ANTECEDENTS TO IMPLEMENTING SPECIALIZED POLICE UNITS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL-ENVIRONMENTAL INTERACTION

Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D.

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JACK RAYMOND GREENE

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ABSTRACT

ANTECEDENTS TO IMPLEMENTING SPECIALIZED POLICE UNITS:
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF
ORGANIZATIONAL-ENVIRONMENTAL INTERACTION

By

Jack Raymond Greene

This study explored organizational issues faced in the implementation of special police units, particularly the effects of the external environment in project implementation.

The study essentially pursued the following research questions:

1. To what extent is special police unit implementation (acceptance and use) affected by the environments of these units?

2. In the implementation process, can specific strategies be employed to facilitate unit integration in the larger organizational system?

3. What characteristics of the special unit's environment facilitate or impede the implementation process?

To investigate the preceding questions a sample of six special police unit projects, involving thirteen separate law enforcement jurisdictions, were selected for inclusion in the study. The study employed the use of two data gathering instruments; (1) a series of structured

interviews conducted in each of the six research sites, and (2) a survey instrument distributed within each site. Sixteen variables were identified for inclusion in the study and variables were classified as either outcome variables, process variables or control variables. Data collected were then analyzed using both a one-way and two-way fixed effects analysis of variance model.

The results of data analysis indicated:

1. The nature and structure of the environment was found to have an effect on levels of command officer resistance toward the special police units. Specifically, higher levels of command officer resistance to the special unit were found to exist in the unitary environment than in the federative or coalitional environments.

2. Environment was found to have an influence on individual evaluations of special unit impact.

3. Environment was found to have an effect on domain consensus, particularly in the federative environment, which exhibited the highest levels of domain consensus. Furthermore, environment was found to have a significant effect on individual perceptions of influence, the use of formal coordination as a strategy to manage the environment, and levels of threat perception.

4. Levels of domain consensus (agreement with organizational purposes) were found to have a significant effect on each of the four outcome variables. No

significant differences among groups classified by goal clarity were found. These findings indicated that domain consensus is an important variable to the implementation process.

5. External dependence on the special units was found to have a significant influence on evaluations of the special unit's integration into the larger environmental system, and evaluations of special unit impact.

6. The measure of perception of influence in the policy-making structure of the special units produced consistently significant results across each of the outcome variables. This finding indicated that creating perceptions of influence in the external environment affected levels of acceptance and use of special unit outputs. The measure of special unit influence in the environment produced no significant results in the analysis.

7. Strategies designed to manage the environment were found to affect different outcome variables. Cooptation was found to affect both evaluations of unit integration and use. Informal cooperation was found to influence unit integration. The two most consistent measures of environmental management strategies across the outcome variables were formal coordination and market creation.

8. The measure of threat perception in the external environment created by the establishment of the special unit was found to produce significant effects on evaluations

of special unit integration, impact, and use. This finding suggested that threat perception had a negative impact on the implementation process.

These findings indicated that environmental considerations significantly affect the implementation process. Furthermore, the effects of both inclusive environmental context and the dynamics of the implementation process on subsequent outcomes suggested that the initiation of special police units requires a concern for factors external to the organization if successful implementation is to be realized.

ANTECEDENTS TO IMPLEMENTING SPECIALIZED POLICE UNITS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL-ENVIRONMENTAL INTERACTION

By

Jack Raymond Greene

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To Ramona, Laurie and Stephanie, for all the obvious reasons and many more.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In recent years the provision of police service has become a focal issue in many American communities. Rising crime, coupled with an awareness that police patrol deployment practices have had little impact on either reported or actual levels of criminal activity,[1] has resulted in the development of specialized police units. The term specialized police units refers to crime-specific proactive task forces developed to focus upon either the general deterrence of crime or the immediate apprehension of criminal offenders. Three general types of special police units were considered in this study: (1) covert surveillance teams developed to maximize the direct apprehension of criminal offenders; (2) saturation patrol units designed to increase the visibility of police patrol operations, thus presumably

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[1]George L. Kelling, Tony Pate, Duane Dieckman and Charles E. Brown, The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: The Police Foundation, 1974), pp. 20-23.

deterring criminal behavior; and, (3) regionalized detective bureaus designed to improve existing criminal case investigations in a particular jurisdiction.

The impetus for the development of specialized police units stems from a recognition by many law enforcement experts that a police administrator's ability to deploy police personnel effectively on crime-specific problems is severely circumscribed because of the normal volume of citizen requests for police service. One governmental commission addressing the problems associated with maintaining existing levels of police service indicated:

> Every police administrator is often troubled by an apparent inability to deploy his patrol strength for maximum effect against particular problems. Limited personnel and the many problems of regular patrol service frequently preclude the attaining of proper selective enforcement or selected pressure against special crime problems.[2]

In addition to identifying the need to deploy police personnel more effectively, this commission further advised:

> To achieve proper emphasis and pressure particular crime situations, crime tactical forces

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[2]National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police, (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 238-39.

> are often deployed to serve as compact, flexible operational task forces in given locations at times when a concentrated effort is needed.[3]

Further support for the development of specialized policing units is gained from the study of official crime reports. Analysis of crime patterns and arrested offenders in adjacent municipal or county localities has led most police administrators and planners to the conclusion that the jurisdictional boundaries established for most police agencies are not in concert with the mobility patterns of criminal offenders. In an effort to remedy this situation, specialized police units have been initiated with a view toward improving police investigation services in each jurisdiction.

The success or failure of specialized police units has been evaluated largely in terms of their ability to (1) reduce specific types of crimes, (2) increase clearance rates, (3) deter criminal activity, or (4) improve criminal conviction rates.[4] However, little

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[3]Ibid., p. 239.

[4]Examples of the types of police-productivity measures currently being used may be found in Harry P. Hatry, "Wrestling with Police Crime Control Productivity Measurement", Readings in Productivity in Policing, ed. Joan L. Wifle and John F. Heaphy (Washington, D.C.: The Police Foundation, 1975), pp. 86-128; Peter B. Bloch, Equality of Distribution of Police Services--A Case Study of Washington, D.C. (Washington, D. C.: The Urban Institute, 1974); Peter W. Greenwood et. al. The Criminal Investigation Process--Volume III: Observations

effort has been directed toward evaluating these units in terms of the manner in which they were implemented or the degree to which their respective organizational environments permitted, hindered, or facilitated the attainment of these organizational purposes.

Furthermore, research examining the organizational environments of law enforcement institutions, particularly as these environments affect organizational structure and operation, are for all practical purposes nonexistent. However, a review of law enforcement literature does reveal an implicit concern for forces external to police organizations and how these forces might affect policing agencies.

Wilson, for example, in developing his typology of police administrator styles, implicitly addressed the environmental constraints of the eight communities selected, which ultimately influenced the type of administrative style exhibited. Although Wilson minimized the overall impact of "community" upon police administrative style, he did indicate:

> The prevailing police style is not explicitly determined by community decisions, though a few of its elements may be shaped by these decisions . . . The police are in all cases keenly

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and Analysis. (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1975), pp. 34-40; National Commission on Productivity. Opportunities for Improving Productivity in Police Services (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Productivity, 1973).

> sensitive to their political environment without in all cases being governed by it.[5]

Similarly, consideration of changes in the internal and external environments of policing agencies, developed by Sandler and Mintz,[6] reflected a concern for relationships between these agencies and the communities they serve. The limitation of both these studies, however, is that they treated the external organizational environment as some homogeneous entity without specifically considering the actors that composed the environment.

The work by Ostrom et al. represented greater specificity with regard to identifying environmental actors.[7] By conceptualizing the police agency as a service-delivery industry, the authors attempted to trace the degree of fragmentation or duplication of police service for a given geographic area. Although their study examined and specified the organizational actors in a

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[5]James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 230.

[6]Georgette Sandler, and Ellen Mintz, "Police Organizations: Their Changing Internal and External Relationships," Journal of Police Science and Administration 2 (December 1974): 458-63.

[7]Elinor Ostrom, Roger B. Parks, and Gordon P. Whitaker, "Defining and Measuring Structural Variations in Interorganizational Arrangements" (paper presented before the Midwest Political Science Association Meetings, Chicago, Illinois, May 1-3, 1975).

police-service-delivery system, its applicability to the present study is limited because it did not examine the types of relationships between these actors, and hence the dynamics of the environment. Furthermore, the study did not consider the interdependencies that develop among organizations; consequently, it ignored the type, duration, and intensity of interactions among these institutions, all of which may affect the attainment of organizational goals.

The relationships and interdependencies among organizations are of particular relevance when considering the introduction of a new organization, such as a specialized police unit, into an existing institutional structure. As previously noted, the measurement of specialized police unit output ignores a more basic issue, namely: Was the unit implemented as intended, and to what extent does the environment affect this implementation process?

Statement of the Problem

The introduction of a new law enforcement unit into an existing organizational environment may result in: (1) environmental rejection of the initiated change, or (2) varying degrees of environmental acceptance, utilization, and continuation of the newly initiated change strategy. A third, although perhaps less probable, situation may occur, in which the new unit rejects its

host environment and relocates under institutional conditions more favorable to the attainment of its purposes. The opportunity for successful goal attainment, then, may be viewed as dependent upon the extent to which these units are accepted into existing environmental structures, and the extent to which these fledgling organizations are permitted to pursue their goals.

For example, the initiation of a multi-jurisdictional criminal investigation unit is based on the assumption that area police departments and the new unit will exchange information. If such an exchange is not forthcoming, or only partially occurs, the new unit is relegated to a position of impotence before it has had an opportunity to establish its effectiveness. Therefore, the antecedents to measuring special police unit productivity reside in the external environment, particularly when the issue of organizational implementation arises.

The present study focused on the implementation processes surrounding the introduction of specialized police units, and the degree to which implementation and subsequent acceptance, use, and continuation of specialized policing services are affected by the organizational environments of these units. Essentially, this study addressed the following research questions:

1. To what extent is special police unit implementation (acceptance and use) affected by the environments of these units?

2. In the implementation process, can specific strategies be employed to facilitate unit integration in the larger organizational system?

3. What characteristics of the special unit's environment facilitate or impede the implementation process?

Significance of the Problem

Organizational-environmental networks, particularly as they relate to the implementation of a newly initiated organizational unit, have yet to be explored in the literature on criminal justice organizations. The initiation of planned change in the police milieu, as represented by the establishment of specialized policing units, affords an opportunity to examine critically the environmental factors that affect the implementation of such changes.

Planned change in organizations has been a topic of much debate and intensive research. However, as one prominent researcher on the topic noted, "despite the common occurrence of organizational change, its dynamics and underlying processes are understood in only rough, ill-defined ways."[8] This is particularly problematic when considering deliberate attempts to initiate change in a given organization.

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[8]Louis B. Barnes, "Approaches to Organizational Change," in The Planning of Change, second edition; ed. Warren G. Bennis et al. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 79.

The specialized police units under consideration are viewed as attempted innovations designed to improve the operational capability of their respective organizations. Before accomplishing their purposes, however, these units must be accepted by their host organizations and by the environments in which they function. Traditional evaluation efforts in the field of criminal justice have relied almost totally on the measurement of outputs and outcomes of the organization under consideration. Few attempts have been made to measure the degree to which innovations have been implemented or the extent to which external factors impede or facilitate goal attainment. This is indeed a problem, since a growing body of research suggests that organizational environments affect the way in which an organization develops and pursues its goals.[9]

The current study examined the web of interactions between specialized police units and their external environments, with a view toward examining environmental

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[9]For example, see Ernest A. T. Barth, "The Causes and Consequences of Interagency Conflict," Sociological Inquiry 33 (Winter 1963): 51-57; William R. Dill, "Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy," Administrative Science Quarterly 2 (March 1958): 409-43; James D. Thompson, and William J. McEwen, "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal Setting as an Interaction Process," American Sociological Review 23 (February 1958): 23-31; James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), particularly Chapters 3 and 4.

influence in project implementation. Specialized police units provide an ideal opportunity to study the implementation process and the extent to which the environment affects these processes, because they are organizational units over which the environment can exert a great deal of influence. This is particularly evident when considering the special unit's dependence on other police units or organizations for both the supply and use of information on crime and criminals.

The significance of the study lay in its attempt to address a series of policy questions related to the initiation of innovative projects within existing organizational structures.[10] In the policy realm, the study's significance was derived from the following questions related to the initiation and implementation of specialized police units;

1. To what extent does the external environment affect special police unit implementation?
2. Do environmental characteristics differ among special units, and what is their effect upon unit implementation?
3. To what extent must a unit be integrated into the existing environment to achieve its desired ends?

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[10]By innovation is meant concepts, activities, and technologies that are new to the particular setting in which the project is being conducted.

4. Are the more successfully implemented units those that have accomplished environmental acceptance of their goals, objectives, and activities?

5. What is the structure of the environment, and how does that structure alter unit goals, objectives, and activities?

6. To what extent is environmental acceptance necessary for project implementation, and under what conditions is it necessary?

7. Do specific strategies in the project-implementation process facilitate environmental acceptance?

8. What must managers of special units know about their interactions with the external environment to manage that environment effectively?

9. How much power does an organization like the specialized police unit need, to manage its environment?

In addition to addressing the preceding questions concerning project implementation, the study also explored an issue confronting the criminal justice system, in general, and law enforcement organizations in particular: consolidation of police services.

In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, in addressing what is considered to be a critical problem confronting law enforcement organizations, commented:

> A fundamental problem confronting law enforcement today is that of fragmented crime repression efforts resulting from the large number of uncoordinated local governments and law enforcement agencies . . . Formal cooperation or

> consolidation is an essential ingredient in improving the quality of law enforcement.[11]

Similarly, in 1973 the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals continued to emphasize the need for formal coordination and cooperation between police agencies and the entire criminal justice system. As the commission indicated,

> Every police agency immediately should act to insure understanding and cooperation between the agency and all other elements of the criminal justice system (including other police agencies), and should immediately plan and implement appropriate coordination of its efforts with those of other elements of the criminal justice system.[12]

Although both commissions identified a pressing need in criminal justice service-delivery systems, their recommendations require an examination of existing organizational relations among criminal justice component agencies. This is particularly true when considering multi-jurisdictional arrangements of specialized police units. Since four of the six specialized police units under scrutiny in this study involved the combined efforts

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[11]President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Task Force Report: The Police (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 68.

[12]National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police, p. 73.

of more than one police agency, the opportunity to examine multi-jurisdictional effects upon unit implementation begins an exploration of the consolidation issue. The problems associated with implementing and institutionalizing multi-jurisdictional projects in criminal justice have only recently emerged in criminal justice literature.[13] The present study sought to expand upon this literature through an examination of the institutional environments of specialized policing units, with a view toward specifying the organizational issues that arise during project implementation efforts. As the criminal justice system moves toward consolidated or coordinated efforts involving one or more political jurisdiction, the policy issues raised in project-implementation stages become intensified. The significance, then, of this research is that it attempted to examine environmental impact on criminal justice project implementation from both the perspective of innovation within a single organization and the effort to consolidate a specialized criminal justice function.

Scope of the Study

There is a paucity of research pertaining to the organizational environments of criminal justice

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[13]For a review of multi-jurisdictional arrangements in criminal justice, see Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State and Local Relations in the Criminal Justice System, (Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1971).

institutions. Furthermore, the issue of environmental impact upon criminal justice project implementation has received little attention among criminal justice researchers, despite the recognition that forces external to the organization have great impact upon the shaping and pursuit of organizational goals and objectives.

This study sought to examine the network of relations that develops between specialized police units and their environments. The focal point for this examination was the implementation efforts surrounding these projects and the forces in the external environment that facilitated or impeded project implementation. Six specialized police units were investigated. The environments surrounding these units were analyzed with regard to their structure; impact upon project goals, objectives and activities; and the degree of use and support from environmental actors. Also addressed were the implementation process and the role the environment plays in the process.

Overview

The primary concern of this research was to examine the impact of organizational environments upon specialized police units. Consequently, the study explored the organizational interrelations in criminal justice units, particularly as these interrelations affect the implementation of specialized police unit projects.

In Chapter II the theoretical framework underlying the research is reviewed. Delineated in Chapter III are the research methods employed in the study, including the population and sample, variables to be examined, and operational definitions. An analysis of the results of the study is presented in Chapter IV. Chapter V is devoted to presenting the major findings, the implications of these findings, and recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Policy Research and the Implementation Process: An Overview

Studies examining the processes affecting the introduction of social programs are relatively limited in the literature on policy and evaluation research. Instead, under the general rubric of "policy research," two major traditions can be identified. The first, relating to the antecedent processes associated with policy articulation, or the "politics" of the policy-making process,[1] identifies sources of political, social, and economic power within a given locality or over a given issue, and their impact upon a particular policy outcome. The second approach, typified by what is called "evaluation research," concerns the impact or effect policies have on the problems they sought to rectify. Weiss stated, "the purpose of evaluation research is to measure the effects

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[1]Illustrative of this orientation are: Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961); Wallace S. Sayre, and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: W. W. Horton and Company, Inc., 1965), particularly chapters 3, 8 and 13.

of a program against the goals it set out to accomplish."[2]

Both orientations provide much information about and insight into the policy arena, but fail to examine the processes by which policy statements are translated into action--namely, the implementation process. In general, researchers and evaluation specialists, as well as policy makers and planners, have neglected the issue of implementation. It is almost as if everyone has ignored the fact that policies, programs, and projects must be appropriately implemented in order to function. Part of this problem, no doubt, stems from the structure of government and the way in which policies are operationalized. The legislature, for example, assumes that the administrative branch will effectively implement policy statements. However, more often than not, the implementation process is hampered by the very vagueness of legislative mandates.

Distinguishing between implementation analysis and policy analysis focuses attention on factors not normally considered in previous evaluation research efforts. As one researcher on the topic indicated:

> Evaluation is not the same thing as research upon implementation because it usually concentrates upon ultimate program impact without

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[2]Carol H. Weiss, Evaluation Research, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 4.

> asking about the institutional means of achieving that effect . . . . A concern with institutions as the agents of program effectiveness is not central to the work of much that goes under the heading of evaluation.[3]

Since many program or project evaluations fail to consider implementation issues, these studies have difficulty determining either why projects meet their desired ends or why they do not. This problem is particularly serious, as it affects the external validity of evaluation findings. That is, the ability to generalize findings across research sites, and hence the ability to transfer successful programs from one city to another, is reduced when one cannot identify the "causes" of success nor those of failure. Furthermore, despite continued improvement in the design and methodology employed in evaluation efforts, the results of these studies have been disappointing to both the public and public officials. Their disappointment stems primarily from the fact that most programs and projects do not achieve the expected results. This is true for criminal justice programs as well as other social-delivery programs.

The failure of a project to achieve its goals may be the result of many factors. Three of these elements are considered here, for it has been argued that they account for the majority of program failures. The three

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[3]Erwin C. Hargrove, The Missing Link: The Study of the Implementation of Social Policy (Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1975), p. 7.

sources of failure are (1) programmatic over-expectation, (2) theoretical or conceptual failure, and (3) implementation failure.

Failure Resulting From Over-Expectations

The first factor affecting project failure arises when one questions the extent to which projects can actually accomplish everything that is expected of them. That is, expectations for the success of such programs may be extremely exaggerated, even to the point of precluding measurable levels of success once evaluation is undertaken.

The problem of over-expectation was illustrated in Derthick's study of the aborted federal attempt to develop "new towns in town."[4] The primary goal of this federally sponsored project was to eradicate slum housing in Washington, D. C., by using federally owned land to build public housing. In assessing this program and its subsequent failure, Derthick indicated that program failure was, to a great extent, predicated upon exaggerated presidential rhetoric regarding what a program of this type would achieve. As the author indicated, "its

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[4]Martha Derthick, New Towns in Town: Why a Federal Program Failed (Washington, D. C.: The Urban Institute), 1972.

goals [the project's] exceeded by far its capacity to achieve them."[5]

On the other hand, Murphy indicated that "hidden program objectives" may be realized even though "articulated objectives" are not.[6] For example, his assessment of Title I, aid to the disadvantaged, of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) indicated that assistance to the poor was actually a secondary consideration in the development and subsequent initiation of the legislation. As he indicated,

> The objective [of Title I] was a law, not reform. The main thrust for aid to poverty schools came from reformers in the Executive Branch who had a double objective: the establishment of the principle of federal aid to schools and a redirection of local priorities.[7]

The problem of over-advocacy associated with project failure may also result from many of the social problems being dealt with, and the political processes that are expected to address these problems. The ultimate impact of ideological slogans like "The War on

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[5]Martha Derthick, "Washington: Angry Citizens and an Ambitious Plan," in Social Program Implementation, ed. Walter Williams and Richard F. Elmore (New York: Academic Press, 1976), p. 232.

[6]Jerome T. Murphy, "Title I of ESEA: The Politics of Implementing Federal Education Reform," Harvard Educational Review 41 (February 1971): 35-63.

[7]Ibid., p. 38.

Poverty" or "The Great Society" upon "successful" program evaluation has yet to become a topic of substantive research. As Campbell suggested:

> Given the inherent difficulty of making significant improvement [in social programs] by the means usually provided and given the discrepancy between promise and possibility, most administrators prefer to limit the evaluations to those of outcomes of which they can control . . . .[8]

Although it is highly possible that political interests may be served by "controlling" outcomes to be evaluated, it must be noted that the social problems addressed in the last 20 years have been recurring concerns in American society. The eradication of these problems may be more wishful thinking than is operationally feasible at this time. Hence, basing evaluations on inflated expectations may preclude serious assessment of program success or failure.

Project Theoretical Failure

A second reason projects fail to achieve their anticipated results may be labeled conceptual or theoretical failure. The concern here is that the underlying

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[8]Donald T. Campbell, "Reforms as Experiments," in Evaluating Action Programs: Readings in Social Action and Education, ed. Carol H. Weiss (Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon Inc., 1972), p. 188.

conceptual basis of the project may have been inaccurate or inappropriate, and hence the project is unable to intervene in the appropriate causal network. Furthermore, many projects are initiated without having first identified any causal network to be affected.

Presumably, all projects are based upon some underlying conceptual framework. The intent of the project is to intervene into some identified causal network, thus affecting the intended outcome. However, if the conceptual or theoretical framework underlying the project is inappropriate, or never identified, the network is never activated; hence the "idea failed."

An example of conceptual or theoretical failure was reported by Pressman and Wildavsky, in a case study of an employment program initiated through the Economic Development Administration (EDA) in Oakland, California.[9] Essentially, the EDA project was attempting to create employment opportunities for the poor and minorities in the Oakland area. However, as the authors explained, the underlying economic theory used to develop the EDA project called for the subsidization of capital investments made by participating private businesses, instead of a wage subsidy which, the authors argued, would have had a more

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[9]Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley, California: University of California Press), 1973.

immediate impact upon business hiring practices. As Pressman and Wildavsky indicated;

> Instead of taking the direct path of paying the employers a subsidy on wages after they had hired minority personnel, the EDA program expanded their capital on the promise that they would later hire the right people. Theoretical defects exacerbated bureaucratic problems.[10]

Kerr[11] referred to this type of policy failure as "instrumental failure," indicating that for a policy to succeed instrumentally it must "affect some state of affairs which [is] conceived as the goal or point of the policy."[12] This again calls attention to the requirement of "causal network activation" as one criterion upon which evaluation should be undertaken.

Implementation Failure

A third reason for the lack of program success, and the reverse of the second, is simply that the project failed to reach its objectives, which were at least conceptually or theoretically possible. Stated in this manner, both project failure and theoretical failure may be viewed in the following manner; "program [project] failure is a failure to achieve proximate goals; theory

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[10]Ibid., p. 147

[11]Donna H. Kerr, "The Logic of 'Policy' and Successful Policies," Policy Sciences 7 (1976): 351-63.

[12]Ibid., p. 360.

[conceptual] failure occurs when the achievement of proximate goals does not lead to the final desired outcome."[13]

Within the area of project failure, analysis of the implementation process becomes of primary concern. A project may give the appearance of failure, in the sense that it did not attain its goals, simply because the ideas upon which the project was initiated were never tested, as the project was never carried out as originally specified. Consequently, the research issue of major concern shifts from the question "Was the idea successful?" to the question "Was the idea tested?" The failure to operationalize a project as specified, results in what may be called implementation failure, a process that may have serious effects upon subsequent goal attainment.[14]

The term implementation has often been used in quite conflicting ways in the literature. To alleviate this problem, a definition of implementation is advanced to include a concern for "those actions by public and private individuals [or groups] that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy

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[13]Weiss, Evaluation Research, p. 38.

[14]Walter Williams, "Implementation Analysis and Assessment," in Social Program Implementation, ed. Walter Williams and Richard F. Elmore (New York: Academic Press, 1976), p. 267-75.

decisions."[15] This definition also includes a concern for "both one time efforts to convert decisions into operational terms and continuing efforts over time to raise the quality of the agency's staffs and organizational structure."[16]

In addition to the failure in operationalizing a project as specified, which was referred to as implementation failure, certain projects fail even though they were properly implemented and based upon appropriate theoretical premises. This situation may result from the project's failure to acquire "normative justification" for its existence.[17] That is, although the project as operationalized maintained original theoretical specification, it failed to appeal to or was in contradiction with norms or values shared by the relevant environment.

Historical examples of failure to attain normative justification are the programs initiated against the Jews by the Nazi regime. More current examples of this type of project failure are the California lobotomy experiments

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[15]Donald S. Van Meter and Carl E. Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework," Administration and Society 6 (February 1975): 447.

[16]Walter Williams, Social Policy Research and Analysis (New York: American Elsever Publishing Co., Inc., 1971), p. 131.

[17]Kerr, "The Logic of 'Policy' and Successful Policies," p. 361.

conducted with incarcerated offenders in California penal institutions and the "sterilization" programs conducted in many southern states, aimed at reducing "unwanted" pregnancies, particularly in black families. Both of these projects met the criteria of implementation in that they could indeed be "proven" to be successful. However, both failed because of the lack of a normative value structure to support their continued operation.

