in: A w \5\jg;3\\\\1\\gmigxgwgg\i\\§\\\
E hfigfign§nz 4 3
“‘7 9‘37""__ t

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

PC we." STrdcfiJrc (n An Alger/Cm
rural Commune:
presented by

MIzOum 5701-481

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

l"!- A.

 

degree in 500C106?

D
Major professor

Date ?/-Zf/<?0
// /

0-7 639

OVERDUE FINES:
25¢ per day per item
RETURNING LIBRARY MATERIALS:

Place in book return to remove
charge from circulation records

 

 

 

JUL 0 2 2015

”00915

 

 

POWER STRUCTURE IN AN ALGERIAN

RURAL COMMUNE

by

Mizouni Sohbi

A Thesis
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ART

Department of Sociology

1980

a
P};
Q
\..
\
‘3
l.
2.

ABSTRACT

Power Structure in an Algerian
Rural Commune

by

Mizouni Sohbi

This thesis focuses on the power structure of an Algerian rural
commune as encapsulated in the socio-economic formation. The following

issues are analyzed in historical perspective:

The Popular Assembly of the commune was dominated by the
landowning class. The commune's Popular Assembly (A.P.C.)
was deemed to represent the interests of the popular
classes. In fact, the social composition included over-
whelmingly members of the propertied classes (landowners,
merchants . . .) and individuals of petit bourgeois

background (teachers, administration employees . . .).

The different committees appointed by the Popular Assembly
(committees of taxes, of agriculture assistance . . .)
were dominated by the merchant and landowning classes.

The important agriculture committee theoretically called

"committee of assistance to small peasants" did not

 

include any small peasant in its membership. The techni-

cal and financial assistance provided by the Societe

Agricole de Prevoyance (cooperative of services and

 

financial assistance) flowed almost exclusively to

the landowning class.

The Agrarian Revolution program initiated in 1971 and the

claSs conflict it entailed had strong repercussions on the local

peasant class structure and the nature of the local power structure.

1.

The trend was toward the progressive elemination of the
landowning class from the commune's Popular Assembly

to the benefit of the rising local petit bourgeoise
(teachers, employees . . .). Nevertheless, no working
class member nor small peasant or cooperative worker

was included in the new Popular Assembly.

The new Cooperative Agricole de Service et de Commer-

cialisation which replaced the Societe Agricole de

 

Prevoyance was oriented more toward assisting the

 

small peasantry. The grip of the landowning class on
the technical and financial assistance levers was to

a large extent weakened.

To Amourth's martyrs who died

for Independence and Freedom.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to extend warm and friendly thanks to
Dr. Ruth S. Hamilton, Chairwoman of my Guidance Committee for
her invaluable, sincere and friendly help. Friendly and special
thanks go also to Richard Hill and Kevin Kelly, members of my
M.A. thesis, for their invaluable constructive criticisms.
Dedicated scholars who shaped my intellectual development.
I would like to express my warm feelings to Dawn A. Jones,
a very dear friend who contributed greatly to the completion of

this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .

Chapter I: Class Analysis and Peripheral Formations .

Mode of Production and Class .

Agrarian Structures and Classes

Peasantry or Classes? . . . . . . . . . . . .
Peasants and Revolution

Agrarian Reform . . . . .

Class Analysis of the Algerian Social Formation
The State Bourgeoisie/Dependency Thesis . . . .

The Petit Bourgeoisie/Transition Toward Socialism
Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

National Social Formation and Amourth .

Chapter II: Colonization - Commune - Self-Management

Pre-Colonial Algerian Formation . . . . . . . .
French Colonization .

Colonial Legacy and Communes . . . .

Traditional Social Structure . . . .

Communes and Self-Management, 1962-1965

Self-Management . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter III: Class Alliance (1965-1971: Commune and
Agricultural Policy . . . . . . . . . . .

National Class Alliance . . . . . . . . . . .
Centralization of the State Apparatus and Commune
Commune's Popular Assembly (A.P.C.) . . .

Elections and Social Composition of the Popular
Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

10
ll
13
14

l6
19

22

22
25
31
34
35
37

40

40
41
42

43

INTRODUCTION

Algeria experienced one of the bloodiest wars of liberation in
history which ended in 1952 after more than 132 years of French
settler colonialism. The revolutionary decolonization highlighted
by a tremendous popular mobilization, the establishment of self-
management on the former settlers' assets in industry and agricul-
ture, popular volunteering in farms and tree planting . . . de-
clined very soon in momentum. In the absence of a viable political,
economic and social alternative, post-independence Algeria emerged
as a caricature of a revolutionary society. Traditional rural
Algeria, which contributed the main base of the liberation war,

did not witness any radical change until 1971 when a land reform
program was initiated. Hence, despite the all pervasive populism
of the post—independence regimes (1962-1971), the rural socio-
economic and political structures remained under the grip of the
local landowning class.

In this work, the analysis is centered on the power structure
of a rural commune. The issues to be examined relate first to
the social composition of the Popular Assembly of the commune and
to its socio-economic actions and second, to the structures of
the agricultural technical and financial assistance. These two
issues are analyzed before and after the implementation of the land

reform program and are seen within the broader framework of national

Page

The F.L.N. Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Commune's Activities and Population's Demands . . . 55
Agricultural Policy and Peasantry . . . . . . . . . 58
Agrarian Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
State Intervention in the "Traditional" Sector . . . 63
Financial and Technical Assistance . . . . . . . . . 65
Local Peasantry and State Assistance . . . . . . . . 67
The Communal Agricultural Committees . . . . . . . . 67
Credit and Recipients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Types of Credit Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Chapter III: Agrarian Revolution: Class Struggle and
Commune . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Industrial Program (1967-1971) . . . . . . . . . . . 75
The Agrarian Revolution: Goals and Results . . . . 81
Agrarian Revolution and Class Struggle . . . a . . . 84
The Petit Bourgeoisie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Agrarian Revolution and Ideology . . . . . . . . . . 87
Agents of Change: The Bureaucracy . . . . . . . . . 89
The Party (F.L.N.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Commune's Popular Assembly (A.P.C.) . . . . . . . . 94

The Commune's Popular Assembly and the Poor
Peasantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

A.P.C.: The ELimination of the Landowning Class . . 104

The Agricultural Assistance Channels and the Poor
Peasantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Financial Credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Technical Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Footnotes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

transformations. In the first chapter, some theoretical and
methodological questions are discussed to clarify certain implicit
assumptions of this work. In the second chapter, the colonial rural
structure is described briefly to provide a useful background for

the understanding of the subsequent (partial) transformation entailed
by self-management. The third chapter discusses the commune's
structure and the agricultural policy during the period 1965 to

1971, which was characterized by an alliance between the bureau-
cratic-technocratic petit bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie

and the landowning class. The presence of the latter class within
the state power imposed a rural status-quo and agricultural policies
benefiting essentially the landowning class. The fourth chapter
deals with the transformations brought about the the application of
the Agrarian Revolution Program. These transformations affected
first the Communal Popular Assembly from which the landowning class
was progressively eliminated and replaced by a locally rising new
petit bourgeoisie. And second, the agricultural assistance structures

which oriented their action more toward the small peasants.

CHAPTER I
CLASS ANALYSIS AND PERIPHERAL FORMATIONS

The main thrust of this study is the analysis of the power
structure in a rural commune in terms of classes. The identification
of the dominant social classes at the local level is seen within the
broader framework of the national class structure, class alliances
and policies.

Class analysis of an agrarian structure of a peripheral social
formation raises already at the theoretical/methodological level many
complex problems. Of these are the application of class analysis to
a peripheral formation, the problem of rural classes and peasantry
and problems related to class analysis itself.

Resistance to the application of class analysis lies at two
levels:

1. Official denial throughout Africa and particularly Algeria
of the existence of classes. Nationalism and nation-building is
regarded as a supra—class phenomenon.1 At the same time, emphasis
is put on religion and the specific character, for example, of
Islamic societies as irreducible to non-Islamic societies.2

2. Conventional social science teachings supported the re-
jection of class analysis. Sociology encompasses classes into a

broader stratification system of status, ranks and role expectations.

Nevertheless, stratification analysis never transcends the level of
immediate experience and only remains a statistical description that
fails to explain the moving forces of society and social dynamics.

The criteria--occupation, income, life-style and social status-~how-
ever important, are only dependent and secondary factors of the
fundamental criterion explicited by Marx, that is, property relations.

But, however difficult it may be to make a class analysis of
African societies, "the reality of class" as Wallerstein put it, "is
not lessened by the very real resistance to class analysis, nor by
its rarity as a political phenomenon." While all Marxists agree that
peripheral formations are class societies, they disagree on the nature
of the articulation of the peripheral class structure with that of
the center.

Some Marxists emphasize the dependency over-determination that
deprives classes of the peripheral formations of their specific
dymamics.* In this respect, Wallerstein holds that "in the peri-
pheral areas of the world economy. . . the primary contradiction is

between the interests organized and located in the core countries and

their local allies, on the one hand, and the majority of the population

 

4 o o O
on the other." Samire Amin argues that peripheral soc1al formations

U

have no "internal dynamism of their own, they are over-determined by

the world capitalist system. The generalization of peripheral state

*Representatives of this orientation are mainly the dependency
theorists such as A. G. Frank, I. Wallerstein and S. Amin.

capitalism merely reflects changes of the center and expresses the

emergence process of the petty bourgeoisie as a "transmission belt

 

of imperialist domination."S

Emphasis on world system tended to overlook mode of production
analysis and henceforth to regard periphery's classes as mere
epiphenomena of external processes. "Local allies" or local "trans-
mission belt" classes are not always abvious. This ignores the
possible contradictions between periphery's dominant classes and
center's classes. This is true of the fiercely nationalistic petty
bourgeoisie in Algeria and of a national bourgeoisie as opposed to
the camprador bourgeoisie.6 Some observers argue that this "distinction
is irrelevant in a period marked by increasing interpenetration and
internationalisation of capital and consequently dependent capitalisms."7
Indeed, this conception does not account for contradictory class
interests of periphery's and center's classes.

Indeed, Marxist analysis does not mean mechanistic transposition
to peripheral formation of the class relationships characteristic of
central capitalism as it developed from feudalism. But, as Arrighi
put it, "the analysis of the colonial structures should, so to say,

8 I. Shivji wonders

be built into the analysis of the class structures."
how can "the historically determined system of social production

(colonial or neocolonial structures) . . . be placed either in a

subordinate or a dominant position vis §_vis the class structure

9

 

of that system."

Mode of Production and Class

 

Marx's treatment of class was incomplete, but Lenin explicited
the Marxist definition of classes,

as large groups of people which differ from each other by
the place they occupy in a historically determined system
'2: social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed
and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their
role in the social organization of labor and, consequently,
by the dimension and modes of acquiring the share of social
wealth of which they dispose. Classes are groups of people
one if which can appropriate the labor of another owing to
the different places they occupy in a definite system of
social economy.

 

 

Class determination derives from mode of production analysis. A
mode of production being an articulation of specific productive forces
and specific relations of production with the corresponding political
and ideological structures.* Indeed, a mode of production does not
exist in the real sense, in a "pure" state. What exists is a social
formation which combines different modes of production of which one
is dominant, a "historically determined system of social production."
Henceforth, a social formation includes more than two classes. Conse-
quently, any class analysis presupposes an analysis in terms of modes
of production. The articulation of modes of production implies the
maintenance/destruction of non-capitalist forms of production and of“
corresponding social and policital structures. The expansion of the
capitalist mode of production altered precapitalist structures and

subordinated them to capitalism's functioning.ll

 

*A class divided mode of production involves basically a two-class
structure. Proletariat/capitalist for the C.M.P., Serfs/lords for the
F.M.P.,Masters/slaves for slavery, etc.

This articulation of modes of production and its counterpart--
unequal development--is what is sometimes termed as "dualism."
Dualistic theories regard the dichotomy traditional/modern sectors
as independent entities evolving at different stages of their develop-
ment. Self-sustaining growth--hindered by the "backward" sector, is
only reached when the latter is incorporated within the modern sector
through a set of modernizing means.

Factual evidence, however, shows the opposite: 1) that the
"traditional" sector is indeed organically linked to the "modern"
sector (reserve of labor force, market exchange), and 2) that the
"modern" (capitalist) sector is the real obstacle to the growth of
the "traditional" sector because of the transfer of value (rents,

unequal exchange, cheap labor force . . .).l3

Agrarian Structures and Classes

 

Peripheral social formations are sometimes characterized as
agrarian societies* to emphasize the fact that most of their popula—
tion is rural and that their economy is basically agricultural.

While western capitalist countries underwent a process of prole-
tarianization which transformed their peasantries into industrial
working classes, peripheral economies and particularly Africa are
still experiencing a peasantization process subsequent to capitalist
penetration and destruction of the "communal cultivator" form of

organization.

 

*Cpnventional social science uses the dichotomy Agrarian/Industrial
Society to reject mode of production and class analyses.

Peasantry or Classes?

 

Peasantry in sociology literature is problematic insofar as
it includes different rural classes and strata in one undifferentiated
entity. The generally accepted definition of peasantry is Wolf's
systematization of the XIX centruy European rural conditions. His
treatment hinges on four criteria: 1) a peasant is a rural culti-
vator, 2) a peasant manages the exploitation for the market as well
as for family consumption, 3) a peasant belongs to a local community °
larger than the family (even an extended one), and 4) a peasant has
a subordinate economic and political position such that a part of
production is extorted under the form of rents or taxes. This model
has been set essentially in contrast with that of tribal and primitive
societies which escape the domination of a central power.

T. Shaninl4, however, contends that Wolf's treatment turns
"analytically marginal" any peasant category to which these criteria
do not apply. S. Ortiz15 strongly objects to grouping peasants in
one single definition. And, S. W. Mintz16 observed that for the study
of the present problems of the rural world in non-western societies,
it is more important to develop typologies of rural socio-economic
groupments than elaborate on abstract definition of peasantry.

K. Post17 developed the thesis that the African reality reveals two
types of processes tightly linked together. The first is a process
of change from the model of "communal cultivator" to that of "peasant."

The second is a process of incorporating peasant and communal societies

within the world capitalist system. But, at the same time that
Africa experiences a peasantization process because of its deepening
integration to the world systems, Algeria has experienced a "depeasanti-

' process because of the proletarianization, destruction of and

zation'
internal differentiation of peasant community subsequent to the brutal
penetration of capitalism under the form of settler colonialism.
Henceforth, as Hobsbawm18 put it, "beyond a certain point in the socio-
economic differentiation of the agrarian population, the term of
'peasant' is no more applicable." Rural class analysis within Marxism
remained basically under-developed in contra-distinction with analysis

of urban class structures. Insofar as capitalism was essentially an
urban-based mode of production, Marxism developed an extensive body

of literature pertaining to urban class analysis but only few references
to rural classes which had direct relevance to the analysis of capitalist
development. Development of rural class analysis emerged, however,

in Eastern Europe where the peasant question was crucially posed.

Lenin19 in his analysis of the Russian rural society established a
Marxist framework for the study of peasant societies in terms of

classes. The determination of classes was predicated upon the iden-
tification of three rural modes of production defined by three types

of relations of production: 1) feudal relations of production,

comprising landlords and share croppers, 2) capitalist relations

of production, comprising the capitalist farmer (kulak) and the

10

rural proletariat, and 3) "the middle peasant" who cultivated his
own land but, in Russia, was tied to the commune (mir).

Lenin's broad categories were further elaborated by Mao ste
Tung who, in his analysis of China, determined various rural classes
using land ownership and farm implement ownership as criteria: land-
lords, rural capitalist (small because rural capitalism was not develOped),
petit bourgeoisie (owner-peasants or middle peasants), the semi-pro-
letariat (semi-tenant peasants and poor peasants), the rural pro-
letariat and the lumpen rural proletariat (landless and jobless
peasants).

A sharper analysis--using criteria such as standards of living,
sources of income and ownership of farm implements--distinguishes
sections within these classes. For example, the poor peasants are
divided into two sections. One section of the poor peasants owns
comparatively adequate farm implements and a proportional amount of
funds and practices on the side a little livestock raising; the other
section of the poor peasants does not possess adequate farm implements,

funds nor sufficient manure and gets most often into heavy debts.

Peasants and Revolution

 

Many debates revolved around an abstract determination of whether
"peasants" in several areas are a basically conservative force or
- . 20 .
essentially a revolutionary force. But, only concrete analySis of

both the objective and subjective conditions could determine peasant's

11

practice for historical experience illustrated peasant's differential
position. Marx talked of French peasants--and European peasants in
general--as a "sack of potatoes" divided and demobilized, barbary
within civilization.21 Mao concretely analyzed the forces of revolu-
tion in the countryside and appreciated the revolutionary potential

of some strata of the peasantry. Amilcar Cabral22 distinguished

 

between "physical force" and "revolutionary force": While the peasantry
constitute physically a great force, it is not the great fighting

force. E. Wolf and H. Alavi23 observed that it is the middle peasant
rather than the poorest of peasants who is "initially the most mili-
tant element of the peasantry." The middle peasant's social per-
spective is, however, "limited by their class position" in the final
analysis. Yet, poorer peasants could carry on the revolutionary pro-
cess further into structural changes if adequately motivated. It is
nonetheless agreed (Moore, Wolf, Alavi . . .) that "it generally
requires a rare combination of tyranny and misery to produce a peasant

24
revolt let alone a peasant revolution."

Agrarian Reform

Land reforms result from a class conflict at the level of the
agrarian structure--rural classes--and at the level of the state which
engenders a double movement: Break and transformation of the bloc
of classes in power and break and transformation of the rural class

structure. Change does not necessarily embrace simultaneously both

12

poles at the same time: Change at one pole could entail repercussions
at the other and vice versa. Henceforth, agrarian transformation pro-
cesses could be summarized in the following typology.25

1. Transformation at the level of the agrarian structure as a
result of a peasant revolt or insurrection not followed by a dis-
location of the state system. The de facto land reform is then reversed
by a state-organized counter-reform or counter-revolution. This is
the example of Csarist Russia and XIX century Mexico.

2. Transformation at the level of the agrarian structure followed
by a dislocation of the state system. The landowners are eliminated
from the state power and a land reform proclaimed. This is illustrated
by the 1952 revolution in Bolvaria.

3. Transformation at the level of the state system by the elimina-
tion of the landowning class from the bloc of classes in power and
transformation of the rural class structure through land reform. This
is illustrated by the Egyptian experience of 1953, the Peru Revolution
of 1969 and the Algerian Agrarian Revolution of 1971.

4. Simultaneous transformation of the state system and of the
agrarian structure. This type is best illustrated by the revolutionary
experiences in 1917 in Russia, China, Cuba .

The power structure of a rural commune in Algeria cannot be
analyzed scientifically without integrating the local class structure

within the national dimension which is over-determinant. The local

l3

peasant classes are encapsulated within the broader national class
structure and class alliances which dictate the basic social, economic
and political policies of the country. The class nature of the central
state power is thus decisive in the understanding on how the different
national policies have direct repercussions on the local social dynamics

and on the nature of the commune's power structure.

Class Analysis of the Algerian Social Formation

 

The Algerian socio-economic formation has received much attention
in scholarly as well as militant circles. A large body of literature
deal extensively with different dimensions of the Algerian society and
its history. Yet, the character of the Algerian social formation re~
mained very controversial and elusive. A brief review of class analysis
of Algeria reveals that Marxist appraisals include characterizations
ranging from those defining the Algerian social formation as a transi-
tional formation (toward socialism) to those defining it as a dependent
capitalist formation. This stems from the fluctuating social reality
and contradictory development which combine progressive elements
(nationalizations, national industrialization, extensive education pro-
gram, free health care, 'workers' control,‘ land reform . . .) as
well as negative aspects (persistent unemployment, emigration, lag
of agriculture, deepening of social inequalities, deepening of
Algeria insertion within the world capitalist market and hence of

technological dependence, lop-sided sectorial development . . .).

l4

Differential emphasis, either on the positive g£_the negative develop-
ments, leads to different conclusions as regard to the class character
of the Algerian state and the nature of the dominant class. These
analyses could be grouped into two broad categories--the "state
bourgeoisie/dependency" thesis and the "petit-bourgeoisie/transition
toward socialism" thesis--though both categories exhibit a variety

of nuances as regard to the type of analysis, assumptions and

evidence .

The "State Bourgeoisie/Dependency' Thesis26

 

The proponents of this thesis argue that a "state bourgeoisie"*
constituted as the dominant class within Algeria because of its control
of the ownership of the means of production, its leading role in
economic organization and surplus-value distribution and its dominant
role in political decision-making and elaboration of ideology. The
"state bourgeoisie" is regarded as a historical crystallization of
several strata and fractions of class (petit and middle bourgeoisies)
in post-independence Algeria, espeically since 1965. The "state
bourgeoisie" is perceived as a class at the super-structural level
by its position within the state: the Marxist criterion of prOperty
relations which is anchored in the infra-structure is regarded as a
juridicial formalism. As a result, this conception does not explain

the contradictory developments such as low level of consumption

 

*This is also called "administrative bourgeoisie", "bureaucratic
bourgeoisie", "technocratic bourgeoisie."

15

imposed on the "state bourgeoisie" through the ceiling wage and
limitations on luxury imports, the industrial orientation toward
heavy industry and not toward profitable consumer production sectors
and, other decisions benefiting the popular classes such as extensive
free education which absorbs about 19 percent of the annual budget

or free health care . . . Indeed these positive aspects are dis-
missed either as temporary or techniques of cooptation.

