A QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS 0F
RICHARD M. NIXON'S TREATMENT
OF SELECTED ISSUES IN‘HIS
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN DRATGRY
IN THE 1950 AND 1958 ELECTIONSI

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MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY.
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A Qualitative Content Analysis of Richard M. Nixon's
Treatment of Selected Issues in His Presidential

Campaign Oratory‘in the
1960 and 1968 Elections

presented by

David A . Thomas

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ABSTRACT

A QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF RICHARD M. NIXON'S
TREATMENT OF SELECTED ISSUES IN HIS PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN ORATORY IN THE 1960 AND 1968 ELECTIONS
By
David A. Thomas

Issue discussion is one element of political
campaigning which political candidates engage in for the
purpose of manipulating voter behavior. Although it is
not yet possible to demonstrate the precise nature and
degree of influence issue discussion wields in a given
campaign, it is nevertheless instructive to study how a
candidate treats issues in his campaign.methods.

The two presidential campaigns of Richard M. Nixon
offer an opportunity to study how one candidate treated
issues in two different campaigns. once as a losing candi-
date. and once as a winner. Such a study holds value and
interest in three areas: (1) it contributes to an.under-
standing of the role of issues in contemporary Presidential
campaigns. including the attempt to influence voting .
behavior. (2) it contributes to the knowledge of Nixon's
changes as a speaker between his unsuccessful and his

successful campaigns for the Presidency. and (3) it has

Aim—III—A

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leads to To

the role of

 

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David A. Thomas

heuristic value in that comparison of the two campaigns
leads to formulation of relational hypotheses regarding
the role of issue discussion in Presidential election
campaigns in the future.

Accordingly. the problem for research was: How
did Richard M. Nixon treat substantive issues in his
campaign speaking during his two campaigns for the
Presidency? Specifically. the study (1) delineated the
treatment accorded to selected issues. namely war and
peace. the pocketbook aspect of domestic economy. civil
rights. and law and order. (2) analyzed the contents of
a sample of Nixon's formal public addresses on the issues
under examination. (3) conducted a rhetorical analysis of
the issues in these speeches. (h) compared Nixon's shifts
on the treatment of issues over the two campaigns. and
(5) generated a set of testable hypotheses on the
relationships between presidential campaign oratory and
election outcome. V

The study found that Nixon indeed addressed the
selected issues in his campaign oratory in the two cam-
paigns. Leading differences between the two campaigns
included greater emphasis on law and order and civil
rights in 1968. less emphasis on issues of war and peace
in 1968. and a generally more neutral position on nearly
all issues in 1968 (except for issues of the pocketbook.
in which he attacked the spending policies of the incum-

bent administration.) In 1968. pursuing a centrist

strategy. Nixo
then In 1960.
Issues most in
Vietnam.

The h;
possible rela
of these vari

3 .13 used. t

David A. Thomas

strategy. Nixon addressed more issues. more superficially.
than in 1960. He avoided serious discussion of some
issues most important to the electorate. especially
Vietnam.

The hypotheses suggested for further study posed
possible relations between issue treatment and any or all
of these variables: candidate's role. candidate's party.
media used. timing. and voting behavior.

l QUALITATIVE
HEATERS? I

CAVE AIS N

in De

A QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF RICHARD M. NIXON'S
TREATMENT OF SELECTED ISSUES IN HIS PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN ORATORY IN THE 1960 AND 1968 ELECTIONS

BY

David A. Thomas

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Speech

1973

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study has been a long time in preparation.
and has required the assistance of several people.
Acknowledgment is given to Dr. Judith Trent and Dr. Lee
Huebner for their help in locating speech manuscripts
from Mr. Nixon's 1968 campaign.

The bulk of typing has been.done by Mrs. Joan
Engelhardt. and her efficiency and interest in this
project have helped the writer considerably.

Finally. the writer wishes to state that the
moral support and encouragement given by his dissertation
committee co-chairmen. Dr. Gordon L. Thomas and Dr. V. M.
Mishra. have been extremely helpful and are very much

appreciated.

111

*5: or TABLE

rapter

REVI
KETE
R?
Cc

g)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0
Chapter

1. THE PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGICAL
CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . .

INTRODUCTION 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O

Oratory in Presidential Election
Campaigns.............

Nixon's Campaign Oratory in the 1960
and 1968 Presidential Elections. .

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM . . . . . . .
The Research Problem . . . . . . . .
Rationale for the Study. . . . . . .
General Approach Taken in the Study.

Definitions and Limitations of the
Study...............

REVIEW OF LITERATURE . . . . . . . . .
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS. . . . .
Rhetorical Criticism . . . . . . . .
Content Analysis . . . . . . . . . .
Unit of analysis . . . . . . . . .
Categories and indicators. . . . .
Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Speeches.............

iv

Page
viii

11
12

13
in
21:
21:
27
28
29
32
32
35

aspter
Vali
Rule
Ur
Ca
Ir
Di
SUMMAE
Over
2. BImRAPI-
RICHAE
IN THE
INTROI

510031

GI

N11:
1961

G!
313}

Chapter

validity and Reliability .

Rules for Content Analysis

Unit of analysis

Categories .
Indicators .
Direction. .
SUMMARY. . . . .

OverView e e e

2. BIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

RICHARD M.

OF
NIXON'S TREATMENT OF ISSUES

IN THE 1960 AND 1968 CAMPAIGNS . . . .

INTRODUCTION . .

BIOGRAPHICAL'SKETCH. . .

Education. . .

Early Political Career

‘ Vice-Presidency. . .

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN.

1960 Campaign. e e e

OVCN10' e 0

General strategy .

Highlights of Nixon's 1960

campaign.

Nixon's Interim Period. 1960-1968. . .

1968 Campaign. 0 e e e e e

OVOI'VL 0' e e

General strategy e e e 0

Highlights of the Campaign

Page
36
38
38
#1
#2

“5

1+7
1+7
50
51
5t:
58
62
62
62
63
66
68
70
70
71
75

Chapter
snare

3. A ccx:
my

cm

INTE

a\‘
u

Chapter
SW! 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O
3. A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF RICHARD H.

TREATMENT OF ISSUES IN HIS
CAMPAIGN SPEECHES. . . . .

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . .
DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . .
1960 Speeches. . . . . . . . . .
1968 Speeches. . . . . . . . . .
Categories and Indicators. . . .
Reliability. . . . . . . . . .

Frequency of

issue statements in

NIXON'S
1960 AND 1968

the

1960 and 1968 campaigns. 0 e e e e

Differences between the two campaigns.

"Brampeaceeeeeeeeee
Discussion of War and Peace. .

The Pocketbook Issue . . . . .

Discussion of Pocketbook Aspects

the Domestic Economy . . . .
Civil Rights . . . . . . . . .
Discussion of Civil Rights . .
Iam'and Order. . . . . . . . .

Discussion of Law and Order. .

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . .

#. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Role of Issues in Campaigns.

Nixon's Development as a Speaker

‘Relational Hypotheses and Other
Research Possibilities . . . .

vi

Page

8h

86
86
87
88
89
93
93

93
102

102
107
118

122
128
130
135
137
11.1
11.1;
11.5
15h

159

Crapter

Conclu

BEUWRQHY. .

Chapter Page
COBOlusioneeeeeeeeeeeeeeee161

BIBLI mRAPHY O O O O O O O O O O I O O O O O O O O O 162

vii

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1.

9.

Richard
Richard

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State

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COmpa
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Table

1.
2.

3.

h.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

LIST OF TABLES

Richard M. Nixon's 1960 Campaign Speeches. .

Richard M. Nixon's 1968 Campaign Speeches. .

Frequency and Ratio of Issue-Oriented

Statements contained in the 1960 Sample. .

Frequency and Ratio of Issue-Oriented

Statements contained in the 1968 Sample. .

Comparison of Ratios of Issue Statements
the 1960 and 1968 saMPIO e e e e e e e

Comparison of 1960 and 1968 Statements
on War and Peace . . . . . . . . . .

Comparison of 1960 and 1968 Statements
on the Pocketbook Issue. . . . . . .

Comparison of 1960 and 1968 Statements
onc1VL1318ht8eeeeeeeeeee

Comparison of 1960 and 1968 Statements
on Law and Order . . . . . . . . . .

viii

in

90
92

95

97

100

10“

119

129

136

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Elections

Chapter 1
THE PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Although the 1972 re-election of Richard M. Nixon
to the Presidency came as no surprise. his 1968 electoral
victory marked the phenomenal political comeback of a man
who had announced a self-imposed political exile in 1962.
He had. at that time. Just been defeated in the California
gubernatorial election. Only two years earlier. he had
lost the 1960 Presidential election to John F. Kennedy.

In both his earlier campaigns for the Presidency.
Richard M. Nixon gave numerous speeches. A study of the
treatment of issues in his campaign speaking in those two
elections holds interest for researchers in more than one
field: for historians. because of its reflection of the
times: for political scientists. because of its role in
political campaigning: and for rhetoricians. because of
its persuasive impact. Apart from any academic interest
in the subject. there is also a general relevance of this
study to the interests of the American public. which bases
its voting behavior at least in part upon its view of a

candidate's position on the issues.

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This chapter will present a discussion of the uses
of oratory in Presidential election campaigns: a statement
of the problem. including definitions and limitations: a
review of relevant literature: a description of the
methodology employed in the study. an overview of the

remaining chapters of the dissertation: and a summary.

Oratory in Presidential
lection Cam 1 ns

Oratory by candidates is a traditional technique
of campaigning for the Presidency. Perhaps the classic
example of the use of the technique is Harry S. Truman's
famous whistle-stop tours in 19h8. In that year. Presi-
dent Truman traveled approximately 30.000 miles by train
to deliver some 350 speeches during the five months

1 Other candidates have also

preceding the election.
followed this tradition in recent Presidential elections.
For example. in 1960. John F. Kennedy delivered an ”all-
purpose” speech several times a day at various campaign

stops.2 In 1964. Barry Goldwater's campaign centered on

a plan to engage President Lyndon B. Johnson in a

 

19111 w. Stacy. ”The Campaign Speaking of Harry S.
Truman in the l9h8 Presidential Election” (unpublished

Doctor's dissertation. Southern Illinois University.
1968). p. 1880

2Theodore H. White. The Maki of the Pr sident
1960 (New York: Signet Books. 1961). p. 591.

political ms
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political dialogue or debate featuring a confrontation of
the conservative and the liberal positions on various
campaign issues. Although President Johnson refused to
debate. he did make campaign speeches.3

Why do candidates continue this tradition? As
is true of all campaign activities. the general aim of
campaign speaking is to influence voters' behavior.
Campaign strategies revolve around tactics which.
according to Nimmo. (l) raise the candidate's identi-
fication.quotient among voters. when necessary.

(2) motivate a high partisan turnout of supporters.

(3) negatively motivate the opponent's strong partisan
supporters to ”take a walk.” or ignore the election. and
(h) win most of the attentive independent (or undecided)
voters.“

In keeping with the general aim of influencing
voters' behavior. candidates have at least two purposes
in pursuing campaign speaking activities: (1) to
enhance their images as potential leaders. and (2) to
discuss pertinent issues with the electorate.

This distinction is arbitrary. Issue discussion

occurs on at least a superficial level in most. if not

 

3Theodore H. White. Th Mak of h d
126h (New York: Signet Books. 1965?. pp. 393. £25.

“Dan Nimmo. The Polit cal P uade (Englewood
Cliffs. New Jersey: Spectrum. 1970;. pp. Zfi-ZS.

“Samar ~‘- ~ “aw-.1:—

all. of a Pres
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all. of a Presidential candidate's messages. Conversely.
a candidate's in-depth treatment of issues in position
papers. or in articles for intellectual and specialized
publications like Foreign Affairs. is bound to affect
the candidate's image in some ways.

Yet the distinction is real enough in an important
way. The candidate himself makes the distinction between
speaking for the purpose of creating a favorable personal
impression among the electorate. and speaking for the
purpose of persuading voters to accept his position on
substantive issues. For instance. Nixon made such a
distinction in his 1968 campaign. According to Robert B.
Semple. Jr.. Nixon believed that the stump was not the
place to bring depth and substance to his discussion of
the country's problems. preferring instead to reduce
complicated issues to manageable generalities while
goading the audience with ”lusty battle cries."5 In the
same campaign. however. Nixon gave a series of radio
talks aimed at specific issues. containing substantive
discussions and offering specific programs and pledges.6

At any rate. several elements are operative in
the practice of campaign oratory as an instrument of

image building by Presidential candidates. First. the

 

5Robert B. Semple. Jr.. "Two Nixons Emerge in '68

Race: Stump Sloganeer. Radio Thinker." New York Times.
October 17. 1968. p. 38.

5mm.

 

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electorate has come to expect oratory as a traditional
part of a campaign. By "going on the stump.” a candidate
fulfills the voters' expectations in this regard. Through
campaign speeches. a candidate also reinforces his image
as a concerned. knowledgeable and dynamic leader. Nimmo
described this aspect of campaigning as follows:
The prepared speech repeated endlessly is perhaps
the most common. Campaign mythology says that the
purpose behind these formal presentations is to
enable the candidate to "speak out on the issues."
But. the speeches are not designed to change people's
minds or even to give an inpdepth view of the candi-
date's position. The function of discussing issues
is more latent than manifest. By quoting facts and
details on.a variety of issues the candidate leaves
the impression that he possesses the knowledge. 7
sophistication. and acumen to hold public office.
Second. campaign oratory enables the candidate and
the electorate to interact. if only symbolically. By
attending political rallies. voters share a sense of
participation in the election process.8 Moreover. a wide
audience of people shares this sense of participation
vicariously. through the mass media of communications.
Mendelsohn and Crespi stated that one reason candidates
tour the nation is to furnish varied and new backgrounds

for television news items on the campaign.9

 

’7Nimmo. pp. 119-120.

8Murray Edelman. The S mbolic U e of Polit c
(urbana. Illinois: Illini Books. 1965). pp. 2-5.

9Harold Mendelsohn and Irving Crespi. Poll .
Television and the New Politics (Scranton. Pennsylvania:
Chandler Publishing Co.. 1970). pp. 281-282.

selves see:
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Third. at a more pragmatic level. candidates them-
selves seem to derive some measure of inspiration and
motivation from their contacts with voters. and from
voters' feedback to their speeches. In describing the
campaign of John F. Kennedy. White discussed this aspect
of campaign oratory:

Thus only the personal audience. below the level of
strategic calculation. can give him the one thing he
needs most: the response of warmth or frost. of
applause or indifference. Its laughter. its scowl.
its silence. its cheers. its yearning. its measuring
eyes. are the only clues to the mystic communication
between the leader and the led. to tell truly 10
whether he has reached those he seeks to lead.

For these reasons--voter expectations. symbolic
interaction. and audience feedback--campaign oratory is
useful as a device for image enhancement.

But beyond these considerations. oratory also
serves as a vehicle for a candidate's discussion of
selected issues. At the ritualistic level. of course.
certain statements and positions have come to be expected
in a candidate's oratory. For instance. James mentioned
a few of these:

A Presidential candidate is forced to emphasize
party symbols by highly partisan statements. For
Democrats this means hauling out the banner of the
New Deal and blaming Republicans for the Great
Depression. For Republicans it means hauling out

Abraham Lincoln and tII traditional symbols of
rugged individualism.

 

1°wh1ee. The Makigg of the President 126 , p. 291.

11Dorothy Buckton James. he Contem orar
Presidency (New York: Pegasus. 1969). p. 37.

 

 

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Clearly. this level of issue discussion is. at best. on
the borderline between image-enhancement and serious
treatment of issues. Yet a candidate may take the oppor-
tunity to speak in greater specificity on contemporary
national problems. and to advocate policies and actions
which he would take if he were elected. Nimmo recognized
the issue-discussion function of a candidate's speeches:
Despite the limitations to open discussion. however.
it is clear that an election provides an opportunity
for more intimate communication between governors.
or potential governors. and governed than is normal
in the political system. In the process certain
problems on the minds of constituents have an
opportunity to surface. Some become topics for
debate. as did the war in Vietnam and urban
rioting in the presidential primaries of 1968:
others are ignored. as have been problems of water
and air pollution in numerous elections. This.
then. is ”one of the most important functions of
campaigns: the inclusion. exclusion. and crystal-

lization of isspgs and problems on the agenda of
officeholders.”

In summary. then. Presidential campaign oratory
is a traditional means of seeking to influence voters'
behavior. through image enhancement and through discus-

sion of issues.

Nixon's Camgaign Oratory
in the l O and 1
Eyesidential Elections
Nixon engaged in public speaking during both his
campaigns with a view to enhancing his image and discus-

sing issues. In both campaigns. he barnstormed his way

 

12Nimmo. pp. 8-9-

 

 

tact ar
rpasic
'appla‘

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L. . 1h- 11.14

back and forth across the country. presenting the same
”basic speech” which consisted of a series of tested
”applause lines.” but which contained little that could
be designated as an inpdepth discussion of issues.13
This form of campaign oratory seemed designed to serve
the function of image enhancement for the candidate.
Also. in both campaigns. Nixon occasionally
presented campaign speeches with the intention of
discussing campaign issues in depth. and of clarifying
his position on the issues. For these speeches. Nixon
used a variety of media. including radio and television.
as well as in-person audience speaking situations.
Nixon's campaign speaking in both his campaigns
for the Presidency will be presented in greater detail

in Chapter 2.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

he Re earch Problem
As noted above. Richard M. Nixon spoke extensively

in his two campaigns for the Presidency. To this point.
it has been explicitly assumed that Nixon's campaign
oratory can be differentiated between that designed to
enhance his image. and that designed to clarify his

position on issues. That assumption is not universally

 

13"The Vice President: Road Show Tryout.”
Newsweek. August 15. 1960. p. 26. Also Relman Morin. The

Associated Press Story of Election 1268 (New York:
Pocket Books. 19 9 . pp. 1 5-1 .

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accepted. For example. writing about campaign speaking in
general. Lewis A. Froman. Jr.. stated:

Candidates must. first and foremost. not alienate
any of their would-be supporters. They must appeal
to a wide and diverse public. a public which is.
generally speaking. uninformed and uninterested

in specific issues. It is no wonder. then. that
campaigns are generally devoid of any issue content
(other than style issues). because they age
primarily emotional appeals for support.

Blanket evaluations such as Froman's are
underscored by some media analysts who emphasize the
ever-increasing role of professional campaign management
techniques in modern electioneering. For instance.

Gene Hyckoff said:
The influence of issues on the outcome of elections

also seems to be declining as (1) political questions
become too complex for ready statement or compre-

hension and (2) candidates themselves avoid assuming

issue positions ghat might be considered too extreme.
[Italics added.?

Opposing these viewpoints is a school of thought
which asserts that issues in.a campaign play an important
role in helping the voters decide which of the candidates
to vote for. For instance. in V. O. Key's posthumously

published work. The Responsible Electorate. which was
based upon studies made of voting in Presidential

 

llI'Lewis A. Froman. Jr.. People and Politigs
(Engiewood Cliffs. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. l9 2).
p. .

15Gene Nyckoff. The Image Candidates (new York:
Macmillan. 1968). p. 6.

(9
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10

elections from 1936 to 1960. the principle assumption which
was supported is this:
The perverse and unorthodox argument of this little
book is that voters are not fools. . . . In
American presidential campaigns of recent decades
the portrait of the American electorate that
develops from the data is not one of an electorate
straitjacketed by social determinants or moved by
subconscious urges triggered by devilishly skillful
propagandists. It is rather one of an electorate
moved by concern about central and relevant questions
of public policy. of goveigmental performance. and
of executive personality.

In another recent study of Presidential campaign
techniques. John N. Ellsworth stated. "There is a good
possibility that issue-oriented campaigning can be
instrumental in winning votes.”17

Thus. it is clear that there are conflicting
opinions as to the importance. even the existence. of
issues in political campaigns. On the one hand. Froman
and Wyckoff exemplify the school of thought which denies
that candidates discuss issues in campaigns. On the other
hand. Key and Ellsworth articulate the position that
issues are important elements of political campaigns.

In this study. the latter position is accepted.

It is assumed that. at certain times. candidates do

address themselves to substantive issues. As previously

 

16V. 0. Key. Jr.. The Re on b E o te
(New York: Vintage Books. 1966). pp. 7-5.
17John W. Ellsworth. “Policy and Ideology in the

Campaigns of 1960 and 196“.” (Southern Illinois University.
no date). pp. 2-3. (Mimeographed.)

rentione
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11

mentioned. Chapter 2 of this dissertation describes
Nixon's two campaigns for the Presidency. and his strategy
of presenting the ”basic speech” to audiences on the
“stump" for image enhancement. while presenting issue-
discussion speeches on certain occasions.

Accordingly. the problem for research is: fipy_
d d Ri M. Nixon treat ub tantive i us in hi
pamppign speakipg duripg his two campaigns for the
Pregidgnpy? Specifically. the study proposes (1) to
delineate the treatment accorded by Nixon to selected
issues. namely war and peace. pocketbook aspect of domestic
economy. civil rights. and law and order. (2) to analyze
the contents of a sample of Nixon's formal public
addresses on the issues under examination. (3) to conduct
a rhetorical analysis of the issues in these speeches.
(h) to compare Nixon's shifts on the treatment of issues
over the two presidential campaigns. and (5) to generate
a set of testable propositions (or hypotheses) on the
relationships between presidential campaign oratory and

presidential election outcome.

t onale for the tud
A study of Richard M. Nixon's treatment of issues

in his two Presidential campaigns is valuable for its
contribution to knowledge within three broad dimensions:
(1) The study will contribute to an under-

standing of the role of issues in contemporary

Presidentia
:ade on the
aspect of c
campaigns.
influence v

(2}
Elixon's the
of issue-oz
his success
correlatioz
electoral 5
TREIOPIC 1.

\

(3
COZParISOn

0f relatl O

‘1

futill‘e .

General AD
n the S

'i'i
L

3'

IASEOrlcal
ISSUES 1‘]

A
of eelecte

12

Presidential campaigns insofar as generalizations can.be
made on the basis of examining. in depth. that particular
aspect of one candidate's communications in two recent
campaigns. This role of issues includes the attempt to
influence voting behavior.

(2) It will contribute to the knowledge of
Nixon's changes as a speaker (in reference to treatment
of issue-oriented content) between his unsuccessful and
his successful campaigns for the Presidency. Although no
correlation is suggested between "improved" speaking and
electoral success. increased understanding of Nixon's
rhetoric is valuable because of the importance of Nixon's
role as a national leader and as President.

(3) Also. the study has heuristic value in that
comparison of the two campaigns will lead to formulation
of relational hypotheses regarding the role of issue
discussion in Presidential election campaigns in the

future.

Qpnepal Approach Taken
yp php Study

The general approach in this study is a modified
rhetorical analysis of Nixon's treatment of selected
issues in a sample of his campaign speeches during the

1960 and 1968 elections.

A qualitative content analysis of his treatment

of selected issues in the sample of speeches is undertaken

mi: "EV‘Ifl—J !_

to determie
that Nixon'
treatment I
study begii
biographies
spea‘sirg. 1
the two ca‘
wauced b.
53585. UPC)“.
eraluation

ca13121152 ns

”at h

13

to determine with some degree of precision and objectivity
what Nixon's positions were on the issues. and how his
treatment of issues differed over the two campaigns. The
study begins with a description of historical and
biographical factors bearing upon Nixon's political
speaking. and of the socio-economic climates bearing upon
the two campaigns under consideration. Then the data
produced by the content analysis is reported. Finally.
based upon this data. a rhetorical interpretation and
evaluation of Nixon's treatment of issues in the two

campaigns is presented.

Definitions and Limitationg
of the Study

As it is stated. the research problem is broad.
For the purposes of this study. the following definitions
and limitations will apply:

1. This study is limited to the campaign oratory
of only one candidate. Richard M. Nixon.

2. "Substantive issues” is limited to issues of
public policy about which a candidate for the Presidency
might be expected to speak. Issues of public policy are
those issues about which legislative action might be
taken. for example. agricultural policy. defense policy.
foreign policy. economic policy. and the like. The
criteria and the process for selecting issues for this

study are described below in the section on methodology.

ft

m. M—mu we.-

Z'tis study I
relative ex;
leadership.
of fiixon's
3.
the formal
in this tea
Kennedy in
Mil-answer
arthIes'
formal Spe
not lake 8
com”float:
to him 31
The crite,‘
Speeches

A
periods c
nonnatlt

38am in

1b

This study excludes issues of personality. such as the
relative experience of the candidates in positions of
leadership. Also excluded from this study are discussions
of Nixon's style, delivery. and organization.

3. "Campaign speaking” is limited to a sample of
the formal public addresses by Mr. Nixon. Not included
in this term are the Joint television debates with John F.
Kennedy in 1960: any press conference or other question-
and-answer format remarks by Mr. Nixon: or study papers.
articles. books or other publications not presented as
formal speeches by Mr. Nixon. However. this study does
not make a distinction between the various media for
communicating speeches. This definition includes speeches
to live audiences. radio speeches. and television speeches.
The criteria and process of selecting the sample of
speeches for analysis are discussed in the methodology
section below.

h. "During the campaigns” is limited to the
periods of time between the acceptance of the Republican
nomination and the day before Election Day in 1960 and
again in 1968.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

A survey of literature was conducted to discover
existing works which offer insight and information bearing

upon the purposes of this study in the following areas:

15

The political speaking of Richard M. Nixon. the role of
public speaking in Presidential campaigns. and the role

of issues in Presidential campaigns. The survey included
an examination of the card catalogue of the Michigan State

University Ldbrary. and the past ten years' volumes of

American Poiitiggl Science Review, 23biic Qpinion Qua;-
gggiz, Revigg of Politics. Quartggiy gggrnal of Speech.

