THE COLLAPSE OF THE MYCENAEAN WORLD

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A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1978

ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this study is to reexamine the theories advanced to account for the collapse of the Mycenaean civilization and to propose a new explanation of this event. The following existing theories were studied in the light of the available evidence:

1. the Dorian invasion hypothesis
2. the intercity warfare hypothesis
3. the internal revolt hypothesis
4. the Aegean sea-raiders hypothesis

Each of these explanations was found to be deficient in some respect.

The new explanation of the Mycenaeans' decline advanced here presents the idea that the collapse of their civilization was due to wars caused by shortages of raw materials such as grain and metal. These shortages of goods vital to the Mycenaean economy were caused by the weakening of the Hittite Empire which controlled the crucial metal deposits and the rise of powerful

states in western Anatolia whose struggles with the Hittites disrupted the flow of these vital metals. The Mycenaeans became involved in these wars in an attempt to reopen trade routes and markets and to eliminate competitors but they succeeded only in devastating their leading cities and bankrupting the Mycenaean world.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express his deep and sincere appreciation to Mrs. Eleanor Huzar, under whose guidance this study was undertaken, for her helpful suggestions and invaluable assistance in preparing this manuscript. It has been a privilege and an honor to study under her.

Thanks are also extended to Dr. Richard Sullivan and Miss Marjorie Gesner, other members of the guidance committee, for their suggestions and critical examination of the manuscript.

The author also wishes to thank all of the authors cited in this thesis whose years of patient work and research have made a study of this nature possible.

Sincerest appreciation is also expressed to my parents, Mr. and Mrs. L. D. Shanabrook, for their encouragement and help during this study as well as the rest of my educational career.

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2a. LH III destructions and abandonments in Anatolia, Cyprus, and the Aegean.

(See pocket in back of thesis.)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AJA - American Journal of Archaeology

BSA - British School at Athens

JHS - Journal of Hellenic Studies

BICS - University of London: Institute of Classical Studies Bulletin

SM - Submycenaean Period

LH - Late Helladic Period. This time period is further divided into three substages labeled I (early), II (middle), and III (late). LH III is also subdivided into smaller time units labeled A (early), B (middle), and C (late). See Figure 1.

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the twelfth century B.C., Mycenaean Greece was populous and prosperous. Trade had promoted the accumulation of wealth in Greece and a remarkable degree of cultural unity among the leading Mycenaean centers. This growth of wealth and power led in LH IIIA:2 and LH IIIB:1 (see Figure 1) to the construction or enlargement of fortifications, road systems, dams, and massive tombs. Yet in less than 150 years, this glorious achievement would be totally obliterated. The Mycenaeans, their cities devastated, their proud engineering feats ruined, and their culture and trade fragmented and curtailed, sank slowly into obscurity. The question is: why?

The cause or causes of the collapse of the Mycenaean civilization of Greece have long been a subject of discussion among historians. The problem is very complex and there are many factors that must be considered carefully. For example, how important was the re-emergence of coastal Anatolian states (Assuwa, Arzawa) and Alasiya (Cyprus) (see Figure 2) in the scheme of events that led to the Mycenaeans' collapse? Did the Mycenaeans destroy



Figure 1.--Chronology (after L. B. Brea, "Malta and the Mediterranean," Antiquity 34 (1960):137; and V. Hankey and P. Warren, "The Absolute Chronology of the Aegean Late Bronze Age," BICS 21 (1974):151-152).

Figure 2.--A map of the Eastern Aegean showing the location of Ahhiyawa, Assuwa, Arzawa, and related areas.

each other with the help of foreign mercenaries[1] or were they overwhelmed by barbaric invaders? What part did the Sea Peoples play in all of this? The purpose of this thesis is to examine these and other questions in light of all of the available data in an attempt to come to grips with the underlying causes of the Mycenaeans' decline. To do this, each of the major theories that has been advanced to explain this event will be studied in detail in order to see how well it agrees with what is known. Further, a new explanation of the Mycenaeans' fall that seems to fit the known evidence better than any of the existing theories will be advanced here.

Before examining this new explanation of the decline of the Mycenaeans as well as the existing theories in detail, it seems appropriate to mention briefly the problem presented by the types of evidence on which this and all other theories on this topic are based. For description of the evidence itself, the reader is referred

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[1]The presence of mercenaries is generally assumed on the basis of Greek tradition, cut and thrust swords, and other objects of seemingly foreign origin. S. E. Iakovides, "The Centuries of Achaian Sovereignty," Prehistory and Protohistory, ed. G. A. Christopoulos (London: Heinemann Educational Books, Ltd., 1970), pp. 282-283; E. T. Vermeule, "The Mycenaeans in Achaia," AJA 64 (1960):13-15; A. Harding and H. Hughes-Brock, "Amber in the Mycenaean World," BSA 69 (1974):153; and M. Grbić, "Preclassical Pottery in the Central Balkans," AJA 61 (1957):148-149.

to the comprehensive works of Vermeule,[2] Page,[3] Desborough,[4] Chadwick,[5] and Hooker.[6] The major problem with this evidence is that it consists mainly of physical objects such as pottery, swords, walls, and the like. This physical evidence can provide a good deal of information on what, where, and sometimes who but rarely anything on precisely when or why. To answer these two vital questions, historians have to rely on the fragmentary and often confusing written documents from this period or on traditions about the events that occurred then. In short, the evidence, even with the addition of new information from fields like linguistics, provides at most a loose framework which each student of Mycenaean Greece must try to fill in with whys and whens, the vital elements of history.

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[2]E. T. Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). An excellent general summary.

[3]D. L. Page, History and the Homeric Iliad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959). Presents the relevant Hittite texts.

[4]V. R. d'A Desborough, The Last Mycenaeans and Their Successors (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964). A thorough study of pottery and bronze objects.

[5]J. Chadwick, The Mycenaean World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). A good presentation of the available Linear B texts.

[6]J. T. Hooker, Mycenaean Greece (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1977). Another good general summary of all the available evidence.

REVIEW OF EXISTING THEORIES ADVANCED TO EXPLAIN THE COLLAPSE OF THE MYCENAEAN CIVILIZATION

In the following sections, the four major existing theories concerning the Mycenaeans' decline will be discussed in detail. In addition, two of the major problems facing historians of this period, the Sea Peoples and the Hittite documents, will also be examined.

The Burn-Chadwick Theory

This theory, first advanced by A. R. Burn in 1930 and recently supported, at least in part, by J. Chadwick, attributes the collapse of Mycenaean Greece to "the activities of raiders from Thrace."[1] Thracian sea-raiders operating from Naxos, Attica, and other areas are the chief culprits for the destruction in Greece and the Aegean islands according to Burn.[2] Chadwick, although identifying

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[1] A. R. Burn, Minoans, Philistines, and Greeks, B.C. 1400-900 (London: Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, Ltd., 1930), p. 148.

[2] Ibid. Burn bases this on the later tradition of a Thracian thalassocracy. There is no evidence to indicate that the raiders seized and then operated from any of these areas, especially Naxos which shows no signs of disturbance throughout this period (see Appendix).

the raiders as a group of the Sea Peoples, agrees that "their bases were in the eastern Aegean,"[3] but limits the Mycenaean sites destroyed by them to the single city of Pylos since it is the only one for which good evidence exists.[4] In this, he is following the lead of McDonald and Rapp who both believe that the Sea Peoples were responsible for the destruction of Pylos.[5]

Several lines of evidence support this idea. The first is the recent work of J. B. Rutter and E. French who have described some crude, handmade, burnished pottery from Lefkandi, Mycenae, Tiryns, Koraku, and Troy VIIb 1.[6] This pottery seems to be derived from Thrace and Bulgaria, and seems to have been brought south by northern intruders in early LH IIIC or late IIIB.[7] This fits well with Burn's idea of Thracian sea-raiders.

The Linear B tablets from Pylos also support the idea of a destructive pirate raid. A document composed of five tablets (An 657, An 654, An 519, An 656, and An 661) is

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[3] Chadwick, The Mycenaean World, p. 178.

[4] Ibid., pp. 192-193.

[5] W. A. McDonald, Progress Into the Past (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 322 and 413; and W. A. McDonald and G. Rapp, The Minnesota Messenia Expedition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972), p. 192.

[6] J. B. Rutter, "Ceramic Evidence for Northern Intruders in Southern Greece at the Beginning of the Late Helladic IIIC Period," AJA 79 (1975); and E. French and J. B. Rutter, "The Handmade Burnished Ware of the Late Helladic IIIC Period: Its Modern Context," AJA 81 (1977).

[7] Rutter, AJA 79:17.

headed "Thus the watchers are guarding the coastal regions."[8] The document goes on to mark out ten coastal defense districts and the men and commanders assigned to each. Other tablets give lists of rowers, enough to man approximately 20 ships.[9] These documents seem to indicate that the Pylians were expecting some sort of attack from the sea, but as Chadwick says, "No positive evidence [from the tablets] will take us farther."[10]

Another line of evidence is the distribution of amber, Naue II-type swords and other bronze objects, and pottery. All of these objects, which come from central Europe or are modelled after central European patterns,[11] are widely dispersed among Mycenaean sites (see Figure 3). Although it is possible that these objects, dating from LH IIIB/C and LH IIIC, are trade goods, Vermeule finds it more likely that they represent "a military intrusion of Sea Peoples southward rather than a commercial extrusion of Mycenaeans northward"[12] or at least "mercenary contact with northern tribes during the Sea Peoples'

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[8]Chadwick, The Mycenaean World, p. 175.

[9]Ibid., p. 173.

[10]Ibid., p. 178.

[11]Vermeule, AJA 64:13-15; Harding and Hughes-Brock, BSA 69:153; and Grbić, AJA 61:148-149.

[12]Vermeule, AJA 64:15.



Figure 3.--Distribution of LH IIIB-C amber finds (after Harding and Hughes-Brock, BSA 69:151).

period."[13] Vermeule's idea of mercenary movements down the Danube and eventually into the Aegean[14] accords well with Burn's theory and the archeological evidence of widespread disruption in Hungary and Rumania in the mid-thirteenth century B.C.[15]

The last line of evidence that can be used to support this theory has to do with fortifications and refugees. Vermeule notes that in western Greece town "walls are lower and thinner" than along the east coast, especially those eastern towns which are near the sea.[16] This would seem logical since if the sea raiders were operating from Aegean bases, the eastern coast of Greece would be the one most exposed to attack. Further, it seems that the Mycenaeans sought to move beyond the reach of the Aegean-based raiders since "there is also archaeological evidence suggesting that some [Mycenaeans] found refuge in the north-west of the Peloponnese, and even the Ionian islands."[17] The evidence also seems to indicate that these areas turned out to be not all that safe since late LH IIIC tombs in Achaea tend to be further inland

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[13]Ibid., p. 15.

[14]Ibid., pp. 13-14.

[15]S. Piggott, "Neolithic and Bronze Age in East Europe," Antiquity 34 (1960):288-290.

[16]Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age, p. 160.

[17]Chadwick, The Mycenaean World, p. 178.

than earlier ones, perhaps indicating a renewed fear of the sea and those using it.[18]

But despite this impressive array of physical and written evidence, the basis on which this theory rests is very weak. First, although the pottery described by Rutter is similar to that from Rumania and Bulgaria, the foreign cups of this style found at Lefkandi are exactly the same as a native type made in Italy at that time.[19] Rutter admits this fact but still believes that the pottery is closely connected with the Coarse and Knobbed Wares of Troy VIIb.[20] If he is correct in maintaining this position and in discounting the pottery styles in Italy, then the pottery he describes must be credited to intruders since the Knobbed Ware of Troy VIIb is generally attributed to intruders from Thrace and Bulgaria.[21] Walberg, however, rejects the idea that the pottery is that similar to that of Troy VIIb and even goes so far as to state that the handmade domestic pottery in question used styles that had long histories in the Mycenaean

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[18]Vermeule, AJA 64:21.

[19]M. R. Popham and E. Milburn, "The Late Helladic IIIC Pottery of Xeropolis (Lefkandi): A Summary," BSA 66 (1971):338.

[20]Rutter, AJA 79:17.

[21]Ibid., pp. 17 and 24.

world.[22] Walberg may have gone a little too far with this last statement,[23] but it seems equally questionable to use Rutter's collection of sixteen pieces of pottery to establish links with the Knobbed Ware of Troy and thus prove the existence of northern intruders in Greece, especially when some of the pottery has direct counterparts in the native pottery of Italy.

According to Hooker, the evidence of the Pylian Linear B tablets is just as ambiguous. This is because "the military dispositions which they record may well reflect the regular practice and not extraordinary measures to meet a sudden emergency."[24] Further, at least thirty of the 600-odd rowers listed on the Pylian tablets are being sent to Pleuron, which might be a city located north of the Corinthian gulf.[25] If this identification is correct, it would seem rather odd for the Pylians to be sending badly needed men north, away from the expected direction of attack, if they were worried

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[22]G. Walberg, "Northern Intruders in Mycenaean IIIC?," AJA 80 (1976):186.

[23]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 146; and J. B. Rutter, "'Non-Mycenaean' Pottery: A Reply to Gisela Walberg," AJA 80 (1976):187.

[24]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 141.

[25]Chadwick, The Mycenean World, p. 173.

about Aegean-based raiders. In fact, there is no really solid evidence to support the theory that the enemy who destroyed Pylos came by sea. Chadwick's claims that the mountain ranges east and north of Pylos could easily be held against an invader[26] are true only if the Pylians were prepared and had enough troops available to hold the key passes. The Pylians clearly did not feel that the passes were so easily held. They lined the northern one (the "Messenian Gap") with fortified cities and the fortified towns of Nichoria and Ayios Elias block the southern one (see Plates 1 and 1a). But fortified strong points are useless without troops to hold them. What if Chadwick is right and the king of Pylos was not "much worried about invasion by land,"[27] but did mass his troops to repel an assault from the sea?[28] Isn't it possible that an enemy force could strike swiftly from the east moving along the Mycenaean highways described by Bennett[29] (see Plate 1a) and taking the Pylians from the rear? No, Chadwick says, "There was little to fear from

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[26]Ibid., p. 174.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Ibid., p. 177.

[29]E. L. Bennett, Jr., Mycenaean Studies (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), pp. 226 and 234-235.

this direction so long as Mycenae held out."[30] But what if Mycenae or Laconia was the enemy? It is not impossible to imagine this happening at some time. Further, Nichoria, Peristeria and Elleniko, three of the strong-points in the passes, were burned or abandoned at about the same time as the destruction of the palace at Pylos (see Appendix and Plates 1 and 1a). To sum up then, the Pylian tablets do not necessarily indicate that an attack from the sea was expected, nor do they indicate that that was the direction from which the fatal blow came.

The distribution of amber, Naue II swords, and other objects also fails to stand up as evidence under closer scrutiny. "There is a well-marked distribution of finds [of amber] on the west Greek coast and up the Adriatic" which indicates that "the point of entry [of amber] . . . was the west and north-west of Greece."[31] This means that if the amber was brought to Greece by intruders, they came from the Adriatic, not the Aegean. Certain bronze objects also show this "Adriatic" distribution from LH IIIB/C on,[32] and it is likely that this

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[30]Chadwick, The Mycenaean World, p. 174.

