, Chairman of the Department of Educational Communications, both of the University of Hawaii, for their interest, encouragement and suggestions. Their understanding and help could only be described as those of true friends.

Acknowledgment is also due to the official diplomatic representatives of Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Congo Republic and the Federation of Nigeria for their cooperation. The writer obtained valuable information from the personnel of the Embassies and/or of the Information Offices,, and on many an occasion publica-

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tions were sent to him on loan when they were otherwise unobtainable.

Above all, the writer's special "Thank You" goes to his wife for the patience and support which she has provided him with throughout the time of research and writing. Her typing of drafts, as well as of the final copy, and her competent rearrangement of the manuscript as well as of the bibliography were all performed over and above her line of duty.

Together with the acknowledgment to the writer's wife goes an appreciation to his (and her) three children who accepted their long and seemingly unending neglect with understanding, though not always with forbearance.

ABSTRACT

BROADCASTING IN AFRICA: A STUDY
OF BELGIAN, BRITISH AND FRENCH
COLONIAL POLICIES

by Geoffrey Z. Kucera

The Problem

Studies of modernization available today concern themselves with tasks facing the newly established nations and countries, and leave unexplored the role of the former colonial powers. Modernization and development studies more often than not concentrate on economic aspects, and a minimal attention is paid to communication means.

This thesis attempted to look into the role of the former colonial masters of three African States (Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Leopoldville, and Nigeria), in order to discover whether there were any differences, explicit or implicit, in the colonial policies vis-à-vis radio broadcasting.

Broadcasting has been selected for this thesis because it is subject to policies and regulations by its very nature, even in societies where its development might be left entirely to private interests. It is also a medium of recent discovery, so that finding and documenting policy statements and the actions with which the policies were followed was expected to be feasible.

The Methodology

The approach to the study was historical with descriptive, analytical and evaluative phases. Descriptive narrative was given of the background of general colonial policies (those pertaining to the political, economic and social development). Also included was the description of the growth and development of broadcasting as an institution, and the technological basis upon which the medium had been built.

Inasmuch as the relationship of the colonial policies to the development of broadcasting was explored, the study assumed an analytical form. Lastly, the evaluative aspect was attempted in which the policies of the colonial powers vis-à-vis broadcasting were weighed according to the importance which the powers assigned to its development. Parliamentary reports, debates, compilation of laws and statutes (of both the colonial powers and the colonies) were the primary sources.

Conclusions

Differences between communication policies of the three powers were often substantial, and corresponded closely to differences on general colonial policies.

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Broadcasting development appears to have hinged to a greater degree upon other policies than on those specifically dealing with broadcasting.

There appears to exist a direct relation between the colonial capability of receiving broadcasting and the directness and determination with which a colonial power addressed itself to the nature of future relations with its colony within some imperial structure.

Modernization of attitudes is often mentioned as the underlying requirement for change, but it is assumed the reference is made to the attitudes of those undergoing modernization. This study raises a question whether attitudes of former administrating countries ought not to be considered of at least equal importance.

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INTRODUCTION

Modernization is a process of transition -- transition of a society that is governed by traditions and customs into a society ruled by modern versions of law and reason; it is a change of "ancient lifeways" into new, modern modes of living. This process involves what Lerner terms "underlying tensions" -- tensions expressed by "dichotomies such as land versus cash, illiteracy versus enlightenment, resignation versus ambition, piety versus excitement."¹

To Lerner, the central part of the modernization process is a set of changes in modes of communicating ideas.² Pye says that it was the pressure of communications which brought about the downfall of traditional societies.³ Millikan and Blackmer say that

both disruption and the break-up of traditional societies continue, heightened and speeded up in our time by the shrinkage of distances and by the existence of the mass media and the instrumentalities of mass organization.⁴

¹Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of a Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956), 44.

²Ibid.

³Lucian W. Pye (ed.), *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 3.

⁴Max F. Millikan and D. L. M. Blackmer (eds.), *The Emerging Nations* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1961), 17.



They also say that

there are three principal areas in which elements of resistance must be overcome if the modernization of a traditional society is to be carried through successfully: politics, economics, and social structure. The underlying requirement for change is the modernization of attitudes.

.....
 Means of communication must be developed between the government and its citizens to convey to them that the national goals being pursued are ones they would sanction.¹

Schramm and Winfield simply state that

if a nation, rather than merely an advanced society, is to be built, then the necessary knowledge of public affairs, the concepts of national loyalty, and empathy for fellow citizens must . . . be communicated Furthermore, if a nation is to play a significant part internationally, communication must weave the new State to other States, and the necessary understandings of international events and relationships must be communicated to the people. Thus it is clear that national development involves serious and significant communication problems. . . .²

The Role of Colonial Powers

Although the preceding statements are based on common knowledge of today, the present writer has discovered, by a careful review of the available literature, an almost universal lack of any reference which might relate the changes in communications not only to the developing nations themselves, but also to those who controlled such countries in the earlier stages of development. The absence of scholarly efforts to investigate the role of

¹Ibid., 19-20.

²Wilbur Schramm and G. F. Winfield, New Uses of Mass Communication for the Promotion of Economic and Social Development (WS/1163.109/EC) (Paris:UNESCO, 1963), 2.

colonial powers in the field of communications, and especially in the field of radio broadcasting, is quite remarkable.

It is true that one can -- if he looks long enough -- find that the wireless existed in one country earlier than in another, or that some developing country did not have a daily newspaper until after its independence. What is not available, however, is mention of whether any action and/or policy of the metropolitan country responsible for that territory until its independence had caused, or had contributed to, such results. A question is never asked why it is that one developing nation is well ahead of another in matters pertaining to communications, though both might have had the same "mother country." No inquiries have been launched into what made one colonial power act differently in this field than another power. Indeed, hardly any concerted research exists of the colonial powers' interest in, or neglect of, the media of information and of communication in general.

Lest this statement be misunderstood, it is necessary to reaffirm this writer's knowledge of many publications, articles, scholarly studies and the like which deal with growth of developing countries. Almost all of the literature concerns itself with the goals that such countries established for themselves, particularly since they achieved independent nationhood. Such studies, even when concerning themselves with communications, do not

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2 Lerner, 45.

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Communications

While the present study is concerned with only a small aspect of what is known as "communications," it is thought advisable to review the terminology of the whole field. Doob, in his recent work on Communication in Africa, spoke of basic and extended media:

. . . basic media . . . are the original modes of communication between an infant and his mother or any of the human beings in his surroundings. Throughout life, too, the words, the gestures, the clothes, and the actions of a person all convey information and can be directly perceived by others in face-to-face contacts. Media which do not demand the actual presence of the communicator are herewith baptized extending media, for what they do is to extend the range of the original message in time or space. A special type of extending medium is a channel of communication which by itself transmits no message other than that contained in a basic medium or in another extending medium.¹

Lerner meant strictly the modes of communicating ideas and included what can be referred to as "channels."² Pye, enlarging upon Lerner's frame of reference, talked about "the broader concepts of communications as all pervading aspects of social life"³ and included not only "the man's capacity to send and receive in countless ways both intended and unintended messages,"⁴ but also (though to a lesser degree) the industries or institutions such as

¹Leonard Doob, Communication in Africa: A Search for Boundaries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 57.

²Lerner, 45.

³Pye, 4.

⁴Ibid.

the press, radio, etc. Millikan and Blackmer, however, clearly referred to the transportation media as well.¹

Schramm subtitled his work "The Role of Information in the Developing Countries" and included education as one means of imparting such information.² Moreover, he alone among many was also concerned with non-mass media role in developing countries, and specifically pointed out the importance of postal services, telephones and telegraphs to national development.³

Perhaps no one has made the term "media" more encompassing than Marshall McLuhan who in one of his works⁴ gave an extremely wide interpretation to that term. He did this by including not only the electric media and the print, but also roads, paper routes, the wheel, the bicycle, the airplane, the photograph, and even lightbulbs.

If "communications" or "media" are definable and discussable in such a variety of ways, it becomes obvious that a clear understanding of the term has to be reached before further exploration is undertaken. Furthermore, the different contexts and differing scope of the field,

¹Millikan and Blackmer, 50.

²Wilbur Schramm, Mass Media and National Development (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 25-26.

³Ibid. 76.

⁴Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York: The McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964).

as suggested in the brief discussion above, would indicate that considerable narrowing of the scope of this study is necessary. The present writer, though understandably intrigued by the possibilities of viewing communications in what might be referred to as "total communications," recognized the impracticality of such an approach. For the purposes of a meaningful scholarly effort, the study focuses upon an aspect of communication which can be handled with efficacy. Even such term as "mass media" concerns too broad an area which therefore does not lend itself easily to a probe in depth.

Radio broadcasting, as a medium of communication, is suitable for the purposes of this study for this reason, and one other: it alone among the so called mass media is subject to regulation and policy by its very nature, and this even in societies where its development is left entirely to private interests.

A generation ago, Edward Sapir warned that over-concern with what he termed secondary means or techniques in the communicative process, such as telephone, radio, and the railways was not advisable because it might lead into a blind alley, as these were only technological means of communication. While today McLuhan's position is in direct juxtaposition to Sapir's point of view (what with McLuhan's "medium is the message"), the present writer is well aware that the Sapirian warning has been carried through to the Sixties. Sapir, for example, also stated

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that a railroad was of no use unless there was some purpose in someone wanting to get from one place to another.¹ While there is no basic disagreement with this, attention must be called to the possibility that if there is a railroad, or some other means of transportation (communication), maybe someone will find a reason to go somewhere.

In a somewhat similar vein, Doob, referring to the relationship of formal schooling of a person and his access to mass media, pointed out that

. . . it is not possible to determine the cause-and-effect sequence If the guiding hypothesis is valid, then it is possible that becoming literate increases people's alertness because they have access to more media of communication and perhaps to better jobs . . . ; and yet it is also probable that the more alert people in the community responded to the opportunity to attend the literacy classes. Or perhaps both sequences occurred: the initially more alert became literate and then having become literate, they could become still more alert.²

But Doob represents a new kind of sophisticated researchers. He can be contrasted with Everett Hagen³, on whose communication viewpoint Pool commented thus:

Everett Hagen, among others, has suggested that, if certain other conditions of modernization are fulfilled, the development of communication system will somehow automatically follow. The necessary knowledge of technology, and the necessary postal, telephone, telegraph, radio and printed channels, will emerge. Ideas for

¹Edward Sapir, "Communication," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan Co., 1931), IV, 18-80. Note Sapir's primary and secondary means and Doob's basic and extending media.

²Doob, 178.

³Everett E. Hagen, On a Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins (Homewood, Ill.: n.n., 1962).

modernization will be significantly diffused to be available if people wish to adopt them. Those who hold this view do not believe that the communication media can be the bottleneck that obstructs modernization.¹

Apparently, the blind alley of which Sapir warned us earlier, continues to be a clear and present danger, alas in a somewhat different manner. Underestimation of the value of communication media was replaced by over-assessment of their power to develop "on their own."

The Concerns of This Study

According to this writer, the problem is at least threefold: (1) Studies of modernization often begin considerably later than they should, and the role of former colonial masters is left unexplored; (2) aspects of communication often are not fully explored in such modernization studies; and (3) a conventional approach, usually that of economic development, is taken, even when the role of media of communications is recognized.

The modernization process is usually, i.e., most commonly, approached in terms of "economic development."² This is a valid approach, but, as Moore says, it has no absolute validity.³ Though such an approach is proper, it

¹Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The Role of Communication in the Process of Modernization and Technological Change," in Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore (eds.), Industrialization and Society (Paris: UNESCO-Mouton, 1963), 281.

²Wilbur E. Moore, Social Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963), 91.

³Ibid.

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¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

² *Ibid.*, 90.

³ S. E. Eisenstein, *Centuries of Studies*

is very conventional, and most of the studies that take industrialization (an even more conventional approach to the process of modernization) for the starting point, suffer from a common defect,

. . . that of treating industrialization as a given change and recording or ordering of the consequential changes that must then follow, by pursuing the functional model of an integrated social system, which has to achieve a new basis of integration owing to the introduction of a critically important alteration in a strategic sector of a society, the economy.¹

The same author, in addition to pointing out this weakness of the studies of social change, suggested the scope of alternatives:

The process of modernization is broad. . . . In one area at one time, the problem may be defined as that of reducing illiteracy or providing potable water to urban slums or spraying mosquito-breeding swamps with chemicals to control malaria. In other places at other times, roads or hydro-electric power installations may be given top priority. In still other places, or in the same places at other times, precedence may go to capital-goods industries, light consumer-goods industries, or a revamped civil service.

What is involved in modernization is a 'total' transformation of traditional or pre-modern society into the types of technology and associated social organization that characterize the 'advanced,' economically prosperous, and relatively politically stable nations of the Western World.²

Similarly, Eisenstadt³ offered a criticism that research on development and modernization often has been

¹Ibid., 20.

²Ibid., 90.

³S. E. Eisenstadt, "Social Change and Modernization," in Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, V, No. 3 (1965), 453-471.



guided by assumption, often implicit, about the conditions of growth. In particular, he seemed to be deploring the assumption of the primacy of the economic sphere in development and modernization, as well as the assumption of the relative assurance of the continuity of modernization.

With the preceding background being firmly established, it is now possible to state, with considerable definitiveness, the concern of this study. The topic of this work can best be characterized by a single question: What were the differences, explicit and implicit, in the colonial policies vis-à-vis radio broadcasting in selected former colonies in Africa?

Exploration of this basic topic is directly related to the methodological approach, and boundary lines of that approach. In order to obtain a detailed and accurate picture of the role of colonial powers in the development of radio broadcasting, delineation of time and space covered had to be undertaken, as well as specific method of investigation thought out.

Study Procedure

Geographic Area Covered

The three territories studied in this thesis are all located in West Central Africa, and were formerly administered by three colonial powers: The Federation of Nigeria (British), the Republic of Congo (French) and the Congo Republic (Belgian). These three territories had been

chosen because of certain similarities, and at the same time because of certain substantial differences. Among the similarities, the following were considered important: the territories' geographical location, the year in which all three achieved independence (1960), and the identical character of the political elite which mediated the Western impact (in all three, the so-called "alien colonial" served this purpose¹). In the estimation of this writer, all these similarities help the validity of comparisons of the colonial policies and actions, and of their results.

But as with the similarities, the differences were equally important. In the selected territories, the mode of government of tribalized African mass was different. In Nigeria, the indirect rule, that is working through, and developing, traditional political system prevailed, while in the French territory of the so-called Middle Congo (now the Republic of the Congo), the rule was always direct, i. e., the traditional authorities, if used at all, were regarded only as subordinate officials in a monolithic colonial administration.² In the Belgian Congo, the mode of government was mixed; as Coleman put it,

in theory Belgian policy has been one of indirect rule, but in practice, . . . the authorities have inclined toward direct administration.³

¹Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 264.

²Ibid., 257.

³Ibid.

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In reality, the policies within the three territories towards the Westernized African class were also different. In Nigeria, the British had excluded this class from political participation, but by giving the African great political freedom, the British created for themselves the later nationalistic demands; in 1945, the British accepted the new African elite as the successor of their own (i.e., British) rule. The same is not true about the Belgians in the Congo; there the acceptance came very much later, under pressure rather than spontaneously, and on a much smaller scale. In the French territory, the colonial power subscribed to the policy of assimilation, i.e., participation by elite in the higher bureaucracy and central institutions of the territorial governments. However, in practice, the new African elite there was excluded from effective participation just as completely as in the early days of the rule in the British territories. In the Middle Congo, it was not until 1945 that the beginning of the acceptance in practice could be observed.

Political freedom, then, was also different in the three territories selected for this study. While in Nigeria there was considerable freedom for the European-educated African to proclaim and seek his goals, the Belgian Congo provided hardly any such freedom. In the French colony, the freedom began only after World War II.

A number of other factors in which the three territories differed from each other could be mentioned, but

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Time Period Studied

The period investigated for this study begins with the end of the First World War, since it was at approximately that time that radio broadcasting emerged and that a new approach to colonial problems was taken by various colonial powers. However, a brief summary of the expansionistic policies and of means of communication prior to the 1914 - 1918 war is provided, and references to pre-1918 years are frequently made. The time period covered ends with the independence day of each of the territories surveyed, i.e., in 1960. Periodically, the years of 1939 (beginning of World War II), and 1945 (the end of World War II) are used for the determination of the relative stages of progress.

Organization and Treatment

The approach to this study is historical with descriptive, analytical and evaluative phases. Descriptive narrative is given of the background of those colonial policies not only directly pertaining to radio broadcasting but also those regarding political, economic and social development of the colonies, and of the growth and development of the institutions of broadcasting in the colonies. Inasmuch as the relationship of the colonial policies, explicit or implied, to the actual development

of broadcasting is explored, the study assumes an analytical form through which it is hoped to obtain considerable insight into the problems involved.

Thirdly, the evaluative aspect is attempted to the extent allowed by the available data. Undoubtedly, it is this third dimension which is by far the most difficult to achieve, while at the same time it is the most interesting to work with. Some evidence which might emerge that the policies of the colonial powers vis-à-vis broadcasting in the three territories had indeed been of primary importance and consequence to the development of this medium of communication could perhaps be of practical relevance to further planning by all developing nations, and especially by those colonial powers and their colonies that still remain.

Data

Data on most communication aspects within emerging nations are generally meager. In this observation, the present writer has only confirmed what other investigators noticed earlier. Doob, for example, remarked that

. . . material on communications in Africa is lamentably scarce, for not until recently has the rubric become sufficiently fashionable to encourage research and reports.¹

¹Doob, 13. There are, however, notable exceptions, such as Lord Hailey's An African Survey (London: Oxford University Press) which already in its first edition (1938) as well as in the second edition (1957), contained invaluable information on the press, broadcasting, and cinema.

Nevertheless, several sources of information have been diligently perused for the purpose of this study. First, reports and transcripts of Parliamentary debates have been searched for references and documentation of policies. To the same category belong compilations of laws and statutes, of both the colonial powers and of the colonies.

Travelers' and journalistic reports, and the like, also served as a considerably rich source of information. Though numerous, such reports often revealed only glimpses or pieces of information. Doob's remark that "in Africa . . . one must be grateful for the smallest bits of information"¹ is most appropriate here.

Political, economic and sociological treatises have proven to be of value in obtaining a solid background upon which exploration of the topic could be built. It has been this class of sources which often, however, pertained not to the role of the colonial powers but strictly to the African territories, and especially to their functioning as independent nations. Nonetheless, substantial amount of useful background information has been obtained from them.

The last, but not the least, important sources have been innumerable statistical compilations by individual countries or territories, international organizations, and even individuals. Though suffering from the common

¹Doob, 15.



de ficiency of non-uniform way of reporting various data, s t atistical publications have provided much needed basis f O r intelligent interpretations of development of broad- c a s t i n g .

In all these cases, information has been viewed w i t h caution and evaluated with detached objectivity. All s o u r c e s , including government documents and others which m i g h t have been written with some ulterior motives, are v a l u a b l e and cannot be dismissed lightly. Whenever p o s s i b l e , differing versions and/or data are recorded in this s t u d y . An extra reminder regards the data on the French t e r r i t o r y . It was found in the study of the Middle Congo t h a t data and references often pertained to the whole F r e n c h Equatorial Africa (of which the Middle Congo was o n l y one part, the others being Gabon, Chad, and Oubangi- S h a r i) and no breakdown was available. A note in the text o r in the tables always calls attention to this fact.

Population data. --A special word is needed on P o p u l a t i o n data. To arrive at the "per capita" figures, P o p u l a t i o n information for the three territories was r e q u i r e d for various points in time. In all cases, only e s t i m a t e s were available, as they had been to the colonial a u t h o r i t i e s , and even at a very recent time. For example, i n N i g e r i a the 1960 census discovered, and a later recount c o n f i r m e d , that the actual population that year was well o v e r 50 million, while all statistical reports have b a s e d their data on the estimated figure of approximately

35 million. A decision had to be made whether the more accurate data should be given, or whether the error should be repeated for the sake of consistency. The more scholarly approach, demanding as accurate data as possible, won in this investigation. Population data for the three territories are given in the Appendix.

Monetary information. --Throughout the study, references are made to various currencies, whenever financial data have been included. On occasions, there appeared a need for conversion of such financial data from one currency to another. As the exchange rates varied greatly during the period of time investigated in this report, all local currencies have been converted into units of U.S. currency of a given value at specific times of the period 1918 - 1960. This information also is included in the Appendix.

PART I

COLONIALISM AND COMMUNICATIONS

CHAPTER I

COLONIAL EXPANSION AND COMMUNICATIONS:

AN OVERVIEW

The lack of concern with communications in the study of colonial history of the major powers, as expressed in the introduction to this thesis, should not be interpreted as a total disregard of the importance of communications in the study of history of mankind. Robert Ezra Park, of the Chicago school of sociological thought, stated that

. . . the role and function of communication . . . is obviously fundamental to the social process, and . . . extensions and improvements which the physical sciences have made to the means of communications are so vital to the existence of society and particularly to that more rationally organized form of society we call civilization.¹

As a prelude to the exploration of colonial policies regarding communications, the importance and role of communications in society should be briefly examined. Perhaps, a historical perspective can be obtained if various stages of civilization are surveyed to see whether Park was right when he said that

¹Robert Ezra Park, Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955), 314.

technological devices have naturally changed men's habits and in doing so, they have necessarily modified the structure and functions of society. . . . Every technical device, from the wheelbarrow to the aeroplane, in so far as it provided a new and more effective means of locomotion, has, or should have, marked an epoch in society. This is so far true of most other important changes in the means of transportation and communications.¹

It is in the context of empires that the perma-
nent maintenance of control over wide areas was seen to
depend on the organization and continuance of rapid and
frequent communication.² The underlined terms in the pre-
vious sentence are of import here. Political organiza-
tions such as empires are, among other things, concerned
with the territorial expansion of which they are capable,
and also with the length of time over which the organi-
zations can persist. The consideration here is not only
with the historically observable relationship between
means of communications and imperial (i.e., colonial)
diffusion, but also with the suggested changes in, and
declines and demises of, empires as a result of changes
in the technological development of such communication
means.

¹Ibid., 308-309.

²In the following discussion, "Communication" is by necessity defined in its broadest sense. In later chapters, the topic will be restricted to one means of communication, namely radio broadcasting.

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Empires and Communications

In early civilizations, the success of expansion **was** dependent at least in part on such scientific and **te**chnological advances as the crossing of the light Afri-
can horse with the heavier Asiatic horse, and the intro-
duction of horse riding and establishment of cavalry which
replaced horse driving and chariots.¹ Similarly, the re-
placement of heavy solid wheels by light spoked wheels
can be said to have contributed to a more effective con-
trol over territories.² The interdependence of the wheel
and the road and the effect of both upon political con-
trol and its centralization has been noted by McLuhan who
said, however, that a reverse dependence is also true.
"Centralism depends on margins that are excessible by road
and wheel."³ In the Roman Empire just as in the Persian
Empire, dependence on roads facilitated not only invasion
but also administration of foreign territories.⁴ The horse,
the road and the wheel wiped out the independence of vil-
lages, city states and conquered empires by speeding up

¹Harold A. Innis, The Bias of Communication (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951), 134.

²V. Gordon Childe, What Happened in History (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1942), 152.
Cf. Frances Rodgers and Alice Beard, Heels, Wheels and Wire (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1935).

³McLuhan, 167.

⁴Innis, 15.

the technical means of communication.

With increased mobility and improved means of communication, ideas of innovation and change gradually diffuse within the various rural groups and bring about a weakening of the cumulative unifying bonds basic to mechanical solidarity and control.¹

Not all results of mechanization of the means of communication can be said to be of one kind. Historian Toynebee viewed the acceleration factor as translating the physical problems into moral ones, and pointed to the antique road crowded with dog-carts, wagons, and rickshaws as full of minor nuisance as well as minor dangers.²

. . . as the forces impelling traffic mount in power, there is no more problem of hauling and carrying, but the physical problem is translated into a psychological one as the annihilation of space permits easy annihilation of travelers as well. This principle applies to all media study.³

McLuhan's choice of words is perhaps unfortunate, for annihilation often is understood to mean "ultimate destruction." When, however, annihilation is interpreted as "reduction to nothing," in terms of space it can mean its control, and in terms of travelers it can mean the exercise of power over them. When such explanation is adopted, then it is indeed possible to apply the principle of control not only to roads but to all media, and not only to travelers but to media users and consumers as well.

¹Joseph S. Roucek (ed.), Social Control (Princeton, N.J.: D.Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1947), 69.

²Cited in McLuhan, 95.

³Ibid.

The extension of empires was facilitated by various other means of communications. The function of the library to operate as true instrument of imperial power was established during the times of the Assyrians and perfected by the Egyptian king Ptolemy II who instituted the great library at Alexandria as the center of imperial power in the third century B.C. The scribes occupied from then on until the development of the printing press a strategic position in imperial bureaucracies.

Innis pointed to the adaptability of Roman Law in the oral tradition as facilitating the extension of the Roman Empire which followed the success of Roman arms.¹ The development and use of papyrus helped solve administrative problems of the Roman Empire in terms of space, but not in terms of time. A new medium was needed to meet the limitations of papyrus, and was found in the more durable parchment.

The durability of parchment and the convenience of the codex for reference made it particularly suitable for the large books typical of scriptures and legal works. In turn, the difficulties of copying a large book limited the numbers produced. Small libraries with a small number of large books could be established over large areas. Since the material of a civilization dominated by the papyrus roll had to be recopied into the parchment codex a thorough system of censorship was involved. . . . The ban on secular learning gave a preponderance to theological studies and made Rome dominant. The monopoly of knowledge centering around parchment emphasized religion at the expense of law.²

¹Innis, 45.

²Ibid., 48-49.



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A new medium, paper, was discovered in China and greatly affected the balance of power between the Brahmins and the Buddhists in India. The monopoly of knowledge of the Brahmins was based on the oral tradition, thus creating a gap between a small governing class and the mass of the people. Buddhism grew at least partially because of its emphasis on writing and therefore its accessibility to the lower classes.

In the Chinese Empire, an elaborate system of pictographs required a scholarly class of administrators, separated from the mass of people. The technological advance manifested by the invention and availability of paper proved insufficient to maintain the Empire permanently without an alphabet system. From India, Buddhism migrated to China where access to supplies of paper enabled Chinese Buddhists to develop blockprinting on a large scale in the eighth century.

But the manufacturing of paper moved to Bagdad, spread from there to the West and from the thirteenth century on was confined to Western centers, at first especially in Italy. The commercial revolution beginning about 1275 paralleled the increasing production of paper, and the activity of Italian commercial cities in turn weakened the Byzantine Empire. The development of other cities, particularly in France in the fourteenth century, again shifted the imperial power and even the papacy moved to Avignon in 1308.

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The Age of Printing

Attempts to develop a system of reproduction of books by machine were stirred by the high price demanded for hand-reproduced books.¹ The invention of printing in the fifteenth century was a technical achievement which until then had no precedent. It was the development of a complete manufacturing process rather than the invention of a single object or machine.² It is also probably not without significance that it was developed in Germany which lay on the outskirts, as it were, of the area dominated by scribes, or copyists, as Innis called them.³

The interest in the use of paper steered others to the invention of new printing types such as the gothic script in Germany and roman and italic types in Italian cities, and to the production of printed sheets and development of financial houses at Antwerp, Amsterdam, and Utrecht, also lying outside the area controlled by scribes. Printing in France was delayed until 1469 and in England until 1476.⁴

Postal services probably were established in the early days of the Persian and Roman Empires,⁵ but it was

¹Ibid., 53.

²Encyclopadia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XVIII, 306.

³Innis, 53.

⁴Ibid.



printing which signalled their growth.¹ Printing also led to the establishment of the press and of strict governmental controls, especially in France and in England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The existence of the press eventually contributed to the development of postal routes and the reduction of the postal rates in England in 1710, and "the market for newspapers and books had been widened . . . by an extension of the post office and a more frequent service from London."² The post roads of England were, for the most part, paid for by the newspapers.³ In the American colonies a demand for printers for the publication of laws of the assemblies was followed by an interest in newspapers and in the post office.⁴

The history of shipping is undoubtedly an integral part of the history of civilization. All of the ancient empires were dependent upon shipping which was provided mostly on short routes along the coasts. It was not until the Mediterranean world and the Near East were welded together under the authority of the Roman Empire that favorable conditions emerged for the development of trade.⁵

306. ¹Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XVIII,

²Innis, 151.

³McLuhan, 101.

⁴Innis, 57.

541. ⁵Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XX,



The growth of trade was accompanied by the development of legal and commercial institutions, and the Roman maritime code (or at least its main features) survived the fall of Roman Empire itself, found its way into the English maritime law and formed the basic of modern maritime jurisprudence.¹

Oceanic exploration was pioneered by the Portuguese who extended their imperial and commercial influence into America, Africa, India and China. The technological advancement, evident in the development of the mariner's compass (800 - 1200 A.D.), aided the extension of the Portuguese and Spanish powers to the New World. The gradual establishment of British dominance of the seas helped the regularization of the channels of trade, which in turn led to official British support by diplomatic representatives abroad. Thus an extension of British political power was brought into areas previously explored only by private interests for commercial purposes. Later, as sea transport of passengers became lucrative, shipping companies began to be subsidized by the governments, as was the case with the Cunard line in Britain specifically "in order to ensure swift contact with the colonies."²

The development of steamships coincided with the remarkable growth of British shipping, which by the end of nineteenth century exceeded the total tonnage of all

¹Ibid.

²McLuhan, 103.



other foreign merchant fleets.¹ This pre-eminence was due directly to the technical revolution.² It is significant that whereas in the British Empire the imperial expansion grew with the development of shipping and trade routes, the trade of the Roman Empire dwindled as the Roman Empire itself declined.³

That one technological advance led to another has been further documented in the history of the United States where in the period of Western expansion, the technologies "bring the newspaper; the newspaper starts up politics, and a railroad."⁴ Similarly, in the territories across the oceans the railways soon linked the shipping services and centers with railroads to convey not only immigrants, but mail and goods as well.⁵

The need for existence of strong central government over a wide area, with power to command labor, explains the fact that the construction of an elaborate system of roads, for the most part paved, paralleled the growth in power of the Roman Empire. Roman roads and streets were uniform wherever they occurred. The decline of the roads

¹Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XX, 546.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., XXII, 370.

⁴Matthew Josephson, The Robber Barons: The Great American Capitalists, 1861 - 1901 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1934), 27.

⁵McLuhan, 103.

is directly linked with the decline of papyrus supplies, which resulted from the Roman loss of Egypt. The government organization declined, army organization declined and as the army provided the labor, it is not surprising, then, that after the decline of the Roman Empire, Medieval Europe

grew up without uniform roads or cities or bureaucracies, and it fought the wheel, as later city forms fought the railways; and as we, today, fight the automobile for new speed and power are never compatible with existing spacial and social arrangements.¹

The social and governmental arrangements underwent substantial changes. Just as the railway strengthened the monopolies of political centers in England, the invention of the telegraph destroyed them because it encouraged provincial competition.² The regional press in England no longer had to rely on postal services and political control through the post office because of the new telegraph service. The independence from big metropolitan areas and their press was established by the advent of the first of the electric means of communication. The independence of provincial cities from London paralleled the increased influence of the French upon England through the medium of the telegraph and submarine cables. Lord Northcliffe in England made unprecedented use of the new medium in the search for news as he exploited Paris as a vast and inexpensive source of journalistic wealth.³

¹Ibid., 99.

²Innis, 59.

³Ibid., 60.

The Age of Electric Media

Just as the development of paper and printing is said to have ushered in a new age, so the electric and later electronic media introduced a new era. Furthermore, the concerns and interests displayed by the different media of communication over problems of space (territorial expansion) and of time (duration) are markedly different. While political organizations, whether monarchies or republics, were obviously concerned with prospects for permanency, printing and paper, and all the media which grew upon these inventions, exhibited marked concern¹ with space, and considerable neglect of concern with the limitations of time.² When the power of the printing media was, however, challenged by the invention and development of the new ones (telegraph, radio, etc.), the press' monopoly of space weakened as the regionalism patterns of continuity and time became even more conspicuous. The impact of any kind of printing was becoming less and less dominating, and this in turn weakened the imperial structure of centralized powers and their outside territories.

In the British Empire the growth of autonomy and independence among members of the Commonwealth may be attributed in part to the same development.³

¹Innis used the term "obsession," 60.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., 77.

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Furthermore, the telegraph, by intensifying the volume of news, greatly crippled the role of editorial opinions, and by speeding up of news, made them not only immediate but also "human." McLuhan said that the telegraphic medium gives "that immediate dimension of human interest to news that does not belong to a point of view."¹

When the instant speed of information movement begins,

there is a collapse of delegated authority and a dissolution of the pyramid and management structures made familiar in the organization chart. The separation of functions and the division of stages, spaces, and tasks are characteristic of literate and visual society and of the Western world. These divisions tend to dissolve through the action of the instant and organic interrelations of electricity.²

The means of communications which until late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had been based primarily on the eye, developed a power which threatened to change the structure of Western empires, first in war and then in peace.³ The imperial relationships between metropolitan powers and their territories began to change as a result of changes in the relationship between the powers themselves. Some major powers fought the Great War (1914-1918) to expand their colonial holdings, others defended the colonial status quo. But the viewpoint of yet other nations substantially modified the existing opinion of colonialism, and the idea of self-determination was introduced. The Treaty of Versailles, and the subsequently

¹McLuhan, 223.

²Ibid., 217.

³Innis, 80.

established League of Nations, both accepted this principle, and actually broke up and destroyed large political systems such as the Empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and of the Turks. But the emphasis by the printed media on nationalism and imperialistic ambitions, which resulted in the international instability and contributed to the start of the Great War, also hastened the development of a competitive type of communication which was to be based on the ear.

This function, scope, and impact of the radio and the later electronic media has not yet been fully investigated in terms of their contribution to the decline of colonial empires. Perhaps, it is still too early to say with any degree of definitiveness what the return to the media based on the ear has signified. Innis, though, had some ideas on that score:

In Europe an appeal to the ear made it possible to destroy the results of the Treaty of Versailles as registered in the political map based on self-determination. The rise of Hitler to power was facilitated by the use of loud speaker and the radio. . . . Political boundaries related to the demands of the printing industry disappeared with the new instrument of communication¹

He went also a little further and surmised that the radio appealed to vast areas, overcame the division between classes in its escape from literacy, and "favoured centralization and bureaucracy."² It is with this last statement, that McLuhan disagreed rather vehemently and criti-

¹Ibid., 81.

²Ibid., 82.

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cized Innis from not having applied his own (Innis')
method of using history as an instrument of research:

After many historical demonstrations of the space-binding power of the eye and the time-binding power of the ear, Innis refrains from applying these structural principles to the action of radio. Suddenly, he shifts the ear world of radio into the visual orbit, attributing to radio all the centralizing powers of the eye and of visual culture. Here Innis was misled by the ordinary consensus of his time. Electric light and power, like all electric media are profoundly decentralizing and separatist in their psychic and social consequences.

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Visual technology creates a center-margin of organization whether by literacy or by industry and a price system. But electric technology is instant and omnipresent and creates multiple centers-without-margins. Visual technology . . . creates nations as spatially uniform and homogeneous and connected. But electric technology creates not the nation but the tribe -- not the superficial association of equals but the cohesive depth pattern of the totally involved kinship groups.¹

Communications and the Rise
of Self-Determinism

Obviously, the sketchy narrative on the preceding pages can not be thought of as being a complete history of empires and communications. There were, naturally, many other means of communication utilized by the various empires. In the twentieth century, air-transportation and thus further extension of postal services, as well as of trade, etc., could be documented. After the development of the Press, merging of the visual medium with the aural was accomplished, and utilized, in the medium of film. Even later, the various improvements of the telegraph system,

¹McLuhan in his introduction to Innis, xii-xiv.

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such as Telex, have been in evidence. What is very often considered a culmination (at the present time, of course) of the development of communications media, television, did not come into the picture of imperial communications until the second half of the present century, and in the three territories surveyed in this thesis until after the colonial ties had been superseded by independence.

The point to be made is that the era of radio might have contributed to the decline of imperialism even though Emerson suggested that just as we do not really know the causes of war and of imperialism, we cannot be

wholly sure of the forces which, in recent decades, have brought the era of Western overseas imperialism to a close.¹

In contrast, the theorizing by McLuhan seems at least plausible. In any case, the story of the electronic media, and specifically of radio broadcasting, in the former colonial territories promises to be of great interest, and perhaps also of sufficient importance, especially when viewed as resulting from direct actions, or inactions, of the colonial empires of the twentieth century.

The original question asked by this writer, namely "what were the differences, explicit or implicit, in the colonial policies vis-à-vis radio broadcasting?" can now be explored. Perhaps also, an answer can be supplied as

¹Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), 15.

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to whether radio broadcasting aided what various policies termed mission civilisatrice, that is whether radio acted as an instrument of

imperialism . . . by which the spiritual, scientific, and material revolution . . . was spread to the rest of the world,¹

or whether radio broadcasting assumed the role as one of the tools "with which its victims could pry it loose."²

¹Ibid., 6.

²Ibid., 18.

CHAPTER II

COLONIAL POLICIES ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

In order to understand, and even to explore, the communication policies of Belgium, France and Great Britain regarding broadcasting, it is necessary to perceive the setting in which such policies were to operate. Without the understanding of broad colonial philosophies and policies pertaining to political and other development of the dependent territories, no valid interpretation can be made of policies and action specifically dealing with communications. Some relationships have been pointed out and others hinted at in the previous chapter. In 1961, a UNESCO study¹ demonstrated a close affinity of mass media and some general economic and social developments. Scholars such as Emery have suggested that to understand the operation of any broadcasting system, one must know something of the country's history and the nature of its people.²

¹United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Freedom of Information: Development of Information Media in Underdeveloped Countries (New York: U.N., 1961).

²Walter B. Emery, "European Broadcasting: Regulation and Control," NAEB Journal, January-February, 1967, 67.

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The purpose of the following pages is to review, in a concise manner, the thoughts and actions of the three colonial powers on their colonial aims in regards to political, economic, and social development of their overseas territories. A comparison will be attempted of the attitudes of the British, the French, and the Belgians towards their specific geographical areas of this study.

What constitutes a colonial policy? It was ably stated that

it is not possible for a country with a colony or protectorate or other kind of dependency to escape having some intention about the way of running it. The way that a country addresses itself to the problems it encounters in that colony is determined, directly or indirectly, either wholly or in part, by this intention. When, therefore, we speak of the African colonial policy of the Belgians, or the British, the French, Italians, Portuguese or Spanish, we are in fact speaking of the image of the Africa they are seeking to bring into being.¹

To the extent, then, that colonial powers pursued their mandate² in their overseas territories, it is possible to speak of colonial policies.

A colonial policy depends primarily on the political theory prevalent in the metropolitan country itself,

¹George H. T. Kimble, Tropical Africa, II: Society and Polity (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1960), 227.

²The term "mandate" as used here means only the control exercised by colonial powers over the dependencies or territories and not the legal concept devised by the League of Nations after World War I. None of the three territories being studied in this work were "mandated" territories in the League of Nations sense of the word.

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and to the basic concepts of the form of metropolitan government. The colonial powers studied here displayed substantial differences in the form, instruments, and procedures of government, even though there existed the same political theory of parliamentary democracy in all of them. Nowhere are the differences more perceivable than in the political and administrative spheres, though it needs to be mentioned that among the factors influencing the policies were also the historical facts of how each dependency was acquired, what had been the motives for its acquisition, and what were the explanations (or apologia, as one historian put it¹) advanced for national colonization.

The following review of the British, French and Belgian ideas on, and specific conduct for, political, administrative, economic and social development of their colonial empires should provide the necessary background against which explicit communications policies can be judged.

The British Colonial Policy

More often than not, whenever a chance presents itself to compare the British national characteristics with any other, British empiricism is contrasted with Latin rationalism; and the British suspicion of the abstract is

¹Mary Evelyn Townsend, European Colonial Expansion Since 1871 (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1941), 183.



contrasted with the fascination which the abstract has for the "more logical" and the "more systematic" minds of the Latins. Similarly,

in the political sphere, the same distinction in mental habit is detected in the contrast between the alleged Latin attachment to centralization and the alleged British attachment to decentralization.¹

Such distinctions can easily be overemphasized. The British concept of decentralization has always been modified by the British devotion to precedents rather than to principles, as the striking feature of the British common law amply demonstrates. But, as Evans pointed out, both precedents and principles end in systems; they have the same unifying influence, they both lead to identity of methods and performance.

Thus, it is not surprising, that despite the great diversity among the various parts of the British Empire, just about all the British overseas territories exhibited much that had a common form, common principle or common precedent. Similarly, it should not surprise anyone that the declared policy of Great Britain displayed very much the same goals and employed similar means in most of their dependencies.

¹E. W. Evans, "Principles and Methods of Administration in the British Colonial Empire," in C. M. MacInnes (ed.), Principles and Methods of Colonial Administration, Colston Papers, III (London: Butterworth Scientific Publications, 1950), 9.

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Political Development

A substantial part of the long history of British colonialism includes that period of time when not even the Britishers themselves were thinking of any other purpose than "imperialistic" for being in the colonies in the first place.

There was a time when in the British Empire, as elsewhere, colonies were regarded merely as a source of wealth and a place of settlement for Europeans. You have only to read any of the colonial literature of those days to see how little counted the rights and welfare of the Natives.¹

The time referred to the period up to the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century.

British colonization was the effort of the people rather than the government, an activity and an accomplishment due to British temperament at least as much as to England's need for expansion of food, raw materials and commercial markets. The British government followed rather than led the colonization process, partially upon urgings of her own people. When, in 1883, John Seeley published his The Expansion of England², he expounded the history

¹Lord Halifax, quoted in H. A. Wieschhoff, Colonial Policies in Africa ("African Handbook No. 5"; Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press and the University Museum, 1944), 62.

²A series of lectures given in 1883 published in 1902 by Macmillan Co. of New York. Seeley was knighted for his work in 1894. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XX, 281.

of the Empire "to stir pride in the part and ambition for the future."¹

The growth of militarism and nationalism in Europe were among the causes of the re-appraisal of the colonies' values to Great Britain. Concurrently with the military and the economic reappraisals, a new look of the political future of the dependencies also emerged: already there was evidence that some of the dependencies were on their way to self-government (Canada, for example), and

. . . nothing was more certain that as time went on there would be further development in that direction. This, however, from the new viewpoint did not necessarily imply independence; it need involve nothing more than progressive readjustment of the relations between colonies and mother country while all remained under a common flag and loyal to a common crown.²

It was at this time, also, that much effort began to be poured into finding a way in which an imperial organizational framework could be formed. A series of Imperial Conferences began in 1887, and has continued, though under a different name³, till the present.

From a treatise of the British colonial policy the name of Joseph Chamberlain cannot be omitted. His tenure

¹Frederic Austin Ogg, English Government and Politics, (2nd. ed.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1944), 750.

²Ibid., 750-51.

³The last Imperial Conference was held in 1937. Since then, there have been Prime Ministers', Defense Ministers' and Finance Ministers' Meetings; Economic Conferences, Commonwealth Conferences, etc. Great Britain, British Information Services, The Commonwealth Association in Brief (London: B.I.S., 1958), 9-10.

of the office of colonial secretary between 1895 and 1900, though brief, is regarded as a turning point in the history of the relations between the British colonies and the mother country. He worked for the establishment of friendly relations among all parts of the empire, especially for the purposes of defense and commerce.¹

In 1895, he based his proposals for preferential tariff on the economic necessities of the world-wide empire.

Above all, he set out to work on the task of educating the British public opinion into understanding that

the responsibilities of the mother country are not merely to be constructed according to the selfish interests of a nation of consumers.²

Even after he left the Cabinet, he worked for his ideals of a colonial empire, for the establishment of a preferential tariff for the empire, and -- on the foreign affairs front -- against the policies of "splendid isolation."

In 1904, he admonished his fellow Englishmen to "think imperially."³

Certainly, the development as described above signified a notable departure from an announced desire to withdraw completely from the coastal trading posts, as a Select Committee of the House of Commons advocated in 1865. The responsibilities of the mother country that

¹Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), V, 204.

²Ibid.

³In the speech at the Guildhall, in the City of London, January 18, 1904.

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Chamberlain was talking about were exemplified by the administration of Sir Frederick (later Lord) Lugard, when he became High Commissioner of Nigeria in 1900 and which he formalized in his writings, especially in the well known work on The Dual Mandate in British Africa.¹ The concept of a trust for the welfare of the inhabitants of the colonial territories was explained in Lugard's doctrine of the dual mandate which posited the view that

Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit of her own industrial classes, and of the native races in their progress to a higher plane; that the benefit can be made reciprocal, and that it is the aim and desire of civilized administration to fulfill this dual mandate.²

The doctrine of dual mandate has become the official policy of Great Britain, and when the League of Nations began formulating its policies on the former German dependencies, the term mandate appeared to gather momentum. But as far as the British were concerned,

. . . it was the free and generous assistance given to mother country by the colonies in that great hour of need. [i.e. World War I] that finally clinched their claims not only to a more direct voice in the conduct of Empire foreign affairs but to further freedom in the management of their own relations with foreign states, and to clearer recognition of their domestic autonomy.³

A number of Imperial Conferences made this official, and the statements by successive United Kingdom Secretaries of State for the Colonies reaffirmed that

¹Lord Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London: Wm. Blackwood and Sons, Ltd., 1929).

²Lord Hailey, (1938), 133.

³Ogg, 725.

the policy for the dependencies is to help them to attain self-government within the Commonwealth, and to pursue their economic and social development so that it keeps pace with their political advance.¹

Perhaps, a brief explanation of the term "British Commonwealth and "British Empire" is in order at this point. The first mention of the term Commonwealth as pertaining to the British was in 1884.² It was revived in 1917 by General J. C. Smuts, and also by the Imperial War Conference that same year when the dominions were referred to as "autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth."³ The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 spoke of the "British Commonwealth of Nations,"⁴ and the 1926 Imperial Conference, summarized in the so-called Balfour Report⁵, referred to the autonomous communities within the British Commonwealth of Nations.

. . . The use of both descriptions was deliberate, the term 'British Empire' being used to describe the British political organism as a whole, and the designation 'British Commonwealth' to denote within that wider whole the smaller⁶ group of fully self-governing communities. . . .

¹Great Britain, British Information Services, The U. K. Dependencies in Brief (London: B. I. S., 1960), 3.

²Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), IV, 175.

³Ibid.

⁴D. Figgis, The Irish Constitution (Dublin: n.n., 1923), 96. Cf. The Times (London), December 7, 1921

⁵Great Britain, Colonial Office, Summary of Proceedings of the Imperial Conference of 1926; Cmd. 2768 (London: H. M. S. O., 1926).

⁶Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), IV, 175-76.

The Statute of Westminster, in 1931, specified which countries were members of the Commonwealth, but that list has been altered by a few additions and two withdrawals (Eire and Union of South Africa). Non-self-governing territories formed a part of the British Commonwealth, but upon achieving its independence, the new nation could choose to become a member.

By the time the Second World War began in 1939, the policy of self-determination had been fully established. A view was accepted that

the well-being and development of "people not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" is "sacred trust of civilization." That trust has been steadily fulfilled since the War [1914 - 1918] in the case of mandated territories, on which the operation of the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant [of the League of Nations] has conferred immense Benefits. The British Commonwealth is fully aware of the heavy responsibility resting upon it to see that, through respect for these principles, continuity and development is assured to the native populations. The mandatory system, in fact, derives from exactly the same inspirations as that which governs British colonial administrative policy.¹

It is significant that the international bodies established as a result of the two wars formulated their ideals on the British pattern, the League of Nations by "Mandates"² and the United Nations by "Trusteeship."³

¹Lord Halifax, quoted in Wieschhoff, 62.

²Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

³Articles 75 - 85 of the United Nations Charter.

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In Britain herself, trusteeship was replaced after 1945 by partnership:

. . . while no clear-cut definition of what was meant by partnership was formulated, it was felt to imply a more dynamic approach than mere trusteeship.¹

A small digression is needed here to refer to the 1941 Atlantic Charter in which the British Prime Minister and the President of the United States declared their respect for the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live, and their wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been deprived of them. This statement provided a new impetus to the policies of all colonial powers and, of course, was favorably received throughout the colonial world as a proposal to give colonial peoples the right of full self-determination of their political affairs. Soon afterwards, however, a conflict appeared to exist between the interpretation of this statement by Winston Churchill on the one hand and Franklin Delano Roosevelt on the other. Mr. Churchill in his address to the House of Commons after his return from the meeting declared on September 9, 1941 that

the Joint Declaration does not qualify in any way the various statements of policy which have been made from time to time about the development of constitutional government in . . . parts of the British Empire. . . . At the Atlantic meeting we had in mind, primarily, the restoration of the sovereignty,

¹Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), IV, 192.

self-government, and the national life of the states and nations of Europe now under the Nazi yoke and the principles governing any alternations in the territorial boundaries which may have to be made. So, that is quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples which owe allegiance to the British Crown. . . .¹

It is not surprising that Churchill's statement was interpreted in many parts of the world as excluding the colonial peoples from the ideals of the Atlantic Charter. In Nigeria, N. Azikiwe, the editor of the West African Pilot, and later President of Nigeria, was particularly outspoken in his condemnation of such an attitude.² President Roosevelt in a broadcast to his nation the following February contradicted Mr. Churchill by declaring that the Charter was applicable "to all humanity." The obvious conflict remained in existence for quite some time. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Colonel Oliver Stanley, was asked in the House of Commons on June 23, 1943 if any steps were being proposed for the full incorporation of the Colonies within the terms of the Atlantic Charter; according to the official transcript of the debate, Colonel Stanley had "no statement to make on this matter at present."³

¹Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CCCLXXI, 1351.