§pgegh Monggraphg. and gggzggii§m_gg§gtgziz, Additionally.
the past ten years' volumes of the Pubiic ggfaigg

ingormation Service. the 1960 and 1968 volumes of the
New York Times Index. and Volume 22 (march-February 1959-
1961) and Volume 28 (March-February 1968-1969) of the

Readers Guide to Periodical Litgzatuzg. were examined.

Issues of volumes of §2g39g_§gngg;§ph§,and
Qisggrtation gbgtgagtg were also examined.
A selected bibliography of sources found in the

survey is appended to this study.

Works bearing upon the political speaking of
Richard M. Nixon include the followings

Judith S. Trent compared the rhetorical style of
Nixon's campaign speeches in the 1960 and 1968 campaigns
in her doctoral dissertation in 1970.18 Her study found

 

18Judith Swanlund Trent. "An Examination and
Comparison of the Rhetorical Style of Richard Milhous
Nixon in the Presidential Campaigns of 1960 and 1968: A
Content Analysis” (unpublished Doctor's dissertation.
University of Michigan, 1970).

flirts—i..—

 

ture fo

As a
not
of 2'
base
Spee
SEVe.
out .

16

that. in six aspects of style. Nixon's speaking differed
significantly over the two campaigns due primarily to
Nixon's increased use of professional speech writers in
his second campaign. This study, incidentally. is the
only study of Nixon's speaking in the two campaigns found
in this survey. but its principal focus ignores Nixon's
treatment of issues in his speeches.
Trent wrote in summary of her survey of litera-

ture for her dissertation.

As a body, the scholarly research on Nixon does

not provide comprehensive empirical examination

of his speaking. Much of the research has been

based on a small selected sample or even a single

speech. No previous empirical study has examined

several major features of Nigon's rhetoric through-

out even a single campaign.
The survey of literature by this writer revealed nothing
which would change Trent's assessment. except for Trent's
dissertation.

Bernard Kissel examined six of Nixon's speeches

in the nominating convention and campaign of 1956 (when
Nixon was running for his second term as Vice-President)

in his doctoral dissertation.20 Kissel's study is purely

rhetorical in focus. and adds little to an understanding

 

19Ib1do ’ p. 60

zoBernard Kissel. "A Rhetorical Study of Selected
Speeches Delivered by Richard Milhous Nixon During the
Convention and Presidential Campaign of 1956” (unpublished
Doctor's dissertation. University of Michigan. 1956).

 

”-4
exali.
aLnaljfiz
for a:

Saxova:

333137813

ca~~

‘~~818n
used more
in the de

W33 1833

\

2]
the.” u

‘1 “lVOCa
(“publish
1962)

17

of Nixon's treatment of issues in his two Presidential
campaigns.

Larry A. Samovar. in his doctoral dissertation.
examined ambiguity in the Nixon-Kennedy debates by
analyzing the content of the debates and then testing it
for ambiguity in the perception of a group of listeners.21
Samovar found that perception of ambiguity was related
to the listeners' political preferences. as each candi-
date's supporters believed the message of their candidate
to be relatively clear. but his opponent's message to be
ambiguous.

In an article published in the western Poiitigal
Quartgriz. John w. Ellsworth reported that a content
analysis of the 1960 television debates and of other
campaign speeches revealed that both Kennedy and Nixon
used more evidence and analysis. and less partisan attacks.

in the debates than in other campaign speeches where there

was less prospect of imminent rebuttal by the opponent.22

 

21Larry Allen Samovar. ”A Study of Ambiguity and
Unequivocation in the 1960 Presidential Campaign Debates”
(uggublished Doctor's dissertation. Purdue University.
19 . ‘

22John W. Ellsworth. "Rationality and Campaigning:
A Content Analysis of The 1960 Presidential Campaign

Debates.” Western Poiitigal Quarterly. XVIII (1965).
79h—802.

18

Popular. Journalistic accounts of the campaigns
in question. such as T. H. White's The makieg of ihe
ggeeident 126023 and The maki o the e ident 1 68.21‘

Jules Witcover's The Reeuggeetion of Richazd Nixon.25
Chester. Hodsson. and Page's A£_A22£12é£_fl21292522n26

Morin's ' cia ed 3 o of 1 ti
and Polieiee i268 by the Congressional Quarterly Service.28

are among the leading sources of information about Nixon's
campaign strategies and performances. together with
contemporary newspaper and magazine articles (listed in
the Bibliography). The leading biographies of Nixon are
Mazo and Hess's Nixons A Politieai Portrait.29 and

 

23Theodore H. White. T Maki of th President
1260 (New York: Signet Books. 1961).

2“Theodore H. White. Th ki of h id nt
1268 (New York: Pocket Books. 1970).

25Jules Witcover. Th e t on o c
Nigon (New York: 0. P. Putnamis Sons. 1970).

26Lewis Chester and others. Ag_§mezieee_geieg;egee
T Pre d n 1 m 8 (New York: Dell

Publishing Co.. 19 9 e

27Relman Morin. Th2_Aafissiaisd_£:§§:7§&2:z_2£.
gleetioe i2§8 (New York: Pocket Books. 1 9 .

28Nelson Poynter (ed.). Pelitiee ie Aeezicea The
goiitiee end Ieegeg ef ghe Peetgez Yeeze 3rd ed.:

Washington: Congressional Quarterly Service. 1969).

29Earl M320 and Stephen Hess. Ni one A P 1 i 1
Pogtgeie (New York: Popular Library. 1963).

I
w; _oi-¢!_w-—r_

Eoyt's The }

#

Six Crisee :
The
focus on th
but there a
of which ca
Dan
tne best re
management
3"1320. cand
heavily upo
cazpalgn ac
types of 81:)
032.0318...“
°°=municat1
”finding.
on televlsi

Speaklng en
T. ..

%

hilt emphasl

19

Hoyt's The Nixogee An American Eemilx.3° Also. Nixon's
§iz_§;ieee includes a section on the 1968 campaign.31

The survey of literature found few works which
focus on the role of speaking in Presidential campaigns.
but there are several items covering campaign strategies.
of which campaign speaking is one of several tactics.

Dan Nimmo's book. The Poiitieei Pegeeedere. is
the best recent description of contemporary campaign
management strategies and techniques.32 According to
Nimmo. candidates in modern important elections rely
heavily upon polling techniques to determine where
campaign activities ought to be concentrated. and what
types of appeals would be most effective in a particular
campaign. Nimmo also described the various channels of
communication employed by candidates in current campaigns.
including. among others. saturation political advertising
on television. and "personal media” including public
speaking engagements. Crespi and Mendelsohn's geiie.
Televieion. age the New Politiee echoed the same themes.
but emphasized the extensive uses made of polls and

television by candidates. as implied by the title of the

 

3OEdwin P. Hoyt. The N xon e n e i an F m 1
(New Yorke‘ Random House. 1972).

31Richard M. Nixon. W (New York: Pyramid
BOOkS. 1968).

32Dan Nimmo. The Politieei §ezeuadege (Englewood
Cliffs. New Jersey: Spectrum. 1970 .

 

 

uses mad
the 1960
extended
question-
described
agenent o]
for the ca
Reagan's Si
by! the 8151'

\
335,E

Televi ion
3486

% (Sc

35R1c

39511 He
1971 , ”it

s l 36C.
1©1131 1 P

, I'
YEfie 1960 an:
“Gem's diss

)

20

book.33 A recent analysis of campaign practices and
technologies which goes beyond the 1968 campaign consid-

erably is Agranoff's The New Style in Eleetien Cemeeigne.3h

A pragmatic analysis of the Republican approach to the
1968 campaign may be found in Scammon and wattenberg's
The Reai Majority.35

Mortensen's doctoral dissertation compared the
uses made of television by the Presidential candidates in
the 1960 and 1964 campaigns. and found a trend away from
extended speeches and toward brief advertisements and
questionsanswer formats.36 Joyce M. Tsongas' M.A. thesis
described the role of the Spencer-Davis campaign man-
agement organization in Ronald Reagan's successful bid
for the California governorship. and concluded that
Reagan's speeches were heavily influenced. if not dictated

by. the strategies laid down by the professional campaign

 

33Haro1d Meldelsohn and Irving Crespi. Poi e.

e1 vi on nd th N‘w Politic (Scranton. Pennsylvania:
Chandler Publishing Co.. 1970).

34Robert Agranoff (ed.). T N t n “ ion
Cameeigne (Boston: Holbrook Press. Inc.. 1972).

35Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. wattenberg. Tee
R 1 it (New York: Coward. McCann. and Geoghegen.

1971 .

36C. David Mortensen. ”A Comparative Analysis of
Political Persuasion on Four Telecast Program Formats in
the 1960 and 196a Presidential Campaigns” (unpublished
Doctor's dissertation. University of Minnesota. 1968).

21

managers.37 In an article in the Qeei;ei_§§e§ee_§peeeh_
Jougnai. Jerry Mandel stated that public speaking played
a key role in Senator Percy's 1966 Senatorial campaign
in Illinois.38

An interesting. if not scholarly. addition to the
literature of campaign strategies is McGinniss' The
§eilieg oz the Ezeeident 1968. a description of the
television advertising campaign mounted in behalf of
Nixon's campaign for the Presidency.39

There are several traditional rhetorical studies
of Presidents and other leading political speakers which
touch upon campaign speaking to a greater or lesser
degree. A good example of this type of study is Stacy's
doctoral dissertation on the campaign speeches of Harry S.
Truman in 19h8. which concluded that Truman's whistle-
stop campaign tours were instrumental in his successful

election bid.“O

 

37Joyce Monson Tsongas. ”The Role of a Political
Management Firm in the 1966 Gubernatorial Campaign

Speaking of Ronald Reagan” (unpublished Master's thesis.
Purdue University. 1970).

38Jerry E. Mandel. "The Presentation of Image in
Charles H. Percy's Whistle-Stop Tour of 1966.” genteel

§tetee §2eeeh Joureei. XXI. h (Winter. 1970). 209-216.
39Joe McGinniss. T e i e d n l 68

(New York: Trident Press. 19 .

“OBill W. Stacy. ”The Campaign Speaking of Harry S.
Truman in the 19h8 Presidential Election” (unpublished
Doctor's dissertation. Southern Illinois University. 1968).

 

thought.

accuratel:
other ext:
dates' po:
by the st!

531'

(D
U)

Berelson,

Axel-1min 1
\

Ti
“9°31 Seco:
3°” pro:
RM; 5 GEt‘

school of

/

R.
I»?
H
O
a
F‘ Hie-3 43'

o It}

22

As noted. the literature which deals with the
role of issues in political campaigns seems to be divided
between two schools of thought. The older school of
thought. that voters' behavior can be predicted more
accurately from a knowledge of partisan alignments and
other external factors than from a knowledge of the candi-
dates' positions on the campaign issues. is represented
by the standard voting studies by Lazarsfeld. et a1. TQe

People's geoice.”1 Campbell. et al. The Voter Deeides.“2

Berelson. et a1. Voti_n_g.u3 and Campbell. et a1. Tge

American Voter.“u
The other school of thought. apparently based

upon second thoughts about the older studies. gives a

more prominent place to campaign issues as a factor. if

not a determining factor. in voters' behavior. This

school of thought is represented by V. 0. Key. Jr.. in

 

ulPaul F. Lazarsfeld. Bernard Berelson. and Hazel
Gaudet. The P o 1e's Choic (New York: Duell. Sloan and
Pearce. 19 .

uzAngus Campbell. Gerald Gurin. and Warren E.

Miller. e Vo e id (Evanston. Illinois: Row.
Peterson. 1955).

. “3Bernard R. Berelson. Paul F. Lazarsfeld. and
William N. McPhee. Votieg (Chicago: University of Chicago
”383. 195“) 0

M"Angus Campbell and others. The Aeegicae Voger
(New York: Wiley. 1960).

 

his posthu
and Hilton
their arti

0v
several st
about poll
seem to be
innovation
activities
3f Present
discuss 15
appraisal
211We 13 u
“”1 acade
issues in

issue8 in

\
is

Winnings.

Pr

23

his posthumously published Th b e t ,“5
and Milton C. Cummings“6 and Stanley Kelley. Jr..,"7 in

their articles in WW2?
Overall. the survey of literature uncovered
several streams. or at least undercurrents. of thinking
about political campaigning. The campaigners themselves
seem to be moving in the direction of adding modern
innovations such as television commercials to their
activities. while not eliminating the traditional practice
of presenting campaign speeches (including speeches to
discuss issues) from their schedules. The scholarly
appraisal of the effects of any particular campaign tech-
nique is uncertain. Most disconcerting is the shortage of
much academic attention to the candidates' treatment of
issues in a campaign. particularly of Nixon's treatment of

issues in his 1960 and 1968 campaigns for the Presidency.

 

“5V. 0. Key. Jr.. with the assistance of Milton C.
Cummings. Jr.. Tee geeeoneible Eleeeorete: getionaiiEy in
Pregideetiai Voeieg i2} -i2 0 New York: Vintage Books.
19 . ‘

uéMilton C. Cummings. Jr.. ”The Strategic Outlook
for the National Elections of 1968.” Tee Preeideetg Beg.
22ineeee, imperato;?. ed. Joseph M. Ray The University
of Texas at El Paso: Texas Western Press. 1969).

“7Stanley Kelley. Jr.. "Campaign Propaganda in

Perspective.” The President: RexI PrinceesI Imperator?
ed. Joseph M. Ray The University of Texas at El Paso:

Texas Western Press. 1969).

 

1960 and
rhetoric

Nixon' s

Ehetoric
e1"-.Dl<>yed
3eiI‘d's
interprg
his and}
31179 81"!
In ordej
IIECQSSaj
Platene
backiro
to Nor

Speaker

24
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This study of Nixon's treatment of issues in his
1960 and 1968 campaigns for the Presidency is a modified
rhetorical criticism. featuring a content analysis of

Nixon's campaign speeches.

Rhetorieel gritieiem
Scholarship in speech criticism has traditionally

employed the critical approach described in Thonssen and
Baird's §2eeen_gzieieiee, Its aim is to describe. analyze.
interpret and evaluate the interplay between a speaker and
his audience through his messages in terms of the persua-
sive effects of the speaker's messages upon the audience.
In order to accomplish a full-blown criticism. it is
necessary to examine the speaker's messages for com-
pleteness and authenticity. to investigate the speaker's
background for his intellectual and rhetorical resources.
to recreate the speaking situation within which the

speaker acted (both in terms of the immediate situation
and also the larger social and cultural contexts). and
then to reconstruct both the audience's immediate reactions
and the long-term effects of the messages. Aristotelian
canons of rhetoric. including invention. disposition.

style. and delivery: and artistic modes of proof. including

a.

 

ethos. Pa
descripti
products
Bedding c
performed
biographi
attentior
messages,
thQSe prc
I'eEDl‘esent
analysls
be paid 1
such aha]
ӣ13813

1

bl)

the1‘. i

25

ethos. pathos. and logos. comprise the critic's norms for
description. and. to a degree. for evaluation."8
Some researchers in speech have questioned the
products of this traditional form of rhetorical criticism.
Redding observed that when each step was faithfully
performed. the resulting criticism has been overwhelmingly
biographical and historical. with inadequate space or
attention.devoted to rhetorical analysis of the speaker's
messages. Redding called for speech critics to consider
these proposals: "(1) that studies be encouraged which
represent a shift in emphasis toward a more thorough
analysis of speech content: and (2) that more attention
be paid to developing appropriate techniques for executing
such analysis.”9 Specifically. Redding suggested content
analysis techniques.50
Hillbruner also questioned the necessity for

including each step of the traditional rhetorical study.
Rather. he suggested. rhetorical studies might focus on

 

“BLester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird. geeeeg

92i§iciem (New York: Ronald Press. 19h8). Parts I.
IV. 8111 VI ‘

“9w. Charles Redding. ”Extrinsic and Intrinsic
Eggticism.” We t rn S eech. XXI. 2 (Spring. 1957). 96-97.
- O o

5°Ibid.. p. 102. A similar appeal for the use
of content analysis in rhetorical criticism is voiced by
Martin Maloney. ”Some New Directions in Rhetorical

Criticism.” Qentral §tatee geeeeh Journal. IV. 1 (March.
1953 ) 0 1'5 0

 

83W of the
to the fie

Conte:
conce;
ain t?
of put
speeck
its is
scient
educat
the 8;

Ac
Redding ay
rhetorica]

Steps: and

26

any of the steps and still contribute worthwhile knowledge

to the field. Hillbruner stated:
Contemporary critics are beginning to follow the
conception that useful evaluation can have as its
aim the criticism of almost any significant aspect
of public address. It can concern itself with a
speech: its ideas or its artistry or lack of either:
its impact: its relation to current intellectual
scientific. religious. political. philosophical.
educational or artistic problems: its relatigf to
the speaker's deeds: its value: its results.

Accordingly. in keeping with the suggestions of
Redding and Hillbruner. this study modifies the traditional
rhetorical critical approach by eliminating some of its
steps. and by adding content analysis techniques to
analyze the campaign speeches of Nixon in the 1960 and
1968 elections.

Specifically. this study is concerned with the
treatment of issues in Nixon's campaign speaking. To
accomplish this limited criticism. the biographical
antecedents relevant to Nixon's political speaking are
described. and the two campaigns are reconstructed in
terms of their social. historical and political contexts.
with particular reference to the issues selected for
analysis. Next. Nixon's campaign speeches are analyzed
using content analysis techniques as described below.

Finally. Nixon's treatment of campaign issues are inter-

preted and evaluated in terms of his development as a

 

51Anthony Hillbruner. n on (New
York: Random House. 1966). p. .

sneaker.

contenpor

Content A

C
describe
objective
of the me
Berelson‘
for the C
of the m
or Berelg
HOlSti 31
requirem.
limited .
be <l‘ulantj

describe

0f the r
(2)

Sel

nition 0

to ObJEQ

27

speaker. and in terms of the role of campaign issues in

contemporary political campaigns.

Content Analyeis

Content analysis is a research method used to
describe the content of communications in a systematic.
objective manner. Numerous definitions and descriptions
of the method exist: perhaps the best known definition is
Berelson's: ”Content analysis is a research technique
for the objective. systematic. and quantitative description
of the manifest content of communication."52 In a review
of Berelson's and other definitions of content analysis.
Holsti stated that there is broad agreement on the
requirements of objectivity. system. and generality. and
limited agreement on the requirements that the method must
be quantitative and limited to the analysis of manifest
content.53

Content analysis usually follows six stages. as
described by Budd. Thorp. and Donohew: (1) Formulation
of the research question. theory. and hypotheses:

(2) selection of a sample of communications. and defi-
nition of categories: (3) coding of the content according

to objective rules: (h) scoring of the data in some

 

52Bernard Berelson. Cont nt Anal in Communi-
cation Research (Glencoe. Ill.: Free Press. 1952). p. 18.

5301c R. Holsti. Content Agelyeis for the §oeial
Sciences and Humanities (Reading. Mass.: Addison-Wesley

Pubiishing COO. 1969,. e 30

 

aamer: (5
cozparison
pretation .
or theorie

Co
analysis 0
tudies in
different
zessages f
iI‘ferencms

used forms

YT,
V-

aha1381 s f

n
aSSeI-t'loI

a complete
predicate.

A

Ac

St a

\

v. . 51
e Mac=21?

28

manner: (5) if included in the research design. the
comparison of scores with other variables: and (6) inter-
pretation of findings according to appropriate concepts
or theories.51+

Content analysis is particularly useful in the
analysis of political communications. especially in trend
studies in which the same categories are analyzed at
different points in time.55 A study which compares
messages from a single source over time in order to draw
inferences about trends is ”one of the most frequently

used forms of content analysis.” according to Holsti.56

Unit 0; agelyeie. The most useful unit of

analysis for the study of some types of political commu-
nications is the statement (also called "theme.”
"assertion." proposition." or ”idea"). because. being
a complete thought unit consisting of a subject and a
predicate. it takes the form in which issues are usually
discussed.57

Accordingly. the unit of analysis used in this
study is the statement. In this study. a statement

 

5“Richard w. Budd. Robert K. Thorp. and Lewis
Donohew. Coetent Analgeie o; 50mmegieatioee (New York:
The Macmillan Co.. 19 7 . p. .

55Berelson. p. 1H9.

56H018t1 . pp. 28-290

57sere1scn. pp. lug, 139.

.‘ q

 

consists of
either expl
explicit or
sentence. a
sentence. c
Hence. a s‘
from a sin
Euishing c
a S‘Jblect
count or 1
:arks. C
illustrat
l
to their
of issue
°laSSif1
aCchdir
ments ‘0'

fl

29

consists of a subject and a predicate. The subject may be
either explicit or implied: the predicate may also be
explicit or implied. A statement may consist of a simple
sentence. an independent clause in a compound or a complex
sentence. or a dependent clause in a complex sentence.
Hence. a statement may consist of word patterns ranging
from a single word to a paragraph. since the distin-
guishing characteristic of a statement is the presence of
a subject and a predicate. rather than.an arbitrary word
count or the artifacts of indenmations or punctuation
marks. Complete rules for counting statements. including
illustrations. are described below.

In this study. statements are classified according
to their direction as the determinant of Nixon's treatment
of issues. Berelson described direction analysis as the
classification of content as pro. con. or neutral.

58

according to rules. Directions for classifying state-
ments by direction. either pro. con. or neutral. are

described below.

getegoriee and iegieetoge. Categories are the
classifications which are applied to the content to

achieve its analysis. Content analysis stands or falls

 

581bid.. p. 150.

m -' .r h-‘g’r';-,_w:.-_.

by its c:

question

construe
are: ”C
research

pendent.
{Italics

30

by its categories. because the categories reflect the
questions asked by the research problem.59

Categories must meet certain requirements in their
construction. According to Holsti. these requirements

are: ”Categories should refleet the eugeoeee o; the
zeeeareg. be exhau tive. be mutuall ex lu ive. inde-

endent. and be derived from a eiggie_eieeei£iee§iee
[Italics in original.]"60
The requirement that categories must zefiiee§_§ge

ur o of he s ea ch means that the variables are
clearly defined. and that indicators of the categories
are valid and reliable representations of the variables.61
In this study. the categories are comprised of the issues
selected for analysis. and the indicators are comprised
of specific areas of issue analysis and discussion within
each category. Indicators are considered as almost
subcategories of the categories. and have been termed
”operational definitions of categories."62 Rules for
determining categories and indicators. including illus-
trations. are given below. The questions of validity and
reliability are discussed below in the section on

validity and reliability.

 

59Ibid.. p. 1H6. See also Budd. Thorp. and
Donohew. p. 39.

60Holsti. p. 95. 61Ibid.

62Budd. Thorp. and Donohew. pp. h2-h3.

 

“ans ti
not Eff:

apply t:

31

The requirement that categories must be 2292222212
means that all relevant items in the sample of documents
under study must be capable of being placed into a
category.63 In this study. in addition to the issue
categories. there is a separate category labeled ”unclas-
sified" for all statements not counted in another category.

The requirement that categories must be mutuaily
exelueive means that no content datum can be placed in
more than a single cell.6n This requirement is met in
this study by classifying each statement according to a
set of rules. Any statement which fails to fit an indi-
cator according to the rules is placed in the single
”unclassified" category: indicators are mutually exclusive.

The requirement that categories must be independent
means that assignment of any datum into a category must
not affect the classification of other data.65 This
requirement is directed at Q-sort techniques. and does not
apply to this study.

The requirement that categories must be derivee
from a single classification principle means that
conceptually different levels of analysis must be kept
separate.66 In this study. categories represent separate
issues discussed in the two campaigns. and all analysis

is on the same conceptual level.

 

63Hclsti. p. 99. 6“Ibid.
651bid.. p. 100. 66Ibid.

 

are sele

areas a!

32

§emelieg

ieeeee. The issues selected for analysis are not
designed to represent an exhaustive delineation of every
issue statement found in Nixon's campaign speeches. They
are selected to represent some of the broader substantive
areas any candidate for the Presidency might be expected
to address. based on the assumption that the nature of
the office and the nature of the electorate offer some
features commonly found in most elections at the national
level. A second criterion for issue selection is based
upon references in the literature to issues which were.
in fact. found in the two campaigns in question. either
in the candidate's major campaign appeals. or in public
expressions of interest or concern in specific issues.

Regarding the first criterion. the nature of the
office and of the electorate. it is true that the Presi-
dency is the office most concerned with foreign policy
and with questions of national policy bearing upon the
economic and social welfare of the nation's citizens as
a whole. Also. the Presidency. together with the Vice-
Presidency. is the only nationally elected set of offices:
hence. Presidential candidates have to discuss issues of
interest to the national electorate. '

As to the second criterion. the literature

contains several references to what were the major con-

cerns of the national electorate during the two campaigns

 

1n que:
ciple i
For ins

associa

policy :
keeping

oping mi
stated t
domestic
were $8.11
1960 stre
tne Else:
Perity,69
by its {‘0‘

we.“
. éyonslbj

 

33

in question. as well as references to what were the prin-
ciple issue areas addressed by Nixon in both campaigns.
For instance. a telephone poll conducted by Pool and his
associates in August. 1960. revealed that the issues
upper-most in voters' minds in that campaign were foreign
policy issues. including avoiding war with the Russians.
keeping ahead of the Russians in production. and devel-
oping missiles to check the Russians.67 Paul T. David
stated that civil rights. foreign and defense policy.
domestic economic policy. and problems of agriculture

68

were salient throughout the 1960campaign. Nixon's

1960 strategy. according to White. hinged on emphasizing

the Eisenhower record in the areas of peace and pros-

69

perity. and. in fact. Nixon's campaign was characterized

by its focus on firmness toward Russia and ”fiscal

responsibility” in domestic affairs.7o

Turning to the
1968 campaign. Milton C. Cummings. Jr.. stated that in

August. 1968. the American public regarded Vietnam. crime.