[31]Harding and Hughes-Brock, BSA 69:153.

[32]J. Bouzek, "Bronze Age Greece and the Balkans: Problems of Migrations," Bronze Age Migrations in the Aegean, ed. R. A. Crossland and A. Birchall (Park Ridge: Noyes Press, 1974), p. 172.

distribution is due to trade or small population shifts since there are no signs of major migrations at this time in Greece or Italy where these objects are common.[33] The central Danubian pottery Grbić noted in Macedonia also seems to have been introduced peacefully. Small amounts of this Danubian pottery appear as trade items only after 1200 B.C. when the local non-Mycenaean population was unable to import Mycenaean pottery due to the disturbances in mainland Greece.[34] Further, several scholars feel that the Naue II swords are not derived from central Europe but represent a fusion of many features of Minoan and Mycenaean weapons to yield a new sword type.[35] The swords, then, would be evidence of intruders only in the sense that unsettled conditions had made the development of a new weapon type necessary. Whether one totally accepts the reasoning of Catling and others or not, it is still clear that the Naue II's central European pedigree is not unchallengeable, and that the distribution of amber, pottery, and other objects does not strongly support the theory of Aegean-based intruders.

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[33] D. H. Trump, "The Apennine Culture of Italy," Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society 24 (1958):193.

[34] Grbić, AJA 61:148-149.

[35] H. W. Catling, "Bronze Cut-and-Thrust Swords in the Eastern Mediterranean," Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society 22 (1956):125.

Finally, it seems that the evidence of refugees and fortifications is not as solid as it seems either. As Benton and Waterhouse have pointed out, the idea of an influx of inhabitants to the north-west Peloponnesus is based on the negative evidence of this area's not having many LH IIIA or LH IIIB settlements.[36] Even Vermeule believes that the Mycenaean "refugees" in this area arrived before the destructions in Messenia and elsewhere.[37] Further, Achaia was not the only area to receive an influx of population at about this time. Attica, Euboea, and Asine all have what appear to be increased populations.[38] If the main thing that the Mycenaeans were fleeing from was Aegean raiders, these population shifts to areas bordering the Aegean or to coastal cities make little sense. The pattern of abandonment and destruction of settlements also does not seem to fit too well with the idea of Thracian raiders or Sea Peoples sweeping down on Greece from the northeast (Plates 1b and 2a). The Aegean islands were virtually untouched as was Attica while the Argolid and Messenia were being

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[36] S. Benton and H. Waterhouse, "Excavations in Ithaca: Trias Langadas," BSA 68 (1973):23-24.

[37] Vermeule, AJA 64:15 and 18-19.

[38] M. I. Finley, Early Greece: The Bronze and Archaic Ages (London: Chatto and Windus, 1970), p. 66.

pummeled in LH IIIB/C.[39] That is to say, settlements in the west were being disrupted while similar ones in the east were undisturbed. A good deal of the difference between the fortifications in the east and west may be due to the fact that the eastern sites survived long enough to build more massive fortifications although the walls of Kastro Tis Kalogrias in Achaia are easily as massive as anything built on the east coast or in the Argolid.[40]

To sum up the preceding paragraphs, it seems "unlikely that so many centers could have been destroyed" by bands of sea-raiders.[41] Further, there is no compelling evidence that points clearly to hostile intruders from the north or wherever the Sea Peoples may have come from. As Vermeule puts it:

> In none of the mainland cities which suffered is there any sign of an invading people--not an arrowhead, knife or piece of armor in the debris which is not thoroughly Mycenaean.[42]

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[39] Vermeule would advance the date slightly to LH IIB:2. Greece in the Bronze Age, p. 270.

[40] R. H. Simpson, "A Gazetteer and Atlas of Mycenaean Sites," BICS Supplement 16 (1965), site no. 282; and R. H. Simpson and J. F. Lazenby, The Catalogue of Ships in Homer's Iliad (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 98.

[41] R. T. Hopper, The Early Greeks (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1976), p. 63.

[42] E. T. Vermeule, "The Fall of the Mycenaean Empire," Archaeology 13 (1960):71.

Thus it seems that the Burn-Chadwick theory must be abandoned as untenable on the basis of the present evidence.

The Desborough Theory

This theory states that Mycenaean Greece was overwhelmed by northern invaders who came by land. The main element in this violent movement "was that of the Dorians."[43] This invasion started late in LH IIIB but reached its peak in the transitional period between LH IIIB and LH IIIC (i.e.--LH IIIB/C).[44] And indeed, many Mycenaean sites from one end of Greece to the other were either abandoned or destroyed at about this time (see Plate 1b). As the backers of this theory see it, "an invasion by outsiders seems to be the only reasonable explanation."[45] And since the possibility that the invaders came by sea has been rejected above, they must have come by land.

There are several lines of evidence that support this idea of a land attack by backward peoples (Dorians) from northwest Greece. The first is the relatively simultaneous series of site destructions and abandonments in

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[43] V. R. d'A. Desborough, The Greek Dark Ages (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1972), p. 23.

[44] Desborough, The Last Mycenaeans . . ., p. 221.

[45] T. Kelly, A History of Argos to 500 B.C. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976), p. 13.

mainland Greece clearly shown in Plate 1b which seems to imply that the Mycenaeans were overwhelmed by a single, massive blow. Desborough admits that "the invasion may not have been a matter of a single great sweep from north to south"; but it is clear that he believes that the movements, if there were more than one, were not separated by much time.[46] He emphasizes the fact that the Aegean islands were not attacked at this time which accords well with his idea that the attackers came by land.[47]

The massive fortifications built in Mycenaean Greece in late LH IIIB and LH IIIB/C can also be used to support Desborough's theory. These fortifications, which must have required a good deal of time and money to build, may indicate that Greece, although prosperous, was afraid that outsiders would seize its riches.[48] According to Desborough, "the inhabitants were by no means unaware of the danger of attack."[49] The classic example of these new defenses built to stop attacks from the north is the

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[46]Desborough, The Last Mycenaeans . . ., p. 221.

[47]Ibid., pp. 223-224; and Desborough, Dark Ages, pp. 20-21 and 23.

[48]The fortifications must have been built in a period of relative prosperity not only because of the high cost of construction but also because they indicate that the builders felt the need to protect their possessions in this manner.

[49]Desborough, The Last Mycenaeans . . ., p. 221; and Desborough, Dark Ages, pp. 18-19.

massive wall on the isthmus of Corinth (Figure 4). This wall, which is 4 to 4.6 meters thick and has towers projecting on the north side about every 9 meters, was built in late LH IIIB (c. 1230 B.C.) and was designed to



Figure 4.--LH IIIB fortification wall on the Isthmus of Corinth (after Broneer, Antiquity 32:82).

make the approach from the north over very steep terrain.[50] Athens, Mycenae, Tiryns, and many other sites either had their defenses strengthened or their first ones built at about this same time. From this it would seem that the Mycenaeans were expecting an attack, probably from somewhere to the north.

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[50]O. Broneer, "The Corinthian Isthmus and the Isthmian Sanctuary," Antiquity 32 (1958):82.

The next line of argument used to support the idea of a Dorian invasion is the appearance of several somewhat new cultural elements. As Desborough says, "It must be stressed that there is no single object or custom which can be associated with the invaders."[51] Nonetheless, there are several changes in the pattern of life in Greece after the period of destructions such as an increased use of iron instead of bronze, a tendency to cremate rather than inhume the dead, and a tendency to bury the dead in cist tombs rather than chamber tombs.[52] As mentioned before, objects of non-Mycenaean origin are more common in Mycenaean sites of this period. Desborough states that the fact that it is impossible to link any of these cultural elements to the newcomers should pose no problems considering "that the culture of the invaders was probably primitive" and hence "their artefacts may for the most part have been of perishable materials, such as wood and leather, and thus no trace would be left of them."[53] But Desborough goes further and argues that the reason that there are no traces of the invaders is that, having overrun Mycenaean Greece, they moved on.[54] Desborough

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[51]Desborough, The Last Mycenaeans . . ., p. 224.

[52]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 147.

[53]Desborough, The Last Mycenaeans . . ., p. 224.

[54]Ibid., p. 224; and Desborough, Dark Ages, pp. 21 and 23-24.

expresses no opinion as to where the invaders went after their foray into Greece, but Bouzek suggests that they crossed the Aegean and moved into Anatolia.[55] The one cultural element that many authors believe that the invaders did introduce, the Doric dialect,[56] is not mentioned by Desborough, perhaps because it would be difficult to explain how the Dorians could stay long enough to induce the local population to learn a new dialect without leaving any other trace of their presence. Yet it is this introduction of the West Greek Doric dialect that forms the basis of many historians' acceptance of a Dorian invasion or migration.[57]

The last line of evidence that can be used to support Desborough's ideas is that of the ancient Greek tradition of a Dorian invasion. That is, "the oral tradition of the Greeks preserved a story of a series of movements into Greece at very much this time, originating

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[55]Bouzek, Bronze Age Migrations . . ., p. 173.

[56]Kelly, History of Argos, p. 17; Hopper, The Early Greeks, p. 65; Finley, Early Greece, p. 72; and F. J. Tritsch, "The 'Sackers of Cities' and the 'Movement of Populations'," Bronze Age Migrations in the Aegean, ed. R. A. Crossland and A. Birchall (Park Ridge: Noyes Press, 1974), p. 237.

[57]J. Chadwick, "The Mycenaean Dorians," BICS 23 (1976):115.

in the north-western districts which lay outside the Mycenaean world."[58]

But despite this support from Greek tradition as well as the physical evidence cited above, the theory of a Dorian invasion seems to be no more well founded than that of Burn and Chadwick. First, although "virtually the whole of the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean (except the Cyclades and Dodecanese . . .) suffered destruction or disturbance" at the end of the thirteenth century B.C.,[59] "the evidence from the major sites . . . is seen to afford very slight support for the statement . . . that the Mycenaean world . . . came to a violent end" in one shattering disaster in LH IIIB/C.[60] A careful look at Plate 1b and the Appendix will convince the reader that the destructions and abandonments that mark the passing of the glory of the Mycenaean world are spread from mid-LH IIIB to late LH IIIC. This would seem to indicate a protracted period of instability punctuated by repeated disasters rather than a massive invasion of relatively short duration.[61] Further, in addition to the Aegean islands, both Attica and Thessaly escaped major

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[58]Desborough, Dark Ages, p. 23.

[59]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 162.

[60]Ibid., p. 149.

[61]Ibid., p. 151.

devastation in LH IIIB/C.[62] Achaia also seems to have escaped the Dorian attack unscathed,[63] although only a few settlements from this area have been explored. Granted that the idea of an invasion by land makes it easy to explain why the Aegean islands are undisturbed, it makes it hard to explain why an attacker would pass by the fairly rich cities of the coastal districts of Attica and the rich plain of Thessaly. The mountain passes and coastal roads that lead to these areas are certainly no more difficult than those leading to other parts of Greece (Plate 1a). This is especially true of Attica since, considering the topography, it would seem easier for an invader to move east along the Boeotian plain and then south into Attica once he was in Boetia rather than to force his way south across Mt. Kithairon past the fortified towns of Eutresis and Plataea to the coastal road that leads southwest to the Isthmus. To put it simply, the geography of Greece makes it difficult to believe that a major invasion of Greece from the northwest could leave Attica and Thessaly untouched. Only two things could account for this: either the invaders were too weak to defeat the troops of Attica and Thessaly or

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[62] Desborough, Dark Ages, p. 21; and Desborough, The Last Mycenaeans . . ., p. 222.

[63] Vermeule, AJA 64:19.

the invaders' scouts were very bad. If the former is true, it becomes difficult to explain how it would be possible for the invaders to fight their way from the Isthmus to Pylos successfully. If the latter is true, it becomes hard to understand how the invaders successfully found their way across the Peloponnesus sacking all the important settlements there. In short, it is difficult to account for the pattern of destructions and abandonments or for their timing. It is even more difficult to explain why the invaders left or where they went.

But the hardest question to answer is how the Dorians could attack Greece successfully in the first place. To invade Greece from the northwest, one must first penetrate the roughly north-south line of the Pindus Mountains. Then, turning south, one must cross several ranges of mountains that run east-west (Plate 1a). Having finally reached the Peloponnesus, one must move west and south across mountain ranges that run northwest to southeast. If Phocis and Messenia are good examples, many of the passes through the mountains were amply equipped with forts, watchtowers, and other defensive fortifications.[64] As noted before, Desborough states

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[64]E. W. Dase, "Mycenaean Roads in Phocis," AJA 77 (1973):76.

that the Mycenaeans knew that an attack was coming.[65] Even if they did not and the first areas attacked were taken by surprise, the rest would have had ample warning. In either case, the Mycenaeans would have had plenty of time to garrison the passes or to mass enough troops to fight the invader on ground of their own choosing. And even if each one of the Mycenaean forces was defeated in the field, the invaders would still have to reduce the Mycenaean palace-fortresses, something that would require prolonged sieges or very costly assaults.[66] Desborough seeks to make the invaders' job easier by weakening the Mycenaeans' ability to resist. He argues that the Mycenaeans, just prior to the Dorian attack, had seriously weakened themselves through a series of offensive operations in Asia Minor, thus enabling the Dorians to overwhelm them without too much difficulty.[67] But this argument just does not make any sense because any state that has the money, manpower, and time to build the massive fortifications noted above clearly has not been rendered hors de combat. Of course, it could be argued that there are any number of possibilities for the

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[65]Desborough, The Last Mycenaeans . . ., p. 221; and Desborough, Dark Ages, pp. 18-19.

[66]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 178.

[67]Desborough, The Last Mycenaeans . . ., p. 97.

sequence of events. For example, the Mycenaeans could have started a war in Asia Minor and then learned about the Dorians. Or they may have raised armies to repel the invaders, but when the Dorians were slow to arrive, the Mycenaeans found it necessary to employ these troops elsewhere to prevent them from denuding the lands they were supposed to defend. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that enough men would have been available to garrison strong points, making the going slow and costly for the invaders. Thus, the Dorians would have had to fight their way south over difficult terrain, taking heavily fortified positions as they went, against a strong and determined enemy. Yet there are no traces at any of the sites of an intrusion of the large numbers of soldiers that this would require[68] nor have any mass burials of foreign war-dead been found. In short, there is no reason to believe that backward Dorians did fight in Greece. In fact, it would make more sense to argue that the fortifications constructed in LH IIIB and LH IIIB/C were built to defend the Mycenaeans from each other rather than against outsiders. After all, there were probably just as many Mycenaeans north of the wall on the Isthmus as south of it.

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[68]Vermeule, Archaeology 13:71.