The class content of the Algerian state is thus regarded either
as a "globally reactionary"27 regime completely aligned with inter-
national capitalism against the popular masses or as a nationalist
bourgeois regime28 in process of attempting to secure a place within
the imperialist division of labor and which is thus in relation of
relative conflict with dependence on imperialism and compelled to
broaden its internal social bases to strengthen its position vis a
vis international capital. These critiques emphasize the dependence
of the Algerian economy on world capitalism. The technological, trade
dependence is viewed as an already operating mechanism which imposes
on the Algerian economy choices dictated by the requirements of
the central capitalist economies. True, these new forms of dependence
are potentially dangerous but the socio-economic and political options
of Algeria are not dictated to it through mechanisms dependency.

Although, the proponents of the "state bourgeoisie/dependency"
thesis provide good analyses of some dimensions of the Algerian social

formation such as the industrialization program and its contradictions,

16

the significance of State apparatus building or the land reform, they
fail to account for the dynamics of the internal class structure

and for the progressive developments experienced by the Algerian

society. Some observers from this perspective noted a sharp exacerbation
of class conflicts since 1971 and a noticeable leftward move of the
regime. But locked in a dogmatic "state bourgeoisie/dependency" per-
spective, they either dismissed this trend as a populist-demagogic
orientation or accounted for it in a contradictory way that implicitly
refutes that thesis. This is illustrated by the following proposition:
"Rightist opposition forces the regime to move leftward rather than

29 The observer did

back down and capitulate to right wing demands."
not attempt to specify how can a regime initially defined as a techno-
cratic-bureaucratic bourgeois and dependent regime move leftward and
yet under rightist pressure. All in all, this perspective does not
provide a framework that takes into account the contradictory develop-

ments of the Algerian social formation and/or depicts a fluctuating

social reality in terms of social class.

The "Petit Bourgeoisie/Transition Toward Socialism" Thesis30

This thesis holds that Algeria is experiencing a transitional
process from a colonial economy to a national and independent economy
with a socialist perspective. The "socialist option" does not mean
immediate construction of socialism but in a first stage the severance

of dependence relationships with foreign capital and the building of

17

a national economy. In this respect, the nationalizations, the
industrialization, the reinforcement of the public sector, the free
health care program, democratization of education, the Agrarian
Revolution, the "socialist management" of corporations are conceived
of as the tasks of national building.

In the conditions of Algeria the main contradiction opposes
"reactionary and counter-revolutionary strata" (big landowners,
compradore bourgoisie and the "reactionary wing of the bureaucratic
bourgeoisie") to other classes and strata "interested in varying
degrees to progressive transformations" (workers, salaried personnel,
small and middle peasants, landless peasants, unemployed and small
traders). Included in this group are "certain national capitalists"
who thanks to their investments minimize Algeria's dependence on
imports of consumer goods.31 The social dynamics reside basically in
the anti-imperialist struggle which requires an alliance between the
radical elements of the regime and the socialist left on a broad front
united around an antikimperialist charter and where a renovated EEEEE
de Liberation Nationale (the official single party) could play the

leading role.32

 

The nature of the Algerian state is characterized as globally
anti-imperialist with some imperfections due to the infiltration of
reactionary and conservative elements within the state and administra-
tion, political inconsistency of the radical elements who do not hold

a scientific socialist theory. Observers33 from this perspective,

18

reject concepts such as "state bourgeoisie" and "state capitalism"

to define the class nature of the Algerian state as basically petit
bourgeois. This hegemonic petit bourgeoisie is on the other hand
undermined by internal contradictions between its nationalist and
liberal wings. But the institutional structural locations of these
wings are not dealt with. Nevertheless, the character of the Algerian
social formation is of a transitional character. It is worth noting
that the proponents of this perspective allude minimally to the negative
aspects of the Algerian development and especially the new forms of
technological dependence and the deepening of Algeria insertion within
the international division of labor. The antidote to this dependency
is viewed in a closer relationship to the socialist camp. But what

is left unexplained is why a radical petit bourgeoisie tends to favor
tight relationships with the west. Instead of sharpening the analysis
to clearly delineate the contours of the different fractions of the
petit bourgeoisie (military, technocratic, bureaucratic . . .) and
their actual conflicting interests, the literature of the Pg££i_

de 1'Avant Garde Socialiste (former Communist party) does not deal

 

directly with the negative developments.

In this respect, the analysis developed by J. P. Durand34 stands
as an excellent contribution to the clarification of the nature of
the Algerian state and the social contradictions that pervade the

Algerian social formation. The thesis of a "dominant class in the

19

forming" as a contradictory process within the conditions of exacerbated
but not generalized class conflicts constitutes a useful frame that
transcends both the naive thesis of socialist transition and the
dogmatic thesis of "state bourgeoisie/dependency" to account for the
contradictory developments and the (sometimes) elusive character of
class conflicts.

The frozen conceptions of the non—capitalist road and the dependency
theory do not thus account for the contradictory process of class
struggle. These openly teleological perspectives are substituted for

the analysis of the conjuncture of class struggle.

National Social Formation and Amourth*

 

The socio-economic and political orientations dictated by the
national social structure and the class alliance in power shape the
conditions of the existence of the local classes and the nature of
the local power structure. National policies help expand certain
classes power and set limits to other classes power, because of the
highly centralized economic and political structures, because of the
voluntarianism of the state policies and the uricity of economic
and political representation. The local institutions are directly
subordinated to and tightly supervised by the upper echelons of the
central state apparatus. This is not to say that the local classes

have no dynamics of their own. But only that the local classes action

 

*A fictitious name for the rural commune studied.

20

is circumscribed within the socio-economic and political boundaries
set by national policies. Within these boundaries, the local classes
intervention conditions the concrete applications of these policies:
selective interpretations of laws, delays in implementation and/or

misimplementation . . . a clear dialectics is thus at work.

Amourth, a rural commune in Eastern Algeria, can be regarded as a
microcosm of traditional rural Algeria. Its 25,000 to 30,000 inhabitants
live mostly off the "traditional" agricultural sector. Only three

self managed farms employing about 70 workers and four other capitalist
farms belong to the "modern" sector. About 9,000 inhabitants reside

in the commune's village which provides a few dozen permanent jobs

in the local administration and services and casual work in the con-
struction sector for the local lumpen—proletariat. No other outlet--
besides emigration to the big cities and abrcad--is offered to the
increasingly pauperized popular classes. The Agrarian Revolution
program had limited effects since only 350 landless peasants out of

about a thousand applicants were alloted lands regrouped in cooperative.
National policies of industrialization around selected poles of develop-
ment, sacrifice of agriculture and the non-realization of a land reform
(promised since 1956) left unchanged the socio-economic conditions

of life for more than 65 percent of the Algerian population. The

peasant war of liberation was not followed by a social revolution.

21

On the opposite, the historical domination of the landed class re-
mained unchallenged in Amourth, as well as in similar traditional
rural areas until recently (1975). The history of Amourth both
before and after independence tells the story of the Algerian peasant

classes.

CHAPTER II
COLONIZATION - COMMUNE - SELF-MANAGEMENT

In order to grasp the complex social relations prevailing in
rural Algeria (class and tribal dimensions), a historical analysis
is necessarily in order. A brief study of the pre-colonial and
colonial rural structure will provide a useful background to the
post-independence agrarian structure which remained basically un-
altered.

Pre-colonial Algeria experienced a series of successive in-
vasions and occupations by the Phoenicians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines,
Arabs and Turks. The Turkish rule which laster for over three centuries
(1518 - 1830) was ended by France's colonization of Algeria (1830 -

1962).

Pre-Colonial Algerian Formation

 

The nature of Algeria's pre-colonial formation is very contro-
versial.* The dominant pre—colonial mode of production was characterized
either as feudal, asiatic or communal. Galissot contented that the
Algerian pre-colonial formation was a special variance of the fuedal

mode called "command fuedalism.’ Using the different patterns of

property ownership (Arsh, Melk.**), Galissot distinguished three types

 

 

*L. Valenci defined it as "Asiatic mode of Production," French
Administrators called it either Feudal of Communal and Galissot
characterized it as "command fuedalism". .

**Arsh refers to a tribal collective form of property and Melk to
an individual private property.

22

23

of economic formation: 1) the ancient type where Mglk property was
pre-dominant (Mitidja Valley), 2) asiatic type wherever Aggh property
dominated Mglk property, and 3) germanic type wherever égsh is articu-
lated to M215 property as a mere supplement.35 This thesis, however,
is based on wrong assumptions as regard to the nature of the property
system. Indeed, Agsh system is not a communal property but a part of
the tribal land recognized as the private possession of the individual
or family who tills it, although it cannot be alienated. 0n the

other hand, the Mglk_system is a private property acquired by contract
but which is not exclusive of community rights (tight restrictions
over sale). Moreover, "command fuedalism" does not account for the
Turkish colonial superstructure. In fact, pre-colonial Algerian
formation "combined fuedal and colonial features" and henceforth it

is "reducible neither to the ancient nor to the asiatic or germanic

36

models." Besides Arsh and Melk systems and Habus (land donated

for religious or cultural purposes), a public domain (a perverted form

 

of the primitive communal property of antiquity) developed. Half

of the public domain was appropriated by the Turkish ruling aristo-
cracy (Egy,Ԥ31s_and their dependents) and worked by the neighboring
tribesmen or landless peasants while the other half was conceded to
the loyal bureaucracy's staff, loyal tribes which policed the country-
side and levied taxes for the Bey (Maghzen tribes) and sometimes to

farmers who in return paid a rent.

24

The internal process of social differentiation was accelerated
by the Turkish policies of different tax changes and land allocation.
Subsequently, the primitive forms of common labor organizations and

cooperation (Asaba, Touiza*) transformed into exploitative relation-

 

ships. The contracts (plowing association, farming leases, Khamessat .
were by no means mutually profitable since they involve a labor and
product appropriation by a landed class. In this respect, the
Khamessat** system provides that the five factors of production (land,
team, labor, instruments and seeds) are of equal value, and henceforth
the Khames receive one-fifth of the product for his labor. The
Touiza becomes an indirect form of labor appropriation when it involves
socially differentiated classes.

The Turkish rule did not penetrate deep into the hinterland.
Aside from the cities and their immediate environments, the country
was extensively under-administered. The Aroush (plural of Arsh)
preversed their social and political structures. This is particularly
true for the Berbers (of Aures and Kabylia), well entrenched in their
mountains. The Arsh is generally run by a Djamaa, the council of
the Arsh which legislates and especially arbitrates the conflicts that

may arise within the Arsh.

 

*Touiza is a form of communal cooperation within the Arsh for
activities such as house, bridge or road building and especially
harvesting. Able—bodied members perform free labor on the property
and are offered a meal at the end. Ashaba involves tribes of farmers
and breeders and provides that the caretaker tribe receive half the
lamb and wool of the herd owned by the other.

**Sharecropping of one-fifth.

25

The counterpart of the historical absence of a national central
power was a mushrooming of regional and tribal socio-political centers.
The socio-economic and political organization remained basically
territorial and tribal with no or little federal relationships.37
The multiple tribal revolts under the Turkish rule and during French
colonization hardly ever superceded particularistic interests and

went beyond the tribe's territorial bonds. Although French coloni-

zation was not confronted by an all national resistance, it faced

 

successive and sporadic regional resistance engaged by highly cohesive

and powerful tribes.

French Colonization

 

French capitalist expansion in Algeria confronted pre—capitalist
modes (and forms) of production and their corresponding socio-political
structures. To establish Algeria as a settler colony based upon a
capitalist mode of production, the French settlement policy was contin-
gent upon the destruction of the Agsh property and social structure.
Land confiscation proceeded then through violent means and rebel
tribesmen were uprooted and confined to unproductive and marginal

lands.

26

Table 1
Land Confiscation

 

 

Periods Number of Hectares Transferred
1830 - 1850 364,341
1851 - 1870 765,000
1871 - 1880 1,245,000
1881 - 1890 1,635,000
1891 - 1900 1,912,000
1901 - 1920 2,581,000
1921 - 1940 ' 3,445,000

Source: M. Bennoune, "Algerian Peasants and National Politich'Merip,
48, 1976, p. 14.

Land laws, by introducing alienable private property both made
land a freely circulating commodity, proleterianized peasants and broke
down the social-economic bases of the tribe's strength and resistance.
Of the destructive laws (1844-46 ordinances, the 1864 Senatus
consultum and the 1873 law, amended in 1887), the 1863 Senatus
consultum had the most pervasive effect in the dismantling of the
socio-economic structure since it aimed at the delimitation of the
tribe's territory, the break up of the tribe and the extensive intro-
duction of the individual property among the tribesmen. As a result,
709 tribes were delimited territorially and broken up into 1,196
Douars* (between 1863 and 1938). By 1956, dismemberment affected

all but eight tribes out of 801.38 For example, the Haractas** tribe

*Physical territory of tribes or fractions of tribes.

**Name of a Berber tribe whose territory included a large part
of Amourth.

27

was divided into 26 douars. In reality, douars are not homogeneous
tribal fractions but encompass segments from different tribal back-
grounds. Henceforth, the colonial administrative and municipal
organization emerged from the disintegration of the tribe's structures.
The development of the colonial administrative network proceeded
to expand and organize French colonization. The French monarchy (0rd.
September 28, 1847) extended the "loi municipale de 1837" to well
developed settlement centers. The second republiCo(decree of August 16,
1848) following the 1848 constitution which declared Algeria an "integral
part of the French territory," provided that all the civil territory
be erected into communes. This project was realized later on by the
second empire (in December 1866 and December 1868). The then military
territory, which included the non-settler dominated areas, was admin-
istered by the "Bureau of Arab Affairs" headed by military officers
until 1868 where they transformed into "mixed communes." The latter
waxeartificial entities, with no cohesion nor dynamism. They included

douars-communes, settler centers and later municipal centers. The

 

"mixed communes" were administered by an administrateur helped by

 

native assistants, caids, and a municipal commission which comprised
elected European members and appointed token "muslims" (partially
elected later in 1919). Alongside the "mixed communes," the "communes

de plein exercise" (full communes organized after the metropolitan

 

model) developed in settler-dominated areas and were administered for

the exclusive benefit of the European minority. The native population

28

was granted few seats and following WWII the maximum proportion was

raised to two-fifths of the council seats.39
The socio-economic structures of rural Algeria were distorted

and broken up following the expansion of the colonial system. A highly

capitalized settler sector which covered 27 percent of the land with

a farm average of 125 hectares was articulated to a deeply under—

capitalized "traditional" sector located on marginal lands with farm

average of 11 hectares. The development of the former accentuates

the underdevelopment of the latter which constituted a large pool of

cheap labor force, a source of rents and taxes. Moreover, the pauperized

rural masses were refused any technical or financial assistance. In

this respect, out of about 46 billion of francs of short-term credits

the Algerian peasantry received in 1953, about 5.5 billion. For 1952,

the "campaign credits" granted to the Algerian peasantry amounted to

16 percent of the total distributed. The "crop financing credits"

averaged one percent and little or no "equipment credits" have been

granted."0 The Algerian "traditional" sector was by no means homo—

geneous. Colonial penetration to rural Algeria produced both a

pauperized peasantry and a native big landowning class which benefited

as much as the settlers from land confiscation. The following table

illustrates the deep social inequalities of colonial rural Algeria

(of the 1950's).

29

Table 2
Property Distribution

 

 

 

 

 

 

Size Number of Z of Z of

(Hectares) Exploitations Total/Hectares Exploitations Total

0 - 106,000 40,000 17.0 7
170% }18.5%

1 - 10 332,000 1,340,000 53.0J 18.04

10 - 50 167,000 3,200,000 26.0 43.0

50 - 100 16,600 1,100,000 2.5~ 15.07
L4% {38.5%

100 - 8,500 1,700,000 1.5: 23.5;

630,000 7,380,000 100.0 100.0

Source: Le Coz, p. 13 and M. Raffinot, p. 313.

Hence, 70 percent of all exploitations cover only 18.5 percent of the
total while 4 percent have 38.5 percent.

The rural bourgeoisie numbered 25,000 owners of farms of more
than 50 hectares. This class-—a product of capitalist expansion--was
basically an absentee owner class which collaborated extensively with
the colonial administration while sparing the nationalist camp by
providing material support. It thus emerged intact at the independence.
The middle peasantry (150,000 to 170,000 farmers owning between 10 and
50 hectares) played an important part in the liberation movement by
providing most of its cadres and safeguarding features of the "Algerian
personality" (tradition, Arabic language, culture, Islam . . .). The
popular classes, on the other hand, included the small peasantry

(owning less than 10 hectares and numbering about 450,000 peasants),

30

the seasonal workers (450,000 persons), the landless and umemployed
rural lumpen proletariat (1,000,000 persons) and the rural proletariat
(200,000 workers). Sections of the small peasantry, seasonal workers
and the lumpen proletariat engage in sharecropping systems, Khames or
Khaddara. These classes formed the backbone of the liberation army.
Rural Algeria was largely under-administered, especially in
remote and mountainous areas where the sole contact of the local
populations with the French administration was through a hated tax-
hungry Bachagha or ggid. During the way, the F.L.N. (National Libera-
tion Front) established in its strongholds a substitute administration
organized after the French one. The F.L.N. emphasized both the poli-
tical and military dimentions of its organization. The F.L.N. was a
para-military (political) organization whose function was to guide
and officer the military arm, the National Liberation Army (A.L.N.).
The 1956 "Soumam Congress" explicited its guidelines: primacy of the
interior over the exterior and of the political over the military.
But, the application of these principles experienced many "vicissi-
tudes" due to the impossibility for the political to maintain an
autonomous status within the interior which is given also the primary.
Indeed, these problems resulted from the character of the struggle
and the French counter-insurgency strategy. The "Challe Plan" of
1957 and the "regroupment policy"* undercut the organizational effort

of the F.L.N. by depopulating rural and mountainous areas. Henceforth,

 

*Regroupment villages were built to isolate the liberation army and
achieve other economic goals such as labor force reserve and land
confiscation.

31

the political dimension of the F.L.N./A.L.N. was largely reduced to
the guerrila warfare and the A.L.N. outgrew the F.L.N. This process
was equally strengthened by the development of the F.L.N. as a front
in 1956. The F.L.N.'s program was limited to the commune goal of all
tendencies (armed struggle for independence) and thus lacked a clear
ideological component. Thereafter, the emergence of a political
organization alongside and guiding the military arm (the A.L.N.)
never occurred as in China where the Communist Party guided the
liberation army and accomplished tasks of political organization and
popular education.41

The F.L.N. did not fill the administrative/political vacuum and
thus left the initiative for the local dominant but also patriotic
classes (landlords, rural bourgeoisies) to maintain their ideological
and political domination in the rural areas. This was reinforced by
the fact that these classes provided most of the cadres of the

A.L.N.

Colonial Legacy and Communes

At independence, Algeria inherited the colonial administrative
structures without the French staff. The administrative apparatus
remained a colonial administration whose structures were loose and
little diversified. The staff was,however, quickly replaced. The
July 19, 1962 decrees set lower recruitment criteria and promoted

to higher legels "any functionary or public agent, any administratively

32

skilled citizen." Henceforth, many of the colonial trained Algerians
of the lower categories (C and D) were promoted by default to higher
categories (A and B). But, of the 59 Constantine rural communes'
general secretaries, only fourteen belonged to category A, 20 to B
and 25 to lower categories (C and D).42 Theoretically, the "anciens

moudjahidine"* and other militants enjoy the privilege and priority

 

recruitment in all categories provided a minimal level of instruction
(in French) for the higher categories. The extensive illiteracy in

the rural areas confined most of them to the D category and to a

lesser extent to the C category. Thereafter, there was not a single
general secretary in the 59 constantine rural communes coming from
outside the colonial Algerian staff. This is so because most of
experienced local militants were Arabic literate while French re-

mained administrative language in the extensively illiterate rural
areas. But, of forty presidents of the constantive rural communes,
twenty-two were French and thirty-two were Arabic literate. The
proportion of illiterate in French is actually bigger for the special
commission members.43 In Amourth, the French trained administrative
officers occupied all higher levels of the commune's apparatus while

the lowest echelon was staffed with war veterans. None of the 12
members of the 1963 "delegation speciale" knew French and had, therefore,
to rely on the general secretary and other officers to run the commune's

affairs.

 

*War veterans are included in this category, the urban guerrillas
as well as the civil militants (food and medicine suppliers, intelli-
gence . . .). These benefits were extended also to political prisoners.

33

No wonder as an observer of a constantine rural commune noted
that "the differences in attitude, standard of living and lifestyle
between the local administrators and clerks and the ruled rural popu-
lation were very striking."44 The highly cynical and petit bourgeois
opportunist civil servants had no political or ideological training.
Indeed, most of them were products of the "Promotion Lacoste" through
which French colonialism attempted to create an intermediate bourgeois
stratum between the revolutionary fraction of the F.L.N. and its more
moderate but unpopular fraction. As a part of its counterinsurgency
strategy, France devised a neo-colonial (economic) plan which included
a limited land reform, industrialization and technical-administrative
training of indigenous civil servants. The "Promotion Lacoste" civil
servants were to substitute for the exclusively French administrative
and managerial staff. The class loyalties of these groups (techno—
cratic and bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie), as M. Lazreg45 commented,
indeed

affect their performance as civil servants entrusted

with the implementation of policies taken by the central

government. The bureaucracy's resistance to policies that

are deemed to limit the scope of its activity appears in

the form of open opposition to the passage of laws, sele-

tive interpretations of the latter, delays of decision

and/or misimplementation of socio-economic projects.

