ANT ECEDENTS TO IMPLEMENTING SPECIALIZED POLICE UNITS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL INTERACTION Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY JACK RAYMOND GREENE 1977 IIIIIIIIIIZIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII ‘f’r This is to certify that the thesis entitled ANTECEDENTS TO IMPLEMENTING SPECIALIZED POLICE UNITS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF ORGAN I ZATIONAL-ENVIRONMENI‘AL INTERACTION presented by Jack Raymond Greene has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for . Soc1al Sc1ence Ph . D degree in (Criminal Justice) 0146a- N-M‘l/W. Major professor Date 7-J0—77 0-7639 LIBRARY Michigan State University ABSTRACT ANTECEDENTS TO IMPLEMENTING SPECIALIZED POLICE UNITS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL-ENVIRONMENTAL INTERACTION BY Jack Raymond Greene This study explored organizational issues faced in the implementation of special police units, particularly the effects of the external environment in project imple- mentation. The study essentially pursued the following research questions: 1. To what extent is special police unit implemen- tation (acceptance and use) affected by the environments of these units? 2. In the implementation process, can specific strategies be employed to facilitate unit integration in the larger organizational system? 3. What characteristics of the special unit's environment facilitate or impede the implementation process? To investigate the preceding questions a sample of six special police unit projects, involving thirteen separate law enforcement jurisdictions, were selected for inclusion in the study. The study employed the use of two data gathering instruments; (1) a series of structured Jack Raymond Greene interviews conducted in each of the six research sites, and (2) a survey instrument distributed within each site. Sixteen variables were identified for inclusion in the study and variables were classified as either outcome variables, process variables or control variables. Data collected were then analyzed using both a one-way and two- way fixed effects analysis of variance model. The results of data analysis indicated: 1. The nature and structure of the environment was found to have an effect on levels of command officer resis- tance toward the special police units. Specifically, higher levels of command officer resistance to the special unit were found to exist in the unitary environment than in the federative or coalitional environments. 2. Environment was found to have an influence on individual evaluations of special unit impact. 3. Environment was found to have an effect on domain consensus, particularly in the federative environ- ment, which exhibited the highest levels of domain consen- sus. Furthermore, environment was found to have a signifi- cant effect on individual perceptions of influence, the use of formal coordination as a strategy to manage the environ- ment, and levels of threat perception. 4. Levels of domain consensus (agreement with organizational purposes) were found to have a significant effect on each of the four outcome variables. No Jack Raymond Greene significant differences among groups classified by goal clarity were found. These findings indicated that domain consensus is an important variable to the implementation process. 5. External dependence on the special units was found to have a significant influence on evaluations of the special unit's integration into the larger environmental system, and evaluations of special unit impact. 6. The measure of perception of influence in the policy-making structure of the special units produced consistently significant results across each of the outcome variables. This finding indicated that creating percep- tions of influence in the external environment affected levels of acceptance and use of special unit outputs. The measure of special unit influence in the environment produced no significant results in the analysis. 7. Strategies designed to manage the environment were found to affect different outcome variables. Coopta- tion was found to affect both evaluations of unit integra- tion and use. Informal c00peration was found to influence unit integration. The two most consistent measures of environmental management strategies across the outcome variables were formal coordination and market creation. 8. The measure of threat perception in the exter- nal environment created by the establishment of the special unit was found to produce significant effects on evaluations Jack Raymond Greene of special unit integration, impact, and use. This finding suggested that threat perception had a negative impact on the implementation process. These findings indicated that environmental consi- derations significantly affect the implementation process. Furthermore, the effects of both inclusive environmental context and the dynamics of the implementation process on subsequent outcomes suggested that the initiation of special police units requires a concern for factors external to the organization if successful implementation is to be realized. ANTECEDENTS TO IMPLEMENTING SPECIALIZED POLICE UNITS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL-ENVIRONMENTAL INTERACTION BY Jack Raymond Greene A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY College of Social Science 1977 .r-rwfu w. iv 4’ \J CDCopyright by JACK RAYMOND GREENE 1977 The material in this project was prepared under Grant No. 77-NI-99-0028 from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U. S. Department of Justice. Researchers undertaking such projects under Government sponsorship are encouraged to express freely their professional judgment. There- fore, points of view or Opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent the official position or policy of the U. S. Department of Justice. ii To Ramona, Laurie and Stephanie, for all the obvious reasons and many more. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS To acknowledge each and every individual who influenced the direction and development of this thesis, as well as my graduate career, is indeed a formidable task. The academic milieu encountered in the pursuit of a graduate degree is rich in personalities and I am in- debted to all who made the trek rewarding. I wish to thank Dr. John H. McNamara for his assistance and guidance throughout this project. His support and advice were invaluable. I would also like to thank Dr. Cleo Cherryholmes and Dr. Robert Trojanowicz for their participation on my doctoral committee. Certainly, this dissertation would not have come to fruition without the efforts of Dr. Ralph G. Lewis, whose contribution to my personal and professional matura- tion has been boundless. As mentor and nemesis, Dr. Lewis has continually provided the eclectic environment necessary for professional develOpment, and I am truly indebted for his contribution. Special thanks is accorded to Dr. John K. Hudzik whose personal friendship, wisdom and collaboration I shall always treasure. Special thanks is also offered to Steven Edwards whose brightness and great sense of humor iv made the journey that much easier. I would also like to thank Dr. Robert Lorinskas, Stan Vanagunas and Forrest Moss. who encouraged me to pursue an academic career and who fostered that pursuit with appreciated comradeship. . Gratitude is extended to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U. S. Department of Justice for providing financial support for this project and to the Michigan Office of Criminal Justice Programs for their assistance in many aspects of this research. To Mrs. Denise Wootton who typed the manuscript I offer my many thanks. Finally, I thank my wife Ramona and My daughters Laurie and Stephanie for their love, patience, understanding and sacrifice. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER LIST OF TABLES LIST OF FIGURES I. INTRODUCTION Statement of the Problem Significance of the Problem Scope of the Study Overview II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Policy Research and the Implementation Process: An Overview Failure Resulting From Over-Expectations Project Theoretical Failure Implementation Failure Organizations, Organizational Environments, and the Implementation Process Organizations: Open Versus Closed Systems Organizational Domain Power and Dependence Environmental Dependence and Competitive Strategies Environmental Dependence and Cooperative Strategies Contracting as a power-acquiring I strategy ECoopting as a power-acquiring strategy .Coalescing or merger as a power- acquiring strategy Environmental Integration and the Implementation Process vi PAGE ix xi 13 14 16 16 19 . 21 23 29 31 38 43 46 49 SO 52 S4 55 CHAPTER Systems Integration Unit Integration in the Larger System Implementation and Organizational Environ- ment: Summary and Guiding Assumptions III. METHODOLOGY Design of the Study P0pulation and Sample Sample Research Sites Site A--Investigations Coordination Unit Site B--Crime Prevention Unit Site C--Regionalized Detective Bureau Site D--Saturation Patrol Unit-South Site E--Saturation Patrol Unit—North Site F--County Wide Metro Crime Unit Methods of Data Collection Research Variables and Variable Measurement Outcome Variables Process Variables Control (Third) Variable--Inclusive Environmental Context Data Analysis Design Limitations IV. ANALYSIS The Effect of Inclusive Environmental Context Environmental Effects on Goal Clarity and Domain Consensus Dependency and Environmental Context Perceptions of Influence and Environ- mental Context Environmental Management Threat Perception Antecedents to Implementation The Effects of Goal Clarity and Domain Environmental Dependence and Evalu- ations of Outcome Influence Perception vii PAGE 56 6O 67 73 73 74 80 80 82 83 86 87 89 90 101 110 114 114 117 119 121 121 127 132 134 136 140 146 147 152 157 CHAPTER The Impact of Environmental Management Strategies C00ptation and Its Effect Coordination as an Attempt to Manage the Environment Cooperation as a Means of Securing Environmental Acceptance The Creation of a Market for Special Unit Output ' Perceptions of Threat and Special Unit Acceptance and Use The Importance of Environmental Considera- tions in the Implementation Process The Impact of Environmental Context on Implementation Processes V. SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS Summary The Effect of Environment The Effect of Process Variables Implications of the Findings ”A General Model of Factors Affecting the Implementationtfopecial Police Units Implications for Policy Deve10pment in the Implementation Process Conclusions Recommendations for Future Research Generated Hypotheses Additional Research Issues APPENDIX A. QUESTION GUIDELINE FOR SPECIAL POLICE UNIT STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS APPENDIX B. POOL OF QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS AND ASSOCIATED RESPONDENT GROUPS BIBLIOGRAPHY viii PAGE 161 163 167 169 170 172 177 182 193 193 194 194 197 198 202 207 208 209 210 215 219 232 LIST OF TABLES NUMBER OF STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS BY RESEARCH SITE AND RESPONDENT TYPE DISTRIBUTION OF RETURNED QUESTIONNAIRES BY RESPONDENT CLASS BY RESEARCH SITE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RETURNED QUES- TIONNAIRES BY RESPONDENT CLASS BY RESEARCH SITE RESEARCH VARIABLES AND ASSOCIATED SURVEY ITEMS OUTCOME AND PROCESS VARIABLES, ASSOCIATED SURVEY ITEMS AND SCALES, AND RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS RESEARCH SITES CLASSIFIED BY INCLUSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT OUTCOME VARIABLES OVER LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF GOAL CLARITY AND DOMAIN CONSENSUS OVER LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT MEASURES OF EXTERNAL DEPENDENCY OVER LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT MEASURES OF PERCEPTIONS OF INFLUENCE IN SPECIAL UNIT POLICY DECISIONS OVER LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT MEASURES OF STRATEGIES TO MANAGE THE ENVIRONMENT OVER LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT THREAT PERCEPTION OVER LEVELS OF ENVIRON- MENTAL CONTEXT ix PAGE 93 97 98 102 112 116 123 129 133 135 139 143 TABLE 4. 4. 4 7 8 .9 .10 .11 .12 .13 .14 .15 .16 .17 OUTCOME VARIABLES BY GOAL CLARITY AND DOMAIN CONSENSUS OUTCOME VARIABLES BY MEASURES OF ENVIRON- MENTAL DEPENDENCY OUTCOME VARIABLES BY MEASURES OF PERCEPTION OF INFLUENCE (ITEMS 62 AND 65) OUTCOME VARIABLES BY ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES OUTCOME VARIABLES BY THREAT PERCEPTION PERCENTAGE OF VARIANCE ON OUTCOME VARIABLES EXPLAINED BY PROCESS VARIABLES OUTCOME VARIABLES BY DOMAIN CONSENSUS, CONTROLLING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT OUTCOME VARIABLES BY PERCEPTIONS OF INFLUENCE, CONTROLLING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT OUTCOME VARIABLES BY COORDINATION, CONTROLLING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT OUTCOME VARIABLES BY MARKET CREATION, CONTROLLING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT OUTCOME VARIABLES BY THREAT PERCEPTION, CONTROLLING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT PAGE 148 153 158 164 174 179 184 185 187 188 191 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE PAGE 2.1 Processes affecting program success and failure 27 2.2 Types of environmental contexts 58 2.3 Assumed interdependencies between specialized police units and elements of their environment 65 2.4 Special police unit projects as Open systems 71 3.1 Relative position of environmental actors in relation to the special unit 95 5.1 A general model of factors affecting envi- ronmental acceptance and use of specialized police units 201 xi CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION In recent years the provision of police service has become a focal issue in many American communities. Rising crime, coupled with an awareness that police patrol deployment practices have had little impact on either reported or actual levels of criminal activity,1 has resulted in the deve10pment of specialized police units. The term specialized police units refers to crime-specific proactive task forces developed to focus upon either the general deterrence of crime or the immediate apprehension of criminal offenders. Three general types of special police units were considered in this study: (1) covert surveillance teams developed to maximize the direct apprehension of criminal offenders; (2) saturation patrol units designed to increase the visibility of police patrol Operations, thus presumably 1George L. Kelling, Tony Pate, Duane Dieckman and Charles E. Brown, The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: The PoliCe Foundation, 1974), pp. 20-23. 2 deterring criminal behavior; and, (3) regionalized detective bureaus designed to improve existing criminal case investigations in a particular jurisdiction. The impetus for the deve10pment of specialized police units stems from a recognition by many law enforcement experts that a police administrator's ability to deploy police personnel effectively on crime- specific problems is severely circumscribed because of the normal volume of citizen requests for police service. One governmental commission addressing the problems associated with maintaining existing levels of police service indicated: Every police administrator is often troubled by an apparent inability to deploy his patrol strength for maximum effect against particular problems. Limited personnel and the many prob- lems of regular patrol service frequently preclude the attaining of prOper selective enforcement or selectgd pressure against special crime problems. In addition to identifying the need to deploy police personnel more effectively, this commission further advised: To achieve proper emphasis and pressure par— ticular crime situations, crime tactical forces 2National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police, (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 238-39. are often deployed to serve as compact, flexible operational task forces in given locations at timeg when a concentrated effort is needed. Further support for the deve10pment of specialized policing units is gained from the study of official crime reports. Analysis of crime patterns and arrested offen- ders in adjacent municipal or county localities has led most police administrators and planners to the conclusion that the jurisdictional boundaries established for most police agencies are not in concert with the mobility patterns of criminal offenders. In an effort to remedy this situation, specialized police units have been initiated witha view toward improving police investi- gation services in each jurisdiction. The success or failure of specialized police units has been evaluated largely in terms of their ability to (1) reduce specific types of crimes, (2) in- crease clearance rates, (3) deter criminal activity, or (4) improve criminal conviction rates.4 However, little 31bid., p. 239. 4Examples of the types of police-productivity measures currently being used may be found in Harry P. Hatry, "Wrestling with Police Crime Control Productivity Measurement", Readings in Productivity in Policing, ed. Joan L. Wifle and John F. Heaphy (Washington, D.C.: The Police Foundation, 1975), pp. 86-128; Peter B. Bloch, Equality of Distribution of Police Services—-A Case Study of Washington, D.C. (Washington, D. C.: TheTUrBan Institute, 1974); Peter W. Greenwood et. al. The Criminal Investigation Process--Volume III: OEEervations effort has been directed toward evaluating these units in terms of the manner in which they were implemented or the degree to which their respective organizational environ- ments permitted, hindered, or facilitated the attainment of these organizational purposes. Furthermore, research examining the organizational environments of law enforcement institutions, particularly as these environments affect organizational structure and operation, are for all practical purposes nonexistent. However, a review of law enforcement literature does reveal an implicit concern for forces external to police organizations and how these forces might affect policing agencies. Wilson, for example, in developing his typology of police administrator styles, implicitly addressed the environmental constraints of the eight communities selected, which ultimately influenced the type of admi- nistrative style exhibited. Although Wilson minimized the overall impact of "community" upon police adminis- trative style, he did indicate: The prevailing police style is not explicitly determined by community decisions, though a few of its elements may be shaped by these deci- sions . . . The police are in all cases keenly and Analysis. (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Cor- poration, 1975), pp. 34-40; National Commission on Productivity. Oppprtunities for Improving Productivity in Police Services (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Productivity, 1973). sensitive to their political environment without in all cases being governed by it. Similarly, consideration of changes in the internal and external environments of policing agencies, developed by 6 reflected a concern for relationships Sandler and Mintz, between these agencies and the communities they serve. The limitation of both these studies, however, is that they treated the external organizational environment as some homogeneous entity without specifically considering the actors that composed the environment. The work by Ostrom gt_al. represented greater Specificity with regard to identifying environmental actors.7 By conceptualizing the police agency as a service-delivery industry, the authors attempted to trace the degree of fragmentation or duplication of police service for a given geographic area. Although their study examined and specified the organizational actors in a SJames Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 230. 6Georgette Sandler, and Ellen Mintz, "Police Organizations: Their Changing Internal and External Relationships," Journal of Police Science and Adminis- tration 2 (DecemBer 1974): 458-63. 