As mentioned before, "there is no evidence whatsoever of intrusive [cultural] elements."[69] All of the changes in the patterns of life seem to be a normal outgrowth of things in Mycenaean Greece and its neighbors rather than changes due to the presence of invaders, especially since the three changes noted above never occur together or in all of Greece or even at the same time.[70] One of these "new" elements, the use of cist graves, was, in fact, standard practice in the poorer parts of the Mycenaean world throughout this period.[71] Indeed, the only thing that was not Mycenaean or of Mycenaean origin in the invaders' culture was the Doric dialect they spoke.[72] But this Dorian dialect is so close to the type of Greek written on the Linear B tablets that some scholars are finding it hard to believe that the Dorians were not part of the Mycenaean world.[73] Chadwick has recently proposed that this Doric dialect was nothing more than a substandard version of the

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[69]Desborough, The Last Mycenaeans . . ., p. 97.

[70]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, pp. 147 and 173-174.

[71]Ibid., pp. 178-179.

[72]Hopper, The Early Greeks, pp. 63-65.

[73]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 171; and Chadwick, BICS 23:115.

Mycenaean language used by palace scribes.[74] If he is right, then the barbaric hordes of Dorians who overran Greece will turn out to be the common people who already lived there.

Lastly, the support given Desborough's theory by Greek tradition is not as solid as it might seem. The works of Homer are silent concerning the Dorian invasion as are the remaining works of Hesiod. It is only when one reaches Tyrtaeus that one learns of the invasion.[75] But Tyrtaeus is a Spartan writing at a time when Sparta was seeking justification for her aggressive policies toward Messenia, a land "conquered" by the Dorians who "settled" in Laconia. Thus the tradition of a Dorian invasion probably boils down to nothing more than an attempt to justify Sparta's claim to ascendency in the Peloponnesus if not all of Greece.

To summarize the preceding discussion, "it is impossible to equate the Dorian invaders with the destroyers of the Mycenaean civilization."[76] Desborough's theory just does not seem to fit what is known at the present time. The physical and linguistic evidence has

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[74]Ibid., p. 115.

[75]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, pp. 213-214.

[76]Ibid., p. 173.

shown that the Dorians were very familiar with Mycenaean customs and were probably Mycenaeans themselves, and hence they could hardly be called backward men with an inferior culture. This directly contradicts Desborough's main contention that the attackers are not Mycenaeans.[77] Further, Desborough cannot adequately explain how the Dorians were able to conquer Greece, nor why certain rich areas in Greece escaped the Dorian attack, nor why the invaders would leave the fertile areas they conquered. Thus it seems necessary to reject the idea of a land invasion from the northwest at least until satisfactory answers to these objections can be made.

The Thomas Theory

Thomas believes that the reason for the decline of the Mycenaean civilization was not an attack by outsiders, but rather wars among the Mycenaeans themselves. The basis for Thomas' idea is:

> The same factors producing fragmentation that prevailed throughout the Hellenic period of Greek history existed during the Mycenaean Age. These factors seem to have yielded the same results in both ages: lack of unity manifested in internecine warfare.[78]

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[77] Desborough, Dark Ages, p. 23.

[78] C. G. Thomas, "A Mycenaean Hegemony? A Reconsideration," JHS 90 (1970):192.

In other words, inter-kingdom rivalries caused by economic, political, and personal competition led to a series of wars that bled the Mycenaeans white.

There seems to be a good deal to say for this theory. First, it seems to explain the odd pattern of destructions and abandonments observed in mainland Greece and the Aegean area (Plates 1b and 2a) since if these destructions and abandonments were due to conflicts among Mycenaean areas, then one would expect to find different areas being affected by warfare at different times. The idea of a protracted period of instability and disorder mentioned previously harmonizes well with the idea of a series of wars affecting first Mycenae, Tiryns, Orchomenos, Thebes, and Gla, then Laconia, Elis, Phocis, Pylos and Messenia, as well as the rest of Boeotia and the Argolid, and finally Attica, Euboea, and the Aegean islands.[79]

Thomas believes that the main reason for these wars was economic. Archeology has shown that Thebes was a city of great "commercial importance"[80] and "that trade was an important aspect of life in Pylos."[81] Thomas proposes that "this [commercial] success could easily have

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[79]Ibid., p. 187; Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, pp. 96-97, 148-149, and 151; and L. H. Sackett and M. R. Popham, "Lefkandi," Archaeology 25 (1972):14.

[80]C. G. Thomas, JHS 90:187.

[81]Ibid., p. 189.

led to rivalry and distrust on the part of other Mycenaeans"[82] which result in the destruction of Thebes in LH IIIA/B and of Pylos first in LH IIIA/B and LH IIIB/C. Undoubtedly these destructions would be better viewed as climaxes of bloody wars that devastated many communities, but the economic motivation seems nevertheless to be reasonable.

The second line of argument that can be used to support Thomas' theory is the massive amount of defensive fortifications built by the Mycenaeans at about this time. The impressive defenses constructed for many Mycenaean cities have been noted before. An interesting thing about these fortified sites, though, is that they tend to occur at the borders of fertile plains blocking access to these plains by land and sea (overlay Plate 1c on Plate 1a to see this "ringing"). This can be most clearly seen in the cases of the Argolid and Boeotia. Moreover, it seems that the Mycenaean road system in many areas was dotted with watchtowers and border forts[83] (see Plate 1c). This use of a system of checkpoints along a major highway has been clearly demonstrated by Kase[84]

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[82]Ibid., p. 188.

[83]R. Howell, "A Survey of Eastern Arcadia in Prehistory," BSA 65 (1970):87; and Kase, AJA 77.

[84]Ibid.

(see Figure 5). But Mycenaean roads and towns were not the only things to receive protection. The massive drainage works at Lake Copais, undoubtedly vital to the economy of Boeotia, were ringed with fortresses and watchtowers[85] (see Figure 6). All of this seems to indicate that the Mycenaeans feared attacks by highly aggressive, numerous foes, and since it has been shown that it is improbable that these enemies were outsiders, they must have been other Mycenaeans.

Tradition seems to support Thomas' view of a Mycenaean world divided against itself. The story of the Seven against Thebes recounts the hostility of men of Argos and Calydon as well as some exiles from Thebes against the present rulers of the town. Tradition also records that Neleus became king of Pylos by defeating the ruling king in battle and seizing his throne. In both cases the attackers were men from the Heroic Age of Greece with the Mycenaean period at the present time is generally equated. And in both cases the archeologists have found signs of destruction at the sites in question. But the question that Thomas' theory hinges on is whether or not the Mycenaean world was unified.

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[85] S. E. Iakovides, "Building and Architecture, 14th to 11th Century B.C.," Prehistory and Protohistory, ed. G. A. Christopoulos (London: Heinemann Educational Books, Ltd., 1970), pp. 320-321; and Simpson, BICS Supplement 16:114 and 116-117.



Figure 5.--Mycenaean roads in Phocis (after Kase, AJA 77: 75).



Figure 6.--The Lake Copais drainage works (after Iakovides, "Building . . .," Prehistory and Protohistory, pp. 320-321).

Desborough states:

> I am firmly convinced that there was one ruler over the whole Mycenaean territory, with his capital at Mycenae . . .[86]

and not without some justification. Political unity would explain the "large connecting network [of roads] among the chief towns of the Argolid and Messenia" and probably Boeotia and Attica as well[87] (see Plate 1c) since highways with stone bridges, reinforced culverts, numerous switch-backs, and paved surfaces would require a good deal of time, manpower, and money to construct. The closeness of the fortresses in the Argive plain also can be used to indicate political unity since it is unlikely that three or more rival powers could coexist and build such massive citadels in such a small area.[88] Further, it should be noted that the fortifications of Athens, Mycenae, and Tiryns are so similar in design that it is quite likely that they were laid out by the same architect,[89] which implies a free flow of men and ideas between these areas or even cooperation in military affairs. But the most powerful argument for political unity is the amazing

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[86]Desborough, The Last Mycenaeans . . ., p. 218.

[87]Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age, p. 161.

[88]Page, History and . . ., pp. 129-131.

[89]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 103.

"cultural unity of the whole Mycenaean world"[90] prior to LH IIIC. This cultural uniformity or Mycenaean koine which "cover[s] almost every type of object or custom revealed by archeology"[91] implies that the Mycenaean world must have been linked by strong economic and cultural ties,[92] and the closeness of these bonds may be interpreted to imply political connections as well.

But the argument for unity is not based on physical evidence alone. Both tradition and written documents can be used to support the idea of political unity. Several authors believe that Homer thought that the Mycenaean mainland was a single political unit[93] and even Thomas admits that "the Iliad does leave an impression that Agamemnon holds a privileged position."[94] Page tells us that the "Catalogue of Ships" in the Iliad leaves no doubt that Mycenae was the capital of "the overlord of the Achaeans, Agamemnon"[95] while Desborough speaks of "the overlordship

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[90] Desborough, The Last Mycenaeans . . ., p. 219.

[91] Ibid.

[92] C. G. Thomas, JHS 90, p. 191.

[93] Desborough, The Last Mycenaeans . . .; Desborough, Dark Ages; J. R. Poss, Stones of Destiny (Houghton: Michigan Technological University, 1975), pp. 66-68; and E. O. Forrer, "Vorhomerische Griechen in den Keilschrifttexten von Boghazköi," Mitteilungen der Deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft zu Berlin 63 (1924).

[94] C. G. Thomas, JHS 90:189.

[95] Page, History and . . ., p. 131.

of Agamemnon clearly envisaged by Homer."[96] Reinforcing the epic of Homer are the Hittite documents which refer to the king of Ahhiyawa, a powerful monarch whose domains lay to the west of Anatolia. Desborough believes that Ahhiyawa "represent[s] the entire Mycenaean orbit"[97] and that actions attributed to the king of this powerful nation harmonize well with Homer's tales of Agamemnon's deeds. But this impressive edifice of Mycenaean unity collapses when it is examined more carefully.

First, the magnificent road systems in various areas do not necessarily imply anything more than local political unity. Even if these highways do link all of Greece, this need not imply anything more than cooperation between local rulers for their mutual benefit.[98] Second, if Greece was divided into many mutually hostile kingdoms, then it would make perfect sense to provide "protection of the Argive plain at both ends," an idea mentioned and rejected by Page.[99] This tendency to "ring" areas with fortified sites, mentioned before, may indicate a desire on the part of various groups of Mycenaeans to protect their lands against attack by constructing strong

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[96]Desborough, The Last Mycenaeans . . ., p. 218.

[97]Ibid., p. 218.

[98]Iakovides, "The Centuries . . .," Prehistory and Protohistory, pp. 273-274.

[99]Page, History and . . ., p. 130.

border defenses. As for the Mycenaean koine, "such homogeneity did not necessarily derive from political unity."[100] This cultural unity can be adequately explained in terms of mass production of many items for export and lively trade both overseas and on the Greek mainland.[101] The Iliad also fails to support the idea of unity on closer examination. As Hooker puts it, "The poet of the Iliad assumes not a centralized empire with Agamemnon as its head but a large number of independent kingdoms."[102] Menelaus, Diomedes, Odysseus, and Nestor are all powerful rulers in the epic who often "influence the course of events almost as much as Agamemnon himself does."[103] They are clearly not his vassals and the deference they show him is due to his position as the greatest of Mycenaean kings and the chosen leader of the expedition against Troy. Further, if Simpson and Lazenby are right in their contention that Homer's "Catalogue of Ships" is an accurate reflection of the Mycenaean

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[100] Vermeule, AJA 64:3.

[101] Ibid.; and Thomas, JHS 90:191. Since the idea of unity is based mainly on the remains of trade objects and not evidence of common myths or religions, it may in fact be an illusion created by the types of evidence we have to work with.

[102] Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 136.

[103] Ibid.

world,[104] "the probability is, then, that the political divisions implied by the Catalogue reflect a real situation."[105] Of course, Homer is not universally accepted as a reliable historical source. But considering the scope and quality of Simpson and Lazenby's work which indicates that Homer did know what he was writing about in most cases, it seems that the burden of proof now rests on those who doubt his veracity. Finally, many authors after careful consideration of the Hittite texts have concluded that "the identification of Ahhiyawa with Mycenaean world . . . must . . . be abandoned."[106] These documents will be discussed more fully in the next section; but, to anticipate the conclusion of that examination, it seems more likely that Ahhiyawa is a state along or near the coast of Anatolia.[107]

To summarize the preceding paragraph, there seems to be no good reason for believing that the Mycenaeans were politically unified. On the contrary, it seems more reasonable to believe that the Mycenaeans were divided

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[104] Simpson and Lazenby, The Catalogue . . ., pp. 153-163.

[105] Ibid., p. 156.

[106] Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 131. Others supporting this view are: Page, History and . . .; Finley, Early Greece; C. G. Thomas, JHS 90; and Burn, Minoans . . ..

into several groups which were sometimes hostile and sometimes friendly as was the case in later periods of Greek history. My main objection to Thomas' theory is the fact that the destructions and abandonments are concentrated toward the end of Late Helladic III period (see Plate 1b). Pylos is the only major site burned in LH IIIA/B,[108] and the next destruction dates from LH IIIB:1, about 75 years later. This means that in the approximately 300-year span of the LH III period only two destructions occur in the first 125 years while well over half occur in a 50-year period from about 1230 B.C. to 1180 B.C. (see Table 1). Clearly this indicates a profound change in the attitudes and policies of the Mycenaean states toward each other which Thomas does not explain. If, as Thomas proposes, the basis of interstate hostility is economic in nature,[109] what event could have caused the Mycenaeans to adopt this radically aggressive and destructive policy toward neighboring states? If there were clashes in the earlier years of the LH III period in mainland Greece, they did not result in the wholesale destruction of one of the states involved,

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[108] A LH IIIB or LH IIB/C date is generally accepted for the destruction of Thebes (Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, pp. 149-150) as opposed to the LH IIIA/B date given by C. G. Thomas (JHS 90:188).

[109] C. G. Thomas, JHS 90:187-189.

TABLE 1.--Number of sites abandoned or burned by period for all sites.

LH IIIA	LH IIIA/B	LH IIIB	LH IIIB/C	LH IIIC:1	LH IIIC:2	LH IIIC Undifferentiated
0	2	9	29	8	6	15

(LH IIIC total = 29)

(total from 1230 B.C. to 1180 B.C. = at least 37)

(total for the entire LH III period = 69)

and why the clashes should become more brutal later Thomas does not make clear.

To sum up this section, Thomas' idea does have a good deal of merit. It successfuly explains the pattern of fortifications seen in LH IIIB and LH IIIC time in terms of a number of sometimes hostile states who were fearful of their neighbors. It also accounts for the unifying elements observed in the Mycenaean world such as roads and culture while firmly rejecting the idea of Mycenaean political unity. The two weaknesses of this theory are: (1) that Thomas develops the idea of economic motivation at the expense of all other factors in his discussion of the origins of inter-state rivalries[110] and (2) that he fails to account for the sudden and dramatic change in the intensity if not the basic nature of the hostility of the Mycenaean states toward each other. For these reasons, the Thomas theory, excellent in many respects, must be modified and added to in some manner to account for the observed course of events.

