PH. IOINICK L J . I I , .— llll/IlllllllllllI/l‘ ‘ 3 1293 10359 0588 WW II! I II! W! 'J BIZARY Mir higan Static LL-Univcrsity This is to certify that the thesis entitled THE EFFECT OF POWER DISTRIBUTION AND MOTIVATION ORIENTATION ON NEGOTIATED OUTCOMES: A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SIMULATION presented by Jan Leon Woznick has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph . D . . Management degree 1n Major pr essor M 19, 1978 Date ay 0-7639 THE EFFECT OF POWER DISTRIBUTION AND MOTIVATION ORIENTATION ON NEGOTIATED OUTCOMES: A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SIMULATION By Jan Leon Woznick A DISSERTATION Submitted To Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Management 1978 ABSTRACT THE EFFECT OF POWER DISTRIBUTION AND MOTIVATION ORIENTATION ON NEGOTIATED OUTCOMES: A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SIMULATION BY Jan Leon Woznick Bargaining relationships, pervasive in our society, are defined as a process involving two or more parties attempting to attain a mutually acceptable compromise. This study adopted a social psychological rather than game theoretic view using power distribution (PD) and motivation orientation (MD) as independent variables. These written parameters manipulations,equal and unequal PD and cooperative and competitive M0, effect negotiated outcomes. It was hypothesized that equal power or cooperative motivation orientation bargainers would be the most effective bargainers. The primary dependent measure effective outcomes, was defined to be . greater number of dyads reaching agreement fewer rounds to settlement greater amount of settlement greater initial opening offer . greater amount of concession during bargaining . greater perceived satisfaction with outcomes O‘UJ-‘UNH O The bilateral monopoly paradigm served as an experimental vehicle for the simulated collective bargaining process. N 8 172 student subjects bargained under a 2 X 2 factorial design. ANOVA was used to analyze this design plus the 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design taking role into account. Sex, nationality and three personality measures--interpersonal trust, machiavelianism and tolerance of ambiguity-dwere used as covariates in some analyses. For the number of dyads reaching agreement, a PD main effect and PD X MO interaction was significant. PD was the only factor effect for rounds to settlement and the amount of the settlement. The round one initial offer was significant for PD, MO and ROLE although no interaction effects were present. The same findings were true for the concession variable. Payoff was significant for PD and ROLE alone. Lastly, the satisfaction variable had both PD and MD main effects. In general, research hypotheses were confirmed. The PD parameter was a potent effect while the MO variable was generally marginal. Role was an extremely potent effect and some precaution must be taken so one side does not have an undue bargaining advantage. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS It has been a long time in completing; long overdue by any standards. I can only thank those who have given me support and counsel throughout these past years. My sincerest thanks to the dissertation committee of Larry Foster (Chairman), Robert Monczka and Olga Crocker. My special thanks to all those who served as a conscience during the period, especially Henry Tosi and Richard Gonzalez of the Department of Management at Michigan State University and David R. L. Gabhart of the Department of Accounting and Financial Administration at Michigan State University. Each of you gave me continued hope. There remains one person who is very special in my life-~my wife Pam. To her I dedicate this endeavor and this promise: "No more weekends!!!" ii Table of Contents List of Tables I. Introduction II. Literature Review Empirical Research Historical Development of Bargaining Laboratory Research Paradigms Power Distribution Mbtivation Orientation Bilateral Monopoly and Bargaining Outcomes Collective Bargaining Field Studies Social Exchange Theories and Collective Bargaining Summary of Literature Review III. Research Methodology Problem Statement Experimental Design Pre-Experiment Measures Dependent Variables Methodology Subjects Procedural and Experimental Instructions Data Coding and Statistical Analysis Summary Page iii 10 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 20 25 27 27 29 3O 32 35 36 36 39 40 IV. Results PD X MO Factorial Design AGREE ROUNDS SETTLE and END PD X MO X ROLE Factorial Design R1 and R15 PAYOFF CONAMT and CONCESS Post-Experiment Assessment Factorial Designs with Covariates Cognitive-Manipulative Set Sex and Nationality Personality Measures Summary V. Discussion and Conclusions PD X MO Factorial Design PD X MO X ROLE Factorial Design Covariates Limitations Bargaining Theory Simulation and Statistical Analysis Portents for Future Research 45 45 51 56 57 62 65 70 81 82 84 89 92 96 98 100 101 103 103 106 107 Table 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Crosstabs for AGREE - Contingency Table (by PD) Crosstabs for AGREE - Contingency Table (by M0) List of Tables Description Descriptive Statistics for AGREE (by Cell) Descriptive ANOVA Table Descriptive ANOVA Table Descriptive ANOVA Table Descriptive ANOVA Table Descriptive ANOVA Table Descriptive ANOVA Table Descriptive ANOVA Table Descriptive ANOVA Table Descriptive ANOVA Table Descriptive ANOVA Table Statistics for ROUNDS (by Cell) for ROUNDS (by PD and MO) Statistics for SETTLE (by Cell) for SETTLE (by PD and MO) Statistics forEND (by Cell) for End (by Cell) Statistics for R1 (by Cell) for R1 (by PD, M0 and ROLE) Statistics for R15 (by Cell) for R15 (by PD, MO and ROLE) Statistics for PAYOFF (by Cell) for PAYOFF (by PD, MD and ROLE) Statistics for CONAMT (by Cell) for CONAMT (by PD, MD and ROLE) Statistics for CONCESS (by Cell) for CONCESS (by PD, M0 and ROLE) Statistics for POST11 (by Cell) for POST11 (by PD, MD and ROLE) Statistics for POST12 (by Cell) for POST12 (by PD, MO and ROLE) Page 46 47 48 49 50 52 53 54 55 58 59 60 61 63 64 66 67 68 69 71 72 74 75 Table 24 25 26 27 28 29 3O 31 32 33 34 35 ANOVA Table for Description POST16 (by PD, MO and ROLE) Descriptive Statistics for POSTl4 (by Cell) ANOVA Table for ANOVA Table for ANOVA Table for ANOVA Table for NAT) ANOVA Table for and NAT) ANOVA Table for SEX and NAT) ANOVA Table for SEX and NAT) ANOVA Table for SEX and NAT) ANOVA Table for SEX and NAT) ANOVA Table for MACHTOT) POST14 (by PD, MD and ROLE) POST15 (by PD, MO and ROLE) R1 (by PD, MO and ROLE with CMS) R1 (by PD, M0 and ROLE with SEX and PAYOFF (by PD, MO and ROLE with SEX CONCESS (by PD, MO and ROLE with CONAMT (by PD, MO and ROLE with POST16 (by PD, MO and ROLE with POST11 (by PD, MO and ROLE with POST14 (by PD, MO and ROLE with 77 78 8O 83 85 86 87 88 9O 91 93 Chapter I. Introduction Rarely a day passes when an individual does not engage in some type of social relationship. Frequently, these relationships can be characterized as exchange situations having some explicit agreement over division of resources which may be reached between parties after a series of offers and counteroffers. This exchange relationship or interdependence bond (Rubin and Brown - 1975) occurs throughout the world and may involve individuals, groups or entire nations. Families attempt to equitably divide the income brought home by breadwinners and with these monies may bargain over com- modities such as food at a local farmers"market, an automobile on a dealer's lot, or acreage of real estate. Group negotiations may take the form of union against management or two departments trying to reach accord over the allocation of budget. Bargaining on an international scope is regularly reported by the news media. In short, bargaining is a pervasive influence in our lives. Unless actively involved in an exchange relationship, we rarely take the time to study the outcomes of bargaining, let alone analyze the entire process of negotiations. Perhaps some little consideration may be given to reasons why an individual did not obtain an equitable split of a negotiable resource, but again, the content factors are usually ignored. It is this question of the conduct of bargaining (impinging variables and process outcomes) that requires study and deeper investigation in order to better understand exchange relationships. The study of bargaining has taken place at different levels of our society. Schelling (1960) and Ilke (1964) focused on inter- national relations; walton and McKersie (1965), Chamberlain (1965) and Cullen (1965) used labordmanagement relations as a framework for analyzing bargaining relationships; and numerous others cite the racial movement, airline hijackings, corporate mergers and acquisitions, and judicial plea bargaining as examples of exchange relationships. The process of bargaining, as a.mechanism for resolving conflict over resources, is an integral part of social exchange theories of behavior. Whether local, national or international in scope, or studied in the laboratory or in field settings, this topic provides fertile area for investigation and research, Rubin and Brown (1975) encourage more systematic knowledge about the processes of conflict (including bargaining and negotiations), and urge ime (mediate interdisciplinary thought and research to develop this body of knowledge. Other social psychologists and game theoreticians (notably, Bartos - 1974, Deutsch - 1973, Swingle - 1970 and Cross- 1969) have echoed similar sentiments during the past decade. Bargaining and negotiation may be treated synonymously as they are quite frequently used interchangeably.[‘For the purpose of this research, bargaining or negotiation will be defined consistent with Bartos (1974) and Cross (1969) as a process involving two or more parties, each attempting to attain a mutually acceptable com- promise on what each shall give and take (or perform and receive) by means of communication or exchange of written prOposals between them. This conflict, in its broadest social implication, is a state that exists whenever incompatible activities occur and may originate within or between individuals, groups or nations (Deutsch - 1973). It is contended that regardless of origin, the bargaining process between adversaries is a mutually acceptable means of resolving conflict. Current literature on bargaining is divided between two points of viewh-the economic or game theoretic aspect and the behavioral or social psychological orientation. wadington (1975) urges recognition of the importance of making a distinction between the normative types of models used by game theorists and the descriptive simulations found most useful by behavioralists. Normative economic thought mathematically predicts what a bargainer must do to maximize reward in a particular situation whereas descriptive models infer a behavioral dimension. Mbst recently, Bartos (1974), Cross (1969) and Wadington (1975) focus on game theoretic solutions (see also Richardson - 1960, Cross - 1965, Bush and‘Mosteller - 1955, Nash - 1950, Shapley - 1953, Zeuthen - 1930, and Raffa - 1953) to prescribe and predict bargaining outcomes. Several social psychologists (Rubin and Brown - 1975, Deutsch - 1973, and Swingle - 1970) describe the behavioral dimensions of negotiations. This particular study will adopt the latter point of view and largely ignore the game theoretic outlook of the bargaining process. Despite the differences in orientation, both advocates of bargaining research characterize negotiating relationships (conflict of interest schemes) as having structural and social components such as those stated in Cross (1969) 1. parties involved in a cooperative enterprise where mutual compromise is possible 2. voluntary proposals passed in sequential fashion 3. distributive process with productive Outcomes 4. offers and counteroffers take the form of written communications between parties 5. intermediate payoffs of far lesser importance than final outcomes and payoffs Rubin and Brown (1975) note additionally that two or more parties may be involved and that the relationship is temporary. A research paradigm frequently employed to study the process of bargaining, Siegel and Fouraker's (1960) Bilateral Mbnopoly, typically involves a buyer and seller of a hypothetical commodity. Each party is given information about their payoffs for all possible agreements and the bargaining session in terminated whenever settle- ment occurs or the negotiations are terminated. For the purpose of this research, an experimental laboratory variation of the Bilateral Mbnopoly game is described in a collective bargaining context. The relationship will be dyadic (two individuals only) with either assuming the labor or management role at ramdom. Under the guise of this labor-management relationship, the parties negotiate a single wage issue--an increase in hourly pay in a realistic environment. The adversary principle of collective bargaining was chosen as a framework for analyzing the process because of its pervasiveness in the comtempory culture and its familiarity to students who will serve as subjects in the simulation. This particular wage issue negotiation embodies the characteristics of true bargaining with the outcome settlement (resolution of conflict) and associated payoff dependent upon manipulation of the experimental situation. After reviewing much empirical research on social psychological bargaining, Rubin and Brown (1975) present a rather simple conceptual ‘ framework for studying interdependence bonds in bargaining. Inter- dependence implies a mutually dependent relationship, voluntary in nature, where each party seeks to achieve an agreement as personally advantageous as possible. Three parameters are thought to describe the exchange relationship: 1. power distribution (PD) - the relative equality of environmental or personal power in the relationship 2. motivation orientation (MO) - the cognitive disposition of each bargainer in the relationship 3. interpersonal orientation (IO) - the external sensitivity toward our opponent in the relationship. Therefore, through the manipulation of these three parameters the process of bargaining may be closely scrutinized. The central tenent of this present study is that inter- dependence bonds (mutually dependent relationships) affect bargaining outcomes and the effectiveness of bargaining. This author chooses to define bargaining outcome simply as the resolution of conflict (or failure to do so) while bargaining effectiveness is visualized as a gradient measure of success in negotiations. An outcome is seen as the final settlement amount agreed upon by both parties, or the differential between the last Offer and counteroffer when the bargaining was terminated. Effectiveness can be visualized either from the micro view (the success and satisfaction of either adversary) or a macro view (overall cost- benefit allocation to society). For this research it is perhaps most expedient to describe effectiveness in terms of the reported satisfaction in achieving one's objectives and the actual outcome (micro view). In the latter context, effective outcomes occur where the settlement tends toward maximizing joint payoffs, where payoffs are approximately equal, and where the total amount conceeded by each party is approximately equal. Although intervening and antecedent variables such as physical environment in the conduct of the negotiation process, communications allowed between bargainers, demographics of the subjects, and the individual's psychology and behavior admittedly affect outcome measures, this simulation will initially manipulate only two of the independent parameters in the Rubin and Brown (1975) framework. The third independent parameter, interpersonal orientation, will not be utilized this study due to difficulty in operationalizing this variable. Each of the two factors, power distribution and motivation orientation, can be experimentally manipulated via written instructions. Power distribution can simplistically be treated as having two levels--equal and unequal perceived power. To keep the design as straightforward as possible, only cooperative and competitive levels of Deutsch's (1960) motivation orientation construct are used. It is anticipated that interaction efforts are also present. Analysis of previous empirical research also indicates that several personality and attitude measures are related to bargaining outcomes and effectiveness. Administration of the following personality measures will be briefly reviewed in a later section 1. Generalized Interpersonal Trust - Rotter (1967) 2. Tolerance of Ambiguity - Budner (1962) 3. Machiavellianism - Christie and Geis (1970) Later, in statistical analysis, these three measures will be treated as covariates. In summary, bargaining between individuals, groups or nations is seen as a pervasive element in our lives. Theoretical develop- ment in bargaining literature generally takes either an economic or behavioral point of view. To test the belief that interdependence bonds, such as power distribution and motivation orientation, affect bargaining outcomes and effectiveness, an experimental collective bargaining simulation variation of the Bilateral Mbnopoly will be employed. Dependent variables include settlement amount, non settlement differentials, payoff earned by each side, and concession magnitudes. Personality measures will be used as covariates. Chapter II covers the review of literature on bargaining and contains a statement on the relationship between social exchange theories and collective bargaining. In the third chapter research methodology is described. Report of the findings is the basis of Chapter IV and finally, the last chapter includes a discussion of the findings with implications for future research. Chapter II. Literature Review Social psychologists and game theorists acknowledge there is no unified theory of negotiation--no single statement generally applicable to nations, groups or individuals and able to accurately predict out- comes. While this study will not attempt definitive statement of a unified theory of negotiation an attempt will be made to apply social theories variously labeled as justice, exchange, equity or social com- parison to the process of collective bargaining. Therefore, this chapter will be devoted to two major aims, (1) citing empirical research related to the process of bargaining (especially the impact of interdependence bonds) and (2) synthesizing social theories of bargaining behavior. Empirical Research Behavioral literature, especially in social psychology, abounds with studies of bargaining conducted under controlled conditions. In recent years academic journals in the field of labor relations have included articles evaluating real world outcomes of bargaining. Because of this proliferation, thought and empirical research pertaining to the following topical areas will be cited: (1) Historical development of bargaining (2) Laboratory research paradigms (3) Collective bargaining lab experiments (4) Collective bargaining field studies 11 A section on theory development of collective bargaining will follow review of empirical findings. Historical Development of Bargaining Economists, following an economic man rationale, were the first to attempt modeling of collective bargaining behaviors. For example, Edgeworth (1881) and Pigou (1905) treated collective labor negotiations as a form of bilateral monopoly. Later, especially in the 1950's, game theorists sought to apply quantitative logic to the process and outcome of bargaining. Theoretic models were hypothesized by Braithwaite (1955), Bush and Mbsteller (1955), Harsanyi (1956), Luce and Raiffa (1958), Nash (1950), Pen (1952), Richardson (1960), Shapley (1953), Siegel and Fouraker (1960), and Zeuthen (1930). Concurrently, writers in the field of labor relations were attempt- ing to model the bargaining process by studying individual and collective behaviors. Harbison and Coleman (1951), Chamberlain and Kuhn (1965), Peters (1955), Dunlop (1949), and Stevens (1963) represent some who view negotiations as a behavioral process. undoubtedly the most widely recog- nized attempt to theorize about noneconomic or psychological factors in collective bargaining was a study and text by walton and McKersie (1965 and 1966). Drawing together relevant concepts from both game theorists and social psychologists, they formulated bargaining sub-processes by elaborating upon strategies and tactics used in real world collective bargaining situations. 12 From that period on social researchers who chose to study collective bargaining behavior and outcomes invariably cited walton and McKersie's findings. Interest in studying bargaining and negotiation and conflict resolution increased as several major research paradigms appeared in social psychological literature. They are briefly covered in the follow- ing section. Laboratory Research Paradigms Relatively few paradigms account for the vast majority of experi- mental bargaining and conflict resolution studies with Siegel and Fouraker's (1960) Bilateral Mbnopoly being the predominant means of studying collective bargaining. Four major paradigms, Luce and Raiffa's (1957) Prisoner's Dilemma, Vinackre and Ackoff's (1957) Parcheesi Coalition, Deutsch and Krauss's (1960) Acme-Bolt Trucking, and Siegel and Fouraker's (1960) Bilateral Mbnopoly each contain most of the characteristic attributes of the negotiation process. Only the Bilateral Mbnopoly will be discussed. The methodological paradigm employed in this study, the Bilateral MOnopoly, resembles many typical bargaining situations; a fact which gives it considerable face validity. In the hypothetical buyer-seller situation involving sequential exchange, buyer and seller are free to make written offers and counteroffers for a commodity until the agree- ment is reached or the session is terminated. It is through the manipulation of interdependence bonds, power distribution and motivation orientation, that negotiated outcomes will vary. 13 In the following sections, empirical support will be cited for the contention that interdependence bonds affect negotiated outcomes. Power Distribution Relative power distribution can be manipulated by either varying actual or perceived status of the parties or by varying experimental reward structures or payoff matrices. Komorita and Barnes (1969) used the Bilateral Mbnopoly game to test the effects of relative power. Cost structures to the buyer and seller were varied so that power was equal or unequal. Dyadic pairs with equal power reached agreement more often, required fewer trials to do so, and made larger concessions than those with unequal power. Hornstein (1965) had pairs participate in a real estate (acres and cost per acre) variant of Bilateral Mbnopoly. Threat potential, a percentage by which each could reduce the other's profit, was manipulated and considered to be relative power. Although he found no overall signi— ficant differences in bargaining effectiveness, pairs with equal power tended to obtain higher profits and reach agreement more often than those with unequal power. In a study which manipulated perceived status, Bonflu (1963) employed the Acme-Bolt Trucking game and varied status by informing both members of some dyads that the other eas considered to be superior and of higher status. Equal status pairs functioned more effectively, achieving higher median and joint outcomes, and lost less time in deadlock than those in a low relative power condition. 