²Wieschhoff, 73.

³Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CCCXCIV, 2002.

Nevertheless, Great Britain was fully committed to a policy of eventual self-government of her dependencies. Time and time again, the aim of the United Kingdom colonial policy was reiterated. In 1948 a White Paper said that

. . . the central purpose of British colonial policy is simple. It is to guide the colonial territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth in conditions that ensure to the people concerned both fair standard of living and freedom from oppression from any quarter.¹

Mr. Oliver Lyttleton, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies told the House of Commons on November 14, 1951:

. . . We all aim at helping the colonial territories to attain self-government within the British Commonwealth. To that end we are seeking as rapidly as possible to build up in each territory the institutions which its circumstances require. Second, we are all determined to pursue the economic and social development of the colonial territories so that it keeps pace with their political development. . . .²

In 1957, Sir Winston Churchill summarized the long history of British colonial policy in this manner:

There has been no lack of critics, at home and abroad, to belittle Britain's Colonial achievement and to impugn her motives. But the record confounds them. Look where you will, you will find that the British have ended wars, put a stop to savage customs, opened churches, schools and hospitals, built railways, roads and harbours, and developed the natural resources of the countries so as to mitigate the almost universal, desperate poverty. They have given freely in money

¹Great Britain, Colonial Office, The Colonial Empire, 1947-1948. Cmd. 7433; June, 1948.

²Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CDXCIII, 984.

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and material and in the services of a devoted band of Civil Servants; yet no tax is imposed on any of the Colonial peoples that is not spent by their own Governments on projects for their own good.

I write 'their own Government' advisedly, for however much diverse conditions may necessitate different approaches, the British have for long had one goal in view for their overseas territories: their ultimate development into nations freely associated within the Commonwealth framework. The present state of the Commonwealth is the proof of the sincerity of this policy.¹

Administration

The British administration encouraged the utilization of existing local Native institutions in its pursuit of the development of self-government. The administrative device used has been known as "indirect rule." As it was stated earlier, it was the Governor of Northern Nigeria, Sir Frederick Lugard, who created the theoretical foundation for its practical application but he by no means invented the device. The British had used it previously in India, for example, and the Dutch in the Netherlands' East Indies.² No dependency which came under British rule was without established administrative institutions of some kind, and the British turned such institutions to use without creating any conflict with the national aims. It has been said that the British use of indirect rule was a result of institutional tolerance so typical of the

¹Foreword to Peter Abrahams' Jamaica - An Island Mosaic (London: H. M. S. O., 1957).

²Wieschhoff, 69.

British.¹ Till this day, there are survivals of the native institutions in codes of law and in the systems of judicial administration; this is also true of Nigeria where the Moslem law forms a part of the Nigerian legal procedure. It is in this that the British differ so much from the French who insisted on French legal concepts being accepted by the indigenous peoples, especially in order to acquire full French citizenship.²

Yet another explanation can be found for the indirect rule in the British territories. Kimble says that when Lugard introduced it in Northern Nigeria in the early part of this century, he did so on grounds of common sense and economy.³ Obviously, any innovation is not only laborious but also an extremely costly business. Evans put it rather bluntly: "The scrapping and replacement of existing institutions needs men and money, if not munitions."⁴ He, too, explained the respect for established institutions as inseparable from the deep-seated British belief in the natural organic growth of human institutions.⁵

¹Evans in MacInnes, 11.

²Wieschhoff, 94.

³Kimble, II, 237.

⁴Evans in MacInnes, 11.

⁵Ibid.

Economic and Social Development

While the British were specific about their political colonial aims, their pronouncements regarding the economic and social development of the dependencies were not backed up by too much official action until after World War I. Until that time, the British government's intentions had been to make the dependencies and their peoples pay for whatever economic or social work was needed.

. . . it had been the accepted view in Britain that a dependency should have the communications, social services and so forth which it could afford out of its own revenues, and that economic development was properly the function of private enterprise.¹

It needs to be stated, however, that no dependency was required to contribute to the British Treasury, at least not since the American Revolution in the late eighteenth century. In spite of official colonial circles' support of the notion that political, economic and social advancement were interdependent, and in spite of the pronouncement of Joseph Chamberlain who urged building of communications², little official planning was done in this respect.

¹Great Britain, British Information Services, The U. K. Colonial Development and Welfare Acts (London: B. I. S., March, 1960), 5. Henceforth referred to as B. I. S., The CD & W Acts.

²James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), 54.

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The beginning of a conscious effort to introduce central control to the economic sphere of the British Empire appeared in 1923 when the Imperial Economic Conference was called, followed by the establishment of the Empire Marketing Board in 1926. By 1929, when an act was passed and funds earmarked for economic development in the colonies, Great Britain found itself at the threshold of a great depression and was struck by widespread unemployment of both men and equipment.¹ The vast colonial empire presented itself as a suitable field of investment for revitalizing the metropolitan economy. The colonial Development Act of 1929 made provisions for financial assistance of one million British pounds a year (\$4,740,000) to overseas territories, but its purpose was limited to aiding colonial agriculture and industry, "thereby promoting commerce with the industry in the United Kingdom."²

The admitted purpose, then, of the 1929 act was to help the United Kingdom rather than the colonies. Schemes of welfare were not included. In any case, the deepening economic depression of the 1930's halted whatever little planning there existed at the time.

The departure from the principles that a dependency should have only those services which it could itself

¹Economic Bulletin for Africa, II, No. 2 (1962), 29.

²B. I. S., The CD & W Acts, 6.

afford to establish and to maintain occurred just before World War II when it had become clear that greater provision by the British government and a more imaginative handling of the problems of development of the dependent territories were needed to create the conditions required for the establishment of self-government. The Secretary of State for the Colonies said in 1943 that "without proper social and economic development there would be only mockery of self-government."¹ At about the same time Lord Hailey, the African expert acting as consultant to the Colonial Office, explained why the direct help by the government was needed.

. . . our failing has not been in the direction of exploitation; it lies rather in the lack of any systematic organization of economic development. Much has been left to private enterprise, and it would be wrong to underestimate the part which private capital has taken in the material development of the Dependencies. But private enterprise has a limited sphere of action, and there is a wide field left in which the government must now take its part.²

These and similar rationales were at the basis of the legislation, passed by the British Parliament in 1940, in spite of a future made uncertain by war.

The new act went considerably further than the 1929 law. Already its title, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, indicated that the British government intended to provide better services in areas such as health

¹The Times (London), November 18, 1943, 23.

²Lord Hailey, "The Colonies and the Atlantic Charter," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, XXX (1943), 233-46.

and housing. The act was to serve "any purpose likely to promote the development of the resources of any Colony or the welfare of its people,"¹ and this enlarged scope made it possible to assist the building of schools and other social services. Most of the British economic help took the form of direct grants.

The British principle in administering the two Acts, and six others (including amendments) which followed between 1945 and 1960, was to allow the colonial governments as much scope for initiative as was consistent with necessary control by the British government of public funds. Local administrations were required to submit plans which then guided the allocations of CD & W Funds.² The organization of proposals was, of course, followed by local administration of the authorized projects. Thus, the development policy was consistent with the established aim to proceed toward eventual self-government.

Colonial territories were also assisted through other means. In 1948, the Colonial Development Corporation was established to undertake, either alone or in association with others, projects which would promote or expand economic enterprises in a wide range of areas. Public

¹B. I. S., The CD & W Acts, 6.

²Henceforth the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, or their purposes, funds, etc., will be referred to as CD & W.

loans raised by the colonial administration on the London market, the British government loans and the British government guarantees of loans made by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, all were used, together with private capital, to continue the economic and social development of the overseas territories. The requirements of sound financial management and self-imposed responsibilities were considered by the British to be an important part of the preparation for self-government.¹

Colonial Policies of the French

The French colonial empire which can be said to have begun with the founding of the Colony of Canada (in Quebec in 1608) continued to grow to such an extent that it inevitably led to the development of rivalry with the British by about 1740.² The rivalry ended in 1763 when almost all colonial possessions of France had to be ceded to England and Spain. And though the rebuilding of the French colonial empire began almost immediately, the holdings were lost again with the defeat of Napoleon. The Treaties of 1814 and 1815 left France only with Martinique

¹Great Britain, British Information Services, Economic Development in the United Kingdom Dependencies (London: B. I. S., December, 1959), 11.

²Albert Troux and Albert Girard, Histoire de la France (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1942), 280-85.

and Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Réunion, and a few trading ports in Senegal and India.¹ Succeeding governments expanded this meager remainder to create what by 1918 constituted the second largest empire of the world.²

But the fluctuation in size was not the only aspect of French imperialism which has been different from its British rival. The nature of French colonial rule also has been quite unlike the characteristics of the British administration.

The French have never conceived of a program for colonial development which would ultimately lead to the self-government of their colonial territories; they embarked rather on a policy of integrating their colonial holdings into a Greater France which would include as integral parts the metropolitan area as well as all overseas possessions.³

The colonies were subject to law applying to the metropolitan area and to special laws and decrees administered by a central bureaucracy. The 1848 Constitution declared, and the statement remained a part of French colonial thinking until the events of 1958, that colonies were French territories in the same way as the Métropole and were to enjoy the same position in both public and private law.⁴ The inhabitants of the overseas territories were regarded as future Frenchmen, but Frenchmen nevertheless.⁵

657. ¹Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), IX,

²Ibid.

³Wieschhoff, 91.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

Political Development

As the permanence of the association between metropolitan France and her colonial empire was never doubted, and as expression of such permanence was available in a clear-cut legal form, it is not surprising that the French colonial policy remained fairly constant. And yet at least four forms of the colonial policy can be distinguished. The first was the policy of subordination, based on the concept that the colonizing state works for itself and for itself alone. The goal of the colonial enterprise was to enrich the colonizing nation and to enlarge the political influence of its government. The interest, the aspirations, and the needs of the colonies were not even considered. This was the French policy until the middle of the eighteenth century (and partially even later) and the names forever associated with it are those of Duke of Choiseul, the French Foreign Minister from 1758 to 1770, and Jules Ferry a hundred years later. "Colonies are made by the metropole and for the metropole," is a phrase that appears in the French Encyclopedie.¹ The Duke of Choiseul is quoted as having said: "When the fire is in the house, who cares about the stables," referring to the primary interest of France in the defense of her own territory and her willingness to sacrifice her colonies if need

¹Ali Maalem, Colonialisme, Trusteeship, Independance (Paris: Defence de la France, 1946), 260.

be¹ -- as it indeed happened in 1763. Native welfare was to be fostered only insofar as it secured an advantage for France: a slow progressive abandonment of this policy began in the nineteenth century, but as late as 1946 the following comment was made:

We would be incomplete if we were not to acknowledge that in the middle of the twentieth century, after two gigantic wars for liberty, certain consequences of the policy of subordination still persist.²

At the turn of the eighteenth century the policy of assimilation replaced the policy of subordination as a direct consequence of the triumph of the republican ideals. The French Revolution proclaimed equality of all citizens; the declaration of rights of man and of the citizen, passed in 1789, was thought to apply to all men regardless of where they lived, regardless of their color. The absence of color prejudice as well as the French ability to understand native life began to form another distinction between the French and the British in colonial affairs.³ Because of these factors and because of the French belief in the correctness of their interpretations, it was possible for France to consider it her duty to assist the native peoples toward achieving their status as Frenchmen not only in the political sphere, but especially in the cultural and social spheres. The object of the policy of assimilation was the French anticipation that the peoples of her colonies will undergo an evolution

¹Ibid., 263.

²Ibid.,

³Townsend, 185.

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eventually resulting in universal suffrage and citizenship rights for all her subjects.

The assimilation theory reflected the desire to create French citizens of all the peoples within the French Empire but first an intermediate step had to be devised to provide for the evolution. Three classes of the natives were established: the first one was that of French subjects to which the great masses belonged. They enjoyed no political privileges but by absorbing French culture and learning the French language and in addition, by proving their loyalty to France and her ideals, could reach the second classification, the so called evolués (or notable évolués). Thus, the evolués had a superior education which provided them with a solid base upon which they could build and eventually reach the highest classification, that of French citizens.¹

Under the policy of assimilation all metropolitan legislation applied at least in principle to all colonies, very often without any special mention being made to that effect in the laws themselves. Colonies were represented in the French parliament where their deputies and senators possessed the same rights as their metropolitan colleagues. This colonial representation was considered the most important colonial aspect of the policy of assimilation.

A common assembly in which each member represents not this or that district but the whole country, is the most powerful moral bond which unites the different

¹Wieschhoff, 93-94.

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fractions of the European and extra-European territory. Compared to the representation in the Houses of Parliament, all the other consequences of assimilation are secondary. It is the essential feature and characteristic of the system.¹

Toward the end of the nineteenth century the policy of autonomy, or, as the British called it, the policy of ultimate self-government, began to develop among the colonial powers. The French were not immune to the new thinking, as at least twice before there had been attempts to sway the policy towards eventual autonomy.

The new law of 24 April, 1833 and the Senatus-Consulte of 4 July, 1866 had directed . . . French colonies into the ways of the policy of autonomy, but these two tentative [attempts] through which it had been tried to make France abandon its traditional policy were not successful and were soon abandoned.²

The attempts to change the policy of assimilation reappeared at the very start of the twentieth century, not because of dissatisfaction with such policy, but because it had been proven ineffective in all but the anciennes colonies (Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guiana and Réunion) which were the colonies of settlement. All other overseas territories, argued Jules Harmand, were not colonies but dominations, in which European rule was exercised over a large native population, and where the true colon was not the European but the native, the state being the great

¹Arthur Girault, "Le problème colonial," Revue de Géographie, 1894; quoted in Maalem, 265.

²Maalem, 268.



colonizer.¹ Harmand based his theory (which he called the theory of association) on the writings and reports of such colonial officials as General Gallieni, Governor of Madagascar, and Marshall Lyautey, High Commissioner in Morocco. Thus it was only at the beginning of the twentieth century that France has even admitted that in her pursuing of colonization there had been in each territory another civilization. The problem was how to allow two different mentalities, two different ways of living and thinking to live together, to coexist on the same soil.²

The policy of association, though a radical departure from the policy of assimilation, was not interpreted by the French necessarily as leading to autonomy. At first the concept of association was meant to refer to the internal development in which the indigenous peoples would be allowed to conserve their traditions and their customs without being forced to substitute European ways for their own. Maalem, as a matter of fact, referred to this concept as the policy of internal progress³; he explained his doctrine as being based on the maxim that "a mentality is a nationality."

It was not until after the end of the World War I

¹Jules Harmand, Domination et Colonisation (Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 1919), 20-21.

²Maalem, 271.

³Ibid., 272.

that the idea of association was incorporated into an official French colonial policy in regard to other than the oldest colonies; furthermore, it contained special provisions for the three territories France possessed in Indochina. The post-war Minister of Colonies, Albert Sarraut, defined the new policy by emphasizing the functional collaboration between the French rulers and the native elite, that is those who had accepted the standards of the Western, and specifically the French, civilization. Sarraut also combined the political development of the colonies with their economic development, thus showing the way which the British were to follow.

The acceptance of the principle of association did not mean, however, the demise of the concept of assimilation for the remaining territories, though it had progressively encountered greater and greater difficulties. By 1939, of about seventy million people in all French overseas territories only about two-and-a-half million acquired French citizenship (about 3.5 per cent)¹, and many French politicians began to see the futility of pursuing the policy of complete assimilation.

In many territories national political parties were being formed, and political equality and at least some measure of self-government were being demanded. The French defeat in 1940 and the continued resistance of the French overseas territories to both Germany and the Vichy

¹Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), IX, 657.

government put the colonies in an even better position to demand reforms from the French government in exile. General DeGaulle's provisional government acceded to the demands to the extent that it called a special conference in Brazzaville in 1944 where the future of the colonies was debated. The conference rejected the principle of autonomy, but recommended a substantial political re-organization with a twofold purpose: to encourage local self-government and to guarantee the unity of the French Union. A form of federalism was proposed.

The names of two men ought to be mentioned in connection with the Brazzaville Conference of 1944. One is that of Governor-General of the French Equatorial Africa, Felix Eboué, who himself was a Negro and had some twenty-five-year experience in colonial administration. The second is that of René Plevin, Minister of Colonies in the exiled government and in the first post-liberation Cabinet, and later a French Premier. These two men hoped that the recommendations of the Brazzaville Conference would be carried out immediately after the war. The 1946 Constitution, however, though it linked together metropolitan France and her overseas territories in the federalistic French Union contained some of the older French ideas on administration and on assimilation. As Lord Hailey commented,

something of the traditional 'centralist and unitarian in character' of French administration reasserted itself in the discussion which took place in the



Constituent Assembly, and it is clear that its final decisions were viewed with disappointment by many who had hoped for the emerging of a constitution which would correspond more closely with the principles set out at Brazzaville.¹

Among the disappointed was René Plevén²; there is no doubt that had Governor General Eboué lived to see that constitution (Eboué died unexpectedly in 1944) he also would have been disenchanted.

For the next fourteen years or so, the French government and to a great extent the French public opinion held tenaciously to the idea of assimilation in Algeria, but both had to reconcile themselves to the newer policy of modified association in the other territories.

When General DeGaulle returned to power in 1958 it was not because of the internal difficulties of metropolitan policies, but because of French difficulties in colonies, whether they were départements or overseas territories. In public speech in 1958 DeGaulle expressed his idea of the Communauté Française:


a community formed between the French nation and those of the overseas territories that so desire, within which each territory will become a State that governs itself . . . [each territory would be given the opportunity] either to accept France's proposal or to refuse it, and by so doing, to break every tie with her.³

The principle of autonomy was finally made official. In the referendum which followed DeGaulle's speech just three

¹Lord Hailey, An African Survey (1956), 211.

²René Plevén, "Evolution of the French Empire towards a French Union," Journal of the Anti-Slavery Society, July, 1949, 34.

³The Times (New York), September 5, 1958, 11:5.



weeks later all but one (now Republic of Guinea) voted yes and thus approved the new Constitution which General DeGaulle's Special Committee had drawn up. This constitution, as was also promised by DeGaulle in his speech in 1958, was amended on June 4, 1960, offering the member-states of the French Community to become fully independent and sovereign republics without ceasing to belong to the community. The twelve African members availed themselves of this law and became independent soon after.¹

Administration

From the beginning until the time of Napoleon, the colonies had been subject to the same laws that applied to the metropolitan France; from then on till the middle of the nineteenth century, they were governed by the enactment of special laws.² The provisions of the Constitution of 1848 were applied also to the colonies, and under the Second Empire (Napoleon III), the Senate was given the power to legislate on colonial matters.

During the seventy or so years of the Third Republic (1871-1940) the overseas territories were again controlled directly by the central authority. The Republican Constitution of 1875 had no specific provisions

¹The Statesman's Year Book, 1962-1963, 961-62.

²Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), IX,
657.

pertaining to the territories which were governed mostly by decree and administered through territorial governments and assemblies. The French Parliament, however, could always discuss colonial questions and indeed legislate on them. For example, the Finance Act of 1900 provided, at least for the African territories, that all civil expenditures and the cost of the gendarmerie were the responsibility of the colonial budgets, and that all military expenditures incurred by the French government in respect of a colony were to be charged against the budget of that colony.¹

Unlike the British who relied upon the indirect rule to carry out their colonial policy, the French concentrated on the formation of an elite whose members were allowed to hold administrative positions. While the British indirect rule had as its goal the preparation of the territories for self-government, the French used the elite to assist in introducing the masses to French culture. The efficient working of this French system of utilizing the elite was

facilitated by the fact that . . . there exists little race discrimination in the French territories. Inter-marriages between European French and members of the African elite are not uncommon. . . . For this reason alone assimilative tendencies are more likely to be successful in French territories than in those where racial considerations determine the political or social patterns.²

¹Law of April 13, 1900. Cf. Lord Hailey, An African Survey (1938), 186.

²Wieschhoff, 95. Cf. Townsend, 185.



The central authority in Paris was until 1894 centered either in the Ministry of Marine or the Ministry of Commerce, the authority having been moved back and forth several times; in that year a separate ministry, Ministère de la France D'Outre-Mer was established.¹ Even the name suggests the French view that overseas territories were part of France herself.

Economic and Social Development

The economic exploitation as a direct result of the colonial policy of subordination has already been referred to. The colonies were considered a private domain and the benefits that could be derived from them were reserved to the proprietor, that is to the state. Girault wrote that

the only reason for the existence of the colonies was to produce commodities needed by the ruling state and to consume its products. In the instructions addressed by the King to the Governor and to the intendant of Martinique, January 25, 1765, we read: "The colonies founded by the several European powers have all been established for the advantage of those powers. The colonies would not have been established except to facilitate the provisioning of the colonizing state and to provide markets for it." In another document of the period we read: "To consume and to produce, such are the true and only objects in the establishment of colonies. To confine their purchases and sales to the Kingdom -- such is the obligation which they owe to it."²

Such policies justified the exclusion of other nations

¹ Pierre Daresté, Traité de Droit Colonial (Paris: n.n., 1931), 215.

² Arthur Girault, The Colonial Tariff Policy of France (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916), 37.

from trading in the colonies.

The change in the colonial policies brought about by the French Revolution in the late 1700's resulted also in a new view of, and towards the development of, colonial commerce. While under the ancien régime the colonies, even though integral parts of the Empire were considered to be "as different from the provinces of the French Kingdom as the means differ from the end,"¹ the ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity of the late eighteenth century made the "commerce of the colonies to be a commerce between brothers, a commerce of the nation with a part of the nation."² But the liberal policy adopted by the Constituent Assembly did not last. An adverse reaction to the revolution and a progressive reverse to the policies existing prior to 1789 occurred almost as soon as Napoleon assumed power. With the progressive loss of the French colonies, the colonial commerce which flourished so much just before the revolution ceased to exist. When the French colonial empire fell apart in 1814, rebuilding of commerce began almost immediately. The administration policy of the colonies was reorganized again, and from the economic point of view France continued to follow the pre-revolutionary policies. Free trade was again suppressed and the policy of exclusion of other nations from trading in the colonies was in effect. The tariff policy favored

¹Ibid., 37.

²Ibid., 43.

the importation of the products from the French colonies while eliminating almost totally the products of foreign nations and colonies.

During the nineteenth century, the policies of free trade alternated several times with those of commercial exclusions. The Berlin Conference on the Congo in 1884-1885 insisted on free trade in the Congo Basin, with no preferential rights, and no duties.¹ The undersecretary of the State for the Colonies, Etienne, told the French Senate in 1891 that

we do indeed believe, and we assert it emphatically that since France must incur the obligations involved in a colonial domain it is just and proper that this domain be reserved as a market for French product. If we were not to make such a reservation, if we had colonies only to export to them each year millions of capital and soldiers, our colonial policy would be of questionable expediency.²

But the administrators were unable to induce private or public capital to make investments.³ It was at this time, from 1890 on, that granting of monopolies to concession companies began in tropical Africa. Though Etienne favored monopoly companies, Parliament refused in 1891 to allow giving of concessions.⁴

¹Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), IX, 656.

²Girault, The Colonial Tariff . . ., 84.

³Herbert Ingram Priestley, France Overseas: A Study of Modern Imperialism (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1938), 296.

⁴Jean de la Roche and Jean Gottmann, La Fédération Française (Montreal: Editions de l'Arbre, 1945), 39.

First concession in French Equatorial Africa was accorded by Etienne's successor, Theophile Delcassé, who issued a decree giving the right of exploitation for thirty years on a territory of more than 100,000 square kilometers; the decree, however, was deliberately not made public and when the grant became public knowledge, an order by the Minister of Overseas France in 1896 voided the concession. Subsequently an arrangement was worked out in which the concession was granted but for only fifteen years and under the conditions that certain public works such as roads, ports, navigable waterways, etc., would be executed.¹

The principle of concession companies, encouraged by the great success of similar ventures in South Africa, Nigeria, and especially the Belgian Congo, became more and more attractive to French Colonialists. In 1898, a commission of concessions was created for the purpose of establishing the conditions under which the concessions ought to be granted. Several decrees were passed in 1899 that enabled the Minister to issue more than forty concessions, all for thirty years duration, and at least 650,000 square kilometers, about one-quarter of the territory of the French Equatorial Africa, was given

¹Ibid., 411.

away.¹ The usual conditions for the monopoly included a payment to the state and to the colony itself. The companies were supposed to safeguard native interests under the control of the administration.²

The protection of the natives, with which the companies were charged, had been seriously interfered with by the passage in 1901 of a decree which established the principle that

the concessionaires owned the products of the soil and natives could sell their products or gather to none but them. Native free reserves were specified, but on paper only; they were not marked off, and an earlier decree had provided that such reserves should be placed where the land produced no salable articles.³

The results of the decree were abuses. Charges of brutalities, of coercion, and of unjust taxation of the natives began to be heard from the Belgian as well as the French Congo. Furthermore, politically speaking, at this time more than at any other, the masses, at least in Africa, of natives were "subjects" in the full sense of the word.

¹Ibid., 415-16. Priestley, 296, suggests that the concessions took up 95 per cent of the territory. Cf., Arthur Girault, Principes de Colonisation et de Législation Coloniale, III: Notions Economiques (5th ed. rev.; Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1926-1930), 154. Girault says substantially the same as Priestley, namely, "almost all the territory of French Congo was divided. . . ."

² Priestley, 296.

³Ibid., 296-97.

Their lives were governed by the system known as the Indigénat, which virtually deprived them of the liberties of criticism, association and movement, and gave to the French administrator power to inflict disciplinary penalties, without trial, for a wide range of minor offenses; and [the natives] were liable to . . . travail forcé, for public, and some-time private, purposes.¹

To pacify the great public outcry the French government in 1905 sent Savorgnan de Brazza, explorer of the Congo area, to investigate. The companies were found to have done as great a damage as the old slaving concerns²; the government's decrees had legitimized the use of force, and helped create inhuman conditions for the natives. Though there is on record at least one favorable report on the concession companies³, there are many which condemned them. The criticism of the concession company system was often just, but often unfair, as the attack was directed against the principle of such company system, rather than strictly against its application.⁴ Many agreed that the companies did not carry out the promises they had made, and what had been expected of them. The

¹Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (London: F. Muller, 1956), 35.

²Priestley, 297.

³A. H. Savage Landor, Across Widest Africa (London: n.n., 1907), quoted in Priestley, 297.

⁴George Bruel, La France Equatoriale Africaine (Paris: Larose Editeur, 1935), 417.

biggest, most justifiable criticism appears to be that which points out that the system of concession companies was allowed to begin "development" before the inventory of the country, as far as the natural and human resources were concerned, could be undertaken.

. . . Only the government of the metropole possessed the means powerful enough to attempt such inventory, and make a good job of it. But it is precisely in order to be able to divert itself from this natural obligation, and to free itself of the expenses that should be spent, that it was decided to turn to the expedient of the great territorial concessions.¹

More human working conditions, as well as other provisions to safeguard the natives, were passed in 1906.² In 1910, the government succeeded to persuade most of the companies to agree to modification of the concessions. Despite this and other governmental actions, the situation was still bad as late as 1922. That year, a decree sanctioned free labor contracts; until mid-1920's there were only few roads, and no railroad.³

Colonial Economic Planning of the French

In 1922 France began a new colonial economic policy, "much more comprehensive in scope than that of Great Britain."⁴ Albert Sarraut, the then Colonial Minister, instituted a policy in which the political development was tied in with the economic development.

¹Ibid.

²Decree of February 22, 1906.

³Priestley, 299.

⁴Wieschhoff, 96.

His policy¹ was designed to encourage each colony developing only those products that were most suitable for that colony, and simultaneously planning improvements in transportation, irrigation and production. He outlined a plan for the development of the colonies, specifying the order of priority for the projects and social measures thought to be necessary. Lack of finances and the economic crisis of 1929 brought this plan to a halt.

The French Imperial Economic Conference in 1934-1935 was a result of worldwide depression and the accompanying industrial crisis and could not but be inspired, at least partially, by Britain's Colonial Development Act of 1929. A French Colonial Development Fund was established, with 15 billion francs (\$66 million) to be spent over the next fifteen years. Compared to Sarraut's policy, this plan was rather vague, the expenditures envisaged not being linked with specific investment projects.² The aid supplied to AEF by its mother country before World War II was either in form of loans for public works or as subsidies of the budget.

¹Albert Sarraut, La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Française (Paris: Payot et Compagnie, 1923).

²Economic Bulletin for Africa, II, No. 2 (1962), 29.

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The 1944 Brazzaville Conference also was concerned with economic development of the whole French Empire. As a result, a much more precise plan than that of 1934 was introduced in 1946 by the Minister of Colonies, René Plevén, to cover the whole of French Empire, including France herself, for the period of 1946-1956. In planning the development of all overseas territories associated with France, the French were guided by two basic principles: (1) The progress of the economy was to keep pace with political progress to maintain stability, and (2) public investments had to serve as a primer if private capital was to be invested in overseas territories in a manner that would be beneficial to them.¹

To implement these principles, the 1946 Plan, referred to simply as the Plan Plevén², an investment fund for the economic and social development of the overseas territories (FIDES) was created. The legal basis of Plan Plevén was the French law of April 30, 1946.³ The cost of the program was borne by France which until 1960 contributed about 75 per cent of funds necessary for the projects.

¹France, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, Aid and Cooperation (New York: Ambassade de France, December, 1962), 9. Cited hereafter as Ambassade de France.

²It is necessary to distinguish this plan from the Modernization and Equipment Plan for Reconstruction of Metropolitan France (Plan Monnet).

³Journal Officiel de la République Française, May 1, 1946, 3655. Cited hereafter as Journal Officiel.

Colonial Policy of Belgium

"If Belgium is today a colonial power, it's not because it wanted it that way."¹ So stated an authority in 1950, and indeed, the formal take-over of the Congolese territory in 1908 was not received too well by the public opinion, and only reluctantly by the people of commerce.²

Among the factors that had influenced the colonial policies of the Belgians since 1908 was the lack of colonial tradition, further complicated by the apprehension of assuming the colonial role after the debacle of the Congo Independent State under the sovereignty of the Belgian King.

Political Development

Belgium took over the administration of the African territory because of international pressure on King Leopold II, the absolute monarch of the Congo Independent State.³ The methods used in that African country

¹Guy Malengreau, "La Politique Coloniale de la Belgique," in MacInnes, 36.

²Alain Stenmans, La Reprise du Congo par la Belgique: Essai d'Histoire Parlementaire et Diplomatique (Bruxelles: Editions Techniques et Scientifiques, 1949), 458-59.

³The proper name of the Congo from 1884 till 1908 was "L'Etat independent du Congo," and not "L'Etat libre du Congo;" references to Congo Free State are frequent but inaccurate. Cf. Stewart C. Easton, The Twilight of European Colonialism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 431.

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for the recruiting of African labor were widely criticized, and when compared to the methods of slavers whom the Independent State replaced, the practice was said to have been "even worse."¹

. . . By 1900, the Independent State had become a leading source of supply for both rubber and ivory but only through enslaving virtually the entire population. The episode formed one of the darkest chapters in African history.²

Under the pressure of international public opinion (including that of Belgium itself), under the threat of British intervention (the access to the Nile was cut off in 1906 when the British annulled a lease on the Soudanese territory)³ and with the British government having issued a report on the situation in the Congo⁴, the Belgian Parliament, "to save the honor of the country and the prestige of its sovereign,"⁵ voted for annexation of the Congo State. After many months of debate, both Chambers of the Belgian Parliament agreed to accept and annex the territory.⁶

¹Ibid.

²Lowell Ragatz, March of Empire: The European Overseas Possessions on the Eve of the First World War (New York: H. L. Lindquist, 1948), 60.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid. Cf. Maurice N. Hennessy, The Congo: A Brief History and Appraisal (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1961), 30-31.

⁵Malengreau in MacInnes, 37.

⁶The Belgian Parliament voted actually on three different measures, all pertaining to the situation.

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Thus, the way was paved for the official transfer, and on November 15, 1908 the Congo Independent State ceased to exist and became the Belgian Congo. The transfer was made easier by the fact that natural ties existed between Belgium and the Congo State in the person of their sovereign. When the Belgian Parliament had authorized the King to become the ruling monarch of the Congo, the necessary legislation passed with only one dissenting vote.¹ Such an overwhelming vote could be explained by the specific provisions of the law of 28th of April, 1885 which made the union between Belgium and the new state "exclusively personal."² The Belgian Prime Minister Beernaert declared just before the vote was taken in the Chamber of Deputies that

a personal union leaves the two States absolutely distinct, absolutely independent; there is nothing common to them both, military, financially, or diplomatically. The word union has a consecration of law, of history and of usage, but it is not absolutely exact, for there is no union except in the person of the King; the unity of the sovereign is the only link between the two states. . . . What is absolutely certain is that . . . the Belgian Government will [take] absolutely no action and its attitude of tomorrow should be that of today.³

At the last moment, the phrase "the king" was amended to read "His Majesty, Leopold II, King of the Belgians," to assure the doubting deputies of this personal character of the union.⁴

¹Hennessy, 18.

²Ibid.

³Stenmans, 22.

⁴Ibid., 23.

Furthermore, the ties of the African country with Belgium included finances. Leopold II could not, however much he wished to, finance the development of the Congo Independent State from his own pocket. Within a few years, he turned, logically enough, to his (Belgian) Parliament for a loan of 25,000,000 francs¹ (about half-a-million dollars). For a guarantee, Belgium obtained an option which gave her the right to annex the Congo at the end of ten years. That date, February 18, 1901, was allowed to pass without Belgium exercising the option.²

As an additional guarantee, Leopold wrote a testament in which he "bequeathed and transmitted, after his death, all his sovereign rights over the Congo Independent State"³ to Belgium. The testament had been dated August 2, 1889, but was not made public until the Constitutional Convention of 1890 had been voted by the Parliament.

From the foregoing it can be seen that the colonial stature of Belgium had been acquired somewhat involuntarily.

¹H. M. Stanley, the explorer of the Congo, estimated the value of the Congo at that time to be five times that amount, namely, 125,000,000 francs (5 million pounds). The completion of the first railroad in the Congo would have, according to him, increased the value to 375 million pounds, 75 times the original value. Cf. Stenmans, 99-100.

²Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Information and Public Relations Office, (henceforth referred to as InforCongo), Belgian Congo (Brussels: InforCongo, 1959), I, 106. The 1890 Convention provided for six months after the ten-year term expired (July 3); the additional postponement had been agreed on by the two States. Stenmans, 238.

³Stenmans, 144-15; InforCongo, 106.

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Though this lack of tradition explains the colonial policy which followed the acquisition of the territory in 1908, two other factors did play important parts as well: the religious interest of the people of Belgium in the "necessity" to bring Christianity to the natives, and the persisting demands that the humanitarian provisions of the Berlin Conference Act of 1885 be applied.

To begin with the latter, it needs to be said that the concern for the African natives had apparently been much in the minds of the participants. The principles enunciated by the various representatives took form in Article 6 of the General Act of the Conference:

All the powers exercising sovereign rights of influence in the aforesaid territories bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being, and to help in suppressing slavery, and especially the slave trade. They shall, without distinction of creed or nation, protect and favor all religious, scientific or charitable institutions and undertakings created and organized for the above ends, or which aim at instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civilization.

Christian missionaries, scientists, and explorers, with their followers, property, and collections, shall likewise be the objects of special protection,

Freedom of conscience and religious toleration are expressly guaranteed to the natives, no less than to subjects and to foreigners. The free and public exercise of all forms of Divine worship, and the right to build edifices for religious purposes, and to organize religious missions belonging to all creeds, shall not be limited or fettered in any way whatsoever.¹

¹Mark Frank Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law (A Treatise on the Law and Practice Relating to Colonial Expansion) (London: Longsman, Green and Co., Ltd., 1926), p. 140.

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Because the provisions of the Berlin Act regarding the welfare of natives had been flouted, and as even the Commission of Inquiry appointed by Leopold II himself found the criticism to be at least partially true, the Belgian Government declared, by proposing a constitutional law, and the parliament by adopting it¹, that the reforms barely begun under the previous administration of the Congo would be stepped up. The 1908 stock of the colony was officially described to have been as follows.

The raids and the slave trade had been checked. A solid network of administrative posts and a diligent military occupation had established peace where the first explorers found only terror and permanent insecurity. Religious missions, Catholic and Protestant, had undertaken the work of preaching the gospel; schools and dispensaries had been opened. Furthermore, commerce and industry were beginning to be organized. The official medical services had undertaken a struggle against the diseases that were decimating the population. Everywhere the material and moral condition of the natives had been bettered, and the reforms decided upon in 1906 by Leopold II were being applied.²

Some important reforms were to be instituted as a result of the first-hand survey by the first Colonial Minister Jules Renkin. In theory, indirect administration through native chiefs was introduced, but their activities were closely supervised, their power and prestige undermined, and in effect the tribal authorities replaced by Belgian officials. Land concessions were reduced but not yet cancelled, free trade strengthened, the liquor traffic

¹Law of August 20, 1908, known as the Colonial Charter.

²InforCongo, I, 107.

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curbed; use of money became the usual thing, and railroad and telephonic communications were expanded. The new policy, however, proved very costly, and budgetary deficit in 1914 exceeded 30 million francs (\$5.71 million)¹.

Despite the passage of the Colonial Charter which clarified the Belgian policy in some respect and reaffirmed their concern for the natives (Article 6 of the Charter established a permanent commission whose seven² members were charged to "look after the protection of the natives and after the betterment of their moral and material conditions of existence"³), the Belgian objectives in the colony were never clearly defined.⁴ And yet, there are in various writings on the Belgian Congo frequent references to the so called policy of paternalism. What was this paternalism? A dictionary records the meaning of the

¹By contrast, Belgium had a budgetary surplus of 229 million francs in 1913. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), III, 364.

²Later, an amendment increased the number of commission members to 18. Robert Godding, "Development in the Administration of the Belgian Congo," Colonial Administration by European Powers (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1947), 45. The commission was to meet by law at least once a year, but between 1908 and 1947 it had met only eight times.

³Article 6 of the Colonial Charter. Cf. Stenmans, 5-6.

⁴Wieschhoff, 105. Edouard Bustin, "The Congo," in Gwendolene M. Carter (ed.), Five African States: Responses to Diversity (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963), 32.

word thus:

Paternalism, n. The care or control of a country, community, group of employees, etc., in a manner suggestive of a father looking after his children.¹

A father guides his children through their early lives by providing for their well-being but without allowing them to have their say in anything. And while this, of course, is a normal, and under many systems a legal way, the continuation of this policy beyond a certain point in time becomes untenable. A father guides his children through the childhood toward adulthood in which they will have to take care of themselves. It is this lack of the "guiding toward adulthood" that was criticized in the policy of paternalism.

Merriam said that

in looking back on the Congo before the movement toward independence began, one sees a "model" colony in which the Africans were regarded as children virtually incapable of guiding their own destinies, and in which the Belgians made provision after provision for the welfare of their charges. Indeed, the protective coating was applied so thickly and with such thoroughness that for a long time the Congo seemed impervious to any sort of outside influence.²

The policy of paternalism, as practiced by Belgians, manifested itself in numerous ways. In the first place, the Congo was administered directly from Brussels. Though it had the power, it was not always the Parliament that governed, however.

¹Encyclopaedia Britannica World Language Dictionary, 1958, 924.

²Allan P. Merriam, Congo: Background and Conflict (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1961), 33.

It was usually content to accept the yearly report it was entitled to receive under Section 37 of the Charter and to vote the budget without much caviling. Indeed, its most significant legislative contributions to the government of the Congo was the 1908 Charter (with its subsequent amendments) and the sequence of statutes which engineered the transition to independence in 1959-1960.¹

The bulk of legislation came about as royal or ministerial decree, ordonances, or executive orders (the King's or the Minister's) -- but even those orders and ordinances that were put into effect in Leopoldville or any of the regional capitals actually originated in Brussels.²

Besides the state, the Roman Catholic Church and big business influenced the Congolese affairs as the paternalistic forces.³ The church enjoyed the preferred position since the days of Leopold II who in 1906 signed a concordat with the Vatican, thus assuring the Catholic Church of a virtual monopoly not only in religious but also in social and educational affairs.

The accompanying feature of the control directly from Belgium was the exclusion of local participation in any decisions affecting the colony. There existed a General Council and six Provincial ones with advisory powers, but no legislative assembly, and no elections whatsoever took place until December 1957. Even more significant, not even

¹Bustin in Carter, 31-32.

²Merriam, 36.

³Ibid., 36-38. Merriam called the combination of State, Church and Business a "dominating directorate," and a "triumvirate."

the resident Belgian nationals living in the Congo had a right to vote and a voice in the government of the colony; thus it is not surprising that their existence in the Congo was not one of a permanent nature, nor was it ever felt by them to be.¹ Furthermore, settlement by Belgians, or by other nationals for that matter, in the colony was discouraged (by requiring the posting of a sizeable bond, forfeitable when the bondee was unsuccessful in establishing himself)², thus effectively limiting the contact of the native with Europeans to only a minimum in his work for his boss.

As practiced by the Belgians, the policy of paternalism had remained stable throughout the fifty years of Belgian rule in the Congo, though there was a time (1958) when the Governor-General, Leon Petillon, urged the replacement of paternalism by fraternalism, that Belgium in the future should be regarded not as a father but as an elder brother.³ There was never any doubt that the Congo could become self-sufficient, though not politically free. Governor-General Pierre Ryckman declared,

¹Ibid., 32-34.

²Ibid., 34.

³Easton, The Twilight of European Colonialism, 433. Colonial Minister Buisseret spoke in the Parliament in 1957 of the "Belgian-Congolese community." M. A. Buisseret, The Policy of Belgium in her Overseas Territories (An Address to the House of Representatives in Brussels on June 26, 1957) (Brussels: InforCongo, 1957), 30-31.

at the end of his long (twelve-year) tenure in 1946:

If I were to leave you a last message, I would tell you that the function of the State is to make and to safeguard man's happiness, that a country's prosperity is the prosperity of the mass of its inhabitants and that Belgium shall have completed her colonial task when our natives live happily under the shadow of our flag.¹

The political development had been deliberately ignored by the Belgians until at last (because of factors too numerous to mention) the existing policy of native exclusion from the government could not be prolonged any longer. In a rather rapid succession of events, in 1959 the Belgians promised, through their King, to lead the Congolese peoples "without undesirable delays but also without inconsidered precipitation,"² to independence. This represented a sudden change of policy for this was for the first time that the term "independence" was used. No precise timetable was announced, though the Congolese a few months later demanded the establishment of a government by January 1961; this government would have had the task of determining the date of independence.

A roundtable conference was arranged for January 1960, at which the government of Belgium decided to grant the colony independence on June 30, 1960.

¹Bustin in Carter, 29-30.

²W. J. Ganshof van der Meersch, Fin De La Souveraineté Belge Au Congo (Bruxelles: Institut Royal Des Relations Internationales, 1963), 29-30.

Too much was offered in too short a period of time, without a necessary preparation for and guidance to the responsibilities which go hand in hand with independence. The policy of paternalism -- as far as political development was concerned -- failed.

Malengreau in his analysis of the Belgian colonial character stated that

. . . the Belgians . . . are "people without imagination, a people who do not dream, people whose mind is fixed upon the real, and upon the real it will stop to reap the useful fruit. A people who do not create but who utilize, who invent little but who utilize inventions of others even better than the inventors themselves."

It's this, another characteristic of our colonial policy: its very little originality.¹

The same writer, on the same occasion in 1950, wrote:

If we decide to theorize from our acts, never shall we even try to make the facts enter a framework of a preconceived system. . . . An attitude typically Belgian [is] the phrase: "I act first, then I think." [It's] an attitude of mind which is not without inconveniences: though it does not prevent us to be excellent administrators, it makes us forget that to govern is to anticipate.²

Anticipate the Belgian policy did not.

Administration

The policy, though not the practice, of the Belgian Government was to encourage the "indirect rule." Under the auspices of the first Colonial Minister Rankin a decree was passed which provided for letting

¹Malengreau, in MacInnes, 40.

²Ibid.

. . . the chiefs and subchiefs exercise their authority to the extent and in the manner prescribed by the native custom, inasmuch as it is not contrary to universal notions of public order or to statutory provisions intended to substitute other rules for the principles of native customs.¹

Throughout the years, there were other decrees promulgated that had basically the same intent.² But Malengreau, referring specifically to the 1933 decree which regulated native districts, made a point that

. . . [the decree] entrusted in principle the administration of native interests to native authorities, but foresees the possibility of [revoking the principle] for unworthiness or incapability [The decree] respects traditional groups but authorizes the administration to reunite some of them into kinds of federations called sectors and to place them under the authority of a native selected by the administration.³

The legislative ambiguity resulted in a situation in which the local European administrator took advantage of it.

. . . While the legislator scrupulously tried to avoid hurting the native organization, local authorities seldom missed an opportunity to apply direct administration every time the ambiguity of the legislative text permitted it.⁴

Till 1930's, the administrative system, then, operated under this ambiguity and conflict between policies and practices. Hundreds of so called chefferies⁵ had formerly

¹Decree of May 2, 1910 (Article 17).

²Decree of December 5, 1933 and April 15, 1926.

³Malengreau in MacInnes, 43.

⁴Ibid.

⁵A piece of Belgian administrative jargon designating a chief's bailiwick. Bustin in Carter, 42.

been recognized, and there were some 5,000 of them when the 1933 decree drastically reorganized the administration.

The 1933 legislation formalized the existence of secteurs, and ordered the amalgamation of small units such as chefferies. The chiefs were appointed and dismissed, and altogether the native administration was so reorganized (one writer referred to this activity as "wholesale juggling"¹) that the chiefs, many of whom were illiterate, were reduced to a low status of second-class officials. Their tasks included carrying out public works, implementing sanitation and recruiting measures, enforcing the various legislation, enforcing compulsory cultivation of certain crops, acting out police duties, etc. The result, contrary to the spirit of the 1910 decree and contrary to the expectations of the 1904 commission of inquiry appointed by Leopold II, was a creation of indifferent petty officials instead of

. . . extremely useful class, interested in the preservation of an order of things which would uphold their prestige and authority.²

This system of indirect rule continued until 1957 when a minor reform was put into effect: urban communities (there were only three in 1957) were subdivided into communes (boroughs), each of which, however, remained

¹Ibid., 43.

²Quoted in ibid.

uniracial, and election of councils and mayors for each borough was announced to take place in December that year.¹ The term "minor reform" is used advisedly, for despite the importance of such radical departure from traditional Belgian policies regarding local government in the Congo,

. . . local government politics lost their polarizing effect as soon as nationalist forces were allowed to develop on a wider basis.²

A year later, these forces had developed to such an extent that a Round Table Conference was called for January 1960, and the sudden (relative to the total number of years in which the opposite policy prevailed) decision to grant independence was made.

It is precisely at this point that Belgium failed, for not only was the assumption made that the Congo would, obviously and naturally, become a political state in the Western sense, but the assumption was made in the face of considerable evidence to the contrary. There was, after all, an almost complete lack of training and explanation of what a Western political organization is.³

Economic and Social Development

The policy of paternalism relied on the basic truth of its assumptions that where there existed an economic satisfaction, and social as well, new political ideas would not take roots. A corollary of this policy was the notion that economic and social well-being would not create desires for political activity, and that no such oppor-

¹Decree of March 26, 1957. The three cities involved were Leopoldville, Elizabethville, and Jadotville. Joseph Kasavubu elected mayor of one of Leopoldville's 13 boroughs.

²Merriam, 60.

³Ibid.

tunity would be sought and pursued.

The events of the late 50's and also the developments of the post-independence era indicate how incorrect those assumptions were. The record shows that while the Belgians espoused a policy of economic and social development right from the beginning of their administration, the takeover from the Congo Independent State did not result in an appreciable improvement in the Congolese's economic, social and political status.¹

After the war of 1914-1918, the Congo was again open to broader and more fruitful commercial activity. The progress lasted for the next dozen years, though the worldwide depression left its marks there, too.

. . . The consequences of this depression were very serious for the Congo because its prosperity depended essentially on the exportation of raw materials.²

The trade balance, however, remained favorable throughout most of the period between the two wars, with the exception of a few depression years. The data for the ratio of exports over imports (in money value) show the figure of 233.6 per cent for 1907 (last year of the Congo Independent State), 72.8 per cent for 1929, and 140 per cent for 1938.³

¹Townsend, 187, 194.

²InforCongo, I, 111.

³These figures are the ratios of exports over imports (i.e., imports = 100%). Based on data from the U. N. Statistical Yearbook, 1963, 454-55.

The first great undertaking of economic development began under Louis Franck, the second minister of the colonies (1918-1924) who undertook a vast program of public works, especially developing communications. In this, he can be compared to Joseph Chamberlain. Minister Franck also insisted on the improvement in the living conditions of the population. The work and reforms continued even through the depression years, and the progress -- both economic and social -- achieved by the Congo in the period between the two wars understandably made the Belgians proud of the results:

In fact, at the time World War II began, the colony's balance sheet showed an appreciable surplus. The Congo had come through the depression with flying colors and its economic position was getting stronger. . . . The policy had turned out well and has assured an era of peace and tranquility that has never been seriously disturbed.¹

The social achievement, till that time and afterwards, also can be said to have been the direct result of the over-all policy of paternalism which carried over into all aspects of Congolese life. Legislation was passed protecting the native worker through minimum wage provisions, a social security system, and later (in 1949) even through compulsory insurance. The policy of paternalism of the state rubbed off on the employers as well.

