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ON NARCISSISM AND LOVE

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ON NARCISSISM AND LOVE

By

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# ABSTRACT

## ON NARCISSISM AND LOVE

By

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This study seeks to provide a thorough theoretical exposition and empirical examination of the unresolved debate between Otto Kernberg and Heinz Kohut appropos of the relationship between narcissism and love. Sections of Kernberg's writings suggest the capacity to love to be adversely affected by narcissism, whereas sections of Kohut's work suggests love to be independent of narcissism. It is here brought out that this controversy strikes at the heart of the psychoanalytic view of the integrated man. It is contended that if the capacity to love is independent of narcissism, then the widespread view that narcissism is simply an impediment to love must suffer and a "vindication" of narcissism would thus be furnished.

In an effort to resolve this controversy, a far-reaching consideration of major definitions of narcissism and object-love, as well as the enunciation of developmental formulations relating to the two concepts were offered. This presentation included a delineation of the present day

psychoanalytic conception of mature love, and an excursion into the plane of pathological narcissism. Finally, the efficacy of a multidimensional theory of narcissism to the resolution of the Kernberg-Kohut debate was argued. Specifically, it was hypothesized that an aggressive strand of narcissism correlates negatively with object-love (Hypothesis I). It was also hypothesized that a non-aggressive, exhibitionistic strand of narcissism has a negligible correlation with object-love (Hypothesis II).

The current study operationalized love by way of two measurement instruments, the Lov dimension of the Interpersonal Checklist and the Dean Romanticism Scale. Both these measures were utilized to tap underpinnings of psychoanalytic views on mature love. The Verbal Aggression and Exhibitionism Scales of the Dynamic Personality Inventory operationalized the aggressive and non-aggressive, exhibitionistic strands of narcissism, respectively. In order to broaden the range of phenomena tested, these instruments were administered to two samples of males: one composed of thirty-two university undergraduates, the other comprised of twenty adult patients of a local community mental health center.

Hypothesis I received substantive, albeit not complete, support from the data with respect to both subsamples as well as the total sample. Five of the six partial correlation coefficients computed to test Hypothesis I

were in the predicted direction and three of them were statistically significant. Hypothesis II was strongly supported as five of the six partial correlation coefficients designed to test Hypothesis II provided statistical support for it at significance levels far exceeding that required.

It was argued that measurement error served to delimit the extent of the support that could be garnered for the Hypotheses. Differences between the clinic and student samples were next considered with respect to potential avenues for future research. The dissertation concluded with a questioning of the pertinence of the libido theory and metapsychology in general to future explorations of the interface of narcissism and love.

With all my love to my father and mother, Seymour  
and Selma Frank. I will always treasure their  
love.

And to those values which are our family  
tradition--dedication, knowledge, and compassion.

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## INTRODUCTION

Narcissism and love. From its infancy psychoanalysis has paid homage to these powerful and elusive abstractions of human experience. Yet, these haunting percepts are to this day shrouded in mystery and remain objects of fascination. One need only consider the priority and urgency affixed to these concepts by modern psychoanalytic thinkers (e.g., Kernberg, 1970, 1974a, 1974b, 1974c, 1974d; Kohut, 1966, 1971, 1972) to sense their theoretical utility. I would even go so far as to say that with the uncovering of the syndromes of borderline personality organization and narcissistic personality disorder, the topics of narcissism and love have moved to the vanguard of psychoanalytic thought.

I think there would be little disagreement with the statement that the concept of narcissism has been a most fruitful one for psychoanalytic psychology. Not only has it been integrally related to the explanations of a great variety of everyday events, but the concept has been central to the formulation and explication of important theoretical questions. Moore (1975) has recapitulated the range of investigations in which Freud made use of the concept.

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These include (1) The unbounded self-love of children, (2) The choice of object in homosexuality, (3) The regressive egoism of the physically ill and hypochondriasis, (4) Exhibitionism, masochism, and the evolution of the ego, (5) Superego formation, (6) The idealization of the love object. This listing is only a partial one as one might also consider the role of narcissism in sublimation (e.g., Freud, 1923), in the understanding of adolescence (e.g., Jacobson, 1964), in the genesis of identity formation (e.g., Lichtenstein, 1964), and its essential place in the discovery and treatment of narcissistic pathology. Eissler (1971) links the ubiquity of aggression itself to the feeling of narcissistic triumph its expression provides human beings.

The above are compelling testimonials to the utility of narcissism as a tool of understanding. Yet, due to some mistaken popularizations, narcissism, to many, seems applicable only to a handful of people. This belief is artfully shattered by Andreas-Salome (1962, p. 15): " . . . we never attain conviction without the privy compliance of the narcissistic demand within us; conversely, when the latter is gratified, no power is strong enough to make us change our minds again." From these words one begins to glimpse the significance of the role narcissism plays in day to day life.

Freud (1910, 1912), even in his early writings, was obviously quite intrigued by the psychology of love. But the place of love, particularly in applied psychoanalytic psychology, has greatly expanded since those early days

wherein Freud explored its relation to infantile sexuality and choice of object. Today, an assessment of the individual's capacity to love can often be crucial vis-a-vis differential diagnosis (see Kernberg, 1974d). Too, and for better or worse, an increased capacity to love is for many psychotherapists a sine qua non of successful treatment.

Yet, there have been turnings in psychoanalytic understandings of love and narcissism, so much so that it may not only be appropriate to speak of the "new narcissism" (Hanly & Masson, 1976), but the "new love" as well.

Much of this state of affairs is rooted in the pioneering work of Otto Kernberg and Heinz Kohut. These two men have at once, immeasurably facilitated out understandings of love and narcissism, and at the same time presented us with a puzzling quandary: Is it true that narcissism and love can be independent of one another? Can object-love, seemingly so antagonistic to narcissism, be unaffected by it? Kernberg's (1974a) writings suggest object-love to be influenced by narcissism, while Kohut's (1971) work suggests that love is not necessarily swayed by narcissism. My view is that this controversy, the object of not one empirical investigation to date, is not only of theoretical interest but has powerful applications in the applied realm as well. As I shall bring out, the controversy strikes at the heart of the psychoanalytic view of the integrated man, and hence its resolution can have important ramifications for psychoanalytic treatment. To wit, if Kohut's (1971) concept of a

separate developmental line for narcissism is correct, if the capacity to love can be independent of narcissism, then surely the widespread view that narcissism is merely an impediment to love must suffer. Even allowing for our western culture's idealization of love (Kohut, 1971), such a development would also dictate revisions in our attitude toward the "vindicated" narcissism we encounter in our patients and in ourselves. Indeed, there are those who have already acted as judge and jury and either exonerated narcissism or found it reprehensible and proceeded accordingly in their psychotherapeutic ventures.

I am here arguing that both of these verdicts are premature, and envision this study as an attempt to resolve the debate on more empirical grounds. Thus, I will proceed as follows: A comprehensive exploration of the evolution of modern psychoanalytic thinking on love and narcissism, with the end of explicating the current critical and unresolved controversy between Heinz and Kohut and Otto Kernberg, will be presented. Of necessity, such an exploration must entail a far-reaching consideration of major definitions of narcissism and object-love, as well as the enunciation of developmental formulations related to the two concepts. Fortunately, such a scaffolding will also allow and require me to add some reflections on the relationship of Freud's work on love to present day psychoanalytic conceptions of mature love. Too, an excursion into the plane

of pathological narcissism and the related question of a continuity between pathological and normal narcissism will be undertaken. In concluding sections, a theory aimed at resolving the Kernberg-Kohut controversy will be promulgated and subjected to empirical analysis.

## REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

### Definitions of Narcissism

Freud (1914) differentiated primary narcissism from secondary narcissism. He defined primary narcissism as that condition in which object-libido and ego-libido are indistinguishable. He noted this state is not dissipated until the formation of the ego-ideal which, in itself, is an attempt to recover the primary narcissistic state. It would follow that it was Freud's opinion, at least at this juncture in his thinking, that primary narcissism reigns until the dissolution of the oedipal complex. Freud viewed secondary narcissism as resting on the formation and, hence, availability of object libidinal cathexes. Thus, he characterized this latter state as one where the ego withdraws object-libido and focuses it on itself, thus taking itself for an object. In an attempt to elucidate these statements, we might consider Freud's (1914) remarks about the state of being in love. He saw this condition as related to the primal state in which ego-libido and object-libido are merged (i.e., primary narcissism). This is in contrast to secondary narcissism where, as in schizophrenia, there is a

withdrawal of previously utilized object-libido by the ego onto itself.

Hartmann (1956), in attempting to clarify the concept, noted that Freud distinguished egoism from narcissism. He explained that Freud saw egoism as aiming for advantage, whereas he saw narcissism as implying, in addition, the individual receiving libidinal gratifications from the acquisition of such an advantage (e.g., "I've done it" vs. "I'm great because I've done it").

Kohut (1971) approaches the definition of narcissism from a somewhat different vantage point than did Freud. Kohut sees primary narcissism as that state in which the infant experiences an undisturbed equilibrium, a perfection which antedates even the most basic differentiations into later categories of perfection (e.g., perfection in the realms of knowledge, power, beauty, etc.). Herein, the infant experiences the mother and her ministrations not as a "you," but rather as a part of its primitive self. At this juncture, the mother is a narcissistic agent, a servant over whom the infant expects to exercise full control. Kohut (1966) writes that the type of control the infant expects to have over its mother is closer to that which a grownup rightfully expects to have over himself and his actions than to the grownup's experience of others and the degree of control he has over them. Because of the mother's inevitable empathic failures, Kohut reasons that the child

moves out of this stage and into a stage of pre-phallic narcissism (i.e., secondary narcissism) by (a) establishing a grandiose and exhibitionistic image of the self and (b) by giving over the previous perfection to an exalted, omnipotent self-object. Though they describe the subject matter in divergent ways, I see a harmony between Freud's and Kohut's definitions of narcissism. For both men, primary narcissism would appear to be, phenomenologically, a blissful state, one dominated not by grandiosity nor omnipotence. Primary narcissism would seem to know no such self or self-object aggrandizing states.

Bing et al. (1959) suggested dropping the distinction between primary and secondary narcissism, as they saw primary narcissism as a state of energy distribution not truly narcissistic since, at this time, no sufficient ego structure exists for the cathexis of a self-representation. In short, these authors saw primary narcissism as only applicable in the fetal and neonatal states.

In this context, Hartmann's clarification (1950) that Freud was equivocal regarding the definition of narcissism is vital. He points out that on some occasions Freud defined it as the libidinal cathexis of the ego, but on others as the cathexis of one's own person, of the body, or of the self. Hartmann then went about the task of differentiating between the self and the ego. Beautifully,

Hartmann wrote that when one refers to a self-cathexis one is not specifying whether the cathexis is located in the id, ego, or superego. As Hartmann believed that narcissistic cathexes can be found within all the psychic agencies, he suggested that narcissism be defined not as the libidinal cathexis of the ego, but of the self instead. Thus, for Hartmann, the self is both broader than and inclusive of the concept of the ego.

It would seem that a common thread running throughout the various definitions of narcissism is its self-directed, as opposed to object-directed, quality. Up until not too many years ago this statement would probably have received wide agreement. However, Kohut (1971), in what many see as a revolutionary and radical action, wrote that narcissism should be defined not by the target of the instinctual charge (e.g., self or object), but by the quality of the instinctual charge. In a similar vein, Eisnitz (1974) recommends that narcissistic object-choice be defined as that wherein the major cathexis is directed toward the self-representation. As Kohut points out, the small child invests other people with narcissistic cathexes and thus experiences them as an extension of himself. So, what appears to be object-directed may well be self-directed (see Kohut, 1966; Eissler, 1971). I would here accentuate the continuity between earlier work on object-relations theory and the ground-breaking efforts of authors

such as Kohut. With the differentiation between internal and external objects, the psychoanalytic conception of reality was sufficiently altered so as to allow for the realization that a seeming relation with an external object may intrapsychically be a relationship with a self-representation.

It is apparent from the preceding that an attempt to garner from the literature a unitary definition of narcissism is an arduous enterprise. The literature abounds with divergencies of thinking on the matter. But, my view is that it is these very divergencies, divergencies which suggest that there are many sides to narcissism, which in the end may resolve the puzzle to be outlined below.

#### Developmental Formulations of Narcissism

As was alluded to at the outset, narcissism is integrally linked to superego and ego formation. For an explication of these developments let us return to Kohut's thinking. He hypothesizes that subsequent to the stage of primary narcissism the two structures of secondary narcissism emerge. One of these may be expressed as "I am perfect" (the grandiose self), the other as "You are perfect, but I am part of you" (the idealized self-object). Herein is seen, first, pre-phallic narcissism keynoted by the child's need for complete acceptance of his body-mind self. There is next an unfolding of phallic narcissism marked by feelings of invulnerability, self-glorification,

and glorification of the parents. With the resolution of the oedipal complex, the idealized oedipal self-object is internalized in the form of the idealized superego (e.g., cherished values). Freud (1914) looked at this internalization process in an intriguing way. Teleologically, he viewed the ego-ideal as the substitute for the lost narcissism of childhood. Freud theorized that the person strives to recover this lost narcissism by attaining the perfection of the ego-ideal.

Kohut (1966, 1971) also sees the two structures of secondary narcissism as intimately related to the formation of the ego. Specifically, he posits that the early pre-oedipal aspects of the idealized self-object are eventually given up and internalized in a neutralized form, becoming that part of the ego which regulates and channels the drives. Kohut, in addition, views the gradual decathexis of the glorified self-object as critical to the development of a realistic self. As regards the grandiose self, Kohut (1971) maintains that it becomes neutralized into the ambitions of the personality, and leads to a feeling of the right to success. Finally, Kohut believes that the neutralization of the narcissistic cathexes is responsible for the development of such qualities as empathy, creativity, humor, and even wisdom. In summarizing the above developmental processes, one could say that in the course of normal development, the ego accedes to dominance in the realm of the narcissistic structures.

Even among professionals in the field, it is an all too common misconception that "to be narcissistic" is undesirable. This belief is probably based on a delimitation of the scope of narcissism so as to encompass only narcissism as a pathological phenomenon. Yet, as has been brought out, narcissism is also a developmental phase, the successful resolution of which is indispensable to normal development. Kohut (1971), as Freud, theorizes that as a phase narcissism succeeds autoeroticism. The autoerotic stage is comprised of libidinal cathexes of individual body parts or of isolated physical or mental functions. Thus, during the autoerotic stage there is only a fragmented body-self. Now, it is true that in the narcissistic phase the self is grandiose, exhibitionistic, and unrealistic. Nonetheless, this does constitute the cathexis of a cohesive self in contradistinction to the autoerotic phase where there is no such cohesive self. Kohut's point is that narcissism as a phase, and later in its transformed states, is vital to psychological growth. One more illustration of this is Federn's (1952) concept of ego feeling, a feeling which entails the sensing of our bodily and psychic egos. Federn asserted this ego feeling to be prerequisite to normal functioning. As the ego feeling rests on narcissistic cathexes, one is again led to the realization of the existence of a normal or healthy narcissism. Sublimation, a function so intertwined with the perpetuation

of society itself, too, rests on a reservoir of narcissism. In The Ego and the Id (1923) Freud hypothesized that all sublimation may involve the ego's capacity to transform object-libido into narcissistic libido and then to change the aim (e.g. admiration for father--narcissistic identification with father--pursuit of a "father-like" higher level activity).

To this point I have, for the most part, limited myself to a metapsychological discussion of the developmental aspects of narcissism neglecting a phenomenological exposition on the concept. This can be remedied by turning to a most interesting paper by Van Spruiell (1975). Van Spruiell begins by enumerating manifestations of narcissism in the first eighteen months of life before self-object differentiation. During this time period, the author sees self-esteem as mutually regulated in the mother-infant dyad. In regard to the role of omnipotence, she posits a flowering of omnipotence in the first half of the second year as the toddler experiences the world to be almost completely within his control. In the post-eighteen month period, and more specifically within the practicing subphase of separation-individuation, the child is faced with the fact that the parents have interests completely independent of him; he is thus confronted with limits to his omnipotence. With this realization of separateness, object-choice becomes a possibility. Still, in the

pre-thirty sixth month period, the child retains much of his original narcissism; the child idealizes himself. The oedipal period, that is the mother's preference of the father as a sexual object, deals a heavy blow to the child's narcissism. However, in the wake of the oedipal period comes the relinquishment of self-object idealization (due, for example, to disappointments in and competitions with the parents) and in its stead the idealization of the superego. Van Spruiell is of the opinion that self-love, a third aspect of narcissism and defined in terms of feelings of loveability, is likewise a byproduct of increasing individuation. Van Spruiell lays normal adult ambitions and interests, regulation of mood, the ascension of values, and feelings of competence at the doorsteps of infantile self-love, self-esteem, and omnipotence, respectively. To fill out this developmental picture, we should consider Jacobson's (1964) comments about the role of narcissism in adolescence. Jacobson asserts that to the extent that the adolescent can renounce his infantile love objects will he attain a stage wherein he is overinvolved with himself, pursuing narcissistic aims to the detriment of object-directed goals. Yet, Jacobson stresses this to be only a temporary forfeiture which in the end aids in the reconstruction of the superego, in the development of ego interests, and in the capacity for object-love. Again, it is clear that narcissism is critical to normal development.

A Continuum Between Pathological  
and Normal Narcissism?