14 Several more studies were locatedawhich supported the general supposition that equal power dyads would bargain more effectively than unequal power pairs. They are not reported here because their design differed substantially from this research. With respect to power distribution it is hypothesized: H1: Pairs perceiving equality of power will bargain more effectively than pairs perceiving inequality of status. Mbtivation Orientation Experiments in which motivation orientation has been varied through experimental instructions frequently employ Deutsch's (i960) coopera- tive, individualistic and competitive descriptions of an individual's internal cognitive disposition toward bargaining. In his initial research using Acme-Bolt, subjects given a cooperative motivation ori- entation obtained greater cooperation and mutual gain than either of the other two motivation orientations. The only experiment using Bilateral Monopoly found a partial re- versal in the effects of motivation orientation. Schnetizki (1963) used only individualistic and cooperative conditions and found that when no communications were permitted between subjects, cooperators obtained maximum joint profits less often than individual goal sub- jects. When open communications were allowed the differences disap- peared. Other studies employing Prisoners Dilemma report findings similar to Deutsch. Griesinger and Livingston (1973), Kanouse and west (1967), Radlow et a1 (1968) and Alexander and Neil (1969) report greater cooper- ation under conditions of cooperative motivation orientation. 15 Research evidence supporting the belief that cooperative bargainers will be more effective than competitive bargainers is substantial. Whether the manipulation is varied through instruction, reward structures, or premeasurement of attitudes prior research indicates that: H2: Subjects receiving instructions inducing a cooperative motivation orientation will bargain more effectively than those receiving competitive instructions. While the research body of evidence weighs heavily in favor of the hypotheses stated above, there is little to substantiate the following interactiOn hypothesis. Despite the lack of empirical evidence, an attempt will be made at the end of this chapter to articulate this interaction hypothesis based upon a general theory of bargaining. The interaction hypothesis is H3: Bargainers with equal power and a cooperative motivation orientation will tend to function more effectively than those of unequal power and competitive motivation orienta- tion. Greater elaboration of the Bilateral Mbnopoly paradigm and relevant outcome variables are included in the next section. Bilateral Mbnopoly and BargainingfiOutcomes Siegel and Fouraker's (1960) Bilateral Mbnopoly resembles meny real world bargaining encounters. In fact, it not only possesses the charac- teristics of a true bargaining relationship but considerable face valid- ity as well. One buyer and one seller of a hypothetical commodity each attempts to maximize personal profit by negotiating price and quantity. Written offers and counter offers (based upon separate and confidential 16 profit tables for buyer and seller) are exchanged in sequential fashion. Time, number of trial constraints, or penalties may be imposed, outcomes are negatively correlated and effectiveness is generally measured in terms of (a) number of bids or time before agreement (b) rate of concession (c) magnitude of concession (d) joint payoffs (net after penalty) (e) satisfaction with negotiated outcomes Hence,. an effective bargaining dyad would reach agreement sooner, have smaller rates and magnitude of concession, higher joint payoffs and should express greater satisfaction with negotiation outcomes. Effec- tiveness here is construed to mean personal goal achievement within the labor or management role. It should be reiterated that effectiveness can be measured in terms of social welfare or "winning". While the union may applaud its bargain- ing team for wrangling an extremely high wage offer from management, society as a whole is the loser if the company goes out of business and the plant closes. A similar argument would mitigate against management winning an extremely small settlement. Labor dissatisfaction and mobil- ity would surebly be a social misfortune. 'Effectiveness from a social consideration, while certainly important, will not be considered in this study. It is interesting to see the attention that bargaining outcomes is receiving in collective bargaining literature. While not strictly a part of this current research, these studies are of sufficient importance and impact to be included. The following section outlines several field studies. 17 Collective Bargaining;Field Studies Recently several articles have appeared in Industrial Relations and Industrial Labor Relations Review which explicitly attempt to measure bargaining effectiveness or bargaining Outcomes. Despite the fact that no attempts were made to experimentally differentiate between power distribution and motivation orientation (or interaction) it is quite evident that these variables (or at least surrogates) do appear in these field studies. Kochan and Wheeler (1975) developed a model of bargaining outcomes based upon the attainment of union bargaining goals. Negotiation is viewed as a channel of independent variables (environmental character- istics, union and management characteristics, and bargaining process characteristics) influencing union effectiveness or its ability to Obtain desired outcomes. Variables included in the study are similar to power distribution and motivation orientation. Kochan and Wheeler make no attempt to separate the effects of the variables included in their present research. In a study of public sector bargaining agreements Gerhart (1976) hypothesized that environmental features, relative bargaining power, the interests of the parties, and issues raised in negotiations were determinants of bargaining outcomes. In his model, bargaining outcomes, defined as "union penetration into management prerogatives" and operation- ally measured as a contract index (where 100 is the union ideal), are directly affected by relative bargaining power of the parties. Note the similarity to Kochan and Wheeler (1975). 18 Contract Index was found statistically significant for environmental variables such as metropolitan area size, employer size, statutory bar- gaining obligation and bargaining pattern. While Gerhart's study also made no attempt to differentiate between power distribution and motiva- tion orientation, elements of each are reflected in the variables used and discussion of findings. In an attempt to analyze noneconomic factors and negotiators' satis- faction, personal inclination, and attitudes, Tracy (1974) nonrandomly sampled union and management bargainers in both private and public sec— tors. He hypothesized that the dependent variables (1) negotiator's personal inclination to settle, (2) perceived satisfaction with new con- tract and (3) satisfaction with the parties working relationship were related to twelve factors roughly clustered as (a) Herzberg's (1959) work factors (including achievement and interpersonal relations), (b) pattern of relationships between labor and management (which include motivational orientations, belief about legitimacy of other side, trust and respect for opponents, and degree Of friendliness), and (c) just or equitable outcomes (effort, reward and perceived equitability of new contract). Hamermesh (1973) studies only public sector wage data for forty- three negotiations between September 1968 and December 1970. Variables included previous wage paid, union initial demand, employer initial offer and final wage settlement. He found that the final settlement was closer to the employer initial offer than the union initial demand. One possible explanation offered is that after several rounds Of nego- tiations, the unions relative bargaining power may force them to lower 19 their demands as their threats become less credible. Hence, public sector unions may be bluffing more than employers. In a comment to Hamermesh, Boganno and Dworkin (1975) question the bluffing rationale by pointing out that public sector unions cannot legally strike and therefore cannot force the employer to make con- cessions at the bargaining table. Perhaps taken jointly these state- ments lend support to the hypothesis that unequal power distribution results in less effective bargaining. Postulating a path analytic model of city government bargaining, Kochan (1975) included the following concepts in the model: a. goal incompatibility b. dispersion of power c. internal conflict d. perceived negotiations pressure tactics e. union strike pressure tactics f. union political pressure tactics g. perceived political pressure h. multilateral bargaining Results from a survey questionnaire mailed to city officials and union representatives (N = 228 cities) indicated internal management conflict, union political and negotiation pressure, goal incompatibility and dis- persion of power affected (either directly or indirectly through internal conflict) multilateral bargaining. Again, while no direct test of the power distribution or motivation orientation effects and interaction was attempted, it is evident that they could be operationalized. Perhaps in the future it will be possible to operationally define bargaining relationships, power distribution, motivation orientation or interpersonal orientation in such a way as to test for main effects and interaction effects in field settings. Confounding would be an obvious problem, yet the reward may far outweigh this cost. Whether studied in 20 the laboratory or in a field setting collective bargaining outcomes could conceivably be predicted. If that is possible then development of a general theory of bargaining will be enhanced. Social Exchange Theories and Collective Bargaining, A number of social psychologists and collective bargaining behavioralists share a similar theoretical notion of the theory of negotiations. The theoretic basis -- variously called equity, social comparison or exchange theory -- uses self and other and is contingent upon a ratio of inputs and outputs of self and other. In this section an attempt will be made to relate social exchange theories to collective bargaining and then summarize these concepts into theory upon which this research is based. In the field of labor relations the earliest proponents of social exchange theories were collective bargaining practitioners such as Chamberlain (1951), Dunlop (1944), and Stevens (1958); individuals who viewed collective behaviors as power relationships. The prevailing view was the side with the power advantage reaped the fruits of their labors. Power was described largely in economic terms. Practitioners of that time also sought to expand upon the-economic discourses of writers such as Pigou (1938) and Commons (1934). Pigou developed a "pure theory" which was applied to the problem of wage determination. When labor and management enter into negotiations each sets an absolute limit and will not settle outside that wage (range) for to do so would lessen either the demand or supply of labor -- depending which side possessed the power advantage. These limits enclose a range of indeterminateness. 21 But a negotiated settlement probably will not fall near these limits because both sides also construct "sticking points" -- practical limits above or below which each side would endure a strike. A range of practical bargains exists whenever management's upper limit exceeds labor's lower limit. If these practical limits do not overlap, a strike is inevitable. Even if considerable overlap does exist, Pigou states that the ultimate outcome is unknown. With each side seeking to push the other to some presupposed limit, engaging in bluffing tactics, and attempting to exert power over the other, the negotiated settlement will include a power basis as well as an evaluation of the cost to strike. In short, comparisons underlie the bargaining process. Other writers expressed a similar pattern of thought. For example, Commons (1934), a collective bargaining advocate as well as an economist, introduced the concept of limits of coercion -- a range of bargaining bounded by alternatives open to buyer and seller. Within these limits, negotiation skills and ability and bargaining power help determine out- comes. One cannot help but see the unmistakable relationship to bilateral monopoly in this early bargaining thought. In the decades of the forties and fifties, collective bargaining practitioners like Slichter (1940), Shister (1943), Dunlop (1944) and Lindbloom (1948) began to express bargaining power as an ability to exploit and impose costs rather than as a range of possible bargains. Although these later writers appear to be negating the concept of prac- tical limits they were actually changing the foci of their analysis. So began the impetus of exchange theories. With the theoretical base having 22 been developed by economists it was left to practitioners schooled in social psychology to redefine bargaining in behavioral terms. Walton and McKersie, in a 1965 text entitled "A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations" describe labor management relations as a social interaction system. Four sets of activities were believed to account for almost all the behav ior in real world negotiations. Their first two systems, distributive bargaining and integrative bargaining, taken together comprise a construct most familiar to practitioners in negoti- ations and perhaps most applicable to this simulation. Distributive bar- gaining pertains to activities instrumental to the attainment of goals which are in basic conflict (e.g., a wage negotiation issue) and is essentuially fixed sum in nature. When both parties view the common attainment of economic objectives in a manner which is fundamentally not in conflict, the parties are engaging in integrative bargaining. The remaining two systems take advantage of the social interactions prevalent in negotiations. In attitudinal structuring and intraorganiza- tional bargaining the basis economic perspective of distributive and integrative bargaining is supplanted by influencing relationships between parties, "in particular such attitudes as friendliness, hostility, trust, respect, and the motivational orientation of com- petitiveness—cooperativeness." walton and McKersie make the distinction that whereas the first two are joint decision making processes (economic, power based variables) the latter sub systems are interpersonal proc esses requiring attitudinal change and consensus. In reading current collective bargaining literature, the work of 23 Walton and McKersie is clearly evident. The theoretical basis of this simulation, interdependence bonds or relationships of power distribution, motivation orientation and interpersonal orientation was definitively stated in this early period of the behavioral aspects of collective bargaining. Much current social psychological literature on negotia- tions and bargaining focuses on the interdependence nature of social relationships. In most cases mixed motive relationships (motivation to both cooperate and compete) contain both convergent and divergent aims for the parties. This is essentially the distributive and integrative subsystems Of walton and McKersie's model. Social exchange theory meshes quite nicely with the walton-McKersie model and current social psychological literature on bargaining. Raven and Rubin (1976) define social exchange theory as "a theory that analyzes interpersonal and group interaction in terms of interdependence. The process of interaction is examined according to the individual's inputs (or costs) and the rewards and/or punishments he anticipates and receives in a social relationship." If the general process by which an individual evaluates his own opinions, attitudes, beliefs or behaviors is a referent means of viewing others, then the social exchange theory embraces Festinger's (1954) social com- parison theory. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) (as well as other social exchange theor- ists) view negotiations as an interaction system where people continually go through a mental accounting process. In order to maintain a stable relationship, each party critically evaluates the costs and benefits of interdependence; behaviors expected of us by the other and the rewards and satisfactions that we receive for our participation. We continually 24 evaluate these costs and benefits_against a subjective belief of what constitutes equity. Past history of interactions helps define our knowledge of what this balance should be and continual reinforcement "fine tunes" the process. Consider that the cost-benefit continuum may really be a ratio of inputs to outputs and as long as the ratio stays fairly close to the historical norm or pattern of interdependence we are "satisfied" and continue to participate in the relationship. Imbalances can occur either in self's cost-benefit ratio or that of other. In an imbalanced case (when perceived outputs exceed inputs) or in the stable balanced condi- tion, the bargaining outcomes are likely to be cooperative in nature and considered equitable and effective from a participant view. The former situation is probably rate, but the balanced scheme certainly fits many relationships. Also, a quite different condition exists whenever inputs exceed outputs or, most importantly and usually ignored, when substantial shifts in the norm occur. In either case, the individual parties engag- ing in negotiations are likely to engage in competitive endeavors which result in less effective outcomes. In terms of this research simulation, unequal power distribution and competitive motivation orientation would have the effect of reduc- ing cooperative or effective outcomes and in concert, would be a most severe threat to existing stability. In fact, it would be hypothesized that more defensive behaviors (failure to move toward compromise or no desire to settle at all) are likely to occur. Reflect upon the collective bargaining arena again; especially 25 the Walton and McKersie notion of activities of interactions. If we view labor and management negotiations as a ratio of inputs to outputs (both economic and behavioral) instead of a range of limits with cer- tain points above or below which neither side will budge, then the social exchange theories are seen as compatible with real world bar- gaining behaviors. An unbalanced ratio (benefits exceed costs) or stable ratio will lead to cooperative or effective outcomes while the excessive costs situation invariably leads to prolonged strikes, impair- ment of essential goods and services, or maintenance of the conflictive situation. Summary of Literature Review As evidenced by the previous literature review, little controversy exists as to the importance of interdependence bonds or mutual relation- ships in social psychological bargaining or negotiations. There does exist a wide variation in the laboratory methodologies used to operation- ally define power distribution, motivation orientation and interpersonal orientation. For laboratory experimentation to be as meaningful as possible, the research paradigm should be framed as a realistic situa- tion to which the subject can relate -- hopefully in an experiential manner. Collective bargaining, a pervasive force in our industrial society, served as a medium for this research. For independent variables two levels each of power distribution and motivation orientation were exper- imentally manipulated. Dependent variables included number of agreements reached, rounds or Offers to settlement, settlement or end differential if parties did not settle, initial opening Offer, payoff earned by each 26 party, concession amount and magnitude and post-experiment questions about bargaining perceptions. In addition to the topics mentioned above, the research methodology chapter following will contain discussion of the experimental design, personality measures, procedural and experi— mental instructions in the simulation, data coding and statistical analysis. Chapter III. Research Methodology_ Bargaining process, a mode of conflict resolution, can fruitfully be studied using an experimental research simulation to replicate real world collective bargaining behaviors. In the previous chapter empirical evi- dence was cited to support the contention that interdependence bonds (e.g., power distribution and motivation orientation) directly affect bargaining outcomes and effectiveness. It was also hypothesized that higher order interaction effects would also be present. Note was made of recent collective bargaining field studies relating to this current research. This chapter includes (1) a statement of the problem under investigation and (2) a detailed description of the research methodology to include design of the experiment, variables, instructions and statistical analysis. Problem Statement Study of social exchange relationships is widespread in social psychological literature. Considerable research evidence exists which pertains to bargaining or negotiation with four research paradigms accounting for a vast majority of the published empirical evidence. Col- lective bargaining, pervasive in our society, would seem to be an ideal mechanism to study exchange relationships. Based upon these considerations, the focus of this study will be to determine the effect of interdependence bonds 28 A. Power Distribution 0 Equal 1 Unequal B. Mbtivation Orientation 0 Cooperative 1 Competitive on process Outcome variables, effectiveness measures, and subject's perceptions 1. Rounds or Offers Settlement . End differential . Round one initial offer . Payoff . Concession . Post-experiment assessment \IO‘UI-l-‘UON in a collective bargaining simulation. Subjects were told they were either representing the Windsor Electric Contractor's Association (manage— ment) or a local of the International Brotherhood of Electrical WOrkers (labor). Research into previous empirical findings located a paucity of support for interaction effects of interdependence bonds, yet logic indicates a truly multivariate situation. This research aims not only to literally replicate main effects, but interaction as well. In an experimentally manipulated situation, students will bargain against an unknown opponent in an attempt to resolve a realistically structured wage issue. Due to the nature of the experiment, a completely randomized factorial design will be employed in data analysis. During subsequent investigation of the research, covariates will be used to seek additional explanation in findings. 