7Elinor Ostrom, Roger B. Parks, and Gordon P. Whitaker, "Defining and Measuring Structural Variations in Interorganizational Arrangements" (paper presented before the Midwest Political Science Association Meetings, Chicago, Illinois, May 1-3, 1975). police-service-delivery system, its applicability to the present study is limited because it did not examine the types of relationships between these actors, and hence the dynamics of the environment. Furthermore, the study did not consider the interdependencies that develOp among organizations; consequently, it ignored the type, dura- tion, and intensity of interactions among these institu- tions, all of which may affect the attainment of organi- zational goals. The relationships and interdependencies among organizations are of particular relevance when considering the introduction of a new organization, such as a specialized police unit, into an existing institutional structure. As previously noted, the measurement of specialized police unit output ignores a more basic issue, namely: Was the unit implemented as intended, and to what extent does the environment affect this imple- mentation process? Statement of the Problem The introduction of a new law enforcement unit into an existing organizational environment may result in: (1) environmental rejection of the initiated change, or (2) varying degrees of environmental acceptance, utili- zation, and continuation of the newly initiated change strategy. A third, although perhaps less probable, situation may occur, in which the new unit rejects its host environment and relocates under institutional condi- tions more favorable to the attainment of its purposes. The opportunity for successful goal attainment, then, may be viewed as dependent upon the extent to which these units are accepted into existing environmental structures, and the extent to which these fledgling organizations are permitted to pursue their goals. For example, the initiation of a multi- jurisdictional criminal investigation unit is based on the assumption that area police departments and the new unit will exchange information. If such an exchange is not forthcoming, or only partially occurs, the new unit is relegated to a position of impotence befOre it has had an Opportunity to establish its effectiveness. Therefore, the antecedents to measuring special police unit produc- tivity reside in the external environment, particularly when the issue of organizational implementation arises. The present study focused on the implementation processes surrounding the introduction of specialized police units, and the degree to which implementation and subsequent acceptance, use, and continuation of special- ized policing services are affected by the organizational environments of these units. Essentially, this study addressed the following research questions: 1. To what extent is special police unit imple- mentation (acceptance and use) affected by the environments of these units? 4n, 8 2. In the implementation process, can specific strategies be employed to facilitate unit integration in the larger organizational system? 3. What characteristics of the special unit's environment facilitate or impede the imple- mentation process? Significance of the Problem Organizational-environmental networks, particu- larly as they relate to the implementation of a newly initiated organizational unit, have yet to be explored in the literature on criminal justice organizations. The initiation of planned change in the police milieu, as represented by the establishment of specialized policing units, affords an opportunity to examine critically the environmental factors that affect the implementation of such changes. Planned change in organizations has been a topic of much debate and intensive research. However, as one prominent researcher on the tOpic noted, "despite the common occurrence of organizational change, its dynamics and underlying processes are understood in only rough, ill-defined ways.”8 This is particularly problematic when considering deliberate attempts to initiate change in a given organization. 8Louis B. Barnes, "Approaches to Organizational Change," in The Planning of Change, second edition; ed. Warren G. Bennis et al. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 79. The specialized police units under consideration are viewed as attempted innovations designed to improve the Operational capability of their respective organi- zations. Before accomplishing their purposes, however, these units must be accepted by their host organizations and by the environments in which they function. Tradi- tional evaluation efforts in the field of criminal justice have relied almost totally on the measurement of outputs and outcomes of the organization under consideration. Few attempts have been made to measure the degree to which innovations have been implemented or the extent to which external factors impede or facilitate goal attainment. This is indeed a problem, since a growing body of research suggests that organizational environments affect the way in which an organization develops and pursues its goals.9 The current study examined the web of interactions between specialized police units and their external environments, with a view toward examining environmental 9For example, see Ernest A. T. Barth, "The Causes and Consequences of Interagency Conflict," Sociological Inquiry 33 (Winter 1963): 51-57; William R. Dill, "Environ- ment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy," Adminis- trative Science Quarterly 2 (March 1958): 409-43; James D. Thompson, and William J. McEwen, "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal Setting as an Interaction Process," American Sociological Review 23 (February 1958): 23-31; James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), particularly Chapters 3 and 4. 10 influence in project implementation. Specialized police units provide an ideal Opportunity to study the implemen- tation process and the extent to which the environment affects these processes, because they are organizational units over which the environment can exert a great deal_ of influence. This is particularly evident when consi- dering the special unit's dependence on other police units or organizations for both the supply and use of information on crime and criminals. The significance of the study lay in its attempt to address a series of policy questions related to the initiation of innovative projects within existing orga- nizational structures.10 In the policy realm, the study's significance was derived from the following questions related to the initiation and implementation of specialized police units; 1. To what extent does the external environment affect special police unit implementation? 2. DO environmental characteristics differ among special units, and what is their effect upon unit implementation? 3. To what extent must a unit be integrated into the existing environment to achieve its de- sired ends? 10By innovation is meant concepts, activities, and technologies that are new to the particular setting in which the project is being conducted. 11 Are the more successfully implemented units those that have accomplished environmental acceptance of their goals, objectives, and activities? What is the structure of the environment, and how does that structure alter unit goals, objectives, and activities? To what extent is environmental acceptance necessary for project implementation, and under what conditions is it necessary? Do specific strategies in the project- implementation process facilitate environ- mental acceptance? What must managers of special units know about their interactions with the external environment to manage that environment effectively? How much power does an organization like the specialized police unit need, to manage its environment? In addition to addressing the preceding questions con- cerning project implementation, the study also explored an issue confronting the criminal justice system, in general, and law enforcement organizations in particular: consolidation of police services. In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, in addressing what is considered to be a critical problem confronting law enforcement organizations, commented: A fundamental problem confronting law enforcement today is that of fragmented crime repression efforts resulting from the large number of uncoordinated local governments and law enforce- ment agencies . . . Formal COOperation or 12 consolidation is an essential ingredient in improving the quality of law enforcement. Similarly, in 1973 the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals continued to emphasize the need for formal coordination and COOpera- tion between police agencies and the entire criminal justice system. As the commission indicated, Every police agency immediately should act to insure understanding and COOperation between the agency and all other elements of the cri- minal justice system (including other police agencies), and should immediately plan and implement appropriate coordination of its efforts with those of othgr elements of the criminal justice system.1 Although both commissions identified a pressing need in criminal justice service-delivery systems, their recommendations require an examination of existing organizational relations among criminal justice component agencies. This is particularly true when considering multi-jurisdictional arrangements of specialized police units. Since four of the six specialized police units under scrutiny in this study involved the combined efforts 11President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Task Force Report: The Police (Washington, D.C.: U. S. GOvernment Printing Office, 1967), p. 68. 12National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police, p. 73. 13 of more than one police agency, the Opportunity'tx>examine multi-jurisdictional effects upon unit implementation begins an exploration of the consolidation issue. The problems associated with implementing and institutionali- zing multi-jurisdictional projects in criminal justice have only recently emerged in criminal justice literature}3 The present study sought to expand upon this literature through an examination of the institutional environments of specialized policing units, with a view toward speci- fying the organizational issues that arise during project implementation efforts. As the criminal justice system moves toward consolidated or coordinated efforts involving one or more political jurisdiction, the policy issues raised in project-implementation stages become intensified. The significance, then, of this research is that it attempted to examine environmental impact on criminal justice project implementation from both the perspective of innovation within a single organization and the effort to consolidate a specialized criminal justice function. Sc0pe of the Study There is a paucity of research pertaining to the organizational environments of criminal justice 13For a review of multi-jurisdictional arrange- ments in criminal justice, see Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State and Local Relations in the Criminal Justice System, (Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1971). 14 institutions. Furthermore, the issue of environmental impact upon criminal justice project implementation has received little attention among criminal justice re- searchers, despite the recognition that forces external to the organization have great impact upon the shaping and pursuit of organizational goals and objectives. This study sought to examine the network of rela- tions that develOpS between specialized police units and their environments. The focal point for this examination was the implementation efforts surrounding these projects and the forces in the external environment that facilitated or impeded project implementation. Six specialized police units were investigated. The environments surrounding these units were analyzed with regard to their structure; impact upon project goals, objectives and activities; and the degree of use and support from environmental actors. Also addressed were the implementation process and the role the environment plays in the process. Overview The primary concern of this research was to examine the impact of organizational environments upon specialized police units. Consequently, the study explored the organizational interrelations in criminal justice units, particularly as these interrelations affect the implemen- tation of specialized police unit projects. 15 In Chapter II the theoretical framework underlying the research is reviewed. Delineated in Chapter III are the research methods employed in the study, including the pOpulation and sample, variables to be examined, and Operational definitions. An analysis of the results of the study is presented in Chapter IV. Chapter V is devoted to presenting the major findings, the implications of these findings, and recommendations for future research. CHAPTER II THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Policy Research and the Implementation Process: An Overview Studies examining the processes affecting the introduction of social programs are relatively limited in the literature on policy and evaluation research. Instead, under the general rubric of "policy research," two major traditions can be identified. The first, relating to the antecedent processes associated with policy articulation, or the "politics" of the policy-making process,1 iden- tifies sources of political, social, and economic power within a given locality or over a given issue, and their impact upon a particular policy outcome. The second approach, typified by what is called "evaluation research," concerns the impact or effect policies have on the problems they sought to rectify. Weiss stated, "the purpose of evaluation research is to measure the effects 1Illustrative of this orientation are: Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961); Wallace S. Sayre, and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: W. W. Horton and Company, Inc., 1965), particularly chapters 3, 8 and 13. 16 17 of a program against the goals it set out to accom- plish."2 Both orientations provide much information about and insight into the policy arena, but fail to examine the processes by which policy statements are translated into action--namely, the implementation process. In general, researchers and evaluation specialists, as well as policy makers and planners, have neglected the issue of implementation. It is almost as if everyone has ignored the fact that policies, programs, and projects must be appropriately implemented in order to function. Part of this problem, no doubt, stems from the structure of government and the way in which policies are Opera- tionalized. The legislature, for example, assumes that 'the administrative branch will effectively implement policy statements. However, more often than not, the implementation process is hampered by the very vagueness of legislative mandates. Distinguishing between implementation analysis and policy analysis focuses attention on factors not normally considered in previous evaluation research efforts. As one researcher on the tOpic indicated: Evaluation is not the same thing as research upon implementation because it usually con- centrates upon ultimate program impact without 2Carol H. Weiss, Evaluation Research, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., I972), p. 4. 18 asking about the institutional means of achieving that effect . . . . A concern with institutions as the agents of program effec- tiveness is not central to the work of much that goes under the heading of evaluation.3 Since many program or project evaluations fail to con- sider implementation issues, these studies have difficulty determining either why projects meet their desired ends or why they do not. This problem is particularly serious, as it affects the external validity of evaluation findings. That is, the ability to generalize findings across research sites, and hence the ability to transfer successful programs from one city to another, is reduced when one cannot identify the "causes" of success nor those of failure. Furthermore, despite continued improvement in the design and methodology employed in evaluation efforts, the results of these studies have been disappointing to both the public and public officials. Their disappoint- ment stems primarily from the fact that most programs and projects do not achieve the expected results. This is true for criminal justice programs as well as other social-delivery programs. The failure of a project to achieve its goals may be the result of many factors. Three of these elements are considered here, for it has been argued that they account for the majority of program failures. The three 3Erwin C. Hargrove, The MissingLink: The Study of the Implementation of Social Policy (Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1975), p. 7. 19 sources of failure are (l) programmatic over-expectation, (2) theoretical or conceptual failure, and (3) implemen- tation failure. Failure Resulting From Over-Expectations The first factor affecting project failure arises when one questions the extent to which projects can actually accomplish everything that is expected of them. That is, expectations for the success of such programs may be extremely exaggerated, even to the point of pre- cluding measurable levels of success once evaluation is undertaken. The problem of over-expectation was illustrated in Derthick's study of the aborted federal attempt to develop "new towns in town."4 The primary goal of this federally sponsored project was to eradicate slum housing in Washington, D. C., by using federally owned land to build public housing. In assessing this program and its subsequent failure, Derthick indicated that program failure was, to a great extent, predicated upon exagger- ated presidential rhetoric regarding what a program of this type would achieve. As the author indicated, "its 4Martha Derthick, New Towns in Town: Why a Federal Pro ram Failed (Washington, D. C.: The UrBan Insfitute), 197 . 20 goals [the project's] exceeded by far its capacity to achieve them."5 On the other hand, Murphy indicated that "hidden program objectives" may be realized even though "articu- lated objectives" are not.6 For example, his assessment of Title I, aid to the disadvantaged, of the 1965 Elemen- tary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) indicated that assistance to the poor was actually a secondary considera- tion in the development and subsequent initiation of the legislation.. As he indicated, The objective [of Title I] was a law, not reform. The main thrust for aid to poverty schools came from reformers in the Executive Branch who had a double objective: the establishment of the prin- ciple of federal aid to schools and a redirection of local priorities. The problem of over-advocacy associated with project failure may also result from many of the social problems being dealt with, and the political processes that are expected to address these problems. The ultimate impact of ideological slogans like "The War on SMartha Derthick, "Washington: Angry Citizens and an Ambitious Plan," in Social Program Implementation, ed. Walter Williams and RichardiF. Elmore (New York: Academic Press, 1976), p. 232. 6JeromeIT. Murphy, "Title I of ESEA: The Politics of Implementing Federal Education Reform," Harvard Educa- tional Review 41 (February 1971): 35-63. 7Ibid., p. 38. 21 Poverty” or "The Great Society" upon "successful" program evaluation has yet to become a tOpic of substantive research. As Campbell suggested: Given the inherent difficulty of making signifi- cant improvement [in social programs] by the means usually provided and given the discrepancy between promise and possibility, most administrators prefer to limit the evaluations to thosg of out- comes of which they can control . . . . Although it is highly possible that political interests may be served by "controlling” outcomes to be evaluated, it must be noted that the social problems addressed in the last 20 years have been recurring concerns in American society. The eradication of these problems may be more wishful thinking than is Operationally feasible at this time. Hence, basing evaluations on inflated expectations may preclude serious assessment of program success or failure. Project Theoretical Failure A second reason projects fail to achieve their anticipated results may be labeled conceptual or theoreti- cal failure. The concern here is that the underlying 8Donald T. Campbell, "Reforms as Experiments," in Evaluating Action Programs: Readipgs in Social Action and Edfication, ed. Carol H. Weiss (Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon Inc., 1972), p. 188. 