A QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF
RICHARD M. NIXON'S TREATMENT
OF SELECTED ISSUES IN HIS
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ORATORY
IN THE 1960 AND 1968 ELECTIONS

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
DAVID A. THOMAS
1973

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

A Qualitative Content Analysis of Richard M. Nixon's
Treatment of Selected Issues in His Presidential
Campaign Oratory in the
1960 and 1968 Elections

presented by

David A. Thomas

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

_____Ph.D._____ degree in ___Speech___

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Date___April 20, 1973___

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ABSTRACT

A QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF RICHARD M. NIXON'S

TREATMENT OF SELECTED ISSUES IN HIS PRESIDENTIAL

CAMPAIGN ORATORY IN THE 1960 AND 1968 ELECTIONS

By

David A. Thomas

Issue discussion is one element of political
campaigning which political candidates engage in for the
purpose of manipulating voter behavior. Although it is
not yet possible to demonstrate the precise nature and
degree of influence issue discussion wields in a given
campaign, it is nevertheless instructive to study how a
candidate treats issues in his campaign methods.

The two presidential campaigns of Richard M. Nixon
offer an opportunity to study how one candidate treated
issues in two different campaigns, once as a losing candi-
date, and once as a winner. Such a study holds value and
interest in three areas: (1) it contributes to an under-
standing of the role of issues in contemporary Presidential
campaigns, including the attempt to influence voting
behavior, (2) it contributes to the knowledge of Nixon's
changes as a speaker between his unsuccessful and his
successful campaigns for the Presidency, and (3) it has

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heuristic value in that comparison of the two campaigns leads to formulation of relational hypotheses regarding the role of issue discussion in Presidential election campaigns in the future.

Accordingly, the problem for research was: How did Richard M. Nixon treat substantive issues in his campaign speaking during his two campaigns for the Presidency? Specifically, the study (1) delineated the treatment accorded to selected issues, namely war and peace, the pocketbook aspect of domestic economy, civil rights, and law and order, (2) analyzed the contents of a sample of Nixon's formal public addresses on the issues under examination, (3) conducted a rhetorical analysis of the issues in these speeches, (4) compared Nixon's shifts on the treatment of issues over the two campaigns, and (5) generated a set of testable hypotheses on the relationships between presidential campaign oratory and election outcome.

The study found that Nixon indeed addressed the selected issues in his campaign oratory in the two campaigns. Leading differences between the two campaigns included greater emphasis on law and order and civil rights in 1968, less emphasis on issues of war and peace in 1968, and a generally more neutral position on nearly all issues in 1968 (except for issues of the pocketbook, in which he attacked the spending policies of the incumbent administration.) In 1968, pursuing a centrist

strategy, Nixo

than in 1960.

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strategy, Nixon addressed more issues, more superficially, than in 1960. He avoided serious discussion of some issues most important to the electorate, especially Vietnam.

The hypotheses suggested for further study posed possible relations between issue treatment and any or all of these variables: candidate's role, candidate's party, media used, timing, and voting behavior.

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By

David A. Thomas

A THESIS

Submitted to

Michigan State University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Speech

1973

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Chapter 1

THE PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Although the 1972 re-election of Richard M. Nixon
to the Presidency came as no surprise, his 1968 electoral
victory marked the phenomenal political comeback of a man
who had announced a self-imposed political exile in 1962.
He had, at that time, just been defeated in the California
gubernatorial election. Only two years earlier, he had
lost the 1960 Presidential election to John F. Kennedy.

In both his earlier campaigns for the Presidency,
Richard M. Nixon gave numerous speeches. A study of the
treatment of issues in his campaign speaking in those two
elections holds interest for researchers in more than one
field: for historians, because of its reflection of the
times; for political scientists, because of its role in
political campaigning; and for rhetoricians, because of
its persuasive impact. Apart from any academic interest
in the subject, there is also a general relevance of this
study to the interests of the American public, which bases
its voting behavior at least in part upon its view of a
candidate's position on the issues.

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This chapter will present a discussion of the uses of oratory in Presidential election campaigns; a statement of the problem, including definitions and limitations; a review of relevant literature; a description of the methodology employed in the study, an overview of the remaining chapters of the dissertation; and a summary.

Oratory in Presidential Election Campaigns

Oratory by candidates is a traditional technique of campaigning for the Presidency. Perhaps the classic example of the use of the technique is Harry S. Truman's famous whistle-stop tours in 1948. In that year, President Truman traveled approximately 30,000 miles by train to deliver some 350 speeches during the five months preceding the election.[1] Other candidates have also followed this tradition in recent Presidential elections. For example, in 1960, John F. Kennedy delivered an "all-purpose" speech several times a day at various campaign stops.[2] In 1964, Barry Goldwater's campaign centered on a plan to engage President Lyndon B. Johnson in a

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[1] Bill W. Stacy, "The Campaign Speaking of Harry S. Truman in the 1948 Presidential Election" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Southern Illinois University, 1968), p. 188.

[2] Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 (New York: Signet Books, 1961), p. 291.

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political dialogue or debate featuring a confrontation of the conservative and the liberal positions on various campaign issues. Although President Johnson refused to debate, he did make campaign speeches.[3]

Why do candidates continue this tradition? As is true of all campaign activities, the general aim of campaign speaking is to influence voters' behavior. Campaign strategies revolve around tactics which, according to Nimmo, (1) raise the candidate's identification quotient among voters, when necessary, (2) motivate a high partisan turnout of supporters, (3) negatively motivate the opponent's strong partisan supporters to "take a walk," or ignore the election, and (4) win most of the attentive independent (or undecided) voters.[4]

In keeping with the general aim of influencing voters' behavior, candidates have at least two purposes in pursuing campaign speaking activities: (1) to enhance their images as potential leaders, and (2) to discuss pertinent issues with the electorate.

This distinction is arbitrary. Issue discussion occurs on at least a superficial level in most, if not

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[3]Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1964 (New York: Signet Books, 1965), pp. 393, 425.

[4]Dan Nimmo, The Political Persuaders (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Spectrum, 1970), pp. 24-25.

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all, of a Presidential candidate's messages. Conversely, a candidate's in-depth treatment of issues in position papers, or in articles for intellectual and specialized publications like Foreign Affairs, is bound to affect the candidate's image in some ways.

Yet the distinction is real enough in an important way. The candidate himself makes the distinction between speaking for the purpose of creating a favorable personal impression among the electorate, and speaking for the purpose of persuading voters to accept his position on substantive issues. For instance, Nixon made such a distinction in his 1968 campaign. According to Robert B. Semple, Jr., Nixon believed that the stump was not the place to bring depth and substance to his discussion of the country's problems, preferring instead to reduce complicated issues to manageable generalities while goading the audience with "lusty battle cries."[5] In the same campaign, however, Nixon gave a series of radio talks aimed at specific issues, containing substantive discussions and offering specific programs and pledges.[6]

At any rate, several elements are operative in the practice of campaign oratory as an instrument of image building by Presidential candidates. First, the

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[5]Robert B. Semple, Jr., "Two Nixons Emerge in '68 Race: Stump Sloganeer, Radio Thinker," New York Times, October 17, 1968, p. 38.

[6]Ibid.

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electorate has come to expect oratory as a traditional part of a campaign. By "going on the stump," a candidate fulfills the voters' expectations in this regard. Through campaign speeches, a candidate also reinforces his image as a concerned, knowledgeable and dynamic leader. Nimmo described this aspect of campaigning as follows:

> The prepared speech repeated endlessly is perhaps the most common. Campaign mythology says that the purpose behind these formal presentations is to enable the candidate to "speak out on the issues." But, the speeches are not designed to change people's minds or even to give an in-depth view of the candidate's position. The function of discussing issues is more latent than manifest. By quoting facts and details on a variety of issues the candidate leaves the impression that he possesses the knowledge, sophistication, and acumen to hold public office.[7]

Second, campaign oratory enables the candidate and the electorate to interact, if only symbolically. By attending political rallies, voters share a sense of participation in the election process.[8] Moreover, a wide audience of people shares this sense of participation vicariously, through the mass media of communications. Mendelsohn and Crespi stated that one reason candidates tour the nation is to furnish varied and new backgrounds for television news items on the campaign.[9]

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[7]Nimmo, pp. 119-120.

[8]Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, Illinois: Illini Books, 1964), pp. 2-3.

[9]Harold Mendelsohn and Irving Crespi, Polls, Television, and the New Politics (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 281-282.

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Third, at a more pragmatic level, candidates themselves seem to derive some measure of inspiration and motivation from their contacts with voters, and from voters' feedback to their speeches. In describing the campaign of John F. Kennedy, White discussed this aspect of campaign oratory:

> Thus only the personal audience, below the level of strategic calculation, can give him the one thing he needs most: the response of warmth or frost, of applause or indifference. Its laughter, its scowl, its silence, its cheers, its yearning, its measuring eyes, are the only clues to the mystic communication between the leader and the led, to tell truly whether he has reached those he seeks to lead.[10]

For these reasons--voter expectations, symbolic interaction, and audience feedback--campaign oratory is useful as a device for image enhancement.

But beyond these considerations, oratory also serves as a vehicle for a candidate's discussion of selected issues. At the ritualistic level, of course, certain statements and positions have come to be expected in a candidate's oratory. For instance, James mentioned a few of these:

> A Presidential candidate is forced to emphasize party symbols by highly partisan statements. For Democrats this means hauling out the banner of the New Deal and blaming Republicans for the Great Depression. For Republicans it means hauling out Abraham Lincoln and the traditional symbols of rugged individualism.[11]

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[10]White, *The Making of the President 1960*, p. 291.

[11]Dorothy Buckton James, *The Contemporary Presidency* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 37.

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Clearly, this level of issue discussion is, at best, on the borderline between image-enhancement and serious treatment of issues. Yet a candidate may take the opportunity to speak in greater specificity on contemporary national problems, and to advocate policies and actions which he would take if he were elected. Nimmo recognized the issue-discussion function of a candidate's speeches:

> Despite the limitations to open discussion, however, it is clear that an election provides an opportunity for more intimate communication between governors, or potential governors, and governed than is normal in the political system. In the process certain problems on the minds of constituents have an opportunity to surface. Some become topics for debate, as did the war in Vietnam and urban rioting in the presidential primaries of 1968; others are ignored, as have been problems of water and air pollution in numerous elections. This, then, is "one of the most important functions of campaigns: the inclusion, exclusion, and crystallization of issues and problems on the agenda of officeholders."[12]

In summary, then, Presidential campaign oratory is a traditional means of seeking to influence voters' behavior, through image enhancement and through discussion of issues.

Nixon's Campaign Oratory in the 1960 and 1968 Presidential Elections

Nixon engaged in public speaking during both his campaigns with a view to enhancing his image and discussing issues. In both campaigns, he barnstormed his way

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[12]Nimmo, pp. 8-9.

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back and forth across the country, presenting the same
"basic speech" which consisted of a series of tested
"applause lines," but which contained little that could
be designated as an in-depth discussion of issues.[13]
This form of campaign oratory seemed designed to serve
the function of image enhancement for the candidate.

Also, in both campaigns, Nixon occasionally
presented campaign speeches with the intention of
discussing campaign issues in depth, and of clarifying
his position on the issues. For these speeches, Nixon
used a variety of media, including radio and television,
as well as in-person audience speaking situations.

Nixon's campaign speaking in both his campaigns
for the Presidency will be presented in greater detail
in Chapter 2.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Research Problem

As noted above, Richard M. Nixon spoke extensively
in his two campaigns for the Presidency. To this point,
it has been explicitly assumed that Nixon's campaign
oratory can be differentiated between that designed to
enhance his image, and that designed to clarify his
position on issues. That assumption is not universally

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[13]"The Vice President: Road Show Tryout,"
Newsweek, August 15, 1960, p. 26. Also Relman Morin, The
Associated Press Story of Election 1968 (New York:
Pocket Books, 1969), pp. 185-188.

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accepted. For example, writing about campaign speaking in general, Lewis A. Froman, Jr., stated:

> Candidates must, first and foremost, not alienate any of their would-be supporters. They must appeal to a wide and diverse public, a public which is, generally speaking, uninformed and uninterested in specific issues. It is no wonder, then, that campaigns are generally devoid of any issue content (other than style issues), because they are primarily emotional appeals for support.[14]

Blanket evaluations such as Froman's are underscored by some media analysts who emphasize the ever-increasing role of professional campaign management techniques in modern electioneering. For instance, Gene Wyckoff said:

> The influence of issues on the outcome of elections also seems to be declining as (1) political questions become too complex for ready statement or comprehension and (2) _candidates themselves avoid assuming issue positions that might be considered too extreme._ [Italics added.][15]

Opposing these viewpoints is a school of thought which asserts that issues in a campaign play an important role in helping the voters decide which of the candidates to vote for. For instance, in V. O. Key's posthumously published work, _The Responsible Electorate_, which was based upon studies made of voting in Presidential

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[14]Lewis A. Froman, Jr., _People and Politics_ (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962), p. 64.

[15]Gene Wyckoff, _The Image Candidates_ (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 6.

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elections from 1936 to 1960, the principle assumption which

was supported is this:

> The perverse and unorthodox argument of this little
> book is that voters are not fools. . . . In
> American presidential campaigns of recent decades
> the portrait of the American electorate that
> develops from the data is not one of an electorate
> straitjacketed by social determinants or moved by
> subconscious urges triggered by devilishly skillful
> propagandists. It is rather one of an electorate
> moved by concern about central and relevant questions
> of public policy, of governmental performance, and
> of executive personality.[16]

In another recent study of Presidential campaign

techniques, John W. Ellsworth stated, "There is a good

possibility that issue-oriented campaigning can be

instrumental in winning votes."[17]

Thus, it is clear that there are conflicting

opinions as to the importance, even the existence, of

issues in political campaigns. On the one hand, Froman

and Wyckoff exemplify the school of thought which denies

that candidates discuss issues in campaigns. On the other

hand, Key and Ellsworth articulate the position that

issues are important elements of political campaigns.

In this study, the latter position is accepted.

It is assumed that, at certain times, candidates do

address themselves to substantive issues. As previously

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[16]V. O. Key, Jr., _The Responsible Electorate_
(New York: Vintage Books, 1966), pp. 7-8.

[17]John W. Ellsworth, "Policy and Ideology in the
Campaigns of 1960 and 1964," (Southern Illinois University,
no date), pp. 2-3. (Mimeographed.)

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mentioned, Chapter 2 of this dissertation describes
Nixon's two campaigns for the Presidency, and his strategy
of presenting the "basic speech" to audiences on the
"stump" for image enhancement, while presenting issue-
discussion speeches on certain occasions.

Accordingly, the problem for research is: How
did Richard M. Nixon treat substantive issues in his
campaign speaking during his two campaigns for the
Presidency? Specifically, the study proposes (1) to
delineate the treatment accorded by Nixon to selected
issues, namely war and peace, pocketbook aspect of domestic
economy, civil rights, and law and order, (2) to analyze
the contents of a sample of Nixon's formal public
addresses on the issues under examination, (3) to conduct
a rhetorical analysis of the issues in these speeches,
(4) to compare Nixon's shifts on the treatment of issues
over the two presidential campaigns, and (5) to generate
a set of testable propositions (or hypotheses) on the
relationships between presidential campaign oratory and
presidential election outcome.

Rationale for the Study

A study of Richard M. Nixon's treatment of issues
in his two Presidential campaigns is valuable for its
contribution to knowledge within three broad dimensions:

(1) The study will contribute to an under-
standing of the role of issues in contemporary

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Presidential campaigns insofar as generalizations can be made on the basis of examining, in depth, that particular aspect of one candidate's communications in two recent campaigns. This role of issues includes the attempt to influence voting behavior.

(2) It will contribute to the knowledge of Nixon's changes as a speaker (in reference to treatment of issue-oriented content) between his unsuccessful and his successful campaigns for the Presidency. Although no correlation is suggested between "improved" speaking and electoral success, increased understanding of Nixon's rhetoric is valuable because of the importance of Nixon's role as a national leader and as President.

(3) Also, the study has heuristic value in that comparison of the two campaigns will lead to formulation of relational hypotheses regarding the role of issue discussion in Presidential election campaigns in the future.

General Approach Taken in the Study

The general approach in this study is a modified rhetorical analysis of Nixon's treatment of selected issues in a sample of his campaign speeches during the 1960 and 1968 elections.

A qualitative content analysis of his treatment of selected issues in the sample of speeches is undertaken

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to determine with some degree of precision and objectivity what Nixon's positions were on the issues, and how his treatment of issues differed over the two campaigns. The study begins with a description of historical and biographical factors bearing upon Nixon's political speaking, and of the socio-economic climates bearing upon the two campaigns under consideration. Then the data produced by the content analysis is reported. Finally, based upon this data, a rhetorical interpretation and evaluation of Nixon's treatment of issues in the two campaigns is presented.

Definitions and Limitations of the Study

As it is stated, the research problem is broad. For the purposes of this study, the following definitions and limitations will apply:

1. This study is limited to the campaign oratory of only one candidate, Richard M. Nixon.

2. "Substantive issues" is limited to issues of public policy about which a candidate for the Presidency might be expected to speak. Issues of public policy are those issues about which legislative action might be taken, for example, agricultural policy, defense policy, foreign policy, economic policy, and the like. The criteria and the process for selecting issues for this study are described below in the section on methodology.

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This study excludes issues of personality, such as the relative experience of the candidates in positions of leadership. Also excluded from this study are discussions of Nixon's style, delivery, and organization.

3. "Campaign speaking" is limited to a sample of the formal public addresses by Mr. Nixon. Not included in this term are the joint television debates with John F. Kennedy in 1960; any press conference or other question-and-answer format remarks by Mr. Nixon; or study papers, articles, books or other publications not presented as formal speeches by Mr. Nixon. However, this study does not make a distinction between the various media for communicating speeches. This definition includes speeches to live audiences, radio speeches, and television speeches. The criteria and process of selecting the sample of speeches for analysis are discussed in the methodology section below.

4. "During the campaigns" is limited to the periods of time between the acceptance of the Republican nomination and the day before Election Day in 1960 and again in 1968.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

A survey of literature was conducted to discover existing works which offer insight and information bearing upon the purposes of this study in the following areas:

The political speaking of Richard M. Nixon, the role of public speaking in Presidential campaigns, and the role of issues in Presidential campaigns. The survey included an examination of the card catalogue of the Michigan State University Library, and the past ten years' volumes of American Political Science Review, Public Opinion Quarterly, Review of Politics, Quarterly Journal of Speech, Speech Monographs, and Journalism Quarterly. Additionally, the past ten years' volumes of the Public Affairs Information Service, the 1960 and 1968 volumes of the New York Times Index, and Volume 22 (March-February 1959-1961) and Volume 28 (March-February 1968-1969) of the Readers Guide to Periodical Literature, were examined.

Issues of volumes of Speech Monographs and Dissertation Abstracts were also examined.

A selected bibliography of sources found in the survey is appended to this study.

Works bearing upon the political speaking of Richard M. Nixon include the following:

Judith S. Trent compared the rhetorical style of Nixon's campaign speeches in the 1960 and 1968 campaigns in her doctoral dissertation in 1970.[18] Her study found

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[18]Judith Swanlund Trent, "An Examination and Comparison of the Rhetorical Style of Richard Milhous Nixon in the Presidential Campaigns of 1960 and 1968: A Content Analysis" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, University of Michigan, 1970).

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that, in six aspects of style, Nixon's speaking differed

significantly over the two campaigns due primarily to

Nixon's increased use of professional speech writers in

his second campaign. This study, incidentally, is the

only study of Nixon's speaking in the two campaigns found

in this survey, but its principal focus ignores Nixon's

treatment of issues in his speeches.

Trent wrote in summary of her survey of litera-

ture for her dissertation,

> As a body, the scholarly research on Nixon does
> not provide comprehensive empirical examination
> of his speaking. Much of the research has been
> based on a small selected sample or even a single
> speech. No previous empirical study has examined
> several major features of Nixon's rhetoric through-
> out even a single campaign.[19]

The survey of literature by this writer revealed nothing

which would change Trent's assessment, except for Trent's

dissertation.

Bernard Kissel examined six of Nixon's speeches

in the nominating convention and campaign of 1956 (when

Nixon was running for his second term as Vice-President)

in his doctoral dissertation.[20] Kissel's study is purely

rhetorical in focus, and adds little to an understanding

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[19]Ibid., p. 6.

[20]Bernard Kissel, "A Rhetorical Study of Selected
Speeches Delivered by Richard Milhous Nixon During the
Convention and Presidential Campaign of 1956" (unpublished
Doctor's dissertation, University of Michigan, 1956).

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campaigns.

Larry A. Samovar, in his doctoral dissertation,

examined ambiguity in the Nixon-Kennedy debates by

analyzing the content of the debates and then testing it

for ambiguity in the perception of a group of listeners.[21]

Samovar found that perception of ambiguity was related

to the listeners' political preferences, as each candi-

date's supporters believed the message of their candidate

to be relatively clear, but his opponent's message to be

ambiguous.

In an article published in the **Western Political**

Quarterly, John W. Ellsworth reported that a content

analysis of the 1960 television debates and of other

campaign speeches revealed that both Kennedy and Nixon

used more evidence and analysis, and less partisan attacks,

in the debates than in other campaign speeches where there

was less prospect of imminent rebuttal by the opponent.[22]

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[21]Larry Allen Samovar, "A Study of Ambiguity and
Unequivocation in the 1960 Presidential Campaign Debates"
(unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Purdue University,
1962).

[22]John W. Ellsworth, "Rationality and Campaigning:
A Content Analysis of The 1960 Presidential Campaign
Debates," **Western Political Quarterly**, XVIII (1965),
794-802.

Popular, journalistic accounts of the campaigns in question, such as T. H. White's <u>The Making of the President 1960</u>[23] and <u>The Making of the President 1968</u>,[24] Jules Witcover's <u>The Resurrection of Richard Nixon</u>,[25] Chester, Hodgson, and Page's <u>An American Melodrama</u>,[26] Morin's <u>The Associated Press Story of Election 1968</u>,[27] and <u>Politics 1968</u> by the Congressional Quarterly Service,[28] are among the leading sources of information about Nixon's campaign strategies and performances, together with contemporary newspaper and magazine articles (listed in the Bibliography). The leading biographies of Nixon are Mazo and Hess's <u>Nixon: A Political Portrait</u>,[29] and

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[23]Theodore H. White, <u>The Making of the President 1960</u> (New York: Signet Books, 1961).

[24]Theodore H. White, <u>The Making of the President 1968</u> (New York: Pocket Books, 1970).

[25]Jules Witcover, <u>The Resurrection of Richard Nixon</u> (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970).

[26]Lewis Chester and others, <u>An American Melodrama: The Presidential Campaign of 1968</u> (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1969).

[27]Relman Morin, <u>The Associated Press Story of Election 1968</u> (New York: Pocket Books, 1969).