Kernberg (1974a) discerns Kohut as espousing a continuum between normal and pathological narcissism. He views Kohut as maintaining that narcissistic personalities remain fixated in the normal infantile stages of the grandiose self and idealized self-object. Kernberg (1974b) argues strongly against this continuum, reasoning that pathological narcissism is not the equivalent of a fixation at the archaic narcissistic phases, but rather is the result of destructive object-relations. Kernberg does not see the infant as being narcissistic in the devaluating, cold, haughty manner of the person beset with pathological narcissistic processes. Instead, the infant's demands for recognition coincide with a libidinal attachment to the object, even in the absence of need, by the age of 2 1/2 - 3. Kernberg, in support of his position, outlines diverse forms of idealization. He alludes to the idealization of the borderline patient where split-off all good, powerful objects and all bad, sadistic objects are encountered. He notes the idealization found in the transference neuroses where the analyst may be seen as a good, forgiving figure. In even maturer forms of idealization, the analyst is seen as the upholder of treasured values. Kernberg stresses that all these forms of idealization vastly differ from that form characteristic of pathological narcissistic processes where there is the projection onto the other of the

grandiose self. Thus, Kernberg argues against the supposition that the narcissistic personality is simply fixated in a normal developmental stage (Moore, 1975).

Returning to Kernberg's position, clearly it is rooted in the view that narcissistic personalities use their narcissism in the service of their defense. Annie Reich (1960), in an important exposition, delineates such defensive processes. She offers the example of the person who uses his body as a phallus, thus stating "I do not fear castration nor am I bad or inferior. Rather, I am invulnerable and majestic." Ephron (1967), in also stressing such defensive aspects of narcissism, mentions that self-love can be a cover for self-hate. Yet, after perusing Ornstein's (1974) discussion of a paper offered by Kernberg (1974a), one wonders if Kernberg has not been attacking a straw man. By citing passages from Kohut's (1971) Analysis of the Self, Ornstein demonstrated that Kohut does not hold the view attributed to him. That is, Kohut, as elucidated by Ornstein, does not see the twinship, merger, or even mirror transference, characteristic of narcissistic personalities, as simply reinstatements of a normal developmental stage, but rather regressive alterations of them. Nevertheless, I discern a real difference between Kohut and Kernberg on this issue. I think most investigators would concur that Kernberg sees the narcissism of the narcissistic personality as resting on fundamentally

different processes than normal adult or even infantile narcissism, whereas Kohut does not.

The resolution of this question has substantive psychotherapeutic implications. Kohut reasons that because of the traumatic loss of the idealized object, optimal idealization of the self-object does not take place, and hence the importance of allowing for correction of this developmental arrest via a fostering of the grandiose self and the idealized self-object in the treatment. On the other hand, if Kernberg's arguments regarding the lack of continuity between pathological and normal narcissism are correct, this therapeutic procedure is contraindicated. Ornstein (1974) has some interesting thoughts on this issue. He emphasizes the mistake it would be to think that Kohut does not recognize the defensive and exaggerated aspects of narcissistic pathology as compared to infantile narcissism. Rather, in full recognition of these defensive facets, Kohut, as told by Ornstein, chooses to allow the pathological regression to occur in the transference with the end of internalizing those processes which ultimately will build up the deficient ego ideal and superego. Further, Ornstein observes that Kernberg's therapeutic approach aims for the onset of an oedipal transference neurosis in consequence of Kernberg's nonacceptance of the separate developmental line of narcissism.

Surely, Ornstein is quite enamored of Kohut's work and his reflections must be understood with this in mind. Quite clearly both Kernberg and Kohut are successful and unsuccessful with patients. I will rest content if I have here attained the goal of illuminating the intimate relation between the theoretical domain of narcissism and our everyday clinical work.

### Pathological Narcissism

Perhaps it would behoove us to now examine more closely the syndrome labelled "pathological narcissism." One should not be surprised to find that pathological narcissism is different things for different people. As Schwartz (1974) points out, Kernberg's brand of narcissistic disturbance thoroughly differs from that described by Kohut. For Kernberg (1970), narcissistic pathology is key-noted by grandiosity, extreme self-centeredness, absence of interest in and empathy for others, intense envy, and a deficiency in genuine feelings of sadness and mournful longing. Kernberg emphasizes that these people adapt themselves to the demands of the environment not out of a moral sense but out of fear should they not comply. Secretly, these individuals think of themselves as criminals who would indulge in anti-social behavior were there to be no consequences of their actions. It is thus consistent that via projection other people are also experienced as unreliable and dishonest, and are alternatively feared and

deprecated. To meet another person is anathema for this class of people, as to do so is to risk exploitation and mistreatment.

On the other hand, for Kohut (see Goldberg, 1974; Kohut, 1971; Lachmann & Stolorow, 1976; Schwartz, 1976) pathological narcissism does not necessarily entail the huge aggressive component that it does for Kernberg. Lonely and empty lives, lives adrift, aimless, and directionless, devoid of meaningfulness, are frequently encountered in Kohut's writings. Beneath vague, seemingly neurotic, complaints are often encountered serious disorders of the self, or a lack of consolidation of the self. Tortured experiences of a lack of self, that one is play-acting, or of a lack of continuity in one's life, are often heard complaints.

At this point let me pause to make a few qualifying remarks. What has been described is not a borderline syndrome, but rather the clinical signs of a narcissistic personality disorder. While it is true that the two syndromes often present nearly identical dynamic pictures, a differentiation between the two can be made (see Kernberg, 1967). I should also like to stress that to think of narcissistic disturbance as an all or none affair would be to seriously err. Kernberg, for one, has distinguished between narcissistic defenses and a narcissistic personality disorder. In fact, it would probably be rare today to find even in the psychoanalysis of a neurotic patient no work on narcissistic problems.

Somewhat surprisingly, Kohut's (1971) and Kernberg's (1970) metapsychological analyses of narcissistic pathology are similar. Kernberg has delineated the fusion of ideal self, ideal object, and actual self-images, regularly encountered in this disturbance. Herein, patients identify with their own ideal self-images in order to deny normal dependency. This condition bespeaks an absence of superego integration and the dangerous absence of a sharp demarcation between ego and superego. Because of the arrest in superego consolidation, primitive aggressive superego forerunners live on undaunted and constitute fertile ground for paranoid projections. Thus, the inner world is one of good and bad only, one often entirely composed of idealized self-objects and vengeful, dreaded enemies. Kohut's emphases on horizontal and vertical splits in the ego as being causative of disturbances in self-esteem, of the revival of archaic grandiose aspects of the self-representation, of the magical identification with objects that embody longed for attributes of the self, are all quite consonant with Kernberg's metapsychological analyses.

Aside from these structural considerations, Kohut (1966) has added some thoughts on dynamic and genetic aspects of pathological narcissism. He forcefully stresses the devastating impact of the loss of the idealized parent imago on the child. Kohut hastens to add, however, that he not only has in mind the death or absence of a parent, but

also the withdrawal of affection from the child and the child's inevitable disappointments in the parent. All of these conditions may lead to the destruction of the idealized parent representation and to a precocious internalization of functions previously performed by the object. Such a development, too, interferes with superego integration, as ego and superego separation is herein retarded, and may result in endless future searches for external omnipotent objects with which to merge so as to defensively bolster the grandiose self. These structural, dynamic, and genetic facets of pathological narcissism stand in marked contrast to the processes of healthy narcissism where feelings of loveability, competence, of a right to success (Van Spruiell, 1975), to name but a few, are ever present.

#### Freud on Love

As a preface to the Kernberg-Kohut controversy to be developed below, considerations of various psychoanalytic views on love as well as of sundry developmental constructions are in order. I begin with Freud's thoughts on the matter. Bergmann (1971) sees Freud as having made two fundamental contributions to the psychology of love. The first coincided with Freud's (1910, 1912, 1915b) pronouncement of a link between love and infantile sexuality, that love between adults rests on a reawakening and refinding of early relationships. Freud (1915b) flatly stated that the state of being in love consisted of new editions of

infantile reactions. Comparing love in everyday life to transference love, Freud announced that the two are actually quite similar phenomena. He argued that while transference love is more dependent on early infantile precedents and is less protean than is normal love, the two do not differ in any appreciable way.

In tracing the genesis of Freud's second contribution to the understanding of love, Bergmann (1971) refers to Freud's distinction between narcissistic love and object love. This distinction was underscored in a 1917 paper which Freud began by equating the masculine type of love with object-love, and the feminine type of love with narcissistic self-love. Herein, Freud took pains to clarify that this was not to say that women are not capable of object-love. Rather, Freud stressed that the term "masculine" referred to an active giving of love, whereas "feminine" connoted the passive wish to be loved, and the granting of permission to the beloved to do so. As Hitschmann (1952) reiterated, the narcissistic type chooses the object on the basis of his own image, whereas in the anaclitic type of object-choice, in the case of the male, the object resembles the mother. Freud (1917b) saw a prototype of object-love in the child's decision to obediently part with its feces, and a precursor of the narcissistic attitude in the child's stubborn retention of feces for autoerotic purposes.

We are now brought to the realm of Freud's perspectives on normal love. In contradistinction to neurotic love, Freud saw normal love as hinging upon the unification of the tender, affectionate feelings with the sensual feelings. In other words, for Freud, normal love was a blend of erotic-love and aim-inhibited love. To clarify, erotic love might be defined as an object cathexis on the part of the sexual instincts which terminates with the conclusion of the sexual act. Aim-inhibited love, characterized by affection and friendship, is rooted in a deflection of the erotic instincts from their sexual aim. To go on, even in the case of normal love Freud discerned an inevitable sexual overvaluation and idealization. This state is characterized by the absence of criticism for the beloved, and a greater appreciation of the beloved's qualities than existed before the object was loved. Freud (1931) did not insist on a state of postambivalence as a prerequisite for the capacity to love, noting, however, that such an attitude might be attained in a state of advanced development.

In further defining love, Freud (1915a) reminded that it was not a component instinct of sexuality such as sadism-masochism is, for example. Rather, he thought of love as an expression of the whole instinct of sexuality (that is, inclusive of sadism-masochism, scopophilia, exhibitionism, etc.). He added that love has three

opposites: loving vs. hating, loving vs. being loved, and loving and hating vs. lack of concern or indifference. Freud contended that "being loved" was near to narcissism, as in this state the individual is concerned with himself and his pleasures are autoerotic. He remarked that if loving is defined as the relation of the ego to its sources of pleasure, then during the autoerotic period the individual is indifferent to the external world, the second antithesis to loving defined above. The third antithesis to loving, hating, is born with the infant's introjection of objects and projection of its bad self onto the environment. In concluding this developmental foray, Freud noted that with the infant's interest in objects, with its attempts to introject pleasurable objects, we can speak of the attraction of objects, and hence of "love."

Let us now turn to what I discern as Freud's most fascinating work on love, his structural analysis. Freud (1921) wrote that as the sexual overvaluation of the object mounts, the impulse toward direct sexual gratification may recede far into the background. The object may become so precious so as to make the ego's devotion toward the object resemble dedication to an abstract ideal. The object thus elevated to such lofty heights usurps the place of the ego-ideal. In the stead of the ego-ideal reigns a glorified object. Regrettably, it was only in passing that Freud posed two tantalizing queries.

First, he wondered whether it could not be the case that the object was put in the place of the ego rather than of the ego-ideal. Second, the roles of identification, and introjection of the object into the ego in extreme cases, were alluded to by Freud. It is our loss that Freud did not extend his structural analysis of love. However, Jekels and Bergler (1949) did add some of their thoughts on this matter. Building on Freud's analysis, these authors conceptualized a tension between the ego-ideal and the ego as a prerequisite for loving. They envisioned love as a denial, a narcissistic proof given to the ego-ideal that the ego is loved. Intriguingly, they theorized that subsequent to the projection of the ego-ideal onto the object, there is a reintroduction of the projected ego-ideal which constitutes the essential element of love (e.g., "She is wonderful and I am wonderful because I am loved by her"). The authors then continued with structural analyses of feminine and masculine love. In the former, the ego-ideal is projected onto the object while the subject retains the ego. Descriptively, the picture is one of demands to be taken care of by, and admiration of, the superlative object. In the instance of masculine love, the object represents the ego and the subject plays the bolstered ego-ideal, with the result that the subject is primarily concerned with active caring with the receipt of affection distinctly secondary. Jekels and Bergler concluded their most

informative work with the statement that love cannot exist if the object does not fulfill the subject's wishes as expressed through the projected ego-ideal. In fact, "love at first sight" is so powerful and immediate only because the object so closely conforms to the wishful ego-ideal. The more reality "colludes" with the wishful ego-ideal, the greater the illusion upon which love stands.

Reference has been made in the preceding to a distinction between neurotic and normal love in Freud's thinking. Let us now examine this issue closely. Very early on Freud wrote quite extensively of the erotic life of male neurotics for whom conditions of love existed. For example, in discussing the inability of some men to be sexually potent except with a woman who was debased in their eyes, Freud (1910) delineated what he termed the condition of "love for a harlot." He outlined two other neurotic conditions of love, "the need to rescue the beloved" and "the need for an injured third party." From here, however, Freud (1910, 1914) went on to contend that there is a high degree of compulsion even in normal love, and that the conditions of love he uncovered are quite widespread. If I may now turn to Levine's (1977) work on romantic love, my point will become clearer. Levine refers to Freud's romantic vision of love, noting Freud's emphasis on (1) the beloved's absence or inaccessibility due to unconscious forces within the lover, (2) the lover's doubts as to the

beloved's fidelity and reliability, (3) self-abnegation, unrequitedness, and bondage as regularly occurring components. Clearly, each of these three attributes can be seen as indicative of neurotic trends. But, with this realization one must ask in utter amazement: "Is this, concretely, Freud's view of love, of that achievement which for many is humanity's most esteemed accomplishment?" Can it be that for Freud love is more or less only a psychopathological phenomenon?

#### On Mature Love

Certainly, that I raise the above stated questions is by no means to be taken as an indication that in so doing I have presently answered them in the affirmative. It may well be that these queries defy replies in a "yes" or "no" fashion. Rather, I pose these questions with the dual purpose of explicating the modern psychoanalytic view of love, upon which this study revolves, as well as Freud's position on love. I do not believe the one can be accomplished without the other. Let me begin with a recounting of new psychoanalytic excursions into the dominion of love.

Bergmann (1971), in a review of psychoanalytic perspectives on love, set forth the opinion that psychoanalytic theory in its classical era, that is up to the end of World War II, had not provided a systematic theory of love. What had been accomplished Bergmann laid almost entirely at Freud's doorstep, enumerating these three

cornerstones of the theory of love during the classical period: (1) love is possible because there is a rediscovery in the loved object of qualities of a previous love object, (2) love is defined as the transformation of narcissistic libido into object-libido with an accompanying projection of the ego-ideal onto the object, (3) attainment of the genital stage is prerequisite to the experience of love.

This last tenet, however, has received harsh treatment at the hands of modern psychoanalytic thinkers. Lichtenstein (1970) refers to the myth of the genital stage, of a stage encompassing the capacity for orgasm and secure mental health. Lichtenstein observes that from birth to death man continually struggles with himself with no lasting immunity. Reflecting on the discoveries of psychoanalytic ego psychology, Lichtenstein argues that sexuality and the related capacity for orgasm, though an important aspect of object-relations, can no longer lay exclusive claim to preeminence. Kernberg (1974c) reiterates the point baring the fact that the capacity for sexual intercourse and orgasm is not invariantly related to sexual maturity, nor does it necessarily reflect a high level of object-relations. With his usual incisiveness, Kernberg explicates that the capacity for sexual orgasm may remain intact despite a severe arrest in object-relations, as in such conditions libidinal trends may exist in split-off states due to a lack of integration with total object-relations.

Balint's (1947) thoughts were at once, a harbinger of this widespread discontent with the notion of genital primacy, and a bold foray into previously unexplored spheres of love. The breadth of his thoughts warrant a full examination. Balint began by defining an ideal case of object-love, a love devoid of pregenital features. He enumerated that this love should (1) entail no greediness, no wish to deny the object independent existence, (2) include no wish to humiliate or dominate the object, (3) not encompass the wish to defile the partner, or a feeling of being disgusted by the partner, (4) be free of feelings of being incomplete or of having a faulty sexual organ, or of the partner having one. Aware as he was that such ideal cases are a fiction, Balint took up another vantage point. Thus, in defining object-love positively he stated that (1) genital satisfaction is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for genital love, (2) tenderness, not in an excessive sense, but in the sense of quiet, non-passionate gratification is a component of love, (3) a prolonged perpetual emotional tie, a tie which persists in the absence of the genital wish, is present, (4) a special form of identification is found in love; here, interests, wishes, feelings, and shortcomings of the partner attain about the same significance as our own, (5) there is a mutual adaptation to the other's needs. Needless to say, these are all continuing processes, and not once and for all time achievements.

Indubitably, we now find ourselves squarely in the realm of mature love. Though lacking in systematization and, in my view, unfairly and prematurely dismissed by the classical psychoanalytic community, Fromm's (1956) work was a precursor of present day psychoanalytic thinking on love. Fromm steadfastly maintained that love is a "standing in" and not a "falling for." He delineated four basic elements as characteristic of all forms of love: care, responsibility, respect, and knowledge of the loved one. Fromm, as Freud (1930), made reference to various permutations of love such as motherly, erotic, and self-love. However, he saw brotherly love, a nonexclusive love for all human beings based on a feeling of communality with all people, as underlying all other forms of love.