D. L. Page: Mycenaeans and Hittites

This section is not intended to present another theory on the collapse of the Mycenaeans but rather to

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[110]See Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age, pp. 236-237 for a discussion of some of the other factors.

explore the idea that Ahhiyawa was a Mycenaean state in or near Anatolia in direct contact with the Hittites. Page, one of the leading exponents of this idea, argues that Hittite Ahhiyawa is Rhodes.[111] Further, he claims that the Hittite documents offer proof that these Mycenaean Greeks on Rhodes became involved in a series of wars with local Anatolian powers for economic and political reasons during the decline of Hittite power in western Asia Minor.[112] If what Page proposes is true, it means that there was a powerful Mycenaean state placed directly astride the main trade route from mainland Greece to Cyprus and the Levant. The consequences of this, if it is true, make it worthwhile to examine this hypothesis in some detail.

Page bases his theory solely on the Hittite texts which mention Ahhiyawa or which contain information about Anatolian states. He first shows that although the Hittites and Ahhiyawans did clash on occasion, the relations between the two states were generally friendly since the Hittite king felt free to banish his enemies to Ahhiyawa, and the two rulers exchanged gifts and other

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[111] Page, History and . . ., pp. 15 and 18-19. Page, by the way, is a firm supporter of the Dorian invasion hypothesis (see Page, History and . . ., pp. 118-119.

[112] Ibid., pp. 107-111.

diplomatic courtesies.[113] Next he demonstrates that an Ahhiyawan district called Millawanda (or Milawatas) bordered territories controlled by the Hittites.[114] Milawatas, which Page equates with Miletus,[115] is shown by Page to have been located on the coast since a certain Pijamaradus, fleeing the justice of the Hittite king, went by ship from there to Ahhiyawa.[116] The third point Page makes is that Ahhiyawa, while close to Anatolia, was an island or a group of islands off the coast. Several facts indicate this, the first being that Pijamaradus used a ship to go there and the second a letter from the Hittite emperor stating "'that no ship from Ahhiyawa is to sail to the enemy [Assyria].'"[117] Neither of these things, however, proves anything beyond the fact that Ahhiyawa was a maritime state, easily reached by sea, that traded with the Levant. Another Hittite document states that the king of Ahhiyawa was present in Anatolia

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[113] Ibid., p. 7; and Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, pp. 124-125.

[114] Ibid., p. 124; and Page, History and . . ., p. 7.

[115] Ibid., p. 18.

[116] Ibid., pp. 10 and 42.

[117] Hittite text quoted by Page, History and . . ., p. 8.

in the course of a revolt against the Hittites,[118] but this again proves only that Ahhiyawa was in or near Anatolia. The conclusive piece of evidence is a letter from a Hittite emperor, either Mursilis II or Muwattallis, to an Ahhiyawan king in which the Hittite complained of various injuries done him by Ahhiyawan officials as well as other rebels led by Pijamaradus who were taking refuge in Ahhiyawan territory. Overlooking the "'surly message'" sent to him by the Ahhiyawan king, he entreated the king of Ahhiyawa to restrain Pijamaradus and apologized "'for my military occupation of your [the king of Ahhiyawa's] city Millawanda.'"[119] "And where," Page asks, "all this time, is his correspondent, the king of Ahhijawa?"[120] The king's:

> subject city Millawanda lies on the west or southwest coast of Asia Minor, adjacent to Hittite territory and defenseless against Hittite invasion. There is nothing to stop the Hittite Emperor walking in and staying in; and that is what he does.[121]

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[118] Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 126; and Page, History and . . ., p. 8. It is unclear whose side the Ahhiyawans were on, but it is probable that they were supporting the Hittites (Page, History and . . ., pp. 107-108.

[119] A Hittite letter quoted by Page, History and . . ., pp. 11-12.

[120] Page, History and . . ., p. 13.

[121] Ibid., p. 12.

Surely:

> nothing is more certain than that, if he [the king of Ahhiyawa] is anywhere within reach, his days are numbered. There is no room, on the west or southwest coast of Asia Minor, for a kingdom powerful enough to take this tone with the Hittites.[122]

Yet Ahhiyawa did and received nothing worse than a diplomatic wristslap. Page concludes that this must be because the Ahhiyawans were beyond the reach of the Hittites. That is, the Ahhiyawans must live on an island.[123] Page argues that this island must be Rhodes since it is in the right position geographically (Figure 2) and was rich and populous in Mycenaean times.[124] It is interesting to note that Ialysos in Rhodes was also known as Akhiwā City which may be the source of the Hittite name for the country Akhkhijawā = Ahhiyawa.[125]

The last point Page makes is that as Hittite power declined from about 1250 B.C. on, Ahhiyawa assumed a much more aggressive posture towards the states of Anatolia. According to "'The First Tablet of the Crimes of Madduwattas,'" a man of Ahhija named Attarssijas came to Anatolia and attacked Hittite vassals and fought

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[122]Ibid., p. 13.

[123]Ibid., p. 14.

[124]Ibid., p. 16.

[125]Ibid., pp. 17-18.

a pitched battle with Hittite troops during the reign of Arnuwandas III (1220-1190 B.C.).[126] Later Attarssijas and Madduwattas joined forces and seized many states, including Arzawa from the Hittites.[127] But the Ahhiyawans' aggression did not stop there. Page believes that they became involved in a war with Assuwa at about the same time.[128] This seems to be a blatant case of opportunism since Assuwa had just been brutally crushed by Tudhaliyas IV in two devastating campaigns.[129] Further, if Page's geographical positioning of Assuwa is correct, then the Mycenaeans would have had an economic motive for intervention since the area indicated by Page has yielded only a handful of Mycenaean trade objects.[130] In any case, it is clear that toward the end of the thirteenth century B.C. Ahhiyawa was attempting to expand into Asia Minor as the Hittite Empire broke up.

Unfortunately for Page, the physical evidence does not support his theory as neatly as the written evidence does. After a survey of the Dodecanese, Simpson and Lazenby conclude that "the evidence is certainly not

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[126] Ibid., pp. 97-100.

[127] Ibid., pp. 100-101.

[128] Ibid., p. 108.

[129] Ibid., pp. 102-103.

[130] Ibid., p. 105.

sufficient to substantiate the hypothesis of a Rhodian empire, or even a Rhodian hegemony."[131] Considering the lack of Rhodian pottery and numerous large settlements, they prefer "the 'orthodox' view that Ahhijavā lay within Mycenaean Greece."[132] Hooker also rejects the equation of Ahhiyawa with Rhodes but, based on deductions made from the Hittite documents, he prefers to locate it in the Troad.[133] As noted before, both he and Page as well as Finley and Burn reject the idea of Ahhiyawa = mainland Greece because of the things that the Hittite documents imply, the distances involved and the apparent political disunity of Mycenaean Greece.[134]

There are two other lines of evidence, however, that can be used to show the existence of an Aegean island power named Ahhiyawa. The first is based on pottery. As Simpson and Lazenby put it:

> The quantity of L. H. IIIC:1 finds in the Dodecanese, especially in the cemeteries of Kos, and their resemblances to the contemporary finds at Perati and on Naxos in particular, give overwhelming support to Desborough's hypothesis that

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[131] R. H. Simpson and J. F. Lazenby, "Notes from the Dodecanese III," BSA 68 (1973):178.

[132] Ibid., p. 175.

[133] Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, pp. 130-131.

[134] Ibid.; Finley, Early Greece, p. 58; and Burn, Minoans . . ., pp. 136-137.

> they formed a "miniature Mycenaean koine" with the Cyclades and East Attica at this time.[135]

This means that at a time when Mycenaean culture was becoming more localized on the mainland, all or most of the Mycenaean sites in the Aegean basin retained a high level of cultural unity. Although it does not necessarily imply political unity, it does establish that states in the Aegean area had the strength to keep lines of trade and communication open in a period of turmoil in many areas. Further, the similarity of the pottery sequences on Cos, Rhodes, and Carpathos throughout the LH III period indicates exceptionally close ties among these islands.[136]

The second line of evidence is that of trade routes. Recent excavations at Maşat in Anatolia, 120 km west of Bogazkoy, have uncovered some Mycenaean flasks and stirrup jars along with Cypriot pottery dating from approximately 1300 B.C.[137] These finds in conjunction with the mass of Mycenaean and Cypriot pottery in Troy VI[138] seem to indicate the existence of a trade route

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[135]Simpson and Lazenby, BSA 68:173 quoting Desborough, The Last Mycenaeans . . ., pp. 227-228.

[136]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, pp. 112-113.

[137]M. J. Mellink, "Archaeology in Asia Minor," AJA 80 (1976):270.

[138]Ibid.; and D. L. Page, "The Historical Sack of Troy," Antiquity 33 (1959):28.

running from Cyprus to the south shores of the Black Sea. The key way stations along this route would clearly be Rhodes and Miletus. This would put the three islands Cos, Rhodes, and Carpathos athwart both the north-south trade route from Cyprus to the Black Sea and the east-west trade route from Cyprus and the Levant to Greece. In a position such as that, there would be no need for Rhodes to manufacture large amounts of pottery since its role would be that of a transhipper and middleman rather than a manufacturer.

To summarize the last two points as well as the rest of this section, it seems fair to say that there was a Mycenaean power located on the Aegean islands off the coast of Anatolia. This state was strong enough to survive the turmoil of the LH IIIB/C and LH IIIC periods that destroyed many of the seemingly more powerful mainland states. Rhodes, despite the negative evidence of Simpson and Lazenby,[139] is a likely candidate, although Cos and perhpas several other islands could be supported as well. But whether or not one accepts Page's identification, he does seem to have established the existence

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[139]Simpson and Lazenby themselves state that more exploration is needed on Rhodes (BSA 68:156), and they are disturbed that the towns that must be near the numerous, large Mycenaean cemeteries have yet to be located in almost every case (Ibid., p. 133).

of a Mycenaean state named Ahhiyawa in the southeastern Aegean, a position which controlled two major trade arteries and which allowed military intervention in Asia Minor when opportunities presented themselves.

The Hooker Theory

Hooker thinks that the decline of the civilization was due primarily to two causes. The first was intercity warfare in Greece, and the second was intracity warfare between rulers and their oppressed subjects either during or after the intercity wars.[140] Hooker adds that natural disasters such as earthquakes, plague, or drought "may have contributed to the general picture of destruction, although it is unlikely that they were the sole cause of the troubles."[141] Since the idea of intercity warfare has already been discussed fairly completely in the section on Thomas' theory above, and since Hooker presents no new arguments to support this idea,[142] only Hooker's views on Greek rebellions and natural disasters will be presented here.

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[140] Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 180.

[141] Ibid.

[142] In fact, Hooker bases this idea of intercity war solely on the traditional literary material. Ibid.

Hooker argues for rebellions in Mycenaean Greece along the following lines. First, he rejects the idea that the destructions in Greece were due to outside invaders.[143] Second, he attempts to demonstrate that there were large oppressed groups in Mycenaean society who were waiting only for the correct moment to revolt and overthrow their cruel masters.[144] Third, he argues that since outsiders did not cause them, the destructions in Greece must have been due to revolts staged by these oppressed groups. According to Hooker, these revolts took place either during or just after wars waged by the Greek cities against each other.[145]

The first step in Hooker's reasoning need not detain us here since it has already been established in the preceding sections. The second and third steps, however, are new and must be examined here.

Hooker bases the idea of internal dissidents in Greece on two things, both of which are derived from the Linear B tablets. The first piece of evidence comes from the Pylian tablets. According to Hooker, some of these tablets indicate "that the scribes in the Pylian palace had dealings with places in various parts of Messenia and

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[143] Ibid., p. 173.

[144] Ibid., pp. 173 and 179-180.

[145] Ibid., p. 180.

regarded them not as equals but as tributaries."[146] The second piece of evidence the tablets provide is the fact that they were written in an East Greek dialect but contain mistakes that are explainable only if the scribe who wrote the tablets knew a West Greek dialect such as Doric.[147] From this Hooker reasons:

> if Doric and non-Doric dialects co-existed in the Peloponnese and if the language of the palatial administrators was non-Doric, is it not likely that the lower classes, the subjects of the palaces, spoke Doric?[148]

Further, Hooker believes that these oppressed Doric-speakers were "responsible for the overthrow of the palatial system, and perhaps for the destruction of the palaces themselves, and that it is these" revolts that form the basis of the legends about the Return of the Heraclids and the Dorian invasion.[149] Hooker goes on to argue that the Greek way of life changed after the destructions due "to a deliberate rejection of former [Mycenaean] practice by" their former subjects.[150]

Besides wars and revolts, Hooker suggests "the possibility that natural disaster, in the form of famine

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[146] Ibid., p. 102.

[147] Ibid., pp. 172-173; and Chadwick, BICS 23:115.

[148] Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 173.

[149] Ibid., p. 179.

[150] Ibid.

consequent on a severe drought, played its part in disrupting" the Mycenaean world.[151] This position, which is a watered-down version of the idea advanced by Rhys Carpenter,[152] is consistent with all the available evidence,[153] and provides a means for setting in motion the chain of events that led to the disruption of the Mycenaean civilization.

Unfortunately, neither of Hooker's new ideas is strongly supported by the available evidence. Starting with his position on the question of drought, it is clear that he is stretching the available evidence to the breaking point. The strongest supporters of the Carpenter thesis admit that "more field data are needed, especially in critical areas" before it can be proved that a drought occurred.[154] Hooker, who has rejected the traditional literature used by Bryson, Lamb, and Donley to support Carpenter,[155] further notes that the Linear B tablets from Pylos indicate great prosperity and show no signs of drought despite the fact that Messenia is located in a

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[151] Ibid., p. 177.

[152] R. Carpenter, Discontinuity in Greek Civilization (London: Cambridge University Press, 1966).

[153] R. A. Bryson, H. H. Lamb, and D. L. Donley, "Drought and the Decline of Mycenae," Antiquity 48 (1974).

[154] Ibid., p. 50.

[155] Ibid., p. 49; and Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 179.

zone that was supposedly receiving 10 to 20 percent less rainfall than normal.[156] But the harshest criticism of this idea is made by Chadwick, who states bluntly:

> The theory of Rhys Carpenter (1966) that the collapse of Mycenaean Greece was due to climatic change is a mere speculation which seems to be contradicted by the evidence of palaeobotany.[157]

In this light, the drought hypothesis not only lacks solid support but contradicts the little evidence that is available.

Hooker's idea of internal revolts also seems to lack solid evidence when it is examined more carefully. First, it should be noted that the dialect of the Linear B tablets from the mainland, except for a handful of Doricisms, "is virtually the same as that of the Knossos documents, written nearly two hundred years earlier."[158] This clearly implies that the Linear B dialect was "an ossified official jargon which gives a poor . . . guide to the vernaculars actually spoken at the places where the tablets were produced."[159] Thus, to divide the Mycenaeans

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[156]Ibid., p. 177; Bryson, Lamb, and Donley, Antiquity 48:48; and W. A. McDonald and R. H. Simpson, "Further Explorations in Southwestern Peloponnese: 1964-1968," AJA 73 (1969):177. The rainfall figures are based on modern averages.