All these tendencies confirmed the analysis of the Algier's charter
(1964) which warned against the bureaucratic bourgeoisie "a new
stratum" which rapidly forms in the "administrative apparatus, the

state and the economy,‘ and which "by its position . . . may become

34

considerably more dangerous for the socialist and democratic evolu-
tion of the revolution than any other existing social force in the

country" (p. 39). 46

Traditional Social Structure

 

The colonization process did not integrate in its administrative
system the traditional socio-political structures. Actually, it aimed
at the destruction of the traditional structures through the fragmen—
tation of the tribes and the cooptation of the Djamaa institution.
This democratic institution became a fiction because of its cooptation

by the French and integration of the Douar-communes into the "commune

 

mixte" ruled by French administrators. The Djamaa was in fact replaced
by a caidal system where token Algerians called Bachaghas and caids
administer the rural population.

Colonization generated a traditionalization process. Parallel

 

traditional structures maintained and even strengthened in the mountainous
and remote areas. These populations continued to run their lives

avoiding any contact with the French administration. The War of
Liberation, in the conditions of the absence of an alternative

political organization, reinforced an autarcic contraction (compression)
of these populations within family and tribal traditional structures.

It is well known in Amourth area that many armed clashes occurred

between A.L.N. groups from different tribal backgrounds. Theggmmggg

mixte " regrouped different fractions of different tribes. The

35

post-independence Algerian commune was oriented toward supercession

of the traditional structures by melting down the tribal divisions

in one homogenous collectivity."7 Nevertheless, the "delegation
speciales" membership reflected the representation of those natural
collectivities by appointing a delegate for each tribe or 22235.

The five douars of Amourth were represented by one or two delegates

in the "delegation speciale." Moreover, a "garde champetre"

(rural constable) is appointed as a liaison agent with different
mechate,ictors such as material scarcity, unemployment and economic
chaos in the rural areas combined with the total absence of a municipal
tradition and/or a political organization contributed to a heightened
factionalism. ‘Aggh_politics is very strong and reflects in everyday
social relations, especially in the communal elections. The Eggh'
constituted originally a fraction of a tribe, delimited territorially
by its collective property "arch" lands. This fraction was fragmented
following the senatus consultum policy in several patronymics (in 1890).
The historical unity of the §£2h_and the consanguineous relations
weakened slowly with the dissolution of the collective property and

the privatization of land ownership. This privative appropriation
engendered conflicts and rivalries between different archs as well as

separation between the different patronymics.

Communes and Self-Manggement, 1962-1965

 

Following independence and amidst the summer political crisis,

economic and administrative chaos, the decree of March 17, 1956,_

36

pertaining to the colonial martial law, was continued. The decree

provides the appointment of "delegations speciales" (special

 

commissions) having the same attributes as the elected municipal council.
In the rural communes of the Constantine Departnent,* the commission
members were mostly appointed by the district chief or by the A.L.N.

Very few were by the F.L.N.48 Following the administrative reform,

which decreased the number of communes from 1,525 to 675 because of

administration staff shortage, new "delegations specialies" were

 

appointed in May 1963. The selection was contingent upon the three
criteria of competence, honesty and national loyalty.49 But, the
recruitment was basically made within the former commissions whose

members were in majority war veterans and former political prisoners.

In Amourth, the first "delegation speciale" was formed of nine members

 

mostly from the local dominant classes such as rural bourgeoisie
(capitalist farmers or big breeders), construction entrepreurship or
tradesmen.** Following its dissolution in May 1963,50 none of the
members were appointed to the second "delegation speciale" which
included a majority of war veterans and F.L.N. militants from middle
class background, either middle peasants (owning 10 to 50 hectares)
or retail tradesmen. Later in 1965, most of former A.L.N./F.L.N.
militants were granted loans to establish businesses or transporta-

tion services . . .

 

*Department of Eastern Algeria which was divided into 8 districts
and 62 communes. Amourth is located somewhere in this department.

**In reality, some of the members run two or three economic activities
at the same time (for example; farmer, shopowner and transportation ser—
vice owner . . .).

37

Self—Management

 

In a spontaneous revolutionary move, rural and urban workers
established workers' self-management on some 1,200,000 hectares of
fertile land and 1,000 industrial enterprises. Neither socialism
nor self-management were actually parts of the official program of
the F.L.N. The ideological influence of self-management socialism
on some sectors of the nationalist movement (basically the workers'
union - U.G.T.A. - and some militants of the F.L.N. influenced by
Fanonism) came as a result of the important role played by Yugoslavia
in the Algerian Liberation War both directly by its political and
military support and diplomatically by its leading role within the
Non-Aligned Movement. Both in its goals, as well as in its organiza-
tion, the self-management movement imitated Yugoslavia's experience.
The new system was institutionalized in March 1963 through the famous
March Decrees. The self-management movement had strong repercussions
on Algeria's ideology and politics. Commune and self-management
were conceived as an integrated unit. Commune was then theoretically
tightly articulated to the productive collectivities and especially
self-managed farms. Henceforth, the March 22, 1963 decree made pro-
vision for the creation in every commune of a "communal council of
self-management animation" formed of the presidents of self-management
committees, of representatives of the party, workers' union, army and
administrative authorities of the commune. This council necessarily

chaired by a self-management committee president, had the important

38

attribution of control over the directors appointed by the state in
the self-managed units, but hardly met in fact. Moreover, the F.L.N.
central committee, during its June 8 - 11, 1964 meetings, provided
the realization of the land reform at the communal level by communal
committees of landless and poor peasants.

The social component of the communal council was, however, clearly
explicited by the Algier's Charter. The Algier's Charter made the
commune articulated to self-management, the essential economic, poli-
tical and social Algerian institution.51 More importantly, it provided
for a "particular representation of the producers (self-management
and cooperative workers)" within the communal council. But, this
orientation is contradicted by the heavy emphasis on the role of the
state and the party despite the fact that the Algier's Charter itself
clearly underlined the weaknesses of the F.L.N. and the bourgeois
infiltration of the state apparatus. Moreover, this position remained
theoretical insofar as it expressed the voluntaristic orientation of
the F.L.N. left fraction at the top, but which did not have its
autonomous organization channels to implement its program. In the
Constantine department's rural communes, out of 36 communes, more
than 25 had no self-management workers in their council.52 This holds
true for Amourth which has about 70 workers in three self-managed
farms, but had no working class member in its council.

Instead of an expansion of self-management to the commune, a

bureaucratic excrecense contained self-management. Because of its

39

political and social implication, self-management contradicted the
dominant technocratic and bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie which sought
to build an all-powerful state to seat its hegemony and control the
economy. Self-management not only co-existed with an intact colonial
administrative apparatus but was isolated in a basically hostile environ-
ment. At the communal level, the administration and the council were
controlled by the dominant classes which represented traditional social
structures and which were hostile to self-management and land reform

as well. Henceforth, no program of social transformation was on the
agenda because of the combined effects of the unchallenged historical
dominance of traditional social structures, the political disorganiza-
tion of the popular rural classes and the relative weakness of a

nationalistic bourgeoisie seeking to widen its internal market.

CHAPTER III

CLASS ALLIANCE (1965-1971):
COMMUNE AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The post-independence period (1962-1964) was characterized by a
tremendous political mobilization of the popular masses which cul-
minated in the establishment of self-management, popular militia and
campaigns of national reconstruction (agriculture, tree planting . . .).
Nevertheless, because of the absence of any serious political organiza-
tion that channels popular energy toward practical tasks of national
building (political structure, self-management, literacy program, land
reform . . .), the momentum of the popular mobilization dropped little
by little thus opening the way for the emergence of a coalition of the
privileged classes that captured state power in June 1965 through a

coup-d' etat.

National Class Alliance

 

The front of classes in power that emerged after 1965 included
the bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie (in the state apparatus such as
F.L.N., government, army . . .), the technocratic petit bourgeoisie
(in the public sector), the national bourgeoisie, the petit and
middle bourgeoises of the commercial sector, the middle peasantry and
big landowners (until 1972) and the liberal professionals. The

alliance of these classes, fractions of classes and strata materialized

40

41

both in their presence within the state power (Revolutionary Council,
F.L.N. government . . .) and in developments such as containment of
self-management, centralization of the state apparatus, code of invest-
ments and in the non-realization of a land reform program.53

Briefly, the containment of self-management (its bureaucratiza-
tion and ultimately its control) enhanced the hegemony of the techno-
cratic petit bourgeoisie over the economy through the development of
public corporations, the centralization of the state apparatus in-
creased the political control of the bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie by
weakening the power of the wilayistes54 and the local notables, the
code of investments secured the development of a national industrial

private sector.

Centralization of the StategApparatus and Commune

The political power or "revolutionary council" was at its
beginning undermined by olan‘ rivalries which led to a political
immobilism until the civil ministries and the "wila istes" were
excluded respectively in August 1966 and December 1967.55 The
bureaucratic and technocratic petit bourgeoisie well entrenched in
the state and economy and represented in the "revolutionary council"
by the majority "clan d'Oudja"* initiated a process of state power
centralization by the issuing of the "code communal" in 1967 and the
"code de la wilaya" in 1969.

*By reference to the wartime location of Boumediene's group head-
quarters in Oudja, Morocco.

42

Commune's Popular Assembly (A.P.C.)
The program of administrative building intended to reform the

colonial administration and to establish a "revolutionary decentrali-

zation.' An elected "popglar communal assembly" (A.P.C.) is entrusted

 

to run the communal affairs and study local problems pertaining to
finance, equipment and socio-cultural activities. A municipal type
of socialism was evoked but with the containment and cooptation of
self-management and the strictly administrative role tailored for the
commune, a genuine communal political self-management was excluded.
The A.P.C. action was not only restricted to problems of pure service
supply such as water conveying, maintenance of public buildings and

road maintenance but was tightly controlled by the Sous-prefet (district

 

chief). _In Amourth, for example, decisions such as recruitment of a
school caretaker, the tax on garbage collecting, or the transfer of
an amount of money as small as ($20) from a rubric of the communal

account to another requires the Sous-prefet's approval. 0n the

 

other hand, important projects have to be sanctioned by the wali
(department executive) and the ministry concerned. In any way, the
scarce local resources keep the commune tightly dependent on the
state for finances.
H "56 o o o
The code communal prOVides that the selection of the candi-

dates by the F.L.N. is determined by the following criteria: geographic

43

and priority representation of Travailleurs* and producers, commitment

 

to socialist revolution, probity, perfect morality, capability, compe-
tence and dynamism. The selection proceeds from all socio-professional
categories with the exclusion of: 1) those who by their authority in
the army, administration, justice or security services could influence
the rules of the democratic game and block the harmonious functioning
of the assembly, and 2) those whose behavior or social and political
situation are incompatible with socialism and revolution.

The economic representation is thus excluded because of the exten-
sive under and unemployment. According to an observer, the "avant-
project de code communal" of July 1965 which provides the election of

two organs, one of which is exclusively elected by the travailleurs

 

producteurs (direct producers) "would have accentuated the disinherited
57

 

masses" character of passive citizens."

Elections and Social Composition of the Popular Assembly

Most of the colonial elections were fake and manipulated to
sanction the selection by the French administration of token Algerians.
The result was: deep suspicion of the Algerian people toward colonial
elections and strong emphasis of the national movement on genuine
democratic elections in independent Algeria. Since its inception, the

F.L.N. referred to "popular and democratic elections" in its charters

 

*Travailleurs designates loosely any type of wage laborer and any-
one who performs a job. It is different from ouvrier, which specifically
means worker. The official definition includes in this category the
employees as well as the managers and the high—ranking officials.
Speaking to the nation's cadres (ministries, prefects, military officers,
bureaucrats and managers), Boumediene said, "All of us are travailleurs

44

as a fundamental principle of the Algerian Revolution and an in-
alienable right of the Algerian people. At the same time, the principle
of a single "parti" is proclaimed as irreversible. The conciliation
between the democratic electoral process and the necessary selection

of the candidates by the F.L.N. expressed in the "regle de double"

which provides that the number of candidates, two—thirds of whom should
be militants of the F.L.N. and/or of its mass organizations, is double
the number of seats.58 The number of communal delegates to be elected

varies with the population of the commune in the following way:

 

 

Population of the Commune Number of Delegates
l to 5,000 inhabitants 9 members
5,001 to 10,000 ' 11

10,001 to 20,000 15

20,001 to 40,000 21

40,001 to 100,000 29

100,00, to 200,000 39

Source: "Code Communal" in A.A.N., 1967, p. 763.

For the bigger cities, two delegates are elected for every fraction
of 50,000 inhabitants.
In 1967, the average communal population was 18,000 inhabitants

with more than two-thirds of the communes between 5,000 and 20,000.

45

Population Size

 

0 - 5,000

5,000 - 10,000
10,000 - 20,000
20,000 - 40,000
40,000 - 100,000
100,000 - 200,000
Over 200,000

Number of Communes

 

38
209
275
113

34

4
3
W

Amourth had between 1967 and 1971 a pepulation averaging 15,000 to

18,000 inhabitants. The number of delegates was 15 for the 1967-1971

and 1971-1975 terms.

The social component of the popular assembly for these two terms

is shown in Table 3 and reflects an overwhelming majority of Bourgeois

class elements.

Table 3

Amourth's Popular Assembly 1967-1974

Class Background

1. Big landowners and breeders
Big Tradesmen

2. Middle peasants and breeders
Middle tradesmen

3. Traditional (small peasantry
and small shopkeepers)

4. New petit bourgeoisie
(employees, teachers . . .)

Source: Registers of Deliberations

1967 1971
4 4
10 8
1 3
15 15

of 1967 and 1971

Total

18

30

46

Two remarks are in order here:
1. The geographic and priority representation of the

travailleur-producteurs referred to in the "code communal" is

 

totally absent since no workers nor small peasants have been
elected.

2. The local notables59 do not usually run in local elections.
Beside the few who had been appointed in 1962 and 1963, there was not
a single notable in the subsequent Popular Assembly. But generally,
the local notables invest in their arsh members.

The determination of the social class background of the elected
delegates involves many complex factors deriving from the delegates'
position vis-a-vis the means of production, as well as arsh loyalties.
Using the family class background as a decisive factor in the determine
ation of the individual's class condition, several elected officials

who are of a different individual class background are identified

 

as of their family class background. For example, D.B. and M.S.
(members of the 1967 Popular Assembly) who actually were respectively
accounting agent and elementary school teacher were identified as
falling in the "big landowners and breeders" and "big tradesmen" class
following their family's class background. Similarily, M.Y., A.K.

and B.T. members of the 1971 assembly were included within the big
landowners and big breeders class despite their actual individual

condition as elementary school teachers.

47

In the conditions of §£§h_social organization and factionalism,
local politics is basically characterized by vertical cleavages which
run across class lines rather than horizontal division of class con—
flict. Despite the continuing erosion of the arsh structure because
of urbanization, emigration, increasing state intervention in local
economy (public employment as well as services . . .), arsh loyalty
remain a fundamental feature of local politics. This resulted
essentially from the relative absence of the state and of the party
in the local community's social life: no alternative economic,
social and political organizations challenged decisively the existing
traditional structures until recently. Thus, arsh politics as a
factional conflict involves rival factions which are generally
structurally similar, that is, representing similar configurations of
social groups. And therefore, as H. Alavi put it, "such conflicts
(. . .) do not have an ideological expression, because rival factions,
or faction leaders, fight for control over resources, power and status
as available within the existing framework of society rather than for
changes in the social structure."60 The geographic representation of
natural communities stipulated by the communal code is translated
as Amourth by the representation of the five Douars to which correspond
related Aroush. This leads necessarily to §£§h_politics. The objective
criteria of selection becomes a secondary issue beside the arsh
loyalty in the inter-arsh competition. Alliances between Aroush

form and arsh members are mobilized to vote for the arsh's

48

representatives who henceforth feel commissioned by their Arouch
rather than elected by the commune's population. The arsh repre-
sentation is instrumental in benefiting the arsh's mechtate (Hamlets)
with equipment such as roads, schools and other facilities and providing
a casual work for the arsh members. Arsh politics appear as the
politics of the dominant classes to secure popular support for their
representatives. Henceforth, the ultimate interests of the arsh's
leading fraction are as important as the social class condition and
interest of the individual delegate for the understanding of the

nature of local politics and social relations. In an analogous tribal
situation, Amilcar Cabral pointed out "the strong tendency(fiof the

Fula peasants) to follow their chiefs."6’1 The socio-political hegemony
of the dominant classes is translated in their control over the

working committees set up by the communal administration. The
"communal committee of direct taxes" of April 1967 was composed of

20 influential landowners and tradesmen, the party coordinator and 3
A.P.C. members. The committee appointed in April 1971 was exclusively
formed of 24 landowners and tradesmen. At the same time, a committee
of grievances headed by the A.P.C. president and composed of55
tradesmen, the coordinator of the Part1 and a tax comptroller, was

set up. This committee supervises tax levying on real estate, commercial
land agricultural activities which constitute the main source of the

commune resources. The propertied classes are thus directly associated

49

in the control of their contribution to the commune resources. The
propertyless classes are not only excluded from the management of the
commune affairs but are subordinated to the dominant classes even in
committees which allegedly deal exclusively with their needs. This
is illustrated by the dominance of the big landowners over the "agri-
cultural committee for loans to small farmers."

The strong grip of the local dominant classes manifest in their
control of the local committees such as the "agricultural communal
committee" or "direct tax committee."* These two committees have
been directly dominated until 1975 by big landowners and tradesmen
appointed by the A.P.C.62 The quantity and nature of the resources
appropriated by these classes because of their position is little
documented. Some factual evidence could, however, be drawn from the
commune's archives as to decisions benefiting the dominant classes:

--Renting of a communal land covering 22 hectares to the
president of the "Delegation Speciale" who was a big landowner and
tradesman (deliberation No. 16 of November 5, 1963).

--Payment of debts amounting to 21,288.60 A.D. to X, a construction
entrepreneur who was influential within the former appointed commission
(deliberation No. 130 of March 15, 1966).

--Renting of an irrigated land averaging 40 hectares for 8 A.D./

ha to X, influential military officer and landowner (deliberation 137

6f June 5, 1966).

 

*Direct taxes in Algeria refers to income, agricultural taxes,
business taxes, real estate taxes, as well as taxes for water, garbage
collecting.

50

--"Free transfer in the interest of the commune" of a 877
square meter lot in the village center to the profit of the A.P.C.
president who built private garages, storage places and house
(deliberation 22 of August 22, 1968).

--"Sale by mutual agreement" of a construction lot to X,
tradesman and A.P.C. member supposedly for the construction of a
"useful hostel which the village lacks" (deliberation 32 of June 12,
1971). A coffee-house instead of a hostel was actually built.

—-Allocation of four housing lots of 169 square meters to X,
big tradesman and A.P.C. member ("Actes de vente des lots a batir'

of October 1972).

Other factual evidences support the articulation of the A.P.C.
members' interests and those of the private sector especially in
construction entrepreneurship. Decisions of the A.P.C. tend to favor
deals with the private sector to undertake public construction rather
than invest in the communal enterprise. In this respect, the deliber-
ations provide contradictory justifications for the A.P.C.'s choice.
Hence, a deliberation of April 6, 1972 allocates the market of the
construction of 40 rural housing units to two professional artisans
from neighboring commune (home commune of the A.P.C. president) be-
cause of an alleged "absence of a local specialized manpower." Another
deliberation (No. 45/74) of November 7, 1974 favored a private entre-

preneur who because of "his good morality and perfect solvency would

51

present all required guarantees to respect the conditions agreed
upon," while earlier in September 17, 1974, a deliberation (38/74)
emphasized the benefits ("timewise and advantageous conditions") for
the commune to realize en regie (communal enterprise) equipment works
and later on November 12, 1974 another deliberation (52/74) allocated
a market of five classrooms and two housing units to the municipal
‘Egglg. Despite further emphasis on the benfits of the £2312) markets
were regularly awarded to private entrepreneurs from the A.P.C. president
home commune.63

The national results for the 1967 elections were not officially
published. Some results of the 1971 elections show that only one-
fifth of the former A.P.C. officials were re-elected and that the
majority of the elected is of petit bourgeois background (teachers,
small bureaucrats, small traders and middle cadres).64 Furthermore,
the results of the regional elections to the wilaya popular assembly
(A.P.W.) of 1969 could provide some insight as to the selection patterns
and to the social component of the elected regional bodies. In May
1969, popular assemblies were elected in 15 wilayate according to a
process similar to that of the A.P.C. elections.65 These assemblies
are granted a financial and administrative autonomy, but they have
only a consultative voice over the economic projects presented by
the appointed representative of the central power, the gall, Unlike

the communal code, which states that "the representation of a branch

52

of activity means the representation of the workers and not those

who own the means of production (big landowners, factory owners. . .),"
the wilaya charter does not exclude the representation of any socio-
professional category. According to a study of the elections,66

the main trend was toward the selection of liberal professionals,
senior bureaucrats and organized politicans of the F.L.N. and A.P.C.
The category "workers" was one of the least popular. A comparative
(rural/urban) analysis shows that the candidates in urban areas tend

to be subalterne and senior bureaucrats and liberal professionals while
in rural areas candidates are mostly peasants, teachers, members of

the A.P.C. and traditional notables. Senior bureaucrats and liberal
professionals are favored in big cities, liberal professionals and
F.L.N. officials in town and peasants and traditional notables in

rural areas.