22 conceptual basis of the project may have been inaccurate or inappropriate, and hence the project is unable to intervene in the appropriate causal network. Further- more, many projects are initiated without having first identified any causal network to be affected. Presumably, all projects are based upon some underlying conceptual framework. The intent of the pro- ject is to intervene into some identified causal network, thus affecting the intended outcome. However, if the conceptual or theoretical framework underlying the project is inapprOpriate, or never identified, the network is never activated; hence the "idea failed.” An example of conceptual or theoretical failure was reported by Pressman and Wildavsky, in a case study of an employment program initiated through the Economic Development Administration (EDA) in Oakland, California. Essentially, the EDA project was attempting to create employment opportunities for the poor and minorities in the Oakland area. However, as the authors explained, the underlying economic theory used to deveIOp the EDA project called for the subsidization of capital investments made by participating private businesses, instead of a wage subsidy which, the authors argued, would have had a more 9Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implemen- tation (Berkeley, California: University of California Press), 1973. 23 immediate impact upon business hiring practices. As Pressman and Wildavsky indicated; Instead of taking the direct path of paying the employers a subsidy on wages after they had hired minority personnel, the EDA program expanded their capital on the promise that they would later hire the right peOple. Theoretical defects exacerbated bureaucratic problems. Kerr11 referred to this type of policy failure as "instrumental failure," indicating that for a policy to succeed instrumentally it must "affect some state of affairs which [is] conceived as the goal or point of the policy."12 This again calls attention to the requirement of "causal network activation" as one criterion upon which evaluation should be undertaken. Implementation Failure A third reason for the lack of program success, and the reverse of the second, is simply that the project failed to reach its objectives, which were at least conceptually or theoretically possible. Stated in this manner, both project failure and theoretical failure may be viewed in the following manner; "program [project] failure is a failure to achieve proximate goals; theory 101bid., p. 147 11Donna H. Kerr, "The Logic of 'Policy' and Successful Policies," Policy Sciences 7 (1976): 351-63. 12lbid., p. 360. 24 [conceptual] failure occurs when the achievement of proximate goals does not lead to the final desired out- come."13 Within the area of project failure, analysis of the implementation process becomes of primary concern. A project may give the appearance of failure, in the sense that it did not attain its goals, simply because the ideas upon which the project was initiated were never tested, as the project was never carried out as originally specified. Consequently, the research issue of major concern shifts from the question "Was the idea success- ful?" to the question "Was the idea tested?" The failure to Operationalize a project as specified, results in what may be called implementation failure, a process that may have serious effects upon subsequent goal attainment.14 The term implementation has often been used in quite conflicting ways in the literature. To alleviate this problem, a definition of implementation is advanced to include a concern for "those actions by public and private individuals [or groups] that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy 13Weiss, Evaluation Research, p. 38. 14Walter Williams, "Implementation Analysis and Assessment," in Social Program Implementation, ed. Walter Williams and Richard F. Elmore (New York: Academic Press, 1976), p. 267-75. 25 decisions."15 This definition also includes a concern for ”both one time efforts to convert decisions into Operational terms and continuing efforts over time to raise the quality of the agency's staffs and organiza- tional structure."16 In addition to the failure in Operationalizing a project as specified, which was referred to as implemen- tation failure, certain projects fail even though they were properly implemented and based upon appropriate theoretical premises. This situation may result from the project's failure to acquire "normative justification" for its existence.17 That is, although the project as operationalized maintained original theoretical specifi- cation, it failed to appeal to or was in contradiction with norms or values shared by the relevant environment. Historical examples of failure to attain normative justification are the programs initiated against the Jews by the Nazi regime. More current examples of this type of project failure are the California lobotomy experiments 15Donald S. Van Meter and Carl E. Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework," Administration and Society 6 (February 1975): 447. 16Walter Williams, Social Policy Research and Anal sis (New York: American Elsever Publishing Co., Inc., 1971 , p. 131. 17Kerr, "The Logic of 'Policy' and Successful Policies," p. 361. 26 conducted with incarcerated offenders in California penal institutions and the "sterilization” programs conducted in many southern states, aimed at reducing "unwanted" pregnancies, particularly in black families. Both of these projects met the criteria of implementation in that they could indeed be "proven" to be successful. However, both failed because of the lack of a normative value structure to support their continued operation. The preceding discussion has outlined those fac- tors thought to affect most the ultimate "success" or failure" of projects. Figure l is a graphic depiction of these processes and their relationships to program or project outcomes. As indicated in the figure, program failure fieferred to herein as implementation failure) has a profound effect upon project outcomes because without successful implementation the entire change process is aborted. Studies focusing on the pitfalls associated with project implementation are few. One notable exception is an intensive implementation study conducted in the field of public education by the Rand Corporation.18 This study 18For a summary of the entire Rand Study see: Paul Berman, and Edward W. Pauly, Federal Programs Sup- porting Educational ChangpL_Vol. II: Factors Affectipg Change Agent Projects (Santa Mofiica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1975). 27 .mm .m .ANAQH ..u:H .HHm:-pufiu:pcm n.w.z .mmeHo p003O~mcmv copmomom newumsam>m .mmwoz .: Houmu ”ougsom opsfifimm paw mmooosm Empmogg mcwpuowmm mommooopm .H.N.mwm uuowmm ow on o>mc mmoooum :oHuoE aw Emumo mousaflmm pppfimpa pfisoz sows: :Hpmsmu: ppm no: pan pa :oflumuepspfiaeHv OHSHfimm Emuwoym uoomwm Op Emma Ho: mmooopm coflpos Emhmop OAOHflmm panama: pap gown: =HAmspu: an now a Acopce uoommm on mmfl .mmooopm acmuos Empwou Ewumoum thHmOQ gown: :Hmmzmo: cw pom m Hammmoousm 28 examined a sample of 293 educational projects, which were labeled "change agent projects."19 The intent of the Rand study was to examine those factors that facilitated or hindered the implementation and subsequent continuation of planned educational changes. One of the major conclu- sions reached through this undertaking was: The effective implementation of innovative projects depended primarily upon a supportive institutional setting and on an implementation strategy that fostered the mutual adaptation of the staff to the project's demands and of thSOproject's design to the reality of its setting. The findings presented in the Rand study indicated that the environments, social as well as political, in which new projects were initiated had a major impact upon the success of project implementation, and hence their ability to pursue and attain project goals and objectives. To facilitate the exploration of the implementation pro- cess (in the current undertaking, specialized police units), it is necessary to deVelop further the underlying conceptual framework supporting the present research. This is particularly important as the focus of the research was on examining environmental-organizational interaction and the effects of this interaction upon the implementa- tion process. 19Change agent projects were broadly defined to in- clude attempts to initiate, implement, and institutionalize innovative educational programs. 20Berman and Pauly, Federal Programs, p. ix. 29 Conceptually, the study was based on a series of assumptions gleaned from the literature on organizations. The specialized police unit projects under consideration were viewed as being implemented through host organiza- tions, which are open systems characterized by their depen- dency upon members (actors) of their external environment both for a supply of inputs (material, people, and infor- mation) and for the consumption of the project's outputs. The following sections explore in detail the major concep- tual orientations employed in this undertaking. Organizations, Organizational Environments, and the Implementation Process When we say that programs have failed, this sug- gests we are surprised. If we thought from the beginning that they were unlikely to be success- ful, their failure to achieve stated goals or to work at all would not cry out for any special explanation. If we believed that intense con- flicts of interests were involved, if peOple who had to COOperate were expected to be at logger- heads, if necessary resources were far beyond those available, we might wonder rather more why the programs were attempted instsad of expressing amazement at their shortcomings. 1 The preceding statement facetiously addressed a critical issue concerning program implementation, namely the extent to which factors beyond the direct control of project initiators influence the implementation process. If programmatic changes are to be fully realized within 21Pressman and Wildavsky, Implementation, p. 87. 30 existing institutional structures, whether those struc- tures be individual organizations or multi-organizational arrangements, consideration must be given to those factors external to the project that ultimately facilitate or impede project goal attainment. To pursue this inquiry, attention must be focused upon examining the environments within which initial implementation efforts are attempted. If by organization is meant "the coordination of different activities of individual contributors to carry out planned transactions with the environment,"22 then, theoretically, each newly initiated project may be viewed as an organization. Implicit in this definition of organi- zation are the concepts of division of labor (different activities), an internal authority structure (coordina- tion), organizational goals (planned transactions), and environmental interaction. By using a rather broad defi- nition of organization, one may include projects that emanate from a single institutional structure as well as those that span more than one institutional structure. For example, a specialized police unit contained within one police organization may be viewed as interacting with an external environment composed of such units as regular patrol, the detective bureau, and planning and research. 22Paul R. Lawrence, and Jay W. Lorsch, Developing Or anizations: Diagnosis and Action (Reading, Mass.: A ison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1969), p. 3. 31 Similarly, a specialized police unit involving more than one police department may be viewed as interacting with an environment composed of two or three patrol sections or detective bureaus. Whereas the size of the organiza- tion's environment increases in multi-organizational arrangements, the essential relationships between organi- zation and environment, such as information dependence and the need to establish consUming units, remain constant. To pursue these relationships, the following consideration of organizations as open or closed systems, their organizational domains and domain consensus, as well as organizational dependence and environmental inte- gration is essential in exploring the implementation process. Organizations: Open Versus Closed Systems Traditionally, studies of complex organizations have operated under a "closed systems model," that is, an organizational model that relies primarily on processes within the organization to explain variations in organi- zational behavior. This closed systems perspective and its use may be viewed as resulting from (1) the primary units of analysis under consideration and (2) the histo- rical deve10pment of organizational research. 32 Despite the general recognition that the hallmark of modern society is organizational complexity and that few organizations Operate independently, relatively few research inquiries have probed beyond the boundaries of the organization. One general reason for this dearth of research is the predominant intra-organizational focus in the literature. As Blau indicated, Three foci of analysis may be distinguished in organizational research . . . (l) the individual in his specific role as a member of the organi- zation . . . (2) the structure of social rela- tions among individuals in the various groups. within the organization . . . (3) the system of interrelated elements tha characterize the organization as a whole. Although the three foci of analysis Blau identified are indeed important in studying organizations and organiza- tional behavior, they represent essentially a closed systems model, in that each attempts to explain behavior as resulting from internal organizational forces, re- sources, and inputs. This reflects an orientation in organizational research that has been dictated primarily by tradition. Early organizational theorists, including propo- nents of such schools of thoughts as bureaucratic theory, scientific management, and administrative management, were concerned with the internal characteristics of 23Peter M. Blau, On the Nature of Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), pp. 112-13. 33 organizations. Weber, for example, began his analysis by considering the evolution of bureaucracy and the resulting structures that developed to stabilize the organization in the absence of charismatic leadership.24 These structures, being internal to the organization, included such dimen- sions as hierarchy of authority, impersonality of inter- personal relations, the extensive use of rules and regula- tions, merit-based promotion, and the division of labor. Each of these dimensions, however, is internal to the organization and thus does not take into account the extent to which the environment may affect its deve10pment and use. Similarly, the concepts developed by scientific and administrative management theorists relate to the internal structuring of work activities and the management and contrOl of the internal as opposed to the external system. Taylor's25 Principles of Scientific Management and Gulick and Urwick's Papers on the Science of Administration26 are illustrative of this thought. Such 24Philip Marcus, "Organizational Change: A Review and Synthesis of the Literature" (East Lansing, Michigan: Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, 1973), p. 3. (mimeographed) ZSFrederick W. Taylor, Principles of Scientific Management (New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1911). 26Luther Gulick, and L. Urwick, eds., Papers on the Science of Administration (New York: Institute of Public ZAaministration, 1937). 34 concepts as span of control, chain of command, the coordinative principle, the scalar principle, and the now- famous POSDCORB were all designed with a view toward specifying internal structural and interpersonal relations as they related to "efficient" administration and organi- zation. The focus, again, was on the internal organization and its management. Thus, the primary focus of this literature was in the realm of closed systems. The advent of the "human relations" movement in organizational research shifted the focus of inquiry from the structural dimensions of organization to considerations of individual and group behavior patterns as each interacted with the formal structures. Although the human relations movement in organizational research did much to challenge and modify the existing "principles of administration," by introducing both the individual and the group into organizational considerations, the systems model underlying this orientation is still essentially closed.27 Much of the literature developed by human relations theorists relates more to reducing internal organizational conflict and integrating individuals and groups into the organization than to focusing on elements external to the 27For a critical review of the literature on the human relations movement, see: Charles Perrow, Com lex Oggpnizations: A Critical Essay(Glenview, Illin01s: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1972), pp. 97-143. 35 organization. For example, techniques developed by a branch of organization researchers (organizational development theorists) have focused on democratizing bureaucracies. As one researcher commented, the overall mission in organizational deve10pment is to: 1. improve the individual member's ability to get along with other members (or what the field calls "interpersonal competence"); 2. legitimate human emotions in the organi- zation; 3. increase mutual understanding among members; 4. reduce tensions; 5. enhance team management and intergroup cooperation; 6. deveIOp more effective techniques for conflict resolution . . .; and 7. evolve less structured and more "organic" organizations.28 These efforts, while laudible, neglect to consider the extent to which internal organizational conflict is generated by factors external to the organization, and hence beyond its immediate control. Increasingly, organizational researchers are treating complex organizations as "open" systems. In contrast to the closed systems models previously pre- sented, the Open systems model focuses on the 28Nicholas Henry, Public Administration and Public .Affairs (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice—Hall, Inc., 1975), p. 67. 36 interrelations between an organization and its environ- ment to explain changes both internal and external to the organization. The following statement is indicative of the stress placed upon the environment under an Open systems perspective: The parts of a system [organization] do not com- pletely determine the system's outcomes by them- selves, but rather interact with an outside environment that represents situational uncer- tainty. Thus the parts of the organization system are subject to influence by environmental stimuli not directly contained within the system.29 In its most general sense, the term system refers to any set of elements standing in interrelation. This is true of open as well as closed systems. Beyond this general conceptualization, it is assumed that the units or parts of the system share some relationship. Further- more, an alteration in one of the units brings about a relationship that ultimately initiates a change in another element of the system.30 As a heuristic device, systems are given boundaries that delimit their sc0pe, as well as 29Lyman W. Porter, Edward E. Lawler III, and J. Richard Hackman, Behavior in Organizations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975), p. 99. 30For a discussion of the concept of system, see: Ludwig Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, rev. ed. (New York: George Braziller, 1968), particularly Chapters 2 and 3; A. D. Hall, and R. E. Fagen, "Definition of System," in Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist, ed. Waiter Buckley (ChiEago, Illinois: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 81-92. 