29 Experimental Desigg_ For situations in which the dyad (both labor and management) is to be considered as a unit, a 2 x 2 ANOVA factorial design will be utilized. Such a dyadic requirement is necessary because labor and management shares the same score on a dependent measure (e.g., a settlement of $0.84 occurred in round 12). Whenever dependent measures are different for each subject (e.g., after settling for eighty-four cents per hour the twelfth round, labor earned a $1;19_payoff while the management opponent earned a 31:89 payoff) a 2 x 2 x 2 (levels of role) ANOVA factorial design is applicable. Finally, wherever antecedent variables (i.e., sex, nationality and personality measures) are included, these antecedent variables will be presented as covariates. Initially, it was felt that twenty subjects per cell in the 2 x 2 x 2 design would be suitable. Thus, for testing interdependence bonds main effects, 80 subjects per level of a factor would be available. As will be noted, actual numbers in the simulation varied from this goal. Power distribution (PD), Factor A, was experimentally manipulated through written instructions to the subjects. Equal power bargainers read that the previous bargaining relationship with opponent (or other) was stable and that both parties are pleased with present negotiations, believing that satisfactory compromises have been reached on the major bargaining issues. The unequal power bargainers believed that other members of their bargaining team.have done poorly in even reaching a compromise settlement on the major bargaining issues. In addition, the previous relationship was characterized as volatile--even unsuccessful. 30 Written instructions for both levels were embellished by elaborating on the behavioral dimensions of the relationship to a point where even the other was characterized as...(See Appendix E for complete experi- mental instructions). Factor B, motivation orientation (MO), closely paralleled Deutsch's (1960) instructions. For the sake of simplicity and to keep the number of cells to a minimum, Deutsch's individualistic mode was not used. The two levels that were retained, cooperative and competitive, were mani- pulated via written instructions. At each level representatives were asked about their bargaining philosophy on a late-night radio talk show. Cooperative bargainers spoke in friendly terms about the partner (other) and consideration for the welfare and feelings of other. On the other hand, competitive negotiators considered their prime motivation as beat- ing their opponent. Again, complete instructions are in Appendix E. Finally, ROLE was considered to be the third independent variable. Subjects entered the laboratory and were randomly assigned to seats. Depending on the replication number (the experiment was:n1n five separate times over two semesters) students in the front of the room could be either labor or management. Again, it should be remembered that the dependent variables to follow pertain to either the experimental design excluding role (2 x 2) or one with it (2 x 2 x 2). Pre-Experiment Measures In order to measure the impact of the bargaining simulation (in addition to the outcome) subjects took part in a pre-experiment, self- report session in the laboratory. Prior to the actual conduct of 31 bargaining subjects were asked to fill out fifteen semantic differential items pertaining to social exchange relationships. The measure was designed for this study to record an individual's perception of self in terms of previous interactions and self-description in general (reli- ability Of this measure was not determined). Initially, the measure was intended to be indicative of interpersonal orientation but it appears as if the sole purpose will be in making pre- and post-experiment comparisons. All subjects completed a test battery in the week prior to the simulation. The measures were selected because either (1) that measure was cited in previous bargaining research as a statistically significant construct or (2) the measure was generally more reliable than one reported in previous empirical studies. Those scales on the battery included-- 1. Rotter (1967) - Generalized Interpersonal Trust 2. Budner (1962) - Tolerance of Ambiguity 3. Christie and Geis (1970) - Machiavellianism It is obvious that the personality and attitudinal structure of a negotiator (their individual differences) cannot be ignored in studying bargaining outcomes. Rotter's (1967) Generalized Interpersonal Trust construct is designed to measure an individual's predisposition to trust others. Although no studies were located which explicatedly used the Rotter measure there is ample evidence to suggest that trusting bargainers will engage in more cooperative behaviors than less trusting individuals. Tedeschi et a1 (1969), using the Prisoner's Dilemma, found that high trust in others negotiated more cooperatively than those who were low. 32 Similar findings were reported by Benton et a1 (1969) and Wrightsman (1966). For this study, the Chun and Campbell (1974) lZ-item short version of the Rotter measure was used. Individuals who prefer regularity, balance, and concreteness comprise one polar extreme of ambiguity intolerance. Pilisuk et a1 (1965) found that pairs who were tolerant were more likely to evolve a mutually cooperative relationship in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Druckman (1967) measured close—mindedness using Rokeach's Dogmatism (1956) in a col- lective bargaining variant of the Bilateral Mbnopoly. Subjects who were highly dogmatic tended to yield less, resolved fewer issues, and viewed compromise as defeat. In short, they acted more competitively. Christie and Geis (1970a) devised a scale which purports to measure exploitiveness, guile and deceit. It has been widely utilized in bar- gaining studies with predictable results. Subjects high in machiavel- lianism behave more competitively than others low on the construct. In their review of machiavellianism.the authors offer several additional citations in support of the competitive nature of the high-mach person. The measures cited above will be used as covariates in the 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design. No attempt will be made to dichotomize the measures for use in post hoc analysis. All pre-experiment and antecedent measures (personality battery) are found in Appendix B. Dependent Variables A number of dependent measures were recorded during and after the experimental simulation which included both process outcomes and post- experiment perceptual self-report questionnaires. For the 2 x 2 33 factorial design, the following dependent variables were operationally defined as: l. ROUNDS - the number of rounds until both sides reached settlement or the simulation ended (20 rounds). One offer by management and a counterproposal constitutes one round. OFFERS is a similar variable using individual offers rather than rounds. SETTLE - the hourly wage rate increase agreed upon by labor and management. If no settlement occurs, after 20 rounds, the variable is coded '0'. END - the wage rate differential at the end of the simulation. For dyads who settled before or during round 20, the variable is coded '0'. AGREE - the number of dyads reaching agreement during the simulation. For the 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design, several additional process outcome dependent variables can be analyzed. They include 5. R1 - the initial offer made by management and the counteroffer of labor in the first round. Additional variables R2 through R20 were recorded during the simulation, but only R1 and R15 will be discussed. 34 PAYOFF - the bonus earned by either side which is based upon the final wage settlement. During the penalty period a five percent per round deduction is made from profit. Settlements below $0.85 give management larger payoffs than labor. Above $0.85 the opposite is true. CONAMT - the absolute concession amount from R1 to SETTLE or END. CONCESS - the difference between the perceived wage midpoint ($0.85) and SETTLE or R20. The post-experimental measure administered to all subjects immediately upon completion of the simulation was designed to be inter- preted as the perceptual impact of the negotiation session on the individual. Based upon previous research conducted at Michigan State University (see Bigoness - 1974) eight Likert scaled statements were asked. The measure is included in Appendix C and contains the following variables: 9. 10. ll. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. POST ll - satisfaction POST 12 - cooperativeness POST 13 - intensity POST l4 - equality POST 15 - intensity POST l6 - cooperativeness POST l7 - competitiveness POST l8 - realism Research hypotheses stated in Chapter II contain reference to effective bargaining outcomes (settlements tending to maximize joint 35 payoffs or tending to achieve equality between parties are dependent variables 1 through 8). evidenced by l. 2. 3. 4. CDNOUI Further, effective macro outcomes would be ROUNDS - fewer rounds to settlement SETTLE - wage settlement close to the $0.85 midpoint END - small differential at simulation end AGREE - greater number of dyads reaching settlement Rl - initial offers far from.extremes PAYOFF - individual payoffs quite alike CONAMT - smaller concession amount CONCESS - smaller differences from midpoint It is difficult to make a priori statements about a subject's perception of the simulation but in keeping with the definition of effectiveness the following post-assessment outcomes would be 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. POST POST POST POST POST POST POST POST ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 greater satisfaction with outcomes greater desire to settle (foil) greater belief that opponent was reasonable lesser belief that initial differences were small greater desire to reach agreement (foil) (foil) The above dependent measures will be analyzed according to the statistical methodology described in the next section. Methodology For each of the dependent variables the following sets of statistical hypotheses are to be tested in a factorial ANOVA design: 1. Main Effects PD MD H H . O O ROLE H : o ai = 0 =0 6: Yk=0 36 2. Two-Factor Interactions PD x MO H6: (o8)1j = 0 PD x ROLE HO: (ow)1k = 0 MO x ROLE Ho: (By)jk = 0 3. Three-Factor Interactions PD x MO x ROLE Ho: (oBy)ijk = O The statistical analysis will be performed on the university of Windsor's IBM 360/65 using Nie et al's (1975) SPSS program with ANOVA routine. Covariate measures will be analyzed using the ANCOVA option of the ANOVA routine. Subjects Subjects for the simulation were recruited from undergraduate collective bargaining classes at the University of Windsor, told they would be participating in an experiential wage negotiation exercise and randomly assigned to experimental treatments. A total of 172 subjects completed the exercise during the Fall and Winter semesters in the 1976-77 academic year. Ideally, caucasian males should be selected as a homogeneous group. Unfortunately, it was not feasible to exclude subjects based on sex or nationality and n a 24 females and n - 23 non-caucasians are included in the total sample. Analysis of covariance using sex and nationality as covariates will be performed. Procedural and Experimental Instructions A large auditorium at the university was used for all five repli- cations of the study. Subjects were told that their class was meeting 37 in the auditorium. 'When they arrived they were randomly assigned to experimental treatments. The room contained long tables with two chairs per table. All subjects faced the front of the auditorium when the wage negotiation rules and instructions were read to them (approximately 20 mdnutes which included completing the pre-experiment assessment). After all questions were answered, subjects in the back half of the room were asked to turn around and face the rear of the auditorium. At that time subjects learned whether they were management or labor and were instructed to remove their experimental manipulations from an envelope in the front of them. Bid runners were instructed which sub- jects would form dyads and told that each subject should have "about a minute" to decide what the wage offer was to be. Runners were also instructed to continue passing the offers sheet even though a dyad was settled. All questions were referred to the administrator. The simulation is derived from Siegel and Fouraker's (1960) Bilateral Monopoly and modeled after Hamner (1975). The collective bar- gaining context was chosen to emulate a realistic real world environment. The objective of the exercise were stated as: "the task for the two of you is to negotiate a single agreement on the increase of hourly pay for the next one year of the contract." Written instructions reaffirmed that the permissible wage rate increase was from $0.00 to $1.70 per hour. Subjects then read the one and a half pages of experimental treatment which were followed by the procedural instructions for the simulation. Each party (labor or management) had its own Payoff Table and a Wage Offers Record Sheet to 38 keep track of the offers, counteroffers, and potential payoffs. Subjects did not know their opponent's payoff table. A yellow’Wage Offer Sheet was exchanged via the bid runner at approximate one minute intervals. All procedural instructions are included in Appendix D. Management began the negotiations by specifying an hourly wage rate between $0.00 and $1.70. Offers were carried to labor who then had the opportunity of seeing the management Offer before entering their own counteroffer. Bids were then returned to management. During the remainder of the wage negotiation exercise subjects could stay at a certain offer or move toward compromise, but could not reneg on a previous offer. Bid runners were instructed to watch for these instances. Throughout the simulation subjects were free to reread their experimental instructions or attempt to plan strategy if they wished. The administrator made no comments during the exercise other than to inform the bid runners of the one minute limit. During the procedural instructions the administrator mentioned that "As in the real world there is a cost (strike) attached to lack of settlement. Therefore, after round 15 there will be a 5% per round penalty to be deducted from the payoff. If the parties fail to settle after round 20, there will be zero payoff." During the actual exercise, no announcement was made upon completing round 15. Subjects continued the simulation until the administrator passed out the post-experiment assessment. Everyone in the room.was asked not to discuss the negotiation after leaving the auditorium. The administrator promised to return to the class later in the semester and discuss the simulation and personality measures. The subjects were then dismissed. 39 Data Coding and Statistical Analysis Antecedent and dependent measures were classified according to the subjects' student numbers. Personality measures were later returned to the subjects by the administrator if gross errors were detected. (Several subjects misunderstood the forced choice instructions of the Mach IV version of machiavellianism.) Otherwise the entire personality battery was given to a keypuncher and entered on three cards. Likert items were scored on a 1-5 scale, semantic differential items were scored on a 1-7 scale and the machiavellianism.measure was punched on a 1-2 basis if an item was checked. The personality measures were punched once in the Fall and once in the Winter semester by the same keypuncher. Bargaining process outcomes were recorded on the yellow "Wage Offers" sheet (Appendix F) passed between labor and management. After the simulation the administrator coded these sheets with independent variables as well as replication number, subject's sex and nationality and then entered some dependent measures such as rounds, offers, settle- ment amount and end differential. The round by round offers were punched directly from the sheet. The pre-experiment assessment measure and post-experiment questionnaire were keypunched at the same time. The dependent measures were placed on three cards. Hence, a full data set consisted of six cards. Again, keypunching was done once each semester by the same keypuncher. SPSS computer routines were used to identify any apparent data errors (such as out of range data points) and perform complex functions to calculate payoff, concession and personality measures. A copy of the 40 full program is located in Appendix G. Additional analyses, other than those stated in this section, have been run, but those findings will not be reported in this paper. Summagy The final research design and methodology were a culmination of discussion with peers, additional background research into social psychological bargaining and findings from an experimental pilot study. The pilot study was especially helpful in determining that the subjects could understand and follow the procedural and experimental instructions, that the main effects were indeed statistically powerful, and that the wage negotiation exercise was not of undue duration. Results of the pilot study were statistically noteworthy, but did show evidence of some confounding. For instance, sex was found statistically significant (consistent with much empirical evidence); the MBA's were not representative of students in collective bargaining (Opening offers indicated naivity); subjects were allowed to pair off in a non-random fashion and faced each other across a table (later some subjects reported they engaged in cooperative behaviors to ensure that other received almost identical payoffs); and there were environmental seating and time constraints (subjects did not have time to internalize roles and could see the offers of others next to them). Despite these apparent problems, the pilot study affirmed the decision to continue with the proposed research. Within this chapter an effort was made to reiterate the problem under investigation, operationally define the independent and dependent 41 variables in terms of bargaining effectiveness, describe the statistical analysis to be employed, and discuss the experimental manipulation and instructions used in the wage negotiation exercise. Chapter IV reports the quantitative results from each of the factorial designs and presents additional findings of interest from the covariate analysis. Chapter IV. Results In general, analysis of data from the wage negotiation exercise yielded predicted, significant findings consistent with empirical literature. For this research study, significant main effects and interactions were hypothesized for power distribution (PD) and motivation orientation (MO). Due to the nature of the simulation, an additional variable, labor or management (ROLE) assignment was utilized in certain analyses where a dependent variable did not take on the same value for each of the two roles. This chapter is divided into sections according to the experimental design used in statistical analyses - - (1) PD X.MO Factorial Design, (2) PD X.MO X ROLE Factorial Design and (3) Factorial Designs Using Covariates. A post-experiment questionnaire was administered and findings will be presented in the second sec- tion. The latter section was deemed necessary due to the number of self-description, personality variables obtained prior to the wage negotiation exercise. In the same section, significant sex and nationality findings will be presented, as well as a gratifying discovery tentatively called cognitive - manipulative set (whether the subject's cooperative - competitive cognitive orientation was congruent or incongruent with the motivation orientation experi- mental manipulation). Bargaining outcomes, defined in terms of effectiveness, con- note cooperative outcomes from a personal point of view. Hypothesized 43 relationships for the dependent measures (by experimental design) are specified below (except for part C which specifies covariates): A. PD X.MD 1. 10. 11. 12. 13. Factorial Design AGREE - greater number of dyads reaching agreement ROUNDS - fewer rounds to agreement SETTLE - greater amount of settlement END - smaller differential at end of simulation X ROLE Factorial Design R1 - greater initial opening offer PAYOFF - greater labor or management payoff CONAMT - greater difference between opening offer and settlement CONCESS - smaller differential between settlement and $0.85 implicit midpoint POST11 - greater satisfaction with outcome POST12 - greater desire to settle before penalty POST14 - greater belief that opponent was a reasonable person POST15 - lesser belief that initial difference was great POST16 - greater desire to settle before round 20 C. Factorial Designs Using Covariates 14. 15. 16. 17. SEX - sex of subject NAT - nationality of subject CMS - cognitive - manipulative congruence ROTTOT - Generalized Interpersonal Trust 44 18. MACHTOT - Machiavellianism 19. BUDTOT - Tolerance of Ambiguity For each of the dependent variables in the study, descriptive statis- tics and an ANOVA table are presented (except for AGREE). Brief dis- cussion accompanies each ANOVA table, but a more detailed explanation is presented in the final chapter. PX X.MO Factorial Desigg The initial focus of this research was to explore negotiated outcomes resulting from manipulations of perceived power and the in- dividual's cognitive disposition in the dyadic relationship. The methodological paradigm employed was a variant of the Siegel and Fouraker (1960) Bilateral Monopoly written to simulate a collective bargaining environment. In this particular factorial design, the de- pendent variables of interest pertain to both members of the dyad; hence, management or labor role will be ignored. In total, eighty- six dyads bargained in this wage negotiation simulation under one of four experimental conditions shown below: (a) Equal PD - Cooperative MO (Cell 00) (b) Equal PD - Competitive MO (Cell 01) (c) Unequal PD - Cooperative MO (Cell 10) (d) Unequal PD — Competitive MO (Cell 11) It was hypothesized that significant main effects would exist for each of the two factors and further a significant interaction would exist between variables. Each of the dependent measures to fol- low (except AGREE) are based upon the PD XLMO factorial ANOVA design. 45 AGREE To test the hypothesis that a greater number of agreements would be reached under the equal power level of PD, the cooperative level of MO, and the equal power — cooperative motivation orientation cell (Cell 00) of the 2 X 2 (R X C) contingency table, a Chi-Square crosstabulation was performed. Tables 1, 2 and 3, pages 46 to 48 present the results of the PD, MO and PD by M0 analyses of the number Of agreements (settlements) reached. Table 3 contains descriptive statistics for this dependent variable. The hypotheses for agreements settled was confirmed for power distribution and the combination of power distribution and motivation orientation but not motivation orientation alone (although in the desired direction). It appears as if the power distribution factor is so potent in bargaining minds that it cancels out any interaction effects which might be present. An ANOVA table presenting the AGREE findings is located in Appendix H. Multiple R2 was .128 for the AGREE variable. ROUNDS The number of rounds the dyad required to reach agreement was a second dependent variable of interest. The theoretical basis for this variable being that fewer rounds would be required for equal PD and cooperative MO and the equal PD - cooperative MO cell (Cell 00). Tables 4 and 5, pages 49 and 50, summarize these findings. 