I now turn to Kernberg's (1974c, 1974d) prolific contributions in the domain of love. Kernberg, too, emphasizes the relevance of the experience of communality with others, the awareness that we are all on common ground, as prerequisite to mature love. He underscores the capacity to mourn for the lost object, which of course presupposes a bonding with the object, as integral to the experience of love. In fact, he views concern, guilt, and reparation, requisites for mature love, as intimately intertwined with the capacity to mourn and feel depression. Kernberg, too, lays heavy stress on tenderness, empathy, and commitment to shared values and ideals. Kernberg's developmental

constructions in the sphere of mature love are indeed grand accomplishments, and will be outlined in a subsequent section. For now, I hope to have highlighted some general trends in modern day psychoanalytic thinking on mature love, and the divergency in emphasis from the classical, Freudian outlook.

### Freud and Mature Love

As has been alluded to, there is a serious question as to the relevancy of Freud's work on love to modern psychoanalytic conceptualizations of love. First, one need must consider the inextricable tie Freud weaved between love and not only the sexual instincts but the reproductive function, in light of the relatively recent dethroning of the concept of genital primacy. One is indeed hardpressed not to find some reference to the word "sexual" in Freud's thoughts on love. Although it is frequently remonstrated that Freud used the word in a very broad sense, the reader's opinion must be swayed by statements such as, "Thus the word 'to love' . . . becomes fixed to sexual objects in the narrower sense . . ." (Freud, 1915a, p. 137) in spite of Freud's protestations (1925). One cannot but wonder whether Freud's observations of emotionally disturbed individuals, the basis of so many of his theories, did not blind him to the existence of mature love, and instead bind him to a vision of love itself steeped in neurotic trends.

Still, one wades in murky waters in endeavoring to unravel Freud's position, a task made so much more problematic by Freud's own contradictory and highly abstract statements. Freud's 1928 paper in which he differentiates between love and an ordinary erotic-cathexis, accentuating the relative dearth of cathexes attached to the object in the case of the latter as compared to the former, is to my eye quite abstruse. In perusing Freud's adumbration of his definition of "sexual" in 1925, one meets with a similar bedevilment. Herein, Freud explicitly stated that by "sexual" he referred, too, to affectionate and friendly impulses, only secondarily serving reproductive functions. This is in direct contradiction to his 1915 statements. Bergmann (1971) can provide us with the beginnings of a welcome resolution. His remarks are the more noteworthy as he is a staunch defender of Freud's understanding of mature love. However, Bergmann makes the crucial pronouncement that Freud derived aim-inhibited love from sensual love, whereas he, for one, derives it from friendship.

The importance of this distinction cannot be over-emphasized, as I believe it accurately reflects Freud's final thoughts on the matter as delivered in his 1930 work Civilization and its Discontents. Here Freud spoke of those few people for whom loving displaces being loved, who do not exclusively love a single object but rather mankind as a whole, who, in Freud's terminology, substitute an

impulse with an inhibited aim for one with a sexual aim. Though for some such an achievement is laudatory and worthy of the highest of praises, Freud left no doubt whatsoever that he disagreed, adding that such nondiscriminating love loses a part of its value as all people are not worthy of love. Freud (1930), too, as Bergmann (1971) states, derived even this nonexclusive love from sexual origins. Hitschmann (1952), an interpreter of Freud's conceptions of love, recollected a lecture Freud gave in 1914 to a few cohorts in which he touched on the area of love. He related Freud's statements to the effect that love is passionate and directed toward a single object because therein the incestuous love for the mother can be repeated. Hitschmann concluded his paper by scoffing at the idea that there exists a love not rooted unitarily in physical attraction. He bids us resolutely abide by Freud's definition of love. Today, the concept of mature love is thriving in psychoanalytic circles and Hitschmann would find few supporters of the view he promulgated. However, Hitschmann is owed a word of thanks as his final plea demonstrates how the Freudian view of love differs in major ways from the concept of mature love.

This is not to say, however, that Freud's work is not applicable to mature love. As will be brought out, for example, Freud's structural analysis of love is clearly important to an appreciation of mature love. But, I think

the distinction must be drawn between what Freud described and to what purposes his work may be put. Getting down to cases, we should consider the Freudian stress on falling in love and the emphasis of modern authors on remaining in love. Now Kernberg (1974c) does believe that a continuity exists between the normal state of falling in love and remaining in love. Yet, he is quick to add that falling in love has very little to do with remaining in love. Fromm (1956), too, distinguishes falling in love, an often attenuated illusion of sudden intimacy born of sexual desire and dissipating with knowledge of the other, from mature love. Sexuality, the anlage of Freud's conceptualizations of love, though also important to mature love, occupies a subtly different position in this latter domain. In Kernberg's (1974c) system of thought, sexuality is not the wellspring of the capacity to love, but can further the experience of love. He maintains that the integration of genitality into the love relationship facilitates a transmutation of falling in love into the state of being in love, as will be delineated in a later section.

I would be remiss if I did not also highlight the distinction in the role allotted to idealization. Surely, in Freud's schema, idealization of the object is at the core of the phenomenological experience of love. In Kernberg's delineations, on the other hand, idealization of the object is at once relegated to a lesser role, and at the

same time the recipient of a most thorough analysis. Kernberg (1974c, 1974d) outlines no less than three levels of idealization, using a developmental approach. The lowest level is characterized by a primitive idealization, resting on the infantile defense of splitting objects into either all good or all bad ones. Clinging infantile dependency is also a manifestation of this crude psychic functioning, as is some capacity for genital satisfaction. Interestingly, such idealization is in high incidence in borderline personalities. This level of idealization is to be distinguished from a more advanced form founded on concern, guilt, and reparation. This form is encountered in individuals with less severe forms of character pathology and neurotic difficulties, who are capable of stable and deep object-relations albeit in the absence of full sexual gratification. Kernberg addresses a still higher form of idealization reminiscent of a process described by Balint (1947). Here one finds an identification with the idealized values of the beloved, not a sexual overvaluation but rather a mature commitment to the ideals for which the other stands and to what the couple, as one, can become. One may legitimately speak of transcendence, at this highest level of idealization, from a relationship solely with the beloved to a dedication to the couple's jointly held culture and background.

In contemplating this highest form of idealization, Kernberg (1974c) wonders aloud whether the term

"idealization" is really appropriately descriptive of the phenomenon. After all, one is hard pressed to discern overvaluation and overestimation in this mature love, which instead is apparently comprised of a realistic assessment of the other's wants, goals, and aspirations. In pondering Kernberg's musings, some questions raised by Sullivan (1965) are brought to mind. To wit, is it not possible that the loved object is seen in a true light, that the essence of love is the fortune and honor of attesting to a beautiful reality to which one was previously blinded? In short, is it possible that Freud ignored the virtues and very real qualities of the loved one in his zeal to construct a metapsychological theory of love? My own thought is that Freud's structural theory of love is a helpful one, but must be tempered with the knowledge that the world is not a blank screen, that object-choice is dictated, too, by reality considerations. I do believe that while tenderness and affection have some small voice in Freud's vision of love, it has been left to authors like Balint, Kernberg, and Fromm to articulate a conception which highlights a love spearheaded by care and concern, and to dignify such a love as a developmental feat to be aspired to.

#### Developmental Aspects of Mature Love

There can be no doubt but that pre-oedipal object-relations weigh heavily in current psychoanalytic thinking on mature love. Bergmann (1971), for example, basing his

speculations on M. Mahler's formulations, asserts the essence of love to be a revival of memories, feelings, and archaic ego states indigenous to the symbiotic phase of separation-individuation. He interprets the dread of separation, so often encountered in the great love stories such as Romeo and Juliet, as rooted in the infant's equation of separation with death, which is revivified in the adult's love relations. Bergmann, too, eloquently argues that object constancy, the availability of the mental image of the object even in the object's absence, is requisite to the capacity to love. When object constancy has not been attained by the infant, when the ability to form an enduring attachment to another person has been arrested, objects become interchangeable and love, albeit not lust, becomes an impossibility. This construction bears relevance to Kernberg's (1974d) remarks on severe narcissistic pathology where sexual promiscuity is often uncovered. Bergmann has also alluded to individuals with a predilection for sexual escapades. I was most captivated by Bergmann's analysis in which was delineated the almost continual need for social stimulation, and the related inability to be alone with the love object, manifested by such people. Bergmann linked these deficiencies to a developmental failure whereby the capacity to function separately in the mother's presence, to function without her constant stimulation, is sadly retarded. Bergmann (1971) concluded his comments with the statement

that there can be no idealization of the beloved, no specialness attached to another person, in the absence of a special relationship with the mother. Where such a relationship has existed in the symbiotic phase and been adequately resolved, the infant is left with an unyielding longing for its resuscitation in Bergmann's schematization. For Bergmann, mature love in adult life rests on the accomplishment of this crucial but painful developmental milestone.

Feldman (1964) has also heralded the preeminence of attachment and loss in the development of mature love. In differentiating love from lust, Feldman wrote that in the latter one sees a desire to possess whereas in the former the commixture of bliss and anguish following possession or imaginary possession is characteristic. Categorically, Feldman maintains that without an acquaintance with the feeling of fear of loss, love must remain beyond one's reach. Kernberg (1974c, 1974d) embraces these emphases as well, and in fact goes further in theorizing developmental stages requisite to the capacity to love. The first of these stages is successfully completed when there has been a full blossoming of oral and body-surface eroticism and its integration into total object-relations. Tenderness and empathy are the enduring testimonials to a fortunate resolution of this phase, and rest on an overcoming of the need to split off objects into part objects. When the good and

bad objects are united into one there is a deepening in awareness of the self and of others and a dawning capacity to mourn for the lost object, feel guilt, and make amends to the object.

The accentuation of concern, care, and reparation as vital components of mature love is not unique to Kernberg. Josselyn's (1971) paper similarly reveals a conception of mature love rooted in active caring and concern. However, as may have been discerned, there is a certain inexactness about Kernberg's explanations of the development of these qualities, qualities which I believe are well subsumed under the heading of "nurturance." Fortunately, Winnicott (1963) comes to our rescue. Winnicott, utilizing his talent of empathy for the infant to its fullest, begins by stressing the necessity of a good enough environment for the development of care and concern in the infant. In elucidating his thesis, Winnicott transports us to that stage when ambivalence and the integration of good and bad objects have been attained. At this point, the infant experiences the mother as a whole object and in a coherent way, and recognizes that both the erotic and aggressive drives it directs at mother are directed toward the same object. Thus, at this phase, the mother is no longer split into a good and bad object, but is experienced as one unified object in the infant's mind. Yet, in referring to this "humpty dumpty" stage, Winnicott highlights the precariousness of

the infant's position due to the discharge of aggressive impulses toward the mother. The mother must remain emotionally available to the infant in the face of such discharges. For, unless the mother remains empathic and available after having been used by the infant in the expression of id behaviors, the infant feels as if it cannot make a contribution to its mother. Should this feeling hold sway, guilt and reparative tendencies, the paramount underpinnings of mature love, will not be initiated. Let me here underscore Winnicott's clarification that concern, care, and responsibility are resultants of high-level super-ego reorganization, and may be seen as derivatives of guilt. Winnicott appends to these thoughts the caveat that this is not to be viewed as a once and for all process. Rather, it need be repeated again and again throughout the life cycle: we all need to repeatedly feel that we can make a contribution, and be provided with the opportunity for so doing in order to foster care and concern.

As was mentioned, Kernberg (1974c, 1974d) delineated stages in the development of the capacity to love. Subsequent to the accomplishment of care, concern, and reparation, Kernberg envisions a stage wherein genitality is integrated into the love relationship, a feat attendant upon the resolution of oedipal problems. At this juncture I reiterate that whereas sexuality is a cornerstone of Freud's theory of love, for modern authors it is no more

climactic than is the place of nurturance in mature love. In fact, in perusing Kernberg's explication of his second stage of mature love, one is presented with myriad instances of genitality being in the service of nurturance. As Kernberg stresses, genital satisfaction in mature love is accrued from the knowledge that in orgasm one fulfills the oral needs of the partner. Kernberg goes so far as to state that the tolerance of ambivalence, the capacity to sexually use and be used by the loved one with the aid of mutual empathy and collusion, is also a sine qua non of this phase of mature love. Thus, Kernberg here implicitly acknowledges that his conceptualization of love is not to be misconstrued as one where peace and serenity are forever supreme.

### The Kernberg-Kohut Controversy

Having expounded on the modern psychoanalytic conception of love, we can now proceed to the question of the relationship between narcissism and object-love. I will begin by venturing to clarify Freud's position on the matter. Turning to Freud's pivotal paper On Narcissism: An Introduction (1914), the expectation of the delineation of a straightforward position immediately comes to grief. In the early going of this work Freud clearly posited an inverse relationship between the two concepts: "We see also, broadly speaking, an antithesis between ego-libido and object-libido. The more of the one is employed, the more

the other becomes depleted" (p. 76). Such a statement is hardly surprising. After all, Freud's libido theory, steeped in a hydraulic model as it is, would seem to be incompatible with any but an inverse relationship between narcissism and object-love. Yet, in the very same 1914 paper Freud made the befuddling remark that the anaclitic or attachment type object-choice exists side by side with the narcissistic type object-choice. He seemed to be implying that both kinds of object-choice are open to each individual, and that the one does not interfere with the development of the other. With the passage of time Freud appears to have become more committed to this latter viewpoint. For example, in The Libido Theory and Narcissism (1917), Freud observed:

. . . it is probable that this narcissism is the universal and original state of things, from which object-love is only later developed without the narcissism necessarily disappearing on that account (p. 416).

Another 1917 paper, A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis, corroborates this opinion. Therein, Freud contended that there is never a complete cessation of the narcissistic attitude, that libido is in constant flux, flowing out from the ego onto objects and then back again onto the ego.

I find van der Waals' (1965) review most helpful in elucidating Freud's contradictory comments. Van der Waals, in bringing out the development of Freud's ideas on narcissism, remarks that in Freud's early thinking a complete

diminution of narcissism was deemed vital to the evolution of object-love. In van der Waals' schema, Freud had not yet conceptualized a healthy narcissism and only began to do so in his 1914 paper On Narcissism: An Introduction. Van der Waals' understanding is that as Freud began to envision a healthy narcissism, he began to theorize that narcissism is compatible with object-love. Gediman (1975) goes so far as to state that Kohut's theories are founded in Freud's 1914 paper. I will only remark at this point that even if van der Waals' conclusions are true, it would be an error to lose sight of the dissimilarities in Freud's and Kohut's thinking, as will be developed below. Furthermore, I would remind that efforts such as van der Waals' to explicate Freud's recondite apprehension are only recent endeavors, and in large measure spurred on by the work of modern authors such as Kohut. Mistakenly or not, it is unquestionable that many if not most psychoanalytic practitioners have long held narcissism and object-love to stand in inverse relation to one another. This tenet has profoundly affected psychoanalytic practice, influencing as it need must the psychoanalytic view of the integrated person, and hence therapeutic goals.

Having laid this groundwork, we are now equipped to consider Kohut's revolutionary work. Kohut (1971) has theorized the side by side development of narcissism and object-love, each moving from primitive to higher levels.

For Kohut, narcissism is the precursor of object-love, but also has a life of its own. He has written that the two, for the most part, proceed independently albeit at times their paths do meet. This latter circumstance occurs in the state of love where a narcissistic component exists but remains subordinated to the object-cathexis. That is, there may be an unrealistic overestimation of the love-object, but the connection with reality is maintained. The latter circumstance is contraindicative of the sovereignty of the narcissistic component. It should be stressed that even among those who fervently take issue with Kohut, there is no argument that narcissism may act in the ultimate service of object-directed goals [see Jacobson on narcissism in adolescence (1964) and Freud on sublimation (1923)]. Rather, the pivotal question is whether the quantity of narcissistic libido in use can have no effect on the available fund of object libido and visa versa; the question is an economic one.

Now, Kernberg (1974b) disagrees with Kohut, and implies that it is Kohut's therapeutic approach which blinds him. He argues that Kohut does not resolve narcissistic pathology in his treatment. Kernberg's writings suggest that it may be for this reason that Kohut finds no relationship between object-love and narcissism.

There is little doubt of the furor triggered by Kohut's theory. His critics are as scathing as his

supporters are laudatory. In what eventuates in a personal attack, Hanly and Masson (1976) begin their paper by arguing that narcissism retains its infantile character despite post-oedipal reorganization; they maintain that higher forms of narcissism do not exist. They go on to state, quite accurately, that Kohut, in positing a dual libido theory, breaks with Freud. All is coherent until, out of the blue and senselessly, these authors attack Kohut's handling of the dream in his treatment. One begins to sense that what is so disturbing to many is Kohut's disavowal of the singular importance of our western culture's cherished value of romantic love (Kohut, 1971). Hanly and Masson bring out that the higher transformations of narcissism Kohut refers to have an eastern quality about them encompassing as they do "quiet pride . . . mild disdain . . . creative superiority which judges and admonishes with quiet assurance" (Kohut, 1966, p. 265). Kohut's words on society's hypocritical judgment of narcissism, and on the need to concede its legitimacy are at once, bold and unsettling:

We should not deny our ambitions, our wish to dominate, our wish to shine, and our yearning to merge into omnipotent figures, but should instead learn to acknowledge the legitimacy of these narcissistic forces as we have learned to acknowledge the legitimacy of our object-instinctual strivings. We shall then be able . . . to transform our archaic grandiosity and exhibitionism into realistic self-esteem and into pleasure with ourselves, and our yearning to be at one with the omnipotent self-object into the socially useful, adaptive, and joyful capacity to be enthusiastic and to admire the great after whose lives, deeds, and personalities we can permit ourselves to model our own (1972, p. 365).

Hanly and Masson seem almost offended that Kohut could see as much worth in such higher transformations of narcissism as he does in object-love. They are, doubtless, not alone.