37 the demarcation point between organization and environ- ment. It is the placement of these systems' (organiza- tions') boundaries, as well as their permeability, that distinguishes between Open and closed systems. Many problems are associated with the placement of a system's boundaries. Even when the relevant system and its environment have been isolated for analysis, the question arises of whether this constitutes the total system or rather some subset of a broader system. For as one author indicated, "In fact, of course, the system and its environment make up sub-parts of a wider system which often must be treated at its own level."31 In addition to the placement and permeability of a system's boundaries, however, and more important for analytical purposes, is the recognition that exchange takes place between the system and its environment across these boundaries. What is being exchanged may include personnel, information, or referrals. Thus including the environment in the open-systems model goes far beyond the initial recognition that in some manner the organization interacts with its environment. "That a system is open means, not simply that it engages in interchanges with its environment, but that this interchange is an essential 31Walter Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theor (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19 , p. 50. 38 factor underlying the system's [organization's] viability, its reproductive ability or continuity, and its ability to change."32 The recognition, then, is that organization influences environment and environment influences organi- zation. Recognition of this reciprocal influence is central to a discussion of project implementation. If a project is to be fully implemented it must gain environ- mental recognition and acceptance. Conversely, the environment must be made aware of what the new project is attempting and it must have some use for the project's output. To expand upon this discussion requires a consi- deration of three concepts that are believed to affect the implementation process. These concepts focus on the external environments of organizations in terms of (1) do- main and domain consensus, (2) power and dependance, and (3) environmental integration. Organizational Domain "The domain of an organization consists of the specific goals it wishes to pursue and the functions it seeks to undertake in order to achieve these goals."33 321bid. 33Sol Levine, Paul E. White, and Benjamin D. Paul, "Community Interorganizational Problems in Providing Medi- cal Care and Social Service," American Journal of Public Health 53 (August 1963): 1191. 39 Before interacting with an environment, each organization must establish its desired domain. The establishment of an organizational domain, however, is not simply a pro- cess of declaring that X organization claims A as its domain. Externals must also recognize that the organiza- tion has a legitimate claim to that domain, or more precisely the external environment must accept the organi- zation's claim to a specific domain and act in accordance with that acceptance. Agreement regarding an organization's claim to a domain, or what is referred to as domain consensus, "defines a set of expectations both for the members of the organization and for others with whom they interact about what the organization will and will not do.”34 Hence, the role of the organization and others' accep— tance of that role is a fundamental issue in establishing projects within or attached to, existing institutional frameworks. Environmental acceptance of the organization's claim to a domain is particularly important when consi- dering the implementation of an innovative organizational project. Without agreement regarding the new program's domain, the extent to which organizational-environmental 34James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), p. 29. 4O interaction takes place may be severely circumscribed, even to the point where the fledgling organization is isolated from its environment. Dimock's case study of bureaucratic conflict in the War Ship Administration illustrated the extent to which prior domain agreement affects program implementation and survival.35 Similarly, Greiner's dis- cussion of planned organization change incorporated a concern for consensus before program implementation: "The shared approaches [in program introduction] tend to be emphasized in the more successful organizational changes."36 In addition to the establishment of environmental domain consensus, it must be noted that conditions in the external environment are believed to affect not only the domain of the organization but the manner in which the organization maintains that domain. Aspects of what may be termed the ”general organizational environment" have been identified in the literature as the legal, ecological, . . 3 cultural, and power structures external to the organization. 35Marshall B. Dimock, "Expanding Jurisdictions: A Case Study in Bureaucratic Conflict," in Reader in Bureau- cracy, ed. Robert K. Merton et al. (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1952), pp. 282-91. 36Larry E. Greiner, "Patterns of Organizational Change," Harvard Business Review 45 (May-June 1967): 120. 37See Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Engle- wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice HalI Inc., 1964), pp. 110-13; Arthur Stinchcombe, "Social Structure and Organizations," in Handbook of Organizations, ed. James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1965), pp. 142-93. 41 Each of these conditions is viewed as affecting the type, direction, and duration of interactions between an organi- zation and relevant actors in its environment. In conjunction with the general characteristics of an organization's external environment, more specific components of that environment have a direct influence on the organization under consideration. For example, Dill developed the concept of "task environment," indicating that ”we are focusing on the stimuli to which an organi- zation is exposed.”38 In his study of two Norwegian cOmpanies, Dill concluded that the external environment tended to influence the degree of managerial autonomy exercised by divisional managers within the respective companies. Managerial interaction, information flow, and corporate decision making were among the variables affected by conditions in the external environment. Similarly, Clark argued that relations among public educational agencies and private groups affect the struc- 39 He stated that ture of the American educational system. private organizations, such as Education Services, Inc., have greatly influenced the determination of local school 38William R. Dill, "Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy," Administrative Science Quarterly 2 (March 1958): 411. 39Burton R. Clark, "Interorganizational Patterns in Education," Administrative Science Quarterly 10 (1965): 224-37. 42 district curricula. He indicated, "this pattern of in- fluence, in which private groups serve as connectors between large public organizations and levels of govern- ment, is one that, with minor variations, is now wide- spread in the curriculum reform movement that is rapidly altering educational practice in the United States."40 Furthermore, Rose found that variations in the structures of voluntary associations may be associated with the existence of conflict or competition in their 41 Still other research organizational environments. reports have indicated the interactive nature of organi- zational/environmental goal-setting processes,42 the effective incorporation and manipulation of the organi- zation by a somewhat aggressive environment,43 and the' organizational strategies employed in attempts to manage 44 and control the environment. These studies have 4OIbid., p. 232. 41Arnold M. Rose, "Voluntary Associations Under Conditions of Competition and Conflict," Social Forces 34 (1955): 159-63. 42James D. Thompson, and William J. McEwen, "Or- ganizational Goals and Environment: Goal Setting as an Interaction Process," American Sociological Review 23 (February 1958): 23-31. 43John Maniha, and Charles Perrow, "The Reluctant Organization and the Aggressive Environment," Administra- tive Science Quarterly 10 (September 1965): 238-57. 44Jeffrey Pfeffer, "Merger as a Response to Organizational Interdependence," Administrative Science Qparterly 17 (September 1972): 382-94. 43 illustrated the complexity of organizational environments, as well as the subsequent implications for organizational activity in the environmental context. Although not con- clusive, they have focused attention on the environments of organizations as they relate to maintaining and accomplishing organizational purposes. In the context of project implementation, these studies have explored the' impact external environments have upon the setting and accomplishment of project objectives. Power and Dependence The issue of organizational-environmental depend- ence essentially concerns the amount of power or authority an organization is able to exercise vis-a—vis its environment. "It is possible to conceive of a continuum of organizational power in environmental relations ranging from the organization that dominates its environ- mental relations to one completely dominated by its environment."45 This power continuum should not be viewed as all inclusive with regard to organizational- environmental interaction. It is more appropriate to conceptualize power in what Gamson termed "the sc0pe and "46 site of influence. Consequently, organizations 45Thompson and McEwen, ”Organizational Goals and Environment," p. 25. 46William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 81-83. 44 exercise considerable power (influence) over certain segments of their environments, while being influenced by other segments. Considerations regarding the power relations be- tween organizations vying for environmental space directly influence the preceding considerations of orga- nizational domain. The process of securing and main- taining an organizational domain is essentially a negotiated one. "It requires finding and holding a posi- tion which can be recognized by all of the necessary sovereign organizations as more worthwhile than available alternatives."47 Furthermore, because of the hetero- geneous nature of the environment confronting the organi- zation, the issue of interdependence between organization and environment becomes critical when assessing the imple- mentation process. Environments impose constraints upon the organi- zation's goal pursuits, in that fixed factors in the environment may facilitate or hinder goal attainment. This is particularly true when considering specialized policing units. Once initiated within a particular political jurisdiction, the fledgling organization cannot decide to pursue its goals somewhere more favorable to its 47Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 36. 45 purposes. It is, for all purposes, a captive organiza- tion, which must function within the requirements of its local situation. Similarly, the newly formed organization has little control over its clientele, output-consuming units, resources, or parent organizations, each of which may have an effect on the kinds of goals pursued and the speed at which they may be obtained. Whereas fixed constraining forces in the external environment obviously affect the implementation process, forces that are more random in nature pose an even greater threat. These random forces, called contingencies, may severely damage the newly initiated project. For example, at some time a major supporter of the new project may be forced to withdraw support, to provide resources to another segment of his organization. The effect of such a withdrawal may be the termination of the project, particularly if that source of support was essential to the prOper functioning of the new organization. As previously mentioned, each organization is engaged in exchanges with its external environment. The network of these exchanges creates relationships of power or dependence between organizations. As Thompson indi- cated, "an organization has power, relative to an element of its task environment, to the extent that the organiza- tion monOpolizes that capacity."48 Dependence, on the 48Thompson, Organizations in Action, pp. 30—31. 46 other hand, relates to the degree to which the organiza- tion relies on outside actors for input, resources, and/ or organizational outputs. To avoid becoming subservient to an outside environment, organizations may seek to develOp strategies for obtaining external influence, thus attempting to manage their environments. The extent to which these strategies are successful directly affects the implemen- tation of the new organization, for to gain influence, hence acceptance, insures the organization a domain within which activities may be undertaken. Thompson categorized the strategies of acquiring environmental influence as being either (1) competitive or (2) COOpera- tive.49 Environmental Dependence and Competitive Strategies The acquisition of power is essentially an attempt on the part of the organization to minimize the uncer- tainty of constraints and contingencies presented by the external environment. If the organization depends on the external environment for certain resources, it will "seek to minimize the power of environmental elements over [it] by maintaining alternatives."50 Alternative suppliers or 49Ibid., pp. 32-36. 50Ibid., pp. 32. 47 alternative resources will be developed, providing of course that there are more than a few suppliers or that alternative resources exist. By dispersing its use of the needed resources or developing resource alternatives, the organization reduces the possibility that any single supplier can maintain and exercise control over those resources. This assures the organization that externally required resources will be forthcoming and that the organization (as opposed to elements in its environment) has some control over the flow Of these resources. The same situation exists with regard to the organization's outputs. By maintaining alternative con- sumers or creating new markets, the organization seeks to minimize its dependence on only a few consumers, thus increasing certainty regarding the consumption of orga- nizational goods and services. However, when few suppliers or consumers exist, other strategies must be employed. Since special police units depend on a rela- tively small number of suppliers for resources, i.e., personnel, information, or assistance, their ability to maintain available alternatives is severely circumscribed. Consequently, efforts to implement such projects must take into consideration the position of immediate dependence into which these units are thrust. A second and perhaps more effective strategy of acquiring environmental influence is competing with 48 elements in the environment for prestige. "Acquiring prestige is the cheapest way of acquiring power."51 The maintenance of a prestigious organizational image has traditionally been associated with successful institu- tions. Universities, for example, have historically used institutional prestige as a method of attracting appli- cants. Governmental institutions have also manipulated the symbols of prestige to attract personnel, and have been able to do so despite the fact that traditionally government employment has been less remunerative than private sector employment. Perrow illustrated the role organizational pres- tige plays in the functioning of an organization.52 He indicated that the voluntary hospital under examination, faced with a competitive market, manipulated both extrinsic and intrinsic referents to gain prestige in the environment. "Selling" the hospital to clientele groups such as physicians, donors, and patients became a major undertaking. Creating a favorable public image was a primary strategy to reduce hospital dependence on re- sources and services external to the organization and, hence, beyond immediate organizational control. Creating 51Ibid., p. 33. 52Charles Perrow, "Organizational Prestige: Some Functions and Dysfunctions," The American Journal of Sociology 66 (January 1969): 335-41. 49 this favorable public image, however, was not without shortcomings. As Perrow indicated: The production of indirect indexes of intrinsic quality may take precedence over maintaining the quality of goods and services. Resources may be diverted from activities supporting official goals to those which produce the market extrinsic characteristics. Finally, multiple dependencies may interfere with the marketing of either in- trinsic or extrinsic referents and may create conflicts within the organization or between the organization and its target groups. Striking a balance, then, between maintaining a favorable public image and allocating resources that improve the attainment of tangible organizational objec- tives is crucial for the survival of an organization employing a prestige-attaining strategy to reduce dependence upon the external environment. Environmental Dependence and Cooperative Strategies As previously noted, organizations are confronted with constraints and contingencies in their external environments. These factors produce uncertainty for the organization, as well as creating relationships of dependence between organization and environment. To re- duce both uncertainty and dependence, the organization endeavors to stabilize its relationship with the environ- ment, thus making the environment less powerful and more predictable. 53Ibid., p. 341. 50 The preceding section indicated that organizations can diffuse power in the environment either by deveIOping alternative suppliers of resources or by acquiring power through prestige. However, when a project is in its incipient stage, and particularly when the project is a sibling in a parent organization, it possesses little power and much dependence. These projects "acquire depend- ence when they establish domains, but the acquisition of power is not so easy."54 Having little power and much dependence, these newly founded organizations must negotiate with their environments in the hOpe of trading organizational re- sources for political resources in the environment. This exchange process focuses upon gaining environmental cooperation; three strategies of cooperation are discussed below: (1) contracting, (2) COOptation, and (3) co- alescence or merger.SS Contracting as a power-acquiring strategy. Con- tracting, or the formal agreement between two or more organizations committing them to enter into exchanges, is perhaps the most universal COOperative strategy in the private sector. By entering into this formal agreement, 54Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 34. 55The discussion of these strategies follows closely that of Thompson, Organizations in Action, pp. 34- 36. 51 the organization reduces uncertainty in its environment by ensuring that needed resources will be provided. Additionally, contracting reduces dependence between the organization and sectors of its external environment, in that both parties to the contract receive some "benefit" that shifts a power/dependence relationship toward one of mutual dependence. By being reciprocally interdependent, the organization has effectively reduced external in- fluences and similarly increased its own relative power. "The effective achievement of power rests on the exchange of commitments, the reduction of potential uncertainty for both parties."56 However, develOping and maintaining contractual relations with elements of the external environment is not as simple as it may appear. First, the focal organi- zation must convince elements of the external environment that it is willing and able to enter into contractual Vrelationships. Second, externals must be convinced that they will benefit from entering into such a relationship. The focal organization, therefore, must be prepared to expend internal resources to the end of "marketing" its desirability to outside constituencies. 56Ibid., p. 35. 52 Coopting as a power-acquiring strategy. "Coopta- tion is the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organiza- tion as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence."S7 As such, the organization employing this strategy attempts to incorporate elements of the external environment into its functioning as a means of reducing conflict between organization and environment. COOptation may take two forms-~formal or informal. By formal cooptation is meant the public absorption of external elements "signifying participation in the process of decision and administration."58 This strategy is I highly important in the implementation stages of organi- zation initiation, and is closely linked to the preceding considerations of domain consensus. The process of cooptation largely insures the sup- port of "significant others" in the external environment upon which the focal organization is dependent. A study illustrating the effective use of a cooptation strategy was reported by Selznick in his analysis of the Tennessee S7Philip Selznick, "Cooptation," in Complex Or- gpnizations and Their Environments, ed. Merlin B. rinkerhoffiand Phillip R. Kunz (Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown Company Publishers, 1972), p. 141. 