 

67Ithiel de Sola Pool and others. gandidatee.
Igsuee. age §§§a§egiee (Cambridge. Mass.: MIT Press.
19 : PPO 3' 0

68Paul T. David. ”The Presidential Nominations.”

The Pgeeideneiel 5129§1°n§ and Tganeition 1260-1261. ed.
Paul T. David Washington: Brookings Institution. 1961).

pp. 22-23.

69White. The Makieg c; the Preeident 126 . p. 300.
70P0ynter. po 38.

 

and 61171
problems
was desi
violence
of restl
met all
party, e

at home

3n

and civil rights as the three most pressing national
problems.71 Witcover reported that Nixon's 1968 strategy
was designed to focus on the issues of Vietnam. crime and
violence. inflation. civil disobedience. and the causes
of restlessness among minority groups.72 White reported
that all 1968 candidates for the nomination of either
party. except Eugene McCarthy. emphasized ”law-and-order”
at home and ”peace” in Vietnam.73
There is some overlap between issues. of course.
Some commentators see close similarities between "Civil
Rights” and "Law and Order” in particular. However.
especially in the 1968 campaign. there is a strong
argument for isolating the two areas as discrete enough
for content analysis. Philip Converse and his colleagues
at the Survey Research Center at the University of
Michigan stated:
From Vietnam and the racial crisis a corollary
discontent crystallized that might be treated as a
third towering issue of the 1968 campaign. or as
nothing more than a restatement of the other two
issues. This was the cry for ”law and order” and
against ”crime in the streets.” While Goldwater
had talked in these terms somewhat in 196h. events
had conspired to raise their salience very consid-
erably for the public by 1968. For some. these
slogans may have had no connotations involving

either the black race or Vietnam. signifying
instead a concern over rising crime rates and the

 

710ummings. p. 7h. 72Witcover. p. 36“.
73White. The Makigg of the Pgeeident 1268. p. 236.

 

 

all
con

selecte'

(2) «P

Versions
numerous

of both

fulfi 11

group or
SDeecl'ies
twenty S!

ram” 85

cont“: a

\

71
1n

s Merl-Ce
:‘Eecth . e
«ember.

35

alleged ”coddling” of criminal offenders by the
courts. 4
Based upon the foregoing analysis. the issues
selected for this study are: (1) War and Peace.
(2) "Pocketbook” aspects of the Domestic Economy.

(3) Civil Rights. and (4) Law and Order.

Speechee. The total quantity of campaign speeches
in the 1960 and 1968 campaigns by Richard M. Nixon is
formidable. However. most of the speeches are repetitious
versions of the same "basic speech" which was presented at
numerOus campaign stops. and which was not intended to be,
an in-depth discussion of campaign issues. This is true
of both campaigns. as is documented in Chapter 2.

This study is limited to an analysis of Nixon's
treatment of issues in his campaign speeches designed to
fulfill the issue-discussion function. There is a limited
group of these speeches. In 1960. there are fourteen such
speeches. designated by Nixon himself: in 1968. there are
twenty such speeches. designated by his staff. Because
this number of speeches is limited and manageable. no
random sampling scheme was used to reduce it any further.
Hence. a total of thirty-four speeches is included in the

content analysis.

 

7uPhilip Converse. et al.. ”Continuity and Change
in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968

Election." rican Politi a1 1 n e R vi w. LXIII. h
(December. 1969). p. 1087.

 

of bias
content
even a 1'
issues 1
were $81
cats-801.1

principal

I‘

ePPESen

36

yeiidity and Reliability
‘ Budd. Thorp. and Donohew defined validity and

reliability as follows: ”In simplest terms. reliebility
means repeatability with consistency of results: and
validity. actually measuring what the researcher says he
is measuring.”75

Regarding validity. there are two potential sources
of bias in this study. First. the speeches selected for
content analysis might not be a complete inventory. or,
even a representative sample. of Nixon's positions on the
issues in either (or both) of the campaigns. Speeches
were selected by Nixon and his staff. Second. the
categories might not be an accurate reflection of the
principal campaign issues.

To the extent that the selected speeches are fair
representatives of Nixon's treatment of issues. and to
the extent that the issues selected for coding and repre—
sentative of the major substantive issues in the campaigns.
the study may be regarded as valid. The coding procedure
itself poses little problem in the area of validity.
Berelson stated. ”Assuming there is no doubt about the
synonyms. there is no doubt about the validity of the
analysis. The instrument measures what it is intended to

measure. The same can probably be said about most

 

75Budd. Thorp. and Donohew. p. 66.

 

 

subject-
point wt
careful

native

37

subject-matter analysis."76 Berelson repeated the same
point with the qualification that: "Most of the time.
careful definition of categories and judicious and alter-
native selection of indicators will take care of the
matter.”77 In this study. categories and indicators are
specifically defined and selected carefully.

Regarding reliability. Berelson said that explicit
instruction and full illustration for coding the content
help to improve reliability. This study begins with
explicit coding instructions with full illustrations.
Beyond this. reliability can be increased by having inde-
pendent coders test the instructions on material similar
to that used in the main analysis. and then comparing the
codedresults.78 In this study. although all coding is
done by the writer. reliability of all coding instructions
is tested as described above. Data from reliability tests
are presented in Chapter 3.

To this point. the technique of content analysis
has been described in general. including a description of
its procedural steps and its uses in analyzing political
communications. as well as more specific applications of

the technique to this study. Statements and categories.

 

76Berelson. p. 169. 77Ibid.. p. 171.

78John Waite Bowers. "Content Analysis.” eds.
Philip Emmert and William D. Brooks. Methods of Research

in Communication (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co.. 1970).
p. 303.

 

the selectic
analysis. he

What
analyzing t

speeches 1!
Rules for 1

321.1.
statement.
Predicate.
the Predic
kilnitiv.
5‘5 a stat

A
hfiepgnde
or a 99D:
statesmen.
a Sh’81e

8 Statem

mate. h

indentat
'1
thankful

diploma

38

the selection of issues and the sample of speeches for
analysis. have also been described.

What follows is the specific set of rules used in
analyzing the content of Richard M. Nixon's issue-oriented

speeches in his 1960 and 1968 campaigns for the Presidency.

Rulee {or Qontent Analysis

Unie o; analysie. The unit of analysis is the
statement.79 A statement consists of a subject and a
predicate. The subject may be either explicit or implied:
the predicate may also be either explicit or implied. An
infinitive predicate with an expressed subject also counts
as a statement.

A statement may consist of a simple sentence. an
independent clause in a compound or a complex sentence.
or a dependent clause in a complex sentence. Thus. a
statement may consist of a pattern of words ranging from
a single word to a paragraph. The key determinant of what
a statement is is the presence of a subject and a pred-
icate. not an arbitrary word count or the artifact of
indentation or punctuation.

To illustrate these rules. in the passage. ”We are
thankful for Ike's administration. Ike was a firm

diplomat. and his administration was progressive. Ike

 

79Grammatica1 constructions are described in

Porter G. Perrin. Writer's Guide and Index to lish.
(nth ed.: Chicago: Scott. Foresman & Co.. 1965;.

 

kept the F
nature of
the follow

1.

 

39

kept the peace for 7 1/2 years because he knew the ruthless
nature of our enemies. He would expect us to do no less.”
the following are measurable statements:

1. We are thankful for Ike's administration.

(simple sentence.)

(Inde-
pendent
clauses
in a
compound
sentence)

2. Ike was a firm diplomat.

vvvv

3. His administration was progressive.

4. Ike kept the peace for 7 1/2 years.
(independent clause in complex sentence)

5. He knew the ruthless nature of our enemies.
(dependent clause in complex sentence)

6. He would expect. (independent clause)

7. Us to do no less. (infinitive clause with

expressed subject)

In instances of compound subjects. or of compound
predicates. each will count in a separate statement. How-
ever. compound objects will not be regarded as creating
separate statements. To illustrate. in the passage.
”Cabot Lodge and I have had experience with Khrushchev
and the Communists.“ there are two countable statements:

1. Cabot Lodge has had experience . . .

2. I have had experience . . .

Again. in the passage. ”I went to Toledo and told them
about my campaign.” there are two countable statements:

1. I went to Toledo.

2. I told them about my campaign.

 

Now
of verbs. 0:
To illustra
Kennedy vot
statements:
1.
2.
Ad
Place, can
illustrate
Pa1.1-3: he

Statement

1
2

Again. 1!

k
t“ere 8r.

#0

Noun clauses functioning as subjects or objects
of verbs. or objects of prepositions. count as statements.
To illustrate. in the passage. ”Everybody knows how
Kennedy voted on the Quemoy issue." there are two countable
statements:

1. Everybody knows . . .

2. Kennedy voted on the Quemoy issue.

Adverb clauses functioning as notions of time.
place. cause. effect. etc.. count as statements. To
illustrate. in the passage. ”When Ike saw Khrushchev in
Paris. he was firm with him.” there are two countable
statements:

1. Ike saw Khrushchev in Paris.

2. He was firm with him.

Again. in the passage. "Because Ike was defending the
nation's security. he must not apologize for the 0-2.“
there are two statements:

1. Ike was defending the nation's security.

2. He must not apologize for the U-2.

Judgment of the coder will decide whether to count
elliptical clauses with implied verbs. such as "When just
a Senator. Kennedy . . . .” or abridged clauses with no
implied verbs. such as "The more. the merrier." based
upon the emphasis placed upon them in context.

Questions and exclamations will be counted as

statements whenever the conditions of subject and predicate

are met.

. " "#rmb
m. --

Sta
to sources
exception
everything
Judgment a
as a pro,

category,

mentione
Stateme.
aDOVQ‘
in the
Play ‘t

DI the

#1

Statements within direct quotations attributed
to sources other than Richard M. Nixon constitute an
exception to the rules stated above. Coder will count
everything quoted as one statement. and will exercise
Judgment as to whether the quotation should be counted
as a pro. con. or neutral statement within an issue
category. or as an unclassified statement.

Titles of songs. books. poems. etc., which are
mentioned by Nixon and which would otherwise count as
statements constitute an exception to the rules stated
above. and are not counted as statements. To illustrate.
in the passage. ”It is appropriate that the band should
play 'California, here I come' for me today.” the title

of the song is not counted as a statement.

Categories. The categories are limited to
selected issue areas designed to represent the substantive
topics which a candidate for the Presidency might be
expected to address. and which the literature shows were.
in fact. issues in the two campaigns included in this
study. The issue categories selected are: (1) war and
Peace. (2) ”Pocketbook" aspects of the Domestic Economy.
(3) Civil Rights, and (a) Law and Order. A fifth
category. designated as ”unclassified,” will also be
utilized for those statements not counted in any issue
category. to meet the requirement that all statements

found in the content must be categorized.

 

21:.
the operati
study, stat
whenever tl
Statements
or synonym
statements
iniicators
1. War a!

A. u!

h‘

42

Indicators. Indicators are almost sub-categories.
the operational definitions of the categories. In this
study. statements are classified within categories
whenever they deal with the indicators listed below.
Statements which include relatively unambiguous pronouns
or synonyms for the indicators are counted. The tally of
statements counted will be listed according to the
indicators.

1. War and Peace.
A. War:
1. War in general:
a. as U. S. (or Allies') policy.
b. as Enemy policy.
2. Particular wars:
a. World War II.
b. Korea.
c. Vietnam.
B. Peace:
1. Peace in general:
a. as U. S. (or Allies') policy.
b. as Enemy policy.
2. Negotiations. diplomacy as instruments of
achieving peace. I
C. National defense:
1. Military preparedness in principle.
2. Military weaponry.

3. Military actions short of war.

 

L

A. Fis
l.
2.
3.

3. Pr
1.
2.

C. P:
l
2

D. 1

Civij

A.

3.

Law

2.

“3

”Pocketbook" aspects of the Domestic Economy.
A. Fiscal policy:

1. Taxing.

2. Spending.

3. ”Fiscal responsibility.”
B. Price stability:

1. Inflation.

2. Recession (or depression).
C. Personal income:

1. Wages.

a. Labor.
b. Farm income.

2. Retirement income.
D. Employment.
Civil Rights.
A. General.
B. 'Discrimination:

1. Job discrimination.

2. Housing discrimination.

3. Education discrimination.
C. Voting rights.
law and Order.
A. Crime:

1. Organized crime.

2. "Major" crime (listed on FBI crime statistics).

3. Violence (riots, demonstrations).

 

3. Law

1.
2.

the above
pro: con,

1

an

B. Law Enforcement:
1. Police. law enforcement agencies.
2. Courts.
Directigg. Nixon's position on the statements in
the above indicators are classified by directions. 1. e.,
pro, con. or neutral. as follows:
1. A statement will be counted as PRO whenever:

a. Nixon asserts or implies that he. or a
favored concept (including America,
Americans. the people. our allies, a
particular ally, the Republicans. a
particular Republican) approves of. favors,
or aggggg,with the particular indicator.

,b. Nixon asserts or implies that the indi-
cator is beneficial.

c. Nixon asserts or implies a need to accept.
pursue. or obtain the indicator.

d. Nixon asserts or implies that his opponent
(Kennedy, Humphrey. the Democrats, a
particular Democrat) or other disfavored
concept (the enemy, the Communists.
Khrushchev, the Russians. Mac) is CON
the indicator.

2. A statement will be counted as CON whenever:

a. Nixon asserts or implies that he. or a
favored concept (including America,

Americans. the people. our allies, a

 

5--)

“5

particular Republican) disassgovss of.

o o e . or disaggsss with the particular
indicator.

b. Nixon asserts or implies that the indi-
cator is disadvantageous.

c. Nixon asserts or implies that there is no
need to accept. pursue. or obtain a
particular indicator.

d. Nixon asserts or implies that his opponent
(Kennedy, Humphrey. the Democrats. a
particular Democrat) or other disfavored
concept (the enemy. the Communists.
Khrushchev, the Russians. Mao) is PRO the
indicator.

3. A statement will be counted as NEUTRAL
whenever:

a. It is primarily factual. definitive. or
explanatory.

b. It otherwise fails to fit any of the Pro
or Con cues listed above. yet is related
to an indicator.

c. It contains a balance of both Pro and

Con cues.
SUMMARY

This chapter has discussed the uses of oratory in

‘

campaigning: the problem for research, with its

‘37-

definition
relevant 1
including

coding and

g
dissertati
Chapter 2
8 politic.
dency are
and 130111:
issues se
content 5
Campaign
synthefi:
a Speake;
108.1 0&3
Offers c

Bibliogr

#6

definitions. limitations. and Justifications: a review of
relevant literature: methodological considerations.
including rhetorical criticism and content analysis: and

coding and sampling techniques.

Ovsrvis . In the remaining chapters of this
dissertation. the following organization will govern:
Chapter 2 discusses biographical antecedents to Nixon as
a political speaker, and the two campaigns for the Presi-
dency are discussed in terms of their social. historical.
and political contexts. with particular reference to the
issues selected for analysis. Chapter 3 presents the
content analysis of Nixon's treatment of issues in his
campaign speaking in the 1960 and 1968 elections. and
synthesizes the data in terms of Nixon's development as
a speaker, and in terms of the role of issues in polit-
ical campaigns. Chapter h summarizes the findings and
offers conclusions. The dissertation also includes a

Bibliography of selected sources.

 

Quaker fa
Nixon Was
C”Image
81°“) set
during w
11%“ Re
and Sen
Admins!
Preside]
or "hie!
and Com
mete”

campa 18.

Chapter 2

BIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND OF RICHARD M. NIXON'S
TREATMENT OF ISSUES IN THE
1960 AND 1968 CAMPAIGNS

INTRODUCTION

Born in 1913 into a strict. hardworking. and devout
Quaker family in Yorba Linda. California. Richard Milhous
Nixon was reared in the period of Normalcy of Harding.
Coolidge. and Hoover. He studied law during the Depres-
sion: served as a naval officer and federal bureaucrat
during World war II: was elected as a conservative Repub-
lican Representative and then Senator during the Cold war:
and served as Vice-President during the two Eisenhower
Administrations. He was an unsuccessful candidate for the
Presidency in 1960 and a successful candidate in 1968. both
of which campaigns have generated a great deal of analysis
and commentary. This chapter summarizes some important
historical and biographical antecedents of his presidential
campaigns.

The task of any biographer or historian is to set
forth the available facts. and his interpretation of the
facts within some sort of a unified. coherent framework.

In the field of speech traditional rhetorical analysis
1+7

 

 

has requil
go into t!
a complet‘
defined in
well as f
irely. as
rhetorica
filth much
and blogr
the Previ
more nan
E
inent and
has {18114
from Obs.
in the p
reSEarCh
tation.
3°urces
the alias
odiCfils
since h
Jerry v
RepreSe
by his

hAVe 3}:

#8

has required the critic to point out all the factors that
go into the rhetorical production of a speaker. including
a complete accounting of the speaker's education (broadly
defined to encompass childhood experiences in the home as
well as formal schooling) and career experiences. Accord-
ingly. as has been noted by several critics. finished
rhetorical analyses have tended to be lengthy and weighty.
with much of the weight residing in a mass of historical
and biographical freight. Therefore. as pointed out in
the previous chapter. there has been a movement towards
more narrowly targeted criticisms.

Richard Nixon has beens-and remains--busy. prom-
inent and controversial. In the span of his lifetime. he
has figured in many events and elicited many reactions
from observers and commentators. The survey of literature
in the preceding chapter lists some of the major scholarly
research found in the area encompassed by this disser-
tation. But it should be understood that the selection of
sources shown there does not represent all or even most of
the available published material. Newspapers and peri-
odicals have reported straight news about Richard M. Nixon
since he began his public career by upsetting Congressman
Jerry Voorhis in l9h6 for a seat in the 0.8. House of
Representatives. Articles. editorials. and commentaries
by his political opponents and his political supporters

have appeared in profusion. It would also be fair to say

that the I
generated
lthh is 2
cent of i
h
informati
since Ri<
not so. '
assimila
is a DUI
complex
known b;

anyone,

the tor}
(ml? 01
t 1Ve 1

8Peeir

“9

that the Presidential campaigns in 1960 and 1968 have
generated more analysis than previous campaigns. most of
which is related directly or indirectly to Nixon's treat-
ment of issues in them.

Needless to say. this massive accumulation of
information varies in both usefulness and reliability
since Richard Nixon is controversial. Even if this were
not so. the sheer volume of material would be too much to
assimilate. Finally. it must also be noted that while he
is a public figure. Richard Nixon is a private person with
complex motivations-~there are some things which are not
known by anyone because they have not been shared with
anyone. certainly not for publication.

In this study we are not concerned with the total
rhetorical output of Richard M. Nixon. but rather with
only one aspect of his rhetoric. his treatment of substan-
tive issues. in two narrow rhetorical situations.
specifically. a sample of his issue-oriented speeches in
each of his two Presidential campaigns. Consequently. in
this chapter. only such historical data as might illumi-
nate his performance in these designated areas will be
included. While much information is thereby excluded
from our view. what appears in this chapter seems to be
the most relevant background to an understanding of our
subject. The material presented here has been selected

with a view towards brevity. not exhaustiveness.

 

 

Th
listed in
Election 1

R]
in Y0]
Los.m
and E1
of In
gas 8
Calif
l93h.
third
lna
Whit!
briei
istr:
Pact

forn
19mg
Acti
end:
Of (
irxi
195i
1‘03
103

50
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

The skeletal facts of Nixon's biography were

listed in the Essts on Fils publication. gzssidsntisl

Elession 1268:

RICHARD MILHOUS NIXON. Born January 9. 1913.
in Yorba Linda. Calif.. a small farming community near
Los Angeles. One of five sons of Francis Anthony
and Hannah Milhous Nixon. both Quakers and natives
of Indiana. Father was farmer and grocery store-
gas station operator. Moved in 1922 to Whittier.
Calif.. where Nixon attended Whittier College 1930-
193”. Entered Duke University Law School: graduated
third in his class in 1937. Failing to obtain a Job
in a New York firm. he returned to practice in
Whittier until l9h2. During World War II he served
briefly as an attorney in Office of Price Admin-
istration. Joined Navy in l9h2 and served in South
Pacific: was discharged as lieutenant commander.

Elected to House of Representatives from Cali-
fornia's 12th Congressional District 19h6. reelected
19h8. Achieved prominence as House Un-American
Activities Committee member who forced showdown that
ended in Alger Hiss perjury conviction. Co-author
of controversial Mundt-Nixon Communist-control bill
in l9h8. Defeated Rep. Helen Gahagan Douglas in
1950 Senatorial race. Elected Vice President 1952,
reelected 1956. Neminated for Presidency 1960. but
lost to John F. Kennedy. In 1962 he ran for gover-
ncrship of California. was defeated by Edmund G.
Brown. Became senior partner of Wall Street law
firm of Nixon. Mudge. Rose. Guthrie. Alexander. &
Mitchell.

Married Thelma Catherine Patricia Ryan. a school-
teacher. June 21. 19bo. Two daughters-~Patricia. 22.
and Julie. 20.

One important detail omitted from this compilation
is. of course. the fact that he ran for the Presidency
again in 1968 and won. narrowly defeating Hubert H.
Humphrey.

 

lmward W. Knappman. (Odo): WM
12§§ (New York: Facts on File. 1970 . p. 15 .

 

agnostic}

R:
hard. wi‘
brothers
work exc:
characte‘
very ear
0! syste
were his
rian: 1n
earned m
Universi
afforded

I
about ke
SChool s
“Hivergi
Dart-t1m

feared t

51

figucationz
Richard Nixon was taught by his parents to work

hard. with determination and persistence. He and his
brothers were expected to join in the family business and
work except during school hours. As a student. Nixon was
characterized as being serious and studious: he learned
very early the values of doing his homework. As a result
of systematically grinding away at his books. his grades
were high. In grade school. he was the class valedicto-
rian: in high school and college (history major). he
earned mostly A's. He earned a full scholarship to Duke
University Law School. without which he could not have
afforded to attend.

In his first year at Duke. Nixon was apprehensive
about keeping his grades up in competition with other law
school students (several Phi Beta Kappas from prestigious
universities among them). especially since he had to take
part-time employment to earn his room and board. He
feared that he would lose his scholarship under Duke's
“squeeze" policy of dropping the lowest-ranking students
at the end of each year. A classmate. Bill Adelson.

reassured him with the comment. "You don't have to worry.

 

2All factual references in this section on Nixon's
educational background are taken from Earl Mazo and Stephen
Hess. Nixon: A Political Portrait (New York: Popular
Library. 1963). pp. 9-55. and Edwin P. Hoyt. e N ons:
Am rican F mil (New York: Random House. 1972).
pp. 1 0-21 . except where other sources are cited.

' ' w___
my a-..

You know w]
Adelson's 4
when Nixon
ship in th
An
was that h
activities
Club 3111 a
for studer
he orSemi:
club. the
in the g1.
'Varmed t!
body pres
B
deserves
Nixon '83
am dehat
in the LC
entitled.
Constitut
Caliform

& 3132th

52

You know what it takes to learn the law? An iron'butt."3
Adelson's assessment of Nixon's capability was justified
when Nixon graduated third in his class an! earned member-
ship in the school's honorary legal society.

An important aspect of this phase of Nixon's life
was that he participated in.a variety of extra-curricular
activities. In high school. he was a member of the Latin
Club and also feature editor for the school paper. He ran
for student body president and lost. In Whittier College.
he organized and became the first president of a men's
club. the Orthogonians (translated as ”Squares”): sang
in the glee club: acted in plays: played football (he
”warmed the bench” for four years): and ran for student
body president his senior year and won.

But one particular extra-curricular activity
deserves special notice: in both high school and college
Nixon was active in speech contests. especially oratory
and debate. As a high school senior. he was a finalist
in the Lss £25212! Times Oratorical Contest with a speech
entitled. ”America's Progress-~Its Dependence Upon the
Constitution.” Later. in college. he won the Southern
California Intercollegiate Public Speaking Conference with
a speech on the topic. ”Resolved that the Power of the
President Should Be Increased as a Matter of Settled
Policy.”

 

3Richard M Nixon
. Six Crisss (New York: Pyramid
BOOKS. 1968). pp. 317-318;.

 

 

I
Fullertc
the Whit
debating
He and l'
Northwe:
Year Ni:
Pionshi;
Champion
tance t.
taught I
°r tekix
Materiai
Speaker
high SCI
college
but nev
°°nt1nu
and he

“a“ r

steady I
IrOm th

regeare1

NixOn w-

53

In debate. he participated as a student at
Fullerton High School first. then transferred and joined
the Whittier High School debate team. Nixon's college
debating career spanned all four years at Whittier College.
He and his teammates toured the colleges cf the Pacific
Nbrthwest. debating some fifty rounds each year. One
year Nixon’s team won their intercollegiate league cham-
pionship. including a victory over a nationally recognized
championship team from Redlands University.

This particular experience was of seminal impor-
tance to his later career. His high school debate coach
taught him to do thorough research. He acquired the habit
of taking careful notes on his reading and filing his
material away on little note cards. As a beginning
speaker. Nixon was unsure of himself. He wrote out his
high school speeches and carefully memorized them. In his
college career. he learned to speak more extemporaneously.
but never with much ease or natural platform grace. He
continued his practice of collecting a pyramid of facts.
and he saved all his old files for some possible future
use. Thus. as a debater as well as a student. he was
steady and efficient. but not flashy. His primary gains
from the experience were in the skills of library
research. logical analysis and organization of ideas.

Summarizing the educational phase of his life.

