AN EPISTEMGLOGICAL CRITIQUE
OF THE NEW SOCIAL STUDIES

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
RICHARD F. NEWTON
1959’

   
     

  

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Michigan State
University

I‘HPSIS

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

An EpistemoIOQicai Critique
of The New Social Studies

presented by

Richard F. Newton

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

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AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL CRITIQUE
OF THE NEW SOCIAL STUDIES

BY
Richard Fl Newton

AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Secondary Education and Curriculum

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ABSTRACT

AN EPISTEEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE
OF THE NEN SOCIAL STUDIES

BY
Richard F. Newton

Induction and the nature of inductive inferences
have become the most prominent aspect of the “new social
studies." This thesis examines induction from the
epistemological perspective. Induction is defined
as a type of inference which is nondemonstrative and
ampliative in nature. It may go from a set of general
premises to a specific conclusion. or from a specific
premise to a general type of conclusion. Deduction
thus becomes a demonstrative inference which is nonampliative
in nature. It also may go from the general to the
specific. or from the specific to the general. The older
definition, which is often used in the new social studies.
of induction as the type of inference which always goes
from the specific to the general is not in keeping with
the modern usage of the term. In science, and the philosophy
of science, induction is almost always used in the sense
of a nondemonstrative ampliative inference. The conclusion
of such an inference states more than is found in the

premises. and there is no logical necessity for the

conclusio

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Richard P. Newton
conclusions to be true given that all the premises are true.

David Hume was the first to point out the fact
that in induction there is no logical connection between
the premises and the conclusion. Since his analysis
many attempts have been made to Justify the inductive
inference. None of these attempst could be called
successful in that they are accepted by a maJority of
people. In this thesis six of the more prominent
attempts at Justification are explained. Some of
these seem to give a reason for utilizing inductive
policies. but none offer a logical Justification for
believing that the conclusion of a single inductive
inference will follow necessarily from the premises.

That the social sciences must cope with this
inductive problem becomes clear through the analysis of
two of the maJor modes of eXplanation found in social
science. These are the functional and empirical types
of explanation. In functional eXplanations one must
assume that nature has been orderly and regular in the
past. is so in the present. and will continue to be so in
the future. The assumption is unprovable. but is necessary
if a functionalist eXplanation is to have any predictive
value. In empirical explanation the results of any
investigation are always assumed to be tentative and
BubJOCt to either further confirmation or disconfirmation.
In the empirical type of emplanation absolute certainty

regarding matters of fact is unobtainable. New evidence

  
   

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Richard F. Newton

in the future could always lead to the disconfirmation
of the results reached at an earlier time.

Edwin Fenton and Byron Massaialas were examined
as being representative figures in the new social studies.
Also examined to see how the inductive problem is handled
was the Anthropology Curriculum Study ProJect. the High
School Geography Project. the Sociological Resources for
Social Studies. and the Harvard Social Studies ProJect. In
addition the Curriculum Materials Analysis System was
examined. There is a great deal of variation in how these
proJects. and people. handle the problem of induction.
Some episodes produced by the Sociological Resources
for the Social Studies. some of the units in the Anthropology
Curriculum Study ProJect and some of the writings of Byron
Massialas do the best Job of eXplaining the inductive problem
and how the social scientist works with it. Even these
materials though could do a better Job at explaining
the logical problem that induction presents to one who
wishes to make future predictions or statements about

unexamined members of a larger population.

AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL CRITIQUE
OF THE NEW SOCIAL STUDIES

By
Richard anNewton

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Secondary Education and Curriculum

 

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To fully acknowledge all the people who have
aided in helping me reach this point would require
something longer than the thesis itself. Thus. for
practical reasons our specific thanks must be limited
to those directly responsible for help. Kathi and
Cliford must, of course. come first. Next I wish
to thank Drs. John Useem, Troy Stearns. and Frank
Blackington III of the guidance committee. Most
important has been the immense help of Dr. Stanley P.
Hronski. who as chairman. has provided help in more ways
than he will probably ever be aware of. Without the
help of these people. and others. this thesis

might never have been completed.

11

Introduct

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Chapter '

anapter

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ------------ - --------------------------- p. 1
Chapter i-Induction: The Problem and

Attempted Solutions .................... p, a

What is heant by Induction? --------------- p. 5

Hume's Problem -------- --------------- --—-- p. 9

Some Proposed Solutions to

the Problem of Induction -- ------------- p. 12

Chapter 2-Induction and the Social Sciences --------- p. 34
Methodology ------------ - ------------------ p. 3h
FunCtionalism ---‘ ----- II -------------- ----- p. L140
Empiricism -------------------------------- p. N9

Chapter 3-The New Social Studies and Induction ------ p. 62
Edwin Fenton --------------------— ----- ---- p. 67

Byron Nassialas ------ -- ------------------- p. 73

Anthropology Curriculum Study ProJect ----- p. 78

High School Geography ProJect ------------- p. c
Sociological Resources for the
Social Studies ------ ---- --------------- p. 88
Harvard Social Studies ProJect ------------ p. 9?
Curriculum Laterials
analysis System ------------------------ p. 103
Chapter u-Summary and Conclusions - ------------------ p. 109

Why Should the Student Become Aware
of the Inductive Problem? ............... p. 114

iii

Bibliogri

 

iv

Ways of Introducing this Material
into the Classroom --------------------- p. 125

Conclusions -------------------------- -—--- p. 135

Bibliography -------------- - ------------------------- p. 139

Introduction

Inductive approaches to knowledge are once
more in great fashion. This is especially apparent
in the more recent programs for social studies in
the secondary schools. These are the programs
that generally go under the heading of "the new social
studies." and this is how we shall refer to them from
this point on. One needs only to look at some of the
more recent titles in social studies education to see
Just how much in vogue induction really 18.1 This
thesis will look at induction from an epistemological
standpoint.2 This will be done in the hope that we may

1An example of this offered below: Edwin

Fenton, Teachin the New Social Studies in Secondar Schools:
An InductIve Approach. lNew YorE: HoIt. Rinehart an WinSton.
19557] Byron MassiaIas and BenJamin Cox. In uir in
Social Studies. (New York: HoGraw Hill. 1§5%I. Sernard
Kravitz and Diane J. Soroka. "Inquiry in the Middle Grades."
Social Education, vol. 33. no. 5 (May. 1969). p. 540.

It aIso seems clear that the emphasis is on inductive
ways of knowing rather than on learning. While none of
the new programs are explicit on this point the conclusion
seems Justified. This is because of the emphasis on
inductive inferences. methods of inquiry. and patterns of
explanation. All this would indicate that when induction
is used in the new social studies it refers to knowing in
the philosophical sense rather than to learning in the

psychological sense.

 

2One definition of epistemology is found in

Readin s in the Theo of Knowled e. (eds.) John V.
Canfield and Franklin H. Donnell. lNew York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts. 196“). p. v.

"Epistemology is concerned with what it is to

1

2

then have some guidelines as to Just what can. and
cannot. be done with the inductive method.

The first part of this thesis will attempt
to define exactly what is meant by the term
induction. or inductive inference. Also. the
inductive problem. as formulated by David Hume.
and some of the various attempted solutions will be
set down. This will be done because so few classroom
teachers and social studies educators seem clear
on this material. The next part of this work will
look at how social scientists have worked around
or with. the epistemological problems of induction.
If social studies teachers are going to teach
inductive methods of gaining knowledge they must be
aware of what the working social scientist
does. The main thrust of secondary school social
studies should be towards explaining and demonstrating
the process of the social sciences rather than
the product. The product must. of course. be a
part of any course for it provides a kind of
perceptual base for the ongoing process. The product
of the various social sciences is constantly changing

 

know and other questions pertinent to this: what it is to
believe. be certain. perceive. remember. Justify or have
grounds for what one claims to know: what it is to be

true or to be probably true: what concepts. properties.
and propositions are." This thesis will be concerned
with the problem of Justifying what one claims to know

inductively.

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while the process. or methodology. will remain almost
unchanged over time. If the knowledge students acquire
in schools is to be of more than Just passing utility
then the emphasis in social studies classrooms should be
on teaching the process of the various social sciences.
All of this will be examined in closer detail later.

The final section of this thesis will look
at some of the work being done in the new social studies.
Up until this time no one has examined the new social
studies material in terms of its epistemology. There is
a serious question as to whether the people designing
the new material are aware of several assumptions that
are often made in the development of inductive inferences.
The purpose of this thesis is to look at induction. and
how it is used in the new social studies. in a careful and
critical manner to examine Just what is being done with
the inductive problem. There has been no work done which

deals with the new social studies in this manner.

 

 

 

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Chapter 1

Induction: The Problem
and Attempted Solutions

What is Meant by Induction?
One of the most widespread misconceptions is the
belief that deductive arguments proceed from the general
to the specific and inductive arguments proceed from the
specific to the general. This is not true.3 The following
examples will help to demonstrate this.

Deductivelx Valid Arguments

general to general

 

All gorillas are apes.
All apes are mammals.

All gorillas are mammals.

 

3"In traditional terms. deductive inference goes
from the general to the particular. inductive inference from
the particular to the general. No doubt there are
deductive and inductive inferences. in the modern sense
of 'deductive' and 'inductive'. that satisfy this definition."

"In contemporary logic and philosophy of science
'deductive inference' is used in the sense of necessary
(demonstrative) inference: the conclusion, in deductive
inference. is claimed to follow with logical necessity from

the premises.”

"An inductive inference. again according to contemporary
usage. is an inference whose conclusion is not claimed to
follow necessarily but only with some degree of probability

it

. . . . Arthur Pap. An Introduction to Philosoggy of
Science. (Glencoe: The ree Press. 9 . pp. -1 .

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general .

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particular to particular

Alfred is a wolf.
Alfred has a tail.

Alfred's tail is the tail of a wol§.

particular to general

One is a lucky number.
Three is a lucky number.
Five is a lucky number.
Seven is a lucky number
Nine is a lucky number.

All odd numbers between 0 and 10 are lucky numbers.
In much the same manner inductive arguments
do not simply fall into the narrow category of arguments
which go from a set of particular premises to a general

conclusion.

Inductive Arguments;

general to general

All economic recessions in the past have come to
an and only with the outbreak of war.

All recessions come to an and only with the
outbreak of war.

 

particular to particular

Boat A is a Chris-Craft. and boat B is a Chris-Craft.
Both boats have 265 horsepower engines.

Both boats have the same size and shape hulls.

Boat A can go 30 knots.

Boat B can go 30 knots.

general to particular

All emeralds previously found have been green.
The neit emerald to be found will be green.

 

Thus. the difference between inductive and

deductive arguments is not to be found in the generality

6
or particularity of premises and conclusion. but rather
in the definitions of deductive and inductive.
Having dispensed with the definition which
most people use when they talk of induction the question
arises: what is induction? Probably the best way to explain
the difference between deduction and induction is to

show some examples.

Example of a deductive inference:

No gourmets enjoy banana-tuna fish souffles.
(I) hark enjoys banana-tuna fish souffles.

Therefore Mark is not a gourmet.

(I) is a valid deductive inference. The conclusion
follows necessarily from the premises. The form of this
inference is such that if the premises are true: 3233
the conclusion‘gggg be true. In contemporary logic and
philosophy of science. "deductive inference" is used in
the sense of necessary(demonstrative) inference:
the conclusion is claimed to follow with logical necessity

from the premises.

Example of an inductive inference:

George is a man.
(II) George is 100 years old.

Geor a has arthritis 4f:
George will not run a four minute milé'tommorrow.

 

 

“Brian Skyrams. Choice and Chance: An Introduction

to Inductive Lo 10. (Belmon . a i orn a: 10 enson
Publishing 50.. i§66). p. 7.

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In (II) the conclusion is (at most) only logically

probable. not necessary. In an inductive inference. the
truth of the premises does not guarantee the truth of the
conclusion. If the premises are true. the conclusion may
or may not be true. An inductive inference is an inference
whose conclusion is not claimed to follow necessarily
but only with some degree of probability: hence inductive
inference is commonly used interchangeably with "probable
inference."
Before going any further we must make clear
the meaning of the term demonstrative inference.6
It is important that we understand that a demonstrative
inference is one whose premises necessitate its
conclusion: i.e.. if the premises are true then the
conclusion‘gggt be true. A nondemonstrative inference is
simply one which fails to be demonstrative; thus. its
conclusion is not necessitated by its premises. The
conclusion could be false even if the premises are
true.
As Braithwaite puts it:
Induction is not a demonstrative form

of inference like deduction. In deduction the
reasonableness of belief in the premises as it were

overflows to provide reasonableness for the belief
in the conclusion. This happens because the

 

6wes1ey C. Salmon. The Foundations of Scientific
Inference. (Pittsburgh: Univ. 0 s urg ress. .

p. .
This term is used not only by Salmon but by a
great many other writers in the philosophy of science.

anc

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8

conclusion is a logical consequence of the premis $8
and cannot be false while the premises are true.

This source of difference between an inductive
and deductive inference is the property of truth
preservation. Indeed. this is what demonstrative and
nondemonstrative inferences are all about. This truth
preservation is achieved by sacrificing any extension
of content. "The conclusion of such an inference
(demonstrative) says no more than do the premises . . . . "8
We refer to this type of conclusion as being nonampliative:
The conclusion cannot be false if the premises are true
because the conclusion says nothing that was not already
stated in the premises. This is why deduction presents
no logical problem.

The case is quite different for induction.
"There is no logical impossibility in the premises
being true and the inductive conclusion false. The
circumstances which would make the premises true are
not included in the circumstances which would make the

conclusion true. . . . "9 Thus. induction is called

7Richard Bevan Braithwaite. Scientific Ex lanation;
A Stu of the Function of Theor ProEESiIiE and an in
Science. (Eondon: Syndics of the Cambridge University Press.
Igaaye p0 2570

8Wesley C. Salmon. The Foundations of Scientific
Inference. p. 8.

9Bichard s. Braithwaite. Scientific Ex lanation:
A Stud of the unction of Theo Probabilit and flaw in
Science. p. 533.

 

 

9

ampliative: the conclusion has content not present
either explicitly or implicitly in the premises.

This characterization is quite different from
some of the more traditional definitions of induction.
"Induction is not defined as inference from the particular
to the general: it is not defined as the inverse of
deduction: it is not defined as induction by enumeration;
it is not defined as a method of discovery."10 Rather.
induction is a nondemonstrative type of inference whose
conclusion is ampliative. It seeks "to establish a
conclusion on the basis of premises which do not logically

exhaust the content of those conclusions."11

Hume's Problem
David Hume. in the seventeenth century. raised
the fundamental question about this inductive method.
How do we obtain knowledge of the unobserved? This is
really the problem in (11) above. The basic problem

with induction is one of obtaining inductive evidence

 

10Wesley C. Salmon. "Inductive Inference."

Philoso h of Science: The Delaware Seminar. V01. 2.
( ed. ) Bernard Baumrin. (New York: Interscience Publishers.

1963). p. 3&6

111bid.. p. 3&7.

It should be kept in mind that no one individual
definition is widely accepted amongst philosophers.
"There is no unanimity among logic writers about the
definition of induction:" Stephen F. Barker. The Elements
of Logic. (New York: thraw-Hill Book Co.. 19

p. 17.

10

which allows us to predict the future.12

Let the course of things be allowed hitherto
be ever so regular: that alone. without some new
argument or inference. proves not that. for
the future. it will continue so. In vain do
you pretend to have learned the nature of
bodies from your past experience. Their
secret nature. and consequently all their
effects and influence. may change. without
any change in their sensible qualities.

This happens sometimes. and with regard to
some objects: Why may it not happen always.
and with regard to all objects? What logic.
what process of argument secures

you against this supposition? My practice.
you say. refutes my doubts. But you mistake
the purport of my question. As an agent.

I am quite satisfied in the point: but as

a philosopher. who has some share of
curiosity. I will not say scepticism. I

want to leign the foundation of this
inference.

The fundamental question is one of justification
of conclusions concerning unobserved phenomena. or concepts.
The discovery of knowledge. and the justification of

knowledge are two entirely different subjects. Confusion

 

12"It must be observed that this time-
characteristic of inductive inference. which is sometimes
mentioned in the definition of it. is of no essential
importance. and that induction may also proceed from
past cases to other unexamined instances belonging to
the past." Georg Henrik vonwright. The Logical Problem
of Induction. 2nd ed. rev.. (London: Basil Blackwell.
1537). p. 1. -

13David Hume. An En uir Concerni Human
Understanding, Part IV. (Hifvgra élassios: flew lorE:

. . 0 er a Son Corporation). pp. 316-317.

11

arises though. for "when we ask how we can acguire
knowledge of the unobserved. it sounds very much as if
we are asking for a method for the discovery of new
knowledge. This is. of course. a vital problem. but
it is not the fundamental problem Hume raised."1h

The question is thus: Given that one has
"established. or highly confirmed. a certain conclusion
according to the accepted canons of scientific justification.
on what grounds may we accept this conclusion as embodying

15

knowledge?" dhen one applies a scientific method it

is usually done so in anticipation of gaining knowledge.
What David Hume did was to demonstrate exactly how difficult
it is to legitimize the cognitive claims of science.

Indeed. his analysis was such a searching and probing

one that even today no one has really provided

universally accepted answers to his questions.

1“Wesley C. Salmon. The Foundations of
Scientific Inference. pp. 6-7.
This is also discussed in a book by Georg
Henrik von dright. A Treatise on Induction and Probability,
(New York: Harcourt. Brace & Co.. Inc.. 1951). pp.
17-20.