58Ibid., p. 142. 53 Valley Authority.59 Cooptation, however, is reciprocal; commitments are made on both sides of the exchange process. As Selznick indicated: The significance of cooptation for organizational analysis is not simply that there is a change in or a broadening of leadership, and that this is an adaptive response, but also that this change is consequential for the character and role of the organization or governing body.60 The use of a cooptation strategy, therefore, results in the alteration of power/dependence relations between organization and environment, as well as the internal dynamics of the focal organization. Informal cooptation, being less institutionalized than formal, is viewed as a response to "the pressure of specific centers of power within the community."61 The establishment of citizen advisory groups or civilian task forces may be viewed as a response to community pressures for input into the policy-making process. Similarly, institutional response to pressure groups attempts to coopt these groups, in an effort to reduce possible ten- sions. Furthermore, the effective incorporation of 59See Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots: A §tudy in the Sociology of Formal Organizations (New York: Harper and Row, 1966. 6OSelznick, "Cooptation," p. 144. 611bid., p. 143. 54 community support into the focal organization reflects a concern for maintaining public credibility, thus insuring continued domain consensus. Litwak and Meyer suggested that the coordination of bureaucracies and primary groups is essential to the proper functioning of the organiza- tion, and also stated that various mechanisms of coordina- tion are viable under different structures of bureaucracyfi’2 Coalescing or merger as a power—acquiring strategy. Coalescing or organizational merger is, perhaps, the most constraining form of cooperative strategy. It requires that the focal organization and some aspect of its environ- ment participate in a joint undertaking in which both participants commit themselves over time to realizing joint goals. Based on an analysis of 854 institutional mergers occurring between 1948 and 1969, Pfeffer identified three general types of merger behavior: merger designed (l) to ”absorb symbiotic interdependence," (2) to reduce competi- tive interdependence, or (3) for diversification.63 Pfeffer's analysis also indicated that merger behavior 62Eugene Litwak and Henry F. Meyer, "A Balance Theory of Coordination Between Bureaucratic Organizations and Community Primary Groups," Administrative Science Quarterly 11 (1966): 31-58. 63Pfeffer, ”Merger as a Response," pp. 385-92. 55 may be viewed as an attempt to manage organizational interdependencies as they arise. The result of this activity is expected to reduce dependence, and thus uncertainty in the external environment. Closely associated with the issue of power and dependence between organizations is the degree to which the external environment itself is integrated. The following section pursues the concept of environmental integration and its impact on the implementation process. Environmental Integration and the Implementation Process As noted in the discussions of organizational domains and domain consensus, the newly initiated organi- zation must gain acceptance in its external environment. This is essentially a political process. The newly established organization, in attempting to integrate itself into existing environmental structures, must assess the relationships among elements of its external environment before attempting its own integra- tion. In addition, if the new organization or program is to be fully integrated into an existing environmental structure, this assessment must take into account not only the power structures of the environment but the degree to which they are integrated. Is the power struc- ture unitary or coalitional? Is it concentrated or is it 56 diffuse? These questions must ultimately be resolved if the newly initiated unit itself is to be integrated into the existing environment. Therefore an assessment of levels and kinds of systems integration is crucial to the attainment of unit integration in the larger system. Systems Integration An environmental structure can be conceptualized as being on a continuum ranging from highly integrated patterns of interaction and dependence to a situation in which relationships and dependencies are diffuse. These patterns of interaction and dependence create inter- dependencies among organizations within the larger system. By interdependency is meant that when an organi- zation initiates a course of action it does so by taking into consideration other organizations with which it interacts. Litwak and Hylton indicated that the inter- dependence among organizations may be either competitive or facilitative.64 If the interdependence is competitive, the organization acts under the assumption that it can maximize its goal attainment only at the expense of another organization's goals. The competitive nature of private sector organizations illustrates this type of 64Eugene Litwak and Lydia F. Hylton, "Interorgani- zational Analysis: A Hypothesis on Coordinating Agenciesf' Administrative Science Quarterly 6 (1962): 400-402. 57 interdependence. Facilitative interdependence occurs when the organization acts under the assumption that it and other organizations can maximize their goals simul- taneously. Competitive and facilitative interdependencies represent polar extremes, with a range of less clarity falling between these points. The kind of interdependence characterizing the system of interrelationships among organizations may be viewed as creating a context within which these organizations exchange. This organizational environment may take many forms. Warren develOped a typology of environmental contexts in which various dimensions of organizational behavior are compared.65 Figure 2 depicts the variation of organizational dimen- sions across environmental context types. As indicated in Figure 2, environmental contexts may be either (1) unitary, (2) federative, (3) coali- tional, or (4) social choice. Consequently, organizations functioning within a specific environmental context will be affected by the environmental situation in which they exist. A subunit within a larger organization illustrates the unitary context. In this situation the subunit is directly affected by its parent organization. Authority 65Roland L. Warren, "The Interorganizational Field as a Focus for Investigation," Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (December 1967): 396-419. 58 muxoucoo HmucoECOHM>co mo momxh .~.~ enamHa .oov ”anoma poneoooav NH xmwoupmsd 66:6mum o>flumhumwcwsp< :.:ofiu -mwflumo>:m how msoom H mm pfiofim HmcoHumecmwhououcH one: .cou»m3 .4 pcmfiom ”oopzom @COC HO GHHHMA myopmofi was: ou haco unoEuflEEoo 389.56 03335 s... can? ~82 mo :oamfisfip OOADOOSAHm xfifimecow oz HO>OH pan: on x~o>fim5Hoxm moan: pagan: mamow o>wmzaocw oz Hmecflz mumpmofi «an: ow xflco ucosuweeou mcwu3uuzhumou usonuwz .ponma mo :OMmH>fip uo: pm ow oopwm xme .AHmsoeo: -ousm popsuospum wows: HO>OH was: pm >H6>wmzfioxm chauuzhum o>flmsfiocw HMEhom m usonufiz meuhswo :ofipomuoucfi :H mHmom O>Hmsfiocfl pom :oHumpoanHoo HmEhowcfi use .mamow oumhmmmww no“: muwcs oompopoz «coeuweeou manpowos mo mEpoz OHDHOSHHm hams» uoowwm AME sows: .ponmfi mo :ofimm>fip m on oopmm zme .xfimsoeoc -0usm cousuusgum mafia: HO>OH was: um zfiflpmeflum :oflumuflwflumh was: ow goofinsm .thuospum o>fimsfiocfl mo mow u< mamow o>flmsHucfi how :oflumecmwao Hmspom Osom was .mmmom oompmmmfip spa: mafia: Ema: acoEufiEEoo amp; Co menoz :ofiumNflcmwho o>flm5Hocfi :Hcpfiz Honda mo :ofimfi>fiw pom coasposuum mafia: eunuoshum O>wm -saucfl mo xsupm -pofi: mo no» u< Opsuoshum o>flm -SHocw we now u< mamow o>wmsaocw mo ocoeo>owcom pom powwcmwho mafia: mama: mo sodomuCOMAO xufl>wu -OOMHOO ponwpomopm EmummeSm mwcmhomeH m on “COEOMEEOU gonna mo newmw>wv you cofimfi> -opm Housuu3hum xuwhozusm mo msuoq wcfixme :ofimwuow O>wm -saocw mo moooq mpwcs mo :OMHmHom mononu Hmauom Hpcoapwapou O>Humuooom thuflaa cOmmcosfla uxoucou we make Hm:0wum~w:wmuo 59 and decision making are located at the apex of the organi- zational structure. The subunit interacts with other units differentiated by function to pursue an organiza- tional rather than subunit goal. Similarly, individuals within the subunit are expected to commit themselves to the goals of the collective organization and its leader- ship. The second environmental context, the federative, alters the relationships between subunits in the larger system, in that the dominance of any single element is weakened. The coalitional context further decentralizes authority and decision making within the system, while at the same time reducing subunit commitment to the larger system. Finally, the social choice environmental context results in a further reduction of organizational inter- dependence within the inclusive system to the extent that if interaction does occur it arises over specific issues; once these issues have been resolved, it declines. Because the special police unit projects under examination in this research were either units Operating under the control of a single police department, or controlled by more than one jurisdiction, the social choice context appears to be inapplicable to the present consideration. It was presented, however, to illustrate the entire contextual continuum. Moreover, it should be noted that 60 these contexts represent "ideal" types and are offered as descriptions of varying states of system interdependence. “The establishment of the contextual parameters affecting the structure of the environment in which an organization must function provides an initial under- standing of the network of interactions among organizations . Furthermore, assessing environmental contexts provides the fledgling organization with information regarding the appropriate selection of alternative implementation strategies to gain initial environmental acceptance. Once the new organization has determined the context of environ- ment in which it is attempting to gain acceptance, it must then begin to assess its own integration into the larger system. This requires a shift of focus from environmental interdependencies to unit integration in the larger environment. Unit Integration in the Larger System When it is said that an organization is integrated into existing environmental contexts, it means that rela- tionships and interdependencies have been negotiated with the environment to the extent that exchange may take place. However, the environment comprises various "actors," all of whom may have different sets of relation- ships with the focal organization, and all of whom have an environment of their own. 61 The types of relationships arising between the focal organization and various elements in its environment vary in intensity, duration, and direction. The following statement illustrates the variation in relationships between organizations: Relationships vary from routine, highly formalized interactions--such as one business ordering sup- plies from another . . . to such an idiosyncratic situation as when members of the boards of directors of two organizations happen to run into each other in the locker room of their athletic club and compare notes about their overlapping interests. Because relationships vary between the focal organization and elements in its environment, varying types of inter- dependency arise. The management of these varying inter- dependencies aids the integration of the focal organiza- tion into the larger system. Thompson indicated three primary types of interdependence between units within the same organization and their corresponding coordinative mechanisms.67 Although the focus of Thompson's analysis was intra-organizational, the applicability of these con- cepts to relationships between organizations will become apparent. 66Richard H. Hall, Organizations--Structure and Process (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., —j‘—1972 , p. 315. 67Thompson, Organizations in Action, pp. 54-56. 62 Thompson described three primary types of inter- dependence: (1) pooled, (2) sequential, and (3) recipro- cal.68 Under conditions of pooled interdependence, each discrete unit produces a "contribution to the whole and each is supported by the whole."69 Sequential inter- dependence refers to a situation in which the order of interdependence can be specified. The mass production industry is illustrative of sequential interdependence, in that one production unit's process cannot be applied to the product until its antecedent process has first been applied. In the criminal justice process the courts may be viewed as sequentially interdependent upon the police for a source of clientele. The police, on the other hand, may share a pooled interdependence with the courts, in that the courts may impose severe penalties upon criminal offenders, thus reducing the workload of the police. The third form of interdependence, called reciprocal, refers to a situation in which the outputs of two or more units become the inputs of each other. Unfortunately, this is the primary criticism of the criminal justice process; it appears that the outputs of both the courts and correctional agencies are a continual input source for the police. 63Ibid. 69Ibid., p. 54. 63 By focusing upon the materials exchanged between. organizations, Thompson's typology of interdependence may be employed to specify certain relationships between the focal organization and elements in its external environ- ment. Specifically, in the case of specialized police units, the relationships that develop between organization and environmental elements focus upon the exchange of information. By specifying the type and direction of information exchange between the specialized police unit and elements in its environment, one may begin to estab- lish the types of interdependence that exist. However, in specifying these interdependencies, it must be noted that the environmental context, previously discussed, may have the effect of modifying assumed relationships. Consequently, it is the interaction of environmental con- text and focal organization interdependence that estab- lishes the specific relationship between the focal organization and elements of the larger system. For example, under a social-choice environmental context one would not expect to find pooled interdependence. Having this in mind, one may begin to specify certain relation- ships between specialized police units and various elements of their environment. 64 Figure 3 depicts a set of relationships that may be expected to arise between a specialized police unit and various elements of its environment.70 These rela- tionships are specified in terms of interdependence, and their specification is based on the traditional information-exchange process Operant in most policing agencies. Furthermore, it is assumed that these relation- ships and interdependencies will be valid for special police units Operating within a single police organization, as well as those engaged in multi-organizational arrange- ments. In addition, only the relationships between the special police unit and elements in its environment are considered. lnterdependencies among environmental elements also exist; however, their specification is inapprOpriate for the present consideration. They will be considered when issues of the inclusive environmental context arise. As depicted in Figure 3, the specialized police unit interacts with many elements in its external environ- ment, all of which created different types of interdepen- dence. For example, assuming traditional police practices, the special unit is sequentially interdependent with the 70The specification of environmental relationships ik>llows closely a technique develOped by William M. Evan, ‘"Yhe Organizational Set: Toward a Theory of Interorgani- zational Relations," in Approaches to Organizational Ikfizigp, ed. James D. Thompson (Pittsburg, PA: The Univer- 51t)’ of Pittsburg Press, 1966), p. 173-91. 65 . .ucoecoufi>:o Agony mo mo:oEoHo paw mafia: OOHHOQ wouwfimfioomm coozuon mowucoccooochoucfl poESmm< .m.~ opswwm mocmucmawucwucu pmwucmzcmm A.I I 1.. .nnlllllluv mucmucoamccoucH umpoom .‘nlllllluv mucmucmamvcmufi F8838”. u I 8.5.5 cmzuo cm \ co_mm>wo mucwspcmawo \.\ panama 8:8 / xx was: muwpoa vawpmwumam Louzommocm smmczm Pouch m>wuumumo «memo m.$mw;o + + I» + uxmucou Fmpcmscogm>cu o>mm=—o:H 66 patrol division, in that patrol officers respond to initial criminal complaints, and if they cannot be immediately resolved at the patrol level the information is forwarded to the special unit.71 Similarly, the local prosecutor is sequentially interdependent with the special unit, since information once investigated is forwarded to initiate a criminal proceeding. The interdependence between the special unit and the detective bureau, however, is reciprocal. Since both units are producing criminal information, the exchange that takes place between them becomes a source of input for each respective unit. The same reciprocity exists between special unit and policing units external to the immediate jurisdiction. Since criminal offenders cross political jurisdictions in the commission of their offenses, information regarding these offenders is ex- changed between police organizations in the same fashion as between special unit and detective bureau. Finally, one may view the interdependence between special unit and the chief of police as pooled, in that each contributes to the whole, namely the goals of law enforcement. 71The special units under consideration here were formed to respond only to serious crime types and are thereby distinguished from the traditional detective bureaus that respond to all follow-up investigations. 67 The specification of interdependencies between focal organization (special unit) and the various types of institutional actors composing the environment illus- trates the complexity of environmental-organizational interaction. By specifying organizational-environmental interaction patterns, attention is focused upon the antecedents to successful organizational implementation, namely the patterns of interdependence necessary for organizational domain acquisition. The newly founded organization is not merely thrust into a vacuous environ- ment in which it develOps and pursues its goals and Objectives. Instead, the organization is confronted with an environment containing numerous elements, all of which pose contingencies or constraints. Furthermore, each element in this environment is engaged in relationships with other elements; consequently, the new organization must assess these relationships and develop strategies for obtaining its own interdependence in the larger system. Implementation and Organizational Environment: Summary and Guiding AssumptiOns Briefly reviewing the conceptual framework develOped in preceding discussions, the following series of assumptions regarding organizations and their environ- ments is advanced. These assumptions are designed to delineate the present state of knowledge regarding the 68 extent to which organizational environments affect organi- zational implementation. Furthermore, the present study is oriented toward the generation of hypotheses rather than their testing. Consequently, the following set of assumptions is viewed as guiding the present undertaking. 1. 6a. 6b. Organizations are open systems characterized by their dependence on external environments for both sources of input and consumption of outputs. Organizational environments playaimajor role in shaping the focal organization's goals, objectives, and activities. The extent to which an organization is inte- grated into existing institutional structures is largely contingent on the establishment of an organizational domain. Subsequently, the establishment of an organi- zational domain is contingent upon acquiring domain consensus with regardtx>relevant actors in the external environment. An organization attempting to acquire domain consensus, and thuszaviable domain, may employ various strategies (power, authority, in- fluence) to gain environmental integration. The environmental context within which the new organization must function will affecttfluetype of power-acquiring strategy used by the focal organization. Organizations facing large heterogeneous envi- ronments will attempt to use a competitive power-acquiring strategy to reduce dependence upon any single element of the external environment. Organizations facing relatively homogeneous environments will attempt to acquire power through the use of cooperative strategies. 