Slowly, one sees how the problem of values cannot be divorced from the generation and acceptance of psychoanalytic theory. If Kohut had placed as little value in these transformations of narcissism as do Hanly and Masson, he would certainly have labelled them infantile narcissism and, under the influence of Freud's libido theory, not have proceeded to the postulation of a separate developmental line for narcissism. In defense of Kohut, Goldberg (1976), the discussant of Hanly and Masson's paper, asserts there to be no question of the existence of mature forms of narcissism as seen in healthy self-esteem, creative work, and the maturation of ideals. Further, Goldberg emphasizes that, in part, Kohut was led to his theory from the realization that the individual is more than his psychopathology; Schreber loved his wife and was a wise and clever man though he was plagued with profuse narcissistic disturbance.

I should also like to cite a growing sentiment within psychoanalysis to acknowledge a tie between narcissistic-cathexes and object-cathexes. Eisnitz (1974), for one, adheres to the position that either cathexis may predominate at any given moment in an object-relationship, and that attempts to separate them out are doomed to failure. Another illustration of this principle is Gediman's (1975)

reference to the narcissistic underpinnings of friendship. In a more clinical vein, Jekels and Bergler (1949) similarly highlighted the difficulty in segregating narcissism from love. These authors, in support of their view, brought forth the case of a patient who narcissistically identified (e.g., reciting verbatim the analyst's views) with her analyst so as to be loved by him. We are here confronted with the seeming contradiction of narcissism in the immediate service of love. Yet, such a state of affairs is entirely consistent with Kohut's theory.

#### An Attempt at Resolution

What can be said as regards the Kernberg-Kohut debate of the relationship between object-love and narcissism? In what direction is a resolution to be found? Is the course to be followed that of simply submitting the controversy to experimental analysis with the end of proclaiming one man correct and the other mistaken in his supposition? I do not waver in contending this course to be folly. Clearly, each of these authors have substantial followings and for good reason: the principles each theorist has posited have paved the way for psychotherapeutic successes. I then initiate this discussion with the premise that there is no "yes" or "no" answer, that these authors' seemingly conflicting positions are both applicable, but perhaps to divergent phenomena.

Let me begin with a semantic point. Technically, Kernberg's writings suggest not an inverse relationship between narcissism and object-love, but rather between narcissism and object-relations (1974b). Under this latter rubric Kernberg places meaningful relationships with people including, but not limited to, the state of being in love. He also includes under this heading the capacity to feel empathy, gratification in identifying with loved people and values, and a sense of transcendence with nature. Recollecting Kohut's (1966, 1971) delineation of the sundry transformations of narcissism such as wisdom and empathy, one cannot help but observe that much of what Kernberg categorizes as object-relations Kohut espouses to be transformations of narcissism. This clarification of terms does not, however, constitute a resolution of the controversy. Kernberg does see the term "object-relations" as encompassing the capacity to love, and this is in direct opposition to Kohut's position.

Van Spruiell's (1975) work can perhaps point us in the right direction. As will be remembered, this author delineates and traces developmentally three strands of narcissism: self-love, the regulation of self-esteem, and omnipotence. In addition, Van Spruiell makes the somewhat cryptic statement that this means of conceptualizing narcissism is compatible with both Kernberg's and Kohut's writings. I understand this statement as follows:

narcissism has generally been treated as a unitary concept. We assume, for example, that the two theorists have the same phenomenon in mind when they use the term "narcissism" to describe it. Yet, from the foregoing divergency in descriptions offered by Kohut and Kernberg (see Chapter 5), one's belief in narcissism as a unitary concept begins to be shaken.

It is becoming more and more apparent that the concept of narcissism can be viewed in an alternative manner. Evidence mounts that narcissism is multidimensional in nature, that it is a concept containing sub-concepts within it. Van Spruiell has outlined three strands of narcissism; there are no doubt others. Such a notion has the seeds for the resolution of the Kernberg-Kohut controversy. That is, we are by no means bound to assume that Kohut and Kernberg have the same phenomenon in mind in offering their respective theoretical statements.

As has been repeatedly emphasized in this presentation, Kernberg lays tremendous stress on the aggressive components of narcissism, in contrast to Kohut's delineations of its libidinal elements. For Kernberg, arrogance, boastfulness, devaluation and haughtiness, are critical aspects of narcissism. One finds immense difficulty in examining Kernberg's (see 1970, 1974a, 1974b) thoughts on the subject without encountering repeated reference to these attributes. Consistent with Kernberg's writings, I

theorize that for these facets of narcissism the formulation of an inverse relationship between narcissism and love holds true. Kohut (1971, 1972), on the other hand, makes little mention of these qualities and, instead, speaks chiefly of the "softer" side of narcissism. Surely, the libidinal idealization of the self is repeatedly keynoted by Kohut. Concretely, the wish to be admired and famous, if not great, the urge to be on stage and exhibit one's self to others for their applause, earmark Kohut's prose. In heeding Kohut's position, I theorize that for this non-aggressive, libidinal, exhibitionistic, strand of narcissism, narcissism is independent of object-love.

Let me reiterate that the theoretical propositions I have adumbrated are aimed at resolving the Kernberg-Kohut controversy by establishing the validity of the positions suggested by each author's writings, albeit for different components of narcissism. Should the relationships hypothesized hold true, it would be demonstrated that the writings of both authors are important to the explanations of divergent phenomena. More importantly, the validation of this theory would "acquit" narcissism of being necessarily antagonistic to love and, in so doing, support the critical formulation of a separate developmental line for narcissism. As such suppositions are at the heart of contemporary psychoanalytic treatment approaches and theoretical thinking, the outcome of this research has important ramifications for this realm as well.<sup>1</sup>

## STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Narcissism and love, two unremittingly esoteric abstractions of human experience, now stand at the proscenium of psychoanalytic thought. In no small measure is this due to the contributions of Otto Kernberg and Heinz Kohut. Still, even while immeasurably fostering our understandings of these elusive concepts, these theorists have remanded to us a tortuous conundrum. What is the relationship between love and narcissism? Can love, seemingly so antagonistic to narcissism, be unaffected by it as sections of Kohut's writings suggest, or does an inverse relation exist between the two concepts as it suggested by sections of Kernberg's writings?

This controversy, the object of not one empirical investigation to date, is not only of theoretical interest but has applications in the applied realm as well. Theoretically, the concept of a separate developmental line for narcissism and, more generally, the "exoneration" of narcissism are at stake. Practically, the controversy has important ramifications for contemporary psychoanalytic treatment approaches.

To the end of resolving the controversy, an assiduous examination of psychoanalytic thinking on love and narcissism was essayed. A careful scrutiny of developmental formulations, reflections on the relationship of Freud's views on love to mature love, and an excursion into the plane of pathological narcissism, have been central to the exposition.

Finally, a theory was developed resting resolutely on the premise that both, Kohut and Kernberg have elucidated aspects of the mind heretofore veiled. The study concludes with the subjection of this theory to empirical analysis.

## HYPOTHESES

Is it true that narcissism and love can be independent of one another? Can love, seemingly so antagonistic to narcissism, be unaffected by it? Kernberg's writings (1974b) suggest a reply in the negative, whereas Kohut's (1971) work suggests a reply in the positive. A resolution to this controversy may be sought in the conception of narcissism as a multidimensional entity, as a concept containing sub-concepts within it. Proceeding from this proposition, Kernberg's demarcation of the aggressive components of narcissism was culled from his writings (1970, 1974a, 1974b). For Kernberg, arrogance, boastfulness, and devaluation are critical aspects of narcissism.

Hypothesis I: The aggressive strand of narcissism correlates negatively with object-love.

In contrast to Kernberg's delineations of the aggressive components of narcissism, Kohut (1971, 1972) makes little mention of these qualities and, instead, speaks chiefly of the "softer" side of narcissism. That is, Kohut highlights the non-aggressive, exhibitionistic strand of narcissism. Concretely, the wish to be admired and famous, the urge to be on stage and exhibit one's self, exemplify

Kohut's emphases. Kohut's prose suggests such characteristics to be independent of object-love.

Hypothesis II: The non-aggressive, exhibitionistic strand of narcissism has a negligible correlation with object-love.

## METHOD

### Description of Instruments

#### The Interpersonal Checklist

The Interpersonal Checklist (ICL) is a 134-item list of words and phrases (six items are fillers) which may be used to secure self-descriptions. The ICL was designed by Suczek and Laforge (Leary, 1957), and was a part of a larger effort to conceptualize varieties of interpersonal behavior at the Kaiser Foundation. The ICL operationalizes a model of personality proffered by Leary (1957), and connoted by a set of sixteen interpersonal categories arranged in a circumplex around the two axes of dominance-submission and love-hate (see Figure 1). Referring to Figure 1, it can be seen that the sixteen categories may be combined into distinctly labelled pairs, thereby reducing the number of categories to eight. Leary (1957) denotes these eight categories "octants." The ICL itself is designed to measure each of the sixteen interpersonal categories. In form IV of the ICL each of the sixteen categories are represented by eight words or phrases (see Table 1).

An intensity dimension is built into the checklist such that each of the sixteen categories is represented






Figure 1. The Sixteen Interpersonal Categories of the Interpersonal Checklist Arranged Around the Axes of Dominance-Submission and Love-Hate.



Table 1.--The Interpersonal Checklist Arranged By Interpersonal Category and Intensity.

<u>A Managerial</u> 1 Able to give orders 2 Forceful Good leader Likes responsibility 3 Bossy* Dominating* Manages others* 4 Dictatorial *	<u>E Aggressive</u> 1 Can be frank and honest 2 Critical of others* Irritable Straightforward and direct 3 Outspoken* Often unfriendly Frequently angry 4 Hard-hearted
<u>B Narcissistic</u> 1 Self-respecting 2 Independent Self-confident Self-reliant and assertive 3 Boastful* Proud and self-satisfied* Somewhat snobbish* 4 Egotistical and conceited*	<u>F Rebellious</u> 1 Can complain if necessary 2 Often gloomy Resents being bossed* Skeptical 3 Bitter Complaining Resentful 4 Rebels against everything*
<u>C Competitive</u> 1 Able to take care of self 2 Can be indifferent to others* Businesslike Likes to compete with others* 3 Thinks only of himself* Shrewd and calculating* Selfish* 4 Cold and unfeeling*	<u>G Distrustful</u> 1 Able to doubt others 2 Frequently disappointed Hard to impress Touchy and easily hurt 3 Jealous Slow to forgive a wrong* Stubborn 4 Distrusts everybody
<u>D Sadistic</u> 1 Can be strict if necessary 2 Firm but just Hard-boiled when necessary Stern but fair 3 Impatient with others' mistakes* Self-seeking* Sarcastic* 4 Cruel and unkind	<u>H Self-effacing</u> 1 Able to criticize self 2 Apologetic Easily embarrassed* Lacks self-confidence* 3 Self-punishing Shy Timid 4 Always ashamed of self*

Table 1.--Continued.

<u>I Masochistic</u>	<u>M Over-conventional</u>
1 Can be obedient	1 Friendly
2 Usually gives in Easily led Modest	2 Affectionate and understanding Sociable and neighborly Warm
3 Passive and unaggressive Meek Obeys too willingly	3 Fond of everyone Likes everybody Friendly all the time
4 Spineless	4 Loves everyone
<u>J Docile</u>	<u>N Hypernormal</u>
1 Grateful	1 Considerate
2 Admires and imitates others* Often helped by others Very respectful to authority	2 Encouraging others Kind and reassuring Tender and soft-hearted
3 Dependent Wants to be led Hardly ever talks back	3 Forgives anything Oversympathetic Too lenient with others
4 Clinging vine	4 Tries to comfort everyone
<u>K Dependent</u>	<u>O Responsible</u>
1 Appreciative	1 Helpful
2 Very anxious to be approved of* Accepts advice readily Trusting and eager to please	2 Big-hearted and unselfish Enjoys taking care of others Gives freely of self
3 Lets others make decisions Easily fooled Likes to be taken care of	3 Generous to a fault Overprotective of others Too willing to give to others
4 Will believe anyone	4 Spoils people with kindness
<u>L Cooperative</u>	<u>P Autocratic</u>
1 Cooperative	1 Well thought of
2 Eager to get along with others Always pleasant and agreeable Wants everyone to like him	2 Makes a good impression Often admired* Respected by others*
3 Too easily influenced by friends Will confide in anyone Wants everyone's love	3 Always giving advice* Acts important* Tries to be too successful*
4 Agrees with everyone	4 Expects everyone to admire him*

Note. Starred items are deleted from the shortened form of the Interpersonal Checklist used in this study.



on a four-point scale (see Table 1). That is, for each variable there is an intensity 1 (defined as a mild amount of the trait) item, intensity 2 (moderate amount of trait) items, intensity 3 (marked amount of trait) items, and an intensity 4 (extreme amount of trait) item (see Table 1). As is pointed out by Laforge (1973) and Leary (1957), the intensity dimension, and its negative correlation with social desirability, serves as a control for social desirability.

As was mentioned, the sixteen interpersonal categories are arranged in a circumplex around the two axes of dominance-submission and love-hate. With the aid of a weighted sum of the subject's responses to the 134 items, numerical scores for each of these dimensions (Dom and Lov, respectively) can be derived. These summary scores are based on the notion that each subject can be assigned a set of sixteen vectors or points in two-dimensional space. Having accomplished this, a weighted sum of vectors can provide a summary score for each individual along the love-hate axis. Laforge's (1973) formula for the calculation of the Lov summary score is found in Table 2.

Table 2.--Formula for the Calculation of the Lov Summary Score

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$$\text{Lov} = M-E + .924(N+L-D-F) + .707(O+K-C-G) + .383(P+J-B-H)$$


---

Note. The alphabetical letters symbolize the sixteen interpersonal categories (see Table 1).



With a modification to be discussed below, the Lov dimension operationalized object-love in the present study. As I trust I have brought out, the modern psychoanalytic conception of mature love is a complex one, made more so by the fact that work on the concept is only in its infancy. In acknowledging this state of affairs, this investigation sought only to measure the underpinnings of the concept, leaving finer delineations to future efforts. But, what to measure? As I have stated in previous chapters, the psychoanalytic view of mature love is grounded in the qualities of care, concern, and reparation.

The Lov dimension of the ICL would appear to assess affection and a loving attitude (see Laforge et al., 1954; Leary, 1957). Further, Laforge (1973) reports pathology as measured by the MMPI to be positively correlated with lower-left ICL scores, and negatively correlated with upper right ICL scores (see Figure 1). This is to be expected of an instrument that taps care and concern. Most cogently, however, inspection of the item content of the ICL unmistakably demonstrates the ICL's emphasis on care, concern, and reparation. Reliability of the Lov dimension was also encouraging as Laforge (1973) reports the communality of Lov scores to be above .90.

However, there was one problem that remained. In examining the circumplex (see Figure 1), it became evident that the ICL, as every other measure of love I have



scrutinized, assumes narcissism to be antagonistic to love. Such an assumption is built into the formula for the Lov score, and would have obviously biased the testing of the theories here under investigation. For example, referring to Table 1, under the rubric of interpersonal category B one immediately discerns a number of items (e.g., egotistical and conceited) exemplifying the strands of narcissism here under scrutiny. Now, glancing at Table 2, it will be seen that the higher one's score on category B, the lower one's Lov score. This is a general principle of the ICL: the more narcissistic processes hold sway within the personality, the lower the Lov score. It can readily be seen that such an assumption is deleterious to a study which seeks to establish an independence between love and narcissism. For this reason, items on the ICL which were thought to be even remotely suggestive of narcissistic processes or disturbance were deleted from the ICL for use in this study (see starred items in Table 1).

However, the decision to delete 33 of the 128 ICL items raised a serious question. Having so altered the test, was I entitled to derive Lov scores on the shortened form from the same formula from which they are derived on the original form? It was thus necessary to provide support for the supposition that Lov scores on the shortened form yield essentially the same ordering of people as do Lov scores on the unaltered version. With

this end, the ICL was administered to a sample of thirty-three male undergraduates at Michigan State University (the decision to utilize males will be made clear shortly). Lov scores on both, the shortened and full length forms were derived for each subject. The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between the two sets of scores was  $.96(t(31) = 19.86, p < .001)$ . Support was thus provided for the utilization of the shortened form of the ICL in the present study.

#### The Dean Romanticism Scale

The Dean Romanticism Scale (DRS) is a 32-item instrument designed to measure romantic love (Dean, 1961). Twenty-seven items were rated as romantic by agreement of ten of twelve judges; five items were rated as indicative of companionship love by these judges. There are eighteen other items included as fillers on the test. Subjects are required to indicate degree of agreement with each item on a five-point scale. Each of the romantic items receives the maximum score of "5" when the subject strongly agrees with the item. Each of the companionship items receives the maximum score of "5" when the subject strongly disagrees with the statement. In this manner, a total DRS score may be assigned to each subject.

In this investigation the DRS was utilized to assess aspects of object-love not measured by the ICL. While the ICL provides an assessment of care, concern, and reparation,

it is surely deficient in the measurement of the individual's capacity to fall in love and engage in an exclusive relationship. The DRS does remedy this shortcoming, not only assessing these two latter capacities, but providing a gauge of the intensity of the affective experience of exclusive love. This is so as in Dean's vision of romantic love, affective aspects of the relationship are viewed as primary. All of the above-mentioned domains are critical components of the modern psychoanalytic view of love (see Bergmann, 1971; Kernberg, 1974c, 1974d).