[157]Chadwick, The Mycenaean World, p. 192.

[158]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 172.

[159]Ibid.

into groups of non-Doric rulers and Doric subjects on the basis of the tablets is just not possible especially since at least some of the scribes writing the tablets clearly knew Doric.[160] Further, although the tablets do make frequent references to groups of slaves, many of these slaves were of foreign extraction, not native Greeks.[161] And although the Pylian tablets do show that the rulers at Pylos were collecting taxes from their domains, there are no indications that these taxes were oppressive, or that the inhabitants refused to pay them, or that the people of the Pylian kingdom were behaving in a disloyal manner.[162] It seems impossible to believe that a revolutionary plot on the scale envisioned by Hooker could have gone undetected in societies as highly supervised as those of Mycenaean Greece.

Leaving aside Hooker's claims that the Greek tales of the Heraclids and Dorians reflect uprisings of local populations as unprovable,[163] let us examine Hooker's contention that the change in Mycenaean

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[160] Chadwick, BICS 23:115. See 147, above.

[161] Chadwick, The Mycenaean World, pp. 78-81.

[162] Ibid., pp. 69-83.

[163] Admitting that it is not easy to understand where all the elements of a myth come from, it still seems odd to me that the record of an internal revolt would be preserved as tales of invading barbarians or displaced nobles leading foreign troops.

lifestyle reflects a conscious rejection of earlier culture. It is not also possible that the revival of simpler customs and less pretentious dwellings indicates a reduced standard of living due to the destruction of the profitable palace economy rather than the rejection of an "alien" culture? Hooker seems to say this when he states:

> The archeological record provides abundant evidence of destructions; but it shows also that, after the destructions, the Mycenaean civilization was not submerged beneath an alien culture. It becomes less assertive certainly, but it remains the same culture that it had been before the era of destruction.[164]

There is no rejection of Mycenaean culture, then. It continued to exist in Greece on a reduced scale appropriate to a country whose cities have been laid waste and whose trade and economy have been wrecked. While it is likely, in fact exceedingly probable, that revolts would occur in times of war, instability, and shortages of necessities such as grain and metal, the key to what caused the collapse of the Mycenaean world does not lie in the revolts themselves but in the shortages and destructive wars that made them both necessary and possible. Thus, in playing up the importance of the supposedly downtrodden populace, Hooker overlooks the internecine wars that made their revolts possible. And, like Thomas, he fails to

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[164]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 174.

he fails to explain why these bloody wars and the revolts that might accompany them were concentrated toward the end of the Late Helladic III period.

J. T. Hooker: The Sea Peoples

Although Hooker's theory on the collapse of Mycenaean Greece has proved to be somewhat deficient, he does advance another point that seems appropriate to discuss here: he almost totally rejects the traditional view of who the Sea Peoples were and what they did. Many authors have sought to identify the various members of the Sea Peoples' coalition as known peoples of the Mediterranean (see Figure 7), but Hooker rejects all their equations except Plst = Peleset = Philistines.[165] He especially ridicules the equation Kwsh = Ekwesh = Achaeans on the grounds that the Achaeans, being Greek, would never practice circumcision as the Ekwesh reportedly did.[166] Further, Hooker states:

> I find it necessary to reject the picture of the Sea Peoples as a powerful army, moving irresistibly and of set purpose, until their final defeat at the hands of the Egyptians.[167]

He claims that the long lists in the Egyptian records of

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[165] Ibid., pp. 160-161.

[166] Ibid.; and Page, History and . . ., pp. 21-22.

[167] Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 158.

Egyptian Documents	A. R. Burn	A. E. Samuel	E. T. Vermeule	G. L. Huxley	M. I. Finley
Trsh	Etruscans		Etruscans (Lydia)		
Shklsh		Sicilians	Sicilians		
Kwsh	Achaeans	Achaeans	Ahhiyawans		Achaeans
Plst	Philistines				
Zkkr	Zikhria		Zakaray		
Dnyn	Danaans	Danaoi	Dananns	Danaoi (Cilicia)	
Wshsh	Oassos				
Lkk			Lycians		
Shrdn		Sardinians	Sardinians		
?			Alasa (Cypriots)		

Figure 7.--Modern identifications of the various members of the Sea Peoples (from Burn, Minoans . . ., pp. 138-143; A. E. Samuel, The Mycenaeans in History (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 136; Finley, Early Greece, p. 59; Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age, p. 273; Vermeule, Archaeology 13:67; and G. L. Huxley, "The Mycenaean Decline and the Homeric Catalogue of Ships," BICS 3 (1956):20).

the Sea Peoples' tribes and the cities and countries they had destroyed are pure propaganda and are in the records only because they fit Egyptian literary and official tastes, not because they reflect the truth.[168] Hooker attributes the destructions in Asia Minor, Syria and Palestine to other causes. The Hittite Empire with its dependencies, for example, simply collapsed of its own weight while Ugarit was destroyed by an earthquake.[169] And if the Sea Peoples were the conquerors of all these areas, Hooker asks, why did they not settle there rather than advance on Egypt? Unfortunately, Hooker has badly manipulated the evidence to reach his conclusions, so this new interpretation of the Sea Peoples goes down like a card house when it is examined closely.

There are several points in Hooker's treatment of the Egyptian documents that are very inconsistent. First, he is willing to accept only those parts of the records which deal with the Philistines and rejects everything else they contain, not because he proves these other statements to be false but because he does not believe them and wishes to "rid our minds altogether of the over-seductive notion of a migratory movement."[170] True, the evidence that the Philistines (= Peleset) did attack

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[169] Ibid., p. 160.

[170] Ibid.

Egypt is very good,[171] and it is possible that they formed the bulk of the invading forces. But is that any reason to exclude the possibility that other groups might have joined them? Drowner's careful study of Egyptian texts and monuments has shown that the Egyptians clearly knew who all the peoples they named were and what they looked like.[172] If the Egyptians could correctly identify the Peleset, why does Hooker judge that they could not identify the other tribes correctly? What evidence can Hooker produce to show that some raiders from Anatolia and the eastern Aegean such as the Danaoi from Cilicia, the Lukka (= Lkk) from Lycia (Hittite Luqqa?), and the Ahhiyawans did not join the Philistines as they moved south from Syria? Against him is the fact that, as soon as they arrived in Palestine, the Philistines were making pottery reflecting the newest elements of Mycenaean LH IIIC pottery.[173] This means that tribes from northern Syria, unknown to the Egyptians before 1190 B.C., were in close contact either with Mycenaean potters or with men who had access to the latest pottery styles. This contact

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[171] Ibid., pp. 161-162.

[172] M. S. Drowner, "The Identification of the 'Sea Peoples'" Discussion," Bronze Age Migrations in the Agean, ed. R. A. Crossland and A. Birchall (Park Ridge: Noyes Press, 1974), p. 206.

[173] Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, pp. 161-162.

implies either that the Philistines had direct marine links with Mycenaean sites or that Mycenaean and Anatolian elements from trading towns like Ugarit were allied with them. Either of these alternatives makes it possible to believe that the island-dwelling Danaoi and other sea raiders were among the attackers repulsed by Rameses III. And as for the ridiculousness of the equation Kwsh - Ekwesh = Achaeans (or Ahhiyawans), consider the following points. First, it has been established above that there was a Mycenaean power in the eastern Aegean. Further, it is highly likely that Mycenaean traders lived in Ugarit and Cyprus.[174] This means that Mycenaeans were in close contact with Asiatics and Semites, and "it would be strange if, in such a milieu, nothing was every exchanged except objects of trade."[175] Hooker shows that at least five Semitic words found their way into Mycenaean Linear B (see Figure 8) and postulates that "Ugarit [was] a kind of bridge between the Semitic and the Mycenaean world."[176] In this type of setting, is it not possible that some of these "Greek" traders might convert to the local religions and practice circumcision, especially if they became mercenaries in the employ of a foreign king? In short,

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[174]Ibid., p. 116.

[175]Ibid., p. 117.

[176]Ibid.

MYCENAEAN (Linear B)	UGARITIC (Semitic)	ENGLISH
ki - to	ktn	tunic
ku - mi - no	kmn	cummin
ku - pa - ro	kpr	galingale
ku - ru - so	krs	gold
sa - sa - ma	ssmn	sesame

Figure 8.--Semitic loan words in Mycenaean Linear B.

there is no reason not to believe that a few Mycenaeans were circumcised or that the Egyptians were correct in identifying their assailants.

The Ugarit texts form the next set of evidence that Hooker bends to his own interpretation. These Ugarit texts date from about 1200 B.C., shortly before the city was violently destroyed. Ugarit was a vassal of the Hittite Empire at that point, and served as the western terminus of many trade routes originating in central Anatolia and Mesopotamia. These inland trade connections and Ugarit's links with Cyprus made Ugarit a port town of immense strategic and commercial importance. According to Hooker, the king of Ugarit wrote to the king of Alasiya (Cyprus) and asked for help because seven ships of the enemy were ravaging his coastal districts and all his troops and ships were committed elsewhere.[177] Hooker makes light of the suggestion that the mighty Sea Peoples could be the enemy harassing Ugarit since that enemy has only seven ships.[178] Further, he quotes another letter from an Ugarit officer to the king in which the officer urges the king to outfit 150 ships.[179] Hooker concludes:

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[177]Ibid., p. 159. The fleet was in the land of the Lukka and the army was in the Hittites' homeland.

[178]Ibid., pp. 159-160.

[179]Ibid., p. 160.

> and when we read that they [the Ugaritians] disposed of 150 ships, presumably in addition to the fleet already operative, we may find it hard to imagine that an enemy with only seven could have posed any lasting threat.[180]

There are at least three distortions here. First, we have no evidence that Ugarit could or did outfit these 150 ships which would require 5,000 to 8,000 sailors to man. Second, there is nothing that suggests that these ships are in addition to the fleet already serving "'in the land of the Lukka'" mentioned by the king.[181] In fact, considering the distressed tone of the king of Ugarit's letter, there are good grounds for believing that these 150 ships are the Ugaritic fleet. Lastly, it should be noted that the kind of Ugarit did not state that the enemy had only seven ships in his entire fleet. What he did write was that seven ships were attacking him. And after all, some strong naval force must have been detaining the Ugaritic fleet in Lukka unless we choose to believe that the Hittites and their Ugaritic allies were total military incompetents. Thus it would seem that, contrary to Hooker's beliefs, Ugarit, Cyprus, and the Hittites were at war with a strong naval power or powers located in the Aegean or southwest Anatolia.

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[180] Ibid.

[181] Ugarit text quoted by Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 159.

The preceding paragraphs have, in fact, only been nibbling at the edges of the central issue. As Hooker rightly sees, the key to the problem is determining what caused the Hittite Empire to collapse. Hooker states bluntly that it "crumbled under its own weight, the pressure of economic necessity, and the desertion or rebellion of vassals."[182] Realizing that to answer adequately the question of why the Hittites fell lies beyond the scope of this thesis, I must still pause briefly here to reject Hooker's explanations. Overextension of frontiers, rebellions, famine, and the like might weaken the powerful Hittite state, but they certainly could not destroy it utterly in less than 30 years. To believe that a state that was still capable of mounting a major amphibious assault against Cyprus and of exacting tribute from the natives there as late as 1185 B.C.[183] was going down without a fight seems completely incredible. Further, if the enemies who burned Bogazkoy came from Arzawa or Assuwa in the west, then why weren't the Ugarit troops sent with the fleet to the land of the Lukka in order to attack these Hittite enemies (see Figure 2)? Isn't it reasonable to believe that these troops were sent north

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[182]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 160.

[183]Ibid., p. 161; Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age, p. 273; and Iakovides, "The Centuries . . .," Prehistory and Protohistory, p. 295.

into the Hittites' homeland rather than to the west because the Hittites were under attack by northern tribes at that time?[184] A movement of northern peoples and the subsequent shifting of tribes further south might explain why the Philistines, who lived in northern Syria, would move west into "the coastal regions of Syria"[185] and then south into Palestine. And finally, isn't it possible that many of these "land and sea raiders," set in motion by the incursions of outsiders, did settle in the lands they conquered so that by the time they reached Egypt, the Egyptian military was able to handle those who were left?

In short, it seems that in seeking to enfeeble the Sea Peoples and prove "the folly of ascribing all the disasters in the Near East to" them,[186] Hooker has run into the folly of ignoring the evidence that is available. The facts seem to indicate that the Hittites and their allies were fighting against enemies from the north and west by land and sea (this will be discussed more fully in the next section), and there is no reason to suppose that these enemies of the Hittities would not cooperate if it was to their mutual benefit.

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[184] C. G. Starr, A History of the Ancient World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 124-125.

[185] Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 158.

[186] Ibid., p. 160.

Summary

Before proceeding with the detailed presentation of the new explanation of the Mycenaeans' decline, I wish to recapitulate the main points made in the preceding sections:

1. Invaders from outside the Mycenaean world, such as Dorians or sea raiders, were not responsible for the collapse of Mycenaean Greece;

2. Greece, though culturally unified, was probably politically divided in this period. At least one of these Mycenaean states was located in the Aegean and had dealings with the Hittite Empire;

3. these Mycenaean states seem to have adopted ruthless and destructive policies toward each other starting in late LH IIIB and continuing until near the end of LH IIIC;

4. although it is probable that there were revolts at various times and places in Late Helladic III, these revolts were a consequence rather than a cause of the Mycenaean decline;

5. it is highly likely that sea raiders and adventurers from the Aegean and Anatolia did join various migratory peoples in their attacks on Egypt, Ugarit, and other areas although they probably did not comprise a majority of the assailants in most cases.

Since none of the theories discussed above accounts adequately for these points, it is necessary to put forward a new theory which satisfactorily explains them and the evidence on which they are based.

THE NEW EXPLANATION OF THE MYCENAEANS' DECLINE

It has been previously established in this thesis that Mycenaean Greece was probably divided into a number of states or kingdoms. It was also noted that several areas were surrounded by strong rings of fortresses, undoubtedly to protect them from outside attack. Using the fact that these lines of fortification would occur roughly at a state's border,[1] one can attempt to reconstruct in broad outline the political geography of Mycenaean Greece (see Plate 1c). In the north was the large kingdom of Boetia with harbors on both the Aegean and the Gulf of Corinth. Phocis and Locris may have been parts of this kingdom, but they could just as easily have been separate states. South of Boeotia lay Attica and Corinthia. Neither of these areas seems to have been a major power at that time.

Attica lacked a complete ring of border defenses and culturally seems to have been turned eastward into

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[1] In some cases the border forts would not have been built exactly on the boundary line in order to take advantage of a more defensible position.

the Aegean.[2] Corinthia, on the other hand, seems to have been dependent on the Argolid to the southwest since its fortifications were designed to stop attacks from the north.[3] The Argolid was the most heavily fortified of the Mycenaean states, possibly because it was the most exposed to attack. Since this concentration of fortresses in the Argolid seems rather high considering the relatively small size of the Argive plain, it is reasonable to suggest that this kingdom owed its wealth to sources other than agriculture, such as the copper deposits of Mycenae[4] or its position on the trade routes from the Peloponnesus to northern Greece.[5] The fact that there were probably palaces at Tiryns, Mycenae, Midea, and Asine need not imply that there were separate states bordering the Argive plain.[6] In fact, it would seem

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[2]See note 135 of the last section.