[28]Nelson Poynter (ed.), <u>Politics in America: The Politics and Issues of the Postwar Years</u> (3rd ed.; Washington: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1969).

[29]Earl Mazo and Stephen Hess, <u>Nixon: A Political Portrait</u> (New York: Popular Library, 1968).

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Hoyt's <u>The Nixons: An American Family</u>.[30]   Also, Nixon's

<u>Six Crises</u> includes a section on the 1968 campaign.[31]

The survey of literature found few works which

focus on the role of speaking in Presidential campaigns,

but there are several items covering campaign strategies,

of which campaign speaking is one of several tactics.

Dan Nimmo's book, <u>The Political Persuaders</u>, is

the best recent description of contemporary campaign

management strategies and techniques.[32]   According to

Nimmo, candidates in modern important elections rely

heavily upon polling techniques to determine where

campaign activities ought to be concentrated, and what

types of appeals would be most effective in a particular

campaign.   Nimmo also described the various channels of

communication employed by candidates in current campaigns,

including, among others, saturation political advertising

on television, and "personal media" including public

speaking engagements.   Crespi and Mendelsohn's <u>Polls,</u>

<u>Television, and the New Politics</u> echoed the same themes,

but emphasized the extensive uses made of polls and

television by candidates, as implied by the title of the

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[30]Edwin P. Hoyt, <u>The Nixons: An American Family</u>
(New York: Random House, 1972).

[31]Richard M. Nixon, <u>Six Crises</u> (New York: Pyramid
Books, 1968).

[32]Dan Nimmo, <u>The Political Persuaders</u> (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Spectrum, 1970).

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book.[33] A recent analysis of campaign practices and
technologies which goes beyond the 1968 campaign consid-
erably is Agranoff's The New Style in Election Campaigns.[34]
A pragmatic analysis of the Republican approach to the
1968 campaign may be found in Scammon and Wattenberg's
The Real Majority.[35]

Mortensen's doctoral dissertation compared the
uses made of television by the Presidential candidates in
the 1960 and 1964 campaigns, and found a trend away from
extended speeches and toward brief advertisements and
question-answer formats.[36] Joyce M. Tsongas' M.A. thesis
described the role of the Spencer-Davis campaign man-
agement organization in Ronald Reagan's successful bid
for the California governorship, and concluded that
Reagan's speeches were heavily influenced, if not dictated
by, the strategies laid down by the professional campaign

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[33]Harold Meldelsohn and Irving Crespi, Polls,
Television, and the New Politics (Scranton, Pennsylvania:
Chandler Publishing Co., 1970).

[34]Robert Agranoff (ed.), The New Style in Election
Campaigns (Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1972).

[35]Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg. The
Real Majority (New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegen,
1971).

[36]C. David Mortensen, "A Comparative Analysis of
Political Persuasion on Four Telecast Program Formats in
the 1960 and 1964 Presidential Campaigns" (unpublished
Doctor's dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1968).

managers.[37] In an article in the <u>Central States Speech</u>
<u>Journal</u>, Jerry Mandel stated that public speaking played
a key role in Senator Percy's 1966 Senatorial campaign
in Illinois.[38]

An interesting, if not scholarly, addition to the
literature of campaign strategies is McGinniss' <u>The</u>
<u>Selling of the President</u> 1968, a description of the
television advertising campaign mounted in behalf of
Nixon's campaign for the Presidency.[39]

There are several traditional rhetorical studies
of Presidents and other leading political speakers which
touch upon campaign speaking to a greater or lesser
degree. A good example of this type of study is Stacy's
doctoral dissertation on the campaign speeches of Harry S.
Truman in 1948, which concluded that Truman's whistle-
stop campaign tours were instrumental in his successful
election bid.[40]

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[37]Joyce Monson Tsongas, "The Role of a Political
Management Firm in the 1966 Gubernatorial Campaign
Speaking of Ronald Reagan" (unpublished Master's thesis,
Purdue University, 1970).

[38]Jerry E. Mandel, "The Presentation of Image in
Charles H. Percy's Whistle-Stop Tour of 1966," <u>Central</u>
<u>States Speech Journal</u>, XXI, 4 (Winter, 1970), 209-216.

[39]Joe McGinniss, <u>The Selling of the President 1968</u>
(New York: Trident Press, 1968).

[40]Bill W. Stacy, "The Campaign Speaking of Harry S.
Truman in the 1948 Presidential Election" (unpublished
Doctor's dissertation, Southern Illinois University, 1968).

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As noted, the literature which deals with the role of issues in political campaigns seems to be divided between two schools of thought. The older school of thought, that voters' behavior can be predicted more accurately from a knowledge of partisan alignments and other external factors than from a knowledge of the candidates' positions on the campaign issues, is represented by the standard voting studies by Lazarsfeld, et al. The People's Choice,[41] Campbell, et al. The Voter Decides,[42] Berelson, et al. Voting,[43] and Campbell, et al. The American Voter.[44]

The other school of thought, apparently based upon second thoughts about the older studies, gives a more prominent place to campaign issues as a factor, if not a determining factor, in voters' behavior. This school of thought is represented by V. O. Key, Jr., in

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[41]Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944).

[42]Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson, 1954).

[43]Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

[44]Angus Campbell and others, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960).

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his posthumously published <u>The Responsible Electorate</u>,[45]
and Milton C. Cummings[46] and Stanley Kelley, Jr.,[47] in
their articles in <u>The President: Rex, Princeps, Imperator?</u>

Overall, the survey of literature uncovered
several streams, or at least undercurrents, of thinking
about political campaigning. The campaigners themselves
seem to be moving in the direction of adding modern
innovations such as television commercials to their
activities, while not eliminating the traditional practice
of presenting campaign speeches (including speeches to
discuss issues) from their schedules. The scholarly
appraisal of the effects of any particular campaign tech-
nique is uncertain. Most disconcerting is the shortage of
much academic attention to the candidates' treatment of
issues in a campaign, particularly of Nixon's treatment of
issues in his 1960 and 1968 campaigns for the Presidency.

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[45]V. O. Key, Jr., with the assistance of Milton C.
Cummings, Jr., <u>The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in
Presidential Voting 1936-1960</u> (New York: Vintage Books,
1966).

[46]Milton C. Cummings, Jr., "The Strategic Outlook
for the National Elections of 1968," <u>The President: Rex,
Princeps, Imperator?</u>, ed. Joseph M. Ray (The University
of Texas at El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1969).

[47]Stanley Kelley, Jr., "Campaign Propaganda in
Perspective," <u>The President: Rex, Princeps, Imperator?</u>
ed. Joseph M. Ray (The University of Texas at El Paso:
Texas Western Press, 1969).

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METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This study of Nixon's treatment of issues in his
1960 and 1968 campaigns for the Presidency is a modified
rhetorical criticism, featuring a content analysis of
Nixon's campaign speeches.

Rhetorical Criticism

Scholarship in speech criticism has traditionally
employed the critical approach described in Thonssen and
Baird's Speech Criticism. Its aim is to describe, analyze,
interpret and evaluate the interplay between a speaker and
his audience through his messages in terms of the persua-
sive effects of the speaker's messages upon the audience.
In order to accomplish a full-blown criticism, it is
necessary to examine the speaker's messages for com-
pleteness and authenticity, to investigate the speaker's
background for his intellectual and rhetorical resources,
to recreate the speaking situation within which the
speaker acted (both in terms of the immediate situation
and also the larger social and cultural contexts), and
then to reconstruct both the audience's immediate reactions
and the long-term effects of the messages. Aristotelian
canons of rhetoric, including invention, disposition,
style, and delivery; and artistic modes of proof, including

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ethos, pathos, and logos, comprise the critic's norms for description, and, to a degree, for evaluation.[48]

Some researchers in speech have questioned the products of this traditional form of rhetorical criticism. Redding observed that when each step was faithfully performed, the resulting criticism has been overwhelmingly biographical and historical, with inadequate space or attention devoted to rhetorical analysis of the speaker's messages. Redding called for speech critics to consider these proposals: "(1) that studies be encouraged which represent a shift in emphasis toward a more thorough analysis of speech content; and (2) that more attention be paid to developing appropriate techniques for executing such analysis."[49] Specifically, Redding suggested content analysis techniques.[50]

Hillbruner also questioned the necessity for including each step of the traditional rhetorical study. Rather, he suggested, rhetorical studies might focus on

[48]Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York: Ronald Press, 1948), Parts I, IV, and V.

[49]W. Charles Redding, "Extrinsic and Intrinsic Criticism," Western Speech, XXI, 2 (Spring, 1957), 96-97, 100-101.

[50]Ibid., p. 102. A similar appeal for the use of content analysis in rhetorical criticism is voiced by Martin Maloney, "Some New Directions in Rhetorical Criticism," Central States Speech Journal, IV, 1 (March, 1953), 1-5.

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any of the steps and still contribute worthwhile knowledge
to the field. Hillbruner stated:

> Contemporary critics are beginning to follow the
> conception that useful evaluation can have as its
> aim the criticism of almost any significant aspect
> of public address. It can concern itself with a
> speech: its ideas or its artistry or lack of either;
> its impact; its relation to current intellectual
> scientific, religious, political, philosophical,
> educational or artistic problems; its relation to
> the speaker's deeds; its value; its results.[51]

Accordingly, in keeping with the suggestions of
Redding and Hillbruner, this study modifies the traditional
rhetorical critical approach by eliminating some of its
steps, and by adding content analysis techniques to
analyze the campaign speeches of Nixon in the 1960 and
1968 elections.

Specifically, this study is concerned with the
treatment of issues in Nixon's campaign speaking. To
accomplish this limited criticism, the biographical
antecedents relevant to Nixon's political speaking are
described, and the two campaigns are reconstructed in
terms of their social, historical and political contexts,
with particular reference to the issues selected for
analysis. Next, Nixon's campaign speeches are analyzed
using content analysis techniques as described below.
Finally, Nixon's treatment of campaign issues are inter-
preted and evaluated in terms of his development as a

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[51]Anthony Hillbruner, Critical Dimensions (New
York: Random House, 1966), p. 4.

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speaker, and in terms of the role of campaign issues in contemporary political campaigns.

Content Analysis

Content analysis is a research method used to describe the content of communications in a systematic, objective manner. Numerous definitions and descriptions of the method exist; perhaps the best known definition is Berelson's: "Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication."[52] In a review of Berelson's and other definitions of content analysis, Holsti stated that there is broad agreement on the requirements of objectivity, system, and generality, and limited agreement on the requirements that the method must be quantitative and limited to the analysis of manifest content.[53]

Content analysis usually follows six stages, as described by Budd, Thorp, and Donohew: (1) Formulation of the research question, theory, and hypotheses; (2) selection of a sample of communications, and definition of categories; (3) coding of the content according to objective rules; (4) scoring of the data in some

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[52]Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952), p. 18.

[53]Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1969), p. 3.

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manner; (5) if included in the research design, the comparison of scores with other variables; and (6) interpretation of findings according to appropriate concepts or theories.[54]

Content analysis is particularly useful in the analysis of political communications, especially in trend studies in which the same categories are analyzed at different points in time.[55] A study which compares messages from a single source over time in order to draw inferences about trends is "one of the most frequently used forms of content analysis," according to Holsti.[56]

Unit of analysis. The most useful unit of analysis for the study of some types of political communications is the statement (also called "theme," "assertion," proposition," or "idea"), because, being a complete thought unit consisting of a subject and a predicate, it takes the form in which issues are usually discussed.[57]

Accordingly, the unit of analysis used in this study is the statement. In this study, a statement

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[54]Richard W. Budd, Robert K. Thorp, and Lewis Donohew, Content Analysis of Communications (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967), p. 6.

[55]Berelson, p. 149.

[56]Holsti, pp. 28-29.

[57]Berelson, pp. 149, 139.

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consists of a subject and a predicate. The subject may be either explicit or implied; the predicate may also be explicit or implied. A statement may consist of a simple sentence, an independent clause in a compound or a complex sentence, or a dependent clause in a complex sentence. Hence, a statement may consist of word patterns ranging from a single word to a paragraph, since the distinguishing characteristic of a statement is the presence of a subject and a predicate, rather than an arbitrary word count or the artifacts of indentations or punctuation marks. Complete rules for counting statements, including illustrations, are described below.

In this study, statements are classified according to their direction as the determinant of Nixon's treatment of issues. Berelson described direction analysis as the classification of content as pro, con, or neutral, according to rules.[58] Directions for classifying statements by direction, either pro, con, or neutral, are described below.

Categories and indicators. Categories are the classifications which are applied to the content to achieve its analysis. Content analysis stands or falls

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[58]Ibid., p. 150.

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by its categories, because the categories reflect the questions asked by the research problem.[59]

Categories must meet certain requirements in their construction. According to Holsti, these requirements are: "Categories should reflect the purposes of the research, be exhaustive, be mutually exclusive, independent, and be derived from a single classification [Italics in original.]"[60]

The requirement that categories must reflect the purposes of the research means that the variables are clearly defined, and that indicators of the categories are valid and reliable representations of the variables.[61] In this study, the categories are comprised of the issues selected for analysis, and the indicators are comprised of specific areas of issue analysis and discussion within each category. Indicators are considered as almost subcategories of the categories, and have been termed "operational definitions of categories."[62] Rules for determining categories and indicators, including illustrations, are given below. The questions of validity and reliability are discussed below in the section on validity and reliability.

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[59]Ibid., p. 146. See also Budd, Thorp, and Donohew, p. 39.

[60]Holsti, p. 95.   [61]Ibid.

[62]Budd, Thorp, and Donohew, pp. 42-43.

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The requirement that categories must be <u>exhaustive</u> means that all relevant items in the sample of documents under study must be capable of being placed into a category.[63] In this study, in addition to the issue categories, there is a separate category labeled "unclassified" for all statements not counted in another category.

The requirement that categories must be <u>mutually exclusive</u> means that no content datum can be placed in more than a single cell.[64] This requirement is met in this study by classifying each statement according to a set of rules. Any statement which fails to fit an indicator according to the rules is placed in the single "unclassified" category; indicators are mutually exclusive.

The requirement that categories must be <u>independent</u> means that assignment of any datum into a category must not affect the classification of other data.[65] This requirement is directed at Q-sort techniques, and does not apply to this study.

The requirement that categories must be <u>derived</u> from a single classification principle means that conceptually different levels of analysis must be kept separate.[66] In this study, categories represent separate issues discussed in the two campaigns, and all analysis is on the same conceptual level.

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[63]Holsti, p. 99.   [64]Ibid.

[65]Ibid., p. 100.   [66]Ibid.

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Issues. The issues selected for analysis are not designed to represent an exhaustive delineation of every issue statement found in Nixon's campaign speeches. They are selected to represent some of the broader substantive areas any candidate for the Presidency might be expected to address, based on the assumption that the nature of the office and the nature of the electorate offer some features commonly found in most elections at the national level. A second criterion for issue selection is based upon references in the literature to issues which were, in fact, found in the two campaigns in question, either in the candidate's major campaign appeals, or in public expressions of interest or concern in specific issues.

Regarding the first criterion, the nature of the office and of the electorate, it is true that the Presidency is the office most concerned with foreign policy and with questions of national policy bearing upon the economic and social welfare of the nation's citizens as a whole. Also, the Presidency, together with the Vice-Presidency, is the only nationally elected set of offices; hence, Presidential candidates have to discuss issues of interest to the national electorate.

As to the second criterion, the literature contains several references to what were the major concerns of the national electorate during the two campaigns

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In question, as well as references to what were the principle issue areas addressed by Nixon in both campaigns. For instance, a telephone poll conducted by Pool and his associates in August, 1960, revealed that the issues upper-most in voters' minds in that campaign were foreign policy issues, including avoiding war with the Russians, keeping ahead of the Russians in production, and developing missiles to check the Russians.[67] Paul T. David stated that civil rights, foreign and defense policy, domestic economic policy, and problems of agriculture were salient throughout the 1960 campaign.[68] Nixon's 1960 strategy, according to White, hinged on emphasizing the Eisenhower record in the areas of peace and prosperity,[69] and, in fact, Nixon's campaign was characterized by its focus on firmness toward Russia and "fiscal responsibility" in domestic affairs.[70] Turning to the 1968 campaign, Milton C. Cummings, Jr., stated that in August, 1968, the American public regarded Vietnam, crime,

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[67]Ithiel de Sola Pool and others, Candidates, Issues, and Strategies (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 83-84.

[68]Paul T. David, "The Presidential Nominations," The Presidential Elections and Transition 1960-1961, ed. Paul T. David (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1961), pp. 22-23.

[69]White, The Making of the President 1960, p. 300.

[70]Poynter, p. 38.

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and civil rights as the three most pressing national problems.[71] Witcover reported that Nixon's 1968 strategy was designed to focus on the issues of Vietnam, crime and violence, inflation, civil disobedience, and the causes of restlessness among minority groups.[72] White reported that all 1968 candidates for the nomination of either party, except Eugene McCarthy, emphasized "law-and-order" at home and "peace" in Vietnam.[73]

There is some overlap between issues, of course. Some commentators see close similarities between "Civil Rights" and "Law and Order" in particular. However, especially in the 1968 campaign, there is a strong argument for isolating the two areas as discrete enough for content analysis. Philip Converse and his colleagues at the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan stated:

> From Vietnam and the racial crisis a corollary discontent crystallized that might be treated as a third towering issue of the 1968 campaign, or as nothing more than a restatement of the other two issues. This was the cry for "law and order" and against "crime in the streets." While Goldwater had talked in these terms somewhat in 1964, events had conspired to raise their salience very considerably for the public by 1968. For some, these slogans may have had no connotations involving either the black race or Vietnam, signifying instead a concern over rising crime rates and the

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[71]Cummings, p. 74.   [72]Witcover, p. 364.

[73]White, The Making of the President 1968, p. 236.

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alleged "coddling" of criminal offenders by the courts.[74]

Based upon the foregoing analysis, the issues selected for this study are: (1) War and Peace, (2) "Pocketbook" aspects of the Domestic Economy, (3) Civil Rights, and (4) Law and Order.

Speeches. The total quantity of campaign speeches in the 1960 and 1968 campaigns by Richard M. Nixon is formidable. However, most of the speeches are repetitious versions of the same "basic speech" which was presented at numerous campaign stops, and which was not intended to be an in-depth discussion of campaign issues. This is true of both campaigns, as is documented in Chapter 2.

This study is limited to an analysis of Nixon's treatment of issues in his campaign speeches designed to fulfill the issue-discussion function. There is a limited group of these speeches. In 1960, there are fourteen such speeches, designated by Nixon himself; in 1968, there are twenty such speeches, designated by his staff. Because this number of speeches is limited and manageable, no random sampling scheme was used to reduce it any further. Hence, a total of thirty-four speeches is included in the content analysis.

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[74]Phillip Converse, et al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," American Political Science Review, LXIII, 4 (December, 1969), p. 1087.

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Validity and Reliability

Budd, Thorp, and Donohew defined validity and reliability as follows: "In simplest terms, reliability means repeatability with consistency of results; and validity, actually measuring what the researcher says he is measuring."[75]

Regarding validity, there are two potential sources of bias in this study. First, the speeches selected for content analysis might not be a complete inventory, or even a representative sample, of Nixon's positions on the issues in either (or both) of the campaigns. Speeches were selected by Nixon and his staff. Second, the categories might not be an accurate reflection of the principal campaign issues.

To the extent that the selected speeches are fair representatives of Nixon's treatment of issues, and to the extent that the issues selected for coding and representative of the major substantive issues in the campaigns, the study may be regarded as valid. The coding procedure itself poses little problem in the area of validity. Berelson stated, "Assuming there is no doubt about the synonyms, there is no doubt about the validity of the analysis. The instrument measures what it is intended to measure. The same can probably be said about most

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[75]Budd, Thorp, and Donohew, p. 66.

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subject-matter analysis."[76] Berelson repeated the same
point with the qualification that: "Most of the time,
careful definition of categories and judicious and alter-
native selection of indicators will take care of the
matter."[77] In this study, categories and indicators are
specifically defined and selected carefully.

Regarding reliability, Berelson said that explicit
instruction and full illustration for coding the content
help to improve reliability. This study begins with
explicit coding instructions with full illustrations.
Beyond this, reliability can be increased by having inde-
pendent coders test the instructions on material similar
to that used in the main analysis, and then comparing the
coded results.[78] In this study, although all coding is
done by the writer, reliability of all coding instructions
is tested as described above. Data from reliability tests
are presented in Chapter 3.

To this point, the technique of content analysis
has been described in general, including a description of
its procedural steps and its uses in analyzing political
communications, as well as more specific applications of
the technique to this study. Statements and categories,

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[76]Berelson, p. 169.   [77]Ibid., p. 171.

[78]John Waite Bowers, "Content Analysis," eds.
Philip Emmert and William D. Brooks, Methods of Research
in Communication (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970),
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the selection of issues and the sample of speeches for analysis, have also been described.

What follows is the specific set of rules used in analyzing the content of Richard M. Nixon's issue-oriented speeches in his 1960 and 1968 campaigns for the Presidency.

Rules for Content Analysis

Unit of analysis. The unit of analysis is the statement.[79] A statement consists of a subject and a predicate. The subject may be either explicit or implied; the predicate may also be either explicit or implied. An infinitive predicate with an expressed subject also counts as a statement.

A statement may consist of a simple sentence, an independent clause in a compound or a complex sentence, or a dependent clause in a complex sentence. Thus, a statement may consist of a pattern of words ranging from a single word to a paragraph. The key determinant of what a statement is is the presence of a subject and a predicate, not an arbitrary word count or the artifact of indentation or punctuation.

To illustrate these rules, in the passage, "We are thankful for Ike's administration. Ike was a firm diplomat, and his administration was progressive. Ike

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[79]Grammatical constructions are described in Porter G. Perrin, Writer's Guide and Index to English, (4th ed.: Chicago: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1965).

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kept the peace for 7 1/2 years because he knew the ruthless nature of our enemies. He would expect us to do no less," the following are measurable statements:

1. We are thankful for Ike's administration. (simple sentence.)

2. Ike was a firm diplomat.

3. His administration was progressive.

) (Inde-
) pendent
) clauses
) in a
  compound
  sentence)

4. Ike kept the peace for 7 1/2 years. (independent clause in complex sentence)

5. He knew the ruthless nature of our enemies. (dependent clause in complex sentence)

6. He would expect. (independent clause)

7. Us to do no less. (infinitive clause with expressed subject)

In instances of compound subjects, or of compound predicates, each will count in a separate statement. However, compound objects will not be regarded as creating separate statements. To illustrate, in the passage, "Cabot Lodge and I have had experience with Khrushchev and the Communists," there are two countable statements:

1. Cabot Lodge has had experience . . .

2. I have had experience . . .

Again, in the passage, "I went to Toledo and told them about my campaign," there are two countable statements:

1. I went to Toledo.

2. I told them about my campaign.

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Noun clauses functioning as subjects or objects of verbs, or objects of prepositions, count as statements. To illustrate, in the passage, "Everybody knows how Kennedy voted on the Quemoy issue," there are two countable statements:

1. Everybody knows . . .

2. Kennedy voted on the Quemoy issue.

Adverb clauses functioning as notions of time, place, cause, effect, etc., count as statements. To illustrate, in the passage, "When Ike saw Khrushchev in Paris, he was firm with him," there are two countable statements:

1. Ike saw Khrushchev in Paris.

2. He was firm with him.

Again, in the passage, "Because Ike was defending the nation's security, he must not apologize for the U-2," there are two statements:

1. Ike was defending the nation's security.

2. He must not apologize for the U-2.

Judgment of the coder will decide whether to count elliptical clauses with implied verbs, such as "When just a Senator, Kennedy . . . ," or abridged clauses with no implied verbs, such as "The more, the merrier," based upon the emphasis placed upon them in context.