The preceding discussion has outlined those factors thought to affect most the ultimate "success" or failure" of projects. Figure 1 is a graphic depiction of these processes and their relationships to program or project outcomes. As indicated in the figure, program failure (referred to herein as implementation failure) has a profound effect upon project outcomes because without successful implementation the entire change process is aborted.

Studies focusing on the pitfalls associated with project implementation are few. One notable exception is an intensive implementation study conducted in the field of public education by the Rand Corporation.[18] This study

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[18]For a summary of the entire Rand Study see: Paul Berman, and Edward W. Pauly, Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change, Vol. II: Factors Affecting Change Agent Projects (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1975).



Fig. 2.1. Processes affecting program success and failure

Source: Carol H. Weiss, Evaluation Research (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 38.

examined a sample of 293 educational projects, which were labeled "change agent projects."[19] The intent of the Rand study was to examine those factors that facilitated or hindered the implementation and subsequent continuation of planned educational changes. One of the major conclusions reached through this undertaking was:

> The effective implementation of innovative projects depended primarily upon a supportive institutional setting and on an implementation strategy that fostered the mutual adaptation of the staff to the project's demands and of the project's design to the reality of its setting.[20]

The findings presented in the Rand study indicated that the environments, social as well as political, in which new projects were initiated had a major impact upon the success of project implementation, and hence their ability to pursue and attain project goals and objectives. To facilitate the exploration of the implementation process (in the current undertaking, specialized police units), it is necessary to develop further the underlying conceptual framework supporting the present research. This is particularly important as the focus of the research was on examining environmental-organizational interaction and the effects of this interaction upon the implementation process.

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[19]Change agent projects were broadly defined to include attempts to initiate, implement, and institutionalize innovative educational programs.

[20]Berman and Pauly, Federal Programs, p. ix.

Conceptually, the study was based on a series of assumptions gleaned from the literature on organizations. The specialized police unit projects under consideration were viewed as being implemented through host organizations, which are open systems characterized by their dependency upon members (actors) of their external environment both for a supply of inputs (material, people, and information) and for the consumption of the project's outputs. The following sections explore in detail the major conceptual orientations employed in this undertaking.

Organizations, Organizational Environments, and the Implementation Process

> When we say that programs have failed, this suggests we are surprised. If we thought from the beginning that they were unlikely to be successful, their failure to achieve stated goals or to work at all would not cry out for any special explanation. If we believed that intense conflicts of interests were involved, if people who had to cooperate were expected to be at loggerheads, if necessary resources were far beyond those available, we might wonder rather more why the programs were attempted instead of expressing amazement at their shortcomings.[21]

The preceding statement facetiously addressed a critical issue concerning program implementation, namely the extent to which factors beyond the direct control of project initiators influence the implementation process. If programmatic changes are to be fully realized within

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[21]Pressman and Wildavsky, Implementation, p. 87.

existing institutional structures, whether those structures be individual organizations or multi-organizational arrangements, consideration must be given to those factors external to the project that ultimately facilitate or impede project goal attainment. To pursue this inquiry, attention must be focused upon examining the environments within which initial implementation efforts are attempted.

If by organization is meant "the coordination of different activities of individual contributors to carry out planned transactions with the environment,"[22] then, theoretically, each newly initiated project may be viewed as an organization. Implicit in this definition of organization are the concepts of division of labor (different activities), an internal authority structure (coordination), organizational goals (planned transactions), and environmental interaction. By using a rather broad definition of organization, one may include projects that emanate from a single institutional structure as well as those that span more than one institutional structure. For example, a specialized police unit contained within one police organization may be viewed as interacting with an external environment composed of such units as regular patrol, the detective bureau, and planning and research.

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[22]Paul R. Lawrence, and Jay W. Lorsch, Developing Organizations: Diagnosis and Action (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1969), p. 3.

Similarly, a specialized police unit involving more than one police department may be viewed as interacting with an environment composed of two or three patrol sections or detective bureaus. Whereas the size of the organization's environment increases in multi-organizational arrangements, the essential relationships between organization and environment, such as information dependence and the need to establish consuming units, remain constant. To pursue these relationships, the following consideration of organizations as open or closed systems, their organizational domains and domain consensus, as well as organizational dependence and environmental integration is essential in exploring the implementation process.

Organizations: Open Versus Closed Systems

Traditionally, studies of complex organizations have operated under a "closed systems model," that is, an organizational model that relies primarily on processes within the organization to explain variations in organizational behavior. This closed systems perspective and its use may be viewed as resulting from (1) the primary units of analysis under consideration and (2) the historical development of organizational research.

Despite the general recognition that the hallmark of modern society is organizational complexity and that few organizations operate independently, relatively few research inquiries have probed beyond the boundaries of the organization. One general reason for this dearth of research is the predominant intra-organizational focus in the literature. As Blau indicated,

> Three foci of analysis may be distinguished in organizational research . . . (1) the individual in his specific role as a member of the organization . . . (2) the structure of social relations among individuals in the various groups within the organization . . . (3) the system of interrelated elements that characterize the organization as a whole.[23]

Although the three foci of analysis Blau identified are indeed important in studying organizations and organizational behavior, they represent essentially a closed systems model, in that each attempts to explain behavior as resulting from internal organizational forces, resources, and inputs. This reflects an orientation in organizational research that has been dictated primarily by tradition.

Early organizational theorists, including proponents of such schools of thoughts as bureaucratic theory, scientific management, and administrative management, were concerned with the internal characteristics of

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[23]Peter M. Blau, On the Nature of Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), pp. 112-13.

organizations. Weber, for example, began his analysis by considering the evolution of bureaucracy and the resulting structures that developed to stabilize the organization in the absence of charismatic leadership.[24] These structures, being internal to the organization, included such dimensions as hierarchy of authority, impersonality of interpersonal relations, the extensive use of rules and regulations, merit-based promotion, and the division of labor. Each of these dimensions, however, is internal to the organization and thus does not take into account the extent to which the environment may affect its development and use.

Similarly, the concepts developed by scientific and administrative management theorists relate to the internal structuring of work activities and the management and control of the internal as opposed to the external system. Taylor's[25] Principles of Scientific Management and Gulick and Urwick's Papers on the Science of Administration[26] are illustrative of this thought. Such

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[24]Philip Marcus, "Organizational Change: A Review and Synthesis of the Literature" (East Lansing, Michigan: Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, 1973), p. 3. (mimeographed)

[25]Frederick W. Taylor, Principles of Scientific Management (New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1911).

[26]Luther Gulick, and L. Urwick, eds., Papers on the Science of Administration (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937).

concepts as span of control, chain of command, the coordinative principle, the scalar principle, and the now-famous POSDCORB were all designed with a view toward specifying internal structural and interpersonal relations as they related to "efficient" administration and organization. The focus, again, was on the internal organization and its management. Thus, the primary focus of this literature was in the realm of closed systems.

The advent of the "human relations" movement in organizational research shifted the focus of inquiry from the structural dimensions of organization to considerations of individual and group behavior patterns as each interacted with the formal structures. Although the human relations movement in organizational research did much to challenge and modify the existing "principles of administration," by introducing both the individual and the group into organizational considerations, the systems model underlying this orientation is still essentially closed.[27]

Much of the literature developed by human relations theorists relates more to reducing internal organizational conflict and integrating individuals and groups into the organization than to focusing on elements external to the

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[27]For a critical review of the literature on the human relations movement, see: Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1972), pp. 97-143.

organization. For example, techniques developed by a branch of organization researchers (organizational development theorists) have focused on democratizing bureaucracies. As one researcher commented, the overall mission in organizational development is to:

1. improve the individual member's ability to get along with other members (or what the field calls "interpersonal competence");
2. legitimate human emotions in the organization;
3. increase mutual understanding among members;
4. reduce tensions;
5. enhance team management and intergroup cooperation;
6. develop more effective techniques for conflict resolution . . .; and
7. evolve less structured and more "organic" organizations.[28]

These efforts, while laudible, neglect to consider the extent to which internal organizational conflict is generated by factors external to the organization, and hence beyond its immediate control.

Increasingly, organizational researchers are treating complex organizations as "open" systems. In contrast to the closed systems models previously presented, the open systems model focuses on the

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[28]Nicholas Henry, Public Administration and Public Affairs (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975), p. 67.

interrelations between an organization and its environment to explain changes both internal and external to the organization. The following statement is indicative of the stress placed upon the environment under an open systems perspective:

> The parts of a system [organization] do not completely determine the system's outcomes by themselves, but rather interact with an outside environment that represents situational uncertainty. Thus the parts of the organization system are subject to influence by environmental stimuli not directly contained within the system.[29]

In its most general sense, the term system refers to any set of elements standing in interrelation. This is true of open as well as closed systems. Beyond this general conceptualization, it is assumed that the units or parts of the system share some relationship. Furthermore, an alteration in one of the units brings about a relationship that ultimately initiates a change in another element of the system.[30] As a heuristic device, systems are given boundaries that delimit their scope, as well as

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[29]Lyman W. Porter, Edward E. Lawler III, and J. Richard Hackman, Behavior in Organizations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975), p. 99.

[30]For a discussion of the concept of system, see: Ludwig Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, rev. ed. (New York: George Braziller, 1968), particularly Chapters 2 and 3; A. D. Hall, and R. E. Fagen, "Definition of System," in Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist, ed. Walter Buckley (Chicago, Illinois: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 81-92.

the demarcation point between organization and environment. It is the placement of these systems' (organizations') boundaries, as well as their permeability, that distinguishes between open and closed systems.

Many problems are associated with the placement of a system's boundaries. Even when the relevant system and its environment have been isolated for analysis, the question arises of whether this constitutes the total system or rather some subset of a broader system. For as one author indicated, "In fact, of course, the system and its environment make up sub-parts of a wider system which often must be treated at its own level."[31]

In addition to the placement and permeability of a system's boundaries, however, and more important for analytical purposes, is the recognition that exchange takes place between the system and its environment across these boundaries. What is being exchanged may include personnel, information, or referrals. Thus including the environment in the open-systems model goes far beyond the initial recognition that in some manner the organization interacts with its environment. "That a system is open means, not simply that it engages in interchanges with its environment, but that this interchange is an essential

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[31]Walter Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 50.

factor underlying the system's [organization's] viability, its reproductive ability or continuity, and its ability to change."[32] The recognition, then, is that organization influences environment and environment influences organization. Recognition of this reciprocal influence is central to a discussion of project implementation. If a project is to be fully implemented it must gain environmental recognition and acceptance. Conversely, the environment must be made aware of what the new project is attempting and it must have some use for the project's output. To expand upon this discussion requires a consideration of three concepts that are believed to affect the implementation process. These concepts focus on the external environments of organizations in terms of (1) domain and domain consensus, (2) power and dependance, and (3) environmental integration.

Organizational Domain

"The domain of an organization consists of the specific goals it wishes to pursue and the functions it seeks to undertake in order to achieve these goals."[33]

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[32]Ibid.

[33]Sol Levine, Paul E. White, and Benjamin D. Paul, "Community Interorganizational Problems in Providing Medical Care and Social Service," American Journal of Public Health 53 (August 1963): 1191.

Before interacting with an environment, each organization must establish its desired domain. The establishment of an organizational domain, however, is not simply a process of declaring that X organization claims A as its domain. Externals must also recognize that the organization has a legitimate claim to that domain, or more precisely the external environment must accept the organization's claim to a specific domain and act in accordance with that acceptance.

Agreement regarding an organization's claim to a domain, or what is referred to as domain consensus, "defines a set of expectations both for the members of the organization and for others with whom they interact about what the organization will and will not do."[34] Hence, the role of the organization and others' acceptance of that role is a fundamental issue in establishing projects within or attached to, existing institutional frameworks.

Environmental acceptance of the organization's claim to a domain is particularly important when considering the implementation of an innovative organizational project. Without agreement regarding the new program's domain, the extent to which organizational-environmental

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[34]James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), p. 29.

interaction takes place may be severely circumscribed, even to the point where the fledgling organization is isolated from its environment. Dimock's case study of bureaucratic conflict in the War Ship Administration illustrated the extent to which prior domain agreement affects program implementation and survival.[35] Similarly, Greiner's discussion of planned organization change incorporated a concern for consensus before program implementation: "The shared approaches [in program introduction] tend to be emphasized in the more successful organizational changes."[36]

In addition to the establishment of environmental domain consensus, it must be noted that conditions in the external environment are believed to affect not only the domain of the organization but the manner in which the organization maintains that domain. Aspects of what may be termed the "general organizational environment" have been identified in the literature as the legal, ecological, cultural, and power structures external to the organization.[37]

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[35]Marshall E. Dimock, "Expanding Jurisdictions: A Case Study in Bureaucratic Conflict," in Reader in Bureaucracy, ed. Robert K. Merton et al. (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1952), pp. 282-91.

[36]Larry E. Greiner, "Patterns of Organizational Change," Harvard Business Review 45 (May-June 1967): 120.

[37]See Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1964), pp. 110-13; Arthur Stinchcombe, "Social Structure and Organizations," in Handbook of Organizations, ed. James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1965), pp. 142-93.

Each of these conditions is viewed as affecting the type, direction, and duration of interactions between an organization and relevant actors in its environment.

In conjunction with the general characteristics of an organization's external environment, more specific components of that environment have a direct influence on the organization under consideration. For example, Dill developed the concept of "task environment," indicating that "we are focusing on the stimuli to which an organization is exposed."[38] In his study of two Norwegian companies, Dill concluded that the external environment tended to influence the degree of managerial autonomy exercised by divisional managers within the respective companies. Managerial interaction, information flow, and corporate decision making were among the variables affected by conditions in the external environment.

Similarly, Clark argued that relations among public educational agencies and private groups affect the structure of the American educational system.[39] He stated that private organizations, such as Education Services, Inc., have greatly influenced the determination of local school

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[38]William R. Dill, "Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy," Administrative Science Quarterly 2 (March 1958): 411.

[39]Burton R. Clark, "Interorganizational Patterns in Education," Administrative Science Quarterly 10 (1965): 224-37.

district curricula. He indicated, "this pattern of influence, in which private groups serve as connectors between large public organizations and levels of government, is one that, with minor variations, is now widespread in the curriculum reform movement that is rapidly altering educational practice in the United States."[40]

Furthermore, Rose found that variations in the structures of voluntary associations may be associated with the existence of conflict or competition in their organizational environments.[41] Still other research reports have indicated the interactive nature of organizational/environmental goal-setting processes,[42] the effective incorporation and manipulation of the organization by a somewhat aggressive environment,[43] and the organizational strategies employed in attempts to manage and control the environment.[44] These studies have

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[40]Ibid., p. 232.

[41]Arnold M. Rose, "Voluntary Associations Under Conditions of Competition and Conflict," Social Forces 34 (1955): 159-63.

[42]James D. Thompson, and William J. McEwen, "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal Setting as an Interaction Process," American Sociological Review 23 (February 1958): 23-31.

[43]John Maniha, and Charles Perrow, "The Reluctant Organization and the Aggressive Environment," Administrative Science Quarterly 10 (September 1965): 238-57.

[44]Jeffrey Pfeffer, "Merger as a Response to Organizational Interdependence," Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (September 1972): 382-94.

illustrated the complexity of organizational environments, as well as the subsequent implications for organizational activity in the environmental context. Although not conclusive, they have focused attention on the environments of organizations as they relate to maintaining and accomplishing organizational purposes. In the context of project implementation, these studies have explored the impact external environments have upon the setting and accomplishment of project objectives.

Power and Dependence

The issue of organizational-environmental dependence essentially concerns the amount of power or authority an organization is able to exercise vis-a-vis its environment. "It is possible to conceive of a continuum of organizational power in environmental relations ranging from the organization that dominates its environmental relations to one completely dominated by its environment."[45] This power continuum should not be viewed as all inclusive with regard to organizational-environmental interaction. It is more appropriate to conceptualize power in what Gamson termed "the scope and site of influence."[46] Consequently, organizations

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[45]Thompson and McEwen, "Organizational Goals and Environment," p. 25.

[46]William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 81-83.

exercise considerable power (influence) over certain segments of their environments, while being influenced by other segments.

Considerations regarding the power relations between organizations vying for environmental space directly influence the preceding considerations of organizational domain. The process of securing and maintaining an organizational domain is essentially a negotiated one. "It requires finding and holding a position which can be recognized by all of the necessary sovereign organizations as more worthwhile than available alternatives."[47] Furthermore, because of the heterogeneous nature of the environment confronting the organization, the issue of interdependence between organization and environment becomes critical when assessing the implementation process.

Environments impose constraints upon the organization's goal pursuits, in that fixed factors in the environment may facilitate or hinder goal attainment. This is particularly true when considering specialized policing units. Once initiated within a particular political jurisdiction, the fledgling organization cannot decide to pursue its goals somewhere more favorable to its

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[47]Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 36.

purposes. It is, for all purposes, a captive organization, which must function within the requirements of its local situation. Similarly, the newly formed organization has little control over its clientele, output-consuming units, resources, or parent organizations, each of which may have an effect on the kinds of goals pursued and the speed at which they may be obtained.

Whereas fixed constraining forces in the external environment obviously affect the implementation process, forces that are more random in nature pose an even greater threat. These random forces, called contingencies, may severely damage the newly initiated project. For example, at some time a major supporter of the new project may be forced to withdraw support, to provide resources to another segment of his organization. The effect of such a withdrawal may be the termination of the project, particularly if that source of support was essential to the proper functioning of the new organization.

As previously mentioned, each organization is engaged in exchanges with its external environment. The network of these exchanges creates relationships of power or dependence between organizations. As Thompson indicated, "an organization has power, relative to an element of its task environment, to the extent that the organization monopolizes that capacity."[48] Dependence, on the

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[48]Thompson, Organizations in Action, pp. 30-31.

other hand, relates to the degree to which the organization relies on outside actors for input, resources, and/or organizational outputs.

To avoid becoming subservient to an outside environment, organizations may seek to develop strategies for obtaining external influence, thus attempting to manage their environments. The extent to which these strategies are successful directly affects the implementation of the new organization, for to gain influence, hence acceptance, insures the organization a domain within which activities may be undertaken. Thompson categorized the strategies of acquiring environmental influence as being either (1) competitive or (2) cooperative.[49]

Environmental Dependence and Competitive Strategies

The acquisition of power is essentially an attempt on the part of the organization to minimize the uncertainty of constraints and contingencies presented by the external environment. If the organization depends on the external environment for certain resources, it will "seek to minimize the power of environmental elements over [it] by maintaining alternatives."[50] Alternative suppliers or

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[49]Ibid., pp. 32-36.

[50]Ibid., pp. 32.

alternative resources will be developed, providing of course that there are more than a few suppliers or that alternative resources exist. By dispersing its use of the needed resources or developing resource alternatives, the organization reduces the possibility that any single supplier can maintain and exercise control over those resources. This assures the organization that externally required resources will be forthcoming and that the organization (as opposed to elements in its environment) has some control over the flow of these resources.

The same situation exists with regard to the organization's outputs. By maintaining alternative consumers or creating new markets, the organization seeks to minimize its dependence on only a few consumers, thus increasing certainty regarding the consumption of organizational goods and services. However, when few suppliers or consumers exist, other strategies must be employed. Since special police units depend on a relatively small number of suppliers for resources, i.e., personnel, information, or assistance, their ability to maintain available alternatives is severely circumscribed. Consequently, efforts to implement such projects must take into consideration the position of immediate dependence into which these units are thrust.

A second and perhaps more effective strategy of acquiring environmental influence is competing with

elements in the environment for prestige. "Acquiring prestige is the cheapest way of acquiring power."[51] The maintenance of a prestigious organizational image has traditionally been associated with successful institutions. Universities, for example, have historically used institutional prestige as a method of attracting applicants. Governmental institutions have also manipulated the symbols of prestige to attract personnel, and have been able to do so despite the fact that traditionally government employment has been less remunerative than private sector employment.

Perrow illustrated the role organizational prestige plays in the functioning of an organization.[52] He indicated that the voluntary hospital under examination, faced with a competitive market, manipulated both extrinsic and intrinsic referents to gain prestige in the environment. "Selling" the hospital to clientele groups such as physicians, donors, and patients became a major undertaking. Creating a favorable public image was a primary strategy to reduce hospital dependence on resources and services external to the organization and, hence, beyond immediate organizational control. Creating

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[51]Ibid., p. 33.

[52]Charles Perrow, "Organizational Prestige: Some Functions and Dysfunctions," The American Journal of Sociology 66 (January 1969): 335-41.

this favorable public image, however, was not without shortcomings. As Perrow indicated:

> The production of indirect indexes of intrinsic quality may take precedence over maintaining the quality of goods and services. Resources may be diverted from activities supporting official goals to those which produce the market extrinsic characteristics. Finally, multiple dependencies may interfere with the marketing of either intrinsic or extrinsic referents and may create conflicts within the organization or between the organization and its target groups.[53]

Striking a balance, then, between maintaining a favorable public image and allocating resources that improve the attainment of tangible organizational objectives is crucial for the survival of an organization employing a prestige-attaining strategy to reduce dependence upon the external environment.

Environmental Dependence and Cooperative Strategies

As previously noted, organizations are confronted with constraints and contingencies in their external environments. These factors produce uncertainty for the organization, as well as creating relationships of dependence between organization and environment. To reduce both uncertainty and dependence, the organization endeavors to stabilize its relationship with the environment, thus making the environment less powerful and more predictable.

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[53]Ibid., p. 341.

The preceding section indicated that organizations can diffuse power in the environment either by developing alternative suppliers of resources or by acquiring power through prestige. However, when a project is in its incipient stage, and particularly when the project is a sibling in a parent organization, it possesses little power and much dependence. These projects "acquire dependence when they establish domains, but the acquisition of power is not so easy."[54]

Having little power and much dependence, these newly founded organizations must negotiate with their environments in the hope of trading organizational resources for political resources in the environment. This exchange process focuses upon gaining environmental cooperation; three strategies of cooperation are discussed below: (1) contracting, (2) cooptation, and (3) coalescence or merger.[55]

Contracting as a power-acquiring strategy. Contracting, or the formal agreement between two or more organizations committing them to enter into exchanges, is perhaps the most universal cooperative strategy in the private sector. By entering into this formal agreement,

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[54]Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 34.

[55]The discussion of these strategies follows closely that of Thompson, Organizations in Action, pp. 34-36.

the organization reduces uncertainty in its environment by ensuring that needed resources will be provided. Additionally, contracting reduces dependence between the organization and sectors of its external environment, in that both parties to the contract receive some "benefit" that shifts a power/dependence relationship toward one of mutual dependence. By being reciprocally interdependent, the organization has effectively reduced external influences and similarly increased its own relative power. "The effective achievement of power rests on the exchange of commitments, the reduction of potential uncertainty for both parties."[56]

However, developing and maintaining contractual relations with elements of the external environment is not as simple as it may appear. First, the focal organization must convince elements of the external environment that it is willing and able to enter into contractual relationships. Second, externals must be convinced that they will benefit from entering into such a relationship. The focal organization, therefore, must be prepared to expend internal resources to the end of "marketing" its desirability to outside constituencies.

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[56]Ibid., p. 35.

Coopting as a power-acquiring strategy. "Cooptation is the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence."[57] As such, the organization employing this strategy attempts to incorporate elements of the external environment into its functioning as a means of reducing conflict between organization and environment.

Cooptation may take two forms--formal or informal. By formal cooptation is meant the public absorption of external elements "signifying participation in the process of decision and administration."[58] This strategy is highly important in the implementation stages of organization initiation, and is closely linked to the preceding considerations of domain consensus.

The process of cooptation largely insures the support of "significant others" in the external environment upon which the focal organization is dependent. A study illustrating the effective use of a cooptation strategy was reported by Selznick in his analysis of the Tennessee

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[57]Philip Selznick, "Cooptation," in Complex Organizations and Their Environments, ed. Merlin B. Brinkerhoff and Phillip R. Kunz (Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown Company Publishers, 1972), p. 141.

[58]Ibid., p. 142.

Valley Authority.[59] Cooptation, however, is reciprocal; commitments are made on both sides of the exchange process. As Selznick indicated:

> The significance of cooptation for organizational analysis is not simply that there is a change in or a broadening of leadership, and that this is an adaptive response, but also that this change is consequential for the character and role of the organization or governing body.[60]

The use of a cooptation strategy, therefore, results in the alteration of power/dependence relations between organization and environment, as well as the internal dynamics of the focal organization.

Informal cooptation, being less institutionalized than formal, is viewed as a response to "the pressure of specific centers of power within the community."[61] The establishment of citizen advisory groups or civilian task forces may be viewed as a response to community pressures for input into the policy-making process. Similarly, institutional response to pressure groups attempts to coopt these groups, in an effort to reduce possible tensions. Furthermore, the effective incorporation of

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[59]See Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organizations (New York: Harper and Row, 1966.

[60]Selznick, "Cooptation," p. 144.

[61]Ibid., p. 143.

community support into the focal organization reflects a concern for maintaining public credibility, thus insuring continued domain consensus. Litwak and Meyer suggested that the coordination of bureaucracies and primary groups is essential to the proper functioning of the organization, and also stated that various mechanisms of coordination are viable under different structures of bureaucracy.[62]

Coalescing or merger as a power-acquiring strategy. Coalescing or organizational merger is, perhaps, the most constraining form of cooperative strategy. It requires that the focal organization and some aspect of its environment participate in a joint undertaking in which both participants commit themselves over time to realizing joint goals.

Based on an analysis of 854 institutional mergers occurring between 1948 and 1969, Pfeffer identified three general types of merger behavior: merger designed (1) to "absorb symbiotic interdependence," (2) to reduce competitive interdependence, or (3) for diversification.[63] Pfeffer's analysis also indicated that merger behavior

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[62]Eugene Litwak and Henry F. Meyer, "A Balance Theory of Coordination Between Bureaucratic Organizations and Community Primary Groups," Administrative Science Quarterly 11 (1966): 31-58.

[63]Pfeffer, "Merger as a Response," pp. 385-92.

may be viewed as an attempt to manage organizational interdependencies as they arise. The result of this activity is expected to reduce dependence, and thus uncertainty in the external environment.

Closely associated with the issue of power and dependence between organizations is the degree to which the external environment itself is integrated. The following section pursues the concept of environmental integration and its impact on the implementation process.