. . . inspired by this official liberalism and paternalism, the employers followed in the path of the state, adopting the same paternalistic spirit with regard to the natives. Making allowances for

¹InforCongo, I, 112-13.

the times, this state of things was profitable. Indeed, the leading business enterprises, founders of new communities, have gone far beyond their obligations and have contributed, by means of welfare organizations of all kinds that they have set up, to the improvement of the general standards of living; in many cases, their initiatives in the matter of social benefits have even preceded legal measures.¹

The period between 1940 and 1945 had profound effect upon all aspects of life in the Congo, political, economic and social. On May 10, 1940 (the German invasion of Belgium) all relations between the Colony and its mother country had been cut off. The Congolese troops participated in some actions -- on the side of the Allies -- and of course came into contact with other parts of the world, including particularly other parts of Africa, such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, among others. Such contact could not but produce comparisons and affect the political happenings in the later years.²

Politically, the war produced a situation in which the colony supported the representatives of its mother country. The Congo financed all the expenditures of the Belgian government in exile in London. Some 40 million pounds (about 160 million dollars at the 1946 rate of exchange) were spent in expenditures including such things as

¹Ibid., 463.

²Hennesy, 53-54. Hennesy talks about the permissibility of flogging in the Belgian Congo army, while the striking of an African soldier in the British or French forces meant a court martial.

the diplomatic services, and the cost of maintaining Belgian army units. The exiled government, unlike others, "had not to borrow a single shilling . . . and the Belgian gold reserve could be left intact."¹

The severance of economic relations between Belgium and the colony had produced a new phenomenon: imports had to be obtained elsewhere, and the Congo turned to the United States. But perhaps even more fundamental change was happening internally. The Congo was beginning to set up its own factories, utilizing part of its own raw material which until then had been reserved for export, and to take care of the needs of its own market. These and similar economic changes created an awareness among the Congolese of their country's possibilities in the world.

Socially, the most important changes that occurred were: (1) the diminishing of the strong ties that existed between the members of different tribes and clans; and (2) the growing of individualism, and of awareness of it. There was a big departure from the native centers to towns and cities. The population of Leopoldville increased from 40,000 to 100,000 between the years 1939 and 1945.² The growth of urban communities produced in the natives the desire for organizations, especially labor organizations.

¹Godding in Royal Institute of International Affairs, Colonial Administration by European Powers, 63.

²Hennesy, 54.

The Belgian authorities allowed some labor unions to be formed in 1946, but these had to be only local in scope and were strictly controlled by the administration.

After World War II, the Congo entered a period marked by a steady increase of exports, extremely sound financial conditions, and great increase in public and private investments.¹ This favorable situation lasted until 1956-1957 when a worldwide depression affected the Congolese economy. Citing the official documents of the Belgian administration², Bustin described the bleak picture of 1957:

. . . The price of copper had steadily declined from \$1.12 per kilogram at the end of February 1956 to \$0.505 at the end of December 1957. The favorable balance of trade had shrunk from \$134,430,000 in 1956 to \$47,760,000 in 1957; and the balance of payments, which had already slumped from a \$17,100,000 credit in 1955 to a \$5,880,000 drain in 1956, now plummeted down to the unprecedented deficit of \$129,640,000 for 1957. The repatriation of investment return and European salaries for 1957 amounted to a net leakage of nearly \$100,000,000 and the gap in the balance of payments had to be stopped by taking \$146,540,000 from the colony's reserve.³

Bustin adds that these figures explain the understandable, if not completely justified, fear of the government to even contemplate

¹Government investments increased by 350% and private investments by 50%, between 1950 and 1954. InforCongo, II, 77.

²Belgium, Ministère Des Colonies, La Situation Économique Du Congo Belge Et Du Ruanda-Urundi En 1957 (Bruxelles: Ministère Des Colonies, 1958).

³Bustin in Carter, 51.

. . . sweeping political measures that might further shake the confidence of the business world in the Congo's economic future.¹

This, he thinks, explains the minimal changes in local government administration.

Economic Planning

The economic development that had been taking place in the Congo before 1950 was not the result of consistent planning. The richness of the country, especially in mineral wealth, its long tradition of favorable business climate without too many restrictions, and a host of other factors played by far a greater role in the success of economic activity in the Congo than any planned policy on the part of the Belgians. Indeed, it was not until 1949 that any economic plan was suggested, and even then it took the Belgian Parliament two additional years to approve the plan.² The plan's purpose was to raise living standards through stimulation of economic development.

In drawing up the Plan, the Belgian government had as a main target the raising of the standards of living of the population for which it is responsible. A quickened pace of social progress was essential if this was to be achieved. But if this progress is to be possible and permanent it must be based upon a stable and prosperous economy. The economic and social aspects of the Plan are therefore intimately related.³

¹Ibid.

²Merriam, 38.

³J. Huges, "Economic Planning and Development in the Belgian Congo," in William O. Brown (ed.), Contemporary Africa: Trends and Issues (Philadelphia: The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCIIC, March, 1955), 62.

This Ten-Year Plan must not be confused with the later 30-year plan of A. A. J. Van Bilsen, a lecturer at the Antwerp Colonial Institute. Van Bilsen's Plan was actually a timetable for political emancipation of the colony, and not an economic plan.

The plan¹ was to cover the period 1950-1959 but it was not until May 29, 1952 when the Belgian Parliament finally approved it. The first estimates of the cost of the plan indicated over 25,512 million Congolese francs will have been needed. After several revisions, the amount involved in the Ten-Year-Plan was raised in 1954 to almost the double of the initial estimate, namely, to 48,714 million francs. Furthermore, in 1957 it was estimated that a transition program will be required as a connecting link between this Plan and a Second Plan and a new allocation of about 3 billion francs was made for work that would have to be done between 1958 and 1960. Thus, the first Ten-Year-Plan had its cost raised to almost 51 billion francs (\$1 billion).

Unlike the British and the French economic plans, the Belgian Congo plan had been financed without grants or subsidies from the metropolitan country. The capital for the plan was raised either by budget surpluses, that is of the budget of the Belgian Congo itself, and by loans floated on the markets of the Congo, Belgium and

¹Plan Decennal Du Congo Belge.

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some foreign countries. The loans were sometimes guaranteed by Belgium, this guarantee being the only form of direct assistance by the Belgian government to the financing of the plan.¹

Similarities and Differences
of Colonial Policies

The narrative describing the historical development of British, French, and Belgian colonialism, and their respective policies and actions, provides a basis for some comparisons of the policies in the three African territories. For better understanding of the differences as well as of the similarities, the highlights of the narrative have been assembled into a tabular form (Table 1).

In the political development, the difference between the approaches are clear. Great Britain came, at the turn of the present century, to the conclusion that she should lead her colonies toward self-government, and eventual independence within the broad framework of the Commonwealth of Nations. The British thought of the Commonwealth as a loose association of nations. The fact that the indigenous populations of the colonies were given the status of British subjects did not imply any political rights for them, but served well to emphasize the belongingness to the family of all British subjects.

¹U. N., Special Study on Economic Conditions in Non-Self-Governing Territories (New York: U. N., 1958), 32.

TABLE 1.--Comparison of colonial policies

Item	British	French	Belgian
Acquisition Methods	Government followed rather than led colonization efforts of its people	Persistent planning: military conquest	Unwillingly assumed colonial role. Rationalization: humanitarianism and spread of Christianity
Political Development	Dual mandate: mutual benefit for both Home and colony From 1918 on, self-government was ultimate goal	Integration of colonies and France herself into a greater unit Autonomy not considered until 1958	Assimilation until 1917; 1917-1959 dominated by policy of benevolent paternalism
Citizenship Status	Status of British subjects assigned to all indigenous population. No political rights implied: it contributed to feelings of belongingness to a family of nations	Active assistance given toward achieving status of French citizens Three classes: subjects, evoules, full citizens	No rights for the natives: "Black Proletariat"
Administrative Methods	Indirect rule consciously and conscientiously applied: codes of law and judicial administration other than British not only allowed but encouraged Goal: preparation for self-government	Central authority in Paris utilized the evoules who have already absorbed French language and culture, and who could be depended upon to propagate French civilization to the rest of population	Though officially recognized, in practice tribal authorities were not used; In 1917, practice was changed, but by deliberate proliferation of native authorities, their power was minimized

TABLE 1.--Continued

Item	British	French	Belgian
Economic Development	<p>Trading companies, then concessions; At first, development motivated by private rationale, financed by private enterprise; Government planning since 1923, involvement on substantial scale since 1940; Grants-in-aid, loans</p>	<p>Since 1895, concession companies expected to develop territories; Abuses began to be corrected from 1906; Government planning since 1922: recognition of relationship of political, economic and social development</p>	<p>Concession companies reduced in number but not in power; Not eliminated till after independence; From 1918, program of public works, including communications; Industrialization began in the 1940's; No grants or subsidies, only loan guarantees</p>
Social Development	<p>Coupled with economic development since 1940; Conflict of indirect rule with English language and culture</p>	<p>Interrelatedness with political and economic development recognized early; Consistent use of French language, and spreading of French culture</p>	<p>From 1908, goal was to remedy damage done under former administration; Paternalism carried farthest in health and other social spheres</p>
Miscellany	<p>Tolerance in human understanding of native life conspicuously lacking; Social equality unthinkable; Intermarriages rare; Social aloofness</p>	<p>Absence of color prejudice; Ability to understand and share in native life; Inter-marriages not uncommon</p>	<p>Attitude of superiority; Lack of colonial background, imagination, originality; Inability to anticipate, and therefore to govern</p>

1

France had as her ultimate goal the formation of a unified whole of her own nation with the colonies. France talked about integration of colonies with the metropolitan France into a Greater France, or Empire, and since 1946 spoke of the French Union. Not until 1959 was there any talk of individual independence, though. The policy of autonomy was accepted in 1958, only to be replaced with a sort of federalism in 1960. Belgian Congo was treated as part of the family, but an inferior, less capable and less grown-up member, as the policy of paternalism implied. The idea of filial maturity did not occur until too late to result in a desirable family relationship.

The citizenship rights of native peoples in French colonies and territories were distinctly different from what the British used for their dependent peoples. The "British subject" designation implied belongingness, a desirable thing from the British point of view, and one which did not cost anything. The French offered active assistance to, or at least made it possible for, the indigenous peoples to achieve full French citizenship which was deemed desirable not only by the French but by the native populations as well. This, coupled with the availability of a lesser status of évolués, which also was regarded highly by both groups, was for the French Empire what the status of "British Subjects" was meant to be in the British Empire. In the Belgian Congo the

local population was kept at "the level of a great black proletariat,"¹ and the citizenship rights of the natives were nonexistent until 1957 when first municipal elections were held.

Local administrative practices of the three powers also were vastly different from each other. England's skillful use of the indirect rule effectively utilized native institutions, including the codes of law and judicial administrative systems, again with the idea in mind (among others) that the native administrations will serve as necessary preparation for eventual self-government. The Belgian non-use of indigeneous authorities singularly contributed to the unpreparedness of the Congolese to take over their affairs when called upon to do so. France, on her part, trained the elite for local administration, and by coupling the citizenship rights with status and position among the natives, can be said to have contributed significantly toward the fulfillment of her imperial policies.

Economic development in all three territories began under the auspices of concession companies which appeared to be, but actually were not, less significant in the British dependencies.² Planning by governments of Britain and France did not begin until after World War I.

¹Townsend, 187.

²Wieschhoff, 82.

The Belgians, on the other hand, started planning economic development as soon as the State assumed control over the colony in 1908. The main difference between the three powers' approach to economic growth of their dependent territories can be seen in the financing of plans and projects. Great Britain and France used grants and subsidies, as well as governmental loans, while the Belgians only guaranteed loans which the Belgian Congo government arranged on world markets. No direct financing by Belgium occurred, except in a few instances of making up of budgetary deficits.

Similarly, in building up of social services, including education, the differences existed in financing. The French approach, in addition, differed from the British method in that the policy of assimilation was based on adoption by natives of French language, culture and civilization, and thus contributed to similarity with France and other French dependencies, while the British concept and use of the indirect rule created conflicts of language and of culture.

Among other differences between the colonization patterns of the three powers were the methods in which the territories had been acquired, the emphasis put upon the militarization of the natives, and even desires of the colonizers to enter and participate in the life of the natives. In attitudes as well as in actions, the British,

the French, and the Belgians were as different from each other as night and day. The British, in a polite manner, emphasized fundamental racial distinctions between themselves and the natives; the Belgians continued a marked social cleavage between races but the French didn't mind "going native."¹ While the French considered intermarriage as fairly normal, the Belgians as a whole thought of it as undesirable, but individual intermarriages of Belgians and Negroes were not infrequent. The British dismissed the possibility of its happening with typical aloofness.²

The background provided in this chapter allows this writer to proceed with the investigation of colonial policies on communications, particularly radio broadcasting. But there, too, the historical evolvement of radio communications, from line telegraphy and telephony to long-distance cable systems to "beam" radio, needs to be explored first in order to obtain a valid perspective of the policies which determined the development of the various communication means.

The purpose of the next part, then, will be to describe the beginning of the growth of telecommunications in the metropolitan countries of the three powers, and their policies and actions through which the telecommunication media were to be extended to the three African territories. In addition, the policies and actions will

¹Townsend, 184-85; Wieschhoff, 106.

²Townsend, 185; Wieschhoff, 27-28, 95.

be related to the actual growth and utilization of telecommunications, and specifically broadcasting, in Nigeria, Belgian Congo and the Middle Congo.

Comparison of the British, French and Belgian communication policies will be completed by an attempt to see them in light of overall colonial policies. By "superimposing" the communication policies over the general policies on political, economic and social development, a composite picture should emerge in which the interrelationship of various policies, and similarities and differences between policies of the three Powers, would be clearly recognizable.

PART II

COLONIAL POWERS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

CHAPTER III

COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY

IN THE SERVICE OF

EMPIRES

The subject of empires, their growth and development, and the forces that have contributed to their evolution and that have molded their external as well as internal relations often are presented either in terms of actions by national leaders, or in terms of ideological principles. Examples of both methods have been given in the previous chapter on colonial policies of Great Britain, France and Belgium.

The purpose of this and the following two chapters is to introduce the concept of feasibility and plausibility of considering technological advances, and particularly the advances of technology of communications, as being at least equally valid and important in the area of imperial growth. Furthermore, the policies of communications rather than only the policies of human choice, will and action are thought to be of considerable importance. The ultimate purpose is not, however, to arrive at a definite classification or enumeration of social changes resulting from technological advances, nor is it

to establish relationships of causations and effects. Such a task is plainly beyond the scope of this work, even though some such relationships might be hinted at as they come to the surface during the systematic pursuance of the major task, namely the discovery of differences, if any, in the colonial policies of the three powers vis-à-vis communications.

When it is postulated that technology affects imperial relations (just as it affected international relations¹), it is not being implied that other factors were not influential. Political leadership, political and social movement, organizations and institutions were, and continue to be, among the variables that have to be viewed as important when actions and achievements (or for that matter non-action and non-achievement) are sought to be explained. It still remains, however, that the significance of such other variables ought not to obscure the significance of the technological variations, i.e., developments.

Development of Communications Technology
and Its Imperial Use

No documentation is necessary for the statement that communication of intelligence has been the center of

¹William F. Ogburn, "The Process of Adjustment to New Inventions," Technology and International Relations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), 16.

human endeavor from the very beginning of mankind. In order to transmit news, thoughts, and ideas from one place to another, man first employed an intermediary, such as a courier, first on foot (cf. Pheidippides in 490 B.C.) and later on horseback (cf. Paul Revere in 1775). But such an intermediary depended upon memory and also was inefficient because of lack of speed. Among the developments of communications, two distinct kinds can be discerned, one involving the transmission of recorded messages, another seeking to relay voice. The desire for increased speed was common to both.

Technological Revolution in Communications

In the first series of developments, the invention of alphabet was followed by papyrus, vellum and eventually paper. Block printing was followed by the invention of movable type, hand press, ink, thus giving birth to a whole manufacturing process. But the true technological advance can be said to have begun with the steam-driven press early in the nineteenth century, followed by the high-speed rotary press, linotype machine, and the photo-engraving process. Accompanying these inventions were developments in transportation on land, sea and in the air.

The second major series of communication inventions consisted of land-line telegraph, its natural extension over large bodies of water via submarine cables,

and the land-line telephone. The telephone, after the invention of phonograph, was the first development of the other kind of communication, the relay of the human voice. These mid-nineteenth century developments were later followed by technical improvements, not only by further increase of speed but by permitting a considerable increase of volume or number of messages that could be carried over a single wire or cable.

A third series of inventions tended to seriously challenge, if not replace, the land-line telegraph and telephone and cable transmissions. At the very beginning of the twentieth century, the wireless telegraph and telephone eliminated the cost and maintenance of wires and cables. Improvements during the 1940's and thereafter eliminated, or at least alleviated the two handicaps of the wireless system, atmospheric disturbances and lack of privacy.

The invention of wireless (radio) broadcasting came next, enabling to carry sound from a central point to a number of receiving sets within a large radius. Pioneered in the early 1900's, radio broadcasting got established soon after the end of World War I and within ten years or so the radio waves spanned all the continents and oceans.

At approximately the same time motion pictures were being developed. This is the only non-electric medium among all communication means, but its distribution does

depend on electricity. With the addition of sound in the late 1920's and of color in the 1930's it blossomed into an entertainment medium and later was channeled also into an informational means through its documentary form.

The electric and electronic communications inventions have continued. Facsimile transmission process, the multiple-address transmission, walkie-talkie radio, and television are some of the types which need to be mentioned. The totality of these changes, as outlined above is now commonly referred to as "Communication Revolution."

The Equilibrium Role of Technology

Several assumptions can be made upon which a study of colonial communications should rest. Such assumptions are derived from the findings of other disciplines, especially sociology and psychology. One such assumption states that the existence of national as well as inter-national societies and institutions is made possible only if communication allows an inter-action among the societies, and permits a sharing of ideas and information. Another assumption maintains that the existence of communication between the imperial societies as well as within the national societies themselves enables the formation of attitudes and opinions through which the societies and their members organize for societal action.

Both of these assumptions


rest upon the history facts of geological discovery, technological invention, and the international organization, which have been increasing the radius and rapidity of transmission and the abundance, pervasiveness, and accuracy of communications . . . , thus facilitating the acceptance of [common] standards and goals of action by the . . . community as a whole.¹

Imperially linked societies do not remain static.

A sturdy progress in their development can be documented from the beginnings of transportation with slow and infrequent sailboats to the speedy airplanes, from the locally circulating pamphlets to the "penny post," and to the instantaneous communication through the telegraph and radio. Other aspects of technology are observable from the existence and development of trade and diplomatic missions, through inter-national conferences, through the establishment of international organizations to facilitate postal and telegraph communication, to the organizations' of imperial institutions designed to assure peace, security, and the achievement of economic and social goals.

Other assumptions need to be mentioned because of their relevance to the topic under discussion. Developing of common interests, attitudes and values, and establishing of procedures and institutions for realization of social goals under optimum conditions will ideally lead to either

¹Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations (New York: Appleton - Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955), 275.



internalized or sentimentalized symbolism used in communications, with the result that the integration and solidarity of societies within the colonial (imperial) organization will increase. It should follow that adaptiveness of actions of such societies as well as of individuals within those societies is dependent upon the currency and accuracy of communication between them, and upon standards of education and experience of society members.

The degree of solidarity between societies of an empire depends to a large extent upon the amount of internalization of the key value symbols among the societies' populations. But it is

only an international [not integrated] community whose value symbols, though formally accepted by governments, are not sentimentally accepted by the peoples who eventually control the governments. It rests, therefore, on government opinion, not on personal attitudes. Transnational communications are therefore interpreted by the peoples in the light of their national cultures, national opinions, and national beliefs, and tend to increase misunderstanding and conflict rather to further understanding and cooperation.¹


The diversity in the cultures and conditions of the peoples of different societies would indicate, then, that a common imperial culture will probably be relatively ambiguous and loose, and the common imperial polity relatively weak when compared with culture and polity of national states. Similarly, comparison of national communications with trans-national (imperial) communications

¹Ibid., 275.

and their relative effects upon societal structures and cultures contribute to such great diversities. The sentiment of nationalism continues to grow and develop much more rapidly than the sentiment of imperial commonality.

Throughout the colonial period these obviously opposing tendencies have continued alongside one another. The technological and material progress has contributed to the imperial unity which the sentimental and moral tendencies have made for national societies. Many writers seem to support the thesis that world communication, cooperation, culture and institutions are developed as a result of material progress which favors cosmopolitanism, and that these tendencies stimulate reactions toward traditional beliefs and national barriers, differentiations and conflicts. But to pinpoint the causation and effects in such a direct way is to forget that interaction is a two-way street. Communications between nations can in turn contribute to material progress while national differentiations and artificial barriers (such as telegraphic rates) between nations can rekindle the nationalistic loyalties and thus negate the progress made in inter-national communications.

Obviously the tendencies ought to be kept in proper balance, though this was difficult to achieve when the colonial powers possessed the scientific and technological know-how and a substantial advantage over the



colonial nations, not only in trade, but in transportation and communication. The tendency of the colonial peoples to develop equivalent proficiency and skill was helped by their coming in contact with, or becoming aware of, the techniques and means of their colonial masters; this led to the attempts to equalize the relative standings of, or at least reduce the gap between, the governing and the governed. These efforts eventually resulted in the demands for more rights, then autonomy, and eventually became an important factor in the ultimate breakup of empires.

Imperial Needs for Communication

In his historical study of the doctrine of imperialism, Thornton¹ postulated three main doctrines which dominated the actions of all imperial powers: the doctrines of power, of profit, and of civilization. Though this seems to be an oversimplification, it might be said that his thesis reduces rather remarkably the complexity encountered in any study of imperial relations. It might even be said that there is a considerable overlap in the three doctrines and that the doctrines of profit and civilization are to a great extent actually only parts of an overall doctrine of power. When studying imperial

¹A. P. Thornton, Doctrines of Imperialism (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965).

communications this writer has approached the problem in a similar manner. A view can be posited that the primary needs of imperial powers for safe, efficient and as rapid as possible communications were dictated by three factors present in imperial policies of every major power, that of defense, of trade, and of cultural expansion. But again, a considerable overlap was found to exist especially between needs of defense and of trade.

Communication Needs for the Purposes
of Defense and Trade

The gradual acquisition of overseas territories was naturally accompanied by the initiation and expansion of the external trade of the various powers, and in turn required intensified transport over the existing routes, and establishing of new ones, in order to provide better and preferably faster communication. From the outset, the trade between the European powers and their overseas territories took the form of the exchange of raw materials for manufactured goods. Strong trading and other links developed under such arrangements and remained between most territories and their metropolitan countries.

Britain's needs for rapid communications. -- Preservation of the establishment of a sphere of influence as far as trade and commerce were concerned inevitably led not only to the problems of preserving the territorial integrity of the colonial possessions, but also to the need for rapid communication that would stand ready

to assist in such defense as might be necessary. Thus defense and trade as reasons for developing communications were not mutually exclusive. Specifically in case of Great Britain, the question of defense always had raised a corollary question -- defense of what, with the obvious answer "defense of the trade," especially of free-trade.

And yet,

to many people free trade seemed to ignore vital aspects of the problem of defence -- Britain's increasing dependence on foreign nations for her food supply as her population grew and her agriculture declined, and also for the supply of certain goods essential for the purpose of war. Carried logically through, free trade sacrificed military security in favor of maximum economic efficiency. Defence, wrote Adam Smith, is "of much more importance than opulence"; but Britain seemed rather to be following the principle that opulence would be her best defence. Her accumulated wealth was to give her a marvellous power of endurance in the strain of war, and though her economic policy did not enable her to avoid war it contributed to her final victory when war came.¹

During the last thirty years or so of the nineteenth century the imperial affairs of Britain centered around the debate between the Consolidationists (led by W. E. Gladstone) to whom

. . . the United Kingdom's interests outside the Empire seemed far to outweigh those within it; and while they valued the great colonies they were resigned to their drift into full national independence. They looked to the Empire's future as a league of freely associated sovereign states,²

¹E. A. Benians et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of the British Empire, III: The Empire-Commonwealth 1870-1919 (Cambridge: University Press, 1959), 224-25.

²Ibid., 176-77.

and the imperialists (Lord Salisbury, Chamberlain, et al.) who advocated extensions of imperial boundary lines to meet challenges of foreign policy. The scales of the debate were tipping from one position to another, depending on the composition of the Cabinet at any particular time. The question of defense, i.e., military intervention or troop build-up, arose on several occasions (in case of Egypt, and of East Africa, for example) but generally it was agreed that attempts at setting constitutional bounds to the growth of autonomy of the colonies would not preserve but rather disrupt the Empire.

The question of defense and trade had thus become questions of closer union which in turn became intertwined issues of a "common tariff" policy and of sharing the burdens of defense. The debate continued, in and out of Parliament and in the Colonial Conferences, and though at one time it seemed that imperial consolidation and liberation of the existing colonial order would set in, territorial expansion but with conservative reaction actually began. The old laissez-faire policies remained unimpaired, tempering the expansionist policy which developed particularly vis-à-vis Africa. Thus, both sides of the debaters won, for the loyalty to free trade prevented the strengthening of the central imperial authority, and the territorial acquisitions multiplied because of the desire to strengthen the free trade. The old liberal

ideal of the form of Commonwealth as an association of free, independent and sovereign states continued on its way to become a reality.

The "informal empire," evident in the last years of the Victorian era, had seen Britain only reluctantly assume administrative responsibility in the annexed territories. Then, in the early 1900's, it began slowly giving way to a new aggressive kind, nourished especially by the speculative fevers and by self-confidence. The transition from the old status quo consolidationism to the expansionism was marred for a while by a "jingo" imperialism, altogether uncharacteristic of British "imperial thinking" because it departed from accepted standards of British imperial morality and deep-felt humanitarianism. The self-confidence was at that time made more impudent and shameless and was helped on its way not only by economic depressions which periodically hit Britain, but by manhood suffrage and by "the new sensational Yellow Press and the popular music-hall."¹

Industrial imperialism which replaced the mercantilist approach was in turn being replaced in the twentieth century by a new kind -- financial. The British role as exporter of capital remained supreme, in spite of the fact that Pax Britannica, particularly in Africa, was being challenged, just as the British monopoly of commerce

¹Ibid., 342.

was challenged. These factors, and the emerging nationalism among some of the colonies as well as among foreign powers, required an adjustment of imperial policies. It was under such circumstances that Joseph Chamberlain entered the Colonial Office in 1895.

In the multiplicity of the divisions of opinion, though, the issues could be seen clearly and the influence of four main streams upon Britain's conception of the Empire is quite distinguishable:

The Free Traders made a contribution pre-eminently political: the loose elastic form of Commonwealth consultation and the voluntary co-operative nature of full membership. The others demonstrated that political evolution in the self-governing Empire was not enough: the 'Radical Imperialists' by quickening a sense of positive economic development in the dependent Empire, and the 'Socialists' by preparing for replacement of an often complacent trusteeship by the more dynamic ideal of senior and junior partnership. There was, moreover, one factor that could not be overlooked. The humanitarian conscience, deeply but unpredictably indoctrinated by a small devoted evangelical leadership, cut across party allegiance and drew strength as a political force from [all three] alike.¹

If not imperialism itself, then at least some of its forms and expressions were being questioned. Hobson, though basically anti-imperialist by branding imperialism as appealing to the lust of quantitative acquisitiveness and of forceful domination, and as breeding speculation and war, nonetheless realized that an immediate liquidation of the British Empire would be "a barbarous dereliction of a public duty on behalf of humanity and the civilization

¹Ibid., 344-45.

of the world."¹ In order to solve the obvious dilemma, Hobson devised the concept of a "sane and legitimate imperialism" to be conducted under international supervision and for the benefit of all mankind. Such soul-searching, and prodding of Government by the Yellow Press² as well as by the Chambers of Commerce, led to a gradual assumption of responsibility not only for administration of dependent territories but also for their economic and social development, until now entrusted to chartered companies. "Imperial development, the driving of furrows rather than the planting of flags, had become in this period a necessity as much as a duty."³

Chamberlain gave this new policy a direction in which he stressed the responsibility of the government for economic development.

. . . He believed passionately in improved communications as essentially an imperial responsibility, because they would be the means of unlocking vast regions which, though potentially rich for humanity as a whole, were hitherto unused, or misused, by a backward, 'savage' minority. . . .⁴

To him, "legitimate imperialism" implied building up of communications as well as imperial "slum clearance." His successors in the Colonial Office (Lyttleton and later

¹J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (3rd. ed.; London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1948), 368.

²Benians et al., III, 381.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., 384.

Harcourt) shared his devotion to communications, particularly railways. Railways served as means of asserting territorial authority, and in case of West Africa, including Nigeria, "the railways that secured peace were meant also to stimulate prosperity."¹

The problems of Imperial defense were in reality, to the chagrin of Britain, the problems of England alone. The strength of colonial autonomy was responsible for the squashing of the British Government's plans for an Imperial Defense Council, first proposed at the 1887 Colonial Conference, and resubmitted at the 1897, 1902 and 1907 subsequent meetings. Defense was the subject on which the British Government laid most emphasis but the hopes of spreading the burden of imperial defense were not fully satisfied. Just as in trade, in defense, also the colonies didn't always see eye-to-eye with Britain. Clamoring for preferential tariff and rights to settle their trade policies in their own way, the colonies were also

. . . thinking in terms of local defence forces of their own over the disposal of which they would have complete control.²

But the colonies recognized with Britain that the command of the sea and control over sea (and cable) communications was paramount in importance. All Colonial Conferences

¹ Ibid., 390.

² Benians et al., 419.

dealt with the problems and the Committee of Imperial Defence (a structure of lesser formal stature than the proposed and rejected council) dealt with the subject of cables, both British and enemy, on several occasions.

. . . The value of electrical communications was first sensed in connection with the strategic value of efficient communications in military and naval operations.¹

Militarily, the importance of cables came into prominence with the advent of the World War I.

. . . The British Empire, considered strategically, had been a system of coaling-stations and cable-stations, which at all costs must be preserved; the German naval power was obliged to depend upon coal from neutral ports, and upon communication by wireless telegraphy from few powerful transmitting stations recently erected in the German colonies.²

The naval offensive came against the German colonies in the Pacific, German New Guinea and German Samoa, with the help Australian and New Zealand naval forces.

These large and complex naval operations were accomplished so swiftly, without loss, because of the world-wide British system of cable communications. Only at two points, . . . and in each case only for a few hours, did the German warships disrupt the system. . . .³

Communication needs of France. --Practically all events connected with colonization may be explained by the anti-colonial feeling in France, said Roberts in 1928,

¹Leslie Bennet Tribolet, The International Aspects of Electrical Communications in the Pacific Area (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1929), 261.

²Benians et al., 607.

³Ibid., 609.

pointing to the period of the 1870's.¹ The opposition to all colonization, to all expansion, was indeed universal, and practically only Jules Ferry dared to risk his political life on the question of expansion. His first ministry fell in November, 1881 as a direct result of his forward policy on Tunisia, and his comeback two years later ended in his second and final demise because of his policy on Indo-China and particularly Tonkin (March, 1885).

But were it not for Ferry, France would probably not have had any philosophy of her own, except being opposed to territorial and other expansion. Ferry's theory was based on four elements (industrialization, protection, markets, colonies) which he saw as inseparable. According to him industry could not expand and the country could not become self-sufficient unless colonial development went on pari passu.²

Ferry took his main idea from the writings of a contemporary political economist Paul Leroy Beaulieu whose treatise of 1874³ was eight years later republished

with the dogmatic addendum that colonization is for France the question of life and death. Either France will become a great African power, or in a century or two she will be no more than a secondary European

¹ Steven H. Roberts, History of French Colonial Policy (1870-1925) (London: P. S. King and Son, 1929), I, 9.

² Ibid., 15.

³ Paul Leroy Beaulieu, De la Colonisation chez les Peuples modernes (n.p., n.n., 1874).

power; she will count for about as much in the world as Greece and Rumania in Europe.¹

The theory of markets was also supported by the impulse to seek prestige and glory for France, especially as a desire to revenge the injury to national pride inflicted upon the French in 1871 and the subsequent loss of the Alsace-Lorraine, and the conviction that France had a mission to spread its culture abroad.

Taken altogether these rationales formed a strange combination of arguments: while revenge was the keynote of the 1870's, the catch phrase of the 1880's was the withdrawal from the colonies:² while the territorial expansion was opposed, expansiveness was considered a natural French attribute.³ It was therefore illogical but desirable that

the tiniest embellishment of French civilization should be transferred to the newest settlement. The French flag meant France; France meant the apex of civilization; and the duty of a civilizing nation was to proselytize. For what otherwise will be the significance of the phrase with which France described her colonies, "La France outre-mer"?⁴

In his arguments that colonies were needed to increase French commerce, Ferry basically followed the policies of the first Empire, especially as espoused by

¹Carlton J. H. Hayes, A Generation of Materialism, 1871-1900 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1941), 219.

²Roberts, I, 11.

³Ibid., 4.

⁴Ibid.

Colbert. Unlike Colbert, however, and unlike the British of the 1880's, the need of raw materials was not mentioned by Ferry at all, as he took them for granted.¹ The problem was not to make the goods but to market them, and a sufficiently large Empire was thought to provide enough commercial outlets to ensure the vitality to the whole of French economic enterprise. This was especially so because Europe's markets were being satiated, and a wall of protective tariffs was being erected around most of them. For Etienne, who served as Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in the 1880's and 1890's the question was what to do with the products if they couldn't be exported -- and the colonies were the obvious answer.²

Clearly, the policy put into effect by Ferry rested on the idea of mercantilism.

. . . The growth of manufactures reacted on commerce, to which a new and mighty arena had been opened by the establishment of colonies. These were then viewed simply as estates to be worked for the advantage of the mother countries and the aim of statesmen was to make the colonial trade a new source of public revenue. . . . The colonies were prohibited from trading with other European nations than the parent country, to which they supplied either the precious metals or raw produce purchased with home manufactures. Under the mercantile system a colony was thus regarded as a hewer of wood and drawer of water for the mother country. . . .³

Though the economic arguments were in Ferry's concept of the French colonial Empire the most potent, they

¹Ibid., 17.

²Journal Officiel (Deps.), December 2, 1891, 2381.

³Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XV, 263.

were not the only ones, and among the others, the need to maintain the balance of power could not be neglected. France had to maintain -- or rather re-establish -- its position among the other nations of Europe: "France had to advance in order to stand still in comparison with other powers" was the way one historian put it.¹ That was why new points d'appui (bases) were needed for the navy, and that's why the new territories were being added, and not only in the coastal areas. The political arguments for expansion were strongly expressed by Ferry himself:

The nations, in these times, are great only through their activities. To pretend expansion, without acting, without getting involved in world affairs, away from all European combination in Africa or in the Orient; to live like that is, for a great nation, . . . to abdicate, and sooner than you would believe, it would mean to descend from the first rank to the third or the fourth.²

In order to win the respect of rivals, every power had to assert its "rightful" authority over its territories. But military conquest, though assuring an actual submission of a territory, and thus contributing to the accumulation of square mileage and of population of an Empire, was not in international affairs looked upon as a sufficient proof of authority. A very important provision of the Berlin Act of 1885, by demanding that

signatory powers of the present Act recognize the obligation to insure the establishment of authority

¹Roberts, I, 18.

²Quoted in René Grenier, L'Union Française Sera Fédérale ou Ne Sera Pas (Paris: Les Édition du Scorpion, 1956), 30.

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in the regions occupied by them on the coast of African continent sufficient to protect existing rights and, as the case may be, freedom of trade and of transit under the conditions agreed upon,¹

led the signitaries to insist upon a proof of effective occupation. One of the most effective assertions of authority was the establishment of railroads, and it was this that created a considerable difficulty for France, at least in the French Congo. Serious planning of railroad facilities began in earnest in most possessions of all powers, but the difficulties of France in the Congo territory delayed the construction of a railroad for forty years from the time it was first proposed by de Brazza in 1882.²

Military power was one of the main instruments with which France amassed its colonial Empire, which "presupposes a strong people submitting others to its domination by military conquest."³ Strong army, navy, and communications, were needed to make the French Colonial Empire second only to the British by the end of World War I. In addition, the most influential officers of the

¹Lindley, 144.

²De Brazza was quoted as saying in 1882 that even if one kilometer of railroad should cost a million francs, such a sacrifice should be made. Quoted in Bruel, 396. The actual cost of the construction of the 510-km line, completed in 1934, amounted to 1,155,000,000 francs, making the cost per kilometer 2,264,706 francs, more than double of that feared by de Brazza.

³Grenier, 23.

French Army were the aristocratic Catholic monarchists, antiradical and anti-masonic, and the civilian rulers of the Third Republic were happy to see and keep them fully occupied far away from the French metropole.¹

All of the arguments brought out by Ferry in the 1880's continued, in various degrees of intensity, throughout the rest of the duration of the French Colonial Empire. But not until the time after the First World War were the interests of the colonial possessions even considered. The free-trade of the 1860's, the protective policy of the 1890's were examples of

. . . not a colonial measure but a metropolitan one: it affected the colonies but was determined by and for the interests of France.²

The communication needs of France also played, until the 1920's, a far greater role than the developmental needs of individual colonies. The French Empire, however, at no time presented a clear picture of imperial planning, except in the area of naval needs for bases (originally ten points d'appui de la flotte were established,³ but later reduced to six, then to five, and finally, by 1931, to four⁴) and, unlike the British but reminiscent of the Romans, in the development of roads. Of the maritime service between the metropole and the rest of the Empire, not much had been

¹Thorton, 23.

²Roberts, I, 45.

³Decree of October 4, 1892.

⁴Dareste, I, 616.

said, and what had, had not been too complimentary to the Constructeurs de la France d'outre-mer. Service was slow and expensive, and the merchant marine was not being replaced as fast as it was becoming obsolescent.¹

Both the British and the French contemplated railroad connections of their strongholds across the Africa continent.

. . . The British dream of a Cape-to-Cairo railway and the French hope of a trans-Saharan line are the best known (and also the most fanciful) of the rail-building projects.²

None of them realized their ambitions of such a railroad, but the French succeeded in crossing the Continent by road. The French can be said to have had a penchant for roads, quite unlike the British who always preferred railroads.³

Not surprisingly, it was in Africa where the French possessions were to a great extent contiguous that the network of imperial routes could be observed. In Morocco, the direction and speed of construction of roads were directed by military reasons, and special designation was applied to such road: La route type "legion." The rest of the French Empire developed what was called the

¹Girault, Principes de Colonisation, . . . , III., 494-95.

²Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), I, 298. Also Camille Fidel, La Paix Coloniale Française (Paris: Librairie Recueil Sirey, 1918), 164-65.

³De la Roche and Gottman, 179.

administrative type (la route type "administrateur"), involving less haste and more detours.¹

One other distinction was made by the French in regards to their roads: the internal system of roads was developed by each colony independently of, but never contrary to, the interests of the French Empire. The main routes were conceived of as being imperial roads. Pertinent to the French Equatorial Africa, the so called Route Imperiale No. 2 led from Algiers and the Hoggar Road to Kano in Nigeria, and hence to Fort-Lamy in Chad.²

The most interesting fact about this Imperial Road No. 2 is that it connects Nigeria (from Kano) with the French Equatorial Africa, and then through Fort Archambault and the Central African Republic (formerly Oubangi-Chari) with the Belgian Congo. It is via this road that a motorist can traverse the African continent from Cairo to the Cape.³ International connection is made by highway (if that is the proper term) rather than by other means, such as the railways, though the French and the Belgian Congos have their rail systems connected and the Belgian Congo is hooked up with Angola and the British East African territories.

¹Ibid., 180.

²Ibid., 183. Kimble, I, Land and Livelihood, 467, speaks of this same route as No. 5.

³Kimble, I, 469.

The accounts of the French colonial expansion are mute on the role of the telegraphic communications. The importance of the telegraph is mentioned in the connection with Egypt and Tunis¹, and the New World², but the cable connection with the latter was the only one in which France was fully self-sufficient even as late as 1930.³

The appraisal of the importance of the various communication means has, however, been attempted, and particularly in case of France's holdings in North Africa.

. . . The conquest was achieved by effective organization of communications and vigorous policing of nomadic tribes. The telegraph and the fast mehari camel were the chief agents of control. Subsequently motor routes were laid out, and . . . rail and river transportation were combined to bridge the desert. To these improved means of overland communication was added the aeroplane. Together they promised to prevent the reassertion of the Sahara as a political barrier.⁴

The prospects did not turn, though, into reality. The Sahara, in spite of some valiant efforts of the French, as well as the British, has never ceased to be in the way of an efficient overland communication link. Traffic moves either in the air, or by sea around the continent. Culturally, politically, and economically, the French possessions in Africa formed three distinct environments, loosely trapped into the French Empire.

¹Priestley, 164-209.

²Girault, Principes de Colonisation, . . ., III, 499.

³Ibid. .

⁴Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), I, 330D.

Trade, defense, and Communications in the Belgian Empire. --In comparison with the situation in the British and French Empires, the communications needs of Belgium (in regard to its colonial possession in Africa) are much easier to understand and to describe. The existence and operation of that territory was always regulated by an international agreement, first the Act of Berlin of 1885, then the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye (1919), the Covenant of League of Nations (1919) and the United Nations Charter (1945), thus eliminating the frequent policy changes, or at least the possibility of such changes, which characterized the problems of other colonial powers.

Under the Act of Berlin in 1885, two important freedoms were agreed on, and established, for the whole area of the Congo Basin: that of navigation and of trade. As far as the policy of free trade was concerned, the Congo Independent State was forbidden to levy customs' duties of any kind, but the Act of Brussels in 1889 resulted in a new rule and from then on, the African State was allowed to charge a ten per cent ad valorem duty on goods entering the Congolese territories. That was the heritage passed on Belgium when it assumed its colonial role in 1908.¹

The freedom of navigation and the policy of "open door" was promulgated by the Convention of

¹Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), VI, 246.

St. Germain-en-Laye, replacing the Act of Berlin whose validity had been destroyed by the Great War. The system of free trade in the Congo Basin (including the French and Portuguese territories) was reserved exclusively for the signatory countries and for the members of the League of Nations adhering to the Convention. In this, the 1919 Convention differed from the 1885 provisions which applied to all nations. A number of countries, among them the United States, chose not to belong to the League of Nations.

The Convention also authorized Belgium to fix customs duties for ships as well as merchandise. The institution of all of these changes

. . . was unquestionably one of the reasons for [an] increased prosperity which was accompanied by tremendous progress in administrative organization, social life, and scientific research.¹

The freedom of navigation and of trade in the Belgian Congo was scrupulously adhered to, and provided, of course, most of the communication means which Belgium needed to administer its African colony. Belgium's own naval and armed forces were stationed in the Belgian Congo, but the neutrality imposed upon the Congo Independent State by the Act of Berlin was respected by Belgium.²

Throughout the history, the Belgian Congo depended upon its foreign trade, but remained very independent of the foreign trade with the mother country.

¹InforCongo, I, 110.

²Ibid., 108, 199.

Systems of Empire Communications. --The significance of the communications technology can be realized when it is recalled that the technology of the telegraph, the telephone, the wireless and broadcasting took place in an age marked by strong currents of nationalism, imperialism, and frequent wars. It ought not to be too surprising that these media were utilized mainly by governmental and business interests not only within national boundaries, but also for the purposes of consolidation of imperialist and colonial gains.

During the very early part of this period Great Britain was the leading power, and London the world's center of commerce, of finance, of sea-going transportation, destined to become a dominant center of communication. The British were the first ones to realize the importance of submarine cables and undertook the building of an overseas network which connected them with the major parts of their far-flung Empire. The British system of telegraphic communication was dominant in international press communication as well. The development of the wireless telegraph after World War I was a natural extension of the existing network, followed by an equally natural union of the two systems into a single private but government subsidized network (Cable and Wireless, Ltd.), meant primarily to serve the Empire but also open to others. Later (in 1959) the Post Office took over all external telecommunication services, except those offered by foreign companies

operating under United Kingdom license.¹ In the radio broadcasting area, it was also Great Britain where both domestic service and the Empire service developed on large scales.

When these systems were added to the publishing network and the news gathering services, an impressive array of communication system linked practically all parts of the globe with London.

The British communication system was thus an extremely valuable instrument for the transaction of overseas and imperial governmental, commercial, and financial affairs. It was also valuable in serving the cause of national and imperial solidarity. It would be incorrect to say that the existence of the technical instruments of modern mass communication in British hands created the Empire or held the Empire together. It would be nearer the truth to say that the Empire created the communication system or, at least, that the mass-communications system was an essential element in the imperial system. Without it the Empire would have faltered.²

Though the first, the British imperial system of communication was not the only one. The foreign competition, especially in the wireless telegraphy and telephony, was considerable. The French among other foreign nations invested heavily in submarine cables designed as imperial links and followed them up with wireless systems. The main

¹Great Britain, British Information Services, Britain and Commonwealth Telecommunications (London: B. I. S., 1963), 18. Henceforth referred to as B. I. S., Commonwealth Telecommunications.

²Robert D. Leigh, "The Mass-Communications Inventions and International Relations," in Ogburn, 134.

effort of the French was the direct result of an action of Great Britain which in 1899 refused to transmit on English cables any telegraphic messages in code. Especially affected were the French possessions in East Africa, in Asia and the Pacific. But the French effort was manifestly insufficient when compared to that accomplished by the British, the Germans and the Americans.¹

The French Empire was considered much more exposed than any other. The French colonialists always insisted that the maintenance of the Empire was second only to that of national integrity, but the French possessions did not supply France with too much manpower for defense purposes.

. . . Whereas England's army may, through sea-control, be moved at will, the French rely for quick action on a mobile force of seventy thousand held in the mother country ready for emergency anywhere.²

The lack of navy which could have held command of the seas against any of the other maritime or colonial powers, and the dependence of the French upon the telegraphic communication links owned and operated by Britain made France vulnerable and contributed to her living in perpetual dread of a grand war. The communication aspects of the twentieth century plans of Albert Sarraut³, of the French Imperial Conference 1934-1935⁴, and of René Pleven after

¹Girault, Principes de Colonisation, . . ., III, 502.

²Priestley, 425. ³Sarraut, 332ff.

⁴"La Conférence Imperiale depose ses conclusions; la parole est au gouvernement," Le Monde Colonial Illustré (May, 1935), 57-60, 65-67.

World War were never truly translated into meaningful efforts,¹ due to economic problems of the 20's, military threats and actions of the 30's and 40's, and political changes which followed World War II.

The communication network of the Belgian colonial empire relied heavily on the facilities of other nations. The international flavor of the colony, by virtue of the Treaties of Berlin and of St. Germain-en-Laye, provided excellent sea communication by ships flying the flags of many nations. The merchant fleet of Belgium has never been sufficient, not even to warrant a separate listing by the Lloyd's Register of Shipping,² and not until 1956 was there a serious effort to build a large fleet.³

In international telecommunications, Belgium depended upon foreign telegraphs and telephone companies, especially British and French. When, however, wireless communication became practical, the Belgians were in 1912 among the first to plan its use between Brussels and their colony, as well as within the colony.⁴

Belgium also took an early advantage of air transportation. In 1923, the Belgian airline "Sabena"⁵

¹Francois Luchaire, Droit d'Outre-Mer (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), 354 ff.

²Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XX, 255.

³Ibid., III, 364.

⁴InforCongo, 234.

⁵Ibid., 354.

began operating between the mother country and Leopoldville, and in 1930 the service was made regular. It can be said that the Belgian Empire communication system, quite unlike other powers' systems, had its true beginning, rather than its continuation, in wireless and in aviation.

Cultural Expansion and Communications

Among the defenses of imperialism, and among the dire arguments for it, the spread of superior culture of the colonizing peoples ranked very high. It is true that it might not have been mentioned too loudly, or as being actually at par with other, more immediate, needs but it was present since the beginning of mankind in practically all imperial schemes, be it Semitic, Egyptian, Persian, Greek, Roman, Holy Roman, Islamic, German, Japanese, or British, French and Belgian.

Documentation for this point of view can be obtained from the writings of philosophers, such as Aristotle in his Politics or Hegel who argued that

the Germanic nations' destiny was to furnish support for the Christian principle, as well as to aid the development of the human intellect.¹

It is also noticeable in the pronouncements of advocates of colonial imperialism. Harmand, whose theory was based

¹Thornton, 160.

upon the notion that imperialism is a prerogative and duty of superior civilizations, wrote that

we must . . . accept as [the] basic principle the fact that a hierarchy of races and civilization exists, and that [the French] belong to the highest race, the highest civilization. But the French must realize, too, that [their] superiority imposes important duties on [them], as well as giving [them] certain rights.¹

He concluded that

. . . [the conqueror's] first duty toward both his subjects and his own people is to maintain his domination and to guarantee its continuation.²

Just as the French "Mission civilisatrice," the "Imperial Idea" of Chamberlain also went beyond mere imperial control and unity. Both the non-self-governing as well as the self-governing territories were thought to be united by ties of kindred, religion, history, and language. Furthermore, in the colonies,

. . . [there] is also the sense of possession [which] has given place to a different sentiment -- the sense of obligation. We feel now that our rule over these territories can only be justified if we can show that it adds to the happiness and prosperity of the people, and I maintain that our rule does, and has brought security and peace and comparative prosperity to countries that never knew their blessings before. In carrying out this work of civilization we are fulfilling what I believe to be our national mission. . . . In almost every instance in which the rule of the Queen has been established and the great Pax Britannica has been enforced, there has come with it greater security to life and

¹Harmand, 156.

²Ibid., 170.

property, and a material improvement in the condition of the bulk of the population.¹

As far as the Belgian Congo is concerned, the pronouncements of King Leopold II emphasized the necessity of freeing Africa from slavery and of introducing civilization; in spite of his continued professing of such humanitarian principles, the evidence, as has already been pointed out in Chapter II, told an entirely different story.² Abuses of the civilizing mission led to the eventual take-over of the Leopold's domain by Belgium.