 

15

wesley C. Salmon. "lnductive Inference."
p. 3&2.

12

Some PrOposed Solutions
to the Problem of Induction

From the time of David Hume's original criticism
people have attempted to solve the problem of induction.
No one has yet been successful. What we have are
a great many varied proposed solutions. It is an impossible
task to summarize. or examine. all of these. What
I have done here is to select a few on the basis of
how commonly they are used. and also how effectively
they might be integrated into the new social studies.

It is this last criterion - effectiveness - that is the
most important. While Baye's Therom deals with the
inductive problem as well as any other proposal. I

have not included it because of the difficulty that
would be encountered in effectively introducing it

into secondary school studies curriculums. also left
"aside has been the response of . . . unregenerate
deductivists who strive vainly to show Hume's analysis

16

wrong . . . . "

The reader should be well cautioned not to
regard the following proposed solutions as being anywhere
near a complete catalogue of attempts to justify
induction. Rather. the rest of this chapter

should be seen as a listing which demonstrates the

16Israel Scheffler. The Anato of Inquigy.
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1965). p. 22%.

 

13
seriousness and extreme difficulty of the inductive

problem. as raised by David Hume.

Uniformity of Nature

One of the more commmmroffered justifications

 

is that nature is uniform. Hume directed a great deal
of his efforts at just this point. He explained that
one cannot expect inductive inferences to yield
true results if nature is not uniform.
All inferences from experience suppose.
as their foundation. that the future will resemble
the past. and that similar powers will be conjoined
with similar sensible qualities. If there be
any suspicion that the course of nature may
change. and that the past may be no rule for the
future. all experience becomes useliss. and can give
rise to no inference or conclusion. 7
The question now becomes one of attempting to
prove that nature is uniform. for if this can be
proven then indeed we will have justified induction.
The first thing we realize in this quest is that a
deductive inference could not possibly prove that
nature is uniform in the required sense(past. present.
and future) for deduction is nonampliative: it can
tell us nothing about the future.
This leaves us than attempting to prove that
the world is uniform through an inductive argument.

At this point we become cpen to the challenge as to why

we should place our faith in such inductive arguments.

 

17David Hume. An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding. p. 316.

l‘f.‘sa\ 1‘

14
We cannot reply: because nature is uniform,for that
is what we are trying to prove. Thus. we are left
attempting to prove that induction is justified on
the ground that we have inductivly ascertained that
nature is uniform. This cannot be done.

Thus. it cannot be demonstrated. or proven.
that nature is uniform through either inductive or
deductive arguments. "Furthermore. the distinction
between valid deduction and nondemonstrative inference
is completely exhaustive. Take any inference whatsoever.

It must be deductive or nondemonstrative."18

Common Sense or Rational Justification
This position holds that inductive arguments are
justified if they yield true conclusions from true

premises most of the time. This can be established

only inductively. or deductively. The reasons for this

 

18Hesley C. Salmon. The Foundations of Scientific

Inference. p. 20.

In the previous discussion I have not mentioned
the work of Nelson Goodman on the idea of uniformity
of nature. This was done so as not to be confusing
several issues at once. In Fact. Fictionlgand Forecast.
2nd ed.. (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co.. Inc.. 1963).
chapt. 3. "The New Riddle of Induction." Goodman points
out that the regularities found in a sequence of events
may well depend on the language one uses. He goes on
to demonstrate that if we try to project all regularities
that may be found by using any language. our predictions
may well conflict with one another. This is usually
discussed under the rubric of linguistic invariance.
The Journal of Philoso hy. LX111. May 26. 1966.
devoted an entire issue to the problem Goodman
raised. and it may be of interest to those who wish
to look at this problem in more depth.

15

are the same as were given above: our definition of
induction and deduction are exhaustive. An inference
must be demonstrative (deductive) or inductive.

A deductive argument could not possibly justify
the use of induction for it is nonampliative. Hence.
one can only make claims about the past and present.
not the future. It is the future that we are concerned
about. Will any of our inductive inferences in the
future hold true?

If we could [justify induction deductively]
we would have proved that the conclusion must be
true if the premises are. That would make it
necessarily truth-perserVing. hence. demonstrative.
This. in turn. would mean that it was nonampliative.
contrary to our hypothesis. Thus. if an ampliative
inference could be justified deductively it could
not be ampliative. It follows that ampliative
inferences cannot be justified deductively. 9

A deductive argument can only state that induction
has worked in the past and present. not the future.

Likewise we cannot justify any type of ampliative
inference inductively. To attempt to justify induction
by an inductive argument we are in the position of having
to assume that induction is reliable to prove that
induction is reliable. Salmon writes that to justify
any sort of ampliative inference inductively would

require the use of some sort of nondemonstrative
inference. But the question at issue is the
justification of nondemonstrative inferences. so

the procedure would be question begging. Before
we can properly employ a nondemonstrative inference

19wesley C. Salmon. The Foundations of Scientific
Inference. p. 11.

16

in a justifying argument. we must already gave
justified that nondemonstrative inference. 0

Thus. induction cannot "be justified by reference to
the past successes of inductive procedures of predictive
policies."21
Before leaving this section I wish to look

further at one of the more complex attempts to justify
induction inductively. Max Black has produced a highly
sophisticated and widely discussed attempt to justify
induction through the use of self—supporting arguments
The major point in this argument is that the
traditional fallacy of circular argument (Petitio
principii) entails the assumption. as a premise.
that the conclusion is to be proved. Black holds that
the situation is quite different for self-supporting
inductive arguments.

22

He has formulated two inductive rules:

B To argue from all examined instances of A's
1 have been B To all 3'3 323 B.
To argue from Most instances of A's examined
R2 in a wide variety of conditions have been
B to (probably) the next A to be encountered
will be B.

 

20Ibid.. p. 20. Salmon also writes that this
argument is circular and "the trouble with circular
arguments is obvious: with an appropiate circular
argument you can prove anything." (p.13).

lesrael Scheffler. The Anatomy of Inquiry.
p0 3150

22
Max Black. "The Inductive Support of Inductive

Rules." Problems of Anal sis. (Ithaca: Cornell Univ.
Press. 1953). p. I§5.

'1“
—-"

inst b

Each of these has two self-supporting arguments:

(81):

(811):

(32)3

(322):

17

All examined instances of the use of 81 in
arguments with true premises have been
instances in which 31 has been successful.
Hence:
All instances of the use of R1 in
arguments with true premises are instances
in which H1 is successful.
R1 has always been reliable in the past.
Hence:
811s reliable.
In most instances of the use of B in
arguments with true premises exam ned in a
wide variety of conditions. Hz has been
successful.
Hence:
In the next instance to be encountered of
the use of R in an argument with a true
premise 32 w 11 be successful.
32 has usually been successful in the past
Hence(probably):

32 will be successful in the next instance

"Our task accordingly narrows itself down to

(a2) is guilty of circularity."

determining whether and in whet sense either (a1) or

24

is not the circularity of petitio principi . for any
argument that is circular in this traditional sense

must be a valid deductive argument (the conclusion

23

what ever is present it

 

231bid.. p. 197.

20

Ibid.. p. 198.

must be
nor (9'

cannot

demons1
irrefu1
the [21"?

rules I

18

must be true if the premises are true). Neither (a1)
nor (a2) are deductively valid: thus the argument

cannot be circular.

25 26

Both Skyrams and Salmon have fairly coherent
demonstrations that Black's work. while essentially
irrefutable. is nonetheless of little value in solving
the problems of inductive justification. Using Black's
rules both authors show how it is possible to create

a system of inductive logic that would be diametrically

Opposed to scientific inductive logic and would

be one which presupposed on all levels that the

future will not be like the past. We shall cal

this system a system of counterinductive logic.
Thus "it sounds as if a self supporting argument is
applicable only to rules we already know to be correct."28
What all this amounts is that while Black's argument is
interesting and of theoretical significance it does
not satisfy the requirements for an inductive justification.
A system for justification must give reasons for using
that system rather than any other. "Thus if two inconsistent

systems. scientific induction and counterinduction

 

2Skirian Skyrams. Choice and Chance: An Introduction

to Inductive Logic.
26

Wesley C. Salmon. The Foundations of Scientific
Inference.

27Brian Skyrams. Choice and Chance: An Introduction
to Inductive Logic. p. 34.

281.831ey 0. Salmon. The Foundations of Scientific
Inference. p. 16.

.m—‘ I'Vu' -_

cannot

justifl
frameue
throng
and me
since
Black'

pmcti

the
app:
Srea

Prob

19
. . . . "29 can meet the requirements then the system
cannot be an adequate definition of justification.

This section has demonstrated that the logical
justification of induction. within this type of conceptual
framework. is seemingly impossible. It cannot be done
through a demonstrative inference since that is nonampliative.
and neither can it be done through an ampliative argument
since that would be circular (with the exception of
Black's formulation. which seems to be of little
practical consequence). As Salmon writes:

It is extremely difficult. psychologically speaking.

to shake the view that past success of the

inductive method constitutes a genuine justification

of induction. Nevertheless. the basic fact

remains: Hume showed that inductive justifications

of induction are allacious. and no one has since

proved him wrong.
glpothetico-Deductive

‘ One of the more interesting ways of coping with

the inductive problem is the hypothetico-deductive
approach. This is often regarded as a process which has
great usefulness if one assumes that induction presents no

problem. It is not often thought of as constituting a

pure justification. From a general hypothesis and

particular statements of initial conditions a particular

predictive statement is formulated. This includes the

 

29Brian Skyrams. Choice and Chance: An Introduction
to Inductive Logic. p. 36.

30Wesley C. Salmon. The Foundations of Scientific
Inference. p. 17.

20

"deducing [of] the hypothesis in question from higher
level hypotheses which have themselves been inductively
established."31 Also. these hypotheses could be framed
on the basis of some experience with empirical data.

Policies for establishing general hypotheses
in accordance with inductive principles of inference'
on the basis of empirical data will be called
"inductive policies.“ They all have the feature in
common that they require a basis of eXperience to
build upon: in this they differ from many non-inductive
policies for establishing general hypotheses. e.g
that of deducing them from metaphysical premises.32

This notion of eXperience is most important in scientific
work utilizing the hypothetico-deductive method.

After the selection of a particular hypothesis it
is accepted. at least for a time. as being true. This
statement is now regarded as one having predictive value.

By careful observation it is determined whether the predictive

statement turned out to be true.33 It is this idea of

predictive value which is most important. in that it
provides a motive for using a scientific model of explanation.
The reason

scientists use the inductive policies that
they do use is the predictive value of these

31Richard Bevan Braithwaite. Scientific
EXplanation. p. 261.

32Ibid.

33Herbert Feigl in "Naturalism and Humanism."
Readin s in the Philoso h of Science. (eds.) Herbert
Feigl and May BrodEeck. (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts. Inc.. 1953). lists five regulative ideals in
the quest for scientific knowledge. They are: (1)
Intersubjective testability. (2) Reliability. or a
sufficient degree of confirmation. (3) Definiteness

and precision. (4) Coherence or systematic structure.
(5) Comprehensiveness or scope of knowledge. (pp. 11-13)

 

21

policies - their success in yielding hypotheses

from which testable consequences can be deduced

. . . . This is the justification for following

a particular inductive policy . . . namely. that

following this policy yields hypotheses which are

in fact confirmed and not refuted by eXperience.

Good inductive policies are those which do what we

require of them: they enable us to predigfi. and

thereby partially to control the future.

With this model man proposes hypotheses and
nature decides on their truth. or falsity. If by observation
we determine that a particular hypothesis has no predictive
value. i.e.. it turned out to be false. then we say that
this hypothesis is disconfirmed. A point that has
caused some discussion is the idea of rejecting an
hypothesis. Many hold that one contrary instance is
not adequate for the rejection of a hypothesis. There
are generally only two cases where it might indeed be the
case that the prOponent of a hypothesis would continue to
hold his hypotheses after encountering contrary evidence.
The first of these cases may be where "the thesis

is a statistical hypothesis where the rejection of the
hypothesis on the evidence of a set of observations is always
a provisional rejection which may have to be cancelled on the
basis of further evidence."35 This Wodu be where one establishes
acceptance. or rejection. at the .05 or .01 levels of
significance. The second case does not involve a

statistical hypothesis as such. but nonetheless the hypothesis

might "be treated as a statistical one in that it is to be

 

3”Richard Bevan Braithwaite. Scientific

Explanation. p. 26h.

35Ibid.. p. 260.

22

rejected (and only provisionally rejected at that) only if
the contrary instances show deviations from the value
asserted in the hypotheses which exceeds a certain amount."36
This might be found in some functionalist explanations where
certain conditions are thought to be necessary for a specific
type of activity to be carried out. but this is eXpressed

in a nonstatistical manner.

If the observation reveals that the statement is
true. or of predictive value. we then say that the hypothesis
is confirmed to some extent. The important idea here is
that the hypothesis is not conclusively proved by any one
or more positively confirming instances. It may only
become more highly confirmed.

Since the conclusion of an induction is
a general hypothesis. there is no time at which
it is conclusively proved. The hypothesis may. of
course. be established by the induction. but its
establishment at one time will not prevent its
refutation at a later time if contrary evidence occurs.37
The question "naturally arises at this point

whether we ever have or ever can have adequate evidence."38

 

36Ibid.

3711311100 Pp. 265-266.

38Arthur C. Danto. Anal tical Philoso h of
Knowledge. (London: Syndics o? the Cambridge University
Press. 1968). p. 132.

Braithwaite. in Scientific Ex lanation. goes

into the notion of a hierarchy of Hypotheses. and how
the notion of confirmation is related to whether the
hypothesis is of the lower or highest order. He
eXplains that "since a change in the lowest-level hypotheses

in a man's rational corpus will involve a change in
some of the highest-level hypotheses. while the highest-

23
What is usually the problem at this point is that
there exists a misunderstanding of the difference
between understanding and knowing. To understand
something is to only be a party to a convention. This
is quite different from "'knowledge' in the epistemological
39

sense." Danto sees this as a problem in the adequacy
of languange and feels the first step should be concentrating
on the difference between understanding and knowing.
For our purposes here it will suffice to say that no
hypothesis can ever be totally confirmed. but only
highly confirmed. This is the skeptical position
assumed in most scientific investigations.

The question is often asked as to why this
model is viewed as an inductive one? It is because the
inference from the original observation to the hypothesis
is surely not deductive. This inference cannot possibly
be thought of as a demonstrative one. hence it must be
nondemonstrative or inductive. Another distinction is that:

"A pure deductive system. like that of arithmetic hangs from its

summit and can be indefinitely extended downwards; an impure

 

level hypotheses can all change with the lowest-level
hypotheses remaining the same. the totality of the highest-
level hypotheses in his rational corpus is held with less
tenacity than are the lowest-level hypotheses. Of course
any particular set of highest-level may be held very
tenaciously. being treated as 'functionally a riori'
propositions. but this will only result in the others

being held less tenaciously."

39Arthur C. Danto. Analytical Philosophy of
Knowledge. p. 133.

24
deductive system. like that of a natural science. is
supported on its empirical basis land can be indefinitely
extended upwar(is."z"o
It took along time for scientists to realize that
the hypothetico-deductive inductive method
of science was epistemologically different from the
prime facia similar deductive method of mathematics;
an that. in properly imitating the deductive form
of Euclid's system. they were not igso facto taking
over his deductive method of proof.

The big difference between math and science
is that in math. and logic. the propositions are logically
necessary. while in the sciences they are only logically
contingent. In the next chapter we will return to this
hypothetico-deductive system and see how several social
science disciplines have made great use of it.

Even though this system is. or can be. both
effective and elaborate it does not refute Hume's charge.
The hypothesis of the hypothetico-deductive is still
ampliative: the conclusion is a statement whose content
exceeds the observational evidence. Indeed. this is
why we can never say that a hypothesis is true. but

rather must be satisfied with a highly confirmed. or

falsified hypothesis.

Pragmatic Justification
This attempt seems to be quite fruitful even

 

uoRichard Bevan Braithwaite. Scientific
Exglanation. p. 35%.

ullbid.. p. 353.

argumc
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as Hi
era.
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at in

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25
though. as with the others. it does not fully solve
the problem. The pragmatic approach accepts Hume's
argument up to the point of agreeing that it is impossible.
3 priori. to establish that any inductive inferences will
ever again have true conclusions. This position holds.
as with Hume. that we cannot validly show either _a_ priori.
or g posteriori. that nature is uniform in the sense
of past. present. and future, prior to a justification
of induction.

At this point the advocate of the pragmatic
justification would claim that even if induction cannot
be justified on logical grounds. and hence its success as
a method of prediction cannot be established in advance.
induction can be shown to be superior to any alternative
method of prediction. As we stated above it cannot
be demonstrated that nature is uniform. but advocates of
this position argue that we can examine two possibilities:
Nature is uniform or nature is not uniform. "It
is fairly clear that inductive inferences will successfully
establish knowledge of the unobserved if nature happens
to be uniform. and that they will fail if nature
should turn out to be chaotic and lawless.“+2

This in no way guarantees that we shall be
successful in any particular instance considered but

only says that in repeated applications the number of

 

2
Wesley C. Salmon. "Inductive Inference." p. 35b.

succe:
induc‘

£0110'

Induc
implo

(Chic

26

successes would be greater than if we acted against

inductive conclusions. What comes from this is the

 

following tablezua
Nature Uniform Nature not Uniform
Induction Success Failure
Employed
Cther Method Success or
Employed Failure Possible Failure

Most important is the last entry in the table for here
it is asserted "that even the alternative methods will
fail if nature is not uniform."“u Hans ReichenbachHS. the
major proponent of the pragmatic method. reasons that
the continued success of any alternative method would
constitute a uniformity. contrary to the principle of
non-uniformity. Thus. if this other method worked then
induction would also work.