By and large, it appears that the local and regional assemblies
are dominated by middle class and petit bourgeois strata. The slogan
"fills d'ouvriers et de paysans" describing the social background of
the candidates formulates an official ideal of social promotion but
points out also the fact that neither peasant nor workers were actually
themselves the candidate or the elements elected. A single wilaya
(that of Tiaret) had a relatively high rate of workers' and peasants'
candidacy (respectively 12 and 21 percent). Workers' candidacy was far
below 10 percent in the other 14 wilayates where the highest rate

reached 8 percent in Tizi Ouzou, Oran, Oasis and Sidi Bel Abbes.

53

The peasants' candidacy rated more than 10 percent in only five
wilayates: Medea 14 percent, Tlemen and Saida 13 percent, and Batna
and El Asnam 11 percent. The national percentage averaged 5 percent

for workers and 8 percent for peasants.

The F.L.N. Party

 

The F.L.N. was at its inception neither a class—party nor a

front: The F.L.N. was a "parti-nation" through which "the Algerian

 

member of a nation becomes simply synonimous of frontist member of a
parti." As mentioned earlier, the F.L.N. had no clear political or
ideological program besides the goal of national independence. At

the grass root level, the political organization and ideological edu-
cation of the masses was absent. The radicalization process was hence-
forth hindered and the local leadership remained basically conser-
vative. Unlike the rural workers who in a spontaneous and revolu-
tionary move took over the settler's estates and established self~
management, peasants respected private prOperty, even that of the well-
known collaborators and went back to their traditional way of life in
isolated mechtate. An observer noted that "at independence, the

F.L.N. was not a national political party in any sense, but a hetero-
genous alliance. At the top, its leaders were coopted for their
political importance, at the base it rested on local notables rather
than real militants."68 Since independence, the "party" was glorified

as a historic concept susceptible to insert ruler and ruled within a

54

single community but yet rejected as an institution unable to con-
cretize an economic and social project: the official discourse con-
stantly oscillates between a negative pole made of transitory imper-
fections and a positive pole necessarily referring to a future con-
struction of a strong party. But, all the attempts to rebuild the
party have turned fruitless and the party remained basically an un-
popular institution. At the commune level, the F.L.N. is isolated:
First, its members receive less popular support than the non-F.L.N.
candidates and second, when elected its militants tend to sever their
relations with the party. The president's evaluation in 1967 is
particularly harsh: the party became a "resettlement" place "for
individuals who have nothing to do with the party."69 As a result,
the candidates lack popular support and behave as an interest group
rather than representatives of the local population. In a national
conference of the A.P.C. presidents of February 5, 1970, the presi-
dent made a sharp critique of the A.P.C. and severely concluded:

"A new A.P.C. will be elected in February next year . . . and our

hope is that they will be more representative and more competent

 

than the former ones."70 (our emphasis)
In Amourth, the Kasma* has a membership of about 300 militants.
Before 1970, there were 200. The "droit historique" (historic right)

remains a decisive attribute of membership for the former militants,

 

*Kasma refers to the F.L.N. organization at the commune level.

55

war veterans and other A.L.N./F.L.N. auxiliaries. Despite the fact
that most war veterans and former political prisoners were granted
since 1965 privileges and loans to establish businesses, they
remained by the virtue of their past, the leading force within the
Ragga. It is worth noting that the latter does not devise a common
tactical position for all its members to support the F.L.N. candi-
dates during the elections: the gasmg splits basically around ggsh

lines in the elections.

Commune's Activities and Population's Demands

Actions and possibilities of a rural commune are quite limited
by its scarce resources which essentially are from local taxes and
products of the communal domain (land rents, market rights auction and
communal housing rents . . .). Resources from industrial activities
are not extended to rural areas which are completely deprived of
small sized enterprises. Henceforth, the state provides the bulk of
the commune's financial resources (Article 265 of the Communal Code)
and most of the collective equipments through credits to communal
equipment expenditures (D.E.C.) or rural equipment expenditures
(D.E.R.). Nevertheless, credit grants are highly centralized since
the programs are elaborated at the wilaya level countersigned by
exterior technical services and finally sanctioned at the central
level by a committee which supervises the D.B.C., D.B.R. and D.I.L.

(local investment expenditures), as well as the programs of full

56

employment. These highly centralized procedures are intended to
compensate for the technical weaknesses of the communes which tend
to propose punctual projects designed to satisfy the immediate needs
of the local population.

The counterpart of this, however, is the deprivation of those
communes of any local initiative and the ignorance of the local popula-
tion's needs on the part of the central state. Henceforth, the
development of communal small enterprise is blocked and jobs are
scarce for an extensively under and unemployed rural population whose
only outlet is emigration to the cities or abroad. Communal jobs are
both temporary and limited in number and the local administration and
services which provide the only permanent jobs are overcrowded. "Chantiers

de chomage"* and construction works employ temporarily few people but

 

roulements** have to be organized to satisfy all the applicants for

 

jobs.

The reform sought to realize a better integration of the local
economic and social forces through the transformation of the social
relations by making the state rather than the traditional collectivity
(Douar, Arsh) the main channel of expression for these forces. But
the rural commune, because of its marginal economic role, functions

basically as a supplier of services, both social and administrative,

 

*Temporary actions such as tree planting, canal digging that pro-
vide few days or weeks of work for the local unemployed. Usually a
rotation is organized to satisfy everybody.

**Rotation.

57

and not as an integrater of the local economic and social forces which
thus remain largely localist in perspective. As long as the social
and economic life of the rural population remains centered around the
Mechta and the Douar which express a social reality largely marginalized
and autonomous from the central state and the local administration,
the "local community" and "active communal participation" defined by
the "code communal" do not constitute a material reality. The
Mechta and 2223; form a socio-economic cell and the commune is a
provider of social and administrative services.

In the conditions of extreme deprivations and tremendous social
needs of the local population, the rural commune has nothing to
offer beside Action d3 Secours, i.e., little financial support ($10)
once a year during a religious celebration and temporary work relief
programs. The common opinion is that the commune is not useful if it
lacks money and that the elected assembly or the administrative
officials ignore rural poverty. The latter attitude is particularly
true of the bureaucrats who always complain how "wicked" the peasants
are but are never concerned about their pauperization. As relations
with administration intensified following the centralization of the
state apparatus, rural population's dissatisfaction with the commune

parallely increased because of the red tape. Numerous official

papers are required for everything* and most of them cost money

 

*The reasons are twofold: First, Algeria's administration was
organized after the heavy bureaucratic French model and second, the
local administration served as an all pervasive means of control over
any activity of the local population.

58

except the birth certificate and "family card." However, the communal
clerks have even managed to charge the peasants for this since the
acquisition of these official documents takes time: a long wait in
the queue to submit the application and 24 to 48 hours to get it.

Both by its functions and the means used, the bureaucratic adminis-
tration appears as foreign to the local population. To administer

an extensively illiterate population, the communal bureaucracy uses
written communication in French and requires numerous official papers

which have expiration dates.

Agricultural Policy and Peasantry

 

Following independence, rural workers and poor peasants (seasonal
workers) took over the vacant farms of the settlers and the Algerian
collaborators. These classes exhibited a high socio-political maturity
and initiative which, despite crucial shortage of means of production
and technical expertise, contributed largely to avoid an economic chaos
in post independence Algeria. Nevertheless, no land reform program
was applied and the popular offensive was blocked because of a set
of factors of which the landowning class domination over the state
power and the political subordination of the peasantry are the most
important.71 First, the political representatives of the national
bourgeoisie of certain sectors of the newly enriched petit bourgeoisie
and especially of the big landowning class linked together in family

and business networks who infiltrated the state power and the

59

administration managed to hinder the initiatives of the masses.
As a result, self-management was contained and land reform pro-
grams were shelved. Second, the peasantry was not able to exert a
sufficient political pressure to achieve its demands because of the
absence of an autonomous organization. In contrast to the working
class (U.G.T.A.), tradesmen (U.G.C.A.), students (U.G.E.M.A.), which
organized in autonomous trade-unions, the peasantry was massively
mobilized within the A.L.N./F.L.N. structures. Henceforth, most of
the peasant cadres either were killed or moved to the urban centers.
The observation72 about yet another rural community that the loss of
peasant experienced organizers and political leaders was strongly felt
by the devastated local communities, is equally valid for Amourth
which suffered the loss of popular leaders such as A.R. and B.M.
Despite numerous promises of land reform since 1956 (Soummam
Congress of the F.L.N.), no decision was taken until November 1971.
The agrarian structure remained unchanged despite the fact that the
Algerian peasantry formed the backbone of the Liberation Army, that
more than 65 percent of the population was rural, that the rural social
inequalities deepened and that unemployment and underemployment hit

at least two out of three rurals.73

Agrarian Structure

 

The agrarian structure was characterized by a combination of

four farms and/or modes of production: The self-management form of

60

production, the capitalist mode of production, precapitalist forms
and independent middle peasant form .

The Algerian agrarian population is thus by no means a homogeneous
entity. By the mid- 1960's it comprised the following rural classes:74
--The rural bourgeoisie which owned farms over 50 hectares and
numbered 25,000 farmers. This class includes absentee owners and

capitalist farmers.

--The middle peasantry which numbered 150,000 farmers owning
10 to 50 hectares and included potentially capitalist farmers using
seasonal labor, as well as small farmers.

--The poor peasantry including owners of less than 10 hectares,
metayers and Khammessa (sharecropping of one-fifth) and which numbered
about 650,000 elements and performed seasonal work in the self-
management and private sectors (about 200,000).

--The proletariat which numbered about 150,000 in the self-
management farm and about 75,000 in the private sector.

--The lumpen proletariat (landless and jobless rurals) numbering
about 620,000 elements.

The agrarian structure was characterized by striking inequalities

since 3 percent of farmers owned more than 25 percent of the land while
72 percent had farms of less than one hectare and by an extensive
unemployment and underemployment since 50 percent of the active

population were either unemployed or underemployed.

61

The relative stability of the polarized agrarian structure is
explained by several factors of which emigration, traditional
structures and state intervention. Migration to France provided
historically the main outlet to an acute poverty. Close to half
of the rural population depended on emigrants' remittances for sur-
vival in the mid-1970's according to an Algerian estimate.75

0f critical importance are the complex social relations which mask
the class contradictions. This is related to Agsh structure where
the ideological representations are still influenced by ancient
communal relations such as the Touiza and the important tribal and
religious relations. Some observers noted that all classes may be
represented in a single extended family and that tribal loyalties
lead to behaviors contradictory to class oppositions.76 These complex
relations helped the big landowners protect themselves against the
risk of a land reform program by resorting to various dodges such as
fragmentation of holdings and illegal distribution of property titles
among numerous relatives. Henceforth, the number of farmers owning
over 100 hectares dropped from 8,488 in 1962 to 4,659 in 1968. In
Amourth, fictions indivision of property was used extensively to
hide the land concentration. The analysis of 469 property declarations
shows that many properties were claimed indivisible and collectively
owned while they were actually individual private properties. Further-

more, it is worth noting that the number of indivisaires (owners of

 

62

indivisible property) tends to increase parallely to the size of
the property (Table 4).

At the same time, the nature of the activity of the indivisaires

 

suggests that the indivisaires of the property over 20 hectares tend

 

to perform non-agricultural activities (29.6 percent) and to include

more children and women as compared with the indivisaires of the

 

 

 

 

Table 4
Number of Indivisairesyper Property
A B
Size Number of Number of -B
(Hectares) Properties Indivisaires _fL_
0 - 5 158 203 1.72
5 - 10 57 178 3.12
10 - 20 100 333 3.33
20 - 40 112 396 3.53
40 - 80 42 192 4.57
80 - 160 27 126 4.66
160 - 320 ll 65 5.90
Over 320 ___2. __23 11.50
509 1,516

properties below 20 hectares who are active in agriculture (68 per—
cent) and less active in non—agricultural sectors (18.5 percent).

This is illustrated by the following table:

63

Table 5
Activity of Indivisaires

 

 

 

 

Agricul- Non-Agri-

Size of tural cultural Non-

Property Activity Z Activity _ZL_ Active* _ZL- IRES;
0 - 5 156 22 25

5 - 10 118 68.0 36 18.5 24 13.5 100%
10 - 20 211 74 48

20 - 40 204' ' 121 71

4O - 80 118 54 20

-80 - 160 72 54.6 32 29.6 16 15.7 100%
160 - 320 33 19 13

Over 320 ll 6 6

 

Source: Archives of Agricultural Census (1973) of Amourth.

*It is worth noting that children and women form only 17 percent of the
non-active indivisaires of the below 20 hectares properties while they
form 67 percent of the non-active indivisaires of the over 20 hectares
properties.

 

 

A typical example is that of B.R. who owns 344.66 hectares of
an indivisible property with 13 co-proprietors of whom four children,

two students, five functionaries and only one farmer.

State Intervention in the "Traditional" Sector
Agriculture, in the Algerian strategy of development, was deemed

a secondary sector. This reflected essentially the nature of the

64

classes in power: an industrialist petit bourgeoisie and national
bourgeoisie which sought to build a strong industrial economy on the
one hand and a backward landowning class whose interest in the pres-
ervation of the rural status quo. The agricultural policy thus
intended to maintain the agrarian structure unchanged and used
the agricultural credit as the economic levq;_which par excellence
"contributes to engage efficiently the process of development of this
(traditional) sector."77
The development of an agrarian capitalism was blocked because
of a set of factors. First, the landowning class includes a large
number of absentee owners whose annual rents (averaging ZOO-million
of A.D.) were either unproductively consumed or invested in the
tertiary sector.78 Second, state assistance to the traditional
sector was partly used in speculative activities such as livestock
breeding rather than in long-term investments to increase agricul-
ture productivity. Third, state control over the prices of agri—
cultural products, set at a very low level, over the agricultural
wage (S.M.A.G.) and over the supply of the means of production
smoothed the spontaneous workings of capitalist farming. This
resulted in a relative absence of internal dynamic and a slow develop-
ment of capitalist farming which seemingly accelerated in the late
1960's. The "Kulakization" process which the state assistance con-
tributed to through credits and loans ended brutally with the

launching of the 1971 land reform program.

65

Financial and Technical Assistance

 

Between 1962 and 1965, the state's agricultural effort was
practically absorbed by the self-management sector. Small amounts
(30-million of Algerian Dinars/year) were allocated to the private
sector until 1966. Since 1966, the amount of credits tripled and
measures such as tax exemption, debt cancellation and supply of

selected seeds were taken in favor of the Petits Fellahs (small

 

peasants). This program intended to minimize the hardships of the
small peasantry but had in fact very limited effects since only
15,800 farmers in 1966 and a little over 20,000 in 1967 benefited

from it.79

But, within the conditions of the national alliance be-
tween the bureaucratic-techndcratic petit bourgeoisie, the national
bourgeoisie and the big landowning class, the credits served essen-
tially the interests of the rural bourgeoisie. The "equipment loans"
functioned as a classical banking credit, i.e., they were granted
only to those who offer guarantees of reimbursement. Moreover, the
definition of the "small farmer of the traditional sector" was not
clearly specified and was left to the apprecication of the local

authorities as well as to the administrative committee of the

Societe' Agricole gg_Prevoyance.*

 

 

Until 1970, most of the credit was used as follows:

 

*S.A.P. were agricultural cooperatives inherited from coloniza-
tion. Following the launching of the A.R., the S.A.P. was integrated
to the CAPCS, i.e., multi-purpose communal agricultural cooperative.

66

--Loans to middle and big owners who developed speculative
livestock raising.

--Acquisition of agricultural machinery by private farmers who
established enterprises of agricultural works.

--Division of credits to non-agricultural purposes because of
the non-control of the loan use.

--Use by the marginal exploitations to non-agricultural expendi-
tures.
According to an observer, these loans contributed essentially to the
mechanization of the middle-sized farms (20 to 50 hectares).80 This
is confirmed by the general development of the medium and large farms
which acquired many tractors. The number of tractors in the private

sector increased from 15,000 in 1965 to 24,000 in 1970.81

Table 6
Equipment Loans to the
"Traditional" Sector 1966-73
(in 000 of Algerian Dinars)

 

 

lee: wmwimaimezimzlm
Credit Expected 120,000 115,000 118,000 110,000 90,000 60,000 40,000 60,000
Credit Consumer 84,974 112,983 109,965 102,138 54,015 45,399 22,526 12,244
Z Consumed 74% 98% 93% 92% 60Z 75Z 56Z 20%
Expected

Source: SAP and BNA (quoted in A.A.N., 1975, p. 138).

Furthermore, the agrarian bourgeoisie development is illustrated

by its share in milk production. While the "traditional" sector produced

67

in 1970, about 1.2 million of hectaliters of milk with 300,000 cows,
the agrarian bourgeoisie produced about 1.8 million with only 47,500
cows.82

The brutal drop of the credits consumed since 1970 was beside
other factors* due to a more precise definition of the recipient (the
small farmer). This was followed first by a restriction of loans
corresponding to what could really be invested by a small farm and
second by a quick decline of the credit consumption. The latter
tendency confirms the hypothesis that before 1970-71, the credits

were monopolized by the "middle" farmers rather than by the rightful

recipients.

Local Peasantry and State Assistance

 

We have established earlier the dominance of the local bour-
geoisies over the communal institutions, especially the A.P.C. By
virtue of their economic position and control over local institutions,
the rural dominant classes yield most of the resources allocated to

the local "traditional" sector by the state.

The Communal Agricultural Committees

 

These committees are appointed by the executive of the A.P.C.

They are generally formed of the A.P.C. president, the S.A.P. director,

 

*The A.R. generated a brutal drop of the investment in the private
sector. See A. Benachenhou in Revue des Sciences Juridiques,yEconomigges,
No. 3, September 1973, p. 634.

68

the coordinator of the Parti (Kasma), a rural constable and three

or four big landowners. The small peasants are excluded. Two of the
regular members of these committees are E.A. and S.H. who respectively
own 261 and 139 hectares. Sometimes the secretary of the local
workers' union (UGTA) is appointed to this committee. Until 1967,

the secretary was a propertied travailleur who owned a mechanics

 

garage and a shop. Later on, it was headed by commune employee from
a wealthy landowning family. The communal committee studies the
applicant's situation and decides the nature and amount of assistance
to be granted.

Henceforth, because the credit grant is left to the appreciation
of the local committees dominated by the rural bourgeoisies and because
the small peasantry is excluded from the decision-making, the credit
-allegedly granted to the small farmers is, in fact, monopolized by
the local dominant classes. Neither the structures (S.A.P.) nor the
grant procedures were adapted to the needs of the small peasantry
which could not effectively benefit from the credits to develop their

farming methods.

Credit and Recipients
Until 1973, the credit was handled by the heavily bureaucratic

and ill adapted Societe' Agricole dg_Prevoyance which was established

 

 

to meet the requirements of capitalist farming in colonial Algeria.

The S.A.P. did not experience any reform, rather the same procedures

69

were applied indiscriminately to the new social reality composed of
several social classes. While the rural bourgeoisies replaced the
settlers for the credit grants, the small peasantry remained outside
the circuit because of the maintenance of the financial solvency

procedure.*

 

 

Table 7
Amount of Credit for Amourth
Year Amount in A.D. ($ = 3.92
Algerian Dinars
1968/1969 1,787,558.95 in 1978)
1969/1970 3,023,494.00
1970/1971 600,000.00
1971/1972 1,999,900.00
1972/1973 975,000.00
1973/1974 752,600.00
1974/1975 404,850,86
1975/1976 1,825,706.95

Source: B.N.A. (District Branch).

Of these credits, the small peasantry receives a small amount
which consists of little cash and essentially of credits for seeds.
Fewer than 500 small peasants out of a couple of thousands were
adherers to the S.A.P. and receive an average of five to six quintal
of seeds per person and fewer of these recipients were provided with

a complete credit for the different agricultural operations such as

 

*Until 1975, the interest for the short—term credits was 6.38 per-
cent.

70

seeds, plough and harvest . . . Although the exact amount of credits

distributed to the different rural social classes is not available,83
a rough appreciation could be made from the apportionment of the

credits for 1968-1969 and 1969-1970.

 

 

Table 8
Distribution of Credits into Categories
Categories 1968/69 1969/70
Seeds 1,050,397.52 1,020,440.00
Plough 422,710.00
Fertilizers 737,161.43 2,964.00

Several explanatory remarks are necessary:

"seeds" is concerned, about 20,333

1. As far as the category
quintals (of wheat and barley) were distributed. The 500 small farms
of less than 20 hectares could absorb at most 10,000 quintals if those
farms average 20 hectares and are granted 20 quintals of seeds (first
hypothesis). The 500 farmers get six quintal per person as mentioned
earlier, i.e., a total of 3,000 quintal (second hypothesis). In
either case, the middle and big landowners receive most of the "seeds."

2. Fertilizers are not utilized by the small peasants. This is
illustrated by the fact that at the national level only 9.26 percent
of all farmers owning below 10 hectares use fertilizers as compared

with 21.87 percent of farmers owning over 100 hectares.84 Moreover,

this is supported by the fact that locally none of the 600 small

71

peasants adheres of the C.A.P.C.S. since 1974-1975 used fertilizers
despite their availability and cheapness as compared to 1968-1969
period. This is because the small peasants are not trained in
fertilizer use. The traditional view was that the fertilizers "burn"
the land and seeds.

3. Agricultural machinery is not used by the small peasants for
the ploughing operation for two sets of reasons: first, for the S.A.P.
mechanical ploughing of the tiny plots is not efficient especially
if they are scattered on a large area since this requires time and
money (fuel and wages) or location on stony or mountainous lands.
Second, for the small peasants mechanization is expensive since the
costs per hectare are larger than the average yield which is about

seven quintal in northern Algeria.