A former Governor-General of the Belgian Congo implied the civilizing duty of Belgium when he asked

. . . what would have happened in Africa, . . . had the European nations abstained from intervening? Ought the natives to have been left in the condition in which we found them, and which [the] great Livingstone and Stanley have so eloquently described? Could the improvement of their conditions have been achieved without the establishment of European rule, without the assistance and supervision of Europeans? The experiment of leaving the natives to administer themselves has been made in two African Countries; they are in many respects the most backward countries in Africa. . . .³

As could be expected, there existed critical voices in the various Empires who could not with clear

¹Speech at the Royal Institute, March 31, 1897, quoted in Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan Schmidt, Imperialism: The Study and Significance of a Political Word, 1840-1960 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1964), 210.

²Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), VI, 246-47.

³Godding in Royal Institute of International Affairs, 40-41. Godding was Governor-General of the Belgian Congo in 1945-46. The two countries referred to in the above quotation were Ethiopia and Liberia.

conscience subscribe to such dominating point of view. Anatole France, for example, rejected the idea that colonialism carried the mission of civilization and preferred to call it a "new barbarism."¹ Another kind of opposition to the idea of spreading a superior civilization can be detected from the contempt which the representatives of a colonizing power had for the natives:

To inculcate the principles of one's own civilization in men whose company was felt at best a deep bewilderment, and at worst as deep an antipathy, was a task always too great for the pragmatic, non-philosophic rulers of India, who assumed that their own degree of civilization was so self-evident as not to need any propaganda on its behalf. . . .²

The content of the civilizing mission. --What were some of the aspects of civilization which the Imperial Powers intended to proselytize in their vast colonial holdings? If we accept the definition of civilization as the state of human society regarded as having reached a high level of intellectual, social, and cultural development,³ (and it is precisely this that the colonizing powers considered themselves to excel at), it is possible to arrive at some of the traits characterizing the content of the civilizing mission.

¹Anatole France, "La Folie Coloniale," Trente Ans de la Vie Sociale (Paris: Editions Emile - Paul Frères, 1949), I, 207-09. Cf. Harvey Goldberg, French Colonialism: Progress or Poverty? (New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1959), 9.

²Thornton, 176-77.

³Standard Dictionary of the English Language, (1958), 243.

Among such items it is necessary to mention religion, and specifically Christianity. In many cases, as a matter of fact, colonial expansion started through the activities of Christian missionaries. Humanitarian justice also was seen as an essential aspect of a superior civilization, and suppression of slavery and other inhumanities was considered a sacred duty of the colonizers.

Progress, not only economic and agricultural, but in standards of living and in health and sanitation, often formed a corollary with the economic rationales of colonial expansion:

. . . no more of "the right of the strongest," but the "right of the strong to help the weak," that is the truly noblest and the highest right of all.¹

Peace and security also were included in the list of desirable civilizing qualities, and though in many areas of the empires imposition of peace resulted in much-needed tranquility, in many others imperial civilization had -- at least at certain times -- entirely different impact.

It is said that France has brought overseas peace, progress, and life. . . . Now, somewhat everywhere, it is war, regression, and death!²

At last, but not the least, a mention needs to be made of the importance of bringing to the overseas possessions a language through which understanding, Christianizing, and efficient governing might be obtained. Nowhere

¹Sarraut, 88.

²Grenier, 35.

was the stress upon language greater than in the French Empire, for Frenchmen have always displayed a particular attachment to their mother tongue:

If by culture is meant that richness of l'esprit reflected in painting, architecture, music, les lettres and the arts, it seems that the proper contribution of France is due primarily to its language. The French culture, that's the Western culture of French expression.¹

Admittedly, all these are only a host of civilization aspects that the imperial nations planted in the metropolitan extensions. It is not considered necessary to enumerate all the possible ways in which the superior knowledge, including technology, was used. It is thought apropos, however, to raise in this study the question of the techniques, or means, through which this "mission civilisatrice" was made possible, or at least made available faster and to a greater number of people than would be the case had such means not existed.

Technology of cultural expansion. -- Among the means that were used in the spreading of civilizations in the more primitive, or less developed, areas of the various empires, language itself must be mentioned. But that is not the kind of means which can be identified with technological advancement of societies.

¹Ibid., 131. France's attempt to impart to the gifted African the French attachment to the arts is well attested to by the prominence of poets, novelists, and playwrights in the leadership role. Cf. Sékou Toure of Guinea and Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal.

Neither, of course, can be special institutions of the colonial powers designed specifically, or at least primarily, for the purpose of achieving the aims and goals of the acculturating (and often assimilating) efforts. Among these are, undoubtedly, not only schools of various levels, scientific and research institutes, judicial systems, military establishments, etc., but such specialized agencies as the British Council, the Alliance Française, or Centre Belge des Échanges Culturels.

It is at this point that the role of technological inventions, and especially telegraphic and wireless communications that later evolved into point-to-point and broadcast communication, can begin to be explored. This will be done by tracing the development of the telegraph, through new discoveries and inventions, into the medium of radio broadcasting. Policies on communications of the three colonial powers will be extrapolated, and compared with political, economic and social background of the times.

It has been said that a big factor in nationalism is the lack of effective communication between the governed and the governing.¹ It also has been stated (and by the same author, incidentally) that a growing state must be

¹Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1953), 113.

able to change its own pattern of communication in order to combat successfully the threats of overloading the media channels.¹ Implied by both, in fact preceding both but seldom mentioned in a much more basic criterion of a successful nationalism (or, if you will, achievement of self-government): How big and how efficient a communication system had been readied for such eventual self-government, and had it been brought to the colonies by the superior peoples as part of their contribution to the "mission civilisatrice?"

¹Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963), 251.

CHAPTER IV

WIRES, CABLES AND WIRELESS

By the time the first public supply of electricity was established in Great Britain in 1881 (having preceded that of the United States by one year)¹, telegraphy, in practical form, had been in operation for more than thirty years and had grown considerably during the intervening years on national as well as on international scale. The growth of the first electric means of communication and its importance to the imperial relations of the three European colonial powers is of interest here, as it led to the development of radio broadcasting not only in the technological sense, but also in the concept of the need, organization, and social implications.

The Development of the Electric Communications

Telegraphy

As has been true with a number of scientific inventions and discoveries (e.g., radio "beam" in 1916, and radar in the 1940's), telegraphy owes its development to the demands of war. True, the first telegraph was

¹Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), VIII, 257, 261.

non-electric:

The 19th century began with the tumult and ferment of the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars which broke many of the political and social barriers that had divided Europe. Through these broken barriers stretched the communication lines of the revolutionary armies, in particular a semaphore telegraph system invented by Claude Chappe in 1792.¹

Napoleon used that system not only in his military campaigns but later also in administering his conquests. His project was to employ mobile telegraph units to assist in his invasion of Russia but the idea was never carried out.² Early in the nineteenth century other telegraph systems were invented (e.g., optical, pneumatic and hydraulic) and it took until the mid-century for the electric system to replace other non-electric inventions.

The electric telegraph was not invented by any single person; rather, the invention was the result of efforts of many, including at least one whose identity is not even known:

. . . In 1753, the first suggestion for an electric telegraph was made in Scotland by an anonymous writer to Scots Magazine, signing himself C.M., who advised using an insulated wire for each letter of the alphabet.³

Others, whose contributions played a part included George L. Lesage (1774), Betancourt and Lomond (1787), Reusser,

¹W. James King, The Development of Electrical Technology in the 19th Century: Part 2; The Telegraph and the Telephone (Bulletin 228: Contributions from the Museum of History and Technology) (Washington, D.C.: United States National Museum, Smithsonian Institution, 1962), 275.

²Ibid.

³Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XXI, 882.

or Reisser (1794) and Francisco Salva (1798).¹ In the nineteenth century, Samuel T. Soemmerring demonstrated his galvanic telegraph in several European cities, including Paris where

. . . [it] may have been demonstrated to Napoleon;. . .
 . . .; at least Napoleon is reported to have rejected it with the comment, "C'est une idée germanique."²

The work on the idea was continued by J. S. Schweigger (1811), J. R. Coxe (1816), A. M. Ampère (1820), William Ritchie (1830), Joseph Henry (1830), Samuel F. B. Morse (1832) and Carl F. Gauss and Wilhelm Weber (1833), whose system appealed to some railroad officials to such an extent that they considered its installation to control railway traffic on the Leipzig-Dresden Line.³ Karl E. Steinheil's simplified version of the Gauss and Weber's telegraph was successfully demonstrated on separate lines of various length in 1837. A year later,

Steinheil's telegraph system worked so well on the Nürnberg-Fürth railroad that the Bavarian government decided to try a line with a ground return along a portion of the Munich-Augsburg railroad. However, the expense of installing the single line was still too great, and the authorities decided against the application of Steinheil's telegraph.⁴

¹Ibid.

²King, 276; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XXI, 883.

³King, 284.

⁴Ibid.

That the majority of those mentioned in the preceding paragraphs were Continental Europeans does not mean that work on a telegraph system was not being pursued in England. Important pioneer work in this field was done by William Alexander (1837) and especially by William Fothergill Cooke and Charles Wheatstone. The two latter inventors formed a partnership in 1837, after several years of independent work, and obtained their first telegraph patent that year.¹ They became responsible for the laying of telegraph lines along the newly built railroads. The contributions to telegraphy of the two inventors cannot be overestimated. In their early experiments, they used five wires and five needles but were later able to reduce the number to one of each.² Several models of the so-called dial telegraph were also patented, and one by Wheatstone, became quite popular with the British during the remainder of the nineteenth century, and even beyond. The simplicity of operation of this system actually survived until the 1920's.³

Edward Davy (1836-1839), Alexander Bain (1848), and William Thomson (later Lord Kelvin) were among other English inventors who provided competition, not always commercial but always scientific.

¹British Patent No. 7390; June 12, 1837.

²B. I. S., Commonwealth Telecommunications, 3.

³British Patent No. 1241; August 2, 1858. Also, King, 291.

With such a fertile field of experimentation and inventiveness in Europe, it is surprising that the first truly practical, and widely acclaimed and used as such, telegraph system should have been developed in the United States. The invention is credited to Samuel F. B. Morse who conceived the idea in 1832, but for lack of money could not develop even the crudest model until 1835.¹ He was, however, preceded by Joseph Henry, the foremost American physicist of his day, and later the first Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution. In 1830-1831,

. . . Henry . . . invented and demonstrated what appears to have been the first practical electromagnetic telegraph. . . . Reporting his achievements in Silliman's Journal in 1831, Henry pointed out that the way was now clear for the invention of the commercial electromagnetic telegraph.²

But even Henry was not the first American in the field of telegraphy:

The first inventor actually to devise and set up an electric telegraph in the United States was Harrison G. Dyar. Sometime between 1826 and 1828 Dyar worked out an electrochemical system whereby messages were recorded by sparks passing through treated paper and discolorations indicated the message.³

But it was left to Morse to become the honored inventor of the electric telegraph. Morse spent many years perfecting

¹J. Warren Stehman, "Telephone and Telegraph," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, XIV, 561.

²Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XI, 444-45.

³King, 294.

his invention. He made his own models, moulds and castings, and with the help of several partners was able to make public demonstrations of the telegraph in 1837 and 1838. Though the U. S. Government and the Congress were impressed, Morse's request for funds to defray expenses of subjecting his telegraph to actual experiment demonstrating its value was not acted upon.¹ Morse petitioned for a patent, and sailed to Europe to seek patents and financial backing for his invention.

Abroad he met with interest but could not find any financial backers, and "legal difficulties prevented his obtaining any overseas patents."²

. . . In England, his application was refused, and while he obtained a patent in France, it was subsequently appropriated by the French Government without compensation to himself. His negotiations with Russia proved futile, . . .³

and upon his return to the United States, he asked for the patent to be issued, which finally happened on June 20, 1840.⁴ Funds for a demonstration (\$30,000) were appropriated by Congress in 1843, and on May 24, 1844, Morse sent his famous "What hath God wrought" message over the 40 miles of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad

¹Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959) XV, 824.

²King, 298.

³Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XV, 824.

⁴U. S. Patent No. 1647, June 20, 1840. The patent was reissued in 1846 and 1848, following a legal litigation in the U. S.

between Washington and Baltimore. In spite of the demonstrated success of his telegraph, the immediate reaction of the general public was not too gratifying.

So little confidence did the public have in the telegraph that 2 years after the line had been installed, the receipts for one quarter were only \$203.43, at the rate of 1 cent for four characters.¹

But Morse was not discouraged and with his associates formed a private company to exploit the invention. The Magnetic Telegraph Company set out to expand the facilities. The U. S. - Mexican War gave additional impetus to the use of the telegraph system and other companies were formed in competition with the Morse's, among them the New York Associated Press.² Unlike telegraph development in other countries, in the United States the railroad companies did not perceive the value of the telegraph for the control of traffic until the early 1850's, but from then on, the railroad and the telegraph worked side by side helping to open the western part of the American continent.

Among the foreign nations, England was the one which did not need to use the Morse patent. Wheatstone's patent was followed by Bain's in 1846 in which the Morse key was replaced by an automatic device using punched paper. This in turn was improved by another patent by

¹U. S. National Resources Committee, Technological Trends and National Policy (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1937), 49.

²The Associated Press, Handbook for Correspondents (New York: The Associated Press, 1955), 7.

by Wheatstone in 1858, allowing to send and receive messages at the rate of between 50 and 150 words per minute.¹ In 1876 Thomson invented the "siphon-recorder"² in which signals were recorded on paper tape by indicating dots and dashes (a code developed in 1837 by Morse).

Improvements in telegraphy. -- The telegraph system utilizing wires was being continually improved by further experimentation and modification on both sides of the Atlantic: automatic transmission and reception, letter-printing telegraph, and above all the use of a single wire for more than a single message at a time. An Austrian, Wilhelm Gintl, developed the first so-called duplex system in which two messages, one in each direction, could be sent over a single line.³ This led to eventual doubling of the potential, with two messages in each direction on a single line, by an invention of Thomas Alva Edison in 1874⁴, to the carrier systems, as envisaged by Elisha Gray⁵, and to the improvement of the system developed originally by Jean M. E. Baudot.⁶ The result was that

¹King, 294.

²British Patent No. 2147, July 23, 1867.

³Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XXI, 884; also King, 308.

⁴U. S. Patents Nos. 207723 and 207724, September 3, 1878; and 209241, October 22, 1878.

⁵Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XXI, 888.

⁶French Patents Nos. 103898, June 17, 1874; 11719, March 2, 1876; and 146716, January 6, 1882.

while the Morse system could send up to 25 dispatches per hour and the European¹ Hughes machine could send 60 dispatches per hour, the duplex process enabled them to transmit 45 and 110 dispatches per hour, respectively. The quadruplex process as applied to the Wheatstone automatic telegraph could send 90 dispatches per hour, and 160 dispatches per hour if the system was duplexed again. A hundred dispatches per hour could be sent by the Meyer multiplex system, and 160 by the Baudot system and almost double that if duplexed. Use of the Baudot system spread in France in the 1880's, and in the late 1890's it was introduced into England. Further improvements in the Baudot system and its combination with other systems led to the modern printing telegraph system.²

Submarine Cables

The very beginning of telegraphic systems were no more than connections of one locality with another, of industrial, commercial or financial centers with others, but all within the confines of national boundaries. Soon, indeed almost simultaneously, there developed a desire, and in many instances a need, to interconnect two or more national systems. There was no technical difficulty in such an arrangement whereby overhead telegraph lines crossed the national frontiers and connected widely spatially separated empires.

But in case of England in its totality, and in other parts of the world to lesser degrees, "a fresh element was involved when the sea had to be crossed."³

¹Hughes was an American, but his system was widely used in Europe.

²King, 308-09.

³Frank James Brown, The Cable and Wireless Communications of the World (London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, Ltd., 1927), 2.

The idea had been investigated even before Morse's Baltimore-Washington line was put in operation in 1844, and Morse himself in 1842 experimented with submarine cable telegraphy.¹

The problem with cables centered around the coating with which the copper wires had to be surrounded. Before 1849, many materials had been tried as insulants but none of them had lasted long in sea water. The goal of a successful laying of a cable was not attained until gutta-percha was applied. Gutta-percha is the gum from Malayan tree, and was exhibited at the Royal Society of Arts in 1843.² Michael Faraday suggested its use as an insulator to William Siemens, and in January 1849, a cable insulated by gutta-percha was laid along a two-mile coastal stretch of the English Channel.³

That the gutta-percha happened to be developed into insulating material in England was a happenstance. Brought to England by John Tradescant, an English traveller and gardener (1608-1662) in middle of the seventeenth century,⁴ it came from Malayasia, which came under the British rule only a century later. But from this happenstance, the British were able, from 1850's on, to command a decisive

824. ¹Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XV,

²B. I. S., Commonwealth Telecommunications, 4.

³King, 305.

14 : ⁴Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), II, XXII, 372.

position in the manufacture of submarine (and underground) cables for almost one hundred years. This, perhaps more than anything else but certainly not less importantly, contributed to make London a center of cable communications. Gutta-percha's replacement, polyethylene (or polythene), a synthetic insulating material was also discovered in Britain, in 1933.¹

After the unsuccessful attempt in 1850 to cross the English Channel with a cable, the first reliable submarine cable linked England with France in 1851. It consisted of four copper wires each separately covered with two layers of gutta-percha, and then twisted together into a rope which was armored by ten galvanized iron wires laid helically around it.² This design remained relatively unchanged until the end of the century, when the need to establish voice links across oceans necessitated modifications in cable construction.

Telephony

Just as the electric telegraph had been preceded by many non-electric methods of transmission of sound, telephony also began as a non-electric communication means. C. G. Page in the United States already in 1837 and Charles Borseul in France in 1854 suggested methods employing the "make and break" principle of the telegraph

¹B. I. S., Commonwealth Telecommunications, 11.

²Ibid., 4.

to transmit sound in the form of pitch though not as articulated speech.¹ Closer to the real thing came a German high school science teacher, Philipp Reis, who in 1860 devised an electric instrument, referred to as the telephone. Though some scientists and inventors on both sides of the Atlantic claimed the Reis device, with proper adjustment, could work, the German Patent Office in the 1880's carefully investigated the patent application and decided the instrument was not a "speaking telephone."² During the long litigation on the Bell instrument patent, the American courts arrived at the same decision.³

In February 1876, two American inventors approached the U. S. Patent Office: Elisha Gray, at that time superintendent of the Western Electric Manufacturing Company,⁴ applied for a caveat (i.e., a notice of intent to perfect his ideas and file a patent application within three months) for an electric telephone. Unfortunately for himself, Gray was about two hours too late, for on the same day, Alexander Graham Bell had filed his application for a telephone patent. On March 7, Patent No. 174465 was issued to him,

¹Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XXI, 895.

²Ibid.

³King, 313-14.

⁴Gray's Company was later (1881) purchased by Bell's Company. W. Rupert Maclaurin, Invention and Innovation in the Radio Industry (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1949), 27.

a number which came to represent one of the most valuable patents ever issued.¹

It was only two days after the patent was granted that Bell's instrument worked as specified in the drawings and application for the patent. On March 9, 1876², the now well-known command, "Mr. Watson, come here; I want you!" summoned Bell's assistant from one room of Bell's laboratory to another.

Needless to say, others challenged the validity of Bell's patent, including Gray, in spite of his reputed disclaimer of any credit as to the invention in a letter to Bell himself.³ The litigation involved some 600 individual suits, but all of them withstood the challenge.

Actually, Patent No. 174465 pertained to voice transmission and it was not until January 30, 1878 when Bell obtained a patent No. 186787, "the fundamental one for the construction of receivers."⁴

Business, backed by invention competition, started in earnest, followed by court suits and counter-suits, and by out-of-court settlements. The subsequent technical improvements were accompanied by a great increase in the number of telephone instruments as well

¹King, 318.

²Ibid., 32. One source gives March 10 as the correct date of this event. Cf. U. S. National Resources Committee, 251.

³Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XXI, 869.

⁴King, 322. This was the so called box telephone.

as of the area interconnected by telephones. The new invention was brought by Bell to England, where scientists such as Francis Blake (1878) and Henry Hunnings (1878) made improvements upon the designs of telephone transmitters.¹ At the same time, the Continent also began to see demonstrations of the new communication instrument, for example at the Paris World's Fair in 1878.² Slowly but surely, Bell's predicted maze of cables, underground or suspended overhead, connecting "private dwellings, country houses, shops, manufactories, etc., . . . with a central office"³ began to become a reality.

Not only so, but . . . in the future, wires will unite . . . different cities, and a man in one part of the country may communicate by word of mouth with another in a distant place.⁴

Technical improvements occurred, such as "phantoming" (i.e., increasing the inductance of the lines), or multiplying the circuit capacity by carrier systems, similar to those used in telegraphy, but long-distance submarine telephony remained limited because of the relative unsuitability of the telegraphic cables.⁵

¹Ibid., 330.

²Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XXI, 897.

³Ibid., 896.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., 901-03.

Cables of such construction were suitable for shallow water and relatively short distances, and though utilized across the English Channel, they were unsuitable for transoceanic telephone traffic. The first submarine telephone cable was not put into service until 1921 (between Key West, Florida and Havana, Cuba), six years after successful demonstration of radiotelephony and six years before the first commercial overseas radiotelephone circuit between U. S. and England was opened.¹ By that time, the third electric communication invention was beginning to make profound changes upon the existing two in point-to-point communication, and its newly discovered use as a means of broadcasting was being explored.

The Wireless

In order to begin the story of wireless, one must go back at least to the historic prediction of James Clerk Maxwell, the British scientist, who in 1873 pointed to the probability of the existence of electromagnetic waves.² Maxwell died without actual test of his theory, but others, especially Heinrich Hertz in Germany, experimented with Maxwell's ideas. In 1889 Hertz was able to produce in a laboratory the radio, or Hertzian, waves.³ Hertz,

¹Ibid., 902. Also, James M. Herring and Gerald C. Gross, Telecommunications: Economics and Regulation (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1936), 72.

²Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XV, 120; XVIII, 907A,B.

³Ibid., XVIII, 884.

however, did not pursue his discovery to its practical application; that idea came to Guglielmo Marconi.

Even before the work on electromagnetic waves began, other approaches had been studied. In 1842 Samuel F. B. Morse established the principle of conduction,¹ and in 1831, Michael Faraday discovered the phenomenon of electrostatic induction.² Sixty years later, Thomas A. Edison was granted a patent for a signaling system using the principle of induction, and demonstrated its use for communication between a railroad station and moving trains.³ Both conduction and induction, however exciting and promising they were as means of communication without wires, eclipsed eventually into oblivion, when the existence of electromagnetic radio waves was discovered.

Unlike Morse and Bell and their predecessors, Marconi was not an originator. He coordinated the principles of others, improved upon their devices, invented some of his own, and above all decided to turn the results into a commercial enterprise. Though also an inventor, he was primarily an entrepreneur, an innovator. Like Morse and Bell, and like Fulton with his steamboat and Stevenson with his locomotive, Marconi met with criticism and scepticism. In his native Italy he found

¹Hiram L. Jome, Economics of the Radio Industry (New York: A. S. Shaw Co., 1925), 6.

²Maclaurin, 11.

³U. S. Patent 465971 (December 29, 1891) was applied for in 1885. Jome, 314.

very little encouragement, and moved to England. His mother's aristocratic relations in Ireland helped him to move in the "best circles"¹ in London where he met William Preece (Later Sir William), Chief Engineer of the British Post Office. With Preece's assistance, he successfully demonstrated that telegraphic messages could be sent over a distance of almost eight miles.² With Marconi's business acumen, it is not surprising that this demonstration took place only after he had filed an application for his first patent.³

After several such successes, considerable publicity in England and abroad resulted in his being invited by the Italian government to return. He visited Italy in 1897, demonstrated his system by establishing communication over twelve miles of sea with Italian warships, but returned to England the same year to form the Wireless Telegraph and Signal Company, Ltd. His primary energies were devoted to efforts to show the full possibilities of wireless. Soon (1899) he increased the distance of his communications to thirty-one miles between England and France, and then to seventy-five miles between British warships.⁴ Changing the name of his company

¹Maclaurin, 32.

²Ibid., 33.

³British Patent No. 12039, 1896; cf. Jome, 321.

⁴Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XIV, 869.

to Marconi's Wireless Telegraph Company, Ltd. (referred to, however, simply as "British Marconi"), he also formed the American Marconi Company, the Marconi International Marine Communication Company, Ltd., and as the time went on, subsidiaries in Spain, Canada, Austria, Switzerland, South Africa, Belgium, France and elsewhere.

From the very start, the emphasis was on long-distance communication. In 1901, radio telegraphic communication was established between England and Newfoundland, when "three low clicks, signifying the letter 'S'"¹ were flashed. In order to obtain permission for building his transmitting and receiving stations, and in spite of great objections by line and especially cable companies, Marconi reduced telegraphic rates (in case of England - Canada route, e.g., from 25 cents a word for cable to 10 cents a word for radiogram)². But the low rates and small volume of traffic due to reception difficulties, caused by atmospheric conditions, resulted in financial difficulties of the British Marconi. Also, the opposition of the British Post Office played a substantial part in the difficulties. William Preece's superior, the Postmaster-General Austen Chamberlain³

. . . saw the Marconi company as a potential competitor of the government-controlled [since 1869]

¹Jome, 13.

²Maclaurin, 36.

³(Joseph) Austen Chamberlain was the eldest son of Joseph Chamberlain who headed the Colonial Office at that time (1902).

telegraph industry, and adamantly refused to connect the Marconi overseas service with the post office telegraph lines. If someone in London wished to send a Marconigram to Paris, he had to go to a local Marconi office; the office would send a messenger to the post office to telegraph the Marconi Broadcasting [sic] station in Dover, South Foreland. The message was then relayed across the Channel and sent to its final destination through the French telegraph office -- in all, a slow and expensive procedure. The cross-channel cable companies, by contrast, had a direct connection with the post office.¹

This apparently was an illegal situation in that Section 12 of the Telegraph Act of 1869 provided that

the postmaster-general may, upon reasonable request of any company constituted for the transmission of telegrams to and from places abroad, make all necessary arrangements for the transmission of such telegrams within Great Britain, and for the connection of such company's system with the postmaster-general's telegraphs.²

Furthermore, any disputes in this matter were to be settled by arbitration.

The situation was finally corrected by signing an agreement between the Post Office and the Marconi Company in 1904.³

Meanwhile, Marconi turned his attention to wireless communication with and between ships. Through the years, Marconi equipment was being installed on passenger and cargo ships as well as on naval vessels of many nations, though German and American competitors made

¹Maclaurin, 36-37.

²Brown, 120.

³Maclaurin, 37.

considerable gains. The main advantage of the British Marconi was in the fact that "English stations all over the world"¹ refused to enter into communication with vessels equipped with other than Marconi equipment. International Wireless Conference was called to Berlin in 1903 to deal with this problem, but the Convention eventually drawn up was not ratified by Great Britain and other governments and the problem remained until 1912.²

Wireless as applied to telegraphy in the early 1900's was basically a broadcasting system in that the messages were addressed to no one in particular and in that anyone who had the necessary apparatus, skill, ambition and interest could hear, provided of course that he was within the range of the transmitting station. By accident, Marconi discovered in 1902 that he could receive signals at night from distances far greater than he could during the day.³ About the same time the British scientist Oliver Heaviside and, in the U. S., A. E. Kennelly confirmed the existence of a reflecting layer of the ionosphere postulated in 1893 by Nicola Tesla.⁴ All this time radio communication depended upon long waves

¹Ibid., 39.

²John D. Tomlinson, The International Control of Radiocommunications (Ann Arbor: J. W. Edwards, 1945), 29-30.

³Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XIV, 870.

⁴Maclaurin, 59.

but in 1916 Marconi experimented with medium and short waves which method permitted the use of reflectors around the aerial, thus minimizing the interception of the transmitted signals. This was a very important development for the conduct of the war, and signalled the development of short wave "beam" radio communication.¹ Point-to-point radiotelegraphy was born.

The application of wireless to long distance telephony also began during World War I though the American inventor Reginald Fessenden first transmitted speech already in 1900.² The invention that was to revolutionize the wireless industry was the development of a three-element tube (triode) by Lee de Forest, patented in 1908.³

Eventually it was possible to transmit experimentally intelligible speech from U. S. to Paris and also to Hawaii (in 1915)⁴, but it was not until 1928 when a regular radiotelephonic service between two continents (Europe and South America) began.

¹Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XIV, 870.

²Maclaurin, 59.

³U. S. Patent No. 879532 (February 18, 1908). Reportedly it took de Forest three weeks to raise the fifteen dollars necessary for the patent application.

⁴Arno Huth, Radiodiffusion, Puissance Mondiale (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1937), 27.

Wireless transmission of voice in the form of broadcasting also began in the United States, for Marconi failed entirely to envisage this form of wireless. De Forest already before World War I made several attempts at public broadcasting, and David Sarnoff's vision of a "radio music box" was expressed as a suggestion in 1916 to the American Marconi. World War I delayed broadcasting development, but afterwards the phenomenal growth of broadcasting and its development from a hobby of many to the business of a relatively few spread across the ocean and within two years after the first U. S. commercial radio station began¹, the first license was granted to the newly formed (1922) British Broadcasting Company². Soon the development reached continental Europe: France in 1922³, and Belgium in 1923 (after early 1913 experiments)⁴. This aspect of wireless will be explored in the next chapter.

¹KDKA Pittsburg, Pa., 1920.

²The BBC was formed on October 18, 1922, registered on December 15, 1922, but its license from the Post Office was not issued until January 18, 1923. Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, I: The Birth of Broadcasting (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 123.

³Tomlinson, 51. After a 1908 demonstration from the Eiffel Tower by de Forest; Briggs, 29.

⁴Walter B. Emery, "Five European Broadcasting Systems," Journalism Monographs; No. 1 (August, 1966), 3.

Telegraphy, Telephony and the Wireless
in the Three Colonies

Land and Cable Telegraph

With the British Empire being the largest and also because of the heavy concentration of submarine cable communication in London, it is not surprising that it was England which first extended such communication to the African continent. After the 1879 laying of cables alongside the east coast of Africa from Aden¹, the British settlements on the west coast of the continent were since 1886 linked together from Bathurst in Gambia to Cape Town, and thus to Great Britain. More direct communication with England was achieved in 1901 when a cable originating in Cornwall and touching on Madeira, St. Vincent, Ascension and at St. Helena ended at Cape Town and provided a tributary line from Ascension to Sierra Leone.²

Internally, Nigeria was provided with her first telegraph line in 1895, and at the end of World War I

there [were] several thousand miles of telegraph wires, and the system [was] connected with the French Dahomey system.³

The first line between Lagos and Abeokuta

must have been constructed mainly for the use during

¹Brown, 11-12.,

²B. I. S., Commonwealth Telecommunications, 7.

³Statesman's Yearbook, 1921, 246.

the construction of the railway line between the two towns in that year.¹

As the railroad itself progressed, so did the telegraph line, and Ibadan was connected with Lagos in 1898. At least four other towns in the Northern part could communicate with Lagos since that year. Around this period also, telegraph communications had sprung up in the Eastern part of Nigeria.²

In French Equatorial Africa, telegraphy was first introduced in Gabon in 1898. Brazzaville was connected with Loango in 1901³ and thus with Libreville. The overall picture at the end of World War I was described as follows:

The Central African telegraph line connects Brazzaville with Loango, and is in communication with the English Atlantic Cable. . . .⁴

The date of the first telegraphic connection between France and French Equatorial Africa remains doubtful, though several sources place it at the end of the last century. Submarine cable connected the French possessions from Dakar to Libreville in Gabon⁵, but this was an English, not a French connection. The French Colonial

¹Letter from the Nigerian Postmaster-General, March 24, 1965.

²Ibid.

³Eugene Guernier, Afrique Equatoriale Francaise, VII, Encyclopédie de l'Union Française: L'Encyclopédie Coloniale et Maritime (Paris: Encyclopédie Coloniale et Maritime, 1950), 489.

⁴The Statesman's Yearbook, 1919, 862.

Encyclopaedia states that

. . . from the end of the last century, Gabon has been connected with the Metropole by a submarine cable which festoons all along the West African coast,¹

but does not deal with the question of cable ownership. By interconnection with the English cable system, direct communication was of course possible. Indeed the French possessions in Africa depended upon the British cable system, just as they had to depend upon it in Indo-China, and the Pacific.² The unilateral, but legally proper action of the British in 1899, to which reference has already been made³, resulted in extra efforts of other Powers to establish their own communication links. Girault, whose expertness in colonial matters is well known, specifically states that "no French cable [connecting the Metropole] touched West Africa . . . [at the end of the nineteenth century]." ⁴

The original English cable by the West African Telegraph Company was purchased by the French Government⁵

¹Guernier, 489-90.

²J. Charles-Roux, Les Colonies Françaises (Publication de la commission chargée de préparer la participation du Ministère des Colonies a l'Exposition Universelle de 1900) (Paris: Augustin Challamel, Librairie Maritime et Coloniale, 1901), 187-88.

³Supra, 137.

⁴Girault, Principes de Colonisation . . ., III, 499.

⁵Law of July 25, 1901.

in 1901, and soon after the construction of direct cable between Dakar and Brest was authorized.¹ Before the war, another direct cable was laid, landing at Casablanca, and the original cable was extended to Pointe-Noire in the Middle Congo.²

The Congo Independent State entered the telegraphic communication era at an early date. The first line was established between Boma and Matadi, two ports in the Congo estuary, in 1894,³ and an extension to Leopoldville provided just four years later. The start could have come even earlier, had King Leopold, and other powers as well, acted on a proposal by British colonists in South Africa for an overland telegraph between Cape Town and Cairo. The promoters of this "practical, natural, necessary and profitable" scheme

deemed their project to be of such vast importance to Africa and to Europe that they ventured to present their proposal before the International Conference invited by . . . the King of the Belgians to meet at Brussels, September 12, 1876.

The plan was presented but it never found its way into the minutes of the conference.⁴

Had the overland telegraph line been established across the vast territory of the newly established International African Association, quite conceivably an earlier development of an internal telegraph system would have followed.

¹Law of November 23, 1903. Cf. Girault, Principes de Colonisation . . ., III, 500-01.

²Ibid., 501.

³InforCongo, I, 234.

⁴Lois A. C. Raphael, The Cape-to-Cairo Dream: A Study in British Imperialism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), 54.

Wireless Telegraphy in
the Colonies

It is curious to observe that while the wireless had its origins of widespread use in England, it was France and Belgium which began to experiment with the application of wireless telegraphy for internal colonial communication. Belgian Congo, after an early start, had about ten wireless stations by 1912,¹ and at the end of World War I, a network of fifteen stations provided a completely interconnected radiotelegraphic system.

In the French territories of the Equatorial Africa, radiotelegraphic experiments were authorized in 1910, and

. . . in 1912, radiotelegraphic stations in Brazzaville and Loango-Pointe-Noire opened for general public correspondence.²

In the French Congo, all public activity with wireless transmissions ceased for the duration of the 1914-1918 war, but military stations which had been established in Chad, in 1919 passed into the hands of the telegraphic service of the Federation.³ The first

¹InforCongo, I, 234.

²Guernier, 489; Decree of May 15, 1910 authorized experimental transmission. Cf. International Colonial Institute, International Colonial Library, Yearbook of Compared Colonial Documentation (Brussels: International Colonial Institute, 1927-1938), 1932, II, 301. Henceforth referred to as I.C.I., Compared Colonial Documentation.

³Ibid.

recorded internal use of wireless telegraphy in Nigeria occurred in 1913.¹

Telephones

In Nigeria, the telephone system began in 1908 by the opening of a 200-line exchange in Lagos, followed by the opening of a 50-line board at Apobo in 1909. In 1919, there were 920 telephones in Nigeria with public telephone exchanges in 11 towns.²

Brazzaville's first exchange in 1910 was followed slowly by systems in other localities, but no public long-distance lines were available.³ In Belgian Congo, no firm date of introduction of telephones could be established, but by 1918 there were 179 instruments in operation.⁴

The National and Imperial Policies of Great Britain, France and Belgium on Telecommunications

National Policies

The needs and desires for international connections of telegraph lines and later of wireless were, similarly to the needs for imperial expansion, of three basic kinds, though often not easily distinguishable

¹Statesman's Yearbook, 1915, 239.

²Letter from the Nigerian Postmaster-General, March 24, 1965.

³Grenier, 490.

⁴Letter from the A. T. & T., November 13, 1964.

from each other. The commercial desires and needs were being promoted by inventors, innovators, and especially by entrepreneurs. The second need for expansion of telegraphy and wireless can, for the lack of a better term, be called "journalistic." The changes in the Press brought about by the use of telegraphy led in turn to the changes in the social and even economic situation. Thirdly, the military needs of national governments cannot be overlooked. These three kinds of needs very often functioned side-by-side, and it is sometimes very difficult, if not impossible, to determine where one need ended and another started. The journalistic and military needs for long-distance telegraphy were well illustrated by the events of 1854 and 1855, during the Crimean War.¹ All this is not intended to imply that no other factors were of import to the wide spread of the new communication means.² It is only suggested that these were the paramount factors, playing a crucial role in the extent and speed with which the means were employed.

Finally, it is important to remember that it is in the context of society, and specifically of government, that the needs and desires have to be examined. Just as

¹Cf. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), VI, 707-08; XVI, 445A,B; XIX, 681. Also, McLuhan, 222-23.

²Two early cases of apprehending criminals due to fast telegraphic communications are frequently cited. Cf. Briggs, 36; McLuhan, 217.

the political aims of imperial governments differed from each other, so did the needs for communication. Furthermore, even when the needs and desires were substantially the same, the reasons for them did differ, and the actions taken toward reaching and accomplishing them varied. It is, therefore, necessary, especially for understanding of the later developments of wireless in the form of broadcasting, to examine the role of the governments of the three powers, and their ways in which they went about influencing the developments of telegraphy, submarine cables and wireless.

Economic development experts distinguish between many functions of government which are relevant to the economy as a whole. Lewis specifically cites nine functional categories.¹ Of particular interest in this context seem to be the government functions of influencing attitudes, the use of resources and the level of investment, and the function of establishing and maintaining public services. The manner in which the three governments approached these functions was often well reflected in legislative measures.

Governmental support of telecommunications. -- The British Government supported those enterprises which established and assured control of the new media in British

¹W. Arthur Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955), 376-77.

hands. The submarine cable-lying and cable-operating companies in the second half of the nineteenth century were mostly British.

The British early assumed leadership in the laying of transatlantic cables, a leadership that they have never relinquished.¹

The British also actively supported the inventions and discoveries of their own nationals rather than allowing those of others to be legalized in England. By refusing to register Morse's telegraph patent, the British helped Wheatstone, Cooke, Bain, and others. Bell's invention was strongly supported by many distinguished scientists (Thomson, Preece) and even by Queen Victoria², but the instrument finally used in Great Britain (as well as in the United States) was that improved by successive British inventions of Hughes, Blake and Hunnings in the late 1870's.³ The fact that William Thomson, William Preece, J. Ambrose Fleming, Oliver Lodge and even Godfrey Isaac were eventually knighted for their contributions to the development of telegraphic and/or wireless communication also indicates somewhat the official British recognition of the domestic effort. In wireless, Marconi's interests received considerable support not only on the national level, but particularly in the international arena.

¹Herring and Gross, 19.

²Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XXI, 897.

³King, 329-330.

The previously mentioned Post Office opposition to the British Marconi stemmed from the official point-of-view of Marconi's Telegraph Company as a competitor of the Post Office and not from any desire to stifle the development of telegraphy, and in any case was soon changed into a cooperative effort. Altogether, the reasons for British leadership in cable and telegraphic communication were due to the above factors, as well as to the abundance of capital available in England, to the interest in the realization of importance to the conduct of their commercial and shipping enterprises, to the desire of bringing into contact all parts of the Empire, and not less importantly to the monopolistic position of England in the manufacture of cables based upon the exclusive availability of the insulating material, first the gutta-percha and then polyethylene.

Many of these supporting factors were found lacking in France¹ and in Belgium. The latter country controlled enough capital to help its sovereign overcome his financial difficulties in the Congo Independent State by loaning him 25 million francs in 1891 but the need for telegraphic or wireless communication with the African territory was not felt until Belgium formally assumed the responsibility for its development.

¹France, however, also bestowed civil decorations upon some individuals who distinguished themselves in communication and other fields, but used this means much more sparingly. Cf., E.B.U. Review (Part B), No. 84, 44.

In France, the conditions were different from both England and Belgium. In the first place, the French government was reluctant to exert influence in the field of telegraphic, telephonic and cable communications, and this reluctance drew often-expressed comments on communication dependence on British systems. After citing a dozen or so instances over the previous thirty years or so when the governments of France, Spain, Holland and Italy had been unable to communicate with some of their colonies and possessions because of the British telegraphic traffic having been given preference on the British-owned lines, a spokesman for an official French Government Commission asked in 1900

what had been the attitude of [the French] government to the question of escaping this dependence? It would be unfair to say that it had done nothing but it is here that the inferiority of [the French] political method appears when compared to that of the English. Instead of an energetic effort, constant and consistent, . . . we don't find but intermittant efforts, timid and without results.¹

A similar comment was made in 1930 by Girault², and implied in 1956 by Grenier³.

Secondly, one other aspect of the French policy deserving to be mentioned is that of the general economic policy of France. At the time of the telegraph and telephone development, the policies of France toward her colonies operated under the influence of the so-called

¹Charles-Roux, 194.

²Girault, Principes de Colonisation . . ., III, 502.

³Grenier, 213.

Pacte-Colonial¹, of which one premise stated that all transport was to be in French hands.² Similarly, the French also intended to retain control of communication means, though the small degree of determination on the part of the government to make it so prevented this from becoming a reality. In addition, the financial difficulties in the last quarter of the century, as a result of the Franco-German war, found France "on a downward curve of the economic cycle."³ While

the 20 years before 1873 had been a period of expansion and prosperity interrupted by short, sharp periods of crisis and slump, the 20 years after 1873 were a period of depression interrupted by short periods of sudden prosperity.⁴

Under such conditions, not much could have been invested in expansion of existing communication, in the development of the colonies, or put to the disposition of science and inventions.⁵ For that reason, the French scientific progress is the more remarkable. The 1870-1914 period produced in France not only writers and artists, but scientists and inventors:

¹A summary of that policy is contained in Journal Officiel, (Docts. parl., Sess. Ord., Senat), 1888, 54ff.

²Roberts, I, 40.

³Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), IX, 631.

⁴Ibid., 633.

⁵Troux et Girard, 504.

. . . the research of Edouard Branly permitted the invention of wireless; . . . [we] owe the cinematography to Marey and Louis Lumière; the rotary-press . . . to Marinoni; the principle of the telephone to [Charles] Bourseul.¹

Private versus state ownership. --The beginnings of telegraphy were everywhere associated with private ownership. As the importance of telegraphy became to be recognized and as the telegraph lines in existence needed to be linked into national telegraph system, most governments began to consider owning and operating the lines themselves, and having them maintained and operated by public corporations as public service (utility).

It was quite natural that the postal systems, themselves originally private but by then already developed as public utilities, were asked to assume the responsibility for the new means through which to move information. Most often, the governmental entry into telegraphy was done in competition with the already existing private operations, but this fairly soon changed as the service became recognized as requiring centralization, and eventually the establishing of governmental monopoly.

An early, but contrary to the popular belief not the first, legislation to that effect took place in England with the Telegraph Act of 1869. The extent of monopoly granted the Postmaster-General was, however, limited in

¹Ibid. Branly, developed "coherers," the tube-like containers carrying loose particles responding to the currents set off by the Hertzian waves. Briggs, I, 26-27.

this act to internal telegraph communication, specifically excluding telegraph communication to and from foreign places from the application of the legislation.¹

The French also added the telegraph service to the functions of their postal administration. The first legislation of telegraphy there, and perhaps anywhere, took the form of a law in 1837.² This law is often cited as establishing government monopoly in telegraphy, though at least one source asserted soberly that the appointment of Claude Chappe as the State telegraph engineer had accomplished that already in 1793.³ Chappe, as will be recalled,⁴ developed the semaphor telegraph, or as the French called it, télégraph aérien optique.⁵

The French legislation on this matter is interesting for at least three reasons: it is the first legislation establishing the principle of state monopoly, and -- perhaps even more important -- its wording permitted later communication means to be covered by its scope.

¹Telegraph Act of 1869, Sec. 12; cf., Brown, 115-20.

²Law of May 6, 1837. Cf., Grand Larousse Encyclopédique (Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1960-1964), VIII, 995; John Lee, Economics of Telegraphs and Telephones (London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, 1913), 2.

³Nouveau Larousse Illustré (Paris: Librairie Larousse, n.d.), VII, 948.

⁴Supra, 148.

⁵La Grande Encyclopédie (Paris: Société Anonyme de la Grande Encyclopédie, n.d.), XXX, 1035.

The law of May 2, 1837 punishes by imprisonment for the period of from one month up to one year, and by a fine of from 1,000 to 10,000 francs, anyone who transmits, without authorization, signals from one place to another, whether through the devices of telegraphic machines or through whatever other means,
¹

Though this act pertained to non-electric telegraph, the foresight of including other means of signalling made this legislation unique.

Later, the decree-law of December 27, 1851 reiterated this principle and applied it to electric telegraph while also reemphasizing the prescribed penalties for non-obeyance of the law.² First administered by the War Ministry, then by the Ministry of the Interior, later by Public Works and then again by the Interior Ministry,³ telegraphy in France was incorporated into the Administration Générale des Postes et Messageries in 1877. The telephone service which was added to the postal authorities in 1881 continued for a while to exist alongside a private company (Société Générale des Telephones), but that enterprise was absorbed into one state service in 1889. That year also, a special administration of Postes, Telegraphs and Telephones was created, formalizing the use of the well-known combination of the three letters (P.T.T.).

¹Ibid., 1032.

²Ibid. Cf., Fernand Terrou and Lucien Solal, Legislation for Press, Film and Radio ("Press, Film, Radio in the World Today;" Paris: UNESCO, 1951), 180.

³Nouveau Larousse Illustré, VII, 948.

A separate ministry (Ministère des P.T.T.) appeared in 1925.¹

The third interesting point about the early French legislation of telegraphy stems from the fact that not until 1850 were private citizens allowed to use the service.

[On] the 20th of November, 1850, . . . a law was made permitting private persons to send dispatches over the wires (the State hitherto was the only party using it) after rigorous investigation of their identity.²

Somewhat different development occurred in Belgium, where the telegraph service became subject to governmental monopoly in 1850, after a private British Company operated between Brussels and Antwerp since 1846.³ The Belgians put the telegraph service under the administration of the Department of Public Works, as one of the eight bureaus of the general direction of railways, posts and telegraphs.⁴ In 1873, the responsibility for the telegraph service transferred to postal authorities, where it formed a separate branch (Régie des Telegraphs).

¹Marcel Martin (ed.), Les Institutions Politiques de la France ("Le Monde Contemporain;" Paris: La Documentation Française, 1961), II, 436.

²W. Lodian, "Century of the Telegraph in France," Popular Science Monthly (New York: D. Appleton & Co.), April, 1894, 797. Cf., Donald E. Smith (ed.), The New Larned History for Ready Reference, Reading and Research (4th rev.ed.; Springfield Mass.: C. A. Nichols Co., 1922-1924), X, 8230.

³Encyclopaedia Britannica, 9th ed., (1878), III, 525.

⁴Smith, X, 8232.

The telephone service was added to that of the telegraph in 1893-1896.¹

Telephony in England has a somewhat different history. While in 1880

the British courts held that the telephone system was legally a telegraph system under an antecedent [1869] law which made the telegraph a government monopoly under the Postmaster-General,²

the Post Office officials, unwilling to risk involvement in the new medium, preferred to issue licenses to private companies. Only when the potential of telephone began to be realized did the government take over first the long-distance lines (1896) and in 1912 all private telephone properties.

Legal bases of wireless. -- The wireless activity in England was such that a definite need arose for setting a legal framework within which wireless transmission and reception would be governed. Though a number of countries participated in an international conference which was called for the purpose of drafting international regulation³, the legislation of wireless was pioneered

¹Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), XXI, 898. The 1893 date is from H. L. Webb, Development of the Telephone in Europe (n.n., n.d.), 60.

²Ibid., 896.

³This was the first Berlin Conference of 1903. Tomlinson suggested that the conference was called "more in view of the imminent stranglehold of the Marconi interest in wireless communication" than because of an actual need for regulation. Tomlinson, 13.

by Great Britain which in 1904 passed the Wireless Telegraphy Act, formally called an "act to provide for the regulation of Wireless Telegraphy."¹ This act established the wireless to be an extension of telegraphy (and telephony), and as such radio communication fell under the established government monopolies of 1869 and 1880. Licensing was prescribed, and though the act spoke of transmitting only, the Post Office interpreted this as also including receiving apparatus. That interpretation was formally and informally challenged by individuals, business, the Press and even the Parliament.²

In a manner similar to the Telegraph Act of 1869, the wireless legislation accepted the principle that communication with other parts of the Empire was to be in the hands of the Post Office,

and while private companies were to be free to establish communication with foreign countries outside Europe, . . . communication with the Continent [was] to be shared between private companies and the Post Office.³

This principle also applied in France and Belgium, and explains why British Marconi's subsidiary companies could be established and after 1904 maintained abroad. Marconi's subsidiary in Belgium was the Société Anonyme Internationale de Télégraphie sans Fil, established in 1901;⁴ a French subsidiary was founded in 1903,⁵ and ten

¹Ibid., 20.