46 -ONM¢U n hzamu~uuU0u >U4wo£~kZOU ZOOUWKK l3 UNéOwO a Ibn! HUthow H wx<30m ~IU DUFUMEKDU 0000— ”03¢ hocm 4(FOP Om NM NV ZZDJOU ullllllllullllllll~l — OoMN u wowu H a Qoom u comm — com” a #000 a New” H UJPwa PUZ Qua mm m MN m «u u on .uuaununualuanuuanau H 900d m Oo~¢ n u QOMQ a woflh a 00—0 — aoNN u DONG a OthPUW mm a Na H 0M a .0 allllllllullllll'lullllllll wU304 med “.0 u PUQ th Jm wmio< r a u ._ < ._qo m < .P m m no a u a i._' s a a. 4 a .. * s... a a a... a a Aam may moanmh kucomefiucoo r mmmu< you modummouo H manna 47 coweuoo H kZU—UulumDU ruzmuzuhzou WWQNOO "WU—‘(Uuluzonq- FOchdOO "~I1 zufimwuu.LO wwawwo n Ira: uOhQMou u wm<30w “IV ombumzaou Cocoa No—m wand J~ w>u~ hUQ JCU 30a huhmatou hm wwm0< ..0H._<..Dmsnsfiuummn m manna o>fiuauoeaoo o>Huouooooo nowumueo«uo aoaum>wuoz 49 HH HHoo mos.a am Hb~.o~ cam: OH HHoo osH.~ om “mm.ma one: Ho HHOU MHN.H am mwo.oN Goo: oo HHOU mom.m am HHa.mH Goo: Hooves: coaunnfiuumun umsom Hmavm afismu sbv mazsom you bufiubfiumnm m>HSAHuumma s magma o>fiufluooaou o>fiuwuooooo coaumuaouuo coaum>wuoz 50 Nsmom mm owaom N9 NCO-O woman Nhaohm fl ¢MNOO Odo-O Foaoc a cflm-O OQOoo bfinoc a mO—oo NQOou ousbw a “00.0 CON-Ma DNMomv d «00.0 Obcoh mmhbmn N l to u uzdfiom ma uuZQ—m Zduv *******§**¥§**§*§§ .ozummuz moms «pun 0.0 . mmm mu mumDOm to 23m ********§*******§***§§ ZD~h~hUx 32 Zflupoumrwuo Kmauu on >3 hzwwaphwm 3h mozDUu mOZDOG **§*****WMMUZ<~I<> u D m a m > J 4 Z < i * * n * a * * o o A02 can on hnv mQZDQm now OHAMH <>oz¢ m manna 51 The variable ROUNDS proved better than the number of offers (the number of times a bid sheet was passed between opponents) even though both had statistically significant results. Power distribution was highly significant (F = 12.260 and p = .001) and while motivation orientation was not significant, it was in the hypothesized direction and of some magnitude (F = 1.682 and p = .198). As shown below the ANOVA table, multiple R2 (multiple coefficient of determination) was .153 or about fifteen percent of the variance of ROUNDS is explained by PD and MO. SETTLE and END The remaining two dependent variables in the PD X MO Factorial Design are similar in nature. For dyads who reached an agreement, it was hypothesized that the settlement amount would be greater for equal PD, cooperative MO and the equal PD - cooperative MO cell. END is a dependent measure which describes how far apart the parties were when the exercise ended after twenty rounds. Predictions from theory would indicate that the end differential would be smaller in the same configuration that SETTLE was hypothesized to be greater. Tables 6 and 7, pages 52-53, pertain to SETTLE and Tables 8 and 9, pages 54-55, give results for the variable END. For both variables power distribution was again highly significant (SETTLE had F = 10.971 and p = .001 and END had F = 10.242 and p = .002). As with the ROUNDS variable, neither SETTLE nor END proved to be significant for the motivation orientation main effect or interaction. Multiple R2 was 13 percent for each variable. 52 Ha Haoo OH Haoo one. am . 1:. am o>auwuooaoo Ham. cams mm“. new: coauoueowuo Ho Haoo oo HHOU coaum>auoz mmq. am mam. om opfiumuoooou new. new: mwn. one: Hooves: Hosea coau:Afiuumwa meson AHHOU mnv MAHHMm How mowumwumum o>wuofiuomon o wanna 53 «no.0 cameo dnwoo HNmoo «00.0 000.0 u to muzwum cmoon owe-O omooo ducoo «No.64 macaw u $~N.O mouoo Nmboo «unoo «unoo «maoo ocuom mkdo~ Uc mu mUQDOM § * i * i * * * l * i i i * * * i * § * i * i * § * * ¥ * * W * * * i i * * i * **§»**s**nwuz m < > ZduhdhzwumD ZO~h<>~pUZ DE ZO—hJEHthuo mason on >m kzw2UJhbwm Owh<~puomz & O m u m > J 4 Z 4 * * * * i i * * i O Udkhwm Ac: was as say seesaw you «Heme <>oz< a «Home 54 Ha HHoo ca Haoo now. am wNH. am omH. one: coo. one: Ho HHoo co Haoo mow. am moo. am moH. coo: cue. one: Hooves: Hmoum coausnwuumfia Hoaom AHHOU hnv 92m How mufiumHuMum o>wuowuomon w manna o>fiufiuooaoo o>fiumuoeooo defiumueoauo coaum>wuoz 55 oDZ~mm~I Haws «pun 0.0 . wwwnu o oOuwmwuozu Maw; mmw(BIN omNoo Nomon omaoo a omooo Dz NOD-o McNona com-O a ownno 0Q MOOoo «huge OWNoo N she-O mhuwmuw Z~ mu muaDOm luZUum Z4Mw to 53m §§§Wl§%**¥******i*********i**#***i§*l**§ ZO~b~pUI DZ ZOuPJmmihw~O amsuu Du >m 02m widc h< J<~kZdemm~u DZM **§***o*§¥UUZ lU m~m>4<2oz< m bobby 56 To summarize the PD X MO factorial design it was clearly evident that the power distribution experimental manipulation proved extremely potent. While there was no significant main effects attributable to motivation orientation, for the ROUNDS and END variables the F ratio exceeded 1 indicating that the variable MO had some very slight effect. It is interesting to note that in none of the PD X MO ANOVA's was the interaction of the two independent variables significant or anywhere near so. Discussion on the three independent variable factorial design follows. PD X MO X ROLE Factorial Design The remaining dependent variables in this study varied by individual and hence, role had to be added as an independent variable dimension. Nine variables will be discussed, four of which were measures taken during the negotiation exercise and related to the outcome of the process and five of which were attitudinal, post-experiment assessments. There were many additional dependent measures recorded (e.gi,'round by round offers and some postnexperiment semanth:differential repeats of the pre-experiment assessment) but they will not be presented in this study. In total, one hundred sixty nine subjects completed all dependent measures (including pre—exercise assessments) and three subjects were discarded due to missing variables. Dependent variables in the following sections include initial offer, amount of concession, dif- ference from implicit midpoint to settlement or end, and payoff earned by each side after the negotiation. 57 R1 and R15 Variable R1, the opening offer by management to labor and labor's response to management is perhaps the purest measure of the impact Of the three main effects - power distribution, motivation orientation and role. Once again, significant main effects were hypothesized for each of the independent variables and in addition, a two-factor interaction was hypothesized in the PD X MO interaction. Tables 10 and 11, pages 58 and 59,, show. the descriptive statistics and ANOVA table for R1. The ANOVA table reveals findings that confirm the existence of the three main effect differences. Power distribution was significant (F = 4.793 and p = .030), motivation orientation was significant (F = 5.676 and p = .018) and finally, as believed, role was extremely significant (F = 40.967 and p = .000). In conjunction with the last finding it should again be cautioned that labor had the opportunity to see management's opening offer before labor responded, hence, the potent role effect. There were no significant two—factor interactions, but a notable (although nonésignificant) three factor interaction did occur. This may be an artifact due to the F value for the role main effect. Multiple 32 was .252 for the opening round bid. As an added insight it‘might be fruitful to briefly discuss R15, the last round dependent measure before the penalty period. Tables 12 and 13, pages 60 and 61, reveal that MO is no longer significant but two significant two-factor interactions are now present with one being the hypothesized PD X MO interaction 58 «Hoe Looms oHom mausowmcmz HHH Haou Hao HHOU ONH. am oma. am ooa. one: «NH. one: HOH Haoo Hoo Haoo wmo. om oeH. am NOH . one: now . emu: oaa HHOU oao HHOU ooH. am mmH. am NNN. .eooz cow. boom: OOH Haou coo HHOU moa. am mmH. am «am. .amoz wmm. .aomz Hosanna Assam nouusnauumwn “mach AHHbo say He now monumsuaum m>nuasuummn . os manna o>wuwuooaoo o>fiumuooooo o>fiufiuoono o>auouoqooo uornsnuario uornsaraon 59 .C?~mm~3 lap; .»01 ;.a . Ginsu .Omwwuucpn aim? muw<3Im coooo boo-0+ 000.0 a Demo; mncz deoO Oxbow ON~.C u CN—oe Dz ammoo MOhod mn~.n fl N;~.c . on c0c.o mcmoma man.c m ecu.“ mkuwuun Z—(E u no i ucdscm no vm1 mo uucDOm hazwum ZHPUE or anthulrmuo auzoa an >6 we 44*4**s**auuz<~a<> to w~o>nq.trw.***a&****a Amooe was 9: .nm sbv He now bobby <>oz< as means 60 oaom Laban oaom ueoaowmemz AHH Haoo HHo Haoo nmm. om «NH. om oom. new: mom. can: HoH Haoo . Hoo Hamo mma. om mam. om com. com: saw. one: oHH Haoo oHo Haoo mom. om aha. om m: . emu: «mm . new: ooH Haoo ooo Haoo mam. om ooa. om «on. one: mum. new: Hooves: Hanan nowusnfiuumao uoaom AHHmo sno mam you muaumfiumum m>suasuummn u NH beams o>HuHuooeoo o>fiumuoeooo o>wuauoeaoo O>Humuooooo uornenuarlo uorasnrnou .Dzimwur man; Aeun o.~ . mumqu n .ouwwuuaia use: www<3lfi 500.0 moeon fikaoo a whuov wJDI U2 mONoO 560.0 onOoo a doOoO wJDa CQ o~000 moo-b OOH-o u Tflmoo 32 3Q OMOoO mcoom omaoo m nmocu mZDHHU<3IN 000.3 monomd own.” a ram.“ UJUQ «mmoo bNMoa 00aon a rec-o CZ 000.3 0~Oo¢4 oouoo a choo CO 00000 hemocq o¢uoo n uNNoN whuwmuu Z~ uO wUKDOm uuzoum Z~FUE OS ZDHPJflaTPmuo mw3uu 3Q >¢ mud * * * * i * a * e E U U Z < u H < > k D m a w > J < Z d % n * * 4 i i * * * Amooe was as .am say mam you beams <>oz< me seams 62 (the other is MO x ROLE). Multiple R2 is a little over twenty percent for this variable. One possible explanation for the emergent significance is that the subjects had internalized the roles and were bargaining in the manner as envisioned when the simulation was developed. Round 16 marks the beginning of the penalty period in which each participant loses five percent of payoff per round past fifteen. In addition, it was hypothesized that Cell 000 subjects would be more likely to settle before the penalty period than would the other cells (especially the Cell 111 subjects). The significant interactions are PD X MO (F = 5.663 and p = .019) and MO X ROLE (F - 3.408 and p = .007). This latter interaction could again reflect the role effect (Table 13)- PAYOFF As can be seen in the procedural instructions, a payoff table was provided to each side; tables which were inversely ranked and included polar extremes of $-2.00 and $6.00. The implicit midpoint occurs at $0.85 and results in a payoff of $1.75 to each subject who settles during or before round fifteen. The five percent per round penalty begins at that time and the payoff becomes zero for those who failed to reach agreement. 2 It was hypothesized that the payoff received by each bargainer would be dependent upon the main effects of PD, MO and ROLE. Tables 14 and 15, pages 63 and 64, show confirmation of this belief. Both PD and ROLE were highly significant (F = 22.904 and p = .000 also F a 12.610 and p 8 .000) while MO was no longer 63 «Hoe Loewe oaom unmaowmemz HHH HHOU HHO HHOU 0mm. Gm NHO.H Gm oee . came as . H :8: Hoe Heme Hoe Home mom. Gm 0mm. Gm com. com: m: . H new: OHH HHOU 0H0 HHOU cue. Ow moo. Gm m1». flaw: moo . emu: OOH HHOU coo HHOU mun. Gm mmn. am amo . flaw: ocm . ammZ Hooves: Hmsvm Aeebo see eeosaueawummn u ea meets o>fiufiuooaoo O>Humuoaooo o>auauooaoo o>Huouooooo uornenusrio uornsnrnon .02_nnuz Taps .hua t.p . wmm<3Im n¢¢.c €0¢.o hfin.o a firm.c UJCK OI MCU.C NCN.¢ mww.0 a mhm.o UJOO on 000.0 ©m~.0 N~.C — hN~.C GS CG mNC.C NCN.m dC~.N m ~mm.0 mZC~FU<3IN ooc.o o—£.Oe th.n~ a chm.M« UJCE OUN.O mac.“ 00—." u ru~.~ Cs. 009.0 QOO.N1 bub.m— — h~©.m— on c00.0 cm—.de m¢0.0 m ¢¢N.mN mhuwmuu Z~<$ R MD a M6436m. l0 ULQ uC mUuDOm u~20~m ?¢wf ac 53m *¥§***&****§**************¥#*&*********n9 ezmzuc~eos o: Zoe—hnmfizem~: muses 3n. >m hzezmnhhum Ib—k Duh<~usmm< hmuhuc Lu0> u o m _ m > J 4 z ( a a * a * * a a a a fleece eat oz .ee meo eeoaoz< me money 65 significant (but again in the hypothesized direction). One significant interaction which existed was PD X ROLE (F - 9.203 and p = .003). It is still evident that the impact of power distribution and role cannot be ignored. Multiple R2 for the payoff variable was twenty percent. Two additional dependent variables, total concession amount from opening to settlement or end and the difference between the implicit midpoint of $0.85 and the settlement amount or round twenty offer (if the sides did not settle) are process outcome variables of interest. CONAMT and CONCESS For both variables it was believed that significant main effects and interactions would again be present. Tables 16 and 17, pages 66 and 67,pertain to CONAMT and Tables 18 and 19, pages 68 and 69, are for CONCESS. Of the two variables, CONAMT is perhaps a better measure of the impact of interdependence bonds or bargaining outcomes because it reflects the mood of bargaining as it progresses round by round. CONCESS is expected to be significant because of the number of contracts that remain unsettled in the unequal PD, competitive MO (and combination of the two variables) conditions. Analysis of Table 17 on page 67 confirms the existence of CONAMT significant main effects for PD (F 8 9.395 and p = .003), MO (F = 2.843 and p . .094), and ROLE (F = 5.551 and p = .020). Although none of these interactions are significant, some evidence of effect is present. CONCESS shows a tremendously potent main effect for PD (F== 25.958 and 66 maom Loewe oaom uaoeowmcmz HHH HHOU ado Haoo sum. om mmu. om mom. now: com. com: Hod HHOU Hoo HHOU mme. em . mmm. em owe . flmwz MNN . 6mm: oHH HHOU oHo HHOU and. om NoH. om ooo. new: ooo. coo: ooH Haoo ooo HHOU oom. om NmH. am Nmm. new: mom. new: Hooves: Hmsum coausnwuumwa uoaom Aeemo seo ezeueeuomme u be seems O>Huwuoono o>wuouooooo o>fiufiuooaoo O>Humumoooo uorqsauario norasnrnou 67 .OZHmmHS wits Ahuu 9.0 V muw<3|m mm«.o omo.m mfi«.o a Wwo.o £406 32 NON.O moo.~ bOm.O a bco.o UJDu Du NOM.O ®~Q.o Qfio.o — sno.o 02 0Q hh~.m 900.” 02a.o M NCN.0 mZO~b0 mu mUUDQm uHZUum 24m. u: 53m *#§&**$**3#**§i§**********§**#§********t h4h2MGubuz 32 ZO—hDDumhwuo uwsua SQ >1 MOD.— uZG uC Wuw> Joz< so seems 68 «Hog gonna maom unmamwmcmz fidHHHmo ado Hamo «mm. mm mom. am mmH. cam: woo.n.:mmz HOH Haoo Hoe Hawo me. am HQH. am mac. emu: who.n.:mmz OHH HHQU oao HHmo omH. am mua. am NHo.I cum: coa.l_=mmz 00H Hawu ooo damp «ma. am me. am «No. dam: “mo.l_:mu= Hmsvmca Hanan cowusafiuumfia umsom AHHwo xnv mmmuzoo you mofiumflumum o>fiuafiuummn . mH manna o>auaumaaoo m>fiumumnooo m>auuumaaou 0>Humumaooo uoxnenuaxzo noxnanxnon 69 goo.o mom.0 mom.o admoc «$0.0 mmo.o ®h~.c Ouuoo Om0.0 Cococ CO0.0 u kg L~20~m mcr.m ONN.O OFN.C MCM.~ Ono.m mo~.0 606.“ ¢m0.m Coo.c mm0.m1 ONN.~4 u ach.c Quinn 0.4.. “fivd Orv mu (Nd—40 “(3 o 0 (1C) LOC'OQ' o o o o OCCQ CC) "vfiom O O O C d <;occu U7 00¢ F005 00 N mOu 21:] (C? LIIC q-q * i 4 * § * s i * x ******¥*#x Fir! Mud—tun u. Mon—nu ¢mx.c m—r.m. rem.— ( C I-OH C?) o . QC. '“F¢B '(.Q Fl¥ "C ha .00. CL:CC‘- Gomoo CGC.C .czhnmhz 41m; .pug «.c . mpmqu , .cuanwcxu mum; mwmqu cc~ J<3um UJOQ C2 on (3&00 n€—.— mmcdDCm UO 7.2m PZUIwU no uUQDOm * 4 * * * * * a * * * a * * fi * r * § * 4 i i i * * § * * abam~psz oz ZCHhDI~CFw~C zwsua CO >3 MCDF—ZU42 23~mmeZLU GWMUZLU u D . ~ m > 4 < z < § § * * v * § § * ¥ Amgom wan oz .am .nv mmmuzoo you magma ¢>oz< ma mHnma 70 p = .000) and also Significance for ROLE (F = 5.954 and p = .016). As would be expected there existed significant PD X ROLE interaction (F== 3.026 and p = .084). The power distribution finding seems plausible because this CONCESS variable is an indication of reluctance to settle or aversion to Compromise in the inequitable or competitive situation. Multiple R2 for the two variables are .169 and .089 respectively.. The remaining dependent variables are taken from the post—experiment assessment found in Appendix C. Post-Experiment Assessment Immediately after the subjects were told that the wage negotiation exercise was finished, an eighteen item questionnaire was administered. The first ten items were semantic differential reports of self and other in terms of interactions. No present use of this data is anticipated. The remaining eight Likert scaled items .contain three foils with no intended research purpose and five items intended to measure perceptual attitudes toward the bargaining process and outcomes. POST11, satisfaction with the outcomes of bargaining, was intended to convey an idea that cooperative outcomes results in heightened satisfaction. Tables 20 and 21, pages 70 and 71,depict the descriptive statistics and ANOVA table for the satisfaction variable. PD is again highly significant (F - 14.231 and p . .000), MO is significant (F - 2.699 and p s .102) but role is no longer significant although it appears as if role does have some bearing 71 «Hoe poems mHom unmamwmmmz HHH HHou HHo Haoo ssm.H am sma.a am N¢0.m cam: 0mm.N ammz HOH Hflmo Hoo HHoo mn~.H am ms~.H an HH~.m new: omm.m new: oHH HHoo oHo Haoo . mm~.H om eHN.H am emo.m coo: wmm.~ awe: ooH Haoo ooo Haou «mo.H om mam. om ~wm.~ emu: own.~ coo: Hanson: Hmsvm SO.“ USA—H .HU m HQ “030% Aaflmo hnv HHHmom pom mowumauMum o>aunwuummn I ON anmH 0>Huwuoaaoo o>wumuoaooo m>wufluoaaoo o>aumuoaooo uoraenuarzo uornsarnon scalemmuf U5 WQU MW<3lm 060.0 smN.¢ ¢¢N.c ~ ¢¢N.v wJDI DZ m00.0 nmu.c mNfl.0 « mNN.u UJDu 0Q ~mo.0 €00.n 000.0 a 000.0 02 00 BNN.0 00¢.u ©N~.N 0 030.0 mZD~PU mu muabcm uuzoum Z~hui OZ Z..Z.PD$-..F$~3 ~_m<.U 01>m... uEOUbDO Ihua DUuLw—h4 «uhmca * i * 4 * * t * * * w U 2 < H K < > 1 D m u m > 4 Z q * * fi * * * * * i i Amgom was oz .nm say daemon “om manna <>oz< Hm «Hams 73 on satisfaction. It is interesting to note that while the main effects are significant it is opposite to the predicted results. Likely it is caused by ambiguity with the word outcome and this will be discussed in detail. The MO X ROLE interaction is significant (F = 4.287 and p = .000). POST12, the desire to settle before the penalty period, hypothesizes the relationship that equal PD and cooperative MO subjects would want to settle before the penalty period. None of the main effects nor interactions are significant but NO is close (F 8 2.460 and p = .119). POST16, the desire to settle before round twenty, is an indication of the impact of bargaining especially on Cell 000 and Call 111 SUbJeCtS- As can be seen from Table 24 none of the hypothesized relationships exist. Results for POST12 are shown in Tables 22 and 23, pages74-75, the.ANOVA.table for POST16 is on page 76" POST14,. belief that the opponent was a reasonable person, was the best post-experimental measure of the five variables included for study. It was hypothesized that subjects bargaining under the equitable conditions (equal PD and cooperative MO) would view their opponents as reasonable persons--a reflection of the experimental manipulation. ‘Tables 25 and 26, pages 77 and 78 illustrate these important findings. Significant main effects were found for all three independent variables. PD (F a 14.491 and p = .000), MO (F H 3.400 and p = .067) and ROLE (F = 4.752 and p = .031) indicate strong feelings about the opponent. 74 mace poems oaom ucmsowmsmz HHH Haoo Hao HHoo mqo.a am smH.H am o>fiuuuoaaoo mmm.m flmwz Omm.m flmmz HOH HHou Moo HHUU wmm. am mam.H am o>wumuoaooo New.~ coo: 0m0.m coo: oHH Haoo 0H0 HHoU NmH.H 0m mmH.H am m>HuHuonaou NNN.m smut mqo.m cam: OOH Haoo ooo HHou mHN.H am mmH.H am o>aumumaooo cam.m Goo: 0N5.N 6mm: Hanson: Hmsvm coausnfiuumwn moaom AHHoo may : Naemom you mowumaumum o>fiuaauomma I «N manna uornenuario uornsnrnon 75 05¢.0 006.0 00¢.o £O€oo ®-.o 005.0 hum.0 00m.o o-.0 000.0 000.0 L l0 u~20~m "60.0 300.0 ¢0@.O mNm.0 €N®.~ h00.0 NON.O Non.0 00¢.N m©m.0 CON.“ 0 09M.— haw." OHM.— $30.0 NTD.C .330 .0 nfifi.m fi~—.0 00m.0 rein o: .m :3 .o .2 J Ufiflsum Zdflr mdvfld Md L n—Q—I‘H .:Z_mm:>.. uzm O Newsweek «N c¢h.wom mem.w hm.l.o ~Lr.c mm©.0 mOM.N m~—.o QUOom uofl.u 07~.m ~Nh.0 mucoc m “078.1% uU 55m z Akuu c n 0 mum<3lm UJOQ DZ 040m 03 05 0Q mzauhUQKth~ > m0 wUUDDm * * s 4 s s s s s a s s s s 4 s s s * s 4 s s * * * * * s s s * s s * . s * * s s s * a... 3 >PJ J 4 b2m5u0<242 I? IDZDuhDE CZ ZDHPDIuflhmuO szuu SQ >3 M. u kaS Amsom was 02 .mm any Nfiamom pom magma <>oz< mm essay 2 q s + * s * s * *** *** 76 006.0 ~N0.o «N0.n 000.0 005.0 N¢N.~ 060.0 emmw.n m0¢.n ~30.n mmN.0 ****** fifim.~ mnM.H hNn.O nwa.o NN«.0 35m.0 mNn.H flaw.“ nxfi.— 033.0 ON«.0 ¢O~.O oc«.0 uEasum 74m? $**n b**x. Tea aid ")v-ev-d—a —-..-. L... ")0-0'1'1 .Ozummaz m0..-N 0—0.00N wmfi.c NNC.O $00.0 owm.0 mmo.~ nom.~ QON.M 096.0 omm.o ¢c~.0 000.~ wwmeOm “.3 53m hwamOdZ mxmc aPUQ c.0 0 mmw mw .uywnU03aa align Zfiuthumhmuo Kuguu 0N GZDOu wacuwm UJhbuw .m>4<24*********s u U Ammom we. oz .am snv oasmom pom mHnma <>oz< «N manna «u o UlU? m4 .<3lr MJDJ 32 MACK on 3.2 On. mZFuhU<3IN 0401 02 00 mhuummw Z~3 oukwoa ZUHP<~KQ> to mumDOm assss4......*§***.*******.***.. ZDDD~bUZ 77 mflom yoga; waom uawamwmcmz HHH Hamo ado flame mHo.H am NmH.H am o>aufiumnaoo mum.m cams oom.~ cam: Hoa Hamo Hoo Hamo HNH.a am ¢wo.a om m>aumummooo mum.m cam: omm.N 6mm: oHH Hamo oHo Hamo omm. mm mmm.H am m>Hufiumanu mmm.m cam: moc.m cam: OOH HHmo ooo Hamo amm.H am mo~,q am o>wumummooo mmm.m cam: oww.m cam: dances: Hmncm couusnfiuumfin umsom AHHmo >nv «Hymom uzm muaumfiumum m>fiumfiuumma I mm wHamH uoxnenuatlo uoxueAxnon 78 .Ozamm—T mum; .FUQ 9.0 v nmmqu Q .QuwwLUUuu Jaw; mmw mu UUQDOm mazuum 7.431: to 53w * * * . § * s * * x n . * * § 4 * 4 i a * * a 4 * * * * g a * * * * . * * * * * thSJO2 zuwxma uJS LO muw>Joz< ON manna 79 The remaining dependent measure was POST15 (the belief that the initial differences between opponents was great) and it was not significant. It had been hypothesized that power distribution in particular would be significant, but that did not occur. Perhaps subjects felt the initial differences were great regardless of the experimental manipulation, and with no means of making comparisons, differences were not located. (See Table 27 on page 80.) A.word of comment about the significant main effects for the ROLE variable is warranted. Is has been noted throughout this chapter thatamanagement or labor role has been highly significant in several instances. To review the conduct of the wage negotiation exercise, management began the exercise by offering labor a wage rate increase that was small in magnitude (according to custom). In the experimental instructions, subjects were instructed as follows: "In the prenegotiation strategy sessions our side decided to start somewhere about twenty five cents from the extreme limit, but also that it would be dependent upon how the other issues were resolved prior to this wage negotia- tion." Management undoubtedly followed these instructions intently (see Table 11 on page 59). While labor read identically the same manipulations it is foreseeable that labor not only reacted to management's opening offer, but responded as labor is expected to do in our society (i.e., extreme positions in the early stage of negotia- tions). This is'a possible reason for the significance of ROLE. Further discussion.of the role variable is anticipated in the next chapter. 8O .ozdmnufi Lia: “pun 0.0 . mwwqu c .Quwmmumfla uxus wmw<3lm NOC.O Nm~.o m¢~.0 u me~.o uJDc DZ «mat.» ON0.0 fiua .0 u D.«n.0 MAD? Ca Onm.o hoo.n 059.0 ~ Dou.o 35 ca 3FJ.O MOO.O nma.o @ 65—.0 WZOHhU<3lm Nnm.o NOn.o hfia.o « NUU.C U401 -$.u m—O.n M~n.0 ~ N~O.C 32 013.0 @«O.n maa.c ~ nun.c C& 600.0 Mao.o flun.c M EMC.O mhumulw Z~ mu MUEDOm umzuum Zane no 23m ******%**x.