Environmental Integration and the Implementation Process

As noted in the discussions of organizational domains and domain consensus, the newly initiated organization must gain acceptance in its external environment. This is essentially a political process.

The newly established organization, in attempting to integrate itself into existing environmental structures, must assess the relationships among elements of its external environment before attempting its own integration. In addition, if the new organization or program is to be fully integrated into an existing environmental structure, this assessment must take into account not only the power structures of the environment but the degree to which they are integrated. Is the power structure unitary or coalitional? Is it concentrated or is it

diffuse? These questions must ultimately be resolved if the newly initiated unit itself is to be integrated into the existing environment. Therefore an assessment of levels and kinds of systems integration is crucial to the attainment of unit integration in the larger system.

Systems Integration

An environmental structure can be conceptualized as being on a continuum ranging from highly integrated patterns of interaction and dependence to a situation in which relationships and dependencies are diffuse. These patterns of interaction and dependence create interdependencies among organizations within the larger system.

By interdependency is meant that when an organization initiates a course of action it does so by taking into consideration other organizations with which it interacts. Litwak and Hylton indicated that the interdependence among organizations may be either competitive or facilitative.[64] If the interdependence is competitive, the organization acts under the assumption that it can maximize its goal attainment only at the expense of another organization's goals. The competitive nature of private sector organizations illustrates this type of

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[64]Eugene Litwak and Lydia F. Hylton, "Interorganizational Analysis: A Hypothesis on Coordinating Agencies," Administrative Science Quarterly 6 (1962): 400-402.

interdependence. Facilitative interdependence occurs when the organization acts under the assumption that it and other organizations can maximize their goals simultaneously. Competitive and facilitative interdependencies represent polar extremes, with a range of less clarity falling between these points. The kind of interdependence characterizing the system of interrelationships among organizations may be viewed as creating a context within which these organizations exchange. This organizational environment may take many forms. Warren developed a typology of environmental contexts in which various dimensions of organizational behavior are compared.[65] Figure 2 depicts the variation of organizational dimensions across environmental context types.

As indicated in Figure 2, environmental contexts may be either (1) unitary, (2) federative, (3) coalitional, or (4) social choice. Consequently, organizations functioning within a specific environmental context will be affected by the environmental situation in which they exist.

A subunit within a larger organization illustrates the unitary context. In this situation the subunit is directly affected by its parent organization. Authority

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[65]Roland L. Warren, "The Interorganizational Field as a Focus for Investigation," Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (December 1967): 396-419.

Organizational Dimension	Type of Context			
	Unitary	Federative	Coalitional	Social Choice
Relation of units	Units organized for achievement of inclusive goals	Units with disparate goals, but some formal organization for inclusive goals	Units with disparate goals, but informal collaboration for inclusive goals	No inclusive goals
Locus of inclusive decision making	At top of inclusive structure	At top of inclusive structure, subject to unit ratification	In interaction of units without a formal inclusive structure	Within units
Locus of authority	At top of hierarchy of inclusive structure	Primarily at unit level	Exclusively at unit level	Exclusively at unit level
Structural provision for division of labor	Units structured for division of labor within inclusive organization	Units structured autonomously, may agree to a division of labor, which may affect their structure	Units structured autonomously, may agree to ad hoc division of labor, without restructuring	No formally structured division of labor within an inclusive context
Commitment to a leadership subsystem	Norms of high commitment	Norms of moderate commitment	Commitment only to unit leaders	Commitment only to unit leaders
Prescribed collectivity orientation of units	High	Moderate	Minimal	Little or none

Source: Roland L. Warren, "The Interorganizational Field as a Focus for Investigation," Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (December 1967): 406.

Figure 2.2. Types of environmental contexts

and decision making are located at the apex of the organizational structure. The subunit interacts with other units differentiated by function to pursue an organizational rather than subunit goal. Similarly, individuals within the subunit are expected to commit themselves to the goals of the collective organization and its leadership.

The second environmental context, the federative, alters the relationships between subunits in the larger system, in that the dominance of any single element is weakened. The coalitional context further decentralizes authority and decision making within the system, while at the same time reducing subunit commitment to the larger system. Finally, the social choice environmental context results in a further reduction of organizational interdependence within the inclusive system to the extent that if interaction does occur it arises over specific issues; once these issues have been resolved, it declines. Because the special police unit projects under examination in this research were either units operating under the control of a single police department, or controlled by more than one jurisdiction, the social choice context appears to be inapplicable to the present consideration. It was presented, however, to illustrate the entire contextual continuum. Moreover, it should be noted that

these contexts represent "ideal" types and are offered as descriptions of varying states of system interdependence.

The establishment of the contextual parameters affecting the structure of the environment in which an organization must function provides an initial understanding of the network of interactions among organizations. Furthermore, assessing environmental contexts provides the fledgling organization with information regarding the appropriate selection of alternative implementation strategies to gain initial environmental acceptance. Once the new organization has determined the context of environment in which it is attempting to gain acceptance, it must then begin to assess its own integration into the larger system. This requires a shift of focus from environmental interdependencies to unit integration in the larger environment.

Unit Integration in the Larger System

When it is said that an organization is integrated into existing environmental contexts, it means that relationships and interdependencies have been negotiated with the environment to the extent that exchange may take place. However, the environment comprises various "actors," all of whom may have different sets of relationships with the focal organization, and all of whom have an environment of their own.

The types of relationships arising between the focal organization and various elements in its environment vary in intensity, duration, and direction. The following statement illustrates the variation in relationships between organizations:

> Relationships vary from routine, highly formalized interactions--such as one business ordering supplies from another . . . to such an idiosyncratic situation as when members of the boards of directors of two organizations happen to run into each other in the locker room of their athletic club and compare notes about their overlapping interests.[66]

Because relationships vary between the focal organization and elements in its environment, varying types of interdependency arise. The management of these varying interdependencies aids the integration of the focal organization into the larger system. Thompson indicated three primary types of interdependence between units within the same organization and their corresponding coordinative mechanisms.[67] Although the focus of Thompson's analysis was intra-organizational, the applicability of these concepts to relationships between organizations will become apparent.

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[66]Richard H. Hall, Organizations--Structure and Process (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 315.

[67]Thompson, Organizations in Action, pp. 54-56.

Thompson described three primary types of interdependence: (1) pooled, (2) sequential, and (3) reciprocal.[68] Under conditions of pooled interdependence, each discrete unit produces a "contribution to the whole and each is supported by the whole."[69] Sequential interdependence refers to a situation in which the order of interdependence can be specified. The mass production industry is illustrative of sequential interdependence, in that one production unit's process cannot be applied to the product until its antecedent process has first been applied. In the criminal justice process the courts may be viewed as sequentially interdependent upon the police for a source of clientele. The police, on the other hand, may share a pooled interdependence with the courts, in that the courts may impose severe penalties upon criminal offenders, thus reducing the workload of the police. The third form of interdependence, called reciprocal, refers to a situation in which the outputs of two or more units become the inputs of each other. Unfortunately, this is the primary criticism of the criminal justice process; it appears that the outputs of both the courts and correctional agencies are a continual input source for the police.

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[68]Ibid.

[69]Ibid., p. 54.

By focusing upon the materials exchanged between organizations, Thompson's typology of interdependence may be employed to specify certain relationships between the focal organization and elements in its external environment. Specifically, in the case of specialized police units, the relationships that develop between organization and environmental elements focus upon the exchange of information. By specifying the type and direction of information exchange between the specialized police unit and elements in its environment, one may begin to establish the types of interdependence that exist. However, in specifying these interdependencies, it must be noted that the environmental context, previously discussed, may have the effect of modifying assumed relationships. Consequently, it is the interaction of environmental context and focal organization interdependence that establishes the specific relationship between the focal organization and elements of the larger system. For example, under a social-choice environmental context one would not expect to find pooled interdependence. Having this in mind, one may begin to specify certain relationships between specialized police units and various elements of their environment.

Figure 3 depicts a set of relationships that may be expected to arise between a specialized police unit and various elements of its environment.[70] These relationships are specified in terms of interdependence, and their specification is based on the traditional information-exchange process operant in most policing agencies. Furthermore, it is assumed that these relationships and interdependencies will be valid for special police units operating within a single police organization, as well as those engaged in multi-organizational arrangements. In addition, only the relationships between the special police unit and elements in its environment are considered. Interdependencies among environmental elements also exist; however, their specification is inappropriate for the present consideration. They will be considered when issues of the inclusive environmental context arise.

As depicted in Figure 3, the specialized police unit interacts with many elements in its external environment, all of which created different types of interdependence. For example, assuming traditional police practices, the special unit is sequentially interdependent with the

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[70]The specification of environmental relationships follows closely a technique developed by William M. Evan, "The Organizational Set: Toward a Theory of Interorganizational Relations," in Approaches to Organizational Design, ed. James D. Thompson (Pittsburg, PA: The University of Pittsburg Press, 1966), p. 173-91.



Figure 2.3. Assumed interdependencies between specialized police units and elements of their environment.

patrol division, in that patrol officers respond to initial criminal complaints, and if they cannot be immediately resolved at the patrol level the information is forwarded to the special unit.[71] Similarly, the local prosecutor is sequentially interdependent with the special unit, since information once investigated is forwarded to initiate a criminal proceeding.

The interdependence between the special unit and the detective bureau, however, is reciprocal. Since both units are producing criminal information, the exchange that takes place between them becomes a source of input for each respective unit. The same reciprocity exists between special unit and policing units external to the immediate jurisdiction. Since criminal offenders cross political jurisdictions in the commission of their offenses, information regarding these offenders is exchanged between police organizations in the same fashion as between special unit and detective bureau. Finally, one may view the interdependence between special unit and the chief of police as pooled, in that each contributes to the whole, namely the goals of law enforcement.

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[71]The special units under consideration here were formed to respond only to serious crime types and are thereby distinguished from the traditional detective bureaus that respond to all follow-up investigations.

The specification of interdependencies between focal organization (special unit) and the various types of institutional actors composing the environment illustrates the complexity of environmental-organizational interaction. By specifying organizational-environmental interaction patterns, attention is focused upon the antecedents to successful organizational implementation, namely the patterns of interdependence necessary for organizational domain acquisition. The newly founded organization is not merely thrust into a vacuous environment in which it develops and pursues its goals and objectives. Instead, the organization is confronted with an environment containing numerous elements, all of which pose contingencies or constraints. Furthermore, each element in this environment is engaged in relationships with other elements; consequently, the new organization must assess these relationships and develop strategies for obtaining its own interdependence in the larger system.

Implementation and Organizational Environment: Summary and Guiding Assumptions

Briefly reviewing the conceptual framework developed in preceding discussions, the following series of assumptions regarding organizations and their environments is advanced. These assumptions are designed to delineate the present state of knowledge regarding the

extent to which organizational environments affect organizational implementation. Furthermore, the present study is oriented toward the generation of hypotheses rather than their testing. Consequently, the following set of assumptions is viewed as guiding the present undertaking.

1. Organizations are open systems characterized by their dependence on external environments for both sources of input and consumption of outputs.

2. Organizational environments play a major role in shaping the focal organization's goals, objectives, and activities.

3. The extent to which an organization is integrated into existing institutional structures is largely contingent on the establishment of an organizational domain.

4. Subsequently, the establishment of an organizational domain is contingent upon acquiring domain consensus with regard to relevant actors in the external environment.

5. An organization attempting to acquire domain consensus, and thus a viable domain, may employ various strategies (power, authority, influence) to gain environmental integration.

6. The environmental context within which the new organization must function will affect the type of power-acquiring strategy used by the focal organization.

6a. Organizations facing large heterogeneous environments will attempt to use a competitive power-acquiring strategy to reduce dependence upon any single element of the external environment.

6b. Organizations facing relatively homogeneous environments will attempt to acquire power through the use of cooperative strategies.

7. Similarly, the type of interdependence between a focal organization and any specific element of its environment will affect the type of strategy employed by the organization to acquire influence over that element.

8. The degree to which an organization depends on its environment affects the degree to which domain consensus is necessary for program implementation.

9. Successful organizational implementation in the larger organizational system depends on proper assessment of both systems-level integration and unit integration in the larger system.

10. The degree to which the external environment depends on the focal organization as either a source of input or a consuming unit of output affects both domain acquisition and subsequent unit integration in the larger system.

The preceding assumptions focus attention on the dynamics of organizational-environmental interaction, particularly as this interaction is related to the implementation process. The successful implementation of a new organizational modality, such as a specialized police unit, is viewed as being affected by existing environmental structures. Consequently, a new program's success or failure largely depends on the adequate integration of such a program into an existing environment. The antecedents to successful project (organization) implementation are viewed as residing within the project's external environment.

As previously indicated, the special police units under consideration were viewed as open social systems. The open-system approach views organizations as processing systems that must: (1) import some form of energy (inputs) from their external environment; (2) transform these inputs through some form of organizational activity (throughputs); and (3) generate some product (outputs) that is of interest and use to members of the external environment. Efforts to perform these functions become an intricate part of any planned social intervention. Figure 4 represents this process. When the points in Figure 4 are considered, it becomes obvious that a special police unit project cannot be judged as successfully achieving its goals unless it can also be viewed as operating successfully as an organization.

To operate successfully as an organization, the special unit must negotiate its domain, or its reason for being, with the external environment. The structure of the environment, including its general inclusive environmental context and the specific interdependencies among other organizations within that inclusive context, influences (1) the goals and objectives pursued by the special unit, (2) the way in which the objectives are pursued, and (3) the extent to which the objectives are obtained. To facilitate its own integration and hence



Source: Adapted from, Ira Sharkansky, Public Administration, second edition, (Chicago, Ill.: Markham Publishing Co., 1972), p. 5.

Figure 2.4. Special police unit projects as open systems

acceptance into the larger organizational system, the special unit may employ various strategies designed to minimize environmental uncertainty.

Both the structure of the external environment (i.e., relationships among existing organizations) and the interdependencies between the special unit and elements of its environment influence the special unit's selection of an appropriate integration strategy. These relationships also affect the speed at which the special unit is implemented.

In the next chapter this inquiry is pursued by delineating the methodology employed in the current undertaking. Methods used in collecting data, the variables to be observed, analytical procedures, and the selected research sites are explained.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Design of the Study

The research design employed in this study was focused on examining the external environments of specialized police units, particularly as these environments affect organizational implementation processes. An analytical framework developed by Evan[1] was used in data collection and served as a guide for data analysis. The essential features of this framework are: (1) identifying the focal organization (in this case special police units) and (2) tracing relationships between the focal organization and elements of its external environment.

Two data-gathering approaches were used in the study. The first, a series of structured interviews conducted with special police unit personnel, was designed to gather initial information regarding the structure of each research site's external environment, the relationships between the project and elements of its external

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[1]William M. Evan, "The Organizational Set: Toward a Theory of Interorganizational Relations," in Approaches to Organizational Design, ed. James D. Thompson (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966, pp. 173-91.

environment, and environmental impact during project implementation. The second instrument, a survey questionnaire, further probed the external environment of each research site by gathering information from a variety of external actors identified in the initial interview setting.

The study was exploratory and descriptive; no attempt was made to establish causality. Rather, data collection and analysis were focused on examining the extent to which variation in the organizational environments of specialized police units was associated with variations in acceptance levels, evaluations of the special units, and use patterns.

Population and Sample

The current study was part of a broader evaluation effort initiated by the Michigan Office of Criminal Justice Programs, which was designed to evaluate 25 specialized police units funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Six specialized police unit sites were selected for intensive evaluation in the broader study, and within these six sites the current undertaking was conducted. Because of multi-jurisdictional projects, the number of law enforcement jurisdictions actually involved was greater than the specified number of project sites. Consequently, the 6 project sites involved 13 separate police agencies.

Selection of these sites was not random, nor was it arbitrary. Because of their importance and their impact on the study's external validity, the factors affecting site selection must be considered.

Sample site selection was complicated by two major factors that affected the entire evaluation. The first of these factors was site accessibility and the potential for cooperation in the research effort. Since the major evaluation effort employed a basic ex post facto methodology, site selection became even more problematic. For example, of the 25 possible research sites available, many were simply not accessible because their grants had expired and their contractual obligations to participate in project evaluation had terminated. In other cases, not only had the projects expired but many of the units had been totally disbanded; this hindered any serious research effort since potential respondents were either extremely difficult or impossible to identify and contact.

The second factor affecting the external validity of the study related to client selection of the "most desired" or "most promising" sites to be included in the evaluation. That is, certain sites were preferred for evaluation, because the client (Michigan Office of Criminal Justice Programs) viewed them as exemplary projects. Personnel at these sites also expressed an interest in

being evaluated and made themselves fully available for examination.

The selection of project sites because of accessibility, cooperation, their exemplary qualities, or expedience raised a variety of methodological questions that should not be ignored. The compound effects of these selection factors draw attention to the possible limitations they place on the generalizability of the findings presented in the following chapter. To explore these possible limitations requires a brief consideration of the possible threat each poses to the study's external validity.

The issue of external validity is not totally resolvable. However, as indicated by Campbell and Stanley,[2] four major factors threaten the external validity of research findings. These are: (1) the reactive or interaction effects of testing, (2) the interaction effects of selection, (3) reactive effects introduced through experimental arrangements, and (4) problems associated with multiple treatment influences.[3] Three of these problems were not critical in the present

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[2]Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co. 1963), pp. 5-12.

[3]Ibid., pp. 5-6.

study. However, the interaction effects of selection in the current study posed the greatest threat to its external validity.

The sample of specialized police units observed in this study was selected by criteria other than traditional probability sampling techniques. This obviously raises the issue of representativeness between sample and population. However, the six specialized police unit sites constituted a selected sample,[4] in that they were included in the study by criteria that facilitated an exploration of the implementation process. Furthermore, since the population of possible special police unit projects available for examination was only 25, the 6 sites selected represented a sample of more than one-fifth of the population.

With regard to the selection of sites based on a criterion of accessibility, it is important to note the organizational accessibility is, perhaps, the greatest obstacle in attempting to obtain valid results from research that involves a total organizational environment. Recognizing this problem, one group of organizational researchers noted:

> Many of our most difficult problems relate to access to sites which is clearly of overriding

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[4]See Claire Selltiz, et al. Research Methods in Social Relations, rev. ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1959), pp. 520-21, 537-45.

> importance . . . . The familiar problems of research legitimacy, persuasion at several levels, etc., amply described in the literature on organizations, are multiplied tenfold when you attempt simultaneous access to the entire population of a type of organization.[5]

Since most action programs are typically operationalized in only a few sites, the generation of random samples is usually not feasible; when issues of accessibility arise, the population is further delimited. Consequently, the issue of accessibility focused attention on the selection of project sites whose personnel could and would participate in an evaluation effort.

When considering site selection based on the presumed excellence of a project, the type of research objective pursued becomes relevant. As previously indicated, certain sites included in the present sample reflected a client orientation toward evaluating the "most successful" projects. Basing selection of exceptional projects on which generalizations are advanced includes many obvious methodological pitfalls. However, as the intent of this study was primarily to examine the processes by which projects become implemented, as

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[5]Philip M. Marcus, Ann Workman Sheldon, and Margaret J. Adams. "The Empirical Investigation of Interorganizational Relationships: Problems and Prospects," paper presented at the annual North Central Sociological Association Meetings, Windsor, Ontario, May 1974, p. 3.

opposed to measuring outcome variables such as crime reduction, the objection to selecting "atypical" projects becomes less salient. This is because many of the special police units under consideration in this study failed to gain proper implementation during the life of the project. Therefore, it was assumed that even though these projects have been labeled "exemplary," the problems they encountered during the implementation stage of their development are generalizable across similar project types. Also, since all projects, regardless of their success, must be implemented, it was assumed that projects that at least survived initial implementation efforts generate more information than those that did not survive. Finally, by examining projects that may be viewed as operating under a set of "optimal conditions,"[6] the information generated may be generalizable to projects that operated under less optimal conditions.

The following discussions of the special police unit sites were designed to describe the general characteristics of each site, as well as the environments in which they functioned. A more detailed analysis appears in the following chapter.

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[6]See: Ilene N. Bernstein, et al., "External Validity and Evaluation Research: A Codification of Problems," in Validity Issues in Evaluative Research, ed. Ilene N. Bernstein (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1975), pp. 107-34.

Sample Research Sites[7]

Site A--Investigations Coordination Unit

The Investigations Coordination Unit operates within a large urban city in central Michigan. Using predominantly undercover surveillance techniques, the unit's objectives include increasing the probability of detecting crimes in progress, deterring criminal acts in high-crime areas, increasing public awareness of, and participation in law enforcement, and achieving cooperation among the unit, its parent organization, and other area policing agencies.

Administratively, the unit's commander, who is responsible for conducting unit affairs, is supervised by the Commander of the Detective Bureau. Administrative responsibility for the unit then proceeds through the following administrative levels: Commander of the Investigations Division, Deputy Chief responsible for Field Services, Chief of Police, and Board of Police Commissioners.

At the operational level, the unit comprises eight patrol officers and two detectives. These personnel are

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[7]Descriptions of the selected research sites were taken from the official records of the funding agency, as well as information obtained through site interviews. This information included project proposals, quarterly and annual reports, and official correspondence between the project and funding source.

divided into two operational field teams consisting of four patrol officers directed by a detective. Each field team is primarily involved in undercover surveillance activities and gathering criminal intelligence data.

To maintain unit member anonymity, and thus preserve the covert nature of unit operations, unit personnel make arrests only when absolutely necessary. Other departmental personnel, primarily from the patrol division, are summoned by unit personnel to effect arrests. The unit concentrates its activities upon part I crimes including murder, rape, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.

In addition to conducting suspect-oriented tactical field operations, the unit attempts to fulfill a crime-analysis function for its host department. To this end the unit collects data and maintains files to aid the department in its current and ongoing investigations, to generate data used in determining "high crime" areas within which departmental personnel are deployed, and to develop detailed profiles of criminals, premises, and victims within the city. This information is also disseminated to area police departments in an effort to improve the information flow among policing agencies. The vehicle through which this information is circulated is an area detective bureau association designed to improve cooperation among police departments.

Site B--Crime Prevention Unit

The Crime Prevention Unit is attached to a municipal police department in south-central Michigan. The unit is divided into two functional areas: (1) active crime prevention focusing upon the active suppression of criminal activity and (2) passive crime prevention oriented toward preventing crime.

In its efforts to reduce suppressible[8] crime in the city, the active part of the crime prevention unit operates under the concept of saturation patrol. Essentially, this unit attempts to create a high level of police visibility, particularly in designated "high crime" areas of the city, with a view toward deterring criminal activity in that area or intercepting the criminal in the commission of the crime. The active unit is composed of eight patrol officers, supervised by a police sergeant, who patrol designated high-crime areas within the city. This segment of the crime prevention unit operates in a different manner from traditional patrol, in that unit members do not respond to routine patrol calls. Rather, they respond only to "crimes in progress" calls. The active unit also rotates from regular patrol through the unit on a four-month basis.

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[8]Suppressible crimes are robbery, larceny, and burglary.

The "passive" segment of the crime prevention unit focuses on preventing crime before it occurs. The primary objective of this unit is to develop continuing community awareness and response to the local crime problem. The unit is staffed by two patrol officers and a sergeant, who are responsible for developing a community reporting network, establishing a security consultant service to assist residential and commercial residents, and conducting crime analyses to facilitate deployment of the active unit.

Organizationally, the passive function sergeant, in conjunction with the active function team leader (sergeant), reports to the Commander of Patrol Operations, who then reports directly to the Chief of Police. Both segments of the Crime Prevention Unit concentrate their efforts on part I crimes including murder, rape, larceny, burglary, and auto theft.

Site C--Regionalized Detective Bureau

This detective bureau, located in the north-west part of Michigan, involves the cooperative efforts of two rural counties. The primary policing agencies within each county are the county sheriff's department and the largest city's police department. Historically, both counties were unable to maintain the detective function at either the county or local level because of their

relatively small size. Consequently, providing follow-up detective services[9] was primarily the responsibility of the Michigan State Police, which maintained a post serving both counties.

However, even though the Michigan State Police provided limited investigative services in both counties, all four participating jurisdictions (two county sheriffs and two city police departments) desired a detective bureau that would be more responsive to local needs. In 1972, a grant proposal was submitted to the Michigan Office of Criminal Justice Programs, which called for the establishment of a regionalized detective bureau to operate within both counties.

Administratively, this regionalized detective bureau was controlled by a governing board comprising the sheriffs from both counties and the police chief of the largest city within each county. The board was responsible for administrative control, including policy formation, implementation, and evaluation. Additionally, the board was designed to insure the equitable distribution of detective services within each county. About one year after this unit was funded, one of the two counties

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[9]Follow-up detective service refers to the investigation of reported crime that cannot be fully investigated by patrol officers.

withdrew from the project. This left the project operating with one county and its largest city.

Operationally, the detective bureau was composed of four detectives, two operating within each county, who reported directly to the administrative board. Since all four participating jurisdictions had had little experience in the area of detective investigations, operational personnel were selected in two ways. First, one detective was selected locally within each county. Experience and seniority were the major criteria used in this selection. Second, two detectives were hired for the project as the result of a state-wide search for competent, highly skilled investigators from larger urban police departments. It was felt that by constructing detective teams composed of a local investigator and a more highly trained outsider, the potential for more complete, high-quality investigations would be enhanced.

The primary objective of this regionalized detective bureau was to increase the follow-up investigative capability of each participating jurisdiction. Additionally, the project was to improve the cooperation and coordination of police investigative services throughout both counties. Burglary and violations of narcotics laws were the focus of its investigations.

Site D--Saturation Patrol Unit-South

The Saturation Patrol Unit-South involves the coordinated efforts of four contiguous communities located in south-east Michigan. The unit comprises two patrolmen from each participating jurisdiction, who are supervised by a police sergeant from the jurisdiction that initiated the project.

The unit has focused on armed robbery, breaking and entering, and auto theft for major emphasis in personnel deployment. Additionally, the unit has sought to increase cooperative efforts among the four participating communities in their law enforcement efforts. To accomplish these goals, the unit attempts to provide specialized patrols in selecting high-crime areas within each community.