Hence induction will be successful if any other
(method could succeed. "We have. therefore everything
to gain and nothing to lose by induction.“+6 If induction

is destined to failure then so also is any other method.

Reichenbach. in working through this. essentially uses

 

u3lbid.

““Ibid.. p. 355.

u
5Hans Reichenbach. Egperience and Prediction.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1938).

“6wesley C. Salmon. "Inductive Inference." Po 355-

‘u-v .. .
~ .r~_.
4-H

cla

rat)
Just
lgg
only
p011
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enox
enox
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it 1

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2?

induction to mean induction by enumeration. rather
than induction by elimination. Induction by enumeration
is where we wish to go from an observed sample of a
class to an inference which governs the entire class.
He couples the rule we discussed above to a frequency
interpretation of probability. He then holds that the
limit of the relative frequency of the finite sequence
equals (or is closely appromete to the relative frequency
of the sequence as it nears. or reaches. infinity).u7

This pragmatic method of inductive justification is
rather successful. but it is not a justification: that is. a
justification in the sense that it provides a reason for
logically making inductive decisions. It is a justification
only in the sense that it provides a motive for using inductive
policies. The major difficulty is that it is a formidable
task to state a principle of uniformity that is strong
enough to assure the success of inductive inferences and weak
enough to be plausible. This is a variation of the Goodman
paradox again.“8 Uniformity of nature is not an all-or-none
affair: it seems to exist in degrees and this is where the
pragmagic method for inductive justification becomes
unsatisfactory. Still it offers many possibilities and if
it is possible to overcome the paradox concerning the uniformity

of nature it will become even more useful.

 

“7Hans Reichenbach. "The Logical Foundations of
the Concept of Probability." Readings in Philosophical
Analysis. (eds.) Herbert Feigl. and Wilfred Sellars.

(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Inc.. 1949).

48Nelson Goodman. Fact. Fictionl and Forecast.

indu
meth
sear
The

prov

alwa

does

has
refs

refe

into

Beic

28
A Probabilistic Approach

One of the approaches to solving the problem of
induction that has found great favor is the probabilistic
method. It begins with the belief that Hume's original
search for the justification of induction was misconceived.
The problem begins when people try to find a way of
proving that inductive inferences with true premises will
always have true conclusions. This is seen as the task
of deduction. The only thing that an inductive argument
does is establish a conclusion as probable.

As used by philosOphers of science probability
has two basic meanings. They are: (i) probability
refers to the degree of confirmation. and (11) probability
refers to the long run relative frequency.“9 Each notion
of probability has its own set of advocates. The frequency
interpretation is usually associated with von Mises.50

Beichenbach.51 and Feigl.52 Probability when conceived

of in terms of the degree of confirmation is best

 

“9Rudolf Carnap. "The Two Concepts of Probability."
Readings in Philosthical Analzsis. p. 33 .

sonichard von hises. Probabilit Statistics.
and Truth. (rev. ed.). (New for : e Macmillan Co.. 1957).

slnans Reichenbach. The Theo of Probabilit .
(Berkeley: University of California Press. 1§E9).
52Herbert Feigl. "The Logical Character of

the Principle of Induction." Headiggs in Philosophical
AMI! 818 . p. 2970

29

53 5!:

represented by Jeffreys. and Keynes.
Neither side views the other as having much to

offer and hence they reject all other theories but

their own. Carnap believecthat this "controversy
between represewhtives of different conceptions of
probability is due to the blindness on both sides

with respect to the existence and importance of the
probability concept on the other side."55 we need

not concern ourselves here with this mutual disagreement

except in that it allows us to speak of two distinct

meanings of the concept of probability.

Probability as Frequency

Probability viewed as a theory of frequency
essentially says: That which has happened often
in the past. and is now happening often in the present.
will continue to happen often in the future. The
claim is not that inductive inferences will always
be true. but rather that they will frequently be so.
If X has happened frequently in the past it will
probably happen at about the same frequency (or rate

of regularity) in the future. This. as a form of

 

53Harold Jeffreys. Theory of Probability.
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1939).

5uJohn Maynard Keynes. Treatise on Probability.
(London: The Macmillan Co.. Ltd.. 1921).

SSRudolf Carnap. "The Two Concepts of Probability."

P. 335.

30
inductive justification. clearly does not suffice.
Hume has already shown that this claim cannot be
substantiated. There is no question that inductive
inferences cannot be expected to lead to the truth
in all cases. This was hardly the point of Hume's
argument. Instead he argued that we not only "cannot
justify the claim that gzggy inductive inference with
true premises will have a true conclusion. but further
that we cannot prove that gay inductive inference with

56

true premises will have a true conclusion."

Probability as the Degree of Confirmation

This position takes the calculus of probability
to be formulated in terms of statements and is often
thought of as the logical interpretation of probability.
The notion of whether or not a statement is probable
is tied closely with the notion of decision
making. Thus. probability is viewed as some sort of
degree of rational belief. This raises the whole
idea of evidence. and what constitutes evidence.

Under this idea of probability to ask if we
should accept conclusion X is to ask if we should

believe. or accept. the evidence, Salmon feels

that this tantamount to asking if we should be

 

56Wesley C. Salmon. "The Justification of
Inductive Rules of Inference." The Problem of Inductive
Lo ic. (ed.) Imre Lakatos. (Amste am: Nort -Ho and
PuEIishing Co.. 1968). p. 30.

31
rational.57 He then formulates a problem and sets
up three inductive rules concerning the evidence.
Depending on which rule one selects there are three
possible outcomes.58 Now the question becomes which
conclusions are acceptable. "whether a given conclusion
is supported by evidence - whether it would be rational
to believe it on the basis of given evidence - whether
it is made probable by virtue of its relation to given
evidence - depends upon selection of the correct rules
from among the infinitely many rules we might

conceivably adopt.u59

Now the question of what does it mean to be
rational becomes an important question. Is it rational
to believe on the basis of evidence as defined by
one rule as opposed to another rule? What indeed
constitutes evidence? The inductive problem still
exists. It is simply reformulated as a problem
concerning the provision of adequate gounds for the
selection of inductive rules. "It is easy to show
that inferences which conform to our
accepted inductive rules establish their conclusions

{as probable. Unfortunately. we can find no reason to

571b1d.. p. 30-31.
581bid.. p. 31.
sglbid.

32
prefer conclusions which are probable in this sense
to those which are improbable."6o These questions
are essentially a reformulation of the original
problem. "Introduction of the concept of probability
does not dissolve the problem of induction though

it may lead to some interesting reformulations."61

Conclusions

In no way should the preceding positions
on induction be seen as a complete catalog of the
attempted solutions. We have not even touched on
the postulational approach of Bertrand Russel.62
nor the doctrine which holds that there are synthetic
a priori truths.63 Neither have we gone into the

work done by John Stuart hill 64 Rather what I have

 

6Owesley C. Salmon. The Foundations of Scientific
Inference. p. 52-

61

Wesley C. Salmon. "Inductive Inference."

p. 353.
62
Bertrand Russell. Human Knowledge: Its
Scope and Limits. (New York: Simon & SchuSter. 19D8).

‘ ‘63This position is not held by many people
today. The best known advocate of this position

would be Immanuel Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason.
translated by Norman K. Smith. TNew Mark: The Humanities
Press. 1950).

6h . ‘
John btuart hill. A system of Logic.
(London: Longmans. Green. and Co.. 18797. The theory
on which Mill's methods rested is explored quite fully
by Georg Henrik von Wright. A Treatise on Induction and
Probabilit%5 (Patterson. N.J.: LittlZfTEId. Adams.
& 00.. 19 e '

33

attempted is to show the difficulty of the problem

Hume has presented. His argument has so far withstood
all attacks; hence we are left with a problem concerning
the validity of Judgments about future or unknown

cases. Essentially the problem is that "what has
happened imposes no logical restrictions on what will

happen."65

 

65

Nelson Goodman. Fact, Fictionl and Forecast,
p' 590

Chapter 2

Induction and the
social Sciences
In this chapter attention will be focused
on how the social sciences use inductive methods
for gaining knowledge. and how they cope with Hume's
problem. Almost all social scientists are concerned
with theories and generalizations. Thus they must
be concerned with proof and methods of verification.
Our attention will be focused on how the social sciences
offer proof for their eXplanations and predictions

which have been arrived at through inductive processes.

Methodology

Teachers of the new social studies must be
concerned with the methodology of the social sciences
and how this methodology applies to secondary school
social studies programs. The first question normally
raised by teachers is: What is methodology? This
is no easy question to answer. As one po\itical
scientist writes; "method and methodology are the

least developed and most misunderstood components

of political science."1 Excluding perhaps economics

 

1 Heinz Eulau. "Comments on Professor Deutch's

34

35

this comment applies equally well to all of the social
sciences.

Robert K. Merton. in the fashion of most
social scientists. simply refers to it as being the

"logic of scientific procedure."2

Abraham Kaplan.
being more specific. writes that methodology is the
"description. the eXplanation. and the Justification
3

of methods. and not methods themselves." One constant
source of confusion over methodology arises because

too few people are precise about the distinction
between methodology and technique. Richard Hudner
discusses this source of confusion and writes that

"the method of science l§,. . . the rationale on

which it bases its acceptance or rejection of hypotheses
or theory."u This "methodology of validation. of
explanation. or of prediction is precisely what

is referred to when it is asserted . . . that the

 

   

Sco e Ob ectives
and Metho s. . P iladelphia:
The American Academy of Political and Social Science.
1965): p0 1790

2Robert H. Merton. Social Theory and Social
Structure. (rev. ed.: New York: The Free Press. 1957).

p. 1 .

 
 

for Political Science:

  
 

3Abraham Haplan. The Conduct of Inquiry:
Hethodolo for Behavioral Science. (San Francisco:
Chandler Publishing Co.. 19555. p. 18.
4
Richard S. Budner. Philosophy of Social

Science. (Englewood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
IHCe. 1966). p. 5'

.g—Jh:———_;Aa_. ..v__

 

 

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be

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thl

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or

We

1‘01
195

36

scientific method is pervasive through all the
sciences. or is applicable,in the investigaiton

of social as well as nonsocial phenomena."5 Thus

defined,methodology becomes a set of procedural rules

by which a study is validated. Technique then is
such things as factor analysis,or chisquare tests.
The tendency to confuse methodology and technique
is the source of untold confusion.

A teacher of the social studies must be
familiar with methodology. In 1959,8tanley Hronski
wrote one of the first articles advocating the
teaching of methodology. He proposed "that there
be a radical shift in social studies teaching
from the what of the the social sciences to the
‘hgw of the social scientist."6 To simply know
the results of working social scientists is not
enough. To teach the social studies today the
teacher must also know the logic of the procedures.
or procedural guidelines. by which those results
were obtained. “In short. what is the methodology

underlying the social sciences."7 As of late

 

51bid.. p. 6.

 

6
Stanley P. Hronski. "A PrOposed BreAKthrough
for the Social Studies." Social Education.AAIII (May,

1959)! po 215.

71bid.

N‘s.

 

there

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of 61
moth:
that
oper
may
othe

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pos
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(New

37
there has been a great deal of emphasis on the

teaching of the structure of disciplines.8 One

cannot teach. let alone understand the structure

of disciplines unless one has an understanding of
methodology. The newer social studies also believe

that students should be taught how the social scientist
Operates within the logic of validation. so that the students
may do likewise. It is held that to simply teach what
other social scientists have discovered will no

longer suffice in an age when knowledge is eXpanding

at an ever increasing rate. making it entirely

possible that today's knowledge will soon be outmoded.
What must be taught is he! the social scientist operates
within the context of validation. The teacher cannot

be of benefit in this type of classroom unless he
understands the logic of social procedures. He cannot
give descriptions of the logic. or aid students in
utilizing this logic unless he understands the methods
of social science.

One of the major problems facing anyone who
wishes to examine the methodology of the social sciences
has been the lack of material on this subject. A

8The current interest in structure was

touched off by Jerome S. Bruner. The Process of Education.
(New York: Vintage Books. 1960).

38

person attempting to familiarize himself in this area
will not receive much help from the writings of
social scientists. Their writings tend to
consist on the one hand. of instruction in

research techniques. and on the other of
some remarks on induction as viewed by John

Stuart Mill.9

Indus. what work that has done in this area has
often been left to the philosophers, who have generally
csirried on discussions amongst themselves. but the
sc>cial scientist often is unlikely to comprehend
trme meaning of these discussions. For secondary
school teachers of the social studies there has
been even less of a dialogue.

Kaplan raises an issue which should be brought
0111: before proceeding at too great a length
alici that is the difference between logic-in-use and
reconstructed logic.10 The descripions of what
S<>czial scientists do is by necessity an approximation
CDf‘ what social scientists actually do. It is
nOrmally an idealized version of the practices that
are carried out in the conduct of the inquiry. "This
reconstruction idealizes the logic of science only

111. showing us what it would be if it were extracted

g

9Robert Brown. Ex lanation in Social Science.
(luondon: Houtledge & Kegan Paul. 19635. p. 1.

10Abraham Kaplan. The Conduct of Inquiry:
hethodolo for Behavioral Science.

39

and refined to utmost purity."11 It cannot be any
other way since it would be impossible to record
exactly what procedures and considerations the
social scientists went through in his work. It should
be obvious that this issue would be of far greater
importance if we were discussing methods of discovery.

Scientists may. and do. disagree on whether
there exists such a thing a logic of discovery.
but there is not too much controversy on whether
or not a logic of validation exists. There must
be agreement as to what constitutes verification
or no results would ever be agreed upon. One
need only look around at the number of accepted
knowledge claims to see that some agreement on
methods of validation exist. Thus. the necessity
of working with reconstructed logic should prove
to be of no great handicap in looking at the
validation of knowledge claims. The important
thing is to simply be aware of this difference
between logic-in-use and reconstructed logic.

In this chapter we will be concerned with

only one aspect of methodology: The justification

 

11Ibid.. p. 11

no

of knowledge which utilizes inductive procedures.

we will be looking at two types of eXplanation:
functionalism and empiricism. Robert Brown in
Explanation in the S9g$gl_3cienceslz lists seven such
types of explanations. but not all are widely used.
The two most widely used. not only in the social
sciences. but also in social studies. are the
functionalist and the empiricist. For this reason

we will confine ourselves to these two types of

social science explanations.

Functionalism

Having attempted to define functionalism
on previous occasions I fully realize that this is
an impossible task. Demerath is probably close to
the truth when he says that we have no answers as
to what constitutes functionalism.13 Richard Rudner
likewise writes that to examine the available material
is "to become convinced that the major task of
saying clearly what constitutes functionalism still

remains."1u Each author seems to have a slightly

 

12Robert Brown. EXplanation in Social

Science. p. 42.
13N.J. Demerath 111 and Richard A. Peterson

(eds.). S stem Chan e and Conflict. (New York: The
Free Press. 1§675. p. fi§§.

1“Richard S. Rudner. Philosophy of Social
Science. p. 85.

41
different twist to his meaning of function and functional
explanation. Another problem that often arises is that
many writers use the term function indiscriminately. Thus
many empiricists talk of function in a loose manner to
mean purpose. This is quite different from the meaning
functionalists give to it. and the meaning we shall be
using here.

With this in mind we will look at functionalism
as exemplified A.R. Radcliffe—Brown. His method seems to
be somewhat representative of the field at large. thus
making generalizations about functionalism more valid.

In addition Radcliffe-Brown did a great deal of field
work utilizing this method which aids in discovering
just what functionalism means.

The first task confronting us is the definition
of function. It can have three different interpretations
depending on the context in which it is used. It
can mean: (1) What should a social item's purpose
be? (2) What effects does a social item serve? \\
(3) What purpose does this social item serve?

The third is the one with which we are most
concerned. Radcliffe-Brown writes that "the
function of a particular social usage is the contribution

it makes to the total social system."15 To give

 

15A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, "On the Concept of
Function in Social Science." American AnthrOpologist.
XXXVII(Ju1y-Sept.. 1935). pa 397a

42

the function of an item then constitutes telling
the purpose "it plays in the social life as a
whole and therefore the contribution it makes to the

maintenance of the structural continuity."16 This

entails viewing society in holistic terms with
the parts being interrelated. This type of view

implies that a social system . . . has a certain
kind of unity. which we may speak of as a
functional unity. He may define it as a condition
in which all parts of the social system work
together with a sufficient degreg of harmony

or internal consistency . . . .1

Another assumption which is made in defining
functionalism is that a society is in a state
of dynamic equilibrium. This means that the
dominant tendency is towards stability and integration.

Robert Brown refers to this as a self-persisting

system.

A self-persisting system is commonly
taken to be a system which maintains at least
one of its prOperties in an equilibrium ‘\
position despite variations in the other
properties. either inside or outside the system.
to which the presence of the first property
is causally related.18

'Phis creates a great deal of difficulty for the validity

 

161bid.. p. 396.
17Ib1de| D. 395-3960

18Robert Brown. Explanation in Social Science,
p. 110.