[3]Recall the massive wall built for just this purpose. Broneer, Antiquity 32:82. See Figure 4.

[4]Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age, p. 228.

[5]W. A. Heurtley, "Notes on the Harbours of S. Boeotia, and Sea-trade Between Boetia and Corinth in Prehistoric Times," BSA 26 (1923):44.

[6]Kelly, History of Argos, p. 12. Of course it is possible that there were several independent states coexisting in this area. However, the states would have been so small that obtaining enough labor to build the massive fortifications would have been very difficult. See the section on C. G. Thomas above for other arguments for unity.

quite natural to expect that the princes or great noblemen assigned to hold these important places would have courts rivalling the royal court in splendor.

Further south in the Peloponnesus were the kingdoms of Pylos and Laconia. The borders of the Pylian kingdom are fairly easily traced by the location of border fortresses, but those of Laconia are not so easily discernible. It might have been that the Laconians, as in classical times, relied more on geography and the valor of their soldiers to keep intruders away than on fixed defensive positions. It is reasonable to suppose that there was a state located in Arcadia, but at present its size and power are unknown. The same is true for the Ionian islands and other areas of Greece such as Thessaly.

As noted before, there was at least one Mycenaean state in the Aegean. The three islands of Cos, Carpathos, and Rhodes seem to be a logical choice for its location considering the evidence given in the section on the Mycenaeans and Hittites, the excellent harbor on Rhodes, and the islands' position astride the two main Aegean trade routes. Whether the Cyclades and Euboea were grouped politically with this Dodecanese power (Ahhiyawa) or allied with Attica or even were independent states, it is clear that all of the Aegean islands, including

parts of Attica, were closely linked both culturally and economically.[7]

The question now arises, what could have caused tensions and hostilities to exist among these Mycenaean states? Perhaps the best answer is that given by Vermeule:

> It is likely that any general organization of Mycenaean power had no more stability than a classical alliance among city-states, that politics were personal and affected by blood-lines and trade convenience.[8]

Since, at present, there are no means with which to restore the personal politics of Mycenaean Greece, this paper will be limited to the trade and economic issues for which information is available. As noted above, Thomas has suggested that economic factors were behind all or most of the destructions in Greece.[9] As in classical times, competition for trade routes and markets must have been a major source of friction among the Mycenaeans. But what could have raised this tension to the point that the Mycenaeans were willing to destroy utterly their competitors? According to Vermeule, "it must have been a sudden difficulty in procuring raw materials that" caused this increased level of violence.[10]

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[7]See note 135 of the last section.

[8]Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age, p. 237.

[9]C. G. Thomas, JHS 90.

[10]Vermeule, Archaeology 13:68.

That is to say, the various Mycenaean states were not self-sufficient and depended on imports of certain vital materials to keep them functioning. When the flow of these materials was disrupted or slowed down, disastrous shortages would result.

Although the Mycenaeans may have imported many kinds of raw materials from abroad, only two, grain and metal, will be discussed here since they are the only two items for which there is good evidence. There are various reasons for believing that "the Mycenaeans depended upon grain and metal from abroad to maintain their civilization."[11] Several authors have suggested that the population of Mycenaean Greece during the Late Helladic III period was at least as large as the Greek population in classical times.[12] If this is true (and these authors offer good reasons for believing that it is) and unless the fertility of the Greek soil was very much greater than in classical times, then at least some of the Mycenaean states would have had to import grain. There are three reasons for believing that the agricultural productivity of Greece, although higher than that in later times, was not sufficient to support the population entirely. First,

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[11] Ibid., pp. 66-67.

[12] Ibid.; Simpson, BICS Supplement 16; Heurtley, BSA 26:43-44; Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, pp. 105-107; and Chadwick, The Mycenaean World, pp. 67-68.

there are Mycenaean drainage works at Lake Copais. Surely if the Boeotians had had enough grain to support themselves or if surplus grain had not been so valuable to them, they would not have undertaken the monumental task of building the drainage works and fortifications to protect them. Second, Mycenaean Greeks probably served as experienced sailors and mercenary infantry for the major powers of the day such as Egypt and the Hittite Empire.[13] This indicates overpopulation in Greece and parts of the Aegean at this time so that the only way some men could earn a living or increase their fortunes was with the sword. And lastly, the Mycenaeans traded with Italy, Sicily, and the Black Sea,[14] all of which were grain exporters in later times. None of this proves that the Mycenaeans imported grain, but it strongly suggests they did.

Whether the Mycenaeans depended on foreign grain or not, it is certain that they depended on foreign metals. Although there are copper deposits near Mycenae and on the island of Paros, they are too small to have

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[13]Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age, pp. 260-261 and 271-274.

[14]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 111; Mellink, AJA 80:270; and Trump, Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society 24:187.

supplied the Mycenaeans' needs.[15] Further, there are no known deposits of tin, the other ingredient of bronze, in Greece.[16] Since bronze was used to make everything from wheel rims to weapons and common tools,[17] it is clear that "copper and tin were basic, vital Mycenaean imports from abroad."[18] "Copper was easily obtained in Cyprus,"[19] and considering the proximity of the large deposits there when compared with other sources of copper ore (see Figures 9 and 10), Cyprus was probably the Mycenaeans' main source of copper. Numerous large piles of weathered red slag in the central regions of Cyprus as well as metal working shops in Enkomi, Kition, Idalion, and Hala Sultan Tekke attest to the scale of the copper industry there in Mycenaean times.[20] The source of tin, however, poses problems for some authors.[21] As can be

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[15]Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age, pp. 26 and 228.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid.; and Chadwick, The Mycenaean World, pp. 142-143.

[18]Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age, p. 228.

[19]Chadwick, The Mycenaean World, p. 139

[20]L. M. Bear, The Mineral Resources and Mining Industry of Cyprus (Nicosia: Republic of Cyprus, 1963), p. 190; and K. Nicolaou, "Archaeological News from Cyprus," AJA 77 (1973):53-55.

[21]Chadwick, The Mycenaean World, p. 139; and Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age, p. 228.



Figure 9.--Tin and copper deposits in Anatolia (after Poss, Stones of Destiny, p. 48).



Figure 10.--Tin and copper deposits in Europe (after Poss, Stones of Destiny, p. 61).

seen from Figures 9 and 10, deposits of tin are concentrated in three areas: Spain, Central Europe, and Asia Minor. Chadwick believes that the most likely sources of the tin used by the Mycenaeans were located in Spain and Czechoslovakia.[22] This could possibly explain the Mycenaeans' interest in Southern Italy since the Spanish tin would have had to pass by that route. It could also account for their interest in the Black Sea area and the "Adriatic" distribution of Baltic amber since Central European tin must have been transported to Greece either by way of the Danube-Black Sea-Aegean route or the Amber Route-Adriatic path.[23] However, considering the distances involved, the amounts of tin the Mycenaeans must have used, and the lack of large volumes of Mycenaean trade goods and pottery in these areas, especially the Danube region, it would seem more reasonable to believe that "the handiest source for tin was probably Asia Minor."[24] The tin deposits along the Maeander River may account for the great interest the Mycenaeans showed in Miletus. Similarly, the strong Mycenaean interest in Ugarit may indicate that some of the tin mined in central Anatolia

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[22]Chadwick, The Mycenaean World, p. 139.

[23]Harding and Hughes-Brock, BSA 69:153; and G. Cadogan, "Mycenaean Trade," BICS 16 (1969):153. See Figure 3.

[24]Mellink, AJA 80:270.

was brought there by caravan and then traded to Mycenaeans or Cypriots. The Mycenaean trade along the south shore of the Black Sea may also have been for tin since the Hittite city of Maşat, where Mycenaean oil flasks have been found,[25] was very close to the main Anatolian tin fields (Figure 9). Considering this evidence of large-scale Mycenaean trade, the fact that the Mycenaeans were already trading with eastern lands to get copper, the difficulties of trading for tin in more distant areas, and the willingness and ability of a powerful state like the Hittite Empire to organize a tin trade in order to obtain luxuries such as Mycenaean oil, wine, textiles, and utensils,[26] it seems clear that the Mycenaeans' primary and perhaps only source of tin was Anatolia.

Despite the evidence of heavy overseas trade for metals, it is certain that in LH IIIB/C time some areas of Greece were short of metal. The tablets from Pylos make this quite clear. Of the nearly 400 smiths in the Pylian kingdom, almost one-third had no metal issued to them.[27] The other two-thirds received, on average, a

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[25]Mellink, AJA 80:270.

[26]Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age, p. 228; and Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 128. Hooker cites a Hittite text in which goods of this nature from Ahhiyawa are listed.

[27]Chadwick, The Mycenaean World, pp. 140-141.

paltry 3.5 kilograms each.[28] This amount of metal could hardly have been expected to keep these smiths busy for any length of time even if it is assumed that they also farmed or tended flocks part of the time to support themselves.[29] The shortage of metal was apparently so severe that local governors were directed to collect bronze offerings from temples and other shrines in order to increase the amount of metal available.[30] In brief, "there was a shortage of metal"[31] in parts of Greece as LH IIIB was drawing to a close. This shortage coupled with a possible scarcity of grain and other items "could [have] caused[d] a severe crisis in Greece."[32] This, in turn, could have caused the sudden destructive change in the relations of the Mycenaean states.

The question that must now be answered is why the shortage of metals occurred at this time (c. 1230 B.C.)? As noted above, there were three main routes for tin, the metal that was hardest to obtain, to reach Greece. The first was by way of Italy and the Adriatic. Slightly

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[28]Ibid., p. 140; 3.5 kilograms = 7.7 pounds of bronze which would form a cube of metal 3.28 inches on a side.

[29]Ibid., p. 141.

[30]Ibid., pp. 141-142.

[31]Ibid., p. 141.

[32]Vermeule, Archaeology 13:67.

before 1200 B.C. however, due to the rise of the Terremarians in Northern Italy, the tin mined in Central Europe travelled down the Adriatic only in the form of already finished bronze goods.[33] Lipari, a major link in any trade route from Spain to Greece, was violently seized by North Italians at about this same time,[34] thus disrupting any tin-trade the Mycenaeans might have had with Spain. Hence, despite the fact that Greece continued to trade with Southern Italy as evidenced by Mycenaean LH IIIC pottery at Taranto and Italian cups in Euboea,[35] only insignificant quantities of tin could have been obtained from this area.

The second route for tin was by way of the Black Sea. According to Page, "a powerful Kingdom of Assuwa [arose] on the western coast of Asia Minor" sometime between 1250 and 1220 B.C.[36] This state, which was not friendly with the Mycenaeans, seems to have expanded north into the Troad in late LH IIIB.[37] With this expansion, "the volume of Mycenaean imports [to Troy was] reduced to a

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[33]Trump, Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society 24:187.

[34]Ibid., pp. 175 and 196.

[35]Ibid., pp. 191-192; and Popham and Milburn, BSA 66:338.

[36]Page, History and . . ., pp. 102-104.

[37]Ibid., pp. 105-106.

trickle."[38] With the Straits effectively closed in this manner, whatever Mycenaean tin trade there was through the Black Sea must have dried up.

But both of the areas mentioned above were probably only sideshows. As noted before, the main sources of the Mycenaeans' tin were central Anatolia and the Maeander River valley. Since the Maeander River was in the territory of Arzawa, a Hittite vassal, and since the central Anatolian deposits were also under the control of the Hittite Empire, the Hittites had a virtual monopoly on tin. Moreover, Ugarit, the port through which the bulk of the tin was exported to Greece, was a loyal Hittite vassal. Further, the copper producing area of Cyprus (Alasiya) was usually under at least nominal Hittite control.[39] Thus, all of the metals so desperately needed by the Mycenaeans were controlled by the Hittites. Any disruption of this vital trade "would therefore have had drastic consequences for" Mycenaean Greece.[40]

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[38]Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age, p. 276. Several thousand Mycenaean vases have been recovered from Troy VI while only 60 Mycenaean sherds were found in Troy VIIa, the supposed member of the Assuwan Kingdom (Page, Antiquity 33:28).

[39]Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age, p. 348; Page, History and . . ., p. 100; and Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 159.

[40]Chadwick, The Mycenaean World, p. 141.

But what could have disrupted it? The answer to this question seems to be bound up in the events surrounding the fall of the Hittite Empire. As has been discussed above, in its later years the Hittite Empire had to deal with hostile groups pushing into its domains from the north.[41] While the bulk of Emperor Arnuwandas IV's troops were engaged in repelling these invaders, King Kupanta-KAL of Arzawa revolted, aided by Attarssijas, man of Ahhiya.[42] Hittite vassals were sworn to "treat as enemies the ruler of Arzawa, Kupanta-KAL, and the Achaean Attarssijas."[43] Earlier, it was noted that the two main trade routes in the Aegean were controlled by the Ahhiyawans and that the Hittites fully understood how to enforce trade embargoes against their enemies.[44] Thus, although Ahhiyawa would have had access to the tin deposits of Arzawa, Cypriot copper and Hittite tin would have been denied to them. To correct this severing of the vital trade arteries, Arzawans and Ahhiyawans led by Madduwattas and Atarssijas descended on Alasiya,[45] undoubtedly planning to secure

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[41] Page, History and . . ., p. 103; and Starr, A History of . . ., pp. 124-125.

[42] Page, History and . . ., pp. 98-99.

[43] Ibid., p. 98.

[44] Ibid., p. 8.

[45] Ibid., p. 100.

Alasiya's vital copper mines for themselves. Arnuwandas IV, having barely enough troops to contain the Arzawans and their allies on the mainland, could do nothing but write letters to Madduwattas protesting his actions.[46]

The success of the rebels and their Ahhiyawan allies was short lived, however, and Cyprus was soon back under Hittite control.[47] But the Arzawans and their allies were not so easily deterred. The king of Ugarit wrote plaintively to his counterpart in Cyprus, "'ships of the enemy have come; they have burnt my cities by fire and have done terrible things to the land.'"[48] Considering that the Ugaritic fleet had been sent to the land of the Lukka (Lycia), a position directly between Arzawa and Ahhiyawa (Figure 2), it seems clear that they were the enemy. But there was little the king of Cyprus could do to help his unfortunate ally. The island was wracked by several periods of destruction, and after each one the strength of the Mycenaean element in the population increased[49] (see Appendix). Soon Alasiya found herself ranged against her former Hittite masters in the

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[46]Ibid., pp. 98-100.

[47]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 159.

[48]Ugarit text quoted by Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 159.