²Briggs, I, 95, 159, 193.

³Brown, 121.

⁴Jome, 32,34. ⁵Maclaurin, 43.

years later absorbed the private Compagnie Universelle de Télégraphie et Téléphonie sans Fil.¹

The provisions of the English original act were amplified by another act in 1925, known as the Wireless Telegraphy (Explanation) Act, but only after a much more comprehensive bill had been withdrawn from consideration by the House of Commons because of very strong objections to it.² The items which this 1925 (Short) Act explained pertained to the applicability of the 1904 Act to receiving apparatus, and to telephony, and therefore directly to broadcasting. These two Acts, however unsatisfactory they did appear to various sectors of the public, served well until another comprehensive Act was passed in 1949.³ This was later complemented by two specialized Acts, in 1954 (Validation of Charges) and 1955 (Blind Persons).

The pioneering in telegraph regulation in France was not duplicated in matters of wireless. Though technically covered already by the 1837 law, it took France almost twenty years longer than England to specify a legal base upon which radio communications were to develop. The 1923 law confirmed the established principle of radio

¹Jome, 33.

²Briggs, I, 193-94.

³Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Sound and Television Broadcasting in Britain (London: B. I. S., Central Office of Information, 1963), 35. Henceforth referred to as C. O. I., Sound and Television Broadcasting in Britain. Also, Terrou and Solal, 158.

to be an extension of telegraphy and telephony, by stating that

the provisions of the decree of December 27, 1851, regarding the monopoly and control of telegraph lines were applicable to the transmission and reception of radio-electric signals of every kind.¹

The additional time which it took the French to pass the legislation apparently served well as this law clearly spoke of transmission and reception and of its origin in both telegraphic and telephonic communication regulation.²

Belgium also set up its international telegraph system as a public enterprise earlier than Britain, when it began regulating that service in 1850.³ The Belgian Wireless Telegraphy Act⁴ followed by two years the 1906 Radio-Telegraphy Convention which culminated the second Berlin Conference on Radio-Telegraphy.

In summary, two aspects of telegraph and wireless communication need to be pointed out: (1) National systems, i.e., the establishment of internal lines of communication by wire or wireless in a coordinated and connected monopoly system, did not always coincide with the legislative (regulatory) measures that established governmental control; and (2) Governmental control did not

¹Law of June 30, 1923, Art. 85; quoted in Terrou and Solal, 180.

²Grand Larousse Encyclopédique, VIII, 995.

³Francis Williams, Transmitting World News (Paris: UNESCO, 1953), 20.

⁴Emery, Journalism Monographs, No. 1, 3.

necessarily imply governmental ownership and/or operation. If put in a form of a table, different emphases at different times of the three powers will be immediately recognized (Table 2).

TABLE 2.--Dates of legislative measures and of beginnings of national systems in telegraphy, telephony and wireless

Country	National Monopolistic System of Communication		First Legislation		
	Telegraphy	Telephony	Telegraphy	Telephony	Wireless
France	1879	1883-1889	1837	1851 ^a	1923 ^a
Belgium	1850	1893-1896	1850	1850	1908
Gt. Britain	1869	1896-1912	1869	1880 ^b	1904

^aTechnically, the 1837 law applied also to telephony and wireless.

^bA court ruling in 1880 declared that telephony was an extension of telegraphy and as such was covered by the 1869 law.

Imperial Systems of Telegraph and Wireless Communication

It has been pointed out in the previous chapter that the communication needs of all empires required constant improvement of communication lines. On the other hand, new technological development indicated to the empires the potential speed-up of communication, and various empires took advantage of such developments, though not at the same time or to the same extent. In communication

matters, the imperial policies of the empires have quite naturally always been influenced not only by technological, but also by economic, political and strategical considerations.

England, in the first half of the nineteenth century the strongest and the most extended Empire in the world, realized early in the era of the telegraph that there was a medium extremely well suitable for connecting the Empire with the mother country. From the first, the British thought of submarine cables for that purpose, and naturally, when wireless communication became a reality, Marconi himself prepared a plan to that effect.

His company in March 1910 submitted to the Colonial Office a detailed plan for linking, by means of a network of wireless stations, the whole British Empire. As the British Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1904 required licensing of wireless stations, the company's plan was actually a request for licenses, and for support in obtaining licenses from the governments of the self-governing colonies. The company was prepared to erect, maintain, and operate the stations entirely at its own expense. Altogether eighteen stations were proposed to be located in Egypt, India, Malaya, China, Australia, and Africa. A standing committee of the House of Commons reported favorably on this plan, but disagreed with the suggestion that the Marconi Company should own and operate the stations. Instead, a state owned system was recommended,

to be erected by the British Marconi. The same year the Imperial Conference endorsed the plan and a committee headed by the Postmaster-General was formed to begin negotiations. On March 7, 1912, a tender (a formal statement of the clauses which were to be embodied later in a legal contract) was signed, providing for the erection of the first six stations (one each in England, Egypt, East and South Africa, India, and Singapore).

The tender was widely publicised but was opposed by the Press. Many believed that the tender was actually a contract and that the provisions were too generous to the Marconi Company (ten per cent of the gross receipts). But even more important reasons for the opposition were the growing rumors which surrounded the tender. The announcement of the tender resulted in an extraordinary boom in Marconi shares. Charges that the market had been rigged were raised by many who had failed to get in on the rise and by those who lost money in the fall which followed. In the House of Commons, accusations of grave corruption were raised against the Postmaster-General who headed the government side in the negotiations against Godfrey Charles Isaacs, Managing Director of the Marconi Company, and his brother Sir Rufus Isaacs, who, as Attorney General, was to approve the contract. In spite of all this, the actual contract was signed on July 7, 1912.¹

¹Frances Donaldson, The Marconi Scandal (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962), 20.

The government was forced to investigate, and so a Parliamentary Committee was appointed to conduct an inquiry. The charges were found to be unsubstantiated, all three officials exonerated and the carrying out of the agreement recommended.¹ A new contract was signed in July, 1913, but the work on the stations barely started when World War I began. In August of 1914 the contract for the Imperial Chain was cancelled.²

After the World War I. --The agitation, on the part of England and France, for eventual redistribution of German submarine cables was stepped up just prior to the end of hostilities, and increased even further before and during the Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919. In spite of the U. S. efforts, the British and French plans to appropriate the cables won in the Conference, though the U. S. Government succeeded in eliminating these provisions from the Treaty of Versailles itself. Instead, the distribution was handled by an International Conference of Communications in Washington in 1920.³

The cable known as the German South Atlantic system, running to Casablanca, Dakar and Monrovia went

¹Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons) XLI, 893-926.

²A compensation of 590,000 British pounds was given the Marconi Company in 1919. Jome, 39.

³Tomlinson, 48. Cf. O.W. Riegel, Mobilizing for Chaos (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), 32-33.

to France, while all other ex-German cables in the Atlantic went to Great Britain.¹ In the Far East, through later negotiations, the German cables were divided between the U. S., Japan, and the Netherlands.²

The cables continued to play an important role, the development of radio (wireless) communication notwithstanding. The main innovation in the period between the two World Wars was the installation of regenerative repeaters after their introduction in 1924.³ Installed at terminal and intermediate stations, the repeaters resulted in a considerably accelerated service; an impulse could be transmitted over the line London-Bombay, for example, in a fraction of a second, while in 1870, the first cable on that route required almost four-and-a-half minutes to transmit and acknowledge a brief message.⁴

But the inability of the existing cables to handle the required volume of traffic, together with the realization that cables could very easily be cut during a conflict, gave a new urgency to the attempts to seek new, alternate systems of communication. Wireless provided this alternative service. Great Britain returned to the Marconi proposal of 1910.

¹Brown, 4.

²Ibid.

³B. I. S., Commonwealth Telecommunications, 14.

⁴Ibid.

A high-power long-wave transmitter capable of communicating with all the Dominions and other parts of the British Empire opened at Rugby in January, 1926 with power of 500 kw. Similar stations were built in South Africa and Australia.¹

France had similar plans for its Empire communications. An intercolonial network (the so called Plan Ferrie) included a station in Brazzaville and begun, in 1920, with Paris to Brazzaville service; traffic in the opposite direction was inaugurated in 1927.

It works with an arc set; steam engines of imposing dimensions form its source of energy; and its only correspondent is Paris, with transit at Bamako [French West Africa].²

The French plans, and early accomplishments, apparently had the British worried. A report of the Imperial Wireless Telegraphy Committee was quoted thus:

The French Government has a State wireless service which embraces all the French colonies. [The] particulars . . . show how seriously France regarded her colonial obligations. This colonial service reaches such far-distant places as Indo-China, the West Indies and French Guiana. Reunion and Madagascar. It is particularly complete in Northern and Equatorial Africa. . . .³

The Brussels-Leopoldville wireless service was envisaged at the time of the 1912 Radiotelegraphic Conference in London; it was the proposal of Belgian Congo to include long distance service between fixed (rather

¹Ibid.

²Guernier, 490.

³The Times (London), March 1, 1924, 9:3.

than just mobile) stations which was considered indicative of the plans of the Belgian Congolese administration.¹

While the long-wave, long-distance radio communications were being installed, the advantages of low cost and reliability provided by short-wave "beam" system of transmission were being proven. From 1927, Great Britain began developing, together with other Commonwealth governments, a separate "beam" system with stations in England, Canada, South Africa, India and Australia. This, also, was an idea of the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company. This radio-telephony system was complete by 1930 with more than 100,000 circuit miles of channels in operation.² Inasmuch as both long-wave and "beam" network included the African continent, Nigeria had full access to this system via its land and cable lines connecting it with Cape Town.

France also added the newer shortwave network to its imperial communications, and in 1932, Brazzaville station was capable of operating with both methods. The "beam" system, furthermore, provided the French Equatorial Africa with more contact points. Besides Paris, Brazzaville was now in communication with Bamako, Dakar, Tananarive and Djibouti. In 1938 the station in Brazzaville was modernized.

¹Documents de Conférence Radiotélégraphique Internationale de Londres, 1912 (London: n.n., 1912), 8.

²B. I. S., Commonwealth Telecommunications, 14.

During World War II and Afterwards. --The competition between the beam wireless and the cable services, of course, was inevitable, and arose immediately in the 1920's and continued into the 1930's. The competition developed from the discrepancies in speed and rates, but as time went on, these problems were fairly successfully solved by both services in all countries. When the war broke out, however, the terrific demand resulted in a great increase of traffic, especially as access to some radio and cable routes were interrupted by the changes in territorial status of countries or their parts in Europe and elsewhere. Britain dealt with the situation immediately and decided to establish further direct radio telegraph and telephone circuits even though this happened to be contrary to the existing policy of the governments of the Empire as stated in 1928.¹ After World War II, the Commonwealth governments decided on some fundamental changes in the structure of and control over the communications systems. A Commonwealth Telecommunications Board brought together the national bodies in charge of Telecommunications in various Commonwealth as well as non-self-governing countries, and Nigerian External Services Ltd., a public corporation, adhered to the 1948 agreement and became a member.²

¹B. I. S., Commonwealth Telecommunications, 17.

²Ibid., 18.

But the development of cables continued alongside new routes of radio communication, though no new cable was laid between the mother country and its African territory by either of the three powers. The distinct emphasis existed upon radio communication, and special plans in all three territories devoted considerable attention and funds to such development. The British Colonial and Development Welfare Acts supplemented the Nigerian development plan which started in 1951.¹ France had its own ten-year plan of Equipment and of Economic and Social Development (Plan Pleven), but changed it to several four-year plans.²

Belgian Congo's ten-year plan of development³ also intended to help in this area. In terminologies, the three plans differed widely and no specific comparison can be made, but if "infrastructure" or social overhead capital is accepted, and this includes means of communications, it is evident that in all three territories, this rubrique received greater emphasis in terms of funds allocated. For the Middle Congo, 59.9 per cent of all funds were reserved for the development of infrastructure; 40.3 per cent in Belgian Congo; and 33.54 per cent in Nigeria.

¹B. I. S., Economic Development in the U. K. Dependencies, 9.

²Economic Bulletin for Africa, II, No. 2, 1962, 30-31.

³InforCongo, I, 371; II, 127-29.

The problem with long-distance communications to and from the colonial territories could not be said, however, to be only financial. At mid-century, the limitations of radio became apparent when during the winter months of 1950-1951 severe ionospheric storms caused bad reception:

. . . radio propagation conditions at times became very bad and many radio circuits were adversely affected. The poor radio conditions necessitated the transfer of some radio traffic to the cable system.¹

The situation, as well as the overcrowded conditions of the frequency spectrum, led to a Commonwealth decision in 1958² to establish round-the-world system of large-capacity cables; in this system, the South Atlantic Ocean link of Britain with West and South Africa was to be regarded as the first part, ready for completion in 1963.

The French Equatorial Africa and Belgian Congo continued with the building up of their radio communication system. Apparently unaffected by the ionospheric storms (these were particularly disruptive to communications to Australia and New Zealand)², Brazzaville intended to maintain radio contact with other parts of Africa, as well as to serve the center point of radio communication between the capitals of the neighboring countries

¹B. I. S., Commonwealth Telecommunications, 21.

²Ibid., 22.

³Ibid., 21.

and Paris.¹

Leopoldville in Belgian Congo became the pivot of a network that reached every part of its own territory and which connected various points and other African countries as well as other continents. All 180 state-owned and about 100 private radio stations participated in a network by 1960.²

¹France, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, The Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville): The Hour of Independence (New York: Ambassade de France, 1961), 24.

²InforCongo, I, 234.

CHAPTER V

RADIO BROADCASTING IN AND FOR THE COLONIES

Each of the three major powers approached the establishing of broadcasting service in their respective colonial territories differently. In order to understand why this was so, a description of how the development of their own broadcasting had been handled is perhaps the most revealing approach. Even though the service was considered by all three to require monopolistic status vested in the State, each government took a different route to arrive at such a status.

Besides the organization of domestic broadcasting, other facts played important roles in determining when, to what extent, and in what form broadcasting should be undertaken in each of the three colonies. One of these factors, playing a dominant role in every case, was the broadcasting service directed to the colonies from the capitals of the metropolitan countries. A section of this chapter is, accordingly, devoted to a review of this activity on the part of the British, the Belgians, and the French.

Lastly, the description of the broadcasting operations in the colonial possessions is provided. That section actually is a brief historical narrative outlining the highlights of achievements as well as tracing some of the most pronounced problems. It is, by design, a restricted description, as some of the activities, and the policies from which they stemmed, are to be subject to an analysis and comparison in the following part of this writing. Nevertheless, this particular section, and the whole chapter as well, provides a well-documented overview of the main forces which contributed to a particular pattern which colonial broadcasting assumed, and which affected the method, speed, and extensiveness with which the three broadcasting services were developed in the African territories.

In each of the three sections of this chapter, the events are described primarily in their chronological order. While England, among the three powers, appears to have bid first on the domestic broadcasting service, in case of broadcasting to the colonies was forced to observe the French initiative (as well as that of one other colonial Power not subject to this study). In order to emphasize such facts, yet without attaching to them unnecessarily too much importance, a chronological, rather than an alphabetical or any other, order has been employed in the organization of this chapter.

Domestic Broadcasting Services
of the Three Powers

England

When broadcasting began in England in the early 1920's, it was primarily an experimental and private enterprise. And yet, the government already had legal power to regulate the new service. The Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1904, in its statement that

every . . . license shall be in such form and for such a period as the Postmaster-General may determine, and shall contain the terms, conditions, and restrictions on, and subject to which the license is granted,¹

clearly indicated it would be in the power of the Postmaster-General to decide, on May 4, 1922² that only a limited number of the broadcasting (or "radio-telephone broadcasting," as the description read) stations would be allowed from then on. Eventually, his decisions, backed by Parliament³, resulted in the issuance of only one, collective license for that purpose.

The British Broadcasting Company. --The license was to be issued to the British Broadcasting Company, an enterprise combining the broadcasting interests of a number of radio (wireless) apparatus manufacturers, which

¹Briggs, I, 95.

²Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CLIII (1922), 1600.

³C. O. I., Sound and Television Broadcasting in Britain, 2.

was established towards the end of 1922. The broadcasting license, dated January 18, 1923¹, assured the British Broadcasting Company of a monopoly for a period of two years.

Due to a number of friction points that developed almost immediately between the company and the Post Office, an official committee of inquiry considered alternatives for broadcasting in the United Kingdom. This committee (known by the name of its Chairman, Major-General Sir Frederick Sykes, M.P.) endorsed the principle of the State regulating broadcasting, but recommended that the State should not itself operate broadcasting stations.² It suggested extending the existing system by the establishment of a number of local or relay stations in order to reach wider audiences. The company's license was renewed for another two years.

Some of the old problems continued, and so a new committee, under the chairmanship of the Earl of Crawford and Belcarres, was appointed to make recommendations for the constitution of a national broadcasting service. Very much like its predecessor, the Crawford Committee did not

¹By coincidence, another Chamberlain signed the license as Postmaster-General; Arthur Neville Chamberlain was a younger son of Joseph Chamberlain, and half-brother of Austin Chamberlain.

²Great Britain, Broadcasting Committee Report [The Sykes Committee Report] (Cmd. 1951), 1923.

endorse the idea of State operated service, but in addition it also did not favor the existing arrangement of a company operating for profit. The committee's recommendation was for a public corporation, a permanent body operating under a Royal Charter, and acting as a trustee for the national interest.¹ Although a few members of Parliament and some newspapers were against these recommendations, the majority of the House membership was satisfied with the report, as was the Postmaster-General who announced to the House in July 1926 that the government accepted the recommendations.²

Without much debate, the government's plan was agreed on. In January, 1927, the company's assets, staff and equipment were taken over by a new public corporation, the British Broadcasting Corporation. The company's managing director, J. C. W. Reith, was appointed Director-General. The public service character of broadcasting which he helped mold was thus transferred to the new BBC.

The British Broadcasting Corporation. --In theory, the government had by virtue of the **Royal** Charter of 1927 and the License and Agreement between the Postmaster-General and the BBC, full powers over the corporation and over broadcasting. The governors of the corporation

¹Great Britain, Report of the Broadcasting Committee [The Crowford Committee] (Cmd. 2599), 1925.

²Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CIIC (1926), 448.

could be removed and replaced, and the license could be revoked

. . . if, at any time, the corporation, in the opinion of the Postmaster-General, failed in its duties.¹

Furthermore, any department of the government could require the BBC to broadcast any matter or announcement as the department desired. Under such conditions, it could have been expected that the BBC would have developed into another government department.

In practice, this did not happen, partially because the successive governments, with consent of Parliament, agreed to grant the corporation absolute independence, and respect it and to consider the inherent power to remain in reserve, and partially because of the ability of various Directors-General of the Corporation to maintain its political independence, to continue its freedom from commercial pressures, and to establish, and at least maintain if not upgrade, the standards of integrity, efficiency and quality of its service.²

¹C. O. I., Sound and Television Broadcasting in Britain, 3.

²Most writers agree that the personality of J. C. W. Reith had been responsible for the BBC's independence, and its maintenance for the first eleven years. Reith who had previously served for four years as the Managing Director of the British Broadcasting Company, was later knighted for his services to British broadcasting.

But Parliament, of course, reserved for itself the ultimate power. Through the government and its Postmaster-General, Parliament has the last word on what may and what must not be broadcast.¹ The original clause (4) of the License and Agreement of 1927 has been incorporated into every new license. This clause only established the power; the restrictions on program content were always set up by special memoranda.

Broadcasting in the United Kingdom continued to grow while it continued to be revised periodically. In 1935, Viscount Ullswater headed a committee looking into the internal working of the BBC. Lord Beveridge chaired another committee in 1951, and in 1960, the future of all broadcasting services were considered by the Pilkington Committee. On each occasion the BBC's license was renewed. Until 1960, the BBC operated under four Charters, the third and fourth with additional extensions until the next one could be decided on.

Throughout this period, technical improvements were made, alongside with extension of domestic services. From the National and Regional Services developed three major program services, with both distinct and overlapping

¹For a while (until 1928) broadcasting of controversial items were prohibited. Since 1927, no editorializing is allowed, and since 1955, no discussions are allowed for two weeks before, and during, their debate in Parliament. BBC, BBC Handbook, 1964 (London:BBC, 1963), 133-34. Cf. Maurice Gorham, Broadcasting and Television since 1900 (London: Andrew Dakers Ltd., 1952), 81.

components. Number of licenses grew steadily, from two million at the end of the British Broadcasting Company's era in 1926, to almost nine million at the beginning and 9,700,000 at the end of World War II. After the 1954 introduction of the second TV service the number of "sound only" licenses declined to barely four-and-a-half million.¹ Broadcasting to other parts of the Empire, and later to foreign countries as well, developed, beginning in 1932 and growing in scope and importance especially during the years of World War II.

But the independence and basic structure of the British Broadcasting Corporation did not change, except in the area of television, in which the monopoly of the BBC was not maintained.² What the Sykes, and later the Crawford Committees envisaged has proven to be a functional design of organization, fully acceptable to the government and the majority of the people. Although the BBC has served, over the years, as a model for other national broadcasting organizations, it had never been fully duplicated anywhere. The BBC represents a unique broadcasting organization.

Financing of domestic broadcasting service in Britain has since 1922 been done out of the revenue from

¹BBC, Handbook, 1964, 186.

²Television Act, 1954 established the Independent Television Authority and charged it with the task of providing television broadcasting services additional to those of the BBC.

the issue of broadcast receiving licenses. Commonwealth and foreign broadcasting services are funded by the British Government by Grants-in-Aid.¹

As far as the technical facilities are concerned, the number of radio broadcasting stations in Great Britain has grown substantially. From three stations on November 15, 1922², to nine in 1933³, thirteen in 1937⁴, and forty-eights in 1950⁵, the United Kingdom possessed 256 radio stations in 1960, of which 160 were frequency-modulated.⁶ In just eight years since the Stockholm Conference has assigned 190 FM frequencies to Great Britain⁷, the country operated on 84 per cent of them.

France

Broadcasting under the postal authorities. -- First broadcast in France took place, on a coordinated level, in

¹BBC, Handbook, 1964, 128.

²Gorham, 30.

³"Rundfunk," Der Grosse Brockhaus (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1935), XVI, 209. Henceforth referred to as Brockhaus, 1935.

⁴"Rundfunk," Der Grosse Brockhaus (Wiesbaden: F. A. Brockhaus, 1956), XX, 153. Henceforth referred to as Brockhaus, 1956.

⁵UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio ("Reports on the Facilities of Mass Communication;" Paris: UNESCO, 1948-1951), IV, 572-73.

⁶UNESCO, World Communications: Press, Radio, Television, Film (Paris: UNESCO, 1964), 335-37. Henceforth referred to as UNESCO, World Communications, 1964.

⁷European Broadcasting Conference, Stockholm, 1952, Agreement, Plans, Final Protocol and Recommendation (Geneva: International Telecommunication Union, 1952), 29-70.

1922¹, when the administration of P. T. T. set up a transmitter atop the Eiffel Tower. In 1923, the activities were given a firm legal base by the law of June 30, at which time the concept of privately operated stations were disallowed.² State monopoly of transmission and reception of radio-electric signals was reaffirmed by this act, based upon the law of telegraphy of 1837 and 1851.³

The disallowance was theoretical, though, for . . . from 1923 to 1941, there was a mixed system, involving on the one hand State radio stations run by the Postal and Telegraph Service, and on other hand various private stations run by private commercial companies which were at first granted authorization and then concessions. . . .⁴

Three legislative measures⁵ assured such arrangement during those years, but the most significant was the Decree of December 28, 1926 which created a "Broadcasting Service" within the Postal and Telegraphic Administration.⁶

Originally administered on a decentralized base, the French Broadcasting Service was slowly becoming a centralized operation in the early 1930's. In 1934, the

¹George A. Coddington, Jr., Broadcasting without Barriers (Paris: UNESCO, 1959), 18.

²Terrou and Solal, 180.

³Grand Larousse Encyclopédique, VIII, 995.

⁴Terrou and Solal, 180.

⁵Decree of November 23, 1923; Decree of December 28, 1926; Law of March 19, 1928.

⁶Grand Larousse Encyclopédique, VIII, 995.

transmitter atop the Eiffel Tower ceased broadcasting and was to be used for experimental purposes only. That same year, two governmental decrees were issued and the Minister of P. T. T., Mallarmé, announced the increase of State control over broadcasting with the purpose of providing for a greater coordination of the activities. A central Broadcasting Office was then set up, with technical, financial, musical, and information departments. The central office was to be administered by a broadcasting council composed of thirty members, and each station by a managing committee on which representatives of the listeners were to be included. The Minister, however, retained the power of veto.¹

The Broadcasting Council was nominated in April 19, 1935, and consisted of five committees: one for literary and artistic matters, one for administrative affairs, and the remaining three representing the listeners, public interests, and the Ministry of Finance, respectively.²

Reception in France was not legislated on until 1933, at which time licensing fees on receiver sets were established.³ In 1936, a law⁴ stated that further private

¹Keesing's Contemporary Archives (Weekly Diary of World Events; London: Keesing's Publications Limited, Annual), II (1934-1937), 1404K.

²Ibid., 1604A.

³Grand Larousse Encyclopédique, VIII, 995.

⁴Law of March 20, 1936.

broadcasting stations could be established only by special legislation. When private ownership was discontinued in 1941¹, twelve private stations were absorbed by the state system which consisted at that time of twenty stations.²

On December 18, 1938, a decree gave the Prime Minister a complete control over all news broadcast in France, whether transmitted from private or government-owned stations. This control was exercised by Chief Broadcast Control Officer who had been previously appointed and who came under the authority of the Secretary General of the Prime-Minister's Office. Besides news, this office exercised complete control over all talk programs dealing with internal and foreign affairs and with economic and social questions.³

Broadcasting as an autonomous service. -- In 1939, broadcasting was separated from the postal services and transformed into an autonomous administration. A national broadcasting service, La Radiodiffusion Française, created by the Law-Decree of July 29, 1939⁴, was placed under the authority of the French Premier. Television service was already then enumerated among its chief responsibilities;

¹Law of October 1, 1941 (supplemented on November 7, 1942).

²Terrou and Solal, 180.

³Keesing's Contemporary Archives, III (1937-1940), 33731E.

⁴Coddington, 40.

the service also had to oversee the operation of privately owned stations, and carry on the news service of the newly established information branch of the government.¹

The 1941 and 1942 measures reaffirmed the basic organizational structure of the service. The former Director-General became the General Administrator (after World War II, his title again became Director-General), his appointment being made by a decree, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, to whom he was responsible. From 1942², the Prime Minister was for this purpose represented by the Minister in Charge of Information.³

The Chief Administrator was to be assisted by a Higher Council (Conseil Supérieur des Emissions) composed of four appointed members and by a Program Council of sixteen members, all appointed by the Prime Minister. Four specialized committees, one each for music, literature and drama, science, and light entertainment, were also set up. The original role of the Higher Council was

[to be] responsible for the general organization and the working of the broadcasting service as a whole; [to be] consulted on all questions relating to the general organization of the services, the trend and arrangement of the broadcasts, budget proposals, accounts, etc. . . . [and to] supervise the work, programmes and all requisitions and sales.⁴

Private broadcasting stations existed side by side with

¹Terrou and Solal, 180-81.

²Law of November 7, 1942. ³Terrou and Solal, 182.

⁴Ibid., 181. Cf. Brockhaus, 1956, X, 152.

government-owned facilities, but their further development was curtailed when in 1936 a law was passed stating that further private radio facilities could be authorized only by an enactment of a special law.¹ Just before the War, twelve radio stations out of the total of thirty-two, were privately owned, and "were not subject to any strict regulations."² It was not until 1945, that the private stations were abolished by the Law of March 23 which decreed the withdrawal of all existing authorizations of private radio operations.³

The same law also changed the name of Radiodiffusion Française (RDF) to Radiodiffusion et Télévision Française, and made the organization an Administration Spécialisée, a government agency with a budget accessory to the state budget.⁴ Otherwise, the operation of the "new" RTF was not changed. During the succeeding years, though, the role of the Higher Council (of Broadcasting) has diminished considerably in stature, and its "functions have been appreciably curtailed."⁵

The criticisms of the French broadcasting administration have been frequent. In 1959 it was said that

¹Terrou and Solal, 180.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., 181. Cf. Coddington, 40.

⁴Coddington, 40.

⁵Ibid. Cf. Grand Larousse Encyclopédique, VIII, 995.

although the legal framework would appear to offer possibilities for almost unlimited governmental control, such control as exists has usually been exercised discreetly. However, it cannot be denied that broadcasting tends to be regarded rather as the handmaiden of the government. . . .¹

In a study of French public administration, an observation was made that

the control of broadcasting has been one of the thorny problems of both the Fourth and the Fifth Republics. Although Radiodiffusion-Television-Francaise is a public corporation, it comes under the direct control of the government and the government intervenes actively in its programmes and in the employment of its staff. Broadcasting has been used by the government for political purposes, particularly in recent years. There has been a growing demand for greater independence, but it is difficult to see that this will be achieved.²

This statement was made in 1964, in the same year that a new broadcasting law was passed in France. Act No. 64-621, of June 27, 1964, attempted to mold the organization

. . . into the shape of a public state establishment of an industrial and commercial character.³

Inasmuch as the Office de Radiodiffusion-Television-Francaise (ORTF) has come into existence after the Independence of the African territory of Congo, the features of the new organization are not discussed further in this treatise.

¹Codding, 41.

²F. Ridley and J. Blondel, Public Administration in France (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), 73.

³Albert Namurois, Problems of Structure and Organization of Broadcasting in the Framework of Radiocommunications ("Legal Monograph, No. 2"; Geneva: European Broadcasting Union, December, 1964), 70.

The growth of facilities. --The growth of the French broadcasting system has been considerable. Twelve years after the first experimental broadcast from the Eiffel Tower in 1921, France had five radio stations, of which one operated on long-wavelength, with a total power of 222 kW.¹ In 1950, the power increased to almost 1200 kW, divided among 53 medium-wave and one long-wave stations.² The Stockholm Plan³ assigned 178 FM frequencies to France, of which 29 were put in operation by 1960. Together with 66 AM stations at that time, the RTF controlled broadcasting system with more than 2,630 kW transmitting power.⁴

Belgium

Among the three Powers under discussion in this work, Belgium alone faced, in broadcasting services, the problems of linguistic and cultural dualism inherent in the societal make-up of the country. Dual-lingual⁵

¹Brockhaus, 1935, XVI, 210.

²UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, 2nd Supplement, 68-69.

³European Broadcasting Conference, Stockholm 1952, Agreement, . . ., 29-70. France reserved the right to use the assigned frequencies for amplitude modulation stations, "should it prove necessary." Ibi

⁴UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 280, 283-84.

⁵Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), III, 358-59.

Parliament, Flemish and Walloon Press, separate educational system have all been in operation since the establishment of the Belgian State in 1830.

Commercial and private system of broadcasting. --

When wireless broadcasting developed, it was pursued in Belgium, as in other countries of the world, by amateur operators whose activities were since 1908 regulated by the wireless legislation. It was this legislation, also, which empowered the Belgian Government to suspend all wireless broadcasting activities at the outbreak of World War I.¹

Not surprisingly, the first official activities in broadcasting reflected the cultural and linguistic quality of the nation. The government authorized, in 1923, the formation of a private company, "Radio Belgique," and granted this company a license to operate a commercial broadcasting service in French.² Later, a second broadcasting company, "N.V. Radio," for the Dutch speaking population, was authorized³. Both companies were supported by the advertising revenue, and also by voluntary contributions of the listening public.⁴

¹Cf. Emery, Journalism Monograph, No. 1, 3.

²UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, I, 111.

³Ibid.

⁴Albert Namurois, "The Charter for Broadcasting in Belgium," E. B. U. Review, Part B, No. 63 (September, 1960), 2.

Under the then existing allocations, Belgium broadcasting companies operated on frequencies not specifically assigned to either broadcasting or to Belgium. At that time, indeed, no frequencies were assigned to stations but rather to a type of service, and until 1927, only to the mobile (maritime) service, and to the transmission of weather reports.¹ As late as 1920 (at the Preliminary Conference on Electric Communication in Washington) and in 1921 (at the meeting of the Technical Committee of Radiocommunications in Paris), "broadcasting services had not been contemplated."² Licensing by the contracting governments of all radio-communication transmitting stations was incorporated, as an agreement of signatories, into the Washington Conference of 1927, and has been part of all subsequent Radiocommunication Regulations ever since.³ Special European Conferences attempted to solve the problem of mutual interference between European broadcasting stations: the Geneva Plan of 1926, the Brussels Plan of 1929, the Plan of Prague of 1929.⁴ It was

¹Tomlinson, 131.

²Ibid., 134.

³International Radiotelegraph Conference, Washington, 1927 Documents (Geneva: I. T. U., n.d.), II, 188. Though the I. T. U. had not been in existence in 1927, the Documents of this and other conferences were republished later under its auspices.

⁴Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), III, 207. Tomlinson, 181-881 Other conferences took place in 1933 (Lucerne), 1939 (Montreux), 1948 (Copenhagen) and 1952 (Stockholm).

the last plan which assigned to Belgium two exclusive frequencies, plus another one which was to be shared with other countries.¹ In order "to justify retention of these frequencies, Belgian officials were eager to activate them as soon as possible."²

Broadcasting as a state enterprise. -- It was for this reason that the Belgian Government and Parliament decided to assure the state of complete control of broadcasting. In 1930, Belgian Parliament established by law³ a state monopoly of broadcasting and entrusted a new public corporation, the Institut National Belge de Radiodiffusion, with the service. The I. N. R. was administered by a board of governors which consisted of Minister of Posts, Telegraph and Telephones (later Minister of Communications), and nine other members, of which three were appointed by the King, three by the Senate and three by the Chamber of Representatives.⁴ The Senate and Chamber of Representatives' Appointees then elected from among the nine board members a permanent committee in charge of administration, over which presided the delegate of the

¹UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, I, 112.

²Emery, Journalism Monograph, No. 1, 4.

³Law of June 18, 1930, Bulletin usuel des lois et arrêtés, 1930, 1041-43.

⁴Emery, Journalism Monograph, No. 1, 5-7; Terrou and Solal, 168.

minister.¹

Implementation of the new act was put into effect by a royal decree which outlined the responsibility of the I. N. R.: to provide educational, that is scientific, artistic, literary and philosophical programs²; an objective and impartial news service³; and to make available to the government at least twelve hours of broadcasting time per month for official communications⁴. Above all, the parliamentary concern for linguistic and cultural duality was reflected in the legislation and the I. N. R. broadcasts were required to treat both national languages in an equal manner⁵. Though the monopoly of broadcast transmission was reserved for the state,

Parliament also wanted to guarantee that segments of society other than government had opportunity to broadcast, and specified in the law that the institute was required to make air-time available to organizations, groups, and individuals having messages of interest to the public.⁶

The 1930 legislation also established licensing

¹Great Britain, Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division, Belgium (B.R. 521, "Restricted" Geographical Handbook Series; London: Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division, 1944), 579. (The number of governors was later (1945) increased to 16.) Henceforth referred to as British Naval Intelligence, Belgium.

²Terrou and Solal, 170-71.

³Ibid., 171

⁴Emery, Journalism Monograph, No. 1, 4. Cf. Terrou and Solal, 171, say "up to a monthly total of 10 hours per station."

⁵Terrou and Solal, 170.

⁶Emery, Journalism Monograph, No. 1, 4.

fees on receivers. Originally set at 60 Belgian francs (\$1.66) per annum,¹ the fees were increased during the occupation to 70 francs²; and in 1947 to 144 francs³ (\$2.88).

Though the Charter given the I. N. R. in 1930 was for twelve years, the war and subsequent German occupation of Belgium interrupted the orderly functioning of the service. A special commission administered broadcasting for the German military government. However, some of the staff escaped to France where it continued broadcasting for a limited time. When Belgian government in exile was organized in London, it established an official broadcasting agency of which more will be said in the next section of this chapter.

At the conclusion of World War II, this new agency and the re-established I. N. R. operated jointly until September 14, 1965 when the I. N. R. was again given the sole responsibility for broadcasting in Belgium.⁴

The basic provision of the 1930 statute were reconfirmed, though some modifications were made relating to the organization and administration of the institute.⁵

¹Bulletin usuel des lois et arrêtés, 1930, 1097.

²British Naval Intelligence, Belgium, 579.

³Bulletin usuel des lois et arrêtés, 1947, 651.

⁴Ibid., 1945, 591.

⁵Emery, Journalism Monograph, No. 1, 6.

Technical facilities. --By 1945, Belgium had sixteen low-power regional transmitters, but in 1948, the so-called Copenhagen Plan assigned only four frequencies to the country, with a combined authorized power of 340 kW.

The regional stations will have either to use international common frequencies (1,484 kc and 1,594 kc) or operate as a synchronized network on the assigned four frequencies.¹

The Stockholm Conference, which concerned itself with assignment of frequencies for television as well as for FM radio, made twenty-four FM assignments to Belgium.² As some other delegations, notably France and Monaco, Belgium also had serious reservations. FM broadcasting had been no certainty in the minds of the Belgian authorities.

Should it be officially decided in Belgium to use amplitude modulation for sound broadcasting in the 87.5 - 100 mc/s band, the Belgian Administration reserves the right to set up an amplitude modulation network without thereby causing greater interference to neighboring countries than which would be caused by the frequency modulation transmitters provided for Belgium in the present assignment plan.³

The decision went to frequency modulation. Belgium's first FM station went on the air in 1954, but at the end of the period of concern here (1960), fourteen transmitters were operating with 293 kW power.⁴ There were at that time

¹UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, 2nd Supplement, 61.

²European Broadcasting Conference, Stockholm, 1952, Agreement . . ., 29-70.

³Ibid.

⁴UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 32, 286; cf. Micro Magazine (Official Weekly of the Belgian National Broadcasting Service), X, No. 482, (July 4, 1954), 15.

actually twice as many FM stations as medium-wave (AM) stations, which totalled 342 kW power.¹

The advent of television, as well as the radio growth of sound broadcasting made the I. N. R. insufficiently organized. The basic

1930 law was outmoded and inadequate to meet the communication needs of Belgium . . . and Parliament attempted to enact new legislation. A number of bills were introduced and debated, but all were laid on the table. It was not until 1958 that the government took effective steps which resulted in the passage of a new law.²

In a fairly rapid succession, the following steps were taken in Belgium: A study was made (1958-1959) proposing a new radio-television organization, and an act was passed (1959) giving the chairmanship of the I. N. R. Board of Governors to the Minister of National Education rather than to Minister of Communications, or even earlier the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. But the legislation reorganizing the I. N. R. took another full year to crystallize in Parliament, and a new law finally passed on May 18, 1960.³

The new organization, Radiodiffusion-Television Belge, actually consists of three separate sections, Institutes, again reflecting the desires of Parliament that

¹UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 286.

²Emery, Journalism Monograph, No. 1, 11.

³Bulletin usuel des lois et des arrêtés, 1960, 355-61.

cultural and linguistic duality be respected: RTB (the French Section), BRT (The Flemish Section), and the Institute of Common Services. This latter section carries full responsibility not only for administration, but for all technical and financial affairs of the organization, and for the foreign broadcasts.¹

The Three Powers' Broadcasting
to the Colonies

It might be a coincidence that the technical development of broadcasting in the late 1910's concurred with the political disintegration of some established empires, but it appears to have been no ordinary coincidence that the use of shortwave broadcasting occurred first in the countries which possessed important colonial holdings across the oceans. International broadcasting, in the broadest sense of the term, can be traced as far back as World War I, when Germany, through her radio amateurs, provided interested parties abroad, including newspapers, with daily news reports.²

In strictly colonial sense,

. . . short-wave broadcasting in the later 'twenties coincided with the growing threat to colonial empires of the disintegrating forces of autonomy, native nationalism and race consciousness of colored populations. . . .³

¹Namurois, E. B. U. Review (Part B), No. 63, 6.

²Huth, 32.

³John B. Whitton and John H. Herz, "Radio in International Politics," in Harwood L. Childs and John B. Whitton (eds.), Propaganda by Short-Wave (Princeton: University Press, 1942), 8.

Soon, virtually all countries with significant colonial holdings began considering the use of short-wave broadcasting services, though such service was directed primarily to the European "ruling" classes, and only secondarily to the native populations.

France

From among the three powers under discussion, it was France which inaugurated its regular colonial service first.¹ On the occasion of the Colonial Exposition in Paris in 1931, a short-wave station Paris-Colonial was established at Pontoise, about 32 km northwest of Paris.² Until 1937, it was the only short-wave transmitter in France.

From the very outset, the French decided to use not only the French language in their colonial broadcasts, but also local languages, at least those most frequently spoken in the colonial territories. This was said to have been a living "testimony to the French colonial principle of assimilation,"³ but in reality the French colonial broadcasting service suffered from some serious deficiencies.

¹The very first colonial broadcasting was that of the Netherlands, since 1927. Ibid., 8.

²Arturo Mathieu, "Paris-Mondial," in Childs and Whitton, 183.

³Whitton and Herz, in Childs and Whitton, 9.

Though it avoided political propaganda and for that, as well as for its high cultural level, was well liked by educated listeners within and without the empire, its transmissions were weak, reception bad, administration and service poorly organized, its equipment deficient, its finances insufficient.¹ It appears to be an understatement to say that

as a whole . . . the French colonial broadcasting service did not seem to have been very successful.²

First attempts at correcting these deficiencies appeared just before the Second World War. A new short-wave station, 45 km southwest from Paris, at Essarts-Le-Roi, complemented the Pontoise station with 25 kW of power.³ Together with the first station, whose power was increased to 15 kW, it formed the new international broadcasting service under the name of Paris-Mondial since November, 1937⁴. Short time later (Spring, 1938), the international broadcasting service was divided into four zones, one of which being Africa.⁵ A new powerful transmitter (100 kW)

¹Ibid., 34; Mathieu, in Childs and Whitton, 183. Some of these problems were acknowledged even by the British; cf. "British News by Wireless," Round Table, XXIX, (1938-1939), 726-27.

²Whitton and Herz, in Childs and Whitton, 9.

³Broadcasting Yearbook, 1939, 351.

⁴Mathieu, 184; Harold N. Graves, Jr., War on the Short Wave ("Headline Series" No. 30; New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1941), 19.

⁵Whitton and Herz, 34; Mathieu, 184; Coddington, 23.

went on the air in October, 1939, some fifteen months behind schedule,¹ at Allouis, near Bourges in the center of the country (220 km due south of Paris).

To the maze of decrees by which French radio had been administered, a new one was added² which attempted to reorganize the broadcasting service in the colonies. This decree, however, pertained only to North Africa as that was the area in which the French felt the propaganda impact of the Italians at the early stages of the development toward the global war.³ The empire aspect of the service was replaced by that of propaganda which had become far more important.

The administrative and legislative directives, combined with a number of difficulties in other areas, seemed to be at the root of inefficiency of the French international broadcasting service, regardless of the geographical area to which it was directed. On the administrative question, a comment was made that

. . . the State Broadcasting System, not unlike the whole French Republic, was divided into various factions each absolutely independent of the other and all irreconcilable enemies, to the extent of having

¹Mathieu, 184; cf. Thomas Grandin, The Political Use of the Radio (Geneva Studies, X, No. 3; Geneva: Geneva Research Center, August, 1939), 33.

²Journal Officiel, March 27, 1939 (Decree of March 26, 1939).

³Mathieu, 184.

a different address, a separate budget, and a separate staff of personnel.¹

Similarly, a French broadcasting official was reported to have said that

the French radio lacks sufficient offices, material, personnel, and money. . . the work is paralyzed by the interpretation of the mysterious and inextricable decrees, . . . and inventive intelligence . . . is always hampered by the most deadly routine. . . . Any man who accepts work there must consent to waste 90% of his effort in vain and absurd quarrels.²

Ironically, it was the French military defeat³ which contributed to the improvement of the overall French situation as far as international broadcasting was concerned. After the capitulation of France in June 1940, a foundation to a new international broadcasting service was laid in the French Equatorial Africa, when the territory joined the Free French movement of General De Gaulle. At first operating only as a radio-telegraphic transmitters with power of 8 kW (in October, 1940), the station was transformed for broadcasting use by local technicians, though with reduced power of 3 kW.⁴ English complemented French

¹Ibid., 183.

²George Duhamel, ex-Director of the French Broadcasting Administration, in Le Figaro, April 9, 1940, quoted in ibid., 188.

³Paris-Mondial passed into German hands after its staff had first fled to Bordeaux on June 16, 1940.

⁴UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 405; cf. Guernier, 497, who mentions 12 kW as the power of the original station.

as the language used for broadcasting by this station.

Early in 1941, a decision was made by the French Government in exile to establish a strong broadcasting station in Brazzaville, under the administration of Radiodiffusion Française.¹ A 50 kW transmitter began operating under the name Radio-Brazzaville on June 18, 1943², almost exactly three years after the Franco-German armistice. It was destined to broadcast as both the national AEF transmitter and the international broadcasting station beamed its programs toward Europe and North Africa, as well as the United States and French Canada. With a companion transmitter of 7.5 kW of power, the international service broadcast in French, English, German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, and Roumanian.³

After the liberation of France, Radio-Brazzaville was attached to the French metropolitan broadcasting organization, and it has remained under its control even after the independence of the French Congo was proclaimed.

When World War II ended, the French-based transmitters were all located at Allouis. Their power increased to 910 kW in 1950 (10 transmitters)⁴, and to 1,310 kW in 1960

¹Francis Bebey, La Radiodiffusion en Afrique noire (Issy-les-Moulineaux, France: Editions Saint-Paul, 1963), 48.

²UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 405.

³Ibid. Also Bebey, 47.

⁴UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, 2nd Supplement, 69.

(fourteen transmitters, thirteen of which possessed 100 kW of power each).¹

United Kingdom

As it was with the French colonial broadcasting service, the British attempts at international broadcasting also were intended to serve the Empire. Though the original Charter and License and Agreement of 1927 had nothing to say about broadcasting to the Empire, the BBC began experimenting, by arrangement with the British Marconi, with a short-wave transmitter located at Chelmsford, the hometown of the Marconi Company, 29 miles E.N.E. of London. From the day of the first broadcast, on November 5, 1927², Chelmsford stations's call-sign 5 SW soon became familiar to listeners abroad.³

It must be emphasized that even on this experimental occasion, as well as later when the Empire Service was inaugurated, it was not a direct government policy which put the service into operation. The BBC engaged in a series of discussions with the Colonial Office, and later within

¹UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 284.

²"Empire Broadcasting: Proposals submitted by the BBC of the U.K. in November, 1929" in Gt. Britain, Imperial Conference, 1930: Appendices to the Summary of Proceedings (Cmd. 3717; London: H. M. S. O., 1930), 138-39. Gorham, 100, records November 11 as the date of first broadcast, as does BBC, Handbook, 1964, 213. Which BBC source is correct is not known.

³Thomas Owen Beachcroft, British Broadcasting ("British Life and Thought," No. 25; London: Longmans Green & Co., for the British Council, 1946), 28.

the framework of the Imperial Conference of 1930, and on the basis of these discussions, decided to establish the new service. A powerful station begun broadcasting from Daventry on December 19, 1932, thus initiating a regular service with a program output of ten hours a day.¹

The lack of official government sanction carried with it the inevitable lack of funds.

The problem of financing the new service was solved by deciding to allot a small proportion of the Home Listeners' licence fee to this purpose. It was thus the money of the British public and the enterprise of the BBC that were the driving force in the enormously important opening years of the BBC's Overseas Services . . . because these years laid the foundations, on which the broadcasting structure of the war years could firmly stand.²

Luckily enough, this part of the service was staffed by enthusiasts, and though a very small part of the BBC, the service was said to have achieved creditable results.³

Between the end of 1932 and the end of 1937 additional high-power transmitters were brought into service and programme output was extended -- still exclusively in English -- to more than seventeen hours daily.⁴

¹Gorham, 101. C. I. O., Sound and Television Broadcasting in Britain, 4.Gt. Britain, Summary of the Report of the Independent Committee of Enquiry into the Overseas Information Service (Cmd. 9138), April, 1954, 41. Henceforth referred to as Gt. Britain, Cmd. 9138.

²Beachcroft, 28.

³Gorham, 101.

⁴Gt. Britain, Cmd. 9138, 41.

In 1936, the Government accepted the recommendation of the Ullswater Committee to extend the BBC Charter. One of the accepted recommendations was the request that the Empire Service be specifically authorized. The government and Parliament thus assumed responsibility for a service which in a few years was to become the international broadcasting service for the BBC.¹ With the official sanction came financial support in the form of a subsidy (Grant-in-Aid)², and the Government's first demand: a foreign-language broadcast service, in Arabic, and later in Spanish and Portuguese. Later that same year (1938), at the time of Munich, the first French, German, and Italian broadcasts originated, directed to the European Continent.³ With other languages being added, the BBC operated, in addition to the Empire Service, nine foreign language services to Europe and elsewhere besides a service in English, on thirteen transmitters.

The peak of the war-time operations of the BBC was reached in 1944 when the output in nearly 50 languages amounted in aggregate to about 130 programme hours daily over a total of 43 short-wave transmitters.⁴

¹UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, IV, 553-54; authorization of the television and film production services was recommended, and incorporated into the 1936 Charter.

²BBC, Handbook, 1964, 81.

³Gt. Britain, Cmd. 9138, 41. The British Government reserved for itself the right to specify the languages, but not the content of the broadcast services.

⁴Ibid.; UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, IV, 560, specifically mentions 46 foreign languages having been used in the summer of 1944.