*********i*#****§**#*%******** pzuzuo-05 a: znubar~ahw~o case: on >m MUZuamuuHo 4 no m~m>4oz< am magma 81 In summarizing the PD X MO X ROLE factorial design, the significance of role, as mentioned, should be clearly evident. In addition, the potent power distribution main effect remained as noted in the previous section of this chapter. Also, the significance of motivation orientation is now apparent. One plausible reason why this independent variable was significant for R1, CONAMT, POST11 and POST14 is that those four measures are pure responses to the experi- mental manipulations. The marginal significance of motivation orientation in this study remains a puzzle. MO was defined to be a cognitive dispostion toward the opponent, but by not knowing the identity of the opponent, internalization of the manipulation may have been incomplete. In the following section some interesting findings uncovered during data analysis are discussed. Factorial. Designs with Covariates The need to employ covariates with the PD X MO X ROLE factorial design became apparent during the period immediately following completion of the Fall 1976 bargaining replication. For example, previous bargaining research clearly indicates that sex and nationality are critical variable to control. This section reports on the stat- istical use of such covariates as (1) cognitivedmanipulative set (2) sex and nationality (3) personal ity measures 82 Cognitive-Manipulative Set As a by-product of statistical investigation, avenues of further exploration are sometimes warranted. During the analyses of dependent variables, it occurred to this author that perhaps additional explanation of the behavioral outcomes might accompany further insights into the experimental manipulations in the simu- lation. For instance, what if an individual who was cooperative by nature was placed in a competitive experimental setting. Might this apparent incongruence have a bearing on the negotiated outcomes? To test this belief a new variable called cognitive-manipu- lative set (OMS) was created as a covariate. A subject was defined as congruent (n = 61) if the semantic differential self report of cooperative-competitive matched the experimental manipulation to which they were assigned. The remaining individuals (n = 108) were classified as incongruent (their internal cooperative-competitive cognition differed from the manipulation). Factorial ANOVA's with CMS as a covariate were run and the results proved enlightening and of course gratifying. Table 28, page 83, shows that the CMS covariate was significant (F = 7.401 and p = .007) for the round one opening offer. Multiple R2 was .265 as opposed to .227 without the covariate. The same increased explanation was noted in other printouts of rounds five and ten, but no longer held true for PAYOFF, CONAMT or CONCESS "?.l'l| 83 000.0 ~0N.0 «ON.0 ”No.0 Mhm.o cmm.o 0mm.o 000.0 000.0 000.0 000.0 hoo.o 500.0 u no u—zuum Ncm.h MN~.~ MN~.~ 9h—.o 0~M.O Nmfl.o NON.O N50.01 005.0 Nh¢.e 900.0. u0¢.h «00.5 m 0No.o ~N0.0 mmu.o QN0.0 dNn.o 60n.o NOn.o 6.0 6.0 so 00 an an #0 om "1‘5-4‘“ O O O O 0000 mn~.o mm~.o Udefium Zou J<1|N mJUm 02 0Q mhuwluw Zu<2 wZU mwv<~m<>OU Zu~h<~m<> uu mUKDDm **§§*‘%*§#§§i*i*i***§§*§§i**§****§i*#*§i §§*§**§&§xq hum m>ub~kuzwuu mZU IF“: hzuzw0~puz 02 ZO—rJD—mpmuo imsuu 0Q >0 «1 m U 2 < H I d > .50 AmZU cuwa mqom x 02 x any HM Mom waan <>02< 0N mHQMH >J00 nan.0 000 .mo.c Jou u to u magnum to mmaaaom 200F<0m<; do mumaom uazuam z004<20_»«4 p0~02 oz zoapgmampmao mmgou 0a >0 0a ***.**s***wuz<~a<> mo m~m>4<24§***.§..** A0020 0N manna 86 .0zammaz 010. .50a 0.0 0 mumqo o .0mmmwooau mum: wwwau 000 m0¢.0u 500 mom.0 000 m0m.m._ 4<505 .5..0 um, 000.50. Jase—mum 000.0 00m.o onm.c 0 mm0.0n cmz~<4uxw 5.0.0 «no.0 own.o 0 om0.0 maou 02 on 500.0 cm0.0 onn.0 0 om0.0 mzoa5oaum5¢0 >00 u co m mm mu momsom c.2000 2402 to 20m ****‘§fifi!*§*iiiii*i***§**§*§f§*§*§i§*§§* mmz_.om5040501 oz 20.5000a5m00 «msuu 0d 5m pzwzmaphmw I50; owpzuomm,‘ :uoua uu0> no m0m>4440.**..***§§ Ae0z< 0m magma 87 000.0 mno.0 mmw.0 m5N.0 mwo.0 cuw.o Nm—.0 6N0.0 000.0 000.0 000.0 050.0 050.0 fio—.0 l to unzoum m—¢.c ONN.O QNN.0 NON.« floo.n mmN.0 ccw.~ oO~.m N00.0 ONO.¢I 5—c.0. «00.0 an.n MOO.” ~9n.0 Mn«.o Nmuoo 00n.0 30n.0 «00.0 ¢n«.0 003.0 5m6.0 m5~.0 000.0 onn.0 00n.0 000.0 mu~.o 5mn.0 mzqfium ZOu 44535 4(slfi mJDa OS wJDu 0Q 02 0Q mzoukuauwwz— >OU ZU~P mu wumaom *****§$‘*&*§*§i**§*******§§*§****&*i§§*§ ***§****§¥ u D auzaaom5040puz oz 200500.05m00 auguu 0c >0 0 52~OQC_Z Db thZwJppuw mMUUZUU >4oz< Hm NHAMH 88 900.0 mNN.0 mNN.0 5—u.0 CON.0 0mm.0 Nou.0 MN0.0 000.0 $00.0 N00.0 000.0 005.0 "GN.0 k to u—ZU«m 065.N mm¢.~ 00¢.u 00¢.V O5N.~ 0mm.0 mn~.~ o©N.m ¢fl0.m 0~—.m Nco.m 5m5.N 950.0 00¢.u u mvfi.0 Nca.0 ¢-.o Nod.o M00.0 00~.0 nma.0 On«.0 ~5n.0 mum. ON~.0 500.0 0—V.0 ¢~«.0 000.0 o©«.o wzdfivm ZOU 41505 J¢JIN maum 01 0Q Whummmw Zu<1 P42 xwm me<~a<>00 ZU~5<~Q<> mu mUmDOm §**§*§$§¥¥0§§i§**§§*§*§*§§Q********§*§§§ *§#*§ 05*.swu um2~<0u5~J¢ZU~PQ4 5~puz 01 ZO—thumhmuo 00100 01 >0 2 < u I < > u 0 MCDF~ZO402<*.*.***.§* A502 00. xmm 0003 0000 x 0: x 00 500 Hz<200 you manme 00020 mm magma 89 significant, it was of some magnitude (F = 2.105 and p = .149). Nonvcaucasian and female bargainers earned a larger payoff than caucasian and male bargainers. For the concession variables (Tables 31 and 32), sex of subject was significant for CONCESS (F = 3.324 and p -.O70) and nationality was significant for CONAMT (F = 2.757 and p = .099). Within the group of post-experiment assessment variables there was only two instances of significance. SEX was a significant covariate for only one variable--POST16 (F 8 3.819 and p - .052)" indicating females reported a greater desire to settle before round twenty. Remember also that this variable (POST16) was not significant for any main effect or interactions. Nationality proved a significant covariate in only one variable--that being POST11 (F a 3.043 and p s .083). Caucasians were less satisfied with the outcome of bargaining than non—caucasians. These findings are shown in Tables 33 and 34 on pages 90 and 91. Personality Measures Prior to the initial pilot study a decision was made to incorporate some universally cited personality measures as covariates. At that time no Statistical analyses were made using these measures, but they were still maintained in the pre-exercise assessment battery completed by each subject. That final assessment package included 90 ~mu.0 hum.o h~m.o ONQ.0 hon.o MOW.0 amm.0 hub.0 ~¢¢.0 mu1.0 000.0 h—b.0 Nm0.0 ma~.0 & k0 muzuum ***§* * s i. s s a. s s s... m U 7‘ < _ Nu < e, u o NON.0 Mm0.o nm0.0 onooc «ow.o "00.0 GNh.o ~m~.o Fom.0 «no.0 ¢¢N.n Nn~.0 oum.n Nmo.u l onfl.~ Nhfl.~ 053.0 nod.o 303.0 o~n.0 nfi~.~ nmn.~ ~N3.o N©~.o 005.0 #gn.o o—fl.o wca.o mmn.v e0+.N U1Cv wo~ mOU.~—N J(sln u 0am.u MJOQ U! u nn—.— MJOu on a mmo.— 02 on n GOB.N in—FuOU l3 mmm<30w ZU~h<~an> uu wUKDDm uO 24m * s s a. * u.u. * a... * .u * .w * s r. * .7 * . amzu<0uh~4~pu ZO~PDm~mhm~O Gwsu 0N OZDDu waoumm mJP—m m a m > J < AHoz< mm mHan . a... s * 4 . .._. i . . . A h0 m OanUQ .‘ * s s . a... s s s . 91 moo.0 omb.0 0m>.0 mmo.0 onn.0 000.0 MQN.0 OGN.0 000.0 000.0 «00.0 ”00.0 «00.0 0am.0 u to unzcum Obh.N N0«.n N0u.0 0N5.” N~«.0 mNo.o «mm.- nnu.~ chb.m «mm.n Nou.m ”do." mm~.0 05m." u Gan.“ 00¢.— omq.c m¢~.0 o¢~.o n¢¢.m no~.o 0¢4.0 ub0.~ cmo.~ «mn.¢ moh.o~ Nah.m ¢¢¢.€ uwN.0 ¢Ofi.N Umdfium ZDU JdbOh J<3ln mJOu OZ MASK 0Q 02 on mzouhu00 Zu~h<~an> mu muaaom * § * ¥ 0 f $ * * ¥ * i i * i i * § § * * i * * * * Q § § § § * § i t § I § 4 § * i i * i i s s i s m u z < u mm2~<01(m to >F~J~Puz ZOHFDD—mhfluo musu wEQUhDO Lh—i Dmuum~PQ A u w a d > u 0 m a w > < — 4 4 POz¢ «m mHan 92 1. Rotter (1967) - Generalized Interpersonal Trust 2. Budner (1962) - Tolerance of Ambiguity 3. Christie and Geis (1970) - Machiavellianism Of the personality measures, neither Generalized Interpersonal Trust, machiavellianism nor Tolerance of Ambiguity offered added explanation to outcome variables of interst. The Christie-Geis measure was a statistically significant covariate for only one post- experiment measure--POST14, the belief that opponent was a reasonable person (F - 3.972 abd p = .048). As shown in Table 35, page 93, the Machiavellian bargainer felt opponent was not a reasonable person; finding that makes logical sense. It was unfortunate that so few significant findings could be derived from this study especially when some empirical evidence of their validity does exist. Summary of Results Results obtained from the collective bargaining simulation, a single wage negotiation issue, were generally significant in confirming hypothesized main effects of interdependence bonds. The findings were not so gratifying in terms of retaining the interaction research hypothesis. A brief summary of the research findings will be presented in this section with the focus being the specific hypothesized relation- ships stated in Chapters II, III and IV. In terms of the omnibus research hypothesis of Chapter II, significant main effects were reported in some instances for power distribution (PD) and motivation orientation (M0) . Interaction effects were not present for any of the four 93 “00.0 OQM.0 000.0 QMNoa MNn.O 00¢.0 MOQ.0 om0.0 ®m0.o 000.0 000.0 D¢0.0 000.0 m m9 muzuum N60.“ «$1.0 ~00.n M—M.~ «00.0 {00.0 ~00.0 Ono.n 0&0.” “No.fi N~—.h th.m NbO.” u mnu.~ aka.— 05m.o Nhn.~ moo.m hwfi.m mfi«.o~ 005.0 ~m0.m «mn.m UZqficm Zcu J<3in mZO~PU(umw£~ >DU ZU—h<_m<> mu MUQDOm ****§*&§*$*§*§§*§*‘§§***§*i§§i*Gfis—Qifiiwfi s w s s s * a s s s m U z 4 — maOUm Zm~z<~JJw><~IU ZD—h u 0 ZD~#~PUI Jouthno mmtua Zummwa wJD0 Quhmoa m a w > 4 < z 4 * s s s s r s * . . AHOHEUOz< m2” anmH 94 dependent variables in the two-factor (PD X MD) experimental design, but did occur in sporatic instances in the three-factor (PD X MO X ROLE) analyses. Statistically significant higher-order interactions were not present in this latter design. For the PD X MO factorial design hypothesized relationships were found for AGREE, ROUNDS, SETTLE and END by the power distribution (PD) independent variable. No significant relationships existed for any of the four dependent variables when motivation orientation (MO) was the main effect. As stated, there were no second-order interactions present in the 2 X 2 factorial design. Management or labor ROLE was added as a third factor to the above 2 X 2 factorial design. Process or outcome dependent variables of interest included R1, PAYOFF, CONCESS and CONAMT. Five post- exercise assessment variables were also used as dependent variables. Round fifteen offer was analyzed in an attempt to see if the penalty period had an impact on the bargainers. Although MO was no longer significant, the PD X MO interaction was significant. The hypothetical payoff earned by each side at the end of the exercise was significant for PD and ROLE. All three main effect hypothesis for both concession variables were confirmed (except for CONCESS by MD). No significant second—order interactions were present for either dependent variable. In reviewing the PD X.MO X ROLE factorial design it is apparent that power distribution main effect was extremely potent and may have cancelled some hypothesized motivation orientation effects. In addition, the role factor was also powerful--probab1y because bargainers may be reacting to the manipulators By exhibiting real world 95 behaviors. Post-experiment assessment variables displayed a mixed pattern of significance. For the satisfaction with outcomes variable, POST11, both PD and M0 were significant although.opposite to anticipated direction. POST14, belief that the opponent was a reasonable opponent, was correctly predicted by theory for all three factors. The remaining dependent measures, POST12, POST16 and POST15 did not show any predicted results. The final section in this chapter reported findings on the use of covariates with PD X‘MO X ROLE factorial design. A newly created covariate, cognitive-manipulative set (CMS), proved to be a significant variable in explaining additional experimental variation during the progress of the exercise. Outcome variables were not significant though. Use of sex and nationality covariates proved rewarding affected the round one opening offer, the payoff earned, and each of the concession variables (as predicted). Little of noteworthy findings could be gleaned from the post-exercise variables. Statistical analysis of two factorial designs and the use of covariates with a design yielded the results presented in this chapter. Hypothesized findings were discussed and, where applicable, confirmed. The last chapter of this study will focus on reviewing confirmation and discrepancy of predictions, implications of this research effort on theory and future research, and identifying study limitations so future research can become incrementally more sophisticated. Chapter V. Discussion and Conclusions Indeed, it is most gratifying when the hypothesized results of an experimental laboratory simulation prove statistically significant. Gratifaction is enhanced when additional analyses uncover findings of experimental importance and lastly, the administrator feels extremely pleased when the subjects verbally report that they "really got into the exercise" with attendant feelings toward their bargaining opponents. This was especially true for dyads negotiating underthe equal power - competitive motivation orientation condition. This chapter contains a report on the major statistical findings - and why certain hypotheses were retained and possible reasons why others were not confirmed as anticipated. The implications of the findings, both on this research and potential future research, is discussed. Emphasis will be placed on discussion of the limitations of the study, especially potentially confounding effects. The chapter will conclude with some theoretical observations on the importance of bargaining in our society and suggestions for replication research. The principal intent of this research was to study the effect of Rubin and Brown's (1975) interdependence bonds (power distribution and motivation orientation) on negotiated outcomes in an experimental wage negotiation simulation. A third parameter in their framework, interpersonal orientation, was not 97 utilized in this study. A conceptual foundation for bargaining behavior, social exchange or interaction theory, suggests several omnibus research hypotheses for the independent parameters H1: Pairs perceiving equality of power will bargain more effectively than pairs perceiving inequality of status. H23 Subjects receiving instructions inducing a cooperative motivation orientation will bargain more effectively than those receiving competitive instructions. H3: Bargainers with equal power and a cooperative motivation orientation will tend to function more effectively than those of unequal power and competitive motivation orienta- tion. It was previously suggested that behaviors and outcomes in negotiations are a consequence of a cost/benefit or input/output ratio perceived by the bargainer. According to the research hypotheses above, dyads would strive to be more effective (engage in cooperative outcomes) bargainers when they perceive this ratio as being in balance. Imbalances perceived as being inequitable will result in competitive behavioral outcomes. For this collective bargaining simulation, empirical evidence on the dependent measures suggests the following relationships 98 A. PD X MD Factorial Design 1. 2. 10. 11. 12. 13. Discussion of the AGREE - greater number of dyads reaching agreement ROUNDS - fewer rounds to agreement SETTLE - greater amount of settlement END - smaller differential at end of simulation X ROLE Factorial Design R1 - greater initial opening offer PAYOFF - greater labor or management payoff CONAMT - greater difference between opening offer and settlement CONCESS — smaller differential between settlement and $0.85 implicit midpoint POST11 - greater satisfaction with outcome POST12 - greater desire to settle before penalty POST14 - greater belief that opponent was a reasonable person POST15 - lesser belief that initial difference was great POST16 - greater desire to settle before round 20 research findings is organized according to factorial design or covariates. Where applicable implications and recommendations are included. PD X MO Factorial Design Very little disagreement as to the anticipated effect of unequal distribution of power or competitive motivation orientation of negotiations exists among social psychologists. Considering the motivation orientation 99 aspect first, Deutsch's (1960) experimental instructions for c00perative, competitive and individualistic cognitive disposition toward opponent have served as models for many bargaining experiments. Several studies employing the Prisoners Dilemma report findings similiar to Deutsch. The only research employing the Bilateral Monopoly paradigm (as the simulation did) indicated partial contradiction to predicted effects; but only used the cooperative and individualistic levels of the factor. Schenitzki (1963) reports that under conditions of no communications, individualistic MO bargainers made greater profits - (contrary to theory). One plausible explanation is that individual goal setting confounds the main effect. In other words cooperators may not have felt the need to maximize gain. It is unfortunate that concession variables are not reported, but the initial offer for individualists was significantly more extreme, a finding anticipated through theory and replicated by this research (see PD X MO X ROLE section to follow). It is interesting to note that MO was not statistically significant for any of the four dependent variables. To this author one possible explanation is that the power distribution main effect was so potent that potential differences in motivation orientation were cancelled. To briefly summarize the MO variable, there is certainly an indication of the value of continued use of Deutsch's experimental manipulations. The relevant citations on power distribution are many and generally conclusive (although power is a highly complex phenomena). \\ 100 As evidenced from empirical literature the experimental means of man- ipulation power are varied. In this study the perceived historical and current relationship between labor and management was termed equal or unequal. Unequal PD was characterized as a degree of power discrepancy as perceived by self or an obvious imbalance position in social exchange theoretic terms. Komorita and Barnes (1969) varied power in a Bilateral Monoply situation between buyer and seller. They found that equal power dyads reached agreement more often and required fewer trials to do so) than unequal power bargainers. Note the similar replication findings in this research. In both instances, dyads functioned more effectively in the equal power situation as evidenced by the mean settlement being closer to the implicit midpoint. The ending differential reaffirms the cooperative outcomes of equal power; that being a smaller differential. In a second study employing the Bilateral Monoply Hornstein (1965) had subjects participate in a real estate simulation. With respect to the effects of power equality inspection of the results shows a partial confirmation (although not significant) of theory. One potential problem was that there were six levels of threat potential and this research had only the equal-unequal dichotomy. As for the PD variables, theory and findings appear in unison. PD X MO X ROLE Factorial Design. Adding the role factor to the existing design was a necessity in order to analyze outcome and post-experiment assessments for each 101 subject rather than joint outcomes for the dyad. As before, significant main effects were hypothesized for the power distri- bution and motivation orientation variables. Although no literature was cited to suggest that a role variable would be significant, historical norms in collective bargaining might dictate such a hypothesis. Referring to the Komorita and Barnes (1969) study they also reported that equal power pairs made larger concessions than pairs with unequal power. While findings in this study related to individuals the results were conclusive and in agreement with the study using dyads. It is unfortunate that the hypothesized higher order inter- actions were not significant for either design. In retrospect it appears as if the power distribution and role variables, in concert, are highly significant for the payoff and concession variables, but not for the round one initial offer. At the onset of bargaining, the two pervasive forces, one experimental and one cultural, appear to outweigh the predicted findings. Later, as bargaining progresses, the role variable becomes less powerful and significant interactions are allowed to emerge. While this belief alone cannot be considered as confirmation of hypotheses it certainly lends credibility to the study. Covariates Employment of covariates in this study was felt necessary because of the small number of females and non-caucasians participating 102 in the research. Personality variables had been employed in the past with mixed results and the inconclusive evidence of these findings only serves to maintain the status quo. Lastly, the con- gruence of experimental manipulation and the individual's cognitive disposition towards other was a covariate which was found to be an effective predictor of round by round measures, but diminished when final outcomes were analyzed. The sex and nationality covariates require some, albeit brief, explanation. While many studies can be cited which point to significant sex differences there is no decisive tendency for females to behave more cooperatively or competitively than males. Many such contradictory studies exist. The same ambiguity holds true for the nationality variable--there is no clear cut evidence to indicate that the "cultural natives" bargain in a consistent predictable manner. The obvious implication is that a homogenous sample (e.g., all males) be used in future research or that sex be treated as a practical objective rather than a statictal by- product. A last word about cognitive-manipulative set is merited. Under the disguise of ramdom assignment, how many true differences have been concealed by the incongruence postulate? Future research would be fruitfully served by a thorough investigation into the random assignment assumption of experimental design. At the very least, the researcher could be armed with a series of semantic differential composites of the experimental manipulations with which to test preconceived beliefs about outcomes. The rewards might be well worth the effort. 