In a study on romantic love conducted by Levine (1977), the DRS was found to have only a correlation of .25 with another measure of romantic love more closely derived from those principles of romantic love laid down by Freud. The DRS rests, in essence, upon the conception of romantic love portrayed in the mass media in the United States. In view of the problematic relevance of Freud's thinking on romantic love to present day psychoanalytic conceptualizations, such a weak relationship between the two measures was encouraging. Too, that Dean (1961) found the DRS not to be significantly correlated with emotional immaturity, but rather to be significantly correlated with the Emotional Adjustment subscale of the Bell Adjustment Inventory, suggested the relevance of the DRS to a study of mature love.

Since five of the thirty-two items on the DRS are indicative of companionship love, the maximum score is



earned when the subject strongly disagrees with the five companionship items. The modern psychoanalytic vision of love, particularly as articulated by Kernberg (1974c, 1974d), does not abide by the conception that the capacities to fall in love and engage in an exclusive relationship are antithetical to nonexclusive caring, concern, and reparation. On Dean's measure, the reverse holds. For this reason, it was necessary to delete the five companionship items from the DRS for the current investigation. In order to estimate the effect of such an alteration on the test's reliability, the Spearman-Brown Prophecy Formula was applied. The reliability of the modified twenty-seven item DRS should be .88 as compared to the .90 split-half reliability of the 32-item form on a sample of 194 reported by Dean. Lastly, the DRS is not controlled for acquiescence. As such DRS items were reworded for use in this study so as to control for this response set.

### The Dynamic Personality Inventory

The Dynamic Personality Inventory (DPI), a creation of Tadeusz Grygier (1968), is comprised of 325 words and phrases which are responded to in a "like," "dislike" manner. The test is rooted in psychoanalytic theory, heavily influenced as the DPI is by the contributions of Abraham, Fenichel, Ferenczi, Glover, Rank, and Alexander and French. The DPI has the distinct advantage of imbedding a projective approach within an objective measurement



framework. As Grygier expounds, the DPI aims at stirring the subject's imagination and enhancing projection in much the same way as a free association test does. Yet, items are grouped into scales, representing various facets of development from a psychoanalytic perspective, which can be objectively scored. Grygier reiterates that while the DPI is a projective instrument, it does not appear to be so, and this is of great advantage.

Considerable work has been accomplished on the validation of the DPI. Grygier (1968) reports on the massive efforts at the Institute of Personality Assessment and Research at the University of California that resulted in 15,000 correlations of DPI scales with external criteria such as personality tests and psychiatric assessments. The total number of significant correlations exceeded by thirty-two times the number expected on the basis of pure chance. The DPI has been cross-validated in England, and is now utilized in Australia, Canada, India, France, and Poland. Average split-half reliability of the DPI scales is .75, and average repeat reliability is .80 (Grygier, 1968).

In this study, two of the scales from the DPI, the Verbal Aggression (Ov) and Exhibitionism (Pe) scales, were utilized. The Ov scale (see Appendix C) operationalized the aggressive strand of narcissism Kernberg has so accentuated, and the Pe scale (see Appendix C) operationalized the exhibitionistic strand of narcissism Kohut has delineated.

Grygier (1968) reports on a criminological study of 109 chronic petty offenders in which low Ov scores were corroborated by social work data. As Dr. Grygier concluded in a personal communication, the Ov scale is related to boastfulness and arrogance, the keynotes of the aggressive strand of narcissism here being investigated. An inspection of the Ov scale's item content also reveals the tapping of the quality of devaluation. Grygier (1968) defines the Pe scale as a measure of the conscious enjoyment of attention and admiration. Clearly, these qualities are cornerstones of the exhibitionistic self Kohut has delineated. Grygier (1968) recounts a study in which a group of eighty-eight females active in athletics scores higher on the Pe scale than did a control group. Inspection of the item content of the Pe scale reveals that the exhibitionism which is measured is, in addition, devoid of aggressive connotations. Thus, the Pe scale meshes well with Kohut's depiction of non-aggressive, exhibitionistic facets of narcissism.

#### The Acquiescence Scale

As data collection proceeded, the question of whether the results of the present study could be confounded by the presence of an acquiescent response set presented itself. It was decided that indeed this could happen as the DPI, for example, is not controlled for acquiescence.

Since data collection had already commenced, it was necessary to assess the effects of acquiescence with the



aid of measurement instruments at hand. As the DPI, en toto, had been administered to all subjects, and as the Ov and Pe scales of the DPI constitute only 25 of the test's 325 items, it was resolved to use all those remaining items as an acquiescence scale (ACQ). The number of these remaining items to which the subject responded in a "like" manner constituted his ACQ score (two DPI items, not included on either the Pe or Ov scales, were deleted from the ACQ. See Appendix C). In this investigation, split-half reliability estimates of the ACQ were .91, .79, and .95 for the total sample, clinic sample, and student sample, respectively.

In retrospect, it was well that acquiescence was considered, as the acquiescent response set, left uncontrolled, would have seriously affected this study's results. As a glance ahead at the factor matrix reproduced in Table 5 shows, for each of three factors obtained, the ACQ had positive loadings; for one factor the ACQ loading exceeded .67.

#### The Level II Reading Subtest of the Wide Range Achievement Test

The Wide Range Achievement Test (WRAT) assesses the areas of reading (word recognition and pronunciation), written spelling, and arithmetic computation. The WRAT, then, contains three subtests (Reading, Spelling, Arithmetic), with each subtest divided into two levels. Level I

is intended for use with children, Level II is designed for use with persons 12 years old and over.

The Level II Reading Subtest of the WRAT (RSWRAT) consists of 74 words which the subject is asked to read aloud. Grade ratings corresponding to raw scores have been established and enable the determination of the grade level at which the subject is reading. Reliability estimates of the RSWRAT are most favorable. Odd-even reliabilities for three samples of 200 each (ages 16-17, 18-19, 20-up, respectively) all exceeded .98 (see Jastak & Jastak, 1965). These authors also report findings favorable to the subtest's validity. A correlation of .78 ( $p < .01$ ) was found between the RSWRAT and teachers' ratings of achievement (Jastak & Jastak, 1965).

Jastak & Jastak (1965) make reference to the applicability of the WRAT to the establishment of degrees of literacy. In the present investigation the RSWRAT was implemented for this purpose, to gauge literacy. As will be delineated below, the RSWRAT was administered to all potential subjects from the clinic sample.

#### The Vocabulary Subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale

The Vocabulary Subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (VSWAIS) is comprised of forty words which the subject is asked to define. Wechsler (1958) reports the VSWAIS to be an excellent measure of general intelligence.

He writes that the correlation of the VSWAIS with the WAIS full scale score is consistently between .7 and .9 (Wechsler, 1958). Wechsler (1955) has also presented data which demonstrates the VSWAIS to have correlations above .8 with the WAIS verbal IQ score. Odd-even reliabilities presented by Wechsler (1955) for the VSWAIS are consistently above .9.

In this research the VSWAIS was used as a means through which to obtain a WAIS prorated verbal IQ score which then served as an estimate of intelligence. For reasons to be developed in a later chapter, the VSWAIS was administered to all potential subjects from the clinic sample.

### Subjects

Two samples of males were utilized in this research. One sample consisted of thirty-two undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology courses at Michigan State University. These subjects were recruited by means of posters, and received extra credit applied toward their course grades for volunteering to participate in the study.

The second sample was composed of twenty young male patients of the Ingham Community Mental Health Center (ICMHC), located in Lansing, Michigan. These subjects were gathered in the following manner: A listing of all the then currently active outpatient cases of the ICMHC was perused in order to identify those male patients falling within the age range of interest (17-29). Further, ICMHC

outpatient therapists were approached and asked to identify any additional active cases meeting the above criteria. Patients were then contacted (provided they were not judged to be of sub-normal intelligence by their therapists. See Procedure section below) and requested to participate in the study. In one instance, a patient meeting the above specifications heard that the study would be taking place and volunteered his participation. All ICMHC subjects (heretofore referred to as the clinic sample) received \$5 for participating in the research. See Table 3 for a listing of subject variables.

Table 3.--Subject Variables.

Variable	Median	Range
<u>Student Sample</u>		
Age of Subjects	19.4	18.4-24.5
Yearly Income of Subjects' Parents <sup>a</sup>	26,500	12,000-80,000
<u>Clinic Sample</u>		
Age of Subjects	24.35	17.2-28.8
Yearly Income of Subjects' Parents <sup>b</sup>	13,625	0-75,000

<sup>a</sup>Four subjects from the student sample did not report their parents' income.

<sup>b</sup>Eight subjects from the clinic sample did not report their parents' income; in one other case the subject's parents were deceased.

The decision to focus on young males was rooted in the thought that narcissistic processes would be more readily discernible in such a population than in others (see Jacobson, 1964). A similar concern underlied the resolution to utilize two samples, one composed of undergraduates, the other of outpatients from a local community mental health clinic. It was thought that such a method would better assure a heterogeneity of individuals in terms of psychological functioning. Such a heterogeneity was judged to be important to ascertaining the operation of divergent strains of narcissism, and thus to providing a fair test of the Hypotheses. The other consideration upon which the use of the clinic sample was based was the wish to forestall certain arguments which might be made in the case of negative results. Specifically, empirical studies negating aspects of psychoanalytic theory are open to challenge on the basis that the theory rests upon observations of the mentally ill, whereas the empirical investigation utilizes "normal" populations. The use of the clinic sample precluded the possibility that this objection could be raised in the face of negative findings.

As to the determination to focus on males only, let me refer to Kohut's writings. In The Analysis of the Self, Kohut's (1971) major work, his understanding of the relationship between love and narcissism is outlined. In formulating his thesis, Kohut made extensive reference to case



material and, not surprisingly, his theories are rooted in this storehouse. Yet, of the seventeen cases cited by Kohut, only two of these are of females. On this basis alone, there are grave questions as to the applicability of Kohut's demarcations to females. Second, even a cursory examination of Kohut's developmental constructions (see Chapter 3) leaves the reader with serious reservations as to the relevancy of the narcissistic phases outlined to females. For these reasons, only the testing of males was accomplished in this study.

#### Procedure

The thirty-two subjects (Ss) constituting the student sample were tested in group fashion. Testing was accomplished by the experimenter (E) in a lecture hall at Michigan State University. The twenty Ss comprising the clinic sample were tested at the ICMHC in Lansing, Michigan. The testing of this sample was accomplished by the E in a group manner and individually, depending upon the S's schedule.

All Ss were informed at the outset that in order to guarantee anonymity and with the hope that they would answer the items as truthfully as possible, they were requested not to identify themselves by name on the test materials. Having emphasized this safeguarding of anonymity, testing was begun. Measurement instruments were assigned to each S in random sequence in order to prevent



order effects. The measurement instruments required an average of forty-five minutes to complete.

Grygier (1962), in delineating the Dynamic Personality Inventory, stated that a minimum intelligence quotient of 80 is requisite to completion of the questionnaire. It was felt that the possibility existed that some Ss from the clinic sample might not meet this criterion. It was also felt that some Ss from this sample might fail to meet even minimum literacy standards. In order to obviate these potential sources of error, each S from the clinic sample was administered the VSWAIS and the RSWRAT. Ss from the clinic sample who could not perform to a sixth grade reading level and a prorated WAIS verbal IQ score of 80 were excluded from the study. One additional precaution vis-a-vis the intelligence of the clinic Ss was as follows: Each potential clinic S's therapist was approached and asked to assess whether the S's intelligence fell within the normal range or higher. Potential Ss who were not adjudged to fall within this range were not requested to participate in the study.

Thus, in the case of the clinic sample, Ss were informed at the outset of testing that they would be approached one by one by the E while they were completing the inventories, and asked to accompany him to another room to "read and explain some words" (Obviously, testing could be completed in one room for those clinic Ss tested



individually). In this way the VSWAIS and the RSWRAT (assigned in random sequences) were administered to each S from the clinic sample. Three of the twenty-three clinic Ss tested were excluded from the project; one for failing to meet the intelligence criterion, one for not meeting the literacy standard, and one for failing to correctly follow the instructions to the measurement instruments.

#### Predictions in Terms of Instruments Employed

In the present study the aggressive strand of narcissism and the nonaggressive, exhibitionistic strand of narcissism are operationalized by the Verbal Aggression (Ov) and Exhibitionism (Pe) scales, respectively, of the Dynamic Personality Inventory. The variable of object-love has been conceptualized as encompassing romantic love and another form of love, one keynoted by care, concern, and reparation. The Dean Romanticism Scale (DRS) operationalized the former kind of love, the Lov dimension of the Interpersonal Checklist operationalized the latter sort of love. Finally, the Acquiescence Scale (ACQ), composed of items from the Dynamic Personality Inventory, operationalized the acquiescent response set.

To test the Hypotheses, the following specific predictions were formulated in terms of the instruments used in this study. Each of the predictions were hypothesized to hold true for the clinic sample, for the student sample, and for the total sample (the student and



clinic samples combined). Each prediction corresponds with the previously stated hypothesis of the same numeral.

I. Lov scores correlate negatively with Ov scores (ACQ and Pe held constant).

I. DRS scores correlate negatively with Ov scores (ACQ and Pe held constant).

II. The correlation between Lov scores and Pe scores does not significantly differ from zero (ACQ and Ov held constant).

II. The correlation between DRS scores and Pe scores does not significantly differ from zero (ACQ and Ov held constant).



## STATISTICAL TREATMENT OF DATA

Rather than simply utilizing product-moment correlation coefficients for hypothesis testing, partial correlations were computed. A partial correlation is the correlation between two variables when one or more other variables are held constant. The partial correlation procedure entails the correlation of error scores in predicting one variable from another. Such error scores correlate zero with the predictor variable. Thus, if the predictor variable(s) is the same for two error scores, the resultant correlation will be independent of this variable(s). This represents the essence of the partial correlation procedure.

The partial correlation procedure was selected for use in this study as it allowed for the control of the effects of extraneous factors such as acquiescence on variables of interest to the study. In this research, it served as a safeguard that positive results would not simply be an artifact of the correlation of the Acquiescence Scale with the variables under investigation, or of a substantive correlation between the Verbal Aggression and Exhibitionism Scales of the Dynamic Personality Inventory. All partial



correlation coefficients were calculated separately for the clinic, student, and total samples.

T-tests were utilized throughout in order to assess the significance of the partial correlation coefficients. As Hypothesis I was stated in a one-directional manner, t-tests designed to evaluate it were one-tailed with the criterion of significance set at the .05 level.

Hypothesis II, on the other hand, was not stated in a one-directional manner and so two-tailed t-tests were implemented in testing it. Additionally, as in the case of Hypothesis II the inability to reject the null hypothesis provided support for the hypothesized negligible relation between variables, it was resolved to raise the criterion of significance to the .20 level.

An attempt to garner support for Hypothesis II, that is to establish a negligible relation between variables, was also attempted by means of comparisons between partial correlations computed to test Hypothesis I and partial correlations computed to test Hypothesis II. Significant differences, assessed by means of one-tailed t-tests, were another means employed to establish negligibility.

Reliability coefficients for all measurement instruments utilized in this research were computed and were then applied in correcting for attenuation. Finally, the results of a factor analysis using the varimax method



of rotation were important to the examination of the Hypotheses.



## RESULTS

Hypothesis I: The aggressive strand of narcissism correlates negatively with object-love.

Hypothesis I was tested by computing partial correlation coefficients between the aggressive strand of narcissism (Ov scores) and object-love (Lov and DRS scores, examined separately) with ACQ and Pe scores held constant. These partial correlation coefficients were calculated individually for the clinic, student, and total samples.

In the case of the total sample, the partial correlation coefficient of  $-.26$  between Ov scores and Lov scores with ACQ and Pe held constant was significant. The partial correlation of  $-.15$  between Ov scores and DRS scores with ACQ and Pe held constant was not significant, though it was in the predicted direction.

For the clinic sample, the partial correlation coefficient of  $-.29$  between Ov scores and Lov scores with ACQ and Pe held constant was not significant, though it was in the predicted direction. The partial correlation coefficient of  $-.46$  between Ov scores and DRS scores with ACQ and Pe held constant was significant.

Turning to the student sample, the partial correlation coefficient of  $-.33$  between Ov scores and Lov scores with ACQ and Pe held constant was significant. The partial correlation coefficient of  $.05$  between Ov scores and DRS scores with ACQ and Pe held constant was not significant or in the predicted direction (see Table 4 for a summary of these partial correlation coefficients between Ov scores and object-love with ACQ and Pe held constant).

A factor analysis of scores on the five measurement instruments used in this study provides another way of examining Hypothesis I. Looking at Factor 2 of the factor matrix (see Table 5), it may be seen that whereas the Lov dimension has a loading of  $.711$ , the Ov scale has a negative factor loading of  $-.217$ . Similarly, in inspecting Factor 3 it may be observed that whereas the DRS has a loading of  $.551$ , the Ov scale has a negative loading of  $-.197$ . This pattern of positive factor loadings for object love and negative factor loadings for the aggressive strand of narcissism is consistent with Hypothesis I.

In brief summary, Hypothesis I received substantive, albeit not complete, support from the data with respect to the student, clinic, and total samples. Five of the six partial correlation coefficients computed to test Hypothesis I were in the predicted direction. In addition, three of these partial correlation coefficients were significant at less than the  $.05$  significance level. Finally, the results

Table 4.--Partial Correlation Coefficients for Ov Scores  
Versus Object-Love With Acquiescence and  
Exhibitionism Scores Held Constant.

Hypothesis	Variables	r	N	Significance Level <sup>a,b</sup>
<u>Total Sample</u>				
I	Ov Scores Versus Lov Scores	-.26	52	$p < .04$
I	Ov Scores Versus DRS Scores	-.15	52	$p < .15$
<u>Clinic Sample</u>				
I	Ov Scores Versus Lov Scores	-.29	20	$p < .13$
I	Ov Scores Versus DRS Scores	-.46	20	$p < .03$
<u>Student Sample</u>				
I	Ov Scores Versus Lov Scores	-.33	32	$p < .05$
I	Ov Scores Versus DRS Scores	.05	32	$p < .40$

<sup>a</sup>All t-tests were one-tailed.