43

of predictions. In point of fact it requires an
ungrounded assumption that this system will remain
to be self-persisting. or equilibrated in the

flit “1‘6 0

Explanation and Prediction in Functionalism

A great deal has been written on the difference
between explanation and prediction. Some hold it
is possible to predict and still not be able to
fully explain while others hold that explanations
in some subjects (e.g.. history) are possible whereas
predictions are not possible. Hempel feels
that no valid distinction between explanation
and prediction exists. He states:
The customary distinction between

explanation and prediction rests mainly

on pragmatic differences between the two.

While in explanation. the final event is

known to have happened. and its determining

conditions have to be sought. the situation
is reversed in the case of a prediction.19

Thus. a complete eXplanation will have predictive
value. If functionalism can offer a complete
explanation it could conceivably offer us valid
predictions. To discover how it handles explanation

then would give us a clue as to how it would handle

9

Carl C. Hempel. "The Function of General
Laws in History." Readings in Philosophical Analysis.
Do “62.

44

statements about the future. which would entail the
inductive problem.

Hempel is quite critical of the explanatory
nature of functionalism and to him explanation and
prediction are simply two heads of the same coin: to
examine an explanation is to also look at a statement's
predictive force. Thus to look at one is to look at
both. we may look at the predictive nature of functionalism
keeping in mind that we are now also discussing the
quality of prediction which functional explanation
offers. In attempting to eXplain the occurrence of item
1 in a system s at time t. functionalists commit
the fallacy of affirming the consequence.20 The
weakness in this type of explanation becomes quite
apparent when one asks if there could be any
alternatives to i in s at t. Functionalism "simply

fails to explain why the trait i rather than one

 

2OCari c. Hempel. "The Logic of Functional

Analysis." Readin s in the Philoso of the Social
Sciences. (ed.) hay BrodbecE. (New gork: The Macmillan
Co.. 1968). p. 191.

Irving M. Cepi. Introduction to Logic. 3rd ed..
(New York: The Macmillan Co.. 1968). eXplains that the
fallacy of affirming the consequent is where one has a
categorical premise which affirms the consequent of the
conditional premise. (p. 202)

1.0. Jarvis also discusses this point in
"Limits to Functionalism in Anthropology." Functionalism
in the Social Sciences. (Philadelphia: The American
Academy of Political and Social Science. 1965).
Jarvis finds functionalism to be rather lacking in
its eXplanatory power. He feels that its greatest
merits lie in its heuristic value.

 

45
of its alternatives is present in s at t."21
As a comparison a nomological deductive argument

would account for i rather than any of its

alternatives.

In sum then. the information typically
provided by a functional analysis of an item 1
affords neither deductively nor inductively
adequate grounds for eXpecting i rather than one
of its alternatives. The impression that a
functional analysis does provide such grounds.
and thus explains the occurrence of i. is no
doubt at least partly due to the benefit of
hindsight: when we seek to explain an item 1.
we presumably know already that i has

occurred.

At this point it should become clear that
‘the predictive value of functionalism is practically
nonexistent. If functional analysis cannot

«explain the occurrence of one set of items. as

<3pposed to a set of alternatives. then it surely

(cannot allow us to predict. What functional analysis

(ices to make predictions then is that through
Irindsight it eXplains the function of an item 1:
6.8. "since the demand for the services of special
privileges are built into the structure of the
Society. the Boss fulfills diverse functions for

this second subgroup of business-seeking

¥

21Ibid.. p. 193.

zzlbide. pa 194-1950

no
23

privilege." For this to act as a predictive

statement a postulate that states that the future will

be the same as the past must be implicit. Also the

word "since" must be taken to mean that within limits

the structure of society will stay the same. This can

be thought of as an implicit hypothesis of self-regulation.
Richard Rudner refers to this tendency as

preferedness. Functionalism seems to require an

assumption that an item prefers function X. or prefers

to direct itself towards goal G. What exactly this

preference behavior is "must be qualified by the

kind of preference behavior to which we are

referring."2u With this qualification we can surely

have no prediction because item i may simply demonstrate

a preference for goal H rather than goal G at time t'

as opposed to time t. The only way out of this

situation is to produce a law which holds that item

1 always functions in the page manner in system s.

regardless of time. We are now left in a situation

where "we can only predict. and explain. in terms

of functions where explanations contain law-like

 

23Robert H. Merton. Social Theory and Social
Structure. p. 76.

2("Richard S. Rudner. Philosophy_of Social
Science. p. 100.

4?

generalizations."25 Usually this involves "our knowing
that the system is self-regulating . . . ."26
Without this we have no grounds for either prediction
or complete eXplanations.

Functional systems must have this implicit
hypothesis of self-regulation in order to have any
predictive value. This hypothesis is normally
untestable just as it is empirically undefinable. As
Hempel writes:

It will no doubt be one of the most
important tasks of functional analysis in
psychology and the social sciences to ascertain
to what extent such phenomena of self-regulation

can b§7found. and can be represented by corresponding
laWSe

 

25

Robert Brown. SXplanation in Social Science.
p. 129.

Hempel. "The Logic of Functional Analysis." feels
that one way this might be done is to add a premise which
sets the future: "The predictive use of [functional
argumentg] likewise requires a premise concerning the
future . . . but there is often considerable uncertainty
as to whether [this] will in fact prove to be true."
26Robert Brown. Explanation in Social Science,
p. 130.

Carl G. Hempel, "The Logic of Functional
Analysis." p. 205.

Hebert Brown. Explanation in Social Science.
feels that when the point is reached where laws are
developed we will have no need for functional analysis.
Here he is thinking of functionalism as a heuristic
device only. This is similar to Nagel. "A Formalization
of Functionalism." Logic Without Metaphysics. (New York:
The Free Press. 1957).

In support of this idea Brown points out that
of all the social sciences which utilize functional
eXplanation economics is not among them. He holds
that this is because they have developed the laws
which other areas are still searching for. This idea
is discussed by Sherman Roy krupp in "Equilibrium

1+8

Functionalism and Induction

It should be rather clear by now that this
hypothesis of self-regulation is the same as the postulate
that nature is uniform. This idea was discussed at some
length in the first chapter. The idea that item 1. in
system s, in the past, has functioned in manner X and
will continue to do so in the future is the same as
saying that nature has been uniform in the past, is
uniform in the present, and will continue to be uniform
in the future. Indeed Brown and Ghiselli write that "the
utilization of functional analysis . . . is predicated
upon the postulate of the uniformity of nature."28
This, as was shown in the first chapter. is not
justified. There is simply no way of proving this
postulate. It must be taken on faith. One must
assume that nature is uniform.

Raising again the question we opened with: now

do the social sciences handle the inductive problem? We
may now answer that functionalism copes with this problem

by assuming that nature is uniform. It assumes that if a

 

Theory in Economics and in Functional Analysis as Types

of EXplanation." Functionalism in the Social Sciences. as
firupp points out, economics has much to lend to the other
social sciences since it has developed analytic and

systematic methods more than any of the other social sciences.

8Clarence a. brown and mdwin E. Ghiselli,

Scientific Method in Ps cholo . (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Co.. 19335. p. 35.

49

certain item. e.g.. witchcraft. incest taboos. etc..
function in a certain manner in society A, B. and C, this
item if found along with many similar conditions. in
society D. will perform the same function. Functionalism
assumes that time and place will not drastically

alter things. To 2.10.12 this it has been shown that
law-like generalizations would be needed. in

order to have law-like generalizations Chem

have uniformity. Functionalism has never actually
reached this point. It assumes nature to be

uniform. This is how functionalism circumvents

the problem of going from the known cases to

unknown cases .

dmpiricism

One of the difficulties with methodological
problems is that the terminology differs widely
from writer to writer. The social sciences are
especially guilty of this confusion. Not only is
technique confused with methodology but one type of
methodology may be confused with another type of
Quite different methodology. Also. little regard
Seems to be shown for what others in the field have
done before. Thus. one must be very careful in using
different terms. and this shall be kept in mind in

the ensuing discussion on empiricism. rlmpiricism

50

can initially be discussed by referring to the functional
method of explanation we Just finished.

It should first be made clear that I am not
using empiricism in the specific sense that it is
used to designate a school of philosophy. While
parts of this may sound very similar to work done
by the logical empiricists it should not be thought
that the entire model of eXplanation conforms
perfectly. Rather I wish to use the term empiricism
as simply one type of model used for obtaining
knowledge. Empiricism then is seen as an eXplanatory-
predictive generalization. Functionalism. as
previously discussed. if not in the exact form of
a teleological eXplanation,is at least directly related
to a teleological type of purposive eXplanation.
In contrast empiricism performs its eXplanatory-
predictive role through law-like generalizations.
This is similar. in form. to a deductive-nomological
eXplanation. In empirical generalizations X is
taken as a law. "It is [then] used as one of
the premises of an argument in which the fact to
be explained is derived as the conclusion."29 an

empirical generalization is very close to what Kaplan

 

29Robert Brown. Exglanation in Social Science.
p. 45.

51

calls a'nomic generalization. 30 One difference

though is that an empirical generalization does not
have to be derivable from other laws. It may be
derived solely on the basis of eXperience. and not
related to any grand theory. many people. Kaplan
amongst them. are quite displeased with "mere empirical
generalizations" and feel that they are not worthy

of one's time. This seems to be somewhat naive.

Social science is not so far advanced. nor perhaps

is any other science that it can find no use in mere
empirical generalizations which are unrelated to

a grand theory.
This whole notion of theory is one of the

most confusing and misunderstood topics in social
science literature. There are at least three
different senses in which it is found. It is often
used to refer to an explanation which is untested

and whose truth status is questionable. At

other times theory refers to a rule. or a set of rules.
which are opposed to practice. In the third sense in
which it is found it refers to a set of procedural
'rules which contain a schema for terminology

and classification. It is this last meaning of theory

 

304Abrahem Kaplan. The Conduct of Inquiry:
Methodology for Behavioral Science. p. 9 .

52

which has the most usefulness for our purposes. but
it also seems to be the least used meaning of the word.
Social scientists use the term quite indiscriminately
and with little regard for consistency. It is for
this reason I will not look at theories. per £2. for
to do so would only result in undue confusion (and
in an area which needs little more). To attempt
to clarify the situation would be beyond the scope
of this work.

When eXplanation takes the form of an
empirical generalization it usually takes the
form of a hypothesis. Brown and Ghiselli explain
the hypothesis in the following manner.

A hypothesis is a proposition about factual
and conceptual elements and their relationships
that projects beyond known facts and eXperiences
for the purpose of furthering understanding.

It is a conjecture or best guess which involves

a condition that has not yet been demonstrated

in fact. but that merits eXploration. It

may be framed as a potential solution to a

problem. or as an eXplanation of some unknown

fact. It may describe an element or a

relationship which. if found true would by

logical inference ofger support to some

eXplanation e e e e

One problem enters at this point to further

complicate the issue. This is the difference
between a hypothesis and a tendency statement. It

is impossible "to determine by simple inSpection

 

31Clarence w. Brown and Edwin E. Ghiselli.
Scientific Method in Psychology. p. 153.

53

whether a sentence . . . is habitually beterpreted
by economists as a universal hypothesis about all
countries. or as a tendency whose limitations

32

are well known." One of the major reasons for this
source of confusion is that "it is always
possible for investigators to choose between
stating their hypotheses in a simple form that may
mislead outsiders and stating them in a more
complicated and accurate fashion which enlightens the
bystander while inconveniencing the worker."33

The derivation of the term empirical comes
from the next stage of this process of the inquiry.
The verification of the hypothesis depends on empirical
evidence. How the hypothesis came into being falls in
the context of discovery and need not concern us here since
we are mainly concerned with the validation of knowledge
claims. In this process of verification of the tentative.
or suggested. hypothesis the social scientist must
turn to empirical evidence. haufman stresses the
importance of the empirical evidence and writes of
two levels of clarity in understanding the meaning
of the methods of empirical science. only the

first of which will be immediately discussed.

 

32Robert Brown. Explanation in Social
Science. p. 155.

33
Ibid.

54

1. The first is reached as soon as it is realized
that knowledge of reality is acquired through
systematic observations and their interpretation
in terms of theoretical principles.

2. The second is reached when the process of
inquiry is freed of all interpretations
that ascribe to its results an 'absolute'

validity traflscending possible human
eXperience.3

UiRenzo similarly writes that "an adequate
and complete eXplanation in the behavioral sciences
must in some manner be one of an empirical nature.
one whose validity and precision may be establiShed
through empirical verification."35 This point has
been stressed far too little in the social sciences.
Even though it seems obvious enough many social
scientists go off creating deductive systems using
Euclid's system of geometry as a model. Seldom
do they stop to consider the difference
between a social order and a triangle.

The major difference is that in mathematics the
propositions are true or false independent of empirical

existence. A triangle exists by definition even though

 

v“ -.‘

3uFelix naufman. Methodology of the bocial
sciences. (New Xork: The humanities Press. 1958). p. 13.

35Gordon J. Dinenzo. "Ioward szlanation in

the behavioral sciences." Concepts. Theorngand
_QXQlanation in the Behavioral Sciences. Gordon J.
.Diaenzo (ea.). TNew York: Random House. 1966). p. 251.

hobert Merton in Social Theory and Social
science. talks about the empirical verification of
hypotheses also. rhis at first may seem to pose a
problem as to which category he should be placed in;

55

no person has ever perceived a true triangle. This
is usually referred to as analytic knowledge. These
sentences are true or false solely by virtue of their
form. In the social sciences the worker is dealing
with synthetic knowledge. The propositions are
(often referred to as being confirmed. or disconfirmed.
can the basis of empirical evidence. They cannot
be shown to be true or false outside of observational
support. ‘As was brought out in the section on the
luypothetico-deductive method many peOple rushed
to emulate the "true scientist" only to discover.
or worse. have not yet discovered. that two
different types of knowledge are involved. It will
suffice here to simply bring this point out
and add a note of caution for this mistake has
been made a great many times. and will doubtless“
be made many more times. Social scientists must
keep in mind the fact that they are usually
'working with synthetic knowledge. Thus. empirical
evidence is necessary for the confirmation of a
hypothesis.

As was pointed out above "failure to

(listiflhish between deductive logic in the strict

¥

:functionalist or empiricist? What he calls for though

:18 an empirical testing of "theories of the middle range."
Iln working through the larger conceptual schema he
lmaintains a more orthodox functionalist arrangement.

56

sense and the logic of scientific procedure leads to
an inadequate formulation of scientific problems.
methods and solutions."36 This is most evident when
some social scientists deal with the validation

wand disproof of hypotheses. many fail to

‘realize that a hypothesis can never be proved; proved.
that is,in the sense of a mathematical theorem.
tan.u1timate sort of proof. i.e.. good for all

times. This was kaufman's second point in the earlier
quotation. If any notion of truth is used with

a synthetic proposition,it must refer to that
propositions empirical validity. This empirical
validity cannot be substantiated to the degree

of an analytic prOposition; it is always subject

to change in the future.

What then are we speaking about when we often
note that we can base our actions on a proven hypothesis?
dssentially we are saying that it has not been
disproved. "Factual evidence can never 'prove' a
hypothesis; it can only fail to disprove it.

V‘which is what we generally mean when we say. somewhat

inexactly. that the hypothesis has been 'confirmed'

by eXperience . "37

_

36Felix Kaufman. Methodology of the Social
Sciences . p. 230.

3711.11ton Friedman. Essa s in Postive Economics.
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. 53). p. 9.

57

Brown and Ghiselli write:
Hypotheses are never proved. The term carries
the notion of 'certainty'. of 'always' or
'absolutely true.‘ That is if a proposition
is proved. then there is no further question
about its truth characteristics: it is established

for all time. 8In this sense we can never prove
a hypothesis.3

{The reason for this is that a true answer for
'today"may not be true tomorrow. despite empirical
'verification today."39 In contrast to the
functional explanation which was built on an
{assumption that tomorrow would resemble today.
empirical explanation is built upon a distrust of
nature and its patterns. Indeed DiRenzo writes
that "science must always assume a certain
cynicism regarding the reliability of its

answersflm'O

gzplanation and Prediction

It should be evident that empirical eXplanation
is very close to providing a causal explanation
for phenomena. As was pointed out earlier it is

an attempt to explain through the use of law-like

‘

38 Clarence w. Brown and Edwin E. Ghiselli.
Scientific Method in Psychology. p. 171.

39 Gordon J. DiRenzo. "Toward EXplanation in
the Behavioral Sciences. " p. 258.

“0 Ibid.

58

generalizations. This is most important for it
seeks to move social science away from the pure
descriptive type of activity that often passes for
eXplanation. "EXplanation is often contrasted with
description. as telling us. not merely what happens
but why. To explain a fact or a law is to give
ta reason for it . . . ."l’1

This brings us then to the predictive
power of empirical generalizations. we must keep
in mind that a hypothesis is only tenative and can
never be fully accepted. Milton Friedman argues
that "the only relevant test of the validity of a
hypothesis is its predictions with experience."“2
DiRenzo also writes that "the validity and the adequacy
of an explanation can be demonstrated by its
predictive power.”3 Thus. if the hypothesis
enables us to make successful predictions this

fact may be seen as another piece of evidence

which further confirms the hypothesis.

 

nlAbraham kaplan. The Conduct of Inquiry:
_§ethodology for Behavioral Science. p. 329.

“Zailton Friedman. Essays in Positive
Economics. p. 8-9.