Nixon wrote. "I won my share of scholarships. and of

1 lab

‘7‘

 

speaklni
smarter

ofmymu

A
from Du]
fornia a
as a su;

After t1

appears

equ
dis
res:
fall
and
com
"112
Ella]
date

I

run as a
bent Je:
‘381‘ee1ne
leneer,

5h

speaking and debating prizes in school. not because I
smarter but because I worked longer and harder than some

of my more gifted colleagues.“u

Esgly Polisisal gssssz. Following his graduation

from Duke Law School. Richard Nixon returned to Cali-
fornia and entered law practice in Whittier. He served
as a supply officer in the Navy during World War II.
After the war. he responded to a political flier which
appeared in a California newspaper. It read as follows:

”WANTED” Congressman candidate with no previous

experience to defeat a man who has represented the
district in the house for ten years. Any young man.
resident of the district. preferably a veteran.

fair education. no political strings or obligations.
and possessed of a few ideas for betterment of
country at large. may apply for the job. Applicants
will be reviewed by 100 interested citizens who will
guarantee supporg but will not obligate the candi-
date in any way.

Nixon was chosen over seven other applicants to
run.as a Republican against the liberal Democratic incum-
bent Jerry Voorhis. The incumbent made the mistake of
agreeing to a series of debates against his unknown chal-
lenger. who promptly mounted a heavy attack on his liberal
voting record in Congress. Since Nixon had neither record

nor reputation to attack. Voorhis was forced to campaign

 

“Nixon. Si; Crises. p. 317.
5Hoyt. p. 2&0.

 

 

on a str
In that

a Congre

from Cal
America:
firmly <
subversi
3eDress:
Bill whi
members

other b:

°f HUAC
perjury.
parties:
CongervE
COHV1Cte
forced.

the bee:

liberal

Junie} m

he ran f

‘~““‘

55

on a straight defense against Nixon's vigorous attacks.6
In that l9h6 election. Nixon upset his opponent and became
a Congressman.

Nixon served two terms as a U.S. Representative
from California. His first assignment. the House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC). led him to become
firmly convinced that the American Communist Party was a
subversive threat to U.S. security. Nixon teamed with
Representative Karl Mundt to produce the tough Mundt-Nixon
Bill which called for registration of Communist Party
members and denial of passports. federal employment and
other benefits to them.7

In his second term. Nixon was the principal member
of HUAC to push for the prosecution of Alger Hiss for
perjury. The case generated a great deal of acrimonious
partisan fighting between the Truman Administration and
Conservative members of Congress. Hiss was ultimately
convicted. Nixon's anti-Communist reputation was reinp
forced. but at a cost: the episode was credited with being
the beginning of the long-standing hostility of the
liberal elements of the national press towards him.8

Although Nixon had a "safe seat.” he was still a

junior member in.a Democratic-dominated House in 1950. so

he ran for the Senate against Congresswoman Helen.Gahagan

 

61bid.. pp. 2u7-2u8. 71b1d.. pp. 25h—256.
8Mazo and Hess. pp. uu-sa. Hoyt. pp. 251-257.

 

Douglas. 8
hiacampa1
Douglas 01
sition to
in genera?
the state
record pr
election.
T
results.
I'iiothing
a(sainst N
than the

1Wales 1'

the a
siona
skill
comet

 

 

56

Douglas. a liberal Democrat. In the campaign. Nixon and
his campaign manager. Murray Chotiner. accused Mrs.
Douglas of being ”soft on Communism" because of her oppo-
sition to HUAC in particular and her liberal voting record
in general. They labeled her ”the Pink Lady” and flooded
the state with copies of a selective account of her voting
record printed on bright pink paper. Nixon won the
election. and so was elevated to the Senate.9
The 1950 senatorial campaign had at least two
results. For liberal Democrats. Mazo and Hess stated.
”Nothing in the litany of reprehensible conduct charged
against Nixon The Campaigner has been cited more often
than the tactics by which he defeated Helen Gahagan
Douglas for Senator."10 But for Republicans.
the articulate young congressman.whom party profes-
sionals viewed as ”a real comer" because of the
skill on which he ”got Alger Hiss” had accomplished
something in California to hearten Republicans and
concern Democrats nationally. Representative Nixon
had demonstrated in winning his election for Senator
that a ”model Republican” could defeat a ”model
Democrat” in an industrial state where Democriis
outregistered Republicans by a million votes.
As junior Senator from California and nationally
prominent anti-Communist. Nixon fulfilled many speaking
engagements around the country above and beyond his

Senatorial duties. At the 1952 Republican National

 

9Mazo and Hess. pp. 6u-75.
1°Ibid.. p. 6a. 111bid.. p. 76.

Convention.
reading hit!
the ticket
Chotiner's
began a vie
stressed tr
Truman recc
strategy ls
In
arose over
the Democre
suPlioi‘ters
0f controv.
replacing
ElSenl’iouer

GOfense or

 

"”9 Drove
and televi
”m1“. tr
"temporal
Of the rmI
also 0“le
first 981‘]
“harm“ I
to mentio

to his dal

 

57

Convention. party professionals were unanimous in recom-
mending him as the Vice-Presidential candidate to run on
the ticket with General Dwight D. Eisenhower. On
Chotiner's advice. Nixon accepted the opportunity and
began.a vigorous campaign. In the campaign. Eisenhower
stressed the positive while Nixon led the attacks on the
Truman.record and ”Communism at home and abroad.” a
strategy labeled "high road-low road” by the Democrats.
In the midst of his whistle-stop tours. an issue
arose over Nixon's campaign fund. Nixon was accused by
the Democrats of misusing money contributed by his
supporters in California. a charge which aroused a storm
of controversy across the county. There was talk of
replacing Nixon as the Vice-Presidential candidate.
Eisenhower himself refused either to come to Nixon's
defense or to drop him from the ticket until the charges
were proved or refuted. Nixon went on nationwide radio
and television to make the most famous speech of his
career. the ”Checkers” speech. In an emotional. largely
extemporaneous speech he not only explained the details
of the rather innocuous campaign fund in question. but he
also outlined his personal financial history. from his
first earnings as a school boy right up to his current
financial status--mortgages. savings. etc.--not neglecting
to mention the gift of a cocker spaniel named “Checkers"

to his daughters by a Texas Republican.

support
meal I
Eisenhm
almost 4
not exa
Nixon r
against

Nixon t

Preside
Prescrj
over t!
event 1
runcti¢
PrMaia.
the V1.
‘0 avg
hot ke
declsi
dut1es
p°11cy
summar

Du
Ca

\

58

The public reaction was overwhelming in its
support for Nixon. Adlai Stevenson was challenged to
reveal his personal financial situation as Nixon had done.
Eisenhower embraced Nixon. and the incident which had
almost aborted Nixon's political career was salvaged if
not exactly transformed into an asset. In any event.
Nixon remained on the ticket and continued his campaign
against Communism and corruption. and the Eisenhower-

Nixon ticket was elected by a landslide.12

I122:£I£§1922219 Nixon served two terms as Vice
President. 1952-1960. Under the Constitution. the
prescribed duties of the Vice President are to preside
over the Senate and to succeed to the Presidency in the
event that office should be vacated. Beyond that. the
functions of the Vice President are controlled by the
President. Eisenhower's announced intention was to make
the Vice-Presidency a real arm of the administration. and
to avoid the mistake Franklin D. Roosevelt had made by
not keeping Vice-President Truman informed on his major
decisions. Therefore. Eisenhower gave Nixon a number of
duties which would keep him in close touch with the
policy-making processes. Mazo and Hess provided this
summary of Nixon's service as Vice President:

During his administration Nixon was a member of the
Cabinet and presided over 19 meetings: he was a

 

12Ibid.. pp. 91-125.

mi '— ' "avg-"i—

 

memb
over
with
acce
read
the
Comm
the
trat
Pre:

deal of

tour.
arrange
uDon b:
motcrcI
to be
Suarde
lined
riotlt
Very
minim
ever
deve.
trig
thrc
and.

913:

59

member of the National Security Council and presided
over 26 meetings: he attended the weekly meetings
with the congressional leadership: he was given
access to the most secret security information and
read the daily intelligence reports from all over
the world: he was made chairman of the President's
Commission on Government Contracts and chairman of
the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability: and he
traveled 160.000 miles to 55 countries as the
President's emissary.

Two of Nixon's foreign tours resulted in.a great
deal of publicity and attention: Caracas and Moscow.

In 1958. Nixon visited Latin America on.a goodwill
tour. On his last stop at Caracas. Venezuela. security
arrangements broke down. and he and his party were set
upon by uncontrolled mobs. He was spat upon. and his
motorcade was stoned. His itinerary of local events had
to be canceled. as he was unable to leave the heavily-
guarded embassy during his stay. The Venezuelan army
lined the route to the airport to protect him from further
rioting upon his departure. Although the incident had
very serious overtones. the administration attempted to
minimize them as much as possible and go ahead with what-
ever positive diplomatic and economic relations could be
developed between the U.S. and the Latin American counp
tries. including Venezuela. Nixon's personal conduct
throughout the episode was conciliatory and restrained.
and he came home to a show of bipartisan national

praise.1u

 

13Ibid.. pp. 207-208. 1“1b1d.. pp. 165-187.

 

Se)

even more 1
year. 1959
upon the 0
Premier Ni
visit as 1
country e
informati
world. s
for the :
animated
Pictures
around t
of the (-

Private

America

t° char

hencefc

famous

fleaSur

Campai
he e1.

\

6O

Sensational as his Latin American trip was. an
even.more publicity-producing event occurred the following
year. 1959. when he visited Moscow for a goodwill tour
upon the opening of the American National Exhibition.
Premier Nikita Khrushchev was his host. and used Nixon's
visit as the occasion for a series of talks at Khrushchev's
country estate for the purpose of exchanging views and
information concerning U.S.-Russian relations around the
world. While touring the American National Exhibition
for the cameras. Khrushchev and Nixon engaged in an
animated exchange as they walked through a model kitchen.
Pictures of the two men gesturing at each other flashed
around the world. Of course. Vice President Nixon's part
of the discussions (the important ones which occurred in
private) was limited to an explanation and defense of
American policies and viewpoints. since he had no power
to change or make policy on his own authority. However.
henceforward in his campaigns. he would refer to the
famous ”Kitchen Debate” as the time when he took the full
measure of America's enemy.15

Nixon also continued his activities as a
campaigner. In the l95h Congressional races. for example.
he electioneered in thirty-one states over a period of

forty-eight days. hammering at the themes he used in his

 

1511316... pp. 188-2060

om Vice-P.
voters not
candidates
states are
Democratic
blind to

solidifie
but he al

30311111331
Nixon u!
that in
tradlti
levels‘
dation

commit

61

own Vice-Presidential race two years earlier. He warned
voters not to vote for Democratic candidates because ”the
candidates running on the Democratic ticket in the key
states are almost without exception.members of the
Democratic Party's left-wing clique which has been so
blind to the Communist conspiracy.” In doing so. he
solidified his positiontamong organization Republicans:
but he also confirmed his reputation as a ”low road”
campaigner with the press and. of course. the Democrats.16
Nixon served as chairman of the President's
Commission on Government Contracts. In this position.
Nixon was instrumental in.leading the government to demand
that industry employ Negroes in jobs from which they were
traditionally barred at the white collar. professional
levels. For this work. the committee received commenp
dations from such organizations as the American Jewish
Committee. and even Eleanor Roosevelt joined in praise.17
The second chairmanship assigned by the President
to Nixon was of the newly-created Cabinet Committee on
Price Stability for Economic Growth in 1959. Nixon
opposed the simplistic notion advocated by some Cabinet
members that inflation was a result of activities of the
labor unions. The primary missions of this Committee were

education.and consultation. rather than policy-making.18

 

161bid.. pp. 188-206. 17Ibid.. pp. 213-215.
131b1d.. pp. 215-217.

As

 

what Spiro
“hatchet me
the volts c
a father-ff
Eisenhower
tines. Nix
chief can:
'3‘
his tenur
Presidem
in his a
achiever!

CircumS}

11$8883

at the

Presidq

l&

Hive.
Pecq

deni

62

As Vice President. Richard Nixon was to' Eisenhower
what Spiro Agnew is to President Nixon today. He was the
”hatchet man." the hard-hitting lightning rod who attracted
the volts of the Democrats while Eisenhower stood above as
a father-figure and statesman. Additionally. since
Eisenhower was the most non—political President of our
times. Nixon was the de facto Republican Party leader and
chief campaigner.

But it should also be said that Nixon matured in
his tenure as Vice President. As he approached the 1960
Presidential election year. he became broader and mellower
in his approach. His behavior in Caracas and Moscow. his
achievements in his special committee assignments. and his
circumspect compartment during Eisenhower's serious ill-
nesses tended to alter his image. Therefore. his name was
at the top of the list of potential candidates for the

Presidency as the campaign of 1960 approached.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS

12251222152

.222211313 Although Nixon's rhetoric is sometimes
given over to hyperbole. the literature supports his
recollection of the frenetic activity of the 1960 Presi-
dential election campaign:

And so. as the plane flew on to Los Angeles [on

election eve] I wished I could have done even more
than I had done during those last two months of

intensil
I could
starflpo
travels
live a

intens

From th
travel:
fifty I
as man;
conferl
ances.
signed
millic

 

A:
months 13
eration c
mmisn‘
some Par
hiStOric
transpii
he“ sh

““532ct

63

intensive campaigning. I felt that way even though
I could look back on.a campaign which. from the
standpoint of number of states visited. miles
traveled. speeches made. and people seen either in
live audiences or on television. had exceeded in
intensity any in.American history up to that time.
From the time of the Chicago Convention. I had
traveled over 65.000 miles and visited all the
fifty states. made 180 major scheduled speeches and
as many more impromptu ones--not to mention press
conferences. spot interviews. radio and TV appear-
ances. I had shaken uncounted thousands of hands.
signed as many autographs: and an estimated figs
million people had seen Pat and me in person.

As Theodore white wrote. ”To chronicle these
months is like packaging fog."20 This chapter's consid-
eration of the 1960 campaign (and later. of the 1968
campaign) will point only to Nixon's general strategy and
some particular highlights of the campaign to set the
historical framework. This approach omits much of what
transpired: but. by the same token. what is presented
here should help cut through the fog and clarify the

subject of the analysis in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

G r r . Pour important strategic
elements should be noted. First. Nixon accepted the ”man-
not-the-party” approach. Since Republicans were
outnumbered by Democrats by a margin of over three to
two. any Republican candidate had to appeal not only to
members of his own party but to independents and

 

19Nixon. W. p. “05-

2°Theodore H. White. Jr.. W
President: 1 60 (New York: Atheneum Publishers. 1961).
P0 2 50

-L~I"\‘- ._.

 

disaffec
Republic
Eisenhow
identifi
strategy
Nu to t
fact. he
KennedyI

JEffer3(

the Vot:
Vere 3a,
incumbe
a Share
"The O:
at the

'natIOI
0f 'Exj
Pr°3De

DOStur

DOSIti

6h

disaffected Democrats as well. In 1952 and 1956.
Republicans were able to do this by nominating General
Eisenhower. a popular war hero. rather than a candidate
identified with the Republican Party. In 1960. Nixon's
strategy was to play down his own strong Republican ties.
and to try to blur the traditional party distinctions. In
fact. he attempted to paint his opponent. Senator John P.
Kennedy. as a deviant from the ideals of the party of
Jefferson. Jackson. and Nilson.21
A second component of his strategy was to mobilize
the voters (Republican. Democrat. or independent) who
were satisfied with Eisenhower's administration. As the
incumbent Vice President. Nixon could claim to have had
a share in the successes of Eisenhower. White said.
“The only sound Republican strategy-oso ran Nixon thinking
at the outset--was to run as an across-the-board
'national' candidate who rested his appeal on the issues
of 'Experience' and the Eisenhower record of 'Peace and
Prosperity'."22 This strategy implied a defensive
posture. rather than an offensive one of challenging the
positions of the Democrats.
Third. Nixon believed that campaign activities

should be "paced” in such a way that momentum could be

 

21Nelson.Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky. ggggidggtia;
lections (2d ed.: New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
1935;. pp. 125. 13“.

22white. The making of the President. 126 . p. 267.

 

gradually b
arr! mi in
in a bland
pugmcious
concentrat
the last i
emihaaize
televisi<
tallies,
Electlci
wanted
adVertj
He Stu
report

catio]

65

gradually built up over the course of the campaign period
and end in.a ”peak" on election day. Nixon wanted to open
in a bland low key of quiet optimism (in order to erase his
pugnacious image). step up his pace during October. and
concentrate everything he could afford in the media during
the last three weeks of the campaign.‘23 His media plan
emphasized television and deemphasized the press.2“ The
television plan included a number of nationally televised
rallies. a few television “reports.” and a telethon on
election eve.25 Nixon rejected the advice of advisors who
wanted to ”market” his candidacy through short creative
advertisements geared towards target issues and audiences.
He stuck with his own media plan of longer speeches and
reports.26 Because of his ”pacing” theory. the communi-

cations media were not exploited to their fullest. and

 

23Ibid.. p. 266.

2“This decision had undesirable consequences for
Nixon in that his staff translated it into overt hostility
towards newspaper reporters accompanying the candidate. and
reporters were hampered in their coverage of Nixon's activ-
ities. On his tours. Nixon was inaccessible to reporters.
His speeches and statements were not transcribed for them
by his staff. The contrast between Nixon's and Kennedy's
press relations was described as the difference between
being considered as a leper and outcast or as a friend and
battle companion. Ibid.. pp. 336-337.

25Bernard C. Kissel. "Richard M. Nixon: Definition

of an Image.” Quarterly Journal of §pggg . XDVI (December.
1960). 357-358-

26Dan Nimmo. The Political Peggggderg (Englewood
Cliffs. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Inc.. Spectrum Books.
1970). p. 112.

Nixon did
broadcast
Pi
of the cam]
first memb
nation sir

”1° appeal

 

'88 Ellen
a very ea
"1181011
Silence,

mastic,
9011019

tOIQran

tahied

“Ema 1

66

Nixon did not appear in a Republicanpcontrolled television
broadcast until October 25.27

Finally. Nixon chose to ignore a potential issue
of the campaign. John F. Kennedy was a Catholic. the
first member of that faith to achieve the Democratic nomi-
nation since Al Smith in 1928. In order to avoid even
the appearance of exploiting a religious appeal. Nixon
was silent on Kennedy's religious affiliation except for
a very early statement to the effect that Kennedy's
religion was not a legitimate issue. He maintained this
silence even though Kennedy himself openly addressed the
question of whether his religion would influence his
policies: Nixon believed that even so much as a plea for

tolerance might be misinterpreted.28

Highlights of NLZQB'E 1260 campaign. Nixon.mainp
tained only three of his strategic aims. The 1960

campaign did not follow his pacing theory. At the outset.
he injured his knee on his very first campaign swing and
had to be hospitalized for nearly two weeks. When he was
released from the hospital. he had to pick up his tempo
of campaigning in order to redeem his pledge to visit all
fifty states.29

 

27mm. W. p. 312.
28Nixon. §;;_g;1ggg. pp. 330-331-
29Maso and Hess. p. 230.

67

Even.more disrupting to his original plan was his
acceptance of a series of face-to-face confrontations with
his Opponent on nationwide television. During the month
of October. 1960. Nixon and Kennedy engaged in.a series of
programs which had come to be known as ”The Great
Debates."30

Nixon conducted his campaign on at least three
overlapping levels. There was the barnstorming element in
which he crossed the nation. making personal appearances
before crowds of his supporters. This level of campaigning
was at the same time most physically demanding and most
emotionally rejuvenating for the candidate. In these
appearances. Nixon followed his "game plan” of defending
the Eisenhower record by means of a set speech. repeated
literally hundreds of times at political rallies.31
Unlike his earlier barnstorm speeches (e.g.. his races
for Congress and for the Vice Presidency). his ”basic
speech” in 1960 was noted for ”the relative softness of

its sell."32

 

3°The role of these programs in increasing campaign
discussion of issues has been reported by John W.
Ellsworth. ”Rationality and Campaigning: A Content
Analysis of the 1960 Presidential Campaign.Debates."

gggtegg Political anrterlx. XVIII. h (December. 1965).

31Kissel. p. 358.

328tanley Kelley. Jr.. ”The Presidential Campaign.”
h denti Ele tion and an t n 60-1 61. ed.
Paul T. David Washington: The Brookings Institution.
1969): P0 75-

68

Then there was the mass media campaign which
centered on the debates. and. later. on his television
speeches. Included in the media campaign was also the
national news coverage given to the candidate and his
activities.

Finally. there was the more sedate and intellec-
tual campaign of study papers and special speeches dealing
with issues and policy proposals in some depth. As
mentioned in Chapter 1. these messages. particularly the
speeches. represented his position on the substantive
issues. and they constitute the messages analyzed in this
dissertation. Chapter 3 describes the content analysis
of Nixon's issue-oriented speeches.

The concern of this chapter is with the historical

context of the issues themselves.

Nixon's Interim Period. 1260-1268
In 1960. John F. Kennedy defeated Nixon for the

Presidency. thus instituting the beginning of an eight-
year Democratic hold on the Presidency. Kennedy was
assassinated in 1963. and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson
was elevated to the Presidency. In the 196“ presidential
election. President Johnson defeated the Republican
nominee. Senator Barry Goldwater. in.a landslide vote.

During the interim period in Nixon's career. he
was defeated in an effort to win the governorship of

California in 1962 in an election many observers regarded

69

to be his political obituary. Following his defeat in
California in 1962. Nixon accepted a position as a senior
partner in a Wall Street law firm which changed its name
to Nixon. Nudge. Stern. Guthrie. and Alexander in his
honor. This position furnished him with more personal
economic security than he had ever had before (he earned
over two hundred thousand dollars per year). while it also
provided him with time to pursue his political interests.33

From this position. Nixon subordinated his own
political ambitions while actively supporting the Repub-
lican Party's nominees in l96h and 1966. In l96h. Nixon
campaigned for Goldwater more actively than any other
Republican. some of whom feared association with the
right-wing candidate. Nixon traveled 50.000 miles in
thirty-six states. speaking in behalf of the Presidential
candidate and also in behalf of the local Republican
candidates for lesser offices. He repeated this perform-
ance in the 1966 Congressional races. His ”selfless”
performances served to keep him identified as a Republican
campaigner in the public's mind. and they also served to
help him accumulate countless political favors to be

3“

repaid in the future. These favors were remembered

before the Republican nominating convention in 1968.

33Lewis Chester. Chester Hodgson. and Bruce fPage.
g4 eri n Melodrama Th Pre d i; v ..,1; 168

‘

New for : The Viking Press. 9 9 0 PP. - 33.
3unazo and Hess. pp. 299. 303.

70

A new style of election campaigning also came into
its own.during the 1960's. Electioneering came to be
conducted under the guidance of campaign managers heavily
oriented towards public opinion polling and mass media
advertising. Nixon's use of ”The New Politics” played an
important role in his 1968 campaign. It constituted one
of the principal tactics he employed. and thus is
described in.more detail below.

W
nggzggg. There were several important differ-

ences between Nixon's 1960 and 1968 campaigns which
influenced his campaign strategy. First. Nixon's role
changed from the incumbent Vice-President to an "out“.
Consequently. he was free to attack the policies of the
Democratic Administration. Moreover. his absence from
officialdom during his eight year interim period helped
serve to clear his image of specific political content.
His campaign managers had to contend with his ”loser”
image as a result of his frustrated 1960 and 1962
election campaigns. but they at least were relieved of
having to explain any of Nixon's political actions or
decisions. In.a sense. Nixon's position in the 1968
Presidential campaign was less analogous to his 1960
race for the Presidency than it was to his first election
campaign for the U.S. House of Representatives against

71

Jerry Voorhis in l9h6. when he was able to attack Voorhis'
political record with impunity. since his own record was
non-existent and therefore could not be counter-attacked
by Vborhis.

Second. the character of issues had changed some-
what. The Vietnam war had become the albatross around
Lyndon B. Johnson's (and the Democratic Party's) neck:
and the public also sensed an apparent increase in crime
and disorder. These issues will be discussed in detail
in Chapter 3. For now. suffice it to say that the elec-
torate felt confronted by more significant issues in 1968
than in 1960: and those issues tended to work in favor
of the challenger. Richard M. Nixon.

Third. as mentioned above. election campaigns
during the Sixties saw the refinement and increased use
of the methods of the so-called ”New Politics." Nixon's
1968 campaign.made extensive use of the new techniques.
with a corresponding adjustment in his use of more tradi-

tional campaign techniques such as barnstorm tours around

the nation.

General gtzategz
Richard M. Nixon's 1968 campaign strategy was

determined by the anomalous fact that. although he was
the challenger. he was in possession of a commanding lead
at the outset of the campaign. According to historian
James Truslow Adams. Nixon's early campaign lead

72

fluctuated from ten to fifteen points in the polls.35
Another important factor which influenced Nixon's strategy
was the presence of a strong third party candidate.
Governor George C. Wallace. wallace represented the
conservative ideology of the Old South. adapted to attract
the Goldwater camp. Accordingly. Nixon adopted a
“centrist" stance between Hubert Humphrey and George
Wallace. Nixon's centrist strategy has been thoroughly
discussed by Richard Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg in
their book. The Real ggjogigz. Regarding Nixon's stra-
tegic options. Scammon and Wattenberg said:
With Humphrey to his presumptive left. with Wallace
to his presumptive right. there wasn't terribly much
of substance Mr. Nixon could say or do. A move to
the left. to swipe a few of Humphrey's votes. could
cause slippage to the right. After all. George
Wallace was saying about the two parties: ”There's
not a dime's worth of difference.“ A move right.
toward Wallace. could easily cause slippage among
the Rockefeller-Style Republicans.3
A third element of his campaign strategy was
designed to correct over-activeness. a fault of his 1960
campaign. Nimmo stated. “Richard Nixon blamed his 1960
defeat in part on physical fatigue produced by attempting
to live up to the overly ambitious promise to appear in

all fifty states: in 1968 his managers deliberately ran

 

35James Truslow Adams. Ih%_gg:g§_§g_nggfigz§gz,
New York: Charles Scribner's Son s. 19 9 . p. 2.

36Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg. In;
3:31 Majorétz (New York: Coward. McCann. and Geoghegsn.
1971 p p. OOe

73

a low-keyed. slow-paced campaign to avoid similar
strains."37 Translated into actual practice. this meant
that during the whole of the campaign. Nixon visited only
thirty states. with the major emphasis on only seven of
them: California. Texas. Ohio. Michigan. Illinois.
Pennsylvania. and New York.38 Moreover. in his personal
tour itinerary. he followed a very relaxed pace.
Schlesinger said. "Nbr did he squander his energies on
multiple appearances in a single day. Typically. he would
hold one rally in the forenoon (early enough for film

to be available for the major network evening newscasts)
and one in the evening."39 His campaign managers and
advance men.saw to it that his audiences were large and
partisan. with potential dissidents and troublemakers
screened out by the practice of admitting people by ticket
only. Chester. Hodgson. and Page added an interesting
note on this point: "The most spectacular effect of this
policy occurred in St. Louis . . .. Although St. Louis is
forty-percent black. the Nixon advance men managed to
assemble in a central auditorium a crowd of three thousand

which contained just six black faces.”0

 

37Ninuno. p. 1+6.

BBRelman Morin. Th Asso ed e of 1 -
gig; 126 . (New York: Pocket Books. I965). pp. 152. 19:.
39Arthur M. Schlesinger. Jr. gigtogz of Amgr;ggn

ggegidentgal Election; 1E82-1268 (New York: Chelsea House
Publishers. 9 l . Po 3? .

uoChester. Hodgson. and Page. p. 683.

74

In his personal appearances. Nixon toned down the
offensive combativeness which characterized his campaigning
in every previous campaign (and which surfaced later in
the 1970 Congressional races). Refusing all challenges
to debate Humphrey and/or Wallace. Nixon abandoned his
early forensic training and his penchant for debating
political opponents. Instead. as his friendly biographer
de Toledano wrote. ”His speeches were bland. cast in

generalities. and devoid of rancormaking rhetoric. which

he felt was unnecessary for a frontrunner.”u1

To this point. let us turn to Scammon and
Wattenberg's summary of his general strategy:

In examining Mr. Nixon's campaign in the fall of
1968. then. we will do well first to ask ourselves
one quick question: How do you campaign.when you

are way out in front? The rules of psephology
[electoral analysis] answer: "Safely.” Or: ”Don't
rock the vote.” Accordingly. Nixon chose not to
debate with Humphrey. chose not to gamble for extra
votes by campaigning mercilessly from dawn till
midnight. chose to do just enough pressing the flesh
and face-to-face ”unrehearsed" television as was
necessary to attempt to try to avoid the charge that
he wasn't ”taking his case to the people.” This sort
of campaign also dovetailed neatly with another
important element of the Nixon effort: lack of
frenzy. Nixon (correctly) felt that the feeling of
frenzy-~the jumpers and screamers. the confrontations--
was distressing many Americans. Accordingly. therg
was a conscious attempt to run a low-key campaign. 2

ulRalph de Toledano. One Man A one: d N on
(New Yerk: Funk and Wagnalls. i959). Pp. 353-35fi.

“ZSoamnon and Wattenberg. pp. 202-203.

 

75

h m n
The outstanding feature of Richard M. Nixon's
1968 campaign for the Presidency was its extensive use
of the techniques of the so-called ”New Politics." Jules
Witcover wrote of Nixon's 1968 campaign:

That candidacy wrought a revolution in Presi-
dential campaigning: innovations of the Nixon
campaign. particularly the heavy reliance on the
new opinionpshaping technology. will be adapted
by future candidatesugho have the money and the
shrewdness to do so.

To set the context for Nixon's 1968 campaign.
de Toledano described the campaign organization.

or considerable significance was the caliber of
the Nixon machine and the organization of his
campaign--more significant. perhaps. than campaign
strategy or the issues. Among those who watched
the machine roll effortlessly. there was agreement
that it was perhaps the best-oiled in living memory.
Where the teamwork had been faulty in 1960. it was
now superb. with John Mitchell. a Nixon law partner.
and Bob Finch working in tandem. The United Citizens
for Nixon-Agnew was mobilized into a coordinated
force of 5 million members. At the Willard Hotel
in Washington. reopened as headquarters for the
Citizens. some seven hundred paid workers and an army
of volunteers worked quietly and efficiently under

the tutelage of Charles Rhyna. a former law school
classmate of the candidate.

It was the objective of the campaign.managers to
control every aspect of the campaign. Their control of
Nixon's itinerary and campaign audiences has been

mentioned above. Perhaps more important than control of

 

”Jules Witcover. Wises
(”9' York. Ge Pa Putmm.8 80m. 1970 . pa 5e

Mde Toledano. pp. 352-353.

 

76

Nixon's personal appearances was control of the media
campaign. Nixon.refused invitations to appear free on
programs which could not be controlled by his managers:
rather. he chose to purchase media time and use it as he
wished. Herbert E. Alexander wrote:

An example of a candidate's reluctance to accept

free time with stipulations attached can.be found

in Richard Nixon's behavior in 1968. Despite the

high cost of television. Nixon used paid time that

he could control in preference to free time that he

could not control. He refused invitations to inter-

view-type programs like ”Meet the Press“ from early

1967 until the last Sunday before the Nevember 1968

election. 5

One use of television advertising repeated from
the 1960 campaign was brief clips of his acceptance speech
at the 1968 Republican National Convention.“6
Nixon's most innovative use of television

campaigning was a series of questionpand-answer panel
programs. ”The Nixon Answer.” The program format (known
as the ”Hillsboro format”) consisted of six ordinary
citizens asking Nixon questions which came to their minds.
with Nixon answering extemporaneously. There were ten
such programs broadcast on a statewide basis: panelists
were local citizens in each instance. The California

program was an hour long: others were one-half hour each.

 

“5Herbert E. Alexander. “Communications and
Politics: The Media and the Message.” in Robert Agranoff
(ed.). s New t l in Ele o m (Boston:
Holbroo see. no.. 7 . p. 373.

u6N1MO. Do 158 e

 

77

Naturally. states selected for the programs were the large

electoral vote states.

Local Republican officials selected the panelists
so as to produce a proper ”mix." There was always at
least one woman and at least one black person (frequently
combined in the person of one black woman): there were no
professional politicians and no professional broadcasters
or journalists. Panelists were generally incapable of
asking really penetrating questions owing to their back-
grounds and inexperience in either political affairs or
panel discussions. In any case. no questioner was
permitted to follow up a question. In this format. Nixon
excelled. The Ripon Society said:

There was no doubt but that Nixon could handle this
art form well. mixing a few facts and figures with a
host of generalities. After all. he had always relied
heavily on verbal facility. the essential skill of

any good lawyer. He was proud of his ability to
develop appropriate language for any situation. He
was practiced in the art of bridging differences.
obscuring disagreements. of reconciling apparent
conflicts. all through carefully chosen language: one

should not have been surprised to see him utilize that
skill in his presidential campaigning.

 

”7The Ripon Society. V (New
York: Dial Press. 1969). p. . The panel programs are
discussed in most accounts of the 1968 campaign. Addi-
tionally. see John Osborn. Th9 Nixon Wgtgn (New York:
Liveright. 1970). pp. 8-9: Edward W. Chester. Bgdjg‘_]§;gr
(New York: Sheed and Ward.

v a

1929;. p. g70: and Joe McGinniss. In: flglling §£ Eng
gzggjggn§_;2§§ (New York: Trident Press. 19 9 . McGinniss.
said the panel shows were taped and edited to enhance

Nixon's appearance. but the other cited sources refer to
the programs as live.

 

78

In addition to television. Nixon used radio for
issue-oriented speeches. This aspect of his campaign
echoes his 1960 campaign tactics of presenting some issue-
oriented messages apart from the bulk of his campaign
activities. Nimmo wrote of campaign manager John
Mitchell's approach to radio:

But John Mitchell. Richard Nixon's campaign
manager in 1968. exploited radio more fully than in
any campaign to date. He found the medium so effective
that he remarked after the campaign that if it were
to do over again. his only change would be to spend
more money on radio. Among Mitchell's techniques were
rebroadcasts of five-minute excerpts from Nixon's
acceptance speech before the Republican convention
calling for "New Leadership". and the presentation of
long. detailed speeches on key issues that were not
well-adapted to television. but that sounded tightly
reasoned and well-informed on radio . . . regional
broadcastg8 interviews. call-in shows. and talk
programs.

Nixon presented ten network radio speeches on campaign
issues in the closing nights of the campaign. In these
speeches. Nixon dealt in depth and some specificity with
such issues as welfare. youth. arms. peace. and other
topics. Witcover wrote.
The radio talk presented ggtgo vggg many of the same
themes and allusions to racial conflict. crime.
violence and public mistrust of government Nixon was
shouting about on the stump and discussing animatedly

on television. Here. he presaated them in a careful
context of scholarly concern.

 

uleMO. p. 131‘s

“9Witcover. p. 398. See also Chester. p. 276.

86633680 The Ripon Society. pp. 18-23. pgggyg:.Alexander.
p. 0

ill."

79

Schlesinger also remarked on the stark contrast between
Nixon's superficial “basic speech” on the campaign trail
and the series of substantive radio speeches.so These
speeches are included among the sample of issue-oriented
speeches analyzed in Chapter 3.

Nixon's use of communications media also included
the scientific application of direct mail. Chester.
Hodgson. and Page wrote of the campaign technique wherein
voters spoke of their concerns. or asked questions. by
means of recording booths in Nixon campaign offices around
the country. Each person who did so received a four-
paragraph letter typed by a computer-driven electric
typewriter programmed to print Nixon positions on sixty-
seven various issues (each in a slightly different.
“individually-written” style). and signed with Richard
Nixon's signature by a signature machine. The voter
comments were in turn compiled into daily digests of what
the voters were thinking as a chart of public interest in
the issues.51

At the heart of the "New Politics” technology. of
course. was the technique of public opinion polling. which

was used as the guide for almost all of the candidate's

 

5°Schlesinger. p. 37h0.

51Chester. Hodgson. and Page. pp. 612-613. See
also de Toledano. p. 353.

 

 

80

actions and messages. Harry W. O'Neill described the
polling operation conducted in behalf of Nixon:

In a major campaign a candidate may find it most
useful to have in place a system geared to follow
the continually changing political scene. During
the 1968 presidential campaign. Opinion Research
Corporation had such a facility operating for the
Nixon Campaign from mid-September to election day.
It was a centralized WATS line facility capable of
producing several hundred interviews daily. seven
days a week. Certain important issues and aspects
of the campaign were constantly tracked: questions
could be added or deleted on a moment's notice.
Thus. on the night of Humphrey's September 30 Salt
Lake City speech. in which he altered his stand on
Vietnam. we were able to report the latest voter
opinion on many aspects of Vietnam within 3 hours
of receiving the request.

Nixon's use of the polls extended beyond sounding
public opinion about the issues. Chester. Hodgson. and
Page described Nixon's commission of a semantic differ-
ential test designed to test the public's perceptions of

Nixon and Humphrey.53

Although the authors made it clear
that Nixon did not agree with everything his campaign
managers said about how he should conduct his campaign.
they nevertheless quoted John Mitchell's comment about
”programming the candidate” without making clear how much

of an exaggeration that comment really was.5u

 

52Harry N. O'Neill. ”Gathering Intelligence
through Survey Research.” pp. 117-12h in Hiebert. et al.

(eds.). Pol ti 1 I r (Washington:
Acropolis Boo s Ltd.. 97 . p. 0.
53Chester. Hodgson. and Page. p. 619.
5uxbid.. p. 612.

 

81

Overall. Nixon's reduced personal campaigning.
together with his heavy reliance on the polling and mass
media techniques of the New Politics. gave the impression
to political commentators that he was isolated from the
public. Yet the public was exposed fully to Nixon's media
saturation campaign. Witcover described this impact of
Nixon's 1968 campaign:

In a country where people probably are subject

to media influence more than any other people in
the world. they nevertheless take great pride in
their independence. their ability to think and
decide for themselves. Never mind what the press
might be writing about Nixon going into hiding. or
refusing to debate. There he was on your television
set. or talking calmly. confidently. knowledgeably
on your radio. Reporters traveling with Nixon

and trying to assess the campaign were severly
handicapped because they usually did not have the
opportunity to see this side of the Nixon operation
and to gauge its impact. To a considerable degree.
they covered one Nixon campaign in 1968. and the
American people saw another. It was a strategy

revolutionary gn approach and scope. and masterful
in execution.5

Pursuing his analysis of Nixon's strategy and

tactics. Witcover continued:

In the most antiseptic. controlled campaign
in American history. he was a candidate in a glass
booth. His smooth operation contrived for him
appearances of enthusiastic support. and his own
words attracted mostly those who already agreed with
him. It was difficult for a candidate who had been
so effectively sealed off from genuine dialogue with
the public. and from debate with his opponents. to
grasp the depth of the public passions of 1968 ang6
the resoluteness of those who disagreed with him.

55Hltcover. pp. 399-400. 561b1de. pa “62e

82

In his symbolic ”glass booth.” fighting to project
a bland. centrist position in defense of his lead in the
polls. Nixon very nearly lost the election to Hubert
Humphrey.
Humphrey's campaign was the antithesis of Nixon's.

Humphrey. the incumbent Vice-President. was saddled
with the burden of defending the unpopuLar policies
(particularly of the Vietnam War) of Lyndon B. Johnson.
The Democratic National Convention. with its televised
violence and images of the Democratic "boss.” Mayor
Richard Daley of Chicago. cost Humphrey a full ten points
in the popularity polls.57 If Nixon's campaign typified
the best-run campaign in modern times. Humphrey's cam-
paign typified the worst. Humphrey assembled his staff
after the convention. only then to consider the creation
of a campaign plan. The Humphrey campaign not only
suffered from poor planning. but also from a lack of
:rinancial resources. Chester. Hodgson. and Page wrote.

The man who said there was no money was looking

on the bright side. The Democrats actually had

minus money: a debt of roughly one million dollars

. . . . In the event. they did virtually no

advertising until late September. There were no
half hours. there were very few television spots.

57Bernard L. Brock. ”1968 Democratic Campaign:

4 Political Uphoaval.“ W. LV.
1 (February. 1969). 32.

 

83
no radio and no newspaper advertisements-~at 38
time when Nixon was dominating the air waves.

Humphrey campaigned as Truman did. travelling the
country. speaking as often as he could. Meanwhile. he
was frequently greeted by sparse crowds (due to poor
advance work) or. worse. gangs of anti-war demonstrators
with bullhorns who drowned him out-~all dutifully recorded
and reported on the news media.

On September 30. however. Humphrey made a speech
in Salt Lake City on the subject of the Vietnam War which
was broadcast on national television. In that speech.
Humphrey gave the impression that he was finally breaking
with Johnson's policies. Brock wrote. ”It had taken
Humphrey a full month to articulate a stand that gave him
his own identity and the alienated McCarthy forces hope.
With this sign of independence. the Humphrey-Muskie
momentum started to build."59 From then on to the last
gasp of the campaign. Humphrey whittled away at Nixon's
Tlead in the polls. On election eve. Humphrey trailed by
only two points-~too close to predict. With his momentum
building. Humphrey felt he would have defeated Nixon if
the campaign had lasted two more days.60

53¢hester. Hodgson. and Page. pp. 638-639.

59Brock. p. at.

6°Theodore a. White. T e 0 tag ggegidgnt
l2§§.(New York: Pocket Books. 1959). pp. 574 75.

 

8b

Nixon's single-minded adherence to his strategy
and his corresponding failure to respond to Humphrey's
eleventh-hour surge were evaluated by the Ripon Society:

Post-election studies-~some commissioned by state
Republican parties-~show that hundreds of thousands
of notes slipped to Humphrey in the final few days
and hours. It is our conclusion that Mr. Nixon
eventually lost millions of votes that he might not
have and that a primary reason for this was that

his campaign tried so hard to offend6no one that
its very blandness became offensive.

SUMMARY

In this chapter. we have discussed the historical
and biographical circumstances relevant to Richard M.
Nixon's two Presidential campaigns in 1960 and 1968. We
have encapsulated the early life and career of Nixon.
stressing those aspects of his growth and education which
contributed to his later political achievements. We have
seen the influence of his early training to work hard. to
achieve and to excel in achievement (particularly in his
interest areas of academic study. speech and debate
activities. and the law). Further. we have pointed to
the outstanding facets of his political career. beginning
with his first elective office. the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives. and continuing through his service as U.S.
Senator and U.S. Vice President. Our view has included

 

61The Ripon Society. p. 15.

85

both his substantive interests and accomplishments and
also his campaigning techniques.

Finally. we have described in some detail both of
his campaigns for the Presidency. with particular
emphasis on his campaign strategy and the highlights of
the campaigns. It can be seen that his Presidential
campaigns grew out of the context established by his
historical and biographical antecedents. and also that
his campaigning incorporated new elements to adapt to
changing technologies.

Chapter 3

A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF RICHARD M. NIXON'S
TREATMENT OF ISSUES IN HIS 1960 AND
1968 CAMPAIGN SPEECHES

INTRODUCTION

Traditional rhetorical analysis is concerned with
the elements of the speaker. the audience and occasion.
and the message. In the preceding chapter we have out-
lined the biographical antecedents of the speaker we are
considering. Richard M. Nixon. and also the historical
contexts of the 1960 and 1968 Presidential election
campaigns within which he spoke. There remains the
element of the message. In this chapter. we shall
describe the campaign messages of Richard M. Nixon.
using the method of content analysis.

Both the general techniques of content analysis
and the specific methodology employed in this study have
been discussed in detail in Chapter 1. In this Chapter.
we shall approach our research problem of how Richard M.
Nixon treated substantive issues in his campaign speeches
in his two campaigns for the Presidency. Specifically.
we shall address these questions: (1) What was Nixon's
treatment of the issues of War and Peace. the Pocketbook
aspect of the Domestic Economy. Civil Rights. and Law and

86

87

Order: and (2) How did Nixon's treatment of these issues

differ over the two campaigns?

DISCUSSION

Let it be clearly recognized at the outset that.
in reality. the selected issues are closely interrelated.
Indeed. more often than not. Nixon.discussed more than
one of the issues in his speeches. Each issue impinges
on the other issues. directly or indirectly. For example.
the high costs of the Vietnam War. along with the costs
of domestic spending. led to inflation and ultimately
forced cutbacks in some programs. Blacks usually feel
stronger effects from economic fluctuations. thus inten-
sifying their frustration and discontent. Richard M.
Dalfiume linked all four of the selected issues in this
statement:

The increasing commitment of men and money in
Vietnam heightened the natural tensions inherent in
the Johnsonian consensus and led to its dissolution.
The cost of pursuing the war compelled reductions
in what critics had already labeled an inadequate
War on Poverty. This only sharpened the sense of
exclusion in black ghettos. where uprisings had
occurred in 196b, 1965. 1966. culminating in the
summer of 196?. the most violent in the nation's
history. with outbreaks in a hundred cities. The
impatience of black Americans and white youth with
the country's inability-~lack of will--to end
violence at home and abroad exacerbated an.ever-
present white backlash and geneIation.gap. and led
to demands for ”law and order."

 

lRichard M. Dalfiume (ed.). MW
§;ncg 12“: (Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 19 . p. .

88

Although these issues are individually analyzed
in this dissertation. it should not be inferred that Nixon
approached them as if they existed in a vacuum. This
dissertation identifies and isolates four separate issue
areas for purposes of content analysis. and for the sake

of specificity and clarity in rhetorical analysis.

1260 fingeghgg
In 1960. the U.S. Senate authorized the publi-

 

cation of the complete press conferences. speeches.
remarks. and statements of the two major candidates for
the Presidency throughout the presidential campaign
period. Released in six parts under the title. Ezggggg,
o; gommuniggtiogg. Part II consists of ”The Speeches.
Remarks. Press Conferences and Study Papers of Vice
President Richard M. Nixon. August 1 through November 7.
1960."

From among the hundreds of verbatim transcripts
included in this document. Richard M. Nixon.designated
fourteen speeches as being specifically oriented towards
substantive issues. In.a speech delivered on Nevember 7.
1960. the final day of the campaign. he said. ”For nearly
8 weeks I have been tracing out constructive programs in

many fields of public policy.”2

 

20.3. Senate. We: Final
Report of the Committee on Commerce. U.S. Senate prepared
by its Subcommittee of The Subcommittee on Communications
pursuant to 8. Res. 305. 86th Congress. Part II. In;

89

His list of speeches is shown below in Table 1.

Twelve of these fourteen speeches were presented
to local audiences. Two were televised: The November 2
speech on national defense policy was broadcast on KENS-TV.
San Antonio: and ”The Crusade for Freedom“ was a nations

wide telecast on Nevember 6. the Sunday preceding Election

Day.
1268 §peeghg§

There is no U.S. Senate compilation of the 1968
campaign messages produced by Richard M. Nixon as there
had been in 1960.' Moreover. no other convenient repos-
itory for those messages was discovered in the survey of
existing literature. Therefore. a request was made to the
White House staff of President Nixon for assistance in
locating manuscripts or transcripts of his 1968 presi-
dential campaign speeches. Contact was made with Dr. Lee
Huebner. Special Assistant to the President.3

Dr. Huebner furnished the writer with photostatic
copies of twenty speeches which were delivered by Richard
M. Nixon between September 8 and OctOber 2h. 1968.

 

‘9--eh-; .".ma k ' 2:; O - -!°~ 5.1. ' -d' P208; 0
Vigg Ezgiideng Riggggg M. NixonI 43333; 1 2320353 Novembgz
2: l2 0 Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.

19 1 . p. 1075. Hereafter this document shall be referred
to by the title Wam-

3Letters to Dr. Lee Huebner from the writer dated
April 6. April 29. and May 2. 1971: letter to the writer
from Dr. Huebner dated May 6. 1971: telephone conversation
between the writer and Dr. Huebner. May 6. 1971.

90

Table 1

Richard M. Nixon's 1960 Campaign Speeches

 

M

 

Subject Date Place
1. ”Operation Consume." Sept. 16 Guthrie Center.
Program for Reducing Iowa
Agricultural Surplus
2.; Federal Aid for Sept. 19 Scranton.
Depressed Areas Pennsylvania
3. “Operation Safeguard.” Sept. 23 Sioux Falls.
Farm Program South Dakota
h. Metropolitan Housing Sept. 28 Forest Hills.
New York
5. U. S. Defense Oct. 11 San Diego.
Establishment California
6. Aviation Oct. 12 Long Beach.
California
7. Formulation of Foreign Oct. lb Los Angeles.
Policy California
8. The Domestic Economy Oct. 20 New York.
New York
9. Space Exploration Oct. 25 Cincinnati. Ohio
10. ”Operation Plowshare." Oct. 26 Toledo. Ohio
Nuclear Test Policy
11.. Immigration Nev. 1 Philadelphia.
Pennsylvania
123 . National Defense Policy Nov. 2 San.Antonio. Texas
133 . Small Business Nov. 3 Houston. Texas
1‘%-. ”The Crusade for Nov. 6 Los Angeles.

Freedom“

California

 

H

91

The list of speech manuscripts furnished by
Dr. Huebner is shown below in Table 2.

Of these twenty speeches. seven were presented to
local audiences and thirteen were presented to nationwide
radio broadcasts. None of these speeches was presented on
television.

The.fourteen 1960 speeches and the twenty 1968
speeches total thirty-four speeches for the two campaigns.
This number was deemed adequate and representative for the
content analysis.

As can be seen from the list of topics shown in
Table l and 2. Richard M. Nixon addressed a wide variety
of issues. both domestic and international. Included in
these speeches are numerous references to the four issue
areas selected for content analysis (War and Peace. Pocket-
book. Civil Rights. and Law and Order). Although few of
the speeches listed in the sample are devoted gzglugive1z
to one or another of the four issues.“ content analysis
disclosed statements related to the four issue areas in

thirty-three of the thirty-four speeches.

 

“The exceptions are these: in the 1960 sample.
Nixon spoke on ”The Domestic Economy” (Pocketbook issue):
and “National Defense" (War and Peace issue): and in the
1968 campaign. he spoke on ”Order and Justice Under Law"
(Law and Order issue). "To Keep the Peace” (War and Peace
issue). ”To Make a Dollar Worth a Dollar” (Pocketbook
issue). and ”The Security Gap" (War and Peace issue).
Additionally. as one might expect. the content analysis
showed that one or another issue predominated in various
other speeches in the sample.

 

 

92

Table 2
Richard M. Nixon's 1968 Campaign Speeches

 

Subject Date Place

 

r

l. ”The Cradle of Civili- Sept. 8 B'nai B'rith

zation Must Net Be Its Convention
Grave" Washington. D. C.
2. ”Modern American Sept. 1h Des Moines. Iowa

Agriculture: An
Opportunity for Service
in the 1970's"

3. "The Nature of the Sept. 19 NBC and CBS
Presidency” Radio Networks
a. ”Restoring the U. 3. Sept. 25 Seattle.
to the Role of a First- Washington

Rate Maritime Power”
5. ”A Better Day for the Sept. 27 Omaha. Nebraska
American Indian"

6. ”Order and Justice Sept. 29 MBS Radio Network
Under Law“
7. ”The American Spirit“ Oct. 2 Williamsburg.
Virginia
8. ”The Research Gap: Oct. 5 New York.
Crisis in American New York
Science and Technology”

9. ”The Voluntary Way" Oct. 6 ABC Radio Network
10. ”The Time to Save NATO” Oct. 13 CBS Radio Network
11. ”The Alliance for Oct. 14 New York.