Questions and exclamations will be counted as statements whenever the conditions of subject and predicate are met.

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Statements within direct quotations attributed to sources other than Richard M. Nixon constitute an exception to the rules stated above. Coder will count everything quoted as one statement, and will exercise judgment as to whether the quotation should be counted as a pro, con, or neutral statement within an issue category, or as an unclassified statement.

Titles of songs, books, poems, etc., which are mentioned by Nixon and which would otherwise count as statements constitute an exception to the rules stated above, and are not counted as statements. To illustrate, in the passage, "It is appropriate that the band should play 'California, here I come' for me today," the title of the song is not counted as a statement.

Categories. The categories are limited to selected issue areas designed to represent the substantive topics which a candidate for the Presidency might be expected to address, and which the literature shows were, in fact, issues in the two campaigns included in this study. The issue categories selected are: (1) War and Peace, (2) "Pocketbook" aspects of the Domestic Economy, (3) Civil Rights, and (4) Law and Order. A fifth category, designated as "unclassified," will also be utilized for those statements not counted in any issue category, to meet the requirement that all statements found in the content must be categorized.

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Indicators. Indicators are almost sub-categories, the operational definitions of the categories. In this study, statements are classified within categories whenever they deal with the indicators listed below. Statements which include relatively unambiguous pronouns or synonyms for the indicators are counted. The tally of statements counted will be listed according to the indicators.

1. War and Peace.

    A. War:

        1. War in general:

            a. as U. S. (or Allies') policy.

            b. as Enemy policy.

        2. Particular wars:

            a. World War II.

            b. Korea.

            c. Vietnam.

    B. Peace:

        1. Peace in general:

            a. as U. S. (or Allies') policy.

            b. as Enemy policy.

        2. Negotiations, diplomacy as instruments of achieving peace.

    C. National defense:

        1. Military preparedness in principle.

        2. Military weaponry.

        3. Military actions short of war.

2. "Pocket

    A. Fis

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4. Law

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2. "Pocketbook" aspects of the Domestic Economy.

    A. Fiscal policy:

        1. Taxing.

        2. Spending.

        3. "Fiscal responsibility."

    B. Price stability:

        1. Inflation.

        2. Recession (or depression).

    C. Personal income:

        1. Wages.

            a. Labor.

            b. Farm income.

        2. Retirement income.

    D. Employment.

3. Civil Rights.

    A. General.

    B. Discrimination:

        1. Job discrimination.

        2. Housing discrimination.

        3. Education discrimination.

    C. Voting rights.

4. Law and Order.

    A. Crime:

        1. Organized crime.

        2. "Major" crime (listed on FBI crime statistics).

        3. Violence (riots, demonstrations).

B. Law

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B. Law Enforcement:

1. Police, law enforcement agencies.

2. Courts.

Direction. Nixon's position on the statements in the above indicators are classified by directions, i. e., pro, con, or neutral, as follows:

1. A statement will be counted as PRO whenever:

a. Nixon asserts or implies that he, or a favored concept (including America, Americans, the people, our allies, a particular ally, the Republicans, a particular Republican) approves of, favors, or agrees with the particular indicator.

b. Nixon asserts or implies that the indicator is beneficial.

c. Nixon asserts or implies a need to accept, pursue, or obtain the indicator.

d. Nixon asserts or implies that his opponent (Kennedy, Humphrey, the Democrats, a particular Democrat) or other disfavored concept (the enemy, the Communists, Khrushchev, the Russians, Mao) is CON the indicator.

2. A statement will be counted as CON whenever:

a. Nixon asserts or implies that he, or a favored concept (including America, Americans, the people, our allies, a

3.

campaign

particular Republican) <u>disapproves of</u>,
<u>opposes</u>, or <u>disagrees with</u> the particular
indicator.

    b. Nixon asserts or implies that the indi-
cator is disadvantageous.

    c. Nixon asserts or implies that there is no
need to accept, pursue, or obtain a
particular indicator.

    d. Nixon asserts or implies that his opponent
(Kennedy, Humphrey, the Democrats, a
particular Democrat) or other disfavored
concept (the enemy, the Communists,
Khrushchev, the Russians, Mao) is PRO the
indicator.

3. A statement will be counted as NEUTRAL
whenever:

    a. It is primarily factual, definitive, or
explanatory.

    b. It otherwise fails to fit any of the Pro
or Con cues listed above, yet is related
to an indicator.

    c. It contains a balance of both Pro and
Con cues.

SUMMARY

This chapter has discussed the uses of oratory in
campaigning; the problem for research, with its

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Chapter 2

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definitions, limitations, and justifications; a review of relevant literature; methodological considerations, including rhetorical criticism and content analysis; and coding and sampling techniques.

Overview. In the remaining chapters of this dissertation, the following organization will govern: Chapter 2 discusses biographical antecedents to Nixon as a political speaker, and the two campaigns for the Presidency are discussed in terms of their social, historical, and political contexts, with particular reference to the issues selected for analysis. Chapter 3 presents the content analysis of Nixon's treatment of issues in his campaign speaking in the 1960 and 1968 elections, and synthesizes the data in terms of Nixon's development as a speaker, and in terms of the role of issues in political campaigns. Chapter 4 summarizes the findings and offers conclusions. The dissertation also includes a Bibliography of selected sources.

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Chapter 2

BIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL

BACKGROUND OF RICHARD M. NIXON'S

TREATMENT OF ISSUES IN THE

1960 AND 1968 CAMPAIGNS

INTRODUCTION

Born in 1913 into a strict, hardworking, and devout
Quaker family in Yorba Linda, California, Richard Milhous
Nixon was reared in the period of Normalcy of Harding,
Coolidge, and Hoover. He studied law during the Depres-
sion; served as a naval officer and federal bureaucrat
during World War II; was elected as a conservative Repub-
lican Representative and then Senator during the Cold War;
and served as Vice-President during the two Eisenhower
Administrations. He was an unsuccessful candidate for the
Presidency in 1960 and a successful candidate in 1968, both
of which campaigns have generated a great deal of analysis
and commentary. This chapter summarizes some important
historical and biographical antecedents of his presidential
campaigns.

The task of any biographer or historian is to set
forth the available facts, and his interpretation of the
facts within some sort of a unified, coherent framework.
In the field of speech traditional rhetorical analysis

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has required the critic to point out all the factors that go into the rhetorical production of a speaker, including a complete accounting of the speaker's education (broadly defined to encompass childhood experiences in the home as well as formal schooling) and career experiences. Accordingly, as has been noted by several critics, finished rhetorical analyses have tended to be lengthy and weighty, with much of the weight residing in a mass of historical and biographical freight. Therefore, as pointed out in the previous chapter, there has been a movement towards more narrowly targeted criticisms.

Richard Nixon has been—and remains—busy, prominent and controversial. In the span of his lifetime, he has figured in many events and elicited many reactions from observers and commentators. The survey of literature in the preceding chapter lists some of the major scholarly research found in the area encompassed by this dissertation. But it should be understood that the selection of sources shown there does not represent all or even most of the available published material. Newspapers and periodicals have reported straight news about Richard M. Nixon since he began his public career by upsetting Congressman Jerry Voorhis in 1946 for a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. Articles, editorials, and commentaries by his political opponents and his political supporters have appeared in profusion. It would also be fair to say

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that the Presidential campaigns in 1960 and 1968 have generated more analysis than previous campaigns, most of which is related directly or indirectly to Nixon's treatment of issues in them.

Needless to say, this massive accumulation of information varies in both usefulness and reliability since Richard Nixon is controversial. Even if this were not so, the sheer volume of material would be too much to assimilate. Finally, it must also be noted that while he is a public figure, Richard Nixon is a private person with complex motivations--there are some things which are not known by anyone because they have not been shared with anyone, certainly not for publication.

In this study we are not concerned with the total rhetorical output of Richard M. Nixon, but rather with only one aspect of his rhetoric, his treatment of substantive issues, in two narrow rhetorical situations, specifically, a sample of his issue-oriented speeches in each of his two Presidential campaigns. Consequently, in this chapter, only such historical data as might illuminate his performance in these designated areas will be included. While much information is thereby excluded from our view, what appears in this chapter seems to be the most relevant background to an understanding of our subject. The material presented here has been selected with a view towards brevity, not exhaustiveness.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

The skeletal facts of Nixon's biography were

listed in the Facts on File publication, Presidential

Election 1968:

> RICHARD MILHOUS NIXON. Born January 9, 1913,
> in Yorba Linda, Calif., a small farming community near
> Los Angeles. One of five sons of Francis Anthony
> and Hannah Milhous Nixon, both Quakers and natives
> of Indiana. Father was farmer and grocery store-
> gas station operator. Moved in 1922 to Whittier,
> Calif., where Nixon attended Whittier College 1930-
> 1934. Entered Duke University Law School; graduated
> third in his class in 1937. Failing to obtain a job
> in a New York firm, he returned to practice in
> Whittier until 1942. During World War II he served
> briefly as an attorney in Office of Price Admin-
> istration. Joined Navy in 1942 and served in South
> Pacific; was discharged as lieutenant commander.
>
> Elected to House of Representatives from Cali-
> fornia's 12th Congressional District 1946, reelected
> 1948. Achieved prominence as House Un-American
> Activities Committee member who forced showdown that
> ended in Alger Hiss perjury conviction. Co-author
> of controversial Mundt-Nixon Communist-control bill
> in 1948. Defeated Rep. Helen Gahagan Douglas in
> 1950 Senatorial race. Elected Vice President 1952,
> reelected 1956. Nominated for Presidency 1960, but
> lost to John F. Kennedy. In 1962 he ran for gover-
> norship of California, was defeated by Edmund G.
> Brown. Became senior partner of Wall Street law
> firm of Nixon, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, Alexander, &
> Mitchell.
>
> Married Thelma Catherine Patricia Ryan, a school-
> teacher, June 21, 1940; Two daughters--Patricia, 22,
> and Julie, 20.[1]

One important detail omitted from this compilation

is, of course, the fact that he ran for the Presidency

again in 1968 and won, narrowly defeating Hubert H.

Humphrey.

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[1]Edward W. Knappman, (ed.), Presidential Election
1968 (New York: Facts on File, 1970), p. 154.

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Education[2]

Richard Nixon was taught by his parents to work hard, with determination and persistence. He and his brothers were expected to join in the family business and work except during school hours. As a student, Nixon was characterized as being serious and studious; he learned very early the values of doing his homework. As a result of systematically grinding away at his books, his grades were high. In grade school, he was the class valedictorian; in high school and college (history major), he earned mostly A's. He earned a full scholarship to Duke University Law School, without which he could not have afforded to attend.

In his first year at Duke, Nixon was apprehensive about keeping his grades up in competition with other law school students (several Phi Beta Kappas from prestigious universities among them), especially since he had to take part-time employment to earn his room and board. He feared that he would lose his scholarship under Duke's "squeeze" policy of dropping the lowest-ranking students at the end of each year. A classmate, Bill Adelson, reassured him with the comment, "You don't have to worry.

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[2]All factual references in this section on Nixon's educational background are taken from Earl Mazo and Stephen Hess, Nixon: A Political Portrait (New York: Popular Library, 1968), pp. 9-24, and Edwin P. Hoyt, The Nixons: An American Family (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 180-218, except where other sources are cited.

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You know what it takes to learn the law? An iron butt."[3] Adelson's assessment of Nixon's capability was justified when Nixon graduated third in his class and earned membership in the school's honorary legal society.

An important aspect of this phase of Nixon's life was that he participated in a variety of extra-curricular activities. In high school, he was a member of the Latin Club and also feature editor for the school paper. He ran for student body president and lost. In Whittier College, he organized and became the first president of a men's club, the Orthogonians (translated as "Squares"); sang in the glee club; acted in plays; played football (he "warmed the bench" for four years); and ran for student body president his senior year and won.

But one particular extra-curricular activity deserves special notice: in both high school and college Nixon was active in speech contests, especially oratory and debate. As a high school senior, he was a finalist in the Los Angeles Times Oratorical Contest with a speech entitled, "America's Progress--Its Dependence Upon the Constitution." Later, in college, he won the Southern California Intercollegiate Public Speaking Conference with a speech on the topic, "Resolved that the Power of the President Should Be Increased as a Matter of Settled Policy."

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[3]Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (New York: Pyramid Books, 1968), pp. 317-318n.

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In debate, he participated as a student at Fullerton High School first, then transferred and joined the Whittier High School debate team. Nixon's college debating career spanned all four years at Whittier College. He and his teammates toured the colleges of the Pacific Northwest, debating some fifty rounds each year. One year Nixon's team won their intercollegiate league championship, including a victory over a nationally recognized championship team from Redlands University.

This particular experience was of seminal importance to his later career. His high school debate coach taught him to do thorough research. He acquired the habit of taking careful notes on his reading and filing his material away on little note cards. As a beginning speaker, Nixon was unsure of himself. He wrote out his high school speeches and carefully memorized them. In his college career, he learned to speak more extemporaneously, but never with much ease or natural platform grace. He continued his practice of collecting a pyramid of facts, and he saved all his old files for some possible future use. Thus, as a debater as well as a student, he was steady and efficient, but not flashy. His primary gains from the experience were in the skills of library research, logical analysis and organization of ideas.

Summarizing the educational phase of his life, Nixon wrote, "I won my share of scholarships, and of

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speaking and debating prizes in school, not because I
smarter but because I worked longer and harder than some
of my more gifted colleagues."[4]

Early Political Career. Following his graduation
from Duke Law School, Richard Nixon returned to Cali-
fornia and entered law practice in Whittier. He served
as a supply officer in the Navy during World War II.
After the war, he responded to a political flier which
appeared in a California newspaper. It read as follows:

> "WANTED" Congressman candidate with no previous
> experience to defeat a man who has represented the
> district in the house for ten years. Any young man,
> resident of the district, preferably a veteran,
> fair education, no political strings or obligations,
> and possessed of a few ideas for betterment of
> country at large, may apply for the job. Applicants
> will be reviewed by 100 interested citizens who will
> guarantee support but will not obligate the candi-
> date in any way.[5]

Nixon was chosen over seven other applicants to
run as a Republican against the liberal Democratic incum-
bent Jerry Voorhis. The incumbent made the mistake of
agreeing to a series of debates against his unknown chal-
lenger, who promptly mounted a heavy attack on his liberal
voting record in Congress. Since Nixon had neither record
nor reputation to attack, Voorhis was forced to campaign

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[4]Nixon, _Six Crises_, p. 317.

[5]Hoyt, p. 240.

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on a straight defense against Nixon's vigorous attacks.[6]
In that 1946 election, Nixon upset his opponent and became
a Congressman.

Nixon served two terms as a U.S. Representative
from California. His first assignment, the House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC), led him to become
firmly convinced that the American Communist Party was a
subversive threat to U.S. security. Nixon teamed with
Representative Karl Mundt to produce the tough Mundt-Nixon
Bill which called for registration of Communist Party
members and denial of passports, federal employment and
other benefits to them.[7]

In his second term, Nixon was the principal member
of HUAC to push for the prosecution of Alger Hiss for
perjury. The case generated a great deal of acrimonious
partisan fighting between the Truman Administration and
Conservative members of Congress. Hiss was ultimately
convicted. Nixon's anti-Communist reputation was rein-
forced, but at a cost; the episode was credited with being
the beginning of the long-standing hostility of the
liberal elements of the national press towards him.[8]

Although Nixon had a "safe seat," he was still a
junior member in a Democratic-dominated House in 1950, so
he ran for the Senate against Congresswoman Helen Gahagan

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[6]Ibid., pp. 247-248.   [7]Ibid., pp. 254-256.

[8]Mazo and Hess, pp. 44-63; Hoyt, pp. 251-257.

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Douglas, a liberal Democrat. In the campaign, Nixon and his campaign manager, Murray Chotiner, accused Mrs. Douglas of being "soft on Communism" because of her opposition to HUAC in particular and her liberal voting record in general. They labeled her "the Pink Lady" and flooded the state with copies of a selective account of her voting record printed on bright pink paper. Nixon won the election, and so was elevated to the Senate.[9]

The 1950 senatorial campaign had at least two results. For liberal Democrats, Mazo and Hess stated, "Nothing in the litany of reprehensible conduct charged against Nixon The Campaigner has been cited more often than the tactics by which he defeated Helen Gahagan Douglas for Senator."[10] But for Republicans,

> the articulate young congressman whom party professionals viewed as "a real comer" because of the skill on which he "got Alger Hiss" had accomplished something in California to hearten Republicans and concern Democrats nationally. Representative Nixon had demonstrated in winning his election for Senator that a "model Republican" could defeat a "model Democrat" in an industrial state where Democrats outregistered Republicans by a million votes.[11]

As junior Senator from California and nationally prominent anti-Communist, Nixon fulfilled many speaking engagements around the country above and beyond his Senatorial duties. At the 1952 Republican National

[9]Mazo and Hess, pp. 64-75.

[10]Ibid., p. 64.   [11]Ibid., p. 76.

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Convention, party professionals were unanimous in recommending him as the Vice-Presidential candidate to run on the ticket with General Dwight D. Eisenhower. On Chotiner's advice, Nixon accepted the opportunity and began a vigorous campaign. In the campaign, Eisenhower stressed the positive while Nixon led the attacks on the Truman record and "Communism at home and abroad," a strategy labeled "high road-low road" by the Democrats.

In the midst of his whistle-stop tours, an issue arose over Nixon's campaign fund. Nixon was accused by the Democrats of misusing money contributed by his supporters in California, a charge which aroused a storm of controversy across the county. There was talk of replacing Nixon as the Vice-Presidential candidate. Eisenhower himself refused either to come to Nixon's defense or to drop him from the ticket until the charges were proved or refuted. Nixon went on nationwide radio and television to make the most famous speech of his career, the "Checkers" speech. In an emotional, largely extemporaneous speech he not only explained the details of the rather innocuous campaign fund in question, but he also outlined his personal financial history, from his first earnings as a school boy right up to his current financial status--mortgages, savings, etc.--not neglecting to mention the gift of a cocker spaniel named "Checkers" to his daughters by a Texas Republican.

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The public reaction was overwhelming in its support for Nixon. Adlai Stevenson was challenged to reveal his personal financial situation as Nixon had done. Eisenhower embraced Nixon, and the incident which had almost aborted Nixon's political career was salvaged if not exactly transformed into an asset. In any event, Nixon remained on the ticket and continued his campaign against Communism and corruption, and the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket was elected by a landslide.[12]

Vice-Presidency. Nixon served two terms as Vice President, 1952-1960. Under the Constitution, the prescribed duties of the Vice President are to preside over the Senate and to succeed to the Presidency in the event that office should be vacated. Beyond that, the functions of the Vice President are controlled by the President. Eisenhower's announced intention was to make the Vice-Presidency a real arm of the administration, and to avoid the mistake Franklin D. Roosevelt had made by not keeping Vice-President Truman informed on his major decisions. Therefore, Eisenhower gave Nixon a number of duties which would keep him in close touch with the policy-making processes. Mazo and Hess provided this summary of Nixon's service as Vice President:

> During his administration Nixon was a member of the Cabinet and presided over 19 meetings; he was a

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[12]Ibid., pp. 91-125.

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member of the National Security Council and presided over 26 meetings; he attended the weekly meetings with the congressional leadership; he was given access to the most secret security information and read the daily intelligence reports from all over the world; he was made chairman of the President's Commission on Government Contracts and chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability; and he traveled 160,000 miles to 55 countries as the President's emissary.[13]

Two of Nixon's foreign tours resulted in a great deal of publicity and attention: Caracas and Moscow.

In 1958, Nixon visited Latin America on a goodwill tour. On his last stop at Caracas, Venezuela, security arrangements broke down, and he and his party were set upon by uncontrolled mobs. He was spat upon, and his motorcade was stoned. His itinerary of local events had to be canceled, as he was unable to leave the heavily-guarded embassy during his stay. The Venezuelan army lined the route to the airport to protect him from further rioting upon his departure. Although the incident had very serious overtones, the administration attempted to minimize them as much as possible and go ahead with whatever positive diplomatic and economic relations could be developed between the U.S. and the Latin American countries, including Venezuela. Nixon's personal conduct throughout the episode was conciliatory and restrained, and he came home to a show of bipartisan national praise.[14]

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[13]Ibid., pp. 207-208.   [14]Ibid., pp. 165-187.

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Sensational as his Latin American trip was, an even more publicity-producing event occurred the following year, 1959, when he visited Moscow for a goodwill tour upon the opening of the American National Exhibition. Premier Nikita Khrushchev was his host, and used Nixon's visit as the occasion for a series of talks at Khrushchev's country estate for the purpose of exchanging views and information concerning U.S.-Russian relations around the world. While touring the American National Exhibition for the cameras, Khrushchev and Nixon engaged in an animated exchange as they walked through a model kitchen. Pictures of the two men gesturing at each other flashed around the world. Of course, Vice President Nixon's part of the discussions (the important ones which occurred in private) was limited to an explanation and defense of American policies and viewpoints, since he had no power to change or make policy on his own authority. However, henceforward in his campaigns, he would refer to the famous "Kitchen Debate" as the time when he took the full measure of America's enemy.[15]

Nixon also continued his activities as a campaigner. In the 1954 Congressional races, for example, he electioneered in thirty-one states over a period of forty-eight days, hammering at the themes he used in his

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[15]Ibid., pp. 188-206.

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own Vice-Presidential race two years earlier. He warned voters not to vote for Democratic candidates because "the candidates running on the Democratic ticket in the key states are almost without exception members of the Democratic Party's left-wing clique which has been so blind to the Communist conspiracy." In doing so, he solidified his position among organization Republicans; but he also confirmed his reputation as a "low road" campaigner with the press and, of course, the Democrats.[16]

Nixon served as chairman of the President's Commission on Government Contracts. In this position, Nixon was instrumental in leading the government to demand that industry employ Negroes in jobs from which they were traditionally barred at the white collar, professional levels. For this work, the committee received commendations from such organizations as the American Jewish Committee, and even Eleanor Roosevelt joined in praise.[17]

The second chairmanship assigned by the President to Nixon was of the newly-created Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth in 1959. Nixon opposed the simplistic notion advocated by some Cabinet members that inflation was a result of activities of the labor unions. The primary missions of this Committee were education and consultation, rather than policy-making.[18]

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[16]Ibid., pp. 188-206.   [17]Ibid., pp. 213-215.