“3Gordon J. Diflenzo. "Toward Explanation in
the Behavioral Sciences." p. 251.

59

Friedman argues that it is by the criterion of
predictive power that a science of economics can be
Judged. He feels that the ultimate goal of a science
should be the development of hypotheses that yield valid and
meaningful predictions about phenomena not yet observed.

Its task is to provide a system of
generalizations that can be used to make correct
predictions about the consequences of any change
in circumstances. Its performance is to be Judged
by the precision. scOpe. and conformity pith
experience of the predictions it yields.

It should be quite evident that prediction about
unknown states is quite important to an empirical mode
of explanation. indeed it almost becomes central to the

Operation of this type of explanation.

Empirical EXplanation and Induction
It should be rather clear that all of the

above has really constituted a hypothetico- deductive
method of operating with the problem of induction.
The hypothesis is formed on the basis of eXperience
with some empirical data and is accepted. at

least for a time. as being true. This statement

is then regarded as having predictive value and by

 

“unilton Friedman. Essays in Postive
Economics. p. 4.

60

careful observation it is determined whether the
predictive statement turned out to be true.
in the empirical model for eXplanation.
as in the hypothetico-deductive system. prediction
is of central importance. also the notion of a
hypothesis never being found true. but only highly
confirmed is common to the two. Another idea
found in both is that the establishment of a
hypothesis at one time will not prevent its
refutation at a later time. The interesting
thing is that few social scientists refer to this
type of explanation as the hypothetico-deductive
type of explanation and even fewer view it as having
manything to do with the problem of induction as formulated
‘by Hume. At times people elaborate on the model
of the hypothetico-deductive pattern and then
refer to it as a straight deductive system.”5
ZDhis is due. in great part. to the great lack
<>f SOphistication which many social scientists
Fiave in dealing with methodological problems. many
éazre highly skilled in techniques of data-gathering
and.analyzing; and these tools are used to great

1DGBnefit today. These tools often seem to be used with

_‘

“Shelvin harx commits this error in a chapter
2F311. methodology. "The General nature of Theory Construction."
.giiggeories in Contemporary Esychology. (New York: The
"lacmiilan Co.. 1963). p. 1?

61

little understanding of the methodology implicit

in them. Nonetheless it is quite significant that

many social scientists make use of a hypothetico-

deductive pattern of explanation as a means of

«overcoming the inductive problem raised by David

Hume .

Chapter 3

The New Social Studies
and Induction

Having now looked at the problem of induction,
.and how the social scientist works with this problem,

‘we turn our attention to how the new social studies

«deals with this phase of methodology. In the last

'chapter we noticed that the social scientist is
.seldom very concerned with the underlying philosophical

jproblems in his discipline. Kaplan has written

‘that this detachment between problems of a
philosophical nature and how research actually

ggets done is characteristic of philOSOphical methodology
"It affects science only very indirectly."1 Social
studies being one step removed from the social
sciences feels the effect of phiIOBOphical problems

eatren less.
Thus it should be of little suprise to

find out that the various programs in the new

SOcial studies seem to be little concerned with

1Abraham Kaplan. The Conduct of Inquiry;
.‘Methodologz for Behavioral Science. p. 23.

62

63

the problem of induction. Of course. different

projects. and people. handle it differently. Just

as they are aware of the problem to a greater or

lesser extent. One of the most interesting items

must be the fact that the problem is dealt with

at all. even if in an obtuse manner. In the

early stages of this inquiry whenever I explained
how I wished to look at how the new social studies
dealt with the problem of induction most philosophers
and methodologists would shake their heads and

explain that the problem was probably not dealt

1with at all. While it is not true that the

problem is totally neglected. it is relegated to

23 rather low level of priority in many of the

Imaterials.
Part of this is due to the nature of

the newer social studies programs themselves.

They are usually a Joint venture between social

scientists and educators. Since neither one of

these groups are usually overtly concerned with
problems of methodology it should be eXpected

that these new programs might also reflect this

lack of concern. Of course this is not equally

t"I'ue of all programs. Actually at this point we

are almost twice removed from the original problem.

6“

The problem of induction is philosOphical in nature
and problems of this sort. as was pointed out.
affect the social scientist only indirectly. Then.
as programs have been traditionally formulated

for public schools the social scientist has been
only indirectly involved.(this has changed somewhat
in the last ten years. but still not totally).

Thus by the time social studies materials are
released to educators,we are two steps removed,

not only from the problem itself. but also from
people who might be familiar with this material.
‘This is not as it should be and educators must
'become more involved in the philosophical
:foundations of the disciplines they are teaching.
(Dne could almost make a case for the argument that
:aecondary school teachers should be more faminar
vvith this material than the field researcher,

something this writer does not intend to do

here.

Since to look at all of the programs.
and leaders. which come under the rubric new
social studies would prove to be an impossible task I
have selected a few which seem to be representative
of the field. It is a slightly ironic twist that

in a critique of induction,as used by secondary

65

school social studies,that at this point we suffer from
the same problem of induction. We must select a

sample from the total population. which hopefully

is somewhat represenhtive of the whole. This has

been done on the basis of attempting to look at a
broad selection of the various types of material
available for today's achools.

If one person must be labled as the major
figure in the new social studies most peOple would
eagree on Edwin Fenton. Thus the inclusion of his
writings becomes mandatory. Likewise. Byron Massialas

Imust be considered as one of the maJor figures in

'the new social studies programs. It was the book.
IInguiry in Social Studies. co-authored with C.

:Benjamin Cox. which was one of the first of the new

rmethods books on the market.

Another important aspect of the new programs
knas been the addition of social scientists from
the various disciplines to the groups which develop
the various curriculums. This has usually been
IDEItterned after the pioneering efforts in physics.
Eiilthough certain variations can be found. From
‘31113 type of arrangement I have selected portions
or the materials developed by the American

Anthropological Association. and several units of

66

of the material developed by the American Sociological

Society will be examined. In addition the geography

course which has been Jointly deveIOped by the
Joint Committee on Education of the Association
of American Geographers and the National Council
for Geographic Education will be looked at.

One of the most important developments
in social studies education has been the projects
:run by the various universities and funded by

the Cooperative Research Branch of the Department

<3! Health. Education. and Welfare. Here it is

impossible to make any generalizations because

ishe materials range from elementary to secondary

aschools and also from entire social studies

«caurriculums to single courses of study. Even the

'tzerm "structure of the discipline" varies from

one project to another. With this lack of the

1t11e possibility of generalization in mind we will
3L<>ok at how the project at Harvard University

dealt with the problem of induction.

One of the most consistent cries. heard
r‘I‘om the very beginning of this new interest in
the social studies. was the need for evaluation

5113:! a ready index of the efforts of the new

Prosrams. To this end Irving Morrissett and his

6?

associates have developed the Curriculum Materials
Analysis System. By looking at an instrument designed
to evaluate the new social studies programs it

should become much more evident as to how much the
problem of induction is on the minds of the

social studies educators.

Edwin Fenton

Professor Fenton must be considered one
of the leading figures in the new social studies.
From an early interest in secondary school social
studies he became involved. as co-director. in the
Social Studies Curriculum Development Center at
Carnegie Institute of Technology(now Carnegie—Mellon).
Today he has to his credit a high school social
studies program. and materials for a college
course in the methods of teaching secondary school
social studies. One of the problems with
attempting to analyze any materials produced by
a team of people is that one is never too clear
about what has been written by whom. In this
instance I have simply decided to limit my critique
to those materials and publications which bear
the name of Edwin Penton. There is no doubt that

he had a great deal of responsibility for

68

all the Carnegie-Mellon materials. but so also did
a great many others. Since it is impossible to
separate the work of Alfred Hall. or John Good from
that of Edwin Fenton I will look only at
material Fenton has personally authored. This
poses no real problem as he has written a fair
amount. and is rather explicit in describing
how he personally feels the social studies should
be taught.

when Fenton uses the term induction he
means the type of argument which goes from the
specific to the general and is nondemonstrative.
In this scheme the important thing is that the
teacher ask the proper analytical question. Fenton
writes that "the type of questions a teacher asks
as he leads a student to look at the logical
implications of his position holds the key to success."2
.As the student becomes more skilled in the process
<>f inductive inquiry the teacher becomes less
important. Fenton believes that "a student
lsnows how to use analytical questions ass part of

izhinking only when he can do so independently."3

 

2
Edwin Fenton. The New Social Studies. (New
York: Holt. Rinehart and Winston. I96? 5. p. 573.

3Ibid.. p. 48.

69

For Fenton the structure of a discipline is the
"analytical questions which historians and social
scientists put to data in order to make it meaningful."u
This is quite different from what others in social
studies education mean when they refer to the
structure of a discipline. Without going into
too much detail it can simply be said that many
others see structure as being the main body of concepts
and generalizations which make up the discipline.
For our purposes the most important thing about
.Fenton's definition is that these analytical
questions generate hypotheses.5 Fenton is not
particularly clear on what exactly constitutes
a hypothesis. Nonetheless one could not be too
far wrong in assuming that he intends nothing
unusual here from the definition we gave in
chapter two.

The next step is the validation. or confirmation.
<>f the hypothesis. Fenton considers this to be a
wrery important idea.

The development and validation of
hypotheses constitute the heart of the mode
of inquiry in both history and the more rigorous

 

“Edwin Penton. "History in the New Social Studies."
Social Education. May. 1966. p. 326.

SIbId.

 

7O
6

social sciences.

The social studies projects devote
much of their efforts to teaching the rules
by which social scientists verify. modify.
or reject hypotheses.7

A well trained student ought to be
able to state specifically the steps required
in the process of developing and validating
a hypothesis.

we increase our store of useful
knowledge in both our personal and professional
lives by degeloping and validating new
hypotheses.
From the above quotes it should be quite
clear that Fenton definitely believes that there
is a logic to the development of hypotheses. Not
all people would agree that there is a logic to
the development of hypotheses that can be taught.
but this is not our concern here. Rather. we are

interested in how Fenton views the logic of

validation. Fenton is never clear on this point.

Ibid.
7Edwin Fenton. The New Social Studies.
1:. 15.
8
Edwin Fenton. Teaching the New Social
EStudies in Secondar Schools: An Inductive A roach.
(New York: Holt. RineEErE and winston. T5665. p. {38.
9Edwin Fenton. Teacher's Guide for

Three Ex erimental Unit . (New York: Holt. Binehart
Etna HinsEon. T9655. p. g.

71

After giving validation of hypotheses a place of
importance in the course of study he moves on to
other aspects of the curriculum. Even when he
gives sample lessons it is still almost impossible
to determine what exactly is meant by the logic of
validation. This weakness occurs in all of his
writings. One must agree with Penton that the
process whereby social scientists modify. verify
or reject hypotheses are important. but one would
prefer that this receive more clarification.

The closest Penton comes to elaborating on this
issue is when he lists the "Steps in a Node of Inquiry

1° The last item in his list of

for Social Studies:"
six steps is

6. Evaluating the hypothesis in light of
the data 0

a. Modifying the hypothesis. if necessary.

(1) Rejecting a logical implication
unsupported by data.

(2) Restating the hypothesis.
b. Stating a generalization.
From this it must be surmised that Fenton
is using the hypothetico-deductive model of explanation.
lie goes from the hypothesis back to the data in search

—_‘

10Edwin Penton. The New Social Studies.
13. 16-17.

72

of confirming evidence. From this step one then

decides what to do with the hypothesis. It may

be modified. accepted. or rejected. Fenton is not

too clear on either the status of a hypothesis

which has been confirmed or one which has been rejected.
He does not discuss the notion that a hypothesis

is never fully confirmed - confirmed to the

extent that we may have fully guaranteed results.

Nor is he clear on when we should reject a

hypothesis.

This comes from his apparent lack of concern
about the nature of evidence. and the place of
unobserved instances when one makes a generalization.
It is extremely difficult to find an instance where
Fenton discusses the nature of future cases in a
law-like generalization. Neither does he talk of
the difficulties of going from a sample to the
lentire population of whatever one is discussing.
I?enton looks at the process of validation as being
tsomething that is not too difficult. at least he
agives this impression. As we have previously shown
tihough. it is extremely difficult. Fenton does
trot.mention. or even allude to. the problem with
induction that Hume formulated. Even though he

3.5! using a hypothetico-deductive mode of explanation

73

he does not bring this out. nor does he clearly

explain why one why one uses such a pattern of eXplanation.
While Fenton does speak of methodology

he does so in such an imprecise manner so as to

be of limited utility. If one is going to

utilize the methodology of the social sciences

in the teaching of the social Studies it should

not be simplified to such an extent that it does

an injustice to the magnitude of the problems

involved. To simplify the nature of methodology so

that it looses all meaning is to be guilty of a
practice which has been going on for a long time
in the schools. I will return to this same
point in the next chapter after looking at some
other material in the new social studies to see

what they do with the same material.

Byron Massialas
Another individual who has achieved a certain
degree of prominence in the new social studies is
Byron Massialas. Unlike Fenton. he has not been
connected with Project Social studies. but rather
has become prominent more on the basis of his
writings. Massialas prefers the term inquiry to

truatLOf induction. or analytic question. and draws

7“

on the work of John Dewey.11 This is well demonstrated
in his work,and he is very thorough in his explanation
as to what constitutes an inquiry approach. If
one were inclined to complain at the free and easy
use of terms by Edwin Fenton then Byron Massialas
might prove to be much more enjoyable. not to mention
his being more informative. In Massialas's main
book. Inguigz in the Social 5tudies.12 he makes
the probabilistic nature of induction(inquiry) very
clear. Also. rather than lightly dismiss the problem
of induction he feels it‘mggt be dealt with. This
is probably best done. according to Massialas. by
the rigor with which students analyze problems.

Massialas works within a definite empiricist
‘framework. and is skeptical of the orderliness of

'the universe.

Contrary to an accepted myth. science makes
no assumption of an absolutely orderly
universe. were this the case. scientists
could state their findings in mgre
definitive terms than they do.

Tile problem of making an inference from the sample

‘

11One book's influence seems especially strong.
frruat is John Dewey's How We Think. (D.C. Heath and Co..

1933).
1szron G. Massialas and C. Benjamin Cox.

Lnguirz in Social Studies.
131bid.. p. 92.

75

to the pepulation. or the process of inferring

something from a number of known cases to the

unknown cases. is also dealt with. This presents

itself as a problem in the formulation of laws.

The problem is that
the exact nature of the law will never be
known for certain since all possible cases and
instances can never be accounted for. while
science and the scientific method yield
reliable knowledge. both the conclusions and
the methods are open-ended and self-correcting -

i.e.. they are su?&ect to continuous revision
and confirmation.

CPhis represents one of the clearest statements that
zmight be formed in social studies on the nature
<3f the hypothetico-deductive approach to the
iqnductive problem. That Hassialas is utilizing
tJue hypothetico-deductive method should be quite
cibvious. since he seems to emphasize the idea
that an answer may never become true. but only
knighly confirmed. Also. the fact that an
aaqswer is always subject to continuous revision

11‘ some of the empirical facts change is

t3Jr'pical of the hypothetico-deductive solution to
the inductive problem.

For Massialas, a hypothesis "is the primary.

dGCIarative general statement of eXplanation or

——__

Ibid.

 

76

solution . . . . "15 Working from this the
student collects and arranges his data to see whether
or not the hypothesis is tenable. This data
which is marshaled is'offered as evidence to
support. qualify or refute the hypothesis under
consideration."16 If the evidence is generally
supportive to the hypothesis under consideration
then a generalization is arrived at.
If the evidence marshaled for the consideration
of a hypothesis is largely supportive.
then the concluding generalization will
be similar or even the same as the hypothesis.
. . . if the discussion produces certain data
which is true only under qualified conditions.
then it is reconstructed so that the 17
conclusion reflects these conditions.
Most important for our analysis here is the
tentfiive aspect of the conclusion reached. To
Massialas this conclusion takes the form of a
generalization and it
represents the most tenable solution
to the problem based on all available evidence.
The generalization however is never taken to

represent a fipgl truth. Its tentative nature
is recognized.

 

15Ibid.. p. 11?.

16Ibid.. p. 115.

17
Ibid.. p. 132.

181bid.. p. 119.

77

The aspect of tentativeness is raised several times
in this book.
It must be borne in mind that the final
conclusion does not constitute an absolute -
even though all possible data have been brought
to bear on its proof - but is always considered
agaiiggmige and as an approximation of
Massialas thus offers an excellent discussion
on the problems of induction to prospective, and
also practicing, teachers. He fully explains the
nature of the problem without allowing himself
to get overwhelmed by purely technical problems.
He could,though. bring out the point that he is
using only one solution -stressing that results
may be subject to change in the future - to
the basic problem. Also,what he calls inquiry. or
induction. is only one type of probabilistic inference.
A probabilistic inference. which is nondemonstrative,
and goes from the general premise to a general
conclusion is not discussed. Neither is a type
of nondemonstrative inference which goes from a
general set of premises to a specific conclusion

discussed. Nonetheless much material is included

in this work. designed for an undergraduate methods

19
Ibid. , p. 119-120.

78

course. assuring that the future teacher receives

an adequate introduction to the problem of induction.

Anthropology Curriculum Study Project

As was mentioned earlier one of the newer
trends in education has been the partnership between
the members of various academic disciplines,
professional educators. and teachers. Thus far
this has been most benefical. not only in that
it makes social studies resemble the social
sciences. but also acquaints social scientists
with the tremendous problems educators face.
One of these groups of social scientists which
has been actively involved in this activity
imas been the anthropologists.