69 7. Similarly, the type of interdependence between a focal organization and any specific element of its environment will affect the type of strategy employed by the organization to acquire influence over that element. 8. The degree to which an organization depends on its environment affects the degree to which domain consensus is necessary for program implementation. 9. Successful organizational implementation in the larger organizational system depends on proper assessment of both systems-level inte- gration and unit integration in the larger system. 10. The degree to which the external environment depends on the focal organization as either a source of input or a consuming unit of output affects both domain acquisition and subsequent unit integration in the larger system. The preceding assumptions focus attention on the dynamics of organizational-environmental interaction, particularly as this interaction is related to the imple- mentation process. The successful implementation of a new organizational modality, such as a specialized police unit, is viewed as being affected by existing environ- mental structures. Consequently, a new program's success or failure largely depends on the adequate integration of such a program into an existing environment. The ante- cedents to successful project (organization) implementation are viewed as residing within the project's external environment. 70 As previously indicated, the special police units under consideration were viewed as open social systems. The open—system approach views organizations as processing systems that must: (1) import some form of energy (in- puts) from their external environment; (2) transform these inputs through some form of organizational activity (throughputs); and (3) generate some product (outputs) that is of interest and use to members of the external environment. Efforts to perform these functions become an intricate part of any planned social intervention. Figure 4 represents this process. When the points in Figure 4 are considered, it becomes obvious that a special police unit project cannot be judged as successfully achieving its goals unless it can also be viewed as operating successfully as an organization. To operate successfully as an organization, the special unit must negotiate its domain, or its reason for being, with the external environment. The structure of the environment, including its general inclusive environ- mental context and the specific interdependencies among other organizations within that inclusive context, influences (l) the goals and objectives pursued by the special unit, (2) the way in which the Objectives are pursued, and (3) the extent to which the objectives are obtained. To facilitate its own integration and hence 71 msoumxm :omo mm mqumoum “was OOMHOQ Hmwoomm .:0wuflpo pcooom .e.~ ouzwwm .m .a .ANNQH ..oo meagmaapsa senate: ".HHH .owpuwcov .:0wumppmH:pr< OMHOSQ .xxmcmthcm HRH .Eoum wouqmp< ”oopsom mo>fiuooflao paw mHmou pummopm uOOmOHA Com newum>wpoz anomasm OHEocoum muflpmwhouomamcu HmucoEpumaoa uxoucoo Hmucoscoufl>cm OpmwpoesH mowucow< wu Monuo .ouo .mphommm mwmxfimc< oewpu mcoflufiwcou osfipu mo>wuu6mno m:hOuumm mcflmmmpm mcofiuwpcoo Owsocoom wad mfimoo , womfiflwu: xMOHo:;OOH Ahmewpm moMumwhouumhmcu zwficseaou mewuw>fiuo< OOOHOOQ axoucou Hap:OE:OAM>:m Hmpocou webmhbo webmzuaomzh whamzH 72 acceptance into the larger organizational system, the special unit may employ various strategies designed to minimize environmental uncertainty. Both the structure of the external environment (i.e., relationships among existing organizations) and the interdependencies between the special unit and elements of its environment influence the special unit's selection of an apprOpriate integration strategy. These relation- ships also affect the speed at which the special unit is implemented. In the next chapter this inquiry is pursued by delineating the methodology employed in the current under- taking. Methods used in collecting data, the variables to be observed, analytical procedures, and the selected research sites are explained. CHAPTER III METHODOLOGY Design of the Study The research design employed in this study was focused on examining the external environments of spe- cialized police units, particularly as these environments affect organizational implementation processes. An analytical framework developed by Evan1 was used in data collection and served as a guide for data analysis. The essential features of this framework are: (1) identifying the focal organization (in this case special police units) and (2) tracing relationships between the focal organiza- tion and elements of its external environment. Two data-gathering approaches were used in the study. The first, a series of structured interviews con- ducted with special police unit personnel, was designed to gather initial information regarding the structure of each research site's external environment, the relation- ships between the project and elements of its external 1William M. Evan, "The Organizational Set: Toward a Theory of Interorganizational Relations,":hiApproacheS'Ua Organizational Desi n, ed. James D. Thompson (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966, pp. 173-91. 73 74 environment, and environmental impact during project implementation. The second instrument, a survey ques- tionnaire, further probed the external environment of each research site by gathering information from a variety of external actors identified in the initial interview setting. The study was exploratory and descriptive; no attempt was made to establish causality. Rather, data collection and analysis were focused on examining the extent to which variation in the organizational environ- ments of specialized police units was associated with variations in acceptance levels, evaluations of the special units, and use patterns. Population and Sample The current study was part of a broader evalua- tion effort initiated by the Michigan Office of Criminal Justice Programs, which was designed to evaluate 25 specialized police units funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Six specialized police unit sites were selected for intensive evaluation in the broader study, and within these six sites the current undertaking was conducted. Because of multfjurisdictional projects, the number of law enforcement jurisdictions actually involved was greater than the specified number of project sites. Consequently, the 6 project sites involved 13 separate police agencies. 75 Selection of these sites was not random, nor was it arbitrary. Because of their importance and their impact on the study's external validity, the factors affecting site selection must be considered. Sample site selection was complicated by two major factors that affected the entire evaluation. The first of these factors was site accessibility and the potential for COOperation in the research effort. Since the major evaluation effort employed a basic ex post facto method- ology, site selection became even more problematic. For example, of the 25 possible research sites available, many were simply not accessible because their grants had expired and their contractual obligations to participate in project evaluation had terminated. In other cases, not only had the projects expired but many of the units had been totally disbanded; this hindered any serious research effort since potential respondents were either extremely difficult or impossible to identify and contact. The second factor affecting the external validity of the study related to client selection of the "most desired" or "most promising" sites to be included in the evaluation. That is, certain sites were preferred for evaluation, because the client (Michigan Office of Crimi- nal Justice Programs) viewed them as exemplary projects. Personnel at these sites also expressed an interest in 76 being evaluated and made themselves fully available for examination. The selection of project sites because of acces- sibility, cooperation, their exemplary qualities, or expedience raised a variety of methodological questions that should not be ignored. The compound effects of these selection factors draw attention to the possible limitations they place on the generalizability of the findings presented in the following chapter. To explore these possible limitations requires a brief consideration of the possible threat each poses to the study's external validity. The issue of external validity is not totally resolvable. However, as indicated by Campbell and Stanley,2 four major factors threaten the external validity of research findings. These are: (l) the reactive or interaction effects of testing, (2) the interaction effects of selection, (3) reactive effects introduced through experimental arrangements, and (4) problems associated with multiple treatment influences.3 Three of these problems were not critical in the present 2Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally 8 Co. 1963), pp. 5-12. 3Ibid., pp. 5-6. 77 study. However, the interaction effects of selection in the current study posed the greatest threat to its external validity. The sample of specialized police units observed in this study was selected by criteria other than tra- ditional probability sampling techniques. This obviously raises the issue of representativeness between sample and population. However, the six specialized police unit sites constituted a selected sample,4 in that they were included in the study by criteria that facilitated an exploration of the implementation process. Furthermore, since the population of possible special police unit projects available for examination was only 25, the 6 sites selected represented a sample of more than one-fifth of the population. With regard to the selection of sites based on a criterion of accessibility, it is important to note the organizational accessibility is, perhaps, the greatest obstacle in attempting to obtain valid results from re- search that involves a total organizational environment. Recognizing this problem, one group of organizational researchers noted: Many of our most difficult problems relate to access to sites which is clearly of overriding 4See Claire Selltiz, et a1. Research Methods in Social Relations, rev. ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart G Winston, 1959), pp. 520-21, 537-45. 78 importance . . . . The familiar problems of research legitimacy, persuasion at several levels, etc., amply described in the litera- ture on organizations, are multiplied ten- fold when you attempt simultaneous access to the entire population of a type of orga- nization. Since most action programs are typically opera- tionalized in only a few sites, the generation of random samples is usually not feasible; when issues of accessi- bility arise, the population is further delimited. Consequently, the issue of accessibility focused atten- tion on the selection of project sites whose personnel could and would participate in an evaluation effort. When considering site selection based on the presumed excellence of a project, the type of research objective pursued becomes relevant. As previously indicated, certain Sites included in the present sample reflected a client orientation toward evaluating the "most successful" projects. Basing selection of excep- tional projects on which generalizations are advanced includes many obvious methodological pitfalls. However, as the intent of this study was primarily to examine the processes by which projects become implemented, as 5Philip M. Marcus, Ann Workman Sheldon, and Margaret J. Adams. "The Empirical Investigation of Interorganizational Relationships: Problems and Pros- pects," paper presented at the annual North Central Sociological Association Meetings, Windsor, Ontario, May 1974, p. 3. 79 Opposed to measuring outcome variables such as crime reduction, the objection to selecting "atypical" projects becomes less salient. This is because many of the special police units under consideration in this study failed to gain proper implementation during the life of the project. Therefore, it was assumed that even though these projects have been labeled "exemplary," the problems they encoun- tered during the implementation stage of their deve10pment are generalizable across similar project types. Also, since all projects, regardless of their success, must be implemented, it was assumed that projects that at least survived initial implementation efforts generate more information than those that did not survive. Finally, by examining projects that may be viewed as operating under a set of "optimal conditions,"6 the information generated may be generalizable to projects that operated under less Optimal conditions. The following discussions of the special police unit sites were designed to describe the general charac- teristics of each site, as well as the environments in which they functioned. A more detailed analysis appears in the following chapter. 6See: Ilene N. Bernstein, et al., ”External Validity and Evaluation Research: A Codification of Problems," in Validity Issues in Evaluative Research, ed. Ilene N. Bernstein (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publi- cations, Inc., 1975), pp. 107-34. 80 Sample Research Sites7 Site A--Investigations Coordination Unit The Investigations Coordination Unit operates within a large urban city in central Michigan. Using pre- dominantly undercover surveillance techniques, the unit's objectives include increasing the probability of detecting crimes in progress, deterring criminal acts in high-crime areas, increasing public awareness of, and participation in law enforcement, and achieving cooperation among the unit, its parent organization, and other area policing agencies. Administratively, the unit's commander, who is responsible for conducting unit affairs, is supervised by the Commander of the Detective Bureau. Administrative responsibility for the unit then proceeds through the following administrative levels: Commander of the Inves- tigations Division, Deputy Chief responsible for Field Services, Chief of Police, and Board of Police Commis- sioners. At the Operational level, the unit compriseseight patrol officers and two detectives. These personnel are 7Descriptions of the selected research sites were taken from the official records of the funding agency, as well as information obtained through site interviews. This information included project proposals, quarterly and annual reports, and official correspondence between the project and funding source. 81 divided into two operational field teams consisting of four patrol officers directed by a detective. Each field team is primarily involved in undercover surveil- lance activities and gathering criminal intelligence data. To maintain unit member anonymity, and thus pre- serve the covert nature of unit Operations, unit person- nel make arrests only when absolutely necessary. Other departmental personnel, primarily from the patrol divi- sion, are summoned by unit personnel to effect arrests. The unit concentrates its activities upon part I crimes including murder, rape, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. In addition to conducting suspect-oriented tactical field operations, the unit attempts to fulfill a crime-analysis function for its host department. To this end the unit collects data and maintains files to aid the department in its current and ongoing investi- gations, to generate data used in determining "high crime" areas within which departmental personnel are deployed, and to develOp detailed profiles of criminals, premises, and victims within the city. This information is 3150 disseminated to area police departments in an effort to improve the information flow among policing agencies. The vehicle through which this information is circulated is an area detective bureau associatitnldesigned to improve cooperation among police departments. 82 Site B--Crime Prevention Unit The Crime Prevention Unit is attached to a muni- cipal police department in south-central Michigan. The unit is divided into two functional areas: (1) active crime prevention focusing upon the active suppression of criminal activity and (2) passive crime prevention oriented toward preventing crime. In its efforts to reduce suppressible8 crime in the city, the active part of the crime prevention unit operates under the concept of saturation patrol. Essen- tially, this unit attempts to create a high level of police visibility, particularly in designated "high crime" areas of the city, with a view toward deterring criminal activity in that area or intercepting the criminal in the commission of the crime. The active unit is composed of eight patrol officers, supervised by a police sergeant, who patrol designated high-crime areas within the city. This segment of the crime prevention unit operates in a different manner from traditional patrol, in that unit members do not respond to routine patrol calls. Rather, they respond only to "crimes in progress" calls. The active unit also rotates from regular patrol through the unit on a four-month basis. 8Suppressible crimes are robbery, larceny, and burglary. 83 The "passive" segment of the crime prevention unit focuses on preventing crime before it occurs. The primary objective of this unit is to develop continuing community awareness and response to the local crime problem. The unit is staffed by two patrol officers and a sergeant, who are responsible for developing a commu- nity reporting network, establishing a security consultant service to assist residential and commercial residents, and conducting crime analyses to facilitate deployment of the active unit. Organizationally, the passive function sergeant, in conjunction with the active function team leader (sergeant), reports to the Commander of Patrol Operations, who then reports directly to the Chief of Police. Both segments of the Crime Prevention Unit concentrate their efforts on part I crimes including murder, rape, larceny, burglary, and auto theft. Site C--Regionalized Detective Bureau This detective bureau, located in the north-west part of Michigan, involves the cooperative efforts of two rural counties. The primary policing agencies within each county are the county sheriff's department and the largest city's police department. Historically, both counties were unable to maintain the detective function at either the county or local level because of their 84 relatively small size. Consequently, providing follow-up detective services9 was primarily the responsibilityHuuouOo w mpowcdeeoo mponEOz mo mHOHnu mHOOHmmo Houumm qus pch ouHm HOHOH ouHm make unopcommom mm>H Hzmazommmm Dz< mHHm zomm mZmH>mmth QmmDHUDmHm mo mmmZDz H.m mHmHpupopa Hmo LON Haw Cw Hsva HNH we -- H4 Cm Ha SH mappemeaoo psHouoopo HmwmvmmN HpsHVmw Hmavmm HwOHme Hem CHN Hoequ HOHHvHo mnpuHHHo Hogans HSOHVmo Hmm LON HmvaH HwN VmH Ho Sm H4 Um HNH Lo mumpaaesou Happen me me HHN VsH HN LN Hm Lo Hm Cm HH CH «Hm LN pcspuscom spHcoaoa< Hmuop a m a u m < ouHm coumomom mmmHu pcopaoamom mHHm zumchH Ho ucoopoa may mm OOHHOQOH mmpm» cpsuomm om. oo. oo. om. no. mm. oo. mHmuoe mm. No. -- -- mm. -- mm. mpHucpm< OOHHom HOOHOHmcoz mm. «N. we. He. -- No. om. mO>HuoouOn He. mm. nm. ow. -- mm. mN. muovcmesoo O>Huoouoa mm. mm. om. Hm. on. me. om. muooHHmo HOhumm me. an. mo. em. om. mm. om. mpoucweeou Hopped mm. mm. o.oOH mm. o.o0H o.OOH mNo. op:po:hpw poHogun< HmHOH m m G u m < ouHm commemom mmmHu unaccommom mHHm zumm mmm mmmH~ 0) >0) :1) >~ v-4 0) H®>~¢D H 60 In OOH—Mu v—IQ) Cid) a) CO color-Ion com 00) a) co 0:!!ch 853 ha. 51 ‘13 £32823 E—a< c0< < D mat—Q 1. Item 2 - The SPU has definitely improved the exchange (flow) 1 2 3 4 5 6 of information be- tween units within your department. 