[18]Ibid., pp. 215-217.

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As Vice President, Richard Nixon was to Eisenhower what Spiro Agnew is to President Nixon today. He was the "hatchet man," the hard-hitting lightning rod who attracted the volts of the Democrats while Eisenhower stood above as a father-figure and statesman. Additionally, since Eisenhower was the most non-political President of our times, Nixon was the de facto Republican Party leader and chief campaigner.

But it should also be said that Nixon matured in his tenure as Vice President. As he approached the 1960 Presidential election year, he became broader and mellower in his approach. His behavior in Caracas and Moscow, his achievements in his special committee assignments, and his circumspect comportment during Eisenhower's serious illnesses tended to alter his image. Therefore, his name was at the top of the list of potential candidates for the Presidency as the campaign of 1960 approached.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS

1960 Campaign

Overview. Although Nixon's rhetoric is sometimes given over to hyperbole, the literature supports his recollection of the frenetic activity of the 1960 Presidential election campaign:

And so, as the plane flew on to Los Angeles [on election eve] I wished I could have done even more than I had done during those last two months of

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intensive campaigning. I felt that way even though I could look back on a campaign which, from the standpoint of number of states visited, miles traveled, speeches made, and people seen either in live audiences or on television, had exceeded in intensity any in American history up to that time. From the time of the Chicago Convention, I had traveled over 65,000 miles and visited all the fifty states, made 180 major scheduled speeches and as many more impromptu ones--not to mention press conferences, spot interviews, radio and TV appearances. I had shaken uncounted thousands of hands, signed as many autographs; and an estimated five million people had seen Pat and me in person.[19]

As Theodore White wrote, "To chronicle these months is like packaging fog."[20] This chapter's consideration of the 1960 campaign (and later, of the 1968 campaign) will point only to Nixon's general strategy and some particular highlights of the campaign to set the historical framework. This approach omits much of what transpired; but, by the same token, what is presented here should help cut through the fog and clarify the subject of the analysis in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

General strategy. Four important strategic elements should be noted. First, Nixon accepted the "man-not-the-party" approach. Since Republicans were outnumbered by Democrats by a margin of over three to two, any Republican candidate had to appeal not only to members of his own party but to independents and

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[19] Nixon, Six Crises, p. 405.

[20] Theodore H. White, Jr., The Making of the President: 1960 (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1961), p. 245.

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disaffected Democrats as well. In 1952 and 1956, Republicans were able to do this by nominating General Eisenhower, a popular war hero, rather than a candidate identified with the Republican Party. In 1960, Nixon's strategy was to play down his own strong Republican ties, and to try to blur the traditional party distinctions. In fact, he attempted to paint his opponent, Senator John F. Kennedy, as a deviant from the ideals of the party of Jefferson, Jackson, and Wilson.[21]

A second component of his strategy was to mobilize the voters (Republican, Democrat, or independent) who were satisfied with Eisenhower's administration. As the incumbent Vice President, Nixon could claim to have had a share in the successes of Eisenhower. White said, "The only sound Republican strategy--so ran Nixon thinking at the outset--was to run as an across-the-board 'national' candidate who rested his appeal on the issues of 'Experience' and the Eisenhower record of 'Peace and Prosperity'."[22] This strategy implied a defensive posture, rather than an offensive one of challenging the positions of the Democrats.

Third, Nixon believed that campaign activities should be "paced" in such a way that momentum could be

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[21]Nelson Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, _Presidential Elections_ (2d ed.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), pp. 125, 134.

[22]White, _The Making of the President: 1960_, p. 267.

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gradually built up over the course of the campaign period and end in a "peak" on election day. Nixon wanted to open in a bland low key of quiet optimism (in order to erase his pugnacious image), step up his pace during October, and concentrate everything he could afford in the media during the last three weeks of the campaign.[23] His media plan emphasized television and deemphasized the press.[24] The television plan included a number of nationally televised rallies, a few television "reports," and a telethon on election eve.[25] Nixon rejected the advice of advisors who wanted to "market" his candidacy through short creative advertisements geared towards target issues and audiences. He stuck with his own media plan of longer speeches and reports.[26] Because of his "pacing" theory, the communications media were not exploited to their fullest, and

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[23]Ibid., p. 266.

[24]This decision had undesirable consequences for Nixon in that his staff translated it into overt hostility towards newspaper reporters accompanying the candidate, and reporters were hampered in their coverage of Nixon's activities. On his tours, Nixon was inaccessible to reporters. His speeches and statements were not transcribed for them by his staff. The contrast between Nixon's and Kennedy's press relations was described as the difference between being considered as a leper and outcast or as a friend and battle companion. Ibid., pp. 336-337.

[25]Bernard C. Kissel, "Richard M. Nixon: Definition of an Image," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI (December, 1960), 357-358.

[26]Dan Nimmo, The Political Persuaders (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Spectrum Books, 1970), p. 112.

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Nixon did not appear in a Republican-controlled television broadcast until October 25.[27]

Finally, Nixon chose to ignore a potential issue of the campaign. John F. Kennedy was a Catholic, the first member of that faith to achieve the Democratic nomination since Al Smith in 1928. In order to avoid even the appearance of exploiting a religious appeal, Nixon was silent on Kennedy's religious affiliation except for a very early statement to the effect that Kennedy's religion was not a legitimate issue. He maintained this silence even though Kennedy himself openly addressed the question of whether his religion would influence his policies; Nixon believed that even so much as a plea for tolerance might be misinterpreted.[28]

Highlights of Nixon's 1960 campaign. Nixon maintained only three of his strategic aims. The 1960 campaign did not follow his pacing theory. At the outset, he injured his knee on his very first campaign swing and had to be hospitalized for nearly two weeks. When he was released from the hospital, he had to pick up his tempo of campaigning in order to redeem his pledge to visit all fifty states.[29]

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[27]White, The Making of the President: 1960, p. 312

[28]Nixon, Six Crises, pp. 330-331.

[29]Mazo and Hess, p. 230.

Even more disrupting to his original plan was his acceptance of a series of face-to-face confrontations with his opponent on nationwide television. During the month of October, 1960, Nixon and Kennedy engaged in a series of programs which had come to be known as "The Great Debates."[30]

Nixon conducted his campaign on at least three overlapping levels. There was the barnstorming element in which he crossed the nation, making personal appearances before crowds of his supporters. This level of campaigning was at the same time most physically demanding and most emotionally rejuvenating for the candidate. In these appearances, Nixon followed his "game plan" of defending the Eisenhower record by means of a set speech, repeated literally hundreds of times at political rallies.[31] Unlike his earlier barnstorm speeches (e.g., his races for Congress and for the Vice Presidency), his "basic speech" in 1960 was noted for "the relative softness of its sell."[32]

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[30] The role of these programs in increasing campaign discussion of issues has been reported by John W. Ellsworth, "Rationality and Campaigning: A Content Analysis of the 1960 Presidential Campaign Debates," Western Political Quarterly, XVIII, 4 (December, 1965), 794-802.

[31] Kissel, p. 358.

[32] Stanley Kelley, Jr., "The Presidential Campaign," The Presidential Election and Transition 1960-1961, ed. Paul T. David (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1969), p. 75.

Then there was the mass media campaign which centered on the debates, and, later, on his television speeches. Included in the media campaign was also the national news coverage given to the candidate and his activities.

Finally, there was the more sedate and intellectual campaign of study papers and special speeches dealing with issues and policy proposals in some depth. As mentioned in Chapter 1, these messages, particularly the speeches, represented his position on the substantive issues, and they constitute the messages analyzed in this dissertation. Chapter 3 describes the content analysis of Nixon's issue-oriented speeches.

The concern of this chapter is with the historical context of the issues themselves.

Nixon's Interim Period, 1960-1968

In 1960, John F. Kennedy defeated Nixon for the Presidency, thus instituting the beginning of an eight-year Democratic hold on the Presidency. Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson was elevated to the Presidency. In the 1964 presidential election, President Johnson defeated the Republican nominee, Senator Barry Goldwater, in a landslide vote.

During the interim period in Nixon's career, he was defeated in an effort to win the governorship of California in 1962 in an election many observers regarded

to be his political obituary. Following his defeat in California in 1962, Nixon accepted a position as a senior partner in a Wall Street law firm which changed its name to Nixon, Mudge, Stern, Guthrie, and Alexander in his honor. This position furnished him with more personal economic security than he had ever had before (he earned over two hundred thousand dollars per year), while it also provided him with time to pursue his political interests.[33]

From this position, Nixon subordinated his own political ambitions while actively supporting the Republican Party's nominees in 1964 and 1966. In 1964, Nixon campaigned for Goldwater more actively than any other Republican, some of whom feared association with the right-wing candidate. Nixon traveled 50,000 miles in thirty-six states, speaking in behalf of the Presidential candidate and also in behalf of the local Republican candidates for lesser offices. He repeated this performance in the 1966 Congressional races. His "selfless" performances served to keep him identified as a Republican campaigner in the public's mind, and they also served to help him accumulate countless political favors to be repaid in the future.[34] These favors were remembered before the Republican nominating convention in 1968.

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[33]Lewis Chester, Chester Hodgson, and Bruce Page, An American Melodrama: The Presidential Campaign of 1968 (New York: The Viking Press, 1969), pp. 237-238.

[34]Mazo and Hess, pp. 299, 303.

A new style of election campaigning also came into its own during the 1960's. Electioneering came to be conducted under the guidance of campaign managers heavily oriented towards public opinion polling and mass media advertising. Nixon's use of "The New Politics" played an important role in his 1968 campaign. It constituted one of the principal tactics he employed, and thus is described in more detail below.

1968 Campaign

Overview. There were several important differences between Nixon's 1960 and 1968 campaigns which influenced his campaign strategy. First, Nixon's role changed from the incumbent Vice-President to an "out". Consequently, he was free to attack the policies of the Democratic Administration. Moreover, his absence from officialdom during his eight year interim period helped serve to clear his image of specific political content. His campaign managers had to contend with his "loser" image as a result of his frustrated 1960 and 1962 election campaigns, but they at least were relieved of having to explain any of Nixon's political actions or decisions. In a sense, Nixon's position in the 1968 Presidential campaign was less analogous to his 1960 race for the Presidency than it was to his first election campaign for the U.S. House of Representatives against

Jerry Voorhis in 1946, when he was able to attack Voorhis'
political record with impunity, since his own record was
non-existent and therefore could not be counter-attacked
by Voorhis.

Second, the character of issues had changed some-
what. The Vietnam war had become the albatross around
Lyndon B. Johnson's (and the Democratic Party's) neck;
and the public also sensed an apparent increase in crime
and disorder. These issues will be discussed in detail
in Chapter 3. For now, suffice it to say that the elec-
torate felt confronted by more significant issues in 1968
than in 1960; and those issues tended to work in favor
of the challenger, Richard M. Nixon.

Third, as mentioned above, election campaigns
during the Sixties saw the refinement and increased use
of the methods of the so-called "New Politics." Nixon's
1968 campaign made extensive use of the new techniques,
with a corresponding adjustment in his use of more tradi-
tional campaign techniques such as barnstorm tours around
the nation.

General strategy

Richard M. Nixon's 1968 campaign strategy was
determined by the anomalous fact that, although he was
the challenger, he was in possession of a commanding lead
at the outset of the campaign. According to historian
James Truslow Adams, Nixon's early campaign lead

fluctuated from ten to fifteen points in the polls.[35]

Another important factor which influenced Nixon's strategy was the presence of a strong third party candidate, Governor George C. Wallace. Wallace represented the conservative ideology of the Old South, adapted to attract the Goldwater camp. Accordingly, Nixon adopted a "centrist" stance between Hubert Humphrey and George Wallace. Nixon's centrist strategy has been thoroughly discussed by Richard Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg in their book, The Real Majority. Regarding Nixon's strategic options, Scammon and Wattenberg said:

> With Humphrey to his presumptive left, with Wallace to his presumptive right, there wasn't terribly much of substance Mr. Nixon could say or do. A move to the left, to swipe a few of Humphrey's votes, could cause slippage to the right. After all, George Wallace was saying about the two parties: "There's not a dime's worth of difference." A move right, toward Wallace, could easily cause slippage among the Rockefeller-Style Republicans.[36]

A third element of his campaign strategy was designed to correct over-activeness, a fault of his 1960 campaign. Nimmo stated, "Richard Nixon blamed his 1960 defeat in part on physical fatigue produced by attempting to live up to the overly ambitious promise to appear in all fifty states; in 1968 his managers deliberately ran

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[35]James Truslow Adams, The March of Democracy New York: Charles Scribner's Son's, 1969), p. 42.

[36]Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegen, 1971), p. 200.

a low-keyed, slow-paced campaign to avoid similar strains."[37] Translated into actual practice, this meant that during the whole of the campaign, Nixon visited only thirty states, with the major emphasis on only seven of them: California, Texas, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and New York.[38] Moreover, in his personal tour itinerary, he followed a very relaxed pace. Schlesinger said, "Nor did he squander his energies on multiple appearances in a single day. Typically, he would hold one rally in the forenoon (early enough for film to be available for the major network evening newscasts) and one in the evening."[39] His campaign managers and advance men saw to it that his audiences were large and partisan, with potential dissidents and troublemakers screened out by the practice of admitting people by ticket only. Chester, Hodgson, and Page added an interesting note on this point: "The most spectacular effect of this policy occurred in St. Louis . . .. Although St. Louis is forty-percent black, the Nixon advance men managed to assemble in a central auditorium a crowd of three thousand which contained just six black faces."[40]

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[37]Nimmo, p. 46.

[38]Relman Morin, The Associated Press Story of Election 1968, (New York: Pocket Books, 1969), pp. 182, 192.

[39]Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. History of American Presidential Elections 1789-1968 (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1971), p. 3740.

[40]Chester, Hodgson, and Page, p. 683.

In his personal appearances, Nixon toned down the offensive combativeness which characterized his campaigning in every previous campaign (and which surfaced later in the 1970 Congressional races). Refusing all challenges to debate Humphrey and/or Wallace, Nixon abandoned his early forensic training and his penchant for debating political opponents. Instead, as his friendly biographer de Toledano wrote, "His speeches were bland, cast in generalities, and devoid of rancormaking rhetoric, which he felt was unnecessary for a frontrunner."[41]

To this point, let us turn to Scammon and Wattenberg's summary of his general strategy:

> In examining Mr. Nixon's campaign in the fall of 1968, then, we will do well first to ask ourselves one quick question: How do you campaign when you are way out in front? The rules of psephology [electoral analysis] answer: "Safely." Or: "Don't rock the vote." Accordingly, Nixon chose not to debate with Humphrey, chose not to gamble for extra votes by campaigning mercilessly from dawn till midnight, chose to do just enough pressing the flesh and face-to-face "unrehearsed" television as was necessary to attempt to try to avoid the charge that he wasn't "taking his case to the people." This sort of campaign also dovetailed neatly with another important element of the Nixon effort: lack of frenzy. Nixon (correctly) felt that the feeling of frenzy—the jumpers and screamers, the confrontations—was distressing many Americans. Accordingly, there was a conscious attempt to run a low-key campaign.[42]

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[41]Ralph de Toledano, One Man Alone: Richard Nixon (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), pp. 353-354.

[42]Scammon and Wattenberg, pp. 202-203.

Highlights of the Campaign

The outstanding feature of Richard M. Nixon's 1968 campaign for the Presidency was its extensive use of the techniques of the so-called "New Politics." Jules Witcover wrote of Nixon's 1968 campaign:

> That candidacy wrought a revolution in Presidential campaigning; innovations of the Nixon campaign, particularly the heavy reliance on the new opinion-shaping technology, will be adapted by future candidates who have the money and the shrewdness to do so.[43]

To set the context for Nixon's 1968 campaign, de Toledano described the campaign organization.

> Of considerable significance was the caliber of the Nixon machine and the organization of his campaign--more significant, perhaps, than campaign strategy or the issues. Among those who watched the machine roll effortlessly, there was agreement that it was perhaps the best-oiled in living memory. Where the teamwork had been faulty in 1960, it was now superb, with John Mitchell, a Nixon law partner, and Bob Finch working in tandem. The United Citizens for Nixon-Agnew was mobilized into a coordinated force of 5 million members. At the Willard Hotel in Washington, reopened as headquarters for the Citizens, some seven hundred paid workers and an army of volunteers worked quietly and efficiently under the tutelage of Charles Rhyne, a former law school classmate of the candidate.[44]

It was the objective of the campaign managers to control every aspect of the campaign. Their control of Nixon's itinerary and campaign audiences has been mentioned above. Perhaps more important than control of

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[43]Jules Witcover, The Resurrection of Richard Nixon (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), p. 465.

[44]de Toledano, pp. 352-353.

Nixon's personal appearances was control of the media campaign. Nixon refused invitations to appear free on programs which could not be controlled by his managers; rather, he chose to purchase media time and use it as he wished. Herbert E. Alexander wrote:

> An example of a candidate's reluctance to accept free time with stipulations attached can be found in Richard Nixon's behavior in 1968. Despite the high cost of television, Nixon used paid time that he could control in preference to free time that he could not control. He refused invitations to interview-type programs like "Meet the Press" from early 1967 until the last Sunday before the November 1968 election.[45]

One use of television advertising repeated from the 1960 campaign was brief clips of his acceptance speech at the 1968 Republican National Convention.[46]

Nixon's most innovative use of television campaigning was a series of question-and-answer panel programs, "The Nixon Answer." The program format (known as the "Hillsboro format") consisted of six ordinary citizens asking Nixon questions which came to their minds, with Nixon answering extemporaneously. There were ten such programs broadcast on a statewide basis; panelists were local citizens in each instance. The California program was an hour long; others were one-half hour each.

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[45]Herbert E. Alexander, "Communications and Politics: The Media and the Message," in Robert Agranoff (ed.), The New Style in Election Campaigns (Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1972), p. 373.

[46]Nimmo, p. 158.

Naturally, states selected for the programs were the large electoral vote states.

Local Republican officials selected the panelists so as to produce a proper "mix." There was always at least one woman and at least one black person (frequently combined in the person of one black woman); there were no professional politicians and no professional broadcasters or journalists. Panelists were generally incapable of asking really penetrating questions owing to their backgrounds and inexperience in either political affairs or panel discussions. In any case, no questioner was permitted to follow up a question. In this format, Nixon excelled. The Ripon Society said:

> There was no doubt but that Nixon could handle this
> art form well, mixing a few facts and figures with a
> host of generalities. After all, he had always relied
> heavily on verbal facility, the essential skill of
> any good lawyer. He was proud of his ability to
> develop appropriate language for any situation. He
> was practiced in the art of bridging differences,
> obscuring disagreements, of reconciling apparent
> conflicts, all through carefully chosen language; one
> should not have been surprised to see him utilize that
> skill in his presidential campaigning.[47]

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[47]The Ripon Society, The Lesson of Victory (New York: Dial Press, 1969), p. 28. The panel programs are discussed in most accounts of the 1968 campaign. Additionally, see John Osborn, The Nixon Watch (New York: Liveright, 1970), pp. 8-9; Edward W. Chester, Radio, Television, and American Politics (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), p. 270; and Joe McGinniss, The Selling of the President 1968 (New York: Trident Press, 1969). McGinniss, said the panel shows were taped and edited to enhance Nixon's appearance, but the other cited sources refer to the programs as live.

In addition to television, Nixon used radio for issue-oriented speeches. This aspect of his campaign echoes his 1960 campaign tactics of presenting some issue-oriented messages apart from the bulk of his campaign activities. Nimmo wrote of campaign manager John Mitchell's approach to radio:

> But John Mitchell, Richard Nixon's campaign manager in 1968, exploited radio more fully than in any campaign to date. He found the medium so effective that he remarked after the campaign that if it were to do over again, his only change would be to spend more money on radio. Among Mitchell's techniques were rebroadcasts of five-minute excerpts from Nixon's acceptance speech before the Republican convention calling for "New Leadership", and the presentation of long, detailed speeches on key issues that were not well-adapted to television, but that sounded tightly reasoned and well-informed on radio . . . regional broadcasts, interviews, call-in shows, and talk programs.[48]

Nixon presented ten network radio speeches on campaign issues in the closing nights of the campaign. In these speeches, Nixon dealt in depth and some specificity with such issues as welfare, youth, arms, peace, and other topics. Witcover wrote,

> The radio talk presented *sotto voce* many of the same themes and allusions to racial conflict, crime, violence and public mistrust of government Nixon was shouting about on the stump and discussing animatedly on television. Here, he presented them in a careful context of scholarly concern.[49]

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[48]Nimmo, p. 134.

[49]Witcover, p. 398. See also Chester, p. 276. See also The Ripon Society, pp. 18-23. *passim*; Alexander, p. 376.

Schlesinger also remarked on the stark contrast between Nixon's superficial "basic speech" on the campaign trail and the series of substantive radio speeches.[50] These speeches are included among the sample of issue-oriented speeches analyzed in Chapter 3.

Nixon's use of communications media also included the scientific application of direct mail. Chester, Hodgson, and Page wrote of the campaign technique wherein voters spoke of their concerns, or asked questions, by means of recording booths in Nixon campaign offices around the country. Each person who did so received a four-paragraph letter typed by a computer-driven electric typewriter programmed to print Nixon positions on sixty-seven various issues (each in a slightly different, "individually-written" style), and signed with Richard Nixon's signature by a signature machine. The voter comments were in turn compiled into daily digests of what the voters were thinking as a chart of public interest in the issues.[51]

At the heart of the "New Politics" technology, of course, was the technique of public opinion polling, which was used as the guide for almost all of the candidate's

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[50]Schlesinger, p. 3740.

[51]Chester, Hodgson, and Page, pp. 612-613. See also de Toledano, p. 353.

actions and messages. Harry W. O'Neill described the
polling operation conducted in behalf of Nixon:

> In a major campaign a candidate may find it most
> useful to have in place a system geared to follow
> the continually changing political scene. During
> the 1968 presidential campaign, Opinion Research
> Corporation had such a facility operating for the
> Nixon Campaign from mid-September to election day.
> It was a centralized WATS line facility capable of
> producing several hundred interviews daily, seven
> days a week. Certain important issues and aspects
> of the campaign were constantly tracked; questions
> could be added or deleted on a moment's notice.
> Thus, on the night of Humphrey's September 30 Salt
> Lake City speech, in which he altered his stand on
> Vietnam, we were able to report the latest voter
> opinion on many aspects of Vietnam within 3 hours
> of receiving the request.[52]

Nixon's use of the polls extended beyond sounding

public opinion about the issues. Chester, Hodgson, and

Page described Nixon's commission of a semantic differ-

ential test designed to test the public's perceptions of

Nixon and Humphrey.[53] Although the authors made it clear

that Nixon did not agree with everything his campaign

managers said about how he should conduct his campaign,

they nevertheless quoted John Mitchell's comment about

"programming the candidate" without making clear how much

of an exaggeration that comment really was.[54]

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[52]Harry W. O'Neill, "Gathering Intelligence
through Survey Research," pp. 117-124 in Hiebert, et al.
(eds.), The Political Image Merchants (Washington:
Acropolis Books Ltd., 1971), p. 120.