Anthropology has traditionally had no
place in most social studies programs so this
(group could not simply replace an old course with
a new one. To the planners of this project "it

seemed more possible to insinuate new units than

to shoulder aside courses . . . . "20 Thus.

1=kxere are a series of selected units which may

k

20Illustrative material from thgexperimental

llrait Stud 0? Earl Man. (Unit Director) Edwin S.
Bethlefsen. (Chicago: Anthropology Curriculum Study

Project). p. ii.

79

be included within prexisting courses of study.
the most obvious course being the traditional world
history.
In this section we will look at one of
units entitled "The Study of Man." which is fairly
representative of the entire project. This particular
unit deals with the bio-cultural evolution of
man and contains sections on the various kinds
of archeological evidence. types of archeological
influences. the emergence of culture. and early
develOpment of culture.
The writers of the program maintain that
the material does not conform to any special educational
formula. but rather makes use of several.
However. the most common activity is practice
in induction. With their teacher's guidance.
students are encouraged to analyze available
data and to syntheize their own conclusions. 21
They are not "told" the lfacts" of evolution.
Also predominant throughout this unit is the use
of functional analysis. While the materials are
never explicit on this point one cannot fail
to see this when reading through the materials.

Time and time again the term function arises and

it is usually used in the sense of what an item might

 

21Ibid.. p. 111.

80
possibly have contributed to the ongoingness of
a particular society. The introduction discusses
what specific facts combined with a site.
and its assemblege of artifacts. might contribute
to knowledge. The authors hold that "with information

of this sort one can be much more assured about the
correctness of inferences regarding function."22
Function is thus used in the teleological sense. and
is typical of the entire unit.

As was mentioned earlier. inductive inferences
are widely used in this program. While the probable
nature of an inductive inference is never explicitly
brought out the students ate constantly reminded of the
tentativeness of any conclusion they might reach.

You the student. have talked about some kinds
of archeologically provable facts and some
kinds of things that m b'éTrEe. but for

which Sgcheology alone can provide no absolute
proof.

Some answegfi must forever be prefixed with
"Perhaps."

One must exercise caution in intuiting beyond
the lggel of information provided by the
data.

 

22The Stud of Earl ian: Teaching Plan.
(Chicago: Anthropology Curriculum Study Project. 1966).
p. 9.

 

 

81

Due to the nature of the evidence. and the
need to interpret in the light of environmental

adaptation. one must roceed with ution in
evaluating PazeoIiEEic materials.2§

Several of the readings also go into this subject

 

more thmoughly. One such example is a reading on
archeological dating by Charles F. Herbs.27 This
reading deals with the problem of induction in
that it explains why several methods for establishing
dates must be used. It stresses the idea that if
several techniques are used. and give similar
results. then the original hypothesis regarding
an artifact may become more confirmed. or modified.
in light of the new data. This reading on dating
relies on a rather straightForward empirical
mode of explanation and in this respect is quite
different from many of the other readings. Nonetheless
it does show how one might deal with the problem
of induction.

A straight functional analysis is found

in a reading entitled "Report on Grand Central

 

26Ib1de. p. 580

27Charles F. herbs. "Dating." The Stud of
Earl: Man. (Chicago: The Anthropology Curriculum
Study Project. 19 6).

82

28
Terminal." This is an attempt to show the student

how easily a faulty generalization may be made when
only partial evidence is available. The reading
centers on some future archeologists attempting
to determine the function of pay toilets. and
how they draw wrong inferences from the data.

One exercise further demonstrates
the use of functional analysis and introduces the
notion that nature is uniform.29 The students
are asked to write a reconstruction of what life
must have been like at Torralba. an early stone
age site. They are to be reminded. by the teacher.
that some things which they have learned from
a previous reading about present day Bushman30
may be of help in writing this reconstruction.
This. in essence. is telling the student that

 

28
Leo Szilard. "Report on Grand Central
Terminal." The Stud of Earl Man. (Chicago:
The Anthropology Curriculum Study Project. 1966).
29The Study of Early Man: Teachinnglan.

p. 113.

In the second chapter of this work it
was pointed out that functional analysis is based
on the postulate that nature is uniform. To make
inferences from one society another society
one must assume that similar functions must. and
will be. fullfilled in each society.

30Richard B. Lee. "Kalahari - 1: A Site
Report.” The Study of Early Man. (Chicago: The
Anthropology Curriculum Study Project. 1966).

83

similar artifacts must have performed functions
similar to those we find in today's primitive
tribes. This is based on the assumption that
primitive societies have a certain degree of
uniformity. whether they have existed in prehistorical
times. or exist today. None of this is explicit.

but it is quite apparent upon closer analysis.

This material very clearly displays the
work of professional anthropologists. Just as functional
analysis is often combined with the empirical
testing of'certain specific hypotheses in
anthropology so also with this unit for high school
students. Also quite apparent in this unit is
the lack of explanation concerning the reason for
this combination. In this unit. as in field work,
there is really no way for establishing dates
functionally. thus one must go to an empirical mode
of explanation. After a date of origin is
suffidbntly confirmed the method of analysis
switches back to a functional analysis. what was
this tool used for? How did it contribute to the
socio-cultural complex? Indeed. one skill to be

taught in the discussion on tools is the notion

_84

that "the artifact is more meaningful when seen
as part of a once-functioning culture complex."31
Thus. there is no doubt that the student
is asked to utilize a functional mode of explanation.
As with much of the material written by anthropologists
of the functionalist approach. the postulate
that nature is uniform is not clearly stated.
From the standpoint of this analysis, the project and
the materials suffer because because of this neglect.
Failure to bring out the assumptions underlying an
inductive method of Obtaining knowledge allows the
student to arrive at faulty conclusions regarding
the possible uses of inductive reasoning. not to
mention the mistakes he may make in the subject
matter itself. The student should be told of the
assumptions underlying a functional analysis. and
he should be aware that this assumption of the
uniformity of nature is unprovable.
One point on which the project is to be
commended though is the extent to which it
explains to the student the probable nature of any
conclusion that is arrived at through inductive

inference. As was shown in the earlier quotations

 

31The Study of Early Man: Teaching Plan.

 

p. 27.

85
the student. with the help of the teacher. should
become quite aware of the inductive problem by
using this material. Nonetheless the methodological
problems inherent in a functional analysis seems
to be neglected; specifically the idea of forming
the postulate concerning the uniformity of nature.
There is a very real need to bring out the foundations

underlying this type of explanation.

High-School Geography Project

The High-School Geography Project represents
a merger between professional geographers and educators.
It began in 1961 under the sponsorship of the Joint
Committee on Education of the Association of American
Geographers and the National Council for Geographic
Education. In the early years funding came from
the Fund for the Advancement of Education and in
later years from the National Science Foundation.
The first year of the project was given to the
defining of the place of geography in the schools.
and considerations of what type of course should
exist. The next year was given to the testing of
new methods and materials developed by secondary
school teachers. aided by professional geographers.

Since that time a ten unit sequence. based on a

86
settlement theme has been developed.
One assumption that the people in this
project held from the begidlng was "that the principle
objective of a geography course should be to communicate
'the geographer's way.”32 The problem then became
one of translating the geographer's way into the
reality of a high school course. Out of this work
grew "The Settlement Theme Course Outline." one of
the earliest attempts to lay out the sequence of the
course. From the beginning the course "emphasizes
the geographer's mode of inquiry rather than his
accumulated knowledge."33 It is recognized though that
inductive modes of validation cannot make up the entire
course. Inductive approaches must be balanced with other
items in the course. After all we are interested in
seeing that the student is acquainted with induction. not
that he learn all things through an inductive mode.
The inductive approach is used in the
course whenever it is feasible. However. a
healthy balance must be struck between the
inductive and deductive. and time does not

permit thg inductive development of all
concepts. a

 

32Robert McNee. "An Approach to Understanding
the Current Structure of Geography.“ Conce ts and
Structure in the New Social Science Curricula. led.)
Irving horrisse . es La aye e. n .: ocial
Science Consortium. Inc.. 1966). P. 57.

331b1d.. p. 61.
3“Ib1d.. p. 62.

87

The actual course materials reinforce an
attitude of skepticism as to the extent to which the
course is committed to induction. In Unit 3.
"Networks of Cities." by Edward J Taaffe and Leslie
J. King, one of the activities is to look at the
population size and spacing of urban settlement in
a region. The whole exercise seems designed to
convince the student of the validity of Christaller's
central place theory.35 The various exercises.
excellent as they may be. seem designed to bring
the student to the same conclusions as the author's.
Nowhere does there seem to be room for the student to
develop his own hypothesis and attempt to validate
it. If the student does notfind the opportunity
to do this,then the problem of inductive conclusions
can have little meaning.

An optional unit on Japan. which was in its
final stages of development in the Spring of 1968,
lists one of its objectives as: "Select. analyze

and apply-data to test hypotheses."36 In fact though.

 

35A good summary of this may be found in

"Recent Developments of Central Place Theory." by
Brian J. L. Berry and William L. Garrison. Introduction

to Geo ra h : Selected Readin s. (eds.) Fred E. Dofirs and
Lawrence M. Sommers. (New Yorfi: Thomas I. Crowell Co..

1967) .

36
Ja n Teacher's Guide. (Association of
American Geographers. 19355. p. ii.

88

this unit does not approach the caliber of some of
the other material on the market. The data are
prearranged and the presentation is generally

quite superfical. Few real methodological problems
are discussed and nothing is said about the
validity of the concluding.generalization which

the student arrives at. This unit is an

excellent introduction to regional geography. but

a very questionable example of how induction should
be handled. If students are to select. analyze
and apply data to test hypotheses.the High School
Geography Project might not be an example of the
ideal introduction to the material.

Sociological Resources
for the Social Studies

Another of the current projects in the new
social studies that grew out of the concern of
practicing social scientists is the Sociological
Resources for the Social Studies(SRSS). It is an
official project of the American Sociological
Association. funded by the National Science Foundation.
Project headquarters are at 503 First National
Building. Ann Arbor. Michigan. The staff works under
the direction of Robert C. Angell of the University of

39

Michigan. The goal of SRSS is "to develop superior
instructional materials which accurately characterize
sociology as a scientific discipline and which can
easily be integrated into social studies courses

. . . in the senior high school."37 This emphasis

on integration into existing courses is somewhat
different than some of the other projects. with

the exception of the Anthropology Curriculum Study
which we looked at earlier.

One thing which the SRSS scheme allows is
for the materials to reach more students than would
be possible in any type of elective sociology course.
Throughout the various episodes38 the emphasis is
on presenting the student with an Opportunity

to experience sociology first-hand. "Students

 

37Sociological Resources for the Social Studies.

Informational Materials for the hichi n Council for
the Social Studies. (Ann Ar53r: SooIoEogy Resources
for Secondary Schools. 1967). p. i.

38The material has been produced in the
form of episodes. each one being a self-contained
set of materials designed to occupy about ten
classroom periods. Each of these episodes deals
with a limited topic to which sociology
has made a signicicant contribution. These various
episodes greatly resemble the traditional unit with
which classroom teachers are very familiar.

 

9O

participate in gathering. classifying. and manipulating

data through laboratory procedures and field Operations."39

The various episodes may be placed under five different
broad classifications. These are:

1. Methodology

2. Demography
3. Social Structure

h. Social Change. Conflict. and Deviance
5. Social Psychology

For our purpose here two episodes have

been selected: Hypothesis-Testing in the Social
Sciences. and The Difference Between Two and Three:

Family Size and Society. The first comes under the

topic of methodology and the latter under demography.
This project. as do many of the others in

the new social studies. emphasises inductive techniques.

From its inception. SRSS has emphasized inductive
procedures. both in teaching and in dealing

with sociological problems. To sociologists

and high school teachers designing our materials
we said: ' . . . all SRSS materials must be
organized around the data of actual

empirical investigations. which point R8ward
significant theoretical oonclusions.‘

For this project induction is defined as “reasoning

from the particular to the general . . . . "41

 

39SRSS. Informational Materials for the

Michiggn Council for the Social studies. p. 2.

uoIbid.. p. 3.

“Ibid.

91

They would begin the process with questions which
would lead to "thinking through to plausible

answers and getting the evidence - assembling and
analyzing the data that enable a choice among
plausible answers first preferi'adJJ‘2 This is quite
in keeping with our definition of induction that

was given earlier in this work. The main difference
is that the SRSS prefers a narrower type of
definition.

The first episode to be examined is the one

entitled The Difference Between Two and Three: Family
Size and Society. One of the stated purposes of

this episode is to illustrate "some methods and
concepts used by sociologists and demographers to

study human behavior . . . . "”3 "The teaching

strategy suggested is an igguigy approach."uu This

episode consists of two sets of exercises. The first

is

. . . designed to enable the student to see

how social standards - norms - affect not only
people's attitudes about what a good family
size is and how many children they themselves
expect to have. but also the number of children

 

uzIbid.. p. h.

u
3SRSS. The Difference Between Two and
Three: Family Size and Society; Instructor's Guide.

p. 1.
Ibid.

92
actually born.“5
The second set of exercises is set up so that
students can determine the numerical potential
of various family sizes for ggpulation and
growth in the United States.

One possible criticism that may be leveled against
this episode is the one so often made against many of the new
programs in the new social studies. A student must inquire
in such a manner so that he reaches a conclusion which
has already been designed into the material. The data
presented to the student. along with several readings seems
pointed toward getting the student to accept certain value
positions. The teacher should use this material not as
an exercise demonstrating cpen inquiry. but rather an
example of one exercise which deals with the logic of
validation. The episode rather than saying the students "will
use an inquiry approach to reach their conclusions."“7
might better state that a certain mode of inquiry (inductive)
will be used to demonstrate the logic of validation. The
purpose of this episode should be to show how inductive
validation is carried out within certain types of
explanation. This exercise is not meant to be an open-
ended type of activity which allows all manner of answers.

rather it is best used as an example of inductive explanation

working within an empirical framework.

A ‘- -__.
—

“51b1d.. p. 3.

u6Ibid.

47Ib1de. p. 20

93
This episode though does little to point out

that inductive arguments contain conclusions which

are. at best. only highly probable. It tends to leave

one with a feeling of certainty in the conclusions. The
episode also uses inquiry in the somewhat restricted

sense of an inductive argument which goes from

particular premises to a generalized conclusion. As was
earlier pointed out inductive arguments are not limited

to this one type. Another problem with this episode is

that throughout,the emphasis is on technique rather than

on methodology. The student is given a set of questionnaires
which have already been filled out by another class. and

all the student working with the episode must do is

organize the data on predesigned worksheets.“8 The data

is then transferred to worksheet 2. a predesigned graph.

The emphasis seems to be on data collection and the tabulation
of this data. Thus. even though the word inquiry is used

in defining the purpose of the episode it should be

clear that technique. as it was defined in the previous
chapter. is the proper term for this sort of

activity. Very little. if any. material is designed

to show the student the logic. or procedure. whereby

 

us"Worksheet i. to be provided by your
teacher. will enable you to conveniently summarize
the responses which the other class . . . gave to
the questionaire." The Difference Between Two and Three:

Family Size and Society. Students material. p. 3.

91}

the social scientist validates his conclusion.
Inductive problems are discussed very little; instead
the emphasis is on the utilization of demographic
techniques.
Another episode. othesis Testing in the
Social Sciences. does an outstanding job in the very
area which drew so much criticism in the previous
episode. As in the other episode the mode of explanation
is empirical. The.teacher's guide explains that
the student
will state a hypotheses. predict behavior.
construct and administer a questionnaire.
323122.2.332.Shi’izadzfihiiiiw1r W‘"°"°“"
The stated aim of this episode "is to
introduce students to one method of inquiry in the
social sciences . . . . "50 Early in the episode
the material mentions the notion of verification and
reliable knowledge. The teacher's guide points

out that "this exercise should provide a contrast

between the easy generalization of everyday life

 

“9

SRSS. R othesis Testin in the Social
Sciences: Instructoris Guide. p. I.

5°1bid.. p. 8.

 

95
and the careful (and skeptical) search for reliable
knowledge the social scientist pursues as he sets
up hypotheses as targets for testing."51
The notion of the hypothesis and its relation

to prediction is brought into the disucussion quite
early.

In a way. the statement of a hypothesis is

a prediction. The hypothesis states that

under certain conditions . . . a given variable

. . . will enable us to predict likely responses.52

One of the problems inherent in induction is

the notion of generalizing from the sample to a
population. This is always a problem in that the
generalization is not demonstrative. or necessary.
This episode asks the student "suppose we had drawn
a different sample . . . . How probable is it that
we would have obtained similar results?"53 This is
essentially the problem which Hume raised in his
writings. Here the student is asked to cope with it.
Also. the notion of induction being an argument

whose conclusion is. at best. probable. is clearly

 

511bid.. p. 10.

52Ibid.. p. 15.

531bid.. p. 31. The same material is found
on page 11 of the student's booklet.

96

brought out. The student is cautioned that he
"should always be prepared to say how probable
it is that knowledge about the part(the sample)
gives us reliable knowledge about the whole."5u
One solution that is pointed out to the student
is the commonplace practice of reporting
probability values (.05. .01. etc.) so that the
reader may draw his own conclusions. Also.
the student is cautioned that:
rAny generalization . . . would have to be
ualified b s ecif ing the conditions under
which it Holds true. An investigator should
therefore make it clear that he 3g generalizing
only to a particular population.