Administrative responsibility for the unit resides with an administrative board composed of the chiefs of police from the participating jurisdictions. This board sets and administers the general policies and practices of the unit. In addition, the Chief of Police from the jurisdiction that initiated the grant serves as project director for the unit. His responsibilities include determining daily operational patterns, compiling statistical crime data, scheduling unit assignments, and reviewing reports. The operational sergeant supervising

the unit in the field reports directly to the project director and the administrative board.

One command officer from each participating jurisdiction acts as decision maker for the unit when it is operating within his jurisdiction. Additionally, this officer is charged with the overall supervision of the unit's operations when they are performed in his community. The time the unit spends in each jurisdiction is determined by existing need, as indicated by the crime rate across communities. These decisions are made at weekly meetings attended by the operational sergeant, the project director, and the administrative board.

When the need arises, the unit receives operational support from the local jurisdictions; however, in general the unit conducts its activities separately from those of its parent organizations. Consequently, the unit is not expected to provide operational support to the regular patrol divisions with which it interacts.

Site E--Saturation Patrol Unit-North

The Saturation Patrol Unit-North operates within three suburban cities in eastern Michigan. The unit emphasizes enforcement in crimes of armed robbery, burglary, larceny, auto theft, and sex-related offenses. Additionally, the unit was designed to improve cooperation and exchange of information among the participating

agencies and to maximize the use of police personnel by concentrating on particular crime problems in the three communities.

An administrative board composed of the three jurisdictions' police chiefs governs policies and administration of the unit. A police captain from one of the participating jurisdictions is designated project director of the unit and has responsibility for conducting unit operations. He directly supervises two police sergeants, who function as field supervisors on a day-to-day basis. Nine patrol officers compose the unit's operations personnel.

Operationally, the unit's priorities are determined by the project director, following an analysis of crime trends in the three communities. The unit is separated from normal police workloads, to insure that the unit will not be used to supplement normal patrol operations.

When conducting operations in a participating jurisdiction, the unit is expected to inform that jurisdiction of its efforts. Also, the unit is directed not to provide support services to the local jurisdiction in which it is operating, except in extreme emergencies. To pursue its goals, the unit conducts specialized patrols in designated high-crime areas of the three communities.

Site F—County Wide
Metro Crime Unit

The Metro Crime Unit operates on a county-wide basis in southwest Michigan. This multi-agency investigative unit was designed to improve coordination in the investigation of nonsyndicate organized crime affecting more than one law enforcement jurisdiction and the lack of personnel to cope adequately with such criminal activities on an interjurisdictional basis.

Nineteen police officers representing nine law enforcement agencies were selected to participate in the unit. Their operational objective is to supplement investigative efforts on a coordinated, county-wide basis. Selections were made by the separate jurisdictions and then approved by the commander of the unit, who is responsible for unit operations.

Administratively, the unit is directed by a unit commander, who reports directly to a police services council composed of the chiefs of police of county police departments, a county sheriff, and a representative of the Michigan State Police. The purpose of the Police Services Council, which oversees unit operations is to determine policy affecting the unit and to establish unit priorities and operational objectives.

The purpose of the Metro Crime Unit is to suppress violent and property crimes throughout the county. To

accomplish this goal, the unit concentrates on part I crimes, including murder, robbery, larceny, burglary, and auto theft.

Structurally, the unit is divided into two "teams," one concentrating on active crime prevention using such techniques as saturation patrol and decoys, and the other concentrating on crime investigation using surveillance techniques. The unit operates from a "store front" location, maintaining independence from local policing agencies. Unit members are considered a liaison between the metro unit and their respective policing agencies. Consequently, these "boundary-spanning" personnel are expected to maintain close contact with their parent organizations in an effort to facilitate the exchange of information among departments. The unit also participates in an area detective association comprising investigators from all levels of government.

Methods of Data Collection

Data collected for analysis in the study were obtained from two primary sources: (1) a series of structured interviews with personnel in the six research sites and individuals associated with each unit and (2) a mailed survey instrument distributed to police agencies involved in the special units under consideration. A series of structured interviews was conducted within each research

site. These interviews involved unit members, unit commanders, patrol and detective bureau members and command officers, chiefs of police and public safety directors, members of city councils and county commissioners, prosecutors, and representatives of regional planning agencies. The interviews focused on the development of each project, its actual operation, the sociopolitical context in which the unit operated, and the factors that had facilitated or hindered implementation. Appendix A contains the interview schedule used during this phase of data collection.

The primary objective of the structured interviews was to test the applicability of the theoretical framework developed in Chapter II, particularly the conceptualization of specialized police units operating in and influenced by an organizational environment. Consequently, respondents were questioned about the structure of the environment, interactions between special unit and environment, efforts made by the special unit to manage its environment, and power/dependence relations between sectors of the environment and the special unit. The information obtained from these interviews, together with the theoretical framework, provided the basis from which the survey instrument was developed.

To enhance the reliability of the structured survey instrument, two independent interviewers were used during each interview. Tape recordings of each interview facilitated additional analysis of responses. A composite response was developed for each respondent, which integrated both the tape recordings and the interviewers' notes. In a few instances, respondents were reluctant to have the interview recorded, in such cases, interviewer notes were the only available data source.

Sixty-six respondents were interviewed in the six sites under consideration; each interview lasted from one and one-half to three hours. Table 3.1 contains a breakdown of respondent types in each of the six research sites, as well as the totals for each site.

Data obtained from the structured interview setting, as well as the theoretical framework described in the preceding chapter, provided the basis for constructing a mailed survey instrument, which was distributed in each research site. This instrument focused on a series of implementation issues such as interorganizational support, efforts at environmental management, domain consensus, goal clarity, and individual and organizational utilization and evaluation of the special unit. Separate questionnaires were developed for incumbents of a variety of positions in the special unit's total

TABLE 3.1

NUMBER OF STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS BY RESEARCH SITE AND RESPONDENT TYPE

Site	Respondent Type						Total Site
	Unit Members	Unit Commanders	Patrol Officers & Detectives	Chiefs of Police	Politicians	Prosecutors	
A	2	1	2	--	--	--	5
B	8	1	4	1	1	--	15
C	2	1	5	1	1	1	11
D	3	3	1	4	--	--	11
E	4	1	3	1	--	--	9
F	6	1	3	2	2	1	15
Respondent Totals	25	8	18	9	4	2	66

environment. These positions included: (1) police chiefs of governing authority boards,[10] (2) command officers[11] of patrol and detective bureaus, (3) detectives and patrol officers, and (4) officials from neighboring jurisdictions who did not officially participate in the grant.[12]

Figure 3.1 depicts the individuals to whom questionnaires were sent, as well as their relative position in the environment of the special units under consideration.

The distribution of the survey instrument was complicated by the relatively large size of the population to be surveyed and the absence of information regarding the number of possible respondents in each research site. To overcome this problem, contact personnel within each unit distributed questionnaires throughout each research site. These individuals were identified through the initial interview and were primarily the project directors of each special unit.

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[10]To be referred to as Unit's Authority Structure.

[11]Anyone holding the rank of sergeant or above.

[12]These individuals, responding for their entire organizations, are referred to as Non-Jurisdictional Agencies. They were selected for inclusion in the analysis because they represented points of contact for the special unit outside the immediate environment.



Figure 3-1. Relative position of environmental actors in relation to the special unit.

Questionnaires were developed to reflect the operational or administrative level of the person completing them. For example, commanders within patrol and detective bureaus were asked to respond to survey items by indicating the response they felt reflected their organizational unit's orientation, as opposed to their own personal opinion. Thus, these respondents were asked to report their perceptions of the "official" organizational response to each item. Operational personnel within both patrol and detective bureaus, on the other hand, were asked to respond to the survey instrument on a personal basis. With the exception of respondents who completed the questionnaire according to various organizational levels, the pool of items across respondent groups remained constant. Appendix B contains the basic pool of survey items, as well as those respondent groups completing each item. Table 3.2 indicates the number of questionnaires distributed within each research site and the number of questionnaires received from each respondent class.

Also reported in Table 3.2 is the actual number of questionnaires distributed to each identified respondent class in each research site. By dividing the number of returned questionnaires by those distributed, a return rate (reported in percentages) may be assigned to each respondent class for each research site. These return rates are reported in Table 3.3.

TABLE 3.2

DISTRIBUTION OF RETURNED QUESTIONNAIRES BY RESPONDENT CLASS BY RESEARCH SITE

Respondent Class	Research Site						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	Total
Authority Structure	2(3)[a]	1(1)	3(3)	6(8)	7(7)	14(21)	33(38)
Patrol Commanders	6(12)	3(4)	3(6)	15(28)	12(19)	26(35)	65(104)
Patrol Officers	61(110)	17(40)	21(30)	55(108)	53(95)	85(146)	292(529)
Detective Commanders	1(4)	3(4)	--	6(17)	8(14)	8(24)	26(63)
Detectives	27(30)	8(12)	--	11(27)	14(22)	7(30)	67(121)
Nonjurisdiction Police Agencies	2(6)	--	7(12)	--	--	8(13)	17(31)
Totals	99(165)	32(61)	34(51)	93(188)	94(157)	148(264)	500(886)

[a]Numbers reported in parentheses are the actual numbers of questionnaires distributed to each respondent group within each research site.

TABLE 3.3

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RETURNED QUESTIONNAIRES
BY RESPONDENT CLASS BY RESEARCH SITE

Respondent Class	Research Site						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	Total
Authority Structure	.67[a]	100.0	100.0	.75	100.0	.88	.87
Patrol Commanders	.50	.75	.50	.54	.63	.74	.63
Patrol Officers	.56	.43	.70	.51	.56	.58	.55
Detective Commanders	.25	.75	--	.86	.57	.33	.41
Detectives	.90	.67	--	.41	.64	.24	.55
Nonproject Police Agencies	.33	--	.58	--	--	.62	.55
Totals	.60	.53	.67	.50	.60	.60	.56

[a]Return rates reported as the percent of individuals completing the questionnaire. Percentages are rounded to two places. Table 3.2 indicates the absolute numbers from which these percentages were calculated.

As reported in Table 3.3, a return rate of 56 percent was obtained for the entire sample. Total return rates for individual respondent classes and research sites are also reported. In general, the response rate obtained for each class of respondent was reasonably high (approximately 50 percent) for survey research.[13] However, the issue of sample bias must be raised, as a sizable percentage of respondents within each research site did not return a questionnaire, and because issues of organizational accessibility precluded follow-up of nonrespondents. To gain organizational access, the broader evaluation effort was required to assure participating agencies that individual respondents would not be identified. As a result, follow-up on nonrespondents was negated.

The issue of sample bias essentially refers to the proportion of the sample that did not respond to the questions and how this nonresponse subsequently influences the degree of confidence one places in the results obtained. In the current study, the primary units of analysis must be separated from considerations of return rates before the issue of sample bias is addressed. First, the units

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[13]One authority on the subject indicated that a 50 percent response rate is adequate and a 60 percent rate is good. He cautioned, however, that this is only a general rule of thumb. See: Earl R. Babbie, Survey Research Methods (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 165-66.

of analysis in this study were the organizational environments surrounding special police units. As previously discussed, sampling was purposive rather than systematic. Second, the aggregated responses within the research sites were viewed as representing the elements within the environment. These elements were defined by functional roles, i.e., patrol officer, detective commander, authority structure. As such, any bias that existed was at a subsample level.

With regard to any systemic bias in the return rates of each respondent class, it is important to consider the salience of the special unit for individual respondents. Making certain assumptions about why a particular respondent did or did not complete a questionnaire may bolster confidence in the data obtained. The primary assumption, with regard to response patterns, concerned the salience of the special unit for each respondent. It was assumed that the greater the salience the special unit had for a respondent, the more likely he would be to return the questionnaire. If this assumption was correct, respondents who were negatively or positively oriented to the special unit were more likely to reply than those who were indifferent to the unit. The majority of nonrespondents were therefore viewed as being indifferent toward these units, and/or the research;

consequently the absence of their responses was viewed as neither positively nor negatively skewing the data obtained.

Research Variables and Variable Measurement

As indicated in Chapter I, the following research questions using specialized police units as the focus of analysis were examined in this study:

(1) To what extent is special police unit implementation (acceptance and utilization) affected by the environments in which these units find themselves?

(2) In the implementation process, are there specific strategies which may be employed to facilitate unit integration in the larger system?

(3) What are the characteristics of the environment which facilitate or impede the implementation process?

In addition to these guiding research questions, a series of concepts pertaining to organizations in general and, more specifically, to interactions between organization and environment, were identified in Chapter II. These concepts included organizational domain and domain consensus, interdependence and power relationships among organizations, inclusive and immediate environmental context, and unit integration in the larger system.

The concepts identified in Chapter II were measured through a series of survey questionnaire items, which appear in Appendix B. Survey items were developed

to measure certain characteristics of each concept. Survey items were based on the central concepts to be investigated as well as information gathered through the structured interviews conducted at each research site. Table 3.4 depicts the survey items associated with each concept being examined.

TABLE 3.4

RESEARCH VARIABLES AND ASSOCIATED SURVEY ITEMS

I. Outcome Variables

A. Utilization of Special Unit by Externals

1. Item 47 - In general, how often has your unit/ division/ bureau provided the special unit with specific information concerning crimes and/or criminals? (Check one)

a. regularly: at least once a week _____
b. frequently: at least once a month _____
c. occasionally: 3 to 4 times a year _____
d. almost never _____
e. never _____

2. Item 48 - In general, how often has your unit/ division/bureau requested information on specific crimes, criminal suspects, and crime patterns from the special unit? (Check one)

a. regularly: at least once a week _____
b. frequently: at least once a month _____
c. occasionally: 3 to 4 times a year _____
d. almost never _____
e. never _____

TABLE 3.4 - Continued

B. Evaluation of the Special Unit's Impact by Externals

	Totally Agree	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totally Disagree
1. Item 2 - The SPU has definitely improved the exchange (flow) of information between units within your department.	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. Item 3 - The SPU has definitely improved the quality of useful information available about crime, crime patterns and criminals in the area.	1	2	3	4	5	6
3. Item 4 - The crime problem in your jurisdiction has definitely been handled differently because of the establishment of the SPU.	1	2	3	4	5	6
4. Item 44 - The special unit has definitely made my job easier.	1	2	3	4	5	6

C. Unit Integration in the Larger System

1. Item 49 - Over the past years have your cooperative interactions with the special unit increased or decreased? (Check one)

   a. have continually increased since the establishment of the unit _____

   b. initially increased but have now leveled off at highest level _____

   c. initially increased but have recently begun to decrease _____

TABLE 3.4 - Continued

d. initially increased but dropped off quickly_____

e. never increased beyond occasional contact _____

f. never have had operational contacts with the unit _____

D. Opposition to the Special Unit by Command Personnel

	Totally Agree	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totally Disagree
1. Item 7 - The SPU had the active opposition of command officers whose position could influence the success or failure of the unit.	1	2	3	4	5	6

II. Process Variables

A. Goal Clarity

1. Item 26 - From the beginning the SPU had clear, concise goals and objectives.	1	2	3	4	5	6

B. Domain Consensus

1. Item 5 - The SPU definitely had the active support of the chief in your department.	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. Item 6 - The SPU definitely had the active support of other relevant command officers in your department.	1	2	3	4	5	6

TABLE 3.4 - Continued

C. Perceptions of Influence

	Totally Agree	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totally Disagree
1. Item 62 - You feel that representatives of your division/ bureau/unit have some influence in the policy decisions in the special unit.	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. Item 65 - When decisions are made involving matters of mutual concern, the special unit is more likely to have greater influence in these decisions.	1	2	3	4	5	6

D. External Dependency on the Special Unit[a]

1. As a source of information

   a. Item 50 - Your knowledge of criminal activity in your jurisdiction would be no different, significantly reduced, somewhat reduced, significantly increased, somewhat increased.

   b. Item 51 - The quality of information regarding criminal activity in your jurisdiction would be no different, significantly reduced, somewhat reduced, significantly increased, or somewhat increased.

   c. Item 52 - The quantity of information regarding criminal activity in your jurisdiction would be no different, significantly reduced, somewhat reduced, significantly increased, or somewhat increased.

TABLE 3.4 - Continued

	Totally Agree	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totally Disagree
d. Item 59 - To what extent does/did your division/bureau/etc. participate in the activities of the special unit?	1	2	3	4	5	6

2. To conduct better investigations

   a. Item 55 - You would find it no different, harder, or easier to conduct criminal investigations?

   b. Item 56 - There would be no change, increased difficulty, or less difficulty in getting information for ongoing criminal investigations?

3. To increase productivity

   a. Item 57 - Your clearance rate would be no different, significantly reduced, somewhat reduced, significantly increased, or somewhat increased for those criminal investigations you initiate.

   b. Item 58 - Your conviction rate would be no different, significantly reduced, somewhat reduced, significantly increased, or somewhat increased for those criminal investigations which you conduct.

E. Special Unit Efforts to Manage its Environment

1. Through cooptation

	To a Major Extent	To a Great Extent	To Some Extent	To a Minor Extent	Not at all
a. Item 8 - To what extent were you personally involved in the original planning for the special unit?	1	2	3	4	5

TABLE 3.4 - Continued

	To a Major Extent	To a Great Extent	To Some Extent	To a Minor Extent	Not at all
b. Item 11 - To what extent did you participate in the selection of the special unit's goals and objectives?	1	2	3	4	5
c. Item 41 - To what extent is your agency/department/ etc. involved in the ongoing planning of the special unit?	1	2	3	4	5
d. Item 42 - To what extent did your agency/department/ etc. participate in the selection of activities undertaken by the special unit?	1	2	3	4	5

2. Through coordination

	Totally Agree	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totally Disagree
a. Item 30 - The department had SOP for patrol division to regularly report information to SPU.	1	2	3	4	5	6

TABLE 3.4 - Continued

		Totally Agree	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totally Disagree
b.	Item 31 - The department had SOP for patrol officers to directly report critical information to the SPU.	1	2	3	4	5	6
c.	Item 33 - The department had SOP for other investigative units to report relevant information to the SPU.	1	2	3	4	5	6
d.	Item 34 - The department had SOP for officers with other investigative units to directly report critical information to the SPU.	1	2	3	4	5	6
3.	By creating a market for output						
a.	Item 36 - The SPU definitely did a good job of making relevant information available to other investigative units.	1	2	3	4	5	6
b.	Item 37 - The SPU definitely did a good job of making relevant information available to the patrol unit.	1	2	3	4	5	6

TABLE 3.4 - Continued

4. Through cooperation

	To a major Extent	To a great Extent	To some Extent	To a minor Extent	Not at all
a. Item 60 - To what extent was/is your division/bureau's etc. participation in the activities of the special unit encouraged by personnel in the special unit?	1	2	3	4	5
b. Item 64 - People from the special unit display a facilitative (cooperative, helpful) attitude toward your division/bureau/unit.	1	2	3	4	5

F. Perception of the Special Unit as a Threat

	Totally Agree	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totally Disagree
1. Item 61 - You feel completely free to discuss important information with the special unit?	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. Item 63 - Your association with members of the special unit is characterized by mutual trust.	1	2	3	4	5	6

TABLE 3.4 - Continued

III. Control (Third) Variables

A. Inclusive Environmental Context[b]

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[a]External dependency items were preceded by the statement, "If the special unit were to cease to function what would be the consequences for your agency?" See Appendix B.

b. Determined through structured interviews.

Outcome Variables

As indicated in Table 3.4, four major outcome variables were identified: (1) external utilization of the special unit, (2) external evaluation of the special unit's impact, (3) integration of the special unit into the larger organizational environment, and (4) command officer opposition and resistance to the new unit. Eight survey items were developed to measure these concepts.

To reduce the absolute number of survey items measuring a given concept, two scales were created, which combined items. They were: (1) utilization (USE), and (2) evaluation of special unit impact (IMPACT). In the construction of both the USE and IMPACT scales, the following procedures were employed. First, items that met the conceptual criteria of measuring the dimensions of use and evaluations of special unit impact were correlated with each other, producing a correlation matrix. Second, highly

correlated items were then selected for inclusion in separate scales. This resulted in two distinct scales plus two independent survey items. Finally, a reliability coefficient[14] (Cronbach alpha) was computed for each scale. The reliability coefficient is "the proportion of error variance to the total obtained variance yield by a measuring instrument subtracted from 1.00, the index 1.00 indicating perfect reliability."[15] As such, the reliability coefficient is a measure of the proportion of total variance shared by two or more variables and is used to interpret the internal consistency of a series of items, particularly in terms of their homogeneity.[16] The outcome variables, their associated survey items and the reliability coefficient for each scale are reported in Table 3.5.

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[14]The specific program is Reliability. Computer Laboratory Users Guide, Supplement - SPSS Revisions with Local Modifications (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University 1976).

[15]Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, 2nd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 446.

[16]Ibid., pp. 451-52.

TABLE 3.5

OUTCOME AND PROCESS VARIABLES, ASSOCIATED SURVEY ITEMS AND SCALES, AND RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS

Variable Concept	Variable/Scale Name	Survey Item(s)	Reliability Coefficient[a]
I. Outcome Variables			
A. Utilization of Special Unit	Use	47, 48	.69
B. Evaluations of Impact	Impact	2, 3, 4, 44	.87
C. Unit Integration	Integration	49	--
D. Opposition to Special Unit from Commanders	Opposition	7	--
II. Process Variables			
A. Goal Clarity	Goal Clarity	26	--
B. Domain Consensus	Domain	5, 6	.72
C. Perceptions of Influence:			
1. In SPU policy making	External Influence	62	--
2. SPU influence in environment	SPU Influence	65	--
D. External Dependency on the Special Unit:			
1. Dependent as as source of information	Information	50, 51, 52	.91

TABLE 3.5 - Continued

Variable Concept	Variable/Scale Name	Survey Item(s)	Reliability Coefficient[a]
2. Dependent to conduct better investigations	Investigation	55, 56	.85
3. Dependent to increase productivity	Productivity	57, 58	.76
E. Environmental Management:			
1. Cooptation	Cooptation	8, 11, 41, 42, 59	.90
2. Coordination Strategy	Coordination	30, 31, 33, 34	.88
3. Market Creation Strategy	Market	36, 37, 38	.89
4. Cooperation Stratety	Cooperation	60, 64	.62
F. Perceptions of Threat	Threat	61, 63	.83

[a]Reliability Coefficient is Chronbach's Alpha

Process Variables

Six concepts were identified as process variables. Each of these concepts was developed in Chapter II, and its associated survey items are presented in Table 3.4. Twenty-seven survey items were selected as measures of the six process variable concepts. Using these 27 items, a series of scales was constructed for concepts that had multiple measures. This reduced the measurement of these concepts to nine scales and three individual survey items. As was the case in the construction of the outcome variable scales, a correlation matrix was constructed using the 27 survey items. Items that were highly correlated ($r \geq .6$) were then selected for inclusion in a specific scale. This procedure had the added advantage of insuring discrimination among scales, as survey items highly correlated in one scale were found to have virtually no correlation with items contained in other scales. Table 3.5 indicates the concepts for which scales were developed, the survey items included in these scales, and the reliability coefficient computed for each scale.

Control (Third) Variable -- Inclusive Environmental Context

The control (third) variable selected for inclusion in the study was inclusive environmental context.

Determining the levels of inclusive environmental context was based largely on the theoretical framework developed in Chapter II and the series of structured interviews conducted at each research site.

In Chapter II the concept of an inclusive environmental context was introduced (pp. 57). The four ideal types of environmental contexts discussed were unitary, federative, coalitional, and social choice. To make use of this typology, each of the six research sites was classified as being in either a unitary, federative, or coalitional environment. The social choice environmental type was deleted from the classification scheme because the diffuse relationships implied in this context were not exhibited in the six research sites. Table 3.6 indicates the results of the classification of research sites under the concept of environmental context.

As indicated in Table 3.6, sites A and B were classified as belonging to a unitary environmental context, as each project had been initiated by a single police agency and consequently incorporated into the formal organizational structure of that agency. Sites C, D, and E were classified as involved in a coalitional environmental context, because interviewers indicated that until the foundation of these special units interaction and formal participation between the sponsoring police jurisdictions

TABLE 3.6

RESEARCH SITES CLASSIFIED BY INCLUSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

Research Site	Environmental Context		
	Unitary	Federative	Coalitional
A	X	-	-
B	X	—	—
C	—	—	X
D	—	—	X
E	—	—	X
F	—	X	—
Total Context N Total N = 500	131	148	221

had been minimal and at times even negative. Since the grant requirements for these projects forced the agencies to interact on a formal basis for perhaps the first time, they were classified as involved in a coalitional arrangement.

Site F was classified as belonging to a federative environmental context because its characteristics were the opposite of those of sites C, D, and E. Site F, involving an entire county, had participated in many multi-jurisdictional projects, including a narcotics enforcement

unit and a consolidation of radio dispatch services. The grants awarded to this county were managed by a Police Services Council, composed of the chiefs of police from all participating jurisdictions; this board has taken a strong leadership position in the delivery of police services throughout the county. Consequently, it was felt this site most closely approximated a federation of police agencies.

Data Analysis

Analysis of the data collected in the study was facilitated by the use of analytical programming developed in Norman H. Nie et al.'s Statistical Package for the Social Sciences,[17] particularly the one and two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) models. Analysis of the data proceeded through six stages, in all cases using a fixed-effect analysis of variance model. Each stage of analysis is presented in the appropriate section in Chapter IV. However, one issue common to all analytical stages needs to be discussed here.