We must conclude that all and by and large most, of the credits
were consumed by the middle and big landowners who control the
institutions, are financially solvent and whose properties are
adapted to mechanized farming. A comparative analysis of the
C.A.P.C.S.* action for 1974-1975 and 1975-1976 further support the
hypothesis that the credits were monopolized by some other

recipients.

 

*C.A.P.C.S. cooperative of commercialization and services
established within the framework of the A.R. to replace the S.A.P.
and provide services for the socialist sector, the A.R. sector as
well as for the individual private sector. An agency of the national
bank located within the CAPCS handled the credits since 1974-1975.

72

Table 9
Seeds Credits to Small Peasants 1974/75 and 1975/76

Year ‘ Number of Recipients Amount of Credis (in A.D.)
1974/75 612 205,250.86
1975/76 702 347,974.50

Source: C.A.P.C.S. of Amourth

This means that despite a smaller amount of credit85 (compare
these amounts to the 1968/1969 and 1969/1970 seeds credits mentioned
supra), the C.A.P.C.S. provides assistance for more peasants (612 and

702 as compared to fewer than 500.)

Types of Credit Use
The distribution of the credits at the national level was as

follows for the period 1966-1973:

Means of production 25%
Livestock 52%
Hydraulic 20Z
Fruit tree plants 2%
Building of exploirtation 1%

This distribution suggests a strong tendency toward speculative agri-
cultural activity, i.e., livestock raising and establishment of agri-
cultural work enterprises (machinery for rent . . .). Long-term

productive investments such as hydraulic, tree plants and other land

73

improvement or farming facilities (buildings) types of investments

are of secondary importance. This tendency is more characteristic

of the privileged classes for the following reasons: First, despite
the fact that between 1965 and 1970, the number of tractors in the
private sector increased from 15,000 to 24,000, a little more than

55 percent of the small peasantry owningless than 10 hectares utilized
animal traction and only 18.02 percent utilized mechanic traction.86
Second, extensive livestock raising requires a large capital in

terms of farm building facilities, pasture resources, livestock food
and transportation. This category--livestock--which includes mainly
cattle raising for milk and meat production involves capital intensive
farming techniques that small peasants are deprived of.

Credit use at Amourth exhibited generally a similar tendency
although other types of use were frequent also. Solvent individual
farmers were granted equipment loans to mechanize their farms as
well as selected seeds and heads of livestock. On the other hand,
cooperatives of privates which mushroomed following the credit re-
form in 1970 received large amounts of credits since no limitation
on loans is set when the borrower is a "regularly constituted
cooperative." Only few "cooperatives" grouping middle and big
landowners and local bureaucrats* developed cattle raising and

livestock breeding while no cooperative of small peasants existed.

 

*Party officials, officials of the war veteran organization and
of A.P.C.

74

The criterion of solvency and the bureaucratic procedures operated
a social selection by exclusion of the small peasants although the
criterion of solvency is dghfggto_non-operative since the credits
granted from 1968 to 1973 were not reimbursed (except for the 1969/
1970 where one-third only was reimbursed.) The small peasantry, on
the other hand, conceives of the credit it receives (seeds credits
essentially) as a social aid rather than as an economic assistance.
Perceived as a social aid, the selected seeds were generally consumed
since according to them the sowing of grains of such a quality with
no technical assistance is pure waste. The financial assistance (in
cash) is not used productively (productive consumption) but consumed
by the household (reproductive expenditures) during the dead seasons.
Thus, despite a pervasive populist rhetorics, the bloc of classes
in power blocked any prospect of rural change until 1971. The agri—
cultural policy (financing, technical assistance, equipment) and the
agrarian status quo benefited the big landowning Classes. The
result was: regression of the agricultural sector, increasing pauperi-
zation of the rural popular classes, rapid social differentiation and
dominance of the big landowning class over the local institutions and

administration.

CHAPTER III

AGRARIAN REVOLUTION: CLASS STRUGGLE AND COMMUNE

The status quo which characterized the agrarian structure ex-
pressed a compromise between the different social forces exercising
power. This heterogeneous class alliance was undermined by contra-
dictory interests of the petit bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie
and the big landowning class as the development program initiated by
the former classes clashed with the backward agrarian structures which

formed the socio-economic foundation of the latter class.

Industrial Program (1967-1971)

 

In the Algerian developmental strategy, industrialization was
deemed a remedy for the country's underdevelopment problems. The
program was initiated by an extensive policy of nationalizations of
the most advanced sectors of the economy (banking, foreign trade,
natural resources). The public control of the economy provided the
Algerian state with means of a centrally planned strategy of develop-
ment aimed at an "integrated development" breaking with the forms
of labor division imposed by imperialism and at initiating the passage
from a colonial economy to a national, independent, and modern
economy.

This strategy is based on the development model through "industrial-

izing industries" formulated by G. Destannes de Bernis.87 According

75

76

to G. D. de Bernis, the "industrializing industries" constitute the

main force of the advanced capitalist countries and the necessary
foundation of any development policy.88 From the historical develop-

ment of advanced capitalist countries and notably by analyzing the

decisive role of the steel and energy sectors and their transfor-

mation by modern industries (chemistry, electronics . . .), G. D. de Bernis

"underdeveloped

draws two important conclusions that he applies to
countries": 1) A fundamental condition of industralizing industries
is to supply the industrializing economy with its product. One
cannot develop without inward orientation of industries more often
outward oriented. 2) The industrializing countries cannot catch up
with the advanced ones which started their industrialization a century
ago, unless they skip a certain number of stages and adopt the most
advanced processes of production.

Hence, these conditions lead to privileging industries characterized
by their large size and their high capitalistic level, utilizing the
most sophisticated technology and producing means of production.
According to this model, however, the large size of such activities
and the "integration" sought supposes a regional development policy.
Finally, agriculture is strictly dependent, as an outlet and source
of accumulation, on the industrializing industries development.89

The industrialist strategy led to a spectacular economic growth.

The immediate objectives of the economic planning were globally reached.

77

The national control over resources has been reinforced and the
global investment increased from 12 percent to 30 percent between
the pre-plan (67-69) and the first plan (69-73), reached 49 percent

in 1976, and 57.84 percent in 1977.

INVESTMENTS 1967-77 (In Million of D.A.)

 

Pre-Plan 67-69 First Plan (69-73) Second Plan (74-77)

11,081 27,000 110,000

The realization of the objectives was 82 percent for the pre-plan
(including an overcost of threefold for industry and two-fold for
housing), around 90 percent for the first plan with a total investment
of 34,846 million of Algerian Dinars (instead of 27,000) and the second
plan totalled 106,398 million of A.D. of investments. The industrialist
orientation of the development planning reflects in the sectoral allo-

cation of investments:

 

Pre-Plan lst Plan Second Plan*
Agricultural Investment 17.9% 14% 7.3%
% 51.7%

Industrial Investment 51.3% 51.5

*These are the revised rates after two years of application
(initial rates were 10.9% and 43.5%).

The allocation of industrial investments privileged hydrocarbons

and petro-chemistry branch which absorbed 51 percent during the

78

pre-plan, 42.2 percent during the first plan and "a little half"
during the second plan. The development policy led to the emergence
of industrial nucleus such as steel industry in Annaba, mechanical
industries in Constantine and Rouiba, petro-chemistry in Skikda and
Arzew and electrical industries in Tiziouzoo and Sidi Bel Abbes. In
quantitative terms, about 420 realizations of which 270 factories and
150 infra-structural works entered in activity between 1971 and 1977.
Five hundred other projects concerning 350 factories were realized
between 1973 and 1977. Production reached 400,000 tons of steel,
400,000 bicycles and motorcycles, 3,000 tractors and some other agri-
cultural material, 500,000 tons of fertilizers, 100,000 tons of
petro-chemical and plastic products, 6,000 trucks (or one-third of
Algeria's needs).90 The number of industrial jobs increased from
164,350 in 1966 to 563,800 in 1977.91

The industrialist strategy runs into critical contradictions
among which are persistent unemployment and underemployment, per-
sistent regional and sectoral inequalities and deepening social
inequalities.92 These are, however, effects of the main contra-
diction, i.e., the lag between industrial growth and stagnation/
regression of agriculture which led to a critical slowdown of
industrial growth.

The "industrializing industries" could not engender an inward

oriented national development unless the manufactured products find

79

a local outlet. G. D. de Bernis, the theorist of the Algerian
strategy who pointed out in 1970 the constraints of the ideal model
which is fundamentally based on the internal dynamism of the relations
between agriculture and industries, denounced the regression of
Algerian agriculture and concluded:

If this situation (regression of agriculture) evolutes still
more, it is excluded that agriculture will become the ex-
pected outlet of industry (our emphasis). Industrialization
is (thus) questioned in its orientation and in the only single
logic it could be conceived in. The recourse to exportation--
if possible but most probably unlikely--will save in part the
functioning of the (industrial) complexes but the big con-
struction of independence will be shattered to its foundation.

 

In this respect, there was an important discrepancy between production
of the newly built complexes and the demand of industrial inputs by
agriculture. In the case of fertilizers while consumption averaged
102,000 tons in 1970-1971, objectives were twice the volume (213,000
tons). For 1972-1973, about 450,000 were to be consumed. At the

same time, only the self-managed sector absorbed this production:

 

1970-1971 Size Consumption of Fertilizers
Self-managed Sector 27% 94.3%
Private Sector 73% 5.7%

The same problem faced the tractor complex whose production could
not be consumed since the self-managed sector was already mechanized
(in 1969 it has half the 50,000 tractors in agriculture), and other

production such as pumps and vanes. Bottlenecks appeared in light

80

industries sector as well. For example, the shoe industry which grew
rapidly since the beginning of 1970, witnessed a slowdown due to
problems of insufficient demand.93 0n the other hand, while the
narrowness of the rural market blocked the industrial growth, the
stagnating agricultural production affected adversely the dynamic
food industry branch.

Moreover, the food imports and subsidies to consumption of
agricultural products constituted a heavy burden (20 to 25 percent of
oil revenues since 1974) which cut sharply into development plans.
The solution to the contradiction (industry/agriculture) could only
proceed along two possible paths: either renounce the building of
a national independent economy and engage in an outward-oriented
industrial growth, i.e., a neo-colonial solution or deepen the anti-
imperalist struggle through the transformation of the agrarian
structures inherited from colonial capitalism. But either orienta-
tion is contingent upon the balance of forces within the bloc of
classes in power and has critical implications as to the material
foundations of these classes.

The neo-colonial solution developed in social formations where
the big landowning class and the campradore bourgeoisie had histor—
ically a hegemonic position as in Morocco and Tunisia. In Algeria,
however, the conditions of settler colonialism and the revolutionary

decolonization (War of liberation, self-management, and nationalization

81

of foreign trade) curtailed the strength of these classes. The
landowning class did not hold a dominant position within the bloc

of classes in power to initiate a neo-colonial development. The
proponents of the second path progressively constituted a large

front which included; the poor peasantry, the national bourgeosie,

the technocratic-bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie and the working

class. These classes have heterogeneous interests-~the poor peasantry
wants land, the national bourgeoisie intends to widen its market, the
working class (at least its most conscious fraction) sees in the
liquidation of the big landowning class a step toward the elimination
of labor exploitation, the petit bourgeoisie (at least its nationalist
wing) aims at reinforcing the anti-imperalist state capitalism--

but converged toward the elimination of the big landowning class.
Nevertheless, the pro-land reform classes have diverging political

perspectives as to the magnitude of the land reform, the nature of

the social agents of change and the ways to initiate change.

The Agrarian Revolution: Goals and Results94

 

The agrarian revolution charter (November 8, 1971) intended to
carry out a global modernization of rural Algeria through the elimina-
tion of the latifundium, homogeneization of the legal statuses of
landownership by instituting a single type of private property,
mechanization of agriculture, absorption of rural unemployment and

underemployment, improvement of the rural standard of living and

82

political and administrative integration of the marginalized
peasantry to the existing national institutions.

The program was divided into three phases. The first phase
concerns arable communal and state lands which had been previously
leased to private farmers and used for pasture; the second phase
concerns the absentee landowners by nationalizing the properties
over 5 hectares and the resident big landlords by restricting their
properties to a manageable size; the third phase concerns livestock
breeding by limiting the flock ownership to 300 heads per breeder.*
The recipient peasants were to organize in cooperatives while the
small landowning peasants could voluntarily join existing cooperatives
or establish their own cooperatives.** The production cooperatives
in a commune were grouped into a marketing and service cooperative
which provides them with machinery, seeds, fertilizer, other services
such as repair and transportation and also markets their production.'

The charter used two criteria--size of the property and absence/
presence of the owner--to determine the rural stratification. Four

categories were thus identified: 1) absentee owners, 2) big land-

owning class, 3) small peasantry and 4) landless peasantry. While

the absentee owners' property is nationalized, the big landlords'

 

*and 450 if the household has 2 or more dependent children.

**There are two types of cooperatives: l) Pre-cooperative associ-
ations such as C.M.V. (development groups) and C.A.I. (cooperative of
Individsires), G.E.P. (association of peasant mutual aid) and 2) cooper-
atives such as C.E.C. (cooperative of joint exploitation) and C.A.P.R.A.
(production cooperative).

 

83

property is limited but the means of production are not nationalized.
The criteria of limitation--because of the regional difference in
agricultural productivity was based not on the size but on the potential
income which should be equivalent to threefold the income of a per-
manent worker laboring in a self-managed farm.* The size of the
property could reach 150 percent of the ceiling size when the house-
hold has dependent children.95

The number of nationalized and restricted properties varies from
one estimate to another. The official figure put it at 17,000 properties
nationalized from absentee owners and 5,000 partially nationalized from
big landlords. The total land size was estimated at 632,000 hectares
and 769,000 palm trees. These results are quite limited compared to an
initial survey which predicted much higher figures for absentee owners
(34,096) and potentially limitable properties (25,904). All in all, out
of about 930,000 families who could quality for the Agrarian Revolution,

3 maximum of 150,000 are expected to benefit actually. In Amourth,

the results were as follows:

 

 

 

 

 

Table 10
Agrarian Revolution in Amourth
Land Size Number of Number of
Phase** (in Hectares) Recipients Cooperatives
First Phase 4,184 149 7
Second Phase 3,490 201 14
7,674 350 21

 

*A ceiling size corresponding to three times the income of a self-
management worker is thus determined for each region.

**The third phase is allocated an area of about 26,427 hectares.

84

but of 1,050 applicants only 350 peasants were allotted an A.R. share.
As far as the second phase is concerned, three big landowners had

their properties limited to 105 hectares and 95 properties (5,130
hectares) of absentee owners had been nationalized. The total figure
of expropriated land averages 5,594.46 hectares. The national Agrarian
Revolution sector comprised (after achievement of the first and second
phase) one-third of the cultivated area in the private sector and

about one-tenth of the active rural population. This indicates the
magnitude of the process of relation production transformation that
lies ahead of the A.R. program, beside the technical problems, social

resistance and political opposition that confronted its unfolding.

Agrarian Revolution and Class Struggle

The land reform decision was not generated by pressure from a
heightened rural class struggle between the poor peasants and the land-
owning class, for class conflicts were beclouded by perverted forms
of communalism, strong tribal relations and traditional folk religion
ideology. Basically, the decision was to solve the contradiction of
the development program rapid industrialization/stagnating agriculture
which tended to block the economic expansion of the petit bourgeoisie
and national bourgeoisie. It could be characterized as a "revolution
from above decided basically by the petit bourgeoisie. This has far
reaching implications as to the nature of the process of change. Briefly

it means: First that the process affects the "top" (state power,

85

apparatus . . .) followed by repercussions at the grassroot level.
The rhythm of local change is contingent upon the degree of organi-
zation and mobilization of the poor peasants and strength of the
landowning class. Second, the ideological and political content of
the charter as well as the means used to carry out the A.R. program
bear the imprint of the petit bourgeoisie which is by its very nature

politically inconsistent.

The Petit Bourgeoisie

 

A few remarks are in order here as to the characteristics of the
petit bourgeoisie. In Marxism, the petit bourgeoisie referred
historically to the pre-capitalist forms of small commodity production
and circulation. This class is in process of extinction (proletarian-
ization) with the expansion of capitalism in the pre-capitalist sectors.
This class is called in contemporary Marxism the traditional petit
bourgeoisie to distinguish it from "the new petit bourgeoisie," that
is the different social strata such as technocrats, bureaucrats,
service employees, professionals, intellectuals . . . which developed
with the expansion of capitalism. Some theorists, like Nicos Poulantzas,
subsume the "traditional" and "new" petit bourgeoisie in one single
class because of some formal political and ideological similarities.96

Obviously, two different social groupings structurally located in two

different modes of production could not be simply grouped in one class.

86

Erik 0. Wright97 developed the concept of contradictory locations
(between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie) to characterize the
"new petit bourgeoisie" which thus is not a fraction of the petit

bourgeoisie. The latter refers exclusively to the pre-capitalist small

 

commodity production and circulation. The error is not whether to call
these different social groupings "new" or "traditional" petit bourgeoisie
although this may induce some confusion but to subsume them in one
single class.

The "traditional" and "new" petit bourgeoisie played a dominant
role in Algeria's politics. There was a historical continuity of the
dominance of the traditional and new petit bourgeoisies from the leader-
ship of the national movement to the hegemony over the post-independence
Algerian state. Moreover, the industrialist/modernist strategy and
the emphasis on technical expertise and economism that accompanied
it tended to operate a heavy recruitment from the new petit bourgeoisie
to decision-making positions. Although members of the state power
include traditional petit bourgeois (small traders . . .), it is
basically composed of new petit gourgeois members who control the
state apparatus and economic institutions. The new petit bourgeois
fractions (technocrats, bureaucrats, army officers, intellectuals . . .)
do not constitute a politically homogeneous entity. It is divided
into two political fractions: a nationalist-populist wing whose

core elements were self defined in the 1976 National Charter as "the

87

revolutionary partriotic elements" (p. 36) and a liberal wing formed

of elements who entertain close relations with the national bourgeoisie,
the landowning class and compradore elements. Because of its economic
and social position, the petit bourgeoisie necessarily oscillates be-
tween the main antagonist classes (proletariatlbourgeoisie) and does
not have an independent consistent class project.98 This is true, how-
ever, only when the social contradictions between the bourgeoisie and
the proletariat polarize the social formation as it happened in Cuba
'and in Yemen where the petit bourgeoisie was absorbed in a proletarian
project or in Egypt where it finally fell to the bourgeoisie. In
Algeria, the non-generalization of the class conflicts resulted in

a large (relative) autonomy of the state power which gave the petit
bourgeoisie a great margin of maneuver vis a vis the main contending
classes. Henceforth, despite concessions to both the bourgeoisie,

and the laboring classes, the petit bourgeoisie still maintains a

large class autonomy.99 As a result, the petit bourgeoisie's theory
and practice manifested in the content of the charter (economist/

technicist), the nature of the agents of change (bureaucracy) and

ideology of change (national solidarity).

Agrarian Revolution and Ideology

 

The modernist-technicist ideology which pervades the theory and
practice of the hegemonic bureaucratic and technicratic petit

bourgeoisie rests on the technocratic myth that modern techniques

88

and technology constitute the solution to any social problem and

lead to socialism--a technocratic socialism. Henceforth, socialism
is deprived of its social content and of the social contradictions
that accompany it and the socialist project appears illusive in its
projected ends (social justice, national solidarity . . .) as well as
in its means, i.e., transformation of the production relations and
producers' control.

The petit bourgeoisie negates class contradictions and makes the
national revolution for the benefit of all classes. The Agrarian
Revolution is deemed a national task of solidarity between the landed
classes and the landless peasants: the landowning classes were called
upon to donate some of their lands. The notables of the regime started
the solidarity campaign by giving away their lands following the
President's speech (January 21, 1972): donations came from personal-
ities like Zohra Bitat, Belaid Abdesslam, Belhouchet and some 150
officers and non-commissioned officers of the National Popular Army
(A.N.P.). By June 1975, 2,500 donations totaling 81,000 hectares
were recorded.100 Nevertheless, the landowning class did not partici-
pate massively in the campaign and openly resisted the program.
Despite the overt class conflict, the official ideology emphasized
that "it did not intend to create class conflicts . . .[and] did not
want to pinpoint the enemies of the Revolution as it had been done

101

in other revolutions." Developing this idea on many occasions,

the President stated on July 2, 1973 that:

89

one of the great victories of our socialist revolution

is certainly the Agrarian Revolution . . . Numerous

countries have accomplished land reforms resorting

often to force and violence. In the opposite, the A.R.

in our country advances and progresses and is being

applied on the basis of solidarity between all citi-

zens . . . Thus all citizens have understood that they

have a common future and that Algeria should advance as

a nation and a whole and not as classes or individuals

or groups. The A.R. is a revolution of solidarity and

not a revolution of revenge.
Agents of Change: The Bureaucracy

Negating class conflicts and substituting for the concerned
classes (poor and landless peasants) to undertake the Agrarian Revo-
lution program, the dominant petit bourgeoisie avoided very carefully
the mobilization of the poor peasantry and emphasized the role of
the bureaucracy: state apparatus and army. The content of the
ordinance of the A.R. explicitly stresses the role of the state.
The articles of the ordinance 5 through 12 start as follows: the
state allocates, the state favors, the state insures, the state
guarantees, the state defines, the state creates, the state pre-
pares . .