 

The episode ends by pointing out the
difficulty involved in stating a causal connection
between two variables. What is usually done is
a correlational study. This entire episode is an
excellent example of how the problem of induction
may be presented to students in secondary schools.
while it introduces students to techniques which
social scientists use. such as the Chi-Square. it

also deals with methodological problems. The entire

 

5“'Ibid.

55Ibid.. p. 74. The same material may
be found on page 39 of the student's material.

9?

problem of making inferences from sample to population
and the notion of the predictive value of hypotheses
are examples of this. In this episode the student
receives a complete introduction to the hypothetico-
deductive style of explanation. Thus. the student
should become quite aware of the nature of the

inductive problem.

Harvard Social
Studies Project

One of the projects funded by the Cooperative
Research Program of the United States Office of
Education was the Harvard Social Studies Project.
This program. under the direction of Donald H.
Oliver. developed a program based on the analysis
of public controversy. Its objective is
to train students to examine and analyze the
kinds of controversies that give rise to
social conflicts. The material is designed to
encourage students to consider situations and
problems in the light of social science theories
and eXplanations. The materials are now produced
by American Education Publications. 55 High Street.
Middletown. Connecticut. The material is published

in the form of case studies. each one dealing

 

98

with a problem. or value dilemma, which has
persisted throughout history and across cultures.

The object of each case study "is to gather
detailed information about a relatively small class
of phenomena. such as the growth of a corporation.
the decision to drop the atomic bomb. the living
conditions of a Negro family in an urban slum. or
the behavior of a politician seeking election."56
It is then "assumed that examination of a limited
incident will yield conclusions applicable to a more

e c as of incidents."57 An example of how
this is encouraged may be found in the booklet
entitled The Railroad Era: Business Competition
and the Public Interest. After examining the railroads
at the turn of the century. the student is given
an analogous case on tevelsion regulation.

It is interesting that the material points
out thatX:inductive(or 'discovery') approach allows
students to search for and reach conclusions on

58

their own . . . . " As we talked about in the

first chapter. methods of discovery. and processes

 

 

56Donald H. Oliver and Fred M. Newman. (eds.).
Cases and Controversy: Guide to Teaching.(rev. ed.).
(Middletown. Conn.: American Education Publications.

1968). p. 8.

99

of validation are two different things. Discovery
‘of new knowledge is not the same as the justification
of an inductive inference. yet here the
author seemsto be using the two interchangeably.
It could well be that they are stating their belief
that there is an inductive method of discovery.
or more likely. the authors are simply using
the most popular word in the new social studies.
The complaint is not with their methods. but rather
with the looseness which they give to
the term induction. It would have been much
better had they stayed with the term discovery.
for it describes the approach better and would
have resulted in less confusion.

The materials which are meant to explain
this project point out that ”it is important
. . . to distinguish between two ways of applying
the approach."59 i.e.. open-ended and closed inductive
discussion(either of which might better be termed
discovery approaches). In the closed approach
the teacher already has in mind the knowledge.
structures or conclusions the students are expected

to discover. This might also be called contrived

 

591bid.

100

discovery. Since comments were made earlier on

this type of activity. any further treatment of this
would simply be repitious. Granted that closed
inductive approaches may well have a place in social
studies education. but it is questionable whether

it should so much emphasis.

The c en-ended approach occurs when the
teacher Has not previously decided what

knowledge or conclusions the students are
supposed to gain from the study or a case.
The teacher himself is willing to entertain
whatever issues and approaches the students
suggest. so long as these issues and 60
approaches seem serious and relevant.

The materials in the Harvard Project all seem designed
to be used with this open-ended approach and the
authors seem to stress the idea of value-oriented
questions which cannot be absolutely resolved.

While not a part of the AEP materials.
Teaching Public Issues in the High School.61
did grow out of the Harvard Social Studies Project.
The authors point that there are three levels of
disagreement in the study of public issues.

1. The values surrounding the disagreement
are in conflict.

2. The facts around the conflict are not
in agreement.

 

Ibid.
61Donald H. Oliver and James P. Shaver. Teachigg

Public Issues in the High School. (Boston: Houghton
M1 f in C00. 9 0

62Ibid.. p. 89.

 

101

3. The meaning of the words surrounding
the conflict need clarifying.

In elaborating on the second category above.
the authors discuss one aspect of the problem of
induction.
Whether or not a claim is actually true
depends upon the quality and quanity of
evidence supporting it. Because evidence
is always limited we never know for sure
3°§22§1§t2i§‘?.12333“““1’ “m“
Based on what evidence is available we
may refer to a knowledge claim as a fact. probably
true. false. beyond reasonable doubt. probably
false. and doubtful or controversial. It is this
problem of ascertaining what a knowledge claim's
status is which helps in the clarification of
public issues. Thus. we can easily see how the
problem of induction enters into the handling
of values. Unless one is reasonably sure of the
factual areas in a disagreement then the
value conflict cannot go to another level. Oliver
and Shaver seem to be working in a kind of empirical

framework when talking of this problem. and the
hypothetico-deductive model for explanation

 

63ibid.. p. 110.

102

is the one used. The idea of never attaining

perfect certainty and also of a gradient of

confidence is common to both the Harvard materials and

what we have been calling the hypothetioo-deductive approach.
In the AEP materials. the problem of

ascertaining the status of a knowledge claim is

brought out to the student when he is asked

questions concerning the £2225 of a case. This

is done before the student is asked questions

concerned with valuation and normative standards.

This then is where the inductive problem enters

into the Harvard materials. It is not referred

to as such though. It might be better if they were

to simply drop the use of the term induction the way it

is now used in the materials. using instead the

term discovery. The way the Harvard Social Studies

Project now uses the word induction simply seems

to add confusion. for it is almost as if the term

induction is used solely on the basis of its popularity.

Worse yet. when they do deal with the problem of

drawing conclusions from the premises in an

inductive inference they do not mention the nature

of the problem by its proper name.

103
Curriculum Materials Analysis System

One of the problems with the new social
studies is that there is simply an overwhelming amount
of material on the market, :nore material than the
average specialist in social studies education
can ever hope to keep up with. For the classroom
teacher. or curriculum generalist the task is
doubly difficult. One can well imagine the difficulty
of an assistant superintendent of schools attempting
to find out what programs are available for possible
use in his school district. To simply know what is
available though is only half the task for then
he must look through all of this material to locate
what each course of study attempts to do. In an
effort to help educators in this task Irving Morrissett
and his associates have developed a Curriculum
Materials Analysis System (CHAS).

The earliest version was simply a "brief
mimeographed form containing a dozen or so

questions."6u .After being revised and enlarged

 

éulrving Morrissett. w.w. Stevens. Jr..

and Celeste P. Noodley. "A Model for Analyzing

Curriculum Materials and Classroom Transactions." p. 2.
This is due to be published in the 1969

National Council for the Social Studies Tearbook.

The page numbers shall refer to the pages as

they appeared in the draft. and may not correlate

with those as they finally appear in the

published edition which should appear in the

fall of 1969.

104

several times an early version was published in
Social Education.65 It is worth looking at the

CHAS to see if it is capable of handling the problem
of induction in its evaluations since one possible
use for the CHAS is "to introduce teachers to new
ideas and approaches in curriculum material . . . . "66
If the CHAS is to fill this aim then it becomes
pertinent to the central issue of this thesis:

Are teachers and students being introduced to the
problem of induction through the new social studies
materials? Since it is easy to envision the CHAS
becoming widely used. whether or not it deals with
the inductive problem. it is imperative that we
examine it. If it does not critique the new programs.
or courses of study. on how it uses induction. then
teachers will miss an opportunity for possible
eXposure to an important philosOphical problem.

The CHAS has six major headingsx67

 

5Irving Morrissett and w.w. Stevens. Jg..
"Curriculum Analysis." Social Education. Oct.. 19 7.

p. 483.

66Irving Morrissett. w.w. Stevens. Jr..

and Celeste P. Hoodley. "A Model for Analyzing
Curriculum Materials and Classroom Transactions."

p. 3.
67Ibid.. p. 27.

105

1. Descriptive Characteristics
2. Rationale and Objectives
3. Antecedent Conditions

4. Content
5. Instructional Theory and Teaching Strategies

6. Overall Iudgments
what we wish to look at could come under

either Content or Instructional Theory and Teaching
Strategies. but the previous uses of the CHAS

have remained fairly close to teaching strategies
in the section on Instructional Theory. The CHAS as

a whole does not really concern itself with problems of an
epistemological nature. Rather. the section on
content might be more pertinent to our purpose.

The entire section as it appears in the basic

68
instrument is reproduced below.

4.0 Content
#.1 Cognitive structure
“.11 Overall view of subject
4.111 Major concepts(or schemes. or
conceptual atructures. or
fundamental ideas)
“.112 Major processes of the discipline

“.113 Facts

68Herle M. Knight and James O. Hodges.
"Curriculum Materials System:.A summary of EXperience."
Social Science Education Consortium. May. 1969. p. 1.

106

“.12 Curriculum subject content
“.121 Major concepts
“.122 Major processes
“.123 Facts

“.2 Affective content
“.21 ‘Author's views of affective content
of the discipline(s)
“.22 Curriculum content
“.3 Psychomotor skills
“.31 Gross muscular use. conditioning.
and coordination
“.32 Fine muscular use. conditioning.
and coordination
The National Council for the Social Studies Yearbook
for 1969 has a chapter on the CHAS and shows examples
on how the CHAS has been used. In this chapter
the Harvard Social Studies Project and ECON 12
(San Jose State College. Project Social Studies).
are used as examples of how the CHAS “.1 (Cognitive
Structure) has been used. It is pointed out that
ECON 12 "discusses the processes used by the economist
and indicate the outcome of doing economics."69
This then could be an appropiate place to ask
how the materials handle the problem of induction.
although in this case it is not done. The phrase

"discusses the processes used by the economist"

69Irving Morrissett. mu. Stevens. Jr..
and Celeste P. woodley. "A Model for.Analyzing
Curriculum Haterials and Classroom Transactions."

1). 35.

10?

is really too broad to allow any insight into the
material. Nonetheless the possibility for doing an
adequate job exists. Perhaps “.112(MaJor 9rocesses
of the discipline) might be the most appropriate
place to discuss the inductive problem.

Since all of the social sciences use

induction. and many of the new social studies do
also. then this might well be the best place for
such a critique.

Simply because the one example we looked at
fails to examine the problem is no reason for feeling
that the instrument can not handle the inductive
problem. It must be remembered that the CHAS
is a tool. a tool that is used by people.

If the people who are using the tool are aware

of the nature and problems of induction

then the analysis will demonstrate this.

Likewise if the people doing the analysis are

not aware of the problems one may encounter

in using inductive arguments then the final analysis
will also show this. In neither case is the tool
the responsible agent.

At present the Social Science Education

Consortium has "approximately 1“O analyses of about

. i.l'.§ I"

106
25 different curriculum units or packages."70
These no doubt vary quite widely in quality and
scope. To evaluate the CHAS at this date on what
it has done and how it has been used. would be an
injustice. hather. it would be much better to
concern ourselves with what the instrument is
capable of. In this aspect the CHAS is fully capable
of critiquing a social studies curriculum on the
basis of how it handles induction. Indeed, it
might well present an excellent opportunity to
make teachers aware of the problem encountered when

dealing with inductive inferences.

 

70Ibid.. p. 7. In addition to the ones
mentioned in the text four others were examined.
These were the Curriculum Materials Analysis of the
Anthropology Curriculum Study Project by Gary S.
Stainbrook. Aubrey Hillman. and Anthony DeStefanis
(CHAS #76), and an analysis of the same materials by
Robert Janke (CHAS #7). Also two analyses of the
High School Geography Project were examined; one by
Robert w. Ahrens et. a1. (CHAS #52) and one by John
Trujillo, Hay Ostrom. and Terry Masters (CHAS #85). The
two dealing with the Anthropology Curriculum Study Project
examine how the materials cope with the problem of
verification under the section on Major Processes of the
Discipline (“.112). The two dealing with the High School
Geography Project do not discuss this problem. This
should serve as a reminder that the CMAS is only a tool
and that what is done with it is largely dependent upon
the person using it.

Chapter “

Summary and
Conclusions
We have now viewed induction. and how

it is used in the social sciences as well as in the
new social studies. We found that the only conclusion
that one can come to is that presentations of the
inductive problem vary widely. Another conclusion
that could be reached is that almost all of the programs
might be revised so as to do a better job on this
inductive problem. If the programs are going to
call themselves inductive. and utilize inductive
inferences. then they ought to acknowledge. and
cope with, the problems of verification of inductive
conclusions. Also students should be introduced
to the nature. and attempted solutions. of this
problem. To not do this. is to fall into a
trap which has ensared many educators. Picking
up a title of a method and tacking it on things
which are quite different from what the original
was. Educators are often very guilty of believing

in some type of verbal magic. At times we do not

109

110

seem to care as much about what we are doing as
we do about whether or not it sounds good. Induction
is not immune to this ailment.

All of the projects in the new social studies.
for instance. identify induction as being the
type of argument which goes from a set of specific
premises to a general conclusion. This is
different from the way people involved in the
philosophy of science define induction. As was
shown in the first chapter. induction today is
regarded as a nondemonstrative. ampliative
inference. It may consist of an argument whose
premises are either general or specific and whose
conclusion may also be general or specific.

Host important though is the nature of the conclusion;
it is at best only probabilistic. This is where much of

the material in the new social studies meets its downfall.
The nature of the conclusion is too often left in

such a manner that the student may well think
that it may not be subject to change in the

future.

Of course this quality varies from one

set of materials to another and in one case (the

111

Sociological Resources for the Social Studies)
varies widely with the set of materials. Edwin
Fenton is one individual who is seemingly guilty of
this error of omission. As was pointed out earlier.
it is difficult to be explicit about him because of
the vagueness of his own writing. Nonetheless
his writings do almost nothing to bring out.
and make explicit. the tentative nature of an
inductive conclusion. Even in history. which is
essentially a type of empirical research endeavor
(any conclusion is subject to constant revision.
or rejection on the basis of new evidence which
might be discovered). inductive inferences are
important. This is because our knowledge is
incomplete and as new documents (empirical evidence).
become available a conclusion must be revised.
This is what is meant by saying that a conclusion
is tentative. This is where Edwin Penton is rather
weak.

He does little to bring this out. just
as he also fails to be specific enough on the
nature of a hypothesis. Fenton completely neglects

to bring out the predictive nature. or uses. of

112

a hypothesis. Milton Friedman. as we saw in
chapter two. considers this most important. So
also does Byron Hassialas. The Sociological
Resources for the Social Studies brings this out
quite well in the episode on hypothesis-testing.
Indeed the idea of a hypothesis and its predictive
usages is one point which separates the

various programs in terms of quality. It is

in the handling of this aspect of induction that
one can see wide differences in the materials.

A complaint that one might well have
against the newer materials is that they do not
make explicit what style of explanation they
are using. i.e.. functionalist or empirical.

If the materials utilize one mode of explanation

little is done to point out that there are other

types of explanation. A student working with the
anthropology unit would receive a very good explanation
of a functionalist mode of operation. but would

get very little insight into the operation of an
empirical frame of reference. Perhaps by utilizing
several different sets of materials in the

organization of a course. this liability coud be

113

overcome. But this should not have to be done.
After many years of struggling with implied
political party lines (mainly conservative) in
social studies materials. we are now faced with a

seemingly hard core methodological line.

This brings us to another weak point in
almost all the new social studies materials -
methodology. The one point which the new social

studies often proclaims the loudest - "We teach

the methods of social science. not just facts." -
is often the weakest point the new materials.

Too little is done to explain to the student that
there are several types of methods at work in

the social sciences. Even the materials which

do the best jobs. such as the eplsode on hypothesis
testing. produced by the Sociological Resources
for the Social Studies. are weak. This unit
overwhelmingly consists of techniques. with

doses of methodology as needed. Little is

done to explain the difference between the two.
To confuse methodolgy with technique is to add
confusion to an area which needs little more.

Later I will discuss several ways in which teachers

11“

can familiarize themselves with these differences.
This familiarization is something that should be done
before attempting to work with the new social studies
programs

To return now to our original question:
How well do the new social studies handle induction?
We might answer that it depends. It depends on
which new programs one is talking about and
even what parts within a total program. The
picture is not really bleak for some do a very
good job of introducing the student to induction.
Others do a rather poor job. Still others
seem to call their programs inductive because it
is fashionable: the Harvard Social Studies Project

is the most notable example in this category.

Why should the student become aware
of the inductive problem?

At this point some people might be asking:
why must the student be aware of the inductive
problem? If the scientist seems to be little
bothered by it. as some claim. then why must

secondary school teachers and students be concerned

115

with Hume's formulation of the inductive problem?
Essentially thre are three reasons for this and
each of these will be developed in this chapter.
In no way does the order in which they are given
reflect the order of importance attached to them.
I am sure each person will see them in a different

order and this is quite acceptable.

The Inductive Problem Appears in the
Social Sciences and Should Therefore

Appear in Social Studies Classes.