The primary methodological problem encountered in the use of analysis of variance models in this study was unequal and nonproportional cell frequencies. Since ANOVA

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[17]Norman H. Nie, C. Hadlai Hull, Jean G. Jenkins, Karin Steinbrenner, and Dale H. Bent, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, 2d ed (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975), particularly chapter 22.

models are normally calculated using equal or proportional cells, the issue of the consequence of unequal and nonproportional cells arises. In the current study, it was felt this violation of the ANOVA model resulted in a test of significance that is more conservative than would be the case if equal or proportional cells were used. This feeling was supported by Glass and Stanley's interpretation of the effect of unequal cells on the ANOVA Model;

> When the Sample Sizes and Variances are unequal and greater numbers of persons are sampled from the population with larger variances, the probability of a type I error is less than . The effect of heterogeneous variances in this case is to shift the distribution of F-ratios to the left.[18]

After checking the variances associated with the larger samples, it was determined that smaller variances were indeed associated with smaller sample sizes. Consequently, the ratios reported in Chapter V were viewed as conservative. Hence, when levels of significance were obtained they were interpreted as indeed representing differences among populations. The .05 alpha (α) level was selected, indicating that one would expect to obtain a finding of this magnitude only five times in one hundred.

Interpretation of the results obtained through data analysis was cast primarily in terms of the absolute

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[18]Gene V. Glass, and Julian C. Stanley, Statistical Methods in Education and Psychology (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970), p. 372.

differences between group scores on the selected survey items or scales. In general, the survey instrument used a Likert-type scaling technique to indicate the strength of individual agreement/disagreement with the item. The aggregated scores were treated as continuous variables, ranging from the most positive (greatest agreement) to least positive responses. For example, the absolute value of scores for all groups may have indicated a positive response to a particular variable. However, as the analysis was focused on differences among groups, the interpretation classified groups as being more positive (or negative) than others because the concern was with relative differences among the established groups and not primarily their absolute position on the scale.

Design Limitations

The limitations in the design of this study were as follows:

1. The research used nonprobability sampling in the selection of research sites, thereby limiting the extent of generalization.

2. The survey instrument was not pretested before data collection.

3. Issues of organizational accessibility, requiring that individual respondents not be identified, prevented follow-up of non-respondents to the survey instrument. This may have biased the response distribution.

4. Research pertaining to the issues identified in this research is nonexistent, thereby precluding the use of validated instruments.

5. The study was limited to a discussion of the environments surrounding Specialized Police Units in Michigan.

Chapter IV presents the analysis of the data obtained through the survey instrument and the impact of these findings on the implementation of special police units.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS

As indicated in Chapter II, the primary focus of this study was to examine the extent to which factors in the external environment affect project implementation efforts. To pursue the inquiry, this chapter is divided into three sections. Section one examines the effect of inclusive environmental context on the outcome and process variables identified in Chapter III. The second section examines the effect of the process variables on the outcome variables across all environmental contexts. Finally, section three follows up on the analysis of process variable, effect on outcomes, while controlling for environmental context.

The Effect of Inclusive Environmental Context

The concept of an inclusive environmental context was introduced in Chapter II. The ideal types represented in this classification result in an ordinal scale that ranges from extremely structured relationships in the unitary structure to diffuse relationships in the social

choice context.[1] Using this conceptualization as a beginning point for analysis, the outcome variables in Chapter III were subjected to a one-way analysis of variance using as the independent variable three levels of inclusive environmental context (unitary, federative and coalitional). The results of the analysis are presented in Table 4.1, together with the F-ratios obtained, level of statistical significance, and the results of two post hoc comparison procedures.[2] Due to the vast amount of information presented in Table 4.1 and succeeding tables, a brief consideration of table interpretation is warranted.

Using Table 4.1 as an example for interpreting the tables presented in this Chapter, each set of row figures includes the following information; (1) the mean ($\bar{X}$) scores on each outcome variable (listed in the far left column) for each level of environmental context (unitary, federative, and coalitional), followed by, (2) the results of a one-way analysis of variance for each outcome variable over

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[1]Roland L. Warren, "The Interorganizational Field as a Focus for Investigation," Administrative Science Quarterly. (December 1967): 399-401.

[2]The two post hoc comparison procedures selected were (1) the Least Significant Difference Test (LSD), and (2) the Scheffé post hoc procedure. Both of these tests are designed to isolate differences among means once a statistically significant F-ratio has been obtained. The alpha (α) set for each post hoc procedure as well as the F-ratio was .05. As this research was exploratory, both post hoc procedures were employed because the LSD test is more liberal in its placement of confidence intervals than is the Scheffé, which is more conservative.

TABLE 4.1

OUTCOME VARIABLES OVER LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

Outcome Variable	Environmental Context $\bar{X}$						Post-Hoc Test (.05)	
	(1) Unitary	(2) Federative	(3) Coalitional	F	DF	SIG	LSD	Scheffé
Opposition	3.67 (108)[a]	4.24 (87)	3.99 (149)	5.92	343	.003	1-3 1-2	1-2
Integration	3.84 [b] (124)	3.27 (131)	3.34 (198)	.57	452	.57	--	--
Impact	3.58 (123)	3.43 (120)	3.68 (191)	2.08	433	.13	2-3[c]	--
Use	2.14 (125)	2.17 (130)	2.27 (199)	.77	453	.46	--	--

[a]Figures in parentheses represent the N upon which $\bar{X}$'s were computed.

[b]Group (N) will not be equal as concepts were responded to by differing groups. See Appendix B.

[c]Although F Value > .05 the LSD procedure identified the distinction among groups.

the levels of environmental context, including the F-ratio, degrees of freedom (DF) and level of statistical significance (SIG), followed by (3) the results of both post hoc (LSD and Scheffe) tests. Consequently, the first row of figures in Table 4.1 indicate that with respect to the measure of opposition to the existence of the special unit (opposition) the mean scores for each type of environmental context were; 3.67 unitary context, 4.24 federative, and 3.99 coalitional. The analysis of variance on opposition yielded an F-ratio of 5.92 with 343 degrees of freedom which was significant at the .003 level. Finally, the LSD test indicated a significant difference between groups 1 and 3 the unitary and coalitional contexts, as well as groups 1 and 2, the unitary and federative contexts. The Scheffe test isolated a significant difference (P = .05) between groups 1 and 2, the unitary and federative contexts. This method of interpretation is used for each table row and in subsequent tables, levels of the process variables are substituted for levels of environmental context.

As indicated in Table 4.1, all but one of the four outcome variables failed to reach a level of statistical significance when inclusive environmental context was used as the independent variable. Levels of significance were obtained, however, on the outcome variable measuring the amount of command officer resistance to the special unit (Item 7). Furthermore, post hoc comparisons using the Least Significant

Difference Test revealed that, on this item, group one (unitary context) was distinctly different from groups two and three (federative and coalitional). The Scheffe test revealed a similar distinction among groups. Comparing group means on opposition suggested greater levels of command officer resistance toward the special unit existed in the unitary environmental context ($\bar{X}$ = 3.67) than in either the federative or coalitional context ($\bar{X}$ = 4.24 and 3.99). This is a most tentative interpretation of the data, as each of the environmental contexts yielded negative responses to the survey item ($\bar{X} > 3.50$), indicating that strong opposition to the special units was not exhibited in any of the research sites. This finding does suggest, however, that individuals responding in the unitary context were more willing to agree that command officer resistance to the special unit existed than were respondents in either the federative or coalitional contexts.

Although the F-ratio obtained on the scale measuring perceptions of special unit impact was not statistically significant (P = .13), the Least Significant Difference Test of group means indicated that differences in environmental context existed on evaluations of this scale (Impact). Specifically, the test yielded significant differences ($P < .05$) between the federative and coalitional contexts. An examination of the mean scores on this item revealed that the contexts were ranked in the following manner: federative most positive ($\bar{X}$ = 3.43), unitary

($\overline{X}$ = 3.58), and coalitional least positive ($\overline{X}$ = 3.68). A possible explanation for this finding is that in some marginal way environmental context may affect levels of expectation regarding the impact of the special unit. For example, in the coalitional context meeting these expectations may have been impeded by the strength of the coalition itself, in that commitments to the special unit's success may have been weakest in this type of environmental arrangement. By contrast, commitments in both the federative and unitary contexts may have led to more positive evaluations of the special unit's impact, as individuals are more willing to perceive this effect. Of course, the alternative explanation is that obtaining perceptible levels of influence in the coalitional context may simply be more difficult because of the tentative nature of the coalitional structure.

The conclusion that may be drawn from these analyses is that inclusive environmental context, in and of itself, has little effect on either unit integration in the larger system (Item 49), or environmental patterns. However, the nature of the inclusive environmental context does have an effect on the degree of command officer resistance to these units and evaluations of special unit impact.

Environmental Effects on Goal Clarity and Domain Consensus

The preceding conclusions are not altogether surprising, as the concept of inclusive environmental context was not expected to have a direct effect on acceptance or use patterns. It is more realistic to expect that environmental context may have a greater effect on factors that precede measures of the outcome variables. To explore this possibility, each process variable was used in a one-way analysis of variance controlling for the levels of environmental context.

The concepts of goal clarity and domain consensus are closely related, in that one should normally precede the other in time. The goals of the organization should be understood before establishing consensus or dissensus about those goals. It was not possible to address this temporal issue, with the current design; however, analysis proceeded by examining each concept individually.

In Chapter II it was argued that the goals of the fledgling organization must be understood by those with whom it wishes to interact. Clients must be developed, suppliers of necessary organizational resources must understand the organization's needs, and consumers of output must be identified. Each of these concerns draws attention to the clear specification of organizational goals and purposes. To explore the clarity of the

special unit's goals and objectives, survey item 26 was included in the instrument. Two respondent groups answered this item: (1) commanders of patrol divisions, and (2) commanders of detective bureaus. It was assumed that these two groups of individuals, by virtue of their organizational positions, would be in a better position to respond to this item than would individuals occupying lower level positions.

On the other hand, operational personnel in both patrol and detective bureaus responded to domain consensus items. The items included in this scale elicited evaluations of the extent to which command personnel and chief executives in the affected policing jurisdictions supported the special unit. The results of the analysis of variance on both concepts are reported in Table 4.2.

As indicated in the table, a significant F-ratio was not obtained for the item measuring goal clarity (Item 26). However, the post hoc LSD Test revealed that differences ($P \leq .05$) existed between the coalitional and federative contexts in comparison to the unitary context. In fact, a comparison of the means obtained for each context revealed that the unitary context exhibited the most negative assessment (less agreement with the item) of special unit goal clarity ($\bar{X} = 3.56$ when federative and coalitional contexts were $\bar{X} = 2.84$ and 2.82, respectively).

TABLE 4.2

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF GOAL CLARITY AND DOMAIN CONSENSUS OVER LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

Process Variable	Environmental Context $\bar{X}$						Post-Hoc Test (.05)	
	(1) Unitary	(2) Federative	(3) Coalitional	F	DF	SIG	LSD	Scheffé
Goal Clarity	3.56 (16)	2.84 (45)	2.82 (60)	2.53	120	.08	3-1 2-1	--
Domain	2.74 (107)	2.40 (88)	2.72 (151)	3.73	345	.03	2-1 2-3	--

This finding suggested that in the unitary context, where goal clarity was expected to be the highest by virtue of the inclusiveness and structured arrangement of organizational subcomponents, it was actually the lowest.

One possible reason for this presumed contradiction between what was expected and the above finding may have been the nature and organization of police agencies. Traditionally, police organizations have been structured along almost mutually exclusive functional lines. Information flow has traditionally flowed downward from the top of the organizational hierarchy. Consequently, the chief executives of these organizations may not have communicated efficiently to their subordinates the precise goals and objectives of the special units. The opposite may be the case for special units operating in less inclusive environmental contexts. In these situations the transmission of information regarding the goals and objectives of the special unit may require more effort and, as a result, may improve individual understanding of the unit's purposes.

The second process variable to be examined was domain consensus. Here the concern was with the degree of support generated for the special unit. As indicated in Table 4.2, there was a significant difference among the types of environmental context on this measure ($P = .03$). Whereas the Scheffé procedure did not identify differing groups, the Least Significant Difference (LSD) test

indicated that the federative context differed from the unitary and coalitional contexts ($\bar{X}$ = 2.40 vs. $\bar{X}$ = 2.74 and $\bar{X}$ = 2.72 respectively). Although the averages on this scale were all in a positive direction,[3] it was clear that the federative context scored appreciably higher on this scale. The results indicated that, with regard to goal clarity and domain consensus, the nature of the inclusive environmental context had an effect on the outcome variables.

An examination of the group scores on both goal clarity and domain consensus further indicated that where goal clarity was found to be lowest (unitary context ($\bar{X}$ = 3.56) responses to domain consensus were found to be more negative (unitary context $\bar{X}$ = 2.74). By contrast, where goal clarity was relatively higher (federative and coalitional contexts, $\bar{X}$ = 2.84 and 2.82), evaluations of domain consensus were also found to be more positive (federative and coalitional contexts $\bar{X}$ = 2.40 and 2.72). This general trend in the data added support to the argument that goal clarity affects levels of domain consensus.

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[3]To be negative, the mean value would have to be equal to or greater than 3.50.

Dependency and Environmental Context

The issue of power/dependence relations is indeed difficult to measure in survey research. However, respondents in detective bureaus were asked to respond to a series of questionnaire items seeking assessments of the impact the absence of the special unit would have on (1) the quality and quantity of information needed to conduct criminal investigations, (2) the quality and quantity of investigations conducted, and (3) the productivity[4] of the detective unit. Admittedly, a certain social desirability component existed with regard to these measures. That is, the questions may have put the respondent in the position of demeaning his own usefulness to the organization by responding too positively to the items. However, the measures were viewed as an attempt to gain some insight into dependencies that may have existed between the special unit and at least one element of its environment. Table 4.2 depicts the results obtained on the three dependency scales.

As shown in Table 4.3, no significant variation was obtained across the three environmental contexts on the three dependency scales. However, it must be noted that in all cases the average response for each context

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[4]Defined as an increase or decrease in the number of cases cleared by arrest and the number of convictions obtained.

TABLE 4.3

MEASURES OF EXTERNAL DEPENDENCY OVER LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

Process Variable	Environmental Context $\bar{X}$						Post-Hoc Test (.05)	
	(1) Unitary	(2) Federative	(3) Coalitional	F	DF	SIG	LSD	Scheffé
Information	2.32 (50)[a]	2.56 (50)	2.43 (76)	.88	175	.43	--	--
Investigation	1.74 (41)	1.71 (24)	1.65 (46)	.22	110	.80	--	--
Productivity	2.63 (40)	2.65 (24)	2.51 (46)	.38	109	.68	--	--

[a]The information dependency items were also asked of patrol officers; thus the N's are not equal across each measure.

on each scale was in a positive direction, indicating that within each context respondents viewed their roles as at least somewhat dependent on the function and activities of the special unit (range of $\bar{X}$ = 1.65 to 2.65). This finding indicated that, to a degree, the detectives functioning in each context perceived themselves as dependent on the supply of outputs from the special unit.

Perceptions of Influence and Environmental Context

Closely related to the consideration of environmental dependencies upon the special unit was the issue of environmental influence in the determination of policy affecting special unit operations. Two survey items asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they felt they or their respective organizational units influenced policy decisions affecting the special units (Items 62 and 65). The first item (Item 62) asked respondents whether they felt representatives of their organizations had some influence on policy decisions in the special unit. The second item (Item 65) asked whether or not the special unit was more likely to have a greater influence than the respondent's agency in decisions involving matters of mutual concern. Both items were viewed as measuring an underlying dimension of reciprocal influence. Table 4.4 presents the analysis of these variables.

TABLE 4.4

MEASURES OF PERCEPTIONS OF INFLUENCE IN SPECIAL UNIT POLICY DECISIONS OVER LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

Process Variable	Environmental Context $\bar{X}$						Post-Hoc Test (.05)	
	(1) Unitary	(2) Federative	(3) Coalitional	F	DF	SIG	LSD	Scheffé
External Influence	3.94 (125)	3.55 (130)	3.83 (201)	2.52	455	.08	2-1	--
SPU Influence	3.42 (125)	3.40 (127)	3.27 (203)	1.04	454	.36	--	--

As indicated in Table 4.4, neither measure of influence was found to be statistically significant ($P \leq .05$) across context types. However, post hoc comparisons (LSD) indicated differences between the federative and unitary contexts on Item 62, the implication being that individuals in the federative context perceived greater influence ($\overline{X} = 3.55$) than did individuals in the unitary context ($\overline{X} = 3.94$).

Environmental Management

The next process variables to be considered in relation to inclusive environmental context were the possible strategies employed by the special unit to manage its environment, thus securing an organizational domain. Four scales were constructed to measure various environmental strategies. As different groups of individuals responded to the four scales, each scale and its corresponding respondent group will be considered.

The first scale (cooptation) examined the degree to which command personnel and executives participated in the initial and operational stages of special unit development. The underlying dimension the scale addressed was that of coopting elements of the external environment into the policy-making structure of the new organization, which presumably should have the ultimate effect of reducing external hostility toward the focal organization.

Consequently, respondents were asked to indicate the extent of their participation in the selection of special unit goals, objectives, and activities.

The second scale (coordination) was directed toward examining the degree to which formal mechanisms linked the special unit to its environment. Scale items asked whether there were written standard operating procedures, provisions, or requirements for patrol and detective bureaus to report information regularly to the special unit. The scale, therefore, was viewed as measuring the formal coordination of efforts between the environment and the special unit, and was given to all respondent groups.

The third environmental management scale (market) asked all respondent groups to assess the special unit's ability to provide information on a regular basis to both patrol and investigations bureaus. The intent of this scale was to focus attention on the special unit's ability to create a market for its output. As one of the major goals of each of the units under consideration was to improve the flow of information between area police departments and units within the same agency, this scale measured the special unit's market creation potential.

The fourth scale (cooperation) was developed to examine the extent to which individuals in the external environment felt the special unit attempted to cooperate

with established agencies or organizational subunits. The distinction between this scale and the coordination scale was the degree of formality implied. The cooperation scale was directed toward top-level command personnel in the external environment.

Table 4.5 indicates the results of data analysis on the four scales. The table shows that, with one exception, analysis of differences on the four scales measuring environmental management failed to produce significant results when controlling for the levels of inclusive context. The scale that did produce significant results ($P = .000$) was the one measuring formal coordination of efforts between the special units and their environments. Furthermore, post hoc tests indicated that significant differences existed on the coordination scale across all levels of environmental context. Specifically, the unitary context exhibited the highest levels of formalized coordination between special units and elements of the environment ($\bar{X} = 3.21$). Additionally, the federative environmental context yielded higher levels of formal coordination than did the coalitional context ($\bar{X} = 3.59$ and 3.93, respectively).

This finding suggested that the results were consistent with the original conceptualization of a continuum

TABLE 4.5

MEASURES OF STRATEGIES TO MANAGE THE ENVIRONMENT OVER LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

Process Variable	Environmental Context $\bar{X}$						Post-Hoc Test (.05)	
	(1) Unitary	(2) Federative	(3) Coalitional	F	DF	SIG	LSD	Scheffé
Cooptation	3.68 (15)	3.56 (40)	3.95 (50)	1.81	104	.17	--	--
Coordination	3.21 (124)	3.59 (132)	3.93 (212)	14.83	467	.000	1-2 2-3	1-2 2-3
Market	4.00 (126)	3.66 (130)	3.97 (204)	2.41	459	.09	1-3 --	1-3 --
Cooperation	3.00 (15)	3.06 (41)	3.04 (51)	.02	106	.98	--	--

of inclusive environmental contexts.[5] As predicted in the ideal contextual types, the formal ordering of relationships was expected to be the strongest under the unitary context. Similarly, the degree of such structured relations was expected to decline in both the federative and coalitional arrangements. As a result, it was expected that special units that functioned within a unitary context would, by virtue of that context, be engaged in more formally coordinated relations with other subcomponents of the environment. The data presented in Table 4.5 substantially corroborate this expected relationship across environmental context types.

Threat Perception

The last concept to be considered in this section is the potential threat the special unit might create for elements of its environment. The "Threat" scale was created in an effort to examine the possibility that the special unit might be considered threatening to various elements in its environment. The term threat is somewhat ambiguous, and its use in this analysis is somewhat problematic. All respondent groups were asked to indicate the level of trust they placed in the special unit, primarily with regard to the sharing of information. Since

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[5]Warren, Op cit.

the reward structures of most policing agencies give credit for criminal apprehensions, the measurement of threat centers on the degree to which individuals are willing to share, with the special unit, information that might ultimately result in an arrest. It was assumed that for any given police jurisdiction a finite number of arrests is to be made. This assumption draws attention to the possibility that individuals seeking rewards in the police milieu would be reluctant to share information that might lead to an arrest, which they could make.

An analogous situation is that of information distortion in bureaucracies.[6] As one author commenting on the process of information distortion indicated:

> Each official tends to distort the information he passes upward to his superiors in the hierarchy. Specifically, all types of officials tend to exaggerate data that reflect favorably upon themselves and to minimize those that reveal their own shortcomings.[7]

The distortion of information in bureaucracies because of individual fear of receiving a negative organizational sanction ultimately affects the total communications process within the organization. Similarly, the reluctance

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[6]Herbert A. Simon offered an excellent analysis of obstacles to the communications process in bureaucracies in Administrative Behavior 2d ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 154-171.

[7]Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1967), p. 77.

on the part of environmental actors to trust and share information with the special unit may ultimately be based on the threat to obtaining organizational rewards that is presented by the existence of a special unit also seeking reward. Data analyzed for this concept are presented in Table 4.6.

As indicated in Table 4.6, the analysis yielded a statistically significant level of difference among environmental contexts on the scale measuring threat perception ($P = .05$). This finding indicated that threat perception was affected by the inclusive environmental context. Post hoc procedures to test differences in means indicated that the greatest differences existed between the coalitional and unitary environmental contexts ($\bar{X} = 2.61$ and 2.95, respectively). This finding suggested that with regard to viewing the establishment of a special unit as a threat, the unitary context exhibited higher levels of threat perception (lower levels of trust) than the coalitional context. This finding was not necessarily at variance with the original environmental context typology.

For example, under the unitary environmental context, organizational subunits are normally assumed to be divided by function; authority and decision-making reside at the apex of the organization and individual commitments are to the organization as a whole. However, functional

TABLE 4.6

THREAT PERCEPTION OVER LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

Process Variable	Environmental Context $\bar{X}$						Post-Hoc Test (.05)	
	(1) Unitary	(2) Federative	(3) Coalitional	F	DF	SIG	LSD	Scheffé
Threat	2.95 (125)	2.73 (131)	2.61 (204)	3.12	459	.05	3-1	3-1

differentiation may result in individual commitments to subunit goals rather than to those of the broader organization.

> The maintenance needs of the subunits dictate a commitment to the subunit goals over and above their contribution to the total organizational program. Many individual needs depend on the continued success and even the expansion of the subunit.[8]

Furthermore, since the division of labor is inclusive in the unitary context, in that all major tasks and functions are assigned to specific organizational subunits, the introduction of a new unit into this milieu may create competitive strain between the new unit vying for organizational space and an already existing unit that lays claim to that territory. The special police units in a unitary context may, therefore, be viewed as in many ways directly competing with patrol and detective bureaus for subunit status.

In both the federative and coalitional contexts, the salience of threat may be reduced simply by the size of the environment and the number of subunits operating within those contexts. That is, a special unit operating in an environment composed of three or four patrol and detective bureaus may represent less threat potential

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[8]James G. March, and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), pp. 41-42.

simply because the unit in all probability could not compete simultaneously with all factions of the environment.

Using the concept of an inclusive environmental context, the outcome and process variables were analyzed. The major findings in this section are as follows:

1. Inclusive environmental context was found to have a direct effect on existing levels of command officer resistance to the special police units. Specifically, higher levels of command officer resistance to the special unit were found to exist in the unitary environmental context.

2. Although not statistically significant, environmental context was found to have an effect on evaluations of special unit impact, indicating that the nature of the inclusive environmental context may create differing levels of expectations with regard to the anticipated outputs and effects of the special unit.

3. Environmental context was found to affect domain consensus, particularly in the federative context, which exhibited the highest levels of domain consensus. Also the effect of goal clarity may have had an influence on the obtained levels of domain consensus. Furthermore, environmental context was found to have a significant effect on perceptions of influence (Item 62), the use of formal coordination as a strategy to manage the environment (highest in the unitary context), and levels of threat

perception. These findings indicated that the structure of the environment did, indeed, affect the processes antecedent to implementation.

Antecedents to Implementation

Analyses, to this point, have focused on the effects inclusive environmental context had on outcome and process variables. This section examines the antecedents to implementation, namely the influence the process variables identified in Chapter III have on outcomes. As discussed in Chapter II, the theoretical framework postulated that within environmental contexts such issues as domain consensus, goal clarity, perceptions of influence, power dependence relations, and exchange affect the ultimate securing of an organizational domain.

To explore these possible relationships, the process variables identified in Chapter III were truncated into ordinal levels, i.e., high, intermediate, and low levels of threat perception. Each outcome variable was then analyzed in a one-way analysis of variance model, using as the independent variable the levels of the truncated process variables. Tests of statistical significance were applied to the overall analysis as well as post hoc comparisons designed to determine the precise differences among groups.

The Effects of Goal Clarity and Domain Consensus

As discussed in Chapter II, the acquisition of a viable organizational domain is largely predicated on the attainment of external domain consensus regarding the role and purposes of the focal organization. Furthermore, securing an organizational domain through domain consensus is believed to be affected by the clarity of organizational goals. To explore these possible relationships, the measures of goal clarity (Item 26) and domain consensus (Domain) were truncated into three levels. The three levels on each measure provided groups upon which the outcome variables could be analyzed. In truncating both goal clarity and domain consensus, concern was with preserving the interpretive value of each underlying scale. Consequently, in general variables were truncated in the following manner: (1) High equaled total or strong agreement, (2) intermediate equaled agreement, and (3) low equaled disagreement of all degrees. Occasionally the distribution of scores on a scale or survey item required that the intermediate classification include both weak agreement and weak disagreement. As both of these represented the midpoint of the scale, the classification appeared justified. This procedure was followed for each process variable. The results of this analysis, as well as the ranges of the truncated variables - goal clarity and domain consensus are reported in Table 4.7.