Progress” New York

12. ”Today's Youth: The Oct. 16 NBC Radio Network
Great Generation”

13. ”The All-Volunteer Oct. 17 CBS Radio Network
Armed Force"

14. “America's Natural Oct. 18 CBS Radio Network
Resources”

15. ”To Keep the Peace” Oct. 19 CBS Radio Network

16. ”Education for Excel- Oct. 20 CBS Radio Network
lence. Freedom and

Diversity"

1?. ”An Open Door for Oct. 21 CBS Radio Network
American Labor”

18. "The Elderly: For Oct. 22 CBS Radio Network
the Enduring Generation”

19. ”To Make a Dollar Oct. 23 CBS Radio Network

Worth a Dollar”
20. ”The Security Gap“ Oct. 2“ CBS Radio Network

 

93

t o and or
The four issues selected for this study (war and
Peace. Pocketbook aspect of the Domestic Economy. Civil
Rights. and Law and Order) were broken down into several
indicators. or sub-categories. These indicators are
listed in the Methodology section of Chapter 1. and they
also appear in the tables below. In general. indicators

were selected to provide an orderly system for recording

 

Nixon's statements on the principal specific substantive
topics within the four issue areas which one would expect

to be discussed in a Presidential campaign.

figligb;litz. An independent coder and the writer
coded a sample of approximately 150 statements in a speech
by Richard M. Nixon not included in the speeches analyzed
in this dissertation. Inter-coder agreement was achieved
in eighty-two percent of the coding judgments. Coding of

all speeches in the samples was performed by the writer.

uen of us m n 0 68
campaigns. The following tables illustrate the frequency
with which Richard M. Nixon made statements regarding the
issues. Table 3 shows the frequency and ratio of issue
statements in the 1960 sample. and Table 4 shows the
frequency and ratio of issue statements in the 1968 sample.

Over all. Nixon made 4.646 countable statements in

the fourteen speeches in the 1960 sample. and 5.082

 

94

countable statements in the twenty speeches in the 1968
sample. Of these statements. 984 of the 4.646 statements
in 1960 were related to the issues (a ratio of 21%). and
1.156 of the 5.082 statements in 1968 were related to the
issues (a ratio of 23%). Thus. at the outset it is clear
that Nixon gave his attention to the issues in both
campaigns.

Table 3 shows that the 1960 sample includes fourteen
speeches. ranging in length from 31 statements to 648
statements. Speech 11. ”Immigration.” contains no state-
ments related to the issues. Speech 10. ”Operation
Plowshare." Speech 12. "National Defense." and Speech 14.
”Crusade for Freedom.” contain statements related to the
category of War and Peace (the last named speech also
contained a single statement related to another issue).
Speech 13. "Small Business.” contains statements related
to the category of the Pocketbook. The other nine
speeches all contain statements related to two or more
issues.

Table 4 shows that the 1968 sample contains twenty
speeches. all of which include statements related to the
issues. These speeches range in length from 99 statements
to 609 statements. Speech 2. ”Modern Agriculture.” Speech
14. ”Natural Resources.” Speech 16. ”Education.” and
Speech 18. "The Elderly." each might fairly be considered
one-issue speeches related to the Pocketbook. (Speeches 2

 

95

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99

and 18 each also include single statements related to War
and Peace.) Speech 10. "Time for NATO.” Speech 15. ”To
Keep the Peace.” and Speech 20. ”The Security Gap.” are
primarily War and Peace-oriented. (Speeches 10 and 15
each contain a single statement related to Law and Order.)
The other thirteen speeches in the sample all contain
references to two or more issues.

The preceding tables show the frequency with which
Richard M. Nixon made issue-oriented statements in the
1960 and 1968 samples. When the unclassified statements
are removed from consideration. the ratios of the issue-
oriented statements in the two campaigns show a dramatic
comparison. These comparisons are shown in Table 5 below
in which the ratio of issue-oriented statements are calcu-
lated as a percentage of total issue statements. rather
than as a percentage of total statements.

Table 5 illustrates in a general way the comparison
of Nixon's emphasis on the four selected issues over the
two campaigns. There are several striking things to note
from Table 5 before proceeding to a more detailed analysis
of Nixon's treatment of each of the issues. First. notice
that the first two issues. War and Peace and the Pocket-
book. received the bulk of Nixon's emphasis in both
campaigns. Next. notice that the emphasis on each of the
four issues is different in the two campaigns. except for
the Pocketbook issue. (Even though the Pocketbook issue

received roughly equal emphasis in the two campaigns--39$

100

in 1960 and 38% in l968--subsequent analysis will show that
W m of the Pocketbook issue were emphasized
in the two campaigns.) Next. notice that War and Peace
received substantially less emphasis in 1968 than in 1960.
Next. notice that Law and Order was ignored as an issue in
1960. but was substantially included in the 1968 sample

(Q! in 1960. 16$ in 1968). Finally. notice that Civil
Rights received over twice as much emphasis in 1968 as it
did in 1960 (2% in 1960. 55 in 1968).

Table 5

Comparison of Ratios of Issue Statements
in the 1960 and 1968 Samples

 

 

 

 

 

 

1960 1968 Gain Score
Issue n $5 n 55 fl
1. War and Peace 576 59 472 41 -18
2. Pocketbook 385 39 442 38 - 1
3. Civil Rights 22 2 53 5 + 3
4. Law and Order 1 0 189 16 +16
Total 984 100 1 . 156 100

 

 

aPercentages are of total issue statements in 1960
campaign. Percentages are rounded off.

bPercentages are of total issue statements in 1968
campaign. Percentages are rounded off.

101

The importance of these differences can.be gener-
ally summarized at this point. but it should be kept in
mind that each issue will be analyzed in depth later in
this chapter. In 1960 Nixon devoted 59 percent of his
issue-oriented statements to War and Peace. and another
39 percent to the Pocketbook. Thus. 98 percent of his
issue-oriented statements dealt with only those two areas.
But in 1968. Table 5 shows that Nixon also addressed the
issues of Civil Rights and Law and Order.

War and Peace. particularly. seemed to be de-empha-
sized as a topic of discussion. Net only did the ratio
decrease. (59% in 1960. 41% in 1968) but the absolute
number of statements about War and Peace decreased (n=576
in 1960. n=472 in 1968). notwithstanding the fact that
there were more speeches and more issue-oriented state-
ments in the latter campaign. But while Nixon seemed to
be backing away from quite so much emphasis on War and
Peace in 1968. he was adding Civil Rights and Law and
Order to the Pocketbook as topics in his discussion of
issues. In particular. Law and Order stands out in Table 5
as an.area of attention: but when the issue is combined
with Civil Rights. it can.be seen that Nixon devoted 21
percent of his issue-oriented statements of these two
domestic issues in 1968 (Law and Order-16%. Civil Rights
.55). Hence. one of the principal differences between the

two campaigns was that Nixon discussed War and Peace

102

considerably less. and the domestic issues of the Pocket-
book. Civil Rights. and Law and Order. considerably more
in 1968 than he did in 1960.

n e betwe t m . The
preceding section demonstrates the gross similarities and
differences between the two campaigns. More interesting
findings may be shown by displaying the data according to
indicators and direction of statements. Subsequent tables
(Tables 6-9 below) compare Richard M. Nixon's treatment of
specific topics subordinate to the four major issue areas.
Each table focuses on one of the issue areas. Statements
are broken.down.according to Nixon's stance on.a particular

indicator. either Pro. Con. or Neutral. in both campaigns.

W a P e. As a substantive issue area. War
and Peace is a general topic. Subordinate topics used as
indicators in the content analysis included all of Nixon's
statements which were related to the topic in his two
campaigns. Regarding War. indicators included both War as
a general policy (War as U.S. policy. War as Enemy Policy).
and particular wars (World War 11. Korea. and Vietnam).
Regarding Peace. indicators included both Peace as a
general policy objective (Peace as U.S. policy. Peace as
Enemy Policy) and particular actions in pursuit of Peace
(Negotiation & Diplomacy). Additionally. indicators
included military defense in general (Military Preparedness»

103

and objects and actions in pursuit of military defense
(Military Weaponry. Military Actions Short of War).

Table 6 shows that the selection of indicators
was appropriate. except for ”Peace as Enemy Policy.”
Content analysis disclosed that in neither campaign did
Nixon make a statement which fit this indicator.

As to direction. there seemed to be a slight
moderation of tone over the two campaigns. Overall. Nixon
made fewer statements which would be categorized as either
"Pro” or “Con.” and more statements categorized as
”Neutral.” in the 1968 campaign.

In 1960. Nixon's statements about War and Peace
were concentrated in these indicators: War as Enemy
Policy (n=76). Peace as U.S. Policy (ns84). Negotiations &
Diplomacy (n=l4l). Military Preparedness (n=108) and
Military Weaponry (n=93). Within this grouping falls 502
of the 576 statements on War and Peace in 1960: and of
them. 189 were Neutral (a ratio of 38%).

In 1968. in the same group of indicators. the
corresponding figures are: War as Enemy Policy (n=118).
Peace as U.S. Policy (n=58). Negotiations & Diplomacy
(ns68). Military Preparedness (n=86). and Military Weap-
onry (n=43). Within this group of indicators are 373 of
the 472 statements made about War and Peace in 1968. Also

within this group of indicators. 168 statements are
Neutral (a ratio of 45%).

104

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105

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106

It should also be pointed out that there are some
differences in the direction of statements related to
these five indicators over the two campaigns. In 1960.
Nixon made more Con statements related to War as Enemy
Policy than Neutral statements: in 1968. he was decidedly
Neutral in his emphasis on this indicator. Similarly. he
was a strong advocate of Peace as U.S. Policy in 1960. but
his 1968 remarks were fairly evenly divided between Pro
and Neutral in this indicator. Conversely. he made more
Neutral as well as more Con statements regarding Negoti-
ations a Diplomacy in 1960 than in 1968. along with an
approximately equal proportion of Pro statements in both
campaigns.5 In the last two indicators in this group.
Nixon's pattern of direction was similar in.both campaigns.
He was definitely Pro Military Preparedness. and divided
between Pro and Neutral on Military Weaponry.

In addition to these five indicators. two other
indicators deserve special notice. In 1960. Nixon empha-
sized his support for Military Actions Short of War
(mostly in relation to the specific issue of Quemoy-Matsu).
Of more interest to subsequent history. in 1968. Nixon

 

5The fact that. in 1960. Nixon made a substantial
number of Con statements on Negotiations & Diplomacy may be
partly explained by his opposition in that year to John F.
Kennedy's proposed nuclear arms treaty. Without the
campaign statements related to this specific issue. his
pattern would have been much more similar to 1968--a
distribution of statements between the Pro and Neutral
categories.

107

made several statements regarding Vietnam. an indicator he
ignored in 1960. His 1968 statements on Vietnam were
about evenly divided between the Con.and Neutral

directions.

Qiggugg§on of W3; gag P3393. In.both the 1960 and

1968 campaigns. Richard Nixon devoted more attention to
the issue of War and Peace than he did to any other issue:
moreover. his treatment of the issue was more specific
than the other issues. particularly in the latter campaign.
Consequently. the discussion of this issue will be more
extensive than the ensuing discussions of the other issues.

In 1960. Nixon's position on War and Peace in his
issue-oriented speeches was similar to his stump speeches.
In his three 1960 defense speeches. this theme recurred:

What kind of leadership is needed to keep the peace
without surrender and extend freedom throughout the
world? In seven and a half years. President Eisenhower
got us out of one war and kept us out of other wars.

To be strong diplomatically. we must remain strong
militarily. Kennedy's offer to apologize to the
Soviets for the U-2 incident displayed weakness. and
his position on Cuba displayed rashness.

As a matter of fact. this theme pleased Nixon so
much that he repeated it in other speeches not devoted to
national defense. It appeared. for example. in his farm
speeches and his Appalachian Relief speech. Frequently.
the theme was no more substantial than is shown here.
although it was elaborated at greater length. Nixon

relied greatly upon his position as incumbent Vice

 

108

President. and his recital of Eisenhower's achievements
in the area of peace and national defense. This general
argument was Nixon's response to Kennedy's charge that
there existed a serious ”missile gap.” or imbalance in
military weaponry between the United States and Russia.
Arthur M. Schlesinger. Jr. wrote that Nixon hesitated to
reveal classified information which totally disproved the
charge. and so continued to give general reassurances
instead of specific rebuttal points against Kennedy's
charges.6

If Nixon felt constrained not to deal with the
status of America's missile strength. he felt positively
frustrated in attempting to handle Kennedy's Cuban
position. Kennedy at one point took a position that the
United States should actively assist Ouban exiles in
recovering their homeland from Fidel Castro. Unknown to
Kennedy. the Eisenhower administration was proceeding with
plans to do exactly that. In order to protect the secrecy
of the plans. Nixon argued that any such action by the
United States would be foolhardy.7

 

6Arthur M. Schlesinger. Jr. (ed.).

to of
e l o 8 -l 8. IV New York:
Chelsea House Publishers. 1971 . pp. 3 5-66.

7Ibid. As a footnote to this issue. Kennedy
approved of the plans to help the Cuban exiles when he
took office. and the result was the ill-fated Bay of Figs
fiasco. This put Nixon in.a position to say “I told you
so:“ and. indeed. he did include the mistake in his litany
of Democratic errors in foreign policy during the 1968
campaign.

109

The only other issue of War and Peace Nixon dealt
with in the 1960 sample of speeches was even.more minor:
the question of Quemoy and Matsu. the islands lying a few
miles off the shore of mainland China still held by the
Nationalist Chinese. In.a reversal of philosophies.
Kennedy originally contended that the Nationalists should
withdraw from the islands. but Nixon. who hesitated to
support the Cuban exiles during his campaign. argued that
the United States should never give up ”a foot of free
soil” in the China instance. Ultimately. both Nixon and
Kennedy moderated on Quemoy and Matsu. opting for general
support of Eisenhower's approach.

On the issue of War and Peace in 1960. Nixon held
a strong position in the minds of the voters because
traditionally the Republicans enjoyed solid public trust
in foreign affairs. Polsby and Wildavsky stated:

Nixon sought to differentiate himself as much as
possible from Kennedy in the field of foreign affairs.
He suggested that he was uniquely capable of securing
peace without surrender. and that Kennedy was not.

He tried to strengthen the prevailing impression of
the Democratic party as the party of war. He implied
alternatively that Kennedy would permit the Communists
to make unwarranted advances (for example in Matsu
and Quemoy). and that the Democrats would make rash
moves (Cuba). Even Nixon's espousal of an aggressive

line. such as he took regarding Matsu and Quemoy.

helped him becauge in foreign affairs voters trust
the Republicans.

 

8Nelson w. Polsby and Aaron 3. Wildavsky.

5e:e idential Eletio : ‘ t is o .r- 1 -
g%%%§;g§, d ed.: New York: Charles Scribner s Sons.
1 : P0 1380

110

In 1968. the leading issue of War and Peace was
the Vietnam War. Milton Cummings. Jr. reported that the
polls recorded that in 1968. at least half of the American
public named Vietnam as ”the most serious problem facing
this country today”--a striking indication of the salience
of the issue.9 Chester. Hodgson. and Page commented.

Nothing is clearer than the imperative that an
account of the politics of 1968 must start with
Vietnam. the progress of which dominated the struggle
for the Presidency from first to last . . . Yet

no subject is harder to deal with briefly."1°

It has been noted in Chapter 2 that the turning
point in Humphrey's campaign came in late September. when.
in a television speech. he offered the clear impression
that he had broken with Johnson's policies on the Vietnam
War: and after that point. his standing in the pre-
election polls began to rise sharply. What has not been
indicated is the depth of attitudes about the warwhich
were held by the American public. Historian James Truslow
Adams pointed out that anti-war Senator Eugene McCarthy's
strong showing in the New Hampshire primary early in 1968

alerted Democrats to the fact that the war was a threat

 

9Milton c. Cummings. Jr.. ”The Strategic Outlook

for the National Elections of 1968.” T?g_§zg§19gn;;__flgx.
P;1gggg§‘_lggg£ggggfl ed. Joseph M. Ray El Paso. Texas:

Texas Western Press. 1969). p. 74.
10Lewis Chester. Godfrey Hodgson. and Bruce Page.

An %%e:;g§n Mglodgggg (New York: The Viking Press. 1969).
p. .

111

11 That primary. combined

to their hold on the Presidency.
with the North Vietnamese Tet offensive which led General
Westmoreland to request another 200.000 American troops
for Vietnam. encouraged Senator Robert F. Kennedy to enter
the campaign for the Democratic nomination. These events.
in turn. forced President Johnson's withdrawal from the
race on March 31. according to Richard Dalfiume.12
Yet. while public feelings were widespread and
strong. they were also mixed. Samuel Lubell's survey in
the summer of 1968 showed that there was ambiguity and
vagueness: in other words. there was serious confusion in
the public mind. For example. over half of those who
favored stepping up the war also opposed sending more U.S.
troops. Instead. they favored using intensified bombing:
yet they believed that bombing was ineffective. Again.
those opposed to the war ”leaped on the suggestion that
the war be 'de-Americanized' by having the South Vietnamese
take over the fighting." yet these same respondents said
the South Vietnamese government was corrupt and could not

be trusted in 'Vietnamizing' the war. Lubell's conclusion
was that "a hawk is a dove is an albatross.” and that the

 

11James Truslow Adams. Continued by Jacob G. Cooke
Th Ma mo (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons. 19 9 : 99- 3' .

12m1f1uma . De 25 e

112

people wanted to get out so badly they didn't really care
about South Vietnam.13
Given these circumstances. Nixon elected to keep

silent about the Vietnam War. despite its importance as
an issue. It was. after all. the Democrats' problem. It
was costing Humphrey. not him. As his public strategy for
dealing with the Vietnam War. Nixon told his biographers.
Mazo and Hess.

At this time President Johnson is attempting to

negotiate a settlement with the North Vietnamese.

If I or any other candidate were to indicate what we

would settle for. and if that position were different

from and possible more attractive to the North

Vietnamese than.what the President was offering. this

immediately would torpedo the negotiations. So I

will not discuss that under any circumstances. It

would 14 inappropriate and highly irresponsible to

do so.

Table 6 shows that Nixon made several statements

about Vietnam. but in the sample of speeches. nowhere did
he make the famous statement which seems to characterize
his 1968 position on Vietnam. “1 have a plan.” It is also
true. however. that all the statements about Vietnam are
isolated. passing references. usually in some context
other than.discussion of the war. For example. in ”Time
to Save NATO.” he said that Vietnam was responsible for

loss of U.S. influence in Europe. In his speech on the

13Samuel Lube-11. W
(New York: W. W. Norton 2 Co.. Inc.. 1971 .

ppe -261 e

1"Earl Mazo and Stephen Hess. o : Po ti 1
Portrait (New York: Popular Library. 19681. p. 310.

 

1113!? n. MUN

113

all-volunteer army. he proposed the abolition of the
draft: but he mentioned in passing that his proposal would
have to wait until after Vietnam. In his speech. ”To
Keep the Peace." he warned that the U.S. should avoid
future Vietnams. but he asserted that our participation
in the Vietnam War has ”bought time” for other small
Southeast Asian countries in resisting the strength of
Communist China. In his speech on inflation. he made brief
reference to Vietnam as one contributing factor to the
economic situation. Finally. in his major speech on
national defense. ”The Security Gap.” he blamed Vietnam
for depleting the U.S. lead in armaments. The point should
be emphasized that Nixon did not make an issue of the
Vietnam War in the sample of speeches. and that the
references cited above are hardly any more important to
his campaign speeches than his references to World War II
or the Korean War. of which there are nearly as many. In
fact. the only extended attention he gave to Vietnam
during the 1968 campaign was a brief statement he submitted
to the Republican Platform Committee. Adams saw Nixon's
non-treatment of the Vietnam issue. so important to the
electorate. as a deliberate strategy:

Nixon's position. clever but deceptive. fitted the

pattern of his general campaign strategy which called

for maintaining his lead by avoiding a specific stand

which might alienate his constituency. He had only

to criticize Administration policy. pinning the blame

for its failure on Humphrey and the Democrats. and

avoid the pitfalls of proposing alternative policies
by taking the lofty and safe position that any such

114
discusigon might interfere with the Paris peace
talks e

If Nixon tended to ignore the Vietnam War. it does
not follow that he ignored War and Peace as a campaign
issue. He spoke of the Middle East and NATO. He spoke of
the draft. and his proposal for an all-volunteer army.

But his major thrust in the 1968 campaign was national
defense. and his major development of the issue is found
in the last issue-oriented speech in the sample. ”The
Security Gap." presented on October 24 on nationwide
television.

In that speech. Nixon began by describing the
state of national defense in 1960 when Eisenhower left
office. Owing to Eisenhower's policies and planning.

America was still at peace. and not one American boy
had been killed or wounded on any battlefield for
eight years. Moreover. our nation was the acknowl-
edged leader of the Free World. Our superiority in
weapons was unquestioned . . . I retrace this history
because it explains why. during the eight Eisenhower
years. there was not a Berlin wall. no Bay of Pigs.
no Cuban missile crisis. no American fighting in
Southeast Asia. no Pueblo piracy. It also explains
why our globe-encircling alliances stayed strong and
firm.

Proceeding from this glowing account of Eisenhowere
achievements. Nixon went on to compare America's pesition
eight years later. beginning with weapons. In five
specific areas. intercontinental ballistic weapons.

bombers. nuclear submarines. tactical aircraft. and the

 

,15Adams. pp. 48-49.

115

total weapon stockpile. Nixon stated that the U.S. dropped
from superiority to inferiority to the U.S.S.R. There-
fore. he accused the Democratic Administration with
"creating a security gap for America.” He charged the
Democrats with abandoning Eisenhower's policy of superi-
ority in weaponry in favor of ”parity.” or equality with
the Communists. in hopes of producing "peace in our time“
(coincidentally. the phrase had been used by Prime
Minister Chamberlain to justify appeasing Hitler before
World War II) by setting a good example. Nixon refuted
the ”parity” doctrine by expounding his theory that. since
the U.S.S.R. is weaker than the U.S. economically. to
allow them to catch up to the U.S. militarily would
symbolize superiority for them. He said. ”We cannot
accept this concept and survive as a free people.”

So long as the U.S.S.R. continued to entertain
world expansionist ambitions. Nixon warned that to continue
the policy of ”parity” would shift America's predicament
from "a security gap” to "a survival gap.” Additionally.
the Democrats had also scuttled the National Security
Council set up by Eisenhower. thus eliminating the process
for orderly planning and decision making regarding
national defense. In short.

The risks facing our country have intensified these
past eight years. Wrong policy assumptions--unrealism
in numbers and types of weapons-~laxity in research
and development--flaws in the decision making process

--a disregard of timing--allowing the Soviets to move
rapidly toward parity and in some areas to achieve

116

superiority--a near breakdown of top policy-making
procedures--these have been somber developments for
our country. I am intensely dissatisfied with these
conditions. As President I would move promptly to
correct these mistakes of judgment and action.

In rapid-fire. ”one-liner” sequence. Nixon then
listed seven actions he would take. such as reorganizing
the Department of Defense. rooting out the ”whiz kids."
restoring military superiority over the U.S.S.R.. and
restoring the National Security Council.

In the 1960 campaign. Kennedy had made much of a
”missile gap” in his campaign. especially in the tele-
vision debates. That ”gap” evaporated after the election.
but it was an issue favorable to Kennedy when it was used.
In 1968. however. Nixon's attempt to conjure up a ”secu-
rity gap” on the eve of the election failed to bolster his
campaign in the same way. For one important reason for
its failure. it provided Humphrey with an opportunity for
the closest thing to a debate with Nixon he would get in
the campaign. Ordinarily. a major response to an opponent
requires two or three days of advance preparation. consul-
tation. and speech writing. On the issue of national
defense. however. Humphrey had anticipated the possibility
that Nixon would present a speech along the lines that he
did: and a speech draft was already prepared. With only
two or three hours of manuscript editing. and with the

de-classification of certain items of defense information

by Secretary of Defense Clifford. Humphrey was on the air

117

the next morning with an item-by-item refutation of
Nixon's speech. He showed that the U.S. enjoyed substan-
tial leads in each of the weapon types Nixon had discussed.
and added details on other weapons possessed by the U.S..
so that for the foreseeable future. the U.S. could ”oblit-
erate any aggressor nation or nations."16 As Schlesinger
wrote.
Throughout the campaign. Humphrey had hammered at
Nixon's advocacy of delay in ratification of the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Now. with Nixon's
own words. he was able to dramatize their differences
on arms control. As the first candidate to propose a
bombing halt and now as the enemy of the arms race.
Humphrey was emerging suddenly as the ”peace” candi-
date in the election. New. if peace talks and a
bombi halt became a reality. it might turn the
tide.1
Instead of dampening Humphrey's momentum. Nixon's
speech merely added more impetus to it. On October 31.
President Johnson declared a halt to the bombing. and the
twenty point lead Nixon enjoyed in the summer of 1968
evaporated to nothing. Nixon's image of blandness and
calm in the 1968 campaign had reverted to the "Old Nixon"
on War and Peace. As the Ripon Society said. ”When he
did speak out. he was the hard-line Nixon: his foreign
policy suddenly degenerated into preoccupation with

‘weaponry . . . ."18

16Chester. Hodgson. and Page. pp. 719-726.
17Schlesinger. p. 3749.

18The Ripon Society. Thg Egggon cg Vigtorz (New

York: Dial Press. 1969). p. 22.

.fi.

118

The Pogketbook Iggug. As a substantive issue

area. the Pocketbook issue is a broad topic which includes
specific statements related to the domestic economy.
Indicators subsumed all the statements which were related
to fiscal and economic policies (Taxing. Spending. Fiscal
Responsibility). and factors related to income. business.
and employment (Inflation. Recession/Depression. Labor.
Farm Income. Retirement Income. Employment).

Table 7 shows that the selection of indicators was
appropriate. with one exception. Content analysis
disclosed that Nixon made only one statement in either
campaign.related to Recession/Depression. (That was a
Con statement in 1968).