[53]Chester, Hodgson, and Page, p. 619.

[54]Ibid., p. 612.

Overall, Nixon's reduced personal campaigning, together with his heavy reliance on the polling and mass media techniques of the New Politics, gave the impression to political commentators that he was isolated from the public. Yet the public was exposed fully to Nixon's media saturation campaign. Witcover described this impact of Nixon's 1968 campaign:

> In a country where people probably are subject to media influence more than any other people in the world, they nevertheless take great pride in their independence, their ability to think and decide for themselves. Never mind what the press might be writing about Nixon going into hiding, or refusing to debate. There he was on your television set, or talking calmly, confidently, knowledgeably on your radio. Reporters traveling with Nixon and trying to assess the campaign were severly handicapped because they usually did not have the opportunity to see this side of the Nixon operation and to gauge its impact. To a considerable degree, they covered one Nixon campaign in 1968, and the American people saw another. It was a strategy revolutionary in approach and scope, and masterful in execution.[55]

Pursuing his analysis of Nixon's strategy and tactics, Witcover continued:

> In the most antiseptic, controlled campaign in American history, he was a candidate in a glass booth. His smooth operation contrived for him appearances of enthusiastic support, and his own words attracted mostly those who already agreed with him. It was difficult for a candidate who had been so effectively sealed off from genuine dialogue with the public, and from debate with his opponents, to grasp the depth of the public passions of 1968 and the resoluteness of those who disagreed with him.[56]

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[55]Witcover, pp. 399-400.   [56]Ibid., p. 462.

In his symbolic "glass booth," fighting to project
a bland, centrist position in defense of his lead in the
polls, Nixon very nearly lost the election to Hubert
Humphrey.

Humphrey's campaign was the antithesis of Nixon's.
Humphrey, the incumbent Vice-President, was saddled
with the burden of defending the unpopular policies
(particularly of the Vietnam War) of Lyndon B. Johnson.
The Democratic National Convention, with its televised
violence and images of the Democratic "boss," Mayor
Richard Daley of Chicago, cost Humphrey a full ten points
in the popularity polls.[57] If Nixon's campaign typified
the best-run campaign in modern times, Humphrey's cam-
paign typified the worst. Humphrey assembled his staff
after the convention, only then to consider the creation
of a campaign plan. The Humphrey campaign not only
suffered from poor planning, but also from a lack of
financial resources. Chester, Hodgson, and Page wrote,

> The man who said there was no money was looking
> on the bright side. The Democrats actually had
> minus money: a debt of roughly one million dollars
> . . . . In the event, they did virtually no
> advertising until late September. There were no
> half hours, there were very few television spots,

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[57]Bernard L. Brock, "1968 Democratic Campaign:
A Political Upheaval," Quarterly Journal of Speech, LV,
(February, 1969), 32.

no radio and no newspaper advertisements—at a time when Nixon was dominating the air waves.[58]

Humphrey campaigned as Truman did, travelling the country, speaking as often as he could. Meanwhile, he was frequently greeted by sparse crowds (due to poor advance work) or, worse, gangs of anti-war demonstrators with bullhorns who drowned him out—all dutifully recorded and reported on the news media.

On September 30, however, Humphrey made a speech in Salt Lake City on the subject of the Vietnam War which was broadcast on national television. In that speech, Humphrey gave the impression that he was finally breaking with Johnson's policies. Brock wrote, "It had taken Humphrey a full month to articulate a stand that gave him his own identity and the alienated McCarthy forces hope. With this sign of independence, the Humphrey-Muskie momentum started to build."[59] From then on to the last gasp of the campaign, Humphrey whittled away at Nixon's lead in the polls. On election eve, Humphrey trailed by only two points—too close to predict. With his momentum building, Humphrey felt he would have defeated Nixon if the campaign had lasted two more days.[60]

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[58]Chester, Hodgson, and Page, pp. 638-639.

[59]Brock, p. 34.

[60]Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1968 (New York: Pocket Books, 1969), pp. 474-475.

Nixon's single-minded adherence to his strategy and his corresponding failure to respond to Humphrey's eleventh-hour surge were evaluated by the Ripon Society:

> Post-election studies--some commissioned by state Republican parties--show that hundreds of thousands of notes slipped to Humphrey in the final few days and hours. It is our conclusion that Mr. Nixon eventually lost millions of votes that he might not have and that a primary reason for this was that his campaign tried so hard to offend no one that its very blandness became offensive.[61]

SUMMARY

In this chapter, we have discussed the historical and biographical circumstances relevant to Richard M. Nixon's two Presidential campaigns in 1960 and 1968. We have encapsulated the early life and career of Nixon, stressing those aspects of his growth and education which contributed to his later political achievements. We have seen the influence of his early training to work hard, to achieve and to excel in achievement (particularly in his interest areas of academic study, speech and debate activities, and the law). Further, we have pointed to the outstanding facets of his political career, beginning with his first elective office, the U.S. House of Representatives, and continuing through his service as U.S. Senator and U.S. Vice President. Our view has included

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[61]The Ripon Society, p. 15.

both his substantive interests and accomplishments and
also his campaigning techniques.

Finally, we have described in some detail both of
his campaigns for the Presidency, with particular
emphasis on his campaign strategy and the highlights of
the campaigns. It can be seen that his Presidential
campaigns grew out of the context established by his
historical and biographical antecedents, and also that
his campaigning incorporated new elements to adapt to
changing technologies.

Chapter 3

A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF RICHARD M. NIXON'S
TREATMENT OF ISSUES IN HIS 1960 AND
1968 CAMPAIGN SPEECHES

INTRODUCTION

Traditional rhetorical analysis is concerned with
the elements of the speaker, the audience and occasion,
and the message. In the preceding chapter we have out-
lined the biographical antecedents of the speaker we are
considering, Richard M. Nixon, and also the historical
contexts of the 1960 and 1968 Presidential election
campaigns within which he spoke. There remains the
element of the message. In this chapter, we shall
describe the campaign messages of Richard M. Nixon,
using the method of content analysis.

Both the general techniques of content analysis
and the specific methodology employed in this study have
been discussed in detail in Chapter 1. In this Chapter,
we shall approach our research problem of how Richard M.
Nixon treated substantive issues in his campaign speeches
in his two campaigns for the Presidency. Specifically,
we shall address these questions: (1) What was Nixon's
treatment of the issues of War and Peace, the Pocketbook
aspect of the Domestic Economy, Civil Rights, and Law and

Order; and (2) How did Nixon's treatment of these issues differ over the two campaigns?

DISCUSSION

Let it be clearly recognized at the outset that, in reality, the selected issues are closely interrelated. Indeed, more often than not, Nixon discussed more than one of the issues in his speeches. Each issue impinges on the other issues, directly or indirectly. For example, the high costs of the Vietnam War, along with the costs of domestic spending, led to inflation and ultimately forced cutbacks in some programs. Blacks usually feel stronger effects from economic fluctuations, thus intensifying their frustration and discontent. Richard M. Dalfiume linked all four of the selected issues in this statement:

> The increasing commitment of men and money in Vietnam heightened the natural tensions inherent in the Johnsonian consensus and led to its dissolution. The cost of pursuing the war compelled reductions in what critics had already labeled an inadequate War on Poverty. This only sharpened the sense of exclusion in black ghettos, where uprisings had occurred in 1964, 1965, 1966, culminating in the summer of 1967, the most violent in the nation's history, with outbreaks in a hundred cities. The impatience of black Americans and white youth with the country's inability--lack of will--to end violence at home and abroad exacerbated an ever-present white backlash and generation gap, and led to demands for "law and order."[1]

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[1]Richard M. Dalfiume (ed.), American Politics Since 1945 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), p. 24.

Although these issues are individually analyzed in this dissertation, it should not be inferred that Nixon approached them as if they existed in a vacuum. This dissertation identifies and isolates four separate issue areas for purposes of content analysis, and for the sake of specificity and clarity in rhetorical analysis.

1960 Speeches

In 1960, the U.S. Senate authorized the publication of the complete press conferences, speeches, remarks, and statements of the two major candidates for the Presidency throughout the presidential campaign period. Released in six parts under the title, Freedom of Communications, Part II consists of "The Speeches, Remarks, Press Conferences and Study Papers of Vice President Richard M. Nixon, August 1 through November 7, 1960."

From among the hundreds of verbatim transcripts included in this document, Richard M. Nixon designated fourteen speeches as being specifically oriented towards substantive issues. In a speech delivered on November 7, 1960, the final day of the campaign, he said, "For nearly 8 weeks I have been tracing out constructive programs in many fields of public policy."[2]

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[2]U.S. Senate, Freedom of Communication: Final Report of the Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate prepared by its Subcommittee of The Subcommittee on Communications pursuant to S. Res. 305, 86th Congress. Part II, The

His list of speeches is shown below in Table 1.

Twelve of these fourteen speeches were presented to local audiences. Two were televised: The November 2 speech on national defense policy was broadcast on KENS-TV, San Antonio; and "The Crusade for Freedom" was a nation-wide telecast on November 6, the Sunday preceding Election Day.

1968 Speeches

There is no U.S. Senate compilation of the 1968 campaign messages produced by Richard M. Nixon as there had been in 1960. Moreover, no other convenient repository for those messages was discovered in the survey of existing literature. Therefore, a request was made to the White House staff of President Nixon for assistance in locating manuscripts or transcripts of his 1968 presidential campaign speeches. Contact was made with Dr. Lee Huebner, Special Assistant to the President.[3]

Dr. Huebner furnished the writer with photostatic copies of twenty speeches which were delivered by Richard M. Nixon between September 8 and October 24, 1968.

Speeches, Remarks, Press Conferences, and Study Papers Of Vice President Richard M. Nixon, August 1 through November 7, 1960 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 1075. Hereafter this document shall be referred to by the title Freedom of Communications.

[3]Letters to Dr. Lee Huebner from the writer dated April 6, April 29, and May 2, 1971; letter to the writer from Dr. Huebner dated May 6, 1971; telephone conversation between the writer and Dr. Huebner, May 6, 1971.

Table 1

Richard M. Nixon's 1960 Campaign Speeches

	Subject	Date	Place
1.	"Operation Consume," Program for Reducing Agricultural Surplus	Sept. 16	Guthrie Center, Iowa
2.	Federal Aid for Depressed Areas	Sept. 19	Scranton, Pennsylvania
3.	"Operation Safeguard," Farm Program	Sept. 23	Sioux Falls, South Dakota
4.	Metropolitan Housing	Sept. 28	Forest Hills, New York
5.	U. S. Defense Establishment	Oct. 11	San Diego, California
6.	Aviation	Oct. 12	Long Beach, California
7.	Formulation of Foreign Policy	Oct. 14	Los Angeles, California
8.	The Domestic Economy	Oct. 20	New York, New York
9.	Space Exploration	Oct. 25	Cincinnati, Ohio
10.	"Operation Plowshare," Nuclear Test Policy	Oct. 26	Toledo, Ohio
11.	Immigration	Nov. 1	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
12.	National Defense Policy	Nov. 2	San Antonio, Texas
13.	Small Business	Nov. 3	Houston, Texas
14.	"The Crusade for Freedom"	Nov. 6	Los Angeles, California

The list of speech manuscripts furnished by Dr. Huebner is shown below in Table 2.

Of these twenty speeches, seven were presented to local audiences and thirteen were presented to nationwide radio broadcasts. None of these speeches was presented on television.

The fourteen 1960 speeches and the twenty 1968 speeches total thirty-four speeches for the two campaigns. This number was deemed adequate and representative for the content analysis.

As can be seen from the list of topics shown in Table 1 and 2, Richard M. Nixon addressed a wide variety of issues, both domestic and international. Included in these speeches are numerous references to the four issue areas selected for content analysis (War and Peace, Pocketbook, Civil Rights, and Law and Order). Although few of the speeches listed in the sample are devoted exclusively to one or another of the four issues,[4] content analysis disclosed statements related to the four issue areas in thirty-three of the thirty-four speeches.

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[4]The exceptions are these: In the 1960 sample, Nixon spoke on "The Domestic Economy" (Pocketbook issue); and "National Defense" (War and Peace issue); and in the 1968 campaign, he spoke on "Order and Justice Under Law" (Law and Order issue), "To Keep the Peace" (War and Peace issue), "To Make a Dollar Worth a Dollar" (Pocketbook issue), and "The Security Gap" (War and Peace issue). Additionally, as one might expect, the content analysis showed that one or another issue predominated in various other speeches in the sample.

Table 2

Richard M. Nixon's 1968 Campaign Speeches

	Subject	Date	Place
1.	"The Cradle of Civilization Must Not Be Its Grave"	Sept. 8	B'nai B'rith Convention Washington, D. C.
2.	"Modern American Agriculture: An Opportunity for Service in the 1970's"	Sept. 14	Des Moines, Iowa
3.	"The Nature of the Presidency"	Sept. 19	NBC and CBS Radio Networks
4.	"Restoring the U. S. to the Role of a First-Rate Maritime Power"	Sept. 25	Seattle, Washington
5.	"A Better Day for the American Indian"	Sept. 27	Omaha, Nebraska
6.	"Order and Justice Under Law"	Sept. 29	MBS Radio Network
7.	"The American Spirit"	Oct. 2	Williamsburg, Virginia
8.	"The Research Gap: Crisis in American Science and Technology"	Oct. 5	New York, New York
9.	"The Voluntary Way"	Oct. 6	ABC Radio Network
10.	"The Time to Save NATO"	Oct. 13	CBS Radio Network
11.	"The Alliance for Progress"	Oct. 14	New York, New York
12.	"Today's Youth: The Great Generation"	Oct. 16	NBC Radio Network
13.	"The All-Volunteer Armed Force"	Oct. 17	CBS Radio Network
14.	"America's Natural Resources"	Oct. 18	CBS Radio Network
15.	"To Keep the Peace"	Oct. 19	CBS Radio Network
16.	"Education for Excellence, Freedom and Diversity"	Oct. 20	CBS Radio Network
17.	"An Open Door for American Labor"	Oct. 21	CBS Radio Network
18.	"The Elderly: For the Enduring Generation"	Oct. 22	CBS Radio Network
19.	"To Make a Dollar Worth a Dollar"	Oct. 23	CBS Radio Network
20.	"The Security Gap"	Oct. 24	CBS Radio Network

Categories and Indicators

The four issues selected for this study (War and Peace, Pocketbook aspect of the Domestic Economy, Civil Rights, and Law and Order) were broken down into several indicators, or sub-categories. These indicators are listed in the Methodology section of Chapter 1, and they also appear in the tables below. In general, indicators were selected to provide an orderly system for recording Nixon's statements on the principal specific substantive topics within the four issue areas which one would expect to be discussed in a Presidential campaign.

Reliability. An independent coder and the writer coded a sample of approximately 150 statements in a speech by Richard M. Nixon not included in the speeches analyzed in this dissertation. Inter-coder agreement was achieved in eighty-two percent of the coding judgments. Coding of all speeches in the samples was performed by the writer.

Frequency of issue statements in the 1960 and 1968 campaigns. The following tables illustrate the frequency with which Richard M. Nixon made statements regarding the issues. Table 3 shows the frequency and ratio of issue statements in the 1960 sample, and Table 4 shows the frequency and ratio of issue statements in the 1968 sample.

Over all, Nixon made 4,646 countable statements in the fourteen speeches in the 1960 sample, and 5,082

countable statements in the twenty speeches in the 1968 sample. Of these statements, 984 of the 4,646 statements in 1960 were related to the issues (a ratio of 21%), and 1,156 of the 5,082 statements in 1968 were related to the issues (a ratio of 23%). Thus, at the outset it is clear that Nixon gave his attention to the issues in both campaigns.

Table 3 shows that the 1960 sample includes fourteen speeches, ranging in length from 31 statements to 648 statements. Speech 11, "Immigration," contains no statements related to the issues. Speech 10, "Operation Plowshare," Speech 12, "National Defense," and Speech 14, "Crusade for Freedom," contain statements related to the category of War and Peace (the last named speech also contained a single statement related to another issue). Speech 13, "Small Business," contains statements related to the category of the Pocketbook. The other nine speeches all contain statements related to two or more issues.

Table 4 shows that the 1968 sample contains twenty speeches, all of which include statements related to the issues. These speeches range in length from 99 statements to 609 statements. Speech 2, "Modern Agriculture," Speech 14, "Natural Resources," Speech 16, "Education," and Speech 18, "The Elderly," each might fairly be considered one-issue speeches related to the Pocketbook. (Speeches 2

Table 3

Frequency and Ratio of Issue-Oriented Statements contained in the 1960 Sample

Speech	Total statements	Total issue		Issue oriented statements								Unclassified statements	
				War & Peace		Pocket-book		Civil Rights		Law & Order			
		n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
1. Operation Consume	648	127	20	18	3	109	17	0	0	0	0	521	80
2. Depressed Area	232	85	37	47	20	38	16	0	0	0	0	147	63
3. Operation Safeguard	627	114	18	24	4	90	14	0	0	0	0	513	82
4. Metropolitan Housing	156	33	21	0	0	25	16	7	4	1	1	123	79
5. Defense Establishment	540	110	20	86	16	24	4	0	0	0	0	430	80
6. American Aviation	50	7	14	3	6	4	8	0	0	0	0	43	86
7. Foreign Policy	555	95	17	77	14	6	1	12	2	0	0	460	83
8. Domestic Economy	483	76	16	0	0	73	15	3	1	0	0	407	84
9. Space Exploration	150	19	13	14	9	5	3	0	0	0	0	131	87

Table 3 (continued)

Speech	Total statements	Issue oriented statements											Unclassified statements	
		Total issue		War & Peace		Pocket- book		Civil Rights		Law & Order				
		n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%		n	%
10. Operation Plowshare	273	126	46	126	46	0	0	0	0	0	0		147	54
11. Immigration	31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		31	100
12. National Defense	297	132	44	132	44	0	0	0	0	0	0		165	56
13. Small Business	66	10	15	0	0	10	15	0	0	0	0		56	85
14. Crusade for Freedom	538	50	9	49	9	1	0	0	0	0	0		488	91
Total	4,646	984	21	576	12	385	8	22	0	1	0		3,662	79

aPercentages are all rounded off.

Table 4

Frequency and Ratio of Issue-Oriented Statements
contained in the 1968 Sample

Speech	Total statements	Total Issue n	%a	War & Peace n	%	Pocketbook n	%	Civil Rights n	%	Law & Order n	%	Unclassified statements n	%
1. Cradle of Civilization	609	135	22	99	15	13	2	4	1	19	3	474	78
2. Modern Agriculture	218	41	19	1	0	40	18	0	0	0	0	177	81
3. Nature of Presidency	275	12	4	2	1	0	0	0	0	10	4	263	96
4. Maritime Power	182	28	15	12	7	16	9	0	0	0	1	154	85
5. American Indian	99	24	24	0	0	18	18	5	5	1	1	75	76
6. Order & Justice	309	161	52	0	0	2	1	5	1	145	47	148	48
7. American Spirit	292	10	3	4	1	1	1	5	1	0	0	282	97
8. Research Gap	185	52	28	20	11	32	17	14	8	1	1	133	72
9. Voluntary Way	250	35	14	4	1	26	10	8	3	1	0	215	86
10. Time for NATO	242	76	31	75	31	0	0	0	0	1	1	166	69
11. Alliance	132	13	10	5	4	8	6	3	1	0	0	119	90
12. Progress	285	14	5	2	1	8	1	3	1	7	2	271	95
13. Today's Youth / Voluntary Army	254	49	19	37	15	2	4	1	1	0	0	205	81

Table 4 (continued)

Speech	Total state-ments	Total issue		Issue oriented statements War & Peace		Pocket-book		Civil Rights		Law & Order		Unclassified statements	
		n	%[a]	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
14. Natural Resources	184	11	6	0	0	11	6	0	0	0	0	173	94
15. To Keep the Peace	214	85	40	84	39	0	0	0	0	1	0	129	60
16. Education	445	37	8	0	0	37	8	0	0	0	0	408	92
17. American Labor	241	93	39	0	0	78	32	14	6	0	0	148	61
18. The Elderly	227	59	26	0	0	58	26	0	0	1	0	168	74
19. To Make a Dollar	204	96	47	5	2	90	44	0	0	1	0	108	53
20. Security Gap	235	125	53	125	53	0	0	0	0	0	0	110	47
Total	5,082	1,156	23	472	9	442	9	53	1	189	4	3,926	77

[a]Percentages are all rounded off.

and 18 each also include single statements related to War and Peace.) Speech 10, "Time for NATO," Speech 15, "To Keep the Peace," and Speech 20, "The Security Gap," are primarily War and Peace-oriented. (Speeches 10 and 15 each contain a single statement related to Law and Order.) The other thirteen speeches in the sample all contain references to two or more issues.

The preceding tables show the frequency with which Richard M. Nixon made issue-oriented statements in the 1960 and 1968 samples. When the unclassified statements are removed from consideration, the ratios of the issue-oriented statements in the two campaigns show a dramatic comparison. These comparisons are shown in Table 5 below in which the ratio of issue-oriented statements are calculated as a percentage of total issue statements, rather than as a percentage of total statements.

Table 5 illustrates in a general way the comparison of Nixon's emphasis on the four selected issues over the two campaigns. There are several striking things to note from Table 5 before proceeding to a more detailed analysis of Nixon's treatment of each of the issues. First, notice that the first two issues, War and Peace and the Pocketbook, received the bulk of Nixon's emphasis in both campaigns. Next, notice that the emphasis on each of the four issues is different in the two campaigns, except for the Pocketbook issue. (Even though the Pocketbook issue received roughly equal emphasis in the two campaigns—39%

in 1960 and 38% in 1968--subsequent analysis will show that **different aspects** of the Pocketbook issue were emphasized in the two campaigns.) Next, notice that War and Peace received substantially less emphasis in 1968 than in 1960. Next, notice that Law and Order was ignored as an issue in 1960, but was substantially included in the 1968 sample (0% in 1960, 16% in 1968). Finally, notice that Civil Rights received over twice as much emphasis in 1968 as it did in 1960 (2% in 1960, 5% in 1968).

Table 5

Comparison of Ratios of Issue Statements in the 1960 and 1968 Samples

		1960		1968		Gain Score
	Issue	n	%[a]	n	%[b]	%
1.	War and Peace	576	59	472	41	-18
2.	Pocketbook	385	39	442	38	- 1
3.	Civil Rights	22	2	53	5	+ 3
4.	Law and Order	1	0	189	16	+16
	Total	984	100	1,156	100	

[a]Percentages are of total issue statements in 1960 campaign. Percentages are rounded off.