2. Item 3 - The SPU has definitely improved the quality of useful information avail- I 2 3 4 5 6 able about crime, crime patterns and crimdnals in the area. 3. Item 4 - The crime problem in your jurisdiction has definitely been 1 2 3 4 5 6 handled differently because of the estab- lishment of the SPU. 4. Item 44 - The special unit has definitely l 2 3 4 5 6 made my job easier. C. Unit Integration in the Larger System 1. Item 49 - Over the past years have your cooperative interactions with the special unit increased or de- creased? (Check one) a. have continually increased since the estab- lishment of the unit b. initially increased but have now leveled off at highest level c. initially increased but have recently begun to decrease 104 TABLE 3.4 - Continued d. initially increased but drOpped off quickly e. never increased beyond occasional contact f. never have had operational contacts with the unit D. Opposition to the Special unit by Command Personnel >. o >.o o >~ H 0) HQ) >~o H CO :0 COM HE) v-IQ) ‘20) (D COOP-t m o o o o m o m cucu 443-! i-ti-t TH U) HUD HID 000 +460 00 'P-I H-t-I o-H H< m< < a UMJHD 1. Item 7 - The SPU had the active Opposition of command officers whose position could I 2 3 4 S influence the success or failure of the unit. II. Process variables A. Goal Clarity 1. Item 26 - From the beginning the SPU had 1 2 3 4 S clear,concise goals and objectives. B. Domain Consensus 1. Item 5 - The SPU definitely had the active support of the l 2 ' 3 4 5 chief in your depart- ment. 2. Item 6 - The SPU de- finitely had the active support of 1 2 3 4 5 other relevant com- mand officers in your department. 105 TABLE 3.4 - Continued Perceptions of Influence >. o >.O o >~ H G) v-IQ) >~~ a) >~® co >\ H O) HO.) >~ m swoonuHHumpopom thuHca Hmv HNV HHS pHpmHam> Hmo.v “mob oaoupso oo:-umom M uxoucoo Hmuco5=OHH>cm mebzou Hzm mo mHm>mH mm>o mmHm mEOUHDO H.v mHm 3.50), indicating that strong opposition to the special units was not exhibited in any of the research sites. This finding does suggest, however, that individuals responding in the unitary context were more willing to agree that command officer resistance to the special unit existed than were respondents in either the federative or coalitional contexts. Although the F-ratio obtained on the scale meas- uring perceptions of special unit impact was not statisti- cally significant (P = .13), the Least Significant Difference Test of group means indicated that differences in environmental context existed on evaluations of this scale (Impact). Specifically, the test yielded significant differences (P < .05) between the federative and coali- tional contexts. An examination of the mean scores on this item revealed that the contexts were ranked in the following manner: federative most positive (X = 3.43), unitary 126 (X = 3.58), and coalitional least positive (X = 3.68). A possible explanation for this finding is that in some marginal way environmental context may affect levels of expectation regarding the impact of the special unit. For example, in the coalitional context meeting these expec- tations may have been impeded by the strength of the coali- tion itself, in that commitments to the special unit's success may have been weakest in this type of environmental arrangement. By contrast, commitments in both the federa- tive and unitary contexts may have led to more positive evaluations of the special unit's impact, as individuals are more willing to perceive this effect. Of course, the alternative explanation is that obtaining perceptible levels of influence in the coalitional context may simply be more difficult because of the tentative nature of the coalitional structure. The conclusion that may be drawn from these analy- ses is that inclusive environmental context, in and of itself, has little effect on either unit integration in the larger system (Item 49), or environmental patterns. However, the nature of the inclusive environmental context does have an effect on the degree of command officer resistance to these units and evaluations of special unit impact. 127 Environmental Effects on Goal Clarity and Domain Consensus The preceding conclusions are not altogether sur- prising, as the concept of inclusive environmental context was not expected to have a direct effect on acceptance or use patterns. It is more realistic to expect that envi- ronmental context may have a greater effect on factors that precede measures of the outcome variables. To explore this possibility, each process variable was used in a one-way analysis of variance controlling for the levels of environmental context. The concepts of goal clarity and domain consensus are closely related, in that one should normally precede the other in time. The goals of the organization should be understood before establishing consensus or dissensus about those goals. It was not possible to address this temporal issue, with the current design; however, analysis proceeded by examining each concept individually. In Chapter II it was argued that the goals of the fledgling organization must be understood by those with whom it wishes to interact. Clients must be developed, suppliers of necessary organizational resources must understand the organization's needs, and consumers of output must be identified. Each of these concerns draws attention to the clear specification of organizational goals and purposes. To explore the clarity of the 128 special unit's goals and objectives, survey item 26 was included in the instrument. Two respondent groups answered this item: (1) commanders of patrol divisions, and (2) commanders of detective bureaus. It was assumed that these two groups of individuals, by virtue of their organizational positions, would be in a better position to respond to this item than would individuals occupying lower level positions. On the other hand, operational personnel in both patrol and detective bureaus responded to domain consensus items. The items included in this scale elicited evalu— ations of the extent to which command personnel and chief executives in the affected policing jurisdictions sup- ported the special unit. The results of the analysis of variance on bOth concepts are reported in Table 4.2. As indicated in the table, a significant F-ratio was not obtained for the item measuring goal clarity (Item 26). However, the post hoc LSD Test revealed that differences (P i .05) existed between the coalitional and federative contexts in comparison to the unitary context. In fact, a comparison of the means obtained for each con- text revealed that the unitary context exhibited the most negative assessment (less agreement with the item) of Special unit goal clarity (X = 3.56 when federative and coalitional contexts were X = 2.84 and 2.82, respectively). 129 -- m-N mo. mam mN.m HHmHV wav HNOHV H-~ NN.N oe.~ 4N.N ereom -- H-N mo. ONH mm.~ Hop V Hmev HSH V NoHcpHo H-m mm.N aw.~ om.m Hpou wmmpnum amq on an a HmeoHpHHmou. psHumemepm zeppHep. HMS HNV HHV oHanpp> Hmo.v HmOH mmouopm oo:-umom M axoucou HmucoE:ouH>:m meHZOU Hzm mo mHm>mH mm>o mamzmmzou ZH mo mHm>HHHmuowom xpmuHea Hmv HNV HHS pHpmHnm> Hmo.v umop , mmOOOhm oo:-umom x uxOpaou HmuaoscopH>cm mebzou HZm mo mHm>MH mm>o >Uzmmzmmmn H Amo.g umOH . z . . mmoooum oom-umom x axoucou HmucoecopH>cm >UHHOm HHZD Hzm mo mHm>mH mm>o monmHqu v.v mHmHumHopom humuHcs Hmv HNV HHV pHpmHem> mmoooum Hmo.v omoe uo:-umom M pxoucou HmucoE:OHH>cm meezou Hzm mo mHm>mH mm>o HzmzzomH>zm mmb mo mmooopm Hmo.v same oo:-pmom x pxoucou HmpcoacopH>cm meHZOU Hzm mo mam>mq mm>o ZOHHmmUmmm H mqu oNmecm OH oHnaHHw>n ocoz mommo zmsoco uozo .o swooped Ho.m u 304 no.m-Hm.N n OumHOOENOHCH ”m.N-H u cwH: ”:Hmsoc oHanua> woumocsuh mo omcmmn .o-m u 304 ”v-m u OumHvOELOuc_ "N-H u :wH: “quuaHu Hmoo oHanCm> pepmocsch No owcmmm n-N n-— N-H N-_ Hoo. N om.N HoNo oo.N Hmoo mN.N HooNo oo.N om: m-N m-_ m-~ N-N ooo. N mo.oH HoNo oH.o Hooo No.m HooNo om.m pupaeo N-N m-N N-_ N-N ooo. N No.oN HNNo SH.o HNoo oo.m HooNo mo.m ooNoocwooco H-N H-N H-m H-m ooo. N oo.HH HmNo om.m Hooo oo.m HNNoo oN.o :oNonoaao oomozum omo com on a zoo pooaopenooco zoo: popoHco> oEoouso mo. OHMV mamCOmcou :Hmeoc mo mHo>oq -- -- om. N mo. Ho o Ho.H HoHo 4N.N HNo o oo.N om: -- -- mN. N No.H Ho o oo.m Hooo so.m Hoo o om.m ouooso -- -- mN. N oo.H Ho o oo.N Hofio oN.m HHo o oo.m coHuocmpoco -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --o :oHuHmoaao wowpaum omo com no a zoo ooooooEepooo con: oHnmNep> oEouuso mo. 5 «HoN Epsoo Noacmou Hoou No mop>oa mamzmmzou ZHHHM mzouezo n.v mam mo. Aucowcomoa :oHumeumo>cH mo mHo>OH oEouuso -- -- oN. N mo.H HoNo NH.N HHoo mo.N Hoomo oH.N pm: N-H N-H N-m N-m Hoo. N oo.N HHNo Hm.m Homo NN.o Hoomo om.m ouposo N-H N-H N-m N-m ooo. N om.m HoNo HN.N Hooo No.4 Hoomo mm.m :oHopcmooco -- -- No. N we. HoNo oo.m HoHo oo.m HNNmo oo.m :oHonoooo wwwogum omo on on a so; pooHooENooco :mH: Hmo HNo HNo pHooHeo> esoouso mo. 5 Hucowcomoa coHumsuowcH mo mHo>OH m>uzmnzmmma Hzm mo mmmDmm mmqm mZOUHDO w.¢ mHmHuuswoum oo.m - Ho.N oo.N - Hm.H om.H - H acoHumeumo>cH oo.m - Ho.m oo.m Hm.N om.N - H :oHumEuomcH 30H oumethoucH :wH: momcmm umonHow mm ONO: mousmmos omocu :o 30H pew oumeoEH6ch .an: mHo>OH mo :OHHHOHmHmmmHum -- -- oo. N No. HNHo mo.H Hmoo oN.N Hoomo oH.N pm: -- N-H HH. N NN.N Ho o om.m Homo oo.m HmoMo mm.m oupoeo -- -- mm. N NH.H HNHo oo.N Hooo om.m Hoomo Nm.m eonooummueH -- -- HN. N mm. Hm o oN.o HNNo NN.m Hoomo mo.m :oHonoooo mmmocum omq on mm a 204 muoHeosNoueH :wH: Hmo HNo HHo pHnoHeo> mo. 5 zocowcomon AHH>Hpuapoum Ho mHo>oH oEoouso 155 The analysis presented in Table 4.8 indicates that two of the three dependency scales (Information and Inves- tigation) yielded significant differences among groups in the analysis of variance. Levels of information depen- dence were found to differ significantly over both outcome variables-~unit integration in the larger system and I special unit impact (P = .004 and .001, respectively). Interestingly, however, the differences among levels of information dependence on these outcome variables were ‘5...— . in an unanticipated direction; individuals indicating the lowest levels of information dependence were more positive in their evaluations of the outcome measures than were individuals classified as either high or intermediate. This suggested that evaluations of unit integration and impact may have been negatively affected by the degree of perceived dependence on the special unit. Consequently, individuals who viewed themselves as not dependent on the special unit as a source of information may have felt less constrained in their evaluations. Conversely, individuals who felt intermediate or high dependence on the special. unit as a source of information may have attempted to minimize this dependence by more negatively evaluating the impact and integration of the special unit. With regard to levels of investigation dependence, results similar to those obtained above were found. Indi- viduals indicating low levels of investigation dependence 156 were more positive in their evaluations of the special unit's integration into the larger organizational envi- ronment than were individuals classified as either high or intermediate (X = 2.25 vs. 3.37 and 3.63, respectively). Again this suggested that perceptions of dependence on the special unit may have negatively affected externals' evaluations of the unit. Although significant (P 5 .05) differences on evaluations of special unit impact were not found to exist, the Least Significant Difference Test isolated a difference between the "low" and "intermediate" levels of investigation dependency on this variable. By comparing group means, the direction of difference indi- cated that individuals categorized as "low" were more positive in their evaluations of impact than were those classified as "intermediate" (X = 3.27 and 3.97, respec- tively). No significant difference on the outcome variables was detected over the levels of productivity dependence. One post hoc comparison, the most liberal, isolated a difference between "high" and "intermediate” levels of productivity dependence on the outcome variable special unit impact, indicating that individuals who believed that their productivity was affected by the existence of the special unit were more positive in their evaluations 0f impact than were those who did not view their produc- tivity as affected by the special unit. ”Em! 157 The implications of the results obtained, with regard to measures of external dependence on the special unit, appeared to indicate that environmental dependence on the special unit affected acceptance of the special unit into the host environment. As dependence relations are one extreme of the power continuum, attention must now be focused on the other end—-namely perceptions of influence. Influence Perception Individual perceptions of influence were examined in preceding sections to determine the extent to which environmental context affected these perceptions. The results of this analysis indicated that inclusive environ- mental context had no effect on perceptions of influence. The issue that now arises is: Do varying levels of in- fluence perception have an effect on evaluations of the outcome variables? To pursue this issue, both measures of influence perception (Items 62 and 65) were truncated into three ordinal categories: (1) high, (2) inter- mediate, and (3) low. Data for individuals in each of these categories were then analyzed with respect to their evaluations or the outcome variables. The results of this analysis, as well as the ranges of the truncated process variables measuring influence perception, are presented in Table 4.9. ‘3.“ 158 . .o-v u 30H pew m u oumHvoE -uoucH “N-H :NH: "mowcmu 05mm on» wch: woumocsuu one: we can No mEOuHm -- -- No. N oo. HoHNo NH.N HNmHo HN.N HNNo HN.N om: -- -- oo. N NN. HooNo mo.m HooHo oo.m HNNo om.n uuoaeH -- -- oN. N om. HoHNo om.m HNmHo No.m HoNo oN.m :oNoouwoucH -- -- No. N no. HooHo mo.m HNHHo No.m Hooo mo.m :oHonooao pomogum omo oom no a so; pooHepeNpooN goo: Hmo HNo HHo pHomHep> mo. oocOOHmcH uHca HmHuoom mo mHo>OH oEouuao m-N m-N m-H m-H .N-H N-H ooo. N No.oN HmoNo Ho.N HNHHo oo.N HHNo oN.H om: m-N m-N N-H m-w ooo. N oo.Nm HomNo Ho.m HoHHo NN.m Hooo No.N pumoeN m-N m-H m-H .N-H .N-H ooo. N HN.No HNoNo No.m HoHHo oo.N HNNo mN.N :oHupcmooco H-N N-m H-m moo. N mm.o HooNo mo.m Hoo o oo.m Homo oo.o :oHonoooo owmogum omo oom on o 304 puooppENpooo goo: Hoo HNo HHo pHomNcm> oEoouso ma. 5 mucouscH HmucoaGONH>cm mo mHo>OH mmcszHmzH no onhmmummm mo mmm3mm mmqm mZOUHDO m.v mqm oEouuso mo. :oHpmHomoou Ho mHO>OH m-N N-N mo. N oo.m HHo o oo.N HHN o Ho.H HmNmo oH.N om: -- -- HH. N NN.N HNo o Ho.m HNH o oH.m HNNmo om.m ouooeH m-N m-N H-N H-N Noo. N mm.o Hoo o NN.N HoN o mN.N Hono mm.m :oHooeooucH -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --n :oHuHmomgo Hoooom omH on No a zoo pHmHopeNpooH ENH: Hmo HNo HHo . pHooHHo> oEouuso mo. 8 :oHumumoou Ho mHo>OH mmmHOMHzm >m mmHm mEOUHDO OH.v mHm Osouuao mo. coHumouu uoxumz mo mHo>OH -- -- NH. N oN.H HHo o mo.N HNN o NN.N HNomo NH.N om: -- m-N oo. N oo.N Hom o No.m HNN o NN.N Hono om.m HomoeH m-N N-N m-H m-H ooo. N om.o HHo o NN.N HoN o oo.m HNomo NN.N :oHHonoucH -- -- -- -- -- -- -- n-- :oHuHmomno pompoum omH on oo o 30H pooHopEcpooH .ooH: Hmo HNo HHo pHooHHo> oEouuso mo. 5 :oHumHOooou Ho mHo>OH 166 of cooptation as a strategy may provide some insight into the results obtained. COOptation as a process requires that elements of the environment be directly incorporated into the policy-making structures of the new organization. In the case at hand, the group identified as havingahigh level of participation in the deve10pment of the special unit was viewed as meeting this criterion. It was believed that once these elements were incorporated into the organization they would lose someztfnot alltxftheir initial resistance to the fledgling organization. Consequently, tension be- tween organization and environment would be reduced and the new organization would be free to pursue its goals. A problem arises, however, that relates to the COOptation process itself. COOptation is by its very nature a reciprocal process. "The character of the COOpted elements will necessarily shape the modes of action avail- able to the group which has won adOption at the price of commitment to outside elements."9 Consequently, elements of the environment once COOpted may have an extreme in- fluence on the setting and attainment of organizational goals and objectives. The findings obtained on the COOp- tation scale presented in Table 4.10 were viewed as being consistent with the COOptation process described above. 9Philip Selznick, "COOptation," in Complex Organi- zations and Their Environments, ed. Merlin B. Brinkerhoff and Phiilip R. Kunz (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1972), p. 144. 167 Individuals who feel they have been major partici- pants in the deve10pment of the special unit may be in- fluenced in their evaluations by their own levels of participation. For example, individuals who directly participated in the deve10pment of the special unit may have been far more critical with regard to its integration in the larger environment and its use than others who did not participate as directly, because the former group may have had greater expectations for the unit than their Counterparts whose participation was less direct. Although this interpretation is tentative, because a majority of the respondents fell into the "high" cooptation classifi- cation, it nevertheless is consistent with the original conceptualization of the COOptation process and is offered as an attempt to explain the dynamics of this process and the results obtained. Coordination as an Attempt to Manage the Environ- mene - Formal coordination between the special units and elements of their environments was previously found to be most used in the unitary environmental context. This initial finding was viewed as consistent with the theore- tical development of an environmental continuum and the attributes associated with each context type. 168 The results of examining the effect of varying levels of formal coordination on the outcome variables are reported in Table 4.10. As indicated in the table, significant differences were found to exist among groups classified by levels of coordination on three of the four outcome measures. The results indicated that evaluation of the special unit's integration, impact, and use differed significantly among groups classified by levels of coordi- nation. Post hoc comparisons revealed the direction of these differences to be consistent with expectations, in that individuals classified as either high or intermediate with regard to coordination tended to evaluate the special unit in terms of integration, impact, and use more posi- tively than did individuals classified as "low" on coordi- nation. This appeared to indicate that the deve10pment of formal linkages between the special unit and elements of its environment had an impact on subsequent environ- mental acceptance of the unit and use of its output. As indicated earlier, however, the specific environmental context in which the coordination strategy was attempted affected environmental acceptance or rejection of that management strategy. Consequently, it appeared that the use of a coordination strategy may have been more effec- tive in the unitary environmental context than in the others. 169 COOperation as a Means of Securing Environmental Acceptance - The COOperation strategy was viewed as a means to secure environmental acceptance and use on a less formal basis than coordination. The measurement of COOperation focused on perceptions of environmental actors with regard to the levels of COOperation extended by the special unit. The results of the analysis of the impact of levels of cooperation on the outcome measures are re- jported in Table 4.10, along with the ranges on each COOperation level. As indicated in Table 4.10, significant differences tvere found to exist among groups classified by COOperation (an the outcome measure of unit integration (Item 49). Pharthermore, the direction of these differences showed tJiat individuals who indicated high levels of COOperation vveme also higher (more positive) in their evaluations of :SIDecial unit integration in the larger environmental sys- ‘temn than were individuals who indicated low levels of CKDOperation (X = 3.27 vs. X = 4.37). This difference was also found to exist between the intermediate (X = 3.08) ‘aJId.low (X = 4.37) groups. No differences were detected be‘tween the high and intermediate COOperation classifica- tlitrans. This may have been the result of the artificiality (’17 the classifications themselves. As concern was with the polar extremes of COOperation, the intermediate classi- fication may have been unnecessary. 