As was pointed out earlier there is today
a great deal of emphasis on the teaching of 32!
the social scientist operates rather than Eggs
he has discovered and written about. There is
more stress on the process of social science
disciplines than just on the product.
In this process the social scientist is confronted
with the inductive problem whenever he attempts
to formulate a generalization. They have
two ways of coping with this problem depending
on the mode of explanation they are using;
i.e.. functionalist or empirical. In a functionalist

explanation it is assumed that nature is uniform

and orderly. (There is. as was earlier demonstrated.
no way of proving this.) If one is working within
an empirical framework. and using a hypothetico-
deductive model. then one assumes that the answer.

or hypothesis. is tentative and can never be
absolutely true. In either case the social

scientist is confronted with a methodological
problem. Thus if the student is to learn how the
social scientist operates within the context of
validation he must confront this problem.

Not to introduce the student to the problem
of induction. and some of the attempted solutions.
is to shortchange the student. It is to say that
one is teaching methodolgy. when in reality one
is doing no such thing. This type of activity
(pretending to do something when you really
are not) has been seen quite often in the past.
This type of education was also greatly criticised
in the past. and rightly so. We are now in the
situation of allowing the same thing to happen
to inductive approaches in the social studies.

In some cases. such as the narvard Social Studies

Project. it seems to have already taken place.

117

Teachers must be aware of proper scientific
methodology. and not allow themselves to

blindly teach the rote application of techniques.
They must fully understand. and communicate

to the student. methodological problems.

The Teachin of the Inductive Problem
may well foster a spirit of inqg;_z.

The secondary school student is too often
given answers to questions he has not formulated.
or question which he could care less about.

One of the supposed advantages of the inductive
approach is that it allows the student to formulate
his problems and work them through utilizing
inductive methods. This usually results in the
student being more motivated. since he can become
more involved in the search for a probable
answer. All this should happen. we hope.

through the utilization of inductive methods.
More than likely this will prove to be true. but
only if we actually teach inductive methodology.
and not prearranged puzzle games.

There is a definite tendency for the

 

118

materials to allow the student to inquire only so
far but that he can not avoid coming up with the
[right answer. This was the situation in the
episode on family size. produced by the Sociological
Resources for the Social Studies. which was examined
earlier. The path of inquiry. in that case.
was prearranged to such an extent that the student
could hardly miss being hit over the head with the
conclusions of the author. The student will
not get a spirit of inquiry from this type of
material. Rather. he will probably become as
bored with this material as he has been with
the traditional textbook; the one which contains
all the right answers in the teacher's edition.

Huch better is the episode on hypothesis
testing. also produced by SRSS. Here there is
no prearranged conclusion which the student
must understand. Rather. he is taught some ways
in which the social scientist goes about obtaining
reliable knowledge about society and its institutions.
From this type of material the student should
acquire an appreciation of the fact that not

all the answers are to be found in colored ink

119

in the teacher's edition of the text. The student
may well come to understand that not all questions
can be answered with definitive answers. If
the student gains an appreciation of the fact
that there is no guarantee that empirical
phenomenona will continue into the future. as
they have in the past. then he may not be so
anxious about right answers. Hopefully the student
will develOp a critical attitude toward all knowledge
claims. and he will also be better prepared to
evaluate and weigh the varying evidence. All
of this should result in a less dogmatic attitude
on the student's part toward his own. and others.
knowledge claims. This is not to say that
he should always take the position of the
extreme skeptic; rather,he must learn to walk
the narrow path between the chasms of over-
skepticism and dogmatisim.

Up to this point the discussion has been
centered on the student.1 Another benefit
that might arise by improving the materials is
that the teacher will also become more critically

minded. In order for this to happen the materials

120

must realistically cope with the inductive

problem. Some teachers are dogmatic. Often.

the materials which these teachers work with
encourages the notion that the teacher knows the
facts and all of the answers to every varying claim
that might occur in the classroom. After working
through a unit such as the one on archeology

which we previously looked at. a teacher might

be more willing to admit he does not know all

the answers. After all if the experts admit that
generalizations based on limited evidence are
difficult to make. then perhaps the classroom
teacher will find it easier to admit that he

also is fallible. In a unit such as the one on
hypothesis-testing the teacher is no better off
than the students; both are immersed in the problems
of methodology. Both are confronted with the
problem of inductive knowledge. Hopefully

both student and teacher will become more
critically minded when dealing with knowledge
claims. Both may deve10p a more skeptical attitude

 

 

121

towards claims of truth and infallible
knowledge. Both teachers and students will have
Opportunities to deve10p skills which allow them

to carefully asses evidence.

This lack of dogg%tism may carry
over 0 e a ec ive oma_g.

One very important result of the fostering
of this critical attitude is that there may be
a possible carry over into the affective domain.
Up until now only the cognitive aspect has been
discussed. for it is our main concern here.
Nonetheless I fail to see how a critical attitude
towards knowledge claims could not fail to
have some effect on the student's assessment of
normative claims. If one is trained to carefully
evaluate the evidence and learns to be wary of
any one correct answer in the cognitive domain,
it would be unusual for the student not to
carry some of this skill over into the affective
domain. He would thus become more tolerant

of other systems of valuation which differ from

his own.

 

122

This idea of integration between the
cognitive and affective domains is brought out
by Martin Scheerer.

Behavior may be conceptualized as being embedded
in a cognitive-emotional-motivational matrix

in which no true separation is possible.

No matter how we slice behavior. the

ingredients of motivation-emotion-cognition

are present in one order or another.

 

Usually the distinction between affective and :
cognitive domains is made only as a means of 3

making it easier to conceptualize behavior.

 

Rokeach in a similar view has also
written on this relationship between the two

domains.

If we know something about the way a
person relates himself to the world of
ideas we may also be able to say in what
way he relates himself t3 the world of
people and to authority.

 

1Martin Scheerer, "Cognitive Theory."
Chapter 3. Handbook of Social Ps cholo . vol. 1.
(Cambridge. Mass.: Addison-Wesley. T§3E!. p. 123.
2

Milton Bokeach. The 0 en and Closed
Mind. (New York: Basic Books. 19£05. p. 3.

123

What we are looking at then is a complete
value complex organized as a unified whole.
Turning for a moment to the Taxonomies of
Educational ObJectives. Handbook I and II,
we can easily see how the two domains. cognitive
and aggective, are intertwined. On the cognitive
level we are asking the student to operate at
the sixth level.
6.00 EVALUATION
Judgments about the value of material
and methods for given purposes. Quantitative
and qualitative Judgments about the extent
to which material and methods satisfy criteria.
Use of a standard of appraisal. The criteria
may be those determined by th student or
those which are given to him.
In the affective domain we are asking the student
to operate at the fifth level.
5.00 Characterization by a Value or Value Complex
At this level of internalization the

values already have a place in the individual's
value hierarchy, and are organized into

 

 

3David R. Krathwohl. Benjamin S. Bloom.

Bertram B. lasia. Taxonomy of Education Objectives:
The Classification 0 E uca iona Goals: Handbook
: ec ve oma n. New Ior : Dav c ay Co..

Inc.. Iganjp p0 i950

 

124

some kind of internally consistent system,
have controlled the behavior of the individual
for a sufficient time that he has adapted

to behaving this way; and an evocation

of the behavior no longer arouses emotion

or affect except when the individual

is threatened or challenged.

The handbook goes on to speak of the
generalized set (5.1). This "is a basic orientation
which enables the individual to reduce and order
the complex world about and to act consistently
and effectively in it."5 The person at this stage
should demonstrate a "readiness to revise Judgments
and to change behavior in the light of evidence."6
In order to have this ability to balance
values against one another. as would be
necessary for the organization of a value complex,
it is implied that the student is capable of
Evaluation (6.0). Thus. if a student has an

adequate introduction to the problem of induction

there should be some carry-over to the affective

 

“Ibid.. p. 18h.

51bid.

6Ibid.

125

domain. as well as the cognitive domain. The
student should be more open to accepting and
evaluating value claims in addition to knowledge

Olfilms e

Ways of introducing this material
into the classroom.

Now that it has been shown what some of
the possible benefits of a systematic study of
induction might be. the problem becomes one
of introducing the material into the classroom.
Many untold innovations have failed at this
Juncture. This problem cannot be solved in
these last few pages. All I mean to do
is suggest some possible points that might be
considered as ways of teaching the problem of
induction.

Essentially I see three basic ways of
getting this material into the secondary school
classroom: (1) through the introduction of

materials directly to the student. such as the

 

 

‘ Fm.-
\
“—2. a...

126

unit on hypothesis testing; (2) through undergraduate and
.graduate college courses which new and experienced
teachers take; (3) through an in-service type of program.
Since the subject of educational change and the adoption
of new materials is several library shelves in

itself. the following should in no way be regarded

as a comprehensive plan for bringing about a change in
the new social studies. Rather I am only offering some
rather loose suggestions for incorporating the

inductive problem into the new courses of study.

This material should be included on a more

regular basis than it is now found. This section

may provide some help in accomplishing this

goal.

Classroom Materials

The best example of how this problem
might be integrated is probably the episode on
hypothesis-testing by SRSS. The nice thing about
this type of material is that it could be used

with almost all of the current social studies

 

127

materials. Since it does not represent a part
of a course of study garage, there is no real
problem in plugging it into existing programs or
even integrating it with other programs in the
new social studies. Indeed the episode was
designed to be used in this way. Of course
the teacher must prepare a place in the course
for it. To blindly shove the episode into
any place that seems convenient would be
to guarantee its failure. The teacher must
carefully assess where a unit such as the one
on hypotheses-testing could be used to elicit
the greatest effectiveness. It calls for a
measure of curriculum planning on the teacher's
part. Placement of this episode will require
planning. but if used properly it would constitute
a very good way of showing students the difficulty
of making generalizations.

Whereas the episode on hypothesis-testing
would be difficult to integrate into a world
history course,the unit on archeology. produced

by the AnthrOpology Curriculum Study Project.

 

128

could easily be integrated into such a course.
This unit outlines the problem of induction and
shows how an archeologist. dealing with fragmentary
evidence. would deal with the problem of
making generalizations. The problem of induction
shows up then in the practical context of field-
work. The student should easily see from a
unit such as this that we are not discussing
an abstract philosophical problem. but one which
has immediate consequences for the social
scientist.

Both of these. hypothesis-testing
and the unit on archeology. are good
examples of how induction creates problems for
people wishing to arrive at. and state. quite
specific conclusions. This is how the material

can probably be best introduced to secondary

school students. It must be kept in mind that

we are concerned with social studies classes.
not philosophy classes. Thus. the philosophical
problem (and induction is essentially that) must

be integrated into the work of social scientists.

129

The area which allows this blending is methodology.
Methodology brings us to the consideration of
induction. This is how it was done in the two

episodes we have Just used as examples of how

social studies might best handle the problem

of induction. There is no need for a special

unit on the problem if it is given proper consideration
in the course of teaching about social science

methods.

The social studies teacher should be
concerned with teaching what the social scientist
does perhaps more than any other obJective. or at
least it should be the equal of any other obJective.
If social studies are going to teach the methods
of social science than they ought to concern
themselves with the inherent problems of these
methods also. Functionalist and empirical
methods of explanation both deal with the inductive
problem. and so also should the student who is

learning to use these methods.

 

 

130

Teachers must be familiar with
e pro em 0 n uc on.

Up to this point the attention has been
centered on materials. not on the peeple using
them. At times it may have seemed as if this
writer believes in teacher proof materials. which
is hardly the case. There is no such thing as
teacher proof materials. No matter how good
the material is it can be misused by some poor

soul. So also is the reverse true; no teacher

 

can do an effective Job with truly poor materials. L>
Teachers and materials exist in a sort of symbiotic

relationship. Thus. returning to our problem. if

the inductive problem is to reach students then

teachers must become aware of it and learn what

it is all about. All that is offered here are some

suggestions as to where teachers could be exposed

to. and learn to work with the materials that
have been looked at in this thesis. In no way
does this constitute a set of recommendations for
teachers. Teachers have not been the center of
this thesis. and they can hardly achieve the
center of attention in the last few pages. we

are looking at teachers only in terms of what

131

implications the materials have on the teacher
and teacher-training programs.

All future social studies teachers are
usually required to take some sort of methods
course. Today. and probably even more so in the
future. inductive approaches are being given a B
great deal of attention is such courses. Here
then is one place for people who are going

to be teaching to familiarize themselves

 

with the material on induction. As was
discussed in the previous chapter. hassialas and Cox's
methods book. Inquiry in Social Studies. is
an excellent introduction to the problem of
induction. Aside from a few imperfections it
is one of the better textbook introductions to
the inductive problem. Another way of presenting
this material might well be for the methods
class to participate in actually doing
a unit of the sort they may well be teaching
after graduation.

An example of this type of exercise might

be the unit produced by the Sociological Resources

for the Social Studies. Hypothesis Testing in the

132

Social Sciences. This might be done by the
undergraduates. and would hopefully give them

an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the
techniques used. and also with the implicit
methodological problems. After going

through this type of unit the discussion

could be centered on the limits of inductive inference.
and how it acts as a brake on the making of universal
hypotheses. The instructor would necessarily

have to supplement the philosophical material

to some extent. but this should pose no real
problem. This then represents one example of

how the material on induction might be presented

to future teachers. Most important is the

idea that an exercise.such as the one on hypothesis-
testing. would provide a base on which to build

the philosophical discussion. This base may not
always arise from the student's work in the

social sciences. Too often what instruction an
undergraduate does receive in the social sciences
consists of lectures. or some instruction in
research techniques. Methodology is often

neglected.

 

133

To present the problem of induction to

undergraduates without this base in actual research

is to risk doing an ineffective Job of the
presentation. It is too easy to discuss the
inductive problem as a straight philosophical
problem. one which future teachers tend to

take as a pseudo-problem. Having presented

this material to several undergraduate methods
courses I fully realize how easily this
misunderstanding can take place. If the problem
of induction is seen only as a rarefied
philosophical problem then the chances are great
that the high school student will not

become aware of the great methodological problems
that induction presents.

If one is working with teachers who are
familiar with. and working with. the new social
studies materials then the problems encountered
are quite different. There is a tendency for
these teachers to confuse a critique with
criticism. Told that there is no logical reason
for inductive conclusions to hold true in the

future. these teachers often have a tendency to

 

13“

feel that perhaps induction should not be used.

It is almost as if some of these teachers are looking
for an excuse to drop a new approach and regard

the slightest limitation as an excuse for doing

so. Great caution must be used presenting the
problem of induction to such people to prevent

this misunderstanding. It must be emphasized

 

that the inductive problem does not mean that
induction has no valid uses. but rather that
it has limitations that one must be aware of.

 

How serious the limitation is dependent entirely
on the nature of the knowledge claim being made. An
example of this might well be the difference
between a tendency statement and a universal
generalization. which was discussed in chapter
two.

With caution though. the logical problems
that induction presents can be pointed out
with little misunderstanding. With experienced
teachers there is also less of a chance that it
will be viewed as a pseudo-problem. Rather.

it will be seen as a problem of immediate concern

135

to a teacher working with the new materials.
As has been shown not all of the new social
studies materials actually discuss the problem
in its philosophical context. Teachers must
be made aware of this problem. The best way
for this to be done is a subJect that is
beyond the topic in this thesis. What we have
shown is that there is a need for teachers to
know about the problem of induction. since not

all the new social studies programs have confronted

this issue.

Conclusions

What then have we found in this critique?
Many things. some that were expected and many that
were not. Perhaps. the most striking thing is
the great uneveness in how the materials which make
up the new social studies cope with the inductive
problem. The full range has been encountered:
from Fenton. and the episode on family size.
neither of which even alludes to the problem. to

hassialas and Cox. and the episode on hypothesis-

136

testing. which give the inductive problem great
prominence. While it may not be the most critical
aspect of the new social studies. the inductive
problem is most worthy of a place in the new
curriculum.

The problem of induction is real. This P
is attested to solely by the fact that many people .
have attempted solutions since David Hume first

presented the problem. It is also an extremly

 

difficult problem. as shown by the fact that no

one has yet found a widely accepted solution.

Also. the inductive problem is of concern to the

social scientist as evidenced by the types of
methodological solutions which allow one to

circumvent the problem: A postulate holding nature

to be uniform in functional explanations. and the
always tentative nature of the hypotheses in empirical
explanations. If one of the desirable characteristics of
social studies is that they should resemble the social
sciences (in terms of process. as well as product). and

earlier we pointed out that they should. then

137

the inductive problem becomes very important for
the new social studies.

First there must be a change in the
meaning of induction in these new programs.

Rather than defining induction as simply going

from a set of specific premises to a generalized
conclusion. the nondemonstrative nature of induction
must be made more explicit. Then more programs

must point out how certain modes of explanation

work with this problem in their operations. From
these two steps the student will hopefully

achieve a much greater awareness of the immense
problems involved in stating inductive

conclusions.

The student will likewise be made more
aware of the complexity of methodological problems
by changing some of the new social studies material
to give greater attention to the inductive problem.
Also students using this type of material may
well be less dogmatic in their conclusions
regarding matters of knowledge. Students in high
school today will undoubtly see a great many

knowledge claims revised. and overthrown. in

 

138

their lifetimes. Today's student must be flexible
for tomorrow. The new social studies must aid
the student in achieving this flexibility. We
are running a great risk with the new materials
if we will not allow for this flexibility. We
may be guilty of presenting the new materials

in the same straightforward way as the old (here
is a problem. find 253 solution). By explaining
exactly how difficult it is to verify a knowledge
elaim concerning the future. or unexamined cases.
it will be possible to accomplish the goals set
out Just above. The problem of induction is real.
it is tough. and it is not being handled by the
new social studies as well as it could be. Work
must now be done on seeing that better efforts
are made in including the inductive problem into

the new social studies.

 

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"MAINTAINEs