<sup>b</sup>There were N-4 degrees of freedom for each  
significance test.

Table 5.--Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix of Scores on the Five Measurement Instruments for the Total Sample With Kaiser Normalization.

Measurement Instrument	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Exhibitionism Scale (Pe)	.669	.048	.064
Verbal Aggression Scale (Ov)	.736	-.217	-.197
Lov Dimension	-.026	.711	-.072
Dean Romanticism Scale (DRS)	.002	-.038	.551
Acquiescence Scale (ACQ)	.679	.466	.256

of a factor analysis provided ancillary support for Hypothesis I.

Hypothesis II: The non-aggressive, exhibitionistic strand of narcissism has a negligible correlation with object-love.

Hypothesis II was tested by calculating partial correlation coefficients between the exhibitionistic strand of narcissism (Pe scores) and object-love (Lov and DRS scores, treated separately) with ACQ and Ov scores held constant. These partial correlation coefficients were computed individually for the clinic, student, and total samples. Since it was resolved that the retention of the null hypothesis would provide support for Hypothesis II, it was decided that the null hypothesis would be retained only if the criterion of significance equalled or exceeded the .20 level.



For the total sample, the partial correlation coefficient of  $-.06$  between Pe scores and Lov scores with ACQ and Ov held constant satisfied the criterion for statistical support of Hypothesis II. The partial correlation of  $.03$  between Pe scores and DRS scores with ACQ and Ov held constant also satisfied the criterion for statistical support.

Turning to the clinic sample, the partial correlation coefficient of  $-.03$  between Pe scores and Lov scores with ACQ and Ov held constant yielded statistical support of Hypothesis II. However, the partial correlation of  $.32^2$  between Pe scores and DRS scores with ACQ and Ov held constant did not satisfy the criterion for statistical support of the Hypothesis.

In the case of the student sample, the partial correlation coefficient of  $-.08$  between Pe scores and Lov scores with ACQ and Ov held constant provided statistical support of Hypothesis II. Likewise, the partial correlation coefficient of  $-.06$  between Pe scores and Lov scores with ACQ and Ov held constant satisfied the criterion for statistical support of the Hypothesis (see Table 6 for a listing of these partial correlation coefficients between Ov scores and object-love with ACQ and Pe held constant).

The factor analysis alluded to above allows for further scrutiny of Hypothesis II. Glancing at Table 5, it may be seen that on both those factors on which the measures of object-love (Lov and DRS) load heavily (Factors 2 and 3,

Table 6.--Partial Correlation Coefficients for Pe Scores Versus Object-Love With Acquiescence and Verbal Aggression Scores Held Constant.

Hypothesis	Variables	r	N	Significance Level <sup>a,b</sup>
<u>Total Sample</u>				
II	Pe Scores Versus Lov Scores	-.06	52	$p < .69$
II	Pe Scores Versus DRS scores	.03	52	$p < .86$
<u>Clinic Sample</u>				
II	Pe Scores Versus Lov Scores	-.03	20	$p < .92$
II	Pe Scores Versus DRS Scores	.32	20	$p < .19$
<u>Student Sample</u>				
II	Pe Scores Versus Lov Scores	-.08	32	$p < .68$
II	Pe Scores Versus DRS Scores	-.06	32	$p < .74$

<sup>a</sup>All t-tests were two-tailed.

<sup>b</sup>There were N-4 degrees of freedom for each significance test.

Table 7.--Means and Standard Deviations of the Student and Clinic Samples on the Five Measurement Instruments.

Instrument	Mean	Standard Deviation
<u>Clinic Sample</u>		
Exhibitionism Scale (Pe)	7.20	3.49
Verbal Aggression Scale (Ov)	8.65	3.03
Lov Dimension	19.76	15.76
Dean Romanticism Scale (DRS)	75.80	7.40
Acquiescence Scale (ACQ)	197.60	21.59
<u>Student Sample</u>		
Exhibitionism Scale (Pe)	6.84	3.57
Verbal Aggression Scale (Ov)	7.91	3.02
Lov Dimension	10.80	15.12
Dean Romanticism Scale (DRS)	73.72	7.70
Acquiescence Scale	188.94	32.13

respectively), the Pe scale has negligible loadings (.048 and .064) with respect to zero and with respect to the loadings of the Ov scale. This pattern of loadings provides support for Hypothesis II.

To summarize, the data bearing on Hypothesis II offers strong support for it in both sub-samples as well as the total sample. Five of the six partial correlation coefficients calculated to test Hypothesis II provided statistical support for it at significance levels far exceeding the criterion of  $.20^3$ . Lastly, the results of a factor analysis upheld Hypothesis II.

## DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

The results of this study provided support for both hypotheses. Hypothesis II, however, was more strongly upheld than was Hypothesis I. In what follows I will first endeavor to bare impediments to even more forceful results than were obtained. I shall then remark upon different patterns of results in the clinic and student samples and conclude with some thoughts on the implications of this research for psychoanalytic psychology.

### Impediments to Further Substantiation of the Hypotheses

A look at Table 8 immediately clarifies the existence in this research of a key obstacle to even more powerful results, this being measurement error. First, the reliability of the DRS was poor throughout this study. For the total sample its reliability was .50, for the clinic sample .45, and for the student sample .53. Again, all three of these reliability coefficients are disappointing. Second, the reliability of the Lov dimension was also poor throughout the study. For the total sample its reliability was .51, for the clinic sample .27, and for the student sample .30. But, what were the specific effects of these

Table 8.--Reliability Estimates of the Five Measurement Instruments.

Instrument	Items	N	Method	Reliability Coefficient
<u>Total Sample</u>				
Lov Dimension	83	52	Communalities	.51
Dean Romanticism Scale	27	52	Coefficient Alpha	.50
Exhibitionism Scale	13	52	Coefficient Alpha	.85
Verbal Aggression Scale	12	52	Coefficient Alpha	.78
Acquiescence Scale	298	52	Split-Half	.91
<u>Clinic Sample</u>				
Lov Dimension	83	20	Communalities	.27
Dean Romanticism Scale	27	20	Coefficient Alpha	.45
Exhibitionism Scale	13	20	Coefficient Alpha	.85
Verbal Aggression Scale	12	20	Coefficient Alpha	.79
Acquiescence Scale	298	20	Split-Half	.79
<u>Student Sample</u>				
Lov Dimension	83	32	Communalities	.30
Dean Romanticism Scale	27	32	Coefficient Alpha	.53
Exhibitionism Scale	13	32	Coefficient Alpha	.85
Verbal Aggression Scale	12	32	Coefficient Alpha	.78
Acquiescence Scale	298	32	Split-Half	.95

reliabilities on the partial correlations on which significance tests were performed? It is known that the lower the reliability and thus the greater the measurement error, the more the obtained correlations are lessened, or attenuated, by such measurement error. Fortunately, there exists a formula for correcting for such attenuation, for estimating what the correlation between variables would be were measurement instruments made perfectly reliable. It was decided to implement this procedure appropos the total sample (reliability estimates for the two sub-samples were so poor so as to make estimates of correlations actually obtaining between variables in these sub-samples highly tenuous).

Table 9 reproduces those partial correlations computed to test the Hypotheses on the total sample reported in Tables 4 and 6 above, with the exception that the partial correlations (in Table 9) are corrected for attenuation. The results are striking. When corrected for attenuation, the two partial correlations designed to test Hypothesis I in the total sample were both significant. Similarly, when the correction for attenuation formula was applied to those partial correlations calculated to test Hypothesis II, the substantive support for Hypothesis II reported in the preceding section remained unaltered. Both partial correlations implemented to test Hypothesis II in the total sample, even when corrected for attenuation, provided statistical support for the Hypothesis.

Table 9.--Partial Correlation Coefficients for the Total Sample With the Correction for Attenuation in Force.

Hypothesis	Variables	r	Significance Level
I	Ov Scores Versus Lov Scores (ACQ, Pe)	-.46	$p < .002$
I	Ov Scores Versus DRS Scores (ACQ, Pe)	-.27	$p < .04$
II	Pe Scores Versus Lov Scores (ACQ, Ov)	-.08	$p < .59$
II	Pe Scores Versus DRS Scores (ACQ, Ov)	.07	$p < .64$

Note. Variables in parentheses have been partialled out of the correlation preceding them.

Some other findings which also highlight the manner in which measurement error served to delimit the results of the present inquiry are summarized in Tables 10 and 11. Table 10 contains the compilation of results of a supplemental tack through which it was sought to muster support for Hypothesis II. Referring to the wording of Hypothesis II, it will be remembered that a "negligible" correlation between object-love and the exhibitionistic strand of narcissism was predicted. Now, negligibility may be defined as it has been to this juncture, that is in terms of the difference between the correlation and zero. However, negligibility may also be defined in terms of the difference

Table 10.--Results of One-Tailed Significance Tests of the Difference Between Partial Correlation Coefficients.

Hypothesis	Variables	N	Z Value <sup>a</sup>	Significance Level
<u>Total Sample</u>				
II	Lov Scores Versus Ov Scores (ACQ, Pe)- Lov Scores Versus Pe Scores (ACQ, Ov)	52	-1.22	$p < .12$
II	DRS Scores Versus Ov Scores (ACQ, Pe)- DRS Scores Versus Pe Scores (ACQ, Ov)	52	-1.13	$p < .13$
<u>Clinic Sample<sup>b</sup></u>				
II	Lov Scores Versus Ov Scores (ACQ, Pe)- Lov Scores Versus Pe Scores (ACQ, Ov)	20	-.901	$p < .19$
<u>Student Sample</u>				
II	Lov Scores Versus Ov Scores (ACQ, Pe)- Lov Scores Versus Pe Scores (ACQ, Ov)	32	-1.17	$p < .13$
II	DRS Scores Versus Ov Scores (ACQ, Pe)- DRS Scores Versus Pe Scores (ACQ, Ov)	32	.537	$p < .30$

Note. Variables in parentheses have been partialled out of the correlation preceding them.

<sup>a</sup>There were N-4 degrees of freedom for each significance test.

<sup>b</sup>In the case of the clinic sample, the correlation coefficient for DRS scores versus Pe scores with ACQ and Ov held constant was .32 (see Table 6). This correlation coefficient was neither negative nor significant at greater than or equal to the .20 level. As such, the results of a significance test of the difference between DRS scores versus Ov scores (ACQ, Pe) and DRS scores versus Pe scores (ACQ, Ov) would not only have been meaningless, but misleading. Hence, this significance test was not conducted.

Table 11.--The Difference Between Partial Correlation Coefficients for the Total Sample with the Correction for Attenuation Considered.

Hypothesis	Variables	Original r	Corrected r
II	Lov Scores Versus Ov Scores (ACQ, Pe)	-.26	-.46
	Lov Scores Versus Pe Scores (ACQ, Ov)	-.06	-.08
II	DRS Scores Versus Ov Scores (ACQ, Pe)	-.15	-.27
	DRS Scores Versus Pe Scores (ACQ, Ov)	.03	.07

Note. Variables in parentheses have been partialled out of the correlation preceding them.

between one correlation and another correlation. In terms of this study, the negligibility of the relationship between Pe scores and Lov scores may be ascertained by finding the difference between this partial correlation (ACQ and Ov held constant) and the partial correlation between Ov scores and Lov scores (ACQ and Pe held constant). Likewise, the negligibility of the partial correlation between Pe scores and DRS scores (ACQ and Ov held constant) may be determined by finding the difference between this partial correlation and the partial correlation between Ov scores and DRS scores (ACQ and Pe held constant). Should the difference between partial correlations be significant, negligibility may be inferred. This strategy was implemented with respect to the total sample as well as for this clinic and student samples.

As Table 10 evinces, however, the results of this tack were disconcerting. In no case was a significant difference found.

The attempt to fathom this disappointing outcome once more leads to a consideration of measurement error. Turning to Table 11, the column labelled "Original  $r$ " reproduces those partial correlations for the total sample to which the significance tests conducted to assess negligibility were applied. Thus, the first significance test listed in Table 11 compared the partial correlation of  $-.26$  with that of  $-.06$ ; the second significance test compared the partial correlation of  $-.15$  with that of  $.03$ . The column labelled "Corrected  $r$ " lists these same partial correlations, garnered to assess negligibility, when corrected for attenuation. Thus, the partial correlations of  $-.26$  and  $-.06$  became  $-.46$  and  $-.08$ , respectively, when corrected for attenuation, and the partial correlations of  $-.15$  and  $.03$  became  $-.27$  and  $.07$ , respectively, when corrected for attenuation. What is here illustrated is that when the partial correlations on which significance tests geared to assess negligibility were corrected for attenuation, the difference between partial correlations grew larger. As will be recalled, the determination of negligibility as delineated in the previous paragraph, rested on significant differences between partial correlations. Thus, the corrected partial correlations reproduced in Table 11 suggest that measurement error served

to delimit the extent of the negligible relationships actually obtaining between the variables under consideration.

The query naturally arises as to the overall meaning and utility of the findings garnered with the correction for attenuation in force. After all, the argument can be made that the correction for attenuation is only a means of artificially influencing the correlation actually yielded by the data. Nunnally's (1967) remarks are to the point. He observes that while the correction for attenuation is admittedly not applicable to all research undertakings, it is particularly relevant to the realm of basic research where what is of importance is not the relationship between measurement instruments, but the relationship between the underlying variables these measurement devices seek to tap. It can then be contended that not only is the correction for attenuation justifiably utilized in this research, but that not to have corrected for attenuation would have been to seriously underestimate the extent of the documentation this study suggests there to be for the Hypotheses.

#### The Student and Clinic Samples Compared

I want now to reflect on another aspect of the data, this being the way in which the two sub-samples differed from one another. With respect to Hypothesis I, the most noteworthy deviation occurred in the case of the partial correlation coefficient for Ov scores versus DRS scores (ACQ and Pe held constant). Whereas for the clinic

sample this correlation was  $-.46$  and thus both negative and significant as predicted, for the student sample the correlation was  $.05$ . In other words, while for the clinic sample a substantively negative relationship obtained between variables, for the student sample a negligible relationship was evidenced (see Table 4). These findings suggest that, overall, a greater independence between love and narcissism existed for the student sample than for the clinic sample.

In considering Hypothesis II, the most striking difference between samples occurred with respect to the partial correlation between Pe scores and DRS scores (ACQ and Ov held constant). For the student sample this correlation was  $-.06$  and, thus, negligible as predicted. However, for the clinic sample a positive correlation of  $.32$  was the case (see Table 6). This piece of data does also lend itself to the interpretation that there was a greater overall dependence between love and narcissism in the clinic sample than in the student sample.<sup>4</sup>

Though one must be cautious in interpreting this pattern of findings, it would seem that theoretical speculations could be developed based upon demographic data on the two sub-samples. First, the student sample (median age of 19.4), to a greater extent than the clinic sample (median age of 24.35), was composed of adolescents. Second, there is evidence that the student sample was of a higher socioeconomic class than was the clinic sample (see Table 3).

While not wanting to elaborate any specific theoretical statements for reasons to be developed below, the data at hand suggests that perhaps age and socioeconomic class can be important to future understandings of the relationship between love and narcissism.

At this juncture, however, I must strongly admonish that any theoretical propositions which might be developed based upon differences between the two sub-samples would be quite tenuous without empirical exploration and verification. This must be so as the sizes of the sub-samples were quite small and the reliabilities of the DRS and the Lov dimension were quite poor in this research (In no case did the reliability of either instrument exceed .53 in this study).

#### Implications for Psychoanalytic Theory

This research has provided palpable evidence for the theoretical positions implied by the work of Otto Kernberg and Heinz Kohut, psychoanalytic theoreticians whose writings suggested seemingly contradictory formulations on the relationship between love and narcissism. What are the ramifications of this unifying discovery, in both the theoretical and applied spheres, for psychoanalytic psychology?

As will be recalled, the view that narcissism is multidimensional in nature was the premise from which the specific theory conceived to resolve the Kohut-Kernberg controversy was derived. Had not the position that narcissism is unitary in nature been discarded, the positive

results of this investigation would not have come to pass. I conclude that future inquiry into narcissistic processes, whether it be strictly theoretical or empirical, must begin with the recognition that the term "narcissism" is only a rubric for what are likely quite divergent strains.

In the introductory section of this dissertation I argued that if the concept of a separate developmental line for narcissism is correct, if the capacity to love can be independent of narcissism, then certainly the widespread view that narcissism is merely an obstacle to love must come to grief. This study bespeaks a separate developmental line for one constellation of narcissistic processes--the exhibitionistic, non-aggressive strand. Though it goes without saying that replication with diverse populations is in order and that generalizability is limited as only young adult males were studied, I would be remiss if I did not proclaim this effort to have provided a "vindication" of narcissism. Whatever functions narcissism serves, the antedated view that it is simply an impediment to love is contradicted by the present research. And as has been repeatedly emphasized, such an exoneration of narcissism has important connotations for psychoanalytic treatment especially as regards males. Certainly, to simplistically treat narcissism as solely and invariably a defense against object-love if not object-relations, though it may also function in the behest of self-protection, may now be seen as doctrinaire and problematic at best.