103 Limitations If criticism is to be leveled at the wage negotiation exercise, and some is certainly warranted, then it should be categorized according to its overall effect on the findings and their applicability to bargaining theory. This section will be divided into discussion on (1) the theory of bargaining, (2) the physical conduct of the simulation and the statistical analysis. Based upon the discussion preceeding this section and a critique of the exercise, it should be possible to make recommendations as to the directions for future research. Bargaining Theory At the onset it was noted that there is no unified theory of bargaining or negotiations, one which would accurately and consistently predict both social psychological behaviors and perceptions or theoretic game optima. Human nature, being what it is, dictates individual differences and individual differences dictate unpredictability. In addition to the unpredictable nature of the human, it is not at all clear that a bargainer operates under a social exchange or mutual relationships framework. For instance, in this research we have virtually ignored such potentially powerful driving forces such as anxiety or fear; depressive reaction; ego needs; the achievement, power, affiliation, and security motives; and such collective bargaining issues as prevailing wage rates comparability, and fluctuating public sympathies for labor or manage- ment. Certainly, each is situational in nature, highly dynamic 104 and difficult to quantify. Inclusion of such variables in a study precludes parsimony-wone:of the central tenets of research. Even in bargaining theory, as with all theories of human behavior, the researcher is faced with two conflicting alternatives - - simplify (and risk missing important effects and interactions) or quantify (and risk creating such a highly complex situation that concise analysis is virtually impossible). At the over-simplification level, power distribution and motivation orientation certainly do not adequately describe real world-bargaining behaviors and outcomes. Yet to replicate previous research and make contributions to advancing the theory this is ex- actly what must be done. As in previous empirical research on bargaining, this simulation found significant main effects for the two independent parameters. Analogies exist in the real world. In strategic arms limitation talks, the equal power distribution between two leading nations certainly affects the negotiated outcomes. Kissinger, in his heyday, was variouSly characterized as cooperative or competative in his dealings with adversaries. His demeanor certainly had an effect on outcomes. Lastly, in the field of collective bargaining, one hears of conflict almost daily. Some unions are known for militancy; for having an acknowledged power edge over management. In the not to recent past, Teamsters and Miners strikes serve as exemplary situations. In many areas of the country the Garment WOrkers are 105 noted for their cooperative endeavors with management in seeking to maintain employment and blunt foreign imports. The auto companies and Auto Wbrkers seem equally powerful at the bargaining table. We all realize that real world negotiations are complex behavioral phenomena with the public rarely ever knowing the true history about the parties. Plea bargaining, lately pervasive in our society, provides a case study. Prosecution and defense argue legal subtlties; municipal, state and federal criminal law; defendant's past criminal record; jail crowding conditions; experimental rehabil- itation programs; recidivism rates; and a host of other ideals before arriving at an agreement. This complex situation cannot be replicated in the laboratory (nor would the researcher necessarily want to do so). The dilemma over bargaining theory (simplification or elaboration) cannot neatly be resolved. Social exchange theories seem to be a plausible explanation for laboratory as well as real world bargaining endeavors. The former setting allows for both methodohigical and statistical control of variables which collective bargaining behaviors exhibit a multi-attribute nature. The only practical recourse is to (1) continue as we have in the past seeking additional explanation, (2) actively develop alternative schemes for predicting bargaining outcomes and (3) test these beliefs against the present social exchange foundation. The behavioral sciences will surely benefit from the renewed effort. Should any reader seek to use this experimental design, its procedural or manipulative instructions and dependent measures, or theoretic base, the following discussion of the simulation and statistical analyses is intended to be instructive as well as conceptual. 106 Simulation and Statistical Analysis The wage negotiation was felt to be an intense, theoretically conceptualized and realistic attempt to model bargaining behaviors. The realm of collective bargaining was selected because it is a widely publicized medium for the resolution of conflictive situations. A vast majority of the subjects could enter into the simulation believing their contribution to be meaningful. Rationale for the use of power distribution motivation orientation and interpersonal orientation is sound. Interdependence bonds of mutual relationships do exhibit both structural and social psychological components (Cross—1969). Relationships between parties, characterized as being in conflict, can be studied using the theoretical framework of social exchange or comparison. While the wage negotiation exercise did not explicitly test the individuals cognitive map of input/output ratios, the Social exchange hypotheses seem a reasonable interpretation of real world collective bargaining behavior. The simulation itself is too long (too many rounds) to be attempted when face to face contact is not permitted. While there appears to be an interesting pattern of incremental concessions taking place over the course of the bargaining, the initial offer, final settlement and concession rate or magnitude are the major dependent variables of interest. These would still be valid even in a shorter simulation. 107 Care should be taken to insure that subjects cannot see the responses of other bargainers in the same facility because failure to do so might result in the subtle encouragement toward prolonging the exercise. The computer would be an ideal mechanism by which the independence asSumption can be maintained. Prospective researchers should explore different scoring and incentive schemes for the payoff matrices. As mentioned previously, sex, nationality and some personality measures proved interesting covariates. Some attempt should be made to provide for other than statistical control for sex and nationality. Historical success with administering, scoring and analyzing personality measures will be prime determinants in which measures to use. Lastly, readers are urged to contact this author personally for subjective comments on the conduct of this simulation. Portents for Future Research Confirmation of the omnibus hypotheses were found in the data gathered from the wage negotiation exercise, a simulation of collective bargaining outcomes and behaviors. The written experimental manipulation for power distribution was significant; in fact extemely potent. If recent experience with the striking Teasmsters or Miners is a true indication of the feelings of the union membership, then power distribution will continue to be significant in simulations modeled after collective bargaining situations. In short, the wage negotiation appears to be a valid means of depicting power distributions. 108 Rubin and Brown (1975) offer suggestions on methodology to vary power. Future research could continue to use the equal-unequal dichotomy (as it is significant), vary the payoff or reward structure or employ different experimental manipulations to vary power. The motivation orientation factor is relevant to social psychological process and should continue to be employed in research. Effort should be expended to insure that the power factor . (structural) does not overwhelm the behavioral dimension. Perhaps a physical manipulation of power (e.g., seating arrangements, provision for communications or departure from a bargaining schedule, or inclusion of a constituency variable) could be combined with the Deutsch (1960) experimental written instructions in an attempt to discover interaction effects. The final interdependence bond, interpersonal orientation, is also social psychological in nature. The most frequently employed manipulation, physical manipulation of seating or inter- action, does not accurately model interpersonal behaviors. In fact, physical manipulation of IO might be confounded with either written or physical manipulation of power. Care must be taken to insure that interaction effects can theoretically occur in the design. The handling of role, either managment or labor, can possibly cause carryover interaction effects due to the extreme power of the role variable. Three possible alternatives to this dilemma exist. 109 First, alternate the starting role so that labor does not always get to see management's opening offer. Second, force both management and labor to stipulate an initial offer before seeing the bids. In effect, sequential bargaining begins in the second round. Last, specify predetermined initial positions and let bargaining commence from that point. The last area for potential research lies in using real world bargainers in a pseudo—Validation study. The public sector offers a fertile testing arena because one-on-one bargaining frequently takes place in merit and promotional schemes between labor and management. If real world bargainers operated according to theory; and their outcomes potential or effectiveness could be measured in a laboratory experiment, then an ideal medium exists for testing negotiation ability in advance of an crisis or potentially crippling situation. Appendices Appendix A ‘—‘- Interpersonal Orientation Measure 1110 Please indicate your feelings about these statements about people by circling the response you feel is most appropriate. 10. ll. 12. strongly agree agree neither agree or disagree disagree strongly disagree 0 “AuNu—I The judiciary is a place where we can all get unbiased treatment. If we really knew what was going on in inter- national politics, the public would have more reason to be frightened than they now seem to be. In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until they have provided evidence that they are trustworthy. It is safe to believe that in spite of what people say, most people are primarily interested in their own welfare. Using the Honor System of not having a teacher 'present during exams would probably result in increased cheating. ‘Most idealists are sincere and usually practice what they preadh. Hypocrisy is on the increase in our society. Even though we have reports in newspapers, ‘radio and television, it is hard to get objec- tive accounts of public events. Parents usually can be relied upon to keep their promises . Most salesmen are honest in describing their products. The future seems very promising. Most experts can be relied upon to tell the ‘truth about the limits of their knowledge. Use the pattern: SA Appendix B - Pre-EXperiment Assessments 111. lflease indicate your feelings about these descriptions by circling the response you feel is most appropriate. >. >. H >, >‘ 1—4 0 H H r-C 0 5 2 i3 3:” 5 H >. on e: no >. a u u -a s -n a H X 0 H Q3 H 0 K m > U) 2 U) > a: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Interaction. Think of experiences in the past when you have interacted with one other person. In:general, would you consider yourself: Fair 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 Exploitive Strong 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 Weak Deceptive l 2 3 4 5 6 7 Honest Trusting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Suspicious Yielding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unyielding Self-description. The following are some terms used to describe ourselves and others. Ingeneral, would you consider yourself: ~ Democratic 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 Autocratic Emotional l 2 3 4 5 6 7 Rational Cooperative 1 2 3 4 5 6 .7 Competitive Submissive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Dominant Other-Centered l 2 3 4 S 6 . 7 Self-Centered Attributes. Certain terms are used to describe human behavior and personality. In general, how would you describe yourself: Risk Seeker 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Risk Avoider Abstract Thinker 1 2 3 4 -5 6 7 Concrete Thinker Intolerant of Ambiguity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Tolerant of Ambiguity Seek Friendships 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Avoid Friendships Willing to Compromise 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 Unwilling to Compromise {l12 Please use the same response pattern (strongly agree to strongly disagree) as used on the previous page. ‘ 13. 14. 15. l6. 17. '18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict. The most important thing a child should learn is obedience to parents. A few strong leaders could make this country better.than all the laws and talk.- Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power. Women should stay out of politics. An insult to your honor should not be forgotten. People can be trusted. An expert who doesn't come up with a definite answer probably doesn't know too much. Often the most interesting and stimulating people are those who don't mind being different and original. Many of our most important decisions are based upon insufficient information. A good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be done are always clear. I like parties where I know most of the people more than ones where all or most of the people are complete strangers. There is really no such thing as a problem that can't be solved. People who fit their lives to a schedule probably miss most of the joy of living. Teachers or supervisors who hand out vague assign- ments give a chance for one to show initiative and creativity. A N 0890009. D 50 “113 Please use the same response pattern (strongly agree to strongly disagree) as used on the previous page. 28. 31. 32. 33. 35. People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don't know how complicated things really are. It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a simple one. A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of looking at things. The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better. I would like to live in a foreign country for a while. Nhat'we are used to is always preferable to what in unfamiliar. In the long run, it is possible to get more done by tackling small, simple problels rather than large and complicated ones. A person who leads an even, regular life in which flaw surprises or unexpected happenings arise, really has a lot to be grateful for. SA SD 1. 1111 For each of the following twenty sets of statements, indicate which statement is most true(T) and which is most false (F) in the space provided before each statement. Obviously, one statement must be left blank. Ill HI H! H! lll It takes more imagination to be a successful criminal than a successful business man. The phrase, "the road to hell is paved with good irtentions" contains a lot of truth. Most men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their property. Men are more concerned with the car they drive than with the clothes their wives wear. It is very important that imagination and creativity in children be cultivated. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly to death. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so. The well-being of the individual is the goal that should be worked for before anything else. Since most people don't know what they want, it is only reasonable fer ambitious people to talk them into doing things. People are getting so lazy and self-indulgent that it is bad for our country. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear. It would be a good thing if people were kinder to others less fortunate than themselves. Mbst people are basically good and kind. The best criteria for a wife or husband is compatibility - other characteristics are nice but not essential. Only after a man has gotten what he wants from life should he concern himself with the injustices in the world. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives. Any man worth his salt shouldn't be blamed for putting his career above his family. People would be better off if they were concerned less with how to do things and more with what to do. A good teacher is one who points out unanswered questions rather than gives explicit answers. When you ask someone to do something, it is best to give the real reasons for wanting it rather than giving reasons which might carry more weight. A person's job is the best single guide as to the sort of person he is. 10. ll. 12. 13. 14. c n 1115 The construction of such monumental works as the Egyptian pyramids was worth the enslavement of the workers who built them. Once a way of handling problems has been worked out it is best to stick to it. One should take action only when sure it is morally right. The world would be a much better place to live in if people would let the future take care of itself and concern them- selves only with enjoying the present. It is wise to flatter important people. Once a decision has been made, it is best to keep changing it as new circumstances arise. It is a good policy to act as if you are doing the things you do because you have no other choice. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are stupid enough to get caught. Even the most hardened and vicious criminal has a spark of decency somewhere within him. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be important and dishonest. A man who is able and willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding in whatever he wants to do. If a thing does not help us in our daily lives, it isn‘t very important. A person shouldn’t be punished for breaking a law that he thinks is unreasonable. Too many criminals are not punished for their crimes. There is no excuse for lying to someone else. Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they are forced to do so. Every person is entitled to a second chance, even after he commits a serious mistake People who can’t make up their minds are not worth bothering about. A man's first reSponsibility is to his wife, not his mother. Host men are brave. It's best to pick friends that are intellectually stimulating rather than ones it is comfortable to be around. 15. l6. 17. 18. 19. 20. C116 There are very few people in the world worth concerning oneself about. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there. A capable person motivated for his own gain is more useful to society than a well-meaning but ineffective one. It is best to give others the impression that you can change your mind easily. It is a good working policy to keep on good terms with everyone. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.' It is possible to be good in all respects. To help oneself is good; to help others even better. War and threats of war are unchangeable facts of human life. Barnum was probably right when he said that there’s at least one sucker born every minute. Life is pretty dull unless one deliberately stirs up some excitement. Most people would be better off if they control their emotions. Sensitivity to the feelings of others is worth more than poise in social situations. The ideal society is one where everybody knows his place and accepts it. . It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given a chance. People who talk about abstract problems usually don‘t know what they are talking about. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking fer trouble. It is essential for the functioning of a democracy that every- one vote. ' +—ijf 1137 Please indicate your feelings about this experential exercise by circling the response you feel is most appropriate. Opponent. How would you rate your bargaining opponent in the negotiation? Strong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Weak Cooperative l 2 3 4 5 6 7 Competitive Fair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Exploitive Other-Centered l 2 3 4 5 6 7 Self-Centered Yielding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unyielding §21g, How would you rate yourself in the negotiation process? Strong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Weak Cooperative l 2 3 4 5 6 7 Competitive Fair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Exploitive Other-Centered l 2 3 4 5 6 7 Self-Centered Yielding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unyielding Outcomes. Please indicate your feelings about these statements about the exercise by circling the response you feel is most appropriate. Use 1 strongly agree 2 agree 3 neither agree nor disagree 4 disagree 5 strongly disagree I was satisfied with my outcome on the neogitation. I wanted to make sure we settled before the penalty period. I wanted to do a good job on this exercise. My bargaining opponent seemed to be a reasonable person. The intital difference in bargaining positions between me and my opponent was great. It was important to me to reach agreement within the twenty round limit. I am confident that I earned more than my opponent. I would likeito take part in a negotiation like this one again. SA SD Appendix D'- Procedural InStructions Role: IL18 WAGE NEGOTIATION EXERCISE Instructions for Management Baggainer Labour Services Coordinator Windsor Electrical Contractor's Association Windsor, Ontario 119 WAGE NEGOTIATION EXERCISE Instructions for Labour Bargainer Role: Business Agent International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 1773 Windsor, Ontario 1120 Exercise Objective: Labour and management will engage in bargaining process to be carried out by means of written offers and counteroffers. The task for the two of you is to negotiate a single agreement on the increase in hourly pay for the next one year of the contract You have been paired at random with one other person in this room. You will not be permitted to speak to this person or any other person engaged in or watching this bargaining exercise. Read your role instructions carefully! Experimental Manipulations here (1% pages) I'ts nearly time to begin the bargaining exercise. Think about your opening proposal and the final negotiated settlement. The initial offer or counteroffer is left solely to your discretion. In the prenegotiation strategy sessions our side decided to start somewhere about twenty-five cents from the extreme limit, but also that it would be dependent upon how the other issues were resolved prior to this wage negotiation. Read over these role instructions again. As a strategy think about an initial opening offer and what your opponent will open with. Try and determine where (what amount) and when (what round you feel the final settlement should occur. Bargaining will be in about five minutes. 