As to direction. Nixon became more definite and
assertive in 1968 than in 1960. In the earlier campaign.
of 385 statements. 124 were Neutral (a ratio of 32%). In
the latter campaign. of 442 statements. only 90 were
Neutral (a ratio of 20%). Thus. in the Pocketbook area.
unlike War and Peace. Nixon appeared to sharpen his thrust
in 1968.

Nixon's statements about the Pocketbook issue
appeared to be concentrated in these indicators: Spending.
Fiscal Responsibility. and Farm Income. In 1960. Nixon's
statements related to these indicators were as follows:
Spending (na246). Fiscal Responsibility (ns46). and Farm
Income (ns53). Taken together. these three indicators 6

119

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121

include 345 of the 385 statements related to the Pocket-
book issue: and. of them. 110 are Neutral (a ratio of
325‘).

In 1968. in these same indicators. the corre-
sponding figures are: Spending (n.150). Fiscal
Responsibility (ns32). and Farm Income (n-21). Taken
together. these three indicators amount to 203 of the 442
statements related to the Pocketbook issue: and. of them.
only 24 are Neutral (a ratio of 115).

As is apparent. Nixon failed to devote the same
degree of attention to these three indicators in 1968 as
he did in 1960. Particularly evident is the reduced
emphasis on Spending and Farm Income. As to Farm Income.
there are two speeches in the 1960 sample related to the
farm prdblem. and only one speech in the 1968 sample
related to the farm problem. Moreover. gggg of the 1960
farm speeches contains over twice as many issue-oriented
statements as the 1968 speech. Such is not the case with
the Spending indicator. in which Nixon's statements
related to Spending (or government programs requiring new
outlays) may be found in at least half of the speeches in
both samples.

It has been noted above that Nixon made a higher
proportion of Neutral statements about the Pocketbook
issue in 1960 than in 1968. That trend is also apparent
in the three indicators containing the majority of his
Pocketbook statements.

122

The trend is not nearly so apparent in the
Inflation and Retirement Income indicators. two indicators
which received considerably more attention in the 1968
sample than in the 1960 sample. In 1968. Nixon made 60
Con and 13 Neutral statements about Inflation. and 36 Pro
and 3 Neutral statements about Retirement Income.

Finally. in two other indicators. Nixon made
statements about specific issues in 1968 which he virtu-
ally ignored in 1960. In.both the labor and Employment
indicators. statements are fairly evenly divided between
the Pro and Neutral categories.

Qisguggion of Pogkggbook Aggggtg of thg ngggt;g
figggggz. A standard issue in political campaigns is the

Pocketbook issue. particularly in.a period when the
economy is not working perfectly. Some assign it the
highest value of all issues. For example. Scammon and

Wattenberg stated:

Generally speaking. it is the feeling of the
authors that Americans vote for candidates largely
on the basis of domestic issues. not international
issues. The ever-potent Economic Issue always holds
a high priority. and in a time of economic crisis
--great inflation. depression. deep and lengthy
recession--the Economic Issue will likely be the
crucial Voting Issue in.a national election. This

is as it has beta. and it is. and as it will likely
continue to be.

 

19Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg. ghg
agg;_§§jgg§gy_(New York: Coward. McCann. and Geoghegan.
Inca. 1970 . Do “Do

123

What is meant by the Pocketbook issue includes
inflation. recession. employment. taxes--in fact. any
issue which affects the pocketbook of the voter. A voter
might be naive in matters of economic policy. but he is
concerned about governmental actions and decisions which
he believes cost him money. Economist Arthur Okun said.
”The gut issues about inflation are those of household
finance. not world finances."20 The same holds true for
other economic areas such as fiscal and monetary policies
or employment.

The concept that fiscal and monetary policies are
positive tools for influencing the national economy is now
fairly well understood: but it is only in recent years
that the concept has come to be accepted by the federal
government to the extent that. for example. deficit
financing can sometimes be considered desirable. or that
a tax out under certain circumstances can operate to
increase federal revenue. As we saw in the preceding
chapter. Nixon had rejected the idea in the late 1950's
that wage demands by labor unions were responsible for
inflation: but President Eisenhower subscribed to the
notion that a balanced budget is a primary goal to be

attained at almost all costs. In approaching campaign

 

2°Arthur n. Okun. ”Inflation: The Problems and
Prospects Before Us.” Inflation. eds. Arthur M. Okun.
Henry H. Fowler. and Henry Gilbert (New York: New York
University Press. 1970). p. 13.

124

rhetoric about the Pocketbook issue. therefore. the
contemporary economic understanding must be kept in mind.

One other characteristic of campaign rhetoric. at
Presidential levels at least. is a certain amount of
emphasis on agricultural policies: farm income. produc-
tion controls. and related topics. The sample of fourteen
speeches from 1960 contains two speeches on farm policy:
from 1968. there is one speech on agriculture. Wilkins
and Friday commented on this peculiarity of campaigning
in their anthology:

The problem of agriculture has occupied an inordinate
amount of time and energy of politicians. It has
become a major issue of public controversy although
it may be but a minQI economic prOblem for the
country as a whole.

In point of fact. agriculture posed a serious
economic problem in the 1960 campaign.due to a surplus of
farm commodities in storage valued at an estimate 89
billion.22 Nixon's farm speeches emphasized a stronger
application of the program of Eisenhower's Administration
to reduce production acreage. while proposing various

means to reduce the surplus. This emphasis was more

acceptable to the farm states than that of Kennedy. whom

 

213. Hughel Wilkins and Charles a. Friday (eds.)
h "OHi°lf§-‘ O - ~. Sr 9 t1 i.‘ {.1 101-1'; (NO!
*or.: Random House. °- . p. .

22Willard w. Cochrane. ”The Technological Revo-

lution 1n Aerioultureo" W:
W p- 223.

125

farmers distrusted. Nixon reported that the polls showed
gains for his candidacy in the farm states after both his
speeches ggg,after Kennedy's speech on farm policy.23
Unfortunately for Nixon in 1960. the electorate
consisted of more than the farm belt. President
Eisenhower's balanced budget philosophy prevented him from
heeding the warning of Arthur M. Burns in March of that
year that a recession was inevitable unless government
spending was increased immediately. or interest rates
lowered. No action was taken. and the predicted recession
bottomed out in October. with nearly an additional half
million more workers unemployed and an unemployment rate
of 6.8 percent. This was the third recession in
Eisenhower's eight years. a clear instance of how being
an incumbent Vice-President can be a disadvantage.
Schlesinger explained. ”The Vice-President had little
choice but to deny the existence of the recession and to
defend the Eisenhower record. while Kennedy was presented
with grim evidence of his basic theme."2u Lubell stated
that the recession. i.e.. this single aspect of the
Pocketbook issue. cost Nixon the election in 1960.25

 

23Richard M. Nixon §;g ingeg (New York: Pyramid
Books. 1968). p. 360. '

2“Schlesinger. p. 3466. See also §iz gzigeg.
pp. 333-334-

25Lubell. p. 2&7.

126

By 1968. the economy was not the same: and. of
course. neither was Nixon. As the ”out” candidate. he
was free to attack Administration weaknesses. and to make
suggestions for changes in economic policies freely. But
in 1968. the economy was surging in its eighth consecutive
expansionary year. Increases had been seen continuously
in the nation's gross national product. retail sales.
personal income. and total employment. while the unemploy-
ment rate fell.26

Yet Nixon was able to capitalize on one crucial
Pocketbook issue in 1968: inflation. While the economy
was rapidly expanding. so was the inflation rate. Econo-
mist Henry Fowler stated that beginning in 1965-66.
increased government spending for defense (Vietnam) and
for domestic programs (The War on Poverty). superimposed
on the already booming economy. led to inflation in the
late 1960's.27 At first. President Johnson believed that
inflation could be avoided without increasing taxes or
decreasing spending in any area (the ”guns and butter”
theory). but by mid-1967. he was urging enactment of a ten
percent income tax surcharge. Congress. hoping to cut
spending instead. delayed passage of the tax increase for

nearly a year until mid-1968. too late to maximize its

 

26Adams. pp. 51-2.

27Henry H. Fowler. "Fiscal Policy and Inflation.“
12112222. PP- 67-68-

127

effectiveness is heading off inflation. It is ironic that
Nixon. who had been hurt on the Pocketbook issue in 1960
by governmental inactivity to head off recession. was able
to profit politically in 1968 by governmental inactivity‘
(at least. by untimely action) in solving another pocket-
book issue. inflation.28

He devoted a speech to the topic of inflation.
"To Make a Dollar Worth a Dollar.” in which he blamed
Administration ”fiscal irresponsibility” and the tendency
”to promise far more than they can.de1iver through govern-
ment or pay for through taxes.” The impact. he said. is
”that inflation has hurt the impoverished far more than
the War on Poverty has helped them.” To avoid the unde-
sirable alternative of wage and price controls likely to
be imposed by Humphrey. should he be elected. Nixon called
for ”fiscal responsibility" to redress ”present imbalances
without increasing unemployment or controls.“ The problem
phase of Nixon's speech was incisive and in agreement with
exonomists' assessment of the economy: the solution phase
was no more specific than the quotation furnished above.
Nevertheless. Humphrey was caught in the same Pocketbook
bind that Nixon had been eight years earlier. (As an
ironic footnote to Nixon's treatment of the Pocketbook
issue. he eventually established a system of wage and price
controls in 1970).

 

28Fowler. pp. 71. 75: Adams. pp. 29. 52-53.

ii. have; L We

128

Civil Rights. Indicators used to designate state-

 

ments related to the issue area of Civil Rights include
the major public policy fields related to discrimination.
and an additional General indicator. They are: Civil
Rights (General). Job Discrimination. Housing Discrim-
ination. Education Discrimination. and Voting Rights.

Table 8 shows that the samples of campaign
speeches included very few statements related to Civil
Rights. In 1960. there is a total of 22 statements: in
1968. there is a total of 53 statements. Most of these
statements occurred in the General indicator.

In neither campaign did Nixon make a statement
which fit the Education Discrimination indicator despite
the fact that in 1968. Nixon made a speech on the subject.
”Education for Excellence. Freedom. and Diversity.“

In 1960. Nixon made no statements which could be
categorized in the Job Discrimination or Voting Rights
indicators.

In the General indicator. Nixon's statements
showed a pronounced shift in direction from Pro in 1960
to Neutral in 1968. The few statements included in the
specific Civil Rights policy areas show that Nixon was
more Neutral than Con on Job Discrimination in 1968.
slightly more Neutral than Con on Housing Discrimination
in both campaigns. and Pro Voting Rights in l968--but it
should be noted that whereas most of the Civil Rights

129

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130

statements appeared in a racial context. the statements
on voting rights appeared in Nixon's support for the

eighteen-year-old vote.

Qigguggiog of 21v}; filghtg. The historical

context of the Civil Rights issue reveals an area of
national ferment which was political dynamite. Blacks
gained concessions as they gained mobility at an accel-
crating rate between the end of the Depression until the
end of the 1960's. with an.accompanying confusion in the
mind of the public over the nature. scope. or ultimate
outcome of the civil rights movement. Consequently.
campaign rhetoric was designed to play to the values of
both sides. Nixon's speeches in particular. were weighted
towards the whites' point of view.

Blaustein and Zangrando's historical review of the

civil rights movement reveals that the 1940's and 1950's
saw executive and judicial actions for minority groups.
and the 1960's saw legislative actions in an.even broader
scale. Of the earlier phase. they wrote:

From 1941 to 1958. Presidents Roosevelt. Truman.
and Eisenhower issued a dozen executive orders
affecting civil rights. These touched upon fair
employment practices. federal contracts with private
industry. employment and advancement opportunities
in federal service. integration in the armed forces.
and the implementation of a federal court order for
school desegregation. The United States Supreme
Court heard and ruled upon a wide range of cases

related to civil rights. and its decisions on
voting. interstate travel. housing covemnts. higher

131

education. and public school desegregation were
resoundingly fagorable to the Negro's plea for
refcrm e e e e

The judicial actions were most remembered. of course. for

the historic 1954 decision. B o v u a on

22.222252:
Regarding the second phase. legislative actions.

Blaustein and Zangrando continued:

The period 1957 to 1968 witnessed the most
dramatic series of changes in the status of the Negro
in America since the Civil War and Reconstruction.
Finally roused to action. the United States Congress
passed four significant pieces of legislation
touching on voting. school desegreation. fair
employment practices. and public accommodation.

These were designed to overcome local and state
obstruction which had obduratedly defied the imple-3
mentation of federal executive and judicial action.

To whites. this federal activity represented
progress: but to blacks. the progress seemed slow. Blacks
perceived that. despite each new executive order. court
decision. or federal law passed. discrimination continued.
Roseboom believed it was the ineffectiveness of these
federal actions in achieving concrete gains that led to
l

boycotts. sit-ins and other passive resistance tactics.3

Through the 1960's. resistance tactics intensified and

 

29Albert P. Plaustein and Robert L. Zangrando
(eds.). v o m n-

§§;z_3;§§gzz_ New York: Washington Square Press. 19 .
PP- 355- -

3°Ibid.. p. 469.

31Eugene H. Roseboom. o o o Pr si-
dential Elections (New York: Collier Books. 1967). p. 242.

132

escalated until the hot summers led to Watts. Detroit.
Newark. and a hundred other riot-torn cities in 1966-1967.
In the 1960 campaign. Nixon devoted relatively

little attention to the Civil Rights issue. although he
might have made more of a constructive position for him-
self than he did. President Eisenhower had been.more
active than previous presidents on behalf of blacks in
terms of executive orders to integrate the armed services.
Washington. D. C. and other areas within the purview of
executive control. He also sent the troops to Little Rock.
Nixon himself had a good record on Civil Rights. Mazo
and Hess wrote.

On civil rights. Nixon had the solidest record of

any man in the Eisenhower administration--and before

that. a voting record in Congress that matched John

F. Kennedy's and surpassed that of Lyndon B. Johnson.32

However. he determined not to campaign for black

votes. as that course seemed a bad political choice for a
Republican running against John F. Kennedy. Therefore.
he employed instead his earlier version of the Southern
strategy. Schlesinger stated. ”Nixon. realizing that the
black vote was largely Democratic by tradition anyway.
concentrated more on wooing southern whites displeased

with Kennedy's civil rights stand."33 Consequently. he

confined himself on his tours to generalities about

 

32Mazo and Hess. pp. 5-6.
33Schlesinger. p. 3466.

133

brotherhood and tolerance coming from the hearts of all
Americans. In the sample of 1960 speeches. this quotation
from his speech on ”The Domestic Economy" typifies the
tenor of his campaign position:
To mobilize all our human resources. we must make
equality of opportunity a living reality for our Negro
citizens. and those of other minority groups. Tremen-
dous untapped resources for the economy can.be
released by eliminating the barriers of racial
discrimination that now deny these citizens fail
opportunity to develop and use their talents.
In 1968. the racial tensions in the country were
more severe than they had been eight years earlier.
Public feelings remained confused. Chester. Hodgson. and
Page referred to a report by Angus Campbell entitled
Racial Attitudes in Fifteen American Cities (1968) which
concluded that only one-fifth of the white population
believed Negroes suffered any discrimination after the
1964 Civil Rights Act was passed. as opposed to a near-
unanimous black belief that discrimination continued. As
a consequence. whites could not understand why blacks
continued to press for more change. whereas blacks could
not comprehend white inactivity.35 The 1968 campaign was
further complicated by the candidacy of Governor George

Wallace for the presidency on.a third-party ticket.

 

3uThis is the only reference in this speech to
Civil Rights. In the 1960 sample. there is no full-blown
development of his position on the issue.

35Chester. Hodgson. and Page. pp. 33-36.

134

Wallace symbolized Southern resistance to federal inter-
vention in behalf of blacks.

As in 1960. Nixon wrote off the black vote as a
conscious part of his strategy. He was interested in
capturing the White urban and suburban vote in the South.
and the white suburban vote elsewhere. The Southern
strategy was to limit Wallace to rural Southern white
votes. and win other whites dissatisfied with federal
interventions in what seemed to them to be too hasty a
pace. thus leaving the votes of blacks and of the whites
sympathetic to blacks to Humphrey. Accordingly. he made it
a point g2; to give the appearance of yielding to black
voting blocs. even to the extent of refusing to meet Negro
leaders in Philadelphia during the campaign. on the grounds
that "I am not going to campaign for the black vote at the
risk of alienating the suburban vote . . . . If I am Pres-
ident. I am not going to owe anything to the black
community."36

As Table 8 demonstrates. Nixon's statements on
Civil Rights increased in 1968 over 1960. and touched on
a few more aspects of the area--but the tone of his
remarks was even more neutral than before. The result of
this treatment of the Civil Rights issue was reflected in
the final vote: 88 percent of the blacks voted for

 

36Ibid.. p. 624. The authors drew this point:
"The idea appeared to be that the Negroes' confidence
would be preserved by promising them nothing--and then
delivering it.” Ibid.

135

Humphrey and 12 percent for Nixon (as compared with 32
percent for Nixon in 1960). But the strategy did not
accomplish the desired end fully. Samuel Lubell said that
Nixon's quiet approach to this explosive issue ought to
have been more positive:

Nixon's failure to speak out on our racial
conflicts probably cost him more politically than the
war issue. As the vote-pulling effect of the war
declined. the desire for a change in racial policies
became Nixon's strongest single vote-getting issue.
More of the Democrats who were switching to him cited
{goigl trouble as their reason than any other issue.
Here. as with the war. rioting and violence had had
too emotional gn impact for vague statements to be
satisfactory.3

Of course. it could also have been the case that

Nixon's treatment of the Law and Order issue was inter-
preted as an.adjunct of his Civil Rights position. Law

and Order is analyzed below.

L3! and nggg. Indicators designed to classify
Nixon's statements on the issue of Law and Order included
topics under both Crime and Law Enforcement. Specifically.
the indicators are: Crime (General). Organized Crime.
”Major Grime.” Violence (Riots & Demonstrations). Law
Enforcement (General). Police & Law Enforcement Agencies.
and Courts.

Content analysis disclosed that Law and Order was
an inapplicable issue to the 1960 campaign. but that the

 

37Lubell. p. 60.

136

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137

indicators selected seemed appropriate to the 1968
campaign. Only one statement in the 1960 sample could be
categorized as related to Law and Order. (It was a state-
ment supporting increased police protection in metropolitan
areas.)

As to direction. in 1968. results of the content
analysis disclosed that Nixon's statements were Con Crime
(General). Organized Crime. "Major Crime.” Violence. and
the Courts. Statements on Law Enforcement and Police &
Law Enforcement Agencies were about evenly divided between

Pro and Neutral.

Discussion of Law and Order. Law and order as an
'issue is strangely out of place in a Presidential election
campaign for at least two reasons. First. it is difficult
to operationalize what is meant by the term: and. second.
except for those circumstances involving federal laws.
maintenance of law and order is not even a federal concern.
but rather a state and local matter. In any event. as the
content analysis demonstrates. Law and Order was an
important issue only in the 1968 sample of speeches.

Regarding the ambiguous nature of the term. the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis-
tration of Justice prefaced its report in 1967 with the
statement.

Many Americans also think of crime as a very narrow

range of behavior. It is not. An enormous variety
of acts make up the 'crime problem' . . . . No

138

single formula. no single theory. no single generali-
zation gan explain the vast range of behavior called
crime.3

Again:
For "crime" is not a single simple phenomenon that
can be examined. analyzed and described in one piece.
It occurs in every part of the country and in every
stratum of society. Its practitioners and its victims
are people of all ages. incomes and backgrounds. Its
trends are difficult to ascertain. Its causes are 39
legion. Its cures are speculative and controversial.
In 1960. Americans were not much concerned with
issues of crime and law enforcement. Neither Nixon nor
Kennedy made serious reference to it in the 1960 campaign.
But the issue rose in public awareness through the decade
of the 1960's for reasons already hinted at. For one
thing. the civil rights movement and its gains produced at
least two related outcomes: among many whites. it forced
renewed attention on blacks in a context of what was felt
to be undeserved or hasty social change: and among some
blacks. it aroused frustration and the so-called "crisis
of rising expectations" over what seemed to them to be
the grudging and molasses-slow pace of progress. Thus.
civil rights demonstrations and riots took place within a
white perceptual field already attuned to black civil

disobedience and crime. A second factor was the growing

 

38President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice. The Challeggg of 2;;me in a

19 e ociet (Washington: Government Printing Office.
’pe Va

39Ibid.. p. l.

139

intensity of public resistance to the Vietnam War. leading
to its own riots and demonstrations on college campuses.
and even marches on Washington.

These special threats to law and order were over-
laid on substantially increasing rates of more ordinary
violations of the criminal code. such as the crimes
against persons and property listed in the Federal Bureau
of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports--homicide. rape.
assault. robbery. and the like. Barry Goldwater had
attempted in 1964 to capitalize on public fears of street
crimes. along with a general deterioration of moral
values: but his efforts to link crime and degeneracy to
the Johnson Administration never got off the ground. Not
so in 1968: Law and Order was the principal issue in
George Wallace's campaign. and the responsive chord it
struck in the electorate forced both Nixon and Humphrey
to deal with it.

Nixon's campaign was probably strengthened by the
public's new interest in Law and Order. given his reluc-
tance to handle the Vietnam War. Scammon and Wattenberg
quoted a Gallup poll taken in September. 1968. which
showed 36 percent favored Nixon. 26 percent favored
Wallace. and only 23 percent favored Humphrey. as the
candidate who ”could do the best job handling law and

order."""0 Humphrey. who had gained national prominence

 

uoScammon and Wattenberg. p. 167.

140

as a ”crime-buster“ during his tenure as mayor of
Minneapolis. was seen in 1968 as a liberal. an instigator
of black discontent. as well as the embodiment of the
Johnson Vietnam policies that were causing so many
problems. Nixon reaped the benefits of appearing to have
a more moderate stance than Humphrey. yet not quite so
hard-nosed an image as wallace.

In his 1968 speeches. Nixon did little to clarify
the ambiguity of the issue. In ”The cradle of Civili-
zation Must Not Be Its Grave.” Nixon.declared the nature
of the problem: ”We see the rise in crime. we see the
riots in our cities. we see the problems in the ghettos.
the problems in the universities.” In his speech devoted
to the issue of Law and Order. ”Order and Justice Under
Law.” Nixon placed blame on Attorney General Ramsey Clark
for a failure of energy. will. and purpose: and also on
the Supreme Court for raising ”unreasonable obstacles to
the enforcement of the law." In that speech. Nixon flatly
dismissed poverty as the cause of crime. and declared.
”The truth is that we will reduce crime and violence when
we enforce our laws--when we make it less profitable. and
a lot more risky. to break our laws." By way of construc-
tive proposals. he went on in the speech to advocate
federal support of local law enforcement through coordi-
nation. police training. and education: but the ultimate

answer to problems of law enforcement he suggested was

141

this: "The sources of moral and civic order are in the
family. the church. the school and the community . . . .
In every family let us renew our commitment to the
traditional American standards.”
In their analysis of campaign.techniques. Dan F.
Hahn and Ruth M. Gonchar summarized the question of Law
and Order in 1968:
Initiated by Wallace as an.issue. and joined by the
other two major candidates. it was bogus from first
to last. Nixon contended that he would solve the
problem by appointing a new Attorney General. yet
enforcement of the law (thus the acquisition of order)
is a matter of local concern. There is little the
national government can do--except. perhaps. work to
eliminate the causes of crime. However. such efforts
would be conducted through R. E. W. rather than the
Attorney General's office. And. anyway. such a
realistic approach to the problem of crime would have
turned away those Nixon was trying to reach--those

who were reacting to the words 'law and order' as“1
code words for 'put the Niggers in their place.'"

fiEEEEII.
Content analysis of Richard M. Nixon's treatment

of issues in selected samples of his 1960 and 1968 campaign
speeches has provided a relatively objective and precise
description of what Nixon the candidate said about four
major issues. the positions he took relative to specific
sub-issues (indicators). and how Nixon's treatment of

issues compared over the two campaigns.

 

“loan F. Hahn and Ruth M. Gonchar. "Political myth.
The Image and the Issue." godaz'g §pggg . xx. 3 (Summer.
1972): P0 590

142

Overall. the two samples of speeches were similar
in several ways. Each contained almost the same proportion
of issue-oriented statements to total statements (21% in
1960. 23% in 1968). Considering the issue-oriented state-
ments. the two samples also contained roughly equal
percentages of statements related to the Pocketbook issue
(39% in 1960. 38% in 1968). On the Civil Rights issue.
there is a noticeable increase in the proportion of state-
ments. through the total emphasis given to the issue is
relatively small in both campaigns (2} in 1960. 5% in
1968). However. there is a substantial decrease in the
proportion of statements about the War and Peace issue
(59% in 1960. 41% in 1968). and a corresponding increase
in the attention paid to Law and Order (05 in 1960. 16%
in 1968).

Turning to specific issues. Nixon was more neutral
in 1968 than in 1960 in his statements related to War an
Peace. but less neutral in 1968 than in 1960 in his state-
ments related to the Pocketbook issue. In fact. in 1968.
the only War and Peace categories where the Neutral state-
ments did not substantially outnumber the others were
Peace as U.S. Policy (32 Pro. 26 Neutral) and Military
Preparedness (70 Pro. 16 Neutral). By comparison. in 1960.
Nixon was decidedly Con War as Enemy Policy. Pro Peace as
U.S. Policy. Pro Military Preparedness. and Pro Military
Actions Short of War.

143

In regard to the Pocketbook issue. Nixon.made
substantially more statements about Spending and Farm
Income in 1960 than in 1968. but more statements about
Inflation. Labor. Retirement Income. and Employment in the
latter campaign. Also. as a rule. Nixon was far less
Neutral in 1968 than in 1960 about the Pocketbook.