The growth of the foreign-language broadcasts should not overshadow the continued development of the original Empire Service to the colonies and the countries of the Commonwealth. The British continued to use broadcasting to the Empire

. . . as an instrument that could allow a common feeling, a common culture, to express itself gradually and without self-conscious forcing. It [had] the appearance of a natural, rather than a deliberate, process. ¹

The spirit behind the programs did not change, just because the name of the service did (this activity has been since World War II referred to as "External Broadcasting," with the Overseas Services being directed toward the Commonwealth countries and the colonies, and the European Services covering practically the whole Continent). The rationale for the successor of the pre-war Empire service remained: it was to continue as an extension of the British Home Service "to the entire British family overseas."²

[The Empire transmissions as a public spirited act of service] was essentially a by-product of the spirit of the Commonwealth itself, the spirit of belonging together and not counting too closely the cost of mutual service. Who knows how much, in return, B.B.C. short-wave broadcasts may not have contributed, . . . to preserving and strengthening that spirit? By assuming it, they have built it up. . . .³

¹Beachcroft, 30. ²Gt. Britain, Cmd. 9138, 45.

³H. V. Hodson, "Broadcasting and the Commonwealth," The B. B. C. Quarterly, VI, No. 1 (Spring, 1951), 2.

In its broadcasts to Africa, only three¹ local languages have been used by the BBC, one of them from West Africa, Hausa. This is the most important language in the Northern Nigeria, extending beyond the limits of that territory.

It has obtained the rank of a Lingua Franca, and it is the general vehicle of communication between tribes speaking different languages.²

The Hausa language service began March 13, 1957, and though the British claim that such programs (as well as those in English) have been rebroadcast regularly by local stations³, a very comprehensive history of radio in Nigeria⁴ does not contain a single reference to this fact. Up to that time (1957), however, the BBC programs in English had been utilized.

There was . . . considerable emphasis on BBC programmes and these were featured continuously from 2 p.m. until 5 p.m. daily. The BBC news bulletins always had pride of place. . . .⁵

The BBC programs, in addition to their informative content, were valued by the British colonial authorities,

¹Service in Africaans was discontinued in 1957, BBC, Handbook, 1964, 214.

²Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed. (1959), XI, 254.

³BBC, Handbook, 1964, 84.

⁴Ian K. Mackay, Broadcasting in Nigeria (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1964). Mr. Mackay was the last non-Nigerian Director-General of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (1961-1964).

⁵Ibid., 34.

and others, primarily because they were in the English language:

The use of English as a means of international and cultural intercourse throughout the Commonwealth is a powerful guarantee that the sense of belonging together will remain, and that, even if we do not agree, we shall at least see each other's points of view. ¹

Transmitting facilities. -- From a single-station operation, the Overseas Service of the BBC (excluding the European Service) grew to 31 transmitters with a combined power of 2,740 kW in 1950² and to 39 transmitters with 3,100 kW of power in 1960.³

Belgium

Broadcasting to Belgian Congo. --When Belgium inaugurated its colonial broadcasts, on a daily basis, in 1934⁴ the timing coincided with the passage of a decree authorizing the Government of the Belgian Congo to negotiate with the I. N. R. to establish such service⁵,

¹Hodson, The BBC Quarterly, VI, No. 1, 5.

²UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, IV, 573.

³UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 336.

⁴Codding, 23; Whitton and Herz, in Childs and Whitton, 9. Experimentation with broadcasting was conducted by radio-beam (Belradio) since 1932. I. C. I., Compared Colonial Documentation (1934), I, 78; (1936), I, 127.

⁵Bulletin Officiel du Congo Belge, August 15, 1934, No. 8, 727.

to be paid for, at least partially, by a newly established tax (i.e., license fees) on receivers in the Belgian Congo.¹

. . . This broadcasting service, which at first ran for an hour and a half, consisted of 15 minutes of news in Flemish, 15 minutes of news in French, and one hour of music. In 1935 the Belgian programme had about eight hundred and fifty listeners.²

The broadcasting service continued to operate from the original short-wave transmitter at Ruysselede until the fall of Belgium in World War II, at which time some of the I. N. R. staff moved to France from where they continued broadcasting, this time also to the home country.

Broadcasting from Belgian Congo. --During the war, the roles of the home country and its colony were reversed. The loss of the daily colonial service of the I. N. R. to the African colony was deplored, but the unavailability of a strong broadcasting coverage for the population of the occupied Belgium was considered even more in need of correction. In 1941, the exiled Belgian government decided to establish on the Congolese territory a strong enough station which could beam news and other programs to Belgium as well as to other parts of the world. By special agreement between the Minister of Information and the Minister

¹The actual title of the 1934 decree was "Tax on Wireless Receiver Apparatus" (Redevance sur appareils recepteurs radioélectriques).

²Codding, 23.

for the Colonies, both of whom were in London, arrangements were made to build a 50-kW short-wave transmitter at Leopoldville. Put into service in March, 1943, it was operated from the Congo by a newly established Office de Radiodiffusion National Belge but administratively responsible directly to the London-based government, not to the Colonial Government.¹ A year later, by a further agreement, this time between the Belgian and the Colonial governments, pooling of staff and other resources of the Congolese and Belgian broadcasting service was affected.²

1945 - 1960. --After the war, Belgium's I. N. R. owned two transmitting sites. One at Ruyssede, with 5 kW, however,

. . . [did] not broadcast programmes to other countries but [ensured] liaison between Belgium and the Congo by beam.³

It was the transmitter at Leopoldville which used its 50 kW of power to function as the main disseminator of international programs of the Belgians. There were considerable changes planned in the post-war situation:

The station operates under the direct control of the Foreign Broadcast Department of the INR in

¹Bulletin usuel des lois et arrêtés, May, 1940 - December, 1943, 106-07.

²UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 396.

³Ibid., 2nd Supplement, 59.

Brussels, and although programmes still originate in Leopoldville it is planned that when the powerful, short-wave transmitters now under construction in Belgium come into operation all programme staff will be withdrawn from Leopoldville, leaving transmitter to act as a relay centre only.¹

When this happened in the mid-1950's, not much was made of it; the transmitter was still available. The fact, however, that by 1960, Belgium had four short-wave transmitters with a total power of 240 kW², simplified for the Belgian broadcasting service the adjustment which was necessary due to the political upheaval in the Congo immediately after the Independence Day. The Leopoldville transmitter was no longer available to the Belgians.

Domestic Broadcasting Service
in the Colonies

Middle Congo -- The French
Equatorial Africa

Of the three colonial territories surveyed in this work, it was the French possession in Tropical Africa which first broadcast to the general public, albeit on the amateur level. With the power of 50 watts, a transmitter belonging to a small "radio-club" began broadcasting, on a wavelength in the 36-meter band, in 1935.³ The station operated from

¹Ibid., v, 397.

²UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 268. Emery, Journalism Monograph, No. 1, 18, states that in 1964-1965 RTB-BRT operated three short-wave transmitters with a combined power of 220 kW.

³Guernier, 497; UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, v, 405; Bebey, 47.

Brazzaville, capital of the territory.

Radio-Brazzaville. -- When France fell in June of 1940, the station went "underground," but with the alignment of the A.E.F. with the Free French Movement on August 26 of that year the facilities were formally taken over in the name of the movement and of General De Gaule just two days later.¹ At about the same time, an international station was constructed by transforming a radio-telegraphic transmitter for broadcasts to Metropolitan France.² This was the true beginning of Radio-Brazzaville. In 1941, the station broadcast for three-and-a-half hours daily, in French and English, and could be heard in the territory as well as Metropolitan France, French Canada and the U. S.³

The Comité National Français Libre de Londres then decided to install a 50-kW transmitter, using equipment ordered in the United States. The project was carried out in 1943. Added to this was a 7.5 kW transmitter.⁴

The local population also was served by an increase in the number of transmitters of the "radio-club," which operated from mid-1941 with 4 transmitters (900 kW total power), and from 1942 with 6 transmitters, totalling 2,900 kW, of which 5 operated simultaneously.⁵

¹Guernier, 497.

²Supra, 227.

³UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 405.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid. Cf. Guernier, 498.

At the end of the Second World War, Radio-Brazzaville, six transmitters strong (62.3 kW)¹, became an integral part of Radiodiffusion Française², and

thereafter its policy was formulated by the Quai d'Orsay and its operation was financed by the French treasury.³

Three more short-wave transmitters were added between then and 1960, and the end of the colonial regime saw Radio-Brazzaville operating twenty-four hours a day, with a total power of 125.8 kW.⁴

Radio A.E.F. --Although the reception of Radio-Brazzaville's programs was possible in French Equatorial Africa, its programs were destined for non-AEF audiences, and it soon became clear that a purely local service was needed. In 1946, the government of the AEF Federation decided to ask the RTF to help establish, operate and maintain a number of transmitters for local as well as federal broadcasting. On a distinctly territorial initiative, the

¹Guernier, 498.

²UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 405.

³Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1960), 315. Quai d'Orsay, the address of the French Foreign Office, is synonymous with that Ministry. As pointed out earlier, the RDF and then RTF was attached to the Office of the Prime Minister (supra, 211-12) but international aspects of broadcasting undoubtedly were of concern to the Foreign Office as was the case of news agencies. Cf. O.W. Riegel, Mobilizing for Chaos: The Story of the New Propaganda (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), 117-124.

⁴UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 79.

plan for Radio-AEF developed over the years, until an agreement was signed in September, 1950 in which the French broadcasting organization undertook to operate the service for the Federation. On December 9, 1950, Radio-AEF broadcasts were inaugurated on two 4-kW and one 1.5-kW installations.¹ All three transmitters operated on short-waves. Studio as well as personnel belonged to the RTF's Radio-Brazzaville.² Responsibility for programs also belonged to RTF, through its director in Brazzaville, who submitted all programs to the Governor-General for prior approval.³

At first, broadcasting operated only in Middle Congo; on May 1, 1951 a special section of the service opened its broadcast facility as Radio-Tchad.⁴ But it must be kept in mind that Radio-AEF was intended to address itself to the population of all four territories federated in the French Equatorial Africa, including Oubangi-Chari and Gabon. Stations with such small transmitting power could not deliver a dependable coverage of the vast geographical area of almost the same size as Alaska, Texas and California put together.⁵ In 1957, an arrangement was worked out with Radio-Brazzaville to use the strong transmitter of the station between 6 p.m. and 7:55 p.m. daily, in order to

¹UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 406. ²Bebey, 48.

³UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 405. ⁴Codding, 55.

⁵The AEF covered 969,111 sq. miles of territory. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 27th ed., (1959), IX, 756B.

allow the local inhabitants to benefit from the Radio-AEF transmissions.¹ But the mediocrity of the reception became only more pronounced when the powerful transmitter ceased at 7:55 p.m. While substantially improving the conditions of reception, the maneuver also exposed the pretense of total coverage of the territory.

The authorities of the four individual territories thought of . . . installing new transmitters, more powerful, so that Radio-A.E.F. could fulfill its important mission: instruct, educate and inform the inhabitants of its vast territory.²

Radio-Congo. --Assembled at Brazzaville, the four administrations met for the purposes of signing a convention to develop Radio-AEF. As the date was June 23, 1959, French possessions had already become Republics within the French Community, and the AEF as an entity had ceased to exist. Radio-AEF changed its name, therefore, to Radio-Inter-Equatoriale, known as Radio-Inter³. With the help of an official French governmental organization (SORAFOM)⁴ a studio building was built, and the power of transmitters brought up to 50 kW. From an organizational point of view, Radio-Inter acquired complete autonomy and independence from Radio-Brazzaville, a station of the national (metro-

¹Bebey, 48.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., 49.

⁴SORAFOM (Société de Radiodiffusion de la France d'Outre-mer) was established in 1955 as a state company, with financial autonomy, for the purpose of facilitating improvements and developments of radio broadcasting, and of establishing an imperial network. SORAFOM was eventually (April, 1962) replaced by OCORA (Office de Coopération Radiophonique). Ambassade de France, Aid and Cooperation, 43; cf. Bebey, 31-33, 161.

politan) Radiodiffusion-Television Francaise¹.

The idea behind Radio-Inter-Equatoriale was, of course, to serve all four States equally. In reality, each of the States expressed a desire to operate its own broadcasting service; already Oubangi-Chari (known as the Central African Republic) and Chad had such service, and Gabon was about to start one.² The Congo Republic therefore decided to disband Radio-Inter, distribute its technical assets and personnel, and with a major portion of those facilities created a national broadcasting service, with three transmitters of 25 kW power.³ Radio-Congo was born on May 23, 1960, three months before the independence of the Republic was proclaimed.

Belgian Congo

Broadcast receiving licenses. -- When the Government of Belgian Congo issued a Decree in 1924⁴ laying down the principle that a permission was needed by anyone wishing to operate a radio transmitter⁵, undoubtedly it was a direct result of the first broadcasting license issued just one year before in Belgium, thus reiterating the

¹Bebey, 49.

²Ibid., 45, 49.

³UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 79.

⁴Decree of September 29, 1924.

⁵UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 395.

established power of the State to regulate radio communications. As it turned out, the decree concerned itself for twelve years with only amateur stations, not broadcasting to the general public. The possibilities of receiving direct broadcasts from Belgium actually gave rise to the first true concern of the authorities with broadcasting in Belgian Congo.

The 1934 Decree established license fees of 120 francs per annum for radio receivers, authorized the colonial government to enter into negotiations with the INR, and included a provision that a proportionate amount of the receiver set fees collected in the Congo might be applied towards the cost of such service.¹

Radio-Léopoldville. --With the legislation regarding transmitters (1924) and receivers (1934) established, the stage for broadcasting was set. In 1936, the Jesuit College at Leopoldville applied for and received permission to operate as Radio-Léo. Its transmitting power is unknown, but it was soon joined on the air by two commercially operated private stations of Radio-Congolia (in 1939) whose combined power was only .14 kW.² All three stations were located in the capital, Leopoldville.

¹Section 6 of the 1934 Decree; cf. UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 395-96; I.C.I., Compared Colonial Documentation (1934), I, 226.

²UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 400.

With the occupation of Belgium in World War II by Germany the programming beamed to the colony ended. Information Service was established within the government of the colony, of which a specialized section Radio-Congo-Belge was designated to operate an official broadcasting service.¹ The Belgian Government in exile passed an act which enunciated the principle that

the colonial government alone had the right to establish and operate telecommunications services of whatever nature, including the transmission of sound or images for public reception. It provided, however, that this right could be conceded to private parties if public interests required such a step, although the operation of private services remained subject to government control and the staff employed had to be approved by the government.²

The need for the domestic broadcasting service in the colony was felt to be great, as the three transmitters, all privately owned, apparently did not provide the content or the coverage needed. Two government-owned transmitters, of 3 kW and 50 kW of power, respectively, were put into operation in 1942.³

In 1943, the Leopoldville transmitter belonging to the Belgian government in exile was completed⁴; it did serve at least partially some inhabitants of the Congo, though its programs had been designed for non-African consumption. Also during the war years, a private concern,

¹InforCongo, 530.

²UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 396.

³Ibid., 400.

⁴Supra, 236.

Radio-Elizabethville, began broadcasting on two wave-lengths in 1941, each transmitter with a power of 150 watts.¹

This operation was financed by listeners' contributions.

Radio-Congo-Belge. --The six transmitters operating under the authority of the Congolese government (by this time, the first station, Radio-Léo, used one of the two transmitters of the official Radio-Congo-Belge) at the end of the Second World War were during the next fifteen years joined on the air by others in different parts of the country. Regional stations slowly developed in Stanleyville, at Bukavu, Luluabourg, and Coquilhatville, as part of the official network of government stations.² In Elizabethville, another private station commenced broadcasting in 1947, on three different wave-lengths, as Radio-Collège. Operated by a Jesuit College, it alone among the private stations received an annual government subsidy. Private contributions supplemented such revenue.³ Radio-Congolia ceased operations in 1949.

Legislatively,⁴ broadcasting in Belgian Congo was dealt with after the war through Act 370 of October 31, 1947.

¹UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 400.

²InforCongo, II, 175, lists transmitters in these provincial capitals as private stations, rather than as governmental stations with privately operated production studios. Attention is called to this inaccuracy in light of the very explicit language of the 1947 Act. Cf. UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 400.

³UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 397.

⁴Bulletin Officiel du Congo Belge, November 2, 1947, No. 370, 1131.

Though private stations already possessing governmental licenses were allowed to continue operations -- without advertising -- no new transmitting facilities were permitted to be in private hands. Only the government retained the right to own transmitters. The license fee was doubled at that time for the Europeans, and lowered for the Congolese who paid only one-fifth of the fee assessed on European-owned sets.

Broadcasting and the private enterprise. --However, private parties were eligible to receive governmental authorizations to operate production studios, and their programs were to be used on the government-owned stations. The enactment provided that

. . . persons wishing to establish studios must furnish proof of their financial and technical ability to produce satisfactory programmes. The studios must be set up in a provincial capital, and the governor of the province has the right to supervise the programmes. The transmission of any programme can be forbidden if it does not come up to the required technical or cultural standard.¹

The standards were not indicated in the enactment, but the content areas were:

Programmes must have a real educational, moral, artistic, literary or scientific value, and must be prepared in such a way as to interest the public.²

In addition, the government could have required inclusion of any administrative announcement, and the licensee

¹UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 396.

²Ibid.

(of the production studio) would have been obligated to incorporate such announcement, up to five per cent of the total length of the program.¹

At the time of achieving independence, of the twelve government stations five were situated in Leopoldville, two in Elizabethville, two in Stanleyville, and one each in Luluabourg, Coquilhatville, and Bukavu, with a combined power of 191.25 kW. The three private stations, all operating with authorizations issued prior to 1947, together had 8.75 kW of power.² To these, the metropolitan transmitter of 50 kW should be added. Five production studios owned by three private organizations were in operation in five provincial capitals.³

Nigeria

When broadcasting is defined as transmission of signals for reception by the general public, Nigeria, the largest African state and under its former colonial status the largest British non-self-governing territory, must be said to have been among the last countries to get a broadcasting service of its own.

¹Ibid. None of the provisions of this act applied to the Leopoldville station belonging to the metropolitan broadcasting service.

²Ibid.

³The only province not having such private production studio was Leopoldville. InforCongo, II, 175.

The Nigerian Broadcasting Service commenced operations on April 1, 1951, in a world situation growing more alarming day by day, with limited money and purchasing power which had fallen drastically since the original estimates had been prepared, and in a Nigeria with constitutional difficulties which threatened the very existence of the NBS before it even started.¹

It might be assumed that when it is stated that "a broadcasting service commenced operations," it could be understood that the first program was transmitted. Not so in case of Nigeria, which had considerable problems with its first transmitter. The first national program went on the air almost fifteen months later, on June 27, 1952.

But the history is much richer than the above paragraphs would indicate. On December 19, 1932, when the BBC commenced its Empire Service, a station in Lagos was ready:

The Lagos wireless station receives all Empire broadcast news. Shortage of staff has prevented a continuation of the experiments in broadcasting from Lagos,²

reported the Colonial Office in 1933. This was the first mention of broadcasting in Nigeria: it also was the last mention of an operational broadcasting station there until 1949.

Wired Wireless. --It was the Colonial Office which, on the basis of its discussions with the BBC, began to explore the possibilities of radio broadcasting in the colonies. The Nigerian Posts and Telegraph Department was

¹Mackay, 15.

²Great Britain, Colonial Office, Colonial Report 1932-1933 (London: H. M. S. O., 1933), 19.

directed to develop a wired wireless system, a method of distributing, but not as yet originating, suitable programs to those who subscribed to such service.¹ The service, according to the directives of the Colonial Office, was to operate in conjunction with the Empire Service of the BBC, in other words the service was to be confined to rebroadcast of BBC programmes.²

The wired wireless system was, for the British, nothing new. It had been developed about a dozen years before in Great Britain, and one of the British wireless pioneers, Peter P. Eckersley, Chief Engineer of the British Broadcasting Company³, later of the British Broadcasting Corporation, improved upon it by changing the original system which required special wiring for each subscriber, into another system by using ordinary electric mains.⁴

A wireless distribution station was set up in Lagos in December 1935: in due time other RDS (Radio Distribution Service) stations were erected. The diffusion service grew from three in 1939⁵ to thirteen in 1951⁶. Until then,

¹Letter from the Nigerian Postmaster-General, March 24, 1965.

²Mackay, 2.

³Briggs, Appendix 4.

⁴Gorham, 106-07.

⁵Mackay, 4.

⁶UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 427.

wired service was operated and maintained by the Post and Telegraphs. Since 1939, the newly established Public Relations Office in the colony originated local programs to be used on the RDS stations, and although these locally produced programs were few (in 1948, some RDS stations operated for as long as eighteen-and-a-half hours daily, with only one hour of Public Relations Office programs), the future pattern of the Nigerian broadcasting was thus shaped. Each RDS station was from 1951 controlled by a broadcasting officer of the Public Relations Office, the function of each station was extended to include local production, Nigerian artists and talents were provided with an outlet -- and the program structure was considerably broadened, a fact which could not but benefit the subscribers and other audience.¹ Only the maintenance of the lines connecting subscribers to the rediffusion centers remained as the responsibility of the Post Office after 1951.

The Nigerian Broadcasting Service. --While the RDS grew and prospered, direct broadcasting fell into oblivion until after World War II when

. . . the urgent need to build new broadcasting stations in the colonies was . . . recognized. In 1948, the Secretary of State for the Colonies addressed Colonial Governments asking them to consider

¹Mackay, 3-4, 6-7. In 1948 it was assumed that at least six persons listened on each receiver (wired loud-speaker).

whether their existing arrangements for broadcasting were adequate and, in the case of those colonies without services, whether some action would be taken to provide them. He endorsed the recommendations of the 1936 Plymouth Committee that broadcasting should be operated by Governments as a public service, and stressed the need for broadcasting services to be the instruments of social and educational advancement.¹

One immediate result was the commissioning of the BBC to conduct a survey in West Africa.² This basically engineering survey "levelled a devastating criticism at Nigerian broadcasting:"

. . . It was in a 'retarded state of development or non-existent'; the low-powered short-wave transmitters were quite inadequate, the site was unsatisfactory, studio arrangements were poor, and out-of-date equipment was in bad condition.³

Among the recommendations made by the survey team was that the four surveyed territories (Gambia, Gold Coast -- today's Ghana --, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) should have one broadcasting service common to all four, with the proposed West African Broadcasting Corporation to have its headquarters in Accra (Gold Coast), a Director of Programs

¹Gt. Britain, Colonial Office, Sound and Television Broadcasting in the Overseas Territories, Handbook (London: Information Department, Colonial Office, 1964), 1. Mr. A. Creech-Jones, M.P., was the Colonial Secretary at that time. Henceforth referred to as British Colonial Office, Handbook of Colonial Broadcasting.

²L. W. Turner and F. A. W. Byron, Broadcasting Survey of the British West African Colonies (London: The Crown Agents, 1949).

³Mackay, 6-7.

and a Director of Technical Services in London, and an operating staff in each territory.¹

It is of some interest, perhaps, to point out that there is a great similarity between this broadcasting recommendation, and that pertaining to the establishment of a single institution of higher education, made in 1946.² Unlike that recommendation, however, this one was rejected almost immediately because one program could not have been expected to serve

. . . the diverse religious, cultural and linguistic background between the peoples and, indeed, because the same problems applied to individual countries, particularly the Gold Coast . . . and Nigeria.³

The reference in the Turner-Byron Report to the "low-powered shortwave transmitters" needs a word of explanation. Just prior to the visit of the survey team, the Department of Posts and Telegraphs established, for experimental purposes, a broadcasting station in Lagos, "relaying the ordinary re-diffusion programmes on short waves."⁴ Operating as Radio-Nigeria, it had one transmitter of 300 watts of power,

. . . often broke down, was frequently off the air, and with its low power could only provide limited coverage. Even so there were occasions when freak reception conditions drew verification cards from countries as far removed as Sweden and New Zealand.

¹Turner and Byron, 68.

²Gt. Britain, Report of the Commission of Higher Education in West Africa (Cmd. 6655), 1945, 13.

³Mackay, 7.

⁴UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 427.

. . . Nigeria now had a voice, a small voice perhaps, but its advent was important.¹

Whether its beginning was due to the anticipation of the BBC-Colonial Office survey or was meant to be a ready answer to the anticipated survey report is only a matter of conjecture. The criticism, offered by the report in 1949, remained unanswered for several years.

In 1949, Great Britain passed its first significant Colonial Development and Welfare Act. Together with the interest indicated by the Colonial Office, its passage pointed the way toward realization of a plan to establish a national, as well as regional, broadcasting service in Nigeria. On local initiative, a decision was made to convert the RBS stations into a full-fledged broadcasting system. With local funds totalling 150,000 pounds and CD&W Funds amounting to 190,000 (later increased to 205,000)pounds and with the BBC's promise to help in training Nigerians for broadcasting², the Nigerian Government felt it was in a position to build a comprehensive broadcasting system. A Broadcasting Department was established under the direct control of the Chief Secretary of the territory; at its helm was to be a Director-General, to be appointed by the Governor-General.³ The first man to

¹Mackay, 4.

²Ibid., 13-14.

³UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 427.

Occupying that position was T. W. Chalmers, of the BBC, who, together with another BBC man, J. W. Murray, an engineer, was brought to Nigeria for the specific purpose of formulating a broadcasting plan acceptable to the government. The Chalmers' Plan, calling for a capital expenditure over the subsequent three years of 335,000 pounds and reconciling the actual situation with the 1948 Turner-Byron Report, was accepted¹, and the Nigerian Broadcasting Service was born.

Nigerian Broadcasting, 1951-1956. --The development was slow, basically because of the financial situation of Nigeria at that time, and also because of material shortages caused by the Korean War. One of the big problems was to obtain a suitable transmitter.

The famous Normandy Beachhead mobile transmitter of the BBC was available for purchase This unit consisted of an RCA 7 and a half kW HF transmitter with rectifier unit, mounted in two extremely large mobile vans, which also housed a mobile diesel generator. . . . Apparently it was in a reasonable state of repair. . . .²

The unit was purchased and with difficulty and delays transported to Lagos. After a complete overhaul, it finally went on-the-air in June, 1952. Its life expectancy of about a year had been well figured out, for "it literally collapsed on May 10, 1953."³

¹Mackay, 14, pointed out that the actual governmental acceptance was 100 pounds less than the recommended amount.

²Ibid., 17.

³Ibid., 18.

There were other problems as well. Prices on the world markets went up because of the war conflict in the Far East, certain parts and materials were in short supply or unobtainable, sites for transmitters (recommended by the 1948 survey) no longer available, technical staff unavailable. Furthermore, political events in Nigeria itself where the regions were demanding more power and autonomy, threatened the new Service.¹

The RDS operations, formally taken over in toto by the broadcasting service from the Post and Telegraphs Department in 1952², formed the nucleus of the system. New RDS stations appeared, but the one which almost created a crisis was a commercial enterprise of a London firm, Overseas Rediffusion, Ltd. Granted a fifteen-year franchise to operate in Lagos and the Western Region, the company entered the scene amidst great confusion and furor. Apparently, the franchise had been issued before the plans for the establishment of the NBS were made and, indeed, before the Director-General-Designate, T. W. Chalmers,

¹For the technical difficulties, an excellent source is E.C. Milton's Survey of the Technical Development of the Nigerian Broadcasting Service (Lagos: Nigerian Broadcasting Service, 1955). For the internal difficulties, Colonial Office publication, Report of the Commission on Enquiry into the Disorders in the Eastern Provinces of Nigeria, November, 1949 (Col.No. 256; London: Colonial Office, 1950) and Report by the Conference on the Nigerian Constitution Held in London in July and August, 1953 (Cmd. 3934), 1953; also Report by the Resumed Conference on the Nigerian Constitution held in London in January and February, 1954 (Cmd. 9059), 1954, can be consulted. Also, Mackay, 56-60.

²Mackay, 153.

arrived in Nigeria. But the relationship between the commercial firm and the NBS improved in time, and the historian was able to report in 1964 that

the fears of yesterday have vanished long since and today Overseas Rediffusion Ltd. and the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation enjoy a happy relationship and help each other in every way possible.¹

The political development in Nigeria during the formative years of both broadcasting and constitutional development resulted in a very free Press, which took up the question of government monopoly of broadcasting in relationship to the government control of programming. The Press criticism continued for a number of years, and in spite of strong urges to abandon broadcasting on a Federal level, thus leaving it strictly to the Regions, a motion was put forth in the Federal House of Representatives to establish a Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation patterned on the traditions of the BBC, and specifically

. . . in order to remove the press criticism that the Nigerian Broadcasting Service is an organ of the Nigerian Government.²

From this 1954 motion, and the resulting White Paper which urged the transformation of the NBS into the NBC "without delay," it took more than two years to pass

¹Ibid., 30-31.

²Nigeria (Federal), House of Representatives: Debates (The Third Session, March 6-25, 1954; Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1954), 595.

the appropriate legislation.¹

By the time when the Nigerian Broadcasting Service finally signed off on March 31, 1957,

new transmitters had replaced the old and the make-shift. Broadcasting houses had been built or acquired. A Radio Times had commenced publication. News sessions had been expanded and were being heard in a number of Nigerian languages and dialects. Moslem and Christian religious sessions had been introduced, vernacular language broadcasts had steadily increased, and the staff had expanded from three (. . . one Nigerian) to 472, comprising 415 Nigerians. . . .²

Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation, 1957-1960. --The Ordinance which established the Corporation provided for a Board of Governors (Federal) and three regional boards, to be responsible for the overall policies. But through the following years, while the NBC was charged with providing services which,

. . . when considered as a whole, reflected the unity of Nigeria as a Federation, and at the same time gave adequate expression to the culture, characteristics, affairs and opinions of the people of each Region or part of the Federation,³

¹Nigeria, Collated Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, Chapter 133, No. 39 (1956). The Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation Ordinance, 1956. The White Paper consisted of Proposals for the Establishment of a Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation together with an Outline of the Projected further Development of Broadcasting in Nigeria. (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1954). Cf. Mackay, 44-47, 52; also Lord Hailey, An African Survey (1956), 1248.

²Mackay, 49.

³Part 3, Section 10 (3) of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation Ordinance, 1956. The "part of the Federation" was the territory of Southern Cameroon, which received a small radio studio and a mobile recording unit in January, 1958. Mackay, 54.

it did so by centralizing activities and decision-making in Lagos. This was viewed by the Regions simply as continuation of federal control, and gave rise to regional dissatisfaction. Instead of one broadcasting service, Nigeria in reality began to develop four, and this became formalized when in 1959 the Western Regional Government Broadcasting Corporation was established. The Eastern Region followed suit, with its own radio service on Nigerian Independence Day, October 1, 1960.

A mention of the mottoes of the various broadcasting services is apropos here. The Western Region's slogan was "First in Africa,"¹ while the East was proud of its "Second to None" motto.² The ideal of One Nigeria, expressed in the NBC motto "Unity in Diversity. Diversity in Unity," was slowly dissipating.³

The political and administrative difficulties notwithstanding, the technical achievement of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation, and its predecessor, cannot be slighted. On October 1, 1960, Nigeria possessed twenty-seven transmitters, of which one was frequency-modulated, with total power of 141 kW.⁴

¹ Makay, 61.

² Ibid., 62; Bebey, 130.

³ Mackay, 47.

⁴ UNESCO, Statistics on Radio and Television 1950-1960 (Statistical Report and Studies; Paris: UNESCO, 1963), 38. Henceforth referred to as UNESCO, R-TV Statistics.

The surprising fact about the Nigerian broadcasting situation at that time is that unlike many other African territories, Nigeria used the majority of its transmitters operating on medium waves, fully 19 of them.¹ And, just as a 1937 (Plymouth Committee) and the 1949 (Turner-Byron) Report recommended the side-by-side existence of broadcasting and wired wireless², the 1960 situation included 48 rediffusion services, 36 of them private, together servicing some 74,000 subscribers³, and perhaps six times as many actual listeners.

¹Ibid.

²Gt. Britain, Colonial Office, Interim Report of a Committee on Broadcasting Services in the Colonies and Broadcasting Services in the Colonies: 1st Supplement to the Interim Report of the Committee (Colonial No. 139, Sec. 16; London: Colonial Office, 1937, 1939). Henceforth referred to as British Colonial Office, Colonial No. 139 (1937) or (1939). Also, Turner and Byron in Mackay, 7.

³Royal Institute of International Affairs, Nigeria: The Political and Economic Background (London: R. I. I. A., 1960), 120.

PART III

THE COLONIAL HERITAGE

CHAPTER VI

COLONIAL POLICIES ON BROADCASTING:

A COMPARISON

Writing on the topic of policy issues which most emerging nations must resolve in the sphere of mass media development, Pool enumerated four areas to which the governments must address themselves:

First, and most important, developing nations must decide how much of their scarce resources to invest in mass media. Second, they must decide what roles to assign the public and private sectors respectively. Third, they must decide how much freedom to allow or how much control to impose; how much uniformity to require and how much diversity to permit. Fourth, they must decide at how high a cultural level to pitch the media output.¹

In a similar context, Fagen found it convenient to compile a short list of "the chief determinants of the emerging patterns and channels of communication in the new states."² Among the most important "limiting factors" he listed

¹Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The Mass Media and Politics in the Modernization Process," Lucian W. Pye (ed.), Communications and Political Development (Studies in Political Development, No. 1; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 234.

²Richard Rees Fagen, "Politics and Communication in the New States: Burma and Ghana" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1962), 35.

1. Limits stemming from lack of cognitive skills (literacy) and habits (curiosity).
2. Limits stemming from lack of technical skills needed to operate and maintain a modern communication system (including educational skills).
3. Limits stemming from special socio-cultural problems such as vernacular languages and taboos.
4. Limits stemming from lack of capital both at the top and bottom of society.
5. Limits stemming from the economics of the publishing and broadcasting business.
6. Limits stemming from ideological and political commitments and positions (e.g., accept no help from the "imperialists").
7. Limits stemming from the scarcity of appropriate material technology (such as a \$5 battery operated radio receiver).
8. Limits stemming from the lack of appropriate social technology.¹

Even though both of the above quotations refer to the problems of the new and developing nations, it can unhesitatingly be emphasized that an analysis along the lines suggested by Pool and Fagen, among others, can profitably be applied to the colonial era. The comment that

to a disturbing degree Western political theory has ignored the problems of nation building as a systematic goal of public policy. . .²

seems to be most appropriate here. If the three colonial territories under discussion indeed formed transitional societies, in Lerner's frame of reference³, then inescapably the concern must be with the policies, and policy problems, of colonial powers which controlled these transitional societies and accepted the responsibility for

¹Ibid., 35-36.

²Pye, Communications and Political Development, 12.

³Lerner, passim.

guiding their colonies on their way to modernization.

In a legalistic manner, Terrou distinguished four areas of what is often termed "information law," a phenomenon characteristic of the contemporary development of societies. A convenient division of this law includes four distinct branches:

The first and most traditional may be described as the statute of content. This statute sets, either by enacting precise restrictions or by indicating criteria of guidance, (a) the limits or conditions imposed on the diffusion of facts or the public expression of ideas by the need to safeguard the basic interests of the national community and dignity of individuals; (b) the process of sanction or of prevention or of guidance intended to ensure the respect of these limits or these conditions. . . .

.
The second branch, . . . the statute of enterprise, includes all the provisions applicable to the material means of publication (establishment and functioning of enterprises, their economic and fiscal regime, the special rules and formalities imposed . . . in connection with publication operations). The third branch, called the statute of the profession, which has arisen from the professionalization of informational activities, includes the particular institution and regulations which concern the status of professionals and the exercise of their activities. Finally, the development on the international plane of institutions, conventions, and legal acts of cooperation has given rise to an international statute, which constitutes the fourth branch of information law.¹

Here also Terrou, seconded by Schramm, talks basically about the situation in the independent countries. But national development, that is the economic and social

¹Fernand Terrou, "Legal and Institutional Considerations" in Schramm, 237.

changes taking place in a country on its way from a traditional to a modernized pattern of society, and all the other changes commonly associated with this term, began under the regime of colonial powers. The sophistication of terminology might not have been as great then as it is now but the same principles of development applied. It is the goal of this chapter to survey the role of the colonial powers in the three African territories as regards the development of communications, specifically radio broadcasting, and to compare the similarities and differences of the approaches, as well as the similarities of and differences between the metropolitan and colonial ways of building a new branch of communications.

Pool's, Fagen's, Terrou's and Schramm's conceptualizations as well as those of many others are useful in such a task. In order to present a clear picture, this chapter will look into the policies on ownership and operations of broadcasting enterprises, into the financial policies and planning activities of the three powers, and into the policies on programming, audiences, and personnel of broadcasting institutions in Belgian and French Congo as well as in Nigeria.

Earlier in this study a statement was made that the inter-relationships of communication policies and general development policies of the colonial powers might become recognizable if the former were "superimposed" over the

latter.¹ This, too, will be attempted on the pages which follow.

Policies on Internal Broadcasting
in the Colonies

The colonial authorities, as has been documented in the previous chapter, fashioned broadcasting services in their respective territories well before their colonies reached political maturity and national independence. The development of broadcasting took in each case a somewhat different route, began at different time, proceeded at different pace.

Policies which determined the organizational and operational structures; ideas which expanded into plans of broadcasting systems, both internal and imperial; the degree of willingness or capability, or both, to help the broadcasting ventures financially; intention to prescribe or proscribe the content of broadcasts; desire to help train technical, programming and administrative staff from among the natives; facilitating the availability of receivers, and their acquisition by the general population, or devising alternate methods of reception; these are perhaps the most important among the factors which contributed to broadcasting development in the African territories. They are also the factors on which the three colonial

¹Supra, 105.

powers differed as to their scope and expediency.

In that light, the policies on these and related matters of Belgium, France and Great Britain will be compared.

Ownership and Operational Policies

By the time the three powers took their first steps toward establishing of broadcasting services in their African possessions, the fundamental question of control had long been settled. From the early days of wireless, and firmly based on the situation which developed in their own countries as regards the telegraph systems, Great Britain, France and Belgium maintained the State's right to control the newest communication medium. The authorities of all three powers made this clear in the legislative measures governing radiocommunications: Belgian Congo's Decrees of 1924 and 1934¹, French Congo's Decree of 1930², and Nigeria's of 1935³. All these measures, and others which

¹Decree of September 29, 1924; and Decree of August 15, 1934. I. C. I., Compared Colonial Documentation, (1934), I, 226.

²French Decree of March 10, 1930, actually enforced the 1923 Law (of June 30) and the Decree-Law of December 27, 1851 in the whole of the French Colonies and African Territories under French Mandate. The language of the measure spoke of "emission and reception of all and any kind" and reiterated the concept of state monopoly in radiocommunications. Ibid., (1930), II, 63.

³The Wireless Telegraphy Ordinance of April 1, 1935, No. 3. Collated Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, cap. 213.

amended or superseded them, required that specific authorization be obtained from the state (usually represented by its postal authority) by anyone wanting to operate wireless equipment, always transmitting, and often, even though later, also receiving equipment. That no one was exempt from the provisions of such legislation can be observed, for example, in this provision regulating the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation:

27. The Corporation shall operate all the broadcasting services provided by it in accordance with the terms, conditions and restrictions of a licence or licences granted under the Wireless Telegraphy Ordinance, which the Director of Posts and Telegraphs is hereby authorized and required to grant.¹

Ownership vs. control. --But the control of broadcasting vested in the State did not rule out the possibility that ownership other than by the State could not be authorized. It was this aspect in which the three powers differed from each other. The British, basing their opinion on the experience with the BBC, thought that

there was [not], in regard to most dependencies, much to be said in favor of [conduct of broadcasting services wholly or partly by companies or individuals licensed to do so]; the profit . . . is clearly a necessary condition of any company undertaking such a project . . . and private control has obvious (though not unsurmountable) obstacles to the development of the service as a social and administrative service It may be desirable to set up an organization on the lines of the British Broadcasting Corporation.²

¹Section 27 of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation Ordinance, 1956, No. 39 as amended.

²British Colonial Office, Colonial No. 139 (1937), Sec. 25.

The only exception in the British territories was in Kenya where the Cable and Wireless Company Ltd. operated a broadcasting service for the Colonial Government under a Charter since 1931.¹

Both French-speaking territories, like their respective mother countries, allowed private broadcasting operations -- indeed, without such private initiative, broadcasting quite probably would have come to those colonies much later than it actually did.

In both cases, private broadcasting did not necessarily mean that the operations were commercial enterprises. Reasons for this were both legal and practical. Legally, advertising was prohibited in both territories (unlike the very beginning in France and Belgium where commercially motivated broadcasting services by private companies were allowed)². This, in turn, resulted in a situation where either an organization of radio "hams" (as in the Middle Congo) or an educational institution (as in Belgian Congo) spearheaded the establishment of radio broadcasting.

¹UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, IV, 426; Bebey, 21; Coddington, 51. Actually, charter was in the name of Imperial and International Communications Company which in 1932 changed its name. Tomlinson, 56.

²Supra, 209-13, 216-17. Cf. Bulletin Officiel du Congo Belge, November 1, 1947, which published the text of Act 370 of October 31, 1947 specifically stating that "Commercial advertising by any means of transmission whatsoever is forbidden." Cf. UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 396.

The other reason for non-commercial operation, whether by private concerns operated with governmental authorization or by the states themselves, appears to have been simply the lack of profitable "markets" in that part of the world, and consequently the lack of "sponsors" willing to spend considerable sums of money on what is really advertising and what the French call publicité.¹ That this was the case in the 1930's when radio made its appearance in the French and Belgian Congos can only be deduced from the fact that it was so in the mid-50's, a far more prosperous time than the thirties:

. . . Operating costs must be met. The ideal solution would be to have an independent broadcasting service supported primarily by local resources. This is possible, however, only where costs can be met from the sale of advertising time or from listeners The basic difficulty with commercial services is that in most of the less advanced countries, few markets for products are sufficiently developed to interest advertisers.²

Even where they might have been interested, the legal barriers stood in their way. Kimble, in 1960, made this observation:

In most territories the radio program is still out of bounds to the advertiser, but his trumpeting has tumbled stronger walls than Jericho's, and in time he will surely be granted entry into all broadcasting strongholds of Africa.³

¹Bebey, 13.

²Codding, 50.

³Kimble, I, 472.

Politics and broadcasting: a Nigerian parallel. --

The British authorities insisted from the very beginning on non-commercial broadcasting activities in Nigeria, even though they tolerated the development and considerable expansion of commercially motivated, privately owned wired wireless (distribution) operations. Nigeria also, alone among the three territories, decided to explore the possibilities of commercial broadcasting (on the Federal level) when it authorized for one year a trial of such operation six months before it achieved independence.¹ Eventually, this trial period led to a full blown commercial service.²

All this happened, however, only after the Federal broadcasting service ceased to hold its monopolistic position. In 1954, the third Nigerian Constitution contained a provision which, on the insistence of the Regional Governments, established emphatically

a provision for broadcasting to be a concurrent subject, i.e., within the competence of the Central and Regional Governments.³

Regional competition began five years later, but the above mentioned provision created a schism which, while reflecting the political division of the territory, probably

¹Mackay, 72.

²Ibid., 73. Cf. UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 103.

³Mackay, 58.

also contributed to it. After the Western Region Government set up its own broadcasting (and incidentally also its television -- first in Nigeria) service in 1959, the Eastern Region followed suit in 1960, and the Northern Region in 1962. This broadcasting development can be traced to a historical development of Nigeria as a geographical unit. The artificial political boundaries of Nigeria did not correspond to the tribal boundaries of those populations put together into a single would-be polity. It was for this reason that the first Nigerian Constitution of 1946¹ worked for only a short while, even though some regionalization was provided for. As regionalism intensified, it interrupted the trend toward unification; while regionalism was designed to give expression to ethnic and traditional diversity within Nigeria, it felt short of reflecting the genuine ethnic grouping. Nationalistic tendencies in the Regions grew, and national consciousness and unity of Nigeria declined.

The 1951 Constitution² emphasized both major strands of constitutional evolution, i.e., unification on the national level and autonomy of the Regions. The result

¹The Richards Constitution; Cf. Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Information, Nigerian Constitutional Development, 1861-1960 (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1960), 23.

²The Macpherson Constitution, in ibid., 28.

was that the concept of national unity competed, often unsuccessfully, with regional demands. In 1954, the federal principle was firmly established, but so were the Regions. The 1958 Constitution again sharpened the distinctions. Actually, Nigeria had one Federal and three Regional Constitutions when it reached its independent status on October 1, 1960.

These political developments, the insistence of the British to govern through traditional African chiefs (the indirect rule), and the natural enmity between various ethnic groups, especially Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba, eventually led, in mid-sixties, to serious disturbances and actual disintegration of Nigeria.¹ But the fact that the British were unable, in the decade prior to Independence, to resist regionalism in the broadcasting operation, or unable to make it work better than it did, confronted Nigeria with broadcasting problems not present in other territories, British or otherwise. Perhaps, the beginning of the problems lay in the late start:

Had a national broadcasting service been established in, say 1947 or 1948, it could have emerged as a prime medium of information at a time when it was needed most, i.e., from 1952 onwards. Instead it arrived on the scene too late, too little was offered, and too much was expected. The NBC Charter gave the Corporation a chance of succeeding, but in the long run, the emotional forces against a single corporation were too great. The hardening political climate made the

¹There obviously were other factors involved, among them the fact that the Ibo tribesmen of the Eastern Region were the most mobile group, the most entrepreneur-like, and very active in national politics.

emergence of separate regional broadcasting organizations inevitable and so, instead of one all-Nigerian broadcasting and television organization, we have four. . . .¹

Thus, it is in Nigeria where the interrelationship between the political development and broadcasting can best be observed. The split of Radio-AEF and later of Radio-Inter also shows such interrelationship, but without tragic consequences.

The French "direct-rule." --As seen earlier, the French legislation was applicable to the overseas territories. It is in this that France differed from other powers; in broadcasting, as in all telecommunications matters, the early (1837 and 1851) foresight of the French to include regulation of all kinds of transmission and reception in one statute, and promulgating it to all overseas territories, often in one single law, simplified the operational regulations of broadcasting in the French Congo before and during World War II. After the world conflict, metropolitan legislation was supplemented by special laws, such as that of 1955 which created the Société de Radiodiffusion de la France d'Outre-Mer (SORAFOM).

But while the legislation simplified regulation of broadcasting, it complicated its operation, both in France and in the colonies. The French authorities constituted

¹Mackay, 60.

over the years a number of special commissions or committees which were charged with one thing or another. In 1930, a Comité de Radiodiffusion was established within the Ministry of Colonies,

charged to advise on questions submitted to it regarding the development of colonial broadcasting. ¹

This committee consisted originally of 19 members, later increased to 27², of which only one represented the "Union Coloniale."

In 1938 -- at the time when colonial broadcasting of the French faced its first great challenge³ -- two additional commissions were formed: an interministerial commission consisting of representatives of the Ministries of Colonies, Foreign Affairs, Finance, the P. T. T., Interior and War, and having as its task

to prepare and specify the programs to be broadcast as colonial propaganda in the metropole, and as the liaison between France and her overseas territories.⁴

At the same time, the Ministry of Colonies, established its own Permanent Commission on Broadcasting with practically identical tasks.⁵

¹Arrêté du 6 juin 1930, Journal Officiel, June 9, 1930, 6418.

²Arrêté du 4 décembre 1930, Journal Officiel, December 6, 1930, 13371.

³Supra, 226.

⁴Arrêté Ministeriel du 7 avril 1938, Journal Officiel, April 10, 1938, 4298.

⁵Ibid., 4299.

This represented another difference in the methods of approaching the same problem. In Belgium, the broadcasting service to the colonies was a matter of negotiation between the established domestic broadcasting enterprise (INR) and the Government of the colony. In Great Britain, it was a matter initiated and pursued by the BBC. Only in 1938 did the British Government change its financial policy, and reserved for itself the right to prescribe the languages which such foreign broadcasting service should utilize. The involvement of the Colonial Office in either of these two countries was minimal. In France, on the other hand, the Colonial Broadcasting began as a direct result of the push by the Colonial Ministry in 1930. Whether the real reason for this was the determination of the colonial authorities, or whether the method was due to the less firmly established domestic broadcasting institution (la Radiodiffusion Française was not formed until 1939) cannot be said with any degree of certainty.

Broadcasting in the imperial context. --In comparing the broadcasting policies of the three powers, whether dealing with services to or in the given colonies, some observations can be made regarding the imperial aspects of broadcasting. No truly imperial aspiration of

the Belgians can be found to be in evidence, with the possible exception of the original Empire Service. Though some striking similarities between Belgium and its colony can be noted, there was nothing in Belgian Congo's broadcasting at the time of independence which could compare with the ties, both tangible and intangible, present in Nigeria and the French Congo. When Belgium's idea of a Belgian-Congolese Community jelled in 1958 it was too late to make any difference.

Nigeria's ties were established through the decade of direct cooperation with the BBC personnel.¹ Britain had no desire to form an imperial network of broadcasting (other than that provided by the BBC through live and recorded programs) even though there had been individuals with such plans:

The war 1939-45 brought an immense stimulus to the idea of broadcasting within the British Commonwealth of Nations. . . . People who have thought most deeply about the possibilities of commonwealth broadcasting look forward to a far greater degree of sharing and exchange of programmes. There could well be an organization with its headquarters outside Great Britain. The BBC would then become simply a partner with the other Commonwealth broadcasting organizations in building up a new type of Empire-wide broadcasting service -- created by all and available to all.²

But at best such dreams were unofficial. Officially,

¹The so-called "secondment" of BBC officers must be considered a unique and significant characteristic of Britain's development of broadcasting in Nigeria, as well as in many other British overseas dependencies.