TABLE 4.7

OUTCOME VARIABLES BY GOAL CLARITY AND DOMAIN CONSENSUS

Outcome Variable	Levels of Goal Clarity (Item 26)[a] High	Intermediate	Low	F	DF	SIG	LSD	α .05 Scheffé
Opposition	[c]--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Integration	3.09 (61)	3.74 (19)	2.88 (8)	1.40	2	.25	--	--
Impact	3.36 (60)	3.41 (19)	3.94 (8)	1.42	2	.25	--	--
Use	2.06 (62)	2.24 (19)	1.81 (8)	.63	2	.54	--	--

Outcome Variable	Levels of Domain Consensus ($\bar{X}$)[b] High	Intermediate	Low	F	DF	SIG	LSD	.05 Scheffe
Opposition	4.24 (172)	3.69 (98)	3.59 (75)	11.68	2	.000	3-1 2-1	3-1 2-1
Integration	3.05 (286)	3.69 (97)	4.11 (71)	16.02	2	.000	1-2 1-3	1-2 1-3
Impact	3.39 (266)	3.67 (96)	4.16 (74)	16.03	2	.000	1-2 1-3 2-3	1-3
Use	2.08 (286)	2.35 (95)	2.48 (74)	7.59	2	.001	1-2 1-3	1-2 1-3

[a]Range of Truncated Variable Goal Clarity: High = 1-2; Intermediate = 3-4; Low = 5-6.

[b]Range of Truncated Variable Domain: High = 1-2.5; Intermediate = 2.51-3.0; Low = 3.01 through 6.

[c]Not enough cases were available to analyze this variable.

The analysis of domain consensus, the results of which are reported in Table 4.7, indicated quite clearly that levels of domain consensus effected evaluations of command officer resistance toward the special unit, unit integration in the larger system, evaluations of special unit impact, and use patterns. The post hoc comparisons also revealed that the direction (difference among groups) of responses by categories of domain consensus was consistent across each of the outcome variables. For example, both the Least Significant Difference and Scheffé post hoc comparisons indicated that, on evaluations of levels of command officer resistance to the special unit, significant differences (α .05) existed between individuals classified as either high or intermediate on domain consensus and those classified as low. An examination of the means for each category revealed that those who were classified as high on domain consensus perceived lower levels of command officer resistance to the new unit than did those who were classified in the low domain consensus category ($\overline{X}$ = 4.24 and 3.59, respectively).

Similarly, those classified as high on domain consensus exhibited higher evaluations of unit integration ($\overline{X}$ = 3.05), impact ($\overline{X}$ = 3.39), and use ($\overline{X}$ = 2.08) than did individuals classified as intermediate ($\overline{X}$ = 3.69, 3.67, 2.35) or low ($\overline{X}$ = 4.11, 4.16, 2.48). Additionally, individuals occupying the intermediate classification of

domain consensus consistently were more positive in their evaluations of unit integration, impact, and use than were individuals in the "low" classification.

This consistent and statistically significant pattern of response drew attention to the effect domain consensus had on the outcome measures. The establishment of domain consensus, as indicated by the data presented in Table 4.7, appeared to have important consequences for the acceptance and use of the special unit by its organizational environment.

In contrast to the results obtained on domain consensus, levels of goal clarity apparently had no effect on evaluations on any of the outcome variables. This was indeed surprising, for it had been anticipated that goal clarity was a necessary condition for domain consensus, and as the data indicated domain consensus was found to have a significant impact on all of the outcome variables. Furthermore, even when the mean scores of categories of goal clarity were compared, on at least two outcome variables (unit integration and use) those classified in the "low" category of goal clarity apparently evaluated unit integration more highly than did other groups, as well as indicating higher levels of utilization. This suggested that those individuals who, by implication, understood the goals of the special unit the least tended to use it more and felt it was more integrated into the larger environmental

system than did individuals who presumably understood the special unit's goals and objectives. Two possible explanations of this unexpected pattern may be advanced.

First, the problem of respondent status position may have had some effect on the obtained results. The survey item measuring goal clarity was asked only of patrol and detective bureau command personnel. Presumably, these individuals would have been in a better position than those in noncommand positions to evaluate goal clarity. However, these individuals were also responsible for managing the affairs of their respective organizational subcomponents. Once the special unit received the official support of the agency's chief executive, the issue of goal clarity may have been less salient for these types of respondents. Consequently, their evaluations of the outcome variables may have been less affected by their understanding of the special unit's goals and objectives than by other factors, i.e., specific needs of their units of organization, the will of the chief executive, or immediate or developing dependencies between their organizational subdivision and the special unit.

The second possible reason for the apparent contradiction in the response to goal clarity was the measurement item itself, particularly with regard to its relationship to domain consensus. As the issue raised by this item was the clarity of special unit goals and objectives,

much latitude in agreement or disagreement with these goals and objectives may have been evidenced. Individuals who indicated "high" levels of goal clarity simply may have disagreed with these goals. Consequently, their evaluations would have been consistent not with clarity but with agreement. This supported the initial characterization of goal clarity as a necessary but not sufficient condition to domain consensus.

Environmental Dependence and Evaluations of Outcome

Previous analyses of the impact of environmental context on dependence on the special unit as either a source of information, an aid to improved investigations, or a potential for improvement of productivity indicated that no significant differences existed among environmental contexts. However, the issue of the impact of dependence relationships warrants consideration of the effect of levels of dependence on the outcome variables. Each of the three dependency scales was truncated into three levels. Following the procedures outlined in the preceding section, these levels of dependence were then analyzed in relation to their impact on the outcome variables. The results of this analysis, as well as the ranges of the truncated variables, are reported in Table 4.8.

TABLE 4.8

OUTCOME VARIABLES BY MEASURES OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEPENDENCY[a]

Outcome Variable	Levels of Information Dependency						α .05	
	(1) High	(2) Intermediate	(3) Low	F	DF	SIG	LSD	Scheffé
Opposition	3.96 (321)	3.86 (14)	3.60 (10)	.48	2	.62	--	--
Integration	3.33 (390)	4.03 (40)	2.71 (24)	5.58	2	.004	3-2 1-2	3-2 1-2
Impact	3.54 (380)	4.23 (35)	3.31 (21)	7.46	2	.001	3-2 1-2	3-2 1-2
Use	2.18 (390)	2.43 (41)	2.13 (24)	1.43	2	.24	--	--
Outcome Variable	Levels of Investigation Dependency						.05	
	(1) High	(2) Intermediate	(3) Low	F	DF	SIG	LSD	Scheffe
Opposition	3.97 (312)	3.52 (21)	3.92 (12)	1.42	2	.24	--	--
Integration	3.37 (396)	3.63 (38)	2.55 (20)	3.10	2	.05	3-2 1-2	--
Impact	3.57 (391)	3.97 (29)	3.27 (16)	2.66	2	.07	3-2 1-2	--
Use	2.19 (397)	2.38 (38)	1.93 (20)	1.66	2	.19	--	--

Outcome Variable	Levels of Productivity Dependency						α .05	
	(1) High	(2) Intermediate	(3) Low	F	DF	SIG	LSD	Scheffé
Opposition	3.95 (318)	3.77 (22)	4.20 (5)	.35	2	.71	--	--
Integration	3.37 (399)	3.36 (44)	2.64 (11)	1.12	2	.33	--	--
Impact	3.55 (395)	3.96 (33)	3.59 (8)	2.23	2	.11	1-2	--
Use	2.19 (399)	2.26 (45)	1.95 (11)	.52	2	.60	--	--

[a]Classification of Levels High, Intermediate and Low on these measures were as follows:

	Ranges		
	High	Intermediate	Low
Information	1 - 2.50	2.51 - 3.00	3.01 - 5.00
Investigation[b]	1 - 1.50	1.51 - 2.00	2.01 - 3.00
Productivity	1 - 2.50	2.51 - 3.00	3.01 - 5.00

[b]A three point scale.

The analysis presented in Table 4.8 indicates that two of the three dependency scales (Information and Investigation) yielded significant differences among groups in the analysis of variance. Levels of information dependence were found to differ significantly over both outcome variables--unit integration in the larger system and special unit impact (P = .004 and .001, respectively). Interestingly, however, the differences among levels of information dependence on these outcome variables were in an unanticipated direction; individuals indicating the lowest levels of information dependence were more positive in their evaluations of the outcome measures than were individuals classified as either high or intermediate. This suggested that evaluations of unit integration and impact may have been negatively affected by the degree of perceived dependence on the special unit. Consequently, individuals who viewed themselves as not dependent on the special unit as a source of information may have felt less constrained in their evaluations. Conversely, individuals who felt intermediate or high dependence on the special unit as a source of information may have attempted to minimize this dependence by more negatively evaluating the impact and integration of the special unit.

With regard to levels of investigation dependence, results similar to those obtained above were found. Individuals indicating low levels of investigation dependence

were more positive in their evaluations of the special unit's integration into the larger organizational environment than were individuals classified as either high or intermediate ($\bar{X}$ = 2.25 vs. 3.37 and 3.63, respectively). Again this suggested that perceptions of dependence on the special unit may have negatively affected externals' evaluations of the unit. Although significant ($P \leq .05$) differences on evaluations of special unit impact were not found to exist, the Least Significant Difference Test isolated a difference between the "low" and "intermediate" levels of investigation dependency on this variable. By comparing group means, the direction of difference indicated that individuals categorized as "low" were more positive in their evaluations of impact than were those classified as "intermediate" ($\bar{X}$ = 3.27 and 3.97, respectively).

No significant difference on the outcome variables was detected over the levels of productivity dependence. One post hoc comparison, the most liberal, isolated a difference between "high" and "intermediate" levels of productivity dependence on the outcome variable special unit impact, indicating that individuals who believed that their productivity was affected by the existence of the special unit were more positive in their evaluations of impact than were those who did not view their productivity as affected by the special unit.

The implications of the results obtained, with regard to measures of external dependence on the special unit, appeared to indicate that environmental dependence on the special unit affected acceptance of the special unit into the host environment. As dependence relations are one extreme of the power continuum, attention must now be focused on the other end--namely perceptions of influence.

Influence Perception

Individual perceptions of influence were examined in preceding sections to determine the extent to which environmental context affected these perceptions. The results of this analysis indicated that inclusive environmental context had no effect on perceptions of influence. The issue that now arises is: Do varying levels of influence perception have an effect on evaluations of the outcome variables? To pursue this issue, both measures of influence perception (Items 62 and 65) were truncated into three ordinal categories: (1) high, (2) intermediate, and (3) low. Data for individuals in each of these categories were then analyzed with respect to their evaluations or the outcome variables. The results of this analysis, as well as the ranges of the truncated process variables measuring influence perception, are presented in Table 4.9.

TABLE 4.9

OUTCOME VARIABLES BY MEASURES OF PERCEPTION OF INFLUENCE[a]

Outcome Variable	Levels of Environmental Influence						α .05	
	(1) High	(2) Intermediate	(3) Low	F	DF	SIG	LSD	Scheffé
Opposition	4.40 (58)	3.94 (81)	3.83 (200)	5.35	2	.005	3-1 2-1	3-1
Integration	2.25 (72)	2.84 (114)	3.87 (262)	42.71	2	.000	1-2 1-3 2-3	1-2, 1-3 2-3
Impact	2.97 (68)	3.22 (110)	3.91 (250)	32.68	2	.000	1-3 2-3	1-3 2-3
Use	1.70 (71)	2.04 (112)	2.41 (263)	20.67	2	.000	1-2 1-3 2-3	1-2, 1-3 2-3
Outcome Variable	Levels of Special Unit Influence						.05	
	(1) High	(2) Intermediate	(3) Low	F	DF	SIG	LSD	Scheffe
Opposition	3.93 (68)	3.97 (113)	3.95 (160)	.03	2	.97	--	--
Integration	3.29 (78)	3.42 (152)	3.30 (216)	.30	2	.74	--	--
Impact	3.56 (77)	3.48 (144)	3.63 (204)	.73	2	.48	--	--
Use	2.21 (77)	2.21 (152)	2.17 (216)	.09	2	.92	--	--

[a]Items 62 and 65 were truncated using the same ranges: High 1-2; Intermediate = 3; and Low = 4-6.

As shown in Table 4.9, significant differences among the groups classified by level of influence perception on Item 62 were obtained for each outcome variable. This indicates that level of perception of influence in the special unit's policy-making process did have an effect on evaluations of the special unit. Furthermore, post hoc comparisons of the means of each influence perception classification indicated that individuals who were classified as "high" on influence perception consistently evaluated the special unit more positively than did those exhibiting lower levels of influence perception. For example, with reference to evaluations of unit integration into the larger environmental network, special unit impact, and use, the means for the "high" influence group were 2.25, 2.97 and 1.70, respectively. By contrast, the intermediate influence group ($\overline{X}$ = 2.84, 3.22 and 2.04) and the low influence group ($\overline{X}$ = 3.87, 3.91, and 2.41) scored appreciably lower on each evaluation. Also, individuals in the intermediate group consistently were more positive in their evaluations of unit integration, impact, and use than were individuals classified as having low perceptions of influence in the special unit's affairs.

The direction of group means reversed itself with regard to evaluations of command officer resistance to the special unit (Item 7). On this item individuals classified in the low influence group indicated higher levels of

agreement with the existence of command officer resistance than did the high influence group ($\overline{X}$ = 3.94 vs. $\overline{X}$ = 4.40). An examination of the response pattern on perceptions of influence in the special unit's policy-making structure revealed that this pattern was identical to the one obtained on domain consensus. This lent confidence to the classification scheme, in that consistent and statistically significant differences existed among all levels of the classification of external influence perception. It also indicated the importance of distinguishing among high, intermediate, and low levels of influence perception, as these various levels consistently differed in the expected direction. These findings suggested that levels of influence perception did indeed have an effect on acceptance and use of the special unit by the external environment.

The results obtained on Item 65, which measured the extent to which individuals believed the special unit was more likely to have greater influence, than the respondent's agency indicated no significant differences among groups ($P \leq .05$). This appeared to indicate that perceptions of positive influence, i.e., being able to influence others, had more of an effect on evaluations on the outcome variables than did perceptions of negative influence, i.e., being influenced by others. The conclusion that may be drawn from this finding is that the direction of perceived influence had an important bearing

on subsequent evaluations of the special unit. This conclusion has important implications with respect to the special unit's ability to manage its environment effectively, thus securing a viable organizational domain. Creating high levels of influence perception may prove to be a major task in the negotiation of special unit existence. It is on the issue of environmental management that attention is now focused.

The Impact of Environmental Management Strategies

As discussed in Chapter II, efforts to manage the environment are essentially designed to secure and maintain an organizational domain. The preceding discussion indicated that the development of high levels of influence perception with regard to actors in the external environment had a significant effect on attitudes toward and evaluations of the special unit. The next step in the analysis is to examine the impact of various environmental management strategies on external levels of special unit acceptance and use.

Each of the scales measuring a particular type of environmental management strategy was truncated to produce an ordinal classification of that scale.

In truncating the four scales measuring the speial unit's efforts to manage its environment, two primary considerations were salient. First, the ranges of each

category of the truncated scale were kept consistent with the underlying measures of each independent survey item. Consequently, care was exercised to preserve the distinctions among the positive, intermediate and negative ranges of the original scales. However, as the distribution of scores on each scale varied among scales, points of demarcation among classifications were adjusted to reflect the distribution on each measure. For example, the score measuring cooptation was derived from a series of survey items that asked for individual assessments of the extent of participation in the special unit's goal, activity, and objective selection. The scale measuring cooptation was a five-point rather than six-point scale, and was truncated in a different fashion than either formal coordination or cooperation. Similarly, the response distribution on the scale measuring the special unit's market creation efforts was clearly bimodal. As a result, this scale was truncated into four levels to preserve the distribution of responses.

Furthermore, as indicated in Chapter III, the procedures used to construct each scale had the effect of insuring that each scale was indeed an independent measure. As items selected for inclusion in a particular scale were highly correlated with one another and not with items contained in other scales, it was believed that each scale was an independent measure of a different environmental management strategy. The ranges associated with each level are

reported in Table 4.10, together with the results of the analysis. The discussions that follow, however, are presented separately for each type of management strategy.

Cooptation and Its Effect - The scale measuring levels of environmental cooptation was essentially a measure of the extent to which individuals felt they participated directly in the establishment of the special unit, particularly in the areas of goal, objective, and activity selection. As such, the cooptation scale was viewed as an indirect measure of the cooptation strategy.

The results of data analysis reported in Table 4.10 indicated that significant differences ($P \leq .05$) were detected between levels of cooptation on two of the outcome variable measures--unit integration and special unit impact. Additionally, post hoc comparisons among groups were able to identify and localize these differences. On the measure of unit integration, the most positively oriented group was those individuals in the intermediate category ($\bar{X} = 2.25$). With regard to the measurement of use, again individuals classified in the intermediate cooptation group were found to differ significantly ($P \leq .05$) from both the "high" and "low" cooptation groups.

Although this finding would at face value appear to be difficult to explain, the original conceptualization

TABLE 4.10

OUTCOME VARIABLES BY ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES[a]

Outcome Variable	Levels of Cooptation						α .05	
	(1) High	(2) Intermediate	(3) Low	F	DF	SIG	LSD	Scheff
Opposition	[b]--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Integration	3.35 (374)	2.25 (20)	3.73 (60)	6.53	2	.002	2-1 2-3	2-1 2-3
Impact	3.54 (372)	3.19 (17)	3.81 (47)	2.22	2	.11	--	--
Use	2.19 (373)	1.81 (21)	2.40 (61)	3.46	2	.03	2-3	2-3
Outcome Variable	Levels of Cooperation						.05	
	(1) High	(2) Intermediate	(3) Low	F	DF	SIG	LSD	Scheffe
Opposition	3.90 (52)	3.91 (90)	3.97 (203)	.11	2	.89	--	--
Integration	2.94 (82)	3.02 (122	3.66 (250)	10.21	2	.000	1-3 2-3	1-3 2-3
Impact	3.34 (75)	3.31 (112)	3.78 (249)	9.79	2	.000	1-3 2-3	1-3 2-3
Use	2.06 (82)	1.95 (121)	2.36 (252)	9.67	2	.000	1-3 2-3	1-3 2-3

Outcome Variable	Levels of Cooperation						α .05	
	(1) High	(2) Intermediate	(3) Low	F	DF	SIG	LSD	Scheffé
Opposition	--[b]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Integration	3.27 (387)	3.08 (26)	4.37 (41)	9.39	2	.000	1-3 2-3	1-3 2-3
Impact	3.56 (378)	3.33 (22)	3.92 (36)	2.46	2	.09	2-3	--
Use	2.17 (387)	2.22 (27)	2.45 (41)	1.74	2	.18	--	--

Outcome Variable	Levels of Market Creation							.05	
	(1) Extremely High	(2) Moderately High	(3) Moderately Low	(4) Extremely Low	F	DF	SIG	LSD	Scheffe
Opposition	4.14(57)	4.13(79)	3.84(99)	3.81(110)	1.88	3	.13	--	--
Integration	1.96(78)	2.61(109)	3.70(127)	4.39(140)	71.01	3	.000	*	*
Impact	2.52(69)	3.04(101)	3.64(129)	4.45(137)	103.02	3	.000	*	*
Use	1.73(78)	1.93(108)	2.31(131)	2.57(138)	20.31	3	.000	*	*

[a]Ranges on the Truncated Measures are: Cooptation, High = 1-2.8, Intermediate = 2.81-3.6, Low = 3.61-5; Coordination, High = 1-2.75, Intermediate = 2.76-3.0, Low = 3.01-6.0; Cooperation, High = 1-2.75, Intermediate = 2.76-3.0, Low = 3.01-6.0; Market Creation, Extremely High = 1-2.50, Moderately High = 2.51-3.5, Moderately Low = 3.51-4.33, Extremely Low = 4.34-6.

[b]Not enough cases to calculate.

*Significant differences among all groups - $\geq$ .05.

of cooptation as a strategy may provide some insight into the results obtained. Cooptation as a process requires that elements of the environment be directly incorporated into the policy-making structures of the new organization. In the case at hand, the group identified as having a high level of participation in the development of the special unit was viewed as meeting this criterion. It was believed that once these elements were incorporated into the organization they would lose some if not all of their initial resistance to the fledgling organization. Consequently, tension between organization and environment would be reduced and the new organization would be free to pursue its goals.

A problem arises, however, that relates to the cooptation process itself. Cooptation is by its very nature a reciprocal process. "The character of the coopted elements will necessarily shape the modes of action available to the group which has won adoption at the price of commitment to outside elements."[9] Consequently, elements of the environment once coopted may have an extreme influence on the setting and attainment of organizational goals and objectives. The findings obtained on the cooptation scale presented in Table 4.10 were viewed as being consistent with the cooptation process described above.

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[9]Philip Selznick, "Cooptation," in Complex Organizations and Their Environments, ed. Merlin B. Brinkerhoff and Phillip R. Kunz (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1972), p. 144.

Individuals who feel they have been major participants in the development of the special unit may be influenced in their evaluations by their own levels of participation. For example, individuals who directly participated in the development of the special unit may have been far more critical with regard to its integration in the larger environment and its use than others who did not participate as directly, because the former group may have had greater expectations for the unit than their counterparts whose participation was less direct. Although this interpretation is tentative, because a majority of the respondents fell into the "high" cooptation classification, it nevertheless is consistent with the original conceptualization of the cooptation process and is offered as an attempt to explain the dynamics of this process and the results obtained.

Coordination as an Attempt to Manage the Environment - Formal coordination between the special units and elements of their environments was previously found to be most used in the unitary environmental context. This initial finding was viewed as consistent with the theoretical development of an environmental continuum and the attributes associated with each context type.

The results of examining the effect of varying levels of formal coordination on the outcome variables are reported in Table 4.10. As indicated in the table, significant differences were found to exist among groups classified by levels of coordination on three of the four outcome measures. The results indicated that evaluation of the special unit's integration, impact, and use differed significantly among groups classified by levels of coordination. Post hoc comparisons revealed the direction of these differences to be consistent with expectations, in that individuals classified as either high or intermediate with regard to coordination tended to evaluate the special unit in terms of integration, impact, and use more positively than did individuals classified as "low" on coordination. This appeared to indicate that the development of formal linkages between the special unit and elements of its environment had an impact on subsequent environmental acceptance of the unit and use of its output. As indicated earlier, however, the specific environmental context in which the coordination strategy was attempted affected environmental acceptance or rejection of that management strategy. Consequently, it appeared that the use of a coordination strategy may have been more effective in the unitary environmental context than in the others.

Cooperation as a Means of Securing Environmental Acceptance - The cooperation strategy was viewed as a means to secure environmental acceptance and use on a less formal basis than coordination. The measurement of cooperation focused on perceptions of environmental actors with regard to the levels of cooperation extended by the special unit. The results of the analysis of the impact of levels of cooperation on the outcome measures are reported in Table 4.10, along with the ranges on each cooperation level.

As indicated in Table 4.10, significant differences were found to exist among groups classified by cooperation on the outcome measure of unit integration (Item 49). Furthermore, the direction of these differences showed that individuals who indicated high levels of cooperation were also higher (more positive) in their evaluations of special unit integration in the larger environmental system than were individuals who indicated low levels of cooperation ($\bar{X}$ = 3.27 vs. $\bar{X}$ = 4.37). This difference was also found to exist between the intermediate ($\bar{X}$ = 3.08) and low ($\bar{X}$ = 4.37) groups. No differences were detected between the high and intermediate cooperation classifications. This may have been the result of the artificiality of the classifications themselves. As concern was with the polar extremes of cooperation, the intermediate classification may have been unnecessary.

The results suggested that informal cooperation between the special unit and elements of its environment affected unit integration in the larger network, but this effect was related to the polar extremes of the cooperation continuum. Informal cooperation was not found to have an effect on either perceptions of command officer opposition toward the unit or evaluations of impact and use.

The Creation of a Market for Special Unit Output - Perhaps one of the most important tasks facing the special unit attempting to integrate itself into an environmental network is creating an external demand for its services. Preceding discussions have examined such management strategies as cooptation, formal coordination, and informal cooperation, which are rather direct attempts to manage the external environment. The creation of external demand for special unit services, however, approaches the problem of environmental management from a somewhat different direction. Here, the concern is with creating perceptions of need.

As one of the primary objectives of all the special units under examination was the creation of improved information regarding crime and criminal offenders, the measurement of a market creation strategy focused on evaluations of the special unit's ability to disseminate information to relevant actors in the external environment.

Consequently, individuals who indicated that the special unit did in fact disseminate useful crime information were viewed as implicitly stating that the units were creating an external market for their services. Admittedly this measure is less than direct; however, it was felt that indirectly measuring market creation capabilities would minimize response bias.

The scale measuring market creation efforts was truncated into four levels, as the distribution of responses was clearly bimodal. Table 4.10 presents the ranges of each level of the market creation strategy as well as the results obtained through analysis.

As shown in Table 4.10, significant differences among groups classified by level of market creation were obtained on three of the four outcome variables. Specifically, differences were found to exist among groups with respect to unit integration, impact, and use. Post hoc comparisons revealed that each of the groups was found to be significantly different from the others (P = .05, LSD and Scheffé), indicating that higher perceptions of the special unit's market creation abilities were strongly associated with corresponding higher evaluations of unit integration and impact, as well as greater use of the special unit's services. An examination of the means for each classification of market creation over the outcome variables reinforced this conclusion. For example,

evaluation of special unit impact indicated that individuals classified as either extremely high or moderately high with respect to their perceptions of market creation were markedly higher in their evaluations of impact ($\bar{X}$ = 2.52 and 3.04 vs. $\bar{X}$ = 3.64 and 4.45). A similar pattern was identified on both evaluations of unit integration and use patterns.

These findings suggested that attempts on the part of the special unit to create a market for its output had an important effect on subsequent environmental acceptance and use. The expenditure of organizational resources to create external demand may be viewed as a viable strategy for special units to pursue. The consequences of such a pursuit, as indicated by the data presented in Table 4.10, support special unit domain acquisition.

Perceptions of Threat and Special Unit Acceptance and Use

Preceding discussions of the impact of threat perception on environmental acceptance and use of the special unit indicated that the special unit was more likely to create a threat in the inclusive environmental context than in the federative or coalitional context. To expand on this finding, the measure of threat perception was truncated into three levels: high, intermediate and low following the procedures described in the previous

discussion, these levels of threat perception were then examined in relation to their impact on the outcome variables. Table 4.11 presents the results of this analysis.