[b]Percentages are of total issue statements in 1968 campaign. Percentages are rounded off.

The importance of these differences can be generally summarized at this point, but it should be kept in mind that each issue will be analyzed in depth later in this chapter. In 1960 Nixon devoted 59 percent of his issue-oriented statements to War and Peace, and another 39 percent to the Pocketbook. Thus, 98 percent of his issue-oriented statements dealt with only those two areas. But in 1968, Table 5 shows that Nixon also addressed the issues of Civil Rights and Law and Order.

War and Peace, particularly, seemed to be de-emphasized as a topic of discussion. Not only did the ratio decrease, (59% in 1960, 41% in 1968) but the absolute number of statements about War and Peace decreased (n=576 in 1960, n=472 in 1968), notwithstanding the fact that there were more speeches and more issue-oriented statements in the latter campaign. But while Nixon seemed to be backing away from quite so much emphasis on War and Peace in 1968, he was adding Civil Rights and Law and Order to the Pocketbook as topics in his discussion of issues. In particular, Law and Order stands out in Table 5 as an area of attention; but when the issue is combined with Civil Rights, it can be seen that Nixon devoted 21 percent of his issue-oriented statements of these two domestic issues in 1968 (Law and Order=16%, Civil Rights =5%). Hence, one of the principal differences between the two campaigns was that Nixon discussed War and Peace

considerably less, and the domestic issues of the Pocket-book, Civil Rights, and Law and Order, considerably more in 1968 than he did in 1960.

Differences between the two campaigns. The preceding section demonstrates the gross similarities and differences between the two campaigns. More interesting findings may be shown by displaying the data according to indicators and direction of statements. Subsequent tables (Tables 6-9 below) compare Richard M. Nixon's treatment of specific topics subordinate to the four major issue areas. Each table focuses on one of the issue areas. Statements are broken down according to Nixon's stance on a particular indicator, either Pro, Con, or Neutral, in both campaigns.

War and Peace. As a substantive issue area, War and Peace is a general topic. Subordinate topics used as indicators in the content analysis included all of Nixon's statements which were related to the topic in his two campaigns. Regarding War, indicators included both War as a general policy (War as U.S. policy, War as Enemy Policy), and particular wars (World War II, Korea, and Vietnam). Regarding Peace, indicators included both Peace as a general policy objective (Peace as U.S. policy, Peace as Enemy Policy) and particular actions in pursuit of Peace (Negotiation & Diplomacy). Additionally, indicators included military defense in general (Military Preparedness),

and objects and actions in pursuit of military defense (Military Weaponry, Military Actions Short of War).

Table 6 shows that the selection of indicators was appropriate, except for "Peace as Enemy Policy." Content analysis disclosed that in neither campaign did Nixon make a statement which fit this indicator.

As to direction, there seemed to be a slight moderation of tone over the two campaigns. Overall, Nixon made fewer statements which would be categorized as either "Pro" or "Con," and more statements categorized as "Neutral," in the 1968 campaign.

In 1960, Nixon's statements about War and Peace were concentrated in these indicators: War as Enemy Policy (n=76), Peace as U.S. Policy (n=84), Negotiations & Diplomacy (n=141), Military Preparedness (n=108) and Military Weaponry (n=93). Within this grouping falls 502 of the 576 statements on War and Peace in 1960; and of them, 189 were Neutral (a ratio of 38%).

In 1968, in the same group of indicators, the corresponding figures are: War as Enemy Policy (n=118), Peace as U.S. Policy (n=58), Negotiations & Diplomacy (n=68), Military Preparedness (n=86), and Military Weaponry (n=43). Within this group of indicators are 373 of the 472 statements made about War and Peace in 1968. Also within this group of indicators, 168 statements are Neutral (a ratio of 45%).

Table 6

**Comparison of 1960 and 1968 Statements
on War and Peace[a]**

Indicators	Pro 1960 n	%	Pro 1968 n	%	Con 1960 n	%	Con 1968 n	%	Neutral 1960 n	%	Neutral 1968 n	%
I A 1 a War as U.S. (Allies') Policy					13	2	11	2			11	2
b War as Enemy Policy	6	1			60	10	47	10	10	2	71	14
I A 2 a World War II			5	1					17	3		
b Korea					5	1	2	0	8	1	9	2
c Vietnam			1	0	1	0	17	4	1	0	23	5
I B 1 a Peace as U.S. (or Allies') Policy	67	12	32	7					17	3	26	6
b Peace as Enemy Policy												

Table 6 (continued)

Indicators	Pro 1960 n	Pro 1960 %	Pro 1968 n	Pro 1968 %	Con 1960 n	Con 1960 %	Con 1968 n	Con 1968 %	Neutral 1960 n	Neutral 1960 %	Neutral 1968 n	Neutral 1968 %
I B 2 Negotiations, Diplomacy	45	8	39	7	24	4	2	0	72	13	27	6
I C 1 Military Preparedness	74	13	70	15					34	6	16	3
I C 2 Military Weaponry	39	7	15	3					56	10	28	6
I C 3 Military Actions Short of War	31	5			6	1	2	0	8	1	1	0
Total	262	45	162	34	109	19	81	17	205	34	229	49

aPercentages are of total statements related to the issue of War and Peace in the respective campaigns. In 1960, n=576; in 1968, n=472. Percentages are rounded off.

It should also be pointed out that there are some differences in the direction of statements related to these five indicators over the two campaigns. In 1960, Nixon made more Con statements related to War as Enemy Policy than Neutral statements; in 1968, he was decidedly Neutral in his emphasis on this indicator. Similarly, he was a strong advocate of Peace as U.S. Policy in 1960, but his 1968 remarks were fairly evenly divided between Pro and Neutral in this indicator. Conversely, he made more Neutral as well as more Con statements regarding Negotiations & Diplomacy in 1960 than in 1968, along with an approximately equal proportion of Pro statements in both campaigns.[5] In the last two indicators in this group, Nixon's pattern of direction was similar in both campaigns. He was definitely Pro Military Preparedness, and divided between Pro and Neutral on Military Weaponry.

In addition to these five indicators, two other indicators deserve special notice. In 1960, Nixon emphasized his support for Military Actions Short of War (mostly in relation to the specific issue of Quemoy-Matsu). Of more interest to subsequent history, in 1968, Nixon

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[5]The fact that, in 1960, Nixon made a substantial number of Con statements on Negotiations & Diplomacy may be partly explained by his opposition in that year to John F. Kennedy's proposed nuclear arms treaty. Without the campaign statements related to this specific issue, his pattern would have been much more similar to 1968--a distribution of statements between the Pro and Neutral categories.

made several statements regarding Vietnam, an indicator he ignored in 1960. His 1968 statements on Vietnam were about evenly divided between the Con and Neutral directions.

Discussion of War and Peace. In both the 1960 and 1968 campaigns, Richard Nixon devoted more attention to the issue of War and Peace than he did to any other issue; moreover, his treatment of the issue was more specific than the other issues, particularly in the latter campaign. Consequently, the discussion of this issue will be more extensive than the ensuing discussions of the other issues.

In 1960, Nixon's position on War and Peace in his issue-oriented speeches was similar to his stump speeches. In his three 1960 defense speeches, this theme recurred:

> What kind of leadership is needed to keep the peace without surrender and extend freedom throughout the world? In seven and a half years, President Eisenhower got us out of one war and kept us out of other wars. To be strong diplomatically, we must remain strong militarily. Kennedy's offer to apologize to the Soviets for the U-2 incident displayed weakness, and his position on Cuba displayed rashness.

As a matter of fact, this theme pleased Nixon so much that he repeated it in other speeches not devoted to national defense. It appeared, for example, in his farm speeches and his Appalachian Relief speech. Frequently, the theme was no more substantial than is shown here, although it was elaborated at greater length. Nixon relied greatly upon his position as incumbent Vice

President, and his recital of Eisenhower's achievements in the area of peace and national defense. This general argument was Nixon's response to Kennedy's charge that there existed a serious "missile gap," or imbalance in military weaponry between the United States and Russia. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. wrote that Nixon hesitated to reveal classified information which totally disproved the charge, and so continued to give general reassurances instead of specific rebuttal points against Kennedy's charges.[6]

If Nixon felt constrained not to deal with the status of America's missile strength, he felt positively frustrated in attempting to handle Kennedy's Cuban position. Kennedy at one point took a position that the United States should actively assist Cuban exiles in recovering their homeland from Fidel Castro. Unknown to Kennedy, the Eisenhower administration was proceeding with plans to do exactly that. In order to protect the secrecy of the plans, Nixon argued that any such action by the United States would be foolhardy.[7]

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[6]Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (ed.), History of American Presidential Elections 1789-1968, IV (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1971), pp. 3465-66.

[7]Ibid. As a footnote to this issue, Kennedy approved of the plans to help the Cuban exiles when he took office, and the result was the ill-fated Bay of Pigs fiasco. This put Nixon in a position to say "I told you so;" and, indeed, he did include the mistake in his litany of Democratic errors in foreign policy during the 1968 campaign.

The only other issue of War and Peace Nixon dealt with in the 1960 sample of speeches was even more minor; the question of Quemoy and Matsu, the islands lying a few miles off the shore of mainland China still held by the Nationalist Chinese. In a reversal of philosophies, Kennedy originally contended that the Nationalists should withdraw from the islands, but Nixon, who hesitated to support the Cuban exiles during his campaign, argued that the United States should never give up "a foot of free soil" in the China instance. Ultimately, both Nixon and Kennedy moderated on Quemoy and Matsu, opting for general support of Eisenhower's approach.

On the issue of War and Peace in 1960, Nixon held a strong position in the minds of the voters because traditionally the Republicans enjoyed solid public trust in foreign affairs. Polsby and Wildavsky stated:

> Nixon sought to differentiate himself as much as possible from Kennedy in the field of foreign affairs. He suggested that he was uniquely capable of securing peace without surrender, and that Kennedy was not. He tried to strengthen the prevailing impression of the Democratic party as the party of war. He implied alternatively that Kennedy would permit the Communists to make unwarranted advances (for example in Matsu and Quemoy), and that the Democrats would make rash moves (Cuba). Even Nixon's espousal of an aggressive line, such as he took regarding Matsu and Quemoy, helped him because in foreign affairs voters trust the Republicans.[8]

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[8]Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Presidential Elections: Strategies of American Electoral Politics (2d ed.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), p. 138.

In 1968, the leading issue of War and Peace was the Vietnam War. Milton Cummings, Jr. reported that the polls recorded that in 1968, at least half of the American public named Vietnam as "the most serious problem facing this country today"--a striking indication of the salience of the issue.[9] Chester, Hodgson, and Page commented,

> Nothing is clearer than the imperative that an account of the politics of 1968 must start with Vietnam, the progress of which dominated the struggle for the Presidency from first to last . . . . Yet no subject is harder to deal with briefly."[10]

It has been noted in Chapter 2 that the turning point in Humphrey's campaign came in late September, when, in a television speech, he offered the clear impression that he had broken with Johnson's policies on the Vietnam War; and after that point, his standing in the pre-election polls began to rise sharply. What has not been indicated is the depth of attitudes about the war which were held by the American public. Historian James Truslow Adams pointed out that anti-war Senator Eugene McCarthy's strong showing in the New Hampshire primary early in 1968 alerted Democrats to the fact that the war was a threat

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[9]Milton C. Cummings, Jr., "The Strategic Outlook for the National Elections of 1968," The President: Rex, Princeps, Imperator? ed. Joseph M. Ray (El Paso, Texas: Texas Western Press, 1969), p. 74.

[10]Lewis Chester, Godfrey Hodgson, and Bruce Page, An American Melodrama (New York: The Viking Press, 1969), p. 21.

to their hold on the Presidency.[11] That primary, combined

with the North Vietnamese Tet offensive which led General

Westmoreland to request another 200,000 American troops

for Vietnam, encouraged Senator Robert F. Kennedy to enter

the campaign for the Democratic nomination. These events,

in turn, forced President Johnson's withdrawal from the

race on March 31, according to Richard Dalfiume.[12]

Yet, while public feelings were widespread and

strong, they were also mixed. Samuel Lubell's survey in

the summer of 1968 showed that there was ambiguity and

vagueness; in other words, there was serious confusion in

the public mind. For example, over half of those who

favored stepping up the war also opposed sending more U.S.

troops. Instead, they favored using intensified bombing;

yet they believed that bombing was ineffective. Again,

those opposed to the war "leaped on the suggestion that

the war be 'de-Americanized' by having the South Vietnamese

take over the fighting," yet these same respondents said

the South Vietnamese government was corrupt and could not

be trusted in 'Vietnamizing' the war. Lubell's conclusion

was that "a hawk is a dove is an albatross," and that the

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[11]James Truslow Adams. Continued by Jacob G. Cooke
The March of Democracy (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1969), pp. 3-4.

[12]Dalfiume, p. 25.

people wanted to get out so badly they didn't really care about South Vietnam.[13]

Given these circumstances, Nixon elected to keep silent about the Vietnam War, despite its importance as an issue. It was, after all, the Democrats' problem. It was costing Humphrey, not him. As his public strategy for dealing with the Vietnam War, Nixon told his biographers, Mazo and Hess,

> At this time President Johnson is attempting to negotiate a settlement with the North Vietnamese. If I or any other candidate were to indicate what we would settle for, and if that position were different from and possible more attractive to the North Vietnamese than what the President was offering, this immediately would torpedo the negotiations. So I will not discuss that under any circumstances. It would be inappropriate and highly irresponsible to do so.[14]

Table 6 shows that Nixon made several statements about Vietnam, but in the sample of speeches, nowhere did he make the famous statement which seems to characterize his 1968 position on Vietnam, "I have a plan." It is also true, however, that all the statements about Vietnam are isolated, passing references, usually in some context other than discussion of the war. For example, in "Time to Save NATO," he said that Vietnam was responsible for loss of U.S. influence in Europe. In his speech on the

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[13]Samuel Lubell, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1971), pp. 260-261.

[14]Earl Mazo and Stephen Hess, Nixon: A Political Portrait (New York: Popular Library, 1968), p. 310.

all-volunteer army, he proposed the abolition of the draft; but he mentioned in passing that his proposal would have to wait until after Vietnam. In his speech, "To Keep the Peace," he warned that the U.S. should avoid future Vietnams, but he asserted that our participation in the Vietnam War has "bought time" for other small Southeast Asian countries in resisting the strength of Communist China. In his speech on inflation, he made brief reference to Vietnam as one contributing factor to the economic situation. Finally, in his major speech on national defense, "The Security Gap," he blamed Vietnam for depleting the U.S. lead in armaments. The point should be emphasized that Nixon did not make an issue of the Vietnam War in the sample of speeches, and that the references cited above are hardly any more important to his campaign speeches than his references to World War II or the Korean War, of which there are nearly as many. In fact, the only extended attention he gave to Vietnam during the 1968 campaign was a brief statement he submitted to the Republican Platform Committee. Adams saw Nixon's non-treatment of the Vietnam issue, so important to the electorate, as a deliberate strategy:

> Nixon's position, clever but deceptive, fitted the pattern of his general campaign strategy which called for maintaining his lead by avoiding a specific stand which might alienate his constituency. He had only to criticize Administration policy, pinning the blame for its failure on Humphrey and the Democrats, and avoid the pitfalls of proposing alternative policies by taking the lofty and safe position that any such

discussion might interfere with the Paris peace talks.[15]

If Nixon tended to ignore the Vietnam War, it does not follow that he ignored War and Peace as a campaign issue. He spoke of the Middle East and NATO. He spoke of the draft, and his proposal for an all-volunteer army. But his major thrust in the 1968 campaign was national defense, and his major development of the issue is found in the last issue-oriented speech in the sample, "The Security Gap," presented on October 24 on nationwide television.

In that speech, Nixon began by describing the state of national defense in 1960 when Eisenhower left office. Owing to Eisenhower's policies and planning,

> America was still at peace, and not one American boy had been killed or wounded on any battlefield for eight years. Moreover, our nation was the acknowledged leader of the Free World. Our superiority in weapons was unquestioned . . . I retrace this history because it explains why, during the eight Eisenhower years, there was not a Berlin wall, no Bay of Pigs, no Cuban missile crisis, no American fighting in Southeast Asia, no Pueblo piracy. It also explains why our globe-encircling alliances stayed strong and firm.

Proceeding from this glowing account of Eisenhower's achievements, Nixon went on to compare America's position eight years later, beginning with weapons. In five specific areas, intercontinental ballistic weapons, bombers, nuclear submarines, tactical aircraft, and the

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[15]Adams, pp. 48-49.

total weapon stockpile, Nixon stated that the U.S. dropped
from superiority to inferiority to the U.S.S.R. There-
fore, he accused the Democratic Administration with
"creating a security gap for America." He charged the
Democrats with abandoning Eisenhower's policy of superi-
ority in weaponry in favor of "parity," or equality with
the Communists, in hopes of producing "peace in our time"
(coincidentally, the phrase had been used by Prime
Minister Chamberlain to justify appeasing Hitler before
World War II) by setting a good example. Nixon refuted
the "parity" doctrine by expounding his theory that, since
the U.S.S.R. is weaker than the U.S. economically, to
allow them to catch up to the U.S. militarily would
symbolize superiority for them. He said, "We cannot
accept this concept and survive as a free people."

So long as the U.S.S.R. continued to entertain
world expansionist ambitions, Nixon warned that to continue
the policy of "parity" would shift America's predicament
from "a security gap" to "a survival gap." Additionally,
the Democrats had also scuttled the National Security
Council set up by Eisenhower, thus eliminating the process
for orderly planning and decision making regarding
national defense. In short,

> The risks facing our country have intensified these
> past eight years. Wrong policy assumptions--unrealism
> in numbers and types of weapons--laxity in research
> and development--flaws in the decision making process
> --a disregard of timing--allowing the Soviets to move
> rapidly toward parity and in some areas to achieve

superiority--a near breakdown of top policy-making procedures--these have been somber developments for our country. I am intensely dissatisfied with these conditions. As President I would move promptly to correct these mistakes of judgment and action.

In rapid-fire, "one-liner" sequence, Nixon then listed seven actions he would take, such as reorganizing the Department of Defense, rooting out the "whiz kids," restoring military superiority over the U.S.S.R., and restoring the National Security Council.

In the 1960 campaign, Kennedy had made much of a "missile gap" in his campaign, especially in the television debates. That "gap" evaporated after the election, but it was an issue favorable to Kennedy when it was used. In 1968, however, Nixon's attempt to conjure up a "security gap" on the eve of the election failed to bolster his campaign in the same way. For one important reason for its failure, it provided Humphrey with an opportunity for the closest thing to a debate with Nixon he would get in the campaign. Ordinarily, a major response to an opponent requires two or three days of advance preparation, consultation, and speech writing. On the issue of national defense, however, Humphrey had anticipated the possibility that Nixon would present a speech along the lines that he did; and a speech draft was already prepared. With only two or three hours of manuscript editing, and with the de-classification of certain items of defense information by Secretary of Defense Clifford, Humphrey was on the air

the next morning with an item-by-item refutation of
Nixon's speech. He showed that the U.S. enjoyed substan-
tial leads in each of the weapon types Nixon had discussed,
and added details on other weapons possessed by the U.S.,
so that for the foreseeable future, the U.S. could "oblit-
erate any aggressor nation or nations."[16] As Schlesinger
wrote,

> Throughout the campaign, Humphrey had hammered at
> Nixon's advocacy of delay in ratification of the
> nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Now, with Nixon's
> own words, he was able to dramatize their differences
> on arms control. As the first candidate to propose a
> bombing halt and now as the enemy of the arms race,
> Humphrey was emerging suddenly as the "peace" candi-
> date in the election. Now, if peace talks and a
> bombing halt became a reality, it might turn the
> tide.[17]

Instead of dampening Humphrey's momentum, Nixon's
speech merely added more impetus to it. On October 31,
President Johnson declared a halt to the bombing, and the
twenty point lead Nixon enjoyed in the summer of 1968
evaporated to nothing. Nixon's image of blandness and
calm in the 1968 campaign had reverted to the "Old Nixon"
on War and Peace. As the Ripon Society said, "When he
did speak out, he was the hard-line Nixon; his foreign
policy suddenly degenerated into preoccupation with
weaponry . . . ."[18]

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[16]Chester, Hodgson, and Page, pp. 719-726.

[17]Schlesinger, p. 3749.

[18]The Ripon Society, The Lesson of Victory (New
York: Dial Press, 1969), p. 22.

The Pocketbook Issue. As a substantive issue area, the Pocketbook issue is a broad topic which includes specific statements related to the domestic economy. Indicators subsumed all the statements which were related to fiscal and economic policies (Taxing, Spending, Fiscal Responsibility), and factors related to income, business, and employment (Inflation, Recession/Depression, Labor, Farm Income, Retirement Income, Employment).

Table 7 shows that the selection of indicators was appropriate, with one exception. Content analysis disclosed that Nixon made only one statement in either campaign related to Recession/Depression. (That was a Con statement in 1968).

As to direction, Nixon became more definite and assertive in 1968 than in 1960. In the earlier campaign, of 385 statements, 124 were Neutral (a ratio of 32%). In the latter campaign, of 442 statements, only 90 were Neutral (a ratio of 20%). Thus, in the Pocketbook area, unlike War and Peace, Nixon appeared to sharpen his thrust in 1968.

Nixon's statements about the Pocketbook issue appeared to be concentrated in these indicators: Spending, Fiscal Responsibility, and Farm Income. In 1960, Nixon's statements related to these indicators were as follows: Spending (n=246), Fiscal Responsibility (n=46), and Farm Income (n=53). Taken together, these three indicators

Table 7

Comparison of 1960 and 1968 Statements
on the Pocketbook Issues[a]

Indicators	Pro 1960 n	%	Pro 1968 n	%	Con 1960 n	%	Con 1968 n	%	Neutral 1960 n	%	Neutral 1968 n	%
II A 1 Taxing	7	2	1	0	7	2	15	3	3	1	3	1
II A 2 Spending	116	30	97	22	50	13	45	10	80	21	18	4
II A 3 Fiscal Responsibility (Economic Strength)	31	8	26	6					12	3	6	1
II B 1 Inflation			3	1	6	2	60	14	3	1	13	3
II B 2 Recession/ Depression							1	0				
II C 1 a Labor	4	1	12	3	2	1			5	1	9	2

Table 7 (continued)

Indicators	Pro 1960 n	Pro 1960 %	Pro 1968 n	Pro 1968 %	Con 1960 n	Con 1960 %	Con 1968 n	Con 1968 %	Neutral 1960 n	Neutral 1960 %	Neutral 1968 n	Neutral 1968 %
II C 1 b Farm Income	35	9	21	5					18	5		
II C 2 Retirement Income			36	8			5	1			3	1
II D Employment	2	1	30	7	1	0	126	28	3	1	38	9
Total	195	51	226	51	66	17	126	28	124	32	90	20

[a]Percentages are of total statements related to the Pocketbook Issue in the respective campaigns. In 1960, n=385; in 1968, n=442. Percentages are rounded off.

include 345 of the 385 statements related to the Pocket-
book issue; and, of them, 110 are Neutral (a ratio of
32%).