²Beachcroft, 31-32.

only regional broadcasting was thought of (immediately after WWII) for both West and East Africa, but when the plans proved to be unworkable, even regional arrangements were dropped. From then on, practically everywhere a national service became the goal for each non-self-governing territory. There were still regional arrangements within the boundaries of individual territories, such as Nigeria, but this was thought to present a challenge similar to the regional situation facing the BBC. As pointed out, this challenge was far more serious.¹ It was the BBC, and especially its own uniqueness among all broadcasting organizations -- its expertness in broadcasting techniques, its "Mother of Broadcasting Organizations"-type of uniqueness -- and above all, its programming policies of both domestic and external services which were looked upon by colonial possessions of Britain, including Nigeria, as contributing most mightily to the common bond of the Empire.

The French administrative concern with imperial possibilities of broadcasting, though real from the 1930's on, was not immediately reflected in either the number or the quality of established facilities. Only from 1946 (Plan Pleven) and particularly since 1950, a serious attempt and a coordinated effort were made to establish an Empire broadcasting network of the French colonies;

¹Supra, 257-58.

this effort culminated when the undistinguished record of the post-war Service de Radiodiffusion d'Outre-Mer was replaced by successes of the SORAFOM, established in order

to facilitate improvement and development of broadcasting in the territories under the Ministry of Overseas France, through establishing equipment of the Network and through assuring its eventual functioning.¹

The concept of this empire network, primarily intended for Africa, was best explained by the French colonial authorities in 1955:

A reconciliation of the principles of political decentralization [with] the necessity for professional coordination inherent in broadcasting techniques [led to the] concept not of territorial stations without relations among themselves, but of a chain of stations spread over the total of French territory in Africa. This network would function because of the coordination assured by a "central echelon" situated in Paris, the seat of SORAFOM.²

Who helped whom? --The question of the relationship, and its direction, of the metropole and the dependency, inasmuch as broadcasting was concerned can be analyzed in the financial context, as well as in the context of operational sphere. The answer is, perhaps, even more revealing here as it provides an insight into the very basic attitudes of the colonial authorities towards their possessions, and as it contrasts each power's policies with its practices and at the same time

¹Bebey, 32.

²France, Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer, Vers un réseau de Radiodiffusion de la France d'Outre Mer (Paris: Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer, 1955), 12.

shows the differences between each other's modus operandi.

Great Britain, it was already said, offered its particular broadcasting talents through the device of seconding the BBC's high officials sent to Nigeria "on loan" and paid for by grants or subsidies lest the local treasury be unduly taxed.¹ The French policy established a direct help to her overseas territories through the Radiodiffusion (and later also Television) Française which in many instances was responsible for the creation, administration, and operation (including the supplying of programs)² of colonial broadcasting systems.³ In the French Congo, specifically, the RTF had undertaken, in 1950, to create and administer Radio-AEF⁴, and though there later developed some misunderstanding because of the money involved the arrangement was able to be continued until 1958.⁵

In contrast to these approaches, and particularly to those of the French, the method used by the Belgian authorities had been vastly different. It started in 1934

¹Mackay, 79.

²Programs were also supplied to Nigeria by the British; Belgium's INR programs were rebroadcast in Belgian Congo only on rare occasions.

³Cf. Francois Luchaire, Droit D'Outre-Mer (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), 293.

⁴UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 405.

⁵Thompson and Adloff, 316.

when the colony was "authorized" to contribute to the cost of broadcasting by the metropole to the colony.¹ It continued during the war when the cost of broadcasting to the metropole (as all other cost of the Belgian effort) was financed by Belgian Congo.² After the war, it was not the INR, the owner and programmer of its "Goodwill" station in Leopoldville, who operated the station, however. It was the Telecommunication Department of the Congo Government which was responsible for technical operation of the metropolitan stations, while it was also operating Radio-Congo-Belge, and maintaining the studios which were shared by both organizations.³ While the French RTF housed the infant Radio-AEF; the infant Radio-Congo-Belge hosted the metropolitan "Goodwill" station of the INR⁴. A fundamental difference in handling a basically identical situation by the two powers, neighbors both in Europe and Africa.

Planning and Financial Policies

Under the auspices of UNESCO. a number of meetings of experts were held within the last decade to survey the status and explore the possibilities of help to media of mass communications in developing countries. Whether in

¹Supra, 234-35.

²Supra, 93-94, 236.

³UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 396-97, 399.

⁴Ibid., 405; Bebey, 48.

South East Asia, in Latin America or in Africa, the experts in their final reports invariably agreed that "planning for media of information should be a part of the planning for social and economic development by the governments of the underdeveloped countries."¹ And even though the meetings operated in the atmosphere modified by statements such as that

the underdeveloped countries are seeking to attain in a matter of years a level of advancement which it has taken the developed countries centuries to achieve,²

there could be no doubt that the "planning that should be" actually also referred to "planning that should have been."

The expansion of telecommunication facilities, including broadcasting, should be considered part of the overall social, economic and educational planning. The extension of the mass media should therefore be linked to the planning and expansion of other services.

.
 . . . Governments should give particular attention to the establishment of broadcasting organizations with adequate production and transmission facilities to meet the social, educational and cultural

¹UNESCO, Mass Media in the Developing Countries, Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, No. 33 (Paris: UNESCO, 1961). UNESCO, Developing Mass Media in Asia, Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, No. 30 (Paris: UNESCO, 1960). UNESCO, Developing Information Media in Africa, Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, No. 37 (Paris: UNESCO, 1962). UNESCO, Radio Broadcasting Serves Rural Development, Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, No. 48 (Paris: UNESCO, 1965). UNESCO, Radio and Television in the Service of Education and Development in Asia, Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, No. 49 (Paris: UNESCO, 1967).

²René Maheu, Acting Director-General of UNESCO to Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the United Nations, cited in U. N., Economic and Social Council, Freedom of Information . . ., ii.

needs of all sections of the community. The structure and objectives of broadcasting organizations should serve the overall purpose of the country... . . .

 Broadcasting should not be considered a luxury but a vital necessity in the development of the country. . . . It could not fulfill its task of informing and educating the general public in developing countries unless it were available to all.¹

To what extent had the colonial powers measured up to these standards? Had there been any planning, and if so, had it been adequate? These are some of the questions which can legitimately be asked, and which can to a certain degree be answered in terms of the policies and practices of the powers in the three African territories.

It was the First World War which caused practically all major colonial powers to reconsider their basic development policy. This was well illustrated in Great Britain where

hitherto it had been the accepted view . . . that a dependency should have the communication, social services, and so forth which it could afford out of its own revenues. . . .²

France and Belgium also professed this policy, though only the latter power adhered to it until the end.

When applied to development of broadcasting, certainly the Belgian Decree of 1934 calling for at least partial payment toward a broadcasting service to the colony points out that the old policy was still very much alive. In Belgian Congo, all development was paid for by

¹UNESCO, Developing Information Media in Africa, 25.

²B.I.S., The CD&W Acts, 5. British Colonial Office, Colonial No. 139 (1937), Sec. 12.

the colony. A look at the trend of the Belgian Congo budgets reveals that though

[they] at certain times showed a deficit that Belgium had to make good [and though] the situation was particularly critical at the time of the great depressions of the years 1932 and 1953, . . . since the war, budgetary equilibrium has been established. . . .¹

From 1934 on, only the last three years of the Belgian regime in the Congo were marked by the budgetary deficits.²

The surpluses of the ordinary budgets allowed for setting up of reserves in a special fund, to be used in case of a depression, and also to be invested, through a special budget, in the economic equipment of the country. Between the years 1939 and 1959, the surplus of the ordinary budgets amounted to 14,171 million of Belgian Congo francs.³ Except for the amount which had to be transferred into the Special (Equalization) Fund (three per cent of the ordinary budgetary expenses, as prescribed by law), the surpluses financed the expenses of special budgets and constituted investments in an economic and social infrastructure. They were supplemented by loans, and it was at that point that Belgium's contribution began through the guarantees of loans. Thus, Belgium could plan the Congo's economic and other development without direct monetary contributions. In spite of this policy and indeed in spite of the opportunity this policy offered, no broadcasting plan was formulated until 1949, when a four-phase devel-

¹InforCongo, I, 177.

²Ibid., II, 54.

³Ibid.

opment was included in the proposed Ten-Year Plan.¹

The British policy, though changing in the early 1920's, did not affect planning of broadcasting in the colonies until 1949², and in Nigeria until 1950³, when bulk of Britain's financial contribution to Nigerian broadcasting (190,000 pounds out of 205,000) was provided under the CD&W Acts⁴.

There are two aspects of British planning of broadcasting in the colonies which deserve some emphasis here. Firstly, it is a fact that out of the total amount of £205,060 expended by Britain on Nigerian broadcasting, £194,000 were given to pre-Federation Nigeria, i.e., to Nigeria prior to the passage of the 1951 (Macpherson) Constitution⁵. This fact further supports the contentions made in the previous section on the interrelationship of constitutional and broadcasting development in Nigeria.

In the second place, financial support cannot be equated with planning which began, as pointed out, in 1937 with the Plymouth Committee. The time lag, however,

¹J. Grenfell Williams, Radio in Fundamental Education in Underdeveloped Area, (Press, Film and Radio in the World Today) (Paris: UNESCO, 1950), 28-30.

²British Colonial Office, Handbook of Colonial Broadcasting (1964), 2.

³Mackay, 10.

⁴Gt. Britain, Colonial Development and Welfare Acts (Cmd. 672), 1959, 16.

⁵Ibid.

between the first planning, the second planning (1948) and the establishment in Nigeria of the NBS (1951) serves as indication of just one characteristic in colonial development of a medium of information which should have been considered part of overall social and economic planning.

The early broadcasting policy of France in Africa in general, and in the Middle Congo in particular, did not distinguish itself over the early policies of Britain and Belgium. Though the talking stage was reached in the early years of the 1930's, only Madagascar and the Middle Congo could boast of a transmitting station prior to 1939 . But there, as in Dakar, in French West Africa in 1939, the broadcasting stations were set up not because of a particular French policy and plan but rather independently: by the Government-General of Madagascar, by a group of radio "hams" in the Congo, by the French army in AOF. The loss of the international broadcasting station at Allouis in occupied France in 1940 reversed the prevalent policy of "no policy," and in Plan Pleven a broadcasting system for the French Union made its appearance.

The next conscious effort by the French to help broadcasting in the French Union, and especially in the overseas territories, in a systematic way came in 1954, as a result of the difficulties with Plan Pleven. The

original Ten-Year Plan, formalized in 1947, had to be changed to several four-year plans which were to be preferred. The first four-year period was scheduled to end on June 30, 1953, but the date had to be deferred until June 30, 1954.¹ The second four-year plan, though already late, was delayed even more and its financial authorization did not come until 1956. In the interim, special decrees were issued to enable the execution of the economic projects.

If the difficulties appeared in the general development plan, they certainly were present in the broadcasting sphere. The Service de la radiodiffusion d'outre-mer was helping and directing

several stations scattered in Africa, in the Antilles and in the Pacific. The majority of these stations functioned with equipment of bad quality and with personnel often haphazardly selected.²

In 1950, an interdepartmental commission was instituted to study the problem of French overseas broadcasting.³

Among the recommendations made by this commission were the following:

¹United Nations, Progress of the Non-Self-Governing Territories under the Charter (ST/TRI/SER.A.15, 1960-1964) (New York: United Nations, 1959-1964), II, 87. Henceforth referred to as U.N., Progress

²Bebey, 32.

³The Commission mentioned included representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance, Overseas France, Information, Minister of State charged with administering the relations with the Associated States (of Indo-China). Journal Officiel, February 21, 1950, 876. 876.

- (1) That the development of broadcasting means be made an object of a total plan in which considerations will be made not only of technical installations but also the conditions of utilizing such installations, and the creating of personnel who will operate them;
- (2) That appropriate measures be taken to facilitate supplying the stations with programs. (The suggested measures are the establishment of regular circuit for exchange of prerecorded programs or of relaying of metropolitan programs);
- (3) That an effort is made in the area of reception, through distribution of popular radio sets.¹

These and other recommendations were passed on to SOFIRAD (Société Financière de Radiodiffusion), but because of its inexperience in colonial matters, this organization could not discharge its new task.² The Ministry of Overseas France then created SORAFOM (Société de Radiodiffusion de la France d'Outre-Mer) in 1955³ and formalized its legal standing as a state company with legal entity and financial autonomy, in 1956.⁴

France's attitude toward financial aid for her overseas territories is well expressed by the following post-1960 statement:

In the technical and cultural domain, even more than in the purely financial and economic domain, France considers it appropriate to speak of

¹Bebey, 31.

²Ibid., 32.

³France, Services de la France d'outre-mer, Outre-Mer 1958 (Paris: Service des Statistiques d'outre-mer, 1959), 503.

⁴Arrêté du 18 janvier, 1956 (application of the law of January 30, 1946), Journal Officiel, January 20, 1956, 347. This ministerial order was later amended, on November 17, 1956 and May 5, 1958. France, Outre-Mer 1958, 506.

"cooperation" rather than "assistance."¹

But in spite of France's deemphasis of "assistance," the term is fitting, especially in financial aspects of aid to its overseas territories. The importance of how much money was to go to develop broadcasting, and how much of it would be forthcoming from the mother countries should not be underemphasized either in case of France or of Great Britain and Belgium.

Table 3 summarizes the data available on this subject. In the total planning as has been stated already, there were substantial differences. These are vividly illustrated when actual sums of money directed toward the building up of broadcasting are examined. Equally illuminating are the percentages which the total economic development plans reserved for "a vital necessity in the development of a country."²

The per cent of the total plan ranges from .04 in Belgian Congo to 1.2 in French Congo and to 2.85 in Nigeria. But among the figures that could be considered the most valuable comparisons are the per capita figures. The range of these is considerable but the data favor the French territory which between 1946 and 1960 spent on broadcasting about \$2.00 per person, while Nigeria in its Ten-Year Plan of 1951-1960, spent only about 56¢ per

¹Ambassade de France, Aid and Cooperation, 42.

²UNESCO, Developing Information Media in Africa,

TABLE 3.--Financing of broadcasting through the development plans of the colonies

Item	Belgian Congo	French Congo	Nigeria
<u>Development Plan^a</u>			
Total (in millions).....	\$ 1,040	\$ 117	\$ 983.5
Per Capita ^b	\$ 74	\$ 148	\$ 18
<u>Set Aside for Broadcasting</u>			
Total (in millions).....	\$ 23.4	\$ 1.5	\$ 28.1 ^c
Percentage of Plan04	1.2	2.85
Per Capita	3.5¢	200¢	56.2¢
<u>Metropolitan Country's Contribution to Broadcasting</u>			
Total (in thousands).....	nil	\$ 18.6	\$ 567
Percentage of Broadcasting Plan	nil	\$ 12.2	\$ 2.5
Per Capita ^b	nil	24¢	11¢

^aThe length of the development plans varied among the territories: in the Belgian Congo, 1950-1959; in the French Congo (as part of French Equatorial Equatorial Africa), 1946-1960; in Nigeria, 1951-1960.

^bCalculated on the basis of 1960 population data.

^cEstimated 40 per cent of a budget titled "Broadcasting, Film and Public Information."

person on the same item. In Belgian Congo, during the last decade of the colonial regime, only 3.5¢ per capita were spent on broadcasting.

When the actual contribution of colonial powers to broadcasting development is viewed, Belgium, by virtue of its prevailing policy relying on local Belgian Congo resources to finance the total plan, can be observed to have given no direct monetary aid. Great Britain, through the CD&W grants, supported the substantial Nigerian planning, but over the total post-WWII period contributed only two per cent of the budgeted expenditures on broadcasting, though slightly more than ten per cent of the whole Nigerian Ten-Year Plan came from CD&W funds.¹ By far the largest financial support of broadcasting was given by France, both in terms of percentage of the total French Congo's planned expenditures (12.2 per cent) and in terms of per capita contribution (24¢ for every inhabitant of the territory). The per capita figure in Nigeria amounted to only 11¢. The question of the population numbers is often brought out in defense of such data as recorded above. Specifically, however, it must be reemphasized that in Nigeria, the authorities had no accurate figures on Nigeria's total population, and though that fact alone can be used as a rationalization, it appears to be a poor excuse for a colonial power. Belgium, with a far smaller population

¹B. I. S. The CD & W Acts, 23.

than Nigeria, devoted even less money per capita.

Also, it has to be borne in mind that in the twentieth century there were substantial differences in the financial capabilities and willingness of the various powers, and also that the observations recorded in the Table 3 are based upon the 1960 data when broadcasting was nothing new. It is the emphasis on planning for broadcasting which is of concern here, and as reflected by various data, the British in Nigeria and the Belgians in the Congo can be said not to have done as well as the French in the Middle Congo. Some further conclusions regarding finances will be brought up in the next Chapter.

The data indicate that the broadcasting services developed according to the general policies of the three powers on economic development. There was Belgium's expressed desire to have its colony pay for all its needs. Britain maintained a cautious approach claiming that planning, administering, and managing finances were experiences which the Africans had to acquire as part of their training for independence.¹ The French kept insisting on two principles, namely, that

the progress of the economy must keep pace with political progress if stability is to be maintained: [and that] public investments must serve as primer if private capital is to invest in a manner beneficial to [the overseas] countries [associated with

¹Ibid., 3. Coping with the difficulties of obtaining sufficient finances apparently was included in the training process.

France]¹.

All these characteristics can be observed in the field of broadcasting and in its development in Africa. Rapid development of radio services indeed seem to have coincided with speedy change in the French territory from assimilation to autonomy, the former leading to the French Community and the latter to independence with this Community. The British doubled their CD & W grants between 1948-1949 and 1949-1950. It was in that latter period that the first significant contribution to radio broadcasting occurred in Africa (the Rhodesias and Naysaland)². But on the basis of available data, broadcasting continued, in spite of the increased support of it, to be regarded as a nonessential service and one which the British dependencies should finance themselves. Of almost £190 million in CD & W commitments between 1946 and 1959 (March 31), only 2.88 million pounds were allocated by Britain to broadcasting development in all her territories, i. e., 1.5 per cent.³

Before leaving the topic of planning, and before considering some other financial aspects of the colonial

¹Ambassade de France, Aid and Cooperation, 9.

²B. I. S., The CD & W Acts, 27. Gt. Britain, Cmd. 672, 16. UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, IV, 429. The grants jumped from less than £6.5 million to almost £13 million in the periods mentioned. Cf. Peter Frankel, Wayaleshi (London: Fakenham and Reading, 1959).

³B. I. S., The CD & W Acts, 16, 22.

policies on broadcasting, a mention needs to be made of the way in which the powers fulfilled or completed the prerequisite of any planning, viz. surveying, or taking stock of, the existing communication and other situation.

No inventory of mass communications and planning for the whole mass communication area is known to have existed in the three territories during the colonial regimes. Primarily, this seems to be because certain media of mass communication have been traditionally regarded as being in the private, rather than the public, sphere (newspapers and magazines, books, and to a great degree, films). There were other factors, such as mentioned earlier in this section, contributing to the lack of such stock-taking activity. In their general economic surveys, the three powers generally were unconcerned with broadcasting, though other communications matters, such as postal and telegraph and telephonic communications, both wire and wireless, were included. It was not until the "big" development plans¹ were being drawn that broadcasting appeared

¹Belgium, Ministère des Colonies, Plan Décennal pour le Développement économique et social du Congo Belge (Bruxelles: Ministère des Colonies, 1949). France, Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement économique et social des Territoires d'Outre-Mer (Law of April 30, 1946, Plan Pleven). Nigeria, The Ten-Year Plan of Development and Welfare (Revised, 1951-1955).

in any of them. Britain, as noted in the previous Chapter, surveyed broadcasting needs in West African colonies, including Nigeria, in 1948 -- and the Ten-Year Plan reflected the thinking which grew out of that survey. France, in early 1950's, conducted her most comprehensive stock-taking survey¹, including broadcasting. Belgian Congo prepared its Ten-Year Plan, and its four-stage development plan for broadcasting, in 1949. Unlike the other two powers, however, the Belgian authorities in the Congo concerned themselves to a great degree (in financial estimates, to almost one third) with developing listening posts for collective listening, and also with wired wireless.²

License fees for receivers. -- The decision in all three territories not to allow commercial advertising resulted in the elimination of a possible source of broadcasting revenue. Though the instituting of receiver set license fees was nowhere thought of as being the best method of financing the broadcasting services, it most certainly was designed to offset the capital and especially recurring costs of the national service.

As Coddington pointed out,

¹France, Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer, Inventaire Social et Économique des Territoires d'Outre-Mer (Paris: Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer, 1955).

²Williams, 29-30.

. . . receiver license fees are no better than advertising as a source of revenue, since listeners are too poor to provide the necessary funds. They do provide some income, and payment doubtless gives the listener the feeling that the system actually belongs to him. But the yield remains inadequate.¹

Following the pattern established in the home countries, the three territories established the license fee system: Belgium's fee originated in 1930, Belgian Congo's in 1934²; in 1935 Nigeria's receiver licenses were established, thirteen years later than in Great Britain, but only three years after the start of the colonial service³; the French Congo's fees came into effect after 1938.⁴ It is to be noted that in the case of Belgian Congo and Nigeria the fees had been established not to pay for the local (national) broadcasting service, but were directly connected with the empire services of the respective metropolitan broadcasting organizations; only in Belgian Congo, however, did the colonial authorities appear eager to collect the fees in order to offset the cost of the colonial broadcasting.

A few more explanations need to be made on the subject of license fees. To begin with, a question

¹Coddington, 51.

²Decree of August 15, 1934, No. 8; cf. supra, 235.

³Gt. Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Nigeria, 1935 (No. 1763; London: H. M. S. O., 1935), 72.

⁴UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 406.

undoubtedly arose whether the fees were to apply to the set itself, or the place where it was used, or the physical person of the owner. In England, the second alternative has been used, and the term "household" employed in the definition. In that country, "household" now includes a car, and therefore car radio, as well as portable, especially transistor, sets are considered covered by a single license issued to a household. In the other two Continental countries, and all three dependencies in Africa, license fees referred to a receiver set.

Though the regulation apparently is legal, it is unenforceable, as some legal experts pointed out.¹ What is apropos here is that the British officials in Nigeria promulgated a system unlike that of Britain, even though the advantages of the "per household" system must have been known. The advantage is, of course, from the point of view of the listeners; it must be assumed, then, that the license fee was destined to contribute to the State revenue. In that case, however, the authorities should have anticipated that either some sets would not be declared, or that the growth of broadcasting and its availability to great masses would suffer, or both. In either event, the policy on licensing fees, as practiced not only in Nigeria, but also in the two Congos, produced one or the other undesirable effect.

¹Eugene Pons, License Fees for Radio and Television Sets, Legal Monograph No. 1 (Geneva: E. B. U., 1964), 12.

The fact that in Belgian Congo the Congolese owners of receivers paid substantially lesser fees than the Europeans (except during the early years when the fees were not differentiated) is interesting in that it could have been potentially very beneficial to the growth of broadcasting in that territory. The African paid only one-fifth of the fee assessed on a set owned by a European, 48 BC francs as opposed to 240 BC francs per annum. The potential, however, was never realized for this fee was still very high in relation to the income of the Congolese.

Yet, at least that much was done for the African by the Belgians, while France and Britain had done nothing comparable. In Nigeria, the original 10-shilling fee remained unchanged during the colonial regime; in the French territory of the Congo, it changed almost as often as it did in France. The financial aspect of the licensing fees will be taken up again in the discussion of the policies on listenership.

No less interesting is the number of undeclared receiver sets. As Coddington suggested, the yield of the fees had been inadequate. In the post-WWII survey of the UNESCO the undeclared receivers represented the following percentages of the total estimated number of sets: in Belgian Congo 27 per cent; in French Congo about 60 per cent; and in Nigeria some 50 per cent.¹ The comparatively small

¹UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 399, 406, 429.

percentage figure for Belgian Congo can, perhaps, be explained by noting that

. . . at the present time the majority of the sets in use are owned by Europeans, so that it may be roughly estimated that there is one set for every four members of the non-African population. . . .¹

With approximately 35,000 white settlers in Belgian Congo in 1950, the ratio of Europeans vs. African-owned receivers can be estimated at close to nine to two. With this ratio and less than 8,000 declared, that is licensed sets, the receipts from the fees amounted to just over 1.5 million BCFrs, only about 15 per cent of the Radio-Congo-Belge budget that year (1950).² In the French Congo, only 2 per cent, approximately, of the total budget (CFA Frs. 13.14 million) of Radio-AEF in 1951 came from the 850 paid for receiver licenses³, and in Nigeria, in 1955-1956, even less than that: 1.6 per cent (£4,180) of the budget of £256,580 was brought in from 8,360 licenses.⁴

The licensing policy of the three powers, then, actually ended in three undesirable results: (1) there were substantial numbers of undeclared sets; (2) licensing mitigated against widespread ownership of receivers; and (3) the revenue from the licensing fees was negligible.

¹Ibid., 399.

²Ibid., 396.

³Ibid., 405.

⁴Codding, 51.

Supporting financial policies. --Finally, the tariff and fiscal policies of the colonial powers ought to be mentioned. UNESCO in 1948 recommended that

governments of the underdeveloped countries might consider reviewing their tariff and fiscal policies with a view to facilitating the development of the information media and the free flow of information within and between countries.¹

The so-called Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials constituted an international convention designed to eliminate trade barriers to the free flow of such materials. By 1960, all three powers ratified this Agreement but failed to extend it to the three territories in question.

The importance of this policy comes to the fore when it is viewed in relation to the practices pertaining to custom duties, and to the imposition of other taxes or fees. In Table 4, information as of mid-1950's is assembled.

It can be seen that the highest aggregate of taxes at that time existed in the French territory, amounting to, for radio receivers, more than 21 per cent of the set value. Nigeria possessed the second highest rate, though special sets (and parts), valued at no more than £15 were exempt from custom duties. With the exception of Nigeria, where

¹UNESCO, Mass Media in the Developing Countries, 39.

only materials of an essential nature that cannot be obtained elsewhere are licensed to be imported from dollar and other non-sterling sources,¹

the other two colonies made no legal distinction of the place of origination, though in the AEF, imports from non-French franc area depended on the availability of foreign exchange. In Belgian Congo, the long-established requirement of "open-door" trade policy remained in force until the end of the colonial era.

TABLE 4.--Import duties and taxes affecting broadcasting

Item	Belgian Congo	French Congo	Nigeria
Radio Receiving Sets	15% ad val. .05% stat. tax	12% ad val. .75% ad val. stat. tax 2% stamp duty 6.38% sales t.	Up to £15 value: exempt Wired-wireless sets: exempt
Radio Parts	same as above	same as above	Up to £15 value: exempt Other: 20% ad valorem
Sound Recordings	same as above	same as above	Educational, scientific and cultural materials: exempt Other: 20% ad valorem

Based on UNESCO, Trade Barriers to Knowledge (1955), 38-39, 113-15, 208-09, 333-35.

¹UNESCO, Trade Barriers to Knowledge: A Manual of Regulations Affecting Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials (2nd ed. revised; Paris: UNESCO, 1955), 208.

Policies on Programming, Professional
Training and Audiences

Three distinct and yet interdependent factors are the subject of this section. Undoubtedly, programming and the quality of it is directly related to the quality of the professional staff, which depends on the training programs available to those who work in broadcasting. Audiences, i.e., their numbers, also depend on the programming which is available to them, though this is true more of advanced societies than of those where radio ownership is in many cases still a luxury, and where listenership still is something of a novelty.

But even to the African who is affluent enough to have had the opportunity of being a listener for a long time, radio broadcasting was still very important because, as one of them said,

. . . it corresponds perfectly with our African civilizations which are not civilizations of the written word but of the spoken language. We like this form of disseminating news and ideas, because it is addressed at each one of us, and because we do not need, necessarily, to learn to read and write to understand the message which comes to us.¹

With what kinds of audiences were the colonial powers concerned? What type of programming did they make available to the native population? In which way was the problem of training the Africans for broadcasting handled? Some tentative answers are provided on the following pages.

¹Bebey, 5. Francis Bebey is an African, born in Douala in the former French Cameroon.

Policies on listenership. --The problem of reaching an audience, though it does have its particular aspects in less developed countries, had been sufficiently familiar to the major powers by the time broadcasting reached their colonies. Basically, in all countries, this problem is twofold: the broadcasting service must be made very widely available, and the programs produced for the audience must be appropriate to that audience.

Undoubtedly, all three colonial powers solved the problems at home relatively soon. This is not to say that the metropolitan audiences have always been satisfied; but a look at the availability of transmission facilities, number of listeners or at least of licensed sets, and the type of programming broadcast by the stations in Great Britain, France and Belgium in the early 1930's, some seven or eight years after the very first local station went on the air, would reveal that both aspects of the problem had been fairly satisfactorily solved long before broadcasting activities began in the dependencies. If the suggested minimum (i.e., 5 receivers per 100 population) facilities, as expounded by UNESCO, be applied to the metropolitan countries, Great Britain would be found to have reached it approximately in 1927; France and Belgium in the 1930's, i.e., within five to ten years of the beginning of broadcasting in those countries.¹

¹BBC, Handbook, 1964, 186; Brockhaus, 1935, XVI, 209.

In Africa, the policy on listenership took three available routes: (1) the ownership of individual broadcast receiving sets in the homes; (2) subscription to wired wireless systems; and (3) collective, sometimes called group or community, listening.¹ The first alternative might seem, at least in a democratic society, to be the most desirable. It existed in all three territories, but as mentioned above, at the beginning and in some instances for quite some time, the ownership remained to a large degree in the hands of the European populations. The observation that in Belgian Congo the license fee was considerably less for African than for European owners would indicate a desire on the part of the Belgian authorities to make the ownership easier to achieve by Africans. The truth of the matter is, however, that the annual tax of BC francs 48 (approximately \$1.00)², alone amounted to more than four per cent of the per capita personal income in 1950, and between 1.3 and 2.3 per cent in 1957, depending on whose data are used.³ In addition, it will be seen that collective listening was considered the most desirable form, and actually could be

¹Williams, 138-39, makes a distinction between community and group listening, but this distinction is not of too great importance in this discussion. Under both kinds of listening, large numbers of people listen to broadcasts on one set only.

²UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 399.

³U. N. Progress, . . ., II, 19; Kimble, II, 482.

said to have been the official policy of the authorities.

In Nigeria, similar economic problems had to be overcome. As late as 1948 when the Turner-Byron Report on West African broadcasting was made,

millions of rural Africans had income approximating one shilling a day, . . .¹

while in the urban areas

weekly incomes were in the range from twenty-five shillings for an artisan, to £7 for a first-grade government clerk.²

The majority of those who would have benefited from owning broadcast receivers earned thus about £15 or 300 shillings a year, and the license fee amounted to 10 shillings per year, that is 3.3 per cent of their income.

The French authorities in the Congo faced similar problem. The tax of CFA francs 300 in 1950 (i.e., \$1.70) represented a substantial portion of per capita income of less than \$100.³

But the license fee, in spite of the fact that it represented a burden to the African and for that reason had often been ignored by him, emerged in the African broadcasting situation as only a small problem. The purchase of the set was a far greater obstacle to the African population, as was the difficulty of finding a relatively inexpensive receiver suitable for use in tropical climate.

¹Mackay, 7.

²Ibid.

³Kimble, II, 482.

The first receiving set especially made for tropical Africa was the "Saucepan Special," so called on account of its shape. The surprising thing about the history of this receiver is not the shape or other technical characteristics, but rather the difficulty which the broadcasting official in Northern Rhodesia (it was there that the request originated) had in persuading manufacturers to produce the set. Designed in Northern Rhodesia by an engineer with long experience in the colony, for more than three years the set could not find a manufacturer -- a surprising fact considering the potentialities of the African market.¹ By 1949, the first sets were made and delivered, and though the Northern and Southern Rhodesias and Nyasaland obtained most of them at first, some of the sets eventually found their way to other countries, including Belgian Congo and Nigeria.² In Belgian Congo, these "Saucepan Specials" must have been very few and far between, if,

in 1950, 5,226 receiving sets were imported [and] the average sales price of the receiving set [was] 5,000 [BC] francs (U.S. \$100).³

This would indicate that it had not been the policy of the Belgian to encourage individual ownership of sets by Africans.

¹Codding, 52; cf. Williams, 61-64. Frankel, *passim*. In French, the set was called "Radio-Casserole," Bebey, 62.

²UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 399, 429.

³Ibid., 400.

Another instance of the lack of interest on the part of manufacturers was demonstrated in the early fifties when the Nigerian Government wanted to supply the market with receivers suited to local needs.¹ Sets selling in Nigeria for £5 and 10 shillings (\$15.40) began entering the country, and between 1953 and 1958 almost 140,000 radios (battery operated, short-wave sets) were imported. Nigeria, however, also needed more expensive sets for its medium-wave broadcasting service, and

despite [some] attempts, much has yet to be done to assure provision of an inexpensive and reliable set for the underdeveloped countries. Many cheap sets have too narrow a frequency range and are often unpleasingly designed It is strange that no manufacturer or group of manufacturers has made any serious effort to capture the African market. . . . Governments, on the other hand, could do much to encourage the production and sale of a low-cost set. . . . Above all, why do governments stress the need to provide people of little means with an inexpensive set and at the same time impose on receivers import duties of as much as 60 per cent?²

None of the three territories imposed such high import duty, but only Nigeria exempted the low-cost receivers from any tax. But why indeed did the colonial authorities concern themselves so little with a medium of which they all said it can educate and inform better than any other?

The other two methods of listening should have been, at best, alternatives, not substitutes. Again, different policies that were operative at the period are now

¹Codding, 52.

²Ibid., 53.

observable. In wired wireless listening, Nigeria without question made the greatest stride as it had the longest history of that type of broadcasting service. Already in 1948, the British policy was to allow wired wireless to function side by side with regular broadcasting. Actual data on facilities in Nigeria at the time of independence indicate that the growth of the broadcasting service did not result in the suffocation of rediffusion. On the contrary, the rediffusion service grew from serving less than 1,000 subscribers in 1939¹, to serve 74,000 subscribers²; in broadcast receivers, comparative figures would be less than 2,000 in 1939³ and 143,000 in 1960⁴. The rate of growth was almost identical.

The two Congo territories also considered employing radiodiffusion system in the 1950's, but only the French colony put the scheme into operation, and only on a very small scale. Belgian authorities in the Congo only planned, within the broadcasting program of the Ten-Year Plan, such wired wireless systems, but no further mention of it could be found anywhere.⁵

¹Mackay, 3.

²Royal Institute of International Affairs,
Nigeria, 120.

³Mackay, 3.

⁴UNESCO, R-TV Statistics, 50.

⁵Only the UNESCO survey of all countries and territories (1947-1951) reported the use of wired wireless in the French Equatorial Africa and the intended use of it in Belgian Congo. UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 399, 405.

By far the greatest supporter of "community listening" was the Belgian Congo. The authorities there, according to Kimble, had taken the view that

. . . the needs of the people are best served by providing community listening facilities in the rural areas and rediffusion systems in the larger centers, . . .¹

But as noted above, the wired wireless system did not get very far. The government concentrated on "community listening," and in 1951 operated 50 such centers², a number which increased towards the end of colonial times to 61.³ The equipment was a combination receiver-public address system, thus allowing not only broadcast relays from a distant station, but also origination of local "programs," i.e., local news, talks and even music.⁴

Nigerian experience with community listening was not too good. Six sets of collective listening apparatus (a receiver and a loud-speaker) were put into operation in the rural areas but

the Post Office [did] not intend to increase the number of collective-listening centers. The results [were] not encouraging; too many staff [were] needed, repairs [were] difficult and the population [did] not seem greatly interested in this form of reception.⁵

In toto, the British, in their policy enunciated in 1937,

¹Kimble, II, 155.

²UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 399.

³UNESCO, R-TV Statistics, 46.

⁴UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 399.

⁵Ibid., 429.

clearly indicated that in their thinking, "community listening" was the most economical method of listening; they did not, however, prescribe it as the one to be preferred.¹

The French did believe in community listening, and established listening centers at all larger towns in the AEF Federation.² The French, however, were sympathetic to the idea of the private ownership of radio receivers:

for some years the Grand Councilors³ urged the government of the federated territory to distribute to Africans without charge several thousands battery-operated sets. . . .⁴

"Such largesse of free sets was clearly beyond the Federation's means,"⁵ and so only a few free receivers were ever distributed. A logical place in AEF for such community receivers was in the cercles culturels, meeting places of the community groups which had been established by the French for the purposes of adult education.⁶ The number of

¹British Colonial Office, Colonial No. 139 (1937), Sec. 19.

²UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 407.

³Members of Grands Conseils, a political organ of the AEF Federation in which representatives, selected from the elected Territorial Assemblies, met to discuss those aspects pertaining to the Federation which were analagous to those of the local territorial assemblies. No legislative power resided in the Grands Conseils. Luchaire, 374.

⁴Thompson and Adloff, 317.

⁵Ibid.

⁶This was the more popular method of adult education in the French territories. Another one consisted of mobile teams which visited various villages and initiated a variety of improvement projects. Pierre Fourré, Rapport sur l'expérience d'éducation de base organisée par le gouvernement general de l'Afrique Equatoriale Française en Oubangui-Chari (Paris: n.n., 1952), 1ff.

receivers made available under the Grand Conseil's recommendation could not amount to too many, as there were, in 1956, only thirteen such cercles culturels.¹

As far as policies were concerned, the French ideas of free sets, the British desire to make available fairly large numbers of reasonably inexpensive receivers, and the average price of a radio set in Belgian Congo, can be laid side by side and compared with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information in 1948 which recommended measures to enable the general public to obtain radio sets at low prices and to reduce the inequalities in information facilities, inter al.²

The number of receivers and the number and powers of transmitting¹ facilities in the three territories are represented in Table 5. It has been suggested³ that because of the variations in the types of listenership, assessments of the comparative reach of radio broadcasts made on the number of receiving sets per given number of population should always be treated with caution if not with distrust. Though this premise is true, it is nonetheless

¹United Nations, Special Study on Social Conditions in Non-Self-Governing Territories (New York: U. N., 1958), 11.

²United Nations, United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information, Geneva, 1948 (No. 1948.XIV.2) (Geneva: U. N., 1948).

³Codding, 27-28.

TABLE 5.--Colonial broadcasting transmission and reception facilities

Year	Transmitters			Transmitting Power (kw)			No. of Radio Receivers			No. of Radio Receivers per 100 Population		
	Belgian Congo	French Congo	Nigeria	Belgian Congo	French Congo	Nigeria	Belgian Congo	French Congo	Nigeria			
1939	3	1	0	1	.05	0	1,660	500	2,000 ^c	.0159	.06	.010
1946	7	3	2 ^a	61	60	1.3 ^a	5,200 ^b	1,500	3,600	.05 ^b	.23	.016
1960	12	9	27	19125	126	141	35,000	11,000	143,000	.25	1.39	.26

^a1949

^b1948

^cestimate

Francis Bebey, La Radiodiffusion en Afrique Noire (Issy-les-Moulineaux: Editions Saint-Paul, 1963), 28, 46-51. Thomas Gradin, Political Use of Radio (Geneva: Geneva Research Center, 1939), 97. UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio (Paris: UNESCO, 1951), V, 395-400, 405-407, 427-29. UNESCO, Statistics of Radio and Television 1950-1960 (Paris: UNESCO, 1961), 38, 50. United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1963 (New York: United Nations, 1964), 685-786. United Nations, Progress of the Non-Self-Governing Territories under the Charter (New York: United Nations, 1960), I, 66.

thought that in a study dealing with the policies, and their results, it is valid to look comparatively on the growth of the radio broadcasting medium in the three colonies.

So far, an attempt has been made to look at the policies of "having an audience;" "reaching the audience" is an entirely different, and much more difficult if not impossible task. This is a question of programming.

Programming policies. --In all three territories, the authorities were insisting on certain standards which the programs of the local radio stations had to meet. The Belgians stated that in Belgian Congo,

programmes must have a real educational, moral, artistic, literary or scientific value,¹

which is very much like the prescription decreed in Belgium itself in 1930. Belgian Congo's broadcasting organization, Radio-Congo-Belge, was assisted by special consultative boards, one for European broadcasts and the other for broadcasts to Africans, just as in Belgium, the 1930 legislation directed the INR to draw upon

the resources of organizations whose messages might be of special interest to the public.²

This, in turn, can be compared with the development in Belgian Congo of production studios owned and operated

¹Bulletin Officiel du Congo Belge, November 2, 1947, No. 370, 1131.

²Emery, Journalism Monographs, No. 1, 5.

by recognized organizations and groups to whom licenses could be issued to operate production studios, in accordance with the 1947 legislation. Such groups were mostly private, but sometimes semi-official, organizations, and among those which were authorized to operate studios and produce programs were the Ex-Servicemen's Association (Union des fraternelles des anciens combattants de 1940-1945), a high school association (Les Amis de l'Athenée), and a Jesuit College.¹

The programming in the French territory of the Congo was guided by the maxim "Instruct, Educate, and Inform," on the Radio-AEF, later on Radio-Inter-Equatoriale; not too long after Independence, it had to be reported, though, that

the programs produced or transmitted by Radio-Congo consisted in 1960, of about 80 per cent of musical programs. The news did not occupy but 12 per cent of the time.²

This attempt to depart from the prescription could have been a natural result of several years of "French-type" broadcasting which was considered highly "talkative" in its programming.³ Radio-AEF, as noted,⁴ was born through an agreement between the Governorate-General of AEF and Radio Television Française in 1950. Administrative, technical

¹InforCongo, II, 175; cf. UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 397.

²Bebey, 93.

³Cf. Mathieu in Childs and Whitton, passim.

⁴Supra, 239-40.

and programming functions were all placed under the metropolitan broadcasting organization, but the financial burden was on the colony. In 1951, for example, over 13 million CFA francs was paid to RTF.¹

Barely three years after Radio-AEF had begun operating, the RTF cancelled the agreement, charging that the subsidies were not sufficient. The loss of Radio-Tchad the members of the Grand Conseil did not mourn, but a desperate effort was launched to save the all-territory station. After lengthy negotiations, a new agreement was reached, and a two-hour daily broadcast schedule for 10,000,000 CFA francs per year began. Thus, the bill was reduced by one-third approximately, but the service was reduced by two-thirds, as a six-hour daily schedule had been in operation earlier.²

The basis for the Nigerian broadcasting, as far as programming is concerned, was laid almost fifteen years before the service began. Said the Report of the Plymouth Committee:

We envisaged the development of Colonial broadcasting -- and its justification -- . . . also as an instrument of advanced administration, an instrument not only and perhaps not even primarily for the entertainment, but rather for the enlightenment and education of the more backward sections of the population

¹UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 405. (Additional CFA francs 2.75 million were paid for the operation of Radio-Tchad).

²Thompson and Adloff, 316.

and for their instruction in public health, agriculture, etc. . . .¹

In 1951, the first Director-General-designate of the NBS indicated that though entertainment will "naturally"² always be radio's biggest selling point to the public, the NBS was to concentrate on three phases,

entertainment, news, and information, each designed and presented to raise standards and appreciation. . . . Broadcasting was to play a dominant and vital role in spreading knowledge and understanding.³

And though the ordinance did not mention (nor did the 1956 ordinance creating the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation) any specific kind or type of programming, the basis laid by Britain in 1937 remained. As already indicated, the desire by Nigeria to emulate the BBC resulted in a very similar type of programming structure. In addition, the NBS and later NBC always were attempting

to ensure that the services which it provides when considered as a whole, reflect the unity of Nigeria as a Federation and at the same time give adequate expression to the culture, characteristics, affairs and opinions of the people of each Region or part of the Federation.⁴

This programming obligation had no parallel in the two Congos, even though the French, of course, administered a Federation of four territories of which all were served from the Middle Congo by Radio-AEF and later by Radio-Inter. Other obligations, however, were in

¹British Colonial Office, Colonial No. 139 (1937), Sec. 14.

²Quoted in Mackay, 14.

³Ibid., 32.

⁴Sec. 10, (3), of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation Ordinance, 1956.

existence there.

In the French Congo, the RTF, the operating agent, had been subject to a myriad of restrictions spelled out by a great number of legislative or ministerial enactments. From 1939, e.g., a rule existed that

all broadcasting stations which do not fulfill a national purpose will be suppressed.¹

Altogether, the review of the obligations and restrictions can be supplemented by saying that nothing contrary to laws, public order, decency, national safety, and nothing offensive in any way was allowable for broadcasting purposes. In this respect, no difference existed between broadcasting in both the African territories and in the metropolitan countries.

No special requirements regarding news programs were in existence: in Belgian Congo, where from 1944 to 1945 Radio-Congo-Belge had been operated by the wartime Belgian National Broadcasting Service, the ideal of an impartial news broadcasts was accepted as heritage of the INR.² The heritage of BBC in Nigeria broadcasting could not but include the news,³ for

¹Decree of August 29, 1939, quoted in Mathieu, in Childs and Whitton, 185.

²UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 396. Cf. Emery, Journalism Monograph, No. 1, 5.

³Mackay, 94.

[the] long association [between NBC and BBC] was responsible for establishing a pattern of public service broadcasting which has remained unchanged for the last thirteen years. It is as ingrained today as when first introduced by the BBC administrators who served [in Nigeria].¹

The reputation of French (metropolitan) news programs had never been too high,² but no serious criticism of news broadcasts coming from Brazzaville could be found. On the contrary, the absence of complaints about Radio-AEF in the territorial assemblies and in the Grand Council was thought to be significant, and a statement was made that

Radio-AEF was giving more satisfaction to its audiences in the late 1950's than at any other time.³

With regard to news, two more items are worth reporting here. While in Nigeria broadcasting news was respected, and actually emerged as a model for Africa⁴, an evaluation of the Belgian Congo newscasts presented a different picture in that part of the continent:

Radio Congo Belge was perhaps a greater success with its African than with its Belgian listeners. Most, though not all of the Belgians I knew were somewhat suspicious of the Congo radio and preferred to listen to Radio-Brazzaville, which they felt gave better, more detailed, more accurate, and more frequent news programs. Africans did not seem to be so involved with this particular problem, but they, too, listened to Radio-Brazzaville as well as Radio-Congo-Belge. Other

¹Ibid. The author wrote this in 1964.

²Mathieu, in Childs and Whitton, passim.

³Thompson and Adloff, 316.

⁴Mackay, 36.

other stations were heard in the Congo, too, . . . Radio-Congo-Belge was, of course, as tightly controlled as was the press in the Congo, and the result was that the listeners turned to other channels; this is not so say, of course, that it was not heard in the Congo -- it was widely heard, but it was not widely trusted.¹

Kimble also suggested that the role of radio in tropical Africa should not be judged solely on the basis of territorial facilities.² How some colonial powers felt about this prospect can perhaps be seen from the policies on broadcast receiving sets. Africans themselves apparently did not feel that way. A Nigerian radio official when confronted with a question suggesting that receivers in the hands of ordinary people might lead to a full grown broadcasting system but produce no regular domestic listeners, a Nigerian official replied:

Well, it's up to us to deliver a program that will hold their attention. What is democracy for, if it doesn't mean the right of people to listen to any station they want to?³


Other officials -- and authorities -- felt apparently the same way about the need for attention-getting programs. In Belgian Congo, for example, the 1947 Legislation stipulated that the programs (which had to have a real educational, moral, artistic, literary or scientific value) had to be "prepared and produced in such a way as to interest the public."⁴ But then, all

¹Merriam, 55, 56.

²Kimble, II, 153.

³Ibid., 154.

⁴UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 396.



broadcasting activity anywhere needs to be concerned with this.¹ The colonial authorities in Belgian Congo specified such a concern in an enactment, obviously for the benefit of the operators of private stations and production studios. The other two colonies needed no such specific measures, as they operated exclusively state broadcasting systems.

The molding of the colonial broadcasting in the image of the metropolitan service can also be observed in the requirements of all to include in the broadcast schedules certain government announcements, as the authorities might from time to time request. In France and in the French Congo, this was implied by the solid monopolistic position of the state; in Belgian Congo, as in Belgium, this was included in the legislative measures.² The Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation Ordinance also included such provision,³ which in Britain has consistently been part of the "License and Agreement" between the Postmaster General and the BBC.⁴

¹Williams, 109-123.

²Bulletin Officiel du Congo Belge, November 2, 1947, No. 370, 1132. Bulletin usuel des lois et arrêtés, 1930, 1044. Cf. Emery, Journalism Monographs, No. 1, 5.

³Sec. 19 (1), The Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation Ordinance, 1956, No. 39.

⁴Sec. 15 (3) of the 1952 License and Agreement.

Languages used in broadcast programming. --The language policy of the broadcasting organizations reflected well the general policy relative to the mother tongues of the metropolitan countries and the spreading of that tongue to the colonial possessions. In all three cases, the colonial powers began broadcasting in only the language of the colonizers: French and Flemish in the Belgian Congo, French in the French Congo, and English in Nigeria. In the domestic broadcasting, the need for the use of vernacular languages soon was felt, and since 1949 in Belgian Congo at least four main native languages were used, even though the African programs amounted to only about 20 per cent of the total programming of Radio-Congo-Belge.¹ In the use of vernaculars, the Belgians built upon the educational system which taught, at its elementary level, a great number of people in the native mother-tongues. The direct rule, though, even when modified, required knowledge of French on the part of at least some Congolese; the authorities, however, were not interested in assimilating the natives, and certainly not in the creation of an elite² -- and the teaching of French (and Flemish) was not encouraged.

The British also used vernaculars in their education

¹UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 397.

²Helen Kitchen (ed.), The Educated African (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 192.

of the native Africans, but only on the very primary level; the English language was regarded as a necessity in all schooling above primary grades.¹ In broadcasting, English was used throughout the broadcast schedule, though newscasts and certain other programs were broadcast in number of vernaculars, by 1960 amounting to seventeen. But even in broadcasts to schools, Nigerian government officials and the broadcasting organizations stressed the need for programs in English.² Broadcasting in English was for Great Britain a wonderful opportunity to carry out its work of civilization.