121. Bargaining Instructions A table entitled "Management Payoff Table" has been furnished to you. The full range of management offers and counteroffers ($/hour Wage Increase) are listed on the payoff table. Corresponding net savings in labor costs or "Management Profit" is also shown on that same sheet. For example, if you and labor agree on a wage increase of $0.12/hour you will receive a payoff of $5.40 which will be paid to you as a bonus. For a settlement of $1.18/hour you will receive $0.10 as a bonus. You will not be told the bonus award we are paying labor. In general, wage rate agreements which give management a high 'profit' will result in a low 'profit' to your opponent. The opposite also holds true. Your range of possible payoffs may be higher or lower than your opponent's range of possible payoffs depending on specific bargaining strategy instructions the labor team may be following. The neogitation will begin by you stipulating a wage rate increase to be considered the initial offer. You may choose any hourly wage rate increase between $0.00 and $1.70/hour in whole cent increments. Once you have chosen a specific wage rate offer, you can ngzg£_make an offer which is lgwg£_than the initial offer. In other words, you do not have to increase your offer in subsequent rounds, but once an offer is made, in cannot be reduced by you. The Bargaining Process The bargaining process is to be conducted as follows. You will write your initial wage offer in column "A" on the yellow sheet labeled "wage Offers" .122 This yellow sheet will then be taken to your opponent. Labor then must either accept your offer or make a wage counteroffer of its own. If the offer is accepted, labor will write "accept" next to your offer--otherwise a counter- proposal will appear in column "B". Just as for you, your opponent, once an offer is made, cannot increase that offer on subsequent rounds. However, your opponent may stick to an offer--there is no obligation to reduce the wage demand. You may not write messages on the "wage Offers" sheet, or communicate with your opponent in any way except by the offer by counteroffer negotiation process. You are also provided a second "Wage Offer" sheet which you should use to keep a round by round summary of your offers and your opponent's counter offers. In addition, in column "C" you would keep track of the payoff you would receive if your offer on that round was accepted. For example, if you offered $0.48/hour to your opponent and a counteroffer of $1.22/hour was tendered you should list both of these offers in columns "A" and "B" and in column "C" list the actual payoff associated with your offer of $0.48/hour which is $3.60 as a bonus. The bargaining process will continue until one of you writes "accept" on the "wage Offer" sheet (the yellow one). Note that only one agreement is to be made between the two of you. As soon as you reach an agreement, please remain seated until you receive further instructions. You and your bargaining opponent will be given 20 rounds (a round is one offer and counteroffer and is labeled as such on the "Wage Offer" sheet) to reach agreement. 'If’at the end of 20 raunds you have not reached_ag£eement, the bargainingsession will end and bath you'and_your opponent will begpaid nothing (zero payoff) for the session. If you do reach an agreement you will 1123 be paid as a bonus an amount equal to the "profit" shown on your payoff table. In addition to having at most 20 rounds to reach an agreement, there is one other restriction to the bargaining. Since the possibility of a strike exists, you and your opponent will each be penalized 5% per round of your "profit" for every round it takes you past round number 15 to reach an agreement. As in the real world, there is a "cost"5to both management and labor to withstand a strike of any duration. As an example, if you agree on round 19 to settle at a wage rate increase of $0.70, your payoff will be $2.00 based on a profit of $2.50 minus a penalty of $0.50 which is 20% or 5% per round beyond round number 15. Your opponent will also be penalized 20% of the payoff. If you have any questions about the negotiation process or the payoff table, please ask them now. Do not, inquire about or suggest appropriate bargaining strategies at any time today. As in the real world, there is no correct solution--any of the wage rate increases shown on your payoff table is possible. At the end of the process you and your opponent will be paid the bonus and dismissed separately and you will not be allowed to talk to or discern the opponent's identity. Round .124 wage Offers Record Sheet Instructions: On this sheet keep track of your offers and your opponent's counteroffers. Management offers go in column "A" and labour offers go in column "B". Be sure to record your anticipated payoff if the other side accepts your offer in column "C". A B C Management Labour Anticipated Number Wage Offers wage Offers Payoff if Accepted 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. .125 Management Payoff Table Negotiated Negotiated $/hour Wage Management $lhour Wage Management Increase Profit Increase Profit $0.00 $6.00 $1.00 $1.00 0.02 5,90 1.02 0.90 0.04 5,30 1.04 0.80 0-06 5,70 1.06 0.70 0.08 5,60 1.08 0.60 0.10 5.50 1.10 0.50 0.12 5,40 1.12 0.40 0-14 5,30 1.14 0.30 0.16 5,20 1.16 0.20 0.18 5,10 1.18 0.10 0-20 5.00 1.20 0.00 0.22 4,90 1.22 -0.10 0.24 4,30 1.24 -0.20 0-26 4.70 1.26 -0.30 0-28 4,60 1.28 -0.40 0.30 4.50 1.30 -0.50 0.32 4,40 1.32 -0.60 0.34 4,30 1.34 -0.70 0.36 4.20 1.36 -0.80 0.38 4.10 1.38 —0.90 0.40 4.00 1.40 -1.00 0.42 3,90 1.42 -1.10 0.44 3,30 1.44 -1.20 0.46 3.70 1.46 -1.30 0.48 3.60 1.48 -1.40 0.50 3,50 1.50 -1.50 0.52 3,40 1.52 -1.60 0.54 3.30 1.54 -1.70 0.56 3.20 1.56 -1.80 0.58 3.10 1.58 -1.90 0.60 3,00 1.60 -2.00 0.62 2.90 1.62 -2.00 0.64 2.80 1.64 -2.00 0.66 2.70 1.66 -2.00 0.68 2.60 1.68 -2.00 0.70 2.50 1.70 -2.00 0-72 2.40 0-74 2.30 0-76 2.20 0.78 2.10 0-80 2.00 °~82 1.90 0-34 1.80 0-36 1.70 0-88 1.60 0-90 1.50 0-92 1.40 0-94 1.30 0-96 1.20 0.98 1.10 .126 Labour Payoff Table Negotiated Negotiated $/hour wage Labour $/hour Wage Labour Increase Profit Increase Profit $0.00 $-2.00 $1.00 $2.50 0.02 -2.00 1.02 2.60 0.04 -2.00 1.04 2.70 0.06 -2.00 1.06 2.80 0.08 -2.00 1.08 2.90 0.10 -2.00 1.10 3.00 0.12 -1.90 1.12 3.10 0.14 -l.80 1.14 3.20 0.16 —l.70 1.16 3.30 0.18 -1.60 1.18 3.40 0.20 —1.50 1.20 3.50 0.22 -l.40 1.22 3.60 0.24 -1.30 1.24 3.70 0.26 -1.20 1.26 3.80 0.28 -1.10 1.28 3.90 0.30 -1.00 1.30 4.00 0.32 -0.90 1.32 4.10 0.34 -0.80 1.34 4.20 0.36 -0.70 1.36 4.30 0.38 -0.60 1.38 4.40 0.40 -0.50 1.40 4.50 0.42 -0.40 1.42 4.60 0.44 -0.30 1.44 4.70 0.46 -0.20 1.46 4.80 0.48 -0.01 1.48 4.90 0.50 0.00 1.50 5.00 0.52 0.10 1.52 5.10 0.54 0.20 1.54 5.20 0.56 0.30 1.56 5.30 0.58 0.40 1.58 5.40 0.60 0.50 1.60 5.50 0.62 0.60 1.62 5.60 0.64 0.70 1.64 5.70 0.66 0.80 1.66 5.80 0.68 0.90 1.68 5.90 0.70 1.00 1.70 6.00 0.72 1.10 0.74 1.20 0.76 1.30 0.78 1.40 0.80 1.50 0.82 1.60 0.84 1.70 0.86 1.8- 0.88 1.20 0.90 2.00 0.92 2.10 0.94 2.20 0.96 2.30 0.98 2.40 Appendix E - Experimental Manipulations .127 .:mwocm>mauw mama» so wsaasu un kaHom wsa>fia .:mma3 he saw? vammm H amnu momma usoaowmsma new m mxms ow to: H ma m>hmum v.H: wmusmaaoo am>m usonma ou wsfismumfia maHu whoa madam w.H: vousoaaoo mm: usmammuwm mnma HMUOAIfiOHumHoomm¢ mnu saws ao>m mm: usoamouwm mnna HmooqlsOHumHoomm< onu umHHHamm .uoumuuwnum Hmooa < .huumavafi mnu :H Sufi: umwfiwamm .uoumuuanum Hmuoa < .huumsvsfi wsu Hmnuo ham umnu uH umsfimwm vmafim moosm>waum Hosow a“ umnuo mam amnu uH umswmwm wmawm moosm>mwuw whoa mm: noaumwoomm< mnu .uodm CH .wanmum haufimM mm: sowumuoomm< mnu .uomm :H .mHHuwHo> manwwa mg mg afismaoaumfimu manna umnu caosx Hams ma u“ .zuu aasmsoaumawu uwwnu umsu azosx HH03 ww uH .%uum=waa Imsvsa sowuoouumaoo mnu wmwaounaoo umnu msuum mnu soauoauumcoo onu wmwunaoo umnu mahwm onu swnufiz swnuas .Hsmmmmoosm hasuu soon mm: awsmsoaumaou .oco Hammmmooomas kammouw m soon was awnmso«umaou muwxuos Hmofiuuuoamlsofiumwoomm< w.uouomuusoo mnu mumxuoa HmoauuooHMIaoaumHoomm< m.HOuomuuaoo m:u.mwuvaMum wsfisamwumn usoaowmsmalusonma Ham hm .wvumvsmum wswafimwumn usmaowmamaluaonma Ham hm .ommouosa .oHnHmmon unmaoauuwm ammo hum> oau samuno Ou mwmz >uuoommmwumm kHHmauaa m muMHuowm: ou mo wouosuumafi soon m>ms 5oz .hHHmonwooam .maowmfi>oua Iuosuumafi sown m>ms och .hHHmonwoonm .msowmfi>oua uowuusoo uswmmua Hmuw>mm can mwmamao Houwamomw waw>fia uomuucoo ucmmmua Hmum>mm can momsmHu Houmflmomm mo uwoo m “mamaa sowmsoa mam .Hmusmv .Hmoficoa osu wsfi>aa mo umou a madman dogmaoa can .Hmusmv .Hmoa InmmSmmH mewsamwumn uohma oau so usmamauumm mmaaoua lama onullmmawma wsHsHmwumn “ohms mnu so monomou 1800 m wawsommu amps ca hHuooa meow m>mn Emou we“ soon o>m£ mmmwaouaaoo uncuommmaumm umnu wsw>ofiamn Iafimwuwn usom mo muonama umauo onu uMSu o>maamn so» .mGOfiuMHuowms Sufi: vmmmoaa mum mmauumn nuon .HMM .Hmm many .msfimaou umnu Ham ma osmmw owma onullwumv many .maamEou umnu Ham ma momma mwma maulloumw mwnu cu uowum wm>aommu zaamsuaa coon m>mn mucowm mfinu cu Hoaua vm>aommu kHHMSusa sown m>mn wvsmmm wsaaamwumn m.umm% mwnu so mmsmmfi Hmnuo HH¢ wswaamwumn m.umm% manu so mosmmfi Hosuo HH< umsom Hmsumsa poaom Hmawm . .vumom coaumamaH Hua< mau Eouw mwfiuasowmmww on uomaxm sow .hufiawnfimmoa mmaaouaaoo m wnfimn cmmBumn cw usuamuoaa ucmo maosa ham Suaa Mao: you o~.Hm ou oo.om aouw ma mwcmu manwmmfiauma mnu .mmmmmuosw wwm3 Ou uomammu nufiz .uomuusou so: wnu mo coauuoa sowumsfisuouov mwma mnu wow oHnHmaoammu mum cam Emmu mafiaamwumn mnu mo Honaoa m mum so» .uoma pooh mco Bo: m wsfiumauowma mo mmoooua mnu ca mum .mnna Hmooq .muoxuoz Hmoauuomam mo woonumSuoum HchHumcuouaH oSu mam coauMfioomm< m.u0uomuuaoo Hmofiuuooam nomvsfls one vasommmomm 2128 1 J0 HH Hku .usm: Ionao Hack saws uomucoo comm ou oomm cu memo ufi sons :xmm3: wswon mo cam .momamao uumuusoo Hmfiusommm maom wsfimoa mo .:uwwsa wsaonanz mo vomsoom haqua mums sch .owm mummh oau maowu Imfiuowos mo mason umma mnu wsausw .mosmumaa you .msoasasuomca AHHmuoa mam .o>aufiuoa Iaoo .Hsmuwmoow mm wouauouomumso somuma all usosomao wowsfimmumn Hamuosoa Mach Ou wovumvsa cm uHmm mzmaam m>mn 50> QHSmGOHumHmu ms“ Isfimwumn m>HuuoHHoo mafiumao> macu wswusn OH Hamo .wcwuumm How wanfimsoamou mama 90% scans moammw mSu so :ofiufimoa Hoawm m an 0>Huum cu mans mmmBHm mama nan meowmmsomflv Hmnum> coca :H umwmwso 30% «0 ayes .owm munch oau macaw Imwuowo: mo vasou umma mnu wsfiusw .ooamumafi pom .msoasasuom kaamuoa usn o>fiuauoasoo .oanmuHSUo mm voaauwuomumno somuom mllupmcoaao wswsamwumn poo» :ua3 oumnov m>fiuoocoua uan woumm: can mamaam o>mn 90% nanmsofiumamu wsfisfimwumn m>wuooHHoo oHAMum osu mufimmmo Ho HHmo .hufissaaoo mnu mam mmfiuuma noon mo umoumucfi umon onu :« on wasos omwsounaoo manmufiauw cm uaom hasuu so» muons osmma amasoauumn use so omaaoua Iaou mo monsoon mums sch .owm munch o3u macau Imwuowos mo mason ummH mau wswuov .oUGMumsH pom .m:oasaauom >Hamuoa mam o>aumumnooo .st Iuosom mm coagumuomumno common 6 sue: Hmwv ou zuauonusm ucmfiowmmsm usonua3 usn umcuumm usom ou amass uHom mhmafim m>mn so» awSmGOHumHmu mew Iafimwumn o>fiuomHHoo mHHumHo> menu mufiamon oo HHmo .mfivoa mam: onu ou uso vmxmoa um>o um: whoa NH muwasaaoo HmooH mnu ca mmosu hp vmumua Po [nousfimfia coon m>ms fiasco umnu momma %xo«um so wo>aommu hauomuomav :o% «0 Soon .owm muwo% aka msofiumwuowos mo canon ummH mnu wsfiusw .mosmumsfi pom .msoasnauom kHHmuoa cam .mHnmu lasso .m>aumumaooo mm pouauouomHNSU coupon ml: uwsuuma wafisfimwumn Mao» nuHB uuonamu amasmwsou am usoaamoxm was mhmBHm m>m£ sch magmaofiumamu wswawmwumn m>fiuumHHoo manmum mwnu wsfipan Hmsvmca Hmsvm coauanwuuman uoaom enrnrnadmog earneladooo uorqenuarao uornenrnon 129 .:%uH:=anu onu sH wsouum xOOH ou uow m>.03 .05 mo uso HHw: mnu umwn cu mucma on .ousm now can .ucmcoaao he umon ou uso Em H .uH um JOOH so» >m3 kq< .uonun mva uozuo onu ou mocmuommwv Ham oxma u.sov mwsHHoom >8 sosx H can 05 cu mosmuommHu usm mxma u.cov mmaHHmmw m.ucmsoaao >2 .chwm Honuo sumo mom ou m>m£ uo>os HH.03 mam ponuo comm soax u.sov 03 .an3 so» HH hmsoa no mmsmmw omOH smnu nonumu sHs ou usms omHm H usn .usmsoaao waHsHmmumn ham mo wmmnm use 0800 Ou ucma H ow zHao uoz .uamsoaao he amnu umuuwn ow ou omHm mam emu H mm mva %a now some mm sHs cu on vHoonm QOHum>Huoa wEHua he powwmsoo H wsficfimwumn :H away mNHmmnaEw we umH .msOHumHuomma mnu wsHuumum snowmm: wsHumm mm vmuosc mums ooh mafia umnu u< .hnaomOHHsn wchHmwumn usoz uaonm uoxmm mums 50% 303m meu oavmu unwfislmuoH a so 3003 ume o>HuHuomaou .:muHc=ano mnu so uomaafi mud cam msowumHou usmsmwwsmslusonMH you voow m.uH .OOu :aHB: cu mem Honuo mSu uswa omHm 03 and ::H3: cu mucus m: «0 50mm .mvuoa umzuo :H .omHm HHoa om cu we must m: .oamm onu hHuomxm mHoou on can ouOmmn nuwcmH um uH vmmmsomfic o>.93 .wme mHn now HHmB ow ou EH: usmB H can mva he now coo H as none mm ouMHuowo: ou usma H .EH: ou moamummmHv m oxwa mwcfiHmom 58 whom an H can we cu consummch m mxma mwsHHmmm mHm .ov 03 so; mmuwo on can .moov mch uHmnu HHos so: sumo H .mmmoH no msfiz on nonumna :« ummumuaa am m>ms or H .930 >5 mm HHms mm mummHoa m.nmcuumm us ca woumoumusfi an H .mums [anon on on mova noon umemsoo H wsHaamwumn 6H umnu mufimmnaam ma umH .msOHumHuowos mnu wcHuumum whommm: msfihwm mm kuoav mums sch oaHu umnu u< .asaomoHHnn wsHsHmwumn Hack uaonm voxmm mum: =o> 3ocm meu 0vau ustcaouMH a so #003 ume m>Humuoaooo sowumusmHuo :OHum>Huoz 130 flags Offers Instructions: ‘Management makes the first offer. Thereafter, a series of offers and counteroffers can be made by the labor and management sides in turn. Once either side is happy with the current round offer, write accept next to the offer just tendered. Otherwise, continue writing wage offers in the appropriate column. (Management offers in column "A" and labor offers in column ”3") Remember, there is s SZ_per round penalty after round 15, and if no agreement is reached by round 20, you and your opponent will receive zero payoff. "A" "B" Round Management . Labor Number wage Offers wage Offers 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 140 - ' 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. éBPe'ndix "G '3: $886 Program t v v w v v 131 uJXIONouflmx .H 0m macaw \ONZJ Oh «OCJumJX\ONa 0b uuflflax ZXHCJK .H cw mdomv \ONd Wk HOKHZX\ONmJ Ob HOmJume .0. ONE Oh OH! mZU~hJ(Z< J<30u>~02~ {*IW)UINE FOL OD*§§*§**I¥*§*§*§§§*‘iiiflsiiifififiifiiso*§§*§*§§§§§O§§ w-***§Q** NIP ZNW‘hmm wumOtwm mum>J~39~ OZ< O(>O MUZQIUmeZH Oh h ozumm—Z hzwzzDU mu m— EH E— k— whDQIDU PZNIIDU woouwa wooumm moouwm moouwm mmm szxzou Pcmzzuu htmtzou hzwzzou hzmIIUU 132 HONOHH XUHZNDI 02m Oh 0H 0H WH m02¢m J¢Uth10wa bDPNOI mMDDhHPb¢ 2300¢J30ua mmh¢UH02H hDhNDI IUHI mmODthh¢ h2m100¢2¢tluau mwh¢UH02H FOHNDI 304 ¢HN03+MHN03+VHNO§euo~us+ho~03+00~08uPOHNODm ¢HNH3+MHN03+NHN08+HHN03+OHN03 vwuN03+00N03+NON03+00NUI+mON0n+¢o~3t+MoN03+NONOI+HONODNPOFNDB .mNHHHéflmanflnHHNflQHHHflmv nHNflloNHN1!.movfisomON03oQ0N0:.MON03.NON0! 3HN0§ 0h HONDBIImm40¢H¢¢> bDQZH mZDHh!amOlmZ¢mh mNDDhth¢ Hzmzw042¢zlu300¢4 HOBOHH XUHZNDB AchuHH XUHZNOB ZHme MU¢¥U¢Q 20¢a 02w «oatm4hhm0Nh£¢ZOU .0 m2 thPme HOYOONGHHI¢ZOU .0 0w thhmmH mlm02001\momlthPmmnozmmOU HN CO H 0w h1mUU¢v OHIWOZDDI\OHEIIthmflfl02moHU HN 10 H Om thUU¢~ 002312\H0210Naumh¢2200 .0 0w hQMUU¢H m02002\HOEUmlhhmquh¢KZOU am 10 H Um thUU¢H Ofluuob¢Q HWH PU WDZDDQ 02¢ H 0w wJomH HHHMthwmfimloHfimOov*.1Hlm0230uvHIHUJhkmmimIOHflmu0>¢Q HmH #0 002302 02¢ 0 0w wJOEH wath§m+moNluulo>¢Q HmH N; 002302 02¢ H Um mJOGH thhUmemlonul0>¢Q HmH m4 mQZDoa 02¢ 0 cm MADE. #201200 #202200 bZNIEDU PZMISOU wbDQIOU whDQIOU mooumm hzwzzou hZNIIOU hzmllou h2m2200 hZMIIDU kH lH EH uH EH uH uH &H &H EH uH lH Ha. ONmJ 0h oHaJoONm 0h 0H1 mw34¢> UszmHz 133 as+a.z_u»_z_.xo cm 9.. \¢.m.s.~.n. .n.m.~.m.n.~.n.~.n.~.~ues \a._.~.~...u.~.m.a._.~.~.~.~.~._.~u¥o \aoo .ooo.wmo.smu.www.5eo.mno.nmo.~no.«no.ame.o.o.e~o.~ao._.o.oomnwwow u z ks+OHIOHH¥0 0w OHH \N.H.HoHoH oNo¢oooNe onoVoHonoH HeNo¢.NoN.No<.HoH fioH HoN.¢oNsNoNoHeN.N.cuhl \HaHeN.N.H .H HoH HaNoHou.N.N H HoHoNofluHawougmoH H How-NoN.HeHoN.NoHoN.Nn¥0 \couowoonoquOUoomu omwom mUonVoflm0.Nmooomuom¢ooh¢0gaooanduoncoamccoHomeocuomnoubnc omnOovaohNU mNO.¢N0.VND.OH3.OH0.«HUoNHoooHUo00.00o¢UoMWN a“ 0 hs+th¢QJmflth¢QDm H¥0 0w 0H0 \N N. :HoNoNoVoH No1aH. 0.”.Hun-Nuncnonomononewomflk. \Ho How He oHoNomaHoHoweHaHeNgfleHo H. H HoH.N.N.H-Nu¥0 \H00.o©0noncocwouHm0o0m0o0¢0o¢¢0.mcuaH00 oonoemnuo¢nu.m00.HnJ.OMUoNuOomNmenNU.HNuomeocHUomUocuuoH othm¢QDm H00 €00 0h HQ Hon¥2¢JmH €00 0h H0 900 U» HUIImem¢Hm¢> kDQZH mZDHh¢110mmZ¢Qh >IDHZM>ZH 71HHQHvuwm0lqum HHNOHv HJmele HHNOHH HJmeHIO ZHme h¢wum¢ 020 lH b¢mawa 00 thQZDU h¢mamm 02m l— h¢mam¢ 00 whDQIOU h¢mam¢ 020 EH h¢muma 00 mMDJ¢> thQIDU OszwHZ moouwm bzmzzuu bAwISOU hzwzzou 134 hn+wu3h¢zuwa3h¢2H¥0 Ow DHH \NomavoH.M.N.H.mon.H-M.H.4oHoeoHo¢.HoN.H.HoNoNoHocomothl \HoHoHomomoH-HoHoNoV.N.N.J.H.NoH.N.HoHomoH.N.NoN.HoN.N"¥0 \nouoHowaoou.1m0.fi¢0.cvu.n¢0.o¢ooonoo~00.mm0 ocmwonnwomwwommvoHNUoONUonHU.OHsgmHoonHoomHU.OH0.QU.OUoMUWHOu0H N 13h¢1 H3+mw02m0umm02002¥0 0m 0HH \HoH.HoHoH.H-H. H. :HuHoHoHoHoH.HoHoNoHoHuHoN.HNhI \d0~ONO‘O~OdONOd0JIdONC MONO—ONO‘ONONOdDNONOdO~uxo \QfiuooncoomoommUonU.mcooO¢0 .ocooum06000.Unuocnuom00.mndoonwo«VooémmonmuamHUoNHwoHHUoowomUHOH Oflawozmw bs+um0uumoH¥0 00 OH. \HaNaNoHoHoNo :H.HonoHawoN.NoNoNoN.H.NoHomubs \HoHoH.HoHnHoNoNoHoHoH.HoH.HoH.H.4.NoH.HoH"¥0\MOU.HOUoOOOoth.MmU oomwomcooNQVomnoocnwo000.0NUoQNU.VN0o0H060HoomHUooHuooo.mwomowmm h£+00wfl00wHXO cm OHH \H.NoonoHoHoNoNoNoHomoH.NoHoHow.uaHoHoHoNoNoHcHoNoNoHoN.H.Homuhn \HoHeonoHoN.H.H.HJH.HoN.NoVoHoNougNufloHoHoHoN.HoHoN.HoHoNowomuxo \NOU.OOUoomU.mmU.hmouOfl0.an.Hmooowoaooo.an.N¢UoH¢Uoom0ohm0 onMUoH”WeonwohwwoONOomNU.¢N0.NNU.1VU.0H0.OH0oMH0oNHUoHHO-hUoMOMMW b¢uam¢ 02w lH h¢mnmm 00 wbDnIOU h¢me¢ 020 uH h¢wnwu 00 MPDQIOU h¢mnm¢ 020 kH h¢mama 00 whDQSDU h¢wam¢ 02m lH h¢wamm 00 MHDQZDU 135 bl+¢m300u¢m10QH¥0 cw 0H. \H.N.u.H.H.HoHcHomoH.HeH-H.H.H.H.Hflh3 \HoNoHoH.HoH.4.H.N.HoNoNoHoNoHeNoHu¥0\¢00.noU owmvommU.Hmuo0¢U.NQO.knogmnoo¢19.000.onmocmooomwomHUoNHUoh0u0H cumwnoa bs+hu¢u4muhu¢meHXO 0m OH. \HoHoH.HoN-H.Ne~oNoHoN.VNHI\H.N.~.H.NoHeNoNoHomoHoNNXO \oowoomU-ocfiaon0.400.0N9.HNUocHU.NH0oHH0oQQonU"0H ouhU¢qu he+w>wHIU¢uw>mHIU¢H¥0 0m OHH \N.M-No¢.0.agfiooo”.m.n.non.Me¢.No¢-nonuHubs \HcHoH.NoHoH.HowawoN.NeHoHoH.VaH.H.N.N.Nu¥0 \QOUoMOU.H00oomU omwwonmw.omweo¢oobcoochgmnoohuJ.OND-0NU.ONU.kaooooncmNWonflwH n >w I ¢ h3+¢02103u¢uxm03.¥0 0w 0H. \NomoJ.N.N.MoHoHoNoNoNeHoNoHaonoNth \NoHoH.HoUgNoHoflamoHemoHumoHoHoN6Nfl¥0\n00 ooowe¢006NmWomoo.¢¢0oncouwcoocnw.HnoammwoHNUonHooNHUoOU.WO.WUMMH "4 12 I h¢mnw¢ 020 lH h¢wuma 00 thQIOU h¢mam¢ 02w EH h¢muwa 00 thuIOU h¢wnmm 02w uH b¢wawm 00 MPDQZOU b¢wamm 02m mH h¢unwa 00 MbJQIDU 136 quflnw¢¢>x \ONIU 0P «IONIUX\0NQmm<> 0h HQMK¢>uQm¢¢>X How QNIU 0h H10 Hofl¥2¢40v QNIU 0h #20 QNIU 0h HIUllmw40¢Hm¢> PDQZH WZOHh¢IGOEmZ¢¢h thUZOU'uJMm HQNMHH JJ¢II200¢00 H¢huHH JJw202fl>m202H¥0 0m 0H. \noHoHoHoH.HoHothl \NoHoHoHoHauoHoNl¥0\Oo0eonUothoONU.NNuoOHGonHQoOOWOH ou>mzoz P¢wnm¢ 02w MPJQIOU b¢mnwa 00 mm34¢> UZHmmHZ moouma hzwIIOU bZMIIOU PZMZIOU hZMISDU mw34¢> OszmH! h¢mnm¢ 02w kH h¢mnmu 00 WPDQIOU h¢mum¢ 02m uH h¢mnm¢ 00 thQIDU 137 choHH 44(10200200 02m OoH\HOonlflNQm¢¢>H§¢HOo+ NoH\HholeHme¢>H§00Mo+mcH\HooQIOHQWQ(>H§HMHol doH\HNonlnHQa!¢>H§BOOoIQoH\HcomlHHme¢>HfiH0+ ¢.H\H0oNloHnma¢>HfiNan+HoH\HNonIth!¢>HiHoHoflmwm HoH\HHomIHNQm&¢>H§NHHoI moH\HOo¢thQmEt>H&¢Ofie+ooH\HUo¢ImHQmm¢>H§QOH0+ HoH\.NonOthI<>H*OoHo+moH\HMo¢Imnma¢>H§05Ho+ HoH\HGomlflamd¢>HiwhHo+noH\Hbo¢!NQma¢>Hewmmoflcwm onH\HoomtnNQmmt>H§hoHo+HoH\HHomIHNQma¢>H§0mNo+ O.H\Hm.¢IOHQMZ¢>H§m¢Ho+NoH\HhoNlmHQm1¢>H§mNH0+ Oo\HooOIQHQma<)H§0hHo+¢oH\.¢omIHHQma¢>H§m¢no+ HoH\HnoNIOQm¢¢>HiHOOs+¢oH\HOomIOQma¢>H§OQNounmm m.H\HOomIQNth<>H§HOHolOo\HNoNI¢NQmm¢>HQOGHo| Oo\HnoOINNQmm()HommHo+HoH\HHomIHNQmC¢>H*NQOoO 00\HOccicHQma¢>HNOoHo+¢oH\HeomlHHnma¢>H§QwOo| HoH\HnoN!onr<>H*bnNolmoH\Hflo¢lmamm¢>.§bwool OoH\HOcOl¢Qmu¢>Hemmco+fioH\Hho¢'NQwa¢>H*HQOoIflwa 00H\.OoNImNQmm¢>Ho~00o+~o\HNoNI¢NQmm¢>H*ooHoo NoH\HMoMIONQMIt>H§NmHo+moH\HOo¢|OHamm¢>H§N~¢o+ ¢0H\HNonthnmt<>H*HHNo+¢oH\HOoNIOHQmm¢>HfiHOOo IOoH\HOoO|¢Qma¢>H§OOH0+00H\.MoNIHQma¢>H§mNHoflHWm QNQma¢> 0P 41m¢¢>llmme¢Hm¢> QZHmoum 20hu¢k hzmxzuu thQZOU whDQIDU thQZOU MFDQIDU thQIOU hcmZZOU Ho. mNQmm¢> 0h Huwm¢> mmDJ¢> UszmH! 138 HmvoHH 002030 020 00 Ga OH 0— 002¢m J¢0H#02002# #0#030 #H30H62¢ no J02¢GMJU# 00b¢0H02H #0#030 20H: ##H30H02¢ no IJ2¢0040#2H m0#¢0H02H #0#030 304 0H0+0H0+¢H0+MHD+NHD+HHO+on+ms+00+#fi+om+mm+om+00+N0+Hmu#0#000 HmnHVchNvHMHMHHNucHHHan «HmoHHmoonuomowmo#0.mmomm m20#H 0>H#¢002 00000! HO. 0H0 0# H0 Hou¥2¢JmH 0H0 0# H0 0H0 0# H00l00Jm¢Hm¢> #JQZH 020H#¢200202¢m# >#DH9H02¢ 00 002(0040# HNOOHH 002000 HNOOHH 002000 2H000 u J¢0 020 ms 0# # mH 002¢a J¢0H#0m002# #0#& 2mH24Hm¢#H~DIHD¢ m0#¢0H02H #0#u 10H: 2GHZ¢HI<#HJ¢00 00#¢0H02H #0#u 30J #moou+ml+¢u+mk+NE+Hkfl#0#l HHumHHNMQHHnflMHHQHNHHmHHH#l How #u 0# Hm HO"¥2¢JOH #l 0# Hm #& 0# Hull0040¢Hm¢> #DQZH 020H#¢2m0l02¢¢# 2mH2¢Hd¢HHCOI#fi¢ u 200% #2020 ¢H2200H4¢u u J¢0 2H000 HbooHH d0##0¢ 020 00 0H NH 0H 002¢a J¢0H#0a002# #0##0¢ ma0I#0 2H #1)0# #4020 00#¢0H02H #0##Dm 20H: m¢0I#J ZH #131# 0J##HJ WU#¢0H02H #0##0u IOJ NH#m+HH#C +OH#K+OO#¢+30#Q+#O#IN :00 :U :O#m+¢O#a+MO#a+NO#E+HO#G #0##0¢ HHumvHNHQHHMH MHHdu :HH n H NH#~3HH#mooH#moOO#moOO#aoHO#¢ Ho. NH#¢ 0# Ho#m Hon¥2¢JDH NH#2 0# H0#¢ AcboHH 4400Q210 024 2320 2000 #00030 0000000 NH#1 0# HO#1l10040¢Ha¢> #JQZH 020H#¢200u02¢m# #e)m# J<200u0020#2H HNOOHH 20##0¢ . AhomHH ¢0##02 2H000 0034¢> 000J¢> m0DJ¢> #202200 #202200 #202200 #202200 0#3Q200 000000 #202200 02HWWH2 00000! #202200 #202200 #202200 #202200 #202200 #202200 #202200 0#JQ200 000000 02HmmH2 00000d #202200 #202200 #202200 #202200 #202200 #202200 #202200 0#DQ200 000002 02HO0H2 00000& #202200 #202200 #202200 #202200 139 ~u20¢2N an 00 N00 02¢ N 00 H¢¢H Gu20¢wN HH 00 N00 02¢ N 00 H¢¢H OHIU¢2N an 00 N00 02¢ H 00 H¢¢H 1u10¢$N HH 00 N00 02¢ n 00 H¢¢H e...u....0¢7N HN 00 N00 02¢ H 00 H¢¢v 4H20¢$N HN 00 N00 02¢ M 00 H¢¢H \0n2oww2oNMIo002.0N230H2o0H2uN00\~fi2ohN2.Hal-0N2.MN23#H260H2HH¢¢ \OH£0¢2o¢HIU¢2oOH20¢2om320(2.NH20¢230020¢2a0010¢2NIU¢2N NuIU¢s> HH :0 N00 02¢ N 00 H¢¢H 3M20¢v> Hn 00 N00 02¢ N 00 H¢¢H nu10¢2> HH 00 N00 02¢ n 00 H¢¢H flu20¢v> HM 00 N00 02¢ H 00 H¢¢H flu20¢2> HN 00 N00 02¢ n 00 H¢¢H «NIU¢2> HN 00 N00 02¢ H 00 H¢¢H \0H2.0¢2oNN2.0N2o0H2.fltflN00\mH2oOn2.HN2ooH2oo2oF2uH¢¢ \NOIU¢2.0N20¢2.H420¢2o0H20¢2o0010¢2od020¢2fl£0¢2> #"IU¢2X HH 00 N00 02¢ m 00 H¢¢H nfl10¢2x HN 00 N00 02¢ m 00 H¢¢H nflIU¢2X HH 00 N00 02¢ N 00 H¢¢H fiWIU¢XX HN 00 N00 02¢ H 00 H¢¢~ flu10¢2x an 00 N00 02¢ N 00 H¢¢H H"IU¢zx Hm 00 N00 02¢ H 00 H¢¢H \On2.0w2.02.¢n2oNH2oQ2oN2udfiQ\002-0N2.02.nn2.HH2on2oH2flH¢¢ \0H10¢2oMHIU¢2oMOIU¢2o#420(260020¢20N020¢2oH010¢2020¢2x .00 0&2 0# H2 HOHX2¢40H 0¢2 0# H2 H20H#anc 1J1 NH 602 0# H2ll0040¢Ha¢> #302— 020H#¢220002¢1# 20HZ¢¢HIU¢2 H0#OHH 0H00I0H#mH120 HONSHH 0H00|0H#0Ha20 2H000 #¢000a 020 uH uH uH &H &H lH #¢0Q0a 00 #¢0Q0m 020 uH lH 2H 0H uH uH #¢0u0m 00 #¢0Qmu 020 uH uH kH lH 0H uH #¢0u0m 00 0004¢> 02HmmH2 000001 #202200 #202200 #202200 140 a J CON and- n0000200 H0 02 04##0mv 00 02 02¢ m #J 00000H 0 0 "O- 0 02 02¢ m #0 000000 0 02 02¢ M 0A 000000 00 02 02¢ 0 00 000000 >#J¢200 HmH #0 0023000 >#J¢200 HmH 04 0023000 0000¢ 02¢ H 00 002000H 0000¢ 02¢ H 00 0020000 0000¢ 02¢ 0 00 0020000 0 0000¢ 02¢ 0 00 0020000 Hnflm.cHHNflnHHHflN.HH n00N03 0HN03fl000N03 Hfi"#HH¢u00Hnum DOI# M0 0000 000um000 HNuwwawvauoooH DOI# HnoHHNHOMo th# OHoHHHano DOI# 0000 0002000 H00nm002000 HHflmmeHHHu¢ 30I# HNoHHOHONo 301# 0. 002000 H00u002000 «HHON «0I# nchOHNc DOI# QHH 000 #0#N03u000 HHHK 302# OvHoflm 00I# HH N000 000NN000 HHHMHHONN DOI# HH 0000¢ #0000¢n0000¢ ‘.)'JU ')| (DUN!) mm 2’?! 2'!) Qu00¢2a13 fifl00¢2110 N000¢ZI10 n H H HN00¢2I10 H “A“- 00¢¥0¢0 v3H#¢210002¢0# 020 Hfl0H HNn 0J #0##00H0 OHDH HNM #0 #0##00H0 HHu1¢H DOT# HOHHONOQ DOI# ONHIU¢2H #0#20¢2"IU¢2H Hanan DOI# MNvHouNN DOI# #H#0#0H0 #0#0H#0#0H0 #0##00u#0##00H0 H00 #0#20¢2o#0#000.#0#0.