In 1968, in these same indicators, the corre-
sponding figures are: Spending (n=150), Fiscal
Responsibility (n=32), and Farm Income (n=21). Taken
together, these three indicators amount to 203 of the 442
statements related to the Pocketbook issue; and, of them,
only 24 are Neutral (a ratio of 11%).

As is apparent, Nixon failed to devote the same
degree of attention to these three indicators in 1968 as
he did in 1960. Particularly evident is the reduced
emphasis on Spending and Farm Income. As to Farm Income,
there are two speeches in the 1960 sample related to the
farm problem, and only one speech in the 1968 sample
related to the farm problem. Moreover, each of the 1960
farm speeches contains over twice as many issue-oriented
statements as the 1968 speech. Such is not the case with
the Spending indicator, in which Nixon's statements
related to Spending (or government programs requiring new
outlays) may be found in at least half of the speeches in
both samples.

It has been noted above that Nixon made a higher
proportion of Neutral statements about the Pocketbook
issue in 1960 than in 1968. That trend is also apparent
in the three indicators containing the majority of his
Pocketbook statements.

The trend is not nearly so apparent in the Inflation and Retirement Income indicators, two indicators which received considerably more attention in the 1968 sample than in the 1960 sample. In 1968, Nixon made 60 Con and 13 Neutral statements about Inflation, and 36 Pro and 3 Neutral statements about Retirement Income.

Finally, in two other indicators, Nixon made statements about specific issues in 1968 which he virtually ignored in 1960. In both the Labor and Employment indicators, statements are fairly evenly divided between the Pro and Neutral categories.

Discussion of Pocketbook Aspects of the Domestic Economy. A standard issue in political campaigns is the Pocketbook issue, particularly in a period when the economy is not working perfectly. Some assign it the highest value of all issues. For example, Scammon and Wattenberg stated:

> Generally speaking, it is the feeling of the authors that Americans vote for candidates largely on the basis of domestic issues, not international issues. The ever-potent Economic Issue always holds a high priority, and in a time of economic crisis --great inflation, depression, deep and lengthy recession--the Economic Issue will likely be the crucial Voting Issue in a national election. This is as it has been, and it is, and as it will likely continue to be.[19]

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[19]Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, Inc., 1970), p. 40.

What is meant by the Pocketbook issue includes inflation, recession, employment, taxes--in fact, any issue which affects the pocketbook of the voter. A voter might be naive in matters of economic policy, but he is concerned about governmental actions and decisions which he believes cost him money. Economist Arthur Okun said, "The gut issues about inflation are those of household finance, not world finances."[20] The same holds true for other economic areas such as fiscal and monetary policies or employment.

The concept that fiscal and monetary policies are positive tools for influencing the national economy is now fairly well understood; but it is only in recent years that the concept has come to be accepted by the federal government to the extent that, for example, deficit financing can sometimes be considered desirable, or that a tax cut under certain circumstances can operate to increase federal revenue. As we saw in the preceding chapter, Nixon had rejected the idea in the late 1950's that wage demands by labor unions were responsible for inflation; but President Eisenhower subscribed to the notion that a balanced budget is a primary goal to be attained at almost all costs. In approaching campaign

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[20]Arthur M. Okun, "Inflation: The Problems and Prospects Before Us," Inflation, eds. Arthur M. Okun, Henry H. Fowler, and Henry Gilbert (New York: New York University Press, 1970), p. 13.

rhetoric about the Pocketbook issue, therefore, the contemporary economic understanding must be kept in mind.

One other characteristic of campaign rhetoric, at Presidential levels at least, is a certain amount of emphasis on agricultural policies: farm income, production controls, and related topics. The sample of fourteen speeches from 1960 contains two speeches on farm policy; from 1968, there is one speech on agriculture. Wilkins and Friday commented on this peculiarity of campaigning in their anthology:

> The problem of agriculture has occupied an inordinate amount of time and energy of politicians. It has become a major issue of public controversy although it may be but a minor economic problem for the country as a whole.[21]

In point of fact, agriculture posed a serious economic problem in the 1960 campaign due to a surplus of farm commodities in storage valued at an estimate $9 billion.[22] Nixon's farm speeches emphasized a stronger application of the program of Eisenhower's Administration to reduce production acreage, while proposing various means to reduce the surplus. This emphasis was more acceptable to the farm states than that of Kennedy, whom

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[21]B. Hughel Wilkins and Charles B. Friday (eds.) The Economists of the New Frontier: An Anthology (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 221.

[22]Willard W. Cochrane, "The Technological Revolution in Agriculture," The Economists of the New Frontier: An Anthology, p. 223.

farmers distrusted. Nixon reported that the polls showed gains for his candidacy in the farm states after both his speeches __and__ after Kennedy's speech on farm policy.[23]

Unfortunately for Nixon in 1960, the electorate consisted of more than the farm belt. President Eisenhower's balanced budget philosophy prevented him from heeding the warning of Arthur M. Burns in March of that year that a recession was inevitable unless government spending was increased immediately, or interest rates lowered. No action was taken, and the predicted recession bottomed out in October, with nearly an additional half million more workers unemployed and an unemployment rate of 6.8 percent. This was the third recession in Eisenhower's eight years, a clear instance of how being an incumbent Vice-President can be a disadvantage. Schlesinger explained, "The Vice-President had little choice but to deny the existence of the recession and to defend the Eisenhower record, while Kennedy was presented with grim evidence of his basic theme."[24] Lubell stated that the recession, i.e., this single aspect of the Pocketbook issue, cost Nixon the election in 1960.[25]

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[23]Richard M. Nixon, __Six Crises__ (New York: Pyramid Books, 1968), p. 360.

[24]Schlesinger, p. 3466. See also __Six Crises__, pp. 333-334.

[25]Lubell, p. 247.

By 1968, the economy was not the same; and, of course, neither was Nixon. As the "out" candidate, he was free to attack Administration weaknesses, and to make suggestions for changes in economic policies freely. But in 1968, the economy was surging in its eighth consecutive expansionary year. Increases had been seen continuously in the nation's gross national product, retail sales, personal income, and total employment, while the unemployment rate fell.[26]

Yet Nixon was able to capitalize on one crucial Pocketbook issue in 1968: inflation. While the economy was rapidly expanding, so was the inflation rate. Economist Henry Fowler stated that beginning in 1965-66, increased government spending for defense (Vietnam) and for domestic programs (The War on Poverty), superimposed on the already booming economy, led to inflation in the late 1960's.[27] At first, President Johnson believed that inflation could be avoided without increasing taxes or decreasing spending in any area (the "guns and butter" theory), but by mid-1967, he was urging enactment of a ten percent income tax surcharge. Congress, hoping to cut spending instead, delayed passage of the tax increase for nearly a year until mid-1968, too late to maximize its

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[26]Adams, pp. 51-2.

[27]Henry H. Fowler, "Fiscal Policy and Inflation," Inflation, pp. 67-68.

effectiveness is heading off inflation. It is ironic that Nixon, who had been hurt on the Pocketbook issue in 1960 by governmental inactivity to head off recession, was able to profit politically in 1968 by governmental inactivity (at least, by untimely action) in solving another pocketbook issue, inflation.[28]

He devoted a speech to the topic of inflation, "To Make a Dollar Worth a Dollar," in which he blamed Administration "fiscal irresponsibility" and the tendency "to promise far more than they can deliver through government or pay for through taxes." The impact, he said, is "that inflation has hurt the impoverished far more than the War on Poverty has helped them." To avoid the undesirable alternative of wage and price controls likely to be imposed by Humphrey, should he be elected, Nixon called for "fiscal responsibility" to redress "present imbalances without increasing unemployment or controls." The problem phase of Nixon's speech was incisive and in agreement with exonomists' assessment of the economy; the solution phase was no more specific than the quotation furnished above. Nevertheless, Humphrey was caught in the same Pocketbook bind that Nixon had been eight years earlier. (As an ironic footnote to Nixon's treatment of the Pocketbook issue, he eventually established a system of wage and price controls in 1970).

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[28]Fowler, pp. 71, 75; Adams, pp. 29, 52-53.

Civil Rights. Indicators used to designate state-
ments related to the issue area of Civil Rights include
the major public policy fields related to discrimination,
and an additional General indicator. They are: Civil
Rights (General), Job Discrimination, Housing Discrim-
ination, Education Discrimination, and Voting Rights.

Table 8 shows that the samples of campaign
speeches included very few statements related to Civil
Rights. In 1960, there is a total of 22 statements; in
1968, there is a total of 53 statements. Most of these
statements occurred in the General indicator.

In neither campaign did Nixon make a statement
which fit the Education Discrimination indicator despite
the fact that in 1968, Nixon made a speech on the subject,
"Education for Excellence, Freedom, and Diversity."

In 1960, Nixon made no statements which could be
categorized in the Job Discrimination or Voting Rights
indicators.

In the General indicator, Nixon's statements
showed a pronounced shift in direction from Pro in 1960
to Neutral in 1968. The few statements included in the
specific Civil Rights policy areas show that Nixon was
more Neutral than Con on Job Discrimination in 1968,
slightly more Neutral than Con on Housing Discrimination
in both campaigns, and Pro Voting Rights in 1968--but it
should be noted that whereas most of the Civil Rights

Table 8

Comparison of 1960 and 1968 Statements
on Civil Rights[a]

Indicators	Pro				Con				Neutral			
	1960		1968		1960		1968		1960		1968	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
III A General (Civil Rights)	13	59	10	19					2	9	22	42
III B.1 Job Discrimination												
2 Housing Discrimination					5	23	5	9			10	19
3 Education Discrimination												
III C Voting Rights			3	6			1	2	2	9	2	4
Total	13	59	13	25	5	23	6	11	4	18	34	64

[a]Percentages are of total statements related to the Civil Rights issue in the respective campaigns. In 1960, n=22; in 1968, n=53. Percentages are rounded off.

statements appeared in a racial context, the statements
on voting rights appeared in Nixon's support for the
eighteen-year-old vote.

Discussion of Civil Rights. The historical
context of the Civil Rights issue reveals an area of
national ferment which was political dynamite. Blacks
gained concessions as they gained mobility at an accel-
erating rate between the end of the Depression until the
end of the 1960's, with an accompanying confusion in the
mind of the public over the nature, scope, or ultimate
outcome of the civil rights movement. Consequently,
campaign rhetoric was designed to play to the values of
both sides. Nixon's speeches in particular, were weighted
towards the whites' point of view.

Blaustein and Zangrando's historical review of the
civil rights movement reveals that the 1940's and 1950's
saw executive and judicial actions for minority groups,
and the 1960's saw legislative actions in an even broader
scale. Of the earlier phase, they wrote:

> From 1941 to 1958, Presidents Roosevelt, Truman,
> and Eisenhower issued a dozen executive orders
> affecting civil rights. These touched upon fair
> employment practices, federal contracts with private
> industry, employment and advancement opportunities
> in federal service, integration in the armed forces,
> and the implementation of a federal court order for
> school desegregation. The United States Supreme
> Court heard and ruled upon a wide range of cases
> related to civil rights, and its decisions on
> voting, interstate travel, housing covenants, higher

education, and public school desegregation were resoundingly favorable to the Negro's plea for reform . . . .[29]

The judicial actions were most remembered, of course, for the historic 1954 decision, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.

Regarding the second phase, legislative actions, Blaustein and Zangrando continued:

The period 1957 to 1968 witnessed the most dramatic series of changes in the status of the Negro in America since the Civil War and Reconstruction. Finally roused to action, the United States Congress passed four significant pieces of legislation touching on voting, school desegreation, fair employment practices, and public accommodation. These were designed to overcome local and state obstruction which had obduratedly defied the implementation of federal executive and judicial action.[30]

To whites, this federal activity represented progress; but to blacks, the progress seemed slow. Blacks perceived that, despite each new executive order, court decision, or federal law passed, discrimination continued. Roseboom believed it was the ineffectiveness of these federal actions in achieving concrete gains that led to boycotts, sit-ins and other passive resistance tactics.[31] Through the 1960's, resistance tactics intensified and

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[29]Albert P. Plaustein and Robert L. Zangrando (eds.), Civil Rights and the American Negro: A Documentary History (New York: Washington Square Press, 1968), pp. 355-6.

[30]Ibid., p. 469.

[31]Eugene H. Roseboom, A Short History of Presidential Elections (New York: Collier Books, 1967), p. 242.

escalated until the hot summers led to Watts, Detroit,

Newark, and a hundred other riot-torn cities in 1966-1967.

In the 1960 campaign, Nixon devoted relatively

little attention to the Civil Rights issue, although he

might have made more of a constructive position for him-

self than he did. President Eisenhower had been more

active than previous presidents on behalf of blacks in

terms of executive orders to integrate the armed services,

Washington, D. C. and other areas within the purview of

executive control. He also sent the troops to Little Rock.

Nixon himself had a good record on Civil Rights. Mazo

and Hess wrote,

> On civil rights, Nixon had the solidest record of
> any man in the Eisenhower administration--and before
> that, a voting record in Congress that matched John
> F. Kennedy's and surpassed that of Lyndon B. Johnson.[32]

However, he determined not to campaign for black

votes, as that course seemed a bad political choice for a

Republican running against John F. Kennedy. Therefore,

he employed instead his earlier version of the Southern

strategy. Schlesinger stated, "Nixon, realizing that the

black vote was largely Democratic by tradition anyway,

concentrated more on wooing southern whites displeased

with Kennedy's civil rights stand."[33] Consequently, he

confined himself on his tours to generalities about

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[32]Mazo and Hess, pp. 5-6.

[33]Schlesinger, p. 3466.

brotherhood and tolerance coming from the hearts of all Americans. In the sample of 1960 speeches, this quotation from his speech on "The Domestic Economy" typifies the tenor of his campaign position:

> To mobilize all our human resources, we must make equality of opportunity a living reality for our Negro citizens, and those of other minority groups. Tremendous untapped resources for the economy can be released by eliminating the barriers of racial discrimination that now deny these citizens full opportunity to develop and use their talents.[34]

In 1968, the racial tensions in the country were more severe than they had been eight years earlier. Public feelings remained confused. Chester, Hodgson, and Page referred to a report by Angus Campbell entitled Racial Attitudes in Fifteen American Cities (1968) which concluded that only one-fifth of the white population believed Negroes suffered any discrimination after the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed, as opposed to a near-unanimous black belief that discrimination continued. As a consequence, whites could not understand why blacks continued to press for more change, whereas blacks could not comprehend white inactivity.[35] The 1968 campaign was further complicated by the candidacy of Governor George Wallace for the presidency on a third-party ticket.

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[34]This is the only reference in this speech to Civil Rights. In the 1960 sample, there is no full-blown development of his position on the issue.

[35]Chester, Hodgson, and Page, pp. 33-36.

Wallace symbolized Southern resistance to federal inter-
vention in behalf of blacks.

As in 1960, Nixon wrote off the black vote as a
conscious part of his strategy. He was interested in
capturing the White urban and suburban vote in the South,
and the white suburban vote elsewhere. The Southern
strategy was to limit Wallace to rural Southern white
votes, and win other whites dissatisfied with federal
interventions in what seemed to them to be too hasty a
pace, thus leaving the votes of blacks and of the whites
sympathetic to blacks to Humphrey. Accordingly, he made it
a point not to give the appearance of yielding to black
voting blocs, even to the extent of refusing to meet Negro
leaders in Philadelphia during the campaign, on the grounds
that "I am not going to campaign for the black vote at the
risk of alienating the suburban vote . . . . If I am Pres-
ident, I am not going to owe anything to the black
community."[36]

As Table 8 demonstrates, Nixon's statements on
Civil Rights increased in 1968 over 1960, and touched on
a few more aspects of the area--but the tone of his
remarks was even more neutral than before. The result of
this treatment of the Civil Rights issue was reflected in
the final vote: 88 percent of the blacks voted for

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[36]Ibid., p. 624. The authors drew this point:
"The idea appeared to be that the Negroes' confidence
would be preserved by promising them nothing--and then
delivering it." Ibid.

Humphrey and 12 percent for Nixon (as compared with 32
percent for Nixon in 1960). But the strategy did not
accomplish the desired end fully. Samuel Lubell said that
Nixon's quiet approach to this explosive issue ought to
have been more positive:

> Nixon's failure to speak out on our racial
> conflicts probably cost him more politically than the
> war issue. As the vote-pulling effect of the war
> declined, the desire for a change in racial policies
> became Nixon's strongest single vote-getting issue.
> More of the Democrats who were switching to him cited
> racial trouble as their reason than any other issue.
> Here, as with the war, rioting and violence had had
> too emotional an impact for vague statements to be
> satisfactory.[37]

Of course, it could also have been the case that
Nixon's treatment of the Law and Order issue was inter-
preted as an adjunct of his Civil Rights position. Law
and Order is analyzed below.

Law and Order. Indicators designed to classify
Nixon's statements on the issue of Law and Order included
topics under both Crime and Law Enforcement. Specifically,
the indicators are: Crime (General), Organized Crime,
"Major Crime," Violence (Riots & Demonstrations), Law
Enforcement (General), Police & Law Enforcement Agencies,
and Courts.

Content analysis disclosed that Law and Order was
an inapplicable issue to the 1960 campaign, but that the

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[37]Lubell, p. 60.

Table 9

Comparison of 1960 and 1968 Statements
on Law and Order[a]

Indicators	Pro 1960 n	%	Pro 1968 n	%	Con 1960 n	%	Con 1968 n	%	Neutral 1960 n	%	Neutral 1968 n	%
IV A Crime (General)					16	8			3	2		
IV A 1 Organized Crime							14	7				
IV A 2 "Major Crime"							21	11			2	1
IV A 3 Violence (Riots, Demonstrations)			2	1			24	13			15	8
IV B Law Enforcement			16	8							22	12
IV B 1 Police; Law Enforcement Agencies	1	100	19	10							15	8
IV B 2 Courts							16	8			4	2
Total	1	100	37	20			91	48			61	32

[a]Percentages are of total statements related to the issue of Law and Order in the respective campaigns. In 1960, n=1; in 1968, n=189. Percentages are rounded off.

indicators selected seemed appropriate to the 1968 campaign. Only one statement in the 1960 sample could be categorized as related to Law and Order. (It was a statement supporting increased police protection in metropolitan areas.)

As to direction, in 1968, results of the content analysis disclosed that Nixon's statements were Con Crime (General), Organized Crime, "Major Crime," Violence, and the Courts. Statements on Law Enforcement and Police & Law Enforcement Agencies were about evenly divided between Pro and Neutral.

Discussion of Law and Order. Law and order as an issue is strangely out of place in a Presidential election campaign for at least two reasons. First, it is difficult to operationalize what is meant by the term; and, second, except for those circumstances involving federal laws, maintenance of law and order is not even a federal concern, but rather a state and local matter. In any event, as the content analysis demonstrates, Law and Order was an important issue only in the 1968 sample of speeches.

Regarding the ambiguous nature of the term, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice prefaced its report in 1967 with the statement,

> Many Americans also think of crime as a very narrow range of behavior. It is not. An enormous variety of acts make up the 'crime problem' . . . . No

single formula, no single theory, no single generali-
zation can explain the vast range of behavior called
crime.[38]

Again:

> For "crime" is not a single simple phenomenon that
> can be examined, analyzed and described in one piece.
> It occurs in every part of the country and in every
> stratum of society. Its practitioners and its victims
> are people of all ages, incomes and backgrounds. Its
> trends are difficult to ascertain. Its causes are
> legion. Its cures are speculative and controversial.[39]

In 1960, Americans were not much concerned with

issues of crime and law enforcement. Neither Nixon nor

Kennedy made serious reference to it in the 1960 campaign.

But the issue rose in public awareness through the decade

of the 1960's for reasons already hinted at. For one

thing, the civil rights movement and its gains produced at

least two related outcomes: among many whites, it forced

renewed attention on blacks in a context of what was felt

to be undeserved or hasty social change; and among some

blacks, it aroused frustration and the so-called "crisis

of rising expectations" over what seemed to them to be

the grudging and molasses-slow pace of progress. Thus,

civil rights demonstrations and riots took place within a

white perceptual field already attuned to black civil

disobedience and crime. A second factor was the growing

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[38]President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a
Free Society (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1967), p. v.

[39]Ibid., p. 1.

intensity of public resistance to the Vietnam War, leading to its own riots and demonstrations on college campuses, and even marches on Washington.

These special threats to law and order were overlaid on substantially increasing rates of more ordinary violations of the criminal code, such as the crimes against persons and property listed in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports--homicide, rape, assault, robbery, and the like. Barry Goldwater had attempted in 1964 to capitalize on public fears of street crimes, along with a general deterioration of moral values; but his efforts to link crime and degeneracy to the Johnson Administration never got off the ground. Not so in 1968: Law and Order was the principal issue in George Wallace's campaign, and the responsive chord it struck in the electorate forced both Nixon and Humphrey to deal with it.

Nixon's campaign was probably strengthened by the public's new interest in Law and Order, given his reluctance to handle the Vietnam War. Scammon and Wattenberg quoted a Gallup poll taken in September, 1968, which showed 36 percent favored Nixon, 26 percent favored Wallace, and only 23 percent favored Humphrey, as the candidate who "could do the best job handling law and order."[40] Humphrey, who had gained national prominence

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[40]Scammon and Wattenberg, p. 167.

as a "crime-buster" during his tenure as mayor of
Minneapolis, was seen in 1968 as a liberal, an instigator
of black discontent, as well as the embodiment of the
Johnson Vietnam policies that were causing so many
problems. Nixon reaped the benefits of appearing to have
a more moderate stance than Humphrey, yet not quite so
hard-nosed an image as Wallace.

In his 1968 speeches, Nixon did little to clarify
the ambiguity of the issue. In "The Cradle of Civili-
zation Must Not Be Its Grave," Nixon declared the nature
of the problem: "We see the rise in crime, we see the
riots in our cities, we see the problems in the ghettos,
the problems in the universities." In his speech devoted
to the issue of Law and Order, "Order and Justice Under
Law," Nixon placed blame on Attorney General Ramsey Clark
for a failure of energy, will, and purpose; and also on
the Supreme Court for raising "unreasonable obstacles to
the enforcement of the law." In that speech, Nixon flatly
dismissed poverty as the cause of crime, and declared,
"The truth is that we will reduce crime and violence when
we enforce our laws--when we make it less profitable, and
a lot more risky, to break our laws." By way of construc-
tive proposals, he went on in the speech to advocate
federal support of local law enforcement through coordi-
nation, police training, and education; but the ultimate
answer to problems of law enforcement he suggested was

this: "The sources of moral and civic order are in the family, the church, the school and the community . . . . In every family let us renew our commitment to the traditional American standards."