No other colonial power felt such opportunity more strongly, however, than did France. Their deep commitment to using French as the carrier and disseminator of culture and Western civilization could not produce a vernacular broadcasting service, as it would have led to "an indirect encouragement of the citizenry's disunion."³ To Frenchmen, and to Africans in any French territory,

that would be like [asking] the French network [to] broadcast daily in provençal or in breton, thus indicating to the people of these two provinces that

¹Gt. Britain, Colonial Office, The Place of the Vernacular in Native Education (African, No. 1110; London: H. M. S. O., 1927), 4.

²Mackay, 81. The first Ford Foundation Grant to Nigerian educational radio programs stated that "the programs should primarily be designed to improve English language usage."

³Bebey, 158.

they are finding themselves on French soil just because they are not somewhere else. The language is the first ingredient of unity of a country.¹

While the French were willing to concede that any modern language was better than any vernacular in scientific instruction, they were convinced that no other language could surpass French as the most effective means of communicating the literary, spiritual and humanistic treasures of civilization which -- according to them -- reached its peak in the French culture. The French were proud of their language's richness of vocabulary, order and clarity of its syntax, the harmony of its pronunciation.

It is no wonder that at the 1944 Brazzaville Conference it was decided that it was most desirable to use French exclusively as the language of instruction at all levels and in all territories², even though other civilizing and acculturating programs could be modified by special adaptations to local conditions.³

Equally understandable is the French belief that . . . no reconciliation, i.e., assimilation of the Metropolitans and the natives is in effect possible when both are hitting against impassable barriers of linguistics.⁴


To them, the French language has been much more than that; it has become the language of all humanity.

¹ Ibid.

² France, Ministère des Colonies, Conference Africaine (Paris: Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer, 1945), 12. This was simply a reiteration of the official policy since 1890's.

³ Grenier, 132.

⁴ Ibid., 133.



Policies on professional training for radio broadcasting. --Radio broadcasting is not unique in its demands for trained personnel, but as a new activity in which the colonial governments had engaged, the new medium possessed a very low priority in the total development programs. This was quite naturally reflected in the low priority as far as training was concerned. And yet, it was pointed out that

the first essential in organizing a broadcasting system in an underdeveloped area is a local staff skilled and experienced in the fundamental art of presentation,¹

and, it could be added, in the technical operation and maintenance of the system.

At the very beginning, all three colonial powers relied on staff brought from the mother country. The difference between the training policies of Great Britain, Belgium and France can be seen in the degree in which the colonial authorities were willing to train local staff, and in the method through which this was to be accomplished.

Again, the overall colonial policy on political development can be easily seen in the area of staff training for broadcasting. The British policy, as can be recalled, directed itself to an eventual self-government. The complete "Nigerianization" of the broadcasting service, as in other governmental and non-governmental activities,

¹Codding, 54.

was the ultimate goal.¹ Already the first Director-General of the Nigerian Broadcasting Service, T. W. Chalmers (1951-1957), stated that

the declared aim of the NBS is to train Nigerians to run the service with the same standards as those set by the BBC. Nothing less is worthy of this country and people.²

As the broadcaster-historian commented, this statement was made just one year after the establishment of the service, and at that time ten per cent of the staff were the so-called "expatriates," mostly the British on secondment from the BBC.³

The training method employed by the British was the "on-the-job" instruction by experienced BBC staff members who conducted workshops or training sessions in the African countries:

Staff training and development had to proceed simultaneously, and shortage of teachers, facilities and equipment made the utmost demands on the people involved. Training was to be in Nigeria where Nigerians would learn by actual operation and example and at times this was accomplished at the expense of listeners. The advantage of course was the immediate evaluation in learning by actual performance and personal application to the problems. This more than offset the disadvantage of having semi-trained staff on the air.⁴

¹Bebey, 158.

²T. W. Chalmers, Five Years of Broadcasting 1951-1956 (Lagos: Federal Information Service, n.d.), 13.

³Mackay, 38. Mackay himself was an expatriate, but a New Zealander. He was the last expatriate Director-General of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation from 1961 to 1964.

⁴Ibid., 39.



The emphasis on training within Nigeria increased as time went on, but it was by no means the only training scheme put into operation. Provision was made for selected¹ candidates to undertake the BBC courses in Great Britain. The Staff Training Department of BBC, established in 1936², was reorganized in 1941 to be able to absorb personnel from other Commonwealth countries.³

The program of Nigerianization progressed slowly in all departments (programming, administration, news) with the exception of engineering where it proceeded too quickly, and where consequently the degree of competence declined. The total broadcasting operation of the NBC achieved full Nigerianization by 1964 when E. V. Badejo took over as the first native Director-General of the Corporation.⁴

The system of training in the French-oriented and associated territories took an entirely different route. Though from the first, some Africans had been employed by the regional management of the Radio-Télévision Française in Brazzaville (which also operated the Radio-AEF until

¹In Nigeria, the employment in broadcasting was associated with educational achievements, and a fixed pattern of selection and recruitment, based on listed qualifications, was established. Ibid., 40.

²BBC, Handbook, 1964, 155.

³Ibid., 75; Mackay, 40.

⁴Mackay, 154.

1957) , the training within a French overseas territory was minimal. The Metropolitan Broadcasting Organization trained some Africans, in production and technical services, on the spot, but the unique training scheme was developed in 1954 when the Studio-School of Overseas Broadcasting (Le Studio-École de la Radiodiffusion Outre-Mer) was established:

In France, a novel experiment was begun . . . when a broadcasting station was constructed in the Forest of St. Germain, near Paris, for the training of staff for overseas stations. The station, whose transmitter caters for listeners in the neighbourhood, includes studios and other equipment. An attempt is made to reproduce the actual conditions which trainees will encounter in their home territories One of the centre's major purposes is to make possible the "steady Africanization" of higher level staffs of overseas territories.¹

The selection of candidates for the Studio-School is by competition. The idea behind the training at this school, which preceded the establishment of the SORAFOM just by a very few months, was the need to localize (Africanize) the middle- and upper-echelon personnel. In this, the concept was similar to that of the British, but unfortunately,

this apparent analogy remained theoretical only during the first few years of existence of the studio-school; during those years, the competition for entry into the school was open to Africans as well as Europeans -- to young Frenchmen, to be exact. That was an error for it needs to be recognized that the Africans and the Madagascarians recruited from the training, being almost always less educated than the Frenchmen, were because of it destined to hold only

¹ Coddington, 54; cf. France, Outre-Mer, 1958, 504.

secondary positions in the overseas radio stations, whose directorial positions were entrusted to the more educated former students, the Frenchmen.¹

In spite of this problem, the efforts of the Studio-School appear to have been appreciated. From the French point of view, perhaps, the mixing of the French and territorial students only supported the long-standing French notion that they all were Frenchmen.

Thus, it might be concluded that Africanization, though practiced in broadcasting training by both France and Britain, did not mean the same thing to both. For Belgium, however, Africanization was a term practically unknown, and creation of an elite -- strongly implied in any organized training for positions of responsibility in broadcasting -- considered undesirable. The 1920 premise of the Belgians

. . . not [to] attempt to form Europeanized natives but to train Africans better equipped for life, possessing greater skill, and instructed in the knowledge that suits their mentality and their environment,²

was pursued throughout the colonial regime whose

. . . aim was to lead the Congolese toward a measure of civilization and progress rather than to form a small group of ersatz European elite who would not be likely to have an interest in the welfare of the masses of Africans.³

¹Bebey, 159-160.

²Kitchen, 142.

³Pierre Ryckmans, former Governor-General of the Belgian Congo, in 1953, quoted in ibid., 192.

For broadcasting, there was no formal or informal training scheme ever established by the Belgians. Engineers and technicians for the Telecommunications Department of the colonial government were trained at the Colonial School in Belgium, but they all were Belgian nationals.¹

At one time, a privately organized course, with some relevance to broadcasting, was offered by a Belgian journalist:

. . . [the] nine-weeks' course in journalism which included a special lecture on broadcasting . . . was opened only to Africans working in press and radio. It was attended by three members of the African Broadcasts staff of Radio-Congo-Belge and four members of the Colonial Army engaged in the preparation of the army's educational programmes. So far this is the only form of professional training for radio that has been given in the Congo itself . . . Programme staff for Radio-Congo-Belge is engaged by the Ministry for Colonies, but there is no organized training course.²

In retrospect, the lack of policy, on the part of the Belgians, for training Africans in broadcasting, is in sharp contrast to the other two powers' policies, but in complete agreement with the Belgian point of view pursued in the sphere of political and educational development.

¹UNESCO, Press, Film, Radio, V, 400.

²Ibid.

International Involvement of Colonial
Powers and Their Colonies in
Broadcasting Matters

In the process of doing this study, a number of rather interesting discoveries were made pertaining to the involvement of colonial powers with radio communication matters on the international level. When probing the areas of international organization and of regulation in the field of telegraphic as well as radio communications, the possibilities were revealed of discovering striking differences in the approaches of the major powers to communication problems in the international arena.

Clearly, it was outside the scope of this work to include a substantial discussion of this nature. On the other hand, a complete neglect and disregard of the existence of a promisingly fertile field of study seemed equally unthinkable. The compromise resulted in brief descriptions of some of the most intriguing aspects which will have to await further attention -- by this or some other writer -- at a more opportune time.

The Wireless (Pre-Broadcast) Era

In most instances, there appears to have been differences of opinion between Great Britain and France in matters involving wireless and its international regulation. From the time of the first Radiotelegraph Conference in 1903 at Berlin, these two powers, with very few

exceptions, stood on the opposing sides of most arguments. While Britain was intent on preserving the lead of the British Marconi over its non-British competitors, France, often with considerable support of other nations, was equally intent on breaking the British Marconi's monopoly. The study of what today appears to have been a tug-of-war between the two major powers tends to provide some support to the contentions made earlier in this chapter, as well as to explain further the reasons why each power acted the way it did at any given time in its colonies and other extensions of its empire.

Not only the major powers, but even a small colony like Belgian Congo could be discovered to have made a significant contribution to radiotelegraphic regulation of service between fixed (as opposed to ship-to-ship or ship-to-shore) stations. In 1912, Belgian Congo was looking ahead and toward the day when it would have a direct communication with Belgium.¹ Together with its mother country, it planned to span almost 3,800 miles between Brussels and Boma, the then capital of Belgian Congo.²

Belgian Congo, therefore, suggested that the service between fixed points be provided for in the regulations that were being drawn up in London. The British

¹Bureau of International Telegraphic Union, Documents: Conférence Radiotélégraphique Internationale à Londres (Geneva: I. T. U., 1912), 8.

²The Statesman's Yearbook, 1914, 702.

objected but a recommendation to the effect that no inter-communication could be allowed to be refused because of the use of apparatus of different makes, was put forth. Great Britain refused to allow the interpretation of this recommendation to imply an obligatory service, and finally proposed a regulation which gave each country the right to organize the services between fixed points. Though in this argument there were no winners, the fact that Great Britain was not permitted to "steal another march on other powers"¹ was considered very significant. No less significant was the Belgian Congo's plan itself, especially because of its early introduction into the sphere of communication possibilities. The First World War delayed considerably its fulfillment but the service was finally reported to be in operation in 1925.²

The Broadcasting Era, 1927 On

Early after the introduction of broadcasting as a form of communication, problems began presenting themselves and began also posing a new challenge to international legislation. In addition to technical questions, such as assignments of wave-lengths specifically reserved for broadcasting, there were problems of copyright to be settled, and also the international aspects (from the

¹Tomlinson, 36.

²The Statesman's Yearbook, 1925, 703.

audiences' point of view) to be recognized and solved. Even the League of Nations became concerned with the issues, especially the last mentioned.¹

Some Continental concerns suggested an international conference at Geneva, but an insistence was expressed on participation by the British Broadcasting Company. J. C. W. Reith, the BBC's Managing Director, declined to participate mainly because the sponsoring Swiss organization showed a greater interest in proselytizing Esperanto as an international language than in solving broadcasting matters.


. . . Why not spread British thought in English or French which are increasingly understood?²

Reith noted on that occasion.

From this humble beginning in 1925 grew a number of related issues which put the British interests often at odds with the interests of other nations, and particularly those of France. The imperial rivalry between the two powers in the field of international regulation of broadcasting as well as of other telecommunications could easily be documented from the reports of various conferences, from the 1903 Berlin Conference on. One instance of this rivalry involved international broadcasting, and though it concerned primarily (but not exclusively) the broadcasting station Radio-Luxembourg, which beamed commercial programs -- to England -- in English, it deserves

¹Briggs, I, 310.

²Ibid., 311.



a further mention here because of the principle which was at stake.

The principle was that of the right to engage in broadcasting to other countries in whatever language. It seems safe to conclude that France was actually defending commercial interests in broadcasting; on the other hand, it also must be stated that France did not attempt to prohibit the practice of commercial international broadcasting even though it was also directed against their own State broadcasting service -- in French. The British, however, appear to have altogether discarded the principle primarily because the financial benefits accrued to the competitors. Some British companies were in on the deal together with the French but

. . . it was naturally a matter of some distress to the companies to be dependent on a French group, and they made strenuous efforts [in 1937] to extend the scope of their operations. . . .¹

It was at this time that the British commercial interests proposed the operation of a broadcasting station from aboard ships, an effort which did not succeed and which was outlawed -- on the insistence of the British Government -- at the 1938 Telecommunications Conference at Cairo.

But the whole episode is puzzling for one major reason -- that of the British insistence at 1932 and 1938 conferences that broadcasting ought to be considered only

¹ Sir Osborne Mance, International Telecommunications (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), 39.

a national service,¹ while the British Broadcasting Company in 1924-1925 fought for the establishment of an international body on the basis that broadcasting is international in scope. J. C. W. Reith himself stated in 1923 that he would have liked to organize broadcasting in India from London.² The late 1920's were filled with plans for international broadcasting by the British Broadcasting Corporation. Why should it be right "to spread British thought in English or French"³ in 1924, in Arabic in 1938, and in some 40 other languages in 1960, but no foreign thoughts in English in the 1930's? Though it might appear that the difference was considered important on account of the type of propaganda used, it seems highly probable that the place of origination had always been of primary import.⁴

As already indicated, the inclusion of the communication policies of colonial powers on the international level should be used as illustrative of the differences among the powers in attitudes⁵ as well as methods, and at


¹Tomlinson, 160, 224.

²J. C. W. Reith, Into the Wind (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1949), 113.

³Supra, 332.

⁴Cf. supra, 333.

⁵Note that attitudes of the three powers toward internal systems of broadcasting also differed significantly; infra, 341.



the same time exemplifying the relationship of their policies in communication matters with those pertaining to other areas of colonial and imperial endeavor. Business, shipping, monopolistic and imperial considerations dictated the international actions of perhaps most powers, but certainly and especially those of Great Britain.

CHAPTER VII

BROADCASTING IN THE LIGHT OF GENERAL COLONIAL AND IMPERIAL POLICIES

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has concerned itself since its inception in 1946 with the standards of various mass media in all countries, and on the basis of many surveys, it determined which nations provided for their populations a sufficient access to news and information. In one such survey,

UNESCO adopted the criterion that a country is inadequately supplied with information media if it has less than 10 copies of daily newspapers, less than five radio receivers and less than two cinema seats per 100 inhabitants.¹

The survey found that there existed a wide gap between the standards of developed countries and those of the so called developing nations. It also found that

in the field of broadcasting, as of other media, Africa is by far the worst equipped. With [a few exceptions], few countries have as many as one receiver per 100 inhabitants.²

Many factors have since been cited as having

¹Codding, 48. This criterion was first mentioned in UNESCO, World Communications, 1959 (3rd ed.), 48-49.

²Codding, 48.

contributed toward this wide gap between countries and continents, and some correlations were found between number of receiver sets and some economic and educational indicators, such as per capita income and the level of literacy.¹ A question, however, which might -- and should -- be raised is whether colonial policies of the metropolitan countries had been among the contributing factors. In a simple language, this question can be rephrased to read "Why did the colonial powers not reach these minima in their respective dependencies?"

Why, indeed, did the Independence Day in Nigeria, the French Congo and Belgian Congo in 1960 see the number of radio receivers at such a low level, when broadcasting had already such a long history there? Broadcasting was introduced to the three African territories, in one form or another, some twenty-five years before the territories achieved independence. If the colonial powers themselves could have achieved almost six times the minimal standard in receiver sets², why had not even the bare minimum been reached in the dependencies?

The question in the above paragraph is indeed raised in a serious vein. It has been generated by such

¹Cf., UNESCO, Mass Media in the Developing Countries, 16ff.

²The 1960 data for number of receivers per 100 population in Belgium, France and the United Kingdom were 28.9, 28.5, and 29.3, respectively. UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 266, 280, 332.

comments as that of a UNESCO official who stated that the underdeveloped countries were attempting to attain in just a few years, what had taken the developed countries centuries to achieve.¹ In broadcasting, this clearly could not be the case.

An analogy can perhaps also be made with the development of roads and railroads. Though obviously begun later in the colonies than in the mother countries, the difference in time certainly did not amount to centuries. There had been considerable growth of roads and railroads in all three territories, and even though in neither of them these communication means were as developed as in the metropolitan countries, the gap was substantially less pronounced there than in number of radio receivers per capita.

What it amounts to is perhaps the fact that the benefit of the development had to accrue primarily to the colonial powers rather than to the population of the colony itself. Undoubtedly, railroads were built in the first place for the benefit of the commercial interests which at the beginning were indeed not in the hands of the natives. The benefit of radio broadcasting, however, would have accrued to the colonial populations. Radio broadcasting could not compete with railroads and other developments, as far as their importance, as perceived by the colonial powers, was concerned.

¹Supra, 179.

Perceived importance leads to the establishment of priorities and this becomes an important aspect of policy-making, if it is not in itself a policy. The previous chapters discussed the main policies which operated in the development of broadcasting. Were some of these policies of such a nature that they did not allow for the minimum to be reached? Is there something to the difference between the developed and the developing, between the governing and the governed, between the "haves" and the "have nots"¹ than can be explained by the policies?

Pace of Broadcasting Development

The growth of broadcasting facilities was summarized in Table 5.² A look at the data reveals that the initial thrust on developing broadcasting in the French and Belgian Congos had occurred during the Second World War. A relatively great increase in the number and power of transmitters took place there between 1939 and 1946, i.e., in about six years of time marked by the national and international emergencies. If no other data were available, this might quite possibly be interpreted as a tremendously good achievement in the betterment of the inhabitants in the two territories. Such an interpretation might, on the other hand, be misleading, if a realization were made that the reasons for such rapid and

¹Schramm, 9-17.

²Supra, 311.

substantial development had not been based primarily upon the concern of the authorities for the native populations but for the populations of the metropolitan areas of France and Belgium, respectively. The growth in the number of receiver sets undoubtedly occurred, and in percentages this growth had been substantial (in both territories, the number of receivers per 100 inhabitants grew by approximately 213 per cent during the war years). This occurrence, however, was incidental rather than a result of a deliberate policy; as already pointed out, the receivers were more often than not in the hands of Europeans rather than Africans.

Under the circumstances of war, the purposes and rationales of the colonial powers must be considered in a somewhat different light. The gravity of the situation on the European continent at that time required that some such steps be taken. Yet, the fact remains that the policy of the colonial powers at that time considered radio broadcasting not as a medium of information for the African dependencies but for the European powers and their own home populations, just as it had been the policy in the thirties to introduce the medium as an extension of the domestic broadcasting service primarily for the benefit of the colonialist (i.e., non-African) inhabitants.

The situation in Nigeria was somewhat different, but it too can serve to emphasize a similar point. The

British territory had no broadcasting transmitters on the air until well after the World War II. During the war, there appeared to be no need for Great Britain to do what for the exiled French and Belgians had been imperative: to obtain a strong voice that could be used not only for propaganda and counterpropaganda purposes, but also as rallying point for the domestic populations in the war efforts on the side of the Allies. It could, perhaps, be argued -- and it is suspected, argued quite convincingly -- that while Britain did not need Nigeria for broadcasting, maybe Nigeria needed Britain: history seems to rule out an absolute need of this medium in Nigeria, as the task at hand apparently had been performed well by other media, especially by film¹, but that broadcasting, had it existed in Nigeria at that time, could have contributed substantially cannot be doubted; it has never been officially explained why broadcasting had not been brought into the picture at such an opportune time. The delay before the war led to another after the war. Broadcasting for the Nigerians did not become a reality until some thirty years after the medium had been "discovered" -- and Nigeria was one of the largest and the second most populous of all British Colonies, after India.

The pace of development is often explained by the availability or non-availability of financial resources.

¹UNESCO, The Use of Mobile Cinema and Radio Vans in Fundamental Education (London: UNESCO, Film Centre, 1949), 24.

To say that money was not important would be unrealistic, but to explain delays and even non-action on the part of the colonial powers simply by the lack of money is only a rationalization. In transportation, for example, the French in the AEF spent more money per capita than did the British and the Belgians in their respective colonies, but transportation facilities not only did not grow more but actually declined (in terms of mileage per capita) over the post-WWII data.¹ In education, a similar occurrence could be observed in Nigeria: less money was poured into educational development by the British there than by the other two powers in the two Congos, but the education index of elementary enrollment ratio² showed an achievement in that area of endeavor higher than in the two Congos where the colonial powers spent considerably more per capita on education.³

¹Based on data taken from the development plans for the three territories, and from United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1963, 319, 373, 378-79, 389, 391.

²This ratio expresses elementary school enrollment as a percentage of the population between the ages 5 and 14. Cf. UNESCO, World Survey of Education (Paris: UNESCO, 1960), I, 58-60.

³Based on data of the development plans. Nigeria spent only 41¢ (U.S.) per capita on education, the French Congo \$1.24, and Belgian Congo \$3.85. The education index for the Belgian colony in 1960 stood at the lowest level of all three territories, 56 compared to 75 in the French Congo and 80 in Nigeria.

It could well be that financial expenditures should not be considered as important as some other factors, such as attitudes of colonial powers toward a particular sphere of development or their perception of the attitudes' importance. A positive and enthusiastic attitude quite conceivably could have resulted in a greater achievement and a negative, apathetic attitude led to less achievement than money could buy. In other words, it might indeed be true that money was not everything.

The attitudes, perceptions, and commitments of colonial powers played a crucial part in broadcasting development on the local (colonial) level. The absence of concern for the indigenous populations, the lack of the powers' perceptiveness of the importance of broadcasting to those populations, and the powers' unwillingness to make a commitment and consider broadcasting a vital force in nation-building, these seem to emerge as the most important among the dominant factors affecting particularly the early stages of colonial policies on broadcasting. These factors were reflected either in the procrastinations with which the development of broadcasting had to contend, or in the lack of policies which would facilitate such development, or in a combination of both.

The want of the concern, of the perceptiveness and of the commitments did not, however, manifest itself

to the same degree in every case. Often, the need had been modified by the overall imperial philosophies of the colonial policies on political, economic and social matters, and by their particular administrative ways and methods.

The relationship between the general colonial policies and the development of broadcasting was pointed to at the outset. It was suggested that

by "superimposing" the communication policies over the general policies on political, economic and social development, a composite picture should emerge in which the interrelationship of various policies, and similarities and differences between policies of the three Powers, will be clearly recognizable.¹

The "superimposure" will be attempted in the following section of this chapter. Immediately afterwards, the imperial philosophies and their reflections in the field of broadcasting will be discussed as a climax of the investigation, for it is the contention of this writer that the development of broadcasting, the degree of rapidity and intensity of its development, and the place which broadcasting was allocated in the social, economic and political life of the colonies was primarily a function of the imperial plans and practices of the three colonial powers.


¹Supra, 68.

The Interrelationship of General Colonial
Policies with Policies on the
Development of Broadcasting

To view the policies on and practices in broadcasting against the background of general colonial policies seems to offer a very profitable way of analyzing the development of broadcasting in the colonies. The approach actually appears to reinforce the notion that broadcasting, just as other electric communication means which preceded it, had been conceived and utilized not at par with other social developments or economic institutions but only as channels useful for nothing more than helping to carry through other policies, practices and developments which on the whole were judged more important. In other words, broadcasting appeared at the conclusion of the colonial era in the three dependencies to be not agents of social and political and economic interaction, but at best as channels used in such interaction, and molded in the image of political structure within which it was to be used.

Policies on Political
Development

Policies and practices of colonial powers in political development of colonies are reflected in the policies and practices in broadcasting. For example, the idea to federate the colony of South Nigeria and Protectorate of Lagos with Northern Nigeria was within a few



years paralleled by the concept of regional broadcasting, later changed, as the autonomy of various regions changed, into several independent broadcasting services.

In the French territory of the Congo, the assimilation policies, as far as political institutions as well as broadcasting services were concerned, resulted in organizational structures and operating procedures identical with those found in the metropolitan country. In Belgian Congo, broadcasting, though controlled by the state, could not be said to have formed a unified structure under the Belgian administration; serious, conscientiously applied planning was missing in that territory in broadcasting as it was on political level.

Policies on and practices in political and educational development are also reflected in the kind and degree of training made available for broadcasting personnel. Nigerianization was the announced goal, and training program designed toward reaching that goal. The French, maintaining the assimilation goal even through the stages of policy of association, conveniently applied the principles of equality also in training, so that in many instances Frenchmen were trained alongside the Africans, and were allowed to compete on an equal footing with them. In the Belgian Congo, no plans for equality or "Congolization" existed on political level and no training scheme for broadcasting was developed.

The Administration Methods

An application of the administrative methods used by the colonial powers can also be seen in the broadcasting field. Nigerian regionalization of broadcasting services is an example of the indirect method; direct administration and control of broadcasting could be seen in the French Congo; mixed administration methods were present in the Belgian territory, where direct control was interspread with indirect control, e.g., in the state and private broadcasting structure.

Use of the vernacular languages likewise can be paralleled with the method of administration. In Nigeria, though English was used throughout the colonial period, many vernaculars were introduced into the broadcasting schedules on a regular basis. In the French Congo broadcasting vernaculars were relatively unimportant, though they became more important after the French Community was established. The mixed administrative method in Belgian Congo showed through in the separate programming services for European and African audiences.

The Economic and Social Development

The economic development policies also provide examples of parallelism with broadcasting. In the British situation, all communication links between the home country and the colonies were considered mainly to the extent in

which they contributed to the enhancement of trade, industry or financial imperialism of Britain. Broadcasting also formed such a link, and was originally meant to enhance cultural imperialism. In the strictly economic sense, broadcasting facilities were to be preferably of British origin, though some non-British equipment had to be used.

The French established their own protective economic policies, designed to benefit the whole French empire but often enhancing only the interests of metropolitan France. Tariff and fiscal policies as applied to radio receivers and radio parts, as well as to educational program materials, can be cited as examples. Economic policies regulating the Belgian colony reflected the international concern with that part of Africa, where the ideal of an "open-door" trade policy was to remain. Economic profits, however, were deliberately applied toward the social and health benefits of the Congolese, and not to any communication media. As in trade, Congolese broadcasting depended more on contacts with the rest of Africa and the world than with Belgium itself.

The summary of the few observations and conclusions as well as some others, is recapitulated in Table 6, and includes information on the interrelationship of broadcasting development with colonial policies on Empire relations. This relationship is judged to be of such

TABLE 6.--Interrelationship of general colonial policies with policies on development of broadcasting

Item	British Policies in Nigeria	French Policies in the Middle Congo	Belgian Policies in Belgian Congo
Political Development	<p>Form of Federation agreed on, and broadcasting system designed in line with political system.</p> <p>Conscious effort to guide Nigeria to self-government; in broadcasting, to full self-sufficiency (total Nigerianization of broadcasting staff vigorously pursued). Training devised toward the achievement of that goal.</p>	<p>Assimilation was the heart of French policy; colonies were just French soil overseas with institutions just like those in metropolitan area. Broadcasting was to be no exception.</p> <p>The concept of colonies as Overseas France served conveniently to apply "equality" to all Frenchmen, who eventually competed for top staff positions in broadcasting.</p>	<p>No political development contemplated by the Belgians. Though this cannot be said of broadcasting development, in practice the Belgians did very little beyond contemplating. No true, conscientious planning of African broadcasting.</p> <p>No political rights of the Congolese until just prior to 1960. No desire to create elite, political or otherwise. No training scheme in broadcasting.</p>
Policies on Administrative Methods	<p>Indirect method of administration grew into, or greatly supported, the political Regionalism. This reflected in broadcasting systems, one federal and three regional. On both levels</p>	<p>Direct method of administering the territories was reflected in the organization and operation of broadcasting. Only once was there a serious disagreement (on broadcasting) between France</p>	<p>Mixed administration was evidenced in Belgian Congo; in broadcasting, this operated as it suited the authorities. While paternalism can be seen operative in broadcasting, so can indirect</p>

TABLE 6.--Continued

Item	British Policies in Nigeria	French Policies in the Middle Congo	Belgian Policies in Belgian Congo
<p>Policies of Administrative Methods (Continued)</p>	<p>(political and broadcasting), Regionalism had serious consequences in the post-Independence era. Indirect administration used vernacular languages; same in broadcasting. The single most important unifying factor -- English language -- lost some ground. Indirect method evident in form of operation allowed in broadcasting: from a governmental service to a public corporation.</p>	<p>and French Congo -- and it was raised by the <u>Métro</u>, not by the colony; the issue in question could be said to have been "not enough direct control." Language always French; vernacular languages only incidental in political and broadcasting matters. Direct method: State-owned broadcasting system.</p>	<p>methods through which Congolese were made to feel equal to the Belgians (cf. maintenance of <u>Métro</u> broadcasting facilities by the Congolese). Programming separate for Europeans and Africans: vernaculars stressed, languages of the colonizers not judged too important. Mixed system (private and state operation of broadcasting).</p>
<p>Policies of Economic Development</p>	<p>Policies (mercantilist, industrial or financial) were more important than broadcasting. Communication included in economic considerations only to the extent in which they helped the</p>	<p>Protective policies and devices established in order to enhance the interests of the whole France (incl. territories). If not the practices, the principles of economic, political and</p>	<p>Profits of trade passed on to the Congolese in social and health benefits, but access to information means was regulated considerably. Belgian Congo depended</p>

TABLE 6.--Continued

Item	British Policies in Nigeria	French Policies in the Middle Congo	Belgian Policies in Belgian Congo
Policies on Economic Development (Continued)	<p>advance of economic imperialism. Later economic plans included broadcasting, but for another decade there was no action.</p>	<p>communication assimilation were liked by Frenchmen everywhere.</p>	<p>on foreign trade, but was independent of foreign trade of Belgium. In broadcasting there was greater influence of Africa and of the world than of I.N.R. of Belgium.</p>
Policies on Empire Relations	<p>Great Britain wanted, and needed, to be a colonial power. A loose federation of nations was considered most appropriate. Imperial communication policies were based on trade and defense, not on desire to connect colonial peoples with "Home."</p>	<p>Competition with England often forced France into colonial role. French imperial planning included communications for trade and defense reasons; also to proselytize French civilization. In broadcasting, <u>Radio-Brazzaville</u> was synonymous with African broadcasting. Stress on people, through citizenship.</p>	<p>No desire, no experience, a little ability to be a colonial power. Belgo-Congolese community was proposed too late and with little conviction to be acceptable. In wireless telegraphy and "beam" radio, some glimpse of imperial thinking -- but this was not carried over in broadcasting.</p>

interest and import that a discussion of it is contained in a separate section.

Broadcasting and the
Empire Policies

The earlier description¹ of imperial policies on communications suggested that imperial cohesion was enhanced by the availability of communication links. This was stated to have been particularly the case in the British Empire where the communication system "was valuable in serving the cause of national and imperial solidarity."² In the French Empire, communication links helped establish the idea of commonality, of being a part of one France, one French culture.³

Solidarity Within The Empires

But the two largest Empires were just as dissimilar in structure as they were in the policies and philosophies governing the structures. The degree of solidarity in the two Empires can be observed when Wright's point of view of distinguishing integrated and non-integrated communities is used as a base.⁴

When a community is non-integrated, Wright terms

¹Supra, 115 ff.

²Leigh, in Ogburn, 134; supra, 136.

³Supra, 56.

⁴Wright, 275.

it to be only inter-national in scope, and says that in such a community, "value symbols are formally accepted by the governments but not sentimentally accepted by the peoples."¹ The structure of the British Commonwealth provides for a loose association inter nationes, while the French Union, later the French Community, emphasized relations intra imperium. There the sentimental acceptance and support of value symbols was very much in evidence, even though it was not universal, or without reservations. Assimilation, for example, was acceptable, even though it would have been preferred as assimilation by, rather than assimilation of, the Africans.² The French Empire was also much more integrated through its political and administrative arrangements as well as through popular feeling toward France and French culture, than was the British Empire, built upon no special formula of a constitutional form³, and in which stress was put on governmental relations rather than on the feeling of the populace.

¹Ibid.; supra, 113.

²Léopold Sédar Senghor, "Vues sur l'Afrique Noire, ou Assimiler, Non Être Assimilés," in La Communauté Impériale Française (Paris: Editions Alsatia, 1945), 97.

³Lord Hailey, "British Colonial Policy," in Royal Institute of International Affairs, Colonial Administration by European Powers, 91.

The case of Nigeria. --The above contentions can be illustrated by citing lengthy political discussions over constitutional matters of Nigeria.

From 1946 to 1960 Nigeria was on the move. Four separate constitutions were operative and the third was amended several times during its existence. The Nigerians claimed the British were hedging and the British retorted they were exercising caution and spreading the risks. In Nigerian eyes there were too many checks and balances and the British were still controlling and not advising.¹

And even though the transfer of power from the British to the Nigerians was accomplished very peacefully in 1960, the secessionist movement in some of the Regions within a few years of Nigerian independence could be taken as supporting the premise that personal attitudes of Nigerians were not necessarily identical with governmental opinions.²

The constitutional matters in Nigeria included broadcasting services, first by deliberate omission, and later by direct commission. The latter came about as a result of a 1953 political crisis in which the concept of "One Nigeria" proved to be the loser. The Nigerian Broadcasting Service carried the Governor's statement criticizing a political stance of the Western Region's Action

¹Mackay, 57.

²Cf. David A. Apter and Carl G. Rosberg, "Nationalism and Models of Political Change in Africa," in The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (Wash., D.C.: George Washington University, 1959), 11.

Group led by Chief Awolowo, but did not obtain the permission to carry a rebuttal. "The die was cast,"¹ and soon afterwards the Regions obtained specific constitutional rights to operate broadcasting services of their own.

The solidarity in Nigeria was considerably upset, though the complete breakdown of the British-devised political broadcasting plan did not occur until some years later. In the matter of personnel, including those in broadcasting, there seems to be a curious coincidence in dates: the first recorded criticism of the British staff members was reported to have occurred in 1954.

As far back as 1954 a Nigerianisation committee observed, . . . the present predominance of imported officers in the senior ranks of the civil service seems, to large numbers of politically conscious Nigerians, to belong to a past political order, and to be out of keeping with recent advancement and irreconcilable with political aspirations. . . .²

Technological and material progress could have contributed to imperial solidarity, even though the sentimental tendencies and practical considerations moved Nigeria toward the nationalistic expression of Nigerianization. That there was technological and material progress in Nigeria could not be doubted, but broadcasting was conspicuously absent until 1951. The fact that it arrived on the Nigerian social and political scene so late must have had an effect, for broadcasting had become not the contributor to solidarity, but a part of the slow disintegration

¹Mackay, 58.

²Ibid., 92-93.

to which solidarity was being subjected.

Solidarity in assimilation. --In the Middle Congo, the French political philosophy of assimilation was never seriously questioned, even though in some other French overseas possessions, particularly in North Africa, assimilation policies were actively resisted. When General de Gaulle, in 1958, made the statement outlining his concept of the French Community, he declared, for France, that the refusal of the French proposal meant the dependency desired "to break every tie" with France.¹ The French were in this entirely different from the British, whose motto might have been "We'd like to have you, but if you don't want to, we continue to be friends."

Surprisingly, only one French territory broke the ties with France immediately and completely (Guinea), though eventually other newly independent nations also withdrew from membership in the French Community. But those withdrawals did not constitute complete separation from France, and in every case (Mali, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta and Dahomey) ties of cooperation were maintained. On the British side, a number of former dependencies declined involvement in the Commonwealth over the years (Ireland, Burma, the Union of South Africa, Western Samoa and Southern Rhodesia) and a greater number refused to accept the British Sovereign as their Head of State

¹The New York Times, September 5, 1958, 11:5.

(India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Botswana, Cyprus, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Singapore, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Nigeria). It is suggested that a possibility exists of the relationship between the membership of an imperial structure, and the broadcasting services (and the concept of them) which exist within that structure for the purposes of maintaining it. Investigation of such relationships presents a challenge which was outside the scope of the study of colonial and imperial policies.

The situation in 1960 in the French and British territories, in terms of broadcasting and particularly in terms of the receiving capabilities of the populations, clearly indicate the advance of the French Congo.¹

As stated, the British had no imperial broadcasting system in operation, nor did they plan any. What the British did rely on was the General Overseas Service of the BBC, the successor of the Empire Service. In the French Community, however, there actually existed a broadcasting network (réseau) almost immediately (December 31, 1958), consisting of twenty-one stations and with two additional stations expected to join the following year. This is how the French described the purpose of this

¹This would also be true if the whole AEF were considered. There was at least one receiver per 100 population in the French Equatorial Africa. UNESCO, World Communications, 1964, 76-77.

network:

A great portion of the broadcasts by the network has for goal nothing else but direct intervention in the social life of the territorial population, by fundamental educational campaigns in various domains (hygiene, agriculture, . . . economy, civic affairs), [by elevating the status] of local folklore, by organizing audience-participation programs, [and] by penetrating into the bush through utilization of some 58 dialects.¹

While the French were in a position to continue their assimilation policies, even they apparently decided to undertake the task through the indirect method of vernaculars, rather than through the use of only the French language as had been the case until then.

No union, no solidarity. --The point of the previous discussion -- that the imperial policies, even though they were different on either side of the English Channel, did have an effect upon the development of broadcasting in Nigeria and the French Congo -- comes to the fore when the lack of imperial policies of Belgium is reemphasized, again in terms of broadcasting. There is very little evidence which would support an existence of even a concept of an empire. Belgium administered a colony, but it did not have a desire to establish an imperial organization. It did not have a desire or see the need to build any communication link, broadcasting or otherwise, which would be useable in promoting an international unity including both the

¹France, Outre-Mer, 1958, 513.

Belgians and the Africans.¹ The usefulness of such a community (had one existed in the late 1950's) for the less violent transfer of sovereign power than it actually took after 1960, can be suggested in retrospect. It can also be prophesized that had a union existed of Belgium and its colonies, broadcasting would have received correspondingly higher emphasis and a higher degree of solidarity would have been obtained.

The Contrast

The difference between the three powers is now clear; Belgium's Empire policies did not exist -- and the broadcasting in the imperial context did not either. The very existence of broadcasting suggests its having been authorized and supported at best only to the extent in which it fitted the plans for social development, while carefully eliminating the possibility of its being utilized for political advancement of the Congolese.

In Nigeria, broadcasting in the imperial context existed on a very small and somewhat inconsequential scale. The General Overseas Service was designed for the expatriates, not for the Nigerians. Though Britain has been

¹The communication link through wireless telegraphy and later through "radio beam" between Belgium and Belgian Congo, considered since 1912 (*supra*, 330-31) and operational since 1925 functioned for the purposes of administering the colony, not for the purposes of establishing and maintaining an imperial structure. Perhaps it was at that time that the Belgians should have been aware of the maxim that "to govern is to anticipate." Malengreau, 40.


a champion, even if not the true inventor, of the indirect administration, broadcasting service to Nigeria did not reflect this indirect method in the use of vernacular languages until 1957. Coincidentally, the Hausa language which the BBC began to use that year, is a language of the Northern Region (approximately 18 per cent of the population, the largest single ethnic group in Nigeria¹); the internal secessionist difficulties which Nigeria has been experiencing since its independence have involved the Eastern and the Mid-West Regions, both of which are basically non-Hausa speaking regions.

The British Empire Service, and its successor, have been used as instruments to express "a common feeling, a common culture"² without force, without deliberate effort. The English language was thought of in the same spirit.³ The French, on the other hand, used their own language almost exclusively and deliberately, consciously and systematically forcing the French ideas and convictions into the minds of the listeners. The difference between the British and the French is therefore not in the reasons for broadcasting to and in the colonies, but in the forcefulness with which broadcasting was employed and in

¹Nigeria, Department of Statistics, Population Census of Nigeria, 1963 (Lagos: Government Printer, 1964), 7.

²Beachcroft, 30.

³Hodson, The BBC Quarterly, VI, No. 1, 5.



the directness with which the metropolitan language was used. Additionally, the French broadcasts were dominated by the overall desire to achieve assimilation of the Africans with the French. One French Union or Community was an idea found acceptable in many French overseas territories, including the Middle Congo. Broadcasting, and particularly Radio-Brazzaville, undoubtedly played significant role in maintaining the French model in constant evidence.

In their efforts, the British stressed the happiness and prosperity of the people, but the material prosperity, the greater security and peace, the kindred, historical, economic and cultural ties were to take place preferably in a British family of nations. This was very much unlike the French, where prosperity, security and peace were the ideals (albeit also not always achieved) to which all individual Frenchmen, white, black, yellow or brown could subscribe. Perhaps even the French ability to understand and share in native life, and the absence of color prejudice in their overseas territories could be interpreted as being a practical expression of French imperial policy of assimilation. Disregard of racial distinctions especially was important for without such disregard, assimilation might not have been possible.¹

¹Wieschhoff, 28.

The stress on imperial system of broadcasting, with stations on French but not necessarily only on metropolitan soil, and the overall systematic pursuing of the French ways, French institutions, French civilization and French language, stand in direct opposition to the casualness of the British in their approach to the Empire relations and to broadcasting as a means of communication within the Empire, and to the overall lack of such concern on the part of the Belgians.

Conclusions

From the writer's point of view, this study accomplished its primary objective, which was felt to stem from the need to look into the role of the colonial powers in the modernization process, in order to find whether there were any differences between the policies and actions of the three major powers vis-à-vis one medium of communication, i.e., broadcasting.

As observed in this study the interrelationship of broadcasting policies with those on political and economic development and with the method in which the colonies were administered strongly suggest a number of generalizations:

(1) The observed differences between the Belgian, British and French policies and actions often were substantial, and in every case corresponding very closely to the differences between policies on other colonial matters.

Such a finding might have been assumed as being of

the common sense variety, yet in retrospect it seems that such assumptions, or predictions, were not always made by the colonial powers themselves. In the British territory, for example, broadcasting structure was to be a national service, with regional services subordinated to it. This concept was formulated at a time when it almost surely could not succeed, in view of political developments. If correspondence between political development and broadcasting policies could have been assumed, no tactical errors such as those committed in Nigerian broadcasting development could have occurred.

(2) Even more importantly, development of broadcasting in the three African territories appears to have hinged to a greater degree upon these other policies than on policies specifically dealing with broadcasting. This is to say that development of political or economic aspects of modernization in the colonies impinged heavily upon the development of broadcasting, and in many instances totally eclipsed broadcasting policies in importance.

In simple terms, this means that broadcasting often was not considered very important by the colonial powers. This was so in spite of many official pronouncements on the value of broadcasting, especially for education, and also in spite of the mounting evidence that broadcasting could be a vital force in nation-building and in improving educational standards of the native populations. The

evidence had been available in the metropolitan countries themselves, and for that very reason the disinterest in, or the lack of emphasis on, broadcasting in the colonies are both remarkable even though not always understandable.

(3) A very important conclusion that seems warranted on the basis of the investigation deals with parallelism between the broadcasting development in the colonies, and the policies on Empire relations of the great Powers. The conclusion is that there appears to exist a direct relation of the colonial capability of receiving broadcasting (in the number of receivers per given number of inhabitants of a colonial territory) with the directness and determination with which a colonial power addressed itself to the nature of the future relations with its colony or colonies within some imperial (i.e., inter-national) structure.

In this connection, a statement cited at the very outset of this study needs to be repeated:

. . . if a nation is to play a significant role internationally, communication must weave the new State to other States, and the necessary understandings of international events and relationships must be communicated to the people.¹

In citing the above quote, the writer is aware of the need to relate and apply the reference to "nations" to the term "colonies." The latter were always extensions of individual nations, and often formed a part of some overall structure. In any case, a colony played an inter-

¹Schramm and Winfield, 2; supra, 2.

national role at least within the sphere of that particular empire structure; minimally, a colony had to interact with its mother country, and also with other colonies participating in the same structure. The degrees of such interaction were not the same in the Belgian, British, and French empires, and that was precisely what supported the writer's conclusion.

An analysis of the quoted statement and its application to the tentative conclusion that there existed a kind of correlation of empire relations with broadcasting both support the notion that broadcasting policies and actions of France, Belgium and Great Britain differed precisely because of differences in emphasis, determination and forcefulness which each displayed in the practice of imperial concepts before 1960.

(4) When modernization of attitudes was mentioned as the underlying requirement for change¹, it was assumed that reference was made to the attitudes of those undergoing modernization. This study raises a question whether the attitudes of former administrating countries ought not to be considered of at least equal importance.

To round up the conclusions, Marshall McLuhan must again be cited.

. . . Telegraph and radio neutralized nationalism but evoked archaic tribal ghosts of the most vigorous brand.

¹Millikan and Blackmer, 19-20; supra, 1.

Radio provides a speed-up of information that also causes acceleration in other media. It certainly contracts the world to village size . . . but while [it does so], it hasn't the effect of homogenizing the village quarters. . . . Radio is not only a mighty awakener of archaic memories, forces, and animosities, but a decentralizing, pluralistic force, as is really the case with all electric power and media.¹

Though not foreseen, the idea of superimposing McLuhan's thesis on the present study and its conclusions appears particularly applicable, and seems at this point to raise an additional point. Is it possible that the revolutionary and also secessionist events in the British and Belgian territories after 1960 bear him out, while the relative calm in the French territory (as well as other French territories in Africa) could perhaps be explained by another of McLuhan's remarks² implying that literate³ societies are capable of neutralizing the radio implosion without revolution? Were this indeed the case, Emerson's categoric statement that "imperialism forged the tools

¹McLuhan, 263, 267.

²Ibid., 262.

³McLuhan sees literacy as typographical technology, and maintains that literacy is learned from traffic and streets as well as from visual representations. "Learning to read and write is a minor facet of literacy" Ibid. Cf. Wallerstein, "Evolving Patterns of African Society," in The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, 2. In this context, then, the high degree of urbanization (when defined as percentage of population living in cities of 20,000 or more) present in the French territory toward the end of the colonial era could provide some support for McLuhan's thesis.

with which its victims could pry it loose"¹ could very well be made applicable to radio, and "imperial", policies. The post-Independence events seem to support such conclusion.

The tribal animosity was awakened in the former Belgian Congo, and decentralization took place there, first by a direct secession attempt of Katanga, and then by the establishment of an additional province (South Kasai).

The upheaval in Nigeria eventually led to the creation of a new region (Mid-Western) and also to a serious war-like effort of the Eastern Region to secede and proclaim itself a sovereign state. At the end of 1967, the civil war was not yet resolved.

In direct contrast, France apparently molded its own imperial structure in such a way as to prevent its disintegration. The former French territory of the Middle Congo not only has remained territorially intact but is still very much a part of the French-oriented block of former French colonies.

Thus, in all three cases, the answers to questions on broadcasting development in the colonies appear to be in the imperial policies, structures and attitudes.

¹ Emerson, 11.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

POPULATION AND CURRENCY INFORMATION

Population

To arrive at the "per capita" or similar data, accurate figures on population in each of the territories at the four important points of their recent history were necessary. In all cases, only estimates were available even to the colonial authorities, and even at a very recent time. For example, in Nigeria, the 1962 census discovered (and later recount confirmed) that the actual population that year was well over 55 million, while all statistical reports based their data on the estimated figure of just over 35 million. For the sake of scholarly accuracy, the best possible estimate for 1960 has been used in this study. No adjustment of earlier population data has been made. It is conceded that the pre-1960 data for Nigeria might look better on paper than they actually had appeared in reality.

Population figures, as agreed on by most authorities and scholars, are recorded in Table 7.

TABLE 7.--Population figures (in thousands) for Belgian Congo, Middle Congo and Nigeria, 1918-1960

Year	Belgian Congo	Middle Congo	Whole AEF	Nigeria
1918....	10,240	582	...	17,500
1921....	11,000	439	2,851	...
1939....	11,000	746	3,413	20,000
1946....	11,000	651	3,994	22,000
1948....	12,000	24,000
1950....	...	675	4,385	...
1955....	13,000	29,730
1957....	...	749	4,848	...
1960....	14,150	790	...	55,000

Based on:

Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), 326. The Statesman's Yearbook, 1918-1960. H. A. Wieschhoff, Colonial Policies in Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, The University Museum, 1944), 9. UNESCO, World Communications, 1964 (Paris: UNESCO, 1964). Ambassade de France, Hour of Independence (New York: Ambassade de France, 1961), 13. Lord Hailey, An African Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1938 and 1957). Nigeria, Department of Statistics, Population Census, 1963 (Lagos: Government Printer, 1964), 2.

Currency Information

For easier understanding of the financial information on the African territories of Great Britain, France and Belgium, it was necessary to translate the data from local or metropolitan currencies to the U. S. dollars. This was done in the text; such translations were based on the exchange rates as recorded in the following table (Table 8).

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
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
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
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
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
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