#0##00 H0#MHH mH00I0H#mH0IU 020 3€H 0# )N 0H 002(0 J¢0H#0000I# #0#IU¢2 040000 00 20H#¢40041¢2 20H: m0#¢0H02H #0#20¢2 IOHI 040000 00 20H#¢410HZ¢2 30J 00#¢0H02H #0#20¢2 304 ON r)¢2+0 H20¢2¢0 HIU¢2+# HIO¢2+OHIU¢2 +mHIU¢2+¢HIU¢2+mH$J¢2+NHIU¢2+HHIU¢2+0HIU¢2+0010¢2 +002012+#010¢2+0020¢2+0010¢2+¢OI1(2+Mn20¢2¢N0I0¢2+H020¢2H#0#20¢2 HHN#~HnumHHmflnHHPNHH OHIJ¢230Hr1¢2o¢HIU¢2onHIU¢2ohoIU¢2.MOIU¢2 0Nv)¢2 0# H010¢2llm040¢H0¢> #30#30 H H 0 0 0004¢> 0H 0H 0H 0H 0H 0H 0H 0H 0H 0H 0H 000000 0#30200 000000 0#30200 000000 0#00200 000000 0#30200 000000 0#30200 000000 0#40200 000000 0#30200 #202200 0H 0H 000000 0#30200 000000 0#30200 0#J0200 02HO0H2 #202200 #202200 #202200 #202200 0#30200 000000 #202200 How OHIU¢2 0# H020¢2 WUDJ¢> 02HmmH2 141 \0>HhHh0010000.0sHh<000000lh2020000 b000oN0h000 \!<0'ooo0230bmih2020000 #000.H0h000 \02uJJH323.ou02HJJHt 00.2000200I000.0H000 \0H0$bHDOH02<|000onH000 \0h000230009b0(0hmm< 00!2~Ib!000.NH000 \IUOH0>¢ooo00¥000 ¥m~0t000oHH000 \0000h200 0J000000000h200 00Ih0|000ooH000 \h242Hz«00000>HmmH2030l000o00000 \0>~h4h0010000o0>HP<000000|000o00000 \J<20Hb(0oo04(20Hb010i000obo000 \0—~4000h3200oo02~040~>|000.00000 \fl30HOH0mDWooo02~h030h|000.¢0000 \hmwforco00>Hh000000000oM0000 \2<03¢oo0200h0l000.~0000 \0>HhH040x00oo0~<0l000aHo000 \020000 Z~ 00200000H0 IthuomolHO \WIUKKD 2H 00200000H0 Ih0000o000H0 \fl10000 2H 00200000H0 00HIhunouH0 \013000 ’— 00200000—0 020000.NO0H0 \flrmuuo 2H 00200000H0 hm0H0oHO0H0 \020 01(0 h< Jh~J¢20Hh(2.h(2 \002—(00(0 00 xmwoxwm \000232 20Hh(>00000o20 \000232 20Hb(0~J000o000 \20uhub01o01 \ZOHh30HOPmH0 00300-00 mo0flm0 HO0MH0 0N0lmwoumm00200 Ho 00 thhwmu 0400(4 01) 0P30100 0h00100 0H 142 \00100 000 0002.00300 \ZO«~Hb01 b2020>0HIU<.0>0H10( \70~hh~00h<2o003b(! \>b~v~2Hz0ll>hHZH4300_0H000.000 \002<0Dmm(l0400.000 \0>Hhh—JHO< >000~>00000.r40<000 \42000 hma0h 4(20000000P2Hob0hb00 \00000 UUZ(00J0b >hHDOH02( Jh4<200 \DJZHQIOU 0000< 02¢ 002000.00CZ000 \h20200<’<2 IFHI 00000< 2H 00000 mZflHh¢0~J000 005(1 0>H0.0000 \mZDHh<0HJ000 00hZH£ 02¢ JJ<09N000 \nwoDhH~h< h20100<2<2 00 0300Pon00z000 \020 02000 ?H 00000 02—2000 00 00>ho002000 \Z~<0< 0h<~h0002o0HP000 \b2u20000 2hJ<700 000000 004hh0moNHb000 \0100h00 Ihut 00Hum~hI0J00 hmOQoOHh000 \040moootJIh0 0000h200l040m #000o00h000 \0>H~HOJ0XMooo0H<000400 hmo0owohmo0 \0>HbHb00100ooo0>Hb<000000'0400 #000abOh000 \¥<0zooo0£00hm|0400 P000o00h000 \02H0JHH>ZDcoo02~0J0~>lh2020000 hmo0omcrmo0 \040mouo001b1 0000b200|h2020000 h000.¢0h000 \0>HhH0J1K000020<0Ih2020000 #000o00b000 143 §§*0)0100 PD‘ 00§§*****§§*§*§**§§‘§*§*§§i*iofifiitfiifiifi§§§§*§*§§§*§ h20104bk0m 000000 000001 20 fl00200000H0lI000H0 0h H0000 \00 IOHIHH43H BOJH00I0<2H0.P0h0H0.h0hh00H0 \00203702002HHH00020300200H00020 \OZHNO 00>H00 >h4<200 \004bhlfillhkfichv 004hb0m b02|lh000an 004hb00l020305HJ0 0040b00 hOZIIIUDOPHHv 00(2000 \P2010000(0H0 4400200an J<0h30vaN0 b?020000< 4(00200HH. n00N03 \h20100<2<$l000HH0 0300<4l000H00 000 \QQN 02‘ 000.00 cancu m.¢¢nH00 32¢ mbmHNO 0¢¢ 02¢ mONQHHv 0000 \fihoH 00h2H3HHv QNMH 44<0H00 N000 \040h00 hfiz 0H0 H0 004bh00H00 0000< \lemHn. Ih40200h 0HFO ooo>00>H00 on. >4hLU—4WHO. 4(0h302H¢0 ooo>4kIOHlflHnH ooo>00>ANv ooo>40200bx0HHO 3Hb000 0b H0h000omH000 0P H0000 \0000QOH0 >4$200bmH00 000040200h0HHO fiHhmOQ 0b HHh000omHNO) 0h HONDI \00IhHOZHn. 0300<4HNO h20100<2HP~P00200HH0 0>Hh1000000HOv 01 \4(30023HHO 44300H00 00 \b2H000uv h< PGPIUHh<430~2<0 \00000 ImH24~440>h~0300m 000 00029003000 \00130! 40201 H H m x h£01200 #201200 040004 034(> AQpendix H IL44 maom “BS mHom udmfimwmcmz oHH Hamu HHo Hamo ohm. am mao.H am nmo.a :mmz ooo.H ammz HOH Hamo Hoe Haoo . H8. a OS; am ch.H cum: omn.H 6mm: OHH Hawo oao HHmo mom. am qu.H am omo.H cum: awo.H cam: OOH Hawo ooo Hamo moH.H am cow. om nqo.a cam: ooo.H cam: Hmavmcs Hmacm 00H Han—Hhumfin— “—00.90% mflamom you moaumfiumum m>auafiuumma m>Huwumaaoo m>fiumuwaooo m>wufiuuqaoo m>wumumaoou uornenuaxzo noxnenxnon IL45 maom Henna mac“ ucmammmcmz CHH Hamo HHo Hku omo.H mm an.H am mmm.~ cam: omo.N cam: HOH HHmu Hoo Hamo «NH.H mm mma. am on.N cam: ooe.~ cam: OHH Haou 0H0 Hamo mmo. am nom.H am mnm.~ cam: NNN.N cam: ooa Hamu ooo Hamu ¢mm.H 0m QOH.H 0m cow.N dam: omm.N :mmz Hangman Hmsvm coauanfiuumfln um3om caemom How mofiumfiuMum m>wuawuummn m>fiuwummaoo m>wumumaooo w>fiuaumaaoo w>aumumnooo uotnenuaxzo UOIJeAIJON 146 .azumwaz my“; Apuu p.0 0 nqu .umwmmucua “gm; m0wdzlm meoO Nmmou nfln.0 H CwNou n2 NOOoO mooom endow A Cmaow 00 600.0 000.0 «OA.~ m NCO-N m~00000 204? 0 00 0 wxfaum 0O mu7<400 ZU~F<~7<) 00 mUTDCw 00200m Ydmw 03 *Dfi *§***a$**‘********a_§******+*.y***§******* zafipcpzwuzd zv~p<>0pux a: ZnHPJm~Ihwuu 00300 30 >9 00004 .w .9 x. .7 i .2 .r .2 .7 n m U 2 < H 0 d > 0 Q m H w > 4 < Z a. a. an * .w .w i “w u” no. .7 82 28 am .5 HEB. you «38 «>92 147 oOZ~00~z 000; .pUQ 0.0 v 00040 0 0000000000 0003 0000U 000.0 00" mum-med 4(3tm Ohcco 000.0 omfloo a 000.0 0400 0! 000.0 003.0 004.0 a OO—oo 0400 00 000.0 00~on Mnaoo a m_~oo 02 00 bNOoo ONuon flcuom n mm¢ou 020~hU<00h4~ >(slN ooo-O 000.04 uOMoNa a hOOow— 0400 Nod-o was.“ aka.“ a 05—.“ 01 000.0 who-NJ Ofi~omu — OMNomu 00 000.0 who-#4 {00.0 n moo-0N 0h00000 Z~(Z coo-O wmuoo Gnu-o — 004.0 020 000.0 omuoo Ofiaoo a Gnu-o 00p<~0<>0u 0 00 0 00(500 00 000q400 ZU~h4~0q> 00 000300 lulu—0 2(07 00 200 ¥§§***¥**¥*§****§§******§**i******§***§w hum m>~huhnzwuv mzu Ibus b40200~Puz Dz zonhnmuahmuo musuu on >0 kzwzu4hhww Ibux thquuommq humouu 000><0 ‘§§**;§**nwuz<~z<> “.0 mum>4oz< 148 .02—00—2 0003 «p00 0.0 0 00040 0 .000000000 000! 00000 «00.0 00— 000.0 4(h0b emboo 00a oumom 4d30~000 000.0 050.6 00~.0 0 ncfi.— 002~<40x0 000.0 homoc 000.0 d 000.0 0400 02 00 000.0 NONoo 000.0 a 000.0 020~h0<00p4~ ><1lm aflmoo 000.0 065.0 a 060.0 0400 02 N00.0 050.0 000.0 a 000.0 0400 00 000.0 50—.0 00s.0 a 003.0 01 00 Mb~.0 000.“ 000.0 M ¢h«.0 020~h0<00hzn >00 l 00 0 004300 00 0004300 20~b<~0<3 00 000300 luzuam 240* 00 230 .._..._._...._.5*...*_._.w_..*......_..._.._*******..******.****. hww w>~b<44a~z~»_zuuu mzu rpm: pzmzwu_puz :2 zoupanuahm~o uwzuu on >m muzmxwmuuo kzuoacaz o» hzmszPme mnuuzou ******s.**wuz<~a<> no m~m>4<2<*****.**.* 320 fig Box 28 o: .E is $8on pom «Baa $624. 149 Q00.0 flNN.0 nmmoo uh~.0 ¢0N00 Ouc.0 hNN.0 NN0.0 0~—.0 Noo.o N00.0 h0~.0 b0u.0 l 00 l~20~0 000.N hocoa Fu¢.~ nom.~ 0N¢.~ 000.0 Noe.~ 000.0 ~00.” 005.0 00N.0 0N0.~ QNO.« 0 .02—00~z 000s ApUQ 0.0 v 000 .000000000 0003 000 0co.o h20~0~00000 40~0000000 3(0 men.o no. owe.“ N¢0.n 00~ 000.0 NN~.0 0 950.0 Non.o . 000.0 0400 02 000.0 — 000.0 020~h0<0 ohn.0 — 050.0 0400 000.0 u 000.0 0400 000.0 a 0N0.0 . 01 «o~.0 M N0—.0 020~P0<0 00M.o « muN.0 300.0 . 300.0 000.0 a ¢0€.0 0~N.0 0 000.0 0p 00n.o a 000.0 000.0 ~ 000.0 wm 2(01 00 200 § § * * . . t * § . § * i * . § * § § * * * i * i . a . § . i * . § 9 P00 0>~h<430~2<2l0>~hu4000 0:0 Ihus h40200<2uhuz 02 zoupam_mhmuo uwsuu on >m 003hu20<2 2000000400 b1<400 *‘*‘§*¥‘*QMUZ<~1(> u o m a m > 4 < z < * § § § . $5 5? Box 3.. oz .3 .2: H.528 .8 ~38. <>oz< .\ . ( <0 (U 30” 020 0h<~0<)00 4<3lm 0! 00 00 0h£u ><3lN 0400. 02 00 00000 Z~(z 020 00p<~0<>00 00 000400 {ixnifi . i * . § 150 900.0 m0o.0 000.0 NQ0.0 900.0 ~00.0 mnmoc noN.o Nu~.0 000.0 ~00.o chm.0 chmoo u to muzoum 00n.~ mos.“ «DN.¢ NNN.0 NNM.0 «$4.0 finN.o “05.0 nou.N fihfi.N h¢~.m mfinoom $05.0 000.0 ¢O¢.0 ma<ficm 9.44M! mo" 00— ndo-I— «a. u, d—a mac... .02—mmuz mam: .hUQ .uwmmuuo qu~uuuuUOu zuamm mmo.wON on...n~ QGN.¢M NNN.0 NNN.0 ~h~.0 mnN.0 000.0 won.u mhn.w bch.m mmmoo U40m N mmN.fiN 00¢.0 00¢.O mum<30m no 23 m 0.0 0 mmw0U 4(h3» 4<3lm w403 DE w40m on 01 0Q mZO~PUou ZU~P<~Z§) mu wUQDDm *i§§**i§*u***§*‘*****§**i*§********§**§§ hum w>~b<44Q~Z<£lw>~h~£wUU mIU Ihus hZUSUU~uuz OZ ZOaPJmuihm—O mwsuu 0Q >3 UZOUPDD IHHB Om~um~p us m~m>4<4<*§*4..**.* Amzu 5.43 mgom an. 02 .nm hav.HHemom you wanna <>oz< 151 .02ammui mum: «bun 0.0 0 wwwdu o m waUuu mam; www(u 0o— 0N0.o wEU th—Uuuquu 40—mmwa0ua 341 mpquu<>00 n0fl.u mom 0®N.h~N 4(h3h ¢0%.~ oou $00.00N 4<40~mum «mm.o Omm.n aka.“ 0 ~N0.w Dw2~<4uxm 00¢.0 n00.0 #0m.0 a €00.0 u4Du 02 on 000.0 ”00.0 30m.0 a 000.0 mzuuhu(3'M 0b0.0 oom.n ~m0.0 n hmo.0 wJDu Dz Oh~.0 ncm.« 36$.N a moeow w40u OQ enh.0 $00.0 3N~.O « mN—.0 02 0Q Q~m.0 005.0 gen.“ n #00.” mzouhUQuth~ >00 & no u m14fium to mwa<39m Zuuh<~c<3 mu uUflDDm luzoum Z~h<4JQ~Zuh~LUUU mEU Ihus h4w2w0<2(z 10 zDOm<4lw4Uu w4ua ZO—bdhzwnmo ZO~P(>«ruz OZ ZOuhamumbmuo mwsuu 0Q >m >p4 nu m~m>4oz< 152 «00.0 m«n.o m«M.o NON.0 0®N.0 bb¢.o 0«¢.0 hNooo Nmo.o 000.0 000.0 mom.0 mon.o l to L«Zo«m MNM.M 0«0.« 0«o.« mON.« Nn«.« 00m.0 m¢0.o «$0.0 Moo.” «Q«.¢. m«¢.~ wmm.o wm®.n m nun.“ .4..— .05.. Ofi%.« on+.« Nm~.« ooc.« ON~.0 OQm.« N¢«.h onn.c «0m.0« mh¢.o« WDM.« fiflfl.« mmou 4<3Im m40a OI w40u 0Q 02 on wZD«hU<1|N U4uu 01 0Q mhumulw Z«DU ZU«P<«¢<) mu uuanam ****§*$5§§§§§§§§i¥ii§§i§§ii§§¥*****§***, **.***.**n.wuz<«x<> hum m>«h<4DQ«Z«h«£wUU htmsz«PU2 Jm«dhm«0 awsuu zumzmu m4Dm ¢«PWDQ m~w>4<£<********§* Amzu nuaa MAOM 0am 02 .00 %nv «HHmom How manna <>oz< 153 000.« mwo.0 mwooo 000.0 «h®.0 0m0.0 Oh0.0 N«0.o ©M0.0 «00.0 000.0 fimh.0 nmhoo u to l«20«m * ** §u_* $* *n.** *0 §;.*u**u** ** ** hum m>«h<4DQ«Z« h2020042<2 KO mDOmQ ZO—h4h20«a0 ZD«h ZD«po«mhm— wUZmammu«o 4(«h U 2 < H K 4 > 000.6 m0«.o m0«.0 «b«.o 0N0.0 moo.o Obo.o N«o.o h00.0 O«o.o ««o.o 050.0 Oho.o u 303.0 ~N1.o omfi.0 fim«.o fim«.0 Gm«.o nNn.0 NOn.0 man.o «««.0 000.0 ¢«n.o «««.o 05w.0 ONn.O mm<fi0m Z00 443!” w40u 02 0403 0Q 02 0Q WZC«h0<8|N 0403 02 0Q * Z wwuuuum Z«00 mIU Ih«s 040u 01 on >m «hmon * *§ #* **.i§ § 35 fig Box 25 oz .2 30 2.58 now .39... <>oz< 20«h<«QQ) mu mumDom ** ** if {i {i t 154 c00.0 h00.0 F00.0 oucoo NNM.0 NON.0 —h¢.0 ~Qm.0 bNm.0 05h.0 hmw.0 050.0 0hu.0 l to uuZOHm 0Nc.0 0N0.0 0N0.0 N00.0 Now.o N¢N.u m¢0.0 cbn.0 Mn¢.0 000.0 MQN.0 «00.0 «00.0 k .02~mm~z uxw hzm~U~LKUUU Luuwmmuowm 3DU J<1ln wJou oz MJOu on 02 a... mzouhuou ZU—b<~a<> mu wUQDDm ******$§§4§§§§§§§§§§§*********§********§ hum U>~F~hNAUUU WEU IF“: P4U200~PUZ 31 (Dnhfimakauo uuzuu 01 >m 0N QZDUJ meuufl erpmw 0—hwoa * * . § * * w * § & a u z < ~ a < > u 0 > 4 4 4 < * u i . i i . . § . $5 5? 58 E. o: .2 Ev Samoa .8“ mafia <>oz< .02~wm~z mums .pUQ 0.0 . www4U a .uuwmwuouu mam! www00 155 nam._ m0~ om~.~.m 4<»o» _~n.~ mm. oqc.wom 4«sam n.0.o ~m~.o unnao d smn.o maua om~.o nmn.~ m¢a.n u mo..m oz so¢.o co..n moo.o . muo.u on mmm.o nmo.. om... n oom.c mFUwuuw z~ou u no u maqsum no mmm mu mumaom u~zw_m 2h~J—Puz O! ZOthmuka~D umsuu 0Q >m >h4 uu m.m>4«z<*§&...&vi; AHoz< 156 n00.0 «NM.0 «Nm.0 NON.0 cnm.o N5¢.0 «00.0 0n0.0 050.0 000.0 000.0 ¢0N.n 50n.0 «00.0 l to m«20«m ***§*i*§*§§**§*§ {*nni‘ o5o.N N00.0 NO0.0 GON.« 5M0.o «Nm.o «00.0 «05.3 mn«.n ¢N«.n ¢«0.5 5m«.« o«m.0 mN0.« u 050.« 0N3.« 5NN.¢ N«¢.« N«¢.« #00.« #nfi.« «$5.0 mmN.« €0m.0 503.6 059.0 Nnm.o 530.« 00«.« mme.« wc5«J u O 2 a0 K33m<4|m40u ZO«5(>«ruz ZO«PJm«m5m«0 uwsuu m « m wmm < 52wZuuu0 > J < 2 5(2 xww mr<«1<>OU 4(505 J<3|N mhuwuum Z«(z 542 xwm mw5<«m<>00 ZU«5<«G<> mu muabom *****9*******§§**§9 50 ¢«5mU& 4 G * § § * i * i Q § AHOz< 157 .02«mm«z mzms «wUQ 0.0 . mmm4u 0 .ummmmuoma may; mww4v 00« Nmo.0l 542 o0«.0 xMw 52w«0«muUOu LU«wwquum 34m wr4~¢4>00 000.0 00« ~00.w¢« J4505 mN«.0 vm« N50.54« J4Jo«mwu 000.0 NN«.0 ¢««.0 o 0N0.« OmZ~4Jme 450.0 05«.0 m0«.0 « 00«.0 UJOu 02 0Q 450.0 m5«.0 00«.0 « 00«.0 mzo~504uw54« >4£ln 950.0 N5«.0 00«.0 « 00«.0 wJOa Dz 0N3.0 000.0 503.0 « 500.0 UJOK on 000.0 000.0 000.0 « 000.0 O! on 050.0 000.0 00n.0 n m5«.0 mZU«5U4uth« >4J|N 000.0 5N0.0 0Nfi.0 « 0N0.0 wJUm 300.0 N00.0 N0«.0 « N00.0 02 «00.0 «00.0 «00.0 « «00.0 on 000.0 0«0.0 300.0 M 0N0.0 mPmeum Z«41 000.0 000.0 000.0 « 0.0.0.0 542 5N¢.0 000.0 000.0 « 000.0 xwm n05.0 nmn.0 0Nn.0 N 000.0 mmr4«m4>DU u to u wdefium no me4JOm Zu«54«m4> mu mUaDOm k«20«m Z4Uv no 23m * . * § . 4 . . § . . . . * . * § § § * . a . . . u e . . * § § 5 i . . § * i . amz~40a»«J«PU2 02 ZO«5)0«15m«0 uwsuu 01 >3 muzmcwum«o J<«»«Z« pquuu m«hmoa . * § § . . . . * g u u 2 < _ a q > u o m « m > 4 q z < . * * u * i * . . . A942 cam xmm :uHB maom cam 0: .0m 50V mHHmom you MHAMH 4>oz< Bibliggraphy £158 Bibliography Alexander, C. N. and H. G. Weil, "Players, Persons, and Purposes: Situational Meaning and the Prisoners Dilemma Game" Sociometry, 1969, V32, 121-144 Bartos, Otomar J., "Process and Outcome of Negotiations" (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1974) Bass, B. M., "Effects on the Subsequent Performance of Negotiations of Studying Issues or Planning Strategies Alone or in Groups" Psychological Monographs, 1966, V80 Bigoness, William J., "The Impact of Alternative Mbdes of Third Party Intervention in Resolving Bargaining Impasses" (East Lansing; MSU, 1974) Boganno, Mario F. and James B. Dworkin-"Comment: Who 'Wins' in wage Bargaining" Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Jul 75. V28, N4, 570-572 Boran, L. A., "The Effects of Threat in Bargaining" Journal Abnormal & Social Psychology, 1963, V66, 37-44 Braithwaite, R. B., "Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955) Budner, Stanley, Tolerance of Ambiguity as 3 Personality Variable" Journal Personality, Mar 1962, V30, NI, 29-50 Bush, R. R. and F. Mbsteller, "Stochastic Models for Learning", (New York: Wiley, 1955) Chamberlain, N., "Collective Bargaining" (New York: ‘McGraw—Hill, 1951 Chamberlain, N. W. and James Kuhn "Collective Bargaining" (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965) Chaney, M. V., and W. E. Vinacke, "Achievement and Nurturance in Triads varying in power distribution" Journal of Abnormal & Social 1960, Psychology, V60, 175-181 Christie, Richard and Florence L. Geis "Studies in Machiavellianism" (New York: Academic Press, 1970) Chun, Ki Tack and John B. Campbell, "Dimensionality of the Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale" Psychological Reports, Dec 1974, V35, N3, 1059-1070 .159 Commons, John R., "Institutional Economies: Its Place in Political Economy" (New York: Macmillan Company, 1934) Cross, J. G., "A Theory of the Bargaining Process" American EconOmic Review 1965, V55, 67-94 Cross, J. G., "The Economics of Bargaining" (New York: Basic Books, 1969) Cullen, D. E., "Negotiating Labor-Management Contracts" (Ithaca, New York: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1965) Deutsch, Morton, "The Effects of Motivational Orientation Upon Trust and Suspicion" Human Relations, May 1960, V13, N2, 123-140 Deutsch, Morton, "The Resolution of Conflict" (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973) Deutsch, Morton and R. M. Krauss, "The Effect of Threat Upon Interpersonal Bargaining", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, V61, 181-189 Druckman, D., "Dogmatism, Prenegotiation Experience, and Simulated Group Representation as Determinants of Dyadic Behavior in a Bargaining Situation" Journal of Personality and Scoial Psychology, 1967, V6, 279-290 Druckman, Daniel, "Prenegotiation Experience and Dyadic Conflict Resolution in a Bargaining Situation" Journal Experimental and Social Psychology_ Oct 68, V4, N4, 367-383 Dunlop, John T., "Collective Bargaining: Principles and Cases" (Chicago: Irwin, 1949) Dunlop, John T., "Wage Determination under Trade Unions" (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944) Edgeworth, Francis Y., "Mathematical Physics" (London: C. Keegan Paul 8 Co., 1881) Edwards, Allen L., "Experimental Designs in Psychological Research", (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972) Faucheux, C. and S. Mbscovici, "Self-esteem and Exploitative Behavior in a Game Against Chance and Nature" JOurnal of Personality & Social Psychology, 1968,‘V8, 83-88 Festinger, Leon, "A Theory of Social Comparison" Human Relations, 1954, V2, 117-140 £160 Gerhart, Paul F., "Determinants of Bargaining Outcomes in Local Government Labor Negotiations" Industrial & Labor RelatiOns‘Review, Apr 76, V29, N3, 331-351 Ghiselli, Edwin E., "Explorations in Managerial Talent" (Pacific Palisades: Goodyear Publishing, 1971) Gordon, Francine and D. T. Hall, "Self-image and Stereotypes of Femininity" Journal of Applied Psychology, 1974, V59, 241-243 Griesinger, D. W. and J. W. Livingston "Toward a Model of Interpersonal Motivation in Experimental Games" Behavioral Science, 1973, V18, 173-188 Hamermesch, Daniel 8., "Who 'Wins' in Wage Bargaining" Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Jul 73, V26, N4, 1146-1149 Hamner, W. Clay and Donald L. Harnett, "The Effects of Information and Aspiration Level on Bargaining Behavior", Journal Egperimental Social Psychology, Jul 1975, V11, N4, 329-342 Harbison, Fredrick H. and John R. Coleman "Goals and Strategy in Collective Bargaining" (New York: Harper, 1951) Harsanyi, J. C., "Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games", Econometrica, April 1956, V24, N2, 144-157 Herzberg, F., B. Mausner and B. Snyderman "The Motivation to work" (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1959) Hornstein, H. A., "The Effects of Different Magnitudes of Threat Upon Interpersonal Bargaining" Journal Experimental Social Psychology 1965, V1, N 282-293 Ilke, Fred C., "How Nations Negotiate" (New York: Harper and Row, 1964) Kanouse, D. E. and W. M. Wiest "Some Factors Affecting Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma" Journal Conflict Resolution, 1967, V11,'N3 , 206-213 Kirk, Roger E., "Experimental Design: Procedures for the Behavioral Sciences" (Belmont" Brooks Cole, 1968) Kochan, Thomas A. "City Government Bargaining: A Path Analysis" Industrial Relations, 1975 Kochan, Thomas A. and Hoyt N. Wheeler "Municipal Collective Bargaining: A Model and Analyses of Bargaining Outcomes" Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Oct 75, V29, N1, 46-66 161. Komorita, S. S. and Marc Barnes, "Effects of Pressures to Reach Agreement in Bargaining" JournalPerspnality and Social Psychology, Nov 69, V13, N3, 245-252 , ' Lindblom, C. E., "'Bargaining~Power' in Price and wage Determination" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1948, V62 Luce, R. D. and H. Raiffa, "Games and Decisions" (New York: Wiley, 1958) Luce, R. D. and H. Raiffa, "Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey" (New York: Wiley, 1957) Mabry, Bevars Dupre, "The Pure Theory of Bargaining" Industrial Labor Relations Review, Jul 1965, V18, N4 479-502 . ‘fi Marlowe, D., "Psychologicaeree s and Cooperation: Competition in a Two-person Game" Psychological Reports , 1963, N13, 364 McKersie, Robert B., Charles R. Perry &«Richard E. Walton "Intraorganizational Bargaining in Labor NegotiationS" 'Journal of Conflict Resolution, Dec 65, Vol 9, No 4, p 463-481 ' McKersie, Robert B. and Richard E. Walton, "The Theory of Bargaining" Industrial Labor Relations Review, Apr 1966, V19, N4, 414-424 Meyers, Jerome L., "Fundamentals of Experimental Design" (Boston: Allyn & Bauer, 1966) Nash, John F., "The Bargaining Problem" Econometrica, April 1950, V18, N2, 155-162 Nil, Norman H. et a1, "SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences" (New York: MtGraw-Hill 1975) Noland, S. J., and D. N. Catron, "Cooperative Behavior Among High School Students on the Prisoner's Dilemma Game", Psychological Reports, 1969, V24, 711-718 Pen, Jan, "A General Theory of Bargaining" American Economic Review, March 1952, v42, N1, 24-42 , Peters, Edward, "Strategy and Tactics in Labor Negotiations" (New London: National Foremans Institute, 1955) Pigou, Arthur C., "Economics of Welfare", 4th ed., (London: Macmillan & Co., 1938) Pigou, Arthur C., "Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace" (London: Macmillan, 1905) .162 Pilisur, N., P. Potter, A. RapoPOrt, & A. Winter, "War Hawks and Peace Doves: Alternate ResolutiOns of Experimental Conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1965, V9, 491-508 Pruitt, D. G., "Reciprocity and Credit Building in a Laboratory Dyad" Journal Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, V8, 143-147 Radlow, R., M. F. Weidner, and P.M. Hurst, "The Effect of Incentive Magnitude and'Mbtivation Orientation! upon Choice Behavior in a Two Person Nonzero-sum Game" Journal'Social'Psycholggy, 1968, 74, 199-208 Raiffia, H., "Arbitration Scheme for’Genera-l-ized I‘ve—person Games" Contributions to the "Theory of Games", eds. H. W} Kuhn and A. W. Tucker, V2, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953) Raven, Bertram H. and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, "Social Psychology: People in Groups", (New York:’ Wiley & Sons, 1976) Richardson, L. F., "Statistics of Deadly Quarrels" (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1960) Rokeach, Milton, "Political and Religious DOgmatism:~-An «Alternative to the Authoritarian Personality", Psychological Mbnographs, 1956, v70, N18, whole N425, 1-43 Rotter, Julian B., "Generalized Expectancies for Interpersonal Trust" American Psychologist, May 71, V26, N5, 443-452 Rotter, Julian B., "Generalized Expectancies for Internal Versus External Control of Reinforcement" Psychological Monographs, 1966, V80, N1 Whole N0609, 1-28 Rotter, Julian B., "A New Scale for the Measurement of Interpersonal Trust" Journal Personality, 1967, V35, 651-665 Rubin, Jeffrey Z. and Bert R. Brown, "The:Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation" (New York: Academic Press, 1975) Sermat, V., "Dominance-Submissiveness and Competition in a Mixed-motive Game", British Journal of Social and Clinical Psycholqu, 1968, V7, 35-44 ' Schelling, Thomas C., "The Strategy of$Conflict" (Cambridge, MaSS: Harvard University Press, 1960)’ Schenitzki, D. P., "Bargaining, Group Decision Making and the Attainment of Maximum Joint Outcome" Dissertation Abstract, 1963, V23, 3528-3529 .163 Shapley, L. 8., "A value for n-PerSon Games" in Kuhn, H. W. and A. W. Tucker ed8., "Contribution to the Theory of Games", V2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953) Shister, Joseph, "The Theory of Union Bargaining Power", Southern Economic Journal, 1943,V10 Siegel, S. and L. E. Fouraker, "Bargaining and Group Decision Making" (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960) Slicheter, Sumner, "Impact of-Social Security Legislation upon Mobility and Enterprise", Americag_Economic'Review, 1940, v30 Stevens, Carl M., "Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation" (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963) Stevens, C. M., "On the Theory of Negotiation "QuarterlyJournal of Economics, 1958, V72, 77-97 Swingle, Paul, "The Structure of Conflict" (New York and London: Academic Press, 1970) Tedeschi, J., T. Burrill, and J. Gahagan, "Social Desirability, Manifest Anxiety, and Social Power", Journal of Social Psychology, 1969, V77, 231-239 Thibaut, John W., and Harold H. Kelley, "The Social Psychology of Groups" (New York: Wiley, 1959) Tracy, Lane "The Influence of-NoneconOmic Factors-on Negotiations" Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Jan 74, V27, N2, 204-215 valecha, Gopal K. and Thomas M. Ostrom, "An Abbreviated Measure of Internal- External Locus of Control" Journal Personality Assessment, Aug 1974 V38, N4, 370—383 Vinacke, W. E. and A. Arkoff, "An Experimental Study of Coalitions in the Triad", American Sociological Review, 1951 V22 Walton, Richard E., and Robert B. McKersie, "A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations" (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965) Walton, Richard E., and Robert B. McKersie, "Behavioral Dilemmas in Mixed-Motive Decision Making" 'Behavioral Science, 1966, V11, 370-384 Williams, C. D., M. W. Steele, and J. T. Tedeschi, "Motivational Correlates of Strategy Choices in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game" ‘Journal of Social Psychology, 1969, V79, 211-217 Zeuthen, Frederick, "Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare" (London: Rutledge and Sons, 1930) "I7'11ll'llll'illflllll