Finally. most of Nixon's issue-oriented statements
in both campaigns were devoted to either War and Peace or
the Pocketbook. Of a total of 2.140 issue oriented state-
ments in the two campaigns. 1.048 were devoted to War and
Peace. and 827 were devoted to the Pocketbook issue--a
grand total of 1.875 statements (a ratio of 88%). Of the
remaining 265 statements. 189 were devoted to the issue of
Law and Order in.the 1968 campaign. where Nixon declared
himself to be against crime in all its forms. against the
courts. but for the police and their law enforcement
efforts. In.a few scattered statements. Nixon also stated

that he was for Civil Rights in general.

Chapter 4
CONCLUSION

This study has presented the results of a modified
content analysis of Richard M. Nixon's treatment of
selected issues (War and Peace. Pocketbook aspects of the
domestic economy. Civil Rights. and Law and Order) in his
issue-oriented speeches during the presidential election
campaigns of 1960 and 1968. The technique of content
analysis has been employed to describe with some precision
and objectivity exactly how Nixon treated the issues in
terms of his statements about them. and more traditional
rhetorical approaches have been employed to evaluate his
treatment of the issues.

In this chapter. conclusions will be drawn from
the preceding analysis. Specifically. this chapter will
discuss the following areas. based upon the findings of
this study:

(1) What is the role of issues in contemporary
Presidential campaigns. including their relationship to
voting behavior. insofar as generalizations may be made
on the basis of one candidate's communications in two

recent campaigns?

(2) How did Nixon change as a speaker in reference

to treatment of issue-oriented content between his

144

145

unsuccessful and his successful campaigns for the Presi-
dency?

(3) What relational hypotheses may be formulated
regarding the role of issues in political campaigns?

W

In this section. the relationship between issues
and voting behavior will be discussed: but it must be made
clear at the outset that it is not yet possible to make
any specific claim as to the efficacy. or lack of efficacy.
of issue discussion in getting votes. Key. who argued for
the notion of the responsible electorate. prefaced his
argument with this statement: ”It thus can be a mischie-
vous error to assume. because a candidate wins. that a
majority of the electorate shares his views on public
questions . . . ."1 Robert Agranoff wrote in 1972. "very
little is known about how effective the candidate-with-the-
sleeves-rolled-up approach is vis-a-vis the straight-
forward-isane-development approach."2 McBath and Fisher
also noted. "No method presently exists by which campaign
communication can be analyzed and evaluated to the mutual

satisfaction of those who are party to the process and

 

1V. 0. Key. Jr.. 5.- ;-:e-.: - . -~ Ow: -:

L109; ' 1 w --‘ 0-1 a 0 :; ° - '0' New York:
Vintage Books. l°-- . p. .

2mm Agranoff. W
gggpglggg (Boston: Holbrook Press. Inc.. 19 2 . p. 263.

146

those who study it."3 Swanson concluded his recent survey
of campaign communication studies with this assessment:
Despite all this popular interest and scholarly
activity. however. disappointingly little is known
about the operation of campaign comgunication in
the contemporary election contests.

Neither does this study claim to have quantified
Ithe causal link between a candidate's discussion of issues
and his ability to attract votes: in fact. any such inter-
pretation is hereby specifically disclaimed. But the
nature of the relationship may be explored: and some
general observations may be offered to clarify whatever
relationships may exist.

Issues 3:3,discussed in election campaigns in the
real world. As we have found in both his election
campaigns. Nixon.made a distinction.between his basic
”stump speech“ which he repeated many times on the
campaign trail and those issue-oriented speeches which
have served as the basis of the content analysis reported
in Chapter 3 of this study. Also. as we have found through

content analysis. Nixon indeed made numerous statements on

the issues in those speeches. On the intuitive level. it

 

3James H. McBath and Walter R. Fisher. ”Persuasion
in Presidential Campaign.Communication.”

£22££§1_21_§222221 L”: 1 (February. 1969): 17'

1'David L. Swanson. ”The New Politics Meets the
Old Rhetoric: New Direction in Campaign.Communication
Research.” J . LVIII. 1
(February: 97 o 310

147

is hard to imagine a campaign in which a candidate never
mentions an issue. or in which he does not care what he
says about the issue.

Of course. issues are not the only important
element in.a campaign. nor necessarily even the most
important element. Agranoff wrote. ”It is always a matter
of the proper mix between candidate. issue. and party
factors. and reinforcement. conyersion or activation of
latency."5 Yet. partisan alignment accounts for less
variance in election returns than.was once true. especially
in Presidential elections. Lubell noted that there have
dramatic swings from one election to the next in recent
times. such as the large numbers of cross-over votes for
Lyndon Johnson in 1964.6 In each of the campaigns encom-
passed by this study. there was a margin of difference
between Nixon.and his Democratic opponent of less than one
percent of the votes cast. despite the fact that Democrats
outnumber Republicans by at least three to two. In fact.
in the 1968 election. fully forty percent of those who
voted for Nixon.had voted for Johnson in 1964.7

 

5Agranoff. p. 25.

6Samuel Lubell. T n

_ha_Eidda__9:lalfl_ln.dssllasn.
£91§§19§,(New York: W. W. Norton a Company. Inc.. 1971).
p. e

7Philip Converse. et al.. ”Continuity and Change in
American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968
Election." n Po n v . LXIII. 4
(December. 19 9 . 10 .

1&8

On the other hand. while party influence seems to
be weakening. the importance of issues seems to be
increasing. Converse and his associates at the Survey
Research Center stated.

In our analyses of such changes in the national
vote over the course of presidential elections in
the 1950's and 1960's we have been impressed with
the magnitude of the effects introduced as new
candidates focus on different issues of public
policy. and as external events give particular
candidate-issue intersections greater salience
for the nation.8
These authors pinpoint 1968 as a "prototypical” issue
campaign. and they name Vietnam. civil rights. and law
and order as the critical issues. with the cold war and
social welfare both important to large groups of voters
as well.9

The question remains as to how issues influence
voter behavior. These seem to be two major possibilities:
(1) some voters may be influenced directly by a candi-
date's statements about the issues. by being either
reinforced and/or activated in their already-held positions.
or (far less likely) converted to the candidate's position:
and (2) voter perception of the candidate's personality
may be influenced to the extent to which he discusses

issues.

 

31bid.. p. 1096.
9Ibid.. pp. 1085. 1095. 1097-1099.

1&9

As to the direct influence of issue discussion on
voter behavior. it appears that some voters are oriented
towards issues under certain conditions. Polsby and
Wildavsky stated the principle involved:

He can now see that a strong issue orientation is
likely to guide voting decisions under some circum-
stances. One set of circumstances occurs when one
issue becomes so intensely important that the voter
is willing to lay aside his party preferences and his
preferences on other issues. An unpopular war. severe
economic deprivation . . . have at times led to the
required intense feeliBg. The pocketbook nerve seems
especially sensitive.
These authors specify that. for voters to be subject to
influence by an issue. they must know about the issue.
care about the issue. and be able to distinguish between
the competing candidates' positions on the issue: further-
more. the number of voters who meet these prerequisites
may reach as high as 30 percent of the electorate.11

Isolating the groups of voters who have specific
issue concerns is problematic at best. It would be falla-
cious to claim that all “switchers" do so because of a
candidate's position on issues. Nevertheless. Natchez and
Bupp reported that although the Survey Research Center's
data indicates "switchers" have low information about

issues in.general. ”switchers” are attuned to single

 

10Nelson w. Polsby and Aaron R. Wildavsky.
“d1”; 17,2 0:4 ‘ 1;. --_ --‘ ' gun was a." -~ 9
o itics d ed.: New York: Charles Scribner s Sons.
1935’. p. 15e

111b1d.. p. 13.

150

issues and thus form fractionated ”issue publics” within
the electorate.12 This gives further support to Polsby
and Wildavsky's assertion about the influence of issues
on voter behavior.

As to the image-enhancement function of issue
discussion. McBath and Fisher stated.

Political persuasion operates more on the basis of
”images.” ”signs of consubstantiality.” than the
presentation of facts or arguments or even direct
emotional appeals. The attempt is to show the
candidate as possessing a view of the world which
corresponds with that of potential voters. Infor-
mation relative to the candidate's stand on issues
is interpreted as evidence of the kind of man the
candidaig is in respect to his potential electors

Nimmo reinforced the point when he stated.
By quoting facts and details on.a variety of issues
the candidate leaves the impression that he possesses
the knowledge.lsophistication. and acumen to hold
public office.
Thus. it would appear that even when issues do not
directly influence voters. the discussion of issues by the
candidate may strengthen the credibility of his appeal to

voters by virtue of enhancing his image as a potential

 

12Peter B. Natchez and Irvin c. Bupp. "Candidates.
Issues. and Voters.” Po t v :
“ s ud . eds. Edward C. Dreyer and Halter A.
Rosenbaum 2d ed.: Belmont. California: Hadsworth Pub-
llahim Co.. IHOe. 1970). p. “500

13McBath and Fisher. p. 18.
1”Dan Nimmo. Pol P d

Nod n so i Englewood Cliffs. New
Jersey: Prentice Hall. Inc. Spectrum Books. 1970). p. 120.

151

leader. Natchez and Bupp summarized the point when they
stated. ”Political issues are an important component of
candidate imagery: and in certain cases they account almost
entirely for electoral behavior.'15

In regard to the effect Nixon's treatment of
issues had on the election campaigns of 1960 and 1968.
more analysis is available in the literature about the
latter campaign. In fact. 1960 appeared to be a special
year because of the non-substantive issue of Kennedy's
religion. Both Nixon and Kennedy were young and vigorous
candidates who differed very little on the substantive
issues even in their Joint television appearances.
Axelrod's analysis of the voting patterns by interest
groups showed that the greatest single deviation from
previous voting levels was located along religious lines:
Catholics voted for Kennedy. whereas Southern Protestants
voted for Nixon.16 Converse and his colleagues reported
that. whereas 63 percent of Catholic voters were considered
to be predictably Democratic. Kennedy garnered 80 percent
of their votes: almost half of Kennedy's total vote came
from this group. Rather than substantive issue discussion.

it was the style issue of religion that counted most among

 

15N’atchez and Bupp. p. #49.

16Robert Axelrod. ”where the Vbtes Come From.”

1 o 1 n v . mm. 1 (March. 1972).

152

the voters. They said. ”There can be little doubt that
the religious issue was the strongest single factor over-
laid on.basic partisan loyalties in the 1960 election."17

What of the 1968 election. the ”prototypical"
issue-discussion campaign? We have seen that Nixon
devoted about the same proportion of his issue statements
to the four issue categories as he did in 1960. but that
he spread his attention among several more issue indi-
cators within the categories in 1968. Most importantly.
he took a neutral stance in a majority of his issue state-
ments. except for Military Preparedness. Inflation.
Retirement Income. Spending and Law and Order. Re
pursued a centrist strategy. and deliberately presented a
low-key. bland image. He avoided serious discussion of
Vietnam. the most salient issue to the public: and he also
followed the so-called Southern strategy of ignoring black
voters and appealing to whites. We have seen in previous
chapters how his twenty-point lead in early polling
evaporated to nothing by Election Day.

What relationships may be drawn between Nixon's
treatment of issues and the voting behavior of the
electorate in 1968? Converse reported the results of a
Survey Research Center analysis of the correlation between

voters' affective ratings (support or opposition) of the

 

17Philip Converse. et al.. "Stability and Change in

1960: A Reinstatins Slocum” WW
Rgzigw. LW. 2 (June. 1961). 275.

153

three candidates (Nixon. Humphrey. and Wallace). and both
issue position and party affiliation. The analysis showed
that. of the three candidates. there was highest corre-
lation between issue and affective rating for George
Wallace. and least for Richard Nixon: but there was high
correlation.between party affiliation.and affective rating
for Nixon.18 Axelrcd reported that those who voted for
Nixon in 1968 were 99 percent white. 90 percent nonpoor.
81 percent nonunion members. 80 percent Protestant. 80
percent from Northern states. and 92 percent from outside

19

the central cities. Stated another way. Chester.

Hodgson. and Page said.
Nixon owes his election to the votes of the middle
class. old stock. Protestants of the West. the Middle
West. and the Southern states. and in general to the
business class and its allies. He won those votes
because he bade for them. And he is more exclusively

the choice of t98se classes than.any President since
Herbert Hoover. - -

Thus. in summary. issue discussion by a Presi-
dential candidate may be important as a factor in
influencing voter behavior. in view of the decreasing
weight attached to partisanship. Issue discussion may be
directly decisive in fractionated issue publics under

 

13Converse. et al.. ”Continuity and Change.”
pp. 1097-1099:

19Axelrod. p. 18.

20Lewis Chester. Godfrey Hodgson. and Bruce Page.
' ;~—__.:n M lodr; n E: ' _d , a e H°a ; o -8
New York: The Viking Press. 19 9 . P. 7 9.

15“

certain circumstances: and beyond that. issue discussion
may enhance the candidate's image by altering the percep-
tion which the electorate has of him as a potential leader.
In the two campaigns under study. Nixon appeared not to
have gained much from his issue discussion in 1960.

because of the confounding issue of Kennedy's religion:

and in 1968. because of his reluctance to deal seriously
with the most salient issues to the public. and because

of his generally neutral position on those issues he did

choose to cover.

W

This study has focussed on Nixon's treatment of
issues in his two Presidential campaigns in 1960 and 1968.
In particular. Nixon's issue-oriented speeches have been
subjected to content analysis to determine what he said in
regard to four selected issues. whether he was pro. con.
or neutral. and how his treatment of issues differed over
the two campaigns in question. This data has been reported
fully in Chapter 3.

This study has not encompassed questions related
to Nixon's style. organization. delivery. audience adap-
tation. or other elements traditionally associated with
public speaking. It is of some relevance at this point.
however. to refer to a study of Nixon's style in the two
campaigns in question. In her dissertation of Nixon's

style. Trent discovered that in 1960. Nixon leaned heavily

155

upon personal experiences. association with prestigious
Republicans (Eisenhower. Lodge). and unsupported assertions
to carry his arguments. In 1968. however. he rarely
referred to personal experiences. associations with
prestigious Republicans. or made unsupported assertions.
Rather. he used reasoning and evidence (such as statistics
and examples) heavily as his primary supporting materials
for his positions on issues.21 She attributed the dif-
ferences to Nixon's increased reliance upon his speech
writers. his different roles (incumbent Vice-President as
contrasted with eight-year layoff). and his desire to
overcome negative audience perceptions of him in 1968.22
Trent's study was limited to elements of Nixon's
campaign.messages which might reasonably be expected to
occur in equal measure in any message. such as types of
support. types of sentences. and types of language.
Therefore. she was able to utilize small samples of
Nixon's campaign.apeeches in her content analysis. The
present study is concerned with Nixon's treatment of
particular issues in his campaign messages. ‘While Nixon
might be expected to deal with several issues in any given

 

21Judith Swanlund Trent. "An Examination and Com-
parison of the Rhetorical Style of Richard Milhous Nixon
in the Presidential Campaign of 1960 and 1968: A Content
Analysis.“ (unpublished Doctor's dissertation. University
of Michigan. 1970). pp. lfia. lfié.

zzlbide. p. 910

156

speech. it is also reasonable to expect particular issues
to receive different emphasis from speech to speech. In
the present study. therefore. all speeches designated as
issue-oriented have been subjected to content analysis in
order to produce a more complete description of Nixon's
treatment of issues. The findings may be summarized as
follows:

Nixon devoted roughly the same overall proportion
of his statements to the selected issues in both campaigns.
but he concentrated on fewer issues in 1960 (namely. War
and Peace and the Pocketbook) than in 1968.

Nixon devoted considerably 1g§§_attention to the
War and Peace issue in 1968 than he did in the earlier
campaign: but he devoted considerable mg;g_attention to
the domestic issues of Civil Rights and Law and Order in
1968 than.he did in 1960.

In terms of direction. Nixon was nggg,neutra1 in
1968 than in 1960 in the issues of War and Peace (except
for the Military Preparedness indicator) and Civil Rights.
but 13§§,neutra1 in 1968 than in 1960 in the issue of the
Pocketbook. Regarding Law and Order. since there was only
one statement in 1960. no comparison can be made across
campaigns. except for the important observation that he

made it into an issue in 1968.

Chapter 3 also included a discussion of some of

the reasons why Nixon chose to emphasize the issues as he

157

did in the two campaigns: why he avoided grappling with
the basic issues of Vietnam and civil rights in 1968.
confining himself to generalities or peripheral aspects of
those areas instead: and why he addressed himself to the
issue of Law and Order. His speaking strategies were
conditioned by historical events impinging upon the issue
areas. his own changed status. and innovations in campaign
techniques.

In addition to these conclusions drawn from the
content analysis findings. this final chapter should also
point to some important differences in Nixon's positions
on particular issues over the two campaigns.

The most interesting position shift occurred in
the area of war and Peace. In 1960 Nixon's speeches
presented the picture of a monolithic communist world
headed by Premier Khrushchev of the U.S.S.R. In this
simplistic world view. Communism/Russia had the single-
minded purpose of conquering the world by aggression: and
the role of guardian of the world's peace and freedom
rested upon America's military power and will to resist
Communist domination. Red China's Mao Tse Tung was
mentioned in one 1960 speech as also having aggressive
intentions. but lacking the military strength to fulfill
his ambitions. In 1968. however. Nixon elaborated upon
the concept of the ”global village“ in which nationalistic

Communism was only one of several systems competing for

 

158

influence. Nixon did not.appear to be preoccupied with
Russia alone: but he recognized the importance of Red
China. especially in Southeast Asia. He seemed to regard
the Communist threat as being economic and ideological as
well as military. and he did not advocate military supe-
riority as the main response America should make to
Communism (except for his speech on ”The Security Gap”
which was discussed in Chapter 3). Also. it is interesting
to note that Nixon identified the Middle East. not Vietnam.
as the area of the world most likely to produce a military
confrontation.between the major powers in 1968. In short.
Nixon presented a much more complex and sophisticated view
of the world in the 1968 campaign than he did in 1960.

The same cannot be said for the other issue areas.
In the Pocketbook area. Nixon's two campaigns revealed
consistent positions. His agriculture speeches were
similar in the two campaigns. with the statistics updated
for the latter campaign. In both campaigns. Nixon deplored
federal approaches to social problems. particularly if they
involved increased federal spending. In 1968. Nixon
presented a detailed analysis of inflation and its effects
upon fixed income. taxation. and world trade. But his
solution to the problem of inflation consisted of rejecting
Humphrey's alternatives of ”recession or harmful controls.”
promising instead to practice something called "fiscal
responsibility.” The difference between this position and

 

159

his earlier position in 1960 is indistinguishable. because
then his pledge was to "control the federal budget.“

In both campaigns. his position on civil rights
appeared to rest upon good will and toleration in the
hearts of all Americans. In 1968. he did recognize racial
discrimination as related to more indicators than in 1960.
And finally. as mentioned before. in 1968. he presented an
emphasis on law and order which was absent in 1960. In
several passing references in 1968. Nixon linked the law
and order issue to disruption and violence (which was also
related to civil rights and the Vietnam War): but his.
speech on law and order focussed on street crimes and law
enforcement problems which he claimed were exacerbated by
a weak Attorney General and by court decisions which aided

criminals.

:_ :_ egg; e'oo _g'.:-: ;g£ .11- ;-;-;_ Q 'o;: o i;
This study has generated several questions for
future research by this writer or by others:

1.

  
     

   

   

. 0
ii- -

         

“I. 3' 0!

W? This study was limited
in time to 1960 and 1968. Mere could be learned about

'9 f' 1

      

   
 

     

 

Nixon's campaign speaking by extending the analysis to
include the 1972 campaign. 1 w

2. This study has analyzed Nixon's treatment of
issues in two campaigns without regard to his differing

roles in those campaigns. e.s. incumbent Vice-President

 

160

(1960). and challenger (1968). except in subsequent
discussion of the analysis. Accordingly. it would be
useful to test these hypotheses which relate a candidate's

role to his treatment of issues:

a. b n o
W-

b. e o o
W-

0- IaCuanaaEa_and_2nall:nsszs.i:n§.22_ireai.
133223.9l21222nikl-

3. This study has subjected all speeches in the
samples to content analysis on an equal basis without
regard to the channel used for their presentation. It may
be that the channel selected has some influence on the
treatment of issues. Accordingly.

a. e t b t

4. This study has been limited to the speeches of
a Republican. It may be that party affiliation influences

a candidate's treatment of issues. Accordingly:

a-WW
tm t o u 0 nd d .
mirssmnammmmmiaam
d n -a .- . - f,°u n . a

 

161

5. This study has analyzed all speeches in the
sample without regard to their timing in the campaign. It
may be that timing is an important factor in the treatment
given to issues by a candidate. Accordingly:

a-WW

6. This study has concentrated on the content of
the speeches in the sample without regard to specific
impact upon voter behavior. Yet. as noted earlier in the
chapter. the literature supports the notion that issues
are increasingly important in influencing voting behavior.
Accordingly:

This chapter has briefly summarized the results of
the study. and has addressed these key areas: (1) the
role of issues in contemporary Presidential campaigns.

(2) how Nixon developed as a speaker in terms of observed
differences between the treatment of issues in the 1960
and 1968 campaigns. and (3) relational hypotheses
suggested by the study for further research.

 

 

 

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”What the Campaign Issues Are.” W. (September
7. 1968). 1%.

"what “‘9 93,3193)” Stand F915" We
LXV (October 28. 1968). li8-50.

”What President Nixon. Humphrey. Would Be Like.” 2129.-
XCII (November. 1968). 17-18.

”Where the Battle Is Between Nixon a. Wallace." ¥.§, N!!!
W. LXV (October 21. 1968). 50-5 .

”Where They Stand: Domestic Issues " m CV
(October 22. 1960). 112. ' '

"Whistle Stop.” m. LXXVI (November 7. 1960). 25-26.

Wildavsky. Aaron. “Nixon as President?” W.
VI (October. 1968). 8-15.

”Will Nixon Crack the Solid South?"
m. XLIX (September 26. 1960). 33-3 .

 

175

”Will TV or Events Swing It.” W. LVI (October 3.
1960). 3744-“.

“With Nixon on the Stum ." W. XLIX
(September 26. 1960?. 5h- .

 

176

C . NEWSPAPERS

Janssen. R. F. “Nixon's Economics.” £311_§§zee§_legghgl.
XLVIII. 29”. 00150”)? 21. 1968. pp. 1+0

Large. Arlen J. "Law and Order.” W1.
XLVIII. 295. October 22. 1968. p. 0.

Otten. Alan L. ”Nixon's Strategy.” lill.§£££££_l223nllm
XLVIII. 221. August 9. 1968. pp. 1+.

 

Royster. Vermont. “Reshaping the G.O.P.: .Nixon Aims to
Wed Fiscal Responsibility to Welfare State.“ 1311

W. XL. 210. July 29. 1960. p. 6.
. ”Richard Nixon's Return to the G.O.P. Helm."

W. XLVIII. 221. August 9. 1968.
pp. 1 -190

Semple. Robert B.. Jr. ”Two Nixons Emerge in 1968 Race:

Stump Sloganeer. Radio Thinker.” Ne:_xe;h_TThee.
OctOber 17. 1968. p. 38.

 

177

D. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce.
Subcommittee of the Subcommittee on Communication.
Q-‘sOg. e“ ".‘i'u ;. e : ':. - 'e-; g-_‘.
:"G. k P ' i 0 ,’ . -; {2! .d' .-’_°- 5 O V ‘-
' -: deg, 313.11 1 N 0 3-1,: a 1 0-1: A-Vben:
2. 12.0. Report 99 . Part 2. 37th Congress. 1st
Session. NOvember 28. 1961. Washington: Government
Printing Office. 1961.

U.S. Office of the President. President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. The

W- Neehinstem
Government inting Office. 1 .

 

178

E. UNPUBLISHED WORKS

Ellsworth. John W. ”Policy and Ideology in the campaigns
of 1960 and l96h.” Southern Illinois University. no
date. (Mimeographed).

Hartzer. James Robert. ”The Political Use and Abuse of
Television.” Unpublished'flaster's thesis. Michigan
State University. 1968.

Kissel. Bernard. ”A Rhetorical Study of Selected Speeches
Delivered by Richard Milhous Nixon During the Conven-
tion and Presidential campaign of 1956.” Unpublished
Doctor's dissertation. University of Michigan. 1956.

Mortensen. c. David. ”A Comparative Analysis of Political
Persuasion on Four Telecast Program Formats in the
1960 and 1969 Presidential Campaigns.”' Unpublished
Doctor's dissertation. University of Minnesota. 1968.

Polisky. Jerome B. “The Kennedy-Nixon Debatess' A Study
in Political Persuasion.“ Unpublished Doctor's
dissertation. University of Wisconsin. 1966. (Abstract

in fieeeeh_heheg;ehhe. XXXIII (August. 1966). 250-251.

Powell. James Grant. ”An Analytical and Comparative Study
of the Persuasion of Kennedy and Ndxon in the 1960
campaign.” Unpublished Doctor's dissertation.
University of Wisconsin. 196k. (Abstract in.§heeeh

W. m1 (August. 196“). 255-256-

Samovar. Larry A. ”A Study of Ambiguity and Unequivocation
in the 1960 Presidential Campaign Debates.” Unpub-
lished Doctor's dissertation. Purdue University. 1962.

Stacy. Bill W. ”The Campaign Speaking of Harry S. Truman
in the l9h8 Presidential Election.” Unpublished
goggor's dissertation. Southern Illinois University.

9 .

Trent. Judith S. ”An Examination and Comparison of the
Rhetorical Style of Richard Milhous Nixon in the
Presidential campaigns of 1960 and 1968: A Content
Analysis." Unpublished Doctor's dissertation.
University of Michigan. 1970.

179

Tsongas. Joyce Monson. "The Role of a Political Manage-
ment Firm in the 1966 Gubernatorial campaign Speaking
of Ronald Reagan.” Unpublished Master's thesis.
Purdue University. 1970.

 

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