The results of analyzing the impact of levels of threat perception upon the outcome variables indicated significant differences existed among threat perception groups. These differences were found on the measures of unit integration, evaluations of impact, and use. Group comparisons further revealed that individuals classified as having low levels of threat perception were consistently more positive toward the special unit than were individuals classified as either intermediate or high. These differences were also detected between the intermediate and low classes of threat perception ($P \leq .05$ on both LSD and Scheffé).

From the analysis of Table 4.11, it may be concluded that perceptions of threat created by the establishment of the special unit had a negative impact on environmental acceptance and use of the special units under examination. This finding suggested that a major task confronting the special unit in its attempt to secure an organizational domain was reducing environmental perceptions of threat. This is consistent with the preceding considerations of attempts to manage the environment, in that efforts to secure an organizational domain by any

TABLE 4.11

OUTCOME VARIABLES BY THREAT PERCEPTION[a]

Outcome Variable	Levels of Threat Perception						α .05	
	(1) Low	(2) Intermediate	(3) High	F	DF	SIG	LSD	Scheffé
Opposition	4.12 (162)	3.80 (74)	3.79 (109)	3.24	2	.04	3-1	--
Integration	2.66 (219)	3.78 (105)	4.18 (130)	50.58	2	.000	1-2 1-3 2-3	1-2
Impact	3.09 (204)	3.58 (100)	4.34 (132)	69.86	2	.000	1-2 1-3 2-3	1-2 1-3 2-3
Use	2.02 (219)	2.23 (105)	2.47 (131)	10.72	2	.000	1-3 2-3	1-3

[a]Ranges for the 3 levels of Threat Perception: High = 1-2.50; Intermediate = 2.51-3.00; Low = 3.01-6.0.

management strategy should take into account the need to reduce external perceptions that the new unit may impose a threat to existing environmental actors. Without such a recognition, the analysis suggested, efforts to secure environmental acceptance and use may be thwarted.

The analysis of the identified process variables, with respect to their impact on the measures of outcome, yielded the following results:

1. Levels of domain consensus were found to have a significant effect on each of the four outcome variables. These findings indicated that domain consensus was an important variable in the implementation process, because it could be directly related to variations in the outcome variables. No significant differences among groups classified by goal clarity were found.

2. With regard to measures of external dependence on the special unit, information and investigation dependence were found to have a significant effect on evaluations of the special unit's integration into the larger environmental system. Information dependence also produced significant results on evaluations of special unit impact. In general, however, the measures of external dependence failed to produce consistently significant results across the outcome variables, and were, therefore, viewed as having a minimal impact in the current study.

3. The measure of perception of influence in the policy-making structure of the special units under examination (Item 62) produced consistently significant results across each of the outcome variables. This finding indicated that creating perceptions of influence in the external environment had an effect on gaining environmental acceptance and use of special unit outputs. The measure of special unit influence in the environment (Item 65) produced no significant results in the analysis.

4. Strategies designed to manage the environment, thus ensuring the special unit a viable organizational domain, were found to affect different outcome variables. Cooptation was found to affect both evaluations of unit integration and use, although this effect was not strong. Similarly, informal cooperation was found to influence unit integration, although the size of this impact was believed to be minimal. The two most consistent measures of environmental management strategies across the outcome variables were formal coordination and market creation.

Formal coordination as a management strategy was found to have a great influence on evaluations of unit integration, impact, and use. Perceptions of the special unit actively creating a market for its output were also found significantly to affect evaluations of unit integration, impact, and use.

5. The measure of threat perception in the external environment created by the establishment of the special unit was found to have a significant effect on evaluations of special unit integration, impact, and use. This finding suggested that threat perception had a negative impact in the implementation process. This finding also suggested that implementation efforts, particularly in the unitary environmental context, must recognize the need to reduce external perceptions of threat.

The Importance of Environmental Considerations in the Implementation Process

To this point the analysis has focused on isolating significant differences ($P \leq .05$) among groups classified by either inclusive environmental context or the truncated process variables, with regard to their evaluations of the outcome variables. Although significant differences on the outcome measures have been isolated, the issue concerning the strength of these differences or the degree of relationship between these variables must be raised.

The statistic selected to determine the degree of relationship between these variables was the correlation ratio E (Greek eta). The computational formula for E is:

$$E = \sqrt{\frac{SS_b}{SS_t}}$$

where: SS_b = between groups sum of squares, and

SS_t = total sum of squares

The advantage of selecting this statistic was that it makes no assumption about the linearity of the data.[10] That is, relationships between the data are not assumed to follow a straight line. Consequently, E (eta) was viewed as a general coefficient or index of the relationship between two variables. The square of eta (E^2) was interpreted as "the proportion of the variance of the dependent (outcome) variable determined by the variance of the independent [environment and process] variable.[11] Eta (E) was calculated only after significant differences were found to exist in the analysis of variance model. Table 4.12 reports eta (E) and eta squared (E^2) for both environmental context and process variables found in previous analyses to differ significantly with respect to the outcome measures.

As indicated in Table 4.12, a majority of the process variables accounted for little or no variation in the outcome variables, even though they were found to differ significantly. However, three process variables--domain consensus, perception of influence (Item 62), and threat

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[10]See: Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. (2nd ed.), 1973, pp. 227-31.

[11]Ibid., p. 231.

TABLE 4.12

PERCENTAGE OF VARIANCE ON OUTCOME VARIABLES EXPLAINED BY PROCESS VARIABLES

Variable	Outcome Variable							
	Opposition		Integration		Impact		Use	
	E	E^2	E	E^2	E	E^2	E	E^2
Goal Clarity	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Domain	.25	.06	.27	.07	.27	.07	.17	.03
Information	--	--	.14	.02	.17	.03	--	--
Investigation	--	--	.10	.01	--	--	--	--
Productivity	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
External Influence	.17	.03	.40	.16	.36	.13	.30	.09
SPU Influence	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Cooptation	--	--	.17	.03	--	--	.14	.02
Coordination	--	--	.20	.04	.20	.04	.20	.04
Cooperation	--	--	.20	.04	--	--	--	--
Market	--	--	.57	.32	.65	.42	.35	.12
Threat	.14	.02	.42	.18	.49	.24	.22	.05
Environmental Context	.18	.03	.05	.002	.10	.01	.06	.004

perception--consistently explained variation on each of four outcome variables. Additionally, two process variables--coordination and market creation--explained variation on at least three of the four outcome variables. These five process variables were viewed as embodying the underlying dimensions of the implementation process, in that they were found to affect significantly the evaluations of acceptance and use.

As reported in Table 4.12, domain consensus accounted for a range of 3 to 7 percent of the variation in the outcome measures. Perception of external influence (Item 62) had a greater effect on both unit integration (Item 49) and evaluation impact than it did on either use or perceptions of command officer resistance to the new unit (E^2 = .16 and .13 vs. .09 and .03). The environmental management strategy of formal coordination consistently accounted for 4 percent of the variation on unit integration (Item 49), impact, and use. The greatest levels of explained variation and, consequently, the strongest relationships found between a process and outcome variable were found for the environmental management strategy of market creation. Market creation accounted for 32 percent of the variation on the outcome variable of unit integration (Item 49), 42 percent of the variation on evaluations of special unit impact, and 12 percent of the variation on

use. This finding clearly indicated the importance of creating a favorable climate for the effective implementation of the special unit. The process variable measuring threat perception was found to be strongly related to evaluations of unit integration and impact, explaining 18 and 24 percent of the variation on those respective outcome variables. Threat perception was also found to explain 5 percent of the variation on the measure of environmental use.

The nature and structure of the inclusive environmental context, as reported in Table 4.12, was found to explain little of the variation on the outcome variables, indicating that the specific environmental context did not directly affect variations in outcomes. The largest amount of variation explained by environmental context was on the outcome variable of measuring command officer resistance to the special unit ($E^2 = .03$).

These findings indicated that certain aspects of the implementation process were importantly related to subsequent environmental acceptance and use of the special police unit services. The five process variables discussed above, by virtue of the variation each explained on the outcome measures, were viewed as critical variables in the implementation process. The final section in this analysis describes the effect of these five process variables on

three of the four outcome measures,[12] while controlling for the effects of inclusive environmental context. Previous analyses have indicated that environmental context significantly affected each of the five process variables. Therefore, the possibility existed that environmental context had an indirect effect on the outcome variables. To explore this possibility, the following section examines the effect of environmental context on the implementation of special police units. To accomplish this examination a two-way analysis of variance of the outcome measures was undertaken using the levels of environmental context and the identified process variables.

The Impact of Environmental Context on Implementation Processes

Previous analyses have indicated that inclusive environmental context did affect both the outcome and process variables. In the preceding section, five process variables were identified as having the largest impact on environmental acceptance and use of the special police units under examination. In this final stage of analysis,

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[12]The outcome variable measuring the level of command officer resistance (Item 7) was dropped from the analysis, as the process variables explained little variation on this variable. Also, only three of the five process variables identified were found to differ significantly on this measure.

the joint effect of process variables and inclusive environmental context is considered.

The independent effects of both domain consensus and environmental context have been discussed. Table 4.13 presents the results of analysis of the outcome variables among groups classified by levels of domain consensus and context. As indicated in the table, significant differences existed on each outcome variable among groups classified under domain consensus (P = .001), whereas no differences were detected between groups classified by context type. Furthermore, no interaction effects were noted between domain consensus and environmental context on the outcome variables. This finding indicated that levels of domain consensus had a greater impact on environmental acceptance and use of the special units than did the inclusive environmental contexts in which these units existed. This finding also suggested that the issue of domain consensus was salient in each of the environmental contexts discussed.

The second process variable to be discussed in relation to environmental context is perception of influence. Table 4.14 presents the results obtained from analysis of this variable. Again, as indicated in Table 4.14, significant differences among groups classified by perception of influence were found to exist on each of the outcome variables (P = .001), whereas

TABLE 4.13

OUTCOME VARIABLES BY DOMAIN CONSENSUS,
CONTROLLING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

Outcome Variable	Source of Variation	SS	DF	MS	F	P
Integration	Domain	73.76	2	36.88	15.03	.001
	Context	.18	2	.08	.03	.97
	Interaction	2.11	4	.54	.22	.93
Impact	Domain	33.59	2	16.79	15.23	.001
	Context	3.33	2	1.67	1.51	.22
	Interaction	2.15	4	.54	.49	.75
Use	Domain	13.06	2	6.53	7.98	.001
	Context	2.05	2	1.03	1.25	.29
	Interaction	1.45	4	.36	.44	.77

TABLE 4.14

OUTCOME VARIABLES BY PERCEPTIONS OF INFLUENCE, CONTROLLING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

Outcome Variable	Source of Variation	SS	DF	MS	F	P
Integration	External Influence	179.49	2	89.74	40.65	.001
	Context	.89	2	.44	.20	.81
	Interaction	1.42	4	.35	.16	.96
Impact	External Influence	63.25	2	31.63	31.03	.001
	Context	1.63	2	.81	.80	.45
	Interaction	1.36	4	.34	.33	.87
Use	External Influence	32.10	2	16.05	20.65	.001
	Context	1.12	2	.56	.72	.49
	Interaction	1.21	4	.30	.39	.82

environmental context produced no significant differences between groups. Also, no interaction effects were noted among perception of influence and environmental context.

Apparently perceptions of influence were independent of the specific environmental context. As was noted with respect to the measure of domain consensus, this finding appeared to indicate that influence perception was a salient implementation issue, regardless of the environmental structure with which the special unit was contronted.

Environmental management strategies are presumably designed to counteract forces external to the focal organization that may influence special unit acceptance and use. As previously indicated, two such strategies were found to affect the types of evaluations given to the special unit. Formal coordination was significantly affected by environmental context, and market creation significantly affected variation on the outcome variables. Table 4.15 and 4.16 present the results for both of these environmental management strategies on the outcome variables while controlling for inclusive environmental context.

The results obtained through the analysis of the outcome measures over both the truncated levels of formal coordination and environmental context indicated that significant differences existed among groups classified by coordination level ($P = .001$) for all outcome variables.

TABLE 4.15

OUTCOME VARIABLES BY COORDINATION,
CONTROLLING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

Outcome Variable	Source of Variation	SS	DF	MS	F	P
Integration	Coordination	57.62	2	28.81	11.89	.001
	Context	11.20	2	5.60	2.31	.10
	Interaction	32.13	4	8.03	3.32	.01
Impact	Coordination	22.17	2	11.08	10.06	.001
	Context	4.89	2	2.44	2.22	.11
	Interaction	13.89	4	3.47	3.15	.01
Use	Coordination	14.36	2	7.18	9.07	.001
	Context	.12	2	.06	.08	.93
	Interaction	11.17	4	2.79	3.52	.01

TABLE 4.16

OUTCOME VARIABLES BY MARKET CREATION,
CONTROLLING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

Outcome Variable	Source of Variation	SS	DF	MS	F	P
Integration	Market	371.94	3	123.98	70.32	.001
	Context	2.32	2	1.16	.66	.52
	Interaction	15.96	6	2.66	1.51	.17
Impact	Market	210.77	3	70.26	104.54	.001
	Context	1.23	2	.62	.92	.40
	Interaction	10.11	6	1.69	2.51	.02
Use	Market	45.22	3	15.08	20.04	.001
	Context	1.28	2	.64	.85	.43
	Interaction	.68	6	.11	.15	.99

Furthermore, Table 4.15 indicates that the independent effects of environmental context were not significant ($P \leq .05$). However, the interaction effects of coordination and environmental context were found to be significant ($P = .01$), indicating that the combined effect of formal coordination efforts and the particular environmental context did influence the outcome variables. This is consistent with previous findings, which indicated that the unitary environmental context was affected more by formal coordination efforts than were the federative or coalitional environmental contexts.

Similar, yet less conclusive results were obtained with respect to the effects of market creation as an environmental management strategy. As shown in Table 4.16, market creation had a significant effect on the outcome measures ($P = .001$), whereas environmental context had no effect. No interaction effects were found between market creation and environmental context on two of the outcome variables--unit integration (Item 49) and use. However, the interaction effects of market creation and environmental context were significant on the outcome variable of special unit impact. This indicated that environmental context may have affected evaluations of impact but not subsequent integration and use.

The final process variable to be considered with regard to environmental context and the selected outcome

variables was threat perception. Perception of threat was previously found to be strongest in the unitary environmental context. Consequently, it was expected that threat perception and environmental context would both affect the outcome variables. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4.17.

As shown in Table 4.17, threat perception had a significant effect on each of the outcome variables (P = .001). However, environmental context was found to be significant only with respect to the outcome variable measuring evaluations of the special unit's impact (P = .02). Furthermore, no interaction effects were indicated among threat perception and environmental context.

These findings suggested that, in general, threat perception had an independent effect on evaluations of unit integration in the larger environmental network, special unit impact, and use. Also, environmental context affected evaluations of special unit impact when levels of threat perception were controlled.

The results of the analyses of the factors affecting the implementation of special police units indicated the complex nature of organizational-environmental interaction. Specifically, it was found that the process variables did have an effect on outcomes, whereas the nature and structure of the inclusive environmental context, in general, did not. However, environmental context

TABLE 4.17

OUTCOME VARIABLES BY THREAT PERCEPTION,
CONTROLLING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

Outcome Variable	Source of Variation	SS	DF	MS	F	P
Integration	Threat	209.92	2	104.96	48.85	.001
	Context	.60	2	.30	.14	.87
	Interaction	1.51	4	.39	.18	.95
Impact	Threat	126.48	2	63.24	71.48	.001
	Context	6.76	2	3.38	3.82	.02
	Interaction	1.99	4	.50	.56	.69
Use	Threat	18.18	2	9.09	11.25	.001
	Context	2.32	2	1.16	1.43	.24
	Interaction	.66	4	.16	.20	.94

did affect the process variables. The implication of these findings was that the nature and structure of the inclusive environmental context had a somewhat indirect effect on the outcome variables in that environmental context itself rarely had a direct effect on the outcome measures. The process variables, by contrast, may be viewed as more directly affecting the outcome variables.

In the next chapter, conclusions, policy implications, and recommendations for future research are presented. Conclusions were drawn from the analyses of the data presented in this chapter; policy implications are advanced in an effort to improve the process of implementing specialized projects in organizational settings.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

The purpose of this study was to explore organizational issues faced in the implementation of specialized police units, particularly the effects of organizational environments. As the research was exploratory, no formal hypotheses were advanced. However, implicit in the analysis, and the statistical models used to explore the data, was an overall hypothesis that no difference would be found among groups classified on either the control or process variables with respect to their evaluations of command officer resistance to the special unit, the integration of the special unit into existing environmental networks, special unit impact, or use of special unit output. Consequently, the findings obtained in this study are cast in terms of the differences among observed groups and are divided into two major sections; (1) the effect of the environment, and (2) the effect of implementation (process variables).

The Effect of Environment

1. Inclusive environmental context was found to have an effect on existing levels of command officer resistance to the special police units. Specifically, higher levels of command officer resistance to the special unit were found to exist in the unitary environmental context than in the federative or coalitional contexts.

2. Environmental context was found to have an influence on evaluations of special unit impact, indicating that the nature of the inclusive environmental context may have created differing levels of expectations with regard to the anticipated outputs and effects of the special unit.

3. Environmental context was found to have an effect on domain consensus, particularly in the federative context, which exhibited the highest levels of domain consensus. Furthermore, environmental context was found to have a significant effect on perceptions of influence (Item 62), the use of formal coordination as a strategy to manage the environment (highest in the unitary context), and levels of threat perception. These findings indicated that the structure of the environment did, indeed affect the processes antecedent to implementation.

The Effect of Process Variables

Analysis of the identified process variables, with respect to their impact on the measures of outcome, yielded

the following results:

1. Levels of domain consensus were found to have a significant effect on each of the four outcome variables. No significant differences among groups classified by goal clarity were found. These findings indicated that domain consensus is an important variable to the implementation process, in that it can be related to variations in the outcome variables. Furthermore, where the effects of environmental context were controlled for, domain consensus was again found to affect outcomes significantly.

2. With regard to measures of external dependence on the special unit, information and investigation dependence were found to have a significant influence on evaluations of the special unit's integration into the larger environmental system. Information dependence also produced significant results when compared to evaluations of special unit impact. In general, however, the measures of external dependence failed to produce consistently significant results across the outcome variables, and were therefore viewed as having a minimal impact in the current study.

3. The measure of perception of influence in the policy-making structure of the special units under examination (Item 62) produced consistently significant results across each of the outcome variables. This finding indicated that creating perceptions of influence in the external environment affected levels of environmental

acceptance and use of special unit outputs. The measure of special unit influence in the environment (Item 65) produced no significant results in the analysis.

4. Strategies designed to manage the environment, thus ensuring the special unit a viable organizational domain, were found to affect different outcome variables. Cooptation was found to affect both evaluations of unit integration and use, although this effect was not strong. Similarly, informal cooperation was found to influence unit integration, although the size of this impact was believed to be minimal. The two most consistent measures of environmental management strategies across the outcome variables were formal coordination and market creation.

Formal coordination as a management strategy was found to have a sizable impact on evaluations of unit integration, impact, and use. Perceptions of the special unit actively creating a market for its output were also found to significantly affect evaluations of unit integration, impact, and use. Both of these management strategies were also found to account for a large amount of the variation on the outcome variables. It may be concluded from these findings that the use of these two management strategies appeared to affect significantly the implementation of the specialized police units. This conclusion was supported in the analysis controlling for the effects

of environmental context, which revealed that, in general, these strategies were not constrained by the environment in which they were used.

5. The measure of threat perception in the external environment created by the establishment of the special unit was found to produce significant effects on evaluations of special unit integration, impact, and use. This finding also suggested that implementation efforts, particularly in the unitary environmental context, must recognize the need to reduce external perceptions of threat.

These findings indicated that environmental considerations significantly affect the implementation process. Furthermore, the effects of both inclusive environmental context and the dynamics of the implementation process itself (process variables) on subsequent outcomes suggested that the initiation of special police units requires a concern for factors external to the organization if successful implementation is to be realized. The implications of these findings for both policy development and implementation efforts are considered in the following section.

Implications of the Findings

Throughout this study, attention has been focused on environmental impact on the implementation of specialized police units. The major findings obtained through

data analysis have indicated that the nature and composition of the special unit's organizational environment affect the implementation of these units. In addition, variables associated with the implementation process itself have been found to affect evaluations of the special unit's impact, its integration into the larger environmental network, levels of resistance to the initiation and operation of the new unit, and external use of special unit output. The implications that may be drawn from these findings can be classified under two distinct yet closely related headings: (1) implications for the development of a model of factors affecting special police unit implementation and (2) special police unit policy development in the implementation process.

A General Model of Factors Affecting the Implementation of Special Police Units

This study of the implementation of specialized police units proceeded from a series of assumptions about organizations and their environments, which was developed in Chapter II. These assumptions are as follows:

1) Organizations are open systems characterized by their dependence on external environments for both sources of input and consumption of outputs.

2) Organizational environments play a major role in shaping the focal organization's goals, objectives, and activities.

3) The extent to which an organization is integrated into existing institutional structures is largely predicated on the establishment of an organizational domain.

4) Subsequently, the establishment of an organizational domain is contingent on acquiring domain consensus with regard to relevant actors in the external environment.

5) An organization attempting to acquire domain consensus, and thus a viable domain, may employ various strategies (power, authority, influence) to gain environmental integration.

6) The environmental context within which the new organization must function will affect the type of power-acquiring strategy used by the focal organization.

6a) Organizations facing large heterogeneous environments will attempt to use a competitive power-acquiring strategy to reduce dependence on any single element of the external environment.

6b) Organizations facing relatively homogeneous environments will attempt to acquire power through the use of cooperative strategies.

7) Similarly, the type of interdependence between focal organization and any specific element of its environment will affect the type of strategy employed by the focal organization to acquire influence over that element.

8) The degree to which an organization is dependent on its environment affects the degree to which domain consensus is necessary for program implementation.

9) Successful organizational implementation in the larger organizational system depends on proper assessment of both systems--level integration and unit integration in the larger system.

10) The degree to which the external environment is dependent on the focal organization as either a source of input or a consuming unit of output affects both domain acquisition and subsequent unit integration into the larger system.

The results of data analysis, reported in Chapter IV substantively supported these initial organizational assumptions, particularly those relating to domain consensus, the use of various strategies designed to gain influence in the environment, and the nature of the inclusive environmental context. Furthermore, data analysis indicated that a general model of the effect of environmental issues may be advanced in an attempt to explain the complexity of organizational-environmental interaction in the implementation of special police units. Figure 5.1 depicts these relationships and their ultimate effect on environmental acceptance and use of the special unit.

As diagrammed in Figure 5.1, the inclusive environmental context had a direct effect on levels of resistance to the initiation and operation of the special unit. The environmental context also had an indirect effect on individual evaluations of the special unit's impact. These two findings were reported in Chapter IV. Although environmental context type had no effect on either evaluations of unit integration in the larger organizational system or external use of the special unit's output, the specific nature of the environmental context did influence a series of antecedent processes, all of which affect outcomes. Specifically, the nature of the inclusive environmental context affected: (1) levels of domain



Figure 5-1. A general model of factors affecting environmental acceptance and use of specialized police units.

consensus, (2) individual perceptions of influence in the special unit's policy-making structures, (3) the use of strategies designed to manage uncertainty in the environment, and (4) levels of threat perception. Each of these factors, in turn, impacted on the outcome variables. Consequently, the antecedent processes directly affecting the special unit's acquisition of an organizational domain were affected by the nature and composition of the environmental context in which they operated. This finding, as shown in Figure 5.1, has import for the development of special unit policy, particularly where these policy decisions include a concern for interaction with the environment. The following section explores the implications of these findings for policy development in the special units.

Implications for Policy Development in the Implementation Process

The data analyzed in Chapter IV, as well as the model of factors affecting the implementation of special police units presented in the preceding section, call attention to the policy relevance of this study. As the ultimate goal of any newly initiated organization is the acquisition of a viable organizational domain, the findings presented have policy implications for the development and initiation of special police units and for their continued operation in the environmental milieu.

The first and perhaps most obvious policy consideration arising from this study is the nature and composition of the inclusive environmental context within which the special unit is expected to function. Special unit policy makers must recognize that the external environment affects both the development and pursuit of organizational objectives. Beyond this recognition, however, policy makers must be informed of the dynamic nature of the environment. This is, perhaps, a critical recognition for the integration of a newly formed organization into its host environment. "A main problem in the study of organizational change [and organizational initiation] is that the environmental contexts in which organizations exist are themselves changing, at an increasing rate, and toward increasing complexity."[1] The data analyzed in this study indicated that environmental contexts affect implementation efforts.

The unitary environmental context may be viewed as presenting the greatest obstacles to the initiation of specialized police units. Lines of authority, loci of decision-making, vested interests, inter alia are explicitly defined. In short, the "institutional

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[1]F. E. Emery, and E. L. Trist, "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments," in Complex Organizations and Their Environments Merlin B. Brinkerhoff, and Phillip R. Kunz (eds.) (DuBuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company, Publishers, 1972), p. 268.

territory" has been divided among interested parties. Resistance to the establishment of a new organizational subunit that must compete for organizational resources and rewards may be expected to follow. Perceptions of the new unit as a source of competition, and hence a threat, have been documented in this context. Furthermore, as the primary organizational means for reducing internal tension is the formal coordination of effort among organizational sub-components, interactions between a somewhat hostile environment and the special unit may be more the result of official force than individual desire. To overcome these problems, policy makers must attempt to neutralize hostility and threat perception in the environment. The strategy of creating an external demand for special unit output appears to help overcome these difficulties.

Although the problems associated with the unitary environmental context, i.e. greater resistance and threat perception, are reduced in the federative and coalitional environmental contexts, the implementation issues identified above are not less salient. Data analyses have indicated that the issues of domain consensus, threat perception, environmental management strategies, and perceptions of influence in the special unit's policy-making process are concerns in all environmental contexts. Policy makers in each context are, therefore, confronted with similar organizational-environmental issues. The

intensity of these issues may be mediated by the specific environmental context, but they nevertheless exist and affect acceptance and use of the special unit by externals.