In their analysis of campaign techniques, Dan F. Hahn and Ruth M. Gonchar summarized the question of Law and Order in 1968:

> Initiated by Wallace as an issue, and joined by the other two major candidates, it was bogus from first to last. Nixon contended that he would solve the problem by appointing a new Attorney General, yet enforcement of the law (thus the acquisition of order) is a matter of local concern. There is little the national government can do--except, perhaps, work to eliminate the causes of crime. However, such efforts would be conducted through H. E. W. rather than the Attorney General's office. And, anyway, such a realistic approach to the problem of crime would have turned away those Nixon was trying to reach--those who were reacting to the words 'law and order' as code words for 'put the Niggers in their place.'"[41]

Summary

Content analysis of Richard M. Nixon's treatment of issues in selected samples of his 1960 and 1968 campaign speeches has provided a relatively objective and precise description of what Nixon the candidate said about four major issues, the positions he took relative to specific sub-issues (indicators), and how Nixon's treatment of issues compared over the two campaigns.

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[41]Dan F. Hahn and Ruth M. Gonchar, "Political Myth: The Image and the Issue," Today's Speech, XX, 3 (Summer, 1972), p. 59.

Overall, the two samples of speeches were similar in several ways. Each contained almost the same proportion of issue-oriented statements to total statements (21% in 1960, 23% in 1968). Considering the issue-oriented statements, the two samples also contained roughly equal percentages of statements related to the Pocketbook issue (39% in 1960, 38% in 1968). On the Civil Rights issue, there is a noticeable increase in the proportion of statements, through the total emphasis given to the issue is relatively small in both campaigns (2% in 1960, 5% in 1968). However, there is a substantial decrease in the proportion of statements about the War and Peace issue (59% in 1960, 41% in 1968), and a corresponding increase in the attention paid to Law and Order (0% in 1960, 16% in 1968).

Turning to specific issues, Nixon was more neutral in 1968 than in 1960 in his statements related to War an Peace, but less neutral in 1968 than in 1960 in his statements related to the Pocketbook issue. In fact, in 1968, the only War and Peace categories where the Neutral statements did not substantially outnumber the others were Peace as U.S. Policy (32 Pro, 26 Neutral) and Military Preparedness (70 Pro, 16 Neutral). By comparison, in 1960, Nixon was decidedly Con War as Enemy Policy, Pro Peace as U.S. Policy, Pro Military Preparedness, and Pro Military Actions Short of War.

In regard to the Pocketbook issue, Nixon made substantially more statements about Spending and Farm Income in 1960 than in 1968, but more statements about Inflation, Labor, Retirement Income, and Employment in the latter campaign. Also, as a rule, Nixon was far less Neutral in 1968 than in 1960 about the Pocketbook.

Finally, most of Nixon's issue-oriented statements in both campaigns were devoted to either War and Peace or the Pocketbook. Of a total of 2,140 issue oriented statements in the two campaigns, 1,048 were devoted to War and Peace, and 827 were devoted to the Pocketbook issue--a grand total of 1,875 statements (a ratio of 88%). Of the remaining 265 statements, 189 were devoted to the issue of Law and Order in the 1968 campaign, where Nixon declared himself to be against crime in all its forms, against the courts, but for the police and their law enforcement efforts. In a few scattered statements, Nixon also stated that he was for Civil Rights in general.

Chapter 4

CONCLUSION

This study has presented the results of a modified
content analysis of Richard M. Nixon's treatment of
selected issues (War and Peace, Pocketbook aspects of the
domestic economy, Civil Rights, and Law and Order) in his
issue-oriented speeches during the presidential election
campaigns of 1960 and 1968. The technique of content
analysis has been employed to describe with some precision
and objectivity exactly how Nixon treated the issues in
terms of his statements about them, and more traditional
rhetorical approaches have been employed to evaluate his
treatment of the issues.

In this chapter, conclusions will be drawn from
the preceding analysis. Specifically, this chapter will
discuss the following areas, based upon the findings of
this study:

(1) What is the role of issues in contemporary
Presidential campaigns, including their relationship to
voting behavior, insofar as generalizations may be made
on the basis of one candidate's communications in two
recent campaigns?

(2) How did Nixon change as a speaker in reference
to treatment of issue-oriented content between his

unsuccessful and his successful campaigns for the Presi-
dency?

(3) What relational hypotheses may be formulated
regarding the role of issues in political campaigns?

The Role of Issues in Campaigns

In this section, the relationship between issues
and voting behavior will be discussed; but it must be made
clear at the outset that it is not yet possible to make
any specific claim as to the efficacy, or lack of efficacy,
of issue discussion in getting votes. Key, who argued for
the notion of the responsible electorate, prefaced his
argument with this statement: "It thus can be a mischie-
vous error to assume, because a candidate wins, that a
majority of the electorate shares his views on public
questions . . . ."[1] Robert Agranoff wrote in 1972, "Very
little is known about how effective the candidate-with-the-
sleeves-rolled-up approach is vis-a-vis the straight-
forward-issue-development approach."[2] McBath and Fisher
also noted, "No method presently exists by which campaign
communication can be analyzed and evaluated to the mutual
satisfaction of those who are party to the process and

[1]V. O. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate:
Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960 (New York:
Vintage Books, 1966), p. 2.

[2]Robert Agranoff, The New Style in Election
Campaigns (Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1972), p. 263.

those who study it."[3]   Swanson concluded his recent survey

of campaign communication studies with this assessment:

> Despite all this popular interest and scholarly
> activity, however, disappointingly little is known
> about the operation of campaign communication in
> the contemporary election contests.[4]

Neither does this study claim to have quantified

the causal link between a candidate's discussion of issues

and his ability to attract votes; in fact, any such inter-

pretation is hereby specifically disclaimed. But the

nature of the relationship may be explored; and some

general observations may be offered to clarify whatever

relationships may exist.

Issues are discussed in election campaigns in the

real world. As we have found in both his election

campaigns, Nixon made a distinction between his basic

"stump speech" which he repeated many times on the

campaign trail and those issue-oriented speeches which

have served as the basis of the content analysis reported

in Chapter 3 of this study. Also, as we have found through

content analysis, Nixon indeed made numerous statements on

the issues in those speeches. On the intuitive level, it

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[3]James H. McBath and Walter R. Fisher, "Persuasion in Presidential Campaign Communication," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, LV, 1 (February, 1969), 17.

[4]David L. Swanson, "The New Politics Meets the Old Rhetoric: New Direction in Campaign Communication Research," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, LVIII, 1 (February, 1972), 31.

is hard to imagine a campaign in which a candidate never mentions an issue, or in which he does not care what he says about the issue.

Of course, issues are not the only important element in a campaign, nor necessarily even the most important element. Agranoff wrote, "It is always a matter of the proper mix between candidate, issue, and party factors, and reinforcement, conversion or activation of latency."[5] Yet, partisan alignment accounts for less variance in election returns than was once true, especially in Presidential elections. Lubell noted that there have dramatic swings from one election to the next in recent times, such as the large numbers of cross-over votes for Lyndon Johnson in 1964.[6] In each of the campaigns encompassed by this study, there was a margin of difference between Nixon and his Democratic opponent of less than one percent of the votes cast, despite the fact that Democrats outnumber Republicans by at least three to two. In fact, in the 1968 election, fully forty percent of those who voted for Nixon had voted for Johnson in 1964.[7]

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[5]Agranoff, p. 25.

[6]Samuel Lubell, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971), p. 33.

[7]Philip Converse, et al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," American Political Science Review, LXIII, 4 (December, 1969), 1084.

On the other hand, while party influence seems to be weakening, the importance of issues seems to be increasing. Converse and his associates at the Survey Research Center stated,

> In our analyses of such changes in the national vote over the course of presidential elections in the 1950's and 1960's we have been impressed with the magnitude of the effects introduced as new candidates focus on different issues of public policy, and as external events give particular candidate-issue intersections greater salience for the nation.[8]

These authors pinpoint 1968 as a "prototypical" issue campaign, and they name Vietnam, civil rights, and law and order as the critical issues, with the cold war and social welfare both important to large groups of voters as well.[9]

The question remains as to how issues influence voter behavior. These seem to be two major possibilities: (1) some voters may be influenced directly by a candidate's statements about the issues, by being either reinforced and/or activated in their already-held positions, or (far less likely) converted to the candidate's position; and (2) voter perception of the candidate's personality may be influenced to the extent to which he discusses issues.

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[8]Ibid., p. 1096.

[9]Ibid., pp. 1085, 1095, 1097-1099.

As to the direct influence of issue discussion on voter behavior, it appears that some voters are oriented towards issues under certain conditions. Polsby and Wildavsky stated the principle involved:

> We can now see that a strong issue orientation is likely to guide voting decisions under some circumstances. One set of circumstances occurs when one issue becomes so intensely important that the voter is willing to lay aside his party preferences and his preferences on other issues. An unpopular war, severe economic deprivation . . . have at times led to the required intense feeling. The pocketbook nerve seems especially sensitive.[10]

These authors specify that, for voters to be subject to influence by an issue, they must know about the issue, care about the issue, and be able to distinguish between the competing candidates' positions on the issue; furthermore, the number of voters who meet these prerequisites may reach as high as 30 percent of the electorate.[11]

Isolating the groups of voters who have specific issue concerns is problematic at best. It would be fallacious to claim that all "switchers" do so because of a candidate's position on issues. Nevertheless, Natchez and Bupp reported that although the Survey Research Center's data indicates "switchers" have low information about issues in general, "switchers" are attuned to single

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[10]Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, _Presidential Elections: Strategies of American Electoral Politics_ (2d ed.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), p. 15.

[11]Ibid., p. 13.

issues and thus form fractionated "issue publics" within the electorate.[12] This gives further support to Polsby and Wildavsky's assertion about the influence of issues on voter behavior.

As to the image-enhancement function of issue discussion, McBath and Fisher stated,

> Political persuasion operates more on the basis of "images," "signs of consubstantiality," than the presentation of facts or arguments or even direct emotional appeals. The attempt is to show the candidate as possessing a view of the world which corresponds with that of potential voters. Information relative to the candidate's stand on issues is interpreted as evidence of the kind of man the candidate is in respect to his potential electors . . . .[13]

Nimmo reinforced the point when he stated,

> By quoting facts and details on a variety of issues the candidate leaves the impression that he possesses the knowledge, sophistication, and acumen to hold public office.[14]

Thus, it would appear that even when issues do not directly influence voters, the discussion of issues by the candidate may strengthen the credibility of his appeal to voters by virtue of enhancing his image as a potential

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[12]Peter B. Natchez and Irvin C. Bupp, "Candidates, Issues, and Voters," Political Opinion and Behavior: Essays and Studies, eds. Edward C. Dreyer and Walter A. Rosenbaum (2d ed.; Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1970), p. 450.

[13]McBath and Fisher, p. 18.

[14]Dan Nimmo, The Political Persuaders: The Techniques of Modern Election Campaigns (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. Spectrum Books, 1970), p. 120.

leader. Natchez and Bupp summarized the point when they stated, "Political issues are an important component of candidate imagery; and in certain cases they account almost entirely for electoral behavior."[15]

In regard to the effect Nixon's treatment of issues had on the election campaigns of 1960 and 1968, more analysis is available in the literature about the latter campaign. In fact, 1960 appeared to be a special year because of the non-substantive issue of Kennedy's religion. Both Nixon and Kennedy were young and vigorous candidates who differed very little on the substantive issues even in their joint television appearances. Axelrod's analysis of the voting patterns by interest groups showed that the greatest single deviation from previous voting levels was located along religious lines: Catholics voted for Kennedy, whereas Southern Protestants voted for Nixon.[16] Converse and his colleagues reported that, whereas 63 percent of Catholic voters were considered to be predictably Democratic, Kennedy garnered 80 percent of their votes; almost half of Kennedy's total vote came from this group. Rather than substantive issue discussion, it was the style issue of religion that counted most among

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[15]Natchez and Bupp, p. 449.

[16]Robert Axelrod, "Where the Votes Come From," American Political Science Review, LXVI, 1 (March, 1972), 16.

the voters. They said, "There can be little doubt that
the religious issue was the strongest single factor over-
laid on basic partisan loyalties in the 1960 election."[17]

What of the 1968 election, the "prototypical"
issue-discussion campaign? We have seen that Nixon
devoted about the same proportion of his issue statements
to the four issue categories as he did in 1960, but that
he spread his attention among several more issue indi-
cators within the categories in 1968. Most importantly,
he took a neutral stance in a majority of his issue state-
ments, except for Military Preparedness, Inflation,
Retirement Income, Spending and Law and Order. He
pursued a centrist strategy, and deliberately presented a
low-key, bland image. He avoided serious discussion of
Vietnam, the most salient issue to the public; and he also
followed the so-called Southern strategy of ignoring black
voters and appealing to whites. We have seen in previous
chapters how his twenty-point lead in early polling
evaporated to nothing by Election Day.

What relationships may be drawn between Nixon's
treatment of issues and the voting behavior of the
electorate in 1968? Converse reported the results of a
Survey Research Center analysis of the correlation between
voters' affective ratings (support or opposition) of the

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[17]Philip Converse, et al., "Stability and Change in
1960: A Reinstating Election," American Political Science
Review, LV, 2 (June, 1961), 275.

three candidates (Nixon, Humphrey, and Wallace), and both issue position and party affiliation. The analysis showed that, of the three candidates, there was highest correlation between issue and affective rating for George Wallace, and least for Richard Nixon; but there was high correlation between party affiliation and affective rating for Nixon.[18] Axelrod reported that those who voted for Nixon in 1968 were 99 percent white, 90 percent nonpoor, 81 percent nonunion members, 80 percent Protestant, 80 percent from Northern states, and 92 percent from outside the central cities.[19] Stated another way, Chester, Hodgson, and Page said,

> Nixon owes his election to the votes of the middle class, old stock, Protestants of the West, the Middle West, and the Southern states, and in general to the business class and its allies. He won those votes because he bade for them. And he is more exclusively the choice of those classes than any President since Herbert Hoover.[20]

Thus, in summary, issue discussion by a Presidential candidate may be important as a factor in influencing voter behavior, in view of the decreasing weight attached to partisanship. Issue discussion may be directly decisive in fractionated issue publics under

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[18]Converse, et al., "Continuity and Change," pp. 1097-1099.

[19]Axelrod, p. 18.

[20]Lewis Chester, Godfrey Hodgson, and Bruce Page, An American Melodrama: The Presidential Campaign of 1968 (New York: The Viking Press, 1969), p. 789.

certain circumstances; and beyond that, issue discussion may enhance the candidate's image by altering the perception which the electorate has of him as a potential leader. In the two campaigns under study, Nixon appeared not to have gained much from his issue discussion in 1960, because of the confounding issue of Kennedy's religion; and in 1968, because of his reluctance to deal seriously with the most salient issues to the public, and because of his generally neutral position on those issues he did choose to cover.

Nixon's Development as a Speaker

This study has focussed on Nixon's treatment of issues in his two Presidential campaigns in 1960 and 1968. In particular, Nixon's issue-oriented speeches have been subjected to content analysis to determine what he said in regard to four selected issues, whether he was pro, con, or neutral, and how his treatment of issues differed over the two campaigns in question. This data has been reported fully in Chapter 3.

This study has not encompassed questions related to Nixon's style, organization, delivery, audience adaptation, or other elements traditionally associated with public speaking. It is of some relevance at this point, however, to refer to a study of Nixon's style in the two campaigns in question. In her dissertation of Nixon's style, Trent discovered that in 1960, Nixon leaned heavily

upon personal experiences, association with prestigious

Republicans (Eisenhower, Lodge), and unsupported assertions

to carry his arguments. In 1968, however, he rarely

referred to personal experiences, associations with

prestigious Republicans, or made unsupported assertions.

Rather, he used reasoning and evidence (such as statistics

and examples) heavily as his primary supporting materials

for his positions on issues.[21] She attributed the dif-

ferences to Nixon's increased reliance upon his speech

writers, his different roles (incumbent Vice-President as

contrasted with eight-year layoff), and his desire to

overcome negative audience perceptions of him in 1968.[22]

Trent's study was limited to elements of Nixon's

campaign messages which might reasonably be expected to

occur in equal measure in any message, such as types of

support, types of sentences, and types of language.

Therefore, she was able to utilize small samples of

Nixon's campaign speeches in her content analysis. The

present study is concerned with Nixon's treatment of

particular issues in his campaign messages. While Nixon

might be expected to deal with several issues in any given

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[21]Judith Swanlund Trent, "An Examination and Com-
parison of the Rhetorical Style of Richard Milhous Nixon
in the Presidential Campaign of 1960 and 1968: A Content
Analysis," (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, University
of Michigan, 1970), pp. 143, 146.

[22]Ibid., p. 91.

speech, it is also reasonable to expect particular issues to receive different emphasis from speech to speech. In the present study, therefore, all speeches designated as issue-oriented have been subjected to content analysis in order to produce a more complete description of Nixon's treatment of issues. The findings may be summarized as follows:

Nixon devoted roughly the same overall proportion of his statements to the selected issues in both campaigns, but he concentrated on fewer issues in 1960 (namely, War and Peace and the Pocketbook) than in 1968.

Nixon devoted considerably less attention to the War and Peace issue in 1968 than he did in the earlier campaign; but he devoted considerable more attention to the domestic issues of Civil Rights and Law and Order in 1968 than he did in 1960.

In terms of direction, Nixon was more neutral in 1968 than in 1960 in the issues of War and Peace (except for the Military Preparedness indicator) and Civil Rights, but less neutral in 1968 than in 1960 in the issue of the Pocketbook. Regarding Law and Order, since there was only one statement in 1960, no comparison can be made across campaigns, except for the important observation that he made it into an issue in 1968.

Chapter 3 also included a discussion of some of the reasons why Nixon chose to emphasize the issues as he

did in the two campaigns; why he avoided grappling with
the basic issues of Vietnam and civil rights in 1968,
confining himself to generalities or peripheral aspects of
those areas instead; and why he addressed himself to the
issue of Law and Order. His speaking strategies were
conditioned by historical events impinging upon the issue
areas, his own changed status, and innovations in campaign
techniques.

In addition to these conclusions drawn from the
content analysis findings, this final chapter should also
point to some important differences in Nixon's positions
on particular issues over the two campaigns.

The most interesting position shift occurred in
the area of War and Peace. In 1960 Nixon's speeches
presented the picture of a monolithic communist world
headed by Premier Khrushchev of the U.S.S.R. In this
simplistic world view, Communism/Russia had the single-
minded purpose of conquering the world by aggression; and
the role of guardian of the world's peace and freedom
rested upon America's military power and will to resist
Communist domination. Red China's Mao Tse Tung was
mentioned in one 1960 speech as also having aggressive
intentions, but lacking the military strength to fulfill
his ambitions. In 1968, however, Nixon elaborated upon
the concept of the "global village" in which nationalistic
Communism was only one of several systems competing for

influence. Nixon did not appear to be preoccupied with Russia alone; but he recognized the importance of Red China, especially in Southeast Asia. He seemed to regard the Communist threat as being economic and ideological as well as military, and he did not advocate military supe- riority as the main response America should make to Communism (except for his speech on "The Security Gap" which was discussed in Chapter 3). Also, it is interesting to note that Nixon identified the Middle East, not Vietnam, as the area of the world most likely to produce a military confrontation between the major powers in 1968. In short, Nixon presented a much more complex and sophisticated view of the world in the 1968 campaign than he did in 1960.

The same cannot be said for the other issue areas. In the Pocketbook area, Nixon's two campaigns revealed consistent positions. His agriculture speeches were similar in the two campaigns, with the statistics updated for the latter campaign. In both campaigns, Nixon deplored federal approaches to social problems, particularly if they involved increased federal spending. In 1968, Nixon presented a detailed analysis of inflation and its effects upon fixed income, taxation, and world trade. But his solution to the problem of inflation consisted of rejecting Humphrey's alternatives of "recession or harmful controls," promising instead to practice something called "fiscal responsibility." The difference between this position and

his earlier position in 1960 is indistinguishable, because then his pledge was to "control the federal budget."

In both campaigns, his position on civil rights appeared to rest upon good will and toleration in the hearts of all Americans. In 1968, he did recognize racial discrimination as related to more indicators than in 1960. And finally, as mentioned before, in 1968, he presented an emphasis on law and order which was absent in 1960. In several passing references in 1968, Nixon linked the law and order issue to disruption and violence (which was also related to civil rights and the Vietnam War); but his speech on law and order focussed on street crimes and law enforcement problems which he claimed were exacerbated by a weak Attorney General and by court decisions which aided criminals.

Relational Hypotheses and Other Research Possibilities

This study has generated several questions for future research by this writer or by others:

1. What was Nixon's treatment of the issues in his 1972 campaign for reelection? This study was limited in time to 1960 and 1968. More could be learned about Nixon's campaign speaking by extending the analysis to include the 1972 campaign.

2. This study has analyzed Nixon's treatment of issues in two campaigns without regard to his differing roles in those campaigns, e.s. incumbent Vice-President

(1960), and challenger (1968), except in subsequent
discussion of the analysis. Accordingly, it would be
useful to test these hypotheses which relate a candidate's
role to his treatment of issues:

    a. <u>Incumbents running for reelection tend to
treat issues similarly.</u>

    b. <u>Challengers for an office tend to treat
issues similarly.</u>

    c. <u>Incumbents and challengers tend to treat
issues differently.</u>

3. This study has subjected all speeches in the
samples to content analysis on an equal basis without
regard to the channel used for their presentation. It may
be that the channel selected has some influence on the
treatment of issues. Accordingly,

    a. <u>Treatment of issues will vary between
messages presented live to specific audiences and messages
presented via the mass media.</u>

4. This study has been limited to the speeches of
a Republican. It may be that party affiliation influences
a candidate's treatment of issues. Accordingly:

    a. <u>Republican candidates differ in their
treatment of issues from Democratic candidates.</u>

    b. <u>Independent (or Third Party) Candidates
differ in their treatment of issues from major party
candidates.</u>

5. This study has analyzed all speeches in the
sample without regard to their timing in the campaign. It
may be that timing is an important factor in the treatment
given to issues by a candidate. Accordingly:

a. <u>Candidates treat issues differently in
speeches given early in a campaign than in speeches given
late in a campaign.</u>

6. This study has concentrated on the content of
the speeches in the sample without regard to specific
impact upon voter behavior. Yet, as noted earlier in the
chapter, the literature supports the notion that issues
are increasingly important in influencing voting behavior.
Accordingly:

a. <u>A candidate's treatment of issues in the
campaign influences voters' perception of him as a
potential leader.</u>

b. <u>A candidate's treatment of issues in the
campaign influences voting behavior of the electorate.</u>

Conclusion

This chapter has briefly summarized the results of
the study, and has addressed these key areas: (1) the
role of issues in contemporary Presidential campaigns,
(2) how Nixon developed as a speaker in terms of observed
differences between the treatment of issues in the 1960
and 1968 campaigns, and (3) relational hypotheses
suggested by the study for further research.

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