The state operates through the Ministry of Agriculture and its
technical services, the wali who decides over the commune's Popular
Assembly (A.P.C.) proposals, the Party which is theoretically repre-

sented at these levels and the Army which delegates representatives

in these institutions and which provides a supervisor for every

90

commune, the officier charge de la revolution agraire. The A.P.C.
constitutes theoretically the main decision-making center in the
realization of the A.R. program.

But the fact that this instrument (the bureaucracy of the F.L.N.
and A.P.C.) is overwhelmingly dominated at the privincial and grass-
root level by the landowning classes, induced the petit bourgeoisie
to seek ways of integrating the poor and landless peasants within the
institutions to achieve the A.R. program. This resulted from the
growing resistance to the A.R. within the institutions that are
supposed to realize it. But initially and within the national solidarity
ideology, these landowning classes were curiously expected to implement
the A.R. decisions on themselves.

The struggle between the pro and anti-A.R. pervaded all the
institutions. At the top (Revolutionary Council, Party, Government),
the landowning classes had important positions. In the Revolutionary
Council, the presence of K. Ahmed (former Finance Minister and then
head of the Party, 1967-1972) who owned about 3,000 hectares,symbolized
the class alliance between the landowners and the petit bourgeoisie.102
The conflict was open since the central power had to resort to the
Army to dissuade any opposition in March 1972. The resignation . of
K. Ahmed (December 1972) transformed the balance of forces at the
summit but the provincial and local positions remained practically
under the landowners domination since no alternative channel had been

created to counterbalance their influence.

91

The Party (F.L.N.)

From "campaign of reorganization" under C. Belkaeem (1965-1967)
to "campaign of restructuration" under K. Ahmed (1967-1972), the
party failed to establish a militant organization capable of mobilizing
the masses for the national construction. The permanent crisis of
the party was deemed a "recruitment crisis and above all a qualita—
tive recruitment, [a] poverty of the ideological inspiration, [an]

inefficient propaganda, . . . compromissions (compromising of con-

103

 

science) with 'bourgeois' elements." Indeed the party remained a
moribund organization which was ironically enough busy with secondary
tasks, i.e., establishment of neighborhood committees under K. Ahmed's
direct supervision while practically absent in the implementation of
the A.R. The A.R. constituted the first single Operation where party
militants could be geared into an important practical task in contra-
distinction with the establishment of the national administrative
machinery or the industrialization program. Nevertheless, observers
reported not only the inexistence of the party in the countryside, but
more importantly resistance to the A.R. implementation as in Tiaret or
Constantine.104 The situation was summarized in the A.N.P. paper §1_
Djeich (March 1973) as follows:

multiple factors urgently command the reorganization of the

F.L.N. Its structures and methods of work must be renewed.

More travailleurs (workers) and revolutionary intellectuals

must be brought in . . . A label of revolutionary cannot be

put on all rethors of socialism . . . The party functioned

as an administrative apparatus with no political efficiency

and therefore did not play its part . . . Thereafter the risk

of a dangerous as well as threatening political emptiness for
the future.

 

92

The absence of the F.L.N. was more or less substituted for by the
student volunteers who undertook the task of explaining the A.R.
charter.

Two processes combined in initiating the student mobilization
(for the implementation of the A.R. program): First, the government's
will to re-integrate students within the country's political process
and ultimately coopte and use the student movement to further its
policies. The student union, Union Nationale des Etudiants Algeriens,
was dissolved following the students' resistance to the attempts of
the party to control its activities in 1968. And second, the student
movement (or at least its most organized elements of the Parti de

d'Avant Garde Socialiste - former Communist Party) considered the

 

A.R. program as an important task of national building and a pro-
gressive decision to be supported.* The nature of the student
volunteering which was ambiguous at first (administration tasks,
census activities, literacy agents or political commissars . . .)
became clearer when it was defined as a work of political education
around the importance of the land reform and the peasant union. The
students' tasks were primarily to vulgarize the A.R. charter provisions
and the peasant union statutes and secondarily to perform manual
tasks.

The student volunteering was institutionalized by the end of

summer, 1972, to serve as a "political auxiliary" to the other

 

*This is in cohesion with the position of the P.A.G.S., that of
"critical support" for the regime.

93

instruments of the A.R. realization. The students' work advanced the
enforcement of the A.R. provisions while uncovering the Opponents of
the A.R. Furthermore, their reports on the A.R. unfolding and their
direct relations with the President contributed to short circuit the
local and provincial authorities opponents of the A.R. program.

Nevertheless, a new restruction of the party was necessary if the
A.R. was to succeed. As the President put it (February 1973): "The
Algerian Revolution has reached a stage of development such that it
needs badly resolute support from militants who have faith in.

revolutionary principles." Although the bureaux de Kasma F.L.N.

 

(office of the F.L.N. organs at the commune's level) were renewed,
no change has yet occurred at the superior levels: elections never
took place to designate the district, department, or national
leaders and no Congress met since 1964. In Amourth, the Kasma
coordinator A.D. remained in office despite the fact that he was
involved with other influential local militants like T.B., the war
veterans' secretary in agricultural venture with grants from the

Societe Agricole de Prevoyance (S.A.P.)*. New militants--mostly

 

young teachers joined the Kasma cells but the style of work remained
the same. In an informal interview, the Kasma coordinator who was
asked about the nature of the problems discussed in the cells--

replied that these are the F.L.N. secrets not to be disclosed. To

 

*This refers to the cooperatives of privates organized in
1970-1971.

94

yet another question about his understanding of what a mass organiza-
tion is, the coordinator flatly said that organization means structuring
of people, that is, establishing files for them and providing them

with cards. No wonder that none of the local union organization (Kasma,
workers' union, women union, youth union or peasant union) works.

The organization is not regarded as born out of practice and for
practice. The activity of the local militants during the imple-
mentation for the A.R. was confined to few tasks: participation to

the extended Popular Assembly (A.P.C.E.) meetings and visits to
peasants' communities with student volunteers who explain the A.R.

charter and perform some manual tasks.

Commune's Popular Assembly (A.P.C.)

 

The commune in the official discourse is deemed the basic economic,
political and administrative cell of the Algerian society. Neverthe—
less, only its administration dimension is emphasized in practice.105
In the absence of any parliament or other representative institution,

the central power maintained its single direct contact with the

"basis" through the conference nationale des presidents d' A.P.C.

 

This conference started in February 27, 1967, as a seminar for the
676 presidents of the A.P.C. and became an annual meeting where the
central power exposes its policies and receives reports about the
A.P.C.'s activities and their problems. The meetings generally end

by the adoption of resolutions pertaining to administrative,financial

95

and economic questions. Of the latter is the agricultural question
which constitutes for most communes, the crucial problem. The
second conference (February 7-9, 1968) resolution noted "defects"

in the management of the agriculture sector, decrease of its pro-
ductivity and demanded a land reform program to whose study the
communal elected officials should be associated. The third con-
ference (February 5-9, 1969) resolution renewed the demand of a land
reform . . . The nature of this land reform is not clear but the
demand itself raises some questions. Questions like who actually
demanded the land reform and who elaborated the resolutions are not
elucidated. First, the reports of the individual communes are
synthesized in a report for the whole department (wilaya) whose
drafting is tightly supervised by the hierarchical authority. This
means that demands that are officially opposed could not filter
down.106 But once more this is to assume a politically homogeneous
authority and requires close analysis of the procedures and the
political orientation of the supervisers. Second, no information is
actually available as to the procedures and resolution drafting nor
to the political background of the authors. Nevertheless, the content
of 1968 resolutions is not politically consistent. For example, while
a land reform is demanded, the workers are paternalistically advised

to cease resorting to demands and strikes and work harder.107

96

The Commune's Popular Assembly and the Poor Peasantry

 

The Agrarian Revolution charter made the A.P.C. the central
institution in the implementation of the program, choosing to discard
proposals for the creation of special committees.108 But as the
resistances to and sabotages of the A.R. program clearly surfaced
within the A.P.C. themselves, extended A.P.C. were established on
March 16, 1972. These extended A.P.C. (A.P.C.E.) sought to associate
representatives of the local "peasantry" to the decision-making process
about nationalization/limitation of land property to counterbalance
the landowning class dominated A.P.C. The latter could not enforce
decisions of nationalization over its own members and did not enforce
the important A.R. charter provision that bars big landowners from
participating to the decisionémaking (Article 174 of the ordinance).
Now the peasants' unions which were established in 1970 and through
which the F.L.N. "structured" about 150,000 peasants, included a
majority of middle and big landowners and was unequally distributed
on the territory.109 The unions were open to all strata of the
peasantry except the landless peasantry since only the landed
peasants are more or less economically integrated to the existing
circuits. The unions were corporatist organizations and the landless
peasants have no corporate interests to defend.

In the extended A.P.C. (A.P.C.E.) which is composed of the A.P.C.

members, delegates of the party, of the War Veterans' Association, of

97

the Workers' Union, of the Women's Union, of the F.L.N. Youth Organ-
ization and of the Peasants' Union, the latter were not representative
of the poor peasant strata. The poor peasants were outnumbered.

Indeed, the official interpretation of the provisions dealing
with the quorum appertaining to the extended A.P.C. was restrictive.
The Article 6 of the Decree 72—108 of June 7, 1972, relative to the
agencies of realization of the A.R. program at the commune level
reads as follows: "The number of representatives of the local peasant
union to the extended popular communal assembly is set a:6 members,
in accordance with Article 175 of the Ordinance No. 71-73 of November 8,
1971 . . ."110

Indeed, from the first election of peasants' representatives to
the A.P.C.E. emerged "representatives" susceptible of being affected
by measures of property limitation. Henceforth, new peasant unions
were to be organized and the poor and landless peasants have to be
associated to the A.R. program if the latter is to be realized. The
process was initiated by the adoption of a project for the National
Peasants Union (U.N.P.A.) on March 22, 1972, which was to become the
F.L.N.'s rural mass organization.* The U.N.P.A. sought to re 1y on
the poor peasant strata (recipients of A.R. first phase, landless

peasants and small peasants non-affected by the A.R.--those affected

could join after the achievement of the second phase) and as an

 

*It is worth noting that although the F.L.N. had full control
over the U.N.P.A. at the commune's level (U.P.C.), its authority at
the wilaya (department) level is shared with the wali, the central
power direct representative (department executive).

98

immediate objective to replace the former representatives of the
peasantry within the A.P.C.E. The peasants' union quickly grew from
a membership of 60,000 in June 1973 to 800,000 peasants by the end

of the same year.111 This restructuring weakened relatively the
position of the landowning class within the A.P.C.E. since landowners
were excluded following a stricter application of the Article 174

of the Ordinance, which states that officials susceptible of being
affected by the A.R. decisions cannot participate in the delibera-
tions of the A.P.C.E. But the student volunteers reported as of
September 1973 that in Eastern Algeria "big landowners are in most
cases members or responsibles of the Peasant Union (U.P.)."112
Henceforth, far from controlling the operations of the A.R., the
National Union of Peasants (U.N.P.A.) emerged in the midst of the
A.R. unfolding. The U.N.P.A. was established less to wage an anti-
feudal struggle then to constitute an instrument of the petit
bourgeoisie to counterbalance the influence of the landowning class
that it could not win over to its "national solidarity" ideology.
Ironically enough, during the first Congress of the U.N.P.A. (26-29
of November, 1974), where 1,000 peasant delegates gathered, the
President announced the end of the first and second phase of the
A.R.113 The official conception of the U.N.P.A. is a corporatist

conception since ultimately all "peasants", the recipients of the

A.R., the small peasants and the (still) landless peasants, the

99

self-management workers, and the workers in the private sector to the

agrarian bourgeoisie, are entitled to its membership, Moreover,

this conception is pervaded by a strong paternalistic ideology

illustrated in the following quote from the President's declaration

to "Le Monde": "We don't have problems with our peasants, on the

contrary, we are doing everything for them."114
Henceforth, the U.N.P.A. was not strong enough to impose the

interests of the poor peasant strata and lead a consistent anti—

1atifundist struggle. Reports confirmed that in many places, poten-

tially nationalizable properties were not expropriated and that the

A.P.C.E. did not fulfill their functions.115 This is illustrated

by the official extension of the second phase period. Despite the

fact that the operations of the second phase were officially declared

terminated by June 16, 1975, a President's instruction of January 16,

1976, ordered the A.P.C.E. to establish supplementary lists of owners

to be nationalized because the overall results were regarded as limited.116

These limitations stem on the one hand from the domination of the

landowning class within the A.P.C.E., not through their physical presence

'but through their commissioned representatives and on the other hand

:from the influence of this class within the upper decision-making

(:enters. First, the A.P.C.E. tended to set a high landownership

<2eiling that benefited big landowners and to emphasize the principle

(Df propriete en indivision 3 dodge through which big landowners kept

100

their property intact. An observer noted that some of the big
landowners "lost no more than half their holdings (some of which
reached 4,000 hectares per owner).l17Student brigades volunteers
observed a strong collusion of interests of the local and provincial
officials and the local big landowners. The volunteers' report

(about western Algeria) noted the curious absence of local and
provincial officials (presidents of A.R.C.'s, coordinators of the
F.L.N. and chiefs of district) in the midst of the student volunteering
campaign* as well as the disappearance of numerous property declara-
tions of the big landowners in many communes.118 Second, the upper
decision-making centersof which the commission de recours (grievances
commission) handed back confiscated lands to their owners.119 These
problems are tightly connected with the class nature of the agencies

of change and the limited role of and weakness of the U.N.P.A. Despite
its numerical weight, the U.N.P.A. remained "absent" in numerous rural
areas or land functions as a chambre d'enregistrement.120 An observer
summarized the U.N.P.A. role writing that it seems "to be more a
container of peasants rather than a defender of their interests."

And went on to comment that "contrary to these objectives Cthose listed
by the Second Congress of the U.N.P.A. in April 1978 relative to the

political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of the U.N.P.A.

role) and others, the U.N.P.A. is not given necessary power to help

 

*The student volunteers brigades constituted the single instances
of militant control over the realization of the A.R. provisions.

101

peasants" and quoting the local U.P.C. coordinator as saying "we
have no power, all we can do is to send reports that are not looked
at."121

This reflects the situation in Amourth where the U.P.C. (communal
peasant union) of about 1,000 members strong has no power nor activities
besides bureaucratic work of report drafting. The U.P.C., according
to the commune's officials, were minimally involved in the A.R.
operations of such importance as delimitation of pr0perties on the
field. Unfortunately, it is difficult to independently verify the
validity of the statement or to study the A.P.C.E. deliberations to
make a substantiated argument. Nevertheless, the small peasants who
seek assistance from the cooperative of services and marketing (CAPCS)
have to be members of the U.P.C. On several occasions, it could be
observed in the National Bank Office (agency of the National Bank
which takes care of the assistance program) in the C.A.P.C.S. that most
of the small peasants seeking assistance (500 to 700 peasants) were
compelled to adhere to the U.P.C.,since most of the applicants were
turned down until they exhibit their U.P.C. membership card and
receipt of their payment of membership fees, which is of three
Algerian Dinars. I

The U.P.C. is not an autonomous organization of the peasants.
It is totally subordinated to the party: the leaders must be necessarily

F.L.N. members. Still, more the absence of a militant tradition--

102

in contradistinction with the working class or the student movement--
and its character as a recent superimposed structure made it more an
auxiliary agency of the F.L.N. and bureaucracy than a peasant organi-
zation. Few examples of how peasant problems are dealt with in Amourth
illustrates this point. The first example related to the important
problem of the form of cooperative to be established. Despite the

lack of a tradition of collective labor or ownership and of peasant
resistance and despite provisions of the charter which listed various
types of cooperatives, the form of cooperative chosen in Amourth

was the most elaborate, i.e., the Production Cooperative of the Agrarian
Revolution (production cooperative), based on collective ownership and
labor. The decision over the type of cooperative was not taken by

the recipients and their U.P.C., but by the A.P.C.E. and the "technical
services" of the agriculture ministry. This, however, is not a local
phenomenon since about 70 percent of all cooperatives in Algeria are

of this type and since the tendency leans toward the transformation

of other existing types into C.A.P.R.A. An observer noted that from
the 825 cooperatives agricoles d'entraide (C.A.E.C.)* established at

- the end of the first phase (July 1973), only 601 remained by December
1973.122 This voluntaristic tendency to ignore the level of peasant
consciousness and skip objectively essential stages of cooperative

development, generated problems that beside other factors led recipients

 

*C.A.E.C.: Cooperative of mutual aid.

103

to withdraw from the cooperative. Factors such as proximity of
industrial centers, initial excessive expectations, long home-
cooperative distance, low income . . . contributed to withdrawals.

By November 30, 1976, about 8,041 "withdrawals" were recorded

(4,885 for the first phase and 3,156 for the second).123 The De-
partment where Amourth is located, 609 peasants withdrew from the
cooperatives of whom 63 for Amourth, which counted 350 A.R. recipients
(18 percent). The problem was taking alarming proportions and instead
of solving the subjective and objective contributing factors, the
local authorities including the U.P.C. resorted to coercion to

keep the recipients in the cooperatives. Peasants who withdraw are
banned from working in other sectors within the commune.

Another example of peasants/U.P.C. and local authorities rela-
tionships relates to methods of "mobilization" of the peasants. On
one important event-~visit of the President in the region--recipients
of the A.R. were forced to attend the President's speech because of
threats of exclusion from the cooperatives. They were gathered by
3:00 in Amourth village and transported to B. (which is about 37
kilometers away) to welcome the President, who arrived inthe after-
noon.

Despite these critical shortcomings due to the nature of the
social forces which decided and implemented the A.R. program, that

is a petit bourgeoisie which sought to balance out its developmental

104

program but at the same time avoid an autonomous mass movement and a
sharpening class conflict, the struggle over the A.R. program delineated
a social cleavage within the Algerian society. This is illustrated

in the change of the social composition of the A.P.C., particularly

in the rural areas.

A.P.C.: The Elimination of the Landowning Class

 

As alluded to earlier, the A.P.C. and F.L.N. Kasmate (plural
of Ragga) were under dominance of the landowning class in most rural
areas and that they were not particularly enthusiastic about the A.R.
program. This led to a campaign of "renovation" of the party and the
purging of its most notorious anti-A.R. elements. This move had
repercussions on the A.P.C. since some of them were sharply criticized
and other simply dismissed as illustrated by the following declaration
of the F.L.N.: "The F.L.N. ceased to have confidence in about 90
percent of the A.P.C. Presidents of the Saida, Bechar and Tiaret

124 But all the A.P.C. could not be dismissed at once and

regions."
the tendency was toward a future stricter recruitment of the A.P.C.
members, i.e., on the communal elections of March 1975 which took
place in the midst of the struggle over the Agrarian Revolution
program. The theme of the election campaign-~"rigorous choice of

the candidates"--reflects the tendency toward the elimination of the

local notables and other propertied classes from the A.P.C. membership.

On March 30, 1975, 23,284 candidates campaigned for the 11,647 seats

105

of the 691 A.P.C. The new lists included a minority of former members
and the socio-professional composition was more "popular," i.e.,

more representative of the forces supporting the government's policies.
Overall, the candidates tended to be teachers, subordinate functionaries,
middle cadres and employees of the national corporations. The partici-

125 This is con-

pation of workers and peasants was still very limited.
firmed by an observation about the social composition of the Constantine*
A.P.C. where the candidates list included 28 teachers, 2 students, 9
employees, 13 administrative agents, 3 health employees, 1 medical
doctor, 12 employees of national corporations, 5 employees of agri-
cultural services, 4 F.L.N. and mass organizations' officials, 2
journalists, 2 technicians and 3 businessmen. The workers' and
peasants' participation is clearly non-existent.126
The general trend is thus clearly toward a petit bourgeoisie
membership, i.e., the new petit bourgeoisie created by the develop-
mental strategy which is the main social basis of the regime. In
rural areas,however, as one observer put it: "Although the economic
base of large private landowners has been weakened, they retain greater
or lesser political influence in various regions . . ."127
In Amourth, the social composition of the 1975 A.P.C. shifted

toward the new petit bourgeoisie with a majority of teachers and

employees and other strata such as small shopkeepers and middle

 

*Constantine is the metropole of Eastern Algeria with a population
averaging 300 to 350,000 inhabitants.

106

peasants. Nevertheless, the problem is much more complex since
Arsh relations are still quite strong and the F.L.N. militant credentials
are not sufficient to win an election and since most of the elected
members are from the propertied class and are to a greater or lesser
extent commissioned by their arsh's notables. The most significant
cases are those of T.C., S.L., and H.H. who are the sons of close
parents of big landowners affected by the A.R. program. Others like
M.A., R.S., B.C., or D.A. come from influential Aroush of the commune.
It is worth noting that no poor peasant or worker is member of the
assembly. But the general opinion is that the new assembly is less
"rotten" than the former ones. The "revolution form above" of the
petit bourgeoisie has reached its goals of eliminating the opponents
to its policies, i.e., the landowning class from its institutions and
insuring, so to speak, a "petit bourgeoisification" of the latter.
These changes are reflected in the working of the new institutions
and especially in the functioning of the agricultural assistance cir-

cuits within the C.A.P.C.S. (Cooperative of Services and Marketing).

The Agricultural Assistance Channels and the Poor Peasantry

Within the framework of the A.R., the Cooperative Agricole

 

Polyvalente Communal de Service (marketing and service cooperative)

 

plays a central role in the communal agriculture sector. The member-
ship is mandatory for the A.R. cooperatives and self-management farms

and voluntary for individual private farmers who must pay a membership

107

fee* to benefit technical or service assistance. About 500 to 800
smallpeasants are actually members of the C.A.P.C.S. The C.A.P.C.S.
houses the local Banque Nationale d'Algerie (National Bank) agency

which handled financing of the "traditional" since 1975-1976.