[49]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, pp. 153-154.

reign of Suppiluliumas II.[50] But making a mighty effort, the Hittites retook the island. Suppiluliumas II wrote:

> Now the ships of the land Alasiya three times met me in the sea for battle, and I destroyed them; the ships I took and in the midst of the sea I burnt them.[51]

The text goes on to state that the Hittites landed on the island, vanquished its defenders, and imposed a tribute of copper and gold on its inhabitants in about 1185 B.C.[52]

Despite the ultimate success of the Hittites in denying Cyprus to their enemies, the fighting seems to have spread far beyond this initial area of conflict. "In Cilicia, intrusive [Mycenaean] pottery of an early Late Helladic IIIc type was found above a burnt level at Tarsus," an important Hittite town.[53] Miletus and Troy VIIa were both destroyed, perhaps indicating hostilities among Ahhiyawa, Arzawa, and Assuwa over the Maeander River tin fields and the Black Sea trade routes. At the same time as this warfare in Asia Minor, hostilities were also

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[51]Hittite text quoted by Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 159.

[52]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 155; Iakovides, "The Centuries . . .," Prehistory and Protohistory, p. 295; and Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age, p. 273.

[53]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, p. 155; and Vermeule, Archaeology 13:72.

taking place in mainland Greece. Several sites, such as Mycenae and Tiryns, underwent repeated devastation. Boeotia, with its rich farmlands and Cretan trading connections,[54] was laid waste. Lefkandi was destroyed and then besieged again in LH IIIC.[55] Pylos and most of Messenia were ravaged. In fact, of the parts of Mycenaean Greece that have been thoroughly explored, none escaped unscathed from the wars of LH IIIB and LH IIIC (see Plate 1b). Everywhere there are signs of upheaval: cities and fortresses destroyed, towns abandoned, and engineering works neglected.

I maintain that the reason for these internecine wars in Greece was the disruption of the vital trade in raw materials caused by the conflict between the Hittites and the Ahhiyawans and Arzawans. The best example of this disruption was the almost complete breakdown of the crucial metals trade. Although the Ahhiyawans did have access to Arzawa's tin and Alasiya's copper at various times, it is clear that their control of these source areas was not very firm. Between the destruction caused by the fighting for control of the mines, the loss of

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[54]Heurtley, BSA 26; Iakovides, "Building and . . .," Prehistory and Protohistory, p. 295; and Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age, p. 273.

[55]Popham and Milburn, BSA 66, pp. 333-334; and Sackett and Popham, Archaeology 25:14.

shipping in the war, and general chaos caused by the repeated shifts in the political and military picture, the export of metals to Greece must have plummeted sharply. There probably were enough tin and copper available to keep the Aegean states like Ahhiyawa rich and prosperous, but their mainland neighbors must have felt the pinch.[56] The rigidly organized economies of these Mycenaean states were probably not able to adjust to this loss of basic raw materials and the unemployment and discontent that were bound to follow.[57] There were only two ways to solve these problems: either the Mycenaeans could attempt to secure sources of metal abroad, or they could attack each other in order to eliminate their rivals for the dwindling supply of metals. Despite the difficulties of mounting a major overseas expedition to seize mining areas, there is evidence to suggest that that was what some Mycenaean states did. The materials above the second destruction

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[56]Vermeule, AJA 64:3.

[57]Hooker, Mycenaean Greece, pp. 187-189. For example, consider the impact on the Pylian economy of having 130 unemployed and 270 underemployed smiths. Not only would they not have been able to produce the normal level of consumer goods, but also they would not have been able to purchase fine textiles, good pottery, and other trade goods. Thus, a metal shortage would trigger an economic chain reaction that would affect everyone from the king to the poorest shepherd.

levels at Enkomi and Kition on Cyprus have strong connections with the Greek mainland, possibly the Argolid.[58] Tarsus may have been another victim of mainland Mycenaean aggression.[59]

But on the whole, it seems that most mainland states chose the second, and far easier, option. According to Homer, Argives fought Boeotians, Pylians fought Epeians, Arcadians fought Pylians, and Curetians fought Aitolians.[60] Whatever the actual alliances and enemies, the wars fought for bronze and probably grain and the revolts of discontented nobles and the impoverished, and possibly hungry, commoners that very likely accompanied the fighting spared few sections of Greece (see Plate 1b). In the end, both methods failed. The Mycenaeans were unable to hold the vital mines abroad, and they succeeded only in bleeding each other to death at home. Her finest cities reduced to rubble, her economy shattered, and the trade that had made her rich and powerful withered, Mycenaean Greece slid slowly into the poverty and isolation of the Dark Ages.

The last question that must be answered is why. Why did the Mycenaeans embark on such a futile and bloody

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[59] See note 53 above.

[60] Homer, The Iliad, trans. W. H. D. Rouse (New York: New American Library, Inc.), iv. 376f., vii. 132-156, ix. 527f., and xi. 670-761.

course of action? For the mainlanders, the answer is clear. These states fought to maintain their way of life if not simply to survive. They became more ruthless because it seemed necessary to remove permanently competitors and rivals, and to seize whatever they might have. Ahhiyawa's policy of aggression or its tolerance of the aggressive acts of some of its leading men is rather more puzzling. The key must lie in the Hittite tin and copper monopolies. Perhaps the Hittites had raised the prices of these metals so high, to help pay for the cost of their many wars and their large bureaucracy, that the Ahhiyawans would do anything to lower them. Perhaps the Ahhiyawans became too greedy and took advantage of the Arzawan revolt and the Hittites' northern problems to attempt to set up a metal monopoly of their own. Perhaps it was a little of both. But in any case, the Ahhiyawans' plans miscarried with disastrous results. Despite the hammerings they absorbed in the north, west, and south, the Hittites proved strong enough to deny Ahhiyawa and her Arzawan allies the vital copper mines of Cyprus, but it was the Hittite Empire's last act of any importance. When the fighting finally stopped, Ahhiyawa still controlled the main trade routes, but now they linked only ghost towns and blackened ruins. Like her mainland counterparts, she too slid into the gentle embrace of obscurity for lack of trade and money with which to make

good her losses. The Mycenaean world thus passed from the realm of living men into that of the poet.

MEANS OF TESTING THE NEW EXPLANATION

Any idea or theory, new or old, has a number of places at which it can be checked and either verified or rejected. The items below form a check list of the major areas where new or revised evidence might further support the explanation of the Mycenaeans' decline advanced here, or cause it to be modified, or even rejected. This brief list is intended only to indicate areas of major importance or ones about which very little is known, and hence it is not exhaustive. These areas are:

1. The discovery or translation of Hittite documents dealing with Assuwa, Arzawa, Ahhiyawa, Alasiya, or the troubled days preceding the final collapse of the Hittite state;

2. sites in Ionia, the Cyclades, the Dodecanese, the Danube region, and the northern parts of Anatolia should be carefully inspected for signs of Mycenaean trading activity or occupation and signs of disturbances. This information might help indicate the existence and scale of Mycenaean Black Sea trade, Mycenaean trade along the shores of the Aegean, and the existence and degree of unity of Mycenaean states in the Aegean;

3. studies of the climate in LH IIIB/C and neighboring periods are needed as well as information on Greece's agricultural productivity and mineral wealth in Mycenaean times. This information would permanently resolve the controversy over the Carpenter thesis and supply hard data on the size of Greece's dependence on foreign grain and metal;

4. further exploration and excavation of sites in the Greek mainland. This would help to flesh out the blank areas on Plate 1 and would help to test the pattern of devastation given by Plate 1b and the political geography proposed on Plate 1c;

5. the discovery and decipherment of more Linear B tablets. This would provide us with more data concerning the economies and social structures of various Mycenaean states and perhaps their relations with each other;

6. provenience studies of mainland Mycenaean pottery. These studies could be used to determine which mainland state was trading with a given area and how that trade fluctuated with time.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has shown that the collapse of the Mycenaean world was probably the result of a series of protracted and destructive wars fought from late LH IIIB (c. 1240 B.C.) until late LH IIIC (c. 1100 B.C.). Prior to this time, the Mycenaean world, which was divided into several highly organized and unified states, had remained in a state of relative peace. The wars were caused by shortages of metal, grain, and possibly other necessities brought about by the loss of markets in Italy to the Terremarians and the disruption of trade routes in the eastern Aegean due to the re-emergence of Arzawa, Assuwa, and other states in Anatolia that were hostile to the Hittites. Exactly what caused the Ahhiyawans led by Attarssijas, man of Ahhiya, to involve themselves in the struggle between the Hittite Empire and its subjects and thus to trigger this sequence of events is not completely clear. The reason, however, must have stemmed from the Hittites' virtual control of the vital metals needed by the Mycenaeans and the pressure exerted on the Hittite Empire by migrating peoples from the north. Once started, the fighting spread from southwest Anatolia to Cyprus,

Ugarit, the Troad, Caria and Greece. It seems possible to identify five of the Mycenaean states involved:

1. the Argolid (Mycenaean Kingdom)
2. Laconia
3. Boeotia
4. Messenia (Pylian Kingdom)
5. Attica, parts of Euboea, the Cyclades, and the Dodecanese (Ahhiyawa?)

In various combinations, these states fought each other and probably other non-Mycenaean states to control or regain markets and the vital supplies they provided. The results were the same everywhere: wanton destruction and chaos. Unable to regain the trade routes and markets that had made them prosperous, the Mycenaean states faded into the twilight of the Dark Ages. In short, the enemies who destroyed the Mycenaean world came not from without, but from within. Had he known this, Thucydides might have written:

> This was the greatest disturbance in the history of the Hellenes, affecting also a large part of the non-Hellenic world, and indeed, I might almost say, the whole of mankind.[1]

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[1]Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. R. Warner (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972), i.1.

APPENDIX

CATALOGUE OF MYCENAEAN SITES

APPENDIX

CATALOGUE OF MYCENAEAN SITES

This catalogue of sites includes only those Mycenaean sites known to have been inhabited in LH IIIB or LH IIIC, or which possessed some unusual or interesting feature such as roads, walls, and watchtowers. The number given before the site name refers to the numbers on the site maps (Plates 1 and 2). The numbers given in parantheses after the site names are the site numbers assigned by R. H. Simpson in "A Gazetteer and Atlas of Mycenaean Sites," BICS Supplement 16 (1965).

Site Name	Habitation LH IIIB	LH IIIC	SM	Notes
1. Mycenae (1)	x	x		palace; walls; outer houses destroyed in LH IIIB:1, houses and citadel destroyed in LH IIIB:2, Granary and citadel destroyed in LH IIIC:2
2. Magoula (2) (Priphtiani)	x			
3. Vreserka (3)	x			
4. Prosymna (4) (Argive Heraion)	x			abandoned LH IIIB/C
5. Berbati (5) (Kastraki)	x			abandoned LH IIIB/C
6. Palaiokastro, Dendra (7) (ancient Midea)	x	x	x	walled in LH IIIB; palace?; burned LH IIIB/C or IIIC; unclear whether habitation ends in LH IIIC
7. Tiryns (8)	x	x	?	palace; walls; signs of 3 or more fires in LH IIIB and IIIC
8. Nauplion (9)	x	x	x	continuous occupation
9. Profitis Ilias (11) (Ayios Adrianos)	?	?		walled
10. Argos (12)	x	x	x	walled in LH IIIB;

Site Name	Habitation LH IIIB,	LH IIIC	SM	Notes
Argos (cont.)				burned in LH IIIB/C; continuous occupation
11. Lerna (13) (Myloi)	x			abandoned LH IIIB/C
12. Kephalari (15) (Magoula)	x			
13. Melichi (16) (Schoinochori)	?			
14. Kastro (18) (Gymno)	x			in center of pass
15. Asine (19) (Kastraki)	x	x	x	walled; palace?; continuous occupation
16. Kasarma (20) (Arkadiko)	x			in pass on road to Epidauros
17. Ligourio (21)	x			
18. Apollo Maleatis (22) (Epidauros)	x			abandoned LH IIIB/C
19. Vassa (25) (Nea Epidauros)	x			walled
20. Kandia (26) (Kastro)	x			walled; destroyed LH IIIB/C
21. Ano Iria (28) (Kastro Tou Kapetanou)	x	x		abandoned LH IIIB/C:1
22. Ayios Ioannis (29) (Koiladhia)	x			
23. Kastri (31) (Hermione)	x	x		
24. Eliokastro (32) (Karakasi)	x			ancient Eileoi?
25. Ayios Yeoryios (39) (Lessia)	x			controls road through pass
26. Kastro Choritsa (42)				watchtower
27. Ayia Eirini (44)	x			
28. Tsoungiza (46) (Heraklion)	?			
29. ancient Cleonae (47)	x			in pass with road from Mycenae
30. Zygouries (48) (Ayios Vasilios)	x			destroyed and abandoned in LH IIIB/C
31. Old Corinth (56)	x	x	?	abandoned in LH IIIB/C?
32. Mylos Cheliotou (57)	x			
33. Aletopetra (58)	x	x		contols Mycenaean road to Cleonae
34. Ayios Gerasimos (59)	x			

35. Korakou (60)	x	x		abandoned in late LH IIIC?
36. Arapiza (61)	x			
37. Gonia (62)	x	?		abandoned in LH IIIC?
38. Isthmia (63)	x	x	x	walled in LH IIIB/C
39. Perdikaria (64)	x			a section of LH IIIB fortification wall found here probably connects with the 2 km long wall south of Isthmia
40. Cenchreae (65)	x			
41. Ayia Kyriaki (69) (Loutraki)		x		
42. Temple of Hera Akraia (75) (Perachora)	x	x		
43. Vasiliko (77)	x			watchtower
44. Ayios Tryphon (80) (Gonoussa)	x			
45. Solos (82)	x	x		ancient Aigeira
46. Pyrgos (83) (Pheneos or Kalyvia)	x	x		
47. Stymphalos (84) (Kionia)	x			walled?
48. Orchomenos (85) (Kalpaki)	x			
49. Gourtsouli (87) (Mantineia or Pikernis)	x			ancient Ptolis
50. Nestane (88) (Paniyiristra)				wall with gate across Mycenaean road
51. Temple of Athena (89) (Tegea)	x	x		
52. Synoikismos (90) (Sarandapotamos)	x			also known as Palaiokhori or Alea
53. Asea (91)	x			
54. Palaiokastro (92) (Trypes)	x	x	x	walled; continuous occupation
55. ancient Sparta (94)	x			
56. The Menelaion (95)	x			destroyed LH IIIB/C
57. Kouphovouno (96)	x			
58. The Amyklaion (97) (Aria Kyriaki)	x	x		continuous occupation
59. Palaiopyrgi (98) (Vaphio)	x	x		walled
60. Ayios Vasilios (99)	x			walled
61. Laina (103) (Goritsa)	x			
62. Geraki (105)				walled