But, how many times has a conclusion such as this last met with that jaded rejoinder which has long been a source of vexation to psychoanalysis: "In making such a statement you implicitly and unjustifiably assume a continuum between normal and abnormal phenomena of psychic life." I can not forbear from seizing the opportunity to answer this tired refrain. For, in the case of this research an independence between love and narcissism was upheld in the clinic sample as well as in a "normal" sample. This finding bolsters the doctrine that what we discover in the realm of psychopathology does indeed provide important clues as to psychic processes in the adjusted individual. While not wishing to belabor the point, this sort of finding must be welcome news to anyone interested in constructing general theories of motivation, emotion, etc. without giving up the hard won insights of psychoanalysis.

We come now to the concluding portion of this dissertation, one in which I should like to offer some comments upon the libido theory in particular and metapsychology in general. Today, we are witness to the subjection of metapsychological concepts to the sharpest and keenest of attacks; metapsychology is under siege. Whether it be Gill's (1976) declaration that metapsychology is not psychology and that the former is steeped in erroneous biological and neurological assumptions, or Schafer's (1976) action language which he envisions as an alternative

to Freud's nineteenth-century, biological and neurological language, the principle is the same: metapsychological propositions are not explanatory of clinical data, but rather reductionistic restatements of such data presented in the discourse of the natural sciences (see Gill, 1976).

What, if any, relevance does the present investigation have to this debate on metapsychology? My reply will, I hope, not be too cryptic. While the findings of this dissertation do clearly uphold the heuristic value of their guiding metapsychological tenets (i.e., the libido theory), the very extent of this support may indicate that metapsychology has outlived its usefulness, at least in this area of inquiry.

For, while the results have yielded an attestation for the classical libido theory (see Table 4), a similar vote of confidence has been furnished the dual libido theory (see Table 6). And if I may attribute at least some meaning to the differences found between samples, the argument may even be advanced that under certain conditions a positive correlation exists between certain strands of narcissism and love.<sup>5</sup> We would then have a second permutation of the libido theory (the first being the dual libido theory).

My point is that as in science we come to recognize the heuristic worth of a guiding principle so much so that we are required to postulate permutations of this guiding principle, we feel the necessity of developing new

and even more sophisticated principles. This is done not because of the failure of the guiding principle, but because of its success: this is a continuing aspect of the scientific process. The libido theory has served us well but I suggest we acknowledge our debt to it and move on.

This research has evinced support for the propositions that an exhibitionistic strand of narcissism is independent of the capacity to love, whereas an aggressive strand of narcissism stands in inverse relation to love. Initially, I intuited these propositions and then found justification for them in various theoretical texts. But, it will be observed that to have intuited a proposition and even to have validated it empirically is not to have fully understood it. The precise fantasies, memories, ideas, etc. involved in the workings of these propositions remain obscure. I suggest a dissection of such terms as "exhibitionism," "aggressive strand of narcissism," "care, concern, and reparation," so as to arrive at their host of personal meanings to be a potentially beneficial *modus operandi* for future research efforts. Even adjectives such as "famous," "great," etc., used freely in this dissertation, encompass a plethora of conscious and unconscious fantasies, memories, and wishes which beg exploration and classification. My predilection is to think that the libido theory in any or all of its permutations, and for that matter metapsychology at least as we've known it, cannot further the search for such personal meanings of narcissism and love.



## SUMMARY

This project was designed to provide a thorough theoretical exposition and empirical probe of the unresolved debate between Otto Kernberg and Heinz Kohut appropos of the relationship between narcissism and love. Sections of Kernberg's writings suggest the capacity to love to be adversely affected by narcissism, whereas sections of Kohut's work suggest love to be independent of narcissism.

In an effort to unriddle this controversy, a multi-dimensional theory of narcissism was offered. Specifically, it was hypothesized that the aggressive strand of narcissism correlates negatively with object-love. It was also hypothesized that the non-aggressive, exhibitionistic strand of narcissism has a negligible correlation with object-love.

The current study operationalized love by way of two measurement instruments, the Lov dimension of the Interpersonal Checklist and the Dean Romanticism Scale. Both these measures were utilized to tap underpinnings of psychoanalytic views on mature love. The Verbal Aggression and Exhibitionism Scales of the Dynamic Personality Inventory operationalized the aggressive and non-aggressive,

exhibitionistic strands of narcissism, respectively. These instruments were administered to two samples of males, one composed of thirty-two university undergraduates, the other comprised of twenty adult patients of a local community mental health center. These latter subjects were screened for literacy and for the intellectual capability to complete the measurement devices by way of sections of the Wide Range Achievement Test and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale.

Hypothesis I received substantive, albeit not complete, support from the data with respect to both sub-samples as well as the total sample. Five of the six partial correlation coefficients computed to test Hypothesis I were in the predicted direction and three of them were significant. Hypothesis II was strongly supported by the data also with respect to both sub-samples as well as the total sample. Five of the six partial correlation coefficients designed to test Hypothesis II provided statistical support for it at significance levels far exceeding that required.

The discussion of results began with an inquiry into impediments to even further corroboration of the Hypotheses. It was argued that measurement error served to delimit the results of the present study. Differences between the clinic and student samples were next considered with respect to potential avenues for future research. The dissertation concluded with some thoughts on the pertinence of the libido theory and metapsychology in general to future explorations of the interface of narcissism and love.



## APPENDICES



## APPENDIX A

### THE INTERPERSONAL CHECKLIST



## APPENDIX A

### THE INTERPERSONAL CHECKLIST

On the following pages you will find a list of 134 words and phrases which describe ways people may behave in relation to one another. Go through the list and when an item describes you mark "X" in the space next to the number of that item. If an item does not describe you, leave the space blank. For example, the first phrase is "Able to give orders," number 1 on the list of items. If you believe you are able to give orders, fill in an "X" next to the number "1." If you believe you are not able to give orders, leave the space blank. Your first impression is best; so go through the list as quickly as you can, making an "X" when the word or phrase describes you, leaving the space blank when it does not describe you.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| ___ 1. Able to give orders             | ___ 37. Eager to get along with others  |
| ___ 2. Appreciative                    | ___ 38. Easily fooled                   |
| ___ 3. Apologetic                      | ___ 39. Egotistical and conceited       |
| ___ 4. Able to take care of self       | ___ 40. Easily led                      |
| ___ 5. Accepts advice readily          | ___ 41. Encouraging others              |
| ___ 6. Able to doubt others            | ___ 42. Enjoys taking care of others    |
| ___ 7. Affectionate and understanding  | ___ 43. Expects everyone to admire him  |
| ___ 8. Acts important                  | ___ 44. Faithful follower               |
| ___ 9. Able to criticize self          | ___ 45. Frequently disappointed         |
| ___ 10. Admires and imitates others    | ___ 46. Firm but just                   |
| ___ 11. Agrees with everyone           | ___ 47. Fond of everyone                |
| ___ 12. Always ashamed of self         | ___ 48. Forceful                        |
| ___ 13. Very anxious to be approved of | ___ 49. Friendly                        |
| ___ 14. Always giving advice           | ___ 50. Forgives anything               |
| ___ 15. Bitter                         | ___ 51. Frequently angry                |
| ___ 16. Bighearted and unselfish       | ___ 52. Friendly all the time           |
| ___ 17. Boastful                       | ___ 53. Generous to a fault             |
| ___ 18. Businesslike                   | ___ 54. Gives freely of self            |
| ___ 19. Bossy                          | ___ 55. Good leader                     |
| ___ 20. Can be frank and honest        | ___ 56. Grateful                        |
| ___ 21. Clinging vine                  | ___ 57. Hard-boiled when necessary      |
| ___ 22. Can be strict if necessary     | ___ 58. Helpful                         |
| ___ 23. Considerate                    | ___ 59. Hard-hearted                    |
| ___ 24. Cold and unfeeling             | ___ 60. Hard to convince                |
| ___ 25. Can complain if necessary      | ___ 61. Hot-tempered                    |
| ___ 26. Cooperative                    | ___ 62. Hard to impress                 |
| ___ 27. Complaining                    | ___ 63. Impatient with others' mistakes |
| ___ 28. Can be indifferent to others   | ___ 64. Independent                     |
| ___ 29. Critical of others             | ___ 65. Irritable                       |
| ___ 30. Can be obedient                | ___ 66. Jealous                         |
| ___ 31. Cruel and unkind               | ___ 67. Kind and reassuring             |
| ___ 32. Dependent                      | ___ 68. Likes responsibility            |
| ___ 33. Dictatorial                    | ___ 69. Lacks self-confidence           |
| ___ 34. Distrusts everybody            | ___ 70. Likes to compete with others    |
| ___ 35. Dominating                     | ___ 71. Lets others make decisions      |
| ___ 36. Easily embarrassed             |   |

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| ___ 72. Likes everybody                 | ___ 104. Selfish                          |
| ___ 73. Likes to be taken care of       | ___ 105. Skeptical                        |
| ___ 74. Loves everyone                  | ___ 106. Sociable and neighborly          |
| ___ 75. Makes a good impression         | ___ 107. Slow to forgive a wrong          |
| ___ 76. Manages others                  | ___ 108. Somewhat snobbish                |
| ___ 77. Meek                            | ___ 109. Spineless                        |
| ___ 78. Modest                          | ___ 110. Stern but fair                   |
| ___ 79. Hardly ever talks back          | ___ 111. Spoils people with kindness      |
| ___ 80. Often admired                   | ___ 112. Straightforward and direct       |
| ___ 81. Obeys too willingly             | ___ 113. Stubborn                         |
| ___ 82. Often gloomy                    | ___ 114. Suspicious                       |
| ___ 83. Outspoken                       | ___ 115. Too easily influenced by friends |
| ___ 84. Overprotective of others        | ___ 116. Thinks only of self              |
| ___ 85. Often unfriendly                | ___ 117. Tender and soft hearted          |
| ___ 86. Oversympathetic                 | ___ 118. Timid                            |
| ___ 87. Often helped by others          | ___ 119. Too lenient with others          |
| ___ 88. Passive and unaggressive        | ___ 120. Touchy and easily hurt           |
| ___ 89. Proud and self-satisfied        | ___ 121. Too willing to give to others    |
| ___ 90. Always pleasant and agreeable   | ___ 122. Tries to be too successful       |
| ___ 91. Resentful                       | ___ 123. Trusting and eager to please     |
| ___ 92. Respected by others             | ___ 124. Tries to comfort everyone        |
| ___ 93. Rebels against everything       | ___ 125. Usually gives in                 |
| ___ 94. Resents being bossed            | ___ 126. Very respectful to authority     |
| ___ 95. Self-reliant and assertive      | ___ 127. Wants everyone's love            |
| ___ 96. Sarcastic                       | ___ 128. Well thought of                  |
| ___ 97. Self-punishing                  | ___ 129. Wants to be led                  |
| ___ 98. Self-confident                  | ___ 130. Will confide in anyone           |
| ___ 99. Self-seeking                    | ___ 131. Warm                             |
| ___ 100. Shrewd and calculating         | ___ 132. Wants everyone to like him       |
| ___ 101. Self-respecting                | ___ 133. Will believe anyone              |
| ___ 102. Shy                            | ___ 134. Well-behaved                     |
| ___ 103. Sincere and devoted to friends |   |

## APPENDIX B

### THE DEAN ROMANTICISM SCALE

## APPENDIX B

### THE DEAN ROMANTICISM SCALE

Most people marry for love; but love enough to marry on is difficult to describe. On the following pages are statements we have obtained from young people in love, from magazines, from newspapers, etc. Would you please give us your opinion?

Please read each of the 45 statements carefully. Then mark each statement with the response from those listed below which most nearly fits your beliefs.

SA -- indicates Strongly Agree

A -- indicates Agree

U -- indicates Uncertain

D -- indicates Disagree

SD -- indicates Strongly Disagree

SA -- indicates Strongly Agree  
A -- indicates Agree  
U -- indicates Uncertain  
D -- indicates Disagree  
SD -- indicates Strongly Disagree

- \_\_\_ 1. Love is a mutual responsiveness.
- \_\_\_ 2. Love is the strange bewilderment which overtakes one person on account of another person.
- \_\_\_ 3. People truly in love do not try to play down their differences.
- \_\_\_ 4. Deep love grows through many shared experiences.
- \_\_\_ 5. One can't help falling in love if he (she) meets the right person.
- \_\_\_ 6. Parents should attempt to influence their children's selection of a mate.
- \_\_\_ 7. Love does not include willing self-restraint for the sake of the other person.
- \_\_\_ 8. True love would be affected by poverty.
- \_\_\_ 9. "Every time we are near each other we get a funny feeling inside" is a good sign of being in love.
- \_\_\_ 10. The wish to be with someone constantly is not a good test of love.
- \_\_\_ 11. Perfect love means one is always satisfied with his (her) partner.
- \_\_\_ 12. One can truly love more than once.
- \_\_\_ 13. True love is not based at all on physical attraction.
- \_\_\_ 14. All love is tainted, at times, with some anger and hostility.
- \_\_\_ 15. Problems don't always work out even when two people are really in love.
- \_\_\_ 16. People in love are often oblivious to their surroundings.
- \_\_\_ 17. Real love can only be founded on a close acquaintance with the whole personality.

SA -- indicates Strongly Agree  
A -- indicates Agree  
U -- indicates Uncertain  
D -- indicates Disagree  
SD -- indicates Strongly Disagree

- \_\_\_ 18. Love usually makes the heart beat faster.
- \_\_\_ 19. The strength of your feelings towards each other demonstrates the fact that you were made for each other.
- \_\_\_ 20. People need to have a long engagement even if they are made for each other.
- \_\_\_ 21. True love lasts forever.
- \_\_\_ 22. It's possible to think one is in love when he (she) is only "in love with love."
- \_\_\_ 23. Love never gives one a sickly feeling.
- \_\_\_ 24. When in love, it is hard to see the other's faults.
- \_\_\_ 25. Expecting to find all things in one woman or man is realistic.
- \_\_\_ 26. A loss of appetite does not usually accompany true love.
- \_\_\_ 27. Love knows no bounds.
- \_\_\_ 28. The marriage ceremony marks the beginning of true love, not the culmination of it.
- \_\_\_ 29. Love is not an "all-or-nothing" feeling; there is an in-between.
- \_\_\_ 30. One in love should just love and not reason why.
- \_\_\_ 31. True love grows out of a deep respect for each other.
- \_\_\_ 32. One in love is sometimes bored.
- \_\_\_ 33. One should strive to maintain love; it does not maintain itself.
- \_\_\_ 34. Love will find a way.
- \_\_\_ 35. Even if it's true love, one needs to actively seek the other.

SA -- indicates Strongly Agree  
A -- indicates Agree  
U -- indicates Uncertain  
D -- indicates Disagree  
SD -- indicates Strongly Disagree

- \_\_\_ 36. The way people fall in love is not largely determined by the society they live in.
- \_\_\_ 37. If one's marriage turns out to be a failure, it wasn't because he (she) chose the wrong mate.
- \_\_\_ 38. Even in true love, happiness is not inevitable.
- \_\_\_ 39. People in love are not always considerate of each other.
- \_\_\_ 40. Life without being in love is barren.
- \_\_\_ 41. "Love at first sight" is real affection, not only physical attraction.
- \_\_\_ 42. It's love if it makes you feel good.
- \_\_\_ 43. Opposites do not attract each other.
- \_\_\_ 44. One can be in love and still want his (her) own way.
- \_\_\_ 45. You can fall in love more than once in a lifetime.

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Note. Item #23, in retrospect, was not perfectly counter-balanced (the original item reads "Love sometimes gives one a sickly feeling"). In order to assure that the obtained results were not an artifact of this circumstance, the statistical analyses were also completed with this item deleted from the DRS. In no instance did this tack deleteriously affect the support garnered for the Hypotheses.

## APPENDIX C

### THE DYNAMIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY



## APPENDIX C

### THE DYNAMIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY

On the following pages is a list of objects and activities. Go through the list and if you like an item mark an "L" in the space next to the item. If you dislike an item mark a "D" in the space next to the item. If you don't care either way, or are not sure how you feel, leave a blank, but don't leave too many blank spaces.

If an item describes something you have never done, imagine how you would feel if you had the opportunity and ability to do it. Take the first item on the list, "Driving." If you have no car but would like to drive, mark an "L" in the space next to number 1. When in doubt, judge by your first reaction.

If an item describes something within your experience, go by what you really tend to do, not what you think ought to be done. If you smoke, you should say you like it, even if you wish you could give up the habit. If you never discuss politics, you should say you dislike this item.

If your likes and dislikes have changed, indicate them as they are now, but don't be influenced by a temporary mood or special circumstances.

There is no time limit, but work as quickly as you can.