Financial Credit

 

The new circuits seek to control administratively the use of the
credits granted to the so-called "individual" sector which includes
individual recipients of the A.R., "the private owners affected by
the property limitation measure but continuing to exploit personally
or in the family framework their remaining lands" and the small
peasants non-affected by the A.R.--farming lease and sharecropping
being excluded. The tendency seems toward an emphasis over the economic
efficiency of the credit. An official document specified that credit
grant "must remain within its truly economic frame of encouragement
and stimulation for development without leaving room for a permanent
assistance mentality."128

In an attempt to control the credit use even in its minute de-
tails, the B.N.A. established files for applicants. The file has to
include:

--A certificate delivered by the A.P.C. attesting that the
applicant is a farmer.

--A certificate proving membership in the U.P.C.

 

*The fee was 15 A.D. in 1974—1975 and 10 A.D. in 1975-1976.

108

--Identification of the applicant as a physical person
(filiation . . .).

--Accurate and detailed situation of the applicant farmer.

--Estimates and results of the previous agricultural year.

--A plan of culture with estimates of charges and product
as well as financial needs taking account of self-financing
potential . . .

The second step involves a first control by the B.N.A. agent who for-

mulates a judgment based on:

--Honorableness/solvency of the applicant (by consulting lists
of indebtedness from the former S.A.P. and present C.A.P.C.S.).

--Object of the credit which must be destined to purely
economic actions.

--Possibilities of realization of the plan of culture, and

--Estimate of the amount of credit to be granted.129

Of all these conditions, the solvency criterion is of critical
importance because it is based on a social selection that excludes
the small peasantry. For 1974-1975, only 17 peasants have totally or
partially paid back their debts. Indeed, this economist conception
could lead to social problems since the small peasantry could not
survive without assistance. As long as the agrarian structures are
not completely transformed, the credit functions necessarily as a
political and social necessity. Henceforth, the conditions of solvency,
though still used as a pressure for efficiency, is dropped in practice.

The third step involves the establishment of an individual account

for every applicant recording all the operations in order to prevent

109

any diversion of the credit from "exclusively production ends."

The control is a control of expenditures through the necessary presen—
tation of bills. The credit is provided only for the following opera-
tions: buying of seeds or other plants, of fertilizers or pesticides
and payment of wages for seasonal labor force.

This bureaucratic mode of control was strongly felt by the small
peasantry because the recipients are confronted with many difficulties.
For example, the recipients have to get a stub from the B.N.A. agency
located in the District Center, which is 40 kilometers away, in order
to pay for the services needed. But this requires time and money and
the coupons are generally not accepted by the privates who ask for cash
payment since the coupon payment induces charges (fare of the trip
and tax for the bill) for them. -

These bureaucratic problems could be transcended by a decentralized
system where the poor peasants could play an active role to make the
C.A.P.C.S. an efficient tool of rural development. Despite its present
problems, the C.A.P.C.S. financing circuit, in contra-distinction with
the former S.A.P. system, is not dominated by the landowning class.

The credit is managed by the bureaucratic-technocratic petit bourgeoisie
which sometimes takes advantage of its dominant position in the insti-
tutions to acquire some credits but the social composition of the
recipients shows that only few big landowners and bureaucrats benefit
from the credits, the majority being small and middle peasant. The

following table illustrates this point.

110

Table 11
Size of Property of Recipients of a Campaign Credit*
1975/76 & 1978/79

 

 

 

 

Size in Number of Recipients
Category Hectares 1975/76 1978/79 .Igggl
l O - 10 344 292 636
2 ll - 20 ' 83 140 223
3 21 - 50 21 52 73
4 51 - 100 l 5 6
5 100 & over __11_ 1 l
440 490

Source: B.N.A. of Amourth's C.A.P.C.S.

The comparison between the 1975/1976 and 1978/1979 recipients
indicates a drop in the category 0 - 10 hectares from 344 to 292 recipients
and an increase in the categories 2, 3, and 4.

The first hypothesis is that in 1975/1976 in the midst of the
unfolding of the A.R. program, peasants tend to under-estimate their
property. This could be tested through a comparison of the size property
declared by the same person for 1975/1976 and for 1978/1979. Some
cases tend to support the under-estimation hypothesis but it was
difficult to establish this fact for a sufficiently significant number

for lack of evidence.

 

*The recipients of a seeds credit numbered 612 in 1974/1975, 708
in 1975/1976.

111

Yet a second hypothesis--real absolute drop in the first category
for several reasons of which 1) the small peasants tend to favor cash
credit because the energy time and money invested to acquire a credit
are overweighed by the inefficiency of the credit use because of non-
technical assistance, and 2) solvency condition . . .--could be tested
by recording the recipients of 1975/1976 that did not apply in 1978/
1979 and compare the drops of the different categories. Once more
some cases tend to corroborate this hypothesis but limited data which
was not sufficiently systematic does not warrant validation of the
statement.

The increase of the number of applicants and recipients of the
categories 3 and 4 illustrates the growing insurance of the middle
peasantry and the non-affected big landowners that the second phase
of the A.R. program was terminated by June 1976 and they are not
threatened anymore.

In conclusion, the financing circuit of the C.A.P.C.S. is oriented
mainly toward the small peasantry: 427 out of 449 in 1975/1976 and
432 out of 490 in 1978/1979 are small peasant recipients. But the
credit as such constitutes a dimension only of the agricultural
assistance that could not be realized without technical assistance

(plough, harvest, transportation . . .).

112

Technical Assistance

 

Because of their size, which does not allow a technical accumula-
tion and an efficient material use, the small properties depend
heavily on outside technical assistance for their reproduction.
Because of the C.A.P.C.S.'s relative lack of farming machinery, the
priority supply of services to the A.R. and self-management sectors
and the search for efficient use of machinery, which necessitates a
given ceiling of the land size, the small peasantry is confronted
with a relative shortage of technical assistance from the C.A.P.C.S.
The small peasants plots are too tiny and scattered in remote areas
for the C.A.P.C.S. to efficiently use its machinery. The middle and
big landowners' properties offer better advantages for the C.A.P.C.S.
because they are larger and better located. An analysis of the
C.A.P.C.S. machinery use by the private sector for the period January -
May 1976 illustrates the monopolization of the C.A.P.C.S. technical
services by the agrarian bourgeoisie. Five to six farmers (of whom
4 are consistent users) benefited from most of the services provided
by the C.A.P.C.S. to the private sector as shown by the following

table.

113

Table 11
Machinery Use by the Private

 

Share of the

 

 

 

# of Time of Use 5 or 6 Consistent
Machine lggggg (in hours) Users
Mowing Machine 15 132 50%
Coover Croop. 9 27 80%
Dechaumeuse ll 47 70%
Dressing Machine 11 2062 90%
(Fodder Bundles)
3 Ploughshare 50 472 50%
Caterpillar Tractor 6 49 100%
Regular Plough 6 51 100%

Source: Compiled from records of the machinery supervisor at Amourth's
C.A.P.C.S.

The limited technical action of the C.A.P.C.S. within the small
peasantry sector results in a persistent technical dependence of
large sectors of the small peasantry upon the agrarian bourgeoisie
and notables who possess all the farm implements and who rent them
out to the neighboring small peasants-~of his arsh and occasionally
even to the cooperatives. Some cases seem to fit the following
pattern: The agrarian bourgeoisie because of its bureaucratic and
family relations and because of the C.A.P.C.S. efficiency orientation

uses the C.A.P.C.S. machinery on its lands at low rate prices and

114

rents out its own implements to the small peasantry whose demand

could not be fully met by the C.A.P.C.S. at higher rate prices. The
difference of rent between the C.A.P.C.S. and the private varies from
3 to 6 A.D. per hour for a tractor, for example. A relatively similar
situation was noted during the summer of 1973 by an observer130 of a
rural community at Douera near Algiers, where a 30 horse powered
tractor was rented 23 A.D. per hour by the S.A.P., l8 A.D./H by the
private owners and 13 A.D./H. by the C.A.P.C.S. The limited technical
assistance of the C.A.P.C.S. to the small peasantry could not be solely
explained by technical factors: lack of machinery (how to explain
then that the use of the existing material is monopolized by the
agrarian bourgeoisie?) or inefficient machinery use on tiny and
scattered plots. The latter argument is not valid since the problem
of efficiency could be overcome if effective socio-political organizing
of the small peasantry is realized. The small peasant communities
could introduce collective demand of services to the C.A.P.C.S.
through their alleged organ, the U.P.C. The Faoudj*, whose member-
ship consists of small peasants,could record the needs of the latter
during the sowing, plowing or harvesting season and program the
operations since the area to be worked would be large enough not to
sacrifice efficiency. Neighboring Faoudjs and mechtate (hamlets)

could coordinate thus eliminating technical obstacles to mechanical

 

*Faoudj is the basic cell of the U.P.C. The Faoudj often times
corresponds geographically to the hamlets.

115

farming and enhancing an embryonic form of a future collective cooper—
ation. The problem is thus a basically socio-political problem, i.e.,
whose interests the C.A.P.C.S. is to serve and the responsibility must
be necessarily assumed by the U.P.C. and the F.L.N. Ragga.

The Agrarian Revolution program was carried out in its minute
details by the administration bureaucracy. The concerned classes and
strata (small peasantry, landless peasantry . . .) did not play any
role in the elaboration nor in the implementation of the charter
provisions. Their involvement was marginal and accepted only to the
extent it counterbalanCed the strength of the landowning classes
within the decision-making centers and institutions. The Agrarian
Revolution was not thus a social revolution that radically trans-
formed the rural social structure but a reform conceived in a narrow
technicist-economist sense so as to play the role of outlet for
the industrial production. Nevertheless, the Agrarian Revolution
program unleashed the long time frozen social dynamics by eliminating
traditional social structures. The anti—feudal struggle is in the
process of being transcended and this is opening a new stage of class

struggle.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The revolutionary decolonization_and the mass mobilization that
Algeria experienced in the period 1962-1964 did not translate into a
global restructuration of the existing social system. The absence of
viable socio-political and economic alternatives and especially
the absence of a politically-ideologically and organizationally
structured party of the popular masses left the hegemony of the
traditionally dominant classes unchallenged. Subsequently, the
achievements of popular struggles, such as self-management, remained
marginal and were ultimately coopted by 1964. Despite socialist
rhetorics, the nature of the bloc of classes in power which included
the petit bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and the big landowning
class blocked any radical change until 1971, when inter-class contra-
dictions within the bloc in power shattered the class alliance by the
elimination of the landowning class. Until the mid-1970's, the rural
class structure remained unchanged and the local social, political
and economic and administrative institutions were under the control
of the landowning class and merchant class. The local popular assembly,
which was theoretically to represent the popular classes, the agri-
cultural services set up to provide technical and financial assistance
to the small peasantry were either directly or indirectly dominated by
the local notables.

116

117

Following the initiation of the land reform program in 1971,
the main trend in rural areas,as illustrated by AMOURTH, was toward
the weakening of the positions of the big landowning class within
the communes. The landowning class was eliminated from the popular
assembly whose social composition included more and more members of
the rising petit bourgeois strata which constitute the social basis
of the regime.

Although the land reform issue opened new horizons for the
development of class struggle in Algeria, the political inconsistency
of the petit bourgeoisie prevented the emergence of an autonomous
mass movement. The Agrarian Revolution was essentially a reform .
"technocratically offered and controlled, from top to bottom in its
rhythms, as well as in the procedures of its application by the admin-
istration and party apparatus."131

The conditions and land reform application-ideology of "national
solidarity," implementation and the decisions by the local and provincial
bodies that were historically dominated by the landowning class--
necessarily limited the participation of the landless and poor peasantry.
The latter were associated only to counterbalance the landowning class
which did not adopt enthusiastically as expected the "revolution of

national solidarity." The subsequent results were quite limited as

illustrated by the Amourth's case where only 350 peasants benefited

118

out of more than a thousand applicants. Despite its restructuration,
the financial and technical assistance is still not extended to all
the small peasantry because of irrational bureaucratic organization
and absence of effective political and economic organization of the
small and poor peasantry.

The Land Reform Program has thus initiated an "anti-feudal"
struggle led by the petit bourgeoisie. But the popular rural classes'
mobilization was carefully circumscribed to a minimal degree. The
"petit bourgeoisification" of the local institution that resulted has
eliminated the contradiction between the theoretical function and the
actual functioning of the (rural) Algerian institutions, that is, the
contradiction between the administrative and political institutions
set up by the petit bourgeoisie to seat and expand its hegemony and
their actual subordination at the grassroot level to the landowning
class and traditional interests which tended to block the petit
bourgeoisie's program (especially industrialization . . .). The
stage of anti-feudal struggle is globally in the process of being
transcended.* The conditions of class coalition (petit bourgeoisie,
national bourgeoisie and marginally the working class and poor

peasantry) have been superceded by the transformation of the colonial

 

*Although scores of big landowners escaped limitation or nation-
alization at this point, the fact that the A.R. charter provides for
a constant and continuous supervision of the state and private
property, limits to a relatively great extent the margin of maneuvering
of the big landowners.

119

structures. Hence, a new stage of class struggle was in process of
development: it is characterized by a new class coalition, new
contradiction and new socio-economic and political stakes.

The transformation of the agrarian structures in the peripheral
social formations constitutes a condition sine qua non of economic
development and of the evolution of social structures. The social
dynamics of a land reform refers to a transitional process or a
tentative passage from a dominant mode of production to another or
from a form to another of a same mode of production. Anti-imperialist
land reforms* in peripheral social formations have historically pro-
ceeded along two paths: 1) as an element of transition from dependent
capitalism to socialism (China, Cuba . . .) and 2) as an element of
a tentative-transition from dependent capitalism to a self-centered
capitalism (Mexico . . .). Nevertheless, within the conditions of
imperialist domination, the transition of the second type has histori-
cally ended either by the reversal/blocking of the transition (Egypt,
Mexico . . .) or by the passage to socialism (Cuba . . .). The
magnitude of the social dynamics unleashed by the land reform and the
nature of the class coalition that leads the process of transition are
decisive determinants as to whether a transition or a reversal would

occur. In Algeria, the social dynamics have been contained to a large

 

*Land reforms which far from lessening the imperalist domination,
deepen it. The examples of Brazil and Iran illustrate the case of
land reforms expanding and deepening imperalist domination.

120

extent by turning the land reform into a solidarity campaign and a
technical problem. The landless and poor peasantry were poorly
organized into corporatist unions and minimally participated to the
implementation of the decisions. These forces did not experience

any political education and struggle, which constitute decisive
weapons against any counter-revolutionary forces. The bureaucratic
and technocratic petit bourgeoisie realized the land reform for them.
On the other hand, the class coalition that leads the transition-—
because of its nature (petit bourgeois strata and national bourgeoisie)--
does not offer strategically any guarantee for the achievement of the
transition.

In the rural communes, and particularly Amourth, the Agrarian
Revolution--despite its qualitative and quantitative limits--has
weakened the traditional structures and freed the small peasantry
from the big landowners' domination. Although aggh loyalty may per-
sist for still a long period, its structural foundations have been
largely eroded. In the new conditions, conflicts along class dimensions
are expected to replace tendencially factional politics. Experiences
of this transformation have been analyzed by some authors in relation
to the transformation of the agrarian structures following programs

132

of "green revolution." As a result of the land reform, the

following contradictions could be identified in Amourth:

121

1. Contradiction between the cooperateurs (cooperative members)

 

and the technocratic and bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie about important
issues such as control over the Plantation Plan, prices of agricultural
products and industrial inputs (mechanical material fertilizers . . .);

2. Contradiction between the rural bourgeoisie and rural
proletariat;

3. Contradiction between the small peasantry on the one hand and
the technocratic and bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie (over the technical
and financial assistance) and rural bourgeoisie (over renting of material,

loans and debts, etc . . .) on the other hand.

FOOTNOTES

1. Jacques Berque, "L'Idee de Classe," Cahiers Internationaux
de Sociologic, No. 38, 1965, pp. 169-184.

2. For Algeria see Ahmed Kaid, (Former Secretary of the F.L.N.)
in Contradictions de Classe et Contradictions au sein des masses, Alger,
F.L.N.: Central Information, 1971. See also Boumediene's Discours du
President Boumediene collected in three volumes.

 

3. R. Bendix and S. M. Lipsek (Eds.), Class, Status and Power,
Clencoe, Ill., 1953.

T. B. Bottomore, Classes in Modern Sociepy, New York, 1966.

R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society,
Stanford, California, 1959.

G. Lenski, Power and Privilegg, New York. 1966.

S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial
Society, Berkeley, California, 1959.

F. Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order, Praeger
Publishers, New York, 1975.

W. G. Runciman, "Class, Status and Power" in J.A. Jackson
(Ed.), Social Stratification, New York, 1968.

 

 

4. I. Wellerstain, "Class and Class Conflict in Africa," Canadian
Journal of African Studies, 7, No. 3, 1973: 375-380. ‘

5. Samir Amin, Unequal Development, Monthly Review Press, 1976,
pp. 279 and following.

 

6. This is illustrated in Egypt by the opposition to the "Open
Door Policy" (liberalization measures aiming at dismemberment of the
public sector, encouragement to foreign private investments and de-
nationalization of foreign trade) initiated by Sadat in 1971, by the
national bourgeoisie which presented petitious (signed by 120 national
corporations) outlining the dangers of this policy for the national
economy since local corporations could not compete with the inter-
national capital. See El Yassar El Arabi (Arabic Magazine), January,
1979.

 

In Algeria, the national bourgeoisie is represented in the
anti-imperialist class alliance within the state power. See J. P.
Durand, "Contradictions sociales et Alliances politiques" in A.A.N.,
1977, p. 123 and M. Lazreg Emergence of Classes in Algeria, especially
chapter on "Articulation of Class Interests."

 

122

123

7. Editors of the Review of African Political Economy, No. 3,
May-October, 1975, p. 5.

 

8. Quoted in D. Booth, "Andre Gunder Frank: An Introduction
and Appreciation" in Oxaal, 1., Tony Barnett and D. Booth, Eds.,
Beyond the Sociology of Development, London-Boston: Routledge and
Paul, 1975, pp. 50-85.

 

9. I. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania, Monthly Review Press,
1976.

 

lO. Leninin, "A Great Beginning," quoted in R. Stavenhagen,

Social Classes in Agrarian Societies, Anchor Books, 1975, p. 28.

 

11. Normal Long, "International Colonialism: The Case of South
Africa," in Beyond the Sociology of Development.

 

12. G. M. Meier in Leading Issues in Development Economics, (New
York: Oxford, 1964) and A. G. Frank in Latin America: Underdev.
or Revolution (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1969), mentioned several
dualistic theories. A classic model is found in W. W. Rostow,
The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1960), the
"Social dualism" model was developed by J. M. Bocke in Economics and
Economic Policy of Dual Societies (New York, 1953).

 

 

 

 

The "technological dualism" was emphasized by Benjamin Higgins,
Economic Development (New York, 1959, pp. 325-333) and other authors
such as R. S. Eckane in "Factor Proportions Problem in Under-developed
Areas" (American Economic Review, September, 1955). The recent
theorists of dualism are associated with the diffusion theory. For a
review of the basic tenets of this approach, see S. Bodenheimer in TE;
Ideology of Developmentalism, Sage Publications, 1971.

 

 

 

13. R. Stavenhagen in Social Classes in Agrarian Societies,
Anchor Books, New York, 1975 and A. G. Frank in op. cit., and in
World Accumulation. P. Jalee in the Pillage of the Third World,

R. Stavenhagen in "Seven Falacies about Latin America," in J. Petras
and M. Bertlin (Eds.), Latin America: Reform or Revolution.

K. Griffin, Under-development in Spanish America, London: G. Allen
and Unwin, 1969.

For relations between two sectors see: Stavenhagen (1968),
Andre G. Frank, J. D. Cockcroft and D. Johnson in Dependence and Under,
Anchor, New York, 1972, C. Gonzales, "International Colonialism and
National Development," in I. L. Horowitz and Al (Eds.), Latin American
Radicalism, New York: Vintage, 1969.

 

 

 

 

 

124

Cardeso and Faletto, "Dependencia Y Desaviollo en America
Latins," Santiago, Chile: ILPES (mimeo), D. Johnson, "Domination and
Change," mimeo, 1969.

14. T. Shanin (Ed.), Peasants and Peasant Society, Penguin Books,
1971, p. 15.

 

15. S. Ortiz, "Reflections on the Concept of Peasant Culture," in
Shanin, pp. 322-325.

16. S. W. Mintz, "A Note on the Definition of Peasantries," The
Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 1 (1), October, 1973, pp. 91-106.

17. K. Post, "Peasantization in Western Africa," in P. Gutkind
and P. Waterman, Eds., African Social Studies: A Radical Reader,
Monthly Review Press, 1977.

 

18. E. Hobsbawm, "Peasants and Politics," The Journal of Peasant
Studies, Vol. 1 (1), October, 1973, pp. 3-22.

 

19. Lenin in Development of Capitalism in Russia, quoted in
H. Alavi, "Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties," Journal of Peasant

 

 

 

Studies 1, 1, 1973, p. 27.

20. Robert Redfield (in Peasant Society and Culture) said: "In
every part of the world, generally speaking, peasantry have been a
conservative force in social change, a brake on revolution, 3 check on
that desintegration of local society which often comes with rapid
technological change." Frantz Fanon (in the Wretched of the Earth)
said: "It is clear that in the colonial countries only the peasantry
is revolutionary. It has nothing to lose and everything to gain.