63. Apidia (106)	x			
64. Gangania (107)	x			
65. Ayios Strategos (110)	x			
66. Karousi (112) (Asteri)	x	x		abandoned LH IIIC
67. Site north of Asteri (113)	x			
68. Tsasi (115)	x			
69. Ayios Nikolaos (116) (Skala)	x			
70. Xeronisi (117)	x	x		
71. Panayiotis (118) (Lekas)	x			walled
72. Lekas, south (119)	x			
73. Ayios Stephanos (120)	x	x		walled in LH IIIB; abandoned in LH IIIB/C or early LH IIIC
74. Karneas (121) (Krokeai)	x			
75. Paizoulia (123)	x			
76. Cranae (124)	x	x		
77. Mavrovouni (125)	x	x	?	continuous occupation
78. Kalyvia-Pellanes (133)	x			
79. Analipsis (135) (Vourvoura)	x			
80. Kotroni and Sykokis (142) (Palaiochori)	x			
81. Epidaurus Limera (146)	x	x		walled
82. Ayios Ioannis (147)	x			walled in LH IIIB
83. Kastelli (152) (Daimonia)	x			
84. Stena (153)	x			
85. Neapolis (154)	x			
86. Kastri (164)	x			on Cythera
87. Kastro (166) (Kalamata)	x			
88. Kastro (170) (Kardamyle)	x			
89. Petroyephyra (175) (Platy)	x			
90. Ayios Ioannis (176) (Pidhima)	x			
91. Ayios Floros (177)	x			
92. Aristodhemion (180)	x			
93. Nichoria (182)	x	x	x	walled city that controlled east-west pass

Nichoria (cont.) (Rizomilo)				and road to Pylos; burned LH IIIB/C; continuous occupation
94. Viglitsa (185) (Dara)	x			
95. Ayios Elias (189) (Kalochori)	x			walled
96. Kaphrio (193) (Longa)	x		x	continuous occupation after the Submycenaean stage
97. Charakopeio (194)	x			
98. Ayia Analipsis (195) (Phoinikounta)	x			
99. Ano Englianos (197) (Pylos)	x	x	x	palace; probably walled; burned in LH III B/C but habitation continued outside the ruined palace
100. Lagou (202) (Ambelofito)	x			
101. Kanalos (203) (Gargalianoi)	x			walled?
102. Voroulia (204) (Tragana)	?	x		burned LH IIIC; continuous occupation
103. Beyler Bay (208) (Koryphasion)	x			
104. Merzini (211) (Platanos)	x			
105. Pappoulia (213)	x			
106.-108. Osmanga Lagoon (219-221)	x	x		
109. Palaiochori (222) (Gialova)	x			
110. Vigla (223) (Midhen)	x			
111. Koumbe (229) (Chandrinou)	x			
112. Kokkinia (225) (Schoinolakka)	x			
113. Koukounara (226) (Katarachi)	x	x		abandoned LH IIIC:1
114. Platania (230) (Chandrinou)	x			
115. Chilia Choria (231) (Mesopotamos)	x			
116. Kastro (234) (Kyparissia)				walled

117. Peristeria (235) (Moira)	x			walled city in the mouth of the "Messenian Gap" abandoned LH IIIB/C
118. Elleniko (236) (Mouriatadha)	x			walled in LH IIIB; abandoned in LH IIIB/C
119. Stylari (238) (Kopanaki)	x			
120. Malthi (242) (ancient Dorion)	x	x	?	walled in LH IIIB; abandoned in LH IIIB/C ? or continuous occupation ?
121. Loutses (245) (Diavolitsi)	x			
122. Ayios Nikolaos (246) (Agrilovouno)	x			
123. Krebeni (249) (Kato Melphia)	x			
124. Ayios Demetrios (254) (Lepreon)	x			
125. Nestora (255) (Kakovatos)	x			walled; abandoned in LH IIIB/C
126. Pontikokastro (258) (Ayios Andreas)	x		?	continuous occupation ?
127. Kaimena Alonia (256) (Zacharo)	x			
128. Klidhi (257) (Derveni)	x			walled; abandoned in LH IIIB/C
129. Etia (265) (Lantzoi)	x			abandoned in LH IIIB
130. Drouva (266) (Olympia)	x			
131. Altis (267) (Olympia)	x	x		continuous occupation?
132. Ayios Elias (272) (Makrysia)	x			
133. Yerakovouna (274) (Makrysia)	x			
134. Koutsocheira (275) (Diasela)	x	x	?	walled; continuous occupation?
135. ancient Elis (277)	?	?	x	
136. Kastro Tis Kalogrias (282) (Paralimni)	x	x		fortress; burned c.1200 B.C.
137. Chalandritsa (293)	x	x		
138. Drakotrypa (297) (Katawaktis)	x			

139.	Ayios Athanasios (298) (Katarraktis)	x	x		
140.	Kryonei (310)	x			
141.	Calydon (311)	x			walled
142.	Thermon (313)	?	x		
143.	Grabes (314) (Astakos)	x			
144.	Palairos (317) (Kekropoula)				walled
145.	Xylokastro (318) (Mesopotamos)	x			walled
146.	Pelikata (326)	x	?		walled; on Ithaca
147.	Aetos (328)		?		continuous occupation ?; on Ithaca
148.	Kranea and Diakata (333)	x	x		walled; on Cephallenia
149.	Akroterion (344)	x			
150.	Kalogeros (347)	x			
151.	Acropolis, Athens (348)	x	x		walled in LH IIIB/C; houses outside walls abandoned in early LH IIIC; continuous occupation
152.	Ayios Kosmos (353)	x	x		walled in LH IIIB/C; abandoned LH IIIC
153.	Thorikos (361)	x			
154.	Brauron (368) (Ayios Yeoryios)	x	x		walled; abandoned in LH IIIC
155.	Spata (371)	x	x		abandoned in LH IIIC:1/C:2
156.	Asketarion (374) (Raphina)	x			
157.	Agrilliki (376) (Marathon)	x			
158.	Kotroni (380) (Aphidia)	x			
159.	Nemesis (381)	x			
160.	Eleusis (386)	x	x		walled in LH IIIB?; abandoned in LH IIIC ? or continuous occupation ?
161.	The Arsenal (387)		x	x	walled
162.	Megara (390)				walled
163.	Palaiokastro (391)	x			
164.	Kolonna (392) (Temple of Aphrodite)	x	x		continuous occupation
165.	Temple of Aphaia (393)	x			
166.	Orchomenos (396)	x	x		walled; burned in late LH IIIB ?; abandoned in LH IIIB/C:1 ?
167.	Polyira (397)	x			

168. Pyrgos (399)	x			walled
169. Stroviki (400)	x			
170. Gla (402)	x			military fortress and/or palace; burned and abandoned in late LH IIIB
171. Ayia Marina (403)	x			fort
172. Chantsa (404)				fort
173. Ayios Ioannis (405)	x			fort
174. Kastraki (407) (Davlosis)	x			
175. Kasarma (408) (Onchestos)	x			
176. Kastri (409) (Haliartos)	x			walled in LH IIIA or LH IIIB; abandoned in LH IIIB/C
177. Kalami (411)	x			
178. Kastri (413) (Larymna)	x			walled in LH IIIB; port of Orchomenos
179. Thebes (416)	x	x	x	walled in LH IIIB ?; burned in LH IIIB and LH IIIC; continuous occupation
180. Eutresis (417)	x	x		walled town on road from Thebes to Livadostro; abandoned in LH IIIB/C
181. Magoula (418) (Thespiae)	x			
182. Palaiokastro (419) (Thisbe)	x			walled town in pass from Orchomenos to Chorsiai
183. Chorsiai (420)				walled; harbor
184. Halike (421)				walled?
185. Kastro (422) (Livadostro)	x			walled?
186. Plataea (423)				walled?
187. Tourleza (426) (Syrtzi)	x			
188. Dritsa (427) (Eleon)	x	x		
189. Kastri (428) (Lykovouno)	x			
190. Ayios Elias (431) (Schimatari)	x			
191. Dramesi (432)	x			
192. Vlicha (435) (Tseloneri)	x			walled
193. Soros (436) (Chalia)	x			

194. Mandraki (437) (ancient Anthedon)	x	x		walled	
195. Panopeus (440) (Ayios Vlasis)	x			walled	
196. Daulis (441) (Davlia)	x				
197. Ayios Theodoros (443) (Antikyra)	x				
198. Kastro Tou Stenou (444) (Antikyra)	x	?			
199. Delphi (446)	x	x	?	continuous occupation ?	
200. Krisa (447) (Chyrso)	x			walled; burned and abandoned in LH IIIB/C	
201. Itea (448) (Gla)	x	x			
202. Kirrha (449) (Magoula of Xeropigado)	x				
203. Tolofon (452) (ancient Oiantheia)				walled ?	
204. Levendi (454) (ancient Parapotamioi)	x				
205. Hyampolis (455) (Exarchos)	x				
206. Ayia Marina (456)	x	x			
207. Piperis (457) (Drachmani)	x			walled in LH IIIB ?; burned in LH IIIB/C ?	
208. Palaiokastro (461) (ancient Tithronion)	x				
209. Kokkinovrachos (465) (Kyparissi)	x	x			
210. Pyrgos (466) (Livanates)	x	x		ancient Kynos ?	
211. Kastro (467) (Melidoni)	x			walled ?	
212. Alpenoi (468)	x				
213. Rakhita (471)	x	?			
214. Platania (474) (Megali Vrysi)	x	x			
215. ancient Echinous (476) (Akhinos)	x				
216. Fourni (477)	x				
217. Larisa Cremaste (478)	?				

218. Kastro of Fano (479)					walled ?
219. ancient Iolkos (480) (Volos)		x	x		walled in LH IIIB ?; burned in LH IIIC:1; continuous occupation
220. Pevkakia (482) (Volos)		x	x		palace ?
221. Toumba (483) (Dimini)		x			
222. Nea Ankhialos (489)		x			
223. Palatia (490) (Phthiotic Thebes)		x			
224. Aidhiniotiki Magoula (491)		x			
225. Gritsa (496) (Pteleon)		x	x		
226. Magoula (498) (Velestino)		x	?	?	
227. Petra (499)		x			fortress
228. Souphi Magoula (505)		?			
229. Chasambali (506)		x			
230. Bara (507)		x	x		
231. Marmariani (508)		x	x		abandoned in LH IIIC ?
232. Magoula (512) (Rachmani)		x	x		
233. Gonnos (513) (Dereli)		x	x		
234. Tatar Magoula (514) (Phalanna)		x	x		
235. Gremnos (515)		x	x	?	continuous occupation
236. Rhodia (516)		x	x		
237. Kastri (517) (Argyropouli)		x	x		
238. Fetih-Tsami (534) (Pharsala)		x	x		
239. Ktouri (537)		x			small fort built in LH IIIB
240. Ktouri Magoula (538)		x	x		continuous occupation
241. ancient Arne-Kierion (541) (Pyrgos or Mataranga)					small fort
242. Makria Magoula (542)		x			walled ?
243. Ayios Nikolaos (546)		x	x	?	
244. Lefkandi (554) (Xeropoli)		x	x		walled; destroyed early LH IIIC; besieged mid-LH IIIC
245. Manika (556)		x			
246. Kaphikala (557) (Politika)		x			

247. Kastri (558) (ancient Kerinthos)	x		walled
248. Kastelli (559) (ancient Athena Diades)	x	x	
249. Kastri (560) (Lichas)	x		
250. Kastro (561) (Oreoi)	x		
251. ancient Eretria (562)	x	x	
252. Palaiochora (564) (Tris Ekklesies)	x	x	
253. Magoula (565) (near Karavos)	x	x	
254. Palaiokastra (569) (Oxylithos)	?		walled ?
255. Moni Sotirou (572) (near Kymi)			fort ?
256. Prosilion			walled; near two forts and two watchtowers on Mycenaean road
257. ancient Enipse	x	x	walled LH IIIB/C; abandoned in mid-LH IIIC
258. Pavlopetri	x		abandoned or destroyed in late LH IIIB
259. Ayios Yeoryios (Epitalion)	x		ancient Thyron
260. Sphakoulia (Sidherokastro)	x		
261. Ayios Christophoros (Filiata)	x		
262. Mesovouni (Kamari)	x		
263. Ayios Ilias (Glikorizi)	x		
264. Kastro (Kongilion)			walled
265. Krebeni (Kato Melpia)		x	
266. Vigles (Pila)	x		
267. Londariti (Stenosia)	x		abandoned in LH IIIB
268. Velevouni (Mesopotamos)	x		
269. Ayios Ilias (Vigla)			

270. Charalavouni (Strephi)	x			
271. Mesovouni (Aris)	x			
272. Ellinika (Athaia)	x	x		continuous occupation
273. Tigani				fortress
274. Dyme	x			walled in LH IIIB ?; abandoned in LH III B/C ?
275. Monemvasia	x	x		abandoned in LH IIIC ?
276. Volimidia	x	x	?	abandoned in LH IIIC ? or continuous occupation ?
277. Perati	x	x		walled in LH IIIB/C; abandoned in LH IIIC

For the following sites refer to Plate 2

CYCLADES

Ceos

278. Ayia Irini	x	x		walled on landward side

Andros

279. Palaioupolis	x			

Delos

280. Temenos	x	x		abandoned in LH IIIC

Naxos

281. Grotta	x	x	x	continuous occupation
282. Aplomata	x	x	x	continuous occupation

Paros

283. Paroika	x	x		

Melos

284. Phylakopi	x	x		walled (walls built in LH IIIB ?); abandoned early in the Submycenaean phase

DODECANESE

Rhodes

285. Lindos	x	x		walled; abandoned in late LH IIIC ?
286. Ialysos	x	x		abandoned late in LH IIIC
287. Tolon	?			
288. Kattavia	x			

Astypalaia			
289. Ayios Ioannis	x		
Carpathos			
290. Arkaseia			walled ?
291. Pigodhia	x	x	
Cos			
292. Eleona	x	x	
293. Seraglio (Cos Town)	x	x	abandoned in LH IIIC
Calymnos			
294. Perakastro	x	x	walled
Leros			
295. Ayios Mavina	x	x	walled
Syme			
296. Kastro	x		
Telos			
297. Kastello at Livadhia			fort
NORTHERN ISLANDS			
Scyros	x	x	
Lesbos			
298. Thermi			destroyed LH IIIA/B
Samos			
299. Tigani	x		
300. The Heraion	x		walled (walls built in LH IIIB ?); abandoned in LH IIIC ?
Chios			
301. Emborio	x	x	walled in LH IIIB/C ?; destroyed in late LH IIIC
ASIA MINOR			
302. Miletus	x	x	walled in LH IIIA/B; burned in LH IIIB; more walls built in LH IIIB/C; burned in LH IIIC; continuous occupation

303. Tarsus		x	x	Mycenaean occupation starts after LH IIIB/C destruction; abandoned in Submycenaean phase
304. Iasos	x			walled
CYPRUS				
305. Enkomi		x		Mycenaean occupation starts after LH IIIB/C destruction; after c. 1190 B.C. destruction another group of Mycenaeans arrive; burned c. 1100 B.C. and abandoned
306. Kition		x		Mycenaean occupation starts after LH IIIB/C destruction; after c. 1190 B.C. destruction another group of Mycenaeans arrive
307. Sinda		x		Mycenaean occupation starts after LH IIIB/C destruction; site destroyed c. 1190 B.C.; location unknown
308. Idalion	x			occupied in LH IIIB/C by Mycenaean settlers

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