Beyond these general policy implications, the data analyzed in Chapter IV indicated that certain process variables have a significant impact on the measures of outcome. First, levels of domain consensus were found to significantly influence evaluations of outcomes. The implication of this finding is that domain consensus is an important antecedent to successful implementation. This implication was supported by research conducted by Braito et al.[2] In their examination of state level health care organizations, these researchers found that domain consensus was significantly related to resource allocation, governing board composition, organizational activities, domain, organizational age, and degree of formalization. They concluded that domain consensus significantly affects patterns of interorganizational exchange. The establishment of an organizational domain, and hence a reason for being, is an essential task for policy makers in these special units. Obtaining domain consensus is, therefore,

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[2]Rita Braito, Steve Paulson, and Gerald Klonglan, "Domain Consensus - A Key Variable in Interorganizational Analysis," in Complex Organizations and Their Environments. Merlin B. Brinkerhoff, and Phillip R. Kunz, eds. (DuBuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company, Publishers, 1972), pp. 176-92.

viewed as a necessary condition to implementation and subsequent environmental acceptance and utilization.

In addition to the issue of domain consensus, the issues of perception of influence in the special unit's policy-making process and threat perception were found to affect implementation outcomes. The policy implications derived from the findings suggest that policy makers in these special units must be aware of the need to create high levels of influence perception among externals, while at the same time reducing perceptions of threat created by the existence of the special unit. The specific managerial strategy selected to increase influence perception and decrease threat perception may be affected by the structure and composition of the environment itself.

As previously indicated, the use of a formal coordination strategy is more salient in the unitary environmental context, as opposed to the federative or coalitional although it does not insure less threat or more influence perception. The most effective environmental management strategy, regardless of the specific environmental context in which it is used, appears to be that of creating an external market (demand) for the special unit's services. The use of this strategy by special unit policy makers is viewed as an effective means of securing environmental acceptance.

The policy implications derived from the analysis of the data collected in this study draw attention to the importance of including environmental considerations in the implementation of special police units. In the following section, the conclusions that may be drawn from the analysis are discussed.

Conclusions

The major conclusions that may be drawn from the preceding findings and policy implications relate directly to the issue of environmental effect on the implementation process. As indicated in Chapter II, when the issue of implementation arises the research question of primary concern is whether the innovation was properly tested, as opposed to whether it was effective. The antecedents to effectiveness are, therefore, the methods of implementation. The current study addressed this issue from the perspective of organizational-environmental interaction in the implementation of specialized police units. The conclusions drawn from these analyses are as follows:

1) The nature and structure of the inclusive environmental context rarely, in and of themselves, have a direct effect on implementation outcomes.

2) The composition of the inclusive environmental context does, however, have an immediate impact on organizational issues relating to the implementation process, i.e., domain consensus, influence and threat perception, and viable strategies employed by the special unit in an effort to manage its environment.

3) In turn, these antecedent processes to successful implementation--namely domain consensus, levels of influence and threat perception, and strategies designed to reduce environmental uncertainty and gain acceptance, directly affect implementation outcomes.

4) Consequently, the nature and structure of the immediate environmental context are viewed as affecting implementation outcomes by influencing intermediate stages of the process.

These conclusions have been drawn from the data analyses presented in Chapter IV, as well as from the theoretical framework advanced in Chapter II. Presented in the following section are recommendations for future research on the topic of organizational-environmental interaction in the implementation process.

Recommendations for Future Research

This study, being exploratory in nature, has perhaps raised more issues than it has resolved. However, the exploratory nature of the study has facilitated an initial examination of a highly complex social phenomenon that has received little attention in the research on criminal justice institutions. The findings reported in Chapter IV illustrate the importance of including the environment in considerations of project implementation. Recommendations for future research on the impact of the environment on implementation efforts are of two varieties. First, initial hypotheses for future testing may be derived from the

derived from the current study. Second, research issues that were beyond the intended scope of the study are offered as recommended areas for future research.

Generated Hypotheses

As the current study was exploratory, specific hypotheses were not advanced, the data analyzed in Chapter IV led to the development of the following hypotheses, which can be tested in future undertakings:

H_1 The greater the clarity concerning the anticipated domain of the specialized police unit (SPU) the greater the use of the project by relevant environmental actors.

H_2 The greater the original consensus on the need for the SPU the sooner its implementation.

H_3 The greater the perceived benefits to be derived from the SPU, the sooner its implementation.

H_4 The greater the domain consensus regarding the introduction of the specialized police unit, (SPU) the greater the acceptance of the unit by relevant environmental actors.

H_5 The more relevant environmental actors view the project as being of benefit to them, the greater their acceptance of the unit.

H_6 The greater the power (resources/prestige, etc.) of the SPU's sponsoring agency, the greater the acceptance of the unit.

H_7 The greater the perceived threat of the SPU to relevant environmental actors, the greater the resistance to unit implementation.

H_8 The greater the acceptance of the specialized police unit (SPU) by relevant environmental actors, the greater their use of the unit.

H_9 The greater the involvement of relevant environmental actors in the implementation of the SPU, the greater the domain consensus, and hence the greater the acceptance and use of the unit.

H_{10} The greater the participation of relevant environmental actors in the early development of the SPU, the greater their use and support of the project.

H_{11} The greater the involvement of relevant environmental actors in the decision making and programming of the SPU, the greater their acceptance, use, and evaluation of the unit.

H_{12} The more relevant environmental actors believe that the unit goals can be accomplished, the greater the participation in the unit.

H_{13} Specialized police units that are integrated into existing environmental structures will engage in activities different from SPU's that are not integrated.

H_{14} The less integrated the SPU, the greater the emphasis on systems-maintenance activities.

H_{15} The greater the correspondence between the role (goal) expectations of the SPU and relevant environmental actors' expectations of SPU role (goals), the greater the achievement of SPU goals and the greater the satisfaction with unit accomplishments.

H_{16} SPU's that feel relatively powerful vis-a-vis their environments will attempt to expand their domains to a greater extent than will SPU's that feel relatively weak.

Additional Research Issues

In addition to the hypotheses generated by this study, the following research questions, which were beyond the original scope of the study, are advanced for future research endeavors:

1. What is the relationship between the existence of domain consensus and perceptions of influence or threat? Do perceptions of influence or threat affect levels of domain consensus?

The current study has examined the independent effects of domain consensus, perceptions of influence, and perceptions of threat on implementation outcomes. However, future research must explore the interrelationships among these variables. If domain consensus is a necessary condition to implementation, attention must be focused on the variables that most affect levels of domain consensus.

2. What is the relationship between goal clarity and domain consensus? Is goal clarity a necessary condition for domain consensus?

As indicated above, research on the antecedents to domain consensus appears to be a significant direction in which to pursue the dynamics of the implementation process. The clarity of organizational goals and their subsequent effects on levels of domain consensus warrants future attention if the implementation process is to be fully explored.

3. What are the joint effects of all process variables on implementation outcomes? Continuing with the preceding discussion, the effects of all the process variables in their many combinations must be undertaken to understand the dynamics of implementation efforts.

Consequently, more sophisticated measurement of the process variables must be developed, as well as the use of a multivariate statistical model.

4. Do the organizational status positions of individuals in the special unit's environment affect their evaluation of special unit implementation? Research on organizations must continually take into account the effects of organization's status on implementation processes. The current study was unable to address this issue, and future endeavors must include a concern for the role-position of individuals in the special unit's environment.

5. Do projects that were successfully implemented have a greater impact on the problem areas they were designed to affect than those projects that were not successfully implemented? The current study focused on implementation (environmental acceptance and utilization) as the outcome variable. Having explored this process requires that its dynamics be linked to the intended impact of these units. One approach to this investigation is to examine the impact of successfully implemented special units to determine the effects of implementation on the achievement of organizational goals.

6. Do successful implementation efforts produce significant organizational changes in the host environment? Are projects that receive better implementation more likely to be institutionalized by their sponsoring environments? The initiation of a new organization or organizational subunit may be expected to affect the environment. Research on implementation must be cognizant of the effects of the special unit on the host environment. This requires an examination of the organizational change process itself and the degree to which the implementation of a new organizational unit creates change for the broader system.

7. What are the effects of the implementation process over time? The concern here is with the time parameters associated with the implementation process itself. Presumably a need is identified, alternative futures considered, a program designed and then implemented. The process variables identified in this study may have greater impact at certain of these stages than at others. Consequently, longitudinal research designed to explore each stage and its relationship to the next must be undertaken.

8. In addition to the variables identified in the current study, what factors accelerate or impede the implementation process? Obviously, many factors affect the implementation of specialized police units. The

current study has identified only a limited number of these factors, and additional research must continue to identify factors that affect the implementation process. Such factors as the political, social, and economic conditions of the host environment must be considered. Also, administrative philosophy, leadership styles, and the personal characteristics of special unit members must be included if this process is to be fully explored.

Research on the preceding questions will contribute greatly to an understanding of the implementation process and the role the environment plays in this process. Furthermore, these research issues focus attention on the relationships that exist between organization and environment, requiring an open-systems approach to their examination. As the criminal justice process receives a more critical analysis, the issue of organizational interaction must correspondingly receive greater visibility. To do less is to ignore the dynamics inherent in complex social systems.

APPENDIX A. QUESTION GUIDELINE FOR SPECIAL POLICE UNIT STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

QUESTION GUIDELINE FOR SPECIAL POLICE UNIT STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

1. Were you personally involved in the original planning for the special unit?
2. Was your agency involved in the original planning for the SPU?
3. With whom (individuals and agencies) did the original idea for the SPU originate (specify?)
4. What were the community characteristics used to support the need for a SPU?
5. How much civic (community/political) support was there for the creation of a SPU?
6. Who (individuals and agencies) supported or opposed the original idea for a SPU?
7. What were the original goals and objectives (functions) for the SPU? (Why?)
8. To what degree did other agencies participate in the selection of these goals and objectives? (specify)
9. To what degree did other agencies agree with these goals and objectives? (specify)
10. What priorities were assigned to the various goals and objectives by the original planners (By whom?)

1. Are you personally involved in the ongoing planning and activities of the unit? (Why/Why not?)
2. Is your agency presently involved in the ongoing activities of the SPU?
3. Who are the individuals and organizations who presently support/oppose the idea of a SPU? (in the department?/outside department?)
4. What are the community/department characteristics used to support the continued need for a SPU?
5. How much civic (community/political) support is there now for a SPU?
6. Has there been any change in the individuals and agencies who support or oppose the idea of a SPU?
7. Have there been any changes in the goals and objectives of the SPU? (Why?)
8. To what degree do other agencies participate in the activities of the SPU?
9. To what degree do other agencies agree with
10. the present goals and activities of the SPU?

11. How did other agencies prioritize these goals and objectives?

12. What was the conceptual model (assumptions concerning the causes of crime and the behavior of criminals) upon which these goals and objectives were selected?

13. What activities (intervention strategies) were selected for the actual implementation of the SPU?

14. To what degree did other agencies participate in the selection of these activities?

15. To what degree did other agencies agree with the activities selected for the SPU?

16. Where was the SPU located in the organizational structure of the department? What was the rank of the project director? Operational director? To whom did they report? Who made decisions about operational targets, etc.?

17. With what (if any) other organizations did the SPU have agreements for future cooperation? (Formal agreements?)

18. How much did you expect the existence of a SPU would influence the manner in which other units/agencies handled the crime problem?

19. How much did you expect the existence of a SPU would influence the manner in which other units/agencies handled the crime problem?

11. How do other agencies prioritize the goals and activities of the SPU?

12. Have there been any changes in the conceptual model utilized by the SPU? (Why?)

13. Have there been any changes in the activities (intervention strategies) utilized by the SPU in implementing its project?

14. To what degree (if any) did other agencies influence changes in project activities?

15. Has there been any changes in the support given by other agencies to SPU activities?

16. Have there been any changes in the location of the SPU in the department? If you could, what changes would you recommend for the future?

17. With what (if any) other agencies does the SPU now have agreements for cooperation? If changes, why?

18. How do they feel about the SPU? Have there been any significant changes in these attitudes?

19. How much impact has the existence of the SPU had on the manner in which other agencies deal with the crime problem?

20. When it was established, what were the prospects for future funding of the SPU project after the OCJP grant was completed?	20. What are the present prospects for the future funding of the SPU?
21. At the time it was established, what were the factors (political, social, economic, conditions, staff quality, etc.) that you thought would facilitate progress toward the achievement of project goals and objectives?	21. What are the factors which appear to have facilitated the success of the SPU? What could have been done to obtain even more benefits out of these factors?
22. At the time it was established, what were the factors (political, social, economic conditions, staff quality) that would hinder progress toward the achievement of progress goals and objectives?	22. What are the factors which appear to have hindered the success of the SPU? What could have been dome to help overcome these factors?
23. When it was initiated, how much did you expect the SPU project and its staff to relate to other agencies?	23- How much and how well do members of the 24. SPU staff relate to other agencies? Which agencies do they relate best with and why?
24. When it was initiated, how well did you expect the SPU project and its staff to relate to other agencies?	
25. To the best of your knowledge, were any efforts made to help members of other units and/or agencies understand the goals and objectives of the special unit? (What?)	25. In general, how successful were these efforts? What could have been done that would have been more successful?
26. To the best of your knowledge, were any efforts made to encourage the participation of other units and/or agencies in the activities of the SPU?	26. In general, how successful were these efforts? What could have been done that would have been more successful?

27. To the best of your knowledge, did other units and/or agencies view the SPU as being of potential benefit to them? (If so, how?)

28. To the best of your knowledge, how did OCJP (its guidelines, etc.) influence the development of the SPU project? Specify. Are there ways in which the OCJP contribution could be improved?

27. How do they view the benefits to them since the SPU has been in operation? (What could have been done to improve the benefits provided by the SPU?)

28. How did OCJP (its guidelines, etc.) influence the implementation of the SPU project. Are there ways in which OCJP contributions could be improved?

APPENDIX B. POOL OF QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS AND ASSOCIATED RESPONDENT GROUPS

POOL OF QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS AND
ASSOCIATED RESPONDENT GROUPS

Please circle the appropriate number indicating the extent of your agreement/disagreement with the following statements.

	Totally Agree	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totally Disagree
1. The special unit has definitely improved the exchange (flow) of information between area law enforcement agencies.	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. The SPU has definitely improved the exchange (flow) of information between units within your department.	1	2	3	4	5	6
3. The special unit has definitely improved the quality of useful information available about crime, crime patterns and criminals in the area.	1	2	3	4	5	6
4. The crime problem in your jurisdiction has definitely been handled differently because of the establishment of the SPU.	1	2	3	4	5	6
5. The SPU definitely had the active support of the chief in your department.	1	2	3	4	5	6
6. The SPU definitely had the active support of other relevant command officers in your department.	1	2	3	4	5	6
7. The SPU had the active opposition of command officers whose position could influence the success or failure of the unit.	1	2	3	4	5	6

The following questions are designed to gather information about your personal involvement with the special unit. Please indicate your response by circling the appropriate number.

	To a Major Extent	To a Great Extent	To Some Extent	To a Minor Extent	Not at All
8. To what extent were you personally involved in the original planning for the special unit?	1	2	3	4	5
9. To what extent did you actively support the original idea for the special unit?	1	2	3	4	5
10. To what extent did you actively oppose the original idea for the special unit?	1	2	3	4	5
11. To what extent did you participate in the selection of the special unit's goals and objectives?	1	2	3	4	5

The following questions ask for your opinion regarding the goals and objectives of the special unit. Please circle the appropriate number indicating the strength of your agreement/disagreement with the following statements.

	Totally Agree	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totally Disagree
12. The SPU was intended to be a service to other units by acting as a criminal intelligence unit.	1	2	3	4	5	6
13. The SPU was intended to be a service to other units by acting as a surveillance unit.	1	2	3	4	5	6

		Totally Agree	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totally Disagree
14.	The SPU was intended to be a follow-up investigative unit.	1	2	3	4	5	6
15.	The SPU was intended to be a saturation patrol unit.	1	2	3	4	5	6
16.	The SPU was intended to place its greatest emphasis on the ability to identify existing and emerging crime patterns.	1	2	3	4	5	6
17.	The SPU was intended to place great emphasis on its ability to answer requests for information on specific suspects, crimes and locations.	1	2	3	4	5	6
18.	The SPU was intended to place great emphasis on its ability to produce estimates concerning the character and volume of future criminal activity.	1	2	3	4	5	6
19.	The SPU was intended to place great emphasis on the number of arrests it made.	1	2	3	4	5	6
20.	The SPU was intended to place great emphasis on its ability to assist other units by providing information used in making arrests.	1	2	3	4	5	6
21.	The SPU was intended to place great emphasis on the character of the criminals arrested and the types of crimes for which they were arrested rather than the mere volume of arrests.	1	2	3	4	5	6
22.	The SPU was intended to place great emphasis on the ability to obtain convictions for the arrests they made and/or assisted in making.	1	2	3	4	5	6

		Totally Agree	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totally Disagree
23.	The primary objective of the SPU was to directly help reduce or prevent serious street crime.	1	2	3	4	5	6
24.	The primary objective of the SPU was to initiate new patrol patterns.	1	2	3	4	5	6
25.	The primary objective of the SPU was to function as a mobile tactical unit.	1	2	3	4	5	6

The following questions ask for information over a wide variety of issues pertaining to the internal management of the special unit. Please indicate the strength of your agreement with the following statements by circling the appropriate number.

26.	From the beginning the SPU had clear concise goals and objectives.	1	2	3	4	5	6
27.	From the beginning there was command officer consensus (not necessarily agreement) concerning SPU goals and objectives.	1	2	3	4	5	6
28.	From the beginning there was command officer agreement with the goals and objectives of the SPU.	1	2	3	4	5	6
29.	Relevant command officers were systematically involved in developing the unit's goals and objectives.	1	2	3	4	5	6

The following questions ask for information regarding the crime analysis and information exchange functions within the special unit. Please circle the number which is most reflective of your opinion regarding the following statements.

		Totally Agree	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totally Disagree
30.	The department had SOP for patrol division to regularly report information to SPU.	1	2	3	4	5	6
31.	The department had SOP for patrol officers to directly report critical information to the SPU.	1	2	3	4	5	6
32.	The SPU receives all relevant regular reports from the patrol division(s).	1	2	3	4	5	6
33.	The department has SOP for other investigative units to report relevant information to SPU.	1	2	3	4	5	6
34.	The department has SOP for officers with other investigative units to directly report critical information to the SPU.	1	2	3	4	5	6
35.	The SPU receives all relevant information from other investigative units in the department.	1	2	3	4	5	6
36.	The SPU definitely did a good job of making relevant information available to other investigative units.	1	2	3	4	5	6
37.	The SPU definitely did a good job of making relevant information available to the patrol unit.	1	2	3	4	5	6

		Totally Agree	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totally Disagree
38.	The SPU regularly disseminated reports concerning major trends or patterns in criminal activity.	1	2	3	4	5	6
39.	Information from the SPU was systematically disseminated to relevant units within the department.	1	2	3	4	5	6
40.	Information from the SPU was systematically disseminated to other law enforcement agencies.	1	2	3	4	5	6
41.	To what extent is your agency/ department/etc. involved in the ongoing planning of the special unit?	1	2	3	4	5	6
42.	To what extent did your agency/ department/etc. participate in the selection of activities undertaken by the special unit?	1	2	3	4	5	6
43.	To what extent does/did your agency/department/etc. agree with the activities undertaken by the special unit?	1	2	3	4	5	6
44.	The special unit has definitely made my job easier.	1	2	3	4	5	6

		Very Familiar				Very Unfamiliar
45.	How familiar are you with the operation of the special unit?	1	2	3	4	5

		Extremely Valuable				Worthless
46.	Overall, how would you rate the value of the special unit to your department?	1	2	3	4	5

47. In general, how often has your unit/division/bureau provided the special unit with specific information concerning crimes and/or criminals? (Check one)

    a. regularly: at least once a week ____
    b. frequently: at least once a month ____
    c. occasionally: 3 to 4 times a year ____
    d. almost never ____
    e. never ____

48. In general, how often has your unit/division/bureau requested information on specific crimes, criminal suspects, and crime patterns from the special unit? (Check one)

    a. regularly: at least once a week ____
    b. frequently: at least once a month ____
    c. occasionally: 3 to 4 times a year ____
    d. almost never ____
    e. never ____

49. Over the past years have your cooperative interactions with the special unit increased or decreased? (Check one)

    a. have continually increased since the establishment of the unit ____
    b. initially increased but have now leveled off at highest level ____
    c. initially increased but have recently begun to decrease ____
    d. initially increased but dropped off quickly ____
    e. never increased beyond occasional contact ____
    f. never have had operational contacts with the unit ____

Organizations sometimes depend on each other in ways which are not readily apparent, or are not accurately reflected in their contacts with each other. In order to get at these relationships assume that the special unit is no longer in existence. (In some instances this was actually was the case) What do you think would be the probably (or actual) effect on your bureau/division/unit? Please circle he appropriate word(s) in each statement.

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50. Your knowledge of criminal activity in your jurisdiction would be no different, significantly reduced, somewhat reduced, significantly increased, somewhat increased.

51. The quality of information regarding criminal activity in your jurisdiction would be no different, significantly reduced, somewhat reduced, significantly increased, or somewhat increased.

52. The quantity of information regarding criminal activity in your jurisdiction would be no different, significantly reduced, somewhat reduced, significantly increased, or somewhat increased.

53. How do you see the goals of your bureau/division/unit in relation to those of the special unit? Would you say they were mutually exclusive, totally dependent on each other, somewhat dependent on each other, independent of each other, or in competition with each other.

54. You would have more, fewer, or the same number of criminal investigations to conduct.

55. You would find it no different, harder, or easier to conduct criminal investigations.

56. There would be no change, increased difficulty, or less difficulty in getting information for ongoing criminal investigations.

57. Your clearance rate would be no different, significantly reduced, somewhat reduced, significantly increased, or somewhat increased for those criminal investigations you initiate.

58. Your conviction rate would be no different, significantly reduced, somewhat reduced, significantly increased, or somewhat increased for those criminal investigations which you conduct.

	To a Major Extent	To a Great Extent	To Some Extent	To a Minor Extent	Not at All
59. To what extent does/did your division/bureau/etc. participate in the activities of the special unit?	1	2	3	4	5
60. To what extent was/is your division's/bureau's/etc. participation in the activities of the special unit encouraged by personnel in the special unit?	1	2	3	4	5

		Totally Agree	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totally Disagree
61.	You feel completely free to discuss important information with the special unit.	1	2	3	4	5	6
62.	You feel that representatives of your division/bureau/unit have some influence in the policy decisions in the special unit.	1	2	3	4	5	6
63.	Your association with members of the special unit is characterized by mutual trust.	1	2	3	4	5	6
64.	People from the special unit display a facilitative (cooperative, helpful) attitude toward your division/bureau/unit.	1	2	3	4	5	6
65.	When decisions are made involving matters of mutual concern, the special unit is more likely to have greater influence in these decisions.	1	2	3	4	5	6

Respondent Groups

Survey Item	Authority Structure	Patrol Command	Patrol Officers	Detective Command	Detectives	Non-Jurisdictional Police Agencies
1	X	X	--	X	--	X
2	X	X	X	X	X	--
3	X	X	X	X	X	X
4	X	X	X	X	X	X
5	--	X	X	X	X	--
6	--	X	--	X	--	--
7	--	X	--	X	--	--
8	X	X	--	X	--	X
9	X	X	--	X	--	X
10	X	X	--	X	--	X
11	X	X	--	X	--	X
12	X	X	X	X	X	--
13	X	X	X	X	X	--
14	X	X	X	X	X	--
15	X	X	X	X	X	--
16	X	X	X	X	X	--
17	X	X	X	X	X	--
18	X	X	X	X	X	--
19	X	X	X	X	X	--
20	X	X	X	X	X	--

Respondent Groups

Survey Item	Authority Structure	Patrol Command	Patrol Officers	Detective Command	Detectives	Non-Jurisdictional Police Agencies
21	X	X	X	X	X	--
22	X	X	X	X	X	--
23	X	X	X	X	X	--
24	X	X	X	X	X	--
25	X	X	X	X	X	--
26	--	X	--	X	--	--
27	--	X	--	X	--	--
28	X	X	-	X	--	--
29	X	X	--	X	--	--
30	X	X	X	--	--	--
31	X	X	X	--	--	--
32	X	--	--	X	X	--
33	X	--	--	X	X	--
34	X	--	--	X	X	--
35	X	--	--	X	X	--
36	--	X	--	X	X	X
37	--	X	X	--	--	--
38	--	X	X	X	X	X
39	--	X	--	X	--	--

Respondent Groups

Survey Item	Authority Structure	Patrol Command	Patrol Officers	Detective Command	Detectives	Non-Jurisdictional Police Agencies
40	--	X	--	--	--	X
41	--	X	--	X	--	X
42	--	X	--	X	--	X
43	--	X	--	X	--	X
44	--	X	X	X	X	X
45	--	X	X	X	X	X
46	--	X	X	X	X	X
47	--	X	X	X	X	X
48	--	X	X	X	X	X
49	--	X	X	X	X	X
50	--	X	--	X	X	X
51	--	X	--	X	X	X
52	--	X	--	X	X	X
53	--	X	--	X	X	X
54	--	--	--	X	X	X
55	--	--	--	X	X	X
56	--	--	--	X	X	X
57	--	--	--	X	X	X

Respondent Groups

Survey Items	Authority Structure	Patrol Command	Patrol Officers	Detective Command	Detectives	Non-Jurisdictional Police Agencies
58	--	--	--	X	X	X
59	--	X	--	X	--	X
60	--	X	--	X	--	X
61	--	X	X	X	X	X
62	--	X	X	X	X	X
63	--	X	X	X	X	X
64	--	X	X	X	X	X
65	--	X	X	X	X	X

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

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