The peasant, declassed and hungry, is the exploited one who first
discovers that only violence pays."

 

 

21. But as R. L. Harris (in "Marxism and the Agrarian Question
in Latin America" Latin American Perspectives, Vol. V, No. 4, Fall,
1978) put it "Marx's derogatory references regarding the peasantry
were directed at the reactionary elements of the peasantry in certain
historical situations and not the peasantry in general or in all
historical conjunctures."

 

22. Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea, Monthly Review Press,
1969.

23. H. Alavi, "Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties."

125
24. Colin Leys quoted in J. Saul's "Peasants and Revolution,"
Review of African Political Economy, #1, August-September, 1974.

25. Michel Gutelman, Structures et reformes Agraires, Paris:
Maspero, 1974.

 

26. This conception is defended by the following selected writers:

C. Leucate, K. Ammour and J. J. Moulin, La Voie Algerienne,
Paris: Maspero, 1974

M. Raffinot and J. P. Jacquemot, Le Capitalisme d'Etat
Algerien, Paris: Maspero, 1977.

G. Chaliand and J. Minces, L'Algerie Independante, Paris:
Maspero, 1972.

M. Bennove, "Algerian Peasants and National Politics," Merip
48, 1976.

P. Rousset, Emigration, Pauperisation et developpement du
Capitalism d'etat en Algerie, Editions Contradictions
Bruxelles, 1975.

 

 

 

 

 

27. Position of the Parti de la Revolution Socialiste (P.R.S.),
of Maoist tendency. Quoted in . . . J. C. Vatin and J. Leca,L'Algerie
Politigue Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques,
1975, p. 454.

 

28. C. Leucate and a1, La Yoie Alggrienne.

 

29. Mahfoud Bennoune, "National Politics and Algerian Peasantry,"
MERIP, #48, 1976, p. 24.

30. This thesis is upheld mainly by the Algerian Party of Socialist
vanguard (P.A.G.S.), former Algerian Community party (P.C.A.) and its
sympathizers. The literature on this subject is quite limited. The
basic writings representative of this current are: "Front unique ou
Parti Unique en Algerie," a pamphlet of the P.A.G.S. reproduced in La
Nouvelle Critiqpe (theoretical magazine of the French C.P. of April
1970, pp. 42-46. H. Alley (former member of the P.C.A.) in "classes
sociales et socialisme an Algeris," La Nouvelle Critique, December, 1968.
A. Akkache in Capitaux Etrangers et Liberation Economuque, Maspero Paris,
1971, J. P. Durand in "Exacerbation'des contradictions sociales et
Resserrement des Alliances politiques en Algeris," Annuaire de
l'Afrigue du Nord, CNRS, 1977.

The latter avoids the naive assumption of the socialist transi-
tion and offers very interesting analysis based on class struggle. The
non-capiatlist thesis usually assumed explicitly or implicitly by
the classical community current is absent in J. P. Durant's analysis.

The contradictory positions and orientations of the classes and strata

in power are explained as the result of a contradiction between a process
of formation of a dominant class and a process of exacerbation of social
conflicts within the Algerian formation which tend to undermine the former.

 

 

 

 

126

31. The "Parti de 1'Avantgarde Socialiste" in "Front Unique .
La Nouvelle Critique, p. 43.

 

32. "Message to President Boumediene" in La Voix du Peuple (organ
of the P.A.G.S.), November, 1971. Quoted in Vatin and Lcca, p. 411.
The call for an anti-imperalist front was renewed in 1975 by the
First Secretary of the P.A.G.S. in "From Liberation Front to Construction
Front," in World Marxist Review, January, 1975, and in an official
statement of the P.A.G.S. in January, 1977, translated by The African
Communist, 1977.

 

 

The P.A.G.S. regards the National Charter of 1976 as a sufficient
political and economic program for the building of a united front.
(Statement of January, 1977).

33. H. Alleg and J. P. Durand.
34. J. P. Durand in A.A.N., CNRS, 1977, p. 135.

35. Rene Galissot, "Classification Sociale en Systeme Pre-
Capitalistes: L'exemple Algerien," Cahiers du Centre d'Etudes et
de Recherches Marxistes, 60, (1968), 25-30.

"Command Feudalism" as opposed to the country-based European
model, encompasses both town and country but where the country is sub-
ordinated to the town.

 

 

36. Marnia Lazreg, The Emergence of Classes in Algeria, Westview
Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1976, pp. 33 and 35.

For a comparative analysis of the types of pre-capitalist
economic formations, see p. 31 and following.

 

37. Relationships between different fractions of a tribe have
been sometimes confused as federative relations between tribes. See
H. Kouache, "Colonialism and Rural Change," M. A. thesis, MSU, 1979,
pp. 21-24.

38. M. Bennoune, "Algerian Peasants and National Politics," MERIP,
#48, 1976, p. 13.

39. "Charte Communale," in Annuaire de L'Afrique du Nord, C.N.R.S.,
1967, p. 154, and F. d'Arcy, "L'administration communale dans 1es
communes Rurales du Departement de Constantine," in Essais sur
L'Economie de L'Algerie Nouvelle, F. d'Arch, A. Krieger and A. Marill,
Eds. Paris: P.U.F., 1965, pp. 6-7.

 

 

 

127

40. Tami Tidafi, L'Agriculture Algerienne et ses Perppectives de
Developpement, Paris: F. Maspero, 1969, pp. 28-29.

 

41. H. Gourdon, "L'Ordonnance en Algerie," Annuaire de l'Afriqu
du Nord, C.N.R.S., 1975, pp. 354-355 and W. Zartman, "L'Armee' dans
la politique Algerienne," Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord (C.N.R.S., 1967,
p. 268.)

 

 

42. F. d'Arcy, p. 52. The administrative personnel was divided
into four categories:
. Planning and decision-making positions
Managerial positions
Clerical positions
Subordinate jobs

UCW?’

43. F. d'Arcy, p. 54.
44. M. Bennoune, p. 19.
45. M. Lazreg, p. 191.

46. For some excerpts in English see Ian Clegg, Workers' Self-
Management in Algeria. Allen Lane, London, 1971. Appendix 11.

 

 

47. A prefect noted in 1963 that: "The guiding principle (of the
new reform) should aim at the disappearance of the narrow and particu-
larist tribal spirit, maintained by the former colonial administration,
by dropping any criterion pertaining to ethnic considerations. This
reform aims at the administrative centralization and should allow a
better communication between the local administration and the depart-
mental administration." Quoted in R. Descloities and R. Cornet: 517.

48. F. d'Arcy, pp. 20-21.

49. Note no. 3433 DGAPG/AG of May 27, 1963 of the Ministry of
Interior quotes in F. d'Arcy, p. 20.

50. The second delegation speciale was established by the sub
prefect on September 2, 1963. The president (K.S.) was replaced by
the prefect on September 23, 1963. The membership remained the same
(12 members). See Registre des arretes' (decree register), 1962-1969.

 

 

51. Algier's Charter (Paragraph 10 of chapter on the state) declares:
"The socialist option, the harmonious functioning of self-management,
the necessity to hand over real powers to the local collectivities imply
a radical administrative reform whose objective is to establish the
commune as the base of the political, economic and social organization
of the country."

128

52. F. d'Arcy, p. 23.

53. For a discussion of the containment of self-management/
development of national corporations and the code of investments/
national bourgeoisie, see Marnis Lazreg, Emergence of Classes in

Algeria.

 

54. Wilayistes referred to the former wilaya war commanders who
had a strong authority in their region and who favored a decentrali-
zation of power. Wilaya here refers to the military division of
Algeria during the war of liberation (5 Wilayate). After independence,
it designated the administrative division of Algeria into 15 depart-

ments (or Wilayates).

 

55. T. Zbiri--a former Wilayiste--led in December, 1967, an ,
unsuccessful coup d'etat attempt.

56. See in Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, C.N.R.S., 1967,
p. 758. -

 

57. M. Borella. Quoted in Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, C.N.R.S.,
1969, p. 293.

 

58. A provision in the "avant-projet" states that whenever the
population is not content with the candidates, the abstention could
be practiced to bring about a re-evaluation of the composition of the
F.L.N.'s list. But, this formula has been rejected by the F.L.N.

59. Notable refers to the socially recognized authority of the
Arsh. He derives his authority from the ownership of a large estate
and plays a dominant role in the Arsh's economic and social life
through money lending, food supply (wheat), agricultural material
renting. In the Arsh's social life, the notable in collaboration
with other related Arshes' leaders (Djemia) provides advice and
settles disputes. His house is usually the gathering place for the
Arsh members during religious celebrations.

60. H. Alavi, p. 44.

61. A. Cabral, Revolution in Guinea, p. 60.

 

62. Deliberation No. 6 of April 22, 1967, and deliberation No. 14171
and 15171 of April 22, 1971.

129

63. The General Assembly of the A.P.C. explained to me that before
1972 the commune relied upon private enterprises to realize construction
projects. Since 1972 the regie communale (communal enterprise) was
equipped with enough material means to achieve construction projects.
The advantages are: a better control over the realization, choice of
construction material, about 40 percent less costly time efficiency
and use of local labor force.

64. Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, C.R.N.S., 1971, p. 308.

65. In 1973 new elections took place and in June 1974, the number
of Wilayate increased from 15 to 31 following a territorial reform.

66. I. W. Zartman, "Les elections departementales Algeriennes du
25 mai 1969," in Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, C.N.R.S., 1969, p. 311.

 

67. Ibid., pp. 321-22.

68. Ian Clegg, Workers' Self-Management in Algeria, Monthly Review
Press, 1971, p. 119.

 

69. J. Leca, "Parti et Etat en Algerie," A.N.N., 1968, p. 35.

70. One year later (March 29, 1971), he denounced the presidents
and members of the A.P.C. who neglected people's affairs to solely
take care of their own in Jean Leca, "Administration Locale et pouvoir
en Algeria" in A.A.N., 1971, pp. 211-11 and 219.

71. A. Djeghloul, "Revolution Agrarie at Problemes de transition
en Algerie," in Culture et Developpement, Vol. IX, 4, 1977, pp. 590-591.

 

72. M. Bennoune, p. 16.
73. Ibid., p. 21.

74. M. Raffinot and J. P. Jacquemot, Capitalism d'Etate en Algerie,
Paris: Francoise Maspero, 1977, p. 318 and Tidafi pp. 130-135.

75. According to a 1970 UN report, the Algerian peasantry suffered
from one of the lowest and levels of caloric food intake in the world--
even worse than conditions in India. Jim Paul, "Algeria's Agrarian
Revolution," MERIP, #67, May 1978, p. 4.

76. M. Castillo, quoted in Le Coz, p. 7.

77. Algerian official's position quoted in T. Tidafi, p. 153.

130

78. A. Akkache, "La Condition du development Economique," in
Revue Alggrienne du Travail, July 14, 1972, pp. 11-19.

79. M. Raffinot and J. P. Jacquemot, p. 319.
80. Ibid., p. 319.

81. Nico Kielstra, "Agrarian Revolution in Algeria," MERIP, #67,
1978, p. 6.

82. A. Djeghloul, pp. 94-95.

83. The S.A.P. keeps the lists "secret." At one time, I was
advised by the S.A.P. director not to concern myself with statistical
data but rather focus on "real" life.

84. Census of 1973 quoted in Lars Johnsson, La Revolution Aggarie
en Algeria, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Uppsala, 1978,
p. 22. It must be noted that the census does not specify the nature
of the land (dry - irrigated . . .) included within the less than 10
hectares category.

 

 

85. The price of seeds increased from A.D. 75.75 per quintal in
1974/1975 to 93.75 in 1975/1976.

86. Nico Kielstra, p. 6 and Lars Jonsson, p. 22.

87. G. D. de Bernis in "Industries industrialisantes et contenu
d'une Politique d'Integration regionale" Economic Appliquee I.S.E.A.,
No. 3-4, 1966, pp. 415-473. "Industries Industrialisantes et Inte-
gratation economique regaionale" Economic Appliquee I.S.E.A., No. l,
1968, pp. 41-68; "Industries Industrialisantes et Option Algerienne"
Tiers Monde, No. 47, 1971, pp. 545-563. For a critique see M. Raffinot
and P. Jacquemot: 140-147 and K. Ammour, C. Leucate and J. J. Moulin:
109-115.

 

 

 

88. "Industrializing Industries" are those whose fundamental
economic function is to engerder a multiplier effect, creating new
productive activities and supplying them with sets of machinery.

Among these "industrializing industries" are the branches which supply
others with technical capital (steel, metallurgy, mechanical

branches . . .), mineral (fertilizers . . .) and organic chemistry
(rubber, synthetics . . .), emergy (non-industrializing in itself

but) engendering technical innovation at the level of inputs
(petro-chemistry) and output (drilling, pipes) and reducing the
production costs of industries consuming heavy energy.

131

89. K. Ammour, C. Leucate, and J. J. Moulin: La voie Algerienne,
Paris: Maspero, 1974, pp. 109-110.

 

90. Le Monde, January 3, 1979.
91. A.A.N., 1968, p. 341 and A.A.N. 1977, p.

92. For a discussion of these contradictions see K. Ammour and
M. Raffinot.
93. D. Bendemered, "La Consommation en Algerie,"
Developpement, September/October, 1970, pp. 13-19.

in Algerie and

 

 

94. For a discussion of the content of the charter and results
of the A.R. see Annvaire de l'Afrique du Nord since 1971, K. Ammour
and a1, M. Raffinot and P. Jacquemot, A. Benabdelkrim, M. Bonnoune,
R. V. Malder, N. Kielstra, A. Djeghloul, L. Jonsson, T. Smith . .

95. Article 65 and 67 of the Ordinance.

96. N. Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, New Left
Books, 1977.

 

97. E. 0. Wright, Class, Crisis and the State, New Left Books, 1977.

 

98. Lenin in "La catastrophe imminente et les moyens de la conjurer,‘
quoted in J.P. Durand: 132.

Amilcar Cabral (in Revolution in Guinea) talks about the
necessary suicide of the petit bourgeoisie as a dominant class:
"the petty bourgeoisie can either ally itself with imperialism and
the reactionary strata in its country to try to preserve itself as a
petty bourgeoisie or ally with workers and peasants, who must them-
selves take power or control to make the revolution [. . .]. Be-
cause if there is a revolution, then the petty bourgeoisie will have
to abandon power to the workers and the peasants and cease to exist qua
petty bourgeoisie" (p. 70). In either case, the petty bourgeoisie
is absorbed in non-petty bourgeois social projects.

 

99. J. P. Durand: 133-134.
100. A.A.N., 1972, p. 299 and Raffinot: 366.

101. President speech of 2/2/72 before the A.P.C. Presidents.

132

102. Raffinot: 366.
103. A.A.N., 1972, p. 302.
104. A.A.N., 1977, p. 44.

105. J. Leca in "Administration locale et Pouvoir politique eu
Algerie," A.A.N., 1971.

106. In 1968, at a period of self-management containment, the
reports of Oran and Tairet, for example, severely attacked self-
management and at the same time.criticized the policy of Arabization.

107. These statements converge with the attacks of the F.L.N. on
the workers' union in 1968 which was allegedly "imbued with out-of-date
principles based on a narrow concern with wages, work conditions and
class struggle."

108. Boumediene's speech to the Sixth A.P.C. Presidents' Con-
ference (February 21, 1972) in_A.A.N., 1972, p. 719. The 1970 A.R.
project provided the creation of communal committees were the landless
and small peasants would be a majority cited by Raffinot, p. 358.

109. A.A.N., 1973, pp. 363-364.

110. The President's instruction of March 12, 1972, regarded 6
representatives as a "minimum." The participation of the U.N.P.A.
members should reach 50 percent of the A.P.C. members. The instruction
equally specified that "two-thirds of the representatives of the poor
peasants should be landless peasants, those wage laborers or khammes
for whom the A.R. not only means a bettering of their lives but also
an emancipation from their actual condition." Quoted in A.A.N., 1975,
p. 352.

111. A.A.N., 1973, p. 365.

112. Student report about Eastern Algeria, (September, 1973) in
El Moudjahid, September 28, 1973.

 

113. Revolution Africaine, November 29, 1974, cited by Raffinot,
p. 358. In the same speech the President declared that the U.N.P.A.
should constitute "the real frame within which one million peasants
will be structured."

 

114. Quoted in R. Van Malder: 258.

133

115. Mohand-Tayed Benamara, "L'elargissement de l'Assemblee
popularie communale daus 1e processus de la Revolution Agraire dans
la commune de Tenes." Thesis of Political Science, University of
Algiers, 1977. Quoted in A.A.N., 1977, p. 62.

116. Quoted in Raffinot, p. 351.

117. A. Benabdelkrim, "The Agrarian Revolution in Algeria,"
World Marxist Review, October, 1976, p. 120.

 

118. Student Report about Western Algeria in El Moudjahid,
September 30, 1973.

 

119. A. Benabdelkrim, p. 121.
120. A.A.N., 1977, p. 76.

121. H. Kovache, "Colonialism and Rural Change in Algeria,"
M.A. Thesis of Sociology, 1978.

122. Raffinot, p. 343.
123. A.A.N., 1977, p. 5612

124. Revolution Africaine, (F.L.N. Central Organ) of March, 1975.
Quoted in Raffinot, p. 372.

 

125. A.A.N., 1975, p. 437. The observer noted also the low number
of female candidates.

126. R. Lambotte in Algerie, Naissance d'une societe Nouvelle,
Editions sociales Paris, 1976, footnote on pp. l7-18.

 

127. A. Benabdelkrim, p. 120.

128. Department of Agriculture Financing (D.F.A.): note de
service No. 75/38 of December 4, 1975.

129. Hierarchical centers are involved when the amount is over
20,000 A.D.

--The Director of the B.N.A. agency decides for no more
than 20,000 A.D.

--The C.T.A. executive decides for amounts between 20 and
35,000 A.D. and

--The Director of the Group of Chief of the Agricultural
Group for 35 to 50,000 A.D.

134

130. R. V. Malder, p. 261.

131. C. Lancate quoted in M. Bennoune's "Algerian Peasants and
National Politics," MERIP, #48, 1976, p. 23.

132. Cited by H. Alair in "Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties,"
p. 48.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Akkache, Ahmed. Capitaux Etrangers et Liberation Economique, Maspero
Paris: 1971.

"La Condition du Developpement Economique," Revue Algerienne
du travail, July 14, 1972.

 

Alavi, Hamza. "Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties," Journal of
Peasant Studies 1,1, 1973.

 

 

Alleg, Henri. "Classes Sociales et Socialisme en Algerie," La Nouvelle

 

Critique, December, 1968.

Amin, Samir. Unequal Development, Monthly Review Press, 1976.

Barnett, Tony and D. Booth, eds. Beyond the Sociology of Development,
London - Boston: Routledge and Paul, 1975.

Benabdelkim, A. "The Agrarian Revolution in Algeria," World Marxist
Review, October, 1976.

 

Bennoune, Mahfoud. "National Politics and Algerian Peasantry," MERIP,
#48, 1976.

Cabral, Amilcar. Revolution in Guinea, Monthly Review Press, 1969.

 

Clegg, Ian. Workers' Self-Management in Algeria, Monthly Review Press,
1971.

 

d'Arcy, F. and A. Krieger and A. Marill, eds. Essais sur L'Economie de
L'Algeris Nouvelle, P.U.F., Paris: 1965.

 

 

de Bernis, G. D. "Industries Industrialisantes et Option Algerienne,"
Tiers Monde, n: 47, 1971.

 

135

136

Djeghloul, A. "Resolution Agrarie et Problemmes de Transition en
Algeris," Cultures et Developpement, Vol. IX, 4, 1977.

 

Durand, J. P. "Exacerbation des Contradictions Sociales et Resserrement
des Allances Politiques en Algerie," Annuaire de L'Afrique
du Nord, C.N.R.S., 1977.

 

Galissot, Rene. "Classification sociale en systemes pre-capitalistes:
L'exemple Algerien," Cohiers du Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches
Marxistes, 60, 1968.

Gutelman, Michel. Structures et Reformes Agraries, Maspero: Paris,
1974.

Jonsson, Lars. La Revolution Agraire en Algerie, Scandinavian Institute
of African Studies: Uppsala, 1978.

 

Kielstra, Nico. "Agrarian Revolution in Algeria," MERIP, #67, 1978.

Lambotte, R. Algerie, Naissance d'une Societe Nouvelle, Editions
Sociales Paris: 1976.

Lazreg, Marnia. The Emergence of Classes in Algeria, Westview Press,
Boulder, Colorado, 1976.

Leucate, C., K. Ammour and J. J. Moulin. La voie Algerienne, Maspero:
Paris, 1974.

 

Malder.

Raffinot, M. and J. P. Jacquemot. Capitalism d'Etat en Algerie,
Maspero: Paris, 1977.

Shanin, T. Editor. Peasants and Peasant Society, Penguin Books, 1971.

 

137

Shwyi, I. Class Struggles in Tanzania, Monthly Review Press, 1976.

Stavenhagen, R. Social Classes in Agrarian Societies, Anchor Books,
1975.

Tidafi, Tami. L'Agriculture Algerienne et ses Perspectives de Deve10ppe-
ment, Maspero: Paris, 1969.

Vatin, J. C. and J. Leca. L'Algerie Politique, Presses de la Fondation
Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1975.

Wallerstein, I. "Class and Class Conflict in Africa," Canadian Journal
of African Studies 7, 3, 1973.

"I7'1111111111111111“