170 The results suggested that informal cooperation between the special unit and elements of its environment affected unit integration in the larger network, but this effect was related to the polar extremes of the COOperation continuum. Informal cooperation was not found to have an effect on either perceptions of command officer opposition toward the unit or evaluations of impact and use. The Creation of a Market for Special Unit Output - Perhaps one of the most important tasks facing the special unit attempting to integrate itself into an environmental network is creating an external demand for its services. Preceding discussions have examined such management stra- tegies as cooptation, formal coordination, and informal cooperation, which are rather direct attempts to manage the external environment. The creation of external demand for special unit services, however, approaches the problem of environmental management from a somewhat different direction. Here, the concern is with creating perceptions of need. As one of the primary objectives of all the special units under examination was the creation of improved in- formation regarding crime and criminal offenders, the measurement of a market creation strategy focused on evaluations of the special unit's ability to disseminate infOrmation to relevant actors in the external environment. ‘q; .__u* '- 171 Consequently, individuals who indicated that the special unit did in fact disseminate useful crime information were viewed as implicitly stating that the units were creating an external market for their services. Admittedly this measure is less than direct; however, it was felt that indirectly measuring market creation capabilities would I minimize response bias. The scale measuring market creation efforts was truncated into four levels, as the distribution of re- fl sponses was clearly bimodal. Table 4.10 presents the ranges of each level of the market creation strategy as well as the results obtained through analysis. As shown in Table 4.10, significant differences among groups classified by level of market creation were obtained on three of the four outcome variables. Speci- fically, differences were found to exist among groups with respect to unit integration, impact, and use. Post hoc comparisons revealed that each of the groups was found to be significantly different from the others (P = .05, LSD and Scheffé), indicating that higher perceptions of the special unit's market creation abilities were strongly associated with corresponding higher evaluations of unit integration and impact, as well as greater use of the Special unit's services. An examination of the means for each classification of market creation over the outcome variables reinforced this conclusion. For example, 172 evaluation of special unit impact indicated that individuals classified as either extremely high or moderately high with respect to their perceptions of market creation were markedly higher in their evaluations of impact (X = 2.52 and 3.04 vs. X = 3.64 and 4.45). A similar pattern was identified on both evaluations of unit integration and use patterns. These findings suggested that attempts on the part of the special unit to create a market for its output had an important effect on subsequent environmental acceptance and use. The expenditure of organizational resources to create external demand may be viewed as a viable strategy for special units to pursue. The consequences of such a pursuit, as indicated by the data presented in Table 4.10, support special unit domain acquisition. Perceptions of Threat and Special Unit Acceptance and’Use PreCeding discussions of the impact of threat per- ception on environmental acceptance and use of the special unit indicated that the special unit was more likely to create a threat in the inclusive environmental context than in the federative or coalitional context. To expand on this finding, the measure of threat perception was trun- cated into three levels: high, intermediate and low fOllowing the procedures described in the previous 173 discussion, these levels of threat perception were then examined in relation to their impact on the outcome variables. Table 4.11 presents the results of this analysis. The results of analyzing the impact of levels of threat perception upon the outcome variables indicated he significant differences existed among threat perception 1 groups. These differences were found on the measures of unit integration, evaluations of impact, and use. Group .} comparisons further revealed that individuals classified as having low levels of threat perception were consistently more positive toward the special unit than were individuals classified as either intermediate or high. These dif- 'ferences were also detected between the intermediate and low classes of threat perception (P §_.05 on both LSD and Scheffé). From the analysis of Table 4.11, it may be con- cluded that perceptions of threat created by the estab- lishment of the special unit had a negative impact on environmental acceptance and use of the special units under examination. This finding suggested that a major task confronting the special unit in its attempt to secure an organizational domain was reducing environmental per- ceptions of threat. This is consistent with the preceding considerations of attempts to manage the environment, in that efforts to secure an organizational domain by any 174 .o.©-Ho.m u 30H moo.m.Hm.N u oumweos -HoucH mom.N-H u :mH: “coHpmouuom umopcb mo mHo>OH m 04p pom mowemmm m-N m-H N-H ooo. N NN.oH HHmHo No.N HmoHo NN.N HoHNo No.N pm: m-N m-N m-H m-H , N-H N-H ooo. N oo.oo HNmHo No.4 HooHo NN.N HooNo oo.m HumoeH m-N m-H N-H N-H ooo. N om.om HomHo oH.o HmoHo NN.N HoHNo oo.N :oHHacopooH -- H-m oo. N 4N.m HooHo oN.m HoN o oo.m HNoHo NH.o ooHuHmoaoo mHHpEOm omH on on a :mH: pooHoperoeH 30H Hmo HNo HHo manwwhmxw 0500930 mo. 5 aoHpmoopom “money we mHO>OH monHmmUmmm Hm mmqm mZOUHDO HH.¢ mqm=m mcmuummwo «gouge; co Hones Hecmcom < .Hum weaned copunoucoo Hoot: «sauna ea :oHuuuHHHua )\ mnemouacum HIV 38.: mo moo—«3:3. 28322 _ 1V _ < _ co—uacoaucH u_c= _ oucoapecH .8 32333.. «.2559 _ Hausa—.835 2,332: _ “:5 so: 3 3:333”. 333:8 52.8 _ i _ _ 383.5 H3cgocH>cw 5335.8 3.: 202 consensus, (2) individual perceptions of influence in the special unit's policy-making structures, (3) the use of strategies designed to manage uncertainty in the environ- ment, and (4) levels of threat perception. Each of these factors, in turn, impacted on the outcome variables. Con- sequently, the antecedent processes directly affecting the special unit's acquisition of an organizational domain were affected by the nature and composition of the environmental context in which they Operated. This finding, as shown in Figure 5.1, has import for the deve10pment of special unit policy, particularly where these policy decisions include a concern for interaction with the environment. The following section explores the implications of these findings for policy deve10pment in the special units. Implications for Policy DeveIOpment in the—ImpIementation Process The data analyzed in Chapter Iv, as well as the model of factors affecting the implementation of special police units presented in the preceding section, call attention to the policy relevance of this study. As the ultimate goal of any newly initiated organization is the acquisition of a viable organizational domain, the findings presented have policy implications for the deve10pment and initiation of special police units and for their continued Operation in the environmental milieu. 203 The first and perhaps most obvious policy consi- deration arising from this study is the nature and compo- sition of the inclusive environmental context within which the special unit is expected to function. Special unit policy makers must recognize that the external environment affects both the deve10pment and pursuit of organizational objectives. Beyond this recognition, however, policy makers must be informed of the dynamic nature of the environment. This is, perhaps, a critical recognition for the integration of a newly formed organization into its host environment. "A main problem in the study of organi- zational change [and organizational initiation] is that the environmental contexts in which organizations exist are themselves changing, at an increasing rate, and toward increasing complexity."1 The data analyzed in this study indicated that environmental contexts affect implementa- tion efforts. The unitary environmental context may be viewed as presenting the greatest obstacles to the initiation of specialized police units. Lines of authority, loci of decision-making, vested interests,'inter alia are explicitly defined. In short, the "institutional 1F. E. Emery, and E. L. Trist, "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments," in Complex Organizations “and Their EnvirOnments Merlin B. Brinkerhoff, and PhiIIip R. Kunz (eds.) (DuBuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company, Publishers, 1972), p. 268. ,._ En,, 204 territory" has been divided among interested parties. Resistance to the establishment of a new organizational subunit that must compete for organizational resources and rewards may be expected to follow. Perceptions of the new unit as a source of competition, and hence a threat, have been documented in this context. Furthermore, as the primary organizational means for reducing internal tension is the formal coordination of effort among organizational sub-components, interactions between a somewhat hostile environment and the special unit may be more the result of official force than individual desire. To overcome these problems, policy makers must attempt to neutralize hosti- lity and threat perception in the environment. The strategy of creating an external demand for special unit output appears to help overcome these difficulties. Although the problems associated with the unitary environmental context, i.e. greater resistance and threat perception, are reduced in the federative and coalitional environmental contexts, the implementation issues identi- fied above are not less salient. Data analyses have indicated that the issues of domain consensus, threat perception, environmental management strategies, and perceptions of influence in the special unit's policy- making process are concerns in all environmental contexts. Policy makers in each context are, therefore, confronted with similar organizational-environmental issues. 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POOL OF QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS AND ASSOCIATED RESPONDENT GROUPS POOL OF QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS AND ASSOCIATED RESPONDENT GROUPS Please circle the apprOpriate number indicating the extent of your agreement/disagreement with the following state- ments. >. o >.o o >~ e—4 (I) HQ) >s® H on In COT-4 e—II-o r—IQ) CO) (I) DO COO v—IOO (6(1) 00) Q) to OCT) CON 5:. so 2:. a on +5.22 H< m< < G we on 1. The special unit has defi- nitely improved the exchange (flow) of information be- 1 2 3 4 5 tween area law enforcement agencies. 2. The SPU has definitely improved the exchange (flow) of informa- tion between units within your 1 2 3 4 5 6 department. 3. The special unit has definitely improved the quality of useful information available about 1 2 3 4 5 6 crime, crime patterns and cri- minals in the area. 4. The crime problem in your juris- diction has definitely been 1 2 handled differently because of the establishment of the SPU. UT 43 U1 0 5. The SPU definitely had the active support of the chief in l 2 3 4 S 6 your department. 6. The SPU definitely had the active support of other rele- 1 2 3 4 5 6 vant command officers in your department. 7. The SPU had the active Opposi- tion of command officers whose l 2 3 4 5 6 position could influence the success or failure of the unit. 219 The following questions are designed to gather information about your personal involvement with the special unit. Please indicate your responseby circling the apprOpriate number. H +a H 0 co 0 '1'“. Q) C: £44 5+) 24.: Eu 44 0 c 0 c c m <60) <00) (Dd) COO) cf“ 0'? 0'? 0': '05: Hi PM PM em z< 8. To what extent were you person- ally involved in the original 1 2 3 4 5 planning for the special unit? 9. To what extent did you actively support the original idea for l 2 3 4 ‘5 t e special unit? 10. To what extent did_you actively oppose the original idea for 1 2 3 4 5 t e special unit? 11. To what extent did you partici- pate in the selEEiion O t e l 2 3 4 5 special unit's goals and objec- tives? The following questions ask for your Opinion regarding the goals and objectives of the special unit. Please circle the apprOpriate number indicating the strength of your agreement/disagreement with the following statements. (I) >. 5? o 3?33 >.8 H 00 IN 00% I-II-u HQ) :0 o 00 £00 r—IOD COO.) 00) G) CO 0C6 COCO so bio a a 0.22 as e< m< < O we on 12. The SPU was intended to be a service to other units by acting l 2 3 4 5 6 as a criminal intelligence unit. 13. The SPU was intended to be a service to other units by acting 1 2 3 4 5 6 as a surveillance unit. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 231 The SPU was intended to be a follow-up investigative unit. The SPU was intended to be a saturation patrol unit. The SPU was intended to place its greatest emphasis on the ability to identify existing and emerging crime patterns. The SPU was intended to place great emphasis on its ability to answer requests for infor- mation on specific suspects, crimes and locations. The SPU was intended to place great emphasis on its ability to produce estimates concern- ing the character and volume of future criminal activity. The SPU was intended to place great emphasis on the number of arrests it made. The SPU was intended to place great emphasis on its ability to assist other units by pro- viding information used in making arrests. The SPU was intended to place great emphasis on the character of the criminals arrested and the types of crimes for which they were arrested rather than the mere volume of arrests. The SPU was intended to place great emphasis on the ability to obtain convictions for the arrests they made and/or assisted in making. Totally Agree I-J Strongly Agree N Agree (N Disagree 4:. Strongly Disagree U1 Totally Disagree 0‘1 23. 24. 25. 222 >~ <1) >40) Q) >N I-I <1) v—IQ) >~~ CD>~. H 0H0) >~. 3: H 00 r-IG) Cid) <1) (60.) 0(1) (D so. so. 2:. [-<< U)< <1: 1 2 3 l 2 3 l 2 3 l 2 3 l 2 3 l 2 3 l 2 3 Disagree 3 4 Strongly Disagree 5 Totally Disagree 0" 6 very Familiar very Unfamiliar 1 2 3 Extremely valuable 4 5 WOrthless ‘cauol 225 47. In general, how often has your unit/division/bureau provided the special unit with specific information concerning crimes and/or criminals? (Check one) a. regularly: at least once a week b. frequently: at least once a month c. occasionally:. 3 to 4 times a year d. almost never e. never 48. In general, how often has your unit/division/bureau requested in- formation on specific crimes, criminal suspects, and crime u patterns from the special unit? (Check one) regularly: at least once a week frequently: at least once a month occasionally: 3 to 4 times a year almost never never ILmLM (DD-40391 49. Over the past years have your COOperative interactions with the special unit increased or decreased? (Check one) a. have continually increased since the establishment of the unit b. initially increased but have now leveled off at highest level c. initially increased but have recently begun to decrease d. initially increased but drOpped off quickly e. never increased beyond occasional contact f. never have had Operational contacts with the unit IIIIII Organizations sometimes depend on each other in ways which are not readily apparent, or are not accurately reflected in their contacts with each other. In order to get at these relationships assume that the Special unit is no longer in existence. (In some instances this was actually was the case) What do you think would be the probably (or actual) effect on your bureau/division/unit? Please circle he apprOpriate word(s) in each statement. 50. YOur knowledge of crimdnal activity in your jurisdiction would be no different, significantly reduced, somewhat reduced, significantlyiincreased, somewhat increased. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 226 The quality of information regarding criminal activity in your jurisdiction would be no different, significantly reduced, somewhat reduced, significantly_increased, or somewhat in- creasedii The quantity of infOrmation regarding criminal activity in your jurisdiction would be no different, significantly reduced, some- what reduced, significantly increased: or somewhat increased} How do you see the goals of your bureau/division/unit in relation to those of the special unit? WOuld you say they were mutuall exclusive, totally dependent on each other, somewhat dependent on each other, independent Of each other, or in competition with each other. You would have more, fewer, or the same number of criminal inves- tigations to conduct. You would find it no different, harder, or easier to conduct criminal investigations. There would be no change, increased difficulty, or less difficulty in getting infOrmationXIOr ongoing criminal investigations. Your clearance rate would be no different, significantly reduced, somewhat reduced, significantly increasEd, or someWhat increased for those criminal investigations you initiate. Your conviction rate would be no different, significantly re- duced, somewhat reduced, significantly increasediior someWhat increased for those criminal investigations Which you conduct. In «I-J H O CO 0 'f‘} O) E: H G) u-I +4 OH E+—’ 2+4 +4 $3 £2 CC! C to C60) (60) U30) COG) oi? o‘>‘<’ o‘>'<’ oi? ‘6’: [—T-Ll [—I-Ll [—T-Ll I—‘LLI Z< To what extent does/did your division/bureau/etc. partici- l 2 3 4 S pate in the activities of the special unit? To what extent was/is your divi- sion's/bureau's/etc. participa- tion in the activities of the 1 2 3 4 5 special unit encouraged by per- sonnel in the special unit? 227 YOu feel completely free to discuss important infOrmation with the special unit. You feel that representatives of your division/bureau/unit have some influence in the policy decisions in the special unit. YOur association with members of the special unit is charac- terized by mutual trust. Pe0p1e from the special unit display a facilitative (COOp- erative, helpful) attitude toward your division/bureau/ unit. When decisions are made involving matters of mutual concern, the special unit is more likely to have greater influence in these decisions. Totally Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree Totally Disagree Agree Agree A 228 Respondent Groups mowocow<.mofifiom HanoHuuwnmwush-coz mo>wuoopon ocmeeou 9589.8 mhmunwo Howoma wcmsaou Hospmm ohzuUSMum zuwhosua< EopH >o>psm 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 229 Respondent Groups mofiocmw< mowaom Hmcofiuowwmwpam-:oz mo>wpoopon wanesou o>fiuooumo mhmuflwo 3.5mm wcmsaoo Heaven ohsuonppm prpocpz< EouH >o>hsm 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 230 Respondent Groups mofiocow< oofiaom Homewuowwmwpsh-coz mo>fiuompon vcmseou o>wuoouoo mumufimwo Houumm mug—ECU Hogan; manpozpum Apfihozu3< souH xo>psm 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 XXXX XXXX xxxx 54 55 S6 57 231 Respondent Groups mowocom< mowaom Hmcowuowwmfipsh-:oz m®>flHU®uw®Q vamEEou o>wpoopom Bouumo Hoppmm mamEEoo fichumm othoshum btofié mEouH >o>h3m 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Babbie, Earl R. Survey Research Methods. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1973. Bennis, Warren G., Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin (eds.). The Planning of Change. 2d ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969. Berman, Paul and Edward W. Pauly. Federal Programs Sup- porting Educational Change, Volume II: Factors Affecting Change Agent PrOJects. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1975. Bernstein, Ilene N. (ed.). Validity Issues in Evaluative . Research. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1975T5 Bertalanffy, Ludwig Von. General Systems Theory. Rev. ed. New York: George BraziIIer, Inc., 1968. Blau, Peter M. On the Nature of Organizations. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,‘1974. Block, Peter B. Equality of Distribution of Police Ser- vices: A Case Study ofTWashin ton D. C. washington, D. C.: The Urban Institute, 1 74. Brinkerhoff, Merlin B. and Phillip R. Kunz (eds.). Complex Organizations and Their Environments. DuBuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company Publishers, 1972. Buckley, Walter. Sociology and Modern Systems Theory. Englewood Cliffs, N. 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