L -- indicates Like

D -- indicates Dislike

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| ___ 1. Driving   | ___ 27. Holding different political views from your parents                        |
| ___ 2. Smoking   | ___ 28. Glancing at attractive people (of the opposite sex) in a train or bus      |
| ___ 3. Letting fine sand run through your fingers                                | ___ 29. Facing people you dislike rather than crossing the street to avoid them    |
| ___ 4. Spicy foods   | ___ 30. Flogging as a punishment for serious offenses                              |
| ___ 5. Railway lines stretching into the distance                                | ___ 31. Postponing all action until you are quite sure what to do                  |
| ___ 6. Waiting hopefully until things come your way                              | ___ 32. Keeping to yourself  |
| ___ 7. Changing your mind quickly  | ___ 33. Archery  |
| ___ 8. Social gatherings   | <u>Pe</u> 34. Giving a public performance of any kind (by yourself or with others) |
| ___ 9. Wind howling in the trees   | ___ 35. The feeling of floating in the air   |
| ___ 10. Putting off pleasures until later  | ___ 36. Being rather on your guard with strangers                                  |
| ___ 11. Enforcing the law strictly whatever the consequences                     | ___ 37. Drawing up plans introducing new ideas                                     |
| ___ 12. Having no roots, no permanent attachments                                | ___ 38. Picking flowers  |
| ___ 13. Prolonged kissing  | ___ 39. Strenuous physical exercise  |
| <u>Pe</u> 14. Being an M.C. (master of ceremonies)                               | ___ 40. Taking part in a South Pole expedition                                     |
| ___ 15. Watching the stars   | ___ 41. Visiting relatives   |
| ___ 16. Being an executive (in control of a business or government organization) | ___ 42. Working in a small room all by yourself                                    |
| ___ 17. Building or making things as your hobby                                  | ___ 43. Discussion groups  |
| ___ 18. Using perfume or perfumed toilet water                                   | ___ 44. Watching fireworks   |
| ___ 19. Taking risks   | ___ 45. Changing your job  |
| ___ 20. Children's parties   | ___ 46. Steering a ship in unknown waters  |
| ___ 21. Having a difficult job to do   | ___ 47. Departing from accepted routine  |
| ___ 22. Staying in bed late on Sunday mornings                                   | ___ 48. Keeping to your own class of people  |
| ___ 23. Leaping over hedges and streams on horseback                             | ___ 49. Well-made or artistic knives   |
| ___ 24. Getting away from the crowd  | ___ 50. Flying   |
| ___ 25. Rich cakes   |  |
| ___ 26. Undoing all knots (rather than cutting the string)                       |  |

L -- indicates Like

D -- indicates Dislike

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|---|---|
| ___ 51. Suggesting a plan of action<br>in a group or organization                   | ___ 78. Taking photographs of wild<br>animals in the jungle                                       |
| ___ 52. Sucking sweets  | ___ 79. Torrential rain   |
| ___ 53. Working steadily rather<br>than fast  | ___ 80. Drawing   |
| ___ 54. Moulding pottery as a<br>pastime  | ___ 81. Taking a fast ride downhill<br>on skis or sleigh  |
| ___ 55. Having breakfast in bed   | ___ 82. Insisting on perfection   |
| ___ 56. Biting pencils  | ___ 83. Visiting schools for small<br>children  |
| ___ 57. Buying a new hat  | ___ 84. Having stiff competition  |
| ___ 58. Asking others for guidance  | ___ 85. Lying in a warm bath  |
| ___ 59. Absolute respect for one's<br>parents, without any<br>reservations          | ___ 86. Elegant umbrellas or<br>walking sticks  |
| <u>Pe</u> 60. Posing for a picture  | ___ 87. Strong drinks   |
| ___ 61. Vast plains   | ___ 88. Taking part in group<br>activities  |
| ___ 62. Looking at tools and<br>gadgets in shop windows                             | ___ 89. Collecting stamps   |
| ___ 63. Planning a menu at home   | ___ 90. Wearing new clothes   |
| ___ 64. The feeling of riding high<br>on a swing                                    | ___ 91. A tough and active way<br>of life   |
| ___ 65. Being a dress designer  | ___ 92. Admitting black people<br>to higher professions   |
| ___ 66. Having a job with plenty of<br>variety but little security                  | ___ 93. Great spectacles or<br>parades  |
| ___ 67. Having sexual dreams  | ___ 94. Watching high waves breaking<br>against a rocky shore                                     |
| ___ 68. Hard, crisp apples  | ___ 95. Leaving decisions to others   |
| ___ 69. Exploring unknown lands   | ___ 96. Planning your work timetable  |
| ___ 70. A high wall around your<br>garden or home                                   | ___ 97. Passion, abandonment and<br>rich emotional experience<br>among your main goals in<br>life |
| ___ 71. Hot milk  | ___ 98. Preparing meals   |
| ___ 72. Mixing paints   | <u>Ov</u> 99. Reacting quickly to other<br>people's remarks                                       |
| <u>Pe</u> 73. To entertain people   | ___ 100. Taking children for a walk   |
| ___ 74. Watching ships on the<br>horizon  | ___ 101. Giving up plans when they<br>become very difficult                                       |
| <u>Ov</u> 75. Speaking up at a meeting<br>when you don't agree with<br>the majority | ___ 102. Tales and myths of ancient<br>gods and heroes  |
| ___ 76. Looking after babies  | ___ 103. Small cosy rooms   |
| ___ 77. Making others toe the line  |   |

L -- indicates Like

D -- indicates Dislike

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 104. Sailing in rough weather                                     | <u>Pe</u> 130. Dressing up for a party  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 105. Working on committees  | <input type="checkbox"/> 131. Watching the clouds   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 106. Hanging on to old clothes<br>you never wear                  | <input type="checkbox"/> 132. Writing short stories   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 107. Having unusual ways and<br>habits                            | <input type="checkbox"/> 133. Being in charge of a unit   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 108. Crunching sweets rather<br>than sucking them                 | <input type="checkbox"/> 134. Devising plans to increase<br>work efficiency                         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 109. Perfect order and symmetry                                   | <input type="checkbox"/> 135. Keeping all foreigners out<br>of the Civil Service                    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 110. The sight of torches aflame                                  | <input type="checkbox"/> 136. Being a florist   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 111. To dance in the ballet                                       | <input type="checkbox"/> 137. Teaching young children   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 112. Being a leader   | <input type="checkbox"/> 138. Taking part in competitive<br>games or sport                          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 113. Making new gadgets and<br>mechanical devices                 | <input type="checkbox"/> 139. Soft pillows  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 114. Living in a cottage in<br>the woods                          | <input type="checkbox"/> 140. Exploring in Central Africa   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 115. The flash and roar of the<br>Night Express thundering by     | <input type="checkbox"/> 141. Sucking oranges   |
| <u>Pe</u> 116. Appearing on television   | <input type="checkbox"/> 142. Working with many people<br>around you                                |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 117. The company of younger<br>people                             | <input type="checkbox"/> 143. Demanding justice   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 118. Talking about sex  | <input type="checkbox"/> 144. Acting on the spur of<br>the moment                                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 119. Being in a foreign country<br>by yourself                    | <input type="checkbox"/> 145. A slender column rising<br>into the sky                               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 120. Camping out  | <input type="checkbox"/> 146. Taking under-water photographs  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 121. Bread crusts   | <input type="checkbox"/> 147. People with very upright<br>moral standards                           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 122. Working with people from<br>all walks of life                | <input type="checkbox"/> 148. Strict immigration laws   |
| <u>Ov</u> 123. Exposing errors of fact<br>and logic  | <input type="checkbox"/> 149. Checking your appearance<br>in a mirror                               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 124. Spending money on passing<br>pleasures to have fun           | <input type="checkbox"/> 150. Being a surgeon   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 125. Painting pictures  | <input type="checkbox"/> 151. Breaking with your family's<br>way of life                            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 126. Keeping your receipts<br>long after having paid<br>the bills | <input type="checkbox"/> 152. A walk with a wild wind<br>raging around you                          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 127. Being very strict about<br>right and wrong                   | <input type="checkbox"/> 153. Talking to children   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 128. Varnishing or painting<br>things                             | <input type="checkbox"/> 154. Wide open spaces  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 129. Flag poles   | <input type="checkbox"/> 155. Being an architect  |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> 156. Reading fashion reports   |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> 157. Avoiding experiences which<br>remind you of unpleasant<br>past events |

L -- indicates Like

D -- indicates Dislike

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|--|--|
| ___ 158. Sleeping long hours   | ___ 184. Obedience and respect for authority                       |
| ___ 159. Eating very quickly even if there is plenty of time                                   | ___ 185. Wearing expensive clothes                                 |
| ___ 160. The place where you were born   | ___ 186. Climbing mountains  |
| ___ 161. To shock conventional people  | ___ 187. Watching explosions                                       |
| ___ 162. Clay or plastic modelling   | ___ 188. Writing articles  |
| ___ 163. Storing many old things in case you need them one day                                 | ___ 189. Discussing matters of management with your superiors      |
| ___ 164. Being rather particular about small details   | ___ 190. Listening to the rain beating on the windows at night     |
| ___ 165. The honor of your country above everything  | ___ 191. Walking barefoot on a deep carpet                         |
| ___ 166. Javelin throwing  | ___ 192. Waiting for others to take the lead                       |
| <u>Pe</u> 167. Sitting in the front row at a meeting   | ___ 193. Many cushions in your living room                         |
| ___ 168. The feel of stroking soft fur   | ___ 194. Rich creamy foods   |
| ___ 169. Mixing with many people   | ___ 195. Inviting people home to a party                           |
| ___ 170. A place that's always warm  | <u>Ov</u> 196. Giving up an argument before you are beaten         |
| ___ 171. Rabbit shooting   | ___ 197. Taking a nap on Sunday afternoon                          |
| ___ 172. Helping children in their games   | ___ 198. A black family settling in a house opposite yours         |
| ___ 173. Your work (or your last job if you have none now)                                     | ___ 199. Pole-vaulting (jumping very high with the help of a pole) |
| ___ 174. Diving  | ___ 200. Taking responsibility for other people                    |
| ___ 175. Staying in familiar surroundings: the same people, places, shops, food, work and play | ___ 201. Being an engineer   |
| ___ 176. Eating nuts   | ___ 202. Lights twinkling in the distance                          |
| ___ 177. A lighthouse at dusk  | ___ 203. Wood-carving  |
| ___ 178. Being a social worker   | ___ 204. Being a private secretary                                 |
| <u>Ov</u> 179. Attacking accepted points of view   | ___ 205. Doubling your efforts after criticism                     |
| ___ 180. Planning work for others  | ___ 206. Sitting curled up in an arm-chair                         |
| ___ 181. Riding on a roller coaster  | * 207. Cutting your moorings (breaking all your emotional ties)    |
| ___ 182. Having soft-lined silky slippers  |  |
| ___ 183. Checking your letters for errors before you mail them                                 |  |



L -- indicates Like

D -- indicates Dislike

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| ___ 208. Day-dreaming about a happy future  | ___ 233. Cooked cereals (porridge, rice, barley, etc.)       |
| ___ 209. Saving boxes or medicine bottles   | ___ 234. Playing football, hockey or other team games        |
| ___ 210. Paying debts before they are due   | ___ 235. Spending money lavishly                             |
| Ov ___ 211. Opposing a speaker you disagree with  | ___ 236. Moulding wet sand                                   |
| ___ 212. Collecting books, journals or magazines  | ___ 237. Enforcing discipline                                |
| ___ 213. Taking most things very seriously  | ___ 238. Glancing at your reflection in the window           |
| ___ 214. Conscientious objectors  | ___ 239. Organizing group activities                         |
| ___ 215. Wearing a uniform  | ___ 240. Using firearms                                      |
| ___ 216. Watching an Olympic torch-bearer   | ___ 241. Collecting coins                                    |
| ___ 217. Wide open windows  | ___ 242. Sleeping curled up                                  |
| ___ 218. Being sexually excited   | ___ 243. Rare (underdone) meat                               |
| Pe ___ 219. Being a chairman  | ___ 244. Moving to new places                                |
| ___ 220. Living on a small island   | ___ 245. Extravagant, generous people                        |
| ___ 221. Creamy soups   | ___ 246. Looking after your friends' children for a week-end |
| ___ 222. Dozing by the fire   | ___ 247. Engraving (as an activity)                          |
| ___ 223. Reading to sick people   | ___ 248. Sticking at a job when no results are forthcoming   |
| Ov ___ 224. Expressing unpopular opinions   | ___ 249. Mixed marriages                                     |
| ___ 225. Patriotism as the highest ideal  | ___ 250. Many social engagements                             |
| ___ 226. Brushing or combing your hair  | ___ 251. Watching a big fire                                 |
| ___ 227. Leaping into the air   | ___ 252. Being attracted by members of the opposite sex      |
| ___ 228. Arranging flowers  | ___ 253. A home off the beaten track                         |
| ___ 229. Starting a new program or project  | ___ 254. Doing embroidery                                    |
| ___ 230. Discussing international problems  | ___ 255. Chewing gum   |
| * ___ 231. Spending your energy on new ideas which may prove to have no practical value | ___ 256. Starting out on new ventures                        |
| ___ 232. Tracking a stream or river to its source                                       | ___ 257. Unconventional people                               |
|   | ___ 258. Attending personally to details                     |
|   | Ov ___ 259. Criticizing old-established customs              |
|   | ___ 260. Studying efficient management                       |



L -- indicates Like

D -- indicates Dislike

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| ___ 261. Working alongside people of lower social class   | ___ 288. Collecting postcards from your vacation                |
| <u>Ov</u> 262. Using strong language                      | ___ 289. Getting away from your family and friends              |
| ___ 263. Work which demands precision                     | <u>Ov</u> 290. Being slightly sarcastic at times                |
| <u>Pe</u> 264. Making a speech in public                  | <u>Pe</u> 291. Appearing on the stage                           |
| ___ 265. Juicy steaks                                     | ___ 292. Small children in your family                          |
| ___ 266. Concentrating on one task for a long time        | ___ 293. Strict discipline                                      |
| ___ 267. Holding others at a distance                     | <u>Pe</u> 294. Being the life and soul of the party             |
| ___ 268. Ski jumping                                      | ___ 295. Family photographs                                     |
| ___ 269. Exploring an underground cave or secret passage  | ___ 296. Keeping a large stock of canned goods in your cupboard |
| ___ 270. Sleeping in a small room                         | ___ 297. Using scented talcum powder after a bath               |
| ___ 271. Taking advice from older women                   | ___ 298. A settled, orderly way of life                         |
| ___ 272. A roving outdoor life                            | ___ 299. Making things to decorate your home                    |
| ___ 273. Thunderstorms                                    | ___ 300. Conscientious performance of petty duties              |
| ___ 274. Teaching art or music                            | <u>Ov</u> 301. Influencing the behavior of other people         |
| ___ 275. Discussing politics                              | ___ 302. Renewing your efforts after failure                    |
| ___ 276. Keeping the same old friends, however dull       | ___ 303. Taking advice from older men                           |
| <u>Pe</u> 277. Speaking for a charity or welfare society  | ___ 304. Working with black people in your job                  |
| ___ 278. Having offenders prosecuted                      | ___ 305. The open sea   |
| ___ 279. Watching processions                             | ___ 306. Listening to children                                  |
| ___ 280. Motherly women                                   | ___ 307. Crunchy foods  |
| <u>Ov</u> 281. Making snappy remarks (wisecracks)         | ___ 308. Severe penalties for improper conduct                  |
| ___ 282. Parachute jumping                                | ___ 309. Having short term jobs, without binding contracts      |
| ___ 283. Applying very high standards to people's conduct | ___ 310. Trusting people too little rather than too much        |
| ___ 284. Living in a deep valley                          | ___ 311. Carrying out technical tests on a new machine          |
| ___ 285. Family gatherings                                | ___ 312. Composing music  |
| ___ 286. Keeping out of trouble as much as you can        |   |
| ___ 287. Drafting new rules for a society                 |   |



L -- indicates Like  
D -- indicates Dislike

- Pe 313. Being watched when you do things well
- \_\_\_ 314. Thinking a long time before speaking
- \_\_\_ 315. Joining a club of any sort
- \_\_\_ 316. Confiding in your friends when you are in trouble
- \_\_\_ 317. Private correspondence (writing and receiving private letters)
- \_\_\_ 318. Watching airplanes in the sky
- \_\_\_ 319. Spending a vacation on your own
- \_\_\_ 320. Using perfumed bath salts
- \_\_\_ 321. Altering cooking recipes to try out new ways
- \_\_\_ 322. Withdrawing when you are embarrassed
- \_\_\_ 323. Having no boss to guide you
- \_\_\_ 324. Sleeping outdoors in the open
- \_\_\_ 325. Peace, order and content as the main goals in life

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Note. The number of items marked "like" constitute the subject's score on the Exhibitionism Scale; the same holds true for the Verbal Aggression Scale with the exception of item #196 which is scored only if the subject "dislikes" the item.

Note. All items not starred or marked "Pe" or "Ov" constitute the Acquiescence Scale. Starred items (#207 & #231) were not included on the Acquiescence Scale due to typographical errors.

Note. Items marked "Pe" comprise the Exhibitionism Scale; items marked "Ov" constitute the Verbal Aggression Scale.

Note. Words such as "Negro" and "colored" were replaced with the term "black" in this study.

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## FOOTNOTES

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>At this time let me add a brief summary critique of the literature. Major reservations may be voiced about the validity of reconstructing developmental phases based solely on work with very disturbed adults. For example, one may wonder whether what is described as a normal phase in the development of narcissism is not in reality merely the attempt by some children to blot out feelings of weakness and impotence. There is then reason for concern appropos the lack of studies of children as well as the male bias sometimes encountered in the literature. I wish to thank Dr. Gaston Blom of Michigan State University for sharing with me this critique of the literature.

<sup>2</sup>With item #23 of the DRS deleted (see Appendix B), this correlation coefficient becomes .30 ( $p < .23$ ), thus providing further support for Hypothesis II.

<sup>3</sup>Curvilinear relationships were not apparent upon inspection of the scatterplots.

<sup>4</sup>With item #23 of the DRS deleted (see Appendix B), the correlation between Pe scores and DRS scores (ACQ, Ov) becomes .30 ( $p < .23$ ). In this case, too, the interpretation of a greater dependence between love and narcissism in the clinic sample as compared to the student sample can be made.

<sup>5</sup>As was mentioned, with item #23 of the DRS deleted (see Appendix B), the partial correlation between Pe scores and DRS scores (ACQ, Ov) becomes .30 ( $p < .23$ ) for the clinic sample and, by the criteria delineated, is negligible. Still, this correlation, too, is consonant with the supposition of a positive correlation between aspects of love and narcissism.

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